RIDING STYLE, PARTY ETHOS: NOMINATIONS, CANDIDATES AND LOCAL CAMPAIGNS IN CANADIAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

Despite having the appearance of a single event, federal elections in Canada concatenate nearly 300 individual constituency contests. Yet little is known of how constituency campaign teams operate, or how they interact with each other. In order to provide a better understanding of local campaigns, this thesis describes and explains the nature of local riding associations, the candidates they select, and the environment in which they operate. In so doing, it traces the impact of both riding and partisan forces on the character of constituency politics, and on Canadian politics more generally.

The thesis focuses on major party campaigns in seven ridings in British Columbia in the 1988 federal election. It begins with a socio-political profile of each riding, including the media resources available to local campaigns. The dynamics of the local association, nomination, and campaign are then reconstructed using information gleaned from interviews with candidates, campaign managers, party strategists, and volunteers. Similarly, personal interviews with journalists who covered each of the local contests give further insights into the nature of constituency politics, and the methods by which local campaigns communicate with voters.

Information on ridings and associations is then used to develop a typology of candidates and campaigns. This typology suggests that there are four archetypal candidates: local notables, party insiders, stopgaps, and those with a high profile. Each tends to be selected by a certain type of association, and to run a distinctive campaign. This typology is then applied to a number of the actual campaigns from 1988.

The patterns of politics identified by this typology suggest that local associations are central to the nature of Canadian politics and democracy. Each association combines riding and partisan forces together in idiosyncratic ways. Associations are also distinctive in a comparative sense. Unlike local party organizations in other countries, they are neither beholden to their party, nor to the personal politics of a particular candidate.
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To my parents, Mervyn Cornwall Sayers, and Eileen Frances Sayers.
CHAPTER ONE

THE STYLE AND CONTENT OF LOCAL CAMPAIGNS

This thesis describes and explains the style and content of local campaigns in Canadian federal elections. Style and content are shorthand for the strategies and tactics adopted in a local campaign, and the organizational and allocational decisions that these imply. This chapter introduces the theoretical perspective of the thesis. It then outlines the various factors that influence local campaigns, and in so doing, situates the study in relation to other literature on nominations and campaigns. It concludes by briefly describing the manner in which the rest of the thesis is presented.

The thesis takes as its starting point the observation that the nature of any local campaign is a function of both local conditions and the organizational imperatives of the parties and campaigns of which riding-level political organizations are seminal components. While this observation is not new (Siegfried 1906; Eagles 1990; Carty 1991a), this study is the first to apply this insight systematically to all the elements of a local campaign, from the nomination through to election day.

In order to better understand local campaigns, the thesis builds a detailed picture of the factors that shape the nominations which select the candidates who compete in federal elections in Canada. It continues with a description of how candidates construct their campaign teams, and the dynamics of the local contests in which they participate. The thesis concludes by exploring the linkages between the nature of local campaigns
on the one hand and the character and functioning of national parties on the other.

In contrast to most studies of constituency campaigning in Canada (see for example, Meisel 1964), this study does not address directly the link between voters and local campaigns, although it complements much of the work done in this area (see also Meisel 1957). Rather, it focuses on the organizational aspects of local campaigns, and is a corrective to the neglect of local constituency organizations of political parties as a spatially delineated element of the Canadian political system (Smiley 1987, 190).

This thesis fills the gap between the idiosyncratic portraits of local campaigns found in journalistic accounts of nominations and elections, and the more general survey research by academics that by its very nature focuses on the national campaigns of political parties.¹ A number of the studies produced for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1991) have also been directed at filling this lacuna.

The lack of local perspectives on major political processes amongst academics is not unusual. Agnew (1987) argues that there has been a devaluation of place and local context as explanations in the social sciences. He attributes this to the developmental assumptions of much liberal social science, and the absolutizing of commodification in Marxist political economy (ibid.,79).² These approaches tend to view social phenomena at a national level, and are linked to a national integration thesis that is common in the

¹For an example of the former, see Lee (1989), and the latter, Johnston (1992).

²This is a generalization to which there are many exceptions. For example, Key (1949), Siegfried (1913), Beck (1974) and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992).
social sciences, and which denies the explanatory power of local context (ibid., 141).

With respect to Canadian elections, there have been only a few attempts to consider the impact of the character of the riding contests on the behaviour of voters, and these have generally used census and survey data (see Blake 1978).

While Agnew's observations are concerned with the study of voting behaviour, a similar pattern is evident with respect to the study of the dynamics of campaigning. There has been a tendency to study them at the national level, leaving local campaigns and contests largely unexplored. This process has also been driven by a growing belief in the importance of national level campaigning and politics, which has been underpinned by the centralization of media (Fletcher 1987, 363-7), and the importance of leaders in Canadian parties (Courtney 1973).

Agnew suggests that if we are to study local political forms successfully, they cannot be understood by simply adding up the factors that cause political behaviour (such as class, ethnicity and religious affiliation) in a linear fashion. Rather, it is the manner in which these factors "come together" in a particular place and time, and in so doing take on meaning for people and determine political outcomes, which provides a basis for coherent political analysis (1987, 213). This study thus examines the detailed interactions of candidates and campaigners within the spatial and temporal contexts of constituency elections.

To understand local campaigns, it is necessary to begin with a description of riding associations and the nominations they run. Parliamentary representation on the basis of geographically defined single member ridings is central to the character of
Canadian politics. This is most obviously true during a federal election, which can be seen as the concatenation of nearly 300 constituency contests. Most of these constituency elections are contested, and the activities of local campaigns have a bearing on electoral outcomes (Heintzman 1991, 143-4). It is precisely because of the need to win these constituency battles that a national party’s success depends on whatever volunteers it can attract and hold at the local level (Carty 1991a, 72). This underpins the importance of both riding associations and constituency politics in Canada.

Despite great variations in the electoral strength of political parties in Canada, "the electoral system, and our contemporary assumptions about what makes a national party, require each party to maintain a local association in each riding" (Carty 1991a, 71). Control over the nomination process gives constituency organizations a pivotal role in the life of Canadian parties. They are the link between voters and the political parties that dominate political life (ibid., 25). Associations jealously guard local control over the nomination process, and tend to select candidates with some knowledge of and attachment to the riding (ibid., 178). This underpins the importance of local practices and conditions in shaping nominations (ibid., 181).

Despite being formally similar across parties and regions, associations vary enormously in size, stability, and level of activity (ibid., 20-24). The character of an association reflects its competitive position, the nature of the local riding, and the

---

3 Local campaigns easily out-spend the national campaigns of political parties. During the 1988 federal election for example, the election expenses of all local campaigns totalled $31 341 494, while the head offices of the national parties spent a total of $22 425 849 on the election (Canada, Canada Elections 1988).
organizational style of the party of which it is a constituent unit. First, competitive
associations are larger and better funded than those that are uncompetitive. Second,
associations in country ridings have different membership profiles and exist in a very
different milieu than those in city ridings. Third, mass and cadre style associations,
despite sharing similar formal organizational rules, have distinctive approaches to their
central tasks.

The distinction between mass and cadre style parties proposed by Duverger
([1954] 1955, 63) is central to this study. The Liberal and Conservative parties in
Canada have not adopted a mass form, as have most parties in Westminster style
systems (Beer 1967). Cadre style associations in the Liberal and Progressive
Conservative parties have a cyclical existence, springing into action in order to send
delelegates to leadership conventions, or to nominate candidates to run in elections.
Outside these times, many are moribund.

In contrast, many NDP associations have a continuous existence, even in ridings
where the party is not strong. This organizational persistence is characteristic of mass
parties (Carty 1991a, 70). This difference in organizational form across Canadian
parties coincides with an ideological distinction between left and right. As well,
because the NDP is the only one of the three parties not to have held national
government, this division also corresponds to a competitive cleavage. As such, the
mass-cadre distinction is critical in explaining variations in partisan styles with respect
to associations, nominations, and campaigns (Carty and Erickson 1991, 162-169).

Riding conditions, and in particular the competitive positions of the local
associations, have direct implications for the ways in which associations organize nominations. Larger, more competitive associations are better organized to search out candidates, and have greater electoral appeal than their less competitive counterparts. Except where the presence of an incumbent restricts competition, the former are more likely to experience contested nominations. Given the volatility of the Canadian electorate (Blake 1991; Heintzman 1991), there is commonly more than one association in most ridings that can claim to be competitive.

While we would expect a local condition such as competitiveness to influence the character of local associations and their nominations, the impact of partisan organizational styles on local riding nominations is less well documented (although see Carty and Erickson 1991). The cyclical existence of cadre style associations, and their loose organizational arrangements, make it easy for prospective candidates to gain access to their nominations. The ground rules appear straightforward: a candidate places his or her name before the association committee organizing the contest. Once accepted, he or she then works to attract as many supporters as possible. Many of these will be new recruits to the association. The candidate hopes that these recruits will provide him or her with the greatest number of votes at the nomination meeting, and so ensure victory.

This process is not quite the same in a mass party such as the NDP. As a mass party, the NDP expects its members, and in particular its candidates, to exhibit a commitment to the party and its principles. This underpins the continuity of existence between elections found in many NDP associations. Evidence of solidarity with the
party's cause, the *sine qua non* of class-based politics, is critical to a candidate's success, usually taking the form of a history of involvement in either the party or union movement. The implicit requirement that candidates be party members in good standing reduces the size of the group from which NDP association draw their candidates. Their organizational strength makes them well suited for searching out candidates from amongst the party faithful.

Because of the relative importance of the existing membership in these associations, nomination candidates focus more on convincing current members to support them than on trying to recruit large numbers of new members. This is reinforced by the difficulty of attracting new members to mass party associations that appear to demand greater commitment than do cadre style parties. The NDP has also been less successful at the national level than either the Conservatives or Liberals, and has had a more difficult time attracting candidates and members to its associations. The lack of an infusion of recruits just prior to an election, as found in the more permeable Liberal and Conservative parties (Carty 1991a, 30-39), reinforces the NDP's reliance on existing members both as candidates and campaign workers.

The nomination process not only selects the candidate, it is also critical in determining the sort of support a candidate receives during the campaign. The type of candidate that is selected, and his or her relationship with the campaign team, can have a strong bearing on the final shape of the campaign. So too can the resources of the team, and the vision of campaigning that team members bring to the campaign. Campaigns in which the campaign team believes that the candidate's personality is the
key to success are very different from those in which the team focuses on the party platform as their best chance of success.

Competitiveness tends to be associated with well financed and staffed campaigns. In terms of partisan effects, solidarity among NDP members means that even in relatively uncompetitive associations, the campaign is run by a group of experienced party stalwarts. In most NDP associations, party members are willing to work for whichever candidate is selected. In fact the association executive may play an important role in assigning campaign team positions. In looser cadre style associations, the final form of the campaign team is more likely to depend on which candidate wins the nomination, as many members have allegiances to nomination candidates rather than directly to the party. As a result, the candidate plays a much bigger role in composing the membership of the team.

Variation in the nomination experiences of competitive and uncompetitive associations, and even mass and cadre style associations, can be seen in the role of non-local parties in local nominations. Extremely uncompetitive associations may be unable to attract a candidate, and may have to rely on the national party to supply a volunteer from outside the riding. National parties can also become involved in nominations for their own reasons. Ridings that the party is likely to win can attract the attention of national strategists hoping to ensure the party elects a particular mix of MP’s. The national party - using the leader’s veto - may work to have a particular nominee selected.

There are also some riding contests across Canada that national party strategists
believe have an impact on the wider election. This is usually the result of the media attention they have received in previous elections, or some special circumstance that seems certain to attract such attention. Strategists may attempt to ensure that a competent, high profile candidate wins the nomination in these ridings, in order to bolster the party's image. Most such ridings are in metropolitan areas that are serviced by large media outlets.

Such direct strategic intervention is more common in cadre style parties than in mass parties. This reflects the fact that as well as organizational and ideological divisions between the two cadre style parties and the NDP, there is also a competitive division. The greater number of competitive Liberal and Conservative associations offer more opportunities for national strategists to attempt to advance their own causes by intervening in local affairs. It may also be the case, given the common cause across different levels of the NDP, that local outcomes are more consistent with national party objectives, and thus obviate the need for direct national intervention.

It is the distinctive nomination experiences of competitive associations versus those that are uncompetitive, and of cadre style associations as opposed to mass party associations, which provide the basic matrix around which this thesis is constructed. The four types of nominations produced by this typology each tend to select a distinctive type of candidate, around which subsequent campaign teams are built.

During the election proper, national party intervention - driven by local conditions - can alter the make-up of the campaign team. A party may offer a candidate financial assistance and professional advice on how best to run a local campaign. It
may even be willing to provide workers for key positions. Such intervention is a
double-edged sword, as despite its potential helpfulness, it may introduce incompatible
national strategies into the local campaign. Just as importantly, the attitude of local
campaigners to national party imperatives can have a profound impact on the strategic
direction of the campaign. Mass party campaigns are more willing to accept non-local
strategic direction than their cadre style cousins. Given this, more competitive
campaigns in any party can afford to ignore national advice and the resources that might
come with it, and head off in their own strategic direction.

The local contest itself is the final factor that shapes the style and content of
riding campaigns. The nature of the contest reflects the character of the local political
community, its geography, the media in the riding, and the competitiveness of the local
campaigns (Beck 1974; Blake 1978). The character of the riding shapes the local
political agenda to which campaigns must respond. The amount and type of media that
covers the riding is critical in the formation of this agenda, and to the way in which
local campaigns engage with each other. The lack of a media coverage that focuses
directly on the local contest results in an underdeveloped agenda that can easily be
influenced by non-local media and campaigns. There is also a dynamic between the
candidate and the local community. Although not as pronounced as that found in the
United States (Fenno 1978), the ways in which candidates are presented to the public
are shaped by the nature of the local community.4

4Perlin (1964) and Davis (1964) provide accounts of the impact of local issues and
candidates on riding contests.
In addition, the intensity of competition in the riding also influences the style and content of local campaigns involved in the contest. There are two elements which can be used to classify local campaigns. The first is the number of campaigns that have a chance of winning the constituency election. Where there is only one competitive campaign, the election is less intense that in those cases where there are two or more. Secondly, the final form of any campaign depends on whether the party has a chance of winning the election, or is uncompetitive, and therefore marginalized from the real contest. This has clear implications for the style and content of the local campaign.

A campaign’s strategic and allocational decisions are shaped by its access to the media. Campaigners generally believe that the voters’ perceptions of their campaign - its competitiveness and the credibility of the candidate - can be greatly affected by media reporting. Campaigns attempt to attract positive media reporting in influential media by staging news conferences and other events. Most campaigns advertise in local media, but cannot afford to advertise in the major, influential news media. Even if they could, large, influential media outlets are rarely well targeted to voters within any one riding. Conversely, those that are well targeted and which campaigns can afford, are often not influential.

The media play another crucial role: they bring the federal election writ large into the local riding. The reporting of the leaders’ tours, their debates, poll results, and the full panoply of election events can influence the dynamic of the local contest, including voters’ opinions of local campaigns and the morale of local party volunteers. If non-local media dominate reporting in a riding, the view of the election that voters
receive is not shaped by or related to the local agenda. The reverse can be true in
ridings where there is credible media reporting the contest. Not only does this have
implications for the issues that are salient to the local contest, it may underpin voters' perceptions of the competitiveness of local campaigns.

There is certainly evidence that local and regional factors play an important role in shaping local political organizations, and these organizations make use of their local knowledge to enhance their electoral performance (Beck 1974; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). There are identifiable patterns in the social composition of ridings and the media available to them. These patterns are largely visible in the distinction between country, suburban, and city ridings (see Janowitz and Kasarda 1974). Also, different geographies place distinct demands on local campaigns, so that they differ across these city, suburban, and country ridings.

Accordingly, this thesis applies and elaborates the distinction between contested and uncontested nominations, mass and cadre party organizations, and city, suburban and country ridings, in order to analyze the character of local campaigns and constituency contests. The study commences with the observation, drawn from empirical research, that the two broad types of nominations, contested and uncontested, can be further divided into those to which candidates have ready access, and those where restrictions are placed on entry. Such restrictions arise either from partisan organizational mores or from strategic concerns. The result is a convenient four cell typology that can be used to comprehend the variety of observed nominations. Each category of nomination produces its archetypal local candidate: local notable, party
insider, stopgap candidate and high profile candidate.

The particular constellation of support and resources needed by each type of candidate to win the nomination produces corresponding differences in the character and structure of their campaigns. The final form any campaign takes also depends on the nature of the constituency election in which it is involved. The thesis identifies clear differences in the style and content of city, suburban, and country constituency contests and campaigns.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that local associations, and the nominations and campaigns they run, are central to the fabric of Canadian political parties and politics. In building a picture of this important part of the political system, this work provides a clearer understanding of how political parties and elections work, and their impact on Canadian political life. Specifically, it provides insights into the relative importance of local factors over provincial or national concerns, the nature of intra-party relations, the role of the media with respect to elections, as well as the part played by candidates in campaigning.

Further to this, knowledge of constituency organizations and politics is relevant to at least two broad areas of study with respect to political parties. One is the debate over the role of parties in Canadian politics, in which they are regularly found wanting (see for example, Meisel 1991). A related concern is the challenge to their integrative and representative roles by the growth of new interests and modes of political participation (Carty 1991a, 230-1). While parties have both a national and provincial face, and fulfill these tasks in public at these levels, the great bulk of their interaction
with voters happens out of sight in local constituencies.

Second, there is a growing professionalization of political parties in many liberal democracies (Panebianco 1988). This is in response to the centralization of media, and the growing complexities of modern campaigning. Canadian parties have been particularly susceptible to the widespread tendency to focus more heavily on party leaders as the personification of party platforms. The implications of this process, which may attenuate links between the national and local parties, can only be understood if we have a clear picture of constituency organizations and politics.

The thesis proceeds in the following manner. The next chapter introduces the seven ridings and twenty five campaigns that are the focus of this study. It also outlines the methodology of the study, including the reasons for choosing these ridings, and the ways in which information was gathered.

The next three chapters deal with the nomination process through to the construction of a campaign team. Chapter three discusses the various factors that shape the nomination process, and distinguishes between a number of archetypal nomination contests. The following chapter suggests that each of these forms of nominations tend to select a particular type of candidate. This discussion is extended in chapter five by exploring the distinctive character of the campaign teams that each of the four types of candidates take with them into the election.

Chapter six considers the relationship between the local campaign team and its party’s provincial and/or national campaigns during elections. It suggests that the four campaign types have identifiably different sets of relations with their non-local
counterparts. This has implications for control of the strategic direction of local campaigns.

Chapter seven looks at the impact of the riding level contest on the character of local campaigns. It notes that there are consistent differences between campaigns in country, suburban, and city ridings. This is due to patterns in the social and physical character of these three types of ridings, and of the media that covers local election contests.

Chapters eight and nine present eight case studies of local campaigns. The former deals with winning campaigns, the latter with losing campaigns. These campaign stories are told using the categories developed in earlier chapters.

Chapter ten concludes the thesis by suggesting some of the broader links between the nature of local campaigns and the character of the Canadian polity. These observations allow us to consider Canadian politics in a comparative light.
CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHOICE OF RIDINGS

The research on which this study is based was designed explicitly to provide analytical depth rather than representativeness. The aim was to place local campaigns and constituency contests in their riding context. This is difficult to do using survey data. As Barton (1968) notes, "...the survey is a meat-grinder, tearing the individual from his social context and guaranteeing that nobody in the study interacts with anyone else in it" (quoted in Blake 1978, 282). Rather, it was felt that contextualization was best accomplished by interviewing candidates, campaigners, party strategists, and journalists involved in the 1988 federal election.

The selection of ridings to be studied was guided by the criteria used for an earlier study of local campaigns and their relationship to the media done for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. This earlier study distinguished between city and country ridings, and was interested in constituency contests that had different media profiles. It focused on constituency contests and campaigns in Vancouver Centre and Kootenay West-Revelstoke (Sayers 1991).

Vancouver Centre was selected because it is a high profile city riding that received inordinate press attention in 1988 and was very closely contested. In contrast, Kootenay West-Revelstoke is a country riding that was not closely contested in 1988, and was won by the NDP not the Tories. In addition, it had its own local media and
was some distance from the Vancouver media.

Having decided to extend this work to more ridings, it was thought best to select ridings and contests that were *prima facie* interesting in their own right, and which *a priori*, exhibited a variety of characteristics that might be expected to impact on the nature of local campaigning. Any critical variables and patterns that could be identified by this study, might be tested for representativeness in future studies. A similar process is outlined by Fenno, with respect to his work on members of Congress in the United States.

"I spent a lot of time trying to figure out a priori what types of ...[constituencies] ...might pose serious tests for, or exceptions to, whatever generalizations seemed to be emerging. Participant observation is not like survey research ...data collection and data analysis ...proceed simultaneously. [It precedes] survey-type questionnaires [and] sacrifices analytical range for analytical depth" (1978, 3).

The logistics of personal interviews constrained the number of ridings it was possible to cover. For the same reason, it was felt that the study should concentrate on the major parties, although interviews with some Reform Party candidates are included in recognition of the insurgent nature of their campaigns in 1988. In order to choose between the ridings in BC, it was necessary to build a profile of constituency elections in the province in 1988. Some of this was done using media reports of local contests. Further information on the character of ridings, used extensively throughout the thesis, was drawn from Eagles *et al.* (1991) and Canadian Census Data (Canada, Statistics Canada 1987). It should also be noted that campaign funding information, and electoral results cited throughout are drawn from two Canada Elections publications (1988a; 1989). Media profiles for ridings are drawn from Canadian Advertising Rates and Data (1988).
As shown in Figure 2.1, the closeness of the contest, the winning party, the
gEOGRAPHY OF THE RIDING, THE LOCAL ECONOMY, AND THE MEDIA IN THE RIDING WERE ALL USED TO
Determine and choose among constituency elections in the province. It was felt that these
provided substantial variation across a range of factors that might influence local
campaigning and elections, yet were manageable in terms of travel and numbers of
interviews.

Burnaby-Kingsway appealed as an opportunity to look at a riding with a very
high profile incumbent in Svend Robinson, yet whose opponents were nowhere near as
well known. Robinson was an important player in his own party, and received local,
provincial and national media exposure. Studying this riding also offered the
opportunity to consider the impact of an incumbents personal following, and to look at
an NDP stronghold.

Fraser Valley West is a country riding that was a Tory stronghold in 1988. The
incumbent had won by the third highest margin of victory of any Tory in Canada in
1984. The effects of this one-party dominance on local campaigns, media, and the
riding contest are of interest. Fraser Valley West is on the perimeter of Vancouver, and
has its own defined media and local interest. It is in an area renowned for its
conservatism. This was important as the Tories were under attack from the right on a
number of issues in 1988.

Okanagan Centre was a new riding in 1988, and thus without an incumbent. It
was subsequently won by the Tories. The lack of a clear political history meant that it
would be possible to watch local riding associations build themselves from the ground
## TABLE 2.1

CHARACTERISTICS OF RIDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Riding</th>
<th>BK</th>
<th>FVW</th>
<th>KWR</th>
<th>OC</th>
<th>SN</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>VIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winning Party</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>city</td>
<td>cntry</td>
<td>cntry</td>
<td>cntry</td>
<td>suburb</td>
<td>city</td>
<td>city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Manuf. Dorm.</td>
<td>Farm Dorm.</td>
<td>Mining Forests Tourism</td>
<td>Farm Tourism Seniors</td>
<td>Service Dorm.</td>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Manuf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Profile</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local Reg’l</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Local Prov’l Nat’l</td>
<td>Local Reg’l</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** BK - Burnaby-Kingsway; FVW - Fraser Valley West; KWR - Kootenay West-Revelstoke; OC - Okanagan Centre; SN - Surrey North; VC - Vancouver Centre; VIC - Victoria. CBD - Central Business District.
up, and try to convince prospective candidates to run. All three parties experienced contested nominations. In addition, the Reform party had its best result in BC in the riding. Finally, there are sizable media organizations based in the city of Kelowna, which Okanagan Centre encompasses. This provided a chance to look at a riding which had the undivided attention of influential local media, and a distinct local economy and geography.

Surrey North was also a new riding, in the fastest growing suburban area in Canada. It was won by the NDP. It held some of the same attractions as Okanagan Centre, but provided a counter-balance to the country and city ridings already selected. The election had been quite close, with both the PC and NDP nominations being strongly contested. In stark contrast to Okanagan Centre, there was hardly any media interested in covering this contest. Local campaigns had to communicate with voters using other means. Surrey is in some ways an undistinguished dormitory community lost in the larger Vancouver metropolis.

Victoria on Vancouver Island was closely contested, with one of the rare BC Liberal campaigns that did reasonably well against its NDP and Tory opponents. As with Vancouver Centre, an incumbent had retired, leaving three nominations open. Because the riding encompasses the provincial capital, local politics is well covered in the regional media. As a city riding, it offered an opportunity to reconsider some of the findings from the Vancouver Centre study.
THE INTERVIEWS

To ascertain the role played by various actors involved in campaigning at the local level in national elections, a standardized personal interview was conducted with candidates, campaign managers, official agents, communications officers, and party organizers who worked on the 1988 federal election. In addition, a similar interview was conducted with various members of the print and electronic media in the seven ridings studied. The questions were developed from those used for the earlier Lortie Commission study. These interviews attempted to assess the objectives, strategies, and resources each participant brings to a local constituency contest. As well as looking at the relationship between campaigns and the media, the interviews also addressed relations amongst different levels of the media and different levels of political parties.

In the seven ridings, the study covers 25 campaigns, over 50 media outlets, and is made up of 120 personal interviews. In addition, analysis of information from the 1988 National Election Survey and recent surveys of official agents and campaign financing done for the Lortie Commission are used to supplement these interviews.

THE RIDINGS

As noted above, the selection of ridings was the result of an intuitive process. In all, there are four ridings that were won by the NDP, and three by Tories. As John Turner was the only successful Liberal candidate in BC in 1988, and Vancouver Quadra was not considered to be different enough from Victoria and Vancouver Centre to warrant inclusion, there are no contests that were won by Liberals. Four were contested ridings,
three were not. Farming, primary industry, tourism, manufacturing, and services, are each represented amongst the base industries that support local riding populations.

There are three country ridings, three city and one suburban riding. Three of the 25 candidates interviewed were women. Three of the contests could be considered to have had a high profile, and good media coverage, while the other four were run-of-the-mill in this regard.

Changes to electoral boundaries alter the politics of a riding. The membership of local associations can change, as can their competitive positions. The disruption to the life of local associations may make their nominations more open to new candidates. New issues may move onto the local political agenda to replace ones that are no longer relevant. As a result, the campaigns run by local associations, and the contests that they produce will reflect these boundary changes.

Table 2.2 indicates how each of the seven ridings was constituted following the 1987 redistribution. Victoria, Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Vancouver Centre, and Okanagan Centre (although it was a new riding in name), can all be said to contain a high proportion of polls drawn from a single 1984 riding. Burnaby-Kingsway, Fraser Valley West, and Surrey North are less dominated by polls from any single previous riding.

The impact of these changes has much to do with the political history of the various elements that constitute the new riding. If, as in Burnaby-Kingsway, the various polls now grouped together share a similar political history, the change may only impact association membership. The competitive position of the associations, the campaigns
### TABLE 2.2

**COMPOSITION OF 1988 RIDINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT RIDING NAME</th>
<th>CONSTITUENT FORMER RIDINGS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraser Valley West</td>
<td>Fraser Valley East</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fraser Valley West</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey-North</td>
<td>Fraser Valley West</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surrey-White Rock-West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Delta</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okanagan Centre</td>
<td>Okanagan North</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okanagan-Similkameen</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnaby-Kingsway</td>
<td>Burnaby</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Vancouver-Burnaby</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vancouver-Kingsway</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>Esquimalt-Saanich</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Centre</td>
<td>Vancouver Centre</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vancouver East</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vancouver Quadra</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kootenay West-Revelstoke</td>
<td>Kootenay East-Revelstoke</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kootenay West</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Almanac of Federal Ridings* (Munroe Eagles et. al., 1991)
they run, and the issues that are raised, may be largely unchanged from previous elections using the old ridings. In the case of Kootenay West-Revelstoke, the proportionally small addition of Revelstoke to Kootenay West had a large impact on the contest, as it added strongly New Democrat polls to a riding with a fine partisan balance.

The transposition of votes from the 1984 election onto 1988 boundaries was used as an indicator of whether there had been a material change in the terms of competition among parties during the intervening period. None of the chosen ridings had experienced such a change (Canada, Canada Elections 1988b). The competitive positions of the local associations in 1988 was not obviously aberrant.

**Burnaby-Kingsway**

An urban riding of 107,948 residents, Burnaby-Kingsway is a constituency which is largely a product of recent redistributions. Almost 60% of the constituency was in two adjacent ridings prior to 1988. Redistribution resulted in the elimination of NDP MP Ian Waddell’s Vancouver-Kingsway seat. Burnaby-Kingsway is bounded on the west and north by Vancouver ridings, to the south by New Westminster and to the east by the outer suburban riding of Port Moody-Coquitlam.

At nearly 23%, residents of British extraction make up the largest group in the riding, with the Chinese community (11.5%), the Italian community (6.8%), and the South Asian community (4.5%) being the other major groupings. The riding attracted large numbers of immigrants after the late 1940’s, and between 1966 and 1977, 13.1%
of the province’s immigrants settled here. Simon Fraser University lies within the boundaries of this constituency.

Light manufacturing industry employs 14% of the work force, including food and beverages, metal fabricating, and paper and allied services. Large industrial parks and warehouses, situated to take advantage of Burnaby’s central location and proximity to the Port of Vancouver, are also major employers. The average income of $38 528 is above the provincial average, the unemployment rate of 10.7% is 2.7% below the provincial average, and the average value of a private dwelling is $121 330. Low income families make up 18.2% of the local population, and just over 10% of all income is derived from government transfers, below the provincial average.

The NDP candidate in 1988 was Svend Robinson, the NDP MP for the seat of Burnaby since 1979. The 36 year old lawyer had been the NDP’s Justice Critic and declared his homosexuality during the previous parliament. His stand on abortion was at odds with the pro-life attitudes of his opponents, and his willingness to defy a court order by participating in the blocking of a logging road on the Queen Charlotte Islands brought condemnation from his opponents. This local race had national exposure - the Prime Minister made electoral reference to the incumbent - and the NDP went all out to win the seat, out-spending its opponents by more than three to one.

Despite personal attacks over his stand on abortion and his openness concerning his sexuality, Robinson improved on his 1984 vote share by taking just over 43% of the total vote. His Conservative opponent, Italian born John Bitonti, who ran a campaign that emphasized traditional values, received 30% of the vote. Bitonti, an urban designer,
had run for the Social Credit Party in 1986, but was making his first foray into federal politics. Liberal Sam Stevens, a lawyer and status Algonquin Indian from Quebec, received 22.1% of the vote. These Tory and Liberal vote shares were down marginally from 1984. The Reform Party was the major beneficiary of these losses, garnering 2.7% of the vote.

Burnaby-Kingsway has little media of its own. Two student publications associated with Simon Fraser University and BCIT, as well as a couple of community newspapers, gave basic coverage to the local contest. What is remarkable is that incumbent Svend Robinson received inordinate media attention from provincial and national news media of all forms on the basis of his personal profile. This coverage is commensurate with his role on the national political stage. His two opponents were largely ignored by the non-local media.

**Fraser Valley West**

On the eastern fringe of Greater Vancouver, the constituency of Fraser Valley West has the Fraser River as its northern boundary, the US border at its southern extreme, and reaches eastward to Abbotsford. Two thirds of the polls are urban and the rest rural, including the small municipalities of Langley, Aldergrove, Matsqui, and Clearbrook. Langley has recently joined the Greater Vancouver Regional District, an indication of the way in which this once rural riding is changing, with many of its larger agricultural land holdings being converted into small hobby farms.

Most of the 95,014 residents are of British origin, with substantial German and
Dutch components, a francophone minority of 2%, and a native population that accounts for 1% of the riding. The conversion of the Fraser Valley into metropolitan suburbs is seen in the increasing reliance of the population on manufacturing and service sector employment as well as small business. Agriculture still accounts for 8.8% of the workforce, and government services 6%. The average family income is $34 564, and unemployment is slightly below the provincial average of 13%. Almost 18% of the population is classified as low income, and just under 14% receive government transfers. Almost 4.5% of the constituency have university degrees.

The recent addition of the Tory strongholds of Clearbrook and Matsqui to this Conservative riding has arguably made it the strongest PC riding in British Columbia. The Conservative candidate in 1988 was former teacher and businessman Bob Wenman. A Social Credit member of the BC legislature from 1968 to 1972, and a candidate for that party’s leadership in 1986, Wenman had been a member of the federal parliament since 1974. He emphasized the free trade agreement, the environment and family values in his campaign. The Liberal candidate was Tony Wattie, a lawyer and first time candidate. Along with NDP candidate Lynn Fairall, a government corrections worker, Wattie opposed the free trade agreement. The NDP also campaigned against the Conservatives’ proposed tax reforms and attacked their record on the environment.

Support for the Conservatives was 16 percentage points below that of 1984, but with 45.8%, Wenman was 20.2 points ahead of the NDP’s Fairall, who captured 25.6% of the vote. Wattie placed third with 19.6%, an increase for the Liberals of 7.6 points over 1984. National leader of the Christian Heritage Party, John Van Woudenberg,
received 4.7% of the vote while the Reform Party's John Russell garnered 3.5% of the vote.

Perched at the periphery of Vancouver, Fraser Valley West has its own small media outlets based in the towns in the riding, including radio, newspapers and cable television. Local voters also have access to media from Vancouver proper. This creates an interesting media profile. The contest is well reported by local media that is read, watched and listened to by local voters, while the story of the wider contest is told mainly by the Vancouver media.

**Kootenay West-Revelstoke**

This constituency is a large sprawling riding approximately 500 kilometres long and running north-south up the Selkirk Mountains and Columbia River of British Columbia. The US border forms its southern boundary, and the Kamloops and Prince George regions its northern boundary. The main provincial transport and communication links run east-west across the riding. There are a number of clearly identifiable towns (Revelstoke in the north, Nelson, Trail, Rossland and Castlegar in the south) whose economic interests include the large Cominco smelter in Trail, mining, forestry, railway expansion, and tourism. Related manufacturing and service sectors have also been major employers in the region.

In recent times there has been a focus on developing tourism in the area via the skiing industry and the restoration of old towns, some of which have been used by the film industry. This new economy is at odds with the existing highly unionised sectors
noted above which still remain politically important. The addition of the NDP stronghold of Revelstoke following the narrow Conservative win of 1984 promised a tight race in 1988.

Despite an unemployment rate that consistently runs several points above the provincial average, and an average family income that is almost $4,000 below the norm, over 57% of the constituency are "home-owners". This constituency also has the lowest percentage of people moving over the past five years of any constituency in B.C., and 5% of the population have a university degree. About one-quarter of the 67,317 voters have British ancestry, with large Italian, German, French and Hungarian communities.

This constituency has proven to be very competitive. The straight NDP versus PC battle is typical of the province. Remarkably, the same two men have fought four successive elections, and the seat has swung back and forth. This competition between the PC’s Bob Brisco and the NDP’s Lyle Kristiansen, the former a local chiropractor and the latter a woodworker and union executive, has meant that in every election for nearly a decade the incumbent faced an experienced campaigner and former MP.

Brisco won the seat in 1979 running against first-time candidate Kristiansen by a margin of 8 percentage points. The latter took the seat in 1980 by 2.8 points, but Brisco won the seat back in 1984, beating Kristiansen by 2.2 points. They were joined in 1988 by Liberal candidate Garry Jenkins and Green Party candidate Michael Brown, Jenkins a doctor and alderman from Rossland and Brown a self-described hermit. Kristiansen had tried to convince Brown not to run, but in the end the Greens’ 2% vote was not decisive, with Kristiansen winning by more than 10 points from Brisco, who suffered a
greater than 10 point drop in support. The Liberals support increased by 8 points.

Most of the larger towns and cities in Kootenay West-Revelstoke have at least a community newspaper. A few also have larger daily newspapers that have some influence on local events, and that report the local contest in some detail. As well, there is a respected radio network with an emphasis on news that broadcasts throughout the whole riding, and which gives the local contest extensive coverage. The local cable station also provides air-time for local campaigns. The fragmentation of the local media, and its inability to devote substantial resources to interrogating the local campaigns limits its influence across the riding. The larger provincial and national news outlets available in the riding play an important role in telling the wider election story.

**Okanagan Centre**

This seat was created after the redistribution in 1987, reflecting the growth in population of this region in recent years. It is made up of more than three quarters of the old Okanagan North riding. Much of the population growth is associated with the increasing number of retirees moving into the area. The new constituency is half urban and half rural, encompassing the city of Kelowna, home base of the Bennett Social Credit dynasty. The population of 89 730 is largely made up of voters of British ancestry with sizeable German, Ukrainian, French, Dutch and Italian populations. There is a small native population.

Though the constituency has some affluence, over 17% of the population is classed as low income. Average family income is $32 289, over $5 000 less than the
provincial norm. At about 16%, the rate both of unemployment and of those receiving income assistance are above the provincial average, in part as a result of the seasonal nature of employment. More than one quarter of all the employment in the riding is accounted for by small business, manufacturing, and service-related industries. Direct agricultural employment is just below 6%, with tourism the fastest growing industry in the region.

The Conservative bent of the riding is clearly seen in the 1984 Conservative landslide, when the Conservatives won the seat by 34% from the NDP, capturing 58% of the votes. In 1988, the local campaign focused on the impact of free trade on local agriculture. Farmers were pulling up vines, and large numbers of orchards were up for sale. Conservative Al Horning, a well known local realtor and alderman was opposed by NDP’s Bryan McIver, an insurance broker and one time Conservative, and Liberal Murli Petchrakkar, former local school superintendent. The Reform Party had a dynamic candidate in Werner Schmidt, a founding member of the party, and the Green Party ran a candidate.

The result was unsettling for the local Conservatives. The Tory vote fell by almost 21 percentage points, but they still managed to win the seat by a 7 point margin; the Reform party picked up about 14 percent of the vote, much of which must have come from ex-Tories. The NDP vote increased by 5.4 points to 30.2%, and the Liberals maintained third place by increasing their vote by two points to 17.1%.

There are three major local newspapers, two television stations, half-a-dozen radio stations as well as community newspapers in this riding encompassing Kelowna.
While major provincial and national news sources are available in the riding, its own media is influential, and local campaigns can afford to advertise in it. This self-contained aspect of the riding gives a particular local flavour to politics in Okanagan Centre.

**Surrey North**

This largely residential riding of 107 052 was formed since the 1984 election and thus had no incumbent in the 1988 election. 41.1% of the riding came from the Fraser Valley West riding and 58.9% from the Surrey-White Rock-North Delta riding. Its northern boundary is the Fraser River, while the suburb of Delta is on its western boundary and Langley is to the east.

Its population is of predominantly British extraction, with a very large East Indian community and smaller German, Dutch and French communities. 22.7% of the riding are immigrants. The average family income is $4 000 below the provincial norm, and 22% of the riding's families are classed as "low income". The moderate price of housing has attracted young home buyers, and 47% of the constituents own their own home. Unemployment runs 2% above the provincial average, and only 3.4% of the population have a university degree, the lowest in the province.

The economy of the riding is mainly based on shipping and related industries along the Fraser River. About 16.5% of the local work force are in manufacturing, 13.2% in service related work, and there remains an important agricultural sector, now predominantly in market gardening. Because Surrey is a dormitory community for
greater Vancouver, most of its workforce is employed outside the riding.

The 1988 election saw the Conservatives nominate first time candidate and local realtor Cliff Blair. The NDP chose Jim Karpoff, a social services consultant and former local alderman. Former Surrey alderman and mayor Don Ross was nominated by the Liberals. Ross, who had been a football player and teacher, had tried unsuccessfully for the Liberals provincially and was, by far, the best known candidate. The Reform party and the Christian Heritage Party both ran candidates.

The NDP beat the Conservatives with 37% of the vote to their 32.8%. The Liberal vote increased by over 10 points to 24.9%, while the Reform Party and Christian Heritage Party shared most of the remaining vote.

There is nearly no media in Surrey North. A local radio station and two community papers, none of which are strongly identified with Surrey North, gave sporadic and minimal coverage to the contest. It is the absence of media that makes this riding interesting to study.

**Vancouver Centre**

Vancouver Centre is a densely populated downtown residential riding covering an area of 35 square kilometres. It is a cosmopolitan, urban constituency with a population of 104,346 persons and includes the Central Business District (CBD), the Port of Vancouver, and Stanley Park. Long associated with the interests of the business community as well as the ethnically and socially heterogenous communities within its boundaries, the riding includes sizable Greek, Chinese, Japanese, French, Spanish,
German, Ukrainian and Italian neighbourhoods. Thirty percent of the riding is of British ancestry, and there is also a significant Jewish population.

The major source of employment is the service sector which provides 15.8% of jobs; manufacturing accounts for 6.4% of employment, and managerial and administrative employees make up 14.3% of the labour force. There is a wide gap between the average family income of $42,309 and the median of $34,605, indicative of the fact that Vancouver Centre has the second highest percentage of low income families in British Columbia with 24.4% in this category. Furthermore, home values are high, costing an average of $160,999, and the proportion of home ownership is the lowest. The riding population is transient, with 64% having moved within the previous five years. Three of every ten people are classed as immigrants.

The boundaries of Vancouver Centre have remained fairly consistent over the last five elections, all of which have been highly competitive. The Liberals won the riding in 1974 and 1979, the Tories have been successful since then, and the NDP has had a strong showing, for they control much of the area provincially. The high voter turnover and a redistribution that added NDP polls appeared to give all three parties some chance of success, although the NDP and PC candidates were better placed than the Liberals. In 1984 the NDP had placed second to the Tories.

The constituency is of some special interest given the high profile of the local campaign in 1988. The retiring member, Pat Carney, had been a Minister in the 1984-88 government and a central figure in negotiations surrounding the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. The three principal candidates were all high profile figures:
Kim Campbell, an ex-provincial politician who had sought the Social Credit leadership (and premiership) was widely touted as a rising star in the Conservative firmament (she subsequently was appointed Minister of Justice); Johanna den Hertog, federal President of the NDP; and Tex Enemark, one-time assistant to local Vancouver Centre MP Ron Basford who was Minister of Justice in the Trudeau government. They were joined by Reform Party, Green and Rhino candidates, as well as a number of independent candidates.

The PC’s defeated the NDP by 269 votes (0.4 percentage points) in 1988. This represented a loss of 4.5 points for the Conservatives and a gain of 6.1 points for the NDP. The Liberals performed less well than many pundits had expected, coming in third with only 22.8% of the vote, less than in 1984. The spoiling effect of the minor parties is hard to judge, with the Reform Party picking up 1.4% of the vote, the Greens 0.8%, and the Rhinos 0.4%.

The local contest in Vancouver Centre was covered extensively by local, provincial and even national media. This media included the national television networks, two provincially distributed newspapers, several community newspapers, as well as Vancouver radio and television stations. In addition, a number of foreign networks focused on Centre when reporting the wider federal election. Given this, it can be considered one of the best reported local contests of the 1988 election.

Victoria

The capital of British Columbia, Victoria is notable for its large senior population, four
times the Canadian average, and the fact that with 42% of the riding claiming British ancestry, it is the most "British" riding in British Columbia. The population of 94,597 is spread through the City of Victoria, wealthy Oak Bay, and that part of the District of Saanich that includes the University of Victoria.

The local economy is primarily service oriented, with the service sector supplying 18% of employment. Government employment accounts for 15.3% of local employment; tourism is the other large industry. There is less manufacturing in the riding than in any other in British Columbia. Nearly 14% of the riding have university degrees. While it includes some wealthy areas, the riding has a high proportion of low income families, at 22.7%; state transfers support 15.7% of the population; and average family income is $1,000 below the provincial average.

The NDP has had increased success at both a provincial and municipal level since 1975, including the election of NDP Mayor Gretchen Brewin, spouse of the NDP's federal candidate. This and the fact that the incumbent Conservative Allan McKinnon decided not to run in 1988 gave the NDP cause for optimism. McKinnon's personal following may have helped protect him from changing nature of the riding, which increasingly favoured the NDP. From 25 percentage points in 1979, McKinnon's lead over the NDP had been cut to 8 points in 1984 when he defeated former provincial NDP President John Brewin. Brewin's father had represented a Toronto area in the House of Commons.

The 1988 election saw local businessman and alderman Jim Young selected to run for the Conservatives, and lawyer and former rugby star Michael O'Connor for the
Liberals. The NDP gave Brewin his second shot at the seat. Free trade and the NDP defence policy proved to be the important issues (the Esquimalt Naval Base is adjacent to the riding). The election saw the Tory vote cut by 16.5 points to 29.9%, 8 points ahead of the Liberals vote which increased by 8.3 points. The Reform Party’s Terry Volb picked 8.2% of the vote. The NDP won the seat with a static vote of 38%.

Like its Vancouver counterpart, the contest in Victoria was well covered by local and regional news media. Much of the media for Vancouver Island is situated in Victoria, and the local contest was widely reported in newspapers, and on television and radio seen across the island. It did not receive the same level of national and even international attention as did Centre, but was still a well reported contest.

The next chapter uses the information gleaned from the interviews to build a picture of how local associations organize candidate nominations. It suggests that there are some regularities in the nomination contests run by local associations, and that these patterns can be traced to both local conditions and the organizational styles of political parties.
CHAPTER THREE

CLASSIFYING NOMINATIONS

The local associations that organize nominations to select national election candidates in Canada lie at the intersection of two political worlds; the first is that of the local riding, the second is that of their own political parties. Although the rules governing nominations are relatively consistent across parties and ridings, the form these contests take can vary in response to the idiosyncratic mix of riding and partisan forces at work in each association (Carty and Erickson 1991). Viewed from the perspective of the national party, riding-centred forces tend to produce variation in the style of nominations within the same party. Conversely, from the perspective of any one riding, local circumstances appear to generate homogeneity, while it is partisan forces that seem to be the source of variation in the nomination experiences of the several local associations.

Nominations in Canada are, broadly speaking, locally controlled and democratic in form. An association announces that it is seeking candidates to run in an upcoming election, and invites potential candidates to submit their names to a committee established for this purpose. Even sitting members need to be re-nominated by their associations. Candidates and their nomination organizers then compete to obtain the support of a majority of association members. As well as seeking the support of existing members, candidates sign up new members who are willing to support them.

Membership regulations usually allow nomination candidates and their supporters to join
the association until quite soon before the date set for the nomination meeting. A candidate wins the nomination by acclamation if he or she is the only entrant in the race. If there is more than one candidate, local association members cast votes in one or more ballots until one candidate has an absolute majority.

Nominations can be classified with respect to whether or not they are contested, and the type of candidate who is successful. The intensity of competition for the nomination is important in shaping the resources brought to bear by candidates and the criteria for success. It reflects the attraction the nomination holds for candidates and the ease with which candidates can gain access to the nomination. As the product of this process, the successful candidate (nominee) embodies the particular constellation of forces that shape the nomination contest.

The appeal a nomination holds for prospective candidates helps determine whether or not it is contested. The more competitive the association, the greater the appeal its nomination has for prospective candidates. As well, nominations in parties that have a history of forming government or the opposition have an added appeal for potential candidates. The ideological position of the party, and of the association within the party, have a qualitative impact on the sorts of candidates that seek a nomination. Candidates are drawn from the social strata to which a party disproportionately appeals, and some associations attract candidates interested in issues that greatly affect local communities. Other local effects concern the political history of a riding or association. For example, in each province there are ridings that attract high profile candidates from one election to the next.
The organizational ethos of a party shapes the access potential candidates have to a nomination. As their foundational units, local associations embody the essential organizational style of a political party. Mass parties, such as the NDP, which foster solidarity as an organizing ethos (see Duverger [1954], 1959) often have well-developed associations whose strength is somewhat independent of their local electoral performance.¹ This needs to be balanced against the fact that the NDP has not been electorally successful across the country, and in many regions, its appeal is so low that it is unable to support local associations. This regional organizational weakness complicates that task of seeing it as a truly mass party (Carty 1991a, 240-243). It is most likely to act as a mass party in provinces such as BC, where it has experienced substantial electoral success.

Where the NDP has experienced even modest electoral success, its associations have a continuous existence and relatively stable memberships that are largely unaffected by electoral cycles (ibid., 240). The presence of a coterie of party members that meets regularly and understands how the association operates discourages outsiders from joining. Having joined, new members have to prove themselves in order to gain positions of influence within the association. Given their involvement in the party, it is also difficult for existing members to leave the association. Such an association will search out candidates who are good party members, which limits the number of

¹In Fraser Valley West, where the NDP has never been electorally successful, the local association was running fund-raising a year before the 1988 election. Apparent similarities in the inter-election activity levels of associations in the three major parties (Carty 1991, table 4.7) may reflect the inclusion of New Democrat "paper" associations that barely operate in this period (ibid., 57-65, 100).
candidates who have real access to the nomination.

On the other hand, cadre style parties such as the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives do not generally have a commitment to organizational solidarity. Their associations vary in strength and membership size in the periods between elections and leadership conventions, and are less organizationally coherent than those of mass parties. This cyclical existence facilitates the recruitment of new members, and reduces the expectation that nomination candidates should come from amongst those who have demonstrated a long term commitment to the party. The relatively explosive growth in membership around nomination time provides the mechanism by which outsiders gain control over key positions as a result of successful recruitment drives. Moreover, they may have enough new members to ensure a nomination victory. Access to nominations is thus more open than in mass parties.

An association’s ability to organize a candidate search, and the criteria it adopts in this exercise reflect both its strength and organizational style. Competitive associations are usually better organized than their uncompetitive counterparts, and therefore more capable of organizing a candidate search. But it is just these associations that may also be willing and able to let only certain types of candidates - perhaps only one - into the nomination, thus stifling competition. And although mass parties have a commitment to organizational consistency that encourages them to run candidate searches, their organizational ethos encourages them to expect to find candidates amongst existing party members who have proved their allegiance to the party. This focus on internal candidates tends to restrict access to the nomination. For their part,
cadre style Liberal and Conservative associations in Canada have disproportionate numbers of incumbents, which stifles access to their nominations.

Despite these differences in organizational style, both mass and cadre style associations are capable of meeting the extraordinary demands of the election period. (Carty 1991a, Chapter 3). And although there are variations in the form nominations take, there are consistencies in the way nominations function that reflect the nature of the riding as well as the partisanship and competitive position of the local association. As the candidate and the team of supporters he or she can muster are paramount in deciding the style and content of any local election campaign, these forces play a critical role in shaping the nature of that campaign. This chapter provides a framework of exploring associations and nominations that allows for their idiosyncrasies while identifying some shared characteristics.

NOMINATION FILTERS

Appeal and access can be thought of as filters that define the terms of the local nomination contest. Association competitiveness is a large component of the appeal a nomination holds for prospective candidates. But competitiveness does not always have a predictable impact on the nature of nominations. While it is true that competitive associations often experience contested nominations, some have uncontested nominations, while some apparently uncompetitive associations have contested nominations. Moreover, perceptions of competitiveness may be influenced by a number of factors - for example, the organizational structures of individual associations and the
strength of the national parties - and can be manipulated by party members and officials.\textsuperscript{2}

Access can be thought of as having two components: the first is the organizational permeability of the association; the second is the type of candidate search conducted by the association. Permeability refers to the ease with which members can enter and leave the association. This is related to the organizational coherence of the association, which is determined both by competitiveness and partisan ethos. The criteria an association adopts in searching out potential candidates bear directly on who gains access to the nomination. Both appeal and access have a qualitative and quantitative dimension; they determine how many and what types of candidates contest the nomination, and through this, the criteria for success. It should be noted that the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of these filters are inextricably linked. For example, there may only be one candidate who meets the criteria set by the search committee.

In most cases, these filters remove all but one candidate who is acclaimed the nominee. In such cases, appeal and access are quite emphatic in deciding the form of the local contest. Less often, a number of candidates reach the nomination meeting, and one wins on the first ballot. In even fewer instances, the winner has to negotiate several

\textsuperscript{2} Competitiveness refers to an associations chances of winning the next election. The assessment of competitiveness is based on historical electoral performance and a judgement about how changes in local circumstances and the general competitive relationship between the parties will influence the local election.
Depending on the nature and intensity of each of these filters, they produce four general types of nominations, each of which can be distinguished by the appeal they hold for potential candidates and the access such candidates have to the contest. That is, they can be classified by the degree to which they are open or closed to potential candidates, and whether or not they are contested. The rest of this chapter elaborates the logic of these nomination filters. Later chapters discuss the four archetypal local nominations they produce and the distinctive campaign styles of the candidates that are successful in each type of contest.

ASSOCIATION APPEAL

The competitiveness of an association is the main quantitative dimension of appeal. The chance to win a seat is a strong attraction for most potential candidates. As well, the support a competitive non-local party can offer, or the chance to be on a winning team can add to a nomination's appeal. A competitive party is in a better position to offer rewards to losing candidates, and is a necessary vehicle for a candidate who wishes to sit on the government benches. Of course, perceptions about the competitiveness of a local association may be wrong, and can be manipulated by party members. Moreover, anything that creates uncertainty about the electoral outcome in a riding - such as new boundaries - may in fact or appearance alter the competitive position of local associations, thus altering their appeal.

3 Only 35 percent of all nominations were contested in 1988. Of these, about 57 percent had only two candidates. The vast majority were won on the first ballot (Carty and Erickson 1991, 120).
The qualitative dimension of appeal also has a number of aspects. A party’s ideological complexion influences the sort of candidate that is attracted to its nominations. Even within a single party, the ideological character of riding associations varies, and may work to shape the sorts of candidates that are attracted to a particular nomination. Finally, high profile ridings have a special appeal that has a strong qualitative dimension. Aspiring candidates who see themselves as important public figures, or those that wish to take advantage of the notoriety of contesting a high profile riding can be attracted to such contests. Moreover, parties are inclined to try and find well qualified candidates to run in these ridings. Most such ridings are in metropolitan centres.4

Competitiveness

As Carty and Erickson note, competitiveness has both an objective and perceptual component (1991, 133). In forming an opinion about the competitive position of an association, and its appeal, a potential candidate takes into account both these elements. The main objective component of the competitive position of a local party association is its recent electoral performance. That is, associations that have won or come close to winning a riding are considered to be competitive. Not only does the chance of winning attract potential candidates, but the sheer vibrancy of competitive associations is attractive. A history of strongly contested nominations may itself help attract candidates

4 The special attraction of urban ridings for high profile candidates has long been noted (Smith 1964, 68; Land 1965, 2).
simply on the grounds that local activists interested in partisan politics are traditionally involved in active associations. The New Democrat association in the strong union riding of Kootenay West-Revelstoke, which has been successful in the past but faced a Conservative incumbent, attracted three times as many candidates than its NDP counterpart in Fraser Valley West which operates in a more conservative riding that it has never come close to winning.

What is true for associations is also true for parties. Parties with a history of forming the government and/or the official opposition have an advantage in that they have access to greater resources than other parties, and can offer a candidate the chance of being a member of the governing party. They may also be in a position to dole out favours to the party faithful regardless of local success or failure. These parties also have access to extensive polling and other technical information, and are able use this information as evidence of organizational competence in order to convince potential candidates of the wisdom of running for them. The associations of parties which have had little regional success - whether at the provincial or federal level - are usually weaker. These parties are less able to assist local associations, and their nominations are thus less appealing.

In deciding whether to enter a nomination contest, potential candidates take account of factors which may have altered an association's competitiveness since the last election. Changes in local and national circumstances may alter the actual or perceived competitive position of an association. At the very least, anything that makes local electoral fortunes less certain provides an opportunity for speculation about future
electoral performance, and can thus affect the appeal of nominations in a riding. The retirement of an incumbent, new electoral boundaries, or shifts in support for the national parties can alter either or both the objective or perceived competitive position of local associations. Moreover, the relatively low incumbency return rates in Canada have created an environment in which potential candidates have many good reasons to be generous in assessing the direction and intensity of changes in association competitiveness (Blake 1991).

The retirement of an incumbent may disrupt local political traditions, and may alter the calculations of candidates with respect to the competitiveness of local associations. There is typically some personal following that the member has built up over his or her tenure that now becomes available to opposing parties. Such political opportunities invigorate associations, bolstering their appeal and also their capacity to search out good candidates. Thus, New Democrat and Liberal associations in Victoria and Vancouver expected to benefit from the retirements of Conservative members in these ridings.

Despite the potential loss of a retiring incumbent’s personal vote, the nomination following a retirement can be especially appealing to prospective candidates. With a history of competitiveness, and having built up considerable financial and human resources during the tenure of the incumbent, the association is in a position to pursue a thorough candidate search and run a strong campaign. Its strength will appeal to prospective candidates. Given that associations with incumbents discourage contested nominations, there may also be party members whose ambitions have been thwarted,
and who will now seize the opportunity to contest the nomination. When the Conservative MP for Victoria Allan McKinnon retired, but failed to find a successor, the Conservative association swung into action to find nomination candidates. The nomination attracted both existing members and insurgent candidates.

On occasion, party officials attempt to manipulate perceptions of competitiveness to attract candidates. Periods of uncertainty encourage such manipulation. The promise of substantial assistance from either the provincial or federal party can play an important role in persuading some candidates to run. Of course, the credibility of these promises is dependent upon some evidence that the party can deliver the aid. The general condition of a party - its strength and organizational skills - affects both the help it can give, and the perception that it can fulfil its promises of help. Thus, for long periods in recent decades, the endemic weakness of the Liberal party in Western Canada and the Conservatives long exclusion from Quebec made it that much harder for them to attract good candidates in those regions.

Changed electoral boundaries alter the objective competitiveness of an association and allow activists and candidates to think their association will be more competitive in an upcoming election. One example of an altered competitive situation due to changed electoral boundaries was the new riding of Kootenay West-Revelstoke. The addition of polls from Revelstoke to the old riding of Kootenay West favoured the NDP. Revelstoke has voted strongly NDP over many elections. This gave a boost to the NDP association, which attracted six candidates to its nomination, and deflated the incumbent Conservative, who had just barely won the seat in 1984.
The effect can be most pronounced when a new riding is created. Liberals in the new ridings of Surrey North and Okanagan Centre were optimistic about their chances in these newly created ridings, even though the party had a poor record in both areas. This both helped motivate association members to seek out potential candidates, and improved the appeal of Liberal nominations. Association members can claim that any negative voting history attached to the polls brought into the new riding can be ignored, and that the change provides an opportunity to seize the day and recreate the local political landscape. These reinvigorated associations may attempt to convince a local political notable of the benefits of running for a party that has no baggage; that is, has performed poorly in the past.

Sometimes new boundaries can dash the hopes of local associations. The growth of Vancouver into the Fraser Valley has meant that new suburbs regularly encroach into ridings on the periphery of the greater metropolitan area. Fraser Valley West is one such riding. In what is essentially an NDP versus PC contest in the riding, this is generally believed to favour the NDP. But the 1987 redistribution moved the boundaries east, away from Vancouver to include more of the less densely populated and conservative Fraser Valley. This helped protect the incumbent Tory and robbed the New Democrats of a potential advantage.

As for the impact of changes in the competitive position of the national parties on appeal, NDP associations in British Columbia in 1988 reported strong interest in their nominations driven by the belief that Brian Mulroney and the Tories were unpopular and that this would help the New Democrats win seats in BC. Similar perceptions
underpinned the heightened appeal of both Liberal and Reform Party nominations in 1993.

Both the actual and perceived competitive position of an association are crucial to the appeal a nomination holds for potential candidates. In fact, as measurement of this objective element becomes more difficult - such as with changing boundaries - it is reasonable to assume that other factors play an increasingly important role in shaping these perceptions. This in part accounts for candidates entering races in associations which, with hindsight appear to have been uncompetitive.

Nomination Profile

The public profile of nominations can vary. Some barely attract attention within their own community, while others have a regional or national profile. In particular, nominations in a few ridings seem to have high profiles from one election to the next. Media attention focused on a riding or its nominations is the main mechanism by which this public profile is established. This focus results from media outlets reproducing patterns of reporting built up over a number of elections, the original impulses for which can be many and varied. These include a tradition of closely contested elections, a history of sending high profile members to Ottawa and/or the propinquity of the riding to major media outlets. In some cases, other factors related to a current nomination battle - such as a challenge to an incumbent - can raise the profile of one or more nominations in a riding. Although such challenges attract media attention, they are rare (Carty and Erickson 1991, 134)
The profile of a riding has a mainly qualitative impact on the appeal of a nomination. Candidates with a public profile seem to be attracted to nominations in ridings that have a history of sending high profile candidates to Ottawa, and that have been regularly represented by Cabinet Ministers. As party strategists believe that reports of a strong performance in these ridings - in terms of finding good candidates and running a competitive campaign - can help the party elsewhere, they often encourage this trend.

In general, urban ridings tend to have a higher profile than either suburban or rural ridings. This is so for a number of reasons. Many of the institutions and the infrastructures of social life and communications are located in urban ridings. Important political, business, cultural and sporting events have their focus in such centres. For example, influential news media are based in large metropolitan centres. As a result of their centrality, local candidates in urban ridings are drawn into wider debates, and they and their politics are projected well outside the riding via the major news media that report their comments. They may become either the informal or formal spokespeople for their party on a number of issues. This was the case in Vancouver Centre, where Johanna den Hertog and Kim Campbell played important public roles for their respective parties and spoke to many national issues.

Some individuals - notably those with an existing public profile - are attracted by the opportunity to play such a leading role in the media and their own party, and parties expect high profile candidates to wish to contest these nominations. Because parties can be expected to want high profile candidates in these ridings, they may well try to ensure
this type of candidate wins by limiting competition for the nomination. So, although
high profile ridings may be more appealing to candidates, nominations in these ridings
are often uncontested because of efforts by party strategists to ensure a particular
candidate wins their party’s nomination.

Unlike their urban counterparts, rural and suburban nominations rarely have a
profile outside of the local riding. Of the two, rural nominations seem to have a greater
notoriety within local communities. Self-contained rural ridings have a basic level of
local media and often have a more coherent sense of themselves. Local nomination
contests and campaigns have a public profile, and attract candidates that are well known
in the local community. Nominations in Kootenay West-Revelstoke and Okanagan
Centre were very prominent in the local media.

Suburban ridings on the other hand often have little access to major media
outlets, and little influential media of their own. This lack of a mechanism for
generating publicity, and a less certain image of themselves other than a nebulous set of
characteristics associated with suburbia, can mean these nominations are lost in the pre-
election hubbub of a big city. In Surrey North, local newspaper editors could not
always name the major party candidates from the 1988 election when interviewed in
1990. On occasion, the intensity of previous electoral contests, a high profile candidate
or a controversial nomination attracts the attention of the city media. As a result, these
suburban contests are plucked from obscurity. Liberal and Conservative nominations in
Svend Robinson’s riding of Burnaby-Kingsway fell into this category, in part as a result
of his high public profile.
Ideology

Party ideology also has a largely qualitative impact on the appeal of a nomination. At a partisan level, it dictates the sort of person that will be interested in running as a candidate for a party. Nominations in any one party are appealing to some but repel others. Such limits on who is likely to run in a nomination obviously have profound implications for the type of candidates that are likely to be successful in nominations in a particular party. The main divide in Canada is between mass and cadre style parties. Unionists are more likely to run for the mass part New Democrats than are business managers; the reverse is true for the cadre style Conservatives and Liberals.

As well as this general effect, there is also a more localised, or riding effect which shapes the sorts of candidates who contest nominations. Within any single party, there are variations in the ideological preoccupations and even preferences of local associations. For example, urban associations seem more interested in social policy issues, and appear to be more liberal than some of their rural counterparts. They also address economic issues in national terms. In Vancouver Centre, the three leading election candidates addressed issues of concern to women, gays and lesbians, and were pro-choice. They also spoke at length about national economic policy.

Rural associations appear more socially conservative, and think of economic development in very local terms. All three parties in the Okanagan spoke of economic development in purely local terms. And in general, rural candidates were reluctant to become involved in debates over national social policy. If they had to debate national issues, economic policy dominated the agenda. Two of the three candidates in
Kootenay West Revelstoke were pro-life, and the NDP candidate was pro-choice, but the issue never gained prominence. These differences have their roots in local economic and social circumstances which shape local agendas and the attitudes of political activists that run the local associations. This means that candidates in one riding often have a shared interest in a particular set of policy issues, and although they may differ in their approach to these issues, their interest in them produces similarities in their ideological outlook.

To some degree then, local concerns may cut across party lines, and on some issues may foreshorten the ideological distance between the associations of different parties in the same riding. For instance, Tory Kim Campbell was closer to her New Democrat opponent Johanna den Hertog on the question of abortion - both in priority she gave it and her position on the issue - than she was with members of her own party running in other ridings. The NDP candidate in Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Lyle Kristiansen, shared the concerns of his Conservative opponent Bob Brisco with respect to local economic development, and had relatively little interest in the social policy issues that fascinated den Hertog. Such local variations shape the types of candidates that are attracted to nominations. It seems that a potential candidate interested in social policy and with a liberal predisposition, would be more attracted to nominations in urban rather than rural ridings.

A special case of the role of ideology are the insurgent campaigns run by interest groups. If a party - notably the governing party, for it can be held responsible for public policy outcomes - has failed to live up to its promises, interest groups may target
its nominations with their own candidates. All the contested Conservative nominations in this study experienced insurgent nomination campaigns by pro-life candidates backed by organized interest groups. In fact pro-life candidates won nominations in both Burnaby-Kingsway and Surrey North. In NDP associations, battles between candidates supported by groupings of unionists, feminists or environmentalists were common. Competitiveness, riding profile and ideology both directly and indirectly determine the appeal of a nomination. This appeal is important in flushing out candidates. But wanting to be a candidate is not always enough to ensure an individual will get the chance to contest a nomination. There is no guarantee that heightened competitiveness and greater appeal in fact produce nominations that have large numbers of candidates. Sometimes access to a nomination is restricted simply because the organizational structure of the association repels some potential candidates. That is, the association is impermeable. Of course there are times when the association is permeable to prospective candidates and the search process is permissive, allowing all those who wish to enter the race a chance to do so.

ASSOCIATION PERMEABILITY

Permeability refers to the ease with which potential candidates and new members can gain access to an association and positions of influence within that association. The less permeable an association, the less likely that potential candidates will see a means by which they can gain access to the nomination or the critical resources needed to win it. Ceteris paribus, the more permeable an association, the greater the number of candidates
that contest the nomination.

Prospective candidates thinking of entering a nomination will attempt to assess their chances of winning. If there are few existing members it may seem possible to sign up enough new recruits to ensure a majority at the nomination meeting. If there is a sizable coterie of members, the potential candidate must consider his or her chances of garnering the support of existing members, or overcoming them with new recruits. Anything which makes existing members suspicious of outsiders, or makes it difficult for candidates to recruit new members in order to win the nomination, has a negative impact on entry into the contest. That is, fewer candidates are likely to enter the nomination.

Given that the formal rules governing membership are usually promiscuous (Carty and Erickson 1991, 112), the organizational style of a local association is critical in determining the ease with which new members and candidates can join and move up through its ranks. The main determinant of this style is the organizational ethos of the party. Other factors that affect the organizational strength and continuity of an association and hence its capacity to develop rules of behaviour can also influence its permeability. Restructuring associations following changes to riding boundaries is likely to weaken an association, and alter its permeability. Both partisan factors - organizational ethos - and local factors - such as changing electoral boundaries - impact on the nature of nominations in this way.
Mass versus Cadre Style Parties

Mass parties such as the NDP expect candidates and members in general to display a relatively high level of commitment to the party (Ward 1964, 191). This expectation raises barriers to potential candidates; that is, it increases the impermeability of NDP associations. On the other hand, cadre style parties such as the Liberals and Conservatives expect less of potential candidates and new recruits, which eases access to their nominations.

The impermeability of NDP associations is a corollary of the party's commitment to organizational solidarity that is rooted in the very nature of mass parties. The party's links with the union movement serve to highlight the importance of solidarity, the *sine qua non* of unionism. This commitment finds expression in the continuous existence of many New Democrat associations. Members share a sense of comradeship, and as with any community, the rules of behaviour that develop help them distinguish between themselves and outsiders. Local New Democrat associations often share members and organizational arrangements with their provincial and municipal counterparts in the party, and members may work on provincial and municipal elections interposed between federal elections. Because of this continuity, NDP associations make longer term demands of their members. These demands can be very intense: The coincidence of municipal elections throughout British Columbia and the 1988 federal election greatly taxed local NDP activists.

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5In regions where the party is weak, associations will have a more cyclical existence, and will therefore make fewer long term demands of members.
Members of associations that exhibit a high degree of solidarity are likely to have a well-defined and shared definition of politics. They look for candidates amongst existing members, and consider service to the association or perhaps the union movement to be a prerequisite for both entering and winning the nomination. Because it is expected that nomination candidates be members in good standing, NDP nominations are more often contested between existing party members than either Liberal or Conservative nominations. In fact all the successful New Democrat candidates in this study had worked for the party and/or the union movement, whereas 8 of the 14 successful Tory and Liberal candidates had only recently become party members.

Candidates contemplating contesting such a nomination face a membership that often has its own, exclusionary, definition of a preferred candidate. If they fall outside this definition, they can expect to gain little support from existing members. In this case, the only route available to the would-be candidate is to recruit enough new members to overcome the existing membership. They may find signing new recruits to a NDP association that has a history of demanding high levels of commitment from its members quite difficult in comparison to signing members to cadre style associations that regularly expand and contract in size and expect only a small fraction of new members to be actively involved in running the association. Such nominations are unlikely to appeal to insurgent candidates.\(^6\) Even marginally competitive NDP associations can be less permeable to outsider candidates than their Liberal and

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\(^6\)Insurgent candidates are defined as those that have had little or no previous formal contact with the party and/or local association, and who often have a narrow set of policy interests.
Conservative counterparts, particularly in provinces where the NDP is generally strong.

While repelling outsider candidates, solidarity promotes internal competition for NDP nominations. The organizational cohesiveness of mass party associations involves members in long term relationships in an environment that encourages the institutionalisation of local party structures. As well, mass parties are strongly driven by ideology and internal policy debate. As a result, differences in policy emphasis among members become apparent, and are often formalised in the development of factions within the associations and the party at large. In the NDP, the union faction often find itself at odds with the environmental faction, while the feminist faction attempts to ensure its issues are seen in terms of their impact on women. An informal nomination process may take place within these factions prior to the official nomination. As a result, several factions may present their own candidates for nomination. This can produce highly contested nominations, particularly in competitive associations. As a result, factions seem more obvious in these cases. At a broader level, the growing salience of factions within many NDP associations reflects the difficulties of containing the increasingly particularistic nature of left wing politics within a single party.

Cadre style associations do not have the same commitment to organizational solidarity found in mass parties. Federal Liberal and Conservative associations in British Columbia are much looser arrangements of local activists than are their New Democrat counterparts. In the life cycle of a typical Liberal or Conservative

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7 Carty and Erickson note the greater use of formal search committees in the NDP in comparison to their cadre style cousins. (Carty and Erickson 1991, table 3.42)
association, it may all but disappear between elections, only to burst into life as a robust organization in response to the recruitment drives of the nomination candidates or during leadership conventions (Carty 1991a, chapter 3). As a result cadre style associations are more organizationally permeable than their mass party counterparts. They allow new activists and candidates to enter and exit quite easily, and do not develop the high degree of formalised modes of behaviour found in NDP associations.

Even strong Tory associations seem organizationally loose in comparison with NDP associations. In Surrey North, despite a history of success before the riding boundaries were changed in 1987, there was no formal effort to construct a local Tory association until the time came to organize the nomination. In contrast, the local NDP had been in existence for nearly a year. Similar stories were told by Tory association members in most ridings studied.

Although not linked via a permanent association, members of cadre style parties are often interconnected through a range of other social institutions. This allows members to stay in touch between elections when there is no effective association. In BC, the membership of the Socreds provides such a forum for some Liberal and Tory activists. In Victoria, the Liberal and Conservative candidates relied on acquaintances from the Socred party to help run their campaigns. In the Okanagan, where there are many active Conservative supporters, the local association was a collection of individuals who interacted in many other forums such as the local Chamber of Commerce and even local sporting clubs. The Tory association is simply the particular form these relations take at election time. When Tex Enemark decided to run for the
Liberals in Vancouver Centre, he called on a group of friends in the local business community who knew each other and had been Liberal members in the past, rather than rely on the weak Vancouver Centre Liberal association.

**Association Continuity**

The persistence of NDP associations between elections rests on the belief in the value of organization found in mass parties. But other factors affect the continuity of local associations and hence the development of the organizational norms that determine permeability. Competitive associations are often larger and stronger than their uncompetitive counterparts. They are more likely to maintain some form of existence between elections and to develop both the formal and informal rules of behaviour that can repel potential candidates. Also, being larger, they present a greater challenge to a candidate who wishes to recruit new members in order to overcome the existing membership at a nomination meeting. Conversely, anything that disrupts the organizational life of an association, such as changes to constituency boundaries, may well increase its permeability.

Cadre style associations that are competitive, and whose membership maintain the sorts of extra-association relationships noted in the last section are somewhat more likely to maintain a organizational presence between elections. Such associations have a small coterie of long term members with shared beliefs and idiosyncratic modes of behaviour. These associations revive quickly from the relative dormancy of the inter-election period to place their imprimatur on the nomination process. Thus, experienced
members in strong Liberal and Conservative associations act as gatekeepers on the nomination process. They decide on the formal and informal rules that govern the nomination, such as whether there will be a search committee and how it will be organized. Many cadre style party members are often uncertain of the rules of the game as they are not exposed to them on a regular basis (compared to members in the NDP), and defer to these more experienced members. This is consistent with the greater use of informal search committees in Liberal and Tory associations.

Associations with incumbents are special instances of strong associations (Carty 1991a, 39-42). Relying on a mix of paid and volunteer workers, incumbents run local offices which then organize the life of the local association. With the added resources of MP’s, such associations are not only strong, but the incumbent has a vested interest in using them to restrict access to the nomination. Such associations are often very impermeable.

Uncompetitive associations always struggle to maintain some formal structures. Through the mid 1980’s, the Liberal association in Kootenay West-Revelstoke did not exist. The NDP and Conservatives divided the political spectrum in two. In 1988, local doctor Garry Jenkins managed to sign up enough new members to create an association. But there were few formal structures, and the association was an extension of Jenkins’ personality. He went on to run as its candidate.

Changes in local electoral boundaries disrupt the life of local associations. This can seriously weaken associations, breaking up teams of members who have worked on a number of elections, and putting together members who are unfamiliar to each other.
Moreover, rearranging members and financial resources can lead to bitter disputes, and may distract members from the task of organizing a nomination. The patterns of behaviour that directed the organization of the nomination and helped dictate access to the contest are lost, making it more permeable. Liberals in the Fraser Valley complained about the way in which assets were divided amongst the new associations in the area following the redrawing of boundaries. They felt this division had increased the association's vulnerability to insurgent candidates.

The retirement of an incumbent can likewise upset local associations and alter their permeability. Local Tory organizer Bea Holland noted this effect in Victoria:

In part, the ability of the pro-life candidate to recruit new members and nearly win the nomination was due to the uncertainty created by the retirement of our incumbent Allan McKinnon.

The direction once provided by the incumbent and his office was lost, leaving a competitive association vulnerable to insurgent candidates. The disruption caused candidates recruiting many new members not only caught the association off-guard, reducing its ability to direct events, it meant that the dynamics of the nomination meeting favoured those candidates who could rely on well organized support during the early ballots. Insurgent candidates backed by interest groups have just this sort of support.

Any strengthening or weakening of the organizational structures of local associations alters their permeability. Events which affect the persistence of associations between elections are particularly important, for it is continuity which allows for the development of the patterns of behaviour that determine permeability. Given that the
continuity of mass party associations such as those of the NDP is rooted in their
organizational style, it is not surprising that variations in permeability due to other
factors such as competitiveness are more apparent in the more loosely organized cadre
style associations of the Liberal and Conservative parties.

Even in the NDP, competitive associations are somewhat larger and better
organized than their uncompetitive counterparts, and more likely to persist between
elections (Carty 1991a, 30-39, 110-117; Carty and Erickson 1991, 116-129). As well,
irrelevant of party, the greater impermeability of competitive associations is balanced by
their heightened appeal, which encourages potential candidates to make great efforts to
gain access to these nominations. Competitiveness can offset the impact of even high
levels of impermeability, making nominations in different parties appear more similar.

The permeability of a nomination directly affects both the type and number of
candidates that seek a nomination. Impermeable nominations are generally contested by
candidates with some standing within the association who have demonstrated their
commitment to the party. They are likely to be experienced political activists.
Nominations in permeable cadre style associations are much more attractive to insurgent
candidates. Moreover, these organizations are less likely to demand proof of
commitment to the party. As a result, permeable associations are much more likely to
select nominees who have had little contact with the party.
CANDIDATE SEARCH

A formal candidate search process allows an association to exercise some control over which aspiring candidates gain access to their nomination. But not every association conducts a search. Some are too weak and others, such as those that renominate an incumbent, have no need. Whereas formal searches are usually organized by a committee, there are less formal searches that may involve one or two association members, often from the executive. On rare occasions in high profile ridings, a loose affiliation of local party members and officials from the national party conduct the search. Occasionally, a party leader appoints a candidate in order to meet some wider strategic purpose such as influencing the membership of the federal cabinet.

The criteria for selecting candidates may focus on their electability - taking account of factors such as personal charisma, ability, and capacity to finance and operate a good campaign - and their suitability in terms of their attitudes, beliefs and commitment to the party and association. (Of course in some weak associations, the mere willingness to run is all that is required for a candidate to gain entry to the nomination.) Some criteria are quite loose, whereas the NDP’s recent efforts to encourage women to apply are a little more selective (Carty and Erickson 1991, 149). The most highly restrictive are searches such as that in Vancouver Centre in 1988, where the Tories were determined to get a high profile candidate.

The use of a search, the style it takes, and the criteria it uses to select candidates depend on the competitiveness of the association, its commitment to structures that demonstrate internal party democracy, and the role of non-local party strategists in the
process. Such interference may reflect the desire of national strategists to shape a local contest by influencing the choice of candidates.

**Competitive Associations**

Competitive, strong associations have greater resources with which to mount a candidate search, and their wide contacts in the local community help them identify potential candidates. Uncompetitive associations, which are usually although not always organizationally weak, may lack the members and resources to mount a search. The task is often left to one or two members of the executive who call around in an attempt to find someone to run for the nomination. And because this weakness is usually a direct result of electoral failure, they have limited access to the local community and little appeal for potential candidates.

Competitive associations tend to conduct better candidate searches and define the sort of candidate they are looking for more clearly than do their uncompetitive cousins. They also have better access to the sources of power and influence in a riding and to the social circles from which candidates often come. This improves their chances of identifying candidates and convincing them to run. Even associations with a long history of running second may be able to make a credible claim that their candidate will win the election. In some cases, particularly in competitive, permeable associations, a search is a formality, as large numbers of candidates are attracted to the nomination. This was true for Tory nominations in Surrey North and Okanagan Centre in 1988.

Sometimes a competitive association defers to an influential party member or
local notable and refrains from conducting a search. In doing so, it signals its preference for a particular candidate. In Victoria and Vancouver Centre, it was well known that two NDP stalwarts who had contested the seats in 1984 would run again, and this all but eliminated the need for a real candidate search. Similarly, where there is an incumbent, it is uncommon for even a competitive association to organize a candidate search, although some do.

In the case of a retiring incumbent, he or she may prefer to be seen handing the reins to a well qualified successor. Often, the MP - or representatives of the party or local constituency office - coordinate the search for such a candidate. Given that incumbents tend to have developed strong connections to the national party and party strategists, it is not uncommon for non-local officials to be involved in such a search and to bring national party objectives to bear on it. On the other hand, they usually have good contacts among the local political elite. This may result in a search for a high profile candidate who is promised easy access to the nomination, the resources of the retiring incumbent, and perhaps the party at large with which to conduct a campaign. This severely restricts access to the nomination. In Victoria, retiring Tory Allan McKinnon tried hard to find a candidate, but the Tories uncertain electoral prospects made his job difficult, and he eventually let the association search for candidates.

Weak associations may have to rely on luck to attract a candidate. As a last resort, the party may have to provide a candidate from outside the riding association. Weak NDP associations do better at organizing nominations than their cadre style counterparts. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke and Burnaby-Kingsway, the uncompetitive
Liberals did not conduct a search, yet the weak NDP association in Fraser Valley West did. Where they do take place, searches in non-competitive cadre style associations are modest. In the Okanagan, Murli Pendharkar - not a member of any party - was one of a few candidates asked to run by the handful of local Liberals, while in Victoria, Michael O’Connor, the association president, agreed to a request by his friend Liberal leader John Turner to run for the party.

While competitive associations are usually better organized than their uncompetitive counterparts, and should be more capable of instituting a candidate search, overall this is not the case. Partisan organizational styles affect the propensity of associations to search out candidates.

Mass versus Cadre Style Associations

Competitive cadre Liberal and Conservative associations tend to organize fewer searches than might be expected, while even uncompetitive NDP associations often organize candidate searches (Carty and Erickson 1991, tables 3.17 and 3.42). This is the result of the tendency among cadre style associations to rely on informal searches, and the NDP’s greater commitment to the formal institutions of association democracy.

Because of their commitment to local democracy and institutional modes of behaviour, New Democrat associations make greater use of formal search committees than do Liberal and Conservative associations, even in uncompetitive associations. As well, the manner in which these committees operate differs as a result of the distinctive organizational styles of mass and cadre parties. NDP search committees are more
formalised, their work is supervised by the local executive, and they often use selection
criteria which favour existing members over insurgents.

Not surprisingly, all the NDP candidates in the ridings in this study were party members in good standing. This is less true in cadre style associations, where there is often no overview of the process by the local executive, or clear guidelines as to how it should be conducted. Being less formal, well organized Liberal and Conservative associations may find it easier to adopt very strict criteria simply be agreement amongst the few executive members who are conducting a relatively informal candidate search not subject to any form of public scrutiny.

The strength of the NDP's commitment to forming search committees somewhat independently of their competitive position is seen in the fact that in 1988, 44 percent of its associations reported having a regular candidate search committee, while 25 percent of Liberal and 17 percent of Tory associations did likewise (Carty 1991a, Table 5.2). When associations with incumbents are removed the percentage of associations reporting having used search committees is 70, 54 and 51 respectively (Carty and Erickson 1991, table 3.42). This pattern was evident in all seven ridings in this study. The use of search committees in even uncompetitive NDP associations inflates the number of total contested nominations found in uncompetitive associations.

Given that they tend to have stable memberships, New Democrat associations are usually successful in identifying potential candidates within their own ranks. Even in ridings such as Okanagan Centre, where they had little chance of success, the party was able to identify several good candidates. This reinforces the impermeability of NDP
nominations. It also increases the number of NDP associations that produce contested nominations. Only occasionally do New Democrat associations look outside their membership for candidates, and then only if an association wishes to select a high profile candidate, or to meet some wider objective set by the party. Even then, New Democrat associations in BC are connected to a network of party faithful and fellow travellers interested in political office from which candidates can be drawn. Despite their ideological commitment to inclusive politics, this impermeability explains why NDP associations often have fewer links to groups in the local community than do their cadre style counterparts.\(^8\)

For their part, associations in the cadre style Liberal and Conservative parties are more inclined to use a loose collection of experienced local members to pursue an informal search. Because these parties account for most of the competitive associations in Canada, this tendency deflates the number of competitive associations that make use of formal search committees. Competitive cadre style associations are also almost always permeable. Given that they appeal to many prospective candidates, and do not obstruct their entry into the contest, these associations may not need to make much of an effort to search out candidates. As well, associations in the more successful Liberal and Conservative parties account for most cases of retiring incumbents who may try to install a successor by suppressing competition for the nomination. This helps account for the fact that the correlation between electoral competitiveness and the use of formal

\(^8\)The lack of links between the NDP and ethnic groups has been noted by other writers (Schwartz 1964, 267-8).
search committees is weak (ibid).

Because of the type of searches they conduct, nominations in cadre style associations often reach beyond the local membership. On occasion, non-local party officials encourage associations to search out candidates from outside the association, often to fulfil a wider strategic objective. Local organizers may believe that the right candidate can win the riding, and that none of the members fit this bill. Given the cyclical nature of membership, and the relative lack of solidarity amongst members of these associations, they are less likely to define the suitability of candidates in terms of demonstrated commitment to the party. Open searches for candidates in cadre style parties are readily affected by insurgent candidates, as they can recruit new members and overcome any resistance from among existing members. It is not surprising that over half of the Liberal and Conservative candidates in this study were new party members.

But there are drawbacks to the loose organizational style of cadre associations. An insurgent candidate who is hostile to the members of a permeable association may hijack the nomination. Informal searches organized by a group of powerful association members may use narrow criteria for selecting candidates and act to limit competition for the nomination. And the lack of an imperative to conduct a formal and accountable search (as seen in many NDP associations) allows cadre style associations to adopt just such a search regime. Carty notes that 40 percent of association presidents report that an insider group decided who the candidate would be and worked to get that individual nominated. In 61 percent of these cases the candidate was acclaimed, compared to just
44 percent in nominations where no such elite manipulation occurred (1991a, 110-111). Finally, uncompetitive cadre style associations often experience uncontested nominations because they lack the imperative to organize a search, and unlike NDP associations, they cannot rely always rely on members to run as candidates.

Competitiveness and partisan organizational style help determine both the likelihood that an association will conduct a search and the style that search takes. A minimal level of competitiveness allows associations to organize a search, but it is no guarantee that there will be a search. Because of their organizational style, competitive, permeable associations in cadre style parties tend to adopt informal search processes, or eschew them altogether. This is not true for NDP associations, which have a greater propensity to organize formal searches irrelevant of their competitiveness. And the presence of an incumbent or preferred candidate can stifle the candidate search.

Non-Local Interference

The intervention of regional and national strategists may also shape the search process.

The rare instances of direct interference by non-local party officials in local affairs occur mainly in cases where a local association has little appeal for potential candidates and is too weak to organize an effective candidate search (Carty and Erickson 1991, table 3.17)\(^9\). In fewer cases, it is the result of some strategic calculation by the party in

\(^9\)Table 3.17 in Carty and Erickson (1991) does not include associations with incumbents. This deflates the proportion of competitive associations in the table that report having no candidate search. In addition, because these are figures for 1988, the number of Conservative incumbents in this category was very high, reflecting the party's 1984 performance. As the authors themselves note (ibid., 109, 133) this confounds the effect of incumbency on
ridings where it believes a local campaign, or perhaps its wider national campaign, would benefit from having a particular type of candidate. In some cases, the party may wish to have a certain number of women as a matter of principle, or a number of high profile candidates for its cabinet if it wins office. In others, the party may move to protect an incumbent from losing a nomination (or even being challenged) or attempt to ensure an insurgent candidate supported by an interest group does not win a nomination. The manner in which parties go about enforcing these desires, and the experience of local associations in dealing with these demands vary as a function of organizational style and competitive position. As well, nominations in high profile ridings often attract the interest of non-local party strategists.

There are two types of direct party interference in local nominations. The leader can veto a candidacy by refusing to allow the party label to be used to identify a candidate on the voting ballot. This method can be used to prevent unwanted but successful candidates from running for the party, and thus force associations to adopt a preferred candidate, or to ensure a particular candidate, or type of candidate wins a nomination. Other than a leader’s veto, the most direct involvement of the non-local party in association affairs comes when the local association is unable to entice a candidate to run and the provincial or national wing or the party appoints a candidate.

There are distinct regional differences in the level of intervention practised by the major parties. Regions in which parties have been weak, such as the Atlantic provinces for the NDP and the West for the Liberals, tend to experience high levels of candidate searches with that of Tory partisanship.
non-local interference. NDP headquarters played little role in the selection of candidates in this study. This reflects the strength of NDP associations in BC and their ability to organize formal searches. On the other hand, the Liberal party had to appoint a young party worker from Quebec, Sam Stevens, as its candidate in Burnaby-Kingsway, and John Turner persuaded the president of the local association, Michael O'Connor, to run in Victoria. The more common form of non-local intervention is in the form of cooperation between party strategists at various levels in the search for a candidate. In cases where an incumbent is retiring, his or her relationship with the national party facilitates cooperation in the search for a replacement.

Competitive associations, particularly in the Liberal and Conservative parties, and very often in high profile ridings, tend to attract the interest of non-local party strategists for very different reasons. These ridings usually receive inordinate press attention, and may be seen as indicators of a party's general performance. As such, the campaigns run in these ridings are often integral components of the national campaign (Sayers 1991, 45). Candidates in these ridings are expected to be particularly adept at dealing with the media, and capable of developing a positive public image for themselves and the party. National party strategists have an interest in finding good candidates who are offered uncontested rides through their respective nominations. This requires restricting access to the nomination, which can be done either by fiat - the national party leader can refuse to sign the candidates nomination papers for any other candidate - or through
cooperation with the local association. The latter is more common, and requires local and non-local party members to agree on the preferred type of candidate. Consistent with their cadre style, Tory and Grit associations most often make use of informal searches involving both levels of the party in these instances. But even the NDP seems susceptible to non-local intervention in high profile ridings.

Conservative Kim Campbell and New Democrat Johanna den Hertog in Vancouver Centre were both favoured by the hierarchies of their respective parties. The parties brought both direct and indirect pressure to bear so as to limit competition for these nominations. Once Campbell accepted the offer of the nomination, local and non-local Conservatives simply refused to admit any other candidate to the race, and a nomination meeting was arranged in short order. This was possible because the local search committee accepted the need to find a high profile candidate. As for the NDP, the leader’s office made it clear that Broadbent would not attend a highly contested nomination, and the party made its preference for den Hertog, President of the federal party, clear. Given the solidarity of NDP members, a serious challenge to den Hertog was unlikely. Moreover, her husband had unsuccessfully contested the seat three times, and this was her second attempt. This gave the family a special claim on the riding.

The NDP has fewer competitive associations across the country than either the Liberals or Conservatives, and there is less outside interference in the choice of candidates. Much of what interference there is by the national party in local affairs is

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10In 1993, Liberal leader Jean Chretien appointed a dozen candidates. Whether this will create a precedent for future elections and for other parties is as yet unknown.
driven by principle rather than narrowly strategic calculations. This includes attempting to have a certain proportion of women and minority candidates (Carty and Erickson 1991, tables 3.28 and 3.29; Carty 1991a, table 3.21). Cadre style parties tend to eschew this principled intervention, and when they do intervene, they are more willing to invoke the leader's veto or the weight of head office to impose candidates on local associations. But none of the associations in this study had their first choice for nominee vetoed by the party.

Depending on the objective of the non-local interference, it may either increase or decrease competition for a nomination. In general, non-local involvement occurs more frequently in nominations where there is no contest, but cause and effect are unclear (ibid., table 3.49). Weak associations that cannot find a candidate, and which rely on the party to provide one, are included with those where the non-local party helps to limit competition for a sought after nomination to a single candidate. *Prima facie,* the strategic intervention found most commonly in Liberal and Progressive Conservative associations limits competition. This is because the party elites that intervene in these associations search out specific candidates whom they believe will help their cause in a particular riding. Both Tory Kim Campbell in Vancouver Centre and Liberal Michael O'Connor in Victoria were examples of this.

In the NDP, the desire to bring under-represented groups into politics may increase competition for a nomination, because those candidates are sought out and brought into the process without being promised a clear run through the nomination. But this is not to deny the fact that the preferences of head office do hold some sway at
the local level. In fact, their commitment to the principles espoused by the party makes local party members more likely to accept the dictates of the party hierarchy. This more intimate relationship with the national party encourages shared definitions of politics. As such, it is likely that the objectives of the local search reflect the preferences of the national executive of the party.

The use of a formal candidate search process depends on the organizational strength of an association and its commitment to guaranteeing access to all association members who wish to enter the race. The manner of the search committee, and the criteria it uses, determine who has access to the nomination. Formal search committees in NDP associations focus on attracting existing members, while those in Liberal and Conservative associations are more willing to look outside the association for potential candidates. The presence of an incumbent, or the desire to find a particular type of candidate - whether local or otherwise - reduce the chances of a formal search, and restrict access to the nomination. Weak associations that are poorly organized also struggle to arrange a search, and may have to rely on the party to provide a candidate.

**SUMMARY**

This chapter has suggested that the style of a nomination meeting is the function of a set of filters on the nomination process which define the terms of the local contest. By setting the criteria for entry to and success at the nomination, they determine whether there is a contest and the type of candidate who wins the nomination. The filters can be grouped as those that influence the appeal a nomination holds for potential candidates,
and those that determine which candidates have access to the nomination. The particular form these filters take, and the combination in which they are found in any one nomination are largely a function of the competitiveness of the association and its organizational style. These factors are shaped by both local riding and partisan forces.

The appeal a nomination holds for potential candidates has both a quantitative and qualitative dimension. The strength of the appeal varies as a function of association competitiveness, the profile of the nomination, and the ideological position of both the party and a particular association within that party. Associations in parties that have a strong regional presence, or have formed the government or opposition have a higher level of minimum appeal due to the support of the non-local party and the attraction for aspiring candidates of being in one of the major parties. As well, the more competitive the association, the higher its profile, the greater its appeal.

But while it is clear (Carty and Erickson 1991) that increased association competitiveness is correlated with more intense competition for a nomination, a number of factors complicate this relationship. Assessing competitiveness is not without its difficulties, as the low rate of incumbent success in Canada reflects. Canadian elections are inherently volatile, and this encourages outsiders to dream of electoral glory. Not only are perceptions of competitiveness inexact, they are open to manipulation by overenthusiastic party members hoping to improve the appeal of a nomination. Competitiveness is also affected by factors such as changing electoral boundaries. Disruptions to the political history of a region caused by the drawing of new boundaries can create, or be seen to create, new political opportunities that can invigorate moribund
associations and heighten the appeal of the nomination, as well as enhancing their ability to search out candidates.

Appeal also has a qualitative dimension. As the competitiveness of an association increases, so does its ability to attract high profile candidates. This is also true for high profile ridings. The ideology of a party has obvious qualitative implications for its nominations; unionists are not likely to be attracted to Tory associations, and business managers are rare in NDP nominations. And even within the same party, there are variations in the policy emphasis of local associations which impact upon the type of candidates that are attracted to a nomination.

Access to the nomination process is a function of the permeability of the association and the manner in which the candidate search is conducted. The permeability of an association reflects both its strength and its organizational ethos. Competitive associations tend to be better organized, and therefore less permeable than uncompetitive associations. So paradoxically, although competitive associations have greater appeal to potential candidates, they are organizationally stronger and have the capacity to restrict access to their nominations.

Mass party associations are organizationally less permeable than their counterparts in cadre style parties because of their continuity and coherence, which are rooted in notions of solidarity that are central to the very nature of these parties. Impermeable party associations tend to have contested nominations where many of the candidates are long-time party or association members. As such, the degree of competition for the nomination can be somewhat independent of the competitive
position of the association. Cadre style associations are often much looser arrangements of activists that have a cyclical existence, and are more susceptible to local riding conditions than their mass party counterparts. Once again, anything that disrupts the coherence of an association and makes it more permeable - such as new riding boundaries - is likely to increase the chance that its nomination will be contested.

The candidate searches of cadre style and mass party associations are each distinctive. Cadre style associations are less likely to have formal searches (or any form of search) than mass party associations. The latter are much less permeable than the former, and place a greater premium on evidence of commitment to party principles when searching out candidates. The tendency of cadre style associations to use informal searches, and to avoid searches altogether (apparently more readily in competitive associations where there is also a greater likelihood of non-local interference) tempers their apparent openness. But in general, the impermeability of mass party associations and the searches they conduct privilege party members in their quest to win nominations, while cadre style associations offer better access to outsider candidates.

In some high profile ridings that party strategists believe are important to the party, local and non-local party elites may work to find a candidate who is nominated unopposed. This may be so despite the fact that the association is competitive. Similarly, associations with incumbents are less likely to experience contested nominations than those without incumbents. Thus although many associations with incumbents are competitive, they have uncontested nominations.

Different types and mixes of these filters result in distinctive types of
nominations. Figure 3.1 illustrates four distinct nominations and how the appeal they hold for aspiring candidates and the access these candidates have to the race shapes each contest. The first type of nomination is one that is open and contested. That is, the association is permeable, with few if any restrictions placed upon entrance to the nomination. It appeals to prospective candidates, and attracts at least two but usually more who participate in a true contest. Such nominations are most commonly found in competitive, cadre style associations.

The second type of nomination is one that is closed and contested. Candidates from outside the association are rare or non-existent in these contests. Those candidates that do enter the race are mostly long-time association members and may be representatives of factions within the local association. Because the nomination has some appeal and attracts several candidates, it is also a real contest. Most of these nominations are found in impermeable NDP associations. But even here, the more competitive the association, the more contested the nomination.

A third type of nomination is open but uncontested or nominally contested. These nominations have difficulty attracting candidates, but are open to anyone willing to make the effort to run. Where more than one candidate enters the race, one-sided nominations often occur in which only one candidate has a real chance of winning. In some cases, this third type of nomination attracts no candidates, and the party must appoint a party worker to run in the riding. In general, uncompetitive cadre style associations are more prone to these sorts of nominations because they do not have the organizational cohesiveness found in even weak NDP associations.
FIGURE 3.1

NOMINATION FILTERS

 Appeal
Permeability
Search

Strong Appeal  Variable Appeal  Limited Appeal  Strong Appeal
Permeable     Impermeable    Permeable     Impermeable
Open Search   Internal Search Weak Search  Directed Search

Open Contested  Closed Contested  Open Uncontested  Closed Uncontested
And the fourth is a closed and uncontested nomination. Despite being very attractive to potential candidates, only one candidate is allowed access to the contest by nomination organizers. Non-local party strategists are often involved in helping to find such candidates. On very rare occasions more than one candidate gains access to the nomination, but the result is one-sided. The winner is usually a high profile candidate who benefits from the support of the local and often non-local party elite. These nominations occur in competitive associations in high profile ridings. While it is true that they take place in all parties, cadre style associations tend to be more susceptible due to their proclivity to conduct informal searches which are better suited to ensuring that a single candidate gains access to the nomination process.

The next chapter applies the categories developed here to the set of nominations which are the subject of this study. It considers how these nominations resulted from differences in appeal, permeability, and candidate searches in each local associations. Each of these four archetypal nominations produces a distinctive type of candidate who attracts a particular constellation of supporters. Together they form the basis of the local campaign team which is a key element of any local campaign.
CHAPTER FOUR

NOMINATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

The appeal an association holds for potential candidates and the access those candidates have to the nomination determine how many and what sorts of candidates enter the contest. The winner, or nominee, can be considered to embody the logic of these filters, and as such, reflects the particular confluence of the many forces, including both the politics of the local association and the imperatives of the national party, that are at work in a nomination. This chapter uses a number of case studies to explore this approach to understanding nominations.

Categorizing nominations in terms of whether they attract competition and their accessibility produces a matrix which defines four general types of nominations: open and contested; closed and contested; open and uncontested; and closed and uncontested. Each of these tends to generate a particular form of democracy within an association as shown in Figure 4.1.

Each of these forms of nominations is a product of the efforts of candidates to identify and capture the resources that are critical to nomination success within the particular set of constraints produced by the nomination filters. The type of candidate that wins these nominations, the relationship between the nominee and his or her supporters, and the range of resources available to them differs with each. Because candidates tend to construct their campaign teams from amongst these supporters, the
FIGURE 4.1

TYPES OF NOMINATIONS

<table>
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<th>ACCESS</th>
<th>COMPETITION</th>
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<td>CONTESTED</td>
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<td>Local Democracy</td>
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<td>Party Democracy</td>
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type of team that a nominee builds is greatly influenced by these nomination filters. This team then goes on to play a critical role in shaping the local election campaign.

There are two forms of contested nominations. The first is open and contested. These are found in associations that are competitive, permeable, and in which the candidate search process is permissive. With few if any constraints on entry, the competitiveness of the association is a main determinant of the "contestedness" of the nomination. Most such contests occur in permeable, cadre style Liberal and Conservative associations, and provoke heavy recruitment and large, rambunctious nomination meetings. The recruitment drives of aspiring candidates produce explosive growth in the size of Liberal and Progressive Conservative associations around election time (Carty 1991a, table 5.3). Their large size in combination with the organizational style of cadre parties, limits the opportunities for an insider clique to control the nomination. This results in a robust form of majoritarian, local democracy.

The second form of contested nomination is closed but contested. These occur in associations which are of varying degrees of competitiveness but which are organizationally impermeable. The candidate search process is formalised, and access to these nominations is restricted to association members who have demonstrated their commitment to the party. These nominations are found mainly in the associations of mass parties such as the NDP. Being well organized, even marginally competitive mass party associations often manage to attract a number of candidates and experience contested nominations. Because the nomination is very much an internal process, recruitment of new members during these nominations tends to be muted. While on
occasion several factions within the one association put forward their own candidates, which can produce sharp contests, nomination meetings are more restrained than in open associations. These nominations thus exhibit a form of *party democracy*.

Uncontested nominations are of two types. The first, open but uncontested nominations, occur in weak associations. These associations are very permeable, and being weak, do not organize a formal search process. Rather, there may be an informal search by a few association executive members, or none at all if in very weak associations. While access to the nomination is straightforward, the association is uncompetitive, and thus unappealing to most potential candidates. There is little or no membership recruitment by candidates, and the nomination meeting is usually low key. In cases where no candidate can be enticed to run, the party may have to provide a candidate from outside the association. In the ridings studied, Liberal associations account for most of the nominations in this category. This reflects the difficulties faced by the party in British Columbia in 1988. As the reduced competition for these nominations is not manufactured for some strategic purpose but is rather a function of the circumstances of the association, these nominations are a form of evanescent or *latent democracy*. That is, they would be contested if the association was more competitive.

Finally, closed and uncontested nominations occur only in associations that have the desire and ability to restrict entry to their nomination to one candidate. The association is likely to be competitive, and appeal to potential candidates. This category includes most associations that renominate an incumbent. The candidate search restricts
access to just one candidate, although it may have a list of potential candidates that it approaches before choosing one. This intensive, often informal procedure is conducted by local executive members and may involve non-local party strategist who believe their party benefits from running a particular type of candidate in the riding. Associations in this group that do not have incumbents are usually in high profile ridings, many or which are in urban centres. Because of the lack of a real contest, the nomination does not drive recruitment to the association. The nomination meeting is a staged affair designed to avoid conflict and show off the candidate to the media. It is an exercise in *limited democracy*.

In choosing a nominee, nomination meetings are also harbingers of the type of election campaign a party will run in a riding. Local campaigns are profoundly affected by the type of candidate that is successful, and the support that he or she receives. The personal attributes of the candidate are the central pillar around which a campaign often constructs its fund-raising and strategic plan. Its ability to implement this plan is a function of the human and financial resources at its command. These are determined largely by the kinds of support a candidate receives in winning a nomination. The rest of this chapter explores the forms of democracy found in nominations and the implications they have for local campaigns. It suggests that to understand how local campaigns are run, it is necessary to understand how nominations bring candidates and teams of volunteers together.
LOCAL DEMOCRACY

Local democracy exists where there are open, contested nominations. Such was the case in the Tory association in Okanagan Centre. Its competitiveness was never in doubt in a region that has consistently sent Conservatives to Ottawa. The nomination process was locally organized and controlled. As a cadre style association in a newly created riding, the association was very permeable, and it had not settled on a preferred candidate prior to the contest. The changed riding boundaries had disrupted long-standing organizational patterns of membership and resources in local associations, making them even more permeable and susceptible to insurgent challengers such as pro-life candidate David Richter.

Richter hoped to sign up enough new members to swamp the other candidates at the nomination meeting. Association officials believed he succeeded in signing up most of the new recruits. This successful recruitment effort forced the other candidates to follow suit in an effort to stay in the contest. As a result, about 4000 members were recruited. But Richter’s main rival, Al Horning, was nearly as successful at recruiting members as Richter, and had an extra ace up his sleeve; he was much better known among local Conservatives. His extensive contacts among local Conservatives were the result of a long record of community service - 44 years working for local clubs and associations, and 8 years as an alderman. He was widely known as a political moderate with an interest in a range of issues. This not only allowed him to recruit many new members, it was also critical to his success in lobbying other candidates for support on the second ballot.
Typical of open, contested nominations, the Okanagan meeting was a rambunctious affair. The impact of large numbers of new members as well as the stress of signing them up had created a highly fluid environment. Members credentials were challenged, and incentives were offered to get new members to attend the meeting. Estimates of the size of the meeting vary from 2000 to 4300, but just over 2100 members voted for one of the six candidates. Of these voters, a minority were familiar with the formal workings of such meetings. Voter loyalty to a candidate only lasted until the first ballot, and some supporters left the meeting once their candidate was defeated.

Encouraged by the belief that whoever won the Tory nomination would win the subsequent election, many of the candidates ran professional campaigns and spent heavily in doing so. John Keery, reporter for The Kelowna Daily Courier thought that the campaign of newcomer David Richter was the best organized. It was masterminded by Troy Schmidt, an experienced local Conservative who led a group of committed pro-life activists within the association. This team created a carnival atmosphere, playing songs through loudspeakers and offering food and drink to their supporters. Not to be outdone, Al Horning hired public relations expert Brian Lightburn to run his campaign. Although less glitzy than that of his main opponent it too was highly effective. Lightburn made good use of his extensive connections with members of the local Conservative community, built up during his time in the local media, to rally support for Horning.

Richter led Al Horning by just 86 of those votes on the first ballot. The official
tally on the first vote had Richter at 791 and Horning at 705, with the next candidate 500 votes back. This result was a shock to many association members, particularly those that did not want a single issue candidate and relative newcomer to win. Horning and his supporters lobbied the other candidates for their support on the second ballot, noting the limited nature of Richter's platform and his lack of history in the riding. These other candidates withdrew from the race, leaving just Horning and Richter to battle it out. The public support of these other candidates was enough to give Horning the edge over Richter by 1,038 votes to 809. In recognition of the organizational strength of Richter's campaign, Brian Lightburn asked Richter's campaign manager, Troy Schmidt, to join the campaign team, which he did. In reporting the nomination, the Daily Courier reinforced the presumption that the Tory nominee would win the upcoming election by captioning its story of the nomination "Horning headed for Ottawa."

Horning's success is a classic case of local democracy at work. The permeability of the local Tory association in the Okanagan was such that the two leading candidates and many of their supporters joined the party just prior to the nomination. This permeability was heightened by the instability engendered by new riding boundaries and the uneven organizational presence of the Conservatives in British Columbia. Unlike the NDP, there was relatively little central coordination of activity within the Tory party in the province. This meant that local conditions dictated the form of the nomination. In a newly organized association such as that in Okanagan Centre, there was little chance for members to identify and woo a preferred candidate.
Moreover, cadre style associations do not place the same emphasis on formal searches as do those in mass parties. With a limited search, and no effective gate-keeping by association members, the nomination was left wide open to all those attracted by the chance to become an MP. Such nominations favour well known local notables who have good contacts in the community and a strong organization, often made up of personal acquaintances.

Changing electoral boundaries can make once uncompetitive associations more competitive, or at least appear so. The lack of an entrenched party hierarchy removes some of the pessimism that engulfs associations with a history of poor electoral performances, and means there is little chance that access to the nomination will be restricted by existing members. This improves an association’s appeal to candidates, provides the resources with which to mount a candidate search, and may result in an open, contested nomination. The impact of new boundaries in the Okanagan can be seen in all local nominations. Not only did Okanagan Centre experience well contested nominations in all three major parties, but the new Reform Party attracted three candidates and 300 members. As a flash party, the latter was even more permeable than any of the three major parties.¹

New boundaries had a profound impact on the formerly moribund Liberal association in Okanagan Centre. Members came to believe they could reshape the political landscape, and told potential candidates they thought the riding might elect a

¹Carty (1991, 30-39) has applied this term first coined by Converse and Depeux (1966) to the Reform Party in Canada.
Liberal member. They even managed to organize a formal search for candidates - an achievement for any Liberal association west of the Rockies in 1988. The new association was permeable, and the nomination wide open. Other than a desire to find a well known individual to run for the party, the search committee did not attempt to define precisely the sort of candidate it wished to attract. It approached a number of local notables who were told that the new electoral circumstances favoured the Liberal party. They were successful in attracting three candidates to the race. One of these, Murli Pendharkar - a well known ex-school superintendent and a one time New Democrat supporter - considered the matter for several months. He held a meeting at his residence late in 1987 to help gauge interest in his candidacy. When 50 friends turned out, and 49 said they would support him, he decided that his chances of winning the nomination and the level of interest in the Liberal party warranted his entering the race.

Pendharkar had never been a party member, but knew that the nomination could be won by recruiting new members. He did this, making use of his contacts within the local Indo-Canadian community. With the other two candidates recruiting as well, the association grew to about 780 members. The nomination meeting in June of 1988 was attended by over 500 voters. Pendharkar took 278 votes on the first ballot to become the nominee, with his nearest opponent about 100 votes behind him. There was some tension within the association at Pendharkar's success in gaining control of the nomination with strong support from the local Indo-Canadian community. But he was the sort of well known local that the party had hoped to entice into running for the
Because recruitment is so important in open contested nominations, the ability to sign up new members, particularly among organized groups in the community, can play a pivotal role in determining the outcome. Successful recruiting of new members by any one candidate forces the others to follow suit. Even candidates that have been long-time members and who have strong support within the association have to conduct a recruitment drive if they are to avoid being swamped at the nomination meeting. Consequently, the relationship between the candidate and the local community and interest groups can be critical to victory. Candidates often woo the leaders of groups in the hope that they can deliver support from amongst its members (Scarrow 1964, 55). Tory nomination candidate Richter was able to rely on groups opposed to abortion for support. Candidates that are leaders in their local community, such as Pendharkar, have a special advantage in this regard.

If a recruitment drive develops into a contest, there is plenty of room for conflict, and open contested nominations often exhibit all the acrimony of an election campaign. This is particularly true if one or more candidates manages to obtain the support of an interest group or a segment of an ethnic minority. In particular, long-time members may feel they are losing control of their association to new recruits, while the latter resent attempts to control the process by the old hands, and are only concerned with the simple calculus of popular democracy.

Nomination candidates regularly complained about methods used to recruit new members. At least one of Cliff Blair's five opponents for the Tory nomination in Surrey
North was unhappy with the influx of Indo-Canadian members supporting Blair and the role of pro-life activists in his campaign. The Tory nomination in Burnaby-Kingsway was won by John Bitonti, who used his extensive contacts in the local Italian community to recruit new members. He defeated the association secretary to become nominee, and believes that many older members (whom he called "Canadians") absented themselves from the subsequent campaign because of this. The chance to promote his own vision of conservative ideology played an important part in the appeal the nomination had for Bitonti, who ran as an pro-life candidate. His supporters' sometimes strident defense of "family values" in a riding where the first ever openly gay (and popular) MP was running was seen by some members as electorally damaging.

Nominations can motivate community groups to offer their own candidates up for selection. These candidates then have access to a ready-made pool of supporters from which to sign up new members who can vote at the nomination meeting. Being permeable, cadre style Tory associations are susceptible to insurgency, and the parties ideological position attracted a number of pro-life candidates to its nominations in BC. In the Fraser Valley, an association member with links to the pro-life movement challenged Tory MP Bob Wenman for the nomination. In the new riding of Surrey North, Cliff Blair combined support from within the association built up over a long history of working for the party with support from pro-life sympathizers and a strong recruitment drive in the local Indo-Canadian community to win the Tory nomination.

\footnote{For a seminal discussion of the relationship between ethnicity and politics in Canada, see Schwartz (1964).}
The retirement of an incumbent can provide new political opportunities for prospective candidates if the control exercised over an association by the incumbent is removed and the nomination is thrown open. In Victoria, the Tory nomination to find a successor to retiring incumbent Allan McKinnon attracted a number of candidates. Although McKinnon’s retirement and the changing demographics gave the NDP a chance of taking the seat in the upcoming election, the strength of the association and its profile lent it substantial appeal.

The informal search process run by the association with McKinnon’s assistance offered the nomination to such local luminaries as former provincial cabinet minister Brian Smith. But it failed to convince any high profile candidate to accept the nomination. Released from the control of the sitting member and the attempt to parachute a candidate into the association, the nomination immediately became more permeable. This opening of the nomination process to other candidates effectively put the process beyond the party’s control. And despite its desire not to run any local councillors or high profile business people as a candidate in the riding, two councillors, one from Victoria (a high profile businessman) and another from Saanich entered the race along with four other candidates.

A pro-life candidate recruited many new members, forcing the five other candidates to respond with their own recruitment drives. Facing this more charismatic anti-abortion candidate, local councillor Geoff Young convinced long term members and other candidates of the dangers of nominating a single issue candidate, and won the nomination on the third ballot. Some members expressed ambivalence over this result,
as they believed that the pro-life candidate may have been a more attractive nominee than Young. But in the end, the cohesion of an association that has experienced electoral success was evident in both the desire and ability of members to pull together to select one of their own as the nominee.

While competitive, permeable cadre style associations are capable of running candidate searches, their appeal helps them attract candidates and undercuts some of the need for a search. Moreover, as cadre style associations, they do not have the commitment to formal organizational structures such as search committees nor the ideological consistency found in mass parties, and are therefore not as inclined to either develop or impose a definition of a preferred type of candidate. Where they do impose such a definition, it is likely to be through an informal search process conducted by a group of association insiders. Participants in the Liberal and Conservative nominations in Okanagan Centre and Surrey North commented on the fact that the association did not seem to have a particular type of candidate in mind (other than in the broad sense of someone whose beliefs were consistent with party policy), and that as a result, the nomination process was both fair and open.

The number of ballots needed to select a nominee determines the logic of a nomination meeting. A successful recruitment drive is often critical if a candidate is to win on the first ballot. Winning on subsequent ballots may require the additional support of long-time party members and the recruits of other candidates. The more ballots that are needed, the greater the value of the coalition building abilities of experienced candidates and association members in comparison to the recruiting abilities
of candidates. In particular, superior coalition building abilities are needed to overcome insurgent candidates who may have recruited the largest single group of supporters. Al Horning’s win in Okanagan Centre is one example of this, as is Geoff Young’s in Victoria. Irrespective of which ballot nominees are successful on, this type of nomination requires them to have wide popular support within the association. A high profile either in the local community or among association members is crucial to success.

Local democracy is marked by a contest between a number of candidates, at least some of whom have had little or no previous contact with the local association, and several of whom have some chance of becoming the nominee. Because they are open (i.e. permeable with open searches) and appealing, the intensity of the contest varies directly in response to the competitiveness of the association. The more competitive the association, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the number of new members recruited, and the more rambunctious the nomination meeting.

In Canada, the cadre style Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties have historically accounted for most such associations. These two parties that have alternately formed the government and opposition, a situation that has enhanced their appeal. Whichever one of the two goes into an election as the major opposition party is likely to experience more such nominations because there are fewer incumbents, and therefore more nominations are open.

The relationship between the candidates and their supporters in these cases will be personal in nature. The candidate often recruits new members, or members are
recruited by others on his or her behalf. It is not surprising that Okanagan Centre experienced three such nominations. It is centred on a large country town, Kelowna, and the self-sufficient nature of such communities and the importance of personal relations in business and politics heighten the salience of this personal style of politics. But the fact that similar nominations occurred in some urban ridings suggests that while a country context facilitates local democracy, it is not a necessary condition for this type of nomination.

PARTY DEMOCRACY

The internal competition of nominations that exhibit party democracy is synonymous with the relatively impermeable but well organized associations of mass parties. Whereas four of seven New Democrat nominations studied were contested, only five of the fourteen Liberal and Conservative nominations were contested. This in part reflects the greater number of incumbents in Tory associations, and the weakness of many Liberal associations in the group. But it also points to the effectiveness of NDP associations in attracting party members to their nominations. In contrast to the contested Tory and Liberal nominations, which were relatively open, contested NDP nominations were closed. All the open, contested Liberal and Conservative nominations were won by newcomers to the party, while long term party members won all the contested NDP nominations.

New Democrat associations in BC have substantial appeal for party members contemplating running for a nomination. Many associations are highly competitive, and
the provincial party is well organized and has extensive political expertise and resources. In addition, the feeling that the NDP would do well at the Tories' expense in BC in 1988 added to the appeal of its nominations. Although search committees were organized in most NDP associations, there were usually a number of members willing to run for the nomination. No NDP nomination was uncontested due to a lack of interest.

In Surrey North, Okanagan Centre, and Kootenay West-Revelstoke, NDP associations experienced hotly contested nominations that produced internal conflict. In all three cases, this can be explained in part by the fact that changing electoral boundaries created ridings that gave the party a chance of winning (or doing much better in) a seat they did not hold. Surrey North and Okanagan Centre were new ridings, and as such offered local associations a chance to take advantage of this break in local political history. Here, unlike Liberal and Conservative associations in new ridings, the more permanent NDP associations quickly reassigned the assets and members of old associations to the new ones produced by the 1987 changes to federal electoral boundaries. This continuity, and the assistance of a powerful provincial party, helped NDP associations organize for the upcoming election. In the Kootenays, the addition of Revelstoke to the Tory held riding of Kootenay West gave the NDP a real chance of beating the incumbent. This made the local New Democrat nomination especially appealing.

Internal competition in NDP nominations reflects in part the development of informal factions within associations. These groups coalesce around issues such as feminism, unionism, and environmentalism. Factions may each enter a candidate in the
nomination race. Here, the candidates' strategic goal is not recruitment, but rather the gaining of support from long time members and the bolstering of organizational strength of sympathetic factions. This accounts for the reduced recruitment found in NDP associations (Carty 1991a, 111-117). This nomination strategy favours candidates who have built up some organizational credibility in the party. This is in distinct contrast to the more volatile, often outsider, insurgent groups that support candidates in open, contested nomination, and which provoke vigorous recruitment drives.

New Democrat candidate search committees reinforce the bias towards members with a record of extensive work in the party or union movement. And given that NDP associations are more likely to have formal search committees than their cadre style cousins, the exclusion of outsiders is more common. The nomination meetings produced under these conditions are often smaller in terms of voters, although not candidates, than those in their openly contested counterparts. But they can be just as fractious and acrimonious if factions square off against each other.

In Okanagan Centre, the New Democrat nomination involved a spirited and sometimes bitter contest between the two leading candidates, each supported by a faction within the local association. The 250 members who attended the meeting divided into two camps: an old guard and a new guard. The former tended to be unionists while the latter were most concerned with environmental issues. The association selected Bryan McIver as its nominee, a local insurance broker and relative newcomer who had once been a Conservative party member. Although McIver had helped to sign up some new members to the association, his win was only possible with
the support of some of the younger association members. The outcome was not popular with all the members, in part because of McIver’s checkered partisan background.

In the NDP association in Kootenay West-Revelstoke, the addition of unionists from Revelstoke as a result of newly drawn boundaries both strengthened the association and the hand of the union faction against those members who would have put environmental and other issues at the top of the association agenda. As free trade was seen to threaten employment in local heavy industry such as the Cominco smelter in Trail (which is highly unionised), as well as in the transport and forestry industries, unionist in many local communities had added incentive to become involved in association politics.

The formal candidate search committee identified 5 candidates, each with union and party backgrounds. The nomination meeting attracted about 1200 members, and was hotly contested. Some of these candidates stressed social and environmental issues, but these issues were pushed aside by concern over the impact of free trade on the local economy. Lyle Kristiansen, a high profile union member who had led a local experiment in union management of a timber mill, captured the nomination. In addition to his union involvement, Kristiansen had twice before done battle with the Tory incumbent Bob Brisco in the old seat of Kootenay West, winning on one occasion. While his parliamentary experience was an important factor in this win, some of Kristiansen’s supporters admitted that other candidates had better personal qualifications for the job but had lost because they lacked the institutional links with the union movement necessary for success.
The winning NDP candidate in Surrey North, Jack Karpoff, put his nomination success down to the fact that he had the support of women and feminists in the association. This support was the result of his high public profile on issues affecting women built up over eight years as a local NDP municipal councillor. He estimated that about 80 percent of the key organizational positions in the association were filled by women. Unlike candidates in more open nominations, he did not expend much energy signing up new members, but rather aimed at strengthening his support among women members during the nomination campaign. With their backing, he overcame several candidates whose policy emphasis favoured traditional New Democrat industrial and economic concerns. Some of his opponents suggested that Karpoff was opportunistic both in wooing the feminist bloc and seeking to strengthen its hand in the association.

In Fraser Valley West, Lynn Fairall, a union shop steward, managed to meld support from women and some local unionists to overcome a union-supported male candidate. As a union shop steward and long time party worker, she attracted the interest of the search committee, and was ideally placed to win the nomination. A noteworthy feature of her subsequent election campaign was that her main nomination opponent acted as her campaign manager. Although relations between the two were strained, this indicates that the solidarity of NDP associations can extend to the point where losing candidates and their supporters are more likely to stay on in the local association than in many Liberal and Conservative associations.

The impermeability and narrow searches of these associations dampen the
upward impact of competitiveness on membership numbers, and the downward pressure that accompanies lack of competitiveness. In a contest between party insiders with few or no insurgent candidates, there is less pressure for strong recruitment drives, so candidates turn their attention to wooing the existing membership. This compounds the effects of impermeability and further reduces the volatility of membership numbers. It also means that these associations have fewer links to their surrounding community.

Party democracy produces nomination meetings that are generally more subdued than those in permeable associations. Most voters are known to each other and are members of some standing. These mass party nominations favour party insiders who have worked for the union movement and/or party and who have good contacts among members. Winning such a nomination often takes a combination of personal and factional support. If the association does divide along factional lines in selecting a candidate, the nomination can be controversial.

LATENT DEMOCRACY

Latent democracy is found in permeable associations that lack appeal and struggle to find candidates willing to compete for their nomination. Occasionally, open uncontested nominations are able to attract one or two association members to their nominations, but invariably, the contest lacks vigour, and one candidate clearly dominates the process. This situation confronted many Liberal associations in BC in 1988.

In the Fraser Valley, lawyer Tony Wattie, a long time Liberal worker who had
previously held the presidency of two associations, easily won the nomination on the first ballot over one other candidate. His position in the party all but guaranteed this outcome. The nomination was not particularly appealing, as the association had no real chance of winning the 1988 election. Rather, Wattie aimed to strengthen the local association in the hope of future success. From a membership of 39 a year before the election, the association grew to over 350 by the time of the nomination. In addition, the association had paid off a $4 000 debt left over from the 1984 election.

In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, local doctor Garry Jenkins built the Liberal association from the ground up and was its president. The association was very small, and seemed little more than an extension of his own ego. The nomination was very permeable but had little appeal as the party had no chance of success in the Kootenays. As the only candidate, Jenkins won the nomination by acclamation. Jenkins was motivated by a belief that the party should field a candidate in the riding, and that his position as a family doctor in the local community would help him win votes.

Because they are weak, these associations often fail to find nomination candidates from within their own ranks. This encourages them to look beyond the association for potential candidates. Their informal searches are often designed to attract a local notable who has no knowledge of the frailty of the association. Association members may inflate the chances of electoral success and the help it can provide in an election in order to attract such candidates. As well, they encourage local notables to believe that their local personal support can be translated into electoral success.
The Liberal association in the new riding of Surrey North managed to organize a candidate search committee, which succeeded in convincing two candidates to run. They did so in part by claiming that the new boundaries helped make the association competitive, and that the party would provide campaign assistance if the association attracted a good nominee. The association did in fact attract a good candidate, ex-mayor of Surrey, Don Ross. Ross felt that the new boundaries and a lack of an incumbent provided him with a chance to take advantage of his high personal profile to win the seat. In particular, his close ties with the local Social Credit establishment convinced him that he would have access to sufficient help to run a strong campaign. He easily beat his one opponent at the nomination meeting attended by over a hundred newly recruited party members. The permeability of the association which allowed Ross such easy access to the nomination also meant that it had no real substance. He quickly realised after the nomination that it could provide little help during the campaign.

In cases where no candidate can be found, or one does not offer him or herself to the association, the party may appoint a candidate from amongst its loyal party workers. This is unlikely to be a local party member. Rather, a worker from the national or provincial office of the party - perhaps a young person with political aspirations - may be installed as a party standard bearer. The Liberal association in Burnaby-Kingsway was both unappealing and incapable of finding its own candidate. Sam Stevens, a worker from the party’s provincial office was parachuted in as a candidate. He had no connection with the association or riding, and was simply fulfilling an organizational directive aimed at ensuring the party fielded election
candidates in as many ridings as possible. This association barely stirred from its inter-election dormancy during the 1988 election.

The poorly contested Reform Party nominations in Fraser Valley West, Surrey North and Victoria reflect the fact that the party was not yet fully organized. In general, those nominations consisted of a few friends agreeing to support one amongst them as the candidate so as to show the party flag in the riding. As with their Liberal counterparts, the associations were ciphers for the personal ambitions of a candidate and a few of his or her friends.

Latent democracy occurs in uncompetitive, weak, cadre style associations that are open. Because the nomination is either uncontested or nominally contested, it is likely to be a quiet affair (Carty and Erickson 1991, table 3.11). There is often only one candidate, or a candidate that has a clear advantage over all others. If there is a nomination meeting, the low level of recruitment means that the victor can win with a handful of supporters, most of whom are relatives, friends and neighbours of the candidate. The successful nominee may or may not be a party member. Because of the fact that they fill a gap in a party's roster of candidates but have little chance of winning, these candidates can be thought of as stopgaps.

LIMITED DEMOCRACY

Limited democracy occurs in high profile nominations which themselves tend to occur in a few high profile ridings in every province. In some of the ridings such as Victoria and Vancouver Centre, public figures with strong contacts to party hierarchies held
virtual monopolies on the parties’ nominations. Vancouver Centre is an eminent example of a high profile riding that produces this type of nomination. It has a history of electing important MP’s, and immediately prior to 1988, was held by the Conservative cabinet minister Pat Carney whose public profile had been strongly connected to the free trade negotiations with the United States. She had decided to retire just before the election. Conservative strategists expected to lose seats in BC, and hoped they could hold onto a few of their existing seats as a means of maintaining some presence in the province. Centre was one of them. Strategists believed their only hope of winning Centre rested on finding an outstanding candidate.³

In finding a replacement for Carney, local and non-local Tory strategists worked together to control the nomination process by conducting a directed search for a high profile candidate. This was possible because local members believed that the association deserved a high profile candidate, and that an elite search committee would have the best chance of finding such a person. The committee was willing to restrict access to just one candidate in order to make the nomination more appealing, and promised prospective candidates help from both local and non-local elements of the Conservative party. During this time, the association president was aware that negotiations were taking place, but had no role in them. The eventual successor to Carney, Kim Campbell, only accepted the nomination after personally receiving Carney’s endorsement. The search stopped, and she was acclaimed the candidate well

³Such candidates are likely to have strong social contacts with influential members of the party. Scarrow labels such advantages “natural” selectors (1964, 53 54)
after the election writ had been issued. As such, she was the last Tory candidate nominated in 1988. Once Campbell had accepted the nomination, the meshing of her provincial organization with Pat Carney’s national organization created a powerful campaign team.

The NDP nomination in Centre was won by Johanna den Hertog, who had run for the seat in 1984, and was the current National President of the party. While there was a formal candidate search, it was stymied by den Hertog’s well known intention to run again. She was closely aligned with the national head office of the party which obviously supported her nomination. When party leader Ed Broadbent was invited to attend the nomination, his office indicated that the leader would only do so if there was no controversy, partly to protect his image as a caring leader that was so crucial to the New Democrat campaign in 1988. In the face of den Hertog’s overwhelming institutional support, and given her high profile, the other candidate had no chance. The nomination did not develop into a real contest, and Broadbent did attend.

The Liberal nomination in Vancouver Centre was won by Tex Enemark. His experience in Ottawa as a Deputy Minister in a Trudeau Liberal government and his work for one time Liberal MP Ron Basford from Vancouver made him one of the few high profile Liberals in British Columbia. He was also well known in business circles in downtown Vancouver, and had personal ties to Liberal leader John Turner. With this profile, he easily beat his less well known opponent on the first ballot.

Nominations in Victoria shared some of these same characteristics. The presence of a high profile party insider stymied competition for the New Democrat nomination
there. Having run for the seat in 1984, when it appeared the party would lose, John Brewin had built some credit among local party members. As well as being the president of the Victoria association, he was a past president of the BC NDP, and was married to the NDP mayor of Victoria. He had run for the party in Ontario at the provincial level, and his links to the party went back to his father having been a Member of Parliament for the NDP. This attachment to the party helped him secure widespread endorsement, and helped prevent a challenge to his nomination. As in Vancouver, Ed Broadbent’s office made it clear that he would only attend a well managed nomination meeting, further reducing the chances of a coordinated challenge to Brewin. His position was unassailable, and he easily won the nomination.

There was a functioning Liberal association in Victoria, but its lack of competitiveness meant it had little appeal for aspiring candidates. Association president Michael O’Connor agreed to the request of his friend and party leader John Turner to run in order to ensure a high profile candidate in the riding. Turner hoped that disenchantment with the Tories might give a right wing Liberal candidate a chance of success in Victoria. The endorsement of the party leader stifled any chance of a closely contested nomination. In addition, O’Connor was a well known and well liked local lawyer with strong contacts in the community, including many in the local Socred elite. While his personal reputation gave him a chance of doing well, he took a longer term view that saw his campaign as a step towards improving the Liberals future prospects in the riding. He won the nomination unopposed.

The re-nominations of most incumbents exhibit limited democracy. Loyal party
members, and those that recognise the value of backing a winner, do not wish to see the incumbent challenged for the nomination. This limits the impetus for a candidate search by local party members. As well, incumbents normally exercise a great deal of influence over local associations. This influence is based in part on the loyalty of party members and also on the access incumbents have to extensive financial resources and a professional constituency office staff. Incumbents or their representatives often control the rules by which the nomination is run, rules which can be manipulated to complicate a challenger's task. Finally, if the nomination does entail a vote, the incumbent is in a powerful position to lobby for support. This is a strong form of association impermeability, and is why few incumbents lose nominations (Carty and Erickson 1991, 133).

Incumbent Svend Robinson in Burnaby-Kingsway was an example of a well respected MP who had the support of the association executive and membership and was unlikely to be challenged. His office staff was strongly committed to him personally, and his position as a local boy with a national profile gave him extraordinary influence over the local association. At the time his organizational links stretched to the very top of the party as the national spokesperson on defence. He also had a special role in the party and the country as an activist and opinion leader with respect to issues affecting gays and lesbians. There was no chance that he would be challenged, and he was nominated unopposed.

On those occasions where an incumbent is challenged, the nomination is likely to be controversial, and the meeting large (ibid.). To have any chance of winning, a
challenger must open up the contest and then recruit large numbers of new members, or attract support from a large pool of disaffected association members. This is very difficult given that the incumbent usually controls the association and by implication its members and the rules governing the nomination. As well, challenger’s threaten the status quo, and often elicit a hostile response from many association members.

In Fraser Valley West, the long serving Tory incumbent Bob Wenman was annoyed when his plans for re-nomination were derailed by a challenge from an association member. This was particularly galling for an incumbent who publicly prided himself in his control of the local association. His pro-life opponent felt that Wenman had not been forceful enough in his opposition to abortion in Parliament. During the MP’s term as a member of the governing party - the first in his long history representing the riding - he became deeply involved in national politics. In addition, his membership on a Commons committee dealing with foreign affairs encouraged his penchant for travel and international policy issues. He was closely associated with a Conservative government that was seen by some of his constituents as failing to promote socially conservative policies.

Aware of the threat of a challenge, Wenman announced the date for the nomination meeting one day before the deadline for entrance to the contest. Association rules dictate that candidates must nominate a month before the meeting. Wenman announced the date of the meeting just a month and a day in advance, leaving his challenger just a day to enter the race. Despite this, the challenger managed to put his name forward in time. By recruiting new members and with the support of a group of
similar-minded older association members, the challenger presented a moderate threat to Wenman. At the very least, the existence of a challenge was a source of embarrassment and irritation for the incumbent.

While his substantial resources and skills allowed him to win the nomination, the contest upset Wenman's rhythm and created bad feelings. Following the nomination, about a dozen high profile association members, including some of the executive, resigned from the party. The immediately joined the Christian Heritage Party. This is evidence of the power that subgroups within an association can wield, and the dangers faced by incumbents who fail to stay in touch with their riding association, either physically or ideologically.

Variation among those nominations that display limited democracy result from differences in the appeal of the nomination and the manner in which restrictions are placed on access to the nomination. Even in high profile ridings, some associations are more competitive than others and are therefore likely to attract more candidates and face a greater chance of experiencing a truly contested nomination. But often, local and non-local elites working together restrict access to one high profile candidate. In the case of an incumbent, a privileged position usually forestalls any serious challenges to his or her renomination. Because of the lack of real competition for the nomination, there is relatively little recruitment of new members.

The high profile nominees produced by this sort of nomination have access to substantial local and non-local party support during the campaign, in part because there are strategic advantages in making a greater campaign effort in high profile ridings.
This support is in part a function of the nominees' contacts within the party. In mass parties, such as the NDP, this means having worked for the party. In cadre style parties, it may mean having extensive social contacts with the party elite, either locally or nationally.

CONCLUSION

Four types of nominations have been identified here on the basis of whether they are appealing and open to potential candidates. They can be seen as variants of local democratic politics. The filters that control access to each type of nomination operate in distinct ways and combinations to exclude some candidates while allowing other through. As a result, they help determine the composition of the campaign team, and in so doing, the final shape of the local campaign. The 25 campaigns in this study are categorized using this criteria in Table 4.1.

Open, contested nominations are examples of local democracy. They are permeable and have open, but often informal candidate searches. Such nominations appeal to a range of potential candidates who find them easily accessible. This type of contest is likely to occur in competitive, cadre style associations. They are highly contested, involve heavy recruitment drives, and attract candidates from both within and without the association. In fact, some candidates will have just joined the association. They are often won by well known local notables who have the support of large numbers of new members, many of whom know the nominee personally. The campaign teams that result from these nominations are large and have access to substantial
### TABLE 4.1

**TYPES OF NOMINATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIDING</th>
<th>CONTESTED NOMINATIONS AVE. NO. CANDIDATES &gt; 4</th>
<th>UNCONTESTED NOMINATIONS AVE. NO. CANDIDATES &lt; 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>CLOSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOCAL DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>PARTY DEMOCRACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>PC(3)</td>
<td>LIB(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NDP(3); LIB(2); RP(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NDP(6); LIB(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC(^1)</td>
<td>LIB(4); PC(6); RP(4)</td>
<td>NDP(3); PC(^2)(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN(^1)</td>
<td>PC(6)</td>
<td>NDP(4); LIB(2); RP(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LIB(2); PC(^3)(1); NDP(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>PC(^3)(6)</td>
<td>NDP(1); LIB(1); RP(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIDING</th>
<th>LATENT DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>LIMITED DEMOCRACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>LIB(1)</td>
<td>NDP(^2)(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVW</td>
<td>NDP(3)</td>
<td>PC(^2)(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWR</td>
<td>NDP(6)</td>
<td>PC(^2)(1)</td>
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<td>OC(^1)</td>
<td>LIB(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SN(^1)</td>
<td>PC(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LIB(2); PC(^3)(1); NDP(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>PC(^3)(6)</td>
<td>NDP(1); LIB(1); RP(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** BK Burnaby-Kingsway; FVW Fraser Valley West; KWR Kootenay West-Revelstoke; OC Okanagan Centre; SN Surrey North; VC Vancouver Centre; VIC Victoria.

Figures in parentheses denote number of candidates contesting nomination.

Superscripts denote the following:
1. New riding, no incumbent.
2. Incumbent nomination.
3. Retiring incumbent.
financial and other resources, although they may lack experienced campaigners.

Closed, contested nominations have some appeal, but are not easily accessible to candidates from outside the party and are therefore a form of party democracy. They are impermeable, and their formal candidate searches focus on existing association members. Such nominations occur most frequently in mass party associations. Even in less competitive associations of this type, members contest the nomination out of a sense of obligation to the party. As a result, they are usually contested, but the focus on internal party democracy reduces the incentive for candidates to recruit new members. The winner is likely to be an association member or party insider with a history of strong commitment to the party, and for whom other members in good standing are willing to vote.

This type of nomination produces a campaign team which is often constructed by local party executives rather than the candidate, and includes both supporters and opponents of the nominee who are committed to the party. Although as with all campaigns its resource base depends in part on the competitiveness of the association, the committed involvement of experienced association members somewhat irrelevant of electoral concerns often ensures the basic organizational positions are filled. Because mass parties have a commitment to organizational solidarity, party headquarters can be expected to make some effort to ensure every association has access to the minimum finances needed to run a campaign.

Uncontested, open nomination contests are accessible to potential candidates, but the association is so uncompetitive, and the nomination so unappealing that they are best
thought of as a form of evanescent or latent democracy. The association is permeable, but too weak to run a thorough, formal search for candidates. Most such nominations occur in uncompetitive, cadre style associations. Being weakly contested, there is usually little or no recruitment. Candidates may be either outsiders that are ignorant of the weakness of the association or party stalwarts anxious to ensure the party has a candidate in the riding. Sometimes, the party appoints a nominee if none come forward. These are stopgap nominees who are filling holes in a party’s nationwide list of candidates. These nominations can be won with a handful of supporters.

Closed and uncontested nominations are the fourth and final type of nomination explored in this chapter. Access to these nominations is restricted, and as such they exhibit a form of limited democracy. The association is impermeable and the search is directed at a specific sort of candidate (although it may still be informal). Although these associations are often competitive, and should appeal to prospective candidates, this appeal is muted by the wide held belief that only a certain candidate, or type of candidate, has a chance of winning the nomination. This suggests that appeal has more than a competitive element, but there is also a need for prospective candidates to believe they have a chance of gaining access to the types of resources necessary to win.

These nominations occur in high profile or strategically important ridings. Cadre style associations seem more susceptible to such nominations than their mass party counterparts. These ridings are found disproportionately in urban centres, and attract high profile candidates. Associations which renominate incumbents are also included in this group. This brings a great diversity of associations into the category as incumbents
may be in rural, urban, or suburban ridings. In general, the campaign teams formed following these nominations are strong. They are well financed and staffed, and have access to experienced campaigners and professional assistance\textsuperscript{4}.

This chapter noted the relationship between nominations, nominees, and the type of campaign teams that are formed following a nomination. The next chapter looks more closely at the nature of campaign teams and how they vary across associations, ridings, and parties.

\textsuperscript{4}Ward makes this point about the 1962 NDP campaign in Vancouver Burrard (1964, 193-4).
Many of the activities pursued by local campaigns are much the same from one campaign team to the next. These activities are implied by the need to identify supporters, communicate a message, and mobilise support on election day. But close inspection uncovers myriad differences in the forms local campaigns actually take. Some of these differences reflect variations in the composition and nature of campaign teams, their competence, and the resources available to them. Because nominations determine what sorts of candidates contest elections, and the type of supporters each takes through to the campaign, differences in the nomination experiences of local associations help explain variations in the style and content of local campaigns. In addition, the relationship between a local campaign and its national party, and the nature of the local contest also shape the character of a local campaign team and the strategies it pursues.

The next three chapters provide a framework for understanding how the character of a campaign team and the environment in which it operates during an election influence the style and content of a local campaign. Style and content are terms used to describe the strategies, tactics and techniques used by local campaigns. By implication, they encompass the organizational structures, activities, and allocation of funds that result from the adoption of particular campaign strategies. This chapter deals with how
nominations shape the composition of and resources available to a campaign team. The next chapter looks at how the relationship between the local and national campaigns also shapes the resources available to the former and the strategies they adopt. The third of the three looks at the impact of local riding conditions on the nature of local campaigns.

The size and composition of the campaign team is critical to the style and content of local campaigns. Central to this team is the candidate and the volunteers who fill the important organizational positions in the team. Different types of nominations tend to produce distinctive types of candidates and campaign teams. These teams vary with respect to the four characteristics: the relationship among the group of workers that fill key organizational positions; the composition of the campaign team, particularly with respect to the type and number of workers and the financial resources available to it; the locus of decision making with respect to building the campaign team, which may be either local, regional or national, and which can vary in respect of the role taken by the candidate and local association executive; and finally, how the team, including the candidate, perceives the task of running a campaign and its main strategic focus. These characteristics act both as criteria for understanding how local campaigns operate in Canadian federal elections, and as a means of categorizing them. The next section outlines the general form campaigns take, and then distinguishes between a number of different forms of local campaign teams using these four criteria.
The transition from the nomination to the election campaign proper involves putting together a campaign team and organizing initial fund-raising efforts.\(^1\) About half of all associations engage in regular election campaign planning between elections (Carty 1991a, table 3.17), and a third have a campaign team in place prior to the nomination (ibid., figure 7.1). But there is a decided quickening of the pace of these efforts as nominations are organized and completed. Most nominations occur in the six month period prior to the calling of an election (Carty and Erickson 1991, 112 and table 3.5). The strength of the local association and the nature of the nomination process profoundly affect the campaign as together they shape the supply of volunteers.

The volunteers that make up the campaign team are the central resource of any campaign. They are also the most difficult to bring into the campaign process. This recruitment may be done by the candidate alone, or some combination of the candidate and local and non-local party members. Across the three major parties, the appeal of the candidate is the most important factor in attracting volunteers to work in a local campaign (Carty 1991a, table 7.13). As noted in earlier chapters, the winning candidate embodies the style and strength of the local association. The size of the local campaign team reflects the number of supporters the winning candidate has managed to gather together during the nomination and in the period between the nomination and election. Their relationship to the candidate and the skills they possess shape the character of the

\(^{1}\)Stanbury (1991) outlines how the local, provincial and national branches of each of the parties collect and distribute their funds.
Campaign teams must be large enough to fulfil the often gruelling labour-intensive activities that make up a campaign. These include door-knocking, putting up signs, and dropping leaflets. But they must also be smart enough to deal with the more subtle complexities of campaigning, such as advertising, making national party policy relevant to local concerns, presenting the party and candidate in the best light, and responding to the strategies of other campaigns. To complete these tasks properly, it is necessary to have a division of labour that attempts to place volunteers where they will be most effective. Thus, the most experienced campaigners and those with skills well suited to organizing campaigns are at the centre, making strategy, while those with less experience and perhaps less commitment are the foot soldiers, doing the trench-work of the campaign.

Campaign teams consist of three types of workers. At the periphery are those who sympathize with the party, but whose commitment may stretch only to putting up a lawn sign or helping on election day. Closer to the centre of the campaign are secondary workers, who work for the campaign a number of times during the election, handing out leaflets and perhaps doing some canvassing. At the centre are the core workers - the inner circle - that develop and implement strategy. This inner circle includes the candidate. It does the essential work of the campaign, and if there is a lack of workers, its members are called upon to make sure all the basic elements of campaigning - canvassing, literature drops, organizing the candidates schedule, and dealing with the media - are covered. The number and quality of each of these three
types of workers greatly affects the style and content of a local campaign.

Having a good mix of all three types of workers is important if a candidate hopes to win a marginal seat, or turn an apparently hopeless situation into a real contest. Jim Karpoff, elected as the Surrey North NDP MP in 1988, suggested that his success in a riding that might have gone to the Tories had much to do with the mix of supporters found in his campaign team. Large numbers of volunteers from a strong local association supported his campaign, and long-time acquaintances with provincial and federal campaign experience formed an inner circle that directed the campaign.

**Sympathizers**

A campaign organization can be thought of as consisting of three concentric rings of campaign workers which surround and encompass the candidate as shown in Figure 5.1. The outside circle consists of volunteers who play only an occasional role in the campaign. These *sympathizers* may help once or twice during the campaign period, erecting signs, folding flyers, attending fund-raising events, driving voters to polling booths on election day, and perhaps working as a scrutineer on election day. While some are members of the local association, others are not. Their attachment may be to both or either the candidate or the party, but is more likely to the latter. Campaigns that appear to be doing well may attract these workers as the election progresses.

The individual skills and commitment that sympathizers bring to the campaign are not crucial given their sporadic involvement. However, the sheer size of this group can have an impact on the effectiveness of the campaign, and on the atmosphere it
FIGURE 5.1

CAMPAIGN WORKERS

- **Candidate**
- **Inner Circle**
- **Secondary Workers**
- **Sympathizers**

- Inner Circle - 10 to 40
- Secondary Workers - 20 to 50
- Sympathizers - 50 to 300 (in a few cases up to 1,000)
generates in a riding. Large numbers of sympathizers can help give a campaign an aura of competitiveness, and their normal social contacts can influence the way in which a campaign is discussed in the local community. In practical terms, they may be particularly useful when a campaign requires a large, short term workforce, such as when it tries to flood a riding with campaign signs. The number of such campaign workers reported by candidates in this study varied from none to over 1 000. Data collected by Carty (1991a, 168) suggests that the average number of workers in campaign teams in 1988 was 94. Given the experiences of the campaigns in this study, one would expect about half the workers of a team of this size to be sympathizers.²

Secondary Workers

A group of secondary workers forms an intermediate ring around the candidate, and consists of regular campaign office workers and canvassers. Some work a few times during the campaign, while others help out several times a week throughout the campaign. They may be unwilling or unable to fill major roles in the campaign, perhaps due to other commitments such as full-time jobs. The individuals that make up this group are ideally suited to tasks that do not require consistent work but do demand skill and commitment, such as canvassing by phone or foot, doing mail-outs, or helping with administrative tasks. Unlike sympathizers, they must be reliable if a campaign is to get its work done. They may number anywhere from half a dozen in small

²However, this figure may under-represent the number of sympathizers in campaign teams as they are difficult to count given their sporadic involvement.
campaigns to 100 in larger campaigns. Some urban campaigns claimed that they had access to up to three hundred workers who were willing to do this sort of work, but that difficulties in coordinating such a large number of volunteers placed a limit on how many could be used.

The skills and experience of members in this group can be very important to a local campaign, as they often deal with the public and are responsible for the implementation of campaign strategies. The size of this group is also important, as many of the mundane but crucial campaign tasks are done by these workers. Most importantly, by doing this sort of work, they free up the inner circle of strategy makers to concentrate on the more esoteric aspects of campaigning. By the same token, a lack of secondary workers, which nearly always is accompanied by a lack of sympathizers, places great strains on the inner circle.

Secondary workers may be people who have played a more active role in earlier campaigns but are now reducing their commitment, mixed with those that are moving the other way and becoming more involved with campaigning. This tier of workers exchanges important anecdotal information about campaigning. Most such workers are association members. As with sympathizers, a large number of secondary workers gives the impression that the campaign is electorally competitive, not only because of their

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3Tory Bob Wenman in Fraser Valley West had a straightforward view of the life cycle of a campaign volunteer. A volunteer at his or her first campaign is enthusiastic, but inexperienced and thus not very effective. By the second campaign, the volunteer is experienced and hard working, the backbone of a campaign. By the third campaign, the volunteer is a little jaded, but effective due to his or her experience. At this point, it is important that experienced workers pass on their knowledge to new campaigners, because they are unlikely to be back for a fourth campaign.
direct campaign efforts, but also because the campaign is widely discussed by these workers amongst their friends and neighbours in the riding. This can help give a candidate’s claims about being competitive added credibility.

The Inner Circle

At the centre of the campaign with the candidate is the third and most essential group of workers, the *inner circle*. They fill the key positions in the organizational chart depicted in Figure 5.2. Members of this group work either consistently on a part-time basis (at least a few times a week, perhaps daily) or full time on the campaign. In this group, the central organizational role is that of campaign manager. The campaign manager takes responsibility for the day to day running of the campaign. This includes making many key strategic decisions, sometimes with little assistance or advice. In the words of Ron Stipp, campaign manager for Vancouver Centre New Democrat candidate Johanna den Hertog,

...guides the entire campaign, helps develop and ensures its strategic direction, acts as the peak organizer, and oversees important functional elements of the campaign such as media relations, the candidate’s schedule, spending,... with the final say on most things.

The most legally onerous position is that of official agent, who is responsible for managing all the campaign funds. He or she must ensure that campaign contributions and expenditures comply with the demands of the *Canada Elections Act*, and must make

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4Occasionally, if the campaign manager cannot or will not meet all the demands of his or her position, the campaign chair will take over important management functions. But in most campaigns, the chair is a member of the advisory group shown in Figure 5.2.
FIGURE 5.2

THE STRUCTURE OF A CAMPAIGN TEAM

[Diagram showing the structure of a campaign team with various roles and positions such as Candidate Support, Official Agent, Advisory Group, Fundraising Chairperson, Campaign Manager, Auditor, Legal Counsel, Canvass Research Chairperson, Committee Room Chairperson, Advertising & Literature Chairperson, Policy Issues & Research Chairperson, Telephone Centre Chairperson, Volunteers Chairperson, Media Relations Chairperson, Group Communications Chairperson, Election Day Chairperson, Scheduling Chairperson, Signs Chairperson, Multicultural Groups Chairperson, and Computer Chairperson.]
an official report of campaign revenues and expenditures to Elections Canada. This role may be filled by a professional such as an accountant or lawyer. In fact, the Conservatives explicitly recommend this (Carty 1991b, 83). Because of their greater access to the social strata that includes professionals, the cadre style Liberal and Conservative associations are much better at finding such volunteers than is the NDP. In 1988 66.7 of Liberal and 60.2 percent Tory official agents were lawyers or accountants, while only 19.4 percent of NDP agents were from one of these professions (ibid., table 3.1). But all parties usually offer some access to centralized legal and accounting advice, including schools designed to train official agents. All campaigns must also hire a qualified accountant to audit the accounts kept by the official agent and to certify their accuracy. The other central campaign positions that make up the inner circle are shown in Figure 5.2, and include fund-raising, media relations and communications, strategy and so on. Members of the inner circle chair committees dedicated to these tasks and coordinate the work of volunteers in these areas.

There can be up to 40 people in this inner group, but it is often smaller (between 10 and 20), and may include the spouse or other relatives of the candidate. These people coordinate the campaign, and ensure important jobs get done. They are involved in planning strategies, arranging the candidates’ schedule, dealing with press releases and the media, and may be left to do critical administrative chores or canvassing, depending on the number and expertise of other workers that are available to the campaign.

Because of differences in the strength and competitiveness of local associations,
and their nomination experiences, campaign teams vary across ridings and parties. The rest of this chapter investigates how the nomination experiences of local candidates shapes these campaign teams, and influences the mix of workers, skills, and the resources available to them.

CANDIDATES AND THEIR CAMPAIGN TEAMS

The nomination has a profound impact on the character and effectiveness of a campaign team. Most associations form campaign teams during the period between the nomination and the election (Carty 1991a, figure 7.1), although New Democrat associations have a greater tendency to have some elements in place before the nomination. As well as choosing the candidate, the nomination governs the size and nature of the pool of workers and the method by which these workers find their way into the campaign team. Candidates and campaign teams can be classified by reference to their nomination experiences.

The four different types of nominations presented in previous chapters are each associated with a different sort of candidate. The campaign teams built by each type of candidate differ consistently in four important characteristics: the locus of decision making with respect to building the campaign team; the relationship among the inner circle of campaign workers; the composition of the campaign team, particularly the inner circle, with respect to the type and number of workers and the financial resources available to it; and finally, how the inner circle, including the candidate, perceives the task of running a campaign and its main strategic focus. These factors determine both
the style and content of the campaign. The rest of this chapter uses these criteria to develop a model of the structure of campaign teams and uses a number of examples to illustrate four distinct types of teams.

Local Notable Candidates

Local notables are generally the product of local democracy: nominations held in the competitive associations of cadre style parties (see Figure 5.3). In winning these open, contested nominations, local notables make use of their public profiles to recruit many new members. They and their supporters see the candidate as central to the campaign team, a team held together by personal ties. The candidates are often new to the party, and may be inclined to rely on other new members and personal acquaintances to help run their campaigns. With a strong association and plenty of funds to work with, these are competent campaigns. Decision making with respect to shaping the campaign team and choosing strategies is localised. Campaigner's perceptions of the character of the local riding play an important role in their decisions.

The manner in which a local notable chooses his or her campaign team resembles that of a leader choosing a support team after winning a party leadership. Because success in the nomination is strongly affected by the performance of the individual candidate, and his or her support base is somewhat independent of the local association, the winning candidate has a good deal of freedom in building a campaign team. Friendships and acquaintances are likely to play an important role in shaping the decisions the candidate makes. In Surrey North, Tory candidate Cliff Blair chose Scott
FIGURE 5.3

LOCAL NOTABLES

Open
Contested

Local Democracy

Local Notable
Thompson as his campaign manager mainly because they knew each other from previous campaigns and were also close personal friends and business partners.

In general, local executives in cadre style associations are more likely to defer to the candidate with respect to important organizational decisions than those in the NDP, a mass party (Carty 1991a, table 7.1). This is part of the separation between the association and campaign organization that is common in cadre style parties in which local notables are invariably nominated (Scarrow 1964, 61). It should be noted as well that the non-local party is only very rarely involved in selecting campaign team members in any party. This type of intervention is slightly more common in the NDP than either the Liberals or Conservatives (Carty 1991a, table 7.2). This is in part a function of a willingness amongst local NDP organizers to accept the dictates of the national party with respect to association matters, even when the local members disagree with the national decision (Smith 1964, 73).

Occasionally, where the association is well organized, or the candidate is inexperienced, the local association executive may have some say in the selection of people to fill important campaign positions. In the Okanagan, the inexperienced Liberal candidate Murli Pendharkar relied on the few local Liberals with campaign experience to fill crucial campaign positions. Thus, the position of campaign manager was shared between two long time members of the association who had helped search out prospective nomination candidates.

Successful insurgent candidates - that is, those that are new to the association - are disinclined to choose existing association members to fill important campaign roles,
preferring to rely on friends brought into the association during the nomination process. Insurgent Burnaby-Kingsway Tory John Bitonti, having alienated many long time association members during the nomination, had a campaign team composed of his family and friends from the local Italian-Canadian community.

The relationship amongst members of the inner circle, and in particular between the candidate and volunteers, is quite personal. Personal bonds between team members may be formed during the nomination process, from relations built up inside a strong, competitive association, or as a result of shared membership of groups and service organizations outside the association.

In general, volunteers in local notable campaigns have a personality driven view of politics, and see personal attributes as more important than party platforms or policies in deciding the outcome of an election. Local notables and their volunteers consistently rate the role of the candidate in the campaign as very important. This is not surprising, as the candidate plays a crucial role in attracting volunteers to campaigns in cadre style associations (Carty 1991a, tables 7.13 and 7.14). Only the party leader tends to be seen as more important to the outcome of the local election. Moreover, candidates in these associations claim to have known about 80 percent of the volunteers prior to the election.

The campaign team is usually highly competent, either because adequate numbers of well qualified workers are available in the association and amongst new recruits (in part as a function of the social strata that cadre style parties appeal to), or because the campaign is wealthy enough to hire help in critical areas such as fund-
raising, writing advertisements or conducting opinion polling. Because most local notables win in associations that are competitive and hence strong, their membership is large. As a result, winning candidates have a considerable pool of potential workers from which to build a campaign team. Inner circles of 40 volunteers are common, and the campaign team may have over 100 members, and up to 1 000 workers. Cliff Blair in Surrey North and Al Horning in Okanagan Centre claimed to have had access to between 500 and 1 000 workers, many of whom they recruited during the nomination process.

If relations between the candidate and members of the association that supported other candidates have remained cordial, members with election experience are nearly always invited to play an important role in the campaign. This was the case in the Tory association in Okanagan Centre. The organizer of one losing nomination campaign, Troy Schmidt, became the campaign manager for candidate Al Horning.

Effective fund-raising, and a strong local campaign organization are common in these circumstances, and party headquarters is usually willing to provide financial assistance to competitive campaigns. Within the same party, the campaigns of local notables attracted more and larger donations than their less competitive counterparts. Al Horning in the Okanagan easily outdistanced his opponents, and the riding limit on election expenses in raising $54 974 for his campaign.

But if a candidate alienates association members, he or she can struggle to find adequate workers and funds. This is always a danger in open, contested nominations that are won by an insurgent candidate, and is another reason insurgents may rely on
volunteers they know or have brought into the association during the nomination. If they hijack an association, they may have trouble raising funds from traditional party supporters, and experienced campaigners in the association may refuse to help organize their campaign. As it is, insurgent candidates are more likely to win in weaker, if still competitive, associations that are very permeable. These associations may have limited resources to offer a candidate, and party strategists may not feel they are competitive enough to warrant federal support.

John Bitonti in Burnaby-Kingsway and Cliff Blair in Surrey North, both to some degree insurgent, pro-life Conservative candidates, struggled to find adequate campaign funds. Bitonti raised just $20,775 - only a little more than the party-appointed Liberal candidate in the riding. Blair raised a paltry $14,948, half that of the Liberal candidate, and a third of his NDP opponent. The Conservative party's abandonment of Surrey as a lost cause proved to be ill-considered, as Blair lost the seat to the NDP candidate by just over 2,000 votes; he might have won with a properly funded campaign.

There are qualitative differences in the pool of volunteers that local notables have access to in comparison with many other candidates. By encouraging recruitment drives and casting a wide net for candidates, competitive, cadre style associations attract a diversity of candidates and members, thus multiplying the connections between the association and ethnic and interest groups in the riding. These groups may even support a particular candidate, or nominate one of their own, adding to the heterogeneity of the association.

Cadre style associations are likely to have disproportionate number of
professionals drawn from the social strata that support the Liberals and Conservatives. Their skills are often well suited to the technical and management tasks required of the inner circle. This abundance of professional workers can have a profound impact on the competence and style of an inner circle. Furthermore, these professionals often have a degree of flexibility in their work schedules that allows them to take leave without pay from their firms. Not only can they commit themselves full-time to the campaign, their normal salary is not considered by law to be a campaign expense. Thus, the campaigns of local notables often receive expert advice that is not subject to the limits on local campaign spending dictated by law. Consequently, campaign activities that might otherwise be too expensive are accessible to the campaign. While most Liberal and Tory campaigns in this study had professionals such as lawyers and accountants on their campaign staff, only a minority of New Democrat campaigns - those in high profile ridings where the national NDP helped to provide such workers - had direct access to this type of assistance.

With access to workers and funds, the local campaign is in the enviable position of being able to choose its election strategies and determine its organizational style. It can choose to develop its strategies and organizational form, or follow those offered by the party. This decision has implications for every aspect of the campaign, from the focus of literature to the types of public events the candidate attends.

The choice of campaign strategies is greatly influenced by the relationship between the various members of the inner circle as well as the style of the candidate. For local notables, the personal nature of relations among the inner circle, and the fact
that the candidate often welds the team together, result in the candidate being the strategic linchpin of the campaign. In Surrey North, Scott Thompson, campaign manager for Conservative Cliff Blair, spoke about campaign strategy entirely in terms of the role of the candidate:

We saw the candidate is very important to success. Our strategy revolved around increasing Cliff’s profile. The most important poll results for us were those that showed us the level of name recognition we had gained for Cliff.

This role for local notables distinguishes them from many other candidates, and is not surprising given that they are selected by permeable associations in non-programmatical cadre style parties. In contrast, NDP campaigners in Surrey North ranked national and regional issues, as well as the party leader higher than the candidate as factors affecting their campaign.

Given that local notables are central to the campaign team, and usually have an intimate knowledge of local conditions, the campaign is likely to have a local focus. That is, local issues, and the candidate’s links to the riding are important components in the campaign’s strategic calculations. This local impulse makes the campaign susceptible to parochial styles of politics and local interest groups. Local control of the campaign - the development and implementation of its own strategies - is an identifying characteristic of this sort of campaign. Local organizers in cadre style parties view with suspicion any intervention in their affairs by the national party. In contrast, NDP campaigns place greater emphasis on national and regional issues, and are often closely linked with national party strategy.

Because perceptions of association competitiveness that drive the appeal of
nominations may be misplaced, some of the campaigns included in this group are not highly competitive. In general, these less competitive campaigns have fewer volunteers and less resources, and thus less control over their own organizational form and strategic direction. Progressive Conservative John Bitonti’s campaign in Burnaby-Kingsway is an example of this. Although the nomination was contested, he alienated many association members in a riding where the party had little chance of success, and had to manage with a small campaign team.

Party Insider Candidates

Impermeable associations whose nominations are examples of party democracy select committed (usually local) party members, or party insiders, as their candidates (see Figure 5.4). These associations are found mostly in mass parties such as the NDP. Party insiders often perceive themselves as first among equals. This sentiment fits well with the organizational ethos of a mass party such as the New Democrats. In contrast to the personal style of local notable campaigns, party insider campaigns have a bureaucratic/organizational approach to team building.

This bureaucratic approach concentrates on identifying a standard operating procedure for every job and filling it with the best qualified party member. Positions on the campaign team - including the campaigner manager - are regularly assigned by a committee of executive members, often before the nomination is completed. This approach, or some variant of it, is much more common in the NDP than in the cadre style major parties where a more traditional form of organizing, with the candidate
FIGURE 5.4

PARTY INSIDERS

Closed
Contested

Party Democracy

Party Insider
appointing a volunteer campaign manager, is more common (Carty 1991a, figure 7.4).

Experienced NDP candidates have more discretion in choosing a campaign team. This is particularly true in competitive associations, where a history of working for the party at a high level is often critical to nomination success. But these cases are the minority. NDP candidates appointed official agents in 44.2 percent of the ridings the party contested compared with 74.8 and 82.5 in the case of the Liberals and Conservatives (ibid). In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, the official agent for the NDP hardly knew the candidate, but was a long time party member. Neither the Conservative or Liberal official agents were party members, and both were appointed by the respective candidates.

Relations amongst the members of teams constructed by these associations are less personal and more institutionalised than in local notable campaigns. The manner in which volunteers are assigned to campaign team positions favours loyal party members over those brought into the association by the nomination. While some may be friends of the candidate, it is their commitment to the party that underpins workers’ willingness to join the campaign (Carty 1991a tables 7.13 and 7.14).

This organizational style is a function of the impermeable nature of NDP associations which restricts access to and exit from the party. The association builds a repertoire of behaviour which becomes entrenched over time. Formal rules and committee decision making tend to dominate NDP inner circles. Commitment to the party and formalised job descriptions take the place of the friendships and ad hoc organizational arrangements found in cadre style parties. In Fraser Valley West, a
losing nomination candidate, Charles Bradford, was appointed campaign manager to Lynn Fairall because he was considered to be the best person for the job. Bradford did not get on with the candidate nor her supporters on the campaign team, and some volunteers felt his presence disrupted the local campaign.

Fortunately for New Democrats, competitive associations maintain a core group of experienced, competent campaign volunteers that work on local campaigns from one election to the next. This allows them to pursue labour intensive methods of canvassing and campaigning, but it also means that impermeable NDP associations rely heavily on long time members to fill important campaign positions. This facilitates the early formation of campaign teams (Carty 1991a, 156), but reduces the incentive to find new members to help run the campaign.

Another corollary of the impermeability of NDP associations, and the related lack of large recruitment drives during the nomination, is that links between the association and the local community can be relatively limited. This reduces the ability of mass party associations to respond to local political sentiment. But solidarity has its rewards. Even associations that are only minimally competitive are likely to have a group of committed members with some experience that is willing to organize the campaign. The Okanagan Centre NDP had no chance of success, but managed to construct a team of experienced campaigners.

As discussed previously, the nature of the social groups and strata that an association appeals to influences the composition of the campaign team. The NDP in BC appeals disproportionately to bureaucrats, non-professionals, and union members
(see Blake 1986). Thus, the pool of workers that insiders draw from tends to have fewer professionals than for other campaigns. This means that campaign jobs that benefit from professional skills can be difficult to fill in these campaigns. Moreover, unlike professionals, wage earning volunteers do not usually have flexible working hours and as a result have to balance their jobs with their commitment to the campaign. This limits the time they can spend working for the candidate. On the other hand, if they are professional organizers employed by a union (which is common in NDP campaigns), and thus able to devote themselves full-time to the campaign, their wages must be included as an election expense which limits the campaign’s financial flexibility (Carty 1991a, table 7.6). In fact the NDP campaigns are more than twice as likely than those of any other party to have a paid manager (ibid., figure 7.3)\(^5\), and half again as likely to have paid staff of some kind (ibid., table 7.4).

Party insider campaigns place more emphasis on party policy than on the local candidate both organizationally and strategically. This is in part a function of the greater role played by the association executive. New Democrats in Fraser Valley West had hired office space, begun fund-raising, and made important decisions about the conduct of the local campaign well before Lynn Fairall won the nomination. This pattern is evident throughout NDP associations. 41.1 percent of all NDP official agents were appointed by the constituency executive compared with 19.7 percent of Liberal and 9.6 percent of Conservative agents (Carty 1991b, table 3.2).

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\(^5\)But note that paid campaign managers are much more common in British Columbia where the party is strong than elsewhere in the country (Carty 1991, table 7.3).
Local campaigns have formalised links with the rest of the party, and internal party linkages and modes of behaviour greatly influence the manner in which the local campaign operates. The universal use of the NDP developed "three canvass method" in all campaigns with sufficient workers is evidence of this. Unlike workers in the campaign teams of local notables, volunteers in party insider campaign teams perceive their task to be inextricably connected with the goals and policies of the wider party. They believe that there is strength in unity, and that a local campaign can be most effective by being part of a coordinated effort. This reflects the importance of solidarity as an organizing principle in mass parties.

When asked to rank factors that influence election outcomes, campaign workers such as those in Jim Karpoff’s campaign in Surrey North rated issues and party platforms and policies more highly than the efforts of candidates, even though the same workers claimed that Karpoff’s personal history in the riding was important to his success. Even candidates are likely to see their job in this way. Fraser Valley West NDP candidate Lynn Fairall noted that

ours was just one of 290 odd campaigns... our strength comes from presenting the same policies across the country.

This monolithic view of campaigning is not conducive to the influence of idiosyncratic local styles of politics on campaigning. This is not to say that riding conditions do not play a role in these campaigns. Most NDP candidates believed they tailored the national campaign to suit local conditions. John Brewin noted that

we felt that peace issues, which the party platform is strong on but which were not central to the wider campaign, would play well in Victoria, so we emphasized them.
But even in these instances, campaigns concentrate on issues that are in the party platform. The national campaign comes first, and is modified to fit local circumstances.

The commitment to the party binds local associations to their national branches, and there are set levels of funding that must be provided to the national party by constituencies via provincial organizations. This commitment is mutual. The national party tries to ensure as many local campaigns as possible have adequate funding to fulfill the demands of campaigning by redistributing funds to provincial sections that are weak (Stanbury 1991, 156-7). This means that different elements of the party are involved in a web of extensive and formalised financial relations.

Because the appeal of the nominations that lead to party insider campaigns is not just driven by the electoral appeal of the association, there is a great deal of variation in the competitiveness of campaigns in this group. The more competitive (appealing) the nomination, the more likely it is that the association will insist that the candidate have a reputation as a good party member. As with other parties, more competitive associations in this group tend to be larger, better financed and as a result, may be more strategically independent of their national campaign.

Competitive associations may also have enough money to hire experienced campaigners for some jobs. But unlike some other parties, these outsiders will be NDP members in good standing, and are likely to come from the group of professional campaign organizers within the NDP. Members of this group regularly cross provincial boundaries and levels of government to work on campaigns, and may share their time between party work and union organizing.
Stopgap Candidates

Stopgap candidates win latent democracy style nominations in permeable and uncompetitive associations that organize a weak candidate search (see Figure 5.5) Most such nominations occur in cadre style associations. In very weak associations, the party appoints a candidate, and a few local party faithful, working with whatever guidance the provincial or national party is willing to offer, run the campaign. On occasion, the successful candidate is a public figure who is not a member of the association but has been convinced by party members that the association has some chance of success. As such, there are two kinds of stopgap candidates: the faithful party member; and the insurgent or outsider.

Party faithful candidates can take one of two forms: either a local party member willing to run in an uncompetitive association, or a candidate appointed by the party because no local candidate can be found. Insurgent/outsider candidates believe that their personal charisma is enough to attract campaign workers and funds as well as votes. If they lose the election, they invariably claim that they were unaware of the acute weakness of the association. Given their limited contact with the association, this claim may be credible. But it is difficult to determine whether it is this ignorance, or their belief in their own appeal, which plays a bigger role in their decision to run for the nomination.

The campaign teams of stopgap candidates are built locally. Faithful party members and appointed candidates usually see themselves as filling a gap in the parties national election roster, and have few delusions about their role in the campaign. They
FIGURE 5.5

STOPGAP CANDIDATES

Open
Uncontested

Latent Democracy

Stopgap Candidate
have modest expectations about the size and competence of their teams. Candidates that are local party members draw upon acquaintances in the association in building their team. Local association president and Liberal candidate in Fraser Valley West Tony Wattie was an experienced organizer who believed that even if he were unsuccessful in 1988, his efforts would benefit the party in future elections. He managed to make use of his contacts within the Liberal party and as a well known local lawyer to help search out volunteers.

Appointed candidates are often inexperienced party members from outside the local association who are willing to follow the directions of the party or local members on how best to construct the campaign team. The construction of the campaign team has little to do with the candidate. Rather, the size and quality of this team depends on how many local party members are willing to work on what is nearly certain to be a losing campaign. In Burnaby-Kingsway, the Liberals were forced to appoint Sam Stevens - a lawyer with links to the party’s provincial office - as the candidate. A few local party members were willing to direct Stevens and help out with the campaign. The candidate is nearly irrelevant in this type of campaign.

Candidates using the local association as a vehicle for their own personal goals see themselves as the centre of the campaign. Given that the association is likely to be weak, the candidate often builds the campaign team. The fact that most such candidacies are in cadre style parties likely inflates the number of cadre style associations that report candidate control of the campaign organization. These campaign teams consist of party stalwarts willing to support an outsider and new members the
candidate has brought into the association. But as with appointed candidates, there is usually a lack of volunteers, which severely constrains the team’s ability to meet the demands of campaigning. If there are very few volunteers, the candidate must rely on friends and family to fill campaign positions. This was true for Liberal candidate Don Ross in Surrey North; his son managed the campaign.

The relationship amongst the members of stopgap candidate campaign teams is quite intimate. This is both a function of their small size and on occasion, the fact that members know each other well. The inner circle of insurgent/outsider candidates, which are made up of family members, is the most intimate of all. Don Ross, ex-Mayor of Surrey, ran for the party in Surrey North. Even with his extensive contacts among local Social Credit activists, he failed to build a viable campaign team. When the first campaign manager - a party member - realised the campaign was going nowhere and left, Ross was forced to rely on his spouse and sons to run the campaign. His son noted just how limited the campaign inner circle was:

Strategy meetings consisted of mum and dad and my brother and I sitting around the table after dinner discussing what had to be done the next day.

In Vancouver Centre, long time Liberal member and local candidate Tex Enemark was forced to rely on acquaintances and friends in building his team. Team members freely admitted it was their personal loyalty to Tex rather than to the Liberals (although some had been members of the party in the 1970's and early 80's) that led them to join the team. Fortunately for Enemark, some of them had skills appropriate to campaigning. This is quite likely in cadre style associations because of the social strata from which these parties draw members. Professionals - such as accountants, lawyers
and so on - possess skills that can be put to good use in a campaign team. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, candidate Garry Jenkins, his family and a few friends ran the Liberal campaign, and even provided most of its funding.

In general, most campaign teams in this group lack financial resources and cannot field a fully competent campaign team. There may be a core group of workers to fill important positions, but they will lack experience. Or there will be a small number of experienced campaigners who cannot meet all the labour intensive demands of campaigning. Despite the presence of lawyers and accountants in Tex Enemark's team, their lack of campaign experience proved to be a problem. Some campaign team members felt their decision to discount the need to address the diverse ethnic and lifestyle groups in Vancouver Centre was a strategic mistake that revealed their political naivete. Don Ross had his family and a few party workers running his campaign, but none were experienced.

A lack of workers is the most reliable indicator of a campaign that has a limited electoral future. In Centre, the paucity of Liberal volunteers was particularly evident in a riding in which other campaigns had many more than enough. With very few secondary workers and sympathizers, the Liberals could not complete all the labour intensive tasks - such as canvassing the riding on foot - of campaigning. Campaign manager Allan Gould noted that they had to indulge in a "smoke and mirrors" strategy in an attempt to cover up this weakness. Moreover, Gould also noted that a failure to attract adequate numbers of workers early on tends to be self-perpetuating once it becomes widely known.
To substitute for a lack of canvassers and in order to be seen as competitive in the riding, the Vancouver Centre Liberals spent heavily on advertising. This was only possible because of the funding provided by the federal party; testament to Enemark's contacts with national strategists and their belief that Vancouver Centre was a high profile campaign that deserved extra funding. In fact, the local Liberal campaign spent nearly twice as much as its NDP opposition, and a third more than the Tories, the two campaigns that had the best chance of winning the riding. To the degree that the success of this strategy can be measured in terms of media coverage, it failed. Unfortunately for the Liberals, the local media quickly pegged the campaign as uncompetitive, and reported it as such.

Most stopgap candidates do not have the luxury of special funding from their national party, and usually work with limited funds. Ross in Surrey North was angry at the lack of support he received from the federal party, which saw Surrey North as both un-winnable and not important enough to warrant any special treatment. The weak local association did not have a "war chest" prior to the nomination, and the lack of volunteers restricted Ross' capacity to raise funds. Party appointees, such as Stevens, may be able to attract some basic funding from the party if the latter is concerned enough to help make the campaign appear viable. If the candidate has a public profile, as did Enemark and Ross, he or she may be able to attract funding through speaking engagements and personal appeals for support. But most such campaigns are doomed to

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6The Liberals spent $32 438, the Tories $24 602, and the NDP $17 553 on advertising. (Elections Canada, 1988).
impecuniosity and all the difficulties it brings.

Perceptions of what constitutes a campaign can vary among stopgap candidate campaigns. Appointed candidate’s perceptions of the riding are of little consequence to the campaign. The candidate may have very little campaign experience and is often not well known to local volunteers or voters in the riding. This is not a situation likely to encourage a strong strategic focus on the candidate. Moreover, lacking resources, these campaigns rely on the national party for everything from campaign literature to election strategies. This general literature does not emphasize the candidate nor local issues, but rather concentrates on generic party policy. Local party members who run out of a sense of duty will also lack the resources needed to generate or implement a local strategy. There is either no real strategic focus to campaigns such as those of Tony Wattie and Sam Stevens, or they mimic that of the national party. The local campaign is a cipher for the national campaign, devoid of local issues or a direct role for the candidate’s personality and abilities.

Campaigns with better known candidates attempt to develop a strategy that focuses on the candidate and which may ignore the national party. They see themselves as strongly connected to the local community and able to read its pulse. They believe that voters will be sympathetic to a campaign based on their personal qualities and commitment to the riding. Campaigns such as that of Liberal Garry Jenkins, a local doctor in Kootenay West-Revelstoke, focused on his links with the local community. A similar strategy was adopted by ex-Mayor of Surrey Don Ross. Local campaign literature emphasized the candidate, and their strategies were premised around trying to
make an impact at all-candidates’ debates. Ross had some success in reaching voters in Surrey North, and increased the Liberals vote by 15 percent. Jenkins’ campaign failed to establish an identity for itself that was independent of the national Liberal campaign. This campaign was inappropriate in the context of BC politics, and Jenkins’ was squeezed out by the NDP versus PC battle in the riding. These stopgap candidate campaigns attempt to generate a strategic focus - usually local - but only occasionally succeed in doing so.

All the stopgap candidates in this study, even those with some financial backing, ran into the same major obstacle. They could not find enough volunteers to complete the crucial task of canvassing the riding. Most campaigners believe that personal contact with the voters is the means by which candidates prove they are a viable electoral alternative. A failure to make this contact severely weakens the campaign credibility of stopgap candidates. As a result of lack of resources, these campaigns either adopt or are swept up in the national strategy. They run parallel local campaigns; that is, campaigns that are not integrated into the national campaign, but mirror its strategies. So although they may have the necessary autonomy, these local campaigns are unable to implement a truly local strategy. For instance, Garry Jenkins relied heavily on nationally produced literature and followed the national campaign strategy, although he was personally opposed to the party’s position on free trade.

**High Profile Candidates**

*High profile* candidates are successful in associations that are competitive and
impermeable and run nominations that exhibit limited democracy. Local and non-local party members have often worked together to find a suitable candidate who is then guaranteed an easy ride through the nomination (see Figure 5.6) What sets these associations apart is that party strategists believe their campaigns have an impact on the wider election. How well the campaign does, and the performance of the candidate, sends signals to voters in surrounding ridings about the competence of the party and its chances of forming the government. This often occurs in ridings which, for a variety of reasons, receive extraordinary media coverage. This coverage may a function of tradition, or even mundane factors such as the propinquity of the riding to major media headquarters. But it is often related to special features of the riding, such as its demographic character, the profile of the candidates or local MP, or the intensity of the local contest. This category also includes the campaign teams of most incumbents. While not all incumbents may be considered high profile, most have some public profile.

Candidates that win these nominations commonly have a high public profile. The candidates in Vancouver Centre in 1988 included Tory Kim Campbell, a well known provincial MLA, and New Democrat Johanna den Hertog, National President of the NDP. Parties may cast a wide net in order to find such candidates. Within the cadre style Liberal and Conservative parties, the nominee is often from outside the local party association and is chosen because of his or her public appeal. However, this is not to say that the nominees political beliefs are irrelevant - they have to be sympathetic to party philosophy. In contrast, NDP candidates are still expected to have
FIGURE 5.6

HIGH PROFILE CANDIDATES

Closed
Uncontested

Limited Democracy

High Profile
demonstrated their commitment to the party. Even in high profile ridings, NDP candidates are good party members, often with strong connections to the party hierarchy. Finding a nominee who is both high profile and a good party member can be difficult, which helps explain why there are fewer high profile candidates on the NDP roster.

The selection of the campaign team for non-incumbents can depend on the interaction of a number of factors. Most of these associations are strong, and can muster volunteers to help with the campaign. If local opinions have not been overridden in the process of having a high profile candidate brought in to win the nomination, local association members can be expected to volunteer to work on the campaign. But if the candidate has been imposed by elite agreement, some local members will absent themselves from the campaign. Because the candidate is an important attraction for many workers, his or her very presence influences the composition of the campaign team. High profile candidates often have strong links to various groups in the local community and perhaps the party, and bring their own personal supporters to the team. In Kim Campbell’s case, her political experience enabled her to bring with her a proto-campaign team from previous provincial elections.

Given the importance of the candidate to the campaign - evidenced by the party’s pursuit of the candidate - he or she has some leverage within the party and possibly a veto over who holds important positions in the campaign team. But most candidates rely on a trusted strategist or acquaintance to organize the campaign team. This frees the candidate to concentrate on campaigning rather than on the minutiae of organization. Moreover, there is general agreement that the aim is to build the most
professional campaign team possible. As a result, decisions are often made without the
direct input of the candidate. Local and non-local party members negotiate to meet both
local and non-local objectives - often melding personal and partisan motivations - so as
to produce the most effective campaign team. For their part, incumbents rely on
trusted advisors in their constituency office as well as their own judgement in selecting
volunteers, and assigning positions on the campaign team. The degree of direct control
exercised by the MP depends greatly on his or her individual style. Incumbents who
keep close tabs on their associations and local constituency office are heavily involved
in selecting volunteers to fill campaign positions. Tory Bob Wenman in Fraser Valley
West is directly involved in choosing campaign workers. Others take a more hands-off
approach. Svend Robinson places absolute faith in his constituency office staff and
campaigners he has worked with in the past:

They organize the campaign team and deal with all the details of campaigning.
This leaves me free to concentrate on what I do best - meeting with voters.

The use of advisors to organize the campaign team is also evidence of one of the pitfalls
of being an incumbent; being remote from local affairs due to the time spent fulfilling
the duties of an MP (Land 1965, 72).

An MP's constituency office provides a range of support for the campaign,
including office space, equipment, and staff. Lists of campaign volunteers may well be
kept on record in the office. Staff can be used before the election to contact volunteers,
begin fund-raising, and start the process of "priming" voters about election issues and
party policies via direct mail and literature drops. The MP can use his or her office to
hold informal gatherings of voters in order to get a sense of what issues are salient in
the local community. Incumbents can often afford to pay for professional help during the campaign proper, or can extract such assistance from the party.

Although the candidate may have a personal relationship with members of the inner circle, relations among volunteers in campaigns in this group are dominated by a professional ethic. Because of the candidate’s profile, most workers know, or know of the candidate. Some are close personal friends. But as these candidates are drawn from a political and social elite, many of these friends are professionals whose skills are useful to the campaign. On top of this there are the professional campaigners attracted by the profile of the campaign or sent out by party headquarters. Legal advice is often provided by one or more lawyers, the official agent is an accountant, the communications chair a trained journalist or public relations expert, fund raising is done by an experienced party organizer, and advertisements are written by industry professionals. This combined with the fact that the campaign has access to the latest demographic and polling information, as well as other technical assistance from the party, creates a sophisticated campaign team that sees its job in a technical, professional light.7

The size and composition of these campaign teams reflects the appeal of the candidate and the high profile nature of the campaign. As well as a high level of expertise, these campaign teams are usually both large and well financed. Being attached to a strong association and having special appeal helps these campaigns attract

7A good example of this can be seen in Land’s (1965) descriptions of the high profile campaigns in Eglinton in the 1962 federal election.
upwards of 1 000 volunteers. They have access both to professionals in the wider community, and experienced organizers and campaigners in their respective parties. In the case of cadre style associations, this is due in part to the social strata from which these parties draw their supporters. Even within the NDP, a wider net is cast in order to catch campaign workers for these teams than is the case for campaigns in less prestigious ridings. NDP members who make a living as professional campaign organizers are disproportionately assigned by head office to these sorts of campaigns. Or they may know the high profile candidate personally, and prefer to work on his or her campaign. In addition, party supporters that have useful skills (such as in broadcasting and advertising) are used in these campaigns, even though they may live outside the riding. These workers come largely from the public service and education sector.

The campaign teams of high profile candidates either include important party strategists, or have access to those who determine national strategies. The linkages between the local campaign and national strategists that develop during the nomination process, and go on into the campaign, help these candidates run effective campaigns. Kim Campbell’s campaign used public relations experts and experienced campaigners from across the country. Patrick Kinsella, an old hand at Conservative and Social Credit campaigning, helped mastermind her campaign. Johanna den Hertog’s key volunteers included communications chair, Bill Bell, a lecturer in media studies who was well connected to the party hierarchy. She also had access to the NDP’s provincial headquarters through her husband and NDP strategist, Ron Johnson. In addition, den
Hertog's campaign team included a lawyer and an accountant; rare commodities in most NDP campaigns.

Because these campaigns are often attached to competitive, strong associations, they are able to raise considerable funds for campaigning. In addition, the profile of the candidate, and the attention given him or her by non-local strategists heightens the effectiveness of fund-raising efforts. Many such candidates are experienced in public fund-raising. The party usually reinforces the impression that the candidate is special by offering him or her extraordinary assistance. For example, Kim Campbell's campaign received 10 times the financial assistance from the party than did the average Tory campaign in British Columbia. This focus on the local campaign reinforces the candidates' perceptions of their own importance.

Campaigner's perceptions of their jobs on the campaign teams of high profile candidates are shaped by the centrality of the candidate to campaign strategy, a professional ethic that permeates the campaign team, and the links between the local and non-local party. For their part, high profile candidates have a clear understanding of their own worth, and having been wooed by the party, naturally see themselves at the centre of the local campaign effort. This tendency is more evident in Liberal and Conservative campaigns, as New Democrats expect even high profile candidates to adopt the team approach preferred by the party. High profile candidates expect to speak to both local and national issues. They see themselves as influential and knowledgable spokespeople on a range of important issues, and are often explicitly encouraged by parties to take on this role.
Most high profile candidates who live in or near the riding have, or believe they have, a good sense of the local political terrain and the issues that concern local voters. On occasion, these candidates have been parachuted into the riding, and rely on a campaign team and strategy constructed by the party. But even these interlopers have a view of the riding that is informed by the latest technical wizardry available to the party. As such, the campaign should be able to identify effective campaign strategies, and with the resources at its command, implement them.

Despite the professionalism of campaign teams of high profile candidates, their symbiotic relationship with their party’s national campaign often confuses the local agenda. While a high profile local campaign relies on the national campaign for technical, strategic and financial support, it may have its own local agenda about what issues it wants to promote, how the candidate should be presented to the public, and so on. It attempts to maximise the amount of media coverage it receives in order to present this agenda. For its part, the national campaign wishes to use the extraordinary regional and national media coverage these ridings receive for its own ends. As well, it wishes to use the candidate as a national spokesperson and even a symbol of what the party stands for. Not only might it be competing with the local campaign for space in the media, but its strategic objectives can be at odds with those of the local party.

Resolving this tension can consume a good deal of effort. PC and NDP strategists in Centre had to remind national organizers that their campaigns needed to focus on local issues if they were to be successful. Given the close contacts between local and national strategists - in fact the one person can be doing both jobs
simultaneously - the tactics of each level often become intertwined, and the local
campaign finds itself addressing both local and national issues. Using the candidate as a
spokesperson and strategic focus, these campaigns canvass a range of local, regional and
national issues. This is only possible because of the vast array of personnel and
resources available to them.

Despite similarities in the campaigns of high profile candidates across parties,
there are still differences between teams in mass as opposed to cadre style associations.
NDP teams rely more heavily on party members who have proven their commitment to
the party, rewarding this commitment where possible. A number of NDP strategists that
played important roles in the 1988 federal election in British Columbia subsequently
found work with the provincial NDP government. As well, the role of the candidate in
New Democrat campaigns, both in selecting team members and as the preoccupation of
campaign strategy, is circumscribed by the importance of the party platform and the
need for solidarity that run counter to the mercurial, candidate-centred campaigns found
in high profile cadre style associations.

CONCLUSION

The size and composition of the campaign team is critical to the style and content of
local campaigns. Central to this team is the candidate and the inner circle of volunteers.
This inner circle and the larger campaign team are products of the nomination process.
Thus, different types of nominations tend to produce distinctive types of campaign
teams, and in particular, candidates and inner circles. These teams vary with respect to
the four characteristics shown in Table 5.1: the relationship among the inner circle of campaign workers; the composition of the campaign team, particularly the inner circle, with respect to the type and number of workers and the financial resources available to it; the locus of decision making with respect to building the campaign team; and finally, how the inner circle, including the candidate, perceives the task of running a campaign and its main strategic focus. These characteristics act both as criteria for understanding how local campaigns operate in Canadian federal elections, and as a means of categorizing them.

The relationships amongst members of the inner circle vary depending on a number of factors. Local notables often know most of the workers in their inner circle, and may have recruited many of them to the association. Party insiders found in mass party associations tend to have organizational/bureaucratic inner circles staffed with committed party members. In the weak campaigns of stopgap candidates, the inner circle is small and is often made up of the candidate's family and friends, which produces an intimate if not particularly effective team. The campaigns of high profile candidates tend to have professional inner circles which consist largely of experienced campaigners and professionally qualified volunteers.

The composition of the campaign team and the resources available to it have obvious implications for the nature of local campaigns. The competitiveness of the association tends to determine the amount of resources to which it has access. The size of the campaign team, and the resources available to it also reflect the attempts of head office to ensure a basic level of competence in all its campaigns, and in some cases, a
desire to offer extra assistance in those ridings the party thinks are strategically important. Local notables often have large campaign teams drawn from the local community with access to substantial resources. Party insiders rely on committed association members, and also have connections with other elements of the party that have resource implications. High profile candidates have large teams and an excess of resources, including money. These campaigns often receive assistance from the national party hoping for a good performance in strategically important ridings. Appendix A gives some indication of the variation in the financial resources of the different campaign teams.

The locus of decision making with respect to filling campaign positions is a function of the relationship between the candidate and the association, and the association and the party. It may be directed by one of these two relationships, or more commonly, by a combination, with one dominating. Cadre style associations tend to leave decisions regarding the choice of campaigners up to the candidate, who may then choose to involve members of the executive. In mass parties, it is common for executives to control the process of team selection for the teams of party insiders. High profile candidates often delegate the task to trusted advisors who are well connected to the local and non-local political elites from which professional campaigners can be drawn.

Finally, perceptions of campaigning vary across the different types of teams. The campaigns of local notables focus strongly on the candidate, and are often interested in local issues. The campaigners value local control of campaign strategies. Cadre style
associations are clearly more at home with this local focus. It is these sorts of candidates that are most likely to go in search of a personal vote (Ferejohn and Gaines 1991) as part of a local strategy. The campaigns of party insiders in mass parties are more integrated with national party policy and strategy. Local campaigners are more likely to defer to the dictates of the national campaign, and the candidate and local issues are less important in the local strategy.

The campaigns of stopgap candidates fall into two sorts: those that focus on the candidate and local issues; and those in which the candidate is carrying the flag for the party and which are more inclined to focus on party policy rather than local issues or personalities. The second category includes both party members from the local association and appointed candidates. The strategies of campaign teams with high profile candidates focus strongly on the character and ability of the candidate. Because of the resources at their disposal, the profile of the candidate, and the media coverage they garner, they are capable of speaking to local, regional and national issues, seeing themselves as important nodes in the election process.

The strategic choices available to local campaigns can be described dichotomously: local versus non-local issues; party-centre versus riding-centred strategies; policy versus candidate; and so on. This is because local campaigns operate in two contexts, each of which has its own logic. The first is an intra-party one, which is defined by the relationship between the national, regional, and local components of the party. This relationship has obvious implications for the locus of decision making in a campaign, as well as for the other campaign team characteristics noted above.
Exploring intra-party relations before and during the campaign is the object of the next chapter. The second contest is that defined by the local riding contest and conditions. This too has implications for the nature of the campaign team, and its characteristics outlined in this chapter. The impact of local conditions on the style and content of local campaigns is taken up in chapter seven.
**TABLE 5.1**

CAMPAIGN TEAM CHARACTERISTICS

TYPES OF CANDIDATES AND TEAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL NOTABLE</th>
<th>PARTY INSIDER</th>
<th>STOPGAP</th>
<th>HIGH PROFILE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INNER CIRCLE</strong></td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Intimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES</strong></td>
<td>Ample Funds &amp; Volunteers</td>
<td>Adequate Association Funds &amp; Members</td>
<td>Lack of Both Funds &amp; Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCUS OF DECISION MAKING</strong></td>
<td>Candidate &amp; Local Campaign Organizers</td>
<td>Association Executive &amp; Non-local Strategists</td>
<td>Local Campaign by Default</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGIC FOCUS</strong></td>
<td>Candidate &amp; Local Issues</td>
<td>Party Policy &amp; National Issues</td>
<td>No Focus; National by Default</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX

THE PARTY LINE

Just as the composition of the campaign team shapes the style and content of a local campaign, so too does the environment in which it operates. There are both *intra-party* and *local contest* dimensions to this environment. The nature of intra-party relations between the local and non-local campaign organizations is taken up here, while the local contest in which campaigns find themselves is the subject of the next chapter.¹ The final form that intra-party relations take depends on the attitudes and actions of both the local and national party. Each of the four types of campaign teams discussed in the previous chapter have different attitudes towards their non-local counterparts. These attitudes are determined in part by each team’s organizational ethos, and also by its desire to accept the help offered by the national party. The desire and ability of the national party to intervene in local affairs is also important in determining the final shape of the relationship. Such interference is an environmental variable to which local campaigns must respond, and which can alter each of the four characteristics of campaign teams noted in the last chapter.

¹This chapter distinguishes between local and non-local or national campaigns. The terms "national" and "non-local" are often used interchangeably to describe a party's national campaign. The term non-local can also include instances where the provincial wing of the party plays an important role in prosecuting the national campaign; such instances will be explicitly noted. The term "federal election campaign" is used to describe the entire system of campaigns at all levels and by all parties, as well as media reporting of the election.
There has been a remarkable growth in the size and sophistication of national party campaign organizations in Canada over the last decade, paralleling similar trends in other western democracies (Carty 1988a, 9-10; Panebianco 1988). This has resulted in more coherent national campaigns, and encouraged a tendency amongst national strategists to become involved in local campaigns. The Liberals and Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the NDP, are now capable of supplying the basic tools of campaigning to local campaigns across the country. It is through the provision of assistance to local campaigns that national parties can project their interest into the local arena.

The strength and competitiveness of national parties influences their capacity to intervene in local affairs. Because Canadian parties struggle to maintain a consistent presence across the country, there are variations between provinces and ridings in the assistance they can offer local campaigns. Still, all, or nearly all, local campaigns receive some assistance from their national counterparts (see, for example Preyra 1991, 144-155). The resources that flow between the two levels may include money, strategic advice, technical and professional assistance, visits from the party leader, and even the transfer of personnel. Differences in the mix of resources flowing to a local campaign have direct implications for both its style and content.

Intervention in local affairs by national campaigns is a function of either a strategic interest in a particular campaign, or a general commitment to providing assistance to local campaigns. The first type of involvement is driven by local factors. National parties are particularly interested in close contests and high profile ridings that are believed to influence electoral outcomes in other constituencies. As well, there are
cases where a candidate is seen as particularly deserving of party support. The second type of intervention may be motivated by the desire of a national party to run credible campaigns in as many ridings as possible, even where the party is weak. It may also be driven, as in the case of the NDP, by an ideological commitment to organizational coherence that is characteristic of mass parties.

The local campaign team is the other side of this relationship. Each of the four archetypal campaign teams has a distinct type of relationship with its non-local counterpart. The nature of a campaign team influences its attitude towards national party intervention and assistance. It is also related to the interest that national strategists are likely to have in the local contest and campaign. This relationship is inextricably linked with the four characteristics of local campaign teams noted in the previous chapter.

Competitive local notable campaign teams are usually self-sufficient, and can afford to weigh the implications of accepting help from their national counterpart. Although they may be involved in a close contest, and as a result are offered help, these campaigns are usually in cadre style parties, and are inclined to view outside assistance with some suspicion. As well, the personal nature of relations amongst the team, and its focus on the candidate and local issues, do not sit easily with the imposition of national party objectives. Nevertheless, there are resources and skills that only a national party has access to, which the local campaign may be willing to utilize if offered the opportunity.

Party insider campaigns, whether competitive or otherwise, are tied into a set of
formalised relations with the national and perhaps provincial branches of their party. This is evident in the institutionalised funding arrangements the national party uses to redistribute funds to poorer campaigns. Solidarity obliges the national party to play this role. For their part, local campaigns see themselves as part of a collective effort that aims to present the same policies across the country. The candidate is not paramount to these local mass party campaigns, and neither are local issues. Such a mind-set is more welcoming of national party assistance and strategic objectives. Despite the apparent uniformity in relations across levels of the party, the non-local party can provide more help in regions where it is strong, and campaigns involved in close contests may receive added assistance. As well, competitive campaigns have greater access to workers and resources than their uncompetitive cousins.

The campaigns of stopgap candidates are usually uncompetitive and, as a result, must struggle to attract both money and workers. Yet despite their obvious need, their uncompetitiveness means that they do not attract the interest of party strategists. As such, they receive little help from the national party. Moreover, because this type of campaign team is found in cadre style parties, the national party is not committed to equalisation of resources across associations. Resource flows are minimal. Despite this, the campaigns often attempt to generate their own strategies that focus on the candidate and local issues. Because of their weakness, the attempt usually fails, and they adopt by default the national party approach to the campaign.

High profile candidates have campaign teams that are flush with resources and personnel. The candidate in these campaigns is an important alternative strategic focus.
Because it is strong, the local campaign is in a position to develop its own strategies, and to address a wide range of issues. Because of the perceived importance of these campaigns, the non-local party is willing to provide them with further resources. But it may be difficult to do so given spending limits, and the inability of the local campaign to successfully apply more resources to the contest. Non-monetary assistance, such as conducting opinion polls, is one way in which the national party can assist the local campaign. However, the latter is in a position to either accept or reject this assistance. There may be infighting if local and national organizers disagree on how best to apply resources and the correct strategies to pursue. This is the most complex of the four types of intra-party relations.

It is important to identify the resources that constitute the relationship between different levels of a party, and the impact this relationship has on the style and content of a local campaign. The availability of more resources appears to hold out the chance for a local campaign to develop and implement its own strategies. Yet these resources may come with strings attached or have embedded in them assumptions that limit the strategic freedom of a local campaign. In addition, a national party sometimes provides assistance to a local campaign as a means of attaining specific strategic objectives of its own. These may or may not be consistent with local goals. It is possible to categorize relations between the local and non-local party on the basis of whether or not resources flow from the national to local level, and whether or not the local campaign is

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2 Of course, it is always possible for the national campaign to intervene directly in the local contest rather than via the local campaign. This extra-party intervention is taken up in the next chapter.
strategically subservient to its national counterpart (see Figure 6.1). The first can be thought of as measuring the extent of the relationship, while the second is an attempt to measure its impact. These two measures underpin the rest of this chapter.

**INTRA-PARTY RELATIONS**

The resources that national parties offer local campaigns take a range of forms. The most basic is financial assistance, which may come in the form of transfers or loans. From this point, the assistance becomes more complex. All the major political parties conduct campaign schools at which candidates and campaign managers are given advice on all aspects of electioneering. Campaign and policy manuals are another source of information for local campaigners. They describe campaign organizations in detail, and outline how to complete tasks such as fund-raising, finding office space, canvassing the riding, and dealing with the media.

The size and sophistication of the packages provided to local campaigns by national parties varies. In 1988, the Liberal and Conservative parties offered local campaigns a choice between a basic package or a more extended one. The Tories’ extended package included the equipment needed for electronic mail. The NDP provided all campaigns with the same basic kit.

Another direct link between national and local branches of a party during elections is the effort of regional or national organizers to keep in touch with local campaigns. Most campaign managers, and sometimes candidates, take part in a weekly conference call with counterparts in other ridings and strategists at either a provincial or
**FIGURE 6.1**

**INTRA-PARTY RELATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCE FLOWS</th>
<th>STRATEGICALLY SUBSERVIENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PARTY INSIDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STOPGAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOCAL NOTABLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
national office in order to discuss tactics and the progress of the campaign. The party also provides access to lawyers and accountants who can advise local campaigns on electoral laws and campaign spending.

In addition to this basic level of assistance, a few campaigns in strategically important contests have a more extensive symbiotic relationship with their national counterparts. The national party provides technical and professional assistance - such as polling information, help with media relations, and trained personnel - to local campaigns. In return, the local campaign offers a conduit through which the national party can pursue its own strategic objectives. While the objectives of the two levels are often congruent - both want the local campaign to do well - there are times when local and non-local goals clash. Although they are important to the national party, these local campaigns are usually strong, so the non-local party cannot easily impose its will on them. This relationship can involve both conflict and compromise.

The relationship between each of the four archetypal campaigns and their non-local counterparts is different, and has a distinctive impact on the local campaign. The campaign team characteristics identified in the last chapter are useful guides for considering the impact of this relationship on the style and content of a local campaign. The relationship amongst members of the inner circle, the locus of decision making, the resources available to a local campaign and its strategic focus influence, and are themselves influenced by, relations between the two levels of the party.
**Local Notables, Parochial Campaigns**

Most local notable campaign teams are competitive and attached to strong associations. As such, they have access to ample local resources, and do not usually require outside assistance (Carty 1991a, 209-217). They are suspicious of national party intentions, tending to focus on the candidate and local issues. National campaign organizers in cadre style parties that nominate local notables feel no obligation to be involved in local affairs, except in cases where it suits their direct strategic interests. The local team relies little on its national counterpart and is not strategically subservient to it. Rather, the local campaign develops its own *parochial* style and content.

Local notable campaigns rarely lack for volunteer support and are usually well funded. If there is a transfer of money from head office, it is modest (see Table 6.1). The five campaign teams in this category received an average of just over a thousand dollars from their head offices. Most of this money went to the Okanagan Centre Liberal campaign, which struggled after the nomination to maintain its early momentum, and asked for assistance from its national counterpart. Despite this assistance, local Liberal organizers felt they had free rein in shaping their campaign, mainly as a result of the party’s organizational weakness in the West.

With respect to other sorts of resource flows, these teams also received relatively little from their national party. One exception to this was again in the Okanagan, where the Progressive Conservative campaign was happy to have visiting government ministers point out that the Tories would help local farmers adjust to the impact of free trade on
## TABLE 6.1

**INTRA-PARTY RESOURCE FLOWS IN PAROCHIAL CAMPAIGNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMPAIGN TEAM</th>
<th>FUNDS RECEIVED ($)</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL (%)</th>
<th>OTHER RESOURCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BK PC</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>$5 000 LOAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC PC</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>MINISTERS &amp; LEADER VISIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC LIB</td>
<td>4253</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>MANUALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN PC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LEADER VISIT; $5 000 LOAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC PC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LEADER VISIT; $5 000 LOAN; STRATEGIC ADVICE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
agriculture in the region. Moreover, as a riding that the government expected to win against the tide in BC, it was considered politic for the party hierarchy to visit when they were in western Canada.

These local campaigns value their independence from the national party. Campaigners know each other, and there is usually a core of experienced local organizers who can direct the campaign. This creates cohesiveness and promotes independence. The suspicion that local notables have of national strategists is exemplified in Surrey North Conservative Cliff Blair's attitude to the national party candidate school that was supposed to help him run his campaign.

They treat you as if you are training to be prime minister and everything you say might be reported in the media. It is all about what you are not allowed to say, sticking to the party line, never upsetting anybody, dressing the right way... I was seen as a "loose cannon", which suited me.

The independence of these campaigns does not mean they may not adopt national party resources and strategies. Rather, they are in a position to choose the degree to which they develop their own approach, or follow the non-local campaign. Decision making is local. They can assess how appropriate non-local strategies are to the local conditions.

It is the capacity to make this choice that sets them apart from other campaigns that lack the resources and personnel to control their own destiny, or wish to be integrated into the national campaign.

Parochial campaigns tend to focus on local issues and the candidate. They have an intimate organizational style amongst the inner circle that does not fit easily with the imposition of strategies from above. Al Horning's Okanagan Centre campaign is a good example of a parochial campaign. The strength of the local association in a region that
had sent many Conservative members to Ottawa meant the campaign had the money and skilled campaigners necessary to develop and implement its own strategy. Campaign organizers agreed that the campaign should emphasize Horning’s forty years of service to the local community in fields as diverse as sport and local government. This focus on the candidate and local issues suited the personal style in which politics is done in country communities such as Kelowna.

Given that Brian Mulroney was unpopular in the riding, some separation from the national party was considered to be advantageous. Although the senior party was happy to help out in one of the few ridings it looked likely to win in British Columbia, it was content to keep its involvement at the level of visits by party luminaries aimed at reinforcing the importance of the riding. This suited local organizers, and gave them room to pursue their own version of the campaign. Decision making remained local, and the national party made no major contribution to the resources of the campaign.

In something of a contrast to Horning’s campaign, fellow Conservative Cliff Blair’s campaign was less able to develop and implement its own strategies. Although a long-time party member, Blair and his supporters were seen as outside the mainstream of the party given their strong pro-life stand. The local association did not rally behind Blair, and he failed to raise as much money as other local notables. The party was wary of him, and moreover, did not think he had a chance of winning Surrey North. As with Horning, there was a clear separation of local and non-local campaigns. Blair noted that his Surrey North campaign "...hardly saw a party strategist." National strategists felt no compunction to help the local campaign.
The gap between local and non-local PC party strategists in Surrey North was evident during the leader’s tour. The local party asked that Mulroney deal with home ownership, which was an important issue in the area, and that he not speak in French or mention Quebec. These suggestions were flatly ignored. On the day in question, Mulroney failed to mention home ownership, did mention Quebec, and gave an extended press conference in French to the Quebec media contingent that was following his tour. Locals took this as an intentional snub. When campaign manager Scott Thompson criticised Mulroney within earshot of the media, his comments were reported, and he ended up on the CBC’s evening news show, The National, trying to explain his statement.

Unlike Horning, Blair would have welcomed help, as he was short of funds, yet he was unwilling to compromise on the style and content of the local campaign in order to attract assistance. Blair was a strong supporter of free trade and believed that promoting the deal would have worked in the riding. The party was unsure of this tactic, and preferred to soft-peddle free trade in BC. It appears that national party strategists came to realise how close Blair was to winning late in the campaign.

We received hardly anything from the party until the last couple of weeks of the campaign, at which point they started to believe, as we did, that we had a chance of winning. Once they realised this, they made $5 000 available to us as well as key advisors. On election day the party sent workers out to help us organize. If that help had come earlier, and we had been able to widen the debate on free trade and talk about home ownership, we would have done better.

He believes the party lost a riding it might have won because of some minor differences in opinion and its own poor judgement. The successful candidate, New Democrat Jim Karpoff, agreed that he had stolen the riding from the Tories. Despite the inability of
Blair's campaign to fully implement its own strategy, it did have access to plenty of workers with campaign experience, and was able to generate a local strategy.

Liberal Murli Pendharkar's Okanagan Centre campaign stands out as one that raised relatively few funds, and that received a substantial proportion of its money from the national party. Although the Liberal nomination attracted several candidates, and Pendharkar was a local notable, it seems that the Liberals' chances in the riding were over-estimated by local members and nomination candidates. When fund raising began in earnest, it became clear that the campaign would not be able to match the efforts of the NDP and Tory campaigns in Okanagan Centre. As a result, the Liberal campaign had to rely more heavily on national help than other local notable campaigns, and, in fact, came to resemble a stopgap campaign in some ways.

Misjudgment of a party's chances of winning a riding by candidates and even party strategists make drawing the line between some stopgap candidate campaigns and some local notable campaigns difficult. Whereas Pendharkar's campaign came to resemble that of a stopgap candidate, on the other side of this divide, Don Ross's stopgap candidacy came to resemble that of a local notable. As the ex-mayor of Surrey, Ross raised more money in Surrey North than his Tory opponent Cliff Blair. Blair, like Pendharkar, ran a local notable campaign that struggled and resembled that of a stopgap candidate. The line that separates stopgap candidates and local notables reflects the wider competitive position of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Local notables are attracted to open nominations in cadre style parties. Both Liberal and Conservative associations offer such nominations. Of the two parties, the one which looks like
forming the government will have a larger number of strong associations, and attract more local notables. Stopgap candidates are more likely to be needed in the party that does not look like winning government.

Local notables and their parochial campaigns are in general left to their own devices, which provides them with the freedom to succeed or fail on their own terms. Because of their access to workers and resources, they are capable of developing and implementing either a local strategy or elements of the national campaign. While they have this option, the structure of the campaign team and the importance of the candidate as a unifying factor incline them to adopt a local focus. This is consistent with the organizational and philosophical foundations of the cadre style parties in which most such campaigns are found.

Party Insiders, Subsidiary Campaigns

Party insider candidates have a close relationship with non-local campaign organizers. Local campaigns are integrated with and subservient to the non-local campaign, having little influence over its direction (see Dyck 1989, 207-8). Particularly in those provinces where the party is strong, the provincial wing plays a large part in shaping campaign strategies. Local associations and campaigns are involved in a relationship with their non-local counterparts that involves substantial transfers of resources. It is important to mass parties such as the NDP to include local campaigns in regional and national strategies given its ethos of solidarity. The party hierarchy expects compliance with national strategies at the local level, and in general, most NDP campaigns defer to the
### TABLE 6.2

**INTRA-PARTY RESOURCE FLOWS IN SUBSIDIARY CAMPAIGNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMPAIGN TEAM</th>
<th>FUNDS RECEIVED ($)</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL (%)</th>
<th>OTHER RESOURCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FVW NDP</td>
<td>17 639</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>MANUALS, ADVICE; COORDINATED MEDIA RELATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWR NDP</td>
<td>17 552</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>MANUALS, ADVICE; LEADER VISIT; NATIONAL PERSONNEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC NDP</td>
<td>21 657</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>MANUALS, ADVICE; LEADER VISIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN NDP</td>
<td>35 214</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>MANUALS ADVICE; PERSONNEL; COORDINATED MEDIA RELATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC NDP</td>
<td>30 279</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>MANUALS; NON-LOCAL PERSONNEL; LEADERS VISIT; COORDINATED MEDIA RELATIONS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
non-local party. As a result, party insiders run subsidiary campaigns.

The most profound indication of the integration of local and non-local campaigns in the NDP is seen in the way in which the party collects and redistributes funds (see Table 6.2). Local associations send money to the provincial party, which then sends money on to the federal party (Stanbury 1991, 156). Quotas are set for election and non-election years. Up to 40 percent of what associations raise can end up going to the party (Morley 1991, 108). But the party also helps out weaker campaigns by subsidising weaker provincial parties, who pass on the assistance at the local level. Incumbents’ campaigns are excluded from any such extra assistance (Stanbury 1991, 159).

Because of this method of collection and redistribution, the amount given to local campaigns can not be compared with that found in other parties. It does not reflect the national party’s strategic interest in the local riding as clearly as in the case of the Liberals and Conservatives, neither does it suggest clearly which campaigns are competitive and wealthy, and which need help. Because party transfers are calculated as a proportion of money raised, competitive campaigns that raise more funds send larger dollar amounts to the federal party, and receive similarly larger amounts back through their provincial party in comparison to weaker campaigns.

As well as this monetary integration, there is a great effort put into formalised strategic relations between various levels of the party. In attempting to offer a single vision of the campaign across the country, the national party provides manuals, advice, and even personnel to local campaigns. It also makes an effort to coordinate media
relations across the different levels of the party. Where the party is weak, this is difficult. For example, campaigns in the Atlantic provinces are only nominally integrated into the national strategy.

NDP candidates generally have a positive view of the party's efforts to help out local campaigns, and emphasize the importance of consistency across ridings in the policies presented by the party. This involves allowing important strategic decisions to be made non-locally. But this approach is not accepted without reservation. Lynn Fairall, NDP candidate in Fraser Valley West, saw both the good and bad side of the candidate school run by the party.

The campaign school was very good. It taught us some useful skills, and brought us into contact with experienced campaigners, strategists, and other candidates... the sense of comradeship helped motivate me. But the degree to which they wanted us to stick to the party line was much greater than I had expected. I think it is important for a local candidate to be able to bring their own interests to the campaign.

Despite being concerned about the national campaign's emphasis on Ed Broadbent, and its failure to address tax issues (such as the goods and services tax proposed by the Conservative government), Fairall deferred to the party's judgement, and followed the national script. The dominance of the centre reinforces the primacy of policy over local candidates and issues as the focus of local campaigns. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Lyle Kristiansen ran hard on opposition to free trade, and accepted direct strategic help from the national party. In fact one of the key workers in the local campaign team was a local man who had worked in Ed Broadbent's office but who returned to the riding for the duration of the election.

Attempts by the party to assist local candidates can remove the strategic focus
further away from local issues and the candidate. The local campaign must expend time
and effort fitting into a strategy that may take the candidate out of the riding, and which
may or may not suit their local strategy. NDP candidate Lynn Fairall in Fraser Valley
West was included in a number of joint public events with other NDP candidates. As a
publicity stunt, the party produced a suggested federal NDP cabinet made up entirely of
women, and had a press conference of women candidates from BC. As well, Fairall
took part in group canvassing with other NDP candidates, as well as press conferences
attended by all NDP candidates in the Vancouver lower mainland. These group efforts
occurred mainly in downtown ridings because they offer better access to the provincial
and national media. They were invariably dominated by a few high profile candidates,
such as Johanna den Hertog, and by national issues. This emphasis on the collective
nature of campaigning helps make local campaigns subservient to their national
counterpart. Such events are uncommon, if they occur at all, in cadre style parties.

The NDP’s integrated organizational structure helps it to impose a single vision
of the election on local campaigns across the country. The continuous existence of
some NDP associations provides opportunities for volunteers to be schooled in the ways
of the party. This is manifest in the more formal, less personal inter-personal relations
that characterize the inner circles of these teams. In Surrey North, municipal,
provincial, and federal NDP campaigns relied on many of the same volunteers and even
shared office space. This pattern of integration has long been a feature of NDP
campaign organizations (see Peterson and Avakumovic 1964, 93-94). Federal candidate
Jim Karpoff ran his campaign from the offices of the local New Democrat MLA Joan
Smallwood. As a result, the local federal association was continuous in the sense that its members worked on campaigns at different levels year in and year out. As the example of the NDP demonstrates, not only are mass parties more likely to want to impose conformity than are cadre style parties, there are more mechanisms for doing so.

Even in the NDP, there is some local cynicism about the value of the resources such as literature provided by the party. The sheer quantity of information can overwhelm the local campaign, and it is not always relevant to local circumstances.

Gerald Rotering, an NDP organizer in Kootenay West-Revelstoke noted that:

Central party literature predominates. Fact sheets sent out from head office during the campaign, issues sheets from the national party, faxes from head office, and literature from provincial headquarters inundate the campaign. [Yet]... 99% of the material provided by the central office is junk ...[and] of only marginal value to the local campaign. But we feel obliged to use it. For example, we photocopy issues sheets and hand them out, and make some use of pamphlets if people are interested in a particular issue. We also create press releases to announce party policy, but these are largely ignored by the local media. By part way through the campaign, many of the releases from head office are ignored by local organizers.

Integration of local and non-local campaign strategies with the former accepting the definitions offered by the latter is characteristic of mass party campaigns. This integration is driven both by a belief in the need for a consistent campaign strategy across the country. This belief itself is embedded in a view of politics that privileges class and economics over culture and region. Class based views of politics treat geography as a second order variable, and necessarily cut across those that emphasize the importance of localism. The desire for consistency means that weak local campaigns benefit from the redistribution of resources in their favour, while stronger ones pay a price for their strength. As a result, there is less variation in NDP
campaigns across different ridings both in terms of strength and strategic focus. They tend to adopt nationally developed strategies and tactics. This is not to say there is no variation. Well financed and staffed campaigns such as that of NDP candidate John Brewin in Victoria do have greater flexibility and autonomy. Brewin claimed that his campaign was idiosyncratic, taking account of local conditions in Victoria.

Stopgap Candidates, Parallel Campaigns

Although the campaigns of stopgap candidates are weak and in need of campaign assistance, national organizers offer them little help (see Table 6.4). The cadre style parties in which these campaigns are found have little commitment to helping weaker local campaigns. Resources spent on uncompetitive campaigns are seen as wasted. What help the parties do provide is both minimal and generic. As a result, the resources are not suited to local conditions and are therefore unlikely to help these needy campaigns to reverse their poor fortunes. Unable to control their own fortunes, stopgap candidates run parallel campaigns that mimic the national campaign, but have no important interaction with it. There is no real flow of resources, yet the local campaign is strategically subservient to its national counterparts.

The national party may provide a parallel campaign with funds, but only to avoid the embarrassment of a pathetic local campaign. The local association usually struggles to mount even a basic campaign or find a candidate. The national party is particularly obliged to help campaigns of candidates it has appointed, such as Liberal Sam Stevens in Burnaby-Kingsway. In fact, providing the candidate in these instances can be seen as
TABLE 6.3

INTRA-PARTY RESOURCE FLOWS IN PARALLEL CAMPAIGNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMPAIGN TEAM</th>
<th>FUNDS RECEIVED ($)</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL (%)</th>
<th>OTHER RESOURCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BK LIB</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>CANDIDATE; MANUALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVW LIB</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>MANUALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWR LIB</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>MANUALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN LIB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>MANUALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC LIB</td>
<td>23,945</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>MANUALS; ADVICE; LEADER VISIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC LIB</td>
<td>3,574</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>MANUALS; LEADER VISIT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a type of resource flow. Local campaigns in these circumstances must accept whatever assistance they are offered, even if it is not fully suited to local conditions. As a result, the average transfer to parallel campaigns is greater than for their parochial cousins.

Liberals Tony Wattie in Fraser Valley West and Don Ross in Surrey North each raised sufficient money to mount a credible campaign. Their success in raising funds meant the party was not obliged to offer them financial assistance. Other help was restricted to generic campaign manuals and literature. Even campaign advice was limited, in part because of the Liberals' organizational weakness in British Columbia.

Don Ross complained that he could not get any help in writing advertisements or press releases, although he requested assistance. Such treatment soured Ross' attitude towards the national party.

Although weak, parallel campaigns in cadre style parties share with parochial campaigns the desire to be somewhat independent of the national campaign, and to focus on local issues. The small, intimate nature of these campaign teams also encourages them to think of the candidate and local issues as potential strategic foci. The fact that the party provides little help can heighten this sense of independence. Don Ross in Surrey North noted with respect to his own campaign:

Our literature was locally produced... but we used those parts of the national platform where it agreed with our position. Because we had raised our own funds, we had a lot of independence from the national party. The party is weak in the West, and we had a good deal of latitude in the way we ran the campaign.

Unfortunately, this intimate, independent, organizational style is also a result of a lack of workers and resources. Although decision making is local, which encourages a local strategic focus, parallel campaigns are unable to fully develop and implement a local
Despite his strong disagreement with Turner's position on free trade, Liberal candidate Garry Jenkins in Kootenay West-Revelstoke was unable to develop an alternative focus for his own campaign. This had profound implications for his electoral chances. Not only did Jenkins find it difficult to attack free trade during public debates, thus weakening his performance, but the NDP had sewn up all the opposition to free trade in the riding, and the Conservatives all of the support. He needed the campaign to hinge on at least one alternative issue if he was to steal votes from either. But his campaign was underfunded, understaffed, and unable to generate interest in other issues. This is typical of parallel campaigns. Although they may attempt to have a local focus, parallel campaigns are forced to adopt national party approaches to campaigning.

Even Tex Enemark, who received nearly $24 000 (more than ten times the average transfer to campaigns in BC), or about 44 percent of his funding from the national party, failed to generate a successful local strategy. Enemark had served under Vancouver Centre MP and cabinet minister Ron Basford, and was able to call on favours from friends in the party hierarchy. But the main impetus for the funding was the strategic interests of the national party. The contest in Vancouver Centre was seen by national organizers as strategically important. The party wished to make use of the media attention focused on the race to help it appear competitive in British Columbia and western Canada.

Despite running by far the most expensive media campaign, Enemark could not generate credibility. His campaign team was too small and inexperienced to match the
NDP or Tory campaigns on the hustings, nor was it sure how to make proper use of the funding it had access to. It failed to generate a distinctive image for itself. Enemark was annoyed at the lack of sway he had over Liberal tactics in BC, and the fact that circumstances forced him to adopt national party strategies. In particular, like other Liberal campaigns in the west, the Vancouver Centre Liberal campaign could not make sense of the anti-free trade national strategy in a region where the NDP dominated opposition to free trade. In addition, he and many other members of his campaign team were opposed to Turner's position on free trade, and were not comfortable addressing the issue.

As with parochial campaigns, strategists in parallel campaigns often wish to go their own way, but are incapable of doing so due to a lack of resources, and most importantly, insufficient volunteers. Against their will, the locus of strategic decision making is non-local, resulting in a national focus. Campaigns end up adopting the form and content of their national counterparts, handing out national literature and following national party strategies even when these are irrelevant or even damaging in the local context.

**High Profile Candidates, Component Campaigns**

High profile candidates have ample resources and an experienced campaign team capable of running a strong local campaign regardless of whether or not they receive any assistance from their national counterpart (see Table 6.5). But because of the strategic importance of the campaign - the high profile nature of the riding, or the fact
# Table 6.4

## Intra-Party Resource Flows in Component Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Team</th>
<th>Funds Received ($)</th>
<th>Contribution to Total (%)</th>
<th>Other Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BK NDP</td>
<td>58 178</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>Personnel; Strategic Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVW PC</td>
<td>3 029</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Organisational and Strategic Node.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWR PC</td>
<td>5 161</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Leader Visit; $5 000 Loan; Advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC PC</td>
<td>19 540</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Leader Visits; Strategic Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC NDP</td>
<td>50 737</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>Leader Visits; Personnel; Strategic Interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that the candidate is an MP - the national party has a direct interest in local affairs. The fortunes of the MP’s in this group are inextricably linked with those of the national campaign, while high profile candidates offer the party a chance to further its own strategic interests. These local campaigns are components of the national campaign. Although there is a substantial flow of resources to the local campaign, the local campaign is not strategically subservient to its national counterpart. Because of the strength and strategic significance of the local campaign, the relationship is symbiotic; the final mix of strategies employed in the local campaign depends on negotiations between the two levels of the party.

Comparing intra-party transfers within the NDP with those in other parties is obviously difficult given the party’s funding arrangements, but the campaigns of both Svend Robinson and Johanna den Hertog received much more than other New Democrat campaigns, both in proportion to their total funds, and in absolute terms. In both cases, but for different reasons, these campaigns were of particular interest to national party strategists. Den Hertog received assistance because of the importance of her campaign in Vancouver Centre to national party strategies. Centre Tory candidate Kim Campbell also received assistance from the national party; more than ten times the average amount of funds provided to all BC campaigns.

CBC news reporter Wayne Williams noted that the propinquity of Vancouver Centre to the broadcasters’ BC headquarters (as well as those of other media organizations) and the quality of the candidates in the riding made them a natural choice when he went looking for commentators on election issues and events. Such news
coverage provides parties with a conduit for their message, and attracts party strategists. In addition, provincial head offices, with their strategists and resources, are likely to be located near the major centres in which high profile campaigns disproportionately occur. This means they have access to the latest information from the party.

More important than financial assistance was the non-monetary help provided to the Vancouver Centre NDP and Tory campaigns. Party strategists were deeply involved in Campbell’s campaign. They brought both experience and connections with the rest of the party to the local campaign. In addition, the national party provided special polling information and technical advice, and the Prime Minister visited several times. These campaign teams were professionally run.

As president of the national party New Democrats, Johanna den Hertog was well connected to the strategic centre of the party, and her campaign was staffed with experienced NDP campaigners. Bill Bell, a community college instructor in communications and experienced NDP campaign organizer, ran den Hertog’s media relations. Lynda Young, an accountant, and Michael McEvoy, a lawyer, helped out with the professional demands of the local campaign. Her campaign manager, Ron Stipp, had managed a number of municipal, provincial, and federal campaigns for the NDP. As well, her husband, Ron Johnson, was a provincial NDP strategist.

National organizers have a number of reasons for providing help to these campaigns. A professionally run component campaign has a better chance of winning, and gives a good impression of the competence of the party as a whole. It is also likely to attract more media coverage, thus widening the possibilities for national strategists
wishing to get their message to voters via the local campaign. National party assistance helps the local campaign to meet the extra demands placed on it by the party. National organizers expect the candidate to act as a national spokesperson, and the campaign to carry a disproportionate organizational burden, including such tasks as coordinating extensive media relations, sometimes for other candidates. To do this, the candidate and campaigners must make an effort to understand party policy and be able to communicate effectively with voters.

The candidate is a primary strategic focus for both national strategists and the local campaign. Campbell was central to her campaign in Centre. News stories of the contest focused on her efforts at all-candidates’ debates, and were seen across Canada, as major television, radio and newspaper organizations had news teams in attendance.

Johanna den Hertog played a similar role for the NDP. A number of events designed to highlight issues of concern to women were constructed around her appeal to the media. Women from elsewhere in the province were brought together for press conferences in Centre. These conferences were orchestrated by den Hertog’s campaign, and she was clearly the central figure. The party arranged events with her and Broadbent when he was in British Columbia. National strategists thought she was good for the party’s image throughout Canada, and den Hertog was happy to oblige them, as she felt Broadbent’s presence in Centre helped her campaign.

Although the candidate is a central focus of the local campaign, the actual strategies that are employed and the locus of decision-making are the result of negotiations between local and non-local strategists. Aside from any help component
campaigns receive from their national branches, they have more money than they can spend, and are staffed by experienced campaigners attracted directly to the campaign and the candidate. As such, they can generate and implement their own strategies. There is always the possibility of conflict between the two levels, both in how the candidates' time is used (Land 1965, 87), and what strategies are adopted. The outcome depends on the abilities and determination of strategists at both levels. Sometimes local campaigns are crowded out of their own local contest by the intervention of non-local strategies. On other occasions the national party seems subordinate to the local campaign (Sayers 1991, 44). Thus, although the assistance offered to the campaign is shaped by national objectives, its final form is determined by the balance of forces between the local and non-local parties.

Tory campaign manager in Vancouver Centre, Lyall Knott, noted that national strategists only belatedly accepted the wisdom of the local decision to have Campbell campaign on free trade. They initially argued that any such strategy must fail in BC, as polls showed voters to be disenchanted with both Mulroney and free trade, which was seen very much as his policy. As it happened, local strategists were right. A forceful, progressive woman was a counter to the party's general image, and just the sort of candidate who might win a socially heterogeneous riding such as Vancouver. Being determinedly pro-free trade proved her independence of mind and commitment to principle. Such a decision could only have been made and successfully implemented in a component campaign. It had the freedom, capability, and type of candidate needed to pursue such an independent line.
The New Democrat campaign manager in Vancouver Centre, Ron Stipp, was upset with the degree to which the local campaign was forced to focus on national matters at the expense of local issues. He blamed this in part on den Hertog's association with the party hierarchy in her role as national party president. The party's reliance on leader Ed Broadbent as a central strategic focus exacerbated the problem, because he visited Centre several times and always appeared publicly with den Hertog. As his fortunes went down, so did those of the local campaign.

The campaign of an incumbent is a type of component campaign. In these cases, the linkages between the local and non-local party are a function of the MP's time in Ottawa, and public perceptions that hold incumbents responsible for party policy. This is particularly true for members from the governing party. Such campaigns can occur anywhere in a province, as opposed to the component campaigns run in high profile, usually urban, ridings.

Svend Robinson ran a campaign where if anything, he dictated strategy to the national party (and even to Broadbent personally) in a range of areas, notably gay and lesbian concerns, as well as peace and environmental issues. This makes the point that a well placed incumbent with his or her own resources has more freedom to move than other candidates, even in a mass party such as the NDP.

Progressive Conservative incumbent Bob Brisco in Kootenay West-Revelstoke faced an uphill battle to win his riding. Local strategists believed that free trade and Brian Mulroney's leadership were two issues that would hurt their campaign. In an attempt to avoid these issues, the inner circle decided to focus on the benefits his
incumbency had brought to each town in this rural riding. Campaign literature and advertising varied from town to town, and Brisco emphasized his role (not the government's) in bringing money into each, and what he would do for each town in the future. This independence was only possible because of the resources available to Brisco. He got, and wanted, little direct help from the party, other than strategic advice that he asked for.

75% of national literature was party oriented. This required that we use it selectively. We created our own literature, put local issues first, modified these to suit each of the towns in the riding, noted my own record on local issues and things I had done for the riding.

Despite this, the links between Brisco as an incumbent and the national party were strong, and overpowered this local strategy. Voters continued to see his campaign as a component of the national Tory campaign, and to connect it with the very issues and personalities that were so damaging.

The Tory incumbent in Fraser Valley West, Bob Wenman, received little help from the party, but was in one of the safest Progressive Conservative ridings in the country. His campaign acted as an organizational node for the Tories in British Columbia, filling the role of the nearly defunct provincial Conservative party. The campaigns of other experienced Tory MP's such as Chuck Cook in North Vancouver and Tom Siddon in South Vancouver played a similar role. These candidates and their teams advised other campaigns, and acted as conduits for information to flow from the

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3In spite of his campaign's strategy, Brisco was a strong supporter of both Brian Mulroney's Prime Ministership and free trade, and found himself in the difficult position of trying to avoid any discussion of either of these matters.
national party to the local level and back.

The relationship between a component campaign and its national counterpart is symbiotic. That is, the national party provides resources to the local campaign, and the local campaign acts as a standard bearer for the party, and is useful in reaching its wider strategic objectives. The candidate may act as a spokesperson for the party, even on national issues, and the campaign can be an important regional organizational node. As well, the party may hope to use the media coverage it receives to influence other contests in the region. Unfortunately, the resources provided - such as direct strategic linkages - do not always help the local campaign. Bob Brisco in Kootenay West was an example of this. While the local campaigns may be strong enough to implement their own strategies, there is no guarantee that these will win out over national plans. It does, however, make for interesting intra-party dynamics.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between a national party and its local counterpart influences the style and content of a local campaign. It does this in two ways. In the first instance, it shapes the nature of the campaign team, the relationship between its members, its composition and resources, the locus of decision making, and its strategic focus. But in addition, it is also an environmental factor to which this team must respond.

For most local campaigns, this relationship is dominated by pro forma interactions that include the transfer of funds from one level of a party to another, and the provision of campaign manuals and strategic advice to local campaigns by the
national party. A handful of campaigns have a more complex relationship to their national counterpart.

The parochial campaigns of local notables tend to have limited linkages to their national party. They are well financed and staffed, have little need for help from their non-local counterparts, and can resist the party's attempts to impose strategies on them. The relationship therefore has a limited impact on both the characteristics of the campaign team and its strategies. The links that do develop between the local and non-local party are determined by local organizers. Their strategic focus tends to remain centred on the candidate and local issues. Decisions are made locally, and the campaign team retains a distinctive style that is influenced by the personality of the candidate, and relations between members of the team.

Party insider campaigns have formalised linkages with their party headquarters, and tend to run subsidiary campaigns. Funding, staffing and other aspects of the local campaign have a national element, and thus the very character of the campaign team is shaped by its relationship to its non-local counterpart. Candidates and local strategists accept the dictates of the national campaign and allow these to shape the style and content of their campaign. The same mass party ethos that drives the national party to be involved in local affairs encourages local organizers to accept the imposition of national imperatives. The formalised structures of such parties provide the conduits for the transmission of these imperatives. There is a much greater reliance among NDP campaigns on paid organizers from outside the riding (Carty 1991a, table 7.8).

Like parochial campaigns, it is the absence of a relationship that is noticeable in
parallel campaigns, but in this case, it is due to a lack of interest on the part of the non-local party. The campaigns of stopgap candidates have unidirectional linkages with their national counterpart. Limited resources flow down to the local level from the provincial or national party. This means the national party may have a say in the character of the team and its strategic decision making. Parallel campaigns tend to mimic the national party campaign. Even if the non-local party does not directly dictate local strategies, the dynamics of the federal election campaign writ large tend to overwhelm the local campaign because it lacks the resources to offer an alternative strategic vision of its own.

A handful of local campaigns - those with high profile candidates - have a symbiotic relationship with their national counterpart. Local and national strategies often compete for space in these component campaigns. On one hand, they may carry the national campaign in their riding or region, with the candidate acting as a party spokesperson, and party affairs coordinated through the local office. On the other, their local objective - winning the riding - must also be accommodated in this structure.

The strategic focus and the locus of decision making reflect negotiation between the two levels of the party. Because of the non-local party's interest in local affairs, it is willing to provide extensive financial and technical assistance, and personnel, to component campaigns. As a result, the relationship has direct consequences for the character of the campaign team, by giving it access to more resources. This adds to the complexity of the relationship by on the one hand increasing the capacity of the local campaign to maintain its independence, and on the other, tying it into a web of
obligations to its national counterpart.

The degree of integration between a component campaign and its national counterpart is usually but not necessarily high. Because they are the sorts of local campaigns that have access to substantial resources of their own, these local campaigns may attempt to develop and implement local campaign strategies. In the end, as with other campaigns, their success in doing so will in part depend on the national parties willingness and ability to intervene in local affairs. Given the strength of component campaigns, and the bargaining position they hold because of their importance to the national party, they are in a unique position vis-a-vis the national party. Depending on the outcome of negotiations between local and national strategists with respect to shaping local strategies, the relationship between the local and non-local party may either increase the organizational effectiveness of a local campaign, or hinder its efforts by imposing on it national party objectives which may not be suited to local conditions.

One of the critical determinants of a campaign's decision to adopt its own strategic direction is its reading of conditions in the riding. This is taken up in the next chapter, where we consider the impact of local riding factors on the style and content of local campaigns.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE LOCAL CONTEST

The local riding contest is the third in the triumvirate of forces that shape local campaigns. The character of this contest reflects the nature of the local political community constituted by the riding, how the media reports the contest, and how many campaigns have real chance of winning; that is, how contested the race is. Together, these factors work to influence the style and content of a local campaign. In the first place, they directly shape the character of the local campaign team via the nomination process. But these factors also shape the environment in which local campaign teams operate, and in so doing, influence the way in which campaigns communicate with voters, the issues they raise, and the role of the candidate.

For the period of the election, ridings constitute a political community that has a social and geographic form as well as a set of interests. In some cases, this community appears to be disparate in form and artificial in the manner in which it collects together interests. Kootenay West-Revelstoke includes towns that have relatively little in common spread over a wide area. In other cases, such as Okanagan Centre, a riding encompasses an area, in this case the City of Kelowna, which appears to have a clear-cut form and a set of coherent interests.

The physical form of a riding, as well as its social construction, shape both the political interests of the local community to which campaigns must respond, and have a
direct impact on the manner in which campaigns communicate with voters. So to does
the type of media available to a campaign. Campaigns in country ridings must
overcome distance in communicating with voters, while city campaigns may have to
communicate in several languages in order to reach all eligible voters. Apartment
dwellers in more densely populated city ridings are not as easy to reach as voters in
suburban houses, or those living in country towns.

Socially diverse ridings make different demands on local campaigns than those
where the population is more homogeneous. The former are likely to have broader local
agendas than homogeneous ridings, and the issues raised are different. This agenda is
shaped by both the social construction of the riding and the nature of the local economy.
The income and education levels of voters, their transience and employment all
contribute to the development of idiosyncratic agendas. Communities in country ridings
have different interests than those that encompass industrial towns. There are also likely
to be consistent differences in local traditions that suggest how candidates and
campaigns are expected to behave and that shape the style and content of local
campaigns.

Editorials and reporting in the media play a crucial role in shaping political
agendas, and in so doing, have a profound impact on the elections (MacDermid 1991,
89). The type of media that covers a local contest, and the type of access that local
campaigns have to that media - whether they can get their press releases accepted and
so on - affect campaigners' strategic decisions, the means by which they communicate
with voters, and the nature of the political agenda to which they must respond. Because
of the chance to communicate with voters and shape the local political agenda, local
campaigns compete for whatever media attention is available. Moreover, media
coverage is seen to give a campaign credibility.

The amount of media news coverage available to a campaign depends on what
organizations are willing and able to cover the local contest. This is affected by the
location of the riding, the competitiveness of the contest, and the presence of any high
profile candidates (Fletcher 1987, 356). While competitiveness is spread across ridings
relatively randomly, city, suburban and country ridings tend to have access to different
amounts and qualities of media. Both city and country ridings do better in this regard
than their suburban cousins. Furthermore, city ridings have disproportionate numbers of
high profile candidates, and hence better access in general to news coverage.

If there is no media that consistently reports a local contest, there is unlikely to
be a coherent local political agenda. If the media that is distributed in the riding has a
non-local focus, the local community - including the campaigns - must respond to an
agenda that is disconnected from local concerns, and over which local campaigns have
little control. Because it may be impossible to gain access to non-local media, this often
shifts the focus of campaign strategies away from media relations to other, more direct
means of communication.

As well as news reporting, the media is a vehicle for campaign advertising. The
amount of advertising a campaign can afford, and the credibility of local media outlets
are critical to the tactical and strategic decisions of local campaigners. How well the
distribution area of the available media fits the riding is also an important consideration
for campaigners who are trying to find the most cost effective way of reaching voters. Finally, the media, both local and non-local, keeps campaigns informed of each other's actions and apparent competitiveness, and reports the wider federal election to local voters and campaigners. It is also a means by which the advertising campaigns of national parties can intrude into the riding contest, and even shape the local agenda.

As well as influencing the sort of media coverage received by a local contest, the number of campaigns that are competitive in a particular riding has a direct impact on how local campaigns engage with each other. The competitive position of the parties in previous elections often acts as a rule of thumb as to their present competitiveness, but this can change over the course of the campaign. Contests in which only one candidate has a chance of success are usually less intense than those where one or more may win. Campaigns are likely to try hard to engage with each other in close contests as each tries to gain some advantage. In cases where there is a clear front-running candidate, he or she may be able to choose to avoid such engagements.

The nature of the local political community, media coverage and the competitiveness of the local campaigns all shape riding contests. Along with the composition of the campaign team, and the relationship between the team and its non-local counterpart, this riding style is critical to the final shape of any local campaign. Three factors in particular provide a clue to the impact riding conditions have on local campaigns: special arrangements needed to communicate with voters, the types of issues that are raised by campaigns, and the way in which the candidate is presented to voters.
POLITICAL COMMUNITY

All campaigns must fulfill a range of tasks aimed at communicating with voters. These tasks include: producing and distributing literature, campaign signs, and advertising; canvassing the riding by foot and phone; holding media interviews; attending at all-candidates’ meetings; mainstreeting; and getting out the vote. In communicating with voters, campaigns identify and respond to the interests of the local political community, while at the same time trying to manipulate them for their own strategic ends.

Blake (1976; 1978, 282) and Munro (1975) have found evidence that politicians are aware of, and respond to, the nature of local political communities. Although it may not always be as clear an understanding as that held by an incumbent politician, most campaigns have some notional construction of the local political arena that informs their strategies. This community is a function of the geography, social character (Blake 1978, 280), and economy of the riding. In addition, campaigners attitudes are influenced by the competitive position of each of the local campaigns. The media that reports local politics is also important to the development of a riding agenda, and the ways in which campaigns communicate with voters. The character of a community, and the availability of distinctive local media, have implications for whether or not the local agenda is dominated by national issues, and whether or not these issues become localised.

Although the content and coherence of local agendas varies in response to the nature of the political community, there are patterns in the types of agendas found in the political communities defined by riding boundaries. Hence, there are also patterns in the impact riding communities have on the style and content of local campaigns. With
respect to some factors that shape local campaigns, a useful distinction can be made between country, suburban and city ridings. For example, methods for communicating campaign messages in large, country ridings, are different from those needed in small, densely populated, city ones. Suburban ridings are somewhere between the two. On the other hand, there are cases where country and city ridings are more similar than their suburban counterparts. With respect to the media for example, both city and country campaigns have access to relatively influential media, yet suburban ridings do not.

Geography remains at the core of any definition of community. Not surprisingly then, geographically defined single member constituencies in Canada define distinctive communities. Distinctions between urban-rural-suburban ridings, or the city-country divide, are shorthand for complex differences the characteristics of populations captured by these labels, as well as the physical environment in which they live.¹

Underpinning the country - city divide, and of crucial importance to the argument in this chapter, has been discussions over whether the growth of cities is associated with a societal shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. That is, from a society based on communal attachments (idealized as those found in country areas) to one derived from associational relationships (in large cities). The assumptions built into this model are complex, and beyond the scope of this work. What is relevant is the body of evidence to support the claim, accepted here, that there is some greater reliance on associational relations in urban areas than in rural ones, where communal ties are

¹The significance of the urban - rural divide has been noted in a number of studies of local riding contests in Canada (Meisel 1964; Regenstreil 1964, 237).
more important (Janowitz and Kasarda 1974).

The reasons for this difference across communities are a matter of controversy. Janowitz and Kasarda reject explanations based on population size and density. Rather, their evidence favours an explanation based on population transience\(^2\). The transience of voting populations is one of the factors that can be shown to be vary significantly across city and country ridings in Canada, in line with the predictions of this model. City voters in this study are more transient than either their country cousins, with suburban voters somewhere in-between (Canada, Statistics Canada 1987).

Similarly, Fischer (1982, 251-3) has noted that better educated people rely more on social networks outside the family, and they have wider webs of social relations. Moreover, they tend to be more sophisticated in the way in which they form opinions. Once again, differences in the underlying characteristic, education, coincide with the city - country divide. City voters in this study are generally better educated that their country counterparts, while suburban voters areas are again in-between (Canada, Statistics Canada 1987)

Janowitz and Kasarda note that a systemic approach - one that takes account of personal characteristics rather than population densities and sizes - suggests the importance of a process of "socialization" (ibid 231) in the formation of opinions and social networks. This is congruent with the argument made here that the nature of the

\(^{2}\) In favouring transience over population growth and density as an explanatory factor, Janowitz and Kasarda are suggesting that "the systemic model of community organization based on length of residence is a more appropriate model than the linear development model (based on population size and density) for the study of community participation in mass society (1974, 230)."
riding community is likely to be affected by such factors as what media reports local affairs, the profile of a riding, and its social heterogeneity. Differences in the character of ridings with respect to these factors help shape the style and content of local campaigns (Blake 1978, 282).

**Country Ridings**

Country ridings include those that encompass large rural areas as well as those that encompass large country cities and towns. Although there are differences among ridings in this group, they all share a sense that they are on the periphery, separated by distance and interests from large urban centres. They are also often socially homogeneous. Together, these factors create a sense that local political interests are better defined in these ridings than in closely packed, socially heterogeneous city ones. As well, they are often geographically large and include a number of towns, and this can place special demands on local campaigns.

The geography of large country ridings can require that a campaign have several offices in order to take account of the distances involved in campaigning in these ridings and the distinct interests of the different towns in the riding. The Tory incumbent in Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Bob Brisco, decided he could not win by focusing on free trade, the issue that dominated the federal campaign. Instead, strategists decided to address local concerns. Kootenay West stretches over five hundred kilometres from

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3In part, this wider socialization model is attractive because it avoids what Janowitz and Kasarda see as the tautological nature of linear population based models (1974, 210). Blake (1978, footnote 6) provides examples of studies that have explored systemic affects.
south to north and encompasses half a dozen towns. Nestled in valleys between rugged mountain ranges, these towns have developed distinct sets of interests. To fulfill its goal of adopting a local strategy, the campaign had to identify the interests of each town, and adjust its campaign to suit each of these.

The decision to focus on issues in each town in such a riding had implications for the style and content of the Tory campaign. The strategy required special print runs and delivery mechanisms, and meant specifically designed press conferences and public announcements from one place to the next. Fortunately for campaigns in the Kootenays, this strategy was made possible by the availability of affordable media in each town. Each town has its own newspapers, and a single radio network covers most of the riding and has rates that local campaigns can afford. Organizing campaign literature, Brisco’s schedule, news releases, and advertising was a major strain on the campaign. Tory strategies in Kootenay West also placed a great deal of strain on Brisco himself, who was recovering from a heart attack. He found travelling the length of the riding in fall weather very taxing.

In order to cater to varying local conditions and distances, the Tories had campaign offices in three towns. The successful NDP campaign had offices in four towns. The weak Liberal campaign had only one office. Although country rents are modest, staffing these offices was difficult, and involved duplication of effort. The number of well staffed offices a campaign could open came to be seen as a good measure of its strength. As well, there is fierce competition between campaigns to get their signs up in the best positions on major highways. This and the use of multiple
campaigns offices were common in campaigns in Fraser Valley West and Okanagan Centre.

Country ridings are in general socially homogeneous. They have relatively low rates of population turnover, and are generally ethnically and even economically more homogeneous than city ridings. Disparities in incomes levels are less in country as opposed to city ridings. A great majority of country voters own their own homes, while many city voters are renters. While average education levels are lower than in city ridings, more of the population have a basic education. Country communities often have a clear sense of their political interests. The lack of social diversity in country ridings reduces the relative importance of cultural and social issues in political debate. In combination with a shared sense of community, this encourages a focus on issues related to local economic development. Local campaigns can aim to engage these interests.

In any riding, there is a good chance that specific local issues that have been important before, or which remain unresolved, will appear again during the election. This is particularly true of country ridings, where communities and economies are somewhat self-contained. Local economic development is likely to be high on country agendas, in part because many rural areas have been in economic decline over recent times. Candidates and campaigns need to address development, and often act as local boosters. They are called upon to indicate how their party’s platform - and their own

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4The impact on riding politics of economic divisions between prosperous cities and declining country areas has long been noted in Canada (see for example Lemieux, 1964, 50-51).
incumbency if they win - will ensure local prosperity. Of those interviewed, only
candidates in the Kootenays and Okanagan pointed to distinct local development issues
as being on the top of their agenda. Boating and re-negotiating the Columbia River
Treaty were important in the former, and recreational uses and bridgework over
Okanagan Lake in the latter.

About half the polls in the riding of Okanagan Centre are in the neighbouring
cities of Kelowna and Winfield. The other half are considered rural, but are clustered
close to these cities because population densities reflect the intensive agriculture in the
region. In contrast to Kootenay West-Revelstoke, there is a geographic centre to the
riding, and campaigns covered a smaller area. The local political agenda is somewhat
split between the interests of the intensive farming sector in the region, and the issues
confronting Kelowna, which has expanded rapidly in recent years. This growth has also
brought with increased social diversity. Given that, the city’s economy is still
underpinned by the agricultural sector. With a sense of community, and capable media
coverage, there is a distinct local agenda in this riding. Land and water use policies,
protecting intensive agriculture, and controlling growth were all seen as critical to the
local community.

On occasion, campaigners may try to bring the national issues and policy debates
into focus by emphasizing how they impact on the riding. In country ridings, these
debates always have a strong local referent. Because fruit growing in the Okanagan was
likely to be affected by free trade, this wider national issue was localised in the riding in
1988. The NDP and Liberals argued that local intensive agriculture would suffer under
free trade. While in the Kootenays, a similar argument was made concerning the local Cominco smelter. Unionists in Kootenay West-Revelstoke encouraged the NDP to be strident in its opposition to the trade deal. The economies of both these ridings allowed the national free trade debate to be localised. Because of their clear opposition to free trade, this suited New Democrat campaigns. Liberal campaigns were in a more ambiguous position because many Grit candidates supported the idea of free trade despite the party’s opposition to the Mulroney free trade deal.

Like most Tory campaigns in BC, the Kootenay and Okanagan Conservative campaigns saw free trade as a potentially damaging issue. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Tory campaigners tried to concentrate on local issues that were unaffected by the deal. In the Okanagan - a much safer Tory riding - the local campaign tried to sell the deal by emphasizing the help offered to the agricultural sector by the Tory government. The NDP in these ridings considered the issue to be to its advantage, and pushed it at every opportunity, linking it to local development. The Liberal campaigns in these ridings did not want to address the issue because many Liberal candidates supported the principle of free trade.

Given that country voters tend to be less mobile than their city or suburban cousins, informal information networks are often strongly developed in country ridings. These networks transmit campaign messages, and local campaigns try to take advantage of this. As well, and just as importantly, they transmit the gossip about how well the local campaigns are performing. A sensible campaign seeds such networks with positive sentiment about its electoral chances.
These communities may also have commonly held expectations about how elections are conducted and how candidates should behave. There is an emphasis on direct personal contact between candidates and voters, and on the candidate’s connections with the area. For example, two of the candidates in Kootenay West-Revelstoke were local doctors. Others, such as ex-councillor Al Horning in Okanagan Centre, emphasized their familial links with the community, work with local sports clubs, and membership of local organizations. His Liberal counterpart, Murli Pendharkar had been a school superintendent in the riding. As well, the issues that are raised are local or have a local resonance.

**Suburban Ridings**

The geography of suburban ridings lends itself to the use of many traditional forms of campaign communication, most notably, lawn signs. Getting to voters in these communities can be difficult, and requires large teams of volunteers willing to canvass and drop literature. As well, like their city cousins, local campaigns in suburban ridings must find ways or reaching voters in apartment buildings.

Suburban ridings are large enough to encompass several metropolitan communities that may have somewhat distinct interests. In Surrey North, the riding was split along north-south lines, with the north around Whalley being less affluent than Newton in the south. Local campaigners considered the south of the riding to be more supportive of free trade and the Tories, while the north was seen as anti-free trade and pro-NDP. Campaigners tried to tailor their canvassing to suit these perceptions. For the
NDP, this meant attacking free trade in the north, while focusing on party leader Ed Broadbent’s appeal in the south. Tories followed the reverse strategy.

Suburban voters are more mobile than their country cousins, but less so than city dwellers. On average, they have lived in the riding for a shorter period of time than country voters. Many of them also work outside the riding in the downtown core. Voters are unlikely to have a shared history of social or familial relations with other residents. Frequent changes to boundaries in areas that are growing in population also heighten the feeling that their is not a sense of community like that found in some country ridings. Rather than any traditional ties to the riding, associational elements of community life, which are not necessarily connected to any one riding, such as membership of churches, school boards, sports clubs and so forth play a big role in linking members of these communities. Defining truly local issues can be a struggle for local campaigns as they get lost in the larger metropolitan agenda.

These ridings are increasingly culturally heterogeneous, and in the Vancouver lower mainland, may include ethnic subgroups with identifiable associations such as Indo-Canadian, Chinese Canadian and Italian-Canadian communities. They are however, economically homogenous in comparison to city ridings, being largely middle class. The interests and life cycles of many suburbanites are the same from one community to the next within these ridings. Common pursuits such as buying a home, maintaining a family income with one or more jobs, and raising a family are the basis of social bonds. Despite these consistencies, they are general in nature, which suggests a lack of local focus to political debate. This in part reflects the lack of influential local
Mortgage rates, crime rates, schooling and other government services that affect families are important in suburban ridings. Suburban ridings may be dormitory communities for the downtown workforce. Commuters who work outside the riding are likely to have economic concerns that are not as strongly tied to the local community as those that preoccupy country voters. Rather, they have an general interest in a healthy economy that produces jobs, helps pay the mortgage, and maintains the value of the family home. Because they are relatively well-off, and hence pay substantial taxes, they are concerned about tax rates and government spending.

The increasing number of women in the workforce has helped to politicize issues that affect them. Day care, payment for home-making, and abortion have been increasingly important election issues in recent years. There was open hostility between church sponsored pro-life groups and others who wish to protect the successes of earlier campaigns aimed at giving women a choice with regard to abortion. This may be because of the importance of church life in suburban communities. In recent years, the growth in cultural diversity in these areas has meant that immigration and multicultural policies are also of interest to some suburban voters.

In general, agendas in suburban ridings lack a local focus. This makes difficult the development of distinctive local contests, and seems to produce highly ideological and sometimes bitter battles. Rather than being attached to a particular local issue, the opposing sides take on the positions of the major parties. The candidate is often viewed as a party representative rather than on the basis of individual characteristics. That is, it
is what the candidate's party stands for as much as anything a candidate may hold dear that seems most important in these contests. Voters may expect relatively little from the candidates in terms of personal exposure. It is not so much that national issues are localised in suburban ridings, rather, they tend to dominate local agendas in these ridings.

City Ridings

Population densities in city ridings complicate the task of communicating with voters. These ridings often have substantial numbers of voters living in high rise apartments. Access to apartment blocks is often impossible. When they do gain access, campaigners may receive a cool reception as canvassing in apartment buildings is seen as more invasive than approaching voters at the front door of a country or suburban house. City ridings have a high proportion of households in which all members are full time workers. This adds to the difficulty of reaching them, as canvassing has to be done outside work hours, which means during hours set aside for leisure. The alternatives, such as campaign literature dropped in the bank of mail slots of an apartment, is a necessary but poor substitute for direct contact with voters. Apartments may pose other problems for canvassers. In some downtown locations, the need to visit in the evening when voters are home can be daunting if the area is dangerous after dark.

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5Political parties have tried to protect their right of access to these voters in Section 82.1 of the Canada Elections Act which reads: "A candidate and the candidate's representative may enter any apartment building or other multiple residence during reasonable hours for the purpose of conducting the campaign" (Canada, Canada Elections Act, 1993).
The main tactical response by campaigns facing these problems is to make extensive use of phone banks to contact apartment dwellers. If the voter shows further interest, a particular time for a personal visit can be arranged, and the canvasser (often the candidate) can be let into the building. If the campaign is well organized, it may also follow up with a number of letters dealing with particular concerns voiced by the voter. The Tories in Vancouver Centre had a well orchestrated direct mail campaign of this sort. Such a response is also highly flexible as it can be modified to suit each household in ridings that are as socially and culturally diverse as Centre.

A second response is to make use of organizations within the community through which voters can be reached. Seniors’ homes, local ethnic organizations, churches, interest groups, even sports clubs and universities can be used as forums in which to communicate a campaign message. While they exist in many ridings, these institutions take on particular importance when candidates find it hard to meet voters in person (Land 1965, 81). In some cases, these organizations may be in a neighbouring riding, but members or the client group they serve live across the metropolitan area.

Social and public institutions are good back-drops for campaign events. A university offers candidates a chance to speak to education policy and an ethnic association meeting is an ideal place to broach policies dealing with multiculturalism. Events in such places also hold out the opportunity for media coverage. Svend Robinson is a master of this, and made a point of visiting many institutions catering to seniors’ needs in his riding in 1988. The media coverage of these events helped paint him as a sympathetic candidate interested in local voters.
Just as country campaigns face particular problems, there are a myriad of problems peculiar to city campaigns. The cost of renting office space in the downtown, the need to have advertising and press releases in a number of languages, ensuring security in city offices, are just some of these. As an indication of the different cost structures facing campaigns, an office in downtown Vancouver is about three times as expensive than one in a country riding. This means less money for other campaign activities, and shapes the structure of the local campaign team. A full time communications organizer is invaluable to a city campaign.

Party volunteers are able to work for any one of several campaigns in adjacent city and suburban seats. Not only does this mean that workers are more mobile, but there is a greater likelihood that a party member will be able to identify a candidate for whom they wish to work. Such movement can be a matter of preference. A volunteer prefer a certain candidate over another, or prefer to work on a campaign that looks like winning over one that seems destined to lose. A number of NDP workers in Vancouver Centre who might have worked for Johanna den Hertog moved to Svend Robinson's campaign in order to help him win re-election following his public announcement of his homosexuality. His campaign was seen as something of a cause celebre by New Democrats. Given that Kim Campbell only beat den Hertog by 269 votes, these defections may have been costly. Vancouver Centre Liberal candidate Tex Enemark lost volunteers to neighbouring Vancouver Quadra, where Liberal leader John Turner was running for re-election.

Volunteers may also move around in order to assist weaker campaigns, or deal
with emergencies. Parties have major headquarters in urban centres that can provide workers to metropolitan campaigns. Experienced Progressive Conservative campaign organizers and workers moved around in order to assist inexperienced campaigns in Vancouver's lower mainland in 1988.

Parties may formally redistribute workers in order to make the best use of those that are available. This applies in particular to campaigns that strategists believe are of great importance. The NDP supplied skilled party and union organizers from around the lower mainland to den Hertog's campaign in Vancouver. Den Hertog's campaign manager Ron Stipp, was a party organizer with campaign experience who was not personally committed to den Hertog. Tory Kim Campbell benefitted from the help of nationally-known PC organizers. Experienced Liberals from across the country assisted in John Turner's campaign.

The voting populations of city ridings are socially heterogeneous. They are relatively mobile, ethnically mixed, and encompass a number of lifestyle and socio-economic groups. There are groups that rely on the state for income security that are not found in large numbers in most suburban ridings, and which in country ridings may depend as much on alternate social and familial support networks. There is a high proportion who are single or part of a working couple. There is a relatively large proportion of poor renters, but also a sizable middle class, home owning minority. Despite high levels of renting and poverty, education levels among voters in these ridings are above average. Such apparently anomalous characteristics point to the social complexity of inner city ridings.
As a result of transience and heterogeneity, many voters in these communities do not share a common history in the riding. Their understanding of elections and campaigning is as likely to come from the media as it is to be informed by local tradition. This vision of what constitutes a political community is shaped by the current debates in the media. In an increasingly group oriented political culture, city voters are likely to identify with one or more of the groups that are involved in debating public policy rather than with a traditional, geographically defined local community.

Not surprisingly, heterogeneous city communities have a wide range of interests, and a broad local agenda. Campaigns in these ridings must address these many issues, and candidates must be familiar with a range of matters and policy, often acting as spokespeople for their party. Many of the groups that have members in city ridings, and may have regional headquarters there, have members spread across the country. They see elections as an opportunity to have their concerns canvassed, and often use the media in Vancouver to raise issues. Thus, in Vancouver Centre, dealing with the local gay and lesbian communities meant that candidates spoke to national party policy on these matters. Greenpeace used its headquarters in the city to raise environmental concerns. It is national public policy that concerns these groups. This adds to the size of the local agenda, and creates linkages to issues of provincial or national concern.

The same is true with respect to the sorts of economic issues on the political agenda in city ridings. Although there may be local economic issues of some weight, candidates often address the national economy as a way of speaking to the downtown business community, and the business and union organizations that have headquarters in
these ridings. Local and provincial economic issues are not forgotten, but compete with national concerns. In 1988, a very general debate about the merits of free trade was central to the Vancouver Centre contest, with some reference to its direct impact on the local riding.

National issues are not strictly localised, but rather there is a complex interweaving of national and local agendas. In Burnaby-Kingsway in 1988, New Democrat Svend Robinson was seen as the personal embodiment of gay issues in Canada. As the first openly declared homosexual to run for a seat in the House of Commons, Robinson attracted enormous media interest to the contest in Burnaby-Kingsway. As a result, his campaign became something of a surrogate for gay concerns, and was held up as proof of the New Democrats’ commitment to gays.

There is an air of professionalism about many city campaigns, as they attempt to ensure their candidate is capable of dealing with these demands. The riding contest is very much about offering positive high public profiles of the competing candidates. The media play a crucial role in transmitting the personal qualities of candidates in these ridings, and in allowing him or her to address the many issues that make up the political agenda in the local community. This vital means of communicating with voters is crucial to the nature of local riding contests, and the style and content of local campaigns.
THE MEDIA

Campaigns are about communicating with voters. The media that covers a riding contest is crucial to the way the local election unfolds and to the style and content of local campaigns (Fletcher 1987; 1991a; 1991b). Campaigns compete for whatever media coverage is available. They also measure their own performance, as well as the progress of the federal election writ large, through the media. Both the quantity and content of this coverage gives some indication of the performance of the campaigns. Letters to the editors of local newspapers are often logged, to see who is winning the war of words. Column centimetres in newspapers and minutes of coverage on television and radio are measured by local campaigners to test whether their candidate is receiving equal treatment. Less air-time or coverage for their own candidate often leads to claims of media bias.

Campaigns are aware that some media organizations are more influential than others, and try to gain the best quality coverage possible. Campaigns may also advertise in the media. In general, the more influential a news outlet, the less affordable its advertising rates. This determines the amount of advertising a local campaign can do. In large cities, the cost of advertising in the major metropolitan media puts it beyond the reach of local campaigns.

The quality of news coverage is related to size in the eyes of many local campaigners. Major media organizations with large news rooms and distribution areas are often seen by strategists as more credible and influential than smaller, local media outlets. Candidates crave credibility and influence, and expend enormous effort in
trying to gain such coverage. As well, the diversity of media available to campaigners shapes their communication strategies as they try to gain the best exposure possible with their limited resources.

The nature of the media in a riding also plays a crucial role in the degree to which national issues are *localised*. It is only through the media - whether local or non-local - that national issues are aired across the country and can come to be seen as relevant to or even dominate a riding contest. To some extent, this localisation captures the competition between local and non-local media for control of the local political agenda. A weak riding media that is unable to identify and pursue local issues may simply reflect those offered by the national media from where most wire services originate. In contrast, ridings in which the local media can identify local issues and concerns - and even local angles to national issues - produce more robust local political agendas.

With the advent of new technologies, the national media increasingly intrudes directly on ridings in all parts of the country. The growth in the importance of opinion polling, leader's debates, and the leaders' tours - all elements of news coverage that are the province of national media - has increased the impact of national news on local ridings and further strengthened the dominance of the major media organizations and national campaigns (Fletcher 1987, 363-7). Regardless of the capacity of the local media to generate its own stories, if voters get their news mainly from non-local media sources, the local political agenda reflects this outside influence.

The type of media that covers a local contest depends very much on whether
there is a distinct local community within the riding that can support its own media organizations and the newsworthiness of the race (ibid). The latter can be affected both by the profile of the candidates and the competitiveness of the local contest.

The profile of candidates and the distribution of influential media that reports local contests is unevenly distributed across ridings. There are patterns across city, country, and suburban ridings in the quantity and quality of the media that covers a riding contest. This has implications for the nature of the race and the campaigns involved therein. Whereas both city and country contests receive coverage they can call their own, suburban campaigns receive relatively little attention. It is noteworthy that controversies surrounding all-candidates’ debates - perhaps the most local of all campaign stories - tend to occur in ridings where there is media interested in reporting the contest.

**Country Ridings**

Fortunately for many country campaigns, there are ways around some of the difficulties of canvassing large ridings in person. Most country towns have a local media that covers the riding contest and in which campaigns can afford to advertise. This reflects the self contained nature of these towns that makes viable small local media outlets. Campaigns split their advertising budgets between newspapers and radio. As well as advertising in local community papers, which all campaign do, campaigns in Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Okanagan Centre, and Fraser Valley West all ran some form of electronic media advertising. In contrast, campaigns in most city and suburban
campaigns could not afford this form of advertising because of the rates charged by major media outlets in these areas.

The only media which covered the whole riding (towns and countryside) in Kootenay West-Revelstoke was radio. The Kootenay Broadcasting Service (KBS) runs a number of stations that share news across the region, and whose broadcast area is nearly contiguous with the riding. This service has a "news format" style, and is considered to be somewhat influential by local campaigners. In fact, KBS had the most comprehensive coverage of the local campaign of any media, attending more all-candidates’ debates than any other news organization in the riding. Because radio reaches listeners throughout this large, mountainous riding, it is an ideal medium for news coverage and campaign advertising in country areas. It is also affordable, and local campaigns spent about a third of their advertising budgets on this one network. Most of the advertising budget was went to newspapers in the four large towns in the riding.

In many country ridings, newspapers are based in relatively small towns. They have limited circulations, and though affordable, are considered to be uninfluential. This is in part because the resources of these papers are limited and their coverage of the campaign is as a result quite basic. This affects both the weight that campaigns place on news coverage in their strategies and the value they see in advertising. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, each of four large towns has at least one newspaper. As a result, local campaigns had to deal with several newspapers at once, often tailoring their message and advertising to suit each town. And as papers in the riding use a number of different
typesetting methods, campaigns had to adjust their advertising for different towns. This stretched the resources of the local campaigns.

The city of Kelowna, which accounts for about half the polls in the riding of Okanagan Centre, is big enough to have its own influential local television, radio, and newspaper organizations. Yet they are small enough that local campaigns can afford to advertise in them. Riding campaigns worked very hard to garner news coverage and attract editorial support. They advertised extensively in this media, and put a lot of energy into developing advertisements. Locally produced radio and television advertisements featured Okanagan Centre candidates speaking to national and regional issues, and the local cable station aired an all-candidates' debate held at the Kelowna Chamber of Commerce.

The availability of influential media in Kelowna made the local campaign distinctive. Reporting of the election often focused on local campaigns and their progress. The media's interest in the contest and its capacity to follow up news stories allowed local stories to develop into election issues. One such story focused on Al Horning's debating skills. Horning proved to be a very poor public speaker. Despite efforts to improve this aspect of his campaigning, his first appearance in the local community of Winfield was a disaster. He stumbled and appeared out of his depth. The audience laughed at him and other candidates poked fun at his answers. News reports were unflattering with regard to his performance.

In response to this, Horning's campaign manager drastically altered the strategy of the campaign, banning him from public speaking. To offset the lack of exposure that
resulted from withdrawing Horning from the debates, strategists focused on a strong media campaign as the best means of communicating with voters. This campaign emphasized personal interviews and advertisements. An effective local media played a key role in generating the problem for the Tories, and was also crucial in implementing their response.

The spread of national and Vancouver media into country areas now provides voters with an alternative source of information about the major issues. Local country contests receive little if any coverage in this media. Added to this has been the growth in the reach of sophisticated news services from which local news organizations can get bulletins about national or regional issues. This can crowd out space in the local media. Although most country reporters still rate a good local story as more important than a story from outside the riding, reductions in the numbers of journalists on these newspapers over recent years is limiting their capacity to run local stories. The growth in the extent and importance of cable networks is also changing local contests. Cable stations now often host all-candidates' debates that other media organizations are invited to attend.

Local media coverage in country ridings can help give focus to the local political agenda. In cases where the riding is made up of several distinct towns, this may mean several local agendas. The presence of truly local media allows for discussion of idiosyncratic local issues, and allows regional and national issues to be related to local conditions. The fact that there is a local media which can focus on the local candidates also strengthens the candidate-centred nature of campaigning in country ridings. Where
there is some localisation of national issues, such as the relevance of free trade to intensive agriculture in Okanagan Centre or metal smelting in Kootenay-West Revelstoke, the local media give a local tilt to the issue.

A viable local media spurs campaigns to organize local advertising, news conferences, press releases, and media events that often focus on local issues. This brings a sense of local purpose to a contest. Local campaigns invariably have communications organizers who chair the media committee. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Tory committee members wrote letters to the editor in order to ensure equal space with other campaigns. Campaigns try to ensure editorial endorsement by lobbying editors, or spending their advertising budgets in order to gain this support.

National campaigns can also afford to advertise in the media in country ridings. This is another way in which the imperatives of the national campaign can find their way into a local contest. A number of campaigns were confronted with nationally purchased advertising in their riding that was at odds with local strategies. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, the Tory campaign tried to avoid any mention of free trade and Brian Mulroney’s leadership. Yet the national party placed significant amounts of advertising in the local media focusing on both these aspects of the campaign. In fact, it spent more than twice as much as the local campaign advertising on the major radio network in the riding. Local campaigners were furious when their requests for information about the content and timing of the advertisements were turned down.

The presence of local media gives a focus to contests in country ridings. It provides local campaigns with an array of means for communicating with voters. This
encourages the development of local strategies to address riding concerns, balancing out the impact of the national media on local affairs. This alone can help give the local contest a more substantial, as well as idiosyncratic, ambience.

Suburban Ridings

Suburban campaigns operate in what is nearly a vacuum with respect to media coverage as a result of being caught in the distribution areas of major metropolitan media. This media does not, in general, consider suburban contests to be newsworthy, and none of the metropolitan campaigns can afford the advertising rates charged by these large media organizations. The only coverage these campaigns receive, and the only advertising they can afford, is in local community newspapers. Partly due to competition from major media outlets, and partly because of the population densities of suburban areas, these newspapers often cover several ridings. As such, they can give only minimal treatment to any one contest or campaign. Campaigners believe that the community media that does report the riding contest, and campaign advertising in these newspapers, have little influence on political debate in suburban ridings.

In Surrey, local coverage was provided by the Leader and the Now. These newspapers were stretched very thin, covering three different riding contests. They openly admit to having very little coverage of riding contests. Two years after the 1988 election, many reporters could not even recall the names of all the major party candidates. The problem of coverage was exacerbated by the concurrent holding of a municipal election, which further strained the resources of these local papers (and the
Occasionally, these campaigns can afford to advertise on a minor radio station, sometimes broadcasting from the riding itself, and local cable stations run all-candidates' debates. But much like community newspapers, there is little faith in the impact of these mediums. The lack of targeting in these media is much the same as for community newspapers, as they reach well beyond any single suburban riding. The difficulties with media coverage in suburban ridings forces them to rely on labour intensive, traditional forms of campaigning. Other forms of communicating with voters, such as dropping off literature, are more central to suburban campaigns. As a result, campaign structures reflect this. Relatively little effort is put into media relations compared with that found in city or country ridings. Personnel focus on organizing foot canvassing, literature, signs, phone banks, and getting the candidate out to meet groups in the riding.

Unless suburban campaigns break out of these local constraints and attract the interest of major news media organizations, they have little chance of being widely reported. Unfortunately, this situation may only arise if there is a crisis in a local campaign. The PC Surrey North campaign only received regional and national coverage when campaign manager Scott Thompson criticised a local speech given by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Tory John Bitonti’s campaign in Burnaby-Kingsway only received coverage when he attacked NDP candidate Svend Robinson’s personal morality.

A lack of local media coverage can also stymie efforts by local campaigns to
pursue their own strategies. Liberal candidate Don Ross in Surrey North believes that his efforts to use all-candidates' debates to give focus to the local contest failed due to the lack of a media interest in suburban races. Ross is a good debater, and as the ex-Mayor of Surrey, his public profile was his greatest asset. He could only benefit from public events that advertised him and gave him a chance to engage with his opponents. He made a point of challenging his Tory and NDP opponents to all-candidates' debates.

Surrey North Tory Cliff Blair had polling results that showed Ross to be the best known candidate in the riding, with New Democrat and former councillor Jim Karpoff second, and himself running third. Yet in terms of popular vote, he was running second to the NDP. Blair did not consider himself to be a match for Ross in terms of public debating, but was nevertheless willing, if not enthusiastic, to be involved in all-candidates' debates as a means of engaging Jim Karpoff.

New Democrat Jim Karpoff was the front-runner in the Surrey North campaign. He was positively hostile to Ross' proposals for all-candidate's debates. Having reluctantly agreed on an encounter with his opponents, Karpoff, along with Blair, were soundly beaten by Ross in the eyes of the local media. Karpoff did not accept a second invitation. His campaign used this one debate as evidence of his willingness to confront his opponents. Press releases and public claims by Ross that the other candidates were frightened of public debates were not taken up in the media. He believes this was because the media were not interested in, and incapable of covering, the local contest. This robbed Ross of his central campaign strategy.

Although the leaders' tours can help single-out a riding, and lend credibility to a
local campaign, such opportunities are fleeting. Other than this, suburban campaigns can only expect to be covered in the riding features run by most major city news organizations. At some time during the campaign, the *Vancouver Sun, The Province, CBC* and *CTV* television and *CBC* radio do a story on each of the suburban contests. In most cases, these *pro forma* reports have little impact on local contests.

The lack of a media focus to suburban contests exacerbates the apparent anonymity of campaigns in these ridings. The local political agenda is often underdeveloped. Candidates do not regularly appear in the major metropolitan media, and there is not any publication that focuses solely on the issues and dynamics of any one riding contest. The anonymity of suburban campaigns may be another reason why candidates appear to be less important than in other campaigns. Rather, they are seen as representatives of the national parties and policies that are found in the influential major media that dominate news reporting in metropolitan areas.

Local voters are inundated with national advertising on radio and television, and in major metropolitan newspapers. Local campaign advertising, and the limited campaign coverage in community newspapers, pale in comparison. Media relations is not an important aspect of campaigning, and media coverage plays little role in suburban contests. The dominance of national media and campaigns in suburban ridings means that there is no distinct local political agenda; rather, the national agenda is reproduced.

**City Ridings**

The relationship between the media and the candidates in city ridings underpins the
distinctive role played by local candidates in these contests. This role distinguishes these campaigns from most country or suburban ones. In contrast to their suburban counterparts, city campaigns receive regular coverage from influential major metropolitan media. For example, the Vancouver Sun, The Province, and the Globe and Mail newspapers, as well as CBC radio and television, BCTV and other private radio and television stations, all paid special attention to the Vancouver Centre contest in 1988.

Although they received substantial media coverage, these campaigns could not afford to advertise in major media outlets. In most cases if they could, it would be wasted on voters in other ridings. Media in the riding of Victoria appears to be on the threshold of affordability, and the wastage problem is not as bad as in larger cities. Nevertheless, the Tory and Liberal campaigns could only afford a couple of television advertisements. Rather, like their suburban counterparts, city campaigns advertise mainly in the local community newspapers in their riding.

There are a number of reasons why city campaigns attract media attention. Because they are close by, city candidates are easy to reach. The logistics of television reporting in particular often demand that pictures be brought back to the station and edited for the nightly news. City candidates are ideally placed to provide a news-clip in short order, and even a comment for the morning paper. Moreover, as many of them go on to play important roles in government and the opposition, the media have become used to treating candidate’s as party spokespeople.

Parties know that these candidates often play an important role in media
relations, and may invite the media to seek out these candidates. They often encourage and train candidates to play this role, and may even provide city campaigns with additional assistance to help them deal with the media. In doing so, they hope to ensure the candidate is an asset to the wider campaign. Publications aimed at lifestyle and ethnic groups are often based in these socially diverse ridings. City candidates, by speaking directly to these media, play a critical role in discussing party policy with these groups. City campaigns often advertise in these publications. As these groups often have members across the country, this role raises the profile of the candidate.

Ridings centred on the downtown city core encompass many diverse social groups and organizations, each of which hope to get their interests onto the political agenda. In 1988, candidates in Victoria and Vancouver regularly spoke to multiculturalism, environmental issues, issues of interest to women in particular, and gay and lesbian issues. As well as these groups, the downtown business elite is an important local constituency. It has a direct interest in the economic policies of the major parties, and encourages candidates to speak to the local, provincial, and national economies. Forestry companies with headquarters in the riding expected some comment on their sector of the economy, even though it is largely a provincial matter. Reporters can cover a range of issues by contacting the spokespeople for these various groups. They may also expect local candidates to respond to issues raised by these groups. This involves local campaigns in a web of relations with the media and local groups, and raise the profile of the local contest.

Population densities in city areas mean that the distribution area for community
newspapers is small. Newspapers such as the Vancouver Courier and the WestEnder in Vancouver Centre are closely identified with the local community. Advertising and news coverage in these newspapers is not wasted on voters outside the riding as can happen with suburban community newspapers that cover wide areas. As a result, although community newspapers are not considered by city campaigners to be influential, they give such newspapers more weight than do campaign organizers in suburban ridings. Campaigners in Vancouver Centre, Victoria, and Burnaby-Kingsway all hoped to gain editorial support of the community newspapers, and hoped their advertising budgets would assist in this goal.

The competition between campaigns for media coverage can be intense. Candidates are central to the media relations efforts of these campaigns as they try to orchestrate events that appeal to the media. They may participate in "Bermashave" events, standing on busy street corners with supporters waving at peak hour commuters, visit an educational institution, and meet with leaders of a cultural community or interest group, all in a single day. In Vancouver Centre, a visit to the city's Chinatown, the University of British Columbia, and walks through the downtown district meeting business workers - often with the party leader - are obligatory for the candidates. Press conferences, news releases, playing host to the party leader, and responding to media requests for interviews take up a sizable portion of the local campaign effort in both personnel and money terms. Many campaigns have a full-time media relations expert in the inner circle.

Regular coverage of city candidates and contests gives a focus to the political
agenda in these ridings. The amount of media interest and the diverse nature of the local political community means that this agenda is large. It includes many issues, local, regional and national, which are discussed in great depth. That the candidates in these ridings appear in the influential metropolitan media helps place them at the centre of the riding contest and their own campaign. They are seen by voters to speak to many issues, and to be taken seriously by political commentators.

The logic of suburban campaigns is reversed in their city counterparts. The media presentation of candidates means that national parties come to be understood through their candidate. As well, there is a clearer sense that voters are choosing between candidates, each of whom has their personal strengths and weaknesses. In Vancouver Centre, Kim Campbell’s willingness to repeatedly take on anti-free trade hecklers at all-candidates’ debates generated news stories in the major metropolitan and national media. She appeared as a feisty partisan who was both competent and capable of winning. Just as importantly for Tory strategists, as a young, progressive woman, her media exposure gave a very different face to the Conservative party in British Columbia. At the very least, this allowed voters in socially diverse Centre to think of the Tories as an acceptable choice.

Despite the fact that the federal campaign is reported in the major metropolitan media, and that the national advertisements are all that appears in these outlets, the strength of local campaigns and the role of the candidates helps counter-balance this. Candidates play a role in explaining or transmitting the national contest to the local and even provincial arenas because of the media, and the national media often explains
regional politics to the rest of the country by focusing on a high profile candidate or city contest.

Media reporting of city riding contests lead to an integration of the local and non-local campaigns. Kim Campbell's comments on issues in Vancouver Centre were carried across the country, and linked the local and national agendas. The media does not so much localise national issues, as it integrates local, provincial and national issues into a single web. This integration complicates the local political agenda. But this agenda is large, and can accommodate local, provincial and national issues relatively easily. In these ridings, there is not a clear distinction between local and non-local issues.

CONTESTEDNESS AND COMPETITIVENESS

The contestedness of a local riding race - how many campaigns are competitive - has a profound impact on the way in which local campaigns engage with each other, as well as voter participation in the election process (Blake 1978, 296-301). This needs to be distinguished from the impact of the competitiveness of any single campaign team in a contest. This allows us to discriminate between a team that has no chance of winning a contested riding from those competitive local teams that do. The four types of campaigns they produce are shown in Figure 7.1.

Contestedness, or the number of competitive parties in a contest, shapes the intensity with which local campaigns engage with each other. Contests where only one party has a real chance of success are likely to be gentler affairs than those in which
## FIGURE 7.1

CONTESTEDNESS AND COMPETITIVENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMPAIGN COMPETITIVENESS</th>
<th>CONSTITUENCY ELECTION CONTESTEDNESS</th>
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<td>CONTESTED</td>
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<td>COMPETITIVE</td>
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<td>UNCOMPETITIVE</td>
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two or more parties have a chance of winning. There is a tendency amongst front-running campaigns to avoid engaging their opponents (Land 1965, 78). This defensive strategy is aimed at limiting the opportunities for competitors to score points at the expense of the front-runner. Moreover, poorly contested local races may attract little media coverage and voter interest may be low. In contrast, close contests are likely to produce large campaign teams, good media coverage, and high voter turnout.

Individual campaign team competitiveness helps determine the quality of the candidate, the size and composition of the campaign team, and media interest in a particular campaign. Parties that have no or little success in a riding have more difficulty attracting good candidates and running strong campaigns, and their supporters may be unwilling to vote. Moreover, uncompetitive campaigns may be marginalized in the local contest, receiving little media attention, and not being taken seriously by voters at public meetings. Even if there is a close contest for the riding, they may not be greatly involved in it.

Depending on the combination of contestedness and competitiveness under which a local campaign operates, there are four broad types of teams, although two are very similar. A campaign team that is uncompetitive and involved in a contested constituency election is considered to be marginalized from the contest. One that is uncompetitive in a riding that is uncontested - that is, there is only one campaign, the front-runner, that has a chance of winning - is considered to have been excluded from

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6 The exception to this may be a new party such as Reform, which bursts onto the scene in such a way as to draw attention to itself.
contesting the riding. In effect, it is the process rather than the outcome that
distinguishes between these two types of campaign. They are both likely to look
similar. That is, have trouble attracting a candidate, volunteers, and media attention.
One distinction that can be made is that marginalized campaigns may receive more
media attention only because the local race is contested and attracts greater attention,
which spills over to include even uncompetitive local campaigns.

Of competitive campaigns, one, the front-runner is the only team that has a
chance of winning the local contest. The constituency race is uncontested. The other,
an engaged campaign team, is involved in a real contest that it and at least one other
campaign have a chance on winning.

Past electoral performances are the best guide to future outcomes, and suggest
which ridings will be closely contested and which will be easily won. However, there is
nearly always an element of uncertainty in local contests, and campaigners know that
most Canadian ridings have been held by different parties at one time or another (Blake
1991). Even sophisticated polling techniques are not fool proof, as there is often a large
enough margin of error to allow at least two campaigns to believe they can win the
riding. This can encourage candidates and volunteers in trailing campaigns to work hard
for local success. The only way to gain a sense of how competitiveness waxes and
wanes over the election period is to augment statistics with the judgements of those
involved.

Everything that a local campaign does is designed to improve its
competitiveness. Much of this has already been covered in discussions of the nature of
campaign teams, intra-party relations, and riding conditions. As the election progresses, two dynamic aspects of campaigning further shape the competitiveness of local campaigns. One is the way in which they engage each other, seen most obviously in all-candidates' debates, and the other is the impact of the unfolding federal election writ large on the competitive positions of individual campaigns. The other means of reaching voters in person, partisan meetings attended by the party luminaries, and small social gatherings at which candidates meet with voters, have an indeterminate impact on the local contest. Although widely used, few campaigners made mention of them as having had a profound impact on their campaign.

All-candidates' debates are one of the rare occasions at which campaigns and candidates have a chance to gauge their opponents efforts. Strategies and tactics, as well as the abilities of the individual candidates are on public display. These events offer campaigns a chance to fine-tune or alter the direction of their campaign. They regularly produce controversies, as local campaigns attack each other in public. Although candidates and campaigns complain about the value of these meetings, they offer an opportunity to change the competitive relationship of local campaigns, and are hard to ignore.

The ebb and flow of the federal election campaign can influence local contests. The media uses national opinion polls, the leaders' tours, and the national leaders' debates to help tell the story of the campaign (Fletcher 1987, 205-9). Depending on the type of media in a riding, this national story can come to dominate the local contest. Even in ridings that have a well developed local agenda, it is common for the federal
election campaign to influence local events, and even alter the competitive positions of campaigns. As well as this general effect, local campaigns must also deal with the impact on the local contest of issues raised at the national level. The salience of a particular issue can help one campaign and hinder another.

Although contestedness does not vary consistently across different types of riding, the manner in which campaigns engage with each other in order to try an alter their competitive position does. Where there is media that reports the local contest, campaign events such as all-candidates’ debates can be important in shaping how local campaigns interact, and even their competitiveness. This is less true of ridings that lack media. In this sense, city and country ridings that often have such media are distinct from suburban ridings, that usually lack any interested media. The same is true to some degree with respect to the impact of the federal election on a local contest. In ridings where reporting of this contest is not modified to take account of local conditions, the dynamic of the federal election may have a more direct impact on the issues that are important and the perceived competitiveness of local campaigns.

**All-Candidates’ Debates**

All-candidates’ debates can be trite events. Among other things, candidates bemoan the lack of real debate and the stacked meetings. Yet many candidates and campaigners recount stories that suggest these debates can have an impact on local contests, and nearly every campaign sends its candidate to these debates, which may number over a dozen. It seems the chance to engage other local campaigns cannot be foregone. In
addition, the performance of the candidates and the number of supporters that can be
induced to attend these meetings are still seen as crucial thermometers of the local
contest. Finally, they are the one occasion where the candidates must confront the
public directly. There capacity to deal with the situation may influence whatever
personal vote is available in a riding (Ferejohn and Gaines 1991, 297-8).

Campaigns involved in real contests usually engage each other strongly in all-
candidates’ debates. Debates in Vancouver Centre were a good example of this. Tory
Kim Campbell and New Democrat Johanna den Hertog ran neck-and-neck for the riding
in 1988, and this showed in the all-candidates’ debates. Unfortunately for Liberal Tex
Enemark, the competitiveness of the Campbell and den Hertog campaigns only served to
highlight his own difficulties. While Campbell and den Hertog heatedly debated the
merits of free trade, the issue left Enemark in an untenable position. He wanted to
support the principle of free trade, but object to "the Mulroney deal". Unfortunately,
there was no middle ground available to him. The debates only served to highlight that
Centre was a two-candidate race; one in which he and his campaign were out of place.

For candidates with a clear lead, all-candidates’ debates may only offer the
chance to lose votes. As a result, they often attempt to minimise the number of all-
candidates’ debates they must attend. On the other hand, the second and third placed
candidates try to organize these events in the hope of gaining at the expense of the
leader.

In 1988, Fraser Valley West was considered one of the safest Tory seats in the
entire country. However, Tory incumbent and front-runner Bob Wenman was
confronted with an attack from the political right, in the form of the Christian Heritage Party. The CHP ran its national leader in the riding, and it had stolen several high profile Tories in the lead up to the campaign. As well, it was leading an attack on Wenman’s record on abortion and other conservative issues. This exposed a raw nerve in Wenman. Moreover, he believed he could only lose votes by engaging with the CHP on conservative issues.

Wenman refused to attend all-candidates’ debates to which minor parties were invited. The other candidates now insisted that minor parties be given a chance to speak, spurred on in part by Wenman’s demands. When the incumbent did not appear at the first meeting, the matter became an election issue. Wenman responded to public criticism by sending Benno Friesen, Tory incumbent from the neighbouring riding of Surrey-White Rock, and well known as a social conservative, to the second debate. Other candidates and the media ridiculed him for this. This forced him to relent, and he attended a later debate. Wenman was forced to explain his absence from earlier debates and his frequent absences from the parliament during the life of the Tory government.

Debates can also bring home to candidates and campaigns the true nature of the riding contest. In Kootenay West-Revelstoke, Tory incumbent Bob Brisco remembers with bitterness the all-candidates’ meeting in the strongly NDP town of Revelstoke, which had been added to his riding in the 1988 redistribution just before the election. The meeting revealed the difficulties confronting his campaign. His organization in the town was limited, and few of his supporters attended the meeting, which left the New Democrats a clear majority in the audience. So after travelling 500 kilometres from his
home in the south of the riding to a town in which he was not well received, Brisco had to confront a hostile crowd. In Brisco’s own estimation, his difficulties and the lack of partisan support hurt the morale of his workers, and perceptions of his competitiveness.

All-candidates’ debates are central to the way in which candidates and campaigners understand the riding contest. Most of what local campaigns know of each other comes through the media and anecdotal information supplied by volunteers who come across information about opposing campaigns, and is not informed by precise polling data (Carty 1991a, 181-183). Debates bring all the strategies and conjectures of a campaign into sharp relief, and offer an opportunity to score points at the expense of other candidates. To size-up ones’ opponents in the flesh is still important to local campaigns.

The Federal Campaign

The national media, national election events, and national campaigns are increasingly intruding on local campaigns. National opinion polls, the leaders’ tours, and the national leaders’ debates are all used to help tell the story of the campaign in both the local and non-local media. Unfortunately for riding campaigns, none of these story-telling techniques have much local content, and rarely give a true rendering of the nature of the riding contest. Ridings with little or no indigenous media, and those in which the media tends to simply repeat wire stories, are particularly susceptible to this form of reporting. At its worst, it may result in the distortion of the actual competitive positions of local campaigns.
Local campaigners noted that the reporting of national opinion polls greatly altered the mood of their campaign and the sort of reception they received in the riding. Improvements in the Liberals' position in opinion polls reflected John Turner's performance in the national leaders' debates. As polls started to register greater support for the Liberals, the party's performance seemed to improve. An article in *Maclean's* discussing the chances of a Liberal win, touted Vancouver Centre Liberal candidate Tex Enemark as a cabinet member in a possible Liberal government. Morale in Enemark's campaign went up, volunteer numbers increased, canvassers met with a more positive reception, and donations increased. The assistance given Enemark's campaign irked his competitors. The NDP believe this split the anti-free trade vote in the riding, and caused them to lose to the Tories.

The improved result for the Liberals spurred Enemark's Vancouver campaign to focus more strongly on the candidate's credentials. It also brought greater attention from the media. Because Turner's performance revolved heavily around his position on free trade, the Vancouver media wanted Enemark's campaign to provide information on the issue, and for the candidate to give his own position. But Enemark did not agree with Turner's position, and initially refused to hand out anti-free trade literature or get involved in debating the issue. Eventually, he decided to distribute literature, but avoid direct discussion of the issue. As a result, a change that may have been positive for the Liberals in Centre became a liability, only serving to highlight the split in the party over free trade.

Campaigns in all the parties noted increases in worker morale, volunteer
numbers, and donations, depending on how well their leader was seen to have performed in the national debates. The BC NDP campaign was deflated after Broadbent was all but ignored in the debates. It was this that encouraged the provincial party to refocus local BC campaigns away from Broadbent and towards the free trade issue. Many Tories in Vancouver Centre felt Mulroney’s debate performance had lost them the campaign. Campaign manager Lyall Knott was reduced to running competitions in the office in an attempt to bolster the morale of workers.

Many campaigners believe that media interpretation of the debates is critical to how they are perceived by voters. Liberals noted a lag between the impact of Turner’s good debate performances on campaign morale. It was only when a consensus had formed around the opinion that Turner had "won" the debate that local campaigns felt an improvement. Positive assessments by the media fed into subsequent opinion polls and created a bandwagon effect (see Johnston et al. 1993, chapter 7).

The progress of leaders’ tours is used by the media as a vehicle for telling the story of the federal election campaign (see Dion 1964, 111). General assessments of a leader’s performance can influence local campaigns, so to can the presence of the tour in a particular riding. With their band of roving reporters tagging along, these tours briefly focus national attention on a particular riding, or an issue that may affect a riding. This can change the nature of a riding contest. It may enhance the credibility of a local campaign, or threaten its local strategy.

NDP campaigns in particular tried to take advantage of Ed Broadbent’s popularity in 1988. He was welcomed by campaigners in Kootenay West-Revelstoke,
who took every opportunity to create media events around his tour and ensure the local NDP candidate was seen standing next to Broadbent as often as possible. Similarly, in Victoria and Vancouver Centre, Broadbent was largely made welcome, although some Centre workers believed he took attention away from important local issues while he was in the riding.

In contrast, Tory campaigners in 1988 had to deal with one of the least popular leaders in Canadian history. Although Kootenay West-Revelstoke Tory incumbent Bob Brisco was a supporter of the Prime Minister, strategists believed the PM’s unpopularity and support of free trade would damage the local campaign. In fact, the local PC campaign was doing its best not to mention this issue. It decided to minimise its contact with the visitors. Despite this, Mulroney’s presence in the riding inflamed the free trade debate, and hurt the local Tory campaign.

In Surrey North, local PC organizers asked that Mulroney stick to local issues and cautioned against the use of French. The Prime Minister arrived with his media entourage, with its Quebec contingent, at a time when the Tories were down in the polls and mindful of the need to win seats in that province. He spoke about national issues, including the constitution and free trade in both English and French, and did not mention local issues. Local campaigners were distraught at his performance, which they considered hurt their chances of winning.

John Turner’s tour in BC was limited. Local campaigners were mixed in their feelings towards his visits. While many saw Turner as a sympathetic figure in the context of the campaign, many did not support his position on free trade. This meant
they did not seek out Turner to help bolster their campaigns.

As Preyra points out (1991), local campaigns ride the waves of the federal election writ large. These ebbs and flows can have profound implications for the strategies, tactics and content of riding campaigns. They may even alter the competitive position of campaigns in the riding contest. At a more general level, it is important to realise that the competitive position of parties in local contests waxes and wanes as local, provincial and national events play themselves out in various ways in any one riding. Not only do local campaign teams have to respond to local conditions, they must also adapt to the changing dynamics of the federal election.

CONCLUSION

Three aspects of the riding contest shape the style and content of local campaigns. The nature of the local political community, the media available in the riding, and the intensity of the contest among local campaigns. Broadly speaking, there are identifiable differences in the ways in which political community, and the media operate across country, suburban, and city ridings. Contestedness does not vary in any obvious way with respect to different types of ridings, although the presence of an interested local media does give all-candidates’ debates a heightened salience in any contest, and alters the way in which the federal election is reported in a riding. The potential impact of local events, and the degree to which the local contest is made subservient to non-local factors, both shape the way in which local campaigns engage, and hence their style and content.
The particular political community that is defined by the boundaries of a riding has its own form and interests. The social homogeneity of a riding, its geography, and the nature of the local economy underpin the local political agenda to which local campaigns respond. The capacity to develop a truly local political agenda also depends on the whether there is media that is concerned with local issues. On occasion, due to the nature of the riding, the local political agenda is susceptible to national definitions of what constitutes the important issues in an election campaign. The national campaign is then localised. Yet even then, the degree to which a local perspective is brought to the resulting debate depends very much on the availability of interested and influential local media.

Political communities in country ridings such as Kootenay West-Revelstoke and Okanagan Centre are somewhat self-contained, and relatively socially homogeneous. As a result, they tend to have a strong sense of their own interests. Perhaps because local economies are often precarious and subject to the vagaries of primary production, these interests are often tightly focused on local economic development. The presence of a local media that has an interest in local issues and the riding contest helps give focus to this agenda. The lack of population movement into some of these ridings can mean there are local traditions about how campaigns and candidates should behave. At the very least, there is an expectation that the candidate have strong personal links with the area and communities in the riding.

In response to these conditions, campaigns tend to make heavy use of the local media to communicate with voters. This involves extensive resources being given over
to media relations. They emphasize development issues, with social policy being of secondary importance. The candidates are expected to be local boosters. These contests appear as competitions for deciding which candidate, or party, can deliver the greatest amount of local economic prosperity.

Because the media can focus on the way in which local campaigns act, events such as all-candidates' debates can produce political controversy. This is particularly true if the riding is closely contested, and local campaigns must engage with each other at every opportunity. This encourages strategists to focus on these events. The local media can also act as a conduit for national news stories and campaign advertising.

The degree to which the local agenda becomes subordinate to the national campaign depends on two factors: the resonance national issues have in the local community; and, the ability of the local media to define local issues, or local referents for national issues. In the cases studied here, there were distinct local agendas that were able to interpret national events in light of local circumstances.

In suburban ridings such as Surrey North, local political communities are often not well defined. Although increasingly culturally diverse, the populations of these ridings tend homogeneous in the sense of being overwhelmingly middle-class. In addition to lacking a clear local economic or social focus, the media in these ridings is limited, and does not focus on any one local community. The local political agenda is often amorphous. Regular moving of boundaries in suburban areas further hampers the development of any sense of political community.

Local campaigns in suburban ridings cannot rely on the media to help them
communicate with voters. This can only be done in person, by literature drops, or using street signs. Canvassing by foot can be difficult where there are high rise apartments, so these campaigns often rely heavily on phone canvassing. Because of the difficulty of defining truly local issues, campaigns present voters with the broad policy positions offered by their national party. This fits well with many voters concerns with the general state of the economy, which may affect their downtown jobs, and the value of their family home. It is not expected that local candidates have a long personal history in the riding, although community service can be an advantage. Suburban contests often seem highly ideological, and the candidates contest the seat as representatives of their respective parties.

Local all-candidates’ debates do not play a crucial role in the riding contest because there is not a locally focused media that can take up any controversies that develop in or around these meetings. Campaigns cannot usually focus on media relations as a strategy for communicating with voters. Canvassing, street signs, and literature drops dominate these campaigns. The lack of local media means that the large metropolitan media dominates reporting of the election. This results in national issues, or national definitions of issues, dominating the local political agenda. This further encourages local campaigns to adopt the issues and approaches to campaigning offered by their national counterparts. The local contest is subordinate to the federal election campaign.

The local political community found in city ridings such as Vancouver Centre is socially heterogeneous. The presence of large metropolitan media willing to report city
contests, and of community newspapers that are closely connected to the riding, helps to give focus and substance to what is a diverse local political agenda. Important regional organizations and interest groups often have headquarters in these ridings, and as such, its agenda often deals with issues that stretch well beyond the riding boundaries. In part because the local political community is so diverse, campaigns in these ridings often deal with many social issues. In Vancouver Centre, all three candidates were liberal on these issues, and there was a distinctly "yuppie" quality to the local contest.

Media relations are crucial to way in which local campaigns operate. City candidates often act as party spokespeople, and deal with the many issues that are relevant to the local political agenda. Campaigns put a great deal of effort into coordinating their relations with the media. They organize special events aimed at attracting media attention, and organize media interviews for their candidate. Candidates in these ridings have a high profile, regularly appearing in the major metropolitan media. They are central to the local contest and their own campaign strategies, and their personal abilities are always on display. Voters expect to choose between competent, high profile candidates.

These contests are reported by media that is read across a large area, and also sends wire feeds to the national media. As such, it can play an important role in how city contests unfold. Events such as all-candidates’ debates can play a big part in these contests, and parties often try to run candidates that are competent at public speaking. Any controversies that do develop at these or other events are likely to be reported in the influential city media, and thus have an impact on the dynamics of the local contest.
Because the local media is so intimately connected with reporting the election at the local, provincial and to some degree national level, there is an interweaving of issues and agendas in these contests. The local agenda is not made subordinate to its national counterpart, but rather plays a critical role in interpreting national events at a regional level, and sending regional impulses to the national level.

Although both suburban and city voters have access to important metropolitan media, its reporting is more affected by events in the city ridings. Thus, the observation that urban voters generally have a greater access to media, and that this leads them to perceive more readily issues of a personal or group nature than their rural counterparts (Regenstreil 1964, 239), is increasingly true more for city rather than suburban voters. It was in response to just such perceptions on the part of city voters that the successful Vancouver Centre campaigns emphasized group politics. This points to the distinctive experiences of city and suburban voters and campaigns.

Finally, a local campaign is affected by whether or not it is involved in a contested election, and the degree to which it is involved in the local race. Uncontested races attract less media attention, make fewer demands on local campaigns, and are associated with lower voter turnout, than contested constituency elections. The positions of individual campaigns within these contests are also important. Uncompetitive campaigns attract fewer and arguably less able candidates, have smaller campaign teams with less money, and attract less media attention in their own right. In an uncontested race, only one campaign is competitive, and the others are excluded from full participation. In a contested race, at least two campaigns are strongly engaged in the
contest, but there are also likely to be uncompetitive campaigns that are marginalized from the real contest.

The next two chapters present case studies of eight local campaigns. Each of the studies is divided into three sections that focus on the factors that influence the style and content of local campaigns: the campaign team; its relationship to its non-local counterparts; and, the nature of the local contest.
As Figure 8.1 shows, the forces that determine the style and content of a local campaign have their genesis in the nature of the riding community and partisan organizational style of the riding association. These two factors shape the choice of the candidate, the composition of the campaign team, and its relationship to its non-local counterparts. These in turn determine the campaign’s response to the local riding contest. The nature of the local riding community and the competitiveness of the local campaigns underpin the character of the constituency election.

The next two chapters discuss eight case studies that illustrate how riding style and party ethos shape the style and content of local campaigns. This chapter deals with winning campaigns, and the next with losing campaigns. This is in recognition of the impact of contestedness and competitiveness on the final form of local contests, and the campaigns in that contest. All the campaigns in this chapter were competitive. Some however, were involved in closely contested constituency elections. Others were clear front-runners that disengaged from their opponents.

Three of the four losing campaigns presented in the next chapter were uncompetitive, while the fourth was somewhat competitive. While some were involved in closely contested constituency contests, none of had a chance of winning. Despite this, it should be noted that it is possible to have a losing campaign that is highly
FIGURE 8.1

THE STYLE AND CONTENT OF LOCAL CAMPAIGNS

Style and Content of Local Campaign

Candidate and Composition/Resources of Campaign Team

Campaign Environment

Relationship to National Campaign

The Local Contest

Nomination

Nature of Local Association

Non-Local Party Interference

Partisanship

Sociodemographics

Geography

Riding Community

Economy

Competitiveness

Media

Federal Election
competitive, and involved in a closely contested constituency elections.

RIDING AND PARTISAN INFLUENCES ON LOCAL CAMPAIGNS

Riding style and partisanship shape local campaigns in three arenas. The first is the nomination, which chooses a candidate and places around him or her a team of volunteers. Chapter four outlined how this process is a product of the nature of local associations, which themselves reflect both riding conditions and the organizational ethos of their party. Nominations can be distinguished by whether they are open or closed, and contested or uncontested. Open, contested nominations can be seen as a form of local democracy, while those closed to only party members but that are still contested exhibit a form of party democracy. Open, uncontested nominations occur in uncompetitive associations that cannot attract candidates, and can best be described as latent democracy, while those that are closed and uncontested occur where parties wish to restrict access to a nomination, and are thus cases of limited democracy.

As argued in chapter five, each of the different types of nominations produces a distinct type of candidate and campaign team. Local democracy produces local notables, party democracy favours party insiders, latent democracy yields stopgap candidates, and limited democracy is associated with high profile candidates. The campaign teams that surround each of these types of candidates tend to be similar across a range of characteristics: the relationship between the members of the inner circle of the team; the personnel and resources available to the team; the locus of decision making; and, the strategic focus of the campaign. These features are crucial to how it
goes about running a campaign.

The second arena in which local and partisan forces commingle to shape local campaigns is that defined by the *intra-party relations* that develop between the local and non-local campaigns. Local riding conditions play an important role in determining the interest that parties have in a particular riding contest or candidate, and hence, a particular campaign. But the nature of national party involvement in local affairs is also influenced by the organizational ethos of local parties. Mass parties are much more likely to be involved in setting local agendas than cadre style parties.

As noted in chapter six, the complexity of relations between local and non-local campaigns vary, as does the direction of resource flows between different levels of a party. Local notables run parochial campaigns, that are capable of organizing their own affairs. Relations between the two levels are shaped by their mutual interest, but controlled by the local level. Party insiders are involved in subsidiary campaigns in mass parties, and purposefully adopt the strategies of their non-local counterparts. Stopgap candidates in weak associations must adopt national party strategies and in so doing run parallel campaigns. Finally, high profile candidates are central players on the regional and national stage. Their campaigns are well organized and are components of the national party campaign effort.

Riding factors are mainly responsible for shaping the third arena, that of the *local contest*. But even here, the actions of local campaigns, and the partisan motives brought into the local contest via advertising and media reporting help determine its final form. The local political community defined by the riding boundaries is the base
unit for elections and politics in Canada. Chapter seven suggest that campaigns in three types of ridings, country, suburban and city, share a number of characteristics due to similarities in underlying characteristics of local political communities. Social heterogeneity, geography, the local economy, how campaigns engage each other, and the role played by the local media in reporting the contest all impact on the final form of a constituency election. By reporting the national campaign, the media also introduces the dynamics of the federal election into the riding. In this way, the actions of national parties also shape local contests.

In short, there are four general types of campaigns, found in three types of ridings. While there are clearly patterns in the types of campaigns that are found in a riding - for example, high profile candidates and campaigns are most often found in city ridings - there is also an array of possible permutations. The eight case studies presented in the next two chapters do not represent all the possible types of local campaigns. Rather, they have been chosen in part because they illustrate the relationships discussed in earlier chapters, and also because they are interesting stories in their own right.

There are two city, component campaigns from 1988 discussed in this chapter. The first is Kim Campbell's. Campbell was a quintessential high profile candidate in a city riding that receives plenty of media coverage. The campaign team was professional, and the campaign was a component of its national counterpart.

New Democrat incumbent Svend Robinson’s campaign was similar to Campbell’s, but somewhat remarkable in the degree to which it was different from other
NDP campaigns. Most New Democrat campaigns are subsidiary in that they voluntarily national adopt party strategies, and the candidate plays a secondary role. In Robinson's case, his campaign was a component of the national party effort and his personality was central to the local strategy.

Al Horning was a local notable running in the country riding of Okanagan Centre. His success reflected the work of a well funded campaign team that was personally committed to him. Using the local media, Horning was able to overcome early difficulties to win the riding. His parochial campaign only accepted assistance from the national party that it deemed important.

Finally, John Brewin was a party insider candidate who had run and lost in 1984 in the city riding of Victoria. The willingness of party members to defer in this way may reflect the sense of solidarity among members of a mass party such as the NDP. His campaign was a subsidiary of the federal NDP campaign in that it adopted strategies developed by the party. Not surprisingly, there are no stopgap candidates included in this chapter given that these campaigns occur in very weak associations and are usually uncompetitive. Although it is possible that such a candidate might win a riding, it is highly unlikely.

I have employed a common form in telling each of these eight campaign stories. The opening section gives an overview of the major campaigns in the local contest. From there, each description then details the nomination process and the nature of the resulting candidate and campaign team. This is followed by a analysis of intra-party relations. The final section covers the way in which the local campaign team engaged
with its competitors in the riding. The framework developed in earlier chapters is used throughout these descriptions to indicate patterns in the style and content of local campaigns and their root causes.

**KIM CAMPBELL: HIGH PROFILE PARTISAN**

Facing a large swing to the NDP in British Columbia, Conservative party organizers knew that they would need a *high profile* candidate if the party was to have any chance of winning the *city* riding of Vancouver Centre. Cabinet minister Pat Carney had decided not to seek re-election in Centre, leaving a large gap in the party’s BC roster. Kim Campbell, a provincial MLA, was convinced by local and non-local strategists to run for the party. She won a closed, uncontested nomination. With a very high profile in BC politics, Campbell was ideally suited to run in Centre. She had contested but lost the Socred leadership in 1986, and had since then had a stormy relationship with Premier Bill Vander Zalm. She was young, a woman, and socially progressive; all things which would appeal to the relatively young, diverse, and transient population of Centre.

Having moved in conservative circles in Vancouver for many years, Campbell knew many of the local association members. When she added her own team of supporters from provincial politics to those in the association, the end product was a highly skilled and professional campaign team. The campaign had good contacts with national strategists, received substantial funds from the federal party, and was an important *component* of the national Tory campaign. Her campaign was competitive
and engaged in a contested constituency election.

Although clearly a party insider, as the national president of the NDP, and having run for the riding before, Johanna den Hertog was also a high profile candidate. The party was confident of success and put together a solid campaign team which included a number of paid, professional campaigners. However, there was some local annoyance at the party’s support of den Hertog as the preferred candidate in the riding, and a number of local members decided to work on surrounding NDP campaigns in Vancouver East and Burnaby-Kingsway. Despite this, the campaign had more than adequate funds and workers. Her strong connections with the federal party, her access to extensive media coverage in her contest with Kim Campbell, and the resources available to her meant that den Hertog’s campaign was component of the national NDP effort. Den Hertog led in the polls prior to the election, and her campaign was engaged in a contest with Campbell’s.

Liberal Tex Enemark ran the weakest of the three major campaigns in the riding. Enemark had been an assistant to local MP Ron Basford, who was justice minister in the Trudeau government. Although there was one other candidate, Enemark had a stranglehold on the nomination, and it was essentially uncontested. Despite his contacts in the party, Enemark was really a stopgap candidate. The weak, local Liberal association was unable to provide volunteers. Enemark was forced to call upon his friends and acquaintances when building his campaign team. In the end, it was only enormous financial support from the federal party, available to him because of the profile of the riding and his own contacts in the party, that enabled Enemark to generate
the semblance of a campaign. Despite his efforts to run a parochial, locally focused campaign, Enemark was drawn into the national Liberal strategy and ran a *parallel* campaign. Unfortunately for the Liberals, Enemark’s campaign was *marginalized* from the real contest between den Hertog and Campbell.

Vancouver Centre is the quintessential city riding. It has a highly mobile, educated, and diverse population. The city area is known for its gay community, and its population includes voters from many ethnic minorities. While many of these voters were interested in social policy issues those connected to the downtown business community were interested in economic issues. Local, regional, and national issues all played a part in the local contest. Because many regional and national news services have headquarters in and around Centre, it attracted a great deal of media coverage. With a close race, and highly articulate candidates, it was an ideal backdrop for reporting on the election. The local campaigns and their national counterparts tried hard to take advantage of this coverage.

When the Liberal campaign proved to be lacking in substance, Enemark became irrelevant to the local contest, and it came down to a two way race between the NDP and the Tories. The Tory campaign used every available resource to good effect, particularly the candidate herself. The NDP ran a solid campaign, making use of its strong provincial resource base as well as national party support for its candidate den Hertog. In fact, this was one of the most hotly contested ridings in the country in 1988. On election day, Campbell won by just 269 votes, or 0.4 percent of the vote. Tory support had dropped by 4 percentage points. Liberal support was down 2 percentage
points, while the NDP had picked up an extra 6 points over the 1984 results.

The Candidate and Campaign Team

At the outset of the campaign, and without a candidate, the Conservatives own polling showed them behind the NDP in Vancouver Centre. Kim Campbell thought long and hard before accepting the nomination in Centre, which she did in the third week of the campaign. By this time, the party's national fortunes were starting to look a little brighter. As well, Pat Carney's constituency office and a campaign team from previous elections had been at work since the summer of 1988, running campaign style advertising in local newspapers and preparing for an election. In fact Carney's campaign manager from 1984, Lyall Knott, helped organize the search for a candidate in the riding. Her guaranteed ride unopposed through the nomination is a perfect example of the limited democracy often found in associations in ridings such as Vancouver Centre.

Campbell had been chair of the Vancouver School Board in the early 1980's, and her membership of the Social Credit caucus had given her a high public profile in BC. Her name was immediately recognizable to provincial voters, and particularly to her constituents in Vancouver who she had represented in the provincial legislature. Campbell was clearly the central focus of the campaign team. Her feisty personality, and her obvious ability marked her off as a high profile candidate of note. She was very much the strategic focus of the campaign. In addition, in her role as party spokesperson, she canvassed local, regional, and national issues.
The ethos of the campaign team was a mix of personal and professional. Because of the overlap in the support base of the Socreds provincially and the Conservatives federally, Campbell had support amongst many Tory voters and organizers in the province. This meant she had good contacts with the sorts of people that ran Tory campaigns in BC. Among these was long-time Conservative and Social Credit campaigner Patrick Kinsella. To this she added her own group of provincial supporters. Thus, not only did she have the support of the conservative elite in Vancouver, she had a widely experienced group of professional campaigners, many of whom knew her personally, to draw upon. As a result, the final shape of her campaign team and strategies reflected the decisions of both local and national party workers.

Many of the campaigners were on leave from professional jobs in downtown Vancouver, an area that the riding encompasses. Campaign personnel included advertising and public relations professionals, as well as graphic designers. They often brought with them the expertise and resources of the companies they worked for. With lawyers and accountants on the team as well, the campaign had a professional air about it. From office management to advertising, the campaign had access to qualified help. For example, the campaign used the services of creative consultant Ray McCallister, a professional event-organizer who went on to coordinate the Music 91 provincial music festival. The involvement of leading Tories in Campbell’s campaign was seen by workers on some other BC Conservative campaigns as evidence of the parties fixation on Campbell at their expense.

With an inner circle of about 20 workers, and another 50 secondary workers
willing to work in the central campaign, there was more than adequate help around the office. In addition, Knott estimates another 1,000 sympathizers helped at one time or another. While there is little doubt that the campaign contained people who were committed to the Conservative party, the tone of the campaign and the mind-set of the campaign team was very much one of electing a particularly well-qualified individual, Kim Campbell, to the job of MP. Commitment to Campbell and to running a professional campaign were important motivations for local campaigners.

The financial resources the campaign team had access to were stunning. It raised $116,488, more than twice the spending limit in the riding, and about twice that of either of Campbell’s main opponents. With this money, the local campaign could afford to do some polling of its own. In addition, the federal party did its own in-depth polling and analysis in the riding. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney took a special interest in the Vancouver Centre campaign, appearing a number of times in the riding. This was the epitome of a professional campaign team. Decision making in the campaign reflected the input of both local and national strategists. The campaign’s strategic focus was wide, and included the candidate as well as local, regional and national issues.

Intra-Party Relations

Conservative strategists expected the party to lose many of its seats in British Columbia in 1988, but felt that Vancouver Centre was both winnable, and important to win. The seat was considered high profile in the context of BC politics, and it was thought that a
powerful Centre campaign would have some spill-over effect on other BC ridings. Moreover, holding onto the riding would bolster the party's claim that it represented all parts of Canada. Despite the involvement of non-local strategists, the local campaign was strong enough to control its own destiny, and was a component of the national Tory campaign.

The belief that the party had a chance of winning the riding was not mere hopefulness. The party spent considerable money researching the riding. It then used this to convince Campbell that she was the sort of candidate that could win the riding. Strategists told her that "the riding was relatively stable, and could withstand the swing againsts the government expected throughout the province". The choice of Kim Campbell reflected the calculation that the right sort of candidate could win a close race in an important riding. Not only did retiring member Pat Carney encourage Campbell and personally support her candidacy within the party, she also put her campaign team from 1984 and the not inconsiderable resources of a government minister at her disposal. In the words of campaign manager Lyall Knott, the team ran a

...textbook campaign, with a textbook campaign structure. Every important campaign team position was filled by a knowledgeable campaigner. We had the money as well as the professional advice and assistance to ensure every aspect of campaigning was covered. These professional people were willing to work for nothing. In addition, the party put its considerable resources, both provincial and national, at our disposal.

The Vancouver Centre campaign was one of half a dozen identified for special treatment by the Conservative party. The funding provided Campbell by the Progressive Conservative Campaign Fund is indicative of the national party's support for her campaign. Whereas most other campaigns in BC received a few thousand dollars, and
usually via the provincial headquarters of the national campaign, Campbell received $19,490 from the national fund. By way of comparison, the Conservative incumbent in Kootenay West-Revelstoke received nothing from head office. But despite this, and the effort that the party put into Centre through polling and analysis prior to the election, it did not control the local campaign.

Contrary to national party directions, local strategists decided that the local campaign had to address free trade, a potentially damaging issue for the Tories. Vancouver Centre, with its large media outlets and central location was deeply embedded both in the regional and national debates over this major issue, which dominated the local riding context. Moreover, the NDP was willing to use the issue in BC to cement its position as the main opponent to the Conservatives in the province. But national strategists wanted to avoid it. Campaign manager Lyall Knott outlined the local strategy in this way:

We ran a campaign that was 180 degrees away from the one the national party suggested. They had not factored in the BC effect - that is, we were running against the NDP more than the Liberals. We thought that in Centre, the anti-free trade vote would be split between the Liberals and New Democrats, and we could come up the middle. In fact, national strategists didn't even think free trade would be the main issue at the outset of the campaign.

Moreover, as Campbell herself observed:

Local control of campaign strategy allowed us to make the most of the fact that I was a different sort of PC candidate; a feminist, pro-choice candidate, interested in local issues but capable of dealing with national issues. We were able to take advantage of our maverick status. [We were] an antidote to the traditional power politics of the east.

Fortunately for the local campaign, it had enough resources (some provided by the party) to develop its own strategies. This, and the abundance of media coverage and
advertising outlets in the riding helped it implement this strategy successfully. Once again, the symbiotic relationship between component and national campaigns is reflected in the relative autonomy of the local campaign. But this autonomy came at a price, as Knott noted:

Relations with the national party office in Vancouver deteriorated as a result of our decision. They did not believe a PC campaign could win running on this issue.

Yet at the same time, campaigners noted that her campaign played a role in the wider federal election. News stories by regional and national media concerning national issues often dealt with Campbell’s campaign. She was also asked for her opinion on a range of local, regional and national issues. In fact, the national campaign asked for copies of the free trade literature produced in Centre after John Turner’s strong performance in the leaders’ debates raised interest in the issue. The national campaign needed this sort of media attention, and could not afford to alienate candidates such as Campbell, nor local campaign organizers.

The Local Contest

Fortunately for Campbell she walked into a campaign organization that was already up and running. The addition of some of her own supporters strengthened the team further. A defacto "candidate-less" campaign run by Pat Carney’s campaign organization and constituency office had been going on during the summer of 1988. The Carney campaign had been advertising in community newspapers with special four page inserts designed to look like the rest of the paper. Ostensibly presented as information
packages on issues such as free trade, supplements were as much designed to sell the
government’s policies and enhance her re-election chances by touting her role in the free
trade negotiations and the government. When Campbell became the Tory candidate, the
local organization ran a similar advertisement with her name attached.

The nature of this cosmopolitan city riding had profound implications for the
Tory campaign. The political history of the riding held mixed signals for the Tories.
Many pundits, and certainly the polls, were predicting that the NDP would ride the anti-
Tory wave to victory in Centre. It held the two provincial seats in the area, and their
federal performance had improved in recent elections. But the riding has often sent high
profile members to Ottawa. And with their access to influential local, regional and
national media, candidates received a great deal of media coverage. They had a chance
to both present themselves to the public and canvass many issues.

The central theme of the Conservative campaign in Vancouver Centre was Kim
Campbell. She was young, intelligent, experienced, socially progressive, and forceful -
the sort of competent politician a high profile riding deserved. Focusing on the
candidate was the party’s response to the unpopularity of the federal government in
British Columbia. It hoped that by presenting such a good candidate, it could hold on
to this very high profile riding.

Campbell herself noted that her existing public profile was part of the reason she
was wooed by the party and why she won the election. The appointment of Campbell
in late October reflected the difficulty of finding a strong candidate in a riding that the
Tories might lose. Nevertheless, the local association was determined to wait until the
last moment before giving up hope that it could find such a candidate. Without such a candidate, the party knew it had little or no chance of winning the riding.

Tory strategists ensured that Campbell received maximum exposure on the extensive media based in Vancouver Centre. Organizers had her appear at any event that might receive media coverage, and specially constructed events for this purpose. Campbell noted that she had very little to do with the day-to-day running of the campaign. She went where she was told and did what she enjoys and does well: speaking to people. Centre turned out to be a closely fought election campaign, with the NDP and Tories closely engaged with each other. Campbell's win in 1988 in an area dominated by the NDP provincially must go down as a remarkable result. Her personal campaign skills, and her ability to attract to her a team of professional campaigners were crucial to this result.

One of the great benefits of having a campaign strategy built around a competent candidate with access to the media is that a campaign can quickly and effectively respond to the actions of its opponents. The very next press conference or public event provides an opportunity for the candidate to defend his or her position or attack that of an opponent at very little cost to the campaign. This gives a campaign added incentive to hold press conferences and arrange public events. Campaigns in Centre seized every opportunity to gain exposure for their candidates, and they all attended every all-candidates' debate and made innumerable public appearances, both spontaneous and scripted. This heightened the sense that the campaigns were truly engaged with each other, as a statement by one candidate was quickly challenged publicly by an opponent.
The decision to address free trade against the advice of national strategists presented problems for the local campaign, in part because the issue was so closely linked to the unpopular Mulroney. But local strategists believed that in a sophisticated city riding with major news outlets within its borders it would be impossible to avoid the debate over free trade. They decided to tackle the issue head-on. They knew that Campbell’s profile and the media coverage she would attract would allow her to address this issue within a local context. They hoped that by addressing free trade locally, Campbell would prove herself to be both her own person - and therefore able to be elected against the anti-Tory tide in the province - and competent, and worth sending to Ottawa.

Her forceful defense of free trade at public forums helped her capture substantial media attention, and highlighted her strength of character and intelligence. At the all-candidates’ debate in Christ Church Cathedral, Campbell made headlines by challenging anti-free trade hecklers in the crowd, asking them "what [they were] afraid of", and suggesting that those voters with real faith in Canada should have no fear of American dominance due to the agreement. Not surprisingly, such differences in strategy strained relations. More than once, national strategists told local organizers that they had given up on winning the seat. Such independence is only possible when a local campaign can ré-define the election in its constituency. This requires experience and political nous, as well as both the resources and the opportunity.

The downtown location of the riding gave local candidates a reason to address many diverse issues. Many companies and organizations working in different sectors of
the BC economy have their head offices in Vancouver. Thus, issues such as fishing, forestry, and mining, could be addressed using company or association representatives from their respective Vancouver headquarters. This allowed both parties and the media to simplify some of the logistical demands of a province-wide campaign. As a result, the campaign dealt with a wide array of issues, including Campbell’s pro-choice stance, her progressive attitudes toward homosexuality, and her interest in issues affecting women.

Both party officials and the media agreed that in a potentially volatile constituency, a good candidate could be crucial to success. Strong candidates are an attraction for the media, so their activities tend to get reported. Their personal qualities are a vital part of the campaign, particularly as a member from Vancouver Centre may well be in Cabinet if his/her party wins office. Just as crucially, Campbell had built up a working relationship with Vancouver journalists during her time as provincial MLA and minister. She was comfortable with them, and they with her. One local journalist was so taken by her, that he built an impressive pictorial record of her on the campaign trail.

Given that Vancouver Centre is home to most of the major media of British Columbia, coverage of the contest was extensive. The following is a limited selection of those media that covered the election in some detail: the local community newspapers, the WestEnder and the Courier; the main Vancouver television stations including the CBC, Radio Canada, BCTV, and CKVU; several radio stations including both French and English CBC as well as CKNW; and, the daily Vancouver newspapers
the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Province*. All of these have extensive affiliation arrangements for both receiving news from and distributing news to other parts of Canada. Except for the community newspapers and *CKVU*, all have local relays or are published throughout British Columbia. The local *Rogers Cable* station hosted an all-candidates’ debate. *Vancouver Centre* also attracted attention from the *Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Star*, national editions of several news programs, and Dutch, West German, British and American television.

With access to this amount of media, Campbell and den Hertog’s campaigns had a chance to set the local agenda, and also act as components of their respective national campaigns. Particularly in the case of Campbell, it is one of the paradoxes of component campaigns that they are in a position to defy national party strategists. This is because they have the capacity to generate their own strategies, and because national campaigns need them, they have the freedom to implement these policies. This symbiotic relationship means that the local campaign is not at the whim of the federal election campaign. Environmental issues, gay concerns, and abortion were also issues treated in this manner.

Attempts by national strategists to take advantage of media coverage of this high profile contest were criticized by some local campaigners, who thought that this distorted the media reporting of the election, and skewing the content of the local issue space in favour of non-local concerns (Sayers 1991, 45).
SVEND ROBINSON: LOCAL BOY, NATIONAL HERO

Svend Robinson is a high profile politician who is closely associated with issues that are important to his party. Although the local NDP association was competitive, its impermeability and the presence of an incumbent forestalled a candidate search and any challenge to his re-nomination in 1988. He was acclaimed after a closed, uncontested nomination. With a mix of strong local and national support, Robinson built a professional, experienced, and well financed campaign team whose members were strongly committed to his vision of politics; a vision that was seen as symbolic of the politics of the NDP. His strong connections to the national party as national spokesperson on defence and other issues helped ensure that his campaign was a component of the national NDP effort.

Robinson was expected to win, but strategists admitted to some uncertainty as a result of Robinson's public announcement of his homosexuality and changes to riding boundaries in the area. It is possible that in a socially diverse city riding such as Burnaby-Kingsway, that has a history of voting for the NDP, that such an admission was never going to be a liability. With a powerful campaign team committed to both Robinson and the party and excess media coverage of the candidate, the NDP ran a professional campaign that maximized his chances of success. Robinson was a front-runner in a uncontested local constituency election. He went on to record an easy victory, gaining 43 percent of the vote, well ahead of the Tories at 29.8 percent and the Liberals at 22.1 percent.

Robinson's Progressive Conservative opponent was John Bitonti, a local notable
who had run for the BC Socreds in 1987. Although asked to run for the nomination by some local Tories, Bitonti was an insurgent local notable candidate as he was not a member of the association prior to 1988. He won the open, contested, race with the support of relatives and acquaintances in the local Italian-Canadian community. But in so doing, he alienated a number of traditional association members, many of whom refused to help with his campaign. Many of Bitonti’s supporters had little interest in politics. Moreover, he did not look like winning the riding. As a result, few of his supporters were willing to follow him into the campaign, and his campaign suffered from both a lack of funds and of experienced workers. He was forced to rely on an intimate band of family and friends in forming his campaign team. The campaign had little support from the national party, which did not think Bitonti had much of a chance in Burnaby-Kingsway.

Strategically, Bitonti’s campaign was poorly directed. Despite the fact that he was not interested in many of the main themes of the national campaign, Bitonti lacked the resources to run a parochial campaign. While he tried to generate interest in what he thought was a local issue - Svend Robinson’s personality - this was in fact a national issue. Some national Tory strategist saw his anti-gay views as strategically problematic for the party. They did not want his comments to alienate the large gay community in Vancouver Centre, where Kim Campbell was involved in a tight race with the NDP. Bitonti’s was a failed parochial campaign that was excluded from what was an uncontested constituency election by Robinson’s strong electoral position and his professional campaign.
The very weak local Liberal association could not find its own candidate. Although the nomination was open, it was uncontested, and the party appointed party worker Sam Stevens as a *stopgap* candidate in the riding. The campaign team consisted of a few local party stalwarts who had little in the way of funds or other resources. The campaign received substantially more than the average amount given to BC Liberal campaigns by the national party. The help given by the party accounted for a third of the paltry $18,071 raised by the campaign. This was a *parallel* campaign that was *excluded* from the constituency election and had little impact on the local contest.

Only Robinson’s campaign was competitive in the local contest. In fact, his personality dominated the local contest. At no time did the local campaigns ever engage each other. Although Robinson received a great deal of media attention, the local contest and his opponents did not. This media coverage was disproportionately national and provincial, and focused on Robinson’s own agenda.

**The Candidate and Campaign Team**

Svend Robinson’s high public profile and political influence have a number of sources. He is a well-known and respected MP with a reputation for hard work both within his party and his constituency. Robinson is very much at home in Burnaby-Kingsway, and takes pride in the fact that he is a local boy: a graduate of Burnaby North High School who grew up in the area and is now its Member of Parliament. He makes much of his main street, store-front, constituency office in Burnaby as evidence of the access his constituents have to their local member.
Robinson believes he understands the riding, the local issues, and people who live there, and has good support in what has been a strongly NDP riding. As an incumbent, he has access to all the advantages of a constituency office. He has a place where he can meet voters, a coordination centre from which to begin campaigning, the capacity to maintain lists of volunteers and supporters, mailing privileges, and the advantages of continuity in seeking funds and voter support (see Heintzman 1991).

Robinson has also attracted attention as a national spokesperson for gay and lesbian communities across Canada, and has been the NDP critic on a number of issues. His public admission of his homosexuality has given him a high degree of moral credibility among some voters interested in these issues. This national profile and his membership of the NDP executive means that he is intimately connected with party policy-making. He is both a powerful party insider and a high profile public figure. It is not surprising that his renomination was by acclamation; a good example of the limited democracy found in most incumbent nominations.

Robinson enjoyed the support of both his partisan followers in Burnaby-Kingsway, and an issue-oriented, national constituency. Gays in particular, had in Robinson's words, "a direct interest in his re-election." Not only does he work on behalf of these groups, he is a standard-bearer; a role model for a minority that has suffered from extensive discrimination, and for whom public admission of homosexuality is a politically-charged issue.

Many campaign team members exhibited a strong personal commitment to Robinson, either because of his national leadership on some issues, or his role as an
effective local member. Unlike in many other NDP campaigns, volunteers in Burnaby-Kingsway ranked the candidate as very important to the overall campaign strategy. This is to be expected given Robinson's special personal appeal. Although the party platform and the candidate were considered of about equal importance, it is clear that Robinson was an important symbol to campaign workers, and to the party at large. For many members of the campaign inner circle, his candidacy was of great symbolic value, showing the acceptance of gays into mainstream Canada.

Given the strength of the NDP vote in the area, the local association was strong and provided the campaign with substantial funds and numbers of workers. As well, his appeal as a national crusader in 1988 meant he attracted workers from outside the riding. Some were experienced NDP organizers who work in critical campaigns both at the federal and provincial level, and who chose to work with Robinson. Many of his constituency office workers supported his politics, and in addition, had a vested interest in seeing their employer returned as the local MP. One indication of the special appeal of the NDP Burnaby-Kingsway campaign for some activists was the syphoning off of workers from other NDP campaigns in Vancouver. Workers interested social policy and gay and lesbian issues moved from the Vancouver Centre campaign of Johanna den Hertog to Robinson's Burnaby-Kingsway campaign.

The central core of workers in Robinson's campaign numbered around 15. The campaign's inner circle exhibited a high degree of solidarity and professionalism. The second circle of workers numbered about 50, but his high profile meant that he had access to a further 500 or so from the local association and among sympathizers.
Local fund-raising efforts were extensive and effective, made easier by Robinson’s national profile. He attracted funds from political activists and gays and lesbians across Canada, and his high profile support reinforced the image in his riding that its MP was an influential politician. This in turn strengthened his local appeal, and made fund-raising that much easier. The attendance of well-known television personality and environmentalist David Suzuki at a fund-raising event reinforced his stature as a national figure, and helped ensure the event was a success. Regular appearances on national television, often with important public figures, further heightened his profile.

By the time of the election, the campaign had raised $70 331. This is three and a half times what either the Conservative or Liberal campaigns in Burnaby-Kingsway were able to raise, and about twice the average fund-raising result for British Columbian New Democrat campaigns.¹ The campaign managed to spend 93 percent of the $49 005 spending limit in the riding. In comparison, his PC opponent spent 69.2 percent of the limit, and the Liberal candidate 35.2 percent.

Robinson’s profile ensured that his campaign was intertwined with the national NDP effort. Many of his organizers are experienced party workers, and Robinson was a prominent figure in the national campaign. He has wide interests, and his professional campaign, position in the party, and access to national media. Because of his public profile and ideological bona fides, Robinson is important to the NDP. The support he

¹D. Keith Heintzman argues that the ability of incumbents to reach campaign expenditure limits helps them win. These limits also prevent other candidates from using extra campaign spending to overcome the advantage of incumbency (Heintzman 1991, 143-44).
attracts across Canada gives the party reason to allow him leeway in how he campaigns. As well, the strength of his campaign team enabled him to maintain some independence from the national campaign and to address many issues. While the focus of Robinson’s campaign moved across local and national issues, the locus of strategic decision making remained at the local level.

Robinson was reasonably confident that he would hold the riding in 1988. He had substantial personal support, and the New Democrat’s star was on the rise, particularly in British Columbia where the party expected to benefit from Conservative losses. Even the substantial redrawing of electoral boundaries in Burnaby just prior to the 1988 election was unlikely to affect him adversely, as the whole area has a history of voting for the New Democrats, and he had continuously held his seat since 1979. But he had not run as an openly declared homosexual before, and there was uncertainty as to how voters would respond to this. On the other hand, it gave his campaign something of the air of a crusade, and meant it attracted added financial and volunteer support.

Intra-Party Relations

The election of a gay candidate was seen as symbolically very important to many people besides Robinson. Among gays and lesbians, it was seen as a measure of their progress in accessing the political system and their acceptance in wider society. It also reinforced the NDP’s position as a champion of minority causes, and its support of the peace and environment issues that Robinson also championed. As an important policy
maker and opinion leader in the party. Robinson’s high profile brought it much media coverage and helped cement its position on the political spectrum. Robinson was important to the party for these reasons, and because no party wishes to lose a seat it already holds.

The symbiotic relationship between local and national organizations which is the hallmark of component campaigns was evident with respect to the Robinson campaign. Being so closely involved with the national politics, Robinson was invited to speak at regional and national press conferences organized by the party to deal with important issues as they arose during the campaign. He also advised party leader Ed Broadbent in relation to a number of justice issues. In addition, he was heavily involved in the candidate school run by the party to educate candidates and campaign managers in British Columbia. He believes these schools are useful for educating new candidates via interaction with experienced candidates such as himself.

Robinson’s campaign did not require financial or staffing support from the national party, which prefers to avoid offering such help to incumbents, who it hopes are well organized (Stanbury 1991, 151). However, the party made available technical support in the form of polling data, as well as assistance from professionals at party headquarters. As a result, the campaign was in close touch with national campaign strategists, and privy to major tactical and strategic decision-making in which Robinson was often personally involved.

A party wants candidates to speak to issues it sees as important, and to stick to the party line. Maverick candidates that have their own agenda can be damaging to the
national campaign. For their part, candidates that neglect local affairs, or support locally unpopular policies at the behest of their party, can damage their own local campaign. There is always some tension in this relationship. This is even more so in the case of high profile candidates. On one hand, this is just the sort of candidate a party wants to use as spokesperson. On the other hand, they have strong enough local campaigns and access to the media in their own right, and may be difficult to control.

In mass parties such as the NDP, that expect conformity from their members, the independence of high profile candidates is particularly noticeable. Because of his strategic value to the party, and the fact that he could finance and operate a strong campaign of his own, Robinson had some discretion in interpreting party policy. In fact, as Robinson notes, although he shared the party’s objectives, and the strategic focus of his campaign included local and non-local issues, it was not formally integrated into the national campaign.

The national campaign has a life of its own. There was little contact between the local campaign and the national campaign, in part because we were so well organized, and because my riding was not seen as a priority. [That is, the party expected to win it.] For example, Broadbent did not visit Burnaby-Kingsway during the election campaign.

The fact that Robinson could "...[ask] Ed Broadbent to step aside and let me act as party spokesperson on a number of issues, including those affecting gays and lesbians" indicates that his is an exceptional case of this independence.

Despite their potential for independent action, component campaigns, are embedded in party affairs. As a result, their strategic vision is likely to be similar to that of national strategists. As well, component campaigns receive enough media
attention that have the opportunity to raise many issues, both local and non-local. While on the one hand media coverage helps cause tensions, it is also a means for dealing with tensions between national and local campaigns.

The symbiotic relationship between component campaigns and the national party gives the former some autonomy. The national party needs these campaigns, and does not wish to alienate high profile candidates. How the centrifugal impulse of financial independence and access to media balance the centripetal forces of integration depend on the strength and organizational ethos of the party and the local campaign. In this case, although deeply embedded in NDP politics, Robinson’s campaign was largely a world unto itself. Robinson’s pursuit of his own agenda and the party’s willingness to accept this behaviour mark him out as a very different NDP candidate. In a party that prides itself on solidarity and uniformity, he is the exception that proves the rule.

**The Local Contest**

Robinson’s constituency office staff began a *de facto* campaign well before the election was called. Lists of donors and volunteers from previous elections were dusted off, and used to solicit volunteers and funds. Pamphlets extolling Robinson’s virtues were printed and distributed. And as is common among MP’s, Robinson’s office made a point of issuing Householders just prior to the 1988 election, reminding voters of his work for the riding, his accessibility, and pointing to his leadership on high profile issues.

The close relationship between Robinson and the inner circle of campaigners led
him to cede control of his campaign to the campaign team. In his own words,

I do what I am told, I trust their judgement. The most important thing for a
candidate to know is how to take directions from his or her campaign team.

Somewhat paradoxically then, the closeness of the relationship between Robinson and
his team removed him from the everyday strategic decisions required of a campaign.
This was only possible because the team had developed and demonstrated their expertise
in previous elections. Robinson not only trusts their judgement, but he has learnt that
this trust is the basis of a successful *modus operandi*. Winning campaigns tend to use
the same style of campaigning that has been successful for them in the past.

Robinson’s campaign team canvassed the riding thoroughly on his behalf, and
ran the campaign office. By relying heavily on his campaign team to oversee the day to
day organization of the office, Robinson was free to campaign in person about 80 to 90
percent of the time, although he did little door-to-door work, but rather focused on
public events. This is common in the case of incumbents and high profile candidates
(Land 1965, 89).

Separation from mundane tasks was critical in allowing Robinson to campaign in
person across the country and in his own riding. His public profile became the central
organizing theme of the campaign. The campaign revolved around him - where he
went, what he did, the issues he stood for, the media he had access to, and the resources
he brought with him. In a programmatical party such as the NDP, this emphasis on the
candidate is a rarity, and reveals the national party’s willingness to trust Robinson with
this role.

Burnaby-Kingsway, like most city ridings, also encompasses suburban polls.
Whereas the suburban part of the riding is amenable to traditional forms of campaigning, such as foot canvassing and street signs, the more densely populated parts need special attention. Robinson estimates that about 40 percent of the population live in high rise apartments in his riding. These apartments are difficult to canvass in person, because canvassers have to get past security systems, and tenants are notoriously reluctant to allow this to happen. All campaigns try to attract good media coverage, but it is especially important to city campaigns because it may be the only way they can communicate with these voters. Attracting major media coverage was a critical element of Robinson’s campaign strategy. It is thought to be influential, and is seen by voters in Burnaby-Kingsway.

Campaigners worked to maximise his exposure to the media in BC and across the country, and to portray him as an national political figure who took principled stands on a number of important issues. At the local level, the campaign worked hard to show him as a concerned and effective local member. Because national media exposure is also seen in Burnaby-Kingsway, this was an effective strategy, making the point that the riding had an influential MP.

As a high profile candidate, Robinson attracted the attention of the metropolitan media, including high rating television stations such as BCTV, the most popular Vancouver station. But his campaign worked hard to provide him with the sorts of

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2In fact, dwellings in the riding are about evenly split between single-detached houses and all others, which is proportionally much greater than the provincial average. The riding also has a very high level of rented accommodation, at about 41 percent (Canada. Statistics Canada 1987, 135-136).
situations that are worth reporting. When he was in the riding, Robinson did most of his door-to-door campaigning in the mornings, and attended events and other press conferences in the afternoon. In a typical day, with the morning spent canvassing and the afternoon at some event, Robinson would return to the campaign office at about 9 p.m. in the evening to answer questions from campaigners, and see the schedule for the following day.

The Burnaby-Kingsway area has a large number of seniors’ homes, and two large educational institutions, Simon Fraser University and the British Columbian Institute of Technology. The seniors’ homes often provide direct contact with local voters. The campaign considered seniors to be very important, as they have a high propensity to vote, and meetings with seniors provide a good backdrop for media reporting. Robinson’s campaign targeted (or "blitzed" as Robinson calls it) seniors’ homes to meet with voters, and to provide a backdrop for media exposure that would get to other voters in the riding. He visited seniors’ homes, gave speeches, and made a point of chatting with seniors in order to emphasize his local roots in the riding and his interest in people issues. Images of Robinson with senior citizens helped reinforce his standing as a respected, caring, local member.

These educational institutions also provide a useful backdrop for a campaign. Robinson’s efforts at SFU and BCIT were designed to present, both directly and through the media, an image of a candidate concerned for young people and education. Many of those that attend debates and other events at these institutions may not be Burnaby-Kingsway voters. Nevertheless, these events are well covered by the major media. This
can further heighten the profile of candidates such as Robinson, who are invited to
events organized by students precisely because of their public profile. If a media scrum
develops at one of these events, he is often asked about national issues in his role as a
party spokesperson and senior NDP member. This allows him to address a wider
audience, and reaffirms his national stature with local voters. But the candidate forums
held in such places can hold dangers, as media coverage means a gaffe by a candidate
can be very damaging.

The second element of the strategy to deal with voters living in apartments was a
heavy reliance on phone banks. Phone banks allowed campaigners to get to voters, and
were seen as much less intrusive than canvassing in person. The expense of phone
banks, and the need to staff them can place great demands on local campaigns. Neither
of Robinson's opponents could afford this effort.

Whether canvassing is done by foot or phone, the process is much the same.
Voters were classified as either supporter, undecided, or hostile. This information, along
with historical patterns of support was collated by poll. The effort put into a certain
poll, and the style of campaigning adopted depended, on how it was classified. Hostile
polls received the least attention, while strongly supportive polls received attention in
the form or requests for help and money. Supportive polls were targeted on election
day in order to get out the vote. It was the polls where there were many undecided
voters that receive the greatest attention, and were subjected to the most aggressive
campaigning by all the major parties.

Access to a phone bank meant that Robinson's campaign could call undecided
voters several times during the election. Canvassers may have offered to send particular information, or suggested a meeting with the candidates or campaign representative. The concerns of these voters were addressed through specifically designed letters signed by the candidate. In Burnaby-Kingsway, any voter that showed an interest in the campaign, either when approached personally or by phone, was sent a detailed outline of the NDP platform and Robinson's particular interest.

In 1988, the campaign used a mix of local, regional, and national issues to gain the voter's attention. Major issues, such as human rights, social policy, free trade and the GST shared billing with local concerns such as pollution from a local refinery, and transportation problems - an acute concern for commuters in Burnaby. But it was Robinson's profile on national issues which dominated campaign literature and advertising. Robinson also saw national leadership as crucial to election outcomes. This view was not shared by many campaign workers in BC, and is evidence of his strong ties to national party strategies which highlighted Ed Broadbent's leadership.

Relations between the media and the Robinson campaign were extensive. Even before his 1988 announcement of his homosexuality, his media profile was high. Events during the campaign, including ambiguous comments about his sexuality by his Conservative opponent, and the Prime Minister, only heightened media interest in him and his campaign. He estimated that 75 percent of his press releases were used by the media. This was the highest percentage reported by any campaign. Moreover, major media usually came to his press conferences.

Robinson considers coverage by BCTV, the most watched station in Vancouver,
to have been critical to his campaign. He also received extensive coverage in the
Vancouver dailies, the *Vancouver Sun* and *The Province*, as well as radio, including the
most popular station CKNW. Further, his national profile was enhanced by coverage in
the *Globe and Mail* and national CBC and CTV television. Such media exposure
singles out his campaign as one that is of a different order than most.

Because there was alternative sources of media cover, Robinson’s campaign did
not pay community newspapers much attention. Those that covered the contest in
Burnaby-Kingsway were not considered influential. Although Robinson gave interviews
to these newspapers, they played nearly no role in the campaign strategy. While the
local community newspapers believed they should cover the contest, an inability to be
original devalued their impact. In fact, many editors dreaded the extra demands made
of their limited resources and newsrooms during elections. This is particularly if, as in
1988, local municipal elections occur at about the same time as the national one.

Despite their lack of value as a news source, community newspapers are the
main vehicle for campaign advertising as they are the only advertising local campaigns
can afford. Burnaby-Kingsway is relatively lacking in local newspapers. The Burnaby
*NOW* (which reaches beyond the riding boundaries) and the *EastEnder* (covering the
entire Vancouver east side) are the main community newspapers in the riding. Both
SFU and BCIT have student newspapers, and the campaign advertised in these as well.
All these newspapers ran profiles of the candidates, and covered the election, but were
not considered influential. But campaigners are conservative and averse to taking risks,
and will usually not dare to miss an opportunity to advertise where they can afford to,
even if the impact is dubious. The print advertisements, as well as the campaign brochures, were all locally produced. The lack of local media made it doubly important for Robinson’s campaign to maximize its exposure in regional and national newspapers and television.

Because of his confidence in his own position and his sense that he can read the public mind in his riding, Robinson does not use any local polling. Rather, the campaign relies heavily on gaining a sense of voters concerns through canvassing, and having identified undecided, concentrates on garnering their support. Robinson’s confidence is also seen in his attitude towards all-candidates’ debates. His attitude also indicate just how uncompetitive his opponents were, and how little the local campaigns engaged with each other.

We agreed to attend one all-candidates’ meeting. I did not need the exposure, and these events are essentially boring. We get much better exposure at events organized for either myself, or a group of NDP candidates. We did half a dozen meet-the-candidate events, advertising them by dropping literature in the area first, and then reporting what was said at the meeting in the literature dropped after the event. I do not need to go head to head with my opponents - my electoral position does not require it.

There was relatively little interaction between the local campaigns in Burnaby-Kingsway. In fact, a lack of engagement between the local campaigns was a defining characteristic of the local contest. Despite some concern in the NDP about the impact on his chances of Robinson’s candour with respect to his personal life, it turned out that his was the only competitive campaign in what was an essentially uncontested riding.

In fact, not only was the Liberal campaign very weak, but it appears that local
and non-local Tories gave their own candidate no chance of winning. The candidate himself, John Bitonti, believes that the party did not appreciate his controversial stand on family values, and did not want him exposed to the media. He concludes that they were happy to see him lose the riding. Robinson recounts how listless his opponents' campaigns were:

On election night, I went to visit my opponents. I could not find the Liberal headquarters, and tracked down Bitonti in a hotel room with his sister and bother-in-law and two other people; it was sad. Other than the all-candidates' meeting, this is the only time I met or was aware of my opponents. Our campaign did not directly address them [as a serious challenge] at any stage.

The New Democrats could afford to largely ignore the other local campaigns, and concentrated instead on keeping Robinson in the public eye.

His involvement in the federal election campaign, and the national and regional media played a key role in cementing Robinson's position as the only competitive candidate in Burnaby-Kingsway in 1988. Robinson's campaign used his profile, and his access to major media to communicate with voters. The nature of the riding, with its diverse political community, and history of voting for the NDP, meant many voters were sympathetic to his message. Moreover, city ridings expect their candidates to have high profile, and to have them reported in the major media. Similarly, the discussion of a range of issues important to local, regional, and national politics was expected in this heterogeneous community.

Just as his campaign was a component of the national NDP campaign, the local contest was in a sense a component of the federal election writ large. This was heightened by the role played by Robinson in national affairs, and the fact that his
candidacy became a *cause celebre*. Due to his dominance of the local contest, his opponents did not share in this notoriety. Other parts of Canada knew a lot about Svend Robinson, and that he was the MP for Burnaby-Kingsway, but little about his opponents or local issues. The national and local campaigns were intertwined through the person of Robinson. If one of his opponents had seriously challenged Robinson, there is little doubt that this would have been a major news story, and that person would have had a national profile.

Yet while the campaign strategy was heavily loaded towards media events, and Robinson spent much of his time playing to a national audience, the danger of losing touch with local events was diminished by the efforts of his superb campaign team, which paid close attention to local campaigning. It met all the demands of local campaigning - foot and phone canvassing, leaflet drops, placing signs, and so on. Local campaigners made full use of Robinson’s time in the riding during the election, ensuring that the media captured him dealing with local people and issues. It even made a point of trying to tie his national statements into local issues. By working hard in the riding, Robinson and his campaign team continued to cultivate his image as a local boy, and by taking advantage of national media coverage, he promoted his image as a national hero.

**AL HORNING: PACKAGING A LOCAL NOTABLE**

A *local notable*, Al Horning had served on the local council and was a member of many local service organizations when he decided to run for the Tory nomination in the *country* riding of Okanagan Centre. Although he had contacts amongst Tory members,
he was not himself a long-standing member of the Progressive Conservative party, and had not been active in national politics. But he was considered more mainstream than his major rival, who was a pro-life advocate. Because the area has voted Conservative in the past, the nomination had a good deal of appeal for potential candidates. And like most new associations in the cadre style Tory party, it was very permeable and had an open search process.

Horning won a highly contested nomination by recruiting many members and convincing some of his opponents and stalwarts of the party to back him on the second ballot. These new members and some local party stalwarts formed the basis of a well financed and staffed campaign team that ran a highly parochial campaign based on Horning’s personal connection to the riding. A professional tenor was added to the personal tone of relations among the inner circle when Horning appointed Brian Lightburn, an experienced public relations organizer, to deal with media relations. The intimate nature of the campaign team and the resources available to it, allowed it to develop a locally directed, parochial campaign. Although a front-runner in what was in the main an uncontested constituency election, events during the campaign complicated Horning’s electioneering.

The rise of the Reform party, led by candidate and original party member Werner Schmidt, was a shock to the local Tories. Schmidt won an open, contested nomination. Although his campaign lacked the resources and volunteers of the NDP and Tory campaigns, it attracted both money and people as the campaign progressed and Schmidt continued to do well at public events. Given the nascent quality of the Reform
party in 1988, it is difficult to say much more about his campaign.

Horning’s main rival was NDP candidate and local businessman Bryan McIver. Despite the fact that the riding was new, the existing cohort of NDP members from the previous ridings was simply divided to fit the associations created by the new boundaries. Some of these associations were competitive, and reassigning their resources and members, while controversial, gave a fillip to what might otherwise have been weak new associations in those areas of Tory dominance such as Kelowna.

The Okanagan Centre association was relatively impermeable. Although McIver had once been a member of the Tory party, he had been a NDP member for a number of years, and was a party insider. The search committee managed to attract three existing members to run for the nomination. McIver won a classic closed but contested New Democrat nomination.

Given that the party has never done well in Kelowna the local association was not one of the strongest in the province. Although it mustered enough workers and money to run a solid campaign, it was a subsidiary campaign, relying heavily on the regional and national strategies of the party to give it direction. Fortunately, the importance of intensive agriculture in the local economy, which looked likely to be damaged by the free trade deal, made these strategies relevant in the local context. However, given the strength of the Conservative campaign in the riding, the NDP was largely excluded from the constituency election, although there were brief moments during the campaign when the NDP did manage to engage with the Tories.

Spurred on by the opportunity to reshape the political landscape out of the
uncertainty generated by new riding boundaries, the Liberals conducted a candidate search which attracted four candidates to the nomination. These candidates managed to sign up over a thousand members to the new association. In the end, local notable Murli Pendharkar, a former school superintendent, won the nomination on the first ballot with strong support of members from the local Indo-Canadian community.

Unfortunately, the Liberals original optimism turned out to be misplaced, as the party struggled to raise money and to find experienced campaigners. Even the job of campaign manager had to be shared between two people, as no one experienced volunteer was willing to shoulder the responsibility. As with other weak local notable campaigns in cadre style parties, this one hovered between being parochial - trying to run a locally directed campaign - and being a parallel campaign - simply reflecting the strategic moves of its national counterpart. In the end, it was largely swept up in the local free trade debate; a debate which better suited the NDP and Tory campaigns, and which excluded the Liberals from the local election.

The political community defined by a country riding often has clear interests. As such, the Okanagan Centre contest had a clear local focus. The issues that interest voters in the riding - intensive agriculture, water resources, and tourism - are rooted in the rural nature of the riding. Country ridings often have relatively undiversified economies, so that anything that affects a major industry in the riding can have ramifications for employment throughout the area. Because of the potential impact of free trade on the local economy, this quickly developed into the major issue of the campaign. But the issue was interpreted through local lenses.
The local media was both influential, and interested in local affairs. Local campaigns managed to engage with each other, in part because of the local media, which had the resources to cover the local campaign, and events such as all-candidates' debates, in detail. Campaigns could afford to advertise in this media. They could adopt and implement their own strategies such as focusing on the candidates, and the debate over free trade was cast in local terms. Political debate in the riding had a sharp local focus.

The NDP was somewhat competitive mainly as a result of Reform stealing PC votes. In fact, Reform had its strongest 1988 showing in BC in this riding, polling 15.5 percent of the vote. Local Tories were more concerned about the Reform party, whose position to the right of the Conservatives in a socially conservative riding such as Okanagan Centre was seen as a threat. In the end, the Tory vote dropped by about 20 percentage points from 1984, leaving Horning 7 points ahead of New Democrat Bryan McIver who increased the NDP vote only marginally. The fact that the NDP did not gain much ground, meant that the riding was not highly contested. Liberal candidate Murli Pendharkar managed to garner 17 percent of the vote, a modest improvement for the party.

The Candidate and Campaign Team

Al Horning spent all his efforts in the period before the election attempting to win the highly contested Okanagan Centre Conservative nomination. Such demands are a hallmark of open, contested nominations. Although he had no federal campaign
experience, and was not even a member of the party prior to 1988, he had served in local politics in Kelowna for eight years. It was Horning’s intimate connections with the local community and social and business elite that won him the nomination. This was seen as the most difficult task on the road to winning the seat, as the area had often returned Conservative MP’s to Ottawa. As a result, Horning had to wait until after the nomination before he could organize a campaign team.

The Okanagan Centre Conservative nomination meeting attracted just over 2,000 voting members. Because Centre was a new riding, most of these members were signed up by the candidates. The success of a new party member such as Horning is a corollary of the permeability of the nomination process in this new Conservative association in British Columbia. Not only did it exhibit the cyclical growth and shrinkage in size typical of the associations of cadre style parties, its permeability was heightened by the fact that Okanagan Centre was a new riding and the association newly formed.

Such an association lacks a coterie of well-placed and highly organized members who act as gatekeepers for the nomination. Whereas in other associations experienced members might be expected to support the successful insider candidate throughout the campaign itself, this was not the case in the Okanagan association. Only after a single issue anti-abortion candidate looked like winning the nomination after the first inconclusive ballot did members rally behind Horning. Several candidates convinced their supporters to shift their allegiance to Horning. There was a real sense in which local Tories expressed a desire to have one of their own as a candidate. In combination
with Horning’s newly recruited members, this was enough to give him victory on the second ballot.

Fortunately for Horning, the long tradition of support for the Conservatives in the area meant that the local association was strong. But many of the new members were only nominally committed to the party, and were not experienced campaigners. Their first and sometimes only allegiance was to the candidate who signed them up, and many were unwilling to help with the campaign once their candidate had been eliminated from the nomination. Horning had himself signed up many newcomers with little campaign experience. But the association was so large that his campaign still had access to between five and six hundred sympathizers and 40 to 50 secondary workers. The second layer of workers appears to have consisted mainly of Horning’s friends, who took directions from the inner circle. Consistent with this, the cadre style Liberal and Conservative parties - which are most likely to have local notable campaigns - tend to rely more on local workers than the NDP. Those workers that come from outside the riding are not paid organizers, as in the case of the NDP, but are likely to be acquaintances of the candidate (Carty 1991a, tables 7.7 and 7.8).

The strength of the Tories in the area gave the campaign access to about a dozen experienced campaigners with which to build an inner circle. With a good chance of winning the election, Horning’s campaign clearly appealed to local members. Fortunately for Horning, a number of experienced Tories who had supported his nomination rivals were willing to join his campaign team. Glenn Duncan ran the Kelowna campaign, while Troy Schmidt, who was much admired for his efforts in
nearly winning the nomination for the anti-abortionist Richter, ran the campaign in neighbouring Winfield.

Horning could afford to bolster the professionalism of his team by hiring Brian Lightburn as a full time communications director. Having worked for two provincial Socred cabinet ministers, Pat Jordan and Jim Hewitt, and with twelve years experience in the media, Lightburn was well-suited to the job of overseeing media relations, which were a critical part of the local campaign. He later went on to become Horning’s personal assistant after he was elected MP for Okanagan Centre.

The mix of friends and acquaintances with well-connected locals and experienced campaigners produced a strong campaign team. Lightburn estimated that 80 percent of the team were friends of Horning. Although Lightburn played a key role in running the campaign, relations between team members were personal in nature. Most team members had dealt with Horning in local civic affairs, sporting teams, or in business over many years, and many were family friends. Country ridings with their sense of local community seem to lend themselves to this sort of campaign team.

With no experience of campaigning or elected office, Horning was not in a position to challenge the strategic decisions, of Duncan, Schmidt and Lightburn. In fact, Lightburn actively prevented Horning from playing an organizational role:

I kept Al away from the organizational aspects of the campaign, and directed him to spend his time dealing one-on-one with voters. This is what he does best, and in terms of attracting votes, it helped offset his difficulty with public forums.

The strength of the association allowed the team to raise $54,974, $12,000 more than its closest opponent, Bryan McIver of the NDP (Canada 1988a, 3-243). Because of
the close relations between many local campaigners and the local community, the campaign had access to other important campaign resources. Rental equipment, sign painting service and so forth were all arranged through acquaintances in the riding. Moreover, Lightburn’s personal relationship with many local media owners and editors facilitated relations with the local media. The campaign produced its own local literature, as well as radio, television and newspaper advertisements. The inner circle of the campaign team was the locus of strategic decision making. Given this, it is not surprising that campaign strategies focused on the candidate and local issues.

The fact that the strategic foci of the campaign were Horning’s connections to the riding and local issues, this presented some difficulties for the local campaign. After it became clear that Horning did not speak well in public, Schmidt, Duncan, and Lightburn re-designed the campaign in order to limit his attendance at public speaking engagements. They designed a strong media and advertising campaign to promote Horning to voters generally, and in this way overcome his absence from public events that were reported in the media. As well, the campaign conducted a strong canvass of the riding. As the election progressed and media relations became more important, Lightburn became the central player in the campaign, directing strategy, and coordinating the actions of the two regional campaign managers.

In a negative sense, this modification of campaign strategy is proof of how a candidate’s abilities (or lack thereof) can impact on a campaign. The campaign was redesigned to minimize Horning’s opportunities to alienate voters. That the campaign chose to overcome problems with the strategy of focusing on the candidate rather than
adopting one that focused elsewhere points to the importance of local notables to their campaigns, the independence of these campaigns, and in this case, the nature of country ridings. Personal connections between local notables and voters in a riding are seen as powerful vote-getting qualities in a local campaign, particularly one in a country riding. Few campaigns would be willing to give away such an advantage. But Horning’s campaign was only able to do this because it has access to a credible and affordable local media, and the flexibility of a parochial campaign able to develop and implement its own strategies.

Horning was central to his campaign in a very different way than was Robinson. Unlike Robinson, public performances and a national profile were not the key to the local strategy; rather, Horning’s personal history in the riding was considered his greatest asset. This was evident in campaigners assessment of his role in the local campaign. When asked, campaigners ranked the candidate as very important - more so than issues or the party leader - yet qualified this by saying that it was his connections to the riding more than his personality or abilities which were central to the campaign. Given the intimate nature of community life in country ridings, the sort of volunteer work done by Horning seems to be of particular value to a candidate.

**Intra-Party Relations**

Intra-party relations were largely controlled by the local Tory campaign in Okanagan Centre. The campaign did not need financial assistance, but did request that the national Tory government act to still local fears over free trade. As one of the few ridings in BC
that the Tories looked like winning, the local campaign was able to extract just the assistance it needed. During the campaign, visiting cabinet ministers announced a series of plans to encourage local fruit and wine growers to rationalize their production, and an adjustment fund to help them deal with the loss of tariff protection.

Brian Mulroney made a brief visit following Horning’s nomination, and many cabinet ministers including Joe Clark and Don Mazankowski visited the riding both before and during the campaign. The emphasis on cabinet ministers rather than the Prime Minister was intentional, as the free trade deal was controversial in the riding. Such attention also indicated the uncertainty generated by new riding boundaries, and the small but growing Reform threat to the Tories traditional support base. Wheeling out the big guns was seen as a way of reminding the local faithful just how important they, and the riding, were to Tory fortunes in the West. The local campaign also received further strategic assistance from the provincial campaign office in Vancouver. Glenn Duncan, the campaign manager at the Kelowna office, would contact the provincial office daily. Using speaker phones, 3 or 4 strategists in Vancouver would speak to a number of campaign managers from different campaigns at the same time.

Free trade was seen very much through a local lens. The assistance offered by the national party enabled local Tories to demonstrate that local concerns were important to the government and the party. Local Tories pointed to their effective lobbying, and the advantage of having the ear of the Cabinet. A national issues was in fact localised.

Despite the campaign’s willingness to discuss free trade, and even its organizational link with the national party, the strategic focus of the campaign was the
candidate's personal links with the riding. The campaign's success in emphasizing Horning was a function of its access to substantial resources of its own, both financial and human, sound strategic advice from paid organizers and experienced campaigners, and the existence of an influential local media which it could use to shape a local strategy of its own. Horning's was a strong, parochial campaign. Although it received help in order to promote free trade in Okanagan Centre, its financial strength and independence is evident in the fact that the national party only contributed $137 to the local campaign fund.

The Local Contest

Okanagan Centre is a relatively affluent country riding, with a high average age of voters, many of whom are retired and have moved there in recent years. Its population is relatively homogeneous, although mobile (Canada, Statistics Canada 1987, 337-349). It has been a Conservative stronghold, and is the home of the Bennett Social Credit dynasty. As a result of its Tory pedigree, the strategic goal of Al Horning’s campaign was to avoid making mistakes that might upset the outcome. As it happens, the campaign was confronted by a crisis when Horning's poor public performance became an issue, hurting the Tories and giving hope to their opponents. It meant that the Conservative campaign was on the defensive, needing to adopt strategies that at once promoted their well known local candidate but which kept him away from public forums. This entailed substantial use of the abundant local media. Fortunately, in this country riding centred on the city of Kelowna, there was enough influential media
available to the Conservatives with which to modify the local agenda.

The initial interaction of local campaigns played a key role in shaping the local contest. Horning's poor public performance was at the first all-candidates' meeting in the Winfield Community Hall, a satellite city of Kelowna. Horning's speech was poorly delivered, and he did not handle questions well. In addition, he was upset by heckling, and was laughed at by the audience. His performance was widely reported in the influential local media, and quickly became a major election issue. Reform Party candidate Werner Schmidt believes this hurt the Conservatives, but helped his own campaign:

Horning did not speak well, and didn't understand the issues, ...his poor performance set him apart from the other candidates at the meeting. In a strong Conservative riding, we needed something like this to help us. It encouraged people to search out this curiosity, a new political party. We were the most likely alternative for Conservative voters. It was the beginning of a ground swell that [resulted] in people walking in off the street in the last few days of the campaign offering us help.

In essence, what Horning's performance had done was to encourage other local campaigns to think they were competitive, and in fact force the Tories to act as if they were involved in a real contest, as opposed to simply relying on the Conservative history of the riding to guarantee them a win. This sense was further heightened by the advent of the Reform party, which threatened the Tories on their right flank. As the campaign progressed, the Reform Party challenge was taken seriously by Conservative campaigners. They pointed out that a split conservative vote could be very dangerous, and that the RP platform was undeveloped and did not make sense. Voting Reform was presented as a wasted vote.
Horning’s poor performance dogged the campaign thereafter. When he refused to attend all-candidates’ debates, he was taunted by opponents and the issue was pursued by the media. Yet Horning’s personal connections with the local political community were still seen as the campaign’s greatest asset. In part, this may have reflected the fact that one alternative to focusing on Horning, addressing national issues, meant dealing with free trade. This proposal was controversial in the area. Free movement of agricultural products was seen as a recipe for disaster by local fruit and grape growers. The large local wine industry feared being swamped by American wines. Environmentalists were also suggesting that the free trade agreement would give the United States control over Canadian water resources. After running on the free trade issue in the early part of the campaign, local strategists felt free trade was best avoided during later stages of the campaign.

Maintaining a focus on Horning seemed the best option. In direct contrast to the Robinson campaign in Burnaby-Kingsway, Okanagan Conservatives kept Horning in the background. Campaign organizers limited Horning’s public appearances to meeting voters one-on-one either during door-to-door canvassing or phone canvassing. They also organized small group meetings at his campaign office and local civic associations, at which Horning excelled. Lightburn developed a series of briefing notes to help Horning understand the party platform and important issues, enabling him to discuss issues when canvassing. Horning spent most evenings going over these notes, and his days canvassing by foot or phone. This took up nearly all his time.

As the candidate could not present himself to the public at public forums, but
remained central to the campaign strategy, it was necessary for local organizers to
devises ways of maintaining and improving Horning's name recognition. To overcome
these problems, the campaign turned to an advertising campaign that emphasized
Horning's record of community service as well as making it clear that he would extract
action on local transportation, environmental and agricultural problems from the federal
government as a member of the governing party. Horning also made use of his contacts
among local notables, personally calling on friends and acquaintances in various
community and sporting groups to lobby for support. Like most country towns,
Kelowna has a well developed network of informal information flows. Horning and his
campaign were able to tap into these, and use their connections amongst owners of local
media outlets to ensure good media coverage.

The emphasis on a strong advertising campaign aimed at overcoming the
negative impression created by Horning shaped campaign spending. This strategy
required large expenditures on advertising and efforts to attract news coverage. This
was only possible in a country riding like Okanagan Centre that is endowed with
affordable, indigenous, and influential media outlets. There are two newspapers in
Kelowna, The Daily Courier and The Capital News, and one in neighbouring Winfield,
The Westside Sun. There are also three radio stations that cover the area, CKIQ, CILK,
and CKOV. As well, the local television station is owned by BCTV but has a news
affiliation with the CBC, and Shaw Cable runs the local cable television system.

With more than enough financial support, the party was able to organize a strong
media campaign, including locally produced advertising on radio, television and in local
newspapers. Brian Lightburn and Walter Grey, a local radio station owner, oversaw the media campaign. Fortunately, the candidate had a long and extensive history of community service in Kelowna. In this sense - as a community spirited individual - the candidate was important to the campaign. The party spent heavily on brochures featuring Horning, and built a comprehensive advertising campaign in both the electronic and print media. Campaign literature and advertising emphasized the fact that Horning had a 44 year history of community work in the riding, and had been an alderman for eight years.

The choice of vehicles for its advertising was based on the campaign’s assessment of the impact of different media. Most advertising was in newspapers throughout the campaign, because of a belief that they play a special role in the life of a country town. Newspapers are very strongly connected with a town’s sense of itself in a way most other media are not. As Brian Lightburn noted:

A newspaper will be left lying around home or the office or in a shop, and will be read throughout the day by a number of people. People can absorb and analyze information at their own pace.

Radio advertising consisted mainly of tag-ons to national advertisements, naming the local candidate. But the campaign ran some locally produced radio advertisements throughout the campaign.

Television advertising played an important role in the last days of the election. As the election drew near, the campaign faced two problems. Free trade had become a big issue, to which they had not responded adequately, and Horning’s absence from public forums had become an election issue. Strategists believed television could be
used to help overcome both of these problems.

In the opinion of campaigners, occasional daily television advertising was considered to be too glib to be of any help. Rather, it was thought that television is only useful if advertising is constant, from day to day and across the different time periods of any one day. Saturation advertising on television can be very effective in the short run.

Because they could only afford to run a few days' worth of such advertising, the campaign produced some thirty second advertisements emphasizing Horning’s community service and responding to claims made about free trade by other campaigns. It used these to saturate television air-time in that last ten days of the campaign.

This campaign strategy was possible only because Okanagan Centre has many media outlets that are affordable to local campaigns. Unlike the larger stations in Vancouver, rates for advertising on the local television and radio stations are within the reach of local campaigns. Lower rates also make it possible to do a comprehensive program of advertising in influential newspaper outlets. Furthermore, whereas the Vancouver electronic and print media service a large number of ridings, their impact is diffuse, and is further compromised by the sheer number of stations and the news and entertainment alternatives available in a large city. By contrast, although the Kelowna media covers at least three federal ridings, it is more focused, and was particularly suited to covering the Okanagan Centre campaign and the political community defined by the riding boundaries. Furthermore, the new boundaries adopted prior to the 1988 election were closely aligned with the city and areas just around it such as Winfield.
The new boundaries emphasized Kelowna’s growing size and importance, and the media were determined to cover the local contest in some detail.

Locally produced brochures, and the work of foot and phone canvassers were used to reinforce this line of campaigning. However, the pressure on the local campaign, and a sense of ennui borne of Horning’s lack of leadership ability left many workers jaded part way through the campaign. The length of the campaign, 59 days, exacerbated this problem. The day before the election, the campaign re-emphasized Horning’s community service. A full page advertisement in a daily newspaper listed the community service of the four main candidates in columns beneath their names. His column ran the full length of the page, while the others had few or no entries.

The campaign also tried to use staged events that it could control to gain media coverage. During the campaign, press releases were timed for between 7.30 and 8.00 a.m. in the morning to meet the 9.00 a.m. publication deadlines of the two daily papers. In the early part of the campaign, there was usually only one a week, but later on the frequency increased. By the time of the election, it was at least daily, as the campaign tried to both direct the debate and respond to other parties’ campaign propaganda. The campaign organized a number of heavily attended press conferences featuring seven or eight major local employers commenting that free trade would be good for the region. With his excellent contacts among the local media, Lightburn made sure these received extensive radio, newspaper and, most importantly, television coverage.

The campaign used one other method to help overcome the image of Horning as
incompetent. Lightburn and Horning contacted acquaintances in the Kelowna Chamber of Commerce and had them organize a strictly controlled all-candidates’ debate for cable television at the offices of the Chamber just two days before the election. Initially, the NDP and RP refused to attend. But the influence of the Chamber of Commerce, the chance to confront Horning, and the opportunity to be on cable television proved too strong, and they attended. Three local journalists asked questions, and a moderator took questions from the audience. Each candidate was allowed to bring forty supporters into the chamber. Heckling was strictly controlled. Lightburn put Horning through extensive preparations for the event, which appear to have been successful, as the candidate performed credibly, and classified it as the highlight of the campaign. Not only was it run on cable, but local television, radio, and newspapers reported it as well.

The ebb and flow of the national campaign did not play a big part in the local contest. In part, this reflects the ability of local campaigns and the local media to generate a truly local agenda. Where it did intrude, such as the localization of the free trade debate, there was enough local media available to campaigns to effectively defuse the issue by advertising adjustment policies and so forth. This served to further highlight the existence of a coherent local agenda.

A well developed local agenda not only defines the local contest, it also re-defines events that occur at the national level. Because the Tories were competing mainly with the NDP, and the Liberals held little threat for either, John Turner’s strong showing in the national leaders’ debate had only a minor impact on the contest. Local media did some of their own opinion polling, which invariably showed the Tories in a
strong position. Most national polls were useless, given the NDP versus PC contest in the riding, although BC polls showing the New Democrats in a strong position helped the local NDP campaign. In political communities such as this, local campaigns have a much greater impact on the conduct of a local contest that do their national counterparts.

JOHN BREWIN: PARTY INSIDER, HEIR APPARENT

With a strong upward trend in its vote in the previous three elections, and success at the provincial level, the NDP knew it had a chance of winning the city riding of Victoria. This feeling was heightened when the Tory incumbent, Allan McKinnon, decided not to seek re-election. This made the New Democrat nomination very appealing. But the NDP candidate John Brewin had a stranglehold on the nomination as a result of his 1984 attempt to win the seat and his bona fides as a loyal and well connected NDP party insider.

Brewin’s father had been an important founding member of the NDP and an MP from Ontario. His wife Gretchen was the current NDP mayor of Victoria. Brewin himself had run for the Ontario provincial legislature in 1971, and had worked on other campaigns both in Ontario and British Columbia. He had been president of both the local association in Victoria and the provincial NDP, and held office in the provincial party in Ontario.

Transplanted from Ontario to British Columbia, he was a member of the group of professional campaign organizers that work on NDP campaigns across the country. In most cases, impermeable NDP associations produce closed contested nominations. In
this instance, Brewin’s position in the party, and previous effort in the riding, stifled competition. At least one other association member did consider running for the nomination, but no other candidate formally entered the race. Brewin won a closed but uncontested nomination.

Brewin put together an experienced and well organized campaign team. Typical of mass parties, the team was bureaucratic in form, with many volunteers working because of their interest in the party rather than the candidate or particular issues. The team included experienced local campaigners, some with contacts to the party in other provinces. Brewin’s connections within the party meant that his campaign was closely aligned with national and provincial party strategy. The strength of his campaign gave him some independence, but in general, he was happy for the campaign to be a subsidiary of the national effort. His campaign was engaged in a contested constituency election.

The Conservative candidate was businessman and Victoria alderman Geoff Young. Although not a charismatic politician, he can best be describes as a local notable. He won an open, contested nomination in a permeable, cadre style association. The retirement of Tory incumbent Allan McKinnon heightened this sense of openness. Among the five candidates he defeated was an insurgent pro-life advocate who mounted a spirited challenge. Association members finally supported the less charismatic but long time party member and moderate Young mainly out of a desire to reject the single issue pro-life candidate.

Not the best known local notable in this study, his time as a local councillor and
his local business connections gave him something of a profile. The local association was aware that the tide was running against it, but it managed to build a solid campaign team, relying heavily on experienced campaigners and professionals from the local business community. Although strategic decision making was locally controlled in this parochial campaign, Young was determined to try and make free trade the major issue. Some volunteers thought that as an economist, he was convinced that he could persuade voters to see the benefits of the deal. Although the Liberal’s good performance hurt the Tories, its recent success in the riding meant that it felt itself to be engaged in a contest with the NDP, while defending itself from the insurgent Liberals.

Liberal candidate and local notable Michael O’Connor had a relatively high profile in the riding. President of the local Liberal association, a respected local lawyer, sportsman, and member of innumerable local service associations, O’Connor was well connected in the riding. Unfortunately for Young, he also had strong connections to the local Social Credit, a traditional base of Tory support in British Columbia. The lack of interest in the Liberal nomination in Victoria encouraged John Turner to ask O’Connor to run for the party in the riding. The Liberals wanted a competent candidate in a riding that has a higher than average profile. A stopgap candidate, O’Connor won an open but uncontested nomination. Although he could rely on a few experienced local campaigners, the weakness of the local association caught up with the campaign, which lacked volunteers. This was a parallel campaign that tried to balance national issues with local issues. Despite a strong performance, it was largely marginalized from the local contest between the NDP and Tories.
The local contest was dominated by Brewin. His early start on campaigning emphasized the fact that there appeared to be a ground-swell in favour of the NDP and against the Tories; but in fact the NDP did not improve on its 1984 vote, maintaining its share at about 38 percentage points. This was enough to defeat the Tories by just over 8 percent. The win was made possible by a 16.5 point drop in the Tory vote share from 1984. Most of this went to the Liberals. The very popular O’Connor managed to garner 21.4 percent of the vote, an increase of 8.3 points over 1984. The ascendancy of the NDP campaign over the struggling Tories took some of the fire out of the local contest. The Tory campaign is best categorized as moderately competitive, and the Liberals a little less so, leaving the NDP as the only truly competitive campaign.

The importance of a subsidiary NDP campaign in the riding meant that many national issues important to its federal strategy, such as free trade, were brought into the local contest. But influential media coverage of the local campaigns by the city media in Victoria gave them some room to move in terms of shaping the local agenda. Both Brewin and O’Connor made use of this room to introduce local issues, the latter appearing in a television advertisement dealing with some of these issues.

The Candidate and Campaign Team

The Conservatives beat the New Democrats in 1980 by over 7 000 votes, but Brewin cut this margin to 4 000 in 1984. He had begun to think about the next election soon after his 1984 defeat. With the growing unpopularity of the Mulroney government, Brewin knew he had a chance of winning the seat in 1988. When long-serving
Conservative incumbent Allan McKinnon retired in the summer of 1988, perhaps encouraged by the Tories dismal showing in the polls, his position was further strengthened. Assured of winning the nomination, Brewin started campaigning early in mid-1987, taking advantage of flexible working arrangements as a lawyer. He was determined to take advantage of both his party and social contacts which provided him with access to substantial financial and human resources in order run a strong campaign.

As president of the strong local association, Brewin had a large number of volunteers he could call on. In addition, his links with the national party, and personal contacts with professional campaigners, gave him access to experienced volunteers from outside the riding. Most workers were committed NDP members willing to work for a good party member like Brewin. This team did not exhibit the same sort of personal friendships found in local notable campaigns. Rather, it was dominated by a bureaucratic professionalism. In true NDP fashion, Brewin worked with the local association executive in making the decision to begin early campaigning and when filling campaign positions. He and campaign manager Cyril Barkverd decided to get an early start to campaigning.

We began campaigning in 1987, forming an Election Planning Committee. Our strategy was to present an NDP victory as inevitable in an area we controlled both locally and provincially.

With a strategy that involved a long campaign, Barkverd and Brewin decided that it was necessary to have a small band of dedicated workers willing to put in six months to a year of work. More than most campaigns, it relied on a group of
experienced, perhaps even hardened, campaigners to pursue a strategy that required extensive commitment. Brewin was able to find volunteers capable of filling inner circle positions and willing to stick with his campaign over a long period. The inner circle of workers numbered about 20. Unlike many other campaigns, there was no need to rely on several volunteers to fulfil the demands of one job over the course of the election. This reduced the need for the second tier of campaign workers. Fifty to a hundred workers helped less frequently as secondary workers, and there was a large coterie of NDP sympathizers on which the campaign team could draw for additional help. Brewin claimed the campaign used 800 workers on election day.

Although he raised $5 000 less than his Conservative opponent, Brewin raised $51 177, $3 000 more than the spending limit in the riding. Barkverd estimated that the campaign had raised and spent another $15 000 in campaigning in the year before the election. In all then, it raised in excess of $65 000, and was a very well financed campaign.

The locus of decision making in Brewin's campaign reflected elements of the committee approach often adopted by the NDP. Because Brewin was influential in the local association and the wider party, he had a good deal of influence over decision making. Nevertheless, the campaign reflected the impact of decisions made by committees made up of good party members committed to the party rather than to a local candidate. The focus of the campaign largely followed that of the national party, including an emphasis on Broadbent's leadership, and opposition to free trade. There were also efforts made to identify particular aspects of the national platform that
affected local voters. Brewin considered opposition to nuclear energy and armaments, as well as the need to promote peace in the international system to be issues of concern to local voters.

Intra-Party Relations

In order to support such a long running campaign, fund-raising was given a high priority in the Victoria NDP association. Brewin’s success at raising and spending $15 000 by the summer of 1988, using the lists of supporters and donors from previous campaigns, and those made available by local NDP MLA’s Robyn Blencoe and Gordon Hansen, is an example of the advantages of close contacts between different levels of a party. The candidate noted that independent sources of funds and campaign workers allows a local campaign some independence from its national counterpart. But for a subsidiary campaign in the NDP, this means choosing between party policies rather than focusing on strictly local issues or the candidate.

If you raise your own funds, and have your own organization, the party has no leverage on you. You control the campaign, choosing the mix of strategies and issues that suit the local circumstances best. [Thus], our locally produced leaflets contained some elements of the national campaign, adapted to local conditions.

The money was used to produce campaign leaflets and signs, and to support Brewin’s foot canvassing throughout the year. The campaign also organized public speaking events for a number of high profile speakers. It could afford to hire public space and organize the publicity necessary to do this. It also helped finance a phone bank that was the central element of both the on-going fund-raising drive and the process of identifying voter support in the period leading up to the election. The phone bank, set
up in mid-1988 and staffed by about 10 volunteers, had identified 5 000 supporters by
the time the election was called. The continuation of this effort through 1988 and into
the election proved very effective.

All in all, although like most NDP campaigns, this one focused on issues from
the party platform, it had a greater capacity to pick and choose amongst them, and to
implement a multifaceted campaign strategy. This was because of its access to local
funding, a strong campaign team, and an interested, influential media. Being able to
afford office space and the other accoutrements of campaigning long before the election
proper meant that rather like an incumbent, Brewin could invite voters to meet him at
the campaign offices. The small groups of voter that joined him for coffee acted as
focus groups. In combination with the party’s pre-election polling, these groups allowed
Brewin and party strategists to explore the issues that were of importance to local
voters. This was crucial to his strategy of acting as heir apparent to the retiring Tory
incumbent.

Unlike campaigns in other parties, NDP campaigns send questionnaires they
receive from interest groups to head office where they were filled out en masse, to
ensure consistency across ridings and with party policy. Even a well organized
campaign such as Brewin’s had to comply with this edict, although the party did allow
media liaison officer Sue Stroud to deal with what it considered to be non-controversial
questionnaires. However, those from a pro-life alliance and ethnic groups were all
answered by head office. More than in other parties, the structure of the NDP and its
commitment to ideological politics ties New Democrat campaigns more closely to the
rest of the party.

Brewin happily accepted visits from the party leader Ed Broadbent. As a
campaign in a riding that the New Democrats had never held, but had a good chance of
winning, Victoria was high on the list of ridings that the Broadbent's tour had to visit.
He made two visits, both of which were highly publicized by the campaign. Brewin
used these visits as opportunities to publicise his good contacts with the party hierarchy,
and the likelihood that he would influence policy making in the NDP once elected.
Brewin made a point of staying in contact with the federal party and encouraging
Broadbent to visit Victoria.

The issue mix that the campaign settled on included both local and national
elements. But Brewin noted that the national contest is the major game, and that this
shapes local politics. National issues and Broadbent's efforts had important implications
for the local campaign. This is the view of a party insider, whose contacts with the
party encouraged him to reproduce party strategy at the local level. Brewin ranked
attacks on other candidates, his own strengths, and regional issues in that order as the
most important factors affecting the campaign after national matters.

As with other NDP campaigns in British Columbia, Brewin's campaign had a
greater emphasis on free trade than did the national campaign. This was because the
provincial party had decided that in a politically polarized province, confronting the
Tories over free trade was a first priority, ahead of highlighting Ed Broadbent's
leadership qualities. Brewin felt his prime goal was to ensure that it was seen as the
leading anti-free trade party, to forestall a Liberal challenge based on this issue. The
local organization followed the non-local party's lead. Local campaign literature focused most strongly on free trade and other national issues, and added to these some local issues.

The Local Contest

The fact that the Liberal candidate, local lawyer Michael O'Connor, was perhaps the best known candidate in the race helped New Democrat John Brewin's campaign. Because of his strong connections to the Social Credit party, O'Connor managed to undermine some of the traditional Socred support for the Tories. As the Liberals had little chance of winning, their choice of candidate was fortuitous for Brewin.

The two provincial ridings in Victoria were held by the NDP at the time of the 1988 federal election, and the area looked like going to the party at the national level. NDP support in the riding had grown steadily from the under 20 percent in the 1940's, to 40 percent in the 1980's. Campaigners judged that the best strategy was to cultivate a sense of the inevitability of an NDP victory. This could best be achieved by building and presenting to the public a competent campaign organization and candidate. As the local contest unfolded, Brewin's became the clear front-runner, and engagements between the campaigns became tamer.

The campaign system set up by Brewin and Barkved was based on the tried and tested NDP three canvass method. With known supporters, requests for support and donations were in the form of a letter. This was followed by one or two phone calls. The phone calls also gave campaigners the chance to ask for volunteers, and gauge the
concerns of the voters. Campaigners used past federal, provincial and municipal results by poll in Victoria to guide the canvassing process. Polls were labelled on maps as "ours", "theirs", and "undecideds". With regard to the last of these, the campaign used more recent provincial and municipal returns to identify those polls that it thought the party should win, but in which it had not done well in the 1984 election.

Polls with many undecided voters in areas the campaign believed might vote NDP were singled out for special treatment. These areas were subjected to a literature drop, followed some time later by the candidate or campaign worker canvassing in person, and/or a phone call to enquire about the issues that concerned the voters, and to ask for donations. Voters identified as undecided were called again in the hope of convincing them to support Brewin. Either a personal visit from a canvasser or the candidate, or a personal phone call or letter were all used to this end. In the last two weeks of the campaign, identifying the vote and concentrating on areas with high numbers of undecideds became a fixation of the campaign.

The phone bank was critical to the campaign, allowing far fewer workers to canvass a much greater number of voters, including those that may have been missed by foot canvassing, such as apartment dwellers. The early start to the phone bank improved the campaigns coverage of the riding, facilitated voter identification, and acted to train campaign workers in the subtleties of phone canvassing. As with most other campaigns studied, the campaign manager considered the phone bank a necessary substitute for the lack of volunteers. Phone canvassers used canvassing scripts provided by the party. But Barkverd estimates that phone canvassers can only reach 75 percent
of voters, and that the only way of getting to the remaining 25 percent is by foot canvassing.

Victoria has a high number of government workers, who can be persuaded to vote for the NDP (Blake, 1986). As well, as the city becomes more cosmopolitan and more densely populated the riding has become more diverse with respect to the distribution of wealth and its ethnic and age profile. This has replaced what was once a more homogeneous, affluent population. The sizable number of low income families and those receiving welfare are typically target audiences for the NDP. Although there are many senior citizens, a large number of these have moved to the riding from elsewhere, and this adds to the mobility of the population. With 14 percent of population having a university degree, it, like Vancouver Centre, has a relatively well educated population (Canada, Statistics Canada 1987, 353).

In order to forestall any possible Liberal challenge, it was felt necessary to convince voters that the New Democrats were the real anti-free trade party. This tied it closely to the wider federal election campaign. The NDP attacked free trade and the Tories tax proposals, echoing many of the themes of the national and provincial campaigns. Those local issues that were raised - such as water quality and disarmament - were related to wider concerns about the environment and the arms race. As with most city ridings, there is enough room on the local political agenda for a range of issues. The metropolitan media canvassed issues from across the country and the province to which candidates were expected to speak to on behalf of their parties.

As in other city ridings, appearances at seniors’ homes and local schools were
mandatory elements of campaigning. These offered the chance to present the candidate in a sympathetic light, and attract media coverage. Meetings with the local Labour Council and the Centre for Arms Control were important as evidence of the candidate’s ideological commitment.

The strategy of presenting Brewin as the MP-in-waiting was designed to ensure other campaigns engaged with the NDP on its territory. Brewin was to have a superior position on those occasions when they did interact. All-candidates’ debates were considered suitable places to confront these other campaigns because of Brewin’s strong public speaking abilities. With a little help from the Reform Party, which captured 8.2 percent of the votes cast, and the much improved Liberals who only trailed the second place Tories by 8 points, the NDP did manage to take much of the contest out of the local race. This despite the fact that with about 38 percent of the vote, Brewin managed to only maintain his 1984 vote share.

To maintain its image of a well organized, competitive campaign and clear front-runner, Brewin attended every all-candidates’ debate, of which there were about ten. As a lawyer and experienced campaigner, he is comfortable in such forums. These meetings garnered considerable press coverage, much of which was positive towards O’Connor and Brewin. Brewin considered that this helped his campaign. And indicative of there special utility for New Democrats, Brewin was the only candidate interviewed in Victoria who considered all-candidates’ meetings to be helpful to his campaign:

It helped us project an image as a public figure speaking on important issues that I was passionately engaged with.
Although New Democrats were nervous about the Liberals capturing some of the anti-free trade debate, the negative reporting of Tory Geoff Young’s performances at these events suited them.

The salience of all-candidates’ debates in Victoria was thought by Brewin to be a function of a sense of community in this city riding, and an influential local media willing to report these debates. Because the media and a defined urban community help generate a local agenda, voters are engaged in political debate. As members of a community, they are interested in who will represent them in parliament, and how the choice of representative will affect the community. Brewin repeatedly referred to the fact that local information networks are well developed. These networks are influential, and can be a highly effective means of boosting both name recognition and credibility.

The capacity of the local New Democrat campaign to canvass a wide range of issues was in part a function of the media environment in the city of Victoria. Barkverd noted that:

There are walls around Victoria with respect to the media. It is somewhat isolated from the rest of the province and the country.

As the provincial capital and a large regional centre, Victoria has a well developed media of its own. A sense of local community is reinforced by the 30 kilometre gap between Vancouver Island and the mainland. Still, Vancouver dailies, the Vancouver Sun and The Province, as well as Vancouver television stations, BCTV, the CBC and Toronto’s national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, are all available in Victoria. The campaign was covered by the large city newspaper, the Times Colonist, and city television, including CHEKTV (a CTV affiliate) and the local CBC.
The media in Victoria serve an area that encompasses many ridings, and so do not focus on only one election race. But in comparison with most suburban campaigns, the Victoria contest was well covered. Candidates were regularly asked their opinion on policy issues, and their news conferences attracted media attention. For example, when there was an oil spill in the local harbour, they were given a chance to discuss their party's environmental policy. Like Vancouver Centre, the media density in Victoria meant the local agenda was diverse, and included local, regional and national issues. The local media played a dual role in reporting the federal election to local voters, and the local as well as regional contests to the national media. The local campaigns were not components of their respective national party efforts to the same degree as those in Vancouver Centre, but the contest did have a higher profile than many, thanks to its media exposure.

The local community newspapers covered the election in some detail, and the cable station organized an all-candidates' debate. But local NDP organizers craved national media coverage. This was seen as more influential, and also likely to reinforce the image of Brewin as an important member of the NDP, a high profile candidate, and a sure winner in Victoria. A Globe and Mail reporter did spend a day out canvassing with Brewin, which produced an article. And the campaign did hold three formal press conferences that attracted the news media. Other than this, they relied on Brewin being asked to talk-shows and the usual press releases for publicity. Campaigners hoped that by maintaining good personal relations with journalists and editors, they could ensure that press releases were covered, and that Brewin would be asked his opinion on issues
as they arose.

The NDP was the only party not to make use of radio and television advertising in Victoria. Other campaigns advertised on CHEKTV and on several local radio stations. They also used the Times Colonist. Cyril Barkverd suggested that the New Democrats' decision to advertise only in community newspapers was a strategic one:

We advertised in community newspapers to keep "in" with them. We used the advertising budget with local media in the hope of receiving positive editorials. The campaign received little strategic advantage from the advertisements per se, although we encouraged the Committee dealing with advertising to think otherwise. Advertising was not central to our strategy of appearing as if we had already won the election; editorials were.

The implication that advertising is something used by campaigns that are struggling to build their credibility is supported by the money spent on advertising the two main rival campaigns in Victoria. The Liberal candidate, Michael O'Connor, emphasized radio and television advertising, because he believed it gave him credibility. With a budget about the same size as that of the NDP, the Liberals spent two-thirds of their funds on electronic advertising. Given the expense of making television advertising, this accounted for a sizable proportion of this budget. While the Conservatives spent only a sixth of their budget on radio and television advertising, their total advertising budget of $33 300 was twice that of the NDP.

The organizational effort of the local NDP was enormous. Neither of the other campaigns could match it in terms of volunteer commitment. Most volunteers began working on the campaign about six months before the writ was dropped. Brewin noted that the strict control of campaign workers and great demands made of them in pursuit of this professionalism had a debilitating effect.
The workers were burnt out by the time we finished. In fact, many volunteers did not last the distance. It was a gruelling exercise.

Given this, he wished that he could have found more workers. Nevertheless, the campaign was well staffed compared to others. Volunteers organized the campaign office, put up signs, and began foot canvassing months before other local campaigns. Most of these campaign techniques are labour intensive. The extensive phone campaign required about 10 volunteers working full time on the phone bank, as did the foot canvass. This shows remarkable commitment on the part of NDP organizers and workers. To alleviate some of the dislocation that such a long campaign might cause, computing and office facilities were placed in "zone houses," homes of volunteers that acted as local offices throughout the riding. This enabled volunteers to work closer to or in fact out of their homes.

Campaign manager Barkverd believes that it was the organizational strength of the campaign rather than the candidate that won them the riding:

A good candidate, a credible candidate is helpful, but the critical factor was the aura of being well organized. In fact one of the important jobs of a campaign manager is managing the candidate's ego, and controlling them when they get "antsy". John was good to work with because he understood the practical demands of campaigning - finding workers, getting leaflets printed and such things. But managers and candidates do not always see the campaign in quite the same terms.

The bureaucratic bent of NDP campaigners is clear in Brewin's own assessment of the role of the candidate, which he saw in purely organizational terms.

Few voters will cross party lines because of a candidate, although a strong personal attachment may encourage it. The candidate has a cumulative effect, stimulating good organization, finding workers and donors for example, and attracting attention to the campaign.
The New Democrat strategy reveals that to create the impression of a well organized and successful campaign, there is no substitute for campaign techniques that are essentially labour intensive. The NDP was able to separate itself from its competitors just because it could accomplish this task, which the others could not. This was possible because of its access to both workers and money. While the use of labour intensive methods of campaigning was effective, it did take its toll on campaigners. The presence of influential local media and defined political community was also important in allowing the campaign room in which to create and shape a local agenda; one that reflected issues found in the wider election.

CONCLUSION

How the campaign team sees the local election and the manner in which they choose to present the candidate to the voter are critical to the style and content of local campaigns. The resources and skills that the team has at its disposal, and the particular intra-party and riding contexts in which the campaign finds itself, all work to shape these decisions.

Winning or competitive candidates usually have access to sufficient financial resources and workers to run strong campaigns. But given this, the four winning candidates discussed here each ran very different campaigns. Two of them, Svend Robinson and Kim Campbell, were high profile candidates with professional, component campaigns in city ridings. Both were central to the strategies of their campaigns. Freed from the mundane tasks of organizing the campaign, these two candidates spent most of their time on the hustings. Both received inordinate media attention, which underpinned
the central role they played in their respective campaigns. In part, this was because both were in city ridings that were covered by major metropolitan media outlets. Yet despite outward similarities, the two campaigns were quite different in a number of ways.

Although both campaigns were strongly focused on the candidate, Campbell was involved in a closely contested local race while Robinson was a clear front-runner who barely engaged his opponents. This brought a sharper edge to Campbell’s campaign, and forced her to maintain a tight local focus. She spent nearly all her time in the riding, and concentrated on strong public performances in all-candidates’ debates. Her willingness to engage in the free trade debate directly meant that her campaign did not waste its effort trying to steer around the issue that, given Centre’s role as a component contest of the federal campaign, it was confronted with on a regular basis. Paradoxically, it was this that helped the campaign focus on her abilities, which came to be the campaign’s greatest asset.

The media coverage her debating style attracted was crucial to the development of her image as a high profile partisan. Such media coverage is most easily garnered by candidates in city ridings such as Vancouver Centre. Moreover, this reporting and the extended political agenda in these ridings provides candidates with the opportunity to make a name for themselves, often as party spokespeople. City voters appear to expect such performances from their local candidates, and may well judge them on how well they fill this role. Campbell’s win against the anti-Tory tide in BC was a remarkable effort. It required a highly capable campaign team willing to pursue its own local
approach in opposition to the advice being offered by national party strategists, as well as a candidate around which to build such a strategy.

In Robinson's case, he discovered early in the campaign that the other candidates posed no threat to his incumbency. While he maintained a strong local campaign, he was free to roam the country as an NDP spokesperson. He gave well attended press conferences in several provinces, which reinforced his image as an important national politician in his home riding of Burnaby-Kingsway. Differences in the manner of the local contest thus altered the final shape of these campaigns.

These two campaigns were also very different within the context of their respective parties. Although candidate-centred campaigns are quite usual in a cadre style party such as the Progressive Conservatives, such campaigns are a rarity in mass parties such as the NDP. Campbell's success was made easier by a national party accustomed to seeing candidates go their own way. Robinson's dominant role points to his special place within the New Democrat firmament, and perhaps within the wider Canadian community, as a candidate whose personal credentials are paramount to his political success. This success makes him valuable to the NDP. Together, these conditions encourage him to think in independent terms, and required the party to allow him the freedom to do so.

The country riding of Okanagan Centre presented Tory Al Horning with a different set of problems. In this strong Tory riding, Horning should have coasted to an easy election win. But his difficulties with public speaking limited his ability to make use of the public forums around which country campaigns are primarily constructed.
Fortunately for Horning, his well organized, parochial campaign found a solution to this problem. It used the local media to gain control of the agenda and to highlight Horning’s contacts with the local community and his opponents lack thereof. This allowed the campaign to keep Horning in the public eye and make use of his local contacts without directly exposing him to public forums.

This strategy was only possible because of the nature of this country riding and the local contest. Country ridings place a premium on candidates with the sorts of connections to the local community that Horning could demonstrate. Okanagan Centre also has an influential and affordable local media that the Tories could use as a means of communicating with voters and implementing its own local strategy. As well, despite the Tories’ strong electoral position, the riding was new and there was no Tory incumbent. As such, Horning was not closely associated with the Mulroney government. This made it easier for him to steer an independent course.

The fact that the Tories were favoured to win the riding allowed Horning the luxury of being able to disengage from his opponents in order to limit the damage that public appearances might have on his campaign. In a closer contest, such a strategy would have been much harder to pursue, given the fear that it might be seen as a capitulation.

NDP candidate John Brewin in Victoria built a strong campaign team with the help of experienced campaigners he knew in the party. His campaign was a subsidiary of the national NDP campaign. In contrast to other winning campaigns discussed here, Brewin’s connections to the non-local party involved accepting party dictates as to the
nature of the local campaign. Unlike the other candidates, he was not central to the local strategy. Rather, the campaign presented the image of a competent local organization and a party that was the natural successor to the Tories in the riding. The riding was not as contested as Centre, but the local campaigns did engage each other. As with Campbell, Brewin’s strategy required that he appear at all-candidates’ debates, although in his case he was pushing the party line.

Fortunately for Brewin, the previously uncompetitive local Liberal association fielded a strong candidate in Michael O’Connor. His contacts with the provincial Socreds helped him to split the anti-NDP vote with the traditionally strong Tories. This ensured a New Democrat victory. The Liberals’ impact on the local contest is an example of how well run third placed campaigns can have a direct bearing on the final outcome.
Given that most riding contests in Canada consist of three and often more campaigns, most of them are, ultimately, losing campaigns. Some of these are competitive - that is, one of the campaigns that has a chance of winning a contested local constituency race - and look very much like those campaigns discussed in the previous chapter. They have strong strategic links to their party’s national campaign, adequate funds and workers, and develop competent local strategies. Nevertheless, they are unable to overcome the obstacles to victory.

The majority of unsuccessful local campaigns are not competitive. They often face difficulties in building and maintaining a campaign team, and in generating local strategies. Resources such as money and committed volunteers - particularly experienced ones - are usually hard to come by. Candidates in ridings where the association is uncompetitive, and therefore weak, cannot rely on party members to help with their campaign.

Uncompetitive campaigns are often run by amateurs who may struggle to mobilise the supporters and resources that are available. Such campaigns often rely on inner circles made up of acquaintances of the candidate, or even a handful of relatives doing their best to cover the basic elements of a local campaign. In a few instances, notably in the NDP, workers cleave to the uncompetitive campaign out of a sense of
duty to the party.

Campaigns that have little or no chance of winning have limited relations with their national headquarters. From the national party’s perspective, these relations tend to be dominated by organizational considerations such as ensuring that the local campaign appears credible. And unless the national party has a special reason for helping a campaign that does not look like winning, these less competitive campaigns receive little help from their national counterparts. The NDP’s attempts to ensure uniformity in local campaigning does involve it in more complex relations with many of its less competitive campaigns than is the case for either the Liberals or Conservatives. But all parties make a special effort to help uncompetitive campaigns in ridings that they think will be strategically important to the wider federal election. Often this help is designed to make the local campaign appear credible, or as good as its opponents, despite the weakness of the local association. In spite of this assistance, such campaigns are not integrated into the campaigns of their national counterparts.

With respect to the local contest, less competitive campaigns are often linked to weak associations. The limited size and resources of the association mean that its contacts in the local political community are usually limited, and as a result, the campaign may find it difficult to build a strong and reliable sense of the mood and character of the riding. Such campaigns may be very reactive, pushed along by the actions of other local campaigns or the ebb and flow of the wider federal election. As such, even if they are capable of developing some form of local strategy, it may be subverted by forces beyond the control of the campaign.
The first story is about Bob Brisco, a Tory incumbent who was unchallenged for his renomination in the country riding of Kootenay West-Revelstoke. Although strongly connected to the Tory government, Brisco's strategists suggested he distance himself from the party. Despite having access to substantial funds and workers, this proved impossible, and in running a component campaign, he suffered the fate of many BC Tories, losing to the NDP.

Don Ross, the Liberal stopgap candidate in Surrey North won the nomination because of his profile as an ex-Mayor of Surrey, but could find no way of turning this to his advantage in the subsequent election. A lack of local media in this suburban riding meant that despite Ross's wishes, his was a parallel campaign that appeared to mimic its national counterpart.

Although party insider Lynn Fairall won a contested New Democrat nomination, the party was competitive enough to engage the incumbent Tory in the mainly country riding of Fraser Valley West. Fairall ran a subsidiary campaign, following the party line throughout the campaign.

The final story is also about another Liberal stopgap candidate, Tex Enemark, who contested the city riding of Vancouver Centre. Despite being a stopgap candidate, he had access to more money than most winning campaigns. His contacts in the hierarchy of the Liberal party guaranteed him the nomination. His party connections, and the national party's desire to be seen to run a credible campaign in Vancouver Centre, gave him access to substantial campaign funding. Yet his campaign was never a serious contender for the riding. Although Enemark was uncomfortable with national
party policy, his campaign could not break free of its associations with the party. In mimicking national party strategy, this was a parallel campaign.

It should be kept in mind that just as winning campaigns tend to see everything they have done as potentially important to their win - and therefore as strategically sound - the reverse is largely true for losing campaigns. It is often difficult to identify the real reasons for failure, and conclusions about what strategies and tactics work and do not work must always been seen in this light.

**BOB BRISCO: HIGH PROFILE FALL FROM GRACE**

Tory incumbent and local Bob Brisco was re-nominated unopposed in the *country* riding of Kootenay West-Revelstoke. His incumbency marks him as a *high profile* candidate. The boundary changes that created the riding added the NDP stronghold of Revelstoke to the former riding of Kootenay West. This made his task of winning re-election very difficult. As well, his long absences from the riding and personal difficulties had damaged his relationship with local association members who had worked to have him elected in 1984. As a result, the association, and the subsequent campaign, were weaker than in the previous election.

Despite this, Brisco managed to raise more funds than either of his two opponents, and a number of experienced campaigners were willing to work on the campaign. The traditional strength of the Tories in the area meant he had access to enough secondary workers and sympathizers to mount a credible campaign. As an incumbent, his campaign was a *component* of the national party campaign. Although
Brisco tried to avoid national issues and focus on local concerns, he had become a strong supporter of both free trade and the Prime Minister during his time in Ottawa. He could not avoid being linked with the Tories national platform, which he regularly defended. Although weakened, his campaign was engaged with the NDP in what was a contested constituency election.

Brisco's NDP opponent and party insider Lyle Kristiansen won a hotly contested, closed nomination over five other candidates. In winning the race, Kristiansen made good use of his profile both as a well known local unionist in an association with a strong union component, and as the former New Democrat MP for the area. The free trade issue not only enhanced the NDP's chances of winning the riding, it helped strengthen the already robust association still further. It managed to raise more money than the campaign could legally spend in the riding, and had access to many experienced campaigners as well as secondary workers and sympathizers. Kristiansen's was a typically bureaucratic/organizational NDP campaign team made up of the local party faithful. It was a subsidiary campaign which adopted the strategies of the federal NDP campaign. Given the competitive electoral history of the riding, Kristiansen's campaign was engaged with the Tories in a real contest.

The Liberal candidate was local doctor and councillor Garry Jenkins. Jenkins had organized the local Grit association, signing up many of its members himself, and was the only candidate for the nomination. He was a stopgap candidate in a weak association, and had to rely on his family and a few party stalwarts to run his campaign. The provincial party even sent him a campaign manager when the association could not
fill the position. His funding base was very limited, and he raised about half as much money as his opponents. He had no chance of winning the seat. His was a parallel campaign that was forced to use federal party strategies and standard campaign literature even though the candidate had supported free trade in opposition to party policy. His resulting ambivalence when dealing with free trade marginalized his campaign in the local contest between the NDP and Tories.

Kootenay West-Revelstoke is a sprawling country riding that runs over 500 kilometres north-south. It encompasses a number of towns each with its own peculiar set of economic and social interests built up over time in a population that is not very mobile. Campaigns were forced to adapt their strategies and tactics to meet these conditions. Most towns have one or two newspapers, and radio stations cover the riding. None are considered to be very influential. Given this, and the personal nature of country communities, strategists knew that they had to rely on canvassing and public meetings in order to get their message out to voters. The unionised workforces in the traditional industries in the riding, such as smelting, mining, forestry and transportation, were concerned about the impact of free trade on their jobs. This helped localise the national free trade debate, much to the advantage of the NDP. The polarization of the free trade debate, with the NDP on one side and the Tories on the other, left the Liberal candidate holding an uncomfortable middle ground.

The local contest was the fourth time Kristiansen and Brisco had faced each other. Brisco had won the seat in 1979, Kristiansen in 1980, and Brisco again in 1984. As the 1988 contest progressed, the NDP appeared to be increasingly dominant.
Nevertheless, a local media willing to report the race, and regular all-candidates' debates and public meetings ensured that the campaigns did engage with each other. Brisco ran a solid campaign, and as the incumbent, attracted media and voter attention. But his campaign did not match the Tory effort of 1984, and its vote share went down 10 percentage points in comparison to its performance in that election. This was fortuitous for Kristiansen. Although he won the seat by 10 percent, his vote share hardly changed from the previous election. Liberal Jenkins picked up 8 percent of the vote, and may have accounted for much of the lost Tory vote.

The Candidate and Campaign Team

Incumbent Bob Brisco was widely considered by supporters and opponents to have done a good job for the riding. But his efforts on behalf of the riding had kept him in Ottawa and away from the Kootenays for most of the period from 1984 to 1988. So too had a heart attack and the subsequent recuperation period that he spent in Ottawa. In addition, he had gone through a divorce and remarried during the term. This had not endeared him to some of his local supporters. The stress of changes in his personal life, and the lack of a warm welcome in his home riding had only further encouraged him to stay in Ottawa. Consequently, his contact with his support base in his home riding was limited, and he had difficulty maintaining relations with his inner circle of workers from 1984. Even his constituency office could not help him maintain close links with local Tories. Many of Brisco's local supporters felt neglected, and some were angry with him.

Only three months after his heart attack, Brisco returned home in September to
organize his campaign less than two months before election day. Despite local annoyance with him, and perhaps because the Tories chances in the riding were diminished, he was unchallenged for the nomination and was acclaimed as the Tory candidate. The limited democracy of this closed, uncontested nomination robbed the association of any impetus that may have come from the recruitment drives and excitement of a contested nomination. It became immediately apparent that the association was lethargic, and Brisco had trouble finding members willing to help organize his campaign. He was particularly dismayed to discover that no one was willing to be his campaign manager. Many experienced campaigners who had worked for him in 1984 refused to take part in the 1988 campaign, and he struggled to put together a campaign organization. As Tim Barry, chair of the strategy committee noted:

Brisco was a good MP, but not a good politician. Having alienated his support base, his efforts to build a campaign team were ineffective - he did not recruit a campaign manager until September. For an incumbent’s campaign, it was often in disarray. This emphasized the fact that he might lose, and further hurt our effectiveness. The campaign was too little, too late.

As an incumbent, Brisco expected to run a professional campaign that dealt with both local and non-local issues. When no one volunteered as campaign manager, he and his local constituency office searched for a local Tory with management skills to run the campaign. In the end they convinced Jack Chernoff, a manager at the Cominco smelter in Trail, to work as Brisco’s campaign manager. In contrast to 1984, Brisco had to pay his campaign manager in 1988. Chernoff was partially compensated for the loss of income he suffered as a result of taking six weeks off from work. As well, the campaign covered his day-to-day expenses. The campaign manager himself was
relatively inexperienced. Perhaps as a result of this, Brisco and his new wife appear to have done much of the organizational work.

Despite a late start, Chernoff managed to construct a viable if inexperienced campaign team in the few weeks available. Chernoff was able to find campaigners willing to chair 8 key committees, which made for an inner circle of about a dozen volunteers. Along with Chernoff, the most important member of the inner circle was Tim Barry, chair of the strategy committee, the research committee, and de facto the media committee as well. Barry had some experience in public relations and in campaigning. Relations between the team and Brisco were relatively distant and formal in comparison to the 1984 effort.

Brisco lamented that it was a team that could not run the type of campaign needed to beat the NDP:

...there was less of a strategy than in 1984 and an absence of the drive to defeat the NDP. Of the campaign workers from 1984 who did not join the 1988 campaign, we lost mainly key players.

Moreover, the inner circle and candidate came to the campaign with very different views of what the local strategic focus should be. Brisco was a strong supporter of Brian Mulroney, and was keen to run a campaign linked to free trade and the national party strategy. Like a good incumbent from the governing party, he wished to run a campaign which celebrated the government’s successes. Both Chernoff and Barry worked hard to impress on Brisco just how unpopular Mulroney and the free trade deal were in BC, and the Kootenays in particular. In the end, Brisco agreed to try to distance himself from the national party, but continued to defend free trade when
challenged on the issue. This strategic difference unsettled the local team, widening the gap between the candidate and volunteers.

The campaign elected to set up three campaign offices to help cover the large riding. The main office was in Castlegar, staffed by about 15 people. The office in Nelson had 10 key workers, and the office in Trail about 6. While this was seen as necessary in a geographically large riding, running several offices exacerbated the campaign's organizational problems. The campaign had to rely on a rotation of second tier workers, of which there were about 130, to staff these offices. Further to these were about 500 sympathizers spread throughout the riding. But there was a lack of strategic direction, and some doubt as to the commitment of many workers. Tim Barry noted

...that outside the inner group, most workers were not committed. Even some of the inner circle lacked commitment, and there were few experienced campaigners among them. There were not nearly enough people, about 35 or 40 who could be relied upon. For a riding this size, and an incumbent's campaign, that is not enough.

Barry suggested two reasons why the campaign struggled to find workers. The first was a general comment on modern campaigning:

With married couples both working, the pool of housewives has been lost. The syphoning off of workers to interest groups, very noticeable in 1988, means that campaigns struggle to find people.

But he suggests that Brisco has to bear some of the blame for the lack of workers. Maintaining good relations with friends and neighbours - those people from which campaign teams in country communities are built - is critical. This is particularly true of country campaigns where the web of social relations that underpin campaigns is often more intimate than in city or suburban campaigns:
Bob started too late and with little method when he came to select campaign workers. He did not show much sensitivity to the feelings of local people, and as a result found them reluctant to join the campaign. He did not try to maintain the social connections that would have encouraged people to treat him more sympathetically.

Just as telling was the attitude of Brisco’s official agent, Bill van Yzerloo, who emphasized that he filled the job in his capacity as an accountant rather than as a committed campaigner. In stark contrast to the highly personal nature of relations between members of campaign teams in other country ridings, relations in the Brisco team were more functional. Organizers were paid, volunteers tended to emphasize commitment to the party rather than the candidate, and some clearly felt it was prudent or potentially valuable to work for the government party.

Perhaps the only bright spot for Brisco was his ability to raise campaign funds. Most of this came from the local business community, which was strongly committed to the Tory platform, in part because the only alternative, the NDP, was not perceived to be pro-business. As a result, despite his other difficulties, Brisco raised $61,232, nearly $20,000 more than the successful NDP campaign. This enabled the Tories’ to produce their own campaign literature and radio and newspaper advertisements. Although strategic decision making rested with local campaigners, they seemed unable to take advantage of the resources available to them. The focus of the campaign drifted to national issues, often altered by its symbiotic relationship with its national campaign. Integration of local and national campaigns is characteristic of incumbents’ campaigns, and reflects the links developed with the party hierarchy while the MP is in Ottawa. In this instance, the inability of the local campaign to distance itself from its federal
counterpart may have been exacerbated by a lack of experienced workers.

**Intra-Party Relations**

In the face of a concerted New Democrat anti-free trade (and anti-Mulroney) campaign that captured the local imagination, the Tories decided to run on Brisco's personal performance and local issues. His time as a member had been very lucrative for the riding. The campaign literature, nearly all of which was locally produced, contained a list of all the money and projects in the riding that could be attributed in some way to Brisco. By his own estimation he had brought several hundred million dollars of federal money into the riding. But despite its best efforts, the local campaign was continually linked to the national Tory campaign and free trade. This is in stark contrast to Al Horning's successful Tory campaign in Okanagan Centre.

As an incumbent, Brisco was closely linked to the national party. Moreover, Brisco kept regular contact with national party organizers, and was willing to take their advice. This gave him a different perspective on the campaign than local strategists, who were urging him to avoid discussing free trade and Brian Mulroney. Moreover, as a strong supporter of the leader and free trade, Brisco also felt a principled need to defend them in public. Whether he liked it or not, his campaign was treated as a component of the national Conservative campaign.

A number of factors made it difficult for the Tory campaign to convince voters of the importance of local issues. Among them was the national party advertising in the riding that referred to national issues, including free trade, and carried a tag-on
mentioning Brisco as the local Conservative candidate. Because of its vast resources, the national party spent more on advertising on local radio in the constituency than did the local campaign. But the national campaign had little direct interest in the riding, given its expectation that this would likely be one of the many seats it would lose in British Columbia. It was unwilling to listen to local complaints about the impact of its advertising, nor adjust it to suit local strategic conditions. Its advertisements kept reminding voters that Brisco had been a member of a government that was responsible for free trade; that his campaign was a component of the Tories national effort which promoted this issue, and was lead by Brian Mulroney.

According to figures supplied by Kootenay Broadcasting System, the national Progressive Conservative campaign spent $5,149 on radio advertising during November of 1988, compared with $2,629 spent by the local campaign. The relative strength of the national Tory campaign, and its willingness to interfere in local politics is clear from comparisons with the other parties. The national New Democrat campaign spent $1,872, as opposed to the local campaigns expenditure of $2,549, while the figures for the Liberal party were $1,057 and $1,425 respectively.

This meant that the misdirected Tory national campaign actually purchased about twice as much airtime in the riding than did the local PC campaign. This 1:2 ratio in favour of the national Tory campaign was reversed in the case of both the NDP and Liberal campaigns, with the local campaign out-spending its national counterpart by a ratio of 1.5:1.

Local Tory campaigners tried to influence the nature of national party
advertising, but found national strategists uninterested in their complaints. Local strategists could not even get a list of the content and timing of national advertisements. Communications coordinator Tim Barry made an unsuccessful effort to influence national advertising in the riding.

We asked but could not find out what time or how much advertising was being run... where it would be run or what it would contain. This was also true for national party advertising on BCTV, CBC and the major Vancouver and national newspapers that are seen in the Kootenays. Not only was it damaging to our campaign, but we couldn’t coordinate our own advertising with that of the national party.

The local campaign could not even time its own radio advertising to avoid placing it next to a contradictory national advertisements. Contradictory local and national strategies were thought by local campaigners to have badly damaged their efforts to steer clear of the free trade issue. Local strategists felt that they were fighting the local NDP and Liberals and their own national party campaign. Campaign manager Jack Chernoff noted that the local campaign was so distant from the regional or national campaigns that it was "...like working in a vacuum." Tim Barry observed that

The national party has its own "secret" strategy which it allows only a few BC strategists to know. We had no idea about the overall direction of the campaign. It pretty much abandoned us. On one level this was okay, as we were trying to run our own campaign anyway, but the lack of contact meant we couldn’t even stop them hurting us.

This focus on national issues was exacerbated by similar radio, television, and newspaper advertisements and news stories distributed in the riding by various news organizations but originating elsewhere.

Brain Mulroney’s visit did not help the Tories in their efforts to avoid free trade.
Brisco's view was that the visit was "peripheral to the campaign, but [that] Mulroney had been both generous and helpful." Local campaign manager Jack Chernoff had a different view of the visit:

He [Mulroney] brought lots of national media attention, which normally we would have used to our advantage. But because we were down-playing his role and free trade, we could not afford to let the campaign focus on his visit. The visit most probably hurt our campaign rather than helped it.

Brisco felt that provincial strategists were more sympathetic to the ordeals of local campaigners in the west, where the Tories were fighting the NDP not the Liberals as were their colleagues in the east. Brisco felt the party had brought together a group of western issues making it relevant in the west, but he was very much alone in thinking this.

Other campaigners thought that the party did not manage to transmute the national anti-Liberal campaign into an anti-New Democrat campaign as required by the particular politics of British Columbia. Time and again local strategists complained that the literature and advice they were receiving was aimed at the Liberals. Yet the Liberal candidate was not a serious contender in Kootenay West-Revelstoke nor in most other BC ridings. The party was perhaps unwilling to expend effort developing a campaign for a province in which it believed it would win only a handful of seats.

As a result of his time in Ottawa, Brisco was both sympathetic to national party objectives, and perceived to be so by local voters. So although the local campaign had access to many of the resources needed to run a strong independent local campaign - and in some ways did so - it was in fact tied to the national campaign. This is another indication of the symbiotic relationship that exists between component campaigns and
their national counterpart. Brisco could not fully divorce himself from the national party; part of him did not want too and his functional links to the party made it difficult. In fact efforts to do so were noted in the media and by other campaigns, and undercut the strategy. A lack of experienced campaigners exacerbated the difficulty of implementing such a policy.

The Local Contest

Kootenay West-Revelstoke is a stable riding with a low population turnover and a high level of home ownership. This reinforces the strength and intimacy of local communities. The local economy is based on traditional industries such as forestry, mining and smelting. In addition, each town in the riding has one or two local newspapers that are capable of dealing with local issues. These factors work to create a well focused local political agenda in each town. Although the riding creates a single political community out of a number of towns with somewhat distinct concerns, these interests are adequately articulated.

Constituency elections in Kootenay West-Revelstoke have been bi-polar in recent years. The seat has alternated between the Tories and NDP in the last few elections. Most Tory campaigners felt the free trade issue (which bound the local union population closely to the NDP), the unpopularity of Brian Mulroney, and the addition of Revelstoke to the riding, had all shifted the balance against the Conservatives. The tide was therefore running back towards the NDP and Lyle Kristiansen and against Bob Brisco. As the incumbent and with a well financed campaign, and with access to a local media
infrastructure that had some influence in the local community, Brisco had the opportunity to try and turn the NDP tide. These two campaigns engaged each other, particularly early in the campaign. Liberal Garry Jenkins was never seen as a serious contender for the riding.

Local campaigns interacted in an environment largely dominated by the free trade debate. The New Democrats chose free trade as their main focus. The structure of the local economy - and in particular, fears that the Cominco smelter in Trail might suffer under free trade - worked to localise the national free trade debate. That is, the partisan arguments of the national campaign were seen as relevant to local conditions.

The union movement is powerful throughout the riding, and the Local 480 of the Steelworkers of America at the Cominco smelter in Trail was the centre of a strong anti-free trade union campaign which tied in very closely with the NDP provincial election campaign. Furthermore, the Liberal Garry Jenkins was uncomfortable opposing free trade, conceding that "...the Liberal Party had historically supported free trade, as I did myself." This worked to further entrench the NDP as the anti-free trade party, and construct the contest as a two-party race.

In fact, as NDP campaigner Gerald Rotering noted, free trade allowed the party to consolidate its two bases of support in the region:

We emphasized that this was union territory and that free trade was not in the interests of loggers or smelter workers. In addition, it would make it easier for America to interfere with Canadian natural resources, a big concern for environmentalists. This unified these groups which are sometimes at odds behind our campaign.
The localization of the free trade debate was encouraged by television beamed in from outside the riding. It was the main issue throughout the country. Interpretations of the national debates by the non-local media were believed to have affected the number of volunteers and worker morale on local campaigns. Positive interpretations of Turner’s performance were thought to have moved some anti-Free Trade support from the NDP to the Liberals. As well, opinion polls reported in the media which suggested a Tory rout in BC did not help the PC’s local effort, despite the fact that none of these polls had a statistically significant local component.

The Tories decision to emphasize Brisco’s record as MP and local issues in the hope of avoiding free trade had merit. A personal style of politics is both expected and plays well to local audiences in country ridings, as does concentrating on local issues. There were a number of local issues, such as the renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, a promise of action on a small boat harbour for New Denver, and the intelligent development of an aboriginal archaeological site in the Slocan Valley for tourism.

Brisco felt that the renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty was both the most important of these issues, and gave him an opportunity to shift the local election agenda. The Columbia River is a central social and economic resource for the region, and Brisco saw renegotiation of the Treaty as an opportunity to bolster local development. The Treaty regulates the local use of the river and the obligations of both Canada and America with respect to the river. He promised to extract money from the companies that use it to generate hydro-electricity. This money could then be used for local development.
Unfortunately for Brisco, some local issues hurt his campaign. The British
Columbian Power Commission hearings into Cominco’s sale of its controlling share in
West Kootenay Power to an American firm became an issue. Brisco supported the sale,
and was labelled as pro-American (anti-Canadian). The sale intensified concern about
free trade, and Brisco’s public support of the sale played badly in the region. Free trade
was closely connected to Brian Mulroney, whose public image were seen as an electoral
liability. As well, in an ageing riding like the Kootenays, the government’s attempt to
de-index old age pensions during its first term had been unpopular. The campaign
decided to avoid any association with the Prime Minister, a difficult decision for Brisco
who was a big supporter of Mulroney. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s visit to the
riding managed to highlight his leadership and the free trade debate.

The Tories attempts to run on Brisco’s personal performance and local issues
demanded a sophisticated campaign organization. It required that issues relevant to all
the local regions and towns be identified, and that literature, advertising, and speeches
be modified for different parts of the riding. This put added strain on the Tories limited
campaign organization. Despite advertising and media conferences, these matters was
never given priority by other campaigns or the local media. Local journalists did not
find the Tory campaign effort compelling. From their perspective, local campaigners
claimed that the Tory campaign was not up to the demands of such a strategy, and this
is why it failed.

Unlike Tory Al Horning in Okanagan Centre, Brisco had to make use of all-
candidates’ debates if he was to reach voters. The media in the riding is too
fragmented, and not influential enough to provide the basis for an alternative means of communicating with voters. In his role as communications coordinator, Tim Barry created a briefing book with short, snappy answers and comments on a range of issues, and Brisco studied and practised them. His efforts to raise local issues at all-candidates’ debates were, however, swamped by his opponents continued emphasis on free trade. These attacks were carried in the local media across the riding, undermining Brisco’s attempt to run on local issues and his personal credentials.

The all-candidates’ debate in Revelstoke encapsulates the difficulties that confronted Brisco. The Tories organizational weakness was most pronounced in Revelstoke. Whereas the NDP organization from the old riding of Kootenay West had been able to link up with the existing NDP supporters in Revelstoke, Conservative association members had little knowledge of the politics of the town. Given the disarray of the Tory organization leading up to and during the campaign, it was not in a position to develop a local support base. With few Tory supporters in the audience, it was that much easier for his opponents to keep the debate firmly focused on free trade and its implications, overwhelming Brisco’s attempts to speak to local issues. Several all-candidates’ debates on local radio and two on local cable television were equally unhelpful to the Brisco campaign, as they too concentrated on free trade.

The inability to get supporters out to the meeting in Revelstoke affected Brisco deeply, and he came to see it as a harbinger of his impending defeat. This was doubly galling given the personal effort it took to travel the 500 kilometres from his base in the south of the riding, along treacherous mountain roads in poor weather, to speak in a
hostile environment. To add insult to injury, attempts to advertise local issues in
Revelstoke were hampered by the fact that the local newspaper used a distinctive typeset
system that was not compatible with that used by all the other newspapers in the riding.

Like his Tory counterpart in Okanagan Centre, Al Horning, Brisco could afford
to advertise in the local media. There are about ten weekly or daily papers in the
constituency. The main local papers are the Trail Times, the Nelson News and the
Castlegar News. The first two are dailies and the last a bi-weekly. The dailies have
circulations of about 6000 while the Castlegar News has a circulation of about 5000. At
the time of the election, the Trail Times and the Nelson News were owned by the
Stirling News Service of Vancouver and the Castlegar News was an independent. All
relied on the Canadian Press wire service which has its head office in Toronto. Shaw
Cable is the local, independent, cable network in the southern part of the constituency
encompassing Trail, Castlegar and Nelson.

Although it lacks a television station, Kootenay West-Revelstoke has a number
of radio stations. Kootenay Broadcasting System (KBS) runs radio stations covering the
southern half of the constituency, its broadcast area being nearly contiguous with the
boundaries of the constituency. There are two smaller radio stations elsewhere in the
constituency. With seven reporters including a news director, KBS is the largest news
service in the constituency. It runs three AM and one FM station under its parent
company, Four Seasons Radio, with wire services provided by the Satellite News
Network which has its headquarters in Toronto. Local news is fed back to this service.

A large advertising budget as a proportion of total expenditures seems to be
associated with a campaign that relies on non labour-intensive methods of campaigning, usually as a result of a lack of volunteers. The Tories' advertising expenditure represented 43 percent of campaign spending. It was the biggest spending campaign. The NDP spent 36 percent of its budget on advertising and the Liberals 35 percent.\textsuperscript{1}

This means the Tory campaign spent 25 percent more on advertising than the NDP and 40 percent more than the Liberals. But as Tim Barry noted, the Tories found it difficult influence the local agenda.

We spent lots of money on advertising, but had little idea about whether it was making an impact. We were very uncertain of the value of advertising in local media as the local media has limited credibility with voters. With four towns to cover, about 500 kilometres apart, with different needs and separate media outlets, it would have taken more money and a better coordinated campaign to swing the vote back to us.

The need for more spending is a natural response to the failure of the campaign to make much headway against its opponents. In stark contrast to Al Horning’s Okanagan campaign, the media in the Kootenay’s did not have much influence on voters. As such, Brisco was unsuccessful in drawing political debate away from free trade and towards local issues.

While newspaper advertising is less expensive than radio advertising, the decline in the status of local daily newspapers has encouraged campaigners to use radio. Radio advertising targeted certain high listening times, such as the drive to and from work.

The greater use of radio in the Kootenays in comparison with other ridings studied was

\textsuperscript{1}In addition to the amounts spent by the national parties, local spending on radio advertising accounted for 25 percent of the Tory advertising budget and 26 percent and 42 percent respectively in the case of the NDP and Liberal campaigns.
the result of a number of factors. It was more affordable than in suburban or city
ridings, the local radio audience area matched the boundaries of the constituency quite
closely. In addition, it was heard in areas that were hard to canvass, and that were
beyond the circulation zones of town papers.

There were a number of disputes about whether the signs were legally allowed in
some of the places used by the NDP. Their signs ran the length of the major highways
linking the towns in the southern end of the riding. The Tories were unable to match
the NDP with respect to this labour intensive campaign technique, and this gave an
added edge to complaints about the legality of some signs. The same is true for the
distribution of literature. Relatively low density country towns and environs require
large numbers of volunteers to hand out pamphlets. A labour volunteer shortage meant
the Conservatives were forced to rely more on Canada Post than the New Democrats.

As the campaign progressed, it became clear that the NDP had the strongest
campaign team, and that Brisco's campaign could not match them in terms of
volunteers. Although personal contact is seen as important in country communities, the
Tories struggled to reach voters either by phone or foot canvass in this vast country
riding. In another instance, the Tories' attempt to swamp the editorial pages with
supportive letters - a common tactic in country towns - failed because the NDP was
better organized and could muster more such letters. The evidence suggests that it was
a lack of volunteers (an essentially cost-free component of a campaign), that was most
damaging to the Tory campaign.

Brisco's own performance was hampered by the effects of a recent heart attack.
One campaign worker noted that "Brisco lacked energy, and looked jaundiced and unwell throughout the campaign, which did not help us." Brisco himself found the campaign exhausting, and complained that the addition of Revelstoke had made an already large and diverse riding even more difficult for a candidate to cover. The weather in November was poor, and the constant driving and campaigning strained his already fragile health.

A well run campaign may have saved the seat, or at least have put him much closer to the NDP. As it became clear that the campaign could not drive home its message that local issues were important, a sense of fatalism appears to have overtaken the campaign. Engagements between the two campaigns became less intense, and carried less interest for the local media.

Understanding the public mood is the *sine qua non* of a good campaign, and underpins the development of appropriate local strategies, the role given the candidate and the presentation of the candidate. Assessing and influencing the public mood in areas where there is little direct polling and limited investigative media and media interaction in general requires personal contact. In ridings such as Kootenay West-Revelstoke, this requires plenty of campaign volunteers. In communities where social contacts are more intimate, and informal networks of information quite powerful, the ability to attract respected community members to a campaign, and to produce large numbers of supporters at town hall events is important to a candidate’s credibility as an electoral challenger. Due to a lack of volunteers, the Tories in Kootenay West-Revelstoke were out of touch with the local communities, and lacked the numbers to
assert Brisco's claim to the seat.

It is perhaps not surprising that Brisco and his new family moved to suburban Vancouver after the election. He and his wife were deeply offended by the treatment he received, and Brisco was particularly bitter towards some old friends and neighbours in the Kootenays. Although he had lost the seat and won it back before, he was unwilling to travel this road again. Unfortunately for Brisco, the localisation of the free trade debate ruined his only chance for success. Unable to shift the terms of the debate towards local issues, Brisco's component campaign suffered from its links to the national Tory platform.

DON ROSS: STOPGAP CANDIDATE WITH FAMILY AND FRIENDS

Ex-Mayor of Surrey Don Ross believed that the creation of the new suburban riding of Surrey North, and the lack of an incumbent, gave him an opportunity to use his public profile to reshape the political landscape and win the seat for the Liberals. He had run and lost as a Liberal at the provincial level, but knew nothing of the local federal association, and considered himself an outsider. Although well known locally, he was a stopgap candidate in a weak local association. The nomination was only nominally contested, as his profile guaranteed him a lopsided victory. It was much like the open, uncontested nominations of most stopgap candidates.

With a weak association, Ross could only manage to put together a very limited campaign team. He relied heavily on his family to fill the core positions of the inner circle. And although his profile helped him to raise twice the funds of his Conservative
opponent, he was still $13 000 short of the NDP candidate. A lack of all three types of workers banished his campaign to the margins. The campaign could barely keep its head above water, and although Ross had local issues he wanted to promote, his was a parallel campaign which was caught up in the strategies of the national party. Moreover, no local issues pushed their way onto the campaign agenda in the riding. This Liberal campaign was marginalized from the real contest between the NDP and Tories.

Ross's NDP opponent was former alderman and NDP party insider Jack Karpoff. He won a closed but hotly contested nomination over three other candidates with strong support from among female members of the local association. With a strong local association, and solid funding, he managed to build a good campaign team that had a typical bureaucratic NDP form. With experienced campaigners from the municipal, provincial and federal levels of the party, the inner circle was very competent. It easily outclassed its opponents in canvassing the riding and fulfilling the other demands of campaigning.

Although Karpoff made a point of addressing local issues, the campaign was largely a subsidiary of the NDP federal effort. In fact, by the end of the campaign, organizers noted that of the three candidates, only Don Ross had much of a public profile. This is indicative of a campaign that did not focus strongly on its candidate. Although the constituency election did not have much of a focus, it was clear that Karpoff was engaged in a contest with the Tories.

Tory Cliff Blair proved to be Karpoff's main competition. He had won an open,
contested nomination over 5 other candidates. Although he had been a member of the party for a number of years, his strong views on abortion set him apart from many of the other nomination candidates. A local realter, he did not have the profile associated with many local notables, although he was well known amongst pro-life activists, some of whom were members of the local association. Blair’s candidacy alienated some traditional Tory supporters, and he struggled to raise campaign funds. He also had to compete for funds with Ross, who was much better known, and was effective at attracting donations from the local community, including local businesses.

The new Tory association was not well organized, and many new members left after their preferred candidate failed to win the nomination. Despite this, Blair had enough committed workers to run a solid campaign. Blair and his team ran a parochial campaign in that strategies were decided locally. But as he was a strong supporter of free trade, this issue was central to the campaign. In fact, Blair claimed that provincial Tories argued that the campaign should not push as hard as it did on this issue.

It is testament to the power of national trends running against the Tories and the Karpoff’s efforts that for much of the campaign many Tories believed they had little chance of success in Surrey North. Just prior to election day, local and national strategists came realise that they were engaged in a contested constituency election. An infusion of funds by the party at this time failed to secure a victory for Blair by 4 percentage points.

Surrey North is a good example of a suburban riding. There is little sense of a local political agenda. In part, this may be the result of a lack of idiosyncratic local
issues and the lack of a local media to help generate a local political agenda. This may also reflect the fact that many local voters work outside the riding in Vancouver, and that the area is new and rapidly expanding. The home owning families in the riding have general interests in the state of the economy and social issues affecting families.

With few means of communicating with voters, local campaigns needed to make sure that street signs and pamphlets were distributed throughout the riding, and that as much of the riding as possible was canvassed by foot or phone. These are labour intensive campaign methods, and only the NDP could fully meet the demands of the local campaign. The Tory campaign had enough workers to mount a credible campaign, but struggled to find enough money to produce signs, local literature, and to run a phone bank.

The local contest was amorphous. Local journalists and campaigners both noted that the two leading candidates were relatively unknown at the end of the campaign. This highlights the fact that in many suburban ridings, the candidates are first and foremost representatives of their parties. Their individual personalities are of secondary importance. By default then, the campaign revolved around the platforms and issues raised by the national parties. This atmosphere may have been reinforced by the fact that a subsidiary NDP campaign dominated much of the local contest.

The NDP won 37 percent of the vote to the Tories 32.8 percent. While the NDP vote had not changed since 1984, the Tories dropped 13.7 points. Most of this went to the Liberals, whose vote share increased from 14.4 to 24.9 percentage points. Local strategists from all parties put this 73 percent increase in the Liberal vote share down to
Ross's high profile. This points to the fact that it is the inability of suburban candidates to single themselves out rather than voters' unwillingness to be influenced by public profiles that limits the impact of personalities on these contests.

**The Candidate and Campaign Team**

Ross was a stopgap candidate for the Liberals in a riding in which they were simply happy to have a name on the ballot. That he had some local profile was an unexpected bonus. The nomination exhibited many of the characteristics of the latent democracy found in uncompetitive, cadre style associations. Of the two that contested the nomination, neither candidate put much effort in winning. There was relatively little recruitment to the association, and the nomination did not contribute many new members nor their membership dues to the weak association. The lack of a coterie of potential campaign workers became painfully clear to Ross after he won the nomination.

The local association had few resources and could provide only a handful of campaign volunteers, none with any great experience. In the hope that it would help him run a professional campaign in line with his public image as ex-mayor of Surrey, Ross accepted the offer of assistance from Brian Hayes, a professional promoter, and installed him as campaign manager. But Ross had to rely on his family to do most of the actual routine work of the campaign. When Hayes left the campaign after just three weeks as manager, Ross was very upset:

> It was a very negative experience. Hayes's lack of commitment was astonishing. I am not about to go through the same experience again.

After some heated disagreements between members of the association and the Ross
family, the campaign ground to a halt. A number of workers refused to work for the campaign. This meant that Ross had to rely even more heavily on his family to run his campaign. Ross's son Brad stepped into the breach as campaign manager, to "maintain [his] father's dignity," and the family became the core of the campaign team. Although he had assisted his father in municipal campaigns, Brad however, had no experience in coordinating a political campaign. He was in his own words a figurehead, which left his father to run the campaign.

This left Ross, his wife, two sons and a couple of other local Liberals as the inner circle of the campaign. The relationship between the candidate and the core campaign team was very intimate - in fact, largely familial. Ross and his family made the strategic decisions and assigned the work load amongst the few volunteers. In addition to his family, some loyal friends helped Ross out as secondary workers:

They worked for me out of personal loyalty. Not just from Surrey, but from all over the lower mainland, Burnaby, Vancouver, Coquitlam and Langley.

There were about 20 secondary workers willing to provide occasionally help to the campaign, but only a handful were reliable workers. Even less committed were another 15 sympathizers. It often required phone calls from members of the Ross family to get workers to come into the campaign office. The size of the campaign team was a decided let-down for Ross, who was used to having 150 people work on his mayoral campaigns.

So despite having a serious candidate, the local Liberal campaign was too uncompetitive and lacked the organizational backing needed to attract and build a true campaign team. The last resort of such campaigns is friends and family. Although the
commitment of the few volunteers on the campaign was great, mixed as it was with a lack of experience, it proved to be counter-productive. They simply could not understand why the Liberal party would not give Ross money, nor why party members would not work for Ross. Nor could they understand why local voters would not elect him with an overwhelming majority. Such naiveté is not helpful to a local campaign.

Given the lack of volunteers, with no one schooled in the art of local campaigning at federal elections, and in line with his desire to run a professional campaign, Ross placed a high priority on fund-raising. He saw it as a means of overcoming these other deficiencies. When he approached the local association for help, he was shocked to find that they could only provide him with a $1,900 loan, and a $2,837 contribution to his campaign. His request for help from the national party was unsuccessful; it gave nothing to the local campaign. This upset him as he had understood that the party would be willing to finance the campaign of a "suitably high profile candidate such as myself." It also set the tone for the rest of the campaign. Ross ignored national party directives, and happily went about addressing the issues he felt were important. He felt he owed allegiance to no one.

Initial fund-raising efforts led by the first campaign manager, Hayes, were relatively unsuccessful. Ross's son Brad blamed this on Hayes's lack of effort, and a style which alienated many potential donors. With the departure of Hayes, Don Ross took control of the fund-raising effort. This is not unusual, particularly in cadre style parties such as the Liberals (Carty 1991a, 205-209, and table 8.6). The candidate is

\[^2\text{This was in fact more than most BC Liberal associations provided their candidate.}\]
often the main target of funds donated to cadre style associations, and Ross made good use of his public profile in order to generate funds. Campaign manager Brad Ross estimated that 70-80 percent of this money came as a result of his father’s personal connections with Surrey North residents and business people, built up over his time in municipal politics. But the campaign’s reliance on Ross to actually make contact with potential donors was a little more pronounced than in most cadre style associations. And although Ross did much better than most other Liberal candidates in BC in terms of raising funds, he was disappointed with the support he received from the business community.

Ross had much more success in obtaining funds from local voters. He organized a number of speaking engagements where audiences made donations, but the majority of his funds came as a result of personal requests for money while canvassing, and in response to appeals made in campaign brochures. He received solid support from members of the local Indo-Canadian community, and benefitted from his close ties to the local Socred establishment, including local MLA Rita Johnston. Although disappointed with the $31 193 he raised, it was twice as much as his Conservative opponent managed to collect. Yet the Conservatives were better placed electorally to win the seat. In fact the Tories easily out-poll the Liberals on election day. The Ross campaign, with more money and a higher profile candidate could not challenge the Tories for second place, despite adding 10 percentage points to the Liberals vote share

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3This is much less true for the mass style NDP, with its more collective mentality (ibid; see also Padget 1991, 346-347, and tables 8.17 and 8.18).
in the riding.

Successful fund-raising was the full extent of the local campaign's organizational achievements. This strengthened the independence of the campaign, and gave Ross a sense that his power base was both local and unconnected to the national Liberal party. Decision making in the campaign was local but ineffective. The campaign had a clear focus on the candidate, with a secondary focus on issues. While its strategic independence allowed the local campaign to control its own destiny, the lack of sufficient local volunteers and resources placed an enormous burden in relatively inexperienced campaigners and may have damaged its effectiveness. The campaign suffered from volunteers having to learn their jobs as they went along, and lacked enough volunteers to adequately canvass the riding. As a result, the campaign had a limited impact on the local contest.

Intra-Party Relations

When Don Ross received no financial support from the national party whatsoever, any hold party strategists may have had over the direction of the local campaign was lost. For its part, the party did not appear all that interested in exerting any influence over the local campaign. It failed to provide any volunteers or strategic advice to the campaign despite the lack of local volunteers with federal election experience. The national party was happy to just settle for having a Liberal candidate on the ballot in Surrey North, and did not care much about the style or content of the local campaign. Because of its lack of resources, and despite Ross's efforts to focus on his personality and local issues,
his was a parallel campaign that could not be distinguished from the national campaign carried into the riding by the non-local media.

Ross put some of his misapprehension of the role of the party down to the fact that local Liberals wanted to attract a public figure to run for the party and by design or over-enthusiasm, had encouraged the perception that a good candidate would receive assistance from the party. Not only was the local association weak, but the organizational weakness of the Liberals in British Columbia most probably precluded the party from providing substantial logistical support to a campaign which did not have much chance of winning. The difficulty of raising funds and extracting other assistance from the party aggravated the already dyspeptic view of the national party held by local campaigners. Ross believes that many local donations - particularly corporate donations - that should have gone to the local campaign were funnelled directly to the national campaign. This is because there is a perception that the most efficient way of helping the party, or of being seen to help the party, has been to direct donations to the national campaign. He sees this behaviour as symptomatic of the traditional Liberal weakness in British Columbia.

The local organization had little access to expert assistance from the party. After his campaign manager left, Ross was required to organize the media campaign, including writing and placing advertisements. As a newcomer to this aspect of campaigning, he contacted the provincial head office for help.

I was disillusioned to find that party headquarters did not have the wherewithal to help candidates in my position.

In the end, Ross and his wife wrote the copy for his own advertisements. Campaign
advertising and literature focused mainly on his experience and knowledge of the riding, and emphasized those issues they saw as important, including regional issues of national concern, such as forest management and fishing.

The inability of the Liberal party to offer any substantial help, and the local association to offer any real volunteer support, poisoned the relationship between the campaign and the party. Of Virginia Bardluck, the association president, campaign manager Brad Ross noted:

She was overpowering and obnoxious, and quite incapable of helping to run a campaign. I was angry at her, and the atmosphere in the campaign office was very "flat."

As a result of his disenchantment with the national branch of the party, Ross had little contact with the Liberal party in the lead up to or during the election. He did not attend the school for candidates as his nomination was too late, and was largely unaware of any strategies or tactics adopted by the wider party. As the campaign was nearly entirely cut-off from the party, its strategies were very much the result of local decisions. Ross’s attitude to the party platform was free-wheeling, and his personal style of fund-raising allowed him a good deal of leeway to create strategy and respond to local circumstances.

I am a poor example of a candidate sticking to the party line. I tried to adhere to the general principles of the party philosophy, but I called my own shots. The party is weak out here in the West and we are pretty much on our own - there is room within the party for different philosophies. The party is relieved to have a decent candidate, and headquarters provided little direction, or interference. I raised my own money, which strengthened my independence.

This was made easier by the fact that much of the Liberal party literature, and many of the party’s advisers, focused on the Tories and was therefore ill-suited to local
circumstances where the NDP was strong. Ross found that

The Liberal campaign was not even well-suited to British Columbia, as we had to fight the NDP as well as the Tories out here, yet the campaign did not really address the NDP. It was designed for Quebec and Ontario.

Despite the obvious need for a locally focused strategy, Ross’s campaign was unable to develop and implement its own strategic vision. This was due mainly to the weakness of the local campaign. In turn, the lack of national or regional assistance for the local campaign can be said to have exacerbated this weakness.

The only contact between the local campaign and the national campaign was when the National Strategy Committee made available the timetable for the leader’s tour. Turner swung through the riding, but made little direct impression. On the other hand, Turner’s performance in the national debates, the central theme of campaign reporting for the couple of weeks following the event, had a noticeable impact on the enthusiasm of workers, who became willing to work harder and more often on the campaign. Similarly, as the polls improved for the party around this time, it was easier to get volunteers into the campaign office.

The Local Contest

Surrey North is a fairly typical suburban riding, and in the late 1980’s and early 90’s, has been part of the fastest growing suburban area in Canada. It has little local media, and a population made up primarily of young, home owning families who are supported by breadwinners who work mainly outside the riding. Thus, most are not connected to the market gardening or shipping industries that make up the local economy. There has
been a large influx of East Asian immigrants in recent years that have added some
diversity to a population which is predominantly of British extraction. It is not a
wealthy riding, ranging from modest to middle income in the main, with about a fifth of
all households classified as low income, and education levels that are on average the
lowest in the province (Eagles et. al 1992, 61).

The political history of the riding had to be constructed from that of the old
ridings in the area, and this complicated the campaign team’s task of assessing the likely
party vote shares. Although in an area that had elected Tories in the past, the riding
was made up of polls that had previously favoured the NDP as well as some of the
weaker Tory polls from the old ridings. With the unpopularity of the Mulroney
government, the NDP felt it had a chance of winning the seat. Ross, using much the
same logic, hoped that he could win by offering disenchanted Tory voters a middle
option, holding onto traditional Liberal supporters in the riding, and attracting New
Democrats interested in a party that had a chance of forming the national government.

Suburban campaigns such as that in Surrey North are easily swamped by the
many neighbouring campaigns in large cities. They have access to little if any
indigenous media, and often lack any distinct local identity or set of local issues.
Moreover, the voters in these ridings tend to work outside the riding, and many of their
political interests may not be strongly tied to the riding. Frequent changes to suburban
boundaries due to the growth in the metropolitan population further weakens the sense
of community amongst local voters. As a result, local suburban contests are often lost
amongst the tumult of a federal election.
Although weak, the campaign spent a good deal of its resources highlighting Ross and his experience in local government, and linking this to a vote for the Liberal party. Fortunately, the Liberals moderately sized campaign fund was large enough that it could afford the basics of campaigning - campaign literature and signs, as well as advertising and a phone bank. Ross tried hard to get as many all-candidates' meetings as possible scheduled. He did as much canvassing both by foot and by phone as possible. And he used his contacts with the media, built up over his time as mayor, to maximise his public exposure. The campaign signs and literature emphasized his experience and knowledge of the riding, and his good reputation.

In comparison with the 1984 vote transposed onto the new riding boundaries, Ross improved the Liberals share of the vote by 10.5 percentage points to 14.9 percent. According to his opponents, local journalists, and his own campaign volunteers, this was due to Ross's personal appeal. In addition to having a public profile which he needed to link to the Liberal campaign, Ross knew that he was the best public speaker of the three major party candidates. Moreover, he realised that with little media covering the riding, public events such as all-candidates' debates were his best chance for creating a public image for his candidacy. But a number of factors associated with suburban campaigns conspired to limit Ross's ability to make use of this advantage.

The only all-candidates' debate of the campaign was held in Surrey North a week after the national debate in which John Turner had done well. Ross was the star performer, exhibiting great skill as a debater, and linking his previous public service as mayor of Surrey to his current campaign. Immediately following this success, Ross
attempted to arrange further debates, but failed to convince other candidates to agree to participate. As the perceived front-runner, New Democrat candidate Jim Karpoff wanted to avoid engaging with his opponents for fear that such engagements might diminish his campaign in some way. The NDP openly admitted that they attended the first debate only because they believed voters saw this as the minimum condition of a riding contest. Karpoff knew that Ross was a better public speaker than he, and that these events provided the Liberal candidate with an opportunity to raise his profile further, and perhaps even undercut the NDP’s position as the main opponent of free trade. Tory Cliff Blair was less hostile to the suggestion, but knew he was no match for Ross.

The lack of any subsequent all-candidates’ debates denied Ross his best platform for making use his public profile to help his campaign. Unfortunately, as with most suburban campaigns, there was no influential media interested enough in the Surrey North contest to take up Ross’s complaints that the other candidates feared public debate and democracy. As a result, no real pressure to continue the debates was placed on the NDP or PC candidates, and the campaigns did not really engage with each other. Whereas in the Okanagan, well organized local media organizations followed up on the Tory candidate’s fear of public debates, this never became an issue in Surrey North. It appears that suburban campaigns condemn candidates to relative obscurity. As a result, the strategy of focusing on the candidate - even one as competent as Ross - can only be of limited value in these ridings.

As Ross spent most of his days out canvassing, the bulk of the office work for
the campaign was done by his family. Like Brisco in the Kootenays, a substantial amount of this work fell to his wife. Not only did she run the office in Whalley, she phoned volunteers daily to try and get them into the office to work on the campaign. The Ross family - both parents and two sons - designed campaign strategies around the dinner table in the evenings, and son Brad worked in the office as campaign manager. Having to organize the campaign as well as canvass the riding by foot took its toll of the family, and the campaign suffered accordingly.

Ross was openly surprised at the complexity of federal elections, and the demands they made on him in comparison with municipal contests. He could not canvass as much as he would have liked, and he felt that the lack of campaign organizers with experience at federal elections meant that the local effort was not as well directed as it might have been. He received no objective strategic advice, and did not have the resources to assess the success of his campaign strategies. The lack of workers meant the it was difficult to get signs up, and with a small local association, it was hard to find people willing to put a sign on their property. Brad Ross noted that the lack of signs around the riding, in comparison with major parties, made it clear that the Liberals were the third party in the contest.

Like many campaigns that lack the workers, the Liberals relied heavily on campaign advertising and literature. Arranging advertising, news coverage and literature drops were rated as the most important campaign activities by campaigners. Not only was the printing of this literature very expensive, the campaign did not have enough workers to deliver election pamphlets, and had to pay for this service. The advertising
campaign was also expensive, absorbing a massive 63 percent of campaign spending. In comparison, the unsuccessful Tory campaign spent 57 percent of its total campaign expenditures (only half that of the Liberal campaign) on advertising, while the successful New Democrat campaign spent a mere 21 percent of its funds on advertising.

The campaign spent money in local community newspapers such as the *Surrey Delta Now* and the *Surrey Leader*. In addition, it advertised in two Indo-Canadian publications, *Canada Darpan Weekly* and the *Indo-Canadian Times*, in order to reach the large Indo-Canadian community in the riding. It also spent a small sum on radio advertising, using the *CISL*, a station based in the nearby suburb of Richmond, but broadcasting to all of Vancouver. Unfortunately, money spent on advertising was poorly directed. The major city media is too expensive for a local campaign to advertise in and its broadcast or distribution region is much greater than a single riding. Meanwhile, the small local media is affordable, but often not very influential. To make matters worse, the local community newspapers are delivered to parts of at least two other ridings besides Surrey North, and in some cases such as newspapers aimed at ethnic groups, even more widely.

At the time of the 1988 election, the *Now* newspaper had only a satellite office in Surrey North, with the main work for the newspaper being done at the office in Burnaby. Thus, the paper was trying to cover the same three ridings as the *Leader*, although the latter had its head offices in Surrey, and therefore was better able to cover the election in Surrey North.

The local media made a real effort to cover the campaign, but was limited by the
fact that it had to cover the municipal elections as well. The municipal vote was just two days before the national vote. Frank Bucholtz at the Leader noted that the paper gave more coverage to the municipal election because it considers this to be its own territory. The Leader is the "only source of coverage for local municipal politics." The local election had between 30 and 40 candidates who needed to be covered, and the paper has to cover all or part of three federal ridings - Surrey North, Surrey-White Rock, and Delta. As a result, the coverage given any particular candidate is limited.

From a media perspective, the Surrey North federal race was only exceptional in that for the first time anyone could remember, all three leaders of the national parties visited the riding. This was taken as an indication that all the parties saw it as a potential swing riding. The main element of the papers coverage of the local candidates consisted of a questionnaire sent to each asking their positions on the major issues. This was published in the week before the election. There were no face-to-face interviews with the candidates. Rather, communication was by fax or phone, including press releases. Bucholtz outlined the Leader's coverage in this way:

The NDP in particular tried hard to interest us in stories. We covered the all-candidates' debate, and the cable television interviews of the candidates. The paper tried to keep an approximate balance in the partisan nature of letters in the editorial page.

The Now did one interview with each of the candidates, and wrote some stories as a result of campaign press releases. It also ran weekly poll results provided by a national polling company, and shared stories and resources with other Now newspapers in the lower mainland. The municipal election was seen as a higher priority, taking about 70 percent of the space and resources put over to election coverage. Now editor Jeff
Beamish estimates that the coverage of the national election required less than half the working time of one journalist.

The local cable station ran an interview with Ross and each of the other candidates. Some of the Ross’s comments from the interview were picked up on the highest rating radio station in Vancouver, CKNW. He also appeared on a cable political forum, where he was interviewed by long time political commentator Jack Webster. Ross and his opponents in the riding were surprised at the number of people they met who had seen these shows. Ross believes that his access to the media that was available helped him run a close third behind the second placed Tory candidate, unlike many BC Liberals campaigns in 1988, that finished well behind the other major parties.

From the candidate’s perspective, Ross benefitted from his reputation as Mayor and his established contacts with the media. The local newspapers treated his campaign seriously, and regularly initiated contact, asking his opinion on both national and local issues. Karpoff emphasized his service as a local municipal councillor, while Blair the Conservative was seen by the media as a relatively unknown candidate. Blair’s own polling supported this conclusion. But the local contest did not revolve around the candidates; rather, it focused on party platforms. This hurt Ross’s campaign. The partisan ambience of the contest was accentuated by the free trade debate, which in BC, was polarized between the Tories on one side and the NDP on the other. This left the Liberals in a very difficult position. Even Ross’s profile could not overcome this problem.

The Surrey North Liberal campaign failed to generate its own agenda within the
context of the local contest. In fact that contest was hostile to either of the two most common ways in which the campaign may have altered the local agenda to suit its interests. In the first place, the Liberals could not promote its own candidate, partly due to its own weakness, and partly due to the fact that the other campaigns could successfully prevent public debates. Second, the nature of this suburban riding, including the lack of local media, meant there was no well developed local political agenda. Thus, there was no route by which a local candidate could work to counter balance the dominance of the federal campaign and free trade debate. The national debate could not even be localised, as in some ridings, because of the lack of a mechanism for articulating local interests. Furthermore, the polarized nature of the debate left the Liberals in an awkward position between the other two major parties. Despite Ross’s strong showing, the NDP and PC were clearly seen the two competitive campaigns in a two party contest. The local Liberal association in Surrey North did not offer Ross the human or financial resources necessary to mount a strong campaign, and the lack of local influential media limited his options for communicating effectively with voters.

LYNN FAIRALL: THE FAITHFUL PARTY INSIDER

Although it was not likely to win, only the NDP could challenge the long serving and well entrenched Conservative incumbent Bob Wenman in the mainly country riding of Fraser Valley West. Candidate Lynn Fairall, a union shop steward and federal government worker, won a closed but contested NDP nomination. Although she had
only recently moved into the riding, she was a long-time party insider, having been involved in various NDP associations. In classic NDP bureaucratic fashion, the local association executive had hired office space and set up the basics of a campaign team well before the nomination meeting.

Despite the lack of federal or provincial success in the area, the NDP had managed to maintain a small but capable local association. About 80 members were involved in the nomination and campaign process. This is evidence of the impact of organizational solidarity and commitment that is characteristic of the NDP. The local party had enough workers and experienced organizers to cover the basic demands of the campaign period. While Fairall did campaign on the Tories' sales tax proposals and environmental issues, by and large, her campaign stuck to the federal strategy of promoting leader Ed Broadbent and discussing free trade. As such, it was a subsidiary campaign. The Tories big lead in the riding meant that Fairall's campaign was excluded from an uncontested constituency election.

Conservative incumbent and high profile candidate Bob Wenman had a strong hold on the riding going into the 1988 election. It was considered to be one of the safest Tory seats in Canada. The only hiccup in his re-election bid occurred within his own association, when a member challenged him for the nomination, accusing the MP of failing to champion conservative social issues. When Wenman easily won the nomination, a dozen high profile association members, including members of the executive, switched their allegiance to the Christian Heritage Party, whose leader was running in the riding. Such challenges are rare in Canadian electoral politics. With
Wenman’s vast resources and contacts to the federal party, he ran the sort of component campaign expected of an incumbent. Free trade dominated his campaign, but he also spoke to environmental issues. As a front-runner, he managed to avoid being engaged by his opponents.

Liberal Tony Wattie won an open, weakly contested Liberal nomination over one other candidate. Both were running out of a sense of duty to the party. There was little enthusiasm for the nomination, which resembled the uncontested nominations found in many uncompetitive associations. A lawyer, Wattie had at different times been president of both the Fraser Valley West and the Fraser Valley East Liberal associations. His commitment to the party led him to run as a stopgap candidate. The local association was very weak, and his campaign was run by a handful of party stalwarts and friends. As in other weak Liberal associations, the job of campaign manager had to be shared between two volunteers. There were another twenty to thirty secondary workers and sympathizers.

Although Wattie performed well in public, he was not considered a serious contender for the riding. In fact he could only campaign part time, as he kept his law practice open during the campaign. Despite his interest in local transportation issues, his was a parallel campaign which failed to generate a distinct image for itself. He considered John Turner’s performance in the national leaders’ debates accounted for the 7 percentage point improvement in the Liberal vote over 1984. Like Fairall, he was excluded from the constituency election.

The boundaries of Fraser Valley West were moved eastward in the electoral
redistribution that occurred just prior to the 1988 election. This was necessary to take account of the spread of Greater Vancouver eastward into what were once rural parts of the Fraser Valley. About 40 percent of the riding had previously been in Fraser Valley East.

In 1988, the riding was largely rural, with a third of its polls being urban. It encompassed commercial farms, hobby farms, and a number of small communities including Langley, Aldergrove, Matsqui and Clearbrook. Local candidates had access to newspapers, radio stations, and the local cable service in these communities without having to compete with city or suburban campaigns. This allowed them to direct messages at a local audience. Some campaign teams had offices in at least two of these communities, and all had to deal with the difficulties of reaching voters that are spread out across some distance.

There was not really a local contest in Fraser Valley West. In something of an extension of the importance of candidates in other country ridings, voters in this socially conservative riding appear to have found it difficult to imagine an alternative to voting for Wenman. Wenman had such a stranglehold on the riding that he could afford to avoid engaging with other campaigns safe in the knowledge that he would win. Free trade was discussed by the candidates during the campaign, as were a number of other issues, but there was little sense of a local political agenda. It was undercut by Wenman's absence. This despite the fact that there was media in the riding willing to report the contest. The real issue was the size of Wenman's winning margin.

There was however, a cost to Wenman's unwillingness to engage with other
candidates, as he lost votes to parties on both the right and left. The Reform and Christian Heritage parties together captured over 8 percent of the vote. They appealed to the conservative, church-going population of this semi-rural riding renowned for its conservative social values. Wattie ran a solid campaign in spite of the weakness of the local association. He more than doubled the Liberal vote share to nearly 20 percent. Fairall added 1.4 percentage points to the New Democrats’ previous result by capturing 24.1 percent of the votes cast. In the end, Wenman’s vote share dropped by over 16 percentage points. The strength of his hold on the riding can be seen in the fact that this still left him with a comfortable 20 percentage point margin over Fairall.

The Candidate and Campaign Team

For an association which had no chance of winning, the organizational strength of the NDP in Fraser Valley West was impressive. Local NDP members move between the local municipal, provincial, and federal associations as each level faces an election. Local organizers estimated that the federal association had about 800 members in 1988.

A pre-election committee of fifteen began work in December of 1987. It organized initial fund-raising events, oversaw the candidate search, and rented campaign office space by the time of the nomination in June 1988, well before the election was announced. Prior to the nomination, the pre-election committee kept candidates informed about community events, which it encouraged them to attend. This included renting a table on behalf of the association at the local weekly flea market. This greater role for the local association executive in assigning campaign team positions and
choosing strategies is more common in the NDP than in either the Liberal or Conservative parties (Carty 1991a, table 7.1 and figure 7.2).

Lynn Fairall had been approached by a friend who was a member of the search committee and asked to run for nomination. She won on the first ballot ahead of two other insider candidates in what was a classic party democracy style nomination. In order to run for the nomination, she had to take a leave of absence without pay from her federal public service job, where she was a union shop steward. Her union ties, and the support of the large contingent of women members in the association swung the balance for the newcomer Fairall over second place Charles Bradford, a long-time association member. The inexperienced Fairall put together a campaign team in consultation with the association executive. They made good use of association members with campaign experience, and in particular local unionists and women interested in supporting a female candidate.

The relationship among the inner circle, many of whom were executive members, was bureaucratic in nature. While some knew each other well from working together in the local association, most were just acquaintances. But all were committed party members who saw Fairall as the front person of a true team effort. Fairall noted that:

We all know each other, and after the nomination, there was a sense that the best person for the job should do that job. There was some tension between the winners and losers, but we were able to manage it by careful selection of people for different jobs.

The association immediately formed a number of campaign committees to deal with:

election planning, communications and media relations, canvassing, telephone
canvassing, literature, and fund-raising. These were staffed with whatever experienced
campaigners the association executive could find amongst local members. Fairall relied
heavily on a network of female association members, although her main rival for the
nomination, Charles Bradford, was appointed campaign manager. Given that there was
some animosity between candidates during the nomination, this outcome is evidence of
the ethos of solidarity found in NDP associations.

Despite this, Bradford was out of place in the campaign. He was given control
of the campaign office covering Fort Langley and Aldergrove. This became the
secondary campaign office. The second office covering Clearbrook and Matsqui was
managed by a friend of Fairall’s, Lyn Bomford. This became the main campaign office,
and office manager Bomford the de facto campaign manager. 1988 was her third
campaign as an office manager for the NDP, but her first in the Fraser Valley as like
Fairall, she had only arrived in the riding in July of 1988. Bomford saw the need to
accommodate personalities as a necessary part of any campaign.

This was just a more acute example of one of the jobs of campaign organizers -
finding the right job and the right place for the different personalities that work
on a campaign. The mix of personalities is important in keeping people happy
[and therefore willing to work on the campaign] and effective as campaigners.

The inner circle of workers numbered about a dozen, with a larger group of about 50
willing to do some phoning. Outside this was a large circle of about 200 people willing
to put up signs and the like. Fairall can be seen as both a union candidate and a
women’s candidate. Unions contributed $3 000 to her campaign, and her inner circle
was dominated in numbers by women. The candidate noted that an intimacy developed
amongst this group over the course of the election, and that this was important to the
atmosphere surrounding the campaign.

There was a great feeling working with the volunteers, some of whom took two weeks holiday from their jobs to work on the campaign. We were like a family - in fact the hardest worker was my husband.

The candidate saw her primary role in terms of its effect on the cohesiveness of the campaign team, including maintaining morale among the workers while the strategic focus of the campaign remained the campaign mapped out by the federal party:

The candidate brings purpose to the workers, provides inspiration and is a motivational force.

The local NDP association had begun raising funds prior to the nomination. At the nomination itself, party members were encouraged to donate to the campaign. Once the writ was dropped the party organized a picnic and raffle to help raise funds. Because of the close relationship amongst associations at different levels of the party, the federal campaign had access to voters lists and records of contributors, volunteers, and supporters developed by these other organizations. This helped the campaign to canvass, and to raise funds. Fairall also benefitted from the NDP's policy of equalising funds across local associations in order to help out those with limited finances (see Stanbury 1991; Morley 1991). But the $26 191 her campaign raised was only $1 000 more than that raised by the local Liberal association, and actually $3 000 less than what the local Christian Heritage Party campaign raised. All of these totals paled in comparison with the $60 618 that the incumbent Tory Bob Wenman raised. Despite this, when the votes were counted, the NDP had maintained its hold on second place in the riding. A result attributed to the fact that the party had enough volunteers to mount a solid campaign.
Like all NDP campaigns in British Columbia, Fairall's was in constant contact with both the provincial and national party campaigns. The candidate was involved in a number of events organized by the party. Together, her and local organizers would speak with party strategists several times a week as part of an explicit effort to ensure that the local strategy was in keeping with the that of the wider party. As a result, the focus of the campaign was the party platform and leader, and the locus of decision making was at the provincial and national levels of the party.

When asked about the impact of various aspects of campaigning on voter preferences, Fairall herself ranked the leader, the party, and the party platform above her own impact on voters, as did office manager Lyn Bomford. This indicates the organizational mind-set of New Democrats, who believe that a federal campaign is only as good as its local campaigns, but local campaigns can only be successful when embedded in a well run federal campaign.

Intra-Party Relations

The integration between local and non-local elements of the NDP was evident well before the election. Fairall attended a candidate school at the University of British Columbia organized by the New Democrats. The school was designed to familiarise candidates with modern communication technologies, and aimed to develop candidate's skills such as public speaking, dealing with reporters and hecklers, and personal appearance. This included attention to dressing and deportment. It also outlined party policy and strategies. Candidates were given 17 policy statements covering the main
areas of party policy, and were instructed explicitly to follow the party line:

We were told to leave free trade alone and go with taxation issues. To let the national campaign make the running on issues, and not to engage in any policy freelancing. We were urged to respect the expertise and polling of the party.

The panoply of skills covered at the school were taught in a manner that reinforced this conservative attitude to candidate’s freedom to speak off-the-cuff. As Fairall notes, the campaign situations constructed for candidates tended to be hostile, and included public speaking while being heckled and hostile open line shows on radio and cable:

Candidates were warned that the media and their opponents would try to sidetrack them, to get them to speak off-the-cuff - to speak emotionally - by upsetting them. This should be avoided because the type of campaign it would be meant local candidates comments will be important, so they should be cautious.

Fairall was surprised by the extent to which the party attempted to stifle local initiative. She thought that a local candidate should be trusted to make some comments in areas that were germane to his or her own riding or area of special interest. For example, her own union work had involved her in courses and seminars on free trade, so she was informed about the issue and believed she was capable of speaking to it in her own way.

Although written off as un-winnable by the party, the local NDP mounted a credible campaign. The organizational and strategic integration of local and national branches of the party was evident in the attitudes and actions of local campaigners. Volunteers believed solidarity to be an important part of the NDP ethos. The membership was committed to running a good a subsidiary campaign that adopted national party strategies. They believed a well run if unsuccessful campaign would still
benefit the party. This party-centred view of electioneering is evident in Lynn Fairall’s observations that

When all federal candidates appear to give the same message, it gives the impression of an effective organization. To do this we needed to run an effective local campaign. The role of the candidate is to be the public face of the party, to announce party policy in the local area, and connect the party to the local situation.

Lyn Bomford also noted that

The candidate is less important than the party. This was exacerbated by the free trade debate, and also the fact that Lynn was a woman and strong pro-choice candidate in a conservative riding. The local debate was very polarized, and there were many letters to local newspapers attacking Lynn’s position on both issues.

The local campaign at first adopted strategies in line with that set by non-local elements of the party. The national NDP campaign in 1988 was built on the appeal of Ed Broadbent, and the promise of "fair, open, and honest government," with special emphasis on fairness with respect to taxation. But as the election went along, some NDP strategists, and the BC provincial NDP in particular, came to believe that the party would benefit from pushing its anti-free trade position. Most New Democrat campaigners interviewed made mention of this disagreement, which produced some disharmony within the party. The strength of the provincial NDP in British Columbia, and the appropriateness of the policy in a province where the party must fend off the Liberals and make itself the leading opponent of the Conservatives, meant that local campaigns adopted the provincial view of strategy. It is worth noting that it was not local campaigns so much as provincial headquarters which dictated this change. Local campaigns were simply complying with the orders of the provincial office.
The federal campaign did not make a particular effort to become involved in the Fraser Valley West campaign. Most of the contact with the party was through the provincial wing. It kept the campaign apprised of Broadbent’s latest policy announcements, and provided detailed supporting documentation. Campaign coordinator Ron Johnson was in constant contact, pointing out the special priorities of the BC campaign, and giving the latest provincial polling figures. There were regular weekly meetings of candidates and campaign managers at the party’s head office in Burnaby. The provincial women candidates gave two press conferences, one at the Vancouver Hotel, and all the BC NDP candidates attended two dinners organized by the party.

The local campaign in Fraser Valley West, like most of the NDP campaigns studied, was both organizationally and strategically integrated with its non-local counterparts. This integration was with both the national campaign, and the national campaign as interpreted by the powerful provincial party. At time, this led to tensions as strategies adopted at the two levels diverged over the course of the campaign. But despite this, and its very limited chances of success, the local campaign was sustained by its members commitment to the party and to the principle that the party should run strong campaigns in every riding across the country. It is not just that the campaign was integrated with the wider provincial and national campaigns, but the fact that local campaigners accepted this definition of campaigning which is remarkable in NDP campaigns. The campaign was part of a national effort, and campaigners were part of a national team.
The Local Contest

The mainly country riding of Fraser Valley West includes several distinct local communities within an area that has increasingly come to be dominated by manufacturing and service industries in the place of the once dominant agricultural sector. Many agricultural holdings are being converted to smaller hobby farms. This is in response to the eastward march of Greater Vancouver. The average income is below the provincial average, and unemployment is higher than in Vancouver. The population is predominantly European, with the majority of British origin, but with sizable Dutch and German minorities. The area is renowned for the strength of its Christian churches and its social conservatism, and this had underpinned its long support of the Tories. It is revealing that Wenman, though confident of winning the seat, was concerned by the Christian Heritage Party challenge from his political right.

With a committed core of workers, 75 percent of whom had some experience working on NDP campaigns, but with few other resources, the local organization decided the best way of carrying the New Democrat banner was by concentrating on the basics of campaigning. Office space locations had been chosen from a list developed in previous federal and provincial elections, and space had been rented before the nomination. As soon as the nomination was over, campaign signs were produced using provincial party funds, and erected at places that had been used at previous elections. Lists of donors from previous elections were used to send requests for funds, and voter support was identified and classified on the basis of information collected at recent federal, provincial and municipal elections. The campaign produced and started
distributing leaflets along with its door-to-door canvassing campaign. The use of locally
produced campaign literature was extensive, but the campaign also relied on national
party hand-outs. Due to lack of funds, the campaign sent provincial and national
campaign literature to voters who had specific policy enquiries.

The continuity between elections evidenced in the way the local New Democrat
campaign got under way is a feature of many BC NDP campaigns. Local NDP
campaigners considered recording useful information for future campaigns an important
part of their campaign effort, and essential to the eventual success of the party in the
area. This tends to set them apart from many campaigns in cadre style associations,
which, with the exception of ridings where there is an incumbent, either rely on the
informal networks of experienced campaigners or work in a more episodic fashion from
one campaign to the next.

Canvassing is one of the most difficult campaign jobs. It is labour intensive and
relatively specialized work. A semi-rural and therefore large riding such as Fraser
Valley West, dotted with farms and small communities, is difficult to canvass by foot.

Only committed workers are willing to canvass. And you want people who are
capable and presentable. You need to develop a kit that contains the necessary
literature, maps of where to canvass, a suggested script, and suitable responses to
voters questions. And you might want to train them to do this. Even just
dropping literature requires the first two of these.

Given the difficulties of canvassing a country riding by foot, the campaign relied heavily
on canvassing by phone. Each office had half a dozen phones, used by canvassers to
identify voter preferences. This allowed the campaign to focus on undecided voters.

With a competent campaign organization, the candidate was free to foot canvass in
crucial areas and contact undecided voters, or voters with specific questions, by phone. A second use of the phone-banks was to answer voters queries about party policy, and other mundane inquiries such as the location of polling booths. In addition, campaign organizers cajoled potential workers into assisting the campaign, and solicited funds by phone.

Following the party line early on in the campaign was both natural and easy for the local NDP campaign. Literature sent out by the party could be used, and the timed release of policies by Broadbent gave the campaign focus. But as the campaign progressed, increasingly it was felt to be the wrong focus. While some national issues presented themselves - a greater emphasis on the Tories' tax proposals and environmental record - there were few obvious local issues for the campaign to adopt as its own. Moreover, the campaign lacked the resources necessary to fully canvass this large country riding. Given that the campaign had access to only limited funds, it could not afford extensive advertising in the local media. The media was considered somewhat influential, but had to compete with some Vancouver media outlets. Many of the local media outlets were considered to be sympathetic to the Tories. Bomford believed Fairall did not have the necessary public profile nor access to enough canvassers or a large enough advertising budget to force issues onto the agenda.

There were no burning local issues, although as a woman and unionist, Lynn was interested in abortion and the impact of the free trade agreement on jobs and wages. In addition, as a small farm owner, she was aware of the implications of free trade for the intensive agriculture sector such as egg producers in the riding. Some campaign leaflets did target issues of particular concern to women, and Fairall attended press conferences that dealt with such issues. She did allow that because she
was not expected to win, and the riding was not high profile, she had more room to
manoeuvre with respect to the issues she raised than someone like Johanna den Hertog
in Vancouver Centre. It seems that NDP campaigners are loathe to focus on local issues
unless they are of extraordinary importance. There was a change in strategy when the
strong provincial party decided to attack free trade more vigorously than its national
counterpart. But this was a decision of the provincial party that local BC campaigns
were willing to adopt.

Fairall was a hard working candidate. She canvassed by foot about four hours a
day. In addition, she worked around the office when necessary, and spent evenings
researching and keeping up with the national and provincial campaigns. Like the other
candidates, she made a point of visiting the local Sikh temple to woo the local Indo-
Canadian community. The campaign used high profile candidates from other ridings
such as Johanna den Hertog in mainstreeeting and press conference appearances with
Fairall. In this strong Tory riding, the NDP believed its only hope of changing voters
minds was face-to-face contact with the candidate. Undecided voters were targeted for
this treatment.

Unfortunately for Fairall, Wenman's electoral position was unassailable, and he
acted to prevent real engagement among local campaigns. Wenman attempted to stifle
the local contest by refusing to attend several of the all-candidates' debates. He knew
that as a Conservatives MP he would face many difficult questions at public events.
These would come not only from his political opponents and those voters unhappy with
free trade, but also from Christian Heritage Party members.
Fearing an attack from pro-life advocates, he refused to attend all-candidates’ debates to which any minor party candidate was invited. Instead he sent high profile anti-abortion Conservative parliamentarian Beno Friesen to one debate at a local theological college at which Friesen had been an instructor. This created a furore, and it is evidence of the perceived powerful negative effect of failing to perform at all-candidates’ debates that he eventually capitulated, and attended a meeting with minor party candidates. It also gave focus to the NDP’s attacks on Wenman, which highlighted the fact that his long sojourns out of the country had resulted in him speaking only eight times during the entire previous parliament.

As a result of Wenman’s tactics, and his powerful campaign and strategic position in the riding, he was never forced to engage the other local campaigns. This frustrated Liberal candidate Tony Wattie and Fairall. Wenman’s easy win despite the loss of about a third of his 1984 votes is evidence of a riding that really only had one competitive campaign. Although the NDP and Liberal payed close attention to the PC campaign, and scored some points, the latter remained unmoved. This was an uncontested riding.

Wenman could not alter the agenda of the local campaign which contained issues that were difficult for him, but he could avoid the contest. Circumstantial evidence points to Wenman’s reliance on a strategy of not engaging his opponents directly. Campaign advertising accounted for about 55 percent of the Conservatives campaign spending. This proportion is unusually high for a competitive campaign, and is about the same as that spent by the relatively poorly organized Liberals in the riding. It is in
stark contrast to the 35 percent spent by the NDP, and is 30 percent more than the Tories spent in 1984. Other campaigners noted that the Tories were much less well organized in 1988 than in 1984. With dissent in Tory ranks, and facing attacks from all sides, this may reflect a desire to "circle the wagons" on Wenman's part. It seems that even incumbents are not immune to the problem of organizing a campaign team.

While hard to canvass by foot, Fraser Valley West does have a number of newspapers centred on each of the communities in the riding, as well others aimed at the large ethnic communities in this and surrounding ridings. The newspapers include the *Abbotsford Times*, the *Abbotsford News*, the *Abbotsford Now*, the *Aldergrove Star*, the *Langley Advance*, and the *Langley Times*. By and large, campaigners felt the local media was too understaffed to provide a solid coverage of the campaign. It had few resources to give over to the election, although like other community newspapers, local papers tried to give a basic coverage of the candidates positions, all-candidates' debates in their community, and the main issues on which the election was being fought. The campaign tried to get a press release out to these papers once a week. As with other ridings, they benefitted from the substantial advertising spending of the local campaigns. The campaigns also advertised in the *Indo-Canadian Times*, and the *Ranjeet News*, both of which are aimed at the local Indo-Canadian community. The NDP considered advertising important for maintaining credibility, and aimed to have the maximum amount of advertising running in the week prior to the election. The local papers offered special low rates to local campaigns. The existence of local communities in this riding separated from the Vancouver suburbs is the basis of this distinct media presence,
which itself encourages the development of a local agenda.

There are also two radio stations and a cable television station which service the area but not the Vancouver suburbs. This helps put advertising rates on radio within reach of local campaigns in the Fraser Valley, and motivates the local cable station to run all-candidates’ debates. As in the Kootenays and the Okanagan, radio can reach voters across a wide area that is difficult to canvass in person. While the NDP spent proportionately less than the other campaigns on advertising, it alone used radio advertising. It spent $800 on one advertisement which was repeated over the last two weeks of the campaign on Star FM 104, which covers Abbotsford and Chilliwack, and is run by Fraser Valley Broadcasting. The national campaign also used Star, but the local campaign had no idea about the content or timing of these advertisements. Unlike the Tories in Okanagan Centre, the local NDP campaign did not perceive this to be a problem, as they believed the entire party was putting out the same message.

Another local station, CFER 850, hosted an all-candidates’ debate, and had each of the candidates in for an open line show. The local cable station also hosted a debate. Each candidate gave a five minute speech, after which viewers phoned-in questions. Campaign workers were surprised at the number of voters who mentioned that they had seen the debate, which was aired a number of times. Fairall thought it had more impact that any other of the all-candidates’ debates. As well, the day after Fairall was nominated in June, Vancouver radio stations CKNW and JR-Country had called to interview her, but showed no further interest after that. The large city media, the Vancouver Sun, and the Province, covered the riding sporadically, as did Vancouver
television and radio. But these media outlets were seen as relatively uninterested in and as having little effect on the local campaign.

The Tories electoral domination of the riding ensured a lacklustre contest. The main impact of the federal campaign was negative, with a feeling amongst New Democrat's that focusing on Broadbent may not have been the best campaign strategy for the local riding, and an annoyance amongst Tories that they could not escape free trade. Neither the media nor voters believed either the NDP or Liberals could win. Because of this lack of credibility, these campaigns were unable to generate the momentum needed to challenge the status quo. The lack of any defining local issues also made it difficult to gain some strategic advantage over the Tories. Moreover, a subsidiary NDP campaign is not well-suited to adopting local strategies in order to take advantage of issues in a riding.

On election day, the campaign put great effort into finding every possible NDP voter and getting him or her to a polling booth. This ranked only second to canvassing as the most important function of the campaign. Among others, Fairall spent all day on the phone contacting supporters, and urging them to vote. Other workers provided transportation and relevant information to voters. In the end, Fairall and her campaign team were confronted with a semi-rural and conservative riding in which many NDP policy positions are difficult to promulgate. Even with its opposition to free trade, a debate that the riding was drawn into, the NDP could not hope to win Fraser Valley West, and on social policy, more conservative forces were always expected to triumph. The political spectrum in the riding does not easily entertain a contest because of the
dominance of the conservative politics in the riding. The only exception might be between two socially conservative candidates; and the NDP is unlikely to provide such a candidate.

TEX ENEMARK: SMOKE AND MIRRORS

The candidates, riding, and character of the local contest in the city riding of Vancouver Centre is discussed in the description of Kim Campbell’s campaign. Liberal Tex Enemark, is a special case: a stopgap candidate who was given enormous financial support by the party because it suited the party’s wider strategic purpose. Polling done by the party in Vancouver Centre before the 1988 election showed it trailing the NDP but very competitive with the Conservatives. But the Liberals were weak in BC in 1988, and the local association had few members. As a result, Enemark struggled to find volunteers, and he was forced to rely on a few friends with professional training to help run his campaign. Despite receiving substantial financial help from the national party, Enemark’s was a parallel campaign.

Enemark’s strong contacts within the party hierarchy, and the profile of the local riding contest, ensured that he had a more public profile than most stopgap candidates. But he was never a serious contender for the riding, and did not have the profile of either New Democrat den Hertog or Tory Kim Campbell. In addition, a lack of volunteers meant the campaign was marginalized and from the constituency election. The better organized NDP and Tory campaigns were, however, engaged in a close contest with each other.
In an attempt to keep up with the well-staffed component campaigns of his high profile rivals, Enemark spent heavily on advertising. This strategy failed, and the campaign came to be seen as largely smoke and mirrors. In fact, Enemark's campaign is remarkable for having had very little impact on this local contest. The Liberal vote share went down 2 percentage points to just below 23 percent, while Campbell beat den Hertog by just 0.4 of one percent. The Liberals' poor showing indicates the critical role that volunteers play in local campaigns.

The Candidate and Campaign Team

The small Liberal association in Vancouver Centre managed to run a nomination, but it attracted only limited interest. It was open, but only nominally contested. Enemark easily beat an environmental activist in what was a non-contest. Campaign manager Allan Gould suggested that the association had withered in the period 1983 to 1988, before which it had ridden on the back of a strong national party. The weak local association was unable to provide the nucleus of a campaign organization. As well, it managed to donate just $678.96 worth of goods and services to Enemark's campaign. Enemark had to both raise campaign funds, and organize his own team of volunteers.

Enemark's first task was to build an inner circle of campaign workers, including a campaign manager and official agent. This was accomplished by calling in favours from among his professional friends and acquaintances. Enemark had high hopes for his campaign, and contacted friends in public relations and advertising to help out with the campaign. Enemark came to realise that he would have to do much of the
organizational work of the campaign. This is captured in the comment of campaign manager Allan Gould.

Tex approached me and asked me to work on the campaign. I agreed to out of friendship for Tex, not because of some commitment to the party. I think this was true for most of us campaigners. He played the central role in organizing the campaign.

While some campaigners had been members of the party at one time, and many were broadly sympathetic to its objectives, few of them were current members. So while the inner circle of about a dozen workers had a professional air to it, it lacked truly experienced campaigners, and relied more heavily on personal as opposed to partisan ties to bind volunteers together. More problematic was the fact that few of the volunteers appear to have been committed to the enterprise of getting Enemark elected.

The redeeming feature of the inner circle was that many were professionals who, although unschooled in campaigning, had skills that could be put to use organizing a campaign. These included writing advertisements, running an office and dealing with the media. But the weakness of the association made it difficult to find people willing to do the mundane chores of a campaign, such as canvassing by foot and running the phone bank. In addition, many Liberals from Vancouver chose to work on John Turner's campaign in the neighbouring riding of Quadra. This depleted the Liberal ranks in Centre. In the words of the president of the Vancouver Centre association, "Turner’s campaign suffered from an embarrassment of riches."

Enemark’s campaign had access to about twenty five secondary workers. Their commitment varied a great deal, and many of them were more like sympathizers for at least some part of the campaign period. In addition, Enemark could call upon up to one
hundred workers sympathetic to the party, some from surrounding Liberal campaigns, including Turners. These numbers pale against the help available to the PC and NDP campaigns in Centre. Moreover, the struggle to find help shocked members of the inner circle, including Gould, who remembered the halcyon days of Liberal organizations during the Trudeau era.

We went into the campaign expecting 1000 people to show up and help us campaign. We simply did not have enough workers to run a good campaign let alone keep up with the other major parties. It was a smoke and mirrors campaign.

Moreover, campaigners complained that only a few members of the inner circle were reliable volunteers, while secondary workers and sympathizers showed little commitment.

The campaign team can best be described as a motley mix of professionals - lawyers, accountants and managers - with little campaign experience held together by their friendship for Enemark and a memory of the past (and perhaps future) glory of the Liberal party. Their professional skills were useful, but their lack of experience and small number limited their effectiveness. Moreover, as the election progressed it became clear that few of them supported the party's anti-free trade position. As this issue became more important, some volunteers became more disenchanted with the Liberal campaign and reluctant to work for Enemark. This caused Enemark some difficulties, as he did not wish to speak to the issue but wanted to maintain his image as a candidate involved in national debates.

Despite its weakness with respect to the number and experience of volunteers, the campaign had access to substantial campaign funding. This was both a function of
Enemark's contacts in the riding and the Liberal party, and party strategists' willingness to spend money in a high profile riding in order to make the Liberal campaign seem competitive. Enemark was able to raise $54,053, two-and-a-half thousand dollars more than the spending limit in the riding.

The locus of decision making with respect to campaign strategy was clearly local. Enemark dominated the campaign team, and set campaign strategy. Most other campaigners were too inexperienced and or disinterested to offer alternative strategic advice. It is not surprising that this strategy focused strongly on the candidate. Not only was this a product of Enemark's control of the campaign, but it also reflects the lack of a strong Liberal organization in British Columbia in 1988, and the party's inability to project any coherent strategic plan into the province from Ottawa. Local BC Liberal campaigns were very much left to their own devices.

**Intra-Party Relations**

The main support offered Enemark's campaign by the federal party was in the form of money. It provided, $23,945 or forty-four percent of Enemark's campaign funds. This is more than four times the absolute average amount the party gave to all campaigns in BC. This strategy appears to have been based on the desire of the party to be seen to run a credible campaign in a riding with a high media profile where both the NDP and Tories were running strong campaigns. A solid campaign in Centre not only helped the party to maintain a good image in this election, it also aimed to give the party a chance

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*The average donation to BC campaigns by the federal party was $4,436.*
of winning the riding at some future time. As Blake notes (1991), the Canadian electorate is relatively volatile, and maintaining a presence in ridings across the country that may in the short term be un-winnable is a rational strategy for any party which hopes to sustain an image of itself as truly national, and in so doing, retain the hope of forming the government. In addition, Enemark could call on favours from among his personal acquaintances in the party.

The juxtaposition of local and provincial organizational weakness, with extraordinary financial support from the national party aimed at helping the local campaign to appear competitive, captures the essence of the Liberal campaign in Vancouver Centre. While this money did bring some respectability to the local campaign, the Liberals were never in the race, and their vote share actually declined in relation to their 1984 result.

Despite the money given to the local campaign, there was tension between the local and national party strategies. In contrast to the national campaign, the local campaign decided to try and ignore free trade as much as possible. Enemark did not agree with Turner's opposition to the deal, and in the polarized NDP versus PC environment of federal elections in BC, Enemark could not see how he could win on the issue. As many campaigners worked on the campaign because of their personal relationship to Enemark, he became a natural focus of organizational and strategic decisions. He believed he was the campaign's greatest asset.

My experience in Ottawa, my demonstrated competence as a bureaucrat and businessmen, and my knowledge of the political process including the workings of the Liberal party made me well-suited for a candidate-centred campaign. British Columbia has not provided many first class people to Ottawa, and I
believed I would be such an MP. In fact, Vancouver Centre had the three best candidates in the province. But despite this, and the efforts that the campaign made to generate a local strategy, it was continually brought back to the free trade debate. This was a parallel campaign that could not develop and implement its own distinctive electoral strategy.

Relations with the national party were regular, but of little importance. Soon after the election began, it became clear that the NDP and Conservatives were front-runners in Centre. The party did not think Enemark had a great chance of success, but wanted to keep its options open in case the election swung towards the Liberals, and Enemark became competitive. Local campaigners thought that the national campaign offered very little useful assistance, and derided much of the literature available to the campaign as poorly produced and irrelevant to the polarized politics of British Columbia.

The major impact of the national campaign on the local effort was indirect. Local association president Norman Morrison thought that the local campaign was taken more seriously after Turner’s positive debate performance. This gave the local campaign a fillip, and both morale and volunteer support improved. But the leaders’ debates had some negative effects as well, as along with the national campaign, the local campaign was subjected to greater scrutiny. In particular, as Enemark had been touted as a possible cabinet minister, the media and voters became interested in his views on a range of subjects, including free trade. Thus, it forced the local strategists to engage in debates which they believed they could not win. This did not please the campaign manager Allan Gould:
We were happy to let other people do the running on free trade. Once it became a big issue after the debate, we were forced to hand out lots of anti-free trade literature and defend the party’s position, with which we did not agree. The more free trade became an issue, which helped the party in other parts of the country, the better the NDP did in British Columbia and the more we suffered. [Furthermore] the national campaign’s "40 points" program became controversial because it was not clear how it would be funded.

As free trade and the national party platform became more important, the local campaign felt increasingly marginalized in the provincial political milieu. From its early position as apparent challenger to the NDP in the riding, it fell to a distant third. The effectiveness of Kim Campbell’s campaign and the New Democrat’s ability to control the anti-free trade position in a politically polarized province emasculated the fragile local campaign.

Enemark, whose focus was consistently national, was annoyed at the fact that Quebec and Ontario politics dominated the media and the strategies of the major parties. He wished to discuss the impact of national politics on British Columbia, and the sorts of messages that provincial voters should send to Ottawa. He wanted the best of both worlds - national exposure, but without having to address the free trade issue. Relations between the national party and the local campaign were mixed. On one hand, the national party provided a great deal of financial support, and offered all sorts of manuals and logistical assistance. But it gave only token strategic advice, perhaps because it was not welcome by local campaigners. In the end, there was little integration between the two levels of the party. This set Enemark’s campaign apart from those of his major-party opponents.
The Local Contest

This city riding has been described in detail in an earlier section which deals with Kim Campbell’s campaign. The Liberal campaign never really engaged with the NDP and Tory campaigns in the riding. This lack of engagement manifested itself in a number of ways. First, the campaign rejected the vision of the local political community adopted by its main opponents. Both the NDP and Tory campaigns designed their campaigns to explicitly appeal to the group-based nature of politics in this socially heterogeneous riding. Enemark, on the other hand, considered this to be a false view, and preferred to emphasize the middle class nature of the riding. Second, Enemark was clearly the third player at all-candidates’ debates. The parry and thrust of the free trade debate suited the NDP and Tory candidates, but left Enemark in a difficult central position. The campaign also failed to get the same numbers of supporters out to these meetings.

Finally, due to a lack of workers, the Liberal campaign could not canvass the riding as well as its opponents, and was forced to rely on an extensive advertising campaign in order to communicate with voters.

As chief campaign strategist, Enemark thought he understood Centre better than his opponents or the media.

The view of Vancouver as a microcosm of Canada is media-inspired. Vancouver Centre is very much like other middle-class ridings, it responds to the same issues, and is impressed by candidates with relevant qualifications for being in government. Its about name recognition - it's like selling soap.

Enemark is correct in believing that Centre is not a true microcosm of Canada in the sense of simply mirroring the demographic profile of Canadian society. But it is heterogeneous, and as a result, local voters have diverse interests. As well, national
parties often expect their candidates to address issues that may seem peripheral to the riding. These campaigns may also intrude directly into the local contest in search of media coverage that only city ridings can provide.

The word microcosm is shorthand for the fact that the local agenda resonates to issues of interest to voters in many parts of the country. Enemark, in correctly rejecting the literal validity of the term microcosm, missed the fact that it captured this representative quality of the riding. Some of his own volunteers suggested that his decade long absence from active politics, at a time when the demography of Vancouver was changing at a rapid pace, may have been partly to blame for his willingness to see Centre as unreservedly middle-class.

Enemark’s difficulty with the increasingly group-based nature of politics in Canada - epitomised in Centre - was also reflected in his consternation with questionnaires sent to him by various interest groups. He saw these groups as too powerful and inconsistent with what he took to be the basic tenets of politics in Canada. Furthermore, he felt that answering the questionnaires was dangerous, as responding could be seen as endorsing this type of politics, and the answers could be used against him. Furthermore, they required too much volunteer time in an already overstretched campaign, so he decided to ignore them.

The inability of the Liberals to compete with the NDP and Tory campaigns was particularly evident at public events and with respect to campaign activities that required a large workforce. It could not compete with its opponents who had access to hundreds if not thousands of secondary workers and sympathizers. It was painfully clear to those
close to the campaign, including the media and campaign workers from the other parties, that the Liberals failed to attract as many supporters as the other campaigns to all-candidates’ debates. The image of a campaign that was out of its league was heightened when Enemark vacillated over free trade during these debates. Unable to defend the idea due to the position of his leader, yet personally supportive of the concept, he could not truly engage with the other campaign’s on this most crucial of all issues.

The Liberal campaign had no way of keeping up with the extensive foot and phone canvassing campaigns of the Conservatives and New Democrats. It could afford to buy street signs, but had a limited number of people willing to erect them. With a public sensitised to the weakness of the Liberals in the West, this perception of the campaign was soon widespread. Most insidious of all, these failings were felt most acutely by Liberal workers themselves, and badly damaged campaign morale. A lack of workers was considered by most workers as the campaign’s biggest weakness.

To add insult to injury, the Liberal Centre campaign was further weakened by the loss of workers to the adjacent Turner campaign in Vancouver Quadra. A national leader has a strong pull on the party faithful, particularly in BC in 1988, where the party expected to have little success, and its volunteer base was limited. Enemark’s campaign manager noted that except for the office manager, all the central volunteers came from ridings other than Vancouver Centre.

As Enemark did not support Turner’s anti-free trade position, and the national campaign did not provide issues that the local campaign thought were relevant to
Centre, the local campaign decided to focus on Enemark. The riding has a history of
electing high profile MP’s and cabinet ministers, including the retiring member Pat
Carney. Moreover, it was home to the major news media, who frequently used local
candidates as sounding-boards on the full range of election issues.

To overcome what it perceived as a name recognition deficit, and as a result of
its inability to canvass the riding, the Liberals were forced to run a heavy local
advertising campaign which featured Enemark. This was begun with a glossy and
expensive brochure, professionally produced and distributed by direct mail. Similarly,
drop pamphlets, signs, advertising in local community newspapers, and even a radio
advertisement all emphasized the candidate.

As campaign manager Allan Gould noted, this demanded professional, and
expensive, advertising expertise. Although the total spending of the three major
campaigns was about the same, a massive 67 percent ($32 438) of Liberal spending was
on advertising.5 Ray Torresan, of Ray Torresan and Associates, provided advice on and
produced the main campaign brochure. And professional public relations manager Jim
Gilmour, who had done work for the British Columbia Medical Association, worked
closely with Enemark to orchestrate the advertising campaign.

Unfortunately, both his main opponents, New Democrat Johanna den Hertog and
Progressive Conservative Kim Campbell, had much higher profiles, and played much
bigger roles in their parties’ national campaigns in a province where the Tories and

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5The comparable figures for the Conservatives and New Democrats were 54 percent and
35 percent respectively. In raw terms, this represents $24 602, and $17 553 spent on
advertising.
NDP were the major players. Moreover, Enemark was not sought out as a party spokesperson in the way that both den Hertog and Campbell were, as this role more readily fell to party leader John Turner in the adjacent riding of Vancouver Quadra. So although this strategic choice made sense in terms of the Liberal campaign itself, it meant taking on Enemark's rivals on their terms. As a result of this, every interaction or comparison of local campaigns served only highlighted the difficulties facing both the local and provincial Grit campaign.

It should come as no surprise that in a campaign that placed so much emphasis on its candidate and lost, campaigners had little regard for the impact of the qualities of the candidate on the intentions of voters. But Enemark saw the candidate as important in another way:

The candidate is becoming less and less important over time in terms of voting. Where they are most important is in raising money, attracting volunteers and setting strategy.

Enemark considered national media coverage and name recognition to be very important. Like other local campaigns, the Liberals could not afford advertising in the major metropolitan media, but sought to attract news coverage. Enemark phoned people in the national media, organized press conferences and events, but believed he was largely ignored.

The lack of attention to candidates reinforces the irrelevance of candidates to elections. The focus is on the national campaigns, even when there are no real issues being debated. This leads to stupid, often inconsequential news stories.

In addition, the Liberal campaign adopted other tactics that did not require many campaign workers but which maximised Enemark's public exposure. "Bermashave"
stunts, such as standing on street corners with balloons and placards during the rush hour were popular, as was mainstreeting.

The attraction of Vancouver Centre, a close contest with at least two and perhaps three credible candidates, was strong. Journalist in BC agreed that it received at least as much coverage as any riding in British Columbia. With 3 or 4 accomplished media people faxing off press releases and organizing press conferences for each candidate, the campaigns tried hard to take advantage of this coverage.

As if to prove Enemark's point about the importance of national coverage, one of the few times his campaign was taken seriously was when the national affairs magazine Maclean's and the Toronto Star ran articles about a possible Liberal cabinet that included Enemark. Enemark believes his heightened profile helped him get more interviews with both the national and local media. He was interviewed by the Vancouver Sun and the Province, the two Vancouver dailies, as well as on major Vancouver televisions stations such as CBC, BCTV and CKVU. Local radio station CKNW and CBC radio in Vancouver also interviewed Enemark.

But those that live by the sword die by the sword, and an unsuccessful campaign that focuses on its candidate invites critics to look no further in identifying the reasons for its failure. In a rather negative sense, the comments of the campaign manager with respect to the Liberals failure endorse Enemark's perception of the organizational role of a candidate. They also point to the fact that his perceptions of the riding may not have been current.

Tex was too connected to the old Liberal establishment, which meant his view of how a campaign was run - what to expect in terms of financial and volunteer
help, what strategies to pursue - was not relevant to the nature of the contest in Vancouver Centre in 1988. He thought he could win just on his name and connections... ...he put together an inappropriate campaign. For example, the classy brochure we did focusing on Tex may have worked in a traditional campaign, but did not in 1988, in Vancouver Centre. We failed to address free trade and did not get the organizational support we needed from the party.

So while the qualities possessed by the candidate may influence voters directly - by shaping their perceptions of his or her suitability for the job of MP - the effect may also be indirect in that the candidate’s organizational abilities may determine the quality of the campaign, and hence its capacity for identifying and implementing sound election strategies. The decision to base the campaign solely on the candidate proved to be a mistake. One member of the inner circle recalled the devastating impact on his morale of overhearing a conversation about the campaign close to election day in which two local voters could not name the Liberal candidate in Centre.

The impact of the federal election campaign on the local contest and the Enemark campaign was profound. The growing dominance of free trade as the campaign progressed encouraged the local Liberals in their desire to focus their strategies on Enemark, worsening an already dangerous situation. In addition, Enemark believes that opinion polls contributed to the destruction of the Liberals in the West, and hence to the plight of his campaign. The media fixation with poll results, which provide an easy story, damaged perceptions of the Liberals electoral chances. As they faded in the polls, particularly in the West, worker morale and numbers declined in what became an vicious cycle. Less workers made it harder for Liberal campaigns to appear competitive, and the lack of Liberal canvassers was reflected in voters responses to polling questions. The cycle started again.
The Vancouver Centre campaign and Enemark were both out of their league. The candidate's personal profile could not match that of his main opponents, and he was not central to his party's national campaign, or the federal election itself in the way both den Hertog and Campbell were. As for his campaign, while it was well financed, it was understaffed, which severely compromised its ability to compete with the New Democrats and Conservatives. It lacked the necessary number of committed workers at all three levels - inner circle, second tier and sympathizers - and those it did have had relatively little campaign experience. Despite having access to professional help, it was not the sort of campaign-hardened assistance that is of the greatest use to a local organization. If the Liberal party had been better organized in the West, Enemark may have had access to experienced campaigners. As it was, he was forced to rely on personal friends and acquaintances.

CONCLUSION

Not all losing campaigns suffer from the same weaknesses. Some are good campaigns that are not quite good enough. But many lack some vital ingredient needed to mount a complete campaign. Local conditions, or partisan organizational style, can both play a role in reducing a campaign's chances of success. Some uncompetitive and hence weak associations cannot provide enough volunteers or financial support to the local campaign, while others lack for one of these. The local political agenda may suit one campaign and not another. A lack of influential media can make it difficult to communicate with voters and alter the local political agenda. A desire to follow the
party line can force a campaign to adopt inappropriate local strategies.

Party insider Fairall’s inability to make an impact on incumbent Tory Bob Wenman’s strong electoral position highlights a number of difficulties facing her kind of campaign. Fairall’s strategic options were limited. Her campaign was too small and underfunded to canvass the riding in full. As a subsidiary campaign of the national NDP effort, her campaign could not focus on her personally, a strategy that would have been appropriate in a country riding of this sort. Pushing the NDP line in conservative riding such as Fraser Valley West doomed her to failure.

Fairall’s focus on national party strategies complicated the task of attracting the interest of the relatively influential local media, which is mainly involved in reporting local issues. As such, it was not possible for her to adopt the same approach as Al Horning, who made use of the media in Okanagan Centre to control the local agenda. In addition, Tory MP Bob Wenman’s strong position made it possible for him to disengage from the contest. As a result of this, Fairall could not score points at all-candidates’ debates at his expense, although his failure to attend did become an election issue. But even in relation to this, Tory strength in the riding, and Fairall’s lack of empathy with the local media, reduced the impact of this issues, and protected Wenman.

Enemark’s nomination and campaign were built on the support of friends and acquaintances from the Vancouver business community and the hierarchy of the Liberal party. His campaign had access to more money than the spending limit in the riding, yet suffered from a lack of workers. It could not canvass the riding properly, a fact highlighted by its reliance on a massive advertising campaign. This helped convince
both the media and voters that it was an uncompetitive campaign. Money cannot buy a
good campaign. Enemark’s campaign was further damaged by the nature of the local
contest and political agenda. Den Hertog and Campbell made free trade the central
issue of the campaign. Enemark was unable to engage in this debate at public meetings,
because he did not support his party’s position on the issue. The polarized debate did
not suit the campaign, and it came to be seen as uncompetitive in a riding that was hotly
contested by the New Democrats and Conservatives.

As ex-Mayor of Surrey, Don Ross also had something of a local profile, but had
to deal with an even weaker local Liberal association than that in Vancouver Centre.
Furthermore, he received little support from the non-local party, and his campaign was
unable to canvass the riding. Unlike Horning, he could not adopt a media-based
strategy as a means of communicating his strategy to voters. The lack of a well-
developed local agenda, or the media with which to influence that agenda, meant that
Ross was unable to take advantage of his public profile. This also made it difficult for
him to make an issue of his opponents unwillingness to engage in public debate. The
local agenda came to be dominated by free trade. With the Tories supporting free trade,
and the NDP opposing it, there was little room for Ross. The real contest was between
the PC and NDP campaigns.

In the case of Tory incumbent Bob Brisco in Kootenay West-Revelstoke, his
local support base had withered. Changes to the boundaries of his riding had further
weakened the competitive position of the Tory association. Thus, unlike either
Robinson or Wenman, his competitive position did not enable him to disengage from the
other local campaigns. Instead, he tried to confront his opponents with a strategy of focusing on local issues and his incumbency. But as a government MP with strong links to the party and its policies, he was unable to carry this through, and found himself defending the locally unpopular free trade agreement. The local media, which is based in each of the small towns in the riding, was not influential or united enough to generate a single political agenda or have a great impact on the campaign. In comparison with a similar approach adopted by Al Horning in Okanagan Centre, Brisco efforts to use the media to communicate his local strategy were relatively unsuccessful.

The next chapter concludes the thesis by discussing various themes that have emerged from the theoretical framework developed earlier, and the case studies presented in chapters eight and nine.
CONCLUSION: RIDING STYLE AND PARTY ETHOS

The introduction to chapter eight summarizes how this thesis has sought to describe and explain the style and content of local campaigns in Canadian federal elections. This chapter reconsiders campaigns from a broad perspective. It reviews the case studies presented in chapters eight and nine, and comments on some of campaigns that were not included in those two chapters. It reinforces some of the main elements of the thesis, and offers some general and comparative observations about what the thesis suggests for our understanding of Canadian politics.

The previous two chapters have told local campaign stories by focusing on the character of the riding, the candidate and campaign team, the relationship between the campaign and its non-local counterparts, whether the campaign was competitive or not, and if it was involved in a contested or uncontested constituency election. The stories highlight a number of important characteristics of campaigns and constituency elections, as well as Canadian politics more generally.

In particular, the campaign stories told here point to the central role of riding associations in the life of political parties and the nature of democracy in Canada. These associations are neither ciphers for local political interests, nor transmitters for the politics and organizational norms of the wider party. Rather, they mix the two. They are therefore idiosyncratic across two dimensions: geographically, in that local politics
varies across ridings; and, organizationally, in that the balance between party and riding
forces can vary between associations from different parties in the same riding. This
flows through to local campaigns.

Svend Robinson stands out as one of the few NDP candidates who had the
freedom to pursue those issues that interested him. Even a mass party such as the NDP,
which is most inclined to try and reproduce its campaign in every riding in the country,
cannot dictate strategy to a candidate who has national profile and a strong local
following. The party knows that it cannot take its support for granted, not even in a
strongly NDP area such as Burnaby-Kingsway.

Trying to control Robinson’s actions would be very difficult, as there are few
sanctions available to the central party. Local control of the nomination, the strength of
the local association, and Robinson’s local following make it unlikely that his
renomination would be blocked. Despite the difficulty of mounting such a challenge,
particularly in a mass party, this would be the only route available to any one wishing to
challenge Robinson. The party could invoke the leader’s veto, but this is an action
fraught with danger in the case of high profile candidates.

Robinson’s public profile, and ability to take advantage of his position and travel
the countryside debating issues, reflects the value of running in a city riding.
Candidates not only have access to metropolitan media in such ridings, they can still
communicate with local voters when out of the riding via the national news media
which is distributed in major centres. Robinson’s statements made across the country
were seen and heard by voters in Burnaby-Kingsway. This media profile is another
reason why the NDP needs Svend Robinson.

In part, Robinson’s freedom to pursue his own agenda was possible because it became clear as the campaign progressed that he was not involved in a close contest in his own riding. Strategists admitted that in the early part of the campaign, there was uncertainty as to the effect on his electoral support of his public statements concerning his homosexuality. The same uncertainty can be seen in Tory Al Horning’s concern over the impact of the Reform party in Okanagan Centre, and Tory MP Bob Wenman’s response to the Christian Heritage Party in Fraser Valley West. This points to the presumption, common amongst strategists, that the Canadian electorate is volatile.

Although incumbents usually have strong local support, they cannot take it for granted. The challenge to Tory Bob Wenman in Fraser Valley West was not orchestrated by the party, nor a party-wide faction, as might occur in other parties in Westminster style systems. Rather, it came from within the association, including members of the local executive. In contrast to the US, support for an incumbent is more than personal; it is embedded in associations. Associations stand somewhat apart from candidates and incumbents, and their organizational life is important in and of itself. In this case, the fact that it was a Tory association, with its loose cadre style organizational form, facilitated this challenge. As it turned out, Wenman’s electoral position was so strong, that he could ignore this and later challenges by disengaging from the local contest.

Like Wenman, Tory Al Horning in Okanagan Centre could afford to disengage from the local contest. He had a strong lead in an area that was strongly Tory. It was
fortuitous that the amount of media available in a country city such as Kelowna enabled
him to communicate with voters without attending public meetings. In sharp contrast,
Don Ross in Surrey North had no media to work with, and a leading opponent, the
NDP's Jim Karpooff, who refused to organize or participate in all-candidates' debates.
Ross was robbed of his major strategic asset, his personal appeal.

Kim Campbell's win in Vancouver Centre can be seen as a great personal effort.
But it should be kept in mind that although she brought some of her own supporters to
the campaign, she moved into an existing local party structure. The campaign manager,
and other members of the inner circle were experienced local party members.
Moreover, the association chose her for the nomination as much as she chose it. And it
did so in part by arguing that ridings such as Centre favour high profile candidates, are
volatile, and can be won with a good campaign. The fact that the association had
remained coherent and self-directed following the retirement of Tory Pat Carney, is
evidence that it had a life of its own, separate from the incumbent.

The closeness of the local contest in Vancouver Centre forced Kim Campbell to
engage with her opponents, and constrained her strategic horizons. She was not free to
wander the country as Robinson, but had to focus close to home. The decision by local
strategists to confront their opponents over free trade was informed by the belief that it
could not be avoided. As the campaign progressed, and the issue became more
important, the strength and consistency of Campbell's position came to seen as a sign of
her credibility. In this case, the dynamic of the federal contest helped Campbell. As
with Robinson, this strategy proved successful in part because the media coverage
received by this city campaign helped create a image of Campbell as a strong candidate.

Other Tories claimed to have wanted to push free trade harder than the national party suggested. Cliff Blair in Surrey North felt that in the head-to-head contest with the NDP in BC, a committed Tory had to support free trade. At one level, he saw it as a test of whether the Tories believed they were fully engaged in riding contests in BC, and had some chance of winning. Moreover, he felt that free trade could be sold to voters in Surrey North. Blair's willingness to address free trade appears to have helped him. Certainly his better-than-expected performance was noted by the party. The help it offered the local campaign came too late. Earlier attention may have won the seat for the Tories. An understanding of local conditions can be very important, and parties ignore it at their peril.

One candidate who attempted to avoid free trade was Tory incumbent Bob Brisco in Kootenay West-Revelstoke. This was difficult in a riding where free trade had many local resonances. Unfortunately for Brisco, his campaign's capacity to influence the contest was limited by internecine strife, and the difficulty of making use of the fragmented media in a large country riding. Moreover, the closeness of the race placed a premium on public meetings, but his poor health hurt his ability to debate with his opponents. Once again, local factors played a big part in the election outcome.

Tex Enemark's Liberal campaign in Vancouver Centre found it difficult to deal with free trade. Enemark personally supported the agreement, but felt obliged to oppose it publicly, in line with his party's stated position. His attempt to avoid the issue constrained his ability to become involved in public debates and the local contest in
general. His campaign had no clear position on the major issue of the election. This badly damaged his chances in the eyes of the powerful riding media. In addition, the weakness of his campaign team, and its inability to canvass the riding stood in sharp relief to its large advertising budget. This discrepancy was noted by the media. Given the influence of the media in a city riding such as Centre, this is unlikely to have gone unnoticed by voters.

A number of losing Liberal candidates supported free trade and were uncomfortable with the position taken by party leader John Turner. A number of party workers openly wondered whether this had some affect on the number of workers and the amount of money that local campaigns were able to attract. Such deep ambivalence in a party, expressed in every association across the country, could not have helped the Liberal’s cause in 1988. Even amongst those who agreed with Turner’s position, there were some, such as Don Ross, who felt that national party strategies in dealing with free trade were inappropriate in the context of local contests in BC.

Variation in election dynamics from one province to another is endemic to Canadian elections, and can be found in both riding and regional studies of the 1962 federal election (Meisel, 1964). It affects all the parties. The Tory versus NDP battle in BC - which sidelines the Liberals - has a long pedigree (Ward 1964). It has been noted before that the Liberals are most adept at appealing to voters across a wide range of class and social groupings, whereas the NDP and Tories appeal disproportionately to members of different social and economic groups (Alford 1964, 209). The Liberals are uncomfortable with and ill-suited to the polarized politics of British Columbia, which in
1988 manifested itself in the debate over free trade.

The national NDP was caught in a three-way contest with the Tories and Liberals. It opposed free trade and wanted to convince voters that it, rather than the Liberal party, was the real opponent of the agreement. It considered that in this sort of contest, an emphasis on Ed Broadbent’s leadership and opposition to free trade was a sound strategy. New Democrats in BC were involved in a two-way contest with the Tories, whose support had weakened in the West. Provincial New Democrats felt that a strong, confrontational stand on free trade was the best strategy. Early on in the campaign, local strategist toed the national party line, before switching to free trade.

Ron Stipp, campaign manager for Johanna den Hertog in Vancouver Centre, felt particularly aggrieved that the national party had decided to focus on Broadbent. Because of den Hertog’s close relationship to the national party, she tended to favour this approach. Unfortunately, while she was doing this, Kim Campbell was gaining credibility in Centre by addressing the free trade issue in detail. It was only late in the campaign that, with the help of the powerful provincial party, the Centre NDP campaign came to focus its attention on free trade. This meant a quick change in the emphasis of campaign literature and canvassing. Given that den Hertog lost, it may have been too little, too late.

Despite the Liberal’s poor showing in most BC ridings in 1988, they were certainly not irrelevant to electoral outcomes. They managed to improve on their performances in a number of ridings, and in so doing may have helped the NDP defeat Tories. Michael O’Connor in Victoria and Don Ross in Surrey North both increased the
Liberal vote share by 50 percent. Although not good enough to win, in both cases this was less than the margin between the NDP and Tories.

Local campaigns reflect the associations which spawn them, and the constituency elections in which they compete. As such, the way in which partisan and riding forces interact within an association, and how these same forces shape the environment that campaigns must respond to, are critical to understanding local campaigns. The balance between riding and partisan forces in both these arenas - local associations and constituency contests - is central to the nature of Canadian elections and politics.

**THE NATURE OF CANADIAN POLITICS**

The style and content of local campaigns in Canada is intimately connected with the nature of the local associations that control the nomination of candidates for federal elections. They represent the peculiar interaction of a partisan ethic and a local riding style that records the efforts of Canadian political parties to operate within a polity that has a surfeit of geography and is marked by ethno-linguistic diversity. This is true also of local campaigns and constituency contests. Like associations, they reflect the interaction of the distinct local political communities defined by riding boundaries and the imperatives of partisan politics.

What does this imply for our understanding of Canadian politics? Firstly, it suggests that it is impossible to fully comprehend the nature of Canadian parties from a national or even provincial level. Similarly, if local campaigns are shaped so strongly by local influences, our view of federal elections as primarily national events is
misguided, and seriously limits our ability to understand them. As seminal components of the political system, a better understanding of associations and the local politics that shape them should also be able to tell us something about why parties, and Canadian politics more generally, are structured as they are at present.

The power to select candidates places constituency associations at the centre of political parties, and of the democratic process. Just because of this, the riding-based picture of politics presented here is more than a collection of interesting local stories; it provides a means of connecting the nature of the Canadian political system with the society that underlies it. The patterns that mark politics at this local level, and in particular, the balance struck between partisan and riding forces within an associations, suggest something about the nature of Canadian politics.

Sartori (1969, xi) notes that parties connect the rigid political institutions of the state and the wider, always mobile, society. Constituency associations constitute the very membrane that separates parties from the society. The permeability of this membrane, and the way in which these local institutions construct politics is crucial for the role of parties as intermediaries between state and society. Moreover, the collapse of earlier modes of organization which relied on regional bosses, and the disengagement of provincial parties from their national counterparts (Carty 1988a), have meant that associations now play a critical role in a party's relationship with the wider society.

The integrative and representational role of local associations seems particularly crucial in Canada. This is a polity that has defied the unifying assumptions of most social science, and shows no sign of becoming any more socially or politically
integrated than it was in 1867. In fact, it may well be less so today. Yet neither has it been torn asunder by the often competing discourses and claims which constitute its diverse politics.

The local variability that underpins this diversity requires a political system that is responsive to local variation. With respect to political parties, this implies association autonomy, in order that they are given maximum room to respond to local conditions. That is, the capacity of associations to play their representational and integrative role depends very much on the balance between local and national concerns within a political party.

Two pressures that encourage centralization of power and control within parties are the drive to organizational coherence found in integrated mass parties, and the professionalization of the hierarchies of modern parties. This latter development can affect both mass and cadre style parties as they search for electoral success. This has seen the development of powerful central offices, which in Canada’s leader-centred parties, has meant strong leaders’ offices.

It is notable that unlike most other Westminster style systems, Canada’s most successful parties have retained a cadre style. It is possible that this reflects the fact that in maintaining the flexibility necessary to win Canadian elections, they have not been able to adopt a mass form. Canadian national parties vary enormously in strength across Canada. They may hold nearly all the seats in one province, and nearly none in the next. This may also be true in the same province across time, from one election to the next. Dramatic changes in electoral performances favour the cyclical existence and
loose organizational form of cadre style parties that do not attempt to maintain elaborate local organizations between elections.

For example, there is little doubt that the spectacular growth of the previously only modestly competitive Liberal party association in Eglinton prior to the 1962 election (Smith 1965, 71-2), with some party activists willing to admit to have voted Conservative in 1958, would have been reproduced in Vancouver Centre in 1993. Such openness and organizational flexibility is uncommon in NDP associations. This reflects also the underlying volatility of Canadian ridings, which are more contested than either their British or American cousins (Heintzman 1991, 98). This electoral variability favours parties that can come and go over time.

This argument suggests that the electoral failure of the New Democratic Party in Canada reflects the essential tension between mass parties and local autonomy. The diversity of Canadian electorates is anathema to centralized organizational forms and the imposition of consistency across ridings. The party does not nurture the type of association that is capable of transmitting local impulses to its leadership. As such, the party is unable to respond adequately to the underlying variability of Canadian politics. Moreover, the party expends a good deal of effort in maintaining consistency across ridings, and continuity between elections. Changes in the nature of Canadian society may take longer to flow through a more organizationally coherent and hence less permeable mass party such as the NDP, than a more loosely organized cadre style party.

Although the loose organizational style of Canadian cadre style parties has been advantageous up to now, it brings its own difficulties. It has juxtaposed the
personalized machine needed to build and sustain a coalition of support for the leader's policies and open, participatory, extra-parliamentary organizational elements (Carty 1988a, 24). The importance of party leaders in these cadre style parties, promoted by the centralization of the media and its growing focus on the leader, has meant there is a small coterie of organizers in the leaders office who run these parties (Fletcher 1987, 363-7).

The relatively small coterie of party organizers in the leader’s office, cut off from the grass roots of the party, has been susceptible to the trend towards professionalization of party elites found in many liberal democracies. This process, most well developed in the Progressive Conservative party prior to its defeat in 1993, has the capacity to alienate the centre from the grassroots of a party. Just as a mass party may prevent its associations from fulfilling an integrative and representational role, a professionalized party may be unaware of local impulses.

National dominance, or inattention to local concerns, diminishes the influence of local associations in the life of a party. In damaging a party’s capacity to respond to local impulses, this reduces its ability to fulfill representational and integrative roles. In a country as geographically and socially diverse as Canada, this is dangerous for the party, and for politics more widely. It is even more so at a time when intervention by interest groups in association affairs is on the increase, and challenges the parties’ dominance of electoral politics (Carty 1991a, 230).

When we speak of the health of Canadian parties, it is necessary to be clear what, in the Canadian context, qualifies as healthy. It seems that strong, centralized
parties are likely to be ill-suited to Canadian politics. Responsiveness is likely to be a more useful attribute. In this case, flexible, decentralized parties are likely to do well. This seems reasonable in a highly diverse polity. If responsiveness is the test of health, Canadian parties are a mixed bag: some parties are obviously healthy, and others less so, but not all are found wanting.

This suggests also that beyond the health of political parties per se, it is important to enquire as to the state of Canadian democracy more widely. If local association democracy, the involvement of various groups in politics via political parties, the responsiveness of the political system to local impulses through the party system and elections, variation in style and content of constituency campaigns by both party and region, and so on, are accepted as signs of well being, then Canadian democracy is in robust good health. The fact that Canadian politics does not suit or cannot support some parties - or particular forms of parties - is beside the point.

**CANADA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

The level of autonomy enjoyed by constituency associations in Canada is most probably unmatched in any other Westminster style parliamentary system (see Butler and Kavanagh 1992, 211-246). The selection of candidates is a local process, as is much of the work of campaigning itself. In this way, the character of the local riding community works through associations to shape local campaigns. Local campaigns are not dominated by their national branches, and exhibit a riding style. In many parties in other Westminster style parliamentary systems, associations are mainly just
organizational units of the party. Constituencies may be necessary to give order to elections, but do not organize political life much beyond this. Constituency elections seem much more to mimic the wider contest between political parties.

Despite the lack of direct interference in local affairs by the party hierarchy, associations in Canada are deeply embedded in partisan structures and history. These shape the ways in which they go about the task of selecting candidates, building campaign teams, and prosecuting a local campaign. Unlike their counterparts in the United States of America, local party organizations are not dominated by the personalized machines of candidates. Certainly the incumbent has not replaced the party as in the United States (Heintzman 1991, 119). Candidates are important, but party rules and norms, as well as local party stalwarts, have substantial influence over the conduct of nominations and campaigns. As such, local campaigns still embody a partisan ethos that reflects the character of the wider party.

The balance between riding and partisan forces with Canadian constituency associations, and local campaigns, points to their unique role in political life. Activists in the United States work for a particular candidate or member of Congress. Volunteers often identify with the candidate at a personal level, or relate to his or her particular set of interests. In Britain or Australia, political activism is frequently focused above the level of the constituency, in the often permanent secretariats that parties use to discuss policy and make collective decisions.

In contrast to both these cases, candidates and incumbents in Canada come and go too readily to develop as the focus of political activism. On the other hand, there is
relatively little in the way of permanent institutions at any level of most Canadian parties, membership of which an activists can make their goal. Rather, associations, with their often cyclical existence, define the organizational life of parties, and set the terms on which party activists gain access to parties and the political system more generally.

This balancing act is also evident within local campaigns. They are not habitually dominated by the personality of the candidate, and his or her choice of issues. Neither are they dominated by the policies and platforms of the parties. Rather, local campaign organizations each have the opportunity to strike their own balance, within the constraints determined by the particular constituency election in which they are engaged. The balance of local as opposed to regional or national issues, the role of the candidate, the place of national party platforms, are all negotiable. Thus, Kim Campbell’s win in Vancouver Centre, was in part due to her personality and ability to gather around her professional help. Yet many of her workers were long time party stalwarts and strategists who were there as much for the party as for Kim Campbell. Svend Robinson’s electoral success is based in part on his personal appeal and his work in the local riding, but also the national issues and broad policy positions he and his party are associated with.

Local campaigns, and the local forces that shape them, may become even more important in the next few years. There appears to be an important trend in mass media towards audience fragmentation, and a growth in the number of local broadcasters, such a cable stations. If this tendency away from media concentration gains strength, it may
reverse the process of political centralization that began with the advent of mass communication earlier this century (Spencer and Bolan 1991, 30-33). This could breathe new life into local politics, and our understanding of its role in the wider polity.

Local campaigns play a vital role in determining the final form of federal elections and politics in Canada. In his concluding remarks on the 1962 election, Alford links the fact that the bases of support for parties in Canada is localised with the fact that more than any other country, Canadian parties are temporary associations brought together solely because of "the necessities of the strategy of power" (Alford 1964, 232). As well, he points to the possibility that region, religion, and the rural - urban divide hold out more hope of explaining voting behaviour in Canada (ibid., 233) than more commonly adopted explanatory variables such as class. Such conclusions fit well with the thrust of this work, which suggests that Canadian elections and politics can only be fully understood through a matrix that takes account of local and regional phenomena.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Canada. Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1993, c.19,s.39


APPENDIX A

CAMPAIGN ELECTION EXPENSES

Burnaby-Kingsway

Limit of Election Expenses: $49 005

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Candidates: NDP - Svend Robinson; PC - John Bitonti; LIB - Samuel Stevens.

Fraser Valley West

Limit of Election Expenses: $46 003

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Candidates: NDP - Lynn Fairall; PC - Robert Wenman; LIB - Tony Wattie.
Kootenay West-Revelstoke

Limit of Election Expenses: $47 507

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Candidates: NDP - Lyle Kristiansen; PC - Bob Brisco; LIB - Garry Jenkins.

Okanagan Centre

Limit of Election Expenses: $46 595

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Candidates: NDP - Bryan McIver; PC - Al Horning; LIB - Murli Pendharkar.
Surrey North

Limit of Election Expenses: $48,521

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Candidates: NDP - Jim Karpoff; PC - Cliff Blair; LIB - Don Ross.

Vancouver Centre

Limit of Election Expenses: $51,487

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Candidates: NDP - Johanna den Hertog; PC - Kim Campbell; LIB - Tex Enemark.
Victoria

Limit of Election Expenses: $48,746

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Candidates: NDP - John Brewin; PC - Geoff Young; LIB - Michael O'Connor.