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Ally or adversary? : NATO enlargement and the Russian Military Keefe, Tania J. 2003

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A l l y or Adversary? N A T O Enlargement and the Russ ian M i l i t a ry . By Tania J. Keefe B. A . (Hons), The Un ivers i ty of Western Ontar io , 2000 A THESIS S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S • F O R T H E D E G R E E O F I M A S T E R OF ARTS j In T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Po l i t ica l Science) W e accept this thesis as conforming to the requ i red standard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F BRIT ISH C O L U M B I A A U G U S T 2003 © Tania J. Keefe In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of fe>\^<-cx\ SC>A c c CGrgvAuq-U SW\re i ^ The University of Brit ish Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date ^ f / o ^ Q 3 ii A B S T R A C T M i l i t a r y re form has been a stated pr ior i ty of the Russ ian government since the creation of the Russ ian A r m e d Forces i n 1991. Despite this, Russ ia 's mi l i ta ry remains an outdated, b loated, corrupt and incompetent force. The numerous reasons for this state of affairs inc lude severe lack of fund ing , bureaucrat ic impediments , po l i t i ca l instabi l i ty and the anachronist ic percept ion that Russ ia remains a great power . Th is thesis explores beyond the t rad i t iona l ly c i ted internal factors and argues that N A T O expans ion has been a key external factor beh ind the d i sma l progress of mi l i ta ry re form i n Russ ia. Expand ing the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t ion has perpetuated the not ion amongst Russians, especial ly w i t h i n the mi l i tary , the Genera l Staff and the M in i s t r y of Defence, that the A l l i ance poses a threat to Russ ian security. Th is mindset has translated into a cont inu ing focus i n Russ ian nat iona l secur i ty doctr ines on ma in ta in ing nuclear par i ty w i t h the West (i.e., N A T O ) as we l l as the retention of large convent ional forces. Th is has d iver ted scarce resources away f r om equ ipp ing and profess iona l i z ing a smal ler, s t reaml ined a rmy. Furthermore, the current sorry state of Russ ia 's mi l i ta ry is beg inn ing to manifest itself i n serious social prob lems, such as w idesp read d r ug abuse, and increasing suic ide and desert ion rates. Russ ia must modern i ze its a rmed forces if they are to become an effective instrument of state and counter the real threat to nat ional security: terror ism rooted i n re l ig ious ext remism and secessionist movements. The second major argument of the thesis is more opt imist ic . In the post-9/11 security envi ronment, percept ions regard ing the West i n general and N A T O specif ical ly may have evo lved suff ic ient ly to a l l ow Pres ident V l a d im i r Pu t i n to shift the focus of nat iona l security away f r om the inaccurate, albeit strongly perceived, threat f rom the West, to the real menace posed b y Is lamic rad ica l i sm a long Russia 's southern f lank. W i t h bad l y t ra ined conscr ipts and nuclear weapons power less to f ight terror ism both domest ica l ly and i n the former Soviet Un i on , pressure w i l l on ly increase for the l ong overdue modern i za t ion of Russia 's A r m e d Forces. Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents i i i C H A P T E R I Int roduct ion and Ove r v i ew . 1 1.1 Ove r v i ew of N A T O : Creat ion, Evo lu t i on , Expans ion 6 1.2 Ove r v i ew of the Russ ian M i l i t a ry : W o r l d Power to W o r l d P rob l em 19 1.3 Chechnya 27 C H A P T E R II R o u n d One: The N A T O - R u s s i a Relat ionship U n d e r Bor is Ye l t s in (1990-1999) 31 2.1 The H o n e y m o o n Per iod . . . . 32 2.2 The E n d of the H o n e y m o o n ...35 2.3 A n Idea is Bo rn 36 2.4 Russia 's Init ia l Response 39 2.5 M i l i t a r y Re fo rm (or the Lack Thereof) Unde r Ye l t s in 46 C H A P T E R III R o u n d Two : The N A T O - R u s s i a Re lat ionsh ip Unde r V l a d im i r Pu t i n (2000-2003) .52 3.1 Put in 's Cho ice 53 3.2 Some Ramif icat ions of 9 /11 56 iv 3.3 The Rome Summit, the NATO-Russia Council and the Anticlimactic Prague Round 61 3.4 The Conscription Debate 66 3.5 What does this Mean for the Future of Military Reform 71 CHAPTER IV Conclusion 76 4.1 Theoretical Implications 76 4.2 A Disclaimer and a Summation 80 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 85 1 C H A P T E R I I N T R O D U C T I O N : O U T L I N E A N D O V E R V I E W O n the 9 t h of Novembe r 1989 the people of East and West Ge rmany jo ined together i n an unprecedented and unforeseen insurrect ion, du r i ng wh i c h the l i teral and symbo l i c bu lwa rk of C o m m u n i s m , the Ber l i n Wa l l , was to rn d o w n . 1 Th is event d irect ly prec ip i tated the d isso lut ion of the U n i o n of Soviet Social ist Repub l i cs (USSR), wh i c h i n tu rn brought about the end of the C o l d War . 2 A s 40 years of constant—albeit low-level—confl ict faded into memory , the b i -polar internat ional structure that had co loured and character ized a l l aspects of internat ional relat ions was t ransformed. N o t surpr i s ing ly , predict ions regard ing the nature of the new internat ional order were numerous and contradictory. One organ izat ion i n part icu lar stood at the centre of debate on the shape of the internat ional system i n the pos t -Co ld W a r era: the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t ion ( N A T O ) . Real ist and neoreal ist internat ional relat ions (IR) scholars, such as John J. Mearshe imer and Kenneth Wa l t z , were pessimist ic regard ing bo th the future of N A T O and the nature of internat ional relat ions i n the pos t -Co ld W a r system. Mearshe imer argued that the b i -polar conf igurat ion of power had he ld states' 1 See Grant, 1991 for a detailed description of the events and causes of the uprisings of November 9 t h , 1989. 2 For a comprehensive and informative account of events within the USSR preceding and during this tumultuous time, see Pryce-Jones, 1995. natural tendency towards conflict in check; he predicted that without this stabilizing force the new international system would be characterized by decreased cooperation and increased conflict. Both Mearsheimer and Waltz perceived the dissolution of NATO as a practical manifestation of this eventuality because, according to the realist paradigm, cooperation between states generally only occurs when a strong external motivating factor, such as a threat to state survival, is present (Mearsheimer 1990, 35 & 42; Waltz 1993, 75-76)? Adherents of the comparatively more optimistic school of thought, liberalism4, argued that a conflictual post-Cold War era was not inevitable and that NATO could and should continue to play a vital role in preserving peace in Europe within the new security environment. This is consistent with their paradigm because while realists argue that institutions are merely a reflection of the contemporary power configuration and operate according to the whims of the great powers of the day, liberals believe that institutions can take on a life and influence beyond that instilled by the founding states (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 7). Furthermore, as the Cold War came to an end, realists still viewed NATO as a military alliance, although a nontraditional one. Given that the vast majority of IR theory tells us that alliances exist for the sole purpose of countering a specific threat, it was logical for realists to predict the demise of NATO as a corollary to the demise 3 For more on the Realist view of cooperation and alliances see Morgenthau 1985; Waltz, 1993; Grieco 1993 and Mearsheimer, 1994/1995. 4 In the interest of brevity, only the two dominant schools of IR theory, realism and liberalism, shall be mentioned here. For more on the theory behind NATO's post-Cold War persistence according to these paradigms as well as Organizational Theory and Constructivism, see Rauchhaus, 2001. 3 of the organizat ion 's raison d'etre, the Soviet Un i o n . Mo s t l ibera l scholars, however , have l ong argued that throughout the C o l d W a r the N o r t h At lan t i c Treaty Organ i za t ion deve loped into more than a mi l i ta ry al l iance: .. . N A T O is about m u c h more than just co-ord inat ing mi l i t a ry po l i cy to deter and defend against a c ommon enemy. F r o m its incept ion, N A T O has had the broader goal of enhanc ing its members ' security, w h i c h inc ludes p romo t i ng stable c iv i l -mi l i tary relat ions w i t h i n member states as we l l as prevent ing security compet i t ion between them. (Rauchhaus 2001,13-14) Thus, it was consistent w i t h their pa r ad i gm for neol ibera l inst i tut ional ists Joseph N y e and Robert Keohane to argue i n the ear ly 1990s that a l though N A T O cou ld not have been created i n the security env i ronment of the late 1980s, it cou ld and w o u l d cont inue to exist i n the pos t -Co ld W a r system as it had p roven itself to be a va luable internat ional inst i tut ion over the prev ious four decades (Nye & Keohane 1993,104-106). A l t h ough the predict ions of l ibera l scholars certainly seem to have been more accurate than those of the realists', not even the most opt imist ic among them ant ic ipated the level of integrat ion and partnersh ip that has been cu l t ivated between N A T O members and their former adversaries i n the years since the fa l l of the Soviet Un i on . Few, if any, pred icted that less than a decade after the end of the C o l d War , N A T O w o u l d have expanded into former Wa r saw Pact ter r i tory 5 or that Russ ian troops w o u l d be w o r k i n g side-by-side w i t h N A T O troops i n peace-keeping operat ions i n the former Yugos lav ia . 5 The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to become NATO members at NATO's Madrid Summit in 1997. After making the requisite alterations to their political and security systems, they became full members in 1999. 4 This latter occurrence clearly demonstrates that, since the end of the C o l d War , N A T O has reformulated itself into a body that inc ludes Russ ia i n a mu tua l l y benef ic ia l , albeit occas ional ly awkwa r d , quasi-partnership. A s the 21st century progresses, a l l s igns indicate that N A T O and Russ ia w i l l have to cont inue to co-exist despite their turbulent past and sometimes rocky present. A s N A T O expands ever closer to Russia 's borders, the not ion of peaceful co-existence between these two former adversaries is becoming more and more important. G i v e n that the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t ion w i l l reach the western frontier of the Russ ian Federat ion i n less than a year, it seems pert inent to examine h o w the process of expans ion has affected var ious inst i tut ions i n Russ ia . Due to the constraints of this project, on ly one inst i tut ion can be effectively examined here. A s N A T O is at the core a mi l i ta ry inst i tut ion, this thesis w i l l deal exc lus ive ly w i t h the Russ ian A r m e d Forces. In brief, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of N A T O expans ion on the Russ ian mi l i tary . The fo l l ow ing pages w i l l demonstrate that N A T O expans ion had a detr imenta l impact on the Russ ian mi l i t a ry throughout Bor is Yel ts in 's pres idency. The enlargement process, to wh i c h Russ ia 's m i l i t a ry officials were ardent ly opposed, p layed a key role i n s tymie ing essential re fo rm programs; A l l i ance expans ion just i f ied the cont inuat ion of Russia 's cOnscript-based system and propagated dependence on its nuclear arsenal. To this day, the mi l i t a ry bureaucracy remains suspic ious of the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance and fearful of its expans ionary programs. Nevertheless, current president V l a d im i r Pu t i n has been more successful 5 than his predecessor i n orchestrat ing mi l i ta ry re form. Th is is, at least i n part, due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Un i t ed States. Since the beg inn ing of h is po l i t i ca l l ife, Pres ident Pu t i n has demonstrated his bel ief that the p r ima ry contemporary threat to Russ ian nat ional security is terror ism, not an attack f r om the West under the auspices of N A T O . Pu t i n does not v i ew N A T O as an adversary, and is thus able to recognize the necessity of t ransforming the R u s s i a - N A T O re lat ionship into that of an al l iance w h i c h w o u l d more effectively combat the terrorist threat. The 9/11 attacks d i d not change Put in 's bel iefs regard ing threats to h is country, but they have he lped h i m enlist and sustain suppor t for his admin is t rat ion 's anti-terrorist, Western or iented fore ign po l i cy . A s Russ ians ' threat percept ions shift f r om the West to terror ism, the l i ke l ihood of fundamenta l mi l i ta ry re form i n Russ ia w i l l g row. The thesis is d i v i ded into four chapters. Th is in t roductory chapter w i l l f irst p rov ide an ove rv i ew of the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ iza t ion; its h is tory and contemporary role w i t h i n internat ional relat ions as we l l as its expans ionary programs. It w i l l then p rov ide a br ief prof i le of the contemporary Russ ian mi l i ta ry , emphas i z ing the chal lenges it faces and proposed reforms that are be ing cons idered to he lp revi ta l ize and improve this important instrument of state. The second chapter covers the span of Bor is Yel ts in 's pres idency. It examines the tumu l tuous h is tory of N A T O - R u s s i a relat ions throughout the 1990s. Th is d iscuss ion w i l l demonstrate h o w N A T O ' s expansionary po l i cy p layed an instrumenta l ro le i n perpetuat ing the not ion that the West cont inued to pose a threat 6 to Russian national security. This, in turn, propagated the belief that Russia needed to maintain the same military structures that it had employed throughout the Cold War. Combined with other internal factors such as Russia's dire economic straits, this severely hindered Yeltsin's ability to implement military reduction and modernization plans. The third chapter covers the span of Vladimir Putin's presidency, to date. It argues that Putin has been able to use the events of 9/11 in order to help promote anti-terrorism policies and call for active military reform as well adopt a pragmatically pro-Western foreign policy despite his generals' insistence that NATO still poses a threat to Russia's national security. The fourth and final chapter will provide a brief synopsis of the major arguments made throughout the thesis, as well as an assessment of the theoretical implications of the conclusions that have been drawn therein. An Overview of NATO: Creation, Evolution, Expansion The military principle captured in the well-known expression 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' bound the Western powers and the Soviet Union together in a tense but effective partnership throughout the Second World War. However, once the Nazi threat had been successfully eliminated by the Allied powers, relations between the West and the East rapidly deteriorated. In the late 1940s, Western democratic governments grew increasingly nervous and discomfited regarding the perceived threat emanating from the Communist bloc. The sense of unease was 7 exacerbated by the Soviet po l i cy of expans ion and repress ion i n the Balt ic states du r i ng the pos t -WWII era. D i v i d e d Ge rmany also p roved to be a focal po int of the tens ion between East and West at this t ime. Devastated b y the war , the Eu ropean states desperately needed to rebu i ld their infrastructures and economies. Towa rds this end, the U S p rov i ded money for the reconstruct ion of Eu rope under the auspices of the Ma r sha l l P l an . 6 Th is money was earmarked for rev i v i ng and restor ing the shattered Eu ropean economies and there were little to no excess funds for mi l i t a ry and defence spend ing . Fear of a Commun i s t invas ion, however , demanded that the defence of Western Europe be cons idered. For this reason, certain key western democracies began d iscuss ing the format ion of a mi l i ta ry al l iance that w o u l d span the At lan t i c Ocean. Fear ing Stal in 's expansionist tendencies, a smal l g roup of Eu ropean countr ies acknowledged that they were too weak, both economica l ly and mi l i tar i ly , to f ight the USSR. They therefore began to negotiate a system of col lect ive defence that w o u l d automat ica l ly b r i ng N o r t h Ame r i c a to the a id of any European country attacked by the Soviet U n i o n (Du ignan 2000, 2-9). These negotiat ions cu lminated i n the s ign ing of the Wash ing ton Dec larat ion on A p r i l 4 t h , 1949, w i t h wh i c h the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t ion was born. In s ign ing the Declarat ion, the twe lve or ig ina l member states—Belgium, Canada, Denmark , France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembou rg , the Nether lands, N o r w a y , Por tuga l , the Un i t ed K i n g d o m , and the Un i t ed States—agreed to col lect ively come to the 6 For more on the politics and history of the Marshall Plan, see Hogan, 1989. 8 defence of any NATO member attacked by another country.7 Confident that North America's guarantee to provide military aid in the event Of an attack on any NATO member would act as a sufficient deterrent to prevent a Soviet invasion, the Alliance's European members could focus on rebuilding their war-torn countries and economies (NATO 2002 "NATO in the 21st Century", 4-5). For this reason, former US President Harry S. Truman called NATO and the Marshall Plan "two halves of the same walnut" (NATO 2002, "NATO in the 21st Century", 4). Less than one year after NATO was created, two key events in world history caused its significance to increase dramatically. Firstly, on August 29th,1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, effectively removing America's strategic nuclear monopoly and permanently shifting the balance of power.8 Secondly, on June 25th, 1950, Communist North Korea, backed by both China and the Soviet Union, invaded South Korea;9 this confirmed Western suspicions that the USSR was aggressively pursuing an expansionist foreign policy. With these events, the remnants of post-WWII optimism faded into oblivion as the East-West conflict intensified. In May of 1955, the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, more commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact, further entrenched the conflict between East and West.10 For the next three and a half 7 See The Washington Declaration, available at http://www .nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty .htm, for more details. 8 For more on the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, see Holloway, 1994. 9 For details on this conflict and the role played by the Soviets, see Kuznetsov, 2001. 1 0 The Warsaw Pact was comprised of 8 countries; the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It came into being on the 14th of May 1955 and officially disbanded on July 1st 1991. For more on the history and Cold War role of the Warsaw Pact, see Jones, 1981. 9 decades, virtually all relations between nations were influenced by the complex machinations of the superpowers in their respective bids for dominance. Throughout this period, NATO had a clear and unambiguous role to play on the world stage: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [existed] to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control over Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent" (NATO 2002, "NATO in the 21st century", 4). Throughout the long years of the Cold War, NATO was unequivocally successful in fulfilling its mandate to protect Western Europe from the Soviet threat. So much so, that this organization has been called "the most successful alliance system in the history of the world" (Duignan 2000, ix). Nevertheless, as is usually the case for a complex organization comprised of sovereign states, NATO's authority and cohesion has faced numerous challenges. For example, the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus has proved embarrassing for NATO on more than one occasion since those two countries became full members in 1952 (Duignan 2000, 25; Moustakis 2003). Furthermore, the issue of burden sharing is one of the most serious problems that has plagued NATO since its inception. Although disputed by some academics and NATO officials, there has long been an element of the American polity convinced that the US pays an unfair share of NATO's expenses. Adherents of this view argue that NATO's European members "do not fully pull their weight and [spend] too much on welfare and not enough on defence" (Duignan 2000, 24-25). On the other hand, some who take the European perspective feel that the dominant US 10 position within the organization has granted it too much control over the defence of Europe, thereby requiring European nations to sacrifice a degree of sovereignty in order to participate in NATO (Duignan 2000, 25-26). France's position within NATO exemplifies this internal strain within the organization. Although this country strongly supported the creation of NATO in 1949, rising nationalistic sentiment encouraged by then President Charles de Gaulle during the 1960s led France to decide that being a full member of N A T O cost too much in terms of political and military autonomy. As such, ".. .de Gaulle withdrew France from the Alliance's integrated military structure in March 1966, ostensibly to pursue military self sufficiency and independent foreign policy" (Cornish 1997,43). Although this move did not entirely remove France from the Alliance, it decreased France's authority within and commitment to the organization. During the early 1990s France once again questioned NATO's dominant role with regard to European security by pushing for a shift in defence policy from an 'Atlanticist' approach to a 'Europeanist' approach. "Traditionally the champion of Europeanism, France saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to shift the locus of European security planning and organization back to Europe" (Cornish 1997, 32). This challenge to NATO's relevance with regard to matters of European security could have done serious damage to the future viability of the organization. However, a concerted effort on the part of Britain and the US, the strongest supporters of the Alliance and the Atlanticist approach, resulted in a compromise 11 that satisfied France's concerns regarding US dominance of NATO as well as ensuring its continued cooperation with the organization (Cornish 1997 40-45). Although France has once again become a full NATO member, this country's government is a staunch supporter of the militarization of the European Union (EU), which it sees as a way to achieve an independent European security policy. .. .France has, always believed that in the long run the EU must assert its independence of NATO, an organization it regards as ultimately an instrument of American foreign policy. Without an independent European defence force, the French believe there can be no independent European foreign policy. (The Economist 2003 "NATO versus the European Union") While there is little doubt that France will remain an important and powerful member of NATO for the foreseeable future, its concerns over maintaining sovereignty and independence clearly demonstrate that the Alliance must carefully nurture the delicate balance between collectivity and sovereignty if it is to maintain its internal cohesion in future. Not surprisingly, in recent years many scholars and analysts have attempted to explain why and how, within ten years, NATO was able to avoid potential dissolution and become "unquestionably the center of gravity on security issues in Europe" (Schake 2001, 30). While it is not within the scope of this paper to examine all the explanations put forth by NATO scholars, the most compelling among them shall be briefly discussed here. 12 No tw i th s t and ing certain notable exceptions, the general consensus among N A T O experts is that the organ izat ion was able to adapt and thr ive after the C o l d W a r because it was more than a mi l i t a ry a l l iance. 1 1 Throughout the C o l d War , N A T O possessed a l l the s tandard t rapp ings of a mi l i ta ry all iance; weapons, soldiers and an enemy. Howeve r , the organ izat ion also deve loped an incred ib ly power fu l bureaucracy and a ne twork of commun ica t ion systems that spanned the globe by the early 1990s. Because N A T O was concerned w i t h bo th prevent ing as we l l as f ight ing war , it deve loped a complex system of po l i t i ca l and mi l i ta ry ties that p roved inst rumenta l i n conv inc ing the relevant powers that the A l l i ance remained a v iab le and impor tant inst i tut ion i n the pos t -Co ld W a r system. A s Celeste Wa l l ander explains: ... the al l iance di f fered f r om tradi t ional mu tua l a id or guarantee pacts i n several respects important for unders tand ing its inst i tut ional f o rm du r i ng the C o l d War . In add i t i on to its external m i ss ion of deterrence and defence against the Soviet Un i on , the al l iance was also intended to bu i l d peace and security among its members as democrat ic countries. In N A T O parlance, the al l iance was an Ar t i c l e 4 (peace and security) as we l l as an Ar t i c le 5 (collective defence) treaty. (Wal lander 2000, 712-713) Its adaptable po l i t i ca l and mi l i ta ry inst i tut ional assets enabled N A T O to wi ths tand the inevitable questions regard ing its relevance after the disappearance of its or ig ina l raison d'etre. A s the aforement ioned 1996 compromise clearly demonstrates, the A l l i ance was able to reorganize itself into an inst i tut ion acceptable to and appropr iate for the pos t -Co ld W a r era. Therefore, as the 1990s came to an 1 1 Kenneth Waltz, for example, argues that NATO has persevered in the post-Cold War system for one reason only; because the hegemon, the United States, wants it to. For more on this scholar's theories on NATO preservation and expansion, see Waltz 2001. 13 end, many deemed the transformation of NATO to be a complete success; "the fiftieth anniversary summit in April 1999 was envisioned as a gala affair to celebrate NATO's triumphant transformation of its institutions, strategy, membership, and purpose" (Peterson Ulrich 2000). However, unfortunately for NATO, its anniversary celebrations were to be marred by a new and unprecedented challenge; the war in Kosovo. The collapse of Yugoslavia, beginning in 1991, led to the resurgence of ancient conflicts between the various ethnic groups inhabiting the area. The disintegration of the formerly united country quickly degenerated into a violent battle for land and power. The Alliance became militarily involved in the Balkans in 1993 because it feared that violence would spillover into NATO's European territory. Additionally, it desired an end to the mass human rights violations taking place in the region. This was the first time NATO saw cause to get involved in an international conflict. Then, in February of the following year, NATO used military force for the first time in its history when an American contingent of NATO troops shot down four Serbian aircraft that were violating a United Nations (UN) ban on flights over Bosnia. Five years later, NATO launched its first offensive action against a sovereign nation, Serbia, on March 24th 1999 (Duignan 2000, 85-90). These 'firsts' in NATO's history provide some indication as to the importance of the Balkans' conflict for the Alliance. 14 N A T O ' s 1999 wa r w i t h Serbia over Ko sovo was a severe test for the A l l i ance on two levels. F irst ly, it tested the l imi ts of N A T O ' s internal cohesion; secondly, it chal lenged N A T O ' s actual m i l i ta ry capabi l i t ies i n a confl ict. N A T O d i d not pe r fo rm f lawless ly on either leve l . A l t h ough the A l l i ance attempted to present a un i ted front w i t h regard to the M a r c h 1999 air str ikes against Serb forces, beh ind the scenes several N A T O members, i n c lud ing Be l g i um and Po land , were strongly opposed to the act ion. O n the operat ional front, the prob lems were so numerous and severe that many experts quest ioned N A T O ' s abi l i ty to p rov ide an effective mi l i t a ry force i n actual combat s ituat ions (Peterson U l r i c h 2000). N A T O eventua l ly emerged f r om the Kosovo confl ict w i t h m i xed rev iews: Wh i l e some contend that N A T O emerged v ictor ious, un i ted, capable of confront ing 21 s t century secur i ty chal lenges, and strengthened by the add i t i on of its n ew members, others argue that a l though the bomb ing campa ign was paved w i t h good intentions, it was a po l i t i ca l fa i lure the roots of wh i c h can be attr ibuted to the unsu i tab i l i ty of N A T O for the achievement of Europe ' s security interests i n the current era. (Peterson U l r i c h 2000) Despi te unfavorab le commentary regard ing its actions and dire pred ict ions as to the future of the A l l i ance emanat ing f r om certain sources, N A T O was nonetheless able to p rov ide a measure of security and stabi l i ty to the peop le of Bosnia, Ko sovo and the Former Yugos lav Repub l i c of Macedon i a ( N A T O 2002, " N A T O Today " 10-13). It is a testament to the perseverance and ded icat ion of the organ izat ion that, four years after the end of the war , N A T O troops cont inue to p rov ide important and effective 15 support for the peaceful and democrat ic deve lopment of the former Yugos lav repub l i cs . 1 2 In order to ensure its cont inu ing relevance i n a chang ing w o r l d , N A T O was forced to undergo a t ransformat ion after the C o l d War . The Ko sovo W a r forced a second transformat ion i n the late 1990s. Just two years later, the A l l i ance was requ i red to adapt, yet again, to a new and rad ica l ly altered security env i ronment i n the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Un i t ed States, c ommon l y referred to as 9 /11 . These attacks resulted i n the first ever invocat ion of N A T O ' s col lect ive defence clause, A r t i c l e 5 of the N o r t h At lant i c Charter, o n September 12 t h 2001 ( N A T O 2002 " N A T O Today " 5). Despi te the invocat ion of Ar t i c l e 5, the Un i t ed States d i d not ca l l u pon N A T O as a who l e to respond to the attacks, a move wh i c h some observers bel ieve has damaged the A l l i ance ' s prestige and importance (The Economis t 2002, " A M o m e n t of Truth") . Nevertheless, as a result of 9/11, N A T O has taken several steps to ensure its contemporary and future va lue i n assist ing the US- l ed W a r on Terror. These steps inc lude: "enhanced intel l igence shar ing and cooperat ion, blanket over-f l ight clearances and access to ports and air f ie lds for U S and other A l l i e d craft for operat ions against terror ism, and the dep loyment of part of N A T O ' s s tand ing nava l forces to the Eastern Med i te r ranean and of the A l l i ance ' s a i rborne 1 2 For more on NATO's current deployment and activities in the former Yugoslavia see the following articles available on NATO's official website: up to date details on the Bosnia deployment are available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm; details on the Kosovo deployment are available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html; and details on the current deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are available at http://www.nato.int/fvrom/home.hrm. 16 warn i ng and contro l systems ( A W A C S ) aircraft to the Un i t e d States" ( N A T O 2002 " N A T O i n the 21 s t Cen tu r y " 9). A s descr ibed above, N A T O ' s operat ional structures and procedures have been i n a constant state of evo lu t ion since the end of the C o l d War . Howeve r , beyond restructur ing its day-to-day operations, there is another—perhaps even more pro found—way N A T O is adapt ing to the contemporary security env i ronment: it is expand ing. A s prev ious ly ment ioned, N A T O began as an A l l i ance of 12 sovere ign nat ions on A p r i l 4 t h , 1949. Howeve r , accord ing to Ar t i c le 10 of the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty, the organizat ion retained the r ight to expand its membersh ip , subject to the unan imous approva l of its members. A s such, N A T O ' s membersh ip roster has been augmented on 4 separate occasions since its creation: Greece and Tu rkey jo ined i n 1952 1 3; West Ge rmany i n 1954; Spa in i n 1982; the C zech Repub l i c , H u n g a r y and Po land i n 1999. 1 4 A t the Prague Surnmit i n Novembe r 2002, 7 more countr ies — Estonia, La tv ia , L i thuan ia , Roman ia , Bu lgar ia , S lovak ia and S loven ia — were inv i ted to jo in; they are expected to become fu l l members i n 2004. N A T O current ly has 19 members, and w i l l expand to 26 i n 2004. Howeve r , N A T O ' s boundar ies do not end at its member countr ies ' borders; it is also aff i l iated w i t h 25 countr ies th rough the 1 3 Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine. When, after WWII, Britain could not afford to financially support these two states, they destabilized and the democratic, capitalist governments came under attack from communist elements of society. Then US President Harry Truman declared that all democratic states fighting communist 'elements' would receive support from the US to prevent the loss of a state to the Soviet Camp. For more on the politics and logistics of Greece and Turkey's entry into NATO, see Moustakis, 2003. 1 4 Despite the previous additions to NATO's membership roster, the Madrid Round, which initiated the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland's membership into NATO, this is often referred to as the 'First Round' of expansion. 17 Partnership for Peace in i t iat ive 1 5 ( inc lud ing the 7 states inv i ted to become fu l l members at the last summit) . N A T O is aff i l iated w i t h an add i t iona l 7 states th rough the Med i te r ranean D ia l ogue . 1 6 It has a permanent ' re la t ionsh ip ' w i t h Uk ra i ne th rough the N A T O - U k r a i n e Commi s s i on (1997) and w i t h Russ ia, in i t ia l l y th rough the N A T O - R u s s i a Permanent Joint Counc i l (PJC) and, since 2002, t h rough the N A T O - R u s s i a Coun c i l . 1 7 In one w a y or another, N A T O is aff i l iated w i t h 53 states a round the globe. Despite its g rowth and accompl ishments, today 's N A T O is b y no means a trouble-free inst i tut ion. It is chal lenged b y endless internal d isputes over h o w large a role the U S shou ld p lay i n the defence of Europe, and h o w much they shou ld pay for it. External ly , it is be ing bombarded by an entirely n ew range of non-t rad i t iona l threats requ i r ing an entirely n ew style of defence. The wa r i n Ko sovo exacerbated tensions both w i t h i n the A l l i ance and between the A l l i ance and Russ ia. The events of 9/11 h igh l ighted many of N A T O ' s f laws, such as.lack of interoperabi l i ty between members ' nat ional armies, the huge gap between Ame r i c an and Eu ropean technology and weapons, and the al l iance's inab i l i ty to respond qu i ck l y to crisis s i tuat ions (The Economist , " A moment of truth") . A l t h o u g h these prob lems are serious and have no short t e rm solut ions, the most recent N A T O summi t he ld i n the Czech capital i n Novembe r 2002, demonstrated that the organ izat ion is w i l l i n g to 1 5 Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 1 6 Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia (1995), and Algeria, which joined in 2000. 1 7 Russia and Ukraine are also members in the Partnership for Peace Program. 18 adapt itself, once again, to meet the chang ing needs of the post-9/11 security env i ronment. Several important n ew init iat ives were announced at the summi t that—if successful ly implemented—have the capacity to ensure N A T O ' s relevance i n the contemporary security env i ronment. Mos t s ignif icant ly, the A l l i ance announced the creat ion of a r ap i d react ion force w i t h advanced capabil it ies, ca l led the N A T O Response Force (NRF) . The N R F , wh i c h w i l l be part ia l ly operat ional b y October 2004 and fu l l y operat ional b y October 2006, w i l l p rov ide N A T O w i t h a fast and f lexible force able to respond to crises m u c h more qu ick ly than any current mi l i ta ry un i t under the A l l i ance ' s command . A s we l l as the creat ion of the N R F , A l l i ance leaders at the Prague summi t announced their decis ion to al lot funds for the creat ion of f ive new defence in i t iat ives that w i l l focus direct ly on defence against weapons of mass destruct ion attacks ( N A T O , " N A T O after Prague" , 1-5). These concrete changes i n its inst i tut ional structure represent an attempt to reconstruct N A T O into a more effective defence al l iance i n l ight of recent changes to the internat ional security env i ronment. Furthermore, th rough its process of expans ion N A T O has adopted what many scholars cal l a col lect ive security approach as a supp lement to its col lect ive defence obl igat ions. By requ i r ing appl icant states to alter their domest ic structures i n order to reflect the pr inc ip les of l ibera l democrat ic states, N A T O hopes to 'export secur i ty ' into Eastern Europe (Rauchhaus 2001,4). N A T O ' s actions i n Kosovo as we l l as its po l i cy regard ing expans ion have been the source of much contentious debate among scholars throughout the ear ly 19 years of the 21 s t century. A s the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance cont inues to adapt to the post-9/11 security env i ronment, and as its expans ion process extends its boundar ies further eastward, this organ izat ion w i l l undoubted l y p rov ide m u c h more fodder for scholar ly debate for the indef in i te future. Ove r v i ew of the Russ ian M i l i t a r y : W o r l d Power to W o r l d P rob l em D u r i n g the C o l d War , M o s c o w contro l led a we l l - funded, wel l - t ra ined mi l i t a ry that was both env ied and feared the w o r l d over. Today, M o s c o w must deal w i t h a "shattered, d isp i r i ted, corrupt and incompetent a rmy " (Herspr ing 2003,173). U p unt i l 1989, w h e n the Ber l in W a l l col lapsed, the Soviet Red A r m y was w i de l y perce ived as one of the greatest i n the wo r l d . Just three years later, it had deter iorated into one of the worst . Unfortunate ly , ve ry l itt le has been done over the past decade to assist the Russ ian A r m y ' s evo lu t ion into a respectable, effective defence inst i tut ion. The man first charged w i t h rebu i ld ing the Russ ian mi l i ta ry f r om the remains of the Soviet A r m e d Forces was Genera l Pave l Grachev, appo in ted M in i s te r of Defence by then President Bor is Ye l t s in i n M a y 1992 (Murav iev 2001,199). It is not an exaggerat ion to say that the Genera l faced a Hercu lean chal lenge. W h e n the USSR dis integrated, many of Mos cow ' s best troops were stat ioned i n the successor states, and a large percentage of them chose not to return to Russ ia. Furthermore, a vast amount of mi l i ta ry equipment, i n c l ud ing b i l l ions of rubles w o r t h of air defence radars, became the proper ty of the new l y independent non-Russ ian states as this 20 equipment had been stat ioned on their terr i tory du r i ng the C o l d W a r (Murav iev 2001,194-195). The s i tuat ion regard ing the mi l i t a ry indust r ia l complex was even worse. D u r i n g the C o l d War , weapons p roduc t i on and repair facil it ies h ad been del iberately scattered across the enormous terr i tory of the USSR i n order to make it more diff icult for the west to determine the exact assets he ld by the Soviet mi l i tary . Add i t i ona l l y , this strategy made it imposs ib le for the west to destroy the infrastructure of the Soviet a rmy i n a s ingle assault. Th is po l i cy , so log ica l du r i ng the C o l d W a r years, p roved disastrous for the Russ ian mi l i ta ry after it ended; it meant that the new l y created Russ ian a rmy requi red a vast in f lux of cash i n order to recruit n ew troops, rebu i ld stocks of weapons and bu i l d new weapons p roduc t i on plants and repair faci l it ies. Howeve r , increased fund ing for the defence indus t ry was someth ing the n ew government of Russ ia s imp l y cou ld not p rov ide (Baev 1996, 27). D u r i n g the 1980s, Soviet defence spend ing equaled that of the US ; b y the year 2000, defence spend ing totaled on ly 2% of that of the Un i t ed States (Arbatov 2000,5). The results of this drast ic reduct ion i n f und i ng had a p ro found effect on the day-to-day work ings of the mi l i tary . For example, i n 1994 f und i ng for the Russ ian a rmy was so l ow that approx imate ly 120, 000 officers were w i thout the hous ing p romised them by the terms of their employment . In 1998 inspectors d iscovered that, i n an attempt to save money, the mi l i ta ry was feeding its t roops dog food (Barany 2001, 206). Howeve r , rather than increasing the mi l i tary 's budget, Ye l ts in 's 21 admin is t rat ion consistently decreased defence spend ing. G i v e n the chaotic nature of that t ime i n Russia 's po l i t i ca l and economic h istory, it is d i f f icul t to accurately assess exactly h o w much the mi l i ta ry received i n government fund ing; however , accord ing to the S tockho lm Peace Research Institute, f und ing decreased each year unt i l 1998 (SIPRI 2003, 259). Ano the r expert estimates that the decreases i n defence spend ing, as a percentage of the nat iona l budget, cont inued un t i l 2000 (Herspr ing 2003,157). Serious as the prob lems regard ing the mi l i ta ry infrastructure were, there was another more fundamenta l p rob l em fac ing this inst i tut ion i n the early 1990s. Before the A r m e d Forces cou ld be effectively t ransformed into an inst i tut ion appropr iate for the pos t -Co ld W a r era, the menta l i ty of those i n charge had to change. Unfortunate ly , mi l i ta ry officials i n the government had not altered their w a y of th ink ing to fit their n ew situat ion. Thus, Genera l Grachev was hampered i n h is attempts to re fo rm the mi l i ta ry not on l y by a severe lack of f und i ng but also by the " o l d mental i ty [that] preva i led among the armchair generals" (Baev 1996. 28-29). Th is mindset was g rounded i n denia l as to h o w m u c h their pos i t ion had changed, combined w i t h the unshakable bel ief that the U S and N A T O were enemies of Russ ia . It prevented government officials f r om permi t t ing the mi l i ta ry sufficient lat i tude to adapt to the new pos t -Co ld W a r env i ronment and dea l ing w i t h the real i ty of their n ew status as an inferior—rather than superior— mi l i ta ry force (Baev 1996, 29-35). For al l these reasons, mi l i ta ry re fo rm du r i ng Yel ts in 's pres idency was "a joke" (Herspr ing 2003,155). Rather than amel iorat ing, the prob lems that faced Genera l Grachev in 1992 on ly worsened throughout the 1990s. Th is was clearly 22 demonstrated by the fact that "in 1998 the defence ministry was able to cover only 50 percent of its planned budget for food and only 8 percent of the projected clothing budget" (Blair and Gaddy 1998,11). These funding problems directly led to a decline in the number, effectiveness and power of Russia's conventional forces. As a result, throughout the 1990s, Moscow relied increasingly on its nuclear arsenal in order to maintain some semblance of power and authority on the world stage. Although it was not a surprising development, this shift in military focus was exceedingly disturbing for many Russia observers: By 1994 nuclear weapons had become the primary, and virtually the sole, pillar of Russian security. Recognizing its conventional military weakness along its entire border, the Russian government abandoned it longstanding commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Today Russia relies more than ever on using them first or launching them on warning of hostile missile attack. This growing reliance has not only lowered the nuclear threshold for intentional use, but also increased the danger of mistake or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. (Blair and Gaddy 1998,12) Given the plethora of worsening problems in the military sphere, Vladimir Putin could hardly have faced a worse situation upon his accession to power on 1 January 2000. Since that time, limited progress has been made in some areas of military reform. Most significantly, President Putin has increased the military's budget. In 1999, Russia's total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 3.5%; by 2002, that figure had increased to 4% (SIPRI 2003, 260). In actual figures, this translates to an increase of 190 billion rubles between 1998 and 2001. The 2002 federal budget provided 284.158 billion rubles for defence spending, an increase of 23 s l ight ly less than one percent over the prev ious year (SIPRI2003,259). A l so , for the first t ime since the creat ion of the independent Russ ian Federat ion, the defence budget for 2002 al located a signif icant percentage of funds for arms procurement i n terms of both weapons purchases as we l l as research and deve lopment (SIPRI 2003, 262). N e w s of this change i n defence spend ing was surely we l comed by the soldiers and officers of the Russ ian mi l i tary , w h o had been us ing d i s turb ing ly outdated equipment. For example, du r i ng the First Chechen W a r (1994-1996), Russ ian troops used ammun i t i on p roduced i n the 1980s. D u r i n g the Second, or current, Chechen War , troops were reported to "have been us ing 1970s ammun i t i on and there has been talk of b r i ng ing p re -Wor l d W a r I IM -30 122mm howi tzers out of storage" (Herspr ing 2003,168). Ano the r pos i t ive step taken by Put in 's government, under M in i s te r of Defence Sergei Ivanov, was the merg ing of the A i r Force and A i r Defence Forces. Comb i n i ng these forces has decreased redundancy and indicates that the Russ ian mi l i ta ry is m o v i n g towards a more typ ica l Western, 'three-service' m i l i ta ry style, w i t h a separated A r m y , N a v y and A i r Force (Herspr ing 2003,170). Ano the r cost cutt ing measure has i n vo l ved drast ica l ly reduc ing the size of the Russ ian mi l i ta ry . Du r i n g the height of the C o l d War , Soviet troops numbered approx imate ly 4 mi l l i on ; i n stark contrast, the Russ ian A r m e d Forces has a total of 988,100 act ive troops (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 88). 1 8 Experts estimate that 1 8 This figure jumps to approximately 1.2 million troops when personnel from other military-type structures, such as the Ministry for Internal Affairs are included (Arbatov 2000,5; Kommersant 2003). 24 this number w i l l d rop to between 400,000 and 850,000 over the next decade (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85) Some progress has also been made on the issue of conscr ipt ion. Russ ia faces a serious d i l emma on this front because it is "not able to suppor t either a conscr ipt force, for demograph ic and social reasons, nor an expensive profess ional force of suff icient size to meet perce ived future requi rements" (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85). Due to f inanc ia l constraints, fu l l profess ional izat ion of the Russ ian mi l i t a ry w i l l l i ke ly rema in an elusive goal. Nonetheless, ha l t ing steps i n this d i rect ion were taken w i t h the profess ional izat ion of the 76 t h A i r bo rne D i v i s i on i n September 2002 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85-86). 1 9 Despi te a p rov i s i on i n the Russ ian const i tut ion that a l lows cit izens to opt for alternative c i v i l service rather than conscr ipted mi l i ta ry service, the D u m a has on ly recently begun to discuss fu l l legal izat ion, as we l l as implementat ion, of a f ramework to manage this opt ion. O n 25 July, 2002, a l aw was passed lega l i z ing alternative c i v i l service for conscient ious objectors. A year later, on 21 July, 2003, it was act ivated w h e n Pres ident Put in ' s s igned an alternative c i v i l service decree wh i c h stated that Russ ian youths had the r ight to opt out of mi l i ta ry service as of 1 January, 2004 (Fedyuk in 2003; Agence France Presse 2003). Wh i l e this is certainly a v ic tory i n many ways , crit ics argue that the terms of alternative service as set out by the D u m a , under gu idance f r om the M in i s t r y of Defence, are pun i t i ve and unfair . Those seeking to exercise their r ight to alternative c iv i l service must first argue their 1 9 Given the importance of the conscription debate it shall be further explored in chapter 3. 25 case before a Ministry of Defence commission. The commission has the right to turn down any applicant who does not demonstrate sufficient justification for avoiding conscription. Furthermore, the duration of the alternative civil service is three and a half years, which is nearly double that of the military conscription term. Critics also object to the principle of extraterritoriality that will be invoked by the commission: all who chose alternative service must serve in a region away from their homes (Fedyukin 2003; Bivens 2003). Despite their flaws, the aforementioned reforms and advancements are commendable at least in that they demonstrate the current administration's recognition that military reform is essential. However, this should not blind the reader to the fact that the Russian military remains in dire need of much more drastic reform. The problems that currently plague the Russian armed forces are so numerous that most can only be mentioned briefly. On the technical level, they include spiraling debt, difficulties in recruiting professional soldiers and young officers, inadequate training facilities and insufficient training time, outdated weaponry and equipment, insufficient stockpiling of spare parts and a crumbling military infrastructure so serious that over 400,000 army personnel have not been provided with housing (Umbach 2000, 26-27; Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002, 67 & 71). The sinking of the Kursk in August 2000 is a prime example of the gravity of the situation in regard to the insufficient stockpiling of spare parts. When this submarine, "one of the Northern Fleet's most modern and threatening boats" sank, 26 the No r t he rn Fleet d i d not d ispatch a rescue vessel to assist; the one and on ly rescue vessel operated by the Fleet h ad been d i smant led and s t r ipped for parts years earl ier (Herspr ing 2003,166). O n the personnel level , p rob lems inc lude l o w troop mora le , non-payment or l ow payment of soldiers salaries, mass desert ion, increasing cr ime rates, l o w level of cornmitment on the part of t roops and officers, a marked increase i n substance abuse and A I D S rates, increas ing reports of cor rupt ion, and decreasing levels of d isc ip l ine (Umbach 2000, 26-27; Barany 2001, 206-212). By far the most ser ious p rob l em current ly facing the Russ ian mi l i ta ry on the personnel leve l is that of dedovshchina, or haz ing . Dedovshchina i n the Russ ian mi l i ta ry is a t ru ly horr i f i c procedure that inc ludes regular, bruta l beatings, rape, and forced d r ug usage inf l ic ted b y senior conscr ipts u pon new ones (Bogos lovskaya Po l yakova and V i l enskaya 2001,180-185). The p rob l em has become so severe that an est imated 2,500 Russ ian conscr ipts d ie each year as a direct result of dedovshchina; new conscripts are either l i tera l ly beaten to death or commi t suic ide to escape the torture (Ognev 1999). A c co r d i ng to experts this part icu lar p rob l em has progress ive ly worsened over the past decade because the m i l i t a ry has, i n general, on ly been able to recruit l o w cal iber troops. Russ ian men can, at least temporar i ly , avo id conscr ipt ion b y pay i ng a br ibe or attending an inst i tut ion of h igher educat ion. The mi l i tary , therefore, is unable to recruit or conscr ipt educated, m i dd l e or upper class cit izens. Thus the inst i tut ion has been forced to conscr ipt more and more troops f r om the l ower echelons of society, i n part icu lar conv ic ted cr iminals. A s 27 more cr imina ls enter the mi l i ta ry , the number and nature of cr imes, i n c l ud i ng theft w i t h i n the mi l i ta ry as we l l as f r om civ i l ians, and of course haz ing of troops, is progress ive ly worsen ing (Ognev 1999, Po l yakov 2002, 80). Th is has, inevi tably, resulted i n an increase i n desert ion and su ic ide rates and a decrease i n t roop morale. There is a v i c ious cycle at wo r k that must be b roken before the Russ ian mi l i t a ry can achieve any semblance of respectabi l i ty. Unfor tunate ly , r ank ing officers and mi l i ta ry officials are do ing very l i tt le to combat the p rob l em of dedovshchina for the Russ ian soldiers w h o are its v i c t ims (Ognev 1999; Bogos lovskaya, Po l yakova and V i l enskaya 2001,182-190). Chechnya N o d iscuss ion on the contemporary Russ ian mi l i ta ry cou ld be cons idered comprehens ive if it d i d not ment ion the protracted confl ict between Russ ia arid Chechnya . Th is autonomous reg ion is b ound by Russ ian terr i tory on the nor th , west and east; the southern border is shared w i t h Georg ia . A l t h ough it is l and locked and possesses few natura l resources, Chechnya is geostrategical ly important because an important stretch of o i l p ipe l ines is l a id across its terr i tory (K i pp 2003,180). A f iercely p r o u d ethnic group, the Chechens have been intermittent ly f ight ing for fu l l independence since Cza r i na Cather ine II first sent troops of the Russ ian Imper ia l A r m y to conquer the N o r t h Caucasus reg ion i n the 1790s (K i pp 2003,180-183). Four centuries of sporadic but persistent confl ict have had a fundamenta l impact o n the social and psycho log ica l make up of both Chechens and Russians. 28 Therefore, this confl ict persists as one of the most po l i t i ca l ly and emot iona l ly charged issues i n contemporary Russ ian pol i t ics. The current confl ict, labeled the Second Chechen War , began i n 1999. 2 0 There were two ma in catalysts beh ind this newest war; the Chechen invas ion of ne ighbour ing Dagestan i n Augus t and the M o s c o w apartment bu i l d i ng bomb ings i n September of that year. Fundamenta l i s t Is lamic warr iors , w h o had co-opted the Chechen struggle for independence, hoped the invas ion w o u l d spark an up r i s i ng on the part of a l l M u s l i m s i n the Caucasus and eventua l ly result i n the creat ion of an Islamic state i n the reg ion. Fear ing that chaos and Is lamic fundamenta l i sm might spread into the broader N o r t h Caucasus, M o s c o w immed ia te l y retal iated. Th is retal iat ion escalated to fu l l scale combat after the apartment bombings , wh i c h V l a d im i r Pu t in used as a pol i t i ca l p l a t fo rm i n his b i d for the pres idency (K i pp 2003, 190-193). The war , in tended by M o s c o w to qu i ck l y and total ly defeat the Chechen rebels, has lasted four years and cost an est imated $10 b i l l i on U S D as we l l as thousands of soldiers ' , rebels' and c iv i l i ans ' l ives (Herspr ing 2003,169-170). Furthermore, the wa r has h igh l ighted the p rob l em of sold iers steal ing f r om and otherwise abus ing c iv i l ians. H u m a n r ights groups both i n Russ ia and the internat ional commun i t y have l ong been ca l l ing on governments a round the w o r l d to end the atrocities of this wa r ( H u m a n Rights Watch 2002). 2 0 For more on the history of the Chechen conflict and the First Chechen War (1994-1996), see Kipp 2003. 29 A l t h ough the current confl ict does not seem to be approach ing any k i n d of conclus ion, Russ ian mi l i ta ry expert Da le He r sp r i ng bel ieves that the country 's A r m e d Forces are beg inn ing to real ize that this, l ike A fghan is tan , is wa r that cannot be w o n (Herspr ing 2003,169). Th is rea l izat ion, comb ined w i t h decreasing suppor t for the wa r on the part of Russ ian c i t i zens, 2 1 may eventua l ly persuade the Russ ian government of the necessity to force a po l i t i ca l end to the hosti l i t ies. The overv iews p rov i ded here set the stage for an i n depth d iscuss ion as to h o w the process of N A T O expans ion has in f luenced the Russ ian mi l i ta ry . A s descr ibed above, mi l i ta ry re form du r i ng Bor is Yel ts in 's t ime i n office was v i r tua l l y nonexistent, whereas V l ad im i r Pu t i n has enacted some smal l but s ignif icant changes. The remainder of this thesis w i l l compare and contrast R u s s i a - N A T O relations and mi l i ta ry re form programs under Ye l ts in and Pu t in . It w i l l seek to exp la in w h y the same po l i cy of expans ion, o n N A T O ' s part, had a more detr imenta l effect on the mi l i ta ry re form agenda for Ye l t s in than it d i d for Put in . The fo l l ow ing chapter w i l l demonstrate that throughout Yel ts in 's pres idency, Russia 's mi l i ta ry bureaucracy persisted i n v i ew i ng the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance as a threat to the security of their country. They used the expans ionary p lans of the 2 1 According to surveys carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research, support for "continuing military operations" in Chechnya has dropped each year since 1999. A survey in December of that year showed 67% in favour of continuing operations; that number had dropped to 27% by May 2003. Correspondingly, the number of Russians in favour of "peaceful negotiations" has increased from 22% in December 1999 to 62% in May 2003. Alliance to keep the 'threat from the West' at the top of Russia's security agenda and, in doing so, they slowed and blocked military reform efforts. 31 C H A P T E R II R O U N D O N E : T H E N A T O - R U S S I A R E L A T I O N S H I P U N D E R BORIS Y E L T S I N (1991-1999) Estab l i sh ing harmon ious relat ions w i t h Russ ia has been a top pr io r i t y for N A T O off icials since the d isso lut ion of the Soviet Un i on . Since the early 1990s, the A l l i ance has made a concerted effort to prove to the government i n M o s c o w that it is a pure l y defensive organ izat ion w i t h a mandate to promote the values of l ibera l democracies and, as such, does not pose a threat to Russ ian nat ional security ( N A T O " N A T O Today " 2002, 20-21). Th is chapter w i l l argue that v i r tua l l y a l l members of the Russ ian po l i t i ca l elite were resistant to N A T O ' s largely f r iend ly overtures throughout the major i ty of Bor is Yel ts in 's p res idency . 2 2 In part icular, the mi l i t a ry bureaucracy, wh i c h was ardent ly opposed to the s t reaml in ing and profess ional izat ion of Russ ia 's A r m e d Forces, c ited N A T O ' s expans ionary p lans as evidence that the West cont inued to pose a threat to Russ ian nat ional security. Hence, N A T O enlargement p rov i ded just i f icat ion for mi l i ta ry off icials to stymie mi l i ta ry re fo rm efforts throughout the 1990s. Th is chapter is d i v i d ed into two parts. The first traces the turbulent h is tory of R u s s i a - N A T O relat ions f r om the end of the C o l d W a r to the end of Bor is Ye l ts in 's 2 2 It should be noted that not all overtures were entirely friendly. Certain advocates of NATO expansion believed that it would be an effective way, not of strengthening democracy throughout Eastern Europe, but rather of controlling Russia's great power ambitions should the need arise. For more on this, see Asmus 2002, especially Book II, Section 2 and Book III Section 3. 32 term. The second examines the goals of military reform set forth by Yeltsin, and looks at how and why virtually none of these goals was met. Through an examination of the key security doctrines released under Yeltsin's leadership, it will be demonstrated that NATO was unsuccessful in convincing the Russian political elite, particularly the military bureaucracy, that the Alliance and the expansion thereof did not pose a threat to Russian national security. The persistent belief that the West continued to pose a threat to Russia was a direct factor in slowing and preventing military reform throughout Yeltsin's presidency. The Honeymoon Period The 1990 NATO Summit, held in London, England, was a pivotal event not just in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance, but also in world history. At the time of the summit the very structure of the international system was being fundamentally reorganized in a way almost totally unanticipated by scholars and politicians the world over. Not surprisingly, as the threat that had given purpose to the North Atlantic Alliance faded into oblivion, many questioned the future relevance of NATO. The leaders of the Alliance, however, were not ready to concede that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had finished what it had set out to accomplish. They, therefore, used the London Summit assert their view that the Alliance remained valuable and relevant in the newly evolving international system. .. .it must continue to provide for the common defence [of Europe].. .Our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with 33 the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. (NATO 1990 "The London Declaration") While Alliance leaders were determined to prolong the life of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they recognized that it would have to be altered in order to fit the shape of the new international system. Accordingly, they recognized that for NATO to remain viable, it would have to drastically reformulate its relationship with the former Warsaw Pact countries. In order to demonstrate the Alliance's • willingness and ability to conform to the new security environment, NATO leaders used the platform of the London Summit to issue a formal invitation to Russia and the other Soviet Socialist Republics to enter into a new, constructive relationship with NATO. Alliance leaders asked the governments of the Soviet Republics "to come to NATO not just to visit but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO" (NATO 1990, "The London Declaration"). Over the course of the following twelve months, NATO officials and bureaucrats worked tirelessly to develop a positive relationship between Russia (as well as other Warsaw Pact Countries) and NATO. These efforts culminated in the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)—comprised of all the NATO states, the CIS, the Baltics, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania—at the 1991 NATO-Rome Summit. Although some experts argued that the NACC, which was strictly a consultative body, did not have a sufficiently expansive mandate, the creation of this Council 34 was h igh l y s ignif icant as it represented the first inst i tut iona l i zed f o r um w i t h the capacity and mandate to b r i ng together the A l l i ance and its former adversaries ( N A T O 1991, "The Rome Dec larat ion"; So lomon 1998,15-17). The enthus iasm w i t h wh i c h member states accepted the N A C C , as we l l as tentative overtures on behalf of the Russ ian government ind ica t ing interest i n eventual inc lus ion into the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance , fostered op t im i sm regard ing the future of European security and R u s s i a - N A T O relations as the pos t -Co ld W a r era began (So lomon 1996,13; Sergour i in 1997,58). For two years this op t im i sm was va l idated. The per iod between 1991 and 1993, often termed the ' honeymoon ' of R u s s i a -NATO relations, was character ized by essential ly p roduc t i ve and harmon ious deal ings. D u r i n g this t ime, arms l im i ta t ion and reduct ion talks were progress ing rap id ly , Ame r i c an and Russ ian leaders were conduc t ing regular face-to-face meetings, and President Yel ts in 's closest adv isors advocated Russia 's increased integrat ion w i t h the West as the y oung country struggled to f i nd its place i n the new w o r l d order (Kugler 1996, 27-29). Fore ign M in i s te r And r e i Kozy rev , and (to a s l ight ly lesser extent) Ye l ts in adv isor Sergei Stankevitch, were adherents of the At lant ic is t school of thought. At lant ic ists strongly rejected iso lat ion ism; they argued that Russ ia 's r ight fu l place i n the w o r l d cou ld on ly be achieved th rough cooperat ion and cord ia l relat ions w i t h the Un i t ed States and Western Europe. Throughout the honeymoon per iod , the At lant ic ist school of thought dominated Russia 's domest ic po l i t i ca l discourse; this is 35 salient to our unders tand ing of Pres ident Yel ts in 's pro-Western behav iour du r i ng this t ime (Kug ler 1996, 28-31). The E n d of the H o n e y m o o n Unfor tunate ly , a l though perhaps inevi tably, the inf luent ia l pos i t ion of the At lant ic ists cou ld not be sustained. By1993 several different schools of thought h a d ar r i ved on Russia 's domest ic po l i t i ca l scene. To va r y i ng degrees, each began to chal lenge the pro-Western pos i t ion advocated by the At lant ic ists. Some argued that Russ ia shou ld focus on deve lop ing ties w i t h the South and East rather than the West. Others argued that a more 'statist' or 'Russia-f irst ' approach was necessary. St i l l others advocated an imperia l ist ic , an t i -Amer i can/Wes te rn po l i cy based on ultra-national ist ic and communis t i c sentiments. Wh i l e var ious scholars have deve loped different labels for these emerg ing schools of thought, the crux of the matter was that "the At lant ic ists, once the major i ty, were rap id l y los ing st rength" (Kug ler 1996, 30-32; Sergoun in 1997,57-64). A s Russia 's domest ic po l i t i ca l env i ronment began to shift r ightwards , Pres ident Ye l ts in lost au tonomy and f lexibi l i ty. C r i t i c i sm of the president, part icu lar ly i n regard to his pro-Western pol ic ies, began to increase. The c l imax came on October 4 t h ' 1993 when factions opposed to Yel ts in 's domest ic and fore ign pol ices took over the D u m a i n an attempt to oust h i m f r om power . It was on ly because of h is formidab le personal i ty, combined w i t h a certain amount of luck and 36 the loya l ty of the mi l i ta ry that Ye l t s in was able to ho l d onto the reigns of powe r . 2 3 Nonetheless, h is gr ip had lessened. H e was no longer free to govern w i thou t cons ider ing the factions vvdthin the Russ ian government that opposed h im . A l t h ough he su rv i ved the coup attempt, the inc ident h igh l ighted the precar iousness of Yel ts in 's pos i t ion. Just three months later, i n December 1993, D u m a elections further unsett led Yel ts in 's government. M u c h to the surpr ise of the 'Ye l ts in fami l y ' and internat ional observers, V l a d im i r Zh i r i novsk i i ' s L ibera l Democrat ic Par ty of Russ ia ( LDPR) , w o n close to a quarter of the popu la r vote, mak i ng the L D P R "the most impor tant of the r ight rad ica l organizat ions and the largest fact ion i n the Russ ian D u m a f r om 1993-1995" (Sergounin 1997, 66). 2 4 The October coup attempt and the December elections c lear ly demonstrated increased oppos i t ion to Yel t in 's government and pol ic ies; as a result he was forced to adopt a more hard- l ine approach i n dea l ing w i t h the West, so as not to appear weak i n the eyes of populace and other po l i t i ca l part ies (Kug ler 1996,33). A n Idea is Bo rn Wh i l e Russ ian domest ic pol i t ics were undergo ing a r i gh tward shift t owa rd a more statist, less Western or ientat ion, the opposi te was occurr ing w i t h i n the Ame r i c an domest ic po l i t i ca l rea lm. Democrat B i l l C l i n t on took office i n 1993, elected largely on his i nwa r d l ook ing p la t fo rm of stabi l i z ing and rebu i ld ing the U S economy 2 3 For more on the October coup attempt, see Kagarlitsky 2002, specificajly Part 1, Chapter 3. 2 4 For details on this and other referenda and elections held in 1993, see McFaul 2001. 37 (Asmus 2002,20). Howeve r , soon after h is inaugurat ion, he became deep ly i n vo l v ed i n p l ann ing and deve lop ing Amer i ca ' s n ew role on the internat ional stage i n the pos t -Co ld W a r env i ronment. Ea r l y i n C l in ton ' s first te rm i n office, the idea of expand ing N A T O appeared on the radar screen. Before long , it became a cr it ical, de f in ing issue of C l in ton ' s pres idency. In late A p r i l of 1993, President C l i n t on attended the open ing ceremony for the Ho locaus t m u s e u m i n Wash ing ton , D C . It p roved to be a fateful day for the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance. The open ing of the museum was a somber and po l i t i ca l ly l oaded event because ethnic s laughter was occurr ing i n the Ba lkans at the t ime. G i v en the geostrategical ly s ignif icant role they p layed throughout W o r l d Wa r II, the leaders of Po land , the C zech Repub l i c and Hungary—respect ive ly Lech Walesa, Vac lav H a v e l and A r p a d Goncz—attended the M u s e u m open ing. Beyond pay i ng their respects to the Ho locaust v i c t ims and surv ivors , these three men had an important reason for be ing at the museum open ing. They feared for the futures of their countr ies g iven the precar ious and unstable pos t -Co ld W a r env i ronment of Eastern Europe. They felt that the m u s e u m open ing, staged against the background of v io lence i n the Balkans, w o u l d g ive credence and power to their message regard ing the necessity of ensur ing peace and democrat ic stabi l i ty i n Eastern Europe (Asmus 2002, 23). K n o w i n g they had litt le t ime and an important request, the three Eastern European leaders met w i t h Pres ident C l i n t on and expla ined, i n succinct and power fu l terms, that they wan ted to become N A T O members: 38 They st i l l feared Russ ia; they d i d not trust the major West European powers. They trusted Amer i ca . They wan ted to jo in N A T O to ensure that their countr ies w o u l d never aga in fal l v i c t im to the tw i n evi ls of nat iona l i sm and geopol i t ics that h ad p roduced so m u c h tragedy i n their part of Eu rope - and that were rear ing their ug l y heads i n the Balkans. (Asmus 2002,23) A l t h ough no decis ions regard ing the enlargement of the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t ion were made i n the immedia te aftermath of the museum open ing, a seed had been p lanted i n ferti le soi l: " N A T O enlargement resonated w i t h two of C l in ton ' s core convict ions - a commi tment to expand and consol idate democracy and his bel ief i n the importance of mode rn i z i ng Amer i ca ' s al l iances i n a g loba l i zed w o r l d " (Asmus 2002, 25). The request f r om the three leaders, comb ined w i t h C l in ton ' s enthus iasm for it, sparked one of the most intensive debates i n the h istory of internat ional relations. Inside and outs ide the Un i t ed States, the not ion of N A T O enlargement p rovoked fierce argument. The ' p ro ' s ide had two ma i n d iv is ions: those that be l ieved N A T O expans ion w o u l d constra in Mos cow ' s aggressive tendencies and those that be l ieved N A T O expans ion w o u l d p romote democracy, f reedom and security. The ' con ' s ide had numerous arguments. The most serious among them he ld that expans ion w o u l d isolate Russ ia , potent ia l ly resul t ing i n a government takeover by ant i -Western extremists. Other anti-enlargement po l i cy makers argued that expans ion w o u l d d i lute the A l l i ance to the po int of ineffectiveness. St i l l others c la imed it w o u l d be proh ib i t i ve ly expensive for the U S to ma inta in troops i n Eu rope as we l l as 39 assist ing new members i n the t rans i t ion to N A T O member status. 2 5 A s each of these arguments was p ropounded , the enlargement debate attracted more pol i t ic ians, po l i cy-makers and scholars. By m id - summer 1993, the debate was i n fu l l sw i ng and had spread to a l l corners of the globe. Russia 's Init ia l Response Throughout the spr ing of 1993, wh i l e the debate intensi f ied, Russ ia 's domest ic po l i t i ca l scene was st i l l domina ted b y Ye l ts in , w h o suppor ted the At lant ic ists. It is therefore not over ly surpr i s ing that Russia 's, or at least Pres ident Yelts in 's, in i t ia l react ion to N A T O ' s p roposed expans ion was one of ambivalence, border ing on acceptance (Kug ler 1996, 62; So lomon 1998, 22-25). In fact, on Augus t 25 t h , 1993 Ye l ts in and Po l i sh Pres ident Lech Wa lesa s igned a commun ique stat ing that M o s c o w d i d not object to Po land ' s prospect ive membersh ip i n N A T O . A c co rd i ng to the commun ique , Ye l ts in was w i l l i n g to recognize Po land ' s sovere ignty and stated " 'the days were over w h e n M o s c o w w o u l d dictate to Wa r saw what it shou ld do ' " (Boris Ye l ts in , quoted i n A s m u s 2002, 37). Domest ica l ly , however , Ye l t s in was w i de l y cr i t i c ized for h is tolerant v i ew on N A T O expans ion. Barely months after the release of the commun ique , his government was unde rm ined by the aforement ioned October coup attempt and December elect ion results. A s a result of bo th the cr i t i c i sm and the shift w i t h i n Russia 's domest ic po l i t ica l rea lm, Ye l ts in chose or was forced to adopt a s ignif icant ly 2 5 For more on nature of the debate and details of the arguments propounded by both sides, see Asmus, 2002; Duignan 2000; Haglund 1996 and Szyana 2001. 40 less tolerant approach to N A T O expans ion for the dura t ion of h is t e rm i n government. A f ter over twe lve months of beh ind the scenes debate and d iscuss ion, N A T O ' s enlargement was off ic ia l ly p laced on the pub l i c agenda i n January of 1994. T w o key steps were taken du r i ng this mon th to l aunch the concept of N A T O expansion. The first was the off ic ial unve i l i ng of the Partnersh ip for Peace (PfP) p rog ram at the NATO-B ru s se l s summi t , w h i c h had been on the agenda i n one f o rm or another since 1991. One group of N A T O experts deemed this to be a direct pa thway to fu l l N A T O membersh ip , wh i l e another g roup saw it as mere ly an extension of the N A C C and, as such, a w a y to avo id the thorny membersh ip debate that was l oom ing on the hor i zon . Wh i l e N A T O membersh ip is not guaranteed b y P f P membersh ip—in fact, not a l l P f P members even desire fu l l N A T O membership— this N A T O substructure has essential ly f o l l owed the prescr ipt ions of the first g roup of experts (So lomon 1998,26-30; Du i gnan 2000,57). P f P members are requ i red to commi t to the f o l l ow ing goals: ach iev ing a transparent nat iona l defence p l ann ing and budget ing system; democrat ic contro l of their mi l i tar ies; contr ibut ing to U N and / o r O S C E operations; as we l l as establ ish ing cooperat ive relat ions w i t h N A T O and eventual interoperabi l i ty w i t h N A T O troops. In return for car ry ing out these changes, P fP affi l iates receive a security guarantee f r om NATO—a lbe i t i n a weaker f o rm than the guarantee g iven to fu l l N A T O members—as we l l as assistance f r om N A T O ' s headquarters i n Brussels and M o n s to modern i ze their mi l i tar ies (So lomon 1998,37-40). 41 The second key step o n the road to an expanded N A T O was Pres ident C l in ton ' s fo rma l statement made on a state v is i t to Prague immed ia te l y after the Brussels summi t to the effect that the quest ion of N A T O enlargement was no longer 'whether ' but 'when ' and ' h ow ' (Asmus 2002 59; Du l eba 2002,154). By this t ime, Russia 's po l i t i ca l elite had converged on the issue of N A T O enlargement. W i t h surpr i s ing ly few exceptions, Russ ian pol i t ic ians, bureaucrats and off icials were un i ted i n their oppos i t ion to any f o rm of N A T O expans ion. A s A lexander Sergoun in puts it, "there was a sort of a n t i - N A T O consensus i n the Russ ian domest ic arena [at this t ime]" (Sergounin 1997,55) . 2 6 G i v e n the w idespread and ardent oppos i t ion to N A T O enlargement, the Russ ian po l i t i ca l elite in i t ia l l y we l comed the Partnersh ip for Peace p l an as they deemed it an acceptable alternative to the expans ion of the A l l i ance . Howeve r , w h e n it became clear that P f P was to be a coro l lary to expans ion, oppos i t ion to it g rew to the po int where, i n Augus t 1994, V l a d im i r L u k i n , ( in h is capacity of cha i rman of the Fore ign Af fa i r s Commi t tee of the Duma) , l i kened Partnersh ip for Peace to the rape of Russ ia (Kug ler 1996,35). Th is type of str ident oppos i t ion to P fP de layed Russia 's entrance into the Partnersh ip p r og ram for over a year. Howeve r , eventual ly—in ear ly 1995—the government i n M o s c o w s igned documents s ign i fy ing Russia 's acceptance of membersh ip into P f P (Kug le r 1996, 65). Wh i l e Russia 's de layed but we lcome commi tment to jo in the Partnership for Peace was l auded as a watershed event i n R u s s i a - N A T O relations, o n many levels it 2 6 For a breakdown of Russia's most commonly cited arguments against NATO expansion, see Duleba 2002, 167-174; Sergounin 1997, 56 and Baranovsky 2001. 42 fa i led to assuage Russia 's concerns regard ing the expans ion of the A l l i ance . A t a press conference du r i ng a Conference on Security and Coopera t ion i n Eu rope meet ing i n December 1994, Ye l t s in wa rned Pres ident C l i n t on and the w o r l d that N A T O expans ion cou ld spark a ' C o l d Peace' i n place of a C o l d W a r (Wi l l i ams 1994, A l ) . The Russ ian pres ident cont inued to p r opound this and s im i la r l y d i re prognost icat ions for almost three years (Kug lar 1996, 37-38). By mid-1995 the government i n M o s c o w had begun to real ize that N A T O expans ion was go ing to occur whether Russ ia acquiesced or not. Therefore, over the fo l l ow ing twenty- four months, Ye l t s in and his new l y appo in ted Fore ign Min i s ter , Yevgeny P r imakov , attempted to s low, stall and ma in ta in some degree of contro l over the enlargement process, a l l the wh i l e g rudg ing l y accept ing the inev i tab i l i ty of expans ion i n one fo rm or another (Kug ler 1996, 38; Sergoun in 1997, 68). Essential ly, the government i n M o s c o w adopted a pragmat ic approach to the enlargement issue i n hope of mi t igat ing its negat ive ramif icat ions for Russ ia. Part ly i n accordance w i t h this n ew pragmat ic approach, for the first t ime in history, i n 1996, Russ ian troops began to wo rk i n cooperat ion w i t h N A T O troops i n the Balkans ( N A T O " N A T O Today " 2002, 20). N o t surpr i s ing ly , this occurrence was l auded as both a tangible and symbo l i c demonstrat ion of the feasibi l i ty of harmon ious R u s s i a - N A T O relations. Howeve r , the real po l i t i ca l watershed i n the re lat ionship between the A l l i ance and country d i d not occur unt i l 1997 when Russ ia s igned the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO 43 and the Russian Federation (more common l y referred to as the N A T O - R u s s i a Found i ng Act ) i n Par is o n 27 M a y (Mehrot ra 1998,1). The Ac t was des igned to be part of a dua l track process advocated b y Pres ident C l i n ton , i n w h i c h N A T O cou ld expand w i thou t a l ienat ing Russ ia (Asmus 2002, 210-211). Thus, the essential purpose of the Ac t was to assure Russ ia that expans ion of the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance was not an attempt to isolate or of fend the country, but rather to foster a stable c l imate i n wh i c h democracy cou ld f lour i sh throughout Eu rope ( N A T O 1997 " Found i ng Ac t " ) . The most s ignif icant accompl ishment of the Found i ng Ac t was the creat ion of the N A T O - R u s s i a Permanent Joint Counc i l (PJC). The PJC was des igned w i t h the central objective.. .[of bu i ld ing] increasing levels of trust, un i ty of purpose and habits of consultat ion and cooperat ion between N A T O and Russ ia , i n order to enhance each other's security and that of a l l nat ions i n the N Euro-At lant i c area and d im in i sh the security of none. ( N A T O 1997 " Found i ng Ac t " ) To this end, the Found i ng Ac t establ ished regular PJC meet ings at v i r tua l l y a l l government and mi l i ta ry levels. S ignif icant ly, the A c t speci f ied that meet ings of the PJC w o u l d not be str ict ly l im i ted to regular sessions, but rather a l l owed for imp r omp tu meet ings to be he ld w h e n necessary. Wh i l e b y a l l accounts the N A T O -Russ ia Found i ng Ac t s ign i f ied a breakthrough i n N A T O - R u s s i a relations, A l l i ance leaders p laced certain l imi ts on the mandate of the PJC (Mehrot ra 1998, 2-3). For example, the Ac t expressly forbids intervent ion i n the " interna l matters" of bo th bodies as we l l as the " r ight of veto over the actions of the other" ( N A T O 1997 " Found i ng Ac t " ) . Despite these necessary l imi tat ions the Found i ng Ac t was strong enough to overcome the rema in ing hurd les b lock ing N A T O expansion. T w o months after it was s igned, i n Ju ly 1997, N A T O members vo ted unan imous l y to inv i te Hunga r y , Po l and and the C zech Repub l i c to jo in the A l l i ance ( N A T O 2002 " N A T O Today " 14). The Ac t " paved the w a y for N A T O to celebrate its 5 0 t h anniversary w i t h the add i t i on of three n ew members " (Mehrotra 1998, 2). Wh i l e the Russ ian government ostensibly rema ined opposed to the po l i cy of N A T O expans ion even after the s ign ing of the Found i ng Act , the document and the creat ion of the PJC p rov i ded suff icient domest ic po l i t i ca l leverage to sustain Yel ts in 's and P r imakov ' s grasp on power over their opponents i n M o s c o w (Mehrot ra 1998, 2; Dannreuther 1999-2000, 146-147). Relat ions between Russ ia and N A T O rema ined re lat ive ly harmon ious and construct ive for the f o l l ow ing two years, and the new members were we l comed into the A l l i ance at a ceremony he ld i n Independence, M i s sou r i o n 12 M a r c h 1999 w i t h on ly m i l d protest on the part of the Russ ian government (Duleba 2002,153). Unfor tunate ly , however , another roadblock lay ahead for the A l l i ance and its n ew 'partner ' . N A T O ' s Kosovo campaign, carr ied out w i thout U N consultat ion or approva l , ser iously damaged N A T O - R u s s i a relat ions throughout the summer of 1999. In fact, relat ions deteriorated to the lowest level since the C o l d Wa r due to the w idespread 45 percept ion i n M o s c o w that its legit imate c la ims regard ing its 'Serb brothers ' were be ing ignored (Duleba 2002,170-173). Russ ian fears regard ing the nature of an expanded N A T O , mi t igated b y the 1997 Found i ng Act , returned i n fu l l force w i t h the Ko sovo campa ign. The PJC, supposed ly a mechan i sm for consul tat ion and confl ict avoidance, was unable to he lp the two part ies reach a compromise and was thus severely unde rm ined (Antonenko 1999-2000,126-135). A c co rd i ng to A l exe i A rba tov , deputy chair of the D u m a Defence Commi t tee and Director of the Center for Po l i t i ca l and M i l i t a r y Forecasts at the Institute of W o r l d Economics and Internat ional Relat ions, "the use of N A T O aircraft and missi les against Serbia on M a r c h 24 t h 1999 ended the pos t -Co ld W a r phase of internat ional affairs" (Arbatov 2000,1). The bombings direct ly p rovoked a dramat ic increase i n ant i -Amer i can sentiment throughout Russ ia and rev i ved Co ld -War-e ra suspic ions and stereotypes. In short, the Ko sovo campaign, once again, made N A T O one of the top perce ived threats to Russia 's nat ional security (Arbatov 2000, 1, 2 & 9). A l t h ough relat ions had imp roved marg ina l l y by the fal l of 1999, the Russ ia-N A T O associat ion was severely damaged by the Kosovo campa ign. Essential ly, the campa ign negated the progress ach ieved by the establ ishment of the Permanent Joint Counc i l and the Found i ng Act . A s one scholar puts it, by the end of 1999, Russ ia and N A T O had " returned to their p re -Found ing Ac t state" (Antonenko 1999-2000,137). 46 O n the internat ional po l i t ica l leve l , Bor is Ye l t s in he lped to b r i ng about s ignif icant advances i n N A T O - R u s s i a relat ions du r i ng the pos t -Co ld W a r era. Unde r h is leadership, the N A T O - R u s s i a re lat ionship d i d not degenerate to the po int of v io lent confl ict at its l ow points, and the h i gh po ints i n vo l v ed the permanent codi f icat ion of consultat ion mechanisms. These accompl ishments are commendab le and shou ld not be underest imated. Nevertheless, as the next sect ion shal l demonstrate, under Yelts in 's leadership, N A T O was never able to fu l l y conv ince the mi l i ta ry , nor the major i ty of Russia 's c i t izenry, that the West d i d not pose a threat to Russ ian nat ional security. A s a result, mu ch needed mi l i ta ry reforms were de layed and b locked throughout the 1990s. M i l i t a r y Re fo rm (or the Lack Thereof) Unde r Ye l t s in Ac co rd i ng to Russ ian mi l i ta ry expert Da le He r sp r i ng , the term 'm i l i ta ry re form' was used i n speeches, documents and commun iques " l i tera l ly thousands of t imes" throughout Bor is Yel ts in 's pres idency (Herspr ing 2003,165). A l t h ough the detai led p lans for re form are far too numerous and complex to elaborate on w i t h i n the scope of this thesis, Yel ts in 's key promises inc luded: a large reduct ion i n the size of the A r m e d Forces; an end to conscr ipt ion; the establ ishment of c iv i l i an contro l over the mi l i tary; and the s t reaml in ing of the var ious branches of the mi l i ta ry i n order to el iminate redundancy (Hockstader 1997, A01 ; Baev 1996, 66-72). Despi te these var ious commitments and frequent use of the term, accord ing to analyst D im i t r i Tren in, "m i l i t a ry re form has langu ished i n Russ ia for the last ten years" 47 (Trenin 2000). Or , more b lunt ly , He r sp r i ng states that m i l i t a ry re fo rm under Ye l ts in was "a joke" (Herspr ing 2003,155). There is, of course, no one single reason exp la in ing the unfortunate lack of actual mi l i ta ry re fo rm i n Russia. Va r i ous prob lems, i n c l ud i ng a b loated and ineffective bureaucracy and Russia 's d i re economic straits, a l l contr ibuted to the p rob lem. Howeve r , it is the content ion of this thesis that the process of N A T O enlargement also p layed a signif icant role i n s tymie ing mi l i ta ry re form du r i ng the 1990s. A s descr ibed i n the prev ious section, the N o r t h A t l an t i c A l l i ance made a concerted effort throughout the 1990s to demonstrate to the Russ ian po l i t i ca l elite that its expans ion d i d not pose a threat to Russ ian nat ional security. O n the bureaucrat ic level , it cou ld be argued that s ignif icant progress was made t owa rd ach iev ing this goal . For example, the N A T O - R u s s i a F ound i ng Ac t c lear ly states " N A T O and Russ ia do not consider each other as adversar ies" ( N A T O 1997 " N A T O -Russ ia Found i ng Ac t " ) . Despite heartening phrases such as this one, an examinat ion of the key security doctr ines deve loped by the Russ ian mi l i t a ry bureaucracy as we l l as the behav ior of this body throughout Yel ts in 's pres idency indicates that this part icu lar branch of the government, at least, remained unconv inced that N A T O and Russ ia cou ld become allies. The Russ ian mi l i ta ry ' s in i t ia l react ion to N A T O expans ion was m i xed . O n the one hand , the A l l i ance was seen to be the personi f icat ion of the nebu lous 'threat f r om the West ' , and it was the duty of the mi l i ta ry to protect the Mo the r l and f r om 48 that threat. O n the other hand, many mi l i ta ry officials be l ieved that N A T O enlargement cou ld be man ipu la ted i n order to guarantee f und i ng for the Russ ian A r m e d Forces and a l l ow M in i s t r y of Defence officials free re ign over m i l i t a ry decis ions (Duleba 2002,170; Sergoun in 1997, 64). Specif ical ly, the mi l i t a ry argued that N A T O expans ion was suff icient just i f icat ion to stop further demi l i ta r i zat ion of the Ka l i n i ng rad Special Defence and Len ing rad M i l i t a r y Distr icts, foster Russo-Belarus ian defence cooperat ion i n check ing potent ia l N A T O mi l i ta ry bu i l d -up , and even dep loy tactical nuclear weapons on Russ ia 's western border and occupy the Balt ic states if they jo ined N A T O (Sergounin 1997, 64). The mi l i tary 's percept ion of the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t i on can be effectively ana lyzed by examin ing its security doctrines. Three key security doctr ines were released by the mi l i ta ry bureaucracy du r i ng Yel ts in 's pres idency: the 1993 Basic Pr inc ip les of M i l i t a r y Doctr ine, the 1997 Na t i ona l Security B luepr in t and the 1999 Na t i ona l Security Concept. Both the 1993 and 1997 documents contained language that ind icated that the mi l i ta ry was not solely focused on the 'threat f r om the West ' . A c co rd i ng to the 1993 doct r ine—wr i t ten du r i ng the At lant ic is t phase of Russ ian polit ics—the ma i n threat to Russ ian nat iona l security was deemed to be " loca l wa r s " and "a rmed confl icts engendered by aggressive nat iona l i sm and re l ig ious into lerance" (Baev 1996, 33). S imi lar ly , the 1997 B luepr in t " ident i f ies the most s ignif icant threats to Russ ian security as emanat ing f r om wi th in—from its internal pol i t ica l , economic and social crises and f r om the near abroad— rather than f r om more distant sources" (Dannreuther 1999-2000,147). 49 M a n y cited these documents as proof that the Russ ian mi l i t a ry was beg inn ing to recognize real, rather than anachronist ic, threats to security and was thus ready to profess ional ize the A r m e d Forces so that it w o u l d become capable of combat ing the re l ig ious fundamental is t threat i n Russia 's near-abroad. Unfor tunate ly , this is not an accurate assessment of the mi l i ta ry ' s percept ion of threat. Despite the fact that internal threats are prominent i n these doctr ines, external threats do not lag far beh ind . The 1993 Doctr ine c lear ly cites "the expans ion of mi l i ta ry blocs and al l iances to the detr iment of the interests of the mi l i ta ry security of the Russ ian Federa t ion" as a threat to Russ ian nat ional security (Baev 1996, 33). The 1997 B luepr in t also c lear ly states "the prospect of N A T O expans ion to the East is unacceptable to Russ ia since it represents a threat to its nat iona l secur i ty" (Mehrot ra 1998,1). M o r e d is turb ing ly , the 1993 doctr ine s igni f icant ly lowers the threshold for use of nuclear strikes: " i t a l lows for nuclear use against an a rmed attack by any country jo ined i n al l iance w i t h a nuc lear-armed state, if that country advances onto Russ ian terr i tory or mere ly attacks Russ ian forces" (Kugler 130-131). Th is is c lear ly a large step back f r om the prev ious commitment to a 'no first use' or at least a ' last resort ' po l i cy . Therefore, these documents demonstrate that the Russ ian mi l i ta ry , despite the pol i t ica l and bureaucrat ic deve lopments i n the N A T O - R u s s i a re lat ionship, cont inued to inc lude the threat f r om the West i n their key security doctr ines. E ven more signif icant, however , is the actual behav iour of the Russ ian mi l i t a ry du r i ng 50 this t ime, wh i c h further indicates that the N o r t h At lant i c A l l i ance was perce ived as neither a partner nor an al ly: The oppos i t i on of a large part of the mi l i ta ry leadership to the downs i z i ng of Russia 's strategic miss i le forces; the insistence on ma in ta in ing a large conscr ipt-based army; scenario p l ann ing for mi l i ta ry exercises - a l l of these po in ted to a de facto conv ic t ion that the West remained the enemy. (Lo 2003, 83) The persistent bel ief on the part of the Russ ian mi l i ta ry that N A T O was st i l l an enemy can be further ev idenced b y a part icu lar mi l i ta ry exercise labeled Zapad-99 (West-99). In June 1999, just months after N A T O ' s Kosovo campaign, the Russ ian mi l i t a ry carr ied out a t ra in ing exercise des igned to "demonstrate Russia 's mi l i ta ry potent ia l and its abi l i ty to wage substantial m i l i ta ry operat ions i n response to N A T O ' s eastward expans ion, and its m i l i t a ry campa ign against Yugos l av i a " (Murav iev 2001, 212). The exercise s imu la ted an attack on Russ ia and Belarus by a force "h igh l y reminiscent of the N A T O force i nvo l ved i n the Yugos lav ia campa ign" (Ol iker and Char l i ck-Pa ley 2002, 76). It conc luded w i t h the 'use ' of nuclear weapons after it was demonstrated that convent iona l troops were not sufficient to ho l d off the assault. Thus Zapad-99 was a d i s turb ing exercise for at least two reasons. F irst ly, it h igh l ighted the negat ive percept ion of N A T O he ld by Russia 's mi l i ta ry officials, and secondly, it ind icated the wi l l ingness of the Russ ian mi l i ta ry to use nuclear weapons ' on enemy terr i tory ' (Ol iker and Char l i ck-Pa ley 2002, 76-77). A s demonstrated above, the Russ ian mi l i ta ry ' s percept ion of N A T O , wh i c h had never been posi t ive, was further degraded by the A l l i ance 's Kosovo campaign. The 1999 Na t i ona l Security Concept , deve loped soon after the bomb ing of Yugos lav 51 Serbs, repud ia ted the pos i t ive deve lopments that h ad been reflected i n the 1997 doctr ine. Whereas the 1997 Na t i ona l Secur i ty Concept emphas i zed internal , large ly economic and po l i t i ca l threats, the n ew draft doctr ine and security concept reverse that perspect ive. They i nvoke N A T O and the Un i t ed States as the authors of g r ow ing threats, def ine internat ional affairs ma in l y i n terms of the threat U S un ipo la r i ty poses to Russ ia 's espousal of a mu l t ipo la r wo r l d , expand parameters for nuclear first strikes, urge vast ly increased defence spend ing, and calculate that spend ing on a Soviet basis, that is, u pon the mi l i ta ry ' s p roc la imed needs not Russ ia 's actual capabi l i t ies. (Blank 2001,55) Despite the A l l i ance ' s numerous and concerted efforts to prove the contrary, N A T O expans ion was consistently v i ewed as a threat to Russ ian nat ional security by the Russ ian po l i t i ca l elite and mi l i ta ry throughout Yel ts in 's pres idency. In fact, " for most of the K rem l i n ' s generals, the idea that N A T O cou ld become a pos i t ive factor i n East -West relat ions is heresy" (Herspr ing 2003,171). For this reason, the scarce resources al located to the mi l i ta ry were spent on ma in ta in ing an unnecessar i ly b loated conscr ipt force and a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. Wh i l e it is imposs ib le to state w i t h certainty that the Russ ian mi l i ta ry w o u l d have undergone re form if N A T O expans ion had not occurred, it is at least feasible to argue that more money w o u l d have been spent on mode rn i z i ng the A r m e d Forces if the West had not been v i ewed as an active and host i le adversary. 52 C H A P T E R III R O U N D T W O : T H E N A T O - R U S S I A R E L A T I O N S H I P U N D E R V L A D I M I R P U T I N (2000-2003) W h e n V l ad im i r V l a d im i r o v i c h Pu t i n became Russia 's Pres ident i n January 2000, he faced an ove rwhe lm ing array of prob lems. H i s country 's economy was i n shambles, faith i n government inst i tut ions was at an a l l t ime l ow , cr ime and cor rupt ion were rampant, the mi l i ta ry was i n a sorry state, and relat ions w i t h N A T O were st i l l suffer ing i n the wake of the Ko sovo crisis. A l t h ough it w o u l d have been di f f icu l t to make the s i tuat ion any worse and a l though Russ ia st i l l faces numerous prob lems, du r i ng his t ime i n office Pres ident Pu t i n has managed to b r i ng about a ma rked improvement i n many areas. 2 7 O f specif ic concern for this thesis, Russia 's current pres ident has a l ready coord inated a fundamenta l and pos i t ive shift i n N A T O - R u s s i a relations. Th is chapter contends that he w i l l be capable of imp lement ing pos i t ive and considerable mi l i t a ry re fo rm i n the foreseeable future as we l l . A s discussed i n the prev ious chapter, mi l i ta ry re form has been on post-Commun i s t Russ ia 's po l i t i ca l agenda l i tera l ly since the new country 's b i r th . Howeve r , l itt le to noth ing has been accompl i shed on this front. The purpose of this 2 7 See Lo,2003. 53 chapter is to show h o w and w h y it m igh t f ina l ly be possib le for fundamenta l m i l i ta ry re fo rm to take place i n Russ ia . Howeve r , 'poss ib le ' does not mean 'easy'. The vast major i ty of the mi l i t a ry bureaucracy remains opposed to fundamenta l reform, specif ical ly the profess iona l i zat ion of the A r m e d Forces, wh i c h makes overhau l ing the mi l i ta ry a much more compl icated and po l i t i ca l ly loaded task. Furthermore, mi l i ta ry re fo rm w i l l be dif f icult , if not imposs ib le, to achieve w i thou t the successful t ransformat ion of Russ ia 's economy. Nevertheless, the changed post-9/11 internat ional security env i ronment , comb ined w i t h Put in ' s po l i t i ca l strength and w idespread suppor t for mi l i ta ry re fo rm among the Russ ian populace, may p rov ide the government w i t h enough just i f icat ion (and means) to impose the modern i za t ion of Russia 's A r m e d Forces on its unenthusiast ic m i l i t a ry officials. Put in ' s Cho ice It has been the fash ion among journal ists and some academics to po int to September 11, 2001 as the tu rn ing po in t i n Russ ia-US and R u s s i a - N A T O relations. This, however , is not ent ire ly accurate. In actual fact, Pres ident Pu t i n dec ided, at the beg inn ing of h is po l i t ica l career, that the most direct route to re-establ ishing Russ ia as a respected and power fu l country was th rough engagement w i t h the West. The events of 9/11 d i d not change h i s stance; they mere ly made it more po l i t i ca l ly feasible for h i m to pursue this type of Western or iented agenda. S imi la r ly , Pu t i n had already demonstrated h is bel ief that the p r ima ry threat to Russ ian nat ional security was not an assault f r om N A T O or Western Europe, but rather terror ism, 54 s temming f r om secessionist movements and fundamenta l is t Is lam i n Russ ia 's t roublesome southern regions and Cent ra l As i a . Howeve r , the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U S b y A l Qaeda 's operat ives have he lped Pu t i n conv ince the general Russ ian populace—if not the mi l i ta ry bureaucracy—that the C o l d W a r is t ru l y over and that Russ ia faces a n ew and rad ica l ly different threat. O f course, this v i e w has been substantiated by the terrorist acts that have occurred o n Russ ian soi l , i n c l ud i ng the December 2002 hostage tak ing at a M o s c o w theatre and the Ju ly 2003 su ic ide bombings at a M o s c o w rock concert. 2 8 Pu t i n began express ing his p r o - N A T O tendencies as ear ly as M a r c h 2000, when , i n an in terv iew w i t h the Br i t i sh Broadcast ing Company , he stated " i t is ha rd for me to v i sua l i ze N A T O as an enemy." Moreover , du r i ng the same interv iew, he ment ioned the poss ib i l i ty of Russ ia becoming a fu l l member of N A T O at some po int i n the future (V lad im i r Pu t in , quoted i n He r sp r i ng and Ru t l and 2003, 245; G l i n s k i Vass i l iev 2002, 2). Just a few months later, i n Ju ly 2001 he ind icated that Russ ia 's oppos i t ion to the expans ion might be surmountab le, of fer ing hope that the perenn ia l confl ict between Russ ia and N A T O leaders cou ld be reso lved, or at least d im in i shed: A s for N A T O expansion, one can take another, an ent ire ly n ew look at this.. ..if N A T O takes on a different shade and is becoming a po l i t i ca l organizat ion. . .They keep say ing that N A T O is becoming more po l i t i ca l than mi l i tary . W e are l ook ing at this and watch ing this process. If this is to be so, it w o u l d change th ings considerably. (V l ad im i r Pu t in , quoted i n Jones 2001). 2 8 For details on these terrorist acts, as well as an assessment of their impact on Russian security perceptions, see Weir, 2002 and Lafraniere and Baker, 2003. 55 These comments were conf i rmed i n the f o l l ow ing mon th du r i ng a v is i t to He l s i n k i w h e n Pu t i n made a pub l i c statement to the effect that Russ ia w o u l d not v io lent ly oppose the admiss ion of the Balt ic states into the N o r t h At lan t i c A l l i ance (Herspr ing and Ru t l and 2003,245). Together, these statements indicate that Pu t i n had 'chosen the West ' l ong before September 11 t h , 2001. Pu t i n also demonstrated that he had recognized the ' rea l ' threat to Russ ian security and made a concomitant commi tment to mi l i ta ry re fo rm pr io r to the terrorist attacks on the Un i t ed States. A l t h ough in i t ia l ly some observers dubbed Put in ' s anti-terrorist stance a cynica l p l o y to increase his popu la r i t y w i t h the Russ ian electorate, the general consensus nowadays is that the pres ident genuine ly and passionately bel ieves that the p r ima ry threat fac ing Russ ia is terror ism. " H i s hypersens i t ive responses to Western med ia quest ion ing of Mos cow ' s conduct of the Chechen wa r po int to a s incerity of conv ic t ion and purpose that goes we l l beyond the cal l of po l i t i ca l p ragmat i sm" (Lo 2003, 84) , 2 9 Wr i t i n g i n 2000, Russ ia scholars Pave l Baev and Br ian D. Tay lo r argued that Put in ' s stance on mi l i ta ry re form was sincere, and that h is behav iour ind icated a deeper commi tment to re fo rm than either of his predecessors, Bor is Ye l ts in or M i k h a i l Gorbachev (Baev 2000, 5; Tay lo r 2000,4). Ev idence of this commi tment can be seen i n Put in ' s rev iva l of the conscr ipt ion debate early i n his pres idency as we l l as h is appo intment of a c iv i l i an , Sergei Ivanov, as Defence Min ister—replac ing Igor 2 9 Also see, Jones 2001. 56 Sergeev (Herspr ing 2003,170). 3 0 Overa l l , many respected experts—including Drn i t r i Tren in , Depu ty Director of the M o s c o w Carnegie Center, and Celeste Wa l lander , of the Center for Strategic and Internat ional Studies—have argued that Pu t i n had made a commi tment to establ ishing a construct ive re lat ionship w i t h the U S and the West, as we l l as profess iona l i z ing the mi l i tary , before the tragic events of 9/11 (Trenin 2002,1; Wa l l ander 2002,4). Some Ramif icat ions of 9/11 Th is d iscuss ion clearly demonstrates that the events of 9/11 d i d not affect a fundamenta l shift i n Pres ident Put in ' s way of th ink ing . They d i d , however , p rov ide a va luab le w i n d o w of oppor tun i ty that enabled h i m to entrench his Western or iented, ant i - terror ism po l i cy and deepen h is re lat ionship w i t h the Un i t ed States (Jackson 2002,10). A s many scholars have noted, he d i d not hesitate to take fu l l advantage of this oppor tun i ty . It is of great pract ical and symbo l i c s ignif icance that V l a d im i r Pu t i n was the first internat ional leader to offer condolences and support to Pres ident Bush i n the aftermath of the attacks (Kau fman 2001,1). Short ly thereafter, Pu t i n overrode oppos i t ion f r om both h is Defence M in i s te r and several senior mi l i ta ry off icials by dec lar ing that the U S cou ld have access to bases i n Uzbek is tan , Ky rgy z s t an and 3 0 According to Pavel Baev, this was a cynical ploy to increase Putin's control over the Armed Forces. He also states that Ivanov cannot really be considered a civilian given his recent retirement from the Foreign Intelligence Service (Baev 2001,1). 57 Taj ik istan i n order to facil itate its mi l i ta ry campa ign against Afghanis tan 's Ta l iban government (Jackson 2002,19; Wa r r en 2001). G i v e n the histor ica l , symbo l i c and geopol i t ica l s ignif icance of Cent ra l A s i a for Mos cow , it is not surpr i s ing that the major i ty of government and mi l i ta ry officials were opposed to an Amer i c an presence i n the area. Just days after the 9/11 attacks, both Defence M in i s te r Ivanov and H e a d of the Genera l Staff Genera l Ana to l y Kvashn in , stated that sympathy for the Amer i cans w o u l d not extend to mater ia l assistance i n Cent ra l A s i a (Warren 2001; Co l t on and M c F a u l 2001,47). N o t surpr is ing ly , the domest ic react ion to Pu t i n permi t t ing a U S presence i n Cent ra l A s i a was negative. A s one Russ ian general put it, " 'We are c lear ly not impressed w i t h the establ ishment of N A T O bases i n Centra l A s i a n states' " (General Kons tant in Trotsky, quoted i n Jackson 2002,19). Another non-mi l i ta ry off ic ial stated that " 'Russ ia and the entire former USSR is encirc led b y a r i ng of U S and N A T O mi l i ta ry intel l igence gather ing bases, just l ike 50 years ago ' " (Duma Cha i r Gennady Seleznov, quoted i n Jackson 2002,19-20). G i v en the strong and voca l resistance on the part of h is col leagues, Put in ' s decis ion to grant the U S access to the airbases i n quest ion speaks not on l y to h is considerable pol i t ica l power , but also to his determinat ion to use the 9/11 attacks as a means to forge better relat ions w i t h the West, i n part icu lar the US . A l t h ough grant ing Amer i c an access to Centra l A s i a n terr i tory was extremely signif icant, it was on ly one step among many that h in ted at Pres ident Put in ' s pragmat ica l ly pro-Western tendencies. A c co rd i ng to an October 2001 Financial Times 58 report, Pu t i n approached N A T O " for assistance i n restructur ing its defence min i s t ry and a rmed forces" (Dempsey 2001). Since September of 2001, Russ ia 's pres ident has also fostered intensi f ied cooperat ion between Russ ia and N A T O w i t h regard to combat ing ter ror ism and the pro l i ferat ion of weapons of mass destruct ion ( W M D ) ( N A T O " N A T O Today " 2002,23; K r au thammer 2002, A41) . Therefore, wh i l e the September 1 1 t h terrorist acts against Wash ing ton D.C. and N e w Yo r k d i d not foster a dramat ic change i n the Pu t i n admin is t rat ion 's fore ign po l i cy agenda, they d i d open up a w i n d o w of oppor tun i ty wh i c h Pres ident Pu t i n sk i l l fu l l y man ipu la ted i n order to further his Western or iented pol ic ies. A s journal ist and Russ ia expert Robert Ka iser summar izes: W i t h i n n ine months after September 11, Pu t i n took a series of steps that w o u l d have been unth inkab le just a short t ime earl ier. H e s igned up Russ ia for the U S wa r on terror ism, we l comed the establ ishment of U S bases i n once-Soviet Centra l A s i a , acquiesced to U S w i t hd r awa l f r om the Ant i -Ba l l i s t i c M iss i l e Treaty, accepted U S terms for a n ew treaty to reduce strategic arms and brought Russ ia into a new re lat ionship w i t h N A T O . In sum, he cast Russia 's lot w i t h the West. (Kaiser 2002, B I ) These moves are not over ly surpr i s ing w h e n one considers the overa l l d i rect ion of Russ ian fore ign po l i cy since Put in ' s accession to power . Put in 's behav iour , as both p r ime minister and president, has ind icated that he deems Russ ia to be a European (as opposed to an A s i a n or Eurasian) state. In a recent in terv iew he stated this belief quite b lunt ly: " In terms of its geography, history, culture, mental i ty, Russ ia is a European count ry . . . " (Frost 2003). In accordance w i t h this out look, Pu t i n ceased to v i ew the N o r t h At lant i c Treaty Organ i za t ion as an 59 adversary early i n his po l i t i ca l career. Therefore Put in 's desire to forge closer ties w i t h N A T O and the West after 9/11 d i d not s ignify a shift i n Russ ia 's fore ign po l i cy agenda. Rather, it made this stance more pub l i c l y acceptable. Russia 's w idespread sympathy for Amer i cans i n the wake of the attacks has comb ined w i t h a sense of unders tand ing borne of its o w n first h and experience w i t h terror ism. In turn, this has created a more favourable domest ic c l imate for Put in ' s government to pu sh for a better re lat ionship w i t h both Europe and the Un i t ed States. 3 1 Recent surveys indicate that the major i ty of Russ ians have overcome the mental i ty of the C o l d W a r years and are capable of v i ew i ng o l d enemies as potent ia l n ew all ies. A c co rd i ng to the results of a pub l i c op in ion po l l carr ied out i n October 2001,58% of the popu la t i on suppor t strengthening ties w i t h N A T O . 3 2 W e can deduce f r om this that "even Russ ian pub l i c op in i on is abandon ing its percept ion of N A T O as an enemy and is beg inn ing to see it as a possible a l ly for the protect ion of Russ ian secur i ty" (Jackson 2002,26). 3 3 3 1 Sympathy for Americans in the immediate aftermath of the attacks took many forms; countless Russians brought flowers and other offerings to the American embassy in Moscow to demonstrate their compassion for the victims of the attacks. Nevertheless, informal Internet surveys show that many Russians believe that, to a certain extent, the attacks were 'America's fault' in that they were provoked by the US's "aggressive" foreign policy (Kochkin 2002). Russia expert Eduard Ponarin, who has done extensive research on this issue of anti-Americanism in Russia writes that with the exceptions of the 1999 Kosovo campaign and the most recent Olympics, polls indicate that "anti-American sentiment in Russia is surprisingly limited" (Ponarin 2002,1). He goes on to explain that anti-Americanism is more embedded and virulent among the country's elite. For more on this issue, see Ponarin, 2002. 3 2 18% of respondents were opposed to such measures; 24% remained undecided. See Jackson 2002, 26 for more on this survey. These numbers are particularly impressive when one considers that just two years previously, in the wake of NATO's Kosovo campaign, 63% of Russian respondents viewed NATO as a direct threat to Russian national security (Duleba 2002,160). 3 3 One reason behind this positive change in perception is the work that NATO is doing on the ground in Russia. A prime example of this is the Russia Centre for the Retraining of discharged Military Personnel, established in June 2002. The program, now active in St. Petersburg, Yarosavl, 60 In tandem to Put in 's rea l izat ion that N A T O no longer poses a threat to h is country is recogni t ion of what actual ly does pose a threat. The Pres ident has deemed terror ism to be the greatest threat Russ ian nat iona l security throughout h is years i n office. A s Russ ia expert K imbe r l y Ma r t en Z i s k succinct ly expla ins " i t is not aggression b y stable, economica l ly comfortable states that Russ ia needs to fear today.. . . Instead Russ ia needs to fear aggression by unconvent iona l means f r om those w h o w i s h to undermine Russ ian contro l i n its geographic and ethnic per ipher ies" (Mar ten Z i sk 2000,4). In the post-9/11 security env i ronment , President Pu t i n understands that Russ ia and the Un i t ed States face the same p r ima r y threat. A c co rd i ng l y he understands the va lue and even the necessity of Russ ia 's part ic ipat ion i n Amer i ca ' s W a r on Terror (Herspr ing 2003,171). Howeve r , Russia 's m i l i t a ry persists i n v i ew i ng Russ ia 's secur i ty concerns th rough an outdated lens—despite the fact that Russia 's most powe r fu l po l i t i ca l leaders have recognized the contemporary threat to Russ ian security, despite the fact that the C o l d W a r ended over a decade ago, and despite the fact that Russ ia has been the v i c t im of numerous terrorist attacks over the past four years. The mi l i ta ry bureaucracy cont inues to v i ew N A T O and N A T O expans ion as a threat and, accordingly, is sta lwart ly opposed to a l l talks of Russia 's increas ing cooperat ive Chita, Perm and Kaliningrad, is designed to help the nearly half million discharged Russian soldiers adapt to civilian life and find new types of work. It is also assisting Russia in converting former military sites to civilian uses. Not only is this program helping to alter Russians' perceptions of NATO but it should also mitigate the political backlash from reducing the size of the Armed Forces. For more on this program, see NATO 2002 "Civilians"; NATO 2003 "Discharged"). 61 programs w i t h N A T O , let a lone Russ ia 's potent ia l eventual membersh ip i n the A l l i ance: M a n y members of Russia 's mi l i ta ry elite object to Russia 's fu l l entry into NATO . . . [ i t ] w o u l d str ip Russ ia of its independence and relat ive f reedom of maneuver . A s first Depu ty Ch ie f of A r m e d Forces Genera l Y u r y Ba luyevsky expla ins " A s a mi l i ta ry person I see w i thou t a doubt that there is no need for Russ ia to jo in N A T O mi l i ta ry structures.. .all p rev ious R u s s i a - N A T O relations were a waste of t ime". (Jackson 2002, 35) M i l i t a r y off icials also persist i n us ing this m i sgu ided threat percept ion to argue that Russ ia has cont inued need for a vast conscr ipt force and a large arsenal of nuc lear weapons. "The Russ ian mi l i ta ry ' s approach to N A T O cont inues to prevent a major restructur ing away f r om the C o l d W a r preparat ions for wa r w i t h N A T O towa rd a modern , more capable mi l i ta ry that can cope w i t h instabi l i ty and terror ism i n Eu ras i a " (Wal lander 2001,1). To va r y i ng degrees, the president, academics, and cit izens agree that the internat ional system and the security env i ronment have changed since the days of the C o l d War . The events of 9/11 he lped facil itate this acceptance and unders tand ing. Ironical ly, the mi l i ta ry is one of the few rema in ing bodies that has yet to overcome the C o l d W a r menta l i ty and recognize that re l ig ious and separatist terror ism, not N A T O , poses the real contemporary threat to Russia 's nat iona l security. The Rome Summi t , the N A T O Russ ia Counc i l and the Ant i c l imact i c Prague R o u n d 62 Despite the mi l i ta ry ' s persistent d is l ike and fear of N A T O i n general and N A T O enlargement specif ical ly, Pres ident Pu t i n has been able to orchestrate a ' new and imp r o v ed ' re lat ionship w i t h the At lant i c A l l i ance. Th is was made clear at the Rome Summit , w h i c h was organ ized for M a y 2002,6 months before the A l l i ance p lanned to issue inv i tat ions to prospect ive N A T O members. The summi t was o rgan i zed par t ly as a result of Put in 's post-9/11 rapprochement w i t h Pres ident Bush and the US , and par t ly as a w a y of mi t igat ing Russia 's negat ive react ion to N A T O ' s second r ound of enlargement. The Rome Summi t was par t i cu lar ly signif icant for the N A T O - R u s s i a re lat ionship as it not on ly cod i f ied certain cooperat ive measures wh i c h have been taken since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but also because it created the N A T O - R u s s i a Counc i l (NRC ) ( N A T O " N A T O Today " 2002, 20). The Rome declarat ion, the document establ ishing the N R C , was s igned on 28 M a y 2002 at Pract ica d i M a r e A i r Base i n Italy (Ma rkush in and Sumbaev 2002,1). The N A T O - R u s s i a Counc i l was des igned to replace the Permanent Joint Counc i l (PJC) (1997-2002) and differs f r om its predecessor i n one fundamenta l l y important way: it is an executive, not a consultat ive body and, as such, w i l l operate on the pr inc ip le of consensus ( N A T O 2002 " N A T O - R u s s i a Relat ions: A N e w Qua l i t y " 1). Th is means that "[f]or the first t ime Russ ia w i l l have an oppor tun i ty to part ic ipate on equal terms i n deve lop ing and imp lement ing col lect ive dec is ions. . ." (Markush in and Sumbaev 2002,1). The PJC was essential ly a f o r um for N A T O officials to i n fo rm Russ ia of predetermined 63 A l l i ance pol ic ies; the N R C is a f o r um where N A T O and Russ ia w i l l deve lop, at least some, pol ic ies together. The Rome Document delineates several areas where Russ ia and N A T O can cooperate w i t h i n the f ramework of the N R C inc lud ing: the f ight against terror ism, combat ing pro l i ferat ion of W M D , arms contro l issues and search and rescue at sea. 3 4 Moreover , the Rome Declarat ion 's ment ion that the N R C w o u l d "explore the poss ib i l i ty of establ ishing an integrated N A T O - R u s s i a mi l i ta ry t ra in ing center for miss ions to address the chal lenges of the 21st century" was another s ignif icant first for the N A T O - R u s s i a re lat ionship ( N A T O 2002 " N A T O - R u s s i a Relat ions: A N e w Qua l i t y " 3). Th is was the first off ic ial announcement that Russ ian and N A T O troops might wo r k together i n a permanent, rather than mission-specif ic, sett ing. Wh i l e the mi l i ta ry bureaucracy may not have been over ly p leased w i t h the establ ishment of the N A T O - R u s s i a Counc i l and the poss ib i l i ty of a closer re lat ionship w i t h the A l l i ance , Russia 's government wa rm l y we l comed the in i t iat ive, stat ing that it s igni f ied a new era i n N A T O - R u s s i a relations. Pres ident Pu t i n also used the s ign ing of the Rome Dec larat ion to further emphas ize his bel ief that Russ ia cou ld not combat ter ror ism w i thout internat ional support: The dec is ion to t ransform relat ions between Russ ia and N A T O into a new qual i ty partnersh ip is correctly perce ived by mi l l i ons of Russians. The start ing po int here is a clear unders tand ing that neither nuclear miss i le capabi l i ty nor C o l d Wa r obl igat ions can be a panacea for contemporary threats. (V lad im i r Pu t in , quoted i n M a r k u s h i n and Sumbaev 2002,1) 3 4 See NATO document entitled "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" for more details on these and other areas where NATO and Russia have outlined cooperative initiatives. 64 A key reason for the establ ishment of the N A T O - R u s s i a Counc i l was the cont inuat ion of the ' dua l track' approach to N A T O enlargement. Th is approach, advocated by B i l l C l i n ton , ca l led for expand ing N A T O eastward wh i l e s imul taneous ly augment ing Russ ia 's ro le w i t h i n the A l l i ance i n order to avo id aggravat ing this important and potent ia l ly dangerous count ry . 3 5 The dua l track approach w o r k e d quite we l l du r i ng the first r ound of expans ion and extremely we l l du r i ng the second. Experts w r i t i ng as recently as 2001 pred icted a serious rift i n relat ions between Russ ia and N A T O du r i ng the second r ound of expans ion, especial ly if any one, let alone a l l three, of the Balt ic states—Latvia, L i thuan ia and Estonia— were inv i ted to jo in the At lant i c A l l i ance (Larrabee 2001; Du leba 2002,150-164). A journal ist for The Economist explains, "[a] few years ago, the Baits were w i de l y thought imposs ib le to w r a p into N A T O ; the Russ ians w o u l d have been too angry for the West to dare ment ion the i dea " (The Economist "Nastase Shock" 2002). Yet, i n Novembe r 2002 at the N A T O summi t i n Prague seven new countr ies , 3 6 i n c l ud ing the three Balt ic states, were inv i ted to become fu l l N A T O members and the response f r om the Russ ian government was bare ly audib le. A s one expert states, i n contrast w i t h the M a d r i d Round , this r ound "appears almost ant ic l imact ic" (Trenin 2002,1). Or , i n the wo rd s of another Russ ia expert and journal ist, "[t]he fact 3 5 See Asmus, 2002. 3 6 Invitations were issued to Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia as well as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 65 that [ N A T O ' s second r ound of expansion] has el ic i ted notrt ing but yawns is a measure.. .of h o w rad ica l ly the w o r l d has changed" (K rauthammer 2002, A41) . The si lence on Russ ia 's part does not mean that there is no longer any oppos i t ion to N A T O enlargement: on the contrary "[t]he bu l k of Russ ia 's po l i t i ca l establ ishment, par t i cu lar ly the fore ign, defence and security cornmunit ies, st i l l resent what some refer to as N A T O ' s 'eastern march ' because it eats away at their self-esteem and the t rad i t iona l no t ion of Russ ia as a great p o w e r " (Trenin 2002,1). Nevertheless, f r om the establ ishment of the N A T O - R u s s i a Counc i l to the i ssu ing of membersh ip inv i tat ions, Pres ident Pu t i n has been successful i n quash ing voca l domest ic oppos i t ion to N A T O expans ion as part of h is pragmat ic Western or iented fore ign po l i cy (Jackson 2002, 36; T ren in 2002, 2). The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that Pres ident Pu t i n has been able to effect s ignif icant and pos i t ive changes i n Russ ia 's re lat ionship w i t h the West and N A T O at the internat ional po l i t i ca l leve l . The creat ion of the N R C as we l l as the concrete, cooperat ive steps taken i n the aftermath of 9/11 substantiate the Pu t i n admin is t rat ion 's pragmat ic pro-Western fore ign po l i cy agenda. Put in ' s successes at this leve l are due, i n large part, to a dec ided lack of oppos i t ion; Western governmenta l officials, N A T O bureaucrats and Put in ' s inner circle a l l suppor t deepening the ties between Russ ia and the A l l i ance. O n the home front, however , Pu t i n has received less support , and oppos i t ion to his Western-centr ic pol ic ies is 66 ongo ing. Nonetheless, he has attempted to imp lement mi l i ta ry re form. The next sections of this chapter w i l l examine and evaluate Put in ' s success i n this regard. The Consc r ip t ion Debate A s this thesis has argued, overcoming the C o l d W a r no t ion that N A T O represents the 'threat f r om the West ' is a prerequis i te to the modern i za t i on of Russ ian 's a rmed forces. A s l ong as N A T O is cons idered a threat to Russ ian nat ional security, the mi l i ta ry w i l l have leverage i n a rgu ing that the count ry requires a vast conscr ipt force as we l l as a huge arsenal of nuc lear weapons. N A T O is, of course, not the on l y reason w h y Russia 's generals are opposed to the profess ional izat ion and st reaml in ing of the A r m e d Forces. M i l i t a r y off icials have a vested interest i n ma inta in ing the status quo for many reasons, such as ensur ing f und i ng and ma in ta in ing a system i n wh i c h Russ ia 's m i l i t a ry bureaucrats are important and power fu l (Jack 2002). Wh i l e conv inc ing Russia 's generals that N A T O has changed and no longer poses a threat to their country w o u l d e l iminate a major roadb lock on the w a y to establ ishing a profess ional , effective Russ ian mi l i tary , it is h i gh l y doubt fu l that this is possible. Th is fact ion of Russ ian society, more than any other, was shaped and even created by the C o l d War ; the men i n quest ion l i ved and breathed a wo r l d v i ew i n wh i c h N A T O was the mi l i ta ry manifestat ion of the enemy. It is, therefore, no wonde r they f ind it d i f f icu l t to bel ieve that the A l l i ance has changed its stripes. A s 67 the mi l i ta ry is un l i ke l y to come a round to Put in ' s w a y of t h i nk i ng regard ing security issues, the on ly w a y he w i l l be able to effect m i l i t a ry re fo rm is to force it. W i t h i n the mi l i ta ry re form debate, conscr ipt ion is the arguab ly the most important and contentious issue for Pu t i n and h is genera ls . 3 7 E l im ina t i ng conscr ipt ion is p r ima ry and fundamenta l to the reformat ion process. It is also an act ion that the vast major i ty of the mi l i ta ry bureaucracy v igo rous l y opposes. Th is section w i l l evaluate the progress that Pres ident Pu t i n and Defence M in i s te r Ivanov have made i n atta in ing their stated goal of profess iona l i z ing the Russ ian A r m e d Forces, against the w i l l of the mi l i ta ry establ ishment. Un l i k e most po l i t i ca l issues, the ment ion of conscr ipt ion elicits a passionate response f r om the average Russ ian c i t izen (Gerber and Mende l s on 2003,1 & 3). One reason for this is the number of peop le it d irect ly affects; approx imate ly 400,000 male Russians between the ages of 18 and 27 are drafted each year to serve i n the regular army, the M in i s t r y of Internal A f fa i r s forces, border troops, and other branches of Russia 's A r m e d Forces ( H u m a n Rights Wa t ch 2002,4). Howeve r , they represent on ly a fract ion of what authorit ies are legal ly ent i t led to 'recruit ' . In fact, accord ing to one source on ly 11% of those el ig ib le actual ly serve (Agence France Presse 2002). M a n y Russ ians of conscr ipt age avo id mi l i ta ry service by attending an inst itute of higher educat ion, pay i ng a bribe, a n d / o r ( legit imately or i l leg i t imately) obta in ing documentat ion i n order to receive med ica l exempt ion. A n increas ing number of 3 7 Due to the real and symbolic importance of this issue as well as the time and space constraints of this paper, the only aspect of military reform to be examined in detail here will be that of conscription. For a general assessment of other areas of change within the Russian military see chapter 1, Overview of the Russian Military: World Power to World Problem. 68 y oung men are learn ing these and other methods to dodge the draft t h rough seminars organ ized and taught b y pr ivate, grass roots organizat ions such as Sold ier 's Mothers of St. Petersburg, Commit tees of Soldiers Mothers of Russ ia and other l i ke m i nded groups dedicated to keep ing Russ ian youths out of the m i l i t a ry . 3 8 The vast number of youths w h o do almost any th ing to avo id mi l i ta ry service is an ind icat ion of h o w l itt le faith Russians have i n their defence establ ishment. A c co rd i ng to a 2003 survey, on ly half of Russ ia 's popu la t i on feels a degree of conf idence i n their army; approx imate ly 40% have l itt le to no conf idence i n the army; and approx imate ly 10% are undec ided (Gerber and Mende l s on 2003, 2-3). The same survey revealed that support for draft dodgers is unusua l l y h igh ; near ly half - 41% - of the respondents expressed some degree of sympathy towards y oung men w h o avo id conscr ipt ion; 19% indicated that they have ' no ' sympathy , 27% indicated that they have 'probab ly no ' sympathy and 13% remained undec ided (Gerber and Mende l son 2003,4). The increasing number of draft dodgers i n Russ ia has had at least two serious and negat ive ramif icat ions for the mi l i tary . F irst ly, g iven that intel l igent Russ ians can avo i d service th rough educat ion and wea l thy Russ ians can avo id it th rough br ibery, the major i ty of conscripts must be recrui ted f r om the lowest echelons of society, part icu lar ly convicted cr imina ls (Herspr ing 2003,160). N o t surpr i s ing ly , this has caused cr ime to increase, and d rug and a lcohol abuse among serv icemen has skyrocketed. 3 8 For more on this organization and its methods, see Bogoslovskaya, Polyakova and Vilenskaya, 2001. 69 Secondly, mi l i ta ry officials are becoming desperate to ' recrui t ' n ew conscripts. Th is has resulted i n a procedure termed 'conscr ipt ion th rough detent ion ' b y H u m a n Rights Watch ( H R W ) . H R W and Sold ier 's Mothers of St. Petersburg have reported numerous accounts of h o w young men have been l i teral ly k i dnapped by authorit ies and taken to a mi l i ta ry base where are forced to carry out their mi l i ta ry service w i thou t the opt ion or oppor tun i ty to i n f o rm their famil ies of their s i tuat ion, let a lone pack their be longings and say goodbye ( H u m a n Rights Wa t ch 2002,1-12 & 14; Bogos lovskaya, Po l yakova and V i l enskaya 2001,179 & 189). Th is has even happened to y o u n g men w h o have legit imate med ica l condi t ions that exempt them f r om service (Jack 2002). For those youths w h o either chose or are forced to serve i n the mi l i ta ry , it is a horr ib le ordeal . Barracks v io lence and dedovshina (hazing) rates have increased dramat ica l ly over the past decade. H u m a n r ights groups have col lected the test imonies of thousands of y oung men w h o have r un away f r om their m i l i ta ry base i n order to escape bruta l beatings and rapes at the hands of their senior officers (Bogoslovskaya, Po l yakova and V i l enskaya 2001,180-185). Thousands more, unable to escape, have commi t ted suic ide as a direct result of dedovshina (Herspr ing 2003, 161). For a l l these reasons, pub l i c suppor t for the profess ional izat ion of the mi l i ta ry has become w idesp read and strong. A c co rd i ng to the above ment ioned 2003 survey, "v i r tua l l y no one suppor ted the status quo " w h e n asked their op in i on i n regard to the general s tand ing of the mi l i ta ry (Gerber and Mende l son 2003, 2). W i t h specif ic regard to the conscr ipt ion debate, 60% of the Russ ian popu lace supports the 70 convers ion of the mi l i ta ry to a contract based system wh i l e on l y 30% advocate ma in ta in ing the current system (10% rema ined undec ided) (Gerber and Mende l s on 2003,4). In keep ing w i t h pub l i c sent iment and their o w n p la t form, Pres ident Pu t i n and Defence M ins te r Sergei Ivanov have fo rma l i zed p lans to gradua l l y abol ish conscr ipt ion. In Novembe r 2001, Ivanov pub l i c l y announced that the 76 t h A i r bo rne D i v i s i on w o u l d beg in the profess ional izat ion process i n 2002. Th is sma l l scale exper iment was des igned to assist bureaucrats estimate costs and prepare for a more w idespread profess ional izat ion p rog ram set to beg in i n 2004 and end i n 2008 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85-86; H u m a n R ights Wa t ch 2002, 5). In President Put in ' s 2003 State of the U n i o n Address , he declared that the Russ ian mi l i tary , the G r o u n d Forces, the A i rbo rne Troops and the marines, w o u l d become profess ional b y the end of 2008 ("State of the N a t i o n " 2003). Th is statement was corroborated b y Defence M in i s te r Sergei Ivanov the fo l l ow ing day, w h o stated that " i t is utter ly realistic to suppose this p rog ramme [of professional izaton] can be imp lemented by the end of 2008" (Brit ish Broadcast ing C o m p a n y 2003). M i l i t a r y off icials have pub l i c l y expressed their discontent w i t h this p lan . A t an October 2001 conference i n Mos cow , Genera l Ana to l y K u l i k o v stated that conscr ipt ion shou ld not be abandoned, and that the Russ ian a rmy shou ld be kept at 1.3 m i l l i on men (Pravda 2001). Soon after Put in ' s State of the U n i o n Address , Mar sha l l V l a d im i r M i k h a l k i n , adv isor to the Russ ian Defence M in i s te r , stated at an a rmy ra l ly that the Russ ian A r m y w o u l d never become fu l l y profess ional . The 71 Ma r sha l l sa id that "we don ' t need it and our economy w i l l not a l l ow us to do i t " (Rosbalt 2003). Despite mi l i ta ry off ic ia ls ' oppos i t ion to profess ional izat ion, the 76 t h A i r bo rne D i v i s i on has a l ready completed the process i n fu l l , and p lans are progress ing for more uni ts to h i re soldiers o n a contract basis beg inn ing next year (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 83-85). In fact, the Pu t i n admin is t ra t ion has in t roduced a $2.8 b i l l i on , four-year re fo rm p lan , wh i c h a ims to increase the number of profess ional soldiers so that they compr ise hal f the total number of troops b y 2008. Further to this, a new ru l i ng reduces the dura t ion of current conscr ipt terms to one year; new conscripts w i l l also serve one year, up unt i l 2008, w h e n the ru l i ng w i l l be rev iewed (Agence France Presse 2003). A l t h ough abo l i sh ing conscr ipt ion has been on the government 's agenda since the ear ly 1990s, it is on ly recent l y—and part i cu lar ly since 9/11— that Russia 's po l i t i ca l off icials have been able to move fo rward i n this regard. That does not mean, however , that the battle has been won ; profess iona l i z ing Russ ia 's A r m e d Forces w i l l be a s l ow and di f f icul t process. Howeve r , un l i ke h is predecessors w h o mere ly ta lked about the issue, Pu t i n has taken some real steps on the road to a professional Russ ian mi l i tary , du r i ng his t ime i n office. Wha t does this M e a n for the Future of M i l i t a r y Reform? The events of 9/11 d i d not change the beliefs of Russia 's po l i t i ca l or mi l i ta ry elite. President Pu t i n favoured the West both before and after the attacks. Russia 's 72 mi l i ta ry establ ishment feared and d i s l i ked N A T O before that event and cont inues to do so today. Thus, Pu t i n and his close adv isors are locked i n a battle w i t h Russ ia 's mi l i ta ry officials over the nature of the threat that Russ ia current ly faces as we l l as what f o rm and structure the A r m e d Forces shou ld take. The terrorist attacks on the Un i t ed States enabled Pu t i n to "hammer home the message that the C o l d W a r is over and that both the Un i t ed States and Russ ia n o w face a c ommon enemy, regardless of wha t the generals may th ink " (Herspr ing 2003,171). There is no doubt that Pu t i n has al ienated many members of Russ ia 's mi l i ta ry bureaucracy b y pu r su ing h is Western or iented agenda, w h i c h has resul ted in , among other things, a potent ia l ly long-term U S presence i n Cent ra l A s i a and the c los ing of Russ ian bases i n C u b a and V ie t N a m (Ol iker and Char l i ck-Pa ley 2002, 62). The quest ion that remains to be def in i t ive ly answered is whether or not this matters. C a n Pu t i n achieve mi l i ta ry re fo rm w i thout the suppor t of the mi l i ta ry bureaucracy? H o w deep does the mi l i tary 's oppos i t ion to a R u s s i a - N A T O al l iance run? The mi l i tary 's h istor ical and recent behav iour bo th indicate that it w i l l suffer i n relat ive silence. M i l i t a r y officials w i l l most l i ke ly cont inue to comp la in about N A T O expans ion as we l l as fundamenta l m i l i ta ry reform; however , there are ind icat ions that Pu t i n w i l l w i n this impor tant battle. F irst ly, the wake of 9/11, the tak ing of hostages at a M o s c o w theatre, and the rock concert bombings, have caused the major i ty of Russ ians to feel a certain degree of k insh ip w i t h the Amer i c an people, at least as v i c t ims of terror ism. A s the general Russ ian populace begins to v i ew the West and N A T O as an al ly rather than an 73 adversary, the mi l i ta ry w i l l f i nd it harder to convince the pub l i c and government off icials that Russ ia needs to ma inta in a Co l d -Wa r style mi l i ta ry i n order to defend itself f r om the Wes t . 3 9 Secondly, the ' o ld gua rd ' of the Soviet U n i o n is apt ly named: they are ag ing and many w i l l soon retire. The y oung officers w h o replace them w i l l not have been subjected to the same level of indoctr inat ion as their C o l d W a r predecessors. Therefore, mi l i ta ry percept ion of threat is l i ke ly to change. Th i rd l y , the mi l i t a ry has a h is tory of ' do ing what it 's t o l d ' i n Russ ia; this organ izat ion has consistently fo l l owed the po l i t i ca l leadership of the country rather than determined it (Herspr ing 2003,172; Barany 2001). F ina l ly , as p rev ious ly discussed, the major i ty of the Russ ian popu lace is aware of the serious prob lems i n their defence inst i tut ions, and supports fundamenta l m i l i ta ry reform. This, comb ined w i t h Put in ' s popu la r i t y and the n ew internat ional security env i ronment, shou ld p rov ide a suff icient foundat ion for the st reaml in ing and profess ional izat ion of Russia 's A r m e d Forces. P r ov i d i ng that Pu t i n takes fu l l advantage of the s i tuat ion, he shou ld be capable of forc ing l ong overdue mi l i ta ry reform, despite oppos i t ion on the part of the mi l i ta ry bureaucracy. Moreover , if Pu t i n manages his c i t izens' chang ing sentiments regard ing N A T O effectively, he may be able to d r aw u p o n the vast experience of this organizat ion, wh i c h cou ld he lp speed up the process of mi l i ta ry reform; "If Russ ia 's po l i t ica l leadership is ser ious about wo r k i n g w i t h N A T O to modern i ze its mi l i ta ry , N A T O cou ld become a f o rum not on ly for security cooperat ion against terrors but 3 9 See survey cited in Jackson, 2002; the same survey is referenced here (p. 57). 74 for he lp ing Russ ia to shed one of the rema in ing vestiges of the Soviet past" (Wal lander 2001, 2). Ove r the past three years, V l a d im i r Pu t i n has p roven h imse l f to be a sk i l l fu l po l i t i c ian, capable of ma in ta in ing a strong grasp on power and ga in ing t remendous suppor t f r om the Russ ian people, wh i l e strengthening economic and mi l i ta ry ties between Russ ia and the West. W i t h 9/11 hav ing p roven to be a power fu l catalyst for change, Pu t i n may f ina l ly be able to lead the desperately needed and l ong overdue reformat ion of the Russ ian A r m e d Forces. Throughout Yel ts in 's pres idency, N A T O was perce ived to threaten Russ ian nat iona l security. N o w , over a decade after the C o l d W a r has ended, Russ ians ' threat percept ions are f ina l ly beg inn ing to change. Terror ist attacks on Russ ian soi l , as we l l as the in famous attacks of 11 September, 2001, have he lped to convince average Russ ians and certain members of the pol i t ica l elite that the security env i ronment has undergone a fundamenta l t ransformat ion. In this n ew env i ronment, the West (i.e.: N A T O ) is no longer the enemy, but rather a potent ia l al ly; N A T O ' s member countr ies are fac ing the same threat as Russ ia . A s pub l i c and po l i t i ca l threat percept ions cont inue to shift, and terror ism becomes the focus of Russ ian nat ional security, the need to re form Russia 's mi l i ta ry w i l l become more apparent as neither a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, nor a b loated, d i sp i r i ted conscr ipt a rmy, can effectively combat terror ism. Therefore, the Russ ian government must recreate the mi l i ta ry into a smaller, better-equipped, 75 profess iona l i zed force. Put in ' s government has made a pub l i c commi tment to construct ing a profess ional and effective mi l i tary . M o r e s ignif icant ly, it has taken concrete steps to b r i ng this about. Wh i l e the road ahead is l ong and diff icult , Russ ia 's c iv i l ians and soldiers can take heart i n the know ledge that the journey has begun. 76 C H A P T E R IV C O N C L U S I O N Assess ing the impact that N A T O expans ion has had on the Russ ian mi l i ta ry is an important yet daunt ing task. Th is mi l i ta ry inst i tut ion is i n a sorry state and the s i tuat ion has been gett ing worse, not better, for the past decade. M a n y internal factors are responsib le for this s i tuat ion, i n c l ud ing the Russia 's in famous ly vast, ove rwhe lm ing and ineffective bureaucracy and the wel l - reported lack of f und ing al located to the A r m e d Forces. Th is thesis has acknowledged these factors but argued that the process of N A T O expans ion also p l ayed a role i n s tymie ing mi l i ta ry re form. It has also examined the contemporary, post 9/11, security env i ronment and assessed the l i ke l i hood of effective mi l i ta ry re fo rm i n the foreseeable future. Th is brief conc lud ing chapter w i l l assess the theoretical impl icat ions of the conclus ions d r a w n throughout the thesis, as we l l as summar i ze its key arguments. Theoret ical Impl icat ions The l iberal pa r ad i gm w i t h i n internat ional relat ions is comparat ive ly opt imist ic regard ing the abi l i ty of inst i tut ions to inf luence state behav iour and foster peace (Keohane 1993; Keohane and N y e 1993; Snyder 1991). The construct iv ist school of thought argues that IR scholars must take domest ic cu l tura l no rms into account if they are to deve lop sophist icated analyses regard ing contemporary and 77 future relat ions among nat ions (Johnston 1995; Jepperson, Wend t and Katzenste in 1996). The conclus ions reached i n this thesis have impl i cat ions for both these schools of thought. L ibe ra l i sm has many veins or strands, but adherents of this pa rad i gm share certain fundamenta l premises. A c c o r d i ng to l ibera l scholars, " internat ional relat ions are gradua l l y be ing t ransformed such that they promote greater h uman f reedom by establ ishing condi t ions of peace, prosper i ty and justice. Th is att i tude t owa rd progress reflects a general l iberal stance..." (Zacher and Ma t t hew 1995,109). Ano the r fundamenta l premise, present i n a l l strands but p redominant i n neo-l iberal inst i tut iona l i sm and repub l i can l ibera l i sm, is that inst i tut ions can constra in state behav iour and foster peace. Thus, i n the immed ia te aftermath of the end of the C o l d War , Jack Snyder argued that: W h e n inst i tut ions are strong, there is order; the effects of anarchy are mit igated. W h e n inst i tut ions are weak, there is d isorder; pol i t ics are ma rked by the perverse effects of anarchy. Thus, f r om this perspect ive, the p rob l em of creat ing a n ew European security order to supp lant that of the b ipo lar stalemate is above al l a p rob l em of bu i l d i ng inst i tut ions. (Snyder 1991,114-115) A c co rd i ng to l ibera l theorists, the democracy p romot i on regime—of wh i c h N A T O is a key part—has p roved capable of increas ing state-to-state cooperat ion and foster ing peace th rough the p romot i on of its (democratic) values. N A T O ' s expans ion into former communis t , author i tar ian countr ies is often cited as exempl i f y ing the powe r of this inst i tut ion to alter state behav iour and make 78 progress, i n terms of increased peace and prosper i ty , poss ib le (Wal lander 2000, 720-724; N A T O " N A T O T o d a y " 2002,14 & 17). N A T O ' s wo r k i n assist ing the democrat ic deve lopment of new member states and countr ies aff i l iated w i t h it t h rough its Partnersh ip for Peace p rog ram is signif icant, and shou ld not be downp l ayed . Nonetheless, the in fo rmat ion presented i n this thesis indicates that l iberals w o u l d be negl igent to ignore domest ic cu l tura l norms as discussed b y construct iy ists. The w o r k here indicates that unders tand ing a country 's domest ic norms, w o u l d he lp i n unders tand ing its leve l of receptiveness to new ideas and procedures. Eastern Eu ropean states have w i l l i ng l y , even enthusiast ical ly, imp lemented the reforms requ i red b y N A T O i n order to become members. Howeve r , Russ ian leaders, especial ly w i t h i n the mi l i ta ry , have p r oved extremely resistant to accept ing N A T O ' s overtures. A detai led comparat ive analysis of this issue is too complex and convo luted to attempt w i t h i n the scope of this thesis; nonetheless, w e can deduce w i t h relat ive conf idence that Russ ian resistance to N A T O ' s expans ion and p romot i on of democrat ic no rms has been due i n large part to Russia 's un ique domest ic no rms and strategic cu l ture . 4 0 It w o u l d be an understatement to say that the evo lu t ion and deve lopment of Russia 's strategic cul ture has been turbulent. A nat ion forged i n the crucible of destruct ive and b loody confl ict is b ound to have different att itudes towards wa r and 4 0 For our purposes, strategic culture is: "a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture" (Macmillian, Booth and Trood 1999, 8). 79 peace than a country forged i n peaceful negotiat ions. The M o n g o l invas ion of the 13 t h century, the Napo leon i c invas ion of the 19 t h century, a revo lut ion, two devastat ingly b l oody W o r l d Wars , a f i f ty-year- long C o l d War , the Soviet misadventure i n A fghan i s tan and two horr i f i c wars i n Chechnya have, to a large degree, shaped and created Russ ia 's ident i ty and mi l i ta ry doctr ines. Moreover , this h istory has created and fostered nat ional parano ia and insecur i ty. W h e n this is v i ewed i n combinat ion w i t h the humi l i a t i on that Russ ia exper ienced w h e n it lost its Great Powe r status just a l itt le more than a decade ago, it becomes easier to understand w h y Soviet and immed ia te post-Soviet security po l i cy was based on t rad i t iona l quest ions of terr i tor ia l protect ion, sovere ignty and balance of powe r pol i t ics (Blank 2001,53-59). Since the end of the C o l d War , Russ ia 's secur i ty cul ture has been i n f lux. Af ter centuries of fear ing terr i tor ia l conquest, and decades of fear ing an attack f r om the West, it is understandable that Russ ian mi l i ta ry off icials w o u l d be resistant to the idea that threats to Russia 's nat iona l security have undergone a fundamenta l change and that n o w the A r m e d Forces must adapt, restructure and reform. Th is also aids our unders tand ing of the mi l i ta ry establ ishment's reticence regard ing the abol i t ion of conscr ipt ion. N o t on ly has this been the on l y system Russ ian 's generals have k nown , unt i l recently, it was an effective w a y of defend ing and deterr ing a large scale, state-based attack. On l y w i t h t ime and effective po l i t i ca l leadership, w i l l Russ ia 's strategic cul ture evo lve to a po int where it is i n tune w i t h the contemporary security env i ronment. 80 For a l l these reasons, N A T O has been unsuccessfu l i n conv inc ing the Russ ian mi l i ta ry that it is no longer an enemy, but a potent ia l a l ly. In fact, the po l i cy of enlargement, adopted by the A l l i ance i n the mid-1990s, actual ly perpetuated the not ion that N A T O posed a threat to Russ ian nat ional security. A t least i n part because of its turbu lent history, the mi l i ta ry establ ishment was loath to bel ieve that the goal of the A l l i ance i n its eastward march was to b r i ng peace and increased stabi l i ty to Eastern Europe. Th is w o u l d indicate that the construct iv ist approach to internat ional relat ions—with its focus on unders tand ing domest ic cu l ture and norms—can advance our unders tand ing of certain phenomena, such as the Russ ian mi l i tary 's persistent resistance to N A T O i n general and N A T O enlargement i n part icular. A D isc la imer and a Summat i on Wh i l e I have a imed to d r aw ins ight fu l , accurate and usefu l conclus ions f r om m y research into this topic, there is m u c h more wo r k to be done if the ideas presented here are to be g iven fu l l justice and credence. For example, it w o u l d be extremely va luab le to have the means and oppor tun i ty to conduct a survey w i t h i n the Russ ian mi l i t a ry i n order to de lve more deeply into their oppos i t ion to N A T O enlargement and profess ional izat ion of the A r m e d Forces. Further, it w o u l d be va luable to categorize the f ind ings of such a survey into demograph ic and rank groupings. Th is w o u l d help us unders tand h o w deeply rooted a n t i - N A T O sentiments are w i t h i n the mi l i tary , part icu lar ly whether they span a l l branches and 81 levels or are constra ined to the uppe r echelons of the mi l i tary . Add i t i ona l l y , it w o u l d be usefu l to learn h o w many Russ ian officers w o u l d advocate w o r k i n g w i t h N A T O to modern i ze the A r m e d Forces. In order to deve lop more sophist icated arguments on the top ic of this thesis, it w o u l d be necessary to have access to p r ima ry sources that examine V l a d im i r Put in ' s re lat ionship w i t h the Russ ian mi l i tary . Such in fo rmat ion w o u l d be va luab le i n ascertaining the extent to wh i c h Pu t i n is beho lden to the mi l i ta ry for powe r as we l l as h o w un i ted the mi l i ta ry is i n their oppos i t ion to Put in ' s p r o - N A T O pol ic ies. A better unders tand ing of the connect ions w i t h i n Russia 's r u l i ng el ite—polit ical, indust r ia l , mi l i tary, economic—would also be of assistance. F ina l l y and most obv ious ly , more t ime needs to pass before w e can fu l l y evaluate the effectiveness and success of the alternative c i v i l i an service p rog ram set to enter into force on 1 January, 2004 as we l l as the p lan to phase out conscr ipt ion b y 2008. Despite the almost premature t im ing of this project and l im i ted access to p r ima ry sources and survey data, I have endeavored to p rov ide a coherent argument as to the impact of N A T O expans ion on the Russ ian mi l i t a ry as we l l as the l i ke l i hood of real mi l i ta ry re form i n Russ ia under Pres ident Pu t in . D u r i n g the 1990s, N A T O expans ion had a dec ided ly negat ive effect on the Russ ian mi l i tary . In 1991/1992, the A r m e d Forces desperately needed breath ing space to take stock of their s i tuat ion, come to terms w i t h the end of the C o l d War , and deve lop an appropr iate role for themselves i n their n ew country. N A T O expans ion, however , prevented this. F r o m 1993 onwards , the Russ ian mi l i ta ry cited 82 the process of N A T O enlargement as proof that the West was st i l l behav ing aggressively towards Russ ia and cont inued to pose a threat. Therefore, rather than abandon ing the C o l d W a r menta l i ty i n the ear ly 1990s, mi l i ta ry off icials propagated it. They have used N A T O expans ion to fuel res idual C o l d W a r fears of the West and, i n turn , to ma in ta in an outdated and unnecessar i ly b loated mi l i t a ry structure. Specif ical ly, this resulted i n a cont inued focus on ma in ta in ing an unnecessar i ly large conscr ipt force and nuclear arsenal, wh i c h d iver ted scarce funds away f r om re forming, equ ipp ing and t ra in ing a smal ler, more effective force. Regardless of the rhetoric of the mi l i t a ry establ ishment, N A T O no longer poses a threat to Russ ian nat ional security. Certa in ly , it has the capabi l i ty and capacity to do severe damage shou ld it choose to attack the country. Howeve r , for the past decade there has been no intent on the part of N A T O member states or officials to attack Russ ia (Wal lander 2002,3). Th is is wha t Russia 's generals, indoctr inated b y f ive decades of ant i-Western, a n t i - N A T O propaganda, have fa i led to unders tand. Russia 's mi l i ta ry must be capable of defend ing itself against a far more ins id ious and dif f icult adversary than an assault f r om the West, one that cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons or a mass of bad ly t ra ined, demora l i zed conscr ipted soldiers. Ter ror i sm is the new threat and Russia 's mi l i ta ry is v i r tua l l y power less against it because this inst i tut ion is m i red i n a C o l d Wa r era mental i ty. The Russ ian mi l i ta ry must undergo fundamenta l re form and become a profess ional ized, streaml ined, and preferably c i v i l i an run , mi l i ta ry i n order to combat this threat. Furthermore, this is a threat that Russ ia cannot f ight on its own . 83 G i v e n its nature, Russ ia must f o rm al l iances w i t h countr ies a round the wo r l d , and specif ical ly the West. Since the beg inn ing of h is t e rm i n office, Pres ident Pu t i n has demonstrated t ime and t ime aga in that he recognizes terror ism as the p r imary threat to h is country 's security, and that Russ ia needs al l ies to w i n this war . H i s behav iour i n regard to the second r ound of N A T O expans ion as we l l as h is suppor t for the found ing of the N A T O - R u s s i a Counc i l i n M a y 2002 indicates that at the ve ry least he wants to cooperate w i t h N A T O and N A T O members i n combat ing terror ism; at most, he wants to lead his country into N A T O as a fu l l member. M r . Pu t i n has also acknowledged that Russia 's A r m e d Forces are i n desperate need of an overhau l . H e has made numerous pub l i c commitments to re fo rm measures, and more s igni f icant ly, has effected change i n certain areas. Pu t i n sk i l l fu l l y used the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Un i t ed States to further the Western or iented, pro- re form agenda he adopted at the beg inn ing of his pres idency. For example, he overrode voca l oppos i t ion f r om his mi l i ta ry officials and a l l owed the U S mi l i ta ry access to Centra l A s i a n airbases. H e has also pushed ahead w i t h a p l an to gradua l ly profess ional ize the A r m e d Forces by 2008, despite oppos i t ion f r om the mi l i ta ry establ ishment. The shift i n threat percept ion faci l i tated by the events of 9/11 have made Russia 's po l i t i ca l and security env i ronment more conduct ive to Put in ' s re fo rm agenda. In the not too distant past, the Russ ian mi l i ta ry was feared and admi red a round the globe. It is st i l l feared today, but for a l l the w r ong reasons. The West 84 fears the incompetence of the Russ ian mi l i ta ry , and the r isk of a nuclear accident. Russians fear their o w n mi l i ta ry because of the horr ib le tales of y oung men be ing abused and tor tured i n the course of their mi l i ta ry service. Pres ident Pu t i n has both the support and the mandate of his popu la t i on to effect fundamenta l m i l i t a ry reform. H e also has the advantage of operat ing i n the post 9-11 security env i ronment, and the concomitant recogni t ion that ter ror ism has replaced the threat of an East-West war . For these reasons, Russ ian cit izens and soldiers may feel some hope that, f inal ly, their A r m e d Forces w i l l be mode rn i zed and adapted to fit the 21 s t century—despite the fact that its mi l i ta ry officials pers istent ly behave as though they rema in i n the 20 t h . 85 B I B L I O G R A P H Y Agence France Presse. 2002. Only 11 percent of Russian men enter mandatory military service: General. (6 December). Agence France Presse v i a Johnson's Russ ia L ist . Internet. 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