THE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICS OF C U L T U R A L DIFFERENCE: THE CASE OF OKINAWA, 1995-2000 by KEISUKE EN OK I DO BA, Sophia University, 1982 MCP, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Planning) T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 2004 Keisuke Enokido, 2004 11 Abstract Okinawa Prefecture is a Japanese periphery and historically became a marginalized region after it was assimilated into Japan. In recent history, there has been an unbalanced concentration of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, built during the 1945-1972 U.S. occupation period, when compared with those on the Japanese mainland. This imbalance has seriously affected the island's development, even after Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972. Consequently, the Okinawan people have remained in a distinctly disadvantaged status within Japanese society. The case of a local schoolgirl's rape by U.S. soldiers in 1995 triggered an Okinawan campaign against inequities between its own situation and that of the Japanese mainland. Frustration increased among Okinawans over the national government's commitment to reduce the number of military bases, leading to greater core-periphery tensions. These tensions were associated with the reconstruction of Okinawans' distinctive cultural identity, which caused changes in the relationship between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture. This changing relationship, in turn, affected the strength of the power of the identity. This dynamic involvement of cultural identity in the relationship between the national government and the peripheral region may be seen as indicative of the presence of 'substate nation,' a concept that has become widely prominent in the 1990s in the world. This thesis applies the notion of 'substate nation' to Okinawa in order to understand the power of 'cultural politics,' or the 'politics of recognition,' practiced by Okinawa Prefecture in seeking the national government's acknowledgement of its disadvantaged status and greater political and administrative autonomy. The thesis poses three questions: 1) did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa study display a cultural identity I l l and engage in cultural politics? 2) were the various negotiations and 'policy forums' held after 1995 successful? and 3) did issues of 'scale'complicate negotiations betM'een Tokyo and Okinawa? To address these questions, a series of dynamic and complex core-periphery negotiations between Okinawa and Tokyo from 1995-2000 were examined as a case study, focusing on the interplay between 'cultural polities' and the more traditional 'economic politics,' or 'politics of redistribution,' as mechanisms for countering regional disparity. This case study explores six 'policy forums' in which these differing types of politics unfolded between Okinawa and Tokyo concerning two major issues, the presence of U.S. military bases and regional development. The process of restructuring the state-substate (Japan-Okinawa) relationship through the policy forums is best understood by considering the various roles of 'actors.' The thesis finds that Okinawa's cultural politics in the period following 1995 succeeded in increasing the status of Okinawa as a substate nation in that the national government gave more recognition to the region's special economic development needs, but sidestepped the larger issue of U.S. military bases. At a national and prefectural level, at least, tensions were defused just after 1995. However, at the end ofthe study period, local antagonism towards the bases remained strong, particularly among the civic body, and the relaxation of intergovernmental relations was unable to achieve long-term stability. Economic politics remained a major issue at the local level, and became a source of competition for cultural politics at the prefectural level. While cultural difference remained unaddressed in both of the administrative systems overseeing the return of the military bases and regional development, thus engendering no institutional change, the fact that it had even been considered at political levels is significant. This study of Okinawa demonstrates that the recognition of regional cultural iv inequalities, which was ignored by traditional 'redistribution-oriented' regional planning, is necessary to address the institutionalized inequity of core-periphery relationships. Despite the importance of recognizing disparity, this thesis also reveals that the notion of cultural equality is not necessarily entrenched or shared as a public policy objective within the periphery. It argues that further policy discussions would be required in the Okinawa region, and between core and periphery, to define a new planning approach. Acknowledgements First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisory committee, Professors David Edgington, Tom Hutton, Michael Leaf, and Paul Evans. Professor Edgington has led me to the final chapter with enormous patience, tolerance and insightful advice throughout the long and difficult process. Without his guidance and knowledge about Japanese planning, I would not have been able to complete this study. Professor Hutton has not only developed my understanding of the reality of globalization and Canadian peripheries but has also always encouraged me to stay positive when I was under enormous pressure. Professor Leaf has given me great help in widening and deepening my theoretical thinking and understanding of planning and regions in Asia with his expert knowledge of international planning. I have learned from Professor Evans the dynamics of international security in East Asia, which helped me to incorporate this rather unusual factor in regional planning into this study, and has led me to challenge an interdisciplinary approach. I have received generous support from a number of people and institutions both in Japan and Canada. Especially, I would like to thank Professor Hajime Chinen of the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa, who generously and thoroughly helped my fieldwork in Okinawa during August and September 2001. I also wish to thank Mr. Yuichi Takeuchi of the Institute of Behavioral Sciences (IBS) in Tokyo, who was very hospitable allowing me to use the facilities at IBS every time I visited Tokyo. He also invited Professors Hutton, Leaf and me to join an International Workshop, "The Okinawa Model of Sustainable Development," for planning the redevelopment of a U.S. military base, Futenma Air Station, in 1998 held in Okinawa; and for that I was given several chances to visit Okinawa. I feel very grateful for the consistent support from vi my mentor, Mr. Kazumi Tada of Kankyo Sekkei Kobo, a Tokyo-based consulting firm, and the technical help in producing graphic materials from his staff, Ms. Ayako Shoda. I would like to thank Ms. Helen Cain and Ms. Linh Trinh for their editorial support. I also would like to acknowledge the generosity of the Centre for Japanese Research (CJR), Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia (UBC), which granted a CJR Pacific Bridge Award for my study. Finally, I wish to dedicate this work to the late Dr. Brahm Wiesman, the former director of the School of Community and Regional Planning, UBC. I first met Dr. Wiesman in 1995 during my study trip to a frontier region in British Columbia, Kitimat (funded by IBS), on which he was an expert, and he gave me warm and hearty support in my early days of Ph.D. program at UBC. Table of Contents Vll Abstract ii Acknowledgements v Table of Contents vii List of Tables and Figures x Abbreviations xii Preface 1 Part I. Cultural Politics and Historical Background 3 Chapter 1. Introduction 3 1.1 Background 3 1.2 The Intent of the Thesis 11 1.3 Thesis Argument 12 1.4 Research Questions 16 1.5 Methodology 22 1.6 Summary of the Thesis 45 Chapter 2. Cultural Politics: A New Dynamic between Core and Periphery 49 2.1 Introduction 49 2.2 Traditional Approaches to Regional Development 55 2.3 Substate Nations 69 2.4 Japanese Regional Development Planning System as a Foundation of Okinawa Development 83 2.5 Summary 93 Chapter 3. The Historical Background of Okinawa as a Substate Nation 99 3.1 Introduction 99 3.2 Historical Formation of Dependence 100 3.3 Declining Dependency on U.S. Military Bases 116 3.4 The Politics of Cultural Identity in Okinawa 1952-1995 122 3.5 Summary 133 V l l l Part I I . The Negotiations for the Return of U.S. Military Bases and Regional Development 137 Chapter 4. The Context of the Case Study: The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the Futenma Air Station Proposal 137 4.1 Introduction 140 4.2 Growing External Pressures: The end of the Cold War 143 4.3 Challenges to the Conventional Scheme 150 4.4 Establishment of an International Forum to Discuss the Continuing Presence of U.S. Bases in Okinawa: SACO, 1995 158 4.5 Summary 173 Chapter 5. Restructuring of National-Prefectural Relationships: Establishment of the 1995 Consultative Body and 1996 Okinawa Policy Council 176 5.1 The 1995 Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa (Okinawa Beigun-Kichi Mondai Kyogikai) 181 5.2 The 1996 Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai) 206 Chapter 6. Increasing National Intervention in Municipalities 228 6.1 The 1996 Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (Okinawa Kichi Shozai Shichoson ni Kansuru Kondankai or Shimada Kondankai) 228 6.2 The 1997 Nago Referendum 245 Chapter 7. Changes in the Prefectural and National Leadership, 1998 266 7.1 A New Governor of Okinawa and New Prime Minister of Japan, 1998 266 7.2 The Group of Eight [G8] Summit in Okinawa and Kyushu in 2000 290 IX Part III: Did cultural politics bring about changes in the relationship between the state and a substate nation in Japan? 300 Chapter 8. Conclusions 300 8.1 Summary of the Six 'Policy Forums' 301 8.2 Findings 303 8.3 Implications for Planning Theory 320 8.4 Implications for Planning Practices in Okinawa 333 8.5 Future Research 336 Epilogue 338 Appendices 343 Bibliography 361 X List of Tables and Figures Tables Table 1.1 Table 4.1 Figures Figure 1.1 Figure 1.2 Figure 1.3 Figure 1.4 Figure 1.5 Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 3.1 Figure 5.1.1 Figure 5.1.2 Figure 5.1.3 Figure 5.1.4 Figure 5.1.5 Figure 5.2.1 Figure 5.2.2 Figure 5.2.3 Figure 5.2.4 Figure 5.2.5 Figure 6.1.1 Figure 6.1.2 Figure 6.1.3 Figure 6.1.4 Figure 6.1.5 Figure 6.2.1 Figure 6.2.2 Figure 6.2.3 Figure 6.2.4 Chronology of Six Forums 27 Chronological Actor/Forum Matrix 142 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) 30 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual'model) 32 Actors and Roles in the Six Policy Forums 35 Negotiations in the Six Policy Forums 36 Types of Arrangements in the Six Policy Forums 37 Cultural Politics and Economic Politics 96 External and Internal Dynamics of the Emergence of Substate Nations 96 Level of Okinawa's Dependency on Transfer Payments (Public Spending/Residents' Gross Expenditure), 1972-97 112 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) 200 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases (the Consultative Body) 200 Actors and Roles in the Consultative Body 203 Negotiations in the Consultative Body 204 Special Arrangements in the Consultative Body 205 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual'model) 221 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Okinawa Policy Council) 221 Actors and Roles in the Okinawa Policy Council 223 Negotiations in the Okinawa Policy Council 226 Special Arrangements in the Okinawa Policy Council 227 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) 240 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Roundtable) 240 Actors and Roles in the Roundtable 242 Negotiations in the Roundtable 244 Special Arrangements in the Roundtable 245 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) 260 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases (the Nago Referendum) 260 Actors and Roles in the Nago Referendum 263 Negotiations in the Nago Referendum 264 XI Figure 6.2.5 Special Arrangements in the Nago Referendum 265 Figure 7.1.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) 285 Figure 7.1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Gubernatorial Election) 285 Figure 7.1.3 Actors and Roles in the Gubernatorial Election 287 Figure 7.1.4 Negotiations in the Gubernatorial Election 289 Figure 7.1.5 Special Arrangements in the Gubernatorial Election 290 Figure 7.2.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) 295 Figure 7.2.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the G8 Summit) 295 Figure 7.2.3 Actors and Roles in the G8 Summit 297 Figure 7.2.4 Negotiations in the G8 Summit 298 Figure 7.2.5 Special Arrangements in the G8 Summit 299 A b b r e v i a t i o n s CTS Crude Oil Transshipment Station EU European Union JSP Japan Socialist Party LDP Liberal Democratic Party NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement ODP Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku) SACO Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa SCC Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee TVA Tennessee Valley Authority UN United Nations USCAR United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands 1 Preface The people of Okinawa Prefecture, who have continuously endured pressures related to the numerous U.S. military bases located within the island region, are distinct in their development from those in mainland Japan, and perhaps other populations around the world. Because of Okinawa's geographical remoteness, it is not easy for mainland Japanese to imagine the special problems of these living conditions. An incident of a schoolgirl rape involving U.S. soldiers in Okinawa in 1995 made transparent the considerable differences between the day-to-day lives of Okinawans and mainlanders. This shocking event drew my attention to the existence of long-standing social inequalities between regions across the nation of Japan. I felt sympathy toward the people of Okinawa, and also shame about my ignorance ofthe reality of such a situation. At the time, I was working as a Tokyo-based urban planning consultant and dealing mainly with metropolitan planning issues, and thus paid little attention to the marginalized periphery until the rape occurred. While I became interested in the peripheral status of Okinawa as a challenging subject for study, I had no opportunity to become involved in planning projects within the region. At the beginning of my Ph.D. program, I was coincidently given the chance to participate in an international workshop on land use conversion planning for Futenma Air Station, a U.S. base in Okinawa, expected to be returned to Japan. This turn of events suddenly made Okinawa accessible, allowing me to meet a number of local people and gain exposure to a huge amount of information. During my early trips from Vancouver to Okinawa, I was deeply struck by not only the impacts caused by the presence of U.S. military bases, but also the distinctness of Okinawa's geography, history, culture, economy and environment. As I saw the actual spatial constraints imposed by U.S. military bases and talked to local people, I became aware of a large number of difficult planning issues surrounding the presence of U.S. military bases. I recognized my sympathy as a mainlander was too simplistic, and became highly interested in how the Okinawan people struggled to overcome a historical and cultural marginalized status, symbolized by the concentration of U.S. military bases. It seemed to me that the process of development was quite complex and dynamic, quite unlike anything I had witnessed in metropolitan city-regions. I knew the case of Okinawa would make a challenging study, but chose it as the focus of my doctoral research because I believed the work would widen my metropolitan-oriented perspective and help me to understand the structure and dynamics of the core-periphery relationship in Japan. 3 PARTI Cultural Politics and Historical Background CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1. Background Since the end of World War I I in 1945, the life and economy of the people of Okinawa have been influenced directly by the persistent presence of U.S. military bases. These bases occupy one fifth of the area of the main island of Okinawa, Okinawa Honto (Appendix 1), a territory for approximately one million Okinawans and 50,000 U.S. military soldiers and their families (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). The life space of Okinawan people has been threatened continuously by accidents and crimes committed by the U.S. military. Between 1972, when Okinawa was returned to Japan, and 1995, U.S. soldiers killed at least 12 civilians (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998) and raped at least 110 women (Yui 1999). In September 1995, three U.S. soldiers were responsible for the rape of a 12-year-old girl. Unlike previous cases, this one quickly triggered an unprecedented public protest by Okinawans against both the U.S. military and the Japanese government. At the time, 85,000 Okinawan people participated in the protest, supported by members of all political ideologies and attended by all levels of local civil society expressing their anger from a public park (Appendix 2). Protesters accused the Japanese government of continuous disregard for the over-concentration of U.S. bases on Okinawa and its serious impacts on the lives of Okinawans for five decades (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1997). This was a dramatic and new type of crisis for the national government of Japan originating from a subnational region, Okinawa Prefecture. 4 This Okinawa case study reflects more generally on the recent changes in political relationships between nation-states, and subnational regions, changes that have posed new questions for democratic accountability and policy intervention since the 1990s (Castells 1997, Keating 1996, 1997). This change has been represented in a growing trend of political decentralization and the transferring of political autonomy to regional and local governments (Stohr 2001a). In other words, many national governments have had to address the issue of decentralization to peripheral regions and some degree of local self-determination. More specifically, various peripheral regions in the world inhabited by national minorities have begun to claim rights to greater regional autonomy or self-determination, and so challenge the make-up of nation-states (Kymlicka 2002). Such peripheral regions are typically called 'substate nations' in the theoretical work of scholars such as Catt and Murphy (2002), Halperin et al. (1992), and Kymlicka (2002). According to Kymlicka (2002: 349) substate nations are defined as: nations which do not currently have a state in which they are a majority, but which may have had such a state in the past, or which may have sought such a state. Kymlicka (ibid: 350) further suggests that substate nations are a type of ethnocultural national minority. Catt and Murphy (2002: 18) state that: The term sub-state highlights the fact that state power and institutions are primarily in the hands of a larger and more dominant nation(s) with whom these groups coexist. 5 Halperin et al. (1992: 49) are more concerned with the categories of self-determination movements and state that: Sub-state self-determination describes the attempt of a group within an existing state to break off and form a new state or to achieve a greater degree of political or cultural autonomy within the existing state. Despite these assertions, it should be noted that there is no single agreed upon definition of substate nations or 'substateness,' as shown by the fact that scholars identify substate nations slightly differently based on their respective definitions. For example, Kymlicka (2002) includes the Quebecois in Canada, Puerto Ricans in the United States, the Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom, the Catalans and Basque regions of Spain, the Flemish people in Belgium and Corsicans in France, as examples of substate nations. On the other hand, Halperin et al. (1992) regard the Basque Province as a trans-state and Puerto Rico as an anti-colonial nation. Catt and Murphy (2002) include such indigenous peoples as the Yukon First Nations in their analysis of substate nationalism, while Kymlicka (2002) distinguishes indigenous peoples from substate nations. Guibernau (1999: 16) uses the term 'nations without state' as an equivalent concept to substate nations. He considers the latter: nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states, by and large do not identify with them. The members of a nation lacking a state of their own regard the state containing them as alien, and maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves. 6 Generally, substate nations are characterized by the presence of distinctive minority groups of people inhabiting geographically fixed peripheral regions that are historically disadvantaged economically, culturally and/or socially relative to other regions, and by their claims for the right to some form of self-determination. For example, in the case of Canada, Quebec was legally awarded substantial language rights in 1977 (see, for example, Catt and Murphy 2002). In the United Kingdom, Scotland was granted its own Parliament in 2000 (ibid.). Substate nations are not invariable entities, but rather are characterized by varying degrees of intensity in their demand for less subordinate relationships vis-a-vis the nation-state. The present rise of substate nations seeking self-determination is not a new phenomenon. For example, in the post-World War II era, a nationalist movement flourished in Quebec and Scotland in the 1960s (Guibernau 1999). In the 1990s, the issues pertaining to peripheral regions as substates, inhabited by national minorities, began to attract renewed academic and political interest (Keating and McGarry 2001). This re-emergence of substate nations is considered partly a result of globalization, a position opposed to Hobsbawm's (1990) assertion that minority nationalism will disappear as nation-states become more strongly inter-connected at the global level. As mentioned above, substate nations are also a type of subnational region (usually peripheral) and accordingly they are distinct regional units of development. Regional planning literature, over the past 50 years, has commented on the difficulty of development for peripheral regions (see, for example, Myrdal 1957). This is evident in the failure of growth pole strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, policies that aimed to 7 generate economic projects by setting up industrial infrastructure and facilities in peripheral regions as engines of growth (Friedmann and Weaver 1979, Higgins and Savoie 1997). In short, the emergence of substate nations has presented a challenge to existing regional development schemes and programs. Although the peripheral region was already a key issue as early as the 1950s in the field of regional development, the issue of peripheral regions as substate nations, involving a distinct cultural as well as economic dimension, began to attract renewed academic and political interests in the 1990s (Catt and Murphy 2002, Gagnon and Tully 2001, Guibernau 1999, Halperin et al. 1992, Kymlicka 2002). The reason for this is that their challenge to the nation-state has had impacts on the concept of the nation-state, particularly illustrated by the division of Yugoslavia in 1992, and thus the status of peripheral regions is an issue with international importance (Halperin et al. 1992). Indeed, the affirmation of a territorial and minority identity has characterized a growing tension between the centre and periphery in many countries (Keating and McGarry 2001). The claims of substate nations have typically concerned the elimination of cultural inequalities, for instance the prohibition of local languages, and the demand for self-government (Kymlicka 1995). The increase of local and territorial political power for substates has often been supported by the reconstruction of collective identity as a minority people, which facilitates the substate challenge to the nation-state (Castells 1997). In this thesis I argue that this linkage between territory and minority identity has been a challenge to traditional forms of regional planning that seek the promotion of both local and national interests. 8 Okinawa may be considered as a kind of substate within Japan. Okinawa Prefecture is a peripheral region of Japan consisting of a chain of islands running south-westward from Kyushu to Taiwan. Spanning 1,000 kilometres from east to west and 400 from north to south, the prefecture includes nearly 160 islands (see Appendix 3). Okinawa was once an individual kingdom, namely the Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid tribute to China (Muller 2001). But in 1609, the Shimazu Domain, a Japanese lord governing a part of the Kyushu region in southern Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate, forcibly took control of the kingdom's territory. This began the history of Okinawa's assimilation into mainland Japan. In the process of building the modern nation-state of Japan, the national government in Tokyo suppressed the distinctive language and local folklore religions of the Ryukyu Kingdom (one of the dialects of Japan) as uncivilized, and introduced the standard Japanese language and mainland Shinto religion instead (Millard 1999). In addition to this historical marginalization, other factors also acted to differentiate the status of Okinawa from that of regions within the Japanese mainland. For instance, the U.S. military occupied the territory of Okinawa for over a quarter century after the end of the Pacific War in 1945 until its reversion to Japan in 1972, after which numerous U.S. military bases continued to be present, in particular on the main Okinawa island (Okinawa Honto). Despite intensive investment in regional industrial infrastructure by Japan's national government after the 1972 Reversion of Okinawa from the United States to Japan, its economic reliance on national subsidies from Tokyo, together with the presence of U.S. bases, have continued, although the dependency upon national subsidies has gradually decreased (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 9 2001). However, an ongoing sense of frustration within Okinawa regarding the continuous presence of U.S. bases suddenly erupted on a regional scale in 1995 after U.S. soldiers raped the afore-mentioned local girl (Angst 2003, Johnson 1999). The Japanese government's passive attitude toward arresting the U.S. soldiers triggered a large-scale movement against the lack of regional autonomy for governing regional affairs, including the safety of local civic life. Subsequently, and over the next five years, Okinawa's desire for self-determination intensified and relations between the national government and the prefecture began to change. Intensive political negotiations over the U.S. military bases took place, and from time to time the independence of Okinawa was discussed (Ota 2003). Establishing Okinawa as an independent nation from Japan has traditionally been a popular theme of public debate, for instance, in the local media (see, for example, The Ryukyu Shimpo, 15 May 1997). However, it had never become a serious issue in the political arena, for instance in local Okinawan elections held after the 1972 Reversion. An independent Okinawa political movement appeared only once before the 1972 Reversion when the Ryukyu government (a local government established under U.S. military supervision) sent a petition to the United Nations to grant it status as an independent territory upon the termination of the U.S. occupation. By contrast, the post-1995 protests, together with initiatives taken by the prefectural government and local citizens, demonstrated an unprecedented political desire to secure stronger local autonomy (Ota 2003). In Japan, regional development has been enacted under a centralized planning 10 structure since 1945 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s discussion of a more decentralized system of government commenced, leading to the 1995 Decentralization Promotion Law. However, the progress of implementing meaningful decentralization has been slow, despite the continuous demands for more autonomy by local governments (see, for example, Jain 2000). Accordingly, Okinawa's late 1990s challenge of the central government was carried out in the absence of any established mechanism to address the region's claim to the right of self-determination. Historically, the redistribution of subsidies to peripheral prefectures, such as Okinawa, was utilised as a political lever to reduce tensions between the national government and local governments (Calder 1988). However, the special challenge that Okinawa represented to the national government through its rape-related protests was not simply a matter of economic disparity but also one of cultural inequality. This thesis poses the question, "How did the national and prefectural governments manage this conflict of their interests?" With the background of Okinawa's distinctive history and culture, this study will analyze the processes and outcomes of a series of negotiations between the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture between 1995 and 2000. This period commences with the 1995 rape case and continues until relationships between the two levels of government re-stabilized at the time of the 2000 G8 Summit, a national government hosted event held in Okinawa. The dynamics of these intergovernmental negotiations provide an informative example of a regional challenge to central state power affected substantially by the identity of a territorial minority, i.e. the people of Okinawa. Overall, this study will demonstrate the 11 importance of cultural politics (the politics of recognition) in addition to economic politics (the politics of redistribution) in the relationship between the nation-state and a substate nation in Japan in the context of the ongoing transformation of global economies and global geopolitics. 1. 2. The Intent of the Thesis The grievances of Okinawans in the post-war period have attracted the interest of academics, planning professionals and the local public in the multilevel and multidimensional negotiations between Okinawa Prefecture and the Japanese national government that took place after 1995 (see, for example, Hein and Selden 2003). However, existing studies do not systematically and empirically address the role of the distinct and evolving identity of Okinawans in their political interactions with the national government and their power to change the core-periphery relationship. Instead, existing studies typically emphasize the economic dimensions of Okinawa as a peripheral region. For instance, Taira (1999) discusses the spirit of Okinawans as a source of their desire for independence from Japan. However, while he explains the political economic implications for Okinawans' subordination to the national government, he merely expresses the hope that the Okinawan spirit wil l lead to independence. Consequently, the dynamics of intergovernmental tensions and mechanisms for resolving them cannot be properly understood from his research. Further, despite abundant descriptions of the interactions between the national and prefectural governments, there is no single publication that clearly presents and analyzes the series of negotiations and political actions that took place from 1995 to 2000, and thus these remain difficult to understand comprehensively, both for mainland Japanese 12 and non-Japanese observers. This study will therefore analyze the significance of cultural dimensions in resolving political tensions between the Japanese government and a Japanese substate nation, Okinawa Prefecture, after 1995 and up to the year 2000, when the G8 Summit was held in Okinawa. It will examine the process of negotiations for greater local autonomy between the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture during this period, as well as the outcomes of these negotiations. Further, it is intended that the case study will also serve as informative material for researchers interested in substate nations and core-periphery relationships in general, and the history of decentralization in Japan in particular. This study intends to examine the uniqueness of the political processes between Okinawa and the Japanese government during the time period under study. As noted, there are many substate nations in the world such as Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia,' but this study will focus only on the Japanese case and not compare it with others in order to concentrate on providing a detailed account. In other words, this study will not adopt a comparative approach in order to demonstrate the 'uniqueness' of the Japanese substate nation of Okinawa, rather it will present an illustrative example of a 'distinctive type' of substate nation. 1.3. Thesis Argument Intensive Tokyo-Okinawa political negotiations over the removal of U.S. military bases began after the 1995 rape case, following an exceptionally large-scale public ' According to Halperin et al. (1992), there are 54 substate nations in the world. 13 protest against the presence of the U.S. military in Okinawa and also against the Japanese national government. Incidents and accidents caused by U.S. soldiers and military operations were numerous previous to 1995, but such a collective action had never before been taken. The history of marginalization and unequal status of Okinawa in the Japanese polity were newly re-acknowledged by the local public and addressed in a series of negotiations between the national government and local government, including both the prefecture and municipalities. The concept of self-determination defined Okinawans' enduring desire for change in their relationship with the central government and also the U.S. military. This was a direct manifestation of the 'substateness' of Okinawa and as such it represented a crisis for the national government, which previously had tried to treat all regions of Japan in an equal and unified manner in the post-war period (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1996). Some forms of decentralization, ranging from the federalization of unitary states to the provision of greater regional political autonomy in both unitary and federal nations, have been adopted generally in the world as a major solution to restructuring relationships between state and substate nations - for example the federalization of Belgium, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in the United Kingdom, and language and other rights given to Quebec in Canada (see Keating and McGarry 2001). Decentralization, put in its simplest form, is considered to be a policy measure to promote cultural diversity as well as other issues, including political, administrative and economic power, financial autonomy, and local democracy (Barret 2000: 34). More specifically, with respect to the rise of substate nations' claims to separation from their parent states, Cohen and Peterson (1999: 7) also mention the potential of administrative 14 decentralization to assist in holding together fragmented subnational ethnic or religious groups within national borders, especially in order to avoid human rights abuses and to secure peace and stability within countries and beyond their borders. From a multicultural perspective, Kymlicka (1995: 71) discusses the potential of decentralization to meet the needs of national minorities with caution. He argues that decentralization of powers from the state to local level is not sufficient, but "the explicit recognition of national groups, through such things as language rights, land claims, an asymmetric distribution of powers, and the redrawing of political boundaries" are required. As an example of the failure of the adoption of simplistic decentralization, Kymlicka (1995: 71) refers to the indigenous peoples of Brazil's Amazon region whose status was further disadvantaged, because the implementation of decentralization provided non-indigenous settlers with greater power to develop the region. Also, from a multicultural perspective, Taylor (1992: 25) contends that the demand for recognition is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics. In sum, these discussions suggest that political or administrative decentralization may have considerable potential to address the issues of development for national minorities if it recognizes distinctive cultural and material needs of national minorities. Along with seeking extra economic resources, seeking recognition is also a political action. Kymlicka (2002: 331-336) usefully distinguishes between the 'politics of redistribution' and the 'politics of recognition' elaborated by Fraser (2000). He argues that in every Western democracy, there are two powerful hierarchies. The first one is an economic hierarchy that produces struggles against economic inequalities, i.e. a 'politics of 15 redistribution.' The second, a status hierarchy that produces struggles against cultural inequalities, i.e. a 'politics of recognition.' Here, culture means societal values, that is, "a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres" (Kymlicka 1995: 76). Further, culture tends to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language (ibid.). Kymlicka (1995: 333) argues that economic equality is not sufficient for excluded groups; cultural equality is needed for them not to be dominated by the majority, while also recognizing that these are intertwined. Substate nations are a type of national minority that exists in relation to modern nation building (ibid: 348). As a cultural and territorial minority group, they claim differentiated powers and/or rights vis-a-vis other subnational regions within the state and are characterized by their claims for cultural representation and distributive fairness. Thus, in the restructuring of the relationship between the state and substate nation, demands for these two equalities, in particular the former, characterize their negotiations. In this thesis it is argued that because of the high dependency of the Okinawan economy upon subsidies and transfer payments from the national government, and income from U.S. bases to a lesser extent, the 'politics of redistribution' was a major factor in maintaining a stable relationship between the national government and Okinawa. However, I agree that the local public's and prefectural government's protest against the national government after the 1995 rape case was spurred on by a 16 demand for the re-acknowledgement of Okinawa's marginalization and unequal status, one that went beyond the usual request for extra resources. In their protest, economic inequality or economic compensation per se was not a driving force. The assumption here is that, in this situation, it is likely that Okinawa initiated 'politics of recognition' which thus provided power to the substate nation to negotiate with the national government in order to restructure the core-periphery relationship. This thesis aims to illustrate how both economic and cultural inequalities were addressed in the negotiation process that occurred from 1995 to 2000, and especially the significance of the politics of recognition in these negotiations. Overall, this thesis seeks to reveal the opportunities and difficulties for Okinawa of commencing a 'politics of recognition' in the existing national political and administrative systems of Japan. Okinawa, as a distinctive type of substate nation, is an excellent case that illuminates contemporary Japanese national and local level interactions in which economic and cultural inequalities were intertwined dynamically. In order to test this assertion, and to gauge the significance of the 'politics of recognition,' the study looks at the roles of major actors involved in the negotiations after the 1995 protest (the national government, prefectural government and city governments, business and the public), their interests and the resulting outcomes of various 'policy forums' where the politics of recognition was raised. 1.4. Research Questions The fundamental question of this thesis is, "Did the 1995 rape case galvanize a new style of planning for Okinawa, one that incorporated Okinawan desires for autonomy and regional recognition based on their unique status within Japan?" To answer this, I 17 will examine six specific 'policy forums' held subsequently to the 1995 rape case up until 2000, and address the following three specific questions: (1) Before 1995, Okinawans did not pursue cultural politics or the 'politics of recognition' despite the frequent occurrences of serious crimes and accidents. The political movement that arose after 1995 was unique in the history of the structure of relationships between Okinawa and Tokyo, which following the 1972 Reversion was managed within an administrative sphere that emphasized economic redistribution rather than cultural recognition. In the period following 1995, Okinawans mobilized their political power to the extent that they provoked a serious reaction from the national government. This was a distinctive process in which a wide range of local governments, groups and citizens appeared as new actors seeking change in the existing systems of regional governance and planning. Therefore, it is essential to understand the roles and powers of these agencies of change for galvanizing the new style of planning. The first question I will address is "Did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa study display a cultural identity and engage in cultural politics?" In order to answer this question, I will specifically examine (a) who were the major actors involved in each 'policy forum,' and what interests and whose interests received priority? (b) what kind of actions did the various actors take in each 'policy forum,' and what effects did they have on changing the relationships between the actors involved? This political process is characterized by the emergence of distinct individuals and groups who took action to address the existing cultural inequalities. In particular, the personal background and political beliefs of then Governor Masahide Ota were critical 18 to propelling changes in the relationship between core and periphery, but there were other influential actors including the U.S. government, Japanese prime ministers, and local governmental and non-governmental actors who were involved in the changes. Without examining actual actions taken by the various actors, it is difficult to understand the interplay between cultural politics and economic politics in the process of intensifying core-periphery tensions and their eventual relaxation. The focus on actual actors indicates that this study is concerned with the power of individuals and groups to change the Japanese core-periphery political and administrative structures that constrained them. (2) "Were the various negotiations and 'policy forums' held after 1995 successful?" The processes of interactions among various actors were built mainly through a series of democratic negotiations and thus the outcomes of the processes, i.e. the beginning of a new style of planning, can be grasped by looking at the success of those negotiations. This question aims to discover whether there was substantial change in relationships between Tokyo and Okinawa after any or all of the six 'policy forums,' or was there only 'business as usual,' that is, the traditional 'politics of redistribution' or subsidy politics. This question relating to 'success' or 'what really changed' needs to be addressed from two opposing views: one from the perspective of the national government and the other from the perspective of the prefectural government. Therefore, I will examine (a) from the national government's point of view, "did the public forums diffuse the crisis of relations with the prefecture that the national government faced after the 1995 rape case?" (b) from Okinawa's point of view, "did the prefecture obtain any special recognition from the national government in these 'policy forums' or greater 19 autonomy?" These questions are necessary to understand the real impacts of the interactions between the various actors on the existing hierarchical structure of the core and periphery relationship in Japan between the national government and the subnational region of Okinawa. In particular, because negotiations were the major form of core-periphery interactions, the relative outcomes of the six forums need to be understood. (3) Lastly, I will examine, "Did issues of 'scale' complicate negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa?" Political scientists and political philosophers, who lead research on the status and concept of substate nations, rarely address issues of scale. In particular, I will examine constraints on the prefecture's policy actions in the face of both 'macro-scale' dynamics (for example global or international level) as well as 'micro -scale' dynamics (for example local municipal). In short, a substate nation as a demarcated territory is linked not only to the rest of the country but also to extranational entities beyond the nation-state boundary, and so can be susceptible to macro-scale dynamics. On the other hand, the scale of a substate nation may be relatively small but the society of any substate nation may not be uniform and may be divided politically by local-level interests. Thus, it can also be susceptible to micro-scale dynamics. This suggests that the incorporation of Okinawan desires for autonomy and regional recognition was a difficult task in the face of geographical political forces. In the Okinawa case study, I will examine a number of scale issues including (a) the presence of supra-national bodies, such as the U.S. military; (b) the internal north-south division 20 of interests within Okinawa Prefecture; (c) the role of Okinawa's cities; and (d) the political stance taken by different actors in Okinawa. This question is necessary to understand the relevance of global and local contingencies, outside the control of either the national or prefectural government, as well as the relevance of a pluralistic Okinawa society. This thesis will demonstrate that Okinawa is substantially different from other substate nations that have advanced some form of decentralization. The assumption here is that the various forms of substate claims that have caused crises for national sovereignty will vary country by country. In most other examples, some kind of formal decentralization has occurred. For example, in Canada, the province of Quebec (a federal state) has argued for its distinct French culture and was granted special autonomy in language policies after 1977, and it continued to realize a greater independence from Canada throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Coulombe 2001). In the United Kingdom, Scotland (a unitary state) established its own parliament in 2000 (Denver et al. 2000). In Indonesia, East Timor (a post-colonial state) became formally independent on 20 May 2002 (Dunn 2003). However, in Japan in the 1990s there was (and still is) no system in place that allowed for a greater transfer of political autonomy from the centre to localities. Nevertheless, Okinawa chose to protest its unequal status (as did other substate nations around the world in the 1990s). Okinawa's claim illustrates how the traditional method of dealing with peripheral regions outside the major metropolitan centres, i.e. economic redistribution in the form of subsidies to infrastructure and public works, became less effective during the 1990s. 21 That is, it became less effective in compensating for the unfair burden of U.S. military bases and the prolongation of an arrested Okinawan economy. As argued above, 'recognition' is central to cultural politics (i.e. the politics of recognition) vis-a-vis economic politics (i.e. the politics of redistribution). This thesis will reveal exactly which local actors in Okinawa practiced cultural politics in seeking recognition from the centre (the central government in Tokyo), despite the fact that there was no established system to allow them any differentiated powers or rights. The study will also show how they did this and what they accomplished in the years from 1995 to 2000. The concepts mentioned here - decentralization, substate nations and the politics of recognition - resonate with the growing emphasis on local level planning as opposed to the 'top down' centralized approaches which characterizes current planning theories and practices (Stohr 2001a). For example, Noble et al. (1998) articulate the importance of small-scale political communities, local solutions to local problems, participatory decision-making and democratic governance vis-a-vis the rational comprehensiveness which supported a more traditional centralized structure for planning. Along with this trend of local-oriented planning, recent planning theory and practice is characterized further by an increasing interest in marginalized groups of people, such as indigenous or aboriginal people and foreign resident migrants in society (Friedmann and Douglass 1998, Sandercock 1998a, 1998b). However, although substate nations, which combine a type of marginalized people with a particular political territory, have been studied rather intensely as a subject of Political Science, International Affairs, and Political Philosophy (for example Guibernau 1999, Halperin et al. 1992, Keating 1996), they have yet to be a sufficient focus of planning literature. Conversely, while planning 22 theorists have recently embraced cultural politics and multicultural planning at a local level (for example Sandercock 1998a), they have not focused to any major degree on the issue of national governments and substate territories. 1.5. Methodology This study does not intend to advocate any political or partisan stance taken by specific actors in the process of negotiations between the national government and the prefectural government. In order to maintain critical distance between the author and subjects in the examination of events, this study draws upon an existing conceptual framework for developing neutral questions and aims to avoid biases toward actors to be studied. Essentially, this study adopts an institutional approach proposed by Bryson and Crosby (1996) that aims to examine public problems and issues that spill over organizational and institutional boundaries where powers are shared by wider entities including governmental and non-governmental bodies. This is a suitable conceptual framework for looking at the complex and dynamic interactions involving multiple actors between Tokyo and Okinawa, and within Okinawa. This approach emphasizes communication, decision-making, and conflict management by laws or rules in order to understand the complexity of political processes. According to Bryson and Crosby (ibid.), this is a way to explore the rationality of the processes of public discussions and decision-making. Based on this established conceptual framework, this study examines how actors communicate with each other, make decisions and resolve conflict under laws and rules. Focusing on 'policy forums' as explained below is an application of the institutional approach to this study of Okinawa. In addition to the adoption of this conceptual framework, presenting my ideas and receiving critique on them in such 23 opportunities as my prospectus defense, workshops and conferences were also effective means for assessing, and in some ways decreasing, the existence of any biases toward specific political or partisan stances in my study. 1.5.1. Single Case Study with Multiple 'Policy Forums' 1) Multiple 'Policy Forums' In order to operationalize the entire process of interactions between the national government, the Okinawan local governmental and various non-governmental actors, and answer the research questions posed in section 1.4,1 will identify six 'policy forums' for analysis. Various actors interacted with each other in these 'policy forums' and specific arrangements were made for addressing contentious policy issues. These six 'policy forums' took place between 1995 and 2000 and are identifiable, and suitable for more detailed analysis, because they commonly provided new opportunities to national and local governmental actors to communicate and make policy decisions on the issues of the return of U.S. military bases and/or regional development. The 'policy forums' also enabled communications and negotiations to take place outside the usual centre-local administrative relationships. A focus on smaller units or 'sub-units' of analysis is useful in examining such a complex and dynamic event as this case. Yin (1994) called this an 'embedded case study design.' However, he pointed out that a major pitfall of research designed to analyse phenomena on a smaller scale is the failure to return to the larger unit of analysis. In order to avoid this problem, I developed common templates for analyzing each 'policy forum' (i.e. each sub-unit) shown below, and examined linkages between these 24 forums and an overall pattern of various actors interactions and outcomes. I define 'policy forums' as officially arranged opportunities for both national and local governmental and/or non-governmental actors to address specific policy issues. In 'policy forums,' such public policy-related actions as communication and decision-making take place (Bryson and Crosby 1996). As Bryson and Crosby (1996) suggest, such opportunities can be either place-bound (for example meetings) or non-place-bound (for example newspapers). As direct interactions between relevant actors are central to my research, I focus on the former. This focus represents my interest in the rationality of the processes of public discussions and decision-making. Accessibility to such forums is considered fundamental in promoting inclusive political communication and thus inclusive democracy (Young 2000: 52). The 'policy forums' reveal the representations of the specific interests of participating actors in two closely-linked issues: the return of U.S. bases and the promotion of regional development. Both issues had been handled traditionally under the direction of the national bureaucracy, with local actors in Okinawa playing a passive role. These 'policy forums' were rare opportunities for Okinawa to discuss the rearrangement of the traditional 'top down' approach to decision-making about the return of U.S. bases and regional development. In other words, as opposed to the standardized bureaucratic practices adopted with respect to these two policy issues, the 2 Note that Bryson and Crosby (1996) identify adjudication as a third public policy-related action in addition to communication and decision-making. The authors argue that these three actions are dealt with in 'forums,' 'arenas,' and 'courts' respectively in today's shared-power, no-one-in-charge, interdependent world, in which public problems and issues spill over organizational and institutional boundaries. In my case study, communication and decision-making are not always separable and courts are not a major factor. 25 'policy forums' provided new mechanisms to both national and Okinawan actors such as the Japanese prime minister and local prefectural governor. They revealed a range of alternative practices that were taken, and showed their capacities and limitations for addressing the two policy issues that were contested between the national government and Okinawa. The forums addressed the common issue of the return of U.S. bases and regional development, but were held by varying actors at different places and times from 1995 to 2000. Thus, the focus on 'policy forums' is useful to understanding the dynamics and contexts of a rather complex and nuanced political process. I have identified the six 'policy forums' based on the existence of specific discussions and decision-making on the issues of the return of bases and regional development between the national government and the prefectural or municipal governments of Okinawa. All of the critical policy decisions and arrangements that addressed these issues were made in these forums. In other words, the 'policy forums' that will be discussed constitute the entire process of intergovernmental negotiations on these issues from 1995 to 2000. The first 'policy forum' is the Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, established in November 1995, which directly targeted the issue of returning occupying bases. This was a national-prefectural forum. The second is the Okinawa Policy Council in September 1996, also a national-prefectural forum. The third is the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases established in August 1996 - a national-municipal forum. The fourth is the Nago City Referendum, and the national-local interactions that took place before and after the 26 referendum held in December 1997. This municipal vote by the communities of Nago City concerned the matter of whether or not to accept the relocation of the Futenma Air Station. In this 'policy forum,' new political linkages between the national government and the municipal government were forged as well as within the city. The fifth is a gubernatorial election for governor in November 1998 that reshaped the relationship between the prefectural government and Tokyo. It involved an election but included changes in modes of communications between Tokyo and Okinawa before and after the election. The sixth involved national-prefectural interactions over the opening of the G8 Summit conference in Okinawa in July 2000. This final forum was characterized by symbolic and substantial changes in the relationship between the national government and Okinawa as the result of the previous five 'policy forums.' Hence, I argue that over the 1995 to 2000 period a substantial shift in the Tokyo-Okinawa relationship occurred due to various actors' engagement in the politics of recognition, as defined by Kymlicka and others. However, it should be noted that as of the year 2000, a substantial reduction of U.S. bases had still not occurred. Table 1.1 shows the overall chronology of these six 'policy forums.' 27 Table 1.1 Chronology of Six Forums Date of Forum Titles of Forum November 1995 (1) The Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa August 1996 (2) The Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases September 1996 (3) The Okinawa Policy Council December 1997 (4) The Nago City Referendum November 1998 (5) The Gubernatorial Election July 2000 (6) The G8 Summit 2) Strategy for Data Analysis To analyse the series of events in each 'policy forum,' I relied mainly on collecting qualitative data and analyzing events with multiple, explanatory templates, including various diagrams and tables shown in figures 1.1 to 1.5. These diagrams and tables do not fully represent the dynamics and complexity of real-world events. Nonetheless, they proved useful in analyzing various patterns, important similarities and differences between the various 'policy forums,' and, thus, facilitated my understanding of the relationships between them. With these templates, the narrative and events of the Okinawa case study detailed in this thesis become more comprehensible. The first step in my analysis involved identifying 'business as usual' decision-making structures and to compare these with what actually occurred in the six 'policy forums' so 28 as to identify exactly what had changed. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 highlight the various actors at the central and local governmental levels, as well as the local non-governmental level, who were involved in specific policy issues in each 'policy forum.' They describe briefly these actors' conventional 'business as usual' roles and how their relationships were structured formally in terms of the flow of authority, decision-making and resources. Thus figure 1.1 shows the hypothesized 'business as usual' structure for standard decision-making on the return of U.S. military bases, and figure 1.2 presents a similar 'business as usual' structure for standard decision-making involved in regional development. These figures, which I refer to as 'actor/structure' diagrams, are effective in separating the two central agendas of this research, i.e. the return of U.S. bases and regional development, which were closely but ambiguously related issues. The entire domain of the relationships is divided into central governments (i.e. the Japanese government and the U.S. government), local governments (i.e. the prefectural government and municipal governments) and local non-governmental actors (i.e. civil society and business communities). In the context of Okinawa, local civil society implies labour unions and interest groups not tied to local or national governments. In short, these figures show the conventional power relationships between the various actors. It should be noted that some actors are not connected to the others (for example the business community in figure 1.1, and civil society and the business community in figure 1.2). This means that, while these particular actors may have had some influence on decision-making in either policy agenda, for example, through informal political networks in the formal system of regional development planning (explained 29 more fully in chapter 2), their influence is not likely to be decisive. Still, the purpose of including them in these two figures is to examine the exact roles and mode of involvement of non-governmental actors in the six 'policy forums.' In each 'policy forum,' which will be addressed in separate sections of this thesis, these original figures will be compared with those that show the outcomes resulting from the restructuring of the power relationship. Although some overlapping occurs in the discussions and decision-making in each 'policy forum' over the return of U.S. bases and regional development (as they are closely related), each section of my case study will feature one or the other of these two important local issues. Thus, two out of the six 'policy forums' (the first and fourth shown in table 1.1) will feature the return of U.S. bases, and the other four policy forums (the second, third, fifth and sixth shown in table 1.1) will feature regional development issues. 30 a) The Roles of Various Actors in Decision-making over the Return of U.S. Bases Figure 1.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) Central Govts Local Govts Local Non-Govt National Govt U S A H Prefectural Govt H Municipal Govt Civ i l Society Business Community ^ Routine Decision-making Lines Source: Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University (1997) In figure 1.1, the arrow originating from the United States shows that in the normal course of events the U.S. government had ultimate authority over and above the Japanese government in decisions about whether to retain, close and return, or relocate their bases and installations in Japan. The arrow flowing from the Japanese government to 'civil society' indicates that the national government had jurisdiction over notifying private individual landowners in Okinawa of the return of their properties from the U.S. military. It should be noted that the U.S. military had been allowed to use the land exclusively for their purposes without paying rent; it was the Japanese government that had paid rent at an officially guaranteed rate to affected landowners on a case-by-case basis. Between the national government and 'civil society,' two short 31 arrows point toward the prefectural government and municipal governments. These indicate that the prefectural and municipal governments have also leased their land to some U.S. bases. However, in terms of the number and area, as well as the significance of direct impacts on households, local individual owners have been the major stakeholders in the return of bases. In the 'business as usual' arrangements, local stakeholders, including the prefectural government, municipal governments and private individual landowners, lacked the power to negotiate directly with the U.S. government over the return of their properties under U.S. occupation. Thus, when private landowners wanted to regain rights of use over their land, they occasionally asked the national government3 to negotiate on their behalf with the United States, although there was no institutionalized process for responding to these requests. There were, however, cases where the United States decided to return a military site in piecemeal fashion. This ad hoc method of return could disadvantage affected owners wanting to reuse their returned properties but finding that the total amount of land to be returned at once was not a large enough assembly for effective redevelopment. In such cases, the owners sometimes approached the national government to postpone the return until the U.S. military decided to include the entirety of the land used for a base, favouring instead to continue receiving rent (see, for example, Kurima 1998). Local non-landowners also had some power to influence the issue of the return of the bases. By contrast, businesses did not play an important role in the negotiation process over the return of military sites or their 3 The main national government contact for these purposes was the Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus in Naha, Okinawa, which is a local branch of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in Tokyo. 32 redevelopment. However, when the redevelopment of a returned site involved the construction of houses, commercial buildings and land improvement, then local businesses, such as construction firms, became relevant. Their specific influences in base relocation and reversion are explained later in the thesis in a separate outcome diagram in the explanation of each 'policy forum' (from section 5.1 through to section 7.2. of chapters 5 to 7). b) Actors Involved in Decision-making on Comprehensive Regional Development Planning Figure 1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) Central Govts Local Govts Local Non-Govt National Govt Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community USA ^ Routine Decision-making Lines Source: Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University (1997) Figure 1.2 is an 'actor/structure' diagram for examining routine, business as usual decision-making in the area of Okinawa's regional development. The arrow that starts from the national government and points downward to the prefectural government and 33 further to the municipal government reveals the 'top down' approach to decision-making on regional development in Japan (discussed later in chapter 2). This hierarchical framework for development planning is part of Japan's national system and, thus, is not unique to Okinawa. However, there are two important differences between Okinawa and other prefectures in Japan in terms of regional development planning. First, other prefectures unilaterally formulate long-term development plans within a planning framework determined by the Comprehensive National Land Development Plans (see Tanimura and Edgington 2001), while Okinawa does not. Instead, it is the national government that formulates comprehensive long-term (ten year) development plans (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku) that regulate and guide development programs and projects for Okinawa. It should be noted that the prefectural government is formally responsible for drafting original development plans that the national government then approves. However, historically the prefectural government has not led the creation of plans but rather relied on the planning capacity of national bureaucrats. Thus, a request for incorporating specific programs and/or infrastructure projects in the regional plan for Okinawa represented an important change in the relationship between the prefecture and the national government. Second, the hierarchical system is intensified in the relationship between the national government and the prefectural government through the Okinawa Development Agency (a local subsidiary of the national government) established in 1972. The Okinawa Development Agency was assigned to manage regional development planning and financing. It is interesting to note that there is no such agency in other prefectures, with the exception of Hokkaido Prefecture (note: Hokkaido also drafts comprehensive regional development plans on its own).4 This 4 The Okinawa Development Agency was established as an extra-ministerial bureau affiliated with the Prime Minister's Office (Sori-fu) in 1972 and was incorporated into a division of the Cabinet 34 expressly centralized planning system was created in order to streamline a budget for Okinawan infrastructure demands (for example roads and harbours) and to facilitate the re-incorporation of Okinawa into Japan in 1972. In the process of regional development planning, local civil society and businesses were consulted on a rather selective basis (for example, university professors were often consulted). As with the previous diagram, the 'base map' diagram of figure 1.2 (business as usual) is compared with a corresponding outcome diagram in each section dealing with a specific 'policy forum' in the 1995-2000 period (see chapters 5 to 7 later). c) Actors and Roles, Negotiations and Special Arrangements My research further examines the role played by each actor and his/her involvement in both the politics of redistribution (economic politics) and that of recognition (cultural politics), with the assertion that the politics of recognition played a role equally critical to the politics of redistribution in interactions not only between Tokyo and Okinawa but also within Okinawa. The evolution of the two types of politics is represented in three different tables (figure 1.3, 1.4, 1.5). These tables present the actors and their roles (figure 1.3), negotiations (figure 1.4) and arrangements (figure 1.5) relevant to each 'policy forum.' These templates, when analyzed, present critical dimensions of each 'policy forum' but do not effectively capture the dynamics of the six forums chronologically. Thus, in order to compensate for this weakness, I prepared a chronological actor/forum matrix (see table 4.1 in chapter 4), which is a time-series schema that represents major actors and their interaction in these forums. Office (Naikaku-fu) in 2001 as a result of the reorganization of government ministries in the same year. 35 Actors and Roles Figure 1.3 Actors and Roles in the Six Policy Forums ^ \ Roles Policy Forum \ . Initiators (1) Decision-makers (2) Influential Actors (3) From (1) Consultative Body To (6 ) G 8 Summit Governmental (national/local) Non-governmental (civic/business) Governmental (national/local) Non-governmental (civic/business) Governmental (national/local) Non-governmental (civic/business) Various actors represented their own interest in each 'policy forum.' As shown in figures 1.1 and 1.2, actors involved in decision making over the reuse of U.S. bases and regional development issues included national and local governments (i.e. politicians and public administrators) as well as local non-governmental groups (i.e. civic groups and business communities) and the U.S. military. Figure 1.3 shows the template I used to specify which actors (the initiators) that were behind the major 'initiatives' that raised the issues of either the return of U.S. bases or regional development, or both [column (1) ]. Secondly, it specifies those who made decisions to address these issues [column (2) ]. Thirdly, it indicates actors who had significant influence on initiators or decision-makers [column (3)]. Further information about these actors and their roles in each 'policy forum' is given in more detail later on in the thesis. 36 Negotiations Figure 1.4 Negotiations in the Six Policy Forums \ Contents of \ Negotiation A uthorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Forum Policy \ Resource Self- Resource Self-Forum \ Distribution determination Distribution determination From (1) Consultative Body To Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Regular/ Ad hoc Formal/ Informal (6) G 8 Summit Beyond the need to identify the specific actors involved in making decisions, there is a need to specify the role of the 'politics of recognition' in relation to the more predominant 'politics of redistribution' in each of the six 'policy forums.' Figure 1.4 provides a template to specify content of various negotiations and the types of demands made by Okinawans, as well as to record the responses of various national actors to them. Okinawan demands and national government's responses are classified as either economic factors (for example issues of resource distribution) or cultural factors (for example issues of self-determination). With this schema, the template attempts (by a yes/no indicator) to reveal the relative importance of economy and culture in each of the six 'policy forums' considered later in the thesis. In addition, the characteristics of negotiations in each forum are examined, including the type of 'policy forum' (regular or 37 ad hoc) and the formality of each forum (formal or informal). The former clarifies the degree of commitment of the national government in negotiations and the latter the procedural characteristics of negotiations. Special Arrangements Figure 1.5 Types of Arrangements in the Six Pol icy Fo rums \^ Contents of \ . Negotiation Policy Forum Types of Arrangements (Political/Administrative/Legal) Transfer of Authorities (Pol it ical/A dm in istr alive/Legal) Beginning End From (1) Consultative Body To ( 6 ) G 8 Summit Political/ Administrative/ Legal Political/ Administrative/ Legal Yes/No Type of Transfer of Power To identify specific actors from each of the six 'policy forums,' it is also necessary to examine concrete outcomes and to assess to what degree each 'policy forum' was a vehicle for responding to the post-1995 crisis. Figure 1.5 provides a template that aims to specify the types of arrangements made between major actors in negotiations from the beginning (1995) to the end (2000) of the period being analyzed. These arrangements fall under political, administrative and legal categories. This figure also illustrates the ' presence and types of transfer of power from Tokyo to Okinawa (if at all), and whether there were political or administrative or legal forms of devolution. 38 1.5.2. Data Collection My research focused on the process of political negotiations between the Japanese national government and the U.S. government, national and local governments (i.e. prefectural and municipal) as well as local governments and non-governmental actors that had evolved over the five years from 1995 to 2000. It documented aspects of the gradual change in the Japanese national approach to decision-making resulting from these negotiations and subsequent decisions. Furthermore, this research focused on a series of actions and the decisions of various actors as they unfolded in political and administrative arenas, such as policy councils, governmental meetings, and the referendum. Because of the significant impacts of these events on international relations, national security, the national political and administrative system, local living conditions, human rights and democracy, as well as the involvement of politicians, administrators and civil society, the details relevant to this study are contained in many forms of documentation. It was not possible for me to observe these events first hand as, for example, I could not participate in governmental meetings. Arranging meetings with important actors was also very difficult because, for instance, interviewing the prefectural governor was impossible without obtaining special permission. However, this thesis aims to analyze political actors not the psychology of political actions; consequently, personal contact was not critical to the success of the study. I found that published documents, such as newspaper articles, academic and professional papers and reports, and books, were more than sufficient in terms of coverage, the diversity of writers and their views, and detailing the chronological sequence of events. Thus, I relied on these documents as 39 primary sources for my research. There were, however, key informants who helped my understanding of the events and suggested or gave me reference materials, including their own published essays and reports, governmental documents, journal articles and books (see list of interviews conducted in Appendix 4). These included planning consultants, researchers, prefectural officials, and university professors. They were not directly involved in the events I examined but they provided me with important contextual information. The method of data collection is set out in detail below. 1) Local Newspaper Articles A chronological record of the six 'policy forums' was essential for my research in order to examine the changes in the relationships between the national government and Okinawan governmental and non-governmental actors from 1995 to 2000. In terms of the consistency, continuity and detail of the coverage of events relevant to the 'policy forums,' local newspapers, such as The Okinawa Times (established in 1948) and The Ryukyu Shimpo (established in 1893), provided extensive information readily accessible to the public. These two local newspapers divided the local market almost equally and attracted a much larger readership than other local newspapers and national newspapers in Okinawa. Thus, I chose local newspaper articles as one of the primary sources of my research. The main weakness of this method is, of course, media bias. Not only individual journalists but also managing editors select the events to be reported in their papers based on editorial policy. Their interpretations of events may also be biased and, further, because of the limitation of space, newspaper articles cannot cover all aspects of 40 events. Accordingly, in order to avoid as much bias as possible, I referred primarily to these two newspapers and compared differences in their views towards critical events. I relied mainly on the articles in these two newspapers to obtain factual information on political actions and decisions (i.e. 'who did what and when') but avoided relying on them exclusively for the analyses of critical events (i.e. 'why did that happen'). However, it is problematic to merely disregard explanatory articles in these local newspapers solely for the reason that they could be biased, as there are no alternative sources that are purely non-biased. When necessary, I adopted three approaches to counter potential biases, in addition to comparing articles on identical events in the two local newspapers. The first was to refer to other publications that addressed the same event and the second was to consult key informants (discussed later in this chapter), satisfying the need for triangulation. Still, it should be noted that my method was not necessarily free from all bias. The third approach that aided in the understanding of specific actors' actions and decisions was the examination of articles on major events that were published at a later date. The intent of not relying only on newspaper reports from 1995 to 2000, but to also review later articles or other publications, was that the latter discussed the motivations for actions or particular conditions in which actors had to act that were perhaps not clarified at the time. Both The Ryukyu Shimpo and The Okinawa Times have been criticized as biased towards the anti-U.S. base movement, for example, by some mainland politicians (see, for example, The Ryukyu Shimpo, 3 May 1997 and 15 September 2003, and News 23 Today's Column Nov. 4 (Wed) 1998 for arguments against this type of criticism). 41 However, my research did not use newspaper articles to obtain specific information to prove the negative impacts of the presence of U.S. bases, but rather used them to explore the diversity and range of the various actor's actions and decisions. As such, I believe that there was not much room for my research to be seriously affected by the biases of the local newspapers, even if they were present. 2) Governmental Archives To complement the reliance on articles as primary sources for my research, I consulted other sources especially those at the National Diet (parliament) Library in Tokyo. Most of the events that I examined involved governmental decisions between 1995 and 2000 relating to budgeting and policy implementation as well as political speeches. Minutes of meetings, transcripts of speeches and reports issued by governments and held in the National Diet Library were valuable sources of different interpretations and stories that were not covered or highlighted by the newspaper articles. For my research, government documents were very useful for confirming information related to intergovernmental meetings between the United States and Japan and between Tokyo and Okinawa, by providing dates, lists of participants and the venues for the various issues discussed. Relevant historical and legal background information was also available in government documents. Government documents include those published by the Ryukyu government that administered Okinawa under the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), the Okinawa Development Agency, the Japan Defense Agency, the Cabinet Office, Okinawa Prefecture, and municipal governments in Okinawa. 42 Apart from government documents consulted at the National Diet Library in Tokyo, I found further relevant sources at an information centre of the Okinawa prefectural government, at the University of Ryukyus in Okinawa, the Okinawa Association in Tokyo, and from governments' official websites. Major key words for document searches were fukki (reversion), chiiki kaihatsu (regional development) and beigun kichi (U.S. military bases). Although my research does not focus on regional development and base related issues during the period of the U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1972, I collected some documents published during that period in order to better understand the history of the development of the core-periphery relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa. 3) Non-governmental Published Materials Local and mainland academics and local governmental officials have published books, reports and journal articles on relevant events from various perspectives and for various purposes. These were also useful for gathering the range of opinions and interpretations of singular events that appeared in newspapers and government documents. Apart from current affairs, my study reviewed books that examine Okinawan pre-modern history and individual life stories, which proved useful in understanding the origins of the collective identities of the people of Okinawa. I found these books and journals in the same places that I found the government documents. However, bookstores in Okinawa were also convenient places to obtain publications not readily available in Tokyo. The same key words I had used for government documents were also useful to find appropriate non-governmental publications. 43 It is important to know the political stance, if any, of the author of each book in order to avoid bias as much as possible when collecting publications. Some of the major academic figures who have published books and essays are basically anti-centralists and anti-Liberal Democratic Party (the ruling and dominant political party in Japan at the national level). In other words, they strongly support self-determination or decentralization. Another group of scholars supports a neo-liberal or market-oriented approach to the development of Okinawa. While the former group tends to emphasize the need to mobilize political communities in Okinawa to build their capacity for self-determination and self-reliant development, the latter tends to emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship to reduce dependency on the national government and increase economic competitiveness. Publications from both groups were important for my research in order to understand the ideological tensions. In addition, there are non-Japanese authors of some English publications on Okinawa. Their essays do not necessarily provide new information, but were useful to situate Okinawa from an international perspective. 4) Key Informants In addition to the collection of documents, I relied on my key informants, including such experts on the development of Okinawa as governmental officials, academics, businesspeople, planning consultants and researchers, journalists and non-governmental actors. Though none of them were directly involved in the negotiations examined in my study, they provided me information on the context and background of these political processes as experts. My criteria for selecting key informants included native Okinawans, Okinawans with experience living outside of Okinawa, and non-Okinawans 44 very familiar with Okinawa. I obtained access to these informants through my participation in an international workshop on the planning of the redevelopment of a U.S. military base, Futenma Air Station, in 1998, in Okinawa. The workshop, held by the prefectural government, invited various local and non-local scholars and experts on urban and regional development. The sessions were held twice and appeared in the local newspapers. These workshops granted me access to the actors mentioned above in particular, prefectural planners and local academics were important and they introduced me to other local experts. I also found experts on the development of Okinawa in Tokyo relatively easily through research institutes, one to which I was affiliated and the other a centre of Okinawa research in Tokyo. In order to gather as many perspectives as possible, I chose my key informants based on the above-mentioned criteria. The most valuable contribution of the key informants to my study was that their opinions, experiences and personal anecdotes revealed the inadequacy of a simplistic political economic view based on a dichotomy of the strong (the state) and the weak (Okinawa), and suggested a more complex cultural dimension to the political actions within Okinawa and against Tokyo. Most had already published their opinions and experiences and thus made the acquisition of valuable reference materials easier. The publications were useful sources for my research and I was able to expand on the collection of documents available to me because of the generosity of my informants. 45 1.6. Summary ofthe Thesis This chapter sets the stage for discussing the potential and limitation of cultural politics (the politics of recognition) as a driving force for a substate nation to change its relationship with the nation-state and obtain greater local autonomy. In the remainder of part I, I examine the literature that informs the construction of a conceptual framework for the study of Okinawa as a substate nation (chapter 2). This also clarifies the 'substateness' of Okinawa with a focus on its history, culture, economy and the presence of U.S. bases (chapter 3). In chapter 2 I examine the conceptual discussions on the mechanisms, dynamics and evolution of conflicts and tensions between 'substate nations' and nation-states, and the involvement of planning in addressing regional cultural identities. Based on the review of three sets of the literature on Western regional planning, substate nations and the Japanese planning, this chapter discusses the absence of cultural dimensions in traditional planning approaches as well as the Japanese regional planning. In chapter 3 I present an historical account of the 'substateness' of Okinawa within Japan in order to understand the rationality and distinctness of Okinawa's challenge to the national government in the latter half of the 1990s. In part II, I present my case study of Okinawa's challenge to the national government and the resultant changes in this relationship between 1995 and 2000. Chapter 4 introduces the case study and provides contextual data and other information on changes in the global political and economic dynamics, as well as the local contingency, that led to the beginning of Okinawa's political challenge to the national government and the persistent over-concentration of U.S. bases. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 compose the main 46 body of the case study with a focus on the six different 'policy forums.' Each forum illustrates the process of the rearrangement of relations that occurred between the national government and the prefectural government of Okinawa, centring on the two interrelated issues briefly discussed earlier: the return of U.S. bases and regional development. The 'policy forums' are presented separately in order to encourage a more analytical examination of the dynamic and complex core-periphery interactions. In chapter 5 I focus on the two closely linked 'policy forums' that set the direction for the subsequent series of negotiations between the national government and the prefectural government of Okinawa. They are the Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, established in November 1995 (section 5.1), and the Okinawa Policy Council in September 1996 (section 5.2). The former was involved in deciding the return of U.S. bases in Okinawa, and the latter in regional development planning. Actions taken by the prefecture to gain recognition from the national government on the issues of regional development, and the national government's responses and initiatives to relax state-substate tensions are presented. Chapter 6 discusses the two 'policy forums' in which intensive interactions between the national government and local level governments (municipal governments) were taking place. One is the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases established in August 1996 (section 6.1). Non-governmental elites were recruited by the national government to play a central role in developing communications between municipal governments and the national government. This demonstrates an unprecedented cooperative attitude of the national government toward 47 the municipal governments, specifically in the area of economic development. It should be noted that this particular 'policy forum' started before the 1996 Okinawa Policy Council. Because of the linkage of this council with the 1995 Consultative Body, I examine them together in chapter 5. The second 'policy forum' is the Nago City Referendum conducted in December 1997. As occurred with the Roundtable forum, the national government intervened indirectly in local politics and the referendum, but in this case, with a stronger intention to steer local decisions in favour of the national government's interests in keeping the bases in Okinawa (see section 6.2 of chapter 6). In chapter 7 I include the last two 'policy forums,' one representing the formation of a renewed relationship between the national government and Okinawa, and the other, the rearrangement of policies and practices for both the return of the bases and regional development. In section 7.1 I focus on the gubernatorial (prefectural-level) election held in 1998, in which Governor Ota, a key figure of protest against the national government, was replaced by neo-liberal businessman, Keiichi Inamine, who was more cooperative with the national government. In section 7.2 I discuss the symbolic political decision made by then Prime Minister Obuchi to designate Okinawa as a host prefecture for the G8 2000 Summit main conference. These 'policy forums' represent the intensification of both economic and cultural politics in distinctive ways. Lastly, in part III (chapter 8) I present conclusions drawn from the analyses of the case study examined in part II (chapters 5 to 7). Chapter 8 comprises my research findings (section 8.2), their implications for planning theory (section 8.3), their 48 implications for planning practices in Okinawa (section 8.4), and also some suggestions for future research (section 8.5). In section 8.2 I set forth answers to the three questions raised earlier in this chapter (see section 1.4, this chapter). Firstly, it shows the roles and competing interests of the actors in cultural politics, including the Okinawa prefectural governor, the prime minister, and non-governmental actors. Secondly, it addresses the success of cultural politics from the viewpoints of the national government and the prefectural government. Thirdly, it presents the issues of scale affecting the practice of cultural politics. In section 8.3 I reveal the implications of the case study for planning theory. This material relates my case study back to the three types of literature that are reviewed in chapter 2, i.e. regarding Western regional development planning, substate nations, and Japanese planning. In section 8.4 I will discuss the implications of this case study for actual planning practices in Okinawa. Some essential issues for the future actions of planners and decision-makers in Okinawa will be presented. In the final section of this chapter, section 8.5, I discuss possible avenues for future research, in particular in the field of comparative studies. This case study deals with events that took place during the period between 1995 and 2000. However, Okinawa's struggle with the difficult issues of the bases and regional development has continued beyond 2000. New developments that would imply the future of the politics of recognition in Okinawa emerged in the post-case study period of 2000 to 2003. At the end of this thesis, these developments are considered in an epilogue. 49 CHAPTER 2 Cultural Politics: A New Dynamic between Core and Periphery 2.1. Introduction This chapter examines existing conceptual discussions on the mechanisms, dynamics and evolution of conflicts and tensions between 'substate nations' and nation-states, and the involvement of planning in addressing regional cultural identities. It explores the growing importance of 'cultural politics' in core-periphery relations. In the context of Okinawa, it also examines to what degree cultural politics is a part of (if at all) existing Japanese regional development program. Here, 'substate nations' are simply defined as "nations which do not currently have a state in which they are a majority, but which may have had such a state in the past, or which may have sought such a state" (Kymlicka 2002: 349). Self-determination sought by substates is a policy objective that has caused conflict and tension and often continues to challenge the legitimacy of national governments (Halperin et al 1992, Inoguchi 1995, Keating 1996, Keating and McGarry 2001, Kymlicka 1995, 2002). Section 2.1 begins with an introduction of the concept of substate nations and the emergence of Okinawa as such a nation. Based on the literature dealing with planning theory, section 2.2 discusses the traditional planning approach to address the problem of 'peripheral regions' in the post-World War II period. It shows the fundamental inability of this approach to satisfy substate nations' interests in cultural inequalities compared with economic inequalities despite the evolution of planning concepts ranging from the traditional concept of development 'from above' to the alternative concept of development 'from below.' Section 2.2 ends with the discussions on the necessity of 50 decentralization in local and regional development and for substate claims in the context of globalization. Section 2.3 then begins to address various issues of substate nations. First (section 2.3.1), the background of the emergence of substate nations, particularly in the 1990s, will be discussed. Second (section 2.3.2), the nature and dynamics of the actions taken by substate nations to promote cultural identities will be explored along with a focus on the significance of cultural politics as a driving force for substate nations vis-a-vis economic politics. Third (section 2.3.3), the political aspects of minority identities that underlie the issue of cultural politics will be addressed. Lastly (section 2.3.4), reasons that rationalize substate nations' actions in their relationship with nation-states will be discussed, along with a focus on the legitimization of their distinctive claims for stronger local autonomy or self-determination in their negotiations with the nation-states. Section 2.4 will examine the Japanese traditional regional development system as a framework for the development of Okinawa, and its inability to accommodate Okinawa's substate claims. Overall, this chapter places the notion of substate demands for cultural equalities within the planning literature. Furthermore, it builds a conceptual framework appropriate for examining the relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa in terms of contemporary approaches to regional development planning. In what follows, I will discuss the concept of substate nations and their significance as a planning issue. A definition of substate nations was elaborated earlier in this chapter. According to Kymlicka (2002), substate nations are a type of ethnocultural national minority. Apart from substate nations, another type of national minorities, 51 defined by Kymlicka (2002), involves indigenous peoples such as the Sami in Finland, Inuit in Canada, Maori in New Zealand, and American Indians in the United States. They are peoples whose traditional lands have been overrun by settlers, and who have been forcibly, or through treaties, incorporated into states run by people they regard as foreigners (ibid: 349). This distinction between substate nations and indigenous peoples is an issue that has been discussed in the literature on the growing conflicts and tensions between national minorities and nation-states (Catt and Murphy 2002, Halperin et al. 1992, Kymlicka 2002). Their discussions suggest that there is no universal definition of the difference between the two and that different interpretations are possible. For example, Kymlicka (ibid: 350) notes that the difference between the two groups is not necessarily clear and suggests that one way to distinguish the difference in the Western context is to think of substate nations as contenders, but losers in the process of European state formation, and indigenous peoples as being isolated from that process until recently, and so retained a pre-modern way of life until well into this century. In another essay, Kymlicka (1995: 22) notes that indigenous peoples have been regarded by Europeans as being inferior or disadvantageous in terms of their capability to self-govern, and needing the paternalistic protection of their white 'superiors' (quotation mark by Kymlicka). In sum, Kymlicka, from the viewpoint of political philosophy, focuses on differences in the relationship between these two national minority groups and the hegemonic power of state building in order to distinguish them. From the viewpoint of comparative politics, Catt and Murphy (2002: 7-8) acknowledge differences between the two groups in terms of economic and political capacity, demographics, and territorial concentration, but also point out the similarities 52 in terms of their self-identification as separate societies with distinctive languages, cultures and traditional forms of economic activity and governance. Further, they contend that the two groups articulate a similar claim to collective self-determination, anchored both in their distinctive character and in the historic occupation and sovereign control of their traditional territories. From the viewpoint of international affairs, Halperin et al. (1992: 49-51) distinguish the two groups by focusing on differences in the contents of their claims for self-determination, although distinctions between the two are not very clear. This is because substate nations are described seemingly as a type of indigenous peoples; the latter are defined as inhabiting a geographically concentrated area that cut across international boundaries, or dispersed throughout an area, while the former are defined as being concentrated in a particular geographic area. Also, ethnicity and history are important factors that define the two groups. It should be noted, however, that ethnicity is another ambiguous term (see, for example, Rupesinghe and Tishkov 1996). A distinctive feature of the term substate nations is that it is not preoccupied with the identification of indigenous peoples or ethnicity, but rather focuses on the politicization of a territorial unit or a bounded territory within a nation-state. In other words, the rise of a subnational political demand for regional self-determination is exemplified in substate nations. Indigenous peoples may be identifiable because of language, life style, appearance, and so on, even if they do not take actions toward self-determination, but substate nations are less identifiable unless they take such actions. Keating and Loughlin (1997: 3) define such subnational regions as 'historical/ethnic regions.' 53 This focus on territoriality is inevitable if regional planning is to address the growing tensions between national minorities and the nation-state. The claiming of distinct status by substate nations within nation-states is a novel approach to the challenges faced by peripheral regions, and one that is not captured by mainstream models of regional planning. Indeed, social inequality related to territoriality and culture is identified by Young (2000: 91) as an imperative of political theory and practice. She argues that "[gjroups differentiated by historic connection to territories and by culture have received the most attention both in recent political theory and practical politics, for example in nationalist politics, on the one hand, and in efforts to institute multicultural policies, on the other." Okinawans are a distinct group in Japan, distinguished from the mainland Japanese by their historical connection to the territory of Okinawa (i.e. the Ryukyu Islands), their distinctive culture, and, then different form of incorporation into the modern nation-state of Japan (see Morris-Suzuki 1998). The history of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa for the quarter century after the end of World War II, makes the process of the recovery of Okinawa from the devastations of the war unique compared to that of other mainland regions. Okinawa's minority status is symbolized today by the excessive concentration of U.S. military bases on its main island, Okinawa Hontd. The concept of substate nations is used to reveal important processes of negotiation in my case study; those in which Okinawa, a peripheral and historical region with a high economic dependency on the Japanese mainland economy, claimed renewed regional interests in stronger autonomy against the centralized power of the Japanese government 54 after 1995. It also illustrates the primacy of national interests over regional ones in these negotiations. More precisely, the concept is used here as a framework for studying the political movements towards 'self-development' and 'self-determination' that emerged in Okinawa in the 1990's. As will be shown later in this study, these two goals were important principles in guiding negotiations between Okinawa and the national government based in Tokyo. It is important to note that these goals were not new, but had gained political significance and provided Okinawa political power to demand regional interests after 1995. In other words, these represented the emergence of a substate nation. Geographically and politically, most emerging substate nations are found in national peripheries. Thus, from the viewpoint of regional planning, the relationship between nation-states and substate nations can be understood as that of core and periphery, which has been a central topic of regional development planning since World War II (Friedmann 1988: 94). This chapter will discuss the importance of considering cultural dimensions in the development of peripheral substate nations and regional planning. Culture has been an issue that has received little attention and research, as traditional regional planning has focused almost exclusively on economic dimensions. Essentially, although its contributive role for regional economic development is gaining attention (see Danielzyk and Wood 2001, Friedmann 1987, Higgins and Savoie 1997: 23-27), its political power to challenge the nation-state, and thus the traditional national intervention in regional development, has yet to be seriously addressed in regional planning. 55 2.2. Traditional Approaches to Regional Development 2.2.1. National 'Top Down' Initiatives The process of the industrialization of national economies in the post-World War II period drew the overwhelming attention of national development planners to the relationship between core and periphery regions. How to integrate economically backward regions, remotely located from metropolitan regions, into national economic systems and promote the growth of the entire national economy has been a serious challenge to national governments (Glasson 1974). The development of economically backward regions by national governments was first attempted as early as the 1930s in the United States. An exemplary case was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) established under the New Deal. According to Friedmann and Weaver (1979), this was the first comprehensive and large-scale development of an economically depressed rural region remote from metropolitan markets. Contrary to its original aims of creating a self-sustaining resource region and social planning on a regional scale (i.e. territorial integration), the TVA soon began to accelerate urban-industrial expansion and promoted the movement of people to the Valley's metropolitan areas (i.e. functional integration). In the 1950s, as the economic growth idea became the centrepiece of planning, the focus of development shifted from local and regional levels to the consideration of national and international development. Since then, the doctrine of growth centres and growth poles became dominant in regional planning (see chapter 5 in Friedmann and Weaver 1979 for a detailed account). The 'growth pole strategy' was developed based on Francois Perroux's economic 56 theories, and this model became prominent in regional development planning in the 1960s and 1970s (Higgins and Savoie 1997 Ch.6). Higgins and Savoie (ibid: 6) explain that the growth pole model was applied in simplified ways based on the assumption that national governments could "push or pull some industries into some urban centre in a retarded or disadvantaged region, through construction of infrastructure, and incentives or regulations for private investment, and then sit back and watch the 'spread effects' of this investment eliminate the gap between that region and the more prosperous and dynamic ones in the same country." The objective of this model was to build an engine of industrial development and to increase the Gross National Product (GNP). This model established a tradition in post-World War II regional development in both developed and developing countries, and various projects were designed and implemented in different countries based on its concept. However, as a mainstream planning approach adopted by central authorities, it was criticized as being technically deficient, and it came under serious ideological attack (see Friedmann and Weaver 1979: 175). Stohr and Taylor (1981) also found that the growth pole concept, formulated and implemented 'from above,' was not appropriate for the development of economically disadvantaged regions. A symbolic project that disclosed the limitations of the centralized growth pole concept was the city of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela, which started in the 1960s and centred on large steel plant and hydroelectric projects (Peattie 1987). Various scholars analyzed the limitations of the growth pole approaches, explaining it in terms of two major reasons. One lies in problems of its theory and the other of its implementation. For instance, guidelines for rural centre planning, 57 developed by the United Nations (1979: 32-33), pointed out that Perroux's original concept of the growth pole, which was adopted and subsequently developed by Hirschman (1958) and Myrdal (1957) for regional development, was not aimed at spatial development but at firms and industries. According to the guidelines (ibid: 33), while they agree with Perroux that "[c]ertain external economies may stimulate territorial concentration of clustering of particular industries and related activities. This does not, however, mean that the opposite is true, namely that by concentrating economic activities in specific localities accelerated growth will be generated." Higgins and Savoie (1997: 101) pointed out that Perroux's theory was "too complex, too abstract, and too non-operational to be used as a basis for planning." Friedmann and Weaver (1979: 172-180) presented various critiques of the growth centre doctrine in detail. In sum, these authors argued that planners applied the growth pole concept without due rigorous analysis of its theoretical assumptions in terms of the possibility of the generation and diffusion of industrial growth, and the creation of urban centres in specific localities and conditions. The authors also pointed out that, due to its popularity, the application of the concept to localities had spread faster than the actual evaluation of its performance. Hansen (1981: 36) searched for possible explanations to the limitation of the growth pole approach. He argued that attempts to accelerate the development of lagging regions had largely relied upon some kind of growth pole strategy, but that it had never been tried, for example, in terms of the amount of investment, the lack of the concentration of the investment, and short planning horizon. 58 Consequently, this 'top down' centralized planning approach to peripheries that focused on regional industrialization lost popularity after the economic slowdown in Anglo-American economies following the oil crisis of the mid 1970s resulting in the inability of national governments to fund large-scale infrastructure projects in peripheral regions. Moreover, according to Friedmann and Weaver (1979: 178), the growth centre doctrine was generally rejected by neo-Marxist planners and economists after 1974. 2.2.2. Regional and Local 'Bottom U p ' Initiatives In the face of the limitations of the 'top down' growth pole or centre model, the necessity for alternative planning approaches to regional development began to be advocated from the late 1970s (Higgins and Savoie 1997: 167). The most distinctive conceptual challenge to the traditional 'top down' approach was expressed in the concept of development 'from below,' an alternative to that of development 'from above' that had promoted the growth pole model (Stohr and Taylor 1981). Renewed objectives of the alternative regional development were put forward by various scholars and institutions. For example, Friedmann (1979) proposed 'agropolitan development' that aimed at the promotion of territorial interests as a new approach to the development of economically backward and dependent peripheral regions. The Cocoyoc Declaration in 1974 (a symposium organized by the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development) appealed for the necessity of new development strategies that would satisfy basic human needs without causing environmental deterioration and the depletion of natural resources. These alternatives mainly focused on inward-looking local 59 economic development, in particular on basic needs of regional populations. Moreover, they emphasized the significance of cultural dimensions or regional values in promoting development that is sensitive to regional specific needs rather than hastening the functional integration of regional population groups into the global economic system (Stohr 1981, Weaver 1981). As indicated by Friedmann (1988: 9), concepts of territorial 'life space' and functional 'economic space' were alternative development approaches that emphasized territorial integration. They referred to "those ties of history and sentiment that bind the members of a geographically bounded community to one another." In other words, consideration of the territoriality of a region was advocated by alternative 'bottom up' approaches. Yet, notwithstanding the evolution of concepts of alternative development, their application to real localities and regions was rather limited (Sanyal 1994). Sanyal (1994) argued that the alternative development paradigm withered away despite the economic conditions of the early 1970s which brought forth the idea of alternative development. On the contrary, Friedmann (1992: 6) asserted that, although they were not dominant, the alternative development approaches continued to be sought as a remedy to the plight of peripheral regions. Friedmann further noted that 'sustainability' became a new focus of alternative development, especially after the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 (Brundtland 1987). In sum, while the limitations of the traditional growth pole approach invited substantial criticism from various scholars, some of which were mentioned above, the application of the alternative development approach was rather limited, and regional 60 discrepancies between national core regions and surrounding peripheral regions remained in most developed and developing countries. Stohr and Taylor (1981: 454) pointed out that the internal threat of secession or devolution in any country was a reflection of the dissatisfaction with national development strategies that lacked sensitivity to regional values. Thus, the weaknesses of both the traditional and alternative development approaches remained a challenge to not only the promotion of national economic development, but also to the maintenance or establishment of national sovereignty. 2.2.3. Expansion of the Scales of Linkage between Local and Supranational As stated above, the inability of development 'from above' by the central government and the necessity of that 'from below' had already been argued in the 1970s. In the 1990s, renewed discussions on the necessity of stronger local and regional initiatives for regional development gained new momentum. A central thesis of the discussions was that regions have become increasingly active in restructuring their relationships with the nation-state in order to increase their competitiveness across the national boundary, as the state's power to manage national economies have declined significantly in the ongoing changes in global dynamics (Keating 1997). Keating (1997) calls this phenomenon, of an emerging new political space, 'new regionalism.' New regionalism concerns the politicization of subnational regions and their attempt to act as an actor independent from the nation-state. The establishment of such supranational economic institutions as the European Union (EU) in 1992 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 represented the decline of the relative power of states to control national economies. Another important change in global dynamics relevant to 61 subnational regions in the 1990s was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of communist countries, which eased international tensions. Because of the collapse of the East-West Cold War structure, subnational regions' dependence on the state's defense forces was lowered (Keating and McGarry 2001). In the face of this new process of restructuring economic and political relationships at the global scale and the decline of traditional centralized regional development planning, stronger local control over local development became a critical issue (Kumssa and McGee 2001). In this context of global economic and political changes, it became an urgent policy . issue for peripheral regions to find out how and to what extent they should and could link themselves with global markets and actors while also mitigating the negative impacts that emerged. In particular, the significance of local and regional cultures, values and identities for regional development in an environment of globalization began to attract greater attention (Edgington et al. 2001, Noble et al. 1998). The role of local and regional culture on the promotion of local economic initiatives and development is typically represented by such cross-border strategies as cross-border cooperations (Aykac 1994, Scott 1999, Wu 2001) and growth-triangles (Thant et al. 1998). These strategies were attempts to take advantage of cultural and linguistic affinity as well as ethnicity, although they were not necessarily sufficient conditions (Hsing 1998). These strategies were typically used for peripheral regional development, and commonly aimed at strengthening competitive advantage rather than traditional comparative advantage that relied on the advancement of telecommunications and transportation. In terms of the competitiveness of regions in the global economy, Higgins and Savoie (1997) regard entrepreneurship as a critical local culture. These local and regional culture-based 62 strategies demand that the nation-state implement the deregulation of economic activities in the region and thus adopt a laissez-fair policy on regional economic development. Accordingly, stronger local autonomy or power of self-determination that tapped into the global change became a top priority for local governments. Alternatively, some scholars emphasized the impacts of globalization on local communities and the inability of nation-states and centralized planning to protect the regions (Alger 1999, Douglass 1998, Friedmann 1992, Stohr 1990). They suggest the necessity of developing local capacity to cope with global economic restructuring under local initiatives, basing this on the notion that central governmental planning is not effective for regional restructuring and innovation. This urges localities to take measures to mitigate global forces without waiting for decisions by, and support from, the centre. It is in this context that the idea of local capacity building began to attract attention among scholars; for example, the concept of 'empowerment' gained popularity (Friedmann 1992). However, these advocates of local initiatives do not necessarily insist that localities alone can solve all of the problems caused by changes in the global economy; they do give due regard to the fact that the nation-state can also play an important role. For instance, Douglass (1998) presents a notable example of the improvement of citizen welfare in the process of the integration of the national economy into the global market in South Korea by its government, namely the 'Two-Million Unit Housing Construction Plan' for Seoul in 1989. Of course, regions cannot independently choose strategies to either tap into or resist globalization, or both. However, in the face of the realities of globalization, the 63 transfer of the power of decision-making to regions, i.e. decentralization, has become a universal issue. In the next section, I will discuss the issues of decentralization and its importance to regional development. 2.2.4. Decentralization and Its Relation to Planning The core-periphery model of structuring regional relations (usually initiated by the centre)' addressed the discrepancy of income differentiation or economic inequality based on the concept of growth poles. A critical role of regional planning conducted by the central state, then, was to balance the level of economic development between regions along with economic growth. As discussed in the previous sections, development 'from below' became an alternative principle pursued in planning since the 1970s as the limitations of the more traditional planning approach began to reveal themselves in the face of globalization; however, its application was quite limited and did not replace the traditional model. An emphasis on local level planning, as opposed to 'top down' centralized planning, characterizes current planning theories and practices. For example, Noble et al. (1998) stress the importance of small-scale political communities, local solutions to local problems, participatory decision-making and democratic governance vis-a-vis the more centralized structure for planning. Along with this trend of local-oriented planning, the latest development of planning theory and practice is further characterized by an increasing interest in marginalized groups of people, in particular indigenous or aboriginal people and their minority status within cities and regions (see, for example, Sandercock 1998a). 64 With this said, substate nations, a type of national minority, have yet to be sufficiently focused on in planning literature. The study of substate nations necessarily involves the roles and powers of nation-states for governing subnational regions within the national boundary. In other words, the state is a key actor to be studied. However, as Alterman (2001: 1) argues, "[n]ational-level planning in democratic countries has been almost all but ignored by researchers in urban and regional planning since the reconstruction years following the Second World War," while local level planning has attracted greater attentions. In this context, substate nations are studied rather as a subject of political sciences, international affairs, and political philosophy. Substate nations challenge the nation-states and seek significant changes in the degree of local autonomy in order to end their subordination to institutions established by national majorities representing the central government. The most extreme claim of the substate nation is separation from the parent country, but, for the most part, they mainly seek greater self-determination within the state system (Halperin et al. 1992). In studies on the increasing tensions between nation-states and substate nations, decentralization is regarded as a practical mechanism to defuse the tensions (Cohen and Peterson 1999, Kymlicka 1995, Rousseau and Zariski 1987). In other words, decentralization is a principal measure for the state to effectively address pressures from substate nations. While decentralization is a widely accepted and implemented policy measure to deal with the issues of development that had not been addressed successfully under the traditional centralized and hierarchical planning represented by the concept of growth 65 poles (Stohr et al. 2001), its definition varies. As a simple definition, Barrett (2000: 34) suggests that: decentralization implies movement away from the centre and relates to an array of issues including political, administrative and economic power, financial autonomy, local democracy and cultural diversity. The degree of decentralization can be measured on a scale from nominal to radical, with the preferred extent of change conditioned by a number of factors including the ideological perspectives of those pursuing reform and the magnitude of opposition. Barrett (2000: 35) further summarizes the diversity of the definitions of decentralization. He argues that decentralization can be defined as either administrative or political, while related concepts being devolution and localization, deconcentration/delegation and subsidiarity, community participation and empowerment. The two types of decentralization defined by Barrett (2000: 35) are as follows: 1) Administrative decentralization — responsibility is transferred from central to lower levels of government, thereby giving them more managerial discretion, but not necessarily financial independence. Local government remain subordinate to central authority; and 2) Political decentralization — authority is transferred to democratically elected lower levels of government. Local government is placed on equal footing with central government and financial autonomy is increased. The three related concepts, as defined by Barret (2000), are: 1) Devolution and localization: local government is given the power to independently develop projects and programs. Local control over revenue and capital expenditure is increased. Restrictive rules governing organization 66 structure, staffing, budget utilization, revenue raising and contracting-out are removed. 2) Deconcentration/delegation: transfer of responsibilities from central ministries to field offices and autonomous agencies. Consequently, service provision is brought closer to citizens while remaining part of central government. The heads of these field offices/agencies are generally unelected and are given a certain amount of discretionary power. 3) Subsidiarity, community participation and empowerment: implies that political decisions should only be taken to a higher level of government when absolutely necessary. When justification is not possible, the decision-making power shifts to the lower tier of government until it reaches those 'most affected' by the decision. This relationship can also apply to local government and its community. Further to these, Jun and Wright (1996: 5) suggest that "administrative decentralization can be classified into four main approaches: (1) Deconcentration of administrative functions, (2) devolution of decision-making authority, (3) localized program innovation, and (4) citizen participation in the policy process," but acknowledge that these are "not mutually exclusive, but are interrelated and overlapping." Also notable is that, in addition to these two types of decentralization, financial decentralization is also identified as critical because the mechanisms of collecting funds and local discretion of their use directly influence on local social, economic and spatial development (see, for example, Rafuse Jr. 1996, Smoke 2000, Work 2001, Zimmermann 1990). Because of all of these differing interpretations, Barrett (2000: 35) argues that "it is obvious that decentralization can easily be promoted as an attractive panacea by interest groups from all sides of the political spectrum." 67 The diversity and ambiguity of definitions for the term decentralization is an issue to be addressed in the study of substate nations. In theoretical discussions on substate nations, Kymlica (1995: 69-74) uses the term without specific definition. He identifies the general ideas of decentralization with empowering local communities, and uses the term decentralization and devolution interchangeably, as in 'decentralize power' and 'devolving powers.' From a different point, in their comparative analysis of institutional design for substate nations, Catt and Murphy (2002: 37) acknowledge that these two terms are used interchangeably to denote the delegation of some form of power or authority from a central to a local governing institution. The authors further argue that decentralization should be regarded as questions on the subject of jurisdiction, which has four main components: policy areas; people covered; geographic scope; and the source and security of the jurisdictional authority granted. These components are useful in understanding the distinctiveness of the type of decentralization negotiated between substate nation and the state. In their discussion on the subject of jurisdiction (ibid: 39), it is also important to note that there are de jure and de facto powers to be negotiated between them. The former powers are "those explicitly listed in legal documents or interpreted as such via judicial review," and the latter are "those which are implicit as a consequence of administrative arrangements or because of the existence of general and imprecisely defined powers." These discussions on the definition of decentralization suggest that the dynamic and complex nature of relational rearrangement between the state and substate nations originates in these flexible and multifaceted subjects of negotiation. 68 As Stohr (2001b) suggests, decentralization is not a panacea, but that its potentials and limitations need to be understood from various points of views. For example, one viewpoint supports decentralization as a necessary governmental arrangement to remedy the weakest in society (Friedmann 1992, Marris 1998, Stohr et al. 2001). This is a view that insists that public decision-making should be made at the lowest possible community unit. In this perspective, decentralization can provide an ideal form of participatory democratic decision-making and self-determination, and thus sends a strong positive message to minorities whose decision-making power is constrained. The other view raises questions about the decentralization euphoria among policy-makers, politicians, scholars and international organizations. Based primarily on the examples of Latin America, Schuurman (1997) argues that the promotion of decentralization tends to support the neoliberal ideas of deregulation and the global market, and thus affect the weakest groups of people negatively. With respect to Quebec's francophone separatist movement, as an extreme form of decentralization, Schuurman (1997) contends that the separatist discourse advocated by separatist political leaders, in which cultural identity was stressed, was not inherently progressive and positive for the poorer segments of the Quebecois. These theoretical and empirical discussions on decentralization suggest that its impacts on disadvantaged people in peripheral regions are likely to be negative, and 'decentralization' should not be reified. Work (2001: 26) further emphasizes that decentralization is not always a viable alternative to centralization. 69 In the context of substate nations, Kymlicka (1995: 71) argues that decentralization only meets the needs of national minorities if it increases the capacity of the group for self-government. It should be noted that the literature on decentralization regards decentralization as a transfer of an equal set and degree of central authorities and rights to each subnational region. However, substate claims aim at the transfer of differentiated authorities and rights. Thus, this type of state-local negotiation on decentralization necessarily involves the legitimacy of such special claims as distinguished from those of other subnational regions. 2. 3. Substate Nations 2.3.1. Background ofthe Emergence of Substate Nations Rising interest in substate nations became apparent from the 1990s onward, especially from political scientists as claims for self-determination or even independence began to challenge existing state-local relationships (see, for example, Gagnon and Tully 2001, Guibernau 1999, Herb et al. 1999, Keating and McGarry 2001, Kymlicka 1995 and 2002). The emergence of substate nations is a global phenomenon, as shown in their prevalence in Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, successor states to the Soviet Union, and successor states to Yugoslavia (Halperin et al. 1992).5 This was, in part, promoted by global economic restructuring, in particular the establishment of supranational institutions such as EU and NAFTA, as well as the end of the Cold War (Halperin et al. 1992, Keating 1996, Keating and Loughlin 1997). These economic and political dynamics, which had impacts on the power of nation-states to 5 Note that Halperin et al. (1992: 144-5) find no substate nations in Latin America and the Caribbean but recognize that there are some indigenous groups in these regions. 70 control domestic affairs, became more salient in the 1990s, and the opportunities for, and necessities of substate nations to become more independent of the nation-states increased dramatically. Accordingly, substate nations became dissatisfied with acting only as a sub-unit of the nation-state. Guibernau (1999) suggests that they are emerging as global political actors, that is, they are obtaining powers to act transcending national boundaries. In addition to the change in the global political economy, various international arrangements that aimed to protect and promote minority group rights vis-a-vis the traditional and universal concept of individual human rights began to emerge (Keating and McGarry 2001). The protection of minority rights is not a new issue. Halperin et al. (1992: 54) provide the example of the series of bilateral European treaties that, beginning in the early part of the 17th century, already recognized a minority's freedom to practice a different religion within the state, although in a limited way. Halperin et al. (ibid: 55) also note that a legal regime for the protection of minority rights began to evolve after the end of World War I, as well as and the creation of the League of Nations. However, the League had no real enforcement powers and usually favoured the government's position. It was not until the end of the Cold War that minority rights began to draw serious attention again but more specifically as collective rights rather than individual ones (ibid: 57). In the 1990s, international recognition of the protection of minority rights increased. For example, Kymlicka (1995: 5) points out the emergence of such international arrangements as the adoption of a declaration on the Rights of National Minorities in 1991 and the establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1993, both by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 71 Europe; a declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 1992; a draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for which preparation began in 1985 and completed in 1993 by a working group of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; and the adoption of a declaration on minority language rights by the Council of Europe in 1992. These arrangements provided a favourable environment to minority rights, but as Kymlicka (1995: 6) contends, they did not fully articulate either the underlying justification for minority rights nor their limits. Recently, however, Keating and McGarry (2001) point out the proliferation of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and the construction of new forms of international jurisprudence, including the International Criminal Court (1998) and the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia (1993). All of these dynamic processes at the global scale tended to support the re-emergence of national minorities. This is a view (i.e. globalization strengthens the situation of national minorities) adopted by the scholars of substate nations or national minorities including Kymlicka (2002), and Keating and McGarry (2001), and contradicts with that of Hobsbawm's (1990), that globalization undermines national minorities. 2.3.2. Economic Politics and Cultural Politics Self-determination has been central to substate nations' claims to realizing equality. In comparison to other categories of self-determination movements, including anti-colonial self-determination, trans-state self-determination, self-determination of 72 dispersed peoples, indigenous self-determination, and representative self-determination, Halperin et al. (1992) states that substate self-determination is the attempt of a group, concentrated in a particular geographic area, to break off and form a new state or to achieve a greater degree of political or cultural autonomy within the existing state. According to Halperin et al., these various categories of movement towards self-determination are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can overlap. For example, the distinction between indigenous and substate claims may be blurry, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter. Further, interpretations of what constitutes self-determination ranges from minority-rights protection, to cultural or political autonomy, to independent statehood. The diversity of the categories of self-determination and their possible overlap suggest, therefore, that a substate nation may claim varying authorities and/or rights, and it may change those claims, and different actors within a substate nation may seek different types of self-determination. For example, Latouche (2001: 180) points out that the Parti Quebecois, whose raison d'etre is to achieve sovereignty, has attempted to redirect Quebec nationalism away from an ethno-cultural territory into a more civic and inclusive one. Kymlicka (1995: 10) argues that modern societies are increasingly confronted with minority groups, incorporated into a larger state, demanding recognition of their identity and accommodation of their cultural difference. The substate nation is a type of national minority formed as a result of a distinctive pattern of incorporation into the nation-state. It demands various forms of territorial autonomy or self-government to ensure its survival as a distinct society. Kymlicka contrasts national minorities to immigrants (or ethnic groups) in terms of the form of their incorporation into a larger 73 state. As opposed to the first type of minority group, who seek self-governance, this group wishes to integrate into the larger society with full membership. In his more recent literature, Kymlicka (2002) discusses such minorities as isolationist ethno-religious groups, metics (i.e. irregular migrants and temporary migrants), and African-Americans in addition to the previous two groups. He acknowledges that the involvement of self-government claims makes this situation more complicated. In order to understand and evaluate the politics of multiculturalism, he emphasizes the importance of seeing how the historical incorporation of minority groups shapes their collective institutions, identities, and aspirations. Self-determination is a central concern among those, such as Halperin et al. (1992), who are involved in international affairs. However, tensions between nation-states and substate nations cannot be resolved simply by dealing with self-determination because substate nations as sub-national regions have to address the realities of economic development. More precisely, they have to deal with the actual distribution of resources and services for self-reliant development and decrease their dependence on the centre. Traditionally, regional planners have not had to deal directly with self-determination; however, self-development was a central issue in the 'bottom up' alternative development discussed above. Self-determination and self-development are two ideals of social justice (Young 2000: 31). According to Young (ibid.), self-development raises questions about the distribution of resources and positions, and self-determination consists of being able to determine one's action, and the condition of one's action, as opposed to merely being dominated. These discussions are quite conceptual and not directly applicable to understanding the mechanism of tensions 74 between nation-states and substate nations where regional development, i.e. the equitable, effective and efficient distribution of resources, is involved. Substate nations and other national minorities demand differentiated rights and/or treatment. In order to analyze such demands, Kymlicka (2002) presents the existence of two hierarchies that cause inequality between national minorities and majorities. One is an economic hierarchy and the other a status hierarchy, although he acknowledges that they are often combined in the real world. According to Kymlicka (2002: 332), economic hierarchy brings to light the disparity in one's relationship to the market or to the means of production, and struggles against the inequalities inherent in this hierarchy generate a 'politics of redistribution.' The 'politics of redistribution' revolves around perceived socioeconomic injustices rooted in the economic structure of any particular society, including exploitation, economic marginalization, and economic deprivation. Examples of various remedies for these types of injustices may include such measures of economic restructuring as income redistribution, reorganizing the spatial division of labour in society, or regulating the location of investment decisions to favour substate nations. The targets of public policies in this form of politics typically include groups of people whose access to the market or the means of production is substantially limited. The politics of redistribution, therefore, aims to reduce differences in income and wealth between various groups. In sum, this is essentially economic politics. The 'politics of redistribution' has also been an inevitable accompaniment to regional planning administered by national governments. In other words, it has been driven by the desire of national-level planning to reduce inter-regional inequalities within the country (Alterman 2001: 16). 75 In contrast, the 'politics of recognition' focuses on cultural injustices. These are generally rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication, including cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect. For Kymlica (2002), this type of injustice is remedied by cultural or symbolic change aimed at upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups, or more positively valuing cultural diversity. Politics of recognition targets status groups such as women, racial groups, and indigenous peoples, who are defined by relations of recognition in which they experience less esteem, honour, and prestige than other groups. The politics of recognition aims to affirm group differences within society and, by extension, group-differentiated rights, which challenge the notion of individual equal rights or equal citizenship. In the relationship between substate nations and a nation-state, this ultimately involves cultural factors. Gutmann (1992: 5) also acknowledged the significance of the relationship between recognition and politics, and argues that "whether and how cultural groups should be recognized in politics are among the most salient and vexing on the political agenda of many democratic and democratizing societies today." The 'politics of recognition' is central to Kymlicka's argument on national minorities. He uses it as a criticism against the traditional views held by both Marxists and liberals that economic equalities can redress cultural inequalities. He rejects this view, pointing to the existence of those who are economically well off, yet culturally stigmatized, and vice versa. Regional planning in general, and peripheral regional planning in particular, focused on the elimination of economic inequality between the core and periphery and was involved in the politics of redistribution leaving cultural inequalities undealt with on 76 a regional level. Kymlicka's (2002) discussion of the two modes of politics is an expansion of Nancy Fraser's (1997) argument on the dilemmas of justice in a 'Postsocialist' age. Although her discussion focuses on gender and race, ethnicity and nationality are also considered to be facing the dilemmas of justice (ibid: 33). Fraser's (ibid: 12) argument is that justice today requires both redistribution and recognition, and thus it is necessary to examine ways in which economic disadvantage and cultural disrespect are entwined with and support one another. Further, it is necessary to clarify the political dilemmas that arise when we try to combat both socioeconomic injustice and cultural or symbolic injustices. This approach attempts to adopt an analytical method that distinguishes between these two types of injustices notwithstanding the fact that they are often intertwined in the real world. Because economic issues are always relevant in the claims made by substate nations for greater autonomy or self-determination, it is necessary to address the integrative nature of these injustices. Thus, the two forms of political dynamics discussed (redistribution and recognition) provide a powerful conceptual framework to organize theoretical discussions on emerging conflicts and relational rearrangements between substate nations and nation-states. As represented by the traditional growth pole approach, regional planning has mainly focused on economic inequalities, while territorial cultural inequalities was left relatively unexplored. In the sections that follow, I will expand on the issues of substate claims and attempt to show the range and multiplicity of theoretical discussions on this ongoing worldwide phenomenon, focusing on the nature 77 and dynamics of conflicts. 2.3.3. Construction of Identity The consideration of minority identity characterizes the politics of recognition, but as remarked by various scholars, identity is a confusing term (Calhoun 1994, Herb 1999). In the examination of substate claims, collective identities need to be focused on rather than individual ones. Politics is involved in the construction of collective identities. Castells (1997: 6-7) argues that collective identities are constructed in a social and historical context. Political questions include how and by whom different types of identities are constructed, and what the outcomes are. Castells (1997) also discusses the involvement of different types of political interest in the construction of collective identities. Three different forms of the collective identities of minorities in relation to their political interests are presented: legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and project identity. Resistance identity is the most fundamental for substate nations taking action against the existing status of inequality. Language is considered to be a primary element for the construction of identity (for example Herb 1999, Young 2000). However, Herb (1999: 39) acknowledges that other attributes such as social class, ideology, levels of economic development, religion, and so on, are also important factors in constructing collective identities. Given the operational difficulty of identifying a single identity or set of identities in the dynamic relationship between nation-states and substate nations, we cannot expect to find a fixed set of attributes that define collective identity. 7 8 In terms of the relationship between collective identities and the rise of nationalism, Castells (1997: 29) argues that ethnicity, religion, language and territory, per se, do not suffice to build a nation and induce nationalism, but rather that shared experience does. Yet, an experience of an identical event such as war may not be shared equally over time and can be interpreted differently by different people. Therefore, shared experience is only one of the factors. Keating and McGarry (2001: 6), in addition, discuss the dynamic nature of identity construction. They argue that identities are not static and often undergo important changes. For example, distinct sub-national identity was not dominant in Quebec before World War II or in Flanders (Belgium) before the integration of Europe, but a distinct regional identity became dominant after these periods. Problems of linking specific attributes to an identity are discussed by Young (2000). She asserts that identity should not be understood solely by the attributes that characterize that identity (an essentialist view), but rather by the relations that make identity (a relational view). The problem of the former is that it presupposes that social groups can be identified based on fixed and specific attributes. Accordingly, it does not acknowledge the similarities that many group members have with those not considered part of the group, and that members of a group are not necessarily homogeneous. Contrarily, the relational view focuses on the dynamic and overlapping nature of identities and rejects the rigid and exclusive grouping of members of the society. This view sees the possibility of building specific identities in the process of forming relationships with other groups of people. As an example of this second view, Young 79 (2000) notes that the development of the ethnic identity of the New Zealand Maoris resulted from their encounter with English people. Young (2000: 90) further argues that "conceiving group differentiation as a function of relation, comparison, and interaction, then, allows for overlap, interspersal, and interdependence among groups and their members." Regarding minority nationalism, Keating (1996: 19) presents two forms of identities. The first form is based on such ethnic identifies as language, race or religion. The second is an identity formed by civic, territorially based claims rooted in the territorial society itself. This is a collective identity based on traditions, values, institutions and historical memories. It is also important to note Keating's remarks that this type of common identity is difficult to maintain without the bonds of ethnic solidarity and without state institutions. These discussions on identity suggest that collective identities are constructed politically when substate nations aim to change their relationship with national majorities. 2.3.4. Planning for Substates and the Legitimization of Substate Claims Collective identities cannot be automatically translated into substate claims, but accountable and responsible actors are needed to legitimize those claims. Guibernau (1999: 11) argues that a nationalist movement, which generally starts as an elite movement, has to obtain a mass following to be successful, though, as Keating and McGarry (2001: 6) note, elites are not necessarily always influential, as some nationalist 80 elites were successful and others were not. Further, Castells (1997: 30) argues that nationalism is not necessarily an elite phenomenon but rather a reaction against global elites. Castells (ibid.) acknowledges that, as in many social movements, the leadership of nationalism tends to be taken on by more educated people than by the popular masses, but this does not reduce the appeal and significance of nationalism to the mere manipulation of the masses by self-interested elites. The discussion about the actors of cultural politics suggests the necessity of identifying initiators and followers or supporters, who demand 'recognition of difference,' in order to understand the mechanism of cultural politics, and examining who the beneficiaries are. The power of the politics of recognition, which aims to achieve non-material interests, is often referred to as identity politics (Agnew 1997: 250). Such territorially-differentiated authorities and rights as self-determination, self-development, self-governance or greater local autonomy characterize substate nations' interests. In claiming interests against the nation-state, these need to be legitimized by substate actors and accepted by the nation-state as a serious public interest. Thus, this involves political work, linking collective identity with territorially-differentiated interests. For modern nation-states that adopted the notion of equal citizenship, this poses a serious question to democracy and citizenship. Young (2000) points out the practical difficulty of legitimizing minorities' claims for group-differentiated rights in the face of criticism based on the notion of democracy and equal citizenship. She mentions the possibility that claims for differentiated rights would be criticized for being selfish and for producing social exclusion. Kymlicka (1995) argues that minority claims basically 81 seek inclusion and are not seriously selfish. Thus, what is important in the process of negotiation between the nation-state and substate nations is the question of how substate claims are legitimized and whether or not they are reconciled. The process tends to be complex and usually involves wider public discussions. For example, in Quebec, various consultations, commissions, and public negotiations were held and referendums took place several times (Tully 2001). Referendums played an important role in legitimizing the transformation of the status of substate nations in other countries, for example the referendum for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly in 1999 (Guibernau 1999). In the case of the federalization of Belgium, Albrechts (2001) discusses the creations of cultural councils (Dutch-speaking and French-speaking) and their evolution towards the federalization of Belgium, and the resultant establishment of cultural regions. In some countries, the process of negotiations developed in armed struggles, for example Basque in Spain and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom (Guibernau 1999, Halperin et al. 1992). Through their strength in leading the charges made to substate nationalism, nationalist political parties often represent substate nationalism, heading off the process of state-substate negotiations for greater autonomy, for example in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia (Keating 1996). In sum, public negotiations take various forms and the reconciliation of substate claims vary in different countries and situations. Previous section 2.2 discussed the limitations of traditional regional planning in issues of interregional cultural inequalities brought to the surface by the rise of substate nationalism. The review of the literature on substate nations in this section suggests that substate nationalism is an expression of multiculturalism, and thus can be a 82 challenge to multicultural planning, which gained momentum in particular in the 1990s (see, for example, Douglass and Friedmann 1998, Sandercock 1998a, b). However, the major interest of multicultural planning tends to focus on cultural inequalities within cities and regions, and consequently the interregional phenomenon is rarely addressed. One possible reason why substate nations are left out as an issue of planning is that the establishment of substate nations may involve quite revolutionary actions, particularly in cases where independence is a possible goal, as typically shown in the case of Quebec (see, for example, Keating and McGarry 2001). For planners who generally work within the existing administrative framework of the nation-state and are also empowered by national laws, promoting substate nationalism may not be an appropriate action. However, the literature shows that the emergence of substate nations, i.e. the growth of cultural claims made by specific peripheral regions, has been a challenge to the existing system of governing subnational regions by the nation-state as well as an opportunity to enhance social equalities. 2.4. Japanese Regional Development Planning System as a Foundation of Okinawa Development With my preceding review of the many and diverse perspectives on regional planning and decentralization as background, the chapter now turns to a review of Japanese post-war regional planning, which provided a foundation to the development of Okinawa after its reversion to Japan in 1972. Further, this section assesses the stance of the Japanese regional development system toward the regional cultural distinctiveness valued by Okinawa. 83 2.4.1. Increase of Dependency on the Mainland Authority and Capital Development of Okinawa after its reversion from U.S. control to Japan in 1972 was guided within the existing framework of Japanese regional planning. To explain this, this subsection will review the evolution of the Japanese regional development planning system in the post-World War II period prior to the reversion of Okinawa. Japanese regional development in the post-World War II began under the Comprehensive National Land Development Act (Kokudo Sogo Kaihatsu Ho) established in 1950 (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). Until the formulation of the first Comprehensive National Land Development Plan [Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku (Ichi Zen So)] in 1962, the Japanese government prioritized the construction of large scale dams for the development of electricity, water resources and flood control in economically distressed rural regions. It aimed to develop river basins by comprehensively modeling them along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority concept established in the 1930s. To carry out this plan, the Ministry of Construction designated 21 special areas for development (Tokutei Chiiki). Unfortunately, this approach resulted in the significant loss of population in these areas due to the disastrous floods that were caused by the large-scale dam construction projects. Moreover, the planned diversification of local economies that was expected to generate local employment did not occur (see, for example, Endo 1999, Miyamoto 1973, Tanimura and Edgington 2001). According to Miyamoto (1973), a couple of reasons that attributed to the failure of the development was the lack in understanding the designated regions and the lack of an overarching institution responsible for coordinating all of the development projects. 84 As mentioned above, a comprehensive planning approach to regional development was first developed in 1962 upon the formulation of the first ten-year Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). By 1998, five such national plans had been developed and implemented. The central concept of the first plan was to use the growth poles for heavy industrial development (discussed generally in the previous section). The Second plan, developed in 1969 [Shin Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku (Ni Zenso)\, maintained the policy of promoting economic growth but adopted a new concept of regional development. Rather than deploying centres of industrialization sporadically in remote regions and waiting for 'trickle down' effects, this new plan aimed to build large-scale industrial centres and connect them across the country through large-scale transportation and communications networks (i.e. mega projects). It also sought to restructure the distribution of industrial activities across the country and balance the excessive concentration of urban population and depopulation in remote rural areas caused by the first plan, while relying on private capitals (see Tanimura and Edgington 2001). The concept of this plan was embodied in the then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's proposal to remodel the Japanese archipelago, Nihon Retto Kaizo Ron' (Tanaka 1972). This second plan was criticized due to worsening environmental pollution and was consequently revised in 1977 as the Third Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (Dai Sanji Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku). Nonetheless, the growth-oriented policy adopted by the previous plans was retained due to the economic decline that began in 1974 (Endo 1999). 85 2.4.2. Integrat ion o f O k i n a w a into the Japanese M a i n l a n d E c o n o m y The Economic Planning Agency of Japan incorporated Okinawa Prefecture into the second plan as the eighth regional block (see Appendix 5), and the Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku, ODP) was formulated within the framework of the Okinawa Development Special Measures Law (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) in 1972. This law announced that the Japanese people and government should endeavour to promote the reunification of Okinawa with its homeland in compensation for the hardships of life experienced by Okinawa people since 1945 (see Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho Kenkyukai 1974). Two other laws were also enacted in the 1970s that allowed for the establishment of the Okinawa Development Agency and the Okinawa Development Finance Corporation. Based on these laws, the second plan defined the role of Okinawa as a southern node that would facilitate international interactions of people and trade between Japan and neighbouring Asian countries. A strategy of this plan was to attract raw material processing industries, such as a crude oil transhipment station, thereby encouraging heavy industrial development. Accordingly, major infrastructure in Okinawa, such as roads, bridges and ports, were 100 percent subsidized, which was uncommon for public projects on the mainland, and the level of infrastructure quickly reached the national standard (see Arasaki 1992, Miyamoto 1980). The major objectives of the ODP were to urge the elimination of economic discrepancies between Okinawa and the mainland and to fulfill the basic conditions for self-sustaining development. Takara (1981: 281) argued that these objectives were not necessarily complementary but, rather, were conflicting, because the realization of 86 former large-scale public works with subsidies would lead to a higher dependency on the national government. Indeed, during the first ten years of reincorporation, from 1972 to 1981, Okinawa's dependence on national subsidies increased rapidly and public works spending increased by six times. In sum, although highly subsidized public works such as roads, ports, fishing ports (100 percent subsidized), and water and sewerage, and schools (75 percent subsidized) were built under this planning scheme, the provision for such social facilities as parks, recreation and welfare facilities, for which the level of subsidies was much lower, were still insufficient compared with that of the mainland. Further, the manufacturing industry did not come to Okinawa as expected; instead industries that were rejected on the mainland, due to their potential environmental impacts, did (such as the crude oil transshipment station). The lack of a stable mass production manufacturing industry was identified as one of the most serious issues in the development of Okinawa by the end of the ODP in 1981 (Takara 1981). Even subsequent plans could not overcome this issue. In the second (1982-1991) and third (1992-2001) plan ofthe development of Okinawa, this issue still remained a most difficult one (see, for example, Kuba 2000, Makino 1996). However, tourism, which was considered a minor industry as early as the beginning of the 1970s when the first Okinawa plan was developed, continued to grow and became a major industry, even though big resort development projects were typically managed by mainland capital. The level of the prefectural income also remained lower than expected (see further details in Arasaki 1992, Maeshiro 1984, Takara 1981), although it 87 was almost as high as the average of French workers in 1995 (Smith 1999, Tamamori and James 1995). The growth pole approach, which relied on national intensive investment in industrial infrastructures and on the involvement of industrial capital for regional development, was criticized as the Okinawan economy became subordinate to the mainland capital (Kuba 1995). Experts on the development of Okinawa criticized the national government for not paying sufficient attention to the distinctiveness of local conditions for development, and for applying a nation-wide standardized planning strategy to Okinawa. For example, rivers and springs in Okinawa, on which people relied, were polluted by road and agricultural modernization works initiated by the national government (McCormack 1999).6 In this context, the necessity of a local planning initiative was emphasized (see Maeshiro 1984, Takara 1981). In the first ten years after the reversion, Okinawan people witnessed the potential and limitation of centralized national planning for Okinawan development. The first example of the very 'top down' approach adopted by the central government for the development of Okinawa was the Okinawa Ocean Exposition (Okinawa Kaiyd Hakurankai) held in 1975. According to Maeshiro (1984), the idea for this exposition was presented by the national government to the then government of Okinawa (the Ryukyu government) prior to the 1972 Reversion, and the prefectural governor officially asked the national government to hold it in Okinawa. This project 6 In addition, the U.S. military polluted rivers, too. There were at least 25 cases of the pollution of rivers caused by the military from 1972 to 1997. Coastal zones were also polluted by the military. There were at least 23 cases during the same period of time (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). 88 was a celebration of the return of Okinawa to Japan. It was the first major public works project in Okinawa post-reversion; it was authorized by the national government in 1972, and was to begin in July 1975 and end in January 1976. Before the event, various public works related to the event were implemented, including airports, ports, and roads. After the event, Okinawa gained popularity as a tourist destination, though over-investment in tourism and resort development and land speculation triggered bankruptcies. Despite this, a positive effect of the event was that it stimulated Okinawan tourism, setting it on a growth track (Maeshiro 1981). Indeed, the number of visitors to Okinawa increased by approximately seven times between 1972 and 1992 (from 440,000 to 3,200,000 annually) (Tamamori and James 1995). The second example was the construction of a large scale crude oil transshipment station (CTS). This project was a symbol of the growth pole approach adopted by both Okinawa Prefecture and the national government. Oil refineries were built in the 1980s, but the controversial process of allowing the construction began in 1972 when the Ryukyu government gave permission to Mitsubishi to reclaim an ocean coast for the construction, one week before the reversion (Arasaki 1992). It should be noted that before the reversion, the Ryukyu government had already given permission to such major international oil companies as Gulf, Esso, and Caltex, at the end of the 1960s, as a new industry for the development of Okinawa after the reversion. Gulf built refinery facilities on a small island off the shore of Yonashiro Town in 1970, and Esso in Nishihara Village in 1969; both were on the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto) (see Appendix 6). Mitsubishi Development (Mitsubishi Kaihatsu) planned to build a larger CTS near Gulfs facilities. However, because of the 89 possibility of serious negative impacts on the environment and fisheries, local residents of Okinawa sued the prefecture for its legal procedural mistake in granting permission for the reclamation in 1974. At the time, the mainland of Japan had already experienced serious environmental pollution resulting from an accident at a petrochemical complex. Local opposition groups, local support groups, the prefectural governor, the prefectural assembly and Mitsubishi contended for their respective interests (see Arasaki 1992). Shortly after, in 1975, the prefecture won the lawsuit and gave permission to Mitsubishi Development. This action revealed the prefectural government's determination, at that time, to pursue a growth-oriented approach, as prescribed by the national government. However, it turned out that this project did not trigger sufficient 'trickle down' effects (Takatsuki 1992). In particular, two oil shocks in the 1970s were decisive in discouraging further private sector capital investment, and subsequently, Japanese manufacturers started to move their production centres to Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, skipping over Okinawa. Accordingly, attracting manufacturing industries to Okinawa from the mid 1970s onwards turned out to be a difficult venture. Deviating from this growth pole approach, alternative approaches that sought self-sustaining development were attempted at a municipal level. In particular, Yomitan Village (approximate population: 24,000 as of 1975) and Nago City (approximate population: 45,000 as of 1975) (see Appendix 6) have become well known for their attempts at endogenous agropolitan development that aimed to strengthen local cultural identity and agricultural activities suitable for local conditions (Maeshiro 1981, Sasaki 1999). Yomitan Village was highly regarded as an excellent example of 90 endogenous development. Under the village mayor's strong leadership and the village's controll of speculative resort development, agricultural and cultural activities such as pottery and crafts were encouraged. A local financing institution was also set up and facilitated these activities. Nago City, however, could not continue to pursue its local-oriented strategy and its budget deficit expanded (see Sasaki 2000, Takatsuki 1992, Yamauchi and Mizushima 1997). It is important to note that other municipalities of Okinawa Prefecture did not adopt alternative endogenous approaches and thus, Yomitan remained the exceptional case (see Sasaki 1999). 2.4.3. Okinawa's Persistent Desires for Local Autonomous Development The development of Okinawa after the reversion in 1972 was closely related to the policy of its reincorporation into Japan. The issues of Okinawa's development, post-reversion, were extensively examined by researchers in the Japanese mainland (see the Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). In its introduction, this report addressed the lack of respect among Japanese and U.S. governmental representatives for the collective will of the Okinawan people toward the mode of reincorporation. After observing the growing distrust of and criticism against the reincorporation among the people of Okinawa prior to the return, the report examined other islands that faced territorial independence or incorporation after World War II. For instance, Cyprus, Iceland, the Maldives, the Caribbean islands, the Isle of Man, Greenland, Sicily and Sardinia were examined as examples of the rearrangement of territorial status. In sum, this report suggested that experts must recognize that the reincorporation of Okinawa should involve delicate issues of territorial and historical identity. However, as intimated above, the development of Okinawa in the process of 91 reincorporation was guided in the early 1970s by the concept of growth poles, a concept that had been applied to the development of different Japanese mainland regions in a uniform way, and thus lacked sufficient consideration of local specific needs in Okinawa. Kuba, one of the leading scholars in the study of Okinawa, had, from the outset, insisted on the necessity of local autonomy for planning and implementing development in 1971 (Kuba 1995: 317). He argued that Okinawa should move away from its military base-dependent economy and seek environmentally-sound and welfare-oriented development as opposed to the rapid and expansive industrialization being planned under the centralized planning scheme. He criticized the concentration of power in the national centre since the Meiji era and its impacts on the deterioration of local identity and democracy, and then proposed the establishment of a special autonomous region of Okinawa. It is important to note that the popular movement for the return of Okinawa to Japan represented the realization of democracy and the protection of human rights. In the face of the 1972 Reversion, Higa (1971) argued that politics and public administration should be done at a level closest to the people. He opposed the idea of allowing the National Regional Development Agency to guide the development of Okinawa. As various scholars and experts had worried would happen, the Okinawa Development Agency was established with the Okinawa Development Bank, both of which were placed under national control. Consequently, Okinawa prefectural and municipal planners lost their chance to take on the initiative of planning the development. Since the establishment of the 1972 Okinawa development scheme, regional planning has been managed mainly by national bureaucrats. As Sorensen (2002) argues, in the 92 context of city planning, the relationship between the strong central government and the weak local government is distinct one between Tokyo and Okinawa, and further, the relationship has been managed by bureaucrats. Strengthening regional economic independence, or self-development, continued to be a top priority in the ODP. Non-governmental entities, such as labour unions, were also involved in the promotion of autonomy, shown in a policy proposal for the establishment of special autonomy for Okinawa, published by the Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union (Zen Nihon Jichi Dantai Rodo Kumiai) in 1998. This example highlights the persistent desire for self-governance among non-governmental actors. In the 1990s, the necessity of administrative decentralization gained renewed momentum. In 1995, the Decentralization Promoting Law (Chihd Bunken Suishin Ho) was enacted in the Diet, and subsequently the Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization (Chihd Bunken Suishin Iinkai) was established in order to draw up the outline for decentralization (Tajima 1996). In 1999, the Decentralization Law (Chihd Bunken Ho) was enacted based on the recommendations of the Committee. 475 laws were amended including the City Planning Law, Food Hygiene Law, and Public Elections Law, and some administrative powers were transferred to local governments, but the 1995 Law made little change in the power relationship between central and local government because the political decision-making structures remained untouched (Barrett 2000). For example, under the amended City Planning Law, municipal governments no longer needed ministerial approval for urban development plans, but were required to undertake discussions to reach an agreement with the Ministry of Construction. Further, there was no transfer of financial authority from the central 93 ministries. Consequently, the central government retained the power to control local affairs, typically through subsidies (ibid). Former Prefectural Governor Ota (2003) emphasized this point when he argues that decentralization in Japan has no substance, noting the bureaucrats' resistance against changes to their authorities. 2.5. Summary This chapter examined three sets of literature: traditional western regional development planning (section 2.2), substate nations (section 2.3) and Japanese regional development planning (section 2.4). Section 2.2 examined the fact that regional development planning had concentrated on the elimination of interregional economic inequalities, by managing the distribution of economic resources for regional development, and had not dealt with the issues of cultural inequalities between regions. It became clear that regions' desire for development 'from below' as opposed to development 'from above' continued to exist, and the concepts of local oriented or alternative development became increasingly popular. Yet, despite these changes in the trend of regional planning, cultural inequalities between regions was not an issue that was addressed seriously. Consequently, the weaknesses of both the traditional and alternative development approaches remain a challenge to not only the promotion of cultural equalities within the nation-state, but also to the maintenance of national sovereignty. This section also examined how opportunities for subnational regions to expand their networks with the external world across national boundaries began to increase as a result of globalization. It further illustrated the decline of the relative power of nation-states to protect regions under the pressures of globalization. Consequently, subnational regions became more concerned about dealing with global 94 forces without waiting for decisions by, and support from, the centre, and thus their interest in self-determination and self-development has been increasing. This section finally dealt with the issues of decentralization in satisfying claims put forth by substate nations. An important finding presented by such scholars as Kymlicka (1995) and Schuurman (1997) is that decentralization could have serious impacts on some members within a region, while also being fundamental in promoting local interests which cannot be satisfied by 'top down' planning. In other words, various scholars recognize the necessity of decentralization for localities, but also acknowledge that its impacts on different groups of people within localities are important issues to be dealt with. In section 2.3 various arguments on substate nations, developed mainly by political scientists, were reviewed. The section first clarified that the emergence of substate nations was a global phenomenon, particularly in the 1990s, and that various global forces such as economic globalization and the end of the Cold War were driving agents behind the emergence of national minorities. Secondly, it revealed the significance of self-determination as a fundamental goal of cultural politics or the 'politics of recognition,' for substate nations. This is in contrast to economic politics, or the 'politics of redistribution,' that seeks to eliminate economic inequalities between majorities and minorities. These two types of politics were found to be relevant to minorities and were often intertwined. They were understood by scholars like Kymlicka (2002) and Fraser (1997) as being mutually related powers, but the irreducibility of the demand for recognition compared to that for redistribution was identified as a foundation for the emergence of substate nations. 95 Construction of identity is another issue widely discussed by various scholars such as Calhoun (1994), Castells (1997), Herb (1999), and Keating and McGarry (2001). They acknowledge that collective identities are not necessarily fixed but rather constructed when necessary. In order for collective identities to be translated into substate claims, accountable and responsible actors are essential. In other words, specific actors who can legitimize collective identities are necessary for substate nations wanting to challenge nation-states with their claims for various forms of self-determination. The claims are then negotiated between nation-states and substate nations. Overall, these sections discussed the increase of the relative power of cultural politics over economic politics in the relationship between nation-states and substate nations. Various factors were found relevant to the rise of cultural politics including external dynamics and local dynamics (the construction of identities). In what follows, I will present two models to help understand the characteristics of cultural politics and economic politics (figure 2.1), and the dynamics and complexity of the development of interplay between the two (figure 2.2). 96 Figure 2.1 Cultural Politics and Economic Politics Types of ^\Po/itics Policy Issues Cultural Politics Politics of Recognition Economic Politics Politics of Redistribution Values Cultural Equality Economic Equality Objectives Obtain Recognition and Increase Political Status Promote Economic Redistribution Development Resources Dependence on Regional Resources Dependence on Central Resources Figure 2.2 External and Internal Dynamics of the Emergence of Substate Nations Global Forces Economic Globalization The End of the Cold War Nation-State Cultural Politics Econ Politics Substate Nations Identities and Interests 97 Section 2.4 examined Japanese post-war regional planning which provided a foundation for the development of Okinawa after its reversion to Japan in 1972. Regional development planning has been a central mechanism to promote and maintain the unity of Japan as a whole. As Calder (1988) contended, the Japanese government, in the post-World War II era, adopted a economic politics approach toward regional development; this was based on compensating regional interests typically through strong subsidy and a comprehensive development planning system involving public works. In return, it expected each prefecture to develop in a homogenous manner in terms of the levels of income and welfare based on an idea of 'civil minimum.' This standardized regional development model represented by the Comprehensive National Land Development Plans, was basically used to establish systems for the development of national land rather than for the development of the region. In this national planning framework, the issue of cultural distinctiveness for promoting regional development was not addressed. In order to address the unique difficulties in the development of remote and island regions as well as the reincorporation of a territory which had been administered under a foreign government, a new system of regional development was established for Okinawa, but it was in the traditional manner of centralized and standardized national administration. Accordingly, a special autonomous status was needed to tap into the potential power of cultural distinctiveness since local-oriented development was not granted to Okinawa. Decentralization became an increasingly important issue for prefectures and municipalities in Japan, particularly in the 1990s, as it was a necessary step for seeking local-oriented development approaches. However, the progress of decentralization handled by the national government was slow because of bureaucrats' resistance to change. Consequently, the Japanese regional development 98 system remained insensitive to regional cultural distinctiveness in favour of the standardized system administered by bureaucrats. CHAPTER 3 The Historical Background of Okinawa as a Substate Nation 99 3.1. Introduction Chapter 2 outlined the general argument that regional planners need to incorporate models of 'politics of recognition' when addressing the problems of substate nations, a distinctive type of peripheral region. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce Okinawa more concretely as a substate nation in Japan, a state with a distinctive yet subordinate cultural position relative to Japanese mainstream political and cultural life. I will show the distinctiveness of the historical relationship between Okinawa and the mainland Japanese powers as well as the U.S. military forces, in which the subordinate status of Okinawa was formed and maintained. As noted earlier, substate nations are distinguished from other regions within the nation-state by their histories of subordination to the power of national majorities, for example Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia. These distinctive histories were the driving forces behind their recent challenges to the nation-state (see Keating and McGarry 2001). The present tensions between substate nations and the nation-states are the outcomes of a distinctive past. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the historical processes of the formation of the dominant-subordinate relationship between substate nations and the nation-states in order to understand the mechanisms and processes of changes in relationship between them. In section 3.2, I will discuss briefly the historical processes of how Okinawa's economic dependency on Japan and the U.S. military forces was established through 100 increased dependency upon national government subsidies. In section 3.3, I will focus on the decrease of the economic dependency of Okinawa on U.S. military bases after the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972; and in section 3.4,1 will discuss the role of regional identity in the political movement of Okinawans seeking freedom from U.S. occupation, the persistence of ambivalence about identifying themselves as Japanese after the 1972 Reversion, and the political implications of an Okinawan identity in its support of independence from Japan. 3.2. Historical Formation of Dependence To begin with, the history behind current tensions between Okinawa and the government of Japan must be examined to fully understand Okinawa's desire for greater political and administrative autonomy and the reality of its historical and persistent dependency on the Japanese mainland. In Japan, no other prefecture or region apart from Okinawa questions its relationship to the central government or effectively challenges modern Japan's nation-state building. The unique dynamics in the case of Okinawa is evident in three principal dimensions of political economy: These are Okinawa's historical assimilation into Japan; centre-periphery inter-governmental relations; and the persistence of Okinawa's weak economic structure relative to mainland Japan. 3.2.1. Historical Assimilation The history of Okinawa is clearly distinct from the rest of Japan. Over the past five centuries Okinawa has been a marginalized and exploited region. Unlike Hokkaido, the northernmost island in Japan (see Appendix 5), where the aboriginal people, the 101 Ainu, came under the control of the Ando warrior family in the mid 15th century and then the Matsumae family prior to the establishment of Tokugawa Shogunate in 1603, Okinawa was governed by an independent Ryukyu Kingdom, which was established through the unification of northern, central and southern kingdoms in the main island of Okinawa in 1429 (see Kurayoshi 2001). After the authority for the governance of Okinawa was forcibly taken over by the Shimazu, a Japanese warrior family in Kyushu (the southernmost island in Japan) in 1609, mainland Japan controlled Okinawa as 'a kind of colony' (Higa, et al. 1997). Consequently, a system of exploitation of Okinawa established by the Shimazu generated a structure of poverty in the region. Also there was a profound shift in the status of Okinawa from its traditional role as an East Asian trading centre to a peripheral region of Japan populated by a culturally distinct yet minority group. It is important to note that the Shimazu exploited Okinawa in order not only to build financial resources, but also to jockey for political position within the Tokugawa Shogunate system by boasting that it could govern a foreign kingdom (Higa et al. 1997). Interestingly, the Shogunate also offered the conquest of Okinawa as proof that its governing power had reached a remote foreign kingdom (Morris-Suzuki 1998). At this point in the island's history, Okinawa's people were treated as exotic foreigners by the mainland Japanese (Iha 1998). After the Shimazu invasion, the kingdom survived under the control of the Satsuma domain (han) until 1871 when modern nation-state building started in Japan.7 Until then, Okinawa's tributary relationship with China was approved tacitly by the Satsuma so as to benefit from Okinawa's Asian trade (see, for example, Hamashita 2000). 7 In the period of financial drought in the 19th century, the Satsuma domain was involved in illicit trading and rebuilt its economy, and further used its extra savings for gaining influence in the national political world during the period of the establishment of the Meiji Restoration government (Higa et al. 1997). 102 In 1871-1872, the Meiji government reorganized all feudal clans into prefectural governments. This was one of the main steps toward modernization taken by the newly established government. In this process, Okinawa was first placed under Kagoshima Prefecture (the southernmost prefecture in Kyushu) (see Appendix 5). Because the Meiji government wanted to build a modern nation-state in order to establish sovereignty vis-a-vis western countries, it was necessary to clearly delineate national territorial boundaries. Thus, the government decided to make Okinawa a prefecture of Japan, ordering the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was put under the administration of Kagoshima Prefecture, to cut off direct relations with the Chinese Qing Dynasty government. However, because Okinawa still maintained ties to China, and the latter acknowledged the region's political autonomy, Okinawa asked China for protection from Japanese annexation (Onga 1999). But counter to Okinawa's expectations, China did not in fact assist, leaving Okinawa to be annexed to Japan in 1879, ending the Ryukyu Kingdom. This act of annexation is commonly known as 'Ryukyu Syobun' (see Higa et al. 1997, Smits 2001).8 It formalized the peripheral position of Okinawa in Japan. This term was also used by local Okinawan people to criticize the decisions of the Japanese and U.S. governments to place Okinawa under U.S. administration in the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty (the second Ryukyu Syobun), and also at the time of the 1972 Reversion (the third Ryukyu Syobun). Because these latter two events were also the exercise of external hegemonic powers, the notion of 'Ryukyu Syobun' still somewhat affects the attitudes of Okinawan people towards Tokyo (see, for example, Matsuda 1974). After the first Ryukyu Syobun, the Meiji government sent officials from Tokyo There are different interpretations of the 1879 Ryukyu Shobun. One is to regard it as an annexation of Okinawa by the Japanese military forces and the other is to regard it as the liberation of Okinawa people from slavery (see Higa et al. 1997: 122, Iha 1998: 168). 103 to take direct administrative control of Okinawa and to facilitate the process of its assimilation into mainland Japan, transforming the Okinawan people from foreigners into Japanese. The Meiji government also deployed a subsection of the Japanese military into Okinawa in order to protect the security of Okinawans, but its real intention was to prevent Okinawans' resistance to the annexation (Ota 1996: 38). In this process of assimilation, there were some movements towards democratic rights made by Okinawans against the mainland power. A central figure of this movement was, the Okinawan, Noboru Jahana, who was sent from Okinawa to Tokyo in the 1880s to study agriculture in a Japanese university, and became a prefectural official upon returning to Okinawa (Higa et al. 1997). Jahana interacted with various leaders of democratic movements and socialists in Tokyo. In Okinawa, he took the initiative in a movement with local farmers against an attempt made by then Prefectural Governor Narahara, who was sent from the mainland, to put the ownership of forest land under the national government, but this initiative failed in the end (ibid.). It should be noted that Okinawa Prefecture was established in 1879 but was not allowed to establish a local prefectural assembly until 1910, meaning that the governance of Okinawa was in the direct hands of the national government for three decades after the establishment of the Okinawa prefectural government (Iha 1998). People in Okinawa had long suffered from the hardships of poverty since the Shimazu invasion of the early 17th century. In the process of modernization after the Meiji Restoration, Okinawa remained the poorest region in Japan (Higa et al. 1997). In 1899 (Meiji 13), the first group of 27 Okinawan emigrants was sent to Hawaii and prior 104 to the Pacific War in 1941, 75,000 Okinawan people (11 percent of the 655,000 emigrants from Japan) had emigrated to Hawaii and North America (Tamamori and James 1995). At the beginning of the 20 th century, the Okinawan economy was heavily dependent on local sugar production, but sugar prices were directly affected by international market factors. Indeed, a dramatic drop in international sugar prices in the 1920s led to a collapse in the regional economy due to heavy losses in sugar revenue (Higa et al. 1997). The national government's rescue plan for Okinawa that started in 1932 was postponed as Japan went on to a war footing (ibid.). In the Pacific War, from 1941 to 1945, Okinawa became the only site on which ground battles between the Japanese imperial military forces and the U.S. forces took place. The main island of Okinawa, Okinawa Honto, was the battlefield of Okinawa. According to the former Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota (1996: 110-111), there were about 440,000 people in Okinawa before the U.S. attack began, and the number of U.S. soldiers sent to Okinawa was about 550,000. 66,000 soldiers from the Japanese mainland, 28,000 Okinawan soldiers, and 130,000 Okinawan civilians were killed while 140,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in the battle over 80 days in 1945. In other words, about 20 percent of the total population of Okinawa was killed during this battle. Ota (1999) also noted that Imperial Headquarters were more seriously preparing for the protection of the mainland rather than of Okinawa because they did not regard Okinawa as part of the imperial land but a foreign territory. The Imperial Headquarters' wartime security strategy took into account the large stretch of water that separated the mainland and Okinawa at 30 th degree North, and this characterized the mainland authority's attitude toward Okinawa (ibid.). The war ended with the U.S. military occupying the 105 entire territory of Okinawa, including surrounding sea zones. They sent all the residents to local concentration camps and started to bulldoze land for the construction of military bases (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1997). Okinawa was later placed under U.S. administration after the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty until the region's 1972 Reversion to the government of Japan. During the period of Japan's U.S. administration up to 1951, the U.S. military built bases, ports, military residential sites and other installations throughout Japan but mainly in Okinawa Honto, the largest Okinawan island where the majority of Okinawans live. The construction of numerous military bases and ports prevented local Okinawan people from accessing resources, such as water, fishing grounds, arable flatlands and forest, as well as cultural and religious sites and residences. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bases began to provide substantial direct and indirect employment to the local population, and thus established an economic dependence upon the bases. Yet, another serious problem caused by the U.S. occupation was a violation of Okinawan human rights at a time when mainlanders were enjoying the new freedoms granted under the new Japanese Constitution proclaimed in 1946. For example, a six-year girl was raped and killed by a U.S. soldier in 1955 but the suspect was not punished locally and was sent back to the United States. This incident triggered Okinawans' struggle against the violation of human rights by the U.S. military soldiers, but the incidences of rapes continued (Yui 1999). Thus, a sense of marginalization and colonization among Okinawans continued to build. The limited access to local resources and the dependency of the local economy and population on the presence of U.S. bases did not change dramatically after the 1950s, even after Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration in 1972. Some 106 researchers describe this condition as the coexistence of military colonialism and internal (or domestic) colonialism (see, for example, Harada and Yashita 1979) or, more metaphorically, as 'double colonization.' 3.2.2. The Period of U.S. Military Occupation A more detailed consideration of the 1945-1972 period shows an increasing power of Okinawans to move the Japanese and U.S. governments to agree to the return of Okinawa to Japan. During the period between the end of the Pacific War in 1945 and the reversion to Japanese administration in 1972, Okinawa continued to challenge U.S. authorities through negotiations, protests and general resistance. For example, 'island-wide struggles for land' (Shima Gurumi no Tochi Toso) occurred from 1953 to 1956 against the U.S. government when it proposed to complete a forcible takeover of Okinawan land for further U.S. bases with lump-sum payments made to exiting owners (see Ota 1999). The resultant process of change in the U.S. governance of Okinawa was complex. Comprehensive research done by the Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library (1971) details the political relations between Okinawa and the United States. In 1946, the U.S. occupation extended to the entire Ryukyu Islands located on the south of latitude 30 degrees north. At that time, all the islands were grouped into four administrative territories, each of which elected its own governor and assembly members by popular vote. The U.S. military occupying the Ryukyu Islands effectively controlled the four governments until 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was invoked. At that time, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), a civilian 107 government, replaced the military administration and the United States integrated the four island administrative territories to create a single Ryukyu government. The latter was to perform judiciary, administrative and legislative functions under the supervision of USCAR's orders. Indeed, the president of the Ryukyu government was appointed by USCAR (rather than through local elections) and the local Okinawan government did not have any diplomatic rights to represent Okinawan interests overseas. Thus, ultimately, the Ryukyu government was not an entity that represented the territory of Okinawa as it did not have any diplomatic rights (see, for example, Miyazato 1999). As noted, through USCAR it was decided that the president of the Ryukyu government was to be appointed rather than elected by local people. However, in reality, this did not mean that the Ryukyu government had become a nation-state, instead it worked on behalf of U.S. government interests (see, for example, Miyazato 1999, Vogt 2001). It is important to note that the integration of the four island groups into one government in 1952 weakened Okinawan democracy and representation of various interests on the island as a whole. It also signified the end of the U.S. experiment with indirect governance of the Ryukyu Islands (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). According to the Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library, indirect governance ended in response to the intensification of the Korean War (1950-53) and subsequent U.S. policy changes that reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Ryukyu Islands in East Asia at the time of growing Cold War tensions. After 1952, a central political issue for Okinawans was the right to elect a president for the Ryukyu government by popular vote. This was finally accepted by the United States and popular election of 108 the president of the Ryukyu government occurred for the first time in 1968. The Okinawan public, as well as the ruling and opposition political parties, continued to collectively protest the U.S. occupation and in 1955 international communities, such as the Asian-African People's Conference, who were opposed to American colonialism, began to focus on the Okinawa problem. As the situation in Okinawa became visible internationally, a popular movement for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan began to organize in mainland Japan as well. Thus during the 1950s and 1960s, while voicing opposition to the U.S. appropriation of privately owned land for the construction of U.S. bases, Okinawans demanded the right to the popular election of their president, as noted above. The United States wanted to avoid international attention on the problems of Okinawa because the United States needed to demonstrate their proficiency in democratic governance to the world in order not to be challenged by communist countries (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). The U.S.'s fear that Okinawa would become a second Cyprus9 prompted their cooperation with the Japanese national government to ease tensions between Okinawa and the United States. More precisely, although the United States did not think that Okinawans would fight against them with weapons (as people in Cyprus did against the British occupation in the mid-1950s), they wanted to avoid having the U.S. occupation 9 In Cyprus, in the 1950s, the Greek Cypriot population desired union with Greece apart from British control. In 1955, E O K A (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a terrorist group, began to attack British or British-connected targets in Cyprus. The British military in Cyprus (about 10,000 personnel) reacted and brutality expanded in Cyprus. The United States was afraid that Okinawa's protest against the U.S. occupation would evolve into violent actions and undermine the legitimacy of American democracy followed by communists' propaganda for its failure (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). 109 of Okinawa become an international issue (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). It was at this point that the government of Japan became involved in resolving the Okinawa situation. Conversely, the United States wanted financial assistance from Japan for the economic development of Okinawa. Thus, both the U.S. and Japanese governments began to focus on economic and human development during the 1950s and 1960s. However, the Okinawan people continued to demand nothing less than complete political reversion from U.S. occupation (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). Triggered by the United Nations' declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in 1960, the Ryukyu government's prefectural assembly, 75 percent of whose members belonged to the conservative Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, unanimously adopted a resolution for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and sent it to the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva, as well as to all UN member states (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). This political manoeuvre shocked both the U.S. and Japanese national governments. The attention the Okinawan resolution received was extraordinary; even the Soviet Union, which had historically ignored Okinawa, honoured this resolution and broadcasted the necessity of the reversion across USSR television networks (Research and Legislative Reference Department of the National Diet Library 1971). In response, both the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to increase financial assistance to ease frustrations in Okinawa, while Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party put pressure on their Okinawan counterparts to reverse the resolution. As the Vietnam War escalated 110 during the late 1960s and as U.S. military presence intensified, Okinawan politicians saw that the region's autonomy was further threatened, and so in 1965 both conservatives and reformists in Okinawa demanded the popular election of a president for the Ryukyu government as a means to acquire direct political control. This action resulted in forcing then Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to visit Okinawa. By 1967, the return of Okinawa was jointly announced by Sato and U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, and subsequent preparations for the return commenced between Japan and the United States (see Wakaizumi 2002 for a discussion of the process of reversion negotiations between Sato and Nixon). As the date of reversion neared and details were drawn up in Tokyo as to the nature of Okinawan's reversion into Japanese territory, it became increasingly evident that U.S. bases would continue to stay in Okinawa. Additionally, the Okinawan people realized that they faced powerful mainland political interests who were opposed to their campaign for local autonomy. Due to the need to incorporate Okinawa as a 'regular' Japanese prefecture, some institutional structures in Okinawa had in fact became less democratic in nature, for example, the shift occurred from American-style elected school boards to appointed ones based on the Japanese model. National politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo led the process of reversion and standardization. In deciding upon the concrete nature of changes in Okinawa due to the reversion process, there was an official process through which regional interests were supposed to be taken into consideration but, in actuality, national interests superseded Okinawan concerns (see, for example, Kuba 1995). It is arguable that the Ryukyu government lacked the capacity to design the complicated process of reintegration that included such difficult tasks as U l the conversion of currency from U.S. dollars to Japanese Yen and drawing up a huge body of new legislation. However, it cannot be ignored that the lack of local consultation left a deep-seated distrust of the national government within Okinawa. Therefore, while Okinawans expected their lives to substantially improve after reversion, they feared that local interests might be ignored in this third political, economic and cultural assimilation (the third Ryukyu Shobun). 3.2.3. Japanese Economic and Regional Planning and Okinawa (1972-2000) Regional poverty was entrenched in Okinawa before World War II, and today it remains the poorest prefecture in Japan in terms of per capita income. As of 1998, the per capita income of Okinawa was 2,183,000 yen, which was the lowest among 47 prefectures and 73 percent of the national average.10 Nevertheless, the standard of living has improved gradually since the Pacific War, especially after the reversion, and today the lives of the people of Okinawa could hardly be considered miserable (Kurima 1998)." One of the central policy objectives in Okinawa regional development has been to eliminate the economic gap, 'kakusa,' between Okinawa and other prefectures (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Kinyu Koko 1993). This term 'kakusa' was used in Okinawa Development Plans without any clear definition or criteria. In general, it refers to the 1 0 It should be noted that Okinawa's 1992 per capita income in monetary terms was equivalent to that of France as of 1992 (Tamamori and James 1995). 1 1 Per capita income in Okinawa in 1995 was 71 percent of the national average and ranked in the lowest among 47 prefectures (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Planning and Development 1997), but Kurima (1998) argues in fiscal year 1993 only seven prefectures were above the average and the per capita income (2.1 million yen) was not significantly low compared with other poorer prefectures such as Kagoshima Prefecture and Miyazaki Prefecture in Kyushu and Aomori Prefecture, whose incomes were less than 2.3 million yen. 112 underdevelopment of industries and the resultant dependency on transfer payments from the national government and the U.S. military bases. Per capita income is often used as an indicator to express 'kakusa.' In Okinawa, as of the year of reversion (fiscal year 1972), it was as low as sixty percent of the national average, and thus substantial economic bolstering was acknowledged as being necessary (Tamamori and James 1995). As of 2001, Okinawa's per capita income was about seventy percent of the national average and stayed at the lowest level among 47 prefectures (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a). Thus the notion of 'kakuscC continued to provide a rationale for the provision of the special assistance transfer payment to Okinawa, and so did the high dependency on the transfer payment (see figure 3.1), but the term was eliminated from official development policy terminology in 2001. Figure 3.1 Level of Okinawa's Dependency on Transfer Payments (Public Spending/Residents' Gross Expenditure), 1972-97 40 p ^ ' 35 30 25 20 15 National Average 10 5 0 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Year Source: Okinawa Economic Development 21 s Century Plan {Okinawa Keizai Shinko 21 Seiki Plan) 113 Regardless of the ambiguity of the definition of 'kakusa,' it guaranteed Okinawans a moderate standard of living. Because an authorized definition of the term 'economic gap' is no longer used in policy-making, assessing to what extent 'kakusci' has narrowed is difficult. Nevertheless, the definition of the term has been kept ambiguous. What is important to note here is that the elimination of the term 'economic gap' has resulted in the loss of the major rationale behind governmental aid to Okinawa. In September 2001, an article in the magazine, Voice, challenged the continuous provision of special assistance arguing that Okinawa has had already received generous subsidies and the national government should address the problems of other regions in equal measure. This complaint was representative of the growing frustration among some groups of both Okinawans (see, for example, Megumi 1997) and mainlanders (see, for example, critical articles about Okinawa appearing in such national newspapers as The Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 May 1997 and The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 May 1997) with the government's stance towards Okinawa and Okinawans' continual dependence on national subsidies. In recent discussions on the development of Okinawa, the unique and problematic structure of its regional economy has been more seriously emphasized as a policy target, rather than 'kakuscC per se, by both local and mainland politicians and economists, based on the recognition that the traditional catch-up model would not be suitable to the Okinawa development (see, for example, Miyamoto 2000). The traditional economic development of Okinawa since the 1972 Reversion was guided under the framework of the Comprehensive National Development Plans mentioned in chapter 2. When Okinawa was reverted, the second Comprehensive National Development Plan (Zenso, 114 from 1969 to 1976) was being implemented and accordingly, Okinawa was added to the plan as a new planning region. From the beginning, the role of Okinawa as an international hub in the southern part of Japan was emphasized as the main approach to decrease 'kakusa' and promote Okinawa's self-reliant development. Specific development programs and projects were set out by the ten-year Okinawa Development Promotion Plan, formulated within a framework of the Comprehensive National Development Plan since 1972. 'Kakusa' was a top priority in the last three ten-year plans (the first from 1972 to 1981, the second from 1982 to 1991, and the third from 1992 to 2001) revealing that the traditional planning approach had not been able to resolve the economic gap for three decades. This term, however, was not adopted as a goal in the fourth plan (New Okinawa Development Promotion Plan, starting from 2002); instead, the concepts of self-reliant and sustainable development were chosen (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 5 April 2002). Thus the catch-up model was abandoned and a more entrepreneurial model was adopted. The problematic economic structure of Okinawa, which had not been addressed very effectively, can be characterized by: a declining primary sector suffering from the devastation of agricultural land by U.S. attacks during the Pacific War and the subsequent U.S. occupation of a large portion of productive agricultural land; an underdeveloped manufacturing sector despite intensive investment in industrial infrastructure (for example airports, ports, roads and local bridges) since 1972; and the rapid growth of a tertiary sector that outranked Tokyo in terms of its share in total gross prefectural product of 2001. The share of services in the local Okinawan economy was 83.3%, while that of Tokyo, which ranked second in Japan, was 82.3% (Okinawa 115 Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a). In particular, tourism contributed significantly to the prefectural economy, although major resort hotels were owned by mainland capital (Toguchi 1990). This unique regional economic structure has prompted criticism of national and prefectural level economic development planning. More than anything else, the underdevelopment of manufacturing industries has frustrated local citizens, businesses and politicians because the considerable amounts of public investment in industrial infrastructure have yielded no apparent progress in increasing the share of manufacturing industries. The share of manufacturing industries in the local economy was 9.1 percent as of 1972, and this fell to 5.9 percent as of 1998 (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a). Some researchers even argue that Okinawan culture is not conducive to establishing a manufacturing industry because the region and its people lack the ability to develop and operate complex work organizations, and lack also an entrepreneurial mindset (see, for example, Kurima 1998). Construction industries, with a share of 11.8 percent of the local economy as of 1998, have been a key area of Okinawa's secondary industry, but this sector has its own intrinsic weakness (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001a). This weakness lies in the fact that the major construction projects are public works, such as roads and ports, which are funded by subsidies from the national government. Thus, ongoing changes in national subsidization policies directly affect this industry. As a result, the existent construction regime relies on the continuous flow of funds from the centre. Finally, the most unique aspect of the Okinawa regional economy has been its dependence on U.S. military bases. In 1972, U.S. military related incomes (including 116 rent payment to landowners, income of base workers, and military personnel and families consumption) accounted for 15.6% of Okinawa's total gross expenditure, and in 1998 this share had declined to 5.6%. These bases have provided local civilians with employment and generated a need for various local services. For local landowners whose property was being used by the U.S. military, the bases provided income in the form of rent from the Japanese government. It is also important to note that a 'military-industrial city' did not develop in Okinawa as in some cities in the United States (Markusen et al. 1991); 'GI-service cities' such as Okinawa City and Kadena Town have been created instead. 3.3. Declining Dependency on U.S. Mil i tary Bases After the 1972 Reversion, the structure of Okinawa's dependency began to change. This section will address changes in Okinawa's economic dependency on U.S. military bases and the distinctive political role of territorial identity. Together with the above discussions, the following presents the distinctive 'substateness' of Okinawa. 3.3.1. Economic Change in Okinawa 1958-2000 The construction of military bases under U.S. occupation, particular in the early 1950s, and the presence of U.S. military personnel and their families provided employment to the people of Okinawa. The total labour force in Okinawa was about 420,000 in 1968 with base workers making up about 400,000. In 1958, the number of base workers was 300,000 but due to the escalation of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, it rapidly increased (Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai 1970). Major local construction firms were established during this period for base housing construction (Tamamori and James 117 1995). Services such as bars and restaurants for Americans also grew. Consequently, a small-scale agricultural community in Okinawa was transformed into a U.S. military base dependent community (Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai 1970). Before the reversion, in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, military base workers, including those hired directly and indirectly by the U.S. military, accounted for nearly ten percent of Okinawa's labour force (ibid.). However, since 1970 the dismissal of employees continued and the number of those hired directly by the U.S. military reduced from approximately 26,000 in 1970 to 19,000 in 1972 (a 30 percent reduction) and in 1975 this figure fell again to just 11,000 (Kakazu 1980). As of 1995, approximately 8,300 base workers earned 52.3 billion yen (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). . The level of rent to land used by the U.S. military has been a substantial economic income on the island, and this increased by approximately six times upon the reversion in order to maintain cooperation from landowners for the continuous use of their land for the bases. Thus, the high rent level was due to political considerations (see, for example, Kurima 1998, Takara 1981). It should be noted that under U.S. occupation, owners of the land received rent directly from the U.S. administration, but after the reversion, the Japanese government began to pay this land rent. There were approximately 27,000 landowners receiving rents as of 1978 (Takara 1981) and 31,000 as of year 2000 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). In terms of the types of landownership, it is characteristic that 87 percent of land used by U.S. bases on the Japanese mainland was owned by the Japanese government as of 1997, while the Okinawan local population collectively owned 33 percent (ibid.). This means that the 118 dependency of individual owners on U.S. base-related rent is trivial in the mainland. As noted, services grew as a new form of economic activity due to the presence of the military bases. A distinct example of the growth of services is represented by the emergence of new commercial cities around the gates of the bases. In particular, Koza City (a part of present Okinawa City) and Ginowan City rapidly grew in the 1950s as entertainment districts for U.S. soldiers (Molasky 1999). These cities appeared on former agricultural fields. In addition, Naha City, Urasoe City, Chatan City and Kadena Town all grew as base cities in the 1950s and 1960s (see Maeshiro 1984). In terms of dependency on military-related incomes (consumption expenditure, rent on military land, and base workers' wages), their weight in total prefectural gross expenditures accounted for 15.6 percent in 1972. However, this share fell below ten percent after 1977, and as of 1998 it was 5.2 percent (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). However, this trend needs to be interpreted carefully. For example, the total amount of military-related incomes was about 187 billion yen as of 1998, while the gross product of primary industries (i.e. agriculture, forestry and fishery) of the same year in Okinawa Prefecture was about 74 billion yen, in which 39,000 employees were engaged (Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Statistics 2001b). This simple comparison shows the significant contribution of the presence of U.S. bases to the Okinawan economy. On the contrary, Kuba (2000) argues that the presence of the bases has deprived Okinawan people of development opportunities and further, has imposed serious negative impacts on local economic activities, such as pollution and noise. Still, for those who are dependent on military-related incomes, a sudden change 119 caused by the closure of any of the bases would be hard to accept, as observed also in the United States (Accordino 2000) and in Germany (Cunningham et al. 1995). Further, the municipalities in which the bases are located also receive national subsidies as compensation for the loss of revenues caused by the bases that do not pay tax to them. However, as Kuba (2000) argues, in Japan the bases are serious obstacles for the Okinawan economy from a comprehensive and long-term perspective. These two opposing views have caused a dilemma among Okinawans in deciding which attitude to take toward the presence of the bases. 3.3.2. M u n i c i p a l Dependence on National Subsidies Related to U .S . M i l i t a r y Bases The above mentioned figures show that the relative dependency of the Okinawan people's economic life on U.S. bases decreased continuously since the reversion. But this does not mean that new economic activities took their place and continued to sustain people's lives. As indicated earlier, the growth of tourism in Okinawa was distinctive but it alone was not sufficient to provide employment and public services to the local people. With the mission of guiding a smooth re-incorporation of the prefecture into Japanese economic and administrative systems and eliminating the uneven status of Okinawa, the national government has applied standardized assistance measures to compensate for the significant disadvantages caused by the presence of U.S bases (see Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). This assistance has been in the form of two types of subsidies; one for the alleviation of the negative impacts caused by the presence of U.S. bases and military activities, and the other for various financial burdens, both of which will be elaborated below. 120 An important feature of these national subsidies was (and still is) that they targeted Okinawa's municipalities directly, and not the prefecture; and specifically those cities in which bases were located. There are 52 municipalities in Okinawa Prefecture (as of October 2003), out of which 25 have U.S. military installations (the total area is shown in Appendix 1). Subsidies were set by the national government for such municipalities in order to facilitate local development. It is also important to note that municipalities also receive rents from the national government when lands owned by municipalities are used by the U.S. military. These subsidies played an important role in establishing a special relationship between base-related municipalities and the national government. Two major subsidies became available; each administered by different national agencies. The first was the subsidy given by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency {Boei Shisetsu Cho) and the second, given by the Ministry of Home Affairs LJichi Sho)}2 The former involves compensation for reducing the impacts from bases, including soundproofing of housing, road improvement, and compensation for damage done to local fisheries, and so on. Individual residents were major recipients of this subsidy. The latter relates to municipal taxation, and the recipients were municipalities in which U.S. bases were located. For municipalities, property tax, city planning tax, residential tax and municipal tax from U.S. bases have not been available, even when bases are located within their jurisdictions. Moreover, they did not receive these taxes from U.S. military personnel or from their families living outside of bases. Thus, the national 1 2 The Ministry of Home Affairs was reorganized into the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications in 2001 in the reorganization of government ministries. See the following English website about the reorganization made by the Cabinet Office: . 121 subsidies aimed to compensate these constraints on local taxation (see, for example, Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). In terms of the share of these subsidies in total municipal revenues in the fiscal year 1997, the highest was 33 percent in Kin Town, the second was 32 percent in Onna Village, and the third was 27 percent in Ginoza Village (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001) (see Appendix 6). In terms of absolute amount, Nago City received the most in 1997, 37.3 billion yen; Okinawa City received 31 billion yen; and Kin Town received 29.7 billion yen (ibid.). Kadena Town, a municipality whose land area was most dominantly being used by bases (83 percent) compared to other Okinawan municipalities, depended on subsidies by 26 percent, ranking fourth (ibid.). Because these municipalities with a large share of military sites were put under special constraints in relation to the use of local land resources, they continue to face special disadvantages for local economic development. Accordingly, as discussed in chapter 2, obtaining subsidies for public works projects became a priority for such municipal governments so as to improve economic and living conditions. In this relationship between municipalities and subsidies, the structure of the dependency of the base-related municipalities on the subsidies was formed (see, for example, Kawase 2000 for more details). In this regard, Kurima (1998) argued that there was a substantial amount of land suitable for agriculture that was underused in the base-related municipalities, and emphasized that new industries did not necessarily need large areas, thus arguing that a lack of land could not justify the absence of economic development activities. This argument of course was intended to emphasize the 122 importance of local entrepreneurship in economic development. Yet while Kurima's idea may be practical in some municipalities, it has been quite difficult to realize. As mentioned above, 83 percent of Kadena Town's jurisdiction has been used by the U.S. air force (see Appendix 7). The town is relatively small (15 square kilometers) and only an area of 2.6 square kilometers is used, but approximately 14,000 residents inhabit that residual area (approximate population density in this area is 5,400/sq km). According to Kawase (2000), the town used to receive national subsidies for public works projects, but by 1996, it was not able to find further projects to be subsidized. This was because major projects, such as building infrastructure, the city hall and a local community centre, were already completed and furthermore, additional projects would have caused inconveniences to local citizens' lives due to the small land area of the township. This extreme case disclosed the fact that the current system of special subsidies was not well designed to help such municipalities. 3.4. The Politics of Cultural Identity in Okinawa 1952-1995 3.4.1. Promoting Cultural Identity for the Promotion ofthe Reversion of Okinawa Okinawa's desire for returning to Japanese administration grew as early as the 1950s. In 1956, the biggest anti-U.S. movement occurred and was associated with a claim for the enhancement of autonomy by the Ryukyu government, which was put under the administration of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) after 1952 (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971: 12). At that time, USCAR regarded Okinawa as the newest U.S. territory and prohibited Okinawans from officially announcing that they were Japanese nationals (ibid: 13). As noted, the United States feared that they would face a 123 movement similar to that which had occurred in the 1950s when Cyprus argued that it should be returned to Greek administration. As previously discussed, in 1962, the Okinawa legislative assembly (Okinawa Rippo In) finally adopted an appeal for the right of Okinawans to return to Japanese administration and sent this to the United Nations and its member states (ibid.). This resolution stunned both the Japanese and U.S. governments because they did not want to bring the issue to the attention of the international community. Subsequently, U.S. President John F. Kennedy clarified that the United States had no intention of continuing to administer Okinawa in the future (ibid.). In Japan, a resolution for the restoration of the administrative right to Japan was adopted unanimously in 1962 both in the Lower and Upper House (ibid.). However, as the Vietnam War escalated during the late 1960s, the U.S. government was less interested in returning Okinawa, in order to secure strategic military bases. Okinawans' claim for stronger autonomy, typified by the call for a system of popular election for the president of the Ryukyu government (Syuseki), therefore remained constrained. As USCAR suppressed their pro-return political activities, Okinawans shifted their strategy of protest to target the illegitimacy of the Americans' dominance over the use of land. The movement against the U.S. administration transformed from a return to Japan movement to an anti-war peace movement (Hansen heiwa undo) (Onga 1999). As discussed in section 3.2.2, public protests in the mid-1960s occurred on an Okinawa-wide scale, and the intensification of the claim for the popular election was perceived as a threat to the Japanese government (Masuyama 1999). In this process, the ethnicity of Okinawan people played an important role in affecting the attitudes of the Americans and Japanese toward the administration of 124 Okinawa. In particular, during the 1960s a significant portion of Okinawan people wished to be recognized as Japanese, in order to enhance their chances of full reversion to Japan and hopefully to increase their local autonomy. Yet, according to Kawashima (1999), there was an argument within the U.S. occupation forces that the separation of Okinawa from Japan was legitimate because Okinawan people were not Japanese and thus Japan had no right to be involved. Indeed, Iha Fuyu, a native Okinawan and a leading scholar of Okinawa's history, ethnology, linguistics, and literature, recognized as the pioneer in the study of Okinawa (Okinawa Gaku), mentioned that General Douglas MacArthur stated in 1947 that Okinawans were not Japanese and thus the Japanese government should not oppose the U.S. possession of Okinawa (Iha 1998). This claim was rejected by a distinguished Japanese ethnologist, Yanagita Kunio (Kawashima 1999). However, in the 1950's, the Japanese mainlanders were not very clear about whether Okinawans were identical in ethnic background to the mainland Japanese. For example, Higa et al. (1997) mentioned that there was a well-known story in Okinawa that when the first group of Japanese mainland politicians visited Okinawa after World War II in 1954, they asked Okinawan journalists whether there was a Japanese newspaper in Okinawa. Higa et al. (1997) also noted that then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama stated mistakenly that Okinawa was under the UN trusteeship in his answer to a question in the Diet in 1955. Moreover, a well-known journalist's (Fujiyama Udai) findings of general Japanese knowledge about Okinawa, based on his interviews across Japan from north (Hokkaido) to south (Kyushu), was informative. His findings, published in an edition of Fujin Koron13 issued in March 1958, noted that, predominantly, mainland Japanese were not clear about the ethnicity, language or even the location of Okinawa. 1 3 Monthly magazine targeting women, issued first in 1916. 125 These anecdotes show that Okinawa was widely recognized as being different from mainland Japan, not only by the mainland Japanese but also by Americans. Yet, Higa et al. (1997) noted that an anthropological study published in 1950 concluded that the characteristics of the physical features of Okinawans were not significantly different from those of the Japanese living on the mainland. All of these examples suggest that it was not surprising that mainland Japanese were unclear about the ethnicity of Okinawans at the time. Due to this ambiguity, it was difficult for Okinawans to share a sense of solidarity with the mainlanders and gain sufficient support from them. Indeed, Higa et al. (1997) stressed the difficulty of expanding the movement for the return of Okinawa to Japan on a national scale, based on their observation that a public rally for promoting the return of Okinawa held in Okinawa in 1962 drew 70,000 people, while in Tokyo it drew less than 500 people. Thus, action for promoting the return of Okinawa intended to obtain democratic rights equal to those enjoyed by the mainland Japanese, yet it was not shared widely with the Japanese mainlanders. During the period of the U.S. occupation, the standardization of Okinawan dialects was encouraged, in general, because Okinawans wanted to boost nationalism in order to be released from the U.S. (aliens') occupation and return to Japan (see The Okinawa Times 1998). Because schoolteachers were central in the movement of the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese administration, standard Japanese was strictly enforced in classrooms and students were prohibited to speak Okinawa dialect (ibid.). Yet overall, in comparison with the Okinawans' desire to seek affinity with mainland Japan, 126 mainlanders considered Okinawans somewhat differently. It should be noted that the Okinawans' pro-return movement was based on the claim that they were Japanese and had a right to be integrated into Japan, thereby being released from the control of the different ethnic groups (i.e. Americans), iminzoku (Enoki 1999, Teruya and Yamazato 1995). Enoki (1999) notes that the concept of this movement was criticized as an expression of ethno-nationalism lacking a concern for the risk of the absorption of Okinawan culture into these mainland standardized culture, such as the obligation of the raising of the national flag and education. The next section will discuss the continuous inequality in the way Okinawans have been dealt with in Japanese society in relation to the U.S. bases and more broadly, their cultures, and changes in the identities of Okinawans and their political implication. 3.4.2. Problems in Establishing Okinawa's Cultural Identity After 1972, Okinawa was put under the Japanese system and its citizens began to be treated as Japanese nationals; therefore the ethnicity (Japaneseness) of Okinawan people was no longer an issue to be argued. However, they soon learned that the Japanese government had little intention to negotiate seriously with the United States to close the bases on Okinawa, and so their distrust of the government grew. The continuous presence of the bases placed Okinawan people under exceptionally dangerous living conditions. Indeed, they continuously faced airplane crashes, crash landings, water pollution, forest fires and individual crimes, such as vicious, violent, intellectual crimes and moral offences (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). These accidents and incidents frequently occurred and were reported in detail by local newspapers, such as The Okinawa Times and The Ryukyu Shimpo, but they failed to 127 appear in major national Japanese newspapers such as The Asahi Shimbun and The Yomiuri Shimbun. Therefore, the opportunities for the mainlanders to recognize the seriousness of the many problems faced in Okinawa relating to U.S. military activities and bases were limited (Ando 1997). It is important to note that in Okinawa two major local newspapers have dominated the market. According to a survey published by Naito Issui Sha (an advertising agency), 99 percent of the average monthly issues of morning papers in Okinawa from July to December 2001 were dominated by two major local newspapers (i.e. The Ryukyu Shimpo and The Okinawa Times) while the remainder were two major national papers (i.e. The Asahi Shimbun and The Nihon Keizai Shimbun), which shared 24 percent of the total Japanese national market. Two other major national papers (i.e. The Yomiuri Shimbun, which has the largest circulation, and The Mainichi Newspapers) were not circulated in Okinawa at all. From this we may conclude that there is no such prefecture in the mainland in which local papers dominate such a high proportion of circulation. This suggests the existence of a considerable perception gap between Okinawans and mainlanders concerning the impacts of the presence of U.S. military bases on the local society of Okinawa. Thus, sharing a common awareness of the issues relating to the bases has not been easy between Okinawans and Japanese mainlanders. Indeed, the latter's interests in Okinawa are directed by advertisements from the tourism industry and mass media, focusing on the distinctiveness and exoticism of Okinawan performing arts, such as music, festivals, foods and the sub-tropical natural 128 landscape, where the bases are out of sight (see, for example, Japan Airlines 1999, which featured a report entirely on Okinawa's traditional summer festival). This is because tourism is a major industry of Okinawa. In other words, differences between Okinawa and the mainland are disseminated typically for commercial and entertainment purposes (i.e. leisure for the mainlanders). The differences in the conditions of local daily life and the disadvantaged status of Okinawans within Japan are more difficult for the mainlanders to see partly due to the low coverage from the mainland mass media, in addition to the geographical isolation of Okinawa from the mainland. Therefore, it is difficult for the issues of differences in status and rights to be shared and addressed by Okinawans and the Japanese mainlanders. For Okinawans, the delay in the elimination of differences in status and rights after the reversion, and their awareness of the impossibility of changing the situation within the current national system, led to a critique of the reversion and a demand for greater local autonomy or, more radically, independence (Taira 2001). According to Arasaki (1984: 3-4), the disappointment of Okinawans with the reversion was revealed in a survey of the attitude of Okinawans toward the reversion conducted annually by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute since 1970. Arasaki (1984) suggests that respondents who were positive toward the reversion outnumbered those who were negative in 1972, but this reversed in 1973. In 1975 and 1977, the latter still outnumbered the former, but in 1982, the former outnumbered the latter. As far as this survey is concerned, it took six to ten years for the Okinawans to see the reversion in a positive light. The 2002 survey of the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (587 respondents over age 20) mentioned that the positive attitude continued to increase 129 since 1977 but its proportion in the 2002 survey, 76 percent, had dropped from the 1992 survey, which was 81 percent (see NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 2002). These outcomes of the surveys show that the majority of Okinawan respondents thought positively of the reversion. However, the reduction of the support for the reversion in 2002 implies that Okinawans are still ambivalent about the reversion. An extreme claim that represents the critical attitude of local people toward the reversion is the one supporting the independence of Okinawa from Japan, including the idea of the federalization of Japan (see All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union 1998, Oishi 1998, Ota 2003). The All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union (1998) shows that there have been eight major conceptual discussions on the institutional designing of independence and regional autonomy since 1971. Both Oishi (1998) and Ota (2003) argue that discussions on the independence of Okinawa had gained momentum in the late 1990s, although they both acknowledge that the discussions had remained largely conceptual. Oishi (1998) notes that there are two groups concerned with the issues of independence of Okinawa: the first group includes mass media (for example The Nihon Keizai Shimbun) and nonpartisan intellectuals, and the other includes activists and politicians who have opposed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. According to Oishi (1998), the former is represented by such an intellectual as Kazuhisa Ogawa (an international politics and military analyst), and the latter is represented by Arasaki Moriteru (former president of Okinawa University). Ota (2003) also introduces a few of the key players addressing the issues of independence: Chikushi Tetsuya (a well-known Japanese TV newscaster and a journalist for The Asahi Shimbun), Koji Taira (professor emeritus of Economics at the University of Illinois, 130 Urbana-Champaign), Chojo Oyama (former mayor of Koza City, now Okinawa City), and the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union Okinawa Project (1998), which was mentioned above. The continuing discussions on the independence of Okinawa from Japan suggest that the incorporation of Okinawa into the Japanese administration has not been a complete one, in the thirty years from the 1972 Reversion, in terms of the Okinawans' sense of belonging to Japan. In sum, Okinawans' attitude toward the incorporation has softened gradually since the reversion, as indicated by the changing results of the surveys, but the uneasiness among Okinawans from continuing to receive decisions made by the centre does not seem to disappear easily. Furthermore, the legitimacy of demanding stronger power of self-determination continues to be built and discussed by leading intellectuals and groups both inside and outside Okinawa. Identity is considered to be the fundamental driving force that makes Okinawans' attitude toward the Japanese mainland or the central government unstable. According to The Ryukyu Shimpo (9 January 1997), a survey of Japanese Prefectural Consciousness conducted by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (1996) showed that Okinawans tended to have a stronger attachment for their home province, and a poll conducted by The Ryukyu Shimpo in December 2001 also showed that Okinawans tended to be proud of themselves as Okinawans (uchinanchu) (1 January 2002). Suzuki and Oiwa (1996) introduce Shoichi Chibana's exploration into the identities of Okinawans (note that Chibana was well-known for his act of burning the Japanese flag, Hinomaru, at a national Softball game held in Yomitan Village in 1987 as a protest against the enforcement of raising the flag by the president of the Japan Softball Association). Three types of Okinawans are differentiated by Chibana based on their 131 response to the question "Are you Japanese?" The first type of Okinawans will say "Yes, I'm Japanese." The second will say "No, I'm Ryukyu." The third will say "I'm both, but Okinawan first" (Suzuki and Oiwa 1996: 23). Because identities are not fixed or immutable (Herb and Kaplan 1999), it is not meaningful to specify which identity is dominant in Okinawa. Though, suffice it to say that their identity as Okinawans remains strong, as indicative of the popular use of the term uchinanchu (local people) as opposed to yamatonchu (mainlanders). For example, it is characteristic that the Uchinanchu Conference, which aimed to facilitate mutual exchange between local Okinawans and Okinawans who immigrated to foreign countries including Hawaii, North America and Latin America and their descendents, was held under the initiative of Okinawa Prefecture (Tamamori and James 1995). The first conference was held in 1990, a second one in 1995 and a third one in 2001, and each gathered 2,400, 3,400 and 4,000 Okinawan emigrants from these foreign countries respectively (see the website of Okinawa Prefecture International Exchange division: ). Such continuous and large-scale gatherings suggest the persistence of a distinctive territorial and cultural identity of an Okinawan people. This type of international event involving exchange between local residents and emigrants, one that shows the vitality of territorial collective and cultural identity, has been held only in Okinawa in Japan. Emigrants from Okinawa to foreign countries, which began in 1889 to Hawaii, were often discriminated against by other Japanese emigrants mainly because of the peculiarity of their language, and thus they had an inferiority complex (Hokama 1998). Indeed, the use of the dialect of Okinawa was prohibited in local schools and had even 132 elicited punishment since 1879 when Okinawa was incorporated into Japan as a prefecture under the Meiji government, and harsh measures were taken to standardize the Japanese language (Yamazato 1999). Discouragement of the use of the dialect of Okinawa continued even after World War II up until the 1950s (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 April 2000). In the Japanese mainland, Okinawans were often discriminated against because of their dialect (see, for example, Rabson 2003: 110-112). However, the dialect began to regain popularity among Okinawans in the 1990s and they became more interested in learning it (The Okinawa Times, 10 November 2000). In 2002, the establishment of an institute that aimed to popularize the dialects of Okinawa (Okinawa Hogen Fukyii Kyogikai) was symbolic of the growing interest among Okinawans to preserve and use them (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 5 October 2000). Their cultural identity does not seem to be decreasing (Kuniyoshi 2001). Hein (2001a: 33) argues that the revitalization of Okinawan cultural identity had grown in the 1990s, and the reconceptualization of and debate over the identity had been promoted not only in relation to the Japanese nation but also in relation to international 'global citizenship.' Hein (2001a: 33) further notes that the revitalization of Okinawan cultural identity is related to the adequacy of political representation within the Japanese political systems and local bargaining power relative to U.S. military forces. In other words, Okinawans are now rethinking their collective past and imagining their future, which are both relevant to their political representation and power but also causing tensions, not only between the state and Okinawa but also within Okinawa (ibid.). These discussions suggest that two opposing cultural movements are developing in Okinawa. One involves the renewed interest in promoting the distinctiveness of 133 Okinawan culture represented by the discussions on independence, the networking of Okinawans around the world, and the revival of the dialects of Okinawa. The other involves the increase of Okinawans' positive attitude toward the integration of Okinawa into Japan represented by the surveys of NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute. In sum, Okinawans' continuous struggles with identifying themselves illuminate the presence of a multiplicity of cultures within Japan. Also, the diverse views toward their relationship with the nation-state support the relevance of multiculturalism to the Japanese society, and the increase of internal and external political tensions caused by multiple cultures as mentioned by Hein (2001b). 3. 5. Summary The above discussions examined the distinguished historical processes and mechanisms of the continued existence of the dominant-subordinate relationship between the Japanese mainland powers and Okinawa up until today. This chapter showed that Okinawa had the major elements that would characterize it as being a substate as defined by Kymlicka and others. These are mainly related to territory, history, language, cultural and minority identity, and disrespect of minorities' unequal status. First, Okinawan people had their own state in the past, i.e. the Ryukyu Kingdom, which existed until 1879 under the Meiji government, even though it was only in form. This had significant implications for the formation of an Okinawan collective identity. In short, while the mainland Japanese respected Shogun and the Meiji Emperor, Okinawans continued to respect the King of the Ryukyu. Thus, the abolishment of the kingdom in 1879 symbolized a shared history of humiliation and also continued to provide an image of an independent territory separated from the mainland. 134 Second, the ethnicity of Okinawans remained a long and controversial issue. From the time of the Shimazu invasion in the beginning of the 17th century until the 1972 Reversion, the ethnicity of Okinawans was used rather politically by external powers. For example, the Tokugawa Shogunate dealt with Okinawans as foreigners in order to demonstrate its expanding power, and General Douglas MacArthur alleged that Okinawans were not Japanese in order to prevent Japan's involvement in Okinawa's return movement. At present, cultural differences are issues more relevant for both Okinawans and the mainland Japanese. An important feature that characterizes Okinawans' seemingly ethnocultural identity is the fact that they are proud to be Okinawans (or uchinanchu) before Japanese (or yamatonchu). Thus, the first element, the territoriality of Okinawans, and the second one, their ethnocultural distinctiveness, together formed the minority and substandard status of the Okinawan people. Their dilemmatic attitude toward the use of Okinawan dialect reveal their desire for eradicating this minority status. Further to this, Chibana's protest against the flag-raising ceremony symbolized the Okinawans' deep-rooted distrust of the mainland authority. Third, Okinawans suffered from the disrespect of the national majorities, i.e. the Japanese mainlanders and their central government, due to the existence of unequal conditions. These were caused by the concentration of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, mainly on Okinawa Hontd. It should be noted that substate nations are often characterized by their affinity to distinctive local languages, for example in Quebec, Scotland or Catalonia. In the case of mainland Japan and Okinawa, language was not an important factor that triggered the substate movement in the 1990s, rather it was the 135 presence of the bases and further, the institutions that allowed their presence. This characterized the distinctiveness of Okinawa's substate movement. The presence of economic inequality was criticized by Okinawans, but it was not a central force for the development of Okinawa's challenge to the national government. Three elements confirm the status of Okinawa as a substate: Territoriality, identity and the presence of U.S. military bases. These factors are mutually interrelated and enhanced the sense of status inequality among Okinawans and their dissatisfaction against the national government and national policies. The attitudes of the national government toward Okinawa after the 1972 Reversion are characterized by its disrespect of the status inequalities between Okinawa and the rest of Japan mainly caused by the concentration of the bases, and by an emphasis on economic inequalities and compensation, typically through increased transfer payment and subsidies. The national government treated Okinawa as equal to other prefectures in terms of economic compensation, but had never seriously recognized Okinawans' dissatisfaction with the status inequality at a policy level. As signified by the term 'the second Ryukyu Syobun,' Okinawans' distrust of the national government dated back to the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty agreed to separate Okinawa from Japan and as a result, the trajectory of the reconstruction of life in Okinawa in the post-World War II era became dramatically different from that of the mainland. The disregard of the national government for Okinawans' desire for the reversion to Japan, that grew under the U.S. occupation, was also not taken seriously until the end of the 1960s. In addition, the national government did not consider Okinawa's desire for regional autonomy prior to the reversion, instead Okinawan politics and economies were 136 largely reorganized and integrated into national systems after 1972. The national government's focus on economic inequalities helped the growth of Okinawa's local economies over three decades, but this national approach resulted in an increase in the dependence of Okinawa on subsidies, as well as on the bases to a lesser extent, and consequently, the weak economic structure became rooted. The national government thus continued to practice economic politics through the arrangement of the amount of subsidies, and to manage Okinawa's frustration against the persistent concentration of the bases on Okinawa. Although Okinawa's dependence on the bases has decreased, the impacts of their presence on local politics, economy, space and society are still decisive and complex. The strong and persistent dependence of the Okinawa economy on external processes and dynamics and its resultant weak structure are intertwined with regional and national politics and have deeply affected development policy-making and planning at both governmental levels. Linkages between economy and politics have become more complex as demands from both those advocating entrepreneurship and deregulation and those promoting the protection of weak industries increase. In addition, awareness of local environmental problems, already serious in Okinawa, has further complicated these linkages. Okinawans' protest in 1995 against the presence of U.S. bases was aimed at what was the differentiated status conferred only onto Okinawa by the national government. It became clear that the Okinawan people and the mainland Japanese did not share a common history. Consequently, Okinawa's 'substate' condition was reinforced. 137 Part II The Negotiations for the Return of U.S. Military Bases and Regional Development Part II presents a case study of the emergence of a substate nation, Okinawa, in Japan during the period from 1995 to 2000 and its impacts on the transformation of the core-periphery relationship. In Part II, I will examine the process of negotiations between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture on the return of U.S. bases and the regional economic development, which were closely interrelated as policy issues. Through the case study, I will attempt to demonstrate both the significance and limitations of the notion of status inequality as a source of power for the peripheral substate nation to rid itself of its long-standing subordinate position within the country. Chapter 4 will describe the trigger for the initiation of the prefecture's 'politics of recognition' against the national government, a trigger that led to dynamic and complex negotiations at multiple levels between the national government and Okinawa which will be discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In these three chapters, six 'policy forums,' which provided national and Okinawan actors with opportunities to develop dialogues and collaborate or build coalitions, will be examined. In the six 'policy forums,' specific administrative and/or political arrangements were made. In each forum, actions and reactions of major actors, and resulting decisions and rules will be highlighted, and the dimensions of authorities and responsibilities contested by the various actors will be disclosed. In sum, the 'politics of recognition' and the 'politics of redistribution' interacted dynamically and intricately in these 'policy forums.' 138 Chapter 5 will show two 'policy forums,' both in which the prime minister and the prefectural governor played a major role in rearranging the new project of the return of U.S. bases (section 5.1) and local oriented development (section 5.2). Section 5.1 will discuss the Consultative Body on Military Base Issues and section 5.2 the Okinawa Policy Council. The two 'policy forums' discussed in chapter 6 are the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (section 6.1) and the Nago Referendum (section 6.2). This chapter will address the formation of a new political relationship between the national government and municipal governments concerning the issues of the relocation of U.S. bases and local economic development. It is important to note that the involvement of non-governmental actors characterized both forums. In the first forum, institutional elites such as university professors and union leaders played an important role in building national-municipal relationships. In the second forum, local civil society and local business were involved in the issues relating to the relocation of a base and had influence on the national-municipal relationships. Chapter 7 will show the relaxation of the Tokyo-Okinawa intergovernmental tension after the emergence of new Prefectural Governor Keiichi Inamine and new Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. The impacts of Inamine's entrance into the prefectural government on the harmonization of prefectural and national interests after the 1998 gubernatorial election will be discussed in section 7.1. Section 7.2 will show Obuchi's distinctive 'politics of recognition' in terms of his bold decision to hold a G8 2000 Summit and the influence of this on Okinawa. This study will end with the G8 Summit, the point at which both the governor and the Nago city mayor accepted the relocation of Futenma Air Station, even if it came with 139 conditions. Also, the political tension between Tokyo and Okinawa was significantly relaxed, at least at the intergovernmental level. 140 CHAPTER 4 The Context of the Case Study: The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the Futenma Air Station Proposal 4 .1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to provide contextual data and other information in a narrative form that explores the processes and mechanisms of change in the centre-periphery relationship between the Japanese national government, Okinawa's prefectural and municipal governments, and the latter's civil society. The time period covered is from 1995 to 2000. Chapter 4 explores the changes in external and internal dynamics so as to set the background for a lengthier discussion of the evolution of negotiations between the Japanese government and Okinawan governmental and civic actors in chapters 5, 6 and 7. This study deals with a policy issue directly related to national security: the presence and return of U.S. military bases on Okinawa. The involvement of the U.S. government demonstrates the distinctive nature of the change in national-regional relations between Tokyo and Okinawa in the context of global-local linkages. This is because the issue of the presence of U.S. bases has been strategically important for both the national government and the prefecture. Over the course of this study, the processes of conflicts and mediation between national interests and regional interests will be presented, with the intent of revealing shifts in Tokyo's attitude towards Okinawa and negotiations over its substate status. In the sections to follow, I will first lay out the new political context emerging at the 141 global level in the late 1980s and early 1990s that altered the perspectives of substate nations around the world, and those of local decision-makers and the Okinawan public concerning the presence of U.S. bases. I will then present the beginnings of the unprecedented challenge of Okinawan people against the presence of the bases and the Japanese government, who allowed these bases to stay in Okinawa even after the 1995 schoolgirl rape case. Lastly, I will discuss a joint international forum established by the Japanese and U.S. governments, the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), in order to address the rise of antagonism from Okinawan people against the bases and the governments which appeared in the form of an anti-base social movement after the rape case. A chronology of key events (1995-2000) together with the various 'actors' and 'forums' discussed in this chapter is shown in table 4.1. This table aims to facilitate the understanding of a sequence of events, i.e. 'policy forums,' and the roles of the major actors. It separates the events largely into two periods: pre-SACO and post-SACO. Because of the significance of their influences, names of the prime ministers and prefectural governors are provided. Each 'policy forum' will be discussed separately in individual sections from 5.1 to 7.2, respectively shown after the titles of the 'policy forums.' There are six types of actors shown in this table; they are the major actors who were involved in the 'politics of recognition' and the 'politics of redistribution' in various capacities and intensities. The table also shows initiators, decision-makers and influential actors in each 'policy forum' in order to briefly describe the nature of each. 142 Table 4.1 Chronological Actor/Forum Matrix Administration Pol icy Forums Actors Year Prime Minister Pref Governor USA JPN Govt Pref Govt City Govt Civic Group Busi-ness 1995 Tomiichi Murayama Masahide Ota Public Protest (CH4) o © Rejection of Signing (CH4) • © SACO (CH4) © r r Consultative Body (CH5.1)Nov 95 o • © o 1996 Ryutaro Hashimoto (Jan) Roundtable (CH6.1)Aug 96 ©• o o r Okinawa Policy Council (CH5.2) Sep 96 o • © 1997 r r Nago Referendum (CH6.2) Dec 97 0 o • ©o o 1998 Keizo Obuchi (Oct) Keiichi Inamine (Nov) Gubernatorial Election (CH7.1)Nov 98 o • © 2000 r 1 r G8 Summit (CH7.2) Jul 2000 ©• o © Initiators 9 Decision-makers O Influential Actors 143 4.2. Growing External Pressures: The End ofthe Cold War 4.2.1. Destabilizing Legitimacy of U.S. Bases on Okinawa The traditional framework of international security which was dominated by the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union altered dramatically after the Cold War ended, and as illustrated by the deliberate attempt of NATO to ally with Russia, multilateral interdependence between nation-states became a mechanism for the new global security system (Castells 1997). The decrease of tensions between the superpowers and the increase in international cooperation undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state, lessening its monopoly power over its national defense (Guibernau 1999). In this context of reduced military tensions on a global scale, substate nations began to re-assert their frustrations against the unwanted history of the unification with modern nation-states and demanded self-determination (ibid.). In sum, substate nations became less concerned about the issues of defense and security in the rethinking of their relationship with the nation-state (Keating and McGarry 2001). In conjunction with economic globalization, the end of the Cold War set the stage for the emergence of substate nations. The change in global geopolitics had a strong influence on the increased expectation among Okinawan people in regards to the return of U.S. bases in Okinawa. There were a number of external events that impacted traditional central-local relations between Tokyo and Okinawa in the late 1980s. Most importantly, the announcement of the end of the Cold War at the U.S.-Soviet Summit in Malta on 3 December 1989 undermined the legitimacy and practicality of a continuous presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa (Gabe 1993). The first dramatic news that the United States was planning to remove the U.S. 144 Marine Corps'4 from Okinawa was reported by a major national newspaper, The Asahi Shimbun, on 16 December 1989 (ibid.). The Okinawan people were surprised and delighted to directly hear this news from then Prefectural Governor Nishime. U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney then announced the reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa, South Korea and the Philippines in 'A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century' in April 1990. The return of U.S. base sites to the Philippines in the early 1990s further suggested a change in U.S. security strategy with respect to the deployment of military forces in East Asia. These events together indicated that Cold War global geopolitics, which had necessitated the deployment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, had begun to fundamentally change. As it happened, however, this apparent turnaround in U.S. military policy was not as favourable as expected for Okinawa. For instance, the East Asia Strategy Report issued by the U.S. Department of Defense (called the Nye Report), released in 1994, announced the continuation of some 100,000 troops in Japan and South Korea until at least the year 2015 (see Johnson 1999). Moreover, as the U.S. bases in Okinawa were used to deploy troops during the Gulf War with Iraq in 1990, arguments for their immediate removal were undermined (Gabe 1993). 4.2.2. Growing Expectation of the Accelerated Return of U.S. Bases Although the signs relating to the return of U.S. military bases were rather mixed until 1995, public concern over this return and pressure for their removal began to grow in Okinawa. For example, Futenma Air Station (see Appendix 8), home to U.S. Marine 1 4 Marines occupy 18,376.6 hectares or 75.7 percent of the total U.S. military sites in Okinawa and had 16,391 personnel or 60.4 percent of total staff as of 31 March 1997. 145 aircraft, was and remains a focal point of possible base conversion to non-military use due to its long-standing negative impacts on local communities. Consequently, throughout the period from 1990 to 1992, demands for the base's long-awaited return increased. For example, in 1990 Ginowan City (see Appendix 6), 33 percent of which is occupied by Futenma Air Station, was the first municipality to take action through a civic forum (Shimin Forum) to encourage developing ideas for the reuse of the air station. Subsequently, in 1992, a youth forum (Seinen Forum) formulated a comprehensive municipal plan on the assumption that the base would eventually be returned (Furushiro 2001). At the end of the Cold War, the call for the return of Futenma Air Station to private landowners was articulated in a survey of the 'Attitude of Futenma Air Station Property Owners Towards its Future Development' taken by Ginowan City in 1993. This survey not only sought local opinions but also informed affected property owners of the increasing possibility of the return of Futenma Air Station given the changing geopolitical context catalyzed by the Cold War's end. Thus, the survey's purpose was not only to ascertain property owners' needs but also to disseminate information on the inevitability of preparing for base site return and reuse (see Ginowan City 1993). In 1994, Ginowan City and its consultants adopted ideas for non-military uses (discussed at the above-mentioned forums) to draft the first municipal plan for the reuse of the Futenma Air Station site (Futenma Hikojo Atochi Riyd Keikaku Kihon Koso). However, the plan was not officially approved because a prefectural plan for Futenma, with which the municipal plan had to comply, that had not yet been prepared (Furushiro 146 2001). The example of Ginowan City suggests that hierarchical relations between the prefectural government and local cities such as Ginowan made it difficult for the latter to take the sole initiative for land use planning of military sites (whose return was not confirmed by the United States) without formal procedural arrangements with the prefectural government. It was also difficult for municipal governments to take the first steps toward discussing the reuse of the military bases because of the opposition of local property owners. These individuals were unwilling to accelerate the process of the return of their properties because of the question of compensation for potentially large income loss in rents paid to them by the Japanese government (Kurima 1998). Moreover, because the U.S. military had sometimes returned redundant bases without prior local consultation, local property owners, who were paid a generous rent by the Japanese government, generally did not want to encourage the retreat of U.S. military by presenting a land use plan that anticipated the return of bases (The Okinawa Times, 16 January 1997). They wanted to delay losing the income derived from renting their properties to the U.S. military as long as possible unless reasonable measures for reuse were assured. Accordingly, for their own part, municipal officials in general had little incentive to take action that would conflict with the strong economic interest of local property owners' associations (Okinawa-ken Gunydchi to Jinushikai Rengokai, or Okinawa Prefecture Military Site Property Owners' Association) (see Kurima 1998). Beyond local property owners, other actors also expressed their interest in the municipal open forums held in 1990 and 1992; for instance, the fate of base employees and their jobs was revealed. The inclusion of stakeholders other than property-owners, who had 147 traditionally been excluded from the process of base conversion in Okinawa, was a new process in Ginowan. Because the establishment of such public forums as mentioned above was unprecedented, they captured the attention of local residents. 4.2.3. Factors Impeding Base Conversion The growing frustration over the slow rate of base conversion, despite the end of the Cold War, was linked to a number of issues that impeded this process. Normally, the conversion of any U.S. base was decided not at a local level, but rather at the meetings of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, which were held between Japanese and U.S. governmental officials as needed. Still, because the impact on communities has been considerable, local populations have substantial interest in when, or whether, bases are returned. The scheduling of the return of U.S. military bases in Okinawa was, however, controlled by the United States since the 1972 Reversion. Consequently the unpredictability and uncertainty of base return made it difficult for local communities to plan for the future. The lack of authority of both levels of governments to intervene in such scheduling continues to undermine the planned development of local economies and communities. Furthermore, after the United States returned a military site to Okinawa, the prefectural government, municipal governments, property owners, base workers and neighbourhood residents and businesses often faced further difficulties (see, for example, Okinawa Prefecture, Department of Planning and Development 1998). Military base conversion involved special problems in comparison to ordinary land redevelopment. Generally, in the case of large-scale conversion, local governments often struggled with 148 the scarcity of financial resources, especially where involvement of the national government was limited. Consequently, the redevelopment process for returned military sites imposed a considerable burden on resource-scarce municipalities and property owners because they had to satisfy land use regulations and local land market demand under financial resource constraint. Another factor that greatly affected base conversion in Okinawa was the fact that 33 percent of the military sites (or 8,000 hectares) in the region were on private property under lease contract with the Japanese government as of 1997 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). The standard rate for leasing had been set above property market price for political reasons and, generally speaking, landowners requested that municipal governments maintain payment of standing rental rates in any redevelopment scheme.13 There were, however, unique factors that made profitable redevelopment a challenge. Before the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese administration in 1972, the U.S. government had been paying rent to local landowners. Originally, the U.S. military had forcibly taken their land but the U.S. government turned their use into a contractual agreement. USCAR ended land lease agreements with local landowners and sublet lands to the U.S. military. Upon reversion, the Japanese government took the role of concluding new lease agreements under the Japanese civic laws. Because there were private and public landowners (i.e. municipal governments) who wanted to regain the right of using their lands by themselves, and the number of landowners was large (about 30,000), concluding lease agreement with all the landowners was a challenge to the Japanese government. Consequently, the Japanese government increased rent by six times the amount that had been paid to landowners before the reversion in order to conclude agreements quickly and to avoid legal defect in using the land (Research and Legislative Reference Department, National Diet Library 1971). This high rate of rent set above market rate by the national government has been criticized because it was a rate set 'politically' and promoted economic dependence of local landowners on rent incomes. Moreover, for the conversion of military sites to civilian use, landowners requested that the prefectural and/or municipal governments realize the equivalent profitability from new land use (i.e. rent or selling price higher than market rate). But it was usually difficult. In contrast, local property owners' associations claimed the rate was reasonable (see, for example, Arasaki 1999, Kurima 1997). Aside from discussions of the rent level, looking at the fact that real estate brokers' advertisements both on newspapers and on the street that say "[w]e will buy your land being used by U.S. military," it is certain that individual parcels of land used by U.S. military have substantial market value and thus for the landowners their properties were valuable. 149 First, the national government was not directly involved in planning the conversion of U.S. military sites to civilian uses after the sites were returned to private property owners. When the scale of returned sites was quite large (for example 100 hectares or more), municipal governments were generally asked by the owners to take charge of coordinating their economic interests in redevelopment projects. Consensus building on the use of the returned sites among property owners generally required substantial human resources and consequently, conversion planning was costly. In the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense had facilitated the process of military base conversion (see, for example, Accordino 2000). In Germany, various levels of government, including national, jointly managed U.S. base conversion projects that were difficult for local government to undertake unilaterally (see Cunningham and Klemmer 1995). In Japan, such national-local cooperation was not institutionalized as is the case with the United States and Germany. Still, there were a few tasks in this process for which the national Japanese government had to take responsibility. For example, it was required that local property owners were paid financial compensation for the loss of rental income over a three-year transitional period. In summary, the mechanism that allowed the United States to continue to use the land of Okinawa for their own purposes was under the purview of the national government while local governments remained excluded from the decision-making until the land was returned to original title (see Mimura 1979). Second, it should be noted that a statutory Land Readjustment System (kukakuseiri) had been adopted in various kinds of military site redevelopment projects in Japan. This is a system of coordinating local property ownership to facilitate new development 150 with substantial appropriation of subsidies from central government (Mimura 1979). This subsidy system had meant heavy financial burdens on both local governments and individual property owners. Moreover, the land readjustment system was not designed to accommodate such an unusual type of land redevelopment as the return of military sites, and so local government, property owners, and the Okinawa public still face considerable challenges concerning base conversion. 4.3. Challenges to the Conventional Scheme 4.3.1. Publ ic Protest: The Rise of L o c a l C i v i l Society against U . S . Troops on Ok inawa In Okinawa, U.S. service personnel committed numerous crimes including the murder of local citizens during the period of occupation from 1945 to 1972. Even after the reversion in 1972, these types of local crimes continued, although the frequency of occurrence has decreased.16 It is important to note that military operations have also resulted in other serious crimes including rapes, assault and burglary (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). Moreover, U.S. military personnel who committed such criminal acts have been able to escape prosecution in Japanese courts. This is a direct result of the Status of Forces Agreement (churyu beigun chii ni kansuru kyotei), which came into effect in 1960 and regulated the treatment of U.S. military personnel who committed crimes. This agreement allowed the U.S. military to keep criminals until the judgement of their conviction thus these suspects were put under the custody of the U.S. military ahead of the Japanese police (see Johnson 1999). It also permitted the U.S. military to reject handing suspects over to the Japanese police before 1 6 There were 3,859 criminal offences caused by U.S. military personnel, civilian personnel and their families in which 35 were violent crimes in 1972. In 2000, the former were 2,605 and the latter were 4 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 2001). 151 the judgement, and it sometimes sent them back to the United States before this happened. This agreement granted various privileges and immunities to U.S. troops in Japan at the cost of local autonomy and control over U.S. forces at the local level, not only in Okinawa but also across the entire nation. This inability of the agreement to bring U.S. servicemen to trial had been a severe frustration among the population of Okinawa, and led to the popular protest in 1995. As reported earlier in chapter 1, the most notorious incident in Okinawa occurred on 4 September 1995 when a ten-year-old schoolgirl was kidnapped and raped by three U.S. marine servicemen from Camp Hansen on her way home in Kin Town (Appendix 6) (see Angst 2001). The Okinawan police identified the servicemen through the girl's testimony and issued a warrant for their arrest, but the U.S. government did not turn them over to the police under the Status of Forces Agreement (see Johnson 1999). Surprisingly, this incident was initially interpreted by national newspaper editors as a purely Okinawan matter and thus, they chose not to cover it (Ando 1997). But as the severity of the crime was revealed and reported by local mass media, the rape began to be seen as a serious challenge to international human rights and national sovereignty by the population of Okinawa, and consequently was no longer merely as a local event (ibid.). An Okinawan-wide public protest against the 1995 rape took place on 21 October 1995 (at Ginowan Kaihin Kden, a seaside public park), soon after the incident occurred. Approximately 85,000 people joined the bipartisan protest, wherein there was various criticism of the United States, led by Chiken Kakazu, the chairman of the prefectural assembly. Prefectural Governor Masahide Ota, also attended and made an anti-U.S. bases speech at the protest rally (see The Okinawa Times, 22 October 1995). 152 According to Miyagi (1999), U.S. servicemen have committed at least 110 rape crimes over the 23 years since reversion. Yet, such a large-scale and organized protest had never before taken place, this being the first time opposition had been voiced in such a manner since the 1972 Reversion. However, as noted, from the beginning of the United States occupation after the end of the Pacific War to this case, rapes and homicides by U.S. military servicemen were not unusual. However, the reason why such an unprecedented protest occurred against the U.S. military cannot be solely attributed to the 1995 rape incident. At the time, commentators from Tokyo and local experts in Okinawa both pointed out that the Okinawan people had finally appeared to lose patience with both the ongoing presence of the bases as well as the Japanese government's passive attitude toward the rape incident (see Johnson 1999); together they seemed to epitomize the peripheral status of Okinawa as a substate in Japan. Moreover, as noted earlier, the end of the Cold War in 1990 also marked an important turn of events, challenging the original objective of the Japan-U.S. Treaty, and thus the purpose and meaning of U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan. However, there appeared to be specific factors that ignited the protest of 1995. Particularly, the growing feminism movement in Japan played a critical role in initiating the organization of the protest rally (Angst 2001). Women in support of feminism and a general growing awareness of gender issues, were key factors in the 1995 advocacy for the prosecution of the rape crime (see, for example, Yui 1999, Angst 2001). There are further considerations to be taken into account when examining the reasons for the outbreak of civil protests in Okinawa in late 1995. For example, the supportive 153 attitude adopted by then Prefectural Governor Masahide Ota toward the protest should be seen as critical to encouraging the Okinawan public to organize the event (comments provided by Toshio Tajima, partner, Urban Planning Company, Tokyo, 12 September 2001). Ota's attitude toward the protest was expected since he was a professor of Okinawan history and valued culture and identity as the foundation for his political belief. This philosophical background was critical for Ota to be elected as governor in 1990. He defeated incumbent Governor Junji Nishime, who prioritized economy, with the support of the Liberal Democratic Party (The Okinawa Times, 3 November 2002). Ota promised his involvement in the issues of U.S. bases with the support of a coalition of political parties including the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party in the context of an increasing expectation for the acceleration of the return of U.S. bases after the end of the Cold War (ibid.). This anti-base political climate in Okinawa in the first half of the 1990s facilitated the rise of the public protest against the rape case. It should, however, be noted that the Liberal Democratic Party in Okinawa also supported the protest. Anger against the brutality of the crime, feminism, persistent frustration with political marginalization from the centre, and changes in the global military balance converged as influences that triggered the 1995 protest. Suddenly, for perhaps the first time since the 1972 Reversion, the Okinawan people made apparent their sense of political isolation from the Japanese mainland, their substate status, and collectively expressed their anger against consistent unfair treatment by the national government and persistent social, physical and psychological oppression by U.S. military. Although the marginalized status of women in Okinawa is a fundamental issue, representation of the 154 number of rape cases committed by U.S. servicemen as mentioned above, the protest voiced the concerns of all citizens of the region (not only of women per se) to the Japanese and U.S. governments.17 Thus, the protest can be interpreted as an expression of a regional identity positioned against both Tokyo and the United States: a manifestation of an emergent 'resistance identity' (Castells 1997). Indeed, this public protest was not only a challenge by Okinawans to the national government and mainlanders; it also challenged Okinawans themselves who had, in a sense, conceded to a marginal and thus unfair status within Japan from the 1960s onwards, making no attempt to change their situation (Yui 1999). 4.3.2. Ota ' s R e f u s a l to S i g n L a n d Leases on B e h a l f o f U n w i l l i n g L a n d o w n e r s Another major event relevant to U.S. bases, one that would eventually lead to a legal battle between Okinawa Prefecture and the Japanese national government at the High Court and Supreme Court levels, occurred immediately after the rape incident, on 4 September 1995. At issue were land leases between private owners of U.S. military site-land, and the government of Japan. Existing U.S. bases had been constructed on land forcefully taken by the U.S. military immediately upon the U.S. occupation in 1945 (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1997). After the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, U.S. occupation of the bases continued based on the Agreement between Japan and the United States concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Henkan Kyotei) that allowed the U.S. military's uninterrupted access to base land. Indeed, U.S. military sites on Okinawa were, and are, characterized by the fact that a significant portion of the sites involved have been owned 1 7 Note: Smith (2000) recognizes the protest as a civic issue while Angst (2001) contends it is a women's issue. 155 by a large number of private landowners. 32.5 percent of all U.S. military sites (7,872 out of 24,194 hectares) were the property of private owners on the main island of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto), while 13 percent of ownership originated in the Japanese mainland (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). Thus, land lease arrangements between landowners and the U.S. military prior to the 1972 Reversion were following 1972 formal contracts binding owners of involved properties to Japan's national government on behalf ofthe U.S. military. These land leases were subject to renewal every five years. Under this new scheme, land continued to be owned privately, but the government of Japan (i.e. the Defense Facilities Administration Agency) also obtained leases from Okinawan landowners and then re-leased the land free of charge to the U.S. military under the provisions of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. While those who owned affected properties opposed the leasing of their land, municipal mayors had the power to sign land leases on behalf of unwilling landowners. Additionally, in cases where the municipal mayors themselves opposed the policy, the prefectural governor was respectively able to sign, under the terms of the Special Land Lease Law (Nozu 1997). However, no further steps to transfer property rights to the U.S. government could be taken if the prefectural governor rejected the land leasing policy. Here, the prefectural government was given, in theory, considerable discretionary power in deciding on the renewal of leases. From the necessity of renewing land leases for 13 military bases and installations including Kadena Air Base, the largest U.S. air base in East Asia, the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau of the Japanese national government asked then Prefectural Governor Ota to sign on behalf of unwilling landowners and municipal 156 mayors on 21 August 1995 (The Okinawa Times, 16 September 1996). The reason for this was that some antiwar landowners rejected signing the renewal of land leases and further, three out of nine relevant municipal governments refused to sign on their behalf. As a result, it was necessary for the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau to ask the governor to sign. As noted above, the rape case occurred on 28 September 1995, just after this request was made, and so Okinawans' antagonism against the bases was further elevated. In this context, Ota took the bold step of refusing to sign the leases at the Okinawa prefectural assembly. As mentioned above, the Special Land Lease Law had no provisions to override the prefectural governor in case that he or she decides not to sign. As such, Ota's actions were unprecedented and the national government was startled to learn that the international treaty with the United States could be so easily threatened by decision-making power at the prefectural government 18 level. Because the prefectural signing of leases was an administrative action delegated by the national government under the Local Autonomy Law, measures that could be taken by the latter to let the former perform the delegated action (i.e. signing the leases when municipal mayors refused to do so) were specified in the law; namely the national government was to advise (kankoku) signing first, but if the governor did not follow the advice then it could order (meirei) the governor to sign land leases on property owners' behalf. However, even after steps were taken in November 1995 to make this occur, Governor Ota told the then Japanese Socialist Party Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, that he would not acquiesce to the order issued by the national government (Ota 1996). 18 The Special Land Lease Law was later amended in the process of establishing the Decentralization Law on 8 July 1999. The elimination of administrative functions imposed upon local governments by the central government was a main objective of the new legislation, and, consequently, the task of signing leases on behalf of unwilling landowners was transferred from municipal mayors and the prefectural governor to the prime minister (Ota 2003). 157 Ota's refusal to co-operate was widely supported by the people of Okinawa, and also those outside Okinawa who were concerned with the issues surrounding U.S. bases, one such example was the civic group, Broad National Combination for Independence, Peace and Democracy in Kawasaki City. Ironically, Prime Minister Murayama, who was then leader of the Japan Socialist Party which had supported Ota as Okinawa's governor, was forced to sue him for his refusal to comply with the land leases order at the Fukuoka High Court on 7 December 1995.19 In this event, the Court supported Murayama in a decision handed down on 25 March 1996 (see Ota 1999). Ota, however, appealed against this decision through the Supreme Court on 1 April 1996. Although Ota's suit was again widely popular in Okinawa, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 28 August 1996 through strict interpretation of the Special Land Lease Law, judging that the application of the legislation to Okinawa was not unconstitutional. At this point, there was no further legal recourse left to Ota, thus he was forced to finally sign the land leases on 13 September 1996. These events transpired a mere five days after a prefectural referendum on 'Revision of the Japan-U.S. Status-of-Forces Agreement and the Consolidation and Reduction of Military Bases' that was held on 8 September 1996 (to be discussed in section 5.1). After the final court decision, new legal arrangements that transferred the authority to procure signatures from the prefectural governor to the prime minister were incorporated into the Decentralization Law, on 8 July 1999 (Ota 2003). 1 9 Ota was supported by a coalition of progressive parties such as the Japan Socialist Party (later reorganized to be Social Democratic Party), Okinawa Social Masses Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and Komeito in gubernatorial elections. The Japanese Trade Union Confederation Okinawa Branch, Rengo Okinawa, which consisted of local labour unions such as Japan Garrison Forces Labour Union Okinawa Branch or Zen Chu Ro, supported the coalition. 158 4.4. Establishment of an Internationa] Forum to Discuss the Continuing Presence of U.S. Bases in Okinawa: SACO, 1995 In the face of the rising level of antagonism in Okinawa against the U.S. military and the Japanese government during the latter half of the 1990s, both Japanese and U.S. politicians swiftly initiated an ad hoc international forum, the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). This committee was mandated under the framework of the existing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, 1951. Jointly created on 20 November 1995 by the governments of Japan and the United States under the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), SACO became the central mechanism for dealing with the problematic issue of U.S. military presence in Okinawa (see Appendix 9)20. SACO was comprised of high-level officials in the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Japanese Defense Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was initiated at a meeting between then Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono and then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry (The Okinawa Times, 2 December 1996). The overall objective of SACO was to "develop recommendations for the SCC on ways to consolidate, realign and reduce (seiri, togo, shukusho) U.S. facilities and associated areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security and other related agreements" (SACO Interim Report, 15 April 1996). As noted above, since 1972 U.S. bases in Okinawa had occasionally been returned to local landowners on an ad hoc and individual basis without any strategic or comprehensive planning. Thus, SACO represented a new Japan-U.S. policy toward the return of military bases designed to 2 0 Agreement on the establishment of the SCC was reached in 1960 between then Prime Minister Shinsuke Kishi and then U.S. Secretary of State Herter upon signing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. SCC is known as 'two plus two' as it provides an arena for the discussion of security issues between the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Agency chief and the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. 159 achieve a forward-looking comprehensive resolution of the issue. The term of the committee was set at one year, until the release of a final report to be published in 1996. A working committee at a vice ministerial level (shingikan kyu) was set up as part of the 1995 agreement. Under SACO, Japanese and U.S. officials worked jointly to develop measures for easing regional antagonism as well as to maintain and promote international and national interests. The outcome was a schedule for the partial, rather than full, return of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Even so, such international co-ordination over a matter of local interest in Japan was unprecedented, and thus it received not only local but also national public attention. Perhaps the most important decision made under the SACO 1996 Report was to allow the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to an alternative site within Okinawa. Futenma Air Station is one of the biggest air bases on Okinawa (480 ha) located in the midst of a densely populated residential area in Ginowan City. For local residents, the presence of the air station was seen as a life-threatening nuisance (Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998); hence its return was long desired. The decision to relocate it to some other part of Okinawa came through the initiative of Japanese and U.S. politicians when bureaucrats from the two countries could not reach a negotiated agreement on the full return of this air station. Since the probability of full and immediate return was considered quite low, this political compromise surprised Okinawan people (Nozu 1997). However, the decision posed a serious challenge to the prefectural and municipal governments and local civil society because the closure of the air station would be 160 implemented only on the condition that it could be relocated to an alternate Okinawa site. For the prefectural government and local civil society (for example, residents, trade unions, and local newspaper editors), both of which had demanded the reduction of U.S. bases, new construction and relocation of the base within Okinawa was still unacceptable. In reality, because the U.S. military already used 20 percent of the land area on the main island of Okinawa (see Appendix 1), it was impossible to find an alternate site that would have no serious impacts on the island's social life and natural environment. Thus, even though this was a major outcome of the SACO 1996 Report, the international agreement to relocate Futenma Air Station forced a round of new discussions and negotiations between the national government of Japan and the prefecture of Okinawa. However, ensuing discussion over the flow of compensation funds to municipal governments that might be affected by the relocation recommendation made implementation very problematic. For instance, as an unprecedented opportunity to obtain additional funding from the national government in return for the acceptance of relocation became likely, local stakeholders who had an interest in economic growth, i.e. job creation, supported its relocation to their particular city or district, and those concerned with the negative and long-term impacts on local society opposed its relocation to their city or district. The two distinct interests soon began to conflict and as a result, the issue of the relocation of an air base instigated complex social and political processes within the prefecture after 1986. As will be shown in more detail in chapters 5, 6, and 7, the SACO decision, made by Japanese and U.S. politicians, indirectly forced the Japanese government and the Okinawa prefectural government to 161 alter their respective roles and interrelations. Moreover, the change in intergovernmental dynamics also led municipal governments under the jurisdiction of the prefecture of Okinawa to take new actions, with the consequence that their relationship to the prefectural and national governments as well as civil society began to change. Conflict between the two views, that the relocation of Futenma Air Station would be an unprecedented opportunity for local economic development, and alternatively that it would have irreversibly serious social and environmental impacts, began to reshape relations between all three levels of Japanese governance - national, prefectural and municipal - including civil society and local business. 4.4.1. SACO, the Okinawa Action Program and the Continued Presence of U.S. Bases As discussed above, the public protest following the 1995 rape incident captured the attention of the entire nation, and led to severe criticism of existing governmental policy regarding the continuation of U.S. bases in Japan. In addition to two major regional newspapers, The Okinawa Times and The Ryukyu Shimpo, major national newspapers such as The Asahi Shimbun and The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on the incident. Moreover, The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post also covered the story (Ando 1997). Here, the presence of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, which had formerly not been a high-profile issue in metropolitan regions of the Japanese mainland, suddenly began to attract media and public attention both in Japan and the United States, drawing attention to the peripheral and substate status of Okinawa. In particular, it should be noted that these articles did not just report the rape incident but rather the much larger and problematic Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has maintained U.S. 162 hegemony in the security of East Asia in the post-World War II era. In other words, the case of Okinawa was seen not as merely an isolated local event, but as a manifestation of deep-rooted structural problems caused by the treaty. In effect, the incident became embedded in debates over centre-periphery relations, and the role of Okinawa in wider global processes such as the need to reduce U.S. military bases following the end of the Cold War. Such international criticism was seen as a challenge to the capacity of the national government to guarantee security for the Japanese people generally, and specifically Okinawan citizens, from risks posed by U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa for the purpose of international military security. From this new international political perspective on events in Okinawa, Japanese women's groups charged that the 1995 incident was evidence of a structured violation of the rights of women by U.S. military, and that gender implications of the event had been relegated to the sidelines (see Yui 1999). Once again, reflecting the fact that U.S. military servicemen had raped (were charged with raping) more than 100 women in Okinawa since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 (Miyagi 1999). One thing that became clear was that both the Japanese and U.S. governments could not ignore the rise of regional collective anger toward them. Measures that dealt with this anger were needed as was maintaining the stability of U.S. bases in Okinawa. As SACO deliberated on a schedule for downsizing U.S. bases in Okinawa, the prefectural government prepared their own policy proposal for the return of U.S. bases in 1996. The proposal was called the 'Action Program for the Return of Bases' and recommended the phased return of all U.S. bases in Okinawa by 2015. This action 'from below' was necessary because SACO was an international forum, and so the 163 prefectural government was not invited to participate in the meetings. By 1995, prefectural authorities had realized that the Okinawan people would support a prefectural government-led schedule for the return of U.S. bases (personal correspondence with Yoshiyuki Uehara, Deputy Director General, Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, on 31 July 2002). The Okinawa Prefecture's proposal for base return will hereafter be referred to as the 1996 Okinawa Action Program. It was submitted to a national/prefectural forum, the 'Consultative Body on Military Base Issues' (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Mondai Kyogikai), established by the Japanese government vis-a-vis the international forum, SACO, to discuss base-related issues between the national and prefectural governments. SACO will be discussed in this section, and the Okinawa Action Program and the Consultative Body will be discussed at length in chapter 5. An interim report from SACO was released to the public on 15 April 1996 in conjunction with Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Nichibei Anpo Kyodo Sengen) hammered out by then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. President Bill Clinton. Contrary to the Okinawan people's wishes, the report declared that both the Japanese and U.S. governments intended to retain the major U.S. bases on Okinawa indefinitely, mainly because of the political difficulty in providing sites for the bases in Japan anywhere outside Okinawa. Generally speaking it was more difficult to construct a new base in any mainland prefecture because they were politically and economically stronger than Okinawa and local residents were not accustomed to living alongside U.S. bases. Yet the notion of moving some bases in Okinawa to other prefectures where bases were already located, for instance Hokkaido Prefecture and 164 Yamaguchi Prefecture, was not unrealistic in terms of local sentiment in these prefectures. But in effect, the U.S. military did not want to interrupt the efficiency of their troops' activities (Tokai Daigaku Heiwa Senryaku Kokusai Kenkyujo 1997: 233-274). The SACO Interim Report in 1996 immediately provoked further anti-base reactions in Okinawa as it was felt that the Japanese and the United States were treating this prefecture as a 'sink' for U.S. base location. Notably, these included the Central Okinawa Municipal Leaders Consortium's Resolution (Chubu Shichosoncho Kai)22 on 30 April 1996; a resolution against SACO by the prefectural assembly on 16 July 1996; and a prefectural referendum on U.S. bases held on 8 September 1996 (this will be discussed in the next chapter). Although the reactions of the prefectural government were not as intense as in 1995, they all expressed objection to the SACO plan specified in the committee's interim report as well as any new Japanese and U.S. policy in support of the continued presence of bases in Okinawa. SACO meetings continued during that year and a final plan for the return of U.S. bases was drafted by Japanese and U.S. officials, approved by the SCC on 2 December 1996, and then published as the SACO Final Report also on 2 December 1996 (see Appendix 10). In response to pressure from both politicians and citizens in Okinawa, the SACO Final Report specified a schedule for the limited return of military bases. Eleven U.S. military installations were to be shut down (5,002 hectares, in total equivalent to 20 percent of the entire area used by the U.S. military in Okinawa), including Futenma Air Station, which was unexpected due to its status as a host to the 2 1 The relocation of an air refuelling force consisting of 12 planes from Futenma Air Station to the existing U.S. Iwakuni Base in Yamaguchi Prefecture was permitted by the governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture, the Iwakuni city mayor and a Yu-cho town leader in 1997. 2 2 The English translation of the original Japanese title of this organization is the author's own. 165 most intensive military force in Okinawa. However, most bases to be shut down were not scheduled for closure, but instead were subject to relocation to other areas within Okinawa Prefecture. This was mainly because of the aforementioned political difficulties associated with securing alternative sites on the mainland. The condition of relocation as opposed to complete closure was the most serious divergence between the SACO recommendations and the prefecture's own wishes expressed in the Okinawa Action Program. In comparison to the phased schedule specified in the Okinawa Action Program (see Appendix 11), the SACO plan agreed to the return of seven out of the ten U.S. military installations specified in Phase 1 of the Program, and the return of five out of 14 in Phase 2 were approved. However, nine of these installations were to be relocated within Okinawa, and only two, the Northern (Hokubu) Training Area (approximately 3,987 ha/9,852 acres, see Appendix 9) and the Aha Training Area (approximately 480 ha/1185 acres, see Appendix 9), were approved for complete return to civilian use 23 without relocation. Because these two training areas were relatively underused and not located in more urbanized areas, their return was not very effective in promoting local economic development or lowering the density of existing urban residential districts. Nonetheless, the SACO plan may be seen as a compromise. Even so, a prefecture-wide protest rally against the SACO Final Report was soon organized, on 21 December 1996, by groups that included the ruling progressive parties at the prefectural assembly: namely, the Social Democratic Party, the Okinawa Social 2 3 The return of Camp Kuwae was divided between Phases 1 and 2 . Thus, the actual total number of installations to be returned is 11. 166 Masses Party, the Japan Communist Party, and the Komeito Okinawa. Also involved were labour unions, municipalities in which U.S. bases were located such as Nago City, Ginowan City, and Kadena Town, an anti-war landowners' group (Hansen Jinushi Kai) and women's groups (The Okinawa Times, 22 December 1996). However, the scale of this protest was much smaller than the 1995 rally. Most notably, Prefectural Governor Ota, who had initiated the 1995 protest, was absent, as were conservative parties, i.e. the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Frontier Party (opposition parties in the Okinawa prefectural assembly), as well as business groups.24 Newspapers reported that the total number of participants in the 1996 protest-rally was about 22,000 (6,000 according to police figures), whereas approximately 85,000 had participated in the protest of 1995 (The Okinawa Times, 22 December 1996). 4.4.2. Relocation of Futenma Air Station and Naha Military Port Facilities The SACO report allowed for the relocation of some bases, not for return. Okinawan people were already aware that relocation was a very difficult task both technically and politically. The international decision was a venture to instigate Okinawa to engage in this problematic task. Therefore, the special difficulties of base relocation need to be understood. Upon the release of the SACO Final Report, both the Japanese and U.S. national governments announced the termination of SACO and its mission (i.e. defining a 2 4 At the time, then Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prefectural Governor Ota were gradually reaching the compromise of recompensing the presence of bases with economic assistance. The organizers of the protest rally were supporters of Ota but recognized that he should not heighten tensions with Hashimoto by appearing at the rally against the national government. Thus they did not invite him. The relationship between Hashimoto and Ota broke down when the governor announced his rejection of the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago, on 6 February 1998, two days before the city's mayoral election (see Arasaki 1999). 167 schedule for the closure and relocation of U.S. bases). U.S. officials expressed satisfaction with the overall success and assumed that the SACO plan would substantially alleviate the burden on Okinawa (The Okinawa Times, 3 December 1996). The end of SACO also meant that the subsequent task of implementing the return of U.S. bases to Okinawan landlords would be transferred to the Japanese government as well as prefectural and municipal governments. After the SACO Final Report was released, however, the relocation of Futenma Air Station became the single most controversial policy issue in Okinawa. This was due to the expected magnitude of its social and environmental impact at the candidate relocation site, namely Nago City (see Appendix 12). The report recommended that the new base should be an offshore heliport base with a 1300 metre-long runway on 1500 by 600 metres of artificial ground supported by either piled piers or a set of pontoons, and connected to land by a bridge (see Appendix 12). This recommendation was particularly controversial because of certain environmental factors. For instance, the candidate site was immediately adjacent to several communities; it was also above coral reefs and overlapped dugong habitat (see an opinion publicized by World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) Japan in 19 December, 1997).25 It is important to note that the return of Futenma Air Station had been previously requested, as shown earlier by the Ginowan City initiatives of the early 1990s. Its return was discussed between high-ranking Japanese and U.S. officials at SACO meetings in 1995, but the U.S. military opposed the idea from the beginning because The dugong is classified as vulnerable (VU) in the Red List of Threatened Species of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. In the United States, it is designated an endangered species listed under the U.S. Endangered Species Act (Yoshida 2001). 168 Futenma Air Station was the Marines Corps' home base in Okinawa (The Okinawa Times, 2 December 1996). Still, despite the opposition of the U.S. military, the return of Futenma was suddenly announced in a joint statement on 12 April 1996 between then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale. This occurred just three days before the release of the SACO Interim Report on 15 April 1996 (see minutes of the Hashimoto/Mondale press conference, 12 April 1996).26 It should be noted that this agreement to return the land occupied by Futenma Air Station was settled before then U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit to Japan on 16 April 1996 for the Japan-U.S. summit meeting. The relocation agreement was initially kept secret from national governmental officials and even the Japanese Defense Agency chief (who had been involved in the SACO meetings) was not notified prior to the announcement, and was surprised with the governments' joint decision (see The Okinawa Times, 2 December 1996; 21 November 1999). Thus, SACO only played a minor role in the final political decision.27 In fact, the major decisions were made at a very high political level, i.e. between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton (note that substantive talks were held between the former and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale). This decision to allow the relocation of Futenma Air Station had significant impacts In their joint press conference held on 12 April 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale emphasized their united efforts to mitigate base-related problems in Okinawa. They also stressed the increasing importance of bilateral ties between Japan and the United States. Minutes of the press conference are available at . 2 7 Prime Minister Hashimoto claimed the outcome was the result of negotiation, but the U.S. government had made the decision immediately after the 1995 protest to mollify public anger (Arasaki 1999). 169 on national and prefectural actors, as well as local communities in Okinawa. Most of the so-called 'return of bases' policy was to be implemented through the relocation of specific installations or facilities, such as runways, antennae and military residential housing, to existing bases on Okinawa. In other words, the 'return of base' commitment was in actuality a consolidation policy. Only the functions of Futenma Air Station, which was the U.S. Marines' home base, were to be relocated to a brand new site. Relocating a base as large as Futenma Air Station (480 hectares) had already proven an extremely difficult technical as well as political task in discussions held prior to 1995. For instance, relocation of the U.S. Naha military port in Naha City (57 hectares, see Appendix 13), the largest scale relocation plan prior to Futenma Air Station, had been approved in 1974 by the governments of Japan and the United States but was suspended for almost three decades. This was because no municipal government was willing to host the Naha base until Urasoe City, a neighbour of Naha City (see Appendix 6), announced its acceptance in 2001 (Defense of Japan 2001). This occurred after the election of a pro-relocation city mayor, who defeated the incumbent anti-relocation mayor, with the support of the Urasoe Chamber of Commerce, local business groups, and the city assembly, on 12 November 2001. It should be noted that the notion of relocating the Naha installation to Urasoe City was part of the 1996 SACO Final Report, 2 8 The relocation of Futenma's heliport to the Kadena Air Base located approximately 10km north from Futenma Air Station was negotiated between the Japanese and U.S. governments for the SACO Final Plan. However, the U.S. military opposed the idea because of risks associated with the joint use of the air base by jet fighters and helicopters. Additionally, the Town of Kadena, the Town of Chatan and the City of Okinawa (see Appendix 6) were in opposition because of possible impacts on their communities (The Okinawa Times, 16 January, 1997). 2 9 Note that the design and construction methods for a relocated air base were, and remain, controversial, as of July 2002. 170 but that the Final Report did not specify a schedule of timing or a discussion of any alternate location. The initiative of the Urasoe Chamber of Commerce was the main catalyst behind this change in municipal policy. Its members submitted a plan to the city assembly to accept the relocation of the military port that emphasized taking advantage of the unparalleled opportunity to draw specially allocated funding from the national government for the development of a commercial port and adjoining areas (35 hectares). Proponents of the relocation insisted that the impacts would be relatively low for a military port that would be built as part of a larger commercial port in Urasoe City's hinterland (see Appendix 14). As of June 2002, this opportunistic approach and the change of city policy remained controversial in Urasoe and the relocation had not been implemented (The Okinawa Times, 2 June 2002). Further, as long as the technical and political possibility of relocation existed within the municipality, the local community members continued to face potential conflict between the pro- and anti-relocation groups. Similar difficulties regarding the relocation of Futenma Air Station were also likely to occur. This was fully acknowledged in Okinawa after this policy was announced by the national government when the SACO Final Report was published in 1996. It should also be noted that the change in policy within the city of Urasoe showed that, in principle, elected city mayors and the city assemblies had potential power to frustrate the will of the national government regarding the acceptance of relocated military bases. This is because the prefectural and municipal governments possessed certain administrative powers relevant to the decision of relocation. For example, in the case of the Naha installation, it was necessary for Urasoe City 171 (the receiving city), Naha city (the sending city), and the Okinawa prefectural government to jointly establish a special local authority (Tokubetsu Chihd Kokyo Dantai) to manage a new port. Thus, co-operation between the two city mayors was essential and without it, the national government would not be able to start the process of relocation for the Naha military port. In the case of Futenma Air Station, the political process of relocation remained even more problematic than that of the Naha U.S. military port. In particular, the location of the new base and the proposed methods for its construction became important topics through the period from 1996 to 2000. The SACO Final Report, of 2 December 1996, proposed that three alternatives should be examined in the relocation of Futenma Air Station: 1) incorporate a heliport into Kadena Air Base at Kadena Town (see Appendix 7): 2) construct a heliport at the Camp Schwab in Nago City (see Appendix 15); and 3) construct a sea-based facility adjacent to Nago City. It should be noted that the latter's location was ambiguously described in the report as 'off the eastern coast of the main island of Okinawa.' Despite the recommendation by SACO of these three options, the municipal government and local communities immediately understood that the national government had already decided to target the second option, off the coast of Camp Schwab, under the jurisdiction of Nago City, as the relocation site. This was because the national government had already intimated that this area was the most preferable location, even though Nago city government had strongly opposed the idea (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 15 November 1996). In the end, on 5 November 1997, the national government simply notified Prefectural Governor Ota, Nago City Mayor Tetsuya Higa, and the prefectural fishery association that near Camp Schwab was the most suitable 172 offshore site to build a heliport to replace Futenma Air Station.30 SACO's choice of the Nago City location was subsequently criticized by local residents on the grounds that the national government had only reviewed secondary information concerning the targeted sites and that comprehensive in-depth studies of their suitability had not taken place (see The Okinawa Times, 13 November 1997). An Okinawa prefectural senior planner, Reiji Fumoto (interviewed in Naha, 1 September 2001), who has been involved in several conversion planning projects from initial studies to plan implementation, explained that in terms of physical constraints, off the shore of Camp Schwab could satisfy the necessary conditions. For instance, the relocation site could not be near Naha, the capital of the Central-Southern Area (Chunanbu) on the main island of Okinawa, because an international airport already adjoined Naha City. Nago City, on the other hand, is located in the Northern Area of the island (Hokubu) and lies about 60 kilometres from Naha international airport. Katsuren Town (Appendix 6) offered to host Futenma Air Station in 1996 but this municipality was too close to Naha, only 20 kilometres away, and on top of this, the possibility of the destruction of local coral reefs was perceived to be high (interview with Reiji Fumoto, 1 September 2001). However, as planner Fumoto acknowledged, offshore Nago City would also not have been free from serious environmental impacts from the planned heliport. In particular, possible damage caused by the construction of the new air base to coral reefs and the habitat of dugong, an endangered species, was expected to be disastrous (see Stars and Stripes, 28 January 2001). Consequently, local environmental groups such as the Dugong Network Okinawa began to protest through 3 0 Note that at that time the first and third alternatives in the SACO Final Report were seen as politically more difficult than the second option. 173 their links to national and international groups and organizations, arguing that a previous environmental impact study by the national government had been quite inadequate (see World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF) Japan, 19 December 1997). In addition to these logistical problems, the relocation of Futenma Air Station required, and continues to require, difficult political negotiations between Nago City, the prefecture, the national government and the United States. 4.5. Summary This chapter showed an increase of Okinawans' expectation for the acceleration of the return of U.S. bases after the end of the Cold War, and the continued absence of signs of substantial change in the presence of the bases. In addition to changes in the external dynamics, this chapter also presented the significance of a local contingency, the 1995 rape case, which triggered the largest scale public protest against the bases and the Japanese government since the 1972 Reversion. This incident symbolized persistent inequality between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland. It also disclosed the injustice of the role of Okinawa as a sink for U.S. bases. In sum, the concentration of the bases and their impacts on local society revealed that the end of the Cold War did not lead to immediate changes in the presence of the bases on Okinawa (Johnson 1999). In this context, the protest evolved as an expression of territorial 'resistance' identity against the mainland as well as the bases. This chapter further demonstrated that negotiations on the issues of the bases involved not only the U.S. military and the Japanese government but also various local 174 actors. In sum, the issues of scale began to cloud negotiations between the national government and Okinawa. There were mainly three relevant scales. First, while it became clear that some change in the deployments of U.S. military forces was possible, the United States would remain in the post-cold war East Asia and maintain the authority to make decision on the return of the bases. As a result, there was no change in the relative power of the Japanese government in this matter. However, the prefectural government began to reassert the role of the national government to negotiate with the United States for the return of the bases after the 1995 protest, and accordingly relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa became tense more than ever before. In this regard, then Prefectural Governor Ota's refusal to sign land leases was a symbolic event. Second, it turned out that the return of the bases was a distinctive political issue between local landowners and municipal governments and the prefectural government, and that they would not necessarily be able to unite together to request that the national government negotiate with the United States on issue of the return. Third, this chapter showed that municipal governments also had power to reject relocation, evident in the case of Urasoe City, and that the prefectural government could not simply promote relocation after the decision has been agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. governments. Accordingly, the prefectural government was put under pressure from the national government to implement the agreement. This dynamic relationship among the different actors revealed that the return of the bases was a product of complex negotiations in which the United States continued to hold the final authority of making decisions. This had become apparent in the establishment of SACO and its decision. It served as a venue for high profile political 175 negotiation between the U.S. and Japanese governments, and created a new environment for negotiation between Tokyo and Okinawa, focusing on proposals for the relocation of the bases as opposed to their removal. The next three chapters present an evaluation of the series of negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa following the release of the SACO Final Report in 1996. These are characterized by a multiplicity of political actors, diversity in the forms of negotiation, and subtleness of the outcomes of interaction. In order to analyze the dynamic and complex processes from the beginning of negotiations to their conclusion, I will use the diagrams and templates shown in the introductory chapter 1. 176 CHAPTER 5 Restructuring of National-Prefectural Relationships: Establishment of the 1995 Consultative Body and 1996 Okinawa Policy Council The following chapters from 5 to 7 will show the complex and dynamic interplay between national and local governments, as well as governmental and non-governmental actors, and further within civil society, with respect to the return of U.S. military bases and regional development after the inception of SACO. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the relocation of Futenma Air Station proposed by SACO to Nago City became a central source of tension. Overall, the study here will provide empirical evidences for the questions of this thesis: 1) did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa study display a cultural identity and engage in cultural politics? 2) were the various negotiations and 'policy forums' held after 1995 successful? and 3) did issues of 'scale' complicate negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa? The centre-local processes will be examined with a focus on six 'policy forums' in which specific political and/or administrative arrangements were made. In each forum, actions and reactions of major actors, and resulting decisions and rules will be highlighted, and the dimensions of authorities and responsibilities contested by the various actors will be disclosed. The first forum discussed in section 5.1, the Consultative Body on Military Base Issues, was set up by the national government, responding to a request from Okinawa Prefecture in 1995. In a sense it acted as a challenge to the authority of the national government because it enabled the prefectural government to participate in 177 decision-making on the return of U.S. bases, which had never been previously possible. As a result, new national-prefectural dialogues began to develop. This national-prefectural forum effectively contributed to stabilizing the escalating tension in national-prefectural relations that had begun in 1995. In this forum, both regional interests and national interests over Futenma Air Station and other bases could be discussed and negotiated. The former (regional interest) comprised the greater involvement of the prefectural government in decision-making on the return of U.S. bases and the latter the fulfillment of an international security treaty. The prefecture's interest was partially and ambiguously realized but the national-prefectural arrangement was the catalyst for complex processes of restructuring the centre-local relationship thereafter. The second forum discussed in section 5.2 comprises the Okinawa Policy Council. This was a companion forum to the Consultative Body and was also established by the national government in 1996. The aim of the Okinawa Policy Council was to restructure the involvement of the national government in economic development in Okinawa along with the implementation of base closures. A main instrument that guided discussions between national and prefectural actors was the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (hereafter referred to as the Cosmopolitan Concept), formulated by the prefecture in November 1996. This was the first regional development plan made under the initiative of the prefecture and challenged the existing planning scheme set by the national government (discussed in chapter 3). The forum provided opportunities for the prefecture to promote local-oriented development while allowing the national government to develop effective compensation measures. 178 The third forum discussed in section 6.1 of chapter 6 is the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (Okinawa Kichi Shozai Shichoson ni Kansuru Kondankai or Shimada Kondankai). This was again established by the national government in 1996. Different from the previous forums, non-governmental actors (i.e. institutional elites such university professors and union leaders) played an important role in rebuilding the centre-local relationships. Municipal governments, which are most directly responsible for local community services in Japan, but whose jurisdiction falls under the prefectural government, needed to be involved directly in issues related to U.S. bases as well as local economic development. Nevertheless, they generally lacked the capacity and resources to address these two issues. In this forum, municipal governments were targeted directly by the national government, and the prefectural government was treated only as a secondary actor. The planned provision of extra subsidies by the national government to municipal governments in question played a central role in restructuring core-local relationships. Responsiveness of the national government to strictly local needs was emphasized in this forum, and direct links between the national government and municipal governments and local communities were formed. The fourth forum (section 6.2) discusses increasing tension between the local civil society of Nago City and the national government concerning the latter's decision to relocate Futenma Air Station to the city, which led to a municipal non-binding referendum on relocation in 1996. The mayor of Nago City played a critical role in safeguarding relations with the national government by rejecting the result of the referendum, which was won by anti-relocation citizens. In the process of the 179 referendum, various political transactions occurred at various levels from national to local neighbourhood. The previous Roundtable (the third forum) engendered the intensification of intergovernmental relations and reorganization of local economic interests by building a national-municipal coalition. But this forum, i.e. the referendum and related political actions of diverse actors, presented an opportunity for the involvement of all the sectors of society including government, non-governmental and civic organizations, businesses, and individual citizens in political conflicts over the relocation of the air station at the locality. Hence this was a process in which Tokyo-Okinawa relationships became further complicated. The fifth forum discussed in section 7.1 of chapter 7 comprises the social and political process of the 1998 prefectural gubernatorial election, which Governor Ota lost in favour of new Governor Inamine. After the municipal referendum in 1996, connections between the relocation of the air base and local economic development became more apparent. At the same time (1998), intergovernmental relations between Tokyo and Okinawa had developed through the course of the previous forums. Thus, new political networks and stakeholder coalitions were being formed between Tokyo and Okinawa and within Okinawa. The former governor's (Ota) reassertion of anti-relocation policy changed the national government's relatively generous attitude towards Okinawa and affected the result of the election, i.e. the surfacing of a neo-liberal contender (who won and went on to become governor) who was more cooperative with the national government. In this section, the decisive role of the new Prefectural Governor Inamine, who replaced the 'rebellious' Governor Ota, in moving forward intergovernmental negotiation will be featured. Yet this new coalition was not free 180 from tension as the new governor continued to request the national government to fulfill the terms and conditions of relocation acceptance, i.e. that the United States would agree to allow civilian aircrafts to jointly use the relocated military base and to return the site to Okinawa after 15 years. While the duties surrounding relocation were handed from politicians to bureaucrats and began to be regularized, this request, which was (and still is) quite difficult to satisfy, remained a factor that tested the national attitude toward Okinawa. The last forum discussed in section 7.2 in chapter 7 concerns the holding of the G8 2000 Summit main session in Okinawa. The G8 Summit was a symbolic event that demonstrated Prime Minister Obuchi's recognition of Okinawa's historical and cultural distinctness. Okinawa was not a prospective candidate for the summit in terms of its lack of experience and capacity to hold such an international conference. But the new cooperative relationship between Inamine and new Prime Minister Obuchi in 1999 made the conference possible, while other localities in Kyushu which had been better prepared for the event were not favoured by the prime minister. In preparation for the G8 Summit, an unprecedented influx of temporary subsidies to Okinawa occurred indicating that receiving favourable consideration from the nation-state could widen regional opportunities for local project revenue. Co-operation between Tokyo and Okinawa developed at this time since the G8 Summit symbolized the beginning of a new relationship. However, the unexpected death of one of the main actors, Prime Minister Obuchi in 1999, weakened the trust of the prefectural government and the local public with respect to the continuation of the cooperative relation building between Tokyo and the prefecture. 181 This study will end with the G8 Summit because both the governor and the Nago city mayor accepted the relocation of Futenma Air Station even if with conditions and the political tension between Tokyo and Okinawa was significantly relaxed at least at the intergovernmental level. The advantage of this focus on different forums and the chronological examination of them is that the patterns and mechanisms of the unique centre-local relationship between Okinawa and Tokyo can be systematically presented. 5.1. The 1995 Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa (Okinawa Beigun-Kichi Mondai Kyogikai) 5.1.1. Introduction This forum was swiftly and jointly initiated in 1995 by the national government and the prefectural government parallel to the international body, SACO (already discussed in chapter 4). Its establishment came as a request by the prefectural governor to the prime minister of Japan. Because the former could not participate in SACO, Governor Ota wanted a to set up a mechanism through which the prefecture's voice could be included in the international deliberations at SACO. The successful initiation of this national-prefectural forum as will be shown shortly owed a great deal to the changing political dynamics at the national level at that time, i.e. the end of long-term one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1993 as a result of the formation of a coalition government with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had opposed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and thus the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan. Major actors in the Consultative Body included Cabinet members, other high-level national officials, and prefectural governmental leaders, specifically the elected prefectural governor and his appointed deputy governor. 182 The publications used by prefectural leaders to claim regional interests were two plans released in 1995 related to regional development (see chapter 4): the Okinawa Action Program for the Return of Bases and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept. To reiterate material covered in chapter 4, the former proposed the phased return of all U.S. bases on Okinawa by 2015, while the latter plan drew a broad framework for the entry of the region's local economies into the global market. As noted earlier, such a proactive approach to regional development issues was new for the prefecture. Although these plans had no statutory status, they provided a conceptual framework for discussions and negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa, and within the region. The prefecture's initiative in presenting the national government with these plans was also carried out under pressure from local residents (interview with Yoshiyuki Uehara, Deputy Director General, Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, 23 August 2001). The disparity between the decision by SACO to relocate Futenma Air Station as well as a number of smaller installations, and the strategic goal of the prefecture's own Action Program (i.e. the unconditional phased return of all U.S. bases to private and public ownership) highlights the major point of conflict between Okinawa and the Tokyo/Washington D.C. axis. In addition, contrary to the intention of prefectural leaders, the two plans were seen as a trade-off, allowing the national government to offer monetary compensation to the Okinawan people in exchange for hosting Futenma Air Station. The Okinawa Action Program gained popularity, not only in Okinawa but also on the mainland, because of its epoch-making advancement of local human security and interregional equity, which had historically largely been neglected by the national government in Tokyo. 183 In this chapter, section 5.1 will consider the initial stage of the restructuring of the Tokyo-Okinawa political relationship marked by the establishment of the Consultative Body and the proposal of the Okinawa Action Program. Section 5.2 will look at the progress of negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa, mainly on the inception of local oriented and collaborative economic development, but substantially as a compensation for the acceptance of the relocation of the bases. The establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council and the formulation of the Cosmopolitan Concept by the prefecture characterized this second stage. 5.1.2. Role and Functioning of the Consultative Body The establishment of the Consultative Body was decided at a Cabinet meeting (kakugi) on 17 November 1995 under Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's (then leader of the JSP) administration, which was a coalition of the JSP, the LDP and Sakigake. It should be noted that the last time the JSP had assumed the reins of government was from 1947 to 1948, and, prior to 1995, the JSP had been an opposition party against the ruling LDP for nearly half a century (1948-95). Given their policy and ideological differences with the LDP, the JSP had been opposed to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty since it was signed in 1951, while the LDP had been the treaty's so-called guardian. Thus the establishment of the Murayama administration led to dramatic political change at the central government level, as the LDP and the JSP, long-standing political opponents to the treaty and bases, had now formed a coalition government (with a third party, Sakigake). One of the most drastic changes was that the JSP decided to no longer oppose the treaty and the presence of the Japan-Self Defense Forces. This turnabout in JSP ideology effectively caused the dissolution of the party in 1996 into the Social 184 Democratic Party (Shamin To) and the New Socialist Party (Shin Shakaito) (see, for example, Stockwin 1999). Yet during late 1995 and early 1996, due to their ideological shift, the participation of JSP members in the new Cabinet affected national approaches to Okinawa on the issue of U.S. base return. At the local level, Prefectural Governor Ota was supported by local progressive parties, including the JSP (and later the Social Democratic Party after the dissolution of the JSP), the Okinawa Social Masses Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and Komeito 31 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 18 April 2001). Moreover, Okinawa Deputy Governor Masanori Yoshimoto, who brought to Ota extensive political experience, had been with the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union, traditionally a power base for the JSP.32 Because of Ota's local support by progressive political parties, it is therefore understandable that Prime Minister Murayama whould have favoured this Okinawan leader on the issue of U.S. base return. However, because Murayama was also a national government leader, he later faced a serious political dilemma concerning his relationship with Ota when the latter's refusal to sign leases on behalf of unwilling landlords caused prefectural and national interests to seriously clash. The establishment of the Consultative Body in 1995 signalled the determination of Murayama's administration to work more closely and consistently with the prefectural government. The Consultative Body was comprised of the minister of foreign affairs, the chief cabinet secretary (Kanbo Chokan), the defense agency chief, and the Okinawa 31 Komeito did not support Ota in the 1998 gubernatorial election. 3 2 Yoshimoto was also a leader of Okinawa Prefecture Labour Union and once a member of the prefectural government. Yoshimoto was called upon by Ota to work as a policy co-ordination officer (Seisaku Chosei Kari) in 1990 and was appointed to be the deputy governor in 1993. 185 prefectural governor, and together they discussed various issues surrounding the presence of U.S. bases on Okinawa during 1995 and 1996. Governor Ota (1996: 221-2) saw the Consultative Body as a landmark change in the prefecture's relationship with the central government, and perceived it as an excellent forum for the governor and deputy governor to meet directly with Japan's prime minister and Cabinet. Historically, prefectural officials had approached national ministries to request their assistance in coping with base-related and other issues, but meetings were usually with bureaucrats rather than top politicians. Further, meetings were usually short and substantial discussions were difficult to secure. Governor Ota (1996: 221-2) went on to remark that a peripheral island prefecture, such as Okinawa, required more direct links through which the prefecture's voice could be heard by the national government and ministries for base-related problems to be resolved. Moreover, according to Kenji Nozu (1997), a bureaucrat in the Administrative Department of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, the establishment of such a national-prefectural forum was exceptional, and thus represented the Japanese government's 'serious' commitment to resolving base issues. For both prefectural and national actors, this forum can therefore be seen as an innovative mechanism designed to allow the prefecture to not only present its regional needs directly to national governmental leaders but exchange ideas with them. The Consultative Body had an executive committee (Kanji Kai) whose members were the Japanese national government cabinet secretariat, high-ranking officers from relevant national ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense 186 Agency, the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the deputy governor of the prefecture of Okinawa. The Executive Committee met six times during 1995 to 1996, from the beginning of the SACO meetings to their conclusion, while the entire Consultative Body met only four times. The Okinawa Action Program was officially presented at the first Executive Committee meeting in January 1996. It is important to note here that the prefecture expected the Consultative Body to work to see the Okinawa Action Program reach fruition, if not in entirety, through the SACO deliberations. The Consultative Body was therefore a window through which the prefecture could officially access the national government for the purpose of discussing various base-related issues. However, this expectation later turned out to be naive, because an official schedule for the return of bases could only reach final approval through agreement between the Japanese and U.S. governments at SACO, and the U.S. government had veto power. The base return schedule articulated in the Okinawa Action Program was the central matter of debate between the prefecture and the national government within the Consultative Body. However, after the SACO Final Report was released in December 1996, further scheduling for return of U.S. bases was set aside. This was despite the fact that then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who had replaced Prime Minister Murayama in January 1996 thus bringing the LDP back to power, announced that the final report was merely 'the first step' toward the consolidation, realignment and reduction of military bases. He also stated that the national government would continue to discuss the presence of the U.S. military, including the future extent and composition of military forces on Okinawa, with the U.S. government (see Hashimoto's statement issued on 10 September 1996 after the Cabinet's decision). The latter 187 statement and the promise of further action were critical for the prefecture and the implementation of its own Action Plan. Further, according to the prefecture's plan, consolidation, realignment and reduction of military bases would require a significant drop in U.S. troop numbers. Accordingly, in Hashimoto's address to the Okinawan people on 17 September 1996, the prefecture of Okinawa strongly requested that the national government include a firm commitment to reducing the number of U.S. troops in Okinawa (The Okinawa Times, 6 December 1996). To the prefectural government's surprise, the national government accepted this request without much resistance and Hashimoto clarified the national government's attitude toward the reduction of the bases in his speech (The Okinawa Times, 6 December 1996). However, it was later apparent that the national government had little intention of seriously negotiating any significant reduction in U.S. troops, concentrating instead on securing the closure and relocation of bases specified in the SACO Final Report. 5.1.3. Role and Constitution of the Action Program for the Return of Bases (Okinawa Action Program) This sub-section will show the role of the Okinawa Action Program within the changing relations of national and prefectural jurisdictions in Japanese governance. As noted earlier, following the large public protest of 1995, the prefecture launched its two policy proposals, the Okinawa Action Program and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept on 30 January 1996. Both of these plans aimed to promote regional development and influence higher-level consultations and decisions made between the United States and Japan at SACO. At the time of its proposal in 1996, the Okinawa Action Program was unprecedented 188 and thus epoch-making because it was the first official request by the prefectural government for a specific schedule of U.S. base return, since the 1972 Reversion. Specifically it requested the phased and gradual return of all existing military installations on Okinawa by the year 2015 (see Appendix 11). Because it was not politically realistic to request the immediate return of all U.S. bases, the prefecture proposed the return of the 40 military sites gradually in a number of stages. Three stages were defined: Phase 1 covered the period of the Program's inception (1996 to 2001), Phase 2 ran from 2002 to 2010, and Phase 3 covered 2011 to 2015 (see Appendix 11). Overall, the Okinawa Action Program has also been linked to the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept, which aspired to convert Okinawa from a military haven to a more 'peaceful' island. This was seen as possible through promoting international links with foreign nations, such as co-operation with respect to improved technology as well as economic and cultural exchanges, especially with nearby countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The Okinawa Action Program was not a document that merely requested the return of land used by the U.S. military, but rather it claimed the necessity of such action in order to facilitate the restructuring of Okinawa's entire economy. Together then, these two policy documents played a critical role in the debate on prefectural-national relations over the remainder of the 1990s. While military base employees and landowners criticized the Okinawa Action Program for recommending no feasible alternative source of local income (see, for example, Chibana 1999, Makino 1996), the majority of the local public were in favour of the reduction and eventual removal of all U.S. military bases on Okinawa. These views were represented by the 1995 protest-rally as well as the result of the prefectural 189 referendum held in 1996 (discussed later in this section) in which approximately 90 percent of voters (about 60 percent of the prefectural electorate) were opposed to the presence of bases. Because of the wider antagonism against the presence of the bases, the prefecture succeeded in receiving support for the Action Program from local municipal leaders at the Liaison Council of Okinawa Municipal Governments for Cosmopolitan City Formation (Kokusai Toshi Keisei To Shichdson Renraku Kyogikai)33 on 30 January 1996. Okinawa's prefectural government also secured the support of the Prefectural Business Groups Conference34 by directly explaining the objectives of the Action Program to attendees (Ken Keizai Dantai Kaigi).35 The Action Program, by articulating such a bold return schedule, galvanised local opinion in Okinawa. Indeed, it was a rare opportunity for the prefecture to mobilize such a strong regional collective will against the presence of U.S. bases. This local political and business coalition against the national government, led by Ota 36 and Inamine, worked to bring the Okinawa Action Program to the attention of the Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, in 1996. Because of this unprecedented proactive action by local actors against what were widely perceived as unfair national policies and attitudes, the Okinawa Action Program Translation is the author's own. 3 4 Translation is the author's own. 3 5 This was a network of eight organisations that included: the Chamber of Commerce (Shoko Kaigisho); the Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyu Kai), the Central Association of Medium- and Small-sized Companies (Chusho Kigyo Dantai Chub Kai); and the Central Association of Agricultural Co-operatives (Nokyo Child Kai) (Rodo Shimbun, editorial, 5 March 1996). Note all English titles are the author's translation. 3 6 It should be noted that Keiichi Inamine, a leader of local business communities, who at the time was president of the largest oil company in Okinawa, Ryuseki, as well as the Association of Corporate Managers (Okinawa-Ken Keieisha Kyokai. This English title is translated by the author), advocated the Okinawa Action Program and sought wider support for it (Arasaki 1999). However, he defeated Ota in the 1998 gubernatorial election. 190 eventually gained support in 'mainland' Japan. For instance, an appeal for the support of the Okinawa Action Program and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept was made on 4 December 1996 in Tokyo by leaders of a civic coalition that opposed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Liberal Democratic Party. This network was called the 'Broad National Coalition for Independence, Peace and Democracy.'37 The Okinawa Action Program was, however, basically a 'wish list' of how the bases should be returned. It was not based on any realistic prospect of return, but rather on a political gambit of sufficient momentum to push the scheduling of base return onto the official agenda between Japan and the United States at SACO. Importantly, the year 2015 deadline for the completion of the return of all U.S. bases was not predicated on any sound technical or political assumption. Indeed it was quite speculative. Prefectural Governor Ota (1996: 152-3) explained the logic of setting the year 2015 as a target as follows: We are scrutinizing and analyzing statements made not only by high-level governmental U.S. officials but also military experts, researchers, and politicians concerned about national security. In so doing we have come across occasional arguments that in twenty years or so security in Asia-Pacific will stabilize, including the Korean Peninsula, and the political directions of Russia and China will become clear. In addition, there are reports that suggest the presence of U.S. Marines will become unnecessary and the relocation of Kadena Air T O Base would become possible. Thus, we set year 2015 as a non-binding target. Aside from this the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept will not materialize This was composed of prominent scholars and intellectuals from the mainland such as Hiroko Otsuki (formerly President of the International Women's Education Association); Shigeto Tsuru (professor emeritus at Hitotsubashi University); Kinhide Mushanokoji (professor at Meiji Gakuin University); Hiroaki Fukuchi (President of the Okinawa Civil Rights Association); and Hitoshi Motoshima (former mayor of Nagasaki City). 38 The largest U.S. air base in the Far East (2,000 hectares) (see Appendix 7). 191 without national assistance. For instance we took into consideration that the Fifth National Comprehensive Development Plan (Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku) will be completed this autumn and this covers a period approximately up to the year 2010. Thus we decided on a schedule with 2015 as the final year in order to integrate the reuse of military land and associated projects with the new National Comprehensive Development Plan (Ota 1996: 152-3, translated by the author). This remark can be seen to characterise the political and strategic nature of the Okinawa Action Program. 5.1.4. The Process of the Development of the Okinawa Action Program It is important to note that the prefectural initiative of combining a schedule of U.S. base return with associated regional economic development measures would not have occurred if there had not been more factors in play than the 1995 schoolgirl rape. Beyond the 1995 incident, the Action Program was also prompted by the changing local political climate at that time. Then Governor Ota's power base rested in various progressive parties (Kakushin Seito) in the Okinawa prefectural assembly. Traditionally, regional progressive parties as well as local labour unions had taken the position that the continuance of U.S. bases on Okinawa should not be granted any political legitimacy whatsoever. Consequently, they did not support any development policies or plans that would 'trade' special financial assistance for Okinawans in exchange for extending the presence of the bases. This was because the progressive parties were totally opposed to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which allowed U.S. bases on Japanese soil. Moreover, they did not want to be labelled 'anti-pacifist' by taking an 3 9 These included the Okinawa Social Masses Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishu To), the Japanese Communist Party (Nihon Kydsan To) and the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu To). 192 'economic attitude' toward the bases (interview with Yoshiyuki Uehara, Deputy Director General, Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, 23 August 2001). In 1995, local progressive parties and labour unions finally acknowledged the possibility of linking the continued presence of U.S. bases (for a limited period of time) to special national assistance for local economic development. It then, and only then, became possible for Ota's administration to adopt a new approach to dealing with the national government in Tokyo (interview with Yoshiyuki Uehara, 23 August 2001). The drafting of the Okinawa Action Program, and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept, was thus facilitated by major changes in the regional political context. It should be noted that the approach embodied in the Okinawa Action Program was strongly promoted by then Deputy Governor Masanori Yoshimoto. He played an important role in securing special economic assistance from the national government in return for allowing the relocation of U.S. bases (for a limited time). Indeed, using the presence of U.S. bases to the advantage of the prefecture of Okinawa with respect to its regional development in negotiations with the national government was originally Yoshimoto's idea (interview with Tomohiro Nagamoto, Executive Editor of The Okinawa Times, Naha City, Okinawa, 31 August 2001). The return of U.S. bases on Okinawa had been the prefecture's top priority but whether, when, how and to what extent all bases would be returned were outside the prefecture's jurisdiction. Accordingly the prefecture had never developed plans or a 193 schedule for their return.40 As shown in chapter 4, generally speaking, measures for the conversion of U.S. bases had been taken whenever the U.S. military announced the return of a particular base. Thus base conversion had been conducted on an ad hoc basis. In order for such a non-conventional regional government policy document as the Okinawa Action Program (or the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept) to be taken seriously by the national government, a special institutional medium for the discussion of the Action Program between national and regional actors was necessary. As previously discussed, the Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa was thus urgently established in January 1996 to meet this need as well as to link the prefecture with SACO to a certain degree. Because SACO was initiated after the 1995 rape incident as a one-year ad hoc committee, Okinawa Prefecture had to present its position and the will of the Consultative Body in a timely manner. Then Prefectural Deputy Governor Masanori Yoshimoto co-ordinated the preparation of the Okinawa Action Program, as well as the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept (interview with Yoshiaki Uehara, 22 August 2001). It was not, however, drafted solely by prefectural bureaucrats (interview with Tajima) but rather was jointly prepared by a Tokyo-based think tank, the Urban Economic Research Institute, UERI (a foundation partially funded by the Ministry of Construction) and prefectural bureaucrats under the leadership of Yoshimoto.41 This team was commissioned in 1995 to study the scheduling of the return of all U.S. bases and to 4 0 This uncertainty has also prevented, and still prevents, the prefecture from engaging in comprehensive land use and transportation planning. 4 1 The UERI was chartered jointly by the Ministries of Construction, Finance, Internal Affairs and Economic Planning Agency, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Development Committee in 1964. It is a non-profit research organization categorized as zaidan hdjin in Japan, whose establishment requires government agency approval. 194 prepare an appropriate draft plan 4 2 It should also be noted that the same group had additionally been assigned to help the prefecture prepare the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept. Although the Okinawa Action Program and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept were generally accepted by local municipal and business leaders, they were not submitted to the prefectural assembly for formal approval, nor were the general public of Okinawa at any time consulted. Instead, then Prefectural Governor Ota, two deputy governors, and the appointed prefectural treasurer (San Yaku43, or the Three Executive Officers Committee) were the sole sources of final approval. According to Yoshiyuki Uehara (personal correspondence on 31 July 2002), citizen participation was not mandatory in any policy planning that was not classified as statutory in Japan, and thus the prefectural government was able to draft the two policy proposals at its discretion. In addition, the approval of the prefectural assembly was not needed for activities not included in the Local Autonomy Law (Chihd Jichi Ho). Article 96 of this Law specifies items that require a prefectural assembly vote such as municipal ordinances, budgeting and local taxation. Thus, local bureaucrats held discretionary power for the drafting of development plans. Nevertheless, the prefecture needed to legitimise the Action Program and the Cosmopolitan Concept in order to negotiate its interests vis-a-vis the national government. Additionally, it had to prepare the proposals very quickly while SACO discussions were at the top of the central government's agenda in 1995. Thus, the prefectural government managed to legitimize 4 2 See the website of this institute at . 4 3 Translation is the author's own. 195 the proposals by claiming the necessity of taking the shortest route possible. 5.1.5. The Okinawa Referendum: Regional Political Mobilization against SACO The involvement of civic actors and the impacts of their actions on public decision-making were less visible than that of governmental actors and business associations because the former were less organized and had little formal access to governmental processes. The only exception was Rengo Okinawa (the Japanese Trade Union Confederation Okinawa Branch) comprising the majority of unions in the prefecture, which had played the important role of mobilizing their members and citizens in the 1995 protest-rally. As the gap between SACO and Okinawa in their approaches to settling issues surrounding the return of all U.S. bases became obvious, Rengo Okinawa, another influential trade union confederation (Oki Roren), women's groups, university representatives, and lawyers' group took the initiative of claiming a regional position on the presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa through a prefectural referendum in 1996 (The Okinawa Times, 26 July 1996). This vote was non-binding but historic in that a prefecture-wide referendum had never before been conducted in Japan. The intended aim of the prefectural referendum was to allow a protest of local citizens against the international deliberations at SACO, especially the issue of excluding any discussion on the return of all the U.S. bases on Okinawa from the forum in favour of a more restricted policy of relocation and rationalizing the construction of a new base, Futenma Air Station. While the 1996 referendum resulted in making apparent the existence of a regional collective will against the presence of U.S. bases, it also revealed conflicting interests 196 not only between Okinawa and Tokyo/Washington D.C. but also within Okinawan civil society. In particular it drew attention towards tensions between those who were more concerned with seeking financial compensation in exchange for continuing to host the bases, and those who demanded unconditional return, as articulated in the Action Program. Thus while the referendum played the role of asserting regional interests against the nation-state, it exposed a diversity of interests and stakeholders that posed difficulties for efforts to unify the citizens of Okinawa under one anti-base principle. This obstacle suggests that region-wide mobilization against the U.S. bases and the national government, such as that which had occurred during the 1995 rally, would only be possible if and when an Okinawan territorial identity were to precede the pragmatic interests of economics and politics. It also suggested that mediation between different interests in Okinawa would become more important. Thus when Governor Ota was in dispute with the national government over his refusal to sign land leases on behalf of unwilling landowners in 1996, Rengo Okinawa asked him to enact an ordinance in support of a prefectural referendum. The motion of this referendum was 'the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status-of-Forces Agreement and the consolidation and reduction of military bases.' The requested ordinance was eventually enacted on 21 June 1996 by a majority vote of the prefectural assembly44 under the Local Autonomy Law Articles 12 and 74, which specify rules for local referendums. Governor Ota decided that the referendum should be held on 8 September 1996, just before the anticipated release of the SACO Final Report. The choice of date was intended to be an expression of prefectural collective will against the presence of U.S. bases on Okinawa, and was 4 4 Only the Liberal Democratic Party and the Seikei Club, a minor party, opposed the enactment. The other five progressive parties - the Social Democratic Party {Shakai Minsyu T5), the Okinawa Social Masses Party (Shakai Taishu To), the New Frontier Party (Shinshin To), the Japanese Communist Party (Kyosan To) and Kaikaku Okinawa - were all in support. 197 directed at both the government of Japan and the United States (The Okinawa Times, 2 July 1996). It should be noted that although the referendum was not legally binding, it was the very first in Japan to be held at the prefectural level, and so it attracted public and media attention at the national level. The criticism was raised that the referendum was merely political posturing with little substantial effect, because it was already perfectly clear that the majority of the people of Okinawa were against the presence of U.S. bases (see, for example, Ota 1996). The referendum was nonetheless highly valued as the first demonstration of collective prefectural will against the national government on the issue of base return (The Okinawa Times, 7 September 1996; Arasaki 1999). The voting revealed that 89 percent of the total vote in the referendum was opposed to the continuing presence of U.S. bases.45 However, Governor Ota's announcement on 13 September 1996 that he would sign land leases on behalf of unwilling landowners, following the Supreme Court decision of 28 August 1996 that had ruled against Ota, embarrassed the Okinawan people. As discussed in chapter 4, the governor had previously refused to sign, even immediately after losing the Supreme Court decision. Ota had several reasons for refusing to sign the land leases. His rationalization was that the prefectural governor had to play the role of an administrative leader as well as political leader vis-a-vis the national government and the former role made it impossible to defy the Supreme Court decision (Ota 1996). However, for those who had voted in favour of base reduction, or 4 5 The number of qualified voters was 909,832. Voter turnout was 59.53% (541, 638 votes). 89.09% of those who voted (482,538 voters) supported the idea. 198 supported the results of the referendum, his decision was seen as a betrayal (compare Ota's account in Ota [1996] to the version reported by The Okinawa Times, 13 September 1996). Ultimately, no new action resulted from this referendum. In the years following, administrative coordination between the prefectural and national governments was emphasized and thus more direct political antagonism between Okinawa and Tokyo weakened. 5.1.6. Analysis of Change in Relationship between the National Government and Okinawa in the Consultative Body 1) The Level of Change in the Consultative Body (see figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) The Consultative Body was an intergovernmental 'policy forum' established in 1995 between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture. New negotiations on the issue of the return of U.S. bases commenced between these two levels of governments. Arrows in figure 5.1.1 starting from 'USA' represent ordinary flows of decision-making on the return of the bases. This is the 'business as usual' model of decision-making. These arrows show that the U.S. decision on the return of specific bases is given to the Japanese government first and then to the prefectural and municipal governments. Individual landowners whose land properties are decided to be returned also receive the U.S. decision from the national government. It should be noted that a significant portion of U.S. bases on Okinawa are built on privately-owned land. This figure shows Okinawan landowners of military sites are positioned under the bottom of the hierarchy of decision-making in the Japan-U.S. international security. In figure 5.1.2, new dotted arrows are added to the first figure, the 'business as usual model,' and indicates the specific changes that took place upon the establishment of the Consultative Body. A dotted arrow starting from 'Prefectural Government' represents the prefecture's 199 initiative of requesting the national government to accelerate the return of the bases based on the prefecture's proposal of the Okinawa Action Program (an instrument to express the prefecture's demand for the phased return of the bases). This dotted arrow thus suggests the beginning of a 'bottom-up' approach in the issues of the return of the bases. The other dotted arrow starting from 'National Government' shows that the Consultative Body and SACO (a venue for the Japan-U.S. international negotiation on the return of U.S. bases) was linked loosely and ambiguously, and the 'bottom-up' model was vaguely and temporarily formed across the boundary. 200 Figure 5.1.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) National Govt \ ^ USA H Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines Figure 5.1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases (the Consultative Body) Local Non-Govt National Govt 7*— USA H Prefectural Govt H Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines Initiatives Taken through the Consultative Body 201 2) Roles of Actors: Initiators, Decision-makers and Other Influential Actors in the Consultative Body (see figure 5.1.3) Initiators [Prefectural Governor] In the context of growing grievance among the people of Okinawa towards the national government's attitude toward Okinawa in relation to the presence of U.S. bases, Prefectural Governor Ota took the initiative in claiming the right of Okinawa Prefecture to participate in the decision-making on the return of U.S. military bases to Okinawa by publicizing the Okinawa Action Program that proclaimed the phased return of all bases in Okinawa. Ota's initiative was supported significantly by Prefectural Deputy Governor Masanori Yoshimoto and his political skills. The governor took the task of representing Okinawans' territorial and cultural identities. Ota's signing of the land leases, however, revealed the weakness of the prefectural governor to act together with the anti-base citizens and groups in his functional authority as an administrator, not as a politician. Decision-makers [Prime Minister] Then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama made a decision with his Cabinet to establish the Consultative Body in order to discuss the issues of U.S. bases directly with the prefectural government. Because Ota and Murayama were supported by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had opposed the presence of the bases, Murayama's sympathy toward Okinawa was special. Therefore, the presence of Murayama was critical in order to respond to Ota's pro-active actions. 202 Influential Actors [USA] The Ota-Murayama meeting triggered changes in the intergovernmental political relationship between the national government and the prefectural government. It contributed in renewing and prioritizing the consideration of the over-concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa. However, although the individual political relationship between Ota and Murayama developed cooperatively, they did not intend to deal with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty which justified the presence of U.S. bases in Japan. It should be noted that the JSP abandoned its anti-treaty policy upon the formation of its coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party. Further, because the presence of the bases was not a serious issue for most of the other prefectures or the majority of mainland Japanese people, a drastic change in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would be almost impossible. Because the treaty did not specify either the number or location of the bases, a realistic alternative to both the national and prefectural government was to seek change in these elements. [Civil Society] The 1995 protest rally provided a driving force behind Governor Ota's initiative. The prefectural referendum, which was a more organized form of protest against the bases, was another force to support Ota's proactive stance against the national government. Trade unions, women's groups, university professors, and lawyers' group played an important role in this event. Although the discrepancy among Okinawans in their attitudes toward the presence of the bases within the local society became apparent in this referendum, it expressed the deep-rooted antagonism among Okinawans against the bases and the existence of a difference in status between Okinawa and the Japanese 203 mainland. Figure 5.1.3 Actors and Roles in the Consultative Body Forum for Recognition Initiators Decision-makers Influential Actors Consultative Body Prefectural Governor Prime Minister U S A , Civ i l Society 3) Negotiations in the Consultative Body (see figure 5.1.4) Local Demands Ota's presentation of the Okinawa Action Program in the Consultative Body represented a strong desire of Okinawans to obtain greater control over the use of local land, ocean and air, which were constrained by the presence of bases, in order to realize safe and peaceful local civic life. According to Halperin et al., an attempt to take control over local resources is a type of desire for self-determination (Halperin et al. 1992). Ota's interest was not only in the acceleration of the return of the bases but also in clarifying the schedule of the return. Because it was difficult for the prefecture to be directly involved in the international decision-making, which was a matter of diplomacy as well as national security, Ota had to encourage Murayama's recognition of Okinawa and rely on his personal commitment to accommodate Okinawa's requests in the international negotiation, SACO. 204 National Responses The national government established the Consultative Body as an ad hoc forum immediately after the discussion between then Prime Minister Murayama and Prefectural Governor Ota based on the Cabinet's discretionary power. It was Murayama's invention and operationalized outside the established administrative systems. In other words, it was a rather informal meeting. The Cabinet's main interest was to defuse tension between Tokyo and Okinawa by showing its recognition of the seriousness of the concentration of the bases in Okinawa and discussing solutions together. The Consultative Body provided the prefecture with opportunities to voice its desires. It was also a mechanism for both governments to transcend the traditional administrative hierarchy and directly discuss the issues of the bases. Taking into consideration the ambiguity of the Consultative Body's status vis-a-vis SACO, its establishment was quite symbolic and demonstrated the state's recognition of its problems. Figure 5.1.4 Negotiations in the Consultative Body Forum for Authorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Recognition Forum Resource Self- Resource Self-Distribution determination Distribution determination Consultative Body No Yes No No Ad hoc Informal 205 4) Special Arrangements in the Consultative Body (see figure 5.1.5) The national-prefectural discussions were reflected in the SACO Final Report to the extent that there was agreement on the closure of the most of the military sites prioritized by the prefectural government in the Okinawa Action Program. However, because the closures were contingent upon relocation within Okinawa, there was little difference in the degree of concentration of the bases. Rather, the relocation suggested that the bases would be modernized and prolonged in life span. At the local level, the relocation of bases meant the transfer of impacts from one place to another. Consequently, there was no change in Okinawa's role as a sink for U.S. bases. This international agreement (SACO) meant that the political negotiations between Murayama and Ota had begun moving to a sphere of administrative procedures for the implementation of the relocation. Accordingly, no special authority was given by the national government to the prefecture for decision-making on the issue of the return of U.S. bases. Figure 5.1.5 Special Arrangements in the Consultative Body Forum for Recognition Types of Arrangements (Political/A dm inistrative/L egal) Transfer of Authorities (Political/Administrative/Legal) Beginning End Consultative Body Political Administrative No 206 5.2. The 1996 Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai) 5.2.1. Introduction The Okinawa Policy Council was a companion forum established by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto on 17 September 1996. It was Hashimoto's response to then Governor Ota's request that the national government establish a mechanism to secure its ongoing and firm commitment to securing special assistance for economic development, along with the implementation of base closures, demanded by the Okinawa Action Program. Similar to the Consultative Body, the establishment of the Council was also political. The prime minister initiated it at a time of growing distrust of the national government among the Okinawa public, evident in a prefecture level referendum held on 8 September 1996. It was a protest against the Japanese government's continuing policy of allowing the concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa and passivity with respect to negotiating with the U.S. government for the return of property to local landowners. The Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept, which was made official by the prefectural governor on 11 November 1996, was the first prefectural planning instrument to be acknowledged by the Okinawa Policy Council (Sakaguchi 1997). Even though the governor authorized this initiative, it had no legal basis as a regional plan; Okinawa had a statutory Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku) formulated and overseen by the national government. Although both the Cosmopolitan Concept planning process and content prompted local criticism, it provided a policy framework for intergovernmental discussions on new approaches to regional development between the state, the prefecture, and local actors in Okinawa. 207 The political objective of the plan was to emphasize the legitimacy of the prefectural government's claim for the phased return of U.S. bases. In other words, the prefecture intended to pressure the national government to become seriously involved in closing U.S. bases and in promoting locally oriented regional development. Okinawa's vision for planning the region could not be realized if the bases remained. This means that the prefecture did not claim the return of bases as such, despite the fact that the public rally and the regional referendum focused on the presence of the bases. For the prefecture, this linking of development planning with the claim for the return of the bases was necessary in order to gain support from a wider constituency including those who had stakes in base closures. However, this linkage allowed the national government to guide the negotiation process in that it could place priority on providing economic assistance to Okinawa while limiting its involvement in further negotiations with the United States to close bases on Okinawa. The original idea of the Cosmopolitan Concept was introduced to the national government in the Consultative Body, but it was the Okinawa Policy Council that provided the main forum for discussing the plan. During meetings of the Okinawa Policy Council, actors from both the national and prefectural government proposed various development projects to be subsidized and implemented based on the Cosmopolitan Concept. Because no development project was possible on the current U.S. military sites, projects that were feasible outside military sites were discussed. It should be noted that the projects were mostly construction-related (hakamono projects). As extra subsidies were granted to Okinawa through decisions made by the Okinawa Policy Council, the national government began to gain an advantageous position in 208 emphasizing their benevolent attitudes toward Okinawa. The most distinct event that revealed the political nature of the Okinawa Policy Council was represented by Prime Minister Hashimoto's action against Governor Ota. When Governor Ota rejected to accept the relocation of Futenma Air Station, Hashimoto suspended the holding of the council meeting and no meeting was held until a more conservative candidate replaced Ota, Keiichi Inamine (a business man) in the gubernatorial election held in 1998. This relational de-linking by Hashimoto affected the popularity of Ota as the governor and helped to support Inamine's conservative approach in the election. This suggests that the Okinawa Policy Council was playing an important role in managing the political, economic and administrative linkage between Tokyo and Okinawa. It should be noted that Keizo Obuchi replaced Hashimoto in July 1998, before the election held in November 1998. Thus, the main actors of the Okinawa Policy Council changed completely before and after the gubernatorial election. The result was the beginning of a relatively cooperative and dialogical relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa, although no additional return of bases was proposed or discussed. 5.2.2. Role and Functioning of the Okinawa Policy Council Planning of the development of Okinawa since the 1972 Reversion was based on the statutory Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku), made within the framework of the Comprehensive National Land Development Plans (Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku). These plans did not address planning the use of U.S. military sites because neither national nor prefectural planners could predict when and which bases 209 would be returned. In other words, 20 percent of the land of the main island of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto) had remained (and still remains) unplanned. The Cosmopolitan Concept was the first official plan, though not elaborate, that clarified the prefecture's determination to include military sites in development planning. It should be noted that Yomitan Village in Okinawa, well known for its alternative agropolitan development, included military sites in its local development planning, but such an approach had not been adopted by the prefectural government. The Cosmopolitan Concept was formulated to be presented to the members of the Okinawa Policy Council in 1996, but its origin was a study on the reformation of Okinawa as an international city (Okinawa Kokusai Toshi Keisei Seibi Koso Chosa). The study was consigned to the Urban Economic Research Institute (UERI) in Tokyo from the prefecture in 1992.46 Although the plan was criticized by experts for its lack of rigorous analysis of internal and external conditions for development (see, for example, Kurima 1998, Makino 1996), it played an important role in setting a new discourse on regional development between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture. It is important to note that other experts suggested that the Cosmopolitan Concept aimed to present only a conceptual framework for planning and facilitate the formation of specific plans in the future and thus the contents were yet to be elaborated (interview with Yoshiyuki Uehara, Deputy Director General, Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government, 23 August 2001). The Okinawa Policy Council provided the national and prefectural government with a venue for discussing the renewed principles of Okinawa development and individual See the website of this institute at . 210 development projects. While the Consultative Body concentrated on the return of bases, this Council focused on local and regional economic development issues. Two important political processes preceded the establishment of this Council. One was a prefectural level referendum held on 8 September 1996 against the national government policy that had permitted the persistent concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Briefly, it represented the majority opinion of Okinawan constituency against the presence of U.S. bases. This was the first official and regional protest against U.S. bases and national policy toward Okinawa since the reversion in 1972. The result of which allowed Governor Ota to announce that the Okinawa Action Program and the Cosmopolitan Concept had won the confidence of the Okinawan people (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 September 1996). On 5 September 1996, before the referendum, the Cabinet announced a meeting between Governor Ota and Prime Minister Hashimoto to be held on 10 September 1996 at the Prime Minister's Official Residence in Tokyo. The result was a collective expression of distrust of the national government. With this local political support, even if not unanimous, Ota met Hashimoto and requested the inception of the development of new policies and plans. In response, the prime minister announced the provision of financial assistance in the amount of five billion yen to Okinawa at that meeting. However, it is also important to note that the governor had decided to follow the order of the Supreme Court to sign land leases on behalf of unwilling landowners of military sites on 13 September as discussed in the previous chapter. This suggested Ota's concession to Hashimoto in order to maintain their dialogue, while still emphasizing that he had no alternatives than to follow the order issued by the Supreme Court (see Ota 1996). 211 In order to dispel increasing distrust of the national government among the Okinawan local public, Prime Minister Hashimoto had to visit Okinawa in order to restructure their relationship. In his speech during his first visit to Okinawa on 17 September1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto officially apologized, stating that the national government's considerations of Okinawa were not sufficient and announced its renewed approach (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 17 September 1996). In addition to the announcement of the special budget of five billion yen for development and the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council, Prime Minister Hashimoto declared the substantial involvement of the national government in the development of Okinawa (ibid.). The authorization of the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council had been made quickly before Hashimoto's first visit. It was proposed by the prime minister in a Cabinet meeting on 10 September 1996, and decided by the Cabinet on the morning of 17 September. Hashimoto then flew to Okinawa in the afternoon of that day for the first time since taking office. The Okinawa Policy Council was accompanied by the establishment of working-level meetings (Kanji Kai). The former was composed of the chief cabinet secretary, the ministers of each ministry and agency and the prefectural governor of Okinawa. The latter was composed of the heads of the divisions (Kyokucho) of each national ministry and agency, the prefectural deputy governor, the director for policy coordination (Seisaku Chosei Kan) and the head of the division for the Cosmopolitan City Formation. There was no precedent to such a forum in which the governor of a prefecture could meet and have discussions directly with national bureaucrats. Various projects were by both proposed national ministries and the prefectural government. In 212 the second working-level meeting held on 11 Novemberl996, it was decided that joint project teams from the national and prefectural government, to review the feasibility of approximately 80 projects, would be established (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 12 November 1996). Such a dialogical joint venture in regional development between Tokyo and Okinawa was unprecedented. Although the relationship was not equal, the Okinawa Policy Council became a mechanism for facilitating mutual understanding and for exchanging and sharing ideas. Individual governmental actors on both sides played significant roles in the running of the Council. On the prefectural side, the key figure under the Ota administration was Deputy Governor Yoshimoto Masanori, who took on a strong leadership role in the development of the Okinawa Action Program and the Cosmopolitan Concept. He also negotiated with national bureaucrats in their promotion. He worked to realize both the phased return of bases under the Okinawa Action Program and the globalization of Okinawan economies under the Cosmopolitan Concept (Shiroi 1997). Yoshimoto requested that rather than simply listing projects individually by ministry, the ministries should respect the Cosmopolitan Concept and coordinate development projects beyond the traditional sectional boundaries (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 12 November 1996). He pursued the strategic targets of the Cosmopolitan Concept: deregulation for local industries and decentralization. This was basically a market-oriented approach that would increase dependence on the global market while not decreasing dependence on the state because extra subsidies were also claimed. This new situation, of having different sources upon which to depend, was unique in Japan and characterized Okinawa's claim for special rights, which were yet to be available to other prefectures. 213 The fact that Okinawa sought special rights was criticized by some mainlanders who contended that such special treatment was not fair vis-a-vis other prefectures or regions which were also under serious economic constraints, and thus Okinawa was seen as privileged (see, for example, Voice September 2001). However, such criticism was exceptional and other prefectures did not request similar mechanisms. A significant difference in regional planning between Okinawa and other prefectures was and still is that Okinawa was the only prefecture that did not develop a regional development plan on its own, though since the reversion, national planners have made plans for Okinawa through the Okinawa Development Agency. Thus, the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council proved that the traditional centralized planning approach adopted for Okinawa's development was not effective enough to meet local needs. From the viewpoint of the prefectural planners, the council was a major mechanism to secure the continuous special and exceptional involvement of the national government in promoting local needs. Compared with the Consultative Body, which aimed to deal with the relocation of bases, this Council ran continuously and directed the national-prefectural joint efforts to facilitate projects. 5.2.3. Role of the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept The Cosmopolitan Concept changed the discourse of regional development. Internationalization of regional economies taking advantage of Okinawa's location had been defined as a development strategy to promote regional development after the 1972 Reversion. It emphasized growth of a global market and a change in the potential of Okinawa to act on a global scale. The Council proposed to transform Okinawa into a global region by building hubs or nodes of transportation, telecommunications and 214 international functions such as technical cooperation and exchange of commodities and information across the prefecture (see the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept). The traditional focus on manufacturing was replaced by post-industrial types of projects such as processing, exchange and multimedia. Three basic policies presented by the Cosmopolitan Concept were: 1) establishing a centre for peace education and research and a network focused on the concept of peace that links to other Asia Pacific regions; 2) contributing to the sustainable development of the Asia Pacific region by developing international technical cooperation in the Asia Pacific region and promoting scientific and research exchange in various fields; and 3) functioning as a base for economic and cultural exchange and human interaction in the Asia Pacific region. In sum, the Cosmopolitan Concept aimed to make full use of Okinawa's location, i.e. its centrality in the Asia Pacific region, and its historical experience in exchanges with Asian nations (see the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept). Indeed, the plan only presented the vision and images of regional development and did not show logical links between the present and the future. Rather it linked the past (i.e. historical memory of the Middle Ages when Okinawa's economic, political and cultural links with various Asian cities and nations were extensive) and the future. The justification of this plan represented the distinctiveness of the history of Okinawan society and identity of Okinawan people. In addition to highlighting the uniqueness of Okinawa's location between the Japanese mainland and Asian countries, the plan clarified the colonial history of Okinawa within the Japanese feudal system and after 215 World War II. The reference to history, culture and identity suggests the importance of linking shared experience and past memories to a territory in claiming special rights in contemporary issues. For example, the Cosmopolitan Concept stated: At the beginning of the Edo period (early 17th century), the Ryukyu Kingdom lost its independence following the invasion by the Satsuma domain of southern Kyushu. The nation remained under the control of the Satsuma domain until the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century, when it was forced to accept a new position as a prefecture of Japan. During the Second World War, Okinawa was the site of a fierce land battle that involved the local populace. The central and southern areas of Okinawa Island were reduced to burnt grounds. Following the war, Okinawa was under U.S. military occupation until its Reversion to Japan in 1972. Over the centuries, Okinawa has maintained close relations with China, Korea and Southeast Asia, and after the Second World War, it came under the influence of the United States. This prefecture has a long history of exchange with nations spread far and wide from east to west, north to south. As a consequence of its historical experience, Okinawa has a highly diverse and distinct culture that holds an unusual position within Japanese culture. However, the plan played an important role in the process of redefining the relationship between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture. In particular, the plan caused tension not only between Tokyo and Okinawa, but also within Okinawa. The Okinawan people are renowned for friendliness, generosity and easy-going manner, as embodied in their favourite phrase ichariba chodei or "Once we meet, we are as brothers" and in yuimaaru, the tradition of cooperating in labor and in the willingness to accept diversity (sic, the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept, November 1996, Okinawa Prefectural Government: 4). Makino (1996), a banker who was appointed as deputy governor under the Inamine 216 administration, severely criticized this reference to the history of Okinawa. Makino basically argued that Okinawa's cross-border trade in Asia was possible only in the Ming Dynasty and that relations between Okinawa (i.e. the Ryukyu Kingdom) and foreign countries ended in the latter half of the 16th century. Although he rejected the image of the golden age of cross-border trade and criticized the Cosmopolitan Concept for its' insufficient analysis of the reality of Okinawa's potential economies, it is important to note that these stories of the past were shared in Okinawa. For example, a policy proposal for the promotion of a self-sustaining regional economy and local autonomy formulated by the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union (Zen-nihon Jichi Dantai Rodd Kumiai) in 1998 featured this similar historical background. It was characteristic that regional identities and cultures were linked to the rationalization of Okinawa's potential and advantages in order to open the region to the global market while claiming deregulation and stronger local autonomy. 5.2.4. The Political Process of the Institutionalization of New Planning Practices As mentioned above, globalization was a main concern for the prefectural government. The first and most controversial project based on the Cosmopolitan Concept by the prefecture was the designation of the entire jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture as a Free Trade Zone. Because its establishment was impossible under the existing laws, the prefecture requested, at the Okinawa Policy Council meeting, that the national government adopt a 'one country, two systems (ikkoku niseido)' approach that would require the revision of tariff laws, foreign exchange laws, corporate tax, investment tax reduction and so on (see, for example, Shiroi 1997). However, because of oppositions to the idea of the Free Trade Zone from local manufacturers, agriculture 217 and fisheries, which needed protection from deregulation, the idea of prefectural wide designation was abandoned (see Kurima 1998 for detailed information on the discussions of the Free Trade Zone). Instead, the establishment of a Free Trade Zone with limited scale and function was accepted for which some revisions were made in the Okinawa Development Special Measures Law (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) in April 1998. The first business moved into a site in the Free Trade Zone established in the Nakagusuku Bay area on the east coast of the main island of Okinawa in May 2000 (The Okinawa Times, 4 June 2000). Another project symbolic of deregulation was the authorization of air routes from Naha airport (Okinawa) to Seoul and South East Asian countries by the Ministry of Transportation (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 4 June 1997). This succeeded in attracting Federal Express to Okinawa and Okinawa Prefecture was pleased to see this symbolic step towards globalization. Consequently, Naha became the third airport for Federal Express, after Narita international airport (Tokyo) and Kansai international airport (Osaka). The first flight was on the 31 August 1998. However, because of the Asian economic depression and limited local demand, Federal Express withdrew from Okinawa in less than four months of operation (The Okinawa Times, 6 December 1998), revealing the difficulty in linking Okinawa with the global market, despite the deregulation. Upon the replacement of Governor Masahide Ota by local businessman Keiichi Inamine after the gubernatorial election in November 1998, the Cosmopolitan Concept was reviewed and its presence was lowered under the Inamine administration. As 218 mentioned above, the Okinawa Policy Council had been suspended by then Prime Minister Hashimoto in response to Ota's rejection of accepting the relocation of Futenma Air Station within the prefecture. Inamine's first task was to reopen the Council and show his determination and capacity to the constituency to restructure the intergovernmental relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa. On 10 December 1998, the first day of his term in office, Inamine flew to Tokyo to meet with then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. The Okinawa Policy Council then began to discuss the formulation of the Okinawa Economic Development 21 s t Century Plan (Okinawa Keizai Shinko 21 Seiki Plan) more specifically. It was proposed by then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at the 25 th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan held in November 1997, but its progress was delayed, partly due to a communication breakdown between Hashimoto and then Governor Ota in 1998 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 26 August 2000). The interim report on the 21 s t Century Plan was issued in June 1999 and the final plan was authorized in August 2000. It was created under the initiative of the national government (i.e. the Obuchi administration after Hashimoto), and the prefecture (i.e. the Inamine administration after Ota) that requested the inclusion of their ideas in the final plan. Their discussions continued in the meetings. In the formulation of the plan, Inamine's market-oriented and privatization policy on development planning was compatible with the national government policy that favoured the increase of self-sufficiency of the regional economy and thus the decrease of financial burden. Various projects were proposed in the interim report. The plan covered a wide range of projects including processing and trade industries, tourism and resort industries, 219 telecommunications industries, agricultural and fishery industries, and support services for economic development (note that this included environmental improvement and zero emission projects). According to Moritake Tomikawa of Okinawa International University, the plan did not prioritize projects and lacked innovative systems and strategies that could have overcome the limitations of existing systems for regional development (see The Okinawa Times, 18 July 1999). It also did not substantially address the issue of the return of bases (because it was basically an economic development plan). In terms of extra assistance, the Okinawa Policy Council decided to provide ten billion yen to various projects as an urgent economic assistance measure in April 1999. After the death of Keizo Obuchi in April 2002, this Council continued to act as a major forum for discussing economic development issues, but the issue of U.S. bases was still not adequately addressed. 5.2.5. Analysis of Change in Relationship between the National Government and Okinawa in the Okinawa Policy Council 1) The Level of Change in the Okinawa Policy Council (see figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2) The Okinawa Policy Council was a 'policy forum' established in 1996 between the national government and the prefectural government. While the Consultative Body dealt with the return of the bases, the Okinawa Policy Council focused on the issues of regional economic development, which was closely linked with the presence of the bases. Figure 5.2.1 shows the hierarchical system of regional development planning in which decisions are made at the national ministries and given to the prefecture and municipal governments. This is a simplified flow while the real process of regional planning is more complex, but in terms of power relationship this figure shows the typical 'business as usual' model. This hierarchical system was relaxed to some extent, but without any 220 institutional change by the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council. A dotted arrow between 'National Government' and 'Prefectural Government' in figure 5.2.2 shows that the prefecture commenced negotiations with the national government on the issue of regional development through the Okinawa Policy Council. In this 'policy forum,' the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept was used to win recognition of the importance of promoting self-reliant regional economic development, which was quite difficult under the traditional centralized planning scheme. In sum, this 'policy forum' revealed that a nonroutine mechanism was quickly built between the two governments and relaxed the rigid hierarchical system, although no action was taken to institutionalize this modification. 221 Figure 5.2.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) National Govt Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community USA Routine Decision-making Lines Figure 5.2.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Okinawa Policy Council) National Govt USA Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines Initiatives Taken through the Okinawa Policy Council 222 2) Roles of Actors: Initiators, Decision-makers and Other Influential Actors in the Okinawa Policy Council (see figure 5.2.3) Initiators [Prefectural Governor] Then Prefecture Governor Ota took the initiative of requesting the national government to a mechanism for discussing regional development in Okinawa. As in the case of the Consultative Body, Prefectural Deputy Governor Yoshimoto played an important role as a negotiator in the meetings of the Okinawa Policy Council and supported Ota's initiative. In particular, his involvement in the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept was important. Because the Consultative Body had been established before this 'policy forum,' and the national government was already aware of the urgency of the Okinawa problem, Ota was able to extend the relationship to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who replaced Murayama, despite the fact that he was a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a party that took the initiative of establishing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and maintaining it for decades. Decision-makers [Prime Minister] Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made a decision with his Cabinet to establish the Okinawa Policy Council in order to directly discuss the issues of regional development with the prefectural government. The return of the bases was not an issue in this new 'policy forum.' 223 Influential Actors [USA] The potential for Okinawa's regional development was constrained by the presence of U.S. bases, which occupied 20 percent of the entire land of the main island of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto). Air and sea routes were also affected by the U.S. military. Consequently, the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept postulated the necessity of removing all the bases from Okinawa for its development. This was predicated upon Okinawa's claim that the promotion of its development would only be possible when the bases were removed, and that it was legitimate for Okinawa to seek both special economic assistance and the removal of the bases in order to deal with the persistence of the status inequalities. Figure 5.2.3 Actors and Roles in the Okinawa Policy Council Forum for Recognition Initiators Decision-makers Influential Actors Okinawa Policy Council Prefectural Governor Prime Minister USA 3) Negotiations in the Okinawa Policy Council (see figure 5.2.4) Local Demands The prefecture's interest was in restructuring the ineffective and inefficient traditional planning scheme in its favour. It should be noted that Okinawans did not suffer from serious economic problems under the existing system of redistribution. However, the biggest issue was the high level of its economic dependence on the transfer payment 224 compared with other prefectures since the 1972 Reversion in addition to higher unemployment rates. Simply, the prefecture was and still is more susceptible to any decrease in subsidies from Tokyo than other prefectures. This economic issue was closely related to the presence of the bases, and remained the prefecture's top priority. The prefecture pushed for the Cosmopolitan Concept in order to promote its economic interests, i.e. the promotion of self-reliant development. In the formation of this plan, distinctive historical and cultural identities were re-introduced by the prefecture. It presented its vision for new regional development planning emphasizing its distinctive pre-modern economic and cultural linkage with various regions and nations in East and Southeast Asia. In other words, the selected pre-modern identities were used to promote the prefecture's modern interests in economic development. The Cosmopolitan Concept emphasized the prefecture's distinctive potential for functioning as hubs of various material and nonmaterial flows between Japan and other Asian countries and regions as opposed to functioning as a hub for the U.S. military network. The prefecture's strategy was to make the national government recognize the distinctive potentials for and weaknesses of Okinawa's economic development and commence more effective development with more advantageous subsidies. In short, it aimed to combine recognition and redistribution. It should be noted that this prefecture's reliance on its pre-modern history was severely criticized by such local economists as Makino (1996), who was later appointed as the deputy prefectural governor in Inamine's administration, and Kurima (1998) as being too simplistic. 2 2 5 National Responses As in the case of the Consultative Body, relaxing political tension between Tokyo and Okinawa was a major interest of the national government. Prime Minister Hashimoto showed substantial recognition of the persistence of the heavy burden of the military bases on the local society in his speech in Okinawa, and promised that he would work towards reducing the burden. Further, he apologized for the fact that the national government's assistance was not sufficient enough to narrow the gap with the Japanese mainland. His comments acknowledged the incapacity of the ongoing statutory Okinawa Development Plan and the Okinawa Development Agency for carrying out satisfactory regional development. The establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council was meant to demonstrate the national government's recognition of this situation as well as its benevolence. It was Hashimoto's invention and it was operationalized outside the established administrative systems similar to the Consultative Body. Like Murayama, Hashimoto respected face-to-face communications with the governor. The Council focused on the distribution of subsidies to Okinawa and the development of a new and more local-oriented plan. Accordingly, the national government began to work together with prefectural planners to discuss various planning projects to be promoted based on the concept of the Cosmopolitan Concept. It should be noted that, as introduced in section 7.1 of chapter 7, the fact that Hashimoto suspended the holding of the Council after Ota's rejection of the acceptance of relocation revealed that the heightened status of the prefecture's involvement in development planning was conditional. 226 Figure 5.2.4 Negotiations in the Okinawa Policy Council Forum for Authorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Recognition Forum Resource Self- Resource Self-Distribution determination Distribution determination Okinawa Policy Council Yes Yes Yes No Ad hoc Informal 4) Special Arrangements in the Okinawa Policy Council (see figure 5.2.5) The Okinawa Policy Council was established by Hashimoto's political action and worked outside the existing systems of regional development planning, i.e. the statutory Okinawa Development Plan and the Okinawa Development Agency. While the establishment of this Council produced a renewed and more interactive political and administrative relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa, the prime minister could exercise political power to run the Council at will. In other words, the operational flexibility of this Council contributed to a more interdependent centre-periphery governmental relationship, but the ultimate power of maintaining the relationship rests in the national government. Because the deterioration of their relationship would be disadvantageous for the promotion of both national and prefectural governmental interests, this Council worked as a new mechanism for arranging their interdependency while coordinating both of the interests, though not on an equal footing. Consequently, no substantial transfer of authority and rights was made from the national government to Okinawa Prefecture. In terms of the level of the prefecture's involvement in regional 227 development planning, its status was increased due to an increase of opportunities for national and prefectural officials to interact. However, it was allowed only as far as the prefecture was cooperative with the national government. Figure 5.2.5 Special Arrangements in the Okinawa Policy Council Forum for Recognition Types of Arrangements (Political/Administrative/Legal) Transfer of Authorities (Political/Administrative/Legal) Beginning End Okinawa Policy Council Political Administrative No 228 C H A P T E R 6 Increasing National Intervention in Municipalities This chapter will show the progress of change in the relationship between the national government and municipal governments, the lowest level in the hierarchical administrative system of Japan under the prefecture. It will show processes whereby the national government had approached the municipal governments directly bypassing the prefectural government; essentially, this emphasized its recognition of local economic issues. Section 6.1 examines the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases (Okinawa Kichi Shozai Shichdson ni Kansuru Kondankai or Shimada Kondankai). Section 6.2 discusses increasing tension between the local civil society of Nago City and the national government concerning the latter's decision to relocate Futenma Air Station to the city, which led to a municipal non-binding referendum on relocation in 1996. 6.1. The 1996 Roundtable on the Municipal i t ies of Ok inawa Accommodat ing U.S. M i l i t a r y Bases (Okinawa Kichi Shozai Shichdson ni Kansuru Kondankai or Shimada Kondankai) 6.1.1. Introduction In the second half of 1996, one month before the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council discussed in the previous chapter, the central government took the initiative in repairing relationships between itself and Okinawa over the issue of base reductions. This took the form of offering compensation to those local municipalities who were likely to be affected by the SACO recommendations, although development purposes for these subsidies have also been recommended. 229 A forum between the national and municipal governments known as the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases was established on 20 August 1996. This was set up specifically to facilitate socioeconomic development in those municipalities facing difficulties due to the presence of military bases. It should be noted that the prefecture of Okinawa consists of 52 municipal governments: 11 cities, 17 towns and 24 villages. While the prefecture was the main level of government able to represent the public interest within the region vis-a-vis U.S. military sites, each municipality where a U.S. base, or bases, was located had to deal directly with the developmental impacts. As the lowest level political and territorial unit, municipal governments have always been responsible for local issues and interests. A distinctive effect of the presence of U.S. bases on municipal governments has been, and remains, the tendency for local governments to rely on special national government subsidies available as compensation for the constraints hosting the bases places on local land. Because the types of projects for which subsides have been allocated, mainly public works, are pre-determined by the central government, municipal officials have concentrated on obtaining financial subsidies rather than planning or prioritizing projects themselves. In efforts to demonstrate its commitment to helping local communities that host U.S. bases on Okinawa, the national government in 1996 began to change its role from a mere money provider to a partner who worked together with them to build more self-reliant local economies, and to empower local communities. Indeed this was done 230 under a broad strategy. Thus, it was clear that the national government wanted to create a favourable political environment that would facilitate the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago City; instead of focusing on that city exclusively, national politicians took an inclusive approach in that they targeted all 25 of the base-affected municipalities to work collaboratively with them in promoting local economic development. However, this approach was not carried out over Okinawa as a whole. Other municipalities, where U.S. bases were not located, were excluded from these national-local partnerships. Instead of building new relations directly with Okinawa municipalities, national politicians mobilized their networks and asked non-governmental actors, academics, professional experts, and businesses to begin regional consultations. The result was the establishment of the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases, a distinctive public-private partnership mandated by the national government to deal with the presence of U.S. bases, and designed to allow maximum national government control over the agenda and ensuing debates. 6.1.2. Establishment of the Roundtable As noted earlier in this thesis, municipal governments in Japan are placed under the jurisdiction of prefectures and their own administrative and financial resources are rather limited. However, they are the closest governmental bodies to local communities, and elected municipal mayors and assemblies have substantial ability to affect the implementation of national policies. This was also the case for the U.S. bases, as shown in the relocation of U.S. Naha military port from Naha City to Urasoe City. Thus, municipal level co-operation became a top priority for the national government in 231 its post-SACO implementation of the relocation program. National leaders, including Prime Minister Murayama, continued to emphasize that the national government would never disregard local opinion (Jimoto no iko). This was a change in attitude, as national politicians and ministers in Tokyo had rarely met directly with municipal level actors in the past, but now the central government has begun to strengthen its ties with local government in Okinawa. The Roundtable was set up as a private advisory body (Shiteki Shimon Kikan) to then Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama under Prime Minister Hashimoto's administration (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 20 August 1996). Professor Haruo Shimada of Keio University, a well-known labour economist who had obtained his Ph.D. in the United States, was elected as chairman for the conference. Shimada had already served on various national commissions and councils, including the national government's Tax Research Commission, Industrial Structure Council, and Economic Council, and was an advocate of structural reform (kozo kaikaku) and the creation of new industries. Importantly for the national government, his political attitude toward the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was compatible with the policy of the Liberal Democratic Party. Thus Shimada acknowledged the necessity of the treaty for Japan while showing sympathy to the heavy burden of the presence of military bases on local communities in Okinawa. Yukio Okamoto, who had been an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Director of the North America Division) until 1991 before he became a diplomacy analyst, was also asked by then Prime Minister Hashimoto to become his assistant in charge of Okinawa affairs. Okamoto worked together with Kajiyama to choose the members of the Roundtable (see the transcript of a lecture by Shimada on 20 February 1997 at the 122nd 232 Okinawa Mondai Kenkyukai, Tokyo).47 These included five Okinawans and five non-Okinawans in addition to Chairman Shimada. The former included Inamine, who was then chairman of the Association of Corporate Executives of Okinawa but later replaced Ota as governor in 1998. Other Okinawan members were the president of Meio University in Okinawa; a chairman of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation Okinawa Branch (Rengo Okinawa); and presidents of two major local newspapers, The Okinawa Times and The Ryukyu Shimpo. Non-Okinawan members included a representative of the Urban Economic Research Institute in Tokyo, Yukio Okamoto who was mentioned earlier; the former deputy secretary of the Okinawa Development Agency, a chairman of Omron Corporation;48 and an executive director of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). The Roundtable's mandate was to provide special financial assistance and advice for project planning and implementation to the 25 municipalities in which U.S. bases were located. The funding was established for the purpose of supporting the efforts of each municipality to promote social, economic or spatial development projects with the intent to enhance local capacity to pursue self-reliant (jiritsu) development in the future, on the assumption that at least some military sites would be returned. The Roundtable was also supposed to mediate between these municipalities and the U.S. military. Specifically, it aided the former to petition the U.S. military with respect to meeting local needs, something that was difficult for citizens to achieve acting alone. Overall, the goal of the Roundtable was to break the sense of impasse on base issues pervasive Lecture by Haruo Shimada, 'Okinawa Mondai Kondankai Teigen to Okinawa no Shdrai.'' 4 8 O M R O N Group has 25,039 employees (as of 30 March 2001) and specializes in industrial automation, electronic components, etc. 233 among these municipalities by offering additional financial assistance (i.e. special subsidies). A distinctive feature of this funding in comparison with more traditional public subsidies was that non-governmental experts and local private entrepreneurs were recruited by national political leaders, and assigned the task of guiding and empowering municipal officials and local businesses to focus more on profitability in local economic development strategies rather than merely accepting national subsidies for building their projects. Members of the Roundtable thought that changing the local governmental mindset would also make local communities more entrepreneurial and market-oriented in attitude and thus more self-reliant. The scale of assistance given through the Roundtable to local communities was not remarkable compared with the Okinawa Development Agency's budget (for example, it was 333,200 million yen for fiscal year 1997). The maximum amount assured for municipal projects was 100,000 million yen (US$833.3 million, $/¥120) over the 11 years from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2007. However, for rural municipalities that suffered from relatively low tax bases, this amount of money was not negligible.49 The procurement of additional financing was the result of arrangements made between Shimada, Kajiyama and also Mitsuka, then minister of finance. It was included in the national budget on 24 March 1997 by the LDP, the Social Democratic Party and Sakigake coalition in power at the time (The Okinawa Times, 27 March 1997). This agreement to allocate special funds to Okinawa was therefore a rather ad hoc arrangement, and was mandated so that this funding did not overlap with other policies 4 9 For example, Nago City's tax revenue for fiscal 2000 was about 4 billion yen. 234 designed to deal with problems caused by the presence of U.S. bases. Thus, it was not geared to address comprehensive development planning for the entire Okinawa region, which was the purview of another political forum, the Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai). Nor was the Roundtable concerned with the consolidation, realignment and reduction of military bases or issues related to the Status of Forces Agreement (see transcript of Shimada's lecture of 20 February 1997). In order to receive the special national subsidy, so-called 'good' projects were to be proposed by municipal governments then accepted by the Roundtable, before being sent to the national government for final approval. The Roundtable applied four criteria to evaluate whether a municipal development proposal was a 'good' project. 'Good' projects were defined as those that could: (1) stimulate local economies, ease the local siege mentality caused by the presence of U.S. military sites, and inspire the younger generation; (2) provide ongoing employment and lead to economic self-reliance (jiritsu); (3) contribute to the development of human resources for long-term economic vitality; and (4) lead to broad-based socioeconomic development and environmental preservation (Report on the Roundtable issued on 31 May 2000, translated by the author). Examples of projects that were envisioned by the Roundtable included the construction of tourism facilities, community centres, industry support centres, cultural centres and parks, and urban redevelopment projects. In the process of project authorization, Roundtable members and municipal officials held several meetings in Okinawa during 1996. During these meetings the latter explained their needs and ideas while the former advised them on the long-term market 235 economic performance of their projects (see transcript of Shimada's lecture of 20 February 1997). As explained earlier, municipal governments in Okinawa had historically concentrated on obtaining subsidies through the prefectural government with predetermined purposes, such as the construction of public infrastructure like roads and fishing ports, the reconstruction of municipal halls and the reclamation of land from the sea (often called hakomono).50 Municipal budgets were very much tied to the spending budgets of the prefecture and national government ministries. Thus local authorities did what they could with the money rather than pursue any particular municipal priority. Consequently, their own capacity for designing innovative development projects was rather underdeveloped (interview with Toshio Tajima, urban planning consultant, Tokyo, on 12 September 2001). Instead, municipal officials had mostly been concerned with public works such as those mentioned above (hakomono), a major target of the traditional subsidy system. This was typical not only of Okinawa but prefectural jurisdictions across Japan. However, in Japan as a whole, the dependency of Okinawa on national subsidies was particularly high, and the construction of public facilities remained one of the prefecture's major sources of income. Consequently, although such projects only generate short-term construction-related jobs and incomes, construction has been a major local industry in Okinawa. This emphasis on construction tied to yearly subsidies from central ministries tended to prevent municipal governments from considering the true profitability of building public facilities and their contribution to increasing local economic self-reliance. The term 'hakomono 'is often used derogatorily to refer to unnecessary public works projects. 236 The Roundtable funding scheme was essentially a one-time payment to municipalities. Total subsidies approved during the period of fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001 amounted to 31,700 million yen (US$264.2million, $/¥120) for 38 projects. Most of these were aimed at building community service and recreation facilities, including a public golf course in Ie-jima (Ie Island), a recreational park in Higashi-mura (Higashi Village) and the purchase of floor materials for a pre-existing traditional craft museum in Naha City (see Appendix 6). Thus all funded projects by the Roundtable ended up being basically of the hakomono type. Further, these were not necessarily new projects but ones that had been planned even before the Roundtable was formed. 6.1.3. Impacts of the Roundtable on Intergovernmental Relations An important characteristic of the Roundtable on U.S. Military Bases was that it connected the 25 municipalities affected by U.S. military sites on Okinawa directly with the national government in the areas of local social, economic and spatial development. That is, the prefecture was completed excluded. The Roundtable was dissolved on 26 March 1997 upon the completion of its assigned mandate of project recommendation. Soon afterwards an Experts Roundtable (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Shozai Shichdson ni Kansuru Kondankai Teigen no Jisshi ni Kakaru Yushikisha Kondankai) was established on 9 June 1997. This was also a private advisory body (Shiteki Shimon Kikari), to Cabinet Chief Secretary Kajiyama this time, for the purpose of examining and discussing project plans proposed by municipal governments and also advising them on the implementation of those plans (Report ofthe 237 Experts Roundtable, 31 May 2000).51 In the series of meetings between municipal governments and the national government at the Okinawa Roundtable, and subsequently at the Okinawa Experts Roundtable, direct municipal-national relations were strengthened but there was little room for the prefectural government to participate except as a liaison between national/municipal actors. The Experts Roundtable expected the prefecture to work to support the implementation of projects that had obtained final approval from the national government. Historically, the prefecture had channeled national subsidies to municipal government, but as noted earlier, the Roundtable effectively narrowed the distance between the central and municipal governments while undermining the role of the prefecture in local affairs to some extent. This change in relations between municipal governments and the prefectural and national governments was evident in a problem caused by a decision of the Experts Roundtable made in 1997. In Okinawa City, one of the 25 local municipalities designated as eligible for assistance by the Roundtable (see Appendix 6), a science museum for children was approved as a project eligible for special funding. Construction of the science museum had originally been studied and a proposal prepared as a prefectural project, but the Roundtable approved it directly when the city of Okinawa proposed this project along with others as part of their demands. Because funds for Roundtable projects were national in origin (rather than from the prefecture in 5 1 The report is titled 'Okinawa Beigun Kichi Shozai Shichdson ni Kansuru Kondankai Teigen no Jisshi ni Kakaru Yushikisha Kondankai Hokokusho (Report on an Advisory Panel of Experts for the Implementation of Proposals Made for the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases).' Translated by the author. 238 the more traditional ways), it became impossible for the science museum to be built as a prefectural project. As a result, responsibility for the project's implementation and management was transferred to Okinawa City. However, the science museum was a relatively expensive project: the estimated construction cost was about 9.6 billion yen (US$80million, $/¥120), with annual operating and maintenance costs of about 500 million yen (US$4.2million, $/¥120). Importantly, because of the high maintenance costs, which were beyond the normal budget of Okinawa City, a one-time subsidy from the national government to the city was not enough to cover its long-term management, even though construction costs were fully covered. By contrast, if the project were to be carried through the prefectural government, then the city would not have had to shoulder such a heavy ongoing financial burden. Beyond this, there were other projects Okinawa City wanted to realize with the special Roundtable subsidies (The Okinawa Times, 23 March 1997). The Experts Roundtable was formally dissolved on 31 May 2000 after the publication of its recommendations concerning the implementation of various authorized projects.52 On the whole, concerns of both the Experts Roundtable and municipal governments about hakomono projects became apparent over time. This worked to diffuse the power of anti-base groups in Nago City with respect to the acceptance of the relocation of Futenma Air Station, which will now be discussed in detail. " As of July 2002, while the construction of the Okinawa City museum had begun in the form of the renovation of an existing amusement park for children, financial arrangements for the operation of the museum were still not fixed between the city and the prefecture. The latter eventually appealed to Okinawa City to recognise the museum as a prefectural level government facility (The Okinawa Times, 27 July 2002). 239 6.1.4. Analysis of Change in Relationship between the National Government and Okinawa in the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases 1) The Level of Change in the Roundtable (see figures 6.1.1 and 6.1.2) Different from the previous two 'policy forums,' the Roundtable was established between the national government and city (municipal) governments. As the first diagram below (figure 6.1.1) shows, these two levels of governments were not closely related to each other in the issues of local economic development. However, the Roundtable functioned as a medium to connect them (see figure 6.1.2). This 'policy forum' was intergovernmental, but non-governmental elites acted for the national government in order to interact with city governments. 240 Figure 6.1.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) National Govt 1 Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community USA Routine Decision-making Lines Figure 6.1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Roundtable) • • • 1 National Govt Prefectural Govt "jPt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community USA Routine Decision-making Lines Initiatives Taken in the Roundtable 241 2) Roles of Actors: Initiators, Decision-makers and Other Influential Actors in the Roundtable (see figure 6.1.3) Initiators [Chief Cabinet Secretary] Chief Cabinet Secretary (Kanbo Chokan) Seiroku Kajiyama proposed the establishment of a new 'policy forum' between the national government and Okinawa municipalities in which U.S. bases were located. His proposal was agreed upon by the prime minister and the Cabinet members. The individual political power of the chief cabinet secretary was central in organizing non-governmental institutional elites such as university professors, business executives, experts on diplomacy and regional development, labour union leaders, as well as local journalists from both the mainland and Okinawa. Decision-makers [Cabinet] Then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and his Cabinet agreed with the chief cabinet secretary's proposal. Influential Actors [Non-governmental Elites] As mentioned above, non-governmental elites played a significant role for representing the national government's consideration of the issues of the bases for Okinawa's municipalities. In particular, a university professor, Haruo Shimada, who had already been involved in advisory bodies to the national government on macro economic issues, played a key role in the Roundtable. These institutional elites were knowledgeable about business and local economic development and provided advice to 242 municipal officials on designing profitable projects of economic development to be funded by national subsidies. In addition to their advisory function, they helped the national government, which did not generally communicate with municipalities directly, to establish direct links with municipalities and increase its presence with a benevolent attitude towards localities. Figure 6.1.3 Actors and Roles in the Roundtable Forum for Recognition Initiators Decision-makers Influential Actors Roundtable Chief Cabinet Secretary Cabinet Non-governmental Elites 3) Negotiations in the Roundtable (see figure 6.1.4) Local Demands Securing financial resources from the national and prefectural governments was a critical task for municipal governments, but they did not ask the national government directly for an increase of subsidies. Rather, the national government anticipated this persistent demand from municipal governments for subsidies, and established the Roundtable proactively. National Responses The Roundtable was officially aimed at easing the frustration over the prolonged backwardness in economic development among people living in municipalities in which 243 U.S. bases were located. Further, it was a demonstration of the Cabinet's recognition of the effects that the presence of U.S. bases had on municipal governments and communities. The Roundtable was an invention of the chief cabinet secretary, as mentioned above, and functioned as a private advisory body for a relatively short period of time, outside the established administrative systems. It should be noted that the national government was not interested in helping other municipal governments in Okinawa in which bases were not located. The Roundtable emphasized the intention of the government to facilitate self-reliant development, recognizing not only the lack of municipal tax revenue, but also capacities of project designing. This national concern of local specific needs was not existent before. The Roundtable thus provided a mechanism for the national government to intervene in municipal affairs and share a mutual interest in the redistribution of subsidies. However, the establishment of this forum was indirectly linked to the relocation of Futenma Air Station and others recommended by SACO. The Roundtable also encouraged municipal planners to adopt market-oriented thinking in local development. This approach was useful for the Cabinet to justify the extra expenditure by showing that municipalities were being educated on the productive use of the money. 244 Figure 6.1.4 Negotiations in the Roundtable Forum for Authorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Recognition Forum Resource Self- Resource Self-Distribution determination Distribution determination Roundtable No No Yes No Ad hoc Informal 4) Special Arrangements in the Roundtable (see figure 6.1.5) The Roundtable worked as a private advisory body that was not to conflict with the existing administrative authority of any ministry. At the end of this 'policy forum,' which had started from an individual political concern, special budgets for authorized development projects were compiled and the implementation of them were left to relevant ministries and municipalities. Consequently, there was no transfer of authority and rights from the national government to the municipalities. Rather, the effectiveness of the national government's stronger intervention was highlighted. By sending a group of the experts to the local communities, the Cabinet was able to demonstrate its capacity to mobilize both human and economic resources for local economic development at its own discretion and build a closer relationship with the municipal governments. In other words, the national government could emphasize its important role as an agent of change 245 for municipal economic development. Figure 6.1.5 Special Arrangements in the Roundtable Forum for Recognition Types of Arrangements (Political/Administrative/Legal) Transfer of Authorities (Political/Administrative/Legal) Beginning End Roundtable Political Administrative No 6.2. The 1997 Nago Referendum 6.2.1. Introduction In this section, I discuss the progression towards new political ties between the national government, Nago City and the prefecture of Okinawa. In this process the policy decisions of the international body, SACO, were imposed on local political communities, which consequently widened the gap between proponents of relocation, and its staunch opponents. Prospects of special financial assistance from government at the national level played a central role in considerably increasing these tensions. As identified earlier, Nago City was targeted specifically as a relocation site for Futenma Air Station. This situation left residents of the city caught in a dilemma between whether to host the military base in return for special financial assistance that would promote local economic development, or to reject relocation in defense of the security of local residents, and the natural environment. The process of deliberation 246 and decision-making with respect to the acceptance of the air station's functional relocation and associated construction of a new military base was political, and economic interests in the end took precedence over social and environmental interests if not overwhelmingly. Local political turmoil ensued when a municipal non-binding referendum on the acceptance of the relocation of Futenma Air Station was conducted in 1996 with a resultant victory for anti-relocation forces. This was despite the fact that the national government and the local construction industry had exercised their collective influence on gathering pro-relocation votes. Upon the rejection of the referendum result by then Nago City Mayor Tetsuya Higa in favour of relocation, local conflict between anti- and pro-relocation groups further intensified. Still, following the referendum announcement, Mayor Higa allowed a national government-led engineering feasibility study to begin, and then suddenly resigned. A new mayor, Tateo Kishimoto, was elected who had been a deputy mayor under Higa's administration, and who was supported by pro-relocation groups. While he continued to emphasize the reasons why the city should be targeted for relocation, he began to focus more on local economic development issues. Consequently, new intergovernmental relations between the city, prefecture and national government began to take shape. 247 6.2.2. City Politics in Nago Prior to the SACO Final Report, released on 2 December 1996, the defense agency chief indicated that a location off the shore of Camp Schwab (see Appendix 15) close to Nago City might be a potential site for the relocated Futenma Air Station. In response, the city mayor, the chairman of the city assembly, the local fishery association, and local civic groups expressed various objections. The city assembly, in turn, unanimously passed a resolution of protest against the planned relocation site on 18 November 1996. Representatives from the Nago city assembly then visited the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau to stage a protest-rally (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 18 November 1996). Subsequently, "anti-heliport" citizens held a protest-rally led by City Mayor Higa in which 2,600 people participated (numbers reported by a rally organizer; The Ryukyu Shimpo, 30 November 1996).53 The number of participants was smaller than the previous anti-heliport protest-rally held on 10 July 1996 in which 4,400 citizens had participated and which was also led by the city mayor (numbers reported by a rally organizer; The Ryukyu Shimpo, 11 July 1996). This reduction in numbers was mainly due to the absence of the local construction industry54 as well as the local Chamber of Commerce (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 30 November 1996). Because of such intense opposition from the Nago City residents, the national government withdrew its specification of a relocation site for Futenma Air Station in the SACO Final Report released in 1996 (The Okinawa Times, 28 November 1996). All other municipalities in Okinawa, chosen as relocation sites for the remaining military bases on the Final Report's list, also staged opposition protests even where the military sites were smaller 5 3 Major organizers were Nago City bureaucrats, the city assembly, neighbourhood leaders (Shikuchd Kai), the city board of education (Shi Kyoiku Iinkai), city women's groups (Shi Fujin Kai), and labour unions (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 28 January 1997). 5 4 Note that the construction of a new heliport was expected to generate considerable income (Japan Defense Agency, 1997a). 248 scale and proposed to be consolidated with existing U.S. bases. These base-affected municipalities argued that site relocation and consolidation would entrench the existing U.S. military sites, diminishing the possibility of their eventual return (see, for example, Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998, The Okinawa Times, 17 September 1996). Upon the release of the SACO Final Report, Nago City Mayor Higa expressed discomfort with the national government's decision to disregard the will of the local people, and announced that the city would oppose the relocation plan (The Okinawa Times, 3 December 1996). In order to facilitate the relocation of Futenma Air Station, the national government requested that Nago City co-operate with the launch of a preliminary engineering feasibility study On 21 January 1997; the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau chief visited the mayor of Nago City to formally ask for the city's co-operation on this study, but Mayor Higa refused compliance (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 21 January 1997).35 From the viewpoint of the city, its selection as a host for relocation was entirely a decision made between the national and prefectural governments, excluding the municipality from the process. The Northern Area of Okinawa Prefecture (see Appendix 6), in which Nago City is located, was already accommodating approximately 70 percent of the U.S. bases on Okinawa (by area) (see Okinawa Prefecture, General Affairs Department 1998). Therefore, the additional burden of a new U.S. base would effectively compound inequalities within the region. As far as the municipal government was concerned, it was incorrect procedure for 5 5 The study included a preliminary engineering feasibility assessment of a proposed sea-based facility (size approximately 1,500 by 600 metres) with respect to noise, environment, fisheries, existing sea routes, and air routes impacts (Japan Defense Agency 1997b). As a countermeasure, the headquarters for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station (Futenma Hikojo Isetsu Taisaku Honbu) was established by the national government in September 1997. 249 SACO to announce any decision prior to an official explanation of the selection criteria and process by the national and prefectural governments (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 22 January 1997). It is important to note there were two stated reasons for his rejection. In addition to his opposition to relocating Futenma Air Station to Nago City, Higa stressed, in his meeting with the Bureau chief, that he would not entertain the national government's request to meet without the presence of the Okinawa prefectural government (ibid.). Consequently, the Bureau chief apologized to Higa for not having invited the prefecture (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 21 January 1997). However, then Prefectural Governor Ota and then Deputy Governor Yoshimoto continued to insist that the prefecture would not participate in national/municipal meetings on the grounds that approval of the engineering feasibility study was a matter between the municipality and national government (ibid.). This position was in fact contrary to that of Nago City, whose government wanted to establish a forum through which all relevant national, prefectural and municipal representatives could meet. Because such a strong local anti-relocation sentiment was prevalent in the city at that time, it would have been politically feasible for the mayor of Nago City to simply reject the request from the central government for a municipal-national meeting. Instead, Higa offered to consider implementation of the feasibility study if the prefecture was present. Local communities questioned whether he would have approved the study in the event that the prefecture of Okinawa did come to the city's meeting with national bureaucrats. Higa responded that the prefecture's presence would not automatically mean that the city of Nago would allow the relocation of Futenma Air Station within its municipal boundaries (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 11 February 1997). Higa's ambiguity 250 was due to his hesitancy to be primarily responsible for accepting the relocation, preferring the prefecture to make the decision. If the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago were a prefectural decision, the latter would have to provide compensation to Nago City. Whereas if Higa had offered to accept relocation, the impetus for the prefecture to compensate Nago City would be weaker. It should be noted that Nago City and the surrounding municipalities that together constitute the Northern Area were, and remain, the poorest on the main island of Okinawa. The people of this sub-region have constantly been frustrated with their persistent backwardness relative to the Central and Southern Areas of Okinawa (see Appendix 6), which have developed much faster than its Northern neighbours. Thus, even within the island, comparative unbalanced development was fuelling a sense of inequality. The distance between Nago City and Okinawa City, which lies at the heart of the Central Area, is only 40 kilometres and is well connected by an expressway. However, 40 kilometres northwest of Nago is a jungle-like forest which had been used by U.S. troops for warfare exercises (note that the Northern Training Area and the Aha Training Area, that agreed to be returned in the SACO Final Report, are located in the Northern Area). So, for the city of Nago, it was necessary to obtain the prefecture's involvement in the municipal government's meeting with national authorities precisely in order to secure the prefectural government's commitment to the promotion of development in the Northern Area. It was also for this reason that Higa emphasized the presence of the prefecture alongside the city and national actors in deliberations over the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station. Thus, in the beginning, Higa tried to avoid any decisive commitment so as to preserve the power of Nago City to deny national 251 plans for the relocation of military sites where local communities (jimoto) were opposed. Meanwhile, the prefecture continued to insist that the acceptance or rejection of relocated U.S. bases should be restricted to the national and municipal governments. According to The Okinawa Times (11 April 1997), Ota did not want to announce his approval for any engineering feasibility study prior to the decision of the city mayor, in order to avoid taking on the role of mediator between the national government and Nago City. According to The Ryukyu Shimpo (22 January 1997), the city's distrust of the prefecture of Okinawa, with respect to the latter's attitude towards the promotion of developing the Northern Area, had been mounting since the reversion. The Northern Area was a rural periphery of the rapidly urbanized Central Area in the mainland of Okinawa (Okinawa Honto). While the development of the Northern Area was an important policy issue right from the beginning of post-reversion development (as revealed by the decision to hold the 1975 National Ocean Exposition, celebrating reversion, in Nago City instead of the Central or Southern Area), the area remained a periphery and continued to host twice the total area of U.S. bases than the Central Area. As such, Higa declared that the Northern Area was not a dumping site for bases (ibid.). Moriteru Arasaki (1999), a well-known local scholar sympathetic to but not uncritical of Ota, suggested that although the governor objected to the possible relocation of U.S. military bases to new sites within the Central Area of Okinawa (immediately after the initial SACO deliberations), the prefecture remained silent when Nago was targeted. Mayor Higa thus continued to express his objection 'in principle' to the national 252 government's engineering feasibility study on the grounds that the prefecture was absent. However, at a city assembly meeting held on 19 March 1997, Deputy Mayor Kishimoto voiced the possibility of accepting the relocation of Futenma Air Station when, and if, the citizens of Nago approved of this policy (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 March 1997). He also raised the necessity of discussing how the city should approach and take advantage of the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept, a complementary plan proposed by Ota, together with the Okinawa Action Program (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 March 1997). Subsequently, Higa announced that he wanted to allow the feasibility study to be introduced at the first meeting with the community of Henoko on 9 April 1997, which 70 people attended, and requested their support. Henoko is one of the local quasi-administrative districts (i.e. its jurisdiction is not constitutionally prescribed) in Nago City, with a population of 1,500 (560 households), and covers 11 square kilometres (as of April 2002). The district, known as gyosei-ku, has its own decision-making structure and delivers some community services on behalf of the city government.56 While Higa stressed that he only intended to allow for the engineering feasibility study and would not automatically consent to the relocation of Futenma Air Station, local residents (jimoto) decided to oppose the national government study anyway (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 10 April 1997). Henoko had the biggest stake in the relocation of Futenma Air Station because of its location. Mayor Higa therefore had to obtain approval for the feasibility study from Henoko first, as well as another 12 surrounding districts. Nago City is comprised of 55 local quasi-administrative districts (as of Apri l 2002). 253 Despite the presence of strong anti-relocation residents and groups, Higa quickly announced the approval of the feasibility study on 19 April 1997 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 April 1997). According to The Okinawa Times (11 April 1997), it had been a possibility from the beginning that the city government would eventually consent to the study and, moreover, would choose to accept financial compensation in exchange for hosting the relocated air base. To do this was not feasible initially, however, due to the unanticipated anti-relocation resolutions passed by the Nago city assembly and local quasi-administrative districts with a direct stake in barring military site relocation. Higa appeared, therefore, to want special funding assistance from the national government and a confirmed commitment from Okinawa Prefecture to fully develop the Northern Area of Okinawa. Further, in a meeting on 12 April 1997 with the local quasi-administrative district of Kushi (Appendix 12), which is adjacent to Henoko, Higa asked the community to consent to the feasibility study, mentioning the possibility of attracting a national technical college to Nago (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 12 April 1997). This sudden shift in the municipal government's attitude in favour of Futenma Air Station, founded on the potential for obtaining additional national funding, triggered a wave of anger within Nago City. For example, opposition parties in the municipal assembly and anti-relocation groups protested against Mayor Higa, demanding his resignation. As well, anti-relocation citizens held a civic forum to voice their concerns (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 21 April 1997). Ever since then, local residents in Nago City have been torn between two anti- and pro-relocation groups, although the membership of each respective group has not remained static. It should be noted that local residents who supported the relocation only agreed to do so under the condition that the Northern 254 Area of Okinawa would receive extra financial assistance for regional economic development. Otherwise, they remained opposed to hosting the Futenma Air Station. After the announced municipal approval of the feasibility study, 16 Henoko residents established a local forum, on 24 April 1997, interested in promoting the local development of communities adjacent to the planned relocation site, near Camp Schwab, (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 28 April 1997). It should be noted that Mayor Higa appeared to go back on his word that a meeting with the national government would not be entertained without the presence of representatives from the prefecture of Okinawa. In actuality, shortly after announcing his approval of the preliminary study on 24 December 1997, the mayor visited Governor Ota to inform him that the municipality's final decision on Futenma Air Station would be based solely on the will of local citizens (jimoto no iko). Further, Mayor Higa received assurances of the governor's commitment to strengthening the economic development of Okinawa's Northern Area. This suggests that Higa's priority was to build better relations with the prefecture and the national government so as to obtain special financial support rather than to seek local consultation and a broader public consensus on accommodating U.S military sites. 6.2.3. The Nago City Referendum In response to Mayor Higa's actions, a committee to request a municipal referendum on the relocation of Futenma Air Station was set up on 7 June 1997. This was formed by 'anti-heliport' civic groups, labour unions, and opposition parties in the city assembly, who together succeeded in obtaining sufficient residents' signatures to request that the 255 city government enact a referendum ordinance consistent with the Local Autonomy Law. Subsequently a city referendum was held on 21 December 1997. As with the prefectural level referendum before it, the municipal vote was non-binding but was the first referendum in Japanese history to challenge the construction of a U.S. military base. As the referendum approached, the national government intensified its direct interactions with the mayor of Nago City as well as local communities. The key means through which the national government sought to obtain local support for the relocation of Futenma Air Station was a proposed new scheme for the development of the Northern Area of Okinawa (Hokubu Shinko Saku), in which Nago City functions as the central locality. This central government plan was officially approved on 5 December 1997 by the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Sakigake governmental leaders. The total budget of the scheme amounted to approximately 150 billion yen (US$1,250 million, $/¥120). The conditions of this special assistance, and of being eligible for additional financial assistance, were that Nago City, and other municipalities in the Northern Area, would approve the construction of a new offshore heliport to replace Futenma Air Station. Proposed Northern Area development projects focused on construction, such as the redevelopment of Nago city centre, the (re)construction of the Nago port, swimming pools and gymnasiums in elementary and junior high schools, day care facilities, community centres, and so on (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 6 December 1997). A portion of this newly available funding was applied to projects approved by the aforementioned first Roundtable discussed above as well as to ongoing municipal public 256 works. Thus, the structure of the new assistance became rather complex. Realistically, the central purpose of this new scheme was political; i.e. it was geared to 'buying' votes in favour of relocation in a context where anti-relocation advocates had a stronghold. Central governmental officials began to visit Okinawa in 1996 in order to explain the merits of the new financial assistance directly, and to ask for local co-operation from the various cities concerned with the senior government's plans for relocation. The high-level delegation included the appointed chief cabinet secretary (Kanbo Chokari), the Okinawa Development Agency chief (Chokari), and the acting director general of the Liberal Democratic Party (Kanjicho Dairi). This group also visited Nago City, and stated that the national government would apply special financial assistance to the development of the municipality and the Northern Area as compensation for the imposition of a new burden (i.e. a new heliport) on the city. Besides this proposal, there was another way that the national government interfered with the referendum. The Naha Okinawa Defense Facilities Administration Bureau mobilized 200 personnel to go from door to door in Nago City to persuade residents to vote in support of the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station in the referendum (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 December 1997).57 Business communities also intervened in the referendum process. In particular, local construction industry associations worked to encourage potential absentee voters to participate in the referendum. Specifically they encouraged approximately 100 local construction firms in Nago City to secure 50 absentee votes per firm (The Okinawa This action was publicly criticized by a group of lawyers as undue national intervention in the local referendum, administered by the Local Autonomy Law (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 10 December 1997). 257 Times, 19 December 1997). As absentee voting began, it became evident that the rate was exceptionally high.58 Anti-relocation groups complained that pro-relocation groups were gathering votes with some coercion and influence peddling while the latter claimed they were not pressuring voters (The Okinawa Times, 16 December 1997). Tensions between the two groups intensified to the point that the city government finally had to request that the various local groups and associations act in compliance with the principle of a free vote as stipulated in the referendum ordinance (The Okinawa Times, 16 December 1997). At the end of the day, the strongest trend in this referendum was its unusually high rate of absentee votes.59 Although the majority of absentee votes (7,633 votes) were pro-relocation, directly attributable to the actions taken by local construction industry associations, anti-relocation supporters were the victors: 54 percent of votes were against the relocation of Futenma military base.60 As previously noted, this outcome was non-binding. In opposition to the request of anti-relocation groups to officially reject the national government plan for the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago City, the mayor refused to acknowledge the referendum results, and instead approved the military site's relocation on 24 December 1997. He then resigned suddenly on December 26.61 This was embarrassing for the people of According to The Okinawa Times (15 December 1997), the total number of absentee voters in this referendum in the first four days was 20 times larger than the previous prefectural referendum on the presence of U.S. bases on Okinawa held on 8 September 1996. Absentee voters totalled 7,633. The total number of voters was 31,477. The share of the former in the total vote was 24.2 percent (see The Okinawa Times, 22 December 1997). 6 0 14,267 votes were in favour of relocation versus 16,639 against (See the Nago City website at ). 6 1 During rising tensions between pro- and anti-relocation groups, the mayor attended a meeting held by relocation supporters on 9 December 1997 at which the director of the Defense Facilities Administration Bureau was also present (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 December 1997). Given that the city government was to administrate the referendum based on a dedicated bylaw, this act by the mayor was prejudicial. 258 Nago City. Opponents of the base rallied to protest the mayor's action. By contrast, Higa's local supporters praised the mayor's final decision (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 25 December 1997).62 In the subsequent Nago mayoral election held on 8 February 1997, a successor to Mayor Higa and supporter of former deputy mayor, Tateo Kishimoto, was elected. He defeated his opponent, who was supported by anti-relocation groups, by a margin of 1,150 votes. The victory of Kishimoto was owed partly to Governor Ota's announcement of the prefectural government's opposition to the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago City prior to the election. Two days before the mayoral election, on 6 February 1997, Ota had finally announced his decision to reject relocation despite pressure from Prime Minister Hashimoto, who had been asking Ota to co-operate, as Higa did (Arasaki 1999). During the election campaign, Kishimoto insisted that the municipal government follow the prefecture's lead on the issue of base relocation. This enabled Kishimoto to claim that Ota's announcement effectively meant that relocation was no longer an issue because the prefectural governor had now articulated its governmental policy on Futenma Air Station, and all other U.S. military bases on Okinawa. Kishimoto's actions thus made the effects of Higa's rejection of relocation on the state of intergovernmental relations unclear, as he turned to concentrate on the city's economic development as his central campaign issue (see Arasaki 1999; The Ryukyu Shimpo, 6 February 1998). Defense Agency chief Yoshinari Norota presented Higa with a letter of appreciation for the mayor's contribution to the stability of defence facilities and the promotion of a firm foundation of security after Higa resigned (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 15 January 1999). 259 6.2.4. Analysis of Change in Relationship between the National Government and Okinawa in the 1997 Nago City Referendum 1) The Level of Change in the Nago City Referendum (see figures 6.2.1 and 6.2.2) Figure 6.2.1 shows the 'business as usual' model of decision-making on the return of U.S. military bases. This is the same model as shown for the Consultative Body (figure 5.1.1). Various actions at various levels over the issues of the relocation of Futenma Air Station, including both governmental and non-governmental actors, revealed the existence of competing interests among them. The dotted arrows in figure 6.2.2 show the distinctive initiatives and actions taken by non-governmental actors on the issue of the relocation. 260 Figure 6.2.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases ('business as usual' model) National Govt USA W Prefectural Govt H Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines Figure 6.2.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on the Return of U.S. Military Bases (the Nago Referendum) Central Govts Local Govts Local Non-Govt National Govt USA H Prefectural Govt W Municipal Govt TC Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines """ Initiatives Taken in the Nago Referendum 261 2) Roles of Actors: Initiators, Decision-makers and Other Influential Actors in the Nago City Referendum (see figure 6.2.3) Initiators [Civil Society] Local civil society organizations in Nago City, who were opposed to the relocation of Futenma Air Station to the city, took the initiative of holding a referendum on this issue. They included labour unions and anti-base civic groups. Their collective request was approved by the city assembly and the mayor. Decision-makers [Mayor] The city mayor was the most important decision-maker in this municipal referendum because he had the final authority to either accept or reject its result. The rejection of the referendum's result by then Mayor Higa, as discussed earlier, was one of the most important events in the restructuring of the relationship between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture. Influential Actors [National Government] The national government's intervention in the process of the referendum was intense. Before the referendum, it encouraged local voters to vote for the relocation project through an Okinawa branch of a national agency (specifically, the Defense Facilities Administration Agency). After the referendum, the national government pushed the city mayor to reject its result and accept the relocation by confirming the provision of extra subsidies. 262 [Local Business] Local businesses, in particular the local construction industry, were active in gathering votes in favour of the national decision to relocate Futenma Air Station to Nago. An increase of subsidies and public works projects was their top priority. [Local Neighbourhood Districts] It turned out that the local neighbourhood districts, which are at the lowest level in the national administrative system, possessed substantial power to decide the acceptance of the new air base. In other words, local neighbourhood districts in which Futenma Air Station was planned to be relocated had substantial power of self-determination on this matter. Therefore, the mayor had to visit these local villages and negotiate the relocation project . Without their cooperation, the city would face difficulty in the implementation of the relocation. It is, however, important to note that the districts were not official administrative units but rather customary units. Such units did not possess the official authority to make public decisions, but in reality they had substantial political power to represent local interests. [Prefectural Governor] The prefectural governor's involvement in the process of the referendum was not necessary since it was a municipal matter. However, when the decision had to be made on whether or not to accept the relocation in the face of national pressures, the city mayor wanted his involvement. This was because the mayor wanted to obtain substantial recognition from the prefecture that the city, located in the backward Northern Area, would contribute greatly to the elimination of risks in the urbanized Central Area by allowing the relocation. The mayor needed a guarantee from the 263 national and the prefectural government that they would cooperate with the city on a continuous basis for its development once the city accepted the relocation. Ota wanted to distance himself from the mayor's decision because on the one hand, he basically took the side of anti-relocation and on the other hand, he was at the time negotiating the promotion of regional economic development based on the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept in the Okinawa Policy Council with then Prime Minister Hashimoto. Figure 6.2.3 Actors and Roles in the Nago Referendum Forum for Recognition Initiators Decision-makers Influential Actors Nago Referendum Civi l Society Mayor National Government, Local Business, Local Neighbourhood Districts, Prefectural Governor 3) Negotiations in the Nago City Referendum (see figure 6.2.4) Local Demands The referendum was a challenge from the local political community to the authority and rights of the nation state to determine the use of local resources. The coexistence of local demands for self-determination and self-development became apparent in the process of the referendum. This led to the division of local citizens into two groups, those who were anti-relocation and those who were pro-relocation. It turned out that the city mayor supported the latter so as to gain national financial assistance, rather than to risk raising conflict with the national government by supporting the former. This 264 conflict between the two groups became even more obvious in the mayoral election held after the referendum, in which the pro-relocation voters won. The election was not conducted solely on the issue of the relocation, but also on approaches to local economic development. This dynamic shows that local demands for the removal of the bases and economic assistance coexisted and their relative weight for residents continued to change. National Responses The national government wanted to prevent the anti-relocation groups from having a majority in the referendum and thus tried to affect the result by informally using its branch office. In the face of the anti-relocation groups, victory Prime Minister Hashimoto informally persuaded the city mayor to reject the result by guaranteeing him 63 economic compensation. Figure 6.2.4 Negotiations in the Nago Referendum Forum for Authorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Recognition Forum Resource Self- Resource Self-Distribution determination Distribution determination Nago Referendum No Yes Yes No Ad hoc Informal " This was a clear example of Calder's (1988) argument on the Japanese government's response to crisis. 265 4) Special Arrangements in the Nago City Referendum (see figure 6.2.5) The Nago referendum was driven by the political actions of local civic groups. The prime minister exercised his power to affect the referendum and the city mayor. This dynamic political interaction finally resulted in the exercise of the mayor's administrative authority to reject the outcome of the referendum. In the end, there was no transfer of decision-making authority to either the city government or the prefectural government. Rather, it became obvious that local decision-making units including the neighbourhood districts, the city government, and the prefectural government each had individual authority in making decisions on the relocation of the bases.64 Because of the fragmented nature of these decision-making authorities, the national government had to resort to various indirect measures to affect their decisions. Figure 6.2.5 Special Arrangements in the Nago Referendum Forum for Recognition Types of Arrangements (Political/Administrative/Legal) Transfer of Authorities (Political/Administrative/Legal) Beginning End Nago Referendum Political Administrative No This supports the argument made by Muramatsu (1997) that Japanese municipal governments have substantial power against the national government. CHAPTER 7 Changes in the Prefectural and National Leadership, 1998 266 This chapter will show the emergence of new governmental leaders both at the national and prefectural levels; the former was Keizo Obuchi and the latter Keiichi Inamine. Rounded out by the new Nago city mayor discussed in the previous section, these three leaders (national-prefectural-municipal) formed a cooperative pro-relocation coalition and a relatively stable intergovernmental relationship was formed. Consequently, the prefectural government's tough attitude under Governor Ota's leadership was dramatically changed and the national government began to rearrange compensation to Okinawa. Section 7.1 will discuss the political process of the 1998 prefectural gubernatorial election, which Governor Ota lost in favour of new Governor Inamine. Section 7.2 will discuss the last 'policy forum.' It concerns the holding of the G8 2000 Summit main session in Okinawa under the initiative of the new Prime Minister Obuchi. 7 .1. A New Governor of Okinawa and New Prime Minister of Japan, 1998 7.1.1. Introduction Governor Ota's announcement against relocation prior to the Nago mayoral election elicited a negative reaction from national political leaders. They accused him of not having directly notified the prime minister of his decision in advance, and suggested that special financial assistance to Okinawa Prefecture would be suspended. Indeed, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) halted the process of amending the Okinawa Development Special Measures Law (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) to 267 implement the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept (see chapter 5), including development of a Free Trade Zone (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 6 February 1998). Upon the mayor election victory of Kishimoto, who had been supported by relocation proponents, the national government hoped that Ota would change his mind in favour of relocating Futenma Air Station (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 February 1998). However, Ota maintained his decision and accordingly prefectural-national discussions on both relocation and special financial assistance from the national government broke down. In fact, Prime Minister Hashimoto cut off communication with Ota although following the latter's announcement and never met him as the governor of Okinawa again. In May 1998, Governor Ota and three other mayors of municipalities in which U.S. bases were located (Ginowan City, Urasoe City and Kin Town) visited Washington D.C. to request the reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa and the relocation of Futenma Air Station to areas outside the prefecture. They were interviewed by The Washington Post and met U.S. high-level officials, including former Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield; Assistant Under-secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell; and Rust Deming, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for East Asia. However, despite his efforts, Governor Ota received no favourable responses (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 31 May 1998). Both Prefectural Governor Ota and Prime Minister Hashimoto, who had initiated new but more tense centre-periphery relations, left their positions in 1998, and were replaced by Prefectural Governor Inamine and Prime Minister Obuchi. These new players were more co-operative with each other than their predecessors and concentrated on 268 negotiating Okinawa's economic development rather than base relocation per se. They worked to solidify a strong foundation for smoothly implementing the relocation projects defined by SACO. The most important development in the relocation of Futenma Air Station, following Ota's departure, was new Governor Inamine's consent, but under the conditions that the new airbase would be used by civilian air-planes, (thus, sharing the base with the U.S. Marines), and would be returned to Okinawa after 15 years of joint use. He emphasised that the new airport facility should be approached as 'an asset' for local communities, rather than a nuisance. While these conditions remained unapproved by the Japanese and U.S. national governments, the prefectural assembly went ahead and voted to approve the relocation, and Inamine approached Nago City Mayor Kishimoto to second the prefecture's approval. Finally, the prefecture asked the local neighbourhood decision-making bodies to accept the plan. In response to these efforts, anti-base groups and residents again began to voice their opposition when the candidate site for the new base was announced by the national government. 7.1.2. The 1998 Gubernatorial Election While the Ota/Hashimoto meetings remained suspended, Prime Minister Hashimoto resigned from his position in July 1998 and Keizo Obuchi took his place. Even with this change, LDP leaders continued to reject any meeting with Governor Ota because of his continued refusal to consider the relocation of Futenma Air Station within Okinawa. In fact, no national/prefectural meetings had occurred between Prime Minister Obuchi and Governor Ota before the Okinawa gubernatorial prefectural election on 15 269 November 1998. Keiichi Inamine, who had once co-operated with Ota to promote the Okinawa Action Program and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept, defeated Ota with a 'wide margin,'65 bringing a conservative administration into Okinawa's political scene for the first time in eight years (The Okinawa Times, 16 November 1998). The major reason for Inamine's victory was that he emphasized the primacy of economic development and the rebuilding of national-prefectural dialogue, which had been suspended because of Ota's unyielding attitude towards the relocation of Futenma Air Station. It was widely understood that the continuing confrontational relationship between Hashimoto (and Obuchi) and Ota had caused substantial anxiety among the people of Okinawa over the potential loss of opportunities to re-vitalize the regional economy. Another influential factor was that support from Komeito, which had previously been given to Ota, went over to Inamine in the election campaign (interview with Tomohiro Nagatomo, Executive Editor of The Okinawa Times, 31 August 2001). In general, the Okinawan people had become apprehensive about the worsening prefectural/national relations and so rejected Ota's excessively strong position against the central government (interview with Toshio Tajima, 8 August 2001). Considering the fact that the people of Okinawa had initially strongly supported Ota's challenge of the Japanese and U.S. national governments, it seemed rather inconsistent that the majority of voters deserted Ota when conflict between Tokyo and Okinawa intensified past a certain level. According to Toshio Tajima (interview on 8 August 2001), the Inamine obtained 374,833 votes while Ota 337,369, thus Inamine won by 37,464. 270 victory of Inamine was a collective expression of the growing belief that absolute confrontation with the national government was not acceptable. Through a historical lens, people preferred to see their leader, Ota, through the image of the medieval King of the Ryukyu fighting against Yamato, the name for ancient Japan. In this respect, they tended to be enthusiastic about Ota. Nevertheless, there is an old saying in Okinawa that "the people who feed us are our master," meaning that subordination to those who can support our livelihood cannot be avoided. This saying remains descriptive of national-prefectural relations in Japanese governance. Indeed, the people of Okinawa have chosen alternately between progressive governors who will stand against the centre and conservative governors who comply with national government policy (see The Okinawa Times, 13 May 1997). 7.1.3. The Beginning of a Collaborative Regime Inamine argued that the new airport should be built on land, not on the sea, used for joint military-civilian purposes, and returned to Okinawa within 15 years of the new base's construction. Indeed, he emphasised the use of the airport for the economic development of the Northern Area, like building the base on land and channelling adjacent land development for air transportation related industries. Inamine emphasised that the new airport should be 'an asset' for local communities. This economic thinking and willingness to articulate an economic strategy distinguished him, a businessman and son of the biggest oil-company in Okinawa, from Ota, who had been a university professor prior to political life. Despite Inamine's insistence that these difficult conditions be met, the Liberal 271 Democratic Party (LDP) was pleased with his victory. As the Inamine administration took office, on 16 November 1998, political tensions between Tokyo and Okinawa that had hardened under Ota's administration quickly eased and a new national-prefectural relationship began to emerge. Then Chief Cabinet Secretary (Kanbo Chdkari) Hiromu Nonaka of the LDP, who was also in charge of Okinawa issues, expressed his intention to restart meetings with the Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai). To resume dialogue with the national government had also been Prefectural Governor Inamine's top policy priority. On 24 November 1997, he met with Prime Minister Obuchi in Tokyo; just ten days after the election. This rapid scheduling hinted at the national government's high expectations from the Inamine administration, especially over its possible cooperation in implementing the SACO recommendations. Moreover, Prime Minister Obuchi announced his intention to provide new economic assistance for the development of Okinawa on 27 November 1998 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 27 November 1998). In his first policy speech to the Okinawa prefectural assembly on 16 December 1998, Governor Inamine stated that he would revise the Okinawa Action Program, particularly the provision calling for the removal of all U.S. bases from Okinawa by 2015, which made the Action Program unique, but not very realistic. Instead, he articulated that he would rather pursue the consolidation and reduction of bases, as already approved by SACO (The Okinawa Times, 17 December 1998).66 This resolution was a de facto abolition of the Okinawa Action Program. Inamine also indicated interest in setting up a SACO II Committee to plan the further consolidation and reduction of bases, in a 6 6 Inamine again stated his intention not to draft an alternative plan in place of the Okinawa Action Program (16 June 2001). 272 speech on 7 December 1999 at the prefectural assembly (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 17 December 1999).67 It is also noteworthy that Governor Inamine additionally announced that he would revise the Okinawa Cosmopolitan Concept due to its insufficiencies (ibid.). Thus, nearly all of Governor Ota's strategic policy instruments developed between 1996 and 1998 appeared to be eventually lost. However, according to Yoshiyuki Uehara of the prefectural government (personal correspondence with Uehara on 30 July 2002), who had been involved in the preparation of both plans and has worked closely with both governors, the basic concepts from Governor Ota's plans were transferred to Governor Inamine's new policies. For its part, the national government has continuously suggested that it would be impossible to limit the period of time for the use of the new airport as the U.S. military would never accept such a condition. Nevertheless, Inamine continued to stress that the 15-year limitation was necessary, prompting Prime Minister Obuchi and other LDP leaders to offer to keep raising the issue with their U.S. counterparts. The Japanese government did not, however, seriously discuss the desired restriction. Still Governor Inamine, and Mayor Kishimoto, continued to press the national government to restrict the time occupancy, on Okinawa, of Futenma Air Station. The prefectural assembly finally decided to allow the relocation within its jurisdiction on 15 October 1999. Subsequently, Governor Inamine proceeded to ask the 6 7 There had been no progress made with respect to S A C O II as of July 2002. 6 8 The Pentagon suggested joint military-civilian use was a possibility (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 18 November 1999; The Okinawa Times, 24 November 1999). However, with respect to tenure of land use, it has been revealed that the Pentagon specified in an official report that the operational life of the relocated base should be 40 years and its useful life would be 200 years (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 2 November 1999). 273 mayor of Nago City to undertake the new burden of hosting the relocated Futenma Air Station in return for substantive financial assistance for the development of the Northern Area. While Mayor Kishimoto initially complained about the lack of information on why the prefecture had chosen the coastal zone of Henoko for the off shore helicopter base and what specific funding would become available to the city and the Northern Area, he was determined to accept the U.S. base's relocation and the financial assistance associated with it. It should be noted that Kishimoto then had to meet with Henoko's (see Appendix 12) neighbourhood administrative council (Gyosei Iinkai), and the local coastal fishery association to obtain their approval. This was because he had promised to take into account local opinions, beyond those expressed through the Nago city assembly (The Okinawa Times, 17 December 1999). He did not face any serious objections in the meetings, though there was a criticism that he should have consulted other local communities, beyond Henoko (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 17 December 1999). Ultimately, Kishimoto approved the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago after the city assembly had decided in favour of the new military base by a majority vote of 17 to 10, on 23 December 1999 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 24 December 1999). This decision by the mayor came down prior to specifications of the exact site location, construction methods and environmental impacts (these details were assigned to the agendas of subsequent national/prefectural/city meetings). As both proponents and opponents voiced their concerns over Mayor Kishimoto's decision, a number of anti-relocation groups began to take action. Eventually local decision on proposed relocation of Futenma Air Station was brought back into the national political arena. On 28 December 1999, the Henoko sub-district 274 was chosen as the final site for the air base at a Cabinet meeting (Kakugi). Accordingly, the national government began to implement its promised financial assistance to Okinawa's Northern Area. It should be noted that in advance of the city assembly's decision on 23 December 1999, ten billion yen (US$84.7million, $/¥118) was budgeted for Northern Area development. In particular, this funding was allocated to building a national technical college.69 At the local level in Nago, the general attitude toward the relocation was not homogeneous but rather conflicting, given that pro- and anti-relocation factions coexisted within communities. Even the neighbourhood-level administrative council (Gyosei Iinkai), which was the highest decision-making body in the community (not constitutionally but rather customarily), and had accepted the relocation, was not completely supportive. For example, as discussions on the exact site and construction methods for the new air base neared their end in November 2001, members of the council realized, after viewing aerial photo plans, that the proposed scale of the new airport was too large. This was because the size had been increased to satisfy demands from military and civilian facilities simultaneously (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 15 November 2001). The site location and methods for its construction, agreed upon by the Committee on the Relocated Facility (Daitai Shisetsu Kyogikai), which was composed of representatives from the national, prefectural and municipal governments, also inflamed tensions at the local level. In particular, the decision made by the For an image of this college, as well as other development projects and facilities to be funded by this special national governmental budget, see the Japan Defense Agency's website: . 275 neighbourhood-level administrative council that approved the construction of the new airport on reclaimed coral reefs was criticized by various members of the immediate community. This was because the neighbourhood council's decision conflicted with the Nago city council's request to the national government to build Futenma Air Station three kilometres offshore (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 10 November 2001). Anti-relocation residents also protested that the subsequent explanation for the decision to community members was inadequate and that the council did not in fact have the authority to decide such a critical issue on behalf of Henoko residents (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 15 November 2001). Henoko sub-district committee finally agreed to leave the definitive decision in the hands of City Mayor Kishimoto. 7.1.4. Tightening National/Municipal Ties to Facilitate Relocation: The Committee for Northern Area Development (Hokubu Shinko Kyogikai) and the Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas (Isetsusaki Oyobi Shuhen Chiiki Shinko Kyogikai) Beyond the special financial assistance authorized by the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases, national policy on new financial assistance was presented at the Okinawa Policy Council (Okinawa Seisaku Kyogikai)10 meeting held on 17 December 1999. This was prior to the announcement of the acceptance of the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Henoko by Mayor Kishimoto on 27 December 1999. Immediately after the national government announced, on 28 December 1999, the establishment of new national/prefectural/local forums that would discuss special assistance programs, which had already been presented to the Advisory Committee at a national Cabinet meeting. Two forums were officially established soon thereafter on 10 February 2000: one was the Committee for 7 0 Translation is the author's own. 276 Northern Area Development (Hokubu Shinko Kyogikai)11 and the other the Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas (Isetsusaki Oyobi Shuhen Chiiki Shinko Kyogikai). The former aimed to facilitate the implementation of local development projects in the Northern Area (hokubu), and the latter the implementation of local development projects in Nago City, which would host the relocated air base, as well as the areas immediately adjacent to this municipality. The Northern Area, also known as ' Yanbaru' (literally, mountains and fields), covers approximately 820 square kilometres or 70 percent of the land area of Okinawa's main island. It has abundant environmental resources, including fresh water, fauna and flora, and coastal zone habitat. However, the area's per capita income was the lowest among the six areas across the entire prefecture and its dependence on agriculture and construction were among the highest in fiscal year 1997 (Municipal Inhabitant's Per Capita Income in Okinawa Prefecture 1997). Notably, there were more than 200 firms engaged in construction-related activities in Nago City, as of 1997, which indicates the extent to which the municipality's local economy revolved around public works. While the value of the Northern Area's environment was recognised by both local residents and those from outside Okinawa, narrowing the income gap between the Northern Area and the Central and Southern Areas has been a top priority of regional policy. The existence of the Okinawa region's 'north-south problem' has been a major topic in negotiations between national and local governmental actors. 7 1 Translation is the author's won. 277 There were two opposing views in Okinawa politics regarding the special financial assistance proposed by the national government for the development of the Northern Area and the more narrowly defined area around Henoko. The first view was that Northern Area development should be promoted irrespective of Nago City's acceptance of Futenma Air Station because it was a responsibility of the national as well as prefectural government to narrow regional disparities. The second view was that new funds should be available to local communities in the Northern Area only once they had formally agreed to host the new military site. Local political leaders, including the incumbent and former Nago city mayors, Kishimoto and Higa, and local communities took the first view. Historically, the development of the Northern Area had been conducted under the statutory Okinawa Comprehensive Development Plans. However, while the population of the Central and Southern Areas had increased, that of the Northern Area had not increased (Appendix 16). A number of dams had been built in the mountains of the Northern Area and water was channeled into the Central Areas where various industries, residents and U.S. bases consumed it. In terms of ecological resources, the Northern Area was richer than the prefecture's central areas, which were severely impacted during the Pacific War. While environmental conscious residents and groups, including non-Okinawans, tried to protect the Northern Area's environment, such actors were still minor and ineffectual (interview with Toyoko Ichida, Wild Bird Society of Japan, Yanbaru branch, on 30 August 2001). 278 Employment, economic revitalisation, and an attractive living environment have been the major goals of communities in the Northern Area. Given that many other localities on the Japanese mainland have faced similar or possibly even worse conditions, the socio-economic problems of the Northern Area were not unique. However, an important factor that has distinguished the Northern Area from other depopulated regions on the main land is that the economic development of the former has been seriously constrained by the presence of U.S. military bases. Moreover, the Northern Area is located on a peripheral island, 1,700 kilometres from Tokyo. Thus people still live in fear of economic and political separation from the mainland, which is why Okinawa voters worried about the relational problems between former Governor Ota and former Prime Minister Hashimoto. While urban development was intensive in the Central and Southern Areas, and people's lives have modernized since the 1972 Reversion, the development of the Northern Area has been slow. Thus, promoting the development of the Northern Area was an important goal of regional policy and, as such, was not a bargaining chip in negotiations over municipal level consent to relocation. Regional development is, rather, a national and prefectural obligation. The political position that special financial assistance to the Northern Area should be withheld until the relocation of Futenma Air Station had been locally approved was denied around the time that former Nago City Mayor Higa consented to the central government's engineering feasibility study in 1997. At that time, Governor Ota claimed that no financial assistance for development should be seen as compensation for accepting the new air base. The national government made a similar claim. However, anti-relocation groups were already arguing that development funding and compensation 279 were firmly linked. This view was nonetheless publicly denied by then Prime Minister Hashimoto, when Ota rejected the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago City. A statement made in December 1997 by the former Okinawa Development Agency chief Muneo Suzuki stands in stark contrast. In the context of the municipal referendum on relocation, Suzuki explicitly stated that national assistance for the* redevelopment of Nago city centre and improvements to its port facilities would in fact be subject to the construction of the offshore heliport (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 8 December 1997).72 The special assistance programs were arranged in this context of conflict. The Committee for Northern Area Development targeted the area as a whole and included municipal governments where U.S. bases were not located. The Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas focused on only Nago City and two adjacent villages (Higashi Village and Ginoza Village). The core issues discussed by these two committees were the various legal arrangements and types of financial assistance that could promote local development projects in the Northern Area in general and localities adjacent to the new air base in particular. The total budget for these initiatives was approximately 100 billion yen (US$943.4million, $/¥106) over a period of ten years beginning with fiscal year 2000. Traditionally, the development of the Northern Area had fallen under the statutory Ten-year Okinawa Development Plan (Okinawa Shinko Kaihatsu Keikaku) drafted by prefectural and national bureaucrats. The Committee for Northern Area Development and the Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas were ad hoc and not subject to the Third Okinawa Development Plan (effective from 1992 to " Muneo Suzuki was arrested in 2002 for his bid-rigging case. 280 2002). In other words, these committees were strategic and their activities were non-conventional. Thus, special bureaucratic arrangements had to be made among national ministries in order to administer the implementation of the national government funding. In February 2000, high-level governmental officials suddenly began to visit Nago and the Northern Area, following Prime Minister Obuchi's visit. The deputy secretaries (Jimu Jikan) of 13 ministries and agencies with mandates in areas related to funding allocations visited the prefecture as well as municipal governments in the Northern Area. Such intensive visits by national level bureaucrats were quite unusual in Okinawa and suggested that the central government intended to accelerate settlement of the dispute between Tokyo and Okinawa (The Okinawa Times, 12 February 2000). According to Masaaki Gabe, an International Relations scholar at the University of Ryukyus (interview on 29 August 2001), local people saw national bureaucrats as people who were chauffeured in black cars and only available to talk for a few minutes at a time. However, local people learned how to deal with national officials after meeting them face-to-face at various forums. As the psychological distance between locals and the bureaucrats shrank, the former became skilled at negotiation with the latter. Gabe's comments also suggest that national politicians and bureaucrats began to alter the quality of their relations with localities. According to Toshio Tajima (interview on September 12, 2001), the role of the prefecture in the implementation of new Northern Area development was only a matter of formality. The establishment of the two development committees effectively meant that the national government preferred to 281 administer projects in the Northern Area directly. While meeting with municipal level leaders, the central government strengthened its commitment to special development assistance. For example, the Cabinet Office increased the number of staff in the Councillors' Office on Internal Affairs (Naisei Shingi Shitsu) from ten to 23 by borrowing personnel from relevant ministries and agencies to work on new projects (The Okinawa Times, 11 February 2000). The special assistance was made available in the form of the provision of subsidies from different ministries and agencies.73 Subsidies were to be approved for public and private projects separately (5 billion yen or US$47.2million respectively, $/¥106). It should be noted that most of the projects authorized to receive subsidies in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 were dedicated to the construction of infrastructure and various facilities for economic development reasons. For instance, in fiscal year 2001, such public projects included the restoration of coastal zones, construction of roads to tourism facilities, industrial roads, irrigation facilities, and sewage systems. Examples of private sector projects include the construction of a meat treatment centre, a telephone exchange centre, and agricultural production facilities. The rest of the construction projects mainly concentrated on research in the areas of tourism and resort development, domestic ' The national government adopted a specific set of principles for choosing projects in August 2000. The Committee for Northern Area Development was to choose projects which would facilitate community development in the Northern Area that would promote: (a) increases in residential population; (b) a competitive regional economy based on local resources; (c) the exchange of a wide range of information and human interactions; and (d) the harmonious co-existence of humans and nature. All such community development was also required to balance human activities and the quality of natural environment. The Committee for the Development of Relocation Sites and Neighbouring Sites was to choose those projects that would promote employment, attractive living conditions, and nurture the natural environment. In other words, the former committee was concerned with the Northern Area as a whole while the latter concentrated on communities impacted by the relocation of Futenma Air Station (see a meeting report published by the Cabinet Office at . 282 industry and employment (Committee for Northern Area Development and Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas, 8 June 2001). 7.1.5. Trend toward Replacing Poli t ical Issues wi th Technical Ones The Committee for Northern Area Development and the Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas were not mandated to address any issues related to the relocation of Futenma Air Station. The national government agreed to establish forums for the discussion of relocation issues when the two development committees were already in operation. However, the establishment of the forums on relocation was postponed. Eventually, on 31 May 2000, the Committee on the Preparation for the Use of Returned Sites (Atochi Taisaku Junbi Kyogikai)14 was established. This was followed by The Committee for an Alternative Facility for Futenma Air Station (Futenma Hikojo Daitai Shiset.su ni Kansuru Kyogika)15 on 25 August 2000. The latter committee was to identify the exact site of the alternative facility, its scale, construction methods, and issues toward the development of a basic plan. The Committee for an Alternative Facility was an important national-municipal forum through which these specifications for the new air base could be determined. At the first meeting, held on 25 August 2000 at the Prime Minister's Official Residence, both Prefectural Governor Inamine and Mayor Kishimoto of Nago City requested discussion on the question of restricting the time period open to the U.S. military in their use of the facility. This and a few other concerns were raised as conditions of acceptance regarding relocation. More emphatically than Inamine, 7 4 Translation is the author's own. 7 5 Translation is the author's own. 283 Kishimoto requested that Cabinet members in attendance discuss a time limitation on site use as a separate issue best addressed in other more appropriate meetings (see the minutes of the 25 August 2000 meeting at the Cabinet Office). Subsequently U.S. politicians, including George W. Bush, have repeatedly rejected this condition necessary for the acceptance of a relocated air base facility by the city and prefectural governments. Moreover, the national government has also not been serious about addressing this issue as was evident in newly appointed Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka's speech in her first visit to Okinawa in December 2001. At that time, she suggested that such a condition would be difficult to realize because it could not be decided by Japan alone (The Okinawa Times, 29 December 2001). However, an exact site for relocation was agreed upon at the eighth meeting of the Committee for an Alternative Facility for the Futenma Air Station on 27 December 2001: above coral reefs off the coast of Henoko sub-district. Though, this did not necessarily mean that critical issues concerning relocation were resolved. Indeed, anti-relocation groups continued to protest against the proposed plan and the removal of the U.S. Marines from Okinawa continues to be widely supported by the people of Okinawa. Further, environmental concerns are increasing. In August 2001, environmental groups, including the nationally recognized environmental advocate Jun Ui, a professor at Okinawa University, and environmental civic groups began to preparations to file a lawsuit within the U.S. court system. This was to be done to force the U.S. Department of Interior to protect the habitat of dugongs (designated an endangered species in the United States) off the Henoko coastal zone.76 7 6 As of May 2002, the lawsuit was suspended because the U.S. Congress is seeking exemption from the U.S. Endangered Species Act for military operations in the context of the new prioritization of the 284 7.1.6. Analysis of Change in Relationship between the National Government and Okinawa in the Gubernatorial Election 1) The Level of Change in the Gubernatorial Election (see figures 7.1.1 and 7.1.2) The 1998 gubernatorial election marked a turning point for the strength of Okinawa's cultural politics against the national government. Conflicting interests among Okinawan people revealed the relative power of cultural politics and economic politics. Figure 7.1.1 shows the 'business as usual' model of regional development planning. Regional development was not the only issue featured in the election, but was a key issue and characterized the nature of the election held after then Prime Minister Hashimoto suspended dialogue with then Governor Ota about economic assistance. Dotted arrows starting from 'Civil Society' and 'Business Community' in figure 7.1.2 show that anti-relocation voters and pro-relocation voters were competing with each other (the latter are characterized by the involvement of local business communities), and a dotted arrow starting from 'National Government' indicates that an influence of the prime minister's pressure was present in the election. The election was not only a matter between the prefecture and the constituency of Okinawa but also critical to the national government for dealing with Okinawa's interests. latter over other interests in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 285 Figure 7.1.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) National Govt 1 USA Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines Figure 7.1.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the Gubernatorial Election) Local Non-Govt National Govt I USA *"^f Prefectural Govt j<£ - 1 r Municipal Govt Civil Society Business Community Routine Decision-making Lines Initiatives Taken in the Gubernatorial Election 286 2) Roles of Actors: Initiators, Decision-makers and Other Influential Actors in the Gubernatorial Election (see figure 7.1.3) Initiators [Local Business Leader] A local business leader, Keiichi Inamine, who supported Ota's initiative of protesting against the persistent presence of U.S. bases, ran against him in the gubernatorial election, arguing the urgency of promoting regional economic development towards the construction of a self-reliant region. Inamine had no previous experience as a politician, but was well known as a leading businessperson in Okinawa and had extensive business and political networks, as shown by his participation in the Roundtable. He was supported by those who were worried about the heightening tension between Tokyo and Okinawa after Ota's rejection of the acceptance of the relocation. Decision-makers [Citizens] The majority of Okinawan voters supported Inamine, in favour of his 'pragmatic' attitude toward the national government rather than Ota's tough stance toward it. Influential Actors [Prime Minister] As mentioned earlier, prior to the election, then Prime Minister Hashimoto cut off communications with Ota due to the latter's rejection of the relocation of Futenma Air Station. This implied the decrease of special recognition from the national government to Okinawa, and expressed an advantage of a cooperative relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa. Hashimoto's action, thus, supported 'pragmatic' Inamine. 287 Figure 7.1.3 Actors and Roles in the Gubernatorial Election Forum for Recognition Initiators Decision-makers Influential Actors Gubernatorial Election Local Business Leader Citizens Prime Minister 3) Negotiations in the Gubernatorial Election (see figure 7.1.4) Local Demands The Inamine administration's interest was in the advantageous redistribution of development resources and maintaining a cooperative relationship with the national government in order to realize this interest. This was not new; rather it was common under the past conservative prefectural administrations. However, Inamine, the businessman, was more interested in the effective and efficient use of subsidies for investing in projects that could facilitate the region's self-reliant economy rather than simply securing them. As noted above, he was a member of the Roundtable. For this new administration, gaining stronger national commitment to the special difficulties of regional development was a primary agenda. In addition to this distinctive concern with economy, he also showed sensitivity to the issues of the relocation. It was his response to the persistent desire of Okinawans for the removal of the bases. Inamine requested of the national government the confirmation of the use of a relocated air base as a condition to implement the relocation project. He promised that he would not allow the relocation unless the national 288 government confirmed the fulfilment of the two conditions of the use of the air base, i.e. joint military-civilian use of the new air base and its return to Okinawa in 15 years from the beginning of its use. With this promise, Inamine was able to emphasize his concern on the autonomy of Okinawa in the return of the bases. National Responses The national government's interest was to secure a cooperative relationship with Okinawa for accommodating the activities of the U.S. military troops in Okinawa. Therefore, Inamine's less confrontational attitude was preferable to the national government. New Prime Minister Obuchi's quick response to Inamine's request to resume the Okinawa Policy Council for the promotion of regional economic development characterized the national government's interest in the restructuring the Tokyo-Okinawa relationship. This political action by Obuchi revealed that the Okinawa Policy Council worked as a strategic instrument for the national government to guide the prefecture's actions in the intergovernmental negotiations. The Okinawa Policy Council again worked flexibly outside the existing administrative systems. Consequently, tensions between Tokyo and Okinawa relaxed and both governments began to work cooperatively toward the promotion of their respective interests. It was characteristic that the first two committees established by the national government (i.e. the Committee for Northern Area Development and the Committee for the Development of the Host Community and Surrounding Areas) addressed, on a practical level, economic assistance to municipalities chosen to host relocated bases including Futenma Air Station. 289 Figure 7.1.4 Negotiations in the Gubernatorial Election Forum for Authorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Recognition Forum Resource Self- Resource Self-Distribution determination Distribution determination Gubernatorial Election Yes Yes Yes No Ad hoc Informal 4) Special Arrangements in the Gubernatorial Election (see figure 7.1.5) Hashimoto's one-sided suspension of meeting with Ota led to rising suspicions about Ota's leadership in managing the political relationship with the national government. Inamine's challenge to Ota began with his criticism of the latter's tough political stance against the national government and the lack of serious concern on local economy. The victory of Inamine led to the re-establishing of the Okinawa Policy Council, and the effectiveness of the cooperative relationship for securing special assistance was recognized by Okinawans. As mentioned in the analysis of the Okinawa Policy Council (section 5.2), a new regional development plan was established by the national government, but with greater recognition given to Okinawa's specific demands. In addition, four new committees for promoting local economic development and preparing for the relocation of Futenma Air Station were established. These committees were formed for the implementation of relevant projects and suggested that the coordination of national actions and prefectural ones would be moved from the political sphere to the 290 administrative sphere. Consequently, no transfer of authorities of decision-making was made. Figure 7.1.5 Special Arrangements in the Gubernatorial Election Forum for Recognition Types of Arrangements (Political/Administrative/Legal) Transfer of Authorities (Political/Administrative/Legal) Beginning End Gubernatorial Election Political Administrative No 7.2. The Group of Eight [G8] Summit in Okinawa and Kyushu in 2000 7.2.1. Introduction The people of Okinawa are proud of the distinctive history of the Ryukyu Kingdom and culture. Former Prime Minister Obuchi was sensitive to this pride and gave Okinawa an opportunity to host the beginning of a major international conference, the G8 Summit in July 2000. This 'gift' was accompanied by financial assistance for the construction of new facilities associated with the conference in Nago City. It could be said that the opening of the Summit in Okinawa symbolized the notion that the central government of Japan was not ignoring its periphery. Various volunteer groups were formed to prepare for the Summit (The Okinawa Times, 1 June 2000). However, it should also be noted that various civic groups took the opportunity to hold conferences and events that 'showcased' the negative impacts of the presence of U.S. military bases 291 on Okinawan communities and the region's natural environment (see Yonetani 2001). This section will draw attention to the fact that the sophisticated use of political power by Okinawans to restructure centre/periphery relations with national political leaders was deliberate. 7.2.2. Setting-up the G8 Summit The provision of special financial assistance for this event was a major instrument used by the national government to manage its relationship with Okinawa. National politicians were nonetheless aware that it was not entirely appropriate to use money to influence the people of Okinawa when the presence of U.S. bases on their territory was such a political issue. In order to facilitate a peaceful relocation for Futenma Air Station, the national government paid a great deal of attention to the history and culture of Okinawa as the attitude of then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's showed. Obuchi had been a supporter of Hashimoto, and maintained the latter's proactive approach to problems in Okinawa. Obuchi claimed that he had a special interest in Okinawa ever since he was a university student, and displayed a distinctively positive and supportive attitude toward the region. On 30 April 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi announced the holding of the 2000 G8 Summit main conference (Kyushu/Okinawa Summit) in Nago City, even while other cities in Kyushu such as Fukuoka Prefecture and Miyazaki Prefecture (see Appendix 5) were preparing to host the main conference ahead of Okinawa. In December 1998, when Governor Inamine asked the national government and the Liberal Democratic Party to hold the Summit, Okinawa was not at the top of the list of possible locations. Therefore, Obuchi's decision in April to hold 292 the Summit in Okinawa surprised Governor Inamine, who greatly appreciated the final location decision (The Okinawa Times, 30 April 1999). It should be noted that the central government's eventual decision regarding the 2000 G8 Summit was made before the Nago city assembly accepted to host the relocated site of Futenma Air Station on 23 December 1999. Consequently, a new conference hall was built in Nago City and an expressway leading to this locality from Naha, a regional capital city in which an international airport is located, was also quickly renovated between 1999 and 2000. Even the walls of buildings at University of the Ryukyus, sites for visiting conference delegates, were repainted white in order to make the university more attractive (interview with Hajime Chinen, Assistant Professor, the University of Ryukyus, Okinawa, on 23 August 2001). Preparation for the summit, including many public construction works, was unprecedented in expense, approximately 80 billion yen (US$754.7 miilion, $/¥106), compared to the previous Summit. This enormous expense brought forth criticism from British non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that claimed the conference budget could have written off the debt of Gambia or the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (The Okinawa Times, 22 July 2000). The national government's financial assistance to Okinawa was also nicknamed the summit budget for 'special procurements' because of the volume of public works it generated (The Okinawa Times, 11 May 2000). The gift was not limited to the special funds. After Okinawa was chosen for the Summit, the national government decided to issue a new two-thousand yen note that featured a historic gate called Shureimon, a part of reconstructed castle of the pre-modern Ryukyu Kingdom (see Yonetani 2001). 293 7.2.3. Impacts of the G8 Summit All these central government moneys were not simply a generous gift to Okinawa. The release of funds was directly tied to the time frame established for the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago City. This was because then President Bill Clinton had remarked in June 1999 that he did not want to go to the G8 Summit in Okinawa before the issue of the relocation of the U.S. military base was settled. As discussed above, Henoko had already been chosen as the new location prior to the government of Japan's announcement that Okinawa would host the 2000 G8 conference. However, hosting such a major international conference as the G8 Summit was the first time for Okinawa, and the city was not prepared to tackle the task. Thus responsibility for conference preparations for the Summit effectively fell to the prefectural government, which meant that its administrative capacity could not afford to seriously address other pressing issues, including planning the relocation of Futenma Air Station. In general, because of the G8 Summit and other special financial assistance, Prime Minister Obuchi gained popularity within Okinawa. Ironically, two months before the Summit, Obuchi suddenly fell ill and passed away on 14 May 2000. The people of Okinawa were disappointed by his death and worried about the potential of the new Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to address base-related issues. Overall, Mori did not resolve issues surrounding relocation effectively, especially with respect to ongoing national government negotiations with the United States over the condition of a 15-year limitation on the presence of Futenma Air Station in Nago City (The Okinawa Times, 5 April 2001). According to local mass media, he was ignorant of the issues of Okinawa (see the Okinawa Time, 11 March 2001). However, Prime Minister Hashimoto was 294 appointed as Director-General of Okinawa Development Agency on 5 December 2000 under Mori's administration and again became involved in the relocation of Futenma Air Station (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 25 December 2000). He worked as director-general until January 2001 when the Agency was incorporated into the Cabinet Office, as part of the reorganization of national ministries and agencies, and subsequently became the minister in Charge of Okinawa in the Cabinet until April 2001 (see The Okinawa Times, 6 January 2001). Thus it can be generally said that while the G8 Summit of 2000 contributed to re-stabilizing national-prefectural intergovernmental relations, the unexpected death of Obuchi forced Inamine to make a fresh push to strengthen the central-periphery political ties already in part developed. 7.2.4. Analysis of Change in Relationship between the National Government and Okinawa in the G8 Summit 1) The Level of Change in the G8 Summit (see figures 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) The national government's decision to hold the main conference of the G8 Summit in Nago City played a symbolic role in demonstrating the state's power to increase the presence of Okinawa. It was the first high-profile international conference in Okinawa and not only local governmental actors but also local citizens and businesses were involved in preparing for the summit. The dotted arrows of figure 7.2.2 represents the power of an individual prime minister (Obuchi) to give extra economic opportunities and recognition to Okinawans as additions to the 'business as usual' model (figure 7.2.1). Consequently, the G8 Summit became a region-wide event. 295 Figure 7.2.1 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development ('business as usual' model) Central Govts Local Govts Local Non-Govt National Govt Prefectural Govt Municipal Govt Civ i l Society Business Community U S A Routine Decision-making Lines Central Govts Figure 7.2.2 Actor/Structure of Decision-making on Regional Development (the G8 Summit) Local Govts Local Non-Govt National Govt 1 Prefectural Govt • ^ f Municipal Govt Civ i l Society Business Community U S A ^ Routine Decision-making Lines . . . Initiatives Taken in the G8 Summit 296 2) Roles of Actors: Initiators, Decision-makers and Other Influential Actors in the G8 Summit (see figure 7.2.3) Initiators [Prime Minister] Prime Minister Obuchi took the initiative of inviting the main G8 Summit conference to Okinawa. As a response to Prefectural Governor Inamine's request to host the G8 Summit, Obuchi asked his Cabinet members, who were suspicious of Okinawa's capacity to hold the international conference, to support his initiative. Obuchi's interest was to show his strong empathy for Okinawa and demonstrate the state's capacity to help Okinawa effect change in regional socio-economic development. The issuance of the new two thousand-yen bill characterized his special concern for Okinawa; this was basically trust building between Tokyo and Okinawa. However, this 'gift' was tied to the promotion of the relocation of Futenma Air Station. The construction of the new conference hall in Nago City clearly revealed this message from the national government to Okinawa and Nago. Decision-makers [Prime Minister] As mentioned above, the prime minister made the decision about the host city for the G8 Summit at his own discretion, and then the Cabinet approved. Influential Actors [Prefectural Governor] Governor Inamine took the advantage of his relationship with the Liberal Democratic Party for gaining attention to Okinawans' desire for holding the Summit. 297 Figure 7.2.3 Actors and Roles in the G8 Summit Forum for Recognition Initiators Decision-makers Influential Actors G8 Summit Prime Minister Prime Minister Prefectural Governor 3) Negotiations in the G8 Summit (see figure 7.2.4) Local Demands The prefecture wanted the summit as they saw it as an opportunity for sending the image of Okinawa to the world as a potential place to invest and thus raise the status of the region globally. Okinawans' excitement represented their concern with linking Okinawa to the external world and for eliminating persistent dependency. Moreover, there were groups and citizens who wanted to attract the attention of the world to the problems caused by the concentration of bases in Okinawa. National Responses The G8 Summit was a kind of 'gift' from Prime Minister Obuchi to Okinawa, but more specifically to Nago City. It was purely an individual action by Obuchi. The intensive public investment for the summit emphasized the national government's political power to redistribute financial resource to regions in various forms. It showed the national government's attitude in compensating for the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Nago City in that the government was not only redistributing money to Okinawa but also respecting its distinctive history and culture. Thus, Obuchi's 298 decision appealed to Okinawans' concern with economic and cultural inequalities. Because of this empathetic attitude, after his death, Prime Minister Obuchi was sorely missed by Okinawans who were expecting the furtherance of regional economic development. Figure 7.2.4 Negotiations in the G8 Summit Forum for Authorities and Rights Demanded by Okinawan Initiators National Responses to Okinawans' Demands Type of Formality Recognition Forum Resource Self- Resource Self-Distribution determination Distribution determination G 8 Summit No No Yes No Ad hoc Informal 4) Special Arrangements in the G8 Summit (see figure 7.2.5) Obuchi's decision had been purely political and individual. After his decision, an intensive (but controversial) investment in renovating and constructing facilities for the G8 Summit began, and the prefecture and municipal governments placed top priority on the preparation for it. Consequently, there was no change in the prefecture's authority in decision-making. The national government's (Obuchi's) arrangements such as the G8 Summit and the issuance of the new two thousand-yen bill were quite symbolic and were ad hoc measures for building more stability in the new Tokyo-Okinawa relationship. However, the fulfillment of the most important conditions of the 299 relocation of Futenma Air Station remained unresolved and deferred. Figure 7.2.5 Special Arrangements in the G8 Summit Forum for Recognition Types of Arrangements (Political/A dm in istrative/Legal) Transfer of Authorities (Political/Administrative/Legal) Beginning End G8 Summit Political Administrative No 300 PART III Did Cultural Politics Bring about Changes in the Relationship between the State and a Substate Nation in Japan? CHAPTER 8 Conclusions This thesis has argued that following the 1995 rape case, complex cultural politics or the 'politics of recognition' played a stronger role than before in negotiations between the national government and prefectural and city governments in Okinawa. This was a new kind of interaction that unfolded alongside the more traditional dynamics of economic politics or 'politics of redistribution.' In the years from Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972 the prefecture's standard of living in infrastructure has undoubtedly increased overall, although the prefecture remains relatively disadvantaged compared with the mainland. Yet by contrast, issues of Okinawa's 'identity' and 'local autonomy' have not been addressed by traditional regional planning mechanisms. In this concluding chapter, I begin with the findings of the study based on the research questions first raised in chapter 1 and the analyses presented in chapters 5 through 7 (section 8.2). Section 8.2 highlights the roles and interests of various actors in cultural politics, the outcomes of their efforts and important issues of scale. Then, in section 8.3, I will relate these findings back to the literature on Western regional planning, substate nations and Japanese planning examined in chapter 2. Section 8.4 will discuss the implications of this case study for actual planning practices in Okinawa. Some recommendations which flow from this study for the future actions of planners and decision-makers in Okinawa will be presented. Finally, in section 8.5 I will 301 propose some directions for future research, especially the possibility of comparative studies between Okinawa and other substate nations and indigenous peoples. 8.1. Summary of the Six 'Policy Forums' To begin with, I will revisit the method of empirical inquiry used and summarize the six 'policy forums.' This study raised three major questions: 1) did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa study display a cultural identity and engage in cultural politics? 2) were the various negotiations and 'policy forums' held after 1995 successful? and 3) did issues of 'scale' complicate negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa? These were examined through a case study consisting of the six 'policy forums.' The first 'policy forum' was the Consultative Body on the Problems of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, established by the national government in 1995 as an intergovernmental forum between the national government and the prefectural government in order to address the disadvantaged status of Okinawa in terms of the concentration of U.S. bases (see section 5.1 in chapter 5). The Consultative Body provided Okinawa with an opportunity to present a proposal for the phased return of U.S. bases, the Okinawa Action Program, to the national government. Okinawa's desire for the removal of the bases was then conveyed to an international forum dedicated to facilitating the return of the bases, the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The then Prefectural Governor, Masahide Ota, played a key role as a leader in Okinawa's cultural politics played against the national government until he was replaced by Keiichi Inamine in 1998. 302 The second 'policy forum' was the Okinawa Policy Council established in 1996 by the national government, also as an intergovernmental forum (see section 5.2 in chapter 5) . This provided the national and prefectural governments a means to restructure the centralized development planning so that more regionally based development became possible. The Okinawa Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (Okinawa Prefecture's first attempt to draft a regional development plan on its own) was presented and acknowledged as a platform for beginning intergovernmental discussions. The third was the Roundtable on the Municipalities of Okinawa Accommodating U.S. Military Bases, established by the national government in 1996 (see section 6.1 in chapter 6). Different from the previous two 'policy forums,' this was a national-municipal body, one that provided unprecedented opportunities for both central and local levels of government to discuss development issues directly together. It was characteristic of existing Japanese practice that a group of non-governmental institutional elites, such as professors at universities in Tokyo and Okinawa and leading businessmen in those cities, was brought together by the national government to work closely with municipal governments. The fourth 'policy forum' was the Nago City referendum (see section 6.2 in chapter 6) . Again, this was quite different from the first three 'policy forums' as it was a formally unstructured and ad hoc venue for dialogue between various governmental and non-governmental actors. The city's mayor, Higa, played a key role in decision-making relating to the relocation of a large air base, Futenma Air Station, under pressure from the national government, the prefectural government, local civil society, 303 and local businesses. The fifth 'policy forum' was the gubernatorial election held in 1998, an opportunity for prefectural constituencies to express their attitudes toward cultural politics and economic politics (see section 7.1 in chapter 7). The last 'policy forum' was the G8 Summit held in Okinawa during the year 2000 (see section 7.2 in chapter 7). This event was the outcome of talks between the new Prefectural Governor Inamine (who replaced Masahide Ota), and Keizo Obuchi, who succeeded Ryutaro Hashimoto as prime minister. Obuchi's decision to hold the main conference of the G8 Summit in Nago City was regarded by Okinawans as a 'reward' for their acceptance of Inamine, and thus the relocation of Futenma Air Station. 8.2. Findings Here, I discuss the research questions first presented in chapter 1 based on the material examined in chapters 5 through 7. The fundamental question raised at the beginning of this thesis is "Did the 1995 rape case galvanize a new style of planning for Okinawa, one that incorporated Okinawan desires for autonomy and regional recognition based on their unique status within Japan?" My answer to this question is as follows. A new type of planning took place after 1995 at least at the political level but was not institutionalized. The "politics of recognition" had the power to change the political relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa in a short period of time, but at the administrative levels, the traditional centralized planning system was maintained. Section 8.2.1 summarizes my analyses of 'actors' involved in post-1995 negotiations, 304 including constraints on their capacities. Section 8.2.2 looks at the success of cultural politics, from the perspectives of both the national and prefectural governments. Section 8.2.3 shows how issues of scales were constraining forces on cultural politics. 8.2.1. Actors and Their Cultural /Political Interests Did the various 'actors' in the Okinawa study display a cultural identity and engage in cultural politics? To answer this question, I first categorize and review the choices of the various actors as discussed extensively in chapters 5 to 7, before summarizing actions according to their categorization as either traditional 'economic politics' or the new-style 'cultural politics,' and provide reasons for these tendencies. There were basically five types of political actors who played important roles in the 'policy forums.' First, were the two prefectural governors: Masahide Ota and Keiichi Inamine. Second, came the three prime ministers: Tomiichi Murayama, Ryutaro Hashimoto and Keizo Obuchi. Third, were the municipal (city) mayors: Tetsuya Higa and Tateo Kishimoto. The fourth and fifth actors were civil society and local businesses. 1) Prefectural Governors Governor Masahide Ota The two prefectural governors (Masahide Ota and Keiichi Inamine) were political leaders during the period from 1995 to 2000, but they had quite different styles. Governor Ota adopted a firm attitude toward the national government and took on a central role in playing cultural politics against the national government in the various 'policy forums.' With his 'antiwar' political interests, he represented the territorial 'resistance' identity of Okinawa. His main priority was the scheduling and acceleration 3 0 5 of the return of U.S. bases, as shown in his proposal of the Okinawa Action Program (section 5.1). However, he also had an interest in regional economic development, as shown in his proposal of the Okinawa Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept (section 5.2). Both prefectural proposals aimed to increase self-determination with respect to land use in Okinawa as well as to promote the prefecture's economic development, and thus its self-reliance. Ota's cultural politics created a dilemma in that the prioritization of the former (self-determination) did not encourage the national government's cooperative attitude toward the latter (self-reliant economic development). As Kymlicka (2002) suggests, this combination (and perhaps confusion) of concerns about cultural inequalities versus economic inequalities was not unique to Okinawa. Ota finally revealed his prioritization of the return of the bases over Okinawa's economic development after the 1997 Nago City mayoral election (section 5.2). This was his second round of cultural politics with the Japanese nation-state; but as shown in his loss in the 1998 gubernatorial election, the majority of voters did not support him. Thus, Ota's power to exercise cultural politics was lost. Governor Keiichi Inamine Keiichi Inamine participated in the 1995 public rally in response to the 1995 rape case together with Ota. The return of the bases was thus an important issue for him, too, and in this sense he partly assisted Ota in putting the latter's cultural politics into motion. Inamine's motivation for running against Ota, however, was his greater concern about the necessity of traditional 'economic politics,' i.e. decreasing the dependency of Okinawa's economy on the national government through transfer payment and subsidies. He emphasized the necessity of shifting national investment to 306 more strategic development projects. Thus, he focused on a purely economic agenda in his negotiations with the national government. In other words, he was more seriously engaged in economic politics. His 'practical' attitude pleased then Prime Minister Obuchi, who responded to Okinawa with the reward of the G8 Summit. 2) National Government: Prime Ministers and the Cabinet During the period of this study, three Japanese prime ministers have had to respond to Okinawa's cultural politics: Tomiichi Murayama, Ryutaro Hashimoto, and Keizo Obuchi. Their common interest was to re-stabilize political relationships with Okinawa Prefecture and the Okinawan people in order to maintain the concentration of U.S. bases on Okinawa. This concentration was represented by the SACO decision that proposed the downsizing and relocation of the bases, but within Okinawa. In other words, the prime ministers' major interest was in fulfilling the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It should be noted that Murayama was the leader of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which had traditionally been opposed to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty until the establishment of his Cabinet. On the other hand, Hashimoto and Obuchi were the leaders of the traditional ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had supported the treaty. Murayama allowed Okinawa to directly access the national government and his successors expanded this openness. The national Cabinet reacted to Okinawa's request to address inequalities between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland by providing opportunities to discuss issues over the return of the bases and regional development. They approached the promotion of dialogue between Tokyo and Okinawa as a first step to engagement in cultural politics. 307 In other words, because there had been so few opportunities up to 1995 for Okinawa to discuss such issues directly with the national government, the establishment of such 'policy forums' as the Consultative Body and the Okinawa Policy Council was a highly symbolic event. However, because the management of such 'policy forums' was largely in the hands of the prime ministers and their senior advisors, they could counter Okinawa's cultural politics, for example, by suspending the holding of the meetings of the Okinawa Policy Council at a crucial juncture (section 6.2) and by resuming them after Inamine entered office as the prefectural governor (section 7.1). Bureaucrats did not play an important role in this management of the 'policy forums,' but politicians did. The prime ministers' responses to Okinawa's political overtones were therefore largely made at their discretion, and, thus, they were able to act swiftly and flexibly without consulting the more formal and rigid route of bureaucracy. 3) Municipal Mayors Municipal mayors played a key role in the Roundtable (see section 6.1), in which municipalities directly met national representatives, and in the 1996 Nago City Referendum (see section 6.2). They tended to be strongly engaged in economic politics seeking greater opportunities for economic assistance. Masahide Ota (2003) called this 'subsidy politics.' Accordingly, the role of municipal mayors in cultural politics was not significant. 4) Civil Society Civic groups, such as women's groups and labour unions, demonstrated their 'resistance' to the bases and the national government in the 1995 protest rally. Ota's 308 challenge to the nation-state was based on this demonstration of a distinctive cultural identity vis-a-vis the mainland Japanese. While the role of anti-base civic groups in maintaining cultural politics was critical, as shown in the Okinawa Prefectural Referendum (section 5.1) and the Nago Referendum (section 6.2), both initiated by civic groups and citizens, they could not further strengthen the 'resistance' cultural identity. Faced with issues concerning their economic life, such as future job opportunities, their concern over economic inequalities and cultural inequalities tended to fluctuate as shown in the mayoral election in Nago City (section 6.2) versus the gubernatorial election (section 7.1). 5) Local Business Local business was a main actor in economic politics during the study period, especially the local construction industry, a leading industry in Okinawa. This was perhaps unsurprising, as' their major projects comprised public works, not private development. Therefore, national subsidies for public works in Okinawa were absolutely critical for this industry. An important role of this industry in cultural politics was its power to influence votes, either at the time of an election or at the time of a referendum, as typically observed in Nago City (section 6.2). The local business communities were also major players behind the election of Keiichi Inamine, a pro-development leader of the Okinawan economy, as the new governor. 8.2.2. The Performance and Outcome of Each 'Policy Forum' Were the various negotiations and 'policy forums' held after 1995 successful? At the end of the study period in year 2000 there was still no significant transfer of 309 decision-making power to the prefectural government, either concerning the return of U.S. bases or local regional development planning, in the outcome of any of the 'policy forums.' In this sense, the forums did not at all satisfy Okinawa's desire for greater autonomy. However, this study found that following 1995 there were subtle but important changes in the relationship between the national and prefectural governments. I will show below how each 'policy forum' was successful in this regard. 1) From the National Government Point of View The Consultative Body This 'policy forum' was successful from the point-of-view of the national government because it prevented stronger protests from occurring after the 1995 rally. This 'policy forum' also provided the prefectural government with an initial venue for tabling its requests regarding the swift return of the bases after SACO. The 'founding' politicians (i.e. the prime minister and the Cabinet members) established it as a mechanism outside the existing administrative systems, where relatively timely and informal discussions were possible. Moreover, as it was an ad hoc mechanism, the national government was not obliged to continue dialogue on the further return of the bases. The Okinawa Policy Council This 'policy forum' was successful for the national government in that it was able to focus on the inception of new regional economic development in Okinawa cooperatively with the prefectural government. It was also a nonroutine mechanism similar to the Consultative Body, and thus enabled the national politicians to initiate discussions with the prefectural government. 310 The Roundtable The national government also found this 'policy forum' successful in that it built an unprecedented closer and more trusting relationship with municipal governments by anticipating their interests in local economic development. The Roundtable demonstrated the power of the national government in order to help the municipal governments when it became necessary. The involvement of a well-known scholar, Haruo Shimada, as a chairman of the Roundtable increased its symbolic value. This 'policy forum' was established as a nonroutine and short-term mechanism and accordingly it functioned as a one-time event. The Nago City Referendum This 'policy forum' was a success in that the city mayor finally decided to reject the outcome of the referendum and accept the relocation project. After the mayor's decision, the national government was able to focus on the issues of economic redistribution as compensation for the relocation project. The Gubernatorial Election This 'policy forum' was successful for the national government because the 'practical' candidate Keiichi Inamine defeated the 'insurgent' Prefectural Governor Masahide Ota. The national government and the new Inamine administration could therefore work more smoothly toward the mutual concerns of the promotion of self-reliant development, which was more market-oriented. 311 The G8 Summit This 'policy forum' was successful for the national government in that Prime Minister Obuchi's decision demonstrated the government's capacity to create change in the periphery and thus was widely appreciated by the Okinawan people. 2) From the Prefectural Government Point of View The Consultative Body This 'policy forum' was not successful in that the substantial return of the bases was not allowed by SACO; still, the prefecture appreciated that the Okinawa Action Program was respected by SACO, if not sufficiently. Rather, this forum was more important as a symbol of the increase in Okinawa's status, because previously there had been no such venue for Okinawa to express its desires for the return of the bases. Accordingly, the establishment of such a 'policy forum' as the Consultative Body between Tokyo and Okinawa was unprecedented. The Okinawa Policy Council This 'policy forum' proved successful for the prefectural government in that it provided opportunities to discuss strategic development planning and it legitimized the provision of special financial assistance. The presentation of the Okinawa Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept was important for the demonstration and legitimization of Okinawa's special demand for the promotion of self-reliant development, and thus for special assistance responsive to local conditions. Therefore, it was advantageous for Okinawa Prefecture to have access to a forum in which it could introduce its objectives and engage in a dialogue with the national government. 312 The Roundtable This 'policy forum' was not relevant to the prefectural government but relevant to municipal governments in which U.S. bases were located. It was successful for the municipal governments in that it provided windfall profits to them, i.e. extra subsidies and consulting services for project development. For municipal governments lacking financial and human resources, it was generally advantageous. The Nago City Referendum This 'policy forum' was not successful for the prefectural government in that the city's decision to accept the relocation project provided power to the national government to urge the prefectural government to support Nago City. Governor Ota could negotiate with the national government about economic assistance without linking it with the acceptance of the relocation project because both the national and prefectural governments understood that they were separate issues. However, the city's decision made apparent that they were, in fact, related. In other words, the prefecture had little power to insist on the separation of the two issues. The Gubernatorial Election This 'policy forum' was not successful in terms of the prefecture's cultural politics, spearheaded by the previous Governor Masahide Ota, but successful in regards to economic politics. The G8 Summit This 'policy forum' was successful for the new prefectural government in that it 313 could trigger more cooperative and locally oriented-development with the assistance of national government. 3) Overall Performance of Cultural Politics The above evaluation of the success of the 'policy forums' during the 1995-2000 period shows that a new form of compensation for the concentration of the bases on Okinawa was sought by both the national government and the prefectural government, rather than the restructuring of the existing legal and administrative systems either for the return of the bases, or regional development. It also shows that the arrangements made between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture during the period was not the end of the process of eliminating cultural inequalities, but possibly the beginning of this process because further arrangements for the implementation of the relocation project were necessary, which were not made during the period. In particular, the unsettled conditions of using the relocated air base implied the necessity of serious and continued negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa (and the United States), during which the next phase of cultural politics might be launched. In sum, the 1995-2000 period shows that the core-periphery relationship was not easily resolved and rather even 'recreated.' The existence of the inconsistent antagonism of Okinawans against the national government and the acceptance of the non-institutional and relatively minor change during the period also suggest that this relationship was a matter of perception and comparison to some extent. In sum, the core-periphery interactions through the 'policy forums' during the period uncovered the nature of 'cultural politics,' in that its relative strength continuously changed (i.e. it waxed in 1995-1996, and waned thereafter) rather than showing a uniform trend of change in one direction, either as an 314 increase or decrease. The 1995-2000 period thus shows that 'cultural politics' was an ongoing process and provided a context for dynamic regional planning. The evaluation also illustrates mechanisms for the diffusion of core-periphery tensions. The central mechanism of the new compensation was an integration of 'recognition' with special economic assistance, the conventional form of compensation. New development made clear that the conventional form of compensation which only responded to economic factors (Calder 1988) failed to satisfy the prefectural government after 1995. Instead, a change on the part of the national government toward Okinawa was found effective in re-stabilizing intergovernmental relations. For the prefectural government, obtaining greater opportunities to voice their interests and discuss their needs with national politicians and planners were important steps in increasing its own status. Therefore, the establishment of the first and second 'policy forums' (the 1995 Consultative Body and the 1996 Okinawa Policy Council) was in itself a successful first step. Thus, the combination of material and non-material assistance, i.e. opportunities to participate in discussions or decision-making, satisfied the prefectural government (and municipal government) and the Okinawan people at large, while for the national government, the resulting decrease in Tokyo-Okinawa tensions was the greatest mark of success. In short, Okinawa's cultural politics succeeded in disclosing the importance of 'recognition' and causing change in the form of compensation, but was not strong enough to achieve the restructuring of administrative systems, in particular decentralization. The examination of the 'policy forums' also revealed that the goal of the prefectural 315 challenge to the national government was not necessarily specified and common to the prefecture and local citizens. Indeed, there was no local 'policy forum' to discuss shared goals. Even the role of the prefectural assembly was hardly visible in the six 'policy forums.' Therefore, the satisfaction of the prefectural government did not necessarily equate to citizen approval. Indeed, the initial motivation of Okinawan citizens for staging the 1995 protest rally was to force the national government to address issues related to the concentration of the bases more seriously. But, Okinawans' attitude toward base-related issues changed after the first 'policy forum' (the 1995 Consultative Body). While both the national and prefectural governments could promote their respective interests, which to some extent increased 'recognition,' the impacts of the 'policy forums' on existing cultural inequalities were inconclusive. The importance of 'recognition' for regional planning was definitely acknowledged by the national government, more specifically national politicians, and cultural politics became more relevant to planning, but no institutional change was made to integrate 'recognition' into planning systems. However, national-prefectural negotiations have continued beyond the 1995-2000 period (see the Epilogue, later in the thesis), with the possibility still open that the centre's new recognition for its periphery will translate into the inclusion of cultural difference in regional development. 8.2.3. Constraints on Cultural Politics Did issues of 'scale' complicate negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa? Four different 'scales,' either at a scale beyond the national boundary, or at a scale below the level of prefecture, complicated the prefecture's cultural politics against the national government in different ways. 316 1) Supranational Power and the Role of the United States The cultural politics pursued by Okinawa was faced with the uncertainty of U.S. decision-making, and was also undermined by the national government's economic politics, which promoted greater redistribution. Even after the end of the Cold War, East Asian security remained unstable due mainly to persistent tensions between China and Taiwan, and North Korea and South Korea, and Japan. In this geopolitical context, there was no drastic change in the U.S. policy on the deployment of their troops. However, as shown in the establishment of SACO immediately after the 1995 public protest, it became apparent that a region's (Okinawa's) action could force the United States to address local pressures against U.S. bases. Because Okinawa Prefecture did not have access to U.S. decision-making, it had to rely on the national government. Okinawa's request to establish the Consultative Body and its presentation of the Okinawa Action Program were aimed at gaining access to the U.S. indirectly. However, the national government was more concerned about the stability of its state system as a whole rather than the issues of a local society in Okinawa. Accordingly, it remained reluctant to negotiate with the United States about the issues of the bases. Instead, the national government focused on redistribution, i.e. the provision of subsidies, in negotiations with Okinawa Prefecture because this did not require international negotiations, and could be handled domestically. In effect, the provision of extra subsidies marked an increased recognition of Okinawa by national politicians. In other words, cultural politics increased economic opportunities. While it was uncertain as to whether and when the United States would decide to return the bases not accepted by SACO, it was more certain for Okinawa Prefecture to gain greater 317 redistribution from the national government quickly. Thus the relative importance of economic politics increased vis-a-vis cultural politics over the years of the study period. 2) Internal Constraints: Nago and the Northern Area The existence of a core-periphery relationship within Okinawa undermined the prefecture's cultural politics. The Northern Area was a periphery within Okinawa Honto, while the Central and Southern Areas formed an urbanized core region. The Northern Area was frustrated with the persistence of economic backwardness in addition to the concentration of the bases within Okinawa. In this context, the Northern Area was not satisfied with the prefecture's existing commitment to its development. Indeed, the prefecture's ongoing attitude of opposition toward the relocation of Futenma Air Station heightened the frustration felt by residents in the Northern Area. Prior to SACO's final decision that selected Nago City, a central city in the Northern Area, as a candidate city for the relocation project, the possibilities of the base's relocation to other cities in Central Area were examined. The prefecture initially opposed this idea but did not do so when Nago City was selected. Nago City and the Northern Area were not happy with the prefecture's different attitude toward the Central and Northern Area. Mayor Higa's request for an official explanation of the reason why Nago was chosen represented Nago City's and the Northern Area's distrust of the prefecture. Because of this persistent distrust, the mayor finally responded to the national government's persuasion, rather than that of the prefecture. Consequently, the national government gained some leverage in order to pressure the prefectural government into announcing the relocation to Nago. This event revealed the fact that the intra-regional core-periphery political tension was a challenge to the prefectural government in its 318 attempts to display a consistent and cohesive territorial 'resistance' identity against the Japanese nation-state. 3) Role of Okinawa's other Cities City governments did not play a leading role in promoting cultural politics and merely remained reactive to the prefecture's decisions and actions. In fact, the city governments were more concerned about local economic interests, as was seen in Nago City's rejection of the result of the referendum (section 6.2). In the Roundtable (section 6.1), the cities welcomed the renewed intervention of the national government in their local economic development while accepting that the issues concerning the presence of the bases should be left untouched. Further, there were occasionally drastic actions taken by cities, such as Katsuren Town, which proposed an acceptance of the relocation of Futenma Air Station in its own boundary for economic reasons, thus ignoring the prefecture's preference for Nago City as a candidate site. In sum, it was not possible for Okinawa Prefecture to expect that all the cities in Okinawa would form a unified territorial 'resistance' identity to challenge the national government. 4) The Political Stance Taken by Different Actors in Okinawa Local interests in redistribution tended to undermine the prefecture's challenge to the national government. A number of local opposing interests emerged that clouded national-prefectural negotiations. Various local actors promoted a variety of competing issues that put into opposition the values of 'redistribution' and 'recognition.' Thus, the conflicting local interests tended to become most visible in local voting patterns, including referendums held at the prefectural level (see section 5.1) and at the city level 319 (see section 6.2), as well as the two elections including gubernatorial (see section 7.1) and mayoral candidates in Nago City (see section 6.2). These votes had the following substantial influences on the prefecture's decisions and actions. First, single-issue and nonbinding referendums at the two governmental levels ended in the victory of anti-base and relocation voters. The 1996 prefectural referendum was novel in that it first questioned the presence of U.S. bases on a prefectural level. The result expressed persistent anti-base feelings at a territorial scale and thus was advantageous to the prefecture's negotiating position against the national government. It is, however, important to note that the then Governor Ota bowed to the Supreme Court's decision on the signing of land leases on behalf of unwilling landowners immediately after the referendum. His conduct as an administrator, rather than 'insurgent' politician, disappointed the anti-base citizens and groups. The reaction of the then Mayor Higa against the result of the Nago Referendum also disappointed local anti-base citizens and groups. Nonetheless, these important referendums remained symbolic. Second, both elections ended in the victory of pro-economy voters. The main reason for this outcome lay in the enduring interest in economic development. The victory of Inamine over Ota in the 1998 gubernatorial election led to the primacy of economic interests over cultural interests, and consequently the role of cultural politics was decreased. 320 8.3. Implications for Planning Theory This case study has shown that cultural recognition of Okinawa's identity was initially recognized by Tokyo after 1995. However, the Okinawa case study also contributes to the wider issues and literature covered in chapter 2. The examination of the dynamic and complex interplay between the national government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture has been framed in this thesis by three different sets of literature: Western comprehensive regional planning, substate nations and Japanese planning, all examined in chapter 2. With a focus on actors, the fulfillment of their interests by their actions, and the different scales of powers and pressures, this case study presents significant implications for theoretical discussion. Section 8.3.1 discusses the problems facing regional planning that must respond to substate claims for cultural equality, and the need to link the enhancement of regional development to political agendas. Section 8.3.2 adds new insight into the existing literature on substate nations. In particular, it discusses the importance of examining individual actors in addressing cultural inequalities, and also the problem of cultural politics versus economic politics in the face of diverse stakeholder interests as well as macro- and micro-scale political pressures. Section 8.3.3 examines the impacts of the rise of substate nationalism on the Japanese centralized regional planning system. In particular, it describes the involvement of political actors as agents of change in the bureaucratic planning system. 8.3.1. Cultural Politics and Western Regional Planning The formation of the core-periphery relationship within the modern nation-state is characteristic of the process of capital accumulation wherein surpluses concentrate in specific cities and regions (Harvey 2001). This suggests that a regional dimension is 321 intrinsic to the development of Western capitalistic economy. During the period of the Depression in the 1930s, economic disparities between core and peripheral regions were acknowledged as a serious problem for national economies, both in the United States and United Kingdom, and governments began to mitigate these disparities through regional planning (Higgins and Savoie 1997). In the 1930s, the 'New Deal' platform was launched in the United States to respond to the Depression, beginning the policies of national intervention that attempted to guide the capitalist economy for the purpose of countering regional disparity (Friedmann and Weaver 1979). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is representative of the New Deal initiatives (ibid.). In the 1940s, in the United Kingdom, the central government enacted new regional development plans focused on employment growth and the dispersion of industry and population based on Keynesian economic principles (Higgins and Savoie 1997). The ideology of narrowing down differences in the level of development between regions pursued in these Western countries was the basis for the planning of peripheral regions for fifty years after the end of World War II. The popularity of this approach was made apparent by the proliferation of growth poles in various places in the world since the 1960s, which aimed at obtaining 'trickle down' effects in peripheral regions and eliminating the core-periphery relationship within the state, although the application of this concept to the periphery was problematic (Peattie 1987). In the 1990s, a new type of peripheral region, substate nations, began to raise the issue of persistent cultural inequalities that kept their status low within the state and forwarded claims to self-determination, ranging from decentralization to independence. Consequently, the issue of cultural inequality became critical in the development of peripheral regions in 322 numerous countries. In this context, it became evident that regional development planning as a method for dealing with spatial disparities was unable to address the problem of substate nations. This was because regional planning did not recognise the need to resolve cultural inequalities, and indeed this was not a wide-scale issue until the onset of globalization and a wider challenge to the legitimacy of the nation-state in the late 1980s and 1990s. This study of the rise of substate claims in Okinawa revealed that interregional cultural inequalities, resulting from the historical relationship between core and peripheral regions in the process of the formation of a modern nation-state, challenged the traditional regional development planning. While Japan's regional planning mechanisms contributed to an improvement in its infrastructure and standard of living, it did so mainly through government transfers and public works projects leaving Okinawa dependent on national government largesse. Okinawa's claims for greater self sufficiency and local identity represented a new challenge for the power of centralized regional planning to promote the integration of a peripheral region into a national polity with a distinct cultural majority. Okinawa's desire for self-determination and self-development clearly show the relevance of substate nationalism to the critique of 'top down' and economic-oriented regional development planning, because the latter had failed to resolve the problem of core-periphery disparities. This study found that in Okinawa's case as a periphery of Japan, regional planning had not only been faced with the difficulty of interregional economic inequalities but also of cultural inequalities. Thus, the development of Okinawa, and other peripheral regions, has become more challenging. 323 The substate claims to self-determination and self-development suggest the necessity of promoting 'bottom up' planning as a measure to defuse core-periphery political tensions (Stohr 2001a). However, this study does not simply support the introduction of 'bottom up' planning in place of 'top down' planning as an effective solution. It also found that for such an economically weak peripheral region as Okinawa, it was difficult to compete with other regions based solely on local resources. In addition, the prefecture's peripheral economic position was not a recent phenomenon but rather the outcome of history and geography, and was institutionalized within the national political and administrative system. Thus, while self-determination remained a critical issue, as evident by the two referendums initiated by local citizens as well as the proposal of two plans for the return of U.S. bases and regional development (i.e. the Okinawa Action Program and the Okinawa Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept), the lack of local capacity for self-development, which may not necessarily be a serious matter in other 'richer' substate nations, is an issue that cannot be separated from the desire for self-determination. Therefore, 'cultural politics' and 'economic politics' are likely to go hand in hand for successful resolution of peripheral regions' problems. Moreover, a distinctive feature of the recent phenomenon of the rise in substate nationalism is its linkage with global economic, political and cultural dynamics (Castells 1997, Keating 1997). This tendency was demonstrated clearly by the prefecture's interest in establishing a Free Trade Zone rather than small scale 'alternative development' (Friedmann 1992). Such a large-scale project needed special national assistance. The lack of local capacity for such a challenging course of development was made obvious in the municipalities' interests in not only financial but also expert 324 advice available through the Roundtable. In fact, the leader of Okinawa substate nationalism, former Governor Ota, never requested full-fledged local autonomy. Instead, at least as a short-term goal, he concentrated on quick fixes for regional development, i.e. special assistance, in his negotiations with the national government. Regional development planning usually aims at long-term solutions, as in the form of the ten-year comprehensive plans for the development of Okinawa. Under such a system, self-determination and self-development are long-term agendas, and must be discussed as issues of systemic change. Steps taken by various actors in Okinawa indicate that they were concerned about both short-term remedies (i.e. economic assistance through special subsidies or greater 'redistribution') and long-term ones (i.e. the elimination of the bases and self-development, or greater 'recognition') in their setting of priorities. Nonetheless, the local emphasis on the former tactic (economic politics) remained strong and guided civic decision-making, as was the case in the 1998 gubernatorial election. This suggests that 'top down' regional planning often lacks the capacity to respond in a timely manner to the issue of interregional cultural inequality, which suddenly appeared as a major policy issue in Okinawa, and perhaps elsewhere in the world. In numerous countries, decentralization is a general vehicle for responding to cultural groups that stake claims to self-determination (Keating and McGarry 2001). However, this study found that it was not necessarily the best solution for weak peripheral regions, such as Okinawa, and that their developmental capacity must be carefully considered. As such, this study questions the role and limitation of regional planning to establish 325 unity with the nation-state when faced with diverse cultural identities. It made clear that the substantial involvement of political actors was a necessary condition for increasing the capacity of regional planning to promote cultural equality across regions. 8.3.2. Cultural Politics and Substate Nations Planning theory and practice became increasingly aware of the need to address the persistence of unequal status between cultural groups in the 1990s, and multicultural planning started to develop as a new field of planning (see, for example, Douglass and Friedmann 1998, Sandercock 1998a, b). This approach mainly broaches inequalities between groups of people resulting from difference in such attributes as gender, race and ethnicity, and advocates the promotion of inclusive democratic governance in a pluralistic society with a focus on local communities, especially at the urban neighbourhood level. However, cultural inequality between regions, which prolongs core-periphery inequalities within the nation-state, has not been examined by multicultural planning. The issue of interregional cultural inequality began to attract academic attention as the rise of substate nationalism became significant in the 1990s throughout the world. Currently, political scientists and philosophers have been the major scholars discussing substate nations, such as Guibernau (1999), Halperin et al. (1992), Keating and McGarry (2001) and Kymlicka (2002). The literature on substate nations typically focuses on the impacts of the rise of substate nationalism on the authority of the nation-state to govern the national territory, and on the traditional notions of the nation-state, citizenship and democracy. Overall, it addresses the necessity and legitimacy of 326 change in the distribution of authority for governing the national territory between the central government and specific cultural regions, which are often located in peripheries, and the impacts of the change on both national and substate society in terms of sovereignty, economy and democracy (Keating and McGarry 2001). In sum, the political science literature tends to focus on growing conflicts between substate nations and nation-states, and looks at the institutional aspects of their relations, namely legal and administrative arrangements. However, it rarely examines the internal dynamics of substate nations and their political relations with the mainstream nation in detail, or the varying attitudes toward and interests in addressing interregional cultural inequalities, although these are sometimes implied (Catt and Murphy 2002). In other words, the complexity of local politics and the diversity of local interests that make the local political context dynamic tend to be left out of discussions. Consequently, the interplay between cultural politics and economic politics, which are both considered fundamental forces that challenge hierarchies within a society (Fraser 1997, Kymlica 2002) have yet to be studied sufficiently in the context of the core-periphery relationship. This case study presented an alternative approach to the study of the rise of substate nations by focusing on the actors and their complex interactions. This approach that facilitated the understanding of not only the formal, but also the informal, processes of restructuring state-substate relationships. This focus was advantageous in furthering comprehension of the dynamics of cultural politics and economic politics. The case study also revealed the inconsistency of Okinawans' attitude toward the national government in the process of the restructuring of their core-periphery 327 relationship; for example, changes in support for base relocation over time, and differences in the support among different groups and 'actors' within the prefecture. The literature suggests that there is a general tendency for possible variations of cultural politics to exist within regions; for example, in Quebec, the First Nations people tend to be distrustful of French-speaking people's efforts to seek independence, and different political opinions about separation exist even among the French Quebecois (Catt and Murphy 2002). Likewise, this study found that Okinawan local actors' involvement in cultural politics were also divergent, and, more specifically, it found that the prioritization of their interests between gaining 'recognition' and 'redistribution' often changed. This inconsistency of priorities was evident in the contrasting results stemming from both the prefectural referendum, that supported the imperative of the removal of U.S. bases, and the 1998 gubernatorial election that favoured economic development. Identity is a critical factor for the rise of substate nationalism. The literature on substate nations suggests that language or shared history is a major source for substate identities (Castells 1997). This case study demonstrated how the presence of U.S. bases had been a direct trigger for current Okinawan claims to substate recognition. The concentration of the bases was, and remains, a symbol of the marginalized status of Okinawa. Thus, more than just differences in language or shared history, such situations as unfair constraints on the use of regional resources and the governance of regional affairs by external forces (both foreign and national) could also act as impetuses for the construction of a substate identity. The relevance of civic claims, i.e. those against the presence of foreign bases, to the rise of substate nationalism has also been 328 covered by the general literature (for example Keating and McGarry 2001). This study adds to the research, though the presence of foreign bases as a source of substate nationalism is quite rare, and poses special difficulties to the substate nation. The detailed examination of various actors revealed that the involvement of foreign bases destabilized the intensity of 'cultural politics' due to the existence of multiple interests within the local society. In other words, unlike the factors of race, language or religion, a civic rationale for 'substateness' made cultural politics in Okinawa rather inconsistent. This study also examined the relevance of the geographic scale to political dynamics, both external and local, on the durability of 'cultural politics.' Spatial analysis was important to grasp the multi-level political complexity of substate nationalism in the Okinawa case. This type of research is generally lacking in the current literature on substate nations. With this analytical approach, the study revealed diverse constraints on cultural political actors seeking to change existing hierarchical structures. The spatial analysis found that the diversity of interests that were dependent on geographical scale undermined the strength of the prefecture's cultural politics against the national government. Thus, this study emphasized the necessity of looking at the diversity of both cultural and economic interests within the substate society, as well as the complexity of scale issues as important dimensions of the power of cultural politics. 8.3.3. Cultural Politics and Japanese Planning In the post-World War II era, Japanese regional planning has been conducted by Comprehensive National Development Plans under the Comprehensive National Land Development Act. The central objective of Japanese regional planning is to promote 329 balanced development across the country and also to resolve regional economic disparities. The prototype of the Japanese regional planning approach was the TVA, and various development models were adopted since then, among others, growth poles in the early 1960s and development corridors around the turn of the 21 s t century (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). In this planning system, national bureaucrats were key figures in devising regional development programs and projects and managing their implementation. Compared with the role of bureaucrats, national politicians were less influential in regional development planning. The exception was former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who proposed the controversial policy of 'Building a New Japan' (Nihon Retto Kaizo Ron) in 1972 and took a strong stance toward the redistribution of economic resources throughout the country (Tanaka 1972). Also, in this approach to regional or city planning, the role of civil society was generally not significant (Sorensen 2002). The rise of Okinawan substate nationalism was a threat to the power of the national government to govern its sovereign territory equally. Traditionally, the Japanese government was able to manage peripheral objections to national policies, orienting them to metropolitan interests through special economic measures (Calder 1988), but the involvement of territorial identity, expressed by the deep-rooted distrust of the national government among Okinawans, did not permit the use of this policy as such. The intensification of the substate's frustration with cultural inequalities was a challenge to both the existing planning doctrine of economic primacy and the standardization of development programs and projects across the country. 330 This study found that the rise of substate nationalism and its cultural politics was not easily managed by national bureaucrats in the existing system of regional governance. Thus, it was politicians, both at the national and local levels (prefectural and municipal), and local civil society that took urgent actions and played key roles in addressing the issue of regional cultural inequalities, which suddenly appeared as a critical matter of public policy. This political dimension characterizes the responses to the novel issue of cultural inequality in the history of regional planning in Japan. Because it was a new issue for national bureaucrats, there was room for these relatively 'invisible' political actors to be involved in discussions concerning inequalities regarding the return of U.S. bases and regional development. In sum, cultural politics created a new set of political actors who intended to address policy issues that had hitherto been unacknowledged by the existing system of Japanese regional planning, which was, and remains, comprehensive and centralized in approach. Despite the intensive involvement of the new political actors, the 1995-2000 period demonstrated that there was no institutional change with respect to the closely-linked issues of U.S. bases and regional development. In other words, substate nationalism in Okinawa did not result in significant modifications of the regional planning system. That is not to say, of course, that no internal or ad hoc arrangements took place. Political arrangements between the national government (i.e. the Cabinet) and the prefecture were broken down into the tasks of 'business as usual' for national ministries and moved to implementation phases, typically the beginning of the provision of extra subsidies. However, as witnessed by late Prime Minister Obuchi's decision on the G8 Summit conference, national politicians' involvement continued to be vital in 331 demonstrating the nation-state's recognition of the disadvantaged status of Okinawa. This suggested, on one hand, the potential of cultural politics driven by a local government and citizens to raise the issue of cultural difference and, on the other hand, the stability and rigidity of Japanese bureaucratic planning that faces this policy issue. In other words, it became obvious that cultural difference as a new policy agenda gained special attention from central authorities, but it was not strong enough to cause change in the existing planning system, at least during the period of 1995 to 2000. More importantly, the Japanese regional planning system and bureaucrats who managed it continued to focus on economic inequalities and remained unresponsive to cultural inequality. The necessity of circumventing the rigid and hierarchical bureaucracy was expressed in the initiatives taken by former Prefectural Governor Ota and the prime ministers. Their direct and face-to-face interactions for dealing with the issues of the return of the bases and regional economic assistance represented a strategy of excluding bureaucrats, at least in the initial stages of talks. They deliberately tried to make room for negotiations outside the normal sphere of bureaucracy. The establishment of the non-standard mechanisms of different 'policy forums' external to the existing administrative system of regional planning and the return of the bases was central to their political relationship. These informal and ad hoc forums were critical because there was no routine or formal mechanism for Okinawa to discuss the issues of the bases and regional development directly and adequately with the national top leaders, even though the concentration of the bases was in fact an issue for the entire nation-state not just for a particular region. This study thus found that the Japanese centralized 332 bureaucratic planning system needed informal political avenues for expressing national recognition of regional cultural inequalities and for negotiating new compensation measures to respond to territorial interests, so that it could continue to function as a structure for Japanese regional development. Local government in Japan is often powerless against the national government with respect to planning, as indicated by the trend of expanding bureaucratic powers over the last three decades (Sorensen 2002). Yet, by constrast, this study showed that a prefectural government did have substantial power to resist the national government's authority, at least in regards to U.S. bases. Further, it was revealed that a city government (i.e. Nago City) also had the power to interfere with national and international decisions, as with the relocation of the air station, although the mayor decided not to exercise that power. In sum, this study found that Japanese local governments had the potential to challenge the national bureaucratic and hierarchical planning system. Although the state-local relationship in this case involved the issue of U.S. bases, which is not common to all the localities in Japan, the study supports Muramatsu's (1997) observations regarding the power of local governments, which argue their substantial administrative power against the national government. Okinawa's cultural politics was necessarily oriented toward greater autonomy or decentralization. Decentralization has recently emerged as a top agenda item between the national and local governments as well as in Japanese society (Barret 2000). This study found that the 1999 Decentralization Law had little relevance to the Tokyo-Okinawa relationship because it did not include issues that related to cultural 333 inequalities. On the contrary, it even strengthened the central power for securing privately owned land for bases (Ota 2003). This suggests that the current level of administrative decentralization in Japan was not only irrelevant, but also rather disadvantageous. It should be noted that Japanese decentralization is an ongoing process and thus it is too early to evaluate its impacts on Okinawa, but as far as the 1995-2000 period is concerned, its potential for promoting cultural diversity (Barret 2000) was not engaged by the prefecture. Overall, the current bureaucratic planning system was found to be inadequate in addressing cultural inequalities vis-d-vis economic inequalities and could not mitigate substate nationalism and cultural politics without the heavy involvement of politicians. However, politicians both at national and local levels experienced external and internal pressures, and did not, or could not, continue to prioritize the issue of cultural inequalities, tending instead to return to 'business as usual.' The rise of Okinawa substate nationalism was clearly a shock to the ideology of the Japanese regional planning system, which concentrated on regional economic disparities, but, at the same time, the power of redistribution was demonstrated. 8.4. Implications for Planning Practices in Okinawa This case study adopted the concept of substate nations to aid in the comprehension of the processes and mechanisms involved in the restructuring of the relationship between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture. Defining Okinawa as a territory inhabited by national minorities facilitated the understanding of Okinawa's unprecedented challenge to the national government as a dynamic interplay between 334 cultural politics and economic politics. It has become evident that the cultural politics used by Okinawans had a certain power to change, to some extent, the national government's attitude toward Okinawa. Without cultural politics, it would have been difficult for Okinawa to begin negotiations with the national government for promoting regional interests with respect to the return of U.S. bases and regional development. Some issues have surfaced for Okinawa planners and decision-makers who are currently, or will be, involved in cultural politics in various ways, for example as initiators or advocates. First, the legitimacy of regional cultural equality as a policy objective has yet to be discussed sufficiently within Okinawa. Thus, planners and decision-makers need to rationalize the importance of cultural equality. While regional economic equality can be evaluated quantitatively, for example by the level of public investment, cultural equality is more difficult to evaluate in this manner and requires a more qualitative approach. For instance, the using of specific language in public institutions is a relatively clear criterion, as exemplified in the case of Quebec. As shown in this case study, language (i.e. dialect) is a major source of Okinawan identity, but was not a policy target during the study period. Okinawans have argued that the level of concentration of U.S. military bases is an indication of inequality, but the more fundamental issue seems to be the power for more autonomous regional governance, which need to be included in discussions about the development of Okinawa. However, the form and content of local autonomy are diverse, and thus different actors are likely to have different concepts in mind. In reality, bureaucrats in Japan have delayed decentralization, and thus it may be difficult for Okinawans to have a clear vision of autonomy. Therefore, the nature of regional cultural equality, and the criteria to 335 evaluate the achievement of it, must be discussed extensively and shared by constituencies as a policy goal. The issue of identifying possible evaluation criteria for assessing cultural equalities as a policy innovation has not been publicly addressed. This is imperative in order to explore the necessity and legitimacy of cultural equalities for planners and decision-makers in Okinawa, as well as in the mainland. Second, as we have seen cultural politics often conflicted with economic interests held by various actors and at various scales within Okinawa. For local planners and decision-makers who want to strengthen their power to negotiate with the national government, the process of mediating different local interests and forming a consensus on ways to seek cultural equality is inevitable. In dealing with conflicting interests, the legitimacy of regional cultural equality as a policy objective, again, needs to be acknowledged. This case study found that while some 'policy forums' were established between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture, there were no inclusive 'policy forums' established within Okinawa, between the prefecture and municipal government, nor between these governments and civil society. Regional cultural equality is a new public policy issue in Japan, and outside of Okinawa it is not necessarily recognized as important (although there are issue relating to the Ainu in Hokkaido and Tohoku). Therefore, special efforts are needed for Okinawan people to construct and communicate cultural equality as a policy goal within Okinawa. Lastly, the issue of leadership is critical. In the process of restructuring the Tokyo-Okinawa relationship, individual politicians played key roles. While top political negotiations could increase the national recognition of Okinawa, the 336 dependence on individual political actors made Okinawa's cultural politics fragile. In particular, Okinawans' strong dependence on an individual governmental leader, former Prefectural Governor Ota, was one of the reasons for this fragility. Therefore, it is necessary for Okinawan planners and decision-makers to address the question of who should lead cultural politics and how the latter should, or can, be supported. The case study of Okinawa shows the strong involvement of politicians through the entire process, but all the initial actors had disappeared from state-substate negotiations by the end of the study period (i.e. year 2000). This suggests the significance of understanding the role of leadership and the ways in which local interests are represented and transformed into a political force. 8.5. Future Research Substate nations have emerged as a phenomenon since the 1990s in numerous countries. This study attempted to understand the dynamics of a substate nation in Japan and the characteristics of the structure of one particular state-substate relationship. However, it cannot show to what degree this Japanese case is in any way unique. Does it represent a particularly Japanese-style approach to dealing with peripheral regions that is in some way distinct from mainstream cultural and economic politics? In other words, it does not confirm whether similar powers drive the emergence of substate nations in other jurisdictions (for example in Europe and Asia) or their cultural politics, and particular outcomes. For example, cultural regions, such as Hawaii and Puerto Rico, share similarities with Okinawa in terms of their island status, peripheral nature, and the presence of U.S. bases. Yet, how are their relationships with the United States structured? The issues of other national minorities in Japan, such as the Ainu, are also 337 possible subjects for comparison with the Okinawan case. It is further possible to compare Okinawa with larger and industrialized cultural regions, such as Scotland, Quebec, and Catalonia. Specifically, this study found that the informal negotiations between the Japanese government and the prefectural government of Okinawa played an important role in the restructuring of their relationship. Further studies that focus on detailed negotiations between nation-states and substate nations suggest themselves in alternative jurisdictions. Comparative studies can be expected to promote critical evaluations of the Japanese planning model and its relationship to the substate nation. Such studies can be expected to provide both a conceptual foundation and alternative courses of action. Further, comparison with foreign (non-Japanese) substate nations will be useful to encourage 'substate nations' as a new research field in Japan studies. 338 Epilogue At the beginning of the new millennium, the relocation of Futenma Air Station was still delayed and U.S. soldiers continued to commit rapes in Okinawa, yet public protests were smaller when compared to the 1995 public rally. Does this imply that cultural politics was a dead issue for Okinawa, and that the peripheral region had now foregone the need to address cultural inequalities in exchange for more special economic assistance? Some new developments occurred in and outside Okinawa, implying that the region's cultural politics might have entered into a new phase after the year 2000. While another prefecture-wide movement against the presence of U.S. military bases seems less likely to occur under Inamine's administration, which entered its second four-year term in 2002, cultural politics have continued and are even more complex. Thus as the pressure to retain and perhaps increase U.S. forces in East Asia have increased following the September 2001 event, cultural political actors in Okinawa may have begun to find new ways to become more proactive and effective. Most symbolically, former Governor Ota entered the national political arena as a member of the House of Councillors, affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (Shaminto), in 2001, and increased his presence at the national level representing Okinawans' interests, in particular the issue of U.S. military bases. In 2003, the victory of an anti-relocation candidate for Ginowan City, where Futenma Air Station is located, Mayor Yoichi Iha, suggests the continuing deep-seated local antagonism towards the 339 presence of the bases in Okinawa (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 28 April 2003). Iha's victory indicated that Governor Inamine's policy to relocate the air base within Okinawa was not supported by those who would most seriously suffer from its impacts. Civic groups' activities against the bases in general and the relocation of Futenma Air Station in particular became more strategic and sophisticated. For example, in September 2003, a lawsuit over the relocation project filed by U.S. environmental groups and four Japanese groups (Dugong Network Okinawa, Save the Dugong Foundation, Committee Against Heliport Construction, Save Life Society, and the Japan Environmental Law Federation) against the U.S. Department of Defense in the U.S. District Court symbolized the internationalization of local civic actions (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 27 September 2003). The establishment of a civic group (Civic Assessment Nago), which aimed to conduct its own assessment of the environmental impacts of the construction of a new air base in Nago, suggests that citizens have not only become more knowledgeable about impact assessment but also have become more skilful in their involvement in the public decision-making process (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 11 May 2003). These developments suggest that new and strategic actors are beginning to appear and indicate the possibility of fresh approaches to the presence of U.S. bases on Okinawa, and more specifically the relocation project. Meanwhile, the mobilization of citizens against the presence of the bases and the relocation project is ongoing. For example, about 7,000 people participated in a three-day peace march against the passage of legislation that allowed for military emergencies that involved protest against U.S. bases on Okinawa in May, 2003, during 340 which the Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha publicly supported the removal of Futenma Air Station, not its relocation to Nago (see The Ryukyu Shimpo, 18 May, 2003). These examples suggest the diversification and advancement of cultural politics and an increasingly important role of civic actors, as well as mounting concerns about human rights, including the right to environmental quality and human security. This trend implies that the relative power of civil society is growing in Okinawan society. Additionally, as exemplified by the persistence of Okinawan's pride as uchinancyu (native Okinawans), shown in a poll conducted by The Ryukyu Shimpo in December 2001 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 1 January 2002), their territorial and collective self-identity appears distinct. It is also important to note that Okinawans' identity as indigenous peoples has begun to intensify, as suggested by an Okinawan citizens' group's participation in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 2002 (The Ryukyu Shimpo, 25 September 2002). These new developments after 2000 seem to indicate that both civic power and cultural identity are on the rise in Okinawa. Nevertheless, local actions have yet to achieve any significant progress with respect to the return of U.S. bases. East Asian security remains uncertain. Governor Ota's 1995 proposal of the phased return of U.S. bases (the Okinawa Action Program) assumed that it would stabilize substantially by the middle of the 2010s. However, in 2004, it appears that there remain difficult issues to be negotiated between North Korea and Japan and the United States, and tensions remain between China and Taiwan. These are major factors that justify the presence of U.S. bases, more specifically U.S. Marines, in East Asia, although regional security is expected to become more stable gradually. Further, a review of U.S. 341 policies on terrorism after "September 11" involved the reorganization of the Marines, which might encourage a reduction in scale but with an intensification of their function; thus the U.S. military will need Okinawa into the foreseeable future (The Okinawa Times, 12 January 2004). In short, there is little sign that the U.S. will change its policy on Okinawa drastically. Currently, Prime Minister Koizumi (the Liberal Democratic Party) does not exhibit a strong interest in Okinawa compared with the other three prime ministers introduced in this study (i.e. Murayama, Hashimoto and Obuchi). Rather, he is proactive in supporting the Bush administration's anti-terrorism policies and strengthening Japan-U.S. security cooperation. This national policy is not advantageous for Okinawa's interest in accelerating the reduction of the bases, either in terms of their total number or functions. These latest developments suggest the emergence of diverse actors who aim to promote either civic or cultural (or ethnic) interests internationally and in the face of the uncertainty in terms of the impacts of U.S. military restructuring and the persistence of the Japanese centralized administrative system. In this context, it is evident that Governor Inamine and the prefectural government may be abandoning cultural politics in favour of national economic assistance. More specifically, the intrinsic inability of the prefectural government to represent substate nationalism has become apparent. It was only through such a charismatic leader as Governor Ota that cultural politics was placed on the national agenda. It seems unlikely that an equally visionary governor will be elected after Inamine, given present trends in U.S. military strategy and the level of regional economic development in Okinawa. Instead, the diversification and intensification of the involvement of civic actors suggest that Okinawa's cultural politics 342 is reaching for more strategic approaches to the issue of the presence of U.S. bases. The cultural identity of Okinawans is attracting greater attention among non-Japanese researchers after 2000 (see, for example, Allen 2002, Hein and Selden 2003, Kreiner 2001, Roberson 2001). This trend suggests that the issue of the status of Okinawa and Okinawans within Japan will impart valuable information and lessons for international politics and development. The involvement of international scholars may help to identify in cultural politics in Okinawa that which has yet to be adequately recognised. 343 Appendix 1: The Location of U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa Honto Source: The Shape of Okinawa (Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) 344 Appendix 2: Protest Rally in Okinawa, 21 October 1995 Source: Okinawa kara no Message (Okinawa Prefectural Government 1997) 345 Appendix 3: The Location of Okinawa Prefecture Source: The Shape of Okinawa (Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) 346 List of Interviewees Hajime Chinen, Associate Professor, Department of Law & Letters, University of the Ryukyus (25 August 2001, at University of the Ryukyus, Nishihara Town, Okinawa) Reiji Fumoto, Director, Futenma Air Station and Naha Port Reversion Affairs Office, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government (1 September 2001, at the prefectural government, Naha City, Okinawa) Masaaki Gabe, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of the Ryukyus (29 August 2001, at University of the Ryukyus, Nishihara Town, Okinawa) Toyoko Ichida, Wild Bird Society of Japan (30 August 2001, at the Ogimi Village community centre, Okinawa) Tomohiro Nagamoto, The Okinawa Times (31 August 2001, at The Okinawa Times, Naha City, Okinawa) Takashi Omine, Okinawa Association (9 July 1999, at Okinawa Association, Tokyo) Kazuo Oshiro, Bank of the Ryukyus, Naha, Okinawa (25 September 1998, at Bank of the Ryukyus) Toshio Tajima, Urban Planning Consultant, Chiiki Keikaku Kenkyujo, Tokyo (8 August 2001, at Chiiki Keikaku Kenkyujo) Yoshiyuki Uehara, Deputy Director General, Department of Planning and Development, Okinawa Prefectural Government (23 July 2001, at the prefectural government, Naha City, Okinawa) Hiroya Yoshikawa, Professor, Department of Law and Economics, Okinawa University (29 August 2001, at Okinawa University, Naha City, Okinawa) Appendix 4 : List of Interviewees 347 Hokkaido Kanto Chubu Kinki Chuaoku Kyushu 1 Hokkaido 9Ibaraki 17 Shizuoka 25 Shiga 31 Tottori 40 Fukuoka Tohoku 10 Tochigi 18 Aichi 26 Nara 32 Okayama 41 Saga 2 Aomori 11 Gunma 19 Nagano 27 Kyoto 33 Shimane 42 Nagasaki 3 Iwate 12 Chiba 20 Gifii 28 Osaka 34 Hiroshima 43 Oita 4 Akita 13 Saitama 21 Toyama 29 Wakayama 35 Yamaguchi 44 Kumamoto 5 Miyagi 14 Tokyo 22 Ishikawa 30 Hyogo Shikoku 45 Miyazaki 6 Yamagata 15 Kanagawa 23 Fukui 36 Kagawa 46 Kagoshima 7 Fukushima 16 Yamanashi 24Mie 37 Tokushima 47 Okinawa 8 Niigata 38 Kochi 39 Ehime Appendix 5: Regions and Prefectures in Japan Source: National Land Agency 1987 348 0 5 10 15 20km Appendix 6: Municipalities in Okinawa Honto Source: A Minute Guide to Okinawa: Society and Economy (Bank of the Ryukyus International Foundation 1995) Appendix 7: Kadena Air Base Source: Okinawa no Beigun Kichi (General Affairs Department, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) 350 Appendix 8: Futenma Air Station Source: Okinawa no Beigun Kichi (General Affairs Department, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) 351 H e n o k o Ord inance A m m u n i t i o n Depot C a m p Schwab S e n a h a Commun ica t i ons Stat ion \ Kadena Ammunitioj Sobe Communicat ions ' Storage Site Yomitan Auxil iary. Airf ield C a m p K u w a e C a m p Zukeran Fu tenma Air Stat ion Mak iminato : Service A r e a I Naha Port Facil ity A h a Tra in ing A rea H o k u b u Train ing A r e a Ginbaru Training A r e a C a m p Hansen (note: th is is not inc luded ^ff in the S A C O Final Report ) IV.V.'.'.l Full Return V///A Partial Return 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 tl f } \ ri i I I ii Consol idat ion to Exist ing Bases Relocat ion to a N e w Site 1 1 Not A g r e e d 10 15 20km Appendix 9: U.S. Bases Agreed For Return by the SACO Final Report by Method of Return Source: The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) 3 5 2 List of Return Land (SACO) 1) Futenma Air Station 2) Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions: Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121 ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean. Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area. 3) Aha Training Area Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release US joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided. 4) Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. Appendix 10: List of Return Land (Part 1) Source: The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) 353 5) Sobe Commun ica t i on Site Return Sobe Commun ica t ion Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to f inish the process by the end of March 2 0 0 1 after the an tenna facil it ies and associated suppor t facil it ies are relocated to C a m p Hansen . 6) Yomi tan Auxil iary Airf ield Return Yomi tan Auxil iary Airfield (approx. 191 ha/471 acres) with the intention to f inish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to le J ima Auxil iary Airf ield and Sobe Commun ica t i on Site is relocated. 7) C a m p Kuwae Return most of C a m p Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to f inish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is re located to C a m p Z u k e r a n and remaining facil i t ies there are re located to C a m p Zukeran or o ther US facil it ies and areas in Ok inawa. 8) Senaha Commun ica t ion Station Return Senaha Communica t ion Stat ion (approx. 61 ha/151 acres) wi th the intention to f inish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facil i t ies and assoc ia ted support facil it ies are relocated to Tori i Communica t ion Stat ion. However, the mic rowave tower port ion (approx. 0.1 ha/0.3 acres) will be retained. 9) Makiminato Service A rea Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to w iden the Route, after the facil it ies which will be af fected by the return are relocated within the remain ing Mak iminato Service Area . Appendix 10: List of Return Land (Part 2) Source: The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) 3 5 4 10) Naha Port Jointly cont inue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connect ion to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres) . 11) Housing consol idat ion ( C a m p Kuwae and C a m p Zukeran) Consol idate US housing areas in C a m p Kuwae and C a m p Zukeran and return port ions of land in housing areas there with the intention to f in ish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at C a m p Zukeran; in addit ion, approx. 35ha/85 acres at C a m p Kuwae will be returned through housing consol idat ion. That land amoun t is included in the above entry on C a m p Kuwae) . Appendix 10: List of Return Land (Part 3) Source: The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) 355 Base Return Action Program Map of Facilities to be Returned According to Phase le-Jima Auxiliary Airfield ft As. Yaedake Communications Site Olcuma Rest Center o V v Aha Training Area Hokub Training Area Gesaji Communications Site Kadena Ammunitio Storage Senaha Communications Station Sobe Communications^ Site Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Torii Communication; Station Kadena Air Base — Army POL Oepots -Camp Kuwae Camp Zukeran Futenma Air Station Makiminato Service Area Naha Port_ Facility , Army POL Oepots - Camp Courtney • Camp McTureous - Camp Shields - Henoko Ordnance k Ammunition Depot - Camp Schwab • Camp Hansen - Ginbaru Training Area - Kin Blue Beach Training Area - Kin Red Beach Training Area Ukibaru-Jima Training Area White Beach Awase Communications Site Deputy Division Engineer Office T suk en-Jima Training Area Phase 1 -2001 Phase 2 2002-2010 Phase 3 2011-2015 Name of Facilities Naha Pari facilities Futenma Air Station Deputy Division Engineer Office Camp Kuwaa (Partial) Chibana Site Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Tengan Pier Ginbaru Training Area Kin Blue Beach Training Area Okuma Rest Center Makiminato Service Area Camp Zukeran Camp Kuwae Awase Communications Site Sobe Communications Site Torii Communications Station Senaha Communications Station Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot Kesaji Communications Site Camp Courtney Camp McTureous Yaedake Communications Sita Aha Training Area Northern Training Area Kadena Air Base Kadena Ammunition Storage Camp Shields Army POL Oepots Camp Schwab Camp Hsnsen le -Jima Auxiliary Airfield Kin Red Beach Training Area White Beach Ukibaru-Jima training Area Tsuten-Jima Training Area Torisima Range Idt:suna Jima Range Ku me Jima Range Kobi Sho Range Sekibi Sho Range Oki Oatto-Jfcna Range Appendix 11: Base Return Action Program Map of Facilities to be Returned According to Phase Source: Summary Report of International Workshop on Regional Development, February 10,1997 (Cosmopolitan City Development Promotion Office, Okinawa Prefectural Government) 356 Appendix 12: Offshore Heliport Plan A (pier attached to the seabed) and Plan B (pontoon) Source: Kaijo Heliport Kihonan ni Tsuite, 1997 (Futenma Hikqjd Isetsu Taisaku Honbu, Japan Defense Agency) Appendix 13: Naha Military Port Source: Okinawa no Beigun Kichi (General Affairs Department, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) Appendix 14: Urasoe Port Source: Okinawa no Beigun Kichi (General Affairs Department, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) Appendix 15: Camp Shwab (in Henoko) Source: Okinawa no Beigun Kichi (General Affairs Department, Okinawa Prefectural Government 1998) 3 6 0 Population Change by Area 700000 600000 500000 400000 / 300000 200000 100000 0 J i_ Northern Area - - Central Area — - Southern Area 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Appendix 16: Population Change by Area Source: Statistical Yearbook for Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa Ken Toukei Nenkan) 2002 361 Bibliography Accordino, John J. 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