Ally or Adversary?
NATO Enlargement and the Russian Military.

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ABSTRACT

Military reform has been a stated priority of the Russian government since the creation of the Russian Armed Forces in 1991. Despite this, Russia's military remains an outdated, bloated, corrupt and incompetent force. The numerous reasons for this state of affairs include severe lack of funding, bureaucratic impediments, political instability and the anachronistic perception that Russia remains a great power.

This thesis explores beyond the traditionally cited internal factors and argues that NATO expansion has been a key external factor behind the dismal progress of military reform in Russia.

Expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has perpetuated the notion amongst Russians, especially within the military, the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence, that the Alliance poses a threat to Russian security. This mindset has translated into a continuing focus in Russian national security doctrines on maintaining nuclear parity with the West (i.e., NATO) as well as the retention of large conventional forces. This has diverted scarce resources away from equipping and professionalizing a smaller, streamlined army.

Furthermore, the current sorry state of Russia's military is beginning to manifest itself in serious social problems, such as widespread drug abuse, and increasing suicide and desertion rates. Russia must modernize its armed forces if they are to become an effective instrument of state and counter the real threat to national security: terrorism rooted in religious extremism and secessionist movements.

The second major argument of the thesis is more optimistic. In the post-9/11 security environment, perceptions regarding the West in general and NATO specifically may have evolved sufficiently to allow President Vladimir Putin to shift the focus of national security away from the inaccurate, albeit strongly perceived, threat from the West, to the real menace posed by Islamic radicalism along Russia's southern flank. With badly trained conscripts and nuclear weapons powerless to fight terrorism both domestically and in the former Soviet Union, pressure will only increase for the long overdue modernization of Russia's Armed Forces.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:
OUTLINE AND OVERVIEW

On the 9th of November 1989 the people of East and West Germany joined together in an unprecedented and unforeseen insurrection, during which the literal and symbolic bulwark of Communism, the Berlin Wall, was torn down.¹ This event directly precipitated the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which in turn brought about the end of the Cold War.² As 40 years of constant—albeit low-level—conflict faded into memory, the bi-polar international structure that had coloured and characterized all aspects of international relations was transformed. Not surprisingly, predictions regarding the nature of the new international order were numerous and contradictory. One organization in particular stood at the centre of debate on the shape of the international system in the post-Cold War era: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Realist and neorealist international relations (IR) scholars, such as John J. Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz, were pessimistic regarding both the future of NATO and the nature of international relations in the post-Cold War system. Mearsheimer argued that the bi-polar configuration of power had held states’

¹ See Grant, 1991 for a detailed description of the events and causes of the uprisings of November 9th, 1989.
² For a comprehensive and informative account of events within the USSR preceding and during this tumultuous time, see Pryce-Jones, 1995.
natural tendency towards conflict in check; he predicted that without this stabilizing force the new international system would be characterized by decreased cooperation and increased conflict. Both Mearsheimer and Waltz perceived the dissolution of NATO as a practical manifestation of this eventuality because, according to the realist paradigm, cooperation between states generally only occurs when a strong external motivating factor, such as a threat to state survival, is present (Mearsheimer 1990, 35 & 42; Waltz 1993, 75-76).³

Adherents of the comparatively more optimistic school of thought, liberalism⁴, argued that a conflictual post-Cold War era was not inevitable and that NATO could and should continue to play a vital role in preserving peace in Europe within the new security environment. This is consistent with their paradigm because while realists argue that institutions are merely a reflection of the contemporary power configuration and operate according to the whims of the great powers of the day, liberals believe that institutions can take on a life and influence beyond that instilled by the founding states (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 7).

Furthermore, as the Cold War came to an end, realists still viewed NATO as a military alliance, although a nontraditional one. Given that the vast majority of IR theory tells us that alliances exist for the sole purpose of countering a specific threat, it was logical for realists to predict the demise of NATO as a corollary to the demise

⁴ In the interest of brevity, only the two dominant schools of IR theory, realism and liberalism, shall be mentioned here. For more on the theory behind NATO’s post-Cold War persistence according to these paradigms as well as Organizational Theory and Constructivism, see Rauchhaus, 2001.
of the organization's *raison d'etre*, the Soviet Union. Most liberal scholars, however, have long argued that throughout the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty Organization developed into more than a military alliance:

...NATO is about much more than just co-ordinating military policy to deter and defend against a common enemy. From its inception, NATO has had the broader goal of enhancing its members’ security, which includes promoting stable civil-military relations within member states as well as preventing security competition between them. (Rauchhaus 2001, 13-14)

Thus, it was consistent with their paradigm for neoliberal institutionalists Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane to argue in the early 1990s that although NATO could not have been created in the security environment of the late 1980s, it could and would continue to exist in the post-Cold War system as it had proven itself to be a valuable international institution over the previous four decades (Nye & Keohane 1993, 104-106).

Although the predictions of liberal scholars certainly seem to have been more accurate than those of the realists', not even the most optimistic among them anticipated the level of integration and partnership that has been cultivated between NATO members and their former adversaries in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union. Few, if any, predicted that less than a decade after the end of the Cold War, NATO would have expanded into former Warsaw Pact territory\(^5\) or that Russian troops would be working side-by-side with NATO troops in peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

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\(^5\) The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to become NATO members at NATO's Madrid Summit in 1997. After making the requisite alterations to their political and security systems, they became full members in 1999.
This latter occurrence clearly demonstrates that, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has reformulated itself into a body that includes Russia in a mutually beneficial, albeit occasionally awkward, quasi-partnership. As the 21st century progresses, all signs indicate that NATO and Russia will have to continue to co-exist despite their turbulent past and sometimes rocky present. As NATO expands ever closer to Russia's borders, the notion of peaceful co-existence between these two former adversaries is becoming more and more important. Given that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will reach the western frontier of the Russian Federation in less than a year, it seems pertinent to examine how the process of expansion has affected various institutions in Russia. Due to the constraints of this project, only one institution can be effectively examined here. As NATO is at the core a military institution, this thesis will deal exclusively with the Russian Armed Forces.

In brief, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of NATO expansion on the Russian military. The following pages will demonstrate that NATO expansion had a detrimental impact on the Russian military throughout Boris Yeltsin's presidency. The enlargement process, to which Russia's military officials were ardently opposed, played a key role in stymieing essential reform programs; Alliance expansion justified the continuation of Russia's conscript-based system and propagated dependence on its nuclear arsenal. To this day, the military bureaucracy remains suspicious of the North Atlantic Alliance and fearful of its expansionary programs. Nevertheless, current president Vladimir Putin has been more successful
than his predecessor in orchestrating military reform. This is, at least in part, due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Since the beginning of his political life, President Putin has demonstrated his belief that the primary contemporary threat to Russian national security is terrorism, not an attack from the West under the auspices of NATO. Putin does not view NATO as an adversary, and is thus able to recognize the necessity of transforming the Russia-NATO relationship into that of an alliance which would more effectively combat the terrorist threat. The 9/11 attacks did not change Putin’s beliefs regarding threats to his country, but they have helped him enlist and sustain support for his administration’s anti-terrorist, Western oriented foreign policy. As Russians’ threat perceptions shift from the West to terrorism, the likelihood of fundamental military reform in Russia will grow.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. This introductory chapter will first provide an overview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; its history and contemporary role within international relations as well as its expansionary programs. It will then provide a brief profile of the contemporary Russian military, emphasizing the challenges it faces and proposed reforms that are being considered to help revitalize and improve this important instrument of state.

The second chapter covers the span of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. It examines the tumultuous history of NATO-Russia relations throughout the 1990s. This discussion will demonstrate how NATO’s expansionary policy played an instrumental role in perpetuating the notion that the West continued to pose a threat
to Russian national security. This, in turn, propagated the belief that Russia needed to maintain the same military structures that it had employed throughout the Cold War. Combined with other internal factors such as Russia’s dire economic straits, this severely hindered Yeltsin’s ability to implement military reduction and modernization plans.

The third chapter covers the span of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, to date. It argues that Putin has been able to use the events of 9/11 in order to help promote anti-terrorism policies and call for active military reform as well adopt a pragmatically pro-Western foreign policy despite his generals’ insistence that NATO still poses a threat to Russia’s national security.

The fourth and final chapter will provide a brief synopsis of the major arguments made throughout the thesis, as well as an assessment of the theoretical implications of the conclusions that have been drawn therein.

An Overview of NATO: Creation, Evolution, Expansion

The military principle captured in the well-known expression ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ bound the Western powers and the Soviet Union together in a tense but effective partnership throughout the Second World War. However, once the Nazi threat had been successfully eliminated by the Allied powers, relations between the West and the East rapidly deteriorated. In the late 1940s, Western democratic governments grew increasingly nervous and discomfited regarding the perceived threat emanating from the Communist bloc. The sense of unease was
exacerbated by the Soviet policy of expansion and repression in the Baltic states during the post-WWII era. Divided Germany also proved to be a focal point of the tension between East and West at this time.

Devastated by the war, the European states desperately needed to rebuild their infrastructures and economies. Towards this end, the US provided money for the reconstruction of Europe under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. This money was earmarked for reviving and restoring the shattered European economies and there were little to no excess funds for military and defence spending. Fear of a Communist invasion, however, demanded that the defence of Western Europe be considered. For this reason, certain key western democracies began discussing the formation of a military alliance that would span the Atlantic Ocean. Fearing Stalin’s expansionist tendencies, a small group of European countries acknowledged that they were too weak, both economically and militarily, to fight the USSR. They therefore began to negotiate a system of collective defence that would automatically bring North America to the aid of any European country attacked by the Soviet Union (Duignan 2000, 2-9).

These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Washington Declaration on April 4th, 1949, with which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was born. In signing the Declaration, the twelve original member states—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States—agreed to collectively come to the

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6 For more on the politics and history of the Marshall Plan, see Hogan, 1989.
defence of any NATO member attacked by another country.\textsuperscript{7} Confident that North America’s guarantee to provide military aid in the event of an attack on any NATO member would act as a sufficient deterrent to prevent a Soviet invasion, the Alliance’s European members could focus on rebuilding their war-torn countries and economies (NATO 2002 “NATO in the 21st Century”, 4-5). For this reason, former US President Harry S. Truman called NATO and the Marshall Plan “two halves of the same walnut” (NATO 2002, “NATO in the 21st Century”, 4).

Less than one year after NATO was created, two key events in world history caused its significance to increase dramatically. Firstly, on August 29\textsuperscript{th}, 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, effectively removing America’s strategic nuclear monopoly and permanently shifting the balance of power.\textsuperscript{8} Secondly, on June 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1950, Communist North Korea, backed by both China and the Soviet Union, invaded South Korea;\textsuperscript{9} this confirmed Western suspicions that the USSR was aggressively pursuing an expansionist foreign policy.

With these events, the remnants of post-WWII optimism faded into oblivion as the East-West conflict intensified. In May of 1955, the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, more commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact, further entrenched the conflict between East and West.\textsuperscript{10} For the next three and a half

\textsuperscript{8} For more on the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, see Holloway, 1994.
\textsuperscript{9} For details on this conflict and the role played by the Soviets, see Kuznetsov, 2001.
\textsuperscript{10} The Warsaw Pact was comprised of 8 countries; the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It came into being on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of May 1955 and officially disbanded on July 1\textsuperscript{st} 1991. For more on the history and Cold War role of the Warsaw Pact, see Jones, 1981.
decades, virtually all relations between nations were influenced by the complex
machinations of the superpowers in their respective bids for dominance.
Throughout this period, NATO had a clear and unambiguous role to play on the
world stage: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [existed] to counter the risk
that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control over Eastern Europe to other
parts of the continent" (NATO 2002, "NATO in the 21st century", 4).

Throughout the long years of the Cold War, NATO was unequivocally
successful in fulfilling its mandate to protect Western Europe from the Soviet threat.
So much so, that this organization has been called "the most successful alliance
system in the history of the world" (Duignan 2000, ix). Nevertheless, as is usually
the case for a complex organization comprised of sovereign states, NATO's
authority and cohesion has faced numerous challenges. For example, the dispute
between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus has proved embarrassing for NATO on
more than one occasion since those two countries became full members in 1952
(Duignan 2000, 25; Moustakis 2003).

Furthermore, the issue of burden sharing is one of the most serious problems
that has plagued NATO since its inception. Although disputed by some academics
and NATO officials, there has long been an element of the American polity
convinced that the US pays an unfair share of NATO's expenses. Adherents of this
view argue that NATO's European members "do not fully pull their weight and
[spend] too much on welfare and not enough on defence" (Duignan 2000, 24-25). On
the other hand, some who take the European perspective feel that the dominant US
position within the organization has granted it too much control over the defence of Europe, thereby requiring European nations to sacrifice a degree of sovereignty in order to participate in NATO (Duignan 2000, 25-26).

France’s position within NATO exemplifies this internal strain within the organization. Although this country strongly supported the creation of NATO in 1949, rising nationalistic sentiment encouraged by then President Charles de Gaulle during the 1960s led France to decide that being a full member of NATO cost too much in terms of political and military autonomy. As such, “de Gaulle withdrew France from the Alliance’s integrated military structure in March 1966, ostensibly to pursue military self sufficiency and independent foreign policy” (Cornish 1997, 43). Although this move did not entirely remove France from the Alliance, it decreased France’s authority within and commitment to the organization.

During the early 1990s France once again questioned NATO’s dominant role with regard to European security by pushing for a shift in defence policy from an ‘Atlanticist’ approach to a ‘Europeanist’ approach. “Traditionally the champion of Europeanism, France saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to shift the locus of European security planning and organization back to Europe” (Cornish 1997, 32). This challenge to NATO’s relevance with regard to matters of European security could have done serious damage to the future viability of the organization. However, a concerted effort on the part of Britain and the US, the strongest supporters of the Alliance and the Atlanticist approach, resulted in a compromise
that satisfied France’s concerns regarding US dominance of NATO as well as ensuring its continued cooperation with the organization (Cornish 1997 40-45).

Although France has once again become a full NATO member, this country’s government is a staunch supporter of the militarization of the European Union (EU), which it sees as a way to achieve an independent European security policy.

...France has always believed that in the long run the EU must assert its independence of NATO, an organization it regards as ultimately an instrument of American foreign policy. Without an independent European defence force, the French believe there can be no independent European foreign policy. (The Economist 2003 “NATO versus the European Union”)

While there is little doubt that France will remain an important and powerful member of NATO for the foreseeable future, its concerns over maintaining sovereignty and independence clearly demonstrate that the Alliance must carefully nurture the delicate balance between collectivity and sovereignty if it is to maintain its internal cohesion in future.

Not surprisingly, in recent years many scholars and analysts have attempted to explain why and how, within ten years, NATO was able to avoid potential dissolution and become “unquestionably the center of gravity on security issues in Europe” (Schake 2001, 30). While it is not within the scope of this paper to examine all the explanations put forth by NATO scholars, the most compelling among them shall be briefly discussed here.
Notwithstanding certain notable exceptions, the general consensus among NATO experts is that the organization was able to adapt and thrive after the Cold War because it was more than a military alliance.\textsuperscript{11} Throughout the Cold War, NATO possessed all the standard trappings of a military alliance; weapons, soldiers and an enemy. However, the organization also developed an incredibly powerful bureaucracy and a network of communication systems that spanned the globe by the early 1990s. Because NATO was concerned with both preventing as well as fighting war, it developed a complex system of political and military ties that proved instrumental in convincing the relevant powers that the Alliance remained a viable and important institution in the post-Cold War system. As Celeste Wallander explains:

... the alliance differed from traditional mutual aid or guarantee pacts in several respects important for understanding its institutional form during the Cold War. In addition to its external mission of deterrence and defence against the Soviet Union, the alliance was also intended to build peace and security among its members as democratic countries. In NATO parlance, the alliance was an Article 4 (peace and security) as well as an Article 5 (collective defence) treaty. (Wallander 2000, 712-713)

Its adaptable political and military institutional assets enabled NATO to withstand the inevitable questions regarding its relevance after the disappearance of its original \textit{raison d'etre}. As the aforementioned 1996 compromise clearly demonstrates, the Alliance was able to reorganize itself into an institution acceptable to and appropriate for the post-Cold War era. Therefore, as the 1990s came to an

\textsuperscript{11} Kenneth Waltz, for example, argues that NATO has persevered in the post-Cold War system for one reason only; because the hegemon, the United States, wants it to. For more on this scholar's theories on NATO preservation and expansion, see Waltz 2001.
end, many deemed the transformation of NATO to be a complete success; "the fiftieth anniversary summit in April 1999 was envisioned as a gala affair to celebrate NATO's triumphant transformation of its institutions, strategy, membership, and purpose" (Peterson Ulrich 2000). However, unfortunately for NATO, its anniversary celebrations were to be marred by a new and unprecedented challenge; the war in Kosovo.

The collapse of Yugoslavia, beginning in 1991, led to the resurgence of ancient conflicts between the various ethnic groups inhabiting the area. The disintegration of the formerly united country quickly degenerated into a violent battle for land and power. The Alliance became militarily involved in the Balkans in 1993 because it feared that violence would spillover into NATO's European territory. Additionally, it desired an end to the mass human rights violations taking place in the region. This was the first time NATO saw cause to get involved in an international conflict. Then, in February of the following year, NATO used military force for the first time in its history when an American contingent of NATO troops shot down four Serbian aircraft that were violating a United Nations (UN) ban on flights over Bosnia. Five years later, NATO launched its first offensive action against a sovereign nation, Serbia, on March 24th 1999 (Duignan 2000, 85-90). These 'firsts' in NATO's history provide some indication as to the importance of the Balkans' conflict for the Alliance.
NATO’s 1999 war with Serbia over Kosovo was a severe test for the Alliance on two levels. Firstly, it tested the limits of NATO’s internal cohesion; secondly, it challenged NATO’s actual military capabilities in a conflict. NATO did not perform flawlessly on either level. Although the Alliance attempted to present a united front with regard to the March 1999 air strikes against Serb forces, behind the scenes several NATO members, including Belgium and Poland, were strongly opposed to the action. On the operational front, the problems were so numerous and severe that many experts questioned NATO’s ability to provide an effective military force in actual combat situations (Peterson Ulrich 2000). NATO eventually emerged from the Kosovo conflict with mixed reviews:

While some contend that NATO emerged victorious, united, capable of confronting 21st century security challenges, and strengthened by the addition of its new members, others argue that although the bombing campaign was paved with good intentions, it was a political failure the roots of which can be attributed to the unsuitability of NATO for the achievement of Europe’s security interests in the current era. (Peterson Ulrich 2000)

Despite unfavorable commentary regarding its actions and dire predictions as to the future of the Alliance emanating from certain sources, NATO was nonetheless able to provide a measure of security and stability to the people of Bosnia, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (NATO 2002, “NATO Today” 10-13). It is a testament to the perseverance and dedication of the organization that, four years after the end of the war, NATO troops continue to provide important and effective
support for the peaceful and democratic development of the former Yugoslav republics.12

In order to ensure its continuing relevance in a changing world, NATO was forced to undergo a transformation after the Cold War. The Kosovo War forced a second transformation in the late 1990s. Just two years later, the Alliance was required to adapt, yet again, to a new and radically altered security environment in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, commonly referred to as 9/11. These attacks resulted in the first ever invocation of NATO’s collective defence clause, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter, on September 12th 2001 (NATO 2002 “NATO Today” 5). Despite the invocation of Article 5, the United States did not call upon NATO as a whole to respond to the attacks, a move which some observers believe has damaged the Alliance’s prestige and importance (The Economist 2002, “A Moment of Truth”). Nevertheless, as a result of 9/11, NATO has taken several steps to ensure its contemporary and future value in assisting the US-led War on Terror. These steps include: “enhanced intelligence sharing and cooperation, blanket over-flight clearances and access to ports and airfields for US and other Allied craft for operations against terrorism, and the deployment of part of NATO’s standing naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Alliance’s airborne

12 For more on NATO’s current deployment and activities in the former Yugoslavia see the following articles available on NATO’s official website: up to date details on the Bosnia deployment are available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm; details on the Kosovo deployment are available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html; and details on the current deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are available at http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm.
warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft to the United States” (NATO 2002 “NATO in the 21st Century” 9).

As described above, NATO’s operational structures and procedures have been in a constant state of evolution since the end of the Cold War. However, beyond restructuring its day-to-day operations, there is another—perhaps even more profound—way NATO is adapting to the contemporary security environment: it is expanding. As previously mentioned, NATO began as an Alliance of 12 sovereign nations on April 4th, 1949. However, according to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the organization retained the right to expand its membership, subject to the unanimous approval of its members. As such, NATO’s membership roster has been augmented on 4 separate occasions since its creation: Greece and Turkey joined in 1952\(^{13}\); West Germany in 1954; Spain in 1982; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999.\(^{14}\) At the Prague Summit in November 2002, 7 more countries -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia -- were invited to join; they are expected to become full members in 2004. NATO currently has 19 members, and will expand to 26 in 2004. However, NATO’s boundaries do not end at its member countries’ borders; it is also affiliated with 25 countries through the

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\(^{13}\) Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine. When, after WWII, Britain could not afford to financially support these two states, they destabilized and the democratic, capitalist governments came under attack from communist elements of society. Then US President Harry Truman declared that all democratic states fighting communist ‘elements’ would receive support from the US to prevent the loss of a state to the Soviet Camp. For more on the politics and logistics of Greece and Turkey’s entry into NATO, see Moustakis, 2003.

\(^{14}\) Despite the previous additions to NATO’s membership roster, the Madrid Round, which initiated the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’s membership into NATO, this is often referred to as the ‘First Round’ of expansion.
Partnership for Peace initiative (including the 7 states invited to become full members at the last summit). NATO is affiliated with an additional 7 states through the Mediterranean Dialogue. It has a permanent ‘relationship’ with Ukraine through the NATO-Ukraine Commission (1997) and with Russia, initially through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and, since 2002, through the NATO-Russia Council. In one way or another, NATO is affiliated with 53 states around the globe.

Despite its growth and accomplishments, today’s NATO is by no means a trouble-free institution. It is challenged by endless internal disputes over how large a role the US should play in the defence of Europe, and how much they should pay for it. Externally, it is being bombarded by an entirely new range of non-traditional threats requiring an entirely new style of defence. The war in Kosovo exacerbated tensions both within the Alliance and between the Alliance and Russia. The events of 9/11 highlighted many of NATO’s flaws, such as lack of interoperability between members’ national armies, the huge gap between American and European technology and weapons, and the alliance’s inability to respond quickly to crisis situations (The Economist, “A moment of truth”). Although these problems are serious and have no short term solutions, the most recent NATO summit held in the Czech capital in November 2002, demonstrated that the organization is willing to

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15 Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
16 Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia (1995), and Algeria, which joined in 2000.
17 Russia and Ukraine are also members in the Partnership for Peace Program.
adapt itself, once again, to meet the changing needs of the post-9/11 security environment.

Several important new initiatives were announced at the summit that—if successfully implemented—have the capacity to ensure NATO's relevance in the contemporary security environment. Most significantly, the Alliance announced the creation of a rapid reaction force with advanced capabilities, called the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF, which will be partially operational by October 2004 and fully operational by October 2006, will provide NATO with a fast and flexible force able to respond to crises much more quickly than any current military unit under the Alliance’s command. As well as the creation of the NRF, Alliance leaders at the Prague summit announced their decision to allot funds for the creation of five new defence initiatives that will focus directly on defence against weapons of mass destruction attacks (NATO, “NATO after Prague”, 1-5). These concrete changes in its institutional structure represent an attempt to reconstruct NATO into a more effective defence alliance in light of recent changes to the international security environment. Furthermore, through its process of expansion NATO has adopted what many scholars call a collective security approach as a supplement to its collective defence obligations. By requiring applicant states to alter their domestic structures in order to reflect the principles of liberal democratic states, NATO hopes to ‘export security’ into Eastern Europe (Rauchhaus 2001, 4).

NATO’s actions in Kosovo as well as its policy regarding expansion have been the source of much contentious debate among scholars throughout the early
years of the 21st century. As the North Atlantic Alliance continues to adapt to the
post-9/11 security environment, and as its expansion process extends its boundaries
further eastward, this organization will undoubtedly provide much more fodder for
scholarly debate for the indefinite future.

Overview of the Russian Military: World Power to World Problem

During the Cold War, Moscow controlled a well-funded, well-trained military
that was both envied and feared the world over. Today, Moscow must deal with a
“shattered, dispirited, corrupt and incompetent army” (Herspring 2003, 173). Up
until 1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed, the Soviet Red Army was widely
perceived as one of the greatest in the world. Just three years later, it had
deteriorated into one of the worst. Unfortunately, very little has been done over the
past decade to assist the Russian Army’s evolution into a respectable, effective
defence institution.

The man first charged with rebuilding the Russian military from the remains
of the Soviet Armed Forces was General Pavel Grachev, appointed Minister of
Defence by then President Boris Yeltsin in May 1992 (Muraviev 2001, 199). It is not
an exaggeration to say that the General faced a Herculean challenge. When the
USSR disintegrated, many of Moscow’s best troops were stationed in the successor
states, and a large percentage of them chose not to return to Russia. Furthermore, a
vast amount of military equipment, including billions of rubles worth of air defence
radars, became the property of the newly independent non-Russian states as this
equipment had been stationed on their territory during the Cold War (Muraviev 2001, 194-195).

The situation regarding the military industrial complex was even worse. During the Cold War, weapons production and repair facilities had been deliberately scattered across the enormous territory of the USSR in order to make it more difficult for the west to determine the exact assets held by the Soviet military. Additionally, this strategy made it impossible for the west to destroy the infrastructure of the Soviet army in a single assault.

This policy, so logical during the Cold War years, proved disastrous for the Russian military after it ended; it meant that the newly created Russian army required a vast influx of cash in order to recruit new troops, rebuild stocks of weapons and build new weapons production plants and repair facilities. However, increased funding for the defence industry was something the new government of Russia simply could not provide (Baev 1996, 27). During the 1980s, Soviet defence spending equaled that of the US; by the year 2000, defence spending totaled only 2% of that of the United States (Arbatov 2000, 5).

The results of this drastic reduction in funding had a profound effect on the day-to-day workings of the military. For example, in 1994 funding for the Russian army was so low that approximately 120,000 officers were without the housing promised them by the terms of their employment. In 1998 inspectors discovered that, in an attempt to save money, the military was feeding its troops dog food (Barany 2001, 206). However, rather than increasing the military’s budget, Yeltsin’s
administration consistently decreased defence spending. Given the chaotic nature of that time in Russia’s political and economic history, it is difficult to accurately assess exactly how much the military received in government funding; however, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, funding decreased each year until 1998 (SIPRI 2003, 259). Another expert estimates that the decreases in defence spending, as a percentage of the national budget, continued until 2000 (Herspring 2003, 157).

Serious as the problems regarding the military infrastructure were, there was another more fundamental problem facing this institution in the early 1990s. Before the Armed Forces could be effectively transformed into an institution appropriate for the post-Cold War era, the mentality of those in charge had to change. Unfortunately, military officials in the government had not altered their way of thinking to fit their new situation. Thus, General Grachev was hampered in his attempts to reform the military not only by a severe lack of funding but also by the "old mentality [that] prevailed among the armchair generals" (Baev 1996, 28-29). This mindset was grounded in denial as to how much their position had changed, combined with the unshakable belief that the US and NATO were enemies of Russia. It prevented government officials from permitting the military sufficient latitude to adapt to the new post-Cold War environment and dealing with the reality of their new status as an inferior—rather than superior—military force (Baev 1996, 29-35).

For all these reasons, military reform during Yeltsin’s presidency was “a joke” (Herspring 2003, 155). Rather than ameliorating, the problems that faced General Grachev in 1992 only worsened throughout the 1990s. This was clearly
demonstrated by the fact that “in 1998 the defence ministry was able to cover only 50 percent of its planned budget for food and only 8 percent of the projected clothing budget” (Blair and Gaddy 1998, 11).

These funding problems directly led to a decline in the number, effectiveness and power of Russia’s conventional forces. As a result, throughout the 1990s, Moscow relied increasingly on its nuclear arsenal in order to maintain some semblance of power and authority on the world stage. Although it was not a surprising development, this shift in military focus was exceedingly disturbing for many Russia observers:

By 1994 nuclear weapons had become the primary, and virtually the sole, pillar of Russian security. Recognizing its conventional military weakness along its entire border, the Russian government abandoned its longstanding commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Today Russia relies more than ever on using them first or launching them on warning of hostile missile attack. This growing reliance has not only lowered the nuclear threshold for intentional use, but also increased the danger of mistake or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. (Blair and Gaddy 1998, 12)

Given the plethora of worsening problems in the military sphere, Vladimir Putin could hardly have faced a worse situation upon his accession to power on 1 January 2000. Since that time, limited progress has been made in some areas of military reform. Most significantly, President Putin has increased the military’s budget. In 1999, Russia’s total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 3.5%; by 2002, that figure had increased to 4% (SIPRI 2003, 260). In actual figures, this translates to an increase of 190 billion rubles between 1998 and 2001. The 2002 federal budget provided 284.158 billion rubles for defence spending, an increase of
slightly less than one percent over the previous year (SIPRI 2003, 259). Also, for the first time since the creation of the independent Russian Federation, the defence budget for 2002 allocated a significant percentage of funds for arms procurement in terms of both weapons purchases as well as research and development (SIPRI 2003, 262). News of this change in defence spending was surely welcomed by the soldiers and officers of the Russian military, who had been using disturbingly outdated equipment. For example, during the First Chechen War (1994-1996), Russian troops used ammunition produced in the 1980s. During the Second, or current, Chechen War, troops were reported to "have been using 1970s ammunition and there has been talk of bringing pre-World War II M-30 122mm howitzers out of storage" (Herspring 2003, 168).

Another positive step taken by Putin’s government, under Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov, was the merging of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces. Combining these forces has decreased redundancy and indicates that the Russian military is moving towards a more typical Western, ‘three-service’ military style, with a separated Army, Navy and Air Force (Herspring 2003, 170). Another cost cutting measure has involved drastically reducing the size of the Russian military. During the height of the Cold War, Soviet troops numbered approximately 4 million; in stark contrast, the Russian Armed Forces has a total of 988,100 active troops (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 88).¹⁸ Experts estimate that

¹⁸ This figure jumps to approximately 1.2 million troops when personnel from other military-type structures, such as the Ministry for Internal Affairs are included (Arbatov 2000, 5; Kommersant 2003).
this number will drop to between 400,000 and 850,000 over the next decade
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85)

Some progress has also been made on the issue of conscription. Russia faces a serious dilemma on this front because it is “not able to support either a conscript force, for demographic and social reasons, nor an expensive professional force of sufficient size to meet perceived future requirements” (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85). Due to financial constraints, full professionalization of the Russian military will likely remain an elusive goal. Nonetheless, halting steps in this direction were taken with the professionalization of the 76th Airborne Division in September 2002 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85-86).19

Despite a provision in the Russian constitution that allows citizens to opt for alternative civil service rather than conscripted military service, the Duma has only recently begun to discuss full legalization, as well as implementation, of a framework to manage this option. On 25 July, 2002, a law was passed legalizing alternative civil service for conscientious objectors. A year later, on 21 July, 2003, it was activated when President Putin’s signed an alternative civil service decree which stated that Russian youths had the right to opt out of military service as of 1 January, 2004 (Fedyukin 2003; Agence France Presse 2003). While this is certainly a victory in many ways, critics argue that the terms of alternative service as set out by the Duma, under guidance from the Ministry of Defence, are punitive and unfair. Those seeking to exercise their right to alternative civil service must first argue their

19 Given the importance of the conscription debate it shall be further explored in chapter 3.
case before a Ministry of Defence commission. The commission has the right to turn
down any applicant who does not demonstrate sufficient justification for avoiding
conscription. Furthermore, the duration of the alternative civil service is three and a
half years, which is nearly double that of the military conscription term. Critics also
object to the principle of extraterritoriality that will be invoked by the commission:
all who chose alternative service must serve in a region away from their homes
(Fedyukin 2003; Bivens 2003).

Despite their flaws, the aforementioned reforms and advancements are
commendable at least in that they demonstrate the current administration’s
recognition that military reform is essential. However, this should not blind the
reader to the fact that the Russian military remains in dire need of much more
drastic reform. The problems that currently plague the Russian armed forces are so
numerous that most can only be mentioned briefly. On the technical level, they
include spiraling debt, difficulties in recruiting professional soldiers and young
officers, inadequate training facilities and insufficient training time, outdated
weaponry and equipment, insufficient stockpiling of spare parts and a crumbling
military infrastructure so serious that over 400,000 army personnel have not been
provided with housing (Umbach 2000, 26-27; Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002, 67 &
71).

The sinking of the Kursk in August 2000 is a prime example of the gravity of
the situation in regard to the insufficient stockpiling of spare parts. When this
submarine, “one of the Northern Fleet’s most modern and threatening boats” sank,
the Northern Fleet did not dispatch a rescue vessel to assist; the one and only rescue vessel operated by the Fleet had been dismantled and stripped for parts years earlier (Herspring 2003, 166).

On the personnel level, problems include low troop morale, non-payment or low payment of soldiers salaries, mass desertion, increasing crime rates, low level of commitment on the part of troops and officers, a marked increase in substance abuse and AIDS rates, increasing reports of corruption, and decreasing levels of discipline (Umbach 2000, 26-27; Barany 2001, 206-212).

By far the most serious problem currently facing the Russian military on the personnel level is that of dedovshchina, or hazing. Dedovshchina in the Russian military is a truly horrific procedure that includes regular, brutal beatings, rape, and forced drug usage inflicted by senior conscripts upon new ones (Bogoslovskaya Polyakova and Vilenskaya 2001, 180-185). The problem has become so severe that an estimated 2,500 Russian conscripts die each year as a direct result of dedovshchina; new conscripts are either literally beaten to death or commit suicide to escape the torture (Ognev 1999). According to experts this particular problem has progressively worsened over the past decade because the military has, in general, only been able to recruit low caliber troops. Russian men can, at least temporarily, avoid conscription by paying a bribe or attending an institution of higher education. The military, therefore, is unable to recruit or conscript educated, middle or upper class citizens. Thus the institution has been forced to conscript more and more troops from the lower echelons of society, in particular convicted criminals. As
more criminals enter the military, the number and nature of crimes, including theft within the military as well as from civilians, and of course hazing of troops, is progressively worsening (Ognev 1999, Polyakov 2002, 80). This has, inevitably, resulted in an increase in desertion and suicide rates and a decrease in troop morale. There is a vicious cycle at work that must be broken before the Russian military can achieve any semblance of respectability. Unfortunately, ranking officers and military officials are doing very little to combat the problem of dedovshchina for the Russian soldiers who are its victims (Ognev 1999; Bogoslovskaya, Polyakova and Vilenskaya 2001, 182-190).

Chechnya

No discussion on the contemporary Russian military could be considered comprehensive if it did not mention the protracted conflict between Russia and Chechnya. This autonomous region is bound by Russian territory on the north, west and east; the southern border is shared with Georgia. Although it is landlocked and possesses few natural resources, Chechnya is geostrategically important because an important stretch of oil pipelines is laid across its territory (Kipp 2003, 180).

A fiercely proud ethnic group, the Chechens have been intermittently fighting for full independence since Czarina Catherine II first sent troops of the Russian Imperial Army to conquer the North Caucasus region in the 1790s (Kipp 2003, 180-183). Four centuries of sporadic but persistent conflict have had a fundamental impact on the social and psychological make up of both Chechens and Russians.
Therefore, this conflict persists as one of the most politically and emotionally charged issues in contemporary Russian politics.

The current conflict, labeled the Second Chechen War, began in 1999. There were two main catalysts behind this newest war; the Chechen invasion of neighbouring Dagestan in August and the Moscow apartment building bombings in September of that year. Fundamentalist Islamic warriors, who had co-opted the Chechen struggle for independence, hoped the invasion would spark an uprising on the part of all Muslims in the Caucasus and eventually result in the creation of an Islamic state in the region. Fearing that chaos and Islamic fundamentalism might spread into the broader North Caucasus, Moscow immediately retaliated. This retaliation escalated to full scale combat after the apartment bombings, which Vladimir Putin used as a political platform in his bid for the presidency (Kipp 2003, 190-193).

The war, intended by Moscow to quickly and totally defeat the Chechen rebels, has lasted four years and cost an estimated $10 billion USD as well as thousands of soldiers’, rebels’ and civilians’ lives (Herspring 2003, 169-170). Furthermore, the war has highlighted the problem of soldiers stealing from and otherwise abusing civilians. Human rights groups both in Russia and the international community have long been calling on governments around the world to end the atrocities of this war (Human Rights Watch 2002).

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Although the current conflict does not seem to be approaching any kind of conclusion, Russian military expert Dale Herspring believes that the country's Armed Forces are beginning to realize that this, like Afghanistan, is war that cannot be won (Herspring 2003, 169). This realization, combined with decreasing support for the war on the part of Russian citizens, may eventually persuade the Russian government of the necessity to force a political end to the hostilities.

The overviews provided here set the stage for an in depth discussion as to how the process of NATO expansion has influenced the Russian military. As described above, military reform during Boris Yeltsin's time in office was virtually nonexistent, whereas Vladimir Putin has enacted some small but significant changes. The remainder of this thesis will compare and contrast Russia-NATO relations and military reform programs under Yeltsin and Putin. It will seek to explain why the same policy of expansion, on NATO's part, had a more detrimental effect on the military reform agenda for Yeltsin than it did for Putin.

The following chapter will demonstrate that throughout Yeltsin's presidency, Russia's military bureaucracy persisted in viewing the North Atlantic Alliance as a threat to the security of their country. They used the expansionary plans of the

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21 According to surveys carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research, support for "continuing military operations" in Chechnya has dropped each year since 1999. A survey in December of that year showed 67% in favour of continuing operations; that number had dropped to 27% by May 2003. Correspondingly, the number of Russians in favour of "peaceful negotiations" has increased from 22% in December 1999 to 62% in May 2003.
Alliance to keep the 'threat from the West' at the top of Russia's security agenda and, in doing so, they slowed and blocked military reform efforts.
CHAPTER II

ROUND ONE:
THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP UNDER BORIS YELTSIN
(1991-1999)

Establishing harmonious relations with Russia has been a top priority for NATO officials since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s, the Alliance has made a concerted effort to prove to the government in Moscow that it is a purely defensive organization with a mandate to promote the values of liberal democracies and, as such, does not pose a threat to Russian national security (NATO "NATO Today" 2002, 20-21). This chapter will argue that virtually all members of the Russian political elite were resistant to NATO's largely friendly overtures throughout the majority of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. In particular, the military bureaucracy, which was ardently opposed to the streamlining and professionalization of Russia's Armed Forces, cited NATO's expansionary plans as evidence that the West continued to pose a threat to Russian national security. Hence, NATO enlargement provided justification for military officials to stymie military reform efforts throughout the 1990s.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first traces the turbulent history of Russia-NATO relations from the end of the Cold War to the end of Boris Yeltsin's

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22 It should be noted that not all overtures were entirely friendly. Certain advocates of NATO expansion believed that it would be an effective way, not of strengthening democracy throughout Eastern Europe, but rather of controlling Russia's great power ambitions should the need arise. For more on this, see Asmus 2002, especially Book II, Section 2 and Book III Section 3.
term. The second examines the goals of military reform set forth by Yeltsin, and looks at how and why virtually none of these goals was met. Through an examination of the key security doctrines released under Yeltsin's leadership, it will be demonstrated that NATO was unsuccessful in convincing the Russian political elite, particularly the military bureaucracy, that the Alliance and the expansion thereof did not pose a threat to Russian national security. The persistent belief that the West continued to pose a threat to Russia was a direct factor in slowing and preventing military reform throughout Yeltsin's presidency.

The Honeymoon Period

The 1990 NATO Summit, held in London, England, was a pivotal event not just in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance, but also in world history. At the time of the summit the very structure of the international system was being fundamentally reorganized in a way almost totally unanticipated by scholars and politicians the world over. Not surprisingly, as the threat that had given purpose to the North Atlantic Alliance faded into oblivion, many questioned the future relevance of NATO. The leaders of the Alliance, however, were not ready to concede that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had finished what it had set out to accomplish. They, therefore, used the London Summit assert their view that the Alliance remained valuable and relevant in the newly evolving international system.

…it must continue to provide for the common defence [of Europe]…Our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with
the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. (NATO 1990 “The London Declaration”)

While Alliance leaders were determined to prolong the life of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they recognized that it would have to be altered in order to fit the shape of the new international system. Accordingly, they recognized that for NATO to remain viable, it would have to drastically reformulate its relationship with the former Warsaw Pact countries. In order to demonstrate the Alliance’s willingness and ability to conform to the new security environment, NATO leaders used the platform of the London Summit to issue a formal invitation to Russia and the other Soviet Socialist Republics to enter into a new, constructive relationship with NATO. Alliance leaders asked the governments of the Soviet Republics “to come to NATO not just to visit but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO” (NATO 1990, “The London Declaration”).

Over the course of the following twelve months, NATO officials and bureaucrats worked tirelessly to develop a positive relationship between Russia (as well as other Warsaw Pact Countries) and NATO. These efforts culminated in the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)--comprised of all the NATO states, the CIS, the Baltics, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania--at the 1991 NATO-Rome Summit. Although some experts argued that the NACC, which was strictly a consultative body, did not have a sufficiently expansive mandate, the creation of this Council
was highly significant as it represented the first institutionalized forum with the capacity and mandate to bring together the Alliance and its former adversaries (NATO 1991, "The Rome Declaration"; Solomon 1998, 15-17).

The enthusiasm with which member states accepted the NACC, as well as tentative overtures on behalf of the Russian government indicating interest in eventual inclusion into the North Atlantic Alliance, fostered optimism regarding the future of European security and Russia-NATO relations as the post-Cold War era began (Solomon 1996, 13; Sergounin 1997, 58). For two years this optimism was validated. The period between 1991 and 1993, often termed the 'honeymoon' of Russia-NATO relations, was characterized by essentially productive and harmonious dealings. During this time, arms limitation and reduction talks were progressing rapidly, American and Russian leaders were conducting regular face-to-face meetings, and President Yeltsin's closest advisors advocated Russia's increased integration with the West as the young country struggled to find its place in the new world order (Kugler 1996, 27-29).

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and (to a slightly lesser extent) Yeltsin advisor Sergei Stankevitch, were adherents of the Atlanticist school of thought. Atlanticists strongly rejected isolationism; they argued that Russia's rightful place in the world could only be achieved through cooperation and cordial relations with the United States and Western Europe. Throughout the honeymoon period, the Atlanticist school of thought dominated Russia's domestic political discourse; this is
salient to our understanding of President Yeltsin’s pro-Western behaviour during this time (Kugler 1996, 28-31).

The End of the Honeymoon

Unfortunately, although perhaps inevitably, the influential position of the Atlanticists could not be sustained. By 1993 several different schools of thought had arrived on Russia’s domestic political scene. To varying degrees, each began to challenge the pro-Western position advocated by the Atlanticists. Some argued that Russia should focus on developing ties with the South and East rather than the West. Others argued that a more ‘statist’ or ‘Russia-first’ approach was necessary. Still others advocated an imperialistic, anti-American/Western policy based on ultra-nationalistic and communistic sentiments. While various scholars have developed different labels for these emerging schools of thought, the crux of the matter was that “the Atlanticists, once the majority, were rapidly losing strength” (Kugler 1996, 30-32; Sergounin 1997, 57-64).

As Russia’s domestic political environment began to shift rightwards, President Yeltsin lost autonomy and flexibility. Criticism of the president, particularly in regard to his pro-Western policies, began to increase. The climax came on October 4th, 1993 when factions opposed to Yeltsin’s domestic and foreign polices took over the Duma in an attempt to oust him from power. It was only because of his formidable personality, combined with a certain amount of luck and
the loyalty of the military that Yeltsin was able to hold onto the reigns of power. Nonetheless, his grip had lessened. He was no longer free to govern without considering the factions within the Russian government that opposed him. Although he survived the coup attempt, the incident highlighted the precariousness of Yeltsin's position.

Just three months later, in December 1993, Duma elections further unsettled Yeltsin's government. Much to the surprise of the 'Yeltsin family' and international observers, Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), won close to a quarter of the popular vote, making the LDPR "the most important of the right radical organizations and the largest faction in the Russian Duma from 1993-1995" (Sergounin 1997, 66). The October coup attempt and the December elections clearly demonstrated increased opposition to Yel'tsin's government and policies; as a result he was forced to adopt a more hard-line approach in dealing with the West, so as not to appear weak in the eyes of populace and other political parties (Kugler 1996, 33).

An Idea is Born

While Russian domestic politics were undergoing a rightward shift toward a more statist, less Western orientation, the opposite was occurring within the American domestic political realm. Democrat Bill Clinton took office in 1993, elected largely on his inward looking platform of stabilizing and rebuilding the US economy.

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23 For more on the October coup attempt, see Kagarlitsky 2002, specifically Part 1, Chapter 3.
24 For details on this and other referenda and elections held in 1993, see McFaul 2001.
(Asmus 2002, 20). However, soon after his inauguration, he became deeply involved in planning and developing America’s new role on the international stage in the post-Cold War environment. Early in Clinton’s first term in office, the idea of expanding NATO appeared on the radar screen. Before long, it became a critical, defining issue of Clinton’s presidency.

In late April of 1993, President Clinton attended the opening ceremony for the Holocaust museum in Washington, DC. It proved to be a fateful day for the North Atlantic Alliance. The opening of the museum was a somber and politically loaded event because ethnic slaughter was occurring in the Balkans at the time. Given the geostrategically significant role they played throughout World War II, the leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—respectively Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel and Arpad Goncz—attended the Museum opening. Beyond paying their respects to the Holocaust victims and survivors, these three men had an important reason for being at the museum opening. They feared for the futures of their countries given the precarious and unstable post-Cold War environment of Eastern Europe. They felt that the museum opening, staged against the background of violence in the Balkans, would give credence and power to their message regarding the necessity of ensuring peace and democratic stability in Eastern Europe (Asmus 2002, 23).

Knowing they had little time and an important request, the three Eastern European leaders met with President Clinton and explained, in succinct and powerful terms, that they wanted to become NATO members:
They still feared Russia; they did not trust the major West European powers. They trusted America. They wanted to join NATO to ensure that their countries would never again fall victim to the twin evils of nationalism and geopolitics that had produced so much tragedy in their part of Europe – and that were rearing their ugly heads in the Balkans. (Asmus 2002, 23)

Although no decisions regarding the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were made in the immediate aftermath of the museum opening, a seed had been planted in fertile soil: “NATO enlargement resonated with two of Clinton’s core convictions – a commitment to expand and consolidate democracy and his belief in the importance of modernizing America’s alliances in a globalized world” (Asmus 2002, 25).

The request from the three leaders, combined with Clinton’s enthusiasm for it, sparked one of the most intensive debates in the history of international relations. Inside and outside the United States, the notion of NATO enlargement provoked fierce argument. The ‘pro’ side had two main divisions: those that believed NATO expansion would constrain Moscow’s aggressive tendencies and those that believed NATO expansion would promote democracy, freedom and security. The ‘con’ side had numerous arguments. The most serious among them held that expansion would isolate Russia, potentially resulting in a government takeover by anti-Western extremists. Other anti-enlargement policy makers argued that expansion would dilute the Alliance to the point of ineffectiveness. Still others claimed it would be prohibitively expensive for the US to maintain troops in Europe as well as
assisting new members in the transition to NATO member status. As each of these arguments was propounded, the enlargement debate attracted more politicians, policy-makers and scholars. By mid-summer 1993, the debate was in full swing and had spread to all corners of the globe.

**Russia’s Initial Response**

Throughout the spring of 1993, while the debate intensified, Russia’s domestic political scene was still dominated by Yeltsin, who supported the Atlanticists. It is therefore not overly surprising that Russia’s, or at least President Yeltsin’s, initial reaction to NATO’s proposed expansion was one of ambivalence, bordering on acceptance (Kugler 1996, 62; Solomon 1998, 22-25). In fact, on August 25th, 1993 Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa signed a communique stating that Moscow did not object to Poland’s prospective membership in NATO. According to the communique, Yeltsin was willing to recognize Poland’s sovereignty and stated “the days were over when Moscow would dictate to Warsaw what it should do” (Boris Yeltsin, quoted in Asmus 2002, 37).

Domestically, however, Yeltsin was widely criticized for his tolerant view on NATO expansion. Barely months after the release of the communique, his government was undermined by the aforementioned October coup attempt and December election results. As a result of both the criticism and the shift within Russia’s domestic political realm, Yeltsin chose or was forced to adopt a significantly

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25 For more on nature of the debate and details of the arguments propounded by both sides, see Asmus, 2002; Duignan 2000; Haglund 1996 and Szyana 2001.
less tolerant approach to NATO expansion for the duration of his term in
government.

After over twelve months of behind the scenes debate and discussion,
NATO's enlargement was officially placed on the public agenda in January of 1994.
Two key steps were taken during this month to launch the concept of NATO
expansion. The first was the official unveiling of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program at the NATO-Brussels summit, which had been on the agenda in one form
or another since 1991. One group of NATO experts deemed this to be a direct
pathway to full NATO membership, while another group saw it as merely an
extension of the NACC and, as such, a way to avoid the thorny membership debate
that was looming on the horizon. While NATO membership is not guaranteed by
PfP membership--in fact, not all PfP members even desire full NATO membership--
this NATO substructure has essentially followed the prescriptions of the first group
of experts (Solomon 1998, 26-30; Duignan 2000, 57). PfP members are required to
commit to the following goals: achieving a transparent national defence planning
and budgeting system; democratic control of their militaries; contributing to UN
and/or OSCE operations; as well as establishing cooperative relations with NATO
and eventual interoperability with NATO troops. In return for carrying out these
changes, PfP affiliates receive a security guarantee from NATO--albeit in a weaker
form than the guarantee given to full NATO members--as well as assistance from
NATO's headquarters in Brussels and Mons to modernize their militaries (Solomon
The second key step on the road to an expanded NATO was President Clinton’s formal statement made on a state visit to Prague immediately after the Brussels summit to the effect that the question of NATO enlargement was no longer ‘whether’ but ‘when’ and ‘how’ (Asmus 2002 59; Duleba 2002, 154).

By this time, Russia’s political elite had converged on the issue of NATO enlargement. With surprisingly few exceptions, Russian politicians, bureaucrats and officials were united in their opposition to any form of NATO expansion. As Alexander Sergounin puts it, “there was a sort of anti-NATO consensus in the Russian domestic arena [at this time]” (Sergounin 1997, 55). 26

Given the widespread and ardent opposition to NATO enlargement, the Russian political elite initially welcomed the Partnership for Peace plan as they deemed it an acceptable alternative to the expansion of the Alliance. However, when it became clear that PfP was to be a corollary to expansion, opposition to it grew to the point where, in August 1994, Vladimir Lukin, (in his capacity of chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Duma), likened Partnership for Peace to the rape of Russia (Kugler 1996, 35). This type of strident opposition to PfP delayed Russia’s entrance into the Partnership program for over a year. However, eventually—in early 1995—the government in Moscow signed documents signifying Russia’s acceptance of membership into PfP (Kugler 1996, 65).

While Russia’s delayed but welcome commitment to join the Partnership for Peace was lauded as a watershed event in Russia-NATO relations, on many levels it

26 For a breakdown of Russia’s most commonly cited arguments against NATO expansion, see Duleba 2002, 167-174; Sergounin 1997, 56 and Baranovsky 2001.
failed to assuage Russia’s concerns regarding the expansion of the Alliance. At a press conference during a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting in December 1994, Yeltsin warned President Clinton and the world that NATO expansion could spark a ‘Cold Peace’ in place of a Cold War (Williams 1994, A1). The Russian president continued to propound this and similarly dire prognostications for almost three years (Kuglar 1996, 37-38).

By mid-1995 the government in Moscow had begun to realize that NATO expansion was going to occur whether Russia acquiesced or not. Therefore, over the following twenty-four months, Yeltsin and his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, attempted to slow, stall and maintain some degree of control over the enlargement process, all the while grudgingly accepting the inevitability of expansion in one form or another (Kugler 1996, 38; Sergounin 1997, 68). Essentially, the government in Moscow adopted a pragmatic approach to the enlargement issue in hope of mitigating its negative ramifications for Russia.

Partly in accordance with this new pragmatic approach, for the first time in history, in 1996, Russian troops began to work in cooperation with NATO troops in the Balkans (NATO “NATO Today” 2002, 20). Not surprisingly, this occurrence was lauded as both a tangible and symbolic demonstration of the feasibility of harmonious Russia-NATO relations. However, the real political watershed in the relationship between the Alliance and country did not occur until 1997 when Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO
and the Russian Federation (more commonly referred to as the NATO-Russia Founding Act) in Paris on 27 May (Mehrotra 1998, 1).

The Act was designed to be part of a dual track process advocated by President Clinton, in which NATO could expand without alienating Russia (Asmus 2002, 210-211). Thus, the essential purpose of the Act was to assure Russia that expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance was not an attempt to isolate or offend the country, but rather to foster a stable climate in which democracy could flourish throughout Europe (NATO 1997 "Founding Act"). The most significant accomplishment of the Founding Act was the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The PJC was designed with the central objective...[of building] increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. (NATO 1997 "Founding Act")

To this end, the Founding Act established regular PJC meetings at virtually all government and military levels. Significantly, the Act specified that meetings of the PJC would not be strictly limited to regular sessions, but rather allowed for impromptu meetings to be held when necessary. While by all accounts the NATO-Russia Founding Act signified a breakthrough in NATO-Russia relations, Alliance leaders placed certain limits on the mandate of the PJC (Mehrotra 1998, 2-3). For example, the Act expressly forbids intervention in the "internal matters" of both
bodies as well as the “right of veto over the actions of the other” (NATO 1997 “Founding Act”).

Despite these necessary limitations the Founding Act was strong enough to overcome the remaining hurdles blocking NATO expansion. Two months after it was signed, in July 1997, NATO members voted unanimously to invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance (NATO 2002 “NATO Today” 14). The Act “paved the way for NATO to celebrate its 50th anniversary with the addition of three new members” (Mehrotra 1998, 2). While the Russian government ostensibly remained opposed to the policy of NATO expansion even after the signing of the Founding Act, the document and the creation of the PJC provided sufficient domestic political leverage to sustain Yeltsin’s and Primakov’s grasp on power over their opponents in Moscow (Mehrotra 1998, 2; Dannreuther 1999-2000, 146-147).

Relations between Russia and NATO remained relatively harmonious and constructive for the following two years, and the new members were welcomed into the Alliance at a ceremony held in Independence, Missouri on 12 March 1999 with only mild protest on the part of the Russian government (Duleba 2002, 153). Unfortunately, however, another roadblock lay ahead for the Alliance and its new ‘partner’.

NATO’s Kosovo campaign, carried out without UN consultation or approval, seriously damaged NATO-Russia relations throughout the summer of 1999. In fact, relations deteriorated to the lowest level since the Cold War due to the widespread
perception in Moscow that its legitimate claims regarding its 'Serb brothers' were being ignored (Duleba 2002, 170-173). Russian fears regarding the nature of an expanded NATO, mitigated by the 1997 Founding Act, returned in full force with the Kosovo campaign. The PJC, supposedly a mechanism for consultation and conflict avoidance, was unable to help the two parties reach a compromise and was thus severely undermined (Antonenko 1999-2000, 126-135).

According to Alexei Arbatov, deputy chair of the Duma Defence Committee and Director of the Center for Political and Military Forecasts at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, “the use of NATO aircraft and missiles against Serbia on March 24th 1999 ended the post-Cold War phase of international affairs” (Arbatov 2000, 1). The bombings directly provoked a dramatic increase in anti-American sentiment throughout Russia and revived Cold-War-era suspicions and stereotypes. In short, the Kosovo campaign, once again, made NATO one of the top perceived threats to Russia’s national security (Arbatov 2000, 1, 2 & 9).

Although relations had improved marginally by the fall of 1999, the Russia-NATO association was severely damaged by the Kosovo campaign. Essentially, the campaign negated the progress achieved by the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council and the Founding Act. As one scholar puts it, by the end of 1999, Russia and NATO had “returned to their pre-Founding Act state” (Antonenko 1999-2000, 137).
On the international political level, Boris Yeltsin helped to bring about significant advances in NATO-Russia relations during the post-Cold War era. Under his leadership, the NATO-Russia relationship did not degenerate to the point of violent conflict at its low points, and the high points involved the permanent codification of consultation mechanisms. These accomplishments are commendable and should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, as the next section shall demonstrate, under Yeltsin’s leadership, NATO was never able to fully convince the military, nor the majority of Russia’s citizenry, that the West did not pose a threat to Russian national security. As a result, much needed military reforms were delayed and blocked throughout the 1990s.

Military Reform (or the Lack Thereof) Under Yeltsin

According to Russian military expert Dale Herspring, the term ‘military reform’ was used in speeches, documents and communiqués “literally thousands of times” throughout Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (Herspring 2003, 165). Although the detailed plans for reform are far too numerous and complex to elaborate on within the scope of this thesis, Yeltsin’s key promises included: a large reduction in the size of the Armed Forces; an end to conscription; the establishment of civilian control over the military; and the streamlining of the various branches of the military in order to eliminate redundancy (Hockstader 1997, A01; Baev 1996, 66-72). Despite these various commitments and frequent use of the term, according to analyst Dimitri Trenin, “military reform has languished in Russia for the last ten years”
(Trenin 2000). Or, more bluntly, Herspring states that military reform under Yeltsin was "a joke" (Herspring 2003, 155).

There is, of course, no one single reason explaining the unfortunate lack of actual military reform in Russia. Various problems, including a bloated and ineffective bureaucracy and Russia’s dire economic straits, all contributed to the problem. However, it is the contention of this thesis that the process of NATO enlargement also played a significant role in stymieing military reform during the 1990s.

As described in the previous section, the North Atlantic Alliance made a concerted effort throughout the 1990s to demonstrate to the Russian political elite that its expansion did not pose a threat to Russian national security. On the bureaucratic level, it could be argued that significant progress was made toward achieving this goal. For example, the NATO-Russia Founding Act clearly states "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries" (NATO 1997 "NATO-Russia Founding Act"). Despite heartening phrases such as this one, an examination of the key security doctrines developed by the Russian military bureaucracy as well as the behavior of this body throughout Yeltsin’s presidency indicates that this particular branch of the government, at least, remained unconvinced that NATO and Russia could become allies.

The Russian military’s initial reaction to NATO expansion was mixed. On the one hand, the Alliance was seen to be the personification of the nebulous ‘threat from the West’, and it was the duty of the military to protect the Motherland from
that threat. On the other hand, many military officials believed that NATO
enlargement could be manipulated in order to guarantee funding for the Russian
Armed Forces and allow Ministry of Defence officials free reign over military
decisions (Duleba 2002, 170; Sergounin 1997, 64). Specifically, the military argued
that NATO expansion was sufficient justification to stop further demilitarization of
the Kaliningrad Special Defence and Leningrad Military Districts, foster Russo-
Belarusian defence cooperation in checking potential NATO military build-up, and
even deploy tactical nuclear weapons on Russia’s western border and occupy the
Baltic states if they joined NATO (Sergounin 1997, 64).

The military’s perception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be
effectively analyzed by examining its security doctrines. Three key security
doctrines were released by the military bureaucracy during Yeltsin’s presidency: the
1993 Basic Principles of Military Doctrine, the 1997 National Security Blueprint and
the 1999 National Security Concept. Both the 1993 and 1997 documents contained
language that indicated that the military was not solely focused on the ‘threat from
the West’. According to the 1993 doctrine—written during the Atlanticist phase of
Russian politics—the main threat to Russian national security was deemed to be
“local wars” and “armed conflicts engendered by aggressive nationalism and
religious intolerance” (Baev 1996, 33). Similarly, the 1997 Blueprint “identifies the
most significant threats to Russian security as emanating from within--from its
internal political, economic and social crises and from the near abroad-- rather than
from more distant sources” (Dannreuther 1999-2000, 147).
Many cited these documents as proof that the Russian military was beginning to recognize real, rather than anachronistic, threats to security and was thus ready to professionalize the Armed Forces so that it would become capable of combating the religious fundamentalist threat in Russia’s near-abroad. Unfortunately, this is not an accurate assessment of the military’s perception of threat. Despite the fact that internal threats are prominent in these doctrines, external threats do not lag far behind. The 1993 Doctrine clearly cites “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the military security of the Russian Federation” as a threat to Russian national security (Baev 1996, 33). The 1997 Blueprint also clearly states “the prospect of NATO expansion to the East is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security” (Mehrotra 1998, 1). More disturbingly, the 1993 doctrine significantly lowers the threshold for use of nuclear strikes: “it allows for nuclear use against an armed attack by any country joined in alliance with a nuclear-armed state, if that country advances onto Russian territory or merely attacks Russian forces” (Kugler 130-131). This is clearly a large step back from the previous commitment to a ‘no first use’ or at least a ‘last resort’ policy.

Therefore, these documents demonstrate that the Russian military, despite the political and bureaucratic developments in the NATO-Russia relationship, continued to include the threat from the West in their key security doctrines. Even more significant, however, is the actual behaviour of the Russian military during
this time, which further indicates that the North Atlantic Alliance was perceived as
neither a partner nor an ally:

The opposition of a large part of the military leadership to the downsizing
of Russia’s strategic missile forces; the insistence on maintaining a large
conscript-based army; scenario planning for military exercises – all of
these pointed to a de facto conviction that the West remained the enemy.
(Lo 2003, 83)

The persistent belief on the part of the Russian military that NATO was still
an enemy can be further evidenced by a particular military exercise labeled Zapad-99
(West-99). In June 1999, just months after NATO’s Kosovo campaign, the Russian
military carried out a training exercise designed to “demonstrate Russia’s military
potential and its ability to wage substantial military operations in response to
NATO’s eastward expansion, and its military campaign against Yugoslavia”
(Muraviev 2001, 212). The exercise simulated an attack on Russia and Belarus by a
force “highly reminiscent of the NATO force involved in the Yugoslavia campaign”
(Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002, 76). It concluded with the ‘use’ of nuclear
weapons after it was demonstrated that conventional troops were not sufficient to
hold off the assault. Thus Zapad-99 was a disturbing exercise for at least two
reasons. Firstly, it highlighted the negative perception of NATO held by Russia’s
military officials, and secondly, it indicated the willingness of the Russian military to
use nuclear weapons ‘on enemy territory’ (Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002, 76-77).

As demonstrated above, the Russian military’s perception of NATO, which
had never been positive, was further degraded by the Alliance’s Kosovo campaign.
The 1999 National Security Concept, developed soon after the bombing of Yugoslav
Serbs, repudiated the positive developments that had been reflected in the 1997 doctrine.

Whereas the 1997 National Security Concept emphasized internal, largely economic and political threats, the new draft doctrine and security concept reverse that perspective. They invoke NATO and the United States as the authors of growing threats, define international affairs mainly in terms of the threat US unipolarity poses to Russia’s espousal of a multipolar world, expand parameters for nuclear first strikes, urge vastly increased defence spending, and calculate that spending on a Soviet basis, that is, upon the military’s proclaimed needs not Russia’s actual capabilities. (Blank 2001, 55)

Despite the Alliance’s numerous and concerted efforts to prove the contrary, NATO expansion was consistently viewed as a threat to Russian national security by the Russian political elite and military throughout Yeltsin’s presidency. In fact, “for most of the Kremlin’s generals, the idea that NATO could become a positive factor in East–West relations is heresy” (Herspring 2003, 171). For this reason, the scarce resources allocated to the military were spent on maintaining an unnecessarily bloated conscript force and a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. While it is impossible to state with certainty that the Russian military would have undergone reform if NATO expansion had not occurred, it is at least feasible to argue that more money would have been spent on modernizing the Armed Forces if the West had not been viewed as an active and hostile adversary.
CHAPTER III

ROUND TWO:
THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

When Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin became Russia’s President in January 2000, he faced an overwhelming array of problems. His country’s economy was in shambles, faith in government institutions was at an all time low, crime and corruption were rampant, the military was in a sorry state, and relations with NATO were still suffering in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. Although it would have been difficult to make the situation any worse and although Russia still faces numerous problems, during his time in office President Putin has managed to bring about a marked improvement in many areas. Of specific concern for this thesis, Russia’s current president has already coordinated a fundamental and positive shift in NATO-Russia relations. This chapter contends that he will be capable of implementing positive and considerable military reform in the foreseeable future as well.

As discussed in the previous chapter, military reform has been on post-Communist Russia’s political agenda literally since the new country’s birth. However, little to nothing has been accomplished on this front. The purpose of this

chapter is to show how and why it might finally be possible for fundamental military reform to take place in Russia. However, ‘possible’ does not mean ‘easy’. The vast majority of the military bureaucracy remains opposed to fundamental reform, specifically the professionalization of the Armed Forces, which makes overhauling the military a much more complicated and politically loaded task. Furthermore, military reform will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without the successful transformation of Russia’s economy. Nevertheless, the changed post-9/11 international security environment, combined with Putin’s political strength and widespread support for military reform among the Russian populace, may provide the government with enough justification (and means) to impose the modernization of Russia’s Armed Forces on its unenthusiastic military officials.

Putin’s Choice

It has been the fashion among journalists and some academics to point to September 11, 2001 as the turning point in Russia-US and Russia-NATO relations. This, however, is not entirely accurate. In actual fact, President Putin decided, at the beginning of his political career, that the most direct route to re-establishing Russia as a respected and powerful country was through engagement with the West. The events of 9/11 did not change his stance; they merely made it more politically feasible for him to pursue this type of Western oriented agenda. Similarly, Putin had already demonstrated his belief that the primary threat to Russian national security was not an assault from NATO or Western Europe, but rather terrorism,
stemming from secessionist movements and fundamentalist Islam in Russia's troublesome southern regions and Central Asia. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US by Al Qaeda's operatives have helped Putin convince the general Russian populace—if not the military bureaucracy—that the Cold War is truly over and that Russia faces a new and radically different threat. Of course, this view has been substantiated by the terrorist acts that have occurred on Russian soil, including the December 2002 hostage taking at a Moscow theatre and the July 2003 suicide bombings at a Moscow rock concert.28

Putin began expressing his pro-NATO tendencies as early as March 2000, when, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Company, he stated "it is hard for me to visualize NATO as an enemy." Moreover, during the same interview, he mentioned the possibility of Russia becoming a full member of NATO at some point in the future (Vladimir Putin, quoted in Herspring and Rutland 2003, 245; Glinski Vassiliev 2002, 2). Just a few months later, in July 2001 he indicated that Russia's opposition to the expansion might be surmountable, offering hope that the perennial conflict between Russia and NATO leaders could be resolved, or at least diminished:

As for NATO expansion, one can take another, an entirely new look at this...if NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organization...They keep saying that NATO is becoming more political than military. We are looking at this and watching this process. If this is to be so, it would change things considerably. (Vladimir Putin, quoted in Jones 2001).

28 For details on these terrorist acts, as well as an assessment of their impact on Russian security perceptions, see Weir, 2002 and Lafraniere and Baker, 2003.
These comments were confirmed in the following month during a visit to Helsinki when Putin made a public statement to the effect that Russia would not violently oppose the admission of the Baltic states into the North Atlantic Alliance (Herspring and Rutland 2003, 245). Together, these statements indicate that Putin had ‘chosen the West’ long before September 11th, 2001.

Putin also demonstrated that he had recognized the ‘real’ threat to Russian security and made a concomitant commitment to military reform prior to the terrorist attacks on the United States. Although initially some observers dubbed Putin’s anti-terrorist stance a cynical ploy to increase his popularity with the Russian electorate, the general consensus nowadays is that the president genuinely and passionately believes that the primary threat facing Russia is terrorism. “His hypersensitive responses to Western media questioning of Moscow’s conduct of the Chechen war point to a sincerity of conviction and purpose that goes well beyond the call of political pragmatism” (Lo 2003, 84).

Writing in 2000, Russia scholars Pavel Baev and Brian D. Taylor argued that Putin’s stance on military reform was sincere, and that his behaviour indicated a deeper commitment to reform than either of his predecessors, Boris Yeltsin or Mikhail Gorbachev (Baev 2000, 5; Taylor 2000, 4). Evidence of this commitment can be seen in Putin’s revival of the conscription debate early in his presidency as well as his appointment of a civilian, Sergei Ivanov, as Defence Minister—replacing Igor

29 Also see, Jones 2001.
Sergeev (Herspring 2003, 170). Overall, many respected experts—including Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, and Celeste Wallander, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies—have argued that Putin had made a commitment to establishing a constructive relationship with the US and the West, as well as professionalizing the military, before the tragic events of 9/11 (Trenin 2002, 1; Wallander 2002, 4).

Some Ramifications of 9/11

This discussion clearly demonstrates that the events of 9/11 did not affect a fundamental shift in President Putin’s way of thinking. They did, however, provide a valuable window of opportunity that enabled him to entrench his Western oriented, anti-terrorism policy and deepen his relationship with the United States (Jackson 2002, 10). As many scholars have noted, he did not hesitate to take full advantage of this opportunity.

It is of great practical and symbolic significance that Vladimir Putin was the first international leader to offer condolences and support to President Bush in the aftermath of the attacks (Kaufman 2001, 1). Shortly thereafter, Putin overrode opposition from both his Defence Minister and several senior military officials by declaring that the US could have access to bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and

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30 According to Pavel Baev, this was a cynical ploy to increase Putin’s control over the Armed Forces. He also states that Ivanov cannot really be considered a civilian given his recent retirement from the Foreign Intelligence Service (Baev 2001, 1).
Tajikistan in order to facilitate its military campaign against Afghanistan’s Taliban government (Jackson 2002, 19; Warren 2001).

Given the historical, symbolic and geopolitical significance of Central Asia for Moscow, it is not surprising that the majority of government and military officials were opposed to an American presence in the area. Just days after the 9/11 attacks, both Defence Minister Ivanov and Head of the General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin, stated that sympathy for the Americans would not extend to material assistance in Central Asia (Warren 2001; Colton and McFaul 2001, 47). Not surprisingly, the domestic reaction to Putin permitting a US presence in Central Asia was negative. As one Russian general put it, “ ‘We are clearly not impressed with the establishment of NATO bases in Central Asian states’ ” (General Konstantin Trotsky, quoted in Jackson 2002, 19). Another non-military official stated that “ ‘Russia and the entire former USSR is encircled by a ring of US and NATO military intelligence gathering bases, just like 50 years ago’ ” (Duma Chair Gennady Seleznov, quoted in Jackson 2002, 19-20).

Given the strong and vocal resistance on the part of his colleagues, Putin’s decision to grant the US access to the airbases in question speaks not only to his considerable political power, but also to his determination to use the 9/11 attacks as a means to forge better relations with the West, in particular the US.

Although granting American access to Central Asian territory was extremely significant, it was only one step among many that hinted at President Putin’s pragmatically pro-Western tendencies. According to an October 2001 Financial Times
report, Putin approached NATO “for assistance in restructuring its defence ministry and armed forces” (Dempsey 2001). Since September of 2001, Russia’s president has also fostered intensified cooperation between Russia and NATO with regard to combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (NATO “NATO Today” 2002, 23; Krauthammer 2002, A41).

Therefore, while the September 11th terrorist acts against Washington D.C. and New York did not foster a dramatic change in the Putin administration’s foreign policy agenda, they did open up a window of opportunity which President Putin skillfully manipulated in order to further his Western oriented policies. As journalist and Russia expert Robert Kaiser summarizes:

Within nine months after September 11, Putin took a series of steps that would have been unthinkable just a short time earlier. He signed up Russia for the US war on terrorism, welcomed the establishment of US bases in once-Soviet Central Asia, acquiesced to US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, accepted US terms for a new treaty to reduce strategic arms and brought Russia into a new relationship with NATO. In sum, he cast Russia’s lot with the West. (Kaiser 2002, B1)

These moves are not overly surprising when one considers the overall direction of Russian foreign policy since Putin’s accession to power. Putin’s behaviour, as both prime minister and president, has indicated that he deems Russia to be a European (as opposed to an Asian or Eurasian) state. In a recent interview he stated this belief quite bluntly: “In terms of its geography, history, culture, mentality, Russia is a European country…” (Frost 2003). In accordance with this outlook, Putin ceased to view the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an
adversary early in his political career. Therefore Putin’s desire to forge closer ties with NATO and the West after 9/11 did not signify a shift in Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Rather, it made this stance more publicly acceptable.

Russia’s widespread sympathy for Americans in the wake of the attacks has combined with a sense of understanding borne of its own first hand experience with terrorism. In turn, this has created a more favourable domestic climate for Putin’s government to push for a better relationship with both Europe and the United States.\footnote{Sympathy for Americans in the immediate aftermath of the attacks took many forms; countless Russians brought flowers and other offerings to the American embassy in Moscow to demonstrate their compassion for the victims of the attacks. Nevertheless, informal Internet surveys show that many Russians believe that, to a certain extent, the attacks were ‘America’s fault’ in that they were provoked by the US’s “aggressive” foreign policy (Kochkin 2002). Russia expert Eduard Ponarin, who has done extensive research on this issue of anti-Americanism in Russia writes that with the exceptions of the 1999 Kosovo campaign and the most recent Olympics, polls indicate that “anti-American sentiment in Russia is surprisingly limited” (Ponarin 2002, 1). He goes on to explain that anti-Americanism is more embedded and virulent among the country’s elite. For more on this issue, see Ponarin, 2002.}

Recent surveys indicate that the majority of Russians have overcome the mentality of the Cold War years and are capable of viewing old enemies as potential new allies. According to the results of a public opinion poll carried out in October 2001, 58% of the population support strengthening ties with NATO.\footnote{18% of respondents were opposed to such measures; 24% remained undecided. See Jackson 2002, 26 for more on this survey. These numbers are particularly impressive when one considers that just two years previously, in the wake of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, 63% of Russian respondents viewed NATO as a direct threat to Russian national security (Duleba 2002, 160).} We can deduce from this that “even Russian public opinion is abandoning its perception of NATO as an enemy and is beginning to see it as a possible ally for the protection of Russian security” (Jackson 2002, 26).\footnote{One reason behind this positive change in perception is the work that NATO is doing on the ground in Russia. A prime example of this is the Russia Centre for the Retraining of discharged Military Personnel, established in June 2002. The program, now active in St. Petersburg, Yaroslavl,}
In tandem to Putin’s realization that NATO no longer poses a threat to his country is recognition of what actually does pose a threat. The President has deemed terrorism to be the greatest threat Russian national security throughout his years in office. As Russia expert Kimberly Marten Zisk succinctly explains “it is not aggression by stable, economically comfortable states that Russia needs to fear today.... Instead Russia needs to fear aggression by unconventional means from those who wish to undermine Russian control in its geographic and ethnic peripheries” (Marten Zisk 2000, 4). In the post-9/11 security environment, President Putin understands that Russia and the United States face the same primary threat. Accordingly he understands the value and even the necessity of Russia’s participation in America’s War on Terror (Herspring 2003, 171).

However, Russia’s military persists in viewing Russia’s security concerns through an outdated lens—despite the fact that Russia’s most powerful political leaders have recognized the contemporary threat to Russian security, despite the fact that the Cold War ended over a decade ago, and despite the fact that Russia has been the victim of numerous terrorist attacks over the past four years. The military bureaucracy continues to view NATO and NATO expansion as a threat and, accordingly, is stalwartly opposed to all talks of Russia’s increasing cooperative Chita, Perm and Kaliningrad, is designed to help the nearly half million discharged Russian soldiers adapt to civilian life and find new types of work. It is also assisting Russia in converting former military sites to civilian uses. Not only is this program helping to alter Russians’ perceptions of NATO but it should also mitigate the political backlash from reducing the size of the Armed Forces. For more on this program, see NATO 2002 “ Civilians” ; NATO 2003 “ Discharged”).
programs with NATO, let alone Russia’s potential eventual membership in the Alliance:

Many members of Russia’s military elite object to Russia’s full entry into NATO...[it] would strip Russia of its independence and relative freedom of maneuver. As first Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Yury Baluyevsky explains “As a military person I see without a doubt that there is no need for Russia to join NATO military structures...all previous Russia-NATO relations were a waste of time”. (Jackson 2002, 35)

Military officials also persist in using this misguided threat perception to argue that Russia has continued need for a vast conscript force and a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. “The Russian military’s approach to NATO continues to prevent a major restructuring away from the Cold War preparations for war with NATO toward a modern, more capable military that can cope with instability and terrorism in Eurasia” (Wallander 2001, 1).

To varying degrees, the president, academics, and citizens agree that the international system and the security environment have changed since the days of the Cold War. The events of 9/11 helped facilitate this acceptance and understanding. Ironically, the military is one of the few remaining bodies that has yet to overcome the Cold War mentality and recognize that religious and separatist terrorism, not NATO, poses the real contemporary threat to Russia’s national security.

The Rome Summit, the NATO Russia Council and the Anticlimactic Prague Round
Despite the military’s persistent dislike and fear of NATO in general and NATO enlargement specifically, President Putin has been able to orchestrate a ‘new and improved’ relationship with the Atlantic Alliance. This was made clear at the Rome Summit, which was organized for May 2002, 6 months before the Alliance planned to issue invitations to prospective NATO members. The summit was organized partly as a result of Putin’s post-9/11 rapprochement with President Bush and the US, and partly as a way of mitigating Russia’s negative reaction to NATO’s second round of enlargement.

The Rome Summit was particularly significant for the NATO-Russia relationship as it not only codified certain cooperative measures which have been taken since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but also because it created the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) (NATO “NATO Today” 2002, 20). The Rome declaration, the document establishing the NRC, was signed on 28 May 2002 at Practica di Mare Air Base in Italy (Markushin and Sumbaev 2002, 1). The NATO-Russia Council was designed to replace the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) (1997-2002) and differs from its predecessor in one fundamentally important way: it is an executive, not a consultative body and, as such, will operate on the principle of consensus (NATO 2002 “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” 1). This means that “[f]or the first time Russia will have an opportunity to participate on equal terms in developing and implementing collective decisions…” (Markushin and Sumbaev 2002, 1). The PJC was essentially a forum for NATO officials to inform Russia of predetermined...
Alliance policies; the NRC is a forum where NATO and Russia will develop, at least some, policies together.

The Rome Document delineates several areas where Russia and NATO can cooperate within the framework of the NRC including: the fight against terrorism, combating proliferation of WMD, arms control issues and search and rescue at sea.34 Moreover, the Rome Declaration’s mention that the NRC would “explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training center for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century” was another significant first for the NATO-Russia relationship (NATO 2002 “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” 3). This was the first official announcement that Russian and NATO troops might work together in a permanent, rather than mission-specific, setting.

While the military bureaucracy may not have been overly pleased with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council and the possibility of a closer relationship with the Alliance, Russia’s government warmly welcomed the initiative, stating that it signified a new era in NATO-Russia relations. President Putin also used the signing of the Rome Declaration to further emphasize his belief that Russia could not combat terrorism without international support:

The decision to transform relations between Russia and NATO into a new quality partnership is correctly perceived by millions of Russians. The starting point here is a clear understanding that neither nuclear missile capability nor Cold War obligations can be a panacea for contemporary threats. (Vladimir Putin, quoted in Markushin and Sumbaev 2002, 1)

34 See NATO document entitled “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” for more details on these and other areas where NATO and Russia have outlined cooperative initiatives.
A key reason for the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council was the continuation of the ‘dual track’ approach to NATO enlargement. This approach, advocated by Bill Clinton, called for expanding NATO eastward while simultaneously augmenting Russia’s role within the Alliance in order to avoid aggravating this important and potentially dangerous country. The dual track approach worked quite well during the first round of expansion and extremely well during the second.

Experts writing as recently as 2001 predicted a serious rift in relations between Russia and NATO during the second round of expansion, especially if any one, let alone all three, of the Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—were invited to join the Atlantic Alliance (Larrabee 2001; Duleba 2002, 150-164). A journalist for The Economist explains, “[a] few years ago, the Balts were widely thought impossible to wrap into NATO; the Russians would have been too angry for the West to dare mention the idea” (The Economist “Nastase Shock” 2002).

Yet, in November 2002 at the NATO summit in Prague seven new countries, including the three Baltic states, were invited to become full NATO members and the response from the Russian government was barely audible. As one expert states, in contrast with the Madrid Round, this round “appears almost anticlimactic” (Trenin 2002, 1). Or, in the words of another Russia expert and journalist, “[t]he fact

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35 See Asmus, 2002.
36 Invitations were issued to Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia as well as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
that [NATO's second round of expansion] has elicited nothing but yawns is a measure of how radically the world has changed” (Krauthammer 2002, A41).

The silence on Russia’s part does not mean that there is no longer any opposition to NATO enlargement: on the contrary “[t]he bulk of Russia’s political establishment, particularly the foreign, defence and security communities, still resent what some refer to as NATO’s ‘eastern march’ because it eats away at their self-esteem and the traditional notion of Russia as a great power” (Trenin 2002, 1). Nevertheless, from the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council to the issuing of membership invitations, President Putin has been successful in quashing vocal domestic opposition to NATO expansion as part of his pragmatic Western oriented foreign policy (Jackson 2002, 36; Trenin 2002, 2).

The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that President Putin has been able to effect significant and positive changes in Russia’s relationship with the West and NATO at the international political level. The creation of the NRC as well as the concrete, cooperative steps taken in the aftermath of 9/11 substantiate the Putin administration’s pragmatic pro-Western foreign policy agenda. Putin’s successes at this level are due, in large part, to a decided lack of opposition; Western governmental officials, NATO bureaucrats and Putin’s inner circle all support deepening the ties between Russia and the Alliance. On the home front, however, Putin has received less support, and opposition to his Western-centric policies is
ongoing. Nonetheless, he has attempted to implement military reform. The next sections of this chapter will examine and evaluate Putin’s success in this regard.

The Conscription Debate

As this thesis has argued, overcoming the Cold War notion that NATO represents the ‘threat from the West’ is a prerequisite to the modernization of Russian’s armed forces. As long as NATO is considered a threat to Russian national security, the military will have leverage in arguing that the country requires a vast conscript force as well as a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. NATO is, of course, not the only reason why Russia’s generals are opposed to the professionalization and streamlining of the Armed Forces. Military officials have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo for many reasons, such as ensuring funding and maintaining a system in which Russia’s military bureaucrats are important and powerful (Jack 2002).

While convincing Russia’s generals that NATO has changed and no longer poses a threat to their country would eliminate a major roadblock on the way to establishing a professional, effective Russian military, it is highly doubtful that this is possible. This faction of Russian society, more than any other, was shaped and even created by the Cold War; the men in question lived and breathed a worldview in which NATO was the military manifestation of the enemy. It is, therefore, no wonder they find it difficult to believe that the Alliance has changed its stripes. As
the military is unlikely to come around to Putin's way of thinking regarding security issues, the only way he will be able to effect military reform is to force it.

Within the military reform debate, conscription is the arguably the most important and contentious issue for Putin and his generals. Eliminating conscription is primary and fundamental to the reformation process. It is also an action that the vast majority of the military bureaucracy vigorously opposes. This section will evaluate the progress that President Putin and Defence Minister Ivanov have made in attaining their stated goal of professionalizing the Russian Armed Forces, against the will of the military establishment.

Unlike most political issues, the mention of conscription elicits a passionate response from the average Russian citizen (Gerber and Mendelson 2003, 1 & 3). One reason for this is the number of people it directly affects; approximately 400,000 male Russians between the ages of 18 and 27 are drafted each year to serve in the regular army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces, border troops, and other branches of Russia's Armed Forces (Human Rights Watch 2002, 4). However, they represent only a fraction of what authorities are legally entitled to 'recruit'. In fact, according to one source only 11% of those eligible actually serve (Agence France Presse 2002). Many Russians of conscript age avoid military service by attending an institute of higher education, paying a bribe, and/or (legitimately or illegitimately) obtaining documentation in order to receive medical exemption. An increasing number of

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37 Due to the real and symbolic importance of this issue as well as the time and space constraints of this paper, the only aspect of military reform to be examined in detail here will be that of conscription. For a general assessment of other areas of change within the Russian military see chapter 1, Overview of the Russian Military: World Power to World Problem.
young men are learning these and other methods to dodge the draft through seminars organized and taught by private, grass roots organizations such as Soldier’s Mothers of St. Petersburg, Committees of Soldiers Mothers of Russia and other like minded groups dedicated to keeping Russian youths out of the military.38

The vast number of youths who do almost anything to avoid military service is an indication of how little faith Russians have in their defence establishment. According to a 2003 survey, only half of Russia’s population feels a degree of confidence in their army; approximately 40% have little to no confidence in the army; and approximately 10% are undecided (Gerber and Mendelson 2003, 2-3). The same survey revealed that support for draft dodgers is unusually high; nearly half - 41% - of the respondents expressed some degree of sympathy towards young men who avoid conscription; 19% indicated that they have ‘no’ sympathy, 27% indicated that they have ‘probably no’ sympathy and 13% remained undecided (Gerber and Mendelson 2003, 4).

The increasing number of draft dodgers in Russia has had at least two serious and negative ramifications for the military. Firstly, given that intelligent Russians can avoid service through education and wealthy Russians can avoid it through bribery, the majority of conscripts must be recruited from the lowest echelons of society, particularly convicted criminals (Herspring 2003, 160). Not surprisingly, this has caused crime to increase, and drug and alcohol abuse among servicemen has skyrocketed.

38 For more on this organization and its methods, see Bogoslovskaya, Polyakova and Vilenskaya, 2001.
Secondly, military officials are becoming desperate to 'recruit' new conscripts. This has resulted in a procedure termed 'conscription through detention' by Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW and Soldier's Mothers of St. Petersburg have reported numerous accounts of how young men have been literally kidnapped by authorities and taken to a military base where are forced to carry out their military service without the option or opportunity to inform their families of their situation, let alone pack their belongings and say goodbye (Human Rights Watch 2002, 1-12 & 14; Bogoslovskaya, Polyakova and Vilenskaya 2001, 179 & 189). This has even happened to young men who have legitimate medical conditions that exempt them from service (Jack 2002).

For those youths who either chose or are forced to serve in the military, it is a horrible ordeal. Barracks violence and dedovshina (hazing) rates have increased dramatically over the past decade. Human rights groups have collected the testimonies of thousands of young men who have run away from their military base in order to escape brutal beatings and rapes at the hands of their senior officers (Bogoslovskaya, Polyakova and Vilenskaya 2001, 180-185). Thousands more, unable to escape, have committed suicide as a direct result of dedovshina (Herspring 2003, 161). For all these reasons, public support for the professionalization of the military has become widespread and strong. According to the above mentioned 2003 survey, "virtually no one supported the status quo" when asked their opinion in regard to the general standing of the military (Gerber and Mendelson 2003, 2). With specific regard to the conscription debate, 60% of the Russian populace supports the
conversion of the military to a contract based system while only 30% advocate maintaining the current system (10% remained undecided) (Gerber and Mendelson 2003, 4).

In keeping with public sentiment and their own platform, President Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov have formalized plans to gradually abolish conscription. In November 2001, Ivanov publicly announced that the 76th Airborne Division would begin the professionalization process in 2002. This small scale experiment was designed to assist bureaucrats estimate costs and prepare for a more widespread professionalization program set to begin in 2004 and end in 2008 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 85-86; Human Rights Watch 2002, 5). In President Putin’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he declared that the Russian military, the Ground Forces, the Airborne Troops and the marines, would become professional by the end of 2008 (“State of the Nation” 2003). This statement was corroborated by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov the following day, who stated that “it is utterly realistic to suppose this programme [of professionalization] can be implemented by the end of 2008” (British Broadcasting Company 2003).

Military officials have publicly expressed their discontent with this plan. At an October 2001 conference in Moscow, General Anatoly Kulikov stated that conscription should not be abandoned, and that the Russian army should be kept at 1.3 million men (Pravda 2001). Soon after Putin’s State of the Union Address, Marshall Vladimir Mikhalkin, advisor to the Russian Defence Minister, stated at an army rally that the Russian Army would never become fully professional. The
Marshall said that "we don't need it and our economy will not allow us to do it" (Rosbalt 2003).

Despite military officials' opposition to professionalization, the 76th Airborne Division has already completed the process in full, and plans are progressing for more units to hire soldiers on a contract basis beginning next year (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003, 83-85). In fact, the Putin administration has introduced a $2.8 billion, four-year reform plan, which aims to increase the number of professional soldiers so that they comprise half the total number of troops by 2008. Further to this, a new ruling reduces the duration of current conscript terms to one year; new conscripts will also serve one year, up until 2008, when the ruling will be reviewed (Agence France Presse 2003).

Although abolishing conscription has been on the government's agenda since the early 1990s, it is only recently—and particularly since 9/11—that Russia's political officials have been able to move forward in this regard. That does not mean, however, that the battle has been won; professionalizing Russia's Armed Forces will be a slow and difficult process. However, unlike his predecessors who merely talked about the issue, Putin has taken some real steps on the road to a professional Russian military, during his time in office.

What does this Mean for the Future of Military Reform?

The events of 9/11 did not change the beliefs of Russia's political or military elite. President Putin favoured the West both before and after the attacks. Russia's
military establishment feared and disliked NATO before that event and continues to do so today. Thus, Putin and his close advisors are locked in a battle with Russia's military officials over the nature of the threat that Russia currently faces as well as what form and structure the Armed Forces should take. The terrorist attacks on the United States enabled Putin to "hammer home the message that the Cold War is over and that both the United States and Russia now face a common enemy, regardless of what the generals may think" (Herspring 2003, 171).

There is no doubt that Putin has alienated many members of Russia's military bureaucracy by pursuing his Western oriented agenda, which has resulted in, among other things, a potentially long-term US presence in Central Asia and the closing of Russian bases in Cuba and Viet Nam (Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002, 62). The question that remains to be definitively answered is whether or not this matters. Can Putin achieve military reform without the support of the military bureaucracy? How deep does the military's opposition to a Russia-NATO alliance run? The military's historical and recent behaviour both indicate that it will suffer in relative silence. Military officials will most likely continue to complain about NATO expansion as well as fundamental military reform; however, there are indications that Putin will win this important battle.

Firstly, the wake of 9/11, the taking of hostages at a Moscow theatre, and the rock concert bombings, have caused the majority of Russians to feel a certain degree of kinship with the American people, at least as victims of terrorism. As the general Russian populace begins to view the West and NATO as an ally rather than an
adversary, the military will find it harder to convince the public and government officials that Russia needs to maintain a Cold-War style military in order to defend itself from the West.39

Secondly, the ‘old guard’ of the Soviet Union is aptly named: they are aging and many will soon retire. The young officers who replace them will not have been subjected to the same level of indoctrination as their Cold War predecessors. Therefore, military perception of threat is likely to change. Thirdly, the military has a history of ‘doing what it’s told’ in Russia; this organization has consistently followed the political leadership of the country rather than determined it (Herspring 2003, 172; Barany 2001). Finally, as previously discussed, the majority of the Russian populace is aware of the serious problems in their defence institutions, and supports fundamental military reform. This, combined with Putin’s popularity and the new international security environment, should provide a sufficient foundation for the streamlining and professionalization of Russia’s Armed Forces. Providing that Putin takes full advantage of the situation, he should be capable of forcing long overdue military reform, despite opposition on the part of the military bureaucracy.

Moreover, if Putin manages his citizens’ changing sentiments regarding NATO effectively, he may be able to draw upon the vast experience of this organization, which could help speed up the process of military reform; “If Russia’s political leadership is serious about working with NATO to modernize its military, NATO could become a forum not only for security cooperation against terrors but

39 See survey cited in Jackson, 2002; the same survey is referenced here (p. 57).
for helping Russia to shed one of the remaining vestiges of the Soviet past”
(Wallander 2001, 2).

Over the past three years, Vladimir Putin has proven himself to be a skillful politician, capable of maintaining a strong grasp on power and gaining tremendous support from the Russian people, while strengthening economic and military ties between Russia and the West. With 9/11 having proven to be a powerful catalyst for change, Putin may finally be able to lead the desperately needed and long overdue reformation of the Russian Armed Forces.

Throughout Yeltsin’s presidency, NATO was perceived to threaten Russian national security. Now, over a decade after the Cold War has ended, Russians’ threat perceptions are finally beginning to change. Terrorist attacks on Russian soil, as well as the infamous attacks of 11 September, 2001, have helped to convince average Russians and certain members of the political elite that the security environment has undergone a fundamental transformation. In this new environment, the West (i.e.: NATO) is no longer the enemy, but rather a potential ally; NATO’s member countries are facing the same threat as Russia. As public and political threat perceptions continue to shift, and terrorism becomes the focus of Russian national security, the need to reform Russia’s military will become more apparent as neither a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, nor a bloated, dispirited conscript army, can effectively combat terrorism. Therefore, the Russian government must recreate the military into a smaller, better-equipped,
professionalized force. Putin's government has made a public commitment to constructing a professional and effective military. More significantly, it has taken concrete steps to bring this about. While the road ahead is long and difficult, Russia's civilians and soldiers can take heart in the knowledge that the journey has begun.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

Assessing the impact that NATO expansion has had on the Russian military is an important yet daunting task. This military institution is in a sorry state and the situation has been getting worse, not better, for the past decade. Many internal factors are responsible for this situation, including the Russia’s infamously vast, overwhelming and ineffective bureaucracy and the well-reported lack of funding allocated to the Armed Forces. This thesis has acknowledged these factors but argued that the process of NATO expansion also played a role in stymieing military reform. It has also examined the contemporary, post 9/11, security environment and assessed the likelihood of effective military reform in the foreseeable future. This brief concluding chapter will assess the theoretical implications of the conclusions drawn throughout the thesis, as well as summarize its key arguments.

Theoretical Implications

The liberal paradigm within international relations is comparatively optimistic regarding the ability of institutions to influence state behaviour and foster peace (Keohane 1993; Keohane and Nye 1993; Snyder 1991). The constructivist school of thought argues that IR scholars must take domestic cultural norms into account if they are to develop sophisticated analyses regarding contemporary and
future relations among nations (Johnston 1995; Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996). The conclusions reached in this thesis have implications for both these schools of thought.

Liberalism has many veins or strands, but adherents of this paradigm share certain fundamental premises. According to liberal scholars, "international relations are gradually being transformed such that they promote greater human freedom by establishing conditions of peace, prosperity and justice. This attitude toward progress reflects a general liberal stance..." (Zacher and Matthew 1995, 109).

Another fundamental premise, present in all strands but predominant in neo-liberal institutionalism and republican liberalism, is that institutions can constrain state behaviour and foster peace. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, Jack Snyder argued that:

> When institutions are strong, there is order; the effects of anarchy are mitigated. When institutions are weak, there is disorder; politics are marked by the perverse effects of anarchy. Thus, from this perspective, the problem of creating a new European security order to supplant that of the bipolar stalemate is above all a problem of building institutions. (Snyder 1991, 114-115)

According to liberal theorists, the democracy promotion regime—of which NATO is a key part—has proved capable of increasing state-to-state cooperation and fostering peace through the promotion of its (democratic) values. NATO's expansion into former communist, authoritarian countries is often cited as exemplifying the power of this institution to alter state behaviour and make
progress, in terms of increased peace and prosperity, possible (Wallander 2000, 720-724; NATO “NATO Today” 2002, 14 & 17).

NATO’s work in assisting the democratic development of new member states and countries affiliated with it through its Partnership for Peace program is significant, and should not be downplayed. Nonetheless, the information presented in this thesis indicates that liberals would be negligent to ignore domestic cultural norms as discussed by constructivists. The work here indicates that understanding a country’s domestic norms, would help in understanding its level of receptiveness to new ideas and procedures.

Eastern European states have willingly, even enthusiastically, implemented the reforms required by NATO in order to become members. However, Russian leaders, especially within the military, have proved extremely resistant to accepting NATO’s overtures. A detailed comparative analysis of this issue is too complex and convoluted to attempt within the scope of this thesis; nonetheless, we can deduce with relative confidence that Russian resistance to NATO’s expansion and promotion of democratic norms has been due in large part to Russia’s unique domestic norms and strategic culture.40

It would be an understatement to say that the evolution and development of Russia’s strategic culture has been turbulent. A nation forged in the crucible of destructive and bloody conflict is bound to have different attitudes towards war and

40 For our purposes, strategic culture is: “a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture” (Macmillian, Booth and Trood 1999, 8).
peace than a country forged in peaceful negotiations. The Mongol invasion of the 13th century, the Napoleonic invasion of the 19th century, a revolution, two devastatingly bloody World Wars, a fifty-year-long Cold War, the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan and two horrific wars in Chechnya have, to a large degree, shaped and created Russia's identity and military doctrines. Moreover, this history has created and fostered national paranoia and insecurity. When this is viewed in combination with the humiliation that Russia experienced when it lost its Great Power status just a little more than a decade ago, it becomes easier to understand why Soviet and immediate post-Soviet security policy was based on traditional questions of territorial protection, sovereignty and balance of power politics (Blank 2001, 53-59).

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's security culture has been in flux. After centuries of fearing territorial conquest, and decades of fearing an attack from the West, it is understandable that Russian military officials would be resistant to the idea that threats to Russia's national security have undergone a fundamental change and that now the Armed Forces must adapt, restructure and reform. This also aids our understanding of the military establishment's reticence regarding the abolition of conscription. Not only has this been the only system Russian's generals have known, until recently, it was an effective way of defending and deterring a large scale, state-based attack. Only with time and effective political leadership, will Russia's strategic culture evolve to a point where it is in tune with the contemporary security environment.
For all these reasons, NATO has been unsuccessful in convincing the Russian military that it is no longer an enemy, but a potential ally. In fact, the policy of enlargement, adopted by the Alliance in the mid-1990s, actually perpetuated the notion that NATO posed a threat to Russian national security. At least in part because of its turbulent history, the military establishment was loath to believe that the goal of the Alliance in its eastward march was to bring peace and increased stability to Eastern Europe. This would indicate that the constructivist approach to international relations—with its focus on understanding domestic culture and norms—can advance our understanding of certain phenomena, such as the Russian military's persistent resistance to NATO in general and NATO enlargement in particular.

A Disclaimer and a Summation

While I have aimed to draw insightful, accurate and useful conclusions from my research into this topic, there is much more work to be done if the ideas presented here are to be given full justice and credence. For example, it would be extremely valuable to have the means and opportunity to conduct a survey within the Russian military in order to delve more deeply into their opposition to NATO enlargement and professionalization of the Armed Forces. Further, it would be valuable to categorize the findings of such a survey into demographic and rank groupings. This would help us understand how deeply rooted anti-NATO sentiments are within the military, particularly whether they span all branches and
levels or are constrained to the upper echelons of the military. Additionally, it would be useful to learn how many Russian officers would advocate working with NATO to modernize the Armed Forces.

In order to develop more sophisticated arguments on the topic of this thesis, it would be necessary to have access to primary sources that examine Vladimir Putin's relationship with the Russian military. Such information would be valuable in ascertaining the extent to which Putin is beholden to the military for power as well as how united the military is in their opposition to Putin's pro-NATO policies. A better understanding of the connections within Russia's ruling elite--political, industrial, military, economic--would also be of assistance. Finally and most obviously, more time needs to pass before we can fully evaluate the effectiveness and success of the alternative civilian service program set to enter into force on 1 January, 2004 as well as the plan to phase out conscription by 2008.

Despite the almost premature timing of this project and limited access to primary sources and survey data, I have endeavored to provide a coherent argument as to the impact of NATO expansion on the Russian military as well as the likelihood of real military reform in Russia under President Putin.

During the 1990s, NATO expansion had a decidedly negative effect on the Russian military. In 1991/1992, the Armed Forces desperately needed breathing space to take stock of their situation, come to terms with the end of the Cold War, and develop an appropriate role for themselves in their new country. NATO expansion, however, prevented this. From 1993 onwards, the Russian military cited...
the process of NATO enlargement as proof that the West was still behaving aggressively towards Russia and continued to pose a threat. Therefore, rather than abandoning the Cold War mentality in the early 1990s, military officials propagated it. They have used NATO expansion to fuel residual Cold War fears of the West and, in turn, to maintain an outdated and unnecessarily bloated military structure. Specifically, this resulted in a continued focus on maintaining an unnecessarily large conscript force and nuclear arsenal, which diverted scarce funds away from reforming, equipping and training a smaller, more effective force.

Regardless of the rhetoric of the military establishment, NATO no longer poses a threat to Russian national security. Certainly, it has the capability and capacity to do severe damage should it choose to attack the country. However, for the past decade there has been no intent on the part of NATO member states or officials to attack Russia (Wallander 2002, 3). This is what Russia’s generals, indoctrinated by five decades of anti-Western, anti-NATO propaganda, have failed to understand. Russia’s military must be capable of defending itself against a far more insidious and difficult adversary than an assault from the West, one that cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons or a mass of badly trained, demoralized conscripted soldiers. Terrorism is the new threat and Russia’s military is virtually powerless against it because this institution is mired in a Cold War era mentality. The Russian military must undergo fundamental reform and become a professionalized, streamlined, and preferably civilian run, military in order to combat this threat. Furthermore, this is a threat that Russia cannot fight on its own.
Given its nature, Russia must form alliances with countries around the world, and specifically the West.

Since the beginning of his term in office, President Putin has demonstrated time and time again that he recognizes terrorism as the primary threat to his country's security, and that Russia needs allies to win this war. His behaviour in regard to the second round of NATO expansion as well as his support for the founding of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002 indicates that at the very least he wants to cooperate with NATO and NATO members in combating terrorism; at most, he wants to lead his country into NATO as a full member.

Mr. Putin has also acknowledged that Russia’s Armed Forces are in desperate need of an overhaul. He has made numerous public commitments to reform measures, and more significantly, has effected change in certain areas. Putin skillfully used the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States to further the Western oriented, pro-reform agenda he adopted at the beginning of his presidency. For example, he overrode vocal opposition from his military officials and allowed the US military access to Central Asian airbases. He has also pushed ahead with a plan to gradually professionalize the Armed Forces by 2008, despite opposition from the military establishment. The shift in threat perception facilitated by the events of 9/11 have made Russia’s political and security environment more conductive to Putin’s reform agenda.

In the not too distant past, the Russian military was feared and admired around the globe. It is still feared today, but for all the wrong reasons. The West
fears the incompetence of the Russian military, and the risk of a nuclear accident.

Russians fear their own military because of the horrible tales of young men being abused and tortured in the course of their military service. President Putin has both the support and the mandate of his population to effect fundamental military reform. He also has the advantage of operating in the post 9-11 security environment, and the concomitant recognition that terrorism has replaced the threat of an East-West war. For these reasons, Russian citizens and soldiers may feel some hope that, finally, their Armed Forces will be modernized and adapted to fit the 21st century—despite the fact that its military officials persistently behave as though they remain in the 20th.
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