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The planning implications of the politics of cultural difference : the case of Okinawa, 1995-2000 Enokido, Keisuke 2004

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THE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICS OF C U L T U R A L DIFFERENCE: THE C A S E OF O K I N A W A , 1995-2000 by KEISUKE EN OK I DO BA, Sophia University, 1982 MCP, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L M E N T OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF D O C T O R OF PHILOSOPHY in  T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES  (Planning)  T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A  December 2004  Keisuke Enokido, 2004  11  Abstract Okinawa Prefecture is a Japanese periphery and historically became a marginalized region after it was assimilated into Japan.  In recent history, there has been an  unbalanced concentration of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, built during the 1945-1972 U.S. occupation period, when compared with those on the Japanese mainland.  This  imbalance has seriously affected the island's development, even after Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972.  Consequently, the Okinawan people have remained in a  distinctly disadvantaged status within Japanese society.  The case of a local schoolgirl's  rape by U.S. soldiers in 1995 triggered an Okinawan campaign against inequities between its own situation and that of the Japanese mainland.  Frustration increased  among Okinawans over the national government's commitment to reduce the number of military bases, leading to greater core-periphery tensions.  These tensions were  associated with the reconstruction of Okinawans' distinctive cultural identity, which caused changes in the relationship between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture.  This changing relationship, in turn, affected the strength of the power of  the identity.  This dynamic involvement of cultural identity in the relationship between  the national government and the peripheral region may be seen as indicative of the presence of 'substate nation,' a concept that has become widely prominent in the 1990s in the world. This thesis applies the notion of 'substate nation' to Okinawa in order to understand the power of 'cultural politics,' or the 'politics of recognition,' practiced by Okinawa Prefecture in seeking the national government's acknowledgement of its disadvantaged status and greater political and administrative autonomy.  The thesis poses three  questions: 1) did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa study display a cultural  identity  Ill  and engage in cultural politics?  2) were the various negotiations and 'policy forums'  held after 1995 successful? and 3) did issues of 'scale'complicate  Tokyo and Okinawa?  negotiations betM'een  To address these questions, a series of dynamic and complex  core-periphery negotiations between Okinawa and Tokyo from 1995-2000 were examined as a case study, focusing on the interplay between 'cultural polities' and the more traditional 'economic politics,' or 'politics of redistribution,' as mechanisms for countering regional disparity.  This case study explores six 'policy forums' in which  these differing types of politics unfolded between Okinawa and Tokyo concerning two major issues, the presence of U.S. military bases and regional development.  The  process of restructuring the state-substate (Japan-Okinawa) relationship through the policy forums is best understood by considering the various roles of 'actors.' The thesis finds that Okinawa's cultural politics in the period following 1995 succeeded in increasing the status of Okinawa as a substate nation in that the national government gave more recognition to the region's special economic development needs, but sidestepped the larger issue of U.S. military bases. level, at least, tensions were defused just after 1995.  At a national and prefectural  However, at the end ofthe study  period, local antagonism towards the bases remained strong, particularly among the civic body, and the relaxation of intergovernmental relations was unable to achieve long-term stability.  Economic politics remained a major issue at the local level, and became a  source of competition for cultural politics at the prefectural level.  While cultural  difference remained unaddressed in both of the administrative systems overseeing the return of the military bases and regional development, thus engendering no institutional change, the fact that it had even been considered at political levels is significant. This study of Okinawa demonstrates that the recognition of regional cultural  iv  inequalities, which was ignored by traditional 'redistribution-oriented' regional planning, is necessary to address the institutionalized inequity of core-periphery relationships. Despite the importance of recognizing disparity, this thesis also reveals that the notion of cultural equality is not necessarily entrenched or shared as a public policy objective within the periphery.  It argues that further policy discussions would be required in the  Okinawa region, and between core and periphery, to define a new planning approach.  Acknowledgements First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisory committee, Professors David Edgington, Tom Hutton, Michael Leaf, and Paul Evans.  Professor  Edgington has led me to the final chapter with enormous patience, tolerance and insightful advice throughout the long and difficult process.  Without his guidance and  knowledge about Japanese planning, I would not have been able to complete this study. Professor Hutton has not only developed my understanding of the reality of globalization and Canadian peripheries but has also always encouraged me to stay positive when I was under enormous pressure.  Professor Leaf has given me great help  in widening and deepening my theoretical thinking and understanding of planning and regions in Asia with his expert knowledge of international planning.  I have learned  from Professor Evans the dynamics of international security in East Asia, which helped me to incorporate this rather unusual factor in regional planning into this study, and has led me to challenge an interdisciplinary approach. I have received generous support from a number of people and institutions both in Japan and Canada.  Especially, I would like to thank Professor Hajime Chinen of the  University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa, who generously and thoroughly helped my fieldwork in Okinawa during August and September 2001. I also wish to thank Mr. Yuichi Takeuchi of the Institute of Behavioral Sciences (IBS) in Tokyo, who was very hospitable allowing me to use the facilities at IBS every time I visited Tokyo.  He also  invited Professors Hutton, Leaf and me to join an International Workshop, "The Okinawa Model of Sustainable Development," for planning the redevelopment of a U.S. military base, Futenma Air Station, in 1998 held in Okinawa; and for that I was given several chances to visit Okinawa.  I feel very grateful for the consistent support from  vi  my mentor, Mr. Kazumi Tada of Kankyo Sekkei Kobo, a Tokyo-based consulting firm, and the technical help in producing graphic materials from his staff, Ms. Ayako Shoda. I would like to thank Ms. Helen Cain and Ms. Linh Trinh for their editorial support.  I  also would like to acknowledge the generosity of the Centre for Japanese Research (CJR), Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia (UBC), which granted a CJR Pacific Bridge Award for my study. Finally, I wish to dedicate this work to the late Dr. Brahm Wiesman, the former director of the School of Community and Regional Planning, UBC.  I first met Dr.  Wiesman in 1995 during my study trip to a frontier region in British Columbia, Kitimat (funded by IBS), on which he was an expert, and he gave me warm and hearty support in my early days of Ph.D. program at UBC.  Vll  Table of Contents  Abstract ii Acknowledgements v Table of Contents vii List of Tables and Figures Abbreviations xii  x  Preface 1 Part I. Cultural Politics and Historical Background Chapter 1. Introduction  3  3  1.1 Background 3 1.2 The Intent of the Thesis 11 1.3 Thesis Argument 12 1.4 Research Questions 16 1.5 Methodology 22 1.6 Summary of the Thesis 45 Chapter 2. Cultural Politics: A New Dynamic between Core and Periphery 2.1 Introduction 49 2.2 Traditional Approaches to Regional Development 55 2.3 Substate Nations 69  49  2.4 Japanese Regional Development Planning System as a Foundation of Okinawa Development 83 2.5 Summary  93  Chapter 3. The Historical Background of Okinawa as a Substate Nation 3.1 Introduction  99  3.2 Historical Formation of Dependence 100 3.3 Declining Dependency on U.S. Military Bases 116 3.4 The Politics of Cultural Identity in Okinawa 1952-1995 3.5 Summary 133  122  99  Vlll  Part I I . The Negotiations for the Return of U.S. Military Bases and Regional Development  137  Chapter 4. The Context of the Case Study: The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the Futenma Air Station Proposal 4.1 Introduction  137  140  4.2 Growing External Pressures: The end of the Cold War 4.3 Challenges to the Conventional Scheme  143  150  4.4 Establishment of an International Forum to Discuss the Continuing Presence of U.S. Bases in Okinawa: SACO, 1995 4.5 Summary  158  173  Chapter 5. Restructuring of National-Prefectural Relationships: Establishment of the 1995 Consultative Body and 1996 Okinawa Policy Council  176  5.1 The 1995 Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa (Okinawa Beigun-Kichi Mondai Kyogikai)  181  5.2 The 1996 Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai) Chapter 6. Increasing National Intervention in Municipalities  206  228  6.1 The 1996 Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (Okinawa Shimada Kondankai)  Kichi Shozai Shichoson  ni Kansuru  Kondankai  228  6.2 The 1997 Nago Referendum  245  Chapter 7. Changes in the Prefectural and National Leadership, 1998  266  7.1 A New Governor of Okinawa and New Prime Minister of Japan, 1998 7.2 The Group of Eight [G8] Summit in Okinawa and Kyushu in 2000  266  290  or  IX  Part III: Did cultural politics bring about changes in the relationship between the state and a substate nation in Japan?  300  Chapter 8. Conclusions 300 8.1 Summary of the Six 'Policy Forums' 301 8.2 Findings 303 8.3 Implications for Planning Theory 320 8.4 Implications for Planning Practices in Okinawa 8.5 Future Research 336 Epilogue 338 Appendices 343 Bibliography 361  333  X  List of Tables and Figures Tables  Table 1.1 Table 4.1  Chronology of Six Forums 27 Chronological Actor/Forum Matrix  142  Figures  Figure 1.1 Figure 1.2 Figure 1.3 Figure 1.4 Figure 1.5 Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 3.1 Figure 5.1.1 Figure 5.1.2 Figure Figure Figure Figure  5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.2.1  Figure 5.2.2 Figure Figure Figure Figure  5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5 6.1.1  Figure 6.1.2 Figure Figure Figure Figure  6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 6.2.1  Figure 6.2.2 Figure 6.2.3 Figure 6.2.4  Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) 30 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual'model) 32 Actors and Roles in the Six Policy Forums 35 Negotiations in the Six Policy Forums 36 Types of Arrangements in the Six Policy Forums 37 Cultural Politics and Economic Politics 96 External and Internal Dynamics of the Emergence of Substate Nations 96 Level of Okinawa's Dependency on Transfer Payments (Public Spending/Residents' Gross Expenditure), 1972-97 112 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) 200 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases (the Consultative Body) 200 Actors and Roles in the Consultative Body 203 Negotiations in the Consultative Body 204 Special Arrangements in the Consultative Body 205 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual'model) 221 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Okinawa Policy Council) 221 Actors and Roles in the Okinawa Policy Council 223 Negotiations in the Okinawa Policy Council 226 Special Arrangements in the Okinawa Policy Council 227 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) 240 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Roundtable) 240 Actors and Roles in the Roundtable 242 Negotiations in the Roundtable 244 Special Arrangements in the Roundtable 245 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) 260 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases (the Nago Referendum) 260 Actors and Roles in the Nago Referendum 263 Negotiations in the Nago Referendum 264  XI  Figure 6.2.5 Figure 7.1.1  Special Arrangements in the Nago Referendum 265 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) 285 Figure 7.1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Gubernatorial Election) 285 Figure 7.1.3 Actors and Roles in the Gubernatorial Election 287 Figure 7.1.4 Negotiations in the Gubernatorial Election 289 Figure 7.1.5 Special Arrangements in the Gubernatorial Election 290 Figure 7.2.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) 295 Figure 7.2.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the G8 Summit) 295 Figure 7.2.3 Actors and Roles in the G8 Summit 297 Figure 7.2.4 Negotiations in the G8 Summit 298 Figure 7.2.5 Special Arrangements in the G8 Summit 299  Abbreviations  CTS  Crude Oil Transshipment Station  EU  European Union  JSP  Japan Socialist Party  LDP  Liberal Democratic Party  NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement  ODP  Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu  SACO  Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa  SCC  Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee  TVA  Tennessee Valley Authority  UN  United Nations  USCAR  United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  Keikaku)  1  Preface  The people of Okinawa Prefecture, who have continuously endured pressures related to the numerous U.S. military bases located within the island region, are distinct in their development from those in mainland Japan, and perhaps other populations around the world.  Because of Okinawa's geographical remoteness, it is not easy for mainland  Japanese to imagine the special problems of these living conditions. An incident of a schoolgirl rape involving U.S. soldiers in Okinawa in 1995 made transparent the considerable differences between the day-to-day lives of Okinawans and mainlanders. This shocking event drew my attention to the existence of long-standing social inequalities between regions across the nation of Japan.  I felt sympathy toward the  people of Okinawa, and also shame about my ignorance ofthe reality of such a situation. At the time, I was working as a Tokyo-based urban planning consultant and dealing mainly with metropolitan planning issues, and thus paid little attention to the marginalized periphery until the rape occurred.  While I became interested in the  peripheral status of Okinawa as a challenging subject for study, I had no opportunity to become involved in planning projects within the region.  At the beginning of my Ph.D. program, I was coincidently given the chance to participate in an international workshop on land use conversion planning for Futenma Air Station, a U.S. base in Okinawa, expected to be returned to Japan.  This turn of  events suddenly made Okinawa accessible, allowing me to meet a number of local people and gain exposure to a huge amount of information.  During my early trips from  Vancouver to Okinawa, I was deeply struck by not only the impacts caused by the  presence of U.S. military bases, but also the distinctness of Okinawa's geography, history, culture, economy and environment.  As I saw the actual spatial constraints imposed by U.S. military bases and talked to local people, I became aware of a large number of difficult planning issues surrounding the presence of U.S. military bases. I recognized my sympathy as a mainlander was too simplistic, and became highly interested in how the Okinawan people struggled to overcome a historical and cultural marginalized status, symbolized by the concentration of U.S. military bases. It seemed to me that the process of development was quite complex and dynamic, quite unlike anything I had witnessed in metropolitan city-regions.  I knew the case of Okinawa would make a challenging study, but chose it  as the focus of my doctoral research because I believed the work would widen my metropolitan-oriented perspective and help me to understand the structure and dynamics of the core-periphery relationship in Japan.  3  PARTI Cultural Politics and Historical Background CHAPTER 1 Introduction  1.1. Background  Since the end of World War I I in 1945, the life and economy of the people of Okinawa have been influenced directly by the persistent presence of U.S. military bases. These bases occupy one fifth of the area of the main island of Okinawa, Okinawa Honto (Appendix 1), a territory for approximately one million Okinawans and 50,000 U.S. military soldiers and their families (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998).  The life space of Okinawan people has been threatened continuously by  accidents and crimes committed by the U.S. military.  Between 1972, when Okinawa  was returned to Japan, and 1995, U.S. soldiers killed at least 12 civilians (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998) and raped at least 110 women (Yui 1999). In September 1995, three U.S. soldiers were responsible for the rape of a 12-year-old girl.  Unlike previous cases, this one quickly triggered an unprecedented public protest  by Okinawans against both the U.S. military and the Japanese government.  At the time,  85,000 Okinawan people participated in the protest, supported by members of all political ideologies and attended by all levels of local civil society expressing their anger from a public park (Appendix 2). Protesters accused the Japanese government of continuous disregard for the over-concentration of U.S. bases on Okinawa and its serious impacts on the lives of Okinawans for five decades (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1997).  This was a dramatic and new type of crisis for the national  government of Japan originating from a subnational region, Okinawa Prefecture.  4 This Okinawa case study reflects more generally on the recent changes in political relationships between nation-states, and subnational regions, changes that have posed new questions for democratic accountability and policy intervention since the 1990s (Castells 1997, Keating 1996, 1997).  This change has been represented in a growing  trend of political decentralization and the transferring of political autonomy to regional and local governments (Stohr 2001a).  In other words, many national governments have  had to address the issue of decentralization to peripheral regions and some degree of local self-determination.  More specifically, various peripheral regions in the world  inhabited by national minorities have begun to claim rights to greater regional autonomy or self-determination, and so challenge the make-up of nation-states (Kymlicka 2002).  Such peripheral regions are typically called 'substate nations' in the theoretical work of scholars such as Catt and Murphy (2002), Halperin et al. (1992), and Kymlicka (2002).  According to Kymlicka (2002: 349) substate nations are defined as:  nations which do not currently have a state in which they are a majority, but which may have had such a state in the past, or which may have sought such a state.  Kymlicka (ibid: 350) further suggests that substate nations are a type of ethnocultural national minority.  Catt and Murphy (2002: 18) state that:  The term sub-state highlights the fact that state power and institutions are primarily in the hands of a larger and more dominant nation(s) with whom these groups coexist.  5 Halperin et al. (1992: 49) are more concerned with the categories of self-determination movements and state that:  Sub-state self-determination describes the attempt of a group within an existing state to break off and form a new state or to achieve a greater degree of political or cultural autonomy within the existing state.  Despite these assertions, it should be noted that there is no single agreed upon definition of substate nations or 'substateness,' as shown by the fact that scholars identify substate nations slightly differently based on their respective definitions.  For  example, Kymlicka (2002) includes the Quebecois in Canada, Puerto Ricans in the United States, the Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom, the Catalans and Basque regions of Spain, the Flemish people in Belgium and Corsicans in France, as examples of substate nations.  On the other hand, Halperin et al. (1992) regard the Basque  Province as a trans-state and Puerto Rico as an anti-colonial nation.  Catt and Murphy  (2002) include such indigenous peoples as the Yukon First Nations in their analysis of substate nationalism, while Kymlicka (2002) distinguishes indigenous peoples from substate nations.  Guibernau (1999: 16) uses the term 'nations without state' as an  equivalent concept to substate nations.  He considers the latter:  nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states, by and large do not identify with them.  The members of  a nation lacking a state of their own regard the state containing them as alien, and maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves.  6  Generally, substate nations are characterized by the presence of distinctive minority groups of people inhabiting geographically fixed peripheral regions that are historically disadvantaged economically, culturally and/or socially relative to other regions, and by their claims for the right to some form of self-determination.  For example, in the case  of Canada, Quebec was legally awarded substantial language rights in 1977 (see, for example, Catt and Murphy 2002). own Parliament in 2000 (ibid.).  In the United Kingdom, Scotland was granted its  Substate nations are not invariable entities, but rather  are characterized by varying degrees of intensity in their demand for less subordinate relationships vis-a-vis the nation-state.  The present rise of substate nations seeking self-determination is not a new phenomenon.  For example, in the post-World War II era, a nationalist movement  flourished in Quebec and Scotland in the 1960s (Guibernau 1999).  In the 1990s, the  issues pertaining to peripheral regions as substates, inhabited by national minorities, began to attract renewed academic and political interest (Keating and McGarry 2001). This re-emergence of substate nations is considered partly a result of globalization, a position opposed to Hobsbawm's (1990) assertion that minority nationalism will disappear as nation-states become more strongly inter-connected at the global level.  As mentioned above, substate nations are also a type of subnational region (usually peripheral) and accordingly they are distinct regional units of development.  Regional  planning literature, over the past 50 years, has commented on the difficulty of development for peripheral regions (see, for example, Myrdal 1957).  This is evident in  the failure of growth pole strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, policies that aimed to  7 generate economic projects by setting up industrial infrastructure and facilities in peripheral regions as engines of growth (Friedmann and Weaver 1979, Higgins and Savoie 1997).  In short, the emergence of substate nations has presented a challenge to  existing regional development schemes and programs.  Although the peripheral region was already a key issue as early as the 1950s in the field of regional development, the issue of peripheral regions as substate nations, involving a distinct cultural as well as economic dimension, began to attract renewed academic and political interests in the 1990s (Catt and Murphy 2002, Gagnon and Tully 2001, Guibernau 1999, Halperin et al. 1992, Kymlicka 2002).  The reason for this is  that their challenge to the nation-state has had impacts on the concept of the nation-state, particularly illustrated by the division of Yugoslavia in 1992, and thus the status of peripheral regions is an issue with international importance (Halperin et al. 1992). Indeed, the affirmation of a territorial and minority identity has characterized a growing tension between the centre and periphery in many countries (Keating and McGarry 2001).  The claims of substate nations have typically concerned the elimination of  cultural inequalities, for instance the prohibition of local languages, and the demand for self-government (Kymlicka 1995).  The increase of local and territorial political power  for substates has often been supported by the reconstruction of collective identity as a minority people, which facilitates the substate challenge to the nation-state (Castells 1997).  In this thesis I argue that this linkage between territory and minority identity  has been a challenge to traditional forms of regional planning that seek the promotion of both local and national interests.  8  Okinawa may be considered as a kind of substate within Japan.  Okinawa Prefecture  is a peripheral region of Japan consisting of a chain of islands running south-westward from Kyushu to Taiwan.  Spanning 1,000 kilometres from east to west and 400 from  north to south, the prefecture includes nearly 160 islands (see Appendix 3). Okinawa was once an individual kingdom, namely the Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid tribute to China (Muller 2001).  But in 1609, the Shimazu Domain, a Japanese lord governing a  part of the Kyushu region in southern Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate, forcibly took control of the kingdom's territory. assimilation into mainland Japan.  This began the history of Okinawa's  In the process of building the modern nation-state of  Japan, the national government in Tokyo suppressed the distinctive language and local folklore religions of the Ryukyu Kingdom (one of the dialects of Japan) as uncivilized, and introduced the standard Japanese language and mainland Shinto religion instead (Millard 1999).  In addition to this historical marginalization, other factors also acted to differentiate the status of Okinawa from that of regions within the Japanese mainland.  For instance,  the U.S. military occupied the territory of Okinawa for over a quarter century after the end of the Pacific War in 1945 until its reversion to Japan in 1972, after which numerous U.S. military bases continued to be present, in particular on the main Okinawa island (Okinawa Honto).  Despite intensive investment in regional industrial infrastructure by  Japan's national government after the 1972 Reversion of Okinawa from the United States to Japan, its economic reliance on national subsidies from Tokyo, together with the presence of U.S. bases, have continued, although the dependency upon national subsidies has gradually decreased (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department  9  2001).  However, an ongoing sense of frustration within Okinawa regarding the continuous presence of U.S. bases suddenly erupted on a regional scale in 1995 after U.S. soldiers raped the afore-mentioned local girl (Angst 2003, Johnson 1999).  The Japanese  government's passive attitude toward arresting the U.S. soldiers triggered a large-scale movement against the lack of regional autonomy for governing regional affairs, including the safety of local civic life.  Subsequently, and over the next five years,  Okinawa's desire for self-determination intensified and relations between the national government and the prefecture began to change.  Intensive political negotiations over  the U.S. military bases took place, and from time to time the independence of Okinawa was discussed (Ota 2003).  Establishing Okinawa as an independent nation from Japan  has traditionally been a popular theme of public debate, for instance, in the local media (see, for example, The Ryukyu Shimpo,  15 May 1997).  However, it had never become  a serious issue in the political arena, for instance in local Okinawan elections held after the 1972 Reversion.  A n independent Okinawa political movement appeared only once  before the 1972 Reversion when the Ryukyu government (a local government established under U.S. military supervision) sent a petition to the United Nations to grant it status as an independent territory upon the termination of the U.S. occupation. By contrast, the post-1995 protests, together with initiatives taken by the prefectural government and local citizens, demonstrated an unprecedented political desire to secure stronger local autonomy (Ota 2003).  In Japan, regional development has been enacted under a centralized planning  10 structure since 1945 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s discussion of a more decentralized system of government commenced, leading to the 1995 Decentralization Promotion Law.  However, the  progress of implementing meaningful decentralization has been slow, despite the continuous demands for more autonomy by local governments (see, for example, Jain 2000).  Accordingly, Okinawa's late 1990s challenge of the central government was  carried out in the absence of any established mechanism to address the region's claim to the right of self-determination.  Historically, the redistribution of subsidies to  peripheral prefectures, such as Okinawa, was utilised as a political lever to reduce tensions between the national government and local governments (Calder 1988). However, the special challenge that Okinawa represented to the national government through its rape-related protests was not simply a matter of economic disparity but also one of cultural inequality.  This thesis poses the question, "How did the national and prefectural governments manage this conflict of their interests?"  With the background of Okinawa's distinctive  history and culture, this study will analyze the processes and outcomes of a series of negotiations between the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture between 1995 and 2000.  This period commences with the 1995 rape case and continues until  relationships between the two levels of government re-stabilized at the time of the 2000 G8 Summit, a national government hosted event held in Okinawa.  The dynamics of  these intergovernmental negotiations provide an informative example of a regional challenge to central state power affected substantially by the identity of a territorial minority, i.e. the people of Okinawa.  Overall, this study will demonstrate the  11  importance of cultural politics (the politics of recognition) in addition to economic politics (the politics of redistribution) in the relationship between the nation-state and a substate nation in Japan in the context of the ongoing transformation of global economies and global geopolitics.  1. 2. The Intent of the Thesis  The grievances of Okinawans in the post-war period have attracted the interest of academics, planning professionals and the local public in the multilevel and multidimensional negotiations between Okinawa Prefecture and the Japanese national government that took place after 1995 (see, for example, Hein and Selden 2003). However, existing studies do not systematically and empirically address the role of the distinct and evolving identity of Okinawans in their political interactions with the national government and their power to change the core-periphery relationship.  Instead,  existing studies typically emphasize the economic dimensions of Okinawa as a peripheral region.  For instance, Taira (1999) discusses the spirit of Okinawans as a  source of their desire for independence from Japan. political  economic  implications  for  However, while he explains the  Okinawans' subordination to the  national  government, he merely expresses the hope that the Okinawan spirit will lead to independence.  Consequently, the dynamics of intergovernmental tensions and  mechanisms for resolving them cannot be properly understood from his research. Further, despite abundant descriptions of the interactions between the national and prefectural governments, there is no single publication that clearly presents and analyzes the series of negotiations and political actions that took place from 1995 to 2000, and thus these remain difficult to understand comprehensively, both for mainland Japanese  12  and non-Japanese observers.  This study will therefore analyze the significance of cultural dimensions in resolving political tensions between the Japanese government and a Japanese substate nation, Okinawa Prefecture, after 1995 and up to the year 2000, when the G8 Summit was held in Okinawa.  It will examine the process of negotiations for greater local autonomy  between the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture during this period, as well as the outcomes of these negotiations.  Further, it is intended that the case study will also  serve as informative material for researchers interested in substate nations and core-periphery relationships in general, and the history of decentralization in Japan in particular.  This study intends to examine the uniqueness of the political processes between Okinawa and the Japanese government during the time period under study.  As noted,  there are many substate nations in the world such as Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia,' but this study will focus only on the Japanese case and not compare it with others in order to concentrate on providing a detailed account.  In other words, this study will not  adopt a comparative approach in order to demonstrate the 'uniqueness' of the Japanese substate nation of Okinawa, rather it will present an illustrative example of a 'distinctive type' of substate nation.  1.3. Thesis Argument Intensive Tokyo-Okinawa political negotiations over the removal of U.S. military bases began after the 1995 rape case, following an exceptionally large-scale public ' According to Halperin et al. (1992), there are 54 substate nations in the world.  13 protest against the presence of the U.S. military in Okinawa and also against the Japanese national government.  Incidents and accidents caused by U.S. soldiers and  military operations were numerous previous to 1995, but such a collective action had never before been taken.  The history of marginalization and unequal status of Okinawa  in the Japanese polity were newly re-acknowledged by the local public and addressed in a series of negotiations between the national government and local government, including both the prefecture and municipalities. The concept of self-determination defined Okinawans' enduring desire for change in their relationship with the central government and also the U.S. military.  This was a direct manifestation of the  'substateness' of Okinawa and as such it represented a crisis for the national government, which previously had tried to treat all regions of Japan in an equal and unified manner in the post-war period (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1996).  Some forms of decentralization, ranging from the federalization of unitary states to the provision of greater regional political autonomy in both unitary and federal nations, have been adopted generally in the world as a major solution to restructuring relationships between state and substate nations - for example the federalization of Belgium, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in the United Kingdom, and language and other rights given to Quebec in Canada (see Keating and McGarry 2001). Decentralization, put in its simplest form, is considered to be a policy measure to promote cultural diversity as well as other issues, including political, administrative and economic power, financial autonomy, and local democracy (Barret 2000: 34). More specifically, with respect to the rise of substate nations' claims to separation from their parent states, Cohen and Peterson (1999: 7) also mention the potential of administrative  14 decentralization to assist in holding together fragmented subnational ethnic or religious groups within national borders, especially in order to avoid human rights abuses and to secure peace and stability within countries and beyond their borders.  From a multicultural perspective, Kymlicka (1995: 71) discusses the potential of decentralization to meet the needs of national minorities with caution.  He argues that  decentralization of powers from the state to local level is not sufficient, but "the explicit recognition of national groups, through such things as language rights, land claims, an asymmetric distribution of powers, and the redrawing of political boundaries" are required.  As an example of the failure of the adoption of simplistic decentralization,  Kymlicka (1995: 71) refers to the indigenous peoples of Brazil's Amazon region whose status was further disadvantaged, because the implementation of decentralization provided non-indigenous settlers with greater power to develop the region.  Also, from  a multicultural perspective, Taylor (1992: 25) contends that the demand for recognition is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics.  In sum, these discussions suggest that political or administrative decentralization may have considerable potential to address the issues of development for national minorities if it recognizes distinctive cultural and material needs of national minorities.  Along  with seeking extra economic resources, seeking recognition is also a political action. Kymlicka (2002: 331-336) usefully distinguishes between the 'politics of redistribution' and the 'politics of recognition' elaborated by Fraser (2000). Western democracy, there are two powerful hierarchies.  He argues that in every  The first one is an economic  hierarchy that produces struggles against economic inequalities, i.e. a 'politics of  15 redistribution.'  The second, a status hierarchy that produces struggles against cultural  inequalities, i.e. a 'politics of recognition.'  Here, culture means societal values, that is,  "a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres" (Kymlicka 1995: 76).  Further,  culture tends to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language (ibid.). Kymlicka (1995: 333) argues that economic equality is not sufficient for excluded groups; cultural equality is needed for them not to be dominated by the majority, while also recognizing that these are intertwined.  Substate nations are a type of national minority that exists in relation to modern nation building (ibid: 348).  As a cultural and territorial minority group, they claim  differentiated powers and/or rights vis-a-vis other subnational regions within the state and are characterized by their claims for cultural representation and distributive fairness. Thus, in the restructuring of the relationship between the state and substate nation, demands for these two equalities, in particular the former, characterize their negotiations.  In this thesis it is argued that because of the high dependency of the Okinawan economy upon subsidies and transfer payments from the national government, and income from U.S. bases to a lesser extent, the 'politics of redistribution' was a major factor in maintaining a stable relationship between the national government and Okinawa.  However, I agree that the local public's and prefectural government's  protest against the national government after the 1995 rape case was spurred on by a  16  demand for the re-acknowledgement of Okinawa's marginalization and unequal status, one that went beyond the usual request for extra resources.  In their protest, economic  inequality or economic compensation per se was not a driving force.  The assumption  here is that, in this situation, it is likely that Okinawa initiated 'politics of recognition' which thus provided power to the substate nation to negotiate with the national government in order to restructure the core-periphery relationship.  This thesis aims to  illustrate how both economic and cultural inequalities were addressed in the negotiation process that occurred from 1995 to 2000, and especially the significance of the politics of recognition in these negotiations.  Overall, this thesis seeks to reveal the  opportunities and difficulties for Okinawa of commencing a 'politics of recognition' in the existing national political and administrative systems of Japan.  Okinawa, as a  distinctive type of substate nation, is an excellent case that illuminates contemporary Japanese national and local level interactions in which economic and cultural inequalities were intertwined dynamically.  In order to test this assertion, and to gauge  the significance of the 'politics of recognition,' the study looks at the roles of major actors involved in the negotiations after the 1995 protest (the national government, prefectural government and city governments, business and the public), their interests and the resulting outcomes of various 'policy forums' where the politics of recognition was raised.  1.4. Research Questions The fundamental question of this thesis is, "Did the 1995 rape case galvanize a new style of planning for Okinawa, one that incorporated Okinawan desires for autonomy and regional recognition based on their unique status within Japan?"  To answer this, I  17 will examine six specific 'policy forums' held subsequently to the 1995 rape case up until 2000, and address the following three specific questions:  (1) Before 1995, Okinawans did not pursue cultural politics or the 'politics of recognition' despite the frequent occurrences of serious crimes and accidents. The political movement that arose after 1995 was unique in the history of the structure of relationships between Okinawa and Tokyo, which following the 1972 Reversion was managed within an administrative sphere that emphasized economic redistribution rather than cultural recognition.  In the period following 1995, Okinawans mobilized their  political power to the extent that they provoked a serious reaction from the national government.  This was a distinctive process in which a wide range of local  governments, groups and citizens appeared as new actors seeking change in the existing systems of regional governance and planning.  Therefore, it is essential to understand  the roles and powers of these agencies of change for galvanizing the new style of planning.  The first question I will address is "Did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa  study display a cultural identity and engage in cultural politics?"  In order to answer  this question, I will specifically examine (a) who were the major actors involved in each 'policy forum,' and what interests and whose interests received priority? (b) what kind of actions did the various actors take in each 'policy forum,' and what effects did they have on changing the relationships between the actors involved?  This political process is characterized by the emergence of distinct individuals and groups who took action to address the existing cultural inequalities.  In particular, the  personal background and political beliefs of then Governor Masahide Ota were critical  18 to propelling changes in the relationship between core and periphery, but there were other influential actors including the U.S. government, Japanese prime ministers, and local governmental and non-governmental actors who were involved in the changes. Without examining actual actions taken by the various actors, it is difficult to understand the interplay between cultural politics and economic politics in the process of intensifying core-periphery tensions and their eventual relaxation. The focus on actual actors indicates that this study is concerned with the power of individuals and groups to change the Japanese core-periphery political and administrative structures that constrained them.  (2) "Were the various negotiations and 'policy forums' held after 1995 successful?" The processes of interactions among various actors were built mainly through a series of democratic negotiations and thus the outcomes of the processes, i.e. the beginning of a new style of planning, can be grasped by looking at the success of those negotiations. This question aims to discover whether there was substantial change in relationships between Tokyo and Okinawa after any or all of the six 'policy forums,' or was there only 'business as usual,' that is, the traditional 'politics of redistribution' or subsidy politics. This question relating to 'success' or 'what really changed' needs to be addressed from two opposing views: one from the perspective of the national government and the other from the perspective of the prefectural government.  Therefore, I will examine (a) from  the national government's point of view, "did the public forums diffuse the crisis of relations with the prefecture that the national government faced after the 1995 rape case?" (b) from Okinawa's point of view, "did the prefecture obtain any special recognition from the national government in these 'policy forums' or greater  19  autonomy?"  These questions are necessary to understand the real impacts of the interactions between the various actors on the existing hierarchical structure of the core and periphery relationship in Japan between the national government and the subnational region of Okinawa.  In particular, because negotiations were the major form of  core-periphery interactions, the relative outcomes of the six forums need to be understood.  (3) Lastly, I will examine, "Did issues of 'scale' complicate negotiations between  Tokyo and Okinawa?"  Political scientists and political philosophers, who lead research  on the status and concept of substate nations, rarely address issues of scale.  In  particular, I will examine constraints on the prefecture's policy actions in the face of both 'macro-scale' dynamics (for example global or international level) as well as 'micro -scale' dynamics (for example local municipal). In short, a substate nation as a demarcated territory is linked not only to the rest of the country but also to extranational entities beyond the nation-state boundary, and so can be susceptible to macro-scale dynamics.  On the other hand, the scale of a substate nation may be relatively small but  the society of any substate nation may not be uniform and may be divided politically by local-level interests.  Thus, it can also be susceptible to micro-scale dynamics. This  suggests that the incorporation of Okinawan desires for autonomy and regional recognition was a difficult task in the face of geographical political forces.  In the  Okinawa case study, I will examine a number of scale issues including (a) the presence of supra-national bodies, such as the U.S. military; (b) the internal north-south division  20 of interests within Okinawa Prefecture; (c) the role of Okinawa's cities; and (d) the political stance taken by different actors in Okinawa. This question is necessary to understand the relevance of global and local contingencies, outside the control of either the national or prefectural government, as well as the relevance of a pluralistic Okinawa society.  This thesis will demonstrate that Okinawa is substantially different from other substate nations that have advanced some form of decentralization. The assumption here is that the various forms of substate claims that have caused crises for national sovereignty will vary country by country.  In most other examples, some kind of formal  decentralization has occurred. For example, in Canada, the province of Quebec (a federal state) has argued for its distinct French culture and was granted special autonomy in language policies after 1977, and it continued to realize a greater independence from Canada throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Coulombe 2001). In the United Kingdom, Scotland (a unitary state) established its own parliament in 2000 (Denver et al. 2000). In Indonesia, East Timor (a post-colonial state) became formally independent on 20 May 2002 (Dunn 2003). However, in Japan in the 1990s there was (and still is) no system in place that allowed for a greater transfer of political autonomy from the centre to localities. Nevertheless, Okinawa chose to protest its unequal status (as did other substate nations around the world in the 1990s).  Okinawa's claim illustrates how the traditional method of dealing with peripheral regions outside the major metropolitan centres, i.e. economic redistribution in the form of subsidies to infrastructure and public works, became less effective during the 1990s.  21  That is, it became less effective in compensating for the unfair burden of U.S. military bases and the prolongation of an arrested Okinawan economy.  As argued above,  'recognition' is central to cultural politics (i.e. the politics of recognition) vis-a-vis economic politics (i.e. the politics of redistribution). This thesis will reveal exactly which local actors in Okinawa practiced cultural politics in seeking recognition from the centre (the central government in Tokyo), despite the fact that there was no established system to allow them any differentiated powers or rights. The study will also show how they did this and what they accomplished in the years from 1995 to 2000.  The concepts mentioned here - decentralization, substate nations and the politics of recognition - resonate with the growing emphasis on local level planning as opposed to the 'top down' centralized approaches which characterizes current planning theories and practices (Stohr 2001a).  For example, Noble et al. (1998) articulate the importance of  small-scale political communities, local solutions to local problems, participatory decision-making and democratic governance vis-a-vis the rational comprehensiveness which supported a more traditional centralized structure for planning. Along with this trend of local-oriented planning, recent planning theory and practice is characterized further by an increasing interest in marginalized groups of people, such as indigenous or aboriginal people and foreign resident migrants in society (Friedmann and Douglass 1998, Sandercock 1998a, 1998b). However, although substate nations, which combine a type of marginalized people with a particular political territory, have been studied rather intensely as a subject of Political Science, International Affairs, and Political Philosophy (for example Guibernau 1999, Halperin et al. 1992, Keating 1996), they have yet to be a sufficient focus of planning literature.  Conversely, while planning  22  theorists have recently embraced cultural politics and multicultural planning at a local level (for example Sandercock 1998a), they have not focused to any major degree on the issue of national governments and substate territories.  1.5. Methodology This study does not intend to advocate any political or partisan stance taken by specific actors in the process of negotiations between the national government and the prefectural government.  In order to maintain critical distance between the author and  subjects in the examination of events, this study draws upon an existing conceptual framework for developing neutral questions and aims to avoid biases toward actors to be studied.  Essentially, this study adopts an institutional approach proposed by Bryson  and Crosby (1996) that aims to examine public problems and issues that spill over organizational and institutional boundaries where powers are shared by wider entities including governmental and non-governmental bodies.  This is a suitable conceptual  framework for looking at the complex and dynamic interactions involving multiple actors between Tokyo and Okinawa, and within Okinawa.  This approach emphasizes  communication, decision-making, and conflict management by laws or rules in order to understand the complexity of political processes.  According to Bryson and Crosby  (ibid.), this is a way to explore the rationality of the processes of public discussions and decision-making.  Based on this established conceptual framework, this study examines  how actors communicate with each other, make decisions and resolve conflict under laws and rules.  Focusing on 'policy forums' as explained below is an application of the  institutional approach to this study of Okinawa.  In addition to the adoption of this  conceptual framework, presenting my ideas and receiving critique on them in such  23 opportunities as my prospectus defense, workshops and conferences were also effective means for assessing, and in some ways decreasing, the existence of any biases toward specific political or partisan stances in my study.  1.5.1. Single Case Study with Multiple 'Policy Forums' 1) Multiple 'Policy Forums'  In order to operationalize the entire process of interactions between the national government, the Okinawan local governmental and various non-governmental actors, and answer the research questions posed in section 1.4,1 will identify six 'policy forums' for analysis. Various actors interacted with each other in these 'policy forums' and specific arrangements were made for addressing contentious policy issues.  These six  'policy forums' took place between 1995 and 2000 and are identifiable, and suitable for more detailed analysis, because they commonly provided new opportunities to national and local governmental actors to communicate and make policy decisions on the issues of the return of U.S. military bases and/or regional development.  The 'policy forums'  also enabled communications and negotiations to take place outside the usual centre-local administrative relationships.  A focus on smaller units or 'sub-units' of analysis is useful in examining such a complex and dynamic event as this case.  Yin (1994) called this an 'embedded case  study design.' However, he pointed out that a major pitfall of research designed to analyse phenomena on a smaller scale is the failure to return to the larger unit of analysis. In order to avoid this problem, I developed common templates for analyzing each 'policy forum' (i.e. each sub-unit) shown below, and examined linkages between these  24  forums and an overall pattern of various actors interactions and outcomes.  I define 'policy forums' as officially arranged opportunities for both national and local governmental and/or non-governmental actors to address specific policy issues. In 'policy forums,' such public policy-related actions as communication and decision-making take place (Bryson and Crosby 1996).  As Bryson and Crosby (1996)  suggest, such opportunities can be either place-bound (for example meetings) or non-place-bound (for example newspapers).  As direct interactions between relevant  actors are central to my research, I focus on the former.  This focus represents my  interest in the rationality of the processes of public discussions and decision-making. Accessibility to such forums is considered fundamental in promoting inclusive political communication and thus inclusive democracy (Young 2000: 52).  The 'policy forums' reveal the representations of the specific interests of participating actors in two closely-linked issues: the return of U.S. bases and the promotion of regional development.  Both issues had been handled traditionally under  the direction of the national bureaucracy, with local actors in Okinawa playing a passive role.  These 'policy forums' were rare opportunities for Okinawa to discuss the  rearrangement of the traditional 'top down' approach to decision-making about the return of U.S. bases and regional development.  In other words, as opposed to the  standardized bureaucratic practices adopted with respect to these two policy issues, the  Note that Bryson and Crosby (1996) identify adjudication as a third public policy-related action in addition to communication and decision-making. The authors argue that these three actions are dealt with in 'forums,' 'arenas,' and 'courts' respectively in today's shared-power, no-one-in-charge, interdependent world, in which public problems and issues spill over organizational and institutional boundaries. In my case study, communication and decision-making are not always separable and courts are not a major factor.  2  25 'policy forums' provided new mechanisms to both national and Okinawan actors such as the Japanese prime minister and local prefectural governor. They revealed a range of alternative practices that were taken, and showed their capacities and limitations for addressing the two policy issues that were contested between the national government and Okinawa.  The forums addressed the common issue of the return of U.S. bases and  regional development, but were held by varying actors at different places and times from 1995 to 2000. Thus, the focus on 'policy forums' is useful to understanding the dynamics and contexts of a rather complex and nuanced political process.  I have identified the six 'policy forums' based on the existence of specific discussions and decision-making on the issues of the return of bases and regional development between the national government and the prefectural or municipal governments of Okinawa.  All of the critical policy decisions and arrangements that addressed these  issues were made in these forums.  In other words, the 'policy forums' that will be  discussed constitute the entire process of intergovernmental negotiations on these issues from 1995 to 2000.  The first 'policy forum' is the Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, established in November 1995, which directly targeted the issue of returning occupying bases.  This was a national-prefectural forum. The second is the  Okinawa Policy Council in September 1996, also a national-prefectural forum. The third is the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases established in August 1996 - a national-municipal forum. The fourth is the Nago City Referendum, and the national-local interactions that took place before and after the  26  referendum held in December 1997. This municipal vote by the communities of Nago City concerned the matter of whether or not to accept the relocation of the Futenma Air Station. In this 'policy forum,' new political linkages between the national government and the municipal government were forged as well as within the city.  The fifth is a  gubernatorial election for governor in November 1998 that reshaped the relationship between the prefectural government and Tokyo.  It involved an election but included  changes in modes of communications between Tokyo and Okinawa before and after the election.  The sixth involved national-prefectural interactions over the opening of the  G8 Summit conference in Okinawa in July 2000. This final forum was characterized by symbolic and substantial changes in the relationship between the national government and Okinawa as the result of the previous five 'policy forums.'  Hence, I argue that  over the 1995 to 2000 period a substantial shift in the Tokyo-Okinawa relationship occurred due to various actors' engagement in the politics of recognition, as defined by Kymlicka and others.  However, it should be noted that as of the year 2000, a  substantial reduction of U.S. bases had still not occurred. Table 1.1 shows the overall chronology of these six 'policy forums.'  27 Table 1.1 Chronology of Six Forums Date of Forum  November 1995  August 1996  September 1996  December 1997  November 1998  July 2000  2) Strategy for Data  Titles of Forum (1) The Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa (2) The Roundtable on the Municipalities o f Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (3) The Okinawa Policy Council  (4) The Nago City Referendum  (5) The Gubernatorial Election  (6) The G8 Summit  Analysis  To analyse the series of events in each 'policy forum,' I relied mainly on collecting qualitative data and analyzing events with multiple, explanatory templates, including various diagrams and tables shown in figures 1.1 to 1.5. These diagrams and tables do not fully represent the dynamics and complexity of real-world events.  Nonetheless,  they proved useful in analyzing various patterns, important similarities and differences between the various 'policy forums,' and, thus, facilitated my understanding of the relationships between them.  With these templates, the narrative and events of the  Okinawa case study detailed in this thesis become more comprehensible.  The first step in my analysis involved identifying 'business as usual' decision-making structures and to compare these with what actually occurred in the six 'policy forums' so  28  as to identify exactly what had changed. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 highlight the various actors at the central and local governmental levels, as well as the local non-governmental level, who were involved in specific policy issues in each 'policy forum.'  They describe briefly these actors' conventional 'business as usual' roles and  how their relationships were structured formally in terms of the flow of authority, decision-making and resources.  Thus figure 1.1 shows the hypothesized 'business as  usual' structure for standard decision-making on the return of U.S. military bases, and figure 1.2 presents a similar 'business as usual' structure for standard decision-making involved in regional development. These figures, which I refer to as 'actor/structure' diagrams, are effective in separating the two central agendas of this research, i.e. the return of U.S. bases and regional development, which were closely but ambiguously related issues.  The entire domain of the relationships is divided into central  governments (i.e. the Japanese government and the U.S. government), local governments (i.e. the prefectural government and municipal governments) and local non-governmental actors (i.e. civil society and business communities). In the context of Okinawa, local civil society implies labour unions and interest groups not tied to local or national governments.  In short, these figures show the conventional power  relationships between the various actors.  It should be noted that some actors are not connected to the others (for example the business community in figure 1.1, and civil society and the business community in figure 1.2).  This means that, while these particular actors may have had some  influence on decision-making in either policy agenda, for example, through informal political networks in the formal system of regional development planning (explained  29  more fully in chapter 2), their influence is not likely to be decisive.  Still, the purpose of  including them in these two figures is to examine the exact roles and mode of involvement of non-governmental actors in the six 'policy forums.'  In each 'policy  forum,' which will be addressed in separate sections of this thesis, these original figures will be compared with those that show the outcomes resulting from the restructuring of the power relationship. Although some overlapping occurs in the discussions and decision-making in each 'policy forum' over the return of U.S. bases and regional development (as they are closely related), each section of my case study will feature one or the other of these two important local issues.  Thus, two out of the six 'policy  forums' (the first and fourth shown in table 1.1) will feature the return of U.S. bases, and the other four policy forums (the second, third, fifth and sixth shown in table 1.1) will feature regional development issues.  30 a) The Roles of Various Actors in Decision-making over the Return of U.S. Bases  Figure 1.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model)  National Govt  Central Govts  Local Govts  Local Non-Govt  USA  H  Prefectural Govt  H  Municipal Govt  Civil Society  Business Community  ^  Routine Decision-making Lines  Source: Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University (1997)  In figure 1.1, the arrow originating from the United States shows that in the normal course of events the U.S. government had ultimate authority over and above the Japanese government in decisions about whether to retain, close and return, or relocate their bases and installations in Japan.  The arrow flowing from the Japanese  government to 'civil society' indicates that the national government had jurisdiction over notifying private individual landowners in Okinawa of the return of their properties from the U.S. military.  It should be noted that the U.S. military had been allowed to use the  land exclusively for their purposes without paying rent; it was the Japanese government that had paid rent at an officially guaranteed rate to affected landowners on a case-by-case basis. Between the national government and 'civil society,' two short  31 arrows point toward the prefectural government and municipal governments. These indicate that the prefectural and municipal governments have also leased their land to some U.S. bases.  However, in terms of the number and area, as well as the significance  of direct impacts on households, local individual owners have been the major stakeholders in the return of bases.  In the 'business as usual' arrangements, local stakeholders, including the prefectural government, municipal governments and private individual landowners, lacked the power to negotiate directly with the U.S. government over the return of their properties under U.S. occupation. Thus, when private landowners wanted to regain rights of use over their land, they occasionally asked the national government to negotiate on their 3  behalf with the United States, although there was no institutionalized process for responding to these requests.  There were, however, cases where the United States  decided to return a military site in piecemeal fashion. This ad hoc method of return could disadvantage affected owners wanting to reuse their returned properties but finding that the total amount of land to be returned at once was not a large enough assembly for effective redevelopment.  In such cases, the owners sometimes  approached the national government to postpone the return until the U.S. military decided to include the entirety of the land used for a base, favouring instead to continue receiving rent (see, for example, Kurima 1998). Local non-landowners also had some power to influence the issue of the return of the bases.  By contrast, businesses did not  play an important role in the negotiation process over the return of military sites or their  The main national government contact for these purposes was the Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus in Naha, Okinawa, which is a local branch of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in Tokyo. 3  32 redevelopment.  However, when the redevelopment of a returned site involved the  construction of houses, commercial buildings and land improvement, then local businesses, such as construction firms, became relevant. Their specific influences in base relocation and reversion are explained later in the thesis in a separate outcome diagram in the explanation of each 'policy forum' (from section 5.1 through to section 7.2. of chapters 5 to 7).  b) Actors Involved in Decision-making on Comprehensive Regional Development Planning  Figure 1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model)  Central Govts  National Govt  USA  Prefectural Govt  Local Govts  Local Non-Govt  Municipal Govt  Civil Society  Business Community  ^  Routine Decision-making Lines  Source: Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University (1997)  Figure 1.2 is an 'actor/structure' diagram for examining routine, business as usual decision-making in the area of Okinawa's regional development. The arrow that starts from the national government and points downward to the prefectural government and  33 further to the municipal government reveals the 'top down' approach to decision-making on regional development in Japan (discussed later in chapter 2). This hierarchical framework for development planning is part of Japan's national system and, thus, is not unique to Okinawa.  However, there are two important differences between Okinawa  and other prefectures in Japan in terms of regional development planning. First, other prefectures unilaterally formulate long-term development plans within a planning framework determined by the Comprehensive National Land Development Plans (see Tanimura and Edgington 2001), while Okinawa does not.  Instead, it is the national  government that formulates comprehensive long-term (ten year) development plans (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku)  projects for Okinawa.  that regulate and guide development programs and  It should be noted that the prefectural government is formally  responsible for drafting original development plans that the national government then approves.  However, historically the prefectural government has not led the creation of  plans but rather relied on the planning capacity of national bureaucrats.  Thus, a request  for incorporating specific programs and/or infrastructure projects in the regional plan for Okinawa represented an important change in the relationship between the prefecture and the national government.  Second, the hierarchical system is intensified in the  relationship between the national government and the prefectural government through the Okinawa Development Agency (a local subsidiary of the national government) established in 1972. The Okinawa Development Agency was assigned to manage regional development planning and financing. It is interesting to note that there is no such agency in other prefectures, with the exception of Hokkaido Prefecture (note: Hokkaido also drafts comprehensive regional development plans on its own).  4  This  The Okinawa Development Agency was established as an extra-ministerial bureau affiliated with the Prime Minister's Office (Sori-fu) in 1972 and was incorporated into a division of the Cabinet 4  34 expressly centralized planning system was created in order to streamline a budget for Okinawan infrastructure demands (for example roads and harbours) and to facilitate the re-incorporation of Okinawa into Japan in 1972.  In the process of regional development planning, local civil society and businesses were consulted on a rather selective basis (for example, university professors were often consulted).  As with the previous diagram, the 'base map' diagram of figure 1.2  (business as usual) is compared with a corresponding outcome diagram in each section dealing with a specific 'policy forum' in the 1995-2000 period (see chapters 5 to 7 later).  c) Actors and Roles, Negotiations and Special  Arrangements  My research further examines the role played by each actor and his/her involvement in both the politics of redistribution (economic politics) and that of recognition (cultural politics), with the assertion that the politics of recognition played a role equally critical to the politics of redistribution in interactions not only between Tokyo and Okinawa but also within Okinawa.  The evolution of the two types of politics is represented in three  different tables (figure 1.3, 1.4, 1.5).  These tables present the actors and their roles  (figure 1.3), negotiations (figure 1.4) and arrangements (figure 1.5) relevant to each 'policy forum.' These templates, when analyzed, present critical dimensions of each 'policy forum' but do not effectively capture the dynamics of the six forums chronologically.  Thus, in order to compensate for this weakness, I prepared a  chronological actor/forum matrix (see table 4.1 in chapter 4), which is a time-series schema that represents major actors and their interaction in these forums.  Office (Naikaku-fu) in 2001 as a result of the reorganization of government ministries in the same year.  35  Actors and Roles  Figure 1.3 Actors and Roles in the Six Policy Forums ^ \  Roles Initiators (1)  Policy Forum  Decision-makers (2)  Influential Actors (3)  \ .  From  Governmental  Governmental  Governmental  (1) Consultative  (national/local)  (national/local)  (national/local)  To  Non-governmental  Non-governmental  Non-governmental  (6) G 8 Summit  (civic/business)  (civic/business)  (civic/business)  Body  Various actors represented their own interest in each 'policy forum.'  As shown in  figures 1.1 and 1.2, actors involved in decision making over the reuse of U.S. bases and regional development issues included national and local governments (i.e. politicians and public administrators) as well as local non-governmental groups (i.e. civic groups and business communities) and the U.S. military. Figure 1.3 shows the template I used to specify which actors (the initiators) that were behind the major 'initiatives' that raised the issues of either the return of U.S. bases or regional development, or both [column (1) ].  Secondly, it specifies those who made decisions to address these issues [column  (2) ].  Thirdly, it indicates actors who had significant influence on initiators or  decision-makers [column (3)].  Further information about these actors and their roles in  each 'policy forum' is given in more detail later on in the thesis.  36 Negotiations F i g u r e 1.4 Negotiations in the Six P o l i c y F o r u m s  \  Contents \  of  Negotiation  A uthorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators  National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of  Forum Policy Forum  Resource  \ \  Self-  Resource  Formality  Self-  Distribution determinationDistribution determination  From (1) Consultative Body  Yes/No  Yes/No  Yes/No  To  Yes/No  Regular/  Formal/  Ad hoc  Informal  (6) G 8 Summit  Beyond the need to identify the specific actors involved in making decisions, there is a need to specify the role of the 'politics of recognition' in relation to the more predominant 'politics of redistribution' in each of the six 'policy forums.'  Figure 1.4  provides a template to specify content of various negotiations and the types of demands made by Okinawans, as well as to record the responses of various national actors to them. Okinawan demands and national government's responses are classified as either economic factors (for example issues of resource distribution) or cultural factors (for example issues of self-determination).  With this schema, the template attempts (by a  yes/no indicator) to reveal the relative importance of economy and culture in each of the six 'policy forums' considered later in the thesis.  In addition, the characteristics of  negotiations in each forum are examined, including the type of 'policy forum' (regular or  37 ad hoc) and the formality of each forum (formal or informal).  The former clarifies the  degree of commitment of the national government in negotiations and the latter the procedural characteristics of negotiations.  Special Arrangements  F i g u r e 1.5 Types o f A r r a n g e m e n t s i n the S i x P o l i c y F o r u m s  Types ofArrangements  \^  Contents of  (Political/Administrative/Legal)  \ . Negotiation  Transfer ofAuthorities  Policy Forum  (Pol it ical/A dm in istr alive/Legal) Beginning  End  From (1) Consultative Body To  Political/  Political/  Administrative/  Administrative/  Legal  Legal  Yes/No Type of Transfer of Power  ( 6 ) G 8 Summit  To identify specific actors from each of the six 'policy forums,' it is also necessary to examine concrete outcomes and to assess to what degree each 'policy forum' was a vehicle for responding to the post-1995 crisis.  Figure 1.5 provides a template that aims  to specify the types of arrangements made between major actors in negotiations from the beginning (1995) to the end (2000) of the period being analyzed. These arrangements fall under political, administrative and legal categories.  This figure also illustrates the  ' presence and types of transfer of power from Tokyo to Okinawa (if at all), and whether there were political or administrative or legal forms of devolution.  38 1.5.2. Data Collection  My research focused on the process of political negotiations between the Japanese national government and the U.S. government, national and local governments (i.e. prefectural and municipal) as well as local governments and non-governmental actors that had evolved over the five years from 1995 to 2000. It documented aspects of the gradual change in the Japanese national approach to decision-making resulting from these negotiations and subsequent decisions. Furthermore, this research focused on a series of actions and the decisions of various actors as they unfolded in political and administrative arenas, such as policy councils, governmental meetings, and the referendum.  Because of the significant impacts of these events on international relations, national security, the national political and administrative system, local living conditions, human rights and democracy, as well as the involvement of politicians, administrators and civil society, the details relevant to this study are contained in many forms of documentation. It was not possible for me to observe these events first hand as, for example, I could not participate in governmental meetings.  Arranging meetings with important actors was  also very difficult because, for instance, interviewing the prefectural governor was impossible without obtaining special permission.  However, this thesis aims to analyze  political actors not the psychology of political actions; consequently, personal contact was not critical to the success of the study.  I found that published documents, such as  newspaper articles, academic and professional papers and reports, and books, were more than sufficient in terms of coverage, the diversity of writers and their views, and detailing the chronological sequence of events.  Thus, I relied on these documents as  39  primary sources for my research.  There were, however, key informants who helped my understanding of the events and suggested or gave me reference materials, including their own published essays and reports, governmental documents, journal articles and books (see list of interviews conducted in Appendix 4).  These included planning consultants,  prefectural officials, and university professors.  researchers,  They were not directly involved in the  events I examined but they provided me with important contextual information. The method of data collection is set out in detail below.  1) Local Newspaper  Articles  A chronological record of the six 'policy forums' was essential for my research in order to examine the changes in the relationships between the national government and Okinawan governmental and non-governmental actors from 1995 to 2000. In terms of the consistency, continuity and detail of the coverage of events relevant to the 'policy forums,' local newspapers, such as The Okinawa Times (established in 1948) and The Ryukyu Shimpo  (established in 1893), provided extensive information readily accessible  to the public.  These two local newspapers divided the local market almost equally and  attracted a much larger readership than other local newspapers and national newspapers in Okinawa.  Thus, I chose local newspaper articles as one of the primary sources of  my research.  The main weakness of this method is, of course, media bias. Not only  individual journalists but also managing editors select the events to be reported in their papers based on editorial policy.  Their interpretations of events may also be biased and,  further, because of the limitation of space, newspaper articles cannot cover all aspects of  40 events.  Accordingly, in order to avoid as much bias as possible, I referred primarily to  these two newspapers and compared differences in their views towards critical events. I relied mainly on the articles in these two newspapers to obtain factual information on political actions and decisions (i.e. 'who did what and when') but avoided relying on them exclusively for the analyses of critical events (i.e. 'why did that happen').  However, it is problematic to merely disregard explanatory articles in these local newspapers solely for the reason that they could be biased, as there are no alternative sources that are purely non-biased.  When necessary, I adopted three approaches to  counter potential biases, in addition to comparing articles on identical events in the two local newspapers.  The first was to refer to other publications that addressed the same  event and the second was to consult key informants (discussed later in this chapter), satisfying the need for triangulation.  Still, it should be noted that my method was not  necessarily free from all bias. The third approach that aided in the understanding of specific actors' actions and decisions was the examination of articles on major events that were published at a later date. The intent of not relying only on newspaper reports from 1995 to 2000, but to also review later articles or other publications, was that the latter discussed the motivations for actions or particular conditions in which actors had to act that were perhaps not clarified at the time.  Both The Ryukyu Shimpo and The Okinawa Times have been criticized as biased towards the anti-U.S. base movement, for example, by some mainland politicians (see, for example, The Ryukyu Shimpo, 3 May 1997 and 15 September 2003, and News 23 Today's Column Nov. 4 (Wed) 1998 for arguments against this type of criticism).  41 However, my research did not use newspaper articles to obtain specific information to prove the negative impacts of the presence of U.S. bases, but rather used them to explore the diversity and range of the various actor's actions and decisions. As such, I believe that there was not much room for my research to be seriously affected by the biases of the local newspapers, even if they were present.  2) Governmental  Archives  To complement the reliance on articles as primary sources for my research, I consulted other sources especially those at the National Diet (parliament) Library in Tokyo.  Most of the events that I examined involved governmental decisions between  1995 and 2000 relating to budgeting and policy implementation as well as political speeches.  Minutes of meetings, transcripts of speeches and reports issued by  governments and held in the National Diet Library were valuable sources of different interpretations and stories that were not covered or highlighted by the newspaper articles. For my research, government documents were very useful for confirming information related to intergovernmental meetings between the United States and Japan and between Tokyo and Okinawa, by providing dates, lists of participants and the venues for the various issues discussed. Relevant historical and legal background information was also available in government documents.  Government documents include those  published by the Ryukyu government that administered Okinawa under the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), the Okinawa Development Agency, the Japan Defense Agency, the Cabinet Office, Okinawa Prefecture, and municipal governments in Okinawa.  42 Apart from government documents consulted at the National Diet Library in Tokyo, I found further relevant sources at an information centre of the Okinawa prefectural government, at the University of Ryukyus in Okinawa, the Okinawa Association in Tokyo, and from governments' official websites.  Major key words for document  searches were fukki (reversion), chiiki kaihatsu (regional development) and beigun kichi (U.S. military bases).  Although my research does not focus on regional development  and base related issues during the period of the U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1972, I collected some documents published during that period in order to better understand the history of the development of the core-periphery relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa.  3) Non-governmental  Published  Materials  Local and mainland academics and local governmental officials have published books, reports and journal articles on relevant events from various perspectives and for various purposes.  These were also useful for gathering the range of opinions and  interpretations of singular events that appeared in newspapers and government documents.  Apart from current affairs, my study reviewed books that examine  Okinawan pre-modern history and individual life stories, which proved useful in understanding the origins of the collective identities of the people of Okinawa.  I found  these books and journals in the same places that I found the government documents. However, bookstores in Okinawa were also convenient places to obtain publications not readily available in Tokyo.  The same key words I had used for government documents  were also useful to find appropriate non-governmental publications.  43 It is important to know the political stance, if any, of the author of each book in order to avoid bias as much as possible when collecting publications. Some of the major academic figures who have published books and essays are basically anti-centralists and anti-Liberal Democratic Party (the ruling and dominant political party in Japan at the national level).  In other words, they strongly support self-determination or  decentralization. Another group of scholars supports a neo-liberal or market-oriented approach to the development of Okinawa.  While the former group tends to emphasize  the need to mobilize political communities in Okinawa to build their capacity for self-determination and self-reliant development, the latter tends to emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship to reduce dependency on the national government and increase economic competitiveness. Publications from both groups were important for my research in order to understand the ideological tensions. non-Japanese authors of some English publications on Okinawa.  In addition, there are Their essays do not  necessarily provide new information, but were useful to situate Okinawa from an international perspective.  4) Key Informants  In addition to the collection of documents, I relied on my key informants, including such experts on the development of Okinawa as governmental officials, academics, businesspeople, planning consultants and researchers, journalists and non-governmental actors.  Though none of them were directly involved in the negotiations examined in  my study, they provided me information on the context and background of these political processes as experts.  My criteria for selecting key informants included native  Okinawans, Okinawans with experience living outside of Okinawa, and non-Okinawans  44 very familiar with Okinawa.  I obtained access to these informants through my participation in an international workshop on the planning of the redevelopment of a U.S. military base, Futenma Air Station, in 1998, in Okinawa.  The workshop, held by the prefectural government,  invited various local and non-local scholars and experts on urban and regional development. The sessions were held twice and appeared in the local newspapers. These workshops granted me access to the actors mentioned above in particular, prefectural planners and local academics were important and they introduced me to other local experts.  I also found experts on the development of Okinawa in Tokyo relatively  easily through research institutes, one to which I was affiliated and the other a centre of Okinawa research in Tokyo.  In order to gather as many perspectives as possible, I  chose my key informants based on the above-mentioned criteria.  The most valuable contribution of the key informants to my study was that their opinions, experiences and personal anecdotes revealed the inadequacy of a simplistic political economic view based on a dichotomy of the strong (the state) and the weak (Okinawa), and suggested a more complex cultural dimension to the political actions within Okinawa and against Tokyo.  Most had already published their opinions and  experiences and thus made the acquisition of valuable reference materials easier. The publications were useful sources for my research and I was able to expand on the collection of documents available to me because of the generosity of my informants.  45 1.6. Summary ofthe Thesis  This chapter sets the stage for discussing the potential and limitation of cultural politics (the politics of recognition) as a driving force for a substate nation to change its relationship with the nation-state and obtain greater local autonomy.  In the remainder  of part I, I examine the literature that informs the construction of a conceptual framework for the study of Okinawa as a substate nation (chapter 2). This also clarifies the 'substateness' of Okinawa with a focus on its history, culture, economy and the presence of U.S. bases (chapter 3). In chapter 2 I examine the conceptual discussions on the mechanisms, dynamics and evolution of conflicts and tensions between 'substate nations' and nation-states, and the involvement of planning in addressing regional cultural identities.  Based on the review of three sets of the literature on Western  regional planning, substate nations and the Japanese planning, this chapter discusses the absence of cultural dimensions in traditional planning approaches as well as the Japanese regional planning.  In chapter 3 I present an historical account of the  'substateness' of Okinawa within Japan in order to understand the rationality and distinctness of Okinawa's challenge to the national government in the latter half of the 1990s.  In part II, I present my case study of Okinawa's challenge to the national government and the resultant changes in this relationship between 1995 and 2000.  Chapter 4  introduces the case study and provides contextual data and other information on changes in the global political and economic dynamics, as well as the local contingency, that led to the beginning of Okinawa's political challenge to the national government and the persistent over-concentration of U.S. bases. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 compose the main  46 body of the case study with a focus on the six different 'policy forums.'  Each forum  illustrates the process of the rearrangement of relations that occurred between the national government and the prefectural government of Okinawa, centring on the two interrelated issues briefly discussed earlier: the return of U.S. bases and regional development.  The 'policy forums' are presented separately in order to encourage a  more analytical examination of the dynamic and complex core-periphery interactions.  In chapter 5 I focus on the two closely linked 'policy forums' that set the direction for the subsequent series of negotiations between the national government and the prefectural government of Okinawa.  They are the Consultative Body on the Problems  of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, established in November 1995 (section 5.1), and the Okinawa Policy Council in September 1996 (section 5.2).  The former was involved in  deciding the return of U.S. bases in Okinawa, and the latter in regional development planning.  Actions taken by the prefecture to gain recognition from the national  government on the issues of regional development, and the national government's responses and initiatives to relax state-substate tensions are presented.  Chapter 6 discusses the two 'policy forums' in which intensive interactions between the national government and local level governments (municipal governments) were taking place. One is the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases established in August 1996 (section 6.1). Non-governmental elites were recruited by the national government to play a central role in developing communications between municipal governments and the national government.  This  demonstrates an unprecedented cooperative attitude of the national government toward  47 the municipal governments, specifically in the area of economic development.  It  should be noted that this particular 'policy forum' started before the 1996 Okinawa Policy Council.  Because of the linkage of this council with the 1995 Consultative  Body, I examine them together in chapter 5. The second 'policy forum' is the Nago City Referendum conducted in December 1997. As occurred with the Roundtable forum, the national government intervened indirectly in local politics and the referendum, but in this case, with a stronger intention to steer local decisions in favour of the national government's interests in keeping the bases in Okinawa (see section 6.2 of chapter 6).  In chapter 7 I include the last two 'policy forums,' one representing the formation of a renewed relationship between the national government and Okinawa, and the other, the rearrangement of policies and practices for both the return of the bases and regional development.  In section 7.1 I focus on the gubernatorial (prefectural-level) election  held in 1998, in which Governor Ota, a key figure of protest against the national government, was replaced by neo-liberal businessman, Keiichi Inamine, who was more cooperative with the national government.  In section 7.2 I discuss the symbolic  political decision made by then Prime Minister Obuchi to designate Okinawa as a host prefecture for the G8 2000 Summit main conference.  These 'policy forums' represent  the intensification of both economic and cultural politics in distinctive ways.  Lastly, in part III (chapter 8) I present conclusions drawn from the analyses of the case study examined in part II (chapters 5 to 7). Chapter 8 comprises my research findings (section 8.2), their implications for planning theory (section 8.3), their  48  implications for planning practices in Okinawa (section 8.4), and also some suggestions for future research (section 8.5).  In section 8.2 I set forth answers to the three questions raised earlier in this chapter (see section 1.4, this chapter).  Firstly, it shows the roles and competing interests of the  actors in cultural politics, including the Okinawa prefectural governor, the prime minister, and non-governmental actors.  Secondly, it addresses the success of cultural  politics from the viewpoints of the national government and the prefectural government. Thirdly, it presents the issues of scale affecting the practice of cultural politics. In section 8.3 I reveal the implications of the case study for planning theory.  This  material relates my case study back to the three types of literature that are reviewed in chapter 2, i.e. regarding Western regional development planning, substate nations, and Japanese planning.  In section 8.4 I will discuss the implications of this case study for  actual planning practices in Okinawa.  Some essential issues for the future actions of  planners and decision-makers in Okinawa will be presented.  In the final section of this  chapter, section 8.5, I discuss possible avenues for future research, in particular in the field of comparative studies.  This case study deals with events that took place during the period between 1995 and 2000. However, Okinawa's struggle with the difficult issues of the bases and regional development has continued beyond 2000. New developments that would imply the future of the politics of recognition in Okinawa emerged in the post-case study period of 2000 to 2003. At the end of this thesis, these developments are considered in an epilogue.  49  CHAPTER 2 Cultural Politics: A New Dynamic between Core and Periphery  2.1. Introduction  This chapter examines existing conceptual discussions on the mechanisms, dynamics and evolution of conflicts and tensions between 'substate nations' and nation-states, and the involvement of planning in addressing regional cultural identities. growing importance of 'cultural politics' in core-periphery relations.  It explores the In the context of  Okinawa, it also examines to what degree cultural politics is a part of (if at all) existing Japanese regional development program.  Here, 'substate nations' are simply defined as  "nations which do not currently have a state in which they are a majority, but which may have had such a state in the past, or which may have sought such a state" (Kymlicka 2002: 349).  Self-determination sought by substates is a policy objective that has  caused conflict and tension and often continues to challenge the legitimacy of national governments (Halperin et al 1992, Inoguchi 1995, Keating 1996, Keating and McGarry 2001, Kymlicka 1995, 2002). Section 2.1 begins with an introduction of the concept of substate nations and the emergence of Okinawa as such a nation.  Based on the literature dealing with planning  theory, section 2.2 discusses the traditional planning approach to address the problem of 'peripheral regions' in the post-World War II period.  It shows the fundamental inability  of this approach to satisfy substate nations' interests in cultural inequalities compared with economic inequalities despite the evolution of planning concepts ranging from the traditional concept of development 'from above' to the alternative concept of development 'from below.'  Section 2.2 ends with the discussions on the necessity of  50 decentralization in local and regional development and for substate claims in the context of globalization.  Section 2.3 then begins to address various issues of substate nations.  First (section  2.3.1), the background of the emergence of substate nations, particularly in the 1990s, will be discussed.  Second (section 2.3.2), the nature and dynamics of the actions taken  by substate nations to promote cultural identities will be explored along with a focus on the significance of cultural politics as a driving force for substate nations economic politics.  vis-a-vis  Third (section 2.3.3), the political aspects of minority identities that  underlie the issue of cultural politics will be addressed.  Lastly (section 2.3.4), reasons  that rationalize substate nations' actions in their relationship with nation-states will be discussed, along with a focus on the legitimization of their distinctive claims for stronger local autonomy or self-determination in their negotiations with the nation-states. Section 2.4 will examine the Japanese traditional regional development system as a framework for the development of Okinawa, and its inability to accommodate Okinawa's substate claims.  Overall, this chapter places the notion of substate demands  for cultural equalities within the planning literature.  Furthermore, it builds a  conceptual framework appropriate for examining the relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa in terms of contemporary approaches to regional development planning.  In what follows, I will discuss the concept of substate nations and their significance as a planning issue. chapter.  A definition of substate nations was elaborated earlier in this  According to Kymlicka (2002), substate nations are a type of ethnocultural  national minority. Apart from substate nations, another type of national minorities,  51  defined by Kymlicka (2002), involves indigenous peoples such as the Sami in Finland, Inuit in Canada, Maori in New Zealand, and American Indians in the United States. They are peoples whose traditional lands have been overrun by settlers, and who have been forcibly, or through treaties, incorporated into states run by people they regard as foreigners (ibid: 349).  This distinction between substate nations and indigenous  peoples is an issue that has been discussed in the literature on the growing conflicts and tensions between national minorities and nation-states (Catt and Murphy 2002, Halperin et al. 1992, Kymlicka 2002).  Their discussions suggest that there is no universal  definition of the difference between the two and that different interpretations are possible. For example, Kymlicka (ibid: 350) notes that the difference between the two groups is not necessarily clear and suggests that one way to distinguish the difference in the Western context is to think of substate nations as contenders, but losers in the process of European state formation, and indigenous peoples as being isolated from that process until recently, and so retained a pre-modern way of life until well into this century. In another essay, Kymlicka (1995: 22) notes that indigenous peoples have been regarded by Europeans as being inferior or disadvantageous in terms of their capability to self-govern, and needing the paternalistic protection of their white 'superiors' (quotation mark by Kymlicka).  In sum, Kymlicka, from the viewpoint of political philosophy,  focuses on differences in the relationship between these two national minority groups and the hegemonic power of state building in order to distinguish them.  From the viewpoint of comparative politics, Catt and Murphy (2002: 7-8) acknowledge differences between the two groups in terms of economic and political capacity, demographics, and territorial concentration, but also point out the similarities  52  in terms of their self-identification as separate societies with distinctive languages, cultures and traditional forms of economic activity and governance.  Further, they  contend that the two groups articulate a similar claim to collective self-determination, anchored both in their distinctive character and in the historic occupation and sovereign control of their traditional territories.  From the viewpoint of international affairs, Halperin et al. (1992: 49-51) distinguish the two groups by focusing on differences in the contents of their claims for self-determination, although distinctions between the two are not very clear. This is because substate nations are described seemingly as a type of indigenous peoples; the latter are defined as inhabiting a geographically concentrated area that cut across international boundaries, or dispersed throughout an area, while the former are defined as being concentrated in a particular geographic area. important factors that define the two groups.  Also, ethnicity and history are  It should be noted, however, that ethnicity  is another ambiguous term (see, for example, Rupesinghe and Tishkov 1996).  A distinctive feature of the term substate nations is that it is not preoccupied with the identification of indigenous peoples or ethnicity, but rather focuses on the politicization of a territorial unit or a bounded territory within a nation-state.  In other words, the rise  of a subnational political demand for regional self-determination is exemplified in substate nations.  Indigenous peoples may be identifiable because of language, life  style, appearance, and so on, even if they do not take actions toward self-determination, but substate nations are less identifiable unless they take such actions.  Keating and  Loughlin (1997: 3) define such subnational regions as 'historical/ethnic regions.'  53  This focus on territoriality is inevitable if regional planning is to address the growing tensions between national minorities and the nation-state.  The claiming of distinct  status by substate nations within nation-states is a novel approach to the challenges faced by peripheral regions, and one that is not captured by mainstream models of regional planning.  Indeed, social inequality related to territoriality and culture is identified by  Young (2000: 91) as an imperative of political theory and practice. She argues that "[gjroups differentiated by historic connection to territories and by culture have received the most attention both in recent political theory and practical politics, for example in nationalist politics, on the one hand, and in efforts to institute multicultural policies, on the other."  Okinawans are a distinct group in Japan, distinguished from the mainland Japanese by their historical connection to the territory of Okinawa (i.e. the Ryukyu Islands), their distinctive culture, and, then different form of incorporation into the modern nation-state of Japan (see Morris-Suzuki 1998). The history of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa for the quarter century after the end of World War II, makes the process of the recovery of Okinawa from the devastations of the war unique compared to that of other mainland regions. Okinawa's minority status is symbolized today by the excessive concentration of U.S. military bases on its main island, Okinawa  Hontd.  The concept of substate nations is used to reveal important processes of negotiation in my case study; those in which Okinawa, a peripheral and historical region with a high economic dependency on the Japanese mainland economy, claimed renewed regional interests in stronger autonomy against the centralized power of the Japanese government  54  after 1995. It also illustrates the primacy of national interests over regional ones in these negotiations.  More precisely, the concept is used here as a framework for  studying the political movements towards 'self-development' and 'self-determination' that emerged in Okinawa in the 1990's.  As will be shown later in this study, these two  goals were important principles in guiding negotiations between Okinawa and the national government based in Tokyo.  It is important to note that these goals were not  new, but had gained political significance and provided Okinawa political power to demand regional interests after 1995.  In other words, these represented the emergence  of a substate nation.  Geographically and politically, most emerging substate nations are found in national peripheries.  Thus, from the viewpoint of regional planning, the relationship between  nation-states and substate nations can be understood as that of core and periphery, which has been a central topic of regional development planning since World War II (Friedmann 1988: 94).  This chapter will discuss the importance of considering cultural dimensions in the development of peripheral substate nations and regional planning.  Culture has been an  issue that has received little attention and research, as traditional regional planning has focused almost exclusively on economic dimensions.  Essentially, although its  contributive role for regional economic development is gaining attention (see Danielzyk and Wood 2001, Friedmann 1987, Higgins and Savoie 1997: 23-27), its political power to challenge the nation-state, and thus the traditional national intervention in regional development, has yet to be seriously addressed in regional planning.  55 2.2. Traditional Approaches to Regional Development 2.2.1. National 'Top Down' Initiatives  The process of the industrialization of national economies in the post-World War II period drew the overwhelming attention of national development planners to the relationship between core and periphery regions.  How to integrate economically  backward regions, remotely located from metropolitan regions, into national economic systems and promote the growth of the entire national economy has been a serious challenge to national governments (Glasson 1974).  The development of economically backward regions by national governments was first attempted as early as the 1930s in the United States.  An exemplary case was the  Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) established under the New Deal.  According to  Friedmann and Weaver (1979), this was the first comprehensive and large-scale development of an economically depressed rural region remote from metropolitan markets.  Contrary to its original aims of creating a self-sustaining resource region and  social planning on a regional scale (i.e. territorial integration), the TVA soon began to accelerate urban-industrial expansion and promoted the movement of people to the Valley's metropolitan areas (i.e. functional integration).  In the 1950s, as the economic  growth idea became the centrepiece of planning, the focus of development shifted from local and regional levels to the consideration of national and international development. Since then, the doctrine of growth centres and growth poles became dominant in regional planning (see chapter 5 in Friedmann and Weaver 1979 for a detailed account).  The 'growth pole strategy' was developed based on Francois Perroux's economic  56  theories, and this model became prominent in regional development planning in the 1960s and 1970s (Higgins and Savoie 1997 Ch.6).  Higgins and Savoie (ibid: 6)  explain that the growth pole model was applied in simplified ways based on the assumption that national governments could "push or pull some industries into some urban centre in a retarded or disadvantaged region, through construction of infrastructure, and incentives or regulations for private investment, and then sit back and watch the 'spread effects' of this investment eliminate the gap between that region and the more prosperous and dynamic ones in the same country." The objective of this model was to build an engine of industrial development and to increase the Gross National Product (GNP).  This model established a tradition in post-World War II regional development in both developed and developing countries, and various projects were designed and implemented in different countries based on its concept.  However, as a mainstream  planning approach adopted by central authorities, it was criticized as being technically deficient, and it came under serious ideological attack (see Friedmann and Weaver 1979: 175). Stohr and Taylor (1981) also found that the growth pole concept, formulated and implemented 'from above,' was not appropriate for the development of economically disadvantaged regions.  A symbolic project that disclosed the limitations of the  centralized growth pole concept was the city of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela, which started in the 1960s and centred on large steel plant and hydroelectric projects (Peattie 1987).  Various scholars analyzed the limitations of the growth pole approaches,  explaining it in terms of two major reasons. other of its implementation.  One lies in problems of its theory and the  For instance, guidelines for rural centre planning,  57 developed by the United Nations (1979: 32-33), pointed out that Perroux's original concept of the growth pole, which was adopted and subsequently developed by Hirschman (1958) and Myrdal (1957) for regional development, was not aimed at spatial development but at firms and industries.  According to the guidelines (ibid: 33), while  they agree with Perroux that "[c]ertain external economies may stimulate territorial concentration of clustering of particular industries and related activities. This does not, however, mean that the opposite is true, namely that by concentrating economic activities in specific localities accelerated growth will be generated."  Higgins and Savoie (1997: 101) pointed out that Perroux's theory was "too complex, too abstract, and too non-operational to be used as a basis for planning." Friedmann and Weaver (1979: 172-180) presented various critiques of the growth centre doctrine in detail.  In sum, these authors argued that planners applied the growth pole concept  without due rigorous analysis of its theoretical assumptions in terms of the possibility of the generation and diffusion of industrial growth, and the creation of urban centres in specific localities and conditions.  The authors also pointed out that, due to its  popularity, the application of the concept to localities had spread faster than the actual evaluation of its performance.  Hansen (1981: 36) searched for possible explanations to the limitation of the growth pole approach.  He argued that attempts to accelerate the development of lagging  regions had largely relied upon some kind of growth pole strategy, but that it had never been tried, for example, in terms of the amount of investment, the lack of the concentration of the investment, and short planning horizon.  58  Consequently, this 'top down' centralized planning approach to peripheries that focused on regional industrialization lost popularity after the economic slowdown in Anglo-American economies following the oil crisis of the mid 1970s resulting in the inability of national governments to fund large-scale infrastructure projects in peripheral regions.  Moreover, according to Friedmann and Weaver (1979: 178), the growth centre  doctrine was generally rejected by neo-Marxist planners and economists after 1974.  2.2.2. Regional and Local 'Bottom U p ' Initiatives  In the face of the limitations of the 'top down' growth pole or centre model, the necessity for alternative planning approaches to regional development began to be advocated from the late 1970s (Higgins and Savoie 1997: 167). The most distinctive conceptual challenge to the traditional 'top down' approach was expressed in the concept of development 'from below,' an alternative to that of development 'from above' that had promoted the growth pole model (Stohr and Taylor 1981).  Renewed objectives of the alternative regional development were put forward by various scholars and institutions.  For example, Friedmann (1979) proposed  'agropolitan development' that aimed at the promotion of territorial interests as a new approach to the development of economically backward and dependent peripheral regions.  The Cocoyoc Declaration in 1974 (a symposium organized by the United  Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development) appealed for the necessity of new development strategies that would satisfy basic human needs without causing environmental deterioration and the depletion of natural resources.  These alternatives mainly focused on inward-looking local  59 economic development, in particular on basic needs of regional populations. Moreover, they emphasized the significance of cultural dimensions or regional values in promoting development that is sensitive to regional specific needs rather than hastening the functional integration of regional population groups into the global economic system (Stohr 1981, Weaver 1981).  As indicated by Friedmann (1988: 9), concepts of territorial 'life space' and functional 'economic space' were alternative development approaches that emphasized territorial integration. They referred to "those ties of history and sentiment that bind the members of a geographically bounded community to one another." In other words, consideration of the territoriality of a region was advocated by alternative 'bottom up' approaches.  Yet, notwithstanding the evolution of concepts of alternative development,  their application to real localities and regions was rather limited (Sanyal 1994). Sanyal (1994) argued that the alternative development paradigm withered away despite the economic conditions of the early 1970s which brought forth the idea of alternative development.  On the contrary, Friedmann (1992: 6) asserted that, although they were  not dominant, the alternative development approaches continued to be sought as a remedy to the plight of peripheral regions. Friedmann further noted that 'sustainability' became a new focus of alternative development, especially after the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 (Brundtland 1987).  In sum, while the limitations of the traditional growth pole approach invited substantial criticism from various scholars, some of which were mentioned above, the application of the alternative development approach was rather limited, and regional  60 discrepancies between national core regions and surrounding peripheral regions remained in most developed and developing countries.  Stohr and Taylor (1981: 454)  pointed out that the internal threat of secession or devolution in any country was a reflection of the dissatisfaction with national development strategies that lacked sensitivity to regional values.  Thus, the weaknesses of both the traditional and  alternative development approaches remained a challenge to not only the promotion of national economic development, but also to the maintenance or establishment of national sovereignty.  2.2.3. Expansion of the Scales of Linkage between Local and Supranational  As stated above, the inability of development 'from above' by the central government and the necessity of that 'from below' had already been argued in the 1970s. In the 1990s, renewed discussions on the necessity of stronger local and regional initiatives for regional development gained new momentum. A central thesis of the discussions was that regions have become increasingly active in restructuring their relationships with the nation-state in order to increase their competitiveness across the national boundary, as the state's power to manage national economies have declined significantly in the ongoing changes in global dynamics (Keating 1997).  Keating (1997) calls this  phenomenon, of an emerging new political space, 'new regionalism.' New regionalism concerns the politicization of subnational regions and their attempt to act as an actor independent from the nation-state.  The establishment of such supranational economic  institutions as the European Union (EU) in 1992 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 represented the decline of the relative power of states to control national economies. Another important change in global dynamics relevant to  61  subnational regions in the 1990s was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of communist countries, which eased international tensions. Because of the collapse of the East-West Cold War structure, subnational regions' dependence on the state's defense forces was lowered (Keating and McGarry 2001). In the face of this new process of restructuring economic and political relationships at the global scale and the decline of traditional centralized regional development planning, stronger local control over local development became a critical issue (Kumssa and McGee 2001).  In this context of global economic and political changes, it became an urgent policy . issue for peripheral regions to find out how and to what extent they should and could link themselves with global markets and actors while also mitigating the negative impacts that emerged. In particular, the significance of local and regional cultures, values and identities for regional development in an environment of globalization began to attract greater attention (Edgington et al. 2001, Noble et al. 1998). The role of local and regional culture on the promotion of local economic initiatives and development is typically represented by such cross-border strategies as cross-border cooperations (Aykac 1994, Scott 1999, Wu 2001) and growth-triangles (Thant et al. 1998). These strategies were attempts to take advantage of cultural and linguistic affinity as well as ethnicity, although they were not necessarily sufficient conditions (Hsing 1998). These strategies were typically used for peripheral regional development, and commonly aimed at strengthening competitive advantage rather than traditional comparative advantage that relied on the advancement of telecommunications and transportation.  In terms of  the competitiveness of regions in the global economy, Higgins and Savoie (1997) regard entrepreneurship as a critical local culture. These local and regional culture-based  62 strategies demand that the nation-state implement the deregulation of economic activities in the region and thus adopt a laissez-fair policy on regional economic development.  Accordingly, stronger local autonomy or power of self-determination  that tapped into the global change became a top priority for local governments.  Alternatively, some scholars emphasized the impacts of globalization on local communities and the inability of nation-states and centralized planning to protect the regions (Alger 1999, Douglass 1998, Friedmann 1992, Stohr 1990). They suggest the necessity of developing local capacity to cope with global economic restructuring under local initiatives, basing this on the notion that central governmental planning is not effective for regional restructuring and innovation.  This urges localities to take  measures to mitigate global forces without waiting for decisions by, and support from, the centre.  It is in this context that the idea of local capacity building began to attract  attention among scholars; for example, the concept of 'empowerment' gained popularity (Friedmann 1992). However, these advocates of local initiatives do not necessarily insist that localities alone can solve all of the problems caused by changes in the global economy; they do give due regard to the fact that the nation-state can also play an important role.  For instance, Douglass (1998) presents a notable example of the  improvement of citizen welfare in the process of the integration of the national economy into the global market in South Korea by its government, namely the 'Two-Million Unit Housing Construction Plan' for Seoul in 1989.  Of course, regions cannot independently choose strategies to either tap into or resist globalization, or both.  However, in the face of the realities of globalization, the  63 transfer of the power of decision-making to regions, i.e. decentralization, has become a universal issue.  In the next section, I will discuss the issues of decentralization and its  importance to regional development.  2.2.4. Decentralization and Its Relation to Planning  The core-periphery model of structuring regional relations (usually initiated by the centre)' addressed the discrepancy of income differentiation or economic inequality based on the concept of growth poles. A critical role of regional planning conducted by the central state, then, was to balance the level of economic development between regions along with economic growth.  As discussed in the previous sections,  development 'from below' became an alternative principle pursued in planning since the 1970s as the limitations of the more traditional planning approach began to reveal themselves in the face of globalization; however, its application was quite limited and did not replace the traditional model.  An emphasis on local level planning, as opposed to 'top down' centralized planning, characterizes current planning theories and practices.  For example, Noble et al. (1998)  stress the importance of small-scale political communities, local solutions to local problems, participatory decision-making and democratic governance  vis-a-vis  the more  centralized structure for planning. Along with this trend of local-oriented planning, the latest development of planning theory and practice is further characterized by an increasing interest in marginalized groups of people, in particular indigenous or aboriginal people and their minority status within cities and regions (see, for example, Sandercock 1998a).  64  With this said, substate nations, a type of national minority, have yet to be sufficiently focused on in planning literature.  The study of substate nations necessarily  involves the roles and powers of nation-states for governing subnational regions within the national boundary.  In other words, the state is a key actor to be studied. However,  as Alterman (2001: 1) argues, "[n]ational-level planning in democratic countries has been almost all but ignored by researchers in urban and regional planning since the reconstruction years following the Second World War," while local level planning has attracted greater attentions.  In this context, substate nations are studied rather as a  subject of political sciences, international affairs, and political philosophy.  Substate nations challenge the nation-states and seek significant changes in the degree of local autonomy in order to end their subordination to institutions established by national majorities representing the central government.  The most extreme claim of  the substate nation is separation from the parent country, but, for the most part, they mainly seek greater self-determination within the state system (Halperin et al. 1992). In studies on the increasing tensions between nation-states and substate nations, decentralization is regarded as a practical mechanism to defuse the tensions (Cohen and Peterson 1999, Kymlicka 1995, Rousseau and Zariski 1987).  In other words,  decentralization is a principal measure for the state to effectively address pressures from substate nations.  While decentralization is a widely accepted and implemented policy measure to deal with the issues of development that had not been addressed successfully under the traditional centralized and hierarchical planning represented by the concept of growth  65 poles (Stohr et al. 2001), its definition varies.  As a simple definition, Barrett (2000:  34) suggests that:  decentralization implies movement away from the centre and relates to an array of issues including political, administrative and economic power, financial autonomy, local democracy and cultural diversity. The degree of decentralization can be measured on a scale from nominal to radical, with the preferred extent of change conditioned by a number of factors including the ideological perspectives of those pursuing reform and the magnitude of opposition.  Barrett (2000: 35) further summarizes the diversity of the definitions of decentralization. He argues that decentralization can be defined as either administrative or political, while related concepts being devolution and localization, deconcentration/delegation and subsidiarity, community participation and empowerment.  The two types of  decentralization defined by Barrett (2000: 35) are as follows:  1) Administrative decentralization — responsibility is transferred from central to lower levels of government, thereby giving them more managerial discretion, but not necessarily financial independence. Local government remain subordinate to central authority; and 2) Political decentralization — authority is transferred to democratically elected lower levels of government. Local government is placed on equal footing with central government and financial autonomy is increased.  The three related concepts, as defined by Barret (2000), are: 1) Devolution and localization: local government is given the power to independently develop projects and programs. Local control over revenue and capital expenditure is increased. Restrictive rules governing organization  66  structure, staffing, budget utilization, revenue raising and contracting-out are removed. 2) Deconcentration/delegation: transfer of responsibilities from central ministries to field offices and autonomous agencies. Consequently, service provision is brought closer to citizens while remaining part of central government. The heads of these field offices/agencies are generally unelected and are given a certain amount of discretionary power. 3) Subsidiarity, community participation and empowerment: implies that political decisions should only be taken to a higher level of government when absolutely necessary. When justification is not possible, the decision-making power shifts to the lower tier of government until it reaches those 'most affected' by the decision. This relationship can also apply to local government and its community.  Further to these, Jun and Wright (1996: 5) suggest that "administrative decentralization can be classified into four main approaches: (1) Deconcentration of administrative functions, (2) devolution of decision-making authority, (3) localized program innovation, and (4) citizen participation in the policy process," but acknowledge that these are "not mutually exclusive, but are interrelated and overlapping." Also notable is that, in addition to these two types of decentralization, financial decentralization is also identified as critical because the mechanisms of collecting funds and local discretion of their use directly influence on local social, economic and spatial development (see, for example, Rafuse Jr. 1996, Smoke 2000, Work 2001, Zimmermann 1990).  Because of all of these differing interpretations,  Barrett (2000: 35) argues that "it is obvious that decentralization can easily be promoted as an attractive panacea by interest groups from all sides of the political spectrum."  67 The diversity and ambiguity of definitions for the term decentralization is an issue to be addressed in the study of substate nations.  In theoretical discussions on substate  nations, Kymlica (1995: 69-74) uses the term without specific definition.  He identifies  the general ideas of decentralization with empowering local communities, and uses the term decentralization and devolution interchangeably, as in 'decentralize power' and 'devolving powers.'  From a different point, in their comparative analysis of  institutional design for substate nations, Catt and Murphy (2002: 37) acknowledge that these two terms are used interchangeably to denote the delegation of some form of power or authority from a central to a local governing institution. The authors further argue that decentralization should be regarded as questions on the subject of jurisdiction, which has four main components: policy areas; people covered; geographic scope; and the source and security of the jurisdictional authority granted.  These components are  useful in understanding the distinctiveness of the type of decentralization negotiated between substate nation and the state. In their discussion on the subject of jurisdiction (ibid: 39), it is also important to note that there are de jure and de facto powers to be negotiated between them.  The former powers are "those explicitly listed in legal  documents or interpreted as such via judicial review," and the latter are "those which are implicit as a consequence of administrative arrangements or because of the existence of general and imprecisely defined powers."  These discussions on the definition of  decentralization suggest that the dynamic and complex nature of relational rearrangement between the state and substate nations originates in these flexible and multifaceted subjects of negotiation.  68 As Stohr (2001b) suggests, decentralization is not a panacea, but that its potentials and limitations need to be understood from various points of views. For example, one viewpoint supports decentralization as a necessary governmental arrangement to remedy the weakest in society (Friedmann 1992, Marris 1998, Stohr et al. 2001).  This is a  view that insists that public decision-making should be made at the lowest possible community unit.  In this perspective, decentralization can provide an ideal form of  participatory democratic decision-making and self-determination, and thus sends a strong positive message to minorities whose decision-making power is constrained.  The other view raises questions about the decentralization euphoria among policy-makers, politicians, scholars and international organizations.  Based primarily  on the examples of Latin America, Schuurman (1997) argues that the promotion of decentralization tends to support the neoliberal ideas of deregulation and the global market, and thus affect the weakest groups of people negatively.  With respect to  Quebec's francophone separatist movement, as an extreme form of decentralization, Schuurman (1997) contends that the separatist discourse advocated by separatist political leaders, in which cultural identity was stressed, was not inherently progressive and positive for the poorer segments of the Quebecois.  These theoretical and empirical  discussions on decentralization suggest that its impacts on disadvantaged people in peripheral regions are likely to be negative, and 'decentralization' should not be reified. Work (2001: 26) further emphasizes that decentralization is not always a viable alternative to centralization.  69  In the context of substate nations, Kymlicka (1995: 71) argues that decentralization only meets the needs of national minorities if it increases the capacity of the group for self-government.  It should be noted that the literature on decentralization regards  decentralization as a transfer of an equal set and degree of central authorities and rights to each subnational region.  However, substate claims aim at the transfer of  differentiated authorities and rights.  Thus, this type of state-local negotiation on  decentralization necessarily involves the legitimacy of such special claims as distinguished from those of other subnational regions.  2. 3. Substate Nations 2.3.1. Background ofthe Emergence of Substate Nations  Rising interest in substate nations became apparent from the 1990s onward, especially from political scientists as claims for self-determination or even independence began to challenge existing state-local relationships (see, for example, Gagnon and Tully 2001, Guibernau 1999, Herb et al. 1999, Keating and McGarry 2001, Kymlicka 1995 and 2002). The emergence of substate nations is a global phenomenon, as shown in their prevalence in Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, successor states to the Soviet Union, and successor states to Yugoslavia (Halperin et al. 1992).  5  This was, in part, promoted by global economic restructuring, in particular the establishment of supranational institutions such as EU and NAFTA, as well as the end of the Cold War (Halperin et al. 1992, Keating 1996, Keating and Loughlin 1997). These economic and political dynamics, which had impacts on the power of nation-states to  Note that Halperin et al. (1992: 144-5) find no substate nations in Latin America and the Caribbean but recognize that there are some indigenous groups in these regions. 5  70 control domestic affairs, became more salient in the 1990s, and the opportunities for, and necessities of substate nations to become more independent of the nation-states increased dramatically. Accordingly, substate nations became dissatisfied with acting only as a sub-unit of the nation-state.  Guibernau (1999) suggests that they are  emerging as global political actors, that is, they are obtaining powers to act transcending national boundaries.  In addition to the change in the global political economy, various international arrangements that aimed to protect and promote minority group rights vis-a-vis the traditional and universal concept of individual human rights began to emerge (Keating and McGarry 2001). The protection of minority rights is not a new issue.  Halperin et  al. (1992: 54) provide the example of the series of bilateral European treaties that, beginning in the early part of the 17 century, already recognized a minority's freedom th  to practice a different religion within the state, although in a limited way. Halperin et al. (ibid: 55) also note that a legal regime for the protection of minority rights began to evolve after the end of World War I, as well as and the creation of the League of Nations. However, the League had no real enforcement powers and usually favoured the government's position. It was not until the end of the Cold War that minority rights began to draw serious attention again but more specifically as collective rights rather than individual ones (ibid: 57). In the 1990s, international recognition of the protection of minority rights increased.  For example, Kymlicka (1995: 5) points out the  emergence of such international arrangements as the adoption of a declaration on the Rights of National Minorities in 1991 and the establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1993, both by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in  71 Europe; a declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 1992; a draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for which preparation began in 1985 and completed in 1993 by a working group of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; and the adoption of a declaration on minority language rights by the Council of Europe in 1992. These arrangements provided a favourable environment to minority rights, but as Kymlicka (1995: 6) contends, they did not fully articulate either the underlying justification for minority rights nor their limits. Recently, however, Keating and McGarry (2001) point out the proliferation of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and the construction of new forms of international jurisprudence, including the International Criminal Court (1998) and the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia (1993).  All of these dynamic processes at the global scale tended to support the re-emergence of national minorities. This is a view (i.e. globalization strengthens the situation of national minorities) adopted by the scholars of substate nations or national minorities including Kymlicka (2002), and Keating and McGarry (2001), and contradicts with that of Hobsbawm's (1990), that globalization undermines national minorities.  2.3.2. Economic Politics and Cultural Politics  Self-determination has been central to substate nations' claims to realizing equality. In comparison to other categories of self-determination movements, including anti-colonial self-determination, trans-state self-determination, self-determination of  72 dispersed peoples, indigenous self-determination, and representative self-determination, Halperin et al. (1992) states that substate self-determination is the attempt of a group, concentrated in a particular geographic area, to break off and form a new state or to achieve a greater degree of political or cultural autonomy within the existing state. According to Halperin et al., these various categories of movement towards self-determination are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can overlap.  For example,  the distinction between indigenous and substate claims may be blurry, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter.  Further, interpretations of what constitutes  self-determination ranges from minority-rights protection, to cultural or political autonomy,  to independent  statehood.  The diversity of the  categories of  self-determination and their possible overlap suggest, therefore, that a substate nation may claim varying authorities and/or rights, and it may change those claims, and different actors within a substate nation may seek different types of self-determination. For example, Latouche (2001: 180) points out that the Parti Quebecois, whose raison d'etre  is to achieve sovereignty, has attempted to redirect Quebec nationalism away  from an ethno-cultural territory into a more civic and inclusive one.  Kymlicka (1995: 10) argues that modern societies are increasingly confronted with minority groups, incorporated into a larger state, demanding recognition of their identity and accommodation of their cultural difference.  The substate nation is a type of  national minority formed as a result of a distinctive pattern of incorporation into the nation-state. It demands various forms of territorial autonomy or self-government to ensure its survival as a distinct society. Kymlicka contrasts national minorities to immigrants (or ethnic groups) in terms of the form of their incorporation into a larger  73 state. As opposed to the first type of minority group, who seek self-governance, this group wishes to integrate into the larger society with full membership. recent  literature,  Kymlicka  (2002)  discusses  In his more  such minorities as isolationist  ethno-religious groups, metics (i.e. irregular migrants and temporary migrants), and African-Americans in addition to the previous two groups.  He acknowledges that the  involvement of self-government claims makes this situation more complicated. In order to understand and evaluate the politics of multiculturalism, he emphasizes the importance of seeing how the historical incorporation of minority groups shapes their collective institutions, identities, and aspirations.  Self-determination is a central concern among those, such as Halperin et al. (1992), who are involved in international affairs.  However, tensions between nation-states and  substate nations cannot be resolved simply by dealing with self-determination because substate nations as sub-national regions have to address the realities of economic development.  More precisely, they have to deal with the actual distribution of  resources and services for self-reliant development and decrease their dependence on the centre.  Traditionally, regional planners have not had to deal directly with  self-determination; however, self-development was a central issue in the 'bottom up' alternative development discussed above.  Self-determination and self-development are  two ideals of social justice (Young 2000: 31).  According to Young (ibid.),  self-development raises questions about the distribution of resources and positions, and self-determination consists of being able to determine one's action, and the condition of one's action, as opposed to merely being dominated.  These discussions are quite  conceptual and not directly applicable to understanding the mechanism of tensions  74  between nation-states and substate nations where regional development, i.e. the equitable, effective and efficient distribution of resources, is involved.  Substate nations and other national minorities demand differentiated rights and/or treatment. In order to analyze such demands, Kymlicka (2002) presents the existence of two hierarchies that cause inequality between national minorities and majorities. One is an economic hierarchy and the other a status hierarchy, although he acknowledges that they are often combined in the real world.  According to Kymlicka  (2002: 332), economic hierarchy brings to light the disparity in one's relationship to the market or to the means of production, and struggles against the inequalities inherent in this hierarchy generate a 'politics of redistribution.'  The 'politics of redistribution'  revolves around perceived socioeconomic injustices rooted in the economic structure of any particular society, including exploitation, economic marginalization, and economic deprivation. Examples of various remedies for these types of injustices may include such measures of economic restructuring as income redistribution, reorganizing the spatial division of labour in society, or regulating the location of investment decisions to favour substate nations.  The targets of public policies in this form of politics typically  include groups of people whose access to the market or the means of production is substantially limited.  The politics of redistribution, therefore, aims to reduce  differences in income and wealth between various groups. economic politics.  In sum, this is essentially  The 'politics of redistribution' has also been an inevitable  accompaniment to regional planning administered by national governments.  In other  words, it has been driven by the desire of national-level planning to reduce inter-regional inequalities within the country (Alterman 2001: 16).  75  In contrast, the 'politics of recognition' focuses on cultural injustices.  These are  generally rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication, including cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect.  For Kymlica (2002),  this type of injustice is remedied by cultural or symbolic change aimed at upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups, or more positively valuing cultural diversity. Politics of recognition targets status groups such as women, racial groups, and indigenous peoples, who are defined by relations of recognition in which they experience less esteem, honour, and prestige than other groups. The politics of recognition aims to affirm group differences within society and, by extension, group-differentiated rights, which challenge the notion of individual equal rights or equal citizenship.  In the relationship between substate nations and a  nation-state, this ultimately involves cultural factors.  Gutmann (1992: 5) also  acknowledged the significance of the relationship between recognition and politics, and argues that "whether and how cultural groups should be recognized in politics are among the most salient and vexing on the political agenda of many democratic and democratizing societies today."  The 'politics of recognition' is central to Kymlicka's argument on national minorities. He uses it as a criticism against the traditional views held by both Marxists and liberals that economic equalities can redress cultural inequalities.  He rejects this view, pointing  to the existence of those who are economically well off, yet culturally stigmatized, and vice versa.  Regional planning in general, and peripheral regional planning in particular,  focused on the elimination of economic inequality between the core and periphery and was involved in the politics of redistribution leaving cultural inequalities undealt with on  76 a regional level.  Kymlicka's (2002) discussion of the two modes of politics is an expansion of Nancy Fraser's (1997) argument on the dilemmas of justice in a 'Postsocialist' age. Although her discussion focuses on gender and race, ethnicity and nationality are also considered to be facing the dilemmas of justice (ibid: 33). Fraser's (ibid: 12) argument is that justice today requires both redistribution and recognition, and thus it is necessary to examine ways in which economic disadvantage and cultural disrespect are entwined with and support one another. Further, it is necessary to clarify the political dilemmas that arise when we try to combat both socioeconomic injustice and cultural or symbolic injustices.  This approach attempts to adopt an analytical method that distinguishes  between these two types of injustices notwithstanding the fact that they are often intertwined in the real world.  Because economic issues are always relevant in the  claims made by substate nations for greater autonomy or self-determination, it is necessary to address the integrative nature of these injustices.  Thus, the two forms of political dynamics discussed (redistribution and recognition) provide a powerful conceptual framework to organize theoretical discussions on emerging conflicts and relational rearrangements between substate nations and nation-states.  As represented by the traditional growth pole approach, regional  planning has mainly focused on economic inequalities, while territorial cultural inequalities was left relatively unexplored.  In the sections that follow, I will expand on  the issues of substate claims and attempt to show the range and multiplicity of theoretical discussions on this ongoing worldwide phenomenon, focusing on the nature  77 and dynamics of conflicts.  2.3.3. Construction of Identity  The consideration of minority identity characterizes the politics of recognition, but as remarked by various scholars, identity is a confusing term (Calhoun 1994, Herb 1999). In the examination of substate claims, collective identities need to be focused on rather than individual ones.  Politics is involved in the construction of collective identities.  Castells (1997: 6-7) argues that collective identities are constructed in a social and historical context.  Political questions include how and by whom different types of  identities are constructed, and what the outcomes are.  Castells (1997) also discusses  the involvement of different types of political interest in the construction of collective identities.  Three different forms of the collective identities of minorities in relation to  their political interests are presented: legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and project identity. Resistance identity is the most fundamental for substate nations taking action against the existing status of inequality.  Language is considered to be a primary element for the construction of identity (for example Herb 1999, Young 2000).  However, Herb (1999: 39) acknowledges that other  attributes such as social class, ideology, levels of economic development, religion, and so on, are also important factors in constructing collective identities.  Given the  operational difficulty of identifying a single identity or set of identities in the dynamic relationship between nation-states and substate nations, we cannot expect to find a fixed set of attributes that define collective identity.  78  In terms of the relationship between collective identities and the rise of nationalism, Castells (1997: 29) argues that ethnicity, religion, language and territory, per se, do not suffice to build a nation and induce nationalism, but rather that shared experience does. Yet, an experience of an identical event such as war may not be shared equally over time and can be interpreted differently by different people.  Therefore, shared experience is  only one of the factors.  Keating and McGarry (2001: 6), in addition, discuss the dynamic nature of identity construction. They argue that identities are not static and often undergo important changes.  For example, distinct sub-national identity was not dominant in Quebec  before World War II or in Flanders (Belgium) before the integration of Europe, but a distinct regional identity became dominant after these periods.  Problems of linking specific attributes to an identity are discussed by Young (2000). She asserts that identity should not be understood solely by the attributes that characterize that identity (an essentialist view), but rather by the relations that make identity (a relational view).  The problem of the former is that it presupposes that social  groups can be identified based on fixed and specific attributes.  Accordingly, it does not  acknowledge the similarities that many group members have with those not considered part of the group, and that members of a group are not necessarily homogeneous. Contrarily, the relational view focuses on the dynamic and overlapping nature of identities and rejects the rigid and exclusive grouping of members of the society. This view sees the possibility of building specific identities in the process of forming relationships with other groups of people. As an example of this second view, Young  79  (2000) notes that the development of the ethnic identity of the New Zealand Maoris resulted from their encounter with English people.  Young (2000: 90) further argues  that "conceiving group differentiation as a function of relation, comparison, and interaction, then, allows for overlap, interspersal, and interdependence among groups and their members."  Regarding minority nationalism, Keating (1996: 19) presents two forms of identities. The first form is based on such ethnic identifies as language, race or religion. The second is an identity formed by civic, territorially based claims rooted in the territorial society itself.  This is a collective identity based on traditions, values, institutions and  historical memories.  It is also important to note Keating's remarks that this type of  common identity is difficult to maintain without the bonds of ethnic solidarity and without state institutions.  These discussions on identity suggest that collective identities are constructed politically when substate nations aim to change their relationship with national majorities.  2.3.4. Planning for Substates and the Legitimization of Substate Claims  Collective identities cannot be automatically translated into substate claims, but accountable and responsible actors are needed to legitimize those claims. Guibernau (1999: 11) argues that a nationalist movement, which generally starts as an elite movement, has to obtain a mass following to be successful, though, as Keating and McGarry (2001: 6) note, elites are not necessarily always influential, as some nationalist  80 elites were successful and others were not.  Further, Castells (1997: 30) argues that  nationalism is not necessarily an elite phenomenon but rather a reaction against global elites. Castells (ibid.) acknowledges that, as in many social movements, the leadership of nationalism tends to be taken on by more educated people than by the popular masses, but this does not reduce the appeal and significance of nationalism to the mere manipulation of the masses by self-interested elites. The discussion about the actors of cultural politics suggests the necessity of identifying initiators and followers or supporters, who demand 'recognition of difference,' in order to understand the mechanism of cultural politics, and examining who the beneficiaries are.  The power of the politics of recognition, which aims to achieve non-material interests, is  often  referred  to  as  identity  politics  (Agnew  1997:  250).  Such  territorially-differentiated authorities and rights as self-determination, self-development, self-governance or greater local autonomy characterize substate nations' interests.  In  claiming interests against the nation-state, these need to be legitimized by substate actors and accepted by the nation-state as a serious public interest.  Thus, this involves  political work, linking collective identity with territorially-differentiated interests.  For modern nation-states that adopted the notion of equal citizenship, this poses a serious question to democracy and citizenship. Young (2000) points out the practical difficulty of legitimizing minorities' claims for group-differentiated rights in the face of criticism based on the notion of democracy and equal citizenship. She mentions the possibility that claims for differentiated rights would be criticized for being selfish and for producing social exclusion.  Kymlicka (1995) argues that minority claims basically  81 seek inclusion and are not seriously selfish. Thus, what is important in the process of negotiation between the nation-state and substate nations is the question of how substate claims are legitimized and whether or not they are reconciled. complex and usually involves wider public discussions.  The process tends to be  For example, in Quebec,  various consultations, commissions, and public negotiations were held and referendums took place several times (Tully 2001).  Referendums played an important role in  legitimizing the transformation of the status of substate nations in other countries, for example the referendum for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly in 1999 (Guibernau 1999). In the case of the federalization of Belgium, Albrechts (2001) discusses the creations of cultural councils (Dutch-speaking and French-speaking) and their evolution towards the federalization of Belgium, and the resultant establishment of cultural regions.  In some countries, the process of  negotiations developed in armed struggles, for example Basque in Spain and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom (Guibernau 1999, Halperin et al. 1992). Through their strength in leading the charges made to substate nationalism, nationalist political parties often represent substate nationalism, heading off the process of state-substate negotiations for greater autonomy, for example in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia (Keating 1996). In sum, public negotiations take various forms and the reconciliation of substate claims vary in different countries and situations.  Previous section 2.2 discussed the limitations of traditional regional planning in issues of interregional cultural inequalities brought to the surface by the rise of substate nationalism. The review of the literature on substate nations in this section suggests that substate nationalism is an expression of multiculturalism, and thus can be a  82 challenge to multicultural planning, which gained momentum in particular in the 1990s (see, for example, Douglass and Friedmann 1998, Sandercock 1998a, b). However, the major interest of multicultural planning tends to focus on cultural inequalities within cities and regions, and consequently the interregional phenomenon is rarely addressed. One possible reason why substate nations are left out as an issue of planning is that the establishment of substate nations may involve quite revolutionary actions, particularly in cases where independence is a possible goal, as typically shown in the case of Quebec (see, for example, Keating and McGarry 2001). For planners who generally work within the existing administrative framework of the nation-state and are also empowered by national laws, promoting substate nationalism may not be an appropriate action. However, the literature shows that the emergence of substate nations, i.e. the growth of cultural claims made by specific peripheral regions, has been a challenge to the existing system of governing subnational regions by the nation-state as well as an opportunity to enhance social equalities.  2.4. Japanese Regional Development Planning System as a Foundation of Okinawa Development  With my preceding review of the many and diverse perspectives on regional planning and decentralization as background, the chapter now turns to a review of Japanese post-war regional planning, which provided a foundation to the development of Okinawa after its reversion to Japan in 1972. Further, this section assesses the stance of the Japanese regional development system toward the regional cultural distinctiveness valued by Okinawa.  83 2.4.1. Increase of Dependency on the Mainland Authority and Capital  Development of Okinawa after its reversion from U.S. control to Japan in 1972 was guided within the existing framework of Japanese regional planning. To explain this, this subsection will review the evolution of the Japanese regional development planning system in the post-World War II period prior to the reversion of Okinawa. Japanese regional development in the post-World War II began under the Comprehensive National Land Development Act (Kokudo Sogo Kaihatsu Ho) established in 1950 (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). Until the formulation of the first Comprehensive National Land Development Plan [Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku (Ichi Zen So)] in 1962, the Japanese government prioritized the construction of large scale dams for the development of electricity, water resources and flood control in economically distressed rural regions.  It aimed to develop river basins by comprehensively modeling them  along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority concept established in the 1930s. To carry out this plan, the Ministry of Construction designated 21 special areas for development (Tokutei Chiiki).  Unfortunately, this approach resulted in the significant loss of population in these areas due to the disastrous floods that were caused by the large-scale dam construction projects.  Moreover, the planned diversification of local economies that was expected  to generate local employment did not occur (see, for example, Endo 1999, Miyamoto 1973, Tanimura and Edgington 2001).  According to Miyamoto (1973), a couple of  reasons that attributed to the failure of the development was the lack in understanding the designated regions and the lack of an overarching institution responsible for coordinating all of the development projects.  84  As mentioned above, a comprehensive planning approach to regional development was first developed in 1962 upon the formulation of the first ten-year Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). national plans had been developed and implemented.  By 1998, five such  The central concept of the first  plan was to use the growth poles for heavy industrial development (discussed generally in the previous section).  The Second plan, developed in 1969 [Shin Zenkoku Sogo  Kaihatsu Keikaku (Ni Zenso)\, maintained the policy of promoting economic growth but adopted a new concept of regional development.  Rather than deploying centres of  industrialization sporadically in remote regions and waiting for 'trickle down' effects, this new plan aimed to build large-scale industrial centres and connect them across the country through large-scale transportation and communications networks (i.e. mega projects).  It also sought to restructure the distribution of industrial activities across the  country and balance the excessive concentration of urban population and depopulation in remote rural areas caused by the first plan, while relying on private capitals (see Tanimura and Edgington 2001).  The concept of this plan was embodied in the then  Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's proposal to remodel the Japanese archipelago, Nihon Retto Kaizo Ron' (Tanaka 1972). This second plan was criticized due to worsening environmental pollution and was consequently revised in 1977 as the Third Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (Dai Sanji Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku).  Nonetheless, the growth-oriented policy adopted by the previous plans was  retained due to the economic decline that began in 1974 (Endo 1999).  85 2.4.2. I n t e g r a t i o n o f O k i n a w a i n t o the J a p a n e s e M a i n l a n d E c o n o m y  The Economic Planning Agency of Japan incorporated Okinawa Prefecture into the second plan as the eighth regional block (see Appendix 5), and the Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku, ODP) was formulated within the framework of the Okinawa Development Special Measures Law (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) in 1972. This law announced that the Japanese people and government should endeavour to promote the reunification of Okinawa with its homeland in compensation for the hardships of life experienced by Okinawa people since 1945 (see Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho Kenkyukai 1974). Two other laws were also enacted in the 1970s that allowed for the establishment of the Okinawa Development Agency and the Okinawa Development Finance Corporation. Based on these laws, the second plan defined the role of Okinawa as a southern node that would facilitate international interactions of people and trade between Japan and neighbouring Asian countries.  A strategy of this plan was to attract raw material  processing industries, such as a crude oil transhipment station, thereby encouraging heavy industrial development.  Accordingly, major infrastructure in Okinawa, such as  roads, bridges and ports, were 100 percent subsidized, which was uncommon for public projects on the mainland, and the level of infrastructure quickly reached the national standard (see Arasaki 1992, Miyamoto 1980).  The major objectives of the ODP were to urge the elimination of economic discrepancies between Okinawa and the mainland and to fulfill the basic conditions for self-sustaining development.  Takara (1981: 281) argued that these objectives were not  necessarily complementary but, rather, were conflicting, because the realization of  86  former large-scale public works with subsidies would lead to a higher dependency on the national government.  Indeed, during the first ten years of reincorporation, from 1972  to 1981, Okinawa's dependence on national subsidies increased rapidly and public works spending increased by six times. In sum, although highly subsidized public works such as roads, ports, fishing ports (100 percent subsidized), and water and sewerage, and schools (75 percent subsidized) were built under this planning scheme, the provision for such social facilities as parks, recreation and welfare facilities, for which the level of subsidies was much lower, were still insufficient compared with that of the mainland. Further, the manufacturing industry did not come to Okinawa as expected; instead industries that were rejected on the mainland, due to their potential environmental impacts, did (such as the crude oil transshipment station).  The lack of a stable mass production manufacturing industry was identified as one of the most serious issues in the development of Okinawa by the end of the ODP in 1981 (Takara 1981). Even subsequent plans could not overcome this issue. In the second (1982-1991) and third (1992-2001) plan ofthe development of Okinawa, this issue still remained a most difficult one (see, for example, Kuba 2000, Makino 1996). However, tourism, which was considered a minor industry as early as the beginning of the 1970s when the first Okinawa plan was developed, continued to grow and became a major industry, even though big resort development projects were typically managed by mainland capital.  The level of the prefectural income also remained lower than  expected (see further details in Arasaki 1992, Maeshiro 1984, Takara 1981), although it  87 was almost as high as the average of French workers in 1995 (Smith 1999, Tamamori and James 1995).  The growth pole approach, which relied on national intensive investment in industrial infrastructures and on the involvement of industrial capital for regional development, was criticized as the Okinawan economy became subordinate to the mainland capital (Kuba 1995).  Experts on the development of Okinawa criticized the national  government for not paying sufficient attention to the distinctiveness of local conditions for development, and for applying a nation-wide standardized planning strategy to Okinawa.  For example, rivers and springs in Okinawa, on which people relied, were  polluted by road and agricultural modernization works initiated by the national government (McCormack 1999).  6  In this context, the necessity of a local planning  initiative was emphasized (see Maeshiro 1984, Takara 1981).  In the first ten years  after the reversion, Okinawan people witnessed the potential and limitation of centralized national planning for Okinawan development.  The first example of the very 'top down' approach adopted by the central government for the development of Okinawa was the Okinawa Ocean Exposition (Okinawa Kaiyd Hakurankai)  held in 1975. According to Maeshiro (1984), the idea  for this exposition was presented by the national government to the then government of Okinawa (the Ryukyu government) prior to the 1972 Reversion, and the prefectural governor officially asked the national government to hold it in Okinawa.  This project  In addition, the U.S. military polluted rivers, too. There were at least 25 cases of the pollution of rivers caused by the military from 1972 to 1997. Coastal zones were also polluted by the military. There were at least 23 cases during the same period of time (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). 6  88 was a celebration of the return of Okinawa to Japan.  It was the first major public  works project in Okinawa post-reversion; it was authorized by the national government in 1972, and was to begin in July 1975 and end in January 1976. Before the event, various public works related to the event were implemented, including airports, ports, and roads.  After the event, Okinawa gained popularity as a tourist destination, though  over-investment in tourism and resort development and land speculation triggered bankruptcies.  Despite this, a positive effect of the event was that it stimulated  Okinawan tourism, setting it on a growth track (Maeshiro 1981). Indeed, the number of visitors to Okinawa increased by approximately seven times between 1972 and 1992 (from 440,000 to 3,200,000 annually) (Tamamori and James 1995).  The second example was the construction of a large scale crude oil transshipment station (CTS).  This project was a symbol of the growth pole approach adopted by both  Okinawa Prefecture and the national government.  Oil refineries were built in the 1980s,  but the controversial process of allowing the construction began in 1972 when the Ryukyu government gave permission to Mitsubishi to reclaim an ocean coast for the construction, one week before the reversion (Arasaki 1992). It should be noted that before the reversion, the Ryukyu government had already given permission to such major international oil companies as Gulf, Esso, and Caltex, at the end of the 1960s, as a new industry for the development of Okinawa after the reversion. Gulf built refinery facilities on a small island off the shore of Yonashiro Town in 1970, and Esso in Nishihara Village in 1969; both were on the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto) (see Appendix 6).  Mitsubishi Development (Mitsubishi  planned to build a larger CTS near Gulfs facilities.  Kaihatsu)  However, because of the  89  possibility of serious negative impacts on the environment and fisheries, local residents of Okinawa sued the prefecture for its legal procedural mistake in granting permission for the reclamation in 1974.  At the time, the mainland of Japan had already  experienced serious environmental pollution resulting from an accident at a petrochemical complex. Local opposition groups, local support groups, the prefectural governor, the prefectural assembly and Mitsubishi contended for their respective interests (see Arasaki 1992).  Shortly after, in 1975, the prefecture won the lawsuit and  gave permission to Mitsubishi Development.  This action revealed the prefectural  government's determination, at that time, to pursue a growth-oriented approach, as prescribed by the national government.  However, it turned out that this project did not  trigger sufficient 'trickle down' effects (Takatsuki 1992). In particular, two oil shocks in the 1970s were decisive in discouraging further private sector capital investment, and subsequently, Japanese manufacturers started to move their production centres to Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, skipping over Okinawa.  Accordingly, attracting manufacturing industries to Okinawa  from the mid 1970s onwards turned out to be a difficult venture.  Deviating from this growth pole approach, alternative approaches that sought self-sustaining development were attempted at a municipal level.  In particular,  Yomitan Village (approximate population: 24,000 as of 1975) and Nago City (approximate population: 45,000 as of 1975) (see Appendix 6) have become well known for their attempts at endogenous agropolitan development that aimed to strengthen local cultural identity and agricultural activities suitable for local conditions (Maeshiro 1981, Sasaki 1999).  Yomitan Village was highly regarded as an excellent example of  90 endogenous development.  Under the village mayor's strong leadership and the  village's controll of speculative resort development, agricultural and cultural activities such as pottery and crafts were encouraged.  A local financing institution was also set  up and facilitated these activities. Nago City, however, could not continue to pursue its local-oriented strategy and its budget deficit expanded (see Sasaki 2000, Takatsuki 1992, Yamauchi and Mizushima 1997). It is important to note that other municipalities of Okinawa Prefecture did not adopt alternative endogenous approaches and thus, Yomitan remained the exceptional case (see Sasaki 1999).  2.4.3. Okinawa's Persistent Desires for Local Autonomous Development  The development of Okinawa after the reversion in 1972 was closely related to the policy of its reincorporation into Japan.  The issues of Okinawa's development,  post-reversion, were extensively examined by researchers in the Japanese mainland (see the Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). In its introduction, this report addressed the lack of respect among Japanese and U.S. governmental representatives for the collective will of the Okinawan people toward the mode of reincorporation.  After observing the growing distrust of and criticism against  the reincorporation among the people of Okinawa prior to the return, the report examined other islands that faced territorial independence or incorporation after World War II. For instance, Cyprus, Iceland, the Maldives, the Caribbean islands, the Isle of Man, Greenland, Sicily and Sardinia were examined as examples of the rearrangement of territorial status. In sum, this report suggested that experts must recognize that the reincorporation of Okinawa should involve delicate issues of territorial and historical identity. However, as intimated above, the development of Okinawa in the process of  91 reincorporation was guided in the early 1970s by the concept of growth poles, a concept that had been applied to the development of different Japanese mainland regions in a uniform way, and thus lacked sufficient consideration of local specific needs in Okinawa.  Kuba, one of the leading scholars in the study of Okinawa, had, from the outset, insisted on the necessity of local autonomy for planning and implementing development in 1971 (Kuba 1995: 317). He argued that Okinawa should move away from its military base-dependent economy and seek environmentally-sound and welfare-oriented development as opposed to the rapid and expansive industrialization being planned under the centralized planning scheme.  He criticized the concentration of power in the  national centre since the Meiji era and its impacts on the deterioration of local identity and democracy, and then proposed the establishment of a special autonomous region of Okinawa.  It is important to note that the popular movement for the return of Okinawa  to Japan represented the realization of democracy and the protection of human rights. In the face of the 1972 Reversion, Higa (1971) argued that politics and public administration should be done at a level closest to the people. He opposed the idea of allowing the National Regional Development Agency to guide the development of Okinawa. As various scholars and experts had worried would happen, the Okinawa Development Agency was established with the Okinawa Development Bank, both of which were placed under national control. Consequently, Okinawa prefectural and municipal planners lost their chance to take on the initiative of planning the development. Since the establishment of the 1972 Okinawa development scheme, regional planning has been managed mainly by national bureaucrats.  As Sorensen (2002) argues, in the  92  context of city planning, the relationship between the strong central government and the weak local government is distinct one between Tokyo and Okinawa, and further, the relationship has been managed by bureaucrats.  Strengthening regional economic independence, or self-development, continued to be a top priority in the ODP.  Non-governmental entities, such as labour unions, were also  involved in the promotion of autonomy, shown in a policy proposal for the establishment of special autonomy for Okinawa, published by the Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union (Zen Nihon Jichi Dantai Rodo Kumiai) in 1998. This example highlights the persistent desire for self-governance among non-governmental actors.  In the 1990s, the necessity of administrative decentralization gained renewed  momentum.  In 1995, the Decentralization Promoting Law (Chihd Bunken Suishin Ho)  was enacted in the Diet, and subsequently the Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization (Chihd Bunken Suishin Iinkai) was established in order to draw up the outline for decentralization (Tajima 1996). In 1999, the Decentralization Law (Chihd Bunken Ho)  was enacted based on the recommendations of the Committee. 475 laws  were amended including the City Planning Law, Food Hygiene Law, and Public Elections Law, and some administrative powers were transferred to local governments, but the 1995 Law made little change in the power relationship between central and local government because the political decision-making structures remained untouched (Barrett 2000).  For example, under the amended City Planning Law, municipal  governments no longer needed ministerial approval for urban development plans, but were required to undertake discussions to reach an agreement with the Ministry of Construction. Further, there was no transfer of financial authority from the central  93 ministries.  Consequently, the central government retained the power to control local  affairs, typically through subsidies (ibid).  Former Prefectural Governor Ota (2003)  emphasized this point when he argues that decentralization in Japan has no substance, noting the bureaucrats' resistance against changes to their authorities.  2.5. Summary  This chapter examined three sets of literature: traditional western regional development planning (section 2.2), substate nations (section 2.3) and Japanese regional development planning (section 2.4).  Section 2.2 examined the fact that regional  development planning had concentrated on the elimination of interregional economic inequalities, by managing the distribution of economic resources for regional development, and had not dealt with the issues of cultural inequalities between regions. It became clear that regions' desire for development 'from below' as opposed to development 'from above' continued to exist, and the concepts of local oriented or alternative development became increasingly popular. Yet, despite these changes in the trend of regional planning, cultural inequalities between regions was not an issue that was addressed seriously. Consequently, the weaknesses of both the traditional and alternative development approaches remain a challenge to not only the promotion of cultural equalities within the nation-state, but also to the maintenance of national sovereignty. This section also examined how opportunities for subnational regions to expand their networks with the external world across national boundaries began to increase as a result of globalization.  It further illustrated the decline of the relative  power of nation-states to protect regions under the pressures of globalization. Consequently, subnational regions became more concerned about dealing with global  94 forces without waiting for decisions by, and support from, the centre, and thus their interest in self-determination and self-development has been increasing. This section finally dealt with the issues of decentralization in satisfying claims put forth by substate nations.  An important finding presented by such scholars as Kymlicka (1995) and  Schuurman (1997) is that decentralization could have serious impacts on some members within a region, while also being fundamental in promoting local interests which cannot be satisfied by 'top down' planning. In other words, various scholars recognize the necessity of decentralization for localities, but also acknowledge that its impacts on different groups of people within localities are important issues to be dealt with.  In section 2.3 various arguments on substate nations, developed mainly by political scientists, were reviewed. The section first clarified that the emergence of substate nations was a global phenomenon, particularly in the 1990s, and that various global forces such as economic globalization and the end of the Cold War were driving agents behind the emergence of national minorities. Secondly, it revealed the significance of self-determination as a fundamental goal of cultural politics or the 'politics of recognition,' for substate nations.  This is in contrast to economic politics, or the  'politics of redistribution,' that seeks to eliminate economic inequalities between majorities and minorities. These two types of politics were found to be relevant to minorities and were often intertwined.  They were understood by scholars like  Kymlicka (2002) and Fraser (1997) as being mutually related powers, but the irreducibility of the demand for recognition compared to that for redistribution was identified as a foundation for the emergence of substate nations.  95  Construction of identity is another issue widely discussed by various scholars such as Calhoun (1994), Castells (1997), Herb (1999), and Keating and McGarry (2001). They acknowledge that collective identities are not necessarily fixed but rather constructed when necessary.  In order for collective identities to be translated into substate claims,  accountable and responsible actors are essential.  In other words, specific actors who  can legitimize collective identities are necessary for substate nations wanting to challenge nation-states with their claims for various forms of self-determination. The claims are then negotiated between nation-states and substate nations.  Overall, these sections discussed the increase of the relative power of cultural politics over economic politics in the relationship between nation-states and substate nations. Various factors were found relevant to the rise of cultural politics including external dynamics and local dynamics (the construction of identities). In what follows, I will present two models to help understand the characteristics of cultural politics and economic politics (figure 2.1), and the dynamics and complexity of the development of interplay between the two (figure 2.2).  96 Figure 2.1 Cultural Politics and Economic Politics Types of ^\Po/itics Policy Issues  Values  Cultural Politics  Economic Politics  Politics of  Politics of  Recognition  Redistribution  Cultural Equality  Economic Equality  Obtain Recognition Objectives  Promote Economic  and Increase Political  Redistribution  Status Development  Dependence on  Dependence on  Resources  Regional Resources  Central Resources  Figure 2.2 External and Internal Dynamics of the Emergence of Substate Nations  Global Forces Economic Globalization The End of the Cold War  Nation-State  Cultural Politics  Econ Politics  Substate Nations  Identities and Interests  97 Section 2.4 examined Japanese post-war regional planning which provided a foundation for the development of Okinawa after its reversion to Japan in 1972. Regional development planning has been a central mechanism to promote and maintain the unity of Japan as a whole.  As Calder (1988) contended, the Japanese government,  in the post-World War II era, adopted a economic politics approach toward regional development; this was based on compensating regional interests typically through strong subsidy and a comprehensive development planning system involving public works. In return, it expected each prefecture to develop in a homogenous manner in terms of the levels of income and welfare based on an idea of 'civil minimum.'  This standardized  regional development model represented by the Comprehensive National Land Development Plans, was basically used to establish systems for the development of national land rather than for the development of the region. In this national planning framework, the issue of cultural distinctiveness for promoting regional development was not addressed.  In order to address the unique difficulties in the development of remote  and island regions as well as the reincorporation of a territory which had been administered under a foreign government, a new system of regional development was established for Okinawa, but it was in the traditional manner of centralized and standardized national administration. Accordingly, a special autonomous status was needed to tap into the potential power of cultural distinctiveness since local-oriented development was not granted to Okinawa.  Decentralization became an increasingly  important issue for prefectures and municipalities in Japan, particularly in the 1990s, as it was a necessary step for seeking local-oriented development approaches. However, the progress of decentralization handled by the national government was slow because of bureaucrats' resistance to change.  Consequently, the Japanese regional development  98  system remained insensitive to regional cultural distinctiveness in favour of the standardized system administered by bureaucrats.  99  CHAPTER 3 The Historical Background of Okinawa as a Substate Nation  3.1. Introduction  Chapter 2 outlined the general argument that regional planners need to incorporate models of 'politics of recognition' when addressing the problems of substate nations, a distinctive type of peripheral region.  The purpose of this chapter is to introduce  Okinawa more concretely as a substate nation in Japan, a state with a distinctive yet subordinate cultural position relative to Japanese mainstream political and cultural life.  I will show the distinctiveness of the historical relationship between Okinawa and the mainland Japanese powers as well as the U.S. military forces, in which the subordinate status of Okinawa was formed and maintained. As noted earlier, substate nations are distinguished from other regions within the nation-state by their histories of subordination to the power of national majorities, for example Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia.  These distinctive histories were the driving forces behind their recent  challenges to the nation-state (see Keating and McGarry 2001). The present tensions between substate nations and the nation-states are the outcomes of a distinctive past. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the historical processes of the formation of the dominant-subordinate relationship between substate nations and the nation-states in order to understand the mechanisms and processes of changes in relationship between them.  In section 3.2, I will  discuss briefly the historical processes of how Okinawa's  economic dependency on Japan and the U.S. military forces was established through  100 increased dependency upon national government subsidies. In section 3.3, I will focus on the decrease of the economic dependency of Okinawa on U.S. military bases after the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972; and in section 3.4,1 will discuss the role of regional identity in the political movement of Okinawans seeking freedom from U.S. occupation, the persistence of ambivalence about identifying themselves as Japanese after the 1972 Reversion, and the political implications of an Okinawan identity in its support of independence from Japan.  3.2. Historical Formation of Dependence  To begin with, the history behind current tensions between Okinawa and the government of Japan must be examined to fully understand Okinawa's desire for greater political and administrative autonomy and the reality of its historical and persistent dependency on the Japanese mainland. In Japan, no other prefecture or region apart from Okinawa questions its relationship to the central government or effectively challenges modern Japan's nation-state building.  The unique dynamics in the case of  Okinawa is evident in three principal dimensions of political economy: These are Okinawa's historical assimilation into Japan; centre-periphery inter-governmental relations; and the persistence of Okinawa's weak economic structure relative to mainland Japan.  3.2.1. Historical Assimilation  The history of Okinawa is clearly distinct from the rest of Japan. Over the past five centuries Okinawa has been a marginalized and exploited region. Unlike Hokkaido, the northernmost island in Japan (see Appendix 5), where the aboriginal people, the  101 Ainu, came under the control of the Ando warrior family in the mid 15 century and th  then the Matsumae family prior to the establishment of Tokugawa Shogunate in 1603, Okinawa was governed by an independent Ryukyu Kingdom, which was established through the unification of northern, central and southern kingdoms in the main island of Okinawa in 1429 (see Kurayoshi 2001). After the authority for the governance of Okinawa was forcibly taken over by the Shimazu, a Japanese warrior family in Kyushu (the southernmost island in Japan) in 1609, mainland Japan controlled Okinawa as 'a kind of colony' (Higa, et al. 1997). Consequently, a system of exploitation of Okinawa established by the Shimazu generated a structure of poverty in the region. Also there was a profound shift in the status of Okinawa from its traditional role as an East Asian trading centre to a peripheral region of Japan populated by a culturally distinct yet minority group.  It is important to note that the Shimazu exploited Okinawa in order  not only to build financial resources, but also to jockey for political position within the Tokugawa Shogunate system by boasting that it could govern a foreign kingdom (Higa et al. 1997). Interestingly, the Shogunate also offered the conquest of Okinawa as proof that its governing power had reached a remote foreign kingdom (Morris-Suzuki 1998). At this point in the island's history, Okinawa's people were treated as exotic foreigners by the mainland Japanese (Iha 1998). After the Shimazu invasion, the kingdom survived under the control of the Satsuma domain (han) until 1871 when modern nation-state building started in Japan.  7  Until then, Okinawa's tributary  relationship with China was approved tacitly by the Satsuma so as to benefit from Okinawa's Asian trade (see, for example, Hamashita 2000).  In the period of financial drought in the 19 century, the Satsuma domain was involved in illicit trading and rebuilt its economy, and further used its extra savings for gaining influence in the national political world during the period of the establishment of the Meiji Restoration government (Higa et al. 1997). 7  th  102  In 1871-1872, the Meiji government reorganized all feudal clans into prefectural governments.  This was one of the main steps toward modernization taken by the newly  established government.  In this process, Okinawa was first placed under Kagoshima  Prefecture (the southernmost prefecture in Kyushu) (see Appendix 5). Because the Meiji government wanted to build a modern nation-state in order to establish sovereignty vis-a-vis western countries, it was necessary to clearly delineate national territorial boundaries.  Thus, the government decided to make Okinawa a prefecture of  Japan, ordering the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was put under the administration of Kagoshima Prefecture, to cut off direct relations with the Chinese Qing Dynasty government.  However, because Okinawa still maintained ties to China, and the latter  acknowledged the region's political autonomy, Okinawa asked China for protection from Japanese annexation (Onga 1999). But counter to Okinawa's expectations, China did not in fact assist, leaving Okinawa to be annexed to Japan in 1879, ending the Ryukyu Kingdom.  This act of annexation is commonly known as 'Ryukyu Syobun' (see Higa et  al. 1997, Smits 2001).  8  It formalized the peripheral position of Okinawa in Japan.  This term was also used by local Okinawan people to criticize the decisions of the Japanese and U.S. governments to place Okinawa under U.S. administration in the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty (the second Ryukyu Syobun), and also at the time of the 1972 Reversion (the third Ryukyu Syobun). Because these latter two events were also the exercise of external hegemonic powers, the notion of 'Ryukyu Syobun' still somewhat affects the attitudes of Okinawan people towards Tokyo (see, for example, Matsuda 1974). After the first Ryukyu Syobun, the Meiji government sent officials from Tokyo  There are different interpretations of the 1879 Ryukyu Shobun. One is to regard it as an annexation of Okinawa by the Japanese military forces and the other is to regard it as the liberation of Okinawa people from slavery (see Higa et al. 1997: 122, Iha 1998: 168).  103 to take direct administrative control of Okinawa and to facilitate the process of its assimilation into mainland Japan, transforming the Okinawan people from foreigners into Japanese.  The Meiji government also deployed a subsection of the Japanese  military into Okinawa in order to protect the security of Okinawans, but its real intention was to prevent Okinawans' resistance to the annexation (Ota 1996: 38).  In this process of assimilation, there were some movements towards democratic rights made by Okinawans against the mainland power.  A central figure of this  movement was, the Okinawan, Noboru Jahana, who was sent from Okinawa to Tokyo in the 1880s to study agriculture in a Japanese university, and became a prefectural official upon returning to Okinawa (Higa et al. 1997). Jahana interacted with various leaders of democratic movements and socialists in Tokyo.  In Okinawa, he took the initiative in  a movement with local farmers against an attempt made by then Prefectural Governor Narahara, who was sent from the mainland, to put the ownership of forest land under the national government, but this initiative failed in the end (ibid.).  It should be noted that  Okinawa Prefecture was established in 1879 but was not allowed to establish a local prefectural assembly until 1910, meaning that the governance of Okinawa was in the direct hands of the national government for three decades after the establishment of the Okinawa prefectural government (Iha 1998).  People in Okinawa had long suffered from the hardships of poverty since the Shimazu invasion of the early 17 century. th  In the process of modernization after the  Meiji Restoration, Okinawa remained the poorest region in Japan (Higa et al. 1997). In 1899 (Meiji 13), the first group of 27 Okinawan emigrants was sent to Hawaii and prior  104  to the Pacific War in 1941, 75,000 Okinawan people (11 percent of the 655,000 emigrants from Japan) had emigrated to Hawaii and North America (Tamamori and James 1995). At the beginning of the 20 century, the Okinawan economy was heavily th  dependent on local sugar production, but sugar prices were directly affected by international market factors.  Indeed, a dramatic drop in international sugar prices in  the 1920s led to a collapse in the regional economy due to heavy losses in sugar revenue (Higa et al. 1997). The national government's rescue plan for Okinawa that started in 1932 was postponed as Japan went on to a war footing (ibid.).  In the Pacific War, from 1941 to 1945, Okinawa became the only site on which ground battles between the Japanese imperial military forces and the U.S. forces took place. The main island of Okinawa,  Okinawa  Honto,  was the battlefield of Okinawa.  According to the former Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota (1996: 110-111), there were about 440,000 people in Okinawa before the U.S. attack began, and the number of U.S. soldiers sent to Okinawa was about 550,000.  66,000 soldiers from the Japanese  mainland, 28,000 Okinawan soldiers, and 130,000 Okinawan civilians were killed while 140,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in the battle over 80 days in 1945. In other words, about 20 percent of the total population of Okinawa was killed during this battle. Ota (1999) also noted that Imperial Headquarters were more seriously preparing for the protection of the mainland rather than of Okinawa because they did not regard Okinawa as part of the imperial land but a foreign territory.  The Imperial Headquarters' wartime  security strategy took into account the large stretch of water that separated the mainland and Okinawa at 30 degree North, and this characterized the mainland authority's th  attitude toward Okinawa (ibid.).  The war ended with the U.S. military occupying the  105 entire territory of Okinawa, including surrounding sea zones.  They sent all the  residents to local concentration camps and started to bulldoze land for the construction of military bases (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1997).  Okinawa was later placed under U.S. administration after the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty until the region's 1972 Reversion to the government of Japan. During the period of Japan's U.S. administration up to 1951, the U.S. military built bases, ports, military residential sites and other installations throughout Japan but mainly in Okinawa Honto, the largest Okinawan island where the majority of Okinawans live.  The  construction of numerous military bases and ports prevented local Okinawan people from accessing resources, such as water, fishing grounds, arable flatlands and forest, as well as cultural and religious sites and residences.  Meanwhile, the U.S. military bases  began to provide substantial direct and indirect employment to the local population, and thus established an economic dependence upon the bases. Yet, another serious problem caused by the U.S. occupation was a violation of Okinawan human rights at a time when mainlanders were enjoying the new freedoms granted under the new Japanese Constitution proclaimed in 1946. For example, a six-year girl was raped and killed by a U.S. soldier in 1955 but the suspect was not punished locally and was sent back to the United States.  This incident triggered Okinawans' struggle against the violation of  human rights by the U.S. military soldiers, but the incidences of rapes continued (Yui 1999). Thus, a sense of marginalization and colonization among Okinawans continued to build.  The limited access to local resources and the dependency of the local  economy and population on the presence of U.S. bases did not change dramatically after the 1950s, even after Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration in 1972. Some  106 researchers describe this condition as the coexistence of military colonialism and internal (or domestic) colonialism (see, for example, Harada and Yashita 1979) or, more metaphorically, as 'double colonization.'  3.2.2. The Period of U.S. Military Occupation  A more detailed consideration of the 1945-1972 period shows an increasing power of Okinawans to move the Japanese and U.S. governments to agree to the return of Okinawa to Japan. During the period between the end of the Pacific War in 1945 and the reversion to Japanese administration in 1972, Okinawa continued to challenge U.S. authorities through negotiations, protests and general resistance.  For example,  'island-wide struggles for land' (Shima Gurumi no Tochi Toso) occurred from 1953 to 1956 against the U.S. government when it proposed to complete a forcible takeover of Okinawan land for further U.S. bases with lump-sum payments made to exiting owners (see Ota 1999). The resultant process of change in the U.S. governance of Okinawa was complex.  Comprehensive research done by the Research and Legislative  Reference Department of the National Diet Library (1971) details the political relations between Okinawa and the United States.  In 1946, the U.S. occupation extended to the  entire Ryukyu Islands located on the south of latitude 30 degrees north. At that time, all the islands were grouped into four administrative territories, each of which elected its own governor and assembly members by popular vote.  The U.S. military occupying the Ryukyu Islands effectively controlled the four governments until 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was invoked.  At that  time, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), a civilian  107 government, replaced the military administration and the United States integrated the four island administrative territories to create a single Ryukyu government.  The latter  was to perform judiciary, administrative and legislative functions under the supervision of USCAR's orders.  Indeed, the president of the Ryukyu government was appointed by  USCAR (rather than through local elections) and the local Okinawan government did not have any diplomatic rights to represent Okinawan interests overseas.  Thus,  ultimately, the Ryukyu government was not an entity that represented the territory of Okinawa as it did not have any diplomatic rights (see, for example, Miyazato 1999).  As noted, through USCAR it was decided that the president of the Ryukyu government was to be appointed rather than elected by local people. However, in reality, this did not mean that the Ryukyu government had become a nation-state, instead it worked on behalf of U.S. government interests (see, for example, Miyazato 1999, Vogt 2001). It is important to note that the integration of the four island groups into one government in 1952 weakened Okinawan democracy and representation of various interests on the island as a whole.  It also signified the end of the U.S. experiment with  indirect governance of the Ryukyu Islands (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971).  According to the Research and  Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library, indirect governance ended in response to the intensification of the Korean War (1950-53) and subsequent U.S. policy changes that reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Ryukyu Islands in East Asia at the time of growing Cold War tensions. After 1952, a central political issue for Okinawans was the right to elect a president for the Ryukyu government by popular vote. This was finally accepted by the United States and popular election of  108  the president of the Ryukyu government occurred for the first time in 1968.  The Okinawan public, as well as the ruling and opposition political parties, continued to collectively protest the U.S. occupation and in 1955 international communities, such as the Asian-African People's Conference, who were opposed to American colonialism, began to focus on the Okinawa problem. As the situation in Okinawa became visible internationally, a popular movement for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan began to organize in mainland Japan as well.  Thus during the 1950s and 1960s, while voicing  opposition to the U.S. appropriation of privately owned land for the construction of U.S. bases, Okinawans demanded the right to the popular election of their president, as noted above.  The United States wanted to avoid international attention on the problems of  Okinawa because the United States needed to demonstrate their proficiency in democratic governance to the world in order not to be challenged by communist countries (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971).  The U.S.'s fear that Okinawa would become a second Cyprus prompted their 9  cooperation with the Japanese national government to ease tensions between Okinawa and the United States.  More precisely, although the United States did not think that  Okinawans would fight against them with weapons (as people in Cyprus did against the British occupation in the mid-1950s), they wanted to avoid having the U.S. occupation In Cyprus, in the 1950s, the Greek Cypriot population desired union with Greece apart from British control. In 1955, E O K A (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a terrorist group, began to attack British or British-connected targets in Cyprus. The British military in Cyprus (about 10,000 personnel) reacted and brutality expanded in Cyprus. The United States was afraid that Okinawa's protest against the U . S . occupation would evolve into violent actions and undermine the legitimacy of American democracy followed by communists' propaganda for its failure (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). 9  109 of Okinawa become an international issue (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971).  It was at this point that the  government of Japan became involved in resolving the Okinawa situation. Conversely, the United States wanted financial assistance from Japan for the economic development of Okinawa. Thus, both the U.S. and Japanese governments began to focus on economic and human development during the 1950s and 1960s.  However, the  Okinawan people continued to demand nothing less than complete political reversion from U.S. occupation (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971).  Triggered by the United Nations' declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in 1960, the Ryukyu government's prefectural assembly, 75 percent of whose members belonged to the conservative Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, unanimously adopted a resolution for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and sent it to the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva, as well as to all UN member states (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). This political manoeuvre shocked both the U.S. and Japanese national governments. The attention the Okinawan resolution received was extraordinary; even the Soviet Union, which had historically ignored Okinawa, honoured this resolution and broadcasted the necessity of the reversion across USSR television networks (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). In response, both the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to increase financial assistance to ease frustrations in Okinawa, while Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party put pressure on their Okinawan counterparts to reverse the resolution. As the Vietnam War escalated  110 during the late 1960s and as U.S. military presence intensified, Okinawan politicians saw that the region's autonomy was further threatened, and so in 1965 both conservatives and reformists in Okinawa demanded the popular election of a president for the Ryukyu government as a means to acquire direct political control.  This action  resulted in forcing then Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to visit Okinawa. By 1967, the return of Okinawa was jointly announced by Sato and U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, and subsequent preparations for the return commenced between Japan and the United States (see Wakaizumi 2002 for a discussion of the process of reversion negotiations between Sato and Nixon).  As the date of reversion neared and details were drawn up in Tokyo as to the nature of Okinawan's reversion into Japanese territory, it became increasingly evident that U.S. bases would continue to stay in Okinawa.  Additionally, the Okinawan people realized  that they faced powerful mainland political interests who were opposed to their campaign for local autonomy. Due to the need to incorporate Okinawa as a 'regular' Japanese prefecture, some institutional structures in Okinawa had in fact became less democratic in nature, for example, the shift occurred from American-style elected school boards to appointed ones based on the Japanese model. National politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo led the process of reversion and standardization. In deciding upon the concrete nature of changes in Okinawa due to the reversion process, there was an official process through which regional interests were supposed to be taken into consideration but, in actuality, national interests superseded Okinawan concerns (see, for example, Kuba 1995). It is arguable that the Ryukyu government lacked the capacity to design the complicated process of reintegration that included such difficult tasks as  Ul  the conversion of currency from U.S. dollars to Japanese Yen and drawing up a huge body of new legislation.  However, it cannot be ignored that the lack of local  consultation left a deep-seated distrust of the national government within Okinawa. Therefore, while Okinawans expected their lives to substantially improve after reversion, they feared that local interests might be ignored in this third political, economic and cultural assimilation (the third Ryukyu Shobun).  3.2.3. Japanese Economic and Regional Planning and Okinawa (1972-2000)  Regional poverty was entrenched in Okinawa before World War II, and today it remains the poorest prefecture in Japan in terms of per capita income. As of 1998, the per capita income of Okinawa was 2,183,000 yen, which was the lowest among 47 prefectures and 73 percent of the national average.  10  Nevertheless, the standard of  living has improved gradually since the Pacific War, especially after the reversion, and today the lives of the people of Okinawa could hardly be considered miserable (Kurima 1998)."  One of the central policy objectives in Okinawa regional development has been to eliminate the economic gap, 'kakusa,' between Okinawa and other prefectures (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Kinyu Koko 1993).  This term 'kakusa' was used in Okinawa  Development Plans without any clear definition or criteria. In general, it refers to the  It should be noted that Okinawa's 1992 per capita income in monetary terms was equivalent to that of France as of 1992 (Tamamori and James 1995). Per capita income in Okinawa in 1995 was 71 percent of the national average and ranked in the lowest among 47 prefectures (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Planning and Development 1997), but Kurima (1998) argues in fiscal year 1993 only seven prefectures were above the average and the per capita income (2.1 million yen) was not significantly low compared with other poorer prefectures such as Kagoshima Prefecture and Miyazaki Prefecture in Kyushu and Aomori Prefecture, whose incomes were less than 2.3 million yen. 10  1 1  112 underdevelopment of industries and the resultant dependency on transfer payments from the national government and the U.S. military bases. Per capita income is often used as an indicator to express 'kakusa.' In Okinawa, as of the year of reversion (fiscal year 1972), it was as low as sixty percent of the national average, and thus substantial economic bolstering was acknowledged as being necessary (Tamamori and James 1995). As of 2001, Okinawa's per capita income was about seventy percent of the national average and stayed at the lowest level among 47 prefectures (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a).  Thus the notion of 'kakuscC continued to provide a  rationale for the provision of the special assistance transfer payment to Okinawa, and so did the high dependency on the transfer payment (see figure 3.1), but the term was eliminated from official development policy terminology in 2001.  Figure 3.1 Level of Okinawa's Dependency on Transfer Payments (Public Spending/Residents' Gross Expenditure), 1972-97  40  p^'  35 30 25 20 15  National Average  10 5 0 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Year Source: Okinawa Economic Development 2 1 Century Plan {Okinawa Keizai Shinko s  21 Seiki Plan)  113 Regardless of the ambiguity of the definition of 'kakusa,' it guaranteed Okinawans a moderate standard of living.  Because an authorized definition of the term 'economic  gap' is no longer used in policy-making, assessing to what extent 'kakusci' has narrowed is difficult.  Nevertheless, the definition of the term has been kept ambiguous. What  is important to note here is that the elimination of the term 'economic gap' has resulted in the loss of the major rationale behind governmental aid to Okinawa.  In September  2001, an article in the magazine, Voice, challenged the continuous provision of special assistance arguing that Okinawa has had already received generous subsidies and the national government should address the problems of other regions in equal measure. This complaint was representative of the growing frustration among some groups of both Okinawans (see, for example, Megumi 1997) and mainlanders (see, for example, critical articles about Okinawa appearing in such national newspapers as The Yomiuri Shimbun,  14 May 1997 and The Nihon Keizai Shimbun,  14 May 1997) with the  government's stance towards Okinawa and Okinawans' continual dependence on national subsidies.  In recent discussions on the development of Okinawa, the unique and problematic structure of its regional economy has been more seriously emphasized as a policy target, rather than 'kakuscC per se, by both local and mainland politicians and economists, based on the recognition that the traditional catch-up model would not be suitable to the Okinawa development (see, for example, Miyamoto 2000). The traditional economic development of Okinawa since the 1972 Reversion was guided under the framework of the Comprehensive National Development Plans mentioned in chapter 2.  When  Okinawa was reverted, the second Comprehensive National Development Plan (Zenso,  114  from 1969 to 1976) was being implemented and accordingly, Okinawa was added to the plan as a new planning region.  From the beginning, the role of Okinawa as an  international hub in the southern part of Japan was emphasized as the main approach to decrease 'kakusa' and promote Okinawa's self-reliant development.  Specific  development programs and projects were set out by the ten-year Okinawa Development Promotion Plan, formulated within a framework of the Comprehensive National Development Plan since 1972.  'Kakusa' was a top priority in the last three ten-year  plans (the first from 1972 to 1981, the second from 1982 to 1991, and the third from 1992 to 2001) revealing that the traditional planning approach had not been able to resolve the economic gap for three decades.  This term, however, was not adopted as a  goal in the fourth plan (New Okinawa Development Promotion Plan, starting from 2002); instead, the concepts of self-reliant and sustainable development were chosen (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 5 April 2002). Thus the catch-up model was abandoned and a more entrepreneurial model was adopted.  The problematic economic structure of Okinawa, which had not been addressed very effectively, can be characterized by: a declining primary sector suffering from the devastation of agricultural land by U.S. attacks during the Pacific War and the subsequent U.S. occupation of a large portion of productive agricultural land; an underdeveloped manufacturing sector despite intensive investment in industrial infrastructure (for example airports, ports, roads and local bridges) since 1972; and the rapid growth of a tertiary sector that outranked Tokyo in terms of its share in total gross prefectural product of 2001. The share of services in the local Okinawan economy was 83.3%, while that of Tokyo, which ranked second in Japan, was 82.3% (Okinawa  115  Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a).  In particular, tourism contributed  significantly to the prefectural economy, although major resort hotels were owned by mainland capital (Toguchi 1990).  This unique regional economic structure has  prompted criticism of national and prefectural level economic development planning. More than anything else, the underdevelopment of manufacturing industries has frustrated local citizens, businesses and politicians because the considerable amounts of public investment in industrial infrastructure have yielded no apparent progress in increasing the share of manufacturing industries.  The share of manufacturing  industries in the local economy was 9.1 percent as of 1972, and this fell to 5.9 percent as of 1998 (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a).  Some researchers even  argue that Okinawan culture is not conducive to establishing a manufacturing industry because the region and its people lack the ability to develop and operate complex work organizations, and lack also an entrepreneurial mindset (see, for example, Kurima 1998). Construction industries, with a share of 11.8 percent of the local economy as of 1998, have been a key area of Okinawa's secondary industry, but this sector has its own intrinsic weakness (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a).  This  weakness lies in the fact that the major construction projects are public works, such as roads and ports, which are funded by subsidies from the national government.  Thus,  ongoing changes in national subsidization policies directly affect this industry. As a result, the existent construction regime relies on the continuous flow of funds from the centre.  Finally, the most unique aspect of the Okinawa regional economy has been its dependence on U.S. military bases. In 1972, U.S. military related incomes (including  116 rent payment to landowners, income of base workers, and military personnel and families consumption) accounted for 15.6% of Okinawa's total gross expenditure, and in 1998 this share had declined to 5.6%.  These bases have provided local civilians with  employment and generated a need for various local services. For local landowners whose property was being used by the U.S. military, the bases provided income in the form of rent from the Japanese government.  It is also important to note that a  'military-industrial city' did not develop in Okinawa as in some cities in the United States (Markusen et al. 1991); 'GI-service cities' such as Okinawa City and Kadena Town have been created instead.  3.3. Declining Dependency on U.S. Military Bases  After the 1972 Reversion, the structure of Okinawa's dependency began to change. This section will address changes in Okinawa's economic dependency on U.S. military bases and the distinctive political role of territorial identity. Together with the above discussions, the following presents the distinctive 'substateness' of Okinawa.  3.3.1. Economic Change in Okinawa 1958-2000  The construction of military bases under U.S. occupation, particular in the early 1950s, and the presence of U.S. military personnel and their families provided employment to the people of Okinawa.  The total labour force in Okinawa was about  420,000 in 1968 with base workers making up about 400,000. In 1958, the number of base workers was 300,000 but due to the escalation of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, it rapidly increased (Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai 1970). Major local construction firms were established during this period for base housing construction (Tamamori and James  117 1995).  Services such as bars and restaurants for Americans also grew. Consequently,  a small-scale agricultural community in Okinawa was transformed into a U.S. military base dependent community (Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai 1970). Before the reversion, in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, military base workers, including those hired directly and indirectly by the U.S. military, accounted for nearly ten percent of Okinawa's labour force (ibid.). However, since 1970 the dismissal of employees continued and the number of those hired directly by the U.S. military reduced from approximately 26,000 in 1970 to 19,000 in 1972 (a 30 percent reduction) and in 1975 this figure fell again to just 11,000 (Kakazu 1980). As of 1995, approximately 8,300 base workers earned 52.3 billion yen (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998).  . The level of rent to land used by the U.S. military has been a substantial economic income on the island, and this increased by approximately six times upon the reversion in order to maintain cooperation from landowners for the continuous use of their land for the bases.  Thus, the high rent level was due to political considerations (see, for  example, Kurima 1998, Takara 1981).  It should be noted that under U.S. occupation,  owners of the land received rent directly from the U.S. administration, but after the reversion, the Japanese government began to pay this land rent.  There were  approximately 27,000 landowners receiving rents as of 1978 (Takara 1981) and 31,000 as of year 2000 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001).  In terms of  the types of landownership, it is characteristic that 87 percent of land used by U.S. bases on the Japanese mainland was owned by the Japanese government as of 1997, while the Okinawan local population collectively owned 33 percent (ibid.). This means that the  118 dependency of individual owners on U.S. base-related rent is trivial in the mainland.  As noted, services grew as a new form of economic activity due to the presence of the military bases.  A distinct example of the growth of services is represented by the  emergence of new commercial cities around the gates of the bases.  In particular, Koza  City (a part of present Okinawa City) and Ginowan City rapidly grew in the 1950s as entertainment districts for U.S. soldiers (Molasky 1999). These cities appeared on former agricultural fields.  In addition, Naha City, Urasoe City, Chatan City and  Kadena Town all grew as base cities in the 1950s and 1960s (see Maeshiro 1984).  In terms of dependency on military-related incomes (consumption expenditure, rent on military land, and base workers' wages), their weight in total prefectural gross expenditures accounted for 15.6 percent in 1972. However, this share fell below ten percent after 1977, and as of 1998 it was 5.2 percent (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). However, this trend needs to be interpreted carefully. For example, the total amount of military-related incomes was about 187 billion yen as of 1998, while the gross product of primary industries (i.e. agriculture, forestry and fishery) of the same year in Okinawa Prefecture was about 74 billion yen, in which 39,000 employees were engaged (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001b). This simple comparison shows the significant contribution of the presence of U.S. bases to the Okinawan economy. On the contrary, Kuba (2000) argues that the presence of the bases has deprived Okinawan people of development opportunities and further, has imposed serious negative impacts on local economic activities, such as pollution and noise.  Still, for those who are dependent on military-related incomes, a sudden change  119 caused by the closure of any of the bases would be hard to accept, as observed also in the United States (Accordino 2000) and in Germany (Cunningham et al. 1995). Further, the municipalities in which the bases are located also receive national subsidies as compensation for the loss of revenues caused by the bases that do not pay tax to them. However, as Kuba (2000) argues, in Japan the bases are serious obstacles for the Okinawan economy from a comprehensive and long-term perspective.  These two  opposing views have caused a dilemma among Okinawans in deciding which attitude to take toward the presence of the bases.  3.3.2. M u n i c i p a l Dependence on N a t i o n a l Subsidies Related to U . S . M i l i t a r y Bases  The above mentioned figures show that the relative dependency of the Okinawan people's economic life on U.S. bases decreased continuously since the reversion. But this does not mean that new economic activities took their place and continued to sustain people's lives.  As indicated earlier, the growth of tourism in Okinawa was distinctive  but it alone was not sufficient to provide employment and public services to the local people.  With the mission of guiding a smooth re-incorporation of the prefecture into  Japanese economic and administrative systems and eliminating the uneven status of Okinawa, the national government has applied standardized assistance measures to compensate for the significant disadvantages caused by the presence of U.S bases (see Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). This assistance has been in the form of two types of subsidies; one for the alleviation of the negative impacts caused by the presence of U.S. bases and military activities, and the other for various financial burdens, both of which will be elaborated below.  120 An important feature of these national subsidies was (and still is) that they targeted Okinawa's municipalities directly, and not the prefecture; and specifically those cities in which bases were located.  There are 52 municipalities in Okinawa Prefecture (as of  October 2003), out of which 25 have U.S. military installations (the total area is shown in Appendix 1). Subsidies were set by the national government for such municipalities in order to facilitate local development.  It is also important to note that municipalities  also receive rents from the national government when lands owned by municipalities are used by the U.S. military.  These subsidies played an important role in establishing a special relationship between base-related municipalities and the national government.  Two major subsidies  became available; each administered by different national agencies.  The first was the  subsidy given by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency {Boei Shisetsu Cho) and the second, given by the Ministry of Home Affairs LJichi Sho)}  2  The former involves  compensation for reducing the impacts from bases, including soundproofing of housing, road improvement, and compensation for damage done to local fisheries, and so on. Individual residents were major recipients of this subsidy.  The latter relates to  municipal taxation, and the recipients were municipalities in which U.S. bases were located.  For municipalities, property tax, city planning tax, residential tax and  municipal tax from U.S. bases have not been available, even when bases are located within their jurisdictions.  Moreover, they did not receive these taxes from U.S.  military personnel or from their families living outside of bases. Thus, the national  The Ministry of Home Affairs was reorganized into the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications in 2001 in the reorganization of government ministries. See the following English website about the reorganization made by the Cabinet Office: <>. 1 2  121  subsidies aimed to compensate these constraints on local taxation (see, for example, Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001).  In terms of the share of these subsidies in total municipal revenues in the fiscal year 1997, the highest was 33 percent in Kin Town, the second was 32 percent in Onna Village, and the third was 27 percent in Ginoza Village (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001) (see Appendix 6). In terms of absolute amount, Nago City received the most in 1997, 37.3 billion yen; Okinawa City received 31 billion yen; and Kin Town received 29.7 billion yen (ibid.).  Kadena Town, a municipality whose land  area was most dominantly being used by bases (83 percent) compared to other Okinawan municipalities, depended on subsidies by 26 percent, ranking fourth (ibid.). Because these municipalities with a large share of military sites were put under special constraints in relation to the use of local land resources, they continue to face special disadvantages for local economic development.  Accordingly, as discussed in chapter 2,  obtaining subsidies for public works projects became a priority for such municipal governments so as to improve economic and living conditions.  In this relationship between municipalities and subsidies, the structure of the dependency of the base-related municipalities on the subsidies was formed (see, for example, Kawase 2000 for more details). In this regard, Kurima (1998) argued that there was a substantial amount of land suitable for agriculture that was underused in the base-related municipalities, and emphasized that new industries did not necessarily need large areas, thus arguing that a lack of land could not justify the absence of economic development activities.  This argument of course was intended to emphasize the  122 importance of local entrepreneurship in economic development.  Yet while Kurima's  idea may be practical in some municipalities, it has been quite difficult to realize. As mentioned above, 83 percent of Kadena Town's jurisdiction has been used by the U.S. air force (see Appendix 7). The town is relatively small (15 square kilometers) and only an area of 2.6 square kilometers is used, but approximately 14,000 residents inhabit that residual area (approximate population density in this area is 5,400/sq km). According to Kawase (2000), the town used to receive national subsidies for public works projects, but by 1996, it was not able to find further projects to be subsidized. This was because major projects, such as building infrastructure, the city hall and a local community centre, were already completed and furthermore, additional projects would have caused inconveniences to local citizens' lives due to the small land area of the township.  This extreme case disclosed the fact that the current system of special  subsidies was not well designed to help such municipalities.  3.4. The Politics of Cultural Identity in Okinawa 1952-1995 3.4.1. Promoting Cultural Identity for the Promotion ofthe Reversion of Okinawa  Okinawa's desire for returning to Japanese administration grew as early as the 1950s. In 1956, the biggest anti-U.S. movement occurred and was associated with a claim for the enhancement of autonomy by the Ryukyu government, which was put under the administration of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) after 1952 (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971: 12).  At that time, USCAR regarded Okinawa as the newest U.S.  territory and prohibited Okinawans from officially announcing that they were Japanese nationals (ibid: 13).  As noted, the United States feared that they would face a  123 movement similar to that which had occurred in the 1950s when Cyprus argued that it should be returned to Greek administration.  As previously discussed, in 1962, the  Okinawa legislative assembly (Okinawa Rippo In) finally adopted an appeal for the right of Okinawans to return to Japanese administration and sent this to the United Nations and its member states (ibid.). This resolution stunned both the Japanese and U.S. governments because they did not want to bring the issue to the attention of the international community.  Subsequently, U.S. President John F. Kennedy clarified that  the United States had no intention of continuing to administer Okinawa in the future (ibid.).  In Japan, a resolution for the restoration of the administrative right to Japan  was adopted unanimously in 1962 both in the Lower and Upper House (ibid.). However, as the Vietnam War escalated during the late 1960s, the U.S. government was less interested in returning Okinawa, in order to secure strategic military bases. Okinawans' claim for stronger autonomy, typified by the call for a system of popular election for the president of the Ryukyu government (Syuseki), therefore remained constrained.  As USCAR suppressed their pro-return political activities, Okinawans  shifted their strategy of protest to target the illegitimacy of the Americans' dominance over the use of land.  The movement against the U.S. administration transformed from  a return to Japan movement to an anti-war peace movement (Hansen heiwa undo) (Onga 1999). As discussed in section 3.2.2, public protests in the mid-1960s occurred on an Okinawa-wide scale, and the intensification of the claim for the popular election was perceived as a threat to the Japanese government (Masuyama 1999).  In this process, the ethnicity of Okinawan people played an important role in affecting the attitudes of the Americans and Japanese toward the administration of  124 Okinawa.  In particular, during the 1960s a significant portion of Okinawan people  wished to be recognized as Japanese, in order to enhance their chances of full reversion to Japan and hopefully to increase their local autonomy.  Yet, according to Kawashima  (1999), there was an argument within the U.S. occupation forces that the separation of Okinawa from Japan was legitimate because Okinawan people were not Japanese and thus Japan had no right to be involved.  Indeed, Iha Fuyu, a native Okinawan and a  leading scholar of Okinawa's history, ethnology, linguistics, and literature, recognized as the pioneer in the study of Okinawa  (Okinawa  Gaku),  mentioned that General Douglas  MacArthur stated in 1947 that Okinawans were not Japanese and thus the Japanese government should not oppose the U.S. possession of Okinawa (Iha 1998). This claim was rejected by a distinguished Japanese ethnologist, Yanagita Kunio (Kawashima 1999). However, in the 1950's, the Japanese mainlanders were not very clear about whether Okinawans were identical in ethnic background to the mainland Japanese. For example, Higa et al. (1997) mentioned that there was a well-known story in Okinawa that when the first group of Japanese mainland politicians visited Okinawa after World War II in 1954, they asked Okinawan journalists whether there was a Japanese newspaper in Okinawa.  Higa et al. (1997) also noted that then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama  stated mistakenly that Okinawa was under the UN trusteeship in his answer to a question in the Diet in 1955. Moreover, a well-known journalist's (Fujiyama Udai) findings of general Japanese knowledge about Okinawa, based on his interviews across Japan from north (Hokkaido) to south (Kyushu), was informative. His findings, published in an edition of  Fujin Koron  13  issued in March 1958, noted that, predominantly, mainland  Japanese were not clear about the ethnicity, language or even the location of Okinawa.  1 3  Monthly magazine targeting women, issued first in 1916.  125  These anecdotes show that Okinawa was widely recognized as being different from mainland Japan, not only by the mainland Japanese but also by Americans.  Yet, Higa  et al. (1997) noted that an anthropological study published in 1950 concluded that the characteristics of the physical features of Okinawans were not significantly different from those of the Japanese living on the mainland.  All of these examples suggest that it was not surprising that mainland Japanese were unclear about the ethnicity of Okinawans at the time. Due to this ambiguity, it was difficult for Okinawans to share a sense of solidarity with the mainlanders and gain sufficient support from them. Indeed, Higa et al. (1997) stressed the difficulty of expanding the movement for the return of Okinawa to Japan on a national scale, based on their observation that a public rally for promoting the return of Okinawa held in Okinawa in 1962 drew 70,000 people, while in Tokyo it drew less than 500 people. Thus, action for promoting the return of Okinawa intended to obtain democratic rights equal to those enjoyed by the mainland Japanese, yet it was not shared widely with the Japanese mainlanders.  During the period of the U.S. occupation, the standardization of Okinawan dialects was encouraged, in general, because Okinawans wanted to boost nationalism in order to be released from the U.S. (aliens') occupation and return to Japan (see The Okinawa Times 1998). Because schoolteachers were central in the movement of the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese administration, standard Japanese was strictly enforced in classrooms and students were prohibited to speak Okinawa dialect (ibid.).  Yet overall,  in comparison with the Okinawans' desire to seek affinity with mainland Japan,  126 mainlanders considered Okinawans somewhat differently. It should be noted that the Okinawans' pro-return movement was based on the claim that they were Japanese and had a right to be integrated into Japan, thereby being released from the control of the different ethnic groups (i.e. Americans), iminzoku (Enoki 1999, Teruya and Yamazato 1995). Enoki (1999) notes that the concept of this movement was criticized as an expression of ethno-nationalism lacking a concern for the risk of the absorption of Okinawan culture into these mainland standardized culture, such as the obligation of the raising of the national flag and education. The next section will discuss the continuous inequality in the way Okinawans have been dealt with in Japanese society in relation to the U.S. bases and more broadly, their cultures, and changes in the identities of Okinawans and their political implication.  3.4.2. Problems in Establishing Okinawa's Cultural Identity  After 1972, Okinawa was put under the Japanese system and its citizens began to be treated as Japanese nationals; therefore the ethnicity (Japaneseness) of Okinawan people was no longer an issue to be argued. However, they soon learned that the Japanese government had little intention to negotiate seriously with the United States to close the bases on Okinawa, and so their distrust of the government grew. The continuous presence of the bases placed Okinawan people under exceptionally dangerous living conditions.  Indeed, they continuously faced airplane crashes, crash landings, water  pollution, forest fires and individual crimes, such as vicious, violent, intellectual crimes and moral offences (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). These accidents and incidents frequently occurred and were reported in detail by local newspapers, such as The Okinawa Times and The Ryukyu Shimpo, but they failed to  127 appear in major national Japanese newspapers such as The Asahi Shimbun and The Yomiuri Shimbun.  Therefore, the opportunities for the mainlanders to recognize the  seriousness of the many problems faced in Okinawa relating to U.S. military activities and bases were limited (Ando 1997).  It is important to note that in Okinawa two major local newspapers have dominated the market.  According to a survey published by Naito Issui Sha (an advertising  agency), 99 percent of the average monthly issues of morning papers in Okinawa from July to December 2001 were dominated by two major local newspapers (i.e. The Ryukyu Shimpo  and The Okinawa Times) while the remainder were two major national papers  (i.e. The Asahi Shimbun and The Nihon Keizai Shimbun), which shared 24 percent of the total Japanese national market. Shimbun,  Two other major national papers (i.e. The Yomiuri  which has the largest circulation, and The Mainichi Newspapers) were not  circulated in Okinawa at all. From this we may conclude that there is no such prefecture in the mainland in which local papers dominate such a high proportion of circulation.  This suggests the existence of a considerable perception gap between  Okinawans and mainlanders concerning the impacts of the presence of U.S. military bases on the local society of Okinawa.  Thus, sharing a common awareness of the  issues relating to the bases has not been easy between Okinawans and Japanese mainlanders.  Indeed, the latter's interests in Okinawa are directed by advertisements from the tourism industry and mass media, focusing on the distinctiveness and exoticism of Okinawan performing arts, such as music, festivals, foods and the sub-tropical natural  128 landscape, where the bases are out of sight (see, for example, Japan Airlines 1999, which featured a report entirely on Okinawa's traditional summer festival). This is because tourism is a major industry of Okinawa.  In other words, differences between Okinawa  and the mainland are disseminated typically for commercial and entertainment purposes (i.e. leisure for the mainlanders).  The differences in the conditions of local daily life  and the disadvantaged status of Okinawans within Japan are more difficult for the mainlanders to see partly due to the low coverage from the mainland mass media, in addition to the geographical isolation of Okinawa from the mainland. Therefore, it is difficult for the issues of differences in status and rights to be shared and addressed by Okinawans and the Japanese mainlanders.  For Okinawans, the delay in the elimination of differences in status and rights after the reversion, and their awareness of the impossibility of changing the situation within the current national system, led to a critique of the reversion and a demand for greater local autonomy or, more radically, independence (Taira 2001). According to Arasaki (1984: 3-4), the disappointment of Okinawans with the reversion was revealed in a survey of the attitude of Okinawans toward the reversion conducted annually by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute since 1970.  Arasaki (1984) suggests that  respondents who were positive toward the reversion outnumbered those who were negative in 1972, but this reversed in 1973.  In 1975 and 1977, the latter still  outnumbered the former, but in 1982, the former outnumbered the latter.  As far as this  survey is concerned, it took six to ten years for the Okinawans to see the reversion in a positive light. The 2002 survey of the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (587 respondents over age 20) mentioned that the positive attitude continued to increase  129 since 1977 but its proportion in the 2002 survey, 76 percent, had dropped from the 1992 survey, which was 81 percent (see NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 2002). These outcomes of the surveys show that the majority of Okinawan respondents thought positively of the reversion. However, the reduction of the support for the reversion in 2002 implies that Okinawans are still ambivalent about the reversion.  An extreme claim that represents the critical attitude of local people toward the reversion is the one supporting the independence of Okinawa from Japan, including the idea of the federalization of Japan (see All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union 1998, Oishi 1998, Ota 2003).  The All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers'  Union (1998) shows that there have been eight major conceptual discussions on the institutional designing of independence and regional autonomy since 1971. Both Oishi (1998) and Ota (2003) argue that discussions on the independence of Okinawa had gained momentum in the late 1990s, although they both acknowledge that the discussions had remained largely conceptual.  Oishi (1998) notes that there are two  groups concerned with the issues of independence of Okinawa: the first group includes mass media (for example The Nihon Keizai Shimbun) and nonpartisan intellectuals, and the other includes activists and politicians who have opposed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. According to Oishi (1998), the former is represented by such an intellectual as Kazuhisa Ogawa (an international politics and military analyst), and the latter is represented by Arasaki Moriteru (former president of Okinawa University).  Ota (2003)  also introduces a few of the key players addressing the issues of independence: Chikushi Tetsuya (a well-known Japanese TV newscaster and a journalist for The Asahi Shimbun), Koji  Taira (professor  emeritus  of Economics at the University of Illinois,  130 Urbana-Champaign), Chojo Oyama (former mayor of Koza City, now Okinawa City), and the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union Okinawa Project (1998), which was mentioned above.  The continuing discussions on the independence of  Okinawa from Japan suggest that the incorporation of Okinawa into the Japanese administration has not been a complete one, in the thirty years from the 1972 Reversion, in terms of the Okinawans' sense of belonging to Japan.  In sum, Okinawans' attitude  toward the incorporation has softened gradually since the reversion, as indicated by the changing results of the surveys, but the uneasiness among Okinawans from continuing to receive decisions made by the centre does not seem to disappear easily.  Furthermore,  the legitimacy of demanding stronger power of self-determination continues to be built and discussed by leading intellectuals and groups both inside and outside Okinawa.  Identity is considered to be the fundamental driving force that makes Okinawans' attitude toward the Japanese mainland or the central government unstable.  According  to The Ryukyu Shimpo (9 January 1997), a survey of Japanese Prefectural Consciousness conducted by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (1996) showed that Okinawans tended to have a stronger attachment for their home province, and a poll conducted by The Ryukyu Shimpo in December 2001 also showed that Okinawans tended to be proud of themselves as Okinawans (uchinanchu)  (1 January 2002).  Suzuki and Oiwa (1996) introduce Shoichi Chibana's exploration into the identities of Okinawans (note that Chibana was well-known for his act of burning the Japanese flag, Hinomaru,  at a national Softball game held in Yomitan Village in 1987 as a protest  against the enforcement of raising the flag by the president of the Japan Softball Association).  Three types of Okinawans are differentiated by Chibana based on their  131 response to the question "Are you Japanese?" The first type of Okinawans will say "Yes, I'm Japanese." The second will say "No, I'm Ryukyu."  The third will say "I'm  both, but Okinawan first" (Suzuki and Oiwa 1996: 23). Because identities are not fixed or immutable (Herb and Kaplan 1999), it is not meaningful to specify which identity is dominant in Okinawa. Though, suffice it to say that their identity as Okinawans remains strong, as indicative of the popular use of the term uchinanchu (local people) as opposed to yamatonchu Uchinanchu  (mainlanders).  For example, it is characteristic that the  Conference, which aimed to facilitate mutual exchange between local  Okinawans and Okinawans who immigrated to foreign countries including Hawaii, North America and Latin America and their descendents, was held under the initiative of Okinawa Prefecture (Tamamori and James 1995). The first conference was held in 1990, a second one in 1995 and a third one in 2001, and each gathered 2,400, 3,400 and 4,000 Okinawan emigrants from these foreign countries respectively (see the website of Okinawa  Prefecture  International>).  Exchange Such  division:  continuous  and  <www. large-scale  gatherings suggest the persistence of a distinctive territorial and cultural identity of an Okinawan people.  This type of international event involving exchange between local  residents and emigrants, one that shows the vitality of territorial collective and cultural identity, has been held only in Okinawa in Japan.  Emigrants from Okinawa to foreign countries, which began in 1889 to Hawaii, were often discriminated against by other Japanese emigrants mainly because of the peculiarity of their language, and thus they had an inferiority complex (Hokama 1998). Indeed, the use of the dialect of Okinawa was prohibited in local schools and had even  132 elicited punishment since 1879 when Okinawa was incorporated into Japan as a prefecture under the Meiji government, and harsh measures were taken to standardize the Japanese language (Yamazato 1999). Discouragement of the use of the dialect of Okinawa continued even after World War II up until the 1950s (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 April 2000).  In the Japanese mainland, Okinawans were often discriminated against  because of their dialect (see, for example, Rabson 2003: 110-112).  However, the  dialect began to regain popularity among Okinawans in the 1990s and they became more interested in learning it (The Okinawa Times, 10 November 2000).  In 2002, the  establishment of an institute that aimed to popularize the dialects of Okinawa (Okinawa Hogen Fukyii Kyogikai)  was symbolic of the growing interest among Okinawans to  preserve and use them (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 5 October 2000). does not seem to be decreasing (Kuniyoshi 2001).  Their cultural identity  Hein (2001a: 33) argues that the  revitalization of Okinawan cultural identity had grown in the 1990s, and the reconceptualization of and debate over the identity had been promoted not only in relation to the Japanese nation but also in relation to international 'global citizenship.' Hein (2001a: 33) further notes that the revitalization of Okinawan cultural identity is related to the adequacy of political representation within the Japanese political systems and local bargaining power relative to U.S. military forces.  In other words, Okinawans  are now rethinking their collective past and imagining their future, which are both relevant to their political representation and power but also causing tensions, not only between the state and Okinawa but also within Okinawa (ibid.).  These discussions suggest that two opposing cultural movements are developing in Okinawa.  One involves the renewed interest in promoting the distinctiveness of  133 Okinawan culture represented by the discussions on independence, the networking of Okinawans around the world, and the revival of the dialects of Okinawa.  The other  involves the increase of Okinawans' positive attitude toward the integration of Okinawa into Japan represented by the surveys of NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute. In sum, Okinawans' continuous struggles with identifying themselves illuminate the presence of a multiplicity of cultures within Japan.  Also, the diverse views toward  their relationship with the nation-state support the relevance of multiculturalism to the Japanese society, and the increase of internal and external political tensions caused by multiple cultures as mentioned by Hein (2001b).  3. 5. Summary The above discussions examined the distinguished historical processes and mechanisms of the continued existence of the dominant-subordinate relationship between the Japanese mainland powers and Okinawa up until today.  This chapter  showed that Okinawa had the major elements that would characterize it as being a substate as defined by Kymlicka and others.  These are mainly related to territory,  history, language, cultural and minority identity, and disrespect of minorities' unequal status.  First, Okinawan people had their own state in the past, i.e. the Ryukyu  Kingdom, which existed until 1879 under the Meiji government, even though it was only in form. This had significant implications for the formation of an Okinawan collective identity.  In short, while the mainland Japanese respected Shogun and the Meiji  Emperor, Okinawans continued to respect the King of the Ryukyu.  Thus, the  abolishment of the kingdom in 1879 symbolized a shared history of humiliation and also continued to provide an image of an independent territory separated from the mainland.  134 Second, the ethnicity of Okinawans remained a long and controversial issue. From the time of the Shimazu invasion in the beginning of the 17 century until the 1972 th  Reversion, the ethnicity of Okinawans was used rather politically by external powers. For example, the Tokugawa Shogunate dealt with Okinawans as foreigners in order to demonstrate its expanding power, and General Douglas MacArthur alleged that Okinawans were not Japanese in order to prevent Japan's involvement in Okinawa's return movement.  At present, cultural differences are issues more relevant for both  Okinawans and the mainland Japanese.  An important feature that characterizes  Okinawans' seemingly ethnocultural identity is the fact that they are proud to be Okinawans (or uchinanchu) before Japanese (or yamatonchu).  Thus, the first element,  the territoriality of Okinawans, and the second one, their ethnocultural distinctiveness, together formed the minority and substandard status of the Okinawan people. Their dilemmatic attitude toward the use of Okinawan dialect reveal their desire for eradicating this minority status.  Further to this, Chibana's protest against the  flag-raising ceremony symbolized the Okinawans' deep-rooted distrust of the mainland authority.  Third, Okinawans suffered from the disrespect of the national majorities, i.e. the Japanese mainlanders and their central government, due to the existence of unequal conditions. These were caused by the concentration of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, mainly on Okinawa Hontd.  It should be noted that substate nations are often  characterized by their affinity to distinctive local languages, for example in Quebec, Scotland or Catalonia.  In the case of mainland Japan and Okinawa, language was not  an important factor that triggered the substate movement in the 1990s, rather it was the  135  presence of the bases and further, the institutions that allowed their presence. characterized the distinctiveness of Okinawa's substate movement.  This  The presence of  economic inequality was criticized by Okinawans, but it was not a central force for the development of Okinawa's challenge to the national government.  Three elements  confirm the status of Okinawa as a substate: Territoriality, identity and the presence of U.S. military bases. These factors are mutually interrelated and enhanced the sense of status inequality among Okinawans and their dissatisfaction against the national government and national policies.  The attitudes of the national government toward Okinawa after the 1972 Reversion are characterized by its disrespect of the status inequalities between Okinawa and the rest of Japan mainly caused by the concentration of the bases, and by an emphasis on economic inequalities and compensation, typically through increased transfer payment and subsidies. The national government treated Okinawa as equal to other prefectures in terms of economic compensation, but had never seriously recognized Okinawans' dissatisfaction with the status inequality at a policy level.  As signified by the term 'the  second Ryukyu Syobun,' Okinawans' distrust of the national government dated back to the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty agreed to separate Okinawa from Japan and as a result, the trajectory of the reconstruction of life in Okinawa in the postWorld War II era became dramatically different from that of the mainland. The disregard of the national government for Okinawans' desire for the reversion to Japan, that grew under the U.S. occupation, was also not taken seriously until the end of the 1960s.  In addition, the national government did not consider Okinawa's desire for  regional autonomy prior to the reversion, instead Okinawan politics and economies were  136 largely reorganized and integrated into national systems after 1972.  The national  government's focus on economic inequalities helped the growth of Okinawa's local economies over three decades, but this national approach resulted in an increase in the dependence of Okinawa on subsidies, as well as on the bases to a lesser extent, and consequently, the weak economic structure became rooted.  The national government  thus continued to practice economic politics through the arrangement of the amount of subsidies, and to manage Okinawa's frustration against the persistent concentration of the bases on Okinawa.  Although Okinawa's dependence on the bases has decreased, the impacts of their presence on local politics, economy, space and society are still decisive and complex. The strong and persistent dependence of the Okinawa economy on external processes and dynamics and its resultant weak structure are intertwined with regional and national politics and have deeply affected development policy-making and planning at both governmental levels. Linkages between economy and politics have become more complex as demands from both those advocating entrepreneurship and deregulation and those promoting the protection of weak industries increase.  In addition, awareness of  local environmental problems, already serious in Okinawa, has further complicated these linkages.  Okinawans' protest in 1995 against the presence of U.S. bases was aimed at what was the differentiated status conferred only onto Okinawa by the national government.  It  became clear that the Okinawan people and the mainland Japanese did not share a common history. Consequently, Okinawa's 'substate' condition was reinforced.  137  Part II The Negotiations for the Return of U.S. Military Bases and Regional Development  Part II presents a case study of the emergence of a substate nation, Okinawa, in Japan during the period from 1995 to 2000 and its impacts on the transformation of the core-periphery relationship.  In Part II, I will examine the process of negotiations  between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture on the return of U.S. bases and the regional economic development, which were closely interrelated as policy issues. Through the case study, I will attempt to demonstrate both the significance and limitations of the notion of status inequality as a source of power for the peripheral substate nation to rid itself of its long-standing subordinate position within the country.  Chapter 4 will describe the trigger for the initiation of the prefecture's 'politics of recognition' against the national government, a trigger that led to dynamic and complex negotiations at multiple levels between the national government and Okinawa which will be discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In these three chapters, six 'policy forums,' which provided national and Okinawan actors with opportunities to develop dialogues and collaborate or build coalitions, will be examined. In the six 'policy forums,' specific administrative and/or political arrangements were made.  In each forum, actions and  reactions of major actors, and resulting decisions and rules will be highlighted, and the dimensions of authorities and responsibilities contested by the various actors will be disclosed.  In sum, the 'politics of recognition' and the 'politics of redistribution'  interacted dynamically and intricately in these 'policy forums.'  138 Chapter 5 will show two 'policy forums,' both in which the prime minister and the prefectural governor played a major role in rearranging the new project of the return of U.S. bases (section 5.1) and local oriented development (section 5.2).  Section 5.1 will  discuss the Consultative Body on Military Base Issues and section 5.2 the Okinawa Policy Council.  The two 'policy forums' discussed in chapter 6 are the Roundtable on  the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (section 6.1) and the Nago Referendum (section 6.2). This chapter will address the formation of a new political relationship between the national government and municipal governments concerning the issues of the relocation of U.S. bases and local economic development. It is important to note that the involvement of non-governmental actors characterized both forums.  In the first forum, institutional elites such as university professors and  union leaders played an important role in building national-municipal relationships. In the second forum, local civil society and local business were involved in the issues relating to the relocation of a base and had influence on the national-municipal relationships.  Chapter 7 will  show the relaxation of the Tokyo-Okinawa  intergovernmental tension after the emergence of new Prefectural Governor Keiichi Inamine and new Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi.  The impacts of Inamine's entrance  into the prefectural government on the harmonization of prefectural and national interests after the 1998 gubernatorial election will be discussed in section 7.1. Section 7.2 will show Obuchi's distinctive 'politics of recognition' in terms of his bold decision to hold a G8 2000 Summit and the influence of this on Okinawa.  This study will end with the G8 Summit, the point at which both the governor and the Nago city mayor accepted the relocation of Futenma Air Station, even if it came with  139 conditions.  Also, the political tension between Tokyo and Okinawa was significantly  relaxed, at least at the intergovernmental level.  140  CHAPTER 4 The Context of the Case Study: The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the Futenma Air Station Proposal  4.1. Introduction  The purpose of this chapter is to provide contextual data and other information in a narrative form that explores the processes and mechanisms of change in the centre-periphery relationship between the Japanese national government, Okinawa's prefectural and municipal governments, and the latter's civil society. The time period covered is from 1995 to 2000. Chapter 4 explores the changes in external and internal dynamics so as to set the background for a lengthier discussion of the evolution of negotiations between the Japanese government and Okinawan governmental and civic actors in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  This study deals with a policy issue directly related to national security: the presence and return of U.S. military bases on Okinawa.  The involvement of the U.S.  government demonstrates the distinctive nature of the change in national-regional relations between Tokyo and Okinawa in the context of global-local linkages. This is because the issue of the presence of U.S. bases has been strategically important for both the national government and the prefecture.  Over the course of this study, the  processes of conflicts and mediation between national interests and regional interests will be presented, with the intent of revealing shifts in Tokyo's attitude towards Okinawa and negotiations over its substate status.  In the sections to follow, I will first lay out the new political context emerging at the  141 global level in the late 1980s and early 1990s that altered the perspectives of substate nations around the world, and those of local decision-makers and the Okinawan public concerning the presence of U.S. bases.  I will then present the beginnings of the  unprecedented challenge of Okinawan people against the presence of the bases and the Japanese government, who allowed these bases to stay in Okinawa even after the 1995 schoolgirl rape case.  Lastly, I will discuss a joint international forum established by  the Japanese and U.S. governments, the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), in order to address the rise of antagonism from Okinawan people against the bases and the governments which appeared in the form of an anti-base social movement after the rape case.  A chronology of key events (1995-2000) together with the various 'actors' and 'forums' discussed in this chapter is shown in table 4.1.  This table aims to facilitate the  understanding of a sequence of events, i.e. 'policy forums,' and the roles of the major actors.  It separates the events largely into two periods: pre-SACO and post-SACO.  Because of the significance of their influences, names of the prime ministers and prefectural governors are provided. Each 'policy forum' will be discussed separately in individual sections from 5.1 to 7.2, respectively shown after the titles of the 'policy forums.'  There are six types of actors shown in this table; they are the major actors  who were involved in the 'politics of recognition' and the 'politics of redistribution' in various capacities and intensities. The table also shows initiators, decision-makers and influential actors in each 'policy forum' in order to briefly describe the nature of each.  142 Table 4.1 Chronological Actor/Forum Matrix Administration Year  1995  Actors  P o l i c y Forums  Prime  Pref  Minister  Governor  Tomiichi  Masahide  Public Protest  Murayama  Ota  (CH4)  USA  JPN  Pref  City  Civic  Busi-  Govt  Govt  Govt  Group  ness  o  Rejection of  •  Signing (CH4)  ©  ©  SACO  ©  (CH4)  Consultative Body (CH5.1)Nov 95  r  1996  o  •  ©  o  r Ryutaro  Roundtable  Hashimoto  (CH6.1)Aug 96  ©•  o  o  ©o  o  •  ©  (Jan) Okinawa Policy Council  o  •  ©  0  o  (CH5.2) Sep 96  r  Nago  1997  1998  Referendum  r  r  (CH6.2) Dec 97  Keizo  Keiichi  Gubernatorial  Obuchi  Inamine  Election  (Oct)  (Nov)  (CH7.1)Nov 98 G8 Summit  2000  (CH7.2) Jul 2000  r ©  Initiators  9  Decision-makers  O  Influential Actors  1r  o  ©•  o  •  143 4.2. Growing External Pressures: The End ofthe Cold War 4.2.1. Destabilizing Legitimacy of U.S. Bases on Okinawa  The traditional framework of international security which was dominated by the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union altered dramatically after the Cold War ended, and as illustrated by the deliberate attempt of NATO to ally with Russia, multilateral interdependence between nation-states became a mechanism for the new global security system (Castells 1997).  The decrease of tensions between the  superpowers and the increase in international cooperation undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state, lessening its monopoly power over its national defense (Guibernau 1999). In this context of reduced military tensions on a global scale, substate nations began to re-assert their frustrations against the unwanted history of the unification with modern nation-states and demanded self-determination (ibid.).  In sum, substate nations  became less concerned about the issues of defense and security in the rethinking of their relationship with the nation-state (Keating and McGarry 2001). In conjunction with economic globalization, the end of the Cold War set the stage for the emergence of substate nations.  The change in global geopolitics had a strong influence on the increased expectation among Okinawan people in regards to the return of U.S. bases in Okinawa.  There were  a number of external events that impacted traditional central-local relations between Tokyo and Okinawa in the late 1980s. Most importantly, the announcement of the end of the Cold War at the U.S.-Soviet Summit in Malta on 3 December 1989 undermined the legitimacy and practicality of a continuous presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa (Gabe 1993). The first dramatic news that the United States was planning to remove the U.S.  144  Marine Corps' from Okinawa was reported by a major national newspaper, The Asahi 4  Shimbun,  on 16 December 1989 (ibid.).  The Okinawan people were surprised and  delighted to directly hear this news from then Prefectural Governor Nishime. U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney then announced the reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa, South Korea and the Philippines in ' A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century' in April 1990. The return of U.S. base sites to the Philippines in the early 1990s further suggested a change in U.S. security strategy with respect to the deployment of military forces in East Asia.  These events  together indicated that Cold War global geopolitics, which had necessitated the deployment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, had begun to fundamentally change.  As it  happened, however, this apparent turnaround in U.S. military policy was not as favourable as expected for Okinawa.  For instance, the East Asia Strategy Report issued  by the U.S. Department of Defense (called the Nye Report), released in 1994, announced the continuation of some 100,000 troops in Japan and South Korea until at least the year 2015 (see Johnson 1999). Moreover, as the U.S. bases in Okinawa were used to deploy troops during the Gulf War with Iraq in 1990, arguments for their immediate removal were undermined (Gabe 1993).  4.2.2. Growing Expectation of the Accelerated Return of U.S. Bases  Although the signs relating to the return of U.S. military bases were rather mixed until 1995, public concern over this return and pressure for their removal began to grow in Okinawa.  For example, Futenma Air Station (see Appendix 8), home to U.S. Marine  Marines occupy 18,376.6 hectares or 75.7 percent of the total U.S. military sites in Okinawa and had 16,391 personnel or 60.4 percent of total staff as of 31 March 1997. 14  145 aircraft, was and remains a focal point of possible base conversion to non-military use due to its long-standing negative impacts on local communities.  Consequently,  throughout the period from 1990 to 1992, demands for the base's long-awaited return increased.  For example, in 1990 Ginowan City (see Appendix 6), 33 percent of which  is occupied by Futenma Air Station, was the first municipality to take action through a civic forum (Shimin Forum) to encourage developing ideas for the reuse of the air station.  Subsequently, in 1992, a youth forum (Seinen Forum)  formulated a  comprehensive municipal plan on the assumption that the base would eventually be returned (Furushiro 2001).  At the end of the Cold War, the call for the return of Futenma Air Station to private landowners was articulated in a survey of the 'Attitude of Futenma Air Station Property Owners Towards its Future Development' taken by Ginowan City in 1993. This survey not only sought local opinions but also informed affected property owners of the increasing possibility of the return of Futenma Air Station given the changing geopolitical context catalyzed by the Cold War's end. Thus, the survey's purpose was not only to ascertain property owners' needs but also to disseminate information on the inevitability of preparing for base site return and reuse (see Ginowan City 1993).  In 1994, Ginowan City and its consultants adopted ideas for non-military uses (discussed at the above-mentioned forums) to draft the first municipal plan for the reuse of the Futenma Air Station site (Futenma Hikojo Atochi Riyd Keikaku Kihon Koso). However, the plan was not officially approved because a prefectural plan for Futenma, with which the municipal plan had to comply, that had not yet been prepared (Furushiro  146 2001).  The example of Ginowan City suggests that hierarchical relations between the prefectural government and local cities such as Ginowan made it difficult for the latter to take the sole initiative for land use planning of military sites (whose return was not confirmed by the United States) without formal procedural arrangements with the prefectural government.  It was also difficult for municipal governments to take the  first steps toward discussing the reuse of the military bases because of the opposition of local property owners. These individuals were unwilling to accelerate the process of the return of their properties because of the question of compensation for potentially large income loss in rents paid to them by the Japanese government (Kurima 1998). Moreover, because the U.S. military had sometimes returned redundant bases without prior local consultation, local property owners, who were paid a generous rent by the Japanese government, generally did not want to encourage the retreat of U.S. military by presenting a land use plan that anticipated the return of bases (The Okinawa Times, 16 January 1997). They wanted to delay losing the income derived from renting their properties to the U.S. military as long as possible unless reasonable measures for reuse were assured.  Accordingly, for their own part, municipal officials in general had little  incentive to take action that would conflict with the strong economic interest of local property owners' associations (Okinawa-ken  Gunydchi  to Jinushikai  Rengokai,  or  Okinawa Prefecture Military Site Property Owners' Association) (see Kurima 1998). Beyond local property owners, other actors also expressed their interest in the municipal open forums held in 1990 and 1992; for instance, the fate of base employees and their jobs was revealed. The inclusion of stakeholders other than property-owners, who had  147  traditionally been excluded from the process of base conversion in Okinawa, was a new process in Ginowan.  Because the establishment of such public forums as mentioned  above was unprecedented, they captured the attention of local residents.  4.2.3. Factors Impeding Base Conversion  The growing frustration over the slow rate of base conversion, despite the end of the Cold War, was linked to a number of issues that impeded this process.  Normally, the  conversion of any U.S. base was decided not at a local level, but rather at the meetings of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, which were held between Japanese and U.S. governmental officials as needed.  Still, because the impact on communities  has been considerable, local populations have substantial interest in when, or whether, bases are returned.  The scheduling of the return of U.S. military bases in Okinawa was,  however, controlled by the United States since the 1972 Reversion. Consequently the unpredictability and uncertainty of base return made it difficult for local communities to plan for the future.  The lack of authority of both levels of governments to intervene in  such scheduling continues to undermine the planned development of local economies and communities.  Furthermore, after the United States returned a military site to Okinawa, the prefectural government, municipal governments, property owners, base workers and neighbourhood residents and businesses often faced further difficulties (see, for example, Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Planning and Development 1998). Military base conversion involved special problems in comparison to ordinary land redevelopment. Generally, in the case of large-scale conversion, local governments often struggled with  148 the scarcity of financial resources, especially where involvement of the national government was limited.  Consequently, the redevelopment process for returned  military sites imposed a considerable burden on resource-scarce municipalities and property owners because they had to satisfy land use regulations and local land market demand under financial resource constraint.  Another factor that greatly affected base conversion in Okinawa was the fact that 33 percent of the military sites (or 8,000 hectares) in the region were on private property under lease contract with the Japanese government as of 1997 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). The standard rate for leasing had been set above property market price for political reasons and, generally speaking, landowners requested that municipal governments maintain payment of standing rental rates in any redevelopment scheme.  13  There were, however, unique factors that made profitable  redevelopment a challenge.  Before the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese administration in 1972, the U.S. government had been paying rent to local landowners. Originally, the U.S. military had forcibly taken their land but the U.S. government turned their use into a contractual agreement. USCAR ended land lease agreements with local landowners and sublet lands to the U.S. military. Upon reversion, the Japanese government took the role of concluding new lease agreements under the Japanese civic laws. Because there were private and public landowners (i.e. municipal governments) who wanted to regain the right of using their lands by themselves, and the number of landowners was large (about 30,000), concluding lease agreement with all the landowners was a challenge to the Japanese government. Consequently, the Japanese government increased rent by six times the amount that had been paid to landowners before the reversion in order to conclude agreements quickly and to avoid legal defect in using the land (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). This high rate of rent set above market rate by the national government has been criticized because it was a rate set 'politically' and promoted economic dependence of local landowners on rent incomes. Moreover, for the conversion of military sites to civilian use, landowners requested that the prefectural and/or municipal governments realize the equivalent profitability from new land use (i.e. rent or selling price higher than market rate). But it was usually difficult. In contrast, local property owners' associations claimed the rate was reasonable (see, for example, Arasaki 1999, Kurima 1997). Aside from discussions of the rent level, looking at the fact that real estate brokers' advertisements both on newspapers and on the street that say "[w]e will buy your land being used by U.S. military," it is certain that individual parcels of land used by U.S. military have substantial market value and thus for the landowners their properties were valuable.  149 First, the national government was not directly involved in planning the conversion of U.S. military sites to civilian uses after the sites were returned to private property owners. When the scale of returned sites was quite large (for example 100 hectares or more), municipal governments were generally asked by the owners to take charge of coordinating their economic interests in redevelopment projects.  Consensus building  on the use of the returned sites among property owners generally required substantial human resources and consequently, conversion planning was costly. In the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense had facilitated the process of military base conversion (see, for example, Accordino 2000).  In Germany, various levels of  government, including national, jointly managed U.S. base conversion projects that were difficult for local government to undertake unilaterally (see Cunningham and Klemmer 1995). In Japan, such national-local cooperation was not institutionalized as is the case with the United States and Germany. Still, there were a few tasks in this process for which the national Japanese government had to take responsibility.  For example, it was  required that local property owners were paid financial compensation for the loss of rental income over a three-year transitional period. In summary, the mechanism that allowed the United States to continue to use the land of Okinawa for their own purposes was under the purview of the national government while local governments remained excluded from the decision-making until the land was returned to original title (see Mimura 1979).  Second, it should be noted that a statutory Land Readjustment System (kukakuseiri) had been adopted in various kinds of military site redevelopment projects in Japan. This is a system of coordinating local property ownership to facilitate new development  150 with substantial appropriation of subsidies from central government (Mimura 1979). This subsidy system had meant heavy financial burdens on both local governments and individual property owners.  Moreover, the land readjustment system was not designed  to accommodate such an unusual type of land redevelopment as the return of military sites, and so local government, property owners, and the Okinawa public still face considerable challenges concerning base conversion.  4.3. Challenges to the C o n v e n t i o n a l Scheme 4.3.1. P u b l i c Protest: T h e  Rise of L o c a l C i v i l Society against U . S . Troops  on  Okinawa  In Okinawa, U.S. service personnel committed numerous crimes including the murder of local citizens during the period of occupation from 1945 to 1972. Even after the reversion in 1972, these types of local crimes continued, although the frequency of occurrence has decreased.  16  It is important to note that military operations have also  resulted in other serious crimes including rapes, assault and burglary (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). Moreover, U.S. military personnel who committed such criminal acts have been able to escape prosecution in Japanese courts. This is a direct result of the Status of Forces Agreement (churyu beigun chii ni kansuru kyotei), which came into effect in 1960 and regulated the treatment of U.S. military personnel who committed crimes. This agreement allowed the U.S. military to keep criminals until the judgement of their conviction thus these suspects were put under the custody of the U.S. military ahead of the Japanese police (see Johnson 1999). It also permitted the U.S. military to reject handing suspects over to the Japanese police before  There were 3,859 criminal offences caused by U.S. military personnel, civilian personnel and their families in which 35 were violent crimes in 1972. In 2000, the former were 2,605 and the latter were 4 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). 16  151  the judgement, and it sometimes sent them back to the United States before this happened.  This agreement granted various privileges and immunities to U.S. troops in  Japan at the cost of local autonomy and control over U.S. forces at the local level, not only in Okinawa but also across the entire nation. This inability of the agreement to bring U.S. servicemen to trial had been a severe frustration among the population of Okinawa, and led to the popular protest in 1995.  As reported earlier in chapter 1, the most notorious incident in Okinawa occurred on 4 September 1995 when a ten-year-old schoolgirl was kidnapped and raped by three U.S. marine servicemen from Camp Hansen on her way home in Kin Town (Appendix 6) (see Angst 2001).  The Okinawan police identified the servicemen through the girl's  testimony and issued a warrant for their arrest, but the U.S. government did not turn them over to the police under the Status of Forces Agreement (see Johnson 1999). Surprisingly, this incident was initially interpreted by national newspaper editors as a purely Okinawan matter and thus, they chose not to cover it (Ando 1997). But as the severity of the crime was revealed and reported by local mass media, the rape began to be seen as a serious challenge to international human rights and national sovereignty by the population of Okinawa, and consequently was no longer merely as a local event (ibid.). An Okinawan-wide public protest against the 1995 rape took place on 21 October 1995 (at Ginowan Kaihin Kden, a seaside public park), soon after the incident occurred. Approximately 85,000 people joined the bipartisan protest, wherein there was various criticism of the United States, led by Chiken Kakazu, the chairman of the prefectural assembly.  Prefectural Governor Masahide Ota, also attended and made an  anti-U.S. bases speech at the protest rally (see The Okinawa Times, 22 October 1995).  152  According to Miyagi (1999), U.S. servicemen have committed at least 110 rape crimes over the 23 years since reversion. Yet, such a large-scale and organized protest had never before taken place, this being the first time opposition had been voiced in such a manner since the 1972 Reversion. However, as noted, from the beginning of the United States occupation after the end of the Pacific War to this case, rapes and homicides by U.S. military servicemen were not unusual.  However, the reason why such an unprecedented protest occurred against the U.S. military cannot be solely attributed to the 1995 rape incident.  At the time,  commentators from Tokyo and local experts in Okinawa both pointed out that the Okinawan people had finally appeared to lose patience with both the ongoing presence of the bases as well as the Japanese government's passive attitude toward the rape incident (see Johnson 1999); together they seemed to epitomize the peripheral status of Okinawa as a substate in Japan.  Moreover, as noted earlier, the end of the Cold War in  1990 also marked an important turn of events, challenging the original objective of the Japan-U.S. Treaty, and thus the purpose and meaning of U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan.  However, there appeared to be specific factors that ignited the protest of 1995.  Particularly, the growing feminism movement in Japan played a critical role in initiating the organization of the protest rally (Angst 2001). Women in support of feminism and a general growing awareness of gender issues, were key factors in the 1995 advocacy for the prosecution of the rape crime (see, for example, Yui 1999, Angst 2001).  There are further considerations to be taken into account when examining the reasons for the outbreak of civil protests in Okinawa in late 1995. For example, the supportive  153  attitude adopted by then Prefectural Governor Masahide Ota toward the protest should be seen as critical to encouraging the Okinawan public to organize the event (comments provided by Toshio Tajima, partner, Urban Planning Company, Tokyo, 12 September 2001). Ota's attitude toward the protest was expected since he was a professor of Okinawan history and valued culture and identity as the foundation for his political belief.  This philosophical background was critical for Ota to be elected as governor in  1990. He defeated incumbent Governor Junji Nishime, who prioritized economy, with the support of the Liberal Democratic Party (The Okinawa Times, 3 November 2002). Ota promised his involvement in the issues of U.S. bases with the support of a coalition of political parties including the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party in the context of an increasing expectation for the acceleration of the return of U.S. bases after the end of the Cold War (ibid.). This anti-base political climate in Okinawa in the first half of the 1990s facilitated the rise of the public protest against the rape case.  It should, however, be noted that the Liberal  Democratic Party in Okinawa also supported the protest.  Anger against the brutality of the crime, feminism, persistent frustration with political marginalization from the centre, and changes in the global military balance converged as influences that triggered the 1995 protest. Suddenly, for perhaps the first time since the 1972 Reversion, the Okinawan people made apparent their sense of political isolation from the Japanese mainland, their substate status, and collectively expressed their anger against consistent unfair treatment by the national government and persistent social, physical and psychological oppression by U.S. military.  Although the  marginalized status of women in Okinawa is a fundamental issue, representation of the  154 number of rape cases committed by U.S. servicemen as mentioned above, the protest voiced the concerns of all citizens of the region (not only of women per se) to the Japanese and U.S. governments.  17  Thus, the protest can be interpreted as an expression  of a regional identity positioned against both Tokyo and the United States: a manifestation of an emergent 'resistance identity' (Castells 1997). Indeed, this public protest was not only a challenge by Okinawans to the national government and mainlanders; it also challenged Okinawans themselves who had, in a sense, conceded to a marginal and thus unfair status within Japan from the 1960s onwards, making no attempt to change their situation (Yui 1999).  4.3.2. O t a ' s R e f u s a l to S i g n L a n d L e a s e s o n B e h a l f o f U n w i l l i n g  Landowners  Another major event relevant to U.S. bases, one that would eventually lead to a legal battle between Okinawa Prefecture and the Japanese national government at the High Court and Supreme Court levels, occurred immediately after the rape incident, on 4 September 1995. At issue were land leases between private owners of U.S. military site-land, and the government of Japan. Existing U.S. bases had been constructed on land forcefully taken by the U.S. military immediately upon the U.S. occupation in 1945 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1997).  After the reversion of  Okinawa to Japan in 1972, U.S. occupation of the bases continued based on the Agreement between Japan and the United States concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Henkan Kyotei) that allowed the U.S. military's uninterrupted access to base land.  Indeed, U.S. military sites on Okinawa were, and are,  characterized by the fact that a significant portion of the sites involved have been owned  Note: Smith (2000) recognizes the protest as a civic issue while Angst (2001) contends it is a women's issue. 17  155  by a large number of private landowners. 32.5 percent of all U.S. military sites (7,872 out of 24,194 hectares) were the property of private owners on the main island of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto), while 13 percent of ownership originated in the Japanese mainland (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). Thus, land lease arrangements between landowners and the U.S. military prior to the 1972 Reversion were following 1972 formal contracts binding owners of involved properties to Japan's national government on behalf ofthe U.S. military. renewal every five years.  These land leases were subject to  Under this new scheme, land continued to be owned  privately, but the government of Japan (i.e. the Defense Facilities Administration Agency) also obtained leases from Okinawan landowners and then re-leased the land free of charge to the U.S. military under the provisions of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. While those who owned affected properties opposed the leasing of their land, municipal mayors had the power to sign land leases on behalf of unwilling landowners. Additionally, in cases where the municipal mayors themselves opposed the policy, the prefectural governor was respectively able to sign, under the terms of the Special Land Lease Law (Nozu 1997). However, no further steps to transfer property rights to the U.S. government could be taken if the prefectural governor rejected the land leasing policy.  Here, the prefectural government was given, in theory, considerable  discretionary power in deciding on the renewal of leases.  From the necessity of renewing land leases for 13 military bases and installations including Kadena Air Base, the largest U.S. air base in East Asia, the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau of the Japanese national government asked then Prefectural Governor Ota to sign on behalf of unwilling landowners and municipal  156 mayors on 21 August 1995 (The Okinawa Times, 16 September 1996). The reason for this was that some antiwar landowners rejected signing the renewal of land leases and further, three out of nine relevant municipal governments refused to sign on their behalf. As a result, it was necessary for the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau to ask the governor to sign.  As noted above, the rape case occurred on 28 September  1995, just after this request was made, and so Okinawans' antagonism against the bases was further elevated.  In this context, Ota took the bold step of refusing to sign the  leases at the Okinawa prefectural assembly. As mentioned above, the Special Land Lease Law had no provisions to override the prefectural governor in case that he or she decides not to sign.  As such, Ota's actions were unprecedented and the national  government was startled to learn that the international treaty with the United States could be so easily threatened by decision-making power at the prefectural government 18  level.  Because the prefectural signing of leases was an administrative action  delegated by the national government under the Local Autonomy Law, measures that could be taken by the latter to let the former perform the delegated action (i.e. signing the leases when municipal mayors refused to do so) were specified in the law; namely the national government was to advise (kankoku) signing first, but if the governor did not follow the advice then it could order (meirei) the governor to sign land leases on property owners' behalf.  However, even after steps were taken in November 1995 to  make this occur, Governor Ota told the then Japanese Socialist Party Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, that he would not acquiesce to the order issued by the national government (Ota 1996). 18  The Special Land Lease Law was later amended in the process of establishing the Decentralization Law on 8 July 1999. The elimination of administrative functions imposed upon local governments by the central government was a main objective of the new legislation, and, consequently, the task of signing leases on behalf of unwilling landowners was transferred from municipal mayors and the prefectural governor to the prime minister (Ota 2003).  157 Ota's refusal to co-operate was widely supported by the people of Okinawa, and also those outside Okinawa who were concerned with the issues surrounding U.S. bases, one such example was the civic group, Broad National Combination for Independence, Peace and Democracy in Kawasaki City.  Ironically, Prime Minister Murayama, who  was then leader of the Japan Socialist Party which had supported Ota as Okinawa's governor, was forced to sue him for his refusal to comply with the land leases order at the Fukuoka High Court on 7 December 1995.  19  In this event, the Court supported  Murayama in a decision handed down on 25 March 1996 (see Ota 1999). Ota, however, appealed against this decision through the Supreme Court on 1 April 1996. Although Ota's suit was again widely popular in Okinawa, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 28 August 1996 through strict interpretation of the Special Land Lease Law, judging that the application of the legislation to Okinawa was not unconstitutional. At this point, there was no further legal recourse left to Ota, thus he was forced to finally sign the land leases on 13 September 1996. These events transpired a mere five days after a prefectural referendum on 'Revision of the Japan-U.S. Status-of-Forces Agreement and the Consolidation and Reduction of Military Bases' that was held on 8 September 1996 (to be discussed in section 5.1).  After the final court decision, new  legal arrangements that transferred the authority to procure signatures from the prefectural governor to the prime minister were incorporated into the Decentralization Law, on 8 July 1999 (Ota 2003).  Ota was supported by a coalition of progressive parties such as the Japan Socialist Party (later reorganized to be Social Democratic Party), Okinawa Social Masses Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and Komeito in gubernatorial elections. The Japanese Trade Union Confederation Okinawa Branch, Rengo Okinawa, which consisted of local labour unions such as Japan Garrison Forces Labour Union Okinawa Branch or Zen Chu Ro, supported the coalition. 19  158 4.4. Establishment of an Internationa] Forum to Discuss the Continuing Presence of U.S. Bases in Okinawa: SACO, 1995  In the face of the rising level of antagonism in Okinawa against the U.S. military and the Japanese government during the latter half of the 1990s, both Japanese and U.S. politicians swiftly initiated an ad hoc international forum, the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).  This committee was mandated under the framework  of the existing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, 1951. Jointly created on 20 November 1995 by the governments of Japan and the United States under the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), SACO became the central mechanism for dealing with the problematic issue of U.S. military presence in Okinawa (see Appendix 9) . 20  SACO  was comprised of high-level officials in the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Japanese Defense Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  It was initiated at a meeting  between then Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono and then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry (The Okinawa Times, 2 December 1996). The overall objective of SACO was to "develop recommendations for the SCC on ways to consolidate, realign and reduce (seiri, togo, shukusho) U.S. facilities and associated areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security and other related agreements" (SACO Interim Report, 15 April 1996). As noted above, since 1972 U.S. bases in Okinawa had occasionally been returned to local landowners on an ad hoc and individual basis without any strategic or comprehensive planning.  Thus, SACO  represented a new Japan-U.S. policy toward the return of military bases designed to  Agreement on the establishment of the SCC was reached in 1960 between then Prime Minister Shinsuke Kishi and then U.S. Secretary of State Herter upon signing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. SCC is known as 'two plus two' as it provides an arena for the discussion of security issues between the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Agency chief and the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. 2 0  159 achieve a forward-looking comprehensive resolution of the issue. The term of the committee was set at one year, until the release of a final report to be published in 1996. A working committee at a vice ministerial level (shingikan kyu) was set up as part of the 1995 agreement.  Under SACO, Japanese and U.S. officials worked jointly to develop  measures for easing regional antagonism as well as to maintain and promote international and national interests.  The outcome was a schedule for the partial, rather  than full, return of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Even so, such international co-ordination over a matter of local interest in Japan was unprecedented, and thus it received not only local but also national public attention.  Perhaps the most important decision made under the SACO 1996 Report was to allow the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to an alternative site within Okinawa.  Futenma Air Station is one of the biggest air bases on Okinawa (480  ha) located in the midst of a densely populated residential area in Ginowan City. For local residents, the presence of the air station was seen as a life-threatening nuisance (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998); hence its return was long desired. The decision to relocate it to some other part of Okinawa came through the initiative of Japanese and U.S. politicians when bureaucrats from the two countries could not reach a negotiated agreement on the full return of this air station.  Since the  probability of full and immediate return was considered quite low, this political compromise surprised Okinawan people (Nozu 1997).  However, the decision posed a serious challenge to the prefectural and municipal governments and local civil society because the closure of the air station would be  160 implemented only on the condition that it could be relocated to an alternate Okinawa site. For the prefectural government and local civil society (for example, residents, trade unions, and local newspaper editors), both of which had demanded the reduction of U.S. bases, new construction and relocation of the base within Okinawa was still unacceptable.  In reality, because the U.S. military already used 20 percent of the land  area on the main island of Okinawa (see Appendix 1), it was impossible to find an alternate site that would have no serious impacts on the island's social life and natural environment.  Thus, even though this was a major outcome of the SACO 1996 Report,  the international agreement to relocate Futenma Air Station forced a round of new discussions and negotiations between the national government of Japan and the prefecture of Okinawa.  However, ensuing discussion over the flow of compensation funds to municipal governments that might be affected by the relocation recommendation made implementation very problematic. For instance, as an unprecedented opportunity to obtain additional funding from the national government in return for the acceptance of relocation became likely, local stakeholders who had an interest in economic growth, i.e. job creation, supported its relocation to their particular city or district, and those concerned with the negative and long-term impacts on local society opposed its relocation to their city or district. The two distinct interests soon began to conflict and as a result, the issue of the relocation of an air base instigated complex social and political processes within the prefecture after 1986. As will be shown in more detail in chapters 5, 6, and 7, the SACO decision, made by Japanese and U.S. politicians, indirectly forced the Japanese government and the Okinawa prefectural government to  161 alter  their  respective  roles  and  interrelations.  Moreover, the  change  in  intergovernmental dynamics also led municipal governments under the jurisdiction of the prefecture of Okinawa to take new actions, with the consequence that their relationship to the prefectural and national governments as well as civil society began to change.  Conflict between the two views, that the relocation of Futenma Air Station  would be an unprecedented opportunity for local economic development, and alternatively that it would have irreversibly serious social and environmental impacts, began to reshape relations between all three levels of Japanese governance - national, prefectural and municipal - including civil society and local business.  4.4.1. SACO, the Okinawa Action Program and the Continued Presence of U.S. Bases  As discussed above, the public protest following the 1995 rape incident captured the attention of the entire nation, and led to severe criticism of existing governmental policy regarding the continuation of U.S. bases in Japan.  In addition to two major regional  newspapers, The Okinawa Times and The Ryukyu Shimpo, major national newspapers such as The Asahi Shimbun and The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on the incident. Moreover, The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post also covered the story (Ando 1997).  Here, the presence of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, which had  formerly not been a high-profile issue in metropolitan regions of the Japanese mainland, suddenly began to attract media and public attention both in Japan and the United States, drawing attention to the peripheral and substate status of Okinawa.  In particular, it  should be noted that these articles did not just report the rape incident but rather the much larger and problematic Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has maintained U.S.  162 hegemony in the security of East Asia in the post-World War II era.  In other words, the  case of Okinawa was seen not as merely an isolated local event, but as a manifestation of deep-rooted structural problems caused by the treaty.  In effect, the incident became  embedded in debates over centre-periphery relations, and the role of Okinawa in wider global processes such as the need to reduce U.S. military bases following the end of the Cold War. Such international criticism was seen as a challenge to the capacity of the national government to guarantee security for the Japanese people generally, and specifically Okinawan citizens, from risks posed by U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa for the purpose of international military security. From this new international political perspective on events in Okinawa, Japanese women's groups charged that the 1995 incident was evidence of a structured violation of the rights of women by U.S. military, and that gender implications of the event had been relegated to the sidelines (see Yui 1999). Once again, reflecting the fact that U.S. military servicemen had raped (were charged with raping) more than 100 women in Okinawa since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 (Miyagi 1999). One thing that became clear was that both the Japanese and U.S. governments could not ignore the rise of regional collective anger toward them. Measures that dealt with this anger were needed as was maintaining the stability of U.S. bases in Okinawa.  As SACO deliberated on a schedule for downsizing U.S. bases in Okinawa, the prefectural government prepared their own policy proposal for the return of U.S. bases in 1996. The proposal was called the 'Action Program for the Return of Bases' and recommended the phased return of all U.S. bases in Okinawa by 2015. This action 'from below' was necessary because SACO was an international forum, and so the  163 prefectural government was not invited to participate in the meetings.  By 1995,  prefectural authorities had realized that the Okinawan people would support a prefectural  government-led schedule for the return of U.S. bases (personal  correspondence with Yoshiyuki Uehara, Deputy Director General, Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, on 31 July 2002). The Okinawa Prefecture's proposal for base return will hereafter be referred to as the 1996 Okinawa Action Program.  It was submitted to a national/prefectural forum, the  'Consultative Body on Military Base Issues' (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Mondai  Kyogikai),  established by the Japanese government vis-a-vis the international forum, SACO, to discuss base-related issues between the national and prefectural governments.  SACO  will be discussed in this section, and the Okinawa Action Program and the Consultative Body will be discussed at length in chapter 5.  An interim report from SACO was released to the public on 15 April 1996 in conjunction with Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Nichibei Anpo Sengen)  Kyodo  hammered out by then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. President  Bill Clinton.  Contrary to the Okinawan people's wishes, the report declared that both  the Japanese and U.S. governments intended to retain the major U.S. bases on Okinawa indefinitely, mainly because of the political difficulty in providing sites for the bases in Japan anywhere outside Okinawa.  Generally speaking it was more difficult to  construct a new base in any mainland prefecture because they were politically and economically stronger than Okinawa and local residents were not accustomed to living alongside U.S. bases. Yet the notion of moving some bases in Okinawa to other prefectures where bases were already located, for instance Hokkaido Prefecture and  164  Yamaguchi Prefecture, was not unrealistic in terms of local sentiment in these prefectures.  But in effect, the U.S. military did not want to interrupt the efficiency of  their troops' activities (Tokai Daigaku Heiwa Senryaku Kokusai Kenkyujo 1997: 233-274). The SACO Interim Report in 1996 immediately provoked further anti-base reactions in Okinawa as it was felt that the Japanese and the United States were treating this prefecture as a 'sink' for U.S. base location. Notably, these included the Central Okinawa Municipal Leaders Consortium's Resolution (Chubu Shichosoncho Kai)  22  on  30 April 1996; a resolution against SACO by the prefectural assembly on 16 July 1996; and a prefectural referendum on U.S. bases held on 8 September 1996 (this will be discussed in the next chapter).  Although the reactions of the prefectural government  were not as intense as in 1995, they all expressed objection to the SACO plan specified in the committee's interim report as well as any new Japanese and U.S. policy in support of the continued presence of bases in Okinawa.  SACO meetings continued during that year and a final plan for the return of U.S. bases was drafted by Japanese and U.S. officials, approved by the SCC on 2 December 1996, and then published as the SACO Final Report also on 2 December 1996 (see Appendix 10). In response to pressure from both politicians and citizens in Okinawa, the SACO Final Report specified a schedule for the limited return of military bases. Eleven U.S. military installations were to be shut down (5,002 hectares, in total equivalent to 20 percent of the entire area used by the U.S. military in Okinawa), including Futenma Air Station, which was unexpected due to its status as a host to the  The relocation of an air refuelling force consisting of 12 planes from Futenma Air Station to the existing U.S. Iwakuni Base in Yamaguchi Prefecture was permitted by the governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture, the Iwakuni city mayor and a Yu-cho town leader in 1997. The English translation of the original Japanese title of this organization is the author's own. 21  22  165  most intensive military force in Okinawa.  However, most bases to be shut down were  not scheduled for closure, but instead were subject to relocation to other areas within Okinawa Prefecture.  This was mainly because of the aforementioned political  difficulties associated with securing alternative sites on the mainland. The condition of relocation as opposed to complete closure was the most serious divergence between the SACO recommendations and the prefecture's own wishes expressed in the Okinawa Action Program.  In comparison to the phased schedule specified in the Okinawa Action Program (see Appendix 11), the SACO plan agreed to the return of seven out of the ten U.S. military installations specified in Phase 1 of the Program, and the return of five out of 14 in Phase 2 were approved.  However, nine of these installations were to be relocated  within Okinawa, and only two, the Northern  (Hokubu)  Training Area (approximately  3,987 ha/9,852 acres, see Appendix 9) and the Aha Training Area (approximately 480 ha/1185 acres, see Appendix 9), were approved for complete return to civilian use 23  without relocation.  Because these two training areas were relatively underused and  not located in more urbanized areas, their return was not very effective in promoting local economic development or lowering the density of existing urban residential districts. Nonetheless, the SACO plan may be seen as a compromise. Even so, a prefecture-wide protest rally against the SACO Final Report was soon organized, on 21 December 1996, by groups that included the ruling progressive parties at the prefectural assembly: namely, the Social Democratic Party, the Okinawa Social The return of Camp Kuwae was divided between Phases 1 and 2 . of installations to be returned is 11. 2 3  Thus, the actual total number  166  Masses Party, the Japan Communist Party, and the Komeito Okinawa.  Also involved  were labour unions, municipalities in which U.S. bases were located such as Nago City, Ginowan City, and Kadena Town, an anti-war landowners' group (Hansen Jinushi Kai) and women's groups (The Okinawa Times, 22 December 1996). However, the scale of this protest was much smaller than the 1995 rally.  Most notably, Prefectural Governor  Ota, who had initiated the 1995 protest, was absent, as were conservative parties, i.e. the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Frontier Party (opposition parties in the Okinawa prefectural assembly), as well as business groups.  24  Newspapers reported that the total  number of participants in the 1996 protest-rally was about 22,000 (6,000 according to police figures), whereas approximately 85,000 had participated in the protest of 1995 (The Okinawa Times, 22  December 1996).  4.4.2. Relocation of Futenma Air Station and Naha Military Port Facilities  The SACO report allowed for the relocation of some bases, not for return. Okinawan people were already aware that relocation was a very difficult task both technically and politically.  The international decision was a venture to instigate  Okinawa to engage in this problematic task. Therefore, the special difficulties of base relocation need to be understood.  Upon the release of the SACO Final Report, both the Japanese and U.S. national governments announced the termination of SACO and its mission (i.e. defining a At the time, then Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prefectural Governor Ota were gradually reaching the compromise of recompensing the presence of bases with economic assistance. The organizers of the protest rally were supporters of Ota but recognized that he should not heighten tensions with Hashimoto by appearing at the rally against the national government. Thus they did not invite him. The relationship between Hashimoto and Ota broke down when the governor announced his rejection of the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago, on 6 February 1998, two days before the city's mayoral election (see Arasaki 1999). 2 4  167 schedule for the closure and relocation of U.S. bases).  U.S. officials expressed  satisfaction with the overall success and assumed that the SACO plan would substantially alleviate the burden on Okinawa (The Okinawa Times, 3 December 1996). The end of SACO also meant that the subsequent task of implementing the return of U.S. bases to Okinawan landlords would be transferred to the Japanese government as well as prefectural and municipal governments.  After the SACO Final Report was released,  however, the relocation of Futenma Air Station became the single most controversial policy issue in Okinawa. This was due to the expected magnitude of its social and environmental impact at the candidate relocation site, namely Nago City (see Appendix 12). The report recommended that the new base should be an offshore heliport base with a 1300 metre-long runway on 1500 by 600 metres of artificial ground supported by either piled piers or a set of pontoons, and connected to land by a bridge (see Appendix 12).  This recommendation was particularly controversial because of certain  environmental factors.  For instance, the candidate site was immediately adjacent to  several communities; it was also above coral reefs and overlapped dugong habitat (see an opinion publicized by World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) Japan in 19 December, 1997).  25  It is important to note that the return of Futenma Air Station ha