BUSH, RIDGE, ROVE & THE CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

by

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ABSTRACT

In June 2002, President George W. Bush asked Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security to better protect the United States against further terrorist attacks. The public service reorganization that has taken place is perhaps the largest in American history apart from the post-World War II armed forces restructuring. But it remains to be seen whether this initiative will be effective. This thesis is an analysis of the factors at play in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. It focuses on how the department came about, and what challenges, both political and bureaucratic, those who administer and manage the department will face. The thesis relies upon existing public management and bureaucratic theory literature to assess the new department. It also analyzes the Bush administration’s governing style and their execution of presidential power. In particular, it discusses the role played by Bush’s chief strategist Karl Rove in forging the new department. The Department of Homeland Security is not only a timely topic and one that allows for investigation of the federal U.S. public service but it is also about reinventing government, not through small endeavours internal to a department, but through the creation of a new and large organization.
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"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."

~ Benjamin Franklin, in *Historical Review of Pennsylvania* (1759)

"Men of ordinary physique and discretion cannot be Presidents and live, if the strain be not somehow relieved. We shall be obliged always to be picking our chief magistrates from among wise and prudent athletes – a small class."

~ Woodrow Wilson, in *Constitutional Government in the United States* (1908)

"To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."

~ Theodore Roosevelt, in challenge to President Woodrow Wilson’s crackdown on dissent following America’s entry into World War I (1918)
It is difficult to write about the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) without first discussing American homeland security in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks and the subsequent transformation of American foreign policy. The research presented here focuses on how the department came about, what factors were at play in its creation, and what challenges, both political and bureaucratic, those who administer and manage the department will face. The purpose of the research is two-fold: first, it looks at the department from a public management standpoint to get a better sense of the implications of creating, or perhaps more accurately, shifting resources to create a massive federal bureaucracy, with focus on issues arising from its establishment and the web of politics that ensnares the DHS. In terms of evaluating this public management innovation, it may be too early to render an accurate appraisal. But it is not too early to outline the goals and tasks that have been set for the DHS and whether its mandate is feasible and its organizational structure conducive to the ultimate goals of American homeland security.

Second, and just as significant as the public management aspects of creating the DHS, are the political motivations of the White House and the role played by Congress in forging the department. The focusing event of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks not only set the United States government on a new course of foreign policy but has allowed for new relationships among institutions in Washington in terms of setting and controlling the agenda. This leads to two important questions, namely, who has taken advantage of the situation and who can profit politically from the issue of homeland security? This section of the research will not only focus on both theories of public administration and bureaucracy but also on the concept of presidential power and the
changing role of the White House in the domestic policymaking and governance of the nation.

Perhaps the most important public management innovation in the case of the DHS is the massive impact the department has and will have on the federal public service. The DHS is made up of individuals from twenty-two agencies employing 170,000 workers. The uprooting of these public servants is considered to be the largest overhauling of the federal public service since President Harry Truman restructured the Armed Forces in 1947. In many respects, however, this overhaul is infinitely more complicated. There is also an argument to be made that the DHS was a gambit by the White House to change existing labour laws and crush federal employee unions. More convincingly, it is argued by a number of scholars that the department was created for purely political and electoral reasons as the White House and, specifically, the president’s chief strategist Karl Rove, appropriated the Homeland Security department plans and agenda from Senate Democrats and used it as an issue to rally Republican support in the 2002 midterm elections.

The research is structured in four chapters. A chronological synopsis of the events that led to the establishment of the DHS begins the research. Part of this chronology focuses on a review of the genesis of the homeland security field, including a pre-9/11 security task force, led by two former U.S. Senators, whose recommendations were not implemented prior to the attacks. This task force provided the initial organizational design for what became the DHS and outlined many of the options available in the homeland security arena both before 9/11 and after.
The manner in which the White House came to embrace the DHS plans will be discussed in detail in the second chapter. It will focus on the institutions that brought about the department, the roles played by Congress and the White House, and specifically those advisers to President George W. Bush who reversed course on homeland security and usurped the issue from Democrats. Informed by key scholars of public management, an analysis of the Bush administration’s governing style and the way in which the president has structured the White House staff is discussed throughout this section.

The third chapter discusses the organizational structure of the DHS and areas of the mandate that the department perhaps needs to rethink. It focuses on the DHS budget, the role of the private sector, and includes a look at how intelligence gathering is going to work within the new framework. It also looks at some of the agencies that were relocated under the DHS umbrella from other departments and how those existing departments are affected by the changes. This leads into a discussion of the challenges Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge will have to face in managing such a complex department.

Finally, to bring together the three chapters of research, theories of public management and bureaucracy will be applied to the way in which the Bush administration is dealing with the DHS. It will then conclude with an inventory of what the department and administration may have to consider if the DHS is to be effective.

Some of the research material is from newspaper articles and political speeches. But a number of key studies, most notably by the Foreign Policy Studies scholars at the Brookings Institution, are relied upon heavily to link the facts about the department to the wider debates in public management and public administration circles. The DHS is not only a timely topic and one that allows for investigation of the federal public service but
it is also about reinventing government, not through small endeavours internal to a department, but through the creation of a new and large organization.
1. The Creation of the Department of Homeland Security

Just four weeks after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Executive Order 13228 established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) as an advisory body in the Executive Office of the President to “coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from, terrorist attacks within the United States.” Bush appointed long-time friend and former Governor of Pennsylvania Tom Ridge to the post of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the OHS was created primarily to advise the president and develop a national strategy for dealing with terrorism. It would, however, prove to be a temporary measure. The OHS was hastily created but not hastily envisioned. The Heritage Foundation, the CATO Institute, and studies conducted by the RAND Corporation, the General Accounting Office, and the National Intelligence Council had called for a more focused effort on homeland security even during the last year of the Clinton administration. The U.S. Commission on National Security, a taskforce chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, had not only called for a more focused effort but had advocated the creation of an agency devoted to the task eight months before 9/11.2

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The genesis for much of the focus on homeland security after 9/11 came from the Phase III and final Hart-Rudman report, entitled "Road Map for National Security: Impetus for Change." In the report, they warned that:

The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the Cold War have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the Executive Branch of the U.S. government. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy. Most troublesome is the lack of an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Clear goals and priorities are rarely set. Budgets are prepared and appropriated as they were during the Cold War.3

The 150 page report outlined a series of national security inadequacies in almost every department, with particularly pointed criticism of the Departments of Defense and State.

The Hart-Rudman report was delivered in February 2001 and was largely ignored.

Instead of heeding the report's advice, another task force was established.

In May 2001, Vice President Cheney was appointed head of the Office of National Preparedness, an anti-terrorism task force to gauge the threat of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks against the American homeland. The task force neither met nor presented a published report and only existed in White House speeches and in headlines.

Infighting among government agencies slowed homeland security progress even further. Turf wars between the FBI, the CIA, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) undermined efforts by lawmakers to create a more comprehensive homeland defense plan. Their inability to work together contributed to the failure to

3 Hart and Rudman, "Road Map for National Security," x-xi.
follow up leads that might have exposed the al Qaeda plot prior to 9/11. The precise
nature of the failure to share information is now well documented in the Congressional
joint inquiry into intelligence community activities surrounding 9/11. This wrangling
among agencies over homeland security had really been occurring since the bombings in
Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center during the Clinton years. Some would
contend, as the Hart-Rudman report concluded, that it had been occurring since the end of
the Cold War.

The OHS was small and primarily served in an advisory capacity. Its main effect
was to bring Ridge into the inner circle of Bush's advisers, along with Cheney, Attorney
General John Ashcroft, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld's deputy Paul
Wolfowitz, all of whom essentially formed the initial President's Homeland Security
Council. Some policymakers, however, were less than pleased with the performance of
the OHS. Its mandate was massive but vague. It also had a tremendous staffing shortage
in terms of achieving any of its objectives and lacked budget leverage. Many argued,
including some in the administration, that if such an office was going to be created, Tom
Ridge would have to be more than just an anti-terrorism czar and be given authority over
other agencies to maintain control on the ground when disaster strikes. To be effective,
Ridge would have to be able to override line departments not under his authority. But at
this stage, the OHS was not a line department nor did it have much real authority. It
seemed that the scope of the OHS was unfeasible. It was agreed among many Democrats
and Republicans that a homeland security apparatus was needed to guide the federal
government in a time of crisis but it was clear that such an office would have to be provided with the resources and clout in Washington to work with traditional agencies like the Departments of Defense and Justice, the FBI, and the CIA. Strategically, this is the major public management problem with creating a new department. National security advisers believed that Ridge and the OHS would be forced to “take powers away from various different agencies that have them now. There is nothing harder in the federal government than doing that.”

The question thus became how it would be possible, or even feasible, to coordinate some forty other agencies and whether Ridge would be given, and could effectively utilize, the power to not simply coordinate the various agencies but actually make decisions for them. Led by Joseph Lieberman, some Senate Democrats and a couple of Republicans, including Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, began calling for the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security almost as soon as the OHS was created. In an October 11, 2001 press statement by the Lieberman-chaired Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs announcing his bill for the creation of a full department, Lieberman suggested that “we need a robust, executive-level department to carry out the core functions of homeland defense, which are prevention, protection and preparation.” Similar legislation in the House was proposed by Representatives William Thornberry (R-Texas) and Ellen Tauscher (D-California).

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4 The Homeland Security Council is now a statutory entity with a reduced number of core members (the president, the vice president, the secretaries of homeland security and defense, and the attorney general). This council met infrequently when Ridge was head of the OHS.
Bush and the White House strategists opposed creating an actual homeland security department for a number of reasons. First, they did not want an expansion of the federal bureaucracy as had occurred when previous administrations took it upon themselves to rework the federal government. If it went ahead under existing laws, the new homeland security department would have been subject to the same labour laws and public service rules and regulations concerning the hiring and removal of employees that had occurred with the overhaul of the Social Security Administration under Clinton, Carter’s separate Department of Education and revamped Department of Energy, Johnson’s Department of Transportation, and probably would have occurred if Nixon had succeeded in creating four superdepartments. Days after his appointment, Ridge suggested that the goal of the OHS was not to create bureaucracy. He also would not try to single-handedly assert control over various agencies and departments under him. Ridge stressed that his position was created by the vice president in an emergency recommendation eight days after 9/11 and that the agency was constructed without Congressional approval, only consultation, and a simple Senatorial confirmation. As early as September 21, 2001, Lieberman was calling for a full department with a secretary appointed by the President, but confirmed by the Senate and, therefore, accountable to the Congress and the public. He also stressed that the secretary be given full authority over the department’s budget and spending priorities and would be a full member of the National Security Council.

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Second, the mandate, as stipulated in the executive order, called for the OHS to establish a national strategy to prevent terrorism. Bush and his advisers wanted this controlled out of the White House. The administration had a relatively short success list of achievements and had been less than stellar in achieving many of its aims prior to 9/11. The crisis, although a horrifying event, quickly became an issue Bush could exploit for political clout, not only in battling Congress over his agenda but in preparation for the 2002 midterms. Whether this was discussed in the weeks after 9/11 is not clear but his strategists must have realized that homeland security could become a key Bush legacy and an issue on which the president could define himself.

Third, with the infighting among the intelligence agencies and the Pentagon, the White House sought a key place at the table in the post-9/11 intelligence and information gathering operations. The OHS could be used as a conduit between the various organizations to keep the White House in the loop and even ahead of the game. Thus, the creation of the OHS rather than a cabinet-level department had the potential to be a powerful tool the Bush Administration could use to stay ahead of the other agencies in order to receive full political credit for the national security effort.

The lack of direct authority the OHS had over other agencies helped lead to Congressional legislation to establish a department. While acknowledging the OHS was an important first step, Lieberman and other lawmakers recognized that Ridge did not seem to know how to respond to most of the questions about homeland security. Gary Hart commented that “the czar model will not suffice. Without budgetary or statutory authority, Ridge is doomed not to succeed. If he only has the power of exhortation, the disparate agencies will do what he asks them only when that is approved by their own

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superiors. Ridge can have interagency working groups and encourage people in the Coast Guard to talk to Customs, but gaps and seams will remain. He will have to keep going to the Oval Office to make anything happen. Anyone who knows Washington knows this won’t work.”10

Ridge had been thrown into the 9/11 crisis and had a steep learning curve to overcome. In fact, from the 2000 election, the tone of the Bush administration was ordered and organized, with clear distinctions of power and deliberate communications that sought long term goals. But after 9/11, order seemed to break down because decisions had to come faster and the administration was not accustomed to making them that quickly. Paul Light argues that “it’s what we’d call, in formal organizational terms, an organized anarchy or an organized adhocracy.”11

As for Ridge in the position of OHS chief and presidential adviser, Light adds that “what you’re seeing is what you get when you only have a license to persuade...he’s doing a hell of a job with what he’s got. He’s basically playing high-stakes poker with a pair of twos.”12 Ridge dealt mostly with trying to assemble an office from scratch, negotiating a border security pact with Canada, and presiding over the anthrax scare during his time in the OHS, as well as attempting to draft a detailed plan on how to combat terrorism.

But out of crisis, innovation and reinvention of public management can occur. In 1947, Truman undertook the largest transformation of the U.S. government, when he

merged the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces into the Department of Defense to better coordinate against military threats. In this case, it took eight months after 9/11 for the White House to take up the proposal of a full department that had originated with the Hart-Rudman Commission and had been championed by Lieberman. On this issue, the right and the center-left, led by Senate Democrats such as Lieberman, were in agreement that resources should be allocated for such a department headed by a Cabinet-level chief and not just a presidential adviser.

But Lieberman's Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs did not design a department from scratch. The blueprints for the department were just augmented plans from what had already been suggested and outlined in the Hart-Rudman Commission's final report. That report proposed the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) by consolidating a number of agencies across departments. The structure would be composed of three directorates for Prevention (Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Customs Service), Protection (Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, National Infrastructure Protection Center), and Response (FEMA, National Domestic Preparedness Office). Taking the Clinton administration's lead agency concept to organize counterterrorism efforts, the Hart-Rudman plan was to give the new department and its head the lead homeland security role in the federal government.

Beginning in 2002, a group of public policy scholars at the Brookings Institution (referred to herein as Michael O'Hanlon and his colleagues or the Brookings team)

13 For a detailed description of the proposal see Hart and Rudman, "Road Map for National Security," 10-29. Very little of the language of both the White House and Lieberman proposals deviates from the Hart-Rudman framework. The major differences revolve around the placement of a number of agencies which are not principally concerned with homeland security. These were not included in the Hart-Rudman report.
started to analyze the creation of the DHS. In three separate studies, they offered recommendations on how the department should be structured and how much should be spent. In their initial study, they analyzed the Hart-Rudman suggestions and praised the simplicity of the design. They argued that “merging critical functions dealing with frontier security, infrastructure protection, and emergency response into distinct directorates should ease communications and enhance effective implementation of agreed policy both within and probably among the directorates.” But Brookings also outlined key weaknesses of the Hart-Rudman arrangement and it was these recommendations that fell on deaf ears. They noted that most of the homeland security functions of the government were not included, such as the FBI, who are responsible for domestic surveillance, the CIA, who are responsible for tracking terrorists and the materials they might bring into the country, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who are responsible for detecting and responding to a bioterrorist attack. Furthermore, they argued that the DHS could not be perceived as the lead agency without authority over these other agencies. “If the coordinator is seen as a competitor, other agencies whose cooperation is crucial will likely balk at following its lead, and bureaucratic fights over turf become pervasive.”

As Lieberman began working on his legislation in October, top Pentagon and NSC officials believed that a DHS was a more realistic option to achieve the mandate set out in the original executive order. The Senate bill stalled as the post-9/11 agenda shifted in Washington. After the campaign to get Osama bin Laden faltered when the invasion of Afghanistan to take out al Qaeda did not yield desired results, the foreign policy

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agenda quickly shifted to the Bush doctrine, the axis of evil, and consequently the decision to invade Iraq. In the first half of 2002, Lieberman and his committee stopped focusing on the DHS bill and concentrated on the allegations against Enron and other Wall Street financial institutions. He issued only one statement, in March, that addressed homeland security and called on OHS director Ridge to push for a full department. In May, he finally introduced legislation but at this stage, the White House had already begun to design its own. On June 6, 2002, Bush called on Congress to create the department in full knowledge that Senate Democrats had been working on such legislation for seven months. A month earlier, on May 2, Lieberman’s bill, S. 1449, was introduced. It combined the previous House and Senate efforts and was known as the National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002. The measure was reported out of the Governmental Affairs Committee May 22 on a party line vote of 9-7. But the White House legislation followed only two weeks later.

The House passed Bush’s plan (H.R. 5005) largely intact by the end of June. Lieberman initially did not attack the White House legislation and even seemed pleased that his initiative had finally been taken up by the administration. In a press statement from June 6, Lieberman stated that “the good news is that this broad, bipartisan group of us in Congress and the White House are on the same side as we strengthen our guard to protect the American people at home against the threat of terrorism.”

But Lieberman and Senate Democrats balked at some of the provisions that Bush requested and instead introduced several amendments which were passed by the Senate over the next three months. The White House bill differed from the Lieberman

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15 O’Hanlon et al, Protecting the American Homeland, 104.
legislation in one important respect: federal worker rights. Unions argued that the White House bill was “a back-door attempt to erode worker protections” because personnel provisions that circumvent existing civil service pay and performance rules were included.\textsuperscript{17} If one compares the Senate bill to create a department, as written primarily by Lieberman throughout early 2002, and the White House’s version that was introduced after, about ninety-five per cent of it is exactly the same as Lieberman’s.\textsuperscript{18} Securing the homeland should have been an issue that was naturally bipartisan. But it did not play out that way and Rove’s gambit to take the plans away from Lieberman is akin to agenda hijacking.

Already under fire for dragging their heels on post-9/11 security preparations, the White House sought to turn the table on their Democratic opponents by taking up the issue of the department. Karl Rove realized that the White House could go to the people on homeland security “because they trust the Republican Party to do a better job...protecting America.”\textsuperscript{19} He masterminded taking control of the homeland security issue before Congress could finish with it and pass their version. In what was a stroke of brilliant politics and policy entrepreneurship, Rove moved quickly to orchestrate a DHS with a distinctive Republican stamp after the White House decided in mid-spring that there should be a department. Republicans also made Bush’s handling of the war on terrorism the centerpiece of their strategy to win back the Senate and keep control of the House in the November midterm elections. Even though this department was largely the

\textsuperscript{16} United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “Lieberman Pleased Bush Plan Tracks His Own,” June 6, 2002, \url{http://govt-aff.senate.gov/060602press.htm}.
brainchild of Lieberman, Rove argued that Republicans would get the credit and prove to be a “partisan bonanza for the GOP.” For the most part, the White House received the credit and Republicans retook control of both houses in November.

Aberbach and Rockman might see the White House actions on the creation homeland security department as part of the “noisy crisis,” in deference to politicians who openly criticize their inability to limitlessly direct the bureaucracy. For the Bush administration, there is a general perception that the federal public service is unresponsive to political authority and that senior bureaucrats among federal agencies will “actively resist and perhaps even sabotage” policy directives from the White House. It is this distrust, as well as a concerted effort to micromanage homeland security by the administration and the fact that the unions are a core Democratic constituency, that led to the White House proposal for additional flexibility in personnel policy in the DHS. In September, moderate Republican Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island joined Democrats in an amendment to the legislation (S.A. 4471) to keep Bush from getting his way on all his demands for management flexibility over workplace conditions in the DHS. A compromise was worked out that allowed the administration to loosen public service rules but federal employee unions could object and if an impasse resulted, the Federal Services Impasse Panel would arbitrate. But the White House balked and instead gambled on taking control of Congress in the midterms. The gamble paid off and after the Republican victory, Lieberman and Senate Democrats negotiated an

agreement with the White House during the lame duck session, and Congress passed the law (H.R. 5710, S. 2452) creating the DHS on Bush's terms, with most of the management flexibility demands intact.\textsuperscript{22} For a comparison of the three separate proposals (H.R. 5005, S.A. 4471, H.R. 5710) and what agencies were included, see Appendix 1. As can be seen, there is very little difference among the three, with only minor changes to the final composition of each of the four directorates.

According to O'Hanlon and his colleagues, all of this political positioning by Rove and Bush's other strategists was counterproductive to the original, and naturally bipartisan, goal to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks. The "excessive focus on organizational matters during [2002] was one reason...the country lost a good deal of momentum on improving homeland security."\textsuperscript{23} The White House vetoed several specific proposals by Congress that would have addressed immediate security vulnerabilities and it discouraged action on a number of Democratic initiatives to increase funding for domestic security. It was not until almost the end of the year before the department became a reality but only after serious quarrels between the White House and Congress. One battle in particular was the White House's refusal to let Ridge testify before Congress. The Bush administration argued that he should not be forced to give formal testimony about his role as adviser. This prompted Democratic Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Republican Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska to write a letter to Ridge requesting that he testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee. This infighting spilled over when Bush sent his plan to establish the DHS to Capitol Hill and


Congress still insisted Ridge testify. He did speak to them but not as an adviser. Instead, he formally testified about the reorganization of the executive branch and the creation of the DHS.

To Karl Rove, getting the department created before the midterms was less important than having a campaign issue and as E.J. Dionne argues, “adding to the insults to the Democrats, House Republicans larded the final bill with special interest provisions despite David Obey’s (D-Wis.) argument that the administration is providing far less money than is needed for a long list of security priorities.”

The processes that brought about the department demonstrate a lack of planning and forethought on the part of both the administration and Congress. But of particular note is the reversal of the White House and how a strategic adviser to the president turned the administration around. The role played by Karl Rove and the structure of the White House that allowed Rove such power within the administration are the focus of the next chapter.
2. The Politicized-Crisis Presidency: A Reconceptualization of Presidential Power & the Ascendancy of Responsive Competence

Two models of the presidency have come to dominate the political science literature on the subject. The first model originated in the 1950s, with Richard E. Neustadt, the preeminent scholar on presidential power, and was dominant until the ascendancy of the Nixon presidency. It is often referred to as the institutionalized presidency. The second model took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, as expressed by Richard Nathan and Terry Moe. It is known as the administrative presidency or the politicized presidency, and has been subdivided in the literature to encompass a group of scholars (Nathan and Moe) who view the main goal of the presidency as one of mastering responsive competence, a term that refers to the “benefits accruing to presidents from centralization of the institutional resources in the White House and the politicization of the federal bureaucracy.” Another group, led by public administration experts such as Paul Light, Donald Kettl, and Daniel Carpenter, feel that these scholars’ focus on responsive competence comes at the expense of neutral competence. This term starts from the premise that “presidents pursue and safeguard the interests of the United States when – while seeking information, expertise and coordinative capacity – they give due regard to the capabilities of and integrity of established resources.” In this chapter, the creation of the homeland security department is used as an exemplar into how the Bush White House is executing presidential power. It is suggested that the administration has ignored both strains of the administrative presidency model. They have clearly not asserted neutral competence, which one would expect, but have not adhered to responsive

competence either, except only in the context of the immediate midterm elections. This lack of competence in the execution of presidential power to create the DHS has resulted in a department that is not only unresponsive to the homeland security mandate among bureaucrats, but unresponsive to the administration that created it.

In his seminal research on presidential power, Richard E. Neustadt argued that when studying the presidency, “the question is not how [the President] masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance, looking toward tomorrow from today.”\(^\text{27}\) Posed some fifty years ago, that question is still central to analysis of any administration, and in the case of George W. Bush, permits focus on the nature and sources of the power that reside in the White House of today. Nelson W. Polsby puts the scope of presidential power into perspective. “The President must make decisions even when there is no way of knowing what decisions ought to be made...Measured against the opportunities, the responsibilities, and the resources of others in our political system and in other nations, the powers of the Presidency are enormous.”\(^\text{28}\) It used to be that “presidential power is the power to persuade.”\(^\text{29}\) This was certainly the case up until the presidency of John F. Kennedy. But with a longtime Washington powerbroker like Lyndon Johnson in the White House, and more significantly, with Richard Nixon, there came about a reconceptualization of the division of powers between Congress and the Presidency. While the Constitutional relationship between the two branches did not change in any sense that required an amendment, the scope of White House control over the federal government was expanded and with it, the

\(^{26}\) Campbell, Managing the Presidency, 17.
model of presidential power as developed by Neustadt became somewhat outmoded. Rossiter stated as early as 1956 that “perhaps the softest spot of all in the general health of the Presidency lies in the gap between responsibility and authority, between promise and performance, in the area of public administration…his authority over the administration is in no way equal to his responsibility for its performance.”

Rossiter foresaw a fundamental flaw with the power of the presidency during the Eisenhower years. Many of the executive functions were out of reach of the president, in the hands of the Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office and by tradition, with the authority of the Committees of Congress. That changed with the usurpation of some of the Congressional check under Johnson, the ascendancy of Nixon, and the creation of the highly politicized Office of Management and Budget. In the administrative presidency model, the president does not simply accommodate and win over others through powers of persuasion and teach realism to the public as Neustadt suggested, although in some instances this may occur. Instead, it was argued that the president’s central sources of power are the appointment of the senior members of the bureaucracy and his Cabinet from a variety of factions within his own party, the building of a cadre of loyalists, and the reliance on a set of advisers to capitalize on decisions and policy in order to maximize political gain. It is probably more accurate to suggest both are occurring, that the president has the power of persuasion and a more developed set of implements at his disposal to utilize resources. But it depends on the type of administration and how the president uses those resources. With the Bush administration, the advisers play a very

important role, perhaps more important in terms of decision making, than previous White
House office holders.

As a president with little policy experience, typified by his Washington outsider
persona, and as an individual whose knowledge of both domestic and foreign policy was
limited upon taking office, it has fallen upon this core group of advisers, led by strategist
Karl Rove, Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Vice President Dick Cheney, to educate,
instruct, guide, and provide the policy advice Bush needs in order to make appropriate
policy decisions. This is in keeping with both the president’s character and personality,
as someone who prefers to delegate rather than take an active role in policy development.
It also suggests the type of leadership style he wishes to pursue. In his appraisals of the
last four presidents (Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton), Colin Campbell has
suggested four styles chief executives may develop for the administration of
government.\(^{31}\) A *priorities and planning style* often accompanies a president who seeks
an ambitious legislative program and who holds a strong political position that can bring
about such a mandate. They want to expand White House resources and will often foster
competition between departments and agencies by establishing task forces and councils.
A second is termed *broker politics style*, which develops when presidents have a strong
political position but seek a modest legislative program. Campbell notes “broker-politics
leaders will likely resist expanding existing central agencies or creating new ones.”\(^ {32}\)

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\(^{31}\) Colin Campbell has incorporated these types of leadership styles in many of his works. See Colin
Campbell, “The Search for Coordination and Control: When and How Are Central Agencies the Answer?,”
in *Organizing Governance, Governing Organization*, eds. Colin Campbell and B. Guy Peters (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 59-60; Colin Campbell, “The White House and Presidency under the
“Let’s Deal” President” in *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals*, eds. Colin Campbell and Bert A.
Rockman (Chatham: Chatham House, 1991), 189-194; Colin Campbell, *The U.S. Presidency in Crisis: A
Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) specifically the chapter “Bill Clinton
Encounters the Governability Gap,” 72-103.

\(^{32}\) Campbell, “The Search for Coordination and Control,” 59.
third style, the *administrative politics style*, occurs when a president is in a tenuous political position that inhibits a bold legislative agenda. Crisis management and conventional process-management functions often take over central agencies. Campbell adds that “administrative politics arises when presidents do not take special steps to integrate competing views within their administration.” A final style, known as *survival politics style*, arises when an administration needs to improve its performance or face replacement, and when the other three styles have failed.

Bush won a narrow election victory in 2000 and prior to 9/11, governed with a style that could be most closely associated with broker politics, especially on policies like the faith-based initiative and his education plan. But since ascending into the role of wartime president, and even before the 9/11 crisis, none of these styles fit him exactly (although he clearly does not show signs of embracing a priorities and planning style). Even prior to assuming office, on election night and during the administration-in-litigation phase, Bush and his advisers have adopted an adapted form of survival politics. Although he seems politically strong and poised for re-election in mid 2003, Bush has not sought the countervailance of multiple points of view. Instead, he relies on a group of like-minded advisers, and therefore has allowed an administrative politics style to enter into the mix. But with the tax cut, and especially with the homeland and national security initiatives that have accompanied the radical shift in foreign policy and focus on national defense, survival politics is what the administration has embraced. It remains to be seen how Bush as wartime president will play out in terms of leadership style and whether this survival style will continue until the 2004 election. It goes without saying that this survival style is shaped and nursed along by Bush's influential advisers.

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33 Campbell, *Managing the Presidency*, 81.
Influential advisers are nothing new to the presidency. Neustadt described the institutionalized presidency in the 1950s and determined that the president needs help in the form of staff facilities of every sort. Rossiter suggested that the institutionalized presidency "converts the Presidency into an instrument of twentieth century government; it gives the incumbent a sporting chance to stand the strain and fulfill his constitutional mandate." But the role and scope of the advisers to the president has been altered significantly. In describing the Franklin D. Roosevelt White House, Neustadt stated that "not only did he keep his organizations overlapping and divide authority among them, but he also tended to put men of clashing temperaments, outlooks, ideas, in charge of them." This dynamic has been at play with many White House staffs. Bush, however, has opted for a set of advisers who think very much alike ideologically. Campbell noted a similar concern during the first term of the Reagan presidency. He suggested that "the Reagan administration brought on board too many ideologues firm in the belief that true-blue conviction can move mountains." But even the Reagan administration had different strands of conservative thinkers within its fold. Furthermore, the Bush advisers exert a different kind of influence than, for example, did the group of advisers known as "the best and the brightest" under Johnson. At that time, the advisers sought the input of the independent senior bureaucracy when in the process of policy making. Today, the reverse is the norm. The advisers set the agenda and then get the politicized senior bureaucracy to implement the strategy. The top-down approach has given the inner circle of advisers much more authority over the policy making function of the White House. As Campbell notes, "presidents must play close attention to the effects of their White House

34 Rossiter, The American Presidency, 104.
35 Neustadt, Presidential Power, 150-151.
organization and operation both on cabinet secretaries' roles and the functioning of policy shops in the Executive Office of the President.\textsuperscript{37}

Richard Nathan describes the relationship between the president and the advisers in his work on the administrative presidency. Focusing on the Nixon and Reagan administrations, he argues that chief executives "should organize their office – appoint, assign, and motivate their principal appointees – in a way that penetrates the administrative process" because "much of what we would define as policymaking is done through the execution of laws in the management process."\textsuperscript{38} Similar to Rossiter's foresight in the 1950s that an administration's authority over the bureaucracy needed to evolve, Nathan recognized that the "appointed officials in the U.S. executive branch often fail to appreciate"\textsuperscript{39} the need for involvement with the bureaucracy in administrative processes. Nixon's administrative presidency model of the White House began the concentration of power over policy issues. Central to this model was the attempts to create four superbureaucracies. Early in his first term, Nixon determined that he needed to create a direct means of exercising authority over domestic bureaucracy to achieve his goals of "New Federalism," a phrase introduced by the president to describe his domestic program which included a plan to rearrange responsibilities among the various levels of government.\textsuperscript{40} A counter-bureaucracy, set up within the White House, failed to meet the aims but it did demonstrate the centralizing shift that the president demanded. After reelection in 1972, the Nixon administration moved to create superbureaucracies. Four

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Campbell, \textit{Managing the Presidency}, 112.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Campbell, \textit{Managing the Presidency}, 111.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Richard Nathan, \textit{The Administrative Presidency} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), 82.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Nathan, \textit{The Administrative Presidency}, 84.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Richard Nathan, \textit{The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 17-18.
\end{itemize}
super secretaries were appointed in 1973 for Natural Resources, Human Resources, Community Development and Economic Affairs. These Cabinet officers were to be given special roles as counselors to the president but Watergate ended the administrative presidency and this new framework.

The administrative presidency legacy has lived on, even being resurrected with the Reagan administration, which managed to incorporate many of Nixon’s planned initiatives. As Terry Moe indicates, “more than any other modern president, Ronald Reagan has moved with dedication and comprehensiveness to take hold of the administrative machinery of government. At the heart of his approach are the politicization of administrative arrangements and the centralization of policy-related concerns in the White House.” In many respects, the current Bush administration has inherited and adopted this administrative presidency model.

Terry Moe takes the position that the administrative presidency marks an institutionalization of the presidency and a diminution of the role of the bureaucracy and its impact of neutral competence which historically distracted presidents from the trend of responsive competence. Mistrust of the senior bureaucracy, even of those they appoint, and the need to centralize operations has put tremendous strain on the executive branch to provide a myriad of policy and political leadership without the effective resources at their disposal. It has also cut the president off from the divided authority and competitive spirit which Neustadt argued were positive aspects of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. As early as 1983, Campbell noted that “the centralization of executive

authority in the hands of the president and his power of appointment can produce less than satisfactory results.  

Campbell, in his extensive analysis of the Carter and Reagan White Houses, juxtaposed these two administrations’ differing governing styles and West Wing structures. The Reagan approach, of a modified spokes-in-a-wheel pattern of administrative organization, in which a number of advisers hold sway over the operations of the presidency, is more akin to the model Bush has chosen for his White House. The major exception is the position of prominence afforded to Karl Rove. He occupies a position unlike any of those advisers to Reagan or Bush Sr.

The relationship between the White House Chief of Staff and the special adviser is an interesting one. The resentment felt by Clinton’s senior staff (such as George Stephanopoulos and Leon Panetta) to the intrusion of Dick Morris is well-known but the dynamic between Card and Rove is less clear. Rove is an entity unto himself, occupying both a central election campaign role, as political consultant and strategist, and carrying that prominence into the administration, as one of the president’s chief advisers. Within the hypothetical West Wing hierarchy, he is often an equal to Chief of Staff Andrew Card in that his opinion matters a great deal to President Bush. Rove, especially, exemplifies this new ethos of the more powerful adviser. Previous strategists, such as Bush Sr.’s volatile strategist and Rove’s mentor Lee Atwater, or even Clinton’s hired gun Dick Morris, have never instated themselves within the presidential policy realm as much as Rove.

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In Moe's vision of the politicized presidency, grand policy designs and massive change are usually not possible because they come up against a wall of opposition, from the traditional checks and balances and also from the politicized agencies like the Office of Management and Budget. Moe does note that "only under special circumstances will quantum leaps in the institutional presidency meet with congressional approval."45 Certainly, the creation of the OHS and the authority the White House has exercised over security issues since 9/11 could be considered quantum leaps. But the OHS framework did not work and with the White House push for the DHS, Rove did not act to counter what Moe described as a serious knowledge problem: "even if [the president's advisers] had the resources to impose any reforms they liked, they would not know how to design an institutional system optimally suited to presidential needs."46 This goes to the heart of the White House's impractical design for the DHS. Moe adds that in facing major structural constraints, a problem is that they are "new to the scene; in fact, largely as a rational response to the knowledge problem, the presidential team will purposely include members with extensive experience and connections."47 But the more serious problem is that the "social science of organizations is so poorly developed" and no commissioned study, task force, or existing body of knowledge is available to presidential advisers like Rove "for confidently linking alternative institutional designs to alternative sets of consequences."48

This is especially true with an overhaul of the federal public service as significant as the DHS. There is no guidebook to which Rove can refer in order to make the square

pegs of White House political strategy fit into the round holes of the federal bureaucracy where change rarely occurs within limited political timeframes. Is the creation of the DHS a gambit by pursuit of responsive competence or is it a concerted effort by the White House to develop a more coherent bureaucratic culture that ultimately will develop neutral competence or even autonomy in this vital area? It seems that neither of these reasons explains the unworkable framework for the DHS. If it were a gambit, the White House would have taken a page from previous administrations' attempts to modify the public service and would not have enacted a bureaucratic structure that will not be responsive to the administration in the long-term. If the White House wanted to bring about neutral competence and even autonomy, they would have consulted the bureaucracy in proposing the framework. Instead, they were openly hostile to the public service, left them out of the decision process, and adopted a framework that was untested.

It is appropriate to now turn to the other group of scholars on the administrative presidency, those who believe that policy competence is also integral to the presidency. From a short-term political perspective, the about face on the plans for the DHS made sense to the administration. Rove and the White House team saw a rare window of opportunity to capitalize on an issue important in the hearts and minds of the public. But the long-term effects can be damaging if the hasty DHS plans are fully implemented. The lack of visioning and forethought that went into this plan is disconcerting. The structure of the present White House and its relationship to other institutions and agencies helped bring it about. One must speculate if policy such as this would have been allowed prior to the Nixon administration’s reconceptualization of the executive branch. Paul Light has termed this type of political decision making over effective policy making
“short-term-itis.”49 Certainly, the DHS is not a short-term proposal but the limited planning and visioning was largely designed for immediate and short-term political payoff. Light suggests that “the President faces a dilemma between improving the quality of outcomes (long-term) or engaging in high politics (short-term).”50 Dennis Simon and Charles Ostrom, Jr. articulate this dilemma:

The long-term approach will direct the president’s actions and energies toward the solution of principal problems of the day...To the extent that such attempts fail to solve problems, the president’s resource reservoir will become increasingly shallow as the vicious circle begins to undermine his influence on the policy process. This explains the attractiveness of the short-term approach. The president is relatively unconstrained in relying upon political drama and will welcome the bursts in support which actions on the political stage trigger. However, the impact of such actions are short-lived and, by themselves, can do little but provide bumps and wiggles on the downward course of approval.51

The White House was able to move forward with a short-term approach because of the structure of the system, where re-election is always foremost in their minds, and because Lieberman and others in Congress failed to capitalize on the issue. But the short-term versus long-term dilemma really is not at play with the Bush administration. There has been little evidence of any long-term approach to actions. It could even be said that Rove, as an ideological entrepreneur52 rather than a policy entrepreneur, is oblivious to Simon and Ostrom’s distinction, and even less to issues of policy implementation.

Another effect that has occurred over the issue of homeland security is a breakdown in responsive bureaucratic policy as a result of the lack of bipartisanship.

50 Light, The President’s Agenda, 254.
52 For an extensive analysis of ideological entrepreneurship in the Bush administration, see Colin Campbell, "Unrestrained Ideological Entrepreneurship in the Bush II Advisory System: An Examination of the
Moe understood this twenty years ago when he identified the president's need to make the system more responsive to his agenda. Two basic developmental thrusts occur during this pursuit of responsive competence. Moe argues that the first is "the increasing centralization of the institutional presidency in the White House." While executive branch resources maybe tapped, that does not mean the president has at his disposal thousands of personnel. Therefore, "the combination of responsiveness, flexibility, and strong incentives to circumvent established organizations and vested interests gives the White House a built-in advantage in the development of presidential support institutions." The second thrust is the "increasing politicization of the institutional system." The president wields the power of appointment, a power that is increasing from administration to administration in terms of numbers and levels of the public service affected, and one that not only ensures partisans and ideologically similar individuals are appointed to high posts but can lead to the manipulation and amendment of civil service rules, reorganization of parts of the public service, and a bully pulpit from which to press for modification of legislation.

It is with this second development that the Bush administration has succeeded in pressuring for public service change and has done it largely with the support of Congress. The politicized presidency leads to a lack of bipartisanship and in turn has encouraged gridlock in Congress. The administration embraced the DHS in a gridlock framework when it saw an opportunity to accuse the Democrats of obstructionism on homeland security. This might not have been the case if the Republicans had controlled all three

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Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," 244.

Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," 244.
branches as they did prior to Senator James Jeffords' defection from the G.O.P. to sit as an independent. The partisan impetus on every issue helped Rove take the DHS plans from the Democrats. If bipartisanship was truly encouraged, and not just the non-genuine campaign-speak veneer of the two parties working together to reach common ground, then the plans for the DHS could have been more thoroughly researched and planned.

The distinctive Bush administration tinge to the blueprint of the DHS that seeks a restructuring of public service labour laws and an escalation of outsourcing and private sector involvement in the federal government may have also been avoided. This is not to say the White House is entirely to blame for the series of events that culminated in the adoption of the DHS plan. The Democrats failed to get out ahead on the homeland security issue which every political strategist working for their organization could have predicted was an important election issue.

The exploration of theories of presidential power presented here is a means of showcasing how Karl Rove has used the system to full advantage and how the Democrats, as opposition, have fumbled. Comparison of the different eras and circumstances is not the goal but learning from the redefining and rethinking of presidential power from one administration to the next is important in demonstrating how future chief executives will respond to policy issues. The aftermath of 9/11 is certainly unique and with Democrats incapable of running against the president (without being castigated as anti-American or unpatriotic) on a wide range of issues, it is in keeping with the competitiveness of their chosen profession that the White House advisers should exploit the situation to maximum benefit. But they have not addressed policy

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competence at all, and as will be shown, the framework for the DHS even fails to adhere
to notions of responsive competence except simply as an issue for the midterm elections.

It was Rove who believed homeland security was an issue upon which the
president could set the lead and the Republican Party could win with during the 2002
midterms. He then convinced Bush to stay ahead on homeland security. Certainly, Card
and the other advisers play a major role in policy development but they do not have the
president’s attention in quite the same way as Rove does. He has taken to heart what
Neustadt articulated years ago. A president’s object “should be to induce as much
uncertainty as possible about the consequences of ignoring what he wants. If he cannot
make men think him bound to win, his need is to keep them from thinking they can cross
him without risk.” 56 While Neustadt’s notion does not explicitly relate to the
administrative presidency, Rove knew it would be difficult for Democrats to run against
the president on law and order issues and more specifically, on anti-terrorism and
homeland security issues. It is the primary reason the DHS came about. Furthermore,
the White House capitalized on the perceived heroic leadership, as opposed to reflective
leadership, of George W. Bush. 57 Heroic type leaders require bold moves, as was seen
with the decision to go to war against Iraq. But on the domestic policy front, the decision
to reverse course on the DHS was also a bold move, in keeping with the strategy to
convince the public of Bush’s heroic leadership. In the spring of 2002 as Rove helped
develop the midterm strategy, he determined that Republicans could not lose on the

56 Neustadt, Presidential Power, 69.
57 This terminology is adapted from Stanley Renshon’s assessment of heroic versus reflective leadership
among U.S. chief executives in “Governing a Divided America in the Aftermath of September 11.” He
argues that heroic leadership in American society is the traditional. Its archetype is Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Reflective leadership, on the other hand, is more personal and diffuse. Its prototype, but not its archetype,
is Bill Clinton. After 9/11, Bush is perceived to have heroic leadership qualities although much of this has
question of homeland security. The vast majority of Americans trusted Republicans over Democrats on issues of national security. The trust-in-government scores increased remarkably in the aftermath of 9/11. At the end of September 2001, 64% of those surveyed trusted the government to do what was right. This was three times the proportion in a 1994 poll that asked the same question. That trust did not ebb through the 2002 midterm elections. Polls indicate that throughout 2002, approval of George W. Bush’s policies towards terrorism were very high. For example, a Newsweek poll conducted in May 2002 showed that 71% approved of the president’s performance on policies to prevent and minimize terrorism at home. That same poll conducted in September showed 73% approval. Other polls conducted asking a similar question showed approval ratings between seventy and eighty percent.

When asked about the Department of Homeland Security, again, the American public approved of its creation. CNN/USA Today/Gallup, ABC News/Washington Post, and CNN/Time polls conducted in June showed approval levels of the creation of a DHS at 72%, 69%, and 69% respectively. Less than a quarter disapproved of a new department. But when asked whether the department would improve the situation, the results are quite different. In the same June CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, it was asked whether Bush’s announced formation of the DHS was solely because he felt it was in the best interests of the country, or was it designed to divert attention from reports that the come about as a result of being a wartime president. See Stanley A. Renshon, America’s Second Civil War: Dispatches from the Political Center (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 327-344.

government failed to take action on warnings about terrorist attacks it received prior to 9/11. This time, only 56% believed it was in the best interests and 39% said it was to divert attention. In the CNN/Time, a majority of respondents believed that the new DHS would cost too much (57%) and create too much bureaucracy (52%).

Bush’s numbers did not go down and support for the department remained high after the June announcement from the White House. Sensing this issue would be popular back in the spring, Rove advised the President to reverse course on the creation of the DHS. The flip-flop was an excellent short-term, political strategy and since Senate Democrats had largely picked up from where the Hart-Rudman Commission had left off, the White House assumed that most of the policy work had been completed. With the help of the information dissemination resources (some might even call these propaganda resources) at White House disposal, Lieberman and Senate Democrats had little chance of convincing the public that the DHS was their brainchild and that the president did not even want a new department the year before.

One might reconceptualize the presidency under the Bush administration as an extension of Moe’s politicized presidency. Since 9/11 has dominated the president’s agenda, it could be termed the “politicized-crisis” presidency wherein the leeway not afforded previous presidents over the policy agenda is allowed with Bush because of the extraordinary crisis circumstances. But does this have a negative effect on the policy making process as a whole? With Rove in a position to champion crucial decisions such as the adoption of the DHS without any interference or even discussion from among the administration, it would appear that it has had a negative effect. Bush is surrounded by ideological entrepreneurs who are only interested in the short-term and are oblivious to
the more complex implementation issues. In such a world, policy competence plays no role and responsive competence is incoherent to meaningless.

Moe suggests that public administration scholars look favourably on the bureaucracy and unfavourably on politics. “While it is inevitably bound up with administrative behavior and a necessary component of democratic accountability, politics tends to be seen as a corrupting influence on the integrity and competence of formal organization.”

Herein lies the potential schism between the works on the presidency grounded in political analyses of incentives, resources, and behaviour, like Nathan and Moe, and the public administration focus on efficient and effective government through evaluation of appropriate organizational designs, like Kettl and Light. The research conducted by Rossiter, Neustadt, and Nathan have predicted the evolution of presidential power from administration to administration and one can see how the current Bush administration has adapted to meet political challenges. But the Bush administration does present a special case, if not an exception to the rule, because of the fallout from 9/11. Only time will tell if this power shift in keeping with the evolving power of the presidency is permanent or transitory. It is appropriate to now turn to the mandate and organizational structure of the department to demonstrate its dysfunction. This will be informed by bureaucratic and public management scholars whose focus is on public administration and not on the presidency specifically.
3. The Department of Homeland Security Mandate & Organizational Structure

The explanation as to how the department came about is essential to understanding the organization of the DHS and its mandate. If policymakers had not had almost a year to design this department, perhaps it would not have been as complex as it has become. The reorganization that is taking place is highly disruptive at a time when many Americans believe the government should be focusing on protecting against new attacks. If true bipartisanship on this issue had existed, the key agencies needed in the fight against terrorism could have been coordinated much faster and the DHS could have been fully operational by the end of 2002. Instead, Tom Ridge, who was selected as the Secretary by Bush in November 2002 and was confirmed and took office in January 2003, is faced with a bureaucratic nightmare over a year after the 9/11 attacks and in the midst of war with Iraq. Even if he exhibits dynamic and visionary leadership as Secretary of Homeland Security, he still has to design coordinating mechanisms among these twenty-two agencies which will take time. A number of these agencies are highly dysfunctional, have overlapping jurisdictions, and long-standing rivalries. Ridge has the task of melding together federal organizations with conflicting mandates, traditions, and bureaucratic cultures. For example, four separate agencies policed American borders: the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Agriculture Department’s inspection office. Bureaucracies are not conducive to change in the best of times and apart from the overarching concern over homeland security, there is little incentive for these agencies to give up previous authority and autonomy in their specific areas and submit to a new structure under the authority of the DHS. Former House Democrat Lee Hamilton argues that “melding all of this together is

going to take a remarkable management performance – a management virtuoso." Ridge might have accepted the challenge but it is unlike virtually every other federal government restructuring.

In short, the new department’s priority is to protect the United States against further terrorist attacks. Component agencies will analyze terrorism intelligence to match it against vulnerabilities in the U.S., develop new technologies to detect threats and coordinate the response in the event of future emergencies, protect critical infrastructure, coordinate the training and funding of state and local police and fire departments, and scrutinize borders, airports, and ports of entry. But achieving these goals is easier said than done.

The analysis of the DHS mandate and structure will be divided into sections addressing the organization, the budget, intelligence, the role of the private sector, and the managerial challenge. Recommendations and options as suggested by the Brookings team and other public management scholars conclude each section.

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3.1 The DHS Organization

The agencies slated to become part of the DHS will be housed in one of four major directorates: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (See Appendix 2). The directorates are summarized below:

1. The Border and Transportation Security directorate will bring the major border security and transportation operations under one roof, including the Customs Service and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center from the Treasury Department, most of the INS and the Office for Domestic Preparedness from the Justice Department, the Federal Protective Service from the General Services Administration (GSA), the new Transportation Security Administration from the Department of Transportation, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from the Agriculture Department.

2. The Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate will oversee domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinate government disaster response. It will bring together the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System from the Department of Health and Human Services, the Nuclear Incident Response Team from the Department of Energy, the Domestic Emergency Support Teams from Justice, and the FBI's National Domestic Preparedness Office.

3. The Science and Technology directorate will lead the federal government's efforts to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction. It includes the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Countermeasures Programs and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory from Energy, the National Biological Weapons Defense Analysis Center from the Defense Department, and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center from Agriculture.

4. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate will analyze intelligence and information from other agencies (including the CIA, FBI, DIA and NSA) involving threats to homeland security and evaluate vulnerabilities in U.S. infrastructure. It will bring together the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office from the Department of Commerce, the Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the GSA, the National Communications System from Defense, the National Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI, and the Energy Security and Assurance Program from Energy.

The Secret Service (from Treasury) and the Coast Guard (from Transportation) will also be located in the DHS, remaining intact, and reporting directly to Ridge. In addition, the newly named Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the former
INS adjudications and benefits programs, will report directly to Deputy Secretary Gordon England. Some of these agencies will join on March 1, 2003 and others on June 1, 2003. All the agencies will be merged and the department is slated to be completely operational by September 30, 2003. Paul Light argues that “it’s just a hopeless jumble...I do this for a living and I can barely keep up.”

O’Hanlon et al. came down hard on the Bush administration’s original proposal in their initial study of homeland security. They continued to argue that it was too cumbersome in their mid-2002 assessment of the department. But after the administration largely got its original proposal passed by Congress, the Brookings 2003 assessment, entitled Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On, warms up slightly to the plan, going so far as to suggest that in a number of respects it can and will work. Their latest study is too optimistic because at times it is at odds with theories the authors themselves have developed in their extensive acumen on the subject. Certainly, these agencies will be housed under one roof by the end of the year but realistically, it is going to take years to dissolve existing cultures and information sharing barriers that hinder cooperation. James Q. Wilson has outlined the inherent problems with trying to break down bureaucratic cultures:

First, tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part of it. Second, organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy will experience serious conflict as defenders of one seek to dominate representatives of the others. Third, organizations will resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture. The stronger and

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more uniform the culture - that is, the more the culture approximates a sense of mission - the more obvious these consequences.66

Furthermore, the massive manpower shifts are not just in cyberspace or through a refocusing of the telecommunications and information-sharing networks that once connected many of these agencies. Many of these DHS employees will be housed in a new location near the capitol so the physical shift of resources will also take time.

The Brookings team argued for a more focused department and their recommendations were debated in the Senate but most were not implemented. One of their primary concerns was that some of the agencies had a wide range of functions not related to terrorism which would divert resources, both physical and human, away from the central mission of preventing terrorist attacks. For example, FEMA responds to natural disasters, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service set regulations for the humane treatment of animals. The DHS would also be responsible for confiscating stolen art works, setting mariner qualifications, and a list of other duties not essential to securing the homeland.67 The DHS should concentrate “on functions that would gain most from integration – like border security – and others for which a central, integrated focus seems clearly needed – like intelligence and infrastructure protection.”68 They also argued that emergency preparedness and response, and CBRN countermeasures programs should be dropped because the case was not made for their inclusion. In short, what is clear is that wrong agencies, with a focus on non-homeland security activities, have been

67 For a more complete list, see O’Hanlon et al., “Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On,” 15-16.
included in the DHS, and correct ones, particularly those dealing with terrorism assessment and analysis, have not.

If critics are correct, the department may be swamped by activities having nothing to do with fighting terrorism and, at the same time, may be unable to address the intelligence failures of intelligence organizations like the FBI and the CIA. At the National Academy of Public Administration’s Standing Panel on the Federal System Forum in October 2002, which included Light and other scholars, the members present believed that “based on experience with organizing and restructuring large federal agencies…getting a new federal department of such magnitude up and running could take eight to ten years and could distract attention from the more important factors in improving homeland security.”69 In its analysis of the fiscal year 2004 DHS budget request, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation have determined that $12.2 billion of the budget is spent on non-homeland security functions, including $4.3 billion for disaster and emergency relief, $3.4 billion on the Coast Guard for mariner qualification, boating safety, and search and rescue, $2.1 billion on the INS Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau which is responsible for drug smuggling, $1.8 billion on the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, and $1.3 billion on the Secret Service.70 That represents about one quarter of the total DHS budget.

Thus, the department is a half-hearted attempt at a establishing a superagency consolidating the homeland security functions of the U.S. government in one place but without including the intelligence-gathering agencies. One positive note is that although

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Ridge will have to try to coordinate a disparate bureaucracy, he has many capable executives and public service leaders working in the DHS. Aberbach’s recent study of high-level federal executives, an extension of the research conducted for his book *In the Web of Politics* with Bert Rockman, shows that the quality of bureaucrats has not changed significantly since the National Performance Review. He suggests that “in short, the top part of the U.S. bureaucracy may have been under great stress during much of the [nineties], and it has been bent and reshaped in many ways, but, despite widely publicized fears, it has not broken.”

Ridge, therefore, can hopefully rely on established top level bureaucrats from some of the functioning agencies under the DHS umbrella to help carry out the mission. The key will be to build trust amongst them and with his staff. However, Ridge has also inherited constituent agencies that have gained notoriety as bastions of dysfunction, such as the INS. It is going take much more than competent bureaucrats to improve these agencies.

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3.2 The DHS Budget

The White House requested a budget of $36.2 billion for the DHS but Congressional Democrats and even some Republicans believed this dangerously under-financed the department. The White House recanted after vigorous debate and boosted the total budget to $37.5 billion. The Brookings team feels that $45 to 50 billion would have been more prudent and that the budget focuses more on preventing reoccurrences of 9/11, through protecting targets within the country, than on reducing vulnerability by preventing those attacks in the first place. The agencies included are not tracking terrorists.

The central question becomes how much is the transitioning and coordination going to cost? The initial budget cannot possibly be enough because if one were to total all twenty-two agency budgets together from the fiscal year prior the creation of the DHS, it would have a similar total to the $37.5 billion allocated. There is a little left over for the transitioning and it remains to be seen whether the administration will increase funding for the DHS. Perhaps this will occur with the overhaul of the Congressional committee structure to better reflect the new DHS when advocates in the House of Representatives and the Senate can more effectively challenge the White House and stress the need for more spending on homeland security. Its initial budget request came under attack from existing departments because their own budgets were proportionately reduced with the acquisition of some agencies by the DHS.

The hardest hit of all the line departments was the Department of Transportation. The newly created Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard both used

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to be housed here. The Transportation budget was decreased by about $10 billion as a result of the DHS reorganization, or one-fifth of its total annual allocation with the removal of these two agencies. Certainly, the department was not gutted but there has been an effect on the 2004 presidential budget request for Transportation. Its three largest remaining agencies, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Federal Transit Administration all experienced decreased budget requests from the Office of Management and Budget for fiscal 2004. Whether this is just belt tightening in the face of massive defense spending remains to be seen. Certainly, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta (Bush’s only Democratic appointee) shied away from discussing funding specifics in his annual message on the department’s budget, focusing instead on performance measures. But with a fifth of the total departmental budget removed, the psychological effects on the existing Transportation bureaucracy have to be disconcerting. The administration has decreased funding for the Department of Transportation and not just from the agencies that have been relocated, namely, the Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration. Budgets in other agencies still under the Transportation umbrella have also been reduced.

The Justice Department has also experienced a funding shortfall in certain agencies. With the INS located under the DHS umbrella, as well as some minor agencies, one would have expected funding to decrease proportionately for Justice. But instead of the budget being cut by about $4 billion, the previous allocation for the INS, the overall Justice budget has fallen by almost $7 billion from $30.2 in 2003 to $23.3

billion in the president’s request for 2004. Among the agencies in Justice experiencing budget cutbacks are the U.S. Marshal Service (decrease of about $16.5 million from 2003 actual allocation to 2004 OMB request), the Drug Enforcement Agency ($23 million), the Office of Justice Programs ($770 million), and state and local law enforcement funding ($368 million). Furthermore, funding for programs such as the White Collar Crime Information Center has been discontinued.

The Departments of Transportation and Justice have felt the effects of the creation of the DHS. While it is too soon to suggest the funding decreases are a direct result of agencies being removed from the departments and relocated, it does suggest that other line departments are having their budgets reduced to make room for the new DHS and to adjust to the spending increases in other areas across the government.

In a comparison between the 2003 and 2004 budget requests for the DHS, only the Transportation Security Administration has had its funding reduced. The other agencies have either been given a modest increase in funding or remained about the same as the previous year. But despite the holding pattern, the 2004 request still represents a funding shortfall in the magnitude of billions of dollars.

3.3 Intelligence

Donald Kettl argues that “when intelligence agencies fail to share information adequately,” and that failure was no more apparent than in the months prior to 9/11, “calls for better coordination arise.”\(^{76}\) In response to this perceived policy failure, the issue of homeland security and how to administer it became central to the Bush administration and Congress. But now that there is a tangible DHS, perhaps the largest misconception about the department is that it does not collect intelligence. The IAIP is more of a clearinghouse for information on terrorist threats from the intelligence agencies. Instead, the administration has created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which merges units at the CIA, FBI, and the other intelligence agencies, into a single government unit intended to strengthen collection and analysis of foreign and domestic terror threats. It will be led by CIA chief George J. Tenet.\(^{77}\) But this begs the question as to how the DHS can secure the homeland if information collection is not even included in its structure? Not only must Ridge try to find coordinating mechanisms among the twenty-two agencies under his jurisdiction, as well as the partner agencies at the state and local level, but he also must coordinate with the FBI and CIA, two agencies with cultures traditionally inclined to resist information sharing even between each other.

The Brookings team argues that “the department should have the lead responsibility for fusing all sources of intelligence analysis of terrorist threats to the United States – including raw intelligence derived from foreign intelligence sources and


domestic law enforcement operations.” Bush considered but decided against including
the FBI, the National Guard, and the State Department’s consular division in the DHS. Lieberman argued that the final White House proposal did little to overcome the past
failures of the FBI and CIA to share information and cooperate with other agencies. O’Hanlon suggests “there is little insight into how the FBI and DHS intelligence
functions will interact.” The DHS should be changing the way the CIA, the NSA, the
FBI and other agencies gather, analyze, and disseminate information, with a broader goal
of distributing intelligence data throughout the federal government, as well as to state and
local law enforcement officials. With its existing structure, this does not appear to be
taking place. Perhaps it is unrealistic to believe that agencies as autonomous as the CIA,
the NSA, and the FBI would have been housed under the DHS umbrella, as the
Brookings team initially suggested, even if tremendous resources had been allocated
towards proper planning and visioning for a homeland security superdepartment.

The Congressional joint inquiry into intelligence community activities
surrounding 9/11 demonstrated the need for a reexamination of the collection of terrorist
information. Among the inquiry’s recommendations, there is even a suggestion for the
creation of a Director of National Intelligence, a cabinet level position that would work
with the Secretary of Homeland Security. This person would not be the FBI or CIA chief
and would have powers that superseded those agencies. Instead of making the suggestion
that an amalgamation occur among the intelligence agencies, it calls for the creation of

July 2002, 56.
79 David E. Sanger, “In Big Shuffle, Bush Considered Putting F.B.I. in His New Department,” New York
2002, A27.
yet another layer of bureaucracy. The report also calls for expedited revamping of intelligence priorities by the National Security Council, as well as the preparation of a comprehensive national security and anti-terrorism strategy. While some of these recommendations make sense in the context of the new DHS, they fail to appreciate the complexities and realities of the U.S. public service. The most important recommendation concerning the DHS is the following:

Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center that will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community.  

But how is such a fusion center going to come together when the information is first gathered and disseminated in other agencies? Unless changes can come about outside the DHS, this initiative will not work because there will be bureaucratic and agency resistance against any kind of change that seeks to infringe upon their autonomy. The resistance may not come at the top levels. Undoubtedly, Ridge, Tenet, FBI chief Robert Mueller, Rice and others are trying to work together. The conflict will be further down in these agencies, where fusion of information can lead to usurpation of autonomy and authority over areas of intelligence gathering and analysis. The joint inquiry is woefully misinformed about the very construct of the public service and while all of the recommendations are noble, their implementation will be difficult to achieve.

The intelligence community arrangement, as it is now with the DHS, is the fundamental flaw with this realignment of government. Unfortunately, the window of

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opportunity for reversing course has been closed and the DHS must work within the new arrangement to bring about change. However, without the authority over agencies such as the FBI and CIA to fuse together the intelligence community, little can be expected.
3.4 The Role of the Private Sector

With the Bush administration’s continued focus on a free-market approach to government, the role of the private sector in the DHS is one that could be alarming. According to the Brookings team, the administration is too willing to take a free-market approach to the DHS. The “business of business is business, not homeland security.”\(^3\) They argue that private markets will not provide the necessary protection against terrorist attacks on their own, since profit-making is their first priority. This means that some facilities may not be secure because resources will not be invested in the off chance that they are attacked. In other words, in order to ensure a profit, private companies might not allocate sufficient resources to security and leave some facilities vulnerable. Certainly, government intervention would be required, but how the DHS is going to interact with the private sector is still uncertain. Hart and Rudman, in a follow-up independent task force report, also point out that “the barriers to greater information-sharing between the public and private sectors are not simply bureaucratic and cultural. Private-sector leaders have legal concerns with respect to liability.”\(^4\) Furthermore, government agencies are not inclined to disclose classified security information to the private sector. The Brookings team also notes that “70 percent of all private-sector mergers either fail or do little to improve the functioning of their constituent parts.”\(^5\)

While providing incentives to private industry to beef up security precautions is beneficial, the Bush administration is also going to contract out many positions in the new department. This fits with the anti-union rhetoric and the administration’s efforts to

increase targets in contracting out jobs across government. The DHS will include some of the 850,000 potential positions that the administration may privatize. Paul Light believes the policy is an “aggressive and dramatic extension...to save money at all levels of government,” continuing the trend started under Clinton.\textsuperscript{86} Bush even stated in his 2003 budget speech that his goal was to “create a market-based government unafraid of competition, innovation and choice.”\textsuperscript{87} Do Americans want their homeland security operations being run by the private sector? It is clear that the Bush administration is acting more radically conservative with this privatization philosophy than many Americans would like. But on a positive note, the actual outsourcing in the DHS seems to have more to do with private contractors protecting private industry than it does with border security. O’Hanlon et al. looked closely at how much the government should be involved in protecting private property and activities. They were in favour of the private sector footing the bill for security protecting private industry provided that national guidelines are set through direct regulation and that, along with incentive programs for private industry, that there be mechanisms in place to enforce these guidelines.\textsuperscript{88}

Since the outsourcing focus of Al Gore’s National Performance Review initiative, the privatization of government positions and work meets with bipartisan approval since the so-called “New Democrats” like Clinton and Lieberman have bought into the best practices/cutting back to basics rhetoric. Kettl, in his analysis of administrative dilemmas, argues that reliance on incentives and partnerships with nongovernmental...

\textsuperscript{88} For a detailed discussion of the private sector implications, see Chapter 6 of O’Hanlon et al., \textit{Protecting the American Homeland}, 79-90.
players rather than through traditional direct delivery of services is undermining the longstanding traditions of public administration. According to Kettl, “in the last third of the twentieth century...government began relying on new tools, especially grants, contracts, and loans, which undermined [Woodrow] Wilson’s theory.”\(^89\) Wilson believed that elected officials should define policy and then delegate the details to top-level administrators who worked within a hierarchy to organize work. The authority within the hierarchy would ensure that the exercise of administrative discretion remained consistent with policymakers’ goals.\(^90\)

What exists today, and will continue in this direction in the future, is “a dense mosaic of policy tools, many of them placing public agencies in complex, interdependent relationships with a host of third-party partners.”\(^91\) Kettl adds that “federal spending through indirect methods has increased while federal spending through direct provision of goods and services has shrunk – probably by half”\(^92\) in the 1980s and 1990s.

The major issue with respect to outsourcing is that it often complicates the picture. Kettl terms this problem “fuzzy boundaries.” In the past, setting and implementing policy depended upon clear lines of responsibility. With interdependent relationships between the public and private sectors, “the fuzzy boundary problem confounds the central task of administration – building coordinated efforts to solve complex problems.”\(^93\) Ridge will have to monitor how much the private sector will affect decision making at the centre of the department.

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\(^89\) Kettl, *The Transformation of Governance*, 51.

\(^90\) Kettl, *The Transformation of Governance*, 51.


\(^92\) Kettl, *The Transformation of Governance*, 52.
3.5 The Management Challenge

Tom Ridge needs to set clear and attainable reorganization priorities, focusing on those that are crucial to achieving the main goals, like information analysis and border security, and deferring the others until the key areas are coordinated and operational. He must face the fact that critical agencies like the FBI and CIA, as well as the secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Justice, State, and HHS, are not inclined to coordinate actions. Interagency coordination led by individual Cabinet secretaries has seldom worked well in the past and it is not likely to do so in the future. Furthermore, these secretaries are "unlikely to defer to directives from another Cabinet agency that is a competitor for funds and presidential attention. This means some kind of White House-led coordination system must be retained." In terms of managing his department, there is a disconnect between the grandiosity of bold schematic ways of approaching issues, such as the DHS umbrella, versus the harsh realities of American incrementalism. Coordination and innovation are going to come slowly within the DHS. This is somewhat due to the Bush administration which showed little tenacity towards planning and visioning of the department beyond short-term political aims. Daniel Carpenter points out that "it is evident from the history of American bureaucracy that agencies cannot automatically be designed to succeed even when politicians want them to. Innovation and planning capacity arose only when long-tenured bureau and division chiefs could draw on the technical and programmatic expertise in their offices." Kettl adds that "moreover, agencies cannot simultaneously coordinate all activities at all times...Coordination on


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some missions risks weakening capacity to achieve others. 96 Ridge and his staff have to undertake the unprecedented task of integrating these agencies while “clearly keeping their eye on the main ball – which is not to organize for homeland security but to prevent, protect, and respond to a future terrorist attack on U.S. soil.” 97 The scholars at Brookings have pointed out, however, that the DHS plans focus more on the protection and response than on the paramount priority which should be prevention.

Ridge also has to establish national homeland security performance standards for federal, state, and local agencies. Critical to increased homeland security for all sectors and levels of government is improved coordination and cooperation. Federal, state, county, city, and regional governments, private corporations, and the volunteer and non-profit sectors are numerous and fragmented. Their goals and actions are often not coordinated and they do not always know each other or have the ability to communicate readily. This becomes even more complicated because of the lack of information-sharing between the information-gathering agencies and the local agencies responsible for security. How is information that enters the CIA or FBI apparatus about a possible terrorist plot going to get to the security response agencies on the ground at the local level? The DHS needs to coordinate the disparate federal to local agencies within the DHS but it has little authority over the important communication between other federal agencies and local law enforcement and security. There are also substantial gaps between administration rhetoric and funding for the first responders on the ground. This will prove to be a major management and leadership challenge for Ridge.

96 Kettl, The Transformation of Governance, 152.
Harold Seidman has called coordination the philosopher’s stone of public management. He suggests that “If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will disagree.” Put simply, as Kettl argues, “coordination becomes the answer to government’s problems; the lack of coordination is the diagnosis for its failure.”

Besides the public sector/private sector divide, there are three other fuzzy boundaries that exist in the DHS. There are layers within the bureaucracy and so it must be made clear where the responsibility for the critical management and administrative decisions will lie. There are layers between management and labour and these tensions are already noticeable after the changes with respect to workers’ rights issues were included in the White House legislation creating the department. There are also connections between bureaucracies and it is up to managers to sort out the responsibility of each bureaucracy in the DHS.

It is these layers within the bureaucracy that could pose a concern in preventing terrorism. Kettl cites the 1986 space shuttle Challenger tragedy as an example of communication problems across boundaries within NASA. The gaps between levels of command hindered communication “by making lower-level officials cautious about

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100 See Kettl, The Transformation of Governance, 60.
speaking and higher-level officials deaf in hearing.”

Ridge will have to work with managers in the DHS to bridge gaps between them and the operators on the ground.

With the lack of coordination mechanisms, how are the disparate agencies supposed to come together? This is the lynchpin to the DHS management challenge.

Coordination between bureaucracies will also be a management issue. Kettl explained this challenge with respect to Ridge and the OHS:

Ridge’s mission was to coordinate both the government’s intelligence information and its operational response. Critics pointed, for example, to the problems of pulling together facts and analysis from such disparate sources as the FBI, the CIA, and the National Security Agency...Like most public problems, the government’s antiterrorist policy played out through a network of agencies. Each agency, in turn, was part of multiple networks working on a host of different problems. If there were but one problem, policymakers could simply reorganize government agencies to focus on that problem. But as problems proliferated, so too did the networks – and the impossibility of drawing clear boundaries around any of them.

Another concern for Ridge is the amount of bureaucratic autonomy and discretion the DHS will be allowed. With such a personal connection to the Bush administration, Ridge must remain wary of taking orders only from the White House instead of relying on the advice of and working with his top bureaucrats, an approach that might put him at odds with the political agendas in Washington. Carpenter suggests that “bureaucratic autonomy prevails when a politically differentiated agency takes self-consistent action that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but that they either cannot or will not overturn or constrain in the future.”

There is also an important distinction to be made between discretion and bureaucratic autonomy:

Discretion is part of a contractual arrangement between politicians and an agency they establish; a statute may give an agency discretion or leeway to interpret and enforce a law within certain bounds. Bureaucratic autonomy, by contrast, is external to a contract and

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101 Kettl, The Transformation of Governance, 64.
102 Kettl, The Transformation of Governance, 68.
103 Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 17.
cannot be captured in a principal-agent relationship. Indeed, when agencies have autonomy, they can bring their political legitimacy to bear upon the very laws that give them power. They can change the terms of delegation. They can even alter the electoral strategies of their principals in the legislature, the presidency, and the parties.\footnote{Carpenter, \textit{The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy}, 17.}

It is perhaps too early to suggest that the DHS is simply a creation of the administration and will be run out of the White House. The bureaucrats and Ridge have not had time yet to prove themselves and to establish a bureaucratic reputation, the key prerequisite for autonomy. It is also unclear whether the ideologues in the Bush administration would even allow this to emerge.

The DHS mandate suggests that their function will be a complicated one. Carpenter argues that “high uncertainty and task complexity are insufficient conditions for bureaucratic autonomy if politicians and organized interests doubt that an agency will execute its tasks competently, provide innovative solutions to reduce uncertainty, or command the allegiance and confidence of citizens. Absent both complexity and perceived agency efficacy, bureaucratic autonomy will not prevail.”\footnote{Carpenter, \textit{The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy}, 17.} Both of these conditions currently exist with the new department and both must be rectified if the DHS is to become effective.

On a final note, Ridge also must be careful not to trample the rights of American citizens. One hopes that the Orwellian U.S.A. Patriot Act (and potentially Patriot Act II) nightmare envisioned by some will not become a reality. Press releases by the department clearly state that “besides providing a better-coordinated defense of the homeland, DHS is also dedicated to protecting the rights of American citizens and enhancing public services, such as natural disaster assistance and citizenship services, by
dedicating offices to these important missions.” But privacy advocates and civil liberties groups believe the new department is part of an alarming trend by the administration, and specifically by Attorney General John Ashcroft, to collect information about American citizens while simultaneously restricting the amount of information the government discloses to the public. Representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center suggest that the DHS could create advisory committees that are exempt from public disclosure laws.

Regardless of the management challenge of Tom Ridge, he is facing a department that is designed to fail because steps were not taken initially to ensure that it could be effective, both in developing bureaucratic culture and autonomy, and in being responsive to the administration. The focus of the final chapter is a look at the Bush administration from a public management and administration perspective. The conclusions are not optimistic and they demonstrate a real concern that the DHS will prove to be a failure.

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107 In July 2003, a report by internal investigators at the Justice Department identified dozens of cases in which department employees have been accused of civil liberties violations involving enforcement of the sweeping federal antiterrorism law. The report also said that credible accusations were also made against the INS, now included the DHS. See Philip Shenon, “USA Patriot Act Alleges Civil Rights Violations,” New York Times, July 21, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/21/politics/21JUST.html.

4. Politicized Incompetence: The Bush Administration & Ideological Entrepreneurship

John Kingdon asks "why do some problems come to occupy the attention of governmental officials more than other problems?" In the case of homeland security, that question was answered for the Bush administration by the 9/11 attacks. Kingdon suggests that "a focusing event – a disaster, crisis...draws attention to some conditions more than to others. But such an event has only transient effects unless accompanied by a firmer indication of a problem, by a preexisting perception, or by a combination with other similar events." Thomas Birkland adds that a result of such a focusing event "might be a finding by interest groups, government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, the news media, or members of the public of new problems, new attention to existing but dormant problems, and, potentially, a search for solutions in the wake of perceived policy failure." Likewise, Polsby states that "crises may be regarded as situations defined by decision-makers for whatever reasons, but frequently as a response to some notable, well-publicized, exogenous event, as demanding quick decisions."

Clearly, Rove saw the possibilities for policy entrepreneurship on the issue of homeland security, read the context, and exploited that perception of opportunity at the expense of the original homeland security objectives. Senate Democrats also tried to be policy entrepreneurs but Rove and the White House won the day. Hart and Rudman's early 2001 report should get the credit for proposing the idea and Lieberman should be acknowledged for really championing the department in Congress.

As to whether there really was a crisis in homeland security (having recognized the breakdown of information-sharing prior to 9/11) so important that an entire department needed to be created, one only has to refer to the timeframe between the 9/11 attacks and the actual creation of the department. Eight months elapsed before a bill was even passed and more than a year went by before a department became a reality. Polsby expresses it best when he writes that “the empirical difference between an urgent need to act and the capacity to invent alternatives also creates a set of opportunities for those who are prepared: hence there is utility in one common political strategy in America, namely, attempts by sponsors of ready-made alternatives to coerce feelings of urgency among decision-makers, to invent crises.”

Certainly, 9/11 was a crisis. But the elevated importance of creating a DHS almost a year later cannot be considered a pressing concern for the administration or it would have been a priority on September 12, 2001, as it had been for Lieberman. Kingdon states that “people in and around government sense a national mood...a large number of people out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood changes from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes.” Karl Rove monitored this national mood carefully, analyzed polling data and media coverage, and realized the nation had yet to recover from the effects of 9/11. Almost a year later, Bush’s approval on national security issues was very high and the

113 Polsby, Political Innovation in America, 168.
Democrats could not find issues to rally support. It made political sense to bring the DHS plans into the White House.

Aberbach and Rockman argue that “it might well be a good idea for politicians to loosen the constraints they have imposed on the bureaucracy. And it would be a good idea for them to specify realistic, noncontradictory goals for the agencies.”¹¹⁵ What the Bush administration has set for the DHS is unrealistic and maybe even implausible. Furthermore, forcing dramatic change in the public service will not achieve the desired results. The DHS includes a number of constituent agencies that are now superceded by the organizational structure of a superdepartment. “Reinvention requires a civil service with a high degree of autonomy. Discretionary judgment is necessary in a system that is to be less rule bound and that emphasizes rapid adjustment.”¹¹⁶ That is simply not the case with the DHS. Rove and Bush have used the language of reinvention, with emphasis on better organization, a more streamlined and recentralized nexus of operations, outsourcing and privatizing, and elimination of red tape, to create a multi-headed hydra of a department that does not immediately address its most important goal.

To take a cynical view of what is occurring with respect to the DHS, it could be argued that the White House does not really care much as to whether the department succeeds or fails. Its design is unworkable precisely because many want an unworkable framework. Even worse, an ideological entrepreneur like Karl Rove is oblivious to these details because the entire goal is short-term gain and therefore he is not concerned about the framework. Then the focus on the DHS is just busy work or background noise while the White House keeps the public focused on issues they deem important. In this sense,

¹¹⁵ Aberbach and Rockman, In the Web of Politics, 187.
¹¹⁶ Aberbach and Rockman, In the Web of Politics, 180.
the DHS could even be a launching pad for a number of 2004 reelection issues. This is a
jaundiced view of the American political system. But as Moe argues, “American public
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of politics, and
its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise
political power.”¹¹⁷ This elicits an important question, namely, who really wants the
Department of Homeland Security? The public service has expressed little desire to
embark on this restructuring and the public management literature tells us that
bureaucratic culture is fundamentally at loggerheads with change coerced by politicians.
The ineffectual time expended analyzing, planning, and visioning for the department is an
indication that there is little enthusiasm for the DHS among Bush and his advisers. This,
coupled with the fact that the DHS structure is not dissimilar to the one proposed by
Democrats or even the Hart-Rudman Commission, indicates a lack of interest as to
whether the DHS can work. Moe expresses this predicament: “the hitch is that those in
positions of power are not necessarily motivated by the national interest. They have their
own interests to pursue in politics…and they exercise their power in ways conducive to
those interests.”¹¹⁸ Kettl suggests that:

Elected officials – and especially candidates for elected office – launch bold policy
proposals without adequately thinking through how they will carry them out. The mass
media rarely hold them to account for the mismatch of their ambitions and their results,
and when problems occur, they blame the administrative machinery instead of its policy
designers.¹¹⁹

It would appear as if the DHS was created for purely political and electoral
reasons, especially when one considers the sudden reversal of Bush’s position on creating

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the department and the administration’s secrecy in the decision making process. How much deliberation went into the proposal that was eventually passed? In reading the proposal, one gets the uncomfortable feeling that it was hastily done considering the amount of time the White House had to put it together. It is as if in responding to short-term political pressures, they took the Lieberman plan and augmented it with a series of neo-conservative strategies with little or no careful analysis conducted. As Aberbach and Rockman suggest, “the problems that reinvention proclaims it will solve through administrative means,” in this case the amalgamation of twenty-two agencies, “are mainly problems created by the political decisionmaking process.”

Campbell argues that “reorganization presents itself as a way to gain control over the machinery of government by simplification and rationalization.”

This trend towards disinvestment in analysis and planning across the federal government has been occurring since the Reagan administration. There has been a weakening of the traditional sources of policy ideas upon which the president can rely. Aberbach and Rockman noted this in their 1989 study of the decline of analysis in government in the context of the Bush Sr. presidency:

Two decades ago, at least in the U.S., policy analysis could be viewed as a means for energizing comprehensive change as a way of breaking through structures that resisted nonincremental change. The irony is that the powerful ideas of the present political leadership, arguably, have induced nonincremental change. The results, further, have induced crashing the boards strategies for dealing with the perceived, but politically sensitive, budgetary crisis left as the residue. That appears, for the time being at least, to have pushed policy analysis into the background as decision makers struggle with the new politics of deadlines and limits.

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120 Aberbach and Rockman, In the Web of Politics, 188.
121 Colin Campbell, “The Search for Coordination and Control,” 55.
This is essential to understanding how presidential policymaking is packaged and sold to the public. Moe presents a clear analysis: “A group with the political power to tell everyone what to do, then, will typically not find it worthwhile to try. A more attractive option is to write legislation in general terms, put experts on the public payroll, and grant them authority to “fill in the details” and make whatever adjustments are necessary over time.”\(^{123}\) The presidential advisers, as well as the Congressional Committee research staffs, especially those of politicians pondering a presidential run like Lieberman, “are quite unsuited to policy problems of any complexity. The reason is that, although the group has the political power to impose its will on everyone, it almost surely lacks the knowledge to do it well. It does not know what to tell people to do.”\(^{124}\) This helps explain the incoherence of the DHS plan.

Although the White House managed to gain the upper hand on worker rights and outsourcing, the blueprint for the DHS design is Lieberman’s and by extension the Hart-Rudman Commission’s. The DHS may have started with purely political intentions as a potential success story for an eventual 2004 Lieberman presidential run. At the time, the Senate was still in Democratic control and Lieberman chaired the Governmental Affairs Committee. One has to ask what Lieberman was really thinking about when his committee tried to design the DHS. When the White House took the issue away from them, there was little hue and cry from Lieberman, except when the White House insisted on changes to federal service worker rights. Rather ironically, its incoherence may actually help the Democrats in the long run if the department shows few accomplishments. John Gaus suggested that “when you are out of power, you want to


limit the powers of those who are in; but your zeal (or rather, that of your wiser and
shrewder leaders) will be cooled by the consideration that you want to leave a loophole
through which you can respectfully undertake the same activities when you in turn
achieve power." Rove exploited the DHS better for political and electoral ammunition
in the short-term, while Lieberman and Democrats may wait until the DHS shows signs
of weakness or falters before attacking the Bush administration.

Unfortunately, what the U.S. has been saddled with may be the worst of both
political worlds: an incoherent department with a mandate written in very general terms
by Democrats but whose basic structure has been augmented by neo-conservative
strategies to bring about changes in government hiring practices that do not necessarily fit
with a design that was unworkable in the first place.

In many respects, the DHS flies in the face of the conservative Republican agenda
and rhetoric of smaller government. The department represents a re-centralization
instinct and a build-up of government by an administration that campaigned on smaller
government. The one part of the DHS mandate that appears to be in tune with the
Republican agenda is outsourcing, contracting out, and use of the private sector to
achieve some of the homeland security aims. This fits with the Reinventing Government
(REGO) ethos and the general New Public Management (NPM) initiatives that are in
vogue. If there is an area of government that should not be privatized, it is probably
homeland security and information gathering and analysis. But since the key information
gathering agencies have not been included in the DHS, the outsourcing is most likely to
occur in the areas of protection of private property and in airport security, with national
standards that govern both.

Perhaps one of the more positive aspects of the DHS has been the leadership of Tom Ridge. Respected by both Republicans and Democrats, Ridge is not an ideological entrepreneur like many of the president’s advisers and he strikes a chord as a refreshing alternative to the jingoistic rhetoric of the administration. But does he have the makings of a dynamic public figure who, for example, can convince disgruntled public servants stripped of union rights that the DHS is an organization of which they should be proud?

In his written testimony for his confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Ridge committed to the following:

First, we will work to create some measure of stability for employees even as we undergo the transition. For the first year, employees can expect to receive at least the same pay and benefits, and probably in the same location. Some people will certainly be able to take advantage of new career opportunities. Second, we will work hard to create a modern, flexible, fair, merit-based personnel system. Third, we will communicate to ensure that personnel know what to expect and when to expect it. Fourth, we will work hard to ensure that employees continue to receive the same civil service protections that they currently enjoy.\textsuperscript{126}

However, Ridge does not epitomize these organizations and he has had little experience in any of the fields under his jurisdiction. As Governor of Pennsylvania, he had limited opportunity to work with homeland security issues and to many, his only real experience prior to joining the administration was when he visited the crash site of Flight 93 after the 9/11 attacks. The incoherence of the DHS grab bag of functions preordains a lack of discipline because what has been put together is unwieldy. Ridge is not likely the type of leader who can ringmaster the department agencies adroitly and the White House will probably encounter difficulty keeping appointees in disparate organizations in the department adhering to the administration’s agenda.

Ridge is also starting from scratch. There is no guidebook or blueprint for the Secretary of Homeland Security. The studies of agency leaders by Martha Derthick and Beryl S. Radin cannot be relied upon for Ridge to learn his unique position. He is going to have to be more than an accountable juggler. Ridge is also limited in learning from the reform initiatives of Truman, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Clinton. While there are similarities to those tasks, in terms of scope and dollars, only Truman's creation of the Department of Defense has similar implications by amalgamating distinctive cultures. But they were much more like-minded and of a military and not a bureaucratic nature. Furthermore, Ridge must try to balance his new role as head of a bureaucracy with the constraints placed on him by the parameters set out in the Bush administration mandate. He will have to implement reforms to meet Bush's three primary objectives of government: citizen-centered – not bureaucracy centered; results-oriented – not process-oriented; and market-based – actively promoting, not stifling, innovation and competition.

In terms of the department's performance, the only functioning part of the DHS for many Americans seems to be the colour-coded terrorist threat level rating system. In fact, Ridge's public statement to place the nation on "high risk" of terrorist attacks and the public information commercials that followed set off a duct tape and plastic sheeting buying spree in February 2003. This is comparable to the now laughable "duck and cover" strategies for nuclear attacks during the Cold War era. Certainly, a properly

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implemented national alert system would give the public a clearer idea of what is expected when federal, state or local authorities issue terrorism but thus far the system has been ridiculed. Ridge’s function has primarily been one of public relations, traveling the country to deliver his signature line: “If the hometown is secure, then the homeland is secure.” It is, as of yet, difficult for critics to make the case that Ridge is an Orwellian information czar with a mandate to take away civil liberties from citizens.

Are there a series of remedies for the DHS? Can adding or taking away certain agencies improve its performance? It is unrealistic to assume that the DHS can expand to include all homeland security functions of the U.S. government, including information collection. But what might Ridge do to enhance the DHS and make it more effective? These are difficult questions in light of evidence that suggests this department is not going to be responsive to the administration. Ridge could try to put pressure on the administration to include other agencies, to convince other agencies that the DHS should take the lead on all homeland security matters, to push for autonomy in the face of control from the White House, and to reconcile with his own bureaucrats and work with them to achieve its mandate. But are not these actions unlikely to lead to desired results.

Led by Karl Rove, the White House has sacrificed policy competence for responsive competence but it has even neglected any noticeable competence beyond a short-term election strategy. Campbell termed such a phenomenon as “politicized

131 The extent of a mandate to take away civil liberties depends upon an important question, posed by Matthew Brzezinski and others, and one in which the administration and the public must be wary: what is your security worth to you? As the terrorist alert level panics and good-versus-evil, with-us-or-against-us binary rhetoric of the White House have shown, Americans are living in fear, a fear that has been perpetuated and sustained by the government.
incompetence" and that is precisely what has occurred with the DHS. Politicized incompetence results when “exceptionally partisan, ideological, and/or egocentric presidents choose to ignore the state apparatus and do whatever they can get away with politically.”\(^\text{132}\) When the only course of action the Bush administration has pursued is unrestrained ideological entrepreneurship, policy competence will not play any factor. Among his advisers, there is little value placed on submitting policy proposals such as the DHS to countervailing review. This weak countervailance, combined with ideological entrepreneurship leads to poor issue management. Since the president delegates and relies on advisers, especially Rove, to do the policymaking, there is little evidence that even he has a grasp of what it means to push forward with a new department without careful planning. He is detached from the process altogether.

The administration has followed two courses of action with homeland security. The first was that they tried an administrative presidency solution by attempting to address the problem inside the White House without a new external apparatus. This was the OHS model but it quickly proved ineffective. They then embraced the DHS gambit to address concerns of perceived weakness in policy competence and to cash in on the public perception that Republicans would do more than Democrats in terms of homeland security. But this second course of action has proven ineffective as well since there is obviously little policy competence in the design of the DHS. The administration has embraced politicized incompetence.

What might the administration and the DHS Secretary do to make the department more responsive? An inventory of features that suggest themselves as crucial if the DHS is to be successful is provided below. The first set are strategies the White House could

\(^{132}\) Campbell, Managing the Presidency, 19.
pursue, which include a refocusing on oversight, the original inspiration behind the OHS, and use of the appointive system to impose discipline within line agencies. These include elements that are missing from the DHS equation if the Bush administration were to pursue responsive competence and the administrative or politicized-crisis presidency more effectively. The second set of the inventory focuses on options Ridge could pursue to bring about bureaucratic autonomy for the DHS. This set, naturally, is unrealistic if the Bush administration is pursuing only responsive competence at ignoring neutral competence.

Responsive Competence

1. To rein in the bureaucracy, the Bush administration must appoint their own people in each agency under the DHS umbrella. When an agency is being uncooperative or are not singing from the same song book as the administration, new people need to be appointed to bring about discipline. This is one of the keys to the administrative presidency. Both Nixon and Reagan used this option extensively when they were in power. Nathan argues that “explicit effort is required if the president is to exert greater influence over the bureaucracy on administrative matters. The key to doing this is the role of his principal appointees in major agencies of the executive branch.” Since neutral competence is not a priority, circumvention of traditional power sharing relationships combined with extensive presidential appointments would improve adherence to the administration’s agenda.

2. Control homeland security out of the White House. The OHS was ineffective because Ridge could not speak truth to power. He had no statutory authority and
only the power of persuasion. But the idea behind it was in keeping with White House oversight of homeland security issues. As a line department chief, Ridge now has the authority over the agencies under him. With the unwieldy framework, however, the administration ought to keep Ridge on a tight leash. A concerted effort must be made to supervise what the DHS is allowed to do and to keep them from becoming too autonomous. Once this occurs, it will be difficult for the administration to keep it under control.

3. The recommendations of the Congressional joint inquiry that highlights 9/11 intelligence failures should be seriously considered. If the role of Secretary of Homeland Security is not expanded to include discretionary powers over the CIA and FBI, the Cabinet level post of Director of National Intelligence, a position separate from CIA and FBI director, could be created to help with information accessibility among all agencies. But this is yet another expansion of the intelligence bureaucracy and may further hinder flow of information between agencies. It is reminiscent of the super secretary model under Nixon and is in keeping with the administrative presidency. It further concentrates power in the executive branch.

4. The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies team suggested housing all information gathering agencies under one roof. Including the CIA and the FBI would probably improve the flow of information and the rapidity with which terrorist information is analyzed, disseminated to relevant entities, and used to counter terrorism and keep the nation safe. It can still be achieved. The Congressional joint inquiry into the intelligence community activity surrounding 9/11 stressed

133 Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, 85.
the need for a fusion center within the DHS to disseminate terrorist information. But the decision to not include these other agencies in the design of the DHS means that it is unlikely that they will be included in the future. Therefore, breaking down these bureaucratic cultures is unrealistic. The hope is that CIA Director Tenet and FBI Director Mueller have stressed changes in their organizations and that communication between bureaucracies is improving. To reconfigure the intelligence gathering apparatus of the federal government is certainly a bold move but the administration should at least consider it, especially if a noticeable improvement in terrorist prevention is not seen.

**Bureaucratic Autonomy**

1. Ridge must understand that change will come slowly. As Secretary, he must keep the White House and Congress at bay, who may demand rapid change and call for large scale reorganizations of the department if it is not achieving its goals. He must strive for autonomy, even if the administration provides him with little latitude. This will require placing pressure on the administration and the Office of Management and Budget, as well as key Congressional committee members, to increase the DHS budget and support the department. Without adequate funding, the large goals cannot be achieved. Already, the 2004 budget submitted by the president for the DHS does not greatly expand upon the 2003 appropriation. Ridge must also encourage autonomy at lower levels of the DHS while providing an overall direction.
2. Ridge must convince autonomous agencies like the CIA and FBI that it is in their best interests to change the way information is disseminated and shared amongst all agencies focused on homeland security. Turf wars are inevitable and Ridge only has the power of persuasion at his disposal but he can affect change at the top levels which hopefully can filter down through each organization. But resistance will take place and he must be prepared for and acknowledge that each agency will do its utmost to defend its autonomy and authority.

3. Ridge can take action if the design of the DHS proves ineffective. But this should be bottom-up change, from public servants within the organization. If an agency is not working out, it may be better off where it originally was located. The DHS can be reduced in size, to focus on border security efforts, instead of the large portion of the DHS budget spent on non-homeland security functions. He should not be afraid to pare it down to the essentials. Of course, it is always about funding so transferring agencies out without transferring new ones in is not an enticing option. But if too many resources are being focused on non-essential agencies, Ridge must reallocate some of the budget to more important duties.

4. Losing sight of the main goals of homeland security in the face of the political web in Washington will hurt the department in the long run. Advisers such as Rove cannot dictate homeland security policy now that it is an established department. Becoming autonomous from the administration will strengthen Ridge’s (and his successors’) office as a respected entity among the bureaucrats in the DHS. Part of this means standing up to the administration when strategies such as the terror alert system are proposed. The DHS will exist beyond the Bush
years and it must be able to have the discretion to adapt to changing political environments.

5. Ridge must ensure national guidelines for protecting private property and private sector incentives are in place to ensure adequate security around potential terrorist targets. But he also must make sure the private sector does not infringe on or interfere with the mandate of the department. DHS policy must not become entangled in private goals and norms. It means finding a balance between regulation and the restraints of government, and the operating flexibility of the private sector.

6. Coordinating with state and local law enforcement is another challenge but one essential to Ridge’s mantra: securing the hometown. From Washington, he must stress to his bureaucracy that working with the local level is sometimes the best way for the DHS to stay informed. In acknowledging the resistance to information sharing among federal agencies, there are other actors who can help the DHS keep up. More responsiveness to local needs is but one.

7. Finally, politicians will undoubtedly use the DHS for their own political purposes, either campaigning on its merits or against its deficiencies. The employees of the DHS must fight for their autonomy, at all levels, and fight political agendas when Washington is insisting on changes that are untested or have not been thought through. This is one of the reasons why the DHS itself is designed the way it is. Bureaucrats need to be heard.
One would have hoped that the initial OHS, and the subsequent DHS, were created in response to the failure of traditional information agencies such as the FBI and CIA to address homeland security and terrorist information issues leading up to 9/11. But the new department does not even collect the information essential to ensuring homeland security. Furthermore, it is apparent that there are few coordinating mechanisms Secretary Tom Ridge has at his disposal to achieve his mandate and he will have to work hard to build linkages between disparate agencies. It is clear that the DHS will be in a period of transitioning for a number of years and Ridge will find it difficult to adroitly ringmaster disparate agencies. The White House will also struggle with a department that is proving to be unresponsive to its own agenda. Whether it was Rove and the Bush team who stressed responsive competence over coherent policy development and neutral competence, or just the general lack of bipartisanship in Washington, American policymakers wasted a year on homeland security. 9/11 may have provided the focusing event but it did not take long for the administration to lose the focus on homeland security.
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## Appendix 1: DHS Proposal Comparisons

**Overview of Agencies and Budgets in the Department of Homeland Security under HR 5005, SAI 4471, and HR 5170**

<table>
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<th>Agencies and Offices</th>
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<th>HR 5005</th>
<th>Merged to Directorate for:</th>
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*Note: The table above lists the agencies and offices within the Department of Homeland Security, along with their current departments, directives merged to, and their respective FY02 and FY03 budget requests. The table also includes the appropriation details for each department.*
Appendix 2: Department of Homeland Security Organization

Note (1): Effective March 1st, 2003