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Bush, ridge, rove & the creation of the Department of Homeland Security Gillies, James Clark 2003

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BUSH, RIDGE, R O V E & T H E C R E A T I O N OF T H E D E P A R T M E N T OF H O M E L A N D SECURITY by JAMES C L A R K GILLIES B.A. Hons., University of Victoria, 2000 A THESIS S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L M E N T OF T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S FOR T H E D E G R E E OF M A S T E R OF A R T S in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts) W e accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A August 2003 © James Clark Gillies, 2003  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by t h e head o f my department o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n .  Department o f  ?O\I IT'CAJ J  S t - ' ^ c ^  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date  Aucy.K.-T  7,S  j  IjQg'S  ABSTRACT  In June 2002, President George W . Bush asked Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security to better protect the United States against further terrorist attacks. The public service reorganization that has taken place is perhaps the largest in American history apart from the post-World War II armed forces restructuring. But it remains to be seen whether this initiative w i l l be effective. This thesis is an analysis of the factors at play in the creation o f the Department o f Homeland Security. It focuses on how the department came about, and what challenges, both political and bureaucratic, those who administer and manage the department w i l l face. The thesis relies upon existing public management and bureaucratic theory literature to assess the new department. It also analyzes the Bush administration's governing style and their execution o f presidential power. In particular, it discusses the role played by Bush's chief strategist K a r l Rove in forging the new department. The Department of Homeland Security is not only a timely topic and one that allows for investigation of the federal U.S. public service but it is also about reinventing government, not through small endeavours internal to a department, but through the creation of a new and large organization.  ii  T A B L E OF CONTENTS  Abstract  ii  Table of Contents  iii  Acknowledgements  iv  Introduction and Overview  1  C H A P T E R 1 The Creation o f the Department of Homeland Security  5  C H A P T E R 2 The Politicized-Crisis Presidency: A Reconceptualization o f Presidential Power & the Ascendancy of Responsive Competence . . . . 19 C H A P T E R 3 The Department of Homeland Security Mandate & Organizational Structure 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5  The D H S Organization The D H S Budget Intelligence The Role of the Private Sector The Management Challenge  37 39 44 47 51 54  C H A P T E R 4 Politicized Incompetence: The Bush Administration & Ideological Entrepreneurship  60  Bibliography  77  Appendix I  Department o f Homeland Security Proposal Comparisons  Appendix II Department of Homeland Security Organization  iii  83 84  i I i !  "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." ~ Benjamin Franklin, i n Historical Review of Pennsylvania (1759)  " M e n o f ordinary physique and discretion cannot be Presidents and live, i f the strain be not somehow relieved. W e shall be obliged always to be picking our chief magistrates from among wise and prudent athletes - a small class." ~ Woodrow Wilson, i n Constitutional Government in the United States (1908)  "To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public." ~ Theodore Roosevelt, i n challenge to President Woodrow Wilson's crackdown on dissent following America's entry into World War I (1918)  iv  It is difficult to write about the creation of the Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) without first discussing American homeland security in the aftermath of the September 1 1 attacks and the subsequent transformation of American foreign policy. th  The research presented here focuses on how the department came about, what factors were at play in its creation, and what challenges, both political and bureaucratic, those who administer and manage the department w i l l face. The purpose of the research is two fold: first, it looks at the department from a public management standpoint to get a better sense of the implications o f creating, or perhaps more accurately, shifting resources to create a massive federal bureaucracy, with focus on issues arising from its establishment and the web o f politics that ensnares the D H S . In terms of evaluating this public management innovation, it may be too early to render an accurate appraisal. But it is not \too early to outline the goals and tasks that have been set for the D H S and whether its mandate is feasible and its organizational structure conducive to the ultimate goals of American homeland security. Second, and just as significant as the public management aspects of creating the D H S , are the political motivations of the White House and the role played by Congress in forging the department. The focusing event of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks not only set the United States government on a new course o f foreign policy but has allowed for new relationships among institutions i n Washington i n terms o f setting and controlling the agenda. This leads to two important questions, namely, who has taken advantage of the situation and who can profit politically from the issue of homeland security? This section o f the research w i l l not only focus on both theories o f public administration and bureaucracy but also on the concept of presidential power and the  1  changing role o f the White House in the domestic policymaking and governance o f the nation. Perhaps the most important public management innovation in the case of the D H S is the massive impact the department has and w i l l have on the federal public service. The D H S is made up o f individuals from twenty-two agencies employing 170,000 workers. The uprooting o f these public servants is considered to be the largest overhauling o f the federal public service since President Harry Truman restructured the A r m e d Forces in 1947. In many respects, however, this overhaul is infinitely more complicated. There is also an argument to be made that the D H S was a gambit by the White House to change existing labour laws and crush federal employee unions. More convincingly, it is argued by a number of scholars that the department was created for purely political and electoral reasons as the White House and, specifically, the president's chief strategist K a r l Rove, appropriated the Homeland Security department plans and agenda from Senate Democrats and used it as an issue to rally Republican support in the 2002 midterm elections. The research is structured in four chapters. A chronological synopsis of the events that led to the establishment of the D H S begins the research. Part of this chronology focuses on a review of the genesis of the homeland security field, including a pre-9/11 security task force, led by two former U.S. Senators, whose recommendations were not implemented prior to the attacks. This task force provided the initial organizational design for what became the D H S and outlined many o f the options available in the homeland security arena both before 9/11 and after.  2  The manner in which the White House came to embrace the D H S plans w i l l be discussed in detail in the second chapter. It w i l l focus on the institutions that brought about the department, the roles played by Congress and the White House, and specifically those advisers to President George W . Bush who reversed course on homeland security and usurped the issue from Democrats. Informed by key scholars o f public management, an analysis o f the Bush administration's governing style and the way in which the president has structured the White House staff is discussed throughout this section. The third chapter discusses the organizational structure of the D H S and areas of the mandate that the department perhaps needs to rethink. It focuses on the D H S budget, the role of the private sector, and includes a look at how intelligence gathering is going to work within the new framework. It also looks at some of the agencies that were relocated under the D H S umbrella from other departments and how those existing departments are affected by the changes. This leads into a discussion of the challenges Homeland Security Secretary T o m Ridge w i l l have to face in managing such a complex department. Finally, to bring together the three chapters of research, theories o f public management and bureaucracy w i l l be applied to the way in which the Bush administration is dealing with the D H S . It w i l l then conclude with an inventory of what the department and administration may have to consider i f the D H S is to be effective. Some of the research material is from newspaper articles and political speeches. But a number of key studies, most notably by the Foreign Policy Studies scholars at the Brookings Institution, are relied upon heavily to link the facts about the department to the wider debates in public management and public administration circles. The D H S is not only a timely topic and one that allows for investigation of the federal public service but  3  it is also about reinventing government, not through small endeavours internal to a department, but through the creation of a new and large organization.  4  1. The Creation of the Department of H o m e l a n d Security Just four weeks after the terrorist attacks on N e w Y o r k and Washington, Executive Order 13228 established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) as an advisory body in the Executive Office of the President to "coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from, terrorist attacks within the United States." Bush appointed long-time friend and former Governor 1  of Pennsylvania T o m Ridge to the post of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the O H S was created primarily to advise the president and develop a national strategy for dealing with terrorism. It would, however, prove to be a temporary measure. The O H S was hastily created but not hastily envisioned. The Heritage Foundation, the C A T O Institute, and studies conducted by the R A N D Corporation, the General Accounting Office, and the National Intelligence Council had called for a more focused effort on homeland security even during the last year of the Clinton administration. The U.S. Commission on National Security, a taskforce chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, had not only called for a more focused effort but had advocated the creation o f an agency devoted to the task eight months before 9/11.  White House, "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security," October 8, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html. See also Victoria A . Greenfield, The Role of the Office of Homeland Security in the Federal Budget Process: Recommendations for Effective Long-Term Engagement. (Santa Monica: R A N D Corporation, 2002), xi-xii. See Alvin S. Felzenberg, Heritage Foundation, "The Keys to a Successful Presidency," 2000, specifically Chapter 5 - Enacting a National Security Agenda, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/Mandate/kevs_chapter5.cfrn. See Cato Institute, Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 106 Congress (Washington: Cato Institute, 1999), specifically Chapter 47 - Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 1  2  th  5  The genesis for much o f the focus on homeland security after 9/11 came from the Phase III and final Hart-Rudman report, entitled "Road M a p for National Security: Impetus for Change." In the report, they warned that: The dramatic changes i n the world since the end o f the Cold War have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes i n the Executive Branch o f the U.S. government. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy. Most troublesome is the lack o f an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Clear goals and priorities are rarely set. Budgets are prepared and appropriated as they were during the C o l d War. 3  The 150 page report outlined a series o f national security inadequacies i n almost every department, with particularly pointed criticism of the Departments o f Defense and State. The Hart-Rudman report was delivered in February 2001 and was largely ignored. Instead o f heeding the report's advice, another task force was established. In M a y 2001, V i c e President Cheney was appointed head o f the Office o f National Preparedness, an anti-terrorism task force to gauge the threat o f nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks against the American homeland. The task force neither met nor presented a published report and only existed in White House speeches and in headlines. Infighting among government agencies slowed homeland security progress even further. Turf wars between the F B I , the C I A , and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) undermined efforts by lawmakers to create a more comprehensive homeland defense plan. Their inability to work together contributed to the failure to  See Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts. Issues, and Options (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), specifically Chapter 2 - Understanding Homeland Security. See Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, "Road Map for National Security: Impetus for Change," Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security. February 2001. It called for a reorganization to bring together the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in a new National Homeland Security Agency. Hart and Rudman, "Road Map for National Security," x-xi. 3  6  follow up leads that might have exposed the al Qaeda plot prior to 9/11. The precise nature of the failure to share information is now well documented in the Congressional joint inquiry into intelligence community activities surrounding 9/11. This wrangling among agencies over homeland security had really been occurring since the bombings in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center during the Clinton years. Some would contend, as the Hart-Rudman report concluded, that it had been occurring since the end o f the Cold War. The O H S was small and primarily served in an advisory capacity. Its main effect was to bring Ridge into the inner circle of Bush's advisers, along with Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary o f Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld's deputy Paul Wolfowitz, all of whom essentially formed the initial President's Homeland Security Council.  4  Some policymakers, however, were less than pleased with the performance of  the O H S . Its mandate was massive but vague. It also had a tremendous staffing shortage in terms of achieving any of its objectives and lacked budget leverage. M a n y argued, including some in the administration, that i f such an office was going to be created, Tom Ridge would have to be more than just an anti-terrorism czar and be given authority over other agencies to maintain control on the ground when disaster strikes. To be effective, Ridge would have to be able to override line departments not under his authority. But at this stage, the O H S was not a line department nor did it have much real authority. It seemed that the scope o f the O H S was unfeasible. It was agreed among many Democrats and Republicans that a homeland security apparatus was needed to guide the federal  7  government in a time o f crisis but it was clear that such an office would have to be provided with the resources and clout i n Washington to work with traditional agencies like the Departments o f Defense and Justice, the F B I , and the C I A . Strategically, this is the major public management problem with creating a new department. National security advisers believed that Ridge and the O H S would be forced to "take powers away from various different agencies that have them now. There is nothing harder i n the federal government than doing that."  5  The question thus became how it would be possible, or even feasible, to coordinate some forty other agencies and whether Ridge would be given, and could effectively utilize, the power to not simply coordinate the various agencies but actually make decisions for them. Led by Joseph Lieberman, some Senate Democrats and a couple o f Republicans, including Pennsylvania Senator A r l e n Specter, began calling for the establishment o f a Department o f Homeland Security almost as soon as the O H S was created. In an October 11, 2001 press statement by the Lieberman-chaired Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs announcing his bill for the creation o f a full department, Lieberman suggested that "we need a robust, executive-level department to carry out the core functions o f homeland defense, which are prevention, protection and preparation." Similar legislation in the House was proposed by Representatives W i l l i a m 6  Thornberry (R-Texas) and Ellen Tauscher (D-California).  The Homeland Security Council is now a statutory entity with a reduced number of core members (the president, the vice president, the secretaries of homeland security and defense, and the attorney general). This council met infrequently when Ridge was head of the OHS. Ellen Nakashima and Bradley Graham, "Direct Authority Called Key in Homeland Agency," Washington Post, September 22, 2001, A7. United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Lieberman, Specter Offer Homeland Defense Legislation Proposals will be Reviewed at Friday Hearing," October 11, 2001, http://govt-aff.senate.gov/101101homedefpress.htm. 4  5  6  8  Bush and the White House strategists opposed creating an actual homeland security department for a number o f reasons. First, they did not want an expansion o f the federal bureaucracy as had occurred when previous administrations took it upon themselves to rework the federal government. If it went ahead under existing laws, the new homeland security department would have been subject to the same labour laws and public service rules and regulations concerning the hiring and removal o f employees that had occurred with the overhaul o f the Social Security Administration under Clinton, Carter's separate Department o f Education and revamped Department o f Energy, Johnson's Department o f Transportation, and probably would have occurred i f N i x o n had succeeded i n creating four superdepartments.  Days after his appointment, Ridge  suggested that the goal o f the O H S was not to create bureaucracy. He also would not try to single handedly assert control over various agencies and departments under him. Ridge stressed that his position was created by the vice president i n an emergency recommendation eight days after 9/11 and that the agency was constructed without Congressional approval, only consultation, and a simple Senatorial confirmation. A s 8  early as September 21, 2001, Lieberman was calling for a full department with a secretary appointed by the President, but confirmed by the Senate and, therefore, accountable to the Congress and the public. He also stressed that the secretary be given full authority over the department's budget and spending priorities and would be a full member o f the National Security Council.  9  Brian Faler, "Doing the Cabinet Shuffle: Experts Debate Homeland Plan's Rank among Reorganizations," Washington Post, July 30, 2002, A17. William T. Gormley, Jr., Taming the Bureaucracy: Muscles. Prayers, and Other Strategies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 117-121 and Eric Plainin and Bradley Graham, "Ridge: Goal Isn't to Create Bureaucracy," Washington Post, October 4, 2001, A24. United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Lieberman Supports Creation of National Homeland Security Agency," September 21, 2001, http://govt-aff.senate.gov/092101pressrelease.htm. 7  8  9  9  Second, the mandate, as stipulated in the executive order, called for the O H S to establish a national strategy to prevent terrorism. Bush and his advisers wanted this controlled out o f the White House. The administration had a relatively short success list of achievements and had been less than stellar in achieving many o f its aims prior to 9/11. The crisis, although a horrifying event, quickly became an issue Bush could exploit for political clout, not only in battling Congress over his agenda but in preparation for the 2002 midterms. Whether this was discussed in the weeks after 9/11 is not clear but his strategists must have realized that homeland security could become a key Bush legacy and an issue on which the president could define himself. Third, with the infighting among the intelligence agencies and the Pentagon, the White House sought a key place at the table in the post-9/11 intelligence and information gathering operations. The O H S could be used as a conduit between the various organizations to keep the White House in the loop and even ahead o f the game. Thus, the creation of the O H S rather than a cabinet-level department had the potential to be a powerful tool the Bush Administration could use to stay ahead o f the other agencies in order to receive full political credit for the national security effort. The lack of direct authority the O H S had over other agencies helped lead to Congressional legislation to establish a department. W h i l e acknowledging the O H S was an important first step, Lieberman and other lawmakers recognized that Ridge did not seem to know how to respond to most of the questions about homeland security. Gary Hart commented that "the czar model w i l l not suffice. Without budgetary or statutory authority, Ridge is doomed not to succeed. If he only has the power o f exhortation, the disparate agencies w i l l do what he asks them only when that is approved by their own  10  superiors. Ridge can have interagency working groups and encourage people in the Coast Guard to talk to Customs, but gaps and seams w i l l remain. H e w i l l have to keep going to the Oval Office to make anything happen. Anyone who knows Washington knows this won't w o r k . "  10  Ridge had been thrown into the 9/11 crisis and had a steep learning curve to overcome. In fact, from the 2000 election, the tone o f the Bush administration was ordered and organized, with clear distinctions o f power and deliberate communications that sought long term goals. But after 9/11, order seemed to break down because decisions had to come faster and the administration was not accustomed to making them that quickly. Paul Light argues that "it's what we'd call, in formal organizational terms, an organized anarchy or an organized adhocracy."  11  A s for Ridge in the position o f O H S chief and presidential adviser, Light adds that "what you're seeing is what you get when you only have a license to persuade.. .he's doing a hell o f a job with what he's got. H e ' s basically playing high-stakes poker with a pair of twos."  12  Ridge dealt mostly with trying to assemble an office from scratch,  negotiating a border security pact with Canada, and presiding over the anthrax scare during his time in the O H S , as well as attempting to draft a detailed plan on how to combat terrorism. But out o f crisis, innovation and reinvention o f public management can occur. In 1947, Truman undertook the largest transformation o f the U.S. government, when he  Gary Hart, quoted in David Corn, "Ridge on the Ledge," The Nation, November 18, 2001, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml7H20011119&s=corn, Paul Light, quoted in Dana Milbank and Bradley Graham, "With Crisis, White House Style Is Now More Fluid," Washington Post, October 10,2001, A4. Paul Light, quoted in Eric Pianin and Bill Miller, "For Ridge, Ambition and Realities Clash Homeland Security Chief May Lack Means to Implement Major Initiatives," Washington Post, January 23, 2002, A l . 10  11  12  11  merged the various branches o f the U.S. Armed Forces into the Department o f Defense to better coordinate against military threats. In this case, it took eight months after 9/11 for the White House to take up the proposal o f a full department that had originated with the Hart-Rudman Commission and had been championed by Lieberman. O n this issue, the right and the center-left, led by Senate Democrats such as Lieberman, were i n agreement that resources should be allocated for such a department headed by a Cabinet-level chief and not just a presidential adviser. But Lieberman's Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs did not design a department from scratch. The blueprints for the department were just augmented plans from what had already been suggested and outlined in the Hart-Rudman Commission's final report. That report proposed the creation o f a National Homeland Security Agency ( N H S A ) by consolidating a number o f agencies across departments. The structure would be composed o f three directorates for Prevention (Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Customs Service), Protection (Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, National Infrastructure Protection Center), and Response ( F E M A , National Domestic Preparedness Office).  Taking the Clinton administration's lead agency concept to organize  counterterrorism efforts, the Hart-Rudman plan was to give the new department and its head the lead homeland security role in the federal government. Beginning i n 2002, a group of public policy scholars at the Brookings Institution (referred to herein as Michael O'Hanlon and his colleagues or the Brookings team)  For a detailed description of the proposal see Hart and Rudman, "Road Map for National Security," 1029. Very little of the language of both the White House and Lieberman proposals deviates from the HartRudmanframework.The major differences revolve around the placement of a number of agencies which are not principally concerned with homeland security. These were not included in the Hart-Rudman report. 13  12  started to analyze the creation o f the D H S . In three separate studies, they offered recommendations on how the department should be structured and how much should be spent. In their initial study, they analyzed the Hart-Rudman suggestions and praised the simplicity o f the design. They argued that "merging critical functions dealing with frontier security, infrastructure protection, and emergency response into distinct directorates should ease communications and enhance effective implementation o f agreed policy both within and probably among the directorates."  14  But Brookings also outlined  key weaknesses o f the Hart-Rudman arrangement and it was these recommendations that fell on deaf ears. They noted that most o f the homeland security functions o f the government were not included, such as the FBI, who are responsible for domestic surveillance, the C I A , who are responsible for tracking terrorists and the materials they might bring into the country, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who are responsible for detecting and responding to a bioterrorist attack. Furthermore, they argued that the D H S could not be perceived as the lead agency without authority over these other agencies. " I f the coordinator is seen as a competitor, other agencies whose cooperation is crucial w i l l likely balk at following its lead, and bureaucratic fights over turf become pervasive."  15  A s Lieberman began working on his legislation in October, top Pentagon and N S C officials believed that a D H S was a more realistic option to achieve the mandate set out in the original executive order. The Senate bill stalled as the post-9/11 agenda shifted in Washington. After the campaign to get Osama bin Laden faltered when the invasion of Afghanistan to take out al Qaeda did not yield desired results, the foreign policy  Michael O'Hanlon et al, Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 102-103. 14  13  agenda quickly shifted to the Bush doctrine, the axis of evil, and consequently the decision to invade Iraq. In the first half of 2002, Lieberman and his committee stopped focusing on the D H S bill and concentrated on the allegations against Enron and other W a l l Street financial institutions. He issued only one statement, in March, that addressed homeland security and called on O H S director Ridge to push for a full department. In May, he finally introduced legislation but at this stage, the White House had already begun to design its own. O n June 6, 2002, Bush called on Congress to create the department in full knowledge that Senate Democrats had been working on such legislation for seven months. A month earlier, on M a y 2, Lieberman's bill, S. 1449, was introduced. It combined the previous House and Senate efforts and was known as the National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism A c t of 2002. The measure was reported out of the Governmental Affairs Committee M a y 22 on a party line vote of 9-7. But the White House legislation followed only two weeks later. The House passed Bush's plan (H.R. 5005) largely intact by the end of June. Lieberman initially did not attack the White House legislation and even seemed pleased that his initiative had finally been taken up by the administration. In a press statement from June 6, Lieberman stated that "the good news is that this broad, bipartisan group of us in Congress and the White House are on the same side as we strengthen our guard to protect the American people at home against the threat of terrorism."  16  But Lieberman and Senate Democrats balked at some o f the provisions that Bush requested and instead introduced several amendments which were passed by the Senate over the next three months. The White House bill differed from the Lieberman  15  O'Hanlon et al, Protecting the American Homeland. 104.  14  legislation i n one important respect: federal worker rights. Unions argued that the White House bill was "a back-door attempt to erode worker protections" because personnel provisions that circumvent existing civil service pay and performance rules were included.  17  If one compares the Senate bill to create a department, as written primarily  by Lieberman throughout early 2002, and the White House's version that was introduced after, about ninety-five per cent o f it is exactly the same as Lieberman's.  18  Securing the  homeland should have been an issue that was naturally bipartisan. But it did not play out that way and Rove's gambit to take the plans away from Lieberman is akin to agenda hijacking. Already under fire for dragging their heels on post-9/11 security preparations, the White House sought to turn the table on their Democratic opponents by taking up the issue of the department. K a r l Rove realized that the White House could go to the people on homeland security "because they trust the Republican Party to do a better job.. .protecting A m e r i c a . "  19  He masterminded taking control o f the homeland security  issue before Congress could finish with it and pass their version. In what was a stroke o f brilliant politics and policy entrepreneurship, Rove moved quickly to orchestrate a D H S with a distinctive Republican stamp after the White House decided i n mid-spring that there should be a department. Republicans also made Bush's handling o f the war on terrorism the centerpiece o f their strategy to w i n back the Senate and keep control of the House in the November midterm elections. Even though this department was largely the  United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Lieberman Pleased Bush Plan Tracks His Own," June 6, 2002, http://govt-aff.senate.gov/060602press.htm. Adriel Bettelheim, "Workers' Rights Issues Looming Over Homeland Security Debate," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, September 7, 2002, 2294-2297. 1 6  17  15  brainchild o f Lieberman, Rove argued that Republicans would get the credit and prove to be a "partisan bonanza for the G O P . "  2 0  For the most part, the White House received the  credit and Republicans retook control o f both houses in November. Aberbach and Rockman might see the White House actions on the creation homeland security department as part o f the "noisy crisis," in deference to politicians who openly criticize their inability to limitlessly direct the bureaucracy.  For the Bush  administration, there is a general perception that the federal public service is unresponsive to political authority and that senior bureaucrats among federal agencies w i l l "actively resist and perhaps even sabotage" policy directives from the White 21 House.  It is this distrust, as well as a concerted effort to micromanage homeland  security by the administration and the fact that the unions are a core Democratic constituency, that led to the White House proposal for additional flexibility in personnel policy in the D H S . In September, moderate Republican Senator L i n c o l n Chafee o f Rhode Island joined Democrats i n an amendment to the legislation (S.A. 4471) to keep Bush from getting his way on all his demands for management flexibility over workplace conditions in the D H S . A compromise was worked out that allowed the administration to loosen public service rules but federal employee unions could object and i f an impasse resulted, the Federal Services Impasse Panel would arbitrate. But the White House balked and instead gambled on taking control of Congress in the midterms. The gamble paid off and after the Republican victory, Lieberman and Senate Democrats negotiated an See S. 2452, The National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002, http://www.napawash.org/aa public service/Report_S2452.pdf and White House, A Bill to Establish a Department of Homeland Security, http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/hsl-bill.pdf. Karl Rove, quoted in "GOP Touts War as Campaign Issue," Washington Post, January 19, 2002, A2. Karl Rove, quoted in "GOP Touts War as Campaign Issue," Washington Post, January 19, 2002, A2. Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive (Washington: Brookings, 2000), 52. 18  19  20 21  16  agreement with the White House during the lame duck session, and Congress passed the law (H.R. 5710, S. 2452) creating the D H S on Bush's terms, with most o f the management flexibility demands intact.  22  For a comparison o f the three separate  proposals (H.R. 5005, S.A. 4471, H.R. 5710) and what agencies were included, see Appendix 1. A s can be seen, there is very little difference among the three, with only minor changes to the final composition o f each o f the four directorates. According to O'Hanlon and his colleagues, all o f this political positioning by Rove and Bush's other strategists was counterproductive to the original, and naturally bipartisan, goal to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks. The "excessive focus on organizational matters during [2002] was one reason.. .the country lost a good deal of 23  momentum on improving homeland security."  The White House vetoed several  specific proposals by Congress that would have addressed immediate security vulnerabilities and it discouraged action on a number o f Democratic initiatives to increase funding for domestic security. It was not until almost the end o f the year before the department became a reality but only after serious quarrels between the White House and Congress. One battle in particular was the White House's refusal to let Ridge testify before Congress. The Bush administration argued that he should not be forced to give formal testimony about his role as adviser. This prompted Democratic Senator Robert Byrd o f West Virginia and Republican Senator Ted Stevens o f Alaska to write a letter to Ridge requesting that he testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee. This infighting spilled over when Bush sent his plan to establish the D H S to Capitol H i l l and David Firestone and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Stalemate Ends in Bush Victory on Terror Bill," New York Times, November 13, 2002, A l . Michael O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," Washington: Brookings, January 2003, 1.  2 2  2 3  17  Congress still insisted Ridge testify. He did speak to them but not as an adviser. Instead, he formally testified about the reorganization of the executive branch and the creation of the D H S . To K a r l Rove, getting the department created before the midterms was less important than having a campaign issue and as E.J. Dionne argues, "adding to the insults to the Democrats, House Republicans larded the final bill with special interest provisions despite David Obey's (D-Wis.) argument that the administration is providing far less money than is needed for a long list of security priorities."  24  The processes that brought about the department demonstrate a lack of planning and forethought on the part of both the administration and Congress. But o f particular note is the reversal o f the White House and how a strategic adviser to the president turned the administration around. The role played by K a r l Rove and the structure o f the White House that allowed Rove such power within the administration are the focus of the next chapter.  18  2. The Politicized-Crisis Presidency: A Reconceptualization of Presidential Power & the Ascendancy of Responsive Competence Two models o f the presidency have come to dominate the political science literature on the subject. The first model originated in the 1950s, with Richard E . Neustadt, the preeminent scholar on presidential power, and was dominant until the ascendancy o f the N i x o n presidency. It is often referred to as the institutionalized presidency. The second model took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, as expressed by Richard Nathan and Terry Moe. It is known as the administrative presidency or the politicized presidency, and has been subdivided in the literature to encompass a group o f scholars (Nathan and Moe) who view the main goal o f the presidency as one o f mastering responsive competence, a term that refers to the "benefits accruing to presidents from centralization o f the institutional resources in the White House and the politicization o f the federal bureaucracy."  Another group, led by public administration experts such as  Paul Light, Donald Kettl, and Daniel Carpenter, feel that these scholars' focus on responsive competence comes at the expense o f neutral competence. This term starts from the premise that "presidents pursue and safeguard the interests o f the United States when - while seeking information, expertise and coordinative capacity - they give due regard to the capabilities o f and integrity o f established resources."  In this chapter, the  creation o f the homeland security department is used as an exemplar into how the Bush White House is executing presidential power. It is suggested that the administration has ignored both strains o f the administrative presidency model. They have clearly not asserted neutral competence, which one would expect, but have not adhered to responsive  E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Brilliant Politics, At a Price," New York Times, November 22, 2002, A41. Colin Campbell, Managing the Presidency: Carter. Reagan, and the Search for Executive Harmony (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 17.  2 4  2 5  19  competence either, except only in the context o f the immediate midterm elections. This lack of competence i n the execution o f presidential power to create the D H S has resulted in a department that is not only unresponsive to the homeland security mandate among bureaucrats, but unresponsive to the administration that created it. In his seminal research on presidential power, Richard E. Neustadt argued that when studying the presidency, "the question is not how [the President] masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance, looking toward tomorrow from today."  27  Posed some fifty years ago, that question is still central  to analysis o f any administration, and in the case o f George W . Bush, permits focus on the nature and sources o f the power that reside in the White House o f today. Nelson W . Polsby puts the scope o f presidential power into perspective. "The President must make decisions even when there is no way o f knowing what decisions ought to be made.. .Measured against the opportunities, the responsibilities, and the resources o f others in our political system and in other nations, the powers o f the Presidency are enormous."  28  It used to be that "presidential power is the power to persuade."  29  This was  certainly the case up until the presidency of John F. Kennedy. But with a longtime Washington powerbroker like Lyndon Johnson in the White House, and more significantly, with Richard N i x o n , there came about a reconceptualization o f the division of powers between Congress and the Presidency. While the Constitutional relationship between the two branches did not change in any sense that required an amendment, the scope o f White House control over the federal government was expanded and with it, the  Campbell, Managing the Presidency. 17. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Signet, 1964), 16. Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, Fourth Edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 84.  2 6 27  28  20  model o f presidential power as developed by Neustadt became somewhat outmoded. Rossiter stated as early as 1956 that "perhaps the softest spot o f all in the general health of the Presidency lies in the gap between responsibility and authority, between promise and performance, in the area o f public administration.. .his authority over the administration is in no way equal to his responsibility for its performance."  30  Rossiter foresaw a fundamental flaw with the power o f the presidency during the Eisenhower years. M a n y o f the executive functions were out o f reach o f the president, in the hands o f the Bureau o f the Budget in the Executive Office and by tradition, with the authority o f the Committees o f Congress. That changed with the usurpation o f some o f the Congressional check under Johnson, the ascendancy of N i x o n , and the creation o f the highly politicized Office o f Management and Budget. In the administrative presidency model, the president does not simply accommodate and w i n over others through powers of persuasion and teach realism to the public as Neustadt suggested, although in some instances this may occur. Instead, it was argued that the president's central sources o f power are the appointment o f the senior members o f the bureaucracy and his Cabinet from a variety o f factions within his own party, the building o f a cadre o f loyalists, and the reliance on a set o f advisers to capitalize on decisions and policy in order to maximize political gain. It is probably more accurate to suggest both are occurring, that the president has the power o f persuasion and a more developed set o f implements at his disposal to utilize resources. But it depends on the type o f administration and how the president uses those resources. W i t h the Bush administration, the advisers play a very  Neustadt, Presidential Power. 23. Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: Mentor, 1956), 237. 21  important role, perhaps more important in terms o f decision making, than previous White House office holders. A s a president with little policy experience, typified by his Washington outsider persona, and as an individual whose knowledge o f both domestic and foreign policy was limited upon taking office, it has fallen upon this core group o f advisers, led by strategist K a r l Rove, Chief o f Staff Andrew Card and V i c e President D i c k Cheney, to educate, instruct, guide, and provide the policy advice Bush needs in order to make appropriate policy decisions. This is in keeping with both the president's character and personality, as someone who prefers to delegate rather than take an active role in policy development. It also suggests the type o f leadership style he wishes to pursue. In his appraisals o f the last four presidents (Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton), C o l i n Campbell has suggested four styles chief executives may develop for the administration o f government.  31  A priorities and planning style often accompanies a president who seeks  an ambitious legislative program and who holds a strong political position that can bring about such a mandate. They want to expand White House resources and w i l l often foster competition between departments and agencies by establishing task forces and councils. A second is termed broker politics style, which develops when presidents have a strong political position but seek a modest legislative program. Campbell notes "broker-politics leaders w i l l likely resist expanding existing central agencies or creating new ones."  32  A  Colin Campbell has incorporated these types of leadership styles in many of his works. See Colin Campbell, "The Search for Coordination and Control: When and How Are Central Agencies the Answer?," in Organizing Governance. Governing Organization, eds. Colin Campbell and B. Guy Peters (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 59-60; Colin Campbell, "The White House and Presidency under the "Let's Deal" President" in The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals, eds. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham: Chatham House, 1991), 189-194; Colin Campbell, The U.S. Presidency in Crisis: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) specifically the chapter "Bill Clinton Encounters the Governability Gap," 72-103. Campbell, "The Search for Coordination and Control," 59. 31  32  22  i  third style, the administrative politics style, occurs when a president is in a tenuous political position that inhibits a bold legislative agenda. Crisis management and conventional process-management functions often take over central agencies. Campbell adds that "administrative politics arises when presidents do not take special steps to integrate competing views within their administration."  33  A final style, known as  survival politics style, arises when an administration needs to improve its performance or face replacement, and when the other three styles have failed. Bush won a narrow election victory in 2000 and prior to 9/11, governed with a style that could be most closely associated with broker politics, especially on policies like the faith-based initiative and his education plan. But since ascending into the role o f wartime president, and even before the 9/11 crisis, none o f these styles fit h i m exactly (although he clearly does not show signs o f embracing a priorities and planning style). Even prior to assuming office, on election night and during the administration-inlitigation phase, Bush and his advisers have adopted an adapted form o f survival politics. Although he seems politically strong and poised for re-election i n m i d 2003, Bush has not sought the countervailance o f multiple points of view. Instead, he relies on a group o f like-minded advisers, and therefore has allowed an administrative politics style to enter into to the mix. But with the tax cut, and especially with the homeland and national security initiatives that have accompanied the radical shift in foreign policy and focus on national defense, survival politics is what the administration has embraced. It remains to be seen how Bush as wartime president w i l l play out in terms o f leadership style and whether this survival style w i l l continue until the 2004 election. It goes without saying that this survival style is shaped and nursed along by Bush's influential advisers.  33  Campbell, Managing the Presidency. 81. 23  Influential advisers are nothing new to the presidency. Neustadt described the institutionalized presidency in the 1950s and determined that the president needs help in the form o f staff facilities o f every sort. Rossiter suggested that the institutionalized presidency "converts the Presidency into an instrument o f twentieth century government; it gives the incumbent a sporting chance to stand the strain and fulfill his constitutional mandate."  34  But the role and scope o f the advisers to the president has been altered  significantly. In describing the Franklin D. Roosevelt White House, Neustadt stated that "not only did he keep his organizations overlapping and divide authority among them, but he also tended to put men o f clashing temperaments, outlooks, ideas, in charge of them."  This dynamic has been at play with many White House staffs. Bush, however,  has opted for a set o f advisers who think very much alike ideologically. Campbell noted a similar concern during the first term o f the Reagan presidency. H e suggested that "the Reagan administration brought on board too many ideologues firm in the belief that trueblue conviction can move mountains."  But even the Reagan administration had  different strands o f conservative thinkers within its fold. Furthermore, the Bush advisers exert a different kind o f influence than, for example, did the group o f advisers known as "the best and the brightest" under Johnson. A t that time, the advisers sought the input of the independent senior bureaucracy when in the process o f policy making. Today, the reverse is the norm. The advisers set the agenda and then get the politicized senior bureaucracy to implement the strategy. The top-down approach has given the inner circle of advisers much more authority over the policy making function o f the White House. A s Campbell notes, "presidents must play close attention to the effects o f their White House  34 35  Rossiter, The American Presidency. 104. Neustadt, Presidential Power. 150-151.  24  organization and operation both on cabinet secretaries' roles and the functioning of policy shops in the Executive Office o f the President."  37  Richard Nathan describes the relationship between the president and the advisers in his work on the administrative presidency. Focusing on the N i x o n and Reagan administrations, he argues that chief executives "should organize their office - appoint, assign, and motivate their principal appointees - in a way that penetrates the administrative process" because "much o f what we would define as policymaking is done through the execution o f laws in the management process."  38  Similar to Rossiter's  foresight in the 1950s that an administration's authority over the bureaucracy needed to evolve, Nathan recognized that the "appointed officials i n the U.S. executive branch often fail to appreciate"  the need for involvement with the bureaucracy i n administrative  processes. N i x o n ' s administrative presidency model o f the White House began the concentration o f power over policy issues. Central to this model was the attempts to create four superbureaucracies. Early in his first term, N i x o n determined that he needed to create a direct means o f exercising authority over domestic bureaucracy to achieve his goals o f " N e w Federalism," a phrase introduced by the president to describe his domestic program which included a plan to rearrange responsibilities among the various levels o f government.  40  A counter-bureaucracy, set up within the White House, failed to meet the  aims but it did demonstrate the centralizing shift that the president demanded. After reelection in 1972, the N i x o n administration moved to create superbureaucraices. Four  Campbell, Managing the Presidency. 112. Campbell, Managing the Presidency. 111. Richard Nathan, The Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), 82. Nathan, The Administrative Presidency. 84. Richard Nathan, The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 17-18. 37 38  39 4 0  25  super secretaries were appointed in 1973 for Natural Resources, Human Resources, Community Development and Economic Affairs.  41  These Cabinet officers were to be  given special roles as counselors to the president but Watergate ended the administrative presidency and this new framework. The administrative presidency legacy has lived on, even being resurrected with the Reagan administration, which managed to incorporate many o f N i x o n ' s planned initiatives. A s Terry M o e indicates, "more than any other modern president, Ronald Reagan has moved with dedication and comprehensiveness to take hold o f the administrative machinery o f government. A t the heart o f his approach are the politicization o f administrative arrangements and the centralization o f policy-related concerns i n the White House."  42  In many respects, the current Bush administration has  inherited and adopted this administrative presidency model. Terry M o e takes the position that the administrative presidency marks an institutionalization o f the presidency and a diminution o f the role o f the bureaucracy and its impact o f neutral competence which historically distracted presidents from the trend o f responsive competence. Mistrust o f the senior bureaucracy, even o f those they appoint, and the need to centralize operations has put tremendous strain on the executive branch to provide a myriad o f policy and political leadership without the effective resources at their disposal. It has also cut the president off from the divided authority and competitive spirit which Neustadt argued were positive aspects o f the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. A s early as 1983, Campbell noted that "the centralization o f executive  Nathan, The Plot That Failed. 68-69. Terry M. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency" in The New Direction in American Politics, eds. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 235.  41  42  26  authority in the hands o f the president and his power o f appointment can produce less than satisfactory results."  43  Campbell, in his extensive analysis of the Carter and Reagan White Houses, juxtaposed these two administrations' differing governing styles and West W i n g structures.  44  The Reagan approach, o f a modified spokes-in-a-wheel pattern o f  administrative organization, in which a number of advisers hold sway over the operations of the presidency, is more akin to the model Bush has chosen for his White House. The major exception is the position o f prominence afforded to K a r l Rove. He occupies a position unlike any o f those advisers to Reagan or Bush Sr. The relationship between the White House Chief o f Staff and the special adviser is an interesting one. The resentment felt by Clinton's senior staff (such as George Stephanopoulos and Leon Panetta) to the intrusion o f Dick Morris is well-known but the dynamic between Card and Rove is less clear. Rove is an entity unto himself, occupying both a central election campaign role, as political consultant and strategist, and carrying that prominence into the administration, as one o f the president's chief advisers. Within the hypothetical West W i n g hierarchy, he is often an equal to Chief o f Staff Andrew Card in that his opinion matters a great deal to President Bush. Rove, especially, exemplifies this new ethos.of the more powerful adviser. Previous strategists, such as Bush Sr.'s volatile strategist and Rove's mentor Lee Atwater, or even Clinton's hired gun Dick Morris, have never instated themselves within the presidential policy realm as much as Rove.  Colin Campbell, Governments Under Stress: Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington. London, and Ottawa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 48. See Colin Campbell's "spokes-in-a-wheel" construction of the Jimmy Carter White House in Campbell, Managing the Presidency. 83-93. 43  44  27  In M o e ' s vision o f the politicized presidency, grand policy designs and massive change are usually not possible because they come up against a wall o f opposition, from the traditional checks and balances and also from the politicized agencies like the Office of Management and Budget. M o e does note that "only under special circumstances w i l l quantum leaps in the institutional presidency meet with congressional approval."  45  Certainly, the creation o f the O H S and the authority the White House has exercised over security issues since 9/11 could be considered quantum leaps. But the O H S framework did not work and with the White House push for the D H S , Rove did not act to counter what Moe described as a serious knowledge problem: "even i f [the president's advisers] had the resources to impose any reforms they liked, they would not know how to design an institutional system optimally suited to presidential needs."  46  This goes to the heart of  the White House's impractical design for the D H S . Moe adds that in facing major structural constraints, a problem is that they are "new to the scene; in fact, largely as a rational response to the knowledge problem, the presidential team w i l l purposely include members with extensive experience and connections."  47  But the more serious problem is  that the "social science o f organizations is so poorly developed" and no commissioned study, task force, or existing body o f knowledge is available to presidential advisers like Rove "for confidently linking alternative institutional designs to alternative sets o f consequences."  48  This is especially true with an overhaul o f the federal public service as significant as the D H S . There is no guidebook to which Rove can refer in order to make the square  45 46 47 48  Moe, Moe, Moe, Moe,  "The "The "The "The  Politicized Presidency," 240. Politicized Presidency," 241. Politicized Presidency," 241. Politicized Presidency," 241-242. 28  pegs of White House political strategy fit into the round holes o f the federal bureaucracy where change rarely occurs within limited political timeframes. Is the creation of the D H S a gambit by pursuit of responsive competence or is it a concerted effort by the White House to develop a more coherent bureaucratic culture that ultimately w i l l develop neutral competence or even autonomy in this vital area? It seems that neither of these reasons explains the unworkable framework for the D H S . If it were a gambit, the White House would have taken a page from previous administrations' attempts to modify the public service and would not have enacted a bureaucratic structure that w i l l not be responsive to the administration in the long-term. If the White House wanted to bring about neutral competence and even autonomy, they would have consulted the bureaucracy in proposing the framework. Instead, they were openly hostile to the public service, left them out o f the decision process, and adopted a framework that was untested. It is appropriate to now turn to the other group of scholars on the administrative presidency, those who believe that policy competence is also integral to the presidency. From a short-term political perspective, the about face on the plans for the D H S made sense to the administration. Rove and the White House team saw a rare window of opportunity to capitalize on an issue important in the hearts and minds o f the public. But the long-term effects can be damaging i f the hasty D H S plans are fully implemented. The lack of visioning and forethought that went into this plan is disconcerting. The structure of the present White House and its relationship to other institutions and agencies helped bring it about. One must speculate i f policy such as this would have been allowed prior to the N i x o n administration's reconceptualization of the executive branch. Paul Light has termed this type o f political decision making over effective policy making  29  "short-term-itis.'  ,4y  Certainly, the D H S is not a short-term proposal but the limited  planning and visioning was largely designed for immediate and short-term political payoff. Light suggests that "the President faces a dilemma between improving the quality o f outcomes (long-term) or engaging in high politics (short-term)."  50  Dennis  Simon and Charles Ostrom, Jr. articulate this dilemma: The long-term approach w i l l direct the president's actions and energies toward the solution o f principal problems o f the day.. .To the extent that such attempts fail to solve problems, the president's resource reservoir w i l l become increasingly shallow as the vicious circle begins to undermine his influence on the policy process. This explains the attractiveness o f the short-term approach. The president is relatively unconstrained in relying upon political drama and w i l l welcome the bursts i n support which actions on the political stage trigger. However, the impact o f such actions are short-lived and, by themselves, can do little but provide bumps and wiggles on the downward course o f approval. 51  The White House was able to move forward with a short-term approach because o f the structure o f the system, where re-election is always foremost in their minds, and because Lieberman and others i n Congress failed to capitalize on the issue. But the short-term versus long-term dilemma really is not at play with the Bush administration. There has been little evidence o f any long-term approach to actions. It could even be said that Rove, as an ideological entrepreneur  rather than a policy entrepreneur, is oblivious to  Simon and Ostrom's distinction, and even less to issues o f policy implementation. Another effect that has occurred over the issue o f homeland security is a breakdown in responsive bureaucratic policy as a result o f the lack o f bipartisanship.  Paul C. Light, The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton. Third Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 250. Light, The President's Agenda. 254. Dennis Simon and Charles Ostrom, Jr., "The President and Public Support: A Strategic Perspective," in The Presidency and Public Policy Making, eds. George C. Edwards, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 65-66 For an extensive analysis of ideological entrepreneurship in the Bush administration, see Colin Campbell, "Unrestrained Ideological Entrepreneurship in the Bush II Advisory System: An Examination of the 4 9  5 0 51  52  30  Moe understood this twenty years ago when he identified the president's need to make the system more responsive to his agenda. Two basic developmental thrusts occur during this pursuit o f responsive competence. M o e argues that the first is "the increasing centralization o f the institutional presidency i n the White House."  53  While executive  branch resources maybe tapped, that does not mean the president has at his disposal thousands of personnel. Therefore, "the combination o f responsiveness, flexibility, and strong incentives to circumvent established organizations and vested interests gives the White House a built-in advantage in the development o f presidential support institutions." system."  55  54  The second thrust is the "increasing politicization o f the institutional  The president wields the power o f appointment, a power that is increasing  from administration to administration in terms o f numbers and levels o f the public service affected, and one that not only ensures partisans and ideologically similar individuals are appointed to high posts but can lead to the manipulation and amendment o f civil service rules, reorganization o f parts o f the public service, and a bully pulpit from which to press for modification o f legislation. It is with this second development that the Bush administration has succeeded i n pressuring for public service change and has done it largely with the support o f Congress. The politicized presidency leads to a lack o f bipartisanship and in turn has encouraged gridlock in Congress. The administration embraced the D H S in a gridlock framework when it saw an opportunity to accuse the Democrats o f obstructionism on homeland security. This might not have been the case i f the Republicans had controlled all three  Response to 9/11 and the Decision to Seek Regime Change in Iraq," in The George W. Bush Presidency: First Appraisals, eds. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, Forthcoming, 2003. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," 244. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," 244. 53  54  31  branches as they did prior to Senator James Jeffords's defection from the G.O.P. to sit as an independent. The partisan impetus on every issue helped Rove take the D H S plans from the Democrats. If bipartisanship was truly encouraged, and not just the non-genuine campaign-speak veneer o f the two parties working together to reach common ground, then the plans for the D H S could have been more thoroughly researched and planned. The distinctive Bush administration tinge to the blueprint o f the D H S that seeks a restructuring o f public service labour laws and an escalation o f outsourcing and private sector involvement in the federal government may have also been avoided. This is not to say the White House is entirely to blame for the series o f events that culminated in the adoption of the D H S plan. The Democrats failed to get out ahead on the homeland security issue which every political strategist working for their organization could have predicted was an important election issue. The exploration o f theories of presidential power presented here is a means o f showcasing how K a r l Rove has used the system to full advantage and how the Democrats, as opposition, have fumbled. Comparison o f the different eras and circumstances is not the goal but learning from the redefining and rethinking o f presidential power from one administration to the next is important i n demonstrating how future chief executives w i l l respond to policy issues. The aftermath o f 9/11 is certainly unique and with Democrats incapable o f running against the president (without being castigated as anti-American or unpatriotic) on a wide range o f issues, it is in keeping with the competitiveness o f their chosen profession that the White House advisers should exploit the situation to maximum benefit. But they have not addressed policy  Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," 245. 32  competence at all, and as w i l l be shown, the framework for the D H S even fails to adhere to notions o f responsive competence except simply as an issue for the midterm elections. It was Rove who believed homeland security was an issue upon which the president could set the lead and the Republican Party could w i n with during the 2002 midterms. He then convinced Bush to stay ahead on homeland security. Certainly, Card and the other advisers play a major role in policy development but they do not have the president's attention i n quite the same way as Rove does. He has taken to heart what Neustadt articulated years ago. A president's object "should be to induce as much uncertainty as possible about the consequences o f ignoring what he wants. If he cannot make men think h i m bound to win, his need is to keep them from thinking they can cross him without risk."  56  While Neustadt's notion does not explicitly relate to the  administrative presidency, Rove knew it would be difficult for Democrats to run against the president on law and order issues and more specifically, on anti-terrorism and homeland security issues. It is the primary reason the D H S came about. Furthermore, the White House capitalized on the perceived heroic leadership, as opposed to reflective leadership, o f George W . B u s h .  57  Heroic type leaders require bold moves, as was seen  with the decision to go to war against Iraq. But on the domestic policy front, the decision to reverse course on the D H S was also a bold move, in keeping with the strategy to convince the public o f Bush's heroic leadership. In the spring o f 2002 as Rove helped develop the midterm strategy, he determined that Republicans could not lose on the  Neustadt, Presidential Power. 69. This terminology is adapted from Stanley Renshon's assessment of heroic versus reflective leadership among U.S. chief executives in "Governing a Divided America in the Aftermath of September 11." He argues that heroic leadership in American society is the traditional. Its archetype is Franklin D. Roosevelt. Reflective leadership, on the other hand, is more personal and diffuse. Its prototype, but not its archetype, is Bill Clinton. After 9/11, Bush is perceived to have heroic leadership qualities although much of this has 56 57  33  question o f homeland security. The vast majority o f Americans trusted Republicans over Democrats on issues o f national security. The trust-in-government scores increased remarkably in the aftermath o f 9/11. A t the end o f September 2001, 64% o f those surveyed trusted the government to do what was right. This was three times the proportion i n a 1994 poll that asked the same question.  58  That trust did not ebb through  the 2002 midterm elections. Polls indicate that throughout 2002, approval o f George W . Bush's policies towards terrorism were very high. For example, a Newsweek poll conducted in M a y 2002 showed that 71% approved of the president's performance on policies to prevent and minimize terrorism at home. That same poll conducted i n September showed 73% approval. Other polls conducted asking a similar question showed approval ratings between seventy and eighty percent.  59  When asked about the Department o f Homeland Security, again, the American public approved o f its creation. C N N / U S A Today/Gallup, A B C News/Washington Post, and C N N / T i m e polls conducted in June showed approval levels o f the creation o f a D H S at 72%, 69%, and 69% respectively. Less than a quarter disapproved o f a new department. But when asked whether the department would improve the situation, the results are quite different.  60  In the same June C N N / U S A Today/Gallup poll, it was asked  whether Bush's announced formation o f the D H S was solely because he felt it was in the best interests o f the country, or was it designed to divert attention from reports that the  come about as a result of being a wartime president. See Stanley A. Renshon, America's Second Civil War: Dispatches from the Political Center QNew Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 327-344. Dana Milbank and Richard Morin, "Public is Unyielding in War Against Terror," Washington Post, September 29, 2001, A l . Newsweek Poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates in May and September 2002, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm. ABC News/Washington Post Poll conducted by TNS Intersearch June 7-9, 2002; CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted June 7-8, 2002; CNN/Time Poll conducted by Harris Interactive June 19-20, 2002, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm. 58  59  60  34  government failed to take action on warnings about terrorist attacks it received prior to 9/11. This time, only 56% believed it was in the best interests and 39% said it was to divert attention. In the CNN/Time, a majority of respondents believed that the new D H S would cost too much (57%) and create too much bureaucracy (52%). Bush's numbers did not go down and support for the department remained high after the June announcement from the White House. Sensing this issue would be popular back in the spring, Rove advised the President to reverse course on the creation of the D H S . The flip-flop was an excellent short-term, political strategy and since Senate Democrats had largely picked up from where the Hart-Rudman Commission had left off, the White House assumed that most of the policy work had been completed. With the help o f the information dissemination resources (some might even call these propaganda resources) at White House disposal, Lieberman and Senate Democrats had little chance of convincing the public that the D H S was their brainchild and that the president did not even want a new department the year before. One might reconceptualize the presidency under the Bush administration as an extension of M o e ' s politicized presidency. Since 9/11 has dominated the president's agenda, it could be termed the "politicized-crisis" presidency wherein the leeway not afforded previous presidents over the policy agenda is allowed with Bush because of the extraordinary crisis circumstances. But does this have a negative effect on the policy making process as a whole? With Rove in a position to champion crucial decisions such as the adoption of the D H S without any interference or even discussion from among the administration, it would appear that it has had a negative effect. Bush is surrounded by ideological entrepreneurs who are only interested in the short-term and are oblivious to  35  the more complex implementation issues. In such a world, policy competence plays no role and responsive competence is incoherent to meaningless. Moe suggests that public administration scholars look favourably on the bureaucracy and unfavourably on politics. "While it is inevitably bound up with administrative behavior and a necessary component of democratic accountability, politics tends to be seen as a corrupting influence on the integrity and competence o f formal organization."  61  Herein lies the potential schism between the works on the presidency  grounded in political analyses of incentives, resources, and behaviour, like Nathan and Moe, and the public administration focus on efficient and effective government through evaluation o f appropriate organizational designs, like Kettl and Light. The research conducted by Rossiter, Neustadt, and Nathan have predicted the evolution of presidential power from administration to administration and one can see how the current Bush administration has adapted to meet political challenges. But the Bush administration does present a special case, i f not an exception to the rule, because o f the fallout from 9/11. Only time w i l l tell i f this power shift in keeping with the evolving power of the presidency is permanent or transitory. It is appropriate to now turn to the mandate and organizational structure o f the department to demonstrate its dysfunction. This w i l l be informed by bureaucratic and public management scholars whose focus is on public administration and not on the presidency specifically.  36  3. The Department o f H o m e l a n d Security M a n d a t e & O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Structure The explanation as to how the department came about is essential to understanding the organization of the D H S and its mandate. If policymakers had not had almost a year to design this department, perhaps it would not have been as complex as it has become. The reorganization that is taking place is highly disruptive at a time when many Americans believe the government should be focusing on protecting against new attacks. If true bipartisanship on this issue had existed, the key agencies needed i n the fight against terrorism could have been coordinated much faster and the D H S could have been fully operational by the end o f 2002. Instead, T o m Ridge, who was selected as the Secretary by Bush in November 2002 and was confirmed and took office i n January 2003, is faced with a bureaucratic nightmare over a year after the 9/11 attacks and in the midst o f war with Iraq. Even i f he exhibits dynamic and visionary leadership as Secretary o f Homeland Security, he still has to design coordinating mechanisms among these twenty-two agencies which w i l l take time. A number o f these agencies are highly dysfunctional, have overlapping jurisdictions, and long-standing rivalries. Ridge has the task o f melding together federal organizations with conflicting mandates, traditions, and bureaucratic cultures. For example, four separate agencies policed American borders: the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Agriculture Department's inspection office. Bureaucracies are not conducive to change in the best o f times and apart from the overarching concern over homeland security, there is little incentive for these agencies to give up previous authority and autonomy in their specific areas and submit to a new structure under the authority o f the D H S . Former House Democrat Lee Hamilton argues that "melding all o f this together is  61  Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," 265. 37  going to take a remarkable management performance - a management virtuoso."  62  Ridge  might have accepted the challenge but it is unlike virtually every other federal government restructuring. In short, the new department's priority is to protect the United States against further terrorist attacks. Component agencies w i l l analyze terrorism intelligence to match it against vulnerabilities i n the U.S., develop new technologies to detect threats and coordinate the response i n the event o f future emergencies, protect critical infrastructure, coordinate the training and funding o f state and local police and fire departments, and scrutinize borders, airports, and ports o f entry. But achieving these goals is easier said than done. The analysis o f the D H S mandate and structure w i l l be divided into sections addressing the organization, the budget, intelligence, the role o f the private sector, and the managerial challenge. Recommendations and options as suggested by the Brookings team and other public management scholars conclude each section.  Lee Hamilton, quoted in John Mintz, "Homeland Agency Launched: Bush Signs Bill to Combine Federal Security Functions," Washington Post, November 26, 2002, Al. 38  3.1 The DHS Organization The agencies slated to become part of the D H S w i l l be housed in one of four major directorates: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (See A p p e n d i x 2). The directorates are summarized below: 1. The Border and Transportation Security directorate w i l l bring the major border security and transportation operations under one roof, including the Customs Service and the Federal L a w Enforcement Training Center from the Treasury Department, most of the INS and the Office for Domestic Preparedness from the Justice Department, the Federal Protective Service from the General Services Administration ( G S A ) , the new Transportation Security Administration from the Department o f Transportation, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from the Agriculture Department. 2. The Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate w i l l oversee domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinate government disaster response. It w i l l bring together the Federal Emergency Management Agency ( F E M A ) , the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System from the Department o f Health and Human Services, the Nuclear Incident Response Team from the Department of Energy, the Domestic Emergency Support Teams from Justice, and the F B I ' s National Domestic Preparedness Office. 3. The Science and Technology directorate w i l l lead the federal government's efforts to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats involving weapons o f mass destruction. It includes the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear ( C B R N ) Countermeasures Programs and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory from Energy, the National Biological Weapons Defense Analysis Center from the Defense Department, and the Plum Island A n i m a l Disease Center from Agriculture. 4. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate w i l l analyze intelligence and information from other agencies (including the C I A , F B I , D I A and N S A ) involving threats to homeland security and evaluate vulnerabilities in U.S. infrastructure. It w i l l bring together the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office from the Department of Commerce, the Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the G S A , the National Communications System from Defense, the National Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI, and the Energy Security and Assurance Program from Energy. The Secret Service (from Treasury) and the Coast Guard (from Transportation) w i l l also be located in the D H S , remaining intact, and reporting directly to Ridge. In addition, the newly named Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the former  39  INS adjudications and benefits programs, w i l l report directly to Deputy Secretary Gordon England.  Some o f these agencies w i l l j o i n on March 1, 2003 and others on June 1,  2003. A l l the agencies w i l l be merged and the department is slated to be completely operational by September 30, 2003.  64  Paul Light argues that "it's just a hopeless  jumble.. .1 do this for a living and I can barely keep u p . "  65  O'Hanlon et al. came down hard on the Bush administration's original proposal in their initial study o f homeland security. They continued to argue that it was too cumbersome in their mid-2002 assessment of the department. But after the administration largely got its original proposal passed by Congress, the Brookings 2003 assessment, entitled Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On, warms up slightly to the plan, going so far as to suggest that i n a number o f respects it can and w i l l work. Their latest study is too optimistic because at times it is at odds with theories the authors themselves have developed in their extensive acumen on the subject. Certainly, these agencies w i l l be housed under one roof by the end of the year but realistically, it is going to take years to dissolve existing cultures and information sharing barriers that hinder cooperation. James Q. W i l s o n has outlined the inherent problems with trying to break down bureaucratic cultures: First, tasks that are not part of the culture w i l l not be attended to with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part o f it. Second, organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy w i l l experience serious conflict as defenders of one seek to dominate representatives o f the others. Third, organizations w i l l resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture. The stronger and  Department of Homeland Security, "Who Will Be Part of the New Department?," http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial Q133.xm1. John Mintz, "Homeland Agency Launched: Bush Signs Bill to Combine Federal Security Functions," Washington Post, November 26, 2002, Al. Paul Light, quoted in CNN, "Homeland Security Stirs up Alphabet Soup," http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/24/alphabet.soup.ap/index.html. 64  65  40  more uniform the culture - that is, the more the culture approximates a sense o f mission the more obvious these consequences. 66  Furthermore, the massive manpower shifts are not just i n cyberspace or through a refocusing o f the telecommunications and information-sharing networks that once connected many o f these agencies. M a n y o f these D H S employees w i l l be housed in a new location near the capitol so the physical shift o f resources w i l l also take time. The Brookings team argued for a more focused department and their recommendations were debated in the Senate but most were not implemented. One o f their primary concerns was that some o f the agencies had a wide range o f functions not related to terrorism which would divert resources, both physical and human, away from the central mission o f preventing terrorist attacks. For example, F E M A responds to natural disasters, and the A n i m a l and Plant Health Inspection Service set regulations for the humane treatment o f animals. The D H S would also be responsible for confiscating stolen art works, setting mariner qualifications, and a list o f other duties not essential to securing the homeland.  67  The D H S should concentrate "on functions that would gain  most from integration - like border security - and others for which a central, integrated focus seems clearly needed - like intelligence and infrastructure protection."  They also  argued that emergency preparedness and response, and C B R N countermeasures programs should be dropped because the case was not made for their inclusion. In short, what is clear is that wrong agencies, with a focus on non-homeland security activities, have been  James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), 101. For a more complete list, see O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 1516. O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 10.  67  68  41  included in the D H S , and correct ones, particularly those dealing with terrorism assessment and analysis, have not. If critics are correct, the department may be swamped by activities having nothing to do with fighting terrorism and, at the same time, may be unable to address the intelligence failures o f intelligence organizations like the F B I and the C I A . A t the National Academy of Public Administration's Standing Panel on the Federal System Forum in October 2002, which included Light and other scholars, the members present believed that "based on experience with organizing and restructuring large federal agencies.. .getting a new federal department o f such magnitude up and running could take eight to ten years and could distract attention from the more important factors in improving homeland security."  69  In its analysis o f the fiscal year 2004 D H S budget  request, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation have determined that $12.2 billion of the budget is spent on non-homeland security functions, including $4.3 billion for disaster and emergency relief, $3.4 billion on the Coast Guard for mariner qualification, boating safety, and search and rescue, $2.1 billion on the INS Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau which is responsible for drug smuggling, $1.8 billion on the Bureau o f Citizenship and Immigration Services, and $1.3 billion on the Secret Service.  70  That represents about one quarter o f the total D H S budget.  Thus, the department is a half-hearted attempt at a establishing a superagency consolidating the homeland security functions of the U.S. government in one place but without including the intelligence-gathering agencies. One positive note is that although  National Academy of Public Administration, "Highlights of the October 4 Forum, Standing Panel on the Federal System, Implications of the Department of Homeland Security for State and Local Governments," http://www.napawash.org/aa federal system/meetings past oct02.html. 6 9  42  Ridge w i l l have to try to coordinate a disparate bureaucracy, he has many capable executives and public service leaders working in the D H S . Aberbach's recent study o f high-level federal executives, an extension o f the research conducted for his book In the Web of Politics with Bert Rockman, shows that the quality o f bureaucrats has not changed significantly since the National Performance Review. H e suggests that " i n short, the top part o f the U.S. bureaucracy may have been under great stress during much o f the [nineties], and it has been bent and reshaped i n many ways, but, despite widely •  •  71  publicized fears, it has not broken."  Ridge, therefore, can hopefully rely on established  top level bureaucrats from some o f the functioning agencies under the D H S umbrella to help carry out the mission. The key w i l l be to build trust amongst them and with his staff. However, Ridge has also inherited constituent agencies that have gained notoriety as bastions o f dysfunction, such as the INS. It is going take much more than competent bureaucrats to improve these agencies.  Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, "Fact Sheet on DHS Non-Homeland Security Spending," http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/nonhsindhs.html.  43  3.2 The DHS Budget The White House requested a budget o f $36.2 billion for the D H S but Congressional Democrats and even some Republicans believed this dangerously underfinanced the department. The White House recanted after vigorous debate and boosted the total budget to $37.5 b i l l i o n .  72  The Brookings team feels that $45 to 50 billion would  have been more prudent and that the budget focuses more on preventing reoccurrences o f 9/11, through protecting targets within the country, than on reducing vulnerability by preventing those attacks i n the first place. The agencies included are not tracking terrorists. The central question becomes how much is the transitioning and coordination going to cost? The initial budget cannot possibly be enough because i f one were to total all twenty-two agency budgets together from the fiscal year prior the creation o f the D H S , it would have a similar total to the $37.5 billion allocated. There is a little left over for the transitioning and it remains to be seen whether the administration w i l l increase funding for the D H S . Perhaps this w i l l occur with the overhaul o f the Congressional committee structure to better reflect the new D H S when advocates in the House o f Representatives and the Senate can more effectively challenge the White House and stress the need for more spending on homeland security. Its initial budget request came under attack from existing departments because their own budgets were proportionately reduced with the acquisition o f some agencies by the D H S . The hardest hit o f all the line departments was the Department o f Transportation. The newly created Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard both used  71  Joel D. Aberbach, "The U.S. Federal Executive in an Era of Change," Governance, Vol. 16 (2003), 397.  44  to be housed here. The Transportation budget was decreased by about $10 billion as a result o f the D H S reorganization, or one-fifth o f its total annual allocation with the removal o f these two agencies. Certainly, the department was not gutted but there has been an effect on the 2004 presidential budget request for Transportation. Its three largest remaining agencies, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Federal Transit Administration all experienced decreased budget requests from the Office o f Management and Budget for fiscal 2004.  73  Whether this is  just belt tightening i n the face o f massive defense spending remains to be seen. Certainly, Secretary o f Transportation Norman Mineta (Bush's only Democratic appointee) shied away from discussing funding specifics in his annual message on the department's budget, focusing instead on performance measures. But with a fifth of the total departmental budget removed, the psychological effects on the existing Transportation bureaucracy have to be disconcerting. The administration has decreased funding for the Department o f Transportation and not just from the agencies that have been relocated, namely, the Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration. Budgets in other agencies still under the Transportation umbrella have also been reduced. The Justice Department has also experienced a funding shortfall i n certain agencies. W i t h the INS located under the D H S umbrella, as well as some minor agencies, one would have expected funding to decrease proportionately for Justice. But instead o f the budget being cut by about $4 billion, the previous allocation for the INS, the overall Justice budget has fallen by almost $7 billion from $30.2 in 2003 to $23.3  Philip Shenon, "In Reversal, White House Concedes That Counterterrorism Budget Is Too Meager," New York Times, February 27, 2003, A14.  72  45  billion in the president's request for 2004.  74  A m o n g the agencies in Justice experiencing  budget cutbacks are the U.S. Marshal Service (decrease o f about $16.5 million from 2003 actual allocation to 2004 O M B request), the Drug Enforcement Agency ($23 million), the Office o f Justice Programs ($770 million), and state and local law enforcement funding ($368 million). Furthermore, funding for programs such as the White Collar Crime Information Center has been discontinued. The Departments o f Transportation and Justice have felt the effects o f the creation of the D H S . While it is too soon to suggest the funding decreases are a direct result o f agencies being removed from the departments and relocated, it does suggest that other line departments are having their budgets reduced to make room for the new D H S and to adjust to the spending increases i n other areas across the government. In a comparison between the 2003 and 2004 budget requests for the D H S , only the Transportation Security Administration has had its funding reduced. The other agencies have either been given a modest increase in funding or remained about the same as the previous year.  75  But despite the holding pattern, the 2004 request still represents a  funding shortfall in the magnitude o f billions o f dollars.  Figures obtained from the 2003 and 2004 Department of Transportation budget authority. Department of Transportation, Budget Authority 2003, http://www.dot.gov/bib/budget%20auth.htm 1 and Department of Transportation, Budget Authority 2004, http://www.dot.gov/bib2004/budauth.html. Figures obtained from the 2003 and 2004 Department of Justice budget authority. Department of Justice, Budget Authority 2003, http://www.usdoi.gov/imd/2003summarv/html/2003SUMMARYBYAPPROP01-31-02FTNAL.htmand Department of Justice, Budget Authority 2004, http://www.usdoi.gov/ima72004summarv/html/pg4-5.htm. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, "FY 2004 Department of Homeland Security Budget by Directorate," http://www.armscontrolcenter.Org/terrorism/homeland%20security/#Budgets. 73  74  75  46  3.3 Intelligence Donald Kettl argues that "when intelligence agencies fail to share information adequately," and that failure was no more apparent than in the months prior to 9/11, "calls for better coordination arise."  In response to this perceived policy failure, the  issue o f homeland security and how to administer it became central to the Bush administration and Congress. But now that there is a tangible D H S , perhaps the largest misconception about the department is that it does not collect intelligence. The IAIP is more o f a clearinghouse for information on terrorist threats from the intelligence agencies. Instead, the administration has created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which merges units at the C I A , FBI, and the other intelligence agencies, into a single government unit intended to strengthen collection and analysis o f foreign and domestic terror threats. It w i l l be led by C I A chief George J. Tenet.  77  But this begs the question as  to how the D H S can secure the homeland i f information collection is not even included in its structure? N o t only must Ridge try to find coordinating mechanisms among the twenty-two agencies under his jurisdiction, as well as the partner agencies at the state and local level, but he also must coordinate with the F B I and C I A , two agencies with cultures traditionally inclined to resist information sharing even between each other. The Brookings team argues that "the department should have the lead responsibility for fusing all sources o f intelligence analysis o f terrorist threats to the United States - including raw intelligence derived from foreign intelligence sources and  Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for Twenty-First Century America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 151-152. David Johnston, "CIA Director Will Lead Center to Combine Agencies' Information on Terror Danger," New York Times, January 29, 2003, A29. 77  47  domestic law enforcement operations."  78  Bush considered but decided against including  the FBI, the National Guard, and the State Department's consular division in the D H S .  7 9  Lieberman argued that the final White House proposal did little to overcome the past failures o f the F B I and C I A to share information and cooperate with other agencies.  80  O'Hanlon suggests "there is little insight into how the F B I and D H S intelligence functions w i l l interact."  81  The D H S should be changing the way the C I A , the N S A , the  F B I and other agencies gather, analyze, and disseminate information, with a broader goal of distributing intelligence data throughout the federal government, as well as to state and local law enforcement officials. With its existing structure, this does not appear to be taking place. Perhaps it is unrealistic to believe that agencies as autonomous as the C I A , the N S A , and the F B I would have been housed under the D H S umbrella, as the Brookings team initially suggested, even i f tremendous resources had been allocated towards proper planning and visioning for a homeland security superdepartment. The Congressional joint inquiry into intelligence community activities surrounding 9/11 demonstrated the need for a reexamination o f the collection o f terrorist information. A m o n g the inquiry's recommendations, there is even a suggestion for the creation o f a Director o f National Intelligence, a cabinet level position that would work with the Secretary o f Homeland Security. This person would not be the F B I or C I A chief and would have powers that superseded those agencies. Instead o f making the suggestion that an amalgamation occur among the intelligence agencies, it calls for the creation o f  Michael O'Hanlon et al., "Assessing the Department of Homeland Security," Washington: Brookings, July 2002, 56. David E. Sanger, "In Big Shuffle, Bush Considered Putting F.B.I, in His New Department," New York Times, June 9, 2002, A3 5. Alison Mitchell, "New Antiterrorism Agency Faces Competing Visions," New York Times, June 14, 2002, A27. O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 21. 78  79  80  81  48  yet another layer o f bureaucracy. The report also calls for expedited revamping o f intelligence priorities by the National Security Council, as well as the preparation o f a comprehensive national security and anti-terrorism strategy. While some o f these recommendations make sense i n the context o f the new D H S , they fail to appreciate the complexities and realities o f the U.S. public service. The most important recommendation concerning the D H S is the following: Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development within the Department o f Homeland Security o f an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center that w i l l dramatically improve the focus and quality o f counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination o f relevant intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries o f the Intelligence Community. 82  But how is such a fusion center going to come together when the information is first gathered and disseminated i n other agencies? Unless changes can come about outside the D H S , this initiative w i l l not work because there w i l l be bureaucratic and agency resistance against any kind o f change that seeks to infringe upon their autonomy. The resistance may not come at the top levels. Undoubtedly, Ridge, Tenet, F B I chief Robert Mueller, Rice and others are trying to work together. The conflict w i l l be further down i n these agencies, where fusion o f information can lead to usurpation o f autonomy and authority over areas o f intelligence gathering and analysis. The joint inquiry is woefully misinformed about the very construct o f the public service and while all o f the recommendations are noble, their implementation w i l l be difficult to achieve. The intelligence community arrangement, as it is now with the D H S , is the fundamental flaw with this realignment of government. Unfortunately, the window o f  United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Recommendations," 5, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdfyrecommendations.pdf. 82  49  opportunity for reversing course has been closed and the D H S must work within the new arrangement to bring about change. However, without the authority over agencies such as the F B I and C I A to fuse together the intelligence community, little can be expected.  50  3.4 The Role of the Private Sector With the Bush administration's continued focus on a free-market approach to government, the role o f the private sector in the D H S is one that could be alarming. According to the Brookings team, the administration is too willing to take a free-market approach to the D H S . The "business o f business is business, not homeland security."  83  They argue that private markets w i l l not provide the necessary protection against terrorist attacks on their own, since profit-making is their first priority. This means that some facilities may not be secure because resources w i l l not be invested in the off chance that they are attacked. In other words, in order to ensure a profit, private companies might not allocate sufficient resources to security and leave some facilities vulnerable. Certainly, government intervention would be required, but how the D H S is going to interact with the private sector is still uncertain. Hart and Rudman, in a follow-up independent task force report, also point out that "the barriers to greater information-sharing between the public and private sectors are not simply bureaucratic and cultural. Private-sector leaders have legal concerns with respect to liability."  84  Furthermore, government agencies are  not inclined to disclose classified security information to the private sector. The Brookings team also notes that "70 percent o f all private-sector mergers either fail or do little to improve the functioning o f their constituent parts."  85  While providing incentives to private industry to beef up security precautions is beneficial, the Bush administration is also going to contract out many positions i n the new department. This fits with the anti-union rhetoric and the administration's efforts to  O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 4. Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, "America - Still in Danger," Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations, December 2002, 28. O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 14.  83  84  85  51  increase targets i n contracting out jobs across government. The D H S w i l l include some o f the 850,000 potential positions that the administration may privatize. Paul Light believes the policy is an "aggressive and dramatic extension.. .to save money at all levels of government," continuing the trend started under Clinton.  Bush even stated in his  2003 budget speech that his goal was to "create a market-based government unafraid of competition, innovation and choice."  D o Americans want their homeland security  operations being run by the private sector? It is clear that the Bush administration is acting more radically conservative with this privatization philosophy than many Americans would like. But on a positive note, the actual outsourcing i n the D H S seems to have more to do with private contractors protecting private industry than it does with border security. O ' H a n l o n et al. looked closely at how much the government should be involved in protecting private property and activities. They were i n favour o f the private sector footing the bill for security protecting private industry provided that national guidelines are set through direct regulation and that, along with incentive programs for private industry, that there be mechanisms in place to enforce these guidelines.  88  Since the outsourcing focus o f A l Gore's National Performance Review initiative, the privatization o f government positions and work meets with bipartisan approval since the so-called " N e w Democrats" like Clinton and Lieberman have bought into the best practices/cutting back to basics rhetoric. Kettl, in his analysis o f administrative dilemmas, argues that reliance on incentives and partnerships with nongovernmental  Paul Light, quoted in Richard Stevenson, "Government Plan May Make Private Up to 850,000 Jobs," New York Times, November 15, 2002, Al. George W. Bush, quoted in Stevenson, "Government Plan May Make Private Up to 850,000 Jobs," New York Times, November 15, 2002, Al. For a detailed discussion of the private sector implications, see Chapter 6 of O'Hanlon et al., Protecting the American Homeland. 79-90. 86  87  88  52  players rather than through traditional direct delivery of services is undermining the longstanding traditions of public administration. According to Kettl, " i n the last third of the twentieth century.. .government began relying on new tools, especially grants, contracts, and loans, which undermined [Woodrow] Wilson's theory."  89  Wilson believed  that elected officials should define policy and then delegate the details to top-level administrators who worked within a hierarchy to organize work. The authority within the hierarchy would ensure that the exercise of administrative discretion remained consistent with policymakers' goals.  90  What exists today, and w i l l continue in this direction in the future, is " a dense mosaic of policy tools, many o f them placing public agencies in complex, interdependent relationships with a host of third-party partners."  91  Kettl adds that "federal spending  through indirect methods has increased while federal spending through direct provision of goods and services has shrunk - probably by h a l f '  92  in the 1980s and 1990s.  The major issue with respect to outsourcing is that it often complicates the picture. Kettl terms this problem "fuzzy boundaries." In the past, setting and implementing policy depended upon clear lines of responsibility. W i t h interdependent relationships between the public and private sectors, "the fuzzy boundary problem confounds the central task of administration - building coordinated efforts to solve complex problems."  Ridge w i l l have to monitor how much the private sector w i l l affect  decision making at the centre o f the department.  89 90 91 92  Kettl, The Transformation Kettl, The Transformation Kettl, The Transformation Kettl, The Transformation  of Governance. 51. of Governance. 51. of Governance, 51-52. of Governance. 52.  53  3.5 The Management Challenge Tom Ridge needs to set clear and attainable reorganization priorities, focusing on those that are crucial to achieving the main goals, like information analysis and border security, and deferring the others until the key areas are coordinated and operational. He must face the fact that critical agencies like the F B I and C I A , as well as the secretaries o f Defense, Treasury, Justice, State, and H H S , are not inclined to coordinate actions. Interagency coordination led by individual Cabinet secretaries has seldom worked well i n the past and it is not likely to do so in the future. Furthermore, these secretaries are "unlikely to defer to directives from another Cabinet agency that is a competitor for funds and presidential attention. This means some kind o f White House-led coordination system must be retained."  94  In terms o f managing his department, there is a disconnect  between the grandiosity o f bold schematic ways o f approaching issues, such as the D H S umbrella, versus the harsh realities o f American incrementalism. Coordination and innovation are going to come slowly within the D H S . This is somewhat due to the Bush administration which showed little tenacity towards planning and visioning o f the department beyond short-term political aims. Daniel Carpenter points out that "it is evident from the history o f American bureaucracy that agencies cannot automatically be designed to succeed even when politicians want them to. Innovation and planning capacity arose only when long-tenured bureau and division chiefs could draw on the technical and programmatic expertise in their offices."  95  Kettl adds that "moreover,  agencies cannot simultaneously coordinate all activities at all times...Coordination on  Kettl, The Transformation of Governance, 59. O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 16. Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 359.  93  94 9 5  54  some missions risks weakening capacity to achieve others."  96  Ridge and his staff have to  undertake the unprecedented task o f integrating these agencies while "clearly keeping their eye on the main ball - which is not to organize for homeland security but to prevent, protect, and respond to a future terrorist attack on U.S. s o i l . "  97  The scholars at Brookings  have pointed out, however, that the D H S plans focus more on the protection and response than on the paramount priority which should be prevention. Ridge also has to establish national homeland security performance standards for federal, state, and local agencies. Critical to increased homeland security for all sectors and levels o f government is improved coordination and cooperation. Federal, state, county, city, and regional governments, private corporations, and the volunteer and nonprofit sectors are numerous and fragmented. Their goals and actions are often not coordinated and they do not always know each other or have the ability to communicate readily. This becomes even more complicated because o f the lack o f information-sharing between the information-gathering agencies and the local agencies responsible for security. H o w is information that enters the C I A or F B I apparatus about a possible terrorist plot going to get to the security response agencies on the ground at the local level? The D H S needs to coordinate the disparate federal to local agencies within the D H S but it has little authority over the important communication between other federal agencies and local law enforcement and security. There are also substantial gaps between administration rhetoric and funding for the first responders o n the ground. This w i l l prove to be a major management and leadership challenge for Ridge.  Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 152. O'Hanlon et al., "Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On," 15.  55  Harold Seidman has called coordination the philosopher's stone o f public management. H e suggests that "If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one w i l l disagree."  98  Put simply, as Kettl argues, "coordination becomes the  answer to government's problems; the lack o f coordination is the diagnosis for its failure."  99  Besides the public sector/private sector divide, there are three other fuzzy boundaries that exist in the D H S . There are layers within the bureaucracy and so it must be made clear where the responsibility for the critical management and administrative decisions w i l l lie. There are layers between management and labour and these tensions are already noticeable after the changes with respect to workers' rights issues were included in the White House legislation creating the department. There are also connections between bureaucracies and it is up to managers to sort out the responsibility of each bureaucracy i n the D H S .  1 0 0  It is these layers within the bureaucracy that could pose a concern in preventing terrorism. Kettl cites the 1986 space shuttle Challenger tragedy as an example o f communication problems across boundaries within N A S A . The gaps between levels o f command hindered communication "by making lower-level officials cautious about  Harold Seidman, Politics. Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 142. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 59. See Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 60. 99  100  56  speaking and higher-level officials deaf in hearing."  101  Ridge w i l l have to work with  managers in the D H S to bridge gaps between them and the operators on the ground. With the lack o f coordination mechanisms, how are the disparate agencies supposed to come together? This is the lynchpin to the D H S management challenge. Coordination between bureaucracies w i l l also be a management issue. Kettl explained this challenge with respect to Ridge and the O H S : Ridge's mission was to coordinate both the government's intelligence information and its operational response. Critics pointed, for example, to the problems o f pulling together facts and analysis from such disparate sources as the F B I , the C I A , and the National Security Agency.. .Like most public problems, the government's antiterrorist policy played out through a network o f agencies. Each agency, in turn, was part o f multiple networks working on a host o f different problems. If there were but one problem, policymakers could simply reorganize government agencies to focus on that problem. But as problems proliferated, so too did the networks - and the impossibility o f drawing clear boundaries around any o f t h e m . 102  Another concern for Ridge is the amount o f bureaucratic autonomy and discretion the D H S w i l l be allowed. With such a personal connection to the Bush administration, Ridge must remain wary o f taking orders only from the White House instead o f relying on the advice o f and working with his top bureaucrats, an approach that might put him at odds with the political agendas in Washington. Carpenter suggests that "bureaucratic autonomy prevails when a politically differentiated agency takes self-consistent action that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but that they either cannot or w i l l 103  not overturn or constrain in the future."  There is also an important distinction to be  made between discretion and bureaucratic autonomy: Discretion is part o f a contractual arrangement between politicians and an agency they establish; a statute may give an agency discretion or leeway to interpret and enforce a law within certain bounds. Bureaucratic autonomy, by contrast, is external to a contract and 1 2 3  Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 64. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 68. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. 17.  57  cannot be captured in a principal-agent relationship. Indeed, when agencies have autonomy, they can bring their political legitimacy to bear upon the very laws that give them power. They can change the terms o f delegation. They can even alter the electoral strategies o f their principals in the legislature, the presidency, and the parties. 104  It is perhaps too early to suggest that the D H S is simply a creation o f the administration and w i l l be run out o f the White House. The bureaucrats and Ridge have not had time yet to prove themselves and to establish a bureaucratic reputation, the key prerequisite for autonomy. It is also unclear whether the ideologues in the Bush administration would even allow this to emerge. The D H S mandate suggests that their function w i l l be a complicated one. Carpenter argues that "high uncertainty and task complexity are insufficient conditions for bureaucratic autonomy i f politicians and organized interests doubt that an agency w i l l execute its tasks competently, provide innovative solutions to reduce uncertainty, or command the allegiance and confidence o f citizens. Absent both complexity and perceived agency efficacy, bureaucratic autonomy w i l l not p r e v a i l . "  105  Both o f these  conditions currently exist with the new department and both must be rectified i f the D H S is to become effective. On a final note, Ridge also must be careful not to trample the rights o f American citizens. One hopes that the Orwellian U.S.A. Patriot A c t (and potentially Patriot A c t II) nightmare envisioned by some w i l l not become a reality. Press releases by the department clearly state that "besides providing a better-coordinated defense o f the homeland, D H S is also dedicated to protecting the rights o f American citizens and enhancing public services, such as natural disaster assistance and citizenship services, by  Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. 17. Carpenter. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. 17. 58  dedicating offices to these important missions."  106  But privacy advocates and civil  liberties groups believe the new department is part o f an alarming trend by the administration, and specifically by Attorney General John Ashcroft, to collect information about American citizens while simultaneously restricting the amount o f information the government discloses to the p u b l i c .  107  Representatives of the American  C i v i l Liberties Union, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center suggest that the D H S could create advisory committees that are 1 OR  exempt from public disclosure laws. Regardless of the management challenge o f Tom Ridge, he is facing a department that is designed to fail because steps were not taken initially to ensure that it could be effective, both in developing bureaucratic culture and autonomy, and i n being responsive to the administration. The focus of the final chapter is a look at the Bush administration from a public management and administration perspective. The conclusions are not optimistic and they demonstrate a real concern that the D H S w i l l prove to be a failure.  Department of Homeland Security, "Building a Secure Homeland," http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_homel.isp. In July 2003, a report by internal investigators at the Justice Department identified dozens of cases in which department employees have been accused of civil liberties violations involving enforcement of the sweeping federal antiterrorism law. The report also said that credible accusations were also made against the INS, now included the DHS. See Philip Shenon, "USA Patriot Act Alleges Civil Rights Violations," New York Times, July 21, 2003, http://www.nvtimes.com/2003/07/21/politics/21JUST.html. John Mintz, "Homeland Agency Launched: Bush Signs Bill to Combine Federal Security Functions," Washington Post, November 26, 2002, Al. 1Ub  107  108  59  4. Politicized Incompetence: The Bush Administration & Ideological Entrepreneurship John Kingdon asks "why do some problems come to occupy the attention o f governmental officials more than other problems?"  109  In the case o f homeland security,  that question was answered for the Bush administration by the 9/11 attacks. Kingdon suggests that "a focusing event - a disaster, crisis.. .draws attention to some conditions more than to others. But such an event has only transient effects unless accompanied by a firmer indication o f a problem, by a preexisting perception, or by a combination with other similar events."  110  Thomas Birkland adds that a result o f such a focusing event  "might be a finding by interest groups, government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, the news media, or members o f the public o f new problems, new attention to existing but dormant problems, and, potentially, a search for solutions in the wake o f perceived policy failure."  111  Likewise, Polsby states that "crises may be regarded as situations defined by  decision-makers for whatever reasons, but frequently as a response to some notable, wellpublicized, exogenous event, as demanding quick decisions."  112  Clearly, Rove saw the possibilities for policy entrepreneurship on the issue o f homeland security, read the context, and exploited that perception o f opportunity at the expense o f the original homeland security objectives. Senate Democrats also tried to be policy entrepreneurs but Rove and the White House won the day. Hart and Rudman's early 2001 report should get the credit for proposing the idea and Lieberman should be acknowledged for really championing the department in Congress.  John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 206. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives, and Public Policies. 206-207. Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting. Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 22. 109 110  111  60  A s to whether there really was a crisis in homeland security (having recognized the breakdown o f information-sharing prior to 9/11) so important that an entire department needed to be created, one only has to refer to the timeframe between the 9/11 attacks and the actual creation o f the department. Eight months elapsed before a bill was even passed and more than a year went by before a department became a reality. Polsby expresses it best when he writes that "the empirical difference between an urgent need to act and the capacity to invent alternatives also creates a set o f opportunities for those who are prepared: hence there is utility in one common political strategy i n America, namely, attempts by sponsors o f ready-made alternatives to coerce feelings o f urgency among in  decision-makers, to invent crises." Certainly, 9/11 was a crisis. But the elevated importance o f creating a D H S almost a year later cannot be considered a pressing concern for the administration or it would have been a priority on September 12, 2001, as it had been for Lieberman. Kingdon states that "people in and around government sense a national mood.. .a large number of people out i n the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood changes from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes."  114  K a r l Rove monitored this national mood carefully, analyzed polling data  and media coverage, and realized the nation had yet to recover from the effects o f 9/11. Almost a year later, Bush's approval on national security issues was very high and the  Nelson W. Polsby, Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 168. Polsby, Political Innovation in America. 168. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives, and Public Policies. 153. 113  114  61  Democrats could not find issues to rally support. It made political sense to bring the D H S plans into the White House. Aberbach and Rockman argue that "it might well be a good idea for politicians to loosen the constraints they have imposed on the bureaucracy. A n d it would be a good idea for them to specify realistic, noncontradictory goals for the agencies."  115  What the  Bush administration has set for the D H S is unrealistic and maybe even implausible. Furthermore, forcing dramatic change in the public service w i l l not achieve the desired results. The D H S includes a number o f constituent agencies that are now superceded by the organizational structure o f a superdepartment. "Reinvention requires a civil service with a high degree o f autonomy. Discretionary judgment is necessary in a system that is to be less rule bound and that emphasizes rapid adjustment."  116  That is simply not the  case with the D H S . Rove and Bush have used the language o f reinvention, with emphasis on better organization, a more streamlined and recentralized nexus o f operations, outsourcing and privatizing, and elimination o f red tape, to create a multiheaded hydra o f a department that does not immediately address its most important goal. To take a cynical view o f what is occurring with respect to the D H S , it could be argued that the White House does not really care much as to whether the department succeeds or fails. Its design is unworkable precisely because many want an unworkable framework. Even worse, an ideological entrepreneur like K a r l Rove is oblivious to these details because the entire goal is short-term gain and therefore he is not concerned about the framework. Then the focus on the D H S is just busy work or background noise while the White House keeps the public focused on issues they deem important. In this sense,  115 116  Aberbach and Rockman, In the Web of Politics. 187. Aberbach and Rockman, In the Web of Politics. 180. 62  the D H S could even be a launching pad for a number o f 2004 reelection issues. This is a jaundiced view o f the American political system. But as M o e argues, "American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out o f politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises o f those who exercise 117  political power."  This elicits an important question, namely, who really wants the  Department o f Homeland Security? The public service has expressed little desire to embark on this restructuring and the public management literature tells us that bureaucratic culture is fundamentally at loggerheads with change coerced by politicians. The ineffectual time expended analyzing, planning, and visioning for the department is an indication that there is little enthusiasm for the D H S among Bush and his advisers. This, coupled with the fact that the D H S structure is not dissimilar to the one proposed by Democrats or even the Hart-Rudman Commission, indicates a lack o f interest as to whether the D H S can work. M o e expresses this predicament: "the hitch is that those in positions o f power are not necessarily motivated by the national interest. They have their own interests to pursue in politics.. .and they exercise their power i n ways conducive to 1 1S those interests." Kettl suggests that: Elected officials - and especially candidates for elected office - launch bold policy proposals without adequately thinking through how they w i l l carry them out. The mass media rarely hold them to account for the mismatch o f their ambitions and their results, and when problems occur, they blame the administrative machinery instead o f its policy designers. 1 9  It would appear as i f the D H S was created for purely political and electoral reasons, especially when one considers the sudden reversal o f Bush's position on creating  Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in Can the Government Govern?, eds. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989), 267. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," 268. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 48. 117  118  119  63  the department and the administration's secrecy in the decision making process. H o w much deliberation went into the proposal that was eventually passed? In reading the proposal, one gets the uncomfortable feeling that it was hastily done considering the amount of time the White House had to put it together. It is as i f in responding to shortterm political pressures, they took the Lieberman plan and augmented it with a series o f neo-conservative strategies with little or no careful analysis conducted. A s Aberbach and Rockman suggest, "the problems that reinvention proclaims it w i l l solve through administrative means," i n this case the amalgamation o f twenty-two agencies, "are mainly problems created by the political decisionmaking process."  120  Campbell argues  that "reorganization presents itself as a way to gain control over the machinery o f government by simplification and rationalization."  121  This trend towards disinvestment in analysis and planning across the federal government has been occurring since the Reagan administration. There has been a weakening o f the traditional sources o f policy ideas upon which the president can rely. Aberbach and Rockman noted this in their 1989 study o f the decline o f analysis i n government in the context o f the Bush Sr. presidency: Two decades ago, at least i n the U.S., policy analysis could be viewed as a means for energizing comprehensive change as a way o f breaking through structures that resisted nonincremental change. The irony is that the powerful ideas o f the present political leadership, arguably, have induced nonincremental change. The results, further, have induced crashing the boards strategies for dealing with the perceived, but politically sensitive, budgetary crisis left as the residue. That appears, for the time being at least, to have pushed policy analysis into the background as decision makers struggle with the new politics o f deadlines and l i m i t s . 122  Aberbach and Rockman, In the Web of Politics. 188. Colin Campbell, "The Search for Coordination and Control," 55. Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, "On the Rise, the Transformation, and the Decline of Analysis in Government," Governance, Vol. 2 (1989), 299-300. 121  122  64  This is essential to understanding how presidential policymaking is packaged and sold to the public. M o e presents a clear analysis: " A group with the political power to tell everyone what to do, then, w i l l typically not find it worthwhile to try. A more attractive option is to write legislation i n general terms, put experts on the public payroll, and grant them authority to " f i l l i n the details" and make whatever adjustments are necessary over time."  123  The presidential advisers, as well as the Congressional Committee research  staffs, especially those of politicians pondering a presidential run like Lieberman, "are quite unsuited to policy problems o f any complexity. The reason is that, although the group has the political power to impose its w i l l on everyone, it almost surely lacks the knowledge to do it well. It does not know what to tell people to d o . "  124  This helps  explain the incoherence of the D H S plan. Although the White House managed to gain the upper hand on worker rights and outsourcing, the blueprint for the D H S design is Lieberman's and by extension the HartRudman Commission's. The D H S may have started with purely political intentions as a potential success story for an eventual 2004 Lieberman presidential run. A t the time, the Senate was still in Democratic control and Lieberman chaired the Governmental Affairs Committee. One has to ask what Lieberman was really thinking about when his committee tried to design the D H S . When the White House took the issue away from them, there was little hue and cry from Lieberman, except when the White House insisted on changes to federal service worker rights. Rather ironically, its incoherence may actually help the Democrats i n the long run i f the department shows few accomplishments. John Gaus suggested that "when you are out o f power, you want to  123 124  Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," 271. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," 270.  65  limit the powers of those who are in; but your zeal (or rather, that o f your wiser and shrewder leaders) w i l l be cooled by the consideration that you want to leave a loophole through which you can respectably undertake the same activities when you i n turn achieve power."  Rove exploited the D H S better for political and electoral ammunition  in the short-term, while Lieberman and Democrats may wait until the D H S shows signs of weakness or falters before attacking the Bush administration. Unfortunately, what the U.S. has been saddled with may be the worst o f both political worlds: an incoherent department with a mandate written in very general terms by Democrats but whose basic structure has been augmented by neo-conservative strategies to bring about changes in government hiring practices that do not necessarily fit with a design that was unworkable in the first place. In many respects, the D H S flies in the face of the conservative Republican agenda and rhetoric o f smaller government. The department represents a re-centralization instinct and a build-up of government by an administration that campaigned on smaller government. The one part o f the D H S mandate that appears to be in tune with the Republican agenda is outsourcing, contracting out, and use o f the private sector to achieve some o f the homeland security aims. This fits with the Reinventing Government ( R E G O ) ethos and the general N e w Public Management ( N P M ) initiatives that are in vogue. If there is an area o f government that should not be privatized, it is probably homeland security and information gathering and analysis. But since the key information gathering agencies have not been included in the D H S , the outsourcing is most likely to occur in the areas o f protection o f private property and in airport security, with national standards that govern both.  125  John Merriman Gaus, quoted in Kettl, The Transformation of Governance. 79. 66  Perhaps one o f the more positive aspects o f the D H S has been the leadership o f Tom Ridge. Respected by both Republicans and Democrats, Ridge is not an ideological entrepreneur like many o f the president's advisers and he strikes a chord as a refreshing alternative to the jingoistic rhetoric o f the administration. But does he have the makings of a dynamic public figure who, for example, can convince disgruntled public servants stripped o f union rights that the D H S is an organization o f which they should be proud? In his written testimony for his confirmation hearing in front o f the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Ridge committed to the following: First, we w i l l work to create some measure o f stability for employees even as we undergo the transition. For the first year, employees can expect to receive at least the same pay and benefits, and probably i n the same location. Some people w i l l certainly be able to take advantage o f new career opportunities. Second, we w i l l work hard to create a modern, flexible, fair, merit-based personnel system. Third, we w i l l communicate to ensure that personnel know what to expect and when to expect it. Fourth, we w i l l work hard to ensure that employees continue to receive the same c i v i l service protections that they currently enjoy. 126  However, Ridge does not epitomize these organizations and he has had little experience in any o f the fields under his jurisdiction. A s Governor o f Pennsylvania, he had limited opportunity to work with homeland security issues and to many, his only real experience prior to joining the administration was when he visited the crash site o f Flight 93 after the 9/11 attacks. The incoherence o f the D H S grab bag o f functions preordains a lack o f discipline because what has been put together is unwieldy. Ridge is not likely the type o f leader who can ringmaster the department agencies adroitly and the White House w i l l probably encounter difficulty keeping appointees in disparate organizations in the department adhering to the administration's agenda.  Tom Ridge, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Written Testimony for the Confirmation Hearing of Tom Ridge, Department of Homeland Security," http://govt-aff.senate. gov/011703ridge.htm. 67  Ridge is also starting from scratch. There is no guidebook or blueprint for the Secretary o f Homeland Security. The studies o f agency leaders by Martha Derthick and Beryl S. Radin cannot be relied upon for Ridge to learn his unique position.  127  He is  going to have to be more than an accountable juggler. Ridge is also limited i n learning from the reform initiatives o f Truman, Johnson, N i x o n , Carter, and Clinton. While there are similarities to those tasks, i n terms o f scope and dollars, only Truman's creation o f the Department o f Defense has similar implications by amalgamating distinctive cultures. But they were much more like-minded and o f a military and not a bureaucratic nature. Furthermore, Ridge must try to balance his new role as head o f a bureaucracy with the constraints placed on him by the parameters set out in the Bush administration mandate. He w i l l have to implement reforms to meet Bush's three primary objectives o f government: citizen-centered - not bureaucracy centered; results-oriented - not processoriented; and market-based - actively promoting, not stifling, innovation and * •  128  competition. In terms o f the department's performance, the only functioning part o f the D H S for many Americans seems to be the colour-coded terrorist threat level rating system. In fact, Ridge's public statement to place the nation on "high risk" o f terrorist attacks and the public information commercials that followed set off a duct tape and plastic sheeting buying spree i n February 2003.  This is comparable to the now laughable "duck and  cover" strategies for nuclear attacks during the C o l d War era. Certainly, a properly  See Martha Derthick, Agency Under Stress: The Social Security Administration in American Government (Washington: Brookings, 1990), specifically Chapter 5, Agency Leaders, 93-111 and Beryl A. Radin, The Accountable Juggler: The Art of Leadership in a Federal Agency (Washington: C Q Press, 2002), specifically Chapter 6, Accountability and Management Process, 88-117. George W. Bush, "Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies," http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010711-5.html. 127  128  68  implemented national alert system would give the public a clearer idea o f what is expected when federal, state or local authorities issue terrorism but thus far the system has been ridiculed. Ridge's function has primarily been one o f public relations, traveling the country to deliver his signature line: "If the hometown is secure, then the homeland is secure."  130  It is, as o f yet, difficult for critics to make the case that Ridge is an Orwellian  information czar with a mandate to take away civil liberties from citizens.  131  Are there a series o f remedies for the D H S ? Can adding or taking away certain agencies improve its performance? It is unrealistic to assume that the D H S can expand to include all homeland security functions o f the U.S. government, including information collection. But what might Ridge do to enhance the D H S and make it more effective? These are difficult questions in light o f evidence that suggests this department is not going to be responsive to the administration. Ridge could try to put pressure on the administration to include other agencies, to convince other agencies that the D H S should take the lead on all homeland security matters, to push for autonomy i n the face o f control from the White House, and to reconcile with his own bureaucrats and work with them to achieve its mandate. But are not these actions unlikely to lead to desired results. Led by K a r l Rove, the White House has sacrificed policy competence for responsive competence but it has even neglected any noticeable competence beyond a short-term election strategy. Campbell termed such a phenomenon' as "politicized  Lynette Clemetson, "Reshaping Message on Terror, Ridge Urges Calm with Caution," New York Times, February 20, 2003, A l . Mike Allen, "Ridge Faces Daunting Task in Homeland Office: Analysts Question Nominee's Record So Far and Whether He Can Win Bureaucratic Battles," Washington Post, November 26, 2002, A17. The extent of a mandate to take away civil liberties depends upon an important question, posed by Matthew Brzezinski and others, and one in which the administration and the public must be wary: what is your security worth to you? As the terrorist alert level panics and good-versus-evil, with-us-or-against-us binary rhetoric of the White House have shown, Americans are living in fear, a fear that has been perpetuated and sustained by the government. 129  130  131  69  incompetence" and that is precisely what has occurred with the D H S . Politicized incompetence results when "exceptionally partisan, ideological, and/or egocentric presidents choose to ignore the state apparatus and do whatever they can get away with 132  politically."  When the only course of action the Bush administration has pursued is  unrestrained ideological entrepreneurship, policy competence w i l l not play any factor. Among his advisers, there is little value placed on submitting policy proposals such as the D H S to countervailing review. This weak countervailance, combined with ideological entrepreneurship leads to poor issue management. Since the president delegates and relies on advisers, especially Rove, to do the policymaking, there is little evidence that even he has a grasp o f what it means to push forward with a new department without careful planning. He is detached from the process altogether. The administration has followed two courses of action with homeland security. The first was that they tried an administrative presidency solution by attempting to address the problem inside the White House without a new external apparatus. This was the O H S model but it quickly proved ineffective. They then embraced the D H S gambit to address concerns o f perceived weakness in policy competence and to cash in on the public perception that Republicans would do more than Democrats in terms of homeland security. But this second course o f action has proven ineffective as well since there is obviously little policy competence in the design o f the D H S . The administration has embraced politicized incompetence. What might the administration and the D H S Secretary do to make the department more responsive? A n inventory o f features that suggest themselves as crucial i f the D H S is to be successful is provided below. The first set are strategies the White House could 132  Campbell, Managing the Presidency. 19.  70  pursue, which include a refocusing on oversight, the original inspiration behind the O H S , and use of the appointive system to impose discipline within line agencies. These include elements that are missing from the D H S equation i f the Bush administration were to pursue responsive competence and the administrative or politicized-crisis presidency more effectively. The second set of the inventory focuses on options Ridge could pursue to bring about bureaucratic autonomy for the D H S . This set, naturally, is unrealistic i f the Bush administration is pursuing only responsive competence at ignoring neutral competence.  Responsive Competence 1. To rein in the bureaucracy, the Bush administration must appoint their own people in each agency under the D H S umbrella. When an agency is being uncooperative or are not singing from the same song book as the administration, new people need to be appointed to bring about discipline. This is one of the keys to the administrative presidency. Both N i x o n and Reagan used this option extensively when they were in power. Nathan argues that "explicit effort is required i f the president is to exert greater influence over the bureaucracy on administrative matters. The key to doing this is the role o f his principal appointees in major agencies of the executive branch."  Since neutral  competence is not a priority, circumvention of traditional power sharing relationships combined with extensive presidential appointments would improve adherence to the administration's agenda. 2. Control homeland security out of the White House. The O H S was ineffective because Ridge could not speak truth to power. He had no statutory authority and  71  only the power o f persuasion. But the idea behind it was in keeping with White House oversight o f homeland security issues. A s a line department chief, Ridge now has the authority over the agencies under him. W i t h the unwieldy framework, however, the administration ought to keep Ridge on a tight leash. A concerted effort must be made to supervise what the D H S is allowed to do and to keep them from becoming too autonomous. Once this occurs, it w i l l be difficult for the administration to keep it under control. 3. The recommendations o f the Congressional joint inquiry that highlights 9/11 intelligence failures should be seriously considered. If the role o f Secretary o f Homeland Security is not expanded to include discretionary powers over the C I A and F B I , the Cabinet level post o f Director o f National Intelligence, a position separate from C I A and F B I director, could be created to help with information accessibility among all agencies. But this is yet another expansion o f the intelligence bureaucracy and may further hinder flow o f information between agencies. It is reminiscent o f the super secretary model under N i x o n and is in keeping with the administrative presidency. It further concentrates power in the executive branch. 4. The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies team suggested housing all information gathering agencies under one roof. Including the C I A and the F B I would probably improve the flow o f information and the rapidity with which terrorist information is analyzed, disseminated to relevant entities, and used to counter terrorism and keep the nation safe. It can still be achieved. The Congressional joint inquiry into the intelligence community activity surrounding 9/11 stressed  Nathan, The Administrative Presidency. 85. 72  the need for a fusion center within the D H S to disseminate terrorist information. But the decision to not include these other agencies in the design o f the D H S means that it is unlikely that they w i l l be included in the future. Therefore, breaking down these bureaucratic cultures is unrealistic. The hope is that C I A Director Tenet and F B I Director Mueller have stressed changes i n their organizations and that communication between bureaucracies is improving. To reconfigure the intelligence gathering apparatus o f the federal government is certainly a bold move but the administration should at least consider it, especially i f a noticeable improvement i n terrorist prevention is not seen.  Bureaucratic Autonomy Ridge must understand that change w i l l come slowly. A s Secretary, he must keep the White House and Congress at bay, who may demand rapid change and call for large scale reorganizations o f the department i f it is not achieving its goals. H e must strive for autonomy, even i f the administration provides him with little latitude. This w i l l require placing pressure on the administration and the Office o f Management and Budget, as well as key Congressional committee members, to increase the D H S budget and support the department. Without adequate funding, the large goals cannot be achieved. Already, the 2004 budget submitted by the president for the D H S does not greatly expand upon the 2003 appropriation. Ridge must also encourage autonomy at lower levels o f the D H S while providing an overall direction.  73  2.  Ridge must convince autonomous agencies like the C I A and F B I that it is in their best interests to change the way information is disseminated and shared amongst all agencies focused on homeland security. Turf wars are inevitable and Ridge only has the power o f persuasion at his disposal but he can affect change at the top levels which hopefully can filter down through each organization. But resistance w i l l take place and he must be prepared for and acknowledge that each agency w i l l do its utmost to defend its autonomy and authority.  3.  Ridge can take action i f the design of the D H S proves ineffective. But this should be bottom-up change, from public servants within the organization. If an agency is not working out, it may be better off where it originally was located. The D H S can be reduced in size, to focus on border security efforts, instead o f the large portion of the D H S budget spent on non-homeland security functions. He should not be afraid to pare it down to the essentials. O f course, it is always about funding so transferring agencies out without transferring new ones i n is not an enticing option. But i f too many resources are being focused on non-essential agencies, Ridge must reallocate some of the budget to more important duties.  4. Losing sight o f the main goals of homeland security in the face o f the political web in Washington w i l l hurt the department in the long run. Advisers such as Rove cannot dictate homeland security policy now that it is an established department. Becoming autonomous from the administration w i l l strengthen Ridge's (and his successors') office as a respected entity among the bureaucrats in the D H S . Part o f this means standing up to the administration when strategies such as the terror alert system are proposed. The D H S w i l l exist beyond the Bush  74  years and it must be able to have the discretion to adapt to changing political environments. 5.  Ridge must ensure national guidelines for protecting private property and private sector incentives are i n place to ensure adequate security around potential terrorist targets. But he also must make sure the private sector does not infringe on or interfere with the mandate of the department. D H S policy must not become entangled in private goals and norms. It means finding a balance between regulation and the restraints of government, and the operating flexibility of the private sector.  6. Coordinating with state and local law enforcement is another challenge but one essential to Ridge's mantra: securing the hometown. F r o m Washington, he must stress to his bureaucracy that working with the local level is sometimes the best way for the D H S to stay informed. In acknowledging the resistance to information sharing among federal agencies, there are other actors who can help the D H S keep up. More responsiveness to local needs is but one. 7. Finally, politicians w i l l undoubtedly use the D H S for their own political purposes, either campaigning on its merits or against its deficiencies. The employees of the D H S must fight for their autonomy, at all levels, and fight political agendas when Washington is insisting on changes that are untested or have not been thought through. This is one o f the reasons why the D H S itself is designed the way it is. Bureaucrats need to be heard.  75  One would have hoped that the initial O H S , and the subsequent D H S , were created in response to the failure of traditional information agencies such as the F B I and C I A to address homeland security and terrorist information issues leading up to 9/11. But the new department does not even collect the information essential to ensuring homeland security. Furthermore, it is apparent that there are few coordinating mechanisms Secretary T o m Ridge has at his disposal to achieve his mandate and he w i l l have to work hard to build linkages between disparate agencies. It is clear that the D H S w i l l be in a period o f transitioning for a number of years and Ridge w i l l find it difficult to adroitly ringmaster disparate agencies. The White House w i l l also struggle with a department that is proving to be unresponsive to its own agenda. Whether it was Rove and the Bush team who stressed responsive competence over coherent policy development and neutral competence, or just the general lack o f bipartisanship in Washington, American policymakers wasted a year on homeland security. 9/11 may have provided the focusing event but it did not take long for the administration to lose the focus on homeland security.  76  Bibliography  Aberbach, Joel D. "The U.S. Federal Executive in an Era o f Change." Governance, V o l . 16 (2003): 373-399. Aberbach, Joel D. "The State o f the Contemporary American Presidency: Or, Is Bush II Actually Ronald Reagan's Heir?" In The George W . Bush Presidency: First Appraisals. Eds. C o l i n Campbell and Bert A . 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