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Decision-making and conflict resolution in co-management: two cases from Temagami, northeastern Ontario Matakala, Patrick W. 1995

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DECISION-MAKING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN CO-MANAGEMENT: TWOCASES FROM TEMAGAMI, NORTHEASTERN ONTARIObyPATRICK W. MATAKALADip. Ed., University ofZambia, 1983H.B.Sc. For., Lakehead University, 1989M.Sc. For., Lakehead University, 1991A THESIS SUBMITTED iN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESTHE FACULTY OF FORESTRYDepartment ofForest Resources ManagementWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAJUNE, 1995© Patrick W. Matakala, 1995In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. it is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)_____Department of Rfl3E’f R c’ui-cg’, T\4 aevnetn +The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate Augjist 3c 19DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTGovernments across Canada face increasing demands for public involvement in resourcemanagement decision-making, particularly at local levels. At the centre of debate are three issues:(a) the distribution ofdecision-making authority and responsibility; (b) the distributions of costs andbenefits; and (c) the question of sustainability (ecological, social, and economic) at local levels. Inthe face ofthis wide range of often conflicting interests involving many non-aboriginal stakeholderson one hand, and First Nations on the other, governments want less conflict and believe that they canachieve this through more collaboration or co-management agreements. In particular, governmentssuspect that both groups above can share in the management decisions and responsibilities of the lineagencies responsible for land use and resource management.This thesis uses two cases to investigate the effects of co-management on: the delegation ofdecision-making authority to local levels; the substance of resource management decisions; socialrelationships among various actors; and conflict resolution. The two cases, which are both locatedin Temagami, northeastern Ontario, are the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) and theWendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA). The theoretical framework of the study includes comanagement, democratic theory and its applications in citizen participation, and conflict resolutionand its relationship to the theory of communicative action. Data collection methods involved semistructured interviews with members of both agencies, the local public, and key informants.Documentary sources included minutes, administrative documents, letters, memoranda, governmentreports, news briefs, and newsclippings pertaining to both co-management agencies. Transientobservation was also used in data collection. The study employed content analysis and ‘patternmatching’ as the main analytic strategies.11The results of this study show that the decentralization models of co-management agreementsexamined did not delegate decision-making authority to local levels. While one lacked the authorityto effectively advise and influence the decisions of the Ministry ofNatural Resources (MNR), theother lacked the authority to implement its own decisions. Ultimately, the authority to make andimplement decisions rested with the MNR. Generally, the substance of resource managementdecisions under co-management improved over those made in the past by the MNR, However, thesustainability and equitability of those decisions could not be tested because the MNR, rather thanthe two co-management agencies, retained both the responsibility and authority to implement thosedecisions. Therefore, in the absence ofdejure authority by the two agencies to advise/make andimplement decisions, the quality of the substance of decisions under co-management could not bedetermined.The levels of public participation in both agencies’ planning and decision-making processes,and the lack of involvement by stakeholder groups in the selection of members to the two comanagement agencies, influenced social relationships among actors in co-management. This selectionwas the exclusive domain of the government. Both theoretical propositions of co-management andcitizen participation fail to explicitly discuss the quality of information and methods used as importantattributes in effective public participation. While consensus decision-making and land-use zoningtechnique facilitated conflict resolution in the second case, consensus decision-making was lackingin the first case. In addition, the MNR conducted land-use zoning without the involvement of bothlocal publics and the citizens’ group that it was supposed to share decisions with; thus, exacerbatinglocal conflicts among them. Both practical and theoretical implications of this study findings arediscussed.111TABLE OF CONTENTSCHAPTER 1.1iNTRODUCTION1.1 Rationale1.2 Theoretical Framework1.2.1 Co-management1.2.2 Participatory Democracy and Citizen Participation1.2.3 Conflict Resolution and Communicative ActionProblem StatementResearch Questions and ObjectivesOrganizationCHAPTER2 35Temagami Advisory Council (TAC) and laterComprehensive Planning Council (CPC)Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)ABSTRACT iiTABLE OF CONTENTS ivLIST OF TABLES viiiLIST OF FIGURES ixLIST OF ACRONYMS xiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiiDEDICATION xiv1.31.41.51110101725313334METHODOLOGY 352.1 Justification for the Case Study Method 352.2 Limitations and Scope 372.3 Data Collection 392.4 Data Analysis 422.5 Background to the Study Area 452.5.1 Nature of Conflict 542.5.1.1 The Aboriginal Dimension 572.5.1.2 The Multi-Stakeholder Dimension . 612.5.2 The Case Studies 652.5.2.12.5.2.26566ivCHAPTER 3 . 70DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISION-MAKiNG AUTHORITY TN THETEMAGAMI AREA 703.1 Historical Distributions ofDecision-making Authority (under the MNR). . . 703.1.1 Distributions of decision-making 703.1.2 Distributions of authority 803.2 Distributions ofDecision-making Authority under Co-management 823.2.1 Ontario’s Expected and Implied Levels ofDistributions ofDecision-making Authority to the Co-management Agencies 823.2.2 Actual Distributions ofDecision-making Authority to theCPCandtheWSA 853.2.2.1 Distributions ofDecision-making 853.2.2.1.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) . . 853.2.2.1.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) . 933.2.2.2 Distributions of Authority 993.2.2.2.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) . 1013.2.2.2.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) . 1033.2.3 Conclusions 1063.3 Distribution of decision-making from the Co-managementAgencies to the public 1093.3.1 Ontario’s Anticipated Levels ofPublic Participation in theCo-management Agencies’ Planning and Decision-makingProcesses 1133.3.2 Cross-case Analysis 1153.3.2.1 Information and methods of participationused by the Agencies 1163.3.2.2 Key issues raised by the public and their influenceon agency decisions 1203.3.2.2.1 Road Access 1203.3.2.2.2 Lack of clarity of the planning process 1233.3.2.2.3 A zoning decision that excluded a majorcanoe route 1253.3.2.3 Evidence of cooperation in agreement betweenthe agencies and local users 1263.3.3 Conclusions 127vCHAPTER4 . 131THE SUBSTANCE OF DECISIONS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT 1314.1 The Substance ofDecisions made in the Past (under MNR) 1344.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protection . 1344.1.2 Primacy of timber in planning 1354.1.3 Access to the timber resource 1394.2 The Substance ofDecisions under Co-management 1444.2.1 Cross-case Analysis 1444.2.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protection 1444.2.1.2 Primacy of timber in planning 1474.2.1.3 Access to the timber resource 1484.2.2 Conclusions 150SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT 1524.3 Ontario’s Expectations 1524.4 Inclusion 1524.4.1 Conclusions 1564.5 Respect and Trust 1594.5.1 The Enforcement Crisis in the WSA Area 1634.5.2 Consensus Decision-making 1654.6 Cooperation 1684.6.1 Cooperation between the Agencies and other key actors/public . . 1704.6.2 Cooperation among members of the co-management agency 1724.6.3 Conclusions 1734.7 Conflict Resolution 1774.7.1 The CPC and conflict resolution 1794.7.2 The WSA and conflict resolution 183viCHAPTER 5 .189CONCLUSIONS 1895.1 Co-management and Distributions ofDecision-makingAuthority to Local Levels 1935.2 Co-management and the Substance ofResource Management Decisions. . . 1975.3 Co-management and Social Relationships 1985.4 Co-management and Conflict Resolution 2035.5 Implications for Research 207LITERATURE CITED 210APPENDIX 1: Data collection research design by main research question, interviewquestion, interview category, and number of respondents 221APPENDIX 2: Data display for the categories “Public Participation”, “Decision-making authority”, and “Types ofDecisions” 226APPENDIX 3: Data display for the categories “Inclusion”,”Respect and Trust”,“Cooperation”, and “Conflict Resolution” 239APPENDIX 4: Minutes of the Temagarni Advisory Council #28, January 10, 1990 252APPENDIX 5: MNR’s Timber Management Planning & public Participation Process 254viiLIST OF TABLESTable 1: Number of respondents interviewed in each interview category andtotal number of interview questions 41Table 2: Total number of interview questions analyzed and left out of the analysisin this study 43Table 3: Community Profiles of the ‘Temagami Area Community’ 53Table 4: Community Services within the ‘Temagami Area Community’ 53Table 5: Summary of data pertaining to past and present distributions of decision-making authority in the Temagami Area 71Table 6: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from thethe state to the co-management agencies under study 86Table 7: Summary results pertaining to distributions of authority from the state tothe co-management agencies under study 100Table 8: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from theco-management agencies (CPC and WSA) to the general public 112Table 9: Summary results on the substance of decisions made both in the past andin the present 133Table 10: Volume commitments/targets to be supplied to operators under 1994-96Temagami Contingency Timber Management Plans 143Table 11: Summary results pertaining to the principle of “Inclusion” 153Table 12: Summary results pertaining to the principle of “Respect and Trust” 160Table 13: Summary results pertaining to cooperation among actors in co-management . . . . 169Table 14: Summary results pertaining to conflict resolution under co-management 178vii’LIST OF FIGURESFigure 1: Interpretation of “decision-making authority” in this studyFigure 2: A continuum of level of co-management on Arnstein’s ladder ofcitizen participation 12Figure 3: A comparison of the conventional and cooperative planning models 16Figure 4: Eight rungs on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation 19Figure 5: Levels of decision-making power and public participation onParenteau’s evaluation framework 22Figure 6: Maps showing the location of Temagami in northeastern Ontario, Canada 46Figure 7: Map showing the TAA land claim boundary (n’Daki Menan), ComprehensivePlanning Area, and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority Planning Area 52Figure 8: Map showing proposed road extensions within the WSA Planning Areathat sparked controversy between the TAA and Ontario 60Figure 9: The level of public participation of the TAC in the MNR’s planningprocess in the past on Amstein’s ladder of citizen participation 76Figure 10: The levels of public participation and decision-making of the TAC in theMNR’s planning process in the past on Parenteau’s evaluation framework 77Figure 11: The level of public participation in the MNR’s Timber ManagementPlanning process in the past on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation 78Figure 12: The level of public participation and decision-making in the MNR’s TimberManagement Planning Process in the past on Parenteau’s evaluation framework. . 79Figure 13: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA’s public participationunder co-management on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation 83Figure 14: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA’s public participationunder co-management on Parenteau’s evaluation framework 84Figure 15: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation underco-management on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation 92ixFigure 16: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation and decision-making under co-management on Parenteau’s evaluation framework 92Figure 17: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation underco-management on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation 97Figure 18: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation and decision-making under co-management on Parenteau’s evaluation framework 98Figure 19: Ontario’s expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA’splanning and decision-making processes on Arnstein’s ladder of citizenparticipation 113Figure 20: Ontario’s expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA’splanning and decision-making processes on Parenteau’s evaluation framework . . 114Figure 21: Actual levels of public participation in both the CPC and WSA’s planningand decision-making processes on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation . . . . 130Figure 22: Actual levels of public participation in both the CPC and WSA’s planningand decision-making processes on Parenteau’s evaluation framework 130Figure 23: The MNR’s Planning System in Ontario 138Figure 24: Crown Wood Destinations, 4-year Average (1986-90), Temagami District . . . . 140Figure 25: Institutional designs of co-management and their implications for devolutionof decision-making power on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation 190Figure 26: Institutional designs of co-management and their implications for devolutionof decision-making power on Parenteau’s public participation and decisionmaking evaluation framework 190xLIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THIS STUDYAlP Agreement In PrincipleAOC Area of Concern in timber management planningACAO Association ofConservation Authorities of OntarioCPC Comprehensive Planning CouncilCPP Comprehensive Planning ProgramDLUG District Land Use GuidelinesEARP Environmental Assessment Review ProcessFMC First Ministers’ ConferenceFON Federation of Ontario NaturalistsFSP Forest Stewardship PlanLATEMPRA Lake Temagami Permanent Residents’ AssociationLESWP Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness ParkLUP Land Use PermitM1’.TR Ministry ofNatural Resources of OntarioMNDM Ministry ofNorthern Development & Mines of OntarioMOE Ministry of Environment of OntarioMOU Memorandum ofUnderstandingNOTO Northern Ontario Tourist OutfittersOEC Ontario Executive CouncilOEAB Ontario Envrionmental Assessment BoardOFAH Ontario Federation of Anglers and HuntersOIC Order-In-CouncilOPP Ontario Provincial PoliceORTEE Ontario Round Table on the Environment and the EconomyRSO Revised Statuses of OntarioSLUP Strategic Land Use PlanningSNC Sudbury Naturalists ClubTAA Teme-Augama Anishnabai First NationTAC Temagami Advisory CouncilTLA Temagami Lakes AssociationTMP Timber Management PlanWCED World Commission on Environment and DevelopmentWSA Wendaban Stewardship AuthorityWNAG West Nipissing Access GroupxiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would like to thank my research supervisor, Dr. Alan Chambers for his encouragement,support, friendship, and guidance in focusing my work. I would also like to express my appreciationto the rest of my advisory committee for their collective and individual assistance: to Dr. MaureenReed for her guidance, understanding and willingness to share her knowledge, experiences andinsights with me; to Dr. Patricia Marchak and Professor Peter Boothroyd for their thoughtfiulness,advice, and valuable suggestions in conceptualizing this study; and to Dr. Bart Van der kamp for hisprovoking thoughts and advice. Their kindness and sense of humour were greatly appreciated.Special thanks are due to members of both the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) andthe Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) as well as the Ministry of Natural Resources inTemagami, northeastern Ontario, who shared their thoughts and experiences with me and withoutwhose interest and cooperation, this study would not have been possible. In particular, I am greatlyindebted to Paul King-Fisher, Coordinator for the Comprehensive Planning Council and to JimMorrison, Chair for the Wendaban Stewardship Authority, for coordinating my interviews withmembers oftheir organizations. I also thank the many members of the public in the Temagami, NorthBay, and Tri-town areas who participated in this study through interviews and informal discussions.My heartfelt gratitude extend to Tom Whitfield, who as a friend, not only provided me with freeaccommodation during my field interviews, but also engaged me in thought-provoking discussionssprinkled with humour.XIII am grateful to the University ofBritish Columbia for providing me a full graduate fellowshipfor two years and to the Faculty ofForestry without whose financial assistance, this study would nothave been possible.Last, but not least, I would like to thank my wife Edith and daughters, Mwangala and Chaze,for their moral support, companionship, love, tolerance and understanding. To Lulu and Litia, I owethis to them for their patience, love and understanding.xl”DEDICATIONIn memory of my late parents, my dad Mr. Alexander Mubiana Matakala and my mom, Mrs.Agnes Nalishebo Muha Mubiana, who did not live long enough to witness the culmination of myacademic pursuits. I thank them for their caring, encouragement, and moral support throughoutmy life. May their souls rest in peace. Dad, you once told me some words ofwisdom that I willalways cherish and remember,.an educational certficate is like a ticket you buy or earnto get into a dancehall, many can attend the dance; whatis critical is whether you can dance and be amongthe best dancers on the dancefloor ..“Alexander M. Matakala, 1981.xivCHAPTER 1iNTRODUCTION1.1 RationaleGovernments across Canada face increasing demands for public involvement in resourcemanagement decision-making, particularly at local levels (Higgelke and Duinker 1993). At the centreof debate are three issues: (a) the distribution of decision-making authority and responsibility; (b) thedistribution of costs and benefits; and (c) the question of sustainability (ecological, social, andeconomic) at local levels. The premises from which these issues flow are that existing distributionsofboth authority and benefits are inequitable and that the flow ofbenefits is not sustainable. Thus,the overall efficacy of conventional resource management approaches that emphasize top-downmodels of decision-making and result in state and industry control of resources are called intoquestion.Communities are demanding more say and increased accountability in resource managementdecision-making. Environmentalists want the forests to be viewed in terms of multiple resourcevalues, not only timber. Industry wants secure tenure arrangements as a basis for continued woodsupply and investment in the sector. Various local stakeholders want their interests protected.Governments across Canada chose to deal with First Nation’ peoples first because they have the mostpowerful claim to participate in land-use decisions. The legal position of aboriginal peoples in1 The term “First Nation” is used to mean the aboriginal peoples who inhabited North America prior toEuropean settlement. This term is preferred by aboriginal peoples in Canada over “Indians”. Theterm derives from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which refers to aboriginal people of Canadaas’Nations”.1Canada is determined not only by the Indian Act but also by the constitution and the treaties. Unlikeany other identifiable group of citizens, aboriginal peoples’ rights to the land and resources areprotected by the constitution. These rights extend beyond usufructuary to real vested interests and/orpossessory rights. Therefore, aboriginal rights in the land and resources in Canada can becharacterized as dejure rights in the sense that they are entrenched within the constitution. Indeed,if the protection of existing rights is interpreted to embrace the right to self-government, it can beargued that in law, if not in fact, aboriginal peoples fare much better than other Canadians in termsof land rights. For the rest of Canadians, their rights in the land and resources can be characterizedas defacto rights since they do not receive similar protection in the constitution as are aboriginalrights; at best, they are designated usufructuary rights.In view of the special status accorded First Nations within the Canadian constitution, theywant to be included as a distinct group in land-use decisions; they view their relationships with seniorgovernment levels on a nation-to-nation basis. In any discussion of aboriginal sovereignty andrelationships between First Nations and Canada, three important dates warrant review: 1763, 1867,and 1982. These dates, and the acts that flow from them are all interconnected and must beaddressed in context with each other. The dates are explored in detail in the next section becausethey provide a context within which to understand First Nations involvement in co-management ofnatural resources.In 1763 the RoyalProclamation directed that all lands for future settlement and developmentin British America must first be cleared of the aboriginal title only by Crown purchase (Indian andNorthern Affairs Canada 1979). The instruments chosen by the Crown to acquire aboriginal lands2were designated as “treaties11. In other words, the Crown required the consent ofFirst Nations beforeaboriginal title to the lands could be ceded by the latter to the former. This implied Crownrecognition of aboriginal land ownership and authority as continuing under British sovereignty(British Columbia Claims Task Force 1991). Therefore, the Royal Proclamation laid the legalfoundation and principles for fhture relationships between First Nations and the British Crown. Inthe long term, the Proclamation would have other profound implications. It would, after the Britishhad retired from North America, and two new nation-states, the United States and Canada, had beenestablished, be instrumental in the recognition by the courts of both countries of the distinctivepolitical status and aboriginal rights of the First Nations (Berger 1992).In spite of the legal principles and relationships set out in the Royal Proclamation, most ofwestern Canada was not affected by the Proclamation because the Crown did not yet come intocontact with the First Nations (Badcock 1976) and thus, no treaties were made. However, it is stilla matter of legal debate whether the Proclamation applied. By the 1 85Os, the Crown had signedmajor treaties with the First Nations in eastern Canada. In most of these treaties, First Nations cededtitle to the Crown in exchange for land reserves for settlement and other rights such as fishing,hunting, and trapping (Badcock 1976; British Columbia Claims Task Force 1991; Berger 1992).Ultimately, that process continued west to the Rockies, in advance of European settlement.However, the policy was not pursued west of the Rockies. Similarly, it was not pursued in Quebecand parts of the Maritimes (Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince EdwardIsland). In all these areas, many First Nations were not compensated for the dispossession ofaboriginal rights in their ancestral lands.3The explanation for the Crown’s failure to follow the treaty-making process with First Nationsin Quebec and parts of the Maritimes is that those areas were passed from French to British controlwith a history of non-recognition of aboriginal title by the French (Boldt 1993:275). In BritishColumbia, the government simply refused to do so (Boldt 1993:275). However, since the RoyalProc nation has never been repealed and still has the force of a statute, this document, then, is stillthe basis of decisions concerning aboriginal title to land in Canada. It is a primary constitutionaldocument that protects aboriginal rights that were later recognized in the 1867 British North AmericaAct (BNA) (now the Constitution Act of 1867).The BNA Act of 1867 created the Dominion of Canada. Section 9 1(24) of the Act specifiedthat the Dominion was to bear responsibility for “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” (quoted inDickason 1992:340). In other words, the section gave the federal government responsibility foradministering aboriginal affairs. By virtue of that section, the Dominion had undertaken to extinguishaboriginal title by means of treaties (Cassidy 1990; Dickason 1992). Therefore, aboriginal title to theland was implicitly recognized. Section 109 of the Act gave jurisdiction and ownership of land andnatural resources to the provinces. Historically, this has been a matter of contention betweenaboriginal peoples and provincial governments in Canada.In 1982, Canada patriated its Constitution and enacted the Constitution Act, 1982 whichrecognized existing aboriginal and treaty rights under Section 35(1) but did not define those rights.Section 37 ofthe Act also committed both the federal and provincial governments of Canada to holda constitutional conference [also known as First Ministers’ Conference (FMC)] whose purpose waspartly to identify and define aboriginal rights. The Conference, which was held in March 1983 and4attended also by First Nation representatives, failed to define those rights (Boldt 1993:287).However, three more dates were proposed for similar conferences. During the course of thefollowing three FMCs (1984, 1985, and 1987), the governments of Canada, on one side, and theaboriginal peoples, on the other, were unable to bridge their different views of ‘existing aboriginal andtreaty rights’ (Cassidy 1990; Boldt 1993).Section 35(1) ofthe 1982 ConstitutionAct and a recent judicial decision in British Columbiahave given aboriginal and treaty rights, as such, a clear legal status in Canadian law. In 1984, RonaldEdward Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band was charged under the Fisheries Act withusing a drift net longer than permitted under the band’s Indian food fishing licence. Sparrow did notdeny the fact, but defended himself against the charge on the grounds that he was exercising anaboriginal right to fish, as guaranteed by the Constitution Act of 1982 under Section 3 5(1) (Usher1991:20). The Supreme Court ofCanada accepted this defence and set aside the original convictionby ruling that the aboriginal right to fish was an existing right which had not been extinguished(Morgan and Thompson 1992:21).The Supreme Court went on to specify that conservation of the resource was of the utmostimportance followed by aboriginal use, and then non-aboriginal use. As noted by Wolfe (1993 :247),the Supreme Court made reference to provincial law, saying that a provincial law, also, will not apply,to the extent that it interferes with an aboriginal right, unless there is a compelling reason for it to doso. An example of a compelling justification would be the need to conserve and manage the fisheriesresource. The Sparrow case helped to define what aboriginal rights entail. Potential implications ofthe Sparrow case are wide ranging for aboriginal rights and responsibilities with respect to land and5resources. For example, the case implies that after the requirement for conservation, any surplus ofwildlife shall be allocated first to meet aboriginal requirements for food. It also implies that aboriginalrights include involvement of aboriginal peoples in the conservation and management of the resource,and include their direct involvement in regulation of resource use (Wolfe 1993:248).Section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act and its interpretation in the Sparrow case, andSection 109 of the 1867 Constitution Act which gave jurisdiction and ownership of land and naturalresources to the provinces, have resulted in many First Nations seeking land claim settlements withsenior levels ofgovernment (federal and provincial). In non-treaty areas such as most parts of BritishColumbia, Northwest Territories and the Maritimes, many First Nations are pursuing“comprehensive” land claims with the governments. In treaty areas such as most parts of Ontario,some First Nations are seeking “specific” land claim settlements. The federal government of Canadahas developed policies to negotiate these claims2.“Comprehensive claims” are those arising in areas where rights of traditional use andoccupancy have not been extinguished by treaty or superseded by law; “specific claims” are those thatconcern obligations (on the part ofthe government) arising out of treaties, Indian acts, or regulations(Dickason 1992:388). Various First Nations are currently negotiating with Canada to have theirrights ofoccupancy, self-government, and self-determination recognized and affirmed (Reed 1995).aboriginal people whose land claims have not been settled contend that they are not just another “usergroup”; they are the original owners of the resources of “their” land (Berkes et at. 1991:17).2 The terminology of land claims is derived from federal policies. Many aboriginal organizations preferto describe their position as “the land question”. They object to the notion of being claimants.Rather, they view the claims process as one of the few mechanisms for implementing theirconstitutionally protected rights.6In the face of this wide range of often conflicting interests involving many non-aboriginalstakeholders on one hand, and First Nations on the other, governments want less conflict and believethat this can be achieved through more collaboration. In particular, governments suspect that bothlocal stakeholders and First Nations can share in the management responsibilities of the line agenciesresponsible for land use and resource management.In the last few years, as a conflict management strategy, governments across Canada havebegun or are in the process of involving local organizations in the management of local resources.In Temagami, northeastern Ontario, a long-standing resource allocation conflict exists primarilybetween Ontario3and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) First Nation and secondarily, betweenOntario and non-aboriginal local stakeholders. Both groups above contend that they have been leftout ofthe decision-making process by the government through its agency responsible for land use andresource management- the Ministry ofNatural Resources (MNR).Since 1987, Ontario has made several attempts to involve both groups above in themanagement of local resources within the Temagami area. Two such initiatives, which are the focusof this study, are: (a) the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC); and (b) the WendabanStewardship Authority (WSA). Both initiatives are described by Ontario as “co-managementarrangements° and have involved several non-aboriginal local stakeholders and the Teme-AugamaFirst Nation, in varying models of”shared decision-making”. Co-management is a term that has beenused by governments to describe a wide array of decision-making arrangements in resourcemanagement between local stakeholders or First Nations and government line agencies. For the mostThroughout this thesis, the term Ontario is used to denote the government of Ontario or the Provinceof Ontario and has been used interchangeably with the term “state”.7part, co-management may be a conflict containment strategy for governments but does not necessarilyinvolve genuine devolution of decision-making authority to local levels. Therefore, co-managementis a process in which citizens are involved in discussions, and may have responsibility forimplementation of decisions; in its strongest form, it involves genuine devolution of decision-makingauthority to local levels but this is not essential to its existence.Since shared decision-making between the state and local organizations is the desired andoverarching feature of co-management, determining the nature and levels of public participation insuch arrangements is important. It is also important to evaluate whether or not the decisions thatemerge from such arrangements are different from those made exclusively by state managementagencies. Furthermore, it is also important to understand the effects of co-management on localresource-use conflicts as well as on social relationships among key actors and local resource users.Distributions of decision-making authority in this study are understood in terms of decision-making dispersal or levels ofpublic participation in real decision-making, and distributions ofauthority. Decision-making dispersal refers to the decentralization of decision-making among actorsand the influence each actor has on final decisions. Knoke (1990) described authority as a form ofpower that involves explicit recognition of the propriety of the arrangement; the arrangement beingbased on the mutual consent of participants. Therefore, authority is understood in this study to belegitimatedpower that parties in co-management mutually recognize and respect. In practical terms,distributions of authority refer to the source and nature ofauthority as well as legitimatedmandatesof the actors. In the context of co-management, authority could serve to advise or to implementdecisions. Therefore, a group can make decisions which it has the power to implement or it can makedecisions about which to advise the state what to do.8Figure 1 describes schematically the interpretation of decision-making authority in this study.In Figure 1, an agency governance structure can be depicted in terms of its authority structure onone hand, and its influence structure on the other. Authority structure refers to the authority role(rights and duties) of the agency’s participants that may be de jure (existing in law) or de facto(existing in reality but not in law). In the context of co-management, dejure authority can serve toimplement decisions by the co-management agency whereas de facto authority can only serve toadvise the state (i.e., the line agency responsible for resource management) what to do. Theinfluence structure refers to the degree of centralization/decentralization within the agency; i.e., thedispersal of influence over decision-making among agency participants.AGENCY GOVERNANCE STRUCFUREArrangements for Making Collective DecisionsAUTHORITY STRUCTURE iNFLUENCE STRUCTUREStipulated Legitimate Power over Actual Distribution of Power overDecision-making Decision-makingI Authority Role Centralization / Decentralization ISource of authority J Decision-makingStipulated mandate dispersalWhere does the authority What are the levels ofto make decisions derive public participation infrom? Does the authority real decision-making? Iscoincide with the mandate? participation meant toIs such authoritydejure or advise or implementdefacto? decisions??Figure 1: Interpretation of “decision-making authority” in this study(Adapted from Knoke 1990, p. 149).9The interpretation of decision-making authority above is particularly relevant to this studybecause it establishes relationships between authority, responsibility and influence on decision-making. Its is argued that any real influence on decision-making under co-management will requirethe delegation of legislative (dejure) authority to local levels by governments. Three theoreticalpropositions were reviewed to help understand the nature of co-management arrangements under thisstudy and their effects on: (a) distributions of decision-making authority; (b) types or substance ofdecisions; (c) social relationships; and (d) conflict resolution. The theoretical propositions, which aredescribed in the next section, are:(i) co-management;(ii) participatory democracy and its application in citizen participation; and(iii) conflict resolution and its relationship to the theory of communicative action.1.2 Theoretical Framework1.2.1 Co-managementOf the general issues in co-management, perhaps the most basic yet also the most complexare the problems of definition and objectives. Pinkerton (1992) defined co-management as power-sharing in the exercise of resource management between a government agency and a community ororganization of stakeholders. This definition fails to define a method ofdetermining how much poweris held by each party in co-management. Review of the literature on co-management [e.g. Jentoft1989; Gardner and Roseland 1989; various authors in Pinkerton 1989a; Pinkerton 1992; Ross andSaunders 1992; 1 revealed a wide range of definitions ranging from consultative processes topartnerships in decision-making. Campbell (1990:3) summarizes his views on the definition of comanagement:10co-management, as we see it in the literature, is a limiting perspective on social participation.It fails to express the flill meaning of power-sharing; co-management is seen as remedialaction to rescue an ailing state management system. In this conceptual framework socialparticipation becomes an instrument managed by the resource agency; participation byresource users, the stakeholders, becomes a means to conservation ends. The perspective ofthe resource community-- its aspirations, goals, difficulties-- though present, is notcompelling.Therefore, although co-management may entail devolution of resource managementresponsibilities from government to local stakeholders, the level of sharing or relinquishing ofdecision-making authority can be contentious. Berkes et al. (1991) argue that a more precisedefinition is probably inappropriate because there is a continuum of co-management arrangementssuch that if modelled on Arnstein’s (1969) “ladder of citizen participation” (Figure 2), levels of comanagement can be depicted as rungs of a ladder with each rung corresponding to the degree towhich citizens share in government decision-making. The upper rungs indicate increasing degreesof real power sharing, in which joint decision-making is institutionalized in a partnership of equals(Berkes etal. 1991).For the purposes of this study, Berkes et al.’s view above is adopted. Therefore, comanagement is defined as a process wherein citizens are involved in resource managementdiscussions, and may have responsibility for implementation of decisions; it its strongest form, itinvolves genuine devolution of decision-making authority to local levels but this is not essential toits existence.118 Citizen controlE Degrees of7 Delegated power citizen power6 Partnership5 Placation Degrees of4 Consultation tokenism3 Informing2 Therapy Non-1 1- participationManipulation _jFigure 2: A continuum of level of co-management on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation(Adapted from Arnstein 1969:217).Co-management has emerged from a variety ofbackground circumstances, generally involvingjurisdictional disputes, shared jurisdiction that is acknowledged, multiple-use conflicts, or significantexternalities (Benidickson 1992). Writing from a fisheries management point of view, Pinkerton(1989b:4) asserts that co-management has emerged in response to conservation crises or governmentinability to handle specific problems-- co-management is seen as a creative way to break the impassein government/fishermen conflicts over the most effective solutions to such crises. Parties to comanagement have sought a variety of objectives, but as summarized by Pinkerton (1989b:5) in thefisheries context, “the benefits sought by one or all of the actors through co-management are moreappropriate, more efficient, and more equitable management°. In addition, there are secondary goals- also benefits in their own way: community-based development; decentralization of decision-making;and mobilization of local consent through the processes of participatory democracy (Pinkerton1989b:5).12From the first set of goals above (appropriate, efficient, equitable management), comanagement is cast as a result-oriented or “outcome” concept while the second set of goals(community-based development, decentralized decision-making, participatory democracy) depict itas a process-oriented or “proceduraP concept. These goals are seen as processes for achieving othergoals as well as ends in themselves.Not surprisingly, the search for standards against which to evaluate the performance of comanagement arrangements remains an uncertain quest. Benidickson (1992) concluded that comanagement appears generically to be a process-type solution to conflicts over resource allocation,and its substantive implications have been assumed or generalized into projections of “moreappropriate, more efficient and more equitable” management. Therefore, the real difficulty with comanagement goals as advanced above lies in the realization that equity may not be efficient andefficiency may not be appropriate (Benidickson 1992). Once it is accepted that trade-offs have to bemade-- often in the context of a declining resource base-- the questions become, how and by whom?This points to the central issues of decision-making structures and processes as well the nature ofrepresentation on co-management bodies. Who makes the decisions and how?4There has been another and more extended debate about the most effective social andinstitutional arrangements to provide for the long-term conservation of resources. Much of thediscussion and related research has been responsive to Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons”,with advocates of private ownership, communal governance, or state regulation each endeavouringto identify the circumstances in which these particular forms of management are more likely topromote conservation ofthe resource base. The authors of a recent assessment of this literature statethat none of these approaches demonstrates unqualified superiority (Feeny et a!. 1990); and they13conclude that “success in the regulation of uses and users is not universally associated with anyparticular type ofproperty-rights regime. Communal property, private property, and state propertyhave all been associated with success and failure” (Feeny et a!. 1990).Since most examples in the literature on co-management deal with fish and wildlife (e.g. Usher1986; Berkes 1986; Pinkerton 1989a; Jentoft 1989; Berkes et a!. 1991), debates on effectiveness ofco-management have evolved around open access issues with proponents arguing that some self-regulation is possible and with opponents countering that the fugitive nature of fish and wildliferesources brings about the open-access problems that Hardin (1968) characterized as the tragedy ofthe commons-- equating open access to communal property. The solution sought by proponentsabove is communal management. However, as Marchak (1987:4) noted, there has to be sufficientinternal organization at the community level to ensure that the resource is managed in sustainableways. Opponents, on the other hand, seek state regulation and/or privatization as managementsolutions.Such debates fail to recognize that co-management is a hybrid management regime or acombination of local-level and state-level management systems (Berkes et a!. 1991:12); decisionmaking is shared between the state and local interests. Furthermore, such debates fail to dealeffectively with the underlying issues of the redistribution of decision-making authority andresponsibility to local levels, as well as questions of equity, social participation, and conflict resolutionin resource management.14The central thesis of this study is that decisions that emerge from state and cooperativemanagement systems are different. This is partly due to different distributions of decision-makingauthority and decision-making arrangements as well as different emphases put on sources ofinformation used in both management systems. One main concern with state management systemsis that decision-making is concentrated in the hands of specialized resource planners at the district andprovincial levels, many of whose abilities are confined by their position in the decision-makinghierarchy. Provincial planning systems conceived at regional levels are not always suitable to localrealities. What works in one place may not necessarily be suitable in another unique or distinctcontext (Jacobs 1988). For example, although timber management planning may address questionsof resource supply, it concentrates on a limited number of land uses and on a limited set of forestvalues (Dunster 1990). This is partly due to the nature of state-level systems which are characterizedby centralized bureaucratic decision-making in which policy momentum and sheer organization sizelimit the ability ofplans to adapt to changing local environments and social conditions (Berkes et al.1991).Usher (1987) noted that state management systems often separate land use planners from theland, which means that control over resources is shifted away from people whose interests, survival,and livelihoods are long-term. One also finds separation between resource managers and resourceusers, legal enforcement of regulations and land ownership, and a strict reliance on science as the soleknowledge base for decision-making. Yet Berkes et al. (1991) argued that most decisions, beingpolitically driven, do not reflect rationaI” science. Armour (1992) compared the conventional orrational and cooperative planning models as follows (Figure 3):15Rational CooperativeFigure 3: A Comparison of the conventional and cooperative planning models (Source: Armour1992:3 3)The basic change needed, as expressed here by Armour (1992), and repeated by other authors(e.g. Usher 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Carpenter and Kennedy 1988; Wondolleck 1988;and Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990), is to transfer authority from the expert decision-maker to userdecision-maker. The cooperative process calls for a movement away from a technocratic model ofplanning to a more participatory, consensual paradigm of practice (Figure 3). This is no easy shift,requiring as outlined above, enormous changes in bureaucratic structures, behaviour and beliefs. Thisnew planning model will need to:• overtly recognize the political, resource allocation dimensions of the decisionsrather than hiding them within technical analyses;• satisfy each interest group that its concerns have been represented, that is, eachgroup must be directly involved;• recognize the limitations of technical expertise and incorporate other methods ofmaking/recognizing value judgements;• accept that citizens are legitimate and empowered actors in the process; and• provide incentives and opportunity for genuine participation. (Wondolleck 1988:53).• centralized decision-makingplanning “for” the people• formalized process with rigidlydefined rules• formal interpersonal relationships• centrality of technical experts• reliance on positivist mode ofinquiryadversarial• decentralized decision-making• planning “with” the people• flexible, adaptive process withrules jointly defined• informal interpersonal relationships• centrality of citizensemphasis on win-lose, minimizecosts• planner as plan-maker andbureaucratic manager• incorporation of phenomenologicalmode of inquiry• consensusemphasis on win-win, maximizejoint gains• planner as facilitator andcollaborator16Given the assumption that the TMrational” and “cooperative” planning/management modelsdescribed above will produce different sets of results, in the context of this study, what is in questionis whether or not co-management initiatives result or have resulted in different distributions ofdecision-making authority and responsibility. What is also in question is whether or not suchinitiatives have resulted in different relationships among co-managers and between co-managers andlocal resource users. Furthermore, whether or not such initiatives result or have resulted in lessconflict is also questioned.When talking about decentralized decision-making or participatory planning rather thanparticipation in planning and decision-making in co-management of natural resources, one beginsto consider the idea ofparticipation in a broader context. Political theory offers valuable insights asto why a more participatory planning and decision-making process would be desirable based ontheories which support a more participatory society in general. The next section reviews the theoryof participatory democracy and its applications in citizen participation.1.2.2 Participatory Democracy and Citizen ParticipationThe principle of democracy states that each individual has an equal right to participate in thedetermination of all social activities in which s/he is engaged (Gould 1981:52). This is an idealdemocracy. Green (1993) contends that such codetermination or common control over social activityonly becomes meaningful if there is also common control over the means and conditions for suchactivities. Green (1993), among others (e.g. Dahl 1989; Keane 1982, 1993; and Markoviã 1993),assert that the means may involve the redistribution of decision-making power. Therefore, an ideal17ofdemocracy might involve codetermination by individuals in all decision-making about economic,social and cultural life. However, defacto democracy today is generally limited to political spheresand then to representative participation.The equal right to participate in social decisions concerning both the activity and the meanshas implications for the form and nature ofthe democratic process. Specifically, it implies that wherefeasible, the form ofdemocratic decision making should be participatory, or as Kochen and Deutsch(1980) put it-- decentralized to lower levels. For where such participation is feasible and anindividual is excluded from such participation, then others are making decisions for that individualand violating the equal right which s/he has to codetermine these decisions. Gould (1981:54)concludes:the realization of equal rights in social decision-making thus requires the extension anddevelopment of participatory processes. What is required is an adequate system ofrepresentation founded on participation at the lower levels; a participatory rather than arepresentative process is the most direct and surest way of taking into account eachindividuaPs choices. Where individuals have participated in the selection of theirrepresentatives or delegates, those representatives would be held accountable to those whomthey represent by regular elections and regular consultations with those whom they represent,as well as by being subject to recall.Participation in this context is not just an adjunct to the democratic system but central to itsestablishment and maintenance (Pateman 1970). This approach clearly distinguishes betweenparticipation in a representative democracy through occasional acts ofvoting for representatives, andparticipatory democracy which is rooted in participative institutions existing throughout society. Amore concrete description states that participatory democracy is characterized as:18• .a decision-making process whereby people propose, discuss, decide, plan, and implementthose decisions that affect their lives. This requires that the decision-making process becontinuous and significant, direct rather than through representatives and organized aroundissues rather than personalities. It requires that the decision-making process be set up in aflinctional manner, so that constituencies significantly affected by decisions are the ones thatmake them and elected representatives can be recalled.... (Benello and Roussopoulos 1971:6).These basic ideals of participatory democracy discussed above are the same foundations forco-management as reflected in its goals. Similarly, co-management has implications for the form andnature of the participation process engaged in by various parties in order to realize those goals.Arnstein (1969) provided a typology of citizen participation arranged in a ladder pattern with eachrung corresponding to the extent of citizen& power in (co)determining a plan or program (Figure 4).This typology is revisited and explained in detail.8 —IDegrees ofF citizen power6 15432_____________________iNon1participationFigure 4: Eight rungs on Amstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Source: Arnstein 1969:2 17).Citizen ControlDelegated PowerPartnershipPlacationConsultationInförningTherapyManipulation19In Figure 4, levels 1 and 2 (manipulation and therapy) represent non-participation techniquesin the sense that the real objective is to educate or win the support of the public while theyrubberstamp decisions already taken by those in power. Arnstein (1969) argued that for manydecision-makers, these are ways to avoid genuine participation. In practice, these types of “nonparticipation” consist ofnaming citizen representatives to advisory committees or organizing culturaland social events. Although level 3 (informing) represents the first step toward legitimate citizenparticipation, it involves a one-way communication from the powerholders to those without powerand with no mechanisms for feedback nor room for negotiating power. Consultation (level 4)without an assurance that citizen concerns will be taken into account is just as good as informing thepublic (when decisions have already been made by those in power); it becomes merely a window-dressing ritual (Arnstein 1969). Therefore, levels 3 and 4 of the scale allow the public to listen andto have a voice. However, public participation can have no effect on the decision if it ends there, forthe public gives advice only and cannot monitor the effect of its advice on the decision (Arnstein1969). In practice, these forms of participation consist of public information through the media,questionnaires and polis, community meetings, and public hearings.At level 5 (Placation), the public begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism isstill apparent. Citizens are appointed to boards with no final decision-making authority. Often thefinal decision-making authority rests with the agency responsible for planning. However, the boardis asked to formally approve those decisions. This still constitutes ‘rubberstamping’, but at a higherlevel. At the next level (Partnership), decision-making power is redistributed through negotiationwith the powerholders. Delegatedpower (level 7) implies that citizens assume dominant decisionmaking responsibility over the plan. Level 8, Citizen control, gives public representatives fulladministrative control; power is delegated to them and they have absolute control over the plan.20Arnstein’s framework above serves a useful purpose in assessing degrees of publicparticipation in co-management arrangements of natural resources. However, Arnstein does notconsider “Consultation” by itself to be a form of participation; the powerholders consult with thepublic after the decision has been made. It is, at most an administrative practice. For Arnstein,participation means power-sharing. For consultation to constitute a form of participation, therefore,it must include monitoring and follow-up, if not subsequent delegation of power- partial, sectorial,or complete (Parenteau 1988).Arnstein’s (1969) framework does not explicitly coordinate participation with decision-makingpower. Parenteau (1988) partly addresses this problem (Figure 5) where he correlates decision-making power with public participation. In his framework, Parenteau demonstrates that as decision-making power of central authorities decreases, public participation increases. In practical terms thisimplies that the more public involvement in real decision-making, the higher or more meaningfulparticipation becomes.Therefore, the highest public participation level is achieved when the public actually assumesdecision-making power and responsibility (Figure 5) and not just participation for the sake of it.According to Parenteau’s (1988) evaluation framework below, the public begin to assume decisionmaking responsibility at the level of”Consultation”. At this level, the problem is submitted, citizens’opinions are heard and taken into consideration in the decision-making process. Here, Parenteauassumes that the citizens have the power to influence decisions of the central authorities sinceconsultation occurs before the decision is made. At the next level, “Cooperation”, limits are defined,and the decisions are shared with and made together with the public (Parenteau 1988). This mode21of decision-making, which calls for consensus-building, takes a long time to reach decisions becausemany interests are involved. However, the decisions reached are likely to be equitable as they wouldbe responsive to local needs. At the level of “Control°, citizens assume total responsibility overdecision-making and have veto power.Decision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation Cooperation olThe decision The decision The problem is The limi3.... The decision isis made and is made and submitted, frdTIed, made by thethe public an effort is opinions-‘ the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvince-” decision is and made of public1.i’c’ made together with responsibilitythe publicPublic participationFigure 5: Levels of decision-making power and public participation on Parenteau’s evaluationframework (Source: Parenteau 1988:7)Note: Figure 5 is Parenteau’s (1988) evaluation framework reproduced in its originalform, While the diagonal line through the figure confuses some readers, it is intendedto illustrate that as the decision-making power of central authorities such as theMinistry ofNatural resources decreases/weakens (top right hand corner), that of localinterests increases/strengthens through meaningful public participation (bottom righthand corner). Conversely, as the decision-making power of central authoritiesincreases/strengthens (top left hand corner), that of local interests decreases/weakens.In view of the subtle dfferences between Arnstein (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988)evaluationframeworks described above, both have been used in this study.22Both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) frameworks above have implications for howco-management is viewed or characterized as a form of participatory or decentralized decision-making process. Do the levels of participation in co-management coincide with the levels of decision-making power as exemplified above? Stakeholder participation in co-management arrangements hasbeen treated in the literature as an end in itself; that is, local involvement in decision making at itsbest. What is also required is to assess actual user involvement, or as Higgelke and Duinker (1993)put it , “participation of the internal publics” in actual decision-making within co-managementarrangements. Therefore, assessment of local involvement in decision-making in co-managementarrangements becomes a two-pronged approach. At one level is stakeholder involvement and at theother level is local user involvement in decision-making. Again, what is in question is whether or notco-management initiatives delegate decision-making authority to local levels, and if so, to whatextent? That is, do senior levels of government retain final authority?In Ontario today, “advisory” or “stakeholder” groups and committees are the most commonform of shared decision-making (Johnson and Duinker 1993). These types of groups can serve avariety ofpurposes for both the organizers and the members. Johnson and Duinker (1993:38) arguedthat it is important when creating or agreeing to be a part of such committees that the objectives ofthe group be clear and known by all those involved. Two Canadian authors, Filyk and Côté (1992),proposed the following list of fi.rnctions that advisory groups can serve. The flinctions are particularlyimportant in evaluating the role of citizens’ advisory groups in co-management. The thnctions are[Filyk and Côté (1992:68)1:23Decision-making functions___________________________• Encourage coordination• Find common ground between competinginterests; conflict resolution• Critique existing policy• Provide new ideas• Provide independent and alternative opinions• Perform special studiesPolitical functions• Serve to test public reaction to policies• Provide a forum for expression of public opinion• Force controversial issues into an objective arena• Placate opposition by involving potential expert criticsin the decision process• Provide publicity and support for programs• Be used for persuasion• Provide a symbolic response to problems• Give a false or misleading impression of addressing problems;known as “window dressing”• Delay action• Serve as patronage instrumentsClearly, some ofthe political functions above are of dubious merit. Regardless, it is importantfor prospective committee members to examine all the functions, both declared and unstated, andwhether the committee structure will lead to a fair sharing of decision-making power. Committeesthat are given at least some degree of real decision-making authority are generally well-balanced fora(Filyk and Côté 1992; Johnston and Duinker 1993). As Johnston and Duinker (1993) further noted,when committees are advisory only, the agency establishing the group will usually determine thescope, membership, and ground rules. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the levels of authorityof advisory groups parading under co-management. On both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s(1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, it is important to determinewhether or not at the level of “Consultation” citizens’ groups have the power to influence thedecisions made under co-management.Citizen participation functions• Education of the public and policyinterpretation• Public participation• Representation of policy interests• Diffusion of responsibilityDemocratization of the bureaucracy• Policy legitimization24As highlighted earlier, co-management may be a conflict containment strategy forgovernments. At its amicable extreme it would entail true devolution of decision-making authoritythereby fostering shared decision-making between governments and local stakeholders. Actualsharing of decision-making can only take place if there is also shared understanding and cooperationamong parties involved. The theory of communicative action and its application to conflict resolutionoffers some insights into how that shared understanding and cooperation can take place. This isdiscussed in the next section.1.2.3 Conflict Resolution and Communicative ActionConflict exists when activities are incompatible or are perceived to be incompatible. Deutsch(1973) says that an action is incompatible when it prevents, obstructs, interferes with, or impairsanother action, or in other ways makes the other action ineffective. Anstey (1991) defines conflictas... “conflict exists in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achievedsimultaneously, or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests; and purposefully employtheir power in an effort to defeat, neutralize or eliminate each other to protect or further theirinterests in the interaction”.Both definitions above are useful and applicable to this study in that they do not confuseconflict with competition. Some theorists (e.g. Pfeffer 1981) have equated conflict with competition,as if all conflict is a win-lose struggle-- this is destructive conflict. Although individuals incooperative settings also conflict, e.g., they could disagree over the best ways to achieve their goalsand/or over the distribution of the benefits and costs of their joint action, their main goal is to achieve25mutual gain-- this is productive conflict. This study is concerned with productive conflict becausethis perspective of conflict is particularly meaningftil in discussions of co-management whose basicpremises are cooperative decision-making and action to resolve conflicts and arrive at mutuallyacceptable solutions over the use of Crown lands4The intractability of planning and allocation conflicts in resource management has led to acritique of the assumptions of the progressive movement; assumptions “characterized by a belief inthe neutrality of science and the confidence that knowing the facts was sufficient to resolve mostpublic policy disputes” (Brown and Harris 1992). As highlighted earlier, clearly this technical-expertmodel as practiced by the state/industry is viewed by the public as neither adequate nor acceptable.The public contend that existing distributions of decision-making authority as well as costs andbenefits are inequitable and unsustainable. Therefore, local involvement in resource managementdecision-making is seen by some as an attempt to complement both scientific and local knowledgewith each other (Usher 1986; 1987) for mutual gains, and also to redistribute decision-makingauthority as well as costs and benefits in more equitable and sustainable ways.At the core of the cooperative or co-management arrangements is the search for consensusin decision-making at best, or at least, avoidance of insolvable user conflicts. The cooperativeplanning model described by (Armour 1992) is rooted in the same soil as the Harvard NegotiationProject, the strategies of gaining mutually acceptable agreements- the win-win solution. Fisher andUry (1981) and Ury et al. (1988) put forward three generalized negotiation strategies: a) the usualThe term “Crown land” refers to all public lands held by provincial and federal governments inCanada, including lands under water. Crown lands in Canada constitute about 94% of the total landarea.26hard, °beat ‘em up” approach that focuses exclusively on power relationships; b) the soft, collapseapproach where the negotiator wants to avoid conflict and so makes concessions readily in order toreach agreement; and c) the method ofprincipled negotiation whose essence is joint problem-solvingand the search for mutually acceptable solutions. Since one of the goals of co-management is theacceptable resolution of conflict, principled negotiation may be a suitable method for resolving thoseconflicts. From the work ofFisher and Ury (1981) flow suggestions for conducting negotiations sothat achievement of mutually acceptable solutions is more likely:• don’t bargain on positions;• separate the people from the problem;• focus on interests not positions;• invent options for mutual gain;• expand the pie before cutting it;• identi1y shared interests;• don’t attack their position, look behind it; and• don’t defend your ideas, invite criticism and advice.The theory of communicative action throws some light on how communication orientedtowards reaching understanding can foster cooperation and conflict resolution among participants aswell as coordination of their actions. Habermas (1979: 1) characterized conflict, as a form of socialaction, to be a derivative of action oriented to reaching understanding. Habermas (1984a) calledaction oriented towards shared understanding “communicative action”, and in the following definitionwe find both the mode of its action orientation and coordination specified:communicative action is that form of social interaction in which the plans of action ofdifferent actors are coordinated through an exchange of communicative acts, that is throughuse of language (or corresponding non-verbal expressions) oriented towards reachingunderstanding” (Habermas 1982:234).27To reach understanding means here that the partners in interaction set out, and manage, toconvince each other through exchange of validity claims, so that their action is coordinated on thebasis ofmotivation through reason. Validity claims, according to Habermas (1984a), are criticizableclaims raised by partners in interaction, and his conclusion here is that only speech acts with whichthe speaker presents criticizable validity claims have action-coordinating effects. This implies that:(a) the speaker must choose a comprehensible expression so that speaker and listener canunderstand one another (comprehensibility);(b) the speaker must have the intention of communicating a true proposition so that the listenercan share the knowledge of the speaker (truth);(c) the speaker must want to express his/her intentions truthfully so that the listener can believethe utterance of the speaker (can trust himlher) (truthfulness); and(d) the speaker must choose an utterance that is right so that the listener can accept the utteranceand speaker and listener can agree with one another in the utterance with respect to arecognized normative background (rightness). (Habermas 1979:2).The goal of coming to an understanding is to bring about an agreement that terminates inreciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Thus incommunicative action, the coordination of actions is based on ‘the participants’ own fallibleaccomplishments of reaching understanding. This implies that validity claims offered by participantscan be discussed, and confirmed or rejected, Such a discourse, according to Habermas (1984b), canlead to a ‘true’ consensus rather than just a forced one or one which is proclaimed only for the sakeof peace. Raising claims implies the possibility that they can, if need be discussed and this again,implies that in principle this discussion can take place in an ‘ideal speech situation’ which ischaracterized by, according to Brand (1990), a symmetrical distribution of chances to engage in it forall participants in discourse. As Habermas says:28now turns out to be the case that the model of pure communicative action does not onlyrequire, as shown, the possibility of discourse but rather that, conversely, the possibilities ofdiscourse cannot be conceived of independently from the conditions for pure communicativeaction These determinations mutually interpret each other and define together a form oflife which gives validity to the maxim that, when we engage in communication to conduct adiscourse, and continue this only long enough, a consensus must come about which is, by itsnature, a true consensus” (Habermas 1979:13 9).For Habermas, communicative action is more than just a process of reaching agreement onindividual claims; it is also an activity in which the participants develop, confirm, and renew theirmemberships in social groups and their own identities (Habermas 1984b:139). He specifies thefunctions of communicative action as follows:“Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding, communicative action serves totransmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of coordinating action, it servessocial integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally, under the aspect of socialization,communicative action serves the formation of personal identities” (Habermas 1984b:137)As pointed out earlier, the main premises of co-management are shared decision-making, codetermining actions and resolving resource allocation conflicts through shared understanding andcoordinated actions. Parties involved bring to the table their validity claims that are often focusedon their particular interest. Those claims have to be discussed until there is mutual agreement or trueconsensus. That is, participants have to suppose that their claims can be vindicated or redeemed. Thenature and form of discussion pursued by participants becomes critical in co-managementarrangements because the parties involved often have divergent views about the situation and toconverge such views into a common understanding and a mutually agreed upon solution can be aformidable task. This underscores the need for conflict resolution in co-management in order toachieve mutual understanding and cooperation among parties involved in co-management.29Fisher and Ury (1981) and Ury et a!. (1988) suggest that if the process is designed to becompetitive in nature, then parties involved are likely to dig into and focus on their positions ratherthan interests; thereby holding to their validity claims as uncriticizable. But if the process is designedto be cooperative, there is a likelihood that a true consensus may emerge (Ury et al. 1988). This callsfor conflict resolution mechanisms that can foster mutual understanding and coordinated action whilestill being able to preserve individual identities ofparticzpants in co-management arrangements. Thelatter point is important in co-management discussions in that participants still have to be accountableto their constituencies.The theory of communicative action as discussed above gives some insights into strategiesnecessary for resolving local resource-use conflicts; the common dilemma in co-managementarrangements. The theory of communicative action is linked to conflict resolution by the same tenetsexpounded by Habermas above. The tenets include: exchange ofvalidity claims among participants;participants’ recognition that their validity claims are criticizable; and the need for consensus andmutual understanding as a basis for cooperation.We saw that in Habermas’ view, communicative action serves three functional aspects: a)mutual understanding (to transmit and renew cultural knowledge); b) coordinating action (servessocial integration and the establishment of solidarity); and c) socialization (serves the formation ofpersonal identities) (Habermas 1984b: 137). For the purpose of analysis of conflict resolutionstrategies and outcomes of co-management initiatives, I have collapsed the above features suggestedby Fisher and Ury and by Habermas into three main principles: inclusion; respect and trust; andcooperation. These are some of the overarching features anticipated to be found in these newagencies, initiated as experiments in finding better ways of resolving conflicts over the use of Crownlands.30These principles are differentially relevant to the three groups involved in conflict- users,agency, and state. The principle of inclusion refers both to the structure (representation) of the newagencies and to their consultative processes. Therefore, it applies to both the internal operation ofthe agency and representation of user groups. The principle of respect and trust refers both to theoperating procedures within the agency and also to its relationships with users and with the state.It applies to the internal operations of the agency, the relationship between agency and state, agencyand user group and state and user group.The principle of cooperation refers to joint problem-solving opportunities created by thevarious actors in co-management (e.g. the state, local stakeholder groups, and local users).Cooperation is demonstrated in the cooperative behaviours among the actors in co-management inthe performance of all or some management thnctions and how joint performance is coordinated. Thenext section outlines the research problem in light of the theories discussed above.1.3 Problem StatementAlthough previous research in co-management has focused on the evolution of several comanagement agreements, few researchers have evaluated performance (Berkes et at. 1991). Fewerhave examined the decision-making structures and processes of such management arrangements.Thus the role of co-management in conflict resolution, its impacts on social relationships amongactors, and on distributions of decision-making authority at local levels are not well understood.31In addition, the centrality of aboriginal people in such arrangements is commonplace in theliterature on co-management [e.g., see the examples in Pinkerton (1989a)] as opposed to thoseinvolving non-aboriginal people. This is not to suggest that all co-management experience has beenconfined to aboriginal communities, but co-management agreements involving aboriginal users havebeen fairly common. These have several distinctive features, the most noteworthy of which is thechallenge of reconciling divergent philosophical perspectives in decision-making structures(Benidickson 1992). Similarly, although there may be examples of co-management arrangementsdesigned to deal comprehensively with a range of resources within a defined area, these appear to beless common than agreements that attempt to regulate a single sector-- fish, lobsters, or wildlife-- forexample. Both cases in this study deal with management for a range of resources and involve bothaboriginal and non-aboriginal people.While on the surface, resource management problems appear to be biophysical, they aremanifestations of social conflict (Chambers 1992). Such conflict derives primarily from inequalitiesin distributions of decision-making authority and responsibility as well as inequities in the distributionsof costs and benefits among interested parties (Chambers 1992). Since conflict in resourcemanagement may lead to polarized relationships among various resource-use interests and inevitablythwart the stated management goals, researching and understanding the nature of decision-makingstructures and processes of co-management institutions and their outcomes at local levels areimportant. Such understanding may have implications for mitigating potential resource-use conflictsand the restructuring ofmanagement institutions in the thture in order to meet the stated managementgoals and be responsive to local needs.321.4 Research Questions and ObjectivesThe four basic research questions addressed by this study are:1) How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to locallevels?;2) How has co-management changed the substance of resource management decisions at locallevels?;3) How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actorsand local resource users?; and4) How has co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?The research objectives are summarized as follows:1) to describe both historical and current distributions of decision-making authority between thestate and local stakeholders;2) to describe the effects of co-management on the substance of decisions;3) to analyze the effects of co-management on social relationships (mutual understanding andcooperation) among key actors and local resource users; and4) to investigate the extent to which co-management has facilitated resolution of local resourceuse conflicts among key actors and local resource users.331.5 OrganizationThis thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the research methodologyemployed in this study. The Chapter provides a justification for using the case study method anddescribes the techniques used in data collection and analysis. Chapter 2 also introduces thebackground to the study area by describing the nature of conflict in the Temagami Area from bothaboriginal and multi-stakeholder dimensions. It also describes in detail the two cases under study:the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC); and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA).Chapters 3 and 4 present the results of this study based on the research questions andobjectives contained in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 provides both historical and current overviews on thedistributions of decision-making authority based on two attributes: decision-making distribution(public participation and influence on decisions) and authority distribution (sources of decision-making power and stipulated mandates). Chapter 4 builds on the last Chapter and examines thesubstance of decisions in the Temagami Area from both historical and current contexts. Chapter 4also explains the nature of social relationships among the key players in co-management: thesponsors; the agencies; and local resource users. The relationships are described along three mainprinciples of inclusion, respect and trust, and cooperation. The Chapter also discusses the findingpertaining to the role of co-management in the resolution of local resource-use conflicts in theTemagami Area. Chapter 5 contains the summary and conclusions of the study and it discusses boththe practical and theoretical implications of this study findings.34CHAPTER 2METHODOLOGYThis section outlines the justification for the case study approach, the methodologies used indata collection, data analysis, and data evaluation. Field data collection methods have been reviewedby the Research Ethics Committee at the University of British Columbia. In order to uphold theconfidentiality of all respondents, their names have been coded to maintain anonymity. Members ofboth the Comprehensive Planning Council and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (the two casestudies) were provided with copies of this study findings for their review and comments in order toenhance the construct validity of the study as suggested by Yin (1988:145), Miles and Huberman(1994:275), and Wolcott (1994:3 53).2.1 Justification for the Case Study MethodThis thesis uses the case study method to evaluate the effects of co-management ondistributions of decision-making authority, the substance of decisions, social relationships among keyactors and local resource users, and conflict resolution. Two cases, both located in Temagami,northeastern Ontario, have been examined in light of the research questions and objectives of thisstudy. According to Yin (1988:13), case studies are the preferred method to conduct research underthe following conditions:(a) when “how” or “why” questions are being posed;(b) when the investigator has little control over events; and(c) when the focus is on a contemporary event within some real-life context.35The case study method is appropriate to this research as the previously stated objectivesconcur with the three conditions outlined above:1. This thesis has focused on addressing:(a) how co-management has affected the distributions of decision-making authority atlocal levels;(b) how co-management has changed the substance or types of resource managementdecisions at local levels;(c) how co-management has affected mutual understanding and cooperation among keyactors and local resource users; and(d) how co-management has affected local resource-use conflicts;2. The study of co-management or distributions of decision-making in the TemagamiArea requires an examination ofboth historical and presently occurring events that theinvestigator (author) has had no control over; and3. While this thesis has endeavoured to review the history of past resource managementin the Temagami Area to understand how current management systems have evolved,evaluation ofthe performance of current management systems necessitates a focus oncontemporary events-- the two co-management initiatives.362.2 Limitations and ScopeResearch of this nature crosses many disciplines and it may be appropriate to set out thelimitations and scope of this study. This study identifies the key characteristics of institutional designsin co-management arrangements of natural resources that are likely to assist or inhibit local decision-making, resolution of local resource-use conflicts, and social relationships among actors. Theliterature on which this study is based draws from several sources including co-management,democratic theory and its applications in citizen participation, and the application of communicativeaction in conflict resolution. The study does not specifically address the many other socio-economic,biophysical, legal, political, planning, and cultural dimensions related to the study.Although the author spent two summers (eight months) working in the area prior to datacollection, actual data collection on the two cases was done over a period of four months. Multiplesources of data collection were used including semi-structured interviews, transient observation andsecondary data sources. However, according to Murphy (1980), transient observation has itslimitations in the sense that:a) the researcher can’t observe things in the past or be in more than one place at a time toobserve current program activities;b) observing, like interviewing, is usually subject to the “Hawthorne Effect”5 and researcher’sown bias as an observer;“Hawthorne Effect’ means a source of bias caused by the subject’s reaction to the presence of theanalyst whereby the subject either acts in ways that are not normal or provides answers that do notreflect his true views. The term comes from a famous experiment in the 1 930s that examined thefactors affecting worker productivity in the Hawthorne plant. (Murphy 1980:66).37c) a transient observer has little time to develop trust and become a part of the group; andd) it is easy to misinterpret observed behaviour if the researcher does not ask subjects about itsmeaning.Finally, although this study is a microstudy in a particular ecological and cultural region, somegeneralizations have been made to similar regions in Canada where co-management has been appliedor is being contemplated. Therefore, the results of this study have been generalized to theoreticalpropositions on co-management of natural resources between governments and local communitiesacross Canada. A very important limitation in this study, however, is that bothcases in this study have been operational for less than five years, a period that may not be sufficientto evaluate fully a policy initiative. In particular, the full impact of socio-economic and biophysicalconcerns may not yet be realized.Although the comprehensive planning process was initiated seven years ago, the process washeld up for two-and-half years due to other responsibilities conferred upon the CPC/CPP by theMinister ofNatural Resources. Such responsibilities involved: (a) the design and administration ofthe public participation process pertaining to treaty negotiations between the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai First Nation and Ontario; and (b) the preparation of interim and contingency timbermanagement plans. In the same vein, while the Wendaban Stewardship Authority has completed itsmanagement plan, the Comprehensive Planning Council is still in the process of doing so. Thisfurther limits comparative analysis between the two cases.Despite these limitations, multiple sources of data were used. This allowed the author tocross-check and corroborate the data with different sources and account for past events. Feedback38on earlier drafts of this thesis was also sought from members of the two organizations under studyin order to clarifj issues, eliminate errors, and reduce the author’s own bias. The “Hawthorne Effect”was fhrther minimized through close relationships developed between the author and the subjectsduring the eight months that the author worked in the area prior to field interviews. The semi-formalstructure of interviews was intended to put subjects at ease. Probing questions were also developedand administered to subjects during field interviews in order to clarify meanings and avoidmisinterpretations of observed behaviour by the investigator.Despite the short time involved during which the two cases have been operational, thisresearch focuses on decision-making structures and processes as well as social relationships amongactors in co-management rather than on socio-economic and biophysical impacts. The former twoattributes can easily be evaluated within a five-year time frame. For all the above reasons, thisresearch is still worthwhile since it focuses mainly on institutional designs in co-management and theirimpact on social relationships and conflict resolution. These are key components currently not well-understood in co-management.2.3 Data CollectionData were gathered over a period offour months during the summer of 1994. The four mainresearch questions highlighted earlier, guided data collection for this study. Multiple sources wereused. Primary data were compiled on the basis of information generated through semi-structuredinterviews and through transient observation. The semi- structured interviews were both open-endedin nature (to encourage a conversational tone) and focused (following a checklist of key questions-39see Appendix 1). Transient observation refers to a process where the observer or researcher observeswithout disguise, is clearly an outsider, and, is faced with tight time constraints to actively participatein the life of the program and observe day-to-day activities (Murphy 1980:112). Therefore, thetransient observer uses all her/his senses as s/he interviews subjects, roams the halls, and generallyhangs around (Murphy 1980:112).Secondary data sources included minutes, administrative documents, letters, and memorandaof both organizations, government reports and news briefs, as well as newsclippings. Fivecategories of interviews were administered (Appendix 1). Table 1 shows the number of respondentsby interview category and total number of questions. Although the majority of interview questionslisted in Appendix 1 were prepared prior to fieldwork, several questions were added to the interviewschedules while in the field as follow-up questions or probes. This was done to clarifj and elaborateon some key issues raised by the respondents. The additional interview questions are indicated in“italics0 in Appendix 1.40Table 1: Number of respondents interviewed in each interview category and total number ofinterview questions.Interview Category of Total Number Total Number4Category Respondents ofRespondents ofQuestionsStaff of the Ministry ofNatural 5 29Resources - Temagami District.[respondents coded as 1A-1E]2 Members of the Wendaban 21 65Stewardship Authority (10) and theComprehensive Planning Council (11)- the two case studies[respondents coded as 2A-2U]3 Members of the Ontario Native 4 38Affairs Secretariat (2 members) andthe Teme-Augama Anishnabai FirstNation (2 members) - [these are theestablishing agencies that created bothorganizations in category 2 above].[respondents coded as 3A-3D]4 Members of the public who 39 38participated in both theComprehensive Planning Council andthe Wendaban Stewardship Authorityplanning processes.[respondents coded as 4A-4AM]5 Key informants who must have 5 18resided in the area for not less than 5years and who were outspoken in thecommunity as knowledgeable onissues in the area.[respondents coded as 5A-5E]Totals 74 188The total number of questions asked across the five interview categories varies because in some cases, thequestions were not relevant to certain respondent categories. Although the total number of interview questionsabove is shown as 188, the actual total of individual interview questions was 72. The total of 188 simply showsthat several individual questions were repeated across the five respondent categories (see Appendix 1).412.4 Data AnalysisThis study employed multiple analytic strategies and techniques including data displays, matrixbuilding, and frequency tabulations. These techniques have been recommended by Miles andHuberman (1984, 1994) as effective in qualitative data analysis. However, the general analyticstrategy has been guided by the main research questions that led to this study. In turn, the mainresearch questions led to formulation of interview questions that guided data collection. From theresponses to the interview questions, it was possible to draw main categories into which data(responses) were placed. This approach has been suggested as a preferred strategy by Yin (1988).The approach makes it possible to discriminate among the data and select those data that directlyaddress the main research questions and place them into the main categories emerging from thequestions of the study and the data themselves.Final data analysis was performed using “pattern matching”, a strategy suggested by Yin(1988:109), Dey (1993:47), and Wolcott (1994:33) for identifring associations among differentvariables. Once the data were classified, it was possible to examine for regularities, variations, andsingularities (outliers) within the data. It became apparent prior to data analysis that the interviewquestions (and their responses) were too numerous for meaningful analysis. Therefore, out of thetotal number of 72 interview questions, only data pertaining to 35 questions were analyzed in thisstudy (Table 2). The 35 questions were selected on the basis that they addressed directly the mainresearch questions of this study. The 35 questions are highlighted in “bold” in Appendix 1.42Table 2: Total number of interview questions analyzed and left out of the analysis in this study.Main Research Question Number of Interview Questions Total # ofInterviewAnnotated, Annotated,5 Probes6 Questionscategorized categorized but [annotated,& analyzed not analyzed categorized butnot analyzed]1. How has co-management affected 7 6 4 17the distributions of decision-making authority at local levels?2. How has co-management changed 11 11 7 29the substance or types of resourcemanagement decisions at locallevels?Sub-totals 18 17 11 463. How has co-management affected 9 2 3 14mutual understanding andcooperation among key actors andlocal resource users?4. How co-management affected local 8 2 2 12resource-use conflicts?Sub-totals 17 4 5 26Totals 35 21 16 72These interview questions were administered for the purpose of gaining an in-depth understanding of each caseunder study.6 These probing questions were developed while in the field and included in the interview schedules in order to seekclarification from respondents on specific issues.43Although the other questions (in normal text- in Appendix 1) including those developed inthe field (in italics- in Appendix 1) were left out in the final analysis, this is not to suggest that theywere discarded. Responses to these questions were annotated and categorized for reference in theoverall explanation building on each case study. In other words, a full comprehension of the datawas felt necessary and has been preserved throughout the study. Actual data pertaining to mainresearch questions #1 and #2 are displayed in Appendix 2. Data pertaining to main researchquestions #3 and #4 are displayed in Appendix 3.For the purposes of evaluation, research questions #1 and #2 were analyzed together sincethey both pertain to decision-making (i.e., distributions of decision-making authority and substanceof decisions). Similarly, research questions #3 and #4 were analyzed together as they are bothconcerned with social relationships (i.e., mutual understanding, cooperation, and conflict resolution).Both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) evaluation frameworks were used to gauge the levelsof public participation and decision-making in the agencies’ (MNR and the two co-managementorganizations) management processes.442.5 Background to the Study AreaTemagami is a small rural town located in northeastern Ontario on Trans-Canada Highway11, 90 km north ofNorth Bay and about 60 km south of the Tn-towns (Haileybury, New Liskeard,Cobalt) (Figure 6). The official Township of Temagami has a population of 1,137 and is made upofthree geographically separated residential areas or townsites6. These townsites are known as thevillage, Temagami North, and the Mime townsite. The village is the oldest residential area of thetown and is also the commercial and workplace centre of the town. Temagami North was createdin the 1960’s when Sherman Mine came to Temagami. It is now the largest residential area of thetown (approximately 60% of the town residents live there) although contains only a variety store andan arenalcommunity hail in terms of amenities.The Milne townsite is a small residential area (approximately 3.5% of the town or 40 peoplelive there) near the now defunct lumber mill where a small number of those who worked at WilliamMilne and Sons Lumber Company still live. The Milne townsite is located about 1.5 km north onTrans-Canada Highway 11 from the village as compared to Temagami North which is approximately5 km north ofthe village. Also included within the Township boundaries are parts of the hub ofLakeTemagami which include the northeast arm of the lake and Temagami Island (Hodgins andBenidickson 1989). In addition, there is the Lake Temagami Access Road (or locally referred to asMine Road) which is about 6.5 km south of the village. This is the road used by the residents ofBear Island Reserve, the permanent lake residents (who live on the lake all year round) and thesummer cottagers to access the lake and the mainland throughout the year.6 Unless otherwise stated, the information that is contained in this section was attained by talking topeople in Temagami or through my own field note observations.45Figure 6: Maps showing the location of Temagami in northeastern Ontario, Canada (Adapted from MNR 1985)Ternagami District46The commercial and governmental sectors within the town comprise the primary activities ofthe local economy. Until 1990, the town of Temagami’s economy rested largely on the resource-based industries of forestry and mining. However, these industries collapsed with the closure of boththe William Mime and Sons Lumber Company and Sherman iron mine in 1990. Currently the largestemployers in the town are the Temagami District Office of the Ontario Ministry ofNatural Resources,the public school, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the Municipal Town Office. Other employersand commercial operations in the town include various tourist-oriented operations including a marina,15 fishing and hunting outfitters, five (5) youth camps, two (2) commercial fly-in services, three giftstores, and a gasoline/propane station [MNR n.d. (c)].In terms of its natural setting, the town ofTemagami is located within a forested region. Theforests of Temagami occur at the boundary of the Boreal Forest and Great Lakes - St. LawrenceForest Regions (Rowe 1972). Therefore, the Temagami forests take their mixed structure, mostlycomposed of white pine, red pine, jack pine, black spruce, white spruce, birch, poplar, maple, andoak, from both the Boreal and Great Lakes - St. Lawrence forests. A small part in the northeastportion ofthe Temagami Planning Area7 occurs on the Little Clay Belt section of the Great Lakes -St. Lawrence Forest Region. Most ofthe agricultural activity in the area is confined to this clay beltwhich covers the communities of Cobalt, Haileybury, and New Liskeard (also known as the Tn-townarea) (Figure 6).The Temagami Planning Area specifically refers to a land management area of the Ministry ofNaturalResources ofwhich the town and surrounding region of Temagami is a part. This area now coincideswith the lands under the Comprehensive Planning Council and is sometimes referred to as “TemagamiComprehensive Planning Area47Outside the township boundaries is Bear Island, one of Temagami’s neighbouringcommunities. Bear Island is the home ofthe Teme-Augama Anishnabai (Deep Water People). Oftenthey are referred to as the “Temagami Indians” or the Bear Island Band. Bear Island is an IndianReserve of285 hectares with a population of 150 people. These comprise the “Status Indians”8. Inaddition, as of 1993, there were 1,550 Teme-Augama Anishnabai people who lived off the BearIsland Reserve in neighbouring communities (TAA 1994). Members of the Bear Island Reserve andthose who live off the Reserve together comprise the Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation. TheTAA are of Ojibway descent and have been asserting rights to their homeland for over 114 years(Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat 1991). This has created conflicts between the TAA First Nationand the government of Ontario. The history and nature of this conflict is discussed later.Other important neighbouring communities are the islands on Lake Temagami. The summercottagers and permanent lake residents (i.e., those who live on the lake all year round) live on islandslocated on Lake Temagami. In addition, there are five summer camps on the lake, three ofwhich areAmerican and two Canadian. The number of permanent residents who live on the lake all year longis small. There are currently 12 families that live on the lake all year. They are represented by theLake Temagami Permanent Residents’ Association (LATEMPRA) established in the mid 1980’s(Hodgins and Benidickson 1989; Shute 1993). The association is largely a ratepayer organizationfor permanent residents (Shute 1993).8 This term derives from federal policies and the Indian Act which classi1’ aboriginal peoples as statusor non-status Indians. Status Indians are those registered with the Department of Indian Affairs andlive on Reserve; non-status are those who are not registered and live off Reserve.48In addition to those who live on the lake all year are summer residents who own cottages onthe lake. There are 54 island lake communities with a total of 750 cottages on Lake Temagami(Temagami News Association 1994:45). Lake communities are islands on Lake Temagami wherecottage residences are located9. Approximately half of all summer cottagers are American citizens.Ofthe Canadian cottagers the majority are from southern Ontario. Since 1931, the cottagers on thelake formed the Temagami Lakes Association (TLA) through which their needs and concerns havebeen represented and voiced within the area (Sinclair 1992). The TLA membership as of June 1994was 1,344 (Temagami News Association 1994:54).In a survey of cottage expenditures on Lake Temagami for 1993, it was estimated that theTLA members spent an estimated $7,000,000 in the area (Temagami Times 1994:10). Theseexpenditures, which excluded property and school taxes, included: property maintenance (42%); boatmaintenance, purchases, storage and car parking (24%), groceries and beverages (9%); propane,gasoline, electric and telephone (9%); appliances and furniture (9%); and insurance (7%) (TemagamiTimes 1994:10). The TLA’s contribution to the Temagami economy was estimated at over 25% ofannual revenues (Temagami Times 1994:10).Before 1971, the TLA served largely as a ratepayer organization. Subsequently, concerns bysummer residents about the impact of the mining and forestry industries, and fears about futuresubdivision projects and further road building, created a sense of alarm among them (Hodgins andBenidickson 1989:25 1). The residents perceived the above activities to have severe environmentalconsequences that would affect them. This led in 1971 to the election of a new board of directorsCottages are restricted to the islands on Lake Temagami. Cottage building has not been allowed onthe mainland because of the danger of fire to the forest.49ofthe TLA determined to have influence in the land use planning discussions for the area (Hodginsand Benidickson 1989, Sinclair 1992). Hodgins (1990:129) described the new leadership of theassociation as “youngish Canadian and American environmental activists, acid-rain opponents, andproponents of back-country-oriented youth camps”. The TLA ceased primarily to be a ratepayerorganization; it became sophisticated, and it was well connected to all three political parties in Ontario(Hodgins 1990:129). The TLA has since become a major political force on land use discussions inthe area.Of significance to the Temagami area is the provincial park system. These parks haveattracted tourists from all over the world particularly in the summer season. There are currently seven(7) provincial parks within the Temagami Planning Area: four (4) Waterway Parks; two (2)Recreation Parks; and one (1) Wilderness Park. Relevant to this study is the Wilderness Park- theLady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park (LESWP) which has been at the centre of controversyin the area. Wilderness parks are substantial areas where the forces of nature are permitted tofUnction freely and where visitors travel by non-mechanized means and experience expansive solitude,challenge, and personal integration with nature [MNR n.d. (b): 1]. In 1972, the Lady Evelyn Riverwas designated as a Wild River Provincial Park in order to preserve the semi-wilderness qualities ofthe river course (MNR 1978). The park was designated a new status as a Wilderness Park in 1983covering an area of 72,400 hectares. This designation sparked controversy between the MNR andlocal communities as it curtailed pre-existing uses including trapping, hunting, mining, and alsorestricted mechanized access. The nature of this conflict is discussed later.50For the purposes of this study, the study area, which encompasses the Bear Island Reserve,the towns Temagami, Latchford, Cobalt, Haileybury, New Liskeard, and Elk Lake is collectivelyreferred to as the ‘Temagami area community’. As defined here, the geographic area of this‘community’ coincides with the TAA land claim boundary (Figure 7) to which the TAA refers as“nDald Menan” (our homeland). Members of the ‘Temagami area community’ derive their culturalidentity, political values, spirituality, subsistence and economic livelihood from living and usingresources within n’Daki Menan.Some demographic statistics and community services found in this ‘community’ are shown inTables 3 and 4, respectively. Of notable importance in Table 3 are the high rates of populationdecline since 1986 and current unemployment. The unemployment rates in these communities arehigher than the Ontario average of 7% in 1994. Both the population decline and high unemploymentrates could be attributed to the closure of the Sherman Mine and the William Milne and Sons LumberCompany in 1990. Both companies were the major employers in the area prior to their closure. Alsonotable in Table 3 is the unemployment rate at Bear Island Reserve which is higher than in any of thecommunities. The TAA have always argued that they have not had a fair share of the resources fromwithin n’Daki Menan (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). In particular, there have been no directtimber allocations granted by the IvINR to Bear Island despite the existence of a portable mill there.Table 4 also shows the general lack of both medical and recreational facilities in the area. Thecommunities of Latchford and Bear Island have fewer community services than the rest of thecommunities in Table 4 due to a general lack of investment or economic opportunities in bothcommunities. The next section reviews the nature of conflict in the “Temagami area community”.51ROADHOUSEFigure7:MapshowingtheTMlandclaimboundary(n’DakiMenan),ComprehensivePlanningArea,andtheWSAPlanningArea.(Source:MNRI994b)lw<cDZ’DJGISGOODSHAER•s,HAMMELI1020km©OntarioScaleTemagamiDistrictMarch1994AFTONMCBETHMcI%HPARDOHOBBSLEGENDN’DakiMenanDistrictBoundariesCrownManagementUnitBoundariesComprehensivePlanningAreaBoundariesProvincialParkBoundaries‘—MunicipalBoundariesProposedTema-AugamaAnishnabaiDevelopmentLandsProposedLakeTemagamiSharedStewardshipBodyWendabanStewardshipAuthorityAreaofAdjacentInfluenceIaJAI’Sq..McCALLUMSISK(DANAKENNYRTENRIVMcWILLLAMS$‘A.-a---THISTLEr<.McLAREN‘1HENRYCREt\dJAJNIsfRIVERV1.1EV(BASTEDOIZZ7HUGEL-ADGEROViFIELD*zzDi,st1,ctNorth1MinistryofNaturalResources52Table 3: Community Profiles of the ‘Temagami Area Community’.Community Population % decline % % Employed in Resource % Employed in(1994) (1986-94) unemployed Extraction Industry Manufacturing Industiy(a)Bearlsland 150 6.7 54.5 12.0 18.2(b) Temagami 1 137 14.3 15.4 9.5 16.0(c)Latchford 327 17.9 51.3 31.25 0.0(d)Cobalt 1 640 20.0 14.5 17.0 11.6(e)Haileybury 4 820 2.4 13.7 14.8 11.0(f)NewLiskeard 5 286 5.6 8.5 4.6 12.0(g)ElkLake 583 5.8 8.8 25.9 27.6Table 4: Community Services within the ‘Temagami Area Community’.Community Bank Church Dentist Doctor School School Hospital! Lawyer Library Police TheatreK-G8 G9-13 ClinicBear Island / I / / ITemagami / / / / / /Latchford /Cobalt / hi I / I / /Haileybury / / / / / / / /NewLiskeard / hi / / / / / / / / /ElkLake / / / / /Sources: a) Bear Island Community Profile, 1994.(Tables 3 & 4) b) Temagarni Community Profile, 1994.c) Temagami!Latchford Area Socio-economic Database, 1994.d) Temiskaming District Socio-economic Database, 1993.e) Town ofHaileybury Community Profile, 1994.d) Town ofNew Liskeard Community Profile, 1994.0 Corporation of the Township of James, Elk Lake Community Profile, 1994.532.5.1 Nature of ConflictThe history of conflict and struggle in Temagami is very long standing. However, in the lasttwo decades, no natural resource issue has been more publicly controversial or troublesome togovernments in Ontario whatever their political stripe than the land-use conflict in the Temagami area.The issue is multi-dimensional. One facet, the dispute between multi-stakeholders and Ontario overresource management policies and approaches of the MNR in the region has been at the centre of thecontroversy. The multi-stakeholders can broadly be classified into ‘preservationisV’ proponents and‘multiple-use” advocates.The preservationist proponents include Northwatch, Wildlands League, Earthroots, and theSudbury Naturalists Club. Northwatch is a coalition of environmental citizen groups in northeasternOntario. Its head office is located in North Bay, 90 km south of Temagami. The Wildlands League,whose head office is located in Toronto, is the Ontario Chapter of the Canadian Parks and WildernessSociety. Earthroots, formerly the Temagami Wilderness Society, is also based in Toronto.The Temagami Wilderness Society (TWS) was formed in 1986 to establish a large publiccampaign against construction of the Red Squirrel Road Extension (Gardner 1992). The extensionwas intended by the MNR to provide the local timber industry access to the largest contiguous standof old-growth red and white pine in the area. In 1987 the TWS proposed a Wildland Reserve of275,000 ha around the existing 72,400 ha Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park (MNR 1990).The proposal drew strong opposition from pro-development groups such as logging and mining, andin the end, the M]N.TR chose not to implement the proposal (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). The54TWS disbanded in the spring of 1991 to “confront a new and even greater challenge”, forming a neworganization called Earthroots Coalition which was created initially to rally support to fight againstthe James Bay Hydroelectric Project in northern Quebec (Back 1991; Shute 1993). All theenvironmental groups above are opposed to any development activities, particularly logging, mining,and road constructions that threaten the environmental and wilderness qualities of the Temagami area.The multiple-use advocates, on the other hand, believe the area should continue to be usedfor economic benefit. Among such groups are Northcare, the logging and mining industries, the areaChambers of Commerce, labour unions, and local (municipal) governments. Northcare (NorthernCommunity Advocates for Resource Equity) was specifically formed to refute “the accuracy,methodology, conclusions and validity of the basis of the Temagami Wilderness Proposal by theTWS” (Northcare 1988:18; Shute 1993).Northcare, which was largely funded by resource industries in the area, saw itself as anumbrella organization formed to represent industry, labour unions, hunters and anglers, trappers,tourist operators, Chambers of Commerce and local municipalities (Gardner 1992:12). Currently,these pro-development groups draw their following mostly from within the local confines amongpeople whose livelihoods have in one way or another been affected by the restrictions imposed ondevelopment activities in the area due to the ongoing land title dispute between Ontario and theTeme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) First Nation.The dispute between Ontario and the TAA is over legal entitlement to a land areaencompassing 110 geographic townships, to which the TAA refer as “WDaki Menan” (Figure 7). One55geographic township is 9,324 hectares or 23,039 acres. The TAA people assert that they never cededtitle to their ancestral lands. Ontario, on the other hand, maintains that the land in question is Crowndomain (Hodgins 1990). As discussed earlier, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 specified the methodof ceding aboriginal title to the Crown- through treaties signed between aboriginal peoples and theCrown. The Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 (so named after the Crown’s representative, theHonourable William Benjamin Robinson) covered the whole of northern Ontario, and thus theTemagami area. Among the principal features of the Robinson-Huron Treaty included provision forannuities, aboriginal or “Indian” reserves, and freedom for the aboriginal people to hunt, trap and fishon any unconceded Crown lands’° (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1979:26).Many aboriginal groups of Ojibway decent in northern Ontario signed the Robinson-HuronTreaty of 1850. The TAA people assert that, when the Robinson-Huron Treaty covering Temagamiand adjacent areas was negotiated in Sault Ste. Marie in 1850, their leaders were not present tosanction the agreement. Ontario maintains that one of the Ojibway chiefs who signed the treaty,ChiefTawgaiwene, represented the “Temagami Indians” (McNeil 1990:189). However, Ontario didnot grant a reserve to the TAA. As early as 1885, the TAA convinced the federal government of thisfact, a detail of history demonstrated by the reality that the TAA found itself without a reservethroughout much of the century. It was not until 1970 that the 285-hectare Bear Island site ofthe TAA’s village was finally granted reserve status through an Order-In-Council issued by thegovernor-general ofCanada (TAA 1990). Further, as ChiefPotts of the TAA was later to assert inthe courts, the establishment of the Bear Island Reserve did not speak to the larger question of hispeople’s unceded aboriginal title to their entire homeland (n’Daki Menan). The next section describes10 After Canadian Confederation in 1867, aboriginal rights to fish, hunt, and trap on unoccupied Crownlands became restricted by some federal regulations such as the Federal Fish and Game Acts.56the TAA-Ontario conflict in more detail. The aboriginal people claim title to the disputed lands thatare now Crown lands and demand a share in the benefits derived from use of those lands as well asan opportunity to be involved in land-use decision-making. Preservationists and pro-developmentadvocates want their interests protected and also included in land-use decision-making.2.5.1.1 The Aboriginal DimensionIn 1877 the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA), discovering Crown surveyors on their lands,first requested treaty with the government of Canada. Canada and Ontario agreed but despitesurveying of a 26,000 ha reserve in 1884, the land was not transferred (McNeil 1990); the timbermostly consisting of red and white pine, even then, being too valuable and in too short supply to behanded over to aboriginal people (Flodgins 1990). Rather, the Temagami area was declared a ForestReserve in 1901 (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). Ten years later, in 1911, Ontario established theTemagami Game and Fish Reserve in which the TAA were prohibited from fishing, hunting andtrapping (TAA 1990). The situation changed in 1939 when aboriginal people were allowed to trapwithin the Reserve upon purchase of an Ontario licence. State enforcement of this requirementbecame problematic as aboriginal people continued hunting, fishing, and trapping without thenecessary licences (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).In 1943, the federal government purchased from Ontario a one square mile land area at BearIsland for $3 000. This is where the TAA members were later settled (TAA 1990). From 1945 to1969, the TAA continued attempts to secure the 26,000 ha reserve that was surveyed in 1884. In1970, Canada proceeded to create Bear Island Reserve No. 1 (of one square mile) by an Order-In57Council thereby making it official as the TAA homeland. Two years later, in 1972, Ontario proposedconstruction of a tourist resort at Maple Mountain, an area known to the TAA as “Cheebayjing” orthe home of the souls of their dead (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989); and therefore, a sacred site.This sparked further controversy and in 1973, the TAA filed ‘land cautions’ in Ontario courts over110 townships within their traditional lands asserting their ownership of the land. The land cautionswhich were later secured the same year meant that the land title issue between Ontario and the TAAwas in question and therefore all major development works would be curtailed. All mining activitiesand land sales were halted and no new timber licences were to be granted until the land title issue wasresolved (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). This began a legal battle that would go on for the next23 years.Ontario sued the TAA in the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1978 maintaining that the land inquestion is Crown domain. The TAA, on the other hand, asserted that since they did not sign the1850 Robinson Huron Treaty, and the reserve surveyed in 1884 was not transferred to them, they didnot relinquish title to the land. While the Supreme Court of Ontario ruled in favour of Ontario inDecember 1984, the conflict was far from being resolved. The TAA filed notice of appeal four daysafter the Supreme Court ruling (TAA 1990). In January, 1989 the TAA appealed the 1984 SupremeCourt ruling but on February 27, 1989 the Ontario Court ofAppeal upheld the lower court decision,denying the TAA title to the land, maintaining that aboriginal title to the land was invalid underexisting laws and had been surrendered and extinguished. At the same time, the Court also ruled thatOntario had a fiduciary obligation to provide for a homeland to the TAA (TAA 1990). At this pointthe TAA directed legal counsel to apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada andreaffirm their intention to take the case to the international courts in their continuing struggle forjustice (TAA 1990).58While the court battles were going on, a crisis in the Temagami wood supply became evidentduring the 1980’s, the red and white pine, the mainstay of the industry, were scant (Benson et al.1989). To maintain the wood supply, on May 17, 1988 the Ontario Ministry ofNatural Resources(MNR) proposed to extend the Red Squirrel Road to the east to meet the Liskeard Lumber Roadfrom the north and intersect with the Goulard Lumber Road to the south. This network of roadswould bring logging into the last largest contiguous stand (about 2,000 ha) of old growth red andwhite pine in North America (Quinby 1989) located in an area locally known as the “WakimikaTriangle”, the heart of the Wendaban Stewardship Authority planning area (Figure 8).The TAA, joined by recreationists, preservationists and other non-aboriginal peoplesympathetic to the TAA cause, blockaded the road developments for the next six months. Ontarioresponded with injunctions, arrests and jailings (Hodgins 1990). Arrested among the protestors wasBob Rae, who later became Premier ofOntario. Another blockade followed at the proposed GoulardLumber Road extension. Again the Province responded with injunctions and arrests, but also withtwo initiatives- the Temagami Advisory Council, now the Comprehensive Planning Council (casestudy #1) and the offer to negotiate a settlement at last with the TAA. As part of that settlementOntario and the TAA set up a co-management experiment covering the four (4) townships at theheart of conflict in the Wakimika Triangle, now known as Wendaban Stewardship Authority (casestudy #2).59Provincial ParkBoundaryHighway 11• TownsWaterFigure 8: Map showing proposed road extensions within the Wendaban Stewardship Authority Planning Areathat sparked controversy between the TM and Ontario (Adapted from MNR 1994b)Comprehensive Planning Wendaban StewardshipArea Boundary Authority Boundary— —— Major Access RoadsScale:cjiometres :15602.5.1.2 The Multi-Stakeholder DimensionStakeholders based in the Temagami area include local government, tourist outfitters, loggers,miners, environmentalists, cottage owners, recreationists (includes canoeists hikers, hunters, andsportfishers), access groups, and trappers- to which might be added the aboriginal people as well.Conflicts among these groups can best be described as one involving conflicting goals while thatbetween these various groups and Ontario could be characterized as involving the need forredistribution of decision-making authority from the centre to the local levels as well as conflictinggoals.At the centre of conflicts among various groups has been the inadequacies of the IvINR’smanagement policies that emphasized timber to the exclusion of other values. This often pitted oneinterest group against the other as competition over resources escalated (Benson 1990). Hodgins(1990) notes that before 1970, the presence of competing users, notably recreationists and cottagers,hardly interfered seriously with forest management; “if anything, the presence of both recreationalinterests and aboriginal people plus several other interests served to moderate somewhat the mannerand pace of forest cutting”. As the timber supplies diminished over the years, coupled with poorregeneration of red and white pine, MNR was forced to open up new areas for logging in thehinterland; a situation that ignited controversy among various groups and between groups andOntario- particularly the IvINR. The poor regeneration of red and white pine in the area has beenattributed primarily to the provincial fire suppression policy (which continues today) adopted at thebeginning of the 20th Century (Day and Carter 1990). Fire plays a significant role in the ecology andregeneration ofboth species by opening up seed cones and suppressing competing vegetation. High-61grading harvest practices which IvINR (1985) admitted had left the forest with trees of very poorquality, also contributed to poor regeneration ofboth red and white pine.The proposed new harvest allocations came with new proposals for road access as well. Butas highlighted earlier, these proposals were met with strong resistance from various groups.Environmentalists were against any further liquidation of the remaining old-growth forests in the area-pitting them against the timber industry and multiple-use advocates (Skidmore 1990); recreationistsand cottage owners were opposed to any further opening up ofwilderness areas- pitting them againstthe timber industry (Hodgins 1990); local governments in the area wanted more economic activityand thus were on the side of the timber industry- pitting them against environmentalists,recreationists, and cottage owners (Skidmore 1990); trappers saw most of the area being lost throughthe new timber development proposals- pitting them against the timber industry (Hodgins andBenidickson 1989). And naturally, the timber industry were against all the groups trying to curtailits operations. In the end, Ontario bought the local mill (Mime Lumber) in 1990 and closed it at thesame time, in an attempt to cool off the controversy. Part ofMilne’s timber allocations were withinwhat is now the Wendaban Stewardship Authority area.At the same time, a local mine, Sherman Mine, which had been in operation since the mid1960’s was also experiencing production problems due to diminished reserves and finally went underin 1990. During its operation, there was apprehension from environmental groups, recreationists andcommunity residents about the impact of drainage from the tailings basin into Temagami waters(Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).62The mining industry as a whole also experienced a somewhat different but related conflict.The TAA land cautions of 1973, which are still in effect, meant that no new mining development orexploration work would take place in the area. This has always pitted the mining industry, which isjoined by pro-development groups, labour and local governments pushing for local economicdevelopment, against aboriginal people. Furthermore, the land cautions meant that no new cottagedevelopments would take place in the area until the land title issue was resolved. This has alwaysportrayed the aboriginal people as villains in the eyes of pro-development groups (Hodgins andBenidickson 1989).At or about the same time as the tourist resort was being considered for Maple Mountain in1972, the Lady Evelyn river, 50 km south of the community ofElk Lake was designated a Wild RiverPark by the MNR (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). This designation allowed for a number of “nonconforming” uses under MNR policy to take place in the area including timber extraction, mineral andaggregate extraction, fishing, hunting and trapping (Back 1990). However, in June 1983, the varioususers felt betrayed when the same area was enlarged (from 25,000 ha to 72 400 ha) and designateda “wilderness” park status by the MNP. without consultation with the local interests (Back 1990).This was followed by a ban on non-conforming uses taking place in the park, thereby curtailing allresource extraction activities in the area.At the time, three different companies held timber licences in over one-half the Lady EvelynSmoothwater Candidate Wilderness Park (see Figure 4- north of WSA area). Two of thesecompanies were located in Elk Lake and one in Temagami. The mill in Temagami (Mime Lumber)was in the middle of a $4 000 000 expansion programme based in part on obtaining the timber from63the volume agreement it held in the proposed wilderness area. But as pointed out earlier, Ontariopaid offthe company ($4 000 000) and closed the mill in a desperate move to ease the tensions. Ofthe two companies in Elk Lake, Liskeard Lumber was paid off $1.8 million in compensation for losttimber rights in the proposed wilderness area (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).The mining industry and other traditional users such as sport hunters, trappers and fly-intourist operators, all ofwhom would be denied access into the park, were also opposed to the newdesignation. As a case in point, the representatives of twenty-seven towns and townships, organizedas the Temiskaming Municipal Association, opposed the Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Parkproposal because they believed it would hinder the kind of tourism investment they envisioned for theregion (Back 1990).All the above conflicts led to several policy initiatives by the Ontario government, aimed atresolving the various resource conflicts in the area. As highlighted earlier, among those initiativeswere the Comprehensive Planning Council and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority; the two casesin this study. Both initiatives are described in detail in the next section.642.5.2 The Case Studies2.5.2.1 Temagami Advisory Council (TAC) and later Comprehensive Planning Council(CPC)The Temagami Advisory Council (TAC) was established on May 17, 1988. The Councilcomprised eight (8) appointees representing the following local interests: environment, municipalities,residents, tourism, and lumber companies. The TAC had the following mandate (TAC 1989): (a) toprovide advice on matters referred to it by the provincial government, the Ministry of NaturalResources and other government ministries, the public, interest groups and/or members of the Councilitself, that relate to the land use and resource management in the Temagami district; and (b) tomonitor and advise on pre-construction, construction and post-construction phases of the RedSquirrel Road extension. The TAC operated for about three years before Ontario disbanded it inMay, 1991 due to inadequate local representation on it; a sentiment first voiced by the local publicsand later upheld by the government of Ontario.The TAC was replaced in the same year by the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC), a 17member citizen’s group established through an Order-In-Council approved and ordered on May 16,1991 (Ontario Executive Council 1991 a). The CPC has broader representation than its predecessor,TAC. In addition to former TAC membership, the CPC includes representation from education,mining, the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH), and aboriginal people. Theaboriginal group (the TAA) is represented by five members ofwhom one is a co-chair. The CPC’smandate includes planning and advisory (to the Minister of Natural Resources and the TAA)functions with jurisdiction over an area of 569,799 hectares (2 200 square miles) (MNR 1993 a)(Figure 7).65However, the planning fhnction has been undertaken by the Comprehensive Planning Program(CPP), an in-house (MNR) initiative introduced in the spring of 1989 as part of MNR’s goal ofproviding model management in Temagami district by producing an Integrated ResourceManagement Plan for the area (CPP 1990). This objective of integrated resource managementplanning has somewhat changed since the creation of the CPC. In its previous form, integratedresource management was defined as “the co-ordination of resource management programs andactivities so that long-term benefits are optimized and conflicts between programs are minimized”(MNR 1986a). This has now been replaced with what has been described as “a movement away froma preoccupation with timber production”-- to a “comprehensive planning process” dealingsimultaneously with all resource uses and incorporating the perspectives of the public and otherprovincial departments (CPP 1990).All CPP personnel are IvINE, staff specialized in various facets of resource management (e.g.fish, wildlife, timber, recreation, tourism, fire, ecology, soils) drawn from various parts Ontario. TheCPP provides technical input to the CPC which in turn advises the Minister ofNatural Resourcesaccordingly. Therefore, the CPC and CPP are said to represent shared decision-making between localinterests (represented through the CPC) and Ontario (represented through CPP or MNR).2.5.2.2 Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) was initiated through a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU) signed between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario on April 23, 1990(MNR 1990) in which both parties committed themselves to creating a “Stewardship Council”. The66WSA was finally established through an Order-In-Council (Ontario Executive Council 1991b)approved and ordered on May 16, 1991 and through an Addendum to the MOU (MNR 1991) signedby both parties on May 23, 1991.In the context of the land claim negotiations between the TAA and Ontario, the WSA is saidto represent an experiment in shared decision-making (shared stewardship) between the TAA andlocal provincial interests (excluding MNR). Under an Enforcement Agreement signed between theWSA and the MNR, the MNR, in this case, was only to play the role of implementor of specificdecisions referred to it by the WSA. In the same light, the WSA is said to represent an initial steptoward a treaty of co-existence between aboriginal and Euro-Canadian interests in the area (CPP1990).The area of jurisdiction of the WSA includes the four geographic townships of Acadia,Shelburne, Canton, and Delhi; altogether encompassing a total land area of 37,296 hectares (Figure7). According to the MOU (MNR 1990), the WSA has been granted decision-making authority toplan, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, and monitor all uses of and activities on the land withinits area ofjurisdiction.However, according to the Order-In-Council (Ontario Executive Council 1991b) signed anddated May 16, 1991 to rati1,’ the establishment ofthe WSA, the Authoritys functions are to “evaluateand plan for land use and resource management activities in its area ofjurisdiction”. This mandateis somewhat narrower than what was earlier stated under the MOU. Since its inception, the WSAhas been seeking from Ontario to increase the breadth of its mandate to coincide with the MOU, andto secure this authority either by some form of ownership or legislative jurisdiction (as for example67under the Forest Authorities Act such as the Algonquin Forest Authority in eastern Ontario) or both.At a meeting held on August 17, 1992 between the WSA and the then Minister ofNaturalResources, Bud Wildman, the Minister announced that legislation empowering the WSA was alreadyintroduced in Cabinet and was on the order list. However, the Minister gave no indication as to whenor how long it would take before the legislation would go through but advised the WSA, in thepresence of local MNR representatives, to act defacto as if they had the legislative jurisdiction. AsofJune 1995, that legislation has not been passed and the June elections in Ontario ousted the NewDemocratic Party and brought in the Conservative Party.The WSA is composed of 12 members; six appointed by Ontario, six by the TAA, plus aneutral Chair appointed jointly by both parties. The Ontario appointees are said (by Ontario) torepresent several local interests including labour, timber industry, local government, environment,recreation and tourism, and community development. Those appointed by the TAA include fourmembers whose family hunting and trapping grounds lie within the WSA area, and two TAAgovernment officials. According to the MOU (MNR 1990), the WSA is to be guided by thefollowing principles in its actions: a) Sustained Lfe (ecological responsibility); b) SustainableDevelopment (defined as in the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment andDevelopment- the Brundtland Report); c) promotion of Co-existence between the TAA and otherlocal Ontarians; and d) establishment of a Public Involvement process in its planning endeavours.The next chapter discusses the distributions of decision-making authority in resourcemanagement in the Temagami area. This is done in both historical (under the MNR) and current68(under the two co-management agencies) contexts. Both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988)public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks are used to gauge the levels of publicparticipation in the decision-making of the MNR, CPC, and WSA. The same frameworks are usedto evaluate both the CPC and WSA’s involvement in decision-making as co-management agencies.69CHAPTER 3DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THETEMAGAMI AREADistributions of decision-making authority in the Temagami Area are discussed in bothhistorical (under the MNR) and current (under the two co-management initiatives) contexts in lightof the data. As highlighted earlier, distribution of decision-making authority in this study isunderstood to involve both the distributions of decision-making and authority. Distributions ofdecision-making refer to the levels of public participation in real decision-making and the influenceof each player on final decisions. Distributions of authority refer to real devolutions of decision-making power from the state to the local levels.3.1 Historical Distributions of Decision-making Authority (under the MNR)3.1.1 Distributions of decision-makingFour categories of respondents [MNR (N=5), CPC (N=1 1), WSA (N=1O), and Public(N=39)] were asked to describe past and present distributions of decision-making authority in theTemagami Area. The responses concerning decision-making distribution were unanimous (all 65respondents) that in the past, the IvINR made all the decisions (Table 5). Appendix 2 gives detaileddescriptions of the responses under the category “decision-making authority.” However, 10respondents also added that there was minimal public input into MNR decisions in the past.70Table 5: Summary of data pertaining to past and present distributions of decision-makingauthority in the Temagami Area.Interview Question How was decision-making authority distributed in the past and how is it distributednow?Respondent Category Responses Number of respondentsI mentioning itemMembers ofMNR distributed internally within the MNR 5N=5 Present: shared with local citizens 5Members of the CPC authority was retained by the MNR 11N1 I Present not very much different from the past 6decision-making shared with local interests 5Members of the WSA Past: MNR retained all the authority and made 10N=l0 all the decisions with minimal public inputPresent: citizens are now making decisions 9still MNR, it won’t relinquish controlMembers of the Public Past: it was no distribution at all, MNR decided 39N=39 Present: shared with the public 12MNR is still making the decisions because 27it has the legislative basisTo understand past distributions of decision-making in the Temagami area, reference is madeto two processes that attempted to involve the public in decision-making. These are: (a) theTemagami Advisory Council (TAC), a citizen’s group established in 1988 and terminated by Ontarioin 1991; and (b) the MNR Timber Management Planning Process. As highlighted earlier, the TACwas an advisory body to the MNR In fulfilling its mandate, the TAC worked with the MNR on dailyoperational issues involving land and resource management decisions in the Temagami Area (TAC1989). This was possible because in its advisory capacity, the TAC also had a monitoring function.According to three public respondents (4A, 4C, 4K), all the information used in TAC’sdecisions was supplied by the MNR. The TAC members also raised this concern at a meeting heldwith then Minister ofNatural Resources Honourable Lyn McLeod on January 10, 1990 in Temagami71(Appendix 4). In particular, the members expressed concern that they had no way of verifiingwhether or not the MNR’s information was correct (TAC 1990). One of the key informants (5B)who was also a former member of the TAC concluded:This [the lack of control over information] meant that we [the TAC members] were restrictedto work within the system; our activities were restricted to what the MNR wanted us to do.In the long run, it was frustrating for us because we could not influence the land-use planningprocess in Temagami as we had hoped; our mandate was a sham!One public respondent (4P), also a former member of the TAC, commented,Surely, if they [the government and the MNR] wanted us to have input in land-use decisionsof this area, they should have realized that we needed to make informed judgements anddecisions before we could advise the Minister. We were like sitting ducks ready to be fed andshot any time. We were simply rubberstamping their [the MNR] decisions.At the same meeting held on January 10, 1990, the TAC members voiced the concern that thelocal publics considered the TAC as a “rubber stamp” for the MNR. The Minister responded that theTAC was considered as a check on whether the MNR was managing the resources correctly. Sheadded that, “to become a rubber stamp means that no questions are being asked; in TAC’s casequestions are being asked and the MNR is being challenged” (TAC 1990:1) (see also Appendix 4).However, asking questions on information determined exclusively by the MNR without alsothe opportunity for the TAC to participate in the generation of that information and access to it wasno assurance that the TAC asked the right questions. Therefore, the MNR’s total control ofinformation used in the planning process limited the TAC’s participation in the MNR’s deliberations.Consequently, the MNR closely managed the TAC’s advice. These findings are consistent with those72ofRoss (1993) and Reed (1995). In her review of public participation processes in the TemagamiArea, Ross (1993:15) concluded that the TAC was a process essentially operating to reduceparticipation and obstruct scrutiny of the manner and substance ofMNR decisions. Similarly, in astudy ofthe Ignace Co-management Committee in Ignace, northern Ontario, Reed (1995:145) alsofound that the Committe&s close control of information restricted opportunities for broader publicparticipation in its deliberations. The MNR officials depicted a paternalistic attitude by discouragingor closely managing the advice provided by the local community (Reed 1995:137).In the case ofthe TAC, the MNR’s total control of information used in the planning processwas not consistent with the premises of co-management wherein decision-making responsibilitieswere supposed to be shared. This would imply sharing the responsibility of generating andcontrolling information as well. As noted by the 65 respondents in Table 5, the IVINR made all thedecisions. In order to provide informed advice to the MNR, the TAC required access to informationon which the MNR’s decision-making was based; but the MNR denied the TAC such opportunities.This raises questions about the structure and motives of the TAC-MNR model of co-management.One of the WSA respondents (2A) characterized the TAC as simply “a symbolic gesture” designedto cover up the Red Squirrel Road controversy after the MNR made a wrong decision to go aheadwith the construction.Conflicts that predated the TAC in the Temagami area were not resolved by the committee.The TAC was partly responsible for overseeing construction of the most controversial road ever builtin Ontario (Red Squirrel Road Extension). It was asked by the MNR to approve its decisions toconstruct both the Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions. The TAC gave a false impression to73the local publics that its involvement in the decisions over the proposed road constructions by theMNR would halt the actions. According to two key informants (5B, 5C), when the constructionswent ahead and blockades followed, the TAC’s credibility also faded. Four of the five key informantsin this study (5A, 5B, 5D, 5E) noted that this was one of the main reasons that led to a Ministerialdecision to replace the TAC with the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC). The other reason, asnoted by three establishing agency respondents (3A, 3B, 3C), was that local representation on theTAC was inadequate- particularly with the absence of both the Teme-Augama Anishnabai FirstNation and the Temagami Lakes Association, both of whom were major players in the Temagamiconflict.This leads to a conclusion that the TAC simply served most of the political functions describedby Filyk and Côtd (1992) as applicable to advisory bodies. The functions are repeated and illustratedhere:1. Testpublic reaction to policies; the policies being constructions of both the Red Squirrel andGoulard Road Extensions for the primary purpose of accessing the last stand of old-growthred and white pine in the area;2. Provide a forumfor expression ofpublic opinion; both Ontario and the MNR viewed theTAC as a voice for the local publics despite its lack of popularity locally;3. Force controversial issues into an objective arena; the controversial issues beingconstructions of both the Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions;4. Placate opposition by involving potential expert critics in the decision process; the criticsbeing representatives from environment, municipalities, tourism, and lumber companies whichexcluded major stakeholders such as mining and OFAH as well as the TAA;745. Be usedforpersuasion; the TAC was asked by the IVINR to formally approve constructionsofthe controversial Goulard Road and Red Squirrel Road Extensions and also to hold publicconsultations on proposed constructions.6. Provide a symbolic response to problems; the problems being the multi-faceted conflictsurrounding constructions ofthe road extensions and the symbolism stemming from creationby Ontario of an advisory body (the TAC) that lacked authority to influence MNR decisions;7. Give afalse or misleading impression ofaddressingproblems.- known as ‘window dressing3;creation of the TAC gave a false impression to the local publics that it would influence theMNR to stop constructions of the disputed roads;8. Delay action; from 1988 to 1991, the TAC failed to resolve the Red Squirrel and GoulardRoads controversy. In the end, both roads were built but never used for their primarypurpose ofproviding access by the logging industry to harvest old-growth red and white pinein the area. The controversy was taken over by the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)in 1991. As will be discussed later, the WSA resolved the controversy in 1994 throughconsensus decision-making and meaningful public involvement. However, that decision wasturned over to the MNR, the original creator of the conflict, by the Minister of NaturalResources to judge its feasibility, legitimacy, and implementation. It is difficulty at this pointto predict what the MNR’s decision will be.On Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 9), the TAC’s involvement inMNR decision-making constituted tokenism, but at a higher level than consultation (level five -placation). Within its advisory capacity the TAC had a monitoring function and therefore, influencedthe IVINR’s day-to-day decisions to a certain extent. However, at level five, citizens still do not havefinal decision-making authority; the final decision-making authority rests with the agency responsiblefor planning (Arnstein 1969). However, the board is asked to formally approve those decisions.75Here, the TAC formally approved the constructions of the proposed road extensions after the MNRhad already decided to construct the roads in 1988. This is the same year that the TAC was formed.8 Citizen controlI Degress of7 Delegated power citizen power6 Partnership _JrzzzzzzzCzz- 5 Placationplanning in the past4 Consultation Degrees of__________________________________tokenism3 Informing2 TherapyNonI participation1 ManipulationFigure 9: The level of public participation of the TAC in the IVINKs planning process in the paston Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).Using Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation framework(Figure 10), the TAC’s involvement in the MNR’s planning and decision-making processes wasconfined to the first three levels (information, persuasion, and consultation). According to Parenteau(1988), these constitute low levels of participation and decision-making power because the public isnot sharing in decision-making. Although the MNR informed and consulted with TAC, decisionswere made by the MNR; the MNR also controlled both the generation of and access to theinformation.76Decision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation Cooperation olThe decision The decision The problem is The lim9. The decision isis made and is made and submitted, etned, made by thethe public an effort is opinions — the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvince—’ decision is and made of publicJ1k made together with responsibilitythe publicThe levels of public participationand decision-making (through theTAC) in the MNR’s planningprocess in the pastPublic participationFigure 10: The levels of public participation and decision-making of the TAC in the IvINR’splanning process in the past on Parenteau’s evaluation framework (Adapted fromParenteau 1988).The second process involving public participation in MNR’s Timber Management Planningwas initiated in 1986 (MNR 1986b) for the whole province. In this process, which is still presenttoday, four formal opportunities were provided for public consultation in the preparation of a TimberManagement Plan (TMP) (Appendix 5). The MNR invited the public on four separate occasions tocomment on its decisions (MTh1R 1986:5):• an invitation to participate, at the outset of the timber management planning exercise;• an opportunity to review preliminary proposals at an Information Centre, prior toproduction of the draft TMP;• an opportunity to review the draft TMP; and• an opportunity for inspection of the approved TMP.77In terms ofbroader public involvement in the TMP process, public participation was through“invitation” and “consultation.” Here, consultation was without also an assurance that the public’sconcerns would be taken into account. Decisions were made by the MNR staff and the public wereinvited on four separate occasions to give their comments (Appendix 5). On Arnstein’s (1969) ladderof citizen participation (Figure 11), this constituted tokenism at level three (informing). Although‘informing’ represents the first step toward legitimate citizen participation, it involves a one-waycommunication from those with power with no mechanisms for feedback nor room for negotiatingpower (Arnstein 1969). Similarly, on Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-makingframework (Figure 12), participation of the broader publics in the MNR’s planning and decision-making was confined to the first level of “informing”. These findings are consistent with those ofHiggelke and Duinker (1993).8 Citizen controlI Degress of7 Delegated power citizen power6 Partnership5 Placation__]4 Consultation [........ Degrees of______________________ _________________________________tokenismlevel of c 3 Informing _Jthe past2 TherapyNonI participation1 ManipulationFigure 11: The level ofpublic participation in the MNR’s Timber Management Planning processin the past on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Amstein 1969).78Decision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation Cooperation olThe decision The decision The problem is The limi- The decision isis made and is made and submitted, 4iced, made by thethe public an effort is opinions— the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvincej_ decision is and made of publicjJ)Lc made together with responsibilitythe publicIPublic participationThe level of publicparticipation anddecision-making inMNR’s TMP processin the pastFigure 12: The level of public participation and decision-making in the MNR’s TimberManagement Planning process in the past on Parenteaus’s evaluation framework(Adapted from Parenteau 1988).Therefore, historically, public participation in the IVINR’s decision-making involved a rangeofdegrees of tokenism from informing to placation. The public’s influence on MNR decisions wasnegligible. Distributions of decision-making from the MNR to local interests did not take place. TheMNR’s total reliance on information generated by itself also limited the distributions of decision-making to local levels. This also implies that the MNR relied heavily on technical or scientificinformation as a sole basis for planning with no room for local knowledge input. Hence, true sharingofdecision-making between the MNR and local users did not take place. The narrow representationon the TAC also implied that the TAC was a process merely operating to limit participation indecision-making by excluding the most influential groups in the area - the TAA and the TLA.Similarly, public participation in the TMP process was characterized by MNR controlling all theinformation used in the planning process and seeking comments from the public rather than allowingthe public to share in decision-making.793.1.2 Distributions of authorityAccording to the 65 respondents (Table 5), the authority to make decisions was retained bythe MNR in the past. That is, historically, authority over management of natural resources in theTemagami Area has rested primarily with the Minister ofNatural Resources and ministry staff. Therewas a lack of devolution of decision-making power from the Iv1NR to the local level.A look at the historical distributions of both ownership and legislative jurisdictions overresources in Canada reveals that, all natural resources within Crown lands are owned by provincialgovernments. The only exceptions are offshore and marine resources, aboriginal reserves and landson which military installations are found; the Federal government owns such lands and resources(Thompson and Eddy 1973). With Crown lands in Ontario, the Province retains both ownership andlegislative jurisdictions over them.Through several pieces of legislation, such as the Natural Resources Act, the EnvironmentalProtection Act, the Ontario Water Resources Act, the Pesticides Act, and the EnvironmentalAssessmentAct, several line agencies (ministries) have been delegated the responsibility to administerthose pieces of legislation on behalf of the government. For instance, the latter four examples of Actsabove are all administered by the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the former by the Ministry ofNatural Resources (MNR). With the MNR, this has given the Minister ofNatural Resources andministry staff discretionary powers over natural resources as in timber, fisheries, and wildlifemanagement. Through the Natural Resources Act, MNR’s mandate is to manage for all naturalresources on behalf of the people of Ontario.80For the TAC, its mandate was not conferred through legislation but rather an Order-In-Council (OEC 1988). An Order-In-Council (OIC) is a Cabinet-level decision with no legislativeforce. The implication is that powers conferred through an OIC can easily be challenged in a CourtofLaw as the decisions made under it are non-binding. The TAC acted in an advisory capacity thatconferred no authority, thereby limiting further its influence over decision-making.Another process that attempted to legitimize public involvement in resource managementdecision-making in Ontario was the Class Environmental Assessment (EA) for Timber Managementon Crown Lands. However, this forum, which is based on a judicial model through public hearings,has been criticized by several authors including Dunster (1992) and Morgan et al. (1993) asadversarial, long, costly, and focused exclusively on timber. Its counterpart federal process theEnvironmental Assessment Review Process (EARP) has also been criticized for similar reasons (Reed1984) (excluding focus on timber). Parenteau (1988) also described Ontario’s EA process as stronglyoriented toward public information and consultation.On Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, Ontario’s EA process above entailsdegrees of tokenism of “informing” and “consultation”at levels three and four, respectively. Throughits preferred and usual method of public hearings, the EA process offers no assurance that appellantconcerns and ideas will be taken into account. At the conclusion of public hearings, theEnvironmental Assessment Board decides how the plan will proceed. In addition, the granting ofopportunities to appeal is left to the EAB to decide. Therefore, while citizens concerns may be heard,the EA process simply provides one-way flows of communication from the EAB to the citizens. TheEAB retains the authority to make decisions.81While there are examples elsewhere in Ontario where the Province has delegated legislativeauthority to local levels in resource management planning in the past, such examples have beenlacking in the Temagami Area. Existing examples include several Conservation Authoritiesestablished through the Conservation Authorities Act, R.S.O. 1980 and Forest Authorities such asthe Algonquin Forest Authority (established through the Forest Authorities Act, R.S.O. 1980). Theseagencies have retained decision-making authority. Therefore, historically, mechanisms such as OICs,EA hearings, and the EARP have all failed to redistribute authority to local levels in the TemagamiArea.3.2 Distributions of Decision-making Authority under Co-management3.2.1 Ontario’s Expected and Implied Levels of Distributions of Decision-making Authorityto the Co-management AgenciesOntario viewed the creation ofboth the CPC and the WSA as devolution of decision-makingfrom the state to the local level - the Temagami Area. The CPC was said to represent shareddecision-making between local stakeholders (represented through the CPC) and Ontario (representedthrough the MNR). In the same vein, the WSA represented a model of shared decision-makingbetween aboriginal people (represented through the TAA members) and Ontario (represented throughnon-aboriginal interests). In addition, both Ontario and the TAA perceived the WSA as havingdelegated powers to make decisions. The absence of the MNR on the WSA could also be construedas the latter having “absolute” control or full managerial power over its decisions.Therefore, on both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decisionmaking evaluation frameworks (Figures 13 and 14, respectively), Ontario expected the CPC to82constitute a “partnership° and “cooperation,” respectively, between local citizens and the IvINR.Both Ontario and the TAA expected the WSA to constitute degrees of citizen power from“partnership to citizen control” (Figures 13 and 14). The next section explores what happened inlight of the data. Did actual distributions of decision-making authority to both the CPC and the WSAconcur with both Ontario and the TAA’s expectations above?8_________________7I The level of public II participation Ontario :EEZ 6expected/mpliedtheCPC would operate at5432participation levelsDegressofTberaseofpubhc IOntaiio&theTAA_j citizen powerexpected/nplied theWSA would operate attokenismNonparticipationFigure 13: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA’s public participation under comanagement on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein1969).Citizen controlDelegated powerPartnershipPlacationConsultationInformingTherapyManipulation83The range of public participationand decision-making levelsOntario & the TAA expected!implied the WSA wouldoperate atFPublic participationThe level of public participationand decision-making Ontarioexpected/implied the CPCwould operate atFigure 14: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA’s public participation in decision-making under co-management on Parenteau’s evaluation framework (Adapted fromParenteau 1988).Decision-making powerInfonnation Persuasion Consultation CooperationThe decision The decision The problem is The lim3 The decision isis made and is made and submitted, )j46ned, made by thethe public an effort is opinions the decision is public, whichis infonned made to 5JJ2tti the shared with assumes a roleconvincej3...— decision is and made of publicIiC made together with responsibilitythe public843.2.2 Actual Distributions of Decision-making Authority to the CPC and the WSA3.2.2.1 Distributions of Decision-makingFour questions were posed to the CPC (N=1 1), the WSA (N=1O), and public respondents(N=39) to evaluate the actual distributions of decision-making authority to the two co-managementagencies. The questions were:who makes the decisions?;what decisions/recommendations were made by the agencies (CPC and WSA)?;were those decisions/recommendations implemented and by whom?; andis there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/recommendations made bythe agencies by the state or any of the key actors?.Appendix 2 lists detailed responses to the questions under the categories “decision-making authority”and “substance of decisions”. Table 6 provides a summary of the responses.3.2.2.1.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)According to the results presented in Table 6, 62% of the respondents (N50) said that theMNR made decisions for the CPC. In addition, 64% of the respondents (N64) said that the IVINRoccasionally coopted the CPC into decisions concerning the planning process (Appendix 2). All CPCrespondents (N=1 1) noted that a decision made by the CPC to meet with special interest groups inTemagami rather than Toronto was preempted by the MNR - the meeting was eventually held inToronto.85Table 6: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from the state to theco-management agencies under study.Interview Responses No. of Total No. of % ofQuestion pertaining to the respondents respondents respondentsAgency mentioning mentioningitem itemcPc1. Who makes the . MNR makes the decisions 31 50 62decisions? • CPC and MNR make the decisions 13 50 26One of the co-chairs & MNR 08 50 16WSAWSA members make the decisions 49 49 100[see_Appendix 2 for detaiisjcPc2. What decisions! One (1) decision 1 1 1 1 100recommendations Six (6) recommendations 1 1 1 1 100were made by the [see Appendix 2 for details]agencies?WSA20 decisions 10 10 100[see Appendix 2 for details]cPc3. Were those decisions! decision not implemented, rejected 1 1 1 1 100recommendations by MNRimplemented and by recommendation 1, implemented 10 1 1 91whom? recommendation 2, implemented 10 1 1 91recommendation 3, implemented 08 1 1 73recommendation 4, implemented 06 1 1 55. recommendation 5, not implemented 1 1 1 1 100recommendation 6, not implemented 1 1 1 1 100[see Appendix 2 for details]WSAdecisions have not been implemented 10 10 100[see Appendix 2 for details]cPc4. Is there evidence of . cooptation, yes 41 64 64cooptation/preemption . preemption, yes 25 64 39of decisions! . I dont know 16 64 25recommendations WSAmade by the agencies cooptation, yes 08 63 13by the state or any of . preemption, yes 43 63 68the key actors? I dont know 21 63 33[see Appendix 2 for detailsj86Of the six recommendations made by the CPC, two that were not implemented were madeto the Iv[NR (Appendix 2). The two recommendations pertained to two issues: (a) planning on awatershed basis; and (b) hiring of outside consultants to provide alternate sources of information inthe planning process (Appendix 2).The two recommendations above and one example each on preemption and cooptation of theCPC by the MNR, are explored in detail. These four issues test the distribution of decision-makingbetween the MNR and the CPC who, according to Ontario, were supposed to share decision-makingunder the co-management arrangement.On preemption, when the CPC advised the MNR to hire outside consultants to providealternate sources of information in the planning process, the MNR rejected the proposal on the basisthat there were no adequate thnds in the budget to do so (2K, 2M., 2N, 2R). Yet, when the CPC latersuggested that a meeting with special interest groups from southern Ontario be held in Temagamirather than Toronto due to financial constraints, the recommendation was rejected by the MNR. TheCPC members contended that they had already provided opportunities to all interest groups toparticipate in the process. They also contended that it was too expensive for all 17 members to travelfrom Temagami to Toronto and stay there for two days (2K, 2N, 2R, 2S).According to three MNR respondents (1B, 1D, 1E) and three key respondents (5k 5C, 5E),the meeting was taken to Toronto for political reasons; “the environmental groups would in the endshoot down the whole planning process if the CPC did not travel to and consult with them inToronto” (5E). In addition, the Minister of Natural Resources had advised the MNR to take themeeting to Toronto for the same reason (1B, 1D).87The evidence above shows that the CPC was not an equal partner in the CPC/MNR decision-making process. It further reports a movement toward an increase in dependence by the CPC onMNR’s financial resources. The CPC did not have its own budget; it depended exclusively on theMNR’s financial resources. This limited the CPCs independence and influence on the MNR decisions.For example, as discussed earlier, the CPC could not hire outside consultants to provide alternatesources of information because it lacked a budget to do so and the MNR refused to sanction theproposal. This implied that the CPC depended solely on information provided by the MNR in itsdecisions. As noted by Arnstein (1969), partnership can work most effectively when the citizensgroup has the financial resources to hire (and fire) its own personnel. The exclusive dependency ofthe CPC on the MNR’s funding ran the risk of compromising local control, which is one of the mainpremises of co-management and advantages of the local-development approach. In this case, theCPC was preempted by the MNR which had both the financial resources and power to makedecisions.Similarly, the CPC’s recommendation to the MNR to undertake planning in the area on awatershed basis, while not rejected by the MNR, was not implemented. The MNR felt that theprocess of planning on a watershed basis was too time-consuming, costly, and there was no realjustification for it (1k 1C, 2L, 2N, 20). However, the MNR did not tell those reasons to the CPC(1C, 2L, 2N).On cooptation, four (4) MNR respondents (N=5) pointed out that the CPC was likely to becoopted into MNR decisions due to the CPC members’ lack of technical background in variousaspects of the planning process (Appendix 2). All CPC respondents (N=1 1) pointed out one instance88ofcooptation by the MNR. The instance concerned the lack of CPC involvement in the framing ofmanagement options and zoning decisions made by the IvINR. This instance is explored in detailbelow.In April, 1994, the MNR generated management and zoning options for the comprehensiveplanning area (CPP 1994a) without the involvement of the CPC. This was confirmed by all CPCrespondents (N=11) (see Appendix 2) and the four MNR respondents above (1A, 1C, 1D, 1E). InMay 1994, the management options and zoning decisions were taken to the public for comment (CPP1994b) and the CPC was asked to conduct the public consultation process. The result was that theCPC members presided over information they did not generate and did not understand; a situationthat later caused them embarrassment at the public meetings (2K, 2L, 2N, 2P). The four (4) MNRrespondents (N=5) maintained that the decisions involved in producing the management and zoningoptions were too technical to be understood by the CPC (1A, 1C, 1D, 1E). Yet, the MNR asked theCPC to present the product of its “technicaP’ decisions to the public without the CPC’s priorinvolvement in framing of the decisions.In a probing interview question, the CPC respondents (N=1 1) were asked to comment on theassertion by the four (4) IvINR respondents that the decisions involved in producing the managementand zoning options were too technical to be understood by the CPC members. Nine (9) of the 11members refIted the assertion and two (2) felt the MNR may be correct. Three of the nine memberswho refuted the MNR’s assertion summarized their views as follows:89(2L),We [the CPC members] know more of this area than most of them [the MNR stafi]. We have livedhere most of our lives and these guys [the MNR staffJ have come and gone. Most of theComprehensive Planning Program staff [the MNR] have not even been here for a year; they aremostly from outside this area. I can’t imagine why they think we don’t know some of the technicalstuff they talk about. Like most of our members [the CPC], I have a profession- I am a teacher,simply because I am not a forester does not mean I don’t know how to tell a birch tree from a mapletree or that an area has been clearcut.20,Most of the decisions we are talking about here, to many of us who have lived and worked in thisarea, are sometimes a matter of common sense. They [the IvINR stafi] should mind their technicaljargon and not our ability to understand technical information and make informed decisions; who dothey think we are?; fools? We [the CPC] have very competent people on our committee- I don’t thinkany of them [Ivll’%TR staff] understands mining better than John who has been dean of a mining schoolin this area for over 20 years or Ron who has been a forestry consultant in this area for over 15 years.2S,That’s not true. I have been here longer than all of them [the MNR staff]. The WSA members whoare just local citizens like us made zoning decisions without the involvement of the MNR. When we[the CPC and MNR] reviewed the WSA’s draft forest stewardship plan, the MNR were dumbfoundedwhen they saw the work the WSA had done. I guess they wrote off the WSA in the beginning as abunch of activists who could not come up with anything better than them. .boy, were they mistaken.They [the IVtNR staff] only started talking about land-use zoning and watershed stuff in our planningarea after they saw the WSA’s plan. They should thank the WSA for setting the stage in this area.It succeeded on the WSA because the members worked closely with the planner who was willing tospend time to explain and simplify technical information before they [the WSA members] madedecisions. That’s what they [the MNR staff] should be doing- explain some of the forestry technicaljargon so that we are at least talking from the same points of view.The views expressed by the three respondents above dispel some of the myths about thedecision-making capabilities of citizens’ groups in co-management of natural resources. For instance,all three respondents above characterized the long time they had spent living in the area, their workand life experiences, as sufficient conditions to make intelligent land-use decisions. Although thischaracterization may be overstated, it underscores the relevance and value of local user knowledgein land-use planning and decision-making processes. The views expressed by the three respondents90above also show that members of citizen’s groups are not without professional qualifications relevantto land-use discussions. They also point to the need for collaboration between resource planners andthe citizens’ groups. These are the same findings by Usher (1987) and advanced by Armour (1992)in her model of cooperative decision-making, and noted by Filyk and Côté (1992). Usher (1987)argued that citizens’ groups can make decisions based on their local knowledge of the area and ontechnical information presented to them in simpler formats.In this case, the MNR played the role of both plan-maker and manager rather than facilitatorand collaborator. The MNR did not collaborate with the CPC in the production of managementoptions and zoning decisions; it made all the decisions. Therefore, the MNR put emphasis ontechnical knowledge to the exclusion of the local knowledge of the citizen’s group - the CPC. Thefact that the CPC did not participate in the framing of the decisions but was asked by the MNR topresent the decisions it did not understand to the public, amounted to cooptation by the MNR. TheMNR asked the CPC to rubberstamp its decisions.Therefore, the redistribution of decision-making from Ontario (through the MNR) to the CPCdid not take place. As in the past, the MNR made all the decisions and controlled the informationused in the comprehensive planning process, thereby limiting further the distribution of decisionmaking to the CPC. Based on the foregoing analysis, on Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizenparticipation (Figure 15), the CPC involvement in co-management involved degrees of tokenism frominforming to placation. Similarly, on Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-makingevaluation framework (Figure 16), the CPC’s involvement in co-management was confined to the firstthree levels (information, persuasion, and consultation).918 Citizen controlDegress of7 Delegated powercitizen power6 Partnership Ontano implied the CPC IThe level of participationwas operating at under Ico-management5 Placation4 Consultation <EEEEEEEEJ in MNR decision-making under} Degrees of Actaal range ofCPC participation_______________________________________tokenism co-management3 Informing2 TherapyNon1 Manipulation participationFigure 15: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation under co-management onArnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).Decision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation CooperationThe decision The decision The problem is The limi3...- The decision isis made and is made and submitted, made by thethe public an effort is opinionsj- the decision is public, whichis informed made to JIøt, the shared with assumes a roleconvincej3fr decision is and made of publicJ1J.iC made together with responsibility_ the publicI Public participationThe actual levels of CPCparticipation and decision-making under co-managementThe implied level by Ontario ofCPC participation and decision-making under co-managementFigure 16: The implied and actual levels ofthe CPC participation and decision-making under comanagement on Parenteau’s evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).923.2.2.1.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)For the WSA, the results in Table 6 show that all respondents (N=49) said the WSA madedecisions on its own behalf. The respondents also noted that of the 20 decisions made by the WSA,none was implemented due to a lack of legislative authority by the WSA and Ontario’s unilateraltermination ofthe WSA. Out of 63 respondents, 68% said that the WSA was occasionally preemptedby state agencies such as the MNR and the Ministry ofNorthern Development and Mines (MNDM)(Table 6). These instances generally involved issuance of land-use permits or renewal of permits bythe MNR and the MNDM within the WSA boundaries without the knowledge and consent of theWSA (see Appendix 2). Three such instances included: (a) an attempt by the MNR to issue a land-use permit to build a dock; (b) renewal of a land-use permit by the MNR for a tourist lodge operator;and (c) renewal of mining leases in the WSA area by the MNDM.The lack of implementation of the WSA decisions and the three instances of preemption aboveare explored in detail. These instances test the distribution of decision-making between Ontario andthe WSA. According to Ontario, the WSA was supposed to plan, evaluate, decide, implement,enforce, regulate, and monitor all uses of and activities on the land within its area ofjurisdiction(MNR 1990; OEC 1991b).Both Ontario and the TAA established the WSA as a decision-making body rather than anadvisory body (MNR 1990; MNR 1991). As highlighted earlier, then Minister ofNatural Resources,Honourable Bud Wildman, announced on August 17, 1992 that legislation empowering the WSA tomake decisions was already introduced in Cabinet and was on the order list. However, two93respondents representing Ontario in the respondent category “establishing agency” said that suchlegislation was never introduced in Cabinet (3A, 3D). As noted earlier, 63% of the respondents saidthat the lack of legislation meant the WSA could not implement its decisions. This also became apotential source of preemption of the WSA’s defacto authority by the MNR and the MNDM; thelatter two having dejure authority over Crown lands in Ontario (2J).In a memorandum sent to the establishing agencies (Ontario and the TAA) on July 29, 1993,the WSA demanded reassurance on continued funding and the status of its plan. The WSA wantedto know if additional funds were going to be provided to complete its 20-year Forest StewardshipPlan and if its plan would be implemented (WSA 1993:1). While Ontario provided the additionalfunds to the WSA for a year, it did not reassure the WSA on the status of the WSA plan (2B, 2D,2E, 2H). On the other hand, the TAA reassured the WSA that irrespective of the outcome of thenegotiations, either the WSA or an appropriate body mutually agreed upon between Ontario and theTAA would implement the plan (2B, 2E, 2H, 21). Yet, Ontario proceeded unilaterally in January1994 to terminate the WSA on March 31, 1994 through a memorandum from the Ontario NativeAffairs Secretariat (ONAS 1994).The evidence above suggests that Ontario never intended to confer the necessary legislativeauthority to the WSA as earlier promised. The WSA spent three years developing a plan that it couldnot implement in the end. Ontario’s unilateral termination of the WSA without the TAA’s consentalso suggests that Ontario preempted the TAXs authority; the co-sponsor of the WSA initiative.Arnstein (1969) characterized this form of public participation as “placation,” where citizens areallowed to plan ad infinitum but retain for the powerholders the right to decide the citizen board’sfate.94Onpreemption, a resident’s dock accidentally burnt down within the WSA area in 1992. Theresident required a Land Use Permit (LUP) to rebuild his dock and therefore, he approached theWSA for a LUP (2A, 2D, 2G, 2H). Since the WSA had not yet developed the necessaryadministrative forms within a year of its operation, the resident was asked to obtain the LUPapplication forms from the IvINR for WSA approval. The MNR rejected the request because it feltthat the WSA had no legislative authority to issue permits (1A, 1B, 2A, 2D, 2G, 2H). However, theWSA obtained the application forms from the MNR after three weeks of heated debate betweenthem. The WSA finally issued the permit to the applicant (2A, 2D, 2H).In the second instance, the MI\TR renewed a LUP for a tourist lodge operator within the WSAarea without the WSA’s knowledge or consent, an act confirmed by both WSA and MNRrespondents. The MNR respondents cited the same reason that, the WSA had no legislative authorityto issue permits on Crown lands (1A, 1B). Similarly, as noted by all WSA respondents (N1O), theIvINDM renewed mining leases within the WSA area for 21 years without the knowledge or consentofthe WSA. This renewal was further confirmed as having been made to 717953 Ontario Limited,a subsidiary ofMontclerg Resources Limited ofNorth York, Ontario (MNDM 1991).Another instance of preemption ofWSA authority by the MNR that was not mentioned byany ofthe respondents but discovered through secondary sources”, pertains to the issuance ofmoosehunting licences by the MNR within the WSA area. Moose hunting has taken place in the WSA areaevery year based on licences granted by the MNR without the WSA’s consent.These sources include MNR’s Moose Harvest Allocations for the years 1990-1994 in which moosequotas were set for the four townships covering the WSA Planning Area.95This analysis casts doubts on the WSA as a decision-making body; the status suggested bythe two establishing bodies - Ontario and the TAA. In a news release dated February 6, 1995 thenMinister ofNatural Resources, Howard Hampton, confirmed that the WSA decisions were in factrecommendations (MNR 1995); suggesting that the WSA served in an advisory rather than decision-making capacity. For instance, on the WSA’s decision not to use the Red Squirrel Road but theLiskeard Lumber Road to the north (see Figure 8), the news release stated, “..the economic, social,and environmental feasibility ofthe WSA recommendation that the road access to this area be gainedby the Liskeard Lumber Road rather than the Red Squirrel Road Extension shall be considered by theComprehensive Planning Councils (MNR 1995:1). But as discussed earlier, the MNR rather than theComprehensive Planning Council makes decisions about the comprehensive planning process. Thus,the MNR will ultimately assess the feasibility of the WSA’s decisions. Therefore, this releasesuggests that although the WSA made decisions, Ontario still reserved the right to judge thelegitimacy and feasibility of those decisions.On Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 17), this constituted HplacationHin the sense that WSA members made decisions but the MNR retained final authority to implementand judge the feasibility of those decisions. This relegated the WSA to an advisory status. Threepoints cast doubt on the WSA as an exercise in genuine public participation. First, the centrality ofthe WSA planning area in the ‘Temagami Conflict’; second, the direction in the mandate that it reachesdecisions by consensus; and third, the lack of legislative authority for the WSA as promised byOntario. This suggests that the WSA was set up as a therapeutic exercise rather than genuine publicparticipation in decision-making. Arnstein argued that this form of participation is nonparticipationor simply “therapy” and concluded:96What makes this form of participation so invidious is that citizens are engaged in extensiveactivity, but the focus of it is on curing them of their ‘pathology’ rather than changing thecircumstances that created the pathology. (Arnstein 1969:218)Here, the WSA was engaged in an extensive activity of planning for four years. The focusof the planning exercise was on generating consensus over use of resources within the WSA area.However, at the centre ofthe Temagami Conflict’ was the issue of redistribution of decision-makingauthority to local levels. Rather than change the distribution of decision-making authority (thepathology), Ontario’s focus was on the WSA’s reaching decisions by consensus - thereby focusing onconflict resolution rather than the real cause of conflict.8 Citizen control___________________I Degress of The range of participation7 Delegated powercitizen power.‘—-- levels Ontario implied the_________________________________________WSA was operating at6 Partnership5 Placation__]4 Consultation Degrees of Acal range ofWSAI tokenism zzJ participation levelsI under co-management3 Informing2 Therapy 1NonI participation1 Manipulation __JFigure 17: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation under co-management onArnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).97Similarly, on Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluationframework (Figure 18), the WSA process was designed at most to serve °consultation” and notcooperation or control as implied by the establishing agencies. While the WSA had defacto authorityto make decisions, it lacked the authority to implement those decisions. In this case, the WSA simplyexpressed its opinions whose feasibility will be determined by the MNR.Actual level ofWSA’spublic participation anddecision-making underco-managementThe range of public participationand decision-making that Ontarioand the TAA implied the WSAwould operate atFigure 18: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation and decision-making under comanagement on Parenteau’s evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).Decision-rn akin g powerInformation Persuasion Consultation CooperationThe decision The decision The problem is The limi_...— The decision isis made and is made and submitted, j4iied, made by thethe public an effort is opinions the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvince.— decision is and made of publicj1k made together with responsibilitythe publicPublic participation983.2.2.2 Distributions ofAuthorityThree questions were posed to examine the levels of authority conferred by the state to theco-management agencies under study. A summary of the responses is shown in Table 7. Appendix2 lists detailed responses to the questions. The questions were:• what is the source of this decision-making authority?;• what are the stated management functions?; and• which of those functions are actually performed/not performed by the agency?As discussed earlier, the MNR derived its authority to make decisions over natural resourcesprimarily from the Natural Resources Act (R.S.O. 1980). In order to understand and evaluate thesources of authority of the two co-management agencies under study, a review of the mechanismsby which Ontario has conferred authority to local levels in the past is necessary. The mechanismsinclude:(a) Acts of the Legislature [e.g., the Forest Authorities Act (R.S.O. 1980) under which theAlgonquin Forest Authority was created; and the Conservation Authorities Act (R.S.O. 1980)under which 38 Conservation Authorities were created in Ontario by 1987 (ACAO 19871;(b) Memoranda ofUnderstanding (MOU) signed between Ontario and the incumbent resourcemanagement agencies (e.g., with the four pilot community forestry projects in Ontarioinvolving the communities of Geraldton, Hearst, Wikwemikong, and Elk Lake); and(c) Orders-In-Council (OIC).99Table 7: Summary results pertaining to distributions of authority from the state to the comanagement agencies under study.Interview Responses No. of Total No. of % ofQuestion pertaining to the respondents respondents respondentsAgency mentioning mentioningitem itemCPC1. What is the source of • Order-In-Council 15 15 100this decision-making WSAauthority? Order-In-Council, MOU 14 14 100Order-In-Council, MOU, TAA 07 14 50General Assembly ResolutionCpC2. What are the stated Recommend a comprehensive plan; 1 1 1 1 100management establish and manage the publicfunctions? consultation process; provide advice tothe MNR and TAA on ongoing land[reference made by use planning and resource mgmt. issuesrespondents to the two and decisions; and provide advice toOrders-In-Council the Minister ofNatural Resources on1145/91 and 1434/931 -+ mechanisms to allow other parties’input into the negotiations between theTAA & Ontario.WSA[reference made by Plan, decide, implement, enforce, 10 10 100respondents to the Order- regulate, monitor, and undertakeIn-Council 1 144/91 and studies of, all uses in the area of itsSchedule A of the jurisdiction -- and report its findingsAddendum to the from time to time to the TAA andMOU] -, Ontario.CPC3. Which of those Advised the minister on Treaty of Co- 15 15 100functions are actually existence public consultationsperformed/not . Made recommendations to theperformed by the Minister on the CTMPagency? • Recommendations on the CTMP didnot go to the TAARecommended to the Ministerrevised CPC planning objectives andmission goalsWe have not recommended a plan yetto the Minister and TAAWSAPerformed all except long-term 14 14 100management (implementation) becausethe WSA was terminated on March 31,1994 &_lacked_legislation.100Authority conveyed through an Act of the Legislature represents the highest form of authoritythat can be conveyed by a Province (e.g., Ontario) to the local levels. Both MOUs and OICs areCabinet-level decisions without legislative force. An MOU is a private agreement reached betweena Province (e.g., Ontario) and a specific entity (e.g., the TAA) to carry out certain tasks. Byimplication, an MOU is a private contract that could be enforceable under Contract Law. However,the terms of an MOU are often phrased so that it deviates from the conditions enforceable underContract Law (pers. comm. with Prof. Douglas Sanders, Faculty of Law, UBC. May 12, 1995).Although an OIC is made pursuant to a Provincial Statute (e.g., Natural Resources Act, R.S.O.1980), it camiot itself change the Statute (pers. comm. with Prof. Douglas Sanders, Faculty of Law,UBC. May 12, 1995). This implies that legislative authority cannot be conferred through an OICas the parent statute will specify the locus of authority. For instance, OICs created pursuant to theNatural Resources Act are subject to the legislative authority of the MNR. Therefore, authorityconferred through both MOUs and OICs is subject to usurpation by those agencies with thelegislative authority.3.2.2.2.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)With the CPC, like its predecessor the TAC, the results in Table 7 show that its authority wasnot legislated but rather conferred through an OIC (OEC 1991a, 1993a). The implication is that theCPC’s decisions or recommendations were non-binding.However, as highlighted earlier, the CPC understood its role within the advisory capacity toinvolve some degree of decision-making power; and hence the concern that it was preempted and101coopted by the MNR. According to the CPC mandate specified in Orders-In-Council 1145/91 and1434/93, the following functions, which are also listed in Table 7, are stated:(a) recommend to the Minister ofNatural Resources and Executive Council of the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai a comprehensive plan;(b) establish and manage the public consultation process in the development of the comprehensiveplan;(c) provide advice, while the comprehensive plan is being developed, to the Ministry ofNaturalResources and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai on ongoing land use planning and resourcemanagement issues and decisions; and(d) provide advice to the Minister of Natural Resources regarding alternative and preferredmechanisms to allow other parties’ input into the negotiations between the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai and the Province of Ontario with respect to the implementation of theMemorandum ofUnderstanding. (OEC 1991 a, 1993 a).The mandate ofthe CPC as described above has created confusion between both the CPC andthe MNR; the functions listed do not explicitly define the authority of the CPC within its advisoryrole. Clauses (a) and (d) above suggest that the CPC was responsible to the Minister ofNaturalResources. This would imply that the CPC had some degree of decision-making power; a view heldby 45% ofCPC respondents (Appendix 2). In Clause (b) above, this view is rather strengthened inthat for the CPC to establish and manage a public consultation process in the development of thecomprehensive plan, it would have to arrive at a set of decisions and implement those decisions.However, Clauses (a), (b), and (d) above do not deal directly with the day-to-day decision-makingand authority role requirements of the CPC; they relate to peripheral responsibilities of the CPC inrecommending a plan to the Minister.102In Clause (c) above, which is central to the co-management arrangement, the locus ofauthority to make decisions is implicitly identified and the role of the CPC specified. From a comanagement point ofview, this clause tests if decision-making authority was shared between the CPCand the MNR. The Clause states that the CPC advises the MNR on ongoing land use planning andresource management issues and decisions. Implicit in this Clause is that decisions are made by theMNR. Therefore, the CPC’s advisory role above did not coincide with the levels of authoritynecessary to execute its functions. The CPC did not share authority with the MNR. However, theCPCs lack of ‘advisory’ authority coincided with the provisions of an OIC; that is, decisions orrecommendations of the CPC were non-binding.3.2.2.2.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)According to the results presented in Table 7, the WSA derived its authority from both anOIC # 1144/91 (OEC 1991b) and an MOU (MNR 1991). Like the CPC, the WSA’s authority wasnot legislated and therefore, despite having been created as a decision-making body, its authority wasstill subject to usurpation by those with legislative authority. As noted earlier, the WSA’s authoritywas preempted by both the MNR and the MNDM both ofwhich are government agencies.A review of the OIC (OEC 1991b) and the MOU (MNR 1991) above revealed notabledifferences in the specification of the WSA mandate. Any reference to the WSA mandate in theabove OIC was under Clause 1 in which two functions were stated: “...to evaluate and plan for landuses and resource management in the area ofjurisdiction” (DEC 1991b). In the MOU, the followingmandate of the WSA was specified (MNR 1991):103(a) The Wendaban Stewardship Authority shall monitor, undertake studies of, and planfor, all uses of and activities on the land within its area ofjurisdiction, and report itsfindings from time to time to the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario; and(b) It is the intention of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario to assignresponsibility to the Wendaban Stewardship Authority to plan, decide, implement,enforce, regulate, and monitor all uses of and activities on the land within its area ofjurisdiction.The only function common between what was specified in the OIC and the MOU is ‘plan’.Also missing from the list of functions in the MOU was ‘evaluate’. This function was originallyspecified in the OIC. Based on the MOU, the only functions the WSA had were those specified underClause (a): monitor; plan; and undertake studies. Clause (b) above only specifies the intent by bothOntario and the TAA to assign further responsibility to the WSA at some point in the future.However, as discussed earlier, Ontario never conferred the necessary legislation to the WSA. On theother hand, as said by 50% of WSA respondents in Table 7 above, the TAA passed a GeneralAssembly Resolution empowering the WSA to exercise all functions listed under Clause (b) of theMOU (WSA 1994:11). Without legislation coming from Ontario, the WSA used these three sourcesof authority (OIC, MOU, TAA Resolution) to exercise its functions (WSA 1994:11).All 10 WSA respondents and all four (4) establishing agency respondents agreed that theWSA performed all functions except “implementation” of its decisions due to a lack of legislativeauthority and because the WSA was terminated by Ontario on March 31, 1994 (Table 7-- see alsoAppendix 2 for details). Several examples ofmanagement functions performed were given by WSArespondents:104• the hiring of a Forest Steward whose sole function was monitoring (monitor);• a set of 20 decisions made in their Forest Stewardship Plan (WSA 1994:x-xi) (decide);• an enforcement issue the WSA had to deal with involving a splinter group (calling itself theMaKominising Anishnabeg) within the TAA that illegally cut some old-growth red and whitepine trees within the WSA area (enforce);• the issuance of a dock building permit to an applicant (regulate);• two studies undertaken by the WSA involving an ecological sensitivity to disturbance ratingof their planning area, and a traditional knowledge study (undertake studies of); and• production of a 20-year Forest Stewardship Plan (plan).While all the functions above apply to the WSA mandate as specified in the OIC (OEC 1991b)and the MOU (MNR 1991), what is missing from the list, as noted by all 14 respondents in Table 7,is ‘implementation’. However, what the respondents failed to note is that under Clause 7 of the OIC(MNR 1991), it is stated that the term of the WSA would be for the period commencing with the dateof approval of the OIC (May 16, 1991) and extending to April 23, 1993. This does not signal anintention by both sponsoring bodies (Ontario and TAA) in having the WSA plan implemented by theWSA as promised under Clause (b) of the MOU. A mandate of three (3) years is not sufficient toplan and implement a 20-year plan.The aimouncement made by the Minister ofNatural Resources on February 6, 1995 that thefeasibility of the WSA’s ‘recommendations’ would be decided by the CPC (MNR 1995a) alsosuggested that the WSA had no authority over decision-making. The announcement effectivelyreduced the WSA decisions to recommendations thereby relegating the WSA to an advisory status.The CPC being an advisory body to the MNR, and with no decision-making powers, also meant that105the feasibility ofWSA decisions would ultimately be decided by the MNR and not the CPC. Theannouncement also confirmed the point that both MOUs and OICs were subject to preemption bythose with legislative authority-- and in this case, the IvINR. Therefore, the WSA’s mandate did notcoincide with the level of authority necessary to execute its ftinctions as stated in the mandate.3.2.3 ConclusionsHow has co-management affected the distributions ofdecision-making authority to locallevels? The distributions of decision-making authority from the state to local levels under comanagement were not any different from the past. In the past, decision-making authority wasredistributed internally within the MNR. The levels of both the TAC and public’s involvement inMNR decision-making comprised degrees of tokenism from informing to placation. That is, therewas no true devolution of decision-making power from the MNR to the local levels. The TAC’sadvisory function to the MNR was constrained by the latter’s total control of information used in theplanning process. Although the TAC had a monitoring role within its advisory capacity, its authoritywas conferred through an OIC. As a Cabinet-level decision with no legislative force, the OIC meantthat the TAC’s decisions and/or recommendations were non-binding and subject to preemption by theIvfl’R.For the CPC, its involvement in co-management did not result in the redistribution ofdecision-making authority from the state to the CPC; the MNR retained decision-making authority.However, this is not to suggest that co-management failed; only it did not constitute true devolutionsof decision-making to local levels. As in the past, the levels of the CPC’s participation in the106CPCIIvINR planning process were confined to degrees of tokenism from informing to placation. Atthese levels, the citizens were informed by the MNR, the citizens attempted to inform the process butthe MNR controlled the information, and the citizens were not involved in the implementation of theMNR’s decisions. The implied levels by Ontario of CPC involvement through cooperation orpartnership with the MNR did not take place. Therefore, the case of the CPC/MNR did no representan ideal democratic institution. This is because the decisions supposedly codetermined between themdid not also involve common control over the means and conditions of decision-making-- theauthority to make decisions and the ability to suggest changes in policy or change policy itself.There was also a lack of clarity in the CPC mandate about what authority role the CPC playedwithin its advisory capacity. The fact that the MNR preempted the CPC’s decisions/recommendationsand coopted it into its decisions, also shows the failure of OICs as sources of authority particularlyin co-management arrangements that propose shared decision-making through cooperation orformation of partnerships. OICs may be suitable in co-management arrangements where citizens’groups act strictly in advisory roles with no authority to implement decisions. It is important that theparticipants are aware of such arrangements and their stipulated decision-making requirements fromthe outset.In the case of the WSA, both Ontario and the TAA created the WSA as a decision-makingbody rather than an advisory body. Whereas the WSA performed most of the functions specified inits mandate, including ‘decision-making’, it was not able to implement its decisions because it lackeddejure authority to do so. The focus in the WSA’s mandate was on conflict resolution rather thanthe principal cause of the conflict- the lack of devolution of decision-making authority to the local107level. Preemption ofWSA authority, albeit defacto, by state agencies such as the MNR and theMNDM also meant that those agencies retained final decision-making authority.The fact that the WSA was set up as a decision-making body but without the legislativeauthority to implement its decision-making, suggests that its involvement in co-managementcomprised degrees of tokenism. On Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation these wouldcomprise ‘informing’, ‘consultation’, and ‘placation’. Again, this is not to suggest that co-managementfailed in this case. To the contrary, it worked internally because both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal representatives on the Authority were able to reach mutually acceptable decisions throughconsensus. Most of the broader publics also supported those decisions.However, the inadequacy of the WSA co-management model speaks to the failure by Ontarioto delegate the legislative authority necessary for the WSA to implement its decisions. Initially,Ontario had promised to delegate such authority to the WSA. In the same vein, Ontario unilaterallyterminated the WSA before a replacement body was set up and reduced the WSA’s decisions torecommendations. This casts doubts on Ontario’s sincerity in its offer of co-management in the area.In the past, as in the present, OICs and MOUs have both failed to confer the authoritynecessary for meaningful local involvement in resource management; that is, at the upper rungs onArnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation. As witnessed from the three cases above (TAC,CPC, WSA), these instruments were suitable in cases where co-management simply entailedopportunities for local citizens’ groups to get involved in resource management discussions (e.g., theTAC and the CPC). They were not ideal in a case that demanded true devolution of decision-makingauthority and implementation of decisions by the citizens’ group (e.g., the WSA).108Therefore, co-management arrangements designed to delegate decision-making authority tolocal levels require political rather than administrative decentralization of such authority. Politicaldecentralization would include actual delegations of decision-making power through Acts of theLegislature, as compared to administrative decentralization that relies on varying degrees ofdevolution of responsibility but not authority. This also means that the authority roles of citizens’advisory bodies need to be redefined in a context that assures control of their decision-making thatprecede provision of advice.Participation by stakeholders in co-management is one facet; the other is participation of thebroader publics in such arrangements. How did the co-management agencies share decision-makingwith the local publics or users? This question is explored in the following section.3.3 Distribution of decision-making from the Co-management Agencies to the publicAs highlighted earlier, the involvement of stakeholder groups in co-management is not asufficient condition alone to gauge the levels of public participation in resource management at locallevels. While such groups represent specific local interests, they may not always represent all thelocal users and concerned citizens in the area, Sometimes, only the most vocal groups or individualsare nominated to local management boards. Therefore, it was felt necessary in this study to evaluatethe levels ofpublic involvement in the planning and decision-making processes of the co-managementagencies as well.109Five questions were posed to evaluate the levels and influence of public participation in theCPC and WSA’s planning and decision-making processes. The questions are:• was pertinent information made available to all interests in the area?;• what methods of public participation did the/your agency use?;* what were the key issues raised at the public meetings?;• did those issues influence agency decisions?; and• what evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource usersand the agency (CPC or WSA)?.The first four questions and their responses are listed in Appendix 2 under the category“public participation”. The responses to the fifth question are listed in Appendix 3 under the category“cooperation”.For the purposes of analysis, the first four questions were classified into three themes:information; methods; and key issues. Using pattern matching, some sub-themes emerged from thedata. The public participation processes of the two agencies in this study were compared using thesesub-themes. Under information emerged three sub-themes: volume of information provided; time ofdelivery of information to the public; and complexity of information. Under methods emerged twosub-themes: proactive methods; and reactive methods. Under key issues emerged two sub-themes:resource-related issues; and process-related issues.110Analysis was done on three resource-related issues common among all three categories ofrespondents (CPC, WSA, and the public). The issues are: road access; land availabilityfor mining;and old-growthprotection (Table 8). Similarly, two process-related issues common among all threecategories of respondents were analyzed. The issues are: needfor watershed-basedplanning; andlack ofprovincialfocus in planning (Table 8).In addition, one process-related issue common between the agency (CPC or WSA) and publicrespondents was analyzed. Between the CPC and public respondents the common process-relatedissue raised was lack ofclarity of the planning process. Between the WSA and public respondents,the common issue raised was a zoning decision that excluded a major canoe route (Table 8). Table8 also provides a summary of the responses to the five questions and the agencies’ performance onthose questions.111Table 8: Summary results pertaining to distributions ofdecision-making from the co-management agencies (CPC and WSA)to the general public.Interview Question Agency performanceWas pertinent information made CPC WSAavailable to all interests in the area?low medium f high low medium highVolume of information provided / /Comment: -, provided too much provided little to adequateDeliveiy of information in time / /Comment: not provided in time provided in time/not in timeComplexity of information / /Comment — too complex easy to understandWhat methods of public participation did Agency Performancethe/your agency use?CPC WSAMethods .low medium high low medium high1. Open house meeting (reactive) /Comment: —‘ Used in early stage of planning N/A2. Write-in (reactive) / /Comment: — Used in middle stage of planning Used in late stage of planning3. Accessible office and records (reactive) /Comment: N/A Used throughout planning4. Workshop (proactive) I IComment: * Used only in middle & not early stage Used in both early & middle stages5. Public presentation (proactive) / /Comment: Used in both early and middle stages Not encouraged but used somewhat6. General meeting open to public (proactive) /Comment: N/A Used throughout course of planningWhat were the key issues raised at the Influence on Agency Decisionspublic meetings and did those issuesinfluence agency decisions? CPC WSAKey Issues Yes No Yes NoRoad access / /Land availability for mining / /Old-growth protection/mgmt. / /Watershed-based planning / /Lack of provincial focus / /Lack of clarity of the planning process / N/A N/AZoning decision that excluded a canoe route N/A N/A /Totals 3 3 6 0What evidence of cooperative behaviour None Yesexists in agreement between resource with: tourist outfitters, guide outfitters,users and the agency (CPC or WSA)? — baitfish licensees, and timber industry.1123.3.1 Ontario’s Anticipated Levels of Public Participation in the Co-management Agencies’Planning and Decision-making ProcessesOntario saw the creation of both the CPC and the WSA as devolution of decision-makingfrom the state to the local level - the Temagami Area. Ontario also expected both the CPC and theWSA to genuinely involve the public in their planning and decision-making processes. That is, bothagencies were expected to redistribute decision-making to the local public by sharing decisions withthem.On Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 19) both the CPC and the WSAwere expected to engage into partnerships (level 6) with the local public. At level six, planning anddecision-making responsibilities are shared between the powerholders and the public.8 Citizen controlI Degress of7 Delegated power citizen powerOntario’s expected levelof public participation in [:iEEflDz.-6 Partnershipthe CPC and the WSA_____________________________decision-making processes5 Placation4 Consultation Degrees of___ __ ___ __ ___ __tokenism3 Informing2 Therapy_NonI participationManipulationFigure 19: Ontario’s expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA’s planningand decision-making processes on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adaptedfrom Arnstein 1969).113Similarly, on Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluationframework (Figure 20), both agencies were expected to cooperate with the public by sharingdecision-making responsibilities. Given these expectations, how did both the CPC and the WSAinvolve the public in their planning and decision-making processes?Decision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation CooperationThe decision The decision The problem is The limi3_. The decision isis made and is made and submitted, d7ed, made by thethe public an effort is opinions jc_- the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvince decision is and made of publicmade together with responsibility.__ the publicPublic participationExpected level of publicparticipation in the CPC andthe WSA planning anddecision-making processesFigure 20: Ontario’s expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA’s planningand decision-making processes on Parenteau’s evaluation framework (Adapted fromParenteau 1988).1143.3.2 Cross-case AnalysisAccording to Arnstein (1969), informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and optionscan be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation. However, both Arnstein’s(1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks donot explicitly coordinate participation with quality of information provided to the public and methodsofparticipation used. These are important in ensuring two-way communication between officials andthe public. In particular, the volume of information provided, time ofdelivery of information, anddegree ofcomplexity ofinformation provided, are important information attributes and first steps inconsulting with the public.However, it is the methods used in consulting with the public that will ultimately determineifthere are two-way flows of information between officials and the public, by promoting conditionsconducive to shared decision-making. Reactive methods such as open house meetings, write-ins,pamphlets, and posters are characterized by one-way flows of information (Arnstein 1969). On theother hand, proactive methods such as workshops, public presentations, and general meetings open-to-the-public (where the public genuinely participates in meeting deliberations) are often characterizedby two-way flows of information between officials and the public. However, the effectiveness of aparticular method will ultimately depend on what stage of the planning process it was used.Generally, early and middle stages of planning processes entail problem identification, scoping, andanalysis; activities that are conducive to joint problem-solving public participation techniques-- orproactive methods. Reactive methods can be effective in the late stages of a planning process ifproactive methods were used in earlier stages.1153.3.2.1 Information and methods of participation used by the AgenciesFor the CPC, while there was general agreement among respondents (N=50) that it providedpertinent information to the public, such information was generally found by the respondents to beof large volume (80% of respondents); not provided in time, thereby restricting the time required formeaningful public review and feedback (86% of respondents); and too complex to comprehend (88%of respondents) (Table 8). In addition, the data in Table 8 show that the CPC used a combinationof reactive methods (open house meetings and write-ins) in the early and middle stages instead ofproactive methods. Proactive methods (workshops and public presentations) were mostly used inthe middle stage of its planning process (Table 8). The use of these methods by the CPC was alsoconfirmed through observation.Since the CPC scored negatively on all three information attributes above, the informationprovided did not accomplish its intended purpose of consulting with the public. Arnstein (1969)characterized this form of participation as “informing” in the sense that there was one-way flow ofinformation from the CPC to the public. Therefore, the CPC scored low on the theme “information”(Table 8). However, as discussed earlier, it must be noted that this information was all generated bythe MNR without the involvement of the CPC. By using more reactive than proactive methodsparticularly in the early and middle stages of its planning process, the CPC did not create jointproblem-solving opportunities or ‘partnerships’ with the public. The CPC’s use of reactive methodssuch as open house meetings in the early stage of its planning process is equivalent to “informing”-level three on Arnstein’s (1969) evaluation framework, and level one on Parenteau’s (1988) evaluationframework.116As highlighted earlier, infonning is characterized by one-way flows of information; a commoncharacteristic with open house meetings. The MNR has traditionally used open house meetings toconsult with the public in its TMP process. The CPC also used public presentations (a proactivemethod) in both early and middle stages of its planning process (Table 8). Therefore, generally, theCPC scored moderately on the theme “methods” (Table 8). However, it must be noted that the CPCwas in the middle stage of its planning process by the time this data was collected; the comprehensiveplanning process will not be completed until 1996.With the WSA, respondents (N=49) generally agreed that pertinent information was providedto the public in the planning process. They also agreed that the information provided by the WSAwas easy to understand (Table 8). However, there was almost an even split in opinions amongrespondents, between those who felt that the information provided by the WSA was little or adequate;and whether it was provided in time or not (Table 8). However, 5% of the public respondents(N=39) (Appendix 2) felt that there was no need for information to be provided in advance becausethe WSA process was developmental in nature. That is, the WSA and the attending public generatedthe information they needed during the meetings (41, 4L).Further evidence (WSA 1994) also revealed that the first public meeting held by the WSA onAugust 2, 1992 was for establishing citizen participation requirements with residents in the area. Atthat meeting, the following requirements were agreed upon between the attending public and theWSA:• the need for public involvement in all stages of the planning process (goal setting,planning design, and actual sharing in decision-making and implementation);• the need for a feedback mechanism on public input utilization and/or non-utilization;117• use of small group workshops as an effective method for obtaining public input; and• provision of adequate information to the public in time and simplified language priorto and/or during public meetings (workshops), (WSA 1994:8).Of particular interest is the last point above, where both the WSA and the public agreedthat information would be provided by the WSA to the public before or during workshops. Thisconcurs with the earlier argument raised by 5% of the public respondents that the WSA’s planningprocess was developmental in nature and therefore, there was no need for information to be providedin advance. According to Arnstein (1969), partnerships are formed when citizen participationrequirements are negotiated between citizens and the powerholders, and where both agree to shareplanning and decision-making responsibilities. Local users also participated in the generation ofbackground information used in the WSA’s planning process (WSA 1994:13). Since the WSAprovided information that was easy to understand and partly generated by the public, the informationserved its intended purposes of consulting and ultimately sharing decisions with the public. On bothArnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluationframeworks, this constitutes levels 6 (partnership) and 4 (cooperation), respectively.The data in Table 8 also show that the WSA used a combination of reactive (accessible officerecords and write-ins) and proactive (workshops, general meetings open to the public, and publicpresentations) methods. These methods were also confirmed through observation as having beenused by the WSA. In particular, general meetings open to the public were proactive in nature in thesense that the public participated in the deliberations of the WSA meetings, thereby fostering two-waycommunications between the public and the WSA. Unlike the CPC, the WSA used both reactive andproactive methods at the right stages of the planning process (Table 8). In addition, they used moreproactive methods than the CPC (Table 8).118Notably absent from the WSA respondents’ (N=10) list of methods used was ‘publicpresentation.s that 33% of the public respondents (N=39) (see Appendix 2) cited as another methodused by the WSA. In a probing interview question to the WSA members, it was revealed that whilethe WSA condoned special public presentations, the method was not actively encouraged due tofinancial constraints (21). The WSA had an annual operating budget of $250,00012; convening aspecial meeting for a public presentation would cost the WSA a minimum of approximately $5,000($3,500 in members’ daily per diem payments and $1,500 on travel expenses) (21). However, reviewofWSA minutes13 revealed that the WSA had six special public presentations between February 9,1993 and March 8, 1994.Generally, the WSA scored highly on the theme “methods” (Table 8). On both Arnstein’s(1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, theWSA’s use of proactive methods at the right stages of the planning process entailed ‘partnerships’ or‘cooperation’, respectively.12 The audited financial statements of the WSA for 1992-93 showed that 70% of the $250,000 wasspent on staffing and members allowances; 17% on travel expenses, and the remainder of 13% onoffice, telephone, equipment, supplies, postage and shipping, and advertizing expenses. Costs forspecial public presentations would have come from the 70% and 13% above.13- WSA minutes of February 9, 1993 showed that two negotiators, one representing the TAA andanother representing ONAS (the sponsoring bodies) made presentations to the WSA on jurisdictionalmatters and their implications for the WSA.- WSA minutes ofMarch 9, 1993 showed that the Mayor of Latcbford made a presentation to theWSA on horse logging techniques and their possible applications to the WSA area.- WSA minutes ofMay 4, 1993 indicated that the MNDM made a presentation to the WSA onmining potential within the WSA planning area.- WSA minutes of August 13, 1993 outlined presentations made to the WSA by three environmentalgroups: Northwatch, Wildlands League, and Earthroots on old-growth protection.- WSA minutes of September 13, 1993 showed a presentation made by the MNR to the WSA on bearmanagement agreements within the WSA planning area.- WSA minutes of March 8, 1994 outlined presentations made to the WSA by the threeenvironmental groups: Northwatch, Wildlands League, and Earthroots on road access.1193.3.2.2 Key issues raised by the public and their influence on agency decisionsAccording to the results presented in Table 8, only 50% of the key issues raised by the publicat the CPC’s public meetings had influence on its decisions. This compares to 100% of all key issuesraised by the public at the WSA’s public meetings having had influence on its decisions. Tounderstand each agency’s performance, one issue that is central to the Temagami conflict is exploredin detail. The issue is ‘road access.’ In addition, a single issue that was specific to each agency isexplored in detail. For the CPC, the issue was ‘lack ofclarity of the planningprocess.’ For the WSA,the issue was ‘a zoning decision that excluded a niajor canoe route.’ However, it must beremembered that with the CPC, the MNR retained decision-making authority.3.3.2.2.1 Road AccessThe Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)Cross Lake Road is an illegal access road that emerged about 10 years ago within what is nowthe CPC/MNR planning area (5A). All 31 respondents (N=50) who raised the issue wanted the roadclosed because they contended that use of the road by the public had increased fishing pressure onCross Lake. Of the 31 respondents, 28 (90%) felt that the issue did not influence the CPCiMNR’sdecisions. They felt that political rather than biophysical concerns dictated the MNR’s decision tokeep the road open. According to CPC respondents, the CPC recommended to the MNR closure ofthe road and proposed an upgrade of an alternate road, the Bayjing Road. The CPC memberscontended that the proposed road would facilitate access to several lakes in the area that had not beenheavily fished in the past, thereby reducing pressure on Cross Lake (2K, 2L, 2U). However, the120MNR rejected the recommendation and therefore, the road is still open to public access (2L). Aprobing question was posed to MNR respondents (N=5) if indeed there was increased fishingpressure on Cross Lake due to the Cross Lake Road Access. Four (4) of the MNR respondentsagreed that there was increased fishing pressure on Cross Lake caused primarily by direct accessprovided by use of the Cross Lake Road (1B, 1C, 1D, 1E).According to two IVINR respondents (1C, 1E), the West Nipissing Access Group (WNAG),a local lobbying group opposed to any kind of restrictions on existing road access on Crown lands,threatened to lobby higher political levels if the road were closed. To avoid confrontation withWNAG, the MNE. decided to keep the road open (1C, 1E).It may be argued that the MNR weighed both sides to the argument before deciding to keepthe road open. However, the MNR conceded that there was fishing pressure on Cross Lake due tothe Cross Lake Road access. Yet, the MNR decided to keep the road open. This suggests that whilethe MNR heard the opinions expressed by both the CPC and public, it ignored those opinions in itsdecision-making. On both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decisionmaking evaluation frameworks, this constitutes ‘coniltation’; where public opinions are gathered anda decision is made that does not reflect those opinions. In this case, the MNR went against the publicand CPC’s recommendation to close the road; the latter being a planning counterpart to the MNR.Therefore, the CPC/MNR did not share its decisions with the public as the issue did not influence theCPC/MNR decisions (Table 8).121Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)For the WSA, the road issue pertained to the use/non-use of the Red Squirrel Road and itsExtension. As highlighted earlier, this road was at the centre of the ‘Temagami Conflict’. Proponentspreferred use of the road for various resource extraction and recreational activities. Opponents arguedagainst use of the road because they felt that it was built in an environmentally destructive manner(5C). Of the 32 respondents (N=19) who pointed out the issue as having been raised at the WSAmeetings, 27 (84%) felt the issue influenced the WSA decisions. The other five respondents (16%),who were all opposed to using the road, felt it did not.In its decisions, the WSA imposed the following restrictions on use of the Red Squirrel Roadand its Extension:• The Extension shall be maintained as a tertiary rather than primary or secondary forestaccess road;• Use ofthe Red Squirrel Road Extension for extractive purposes shall be limited to thewinter season. However, the Road Extension may be used for restoration andadministrative purposes such as monitoring, research, enforcement, etc., at all timesof the year including the summer;• The Red Squirrel Road Extension shall be gated both before Sharp Rock Inlet inCanton Township and at the western boundary of Shelburne Township, at all times;• The Road Extension is not necessary for access to the Cultural Heritage/Recreation-Tourism-Wilderness Zone within the four townships since current water access levelsare adequate; and• In view of the strong views on unrestricted use of the Red Squirrel Road, and toprevent access to Whitefish Bay, the members recommend that the existing gate atBarmack Lake in Aston Township be maintained. At such time as cottages aredeveloped in the Development Zone in Canton Township, those people would beissued keys on an honour system. Anyone else found in this area would be fined,(WSA 1994:ix)122The decisions above can be characterized as a compromise between the two opposingpositions on use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension. Based on the comments received fromseveral stakeholder groups such as the logging industry, recreationists, local Chambers of Commerce,tourist outfitters, environmental groups, and aboriginal people (the TAA), they all expressed theirsatisfaction with the WSA’s decisions over use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension’4. Thisanalysis shows that the WSA listened to the public’s opinions over use of the road and made decisionsthat reflected those opinions.By imposing restrictions on use of the road, final decisions adapted to both proponents’ andopponents’ views on the issue. On Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation anddecision-making evaluation frameworks this constitutes ‘partnership’ and ‘cooperation’ in that finaldecisions made reflected public opinions. Therefore, there was true sharing of decision-makingbetween the public and the WSA as the issue influenced the WSA decisions (Table 8).3.3.2.2.2 Lack of clarity of the planning processThis issue pertained only to the CPC. Respondents referred to the land-use scenarios andzoning options the CPCIMNR presented to the public for review in April, 1994. All 34 respondents(N=50) who raised the issue felt that this information was too confusing and unclear. They demandedthat the CPC clarify the information and the overall planning process (2M, 2N, 2Q, 4B, 4H). Ashighlighted earlier, these are the same land-use scenarios and zoning options generated exclusivelyby the IVINR without the involvement of the CPC; a situation that later caused embarrassment to thelatter at public meetings because the CPC members did not also understand the information.14 These groups submitted their comments to the WSA on the WSA’s Forest Stewardship Plan in whichthe decisions over use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension are contained.123Of the 34 respondents who raised the issue, 30 (8 8%) felt that the issue did not or was notgoing to influence the CPC/MNR decisions. They argued that the CPCIIvINR operated under tighttime schedules. They also contended that the lack of the CPC’s involvement in the MNR’s decisionsmade it unlikely that the issue would influence the CPC/MNR decisions. The other four (4)respondents said that they were not sure if the issue was going to influence the CPCflvINR’s decisionsor not. The 30 respondents above contended that the comprehensive planning process and theinformation generated from the process were likely to remain technical and complex in nature becauseof the IvINR’s control ofboth and its reluctance to simplify the technical jargon.The MNR respondents (N=5) were asked if the MNR would consider rewriting the land-usescenarios and zoning options in a simplified format before resubmitting them to the public. All fiverespondents replied that it would not be possible to do so due to financial and time constraints (IA,1B, 1C, 1D, 1E). Through observation, it was also confirmed that the CPC/MNR did not revise theland-use scenarios and management options. It did not also simplify the overall planning process asrequested by the public.Here, the CPC/M.NR gathered public opinions on the issue and made a decision that did notreflect those opinions. On both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation anddecision-making evaluation frameworks, this constitutes ‘consultation’. Therefore, there was no truesharing of decision-making as the issue did not influence the CPC/MNR decisions (Table 8).1243.3.2.2.3 A zoning decision that excluded a major canoe routeThis issue pertained only to the WSA. The issue emerged at a WSA public meeting held onOctober 30, 1993 (WSA 1993) to review the WSA’s zoning decisions. In its zoning decisions, theWSA omitted a major canoe route, locally known as Pinetorch, from within its Cultural Heritage-Recreation-Tourism-Wilderness (CH-RTW) Zone (WSA 1993:11). The public felt that the route wasan important heritage canoe route that linked the WSA area to the Lady Evelyn SmoothwaterWilderness Park. Therefore, they felt the WSA should include the route within its CH-RTW Zone.Of the 34 respondents (N=49) who pointed out the issue, 33 (97%) felt the issue hadinfluenced the WSA decisions (Appendix 2). Review of the WSA minutes also revealed that, at ameeting held on November 5, 199315, the WSA made a decision to include the Pinetorch CanoeRoute within the CH-RTW Zone (WSA 1993b). Here, the WSA collected public opinions over theissue and made a decision that incorporated those opinions.On both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-makingevaluation frameworks, this constitutes ‘partnership’ or ‘cooperation’, respectively. Therefore, therewas true sharing of decision-making as the issue influenced the WSA decisions (Table 8).15 This meeting was called by the WSA to specifically discuss public input into the WSAs zoningdecisions. Under Item I I of the minutes, a motion was passed to include the canoe route within theCH-RTW Zone.1253.3.2.3 Evidence of cooperation in agreement between the agencies and local usersThe final test on whether the two co-management agencies distributed decision-making to thelocal users was analyzed through evidence of cooperative behaviour (in agreement) between theagencies and the local users. For the CPC (N=50), the responses were overwhelmingly negative thatthere was no evidence of cooperation between the CPC and the public (92% of respondents) (Table8). The respondents felt that the public was not inclined to cooperate with the CPC because theyperceived the MNR to be driving the CPC planning process. The public was also fed up with theMNR (Appendix 3). However, 36% of the respondents also noted that it may have been prematureand too early in the planning process to tell if there would not be cooperation between the CPC andlocal users by the end ofthe planning process. The CPC planning process was still in its middle stageby the time these data were collected.For the WSA (N49), the responses were overwhelmingly positive that there was evidenceof cooperation in agreement between the WSA and several local users (82%) (Table 8). Examplescited by respondents included existing agreements between the WSA and a local baitfish licensee,several tourist operators, four guide outfitters, six trappers, and one logging company (Appendix 3).Review of the WSA Forest Stewardship Plan (WSA 1994:13) and minutes16 also confirmed theexistence of these agreements. The agreements stated the local users’ roles in monitoring theresources and in gathering of inventory information (WSA 1994:13).16 WSA 1993. WSA minutes of July 18, 1993; July 23, 1993; September 15, 1993; September 28,1993; and December 17, 1993, specil,’ the above agreements, respectively.126For instance, at a general meeting held on July 18, 1993, the WSA and a local baitfish licenseeagreed that the latter would collect inventory information on baitfish production within the WSA area.The licensee also agreed to use his own floater aircraft for that purpose. Local guide outfitters alsoagreed to stop baiting of bear as an unsustainable practice. Baiting of bear leads to overharvestingbecause it becomes easier for the bear hunters to spot and kill the bears. In addition, the outfittersagreed to submit information on bear harvested. Local trappers also agreed to maintain their harvestquotas and submit information on species and numbers harvested. Tourist operators also agreed toenforce fishing quotas and a catch-and-release program among their clients. In addition, they agreedto keep logs of all fish harvested by their clients. A local logging company agreed to employinnovative timber harvesting techniques aimed at reducing soil disturbance by limiting most of itsharvesting operations to the winter season. The company also agreed to experiment with horselogging in the area.3.3.3 ConclusionsHow has co-management affected the distributions ofdecision-making to local users? Thedistributions of decision-making from the co-management agencies to the local users have had variedresults. With the CPC, public participation in its planning process was not any different from the past(under the MNR). As in the past, information provided to the public was complex, highly technical,and generated exclusively by the MNR. While there was an effort by the CPC to use proactivemethods of public participation, reactive methods such as open-house meetings and write-ins stilldominated. These are the same methods traditionally used by the MNR in the past.127What is clear about the CPC is that it had no control over its planning process; the MNRretained decision-making authority. Both the CPC and the public raised the same issues about theCPC planning process and suggested similar changes. However, the MNR made the final decisionsas it reserved the right to judge the legitimacy and feasibility of such changes. The MNR had thelegislative authority. Often, the final decisions made by the MNR reflected the status quo; suggestingresistance to change and high propensity toward following rigidly defined rules and formalizedprocesses. For instance, the open-house meeting is one such formalized and rigidly defined processby the MNR (see Appendix 5).It is concluded that the lack of distribution of decision-making authority to the CPC, in turn,failed the distribution of decision-making to the local users. The level of public participation in theCPC process as initially anticipated by Ontario was not achieved. Public participation levels in theCPC process involved degrees of tokenism from informing to consultation; decisions were not sharedwith the public. In the end, the CPC-MNR co-management model did not significantly change thelocal power structure because neither the CPC nor the local publics were able to influence the IVINR’sdecisions. These findings are also consistent with Reed’s (1995:147) description of the Ignace comanagement model in northern Ontario.In the case ofthe WSA, both Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) achieved thelevels of public participation they anticipated; the WSA shared planning and decision-makingresponsibilities with the public. Information used in the planning process was of a quality generallyaccepted by the public. The public partly generated such information. Public participation methodsused in the early and middle stages of planning were proactive in nature; thereby fostering shareddecision-making. The WSA also made decisions that reflected the key issues raised by the public.128The above performance was possible due to the autonomy enjoyed by the WSA. Despite alack of legislative authority, the WSA made changes and adapted its planning process to the localsituation. Unlike the CPC, the WSA was not restricted to a formalized planning process with rigidlydefined rules. The absence of the MNR on its board meant that the WSA retained decision-makingauthority, albeit defacto, at the planning level.The WSA planning process fits the model described by Armour (1992) due to the followingreasons:• the WSA decentralized decision-making to the local users;• it planned with the people;• it allowed flexibility in its planning process;• it adapted local concerns into its planning process and decision-making;• it jointly defined the public participation requirements with the public; andit incorporated the knowledge of local users in its planning and decision-making.On both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluationframeworks the publics involvement in the WSA planning process constituted ‘partnerships’ and‘cooperation’, respectively (figures below).1298 Citizen conolDegress of7 Delegated power citizen power____________________6 PartnershipAcal level of public Iparticipation in the WSA’s Iplanning process5 Placationof Acal levels/nge of4 Consultation3 Informingtokenism public participation in theCPC’s planning process2 TherapyNon-1 Manipulation _J participationFigure 21: Actual levels of public participation in the CPC and WSA’s planning and decision-makingprocesses on Amstein’s ladder of citizen participation [Adapted from Arnstein (1969)].Decision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation Cooperation Cont!._-’The decision The decision The problem is The lim3..._ The decision isis made and is made and submitted, 4fied, made by thethe public an effort is opinions — the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvince. decision is and made of publicmade together with responsibilitythe publicI I Public participationActual levels of publicparticipation and decision-making in the CPC planningprocessActual level of publicparticipation in the WSAplanning and decision-making processFigure 22: Actual levels of public participation in the CPC and WSA’s planning and decision-makingprocesses on Parenteau’s evaluation framework [Adapted from Parenteau (1 988)].130CHAPTER 4THE SUBSTANCE OF DECISIONS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENTTo understand the substance of decisions made in the present (under co-management), it wasfelt necessary in this study to examine also the decisions made in the past (under the MNR) and theiroutcomes. Ontario created both the CPC and the WSA on the premises that their decisions wouldaddress the issues ofboth ecological and social sustainability. For instance, the CPC mandate impliedecological sustainability by directing the agency to plan comprehensively while that of the WSArequired that it planned based on the principles of sustainable development and sustained life17. Themandates also directed both agencies to establish public participation processes in their planning -implying social sustainability or equity.Lélé (1991) defined ecological sustainability as the “existence of the ecological conditionsnecessary to support human life at a specific level ofwell-being through future generations.” In thisdefinition is the notion of’carrying capacity’. This means that land can only support a limited numberofliving organisms over a specified time and at a given intensity of use. Social sustainability refersto the satisfaction of basic human needs such as food and shelter. It also includes other socialnecessities such as employment, education, recreation, security, and freedom as suggested by Maslow(1970).17 In the Addendum to the MOU establishing the WSA, the following definitions of SustainableDevelopment and Sustained Life are given:Sustainable Development shall mean:” development that meets the needs of the present withoutcompromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987);Sustained Life shall mean: “the enduring cycle whereby currently living organisms live, then mustdie, fall to the earth, become decomposed, be combined with elements from earth, air, and water togive continuing life to the land, including all biological life forms within it. Sustained life emphasizesthe self-renewal of the land through the life, death and rec1c1ing of current life to provide nutrients incombination with earth, air, and water that will support ccintinuous life.”131In this study, ecological sustainability was interpreted to mean how the management agenciesaddressed environmental and other biophysical concerns in the Temagami Area. Social sustainabilitywas interpreted to mean how the management agencies addressed the issues of access to resources(distributional equity) and inclusivity in decision-making as suggested by Boothroyd (1991).Nine questions were posed to 65 respondents in order to examine the substance of decisionsmade both in the past and in the present. Table 9 summarizes the responses to the questions. Thequestions are:(a) what were the environmental and other biophysical concerns in the past?;(b) how were those concerns addressed in the past?;(c) what are the environmental and other biophysical concerns now?;(d) how have those concerns been addressed?;(e) how were resources allocated in the past?;(f) how are resources allocated now?;(g) who made the decisions in the past?;(h) who makes the decisions now?; and(i) how different are current decisions from those made in the past?Through pattern matching, two biophysical concerns of old-growth red and white pineprotection and the primacy of timber in planning were identified and selected for analysis (Table 9).These are explored in detail. These concerns lie at the root of the “Temagami Conflict.” In addition,the question of access to timber was also selected and is explored in detail because it deals with theissue of distributional equity.132Table 9: Summary results on the substance of decisions made both in the past and in the present.Environmental &Biophysical Concerns1. Protect old-growthred and white pine3. Ban Importation oflive baiffish into thearea to control theintroduction ofzebra mussels intolocal waters4. Stop primacy oftimber in planning-lack of integration• An area was zonedfor protectionTimber prescriptionsalso designed toprotect old growth• Formed partnershipswith TouristOutfitters tomonitor pressure &enforce limitsFish yields notestimated andallocations not madeon water bodieswithout inventoryinformationA ban onimportation of livebaiffish into the areawas decidedAll values weretreated equally-plannedcomprehensivelyN’74 [All Respondents]Decision to Past Presentbe made MNR — CPC — WSAOutcome % Outcome % Outcome %2. Monitor fishingpressureMNR made timberallocations insteadInitiated some studiesEnforcement throughpatrols not sufficientNothing was donePrimacy of timber inplanning continued79218291846975679698• Decisions not yetknown, plan notcompleteLikely to protectold-growth• Decisions not yetknown, plan notcompleteDecisions not yetknown, plan notcompleteNo longer primacyof timber butcomprehensiveplanning896277819395Resource Allocation1. Timber Not fair, timber was 88 • Likely to be the 74 . First right of refusal 86allocated to mills same as in the past was granted to localoutside Temagami due to restrictive timber companiesArea; aboriginal MNR policies and aboriginalpeople were excluded people (the TAA)Decision-making1. Who made/makes • MNR made all the 98 Now local citizens 93 • Now local citizens 99the decisions? decisions are involved make decisions2. Differences in • separately treated land 88 . combined land use 97 . combined land use 94decisions made: -+ use & resour. mgmt. & resource mgmt. & resource mgmt.. Emphasized timber 90 . Emphasized all 87 . Emphasized all 95values values• Less participatory 92 • More participatory 76 . More participatory 81Lacked local focus 94 . Have local focus 82 Have local focus 841334.1 The Substance of Decisions made in the Past (under MNR)Generally, the results presented in Table 9 show that the decisions made by the MNR in thepast were not ecologically sustainable. The results also show that the decisions were not equitablefrom a local point of view.4.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protectionAccording to 79% of the respondents (N=74) (Table 9), the MNR continued to allocate old-growth red and white pine stands in the Temagami Area despite public opposition. The MNR’sactions culminated into a decision in 1988 to construct both the Goulard and Red Squirrel RoadExtensions. As discussed earlier, the MNR intended both roads to provide access to the largestcontiguous stand of red and white pine in North America to two companies: Goulard Lumber; andWm. Mime Lumber. The public characterized the IVINR’s decision as ecologically unsustainable(Quinby 1988) because the allocated stand was the only one of its size (2,500 ha) and compositionnot only in Temagami but the whole of North America. The public also viewed the decision ascompromising values other than timber (Quinby 1988). According to Hodgins and Benidickson(1989), it was this decision that precipitated the “Temagami Conflict”. Ross (1993) also noted thatit was this conflict that ultimately led to the formation of the CPC and the WSA to undertakecomprehensive planning in the area and address the various conflicts over resource allocation androad access.134The evidence above shows that the MNR’s lack of policy on old-growth conservation in thepast, led to a decision that was both ecologically and socially unsustainable in the Temagami Area.The decision was socially unsustainable because it also became a source of conflict in the area.However, as noted by 21% of the respondents in Table 9, Ontario also responded withanother initiative aimed at studying the old-growth issue. In January 1992, then Minister ofNaturalResources, Honourable Bud Wildman, established the Old Growth Conservation Initiative (MNR.1992). Central to this initiative was the Old Growth Policy Advisory Committee (PAC). The PAC’smandate was to develop recommendations for conserving old growth forest ecosystems in Ontario.In June, 1993, the PAC submitted its recommendations to the Minister ofNatural Resources outliningcandidate areas for old-growth red and white pine protection in Ontario. The Policy AdvisoryCommittee submitted another report in August, 1993 outlining protection of other forest ecosystemsin Ontario (PAC 1993).4.1.2 Primacy of timber in planningAccording to 84% of respondents (N=74) (Table 9), the primacy of timber in resourcemanagement planning was the norm in the past. The respondents characterized the IvINR’s land-useand resource management planning processes as less integrative and less participatory than in thepresent, centralized, lacked a local focus, uncoordinated, skewed toward timber management,ecologically insensitive, and conflict-ridden. As one of the key informants in this study put it:In effect, what the IVINR has been calling forest or resource management all along was simplytimber management. You can go there [to the MNRJ even today and you will not find a standalone fish management plan, wildlife plan, or cultural heritage plan. In this area [Temagami]they have not even come up with plans for parks yet. All this has done is pit everybody elseagainst the timber industry. There are no winners in this case; we are all losers, (5C).135One public respondent also summarized her views on MNR’s past management as follows:They [the MNR staffJ ceased to do planning, all they were doing is following cookbooks.First, the Strategic Land Use Plans; second, the District Land Use Guidelines; and thenTimber Management Guidelines. All these cookbooks provided was a best recipe for conflictbecause what was always on the menu was timber, timber, timber and there was only onecook- the MNR, (4D).Hodgins and Benidickson (1989) described the primacy of timber in resource managementplanning by the MNR as the root cause ofthe ‘Temagami Conflict’. As described by the respondentsabove, the primacy of timber in planning meant that all other resources were planned for from atimber management point of view. It was observed that, to this date, there are planning documentslike: Timber Management Guidelines for the Protection of Fish Habitat (MNP. 1988); TimberManagement Guidelines for the Provision of Moose Habitat (MNR 1989); Timber ManagementGuidelines for the Protection ofTourism Values (IvINR 1987), and the list goes on to include culturalheritage, wetlands, and water quality. Timber management planning treated other values such asthose listed above as “Areas ofConcern (AOC)” (IvINR 1986b); there were no separate managementplans written for those values. An AOC is defined as a geographical area of value to non-timber usersor uses which could be affected by forestry operations, and which may require modifications to thoseoperations (MNR 1987). As the definition implies, other values could only be managed for bymodifying timber management operations.These findings above are the same views expressed by Benson (1982) and later echoed byBaskerville (1986). In his report entitled “Forest Management in n ‘Daki Menan”, Benson (1982)argued that MNR’s approach to forest management that emphasized timber, jeopardized the integrityof other values. Benson (1982) proposed a more holistic approach that respected public concerns136and dealt with all values equally within a single planning framework. Benson’s argument above waslater echoed by Baskerville (1986) in his report, “An Audit ofManagement of Crown Forests ofOntario.” Baskerville (1986:42) concluded:The approach used to integration of timber with non-timber values is based on localjudgement with no objectively measurable standards.... The approach to discovering publicopinion about planning issues is open, but it is being used to justiiy actions (or inactions)rather than to determine what values the public expect from the resource so that managementcan be designed to achieve those values to the extent possible.Both the Strategic Land Use Plans (SLUP) and District Land Use Guidelines (DLUG) pointedout by the public respondents (4D) above, were conceived at regional and district levels, respectively(Brozowski and King-Fisher 1994). This means that land use planning was centralized at higherlevels. Resource management planning took place at local levels; thereby separating land useplanning from resource management planning (Figure 23). However, at the local levels, the onlyplanning manual that existed was for timber management (MNR 1986b); other values weresimply managed for as AOCs. Therefore, SLUPs, DLUGs and Timber management Guidelines failedto adapt management to local concerns of integrating timber with other values. As noted by publicrespondent (4D) above, the outcome was conflict among various stakeholders in the Temagami Area.These characteristics of the MNR’s centralized planning process are the same deficiencies describedby Usher (1987), Berkes et a!. (1991), and Armour (1992). These authors noted that centralizedplanning shifted control over resources away from local users and resulted in plans that failed to adaptto changing local environments and social conditions.137District Planning 42 Land-Use Guidelines(DLUG)Numerous Plansfor Resources, mostly TMPsFigure 23: The MNWs Planning System in Ontario (Source: IV1NR 1992).The conclusions drawn from the above analysis are that the substance of decisions made inthe past were mostly conflict-ridden and had little to do with conservation of the local resource base.Timber management planning failed to give equal weight to other values; thus decisions were neitherequitable nor ecologically sustainable. Centralized planning effectively alienated resource managersfrom resource users. This excluded local knowledge input into the planning and decision-makingprocesses. Therefore, past decisions were not inclusive. Broad policies conceived at regional anddistrict levels increasingly became irrelevant to the local context.Goals &ObjectivesRegional Planning03 Strategic Plans(SLUP)Resource ManagementPlanning1384.1.3 Access to the timber resourceAccording to the data presented in Table 9, 88% of the respondents felt that past timberallocations were not equitable. Respondents referred to a lack of timber allocations made to theaboriginal people in Temagami. In addition, respondents mentioned loss of employment opportunitiesin Temagami particularly after closure ofMime Lumber Mill by Ontario. As pointed out earlier, partofMime’s proposed timber allocations were for harvesting the old-growth red and white pine standof 2,500 ha within what is now the WSA Area. These proposed allocations also caused proposalsfor new road access - the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions.Following controversies over both use of the roads and harvesting of old growth, Ontario paidoffMilne Lumber $4,000,000 for lost timber rights. Ontario also closed the mill in a move to easetensions. Hodgins and Benidickson (1989) estimated loss of 154 jobs because of the mill’s closure.This was about 50% of labour force in Temagami at the time. Before the mill’s closure, MilneLumber accounted for 32% of the total wood harvested annually from within Temagami District(Figure 24) (MNR 1 994a). Temagami lost that volume allocation once the mill was closed due toa lack of alternate mill locally.139I Tembec I_____________Mattawa I____________Eddy For. Products 700 m3 I Fryer Forest Products IEspanola 0.4% 0.9% Monetvile I6,196 m3 523 m33.9% 1.7% 0.3% 8.5%Field Lumber_ __ __ __ __ ______Field Columbia For. Products2,637 m3__ _Ruthergien1.7% 5.0% 232m_____ ___ _0.1 °‘ 7.0%TembecTemiskaming11,226 m37.1% 25.8% Northern Pressure___________Treated WoodHainpel-Gibson TEMAGAMI DISTRICTKirkland LakeNorth Bay 1986-1990 Annual Harvest141 m3977 m3 158, 594 m3 0.1% 6.2%0.6% 18.8% 66Macmillan Bloedel Elk Lake Planing MillSturgeon Falls Elk Lake34,269 m3 16,563m_______21.6% 32.4% l0.4°/ 4.3%Giroux & Vezina Stone ConsolidatedField Braeside469 m3 11,343 m30.3% 5.0% 7.2% 14.0°!Eddy For. Products Wm Milne & SonsNairn Temagami8,664 m3 51,807m3_____5.5% I 0.9% 32.7% 89.5°/Grant For. Products IRexwood Products Goulard Lumber INew Liskeard Englehart Sturgeon Falls I4,517 m34,144m3______4,187m3 I2.6% 31.9% 2.8% 2.3% 2.6% 112.5% ILEGEND (Source: MNR 1994b).Mill NameMill LocationAverage annual Crown volume received from Temagami m3% of Temagami % of total Crown wood received by mill annuallyharvestFigure 24: Crown Wood Destinations, 4-year Average (1986-1990), Temagami District.140The respondents argued that communities outside the “Temagami Area Community” andthose within the Community but without a mill in Temagami, benefited more from timber allocationsthan Temagami itself. This was due to an MNR policy that discouraged establishment of new mills(4C, 5E). For instance, of all the communities indicated in Figure 8 above, 50% were outside the“Temagami Area Community° (Espanola, Sturgeon Falls, Nairn, Braeside, Kirkland Lake,Rutherglen, and Monetville). Ofthe 50% within the Community, none operated a mill in Temagami(Figure 24), particularly after closure ofMime Mill in Temagami.Past MNR policy on timber allocations, which still exists today, stated that only existing millsand operators would receive timber allocations and no new mills or operators would be considered(MNR 1994a). Therefore, with the closure ofWm. Milne Mill in Temagami, the policy negated thepossibility of a mill in Temagami in the foreseeable future. In a probing question to the 74respondents in Table 9, 98% said that they would support establishment of a mill in Temagami. Thiscalls into question the equitability ofthe IVINR’s policy above from a local (Temagami) point of view.One may argue that Ontario’s decision to close the mill in 1990 saved old-growth red andwhite pine in Temagami. Part of the MNR’s argument for closure of the mill at the time was that themill’s requirements for both red and white pine could not be met due to dwindling stocks in the area(MNR 1994a). Of the total 32.7% ofMilne’s volume allocation in Figure 24, 20% comprised redand white pine (MNR L994a). However, current evidence suggests that the MNR continued toallocate both red and white pine to the companies in Figure 24 since the closure ofMime Mill (MNR1 994a).141For instance, at a meeting held on January 18, 1994 between the CPC and the MNR, the latterpresented volume commitments to the local timber industry under the 1994-96 Contingency TimberManagement Plan. The figures showed that of the total 129,276 m3 of timber commitment to eightlogging companies, 12% comprised red and white pine (MNR 1994b) (Table 10). Although this islower than Mime’s volume requirements by 8%, it still raises the question as to why the MNR did notallocate the 12% to aboriginal entrepreneurs in Temagami.Respondents referred to a locally-owned aboriginal company called George MathiasConstruction located on Bear Island Reserve in Temagami. It was also observed that the companyhas both logging and processing facilities. Temagami Logging, listed in Table 10, is simply a loggingcontractor with no processing facilities. George Mathias Construction operated as third party in thepast. That is, other companies hired its logging services; it purchased all its wood requirements fromother companies in the past (pers. comm. with George Mathias, July 12, 1994, Temagami).The MNR policy has also prevented proposals for small-scale wood processing facilities frombeing established in Temagami. One such proposal came from Goulard Lumber, a company thatcurrently owns a mill in Sturgeon Falls, about 200 km west of Temagami (pers. comm. with ClaudeGoulard, June 25, 1994, Temagami). The company wanted to establish a small-scale mill inTemaganii by entering into partnerships with both the Township of Temagami and the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai at Bear Island. According to the proposal, the mill was going to be based on variousspecies’ assortments including both hardwoods and softwoods (pers. comm. with Claude Goulard,June 25, 1994, Temagami).142Table 10: Volume Commitments/Targets to be supplied to Operators under 1994-96 TemagamiContingency Timber Management Plans (CTIVIP’s).Name ofOperator/Mill Species Annual Commitment/TargetNet Merchantable Volume(NM3)Goulard Lumber White pine, Red pine 9 135Jack pine, Spruce 11 780Field Lumber White pine, Red pine 2 360Jack pine, Spruce 960TEMBEC White birch 14 000Tolerant hardwoods 4 700MacMillan Bloedel White birch/Poplar 6 000Grant Forest Products Poplar 22 650Rexwood Forest Products Poplar 30 000Meadowside Lumber White pine, Red pine 1 550Jack pine/Spruce 5 250Poplar 230White birch 2 250Tolerant hardwoods 5 500Temagami Logging White pine/Red pine 2 033Jack pine/Spruce 7 035Poplar 3 843Total 129276Source: MNR 1994b.The analysis above confirms the respondents’ view that past MNP. policy on timber allocationhas been unfair to the community of Temagami and to the aboriginal people in the area. As notedearlier by Ross (1993), the unsustainability and inequitability of the MNR’s decisions in the past ledto the formation of both the CPC and the WSA. How did these new management agencies addressboth issues of sustainability and equity?1434.2 The Substance of Decisions under Co-management4.2.1 Cross-case Analysis4.2.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protectionAccording to the results presented in Table 9, 69% of the respondents said that they did notknow if the CPC will protect old-growth red and white pine in the area because its plan was not yetcompleted. However, 79% of the respondents also noted that the CPC was likely to do so (Table9). The latter respondents referred to the provincially mandated Old Growth Conservation Initiative.They argued that the IvINR made decisions for the CPC and, as an agency of the government that alsocreated the Old Growth Conservation Strategy, the MNR was likely to adopt the recommendationscontained in the strategy. The strategy, which is contained in the Old-Growth Policy AdvisoryCommittee’s (PAC) report, recommended the identification and protection of representative old-growth areas among all forest ecosystem types (PAC 1994). The respondents’ argument above isexplored in detail.In January 1992, the Ontario government established the PAC with a mandate to develop astrategy for conserving old growth forest ecosystems in the province. The PAC, an independentcitizens’ committee, comprised of representatives from across the province reflective of the variousperspectives on old growth. Among those represented on the Committee included the forest industry,environmentalists, labour, educators, churches, and aboriginal groups. On July 21 1994, the PACsubmitted to the Minister of Natural Resources its final report on conserving old growth forestecosystems in Ontario. The report contained seven broad objectives and 24 areas of action (PAC1994:12). Two such objectives that pertain to the argument above are:144(a) to protect representative old growth forest ecosystems across Ontario; and(b) to perpetuate old growth forest features throughout the production forest, thuscontributing to the maintenance of old growth forest ecosystem thnction across thelandscape. (PAC 1994:13).A review of the specific recommendations under objective (a) above showed that the onlycandidate area identified for protection in the Temagami area was that within the WSA’s planningarea- the Obabika Old Growth stand. This is the same 2,500 ha-forest stand of red and white pinethat resulted in conflict between pro-development and preservation proponents followingconstructions ofthe Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions. In its plan, the WSA zoned this areafor protection (WSA 1994). On February 6, 1995, the Minister ofNatural announced the formalprotection of this area and turned the WSA’s former area ofjurisdiction to the MNR (MNR 1995a).Here, protection of the Obabika Old Growth stand had to do with the WSA rather than IvilWsactions as purported by the respondents above.A further review of the resource management prescriptions and options for theComprehensive Planning Area submitted for public review by the MNR (CPP 1994) in May, 1994,showed that there were no areas specifically identified for old-growth protection. What was apparentin the management options was a proposal to maintain 10% of area in the oldest age classes of allmajor forest species. This related to objective (b) above. The proposal suggested achieving thetarget through a proportionate decrease in the total area allocated for harvest (CPP 1994a). Theareas allocated for harvest were missing from the resource management prescriptions and options.Since this was just a proposal, and the CPC plan has not been completed, it is not possible at thispoint to predict what will happen once resource management plans are developed.145As noted by 89% of the respondents (Table 9), in its decisions, the WSA zoned an area of2,500 ha for old-growth red and white pine protection (WSA 1994). This is the same area describedearlier as the centre of controversy in the Temagami Area. Review of the WSA’s Forest StewardshipPlan also revealed several timber management prescriptions aimed at protecting old-growth in allforest types. The prescriptions included: selection harvest system in white pine stands; retention of20-30 old-growth trees/ha in harvested areas; and where both old-growth red and white pinecomprised 10% or less of a stand marked for harvesting, then both species would not be cut (WSA1994).The WSA’s actions above, reflect the respondent& characterization of the WSA’s decisionsas more participatory and integrative (Table 9). Based upon public comments on the WSA’s ForestStewardship Plan, both the environmental community and pro-development groups described theWSA’s decisions to conserve old growth in its planning area as ecologically sustainable and equitable(WSA 1994). These are the same arguments for local-level management systems advanced by Usher(1987), Jacobs (1988), Pinkerton (1989b), Dunster (1990), and Berkes et al. (1991), that suchsystems are likely to be responsive to local needs and adapt to local conditions. Ontarios adoptionof the WSA’s decision to protect the old-growth red and white pine forest also points to thesustainability and equitability of the WSA decision.1464.2.1.2 Primacy of timber in planningAccording to the results in Table 9, 98% and 95% of the respondents felt that both the CPCand the WSA decisions, respectively, addressed the concern over timber primacy. Comprehensiveplanning ofboth agencies treated all values equally. It was also observed that the first phase ofbothplanning processes entailed data gathering and field inventories aimed at achieving equal levels ofinformation among all values. However, as noted earlier, both agencies approached the first phasedifferently. The CPC relied exclusively on information generated by the MNR. This implied a totalreliance on scientific information. The WSA incorporated the knowledge of long time users in thearea in its information base.For instance, between July and December 1992, the WSA submitted questionnaires to seventourist operators, two forest companies, five municipalities and three unincorporated Townships, sixtrappers, four guide outfitters, and five local Chambers of Commerce to seek both socio-economicand biophysical information relevant to its planning area (WSA 1992b). It was also observed thatduring the long holiday weekend in July 1992, the WSA set up a field interview station at Obabikabridge, at the heart of its planning area, to obtain information from canoeists and hikers about theirexperiences and aspirations for the area. In addition, the WSA hired a long time trapper in the areaas its Forest Steward. The steward was responsible for field monitoring, recording, and reporting ofvarious field aspects including sightings of endangered and protected bird species, wildlife summerand winter habitat conditions, camping pressure, fishing pressure, road access conditions, trails, andportages (WSA 1 992c). The WSA also fielded a study entitled “A documentation of knowledgeassociated with the oral traditions of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai: the land, its waterways, plants147and animals” (WSA 1993c). In particular, this study identified the major medicinal plant speciesoccurring in the area and ways to protect them from resource extraction activities.The WSA included the information obtained from the above sources in its database whichcontained technical data on various resources. These data were obtained from the MNR and theWSA’s own field inventories. The WSA based its decisions on the whole database (WSA 1994:24).Here, the WSA complemented scientific information with the knowledge and experience of localusers, thus adapting resource management decisions to the local situation. As Usher (1987) andBerkes et al. (1991) argued, this approach ensures that management is adapted to local needs andsocial conditions.4.2.1.3 Access to the timber resourceThe results in Table 9 show that 74% of the respondents felt the CPC was not going toallocate timber any differently from the past. This response was attributed to two things. First, therespondents noted that the MNR, rather than the CPC, made decisions concerning the comprehensiveplanning process. Secondly, the respondents argued that existing MNR policy on timber allocations,which is the same as in the past, gave high priority to existing mills and operators. In their view, theMNR’s role both as policy and decision-maker, implied that access to the timber resource under theCPC would not be any different from the past. To understand the premise of this view, it is necessaryto review the CPC’s involvement in the MNR’s Interim Timber Management Planning (ITMP) andContingency Timber Management Planning (CTMP) processes. Both processes pertained to theCPC’s planning area.148In the Spring of 1989, the MNR prepared Interim Timber Management Plans (ITMP)covering the comprehensive planning area for the period April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1992 (MNR1994a). The ITMPs were necessary to maintain existing forest management operations (harvesting,silviculture, etc.) until the comprehensive planning process of the CPC was completed. In May, 1991the MNR decided to extend the 1990-92 ITMPs for two years due to the extension of thecomprehensive planning process from March, 1992 to April, 1994 (MNR 1994a). The extension wasnecessary to maintain existing forest management operations until the comprehensive planningprocess was completed. In Summer of 1993, the MNR again extended the comprehensive planningprocess from April, 1994 to March 31, 1996. Therefore, the IvINR prepared a Contingency TimberManagement Plan (CTMP) for the period 1994-96 (MNR 1994b).Both the ITMPs and CTMP above, contained wood allocations from the comprehensiveplanning area to the existing timber companies. As noted by all CPC respondents in Table 7, the CPCrecommended the CTMP to the Minister ofNatural Resources. Review of these recommendations(CPC 1993), revealed that the CPC did not make specific provisions to redirect the wood flow toTemagami. In particular, there was no wood allocated to George Mathias Construction at BearIsland in Temagami. Instead, the MNR maintained the wood flow as depicted in Table 10.The evidence above shows that the CPC’s methods of allocating timber were not any differentfrom past and are not likely to be different in the future. Timber allocation methods are not likely tobe different in the future because the MNR makes decisions for the CPC. Furthermore, the evidencesuggests that the MNR has been unwilling to change the allocation policy that puts Temagami at adisadvantage. As Chambers (1992) noted, such resistance can be expected particularly from149centralized public sector bureaucracies thought to be insulated from the forces that stimulate change.In the case of the CPC, such resistance, and the existing IvINR policy on timber allocation constraineddistributional equity to local levels.For the WSA, existing MNR policy on timber allocation did not constrain it. As noted by86% ofthe respondents (Table 9), the WSA granted the first right of refusal on timber allocations tolocal companies and aboriginal people in the area. This decision was also confirmed as contained inthe WSA’s Forest Stewardship Plan (WSA 1994). However, the test of how equitable the WSAdecision was lies in the implementation of the decision. As discussed earlier, the Minister ofNaturalResources announced that the CPC would decide the feasibility of the WSA’s decisions (MNR1995a). Since the MNR. made decisions for the CPC, the WSA decision above will be subject toexisting IvINR policy on timber allocations. Consequently, because of lack of authority to implementits decisions, and because of an unfavourable existing MNR policy, the WSA’s redistribution of timberallocations to local timber companies and aboriginal people in the area will not be implemented.4.2.2 ConclusionsThe analysis above raises some implications for co-management. The analysis showed thatultimately, the substance of decisions did not change under both models of co-management studied.This lack of change is attributed to the structures or institutional designs of the two co-managementbodies. The lack of delegation of authority from the government to the two co-management agenciesnegatively affected the substance of decisions. For the WSA, this meant that its decisions, thatpromoted both sustainability and equity, could not be implemented. For the CPC, this meant that it150could not challenge or change existing MNP. policies that were antithetical to both sustainability andequity; its advice to the MNR was non-binding.The WSA acted like an advocacy-style organization whose strategy was to challenge existingMNR policies. This happened because the WSA exercised defacto decision-making authority and50% of its membership participated in the framing of the mandate. However, although the challengeresulted in decisions that were both sustainable and equitable, the lack of de jure decision-makingauthority reduced the WSA to an advisory organization like the CPC. For the CPC, the governmentdefined its mandate, its structure, and its activities; its actions were restricted by existing governmentpolicies. This situation is similar to that described by Reed (1995:147) in the case of the Ignace comanagement committee in which senior government mandates established the parameters withinwhich the co-management initiative operated.This suggests that for co-management agencies to produce any real substance in theirdecision-making, agency members and/or their constituencies need to be involved in drawing up themandates of those agencies. In addition, such agencies require the authority to advise, or makedecisions or implement their decisions. The involvement of agency members and/or theirconstituencies in drawing up the mandate would ensure a congruence of goals between thegovernment and local community interests. The congruence of goals in turn, would ensure that thesubstance of decisions made by those agencies are sustainable and equitable- and supported.The next section discusses how co-management affected social relationships among actors.The actors include agency members, the MNR, Ontario, the TAA, stakeholder groups, and the public.151SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT4.3 Ontario’s ExpectationsIn creating both the CPC and the WSA, Ontario anticipated that both agencies would improvesocial relationships among various local interests by involving them in their planning and decision-making processes. By appointing several individuals from various local interests to the agencies,Ontario expected that local resource-use conflicts would be addressed. In particular, by directing theWSA to reach its decisions by consensus, Ontario expected that various stakeholders groupsrepresented on the authority would resolve their differences.For the purposes of analysis of social relationships among various players in co-management,three main principles were analyzed: inclusion; respect and trust; and cooperation. In addition, theconflict resolution strategies adopted by the co-management agencies and their outcomes wereanalyzed.4.4 InclusionChapter 3 described the consultative processes ofboth co-management agencies in this study.Therefore, this section concentrates on the structure of representation on both agencies. Twoquestions were posed in order gauge the levels of inclusiveness on both the CPC and the WSA. Table11 highlights the questions and summary of responses to the question.152Table 11: Summary results pertaining to the principle of “Inclusion”.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource useconflicts?CategoryIPrinciple: InclusionInterview Question: How were representatives on the management agency (CPC or WSA) selected?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioniun_ItemComprehensive Planning 12 appointed by Ontario through an OIC 7Council members N= 1 1 5 appointed by the TAA Executive Council and 4approved by TAA General AssemblyWendaban Stewardship 6 appointed by Ontario through an OIC 5Authority members 6 appointed by the TAA Executive Council and 5(WSA) N1 0 approved by TAA General AssemblyMembers of the two CPCestablishing agencies: 12 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 4ONAS and the TAA 5 TAA representatives appointed by TAA 4N=46 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 46 TAA representatives appointed by TAA 4Interview Question: Is representation on both CPC and WSA adequate?Ministry ofNaturalResources Staff mining and town of Temagami not represented 5N=5 W$AMining interests and OFAH not represented 5Comprehensive Planning mining interests not represented I ICouncil (CPC) members Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 8N=1 1Wendaban Stewardship mining interests not represented 10Authority (WSA) OFAH not represented 5members N 10Members of the two CPCestablishing agencies: mining interests not represented 3ONAS and the TAA Town of TemagamilLatchford area not represented 4N=4 WSAMining interests and OFAH not represented 4Members of the Public CPCN39 Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 32mining interests not represented 7WSAMining interests not represented 39Key Informants CPCN=5 Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 5mining interests not represented 4WSAMining interests not represented 5153Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Armour (1992) noted that, in order to satisfy eachinterest group that its concerns have been represented, each group must be directly involved.However, the author& view above does not directly address the question of who selects therepresentatives. Gould (1981) argued that, where individuals have participated in the selection oftheir representatives or delegates, those representatives would be held accountable to those whomthey represent and be subject to recall. This suggests that the various interests in the TemagamiConflict needed to participate in the selection of their representatives to the two co-managementagencies. The issue of representation on behalf of Ontario is explored in detail because it wascharacterized by respondents as inadequate on both the CPC and the WSA (Table 11).The results in Table 11 show that Ontario appointed 12 members to the CPC and six (6)members to the WSA. In a separate interview question to the co-management agency, public, andestablishing agency respondents, it was revealed that in some cases the government of Ontariocontacted some local interests or stakeholder groups (mostly environmental) for submission of threecandidate names (4A, 4H, 4L, 2B, 5D). Ontario reserved the right to appoint the final candidate.Other interests such as mining and recreation were not contacted (4A, 4H).According to two establishing agency respondents (3A, 3 C), the criteria used by Ontario forfinal selection of provincial representatives to both the CPC and WSA was that the particularindividual had to have broader interests beyond that of his/her respective constituency. This meansthat appointed candidates had a constituency of interests rather than an actual constituency.154A review of the CPC’s 17 member-list showed that the constituency of possible interestsrepresented on the Ontario side included: education; environment; local government; mining; businessand economic development; labour; logging; tourism and recreation; and social services. In particular,the list showed that there was both a Deputy Reeve for the Township of Temagami who was also alocal business entrepreneur in the tourism industry. The list also showed the presence of a formerDean of a local School of Mines in Haileybury. Based on this broad representation intended byOntario, the view by respondents in Table 11 that the Township of Temagami and mining interestswere not represented on the CPC would not be correct. However, both the Township of Temagamiand the mining community maintained that they did not select those representatives.Similarly, the WSA’s list ofmembers showed that the constituency of possible interests on theOntario side included: labour; logging; local government; environment; recreation and tourism; andcommunity economic development. Based on Ontario’s criteria for selection ofmembers above, itcould also be argued that both the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) and themining interests were represented through the recreation and tourism, and community economicdevelopment constituencies, respectively. This is in contrast to the respondents’ view in Table 11 thatboth OFAH and mining interests were not represented on the WSA.This leads to the question of accountability. To whom were the Ontario representatives onboth the CPC and the WSA accountable? In a separate interview question (discussed later under theprinciple of’respect and trust’), it was revealed that Ontario representatives on both the CPC and theWSA were not directly accountable to the constituencies implied by Ontario. That is, the were nostructured reporting relationships between them and the interests they were supposed to represent.Furthermore, it was revealed that there were no formal reporting relationships between the155representatives and Ontario. Therefore, the respondents’ views in Table 11 about the respectiveinterests not adequately represented on both the CPC and the WSA was correct.This suggests that the internal accommodations made by those involved in co-managementmay be viewed by those excluded from participation as something else other than “more appropriate,more efficient, or more equitable”. That is, the political legitimacy of the decisions reached by thoseinvolved in co-management is likely to be jeopardized by those interests excluded from decision-making. This scenario was played out in the case of the WSA’s decisions on mining activities in itsplanning area. In a letter sent by the Northern Prospectors’ Association (NPA 1994) commenting onthe WSA’s decisions on mining, the NPA condemned the WSA for banning open-pit mining in thearea. The NPA also condemned the WSA Plan for excluding mining exploration and developmentfrom 50% of the planning area. The NPA further criticized the WSA process as an exercise inpolitical tokenism and waste ofmillions of tax dollars and concluded:The Northern Prospectors’ Association is dedicated to the preservation of the rights of themining industry and must condemn this (WSA) Plan as an exercise in political pandering thathas no regard for the rights of the majority of the citizens of this Province. Any attempt toimplement the Plan will be resisted at every level (NPA 1994:2)4.4.1 ConclusionsThe analysis above shows that co-management did not result in the representation of all majorinterests in the Temagami Area. The lack of accountability by Ontario representatives to specificconstituencies also diminished the importance of both co-management bodies. This analysis raisessome implications for co-management and democratic theories.156For the decisions that emerge from co-management to be “more appropriate, more efficient,or more equitable,” the existing interests in a particular area need to be represented on the comanagement agency. Given the diverse array of interests in forest issues today, representing allstakeholders may prove unrealistic. The tendency would be to extend the list of stakeholders toinclude not only those with very specific interests, but also with particular attitudes. However, thenthere is a real danger of slipping down the road to reductio adabsurdum. The bottom line would beto include all major stakeholders; however defined. Such groups often have the potential tojeopardize the final outcome if they are not represented or included in decision-making such as thethreats of the NPA. Mining having been a major economic activity in the area, and likely to be soonce the TAA land cautions are lifted, the NPA will continue to be a strong political voice in theTemagami area.For co-management to be seen as a mechanism for participatory decision-making in resourcemanagement, governments need to consult all interests and non-interested parties and let those groupsselect their own representatives. This will not only assure accountability by representatives to theirconstituencies but also the legitimacy of final decisions. Since accountability is directly linked toauthority, this implies that constituencies would have to be empowered. In particular, the groupsshould have the right to recall their representatives if they are not satisfied with the outcomes of thedecision-making process; that way, the feeling of being “boxed in” would be avoided.The analysis also revealed that Ontario as the creator ofboth the CPC and partly the WSAmandates not only controlled those groups’ actions (as discussed earlier); it decided the system ofrepresentation and selected members to them. If the government and local interests mutually agreed157on the mandates of co-management agencies, then the system of representation should also bemutually decided. That is, stakeholder participation in co-management should be negotiated betweenthe government and the stakeholder groups rather than unilaterally decided by the former. Thiswould be consistent with the principles of participatory democracy.If the government’s concern is to have broader provincial interests represented on comanagement agencies, then the system of selection of members may be based on a combination ofboth elections and appointments. In that case, the government could appoint elected public officialswho would represent both provincial interests and non-interested parties. The selection ofstakeliolder representatives should be left to those groups to decide. Broader regional and nationalinterests may also be protected by ensuring that co-management agencies operate within existingprovincial and federal policies; but with built in flexibility to change policy. The latter point isnecessary to ensure that the management agencies adapt their decisions to changing social,biophysical, and market conditions.The next section reviews the levels of respect and trust among actors. That is, how did comanagement affect the levels of respect and trust among actors in co-management?1584.5 Respect and TrustThe principle of “respect and trust” refers both to the internal operations of the agency andthe relationships among the agency, state, and local users. Five questions were posed in order togauge the levels of respect and trust under co-management. The questions are:• did any members of your agency voluntarily quit, and if so, why?;what are the fundamental principles of your group?;do you feel those principles have been achieved/abandoned in the process?;• how are reporting relationships between you and your constituency structured?; and• was your agency committed to consensus decision-making, and if so, how did itwork?This study assumed that high member turnovers in an agency showed members’ non-commitment to the goals and survival of the agency. That would in turn suggest a lack of trust andrespect for the agency and/or its tenets. Similarly, members’ feelings that their group fundamentalprinciples were achieved and not compromised or abandoned by the co-management agency wouldindicate the members’ attraction to the agency; hence, their respect and trust for the agency. Theexistence of reporting relationships between agency members and their constituencies or any of thekey actors would also indicate a sense of respect and trust between them. The successful applicationofconsensus decision-making would also indicate the agency’s commitment to shared understandingand respect and trust among members. Table 12 provides a summary of the responses to the fivequestions above. Appendix 3 lists detailed responses to the questions.159Table 12: Summary results pertaining to the principle of “Respect and trust”,Interview Question ResponsesCPC N=11 n WSA N=1O1. Did any members of your 1 member quit voluntarily 1 1 5 members quit voluntarily 10agency voluntarily quit, 2 members were terminated 1 1 2 members were terminated 10and if so, why?2. What are the fundamental TAA Side TAA Sideprinciples ofyour group? resource sustainability, 4 sustained life, sustainable 5economic development, development, co-existence,land preservation, and public participation inpreservation of aboriginal decision-making (same asrights WSA goals)Ontario Side Ontario Side. environmental protection, 7 . socio-economic development, 5sustainability, equitable maintaining integrity ofLakeaccess to resources, local Temagami, enhancinggovernance wilderness experience,biodiversity, environmentalprotection.3. Do you feel those principles TAA side TAA sidehave been achieved or . being achieved 0 . achieved 4abandoned in the process? being abandoned 4 abandonedOntario side Ontario side. being achieved 3 . achieved 5being abandoned 4 abandoned 04. How are reporting TAA side TAA siderelationships between you structured 4 structured 4and your constituency informal 0 informalstructured? not structured 0 not structured 0Ontario side Ontario side. structured 0 . structured 0informal 1 . informalnot structured 6 not structured 45. Is your agency conm-iitted Yes, but consensus has not 1 1 Yes, we are committed to 10to consensus decision- been defmed and has not consensus decision-makingmaking,and if so, how did been practiced. It was defmed as a minimum 10it work? of 8/12 in consent but it hasnever been applied that way -it was always 12 members inconsent.. It worked by listening to and 10hearing from everyone• It worked through respect for 10each other. Patience and informality are 7required for it to work. It worked through caring for 4each otherIt worked by sharing values 3160According to the results in Table 12, the CPC had lower member turnover than the WSA.The member who quit on the CPC felt he was in conflict of interest. The member was a Reeve of anearby community and a member of the Municipal Advisory Group (MAG). The MAG is an umbrellaorganization comprised of all the municipalities in the Temagami Area Community and a strongopponent of the land negotiations between Ontario and the TAA. When the Minister of NaturalResources asked the CPC to conduct public consultations on the treaty negotiations, the member felthe was in conflict of interest and he quit.However, a significant change in the composition of the CPC occurred soon after the MinisterofNatural Resources’ News Conference held in Toronto on February 6, 1995. All TAA memberson the CPC quit (pers. comm. with 5A). According to key informant 5A, the TAA recalled itsmembers from the CPC due to:1. Ontario’s unilateral decision to integrate the WSA Plan in the CPC Plan without priorconsultation with the TAA;2. Ontario’s unilateral decision to allow mining in 20 Townships north of Temagami nearthe community of Matachewan. Although these townships were not originallycovered by the TAA land cautions, it was agreed between Ontario and the TAAthrough an MOU that no mineral staking would take place in those townships untilthe treaty negotiations were finalized. Those negotiations have not been finalized; and3. Ontario’s unilateral decision to remove nine (9) Townships from the currentComprehensive Planning Area and transfer those townships under the jurisdiction ofthe Elk Lake Community Forest. The Elk Lake Community Forest (ELCF) wasinitiated by the MNE. in 1991 as part of its Sustainable Forestry Initiative (MNR199 1). The TAA participated on the ELCF but withdrew in July, 1992 due to whatit called as the “ELCF’s pre-occupation with timber rather than resource managementplanning.” All planning functions on the ELCF are undertaken by the IVINR. (5A).161According to the key informant (5A) and the former TAA co-Chair on the CPC (2D), thelocal public was dismayed with Ontario’s latest actions. In the public’s view, the latest actions byOntario compromised the political legitimacy of the CPC. The foregoing scenario points to the lackof trust and respect between Ontario and the TAA. Without the TAA involvement in the CPCprocess and any other resource management initiatives in the Temagami Area, the “TemagamiConflict” is likely to be replayed.A feeling by most of the CPC members that their fundamental principles were compromisedor abandoned in the planning process (Table 12) also points to the lack of respect and trust by themembers for the MNR (the decision-maker in the planning process). A lack of clear and open linesof communication between Ontario representatives on both the CPC and the WSA (Table 12) andOntario affected relationships between them. Similarly, a lack of accountability between Ontariorepresentatives on both the CPC and the WSA and their constituencies also affected relationshipsbetween them. Constituencies or stakeholder groups felt slighted by Ontario’s unilateral action ofappointing representatives to both bodies (5B). The representatives felt alienated from theirconstituencies (2B, 2K, 2M). The WSA also noted a lack of clear lines of communication andsupport from its sponsors (Ontario and the TAA) (5A). In comparison, three key informants (N—5),noted that the WSA had more support from Ontario than the TAA partly because the TAA was alsofinancially dependent on Ontario.Within the first year of the WSA’s operation, three members quit followed by two membersin the second year (Table 12). Ofthe five members, four were all TAA representatives on the WSA.Three ofthe TAA members who quit opposed the treaty negotiations between Ontario and the TAA.162They demanded that the WSA hand over its planning area to the traditional families that once usedthe area (5C). This opposition later caused an enforcement crisis for the WSA that would go on foreight months before resolution. This crisis, which was also observed in this study, warrants furtherdiscussion because it highlights several relationships among different players in co-management.4.5.1 The Enforcement Crisis in the WSA AreaIn the summer of 1993, a dissident group of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA), theMaKominising Anishnabeg (IvIKA), occupied the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) area.The occupation was part of the MKA’s opposition to the Treaty of Co-existence negotiations thenunderway between Ontario and the TAA. To raise funds, the IVIKA harvested some old-growth redpine in the famed ‘2,500 ha old-growth red and white pine stand’ within the WSA area without thelatter’s permission (Hakala 1993 a). This act of defiance by the MKA created a crisis for the WSA.It was a direct challenge to the WSA’s authority. It exacerbated the relationship with the MinistryofNatural Resources (MNR) and with the TAA and created the possibility of fractures within theWSA (O’Grady 1993). The TAA took a consistent position that solving the crisis was theresponsibility of the WSA. Ontario took this position inconsistently; at times the WSA felt it hadbeen abandoned by its sponsors (5C).According to an Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) spokesperson (pers. comm. with GT, anOPP officer, Temagami, on July 15, 1994), the crisis laid groundwork for a racial split within theWSA. That the WSA avoided the split was a credit to all its members (GT). The issue that faced theWSA concerned the relationship between its mandate and traditional land rights. At first, the IVLNR163wanted to go into the area occupied by the IVIKA and arrest all (5C). The OPP advised caution. Nextthe MNR lawyers recommended a broad-based injunction barring all the TAA from the WSA area(5C). This was obviously unacceptable to the TAA representatives on the WSA. According to twoof the key informants (5A, 5C), having worked together for many months, the WSA membersunderstood the tremendous importance of traditional lands. They also understood the awfularrogance of barring aboriginal people from their lands (5A, 5C). The WSA opted for limitedinjunctions that two of its members served to the MKA. The injunctions were ignored (O’Grady1993:6).According to the Enforcement Agreement signed between the WSA and the MNR, the WSArequested an MNR overflight to inspect cutting activities in the area. The MNR turned down WSA’srequest’8because it considered such a flight too dangerous for MNR employees (5C). After the WSAcomplained up the MNR authority ladder, the local MNE. provided the flight. Despite personalthreats to WSA members and family splits within the TAA, the WSA kept in close contact with theIVIKA during the crisis. The WSA took no steps without prior warning to the MKA and it generallyfollowed the OPP ‘s advice, based on the dictum that a few trees are not worth a life (pers. comm.with GT, an OPP officer, Temagami, on July 15, 1994). When a fire was set at the sit-in on July 30,1993, the IVINR flew its fire crews to the area with no forewarning; threats were made (Hakala1 993b).Once the crisis was past, WSA members commented that it forced them to make arecommitment to shared stewardship. It had proved the importance of communication andWSA Minutes of October 25, 1993.164understanding across cultural lines; that they had resolved the crisis without violence was proof thatco-existence did work (5C). The crisis also highlighted the need for jurisdictional clarity since theWSA, without legislative authority, lacked enforcement powers.4.5.2 Consensus Decision-makingAccording to the results in Table 12, all CPC respondents (N1 1) noted that although theywere committed to consensus decision-making, the process was not defined and was not practiced.Members only cited one instance when consensus was practiced during a meeting chaired by the TAAco-chair. In all instances, members felt that either the other co-chair or the MNR made all thedecisions (2K, 2L, 2M). It was also observed that after four years of the CPC members workingtogether, the agency had not developed its own policy and procedures manual. This partly explainswhy the mode of decision-making was not defined. The lack of consensus decision-making on theCPC caused apathy among some members which often resulted in absenteeism at meetings (2L). Italso implied that shared understanding, as argued for by Habermas (1982), was not promoted amongmembers. Through consensus, decision-making is decentralized among members, with each havingequal opportunities to participate in the decision-making. Therefore, from a co-management pointofview, the mode of decision-making on the CPC was not cooperative but rather top-down; the veryantithesis of co-management or the cooperative planning model advanced by Armour (1992). Forthe WSA, part of its mandate states:The Wendaban Stewardship Authority shall reach its decisions by consensus. Consensus shallbe agreement by no less than two thirds of the membership of the Authority, excluding theChairperson. (Ontario Executive Council, 1991b).165According to the results in Table 12, the WSA took the instruction to reach consensusdecisions seriously. Consensus was not interpreted as two-thirds majority but as a real consensus -all in acceptance ofthe decision. According to the WSA’s procedures manual (WSA 1992), the WSAredefined consensus that was given through their mandate as “two-thirds majority” to “all in consent”and if that failed, then the two-thirds rule would apply with dissentions recorded.The WSA members noted that although the process was slow, not without argument, andponderous, it resulted in supported decisions. Habermas (1984b) characterized this form ofconsensus as “true consensus” whereby participants exchange their validity claims throughcommunication and discuss them long enough, recognizing that their claims are fallible, untilconsensus is reached. According to two WSA members (2C, 2H), a serendipitous benefit ofconsensus decision-making became evident during the second year of the WSA’s planning process.Because all the members knew they were working toward consensus, they entered the planningprocess without setting bottom lines but with flexible positions (2C, 2H). These are the samecharacteristics of “principled negotiation” advanced by Fisher and Ury (1981) and supported byArmour (1992).In response to how their consensus process worked, the WSA members characterized theirconsensus decision-making process as follows (number of respondents mentioning the particularcharacteristic is indicated in brackets):166What is needed for consensus to work?• listening to and hearing from everyone (10);• respect for each other (10);• shared goals (10);• shared values (10);appreciating diversity (7);• open-mindedness (7);• clear authority (6);• commitment to the process (6);• some shared background (6);• face to face interactions (5);• ability to compromise (5);• patience (5);• informality (4);• shared social activities (4);• good relationships (4);• humour (4);caring for each other (3); and• level playing field (3).What have been the outcomes of this consensus process?• respect for all members and points of view (10);• relationships developed (9);• mutual learning took place (9);• open and thorough discussions took place (8);• good and mutually satisfying decisions were made (8);• allowed for moving beyond ‘block& (7);• innovative solutions were possible (6);• crises were well managed and strengthening (5); and• decisions went beyond winning and losing (4).What were the constraints of the process?• too time consuming (10);• struggle for authority and concern around re-appointments (10);• duplication of effort and conflict with other jurisdictions (4);• too small and inappropriately configured planning area (3)• not enough go-arounds due to time constraints (2); and• needed more support from sponsors in time of stress (2).1674.6 CooperationCooperation refers to demonstration of cooperative behaviour among actors in comanagement in the performance ofmanagement functions. Cooperation among members of a comanagement agency is necessary to achieve mutual consent in decision-making. Cooperation isenhanced when members engage in joint fact-finding missions or other strategies of trust building.In addition, cooperation between the agency and the public or other key actors is enhanced if thedecision-making process is inclusive and if there are clear lines of communication. Therefore,cooperation was analyzed at two levels: (a) externally, involving the co-management agencies, otherkey actors, and the public; and (b) internally, involving the management agency members. Threequestions were posed in order to identify cooperative behaviour among actors. The questions are:• Have representatives in your agency engaged in joint fact-finding missions or otherstrategies of trust building?• Did your/the agency seek technical advice and/or logistical support from thegovernment or any of the key actors, and was such advice/support accorded?• What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between local resourceusers and the/your agency?Table 13 provides a summary of the responses to the questions. Appendix 3 gives detailed responsesto the questions under the category “Cooperatio&t.168Table 13: Summary results pertaining to cooperation among actors in co-management.Interview Question ResponsesCPC N=11 n WSA N=1O1. Have representatives in No I 1 Yes 10your agency engaged injoint fact-finding missions “we don’t even know each . “closer working relationshipsor other strategies of trust other” through sub-committeebuilding? . “It’s taken for granted structures”everybody knows “consensus demanded trust andeverybody” respect among members”“we only see each other at “joint tours of our planningmeetings”. area”. “individual assignments to themembers”“a joint committee comprisingboth Ontario & TAAappointees to deal with theMKA enforcement issue”“we had informal get-togetherssuch as X-mas Party”CPC N=16 [11 +5] n WSA N=15 [10 +5] n2. Did your/the agency seek due to the nature of 16 MNR provided background 15technical advice and/or working relationships information used in planninglogistical support from the between the CPC and the MNR provided GIS facilities for 15government or any of the MNR, the CPC gets all mapping purposeskey actors, and was such the technical assistance MNR provided printing 15advice/support accorded? and advice it needs facilities for our final planthrough the MNR. . MNR conducted patrols and 15other as per our EnforcementAgreementThe Ontario Provincial Police 10cooperated with us during theIvIKA enforcement issueMNR refused to provide a flight 10over an area illegally cut by theMKA until instructions wereissued from Toronto to do soMNR initially refused to grant 10the WSA applications forms fora Land Use permitCPC N=50 [11+39] n WSA N=49 [10+39] n3. What evidence of None: 46 Several with: 40cooperative behaviour perhaps that will emerge 4 tourist ouffittersexists in agreement in the next planning phase guide outfittersbetween local resource the public are not inclined baitfish licenseesusers and the,iour to cooperate with CPC . logging industryagency? because the process is . trappersperceived to be controlled mining interests may not 9by the MNR — cooperate —1694.6.1 Cooperation between the Agencies and other key actors/publicAccording to the results presented in Table 13, the MNR provided both technical andlogistical support to both the CPC and the MNR. Both CPC and MNR respondents (N=16) pointedout that since the CPC worked with the MNR in the comprehensive planning process, the CPCobtained all the technical support it required through the MNR. Through an Enforcement Agreementsigned between the IvINR and the WSA, it was observed that the former performed several functionson behalf of the latter including: fire patrols; budworm surveys; regeneration assessments; annualclearance of trails; and maintenance of campsites.However, WSA respondents (N=l0) also quoted two incidences where the MNR had refusedto provide the required technical assistance. One incident involved a request for a flight over an areathat was illegally cut by the MaKominising Anishnabeg; a splinter group from the TAA that claimedownership of the lands under the WSA. The other incident involved refusal by the MNR to grant theWSA’s requested application forms for a Land Use Permit. As discussed earlier, the MNR finallyrendered the assistance in both cases despite some initial resistance. Both incidences above relate topower struggles between the WSA and the MNR. As highlighted earlier, the WSA’s de factoauthority was a constant challenge to the IvfNRs dejure authority; the MNR maintained that theWSA had no legislative basis to make operational decisions. The fact that the WSA stuck togetherin both cases and got what it wanted, suggests that it was a cohesive group capable of resistingexternal pressures.170As discussed earlier under section 3.3.2.3, 92% of the respondents (N50) pointed out thatthere was no evidence of cooperative behaviour between the CPC and the public. To the contrary,the WSA had agreements with tourist outfitters, guide outfitters, baitfish licensees, the loggingindustry, and trappers to monitor resources within the WSA area. The levels of public cooperationwith the agencies are related to the latter’s public participation processes. As noted earlier, the CPC’spublic participation process was less effective than the WSA’s due to two reasons. First, the amount,time of delivery, and complexity of information provided to the public by the CPC were generallyfound inappropriate by most ofpublic respondents. Second, the methods of public participation usedby the CPC were also found less effective in relation to the stages of the planning process.Therefore, decentralization as a strategy for cooperative decision-making becomes meaningfulonly if such decentralization entails effective communication through appropriate information and forafor communicative discourse. Such was the case with the WSA; information provided to the publicwas in easy-to-understand formats. The WSA also used workshops for problem solving and to shareideas. Other methods used were also applied at the right stages of the planning process. These arethe same arguments advanced by Habermas (1982) that, communication can only take place throughuse ofmedia (written language or corresponding non-verbal expressions) oriented towards sharedunderstanding. Shared understanding is a prerequisite to cooperative behaviour. Through use ofmedia that promoted shared understanding, the WSA was able to win the cooperation (in agreement)of the local users in the performance of specific management functions.1714.6.2 Cooperation among members of the co-management agencyThe results in Table 13 show that the CPC did not engage in joint fact-finding strategies thatpromote mutual understanding and trust. According to the CPC respondents, they felt they did knoweach other because the only time they saw each other was in meetings. The WSA respondents, onthe other hand, described several strategies used. The WSA used task assignments through ad-hoccommittee structures and individuals. Such committees and individuals reported their findings to thecommittee of the whole (5C). According to two WSA respondents (2E, 2G), delegating decision-making responsibility to appropriate individuals or relevant committees was much more practical,efficient, and satisfying. It avoided the horrible “meeting-out” feeling that comes from everyonehaving to participate in every decision (2E, 2G).Review ofWSA’9minutes also confirmed that the WSA members had four joint tours of theirplanning area; an activity that was highly valued by the members for building trust and fosteringmutual learning. It was also observed that the WSA members had informal get-togethers thatimproved personal relationships. As one WSA member (2H) put it, “...these shared invents createdintimacy and continuity; these kinds of activities offered us the chance to unwind and be refreshedwhile at the same time get to know one another- in the end, they increased our involvement.”Although the requirement for consensus decision-making was instructed through the mandate,the WSA members characterized consensus as one of their strategies for joint problem-solving andtrust-building (Table 13). As one member (2A) put it, “...consensus diminished hierarchy and class19 WSA Minutes of January 25, 1992; April 10, 1992; August 8, 1993; and December 15, 1993.172divisions between our Chair and the members as well as among members, and increased bonding. Weacted as co-equals, we were like one family”. This view is consistent with Cohen et al.’s (1988) viewthat formality in form of address and distinction of special privilege, which are characteristic of themajority-vote-style of decision-making or “Robert’s rules”, contributed to feelings of in-groups andout-groups and not a sense of community.4.6.3 ConclusionsThe Ministry ofNatural Resources (MNR) is likely to remain a key player in co-managementwhether internally (as with the CPC) or externally (as with the WSA). The analysis abovedemonstrated that the MNR generally cooperated with both the CPC and the WSA in providing bothtechnical and logistical support. However, such support to the WSA was at times hampered by a lackofclarity in the authority roles ofboth the MNP. and the WSA over the latter’s planning area. Thisimplies that if the jurisdictional authority of the players in co-management were clear, high levels ofcooperation among them could be enhanced. Given the range of possible co-managementarrangements on Arnstein’s(1969) ladder of citizen participation (see Figure 2, p. 11), such authoritycould entail: authority to advise; and authority to implement and/or make decisions.The lack of cooperation between the CPC and the public or local users implies that the latter’sinvolvement in the CPC public participation and decision-making constituted at most, degrees oftokenism. At these levels, the public simply informed the process and participated in discussions.These entail lower rungs on Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation in a co-managementcontext; i.e., at levels 3 (informing), 4 (consultation), and 5 (placation). According to Arnstein173(1969), it is at the level of “partnership where power is in fact redistributed through negotiationbetween citizens and powerholders. At this level, they agree to share planning and decision-makingresponsibilities through such structures as joint policy boards or planning committees (Arnstein 1969).With the WSA, partnerships were formed with local users by agreeing to share planning and decision-making functions between them. This implies that for cooperation (both in agreement and practice)to be achieved between the public and the management agencies, public participation practices needto operate at levels that promote partnerships.However, the cooperation reached between the WSA and the various local users was only inagreement and at the planning level. The real test of those partnerships lie in the implementation ofthe WSA’s decisions or its plan. As pointed out earlier, the WSA lacked decision-making authorityto implement its decisions and was terminated after four years of operation.The Minister ofNatural Resources’ announcement on February 6, 1996 effectively transferredthe WSA’s plan to the CPC for further decisions on its feasibility and implementation. Since the MNRmakes the decisions in the CPC process, the feasibility of the WSA’s plan will ultimately be decidedby the IvINR. Therefore, it is not possible to predict at this point what will happen to the agreementsreached between the WSA and the various local users after the MNR makes its final decisions on theWSA’s plan.Therefore, how has co-management affectedmutual understanding and cooperation amongkey actors and local resource users?174The decentralization models of co-management agencies studied resulted in a lack ofmutualunderstanding (lack of respect and trust) between Ontario and the Teme-Augama AnishnabaiFirst Nation (the co-sponsors) due to the former’s unilateral actions that undermined theauthority of the latter.2. The decentralization models of co-management agencies studied resulted in a lack ofmutualunderstanding (lack of respect and trust) between stakeholder groups and Ontario due to thelatter’s unilateral decision to appoint Ontario representatives to the management agencies.3. Because of(2) above, there was a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust)between the stakeholder groups and Ontario representatives on both management agenciesdue to a lack of accountability between them. There were no reporting relationshipsstructured between Ontario representatives and their constituencies.4. The decentralization models of co-management agencies studied resulted in a lack ofmutualunderstanding (lack of respect and trust) between the sponsors and the major stakeholdergroups excluded from the processes. The groups not represented were mining interests andthe Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters.5. As a result of (4) above, co-management through the CPC and the WSA resulted in a lackof mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the major stakeholder groupsexcluded from the process and the management agencies. The political legitimacy of the comanagement agencies was threatened by those groups.1756. The decentralization model of co-management of the WSA resulted in a lack of mutualunderstanding (lack of respect and trust) between the WSA and Ontario due to the latter’snon-conferment of legislative authority to the former.7. The decentralization model of co-management of the WSA resulted in a lack of mutualunderstanding (lack of respect and trust) between the WSA and some of its members whoquit due to the larger unresolved land claim issue between the co-sponsors. The membersabove laid claim to the lands under the WSA’s jurisdiction. Ontario’s designation of theselands under co-management created a locational conflict between WSA members andmembers of the splinter group of the TAA- the MaKominising Anishnabeg.8. The decentralization model of co-management of the CPC resulted in a lack of mutualunderstanding (lack of respect and trust) between the CPC members and the MNR due to alack of congruence between members’ goals and those of the agency. The MNR madedecisions that departed from the CPC members’ goals.9. The decentralization model of co-management of the WSA resulted in mutual understandingamong WSA members due to the use of consensus in their decision-making.10. At a planning level, co-management through the WSA resulted in cooperation among agencymembers and between agency members and local users. Internal cooperation was facilitatedby the use of consensus in decision-making while externally, it was facilitated by meaningfulpublic involvement in the agency’s planning and decision-making processes.1764.7 Conflict ResolutionConflict resolution was analyzed at two levels: (a) externally, involving the agencies and thepublic; and (b) internally, involving agency members. Four questions were posed in order to identifjthe conflicts in the area and the strategies used to resolve them. The questions are:• what are the conflicts in the area?;• what conflict resolution strategies were adopted by your agency?;• what are/have been the outcomes of such conflict resolution strategies?; and• have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated over time, and what are the reasons forthe de-escalation/escalation?Table 14 provides a summary of responses to the above questions. Appendix 3 lists detailedresponses to the questions under the category “conflict resolution.” For the purposes of analysis, twoconflicts identified by respondents in Table 14 concerning the aboriginal land claim and mininginterests demanding more land for staking, were left out. The former deals with the larger issue ofthe treaty process between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario. It was felt that neither theCPC nor the WSA could influence such a process. The latter was left out of the final analysis becauseas highlighted earlier, the mining interests were not represented on both agencies and have alreadythreatened to jeopardize both planning processes. Therefore, it was felt that the conflict will not goaway. The rest of the conflicts, the strategies adopted to resolve them, and the outcomes of suchresolutions are discussed by agency from both external (involving the agency and the public) andinternal (involving agency members) points of view. This is followed by a conclusion at the end.177Table 14: Summary results pertaining to conflict resolution under co-management.Interview Question ResponsesCPC N=74 [All Respondents] n WSA N=74 [All Respondents] n1. What are the conflicts in the . Native land claim and cautions 70 Native land claims and cautions 70area? Mining interests want entire 63 Mining interests want entire 63land base opened to staking land base opened to stakingPilots Association wants 42 The MaKominising 49fly-in access into LESW Park Anishnabeg claiming WSAElk Lake opposed to status of 60 landsLESW Park & demand 9 . Road Access: Red Squirrel! 61Twps. from the CPC area Liskeard Lumber roadsRoad Access: Red Squirrel! 61Liskeard Lumber Roads2. What conflict resolution CPC N=ll n WSA Nl0 nstrategies were adopted by — —your agency? Strategies used: — 4 Strategies used: — 10training opportunities in consensus-decision makingconflict resolution . neutral chairmore information sought in . planner as facilitator andlight of conflicts collaboratorpresentations by interest zoninggroups training in conflict resolutionNo strategy: —+ and group facilitationco-chair makes all the 7 open planning processdecisions cooperation with local usersco-chair does not allow No strategy: -+conflicts at the table more time could have beenoption development and zoning spent building relationshipsall done by MNR with the local MNR3. What are/have been the conflicts were played down 10 consensus was achieved 8outcomes of such conflict conflicts are likely to surface in I I completed plan in a short time 10resolution strategies? resource allocation got cooperation in agreement 7from local resource usersco-existence was achieved 10. resolved the most difficulty issue 10of road accessCPC N=74 [All respondents] n WSA N=74 [All Respondents] n4. Have the conflicts de- Conflicts: Conflicts:escalated or escalated over 1. are on hold 29 1. are on hold 72time and what are the 2. are escalating 61 2. are likely to escalate 45reasons for the de-escalation! 3. have de-escalated 18 3. have dc-escalated 7escalation? Reasons: Reasons:I. because plan is not complete 1. because nothing is happeningand nothing is happening on on the ground.the ground. 2. because the future of the WSA2. because planning process is plan is not known; if thetaking too long; treaty process MNR and not a sharedis taking too long; mining stewardship body implementsinterests & ELCF are not the plan as agreed in MOU;happy. mining interests are not happy.3. because nothing was 3. because of the WSAs highhappening on the ground — profile. —1784.7.1 The CPC and conflict resolutionThe conflicts and strategies used externallyAs explained earlier in the background to this study, the community ofElk Lake, among otherlocal communities, opposed the establishment of the Lady Evelyn-Smoothwater Wilderness Park(LESWP) for economic reasons. Establishment of the park 11 years ago meant that timber reserves,including plantations planted 30 years ago, could no longer be accessed by the local timber industryin Elk Lake. Access through the Liskeard Lumber Road, a road built mainly to get to timber in thearea was also closed down because it run through the park. Ontario compensated the company thatbuilt the road, Liskeard Lumber, for closure of the road. But because its timber limits were alsowithin the proposed park area, the company was eventually forced to shut down for lack of timbersupplies. To the community ofElk Lake, the road was the life blood of its economy as it brought intourists from across the Province; tourism being the mainstay of its economy at the time (4H).Therefore, Elk has always maintained that it wanted the Liskeard Lumber Road opened through thePark. Current restrictions include gates on the road.During the 11 years that the park existed, it did not have a management plan and thus, severaluses such as baitfish harvesting, commercial trapping, and hunting were allowed. A number oftourism uses such as fly-in services, commercial outpost camps, fishing, and boat catches, have alsotaken place. Fly-in operators have traditionally used specific staging areas for their aircrafts withinprescribed access zones [IVINR n.d. (b)]. In the past, private aircraft owners also used these stagingareas [MNR n.d. (b)]. However, with the development of a park management plan for LESWP bythe CPC/MNR, most of the above uses including baitfish harvesting, commercial trapping, hunting,179and private aircraft access will all be curtailed [MNR n.d. (a)]. This is in conformity with existingOntario Park Policy on wilderness class parks that states protection as its highest objective.To compound the conflict, the CPC/MNR is proposing expansion ofLESWP size from thecurrent 74,000 ha to 100,000 as a minimum functioning ecological unit (5C). The main concern ofthe Elk Lake community is that the park system is being used as a ‘land grab’ that is likely to stifle itslocal economy even further (4D). To the Private Pilots’ Association, the idea that private aircraftoperators would be prohibited from certain areas where commercial operators would be allowed--independently as well that aircraft would be prohibited in a range of areas, is viewed as discrimination(5C). At the centre of all this conflict is a fundamental disagreement about the Parks Policy. TheMNR maintains that it has to plan according to provincial policy. The community ofElk Lake andother interests supportive of its position, and the Private Pilots’ Association all threatened to lobbythe government directly toward recommending changes in the existing provincial parks policy (5C).The other conflict between the CPC and the Elk Lake Community Forest (ELCF) involvedan overlap in their planning area boundaries. The ELCF was laying claim to nine (9) geographictownships that fell in the comprehensive planning area. The concerned lands are Crown lands andboth the CPC and the ELCF are provincially-mandated initiatives. Ross (1993) noted that this issuehas been the main source of distrust between the two agencies.180According to the results in Table 14, four (4) respondents (N=l 1) identified training of theCPC members in conflict resolution and public presentations as the main strategies adopted by theCPC to address conflicts externally. However, seven (7) respondents felt that the CPC did not adoptany conflict resolution strategies at all. The seven (7) respondents above felt one of the co-chairsplayed down conflicts by not allowing conflicts to surface and thus get discussed at the table. Theyalso contended that the same co-chair made all the decisions together with the MN.R (Table 12).Although the CPC members received training in conflict resolution, this training was nevertested in a real conflict situation (2K, 2L, 2M, 2N, 2P, 2S, and 2U). While the CPC had conflictresolution sessions with the community of Elk Lake, the focus was on training and not on discussingsubstantive issues such as the concerns of Elk Lake over Ontario Parks Policy, the Liskeard LumberRoad, and the nine (9) townships. As one of the key respondents noted (5C):“... We have had conflict resolution training sessions which we applied when we met with theELCF people over a number of sessions. The focus was on training. We didn’t actually getinto the nuts and bolts of doing conflict resolution on anything per Se, and given the concernsofElk Lake over the LESWP and the joint responsibility we have in some townships fallingwithin the Elk Lake Community Forest, I think it would be certainly worthwhile pursuing realconflict resolution with Elk Lake and the Elk Lake Community Forest Partnership Board.”At a meeting held between the CPC/IvINR and the Private Pilots’ Association on July 13, 1994and at which the author was present, both parties held to their positions and failed to accommodateeach other’s concerns. The spokesperson for the CPC, an MNR staff responsible for parks planningin the comprehensive planning process, emphasized how existing provincial policy on wildernessparks could not be changed to accommodate the demands of the Association. Several individualsfrom the Pilots’ Association consistently demanded to know why the CPC/MNR would not allowprivate aircrafts to land in the same areas as commercial aircraft. At the end of the meeting, whose181tone began to get rowdy, neither party was satisfied that its concerns were heard and addressed. Asone CPC member (2M) remarked at the end of the meeting, “what a showdown!”.In both cases above, conflict resolution was avoided. With the Private Pilots’ Association,the CPC/MNR took the role of arbiter rather than facilitator in conflict resolution; not the forum forprincipled negotiations as argued for by Fisher and Ury (1981). Neither did both parties engage indiscussions aimed at reaching shared understanding through exchange of (fallible) validity claims asnoted by Habermas (1982). Here, the CPC/MNR provided a forum for the statement of positionsrather than principled negotiations among protagonists. In her review of resource managementplanning processes in the Temagami Area, Ross (1993:22) also noted that the public consultationsby the CPC on the Treaty of Co-existence followed a similar strategy in their public meetings. Sheconcluded, “.. the meetings were more conducive to the adamant statement of unbendable positionsthan to the calm stating and hearing of interests and needs” (Ross 1993:23).Another point noted by one of the key informants (5C) and also confirmed in this study wasthat, while the CPC members undertook training in conflict resolution, their planning counterparts,the MNR staffwho were also the decision-makers, did not. Habermas (1984a) argued that sharedunderstanding or ‘communicative action’ does not only draw from the explicit knowledge ofparticipants but also against a non-explicit background- ‘the lifeworld’. Part of that lifeworld, in thiscase, could be knowledge gained through training. Therefore, it would appear that training in conflictresolution is a necessary step in ensuring that members or participants harmonize their plan of actionbased on conmon definition of the situation. Despite a lack of background in conflict resolution bythe MNR stafl they felt the CPC members, and not themselves, needed training in conflict resolution182(1A). Again, the MNR was assuming the role of an arbiter. Arnstein (1969) characterized this formof public participation as ‘therapy’, whereby the focus is on educating or curing the participants oftheir pathology rather than changing the circumstances that created the pathology- in this case, thelack of redistribution of decision-making authority to the CPC.Strategies used internallyInternally, the CPC sought more information in light of conflicts (Table 12); but without an internalstrategy for resolving conflicts among members - such as ‘consensus’ or other joint-problem solvingtechniques, more information was of little help. When the CPCIMNR zoned its boundaries fordifferent uses/values, the MNR made all the zoning decisions without the participation of both theCPC and the public. As discussed earlier, when the CPC submitted the completed zones and land useoptions for public review, not only did the public find them complex and confusing but also the CPCmembers.4.7.2 The WSA and conflict resolutionThe conflicts and strategies used externallySection 4.5.1 discussed the enforcement issue involving a splinter group of the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai, known as the MaKominising Anishnabeg. However, when the MNR lawyers based inToronto recommended a broad-based injunction barring all Teme-Augama Anishnabai from the WSAarea20, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai representatives on the WSA rejected the proposal. The WSA20 Ontario Court (General Division): Motion record No. 2320/90 for the Wendaban StewardshipAuthority (Plaintiffs) and MaKominising Anishnabeg (Defendants). Motion sworn July 9, 1993.Smith, Byck & Grant Barristers and Solicitors, New Liskeard, Ontario.183opted for limited injunctions2’that would only barr the defendants from cutting any more trees orselling the timber already cut and not limiting their entry into the area. The second injunction aboveexcluded the phrase “restrained from entering on to the said lands.” Next the MNR suggestedsending in its personnel to scale the timber that was illegally cut. The WSA, supported by the OPP,rejected the proposal because it would be a source of confrontation with the dissident group (5C).Instead, the WSA opted to send in two of its members to talk to and listen to the demands of thegroup. Such meetings took place on five separate occasions22. It was during the last meeting thatthe two WSA members served the injunctions to the defendants. Meanwhile, the WSA had requesteda reconnaissance flight from the IvINR (according to the Enforcement Agreement) to evaluate theextent and exact location of the cut area. The request was turned down on the grounds that it wasnot safe for MNR stafl’to fly over the area; but this is the same agency that had wanted to send in itstimber scalers to measure the wood cut. The WSA took their complaint up the MNR ladder andeventually the flight was provided.According to the WSA respondents, because the WSA developed rapport with the defendants,confrontation similar to the one that occurred in Oka, Quebec, was avoided. The illegally cut timberwas never sold; it still lay on the ground at the time of this study’s field interviews. The strategiesused by the WSA included networking with other enforcement agencies in the area (MNR and OPP),open communications, and application of principled negotiations. The WSA finally resolved theconflict after the defendants appeared in court and agreed to abide by the conditions of the injunction.21 Ontario Court (General Division): Motion record No.2321/90 for the Wendaban StewardshipAuthority (Plaintiffs) and MaKominising Anishnabeg (Defendants). Motion sworn July 13, 1993.Smith, Byck & Grant Barristers and Solicitors, New Liskeard, Ontario.WSA Minutes of August 8, 11, 14, 22, and 28, 1994. These minutes contain short reports by the twomembers given to the whole Authority, specifying details of contacts with members of theMaKominising Anishnabeg.184Another crisis that faced the WSA was how they would decide the status or use of the RedSquirrel Road and its Extension. As highlighted earlier, past controversy over this road led to closureofthe only mill in Temagami (Wm. Mime Lumber), aboriginal and environmentalist blockades, andfinally the formation of the WSA.One of the strategies used by the WSA to resolve this issue was the concept of “land-usezoning” (Table 14). According to three of the WSA respondents (N=1O), the WSA resolved the RedSquirrel Road controversy through zoning decisions that identified different areas for different uses.The WSA plan (WSA 1994:13) described in detail how the zoning technique was applied. The actualzoning proceeded from low impact uses (such as protection, fish habitat, wildlife habitat, and culturalheritage) to high impact uses (such as mining and timber harvesting) (Appendix 3). Rather than putsolid lines on the map, the WSA members took their zoning ideas to the public for discussion andidentification of zones. Composite land value maps showing various patterns of resource potentialin the planning area were used in the zoning decision-making process (WSA 1994). The compositevalues maps were also overlaid with soils, topographic, and watershed maps of the area. Equippedwith those tools, both the public and the WSA participated in a preliminary zoning exercise at aworkshop and public meeting held on October 30, 1993 (WSA 1994). The preliminary results werezones delineated on maps for specific uses that were agreed between the WSA and the public.Once the zones were decided, the WSA then recommended several road access options forreaching those resources/values. Those options were then taken for public review again. In the end,the first option on use of the road, which is described in the decisions outlined in section 3.3.2.2.1,was adopted by both the WSA and the public. Here, zoning forced consensus on use of the Red185Squirrel Road. Zoning resulted in negotiations between the WSA and the public and ultimately in asupported decision. The public supported the WSA’s decision on use of the Red Squirrel Road andits Extension. The process took longer than most of the WSA members had anticipated (2D, 2G, 2J);but in the end, as one WSA member put it,Once the process was explained to the members, and after several rounds of practice, we wereable to follow and understand our decision from beginning to the end; zoning isan open and visual process- there are no hidden agendas. We criticized each othe?s opinionsbut in a constructive way... We participated in it all at the same time, having the sameinformation, and using our local knowledge of the area, and maps provided by the planner.It forced us to work together. In the end we achieved balanced use across our planning areaand everybody was happy. (21).This is consistent with Habermas’ (1984b) view that true consensus can only emerge if participantsin communication exchange validity claims with a pre-understanding that such claims can be criticizedor rejected. For this to have happened on the WSA, the decision-making process had to be open ascharacterized by the WSA respondents in Table 14.Strategies used internallySeveral internal strategies used by the WSA included consensus decision-making, a neutralChair (as specified in the mandate), a planner who acted as facilitator and collaborator rather thandecision-maker, and land-use zoning. These are similar features to the cooperative planning modeldescribed by Armour (1992). Both zoning and consensus decision-making proved to be effectivetools for conflict resolution not only internally but also with the public.186De-escalationlescalation of conflictsFor the CPC, 82% ofthe respondents characterized conflicts in the area as escalating (Table14). This escalation was attributed the public’s discontent with the length of time it was taking theCPC to complete its plan. As noted earlier, the mandate of the CPC was extended twice: first, fromMarch 31, 1992 to March 31, 1994; and second, from March 31, 1994 to March 31, 1996. TheCPC’s involvement in the MNR’s Contingency Timber Management Planning and Interim TimberManagement Planning processes caused delays in the CPC process. These delays demanded the firstextension. The CPC’s involvement in the public consultations over Treaty of Co-existencenegotiations between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai caused further delays in the CPCprocess. The delays demanded the second extension.In addition, the same respondents felt that since the concerns of both mining interests and theElk Lake Community Forest (ELCF) were not addressed, conflicts in the area were likely to escalate.However, in another announcement made by the Minister ofNatural Resources on February 6, 1995,the Minister transferred the nine (9) Townships at the centre of conflict between the CPC and theELCF under the latter’s jurisdiction. In the same announcement, the Minister also allowed mineralstaking in 20 Townships that were previously not covered by the TAA land caution. Previously, anagreement between Ontario and the TAA excluded mining activities in the 20 Townships. Giventhese latest developments, it is possible that the conflicts may not escalate as a result of pressuresfrom mining interests and the Elk Lake Community Forest.For the WSA, 97% of the respondents (N=74) noted that conflicts in the area were currentlyon hold due a lack of action on the ground; that is, the WSA’s plan had not been implemented.187However, it was also felt by 64% of the respondents that conflicts were likely to escalate because thefuture of the WSA was not known. In particular, the respondents pointed out that conflicts werelikely to escalate if the WSA plan was not implemented by a body other than the MNR.The Agreement In Principle (AlP) reached between Ontario and the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai in October, 1993 (Ontario Executive Council 1993b) stated that the mandate of the WSAwould be extended from time to time until the establishment of a transition body mutually agreedupon by both parties. However, Ontario unilaterally tenninated the WSA was without a newtransition body in place. On February 6, 1995, the Minister ofNatural Resources announced that thefeasibility and implementation the WSA’s plan would be decided by the CPC. Given that the MNRand not the CPC will eventually implement the plan (due to a lack of legislative authority for thelatter), it is highly likely, therefore, that conflicts will escalate in the area.In both the CPC and WSA cases, what is clear is that conflicts are anticipated at theimplementation stage. For the WSA the question is “if the plan is not implemented by the WSA oranother body other than the MNR” whereas with the CPC, it is “when the plan is implemented”. Ageneral conclusion that can be drawn here is that the public support the WSA’s planning process andits plan whereas that support was lacking for the CPC. This had to do with the CPC publicinvolvement process perceived by the public to be mere tokenism. In addition, while the WSAcompleted its plan within its three-year mandate, the CPC process has been going on since 1989. Itwill have taken seven years of comprehensive planning by the CPC if they adhere to the currentdeadline ofMarch 31, 1996 for completion of the plan.188CHAPTER 5CONCLUSIONSThis study has examined four main research questions pertaining to co-managementapplications. The study used two cases in Temagami, northeastern Ontario: the ComprehensivePlanning Council (CPC) and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA), in order to answer thosequestions. The questions, which are discussed in the next sections, are:1) How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to locallevels?;2) How has co-management changed the substance of resource management decisions at locallevels?;3) How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actorsand local resource users?; and4) How has co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?This chapter now draws some final conclusions, arguing that while co-management as amodel for resource management has considerable potential, its ultimate success lies in theobjectives of citizen involvement and the relevant institutional designs or structures adopted. If theobjective is to simply involve local citizens in resource management discussions, on both Arnstein’s(1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) evaluation frameworks (Figures 25 and 26, respectively) the levels ofpublic participation would be in the low ranges (informing to placation). At these levels, local citizensor stakeholders are merely informing and participating in the process.1898 Citizen controlCo-management structuresDegress ofdesigned to delegate authority 7 Delegated power } citizen powerto advise, decide, and/orimplement decisions 4, 6 PartnershipA 5 Placationdesigned to operate strictly 4 ConsultationCo-management structures____________________________________} Degrees of1 Informing tokenismin advisory capacities____ ____ ___ ____Non-2 Therapy} participation1 ManipulationFigure 25: Co-management levels/designs and their implications for devolution of decision-making power on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein1969).Co-management structures designed todelegate authority to advise, decide,and/or implement decisionsDecision-making powerInformation Persuasion Consultation Cooperation olThe decision The decision The problem is The limi3....— The decision isis made and is made and submitted, ,ded, made by thethe public an effort is opinions j— the decision is public, whichis informed made to the shared with assumes a roleconvinceç.- decision is and made of publicj1k made together with responsibility_ the publicPublic participationCo-management structures designed tooperate strictly in advisory capacitiesFigure 26: Co-management levels/designs and their implications for devolution of decisionmaking power on Parenteau’s public participation and decision-making evaluationframework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).190Institutional structures suitable to such arrangements include advisory groups or committees withstrictly advisory roles. In such cases, decision-making authority is retained by the government agencyresponsible for planning and resource management. If the objective is to promote shared decision-making among various participants, the levels of public participation would be in the upper rangesof both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) evaluation frameworks (from partnerships orcooperation to citizen control). At these levels, real decision-making authority to advise, decide,and/or implement decisions is delegated to local citizens’ groups. Here, local citizens’ groups informthe process, participate in the process, design the process, and share in decision-making.The two co-management agencies studied depicted two different models of institutionaldesign. Ontario created the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) as an advisory body to theMinistry ofNatural Resources (MNR). Both Ontario and the CPC members understood this advisoryrole to confer some degree of authority to advise the MNR. Hence, the specification in the CPC’smandate to recommend a comprehensive plan to the Minister ofNatural Resources- and not to theMNR District Office staff in Temagami. This implied that the CPC required to arrive at a set ofdecisions before it provided advice to the IvINR. Because the IVINR retained legislative authority tomake decisions, this implied that the MNR was supposed to share decision-making responsibilitieswith the CPC. On both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) evaluation frameworks above(Figures 25 and 26, respectively), this implied some degree of citizen power for the CPC at the levelsof “partnership” (Figure 25) or “cooperation” (Figure 26).Both Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) First Nation created the WSA as adecision-making rather than advisory body. Both establishing bodies above understood the WSA as191a model of shared decision-making between aboriginal interests (represented through six TAAappointees) and non-aboriginal or “provincial interests” (represented through six Ontario appointees).Of notable absence on the WSA was the MNR. Both Ontario and the TAA agreed to exclude theMNR from the WSA pointing out that the WSA was a model for shared stewardship between Ontarioand the TAA; thus connoting a government-to-government relationship between both establishingbodies.Because the WSA was created as a decision-making body, both Ontario and the TAApromised to delegate authority to the WSA. For Ontario, this meant granting the WSA legislativeauthority. With the TAA, this meant conferring the authority through a General AssemblyResolution. General Assembly is the highest legislative body for the TAA which would besynonymous to the Ontario Legislature.As a model of shared decision-making between Ontario and the TAA, the WSA model of comanagement implied some degree of decision-making power. On both Amstein’s (1969) andParenteau’s (1988) evaluation frameworks above (Figures 25 and 26, respectively), the WSA’s degreeof decision-malcing power constituted the levels of “partnership” (Figure 25) or “cooperation” (Figure26). However, the absence of the MNR from its board also suggested that the WSA was created atthe highest level of “citizen control” on both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) evaluationframeworks. Given both the CPC and WSA’s backgrounds above, the next sections provide summaryconclusions in response to the questions highlighted above.1925.1 Co-management and Distributions of Decision-making Authority to Local LevelsHow has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to locallevels? This question was addressed in Chapter 3.The evidence in this study showed that the models of decentralization of decision-making toboth the CPC and the WSA only conferred degrees of responsibility but not authority to effectivelyadvise and implement decisions, respectively. While such responsibility was adequate to makedecisions at the planning level in the case of the WSA, it was insufficient to implement thosedecisions. The lack of advisory authority for the CPC meant that it became convenient for the MNRto preempt the CPC’s decisions or coopt the CPC into its decisions. Therefore, in both cases, thestructural as well as procedural conditions within which these co-management agencies wereconstituted constrained the achievement of “partnerships” or “cooperation” as initially anticipated bythe establishing bodies. These findings are also consistent with those ofReed (1995:147) in the caseof the Ignace Co-management Committee in Ignace, northern Ontario.This has implications for the way co-management is viewed as a model for shared decision-making in resource management. What is in question is whether what is shared is responsibility orthe authority to make and implement decisions. As highlighted earlier, depending on the objectivesofco-management, it is argued that the latter is more meaningful to co-management than the former.This is so because the ultimate success of co-management depends on the degrees of influence thatlocal citizens can exert over decision-making. Consequently, the ultimate test for decentralizationofdecision-making authority to local levels lies in the implementation and not simply in the making193of decisions in the planning process. This is not to suggest that the latter case, involving simplyredistributions of responsibility to engage the public in discussions, has no place in co-management.Such co-management designs may be applicable in cases where the objectives are to “inform” or“educate” the publics. Often, in such cases, there is likely to be an absence of demand for localinvolvement in resource management decision-making. In both cases studied, where demands forlocal involvement in resource management decision-making were apparent, the decentralizationmodels of co-management failed to commit the agencies to share decision-making (in the case of theCPC) and implement (in the case of the WSA) decisions. While the WSA obtained such authorityfrom the TAA through a General Assembly Resolution, Ontario failed to delegate similar authority(granted by the Legislature) to the WSA.For co-management to be truly a model of shared decision-making, political rather thanadministrative decentralization of decision-making authority to local levels is necessary. Politicaldecentralization would include an actual delegation of power to the local level, and the participationof nonprofessionals in the policy-making process, as compared to administrative decentralization,which relies on varying degrees of devolution of responsibility but without the authority to implementdecisions. This study confirmed that administrative decentralization of decision-making throughOrders-In-Council and Memoranda of Understanding only conferred responsibility to makerecommendations. In a western democracy such as Canada, political decentralization can be achievedthrough the legislative granting of authority to local organizations, thereby assuring theimplementation of decisions made by co-management agencies.194The absence of decision-making authority in the co-management agencies studied alsoaffected the broader publics’ participation in the agencies’ planning and decision-making processes.In the case of the CPCiMNR co-management arrangement, the public could not influence itsdecisions because the CPC, which acted in a strictly advisory role, did not make decisions; decisionswere made by the MNR- the government agency. The MNR on the other hand, relied exclusively onscientific information and existing policies in its decision-making process to the exclusion of localknowledge. Consequently, the MNR’s decisions were often not relevant to the local context as theyexcluded local knowledge input and lacked flexibility to change policy. The implication is that boththe CPC and the public did not have control over information used in the planning process, nor couldthey propose or change policy.For the WSA, the levels ofpublic participation in its planning and decision-making processescontained degrees of citizen power. This was possible because the WSA exercised defacto decision-making authority. It incorporated both scientific and local knowledge in its planning process that wasalso flexible and as a result, capable of adapting to the local needs and conditions. However, becausethe WSA lacked dejure decision-making authority, those decisions made with the public could notbe implemented. Its decisions were turned to the Ministry ofNatural Resources, which has legislativeauthority, to judge their feasibility and legitimacy. Public participation in this case was simplyreduced to an advisory exercise in planning. Decision-making authority for co-management agenciesis necessary to ensure that decisions made by the agencies with the public are implemented.One ofthe important findings in this study is that both theories of citizen participation and comanagement do not address the issues of quality of information and methods used in public195participation fora. Both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks fail to explicitly discuss these factors as important for effective publicparticipation. For co-management, whose main premises are shared decision-making and consensus,the degree of complexity of information shared with the public, its volume, and time of disseminationor delivery, are all important attributes of information that need to be considered.Shared understanding between the agencies and the public is likely to be enhanced if theinformation provided by the former to the latter is easy to understand, of adequate volume and detail,and provided in time. It was also found that when proactive methods are used, the informationrequired could be self-generated between agency members and the public. Proactive methods werefound to be most suitable in the early stages of planning processes while reactive methods weresuitable in the late stages particularly if proactive methods were applied in the first place.While the substance of resource management decisions improved under the decentralizationmodels of co-management studied, the implementation of those decisions was affected by the lackof authority (to advise or to implement). The next section summarises this issue in response toresearch question #2 which was discussed in Chapter 4.1965.2 Co-management and the Substance of Resource Management DecisionsHow has co-management changed the substance ofresource management decisions at locallevels?Co-management improved the substance of decision-making at the planning level by movingaway from a pre-occupation with timber management planning to comprehensive or holistic resourcemanagement planning. In both cases examined in this study, this was a requirement reflected in theagencies’ mandates. With the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA), decisions characterized bythe public and agency members as ecologically sustainable and equitable emerged because ofmeaningful public participation. However, as pointed out earlier, the sustainability and equitabilityofthose decisions could not be tested because the WSA lacked the legislative authority to implementthose decisions. With the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC), the Ministry ofNatural Resources(MNR) retained decision-making authority. Acting in a strictly advisory capacity, the CPC could notchallenge or change existing IVINR policies that both the public and itself viewed as unsustainableand/or inequitable.While the general substance of resource management decisions improved under comanagement, from an application point of view, the substance of those decisions did not changefrom those ofthe past because authority to change policy and/or implement decisions remained withtheMjqR. The lesson for theorists and designers of co-management institutions is that, to be able tomake and implement decisions that are “more appropriate, more efficient, and result in more equitablemanagement”, as well as mobilize local consent, true devolutions of decision-making powers to theco-management institutions are necessary.197The requirement in both agencies’ mandates to plan comprehensively (in case of the CPC) andto plan based on the principle of “Sustained Life” (in case of the WSA) provided or identified thepresence of “a superordinate goal.” Having an understanding of a vision such as that provided by“Sustained Life” was found by WSA members to be important from a process point of view; itprovided a way of establishing a common ground and point of reference. This has implications forhow co-management is seen as different from other institutional arrangements in resourcemanagement. The design of co-management institutions needs to incorporate “a superordinategoal” that would guide such institutions toward adapting planning and management to theattainment of the overall goals of co-management.5.3 Co-management and Social RelationshipsHow has co-management affectedmutual understanding and cooperation among key actorsand local resource users?CooperationFor the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA), effective public participation processes thatpromoted partnerships between the agency and local resource users fostered cooperation betweenthe agency and the local publics. However, such cooperation between the Comprehensive PlanningCouncil (CPC) and the public was absent due to ineffective public participation processes employedby the agency. The implication for co-management is that public involvement in the agency’s planningand decision-making processes needs to be at the level of “partnership” or “cooperation” as depictedin both Arnstein’s (1969) and Parenteau’s (1988) frameworks. The quality of information andmethods used are important factors to consider in the public participation processes.198The WSAfailed to implement the partnershipsformedwith the local users because it lackedreal decision-making authority. A further implication for co-management is that local participationneed to move beyond planning functions to implementation and policy making for such participationto be meaningful. Such a shift in local participation will require that co-management agencies areaccorded the necessary legislative authority.Cooperation between the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) and the co-managementagencies was possible by design in the case of the CPC, and because of an enforcement agreementin the case of the WSA. The CPC solely depended on the MNR for all its technical and logisticalsupport requirements. Based on the available evidence, it appears that any requests made by the CPCto the MNR may have been interpreted by the latter as challenging to its authority. Therefore, therequests were rejected. For instance, the CPC requested that outside consultants be hired to providealternate sources of information in some areas of the planning process - and the request was denied.The exclusive dependency on the MNR limited the CPC’s networkingpattern to the institution thatcreated it-- the IvINR.Cooperation between the IvINR and the WSA was also limited to the activities listed underthe Enforcement Agreement signed between them. Any requests made by the WSA viewed by theMNR as a direct challenge to its authority (e.g. a flight to inspect an area that was illegally cut withinthe WSA boundaries, and application forms for a Land Use Permit) were rejected. Therefore, thelack ofclarity in thejurisdictional authority of the WSA hampered cooperationfrom the A’fNR. Forco-management, this implies that enforcement agreements between government agencies and comanagement bodies need to be comprehensive to take advantage of the former’s resources and199expertise. In addition, the external support of co-management bodies need to be diversified beyondgovernment sources.InclusionThe lack of representation on the co-management agencies by some major stakeholders suchas mining and the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) affected social relationships.This in turn affected the political legitimacy of the co-management agencies. In addition, the lack ofinvolvement by stakeholder groups in the selection of their representatives to the co-managementagencies affected relationships between them and the government. This selection was the exclusivedomain of the government. As a result, accountability of agency members to the variousconstituencies which they were to represent was nonexistent. That is, there were no structuredreporting relationships between the members on the co-management agencies and the interests theywere supposed to represent.For co-management to be viewed as a mechanism for participatory decision-making,governments need to consult all stakeholders and let those groups select their own representatives.This would enhance both accountability and legitimacy of decisions made by the agencies. For thesame reasons, the mandates of co-management agencies need to be mutually decided between thegovernment and various local interests. The involvement of both the government and local interestsin the framing ofthe mandates of co-management agencies will ensure that there is a congruence ofgoals. Therefore, the process ofdecentralization is more than simply setting up user groups; it mustalso permeate the larger state organization.200Respect and trustThe lack of congruence between group goals and agency goals and the lack of defineddecision-making process affected respect and trust between the CPC and the MNR. The lack ofredistribution of decision-making authority from the MNR to the CPC meant that decision-makingwas top-down rather than shared or by consensus. This implies that the goals of co-managementneed to coincide with the goals of the various stakeholder groups represented on the managementbody. As highlighted earlier, this implies that the mandates of co-management agencies need to bemutually decided between the government and stakeholder groups. For consensus to work, there isneed to share decision-making authority among all participants in co-management.Ontario’s unilateral actions that preempted or undermined the authority of the Teme-AugamaAnishnabai (TAA) affected respect and trust between them. Despite being co-sponsors of comanagement in the area, the TAA totally depended on Ontario for funding. Without the same powersas Ontario, the TAA was unable to influence what happened to either the CPC or the WSA. Theimplications for co-management are that the sponsors need to have equal powers to influence theprocess. In addition, they need to have financial independence. Where one party is dependent on theother for funding, then such funding must be guaranteed by any appropriate means. This isparticularly important in future relationships between governments and First Nations in areas whereland claim settlements will be reached and where aboriginal self-government agreements will bereached. The relationships may be formalized as government-to-government relationships. In suchcases, co-management will entail “co-jurisdiction” in areas of shared stewardship or outsideaboriginal exclusive title. Financial independence by both parties will be key to successful cojurisdiction agreements.201The lack of structured reporting relationships between Ontario representatives and theirbroader constituencies or with Ontario also undermined the political legitimacy of both the CPC andthe WSA. Various stakeholder groups viewed both the CPC and the WSA as processes designed toreduce participation and obstruct scrutiny of the manner and substance of both agencie& decision-making. At the root of this problem are the issues of accountability and who selects therepresentatives to the co-management bodies. As argued earlier, both the government andstakeholder groups need to be equally involved in the selection process. Such an approach would notonly assure a high degree of accountability between members and their constituencies or betweenagencies and the government, but also open lines of communication among all, Such was the casebetween Teme-Augama Anishnabai representatives on both the CPC and the WSA and theirconstituency - the TAA.High member turnover affected respect and trust on the WSA, particularly among the TemeAugama Anishnabai representatives. These were all individuals opposed to the concept of the WSAbecause ofthe unresolved land claim issue between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. Forco-management, the implication is that attempts to facilitate agreement by narrowing the initialagenda and excluding the big issues, does not make those issues disappear. The WSA expendedmuch effort dealing with the MaKominising Anishnabeg enforcement issue that was part of the big“Temagami Conflict”- the aboriginal land claim and traditional land rights. By designating the WSAPlanning Area on a site claimed by some TAA members as their own traditional family lands beforethe conclusion of the land claim negotiations between the TAA and Ontario only precipitated a‘locational conflict’.202The specification in the WSA mandate that members reach decisions by consensus helpedbuild internal respect and trust among members. This not only helped the members deal withdifficulty resource management planning issues but also the enforcement issue discussed above. Italso fostered mutual learning and cohesion among members. The implicationfor co-management,whose premise is shared decision-making and understanding, is that the mandates of themanagement agencies specfy the requirementfor consensus decision making. Furthermore, illsimportant that the requirement for consensus permeates all levels of potential actors in comanagement arrangements. This includes the government, stakeholder groups, members of the comanagement agencies, and the public.5.4 Co-management and Conflict ResolutionHow has co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?Generally, the two case studies do represent a change in the MNR land-use and resourcemanagement regime. It stems from the failure of the progressive model and rational planning toresolve conflicts engendered by scarce resources and struggles for First Nations. It also stems fromthe failure ofthe progressive model in addressing the issues of sustainability and equity. The resultsof this study revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of these new agencies as planninginstitutions and as conflict resolvers.As exemplars of cooperative planning, only the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)approached the factors noted by Armour (1992): decentralized decision-making; planning with thepeople; flexible, adaptive process with rules jointly defined; informal interpersonal relationships;203incorporation ofphenomenological mode of inquiry, consensus; emphasis on win-win, maximize jointgains; and planner as facilitator and collaborator. The WSA decentralized its planning and decision-making processes and operated by consensus. It came closest to challenging the progressive modelof technical, scientific decision-making with its interest in and adoption of local knowledge. TheWSA members retained decision-making functions while the planner simply facilitated the process.Through land-use zoning, the WSA was able to ensure an equitable distribution of land uses acrossits planning area. The WSA members also interacted informally as a strategy for buildinginterpersonal relationships.The Comprehensive Planning Council fell within the “conventional or rational” frameworkboth in its adoption of rational planning and the acceptance of its advisory nature. Althoughrepresentation on both bodies did not also include mining and angling and hunting interests, theirrepresentation was reflective of the cooperative model. Both agencies comprised of local users andresidents. The major weakness with the CPC is that it played down conflicts and it failed to developstrategies for resolving conflicts among members, and between members and the public. Due to alack of decision-making authority, the CPC failed to influence the resolution of conflicts betweenitself and the public despite the training its members had in conflict resolution. Another weakness isthat the planning process was taking too long to complete. Seven years of planning createduncertainties among users on the ground; and such uncertainties bred conflicts between users andplanners.For the WSA, there were more strengths than weaknesses. The major source ofweaknessfor the WSA lay in its relationship with Ontario. If co-management agencies are to make tough204decisions they should be free to make those decisions and they should have the legislative authorityto make and implement those decisions. Lack of legislation for the WSA meant that it could notimplement its decisions reached by consensus and supported by the public. Because of public supportfor the WSA’s decisions - but with its absence at the implementation stage, conflicts will escalate ifthe MNR preempts the WSA’s decisions.A major finding of this study is that both consensus decision-making and ‘land-use zoning’proved to be valuable tools for conflict resolution on the WSA. However, as with any other tool,mastering the use of both consensus and land-use zoning takes time. The WSA proved that oncemastered, both consensus and land-use zoning produced decisions that all participants supported.Based on the findings of this study, land-use zoning as a conflict resolution tool has practicalimplications for state involvement in co-management. On the CPC, where there was stateinvolvement through the MNR (a government agency), land-use zoning was the exclusive domain ofthe MNR. This resulted in zoning decisions that neither the CPC nor the local publics supported orunderstood. Conflicts between the MNR and the local publics surfaced; the latter also characterizingthe CPC as being in the “back pocket” of the MNR. On the other hand, the WSA, on which theIVINR was absent, involved the local publics in its land-use zoning decisions. As a result, the WSAproduced a management plan and decisions that were supported by most of the local publics.Consequently, conflicts were minimized or abated. Given the potential of “land-use zoning”technique as a conflict resolution tool, the foregoing scenario raises the following theoreticalproposition:205Land-use zoning exercises by state agencies responsible for resource management are notlikely to involve the local publics because public involvement in such exercises would resultin conflict resolution over resource use and allocation; which would, in turn, invalidate ordiminish the role of the state agencies.The proposition above suggests that state agencies are likely to maintain a “paternalistic attitude” inco-management arrangements in order to justify their relevance and establishment. By resolvingconflicts, state agencies would require to give up some degree of decision-making power to localcitizens’ organizations. This is the dilemma of centralized bureaucracies. In summary, the followingconclusions pertaining to the co-management models studied and their effects on local resource-useconflicts are made:1. Consensus-decision-making facilitated conflict resolution among WSA members and betweenWSA members and the public.2. Land-use zoning facilitated conflict resolution among WSA members and between WSAmembers and the public.3. For the CPC, co-management is likely to result in escalated conflicts due to the long durationof the planning process.4. For the WSA, conflicts are likely to escalate if the Ministry ofNatural Resources implementedthe WSA’s plan because that would be contrary to the agreement between Ontario and theTeme-Augama Anishnabai that a shared stewardship body would implement the plan.5. Failure of the co-management agreement to delegate decision-making authority from Ontarioto the WSA resulted in the WSA’s inability to implement decisions that were initiallysupported by the public.6. Generally, co-management has not changed the nature of conflicts in the Temagami Areabecause decision-making authority was not transferred from Ontario to the managementbodies.2065.5 Implications for ResearchThis study has explored both strengths and weaknesses in the institutional designs of comanagement using two case studies. Although the study has revealed more weaknesses thanstrengths, this is not to suggest that there is anything inherently wrong with the concept or practiceof co-management. However, it raises the question of which co-management model for resourcemanagement is most appropriate in a highly conflicted environment. Is it possible that comanagement will provide a long-lasting solution? Comparative research aimed at exploring how comanagement works in both conflicted and non-conflicted situations will be important in understandingthe role of co-management in conflict resolution.The two cases in this study revealed two different institutional designs in co-management.The first, the CPC, served as an advisory body to the MNR, a government agency. The second, theWSA, lacked the presence of the IvINR on its board. It consisted exclusively of local citizens. Theplanning processes of the two agencies while similar in some respects, were different in many ways.For instance, the WSA used both scientific and local knowledge in its planning process while the CPCrelied exclusively on scientific knowledge. The WSA controlled its own budget while the CPC solelydepended on the MNR financially. While the WSA could hire or fire its own stafl for the CPC, bothfunctions remained the exclusive domains of the MNR. In addition, the WSA challenged existingMNR policies that it considered as not locally sustainable and/or equitable while the CPC could not.This raises the question of what roles government staff ought to play in co-management. Shouldthey simply undertake planning functions while citizens’ groups make the decisions or vice versa?Another area worth looking into would be the kinds of political reforms necessary for effective207application of co-management. What kinds of reorientations have to occur within governmentinstitutions for co-management to work? For instance, the evidence in this study showed that therewas no accompanying reorientation within the MNR to facilitate support for the co-managementagencies and to provide a policy nest into which they would fit.The reorientation of any organization is a long-term process requiring continuity and stabilitywithin the agency. Co-management institutions are vulnerable to the withdrawal of political supportby senior levels ofgovernment, the cutting ofbudgets by the government, and the loss of critical staffthrough rotation or retirement. The government should develop policy on co-management tomitigate against loss of political support. The ultimate safeguard for such policy would be a legislatedrequirement for community participation in resource management. Such policy and accompanyinglegislation would in turn ensure continuity and stability within government agencies responsible forresource management. That is, the requirements for co-management applications would be clear togovernment staff.In the same vein, since financial self-sufficiency is a long-term goal of co-management, atransfer of revenue-gathering power from the government to the co-management institutions will benecessary. In the short term, it can be expected that such institutions will require infusions ofprovincial and/or federal monies in the initial stages. Some would argue that such money transfersare long overdue and perfectly justifiable as significant wealth has been transferred from the nation’shinterlands to metropolitan centres.208The problem of staff rotation or transiency within government agencies responsible forresource management needs special attention in co-management. Learning takes time and stability,and repeated orientation of new staff to a co-management program can cause loss of time. Theimplication is that government should attempt to retain dynamic staff who have gained experience ina particular local setting and are more supportive of organizational change.From an operational point of view, government resource planners will need to move awayfrom assuming the positions of arbiters and managers to negotiators and facilitators for comanagement to work. This means that the planners should be trained in conflict resolution,community processes, and comprehensive resource management planning. While inservice trainingmay provide a short-term solution, a long term solution would entail formal training in those areas.This in turn has consequences for how forest curricula in higher institutions of learning are structuredto reflect the multidisciplinary nature of tasks demanded under co-management.Assisting government bureaucracies to make systematic transitions from being resourcemanagers and conflict arbiters to helping communities develop resource management capabilities isa complex process. Little systematic work has been done in this area. One area argued for above isstrong public policy to provide the general direction and stability under which co-management canoccur. 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News Release, ONAS, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat. 1994. Memo to the Wendaban Stewardship Authority:Termination ofWSA Mandate. ONAS, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.PAC. 1993. Interim Report on Conserving Old Growth Red and White Pine. Old Growth PolicyAdvisory Committee (PAC), Toronto, Ontario. 32 pp.PAC. 1994. Final Report on Conserving Old Growth Forest Ecosystems in Ontario. OldGrowth Policy Advisory Committee (PAC), Toronto, Ontario. 48 pp.Parenteau, R. 1988. Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making. FederalAssessment Review Office, Minister of Supply and Serv. Canada. 71 pp.Pateman, C. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge. 211 pp.Pfeffer, J. 1981. Power in Organizations. Pitman: Boston. 320 pp.Pinkerton, E. (ed). 1989a. Cooperative Management ofLocal Fisheries: New Directions forImproved Management & Community Development. UBC Press, Vancouver, B.C.299 pp.217Pinkerton, E. 1989b. Introduction: Attaining Better Fisheries Management through CoManagement - Prospects, Problems, and Propositions, pp. 3-33 j Pinkerton E. (ed.)Cooperative Management ofLocal Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management &Community Development. UBC Press, Vancouver, B.C. 299 pp.Pinkerton, E. 1992. Translating Legal Rights into Management Practice: Overcoming Barriers tothe Exercise of Co-Management. Human Organization Vol. 51, No. 4:330-341.Quinby, P.A. 1988. The ecological values of old growth forest with specific reference to whiteand red pine forest ecosystems in the Temagami Area of Ontario: A Literature Review.Temagami, Ont. 35 pp.Quinby, P.A. 1989. Old Growth Forest Survey in Temagami’s Wakimika Triangle. Tall PinesProject, Research Report No. 2, Temagami Wilderness Society, Toronto, Ont. 33 pp.Reed, M. 1984. Citizen Participation and Public Hearings: Evaluating Northern Experiences.Cornett Occasional Papers No. 4. 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Masters Thesis, Department of Geaography, CarletonUniversity, Ottawa. 142 pp.Sinclair, P.G. 1992. Temagami Lakes Association: An Historical Perspective. Temagami LakesAssociation, Temagami, Ont. 126 pp.Skidmore, Judith. 1990. Canadian Values and Priorities: A Multiple-Use Perspective, pp. 65-68Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness. Dundurn Press:Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.218Susskind, L. and J. Cruikshank. 1987. Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches toResolving Public Disputes. Basic Books: New York.TAA. 1990. The Native Dimension: Key Dates, pp. 147-151 jBrayM. andA. Thomson (eds.) Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness. Dundurn Press: Toronto andOxford. 255 pp.TAA. 1994. 1993 Teme-Augama Anishnabai Census. TAA, Temagami, Ont. 45 pp.TAC. 1989. Temagami Advisory Council Annual Report, 1988. Queen’s Printer, Toronto, Ont.56 pp.TAC. 1990. Temagami Advisory Council Meeting #28 held at Scandia Inn, January 10, 1990.TAC, Temagami, Ont. 2 pp.Taylor, D. and J. Wilson. 1992. Environmental Health - democratic health: an examination ofproposals for decentralization of forest management in British Columbia. Paper presentedto the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of PrinceEdward Island, May 31, 1992. University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C. 27 pp.Temagami News Association. 1994. Temagami Times Directory, May 1994. Temagami LakesAssociation, Temagami, Ont. 90 pp.Temagami Times. 1994. Survey of Cottage Expenditures on Lake Temagami. Temagami Times,Vol. 23, No. 1:10, June 1994.Thompson, A.R. and H.R. Eddy. 1973. Jurisdictional Problems in Natural ResourceManagement in Canada, pp. 67-9 1 in Bennet, W.D., A.D. Chambers, A.R. Thompson, H.R.Eddy, and A.J. Cordell (eds.) Background Study for the Science Council of Canada - Essayson Aspects ofResource Policy, Special Study No. 27, May 1973.Ury, W.L., J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg. 1988. Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systemsto Cut the Costs of Conflict. 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WSA, Public Meeting held at Welcome Centre, Saturday, October 30,1993, Temagami, Ont. 11 pp.Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1993b. Meeting held by the WSA to review public commentson the WSAs zoning decisions. WSA Office, Temagami, Ont. 5 pp.Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1993c. A Documentation ofKnowledge Associated with theOral Traditions of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai: The Land, Its Waterways, Plants andAnimals. WSA, Temagami, Ont. 191 pp.Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1994. Wendaban Stewardship Authority 20-Year ForestStewardship Plan. A Report presented to the Minister Responsible for Native Affairs; TheMinister ofNatural Resources; and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. Temagami, Ontario. 250pp.Wolcott, Harry F. 1994. Transforming Qualitative Data: Description, Analysis, andInterpretation. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Ca. 409 pp.Wolfe, J. 1993. First Nations Strategies for Reintegrating People, Land Resources andGovernment, pp, 23 8-270 j Audrey J. and G. Nelson (eds.) Public Issues: A GeographicalPerspective. Dept. of Geography, University ofWaterloo, Ont. 418 pp.Wondolleck, 3. M. 1988. Public Lands Conflict and Resolution: Managing National ForestDisputes. Plenum: New York.Yin, R.K. 1988. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Applied Social Research MethodsSeries Volume 5. Sage Publications, Newbury Park. 166 pp.220Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Question, InterviewCategory, and Number ofRespondents.MAiN RESEARCH QUESTION AN]) TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BYINTERVIEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)1 2 3 4 5(5) (21) (4) (39) (5)1. HOW 1-lAS CO-MANAGEMENTAFFECTED THE DISTRIBUTIONSOF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITYAT LOCAL LEVELS?• What are the stated management functions / /under the agency terms of reference?• Which of those functions are actually / /performed/not performed by the agency?• How much decision-making authority does / /the/your agency have?• What management functions do you jointly / / /perform with the government?• Who makes the decisions? / /• Who is not involved in decision-making? / / /• Is there evidence of cooptationlpreemption / / / / /of decisions/recommendations made by theagency by the state or any of the keyactors?• How is decision-making authority /distributed among members?• What is the source of this decision-making / /authority?• Is there evidence of power asymmetries /among members?• What has been the effect ofTM / / / / /participation on the CPC, WSA, and thebilateral process in terms ofdistributions ofdecision-making to the TM?• Were you involved in setting the goals of / / / /the agency?• Does the agency have control ofits own / / /budget?• How was decision-making authority / /distributed in the past?• How were decisions made in the past? / / /221Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Questions, InterviewCategory, and Number ofRespondents (continued....)MAiN RESEARCH QUESTION AND TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BYINTERViEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)1 2 3 4 5(5) (21) (4) (39) (5)1. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENTAFFECTED THE DISTRIBUTIONSOF DECISION-MAKITG AUTHORITYAT LOCAL LEVELS?• Following creation of the WSA, then Minister / /ofNatural Resources Bud Wildman assuredWSA members at a meeting held on August27, 1992 in Temagami that legislation thatwas supposed to conferjurisdiction to the WSAover the four townships was already introducedin Cabinet and advised the WSA to act asthough they had legislation. Why was thislegislation never conferred?• What are the implications oflack of legislative / /jurisdictionfor the WSA decisions/recommendations or overall plan?2. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENTCHANGED THE SUBSTANCE OFRESOURCE MANAGEMENTDECISIONS AT LOCAL LEVELS?• What were past environmental concerns? / / / / /• How were those concersns addressed? / / / /• What are current environmental concerns? / / / / /• How have those concerns been addressed? / / / /• What decisions/recommendations were made / /by the agencies (CPC and WSA)?• Were the decisions/recommendations / /implemented and by whom?• If not, why were the decisions/ / /recommendations not implemented?• How were resources allocated in past/present / / / / /• How different are agency decisions fromthose made in the past? / /• How different are current planningprocesses/decisions from those in the past? / / / / /• Are you generally satisfied with the goals ofthe agency (WSA and/or CPC)? / /• What changes have occurred in the DLUGSas a result ofthe CPC planningprocess? /- -222Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Question, InterviewCatenorv. and Number ofRespondents (continued....).MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BYINTERVIEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)1 2 3 4 5(5) (21) (4) (39) (5)2. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENTCHANGED THE SUBSTANCE/TYPESOF RESOURCE MANAGEMENTDECISIONS AT LOCAL LEVELS?• Do you think the WSA achieved their goals / / /in the planning process?• Did WSA & CPC use local knowledge in / /their planning processes?• How have the CPC, WSA, bilateralprocess / / /affected resource management decisions?• How has the CPC/CFP’s role in Treaty I / / / /Negotiations affected their planningfunction?• How has the TM 1973 land cautions / /affected rimbersupply in the area?• How much wood has been harvestedfrom /Temagami since the land cautions?• Wouldyou support establishment ofa mill / / / /in Temagami?• Have you routed decisions through the / /management agency in the past?• Have you directed the agency both in its /mandate and operations?• Was pertinent information made available to / /all interests in the area?• What methods of public participation did / /the/your agency use?• Did the public raise any concerns about your / /public participation process?• if so, were those concerns taken into account? / /• Were you advised by the agency when your / /input was utilized/not utilized?• Did the agency provide opportunities for / /systematic review and improvement of thedecision process in response to your concerns?• What were the key issues raised at the public / /meetings?• Did those issues influence agency decisions? / /• On a scale: 1-10, how do you evaluate the /the agencies’ public participation techniques?223Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Question, InterviewCategory, and Number ofRespondents (continued....).MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BYINTERVIEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)1 2 3 4 5(5) (21) (4) (39) (5)3. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENTAFFECTED MUTUALITh1DERSTANDJNG & COOPERATIONAMONG KEY ACTORS AND LOCALRESOURCE USERS?• Did any members of your agency voluntarily /quit, and if so, why?• Have representatives in your agency /engaged in joint fact-finding missions orother strategies of trust building?• Did the/your agency consult all interests in / / / / /its decision-making?• What are the fundamental principles of your /group?• Do you feel these principles have been /achieved and not abandoned in the process?• How are reporting relationships between you /and your constituency structured?• What has been the role ofONAS/TAA as / /regards the functioning ofCPC & WSA?• Did the/your agency seek technical advice / /and/or logistical support from the governmentand was such advice/support accorded?• Did the government accept the decisions! / / /recommendations made by the agency?• Does the agency have enforcement / / /agreements with the government (MNR)?• During the public consultation process, were / / /the public involved in problem definition,generation of alternative solutions,generation of viable solutions, evaluationand selection of final solutions?• What evidence of cooperative behaviour / /exists in agreement between resource usersand the agency (CPC and WSA)?• Why were the TAA not involved on the CPC / /initially, and what caused their subsequentinvolvement?• Why were the CPC and WSA created? / / /224Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Questions, InterviewCategory, and Number of Respondents ( continued).MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND4 TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BYINTERVIEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)1 2 3 4 5(5) (21) (4) (39) (5)4. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENTAFFECTED LOCAL RESOURCE-USECONFLICTS?• How were representatives on the / /management agency selected?• Is your agency committed to consensus /decision-making?• If so, is this commitment in the mandate or /has simply been adopted by your agency?• What conflict resolution strategies were /adopted by your agency?• What are/have been the outcomes of such /conflict resolution strategies?• What are the conflicts in the area? / / / / /• Have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated / / / / /over time?• If conflicts have de-escalated, can this be I / / / /attributed to the efforts of the CPC or WSA?• If conflicts have escalated, what are the / / / / /reasons for this?• Are the goals ofboth the CPC and WSA / / / / /related to the land-use conflicts in the area?• Have both the CPC and WSA addressed the / / / / /conflicts that were identfIed initially?• Is representation on both CPC and WSA / / / / /adequate?225Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Public Participation” in combined research questions #1 and#2.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Public ParticipationInterview Ouestion: Was pertinent information made available to all interrts in the area?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemComprehensive Planning . Yes, but too much information in short time 10Council members (CPC) . Yes, but too much information and too complex 11N1 I Yes, overall good information and less complex 1. Sometimes information withheld, e.g., on resourcemanagement options 4Wendaban Stewardship . Yes, adequate,and provided in advance ofmeetings 5Authority members Yes, inadequate,and provided during meetings 5(WSA) . Yes, and information was easy to read 10N=10 . Unlike the CPC, WSA constrained by fmances to 6do adequate consultations & complete inventoriesMembers of the Public CPCN=39 Information was too complex and provided in short 33time for any meaningfiul input. Yes, but Information provided was too much 29WSA. Yes, adequate information provided in advance 20. Yes, information was easy to understand 39. Inadequate information, provided during meetings 19. No need for advance information because WSA 2process was more of a developmental processInterview Question: What methods ofpublic participation did the/your agency use?Comprehensive Planning Small group workshops (middle stage) 1 1Council members (CPC) . Open house meetings (early stage) 6N1 I . Public presentations (early and middle stages) 5Write-ins (middle stage) 3Wendaban Stewardship Small group workshops (early and middle stages) 10Authority members . General meetings open to public (throughout) 8(WSA) . Write-ins (late stage) 9N= 10 Office records open to public scrutiny (throughout) 10Members of the Public CPCN=39 Open house meetings (early stage) 24. Small group workshops (middle stage) 23• Public presentations (middle stage) 17Write-ins (middle stage) 3WSASmall group workshops (early and middle stages) 39Public presentations (early and late stages) 13• Write-ins (middle stage) 23Open general meetings (throughout) 33Accessible office (throughout) 21226Appendix 2: Data display for the category Public Participation” in combined research questions #1 and#2 (continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Public ParticipationInterview Ouestion: What were the key issues raised at the public meelin2s2Category of Respondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemComprehensive Planning . Road access (Cross Lake road) [RI 7Council members (CPC) Availability of Crown land for mineral staking [RI 5N1 I Fly-in access into Wilderness Park [RI 5Planning to be based on watersheds [P1 5• Composition of CPC heavily weighted towardsTn-Town area/people; not Temagami [19 4Lack of provincial focus [P1 4The yellow zone that included access was tooconfusing in the land-use scenarios [P1 3Old-growth protection in the Lorraine Valley [RI 6Wendaban Stewardship Zoning decisions to protect a canoe route [P1 10Authority members . Road access (use ofRed Squirrel Road) [RI 9(WSA) . Planning to be based on watersheds in the area [P1 9N1 0 Old-growth white and red pine protection [RI 5. Lack of provincial focus in planning [P1 4. Timber harvesting and allocation methods [P1 2Legitimacy ofWSA and long-term funding 2Ethics of bear hunting [RI ILess area open for mineral staking [RIMembers of the Public CPCN39 Planning process not clear [P] 31Planning process taking too long [P1 22. Permissible uses in Parks (wilderness park) [RI 18. Lack of mgmt. approach in skyline reserve [P1 14. Planning to be based on watersheds [P1 23. Lack of provincial focus [P1 13Management for old growth [RI 13. Road access (Cross Lake Road) [RI 24. Process heavily controlled by MNR [P1 12. Alternatives to herbicide use [RI. General standard of care versus extractive uses [P1Less area open for mineral staking [RIWSALack of information on fish & wildlife [RI 28Planning to be based on watersheds [19 24. Old-growth protection/management [RI 24. Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [RI 23. Lack of provincial focus [P1 18• Cultural heritage protection [RI 16Methods of LTSY allocations of timber [P1 IiMajor canoe route excluded from RTW Zone [‘ 6. No development on Lake Temagami [RI. Lack of third party opinion on WSA [P1N: [R] = resource-related issue [P1 = process-related issue227Appendix 2: Data display for the category ‘Public Participation” in combined research questions #1 and#2 (...conhinued).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Public ParticipationInterview Question: Did those Lcsues influence aencv decisions?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMmtionin_IhmTotal Yes NoComprehensive Planning Road access (Cross Lake road) [RI 7 1 6Council members (CPC) Availability of Crown land for mineral staking [RI 5 5 0N1 1 Fly-in access into Wilderness Park [RI 5 1 4Planning to be based on watersheds [P1 5 0 5Composition of CPC heavily weighted towardsTn-Town area/people; not Temagami [P1 4 0 4Lack of provincial focus [P1 4 4 0The yellow zone that included access was tooconfusing in the land-use scenarios [1] 3 2 1Old-growth protection in the Lorraine Valley [RI 6 5 1Wendaban Stewardship • Zoning decisions to protect a canoe route [P1 10 10 0Authority members Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [RI 9 7 2(WSA) Planning to be based on watersheds in the area [P1 9 9 0N10 Old-growth white and red pine protection [RI 5 5 0Lack of provincial focus in planning [P1 0 4Timber harvesting and allocation methods [P1 2 2 0Legitimacy of WSA and long-term funding 2 0 2Ethics of bear hunting [RI 1 1 0Less area open for mineral staking [RI 1 1 0Members of the PublicN=39 Planning process unclear-zones were confusing [P] 31 2 29• Planning process taking too long [P] 22 0 22Permissible uses in Parks (wilderness park) [RI 18 8 10Lack ofmgmt. approach in skyline reserve [P1 14 0 14Planning to be based on watersheds [P1 23 0 23Lack of provincial focus [P1 13 9 4Management for old growth [RI 13 I 1 2Road access (Cross Lake Road) [Rj 12 3 9Process heavily controlled by MNR [P1 24 2 22Alternatives to herbicide use [RI 9 0 9General standard of care versus extractive uses [P1 4 1Less area open for mineral staking [RI 4 2 2WSALack of information on fish & wildlife [RI 28 12 16Planning to be based on watersheds [P] 24 22 2Old-growth protection/management [RI 24 21 3Major canoe route excluded from RTW Zone [P1 24 23 1Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [RI 23 20 3Lack of provincial focus [P] 18 3 15Cultural heritage protection [RI 1616 0Methods of LTSY allocations of timber [P11 1 10 1Land availability for mineral staking [RINo development on Lake_Temagami_[RI228Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Decision-making Authority’ in combined research questions #1 and #2.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Decision-making authorityInterview Question: What is the source of this decision-making authority?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning_ItemComprehensive Planning Order-In-Council I ICouncil members (CPC)N=l 1Wendaban Stewardship Order-In-Council, Memorandum ofUnderstanding 10Authority members Order-In-Council, Memorandum ofUnderstanding,(WSA) TAA Resolution 5N= 10Members of the two CPCestablishing agencies: Order-In-Council 4Ontario Native AffairsSecretariat (ONAS); and WSAthe Teme-Augama Order-In-Council, MOU 4Anishnabai (TAA) Order-In-Council, MOU, and TAA Resolution 2N=4Interview Question: Who makes the decisions?Comprehensive Planning MNR make decisions 5Council members (CPC) CPC and MNR make decisions 5N1 1 One of the co-chairs & MNR make decisionsWendaban Stewardship WSA members make the decisions 10Authority members(WSA)N=1 0Members of the PublicN=39 MNR make decisions 26CPC and MNR make decisions 7One of the co-chairs makes decisions 6WSAWSA members make decisions 39229Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Decision-making Authority’ in combined research questions #1 and #2(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Decision-making authorityInterview Question: Is there evidence ofcooptation/preemption ofdecisions/recommendations made bythe aencv by the state or any ofthe key actors?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioninc ItemMembers of the Ministry . CPC members are likely to be coopted on technical 4ofNatural Resources decisions due to a lack of planning & technical(MNR) background by CPC members- (no specifics)N5 . CPC preempted on decision to go to Toronto to 4meet with special provincial interest groupsComprehensive Planning Coopted by the state on involvement in Treaty 8Council members (CPC) negotiations and CTMP processN1 1 CPC did not participate in the framing of 1 1management scenarios/zoning that were later takento the public for review, hence coopted by CPP. CPC coopted by CPP on use of Cross Lakes Road 8accessCoopted because we are forced to work within 9existing provincial policies- no room for innovation. CPC coopted by CPP because meeting agendas are 3pre-set by CPP who come to meetings with desiredoutcomes in mindCPC gets coopted by CPP all the time because not 6enough time is given to the CPC to respond toissues; CPP follows strict schedulesCPC preempted by CPP/MNR on decision jç to go 10to Toronto to meet with provincial interests. CPC preempted on decision to plan on watershed 7basisWendaban Stewardship Preempted by the MNR on issuance of a Land use 10Authority members Permit (LUP) to build a dock, and a LUP to renew(WSA) a lodge owner’s licenceN= 10 . Preempted by the state (Iv1NOM) on renewal of 10mining leases in WSA area. Preempted by MNR on Bear Mgrnt. Agreement 10(BMA) applications which MNR decided to handle. Preempted by the CPP/MNR when CPP decided 10to zone over WSA area in its planning processBoth Ontario & TAA did things without consulting 9the WSA, e.g. WSA was never asked for advice norparticipation in discussions on shared stewardshipwhen the WSA was the only body with experience-preemptedCoopted by both sponsoring bodies (Ontario & 6TAA) because it was never made clear as to howmuch WSA was entitled to differ from existingresource management_policies.230Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Decision-making Authority” in combined research questions #1 and #2(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Decision-making authorityInterview Question: Is there evidence ofcooptation/preemption ofdecisions/recommendations made bythe a’encv by the state or any of the key actors?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentionin2_ItemMembers of the two CPCestablishing agencies: Since CPP work under schedules, they have gone to 2Ontario Native Affairs the CPC with ideas of the outcome and in theSecretariat (ONAS); and process may have coopted CPC into their decisionsthe Teme-Augama in order to meet those schedulesAnisbnabai (TAA) TAA involvement on CPC was cooptation by 2N=4 Ontario from day one; the TAA never got involvedin developing CPC’s Terms ofReferenceTAA involvement on the CPC is being used by 2Ontario to legitimize the process- cooptationCPC is not allowed to make decisions! 2recommendations outside provincial policy whichis another case of cooptation.Although CPC is supposed to report to both Ontario 2and the TAA; recommendations on the CTMP wereonly sent to the Minister and not the TAA; TA.A onlyreceived the final plan. This is preemption byOntario of the TAA.WSA. Lack of clarity between the roles of WSA and MNR 2may have prompted preemption of WSA decisionsby the MNR (no specifics).TAA Executive Council received numerous reports 2from its reps on the WSA that MNR tried to or hadpreempted WSA decisions; e.g. on the illegal cutin Delhi Twp., Peter Bates’ dock buildingapplication, and renewal ofKet-Chun-Eny lodge’slicence. Not that I can recallMembers of the Public CPCN=3 9 . Cooptation because CPP/MNR are making 23decisions and make them look as if CPC is part of it. Cooptation because of CPC involvement in Treaty 22negotiationsCPC preempted by CPP/MNR on decision not to go 6to Toronto and meet with interest groupsldon’tknow 16WSA. Lack of legislation for the WSA means that Ontario 24will preempt WSA decisions/not implement its planldon’tknow 15231Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Decision-making Authority” in combined research questions #1 and #2(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Decision-making authorityInterview Question: Is there evidence ofcooptation/preemption ofdecisions/recommendations made bythe agency by the state or any ofthe key actors?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemKey InformantsN5 . Exclusive use ofMNR information in the planning 4process is cooptation of the CPC members. The CPC/CPP structure makes it possible for Iv1NRJ 3CPP to preempt CPC decisions (advisory withoutteeth). CPC decision not to go to Toronto and meet with 3environmental groups was preempted by MNRICPPWSA. Preempted by both Ontario & TAA because WSA 5was not consulted on shared stewardship models. Issuance of two land-use permits by MNR in WSA 5area was preemption ofWSA authority. Renewal of mining leases in Delhi Township by 5MNDM & MNR was preemption ofWSA authority. Attempts by MNR to dismiss WSA’s LTSY method 2of timber allocations was an attempt of cooptationby MNR to use their MAD method.Interview Question: What are the stated managementfunctions?Comprehensive Planning . Recommend to the Minister ofNatural Resources 11Council members (CPC) and the TAA Executive Council a comprehensiveN1 I plan; establish and manage the public consultation (reference made to twoprocess in the development of the comprehensive Orders-In-Council bySources: plan; provide advice to the MNR and TAA on respondents)Order-In-Council 1 145/91 ongoing land use planning and resource mgmt.Amending OIC 1 434/93 issues and decisions; and provide advice to theMinister of Natural Resources regarding alternative& preferred mechanisms to allow other parties’input into the negotiations between the TemeAugama Anishnabai & Ontario with respect to theimplementation of the MOU.Wendaban Stewardship . Plan, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, 10Authority members monitor, and undertake studies of, all uses in the(WSA) area of its jurisdiction -- and report its findings from (reference made to the OrderN=1 0 time to time to the TAA and Ontario. In-Council 1 144/91 andSchedule A of the Addendumto the MOU by respondents)232Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Decision-making Authority” in combined research questions #1 and #2(...continued).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Decision-making authorityInterview Question: Which of those functions are actually performed/not verformed by the aencv?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioninc ItemComprehensive Planning We have advised the minister on Treaty of Co- 11Council members (CPC) existence public consultationsN1 I Made recommendations on the Contingency Timber 9Management Planning Process (CTMP) to theMinister of Natural Resources (no response yet)• When recommendations on the CTMP were made 5to the Minister, they did not go to the TAARecommended to the Minister of Natural Resources 5revised CPC planning objectives and mission goals• We have not recommended a plan yet to the I IMinister because we are still planningWendaban Stewardship Performed all except long-term management 10Authority members (implementation) because WSA was terminated(WSA) N= 10 on March 31, 1994 & lacked legislative authorityMembers of the two CPCestablishing agencies: They have provided advice to the Minister on a 4Ontario Native Affairs number of issues but have not recommended a planSecretariat (ONAS); and yetthe Teme-Augama They have not provided advice or recommendations 2Anishnabai (TAA) to the TAA so far; all we got was a copy of theN=4 MNR’s CTM PlanWSAThey have performed all functions 4They have performed all functions except 2implementing the plan due to lack of legislationInterview Question: How was decision-making authority distributed in the past and how is it distributednow,Members ofMNR Past: distributed internally within MNR 5N=5 Present: Now shared with local citizens 5Members of the CPC Decision-making authority held by MNR 1 1N=1 I Present Not very much different from the past 6Now decision-making shared with locals 5Members of the WSA Past: MNR retained all the authority and made 10N= 10 all the decisions with minimal public inputPresent: Now citizens are able to make decisions 9Still MNR, they won’t relinquish controlMembers of the Public Present: It was no distribution at all, MNR decided 39N=39 Present: Now shared with the public 12MNR is till making the decisions because 27they have the legislative basis233Appendix 2: Data display for the category ‘Types ofDecisions” in combined main research questions #1 and #2.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Types of decisionsInterview Question: What decisions were made in the past?(Pasf)Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemMinistry ofNatural construction of the Red Squirrel Road Extension 5Resources Staff closure ofMime Lumber in 1990 in Temagami 5N=5 planning decisions did not consider land use and 4resource management simultaneously• establishment of the LESW Park 3Comprehensive Planning • Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions 1 1Council members (CPC) establishment of LESW Park 1 1N11 timber was the driving factor in planning decisions 10creation of the Temagami Advisory Council 8Wendaban Stewardship construction of the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road 10Authority members Extensions(WSA) establishment of the LESW Park 10N=10 timber rather than resource management 8. establishment of the Temagami Skyline Reserve 6Members of the two . closure ofMilne Lumber 3establishing agencies: primacy of timber in planning 4ONAS and the TAA . construction of the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road 4N=4 ExtensionsMembers of the Public Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions 39N=39 emphasis on timber management 37closure ofMilne Lumber 37a range of values other than timber not considered 35equally in planningestablishment of the LESW Park 17Key Informants closure ofMime Lumber 5N=5 closure of Sherman Mine 5construction of the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road 5Extensionstimber primacy in planning 3234Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Types ofDecisions” in combined main research questions #1 and #2(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Types of decisionsInterview Question: What were the outcomes ofthose decisions?(PastCategory ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemMinistry ofNatural on construction of road extensions = conflicts over 5Resources Staff diminishing wildernessN=5 on closure ofMilne Lumber = loss ofjobs 5on land use & resource mgmt. integration =conflicts 4on establishment of the LESW Park = conflicts 3Comprehensive Planning on construction of road extensions = conflicts 1 1Council members (CPC) on establishment of LESW Park = conflicts 1 1N1 1 on timber being driving factor = conflicts 10on TAC increased public participation 8Wendaban Stewardship • on construction of road extensions = conflicts I IAuthority members on establishment of the LESW Park conflicts 10(WSA) on timber rather than resource management = 8N10 conflictson closure ofMime Lumber = conflicts 1 1Members of the two on closure ofMime Lumber loss ofjobs, conflicts 3establishing agencies: on primacy of timber in planning conflicts 4ONAS and the TA.A on construction of road extensions = conflicts 4N=4Members of the Public on construction of road extensions = conflicts 39N=39 on emphasis on timber management = conflicts 37on closure ofMilne Lumber joy, conflicts 37on lack of equal consideration of resources in 35planning = conflictson establishment of the LESW Park = conflicts 17Key Informants on closure ofMime Lumber = loss ofjobs 5N5 on closure of Sherman Mine = loss ofjobs 5on construction of road Extensions conflicts 5on timber primacy in planning conflicts 3235Appendix 2: Data display for the category ‘Types ofDecisions” in combined main research questions #1 and #2(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Types of decisionsInterview Ouestion: What decisions/recommendations were made by the a”encies (CPC and WSA)?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentionin2_ItemComprehensive Planning Decisions:Council members (CPC) CPC decided to have a meeting with special 1 1N1 1 interest groups in Toronto but in TemagamiRecommendations:recommended to the Minister a revised management 10strategy and 16 objectives for the CPCrecommended to the Minister a public consultation 10strategy on Treaty negotiationsrecommended to the Minister the extension of the 8CPC mandate from March, 1994 to March, 1996recommended to the Minister and TAA approval of 6CTMP’sCPC recommended to the CPP to take a watershed 8approach in the planning areaCPC recommended to the CPP that outside 7consultants be hired as an alternative source ofinformation from the MNRWendaban Stewardship Decisions: [reference made to WSA plan byAuthority members members (WSA 1 994:x-xi)](WSA) a ban on importation of live baitfish into WSA area 10N= 10 • implementation of a fish catch-and-release program 10no baiting of holes during winter fishing season 10fishing gear restricted to one fishing rod per angler 10acidified lakes to self-reclaim naturally 10• boat motor size restricted to 6 h.p. on lakes 50 ha 10• enforcement of a fishing day user fee in WSA area 10baiffish licence fees based on area ofwaterbody plus 10incremental fee based on unit of baitfish harvestedover and above area chargelicence fee of $200/township charged to bearfitters 10no spring bear huntno use of dogs in bear hunting 10suspension ofwaterfowl hunting 10no use of herbicides 10no new road access in the area 10existing Goulard road in Delhi Twp. to be closed 10development zone to be accessed by Red Sq. Road 10first right of refusal for timber accorded to local 10entrepreneurs and the TAAfirst priority to timber applicants with innovative 10timber harvesting techniques and who do no requireuse ofRed Squirrel Road• IfRed Squirrel Road is used, subject to restrictions 10no open-pit mining in the area 10236Appendix 2: Data display for the category “Types ofDecisions” in combined main research questions #1 and #2(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Types of decisionsInterview Question: Were the decisions/recommendations implemented and by whom?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemComprehensive Planning Decisions:Council members (CPC) on meeting with special interest groups in 1 1N1 1 Temagami - CPP/MNR rejected the decision.Recommendations:on revised management strategy and objectives - 10Minister has not responded but CFC gone aheadon public consultation strategy on Treaty 10negotiations - Minister said Yes• on extension of CPC mandate - Minister said Yes 8on approval of CTMPs- Minister and TM sad Yes 6on watershed approach to planning - CPP did not 11say no but approach has not been implemented0on hiring of outside consultants - CPP saidNo 1 1Wendaban Stewardship Decisions:Authority members . No, decisions have not been implemented by the 10(WSA) WSA due to a unilateral termination of the WSA onN= 10 March 31, 1994 by the Minister, and the future is notknown- also due to lack of legislation.for the WSAInterview Question: How dfferent are current planning processesfrom those in the past?Ministry ofNatural . both combine land use and resource management 5Resources Staff into a single planning framework (+)N=5 both are comprehensive planning processes (all 5values are considered) (+)• all values are considered primary drivers, not just 5timber (+). both use permanent staff assigned to do planning 3whereas MNR staff are mostly transient (+). both have much more proactive public involvement 4processes than the MNR (+). both recognize conflict resolution as part of 5planning (+)amendment process much easier under CPP 5process_than under MNR’s DLUGS_(+)237Appendix 2: Data display for the category ‘Types of Decisions” in combined main research questions #1 and #2(....continued).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-makingauthority and the substance/types of resource management decisions atlocal levels?Category: Types of decisionsInterview Ouestion: How different are current vlannin processes from thnse in the vast?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemComprehensive Planning much more integrative and broad-based (+) 8Council members (CPC) much more sensitive to local concerns (+) 7N=1 I data gathering aims at obtaining equal levels of 10information among all plan components (+)partnerships with other government ministries (+) 9uses non conventional staff in planning such as 8ecologist, fire ecologist, economist (+)• no decision-making power, just advisory (-) 10TAA participation seen to compromise MNR 5integrity (-)lack of provincial focus (-) 5watershed planning abandoned (-) 5Wendaban Stewardship much more participatory (meaningful) (+) 10Authority members based on consensus-building (+) 10(WSA) TAA involved in decision-making (+) 10N1 0 much more holistic planning (all values) (+) 10more ecologically-based planning (+) 10• partnerships with local users and govt. agencies (+) 9prepared in conflict resolution (+) 8watershed-based planning (+) 9lacked provincial focus (-) 5as a new venture, produced uncertainty among 4members and the public_(lack of initial publicity)_(-)Members of the Public CPCN=39 more ecologically driven process 39considers all values other than just timber (+) 39CPC now has TAA involvement (+) 28still better advisory process than in the past (+) 23used local knowledge in initial stages (+) 18lacks provincial focus (-) 18• public participation still tokenism (-) 1 1WSAmore meaningful public participation (+) 39used local knowledge (+) 35process considered all values not just timber (+) 38• more ecologically driven process (+) 39decisions made by local citizens (+) 33decisions still subject to preemption or veto (-) 32lacked provincial focus unlike MNR which lacks 23local focus (-)238Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Inclusion” in combined main research questions #3 and #4.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: InclusionInterview Ouestion: Did the/your aencv consult all interests in its decisio-’makin?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentionin2 ItemMinistry ofNaturalResources Staff Provincial interests inadequately consulted (-) 5N”5 No, Town of Temagami inadequately consulted (-) 2WSANo, provincial interests ignored (-)Comprehensive Planning Yes (+) 4Council members (CPC) No, timber industry and OFAH ignored (-) 5N1 I No, provincial interests inadequately consulted (-) 2Wendaban Stewardship Yes (+) 6Authority members Provincial interests inadequately consulted (-) 4(WSA) No, OFAH and mining inadequately consulted (-) 3N= 10 No, Bear Island Reserve inadequately consulted (-)Members of the two CPCestablishing agencies: Yes, it is doing its best to do so (+) 4ONAS and the TAA Bear Island has not been adequately consulted (-) 2N=4Yes, (+) 4Provincially, consultation was not adequate (-) 2Members of the PublicN=39 Yes (+) 22OFAH and provincial interests not adequately 8consulted (-)No, provincial interests and Town of Temagami not 10adequately consulted (-)WSAYes (+) 24No, provincial interests slighted off (-) 13No, mining & OFAH not adequately consulted (-) 15Key Informants ccN=5 Yes (+)No, municipalities not adequately consulted (-) 4WSAYes(+) 3No, provincial interests, mining, OFAH not 2adequately_consulted_(-)239Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Inclusion” in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: InclusionInterview Question: During the public consultation process, were the public involved in problemdefinition, generation ofalternative solutions, generation ofviable solutions,evaluation and selection of final solutions?Category ofRespondents Responses Number of RespondentsMentioninc ItemComprehensive Planning Yes, public involved in problem definition 8Council members (CPC) Yes, public involved in generation of alternative 8Nl I solutions through review of land use optionsNo, - MNR makes all the decisions 3- public not involved in problem definition 3- public not involved in generation of 3alternative solutions- public not yet involved in generation of I Iviable solutions- public not yet involved in generation of I Ifinal solutionsWendaban Stewardship • Yes, public got involved in the process from start to 10Authority members end(WSA) - public defined public participation process 10N1 0 - public involved in background information 8stage- public involved in resource impact! 10compatibility analysis- public got involved in zoning decisions 10- public got involved in reviewing draft plan 10No, problem definition was already done by Ontario 6Members of the Public CPCN=39 Yes, in background information stage 10No, CPP decides what to take to the public 29WSAYes, public got involved throughout the process 20No, Ontario defined the problem 19Key InformantsN=5 Yes, the public got involved in identifying the 5problems and generating solutions (Phases I & 2)No, because MNR defines the problem then takes 4it to the public; then MNR makes final decisionsNo, the public have not yet been involved in the 5later stages of identifying and selecting viable andfinal solutions; and MNR is likely to do thatWSAYes, the public got involved in all stages of the 5planning processNo, because Ontario already identified the problem 5240Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Inclusion” in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: InclusionInterview Ouestion: How were representatives on the management aencv CPC or WSA) selected?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioninc ItemComprehensive Planning Appointed by Ontario through an Order-In-Council 7Council members N= 1 1 Appointed by the TAA Executive Council and 4approved by TAA General AssemblyWendaban Stewardship Appointed by Ontario through an Order-In-Council 5Authority members Appointed by the TAA Executive Council and 5(WSA) N= 10 approved by TAA General AssemblyMembers of the two CPCestablishing agencies: 12 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 4ONAS and the TAA 5 TAA representatives appointed by TAA 4N=4 WSA6 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 46 TAA representatives appointed by TAA 4Interview Question: Is representation on both CPC and WS.4 adequate?Ministry ofNaturalResources Staff mining interests not represented 5N=5 Town of Temagami not represented 5WSA. Mining interests and OFAH not represented 5Comprehensive Planning mining interests not represented I ICouncil members N= I I Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 8Wendaban Stewardship mining interests not represented 10Authority members Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters (OFAH) 5(WSA) N= 10 not representedMembers of the two CPCestablishing agencies: mining interests not represented 3ONAS and the TAA Town of TemagamilLatchford area not represented 4N=4• Mining interests and OFAH not represented 4Members of the Public CPCN=39 inadequate representation from the Temagami/ 32Latchford area, heavily weighted towards Tritownsmining interests not represented 7WSAMining interests not represented 39Key Informants CPCN=5 Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 5mining interests not represented 4WSAMining interests not represented 5241Appendix 3: Data display for the category Respect and Trust” in combined main research questions #3 and #4.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Respect and TrustInterview Ouestion: Did any members ofvour arencv voluntarily quit, and ifso. why?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentionin2_ItemComprehensive Planning One members voluntarily quit: 1 1Council members(CPC) - GL quit because as a member ofN’l 1 Municipal Advisory Group (MAO) whichis opposed to TAA involvement on CP,and thus, he was in conflict of interest• Two members were terminated:- fl-I because he moved out of the area- HM quit because as a member and Chiefof Bear Island that was opposed to TAAin general, she was in conflict of interestWendaban Stewardship A total of five members voluntarily quit: 10Authority members(WSA) - MM quit because he was opposed to TAAN= 10 - DM quit because he was busy withnegotiations on behalf of the TAA- AM quit because he was opposed to TAA- RT quit because he was opposed to TAA- TF quit because he was busy with theElk Lake Community Forest and alsobecause as member ofMAO that wasopposed to the WSA initiative, he was inin conflict of interestA total of two members were terminated: 10- DA because as chair, he was unpopularamong members, tried to apply Robert’srules in decision-making- H-I because he moved out of the local area242Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Respect and Trust” in combined main research questions *3 and #4(continued...)Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Respect and TrustInterview Ouestion: What are the fundamental principles ofvour group?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemComprehensive Planning resource sustainability, economic development, 4Council members (CPC) land preservation, preservation of aboriginal rightsN’l I (all respondents are TM representatives on CPC)environmental protection, sustainability, equitable 7access to resources, local governance(all respondents are Ontario representatives onCPC)Wendaban Stewardship sustained life, sustainable development, co- 5Authority members existence, and public participation in decision(WSA) making (same as WSA goals)N’l 0 (all respondents are TM representatives on WSA)socio-economic development, maintaining integrity 5of Lake Temagami, enhancing wildernessexperience, biodiversity, environmental protection(all respondents are Ontario representatives onWSA)Interview Question: Do youfeel those principles have been achieved or abandoned in the process?Comprehensive Planning TAA sideCouncil members (CPC) being achieved 0N11 being abandoned 4Ontario sidebeing achieved 3being abandoned 4Wendaban Stewardship TAA sideAuthority members • achieved 4(WSA) abandonedN= 10Ontario sideachieved 5‘ abandoned 0243Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Respect and Trust’ in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...)Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Respect and TrustInterview Question: How are reporting relationships between you andyour constituencystructured?Category of Respondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemComprehensive Planning TAA sideCouncil members (CPC) structured 4N”l 1 informal -not structured -Ontario sidestructured -informalnot structured 6Wendaban Stewardship TAA sideAuthority members structured 4(WSA) informalN1 0 not structured -Ontario sidestructured 0informalnot structured 4Interview Question: Is your agency committed to consensus decision-making, and fso, how did it work?Comprehensive Planning Yes, but consensus has not been defined and has not 1 1Council members (CPC) been practiced on the CPC- the Chair makes allN=l I the decisions plus the MNRWendaban Stewardship Yes, consensus has been defined as minimum of 10Authority members 8/12 in consent but it has never been applied that(WSA) way- it was always 12/12 in consent and no splitsN 10 on racial lines.244Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Cooperation” in combined main research questions #3 and #4.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: CooperationInterview Question: Have representatives in your agency engaged injointfact-flnding missions or otherstrateeies oftrust hui1din’?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning_ItemComprehensive Planning No 11Council members Quotes: - “No, we don’t even know each(CPC) other that well after three years”N1 1 - “It is taken for granted thateverybody knows everybody”- “No, we only meet here in thisroom whenever we are asked to”Wendaban Stewardship Yes 10Authority members Quotes: - “ closer working relationships(WSA) were fostered through subN’’l0 committee structures such asLands & Resources, Finance,Public Relations”- “We toured our management areatogether on four occasions tofamiliarize ourselves withspecific resource managementissues”- “Individual members wereassigned special tasks andreported their findings to thewhole Authority”- “A joint committee was formedcomprising both TAA & Ontariomembers to deal with anenforcement issue involving anillegal timber cut in Delhi Twp.”245Appendix 3: Data display for the category ‘Cooperation” in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: CooperationInterview Question: Did the/your agency seek technical advice and/or logistical supportfrom the.Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioninc ItemMinistry ofNatural Yes, MNR has assisted the WSA in several areas 5Resources Staff including the provision of background information,N=5 using MNR GIS facilities, using MNR board roomfacilities, flight patrols, road transportation facilities,and printing facilitiesComprehensive Planning Due to the nature of the of the working relationships I ICouncil members (CPC) between the CPC and CPP, the CPC gets assistanceN 1 1 on whatever they need through the CPPWendaban Stewardship MNR provided background information, GIS 10Authority members facilities, printing facilities, and other services(WSA) covered through our enforcement agreementN=lO In one instance, MNR refused to provide a flight 9to the WSA when they were faced with the MKAillegal cut in Delhi Township. Things only changedwhen the NNR district manager got instructionsfrom Toronto to do soInterview Question: What evidence ofcooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource usersand the agency (CPC or WSA)?Comprehensive Planning None so far, perhaps that will emerge in the next 1 1Council members planning phase(CPC) There may be cooperation if recommendations!Nl I decisions are made known to the public before orat the same time they are released to the Ministerand the TAAWendaban Stewardship Yes, several partnerships were formed in agreement 10Authority members with: - tourist outfitters, e.g. Obabika Lodge(WSA) - bearfittersN1 0 - one baitfish licence operator- timber industry, e.g. Goulard Lumber- environmental groups, e.g. Northwatchand Wildlands LeagueCooperation may be lacking from mining interests 8246Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Cooperation” in combined main research questions #3 and #4( continued).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: CooperationInterview Question: What evidence ofcooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource usersand the aencv (CPC or WS’A)?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioninn TtemMembers of the Public CPCN=39 The Temagami Lakes Association is likely to 3cooperate with the CPC because of assuredprotection of the Skyline ReserveThere is no evidence; people are not inclined to 35cooperate with the CPC because the CPC processis seen to be an MNR process; people are fed upwith the MNRIt remains to be seen once the plan is completed 18WSAcooperation likely to come from municipalities, 31timber industry, tourist operators, trappers, andguide outfitterscooperation not likely from environmental groups 8because of the proposal/decision to use the RedSquirrel RoadCooperation is unlikely from mining interests and 12Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAN)247Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Conflict resolution” in combined main research questions #3 and #4.Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Conflict resolutionInterview Ouestion: What are the conflicts in the area?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemMinistry ofNatural Native land claim and cautions 5Resources Staff access to resources by different groups 5N5 The splinter group within the TAA 5Road access: Red squirrel/Liskeard Roads 4Comprehensive Planning mining interests want entire land base opened I ICouncil members (CPC) Pilots’ Association wants fly-in access into the I IN1 1 Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Parkthe Native Land Cautions 10Elk Lake wants Liskeard Lumber opened 8Temagami Lakes Association’s opposition to any 3development in the Temagami Skyline Reserveenvironmental groups want old-growth preservation 9Road access: Red Squirrel/Liskeard Lumber Roads 9Wendaban Stewardship a splinter group of the TAA claiming WSA lands 10Authority members as their family territory (Makominising Anishnabai)(WSA) use ofRed Squirrel Road 10N1 0 old-growth protection 10mining interests wanting all land opened to staking 10West Nipissing Access Group opposed to any 4road access restrictionsunsustainable logging practices-- clearcutting 6use of herbicides in timber management 9Native Land Cautions 1 1. recreation-tourism-wilderness versus timber 3interestsMembers of the two the TAA Land Cautions 4establishing agencies: Road access 4ONAS and the TAA opposition to Ontario Parks Policy 2N=4 mining interests want whole land opened for staking 4timber extraction versus protection 3248Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Conflict resolution” in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Conflict resolutionInterview Ouestion: What are the conflicts in the area?Categoiy ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning ItemMembers of the Public lack ofmeaningful participation in decision-making 22N=39 old-growth protection 24protection of viewscapes required 9mining fraternity demanding more land for staking 28Fly-in access into Lady Evelyn Wild. Park 24the MKA splinter group 30Road access (too much of it already) 29Native Land Caution 35Key Informants mining interests all land base opened for staking 5N=5 the West Nipissing Access Group want allrestrictions on road access removedLand cautions placed by the TA.A 5Elk Lake wants Liskeard Lumber Road opened 2through the LESW parkthe MKA splinter group within the TAA 4local & traditional users versus provincial interests 2the parks program 2road access 5timber management (harvest prescriptions, pesticide 5use, rates of harvest)fisheries management (regulation of fishing 3pressure)wildlife management (wildlife population and 3habitat management)• Areas ofNatural and Scientific Interest (ANSIs)-(what are permissible uses?)Crownland RecreationlTourism (canoeing, 3snowmobiling, etc-- access to)Aggregate Resources (access to)Heritage Resources (identification and protection)Water management 3Viewscapes 2249Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Conflict resolution” in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Conflict resolutionInterview Ouestion: What conflict resolution strategies were adopted by ycir aencv?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentionina ItemComprehensive Planning Strategies used: — 4Council members members had training opportunities in(CPC) conflict resolutionN= 1 1 more information sought in light of conflictsingroup lobbyingpresentations by interest groupsNo strategy: —+ 7co-chair makes all the decisionsco-chair does not allow conflicts at the table. option development and zoning all done by CPPWendaban Stewardship Strategies used: — 10Authority members consensus-decision making(WSA) neutral chairN= 10 planner as facilitator and collaboratorknowledgeable memberszoningmembers received training in conflict resolutionand group facilitationnetworking with other agenciesworking together as members of one familyopen planning processNo strategy: —+more time could have been spent building strongerrelationships with the local MNRInterview Question: What are/have been the outcomes ofsuch conflict resolution strategies?Comprehensive Planning conflicts are currently being played down 10Council members (CPC) conflicts are likely to surface in the next planning I IN=1 I phase dealing with resource allocationWendaban Stewardship consensus was achieved 8Authority members produced a good plan within a short period of time 10(WSA) at minimal costN= 10 got cooperation in agreement from local resource 7usersco-existence among Native and non-Native 10members on the WSA was achieved. resolved the most difficulty issue of road access 10250Appendix 3: Data display for the category “Conflict resolution” in combined main research questions #3 and #4(continued...).Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperationamong key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-useconflicts?Category: Conflict resolutionInterview Question: Have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated over time and what are the reasonsforthe de-escalation/escalation?Category ofRespondents Responses Number ofRespondentsMentioning_ItemMinistry ofNatural they are escalating because the CPC planning 5Resources Staff process is taking too longN5 conflicts are escalating because Ontario and the 5TAA have not concluded the negotiations process; ithas taken too long and quite costlyComprehensive Planning conflicts are currently on hold until CPC plan is 9Council members completed(CPC) conflicts are likely to escalate in the plan 1 1N=l I implementation stageWendaban Stewardship conflicts are on hold because nothing is happening 10Authority members on the ground (implementation)(WSA) conflicts have de-escalated because of the WSA 6N10 profileMembers of the two conflicts de-escalated due to the profiles of both 3establishing agencies: CPC and WSAONAS and the TAA conflicts are likely to escalate when plans are 4N=4 implementedmining interests will raise problems with both 3the WSA and CPC plans for inadequate landsset aside for stakingMembers of the Public conflicts de-escalated because nothing was 32N=39 happening on the groundconflicts are likely to escalate because MNR will 14not let go of their power• conflicts are likely to escalate because of no 33progress on the Agreement-In-Principle reachedbetween Ontario and the TAAconflicts are likely to escalate if the WSA plan is 20not implemented by OntarioKey Informants conflicts have escalated due to inaction on the 5N=5 ground• conflicts are escalating because the CPP processes 5is taking too longconflicts will escalate if the WSA plan is not 3implemented by some body other than MNRconflicts to escalate when CPP plan is implemented 3251APPENDIX 4REVISEDPage 1MINUTESTEMAGANI ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING #28SCANDIA INN - TEMAGANIJANUARY 10, 1990 - 6:00 P.M.All council members were present. Also present was the Honourable LynMcLeod, Minister of Natural Resources, Gillian Morrison the Minister’sSpecial Assistant — Policy and Community Liaison and John Kenrick, DirectorTemagami Project.Topics: 1. Temagami Advisory Council: Evolvement2. Operational Issues3. Public Participation and the Planning Process4. Minister Expectation of TAC1. Temagami Advisory Council: EvolvementCouncil members expressed their concern that the council is perceived bythe public as a “rubber stamp” for the MNR. The Minister stated that TACis considered a check on whether the MNR is managing the resourcescorrectly and to become a rubber stamp means that no questions are beingasked; in TAC’s case, questions are being asked and the MNR is beingchallenged. The Minister stated that TAC is an important liaison for thepublic to provide them with public consultation.Council members also expressed their concern that all their information issupplied by the MNR and they have no way of verifying whether the MNR’sinformation is correct. The Minister agreed that much of TAC’s informationis supplied by the MNR experts.Prefasi indicated that TAC needs a staff member coordinator to assist inTAC’s independence. Mathews indicated that TAC needs a Policies andProcedures Manual which should be available to TAC members.Brozowski inquired whether the Minister would object to council seekingpublic input on their own (without MNR) to establish/redefine newobjectives. The Minister said that she has no objections with thisrequest.2. Operational IssuesThe Minister informed council that it was appropriate for them to providenames for replacement members; however, council should not be the onlysource from which nominations come. The Minister indicated that the finalresponsibility for selection would be hers in order to ensure that a goodrepresentation of the public is maintained. Council was pleased that theirnominations will be considered.252TAC MINUTES — Meeting #2SPage 2Council asked the Minister what she thought would be the best method ofreporting to her on contentious issues/decisions. The Minister has noproblem with council reporting to her directly via telephone and then thiswould benefit her as she could respond to media questions immediately.3. Public Participation and the Planning ProcessCouncil expressed their concern that some organizations are notparticipating in the Temagami Planning Process. Council informed theMinister of their new initiative where member(s) will meet with individualorganizations and even attend some of their meetings. The Minister isencouraged that council is looking at ways to rectify this situation.Council asked whether the Minister would consider participating in ameeting of TAC, Minister and selected public group representatives in a“controlled environment”. Council informed the Minister that details havenot yet been worked out but guidelines would have to be established andimplemented (i.e. each representative would be allowed a maximum of a 1page presentation submitted to council prior to the meeting date. TheMinister stated that she would not be uncomfortable participating in thissituation and would do anything to assist TAC in their role. The Ministerquestioned council what purpose would she be serving by attending themeetings. Horncastle stated that she would improve public perceptionverifying that the information does get conveyed to the Minister.4. Minister’s Expectations of TACOn the whole the Minister is very supportive of TAC’s achievements to dateand is very optimistic for their future.The meeting adjourned at 10:00 p.m.253APPENDIX 5Schedule: Timber Management Plan Production, Review and Approval.Public Consultation Stages in Plan ProductionPhase Schedule Review and ApprovalPublic NoticeInvitation to Participate I(30 days)Public response duePubllctNoticeApplications ofTimberManagement PlanningProcessI (normally 4-7 months)(15 days)INFORMA7ON CENTRE PLANI PRODUCTIONPublic Review of (30 days)Preliminary Proposalst Production of DraftPublic re onse due Timber ManagementPlant (normally 60 days)Submission of Draft Timber—— Management Plan — —(60 days) MNR Review of Draftt Timber Management PlanPublic NoticePublic Review of Draft I(30 days)Timber Management PlanPublic !ponse dueI MNR Production of(15 days) Required Alterations PLANREVIEWList of Required Alterations to ANDDistrict Manager/ComapnyAPPROVALProduction of Revised(3lays)Timber Management PlanSubmission of RevisedTimber anagement PlanMNR Review ofRevised Timber(15 days)Management PlanMNR Approval of TMP, Notificationto District Manager/Company & MOEPublic Inspection ofMNR-Approved Timberand PujHc NoticeManagement Plan (30 days)AmendedJune 1987“Bump Up” or Timber Management Plan Approval Source: MNR 1986b.254

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