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Riding style, party ethos : nominations, candidates and local campaigns in Canadian federal elections Sayers, Anthony M. (Anthony Michael) 1995

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RIDING STYLE, PARTY EThOS: NOMINATIONS, CANDIDAThS ANDLOCAL CAMPAIGNS IN CANADIAN FEDERAL ELECTIONSbyANTHONY MICHAEL SAYERSB.A.(HONS), The University of Western Australia, 1986MA., The University of British Columbia, 1988A THESIS SUBMI’imD IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAApril 1995© Anthony Michael Sayers, 1995In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. it is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)_____________________Department of P&hcL &uviaThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate (AprtDE.6 (2/88)11ABSTRACTDespite having the appearance of a single event, federal elections in Canada concatenatenearly 300 individual constituency contests. Yet little is known of how constituency campaignteams operate, or how they interact with each other. In order to provide a better understandingof local campaigns, this thesis describes and explains the nature of local riding associations, thecandidates they select, and the environment in which they operate. In so doing, it traces theimpact of both riding and partisan forces on the character of constituency politics, and onCanadian politics more generally.The thesis focuses on major party campaigns in seven ridings in British Columbia in the1988 federal election. It begins with a socio-political profile of each riding, including the mediaresources available to local campaigns. The dynamics of the local association, nomination, andcampaign are then reconstructed using information gleaned from interviews with candidates,campaign managers, party strategists, and volunteers. Similarly, personal interviews withjournalists who covered each of the local contests give further insights into the nature ofconstituency politics, and the methods by which local campaigns communicate with voters.Information on ridings and associations is then used to develop a typology of candidatesand campaigns. This typology suggests that there are four archetypal candidates: local notables,party insiders, stopgaps, and those with a high profile. Each tends to be selected by a certaintype of association, and to run a distinctive campaign. This typology is then applied to a numberof the actual campaigns from 1988.The patterns of politics identified by this typology suggest that local associations arecentral to the nature of Canadian politics and democracy. Each association combines riding andpartisan forces together in idiosyncratic ways. Associations are also distinctive in a comparativesense. Unlike local party organizations in other countries, they are neither beholden to theirparty, nor to the personal politics of a particular candidate.LiiTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstractThe InterviewsThe RidingsBumaby-KingswayFraser Valley WestKootenay West-ReveistokeOkanagan CentreSurrey NorthVancouver CentreVictoria.116212124262830323335Non-Local InterferenceSummaryChapter Four Nominations and DemocracyLocal Democracy8489Table of ContentsList of TablesList of Figures111viVIIAcknowledgement VIIIixThe Style and Content of Local CampaignsResearch Methodology and Choice of RidingsDedicationChapter OneChapter TwoChapter Three Classifying NominationsNomination FiltersAssociation AppealCompetitivenessNomination ProfileIdeologyAssociation PermeabilityMass versus Cadre Style Parties . .Association ContinuityCandidate SearchCompetitive AssociationsMass versus Cadre Style Associations3842444550535557616566687277ivParty DemocracyLatent DemocracyLimited DemocracyConclusion99104107114Chapter Five Campaign TeamsThe Structure of Campaign Teams .SympathizersSecondary WorkersThe Inner CircleCandidates and Their Campaign TeamsLocal Notable CandidatesParty Insider CandidatesStopgap CandidatesHigh Profile CandidatesConclusion119121123125127130131139146153162Local Notables, Parochial CampaignsParty Insiders, Subsidiary CampaignsStopgap Candidates, Parallel CampaignsHigh Profile Candidates, Component CampaignsChapter Seven The Local ContestPolitical CommunityCountry RidingsSuburban RidingsCity RidingsThe MediaCountry RidingsSuburban RidingsCity RidingsContestedness and CompetitivenessAll Candidates Debate .The Federal CampaignConclusion204208211216219225227232235240245248252Riding and Partisan Influences on Local CampaignsKim Campbell: High Profile PartisanThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party Relations261265268270Chapter Six ThePartyLineIntra-Party RelationsConclusion168• . 173176• . . 182• 188• . . 192• 200Chapter Eight Winning Campaigns 259VChapter TenThe Local ContestSvend Robinson: Local Boy, National HeroThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestAl Horning: Packaging a Local Notable .The Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestJohn Brewin: Party Insider, Heir ApparentThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestConclusionLosing CampaignsBob Brisco: High Profile Fall from GraceThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestDon Ross: Stopgap Candidate with FamilyThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestLynn Fairall: The Faithful Party InsiderThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestTex Enemark: Smoke and MirrorsThe Candidate and Campaign TeamIntra-Party RelationsThe Local ContestConclusionConclusion: Riding Style and Party EthosThe Nature of Canadian PoliticsCanada in Comparative Perspective273279281285288297301306308316319322325333420427432Bibliography 436449Chapter Nineand Friends....338• .. . 341344349353• . . . 362• . . . 366370• • . . 373• • . • 381• . . . 385• . . . 389• • • • 393• .. . 401• . .. 402• . . . 405409• . .. 416Appendix A Campaign Election ExpensesviLIST OF TABLES2.1 Characteristics of Ridings 192.2 Composition of 1988 Ridings 234.1 Types of Nominations 1155.1 Campaign Team Characteristics 1676.1 Intra-Party Resource Flows in Parochial Campaigns 1776.2 Intra-Party Resource Flows in Subsidiary Campaigns 1836.3 Intra-Party Resource Flows in Parallel Campaigns 1896.4 Intra-Party Resource Flows in Component Campaigns 1933. OF FIGURESNomination FiltersTypes of NominationsCampaign WorkersThe Structure of a Campaign TeamLocal NotableParty InsiderStopgap CandidateHigh Profile CandidateIntra-Party RelationsContestedness and CompetitivenessThe Style and Content of Local Campaigns . .viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTI would like to thank the candidates, campaign managers, volunteers andjournalists who agreed to be interviewed for this study. In all, over 150 suchindividuals gave generously of their time, and in so doing, made this thesis possible. Ihave not provided a list of all those I interviewed in order to protect the anonymity ofthose who requested it.I am grateful for the financial support of the University of British Columbia andthe Department of Political Science. This assistance allowed me the opportunity topursue my studies, and to write this thesis.As with all theses, this one reflects something of the environment in which itwas written. I would like to thank my colleagues and friends at the University ofBritish Columbia for providing an atmosphere conducive to work, and moments oflevity when they were sorely needed.I owe a special debt of gratitude to Cathryn Gunn, who volunteered for theonerous task of editing and re-editing the thesis. Her diligence and skill greatlyimproved both its form and content.My committee in the Department of Political Science, including ProfessorsDonald Blake and Richard Johnston, provided critical insights, most of which I hope arereflected in the text. I also wish to thank my advisor, Professor Ken Carty, forstimulating my initial interest in Canadian political parties and campaigns. His adviceand editorial work helped direct the thesis, and purged it of many of the faults Iendowed it with at one time or another. His door was always open to me, and for this Iam deeply grateful.I am also grateful to Professor John Meisel for a single cryptic comment that,although it took me some time to understand, much improved the thesis.Finally, words cannot fully express the debt I owe to Monica Frederica Hess. Itis only with her love, and her support of every aspect of my life, that this thesis wascompleted.ixTo my parents, Mervyn Cornwall Sayers, and Eileen Frances Sayers.CHAPTER ONETHE STYLE AND CONTENT OF LOCAL CAMPAIGNSThis thesis describes and explains the style and content of local campaigns in Canadianfederal elections. Style and content are shorthand for the strategies and tactics adoptedin a local campaign, and the organizational and allocational decisions that these imply.This chapter introduces the theoretical perspective of the thesis. It then outlines thevarious factors that influence local campaigns, and in so doing, situates the study inrelation to other literature on nominations and campaigns. It concludes by brieflydescribing the manner in which the rest of the thesis is presented.The thesis takes as its starting point the observation that the nature of any localcampaign is a function of both local conditions and the organizational imperatives of theparties and campaigns of which riding-level political organizations are seminalcomponents. While this observation is not new (Siegfried 1906; Eagles 1990; Carty1991a), this study is the first to apply this insight systematically to all the elements of alocal campaign, from the nomination through to election day.In order to better understand local campaigns, the thesis builds a detailed pictureof the factors that shape the nominations which select the candidates who compete infederal elections in Canada. It continues with a description of how candidates constructtheir campaign teams, and the dynamics of the local contests in which they participate.The thesis concludes by exploring the linkages between the nature of local campaignson the one hand and the character and functioning of national parties on the other.In contrast to most studies of constituency campaigning in Canada (see forexample, Meisel 1964), this study does not address directly the link between voters andlocal campaigns, although it complements much of the work done in this area (see alsoMeisel 1957). Rather, it focuses on the organizational aspects of local campaigns, andis a corrective to the neglect of local constituency organizations of political parties as aspatially delineated element of the Canadian political system (Smiley 1987, 190).This thesis fills the gap between the idiosyncratic portraits of local campaignsfound in journalistic accounts of nominations and elections, and the more general surveyresearch by academics that by its very nature focuses on the national campaigns ofpolitical parties.’ A number of the studies produced for the Royal Commission onElectoral Reform and Party Financing (1991) have also been directed at filling thislacuna.The lack of local perspectives on major political processes amongst academics isnot unusual. Agnew (1987) argues that there has been a devaluation of place and localcontext as explanations in the social sciences. He attributes this to the developmentalassumptions of much liberal social science, and the absolutizing of commodification inMarxist political economy (ibid.,79).2 These approaches tend to view social phenomenaat a national level, and are linked to a national integration thesis that is common in the1For an example of the former, see Lee (1989), and the latter, Johnston (1992).2This is a generalization to which there are many exceptions. For example, Key (1949),Siegfried (1913), Beck (1974) and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992).3social sciences, and which denies the explanatory power of local context (ibid., 141).With respect to Canadian elections, there have been only a few attempts to consider theimpact of the character of the riding contests on the behaviour of voters, and these havegenerally used census and survey data (see Blake 1978).While Agnew’s observations are concerned with the study of voting behaviour, asimilar pattern is evident with respect to the study of the dynamics of campaigning.There has been a tendency to study them at the national level, leaving local campaignsand contests largely unexplored. This process has also been driven by a growing beliefin the importance of national level campaigning and politics, which has beenunderpinned by the centralization of media (Fletcher 1987, 363-7), and the importanceof leaders in Canadian parties (Courtney 1973).Agnew suggests that if we are to study local political forms successfully, theycannot be understood by simply adding up the factors that cause political behaviour(such as class, ethnicity and religious affiliation) in a linear fashion. Rather, it is themanner in which these factors “come together” in a particular place and time, and in sodoing take on meaning for people and determine political outcomes, which provides abasis for coherent political analysis (1987, 213). This study thus examines the detailedinteractions of candidates and campaigners within the spatial and temporal contexts ofconstituency elections.To understand local campaigns, it is necessary to begin with a description ofriding associations and the nominations they run. Parliamentary representation on thebasis of geographically defined single member ridings is central to the character of4Canadian politics. This is most obviously true during a federal election, which can beseen as the concatenation of nearly 300 constituency contests.3 Most of theseconstituency elections are contested, and the activities of local campaigns have a bearingon electoral outcomes (Heintzman 1991, 143-4). It is precisely because of the need towin these constituency battles that a national party’s success depends on whatevervolunteers it can attract and hold at the local level (Carty 1991 a, 72). This underpinsthe importance of both riding associations and constituency politics in Canada.Despite great variations in the electoral strength of political parties in Canada,“the electoral system, and our contemporary assumptions about what makes a nationalparty, require each party to maintain a local association in each riding” (Carty 1991a,71). Control over the nomination process gives constituency organizations a pivotal rolein the life of Canadian parties. They are the link between voters and the political partiesthat dominate political life (ibid., 25). Associations jealously guard local control overthe nomination process, and tend to select candidates with some knowledge of andattachment to the riding (ibid., 178). This underpins the importance of local practicesand conditions in shaping nominations (ibid., 181).Despite being formally similar across parties and regions, associations varyenormously in size, stability, and level of activity (ibid., 20-24). The character of anassociation reflects its competitive position, the nature of the local riding, and theLocal campaigns easily out-spend the national campaigns of political parties. During the1988 federal election for example, the election expenses of all local campaigns totalled $31341 494, while the head offices of the national parties spent a total of $22 425 849 on theelection (Canada, Canada Elections 1988).5organizational style of the party of which it is a constituent unit. First, competitiveassociations are larger and better funded than those that are uncompetitive. Second,associations in country ridings have different membership profiles and exist in a verydifferent milieu than those in city ridings. Third, mass and cadre style associations,despite sharing similar formal organizational rules, have distinctive approaches to theircentral tasks.The distinction between mass and cadre style parties proposed by Duverger([1954] 1955, 63) is central to this study. The Liberal and Conservative parties inCanada have not adopted a mass form, as have most parties in Westminster stylesystems (Beer 1967). Cadre style associations in the Liberal and ProgressiveConservative parties have a cyclical existence, springing into action in order to senddelegates to leadership conventions, or to nominate candidates to run in elections.Outside these times, many are moribund.In contrast, many NDP associations have a continuous existence, even in ridingswhere the party is not strong. This organizational persistence is characteristic of massparties (Carty 1991a, 70). This difference in organizational form across Canadianparties coincides with an ideological distinction between left and right. As well,because the NDP is the only one of the three parties not to have held nationalgovernment, this division also corresponds to a competitive cleavage. As such, themass-cadre distinction is critical in explaining variations in partisan styles with respectto associations, nominations, and campaigns (Carty and Erickson 1991, 162-169).Riding conditions, and in particular the competitive positions of the local6associations, have direct implications for the ways in which associations organizenominations. Larger, more competitive associations are better organized to search outcandidates, and have greater electoral appeal than their less competitive counterparts.Except where the presence of an incumbent restricts competition, the former are morelikely to experience contested nominations. Given the volatility of the Canadianelectorate (Blake 1991; Heintzman 1991), there is commonly more than one associationin most tidings that can claim to be competitive.While we would expect a local condition such as competitiveness to influencethe character of local associations and their nominations, the impact of partisanorganizational styles on local riding nominations is less well documented (although seeCarty and Erickson 1991). The cyclical existence of cadre style associations, and theirloose organizational arrangements, make it easy for prospective candidates to gainaccess to their nominations. The ground rules appear straightforward: a candidateplaces his or her name before the association committee organizing the contest. Onceaccepted, he or she then works to attract as many supporters as possible. Many of thesewill be new recruits to the association. The candidate hopes that these recruits willprovide him or her with the greatest number of votes at the nomination meeting, and soensure victory.This process is not quite the same in a mass party such as the NDP. As a massparty, the NDP expects its members, and in particular its candidates, to exhibit acommitment to the party and its principles. This underpins the continuity of existencebetween elections found in many NDP associations. Evidence of solidarity with the7party’s cause, the sine qua non of class-based politics, is critical to a candidate’ssuccess, usually taking the form of a history of involvement in either the party or unionmovement. The implicit requirement that candidates be party members in good standingreduces the size of the group from which NDP association draw their candidates. Theirorganizational strength makes them well suited for searching out candidates fromamongst the party faithful.Because of the relative importance of the existing membership in theseassociations, nomination candidates focus more on convincing current members tosupport them than on trying to recruit large numbers of new members. This isreinforced by the difficulty of attracting new members to mass party associations thatappear to demand greater commitment than do cadre style parties. The NDP has alsobeen less successful at the national level than either the Conservatives or Liberals, andhas had a more difficult time attracting candidates and members to its associations. Thelack of an infusion of recruits just prior to an election, as found in the more permeableLiberal and Conservative parties (Carty 1991a, 30-39), reinforces the NDP’s reliance onexisting members both as candidates and campaign workers.The nomination process not only selects the candidate, it is also critical indetermining the sort of support a candidate receives during the campaign. The type ofcandidate that is selected, and his or her relationship with the campaign team, can havea strong bearing on the final shape of the campaign. So too can the resources of theteam, and the vision of campaigning that team members bring to the campaign.Campaigns in which the campaign team believes that the candidate’s personality is the8key to success are very different from those in which the team focuses on the partyplatform as their best chance of success.Competitiveness tends to be associated with well financed and staffed campaigns.In terms of partisan effects, solidarity among NDP members means that even inrelatively uncompetitive associations, the campaign is run by a group of experiencedparty stalwarts. In most NDP associations, party members are willing to work forwhichever candidate is selected. In fact the association executive may play an importantrole in assigning campaign team positions. In looser cadre style associations, the finalform of the campaign team is more likely to depend on which candidate wins thenomination, as many members have allegiances to nomination candidates rather thandirectly to the party. As a result, the candidate plays a much bigger role in composingthe membership of the team.Variation in the nomination experiences of competitive and uncompetitiveassociations, and even mass and cadre style associations, can be seen in the role of nonlocal parties in local nominations. Extremely uncompetitive associations may be unableto attract a candidate, and may have to rely on the national party to supply a volunteerfrom outside the riding. National parties can also become involved in nominations fortheir own reasons. Ridings that the party is likely to win can attract the attention ofnational strategists hoping to ensure the party elects a particular mix of MP’s. Thenational party - using the leader’s veto- may work to have a particular nomineeselected.There are also some riding contests across Canada that national party strategists9believe have an impact on the wider election. This is usually the result of the mediaattention they have received in previous elections, or some special circumstance thatseems certain to attract such attention. Strategists may attempt to ensure that acompetent, high profile candidate wins the nomination in these ridings, in order tobolster the party’s image. Most such ridings are in metropolitan areas that are servicedby large media outlets.Such direct strategic intervention is more common in cadre style parties than inmass parties. This reflects the fact that as well as organizational and ideologicaldivisions between the two cadre style parties and the NDP, there is also a competitivedivision. The greater number of competitive Liberal and Conservative associations offermore opportunities for national strategists to attempt to advance their own causes byintervening in local affairs. It may also be the case, given the common cause acrossdifferent levels of the NDP, that local outcomes are more consistent with national partyobjectives, and thus obviate the need for direct national intervention.It is the distinctive nomination experiences of competitive associations versusthose that are uncompetitive, and of cadre style associations as opposed to mass partyassociations, which provide the basic matrix around which this thesis is constructed.The four types of nominations produced by this typology each tend to select adistinctive type of candidate, around which subsequent campaign teams are built.During the election proper, national party intervention- driven by localconditions- can alter the make-up of the campaign team. A party may offer a candidatefinancial assistance and professional advice on how best to run a local campaign. It10may even be willing to provide workers for key positions. Such intervention is adouble-edged sword, as despite its potential helpfulness, it may introduce incompatiblenational strategies into the local campaign. Just as importantly, the attitude of localcampaigners to national party imperatives can have a profound impact on the strategicdirection of the campaign. Mass party campaigns are more willing to accept non-localstrategic direction than their cadre style cousins. Given this, more competitivecampaigns in any party can afford to ignore national advice and the resources that mightcome with it, and head off in their own strategic direction.The local contest itself is the final factor that shapes the style and content ofriding campaigns. The nature of the contest reflects the character of the local politicalcommunity, its geography, the media in the riding, and the competitiveness of the localcampaigns (Beck 1974; Blake 1978). The character of the riding shapes the localpolitical agenda to which campaigns must respond. The amount and type of media thatcovers the riding is critical in the formation of this agenda, and to the way in whichlocal campaigns engage with each other. The lack of a media coverage that focusesdirectly on the local contest results in an underdeveloped agenda that can easily beinfluenced by non-local media and campaigns. There is also a dynamic between thecandidate and the local community. Although not as pronounced as that found in theUnited States (Fenno 1978), the ways in which candidates are presented to the publicare shaped by the nature of the local community.44Perlin (1964) and Davis (1964) provide accounts of the impact of local issues andcandidates on riding contests.11In addition, the intensity of competition in the riding also influences the style andcontent of local campaigns involved in the contest. There are, two elements which canbe used to classify local campaigns. The first is the number of campaigns that have achance of winning the constituency election. Where there is only one competitivecampaign, the election is less intense that in those cases where there are two or more.Secondly, the final form of any campaign depends on whether the party has a chance ofwinning the election, or is uncompetitive, and therefore marginalized from the realcontest. This has clear implications for the style and content of the local campaign.A campaign’s strategic and allocational decisions are shaped by its access to themedia. Campaigners generally believe that the voters’ perceptions of their campaign -its competitiveness and the credibility of the candidate - can be greatly affected bymedia reporting. Campaigns attempt to attract positive media reporting in influentialmedia by staging news conferences and other events. Most campaigns advertise in localmedia, but cannot afford to advertise in the major, influential news media. Even if theycould, large, influential media outlets are rarely well targeted to voters within any oneriding. Conversely, those that are well targeted and which campaigns can afford, areoften not influential.The media play another crucial role: they bring the federal election writ largeinto the local riding. The reporting of the leaders’ tours, their debates, poil results, andthe full panoply of election events can influence the dynamic of the local contest,including voters’ opinions of local campaigns and the morale of local party volunteers.If non-local media dominate reporting in a riding, the view of the election that voters12receive is not shaped by or related to the local agenda. The reverse can be true inridings where there is credible media reporting the contest. Not only does this haveimplications for the issues that are salient to the local contest, it may underpin voters’perceptions of the competitiveness of local campaigns.There is certainly evidence that local and regional factors play an important rolein shaping local political organizations, and these organizations make use of their localknowledge to enhance their electoral performance (Beck 1974; Huckfeldt and Sprague1992). There are identifiable patterns in the social composition of ridings and the mediaavailable to them. These patterns are largely visible in the distinction between country,suburban, and city ridings (see Janowitz and Kasarda 1974). Also, different geographiesplace distinct demands on local campaigns, so that they differ across these city,suburban, and country ridings.Accordingly, this thesis applies and elaborates the distinction between contestedand uncontested nominations, mass and cadre party organizations, and city, suburbanand country ridings, in order to analyze the character of local campaigns andconstituency contests. The study commences with the observation, drawn fromempirical research, that the two broad types of nominations, contested and uncontested,can be further divided into those to which candidates have ready access, and thosewhere restrictions are placed on entry. Such restrictions arise either from partisanorganizational mores or from strategic concerns. The result is a convenient four celltypology that can be used to comprehend the variety of observed nominations. Eachcategory of nomination produces its archetypal local candidate: local notable, party13insider, stopgap candidate and high profile candidate.The particular constellation of support and resources needed by each type ofcandidate to win the nomination produces corresponding differences in the character andstructure of their campaigns. The final form any campaign takes also depends on thenature of the constituency election in which it is involved. The thesis identifies cleardifferences in the style and content of city, suburban, and country constituency contestsand campaigns.The evidence presented in this study suggests that local associations, and thenominations and campaigns they run, are central to the fabric of Canadian politicalparties and politics. In building a picture of this important part of the political system,this work provides a clearer understanding of how political parties and elections work,and their impact on Canadian political life. Specifically, it provides insights into therelative importance of local factors over provincial or national concerns, the nature ofintra-party relations, the role of the media with respect to elections, as well as the partplayed by candidates in campaigning.Further to this, knowledge of constituency organizations and politics is relevantto at least two broad areas of study with respect to political parties. One is the debateover the role of parties in Canadian politics, in which they are regularly found wanting(see for example, Meisel 1991). A related concern is the challenge to their integrativeand representative roles by the growth of new interests and modes of politicalparticipation (Carty 1991a, 230-1). While parties have both a national and provincialface, and fulfill these tasks in public at these levels, the great bulk of their interaction14with voters happens out of sight in local constituencies.Second, there is a growing professionalization of political parties in many liberaldemocracies (Panebianco 1988). This is in response to the centralization of media, andthe growing complexities of modern campaigning. Canadian parties have beenparticularly susceptible to the widespread tendency to focus more heavily on partyleaders as the personification of party platforms. The implications of this process,which may attenuate links between the national and local parties, can only beunderstood if we have a clear picture of constituency organizations and politics.The thesis proceeds in the following manner. The next chapter introduces theseven ridings and twenty five campaigns that are the focus of this study. It also outlinesthe methodology of the study, including the reasons for choosing these ridings, and theways in which information was gathered.The next three chapters deal with the nomination process through to theconstruction of a campaign team. Chapter three discusses the various factors that shapethe nomination process, and distinguishes between a number of archetypal nominationcontests. The following chapter suggests that each of these forms of nominations tendto select a particular type of candidate. This discussion is extended in chapter five byexploring the distinctive character of the campaign teams that each of the four types ofcandidates take with them into the election.Chapter six considers the relationship between the local campaign team and itsparty’s provincial and/or national campaigns during elections. It suggests that the fourcampaign types have identifiably different sets of relations with their non-local15counterparts. This has implications for control of the strategic direction of localcampaigns.Chapter seven looks at the impact of the riding level contest on the character oflocal campaigns. It notes that there are consistent differences between campaigns incountry, suburban, and city ridings. This is due to patterns in the social and physicalcharacter of these three types of ridings, and of the media that covers local electioncontests.Chapters eight and nine present eight case studies of local campaigns. Theformer deals with winning campaigns, the latter with losing campaigns. Thesecampaign stories are told using the categories developed in earlier chapters.Chapter ten concludes the thesis by suggesting some of the broader linksbetween the nature of local campaigns and the character of the Canadian polity. Theseobservations allow us to consider Canadian politics in a comparative light.[6CHAPTER TWORESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHOICE OF RIDINGSThe research on which this study is based was designed explicitly to provide analyticaldepth rather than representativeness. The aim was to place local campaigns andconstituency contests in their riding context. This is difficult to do using survey data.As Barton (1968) notes, “...the survey is a meat-grinder, tearing the individual from hissocial context and guaranteeing that nobody in the study interacts with anyone else in it”(quoted in Blake 1978, 282). Rather, it was felt that contextualization was bestaccomplished by interviewing candidates, campaigners, party strategists, and journalistsinvolved in the 1988 federal election.The selection of ridings to be studied was guided by the criteria used for anearlier study of local campaigns and their relationship to the media done for the RoyalCommission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. This earlier study distinguishedbetween city and country ridings, and was interested in constituency contests that haddifferent media profiles. It focused on constituency contests and campaigns inVancouver Centre and Kootenay West-Reveistoke (Sayers 1991).Vancouver Centre was selected because it is a high profile city riding thatreceived inordinate press attention in 1988 and was very closely contested. In contrast,Kootenay West-Reveistoke is a country riding that was not closely contested in 1988,and was won by the NDP not the Tories. In addition, it had its own local media and17was some distance from the Vancouver media.Having decided to extend this work to more ridings, it was thought best to selectridings and contests that were prima facie interesting in their own right, and which apriori, exhibited a variety of characteristics that might be expected to impact on thenature of local campaigning. Any critical variables and patterns that could be identifiedby this study, might be tested for representativeness in future studies. A similar processis outlined by Fenno, with respect to his work on members of Congress in the UnitedStates.“I spent a lot of time trying to figure out a priori what types of ... [constituencies].might pose serious tests for, or exceptions to, whatever generalizations seemedto be emerging. Participant observation is not like survey research . . .datacollection and data analysis .. .proceed simultaneously. [It precedes] survey-typequestionnaires [and] sacrifices analytical range for analytical depth” (1978, 3).The logistics of personal interviews constrained the number of ridings it waspossible to cover. For the same reason, it was felt that the study should concentrate onthe major parties, although interviews with some Reform Party candidates are includedin recognition of the insurgent nature of their campaigns in 1988. In order to choosebetween the ridings in BC, it was necessary to build a profile of constituency electionsin the province in 1988. Some of this was done using media reports of local contests.Further information on the character of ridings, used extensively throughout the thesis,was drawn from Eagles et al. (1991) and Canadian Census Data (Canada, StatisticsCanada 1987). It should also be noted that campaign funding information, and electoralresults cited throughout are drawn from two Canada Elections publications (1988a;1989). Media profiles for ridings are drawn from Canadian Advertising Rates and Data (1988).18As shown in Figure 2. 1, the closeness of the contest, the winning party, thegeography of the riding, the local economy, and the media in the riding were all used todescribe and choose among constituency elections in the province. It was felt that theseprovided substantial variation across a range of factors that might influence localcampaigning and elections, yet were manageable in terms of travel and numbers ofinterviews.Burnaby-Kingsway appealed as an opportunity to look at a riding with a veryhigh profile incumbent in Svend Robinson, yet whose opponents were nowhere near aswell known. Robinson was an important player in his own party, and received local,provincial and national media exposure. Studying this riding also offered theopportunity to consider the impact of an incumbents personal following, and to look atan NDP stronghold.Fraser Valley West is a country riding that was a Tory stronghold in 1988. Theincumbent had won by the third highest margin of victory of any Tory in Canada in1984. The effects of this one-party dominance on local campaigns, media, and theriding contest are of interest. Fraser Valley West is on the perimeter of Vancouver, andhas its own defined media and local interest. It is in an area renowned for itsconservatism. This was important as the Tories were under attack from the right on anumber of issues in 1988.Okanagan Centre was a new riding in 1988, and thus without an incumbent. Itwas subsequently won by the Tories. The lack of a clear political history meant that itwould be possible to watch local riding associations build themselves from the ground19TABLE 2.1CHARACTERISTICS OF RIDINGSRiding BK FVW KWR OC SN VC VICWinning NDP PC NDP PC NDP PC NDPParWGeography city cntry dntry cntry suburb city cityEconomy Manuf. Farm Mining Farm Service CBD BCDorm. Dorm. Forests Tourism Dorm. Manuf. Gov’tTourism SeniorsMarginal No No Yes No Yes Yes YesHigh. Profile Yes No No No No Yes YesMedia Local Local Local Local None Local LocalProv’l Reg’l Prov’l Reg’lNat’l Nat’lNote: BK - Burnaby-Kingsway; FVW - Fraser Valley West; KWR - Kootenay WestRevelstoke; OC - Okanagan Centre; SN - Surrey North; VC - Vancouver Centre; VIC -Victoria. CBD - Central Business District.20up, and try to convince prospective candidates to run. All three parties experiencedcontested nominations. In addition, the Reform party had its best result in BC in theriding. Finally, there are sizable media organizations based in the city of Kelowna,which Okanagan Centre encompasses. This provided a chance to look at a riding whichhad the undivided attention of influential local media, and a distinct local economy andgeography.Surrey North was also a new riding, in the fastest growing suburban area inCanada. It was won by the NDP. It held some of the same attractions as OkanaganCentre, but provided a counter-balance to the country and city ridings already selected.The election had been quite close, with both the PC and NDP nominations beingstrongly contested. In stark contrast to Okanagan Centre, there was hardly any mediainterested in covering this contest. Local campaigns had to communicate with votersusing other means. Surrey is in some ways an undistinguished dormitoiy communitylost in the larger Vancouver metropolis.Victoria on Vancouver Island was closely contested, with one of the rare BCLiberal campaigns that did reasonably well against its NDP and Tory opponents. Aswith Vancouver Centre, an incumbent had retired, leaving three nominations open.Because the riding encompasses the provincial capital, local politics is well covered inthe regional media. As a city riding, it offered an opportunity to reconsider some of thefindings from the Vancouver Centre study.21THE INTERVIEWSTo ascertain the role played by various actors involved in campaigning at the local levelin national elections, a standardized personal interview was conducted with candidates,campaign managers, official agents, communications officers, and party organizers whoworked on the 1988 federal election. In addition, a similar interview was conductedwith various members of the print and electronic media in the seven ridings studied.The questions were developed from those used for the earlier Lortie Commission study.These interviews attempted tO assess the objectives, strategies, and resources eachparticipant brings to a local constituency contest. As well as looking at the relationshipbetween campaigns and the media, the interviews also addressed relations amongstdifferent levels of the media and different levels of political parties.In the seven ridings, the study covers 25 campaigns, over 50 media outlets, andis made up of 120 personal interviews. In addition, analysis of information from the1988 National Election Survey and recent surveys of official agents and campaignfinancing done for the Lortie Commission are used to supplement these interviews.THE RIDINGSAs noted above, the selection of ridings was the result of an intuitive process. In all,there are four ridings that were won by the NDP, and three by Tories. As John Turnerwas the only successful Liberal candidate in BC in 1988, and Vancouver Quadra wasnot considered to be different enough from Victoria and Vancouver Centre to warrantinclusion, there are no contests that were won by Liberals. Four were contested ridings,22three were not. Farming, primary industry, tourism, manufacturing, and services, areeach represented amongst the base industries that support local riding populations.There are three country ridings, three city and one suburban riding. Three of the 25candidates interviewed were women. Three of the contests could be considered to havehad a high profile, and good media coverage, while the other four were mn-of-the-millin this regard.Changes to electoral boundaries alter the politics of a riding. The membership oflocal associations can change, as can their competitive positions. The disruption to thelife of local associations may make their nominations more open to new candidates.New issues may move onto the local political agenda to replace ones that are no longerrelevant. As a result, the campaigns run by local associations, and the contests that theyproduce will reflect these boundary changes.Table 2.2 indicates how each of the seven ridings was constituted following the1987 redistribution. Victoria, Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Vancouver Centre, andOkanagan Centre (although it was a new riding in name), can all be said to contain ahigh proportion of polls drawn from a single 1984 riding. Burnaby-Kingsway, FraserValley West, and Surrey North are less dominated by polls from any single previousriding.The impact of these changes has much to do with the political history of thevarious elements that constitute the new riding. If, as in Bumaby-Kingsway, the variouspolls now grouped together share a similar political history, the change may only impactassociation membership. The competitive position of the associations, the campaigns23TABLE 2.2COMPOSITION OF 1988 RIDINGSCURRENT RIDING CONSTITUENTNAME FORMER RIDINGS PERCENTAGESFraser Valley East 41.3Fraser Valley West Fraser Valley West 58.7Fraser Valley West 41.1Surrey-North Surrey-White Rock-North Delta 58.9Okanagan North 78.9Okanagan Centre Okanagan-Similkameen 21.1Burnaby 41.6Burnaby-Kingsway North Vancouver-Burnaby 33.8Vancouver-Kingsway 24.7Esquimalt-Saanich 5.5Victoria Victoria 94.5Vancouver Centre 81.3Vancouver Centre Vancouver East 2.8• Vancouver Quadra 15.9Kootenay EastKootenay West-Revelstoke Reveistoke 1.3.4Kootenay West 86.6Source: Almanac of frederal Ridings (Munroe bagles et. a!., 1991)24they run, and the issues that are raised, may be largely unchanged from previouselections using the old ridings. In the case of Kootenay West-Reveistoke, theproportionally small addition of Reveistoke to Kootenay West had a large impact on thecontest, as it added strongly New Democrat polls to a riding with a fine partisanbalance.The transposition of votes from the 1984 election onto 1988 boundaries was usedas an indicator of whether there had been a material change in the terms of competitionamong parties during the intervening period. None of the chosen ridings hadexperienced such a change (Canada, Canada Elections 1988b). The competitivepositions of the local associations in 1988 was not obviously aberrant.Burnaby-KingswayAn urban riding of 107 948 residents, Bumaby-Kingsway is a constituency which islargely a product of recent redistributions. Almost 60% of the constituency was in twoadjacent ridings prior to 1988. Redistribution resulted in the elimination of NDP MPIan Waddell’s Vancouver-Kingsway seat. Burnaby-Kingsway is bounded on the westand north by Vancouver ridings, to the south by New Westminster and to the east by theouter suburban riding of Port Moody-Coquitlam.At nearly 23%, residents of British extraction make up the largest group in theriding, with the Chinese community (11.5%), the Italian community (6.8%), and theSouth Asian community (4.5%) being the other major groupings. The riding attractedlarge numbers of immigrants after the late 1940’s, and between 1966 and 1977, 13. 1%25of the province’s immigrants settled here. Simon Fraser University lies within theboundaries of this constituency.Light manufacturing industry employs 14% of the work force, including food andbeverages, metal fabricating, and paper and allied services. Large industrial parks andwarehouses, situated to take advantage of Burnaby’s central location and proximity tothe Port of Vancouver, are also major employers. The average income of $38 528 isabove the provincial average, the unemployment rate of 10.7% is 2.7% below theprovincial average, and the average value of a private dwelling is $121 330. Lowincome families make up 18.2% of the local population, and just over 10% of allincome is derived from government transfers, below the provincial average.The NDP candidate in 1988 was Svend Robinson, the NDP MP for the seat ofBurnaby since 1979. The 36 year old lawyer had been the NDP’s Justice Critic anddeclared his homosexuality during the previous parliament. His stand on abortion wasat odds with the pro-life attitudes of his opponents, and his willingness to defy a courtorder by participating in the blocking of a logging road on the Queen Charlotte Islandsbrought condemnation from his opponents. This local race had national exposure- thePrime Minister made electoral reference to the incumbent - and the NDP went all out towin the seat, out-spending its opponents by more than three to one.Despite personal attacks over his stand on abortion and his openness concerninghis sexuality, Robinson improved on his 1984 vote share by taking just over 43% of thetotal vote. His Conservative opponent, Italian born John Bitonti, who ran a campaignthat emphasized traditional values, received 30% of the vote. Bitonti, an urban designer,26had run for the Social Credit Party in 1986, but was making his first foray into federalpolitics. Liberal Sam Stevens, a lawyer and status Algonquin Indian from Quebec,received 22.1% of the vote. These Tory and Liberal vote shares were down marginallyfrom 1984. The Reform Party was the major beneficiary of these losses, garnering 2.7%of the vote.Burnaby-Kingsway has little media of its own. Two student publicationsassociated with Simon Fraser University and BCIT, as well as a couple of communitynewspapers, gave basic coverage to the local contest. What is remarkable is thatincumbent Svend Robinson received inordinate media attention from provincial andnational news media of all forms on the basis of his personal profile. This coverage iscommensurate with his role on the national political stage. His two opponents werelargely ignored by the non-local media.Fraser Valley WestOn the eastern fringe of Greater Vancouver, the constituency of Fraser Valley West hasthe Fraser River as its northern boundary, the US border at its southern extreme, andreaches eastward to Abbotsford. Two thirds of the polls are urban and the rest rural,including the small municipalities of Langley, Aldergrove, Matsqui, and Clearbrook.Langley has recently joined the Greater Vancouver Regional District, an indication ofthe way in which this once rural riding is changing, with many of its larger agriculturalland holdings being converted into small hobby farms.Most of the 95 014 residents are of British origin, with substantial German and27Dutch components, a francophone minority of 2%, and a native population that accountsfor 1% of the riding. The conversion of the Fraser Valley into metropolitan suburbs isseen in the increasing reliance of the population on manufacturing and service sectoremployment as well as small business. Agriculture still accounts for 8.8% of theworkforce, and government services 6%. The average family income is $34 564, andunemployment is slightly below the provincial average of 13%. Almost 18% of thepopulation is classified as low income, and just under 14% receive government transfers.Almost 4.5% of the constituency have university degrees.The recent addition of the Tory strongholds of Clearbrook and Matsqui to thisConservative riding has arguably made it the strongest PC riding in British Columbia.The Conservative candidate in 1988 was former teacher and businessman Bob Wenman.A Social Credit member of the BC legislature from 1968 to 1972, and a candidate forthat party’s leadership in 1986, Wenman had been a member of the federal parliamentsince 1974. He emphasized the free trade agreement, the environment and family valuesin his campaign. The Liberal candidate was Tony Wattie, a lawyer and first timecandidate. Along with NDP candidate Lynn Fairall, a government corrections worker,Wattie opposed the free trade agreement. The NDP also campaigned against theConservatives’ proposed tax reforms and attacked their record on the environment.Support for the Conservatives was 16 percentage points below that of 1984, butwith 45.8%, Wenman was 20.2 points ahead of the NDP’s Fairall, who captured 25.6%of the vote. Wattie placed third with 19.6%, an increase for the Liberals of 7.6 pointsover 1984. National leader of the Christian Heritage Party, John Van Woudenberg,28received 4.7% of the vote while the Reform Party’s John Russell garnered 3.5% of thevote.Perched at the periphery of Vancouver, Fraser Valley West has its own smallmedia outlets based in the towns in the riding, including radio, newspapers and cabletelevision. Local voters also have access to media from Vancouver proper. This createsan interesting media profile. The contest is well reported by local media that is read,watched and listened to by local voters, while the story of the wider contest is toldmainly by the Vancouver media.Kootenay West-ReveistokeThis constituency is a large sprawling riding approximately 500 kilometres long andrunning north-south up the Selkirk Mountains and Columbia River of British Columbia.The US border forms its southern boundary, and the Kamloops and Prince Georgeregions its northern boundary. The main provincial transport and communication linksrun east-west across the riding. There are a number of clearly identifiable towns(Reveistoke in the north, Nelson, Trail, Rossland and Castlegar in the south) whoseeconomic interests include the large Cominco smelter in Trail, mining, forestry, railwayexpansion, and tourism. Related manufacturing and service sectors have also beenmajor employers in the region.In recent times there has been a focus on developing tourism in the area via theskiing industry and the restoration of old towns, some of which have been used by thefilm industry. This new economy is at odds with the existing highly unionised sectors29noted above which still remain politically important. The addition of the NDPstronghold of Reveistoke following the narrow Conservative win of 1984 promised atight race in 1988.Despite an unemployment rate that consistently runs several points above theprovincial average, and an average family income that is almost $4 000 below the norm,over 57% of the constituency are Thome-owners”. This constituency also has the lowestpercentage of people moving over the past five years of any constituency in B.C., and5% of the population have a university degree. About one-quarter of the 67 317 votershave British ancestry, with large Italian, German, French and Hungarian communities.This constituency has proven to be very competitive. The straight NDP versusPC battle is typical of the province. Remarkably, the same two men have fought foursuccessive elections, and the seat has swung back and forth. This competition betweenthe PC’s Bob Brisco and the NDP’s Lyle Kristiansen, the former aioca1 chiropractorand the latter a woodworker and union executive, has meant that in every election fornearly a decade the incumbent faced an experienced campaigner and former MP.Brisco won the seat in 1979 running against first-time candidate Kristiansen by amargin of 8 percentage points. The latter took the seat in 1980 by 2.8 points, but Briscowon the seat back in 1984, beating Kristiansen by 2.2 points They were joined in 1988by Liberal candidate Garry Jenkins and Green Party candidate Michael Brown, Jenkins adoctor and alderman from Rossland and Brown a self-described hermit. Kristiansen hadtried to convince Brown not to run, but in the end the Greens’ 2% vote was notdecisive, with Kristiansen winning by more than 10 points from Brisco, who suffered a30greater than 10 point drop in support. The Liberals support increased by 8 points.Most of the larger towns and cities in Kootenay West-Reveistoke have at least acommunity newspaper. A few also have larger daily newspapers that have someinfluence on local events, and that report the local contest in some detail. As well, thereis a respected radio network with an emphasis on news that broadcasts throughout thewhole riding, and which gives the local contest extensive coverage. The local cablestation also provides air-time for local campaigns. The fragmentation of the localmedia, and its inability to devote substantial resources to interrogating the localcampaigns limits its influence across the riding. The larger provincial and national newsoutlets available in the riding play an important role in telling the wider election story.Okanagan CentreThis seat was created after the redistribution in 1987, reflecting the growth in populationof this region in recent years. It is made up of more than three quarters of the oldOkanagan North riding. Much of the population growth is associated with theincreasing number of retirees moving into the area. The new constituency is half urbanand half rural, encompassing the city of Kelowna, home base of the Bennett SocialCredit dynasty. The population of 89 730 is largely made up of voters of Britishancestry with sizeable German, Ukrainian, French, Dutch and Italian populations. Thereis a small native population.Though the constituency has some affluence, over 17% of the population isclassed as low income. Average family income is $32 289, over $5 000 less than the3’provincial norm. At about 16%, the rate both of unemployment and of those receivingincome assistance are above the provincial average, in part as a result of the seasonalnature of employment. More than one quarter of all the employment in the riding isaccounted for by small business, manufacturing, and service-related industries. Directagricultural employment is just below 6%, with tourism the fastest growing industry inthe region.The Conservative bent of the riding is clearly seen in the 1984 Conservativelandslide, when the Conservatives won the seat by 34% from the NDP, capturing 58%of the votes. In 1988, the local campaign focused on the impact of free trade on localagriculture. Farmers were pulling up vines, and large numbers of orchards were up forsale. Conservative Al Horning, a well known local realtor and alderman was opposedby NDP’s Bryan Mclver, an insurance broker and one time Conservative, and LiberalMurli Pendharkar, former local school superintendent. The Reform Party had a dynamiccandidate in Werner Schmidt, a founding member of the party, and the Green Party rana candidate.The result was unsettling for the local Conservatives. The Tory vote fell byalmost 21 percentage points, but they still managed to win the seat by a 7 point margin;the Reform party picked up about 14 percent of the vote, much of which must havecome from ex-Tories. The NDP vote increased by 5.4 points to 30.2%, and the Liberalsmaintained third place by increasing their vote by two points to 17.1%.There are three major local newspapers, two television stations, half-a-dozenradio stations as well as community newspapers in this riding encompassing Kelowna.32While major provincial and national news sources are available in the riding, its ownmedia is influential, and local campaigns can afford to advertise in it. This selfcontained aspect of the riding gives a particular local flavour to politics in OkanaganCentre.Surrey NorthThis largely residential riding of 107 052 was formed since the 1984 election and thushad no incumbent in the 1988 election. 41.1% of the riding came from the FraserValley West riding and 58.9% from the Surrey-White Rock-North Delta riding. Itsnorthern boundary is the Fraser River, while the suburb of Delta is on its westernboundary and Langley is to the east.Its population is of predominantly British extraction, with a very large EastIndian community and smaller German, Dutch and French communities. 22.7% of theriding are immigrants. The average family income is $4 000 below the provincial norm,and 22% of the riding’s families are classed as “low income”. The moderate price ofhousing has attracted young home buyers, and 47% of the constituents own their ownhome. Unemployment runs 2% above the provincial average, and only 3.4% of thepopulation have a university degree, the lowest in the province.The economy of the riding is mainly based on shipping and related industriesalong the Fraser River. About 16.5% of the local work force are in manufacturing,13.2% in service related work, and there remains an important agricultural sector, nowpredominantly in market gardening. Because Surrey is a dormitory community for33greater Vancouver, most of its workforce is employed outside the riding.The 1988 election saw the Conservatives nominate first time candidate and localrealtor Cliff Blair. The NDP chose Jim Karpoff, a social services consultant and formerlocal alderman. Former Surrey alderman and mayor Don Ross was nominated by theLiberals. Ross, who had been a football player and teacher, had tried unsuccessfully forthe Liberals provincially and was, by far, the best known candidate. The Reform partyand the Christian Heritage Party both ran candidates.The NDP beat the Conservatives with 37% of the vote to their 32.8%. TheLiberal vote increased by over 10 points to 24.9%, while the Reform Party and ChristianHeritage Party shared most of the remaining vote.There is nearly no media in Surrey North. A local radio station and twocommunity papers, none of which are strongly identified with Surrey North, gavesporadic and minimal coverage to the contest. It is the absence of media that makesthis riding interesting to study.Vancouver CentreVancouver Centre is a densely populated downtown residential riding covering an areaof 35 square kilometres. It is a cosmopolitan, urban constituency with a population of104 346 persons and includes the Central Business District (CBD) the Port ofVancouver, and Stanley Park. Long associated with the interests of the businesscommunity as well as the ethnically and socially heterogenous communities within itsboundaries, the riding includes sizable Greek, Chinese, Japanese, French, Spanish,34German, Ukrainian and Italian neighbourhoods. Thirty percent of the riding is of Britishancestry, and there is also a significant Jewish population.The major source of employment is the service sector which provides 15.8% ofjobs; manufacturing accounts for 6.4% of employment, and managerial andadministrative employees make up 14.3% of the labour force. There is a wide gapbetween the average family income of $42 309 and the median of $34 605, indicative ofthe fact that Vancouver Centre has the second highest percentage of low incomefamilies in British Columbia with 24.4% in this category. Furthermore, home values arehigh, costing an average of $160 999, and the proportion of home ownership is thelowest. The riding population is transient, with 64% having moved within the previousfive years. Three of every ten people are classed as immigrants.The boundaries of Vancouver Centre have remained fairly consistent over thelast five elections, all of which have been highly competitive. The Liberals won theriding in 1974 and 1979, the Tories have been successful since then, and the NDP hashad a strong showing, for they control much of the area provincially. The high voterturnover and a redistribution that added NDP polls appeared to give all three partiessome chance of success, although the NDP and PC candidates were better placed thanthe Liberals. In 1984 the NDP had placed second to the Tories.The constituency is of some special interest given the high profile of the localcampaign in 1988. The retiring member, Pat Carney, had been a Minister in the1984-88 government and a central figure in negotiations surrounding the Canada- USFree Trade Agreement. The three principal candidates were all high profile figures:35Kim Campbell, an ex-provincial politician who had sought the Social Credit leadership(and premiership) was widely touted as a rising star in the Conservative firmament (shesubsequently was appointed Minister of Justice); Johanna den Hertog, federal Presidentof the NDP; and Tex Enemark, one-time assistant to local Vancouver Centre MP RonBasford who was Minister of Justice in the Trudeau government. They were joined byReform Party, Green and Rhino candidates, as well as a number of independentcandidates.The PC’s defeated the NDP by 269 votes (0.4 percentage points) in 1988. Thisrepresented a loss of 4.5 points for the Conservatives and a gain of 6.1 points for theNDP. The Liberals performed less well than many pundits had expected, coming inthird with only 22.8% of the vote, less than in 1984. The spoiling effect of the minorparties is hard to judge, with the Reform Party picking up 1.4% of the vote, the Greens0.8%, and the Rhinos 0.4%.The local contest in Vancouver Centre was covered extensively by local,provincial and even national media. This media included the national televisionnetworks, two provincially distributed newspapers, several community newspapers, aswell as Vancouver radio and television stations. In addition, a number of foreignnetworks focused on Centre when reporting the wider federal election. Given this, itcan be considered one of the best reported local contests of the 1988 election.VictoriaThe capital of British Columbia, Victoria is notable for its large senior population, four36times the Canadian average, and the fact that with 42% of the riding claiming Britishancestry, it is the most ‘British’ riding in British Columbia. The population of 94 597is spread through the City of Victoria, wealthy Oak Bay, and that part of the District ofSaanich that includes the University of Victoria.The local economy is primarily service oriented, with the service sectorsupplying 18% of employment. Government employment accounts for 15.3% of localemployment; tourism is the other large industry. There is less manufacturing in theriding than in any other in British Columbia. Nearly 14% of the riding have universitydegrees. While it includes some wealthy areas, the riding has a high proportion of lowincome families, at 22.7%; state transfers support 15.7% of the population; and averagefamily income is $1 000 below the provincial average.The NDP has had increased success at both a provincial and municipal levelsince 1975, including the election of NDP Mayor Gretchen Brewin, spouse of the NDP’sfederal candidate. This and the fact that the incumbent Conservative Allan McKinnondecided not to run in 1988 gave the NDP cause for optimism. McKinnon’s personalfollowing may have helped protect him from changing nature of the riding, whichincreasingly favoured the NDP. From 25 percentage points in 1979, McKinnon’s leadover the NDP had been cut to 8 points in 1984 when he defeated former provincial NDPPresident John Brewin. Brewin’s father had represented a Toronto area in the House ofCommons.The 1988 election saw local businessman and alderman Jim Young selected torun for the Conservatives, and lawyer and former rugby star Michael O’Connor for the37Liberals. The NDP gave Brewin his second shot at the seat. Free trade and the NDPdefence policy proved to be the important issues (the Esquimalt Naval Base is adjacentto the riding). The election saw the Tory vote cut by 16.5 points to 29.9%, 8 pointsahead of the Liberals vote which increased by 8.3 points. The Reform Party’s TerryVoib picked 8.2% of the vote. The NDP won the seat with a static vote of 38%.Like its Vancouver counterpart, the contest in Victoria was well covered by localand regional news media. Much of the media for Vancouver Island is situated inVictoria, and the local contest was widely reported in newspapers, and on television andradio seen across the island. It did not receive the same level of national and eveninternational attention as did Centre, but was still a well reported contest.The next chapter uses the information gleaned from the interviews to build apicture of how local associations organize candidate nominations. It suggests that thereare some regularities in the nomination contests run by local associations, and that thesepatterns can be traced to both local conditions and the organizational styles of politicalparties.38CHAPTER THREECLASSIFYING NOMINATIONSThe local associations that organize nominations to select national election candidates inCanada lie at the intersection of two political worlds; the first is that of the local riding,the second is that of their own political parties. Although the rules governingnominations are relatively consistent across parties and ridings, the form these conteststake can vary in response to the idiosyncratic mix of riding and partisan forces at workin each association (Carty and Erickson 1991). Viewed from the perspective of thenational party, riding-centred forces tend to produce variation in the style of nominationswithin the same party. Conversely, from the perspective of any one riding, localcircumstances appear to generate homogeneity, while it is partisan forces that seem to bethe source of variation in the nomination experiences of the several local associations.Nominations in Canada are, broadly speaking, locally controlled and democraticin form. An association announces that it is seekitig candidates to run in an upcomingelection, and invites potential candidates to submit their names to a committeeestablished for this purpose. Even sitting members need to be re-nominated by theirassociations. Candidates and their nomination organizers then compete to obtain thesupport of a majority of association members. As well as seeking the support ofexisting members, candidates sign up new members who are willing to support them.Membership regulations usually allow nomination candidates and their supporters to join39the association until quite soon before the date set for the nomination meeting. Acandidate wins the nomination by acclamation if he or she is the only entrant in therace. If there is more than one candidate, local association members cast votes in oneor more ballots until one candidate has an absolute majority.Nominations can be classified with respect to whether or not they are contested,and the type of candidate who is successful. The intensity of competition for thenomination is important in shaping the resources brought to bear by candidates and thecriteria for success. It reflects the attraction the nomination holds for candidates and theease with which candidates can gain access to the nomination. As the product of thisprocess, the successful candidate (nominee) embodies the particular constellation offorces that shape the nomination contest.The appeal a nomination holds for prospective candidates helps determinewhether or not it is contested. The more competitive the association, the greater theappeal its nomination has for prospective candidates. As well, nominations in partiesthat have a history of forming government or the opposition have an added appeal forpotential candidates. The ideological position of the party, and of the association withinthe party, have a qualitative impact on the sorts of candidates that seek a nomination.Candidates are drawn from the social strata to which a party disproportionately appeals,and some associations attract candidates interested in issues that greatly affect localcommunities. Other local effects concern the political history of a riding or association.For example, in each province there are ridings that attract high profile candidates fromone election to the next.40The organizational ethos of a party shapes the access potential candidates have toa nomination. As their foundational units, local associations embody the essentialorganizational style of a political party. Mass parties, such as the NDP, which fostersolidarity as an organizing ethos (see Duverger [1954], 1959) often have well-developedassociations whose strength is somewhat independent of their local electoralperformance.’ This needs to be balanced against the fact that the NDP has not beenelectorally successful across the country, and in many regions, its appeal is so low thatit is unable to support local associations. This regional organizational weaknesscomplicates that task of seeing it as a truly mass party (Carty 1991a, 240-243). It ismost likely to act as a mass party in provinces such as BC, where it has experiencedsubstantial electoral success.Where the NDP has experienced even modest electoral success, its associationshave a continuous existence and relatively stable memberships that are largelyunaffected by electoral cycles (ibid., 240). The presence of a coterie of party membersthat meets regularly and understands how the association operates discourages outsidersfrom joining. Having joined, new members have to prove themselves in order to gainpositions of influence within the association. Given their involvement in the party, it isalso difficult for existing members to leave the association. Such an association willsearch out candidates who are good party members, which limits the number of‘In Fraser Valley West, where the NDP has never been electorally successful, the localassociation was running fund-raising a year before the 1988 election. Apparent similarities inthe inter-election activity levels of associations in the three major parties (Carty 1991, table4.7) may reflect the inclusion of New Democrat “paper associations that barely operate inthis period (ibid., 57-65, 100).41candidates who have real access to the nomination.On the other hand, cadre style parties such as the Liberals and ProgressiveConservatives do not generally have a commitment to organizational solidarity. Theirassociations vary in strength and membership size in the periods between elections andleadership conventions, and are less organizationally coherent than those of mass parties.This cyclical existence facilitates the recruitment of new members, and reduces theexpectation that nomination candidates should come from amongst those who havedemonstrated a long term commitment to the party. The relatively explosive growth inmembership around nomination time provides the mechanism by which outsiders gaincontrol over key positions as a result of successful recruitment drives. Moreover, theymay have enough new members to ensure a nomination victory. Access to nominationsis thus more open than in mass parties.An association’s ability to organize a candidate search, and the criteria it adoptsin this exercise reflect both its strength and organizational style. Competitiveassociations are usually better organized than their uncompetitive counterparts, andtherefore more capable of organizing a candidate search. But it is just these associationsthat may also be willing and able to let only certain types of candidates- perhaps onlyone - into the nomination, thus stifling competition. And although mass parties have acommitment to organizational consistency that encourages them to run candidatesearches, their organizational ethos encourages them to expect to find candidatesamongst existing party members who have proved their allegiance to the party. Thisfocus on internal candidates tends to restrict access to the nomination. For their part,42cadre style Liberal and Conservative associations in Canada have disproportionatenumbers of incumbents, which stifles access to their nominations.Despite these differences in organizational style, both mass and cadre styleassociations are capable of meeting the extraordinary demands of the election period.(Carty 1991a, Chapter 3). And although there are variations in the form nominationstake, there are consistencies in the way nominations function that reflect the nature ofthe riding as well as the partisanship and competitive position of the local association.As the candidate and the team of supporters he or she can muster are paramount indeciding the style and content of any local election campaign, these forces play a criticalrole in shaping the nature of that campaign. This chapter provides a framework ofexploring associations and nominations that allows for their idiosyncrasies whileidentifying some shared characteristics.NOMINATION FILTERSAppeal and access can be thought of as filters that define the terms of the localnomination contest. Association competitiveness is a large component of the appeal anomination holds for prospective candidates. But competitiveness does not always havea predictable impact on the nature of nominations. While it is true that competitiveassociations often experience contested nominations, some have uncontestednominations, while some apparently uncompetitive associations have contestednominations. Moreover, perceptions of competitiveness may be influenced by a numberof factors - for example, the organizational structures of individual associations and the43strength of the national parties - and can be manipulated by party members andofficials.2Access can be thought of as having two components: the first is theorganizational permeability of the association; the second is the type of candidatesearch conducted by the association. Permeability refers to the ease with whichmembers can enter and leave the association. This is related to the organizationalcoherence of the association, which is determined both by competitiveness and partisanethos. The criteria an association adopts in searching out potential candidates beardirectly on who gains access to the nomination. Both appeal and access have aqualitative and quantitative dimension; they determine how many and what types ofcandidates contest the nomination, and through this, the criteria for success. It shouldbe noted that the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of these filters are inextricablylinked. For example, there may only be one candidate who meets the criteria set by thesearch committee.In most cases, these filters remove all but one candidate who is acclaimed thenominee. In such cases, appeal and access are quite emphatic in deciding the form ofthe local contest. Less often, a number of candidates reach the nomination meeting, andone wins on the first ballot. In even fewer instances, the winner has to negotiate several2 Competitiveness refers to an associations chances of winning the next election. Theassessment of competitiveness is based on historical electoral performance and a judgementabout how changes in local circumstances and the general competitive relationship betweenthe parties will influence the local election.44ballots.3 Depending on the nature and intensity of each of these filters, they producefour general types of nominations, each of which can be distinguished by the appealthey hold for potential candidates and the access such candidates have to the contest.That is, they can be classified by the degree to which they are open or closed topotential candidates, and whether or not they are contested. The rest of this chapterelaborates the logic of these nomination filters. Later chapters discuss the fourarchetypal local nominations they produce and the distinctive campaign styles of thecandidates that are successful in each type of contest.ASSOCIATION APPEALThe competitiveness of an association is the main quantitative dimension of appeal. Thechance to win a seat is a strong attraction for most potential candidates. As well, thesupport a competitive non-local party can offer, or the chance to be on a winning teamcan add to a nomination’s appeal. A competitive party is in a better position to offerrewards to losing candidates, and is a necessary vehicle for a candidate who wishes tosit on the government benches. Of course, perceptions about the competitiveness of alocal association may be wrong, and can be manipulated by party members. Moreover,anything that creates uncertainty about the electoral outcome in a riding - such as newboundaries - may in fact or appearance alter the competitive position of localassociations, thus altering their appeal.Only 35 percent of all nominations were contested in 1988. Of these, about 57 percenthad only two candidates. The vast majority were won on the first ballot (Catty and Erickson1991, 120).45The qualitative dimension of appeal also has a number of aspects. A party’sideological complexion influences the sort of candidate that is attracted to itsnominations. Even within a single party, the ideological character of riding associationsvaries, and may work to shape the sorts of candidates that are attracted to a particularnomination. Finally, high profile tidings have a special appeal that has a strongqualitative dimension. Aspiring candidates who see themselves as important publicfigures, or those that wish to take advantage of the notoriety of contesting a high profileriding can be attracted to such contests. Moreover, parties are inclined to try and findwell qualified candidates to run in these ridings. Most such ridings are in metropolitancentres.4CompetitivenessAs Carty and Erickson note, competitiveness has both an objective and perceptualcomponent (1991, 133). In forming an opinion about the competitive position of anassociation, and its appeal, a potential candidate takes into account both these elements.The main objective component of the competitive position of a local party association isits recent electoral performance. That is, associations that have won or come close towinning a riding are considered to be competitive. Not only does the chance of winningattract potential candidates, but the sheer vibrancy of competitive associations isattractive. A history of strongly contested nominations may itself help attract candidates‘ The special attraction of urban ridings for high profile candidates has long been noted(Smith 1964, 68; Land 1965, 2).46simply on the grounds that local activists interested in partisan politics are traditionallyinvolved in active associations. The New Democrat association in the strong unionriding of Kootenay West-Revelstoke, which has been successful in the past but faced aConservative incumbent, attracted three times as many candidates than its NDPcounterpart in Fraser Valley West which operates in a more conservative riding that ithas never come close to winning.What is true for associations is also true for parties. Parties with a history offorming the government and/or the official opposition have an advantage in that theyhave access to greater resources than other parties, and can offer a candidate the chanceof being a member of the governing party They may also be in a position to dole outfavours to the party faithful regardless of local success or failure. These parties alsohave access to extensive polling and other technical information, and are able use thisinformation as evidence of organizational competence in order to convince potentialcandidates of the wisdom of running for them. The associations of parties which havehad little regional success - whether at the provincial or federal level - are usuallyweaker. These parties are less able to assist local associations, and their nominationsare thus less appealing.In deciding whether to enter a nomination contest, potential candidates takeaccount of factors which may have altered an association’s competitiveness since thelast election. Changes in local and national circumstances may alter the actual orperceived competitive position of an association. At the very least, anything that makeslocal electoral fortunes less certain provides an opportunity for speculation about future47electoral performance, and can thus affect the appeal of nominations in a riding. Theretirement of an incumbent, new electoral boundaries, or shifts in support for thenational parties can alter either or both the objective or perceived competitive positionof local associations. Moreover, the relatively low incumbency return rates in Canadahave created an environment in which potential candidates have many good reasons tobe generous in assessing the direction and intensity of changes in associationcompetitiveness (Blake 1991).The retirement of an incumbent may disrupt local political traditions, and mayalter the calculations of candidates with respect to the competitiveness of localassociations. There is typically some personal following that the member has built upover his or her tenure that now becomes available to opposing parties. Such politicalopportunities invigorate associations, bolstering their appeal and also their capacity tosearch out good candidates. Thus, New Democrat and Liberal associations in Victoriaand Vancouver expected to benefit from the retirements of Conservative members inthese ridings.Despite the potential loss of a retiring incumbent’s personal vote, the nominationfollowing a retirement can be especially appealing to prospective candidates. With ahistory of competitiveness, and having built up considerable financial and humanresources during the tenure of the incumbent, the association is in a position to pursue athorough candidate search and run a strong campaign. Its strength will appeal toprospective candidates. Given that associations with incumbents discourage contestednominations, there may also be party members whose ambitions have been thwarted,48and who will now seize the opportunity to contest the nomination. When theConservative MP for Victoria Allan McKinnon retired, but failed to find a successor, theConservative association swung into action to find nomination candidates. Thenomination attracted both existing members and insurgent candidates.On occasion, party officials attempt to manipulate perceptions of competitivenessto attract candidates. Periods of uncertainty encourage such manipulation. The promiseof substantial assistance from either the provincial or federal party can play an importantrole in persuading some candidates to run. Of course, the credibility of these promisesis dependent upon some evidence that the party can deliver the aid. The generalcondition of a party - its strength and organizational skills - affects both the help it cangive, and the perception that it can fulfil its promises of help. Thus, for long periods inrecent decades, the endemic weakness of the Liberal party in Western Canada and theConservatives long exclusion from Quebec made it that much harder for them to attractgood candidates in those regions.Changed electoral boundaries alter the objective competitiveness of anassociation and allow activists and candidates to think their association will be morecompetitive in an upcoming election. One example of an altered competitive situationdue to changed electoral boundaries was the new riding of Kootenay West-Reveistoke.The addition of polls from Reveistoke to the old riding of Kootenay West favoured theNDP. Reveistoke has voted strongly NDP over many elections. This gave a boost tothe NDP association, which attracted six candidates to its nomination, and deflated theincumbent Conservative, who had just barely won the seat in 1984.49The effect can be most pronounced when a new riding is created. Liberals in thenew ridings of Surrey North and Okanagan Centre were optimistic about their chancesin these newly created ridings, even though the party had a poor record in both areas.This both helped motivate association members to seek out potential candidates, andimproved the appeal of Liberal nominations. Association members can claim that anynegative voting history attached to the polls brought into the new riding can be ignored,and that the change provides an opportunity to seize the day and recreate the localpolitical landscape. These reinvigorated associations may attempt to convince a localpolitical notable of the benefits of running for a party that has no baggage; that is, hasperformed poorly in the past.Sometimes new boundaries can dash the hopes of local associations. Thegrowth of Vancouver into the Fraser Valley has meant that new suburbs regularlyencroach into ridings on the periphery of the greater metropolitan area. Fraser ValleyWest is one such riding. In what is essentially an NDP versus PC contest in the riding,this is generally believed to favour the NDP. But the 1987 redistribution moved theboundaries east, away from Vancouver to include more of the less densely populatedand conservative Fraser Valley. This helped protect the incumbent Tory and robbed theNew Democrats of a potential advantage.As for the impact of changes in the competitive position of the national partieson appeal, NDP associations in British Columbia in 1988 reported strong interest in theirnominations driven by the belief that Brian Muironey and the Tories were unpopularand that this would help the New Democrats win seats in BC. Similar perceptions50underpinned the heightened appeal of both Liberal and Reform Party nominations in1993.Both the actual and perceived competitive position of an association are crucialto the appeal a nomination holds for potential candidates. In fact, as measurement ofthis objective element becomes more difficult- such as with changing boundaries - it isreasonable to assume that other factors play an increasingly important role in shapingthese perceptions. This in part accounts for candidates entering races in associationswhich, with hindsight appear to have been uncompetitive.Nomination ProfileThe public profile of nominations can vary. Some barely attract attention within theirown community, while others have a regional or national profile. In particular,nominations in a few ridings seem to have high profiles from one election to the next.Media attention focused on a riding or its nominations is the main mechanism by whichthis public profile is established. This focus results from media outlets reproducingpatterns of reporting built up over a number of elections, the original impulses for whichcan be many and varied. These include a tradition of closely contested elections, ahistory of sending high profile members to Ottawa and/or the propinquity of the ridingto major media outlets. In some cases, other factors related to a current nominationbattle - such as a challenge to an incumbent - can raise the profile of one or morenominations in a riding. Although such challenges attract media attention, they are rare(Carty and Erickson 1991, 134)51The profile of a riding has a mainly qualitative impact on the appeal of anomination. Candidates with a public profile seem to be attracted to nominations inridings that have a history of sending high profile candidates to Ottawa, and that havebeen regularly represented by Cabinet Ministers. As party strategists believe that reportsof a strong performance in these ridings - in terms of finding good candidates andrunning a competitive campaign- can help the party elsewhere, they often encouragethis trend.In general, urban ridings tend to have a higher profile than either suburban orrural ridings. This is so for a number of reasons. Many of the institutions and theinfrastructures of social life and communications are located in urban ridings. Importantpolitical, business, cultural and sporting events have their focus in such centres. Forexample, influential news media are based in large metropolitan centres. As a result oftheir centrality, local candidates in urban ridings are drawn into wider debates, and theyand their politics are projected well outside the riding via the major news media thatreport their comments. They may become either the informal or formal spokespeoplefor their party on a number of issues. This was the case in Vancouver Centre, whereJohanna den Hertog and Kim Campbell played important public roles for theirrespective parties and spoke to many national issues.Some individuals- notably those with an existing public profile - are attracted bythe opportunity to play such a leading role in the media and their own party, and partiesexpect high profile candidates to wish to contest these nominations. Because parties canbe expected to want high profile candidates in these ridings, they may well try to ensure52this type of candidate wins by limiting competition for the nomination. So, althoughhigh profile ridings may be more appealing to candidates, nominations in these ridingsare often uncontested because of efforts by party strategists to ensure a particularcandidate wins their party’s nomination.Unlike their urban counterparts, rural and suburban nominations rarely have aprofile outside of the local riding. Of the two, rural nominations seem to have a greaternotoriety within local communities. Self-contained rural ridings have a basic level oflocal media and often have a more coherent sense of themselves. Local nominationcontests and campaigns have a public profile, and attract candidates that are well knownin the local community. Nominations in Kootenay West-Revelstoke and OkanaganCentre were very prominent in the local media.Suburban ridings on the other hand often have little access to major mediaoutlets, and little influential media of their own. This lack of a mechanism forgenerating publicity, and a less certain image of themselves other than a nebulous set ofcharacteristics associated with suburbia, can mean these nominations are lost in the preelection hubbub of a big city. In Surrey North, local newspaper editors could notalways name the major party candidates from the 1988 election when interviewed in1990. On occasion, the intensity of previous electoral contests, a high profile candidateor a controversial nomination attracts the attention of the city media. As a result, thesesuburban contests are plucked from obscurity. Liberal and Conservative nominations inSvend Robinson’s riding of Burnaby-Kingsway fell into this category, in part as a resultof his high public profile.53IdeologyParty ideology also has a largely qualitative impact on the appeal of a nomination. At apartisan level, it dictates the sort of person that will be interested in running as acandidate for a party. Nominations in any one party are appealing to some but repelothers. Such limits on who is likely to run in a nomination obviously have profoundimplications for the type of candidates that are likely to be successful in nominations ina particular party. The main divide in Canada is between mass and cadre style parties.Unionists are more likely to run for the mass part New Democrats than are businessmanagers; the reverse is true for the cadre style Conservatives and Liberals.As well as this general effect, there is also a more localised, or riding effectwhich shapes the sorts of candidates who contest nominations. Within any single party,there are variations in the ideological preoccupations and even preferences of localassociations. For example, urban associations seem more interested in social policyissues, and appear to be more liberal than some of their rural counterparts. They alsoaddress economic issues in national terms. In Vancouver Centre, the three leadingelection candidates addressed issues of concern to women, gays and lesbians, and werepro-choice. They also spoke at length about national economic policy.Rural associations appear more socially conservative, and think of economicdevelopment in very local terms. All three parties in the Okanagan spoke of economicdevelopment in purely local terms. And in general, rural candidates were reluctant tobecome involved in debates over national social policy. If they had to debate nationalissues, economic policy dominated the agenda. Two of the three candidates in54Kootenay West Revelstoke were pro-life, and the NDP candidate was pro-choice, but theissue never gained prominence. These differences have their roots in local economicand social circumstances which shape local agendas and the attitudes of politicalactivists that run the local associations. This means that candidates in one riding oftenhave a shared interest in a particular set of policy issues, and although they may differin their approach to these issues, their interest in them produces similarities in theirideological outlook.To some degree then, local concerns may cut across party lines, and on someissues may foreshorten the ideological distance between the associations of differentparties in the same riding. For instance, Tory Kim Campbell was closer to her NewDemocrat opponent Johanna den Hertog on the question of abortion- both in priorityshe gave it and her position on the issue - than she was with members of her own partyrunning in other ridings. The NDP candidate in Kootenay West-Reveistoke, LyleKristiansen, shared the concerns of his Conservative opponent Bob Brisco with respectto local economic development, and had relatively little interest in the social policyissues that fascinated den Hertog. Such local variations shape the types of candidatesthat are attracted to nominations. It seems that a potential candidate interested in socialpolicy and with a liberal predisposition, would be more attracted to nominations inurban rather than rural ridings.A special case of the role of ideology are the insurgent campaigns run by interestgroups. If a party - notably the governing party, for it can be held responsible forpublic policy outcomes - has failed to live up to its promises, interest groups may target55its nominations with their own candidates. All the contested Conservative nominationsin this study experienced insurgent nomination campaigns by pro-life candidates backedby organized interest groups. In fact pro-life candidates won nominations in bothBurnaby-Kingsway and Surrey North. In NDP associations, battles between candidatessupported by groupings of unionists, feminists or environmentalists were common.Competitiveness, riding profile and ideology both directly and indirectlydetermine the appeal of a nomination. This appeal is important in flushing outcandidates. But wanting to be a candidate is not always enough to ensure an individualwill get the chance to contest a nomination. There is no guarantee that heightenedcompetitiveness and greater appeal in fact produce nominations that have large numbersof candidates. Sometimes access to a nomination is restricted simply because theorganizational structure of the association repels some potential candidates. That is, theassociation is impermeable. Of course there are times when the association is permeableto prospective candidates and the search process is permissive, allowing all those whowish to enter the race a chance to do so.ASSOCIATION PERMEABILITYPermeability refers to the ease with which potential candidates and new members cangain access to an association and positions of influence within that association. The lesspermeable an association, the less likely that potential candidates will see a means bywhich they can gain access to the nomination or the critical resources needed to win it.Ceteris paribus, the more permeable an association, the greater the number of candidates56that contest the nomination.Prospective candidates thinking of entering a nomination will attempt to assesstheir chances of winning. If there are few existing members it may seem possible tosign up enough new recruits to ensure a majority at the nomination meeting. If there isa sizable coterie of members, the potential candidate must consider his or her chances ofgarnering the support of existing members, or overcoming them with new recruits.Anything which makes existing members suspicious of outsiders, or makes it difficultfor candidates to recruit new members in order to win the nomination, has a negativeimpact on entry into the contest. That is, fewer candidates are likely to enter thenomination.Given that the formal rules governing membership are usually promiscuous(Carty and Erickson 1991, 112), the organizational style of a local association is criticalin determining the ease with which new members and candidates can join and move upthrough its ranks. The main determinant of this style is the organizational ethos of theparty. Other factors that affect the organizational strength and continuity of anassociation and hence its capacity to develop rules of behaviour can also influence itspermeability. Restructuring associations following changes to riding boundaries is likelyto weaken an association, and alter its permeability. Both partisan factors -organizational ethos - and local factors- such as changing electoral boundaries- impacton the nature of nominations in this way.57Mass versus Cadre Style PartiesMass parties such as the NDP expect candidates and members in general to display arelatively high level of commitment to the party (Ward 1964, 191). This expectationraises barriers to potential candidates; that is, it increases the impermeability of NDPassociations. On the other hand, cadre style parties such as the Liberals andConservatives expect less of potential candidates and new recruits, which eases access totheir nominations.The impermeability of NDP associations is a corollary of the party’s commitmentto organizational solidarity that is rooted in the very nature of mass parties. The party’slinks with the union movement serve to highlight the importance of solidarity, the sinequa non of unionism. This commitment finds expression in the continuous existence ofmany New Democrat associations. Members share a sense of comradeship, and as withany community, the rules of behaviour that develop help them distinguish betweenthemselves and outsiders. Local New Democrat associations often share members andorganizational arrangements with their provincial and municipal counterparts in theparty, and members may work on provincial and municipal elections interposed betweenfederal elections. Because of this continuity, NDP associations make longer termdemands of their members.5 These demands can be very intense: The coincidence ofmunicipal elections throughout British Columbia and the 1988 federal election greatlytaxed local NDP activists.51n regions where the party is weak, associations will have a more cyclical existence, andwill therefore make fewer long term demands of members.58Members of associations that exhibit a high degree of solidarity are likely tohave a well-defined and shared definition of politics. They look for candidates amongstexisting members, and consider service to the association or perhaps the unionmovement to be a prerequisite for both entering and winning the nomination. Because itis expected that nomination candidates be members in good standing, NDP nominationsare more often contested between existing party members than either Liberal orConservative nominations. In fact all the successful New Democrat candidates in thisstudy had worked for the party andlor the union movement, whereas 8 of the 14successful Tory and Liberal candidates had only recently become party members.Candidates contemplating contesting such a nomination face a membership thatoften has its own, exclusionary, definition of a preferred candidate. If they fall outsidethis definition, they can expect to gain little support from existing members. In thiscase, the only route available to the would-be candidate is to recruit enough newmembers to overcome the existing membership. They may find signing new recruits toa NDP association that has a history of demanding high levels of commitment from itsmembers quite difficult in comparison to signing members to cadre style associationsthat regularly expand and contract in size and expect only a small fraction of newmembers to be actively involved in running the association. Such nominations areunlikely to appeal to insurgent candidates.6 Even marginally competitive NDPassociations can be less permeable to outsider candidates than their Liberal and6lnsurgent candidates are defined as those that have had little or no previous formalcontact with the party and/or local association, and who often have a narrow set of policyinterests.59Conservative counterparts, particularly in provinces where the NDP is generally strong.While repelling outsider candidates, solidarity promotes internal competition forNDP nominations. The organizational cohesiveness of mass party associations involvesmembers in long term relationships in an environment that encourages theinstitutionalisation of local party structures.7 As well, mass parties are strongly drivenby ideology and internal policy debate. As a result, differences in policy emphasisamong members become apparent, and are often formalised in the development offactions within the associations and the party at large. In the NDP, the union factionoften find itself at odds with the environmental faction, while the feminist factionattempts to ensure its issues are seen in terms of their impact on women. An informalnomination process may take place within these factions prior to the official nomination.As a result, several factions may present their own candidates for nomination. This canproduce highly contested nominations, particularly in competitive associations. As aresult, factions seem more obvious in these cases. At a broader level, the growingsalience of factions within many NDP associations reflects the difficulties of containingthe increasingly particularistic nature of left wing politics within a single party.Cadre style associations do not have the same commitment to organizationalsolidarity found in mass parties. Federal Liberal and Conservative associations inBritish Columbia are much looser arrangements of local activists than are their NewDemocrat counterparts. In the life cycle of a typical Liberal or ConservativeCarty and Erickson note the greater use of formal search committees in the NDP incomparison to their cadre style cousins. (Carty and Erickson 1991, table 3.42)60association, it may all but disappear between elections, only to burst into life as a robustorganization in response to the recruitment drives of the nomination candidates or duringleadership conventions (Carty 199 Ia, chapter 3). As a result cadre style associations aremore organizationally permeable than their mass party counterparts. They allow newactivists and candidates to enter and exit quite easily, and do not develop the highdegree of formalised modes of behaviour found in NDP associations.Even strong Tory associations seem organizationally loose in comparison withNDP associations. In Surrey North, despite a history of success before the ridingboundaries were changed in 1987, there was no formal effort to construct a local Toryassociation until the time came to organize the nomination. In contrast, the local NDPhad been in existence for nearly a year. Similar stories were told by Tory associationmembers in most ridings studied.Although not linked via a permanent association, members of cadre style partiesare often interconnected through a range of other social institutions. This allowsmembers to stay in touch between elections when there is no effective association. InBC, the membership of the Socreds provides such a forum for some Liberal and Toryactivists. In Victoria, the Liberal and Conservative candidates relied on acquaintancesfrom the Socred party to help run their campaigns. In the Okanagan, where there aremany active Conservative supporters, the local association was a collection ofindividuals who interacted in many other forums such as the local Chamber ofCommerce and even local sporting clubs. The Tory association is simply the particularform these relations take at election time. When Tex Enemark decided to run for the61Liberals in Vancouver Centre, he called on a group of friends in the local businesscommunity who knew each other and had been Liberal members in the past, rather thanrely on the weak Vancouver Centre Liberal association.Association ContinuityThe persistence of NDP associations between elections rests on the belief in the value oforganization found in mass parties. But other factors affect the continuity of localassociations and hence the development of the organizational norms that determinepermeability. Competitive associations are often larger and stronger than theiruncompetitive counterparts. They are more likely to maintain some form of existencebetween elections and to develop both the formal and informal rules of behaviour thatcan repel potential candidates. Also, being larger, they present a greater challenge to acandidate who wishes to recruit new members in order to overcome the existingmembership at a nomination meeting. Conversely, anything that disrupts theorganizational life of an association, such as changes to constituency boundaries, maywell increase its permeability.Cadre style associations that are competitive, and whose membership maintainthe sorts of extra-association relationships noted in the last section are somewhat morelikely to maintain a organizational presence between elections. Such associations have asmall coterie of long term members with shared beliefs and idiosyncratic modes ofbehaviour. These associations revive quickly from the relative dormancy of the interelection period to place their imprimatur on the nomination process. Thus, experienced62members in strong Liberal and Conservative associations act as gatekeepers on thenomination process. They decide on the formal and informal rules that govern thenomination, such as whether there will be a search committee and how it will beorganized. Many cadre style party members are often uncertain of the rules of the gameas they are not exposed to them on a regular basis (compared to members in the NDP),and defer to these more experienced members. This is consistent with the greater use ofinformal search committees in Liberal and Tory associations.Associations with incumbents are special instances of strong associations (Carty1991a, 39-42). Relying on a mix of paid and volunteer workers, incumbents run localoffices which then organize the life of the local association. With the added resourcesof MP’ s, such associations are not only strong, but the incumbent has a vested interestin using them to restrict access to the nomination. Such associations are often veryimpermeable.Uncompetitive associations always struggle to maintain some formal structures.Through the mid 1980’s, the Liberal association in Kootenay West-Revelstoke did notexist. The NDP and Conservatives divided the political spectrum in two. In 1988, localdoctor Garry Jenkins managed to sign up enough new members to create an association.But there were few formal structures, and the association was an extension of Jenkins’personality. He went on to run as its candidate.Changes in local electoral boundaries disrupt the life of local associations. Thiscan seriously weaken associations, breaking up teams of members who have worked ona number of elections, and putting together members who are unfamiliar to each other.63Moreover, rearranging members and financial resources can lead to bitter disputes, andmay distract members from the task of organizing a nomination. The patterns ofbehaviour that directed the organization of the nomination and helped dictate access tothe contest are lost, making it more permeable. Liberals in the Fraser Valleycomplained about the way in which assets were divided amongst the new associations inthe area following the redrawing of boundaries. They felt this division had increasedthe association’s vulnerability to insurgent candidates.The retirement of an incumbent can likewise upset local associations and altertheir permeability. Local Tory organizer Bea Holland noted this effect in Victoria:In part, the ability of the pro-life candidate to recruit new members and nearlywin the nomination was due to the uncertainty created by the retirement of ourincumbent Allan McKinnon.The direction once provided by the incumbent and his office was lost, leaving acompetitive association vulnerable to insurgent candidates. The disruption causedcandidates recruiting many new members not only caught the association off-guard,reducing its ability to direct events, it meant that the dynamics of the nominationmeeting favoured those candidates who could rely on well organized support during theearly ballots. Insurgent candidates backed by interest groups have just this sort ofsupport.Any strengthening or weakening of the organizational structures of localassociations alters their permeability. Events which affect the persistence of associationsbetween elections are particularly important, for it is continuity which allows for thedevelopment of the patterns of behaviour that determine permeability. Given that the64continuity of mass party associations such as those of the NDP is rooted in theirorganizational style, it is not surprising that variations in permeability due to otherfactors such as competitiveness are more apparent in the more loosely organized cadrestyle associations of the Liberal and Conservative parties.Even in the NDP, competitive associations are somewhat larger and betterorganized than their uncompetitive counterparts, and more likely to persist betweenelections (Carty 1991a, 30-39, 110-117; Carty and Erickson 1991, 116-129). As well,irrelevant of party, the greater impermeability of competitive associations is balanced bytheir heightened appeal, which encourages potential candidates to make great efforts togain access to these nominations. Competitiveness can offset the impact of even highlevels of impermeability, making nominations in different parties appear more similar.The permeability of a nomination directly affects both the type and number ofcandidates that seek a nomination. Impermeable nominations are generally contested bycandidates with some standing within the association who have demonstrated theircommitment to the party. They are likely to be experienced political activists.Nominations in permeable cadre style associations are much more attractive to insurgentcandidates. Moreover, these organizations are less likely to demand proof ofcommitment to the party. As a result, permeable associations are much more likely toselect nominees who have had little contact with the party.65CANDIDATE SEARCHA formal candidate search process allows an association to exercise some control overwhich aspiring candidates gain access to their nomination. But not every associationconducts a search. Some are too weak and others, such as those that renominate anincumbent, have no need. Whereas formal searches are usually organized by acommittee, there are less formal searches that may involve one or two associationmembers, often from the executive. On rare occasions in high profile ridings, a looseaffiliation of local party members and officials from the national party conduct thesearch. Occasionally, a party leader appoints a candidate in order to meet some widerstrategic purpose such as influencing the membership of the federal cabinet.The criteria for selecting candidates may focus on their electability - takingaccount of factors such as personal charisma, ability, and capacity to finance and operatea good campaign - and their suitability in terms of their attitudes, beliefs andcommitment to the party and association. (Of course in some weak associations, themere willingness to run is all that is required for a candidate to gain entry to thenomination.) Some criteria are quite loose, whereas the NDP’s recent efforts toencourage women to apply are a little more selective (Carty and Erickson 1991, 149).The most highly restrictive are searches such as that in Vancouver Centre in 1988,where the Tories were determined to get a high profile candidate.The use of a search, the style it takes, and the criteria it uses to select candidatesdepend on the competitiveness of the association, its commitment to structures thatdemonstrate internal party democracy, and the role of non-local party strategists in the66process. Such interference may reflect the desire of national strategists to shape a localcontest by influencing the choice of candidates.Competitive AssociationsCompetitive, strong associations have greater resources with which to mount a candidatesearch, and their wide contacts in the local community help them identify potentialcandidates. Uncompetitive associations, which are usually although not alwaysorganizationally weak, may lack the members and resources to mount a search. Thetask is often left to one or two members of the executive who call around in an attemptto find someone to run for the nomination. And because this weakness is usually adirect result of electoral failure, they have limited access to the local community andlittle appeal for potential candidates.Competitive associations tend to conduct better candidate searches and define thesort of candidate they are looking for more clearly than do their uncompetitive cousins.They also have better access to the sources of power and influence in a riding and to thesocial circles from which candidates often come. This improves their chances ofidentifying candidates and convincing them to run. Even associations with a longhistory of running second may be able to make a credible claim that their candidate willwin the election. In some cases, particularly in competitive, permeable associations, asearch is a formality, as large numbers of candidates are attracted to the nomination.This was true for Tory nominations in Surrey North and Okanagan Centre in 1988.Sometimes a competitive association defers to an influential party member or67local notable and refrains from conducting a search. In doing so, it signals itspreference for a particular candidate. In Victoria and Vancouver Centre, it was wellknown that two NDP stalwarts who had contested the seats in 1984 would run again,and this all but eliminated the need for a real candidate search. Similarly, where thereis an incumbent, it is uncommon for even a competitive association to organize acandidate search, although some do.In the case of a retiring incumbent, he or she may prefer to be seen handing thereins to a well qualified successor. Often, the MP- or representatives of the party orlocal constituency office - coordinate the search for such a candidate. Given thatincumbents tend to have developed strong connections to the national party and partystrategists, it is not uncommon for non-local officials to be involved in such a searchand to bring national party objectives tc bear on it. On the other hand, they usuallyhave good contacts among the local political elite. This may result in a search for ahigh profile candidate who is promised easy access to the nomination, the resources ofthe retiring incumbent, and perhaps the party at large with which to conduct a campaign.This severely restricts access to the nomination. In Victoria, retiring Tory AllanMcKinnon tried hard to find a candidate, but the Tories uncertain electoral prospectsmade his job difficult, and he eventually let the association search for candidates.Weak associations may have to rely on luck to attract a candidate. As a lastresort, the party may have to provide a candidate from outside the riding association.Weak NDP associations do better at. organizing nominations than their cadre stylecounterparts. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke and Burnaby-Kingsway, the uncompetitive68Liberals did not conduct a search, yet the weak NDP association in Fraser Valley Westdid. Where they do take place, searches in non-competitive cadre style associations aremodest. In the Okanagan, Murli Pendharkar- not a member of any party - was one of afew candidates asked to run by the handful of local Liberals, while in Victoria, MichaelO’Connor, the association president, agreed to a request by his friend Liberal leaderJohn Turner to run for the party.While competitive associations are usually better organized than theiruncompetitive counterparts, and should be more capable of instituting a candidatesearch, overall this is not the case. Partisan organizational styles affect the propensity ofassociations to search out candidates.Mass versus Cadre Style AssociationsCompetitive cadre Liberal and Conservative associations tend to organize fewer searchesthan might be expected, while even uncompetitive NDP associations often organizecandidate searches (Carty and Erickson 1991, tables 3.17 and 3.42). This is the result ofthe tendency among cadre style associations to rely on informal searches, and the NDP’ sgreater commitment to the formal institutions of association democracy.Because of their commitment to local democracy and institutional modes ofbehaviour, New Democrat associations make greater use of formal search committeesthan do Liberal and Conservative associations, evenin uncompetitive associations. Aswell, the manner in which these committees operate differs as a result of the distinctiveorganizational styles of mass and cadre parties. NDP search committees are more69formalised, their work is supervised by the local executive, and they often use selectioncriteria which favour existing members over insurgents.Not surprisingly, all the NDP candidates in the ridings in this study were partymembers in good standing. This is less true in cadre style associations, where there isoften no overview of the process by the local executive, or clear guidelines as to how itshould be conducted. Being less formal, well organized Liberal and Conservativeassociations may find it easier to adopt very strict criteria simply be agreement amongstthe few executive members who are conducting a relatively informal candidate searchnot subject to any. form of public scrutiny.The strength of the NDP’s commitment to forming search committees somewhatindependently of their competitive position is seen in the fact that in 1988, 44 percent ofits associations reported having a regular candidate search committee, while 25 percentof Liberal and 17 percent of Tory associations did likewise (Carty 1991a, Table 5.2).When associations with incumbents are removed the percentage of associations reportinghaving used search committees is 70, 54 and 51 respectively (Carty and Erickson 1991,table 3.42). This pattern was evident in all seven ridings in this study. The use ofsearch committees in even uncompetitive NDP associations inflates the number of totalcontested nominations found in uncompetitive associations.Given that they tend to have stable memberships, New Democrat associations areusually successful in identifying potential candidates within their own ranks. Even inridings such as Okanagan Centre, where they had little chance of success, the party wasable to identify several good candidates. This reinforces the impermeability of NDP70nominations. It also increases the number of NDP associations that produce contestednominations. Only occasionally do New Democrat associations look outside theirmembership for candidates, and then only if an association wishes to select a highprofile candidate, or to meet some wider objective set by the party. Even then, NewDemocrat associations in BC are connected to a network of party faithful and fellowtravellers interested in political office from which candidates can be drawn. Despitetheir ideological commitment to inclusive politics, this impermeability explains whyNDP associations often have fewer links to groups in the local community than do theircadre style counterparts.8For their part, associations in the cadre style Liberal and Conservative parties aremore inclined to use a loose collection of experienced local members to pursue aninformal search. Because these parties account for most of the competitive associationsin Canada, this tendency deflates the number of competitive associations that make useof formal search committees. Competitive cadre style associations are also almostalways permeable. Given that they appeal to many prospective candidates, and do notobstruct their entry into the contest, these associations may not need to make much ofan effort to search out candidates. As well, associations in the more successful Liberaland Conservative parties account for most cases of retiring incumbents who may try toinstall a successor by suppressing competition for the nomination. This helps accountfor the fact that the correlation between electoral competitiveness and the use of formal8The lack of links between the NDP and ethnic groups has been noted by other writers(Schwartz 1964, 267-8).71search committees is weak (ibid).Because of the type of searches they conduct, nominations in cadre styleassociations often reach beyond the local membership. On occasion, non-local partyofficials encourage associations to search out candidates from outside the association,often to fulfil a wider strategic objective. Local organizers may believe that the rightcandidate can win the riding, and that none of the members fit this bill. Given thecyclical nature of membership, and the relative lack of solidarity amongst members ofthese associations, they are less likely to define the suitability of candidates in terms ofdemonstrated commitment to the party. Open searches for candidates in cadre styleparties are readily affected by insurgent candidates, as they can recruit new membersand overcome any resistance from among existing members. It is not surprising thatover half of the Liberal and Conservative candidates in this study were new partymembers.But there are drawbacks to the loose organizational style of cadre associations.An insurgent candidate who is hostile to the members of a permeable association mayhijack the nomination. Informal searches organized by a group of powerful associationmembers may use narrow criteria for selecting candidates and act to limit competitionfor the nomination. And the lack of an imperative to conduct a formal and accountablesearch (as seen in many NDP associations) allows cadre style associations to adopt justsuch a search regime. Carty notes that 40 percent of association presidents report thatan insider group decided who the candidate would be and worked to get that individualnominated. In 61 percent of these cases the candidate was acclaimed, compared to just7244 percent in nominations where no such elite manipulation occurred (199 Ia, 110-11 1).Finally, uncompetitive cadre style associations often experience uncontested nominationsbecause they lack the imperative to organize a search, and unlike NDP associations, theycannot rely always rely on members to run as candidates.Competitiveness and partisan organizational style help determine both thelikelihood that an association will conduct a search and the style that search takes. Aminimal level of competitiveness allows associations to organize a search, but it is noguarantee that there will be a search. Because of their organizational style, competitive,permeable associations in cadre style parties tend to adopt infonnal search processes, oreschew them altogether. This is not true for NDP associations, which have a greaterpropensity to organize formal searches irrelevant of their competitiveness. And thepresence of an incumbent or preferred candjdate can stifle the candidate search.Non-Local InterferenceThe intervention of regional and national strategists may also shape the search process.The rare instances of direct interference by non-local party officials in local affairs occurmainly in cases where a local association has little appeal for potential candidates and istoo weak to organize an effective candidate search (Carty and Erickson 1991, table3. l7). In fewer cases, it is the result of some strategic calculation by the party in9Table 3.17 in Carty and Erickson (1991) does not include associations with incumbents.This deflates the proportion of competitive associations in the table that report having nocandidate search. In addition, because these are figures for 1988, the number of Conservativeincumbents in this category was very high, reflecting the party’s 1984 performance. As theauthors themselves note (ibid., 109, 133) this confounds the effect of incumbency on73ridings where it believes a local campaign, or perhaps its wider national campaign,would benefit from having a particular type of candidate. In some cases, the party maywish to have a certain number of women as a matter of principle, or a number of highprofile candidates for its cabinet if it wins office. In others, the party may move toprotect an incumbent from losing a nomination (or even being challenged) or attempt toensure an insurgent candidate supported by an interest group does not win a nomination.The manner in which parties go about enforcing these desires, and the experience oflocal associations in dealing with these demands vary as a function of organizationalstyle and competitive position. As well, nominations in high profile ridings often attractthe interest of non-local party strategists.There are two types of direct party interference in local nominations. The leadercan veto a candidacy by refusing to allow the party label to be used to identify acandidate on the voting ballot. This method can be used to prevent unwanted butsuccessful candidates from running for the party, and thus force associations to adopt apreferred candidate, or to ensure a particular candidate, or type of candidate wins anomination. Other than a leader’s veto, the most direct involvement of the non-localparty in association affairs comes when the local association is unable to entice acandidate to run and the provincial or national wing or the party appoints a candidate.There are distinct regional differences in the level of intervention practised bythe major parties. Regions in which parties have been weak, such as the Atlanticprovinces for the NDP and the West for the Liberals, tend to experience high levels ofcandidate searches with that of Tory partisanship.74non-local interference. NDP headquarters played little role in the selection of candidatesin this study. This reflects the strength of NDP associations in BC and their ability toorganize formal searches. On the other hand, the Liberal party had to appoint a youngparty worker from Quebec, Sam Stevens, as its candidate in Burnaby-Kingsway, andJohn Turner persuaded the president of the local association, Michael O’Connor, to runin Victoria. The more common form of non-local intervention is in the form ofcooperation between party strategists at various levels in the search for a candidate. Incases where an incumbent is retiring, his or her relationship with the national partyfacilitates cooperation in the search for a replacement.Competitive associations, particularly in the Liberal and Conservative parties, andvery often in high profile ridings, tend to attract the interest of non-local party strategistsfor very different reasons. These ridings usually receive inordinate press attention, andmay be seen as indicators of a party’s general performance. As such, the campaigns runin these ridings are often integral components of the national campaign (Sayers 1991,45). Candidates in these ridings are expected to be particularly adept at dealing with themedia, and capable of developing a positive public image for themselves and the party.National party strategists have an interest in finding good candidates who are offereduncontested rides through their respective nominations. This requires restricting accessto the nomination, which can be done either by fiat - the national party leader can refuseto sign the candidates nomination papers for any other candidate- or through75cooperation with the local association.’° The latter is more common, and requires Localand non-local party members to agree on the preferred type of candidate. Consistentwith their cadre style, Tory and Grit associations most often make use of informalsearches involving both levels of the party in these instances. But even the NDP seemssusceptible to non-local intervention in high profile ridings.Conservative Kim Campbell and New Democrat Johanna den Hertog inVancouver Centre were both favoured by the hierarchies of their respective parties. Theparties brought both direct and indirect pressure to bear so as to limit competition forthese nominations. Once Campbell accepted the offer of the nomination, local and nonlocal Conservatives simply refused to admit any other candidate to the race, and anomination meeting was arranged in short order. This was possible because the localsearch committee accepted the need to find a high profile candidate. As for the NDP,the leader’s office made it clear that Broadbent would not attend a highly contestednomination, and the party made its preference for den Hertog, President of the federalparty, clear. Given the solidarity of NDP members, a serious challenge to den HertogWas unlikely. Moreover, her husband had unsuccessfully contested the seat three times,and this was her second attempt. This gave the family a special claim on the riding.The NDP has fewer competitive associations across the country than either theLiberals or Conservatives, and there is less outside interference in the choice ofcandidates. Much of what interference there is by the national party in local affairs is‘°In 1993, Liberal leader Jean Chretien appointed a dozen candidates. Whether this willcreate a precedent for future elections and for other parties is as yet unknown.76driven by principle rather than narrowly strategic calculations. This includes attemptingto have a certain proportion of women and minority candidates (Carty and Erickson1991, tables 3.28 and 3.29; Carty 1991a, table 3.21). Cadre style parties tend to eschewthis principled intervention, and when they do intervene, they are more willing to invokethe leader’s veto or the weight of head office to impose candidates on local associations.But none of the associations in this study had their first choice for nominee vetoed bythe party.Depending on the objective of the non-local interference, it may either increaseor decrease competition for a nomination. In general, non-local involvement occursmore frequently in nominations where there is no contest, but cause and effect areunclear (ibid., table 3.49). Weak associations that cannot find a candidate, and whichrely on the party to provide one, are included with those where the non-local party helpsto limit competition for a sought after nomination to a single candidate. Prima facie,the strategic intervention found most commonly in Liberal and Progressive Conservativeassociations limits competition. This is because the party elites that intervene in theseassociations search out specific candidates whom they believe will help their cause in aparticular riding. Both Tory Kim Campbell in Vancouver Centre and Liberal MichaelO’Connor in Victoria were examples of this.In the NDP, the desire to bring under-represented groups into politics mayincrease competition for a nomination, because those candidates are sought out andbrought into the process without being promised a clear run through the nomination.But this is not to deny the fact that the preferences of head office do hold some sway at77the local level. In fact, their commitment to the principles espoused by the party makeslocal party members more likely to accept the dictates of the party hierarchy. This moreintimate relationship with the national party encourages shared definitions of politics.As such, it is likely that the objectives of the local search reflect the preferences of thenational executive of the party.The use of a formal candidate search process depends on the organizationalstrength of an association and its commitment to guaranteeing access to all associationmembers who wish to enter the race. The manner of the search committee, and thecriteria it uses, determine who has access to the nomination. Formal search committeesin NDP associations focus on attracting existing members, while those in Liberal andConservative associations are more willing to look outside the association for potentialcandidates. The presence of an incumbent, or the desire to find a particular type ofcandidate - whether local or otherwise- reduce the chances of a formal search, andrestrict access to the nomination. Weak associations that are poorly organized alsostruggle to arrange a search, and may have to rely on the party to provide a candidate.SUMMARYThis chapter has suggested that the style of a nomination meeting is the function of a setof filters on the nomination process which define the terms of the local contest. Bysetting the criteria for entry to and success at the nomination, they determine whetherthere is a contest and the type of candidate who wins the nomination. The filters can begrouped as those that influence the appeal a nomination holds for potential candidates,78and those that determine which candidates have access to the nomination. Theparticular form these filters take, and the combination in which they are found in anyone nomination are largely a function of the competitiveness of the association and itsorganizational style. These factors are shaped by both local riding and partisan forces.The appeal a nomination holds for potential candidates has both a quantitativeand qualitative dimension. The strength of the appeal varies as a function of associationcompetitiveness, the profile of the nomination, and the ideological position of both theparty and a particular association within that party. Associations in parties that have astrong regional presence, or have formed the government or opposition have a higherlevel of minimum appeal due to the support of the non-local party and the attraction foraspiring candidates of being in one of the major parties. As well, the more competitivethe association, the higher its profile, the greater its appeal.But while it is clear (Carty and Erickson 1991) that increased associationcompetitiveness is correlated with more intense competition for a nomination, a numberof factors complicate this relationship. Assessing competitiveness is not without itsdifficulties, as the low rate of incumbent success in Canada reflects. Canadian electionsare inherently volatile, and this encourages outsiders to dream of electoral glory. Notonly are perceptions of competitiveness inexact, they are open to manipulation byoverenthusiastic party members hoping to improve the appeal of a nomination.Competitiveness is also affected by factors such as changing electoral boundaries.Disruptions to the political history of a region caused by the drawing of new boundariescan create, or be seen to create, new political opportunities that can invigorate moribund79associations and heighten the appeal of the nomination, as well as enhancing their abilityto search out candidates.Appeal also has a qualitative dimension. As the competitiveness of anassociation increases, so to does its ability to attract high profile candidates. This is alsotrue for high profile ridings. The ideology of a party has obvious qualitativeimplications for its nominations; unionists are not likely to be attracted to Toryassociations, and business managers are rare in NDP nominations. And even within thesame party, there are variations in the policy emphasis of local associations whichimpact upon the type of candidates that are attracted to a nomination.Access to the nomination process is a function of the permeability of theassociation and the manner in which the candidate search is conducted. Thepermeability of an association reflects both its strength and its organizational ethos.Competitive associations tend to be better organized, and therefore less permeable thanuncompetitive associations. So paradoxically, although competitive associations havegreater appeal to potential candidates, they are organizationally stronger and have thecapacity to restrict access to their nominations.Mass party associations are organizationally less permeable than theircounterparts in cadre style parties because of their continuity and coherence, which arerooted in notions of solidarity that are central to the very nature of these parties.Impermeable party associations tend to have contested nominations where many of thecandidates are long-time party or association members. As such, the degree ofcompetition for the nomination can be somewhat independent of the competitive80position of the association. Cadre style associations are often much looser arrangementsof activists that have a cyclical existence, and are more susceptible to local ridingconditions than their mass party counterparts. Once again, anything that disrupts thecoherence of an association and makes it more permeable- such as new ridingboundaries- is likely to increase the chance that its nomination will be contested.The candidate searches of cadre style and mass party associations are eachdistinctive. Cadre style associations are less likely to have formal searches (or any formof search) than mass party associations. The latter are much less permeable than theformer, and place a greater premium on evidence of commitment to party principleswhen searching out candidates. The tendency of cadre style associations to use informalsearches, and to avoid searches altogether (apparently more readily in competitiveassociations where there is also a greater likelihood of non-local interference) temperstheir apparent openness. But in general, the impermeability of mass party associationsand the searches they conduct privilege party members in their quest to winnominations, while cadre style associations offer better access to outsider candidates.In some high profile ridings that party strategists believe are important to theparty, local and non-local party elites may work to find a candidate who is nominatedunopposed. This may be so despite the fact that the association is competitive.Similarly, associations with incumbents are less likely to experience contestednominations than those without incumbents. Thus although many associations withincumbents are competitive, they have uncontested nominations.Different types and mixes of these filters result in distinctive types of81nominations. Figure 3.1 illustrates four distinct nominations and how the appeal theyhold for aspiring candidates and the access these candidates have to the race shapes eachcontest. The first type of nomination is one that is open and contested. That is, theassociation is permeable, with few if any restrictions placed upon entrance to thenomination. It appeals to prospective candidates, and attracts at least two but usuallymore who participate in a true contest. Such nominations are most commonly found incompetitive, cadre style associations.The second type of nomination is one that is closed and contested. Candidatesfrom outside the association are rare or non-existent in these contests. Those candidatesthat do enter the race are mostly long-time association members and may berepresentatives of factions within the local association. Because the nomination hassome appeal and attracts several candidates, it is also a real contest. Most of thesenominations are found in impermeable NDP associations. But even here, the morecompetitive the association, the more contested the nomination.A third type of nomination is open but uncontested or nominally contested.These nominations have difficulty attracting candidates, but are open to anyone willingto make the effort to run. Where more than one candidate enters the race, one-sidednominations often occur in which only one candidate has a real chance of winning. Insome cases, this third type of nomination attracts no candidates, and the party mustappoint a party worker to run in the riding. In general, uncompetitive cadre styleassociations are more prone to these sorts of nominations because they do not have theorganizational cohesiveness found in even weak NDP associations.Va10•.!•4-..0•a.w0a.0ECo5C,C0I‘0••04-.______a.0A4.c• •—0ovE.0.CriD•ogC—DzCoc—•00z•a.000a.U<0—00C•!z0ESo—a.tE0CV‘C0.0.•4-pG)L..a.••U0.(0<00___.+0.Ea)CO(ChCo00___83And the fourth is a closed and uncontested nomination. Despite being veryattractive to potential candidates, only one candidate is allowed access to the contest bynomination organizers. Non-local party strategists are often involved in helping to findsuch candidates. On very rare occasions more than one candidate gains access to thenomination, but the result is one-sided. The winner is usually a high profile candidatewho benefits from the support of the local and often non-local party elite. Thesenominations occur in competitive associations in high profile ridings. While it is truethat they take place in all parties, cadre style associations tend to be more susceptibledue to their proclivity to conduct informal searches which are better suited to ensuringthat a single candidate gains access to the nomination process.The next chapter applies the categories developed here to the set of nominationswhich are the subject of this study. It considers how these nominations resulted fromdifferences in appeal, permeability, and candidate searches in each local associations.Each of these four archetypal nominations produces a distinctive type of candidate whoattracts a particular constellation of supporters. Together they form the basis of thelocal campaign team which is a key element of any local campaign.84CHAPTER FOURNOMINATIONS AND DEMOCRACYThe appeal an association holds for potential candidates and the access those candidateshave to the nomination determine how many and what sorts of candidates enter thecontest. The winner, or nominee, can be considered to embody the logic of these filters,and as such, reflects the particular confluence of the many forces, including both thepolitics of the local association and the imperatives of the national party, that are atwork in a nomination. This chapter uses a number of case studies’ to explore thisapproach to understanding nominations.Categorizing nominations in terms of whether they attract competition and theiraccessibility produces a matrix which defines four general types of nominations: openand contested; closed and contested; open and uncontested; and closed and uncontested.Each of these tends to generate a particular form of democracy within an association asshown in Figure 4.1.Each of these forms of nominations is a product of the efforts of candidates toidentify and capture the resources that are critical to nomination success within theparticular set of constraints produced by the nomination filters. The type of candidatethat wins these nominations, the relationship between the nominee and his or hersupporters, and the range of resources available to them differs with each. Becausecandidates tend to construct their campaign teams from amongst these supporters, the85FIGURE 4.1TYPES OF NOMINATIONSCOMPETITIONACCESSCONTESTED UNCONTESTEDLocal LatentOPEN Democracy DemocracyParty LimitedCLOSED Democracy Democracy86type of team that a nominee builds is greatly influenced by these nomination filters.This team then goes on to play a critical role in shaping the local election campaign.There are two forms of contested nominations. The first is open and contested.These are found in associations that are competitive, permeable, and in which thecandidate search process is permissive. With few if any constraints on entry, thecompetitiveness of the association is a main determinant of the ‘contestedness” of thenomination. Most such contests occur in permeable, cadre style Liberal andConservative associations, and provoke heavy recruitment and large, rambunctiousnomination meetings. The recruitment drives of aspiring candidates produce explosivegrowth in the size of Liberal and Progressive Conservative associations around electiontime (Carty 1991a, table 5.3). Their large size in combination with the organizationalstyle of cadre parties, limits the opportunities for an insider clique to control thenomination. This results in a robust form of majoritarian, local democracy.The second form of contested nomination is closed but contested. These occurin associations which are of varying degrees of competitiveness but which areorganizationally impermeable. The candidate search process is formalised, and access tothese nominations is restricted to association members who have demonstrated theircommitment to the party. These nominations are found mainly in the associations ofmass parties such as the NDP. Being well organized, even marginally competitive massparty associations often manage to attract a number of candidates and experiencecontested nominations. Because the nomination is very much an internal process,recruitment of new members during these nominations tends to be muted. While on87occasion several factions within the one association put forward their own candidates,which can produce sharp contests, nomination meetings are more restrained than in openassociations. These nominations thus exhibit a form of party democracy.Uncontested nominations are of two types. The first, open but uncontestednominations, occur in weak associations. These associations are very permeable, andbeing weak, do not organize a formal search process. Rather, there may be an informalsearch by a few association executive members, or none at all if in very weakassociations. While access to the nomination is straightforward, the association isuncompetitive, and thus unappealing to most potential candidates. There is little or nomembership recruitment by candidates, and the nomination meeting is usually low key.In cases where no candidate can be enticed to run, the party may have to provide acandidate from outside the association. In the ridings studied, Liberal associationsaccount for most of the nominations in this category. This reflects the difficulties facedby the party in British Columbia in 1988. As the reduced competition for thesenominations is not manufactured for some strategic purpose but is rather a function ofthe circumstances of the association, these nominations are a form of evanescent orlatent democracy. That is, they would be contested if the association was morecompetitive.Finally, closed and uncontested nominations occur only in associations that havethe desire and ability to restrict entry to their nomination to one candidate. Theassociation is likely to be competitive, and appeal to potential candidates. This categoryincludes most associations that renominate an incumbent. The candidate search restricts88access to just one candidate, although it may have a list of potential candidates that itapproaches before choosing one. This intensive, often informal procedure is conductedby local executive members and may involve non-local party strategist who believe theirparty benefits from running a particular type of candidate in the riding. Associations inthis group that do not have incumbents are usually in high profile ridings, many orwhich are in urban centres. Because of the lack of a real contest, the nomination doesnot drive recruitment to the association. The nomination meeting is a staged affairdesigned to avoid conflict and show off the candidate to the media. It is an exercise inlimited democracy.In choosing a nominee, nomination meetings are also harbingers of the type ofelection campaign a party will run in a riding. Local campaigns are profoundly affectedby the type of candidate that is successful, and the support that he or she receives. Thepersonal attributes of the candidate are the central pillar around which a campaign oftenconstructs its fund-raising and strategic plan. Its ability to implement this plan is afunction of the human and financial resources at its command. These are determinedlargely by the kinds of support a candidate receives in winning a nomination. The restof this chapter explores the forms of democracy found in nominations and theimplications they have for local campaigns. It suggests that to understand how localcampaigns are run’, it is necessary to understand how nominations bring candidates andteams of volunteers together.89LOCAL DEMOCRACYLocal democracy exists where there are open, contested nominations. Such was the casein the Tory association in Okanagan Centre. Its competitiveness was never in doubt in aregion that has consistently sent Conservatives to Ottawa. The nomination process waslocally organized and controlled. As a cadre style association in a newly created riding,the association was very permeable, and it had not settled on a preferred candidate priorto the contest. The changed riding boundaries had disrupted long-standingorganizational patterns of membership and resources in local associations, making themeven more permeable and susceptible to insurgent challengers such as pro-life candidateDavid Richter.Richter hoped to sign up enough new members to swamp the other candidates atthe nomination meeting. Association officials believed he succeeded in signing up mostof the new recruits. This successful recruitment effort forced the other candidates tofollow suit in an effort to stay in the contest. As a result, about 4 000 members wererecruited. But Richter’s main rival, Al Horning, was nearly as successful at recruitingmembers as Richter, and had an extra ace up his sleeve; he was much better knownamong local Conservatives. His extensive contacts among local Conservatives were theresult of a long record of community service - 44 years working for local clubs andassociations, and 8 years as an alderman. He was widely known as a political moderatewith an interest in a range of issues. This not only allowed him to recruit many newmembers, it was also critical to his success in lobbying other candidates for support onthe second ballot.90Typical of open, contested nominations, the Okanagan meeting was arambunctious affair. The impact of large numbers of new members as well as the stressof signing them up had created a highly fluid environment. Members credentials werechallenged, and incentives were offered to get new members to attend the meeting.Estimates of the size of the meeting vary from 2 000 to 4 300, but just over 2 100members voted for one of the six candidates. Of these voters, a minority were familiarwith the formal workings of such meetings. Voter loyalty to a candidate only lasteduntil the first ballot, and some supporters left the meeting once their candidate wasdefeated.Encouraged by the belief that whoever won the Tory nomination would win thesubsequent election, many of the candidates ran professional campaigns and spentheavily in doing so. John Keery, reporter for The Kelowna Daily Courier thought thatthe campaign of newcomer David Richter was the best organized. It was mastermindedby Troy Schmidt, an experienced local Conservative who led a group of committed pro-life activists within the association. This team created a carnival atmosphere, playingsongs through loudspeakers and offering food and drink to their supporters. Not to beoutdone, Al Horning hired public relations expert Brian Lightburn to run his campaign.Although less glitzy than that of his main opponent it too was highly effective.Lightburn made good use of his extensive connections with members of the localConservative community, built up during his time in the local media, to rally support forHorning.Richter led Al Horning by just 86 of those votes on the first ballot. The official91tally on the first vote had Richter at 791 and Horning at 705, with the next candidate500 votes back. This result was a shock to many association members, particularlythose that did not want a single issue candidate and relative newcomer to win. Horningand his supporters lobbied the other candidates for their support on the second ballot,noting the limited nature of Richter’s platform and his lack of history in the riding.These other candidates withdrew from the race, leaving just Horning and Richter tobattle it out. The public support of these other candidates was enough to give Horningthe edge over Richter by 1 038 votes to 809. In recognition of the organizationalstrength of Richter’s campaign, Brian Lightburn asked Richter’s campaign manager,Troy Schmidt, to join the campaign team, which he did. In reporting the nomination,the Daily Courier reinforced the presumption that the Tory nominee would win theupcoming election by captioning its story of the nomination “Horning headed forOttawa.”Horning’s success is a classic case of local democracy at work. Thepermeability of the local Tory association in the Okanagan was such that the twoleading candidates and many of their supporters joined the party just prior to thenomination. This permeability was heightened by the instability engendered by newriding boundaries and the uneven organizational presence of the Conservatives in BritishColumbia. Unlike the NDP, there was relatively little central coordination of activitywithin the Tory party in the province. This meant that local conditions dictated theform of the nomination. In a newly organized association such as that in OkanaganCentre, there was little chance for members to identify and woo a preferred candidate.92Moreover, cadre style associations do not place the same emphasis on formal searchesas do those in mass parties. With a limited search, and no effective gate-keeping byassociation members, the nomination was left wide open to all those attracted by thechance to become an MP. Such nominations favour well known local notables whohave good contacts in the community and a strong organization, often made up ofpersonal acquaintances.Changing electoral boundaries can make once uncompetitive associations morecompetitive, or at least appear so. The lack of an entrenched party hierarchy removessome of the pessimism that engulfs associations with a history of poor electoralperformances, and means there is little chance that access to the nomination will berestricted by existing members. This improves an association’s appeal to candidates,provides the resources with which to mount a candidate search, and may result in anopen, contested nomination. The impact of new boundaries in the Okanagan can beseen in all local nominations. Not only did Okanagan Centre experience well contestednominations in all three major parties, but the new Reform Party attracted threecandidates and 300 members. As a flash party, the latter was even more permeable thanany of the three major parties.’New boundaries had a profound impact on the formerly moribund Liberalassociation in Okanagan Centre. Members came to believe they could reshape thepolitical landscape, and told potential candidates they thought the riding might elect a‘Carty (1991, 30-39) has applied this term first coined by Converse and Depeux (1966) tothe Reform Party in Canada.93Liberal member. They even managed to organize a formal search for candidates - anachievement for any Liberal association west of the Rockies in 1988. The newassociation was permeable, and the nomination wide open. Other than a desire to find awell known individual to run for the party, the search committee did not attempt todefine precisely the sort of candidate it wished to attract. It approached a number oflocal notables who were told that the new electoral circumstances favoured the Liberalparty. They were successful in attracting three candidates to the race. One of these,Murli Pendharkar - a well known ex-school superintendent and a one time NewDemocrat supporter - considered the matter for several months. He held a meeting athis residence late in 1987 to help gauge interest in his candidacy. When 50 friendsturned out, and 49 said they would support him, he decided that his chances of winningthe nomination and the level of interest in the Liberal party warranted his entering therace.Pendharkar had never been a party member, but knew that the nomination couldbe won by recruiting new members. He did this, making use of his contacts within thelocal Indo-Canadian community. With the other two candidates recruiting as well, theassociation grew to about 780 members.The nomination meeting in June of 1988 wasattended by over 500 voters. Pendharkar took 278 votes on the first ballot to. becomethe nominee, with his nearest opponent about 100 votes behind him. There was sometension within the association at Pendharkar’s success in gaining control of thenomination with strong support from the local Indo-Canadian community. But he wasthe sort of well known local that the party had hoped to entice into running for the94riding.Because recruitment is so important in open contested nominations, the ability tosign up new members, particularly among organized groups in the community, can playa pivotal role in determining the outcome. Successful recruiting of new members byany one candidate forces the others to follow suit. Even candidates that have been longtime members and who have strong support within the association have to conduct arecruitment drive if they are to avoid being swamped at the nomination meeting.Consequently, the relationship between the candidate and the local community andinterest groups can be critical to victory. Candidates often woo the leaders of groups inthe hope that they can deliver support from amongst its members (Scarrow 1964, 55).Tory nomination candidate Richter was able to rely on groups opposed to abortion forsupport. Candidates that are leaders in their local community, such as Pendharkar, havea special advantage in this regard.If a recruitment drive develops into a contest, there is plenty of room forconflict, and open contested nominations often exhibit all the acrimony of an electioncampaign. This is particularly true if one or more candidates manages to obtain thesupport of an interest group or a segment of an ethnic minority. In particular, long-timemembers may feel they are losing control of their association to new recruits, while thelatter resent attempts to control the process by the old hands, and are only concernedwith the simple calculus of popular democracy.Nomination candidates regularly complained about methods used to recruit newmembers. At least one of Cliff Blair’s five opponents for the Tory nomination in Surrey95North was unhappy with the influx of Indo-Canadian members supporting Blair and therole of pro-life activists in his campaign. The Tory nomination in Burnaby-Kingswaywas won by John Bitonti, who used his extensive contacts in the local Italiancommunity to recruit new members. He defeated the association secretary to becomenominee, and believes that many older members (whom he called “Canadians”) absentedthemselves from the subsequent campaign because of this. The chance to promote hisown vision of conservative ideology played an important part in the appeal thenomination had for Bitonti, who ran as an pro-life candidate. His supporters’ sometimesstrident defense of “family values’ in a riding where the first ever openly gay (andpopular) MP was running was seen by some members as electorally damaging.Nominations can motivate community groups to offer their own candidates upfor selection2. These candidates then have access to a ready-made pooi of supportersfrom which to sign up new members who can vote at the nomination meeting. Beingpermeable, cadre style Tory associations are susceptible to insurgency, and the partiesideological position attracted a number of pro-life candidates to its nominations in BC.In the Fraser Valley, an association member with links to the pro-life movementchallenged Tory MP Bob Wenman for the nomination. In the new riding of SurreyNorth, Cliff Blair combined support from within the association built up over a longhistory of working for the party with support from pro-life sympathizers and a strongrecruitment drive in the local Indo-Canadian community to win the Tory nomination.2For a seminal discussion of the relationship between ethnicity and politics in Canada, seeSchwartz (1964).96The retirement of an incumbent can provide new political opportunities forprospective candidates if the control exercised over an association by the incumbent isremoved and the nomination is thrown open. In Victoria, the Tory nomination to find asuccessor to retiring incumbent Allan McKinnon attracted a number of candidates.Although McKinnon’s retirement and the changing demographics gave the NDP achance of taking the seat in the upcoming election, the strength of the association and itsprofile lent it substantial appeal.The informal search process run by the association with McKinnon’s assistanceoffered the nomination to such local luminaries as former provincial cabinet ministerBrian Smith. But it failed to convince any high profile candidate to accept thenomination. Released from the control of the sitting member and the attempt toparachute a candidate into the association, the nomination immediately became morepermeable. This opening of the nomination process to other candidates effectively putthe process beyond the party’s control. And despite its desire not to run any localcouncillors or high profile business people as a candidate in the riding, two councillors,one from Victoria (a high profile businessman) and another from Saanich entered therace along with four other candidates.A pro-life candidate recruited many new members, forcing the five othercandidates to respond with their own recruitment drives. Facing this more charismaticanti-abortion candidate, local councillor Geoff Young convinced long term members andother candidates of the dangers of nominating a single issue candidate, and won thenomination on the third ballot. Some members expressed ambivalence over this result,97as they believed that the pro-life candidate may have been a more attractive nomineethan Young. But in the end, the cohesion of an association that has experiencedelectoral success was evident in both the desire and ability of members to pull togetherto select one of their own as the nominee.While competitive, permeable cadre style associations are capable of runningcandidate searches, their appeal helps them attract candidates and undercuts some of theneed for a search. Moreover, as cadre style associations, they do not have thecommitment to formal organizational structures such as search committees nor theideological consistency found in mass parties, and are therefore not as inclined to eitherdevelop or impose a definition of a preferred type, of candidate. Where they do imposesuch a definition, it is likely to be through an informal search process conducted by agroup of association insiders. Participants in the Liberal and Conservative nominationsin Okanagan Centre and Surrey North commented on the fact that the association didnot seem to have a particular type of candidate in mind (other than in the broad sense ofsomeone whose beliefs were consistent with party policy), and that as a result, thenomination process was both fair and open.The number of ballots needed to select a nominee determines the logic of anomination meeting. A successful recruitment drive is often critical if a candidate is towin on the first ballot. Winning on subsequent ballots may require the additionalsupport of long-time party members and the recruits of other candidates. The moreballots that are needed, the greater the value of the coalition building abilities ofexperienced candidates and association members in comparison to the recruiting abilities98of candidates. In particular, superior coalition building abilities are needed to overcomeinsurgent candidates who may have recruited the largest single group of supporters. AlHorning’s win in Okanagan Centre is one example of this, as is Geoff Young’s inVictoria. Irrespective of which ballot nominees are successful on, this type ofnomination requires them to have wide popular support within the association. A highprofile either in the local community or among association members is crucial tosuccess.Local democracy is marked by a contest between a number of candidates, at leastsome of whom have had little or no previous contact with the local association, andseveral of whom have some chance of becoming the nominee. Because they are open(ie. permeable with open searches) and appealing, the intensity of the contest variesdirectly in response to the competitiveness of the association. The more competitive theassociation, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the number of newmembers recruited, and the more rambunctious the nomination meeting.In Canada, the cadre style Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties havehistorically accounted for most such associations. These two parties that havealternately formed the government and opposition, a situation that has enhanced theirappeal. Whichever one of the two goes into an election as the major opposition party islikely to experience more such nominations because there are fewer incumbents, andtherefore more nominations are open.The relationship between the candidates and their supporters in these cases willbe peronal in nature. The candidate often recruits new members, or members are99recruited by others on his or her behalf. It is not surprising that Okanagan Centreexperienced three such nominations. It is centred on a large country town, Kelowna,and the self-sufficient nature of such communities and the importance of personalrelations in business and politics heighten the salience of this personal style of politics.But the fact that similar nominations occurred in some urban ridings suggests that whilea country context facilitates local democracy, it is not a necessary condition for this typeof nomination.PARTY DEMOCRACYThe internal competition of nominations that exhibit party democracy is synonymouswith the relatively impermeable but well organized associations of mass parties.Whereas four of seven New Democrat nominations studied were contested, only five ofthe fourteen Liberal and Conservative nominations were contested. This in part reflectsthe greater number of incumbents in Tory associations, and the weakness of manyLiberal associations in the group. But it also points to the effectiveness of NDPassociations in attracting party members to their nominations. In contrast to thecontested Tory and Liberal nominations, which were relatively open, contested NDPnominations were closed. All the open, contested Liberal and Conservative nominationswere won by newcomers to the party, while long term party members won all thecontested NDP nominations.New Democrat associations in BC have substantial appeal for party memberscontemplating running for a nomination. Many associations are highly competitive, and100the provincial party is well organized and has extensive political expertise and resources.In addition, the feeling that the NDP would do well at the Tories’ expense in BC in1988 added to the appeal of its nominations. Although search committees wereorganized in most NDP associations, there were usually a number of members willing torun for the nomination. No NDP nomination was uncontested due tO a lack of interest.In Surrey North, Okanagan Centre, and Kootenay West-Reveistoke, NDPassociations experienced hotly contested nominations that produced internal conflict. Inall three cases, this can be explained in part by the fact that changing electoralboundaries created ridings that gave the party a chance of winning (or doing muchbetter in) a seat they did not hold. Surrey North and Okanagan Centre were newridings, and as such offered local associations a chance to take advantage of this breakin local political history. Here, unlike Liberal and Conservative associations in newridings, the more permanent NDP associations quickly reassigned the assets andmembers of old associations to the new ones produced by the 1987 changes to federalelectoral boundaries. This continuity, and the assistance of a powerful provincial party,helped NDP associations organize for the upcoming election. In the Kootenays, theaddition of Reveistoke to the Tory held riding of Kootenay West gave the NDP a realchance of beating the incumbent. This made the local New Democrat nominationespecially appealing.Internal competition in NDP nominations reflects in part the development ofinformal factions within associations. These groups coalesce around issues such asfeminism, unionism, and environmentalism. Factions may each enter a candidate in the101nomination race. Here, the candidates’ strategic goal is not recruitment, but rather thegaining of support from long time members and the bolstering of organizational strengthof sympathetic factions. This accounts for the reduced recruitment found in NDPassociations (Carty 1991a, 111-117). This nomination strategy favours candidates whohave built up some organizational credibility in the party. This is in distinct contrast tothe more volatile, often outsider, insurgent groups that support candidates in open,contested nomination, and which provoke vigorous recruitment drives.New Democrat candidate search committees reinforce the bias towards memberswith a record of extensive work in the party or union movement. And given that NDPassociations are more likely to have formal search committees than their cadre stylecousins, the exclusion of outsiders is more common. The nomination meetingsproduced under these conditions are often smaller in terms of voters, although notcandidates, than those in their openly contested counterparts. But they can be just asfractious and acrimonious if factions square off against each other.In Okanagan Centre, the New Democrat nomination involved a spirited andsometimes bitter contest between the two leading candidates, each supported by afaction within the local association. The 250 members who attended the meetingdivided into two camps: an old guard and a new guard. The former tended to beunionists while the latter were most concerned with environmental issues. Theassociation selected Bryan Mclver as its nominee, a local insurance broker and relativenewcomer who had once been a Conservative party member. Although Mclver hadhelped to sign up some new members to the association, his win was only possible with102the support of some of the younger association members. The outcome was not popularwith all the members, in part because of Mclver’s checkered partisan background.In the NDP association in Kootenay West-Reveistoke, the addition of unionistsfrom Revelstoke as a result of newly drawn boundaries both strengthened the associationand the hand of the union faction against those members who would have putenvironmental and other issues at the top of the association agenda. As free trade wasseen to threaten employment in local heavy industry such as the Cominco smelter inTrail (which is highly unionised), as well as in the transport and forestry industries,unionist in many local communities had added incentive to become involved inassociation politics.The formal candidate search committee identified 5 candidates, each with unionand party backgrounds. The nomination meeting attracted about 1200 members, andwas hotly contested. Some of these candidates stressed social and environmental issues,but these issues were pushed aside by concern over the impact of free trade on the localeconomy. Lyle Kristiansen, a high profile union member who had led a localexperiment in union management of a timber mill, captured the nomination. In additionto his union involvement, Kristiansen had twice before done battle with the Toryincumbent Bob Brisco in the old seat of Kootenay West, winning on one occasion.While his parliamentary experience was an important factor in this win, some ofKristiansen’s supporters admitted that other candidates had better personal qualificationsfor the job but had lost because they lacked the institutional links with the unionmovement necessary for success.103The winning NDP candidate in Surrey North, Jack Karpoff. put his nominationsuccess down to the fact that he had the support of women and feminists in theassociation. This support was the result of his high public profile on issues affectingwomen built up over eight years as a local NDP municipal councillor. He estimatedthat about 80 percent of the key organizational positions in the association were filledby women. Unlike candidates in more open nominations, he did not expend muchenergy signing up new members, but rather aimed at strengthening his support amongwomen members during the nomination campaign. With their backing, he overcameseveral candidates whose policy emphasis favoured traditional New Democrat industrialand economic concerns. Some of his opponents suggested that Karpoff wasopportunistic both in wooing the feminist bloc and seeking to strengthen its hand in theassociation.In Fraser Valley West, Lynn Fairall, a union shop steward, managed to meldsupport from women and some local unionists to overcome a union-supported malecandidate. As a union shop steward and long time party worker, she attracted theinterest of the search committee, and was ideally placed to win the nomination. Anoteworthy feature of her subsequent election campaign was that her main nominationopponent acted as her campaign manager. Although relations between the two werestrained, this indicates that the solidarity of NDP associations can extend to the pointwhere losing candidates and their supporters are more likely to stay on in the localassociation than in many Liberal and Conservative associations.The impermeability and narrow searches of these associations dampen the104upward impact of competitiveness on membership numbers, and the downward pressurethat accompanies lack of competitiveness. In a contest between party insiders with fewor no insurgent candidates, there is less pressure for strong recruitment drives, socandidates turn their attention to wooing the existing membership. This compounds theeffects of impermeability and further reduces the volatility of membership numbers. Italso means that these associations have fewer links to their surrounding community.Party democracy produces nomination meetings that are generally more subduedthan those in permeable associations. Most voters are known to each other and aremembers of some standing. These mass party nominations favour party insiders whohave worked for the union movement andlor party and who have good contacts amongmembers. Winning such a nomination often takes a combination of personal andfactional support. If the association does divide along factional lines in selecting acandidate, the nomination can be controversial.LATENT DEMOCRACYLatent democracy is found in permeable associations that lack appeal andstruggle to find candidates willing to compete for their nomination. Occasionally, openuncontested nominations are able to attract one or two association members to theirnominations, but invariably, the contest lacks vigour, and one candidate clearlydominates the process. This situation confronted many Liberal associations in BC in1988.In the Fraser Valley, lawyer Tony Wattie, a long time Liberal worker who had105previously held the presidency of two associations, easily won the nomination on thefirst ballot over one other candidate. His position in the party all but guaranteed thisoutcome. The nomination was not particularly appealing, as the association had no realchance of winning the 1988 election. Rather, Wattie aimed to strengthen the localassociation in the hope of future success. From a membership of 39 a year before theelection, the association grew to over 350 by the time of the nomination. In addition,the association had paid off a $4 000 debt left over from the 1984 election.In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, local doctor Garry Jenkins built the Liberalassociation from the ground up and was its president. The association was very small,and seemed little more than an extension of his own ego. The nomination was verypermeable but had little appeal as the party had no chance of success in the Kootenays.As the only candidate, Jenkins won the nomination by acclamation. Jenkins wasmotivated by a belief that the party should field a candidate in the riding, and that hisposition as a family doctor in the local community would help him win votes.Because they are weak, these associations often fail to find nominationcandidates from within their own ranks. This encourages them to look beyond theassociation for potential candidates. Their informal searches are often designed toattract a local notable who has no knowledge of the frailty of the association.Association members may inflate the chances of electoral success and the help it canprovide in an election in order to attract such candidates. As well, they encourage localnotables to believe that their local personal support can be translated into electoralsuccess.106The Liberal association in the new riding of Surrey North managed to organize acandidate search committee, which succeeded in convincing two candidates to run.They did so in part by claiming that the new boundaries helped make the associationcompetitive, and that the party would provide campaign assistance if the associationattracted a good nominee. The association did in fact attract a good candidate, exmayor of Surrey, Don Ross. Ross felt that the new boundaries and a lack of anincumbent provided him with a chance to take advantage of his high personal profile towin the seat. In particular, his close ties with the local Social Credit establishmentconvinced him that he would have access to sufficient help to run a strong campaign.He easily beat his one opponent at the nomination meeting attended by over a hundrednewly recruited party members. The permeability of the association which allowed Rosssuch easy access to the nomination also meant that it had no real substance. He quicklyrealised after the nomination that it could provide little help during the campaign.In cases where no candidate can be found, or one does not offer him or herselfto the association, the party may appoint a candidate from amongst its loyal partyworkers. This is unlikely to be a local party member. Rather, a worker from thenational or provincial office of the party - perhaps a young person with politicalaspirations- may be installed as a party standard bearer. The Liberal association inBurnaby-Kingsway was both unappealing and incapable of finding its own candidate.Sam Stevens, a worker from the party’s provincial office was parachuted in as acandidate. He had no connection with the association or riding, and was simplyfulfilling an organizational directive aimed at ensuring the party fielded election107candidates in as many ridings as possible. This association barely stirred from its inter-election dormancy during the 1988 election.The poorly contested Reform Party nominations in Fraser Valley West, SurreyNorth and Victoria reflect the fact that the party was not yet fully organized. In general,those nominations consisted of a few friends agreeing to support one amongst them asthe candidate so as to show the party flag in the riding. As with their Liberalcounterparts, the associations were ciphers for the personal ambitions of a candidate anda few of his or her friends.Latent democracy occurs in uncompetitive, weak, cadre style associations that areopen. Because the nomination is either uncontested or nominally contested, it is likelyto be a quiet affair (Carty and Erickson 1991, table 3.11). There is often only onecandidate, or a candidate that has a clear advantage over all others. If there is anomination meeting, the low level of recruitment means that the victor can win with ahandful of supporters, most of whom are relatives, friends and neighbours of thecandidate. The successful nominee may or may not be a party member. Because of thefact that they fill a gap in a party’s roster of candidates but have little chance ofwinning, these candidates can be thought of as stopgaps.LIMITED DEMOCRACYLimited democracy occurs in high profile nominations which themselves tend to occurin a few high profile ridings in every province. In some of the ridings such as Victoriaand Vancouver Centre, public figures with strong contacts to party hierarchies held108virtual monopolies on the parties’ nominations. Vancouver Centre is an eminentexample of a high profile riding that produces this type of nomination. It has a historyof electing important MP’s, and immediately prior to 1988, was held by theConservative cabinet minister Pat Carney whose public profile had been stronglyconnected to the free trade negotiations with the United States. She had decided toretire just before the election. Conservative strategists expected to lose seats in BC, andhoped they could hold onto a few of their existing seats as a means of maintaining somepresence in the province. Centre was one of them. Strategists believed their only hopeof winning Centre rested on finding an outstanding candidate.3In finding a replacement for Carney, local and non-local Tory strategists workedtogether to control the nomination process by conducting a directed search for a highprofile candidate. This was possible because local members believed that theassociation deserved a high profile candidate, and that an elite search committee wouldhave the best chance of finding such a person. The committee was willing to restrictaccess to just one candidate in order to make the nomination more appealing, andpromised prospective candidates help from both local and non-local elements of theConservative party. During this time, the association president was aware thatnegotiations were taking place, but had no role in them. The eventual successor toCarney, Kim Campbell, only accepted the nomination after personally receivingCarney’s endorsement. The search stopped, and she was acclaimed the candidate well3Such candidates are likely to have strong social contacts with influential members of theparty. Scarrow labels such advantages ‘natural” selectors (1964, 53-54)109after the election writ had been issued. As such, she was the last Tory candidatenominated in 1988. Once Campbell had accepted the nomination, the meshing of herprovincial organization with Pat Carney’s national organization created a powerfulcampaign team.The NDP nomination in Centre was won by Johanna den Hertog, who had runfor the seat in 1984, and was the current National President of the party. While therewas a formal candidate search, it was stymied by den Hertog’s well known intention torun again. She was closely aligned with the national head office of the party whichobviously supported her nomination. When party leader Ed Broadbent was invited toattend the nomination, his office indicated that the leader would only do so if there wasno controversy, partly to protect his image as a caring leader that was so crucial to theNew Democrat campaign in 1988. In the face of den Hertog’s overwhelminginstitutional support, and given her high profile, the other candidate had no chance. Thenomination did not develop into a real contest, and Broadbent did attend.The Liberal nomination in Vancouver Centre was won by Tex Enemark. Hisexperience in Ottawa as a Deputy Minister in a Trudeau Liberal government and hiswork for one time Liberal MP Ron Basford from Vancouver made him one of the fewhigh profile Liberals in British Columbia. He was also well known in business circlesin downtown Vancouver, and had personal ties to Liberal leader John Turner. With thisprofile, he easily beat his less well known opponent on the first ballot.Nominations in Victoria shared some of these same characteristics. The presenceof a high profile party insider stymied competition for the New Democrat nomination110there. Having run for the seat in 1984, when it appeared the party would lose, JohnBrewin had built some credit among local party members. As well as being thepresident of the Victoria association, he was a past president of the BC NDP, and wasmarried to the NDP mayor of Victoria. He had run for the party in Ontario at theprovincial level, and his links to the party went back to his father having been aMember of Parliament for the NDP. This attachment to the party helped him securewidespread endorsement, and helped prevent a challenge to his nomination. As inVancouver, Ed Broadbent’s office made it clear that he would only attend a wellmanaged nomination meeting, further reducing the chances of a coordinated challenge toBrewin. His position was unassailable, and he easily won the nomination.There was a functioning Liberal association in Victoria, but its lack ofcompetitiveness meant it had little appeal for aspiring candidates. Association presidentMichael O’Connor agreed to the request of his friend and party leader John Turner torun in order to ensure a high profile candidate in the riding. Turner hoped thatdisenchantment with the Tories might give a right wing Liberal candidate a chance ofsuccess in Victoria. The endorsement of the party leader stifled any chance of a closelycontested nomination. In addition, O’Connor was a well known and well liked locallawyer with strong contacts in the community, including many in the local Socred elite.While his personal reputation gave him a chance of doing well, he took a longer termview that saw his campaign as a step towards improving the Liberals future prospects inthe riding. He won the nomination unopposed.The re-nominations of most incumbents exhibit limited democracy. Loyal partyIIImembers, and those that recognise the value of backing a winner, do not wish to see theincumbent challenged for the nomination. This limits the impetus for a candidate searchby local party members. As well, incumbents normally exercise a great deal ofinfluence over local associations. This influence is based in part on the loyalty of partymembers and also on the access incumbents have to extensive financial resources and aprofessional constituency office staff. Incumbents or their representatives often controlthe rules by which the nomination is run, rules which can be manipulated to complicatea challenger’s task. Finally, if the nomination does entail a vote, the incumbent is in apowerful position to lobby for support. This is a strong form of associationimpermeability, and is why few incumbents lose nominations (Carty and Erickson 1991,133).Incumbent Svend Robinson in Burnaby-Kingsway was an example of a wellrespected MP who had the support of the association executive and membership andwas unlikely to be challenged. His office staff was strongly committed to himpersonally, and his position as a local boy with a national profile gave him extraordinaryinfluence over the local association. At the time his organizational links stretched to thevery top of the party as the national spokesperson on defence. He also had a specialrole in the party and the country as an activist and opinion leader with respect to issuesaffecting gays and lesbians. There was no chance that he would be challenged, and hewas nominated unopposed.On those occasions where an incumbent is challenged, the nomination is likely tobe controversial, and the meeting large (ibid.). To have any chance of winning, a112challenger must open up the contest and then recruit large numbers of new members, orattract support from a large pooi of disaffected association members. This is verydifficult given that the incumbent usually controls the association and by implication itsmembers and the rules governing the nomination. As well, challenger’s threaten thestatus quo, and often elicit a hostile response from many association members.In Fraser Valley West, the long serving Tory incumbent Bob Wenman wasannoyed when his plans for re-nomination were derailed by a challenge from anassociation member. This was particularly galling for an incumbent who publicly pridedhimself in his control of the local association. His pro-life opponent felt that Wenmanhad not been forceful enough in his opposition to abortion in Parliament. During theMP’s term as a member of the governing party- the first in his long historyrepresenting the riding - he became deeply involved in national politics. In addition, hismembership on a Commons committee dealing with foreign affairs encouraged hispenchant for travel and international policy issues. He was closely associated with aConservative government that was seen by some of his constituents as failing topromote socially conservative policies.Aware of the threat of a challenge, Wenman announced the date for thenomination meeting one day before the deadline for entrance to the contest. Associationrules dictate that candidates must nominate a month before the meeting. Wenmanannounced the date of the meeting just a month and a day in advance, leaving hischallenger just a day to enter the race. Despite this, the challenger managed to put hisname forward in time. By recruiting new members and with the support of a group of113similar-minded older association members, the challenger presented a moderate threat toWenman. At the very least, the existence of a challenge was a source of embarrassmentand irritation for the incumbent.While his substantial resources and skills allowed him to win the nomination, thecontest upset Wenman’s rhythm and created bad feelings. Following the nomination,about a dozen high profile association members, including some of the executive,resigned from the party. The immediately joined the Christian Heritage Party. This isevidence of the power that subgroups within an association can wield, and the dangersfaced by incumbents who fail to stay in touch with their riding association, eitherphysically or ideologically.Variation among those nominations that display limited democracy result fromdifferences in the appeal of the nomination and the manner in which restrictions areplaced on access to the nomination. Even in high profile ridings, some associations aremore competitive than others and are therefore likely to attract more candidates and facea greater chance of experiencing a truly contested nomination. But often, local and nonlocal elites working together restrict access to one high profile candidate. In the case ofan incumbent, a privileged position usually forestalls any serious challenges to his or herrenomination. Because of the lack of real competition for the nomination, there isrelatively little recruitment of new members.The high profile nominees produced by this sort of nomination have access tosubstantial local and non-local party support during the campaign, in part because thereare strategic advantages in making a greater campaign effort in high profile ridings.114This support is in part a function of the nominees’ contacts within the party. In massparties, such as the NDP, this means having worked for the party. In cadre style parties,it may mean having extensive social contacts with the party elite, either locally ornationally.CONCLUSIONFour types of nominations have been identified here on the basis of whether they areappealing and open to potential candidates. They can be seen as variants of localdemocratic politics. The filters that control access to each type of nomination operate indistinct ways and combinations to exclude some candidates while allowing otherthrough. As a result, they help determine the composition of the campaign team, and inso doing, the final shape of the local campaign. The 25 campaigns in this study arecategorized using this criteria in Table 4.1.Open, contested nominations are examples of local democracy. They arepermeable and have open, but often informal candidate searches. Such nominationsappeal to a range of potential candidates who find them easily accessible. This type ofcontest is likely to occur in competitive, cadre style associations. They are highlycontested, involve heavy recruitment drives, and attract candidates from both within andwithout the association. In fact, some candidates will have just joined the association.They are often won by well known local notables who have the support of largenumbers of new members, many of whom know the nominee personally. The campaignteams that result from these nominations are large and have access to substantial115TABLE 4.1TYPES OF NOMINATIONSCONTESTED NOMINATIONS UNCONTESTED NOMINATIONSAVE. NO. CANDIDATES > 4 AVE. NO. CANDIDATES <2OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSEDLOCAL PARTY LATENT LIMITEDRIDING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACYBK PC(3)- LIB(1) NDP2(1)FVW - NDP(3) LIB(2);RP(1) PC2(2)KWR- NDP(6) LIB(1) PC2(l)OC’ LIB(4);PC(6);RP(4) NDP(3)--SN’ PC(6) NDP(4) LIB(2);RP(l)-VC-- LIB(2) PC3(1);NDP(2)VIC PC3(6) NDP(1) LIB(1);RP(1)-Notes: BK Burnaby-Kingsway; FVW Fraser Valley West; KWR Kootenay WestReveistoke; OC Okanagan Centre; SN Surrey North; VC Vancouver Centre; VICVictoria.Figures in parentheses denote number of candidates contesting nomination.Superscripts denote the following:1. New riding, no incumbent.2. Incumbent nomination.3. Retiring incumbent.116financial and other resources, although they may lack experienced campaigners.Closed, contested nominations have some appeal, but are not easily accessible tocandidates from outside the party and are therefore a form of parry democracy. Theyare impermeable, and their formal candidate searches focus on existing associationmembers. Such nominations occur most frequently in mass party associations. Even inless competitive associations of this type, members contest the nomination out of asense of obligation to the party. As a result, they are usually contested, but the focus oninternal party democracy reduces the incentive for candidates to recruit new members.The winner is likely to be an association member or party insider with a history ofstrong commitment to the party, and for whom other members in good standing arewilling to vote.This type of nomination produces a campaign team which is often constructed bylocal party executives rather than the candidate, and includes both supporters andopponents of the nominee who are committed to the party. Although as with allcampaigns its resource base depends in part on the competitiveness of the association,the committed involvement of experienced association members somewhat irrelevant ofelectoral concerns often ensures the basic organizational positions are filled. Becausemass parties have a commitment to organizational solidarity, party headquarters can beexpected to make some effort to ensure every association has access to the minimumfinances needed to run a campaign.Uncontested, open nomination contests are accessible to potential candidates, butthe association is so uncompetitive, and the nomination so unappealing that they are best117thought of as a form of evanescent or latent democracy. The association is permeable,but too weak to run a thorough, formal search for candidates. Most such nominationsoccur in uncompetitive, cadre style associations. Being weakly contested, there isusually little or no recruitment. Candidates may be either outsiders that are ignorant ofthe weakness of the association or party stalwarts anxious to ensure the party has acandidate in the riding. Sometimes, the party appoints a nominee if none come forward.These are stopgap nominees who are filling holes in a party’s nationwide list ofcandidates. These nominations can be won with a handful of supporters.Closed and uncontested nominations are the fourth and final type of nominationexplored in this chapter. Access to these nominations is restricted, and as such theyexhibit a form of limited democracy. The association is impermeable and the search isdirected at a specific sort of candidate (although it may still be informal). Althoughthese associations are often competitive, and should appeal to prospective candidates,this appeal is muted by the wide held belief that only a certain candidate, or type ofcandidate, has a chance of winning the nomination. This suggests that appeal has morethan a competitive element, but there is also a need for prospective candidates to believethey have a chance of gaining access to the types of resources necessary to win.These nominations occur in high profile or strategically important ridings. Cadrestyle associations seem more susceptible to such nominations than their mass partycounterparts. These ridings are found disproportionately in urban centres, and attracthigh profile candidates. Associations which renominate incumbents are also included inthis group. This brings a great diversity of associations into the category as incumbents118may be in rural, urban, or suburban ridings. In general, the campaign teams formedfollowing these nominations are strong. They are well financed and staffed, and haveaccess to experienced campaigners and professional assistance4.This chapter noted the relationship between nominations, nominees, and the typeof campaign teams that are formed following a nomination. The next chapter looksmore closely at the nature of campaign teams and how they vary across associations,ridings, and parties.4Ward makes this point about the 1962 NDP campaign in Vancouver Burrard (1964, 193-4).119CHAPTER FIVECAMPAIGN TEAMSMany of the activities pursued by local campaigns are much the same from onecampaign team to the next. These activities are implied by the need to identifysupporters, communicate a message, and mobilise support on election day. But closeinspection uncovers myriad differences in the forms local campaigns actually take.Some of these differences reflect variations in the composition and nature of campaignteams, their competence, and the resources available to them. Because nominationsdetermine what sorts of candidates contest elections, and the type of supporters eachtakes through to the campaign, differences in the nomination experiences of localassociations help explain variations in the style and content of local campaigns. Inaddition, the relationship between a local campaign and its national party, and the natureof the local contest also shape the character of a local campaign team and the strategiesit pursues.The next three chapters provide a framework for understanding how the characterof a campaign team and the environment in which it operates during an electioninfluence the style and content of a local campaign. Style and content are terms used todescribe the strategies, tactics and techniques used by local campaigns. By implication,they encompass the organizational structures, activities, and allocation of funds thatresult from the adoption of particular campaign strategies. This chapter deals with how120nominations shape the composition of and resources available to a campaign team. Thenext chapter looks at how the relationship between the local and national campaigns alsoshapes the resources available to the former and the strategies they adopt. The third ofthe three looks at the impact of local riding conditions on the nature of local campaigns.The size and composition of the campaign team is critical to the style andcontent of local campaigns. Central to this team is the candidate and the volunteers whofill the important organizational positions in the team. Different types of nominationstend to produce distinctive types of candidates and campaign teams. These teams varywith respect to the four characteristics: the relationship among the group of workers thatfill key organizational positions; the composition of the campaign team, particularly withrespect to the type and number of workers and the financial resources available to it; thelocus of decision making with respect to building the campaign team, which may beeither local, regional or national, and which can vary in respect of the role taken by thecandidate and local association executive; and finally, how the team, including thecandidate, perceives the task of running a campaign and its main strategic focus. Thesecharacteristics act both as criteria for understanding how local campaigns operate inCanadian federal elections, and as a means of categorizing them. The next sectionoutlines the general form campaigns take, and then distinguishes between a number ofdifferent forms of local campaign teams using these four criteria.12[THE STRUCTURE OF CAMPAIGN TEAMSThe transition from the nomination to the election campaign proper involves puttingtogether a campaign team and organizing initial fund-raising efforts) About half of allassociations engage in regular election campaign planning between elections (Carty1991a, table 3.17), and a third have a campaign team in place prior to the nomination(ibid., figure 7.1). But there is a decided quickening of the pace of these efforts asnominations are organized and completed. Most nominations occur in the six monthperiod prior to the calling of an election (Carty and Erickson 1991, 112 and table 3.5).The strength of the local association and the nature of the nomination processprofoundly affect the campaign as together they shape the supply of volunteers.The volunteers that make up the campaign team are the central resource of anycampaign. They are also the most difficult to bring into the campaign process. Thisrecruitment may be done by the candidate alone, or some combination of the candidateand local and non-local party members. Across the three major parties, the appeal ofthe candidate is the most important factor in attracting volunteers to work in a localcampaign (Carty 1991a, table 7.13). As noted in earlier chapters, the winning candidateembodies the style and strength of the local association. The size of the local campaignteam reflects the number of supporters the winning candidate has managed to gathertogether during the nomination and in the period between the nomination and election.Their relationship to the candidate and the skills they possess shape the character of the1Stanbury (1991) outlines how the local, provincial and national branches of each of theparties collect and distribute their funds.122team (see Carty 1991a, 15 1-162).Campaign teams must be large enough to fulfil the often gruelling labour-intensive activities that make up a campaign. These include door-knocking, putting upsigns, and dropping leaflets. But they must also be smart enough to deal with the moresubtle complexities of campaigning, such as advertising, making national party policyrelevant to local concerns, presenting the party and candidate in the best light, andresponding to the strategies of other campaigns. To complete these tasks properly, it isnecessary to have a division of labour that attempts to place volunteers where they willbe most effective. Thus, the most experienced campaigners and those with skills wellsuited to organizing campaigns are at the centre, making strategy, while those with lessexperience and perhaps less commitment are the foot soldiers, doing the trench-work ofthe campaign.Campaign teams consist of three types of workers. At the periphery are thosewho sympathize with the party, but whose commitment may stretch only to putting up alawn sign or helping on election day. Closer to the centre of the campaign aresecondary workers, who work for the campaign a number of times during the election,handing out leaflets and perhaps doing some canvassing. At the centre are the coreworkers- the inner circle - that develop and implement strategy. This inner circleincludes the candidate. It does the essential work of the campaign, and if there is a lackof workers, its members are called upon to make sure all the basic elements ofcampaigning- canvassing, literature drops, organizing the candidates schedule, anddealing with the media - are covered. The number and quality of each of these three123types of workers greatly affects the style and content of a local campaign.Having a good mix of all three types of workers is important if a candidatehopes to win a marginal seat, or turn an apparently hopeless situation into a real contest.Jim Karpoff, elected as the Surrey North NDP MP in 1988, suggested that his success ina riding that might have gone to the Tories had much to do with the mix of supportersfound in his campaign team. Large numbers of volunteers from a strong localassociation supported his campaign, and long-time acquaintances with provincial andfederal campaign experience formed an inner circle that directed the campaign.SympathizersA campaign organization can be thought of as consisting of three concentric rings ofcampaign workers which surround and encompass the candidate as shown in Figure 5.1.The outside circle consists of volunteers, who play only an occasional role in thecampaign. These sympathizers may help once or twice during the campaign period,erecting signs, folding flyers, attending fund-raising events, driving voters to pollingbooths on election day, and perhaps working as a scrutineer on election day. Whilesome are members of the local association, others are not. Their attachment may be toboth or either the candidate or the party, but is more likely to the latter. Campaigns thatappear to be doing well may attract these workers as the election progresses.The individual skills and commitment that sympathizers bring to the campaignare not crucial given their sporadic involvement. However, the sheer size of this groupcan have an impact on the effectiveness of the campaign, and on the atmosphere it124FIGURE 5.1CAMPAIGN WORKERSSecondary WorkereSympathizerslnn•r CircI•- 10 to 40S•oond.ry Worr•- 20 to 50Sympathizers- 50 to 300 (in a few cases up to 1 000)125generates in a riding. Large numbers of sympathizers can help give a campaign an auraof competitiveness, and their normal social contacts can influence the way in which acampaign is discussed in the local community. In practical terms, they may beparticularly useful when a campaign requires a large, short term workforce, such aswhen it tries to flood a riding with campaign signs. The number of such campaignworkers reported by candidates in this study varied from none to over 1 000. Datacollected by Carty (1991a, 168) suggests that the average number of workers incampaign teams in 1988 was 94. Given the experiences of the campaigns in this study,one would expect about half the workers of a team of this size to be sympathizers.2Secondary WorkersA group of secondary workers forms an intermediate ring around the candidate, andconsists of regular campaign office workers and canvassers. Some work a few timesduring the campaign, while others help out several times a week throughout thecampaign. They may be unwilling or unable to fill major roles in the campaign,perhaps due to other commitments such as full-time jobs. The individuals that make upthis group are ideally suited to tasks that do not require consistent work but do demandskill and commitment, such as canvassing by phone or foot, doing mail-outs, or helpingwith administrative tasks. Unlike sympathizers, they must be reliable if a campaign isto get its work done. They may number anywhere from half a dozen in small2However, this figure may under-represent the number of sympathizers in campaign teamsas they are difficult to count given their sporadic involvement.126campaigns to 100 in larger campaigns. Some urban campaigns claimed that they hadaccess to up to three hundred workers who were willing to do this sort of work, but thatdifficulties in coordinating such a large number of volunteers placed a limit on howmany could be used.The skills and experience of members in this group can be very important to alocal campaign, as they often deal with the public and are responsible for theimplementation of campaign strategies. The size of this group is also important, asmany of the mundane but crucial campaign tasks are done by these workers. Mostimportantly, by doing this sort of work, they free up the inner circle of strategy makersto concentrate on the more esoteric aspects of campaigning. By the same token, a lackof secondary workers, which nearly always is accompanied by a lack of sympathizers,places great strains on the inner circle.Secondary workers may be people who have played a more active role in earliercampaigns but are now reducing their commitment, mixed with those that are movingthe other way and becoming more involved with campaigning.3 This tier of workersexchanges important anecdotal information about campaigning. Most such workers areassociation members. As with sympathizers, a large number of secondary workers givesthe impression that the campaign is electorally competitive, not only because of their3Tory Bob Wenman in Fraser Valley West had a straightforward view of the life cycle ofa campaign volunteer. A volunteer at his or her first campaign is enthusiastic, butinexperienced and thus not very effective. By the second campaign, the volunteer isexperienced and hard working, the backbone of a campaign. By the third campaign, thevolunteer is a little jaded, but effective due to his or her experience. At this point, it isimportant that experienced workers pass on their knowledge to new campaigners, becausethey are unlikely to be back for a fourth campaign.127direct campaign efforts, but also because the campaign is widely discussed by theseworkers amongst their friends and neighbours in the riding. This can help give acandidate’s claims about being competitive added credibility.The Inner CircleAt the centre of the campaign with the candidate is the third and most essential group ofworkers, the inner circle. They fill the key positions in the organizational chart depictedin Figure 5.2. Members of this group work either consistently on a part-time basis (atleast a few times a week, perhaps daily) or full time on the campaign. In this group, thecentral organizational role is that of campaign manager.4Th campaign manager takesresponsibility for the day to day running of the campaign. This includes making manykey strategic decisions, sometimes with little assistance or advice. In the words of RonStipp, campaign manager for Vancouver Centre New Democrat candidate Johanna denHertog, a manager.guides the entire campaign, helps develop and ensures its strategic direction,acts as the peak organizer, and oversees important functional elements of thecampaign such as media relations, the candidate’s schedule, spending,... with thefinal say on most things.The most legally onerous position is that of official agent, who is responsible formanaging all the campaign funds. He or she must ensure that campaign contributionsand expenditures comply with the demands of the Canada Elections Act, and must make4Occasionally, if the campaign manager cannot or will not meet all the demands of his orher position, the campaign chair will take over important management functions. But in mostcampaigns, the chair is a member of the advisory group shown in Figure 5.2.128FIGURE 5.2THE STRUCTURE OF A CAMPAIGN TEAM129an official report of campaign revenues and expenditures to Elections Canada. This rolemay be filled by a professional such as an accountant or lawyer. In fact, theConservatives explicitly recommend this (Carty 1991b, 83). Because of their greateraccess to the social strata that includes professionals, the cadre style Liberal andConservative associations are much better at finding such volunteers than is the NDP.In 1988 66.7 of Liberal and 60.2 percent Tory official agents were lawyers oraccountants, while only 19.4 percent of NDP agents were from one of these professions(ibid., table 3.1). But all parties usually offer some access to centralized legal andaccounting advice, including schools designed to train official agents. All campaignsmust also hire a qualified accountant to audit the accounts kept by the official agent andto certify their accuracy. The other central campaign positions that make up the innercircle are shown in Figure 5.2, and include fund-raising, media relations andcommunications, strategy and so on. Members of the inner circle chair committeesdedicated to these tasks and coordinate the work of volunteers in these areas.There can be up to 40 people in this inner group, but it is often smaller (between10 and 20), and may include the spouse or other relatives of the candidate. Thesepeople coordinate the campaign, and ensure important jobs get done. They are involvedin planning strategies, arranging the candidates’ schedule, dealing with press releasesand the media, and may be left to do critical administrative chores or canvassing,depending on the number and expertise of other workers that are available to thecampaign.Because of differences in the strength and competitiveness of local associations,130and their nomination experiences, campaign teams vary across ridings and parties. Therest of this chapter investigates how the nomination experiences of local candidatesshapes these campaign teams, and influences the mix of workers, skills, and theresources available to them.CANDIDATES AND THEIR CAMPAIGN TEAMSThe nomination has a profound impact on the character and effectiveness of a campaignteam. Most associations form campaign teams during the period between thenomination and the election (Carty 1991a, figure 7.1), although New Democratassociations have a greater tendency to have some elements in place before thenomination. As well as choosing the candidate, the nomination governs the size andnature of the pooi of workers and the method by which these workers find their wayinto the campaign team. Candidates and campaign teams can be classified by referenceto their nomination experiences.The four different types of nominations presented in previous chapters are eachassociated with a different sort of candidate. The campaign teams built by each type ofcandidate differ consistently in four important characteristics: the locus of decisionmaking with respect to building the campaign team; the relationship among the innercircle of campaign workers; the composition of the campaign team, particularly the innercircle, with respect to the type and number of workers and the financial resourcesavailable to it; and finally, how the inner circle, including the candidate, perceives thetask of running a campaign and its main strategic focus. These factors determine both131the style and content of the campaign. The rest of this chapter uses these criteria todevelop a model of the structure of campaign teams and uses a number of examples toillustrate four distinct types of teams.Local Notable CandidatesLocal notables are generally the product of local democracy: nominations held in thecompetitive associations of cadre style parties (see Figure 5.3). In winning these open,contested nominations, local notables make use of their public profiles to recruit manynew members. They and their supporters see the candidate as central to the campaignteam, a team held together by personal ties. The candidates are often new to the party,and may be inclined to rely on other new members and personal acquaintances to helprun their campaigns. With a strong association and plenty of funds to work with, theseare competent campaigns. Decision making with respect to shaping the campaign teamand choosing strategies is localised. Campaigner’s perceptions of the character of thelocal riding play an important role in their decisions.The manner in which a local notable chooses his or her campaign teamresembles that of a leader choosing a support team after winning a party leadership.Because success in the nomination is strongly affected by the performance of theindividual candidate, and his or her support base is somewhat independent of the localassociation, the winning candidate has a good deal of freedom in building a campaignteam. Friendships and acquaintances are likely to play an important role in shaping thedecisions the candidate makes. In Surrey North, Tory candidate Cliff Blair chose Scott132FIGURE 5.3LOCAL NOTABLESOpenContestedI4oac1NbI133Thompson as his campaign manager mainly because they knew each other fromprevious campaigns and were also close personal friends and business partners.In general, local executives in cadre style associations are more likely to defer tothe candidate with respect to important organizational decisions than those in the NDP, amass party (Carty 1991a, table 7.1). This is part of the separation between theassociation and campaign organization that is common in cadre style parties in whichlocal notables are invariably nominated (Scarrow 1964, 61). It should be noted as wellthat the non-local party is only very rarely involved in selecting campaign teammembers in any party. This type of intervention is slightly more common in the NDPthan either the Liberals or Conservatives (Carty 1991a, table 7.2). This is in part afunction of a willingness amongst local NDP organizers to accept the dictates of thenational party with respect to association matters, even when the local members disagreewith the national decision (Smith 1964, 73).Occasionally, where the association is well organized, or the candidate isinexperienced, the local association executive may have some say in the selection ofpeople to fill important campaign positions. In the Okanagan, the inexperienced Liberalcandidate Murli Pendharkar relied on the few local Liberals with campaign experienceto fill crucial campaign positions. Thus, the position of campaign manager was sharedbetween two long time members of the association who had helped search outprospective nomination candidates.Successful insurgent candidates - that is, those that are new to the association -are disinclined to choose existing association members to fill important campaign roles,134preferring to rely on friends brought into the association during the nomination process.Insurgent Burnaby-Kingsway Tory John Bitonti, having alienated many long timeassociation members during the nomination, had a campaign team composed of hisfamily and friends from the local Italian-Canadian community.The relationship amongst members of the inner circle, and in particular betweenthe candidate and volunteers, is quite personal. Personal bonds between team membersmay be formed during the nomination process, from relations built up inside a strong,competitive association, or as a result of shared membership of groups and serviceorganizations outside the association.In general, volunteers in local notable campaigns have a personality driven viewof politics, and see personal attributes as more important than party platforms or policiesin deciding the outcome of an election. Local notables and their volunteers consistentlyrate the role of the candidate in the campaign as very important. This is not surprising,as the candidate plays a crucial role in attracting volunteers to campaigns in cadre styleassociations (Carty 1991a, tables 7.13 and 7.14). Only the party leader tends to be seenas more important to the outcome of the local election. Moreover, candidates in theseassociations claim to have known about 80 percent of the volunteers prior to theelection.The campaign team is usually highly competent, either because adequatenumbers of well qualified workers are available in the association and amongst newrecruits (in part as a function of the social strata that cadre style parties appeal to), orbecause the campaign is wealthy enough to hire help in critical areas such as fund-135raising, writing advertisements or conducting opinion polling. Because most localnotables win in associations that are competitive and hence strong. their membership islarge. As a result, winning candidates have a considerable pooi of potential workersfrom which to build a campaign team. Inner circles of 40 volunteers are common, andthe campaign team may have over 100 members, and up to 1 000 workers. Cliff Blairin Surrey North and Al Homing in Okanagan Centre claimed to have had access tobetween 500 and 1 000 workers, many of whom they recruited during the nominationprocess.If relations between the candidate and members of the association that supportedother candidates have remained cordial, members with election experience are nearlyalways invited to play an important role in the campaign. This was the case in the Toryassociation in Okanagan Centre. The organizer of one losing nomination campaign,Troy Schmidt, became the campaign manager for candidate Al Homing.Effective fund-raising, and a strong local campaign organization are common inthese circumstances, and party headquarters is usually willing to provide financialassistance to competitive campaigns. Within the same party, the campaigns of localnotables attracted more and larger donations than their less competitive counterparts. AlHorning in the Okanagan easily outdistanced his opponents, and the riding limit onelection expenses in raising $54 974 for his campaign.But if a candidate alienates association members, he or she can struggle to findadequate workers and funds. This is always a danger in open, contested nominationsthat are won by an insurgent candidate, and is another reason insurgents may rely on136volunteers they know or have brought into the association during the nomination. Ifthey hijack an association, they may have trouble raising funds from traditional partysupporters, and experienced campaigners in the association may refuse to help organizetheir campaign. As it is, insurgent candidates are more likely to win in weaker, if stillcompetitive, associations that are very permeable. These associations may have limitedresources to offer a candidate, and party strategists may not feel they are competitiveenough to warrant federal support.John Bitonti in Burnaby-Kingsway and Cliff Blair in Surrey North, both to somedegree insurgent, pro-life Conservative candidates, struggled to find adequate campaignfunds. Bitonti raised just $20 775 - only a little more than the party-appointed Liberalcandidate in the riding. Blair raised a paltry $14 948, half that of the Liberal candidate,and a third of his NDP opponent. The Conservative party’s abandonment of Surrey as alost cause proved to be ill-considered, as Blair lost the seat to the NDP candidate by justover 2 000 votes; he might have won with a properly funded campaign.There are qualitative differences in the pooi of volunteers that local notableshave access to in comparison with many other candidates. By encouraging recruitmentdrives and casting a wide net for candidates, competitive, cadre style associations attracta diversity of candidates and members, thus multiplying the connections between theassociation and ethnic and interest groups in the riding. These groups may even supporta particular candidate, or nominate one of their own, adding to the heterogeneity of theassociation.Cadre style associations are likely to have disproportionate number of137professionals drawn from the social strata that support the Liberals and Conservatives.Their skills are often well suited to the technical and management tasks required of theinner circle. This abundance of professional workers can have a profound impact on thecompetence and style of an inner circle. Furthermore, these professionals often have adegree of flexibility in their work schedules that allows them to take leave without payfrom their firms. Not only can they commit themselves full-time to the campaign, theirnormal salary is not considered by law to be a campaign expense. Thus, the campaignsof local notables often receive expert advice that is not subject to the limits on localcampaign spending dictated by law. Consequently, campaign activities that mightotherwise be too expensive are accessible to the campaign. While most Liberal andTory campaigns in this study had professionals such as lawyers and accountants on theircampaign staff, only a minority of New Democrat campaigns- those in high profileridings where the national NDP helped to provide such workers- had direct access tothis type of assistance.With access to workers and funds, the local campaign is in the enviable positionof being able to choose its election strategies and determine its organizational style. Itcan choose to develop its strategies and organizational form, or follow those offered bythe party. This decision has implications for every aspect of the campaign, from thefocus of literature to the types of public events the candidate attends.The choice of campaign strategies is greatly influenced by the relationshipbetween the various members of the inner circle as well as the style of the candidate.For local notables, the personal nature of relations among the inner circle, and the fact138that the candidate often welds the team together, result in the candidate being thestrategic linchpin of the campaign. In Surrey North, Scott Thompson, campaignmanager for Conservative Cliff Blair, spoke about campaign strategy entirely in terms ofthe role of the candidate:We saw the candidate is very important to success. Our strategy revolvedaround increasing Cliffs profile. The most important poii results for us werethose that showed us the level of name recognition we had gained for Cliff.This role for local notables distinguishes them from many other candidates, andis not surprising given that they are selected by permeable associations in nonprogrammatical cadre style parties. In contrast, NDP campaigners in Surrey Northranked national and regional issues, as well as the party leader higher than the candidateas factors affecting their campaign.Given that local notables are central to the campaign team, and usually have anintimate knowledge of local conditions, the campaign is likely to have a local focus.That is, local issues, and the candidate’s links to the riding are important components inthe campaign’s strategic calculations. This local impulse makes the campaignsusceptible to parochial styles of politics and local interest groups. Local control of thecampaign - the development and implementation of its own strategies - is an identifyingcharacteristic of this sort of campaign. Local organizers in cadre style parties view withsuspicion any intervention in their affairs by the national party. In contrast, NDPcampaigns place greater emphasis on national and regional issues, and are often closelylinked with national party strategy.Because perceptions of association competitiveness that drive the appeal of139nominations may be misplaced, some of the campaigns included in this group are nothighly competitive. In general, these less competitive campaigns have fewer volunteersand less resources, and thus less control over their own organizational form and strategicdirection. Progressive Conservative John Bitonti’s campaign in Burnaby-Kingsway is anexample of this. Although the nomination was contested, he alienated many associationmembers in a riding where the party had little chance of success, and had to managewith a small campaign team.Party Insider CandidatesImpermeable associations whose nominations are examples of party democracy selectcommitted (usually local) party members, or parry insiders, as their candidates (seeFigure 5.4). These associations are found mostly in mass parties such as the NDP.Party insiders often perceive themselves as first among equals. This sentiment fits wellwith the organizational ethos of a mass party such as the New Democrats. In contrast tothe personal style of local notable campaigns, party insider campaigns have abureaucratic/organizational approach to team building.This bureaucratic approach concentrates on identifying a standard operatingprocedure for every job and filling it with the best qualified party member. Positions onthe campaign team - including the campaigner manager- are regularly assigned by acommittee of executive members, often before the nomination is completed. Thisapproach, or some variant of it, is much more common in the NDP than in the cadrestyle major parties where a more traditional form of organizing, with the candidate140FIGURE 5.4PARTY INSIDERSClosedContestedI<aremocraJrnsid[41appointing a volunteer campaign manager, is more common (Carty 199 Ia, figure 7.4).Experienced NDP candidates have more discretion in choosing a campaignteam. This is particularly true in competitive associations, where a history of workingfor the party at a high level is often critical to nomination success. But these cases arethe minority. NDP candidates appointed official agents in 44.2 percent of the ridingsthe party contested compared with 74.8 and 82.5 in the case of the Liberals andConservatives (ibid). In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, the official agent for the NDPhardly knew the candidate, but was a long time party member. Neither the Conservativeor Liberal official agents were party members, and both were appointed by therespective candidates.Relations amongst the members of teams constructed by these associations areless personal and more institutionalised than in local notable campaigns. The manner inwhich volunteers are assigned to campaign team positions favours loyal party membersover those brought into the association by the nomination. While some may be friendsof the candidate, it is their commitment to the party that underpins workers’ willingnessto join the campaign (Carty 1991a tables 7.13 and 7.14).This organizational style is a function of the impermeable nature of NDPassociations which restricts access to and exit from the party. The association builds arepertoire of behaviour which becomes entrenched over time. Formal rules andconuriittee decision making tend to dominate NDP inner circles. Commitment to theparty and formalised job descriptions take the place of the friendships and ad hocorganizational arrangements found in cadre style parties. In Fraser Valley West, a142losing nomination candidate, Charles Bradford, was appointed campaign manager toLynn Fairall because he was considered to be the best person for the job. Bradford didnot get on with the candidate nor her supporters on the campaign team, and somevolunteers felt his presence disrupted the local campaign.Fortunately for New Democrats, competitive associations maintain a core groupof experienced, competent campaign volunteers that work on local campaigns from oneelection to the next. This allows them to pursue labour intensive methods of canvassingand campaigning, but it also means that impermeable NDP associations rely heavily onlong time members to fill important campaign positions. This facilitates the earlyformation of campaign teams (Carty 1991a, 156), but reduces the incentive to find newmembers to help run the campaign.Another corollary of the impermeability of NDP associations, and the relatedlack of large recruitment drives during the nomination, is that links between theassociation and the local community can be relatively limited. This reduces the abilityof mass party associations to respond to local political sentiment. But solidarity has itsrewards. Even associations that are only minimally competitive are likely to have agroup of committed members with some experience that is willing to organize thecampaign. The Okanagan Centre NDP had no chance of success, but managed toconstruct a team of experienced campaigners.As discussed previously, the nature of the social groups and strata that anassociation appeals to influences the composition of the campaign team. The NDP inBC appeals disproportionately to bureaucrats, non-professionals, and union members143(see Blake 1986). Thus, the pooi of workers that insiders draw from tends to havefewer professionals than for other campaigns. This means that campaign jobs thatbenefit from professional skills can be difficult to fill in these campaigns. Moreover,unlike professionals, wage earning volunteers do not usually have flexible working hoursand as a result have to balance their jobs with their commitment to the campaign. Thislimits the time they can spend working for the candidate. On the other hand, if they areprofessional organizers employed by a union (which is common in NDP campaigns),and thus able to devote themselves full-time to the campaign, their wages must beincluded as an election expense which limits the campaign’s financial flexibility (Carty1991a, table 7.6). In fact the NDP campaigns are more than twice as likely than thoseof any other party to have a paid manager (ibid., figure 7•3)5, and half again as likely tohave paid staff of some kind (ibid., table 7.4).Party insider campaigns place more emphasis on party policy than on the localcandidate both organizationally and strategically. This is in part a function of thegreater role played by the association executive. New Democrats in Fraser Valley Westhad hired office space, begun fund-raising, and made important decisions about theconduct of the local campaign well before Lynn Fairall won the nomination. Thispattern is evident throughout NDP associations. 41.1 percent of all NDP official agentswere appointed by the constituency executive compared with 19.7 percent of Liberal and