

**DECISION-MAKING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN CO-MANAGEMENT: TWO
CASES FROM TEMAGAMI, NORTHEASTERN ONTARIO**

by

PATRICK W. MATAKALA

Dip. Ed., University of Zambia, 1983

H.B.Sc. For., Lakehead University, 1989

M.Sc. For., Lakehead University, 1991

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

in

**THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
THE FACULTY OF FORESTRY**

Department of Forest Resources Management

**We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard**

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

JUNE, 1995

© Patrick W. Matakala, 1995

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

(Signature)

Department of Forest Resources Management

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date August 30, 1995

ABSTRACT

Governments across Canada face increasing demands for public involvement in resource management decision-making, particularly at local levels. At the centre of debate are three issues: (a) the distribution of decision-making authority and responsibility; (b) the distributions of costs and benefits; and (c) the question of sustainability (ecological, social, and economic) at local levels. In the face of this wide range of often conflicting interests involving many non-aboriginal stakeholders on one hand, and First Nations on the other, governments want less conflict and believe that they can achieve this through more collaboration or co-management agreements. In particular, governments suspect that both groups above can share in the management decisions and responsibilities of the line agencies responsible for land use and resource management.

This thesis uses two cases to investigate the effects of co-management on: the delegation of decision-making authority to local levels; the substance of resource management decisions; social relationships among various actors; and conflict resolution. The two cases, which are both located in Temagami, northeastern Ontario, are the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA). The theoretical framework of the study includes co-management, democratic theory and its applications in citizen participation, and conflict resolution and its relationship to the theory of communicative action. Data collection methods involved semi-structured interviews with members of both agencies, the local public, and key informants. Documentary sources included minutes, administrative documents, letters, memoranda, government reports, news briefs, and newspaper clippings pertaining to both co-management agencies. Transient observation was also used in data collection. The study employed content analysis and 'pattern matching' as the main analytic strategies.

The results of this study show that the decentralization models of co-management agreements examined did not delegate decision-making authority to local levels. While one lacked the authority to effectively advise and influence the decisions of the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), the other lacked the authority to implement its own decisions. Ultimately, the authority to make and implement decisions rested with the MNR. Generally, the substance of resource management decisions under co-management improved over those made in the past by the MNR. However, the sustainability and equitability of those decisions could not be tested because the MNR, rather than the two co-management agencies, retained both the responsibility and authority to implement those decisions. Therefore, in the absence of *de jure* authority by the two agencies to advise/make and implement decisions, the quality of the substance of decisions under co-management could not be determined.

The levels of public participation in both agencies' planning and decision-making processes, and the lack of involvement by stakeholder groups in the selection of members to the two co-management agencies, influenced social relationships among actors in co-management. This selection was the exclusive domain of the government. Both theoretical propositions of co-management and citizen participation fail to explicitly discuss the quality of information and methods used as important attributes in effective public participation. While consensus decision-making and land-use zoning technique facilitated conflict resolution in the second case, consensus decision-making was lacking in the first case. In addition, the MNR conducted land-use zoning without the involvement of both local publics and the citizens' group that it was supposed to share decisions with; thus, exacerbating local conflicts among them. Both practical and theoretical implications of this study findings are discussed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES.	ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS.	xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.	xii
DEDICATION	xiv
 CHAPTER 1	 1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Rationale	1
1.2 Theoretical Framework	10
1.2.1 Co-management	10
1.2.2 Participatory Democracy and Citizen Participation	17
1.2.3 Conflict Resolution and Communicative Action	25
1.3 Problem Statement	31
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives	33
1.5 Organization.	34
 CHAPTER 2	 35
METHODOLOGY	35
2.1 Justification for the Case Study Method	35
2.2 Limitations and Scope	37
2.3 Data Collection	39
2.4 Data Analysis	42
2.5 Background to the Study Area.	45
2.5.1 Nature of Conflict	54
2.5.1.1 The Aboriginal Dimension	57
2.5.1.2 The Multi-Stakeholder Dimension	61
2.5.2 The Case Studies.	65
2.5.2.1 Temagami Advisory Council (TAC) and later Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)	65
2.5.2.2 Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)	66

CHAPTER 3	70
DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE TEMAGAMI AREA	70
3.1 Historical Distributions of Decision-making Authority (under the MNR).	70
3.1.1 Distributions of decision-making	70
3.1.2 Distributions of authority	80
3.2 Distributions of Decision-making Authority under Co-management	82
3.2.1 Ontario's Expected and Implied Levels of Distributions of Decision-making Authority to the Co-management Agencies.	82
3.2.2 Actual Distributions of Decision-making Authority to the CPC and the WSA	85
3.2.2.1 Distributions of Decision-making	85
3.2.2.1.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)	85
3.2.2.1.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)	93
3.2.2.2 Distributions of Authority	99
3.2.2.2.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)	101
3.2.2.2.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)	103
3.2.3 Conclusions	106
3.3 Distribution of decision-making from the Co-management Agencies to the public	109
3.3.1 Ontario's Anticipated Levels of Public Participation in the Co-management Agencies' Planning and Decision-making Processes	113
3.3.2 Cross-case Analysis	115
3.3.2.1 Information and methods of participation used by the Agencies	116
3.3.2.2 Key issues raised by the public and their influence on agency decisions.	120
3.3.2.2.1 Road Access	120
3.3.2.2.2 Lack of clarity of the planning process	123
3.3.2.2.3 A zoning decision that excluded a major canoe route	125
3.3.2.3 Evidence of cooperation in agreement between the agencies and local users.	126
3.3.3 Conclusions	127

CHAPTER 4	131
THE SUBSTANCE OF DECISIONS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT	131
4.1 The Substance of Decisions made in the Past (under MNR)	134
4.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protection	134
4.1.2 Primacy of timber in planning	135
4.1.3 Access to the timber resource	139
4.2 The Substance of Decisions under Co-management	144
4.2.1 Cross-case Analysis	144
4.2.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protection	144
4.2.1.2 Primacy of timber in planning.	147
4.2.1.3 Access to the timber resource.	148
4.2.2 Conclusions	150
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT.	152
4.3 Ontario's Expectations.	152
4.4 Inclusion.	152
4.4.1 Conclusions	156
4.5 Respect and Trust	159
4.5.1 The Enforcement Crisis in the WSA Area	163
4.5.2 Consensus Decision-making	165
4.6 Cooperation	168
4.6.1 Cooperation between the Agencies and other key actors/public	170
4.6.2 Cooperation among members of the co-management agency	172
4.6.3 Conclusions	173
4.7 Conflict Resolution	177
4.7.1 The CPC and conflict resolution	179
4.7.2 The WSA and conflict resolution.	183

CHAPTER 5	189
CONCLUSIONS	189
5.1 Co-management and Distributions of Decision-making Authority to Local Levels	193
5.2 Co-management and the Substance of Resource Management Decisions. . . .	197
5.3 Co-management and Social Relationships	198
5.4 Co-management and Conflict Resolution	203
5.5 Implications for Research	207
LITERATURE CITED	210
APPENDIX 1: Data collection research design by main research question, interview question, interview category, and number of respondents	221
APPENDIX 2: Data display for the categories "Public Participation", "Decision- making authority", and "Types of Decisions"	226
APPENDIX 3: Data display for the categories "Inclusion", "Respect and Trust", "Cooperation", and "Conflict Resolution"	239
APPENDIX 4: Minutes of the Temagami Advisory Council #28, January 10, 1990	252
APPENDIX 5: MNR's Timber Management Planning & public Participation Process	254

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number of respondents interviewed in each interview category and total number of interview questions	41
Table 2: Total number of interview questions analyzed and left out of the analysis in this study	43
Table 3: Community Profiles of the 'Temagami Area Community'	53
Table 4: Community Services within the 'Temagami Area Community'	53
Table 5: Summary of data pertaining to past and present distributions of decision-making authority in the Temagami Area	71
Table 6: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from the state to the co-management agencies under study	86
Table 7: Summary results pertaining to distributions of authority from the state to the co-management agencies under study	100
Table 8: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from the co-management agencies (CPC and WSA) to the general public	112
Table 9: Summary results on the substance of decisions made both in the past and in the present	133
Table 10: Volume commitments/targets to be supplied to operators under 1994-96 Temagami Contingency Timber Management Plans	143
Table 11: Summary results pertaining to the principle of "Inclusion"	153
Table 12: Summary results pertaining to the principle of "Respect and Trust"	160
Table 13: Summary results pertaining to cooperation among actors in co-management	169
Table 14: Summary results pertaining to conflict resolution under co-management	178

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Interpretation of "decision-making authority" in this study	9
Figure 2: A continuum of level of co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation.	12
Figure 3: A comparison of the conventional and cooperative planning models	16
Figure 4: Eight rungs on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	19
Figure 5: Levels of decision-making power and public participation on Parenteau's evaluation framework.	22
Figure 6: Maps showing the location of Temagami in northeastern Ontario, Canada	46
Figure 7: Map showing the TAA land claim boundary (n'Daki Menan), Comprehensive Planning Area, and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority Planning Area	52
Figure 8: Map showing proposed road extensions within the WSA Planning Area that sparked controversy between the TAA and Ontario	60
Figure 9: The level of public participation of the TAC in the MNR's planning process in the past on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	76
Figure 10: The levels of public participation and decision-making of the TAC in the MNR's planning process in the past on Parenteau's evaluation framework	77
Figure 11: The level of public participation in the MNR's Timber Management Planning process in the past on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	78
Figure 12: The level of public participation and decision-making in the MNR's Timber Management Planning Process in the past on Parenteau's evaluation framework	79
Figure 13: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA's public participation under co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	83
Figure 14: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA's public participation under co-management on Parenteau's evaluation framework	84
Figure 15: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation under co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	92

Figure 16: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation and decision-making under co-management on Parenteau's evaluation framework	92
Figure 17: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation under co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	97
Figure 18: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation and decision-making under co-management on Parenteau's evaluation framework	98
Figure 19: Ontario's expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation.	113
Figure 20: Ontario's expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Parenteau's evaluation framework . .	114
Figure 21: Actual levels of public participation in both the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation	130
Figure 22: Actual levels of public participation in both the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Parenteau's evaluation framework	130
Figure 23: The MNR's Planning System in Ontario	138
Figure 24: Crown Wood Destinations, 4-year Average (1986-90), Temagami District	140
Figure 25: Institutional designs of co-management and their implications for devolution of decision-making power on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation.	190
Figure 26: Institutional designs of co-management and their implications for devolution of decision-making power on Parenteau's public participation and decision-making evaluation framework	190

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THIS STUDY

AIP	Agreement In Principle
AOC	Area of Concern in timber management planning
ACAO	Association of Conservation Authorities of Ontario
CPC	Comprehensive Planning Council
CPP	Comprehensive Planning Program
DLUG	District Land Use Guidelines
EARP	Environmental Assessment Review Process
FMC	First Ministers' Conference
FON	Federation of Ontario Naturalists
FSP	Forest Stewardship Plan
LATEMPRA	Lake Temagami Permanent Residents' Association
LESWP	Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park
LUP	Land Use Permit
MNR	Ministry of Natural Resources of Ontario
MNDM	Ministry of Northern Development & Mines of Ontario
MOE	Ministry of Environment of Ontario
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NOTO	Northern Ontario Tourist Outfitters
OEC	Ontario Executive Council
OEAB	Ontario Environmental Assessment Board
OFAH	Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters
OIC	Order-In-Council
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
ORTEE	Ontario Round Table on the Environment and the Economy
RSO	Revised Statutes of Ontario
SLUP	Strategic Land Use Planning
SNC	Sudbury Naturalists Club
TAA	Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation
TAC	Temagami Advisory Council
TLA	Temagami Lakes Association
TMP	Timber Management Plan
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WSA	Wendapan Stewardship Authority
WNAG	West Nipissing Access Group

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my research supervisor, Dr. Alan Chambers for his encouragement, support, friendship, and guidance in focusing my work. I would also like to express my appreciation to the rest of my advisory committee for their collective and individual assistance: to Dr. Maureen Reed for her guidance, understanding and willingness to share her knowledge, experiences and insights with me; to Dr. Patricia Marchak and Professor Peter Boothroyd for their thoughtfulness, advice, and valuable suggestions in conceptualizing this study; and to Dr. Bart Van der kamp for his provoking thoughts and advice. Their kindness and sense of humour were greatly appreciated.

Special thanks are due to members of both the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) as well as the Ministry of Natural Resources in Temagami, northeastern Ontario, who shared their thoughts and experiences with me and without whose interest and cooperation, this study would not have been possible. In particular, I am greatly indebted to Paul King-Fisher, Coordinator for the Comprehensive Planning Council and to Jim Morrison, Chair for the Wendaban Stewardship Authority, for coordinating my interviews with members of their organizations. I also thank the many members of the public in the Temagami, North Bay, and Tri-town areas who participated in this study through interviews and informal discussions. My heartfelt gratitude extend to Tom Whitfield, who as a friend, not only provided me with free accommodation during my field interviews, but also engaged me in thought-provoking discussions sprinkled with humour.

I am grateful to the University of British Columbia for providing me a full graduate fellowship for two years and to the Faculty of Forestry without whose financial assistance, this study would not have been possible.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my wife Edith and daughters, Mwangala and Chaze, for their moral support, companionship, love, tolerance and understanding. To Lulu and Litia, I owe this to them for their patience, love and understanding.

DEDICATION

In memory of my late parents, my dad Mr. Alexander Mubiana Matakala and my mom, Mrs. Agnes Nalishebo Muha Mubiana, who did not live long enough to witness the culmination of my academic pursuits. I thank them for their caring, encouragement, and moral support throughout my life. May their souls rest in peace. Dad, you once told me some words of wisdom that I will always cherish and remember,

"..an educational certificate is like a ticket you buy or earn to get into a dancehall, many can attend the dance; what is critical is whether you can dance and be among the best dancers on the dancefloor .."

Alexander M. Matakala, 1981.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale

Governments across Canada face increasing demands for public involvement in resource management decision-making, particularly at local levels (Higgelke and Duinker 1993). At the centre of debate are three issues: (a) the distribution of decision-making authority and responsibility; (b) the distribution of costs and benefits; and (c) the question of sustainability (ecological, social, and economic) at local levels. The premises from which these issues flow are that existing distributions of both authority and benefits are inequitable and that the flow of benefits is not sustainable. Thus, the overall efficacy of conventional resource management approaches that emphasize top-down models of decision-making and result in state and industry control of resources are called into question.

Communities are demanding more say and increased accountability in resource management decision-making. Environmentalists want the forests to be viewed in terms of multiple resource values, not only timber. Industry wants secure tenure arrangements as a basis for continued wood supply and investment in the sector. Various local stakeholders want their interests protected. Governments across Canada chose to deal with First Nation¹ peoples first because they have the most powerful claim to participate in land-use decisions. The legal position of aboriginal peoples in

¹ The term "First Nation" is used to mean the aboriginal peoples who inhabited North America prior to European settlement. This term is preferred by aboriginal peoples in Canada over "Indians". The term derives from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which refers to aboriginal people of Canada as "Nations".

Canada is determined not only by the Indian Act but also by the constitution and the treaties. Unlike any other identifiable group of citizens, aboriginal peoples' rights to the land and resources are protected by the constitution. These rights extend beyond usufructuary to real vested interests and/or possessory rights. Therefore, aboriginal rights in the land and resources in Canada can be characterized as *de jure* rights in the sense that they are entrenched within the constitution. Indeed, if the protection of existing rights is interpreted to embrace the right to self-government, it can be argued that in law, if not in fact, aboriginal peoples fare much better than other Canadians in terms of land rights. For the rest of Canadians, their rights in the land and resources can be characterized as *de facto* rights since they do not receive similar protection in the constitution as are aboriginal rights; at best, they are designated usufructuary rights.

In view of the special status accorded First Nations within the Canadian constitution, they want to be included as a distinct group in land-use decisions; they view their relationships with senior government levels on a nation-to-nation basis. In any discussion of aboriginal sovereignty and relationships between First Nations and Canada, three important dates warrant review: 1763, 1867, and 1982. These dates, and the acts that flow from them are all interconnected and must be addressed in context with each other. The dates are explored in detail in the next section because they provide a context within which to understand First Nations involvement in co-management of natural resources.

In 1763 the *Royal Proclamation* directed that all lands for future settlement and development in British America must first be cleared of the aboriginal title only by Crown purchase (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1979). The instruments chosen by the Crown to acquire aboriginal lands

were designated as "treaties". In other words, the Crown required the consent of First Nations before aboriginal title to the lands could be ceded by the latter to the former. This implied Crown recognition of aboriginal land ownership and authority as continuing under British sovereignty (British Columbia Claims Task Force 1991). Therefore, the *Royal Proclamation* laid the legal foundation and principles for future relationships between First Nations and the British Crown. In the long term, the Proclamation would have other profound implications. It would, after the British had retired from North America, and two new nation-states, the United States and Canada, had been established, be instrumental in the recognition by the courts of both countries of the distinctive political status and aboriginal rights of the First Nations (Berger 1992).

In spite of the legal principles and relationships set out in the *Royal Proclamation*, most of western Canada was not affected by the Proclamation because the Crown did not yet come into contact with the First Nations (Badcock 1976) and thus, no treaties were made. However, it is still a matter of legal debate whether the Proclamation applied. By the 1850's, the Crown had signed major treaties with the First Nations in eastern Canada. In most of these treaties, First Nations ceded title to the Crown in exchange for land reserves for settlement and other rights such as fishing, hunting, and trapping (Badcock 1976; British Columbia Claims Task Force 1991; Berger 1992). Ultimately, that process continued west to the Rockies, in advance of European settlement. However, the policy was not pursued west of the Rockies. Similarly, it was not pursued in Quebec and parts of the Maritimes (Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island). In all these areas, many First Nations were not compensated for the dispossession of aboriginal rights in their ancestral lands.

The explanation for the Crown's failure to follow the treaty-making process with First Nations in Quebec and parts of the Maritimes is that those areas were passed from French to British control with a history of non-recognition of aboriginal title by the French (Boldt 1993:275). In British Columbia, the government simply refused to do so (Boldt 1993:275). However, since the *Royal Proclamation* has never been repealed and still has the force of a statute, this document, then, is still the basis of decisions concerning aboriginal title to land in Canada. It is a primary constitutional document that protects aboriginal rights that were later recognized in the 1867 *British North America Act (BNA)* (now the Constitution Act of 1867).

The BNA Act of 1867 created the Dominion of Canada. Section 91(24) of the Act specified that the Dominion was to bear responsibility for "Indians and lands reserved for Indians" (quoted in Dickason 1992:340). In other words, the section gave the federal government responsibility for administering aboriginal affairs. By virtue of that section, the Dominion had undertaken to extinguish aboriginal title by means of treaties (Cassidy 1990; Dickason 1992). Therefore, aboriginal title to the land was implicitly recognized. Section 109 of the Act gave jurisdiction and ownership of land and natural resources to the provinces. Historically, this has been a matter of contention between aboriginal peoples and provincial governments in Canada.

In 1982, Canada patriated its Constitution and enacted the *Constitution Act*, 1982 which recognized existing aboriginal and treaty rights under Section 35(1) but did not define those rights. Section 37 of the Act also committed both the federal and provincial governments of Canada to hold a constitutional conference [also known as First Ministers' Conference (FMC)] whose purpose was partly to identify and define aboriginal rights. The Conference, which was held in March 1983 and

attended also by First Nation representatives, failed to define those rights (Boldt 1993:287). However, three more dates were proposed for similar conferences. During the course of the following three FMCs (1984, 1985, and 1987), the governments of Canada, on one side, and the aboriginal peoples, on the other, were unable to bridge their different views of 'existing aboriginal and treaty rights' (Cassidy 1990; Boldt 1993).

Section 35(1) of the 1982 *Constitution Act* and a recent judicial decision in British Columbia have given aboriginal and treaty rights, as such, a clear legal status in Canadian law. In 1984, Ronald Edward Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band was charged under the *Fisheries Act* with using a drift net longer than permitted under the band's Indian food fishing licence. Sparrow did not deny the fact, but defended himself against the charge on the grounds that he was exercising an aboriginal right to fish, as guaranteed by the Constitution Act of 1982 under Section 35(1) (Usher 1991:20). The Supreme Court of Canada accepted this defence and set aside the original conviction by ruling that the aboriginal right to fish was an existing right which had not been extinguished (Morgan and Thompson 1992:21).

The Supreme Court went on to specify that conservation of the resource was of the utmost importance followed by aboriginal use, and then non-aboriginal use. As noted by Wolfe (1993:247), the Supreme Court made reference to provincial law, saying that a provincial law, also, will not apply, to the extent that it interferes with an aboriginal right, unless there is a compelling reason for it to do so. An example of a compelling justification would be the need to conserve and manage the fisheries resource. The Sparrow case helped to define what aboriginal rights entail. Potential implications of the Sparrow case are wide ranging for aboriginal rights and responsibilities with respect to land and

resources. For example, the case implies that after the requirement for conservation, any surplus of wildlife shall be allocated first to meet aboriginal requirements for food. It also implies that aboriginal rights include involvement of aboriginal peoples in the conservation and management of the resource, and include their direct involvement in regulation of resource use (Wolfe 1993:248).

Section 35(1) of the 1982 *Constitution Act* and its interpretation in the Sparrow case, and Section 109 of the 1867 *Constitution Act* which gave jurisdiction and ownership of land and natural resources to the provinces, have resulted in many First Nations seeking land claim settlements with senior levels of government (federal and provincial). In non-treaty areas such as most parts of British Columbia, Northwest Territories and the Maritimes, many First Nations are pursuing "comprehensive" land claims with the governments. In treaty areas such as most parts of Ontario, some First Nations are seeking "specific" land claim settlements. The federal government of Canada has developed policies to negotiate these claims².

"Comprehensive claims" are those arising in areas where rights of traditional use and occupancy have not been extinguished by treaty or superseded by law; "specific claims" are those that concern obligations (on the part of the government) arising out of treaties, Indian acts, or regulations (Dickason 1992:388). Various First Nations are currently negotiating with Canada to have their rights of occupancy, self-government, and self-determination recognized and affirmed (Reed 1995). aboriginal people whose land claims have not been settled contend that they are not just another "user group"; they are the original owners of the resources of "their" land (Berkes *et al.* 1991:17).

²

The terminology of land claims is derived from federal policies. Many aboriginal organizations prefer to describe their position as "the land question". They object to the notion of being claimants. Rather, they view the claims process as one of the few mechanisms for implementing their constitutionally protected rights.

In the face of this wide range of often conflicting interests involving many non-aboriginal stakeholders on one hand, and First Nations on the other, governments want less conflict and believe that this can be achieved through more collaboration. In particular, governments suspect that both local stakeholders and First Nations can share in the management responsibilities of the line agencies responsible for land use and resource management.

In the last few years, as a conflict management strategy, governments across Canada have begun or are in the process of involving local organizations in the management of local resources. In Temagami, northeastern Ontario, a long-standing resource allocation conflict exists primarily between Ontario³ and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) First Nation and secondarily, between Ontario and non-aboriginal local stakeholders. Both groups above contend that they have been left out of the decision-making process by the government through its agency responsible for land use and resource management- the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR).

Since 1987, Ontario has made several attempts to involve both groups above in the management of local resources within the Temagami area. Two such initiatives, which are the focus of this study, are: (a) the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC); and (b) the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA). Both initiatives are described by Ontario as "co-management arrangements" and have involved several non-aboriginal local stakeholders and the Teme-Augama First Nation, in varying models of "shared decision-making". Co-management is a term that has been used by governments to describe a wide array of decision-making arrangements in resource management between local stakeholders or First Nations and government line agencies. For the most

³ Throughout this thesis, the term Ontario is used to denote the government of Ontario or the Province of Ontario and has been used interchangeably with the term "state".

part, co-management may be a conflict containment strategy for governments but does not necessarily involve genuine devolution of decision-making authority to local levels. Therefore, co-management is a process in which citizens are involved in discussions, and may have responsibility for implementation of decisions; in its strongest form, it involves genuine devolution of decision-making authority to local levels but this is not essential to its existence.

Since shared decision-making between the state and local organizations is the desired and overarching feature of co-management, determining the nature and levels of public participation in such arrangements is important. It is also important to evaluate whether or not the decisions that emerge from such arrangements are different from those made exclusively by state management agencies. Furthermore, it is also important to understand the effects of co-management on local resource-use conflicts as well as on social relationships among key actors and local resource users.

Distributions of decision-making authority in this study are understood in terms of decision-making dispersal or *levels of public participation* in real decision-making, and distributions of *authority*. Decision-making dispersal refers to the decentralization of decision-making among actors and the influence each actor has on final decisions. Knoke (1990) described authority as a form of power that involves explicit recognition of the propriety of the arrangement; the arrangement being based on the mutual consent of participants. Therefore, authority is understood in this study to be *legitimated power* that parties in co-management mutually recognize and respect. In practical terms, distributions of authority refer to the *source and nature of authority* as well as *legitimated mandates* of the actors. In the context of co-management, authority could serve to advise or to implement decisions. Therefore, a group can make decisions which it has the power to implement or it can make decisions about which to advise the state what to do.

Figure 1 describes schematically the interpretation of decision-making authority in this study.

In Figure 1, an agency governance structure can be depicted in terms of its authority structure on one hand, and its influence structure on the other. Authority structure refers to the authority role (rights and duties) of the agency's participants that may be *de jure* (existing in law) or *de facto* (existing in reality but not in law). In the context of co-management, *de jure* authority can serve to implement decisions by the co-management agency whereas *de facto* authority can only serve to advise the state (i.e., the line agency responsible for resource management) what to do. The influence structure refers to the degree of centralization/decentralization within the agency; i.e., the dispersal of influence over decision-making among agency participants.




Figure 1: Interpretation of "decision-making authority" in this study
(Adapted from Knoke 1990, p. 149).

The interpretation of decision-making authority above is particularly relevant to this study because it establishes relationships between authority, responsibility and influence on decision-making. It is argued that any real influence on decision-making under co-management will require the delegation of legislative (*de jure*) authority to local levels by governments. Three theoretical propositions were reviewed to help understand the nature of co-management arrangements under this study and their effects on: (a) distributions of decision-making authority; (b) types or substance of decisions; (c) social relationships; and (d) conflict resolution. The theoretical propositions, which are described in the next section, are:

- (i) co-management;
- (ii) participatory democracy and its application in citizen participation; and
- (iii) conflict resolution and its relationship to the theory of communicative action.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

1.2.1 Co-management

Of the general issues in co-management, perhaps the most basic yet also the most complex are the problems of definition and objectives. Pinkerton (1992) defined co-management as power-sharing in the exercise of resource management between a government agency and a community or organization of stakeholders. This definition fails to define a method of determining how much power is held by each party in co-management. Review of the literature on co-management [e.g. Jentoft 1989; Gardner and Roseland 1989; various authors in Pinkerton 1989a; Pinkerton 1992; Ross and Saunders 1992;], revealed a wide range of definitions ranging from consultative processes to partnerships in decision-making. Campbell (1990:3) summarizes his views on the definition of co-management:

co-management, as we see it in the literature, is a limiting perspective on social participation. It fails to express the full meaning of power-sharing; co-management is seen as remedial action to rescue an ailing state management system. In this conceptual framework social participation becomes an instrument managed by the resource agency; participation by resource users, the stakeholders, becomes a means to conservation ends. The perspective of the resource community-- its aspirations, goals, difficulties-- though present, is not compelling.

Therefore, although co-management may entail devolution of resource management responsibilities from government to local stakeholders, the level of sharing or relinquishing of decision-making authority can be contentious. Berkes *et al.* (1991) argue that a more precise definition is probably inappropriate because there is a continuum of co-management arrangements such that if modelled on Arnstein's (1969) "ladder of citizen participation" (Figure 2), levels of co-management can be depicted as rungs of a ladder with each rung corresponding to the degree to which citizens share in government decision-making. The upper rungs indicate increasing degrees of real power sharing, in which joint decision-making is institutionalized in a partnership of equals (Berkes *et al.* 1991).

For the purposes of this study, Berkes *et al.*'s view above is adopted. Therefore, co-management is defined as a process wherein citizens are involved in resource management discussions, and may have responsibility for implementation of decisions; in its strongest form, it involves genuine devolution of decision-making authority to local levels but this is not essential to its existence.




Figure 2: A continuum of level of co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969:217).

Co-management has emerged from a variety of background circumstances, generally involving jurisdictional disputes, shared jurisdiction that is acknowledged, multiple-use conflicts, or significant externalities (Benidickson 1992). Writing from a fisheries management point of view, Pinkerton (1989b:4) asserts that co-management has emerged in response to conservation crises or government inability to handle specific problems-- co-management is seen as a creative way to break the impasse in government/fishermen conflicts over the most effective solutions to such crises. Parties to co-management have sought a variety of objectives, but as summarized by Pinkerton (1989b:5) in the fisheries context, "the benefits sought by one or all of the actors through.....co-management are more appropriate, more efficient, and more equitable management". In addition, there are secondary goals- - also benefits in their own way: community-based development; decentralization of decision-making; and mobilization of local consent through the processes of participatory democracy (Pinkerton 1989b:5).

From the first set of goals above (appropriate, efficient, equitable management), co-management is cast as a result-oriented or "outcome" concept while the second set of goals (community-based development, decentralized decision-making, participatory democracy) depict it as a process-oriented or "procedural" concept. These goals are seen as processes for achieving other goals as well as ends in themselves.

Not surprisingly, the search for standards against which to evaluate the performance of co-management arrangements remains an uncertain quest. Benidickson (1992) concluded that co-management appears generically to be a process-type solution to conflicts over resource allocation, and its substantive implications have been assumed or generalized into projections of "more appropriate, more efficient and more equitable" management. Therefore, the real difficulty with co-management goals as advanced above lies in the realization that equity may not be efficient and efficiency may not be appropriate (Benidickson 1992). Once it is accepted that trade-offs have to be made-- often in the context of a declining resource base-- the questions become, how and by whom? This points to the central issues of decision-making structures and processes as well the nature of representation on co-management bodies. Who makes the decisions and how?

There has been another and more extended debate about the most effective social and institutional arrangements to provide for the long-term conservation of resources. Much of the discussion and related research has been responsive to Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the commons", with advocates of private ownership, communal governance, or state regulation each endeavouring to identify the circumstances in which these particular forms of management are more likely to promote conservation of the resource base. The authors of a recent assessment of this literature state that none of these approaches demonstrates unqualified superiority (Feeny *et al.* 1990); and they

conclude that "success in the regulation of uses and users is not universally associated with any particular type of property-rights regime. Communal property, private property, and state property have all been associated with success and failure" (Feeny *et al.* 1990).

Since most examples in the literature on co-management deal with fish and wildlife (e.g. Usher 1986; Berkes 1986; Pinkerton 1989a; Jentoft 1989; Berkes *et al.* 1991), debates on effectiveness of co-management have evolved around open access issues with proponents arguing that some self-regulation is possible and with opponents countering that the fugitive nature of fish and wildlife resources brings about the open-access problems that Hardin (1968) characterized as the tragedy of the commons-- equating open access to communal property. The solution sought by proponents above is communal management. However, as Marchak (1987:4) noted, there has to be sufficient internal organization at the community level to ensure that the resource is managed in sustainable ways. Opponents, on the other hand, seek state regulation and/or privatization as management solutions.

Such debates fail to recognize that co-management is a hybrid management regime or a combination of local-level and state-level management systems (Berkes *et al.* 1991:12); decision-making is shared between the state and local interests. Furthermore, such debates fail to deal effectively with the underlying issues of the redistribution of decision-making authority and responsibility to local levels, as well as questions of equity, social participation, and conflict resolution in resource management.

The central thesis of this study is that decisions that emerge from state and cooperative management systems are different. This is partly due to different distributions of decision-making authority and decision-making arrangements as well as different emphases put on sources of information used in both management systems. One main concern with state management systems is that decision-making is concentrated in the hands of specialized resource planners at the district and provincial levels, many of whose abilities are confined by their position in the decision-making hierarchy. Provincial planning systems conceived at regional levels are not always suitable to local realities. What works in one place may not necessarily be suitable in another unique or distinct context (Jacobs 1988). For example, although timber management planning may address questions of resource supply, it concentrates on a limited number of land uses and on a limited set of forest values (Dunster 1990). This is partly due to the nature of state-level systems which are characterized by centralized bureaucratic decision-making in which policy momentum and sheer organization size limit the ability of plans to adapt to changing local environments and social conditions (Berkes *et al.* 1991).

Usher (1987) noted that state management systems often separate land use planners from the land, which means that control over resources is shifted away from people whose interests, survival, and livelihoods are long-term. One also finds separation between resource managers and resource users, legal enforcement of regulations and land ownership, and a strict reliance on science as the sole knowledge base for decision-making. Yet Berkes *et al.* (1991) argued that most decisions, being politically driven, do not reflect "rational" science. Armour (1992) compared the conventional or rational and cooperative planning models as follows (Figure 3):




Figure 3: A Comparison of the conventional and cooperative planning models (Source: Armour 1992:33)

The basic change needed, as expressed here by Armour (1992), and repeated by other authors (e.g. Usher 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Carpenter and Kennedy 1988; Wondolleck 1988; and Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990), is to transfer authority from the expert decision-maker to user decision-maker. The cooperative process calls for a movement away from a technocratic model of planning to a more participatory, consensual paradigm of practice (Figure 3). This is no easy shift, requiring as outlined above, enormous changes in bureaucratic structures, behaviour and beliefs. This new planning model will need to:

- overtly recognize the political, resource allocation dimensions of the decisions rather than hiding them within technical analyses;
- satisfy each interest group that its concerns have been represented, that is, each group must be directly involved;
- recognize the limitations of technical expertise and incorporate other methods of making/recognizing value judgements;
- accept that citizens are legitimate and empowered actors in the process; and
- provide incentives and opportunity for genuine participation. (Wondolleck 1988:53).

Given the assumption that the "rational" and "cooperative" planning/management models described above will produce different sets of results, in the context of this study, what is in question is whether or not co-management initiatives result or have resulted in different distributions of decision-making authority and responsibility. What is also in question is whether or not such initiatives have resulted in different relationships among co-managers and between co-managers and local resource users. Furthermore, whether or not such initiatives result or have resulted in less conflict is also questioned.

When talking about decentralized decision-making or *participatory planning* rather than *participation in planning and decision-making* in co-management of natural resources, one begins to consider the idea of participation in a broader context. Political theory offers valuable insights as to why a more participatory planning and decision-making process would be desirable based on theories which support a more participatory society in general. The next section reviews the theory of participatory democracy and its applications in citizen participation.

1.2.2 Participatory Democracy and Citizen Participation

The principle of democracy states that each individual has an equal right to participate in the determination of all social activities in which s/he is engaged (Gould 1981:52). This is an ideal democracy. Green (1993) contends that such codetermination or common control over social activity only becomes meaningful if there is also common control over the means and conditions for such activities. Green (1993), among others (e.g. Dahl 1989; Keane 1982, 1993; and Marković 1993), assert that the means may involve the redistribution of decision-making power. Therefore, an ideal

of democracy might involve codetermination by individuals in all decision-making about economic, social and cultural life. However, *de facto* democracy today is generally limited to political spheres and then to representative participation.

The equal right to participate in social decisions concerning both the activity and the means has implications for the form and nature of the democratic process. Specifically, it implies that where feasible, the form of democratic decision making should be participatory, or as Kochen and Deutsch (1980) put it-- decentralized to lower levels. For where such participation is feasible and an individual is excluded from such participation, then others are making decisions for that individual and violating the equal right which s/he has to codetermine these decisions. Gould (1981:54) concludes:

..the realization of equal rights in social decision-making thus requires the extension and development of participatory processes. What is required is an adequate system of representation founded on participation at the lower levels; a participatory rather than a representative process is the most direct and surest way of taking into account each individual's choices. Where individuals have participated in the selection of their representatives or delegates, those representatives would be held accountable to those whom they represent by regular elections and regular consultations with those whom they represent, as well as by being subject to recall.

Participation in this context is not just an adjunct to the democratic system but central to its establishment and maintenance (Pateman 1970). This approach clearly distinguishes between participation in a representative democracy through occasional acts of voting for representatives, and participatory democracy which is rooted in participative institutions existing throughout society. A more concrete description states that participatory democracy is characterized as:

..a decision-making process whereby people propose, discuss, decide, plan, and implement those decisions that affect their lives. This requires that the decision-making process be continuous and significant, direct rather than through representatives and organized around issues rather than personalities. It requires that the decision-making process be set up in a functional manner, so that constituencies significantly affected by decisions are the ones that make them and elected representatives can be recalled.... (Benello and Roussopoulos 1971: 6).

These basic ideals of participatory democracy discussed above are the same foundations for co-management as reflected in its goals. Similarly, co-management has implications for the form and nature of the participation process engaged in by various parties in order to realize those goals. Arnstein (1969) provided a typology of citizen participation arranged in a ladder pattern with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens' power in (co)determining a plan or program (Figure 4). This typology is revisited and explained in detail.




Figure 4: Eight rungs on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Source: Arnstein 1969:217).

In Figure 4, levels 1 and 2 (*manipulation* and *therapy*) represent non-participation techniques in the sense that the real objective is to educate or win the support of the public while they rubberstamp decisions already taken by those in power. Arnstein (1969) argued that for many decision-makers, these are ways to avoid genuine participation. In practice, these types of "non-participation" consist of naming citizen representatives to advisory committees or organizing cultural and social events. Although level 3 (*informing*) represents the first step toward legitimate citizen participation, it involves a one-way communication from the powerholders to those without power and with no mechanisms for feedback nor room for negotiating power. *Consultation* (level 4) without an assurance that citizen concerns will be taken into account is just as good as informing the public (when decisions have already been made by those in power); it becomes merely a window-dressing ritual (Arnstein 1969). Therefore, levels 3 and 4 of the scale allow the public to listen and to have a voice. However, public participation can have no effect on the decision if it ends there, for the public gives advice only and cannot monitor the effect of its advice on the decision (Arnstein 1969). In practice, these forms of participation consist of public information through the media, questionnaires and polls, community meetings, and public hearings.

At level 5 (*Placation*), the public begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism is still apparent. Citizens are appointed to boards with no final decision-making authority. Often the final decision-making authority rests with the agency responsible for planning. However, the board is asked to formally approve those decisions. This still constitutes 'rubberstamping', but at a higher level. At the next level (*Partnership*), decision-making power is redistributed through negotiation with the powerholders. *Delegated power* (level 7) implies that citizens assume dominant decision-making responsibility over the plan. Level 8, *Citizen control*, gives public representatives full administrative control; power is delegated to them and they have absolute control over the plan.

Arnstein's framework above serves a useful purpose in assessing degrees of public participation in co-management arrangements of natural resources. However, Arnstein does not consider "*Consultation*" by itself to be a form of participation; the powerholders consult with the public after the decision has been made. It is, at most an administrative practice. For Arnstein, participation means power-sharing. For consultation to constitute a form of participation, therefore, it must include monitoring and follow-up, if not subsequent delegation of power- partial, sectorial, or complete (Parenteau 1988).

Arnstein's (1969) framework does not explicitly coordinate participation with decision-making power. Parenteau (1988) partly addresses this problem (Figure 5) where he correlates decision-making power with public participation. In his framework, Parenteau demonstrates that as decision-making power of central authorities decreases, public participation increases. In practical terms this implies that the more public involvement in real decision-making, the higher or more meaningful participation becomes.

Therefore, the highest public participation level is achieved when the public actually assumes decision-making power and responsibility (Figure 5) and not just participation for the sake of it. According to Parenteau's (1988) evaluation framework below, the public begin to assume decision-making responsibility at the level of "*Consultation*". At this level, the problem is submitted, citizens' opinions are heard and taken into consideration in the decision-making process. Here, Parenteau assumes that the citizens have the power to influence decisions of the central authorities since consultation occurs before the decision is made. At the next level, "*Cooperation*", limits are defined, and the decisions are shared with and made together with the public (Parenteau 1988). This mode

of decision-making, which calls for consensus-building, takes a long time to reach decisions because many interests are involved. However, the decisions reached are likely to be equitable as they would be responsive to local needs. At the level of "*Control*", citizens assume total responsibility over decision-making and have veto power.

Decision-making power

Information	Persuasion	Consultation	Cooperation	Control
The decision is made and the public is informed	The decision is made and an effort is made to convince the public	The problem is submitted, opinions are collected, the decision is made	The limits are defined, the decision is shared with and made together with the public	The decision is made by the public, which assumes a role of public responsibility

Public participation

Figure 5: Levels of decision-making power and public participation on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Source: Parenteau 1988:7)

Note: Figure 5 is Parenteau's (1988) evaluation framework reproduced in its original form. While the diagonal line through the figure confuses some readers, it is intended to illustrate that as the decision-making power of central authorities such as the Ministry of Natural resources decreases/weakens (top right hand corner), that of local interests increases/strengthens through meaningful public participation (bottom right hand corner). Conversely, as the decision-making power of central authorities increases/strengthens (top left hand corner), that of local interests decreases/weakens. *In view of the subtle differences between Arnstein (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks described above, both have been used in this study.*

Both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) frameworks above have implications for how co-management is viewed or characterized as a form of participatory or decentralized decision-making process. Do the levels of participation in co-management coincide with the levels of decision-making power as exemplified above? Stakeholder participation in co-management arrangements has been treated in the literature as an end in itself; that is, local involvement in decision making at its best. What is also required is to assess actual user involvement, or as Higgelke and Duinker (1993) put it , "participation of the internal publics" in actual decision-making within co-management arrangements. Therefore, assessment of local involvement in decision-making in co-management arrangements becomes a two-pronged approach. At one level is stakeholder involvement and at the other level is local user involvement in decision-making. Again, what is in question is whether or not co-management initiatives delegate decision-making authority to local levels, and if so, to what extent? That is, do senior levels of government retain final authority?

In Ontario today, "advisory" or "stakeholder" groups and committees are the most common form of shared decision-making (Johnson and Duinker 1993). These types of groups can serve a variety of purposes for both the organizers and the members. Johnson and Duinker (1993:38) argued that it is important when creating or agreeing to be a part of such committees that the objectives of the group be clear and known by all those involved. Two Canadian authors, Filyk and Côté (1992), proposed the following list of functions that advisory groups can serve. The functions are particularly important in evaluating the role of citizens' advisory groups in co-management. The functions are [Filyk and Côté (1992:68)]:

Decision-making functions

- Encourage coordination
- Find common ground between competing interests; conflict resolution
- Critique existing policy
- Provide new ideas
- Provide independent and alternative opinions
- Perform special studies

Citizen participation functions

- Education of the public and policy interpretation
- Public participation
- Representation of policy interests
- Diffusion of responsibility
- Democratization of the bureaucracy
- Policy legitimization

Political functions

- Serve to test public reaction to policies
- Provide a forum for expression of public opinion
- Force controversial issues into an objective arena
- Placate opposition by involving potential expert critics in the decision process
- Provide publicity and support for programs
- Be used for persuasion
- Provide a symbolic response to problems
- Give a false or misleading impression of addressing problems; known as "window dressing"
- Delay action
- Serve as patronage instruments

Clearly, some of the political functions above are of dubious merit. Regardless, it is important for prospective committee members to examine all the functions, both declared and unstated, and whether the committee structure will lead to a fair sharing of decision-making power. Committees that are given at least some degree of real decision-making authority are generally well-balanced fora (Filyk and Côté 1992; Johnston and Duinker 1993). As Johnston and Duinker (1993) further noted, when committees are advisory only, the agency establishing the group will usually determine the scope, membership, and ground rules. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the levels of authority of advisory groups parading under co-management. On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, it is important to determine whether or not at the level of "*Consultation*" citizens' groups have the power to influence the decisions made under co-management.

As highlighted earlier, co-management may be a conflict containment strategy for governments. At its amicable extreme it would entail true devolution of decision-making authority thereby fostering shared decision-making between governments and local stakeholders. Actual sharing of decision-making can only take place if there is also shared understanding and cooperation among parties involved. The theory of communicative action and its application to conflict resolution offers some insights into how that shared understanding and cooperation can take place. This is discussed in the next section.

1.2.3 Conflict Resolution and Communicative Action

Conflict exists when activities are incompatible or are perceived to be incompatible. Deutsch (1973) says that an action is incompatible when it prevents, obstructs, interferes with, or impairs another action, or in other ways makes the other action ineffective. Anstey (1991) defines conflict as... "conflict exists in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously, or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests; and purposefully employ their power in an effort to defeat, neutralize or eliminate each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction".

Both definitions above are useful and applicable to this study in that they do not confuse conflict with competition. Some theorists (e.g. Pfeffer 1981) have equated conflict with competition, as if all conflict is a win-lose struggle-- this is destructive conflict. Although individuals in cooperative settings also conflict, e.g., they could disagree over the best ways to achieve their goals and/or over the distribution of the benefits and costs of their joint action, their main goal is to achieve

mutual gain-- this is productive conflict. This study is concerned with productive conflict because this perspective of conflict is particularly meaningful in discussions of co-management whose basic premises are cooperative decision-making and action to resolve conflicts and arrive at mutually acceptable solutions over the use of Crown lands⁴

The intractability of planning and allocation conflicts in resource management has led to a critique of the assumptions of the progressive movement; assumptions "characterized by a belief in the neutrality of science and the confidence that knowing the facts was sufficient to resolve most public policy disputes" (Brown and Harris 1992). As highlighted earlier, clearly this technical-expert model as practiced by the state/industry is viewed by the public as neither adequate nor acceptable. The public contend that existing distributions of decision-making authority as well as costs and benefits are inequitable and unsustainable. Therefore, local involvement in resource management decision-making is seen by some as an attempt to complement both scientific and local knowledge with each other (Usher 1986; 1987) for mutual gains, and also to redistribute decision-making authority as well as costs and benefits in more equitable and sustainable ways.

At the core of the cooperative or co-management arrangements is the search for consensus in decision-making at best, or at least, avoidance of insolvable user conflicts. The cooperative planning model described by (Armour 1992) is rooted in the same soil as the Harvard Negotiation Project, the strategies of gaining mutually acceptable agreements- the win-win solution. Fisher and Ury (1981) and Ury *et al.* (1988) put forward three generalized negotiation strategies: a) the usual

⁴ The term "Crown land" refers to all public lands held by provincial and federal governments in Canada, including lands under water. Crown lands in Canada constitute about 94% of the total land area.

hard, "beat 'em up" approach that focuses exclusively on power relationships; b) the soft, collapse approach where the negotiator wants to avoid conflict and so makes concessions readily in order to reach agreement; and c) the method of principled negotiation whose essence is joint problem-solving and the search for mutually acceptable solutions. Since one of the goals of co-management is the acceptable resolution of conflict, principled negotiation may be a suitable method for resolving those conflicts. From the work of Fisher and Ury (1981) flow suggestions for conducting negotiations so that achievement of mutually acceptable solutions is more likely:

- don't bargain on positions;
- separate the people from the problem;
- focus on interests not positions;
- invent options for mutual gain;
- expand the pie before cutting it;
- identify shared interests;
- don't attack their position, look behind it; and
- don't defend your ideas, invite criticism and advice.

The theory of communicative action throws some light on how communication oriented towards reaching understanding can foster cooperation and conflict resolution among participants as well as coordination of their actions. Habermas (1979:1) characterized conflict, as a form of social action, to be a derivative of action oriented to reaching understanding. Habermas (1984a) called action oriented towards shared understanding "*communicative action*", and in the following definition we find both the mode of its action orientation and coordination specified:

"..communicative action is that form of social interaction in which the plans of action of different actors are coordinated through an exchange of communicative acts, that is through use of language (or corresponding non-verbal expressions) oriented towards reaching understanding" (Habermas 1982:234).

To reach understanding means here that the partners in interaction set out, and manage, to convince each other through exchange of validity claims, so that their action is coordinated on the basis of motivation through reason. Validity claims, according to Habermas (1984a), are criticizable claims raised by partners in interaction, and his conclusion here is that only speech acts with which the speaker presents criticizable validity claims have action-coordinating effects. This implies that:

- (a) the speaker must choose a comprehensible expression so that speaker and listener can understand one another (*comprehensibility*);
- (b) the speaker must have the intention of communicating a true proposition so that the listener can share the knowledge of the speaker (*truth*);
- (c) the speaker must want to express his/her intentions truthfully so that the listener can believe the utterance of the speaker (can trust him/her) (*truthfulness*); and
- (d) the speaker must choose an utterance that is right so that the listener can accept the utterance and speaker and listener can agree with one another in the utterance with respect to a recognized normative background (*rightness*). (Habermas 1979:2).

The goal of coming to an understanding is to bring about an agreement that terminates in reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Thus in communicative action, the coordination of actions is based on 'the participants' own fallible accomplishments of reaching understanding. This implies that validity claims offered by participants can be discussed, and confirmed or rejected. Such a discourse, according to Habermas (1984b), can lead to a 'true' consensus rather than just a forced one or one which is proclaimed only for the sake of peace. Raising claims implies the possibility that they can, if need be discussed and this again, implies that in principle this discussion can take place in an 'ideal speech situation' which is characterized by, according to Brand (1990), a symmetrical distribution of chances to engage in it for all participants in discourse. As Habermas says:

"...it now turns out to be the case that the model of pure communicative action does not only require, as shown, the possibility of discourse but rather that, conversely, the possibilities of discourse cannot be conceived of independently from the conditions for pure communicative action.....These determinations mutually interpret each other and define together a form of life which gives validity to the maxim that, when we engage in communication to conduct a discourse, and continue this only long enough, a consensus must come about which is, by its nature, a true consensus" (Habermas 1979:139).

For Habermas, communicative action is more than just a process of reaching agreement on individual claims; it is also an activity in which the participants develop, confirm, and renew their memberships in social groups and their own identities (Habermas 1984b:139). He specifies the functions of communicative action as follows:

"Under the functional aspect of *mutual understanding*, communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of *coordinating action*, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally, under the aspect of *socialization*, communicative action serves the formation of personal identities" (Habermas 1984b:137)

As pointed out earlier, the main premises of co-management are shared decision-making, co-determining actions and resolving resource allocation conflicts through shared understanding and coordinated actions. Parties involved bring to the table their validity claims that are often focused on their particular interest. Those claims have to be discussed until there is mutual agreement or true consensus. That is, participants have to suppose that their claims can be vindicated or redeemed. The nature and form of discussion pursued by participants becomes critical in co-management arrangements because the parties involved often have divergent views about the situation and to converge such views into a common understanding and a mutually agreed upon solution can be a formidable task. This underscores the need for conflict resolution in co-management in order to achieve mutual understanding and cooperation among parties involved in co-management.

Fisher and Ury (1981) and Ury *et al.* (1988) suggest that if the process is designed to be competitive in nature, then parties involved are likely to dig into and focus on their positions rather than interests; thereby holding to their validity claims as uncriticizable. But if the process is designed to be cooperative, there is a likelihood that a true consensus may emerge (Ury *et al.* 1988). This calls for conflict resolution mechanisms that can foster *mutual understanding* and *coordinated action* while still being able to *preserve individual identities of participants* in co-management arrangements. The latter point is important in co-management discussions in that participants still have to be accountable to their constituencies.

The theory of communicative action as discussed above gives some insights into strategies necessary for resolving local resource-use conflicts; the common dilemma in co-management arrangements. The theory of communicative action is linked to conflict resolution by the same tenets expounded by Habermas above. The tenets include: exchange of validity claims among participants; participants' recognition that their validity claims are criticizable; and the need for consensus and mutual understanding as a basis for cooperation.

We saw that in Habermas' view, **communicative action** serves three functional aspects: a) *mutual understanding* (to transmit and renew cultural knowledge); b) *coordinating action* (serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity); and c) *socialization* (serves the formation of personal identities) (Habermas 1984b:137). For the purpose of analysis of conflict resolution strategies and outcomes of co-management initiatives, I have collapsed the above features suggested by Fisher and Ury and by Habermas into three main principles: inclusion; respect and trust; and cooperation. These are some of the overarching features anticipated to be found in these new agencies, initiated as experiments in finding better ways of resolving conflicts over the use of Crown lands.

These principles are differentially relevant to the three groups involved in conflict- users, agency, and state. The principle of inclusion refers both to the structure (representation) of the new agencies and to their consultative processes. Therefore, it applies to both the internal operation of the agency and representation of user groups. The principle of respect and trust refers both to the operating procedures within the agency and also to its relationships with users and with the state. It applies to the internal operations of the agency, the relationship between agency and state, agency and user group and state and user group.

The principle of cooperation refers to joint problem-solving opportunities created by the various actors in co-management (e.g. the state, local stakeholder groups, and local users). Cooperation is demonstrated in the cooperative behaviours among the actors in co-management in the performance of all or some management functions and how joint performance is coordinated. The next section outlines the research problem in light of the theories discussed above.

1.3 Problem Statement

Although previous research in co-management has focused on the evolution of several co-management agreements, few researchers have evaluated performance (Berkes *et al.* 1991). Fewer have examined the decision-making structures and processes of such management arrangements. Thus the role of co-management in conflict resolution, its impacts on social relationships among actors, and on distributions of decision-making authority at local levels are not well understood.

In addition, the centrality of aboriginal people in such arrangements is commonplace in the literature on co-management [e.g., see the examples in Pinkerton (1989a)] as opposed to those involving non-aboriginal people. This is not to suggest that all co-management experience has been confined to aboriginal communities, but co-management agreements involving aboriginal users have been fairly common. These have several distinctive features, the most noteworthy of which is the challenge of reconciling divergent philosophical perspectives in decision-making structures (Benidickson 1992). Similarly, although there may be examples of co-management arrangements designed to deal comprehensively with a range of resources within a defined area, these appear to be less common than agreements that attempt to regulate a single sector-- fish, lobsters, or wildlife-- for example. Both cases in this study deal with management for a range of resources and involve both aboriginal and non-aboriginal people.

While on the surface, resource management problems appear to be biophysical, they are manifestations of social conflict (Chambers 1992). Such conflict derives primarily from inequalities in distributions of decision-making authority and responsibility as well as inequities in the distributions of costs and benefits among interested parties (Chambers 1992). Since conflict in resource management may lead to polarized relationships among various resource-use interests and inevitably thwart the stated management goals, researching and understanding the nature of decision-making structures and processes of co-management institutions and their outcomes at local levels are important. Such understanding may have implications for mitigating potential resource-use conflicts and the restructuring of management institutions in the future in order to meet the stated management goals and be responsive to local needs.

1.4 Research Questions and Objectives

The four basic research questions addressed by this study are:

- 1) How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to local levels?;
- 2) How has co-management changed the substance of resource management decisions at local levels?;
- 3) How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users?; and
- 4) How has co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?

The research objectives are summarized as follows:

- 1) to describe both historical and current distributions of decision-making authority between the state and local stakeholders;
- 2) to describe the effects of co-management on the substance of decisions;
- 3) to analyze the effects of co-management on social relationships (mutual understanding and cooperation) among key actors and local resource users; and
- 4) to investigate the extent to which co-management has facilitated resolution of local resource-use conflicts among key actors and local resource users.

1.5 Organization

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the research methodology employed in this study. The Chapter provides a justification for using the case study method and describes the techniques used in data collection and analysis. Chapter 2 also introduces the background to the study area by describing the nature of conflict in the Temagami Area from both aboriginal and multi-stakeholder dimensions. It also describes in detail the two cases under study: the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC); and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA).

Chapters 3 and 4 present the results of this study based on the research questions and objectives contained in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 provides both historical and current overviews on the distributions of decision-making authority based on two attributes: decision-making distribution (public participation and influence on decisions) and authority distribution (sources of decision-making power and stipulated mandates). Chapter 4 builds on the last Chapter and examines the substance of decisions in the Temagami Area from both historical and current contexts. Chapter 4 also explains the nature of social relationships among the key players in co-management: the sponsors; the agencies; and local resource users. The relationships are described along three main principles of inclusion, respect and trust, and cooperation. The Chapter also discusses the finding pertaining to the role of co-management in the resolution of local resource-use conflicts in the Temagami Area. Chapter 5 contains the summary and conclusions of the study and it discusses both the practical and theoretical implications of this study findings.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the justification for the case study approach, the methodologies used in data collection, data analysis, and data evaluation. Field data collection methods have been reviewed by the Research Ethics Committee at the University of British Columbia. In order to uphold the confidentiality of all respondents, their names have been coded to maintain anonymity. Members of both the Comprehensive Planning Council and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (the two case studies) were provided with copies of this study findings for their review and comments in order to enhance the construct validity of the study as suggested by Yin (1988:145), Miles and Huberman (1994:275), and Wolcott (1994:353).

2.1 Justification for the Case Study Method

This thesis uses the case study method to evaluate the effects of co-management on distributions of decision-making authority, the substance of decisions, social relationships among key actors and local resource users, and conflict resolution. Two cases, both located in Temagami, northeastern Ontario, have been examined in light of the research questions and objectives of this study. According to Yin (1988:13), case studies are the preferred method to conduct research under the following conditions:

- (a) when "how" or "why" questions are being posed;
- (b) when the investigator has little control over events; and
- (c) when the focus is on a contemporary event within some real-life context.

The case study method is appropriate to this research as the previously stated objectives concur with the three conditions outlined above:

1. This thesis has focused on addressing:
 - (a) how co-management has affected the distributions of decision-making authority at local levels;
 - (b) how co-management has changed the substance or types of resource management decisions at local levels;
 - (c) how co-management has affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users; and
 - (d) how co-management has affected local resource-use conflicts;
2. The study of co-management or distributions of decision-making in the Temagami Area requires an examination of both historical and presently occurring events that the investigator (author) has had no control over; and
3. While this thesis has endeavoured to review the history of past resource management in the Temagami Area to understand how current management systems have evolved, evaluation of the performance of current management systems necessitates a focus on contemporary events-- the two co-management initiatives.

2.2 Limitations and Scope

Research of this nature crosses many disciplines and it may be appropriate to set out the limitations and scope of this study. This study identifies the key characteristics of institutional designs in co-management arrangements of natural resources that are likely to assist or inhibit local decision-making, resolution of local resource-use conflicts, and social relationships among actors. The literature on which this study is based draws from several sources including co-management, democratic theory and its applications in citizen participation, and the application of communicative action in conflict resolution. The study does not specifically address the many other socio-economic, biophysical, legal, political, planning, and cultural dimensions related to the study.

Although the author spent two summers (eight months) working in the area prior to data collection, actual data collection on the two cases was done over a period of four months. Multiple sources of data collection were used including semi-structured interviews, transient observation and secondary data sources. However, according to Murphy (1980), transient observation has its limitations in the sense that:

- a) the researcher can't observe things in the past or be in more than one place at a time to observe current program activities;
- b) observing, like interviewing, is usually subject to the "Hawthorne Effect"⁵ and researcher's own bias as an observer;

⁵ "Hawthorne Effect" means a source of bias caused by the subject's reaction to the presence of the analyst whereby the subject either acts in ways that are not normal or provides answers that do not reflect his true views. The term comes from a famous experiment in the 1930s that examined the factors affecting worker productivity in the Hawthorne plant. (Murphy 1980:66).

- c) a transient observer has little time to develop trust and become a part of the group; and
- d) it is easy to misinterpret observed behaviour if the researcher does not ask subjects about its meaning.

Finally, although this study is a microstudy in a particular ecological and cultural region, some generalizations have been made to similar regions in Canada where co-management has been applied or is being contemplated. Therefore, the results of this study have been generalized to theoretical propositions on co-management of natural resources between governments and local communities across Canada. A very important limitation in this study, however, is that both cases in this study have been operational for less than five years, a period that may not be sufficient to evaluate fully a policy initiative. In particular, the full impact of socio-economic and biophysical concerns may not yet be realized.

Although the comprehensive planning process was initiated seven years ago, the process was held up for two-and-half years due to other responsibilities conferred upon the CPC/CPM by the Minister of Natural Resources. Such responsibilities involved: (a) the design and administration of the public participation process pertaining to treaty negotiations between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation and Ontario; and (b) the preparation of interim and contingency timber management plans. In the same vein, while the Wendapan Stewardship Authority has completed its management plan, the Comprehensive Planning Council is still in the process of doing so. This further limits comparative analysis between the two cases.

Despite these limitations, multiple sources of data were used. This allowed the author to cross-check and corroborate the data with different sources and account for past events. Feedback

on earlier drafts of this thesis was also sought from members of the two organizations under study in order to clarify issues, eliminate errors, and reduce the author's own bias. The "Hawthorne Effect" was further minimized through close relationships developed between the author and the subjects during the eight months that the author worked in the area prior to field interviews. The semi-formal structure of interviews was intended to put subjects at ease. Probing questions were also developed and administered to subjects during field interviews in order to clarify meanings and avoid misinterpretations of observed behaviour by the investigator.

Despite the short time involved during which the two cases have been operational, this research focuses on decision-making structures and processes as well as social relationships among actors in co-management rather than on socio-economic and biophysical impacts. The former two attributes can easily be evaluated within a five-year time frame. For all the above reasons, this research is still worthwhile since it focuses mainly on institutional designs in co-management and their impact on social relationships and conflict resolution. These are key components currently not well-understood in co-management.

2.3 Data Collection

Data were gathered over a period of four months during the summer of 1994. The four main research questions highlighted earlier, guided data collection for this study. Multiple sources were used. Primary data were compiled on the basis of information generated through semi-structured interviews and through transient observation. The semi-structured interviews were both open-ended in nature (to encourage a conversational tone) and focused (following a checklist of key questions--

see Appendix 1). Transient observation refers to a process where the observer or researcher observes without disguise, is clearly an outsider, and, is faced with tight time constraints to actively participate in the life of the program and observe day-to-day activities (Murphy 1980:112). Therefore, the transient observer uses all her/his senses as s/he interviews subjects, roams the halls, and generally hangs around (Murphy 1980:112).

Secondary data sources included minutes, administrative documents, letters, and memoranda of both organizations, government reports and news briefs, as well as newsclippings. Five categories of interviews were administered (Appendix 1). Table 1 shows the number of respondents by interview category and total number of questions. Although the majority of interview questions listed in Appendix 1 were prepared prior to fieldwork, several questions were added to the interview schedules while in the field as follow-up questions or probes. This was done to clarify and elaborate on some key issues raised by the respondents. The additional interview questions are indicated in "*italics*" in Appendix 1.

Table 1: Number of respondents interviewed in each interview category and total number of interview questions.

Interview Category	Category of Respondents	Total Number of Respondents	Total Number⁴ of Questions
1	Staff of the Ministry of Natural Resources - Temagami District. [respondents coded as 1A-1E]	5	29
2	Members of the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (10) and the Comprehensive Planning Council (11) - the two case studies [respondents coded as 2A-2U]	21	65
3	Members of the Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (2 members) and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation (2 members) - [these are the establishing agencies that created both organizations in category 2 above]. [respondents coded as 3A-3D]	4	38
4	Members of the public who participated in both the Comprehensive Planning Council and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority planning processes. [respondents coded as 4A-4AM]	39	38
5	Key informants who must have resided in the area for not less than 5 years and who were outspoken in the community as knowledgeable on issues in the area. [respondents coded as 5A-5E]	5	18
Totals		74	188

⁴ The total number of questions asked across the five interview categories varies because in some cases, the questions were not relevant to certain respondent categories. Although the total number of interview questions above is shown as 188, the actual total of individual interview questions was 72. The total of 188 simply shows that several individual questions were repeated across the five respondent categories (see Appendix 1).

2.4 Data Analysis

This study employed multiple analytic strategies and techniques including data displays, matrix building, and frequency tabulations. These techniques have been recommended by Miles and Huberman (1984, 1994) as effective in qualitative data analysis. However, the general analytic strategy has been guided by the main research questions that led to this study. In turn, the main research questions led to formulation of interview questions that guided data collection. From the responses to the interview questions, it was possible to draw main categories into which data (responses) were placed. This approach has been suggested as a preferred strategy by Yin (1988). The approach makes it possible to discriminate among the data and select those data that directly address the main research questions and place them into the main categories emerging from the questions of the study and the data themselves.

Final data analysis was performed using "pattern matching", a strategy suggested by Yin (1988:109), Dey (1993:47), and Wolcott (1994:33) for identifying associations among different variables. Once the data were classified, it was possible to examine for regularities, variations, and singularities (outliers) within the data. It became apparent prior to data analysis that the interview questions (and their responses) were too numerous for meaningful analysis. Therefore, out of the total number of 72 interview questions, only data pertaining to 35 questions were analyzed in this study (Table 2). The 35 questions were selected on the basis that they addressed directly the main research questions of this study. The 35 questions are highlighted in **"bold"** in Appendix 1.

Table 2: Total number of interview questions analyzed and left out of the analysis in this study.

Main Research Question	Number of Interview Questions			Total # of Interview Questions
	Annotated, categorized & analyzed	Annotated, ⁵ categorized but not analyzed	Probes ⁶ [annotated, categorized but not analyzed]	
1. How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority at local levels?	7	6	4	17
2. How has co-management changed the substance or types of resource management decisions at local levels?	11	11	7	29
Sub-totals	18	17	11	46
3. How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users?	9	2	3	14
4. How co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?	8	2	2	12
Sub-totals	17	4	5	26
Totals	35	21	16	72

⁵ These interview questions were administered for the purpose of gaining an in-depth understanding of each case under study.

⁶ These probing questions were developed while in the field and included in the interview schedules in order to seek clarification from respondents on specific issues.

Although the other questions (in normal text- in Appendix 1) including those developed in the field (in *italics*- in Appendix 1) were left out in the final analysis, this is not to suggest that they were discarded. Responses to these questions were annotated and categorized for reference in the overall explanation building on each case study. In other words, a full comprehension of the data was felt necessary and has been preserved throughout the study. Actual data pertaining to main research questions #1 and #2 are displayed in Appendix 2. Data pertaining to main research questions #3 and #4 are displayed in Appendix 3.

For the purposes of evaluation, research questions #1 and #2 were analyzed together since they both pertain to decision-making (i.e., distributions of decision-making authority and substance of decisions). Similarly, research questions #3 and #4 were analyzed together as they are both concerned with social relationships (i.e., mutual understanding, cooperation, and conflict resolution). Both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks were used to gauge the levels of public participation and decision-making in the agencies' (MNR and the two co-management organizations) management processes.

2.5 Background to the Study Area

Temagami is a small rural town located in northeastern Ontario on Trans-Canada Highway 11, 90 km north of North Bay and about 60 km south of the Tri-towns (Haileybury, New Liskeard, Cobalt) (Figure 6). The official Township of Temagami has a population of 1,137 and is made up of three geographically separated residential areas or townships⁶. These townships are known as the village, Temagami North, and the Milne township. The village is the oldest residential area of the town and is also the commercial and workplace centre of the town. Temagami North was created in the 1960's when Sherman Mine came to Temagami. It is now the largest residential area of the town (approximately 60% of the town residents live there) although contains only a variety store and an arena/community hall in terms of amenities.

The Milne township is a small residential area (approximately 3.5% of the town or 40 people live there) near the now defunct lumber mill where a small number of those who worked at William Milne and Sons Lumber Company still live. The Milne township is located about 1.5 km north on Trans-Canada Highway 11 from the village as compared to Temagami North which is approximately 5 km north of the village. Also included within the Township boundaries are parts of the hub of Lake Temagami which include the northeast arm of the lake and Temagami Island (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). In addition, there is the Lake Temagami Access Road (or locally referred to as Mine Road) which is about 6.5 km south of the village. This is the road used by the residents of Bear Island Reserve, the permanent lake residents (who live on the lake all year round) and the summer cottagers to access the lake and the mainland throughout the year.

⁶ Unless otherwise stated, the information that is contained in this section was attained by talking to people in Temagami or through my own field note observations.




Figure 6: Maps showing the location of Temagami in northeastern Ontario, Canada (Adapted from MNR 1985)

The commercial and governmental sectors within the town comprise the primary activities of the local economy. Until 1990, the town of Temagami's economy rested largely on the resource-based industries of forestry and mining. However, these industries collapsed with the closure of both the William Milne and Sons Lumber Company and Sherman iron mine in 1990. Currently the largest employers in the town are the Temagami District Office of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, the public school, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the Municipal Town Office. Other employers and commercial operations in the town include various tourist-oriented operations including a marina, 15 fishing and hunting outfitters, five (5) youth camps, two (2) commercial fly-in services, three gift stores, and a gasoline/propane station [MNR n.d. (c)].

In terms of its natural setting, the town of Temagami is located within a forested region. The forests of Temagami occur at the boundary of the Boreal Forest and Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Forest Regions (Rowe 1972). Therefore, the Temagami forests take their mixed structure, mostly composed of white pine, red pine, jack pine, black spruce, white spruce, birch, poplar, maple, and oak, from both the Boreal and Great Lakes - St. Lawrence forests. A small part in the northeast portion of the Temagami Planning Area⁷ occurs on the Little Clay Belt section of the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Forest Region. Most of the agricultural activity in the area is confined to this clay belt which covers the communities of Cobalt, Haileybury, and New Liskeard (also known as the Tri-town area) (Figure 6).

⁷

The Temagami Planning Area specifically refers to a land management area of the Ministry of Natural Resources of which the town and surrounding region of Temagami is a part. This area now coincides with the lands under the Comprehensive Planning Council and is sometimes referred to as "Temagami Comprehensive Planning Area"

Outside the township boundaries is Bear Island, one of Temagami's neighbouring communities. Bear Island is the home of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (Deep Water People). Often they are referred to as the "Temagami Indians" or the Bear Island Band. Bear Island is an Indian Reserve of 285 hectares with a population of 150 people. These comprise the "Status Indians"⁸. In addition, as of 1993, there were 1,550 Teme-Augama Anishnabai people who lived off the Bear Island Reserve in neighbouring communities (TAA 1994). Members of the Bear Island Reserve and those who live off the Reserve together comprise the Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation. The TAA are of Ojibway descent and have been asserting rights to their homeland for over 114 years (Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat 1991). This has created conflicts between the TAA First Nation and the government of Ontario. The history and nature of this conflict is discussed later.

Other important neighbouring communities are the islands on Lake Temagami. The summer cottagers and permanent lake residents (i.e., those who live on the lake all year round) live on islands located on Lake Temagami. In addition, there are five summer camps on the lake, three of which are American and two Canadian. The number of permanent residents who live on the lake all year long is small. There are currently 12 families that live on the lake all year. They are represented by the Lake Temagami Permanent Residents' Association (LATEMPRA) established in the mid 1980's (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989; Shute 1993). The association is largely a ratepayer organization for permanent residents (Shute 1993).

⁸

This term derives from federal policies and the Indian Act which classify aboriginal peoples as status or non-status Indians. Status Indians are those registered with the Department of Indian Affairs and live on Reserve; non-status are those who are not registered and live off Reserve.

In addition to those who live on the lake all year are summer residents who own cottages on the lake. There are 54 island lake communities with a total of 750 cottages on Lake Temagami (Temagami News Association 1994:45). Lake communities are islands on Lake Temagami where cottage residences are located⁹. Approximately half of all summer cottagers are American citizens. Of the Canadian cottagers the majority are from southern Ontario. Since 1931, the cottagers on the lake formed the Temagami Lakes Association (TLA) through which their needs and concerns have been represented and voiced within the area (Sinclair 1992). The TLA membership as of June 1994 was 1,344 (Temagami News Association 1994:54).

In a survey of cottage expenditures on Lake Temagami for 1993, it was estimated that the TLA members spent an estimated \$7,000,000 in the area (Temagami Times 1994:10). These expenditures, which excluded property and school taxes, included: property maintenance (42%); boat maintenance, purchases, storage and car parking (24%), groceries and beverages (9%); propane, gasoline, electric and telephone (9%); appliances and furniture (9%); and insurance (7%) (Temagami Times 1994:10). The TLA's contribution to the Temagami economy was estimated at over 25% of annual revenues (Temagami Times 1994:10).

Before 1971, the TLA served largely as a ratepayer organization. Subsequently, concerns by summer residents about the impact of the mining and forestry industries, and fears about future subdivision projects and further road building, created a sense of alarm among them (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989:251). The residents perceived the above activities to have severe environmental consequences that would affect them. This led in 1971 to the election of a new board of directors

⁹ Cottages are restricted to the islands on Lake Temagami. Cottage building has not been allowed on the mainland because of the danger of fire to the forest.

of the TLA determined to have influence in the land use planning discussions for the area (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989, Sinclair 1992). Hodgins (1990:129) described the new leadership of the association as "youngish Canadian and American environmental activists, acid-rain opponents, and proponents of back-country-oriented youth camps". The TLA ceased primarily to be a ratepayer organization; it became sophisticated, and it was well connected to all three political parties in Ontario (Hodgins 1990:129). The TLA has since become a major political force on land use discussions in the area.

Of significance to the Temagami area is the provincial park system. These parks have attracted tourists from all over the world particularly in the summer season. There are currently seven (7) provincial parks within the Temagami Planning Area: four (4) Waterway Parks; two (2) Recreation Parks; and one (1) Wilderness Park. Relevant to this study is the Wilderness Park- the Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park (LESWP) which has been at the centre of controversy in the area. Wilderness parks are substantial areas where the forces of nature are permitted to function freely and where visitors travel by non-mechanized means and experience expansive solitude, challenge, and personal integration with nature [MNR n.d. (b):1]. In 1972, the Lady Evelyn River was designated as a Wild River Provincial Park in order to preserve the semi-wilderness qualities of the river course (MNR 1978). The park was designated a new status as a Wilderness Park in 1983 covering an area of 72,400 hectares. This designation sparked controversy between the MNR and local communities as it curtailed pre-existing uses including trapping, hunting, mining, and also restricted mechanized access. The nature of this conflict is discussed later.

For the purposes of this study, the study area, which encompasses the Bear Island Reserve, the towns Temagami, Latchford, Cobalt, Haileybury, New Liskeard, and Elk Lake is collectively referred to as the 'Temagami area community'. As defined here, the geographic area of this 'community' coincides with the TAA land claim boundary (Figure 7) to which the TAA refers as "n'Daki Menan" (our homeland). Members of the 'Temagami area community' derive their cultural identity, political values, spirituality, subsistence and economic livelihood from living and using resources within n'Daki Menan.

Some demographic statistics and community services found in this 'community' are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Of notable importance in Table 3 are the high rates of population decline since 1986 and current unemployment. The unemployment rates in these communities are higher than the Ontario average of 7% in 1994. Both the population decline and high unemployment rates could be attributed to the closure of the Sherman Mine and the William Milne and Sons Lumber Company in 1990. Both companies were the major employers in the area prior to their closure. Also notable in Table 3 is the unemployment rate at Bear Island Reserve which is higher than in any of the communities. The TAA have always argued that they have not had a fair share of the resources from within n'Daki Menan (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). In particular, there have been no direct timber allocations granted by the MNR to Bear Island despite the existence of a portable mill there. Table 4 also shows the general lack of both medical and recreational facilities in the area. The communities of Latchford and Bear Island have fewer community services than the rest of the communities in Table 4 due to a general lack of investment or economic opportunities in both communities. The next section reviews the nature of conflict in the "Temagami area community".

Kirkland Lake District




Table 3: Community Profiles of the 'Temagami Area Community'.

Community	Population (1994)	% decline (1986-94)	% unemployed	% Employed in Resource Extraction Industry	% Employed in Manufacturing Industry
(a) Bear Island	150	6.7	54.5	12.0	18.2
(b) Temagami	1 137	14.3	15.4	9.5	16.0
(c) Latchford	327	17.9	51.3	31.25	0.0
(d) Cobalt	1 640	20.0	14.5	17.0	11.6
(e) Haileybury	4 820	2.4	13.7	14.8	11.0
(f) New Liskeard	5 286	5.6	8.5	4.6	12.0
(g) Elk Lake	583	5.8	8.8	25.9	27.6

Table 4: Community Services within the 'Temagami Area Community'.

Community	Bank	Church	Dentist	Doctor	School K-G8	School G9-13	Hospital/ Clinic	Lawyer	Library	Police	Theatre
Bear Island		✓			✓		✓		✓	✓	
Temagami	✓	✓			✓			✓	✓	✓	
Latchford		✓									
Cobalt	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
Haileybury	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
New Liskeard	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Elk Lake	✓	✓		✓	✓				✓	✓	

Sources:
(Tables 3 & 4)

- a) Bear Island Community Profile, 1994.
- b) Temagami Community Profile, 1994.
- c) Temagami/Latchford Area Socio-economic Database, 1994.
- d) Temiskaming District Socio-economic Database, 1993.
- e) Town of Haileybury Community Profile, 1994.
- d) Town of New Liskeard Community Profile, 1994.
- f) Corporation of the Township of James, Elk Lake Community Profile, 1994.

2.5.1 Nature of Conflict

The history of conflict and struggle in Temagami is very long standing. However, in the last two decades, no natural resource issue has been more publicly controversial or troublesome to governments in Ontario whatever their political stripe than the land-use conflict in the Temagami area. The issue is multi-dimensional. One facet, the dispute between multi-stakeholders and Ontario over resource management policies and approaches of the MNR in the region has been at the centre of the controversy. The multi-stakeholders can broadly be classified into "preservationist" proponents and "multiple-use" advocates.

The preservationist proponents include Northwatch, Wildlands League, Earthroots, and the Sudbury Naturalists Club. Northwatch is a coalition of environmental citizen groups in northeastern Ontario. Its head office is located in North Bay, 90 km south of Temagami. The Wildlands League, whose head office is located in Toronto, is the Ontario Chapter of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society. Earthroots, formerly the Temagami Wilderness Society, is also based in Toronto.

The Temagami Wilderness Society (TWS) was formed in 1986 to establish a large public campaign against construction of the Red Squirrel Road Extension (Gardner 1992). The extension was intended by the MNR to provide the local timber industry access to the largest contiguous stand of old-growth red and white pine in the area. In 1987 the TWS proposed a Wildland Reserve of 275,000 ha around the existing 72,400 ha Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park (MNR 1990). The proposal drew strong opposition from pro-development groups such as logging and mining, and in the end, the MNR chose not to implement the proposal (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). The

TWS disbanded in the spring of 1991 to "confront a new and even greater challenge", forming a new organization called Earthroots Coalition which was created initially to rally support to fight against the James Bay Hydroelectric Project in northern Quebec (Back 1991; Shute 1993). All the environmental groups above are opposed to any development activities, particularly logging, mining, and road constructions that threaten the environmental and wilderness qualities of the Temagami area.

The multiple-use advocates, on the other hand, believe the area should continue to be used for economic benefit. Among such groups are Northcare, the logging and mining industries, the area Chambers of Commerce, labour unions, and local (municipal) governments. Northcare (Northern Community Advocates for Resource Equity) was specifically formed to refute "the accuracy, methodology, conclusions and validity of the basis of the Temagami Wilderness Proposal by the TWS" (Northcare 1988:18; Shute 1993).

Northcare, which was largely funded by resource industries in the area, saw itself as an umbrella organization formed to represent industry, labour unions, hunters and anglers, trappers, tourist operators, Chambers of Commerce and local municipalities (Gardner 1992:12). Currently, these pro-development groups draw their following mostly from within the local confines among people whose livelihoods have in one way or another been affected by the restrictions imposed on development activities in the area due to the ongoing land title dispute between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) First Nation.

The dispute between Ontario and the TAA is over legal entitlement to a land area encompassing 110 geographic townships, to which the TAA refer as "n'Daki Menan" (Figure 7). One

geographic township is 9,324 hectares or 23,039 acres. The TAA people assert that they never ceded title to their ancestral lands. Ontario, on the other hand, maintains that the land in question is Crown domain (Hodgins 1990). As discussed earlier, the *Royal Proclamation* of 1763 specified the method of ceding aboriginal title to the Crown- through treaties signed between aboriginal peoples and the Crown. The Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 (so named after the Crown's representative, the Honourable William Benjamin Robinson) covered the whole of northern Ontario, and thus the Temagami area. Among the principal features of the Robinson-Huron Treaty included provision for annuities, aboriginal or "Indian" reserves, and freedom for the aboriginal people to hunt, trap and fish on any unconceded Crown lands¹⁰ (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1979:26).

Many aboriginal groups of Ojibway decent in northern Ontario signed the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850. The TAA people assert that, when the Robinson-Huron Treaty covering Temagami and adjacent areas was negotiated in Sault Ste. Marie in 1850, their leaders were not present to sanction the agreement. Ontario maintains that one of the Ojibway chiefs who signed the treaty, Chief Tawgaiwene, represented the "Temagami Indians" (McNeil 1990:189). However, Ontario did not grant a reserve to the TAA. As early as 1885, the TAA convinced the federal government of this fact, a detail of history demonstrated by the reality that the TAA found itself without a reserve throughout much of the 20th century. It was not until 1970 that the 285-hectare Bear Island site of the TAA's village was finally granted reserve status through an Order-In-Council issued by the governor-general of Canada (TAA 1990). Further, as Chief Potts of the TAA was later to assert in the courts, the establishment of the Bear Island Reserve did not speak to the larger question of his people's unceded aboriginal title to their entire homeland (n'Daki Menan). The next section describes

¹⁰ After Canadian Confederation in 1867, aboriginal rights to fish, hunt, and trap on unoccupied Crown lands became restricted by some federal regulations such as the Federal Fish and Game Acts.

the TAA-Ontario conflict in more detail. The aboriginal people claim title to the disputed lands that are now Crown lands and demand a share in the benefits derived from use of those lands as well as an opportunity to be involved in land-use decision-making. Preservationists and pro-development advocates want their interests protected and also included in land-use decision-making.

2.5.1.1 The Aboriginal Dimension

In 1877 the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA), discovering Crown surveyors on their lands, first requested treaty with the government of Canada. Canada and Ontario agreed but despite surveying of a 26,000 ha reserve in 1884, the land was not transferred (McNeil 1990); the timber mostly consisting of red and white pine, even then, being too valuable and in too short supply to be handed over to aboriginal people (Hodgins 1990). Rather, the Temagami area was declared a Forest Reserve in 1901 (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). Ten years later, in 1911, Ontario established the Temagami Game and Fish Reserve in which the TAA were prohibited from fishing, hunting and trapping (TAA 1990). The situation changed in 1939 when aboriginal people were allowed to trap within the Reserve upon purchase of an Ontario licence. State enforcement of this requirement became problematic as aboriginal people continued hunting, fishing, and trapping without the necessary licences (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).

In 1943, the federal government purchased from Ontario a one square mile land area at Bear Island for \$3 000. This is where the TAA members were later settled (TAA 1990). From 1945 to 1969, the TAA continued attempts to secure the 26,000 ha reserve that was surveyed in 1884. In 1970, Canada proceeded to create Bear Island Reserve No. 1 (of one square mile) by an Order-In-

Council thereby making it official as the TAA homeland. Two years later, in 1972, Ontario proposed construction of a tourist resort at Maple Mountain, an area known to the TAA as "Cheebayjing" or the home of the souls of their dead (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989); and therefore, a sacred site. This sparked further controversy and in 1973, the TAA filed 'land cautions' in Ontario courts over 110 townships within their traditional lands asserting their ownership of the land. The land cautions which were later secured the same year meant that the land title issue between Ontario and the TAA was in question and therefore all major development works would be curtailed. All mining activities and land sales were halted and no new timber licences were to be granted until the land title issue was resolved (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). This began a legal battle that would go on for the next 23 years.

Ontario sued the TAA in the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1978 maintaining that the land in question is Crown domain. The TAA, on the other hand, asserted that since they did not sign the 1850 Robinson Huron Treaty, and the reserve surveyed in 1884 was not transferred to them, they did not relinquish title to the land. While the Supreme Court of Ontario ruled in favour of Ontario in December 1984, the conflict was far from being resolved. The TAA filed notice of appeal four days after the Supreme Court ruling (TAA 1990). In January, 1989 the TAA appealed the 1984 Supreme Court ruling but on February 27, 1989 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision, denying the TAA title to the land, maintaining that aboriginal title to the land was invalid under existing laws and had been surrendered and extinguished. At the same time, the Court also ruled that Ontario had a fiduciary obligation to provide for a homeland to the TAA (TAA 1990). At this point the TAA directed legal counsel to apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and reaffirm their intention to take the case to the international courts in their continuing struggle for justice (TAA 1990).

While the court battles were going on, a crisis in the Temagami wood supply became evident during the 1980's, the red and white pine, the mainstay of the industry, were scant (Benson *et al.* 1989). To maintain the wood supply, on May 17, 1988 the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) proposed to extend the Red Squirrel Road to the east to meet the Liskeard Lumber Road from the north and intersect with the Goulard Lumber Road to the south. This network of roads would bring logging into the last largest contiguous stand (about 2,000 ha) of old growth red and white pine in North America (Quinby 1989) located in an area locally known as the "Wakimika Triangle", the heart of the Wendaban Stewardship Authority planning area (Figure 8).

The TAA, joined by recreationists, preservationists and other non-aboriginal people sympathetic to the TAA cause, blockaded the road developments for the next six months. Ontario responded with injunctions, arrests and jailings (Hodgins 1990). Arrested among the protestors was Bob Rae, who later became Premier of Ontario. Another blockade followed at the proposed Goulard Lumber Road extension. Again the Province responded with injunctions and arrests, but also with two initiatives- the Temagami Advisory Council, now the Comprehensive Planning Council (case study #1) and the offer to negotiate a settlement at last with the TAA. As part of that settlement Ontario and the TAA set up a co-management experiment covering the four (4) townships at the heart of conflict in the Wakimika Triangle, now known as Wendaban Stewardship Authority (case study #2).




Figure 8: Map showing proposed road extensions within the Wendapan Stewardship Authority Planning Area that sparked controversy between the TAA and Ontario (Adapted from MNR 1994b)

2.5.1.2 The Multi-Stakeholder Dimension

Stakeholders based in the Temagami area include local government, tourist outfitters, loggers, miners, environmentalists, cottage owners, recreationists (includes canoeists hikers, hunters, and sportfishers), access groups, and trappers- to which might be added the aboriginal people as well. Conflicts among these groups can best be described as one involving conflicting goals while that between these various groups and Ontario could be characterized as involving the need for redistribution of decision-making authority from the centre to the local levels as well as conflicting goals.

At the centre of conflicts among various groups has been the inadequacies of the MNR's management policies that emphasized timber to the exclusion of other values. This often pitted one interest group against the other as competition over resources escalated (Benson 1990). Hodgins (1990) notes that before 1970, the presence of competing users, notably recreationists and cottagers, hardly interfered seriously with forest management; "if anything, the presence of both recreational interests and aboriginal people plus several other interests served to moderate somewhat the manner and pace of forest cutting". As the timber supplies diminished over the years, coupled with poor regeneration of red and white pine, MNR was forced to open up new areas for logging in the hinterland; a situation that ignited controversy among various groups and between groups and Ontario- particularly the MNR. The poor regeneration of red and white pine in the area has been attributed primarily to the provincial fire suppression policy (which continues today) adopted at the beginning of the 20th Century (Day and Carter 1990). Fire plays a significant role in the ecology and regeneration of both species by opening up seed cones and suppressing competing vegetation. High-

grading harvest practices which MNR (1985) admitted had left the forest with trees of very poor quality, also contributed to poor regeneration of both red and white pine.

The proposed new harvest allocations came with new proposals for road access as well. But as highlighted earlier, these proposals were met with strong resistance from various groups. Environmentalists were against any further liquidation of the remaining old-growth forests in the area- pitting them against the timber industry and multiple-use advocates (Skidmore 1990); recreationists and cottage owners were opposed to any further opening up of wilderness areas- pitting them against the timber industry (Hodgins 1990); local governments in the area wanted more economic activity and thus were on the side of the timber industry- pitting them against environmentalists, recreationists, and cottage owners (Skidmore 1990); trappers saw most of the area being lost through the new timber development proposals- pitting them against the timber industry (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). And naturally, the timber industry were against all the groups trying to curtail its operations. In the end, Ontario bought the local mill (Milne Lumber) in 1990 and closed it at the same time, in an attempt to cool off the controversy. Part of Milne's timber allocations were within what is now the Wendapan Stewardship Authority area.

At the same time, a local mine, Sherman Mine, which had been in operation since the mid 1960's was also experiencing production problems due to diminished reserves and finally went under in 1990. During its operation, there was apprehension from environmental groups, recreationists and community residents about the impact of drainage from the tailings basin into Temagami waters (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).

The mining industry as a whole also experienced a somewhat different but related conflict. The TAA land cautions of 1973, which are still in effect, meant that no new mining development or exploration work would take place in the area. This has always pitted the mining industry, which is joined by pro-development groups, labour and local governments pushing for local economic development, against aboriginal people. Furthermore, the land cautions meant that no new cottage developments would take place in the area until the land title issue was resolved. This has always portrayed the aboriginal people as villains in the eyes of pro-development groups (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).

At or about the same time as the tourist resort was being considered for Maple Mountain in 1972, the Lady Evelyn river, 50 km south of the community of Elk Lake was designated a Wild River Park by the MNR (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989). This designation allowed for a number of "non-conforming" uses under MNR policy to take place in the area including timber extraction, mineral and aggregate extraction, fishing, hunting and trapping (Back 1990). However, in June 1983, the various users felt betrayed when the same area was enlarged (from 25,000 ha to 72 400 ha) and designated a "wilderness" park status by the MNR without consultation with the local interests (Back 1990). This was followed by a ban on non-conforming uses taking place in the park, thereby curtailing all resource extraction activities in the area.

At the time, three different companies held timber licences in over one-half the Lady Evelyn-Smoothwater Candidate Wilderness Park (see Figure 4- north of WSA area). Two of these companies were located in Elk Lake and one in Temagami. The mill in Temagami (Milne Lumber) was in the middle of a \$4 000 000 expansion programme based in part on obtaining the timber from

the volume agreement it held in the proposed wilderness area. But as pointed out earlier, Ontario paid off the company (\$4 000 000) and closed the mill in a desperate move to ease the tensions. Of the two companies in Elk Lake, Liskeard Lumber was paid off \$1.8 million in compensation for lost timber rights in the proposed wilderness area (Hodgins and Benidickson 1989).

The mining industry and other traditional users such as sport hunters, trappers and fly-in tourist operators, all of whom would be denied access into the park, were also opposed to the new designation. As a case in point, the representatives of twenty-seven towns and townships, organized as the Temiskaming Municipal Association, opposed the Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park proposal because they believed it would hinder the kind of tourism investment they envisioned for the region (Back 1990).

All the above conflicts led to several policy initiatives by the Ontario government, aimed at resolving the various resource conflicts in the area. As highlighted earlier, among those initiatives were the Comprehensive Planning Council and the Wendapan Stewardship Authority; the two cases in this study. Both initiatives are described in detail in the next section.

2.5.2 The Case Studies

2.5.2.1 Temagami Advisory Council (TAC) and later Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)

The Temagami Advisory Council (TAC) was established on May 17, 1988. The Council comprised eight (8) appointees representing the following local interests: environment, municipalities, residents, tourism, and lumber companies. The TAC had the following mandate (TAC 1989): (a) to provide advice on matters referred to it by the provincial government, the Ministry of Natural Resources and other government ministries, the public, interest groups and/or members of the Council itself, that relate to the land use and resource management in the Temagami district; and (b) to monitor and advise on pre-construction, construction and post-construction phases of the Red Squirrel Road extension. The TAC operated for about three years before Ontario disbanded it in May, 1991 due to inadequate local representation on it; a sentiment first voiced by the local publics and later upheld by the government of Ontario.

The TAC was replaced in the same year by the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC), a 17 member citizen's group established through an Order-In-Council approved and ordered on May 16, 1991 (Ontario Executive Council 1991a). The CPC has broader representation than its predecessor, TAC. In addition to former TAC membership, the CPC includes representation from education, mining, the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH), and aboriginal people. The aboriginal group (the TAA) is represented by five members of whom one is a co-chair. The CPC's mandate includes planning and advisory (to the Minister of Natural Resources and the TAA) functions with jurisdiction over an area of 569,799 hectares (2 200 square miles) (MNR 1993a) (Figure 7).

However, the planning function has been undertaken by the Comprehensive Planning Program (CPP), an in-house (MNR) initiative introduced in the spring of 1989 as part of MNR's goal of providing model management in Temagami district by producing an Integrated Resource Management Plan for the area (CPP 1990). This objective of integrated resource management planning has somewhat changed since the creation of the CPC. In its previous form, integrated resource management was defined as "the co-ordination of resource management programs and activities so that long-term benefits are optimized and conflicts between programs are minimized" (MNR 1986a). This has now been replaced with what has been described as "a movement away from a preoccupation with timber production"-- to a "comprehensive planning process" dealing simultaneously with all resource uses and incorporating the perspectives of the public and other provincial departments (CPP 1990).

All CPP personnel are MNR staff specialized in various facets of resource management (e.g. fish, wildlife, timber, recreation, tourism, fire, ecology, soils) drawn from various parts Ontario. The CPP provides technical input to the CPC which in turn advises the Minister of Natural Resources accordingly. Therefore, the CPC and CPP are said to represent shared decision-making between local interests (represented through the CPC) and Ontario (represented through CPP or MNR).

2.5.2.2 Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)

The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) was initiated through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario on April 23, 1990 (MNR 1990) in which both parties committed themselves to creating a "Stewardship Council". The

WSA was finally established through an Order-In-Council (Ontario Executive Council 1991b) approved and ordered on May 16, 1991 and through an Addendum to the MOU (MNR 1991) signed by both parties on May 23, 1991.

In the context of the land claim negotiations between the TAA and Ontario, the WSA is said to represent an experiment in shared decision-making (shared stewardship) between the TAA and local provincial interests (excluding MNR). Under an Enforcement Agreement signed between the WSA and the MNR, the MNR, in this case, was only to play the role of implementor of specific decisions referred to it by the WSA. In the same light, the WSA is said to represent an initial step toward a treaty of co-existence between aboriginal and Euro-Canadian interests in the area (CPP 1990).

The area of jurisdiction of the WSA includes the four geographic townships of Acadia, Shelburne, Canton, and Delhi; altogether encompassing a total land area of 37,296 hectares (Figure 7). According to the MOU (MNR 1990), the WSA has been granted decision-making authority to plan, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, and monitor all uses of and activities on the land within its area of jurisdiction.

However, according to the Order-In-Council (Ontario Executive Council 1991b) signed and dated May 16, 1991 to ratify the establishment of the WSA, the Authority's functions are to "evaluate and plan for land use and resource management activities in its area of jurisdiction". This mandate is somewhat narrower than what was earlier stated under the MOU. Since its inception, the WSA has been seeking from Ontario to increase the breadth of its mandate to coincide with the MOU, and to secure this authority either by some form of ownership or legislative jurisdiction (as for example

under the Forest Authorities Act such as the Algonquin Forest Authority in eastern Ontario) or both.

At a meeting held on August 17, 1992 between the WSA and the then Minister of Natural Resources, Bud Wildman, the Minister announced that legislation empowering the WSA was already introduced in Cabinet and was on the order list. However, the Minister gave no indication as to when or how long it would take before the legislation would go through but advised the WSA, in the presence of local MNR representatives, to act *de facto* as if they had the legislative jurisdiction. As of June 1995, that legislation has not been passed and the June elections in Ontario ousted the New Democratic Party and brought in the Conservative Party.

The WSA is composed of 12 members; six appointed by Ontario, six by the TAA, plus a neutral Chair appointed jointly by both parties. The Ontario appointees are said (by Ontario) to represent several local interests including labour, timber industry, local government, environment, recreation and tourism, and community development. Those appointed by the TAA include four members whose family hunting and trapping grounds lie within the WSA area, and two TAA government officials. According to the MOU (MNR 1990), the WSA is to be guided by the following principles in its actions: a) *Sustained Life* (ecological responsibility); b) *Sustainable Development* (defined as in the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development- the Brundtland Report); c) promotion of *Co-existence* between the TAA and other local Ontarians; and d) establishment of a *Public Involvement* process in its planning endeavours.

The next chapter discusses the distributions of decision-making authority in resource management in the Temagami area. This is done in both historical (under the MNR) and current

(under the two co-management agencies) contexts. Both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks are used to gauge the levels of public participation in the decision-making of the MNR, CPC, and WSA. The same frameworks are used to evaluate both the CPC and WSA's involvement in decision-making as co-management agencies.

CHAPTER 3

DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE TEMAGAMI AREA

Distributions of decision-making authority in the Temagami Area are discussed in both historical (under the MNR) and current (under the two co-management initiatives) contexts in light of the data. As highlighted earlier, distribution of decision-making authority in this study is understood to involve both the distributions of decision-making and authority. Distributions of decision-making refer to the levels of public participation in real decision-making and the influence of each player on final decisions. Distributions of authority refer to real devolutions of decision-making power from the state to the local levels.

3.1 Historical Distributions of Decision-making Authority (under the MNR)

3.1.1 Distributions of decision-making

Four categories of respondents [MNR (N=5), CPC (N=11), WSA (N=10), and Public (N=39)] were asked to describe past and present distributions of decision-making authority in the Temagami Area. The responses concerning decision-making distribution were unanimous (all 65 respondents) that in the past, the MNR made all the decisions (Table 5). Appendix 2 gives detailed descriptions of the responses under the category "decision-making authority." However, 10 respondents also added that there was minimal public input into MNR decisions in the past.

Table 5: Summary of data pertaining to past and present distributions of decision-making authority in the Temagami Area.

Interview Question →	<i>How was decision-making authority distributed in the past and how is it distributed now?</i>	
Respondent Category ↓	Responses	Number of respondents mentioning item
Members of MNR N=5	<u>Past:</u> · distributed internally within the MNR <u>Present:</u> · shared with local citizens	5 5
Members of the CPC N=11	<u>Past:</u> · authority was retained by the MNR <u>Present:</u> · not very much different from the past · decision-making shared with local interests	11 6 5
Members of the WSA N=10	<u>Past:</u> · MNR retained all the authority and made all the decisions with minimal public input <u>Present:</u> · citizens are now making decisions · still MNR, it won't relinquish control	10 9 1
Members of the Public N=39	<u>Past:</u> · it was no distribution at all, MNR decided <u>Present:</u> · shared with the public · MNR is still making the decisions because it has the legislative basis	39 12 27

To understand past distributions of decision-making in the Temagami area, reference is made to two processes that attempted to involve the public in decision-making. These are: (a) the Temagami Advisory Council (TAC), a citizen's group established in 1988 and terminated by Ontario in 1991; and (b) the MNR Timber Management Planning Process. As highlighted earlier, the TAC was an advisory body to the MNR. In fulfilling its mandate, the TAC worked with the MNR on daily operational issues involving land and resource management decisions in the Temagami Area (TAC 1989). This was possible because in its advisory capacity, the TAC also had a monitoring function.

According to three public respondents (4A, 4C, 4K), all the information used in TAC's decisions was supplied by the MNR. The TAC members also raised this concern at a meeting held with then Minister of Natural Resources Honourable Lyn McLeod on January 10, 1990 in Temagami

(Appendix 4). In particular, the members expressed concern that they had no way of verifying whether or not the MNR's information was correct (TAC 1990). One of the key informants (5B) who was also a former member of the TAC concluded:

This [the lack of control over information] meant that we [the TAC members] were restricted to work within the system; our activities were restricted to what the MNR wanted us to do. In the long run, it was frustrating for us because we could not influence the land-use planning process in Temagami as we had hoped; our mandate was a sham!

One public respondent (4P), also a former member of the TAC, commented,

Surely, if they [the government and the MNR] wanted us to have input in land-use decisions of this area, they should have realized that we needed to make informed judgements and decisions before we could advise the Minister. We were like sitting ducks ready to be fed and shot any time. We were simply rubberstamping their [the MNR] decisions.

At the same meeting held on January 10, 1990, the TAC members voiced the concern that the local publics considered the TAC as a "rubber stamp" for the MNR. The Minister responded that the TAC was considered as a check on whether the MNR was managing the resources correctly. She added that, "to become a rubber stamp means that no questions are being asked; in TAC's case questions are being asked and the MNR is being challenged" (TAC 1990:1) (see also Appendix 4).

However, asking questions on information determined exclusively by the MNR without also the opportunity for the TAC to participate in the generation of that information and access to it was no assurance that the TAC asked the right questions. Therefore, the MNR's total control of information used in the planning process limited the TAC's participation in the MNR's deliberations. Consequently, the MNR closely managed the TAC's advice. These findings are consistent with those

of Ross (1993) and Reed (1995). In her review of public participation processes in the Temagami Area, Ross (1993:15) concluded that the TAC was a process essentially operating to reduce participation and obstruct scrutiny of the manner and substance of MNR decisions. Similarly, in a study of the Ignace Co-management Committee in Ignace, northern Ontario, Reed (1995:145) also found that the Committee's close control of information restricted opportunities for broader public participation in its deliberations. The MNR officials depicted a paternalistic attitude by discouraging or closely managing the advice provided by the local community (Reed 1995:137).

In the case of the TAC, the MNR's total control of information used in the planning process was not consistent with the premises of co-management wherein decision-making responsibilities were supposed to be shared. This would imply sharing the responsibility of generating and controlling information as well. As noted by the 65 respondents in Table 5, the MNR made all the decisions. In order to provide informed advice to the MNR, the TAC required access to information on which the MNR's decision-making was based; but the MNR denied the TAC such opportunities. This raises questions about the structure and motives of the TAC-MNR model of co-management. One of the WSA respondents (2A) characterized the TAC as simply "a symbolic gesture" designed to cover up the Red Squirrel Road controversy after the MNR made a wrong decision to go ahead with the construction.

Conflicts that predated the TAC in the Temagami area were not resolved by the committee. The TAC was partly responsible for overseeing construction of the most controversial road ever built in Ontario (Red Squirrel Road Extension). It was asked by the MNR to approve its decisions to construct both the Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions. The TAC gave a false impression to

the local publics that its involvement in the decisions over the proposed road constructions by the MNR would halt the actions. According to two key informants (5B, 5C), when the constructions went ahead and blockades followed, the TAC's credibility also faded. Four of the five key informants in this study (5A, 5B, 5D, 5E) noted that this was one of the main reasons that led to a Ministerial decision to replace the TAC with the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC). The other reason, as noted by three establishing agency respondents (3A, 3B, 3C), was that local representation on the TAC was inadequate- particularly with the absence of both the Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation and the Temagami Lakes Association, both of whom were major players in the Temagami conflict.

This leads to a conclusion that the TAC simply served most of the political functions described by Filyk and Côté (1992) as applicable to advisory bodies. The functions are repeated and illustrated here:

1. *Test public reaction to policies*; the policies being constructions of both the Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions for the primary purpose of accessing the last stand of old-growth red and white pine in the area;
2. *Provide a forum for expression of public opinion*; both Ontario and the MNR viewed the TAC as a voice for the local publics despite its lack of popularity locally;
3. *Force controversial issues into an objective arena*; the controversial issues being constructions of both the Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions;
4. *Placate opposition by involving potential expert critics in the decision process*; the critics being representatives from environment, municipalities, tourism, and lumber companies which excluded major stakeholders such as mining and OFAH as well as the TAA;

5. *Be used for persuasion*; the TAC was asked by the MNR to formally approve constructions of the controversial Goulard Road and Red Squirrel Road Extensions and also to hold public consultations on proposed constructions.
6. *Provide a symbolic response to problems*; the problems being the multi-faceted conflict surrounding constructions of the road extensions and the symbolism stemming from creation by Ontario of an advisory body (the TAC) that lacked authority to influence MNR decisions;
7. *Give a false or misleading impression of addressing problems- known as 'window dressing'*; creation of the TAC gave a false impression to the local publics that it would influence the MNR to stop constructions of the disputed roads;
8. *Delay action*; from 1988 to 1991, the TAC failed to resolve the Red Squirrel and Goulard Roads controversy. In the end, both roads were built but never used for their primary purpose of providing access by the logging industry to harvest old-growth red and white pine in the area. The controversy was taken over by the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) in 1991. As will be discussed later, the WSA resolved the controversy in 1994 through consensus decision-making and meaningful public involvement. However, that decision was turned over to the MNR, the original creator of the conflict, by the Minister of Natural Resources to judge its feasibility, legitimacy, and implementation. It is difficult at this point to predict what the MNR's decision will be.

On Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 9), the TAC's involvement in MNR decision-making constituted tokenism, but at a higher level than consultation (level five - placation). Within its advisory capacity the TAC had a monitoring function and therefore, influenced the MNR's day-to-day decisions to a certain extent. However, at level five, citizens still do not have final decision-making authority; the final decision-making authority rests with the agency responsible for planning (Arnstein 1969). However, the board is asked to formally approve those decisions.

Here, the TAC formally approved the constructions of the proposed road extensions after the MNR had already decided to construct the roads in 1988. This is the same year that the TAC was formed.




Figure 9: The level of public participation of the TAC in the MNR's planning process in the past on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).

Using Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation framework (Figure 10), the TAC's involvement in the MNR's planning and decision-making processes was confined to the first three levels (information, persuasion, and consultation). According to Parenteau (1988), these constitute low levels of participation and decision-making power because the public is not sharing in decision-making. Although the MNR informed and consulted with TAC, decisions were made by the MNR; the MNR also controlled both the generation of and access to the information.

Decision-making power

Information	Persuasion	Consultation	Cooperation	Control
The decision is made and the public is informed	The decision is made and an effort is made to convince the public	The problem is submitted, opinions are collected, the decision is made	The limits are defined, the decision is shared with and made together with the public	The decision is made by the public, which assumes a role of public responsibility

Public participation



The levels of public participation and decision-making (through the TAC) in the MNR's planning process in the past

Figure 10: The levels of public participation and decision-making of the TAC in the MNR's planning process in the past on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

The second process involving public participation in MNR's Timber Management Planning was initiated in 1986 (MNR 1986b) for the whole province. In this process, which is still present today, four formal opportunities were provided for public consultation in the preparation of a Timber Management Plan (TMP) (Appendix 5). The MNR invited the public on four separate occasions to comment on its decisions (MNR 1986:5):

- an invitation to participate, at the outset of the timber management planning exercise;
- an opportunity to review preliminary proposals at an Information Centre, prior to production of the draft TMP;
- an opportunity to review the draft TMP; and
- an opportunity for inspection of the approved TMP.

In terms of broader public involvement in the TMP process, public participation was through "invitation" and "consultation." Here, consultation was without also an assurance that the public's concerns would be taken into account. Decisions were made by the MNR staff and the public were invited on four separate occasions to give their comments (Appendix 5). On Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 11), this constituted tokenism at level three (informing). Although 'informing' represents the first step toward legitimate citizen participation, it involves a one-way communication from those with power with no mechanisms for feedback nor room for negotiating power (Arnstein 1969). Similarly, on Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making framework (Figure 12), participation of the broader publics in the MNR's planning and decision-making was confined to the first level of "informing". These findings are consistent with those of Higgelke and Duinker (1993).




Figure 11: The level of public participation in the MNR's Timber Management Planning process in the past on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).

Decision-making power




Figure 12: The level of public participation and decision-making in the MNR's Timber Management Planning process in the past on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

Therefore, historically, public participation in the MNR's decision-making involved a range of degrees of tokenism from informing to placation. The public's influence on MNR decisions was negligible. Distributions of decision-making from the MNR to local interests did not take place. The MNR's total reliance on information generated by itself also limited the distributions of decision-making to local levels. This also implies that the MNR relied heavily on technical or scientific information as a sole basis for planning with no room for local knowledge input. Hence, true sharing of decision-making between the MNR and local users did not take place. The narrow representation on the TAC also implied that the TAC was a process merely operating to limit participation in decision-making by excluding the most influential groups in the area - the TAA and the TLA. Similarly, public participation in the TMP process was characterized by MNR controlling all the information used in the planning process and seeking comments from the public rather than allowing the public to share in decision-making.

3.1.2 Distributions of authority

According to the 65 respondents (Table 5), the authority to make decisions was retained by the MNR in the past. That is, historically, authority over management of natural resources in the Temagami Area has rested primarily with the Minister of Natural Resources and ministry staff. There was a lack of devolution of decision-making power from the MNR to the local level.

A look at the historical distributions of both ownership and legislative jurisdictions over resources in Canada reveals that, all natural resources within Crown lands are owned by provincial governments. The only exceptions are offshore and marine resources, aboriginal reserves and lands on which military installations are found; the Federal government owns such lands and resources (Thompson and Eddy 1973). With Crown lands in Ontario, the Province retains both ownership and legislative jurisdictions over them.

Through several pieces of legislation, such as the *Natural Resources Act*, the *Environmental Protection Act*, the *Ontario Water Resources Act*, the *Pesticides Act*, and the *Environmental Assessment Act*, several line agencies (ministries) have been delegated the responsibility to administer those pieces of legislation on behalf of the government. For instance, the latter four examples of Acts above are all administered by the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the former by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR). With the MNR, this has given the Minister of Natural Resources and ministry staff discretionary powers over natural resources as in timber, fisheries, and wildlife management. Through the Natural Resources Act, MNR's mandate is to manage for all natural resources on behalf of the people of Ontario.

For the TAC, its mandate was not conferred through legislation but rather an Order-In-Council (OEC 1988). An Order-In-Council (OIC) is a Cabinet-level decision with no legislative force. The implication is that powers conferred through an OIC can easily be challenged in a Court of Law as the decisions made under it are non-binding. The TAC acted in an advisory capacity that conferred no authority, thereby limiting further its influence over decision-making.

Another process that attempted to legitimize public involvement in resource management decision-making in Ontario was the Class Environmental Assessment (EA) for Timber Management on Crown Lands. However, this forum, which is based on a judicial model through public hearings, has been criticized by several authors including Dunster (1992) and Morgan *et al.* (1993) as adversarial, long, costly, and focused exclusively on timber. Its counterpart federal process the Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP) has also been criticized for similar reasons (Reed 1984) (excluding focus on timber). Parenteau (1988) also described Ontario's EA process as strongly oriented toward public information and consultation.

On Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation, Ontario's EA process above entails degrees of tokenism of "informing" and "consultation" at levels three and four, respectively. Through its preferred and usual method of public hearings, the EA process offers no assurance that appellant concerns and ideas will be taken into account. At the conclusion of public hearings, the Environmental Assessment Board decides how the plan will proceed. In addition, the granting of opportunities to appeal is left to the EAB to decide. Therefore, while citizens concerns may be heard, the EA process simply provides one-way flows of communication from the EAB to the citizens. The EAB retains the authority to make decisions.

While there are examples elsewhere in Ontario where the Province has delegated legislative authority to local levels in resource management planning in the past, such examples have been lacking in the Temagami Area. Existing examples include several Conservation Authorities established through the Conservation Authorities Act, R.S.O. 1980 and Forest Authorities such as the Algonquin Forest Authority (established through the Forest Authorities Act, R.S.O. 1980). These agencies have retained decision-making authority. Therefore, historically, mechanisms such as OICs, EA hearings, and the EARP have all failed to redistribute authority to local levels in the Temagami Area.

3.2 Distributions of Decision-making Authority under Co-management

3.2.1 Ontario's Expected and Implied Levels of Distributions of Decision-making Authority to the Co-management Agencies

Ontario viewed the creation of both the CPC and the WSA as devolution of decision-making from the state to the local level - the Temagami Area. The CPC was said to represent shared decision-making between local stakeholders (represented through the CPC) and Ontario (represented through the MNR). In the same vein, the WSA represented a model of shared decision-making between aboriginal people (represented through the TAA members) and Ontario (represented through non-aboriginal interests). In addition, both Ontario and the TAA perceived the WSA as having delegated powers to make decisions. The absence of the MNR on the WSA could also be construed as the latter having "absolute" control or full managerial power over its decisions.

Therefore, on both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks (Figures 13 and 14, respectively), Ontario expected the CPC to

constitute a "*partnership*" and "*cooperation*," respectively, between local citizens and the MNR. Both Ontario and the TAA expected the WSA to constitute degrees of citizen power from "*partnership* to *citizen control*" (Figures 13 and 14). The next section explores what happened in light of the data. Did actual distributions of decision-making authority to both the CPC and the WSA concur with both Ontario and the TAA's expectations above?




Figure 13: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA's public participation under co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).




Figure 14: Implied levels by the sponsors of the CPC and WSA's public participation in decision-making under co-management on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

3.2.2 Actual Distributions of Decision-making Authority to the CPC and the WSA

3.2.2.1 Distributions of Decision-making

Four questions were posed to the CPC (N=11), the WSA (N=10), and public respondents (N=39) to evaluate the actual distributions of decision-making authority to the two co-management agencies. The questions were:

- who makes the decisions?;
- what decisions/recommendations were made by the agencies (CPC and WSA)?;
- were those decisions/recommendations implemented and by whom?; and
- is there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/recommendations made by the agencies by the state or any of the key actors?.

Appendix 2 lists detailed responses to the questions under the categories "decision-making authority" and "substance of decisions". Table 6 provides a summary of the responses.

3.2.2.1.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)

According to the results presented in Table 6, 62% of the respondents (N=50) said that the MNR made decisions for the CPC. In addition, 64% of the respondents (N=64) said that the MNR occasionally coopted the CPC into decisions concerning the planning process (Appendix 2). All CPC respondents (N=11) noted that a decision made by the CPC to meet with special interest groups in Temagami rather than Toronto was preempted by the MNR - the meeting was eventually held in Toronto.

Table 6: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from the state to the co-management agencies under study.

Interview Question	Responses pertaining to the Agency	No. of respondents mentioning item	Total No. of respondents	% of respondents mentioning item
1. Who makes the decisions?	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• MNR makes the decisions• CPC and MNR make the decisions• One of the co-chairs & MNR <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• WSA members make the decisions <p>[see Appendix 2 for details]</p>	31 13 08 49	50 50 50 49	62 26 16 100
2. What decisions/ recommendations were made by the agencies?	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• One (1) decision• Six (6) recommendations <p>[see Appendix 2 for details]</p> <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 20 decisions <p>[see Appendix 2 for details]</p>	11 11 10	11 11 10	100 100 100
3. Were those decisions/ recommendations implemented and by whom?	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• decision not implemented, rejected by MNR• recommendation 1, implemented• recommendation 2, implemented• recommendation 3, implemented• recommendation 4, implemented• recommendation 5, not implemented• recommendation 6, not implemented <p>[see Appendix 2 for details]</p> <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• decisions have not been implemented <p>[see Appendix 2 for details]</p>	11 10 10 08 06 11 11	11 11 11 11 11 11	100 91 91 73 55 100 100
4. Is there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/ recommendations made by the agencies by the state or any of the key actors?	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• cooptation, yes• preemption, yes• I don't know <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• cooptation, yes• preemption, yes• I don't know <p>[see Appendix 2 for details]</p>	41 25 16 08 43 21	64 64 64 63 63 63	64 39 25 13 68 33

Of the six recommendations made by the CPC, two that were not implemented were made to the MNR (Appendix 2). The two recommendations pertained to two issues: (a) planning on a watershed basis; and (b) hiring of outside consultants to provide alternate sources of information in the planning process (Appendix 2).

The two recommendations above and one example each on preemption and cooptation of the CPC by the MNR, are explored in detail. These four issues test the distribution of decision-making between the MNR and the CPC who, according to Ontario, were supposed to share decision-making under the co-management arrangement.

On *preemption*, when the CPC advised the MNR to hire outside consultants to provide alternate sources of information in the planning process, the MNR rejected the proposal on the basis that there were no adequate funds in the budget to do so (2K, 2M, 2N, 2R). Yet, when the CPC later suggested that a meeting with special interest groups from southern Ontario be held in Temagami rather than Toronto due to financial constraints, the recommendation was rejected by the MNR. The CPC members contended that they had already provided opportunities to all interest groups to participate in the process. They also contended that it was too expensive for all 17 members to travel from Temagami to Toronto and stay there for two days (2K, 2N, 2R, 2S).

According to three MNR respondents (1B, 1D, 1E) and three key respondents (5A, 5C, 5E), the meeting was taken to Toronto for political reasons; "the environmental groups would in the end shoot down the whole planning process if the CPC did not travel to and consult with them in Toronto" (5E). In addition, the Minister of Natural Resources had advised the MNR to take the meeting to Toronto for the same reason (1B, 1D).

The evidence above shows that the CPC was not an equal partner in the CPC/MNR decision-making process. It further reports a movement toward an increase in dependence by the CPC on MNR's financial resources. The CPC did not have its own budget; it depended exclusively on the MNR's financial resources. This limited the CPC's independence and influence on the MNR decisions. For example, as discussed earlier, the CPC could not hire outside consultants to provide alternate sources of information because it lacked a budget to do so and the MNR refused to sanction the proposal. This implied that the CPC depended solely on information provided by the MNR in its decisions. As noted by Arnstein (1969), partnership can work most effectively when the citizens group has the financial resources to hire (and fire) its own personnel. The exclusive dependency of the CPC on the MNR's funding ran the risk of compromising local control, which is one of the main premises of co-management and advantages of the local-development approach. In this case, the CPC was preempted by the MNR which had both the financial resources and power to make decisions.

Similarly, the CPC's recommendation to the MNR to undertake planning in the area on a watershed basis, while not rejected by the MNR, was not implemented. The MNR felt that the process of planning on a watershed basis was too time-consuming, costly, and there was no real justification for it (1A, 1C, 2L, 2N, 2O). However, the MNR did not tell those reasons to the CPC (1C, 2L, 2N).

On *cooptation*, four (4) MNR respondents (N=5) pointed out that the CPC was likely to be coopted into MNR decisions due to the CPC members' lack of technical background in various aspects of the planning process (Appendix 2). All CPC respondents (N=11) pointed out one instance

of cooptation by the MNR. The instance concerned the lack of CPC involvement in the framing of management options and zoning decisions made by the MNR. This instance is explored in detail below.

In April, 1994, the MNR generated management and zoning options for the comprehensive planning area (CPP 1994a) without the involvement of the CPC. This was confirmed by all CPC respondents (N=11) (see Appendix 2) and the four MNR respondents above (1A, 1C, 1D, 1E). In May 1994, the management options and zoning decisions were taken to the public for comment (CPP 1994b) and the CPC was asked to conduct the public consultation process. The result was that the CPC members presided over information they did not generate and did not understand; a situation that later caused them embarrassment at the public meetings (2K, 2L, 2N, 2P). The four (4) MNR respondents (N=5) maintained that the decisions involved in producing the management and zoning options were too technical to be understood by the CPC (1A, 1C, 1D, 1E). Yet, the MNR asked the CPC to present the product of its "technical" decisions to the public without the CPC's prior involvement in framing of the decisions.

In a probing interview question, the CPC respondents (N=11) were asked to comment on the assertion by the four (4) MNR respondents that the decisions involved in producing the management and zoning options were too technical to be understood by the CPC members. Nine (9) of the 11 members refuted the assertion and two (2) felt the MNR may be correct. Three of the nine members who refuted the MNR's assertion summarized their views as follows:

(2L),

We [the CPC members] know more of this area than most of them [the MNR staff]. We have lived here most of our lives and these guys [the MNR staff] have come and gone. Most of the Comprehensive Planning Program staff [the MNR] have not even been here for a year; they are mostly from outside this area. I can't imagine why they think we don't know some of the technical stuff they talk about. Like most of our members [the CPC], I have a profession- I am a teacher, simply because I am not a forester does not mean I don't know how to tell a birch tree from a maple tree or that an area has been clearcut.

2O,

Most of the decisions we are talking about here, to many of us who have lived and worked in this area, are sometimes a matter of common sense. They [the MNR staff] should mind their technical jargon and not our ability to understand technical information and make informed decisions; who do they think we are?; fools? We [the CPC] have very competent people on our committee- I don't think any of them [MNR staff] understands mining better than John who has been dean of a mining school in this area for over 20 years or Ron who has been a forestry consultant in this area for over 15 years.

2S,

That's not true. I have been here longer than all of them [the MNR staff]. The WSA members who are just local citizens like us made zoning decisions without the involvement of the MNR. When we [the CPC and MNR] reviewed the WSA's draft forest stewardship plan, the MNR were dumbfounded when they saw the work the WSA had done. I guess they wrote off the WSA in the beginning as a bunch of activists who could not come up with anything better than them..boy, were they mistaken. They [the MNR staff] only started talking about land-use zoning and watershed stuff in our planning area after they saw the WSA's plan. They should thank the WSA for setting the stage in this area. It succeeded on the WSA because the members worked closely with the planner who was willing to spend time to explain and simplify technical information before they [the WSA members] made decisions. That's what they [the MNR staff] should be doing- explain some of the forestry technical jargon so that we are at least talking from the same points of view.

The views expressed by the three respondents above dispel some of the myths about the decision-making capabilities of citizens' groups in co-management of natural resources. For instance, all three respondents above characterized the long time they had spent living in the area, their work and life experiences, as sufficient conditions to make intelligent land-use decisions. Although this characterization may be overstated, it underscores the relevance and value of local user knowledge in land-use planning and decision-making processes. The views expressed by the three respondents

above also show that members of citizen's groups are not without professional qualifications relevant to land-use discussions. They also point to the need for collaboration between resource planners and the citizens' groups. These are the same findings by Usher (1987) and advanced by Armour (1992) in her model of cooperative decision-making, and noted by Filyk and Côté (1992). Usher (1987) argued that citizens' groups can make decisions based on their local knowledge of the area and on technical information presented to them in simpler formats.

In this case, the MNR played the role of both plan-maker and manager rather than facilitator and collaborator. The MNR did not collaborate with the CPC in the production of management options and zoning decisions; it made all the decisions. Therefore, the MNR put emphasis on technical knowledge to the exclusion of the local knowledge of the citizen's group - the CPC. The fact that the CPC did not participate in the framing of the decisions but was asked by the MNR to present the decisions it did not understand to the public, amounted to cooptation by the MNR. The MNR asked the CPC to rubberstamp its decisions.

Therefore, the redistribution of decision-making from Ontario (through the MNR) to the CPC did not take place. As in the past, the MNR made all the decisions and controlled the information used in the comprehensive planning process, thereby limiting further the distribution of decision-making to the CPC. Based on the foregoing analysis, on Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 15), the CPC involvement in co-management involved degrees of tokenism from informing to placation. Similarly, on Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation framework (Figure 16), the CPC's involvement in co-management was confined to the first three levels (information, persuasion, and consultation).




Figure 15: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation under co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).

Decision-making power




Figure 16: The implied and actual levels of the CPC participation and decision-making under co-management on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

3.2.2.1.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)

For the WSA, the results in Table 6 show that all respondents (N=49) said the WSA made decisions on its own behalf. The respondents also noted that of the 20 decisions made by the WSA, none was implemented due to a lack of legislative authority by the WSA and Ontario's unilateral termination of the WSA. Out of 63 respondents, 68% said that the WSA was occasionally preempted by state agencies such as the MNR and the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines (MNDM) (Table 6). These instances generally involved issuance of land-use permits or renewal of permits by the MNR and the MNDM within the WSA boundaries without the knowledge and consent of the WSA (see Appendix 2). Three such instances included: (a) an attempt by the MNR to issue a land-use permit to build a dock; (b) renewal of a land-use permit by the MNR for a tourist lodge operator; and (c) renewal of mining leases in the WSA area by the MNDM.

The lack of implementation of the WSA decisions and the three instances of preemption above are explored in detail. These instances test the distribution of decision-making between Ontario and the WSA. According to Ontario, the WSA was supposed to plan, evaluate, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, and monitor all uses of and activities on the land within its area of jurisdiction (MNR 1990; OEC 1991b).

Both Ontario and the TAA established the WSA as a decision-making body rather than an advisory body (MNR 1990; MNR 1991). As highlighted earlier, then Minister of Natural Resources, Honourable Bud Wildman, announced on August 17, 1992 that legislation empowering the WSA to make decisions was already introduced in Cabinet and was on the order list. However, two

respondents representing Ontario in the respondent category "establishing agency" said that such legislation was never introduced in Cabinet (3A, 3D). As noted earlier, 63% of the respondents said that the lack of legislation meant the WSA could not implement its decisions. This also became a potential source of preemption of the WSA's *de facto* authority by the MNR and the MNDM; the latter two having *de jure* authority over Crown lands in Ontario (2J).

In a memorandum sent to the establishing agencies (Ontario and the TAA) on July 29, 1993, the WSA demanded reassurance on continued funding and the status of its plan. The WSA wanted to know if additional funds were going to be provided to complete its 20-year Forest Stewardship Plan and if its plan would be implemented (WSA 1993:1). While Ontario provided the additional funds to the WSA for a year, it did not reassure the WSA on the status of the WSA plan (2B, 2D, 2E, 2H). On the other hand, the TAA reassured the WSA that irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations, either the WSA or an appropriate body mutually agreed upon between Ontario and the TAA would implement the plan (2B, 2E, 2H, 2I). Yet, Ontario proceeded unilaterally in January 1994 to terminate the WSA on March 31, 1994 through a memorandum from the Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (ONAS 1994).

The evidence above suggests that Ontario never intended to confer the necessary legislative authority to the WSA as earlier promised. The WSA spent three years developing a plan that it could not implement in the end. Ontario's unilateral termination of the WSA without the TAA's consent also suggests that Ontario preempted the TAA's authority; the co-sponsor of the WSA initiative. Arnstein (1969) characterized this form of public participation as "*placation*," where citizens are allowed to plan *ad infinitum* but retain for the powerholders the right to decide the citizen board's fate.

On *preemption*, a resident's dock accidentally burnt down within the WSA area in 1992. The resident required a Land Use Permit (LUP) to rebuild his dock and therefore, he approached the WSA for a LUP (2A, 2D, 2G, 2H). Since the WSA had not yet developed the necessary administrative forms within a year of its operation, the resident was asked to obtain the LUP application forms from the MNR for WSA approval. The MNR rejected the request because it felt that the WSA had no legislative authority to issue permits (1A, 1B, 2A, 2D, 2G, 2H). However, the WSA obtained the application forms from the MNR after three weeks of heated debate between them. The WSA finally issued the permit to the applicant (2A, 2D, 2H).

In the second instance, the MNR renewed a LUP for a tourist lodge operator within the WSA area without the WSA's knowledge or consent, an act confirmed by both WSA and MNR respondents. The MNR respondents cited the same reason that, the WSA had no legislative authority to issue permits on Crown lands (1A, 1B). Similarly, as noted by all WSA respondents (N=10), the MNDM renewed mining leases within the WSA area for 21 years without the knowledge or consent of the WSA. This renewal was further confirmed as having been made to 717953 Ontario Limited, a subsidiary of Montclerg Resources Limited of North York, Ontario (MNDM 1991).

Another instance of preemption of WSA authority by the MNR that was not mentioned by any of the respondents but discovered through secondary sources¹¹, pertains to the *issuance of moose hunting licences* by the MNR within the WSA area. Moose hunting has taken place in the WSA area every year based on licences granted by the MNR without the WSA's consent.

¹¹ These sources include MNR's Moose Harvest Allocations for the years 1990-1994 in which moose quotas were set for the four townships covering the WSA Planning Area.

This analysis casts doubts on the WSA as a decision-making body; the status suggested by the two establishing bodies - Ontario and the TAA. In a news release dated February 6, 1995 then Minister of Natural Resources, Howard Hampton, confirmed that the WSA decisions were in fact recommendations (MNR 1995); suggesting that the WSA served in an advisory rather than decision-making capacity. For instance, on the WSA's decision not to use the Red Squirrel Road but the Liskeard Lumber Road to the north (see Figure 8), the news release stated, "...the economic, social, and environmental feasibility of the WSA recommendation that the road access to this area be gained by the Liskeard Lumber Road rather than the Red Squirrel Road Extension shall be considered by the Comprehensive Planning Council" (MNR 1995:1). But as discussed earlier, the MNR rather than the Comprehensive Planning Council makes decisions about the comprehensive planning process. Thus, the MNR will ultimately assess the feasibility of the WSA's decisions. Therefore, this release suggests that although the WSA made decisions, Ontario still reserved the right to judge the legitimacy and feasibility of those decisions.

On Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 17), this constituted "*placation*" in the sense that WSA members made decisions but the MNR retained final authority to implement and judge the feasibility of those decisions. This relegated the WSA to an advisory status. Three points cast doubt on the WSA as an exercise in genuine public participation. First, the centrality of the WSA planning area in the 'Temagami Conflict'; second, the direction in the mandate that it reaches decisions by consensus; and third, the lack of legislative authority for the WSA as promised by Ontario. This suggests that the WSA was set up as a therapeutic exercise rather than genuine public participation in decision-making. Arnstein argued that this form of participation is nonparticipation or simply "*therapy*" and concluded:

What makes this form of participation so invidious is that citizens are engaged in extensive activity, but the focus of it is on curing them of their 'pathology' rather than changing the circumstances that created the pathology. (Arnstein 1969:218)

Here, the WSA was engaged in an extensive activity of planning for four years. The focus of the planning exercise was on generating consensus over use of resources within the WSA area. However, at the centre of the 'Temagami Conflict' was the issue of redistribution of decision-making authority to local levels. Rather than change the distribution of decision-making authority (the pathology), Ontario's focus was on the WSA's reaching decisions by consensus - thereby focusing on conflict resolution rather than the real cause of conflict.




Figure 17: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation under co-management on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).

Similarly, on Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation framework (Figure 18), the WSA process was designed at most to serve "*consultation*" and not cooperation or control as implied by the establishing agencies. While the WSA had *de facto* authority to make decisions, it lacked the authority to implement those decisions. In this case, the WSA simply expressed its opinions whose feasibility will be determined by the MNR.




Figure 18: The implied and actual levels of the WSA participation and decision-making under co-management on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

3.2.2.2 Distributions of Authority

Three questions were posed to examine the levels of authority conferred by the state to the co-management agencies under study. A summary of the responses is shown in Table 7. Appendix 2 lists detailed responses to the questions. The questions were:

- what is the source of this decision-making authority?;
- what are the stated management functions?; and
- which of those functions are actually performed/not performed by the agency?

As discussed earlier, the MNR derived its authority to make decisions over natural resources primarily from the Natural Resources Act (R.S.O. 1980). In order to understand and evaluate the sources of authority of the two co-management agencies under study, a review of the mechanisms by which Ontario has conferred authority to local levels in the past is necessary. The mechanisms include:

- (a) Acts of the Legislature [e.g., the Forest Authorities Act (R.S.O. 1980) under which the Algonquin Forest Authority was created; and the Conservation Authorities Act (R.S.O. 1980) under which 38 Conservation Authorities were created in Ontario by 1987 (ACAO 1987);
- (b) Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) signed between Ontario and the incumbent resource management agencies (e.g., with the four pilot community forestry projects in Ontario involving the communities of Geraldton, Hearst, Wikwemikong, and Elk Lake); and
- (c) Orders-In-Council (OIC).

Table 7: Summary results pertaining to distributions of authority from the state to the co-management agencies under study.

Interview Question	Responses pertaining to the Agency	No. of respondents mentioning item	Total No. of respondents	% of respondents mentioning item
1. What is the source of this decision-making authority?	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Order-In-Council <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Order-In-Council, MOU • Order-In-Council, MOU, TAA • General Assembly Resolution 	<p>15</p> <p>14 07</p>	<p>15</p> <p>14 14</p>	<p>100</p> <p>100 50</p>
<p>2. What are the stated management functions?</p> <p>[reference made by respondents to the two Orders-In-Council 1145/91 and 1434/93] →</p> <p>[reference made by respondents to the Order-In-Council 1144/91 and Schedule A of the Addendum to the MOU] →</p>	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Recommend</i> a comprehensive plan; <i>establish and manage</i> the public consultation process; <i>provide advice</i> to the MNR and TAA on ongoing land use planning and resource mgmt. issues and decisions; and <i>provide advice</i> to the Minister of Natural Resources on mechanisms to allow other parties' input into the negotiations between the TAA & Ontario. <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, monitor, and undertake studies of, all uses in the area of its jurisdiction -- and report its findings from time to time to the TAA and Ontario. 	<p>11</p> <p>10</p>	<p>11</p> <p>10</p>	<p>100</p> <p>100</p>
3. Which of those functions are actually performed/not performed by the agency?	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advised the minister on Treaty of Co-existence public consultations • Made recommendations to the Minister on the CTMP • Recommendations on the CTMP did not go to the TAA • Recommended to the Minister revised CPC planning objectives and mission goals • We have not recommended a plan yet to the Minister and TAA <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performed all except long-term management (implementation) because the WSA was terminated on March 31, 1994 & lacked legislation. 	<p>15</p> <p>14</p>	<p>15</p> <p>14</p>	<p>100</p> <p>100</p>

Authority conveyed through an Act of the Legislature represents the highest form of authority that can be conveyed by a Province (e.g., Ontario) to the local levels. Both MOUs and OICs are Cabinet-level decisions without legislative force. An MOU is a private agreement reached between a Province (e.g., Ontario) and a specific entity (e.g., the TAA) to carry out certain tasks. By implication, an MOU is a private contract that could be enforceable under Contract Law. However, the terms of an MOU are often phrased so that it deviates from the conditions enforceable under Contract Law (pers. comm. with Prof. Douglas Sanders, Faculty of Law, UBC. May 12, 1995). Although an OIC is made pursuant to a Provincial Statute (e.g., Natural Resources Act, R.S.O. 1980), it cannot itself change the Statute (pers. comm. with Prof. Douglas Sanders, Faculty of Law, UBC. May 12, 1995). This implies that legislative authority cannot be conferred through an OIC as the parent statute will specify the locus of authority. For instance, OICs created pursuant to the Natural Resources Act are subject to the legislative authority of the MNR. Therefore, authority conferred through both MOUs and OICs is subject to usurpation by those agencies with the legislative authority.

3.2.2.2.1 The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)

With the CPC, like its predecessor the TAC, the results in Table 7 show that its authority was not legislated but rather conferred through an OIC (OEC 1991a, 1993a). The implication is that the CPC's decisions or recommendations were non-binding.

However, as highlighted earlier, the CPC understood its role within the advisory capacity to involve some degree of decision-making power; and hence the concern that it was preempted and

coopted by the MNR. According to the CPC mandate specified in Orders-In-Council 1145/91 and 1434/93, the following functions, which are also listed in Table 7, are stated:

- (a) recommend to the Minister of Natural Resources and Executive Council of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai a comprehensive plan;
- (b) establish and manage the public consultation process in the development of the comprehensive plan;
- (c) provide advice, while the comprehensive plan is being developed, to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai on ongoing land use planning and resource management issues and decisions; and
- (d) provide advice to the Minister of Natural Resources regarding alternative and preferred mechanisms to allow other parties' input into the negotiations between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and the Province of Ontario with respect to the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. (OEC 1991a, 1993a).

The mandate of the CPC as described above has created confusion between both the CPC and the MNR; the functions listed do not explicitly define the authority of the CPC within its advisory role. Clauses (a) and (d) above suggest that the CPC was responsible to the Minister of Natural Resources. This would imply that the CPC had some degree of decision-making power; a view held by 45% of CPC respondents (Appendix 2). In Clause (b) above, this view is rather strengthened in that for the CPC to establish and manage a public consultation process in the development of the comprehensive plan, it would have to arrive at a set of decisions and implement those decisions. However, Clauses (a), (b), and (d) above do not deal directly with the day-to-day decision-making and authority role requirements of the CPC; they relate to peripheral responsibilities of the CPC in recommending a plan to the Minister.

In Clause (c) above, which is central to the co-management arrangement, the locus of authority to make decisions is implicitly identified and the role of the CPC specified. From a co-management point of view, this clause tests if decision-making authority was shared between the CPC and the MNR. The Clause states that the CPC advises the MNR on ongoing land use planning and resource management issues and decisions. Implicit in this Clause is that decisions are made by the MNR. Therefore, the CPC's advisory role above did not coincide with the levels of authority necessary to execute its functions. The CPC did not share authority with the MNR. However, the CPC's lack of 'advisory' authority coincided with the provisions of an OIC; that is, decisions or recommendations of the CPC were non-binding.

3.2.2.2.2 The Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)

According to the results presented in Table 7, the WSA derived its authority from both an OIC # 1144/91 (OEC 1991b) and an MOU (MNR 1991). Like the CPC, the WSA's authority was not legislated and therefore, despite having been created as a decision-making body, its authority was still subject to usurpation by those with legislative authority. As noted earlier, the WSA's authority was preempted by both the MNR and the MNDM both of which are government agencies.

A review of the OIC (OEC 1991b) and the MOU (MNR 1991) above revealed notable differences in the specification of the WSA mandate. Any reference to the WSA mandate in the above OIC was under Clause 1 in which two functions were stated: "...to *evaluate* and *plan* for land uses and resource management in the area of jurisdiction" (OEC 1991b). In the MOU, the following mandate of the WSA was specified (MNR 1991):

- (a) The Wendaban Stewardship Authority shall monitor, undertake studies of, and plan for, all uses of and activities on the land within its area of jurisdiction, and report its findings from time to time to the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario; and
- (b) It is the intention of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario to assign responsibility to the Wendaban Stewardship Authority to plan, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, and monitor all uses of and activities on the land within its area of jurisdiction.

The only function common between what was specified in the OIC and the MOU is 'plan'. Also missing from the list of functions in the MOU was 'evaluate'. This function was originally specified in the OIC. Based on the MOU, the only functions the WSA had were those specified under Clause (a): monitor; plan; and undertake studies. Clause (b) above only specifies the intent by both Ontario and the TAA to assign further responsibility to the WSA at some point in the future. However, as discussed earlier, Ontario never conferred the necessary legislation to the WSA. On the other hand, as said by 50% of WSA respondents in Table 7 above, the TAA passed a General Assembly Resolution empowering the WSA to exercise all functions listed under Clause (b) of the MOU (WSA 1994:11). Without legislation coming from Ontario, the WSA used these three sources of authority (OIC, MOU, TAA Resolution) to exercise its functions (WSA 1994:11).

All 10 WSA respondents and all four (4) establishing agency respondents agreed that the WSA performed all functions except "*implementation*" of its decisions due to a lack of legislative authority and because the WSA was terminated by Ontario on March 31, 1994 (Table 7-- see also Appendix 2 for details). Several examples of management functions performed were given by WSA respondents:

- the hiring of a Forest Steward whose sole function was monitoring (*monitor*);
- a set of 20 decisions made in their Forest Stewardship Plan (WSA 1994:x-xi) (*decide*);
- an enforcement issue the WSA had to deal with involving a splinter group (calling itself the MaKominising Anishnabeg) within the TAA that illegally cut some old-growth red and white pine trees within the WSA area (*enforce*);
- the issuance of a dock building permit to an applicant (*regulate*);
- two studies undertaken by the WSA involving an ecological sensitivity to disturbance rating of their planning area, and a traditional knowledge study (*undertake studies of*); and
- production of a 20-year Forest Stewardship Plan (*plan*).

While all the functions above apply to the WSA mandate as specified in the OIC (OEC 1991b) and the MOU (MNR 1991), what is missing from the list, as noted by all 14 respondents in Table 7, is '*implementation*'. However, what the respondents failed to note is that under Clause 7 of the OIC (MNR 1991), it is stated that the term of the WSA would be for the period commencing with the date of approval of the OIC (May 16, 1991) and extending to April 23, 1993. This does not signal an intention by both sponsoring bodies (Ontario and TAA) in having the WSA plan implemented by the WSA as promised under Clause (b) of the MOU. A mandate of three (3) years is not sufficient to plan and implement a 20-year plan.

The announcement made by the Minister of Natural Resources on February 6, 1995 that the feasibility of the WSA's 'recommendations' would be decided by the CPC (MNR 1995a) also suggested that the WSA had no authority over decision-making. The announcement effectively reduced the WSA decisions to recommendations thereby relegating the WSA to an advisory status. The CPC being an advisory body to the MNR, and with no decision-making powers, also meant that

the feasibility of WSA decisions would ultimately be decided by the MNR and not the CPC. The announcement also confirmed the point that both MOUs and OICs were subject to preemption by those with legislative authority-- and in this case, the MNR. Therefore, the WSA's mandate did not coincide with the level of authority necessary to execute its functions as stated in the mandate.

3.2.3 Conclusions

How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to local levels? The distributions of decision-making authority from the state to local levels under co-management were not any different from the past. In the past, decision-making authority was redistributed internally within the MNR. The levels of both the TAC and public's involvement in MNR decision-making comprised degrees of tokenism from informing to placation. That is, there was no true devolution of decision-making power from the MNR to the local levels. The TAC's advisory function to the MNR was constrained by the latter's total control of information used in the planning process. Although the TAC had a monitoring role within its advisory capacity, its authority was conferred through an OIC. As a Cabinet-level decision with no legislative force, the OIC meant that the TAC's decisions and/or recommendations were non-binding and subject to preemption by the MNR.

For the CPC, its involvement in co-management did not result in the redistribution of decision-making authority from the state to the CPC; the MNR retained decision-making authority. However, this is not to suggest that co-management failed; only it did not constitute true devolutions of decision-making to local levels. As in the past, the levels of the CPC's participation in the

CPC/MNR planning process were confined to degrees of tokenism from informing to placation. At these levels, the citizens were informed by the MNR, the citizens attempted to inform the process but the MNR controlled the information, and the citizens were not involved in the implementation of the MNR's decisions. The implied levels by Ontario of CPC involvement through cooperation or partnership with the MNR did not take place. Therefore, the case of the CPC/MNR did not represent an ideal democratic institution. This is because the decisions supposedly codetermined between them did not also involve common control over the means and conditions of decision-making-- the authority to make decisions and the ability to suggest changes in policy or change policy itself.

There was also a lack of clarity in the CPC mandate about what authority role the CPC played within its advisory capacity. The fact that the MNR preempted the CPC's decisions/recommendations and coopted it into its decisions, also shows the failure of OICs as sources of authority particularly in co-management arrangements that propose shared decision-making through cooperation or formation of partnerships. OICs may be suitable in co-management arrangements where citizens' groups act strictly in advisory roles with no authority to implement decisions. It is important that the participants are aware of such arrangements and their stipulated decision-making requirements from the outset.

In the case of the WSA, both Ontario and the TAA created the WSA as a decision-making body rather than an advisory body. Whereas the WSA performed most of the functions specified in its mandate, including 'decision-making', it was not able to implement its decisions because it lacked *de jure* authority to do so. The focus in the WSA's mandate was on conflict resolution rather than the principal cause of the conflict- the lack of devolution of decision-making authority to the local

level. Preemption of WSA authority, albeit *de facto*, by state agencies such as the MNR and the MNDM also meant that those agencies retained final decision-making authority.

The fact that the WSA was set up as a decision-making body but without the legislative authority to implement its decision-making, suggests that its involvement in co-management comprised degrees of tokenism. On Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation these would comprise 'informing', 'consultation', and 'placation'. Again, this is not to suggest that co-management failed in this case. To the contrary, it worked internally because both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal representatives on the Authority were able to reach mutually acceptable decisions through consensus. Most of the broader publics also supported those decisions.

However, the inadequacy of the WSA co-management model speaks to the failure by Ontario to delegate the legislative authority necessary for the WSA to implement its decisions. Initially, Ontario had promised to delegate such authority to the WSA. In the same vein, Ontario unilaterally terminated the WSA before a replacement body was set up and reduced the WSA's decisions to recommendations. This casts doubts on Ontario's sincerity in its offer of co-management in the area.

In the past, as in the present, OICs and MOUs have both failed to confer the authority necessary for meaningful local involvement in resource management; that is, at the upper rungs on Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation. As witnessed from the three cases above (TAC, CPC, WSA), these instruments were suitable in cases where co-management simply entailed opportunities for local citizens' groups to get involved in resource management discussions (e.g., the TAC and the CPC). They were not ideal in a case that demanded true devolution of decision-making authority and implementation of decisions by the citizens' group (e.g., the WSA).

Therefore, co-management arrangements designed to delegate decision-making authority to local levels require political rather than administrative decentralization of such authority. Political decentralization would include actual delegations of decision-making power through Acts of the Legislature, as compared to administrative decentralization that relies on varying degrees of devolution of responsibility but not authority. This also means that the authority roles of citizens' advisory bodies need to be redefined in a context that assures control of their decision-making that precede provision of advice.

Participation by stakeholders in co-management is one facet; the other is participation of the broader publics in such arrangements. How did the co-management agencies share decision-making with the local publics or users? This question is explored in the following section.

3.3 Distribution of decision-making from the Co-management Agencies to the public

As highlighted earlier, the involvement of stakeholder groups in co-management is not a sufficient condition alone to gauge the levels of public participation in resource management at local levels. While such groups represent specific local interests, they may not always represent all the local users and concerned citizens in the area. Sometimes, only the most vocal groups or individuals are nominated to local management boards. Therefore, it was felt necessary in this study to evaluate the levels of public involvement in the planning and decision-making processes of the co-management agencies as well.

Five questions were posed to evaluate the levels and influence of public participation in the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes. The questions are:

- was pertinent information made available to all interests in the area?;
- what methods of public participation did the/your agency use?;
- what were the key issues raised at the public meetings?;
- did those issues influence agency decisions?; and
- what evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource users and the agency (CPC or WSA)?.

The first four questions and their responses are listed in Appendix 2 under the category "public participation". The responses to the fifth question are listed in Appendix 3 under the category "cooperation".

For the purposes of analysis, the first four questions were classified into three themes: information; methods; and key issues. Using pattern matching, some sub-themes emerged from the data. The public participation processes of the two agencies in this study were compared using these sub-themes. Under information emerged three sub-themes: volume of information provided; time of delivery of information to the public; and complexity of information. Under methods emerged two sub-themes: proactive methods; and reactive methods. Under key issues emerged two sub-themes: resource-related issues; and process-related issues.

Analysis was done on three resource-related issues common among all three categories of respondents (CPC, WSA, and the public). The issues are: *road access*; *land availability for mining*, and *old-growth protection* (Table 8). Similarly, two process-related issues common among all three categories of respondents were analyzed. The issues are: *need for watershed-based planning*; and *lack of provincial focus in planning* (Table 8).

In addition, one process-related issue common between the agency (CPC or WSA) and public respondents was analyzed. Between the CPC and public respondents the common process-related issue raised was *lack of clarity of the planning process*. Between the WSA and public respondents, the common issue raised was a *zoning decision that excluded a major canoe route* (Table 8). Table 8 also provides a summary of the responses to the five questions and the agencies' performance on those questions.

Table 8: Summary results pertaining to distributions of decision-making from the co-management agencies (CPC and WSA) to the general public.

Interview Question	Agency performance					
Was pertinent information made available to all interests in the area?	CPC			WSA		
	low	medium	high	low	medium	high
Volume of information provided	✓			✓		
Comment: →	provided too much			provided little to adequate		
Delivery of information in time	✓			✓		
Comment: →	not provided in time			provided in time/not in time		
Complexity of information	✓			✓		
Comment: →	too complex			easy to understand		
What methods of public participation did the/your agency use?	Agency Performance					
	CPC			WSA		
	low	medium	high	low	medium	high
1. Open house meeting (reactive)	✓					
Comment: →	Used in early stage of planning			N/A		
2. Write-in (reactive)	✓			✓		
Comment: →	Used in middle stage of planning			Used in late stage of planning		
3. Accessible office and records (reactive)				✓		
Comment: →	N/A			Used throughout planning		
4. Workshop (proactive)	✓			✓		
Comment: →	Used only in middle & not early stage			Used in both early & middle stages		
5. Public presentation (proactive)	✓			✓		
Comment: →	Used in both early and middle stages			Not encouraged but used somewhat		
6. General meeting open to public (proactive)				✓		
Comment: →	N/A			Used throughout course of planning		
What were the key issues raised at the public meetings and did those issues influence agency decisions?	Influence on Agency Decisions					
	CPC			WSA		
	Yes	No		Yes	No	
Road access		✓		✓		
Land availability for mining	✓			✓		
Old-growth protection/mgmt.	✓			✓		
Watershed-based planning		✓		✓		
Lack of provincial focus	✓			✓		
Lack of clarity of the planning process		✓		N/A		
Zoning decision that excluded a canoe route	N/A	N/A		✓		
Totals	3	3		6	0	
What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource users and the agency (CPC or WSA)?	None			Yes with: tourist outfitters, guide outfitters, baitfish licensees, and timber industry.		

3.3.1 Ontario's Anticipated Levels of Public Participation in the Co-management Agencies' Planning and Decision-making Processes

Ontario saw the creation of both the CPC and the WSA as devolution of decision-making from the state to the local level - the Temagami Area. Ontario also expected both the CPC and the WSA to genuinely involve the public in their planning and decision-making processes. That is, both agencies were expected to redistribute decision-making to the local public by sharing decisions with them.

On Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation (Figure 19) both the CPC and the WSA were expected to engage into partnerships (level 6) with the local public. At level six, planning and decision-making responsibilities are shared between the powerholders and the public.




Figure 19: Ontario's expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).

Similarly, on Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation framework (Figure 20), both agencies were expected to cooperate with the public by sharing decision-making responsibilities. Given these expectations, how did both the CPC and the WSA involve the public in their planning and decision-making processes?

Decision-making power

Information	Persuasion	Consultation	Cooperation	Control
The decision is made and the public is informed	The decision is made and an effort is made to convince the public	The problem is submitted, opinions are collected, the decision is made	The limits are defined, the decision is shared with and made together with the public	The decision is made by the public, which assumes a role of public responsibility

Public participation




Figure 20: Ontario's expected level of public participation in both the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Parenteau's evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

3.3.2 Cross-case Analysis

According to Arnstein (1969), informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options can be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation. However, both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks do not explicitly coordinate participation with quality of information provided to the public and methods of participation used. These are important in ensuring two-way communication between officials and the public. In particular, the *volume of information provided*, *time of delivery of information*, and *degree of complexity of information provided*, are important information attributes and first steps in consulting with the public.

However, it is the methods used in consulting with the public that will ultimately determine if there are two-way flows of information between officials and the public, by promoting conditions conducive to shared decision-making. Reactive methods such as open house meetings, write-ins, pamphlets, and posters are characterized by one-way flows of information (Arnstein 1969). On the other hand, proactive methods such as workshops, public presentations, and general meetings open-to-the-public (where the public genuinely participates in meeting deliberations) are often characterized by two-way flows of information between officials and the public. However, the effectiveness of a particular method will ultimately depend on what stage of the planning process it was used. Generally, early and middle stages of planning processes entail problem identification, scoping, and analysis; activities that are conducive to joint problem-solving public participation techniques-- or proactive methods. Reactive methods can be effective in the late stages of a planning process if proactive methods were used in earlier stages.

3.3.2.1 Information and methods of participation used by the Agencies

For the CPC, while there was general agreement among respondents (N=50) that it provided pertinent information to the public, such information was generally found by the respondents to be of large volume (80% of respondents); not provided in time, thereby restricting the time required for meaningful public review and feedback (86% of respondents); and too complex to comprehend (88% of respondents) (Table 8). In addition, the data in Table 8 show that the CPC used a combination of reactive methods (open house meetings and write-ins) in the early and middle stages instead of proactive methods. Proactive methods (workshops and public presentations) were mostly used in the middle stage of its planning process (Table 8). The use of these methods by the CPC was also confirmed through observation.

Since the CPC scored negatively on all three information attributes above, the information provided did not accomplish its intended purpose of consulting with the public. Arnstein (1969) characterized this form of participation as "*informing*" in the sense that there was one-way flow of information from the CPC to the public. Therefore, the CPC scored low on the theme "information" (Table 8). However, as discussed earlier, it must be noted that this information was all generated by the MNR without the involvement of the CPC. By using more reactive than proactive methods particularly in the early and middle stages of its planning process, the CPC did not create joint problem-solving opportunities or 'partnerships' with the public. The CPC's use of reactive methods such as open house meetings in the early stage of its planning process is equivalent to "informing"-level three on Arnstein's (1969) evaluation framework, and level one on Parenteau's (1988) evaluation framework.

As highlighted earlier, informing is characterized by one-way flows of information; a common characteristic with open house meetings. The MNR has traditionally used open house meetings to consult with the public in its TMP process. The CPC also used public presentations (a proactive method) in both early and middle stages of its planning process (Table 8). Therefore, generally, the CPC scored moderately on the theme "methods" (Table 8). However, it must be noted that the CPC was in the middle stage of its planning process by the time this data was collected; the comprehensive planning process will not be completed until 1996.

With the WSA, respondents (N=49) generally agreed that pertinent information was provided to the public in the planning process. They also agreed that the information provided by the WSA was easy to understand (Table 8). However, there was almost an even split in opinions among respondents, between those who felt that the information provided by the WSA was little or adequate; and whether it was provided in time or not (Table 8). However, 5% of the public respondents (N=39) (Appendix 2) felt that there was no need for information to be provided in advance because the WSA process was developmental in nature. That is, the WSA and the attending public generated the information they needed during the meetings (4J, 4L).

Further evidence (WSA 1994) also revealed that the first public meeting held by the WSA on August 2, 1992 was for establishing citizen participation requirements with residents in the area. At that meeting, the following requirements were agreed upon between the attending public and the WSA:

- the need for public involvement in all stages of the planning process (goal setting, planning design, and actual sharing in decision-making and implementation);
- the need for a feedback mechanism on public input utilization and/or non-utilization;

- use of small group workshops as an effective method for obtaining public input; and
- provision of adequate information to the public in time and simplified language prior to and/or during public meetings (workshops), (WSA 1994:8).

Of particular interest is the last point above, where both the WSA and the public agreed that information would be provided by the WSA to the public before or during workshops. This concurs with the earlier argument raised by 5% of the public respondents that the WSA's planning process was developmental in nature and therefore, there was no need for information to be provided in advance. According to Arnstein (1969), partnerships are formed when citizen participation requirements are negotiated between citizens and the powerholders, and where both agree to share planning and decision-making responsibilities. Local users also participated in the generation of background information used in the WSA's planning process (WSA 1994:13). Since the WSA provided information that was easy to understand and partly generated by the public, the information served its intended purposes of consulting and ultimately sharing decisions with the public. On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, this constitutes levels 6 (partnership) and 4 (cooperation), respectively.

The data in Table 8 also show that the WSA used a combination of reactive (accessible office records and write-ins) and proactive (workshops, general meetings open to the public, and public presentations) methods. These methods were also confirmed through observation as having been used by the WSA. In particular, general meetings open to the public were proactive in nature in the sense that the public participated in the deliberations of the WSA meetings, thereby fostering two-way communications between the public and the WSA. Unlike the CPC, the WSA used both reactive and proactive methods at the right stages of the planning process (Table 8). In addition, they used more proactive methods than the CPC (Table 8).

Notably absent from the WSA respondents' (N=10) list of methods used was '*public presentations*' that 33% of the public respondents (N=39) (see Appendix 2) cited as another method used by the WSA. In a probing interview question to the WSA members, it was revealed that while the WSA condoned special public presentations, the method was not actively encouraged due to financial constraints (2J). The WSA had an annual operating budget of \$250,000¹²; convening a special meeting for a public presentation would cost the WSA a minimum of approximately \$5,000 (\$3,500 in members' daily per diem payments and \$1,500 on travel expenses) (2J). However, review of WSA minutes¹³ revealed that the WSA had six special public presentations between February 9, 1993 and March 8, 1994.

Generally, the WSA scored highly on the theme "methods" (Table 8). On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, the WSA's use of proactive methods at the right stages of the planning process entailed 'partnerships' or 'cooperation', respectively.

¹² The audited financial statements of the WSA for 1992-93 showed that 70% of the \$250,000 was spent on staffing and members allowances; 17% on travel expenses, and the remainder of 13% on office, telephone, equipment, supplies, postage and shipping, and advertizing expenses. Costs for special public presentations would have come from the 70% and 13% above.

¹³

- WSA minutes of February 9, 1993 showed that two negotiators, one representing the TAA and another representing ONAS (the sponsoring bodies) made presentations to the WSA on jurisdictional matters and their implications for the WSA.
- WSA minutes of March 9, 1993 showed that the Mayor of Latchford made a presentation to the WSA on horse logging techniques and their possible applications to the WSA area.
- WSA minutes of May 4, 1993 indicated that the MNDM made a presentation to the WSA on mining potential within the WSA planning area.
- WSA minutes of August 13, 1993 outlined presentations made to the WSA by three environmental groups: Northwatch, Wildlands League, and Earthroots on old-growth protection.
- WSA minutes of September 13, 1993 showed a presentation made by the MNR to the WSA on bear management agreements within the WSA planning area.
- WSA minutes of March 8, 1994 outlined presentations made to the WSA by the three environmental groups: Northwatch, Wildlands League, and Earthroots on road access.

3.3.2.2 Key issues raised by the public and their influence on agency decisions

According to the results presented in Table 8, only 50% of the key issues raised by the public at the CPC's public meetings had influence on its decisions. This compares to 100% of all key issues raised by the public at the WSA's public meetings having had influence on its decisions. To understand each agency's performance, one issue that is central to the Temagami conflict is explored in detail. The issue is 'road access.' In addition, a single issue that was specific to each agency is explored in detail. For the CPC, the issue was '*lack of clarity of the planning process.*' For the WSA, the issue was '*a zoning decision that excluded a major canoe route.*' However, it must be remembered that with the CPC, the MNR retained decision-making authority.

3.3.2.2.1 Road Access

The Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC)

Cross Lake Road is an illegal access road that emerged about 10 years ago within what is now the CPC/MNR planning area (5A). All 31 respondents (N=50) who raised the issue wanted the road closed because they contended that use of the road by the public had increased fishing pressure on Cross Lake. Of the 31 respondents, 28 (90%) felt that the issue did not influence the CPC/MNR's decisions. They felt that political rather than biophysical concerns dictated the MNR's decision to keep the road open. According to CPC respondents, the CPC recommended to the MNR closure of the road and proposed an upgrade of an alternate road, the Bayjng Road. The CPC members contended that the proposed road would facilitate access to several lakes in the area that had not been heavily fished in the past, thereby reducing pressure on Cross Lake (2K, 2L, 2U). However, the

MNR rejected the recommendation and therefore, the road is still open to public access (2L). A probing question was posed to MNR respondents (N=5) if indeed there was increased fishing pressure on Cross Lake due to the Cross Lake Road Access. Four (4) of the MNR respondents agreed that there was increased fishing pressure on Cross Lake caused primarily by direct access provided by use of the Cross Lake Road (1B, 1C, 1D, 1E).

According to two MNR respondents (1C, 1E), the West Nipissing Access Group (WNAG), a local lobbying group opposed to any kind of restrictions on existing road access on Crown lands, threatened to lobby higher political levels if the road were closed. To avoid confrontation with WNAG, the MNR decided to keep the road open (1C, 1E).

It may be argued that the MNR weighed both sides to the argument before deciding to keep the road open. However, the MNR conceded that there was fishing pressure on Cross Lake due to the Cross Lake Road access. Yet, the MNR decided to keep the road open. This suggests that while the MNR heard the opinions expressed by both the CPC and public, it ignored those opinions in its decision-making. On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, this constitutes '*consultation*'; where public opinions are gathered and a decision is made that does not reflect those opinions. In this case, the MNR went against the public and CPC's recommendation to close the road; the latter being a planning counterpart to the MNR. Therefore, the CPC/MNR did not share its decisions with the public as the issue did not influence the CPC/MNR decisions (Table 8).

Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA)

For the WSA, the road issue pertained to the use/non-use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension. As highlighted earlier, this road was at the centre of the 'Temagami Conflict'. Proponents preferred use of the road for various resource extraction and recreational activities. Opponents argued against use of the road because they felt that it was built in an environmentally destructive manner (5C). Of the 32 respondents (N=39) who pointed out the issue as having been raised at the WSA meetings, 27 (84%) felt the issue influenced the WSA decisions. The other five respondents (16%), who were all opposed to using the road, felt it did not.

In its decisions, the WSA imposed the following restrictions on use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension:

- The Extension shall be maintained as a tertiary rather than primary or secondary forest access road;
- Use of the Red Squirrel Road Extension for extractive purposes shall be limited to the winter season. However, the Road Extension may be used for restoration and administrative purposes such as monitoring, research, enforcement, etc., at all times of the year including the summer;
- The Red Squirrel Road Extension shall be gated both before Sharp Rock Inlet in Canton Township and at the western boundary of Shelburne Township, at all times;
- The Road Extension is not necessary for access to the Cultural Heritage/Recreation-Tourism-Wilderness Zone within the four townships since current water access levels are adequate; and
- In view of the strong views on unrestricted use of the Red Squirrel Road, and to prevent access to Whitefish Bay, the members recommend that the existing gate at Barmack Lake in Aston Township be maintained. At such time as cottages are developed in the Development Zone in Canton Township, those people would be issued keys on an honour system. Anyone else found in this area would be fined, (WSA 1994:ix)

The decisions above can be characterized as a compromise between the two opposing positions on use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension. Based on the comments received from several stakeholder groups such as the logging industry, recreationists, local Chambers of Commerce, tourist outfitters, environmental groups, and aboriginal people (the TAA), they all expressed their satisfaction with the WSA's decisions over use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension¹⁴. This analysis shows that the WSA listened to the public's opinions over use of the road and made decisions that reflected those opinions.

By imposing restrictions on use of the road, final decisions adapted to both proponents' and opponents' views on the issue. On Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks this constitutes '*partnership*' and '*cooperation*' in that final decisions made reflected public opinions. Therefore, there was true sharing of decision-making between the public and the WSA as the issue influenced the WSA decisions (Table 8).

3.3.2.2.2 Lack of clarity of the planning process

This issue pertained only to the CPC. Respondents referred to the land-use scenarios and zoning options the CPC/MNR presented to the public for review in April, 1994. All 34 respondents (N=50) who raised the issue felt that this information was too confusing and unclear. They demanded that the CPC clarify the information and the overall planning process (2M, 2N, 2Q, 4B, 4H). As highlighted earlier, these are the same land-use scenarios and zoning options generated exclusively by the MNR without the involvement of the CPC; a situation that later caused embarrassment to the latter at public meetings because the CPC members did not also understand the information.

¹⁴ These groups submitted their comments to the WSA on the WSA's Forest Stewardship Plan in which the decisions over use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension are contained.

Of the 34 respondents who raised the issue, 30 (88%) felt that the issue did not or was not going to influence the CPC/MNR decisions. They argued that the CPC/MNR operated under tight time schedules. They also contended that the lack of the CPC's involvement in the MNR's decisions made it unlikely that the issue would influence the CPC/MNR decisions. The other four (4) respondents said that they were not sure if the issue was going to influence the CPC/MNR's decisions or not. The 30 respondents above contended that the comprehensive planning process and the information generated from the process were likely to remain technical and complex in nature because of the MNR's control of both and its reluctance to simplify the technical jargon.

The MNR respondents (N=5) were asked if the MNR would consider rewriting the land-use scenarios and zoning options in a simplified format before resubmitting them to the public. All five respondents replied that it would not be possible to do so due to financial and time constraints (1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E). Through observation, it was also confirmed that the CPC/MNR did not revise the land-use scenarios and management options. It did not also simplify the overall planning process as requested by the public.

Here, the CPC/MNR gathered public opinions on the issue and made a decision that did not reflect those opinions. On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, this constitutes '*consultation*'. Therefore, there was no true sharing of decision-making as the issue did not influence the CPC/MNR decisions (Table 8).

3.3.2.2.3 A zoning decision that excluded a major canoe route

This issue pertained only to the WSA. The issue emerged at a WSA public meeting held on October 30, 1993 (WSA 1993) to review the WSA's zoning decisions. In its zoning decisions, the WSA omitted a major canoe route, locally known as Pinetorch, from within its Cultural Heritage-Recreation-Tourism-Wilderness (CH-RTW) Zone (WSA 1993:11). The public felt that the route was an important heritage canoe route that linked the WSA area to the Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park. Therefore, they felt the WSA should include the route within its CH-RTW Zone.

Of the 34 respondents (N=49) who pointed out the issue, 33 (97%) felt the issue had influenced the WSA decisions (Appendix 2). Review of the WSA minutes also revealed that, at a meeting held on November 5, 1993¹⁵, the WSA made a decision to include the Pinetorch Canoe Route within the CH-RTW Zone (WSA 1993b). Here, the WSA collected public opinions over the issue and made a decision that incorporated those opinions.

On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks, this constitutes '*partnership*' or '*cooperation*', respectively. Therefore, there was true sharing of decision-making as the issue influenced the WSA decisions (Table 8).

¹⁵ This meeting was called by the WSA to specifically discuss public input into the WSA's zoning decisions. Under Item 11 of the minutes, a motion was passed to include the canoe route within the CH-RTW Zone.

3.3.2.3 Evidence of cooperation in agreement between the agencies and local users

The final test on whether the two co-management agencies distributed decision-making to the local users was analyzed through evidence of cooperative behaviour (in agreement) between the agencies and the local users. For the CPC (N=50), the responses were overwhelmingly negative that there was no evidence of cooperation between the CPC and the public (92% of respondents) (Table 8). The respondents felt that the public was not inclined to cooperate with the CPC because they perceived the MNR to be driving the CPC planning process. The public was also fed up with the MNR (Appendix 3). However, 36% of the respondents also noted that it may have been premature and too early in the planning process to tell if there would not be cooperation between the CPC and local users by the end of the planning process. The CPC planning process was still in its middle stage by the time these data were collected.

For the WSA (N=49), the responses were overwhelmingly positive that there was evidence of cooperation in agreement between the WSA and several local users (82%) (Table 8). Examples cited by respondents included existing agreements between the WSA and a local baitfish licensee, several tourist operators, four guide outfitters, six trappers, and one logging company (Appendix 3). Review of the WSA Forest Stewardship Plan (WSA 1994:13) and minutes¹⁶ also confirmed the existence of these agreements. The agreements stated the local users' roles in monitoring the resources and in gathering of inventory information (WSA 1994:13).

¹⁶ WSA 1993. WSA minutes of July 18, 1993; July 23, 1993; September 15, 1993; September 28, 1993; and December 17, 1993, specify the above agreements, respectively.

For instance, at a general meeting held on July 18, 1993, the WSA and a local baitfish licensee agreed that the latter would collect inventory information on baitfish production within the WSA area. The licensee also agreed to use his own floater aircraft for that purpose. Local guide outfitters also agreed to stop baiting of bear as an unsustainable practice. Baiting of bear leads to overharvesting because it becomes easier for the bear hunters to spot and kill the bears. In addition, the outfitters agreed to submit information on bear harvested. Local trappers also agreed to maintain their harvest quotas and submit information on species and numbers harvested. Tourist operators also agreed to enforce fishing quotas and a catch-and-release program among their clients. In addition, they agreed to keep logs of all fish harvested by their clients. A local logging company agreed to employ innovative timber harvesting techniques aimed at reducing soil disturbance by limiting most of its harvesting operations to the winter season. The company also agreed to experiment with horse logging in the area.

3.3.3 Conclusions

How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making to local users? The distributions of decision-making from the co-management agencies to the local users have had varied results. With the CPC, public participation in its planning process was not any different from the past (under the MNR). As in the past, information provided to the public was complex, highly technical, and generated exclusively by the MNR. While there was an effort by the CPC to use proactive methods of public participation, reactive methods such as open-house meetings and write-ins still dominated. These are the same methods traditionally used by the MNR in the past.

What is clear about the CPC is that it had no control over its planning process; the MNR retained decision-making authority. Both the CPC and the public raised the same issues about the CPC planning process and suggested similar changes. However, the MNR made the final decisions as it reserved the right to judge the legitimacy and feasibility of such changes. The MNR had the legislative authority. Often, the final decisions made by the MNR reflected the status quo; suggesting resistance to change and high propensity toward following rigidly defined rules and formalized processes. For instance, the open-house meeting is one such formalized and rigidly defined process by the MNR (see Appendix 5).

It is concluded that the lack of distribution of decision-making authority to the CPC, in turn, failed the distribution of decision-making to the local users. The level of public participation in the CPC process as initially anticipated by Ontario was not achieved. Public participation levels in the CPC process involved degrees of tokenism from informing to consultation; decisions were not shared with the public. In the end, the CPC-MNR co-management model did not significantly change the local power structure because neither the CPC nor the local publics were able to influence the MNR's decisions. These findings are also consistent with Reed's (1995:147) description of the Ignace co-management model in northern Ontario.

In the case of the WSA, both Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) achieved the levels of public participation they anticipated; the WSA shared planning and decision-making responsibilities with the public. Information used in the planning process was of a quality generally accepted by the public. The public partly generated such information. Public participation methods used in the early and middle stages of planning were proactive in nature; thereby fostering shared decision-making. The WSA also made decisions that reflected the key issues raised by the public.

The above performance was possible due to the autonomy enjoyed by the WSA. Despite a lack of legislative authority, the WSA made changes and adapted its planning process to the local situation. Unlike the CPC, the WSA was not restricted to a formalized planning process with rigidly defined rules. The absence of the MNR on its board meant that the WSA retained decision-making authority, albeit *de facto*, at the planning level.

The WSA planning process fits the model described by Armour (1992) due to the following reasons:

- the WSA decentralized decision-making to the local users;
- it planned with the people;
- it allowed flexibility in its planning process;
- it adapted local concerns into its planning process and decision-making;
- it jointly defined the public participation requirements with the public; and
- it incorporated the knowledge of local users in its planning and decision-making.

On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks the public's involvement in the WSA planning process constituted '*partnerships*' and '*cooperation*', respectively (figures below).




Figure 21: Actual levels of public participation in the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation [Adapted from Arnstein (1969)].

Decision-making power




Figure 22: Actual levels of public participation in the CPC and WSA's planning and decision-making processes on Parenteau's evaluation framework [Adapted from Parenteau (1988)].

CHAPTER 4

THE SUBSTANCE OF DECISIONS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT

To understand the substance of decisions made in the present (under co-management), it was felt necessary in this study to examine also the decisions made in the past (under the MNR) and their outcomes. Ontario created both the CPC and the WSA on the premises that their decisions would address the issues of both ecological and social sustainability. For instance, the CPC mandate implied ecological sustainability by directing the agency to plan comprehensively while that of the WSA required that it planned based on the principles of sustainable development and sustained life¹⁷. The mandates also directed both agencies to establish public participation processes in their planning - implying social sustainability or equity.

Lélé (1991) defined ecological sustainability as the "existence of the ecological conditions necessary to support human life at a specific level of well-being through future generations." In this definition is the notion of 'carrying capacity'. This means that land can only support a limited number of living organisms over a specified time and at a given intensity of use. Social sustainability refers to the satisfaction of basic human needs such as food and shelter. It also includes other social necessities such as employment, education, recreation, security, and freedom as suggested by Maslow (1970).

¹⁷

In the Addendum to the MOU establishing the WSA, the following definitions of Sustainable Development and Sustained Life are given:

Sustainable Development shall mean: "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987);

Sustained Life shall mean: "the enduring cycle whereby currently living organisms live, then must die, fall to the earth, become decomposed, be combined with elements from earth, air, and water to give continuing life to the land, including all biological life forms within it. Sustained life emphasizes the self-renewal of the land through the life, death and recycling of current life to provide nutrients in combination with earth, air, and water that will support continuous life."

In this study, ecological sustainability was interpreted to mean how the management agencies addressed environmental and other biophysical concerns in the Temagami Area. Social sustainability was interpreted to mean how the management agencies addressed the issues of access to resources (distributional equity) and inclusivity in decision-making as suggested by Boothroyd (1991).

Nine questions were posed to 65 respondents in order to examine the substance of decisions made both in the past and in the present. Table 9 summarizes the responses to the questions. The questions are:

- (a) what were the environmental and other biophysical concerns in the past?;
- (b) how were those concerns addressed in the past?;
- (c) what are the environmental and other biophysical concerns now?;
- (d) how have those concerns been addressed?;
- (e) how were resources allocated in the past?;
- (f) how are resources allocated now?;
- (g) who made the decisions in the past?;
- (h) who makes the decisions now?; and
- (i) how different are current decisions from those made in the past?

Through pattern matching, two biophysical concerns of old-growth red and white pine protection and the primacy of timber in planning were identified and selected for analysis (Table 9). These are explored in detail. These concerns lie at the root of the "Temagami Conflict." In addition, the question of access to timber was also selected and is explored in detail because it deals with the issue of distributional equity.

Table 9: Summary results on the substance of decisions made both in the past and in the present.

N=74 [All Respondents]						
Decision to be made	Past		Present			
	MNR		CPC		WSA	
	Outcome	%	Outcome	%	Outcome	%
<u>Environmental & Biophysical Concerns</u>						
1. Protect old-growth red and white pine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNR made timber allocations instead • Initiated some studies 	79 21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decisions not yet known, plan not complete • Likely to protect old-growth 	69 75	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An area was zoned for protection • Timber prescriptions also designed to protect old growth 	89 62
2. Monitor fishing pressure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement through patrols not sufficient 	82	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decisions not yet known, plan not complete 	67	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formed partnerships with Tourist Outfitters to monitor pressure & enforce limits • Fish yields not estimated and allocations not made on water bodies without inventory information 	77 81
3. Ban Importation of live baitfish into the area to control the introduction of zebra mussels into local waters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nothing was done 	91	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decisions not yet known, plan not complete 	96	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A ban on importation of live baitfish into the area was decided 	93
4. Stop primacy of timber in planning-lack of integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primacy of timber in planning continued 	84	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No longer primacy of timber but comprehensive planning 	98	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All values were treated equally-planned comprehensively 	95
<u>Resource Allocation</u>						
1. Timber	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not fair, timber was allocated to mills outside Temagami Area; aboriginal people were excluded 	88	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Likely to be the same as in the past due to restrictive MNR policies 	74	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First right of refusal was granted to local timber companies and aboriginal people (the TAA) 	86
<u>Decision-making</u>						
1. Who made/makes the decisions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNR made all the decisions 	98	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Now local citizens are involved 	93	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Now local citizens make decisions 	99
2. Differences in decisions made: →	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separately treated land use & resour. mgmt. • Emphasized timber 	88 90	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • combined land use & resource mgmt. • Emphasized all values 	97 87	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • combined land use & resource mgmt. • Emphasized all values 	94 95
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less participatory • Lacked local focus 	92 94	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More participatory • Have local focus 	76 82	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More participatory • Have local focus 	81 84

4.1 The Substance of Decisions made in the Past (under MNR)

Generally, the results presented in Table 9 show that the decisions made by the MNR in the past were not ecologically sustainable. The results also show that the decisions were not equitable from a local point of view.

4.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protection

According to 79% of the respondents (N=74) (Table 9), the MNR continued to allocate old-growth red and white pine stands in the Temagami Area despite public opposition. The MNR's actions culminated into a decision in 1988 to construct both the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions. As discussed earlier, the MNR intended both roads to provide access to the largest contiguous stand of red and white pine in North America to two companies: Goulard Lumber; and Wm. Milne Lumber. The public characterized the MNR's decision as ecologically unsustainable (Quinby 1988) because the allocated stand was the only one of its size (2,500 ha) and composition not only in Temagami but the whole of North America. The public also viewed the decision as compromising values other than timber (Quinby 1988). According to Hodgins and Benidickson (1989), it was this decision that precipitated the "Temagami Conflict". Ross (1993) also noted that it was this conflict that ultimately led to the formation of the CPC and the WSA to undertake comprehensive planning in the area and address the various conflicts over resource allocation and road access.

The evidence above shows that the MNR's lack of policy on old-growth conservation in the past, led to a decision that was both ecologically and socially unsustainable in the Temagami Area. The decision was socially unsustainable because it also became a source of conflict in the area.

However, as noted by 21% of the respondents in Table 9, Ontario also responded with another initiative aimed at studying the old-growth issue. In January 1992, then Minister of Natural Resources, Honourable Bud Wildman, established the Old Growth Conservation Initiative (MNR 1992). Central to this initiative was the Old Growth Policy Advisory Committee (PAC). The PAC's mandate was to develop recommendations for conserving old growth forest ecosystems in Ontario. In June, 1993, the PAC submitted its recommendations to the Minister of Natural Resources outlining candidate areas for old-growth red and white pine protection in Ontario. The Policy Advisory Committee submitted another report in August, 1993 outlining protection of other forest ecosystems in Ontario (PAC 1993).

4.1.2 Primacy of timber in planning

According to 84% of respondents (N=74) (Table 9), the primacy of timber in resource management planning was the norm in the past. The respondents characterized the MNR's land-use and resource management planning processes as less integrative and less participatory than in the present, centralized, lacked a local focus, uncoordinated, skewed toward timber management, ecologically insensitive, and conflict-ridden. As one of the key informants in this study put it:

In effect, what the MNR has been calling forest or resource management all along was simply timber management. You can go there [to the MNR] even today and you will not find a stand alone fish management plan, wildlife plan, or cultural heritage plan. In this area [Temagami] they have not even come up with plans for parks yet. All this has done is pit everybody else against the timber industry. There are no winners in this case; we are all losers, (5C).

One public respondent also summarized her views on MNR's past management as follows:

They [the MNR staff] ceased to do planning, all they were doing is following cookbooks. First, the Strategic Land Use Plans; second, the District Land Use Guidelines; and then Timber Management Guidelines. All these cookbooks provided was a best recipe for conflict because what was always on the menu was timber, timber, timber.....and there was only one cook- the MNR, (4D).

Hodgins and Benidickson (1989) described the primacy of timber in resource management planning by the MNR as the root cause of the 'Temagami Conflict'. As described by the respondents above, the primacy of timber in planning meant that all other resources were planned for from a timber management point of view. It was observed that, to this date, there are planning documents like: Timber Management Guidelines for the Protection of Fish Habitat (MNR 1988); Timber Management Guidelines for the Provision of Moose Habitat (MNR 1989); Timber Management Guidelines for the Protection of Tourism Values (MNR 1987), and the list goes on to include cultural heritage, wetlands, and water quality. Timber management planning treated other values such as those listed above as "Areas of Concern (AOC)" (MNR 1986b); there were no separate management plans written for those values. An AOC is defined as a geographical area of value to non-timber users or uses which could be affected by forestry operations, and which may require modifications to those operations (MNR 1987). As the definition implies, other values could only be managed for by modifying timber management operations.

These findings above are the same views expressed by Benson (1982) and later echoed by Baskerville (1986). In his report entitled *"Forest Management in n'Daki Menan"*, Benson (1982) argued that MNR's approach to forest management that emphasized timber, jeopardized the integrity of other values. Benson (1982) proposed a more holistic approach that respected public concerns

and dealt with all values equally within a single planning framework. Benson's argument above was later echoed by Baskerville (1986) in his report, "*An Audit of Management of Crown Forests of Ontario*." Baskerville (1986:42) concluded:

The approach used to integration of timber with non-timber values is based on local judgement with no objectively measurable standards....The approach to discovering public opinion about planning issues is open, but it is being used to justify actions (or inactions) rather than to determine what values the public expect from the resource so that management can be designed to achieve those values to the extent possible.

Both the Strategic Land Use Plans (SLUP) and District Land Use Guidelines (DLUG) pointed out by the public respondents (4D) above, were conceived at regional and district levels, respectively (Brozowski and King-Fisher 1994). This means that land use planning was centralized at higher levels. Resource management planning took place at local levels; thereby separating land use planning from resource management planning (Figure 23). However, at the local levels, the only planning manual that existed was for timber management (MNR 1986b); other values were simply managed for as AOCs. Therefore, SLUPs, DLUGs and Timber management Guidelines failed to adapt management to local concerns of integrating timber with other values. As noted by public respondent (4D) above, the outcome was conflict among various stakeholders in the Temagami Area. These characteristics of the MNR's centralized planning process are the same deficiencies described by Usher (1987), Berkes *et al.* (1991), and Armour (1992). These authors noted that centralized planning shifted control over resources away from local users and resulted in plans that failed to adapt to changing local environments and social conditions.




Figure 23: The MNR's Planning System in Ontario (Source: MNR 1992).

The conclusions drawn from the above analysis are that the substance of decisions made in the past were mostly conflict-ridden and had little to do with conservation of the local resource base. Timber management planning failed to give equal weight to other values; thus decisions were neither equitable nor ecologically sustainable. Centralized planning effectively alienated resource managers from resource users. This excluded local knowledge input into the planning and decision-making processes. Therefore, past decisions were not inclusive. Broad policies conceived at regional and district levels increasingly became irrelevant to the local context.

4.1.3 Access to the timber resource

According to the data presented in Table 9, 88% of the respondents felt that past timber allocations were not equitable. Respondents referred to a lack of timber allocations made to the aboriginal people in Temagami. In addition, respondents mentioned loss of employment opportunities in Temagami particularly after closure of Milne Lumber Mill by Ontario. As pointed out earlier, part of Milne's proposed timber allocations were for harvesting the old-growth red and white pine stand of 2,500 ha within what is now the WSA Area. These proposed allocations also caused proposals for new road access - the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions.

Following controversies over both use of the roads and harvesting of old growth, Ontario paid off Milne Lumber \$4,000,000 for lost timber rights. Ontario also closed the mill in a move to ease tensions. Hodgins and Benidickson (1989) estimated loss of 154 jobs because of the mill's closure. This was about 50% of labour force in Temagami at the time. Before the mill's closure, Milne Lumber accounted for 32% of the total wood harvested annually from within Temagami District (Figure 24) (MNR 1994a). Temagami lost that volume allocation once the mill was closed due to a lack of alternate mill locally.



LEGEND

(Source: MNR 1994b).

Mill Name	Mill Location	Average annual Crown volume received from Temagami m³
% of Temagami harvest	% of total Crown wood received by mill annually	

Figure 24: Crown Wood Destinations, 4-year Average (1986-1990), Temagami District.

The respondents argued that communities outside the "Temagami Area Community" and those within the Community but without a mill in Temagami, benefited more from timber allocations than Temagami itself. This was due to an MNR policy that discouraged establishment of new mills (4C, 5E). For instance, of all the communities indicated in Figure 8 above, 50% were outside the "Temagami Area Community" (Espanola, Sturgeon Falls, Nairn, Braeside, Kirkland Lake, Rutherglen, and Monetville). Of the 50% within the Community, none operated a mill in Temagami (Figure 24), particularly after closure of Milne Mill in Temagami.

Past MNR policy on timber allocations, which still exists today, stated that only existing mills and operators would receive timber allocations and no new mills or operators would be considered (MNR 1994a). Therefore, with the closure of Wm. Milne Mill in Temagami, the policy negated the possibility of a mill in Temagami in the foreseeable future. In a probing question to the 74 respondents in Table 9, 98% said that they would support establishment of a mill in Temagami. This calls into question the equitability of the MNR's policy above from a local (Temagami) point of view.

One may argue that Ontario's decision to close the mill in 1990 saved old-growth red and white pine in Temagami. Part of the MNR's argument for closure of the mill at the time was that the mill's requirements for both red and white pine could not be met due to dwindling stocks in the area (MNR 1994a). Of the total 32.7% of Milne's volume allocation in Figure 24, 20% comprised red and white pine (MNR 1994a). However, current evidence suggests that the MNR continued to allocate both red and white pine to the companies in Figure 24 since the closure of Milne Mill (MNR 1994a).

For instance, at a meeting held on January 18, 1994 between the CPC and the MNR, the latter presented volume commitments to the local timber industry under the 1994-96 Contingency Timber Management Plan. The figures showed that of the total 129,276 m³ of timber commitment to eight logging companies, 12% comprised red and white pine (MNR 1994b) (Table 10). Although this is lower than Milne's volume requirements by 8%, it still raises the question as to why the MNR did not allocate the 12% to aboriginal entrepreneurs in Temagami.

Respondents referred to a locally-owned aboriginal company called George Mathias Construction located on Bear Island Reserve in Temagami. It was also observed that the company has both logging and processing facilities. Temagami Logging, listed in Table 10, is simply a logging contractor with no processing facilities. George Mathias Construction operated as third party in the past. That is, other companies hired its logging services; it purchased all its wood requirements from other companies in the past (pers. comm. with George Mathias, July 12, 1994, Temagami).

The MNR policy has also prevented proposals for small-scale wood processing facilities from being established in Temagami. One such proposal came from Goulard Lumber, a company that currently owns a mill in Sturgeon Falls, about 200 km west of Temagami (pers. comm. with Claude Goulard, June 25, 1994, Temagami). The company wanted to establish a small-scale mill in Temagami by entering into partnerships with both the Township of Temagami and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai at Bear Island. According to the proposal, the mill was going to be based on various species' assortments including both hardwoods and softwoods (pers. comm. with Claude Goulard, June 25, 1994, Temagami).

Table 10: Volume Commitments/Targets to be supplied to Operators under 1994-96 Temagami Contingency Timber Management Plans (CTMP's).

Name of Operator/Mill	Species	Annual Commitment/Target Net Merchantable Volume (NM ³)
Goulard Lumber	White pine, Red pine	9 135
	Jack pine, Spruce	11 780
Field Lumber	White pine, Red pine	2 360
	Jack pine, Spruce	960
TEMBEC	White birch	14 000
	Tolerant hardwoods	4 700
MacMillan Bloedel	White birch/Poplar	6 000
Grant Forest Products	Poplar	22 650
Rexwood Forest Products	Poplar	30 000
Meadowside Lumber	White pine, Red pine	1 550
	Jack pine/Spruce	5 250
	Poplar	230
	White birch	2 250
	Tolerant hardwoods	5 500
Temagami Logging	White pine/Red pine	2 033
	Jack pine/Spruce	7 035
	Poplar	3 843
Total		129 276

Source: MNR 1994b.

The analysis above confirms the respondents' view that past MNR policy on timber allocation has been unfair to the community of Temagami and to the aboriginal people in the area. As noted earlier by Ross (1993), the unsustainability and inequity of the MNR's decisions in the past led to the formation of both the CPC and the WSA. How did these new management agencies address both issues of sustainability and equity?

4.2 The Substance of Decisions under Co-management

4.2.1 Cross-case Analysis

4.2.1.1 Old-growth red and white pine protection

According to the results presented in Table 9, 69% of the respondents said that they did not know if the CPC will protect old-growth red and white pine in the area because its plan was not yet completed. However, 79% of the respondents also noted that the CPC was likely to do so (Table 9). The latter respondents referred to the provincially mandated Old Growth Conservation Initiative. They argued that the MNR made decisions for the CPC and, as an agency of the government that also created the Old Growth Conservation Strategy, the MNR was likely to adopt the recommendations contained in the strategy. The strategy, which is contained in the Old-Growth Policy Advisory Committee's (PAC) report, recommended the identification and protection of representative old-growth areas among all forest ecosystem types (PAC 1994). The respondents' argument above is explored in detail.

In January 1992, the Ontario government established the PAC with a mandate to develop a strategy for conserving old growth forest ecosystems in the province. The PAC, an independent citizens' committee, comprised of representatives from across the province reflective of the various perspectives on old growth. Among those represented on the Committee included the forest industry, environmentalists, labour, educators, churches, and aboriginal groups. On July 21 1994, the PAC submitted to the Minister of Natural Resources its final report on conserving old growth forest ecosystems in Ontario. The report contained seven broad objectives and 24 areas of action (PAC 1994:12). Two such objectives that pertain to the argument above are:

- (a) to protect representative old growth forest ecosystems across Ontario; and
- (b) to perpetuate old growth forest features throughout the production forest, thus contributing to the maintenance of old growth forest ecosystem function across the landscape. (PAC 1994:13).

A review of the specific recommendations under objective (a) above showed that the only candidate area identified for protection in the Temagami area was that within the WSA's planning area- the Obabika Old Growth stand. This is the same 2,500 ha-forest stand of red and white pine that resulted in conflict between pro-development and preservation proponents following constructions of the Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions. In its plan, the WSA zoned this area for protection (WSA 1994). On February 6, 1995, the Minister of Natural announced the formal protection of this area and turned the WSA's former area of jurisdiction to the MNR (MNR 1995a). Here, protection of the Obabika Old Growth stand had to do with the WSA rather than MNR's actions as purported by the respondents above.

A further review of the resource management prescriptions and options for the Comprehensive Planning Area submitted for public review by the MNR (CPP 1994) in May, 1994, showed that there were no areas specifically identified for old-growth protection. What was apparent in the management options was a proposal to maintain 10% of area in the oldest age classes of all major forest species. This related to objective (b) above. The proposal suggested achieving the target through a proportionate decrease in the total area allocated for harvest (CPP 1994a). The areas allocated for harvest were missing from the resource management prescriptions and options. Since this was just a proposal, and the CPC plan has not been completed, it is not possible at this point to predict what will happen once resource management plans are developed.

As noted by 89% of the respondents (Table 9), in its decisions, the WSA zoned an area of 2,500 ha for old-growth red and white pine protection (WSA 1994). This is the same area described earlier as the centre of controversy in the Temagami Area. Review of the WSA's Forest Stewardship Plan also revealed several timber management prescriptions aimed at protecting old-growth in all forest types. The prescriptions included: selection harvest system in white pine stands; retention of 20-30 old-growth trees/ha in harvested areas; and where both old-growth red and white pine comprised 10% or less of a stand marked for harvesting, then both species would not be cut (WSA 1994).

The WSA's actions above, reflect the respondents' characterization of the WSA's decisions as more participatory and integrative (Table 9). Based upon public comments on the WSA's Forest Stewardship Plan, both the environmental community and pro-development groups described the WSA's decisions to conserve old growth in its planning area as ecologically sustainable and equitable (WSA 1994). These are the same arguments for local-level management systems advanced by Usher (1987), Jacobs (1988), Pinkerton (1989b), Dunster (1990), and Berkes *et al.* (1991), that such systems are likely to be responsive to local needs and adapt to local conditions. Ontario's adoption of the WSA's decision to protect the old-growth red and white pine forest also points to the sustainability and equitability of the WSA decision.

4.2.1.2 Primacy of timber in planning

According to the results in Table 9, 98% and 95% of the respondents felt that both the CPC and the WSA decisions, respectively, addressed the concern over timber primacy. Comprehensive planning of both agencies treated all values equally. It was also observed that the first phase of both planning processes entailed data gathering and field inventories aimed at achieving equal levels of information among all values. However, as noted earlier, both agencies approached the first phase differently. The CPC relied exclusively on information generated by the MNR. This implied a total reliance on scientific information. The WSA incorporated the knowledge of long time users in the area in its information base.

For instance, between July and December 1992, the WSA submitted questionnaires to seven tourist operators, two forest companies, five municipalities and three unincorporated Townships, six trappers, four guide outfitters, and five local Chambers of Commerce to seek both socio-economic and biophysical information relevant to its planning area (WSA 1992b). It was also observed that during the long holiday weekend in July 1992, the WSA set up a field interview station at Obabika bridge, at the heart of its planning area, to obtain information from canoeists and hikers about their experiences and aspirations for the area. In addition, the WSA hired a long time trapper in the area as its Forest Steward. The steward was responsible for field monitoring, recording, and reporting of various field aspects including sightings of endangered and protected bird species, wildlife summer and winter habitat conditions, camping pressure, fishing pressure, road access conditions, trails, and portages (WSA 1992c). The WSA also fielded a study entitled "A documentation of knowledge associated with the oral traditions of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai: the land, its waterways, plants

and animals" (WSA 1993c). In particular, this study identified the major medicinal plant species occurring in the area and ways to protect them from resource extraction activities.

The WSA included the information obtained from the above sources in its database which contained technical data on various resources. These data were obtained from the MNR and the WSA's own field inventories. The WSA based its decisions on the whole database (WSA 1994:24). Here, the WSA complemented scientific information with the knowledge and experience of local users, thus adapting resource management decisions to the local situation. As Usher (1987) and Berkes *et al.* (1991) argued, this approach ensures that management is adapted to local needs and social conditions.

4.2.1.3 Access to the timber resource

The results in Table 9 show that 74% of the respondents felt the CPC was not going to allocate timber any differently from the past. This response was attributed to two things. First, the respondents noted that the MNR, rather than the CPC, made decisions concerning the comprehensive planning process. Secondly, the respondents argued that existing MNR policy on timber allocations, which is the same as in the past, gave high priority to existing mills and operators. In their view, the MNR's role both as policy and decision-maker, implied that access to the timber resource under the CPC would not be any different from the past. To understand the premise of this view, it is necessary to review the CPC's involvement in the MNR's Interim Timber Management Planning (ITMP) and Contingency Timber Management Planning (CTMP) processes. Both processes pertained to the CPC's planning area.

In the Spring of 1989, the MNR prepared Interim Timber Management Plans (ITMP) covering the comprehensive planning area for the period April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1992 (MNR 1994a). The ITMPs were necessary to maintain existing forest management operations (harvesting, silviculture, etc.) until the comprehensive planning process of the CPC was completed. In May, 1991 the MNR decided to extend the 1990-92 ITMPs for two years due to the extension of the comprehensive planning process from March, 1992 to April, 1994 (MNR 1994a). The extension was necessary to maintain existing forest management operations until the comprehensive planning process was completed. In Summer of 1993, the MNR again extended the comprehensive planning process from April, 1994 to March 31, 1996. Therefore, the MNR prepared a Contingency Timber Management Plan (CTMP) for the period 1994-96 (MNR 1994b).

Both the ITMPs and CTMP above, contained wood allocations from the comprehensive planning area to the existing timber companies. As noted by all CPC respondents in Table 7, the CPC recommended the CTMP to the Minister of Natural Resources. Review of these recommendations (CPC 1993), revealed that the CPC did not make specific provisions to redirect the wood flow to Temagami. In particular, there was no wood allocated to George Mathias Construction at Bear Island in Temagami. Instead, the MNR maintained the wood flow as depicted in Table 10.

The evidence above shows that the CPC's methods of allocating timber were not any different from past and are not likely to be different in the future. Timber allocation methods are not likely to be different in the future because the MNR makes decisions for the CPC. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the MNR has been unwilling to change the allocation policy that puts Temagami at a disadvantage. As Chambers (1992) noted, such resistance can be expected particularly from

centralized public sector bureaucracies thought to be insulated from the forces that stimulate change. In the case of the CPC, such resistance, and the existing MNR policy on timber allocation constrained distributional equity to local levels.

For the WSA, existing MNR policy on timber allocation did not constrain it. As noted by 86% of the respondents (Table 9), the WSA granted the first right of refusal on timber allocations to local companies and aboriginal people in the area. This decision was also confirmed as contained in the WSA's Forest Stewardship Plan (WSA 1994). However, the test of how equitable the WSA decision was lies in the implementation of the decision. As discussed earlier, the Minister of Natural Resources announced that the CPC would decide the feasibility of the WSA's decisions (MNR 1995a). Since the MNR made decisions for the CPC, the WSA decision above will be subject to existing MNR policy on timber allocations. Consequently, because of lack of authority to implement its decisions, and because of an unfavourable existing MNR policy, the WSA's redistribution of timber allocations to local timber companies and aboriginal people in the area will not be implemented.

4.2.2 Conclusions

The analysis above raises some implications for co-management. The analysis showed that ultimately, the substance of decisions did not change under both models of co-management studied. This lack of change is attributed to the structures or institutional designs of the two co-management bodies. The lack of delegation of authority from the government to the two co-management agencies negatively affected the substance of decisions. For the WSA, this meant that its decisions, that promoted both sustainability and equity, could not be implemented. For the CPC, this meant that it

could not challenge or change existing MNR policies that were antithetical to both sustainability and equity; its advice to the MNR was non-binding.

The WSA acted like an advocacy-style organization whose strategy was to challenge existing MNR policies. This happened because the WSA exercised *de facto* decision-making authority and 50% of its membership participated in the framing of the mandate. However, although the challenge resulted in decisions that were both sustainable and equitable, the lack of *de jure* decision-making authority reduced the WSA to an advisory organization like the CPC. For the CPC, the government defined its mandate, its structure, and its activities; its actions were restricted by existing government policies. This situation is similar to that described by Reed (1995:147) in the case of the Ignace co-management committee in which senior government mandates established the parameters within which the co-management initiative operated.

This suggests that for co-management agencies to produce any real substance in their decision-making, agency members and/or their constituencies need to be involved in drawing up the mandates of those agencies. In addition, such agencies require the authority to advise, or make decisions or implement their decisions. The involvement of agency members and/or their constituencies in drawing up the mandate would ensure a congruence of goals between the government and local community interests. The congruence of goals in turn, would ensure that the substance of decisions made by those agencies are sustainable and equitable- and supported.

The next section discusses how co-management affected social relationships among actors. The actors include agency members, the MNR, Ontario, the TAA, stakeholder groups, and the public.

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS UNDER CO-MANAGEMENT

4.3 Ontario's Expectations

In creating both the CPC and the WSA, Ontario anticipated that both agencies would improve social relationships among various local interests by involving them in their planning and decision-making processes. By appointing several individuals from various local interests to the agencies, Ontario expected that local resource-use conflicts would be addressed. In particular, by directing the WSA to reach its decisions by consensus, Ontario expected that various stakeholders groups represented on the authority would resolve their differences.

For the purposes of analysis of social relationships among various players in co-management, three main principles were analyzed: inclusion; respect and trust; and cooperation. In addition, the conflict resolution strategies adopted by the co-management agencies and their outcomes were analyzed.

4.4 Inclusion

Chapter 3 described the consultative processes of both co-management agencies in this study. Therefore, this section concentrates on the structure of representation on both agencies. Two questions were posed in order gauge the levels of inclusiveness on both the CPC and the WSA. Table 11 highlights the questions and summary of responses to the question.

Table 11: Summary results pertaining to the principle of "Inclusion".

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource use conflicts?		
Category/Principle:	Inclusion	
Interview Question:	<i>How were representatives on the management agency (CPC or WSA) selected?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 appointed by Ontario through an OIC 5 appointed by the TAA Executive Council and approved by TAA General Assembly 	7 4
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6 appointed by Ontario through an OIC 6 appointed by the TAA Executive Council and approved by TAA General Assembly 	5 5
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 5 TAA representatives appointed by TAA <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 6 TAA representatives appointed by TAA 	4 4 4 4
Interview Question: <i>Is representation on both CPC and WSA adequate?</i>		
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining and town of Temagami not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests and OFAH not represented 	5 5
Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) members N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 	11 8
Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) members N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented OFAH not represented 	10 5
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests and OFAH not represented 	3 4 4
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented mining interests not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests not represented 	32 7 39
Key Informants N=5	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented mining interests not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests not represented 	5 4 5

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Armour (1992) noted that, in order to satisfy each interest group that its concerns have been represented, each group must be directly involved. However, the authors' view above does not directly address the question of who selects the representatives. Gould (1981) argued that, where individuals have participated in the selection of their representatives or delegates, those representatives would be held accountable to those whom they represent and be subject to recall. This suggests that the various interests in the Temagami Conflict needed to participate in the selection of their representatives to the two co-management agencies. The issue of representation on behalf of Ontario is explored in detail because it was characterized by respondents as inadequate on both the CPC and the WSA (Table 11).

The results in Table 11 show that Ontario appointed 12 members to the CPC and six (6) members to the WSA. In a separate interview question to the co-management agency, public, and establishing agency respondents, it was revealed that in some cases the government of Ontario contacted some local interests or stakeholder groups (mostly environmental) for submission of three candidate names (4A, 4H, 4L, 2B, 5D). Ontario reserved the right to appoint the final candidate. Other interests such as mining and recreation were not contacted (4A, 4H).

According to two establishing agency respondents (3A, 3C), the criteria used by Ontario for final selection of provincial representatives to both the CPC and WSA was that the particular individual had to have broader interests beyond that of his/her respective constituency. This means that appointed candidates had a constituency of interests rather than an actual constituency.

A review of the CPC's 17 member-list showed that the constituency of possible interests represented on the Ontario side included: education; environment; local government; mining; business and economic development; labour; logging; tourism and recreation; and social services. In particular, the list showed that there was both a Deputy Reeve for the Township of Temagami who was also a local business entrepreneur in the tourism industry. The list also showed the presence of a former Dean of a local School of Mines in Haileybury. Based on this broad representation intended by Ontario, the view by respondents in Table 11 that the Township of Temagami and mining interests were not represented on the CPC would not be correct. However, both the Township of Temagami and the mining community maintained that they did not select those representatives.

Similarly, the WSA's list of members showed that the constituency of possible interests on the Ontario side included: labour; logging; local government; environment; recreation and tourism; and community economic development. Based on Ontario's criteria for selection of members above, it could also be argued that both the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) and the mining interests were represented through the recreation and tourism, and community economic development constituencies, respectively. This is in contrast to the respondents' view in Table 11 that both OFAH and mining interests were not represented on the WSA.

This leads to the question of accountability. To whom were the Ontario representatives on both the CPC and the WSA accountable? In a separate interview question (discussed later under the principle of 'respect and trust'), it was revealed that Ontario representatives on both the CPC and the WSA were not directly accountable to the constituencies implied by Ontario. That is, there were no structured reporting relationships between them and the interests they were supposed to represent. Furthermore, it was revealed that there were no formal reporting relationships between the

representatives and Ontario. Therefore, the respondents' views in Table 11 about the respective interests not adequately represented on both the CPC and the WSA was correct.

This suggests that the internal accommodations made by those involved in co-management may be viewed by those excluded from participation as something else other than "more appropriate, more efficient, or more equitable". That is, the political legitimacy of the decisions reached by those involved in co-management is likely to be jeopardized by those interests excluded from decision-making. This scenario was played out in the case of the WSA's decisions on mining activities in its planning area. In a letter sent by the Northern Prospectors' Association (NPA 1994) commenting on the WSA's decisions on mining, the NPA condemned the WSA for banning open-pit mining in the area. The NPA also condemned the WSA Plan for excluding mining exploration and development from 50% of the planning area. The NPA further criticized the WSA process as an exercise in political tokenism and waste of millions of tax dollars and concluded:

The Northern Prospectors' Association is dedicated to the preservation of the rights of the mining industry and must condemn this (WSA) Plan as an exercise in political pandering that has no regard for the rights of the majority of the citizens of this Province. Any attempt to implement the Plan will be resisted at every level (NPA 1994:2)

4.4.1 Conclusions

The analysis above shows that co-management did not result in the representation of all major interests in the Temagami Area. The lack of accountability by Ontario representatives to specific constituencies also diminished the importance of both co-management bodies. This analysis raises some implications for co-management and democratic theories.

For the decisions that emerge from co-management to be "more appropriate, more efficient, or more equitable," the existing interests in a particular area need to be represented on the co-management agency. Given the diverse array of interests in forest issues today, representing all stakeholders may prove unrealistic. The tendency would be to extend the list of stakeholders to include not only those with very specific interests, but also with particular attitudes. However, then there is a real danger of slipping down the road to *reductio ad absurdum*. The bottom line would be to include all major stakeholders; however defined. Such groups often have the potential to jeopardize the final outcome if they are not represented or included in decision-making such as the threats of the NPA. Mining having been a major economic activity in the area, and likely to be so once the TAA land cautions are lifted, the NPA will continue to be a strong political voice in the Temagami area.

For co-management to be seen as a mechanism for participatory decision-making in resource management, governments need to consult all interests and non-interested parties and let those groups select their own representatives. This will not only assure accountability by representatives to their constituencies but also the legitimacy of final decisions. Since accountability is directly linked to authority, this implies that constituencies would have to be empowered. In particular, the groups should have the right to recall their representatives if they are not satisfied with the outcomes of the decision-making process; that way, the feeling of being "boxed in" would be avoided.

The analysis also revealed that Ontario as the creator of both the CPC and partly the WSA mandates not only controlled those groups' actions (as discussed earlier); it decided the system of representation and selected members to them. If the government and local interests mutually agreed

on the mandates of co-management agencies, then the system of representation should also be mutually decided. That is, stakeholder participation in co-management should be negotiated between the government and the stakeholder groups rather than unilaterally decided by the former. This would be consistent with the principles of participatory democracy.

If the government's concern is to have broader provincial interests represented on co-management agencies, then the system of selection of members may be based on a combination of both elections and appointments. In that case, the government could appoint elected public officials who would represent both provincial interests and non-interested parties. The selection of stakeholder representatives should be left to those groups to decide. Broader regional and national interests may also be protected by ensuring that co-management agencies operate within existing provincial and federal policies; but with built in flexibility to change policy. The latter point is necessary to ensure that the management agencies adapt their decisions to changing social, biophysical, and market conditions.

The next section reviews the levels of respect and trust among actors. That is, how did co-management affect the levels of respect and trust among actors in co-management?

4.5 Respect and Trust

The principle of "respect and trust" refers both to the internal operations of the agency and the relationships among the agency, state, and local users. Five questions were posed in order to gauge the levels of respect and trust under co-management. The questions are:

- did any members of your agency voluntarily quit, and if so, why?;
- what are the fundamental principles of your group?;
- do you feel those principles have been achieved/abandoned in the process?;
- how are reporting relationships between you and your constituency structured?; and
- was your agency committed to consensus decision-making, and if so, how did it work?

This study assumed that high member turnovers in an agency showed members' non-commitment to the goals and survival of the agency. That would in turn suggest a lack of trust and respect for the agency and/or its tenets. Similarly, members' feelings that their group fundamental principles were achieved and not compromised or abandoned by the co-management agency would indicate the members' attraction to the agency; hence, their respect and trust for the agency. The existence of reporting relationships between agency members and their constituencies or any of the key actors would also indicate a sense of respect and trust between them. The successful application of consensus decision-making would also indicate the agency's commitment to shared understanding and respect and trust among members. Table 12 provides a summary of the responses to the five questions above. Appendix 3 lists detailed responses to the questions.

Table 12: Summary results pertaining to the principle of "Respect and trust".

Interview Question	Responses				
	CPC N=11	n	WSA N=10	n	
1. Did any members of your agency voluntarily quit, and if so, why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1 member quit voluntarily• 2 members were terminated	11 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5 members quit voluntarily• 2 members were terminated	10 10	
2. What are the fundamental principles of your group?	<u>TAA Side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• resource sustainability, economic development, land preservation, preservation of aboriginal rights	4	<u>TAA Side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• sustained life, sustainable development, co-existence, and public participation in decision-making (same as WSA goals)	5	
	<u>Ontario Side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• environmental protection, sustainability, equitable access to resources, local governance	7	<u>Ontario Side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• socio-economic development, maintaining integrity of Lake Temagami, enhancing wilderness experience, biodiversity, environmental protection	5	
3. Do you feel those principles have been achieved or abandoned in the process?	<u>TAA side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• being achieved• being abandoned	0 4	<u>TAA side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• achieved• abandoned	4 1	
	<u>Ontario side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• being achieved• being abandoned	3 4	<u>Ontario side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• achieved• abandoned	5 0	
4. How are reporting relationships between you and your constituency structured?	<u>TAA side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• structured• informal• not structured	4 0 0	<u>TAA side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• structured• informal• not structured	4 1 0	
	<u>Ontario side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• structured• informal• not structured	0 1 6	<u>Ontario side</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• structured• informal• not structured	0 1 4	
5. Is your agency committed to consensus decision-making, and if so, how did it work?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Yes, but consensus has not been defined and has not been practiced.	11	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Yes, we are committed to consensus decision-making• It was defined as a minimum of 8/12 in consent but it has never been applied that way - it was always 12 members in consent.• It worked by listening to and hearing from everyone• It worked through respect for each other• Patience and informality are required for it to work• It worked through caring for each other• It worked by sharing values	10 10 10 10 7 4 3	

According to the results in Table 12, the CPC had lower member turnover than the WSA. The member who quit on the CPC felt he was in conflict of interest. The member was a Reeve of a nearby community and a member of the Municipal Advisory Group (MAG). The MAG is an umbrella organization comprised of all the municipalities in the Temagami Area Community and a strong opponent of the land negotiations between Ontario and the TAA. When the Minister of Natural Resources asked the CPC to conduct public consultations on the treaty negotiations, the member felt he was in conflict of interest and he quit.

However, a significant change in the composition of the CPC occurred soon after the Minister of Natural Resources' News Conference held in Toronto on February 6, 1995. All TAA members on the CPC quit (pers. comm. with 5A). According to key informant 5A, the TAA recalled its members from the CPC due to:

1. Ontario's unilateral decision to integrate the WSA Plan in the CPC Plan without prior consultation with the TAA;
2. Ontario's unilateral decision to allow mining in 20 Townships north of Temagami near the community of Matachewan. Although these townships were not originally covered by the TAA land cautions, it was agreed between Ontario and the TAA through an MOU that no mineral staking would take place in those townships until the treaty negotiations were finalized. Those negotiations have not been finalized; and
3. Ontario's unilateral decision to remove nine (9) Townships from the current Comprehensive Planning Area and transfer those townships under the jurisdiction of the Elk Lake Community Forest. The Elk Lake Community Forest (ELCF) was initiated by the MNR in 1991 as part of its Sustainable Forestry Initiative (MNR 1991). The TAA participated on the ELCF but withdrew in July, 1992 due to what it called as the "ELCF's pre-occupation with timber rather than resource management planning." All planning functions on the ELCF are undertaken by the MNR. (5A).

According to the key informant (5A) and the former TAA co-Chair on the CPC (2D), the local public was dismayed with Ontario's latest actions. In the public's view, the latest actions by Ontario compromised the political legitimacy of the CPC. The foregoing scenario points to the lack of trust and respect between Ontario and the TAA. Without the TAA involvement in the CPC process and any other resource management initiatives in the Temagami Area, the "Temagami Conflict" is likely to be replayed.

A feeling by most of the CPC members that their fundamental principles were compromised or abandoned in the planning process (Table 12) also points to the lack of respect and trust by the members for the MNR (the decision-maker in the planning process). A lack of clear and open lines of communication between Ontario representatives on both the CPC and the WSA (Table 12) and Ontario affected relationships between them. Similarly, a lack of accountability between Ontario representatives on both the CPC and the WSA and their constituencies also affected relationships between them. Constituencies or stakeholder groups felt slighted by Ontario's unilateral action of appointing representatives to both bodies (5B). The representatives felt alienated from their constituencies (2B, 2K, 2M). The WSA also noted a lack of clear lines of communication and support from its sponsors (Ontario and the TAA) (5A). In comparison, three key informants (N=5), noted that the WSA had more support from Ontario than the TAA partly because the TAA was also financially dependent on Ontario.

Within the first year of the WSA's operation, three members quit followed by two members in the second year (Table 12). Of the five members, four were all TAA representatives on the WSA. Three of the TAA members who quit opposed the treaty negotiations between Ontario and the TAA.

They demanded that the WSA hand over its planning area to the traditional families that once used the area (5C). This opposition later caused an enforcement crisis for the WSA that would go on for eight months before resolution. This crisis, which was also observed in this study, warrants further discussion because it highlights several relationships among different players in co-management.

4.5.1 The Enforcement Crisis in the WSA Area

In the summer of 1993, a dissident group of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA), the MaKominising Anishnabeg (MKA), occupied the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) area. The occupation was part of the MKA's opposition to the Treaty of Co-existence negotiations then underway between Ontario and the TAA. To raise funds, the MKA harvested some old-growth red pine in the famed '2,500 ha old-growth red and white pine stand' within the WSA area without the latter's permission (Hakala 1993a). This act of defiance by the MKA created a crisis for the WSA. It was a direct challenge to the WSA's authority. It exacerbated the relationship with the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) and with the TAA and created the possibility of fractures within the WSA (O'Grady 1993). The TAA took a consistent position that solving the crisis was the responsibility of the WSA. Ontario took this position inconsistently; at times the WSA felt it had been abandoned by its sponsors (5C).

According to an Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) spokesperson (pers. comm. with GT, an OPP officer, Temagami, on July 15, 1994), the crisis laid groundwork for a racial split within the WSA. That the WSA avoided the split was a credit to all its members (GT). The issue that faced the WSA concerned the relationship between its mandate and traditional land rights. At first, the MNR

wanted to go into the area occupied by the MKA and arrest all (5C). The OPP advised caution. Next the MNR lawyers recommended a broad-based injunction barring all the TAA from the WSA area (5C). This was obviously unacceptable to the TAA representatives on the WSA. According to two of the key informants (5A, 5C), having worked together for many months, the WSA members understood the tremendous importance of traditional lands. They also understood the awful arrogance of barring aboriginal people from their lands (5A, 5C). The WSA opted for limited injunctions that two of its members served to the MKA. The injunctions were ignored (O'Grady 1993:6).

According to the Enforcement Agreement signed between the WSA and the MNR, the WSA requested an MNR overflight to inspect cutting activities in the area. The MNR turned down WSA's request¹⁸ because it considered such a flight too dangerous for MNR employees (5C). After the WSA complained up the MNR authority ladder, the local MNR provided the flight. Despite personal threats to WSA members and family splits within the TAA, the WSA kept in close contact with the MKA during the crisis. The WSA took no steps without prior warning to the MKA and it generally followed the OPP 's advice, based on the dictum that a few trees are not worth a life (pers. comm. with GT, an OPP officer, Temagami, on July 15, 1994). When a fire was set at the sit-in on July 30, 1993, the MNR flew its fire crews to the area with no forewarning; threats were made (Hakala 1993b).

Once the crisis was past, WSA members commented that it forced them to make a recommitment to shared stewardship. It had proved the importance of communication and

¹⁸ WSA Minutes of October 25, 1993.

understanding across cultural lines; that they had resolved the crisis without violence was proof that co-existence did work (5C). The crisis also highlighted the need for jurisdictional clarity since the WSA, without legislative authority, lacked enforcement powers.

4.5.2 Consensus Decision-making

According to the results in Table 12, all CPC respondents (N=11) noted that although they were committed to consensus decision-making, the process was not defined and was not practiced. Members only cited one instance when consensus was practiced during a meeting chaired by the TAA co-chair. In all instances, members felt that either the other co-chair or the MNR made all the decisions (2K, 2L, 2M). It was also observed that after four years of the CPC members working together, the agency had not developed its own policy and procedures manual. This partly explains why the mode of decision-making was not defined. The lack of consensus decision-making on the CPC caused apathy among some members which often resulted in absenteeism at meetings (2L). It also implied that shared understanding, as argued for by Habermas (1982), was not promoted among members. Through consensus, decision-making is decentralized among members, with each having equal opportunities to participate in the decision-making. Therefore, from a co-management point of view, the mode of decision-making on the CPC was not cooperative but rather top-down; the very antithesis of co-management or the cooperative planning model advanced by Armour (1992). For the WSA, part of its mandate states:

The Wendaban Stewardship Authority shall reach its decisions by consensus. Consensus shall be agreement by no less than two thirds of the membership of the Authority, excluding the Chairperson. (Ontario Executive Council, 1991b).

According to the results in Table 12, the WSA took the instruction to reach consensus decisions seriously. Consensus was not interpreted as two-thirds majority but as a real consensus - all in acceptance of the decision. According to the WSA's procedures manual (WSA 1992), the WSA redefined consensus that was given through their mandate as "two-thirds majority" to "all in consent" and if that failed, then the two-thirds rule would apply with dissensions recorded.

The WSA members noted that although the process was slow, not without argument, and ponderous, it resulted in supported decisions. Habermas (1984b) characterized this form of consensus as "true consensus" whereby participants exchange their validity claims through communication and discuss them long enough, recognizing that their claims are fallible, until consensus is reached. According to two WSA members (2C, 2H), a serendipitous benefit of consensus decision-making became evident during the second year of the WSA's planning process. Because all the members knew they were working toward consensus, they entered the planning process without setting bottom lines but with flexible positions (2C, 2H). These are the same characteristics of "principled negotiation" advanced by Fisher and Ury (1981) and supported by Armour (1992).

In response to how their consensus process worked, the WSA members characterized their consensus decision-making process as follows (number of respondents mentioning the particular characteristic is indicated in brackets):

What is needed for consensus to work?

- . listening to and hearing from everyone (10);
- . respect for each other (10);
- . shared goals (10);
- . shared values (10);
- . appreciating diversity (7);
- . open-mindedness (7);
- . clear authority (6);
- . commitment to the process (6);
- . some shared background (6);
- . face to face interactions (5);
- . ability to compromise (5);
- . patience (5);
- . informality (4);
- . shared social activities (4);
- . good relationships (4);
- . humour (4);
- . caring for each other (3); and
- . level playing field (3).

What have been the outcomes of this consensus process?

- . respect for all members and points of view (10);
- . relationships developed (9);
- . mutual learning took place (9);
- . open and thorough discussions took place (8);
- . good and mutually satisfying decisions were made (8);
- . allowed for moving beyond 'blocks' (7);
- . innovative solutions were possible (6);
- . crises were well managed and strengthening (5); and
- . decisions went beyond winning and losing (4).

What were the constraints of the process?

- . too time consuming (10);
- . struggle for authority and concern around re-appointments (10);
- . duplication of effort and conflict with other jurisdictions (4);
- . too small and inappropriately configured planning area (3)
- . not enough go-arounds due to time constraints (2); and
- . needed more support from sponsors in time of stress (2).

4.6 Cooperation

Cooperation refers to demonstration of cooperative behaviour among actors in co-management in the performance of management functions. Cooperation among members of a co-management agency is necessary to achieve mutual consent in decision-making. Cooperation is enhanced when members engage in joint fact-finding missions or other strategies of trust building. In addition, cooperation between the agency and the public or other key actors is enhanced if the decision-making process is inclusive and if there are clear lines of communication. Therefore, cooperation was analyzed at two levels: (a) externally, involving the co-management agencies, other key actors, and the public; and (b) internally, involving the management agency members. Three questions were posed in order to identify cooperative behaviour among actors. The questions are:

- Have representatives in your agency engaged in joint fact-finding missions or other strategies of trust building?
- Did your/the agency seek technical advice and/or logistical support from the government or any of the key actors, and was such advice/support accorded?
- What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between local resource users and the/your agency?

Table 13 provides a summary of the responses to the questions. Appendix 3 gives detailed responses to the questions under the category "Cooperation".

Table 13: Summary results pertaining to cooperation among actors in co-management.

Interview Question	Responses			
	CPC N=11	n	WSA N=10	n
1. Have representatives in your agency engaged in joint fact-finding missions or other strategies of trust building?	<p>No</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "we don't even know each other" • "It's taken for granted everybody knows everybody" • "we only see each other at meetings". 	11	<p>Yes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "closer working relationships through sub-committee structures" • "consensus demanded trust and respect among members" • "joint tours of our planning area" • "individual assignments to the members" • "a joint committee comprising both Ontario & TAA appointees to deal with the MKA enforcement issue" • "we had informal get-togethers such as X-mas Party" 	10
2. Did your/the agency seek technical advice and/or logistical support from the government or any of the key actors, and was such advice/support accorded?	CPC N=16 [11 + 5]	n	WSA N=15 [10 + 5]	n
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • due to the nature of working relationships between the CPC and the MNR, the CPC gets all the technical assistance and advice it needs through the MNR. 	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNR provided background information used in planning • MNR provided GIS facilities for mapping purposes • MNR provided printing facilities for our final plan • MNR conducted patrols and other as per our Enforcement Agreement • The Ontario Provincial Police cooperated with us during the MKA enforcement issue • MNR refused to provide a flight over an area illegally cut by the MKA until instructions were issued from Toronto to do so • MNR initially refused to grant the WSA applications forms for a Land Use permit 	15 15 15 15 10 10 10
3. What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between local resource users and the/your agency?	CPC N=50 [11 + 39]	n	WSA N=49 [10 + 39]	n
	<p>None:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • perhaps that will emerge in the next planning phase • the public are not inclined to cooperate with CPC because the process is perceived to be controlled by the MNR 	46 4	<p>Several with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • tourist outfitters • guide outfitters • baitfish licensees • logging industry • trappers • mining interests may not cooperate 	40 9

4.6.1 Cooperation between the Agencies and other key actors/public

According to the results presented in Table 13, the MNR provided both technical and logistical support to both the CPC and the MNR. Both CPC and MNR respondents (N=16) pointed out that since the CPC worked with the MNR in the comprehensive planning process, the CPC obtained all the technical support it required through the MNR. Through an Enforcement Agreement signed between the MNR and the WSA, it was observed that the former performed several functions on behalf of the latter including: fire patrols; budworm surveys; regeneration assessments; annual clearance of trails; and maintenance of campsites.

However, WSA respondents (N=10) also quoted two incidences where the MNR had refused to provide the required technical assistance. One incident involved a request for a flight over an area that was illegally cut by the MaKominising Anishnabeg; a splinter group from the TAA that claimed ownership of the lands under the WSA. The other incident involved refusal by the MNR to grant the WSA's requested application forms for a Land Use Permit. As discussed earlier, the MNR finally rendered the assistance in both cases despite some initial resistance. Both incidences above relate to power struggles between the WSA and the MNR. As highlighted earlier, the WSA's *de facto* authority was a constant challenge to the MNR's *de jure* authority; the MNR maintained that the WSA had no legislative basis to make operational decisions. The fact that the WSA stuck together in both cases and got what it wanted, suggests that it was a cohesive group capable of resisting external pressures.

As discussed earlier under section 3.3.2.3, 92% of the respondents (N=50) pointed out that there was no evidence of cooperative behaviour between the CPC and the public. To the contrary, the WSA had agreements with tourist outfitters, guide outfitters, baitfish licensees, the logging industry, and trappers to monitor resources within the WSA area. The levels of public cooperation with the agencies are related to the latter's public participation processes. As noted earlier, the CPC's public participation process was less effective than the WSA's due to two reasons. First, the amount, time of delivery, and complexity of information provided to the public by the CPC were generally found inappropriate by most of public respondents. Second, the methods of public participation used by the CPC were also found less effective in relation to the stages of the planning process.

Therefore, decentralization as a strategy for cooperative decision-making becomes meaningful only if such decentralization entails effective communication through appropriate information and fora for communicative discourse. Such was the case with the WSA; information provided to the public was in easy-to-understand formats. The WSA also used workshops for problem solving and to share ideas. Other methods used were also applied at the right stages of the planning process. These are the same arguments advanced by Habermas (1982) that, communication can only take place through use of media (written language or corresponding non-verbal expressions) oriented towards shared understanding. Shared understanding is a prerequisite to cooperative behaviour. Through use of media that promoted shared understanding, the WSA was able to win the cooperation (in agreement) of the local users in the performance of specific management functions.

4.6.2 Cooperation among members of the co-management agency

The results in Table 13 show that the CPC did not engage in joint fact-finding strategies that promote mutual understanding and trust. According to the CPC respondents, they felt they did know each other because the only time they saw each other was in meetings. The WSA respondents, on the other hand, described several strategies used. The WSA used task assignments through ad-hoc committee structures and individuals. Such committees and individuals reported their findings to the committee of the whole (5C). According to two WSA respondents (2E, 2G), delegating decision-making responsibility to appropriate individuals or relevant committees was much more practical, efficient, and satisfying. It avoided the horrible "meeting-out" feeling that comes from everyone having to participate in every decision (2E, 2G).

Review of WSA¹⁹ minutes also confirmed that the WSA members had four joint tours of their planning area; an activity that was highly valued by the members for building trust and fostering mutual learning. It was also observed that the WSA members had informal get-togethers that improved personal relationships. As one WSA member (2H) put it, "...these shared invents created intimacy and continuity; these kinds of activities offered us the chance to unwind and be refreshed while at the same time get to know one another- in the end, they increased our involvement."

Although the requirement for consensus decision-making was instructed through the mandate, the WSA members characterized consensus as one of their strategies for joint problem-solving and trust-building (Table 13). As one member (2A) put it, "...consensus diminished hierarchy and class

¹⁹ WSA Minutes of January 25, 1992; April 10, 1992; August 8, 1993; and December 15, 1993.

divisions between our Chair and the members as well as among members, and increased bonding. We acted as co-equals, we were like one family". This view is consistent with Cohen *et al.*'s (1988) view that formality in form of address and distinction of special privilege, which are characteristic of the majority-vote-style of decision-making or "Robert's rules", contributed to feelings of in-groups and out-groups and not a sense of community.

4.6.3 Conclusions

The Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) is likely to remain a key player in co-management whether internally (as with the CPC) or externally (as with the WSA). The analysis above demonstrated that the MNR generally cooperated with both the CPC and the WSA in providing both technical and logistical support. However, such support to the WSA was at times hampered by a lack of clarity in the authority roles of both the MNR and the WSA over the latter's planning area. This implies that if the jurisdictional authority of the players in co-management were clear, high levels of cooperation among them could be enhanced. Given the range of possible co-management arrangements on Arnstein's(1969) ladder of citizen participation (see Figure 2, p. 11), such authority could entail: authority to advise; and authority to implement and/or make decisions.

The lack of cooperation between the CPC and the public or local users implies that the latter's involvement in the CPC public participation and decision-making constituted at most, degrees of tokenism. At these levels, the public simply informed the process and participated in discussions. These entail lower rungs on Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation in a co-management context; i.e., at levels 3 (informing), 4 (consultation), and 5 (placation). According to Arnstein

(1969), it is at the level of "partnership" where power is in fact redistributed through negotiation between citizens and powerholders. At this level, they agree to share planning and decision-making responsibilities through such structures as joint policy boards or planning committees (Arnstein 1969). With the WSA, partnerships were formed with local users by agreeing to share planning and decision-making functions between them. This implies that for cooperation (both in agreement and practice) to be achieved between the public and the management agencies, public participation practices need to operate at levels that promote partnerships.

However, the cooperation reached between the WSA and the various local users was only in agreement and at the planning level. The real test of those partnerships lie in the implementation of the WSA's decisions or its plan. As pointed out earlier, the WSA lacked decision-making authority to implement its decisions and was terminated after four years of operation.

The Minister of Natural Resources' announcement on February 6, 1996 effectively transferred the WSA's plan to the CPC for further decisions on its feasibility and implementation. Since the MNR makes the decisions in the CPC process, the feasibility of the WSA's plan will ultimately be decided by the MNR. Therefore, it is not possible to predict at this point what will happen to the agreements reached between the WSA and the various local users after the MNR makes its final decisions on the WSA's plan.

Therefore, *how has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users?*

1. The decentralization models of co-management agencies studied resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai First Nation (the co-sponsors) due to the former's unilateral actions that undermined the authority of the latter.
2. The decentralization models of co-management agencies studied resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between stakeholder groups and Ontario due to the latter's unilateral decision to appoint Ontario representatives to the management agencies.
3. Because of (2) above, there was a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the stakeholder groups and Ontario representatives on both management agencies due to a lack of accountability between them. There were no reporting relationships structured between Ontario representatives and their constituencies.
4. The decentralization models of co-management agencies studied resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the sponsors and the major stakeholder groups excluded from the processes. The groups not represented were mining interests and the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters.
5. As a result of (4) above, co-management through the CPC and the WSA resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the major stakeholder groups excluded from the process and the management agencies. The political legitimacy of the co-management agencies was threatened by those groups.

6. The decentralization model of co-management of the WSA resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the WSA and Ontario due to the latter's non-conferment of legislative authority to the former.
7. The decentralization model of co-management of the WSA resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the WSA and some of its members who quit due to the larger unresolved land claim issue between the co-sponsors. The members above laid claim to the lands under the WSA's jurisdiction. Ontario's designation of these lands under co-management created a locational conflict between WSA members and members of the splinter group of the TAA- the MaKominising Anishnabeg.
8. The decentralization model of co-management of the CPC resulted in a lack of mutual understanding (lack of respect and trust) between the CPC members and the MNR due to a lack of congruence between members' goals and those of the agency. The MNR made decisions that departed from the CPC members' goals.
9. The decentralization model of co-management of the WSA resulted in mutual understanding among WSA members due to the use of consensus in their decision-making.
10. At a planning level, co-management through the WSA resulted in cooperation among agency members and between agency members and local users. Internal cooperation was facilitated by the use of consensus in decision-making while externally, it was facilitated by meaningful public involvement in the agency's planning and decision-making processes.

4.7 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution was analyzed at two levels: (a) externally, involving the agencies and the public; and (b) internally, involving agency members. Four questions were posed in order to identify the conflicts in the area and the strategies used to resolve them. The questions are:

- what are the conflicts in the area?;
- what conflict resolution strategies were adopted by your agency?;
- what are/have been the outcomes of such conflict resolution strategies?; and
- have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated over time, and what are the reasons for the de-escalation/escalation?

Table 14 provides a summary of responses to the above questions. Appendix 3 lists detailed responses to the questions under the category "conflict resolution." For the purposes of analysis, two conflicts identified by respondents in Table 14 concerning the aboriginal land claim and mining interests demanding more land for staking, were left out. The former deals with the larger issue of the treaty process between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario. It was felt that neither the CPC nor the WSA could influence such a process. The latter was left out of the final analysis because as highlighted earlier, the mining interests were not represented on both agencies and have already threatened to jeopardize both planning processes. Therefore, it was felt that the conflict will not go away. The rest of the conflicts, the strategies adopted to resolve them, and the outcomes of such resolutions are discussed by agency from both external (involving the agency and the public) and internal (involving agency members) points of view. This is followed by a conclusion at the end.

Table 14: Summary results pertaining to conflict resolution under co-management.

Interview Question	Responses			
	CPC N=74 [All Respondents]	n	WSA N=74 [All Respondents]	n
1. What are the conflicts in the area?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Native land claim and cautions • Mining interests want entire land base opened to staking • Pilots Association wants fly-in access into LESW Park • Elk Lake opposed to status of LESW Park & demand 9 Twps. from the CPC area • Road Access: Red Squirrel/ Liskeard Lumber Roads 	70 63 42 60 61	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Native land claims and cautions • Mining interests want entire land base opened to staking • The MaKominising Anishnabeg claiming WSA lands • Road Access: Red Squirrel/ Liskeard Lumber roads 	70 63 49 61
2. What conflict resolution strategies were adopted by your agency?	CPC N=11 <u>Strategies used:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • training opportunities in conflict resolution • more information sought in light of conflicts • presentations by interest groups <u>No strategy:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • co-chair makes all the decisions • co-chair does not allow conflicts at the table • option development and zoning all done by MNR 	n 4 7	WSA N=10 <u>Strategies used:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • consensus-decision making • neutral chair • planner as facilitator and collaborator • zoning • training in conflict resolution and group facilitation • open planning process • cooperation with local users <u>No strategy:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more time could have been spent building relationships with the local MNR 	n 10 1
3. What are/have been the outcomes of such conflict resolution strategies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conflicts were played down • conflicts are likely to surface in resource allocation 	10 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • consensus was achieved • completed plan in a short time • got cooperation in agreement from local resource users • co-existence was achieved • resolved the most difficulty issue of road access 	8 10 7 10 10
4. Have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated over time and what are the reasons for the de-escalation/escalation?	CPC N=74 [All respondents] Conflicts: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. are on hold 2. are escalating 3. have de-escalated Reasons: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. because plan is not complete and nothing is happening on the ground. 2. because planning process is taking too long; treaty process is taking too long; mining interests & ELCF are not happy. 3. because nothing was happening on the ground 	n 29 61 18	WSA N=74 [All Respondents] Conflicts: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. are on hold 2. are likely to escalate 3. have de-escalated Reasons: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. because nothing is happening on the ground. 2. because the future of the WSA plan is not known; if the MNR and not a shared stewardship body implements the plan as agreed in MOU; mining interests are not happy. 3. because of the WSA's high profile. 	n 72 45 7

4.7.1 The CPC and conflict resolution

The conflicts and strategies used externally

As explained earlier in the background to this study, the community of Elk Lake, among other local communities, opposed the establishment of the Lady Evelyn-Smoothwater Wilderness Park (LESWP) for economic reasons. Establishment of the park 11 years ago meant that timber reserves, including plantations planted 30 years ago, could no longer be accessed by the local timber industry in Elk Lake. Access through the Liskeard Lumber Road, a road built mainly to get to timber in the area was also closed down because it run through the park. Ontario compensated the company that built the road, Liskeard Lumber, for closure of the road. But because its timber limits were also within the proposed park area, the company was eventually forced to shut down for lack of timber supplies. To the community of Elk Lake, the road was the life blood of its economy as it brought in tourists from across the Province; tourism being the mainstay of its economy at the time (4H). Therefore, Elk has always maintained that it wanted the Liskeard Lumber Road opened through the Park. Current restrictions include gates on the road.

During the 11 years that the park existed, it did not have a management plan and thus, several uses such as baitfish harvesting, commercial trapping, and hunting were allowed. A number of tourism uses such as fly-in services, commercial outpost camps, fishing, and boat catches, have also taken place. Fly-in operators have traditionally used specific staging areas for their aircrafts within prescribed access zones [MNR n.d. (b)]. In the past, private aircraft owners also used these staging areas [MNR n.d. (b)]. However, with the development of a park management plan for LESWP by the CPC/MNR, most of the above uses including baitfish harvesting, commercial trapping, hunting,

and private aircraft access will all be curtailed [MNR n.d. (a)]. This is in conformity with existing Ontario Park Policy on wilderness class parks that states protection as its highest objective.

To compound the conflict, the CPC/MNR is proposing expansion of LESWP size from the current 74,000 ha to 100,000 as a minimum functioning ecological unit (5C). The main concern of the Elk Lake community is that the park system is being used as a 'land grab' that is likely to stifle its local economy even further (4D). To the Private Pilots' Association, the idea that private aircraft operators would be prohibited from certain areas where commercial operators would be allowed--independently as well that aircraft would be prohibited in a range of areas, is viewed as discrimination (5C). At the centre of all this conflict is a fundamental disagreement about the Parks Policy. The MNR maintains that it has to plan according to provincial policy. The community of Elk Lake and other interests supportive of its position, and the Private Pilots' Association all threatened to lobby the government directly toward recommending changes in the existing provincial parks policy (5C).

The other conflict between the CPC and the Elk Lake Community Forest (ELCF) involved an overlap in their planning area boundaries. The ELCF was laying claim to nine (9) geographic townships that fell in the comprehensive planning area. The concerned lands are Crown lands and both the CPC and the ELCF are provincially-mandated initiatives. Ross (1993) noted that this issue has been the main source of distrust between the two agencies.

According to the results in Table 14, four (4) respondents (N=11) identified training of the CPC members in conflict resolution and public presentations as the main strategies adopted by the CPC to address conflicts externally. However, seven (7) respondents felt that the CPC did not adopt any conflict resolution strategies at all. The seven (7) respondents above felt one of the co-chairs played down conflicts by not allowing conflicts to surface and thus get discussed at the table. They also contended that the same co-chair made all the decisions together with the MNR (Table 12).

Although the CPC members received training in conflict resolution, this training was never tested in a real conflict situation (2K, 2L, 2M, 2N, 2P, 2S, and 2U). While the CPC had conflict resolution sessions with the community of Elk Lake, the focus was on training and not on discussing substantive issues such as the concerns of Elk Lake over Ontario Parks Policy, the Liskeard Lumber Road, and the nine (9) townships. As one of the key respondents noted (5C):

"... We have had conflict resolution training sessions which we applied when we met with the ELCF people over a number of sessions. The focus was on training. We didn't actually get into the nuts and bolts of doing conflict resolution on anything per se, and given the concerns of Elk Lake over the LESWP and the joint responsibility we have in some townships falling within the Elk Lake Community Forest, I think it would be certainly worthwhile pursuing real conflict resolution with Elk Lake and the Elk Lake Community Forest Partnership Board."

At a meeting held between the CPC/MNR and the Private Pilots' Association on July 13, 1994 and at which the author was present, both parties held to their positions and failed to accommodate each other's concerns. The spokesperson for the CPC, an MNR staff responsible for parks planning in the comprehensive planning process, emphasized how existing provincial policy on wilderness parks could not be changed to accommodate the demands of the Association. Several individuals from the Pilots' Association consistently demanded to know why the CPC/MNR would not allow private aircrafts to land in the same areas as commercial aircraft. At the end of the meeting, whose

tone began to get rowdy, neither party was satisfied that its concerns were heard and addressed. As one CPC member (2M) remarked at the end of the meeting, "what a showdown!".

In both cases above, conflict resolution was avoided. With the Private Pilots' Association, the CPC/MNR took the role of arbiter rather than facilitator in conflict resolution; not the forum for principled negotiations as argued for by Fisher and Ury (1981). Neither did both parties engage in discussions aimed at reaching shared understanding through exchange of (fallible) validity claims as noted by Habermas (1982). Here, the CPC/MNR provided a forum for the statement of positions rather than principled negotiations among protagonists. In her review of resource management planning processes in the Temagami Area, Ross (1993:22) also noted that the public consultations by the CPC on the Treaty of Co-existence followed a similar strategy in their public meetings. She concluded, ".. the meetings were more conducive to the adamant statement of unbendable positions than to the calm stating and hearing of interests and needs" (Ross 1993:23).

Another point noted by one of the key informants (5C) and also confirmed in this study was that, while the CPC members undertook training in conflict resolution, their planning counterparts, the MNR staff who were also the decision-makers, did not. Habermas (1984a) argued that shared understanding or 'communicative action' does not only draw from the explicit knowledge of participants but also against a non-explicit background- 'the lifeworld'. Part of that lifeworld, in this case, could be knowledge gained through training. Therefore, it would appear that training in conflict resolution is a necessary step in ensuring that members or participants harmonize their plan of action based on common definition of the situation. Despite a lack of background in conflict resolution by the MNR staff, they felt the CPC members, and not themselves, needed training in conflict resolution

(1A). Again, the MNR was assuming the role of an arbiter. Arnstein (1969) characterized this form of public participation as 'therapy', whereby the focus is on educating or curing the participants of their pathology rather than changing the circumstances that created the pathology- in this case, the lack of redistribution of decision-making authority to the CPC.

Strategies used internally

Internally, the CPC sought more information in light of conflicts (Table 12); but without an internal strategy for resolving conflicts among members - such as 'consensus' or other joint-problem solving techniques, more information was of little help. When the CPC/MNR zoned its boundaries for different uses/values, the MNR made all the zoning decisions without the participation of both the CPC and the public. As discussed earlier, when the CPC submitted the completed zones and land use options for public review, not only did the public find them complex and confusing but also the CPC members.

4.7.2 The WSA and conflict resolution

The conflicts and strategies used externally

Section 4.5.1 discussed the enforcement issue involving a splinter group of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, known as the MaKominising Anishnabeg. However, when the MNR lawyers based in Toronto recommended a broad-based injunction barring all Teme-Augama Anishnabai from the WSA area²⁰, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai representatives on the WSA rejected the proposal. The WSA

²⁰ Ontario Court (General Division): Motion record No. 2320/90 for the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (Plaintiffs) and MaKominising Anishnabeg (Defendants). Motion sworn July 9, 1993. Smith, Byck & Grant Barristers and Solicitors, New Liskeard, Ontario.

opted for limited injunctions²¹ that would only barr the defendants from cutting any more trees or selling the timber already cut and not limiting their entry into the area. The second injunction above excluded the phrase "restrained from entering on to the said lands." Next the MNR suggested sending in its personnel to scale the timber that was illegally cut. The WSA, supported by the OPP, rejected the proposal because it would be a source of confrontation with the dissident group (5C). Instead, the WSA opted to send in two of its members to talk to and listen to the demands of the group. Such meetings took place on five separate occasions²². It was during the last meeting that the two WSA members served the injunctions to the defendants. Meanwhile, the WSA had requested a reconnaissance flight from the MNR (according to the Enforcement Agreement) to evaluate the extent and exact location of the cut area. The request was turned down on the grounds that it was not safe for MNR staff to fly over the area; but this is the same agency that had wanted to send in its timber scalers to measure the wood cut. The WSA took their complaint up the MNR ladder and eventually the flight was provided.

According to the WSA respondents, because the WSA developed rapport with the defendants, confrontation similar to the one that occurred in Oka, Quebec, was avoided. The illegally cut timber was never sold; it still lay on the ground at the time of this study's field interviews. The strategies used by the WSA included networking with other enforcement agencies in the area (MNR and OPP), open communications, and application of principled negotiations. The WSA finally resolved the conflict after the defendants appeared in court and agreed to abide by the conditions of the injunction.

²¹ Ontario Court (General Division): Motion record No.2321/90 for the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (Plaintiffs) and MaKominising Anishnabeg (Defendants). Motion sworn July 13, 1993. Smith, Byck & Grant Barristers and Solicitors, New Liskeard, Ontario.

²² WSA Minutes of August 8, 11, 14, 22, and 28, 1994. These minutes contain short reports by the two members given to the whole Authority, specifying details of contacts with members of the MaKominising Anishnabeg.

Another crisis that faced the WSA was how they would decide the status or use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension. As highlighted earlier, past controversy over this road led to closure of the only mill in Temagami (Wm. Milne Lumber), aboriginal and environmentalist blockades, and finally the formation of the WSA.

One of the strategies used by the WSA to resolve this issue was the concept of "land-use zoning" (Table 14). According to three of the WSA respondents (N=10), the WSA resolved the Red Squirrel Road controversy through zoning decisions that identified different areas for different uses. The WSA plan (WSA 1994:13) described in detail how the zoning technique was applied. The actual zoning proceeded from low impact uses (such as protection, fish habitat, wildlife habitat, and cultural heritage) to high impact uses (such as mining and timber harvesting) (Appendix 3). Rather than put solid lines on the map, the WSA members took their zoning ideas to the public for discussion and identification of zones. Composite land value maps showing various patterns of resource potential in the planning area were used in the zoning decision-making process (WSA 1994). The composite values maps were also overlaid with soils, topographic, and watershed maps of the area. Equipped with those tools, both the public and the WSA participated in a preliminary zoning exercise at a workshop and public meeting held on October 30, 1993 (WSA 1994). The preliminary results were zones delineated on maps for specific uses that were agreed between the WSA and the public.

Once the zones were decided, the WSA then recommended several road access options for reaching those resources/values. Those options were then taken for public review again. In the end, the first option on use of the road, which is described in the decisions outlined in section 3.3.2.2.1, was adopted by both the WSA and the public. Here, zoning forced consensus on use of the Red

Squirrel Road. Zoning resulted in negotiations between the WSA and the public and ultimately in a supported decision. The public supported the WSA's decision on use of the Red Squirrel Road and its Extension. The process took longer than most of the WSA members had anticipated (2D, 2G, 2J); but in the end, as one WSA member put it,

Once the process was explained to the members, and after several rounds of practice, we were able to follow and understand our decision from beginning to the end; zoning is an open and visual process- there are no hidden agendas. We criticized each other's opinions but in a constructive way... We participated in it all at the same time, having the same information, and using our local knowledge of the area, and maps provided by the planner. It forced us to work together. In the end we achieved balanced use across our planning area and everybody was happy. (2I).

This is consistent with Habermas' (1984b) view that true consensus can only emerge if participants in communication exchange validity claims with a pre-understanding that such claims can be criticized or rejected. For this to have happened on the WSA, the decision-making process had to be open as characterized by the WSA respondents in Table 14.

Strategies used internally

Several internal strategies used by the WSA included consensus decision-making, a neutral Chair (as specified in the mandate), a planner who acted as facilitator and collaborator rather than decision-maker, and land-use zoning. These are similar features to the cooperative planning model described by Armour (1992). Both zoning and consensus decision-making proved to be effective tools for conflict resolution not only internally but also with the public.

De-escalation/escalation of conflicts

For the CPC, 82% of the respondents characterized conflicts in the area as escalating (Table 14). This escalation was attributed the public's discontent with the length of time it was taking the CPC to complete its plan. As noted earlier, the mandate of the CPC was extended twice: first, from March 31, 1992 to March 31, 1994; and second, from March 31, 1994 to March 31, 1996. The CPC's involvement in the MNR's Contingency Timber Management Planning and Interim Timber Management Planning processes caused delays in the CPC process. These delays demanded the first extension. The CPC's involvement in the public consultations over Treaty of Co-existence negotiations between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai caused further delays in the CPC process. The delays demanded the second extension.

In addition, the same respondents felt that since the concerns of both mining interests and the Elk Lake Community Forest (ELCF) were not addressed, conflicts in the area were likely to escalate. However, in another announcement made by the Minister of Natural Resources on February 6, 1995, the Minister transferred the nine (9) Townships at the centre of conflict between the CPC and the ELCF under the latter's jurisdiction. In the same announcement, the Minister also allowed mineral staking in 20 Townships that were previously not covered by the TAA land caution. Previously, an agreement between Ontario and the TAA excluded mining activities in the 20 Townships. Given these latest developments, it is possible that the conflicts may not escalate as a result of pressures from mining interests and the Elk Lake Community Forest.

For the WSA, 97% of the respondents (N=74) noted that conflicts in the area were currently on hold due a lack of action on the ground; that is, the WSA's plan had not been implemented.

However, it was also felt by 64% of the respondents that conflicts were likely to escalate because the future of the WSA was not known. In particular, the respondents pointed out that conflicts were likely to escalate if the WSA plan was not implemented by a body other than the MNR.

The Agreement In Principle (AIP) reached between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai in October, 1993 (Ontario Executive Council 1993b) stated that the mandate of the WSA would be extended from time to time until the establishment of a transition body mutually agreed upon by both parties. However, Ontario unilaterally terminated the WSA without a new transition body in place. On February 6, 1995, the Minister of Natural Resources announced that the feasibility and implementation of the WSA's plan would be decided by the CPC. Given that the MNR and not the CPC will eventually implement the plan (due to a lack of legislative authority for the latter), it is highly likely, therefore, that conflicts will escalate in the area.

In both the CPC and WSA cases, what is clear is that conflicts are anticipated at the implementation stage. For the WSA the question is "if the plan is not implemented by the WSA or another body other than the MNR" whereas with the CPC, it is "when the plan is implemented". A general conclusion that can be drawn here is that the public support the WSA's planning process and its plan whereas that support was lacking for the CPC. This had to do with the CPC public involvement process perceived by the public to be mere tokenism. In addition, while the WSA completed its plan within its three-year mandate, the CPC process has been going on since 1989. It will have taken seven years of comprehensive planning by the CPC if they adhere to the current deadline of March 31, 1996 for completion of the plan.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined four main research questions pertaining to co-management applications. The study used two cases in Temagami, northeastern Ontario: the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) and the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA), in order to answer those questions. The questions, which are discussed in the next sections, are:

- 1) How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to local levels?;
- 2) How has co-management changed the substance of resource management decisions at local levels?;
- 3) How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users?; and
- 4) How has co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?

This chapter now draws some final conclusions, arguing that while co-management as a model for resource management has considerable potential, its ultimate success lies in the objectives of citizen involvement and the relevant institutional designs or structures adopted. If the objective is to simply involve local citizens in resource management discussions, on both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks (Figures 25 and 26, respectively) the levels of public participation would be in the low ranges (informing to placation). At these levels, local citizens or stakeholders are merely informing and participating in the process.




Figure 25: Co-management levels/designs and their implications for devolution of decision-making power on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (Adapted from Arnstein 1969).




Figure 26: Co-management levels/designs and their implications for devolution of decision-making power on Parenteau's public participation and decision-making evaluation framework (Adapted from Parenteau 1988).

Institutional structures suitable to such arrangements include advisory groups or committees with strictly advisory roles. In such cases, decision-making authority is retained by the government agency responsible for planning and resource management. If the objective is to promote shared decision-making among various participants, the levels of public participation would be in the upper ranges of both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks (from partnerships or cooperation to citizen control). At these levels, real decision-making authority to advise, decide, and/or implement decisions is delegated to local citizens' groups. Here, local citizens' groups inform the process, participate in the process, design the process, and share in decision-making.

The two co-management agencies studied depicted two different models of institutional design. Ontario created the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) as an advisory body to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR). Both Ontario and the CPC members understood this advisory role to confer some degree of authority to advise the MNR. Hence, the specification in the CPC's mandate to recommend a comprehensive plan to the Minister of Natural Resources- and not to the MNR District Office staff in Temagami. This implied that the CPC required to arrive at a set of decisions before it provided advice to the MNR. Because the MNR retained legislative authority to make decisions, this implied that the MNR was supposed to share decision-making responsibilities with the CPC. On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks above (Figures 25 and 26, respectively), this implied some degree of citizen power for the CPC at the levels of "partnership" (Figure 25) or "cooperation" (Figure 26).

Both Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) First Nation created the WSA as a decision-making rather than advisory body. Both establishing bodies above understood the WSA as

a model of shared decision-making between aboriginal interests (represented through six TAA appointees) and non-aboriginal or "provincial interests" (represented through six Ontario appointees). Of notable absence on the WSA was the MNR. Both Ontario and the TAA agreed to exclude the MNR from the WSA pointing out that the WSA was a model for shared stewardship between Ontario and the TAA; thus connoting a government-to-government relationship between both establishing bodies.

Because the WSA was created as a decision-making body, both Ontario and the TAA promised to delegate authority to the WSA. For Ontario, this meant granting the WSA legislative authority. With the TAA, this meant conferring the authority through a General Assembly Resolution. General Assembly is the highest legislative body for the TAA which would be synonymous to the Ontario Legislature.

As a model of shared decision-making between Ontario and the TAA, the WSA model of co-management implied some degree of decision-making power. On both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks above (Figures 25 and 26, respectively), the WSA's degree of decision-making power constituted the levels of "partnership" (Figure 25) or "cooperation" (Figure 26). However, the absence of the MNR from its board also suggested that the WSA was created at the highest level of "citizen control" on both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) evaluation frameworks. Given both the CPC and WSA's backgrounds above, the next sections provide summary conclusions in response to the questions highlighted above.

5.1 Co-management and Distributions of Decision-making Authority to Local Levels

How has co-management affected the distributions of decision-making authority to local levels? This question was addressed in Chapter 3.

The evidence in this study showed that the models of decentralization of decision-making to both the CPC and the WSA only conferred degrees of responsibility but not authority to effectively advise and implement decisions, respectively. While such responsibility was adequate to make decisions at the planning level in the case of the WSA, it was insufficient to implement those decisions. The lack of advisory authority for the CPC meant that it became convenient for the MNR to preempt the CPC's decisions or coopt the CPC into its decisions. Therefore, in both cases, the structural as well as procedural conditions within which these co-management agencies were constituted constrained the achievement of "partnerships" or "cooperation" as initially anticipated by the establishing bodies. These findings are also consistent with those of Reed (1995:147) in the case of the Ignace Co-management Committee in Ignace, northern Ontario.

This has implications for the way co-management is viewed as a model for shared decision-making in resource management. What is in question is whether what is shared is responsibility or the authority to make and implement decisions. As highlighted earlier, depending on the objectives of co-management, it is argued that the latter is more meaningful to co-management than the former. This is so because the ultimate success of co-management depends on the degrees of influence that local citizens can exert over decision-making. Consequently, the ultimate test for decentralization of decision-making authority to local levels lies in the implementation and not simply in the making

of decisions in the planning process. This is not to suggest that the latter case, involving simply redistributions of responsibility to engage the public in discussions, has no place in co-management. Such co-management designs may be applicable in cases where the objectives are to "inform" or "educate" the publics. Often, in such cases, there is likely to be an absence of demand for local involvement in resource management decision-making. In both cases studied, where demands for local involvement in resource management decision-making were apparent, the decentralization models of co-management failed to commit the agencies to share decision-making (in the case of the CPC) and implement (in the case of the WSA) decisions. While the WSA obtained such authority from the TAA through a General Assembly Resolution, Ontario failed to delegate similar authority (granted by the Legislature) to the WSA.

For co-management to be truly a model of shared decision-making, political rather than administrative decentralization of decision-making authority to local levels is necessary. Political decentralization would include an actual delegation of power to the local level, and the participation of nonprofessionals in the policy-making process, as compared to administrative decentralization, which relies on varying degrees of devolution of responsibility but without the authority to implement decisions. This study confirmed that administrative decentralization of decision-making through Orders-In-Council and Memoranda of Understanding only conferred responsibility to make recommendations. In a western democracy such as Canada, political decentralization can be achieved through the legislative granting of authority to local organizations, thereby assuring the implementation of decisions made by co-management agencies.

The absence of decision-making authority in the co-management agencies studied also affected the broader publics' participation in the agencies' planning and decision-making processes. In the case of the CPC/MNR co-management arrangement, the public could not influence its decisions because the CPC, which acted in a strictly advisory role, did not make decisions; decisions were made by the MNR- the government agency. The MNR on the other hand, relied exclusively on scientific information and existing policies in its decision-making process to the exclusion of local knowledge. Consequently, the MNR's decisions were often not relevant to the local context as they excluded local knowledge input and lacked flexibility to change policy. The implication is that both the CPC and the public did not have control over information used in the planning process, nor could they propose or change policy.

For the WSA, the levels of public participation in its planning and decision-making processes contained degrees of citizen power. This was possible because the WSA exercised *de facto* decision-making authority. It incorporated both scientific and local knowledge in its planning process that was also flexible and as a result, capable of adapting to the local needs and conditions. However, because the WSA lacked *de jure* decision-making authority, those decisions made with the public could not be implemented. Its decisions were turned to the Ministry of Natural Resources, which has legislative authority, to judge their feasibility and legitimacy. Public participation in this case was simply reduced to an advisory exercise in planning. Decision-making authority for co-management agencies is necessary to ensure that decisions made by the agencies with the public are implemented.

One of the important findings in this study is that both theories of citizen participation and co-management do not address the issues of quality of information and methods used in public

participation fora. Both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) public participation and decision-making evaluation frameworks fail to explicitly discuss these factors as important for effective public participation. For co-management, whose main premises are shared decision-making and consensus, the degree of complexity of information shared with the public, its volume, and time of dissemination or delivery, are all important attributes of information that need to be considered.

Shared understanding between the agencies and the public is likely to be enhanced if the information provided by the former to the latter is easy to understand, of adequate volume and detail, and provided in time. It was also found that when proactive methods are used, the information required could be self-generated between agency members and the public. Proactive methods were found to be most suitable in the early stages of planning processes while reactive methods were suitable in the late stages particularly if proactive methods were applied in the first place.

While the substance of resource management decisions improved under the decentralization models of co-management studied, the implementation of those decisions was affected by the lack of authority (to advise or to implement). The next section summarises this issue in response to research question #2 which was discussed in Chapter 4.

5.2 Co-management and the Substance of Resource Management Decisions

How has co-management changed the substance of resource management decisions at local levels?

Co-management improved the substance of decision-making at the planning level by moving away from a pre-occupation with timber management planning to comprehensive or holistic resource management planning. In both cases examined in this study, this was a requirement reflected in the agencies' mandates. With the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA), decisions characterized by the public and agency members as ecologically sustainable and equitable emerged because of meaningful public participation. However, as pointed out earlier, the sustainability and equitability of those decisions could not be tested because the WSA lacked the legislative authority to implement those decisions. With the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC), the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) retained decision-making authority. Acting in a strictly advisory capacity, the CPC could not challenge or change existing MNR policies that both the public and itself viewed as unsustainable and/or inequitable.

While the general substance of resource management decisions improved under co-management, from an application point of view, the substance of those decisions did not change from those of the past because authority to change policy and/or implement decisions remained with the MNR. The lesson for theorists and designers of co-management institutions is that, to be able to make and implement decisions that are "more appropriate, more efficient, and result in more equitable management", as well as mobilize local consent, true devolutions of decision-making powers to the co-management institutions are necessary.

The requirement in both agencies' mandates to plan comprehensively (in case of the CPC) and to plan based on the principle of "Sustained Life" (in case of the WSA) provided or identified the presence of "a superordinate goal." Having an understanding of a vision such as that provided by "Sustained Life" was found by WSA members to be important from a process point of view; it provided a way of establishing a common ground and point of reference. This has implications for how co-management is seen as different from other institutional arrangements in resource management. *The design of co-management institutions needs to incorporate "a superordinate goal" that would guide such institutions toward adapting planning and management to the attainment of the overall goals of co-management.*

5.3 Co-management and Social Relationships

How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users?

Cooperation

For the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA), effective public participation processes that promoted partnerships between the agency and local resource users fostered cooperation between the agency and the local publics. However, such cooperation between the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) and the public was absent due to ineffective public participation processes employed by the agency. The implication for co-management is that public involvement in the agency's planning and decision-making processes needs to be at the level of "partnership" or "cooperation" as depicted in both Arnstein's (1969) and Parenteau's (1988) frameworks. The quality of information and methods used are important factors to consider in the public participation processes.

The WSA failed to implement the partnerships formed with the local users because it lacked real decision-making authority. A further implication for co-management is that local participation need to move beyond planning functions to implementation and policy making for such participation to be meaningful. Such a shift in local participation will require that co-management agencies are accorded the necessary legislative authority.

Cooperation between the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) and the co-management agencies was possible by design in the case of the CPC, and because of an enforcement agreement in the case of the WSA. The CPC solely depended on the MNR for all its technical and logistical support requirements. Based on the available evidence, it appears that any requests made by the CPC to the MNR may have been interpreted by the latter as challenging to its authority. Therefore, the requests were rejected. For instance, the CPC requested that outside consultants be hired to provide alternate sources of information in some areas of the planning process - and the request was denied. *The exclusive dependency on the MNR limited the CPC's networking pattern to the institution that created it-- the MNR.*

Cooperation between the MNR and the WSA was also limited to the activities listed under the Enforcement Agreement signed between them. Any requests made by the WSA viewed by the MNR as a direct challenge to its authority (e.g. a flight to inspect an area that was illegally cut within the WSA boundaries, and application forms for a Land Use Permit) were rejected. *Therefore, the lack of clarity in the jurisdictional authority of the WSA hampered cooperation from the MNR.* For co-management, this implies that enforcement agreements between government agencies and co-management bodies need to be comprehensive to take advantage of the former's resources and

expertise. In addition, the external support of co-management bodies need to be diversified beyond government sources.

Inclusion

The lack of representation on the co-management agencies by some major stakeholders such as mining and the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) affected social relationships. This in turn affected the political legitimacy of the co-management agencies. In addition, the lack of involvement by stakeholder groups in the selection of their representatives to the co-management agencies affected relationships between them and the government. This selection was the exclusive domain of the government. *As a result, accountability of agency members to the various constituencies which they were to represent was nonexistent.* That is, there were no structured reporting relationships between the members on the co-management agencies and the interests they were supposed to represent.

For co-management to be viewed as a mechanism for participatory decision-making, governments need to consult all stakeholders and let those groups select their own representatives. This would enhance both accountability and legitimacy of decisions made by the agencies. For the same reasons, the mandates of co-management agencies need to be mutually decided between the government and various local interests. The involvement of both the government and local interests in the framing of the mandates of co-management agencies will ensure that there is a congruence of goals. *Therefore, the process of decentralization is more than simply setting up user groups; it must also permeate the larger state organization.*

Respect and trust

The lack of congruence between group goals and agency goals and the lack of defined decision-making process affected respect and trust between the CPC and the MNR. The lack of redistribution of decision-making authority from the MNR to the CPC meant that decision-making was top-down rather than shared or by consensus. This implies that the goals of co-management need to coincide with the goals of the various stakeholder groups represented on the management body. As highlighted earlier, this implies that the mandates of co-management agencies need to be mutually decided between the government and stakeholder groups. For consensus to work, there is need to share decision-making authority among all participants in co-management.

Ontario's unilateral actions that preempted or undermined the authority of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) affected respect and trust between them. Despite being co-sponsors of co-management in the area, the TAA totally depended on Ontario for funding. Without the same powers as Ontario, the TAA was unable to influence what happened to either the CPC or the WSA. The implications for co-management are that the sponsors need to have equal powers to influence the process. In addition, they need to have financial independence. Where one party is dependent on the other for funding, then such funding must be guaranteed by any appropriate means. This is particularly important in future relationships between governments and First Nations in areas where land claim settlements will be reached and where aboriginal self-government agreements will be reached. The relationships may be formalized as government-to-government relationships. In such cases, co-management will entail "*co-jurisdiction*" in areas of shared stewardship or outside aboriginal exclusive title. Financial independence by both parties will be key to successful co-jurisdiction agreements.

The lack of structured reporting relationships between Ontario representatives and their broader constituencies or with Ontario also undermined the political legitimacy of both the CPC and the WSA. Various stakeholder groups viewed both the CPC and the WSA as processes designed to reduce participation and obstruct scrutiny of the manner and substance of both agencies' decision-making. At the root of this problem are the issues of accountability and who selects the representatives to the co-management bodies. As argued earlier, both the government and stakeholder groups need to be equally involved in the selection process. Such an approach would not only assure a high degree of accountability between members and their constituencies or between agencies and the government, but also open lines of communication among all. Such was the case between Teme-Augama Anishnabai representatives on both the CPC and the WSA and their constituency - the TAA.

High member turnover affected respect and trust on the WSA, particularly among the Teme-Augama Anishnabai representatives. These were all individuals opposed to the concept of the WSA because of the unresolved land claim issue between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. For co-management, the implication is that attempts to facilitate agreement by narrowing the initial agenda and excluding the big issues, does not make those issues disappear. The WSA expended much effort dealing with the MaKominising Anishnabeg enforcement issue that was part of the big "Temagami Conflict"- the aboriginal land claim and traditional land rights. By designating the WSA Planning Area on a site claimed by some TAA members as their own traditional family lands before the conclusion of the land claim negotiations between the TAA and Ontario only precipitated a 'locational conflict'.

The specification in the WSA mandate that members reach decisions by consensus helped build internal respect and trust among members. This not only helped the members deal with difficulty resource management planning issues but also the enforcement issue discussed above. It also fostered mutual learning and cohesion among members. *The implication for co-management, whose premise is shared decision-making and understanding, is that the mandates of the management agencies specify the requirement for consensus decision making. Furthermore, it is important that the requirement for consensus permeates all levels of potential actors in co-management arrangements.* This includes the government, stakeholder groups, members of the co-management agencies, and the public.

5.4 Co-management and Conflict Resolution

How has co-management affected local resource-use conflicts?

Generally, the two case studies do represent a change in the MNR land-use and resource management regime. It stems from the failure of the progressive model and rational planning to resolve conflicts engendered by scarce resources and struggles for First Nations. It also stems from the failure of the progressive model in addressing the issues of sustainability and equity. The results of this study revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of these new agencies as planning institutions and as conflict resolvers.

As exemplars of cooperative planning, only the Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA) approached the factors noted by Armour (1992): decentralized decision-making; planning "with" the people; flexible, adaptive process with rules jointly defined; informal interpersonal relationships;

incorporation of phenomenological mode of inquiry, consensus; emphasis on win-win, maximize joint gains; and planner as facilitator and collaborator. The WSA decentralized its planning and decision-making processes and operated by consensus. It came closest to challenging the progressive model of technical, scientific decision-making with its interest in and adoption of local knowledge. The WSA members retained decision-making functions while the planner simply facilitated the process. Through land-use zoning, the WSA was able to ensure an equitable distribution of land uses across its planning area. The WSA members also interacted informally as a strategy for building interpersonal relationships.

The Comprehensive Planning Council fell within the "conventional or rational" framework both in its adoption of rational planning and the acceptance of its advisory nature. Although representation on both bodies did not also include mining and angling and hunting interests, their representation was reflective of the cooperative model. Both agencies comprised of local users and residents. The major weakness with the CPC is that it played down conflicts and it failed to develop strategies for resolving conflicts among members, and between members and the public. Due to a lack of decision-making authority, the CPC failed to influence the resolution of conflicts between itself and the public despite the training its members had in conflict resolution. Another weakness is that the planning process was taking too long to complete. Seven years of planning created uncertainties among users on the ground; and such uncertainties bred conflicts between users and planners.

For the WSA, there were more strengths than weaknesses. The major source of weakness for the WSA lay in its relationship with Ontario. If co-management agencies are to make tough

decisions they should be free to make those decisions and they should have the legislative authority to make and implement those decisions. Lack of legislation for the WSA meant that it could not implement its decisions reached by consensus and supported by the public. Because of public support for the WSA's decisions - but with its absence at the implementation stage, conflicts will escalate if the MNR preempts the WSA's decisions.

A major finding of this study is that both consensus decision-making and 'land-use zoning' proved to be valuable tools for conflict resolution on the WSA. However, as with any other tool, mastering the use of both consensus and land-use zoning takes time. The WSA proved that once mastered, both consensus and land-use zoning produced decisions that all participants supported.

Based on the findings of this study, land-use zoning as a conflict resolution tool has practical implications for state involvement in co-management. On the CPC, where there was state involvement through the MNR (a government agency), land-use zoning was the exclusive domain of the MNR. This resulted in zoning decisions that neither the CPC nor the local publics supported or understood. Conflicts between the MNR and the local publics surfaced; the latter also characterizing the CPC as being in the "back pocket" of the MNR. On the other hand, the WSA, on which the MNR was absent, involved the local publics in its land-use zoning decisions. As a result, the WSA produced a management plan and decisions that were supported by most of the local publics. Consequently, conflicts were minimized or abated. Given the potential of "land-use zoning" technique as a conflict resolution tool, the foregoing scenario raises the following theoretical proposition:

Land-use zoning exercises by state agencies responsible for resource management are not likely to involve the local publics because public involvement in such exercises would result in conflict resolution over resource use and allocation; which would, in turn, invalidate or diminish the role of the state agencies.

The proposition above suggests that state agencies are likely to maintain a "paternalistic attitude" in co-management arrangements in order to justify their relevance and establishment. By resolving conflicts, state agencies would require to give up some degree of decision-making power to local citizens' organizations. This is the dilemma of centralized bureaucracies. In summary, the following conclusions pertaining to the co-management models studied and their effects on local resource-use conflicts are made:

1. Consensus-decision-making facilitated conflict resolution among WSA members and between WSA members and the public.
2. Land-use zoning facilitated conflict resolution among WSA members and between WSA members and the public.
3. For the CPC, co-management is likely to result in escalated conflicts due to the long duration of the planning process.
4. For the WSA, conflicts are likely to escalate if the Ministry of Natural Resources implemented the WSA's plan because that would be contrary to the agreement between Ontario and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai that a shared stewardship body would implement the plan.
5. Failure of the co-management agreement to delegate decision-making authority from Ontario to the WSA resulted in the WSA's inability to implement decisions that were initially supported by the public.
6. Generally, co-management has not changed the nature of conflicts in the Temagami Area because decision-making authority was not transferred from Ontario to the management bodies.

5.5 Implications for Research

This study has explored both strengths and weaknesses in the institutional designs of co-management using two case studies. Although the study has revealed more weaknesses than strengths, this is not to suggest that there is anything inherently wrong with the concept or practice of co-management. However, it raises the question of which co-management model for resource management is most appropriate in a highly conflicted environment. Is it possible that co-management will provide a long-lasting solution? Comparative research aimed at exploring how co-management works in both conflicted and non-conflicted situations will be important in understanding the role of co-management in conflict resolution.

The two cases in this study revealed two different institutional designs in co-management. The first, the CPC, served as an advisory body to the MNR, a government agency. The second, the WSA, lacked the presence of the MNR on its board. It consisted exclusively of local citizens. The planning processes of the two agencies while similar in some respects, were different in many ways. For instance, the WSA used both scientific and local knowledge in its planning process while the CPC relied exclusively on scientific knowledge. The WSA controlled its own budget while the CPC solely depended on the MNR financially. While the WSA could hire or fire its own staff, for the CPC, both functions remained the exclusive domains of the MNR. In addition, the WSA challenged existing MNR policies that it considered as not locally sustainable and/or equitable while the CPC could not. This raises the question of what roles government staff ought to play in co-management. Should they simply undertake planning functions while citizens' groups make the decisions or vice versa? Another area worth looking into would be the kinds of political reforms necessary for effective

application of co-management. What kinds of reorientations have to occur within government institutions for co-management to work? For instance, the evidence in this study showed that there was no accompanying reorientation within the MNR to facilitate support for the co-management agencies and to provide a policy nest into which they would fit.

The reorientation of any organization is a long-term process requiring continuity and stability within the agency. Co-management institutions are vulnerable to the withdrawal of political support by senior levels of government, the cutting of budgets by the government, and the loss of critical staff through rotation or retirement. The government should develop policy on co-management to mitigate against loss of political support. The ultimate safeguard for such policy would be a legislated requirement for community participation in resource management. Such policy and accompanying legislation would in turn ensure continuity and stability within government agencies responsible for resource management. That is, the requirements for co-management applications would be clear to government staff.

In the same vein, since financial self-sufficiency is a long-term goal of co-management, a transfer of revenue-gathering power from the government to the co-management institutions will be necessary. In the short term, it can be expected that such institutions will require infusions of provincial and/or federal monies in the initial stages. Some would argue that such money transfers are long overdue and perfectly justifiable as significant wealth has been transferred from the nation's hinterlands to metropolitan centres.

The problem of staff rotation or transiency within government agencies responsible for resource management needs special attention in co-management. Learning takes time and stability, and repeated orientation of new staff to a co-management program can cause loss of time. The implication is that government should attempt to retain dynamic staff who have gained experience in a particular local setting and are more supportive of organizational change.

From an operational point of view, government resource planners will need to move away from assuming the positions of arbiters and managers to negotiators and facilitators for co-management to work. This means that the planners should be trained in conflict resolution, community processes, and comprehensive resource management planning. While inservice training may provide a short-term solution, a long term solution would entail formal training in those areas. This in turn has consequences for how forest curricula in higher institutions of learning are structured to reflect the multidisciplinary nature of tasks demanded under co-management.

Assisting government bureaucracies to make systematic transitions from being resource managers and conflict arbiters to helping communities develop resource management capabilities is a complex process. Little systematic work has been done in this area. One area argued for above is strong public policy to provide the general direction and stability under which co-management can occur. Another promising approach is through extensive local experimentation with strategies and approaches that would provide the range of experience upon which to draw as we move into the future. The provision to learn from past mistakes would ensure that management is adapted to local conditions.

LITERATURE CITED

- Anstey, Mark. 1991. Negotiating Conflict: Insights and skills for Negotiators and Peacemakers. Juta & Co. Ltd., Cape Town, SA. 402 pp.
- Armour, Audrey. 1992. The Co-operative Process: Facility Siting the Democratic Way, *Plan Canada*, March 1992, pp. 29-34.
- Arnstein, S.A. 1969. A Ladder of Citizen Participation, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 35 (July 1969), pp. 216-224.
- Association of Conservation Authorities of Ontario (ACAO). 1987. The Conservation Authorities of Ontario. Information Handbook. ACAO, Toronto, Ont.
- Back, Brian. 1990. Temagami: An Environmentalist's Perspective, pp. 141-144 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.
- Badcock, W.T. 1976. Who Owns Canada? Aboriginal Title and Canadian Courts. Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, Ottawa, Ont. 42 pp.
- Baskerville, G.L. 1986. An Audit of Management of Crown Forests of Ontario. Ont. Min. Nat. Resour., Toronto, Ont. 97 pp.
- Baskerville, G.L. 1988. Management of publicly owned forests. *Forestry Chronicle*, 64:193-198.
- Benello, George C. and D. Roussopoulos (eds.). 1971. The Case for Participatory Democracy: Some Prospects for a Radical Society. Grossman Publishers, New York.
- Benidickson, J. 1992. Co-management Issues in the Forest Wilderness: A Stewardship Council for Temagami, pp. 257-275 in Ross M. and J.O. Saunders (eds.) Growing Demands on a Shrinking Heritage. *Canadian Institute of Law*, Calgary. 428 pp.
- Benson, C.A. 1982. Forest Management on n'Daki Menan of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, Bear Island, Temagami, Ont. 137 pp.
- Benson, C.A. 1990. Theoretically, the Management of Multiple Resources is Simple, pp. 41-59 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.
- Benson, C. A., H. Cumming, H. Akervall, and W. Carmean. 1989. The Need for a Land Stewardship, Holistic Resource Management Plan For n'Daki Menan, Bear Island, Temagami.

- Berger, T.R. 1992. A Long and Terrible Shadow: White Values, Native Rights in the Americas - 1492 - 1992. Douglas and McIntyre, Vancouver, B.C. 183 pp.
- Berkes, F. 1986. Local level management and the commons problem. *Marine Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 3: 215-219.
- Berkes, F., P. George, and R. Preston. 1991. Co-management: The Evolution in Theory and Practice of the Joint Administration of Living Resources. *Alternatives*, 18:2, pp. 12-18.
- Boldt, M. 1993. Surviving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Ont. 384 pp.
- Boothroyd, P. 1991. Distribution Principles for Compassionate Sustainable Development, in Dorsey, H.J. (ed.) Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water Management: Towards Agreement in the Fraser River Basin. University of British Columbia Press, Westwater Research Centre, Vanc.
- Brand, A. 1990. The Force of Reason. An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. Allen & Unwin Inc., Boston, Mass. 152 pp.
- Bray, M. and A. Thomson. 1990. Introduction, pp. 9-18 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.
- Brown, G. and C.C. Harris. 1992. National Forest Management and the "Tragedy of the Commons": A Multidisciplinary Perspective. *Society and Natural Resources* Vol. 5, pp. 67-83.
- Brozowski, R. and P. King-Fisher. 1994. Resource Conflict and Land Use Planning in Northern Ontario: The Case of Temagami, pp. 257-277 in Johnston M.E. (ed.) Geographic Perspectives on the Provincial Norths. Lakehead University Centre for Northern Studies, Northern and Regional Studies Series, Vol. 3.
- Campbell, A. 1990. Co-management and Social Equity. A Discussion Paper. Resource Policy and Economics, Parks and Renewable Resources. Vanc. B.C.
- Carpenter, S.L. and W.J.D. Kennedy. 1988. Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide to Handling Conflict and Reaching Agreements. Jossey-Bass Pub.: San Francisco. 293 pp.
- Cassidy, F. 1990. Aboriginal Self-determination: Proceedings of a conference held September 30 - October 3, 1990. Oolichan Books and The Institute for Research on Public Policy. Lantzville, B.C. 284 pp.
- Chambers, A.D. 1992. Sustainable Development: In Canada? A discussion paper prepared for a meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand, December 14-16, 1992. University of British Columbia, Vanc. B.C. 26 pp.

- Cohen, A.F., S. Gadon, and R. Willits. 1988. *Effective Behaviour in Organizations*, Homewood, III. Irwin Publishers. 278 pp.
- Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC). 1993. *Recommendations made to the Minister of Natural Resources and the Temagami Anishnabai Executive Council on the Contingency Timber Management Plans*. CPC, Temagami, Ontario. 24 pp.
- Comprehensive Planning Program (CPP). 1990. *Comprehensive Planning Program Objectives and Mandate. Background Information*. CPP, Temagami, Ont. 6 pp.
- Comprehensive Planning Program (CPP). 1994a. *Scenario Summaries: Component Descriptions and Resource Management Prescriptions and Options*. MNR, Temagami, Ont.
- Comprehensive Planning Program (CPP). 1994b. *Land Use Options Phase for the Production of the Comprehensive Plan: Public Consultation Instruction Sheet*. MNR, Temagami, Ont. 1p.
- Crowfoot, J.E. and J.M. Wondolleck. 1990. *Environmental Disputes: Community Involvement in Conflict Resolution*. Island Press: Wash., D.C. 278 pp.
- Dahl, R.A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. pp. 108-114, 220-23.
- Day, R.J. and J.V. Carter. 1990. *The Ecology of the Temagami Forest: Based on a Photointerpretive Survey and the Forest Resources Inventory of Temagami District. The Temagami White and Red Pine Ecology and Silviculture Study for the OMNR Northeastern Region*, Temagami, Ont. 88 pp.
- Deutsch, M. 1973. *The Resolution of Conflict*. Yale University Press: New Haven, 128 pp.
- Dey, I. 1993. *Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-friendly Guide for Social Scientists*, Routledge, NY. 285 pp.
- Dickason, O.P. 1992. *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times*. McClelland and Stewart Inc., Toronto, Ont. 590 pp.
- Dunster, J. 1990. *Forest Conservation Strategies in Canada: A Challenge for the Nineties. Alternatives*, 16:4/17:1, pp. 44-51.
- Dunster, J.A. 1992. *Assessing the Sustainability of Canadian Forest Management: Progress or Procrastination? Environ Impact Assess Rev*, Vol. 12:67-84.
- Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B.J. McCay, and J.M. Acheson. 1990. *The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-two Years Later. Human Ecology*, Vol. 18:11-19.

- Filyk, G. and R. Côté. 1992. Pressures from Inside: Advisory Groups and the Environmental Community, pp. 60-82 in Boardman R. (ed.) Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics, and Process. Oxford University Press, Don Mills, Ontario. 321 pp.
- Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston.
- Gardner, M. 1992. Environmental Advocacy and Social Equity: Case Study of a Community Crisis. Masters Thesis. Dept. of Education, University of Toronto. 86 pp.
- Gardner, J. and M. Roseland. 1989. Acting Locally: Community Strategies for Equitable Sustainable Development. *Alternatives*, Vol. 16, No. 3: 36-47.
- Gittel, M. 1980. Limits to Citizen Participation: The Decline of Community Organizations. Volume 109 Sage Library of Social Research, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. 280 pp.
- Gould C.C. 1981. Socialism and Democracy. *Praxis International* 1, no. 1(April 1981): 49-63.
- Green, P. 1993. Selections 20 & 30 from Retrieving Democracy (1985), in Green P. (ed.) Key Concepts in Critical Theory: Democracy. Humanities Press, NJ. 323 pp.
- Habermas, J. 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society (translated and with an introduction by Thomas McCarthy). Beacon Press: Boston. 239 pp.
- Habermas, J. 1982. Reply to my Critics, in Thompson, J.B. and Held D. (eds.). Habermas Critical debates. Basingstoke/MacMillan, London.
- Habermas, J. 1984a. The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society (transl. Thomas McCarthy), Beacon Press: Boston. 465 pp.
- Habermas, J. 1984b. The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (translated by Thomas McCarthy), Beacon Press: Boston. 295 pp.
- Hakala, A. 1993a. Dissident group refuses to recognize injunction. *The North Bay Nugget*, July 15, 1993, p. 6.
- Hakala, A. 1993b. The Breakaway Native group denies burning bridges. *The North Bay Nugget*, August 3, 1993, p. 4.
- Hardin, G. 1968. "The tragedy of the Commons". *Science* 162:1243-1248.
- Higgelke, P.E. and P.N. Duinker. 1993. Open Doors: Public Participation in Forest Management in Canada. Report to the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association and Forestry Canada, WSAI 3318 - FDC 903. School of Forestry, Lakehead Univ., Thunder Bay, Ont. 45 pp.

- Hodgins, B.W. and J. Benidickson. 1989. *The Temagami Experience: Recreation, Resources, and Aboriginal Rights in the Northern Ontario Wilderness*. University of Toronto Press: Toronto. 371 pp.
- Hodgins, B.W. 1990. Contexts of the Temagami Predicament, pp. 123-140 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) *Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness*. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.
- Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 1979. *Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective*. Research Branch of INAC, Ottawa. 49 pp.
- Jacobs, P. 1988. "Towards a Network of knowing and Planning in Northern Canada", pp. 58-64 in Wonders W. (ed.) *Knowing the North: Reflections on Traditional Technology and Science*. Boreal Institute for Northern Studies, Edmonton.
- Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries Co-management: Delegating responsibility to fishermen's organizations. *Marine Policy*, April 1989, pp. 137-154.
- Johnston, P.J. and P.N. Duinker. 1993. *Beyond Dispute: Collaborative Approaches to Resolving Natural Resource and Environmental Conflicts*. School of Forestry, Lakehead Univ., Thunder Bay, Ont. 51 pp.
- Keane, J. 1982. Power, Legitimacy, and the fate of Liberal Contract Theory. *Praxis International* 2, no. 3 (October 1982): pp. 284-96.
- Keane, J. 1993. Stretching the Limits of Democratic Imagination, pp. 105-135 in Carens J.H. (ed.) *Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson*. State University of New York Press, NY.
- Knoke, D. 1990. *Organizing for Collective Action: The Political Economies of Associations*. Aldine de Gruyter, New York. 258 pp.
- Kochen, M. and K.W. Deutsch. 1980. *Decentralization. Sketches Toward a Rational Theory*. Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., Cambridge, Mass. 358 p.
- Lélé, S.M. 1991. Sustainable Development: A Critical Review. *World Development* 19, 6: 607-621.
- Marchak, P. 1987. Uncommon Property, pp. 3-31 in Marchak P., N. Guppy, and J. McMullan (eds.) *Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish Processing Industries in British Columbia*. Methuen, Toronto, Ont. 402 pp.
- Marković, M. 1993. Property and Democracy, pp. 241-261 in Carens J.H. (ed.) *Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson*. State University of New York Press, NY.

- Maslow, A.H. 1970. *Motivation and Personality*. 2nd Edn. Harper and Row, New York. 320 pp.
- McNeil, Kent. 1990. The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket, pp. 185-221 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) *Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness*. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.
- Miles, M.B. and A.M. Huberman. 1984. *Analyzing qualitative data: A source book for new methods*. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA. 320 pp.
- Miles, M.B. and A.M. Huberman. 1994. *An Expanded Sourcebook: Qualitative Data Analysis*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Ca. 338 pp.
- MNDM. 1991. *Summary History of Leased Claims in Delhi Township*. MNDM, Sudbury, Ont. 5 pp.
- MNR. n.d. (a). *Park Access*. Temagami Comprehensive Planning Program Background Information, MNR, Temgamai, Ont. 4 pp.
- MNR. n.d. (b). *Park History and Development*. Temagami Comprehensive Planning Program Background Information, MNR, Temgamai, Ont. 4 pp.
- MNR. n.d. (c). *Park Commercial Tourism Use*. Temagami Comprehensive Planning Program Background Information, MNR, Temgamai, Ont. 4 pp.
- MNR. 1978. *Ontario Provincial Parks: Planning and Management Policies*. MNR Parks Branch, MNR, Toronto, Ont. 28 pp.
- MNR. 1985. *Forest Management Plan for the Temagami Crown Management Unit*, OMNR, Temagami, Ontario.
- MNR. 1986a. *A Framework for Resource Management Planning in MNR*. Ministry of Natural Resources & Policy and Planning Secretariat, Toronto. 96 pp.
- MNR. 1986b. *Timber Management Planning Manual for Crown Lands in Ontario*. Ontario Min. Nat. Resour., Toronto, Ont. 217 pp.
- MNR. 1987. *Timber Management Guidelines for the Protection of Tourism Values*. Queens Printer for Ontario, Toronto, Ont. 96 pp.
- MNR. 1988. *Timber Management Guidelines for the Protection of Fish Habitat*. Queens Printer for Ontario, Toronto, Ont. 72 pp.
- MNR. 1989. *Timber Management Guidelines for the provision of Moose Habitat*. Ministry of Natural Resources, Wildlife Branch, Toronto, Ont. 32 pp.

- MNR. 1990a. Chronology of government actions in Temagami Area. Ontario Government Printing Office, Toronto, Ont. 28 pp.
- MNR. 1990b. Memorandum of Understanding made April 23, 1990 between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and the province of Ontario. Minister of Natural Resources and Minister responsible for Native Affairs, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.
- MNR. 1991. Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Wendaban Stewardship Authority, May 23, 1991. MNR, Toronto, Ont. 4 pp.
- MNR. 1992. News Release: Minister Announces Old Growth Conservation Initiative. MNR, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.
- MNR. 1993a. News Release: Ontario and Teme-Augama Anishnabai negotiations to continue on Treaty of Co-existence. MNR, Toronto, Ont. 4 pp.
- MNR. 1993b. Proposal for Co-existence: A discussion paper for public consultation on the Treaty of Co-existence negotiations between Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Ontario. 8 pp.
- MNR. 1994a. Temagami Area Wood Utilization and Availability: Past, Present, and Future. A Presentation to the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC). January 18, 1994, MNR, Temagami, Ont. 30 pp.
- MNR. 1994b. Contingency Timber Management Plan for Temagami District. MNR, Temagami, Ont.
- MNR. 1995a. Hampton Protects Temagami Old Growth. News Release. MNR, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.
- MNR. 1995b. Elk Lake Community Forest Given Expanded Responsibility. News Release. MNR, Toronto, Ont. 1p.
- Morgan, N. and A.R. Thompson. 1992. Crown Lands: Native Land Claims; British Columbia. Challenges and Opportunities. *Environments* 21(3): 20-25.
- Morgan, N., M. Palleson, and A.R. Thompson. 1993. Environmental Impact Assessment and Competitiveness. Ottawa National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Working Paper No. 7. Ottawa. 92 pp.
- Murphy, J.T. 1980. Getting the facts: a fieldwork guide for evaluators and policy analysts. Goodyear Pub. Co. Santa Monica, Calif. 214 pp.
- Northern Prospector's Association (NPA). 1994. Re: Forest Steawrdship Plan. Letter sent by the NPA to the WSA on mining in the WSA area. Kirkland Lake, Ont. 2 pp.

- O'Grady, J. 1993. Dissident Natives resume timber harvest. *Temiskaming Today Daily News*, September 9, 1993, p. 11.
- Ontario Executive Council. 1988. Order-In-Council establishing the Temgami Advisory Council, October 6, 1988. Queen's Park, Toronto, Ont. 4 pp.
- Ontario Executive Council. 1991a. Order-In-Council 1145/91 establishing the Comprehensive Planning Council, May 16, 1991. Queen's Park, Toronto, Ont. 6 pp.
- Ontario Executive Council. 1991b. Order-In-Council establishing the Wendaban Stewardship Authority, May 16, 1991. Queen's Park, Toronto, Ont. 5 pp.
- Ontario Executive Council. 1993a. Ammending Order-In-Council # 1434/93 for the Comprehensive Planning Council, June 2, 1993. Queen's Park, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.
- Ontario Executive Council. 1993b. Agreement In Principle Between Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Ontario, Reprsented by the Minister Responsible for Native Affairs and the Minister of Natural Resources ("Ontario"), and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. Final Agreement: October 18, 1993. Queen's Park, Toronto, Ont. 24 pp.
- Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat. 1991. Minister and Chief Announce creation of the Wendaban Stewardship Authority. News Release, ONAS, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.
- Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat. 1994. Memo to the Wendaban Stewardship Authority: Termination of WSA Mandate. ONAS, Toronto, Ont. 2 pp.
- PAC. 1993. Interim Report on Conserving Old Growth Red and White Pine. Old Growth Policy Advisory Committee (PAC), Toronto, Ontario. 32 pp.
- PAC. 1994. Final Report on Conserving Old Growth Forest Ecosystems in Ontario. Old Growth Policy Advisory Committee (PAC), Toronto, Ontario. 48 pp.
- Parenteau, R. 1988. Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making. Federal Assessment Review Office, Minister of Supply and Serv. Canada. 71 pp.
- Pateman, C. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 211 pp.
- Pfeffer, J. 1981. Power in Organizations. Pitman: Boston. 320 pp.
- Pinkerton, E. (ed). 1989a. Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management & Community Development. UBC Press, Vancouver, B.C. 299 pp.

- Pinkerton, E. 1989b. Introduction: Attaining Better Fisheries Management through Co-Management - Prospects, Problems, and Propositions, pp. 3-33 in Pinkerton E. (ed.) Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management & Community Development. UBC Press, Vancouver, B.C. 299 pp.
- Pinkerton, E. 1992. Translating Legal Rights into Management Practice: Overcoming Barriers to the Exercise of Co-Management. *Human Organization* Vol. 51, No. 4:330-341.
- Quinby, P.A. 1988. The ecological values of old growth forest with specific reference to white and red pine forest ecosystems in the Temagami Area of Ontario: A Literature Review. Temagami, Ont. 35 pp.
- Quinby, P.A. 1989. Old Growth Forest Survey in Temagami's Wakimika Triangle. Tall Pines Project, Research Report No. 2, Temagami Wilderness Society, Toronto, Ont. 33 pp.
- Reed, M. 1984. Citizen Participation and Public Hearings: Evaluating Northern Experiences. Cornett Occasional Papers No. 4. Dept. of Geography, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C. 65 pp.
- Reed, M. 1993. Governance of Resources in the Hinterland: the Struggle for Local Autonomy and Control. *Geoforum*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 243-262.
- Reed, M. 1995. Cooperative Management of Environmental Resources: A Case Study from Northern Ontario, Canada. *Economic Geography*, V. 71: 132-149.
- Ross, H. 1993. Hostilities in the Hinterland: New Approaches to Planning and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ontario. School of Rural Planning and Development, University of Guelph, Ont. 48 pp.
- Ross, M. and J.O. Saunders (eds.) 1992. Growing Demands on a Shrinking Heritage: Managing Resource Use Conflicts. Can. Inst. Resour. Law, Calgary. 428 pp.
- Rowe, J.S. 1972. Forest Regions of Canada. Dept. of Environment, Can. For. Serv., Publication No. 1300. 172 pp + map.
- Shute, J.J. 1993. Co-management under the Wendapan Stewardship Authority: An Enquiry into Cross-cultural Environmental Values. Masters Thesis, Department of Geaography, Carleton University, Ottawa. 142 pp.
- Sinclair, P.G. 1992. Temagami Lakes Association: An Historical Perspective. Temagami Lakes Association, Temagami, Ont. 126 pp.
- Skidmore, Judith. 1990. Canadian Values and Priorities: A Multiple-Use Perspective, pp. 65-68 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.

- Susskind, L. and J. Cruikshank. 1987. *Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes*. Basic Books: New York.
- TAA. 1990. The Native Dimension: Key Dates, pp. 147-151 in Bray M. and A. Thomson (eds.) *Temagami: A Debate of Wilderness*. Dundurn Press: Toronto and Oxford. 255 pp.
- TAA. 1994. 1993 Teme-Augama Anishnabai Census. TAA, Temagami, Ont. 45 pp.
- TAC. 1989. Temagami Advisory Council Annual Report, 1988. Queen's Printer, Toronto, Ont. 56 pp.
- TAC. 1990. Temagami Advisory Council Meeting #28 held at Scandia Inn, January 10, 1990. TAC, Temagami, Ont. 2 pp.
- Taylor, D. and J. Wilson. 1992. Environmental Health - democratic health: an examination of proposals for decentralization of forest management in British Columbia. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Prince Edward Island, May 31, 1992. University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C. 27 pp.
- Temagami News Association. 1994. Temagami Times Directory, May 1994. Temagami Lakes Association, Temagami, Ont. 90 pp.
- Temagami Times. 1994. Survey of Cottage Expenditures on Lake Temagami. *Temagami Times*, Vol. 23, No. 1:10, June 1994.
- Thompson, A.R. and H.R. Eddy. 1973. Jurisdictional Problems in Natural Resource Management in Canada, pp. 67-91 in Bennet, W.D., A.D. Chambers, A.R. Thompson, H.R. Eddy, and A.J. Cordell (eds.) Background Study for the Science Council of Canada - Essays on Aspects of Resource Policy, Special Study No. 27, May 1973.
- Ury, W.L., J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg. 1988. *Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict*. Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco.
- Usher, P.J. 1986. The Devolution of Wildlife Management and the Prospects for Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest Territories, CARC Policy Paper No. 3, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa.
- Usher, . J. 1987. Indigenous Management Systems and the Conservation of Wildlife in the Canadian North. *Alternatives* Vol. 14, No. 1, February, 1987.
- Usher, P.J. 1991. Some Implications of the *Sparrow* Judgement for Resource Conservation and Management. *Alternatives* Vol. 18, No. 2: 20-21.
- Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA). 1992a. Wendaban Stewardship Authority Office Procedures and Policy Manual. WSA, Temagami, Ont. 25 pp.

- Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA). 1992b. Local User Questionnaires. WSA File # SFU-110. WSA, Temagami, Ontario.
- Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1993a. Report of Public Meeting and Workshop: Forest Land-Use Zoning. WSA, Public Meeting held at Welcome Centre, Saturday, October 30, 1993, Temagami, Ont. 11 pp.
- Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1993b. Meeting held by the WSA to review public comments on the WSA's zoning decisions. WSA Office, Temagami, Ont. 5 pp.
- Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1993c. A Documentation of Knowledge Associated with the Oral Traditions of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai: The Land, Its Waterways, Plants and Animals. WSA, Temagami, Ont. 191 pp.
- Wendaban Stewardship Authority. 1994. Wendaban Stewardship Authority 20-Year Forest Stewardship Plan. A Report presented to the Minister Responsible for Native Affairs; The Minister of Natural Resources; and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. Temagami, Ontario. 250 pp.
- Wolcott, Harry F. 1994. Transforming Qualitative Data: Description, Analysis, and Interpretation. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Ca. 409 pp.
- Wolfe, J. 1993. First Nations Strategies for Reintegrating People, Land Resources and Government, pp, 238-270 in Audrey J. and G. Nelson (eds.) Public Issues: A Geographical Perspective. Dept. of Geography, University of Waterloo, Ont. 418 pp.
- Wondolleck, J. M. 1988. Public Lands Conflict and Resolution: Managing National Forest Disputes. Plenum: New York.
- Yin, R.K. 1988. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Applied Social Research Methods Series Volume 5. Sage Publications, Newbury Park. 166 pp.

Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Question, Interview Category, and Number of Respondents.

MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BY INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)				
	1 (5)	2 (21)	3 (4)	4 (39)	5 (5)
1. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENT AFFECTED THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY AT LOCAL LEVELS?					
• What are the stated management functions under the agency terms of reference?		✓	✓		
• Which of those functions are actually performed/not performed by the agency?		✓	✓		
• How much decision-making authority does the/your agency have?		✓	✓		
• What management functions do you jointly perform with the government?	✓	✓	✓		
• Who makes the decisions?		✓		✓	
• Who is not involved in decision-making?		✓	✓	✓	
• Is there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/recommendations made by the agency by the state or any of the key actors?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• How is decision-making authority distributed among members?		✓			
• What is the source of this decision-making authority?		✓	✓		
• Is there evidence of power asymmetries among members?		✓			
• What has been the effect of TAA participation on the CPC, WSA, and the bilateral process in terms of distributions of decision-making to the TAA?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Were you involved in setting the goals of the agency?	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• Does the agency have control of its own budget?	✓	✓	✓		
• How was decision-making authority distributed in the past?	✓	✓		✓	
• How were decisions made in the past?	✓	✓		✓	

MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BY INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)				
	1 (5)	2 (21)	3 (4)	4 (39)	5 (5)
1. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENT AFFECTED THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY AT LOCAL LEVELS? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Following creation of the WSA, then Minister of Natural Resources Bud Wildman assured WSA members at a meeting held on August 27, 1992 in Temagami that legislation that was supposed to confer jurisdiction to the WSA over the four townships was already introduced in Cabinet and advised the WSA to act as though they had legislation. Why was this legislation never conferred?</i> • <i>What are the implications of lack of legislative jurisdiction for the WSA's decisions/ recommendations or overall plan?</i> 		✓	✓		
2. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENT CHANGED THE SUBSTANCE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AT LOCAL LEVELS? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were past environmental concerns? • How were those concerns addressed? • What are current environmental concerns? • How have those concerns been addressed? • What decisions/recommendations were made by the agencies (CPC and WSA)? • Were the decisions/recommendations implemented and by whom? • If not, why were the decisions/ recommendations not implemented? • How were resources allocated in past/present • How different are agency decisions from those made in the past? • How different are current planning processes/decisions from those in the past? • Are you generally satisfied with the goals of the agency (WSA and/or CPC)? • <i>What changes have occurred in the DLUGS as a result of the CPC planning process?</i> 	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓		
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓		✓	
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓		✓	✓
	✓				

MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BY INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)				
	1 (5)	2 (21)	3 (4)	4 (39)	5 (5)
2. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENT CHANGED THE SUBSTANCE/TYPES OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AT LOCAL LEVELS?					
• <i>Do you think the WSA achieved their goals in the planning process?</i>		✓	✓	✓	
• <i>Did WSA & CPC use local knowledge in their planning processes?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>How have the CPC, WSA, bilateral process affected resource management decisions?</i>	✓		✓		✓
• <i>How has the CPC/CP's role in Treaty Negotiations affected their planning function?</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• <i>How has the TAA 1973 land cautions affected timber supply in the area?</i>	✓			✓	
• <i>How much wood has been harvested from Temagami since the land cautions?</i>	✓				
• <i>Would you support establishment of a mill in Temagami?</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• <i>Have you routed decisions through the management agency in the past?</i>	✓		✓		
• <i>Have you directed the agency both in its mandate and operations?</i>			✓		
• <i>Was pertinent information made available to all interests in the area?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>What methods of public participation did the/your agency use?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>Did the public raise any concerns about your public participation process?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>If so, were those concerns taken into account?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>Were you advised by the agency when your input was utilized/not utilized?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>Did the agency provide opportunities for systematic review and improvement of the decision process in response to your concerns?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>What were the key issues raised at the public meetings?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>Did those issues influence agency decisions?</i>		✓		✓	
• <i>On a scale: 1-10, how do you evaluate the the agencies' public participation techniques?</i>				✓	

MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BY INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)				
	1 (5)	2 (21)	3 (4)	4 (39)	5 (5)
3. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENT AFFECTED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING & COOPERATION AMONG KEY ACTORS AND LOCAL RESOURCE USERS?					
• Did any members of your agency voluntarily quit, and if so, why?		✓			
• Have representatives in your agency engaged in joint fact-finding missions or other strategies of trust building?		✓			
• Did the/your agency consult all interests in its decision-making?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• What are the fundamental principles of your group?		✓			
• Do you feel these principles have been achieved and not abandoned in the process?		✓			
• How are reporting relationships between you and your constituency structured?		✓			
• What has been the role of ONAS/TAA as regards the functioning of CPC & WSA?		✓	✓		
• Did the/your agency seek technical advice and/or logistical support from the government and was such advice/support accorded?	✓	✓			
• Did the government accept the decisions/ recommendations made by the agency?	✓	✓	✓		
• Does the agency have enforcement agreements with the government (MNR)?	✓	✓	✓		
• During the public consultation process, were the public involved in problem definition, generation of alternative solutions, generation of viable solutions, evaluation and selection of final solutions?		✓		✓	✓
• What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource users and the agency (CPC and WSA)?		✓		✓	
• Why were the TAA not involved on the CPC initially, and what caused their subsequent involvement?		✓	✓		
• Why were the CPC and WSA created?		✓	✓		✓

Appendix 1: Data Collection Research Design by Main Research Question, Interview Questions, Interview Category, and Number of Respondents (.....continued).

MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND ⁴ INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS (#) BY INTERVIEW CATEGORY (1-5)				
	1 (5)	2 (21)	3 (4)	4 (39)	5 (5)
4. HOW HAS CO-MANAGEMENT AFFECTED LOCAL RESOURCE-USE CONFLICTS?					
• How were representatives on the management agency selected?		✓	✓		
• Is your agency committed to consensus decision-making?		✓			
• If so, is this commitment in the mandate or has simply been adopted by your agency?		✓			
• What conflict resolution strategies were adopted by your agency?		✓			
• What are/have been the outcomes of such conflict resolution strategies?		✓			
• What are the conflicts in the area?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated over time?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• If conflicts have de-escalated, can this be attributed to the efforts of the CPC or WSA?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• If conflicts have escalated, what are the reasons for this?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Are the goals of both the CPC and WSA related to the land-use conflicts in the area?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Have both the CPC and WSA addressed the conflicts that were identified initially?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Is representation on both CPC and WSA adequate?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Public Participation" in combined research questions #1 and #2.

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Public Participation	
Interview Question:	<i>Was pertinent information made available to all interests in the area?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes, but too much information in short time • Yes, but too much information and too complex • Yes, overall good information and less complex • Sometimes information withheld, e.g., on resource management options 	10 11 1 4
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes, adequate, and provided in advance of meetings • Yes, inadequate, and provided during meetings • Yes, and information was easy to read • Unlike the CPC, WSA constrained by finances to do adequate consultations & complete inventories 	5 5 10 6
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information was too complex and provided in short time for any meaningful input • Yes, but Information provided was too much <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes, adequate information provided in advance • Yes, information was easy to understand • Inadequate information, provided during meetings • No need for advance information because WSA process was more of a developmental process 	33 29 20 39 19 2
Interview Question:	<i>What methods of public participation did the/your agency use?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small group workshops (middle stage) • Open house meetings (early stage) • Public presentations (early and middle stages) • Write-ins (middle stage) 	11 6 5 3
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small group workshops (early and middle stages) • General meetings open to public (throughout) • Write-ins (late stage) • Office records open to public scrutiny (throughout) 	10 8 9 10
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open house meetings (early stage) • Small group workshops (middle stage) • Public presentations (middle stage) • Write-ins (middle stage) <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small group workshops (early and middle stages) • Public presentations (early and late stages) • Write-ins (middle stage) • Open general meetings (throughout) • Accessible office (throughout) 	24 23 17 3 39 13 23 33 21

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Public Participation	
Interview Question:	<i>What were the key issues raised at the public meetings?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road access (Cross Lake road) [R] • Availability of Crown land for mineral staking [R] • Fly-in access into Wilderness Park [R] • Planning to be based on watersheds [P] • Composition of CPC heavily weighted towards Tri-Town area/people; not Temagami [P] • Lack of provincial focus [P] • The yellow zone that included access was too confusing in the land-use scenarios [P] • Old-growth protection in the Lorraine Valley [R] 	7 5 5 5 4 4 3 6
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zoning decisions to protect a canoe route [P] • Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [R] • Planning to be based on watersheds in the area [P] • Old-growth white and red pine protection [R] • Lack of provincial focus in planning [P] • Timber harvesting and allocation methods [P] • Legitimacy of WSA and long-term funding • Ethics of bear hunting [R] • Less area open for mineral staking [R] 	10 9 9 5 4 2 2 1 1
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning process not clear [P] • Planning process taking too long [P] • Permissible uses in Parks (wilderness park)[R] • Lack of mgmt. approach in skyline reserve [P] • Planning to be based on watersheds [P] • Lack of provincial focus [P] • Management for old growth [R] • Road access (Cross Lake Road) [R] • Process heavily controlled by MNR [P] • Alternatives to herbicide use [R] • General standard of care versus extractive uses [P] • Less area open for mineral staking [R] <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of information on fish & wildlife [R] • Planning to be based on watersheds [P] • Old-growth protection/management [R] • Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [R] • Lack of provincial focus [P] • Cultural heritage protection [R] • Methods of LTSY allocations of timber [P] • Major canoe route excluded from RTW Zone [P] • No development on Lake Temagami [R] • Lack of third party opinion on WSA [P] 	31 22 18 14 23 13 13 24 12 9 5 4 28 24 24 23 18 16 11 8 6 1

Note: [R] = resource-related issue

[P] = process-related issue

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Public Participation" in combined research questions #1 and #2 (...continued).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?				
Category:	Public Participation			
Interview Question:	Did those issues influence agency decisions?			
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item		
		Total	Yes	No
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• Road access (Cross Lake road) [R]	7	1	6
	• Availability of Crown land for mineral staking [R]	5	5	0
	• Fly-in access into Wilderness Park [R]	5	1	4
	• Planning to be based on watersheds [P]	5	0	5
	• Composition of CPC heavily weighted towards Tri-Town area/people; not Temagami [P]	4	0	4
	• Lack of provincial focus [P]	4	4	0
	• The yellow zone that included access was too confusing in the land-use scenarios [P]	3	2	1
	• Old-growth protection in the Lorraine Valley [R]	6	5	1
Wendapan Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• Zoning decisions to protect a canoe route [P]	10	10	0
	• Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [R]	9	7	2
	• Planning to be based on watersheds in the area [P]	9	9	0
	• Old-growth white and red pine protection [R]	5	5	0
	• Lack of provincial focus in planning [P]	4	0	4
	• Timber harvesting and allocation methods [P]	2	2	0
	• Legitimacy of WSA and long-term funding	2	0	2
	• Ethics of bear hunting [R]	1	1	0
	• Less area open for mineral staking [R]	1	1	0
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u>			
	• Planning process unclear-zones were confusing [P]	31	2	29
	• Planning process taking too long [P]	22	0	22
	• Permissible uses in Parks (wilderness park)[R]	18	8	10
	• Lack of mgmt. approach in skyline reserve [P]	14	0	14
	• Planning to be based on watersheds [P]	23	0	23
	• Lack of provincial focus [P]	13	9	4
	• Management for old growth [R]	13	11	2
	• Road access (Cross Lake Road) [R]	12	3	9
	• Process heavily controlled by MNR [P]	24	2	22
	• Alternatives to herbicide use [R]	9	0	9
	• General standard of care versus extractive uses [P]	5	4	1
	• Less area open for mineral staking [R]	4	2	2
	<u>WSA</u>			
	• Lack of information on fish & wildlife [R]	28	12	16
	• Planning to be based on watersheds [P]	24	22	2
	• Old-growth protection/management [R]	24	21	3
	• Major canoe route excluded from RTW Zone [P]	24	23	1
	• Road access (use of Red Squirrel Road) [R]	23	20	3
	• Lack of provincial focus [P]	18	3	15
	• Cultural heritage protection [R]	16	16	0
	• Methods of LTSY allocations of timber [P]	11	10	1
	• Land availability for mineral staking [R]	7	4	3
	• No development on Lake Temagami [R]	6	6	0

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Decision-making Authority" in combined research questions #1 and #2.

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Decision-making authority	
Interview Question:	<i>What is the source of this decision-making authority?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• Order-In-Council	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• Order-In-Council, Memorandum of Understanding • Order-In-Council, Memorandum of Understanding, TAA Resolution	10 5
Members of the two establishing agencies: Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (ONAS); and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) N=4	<u>CPC</u> • Order-In-Council	4
	<u>WSA</u> • Order-In-Council, MOU	4
	• Order-In-Council, MOU, and TAA Resolution	2
Interview Question:	<i>Who makes the decisions?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• MNR make decisions • CPC and MNR make decisions • One of the co-chairs & MNR make decisions	5 5 1
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• WSA members make the decisions	10
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> • MNR make decisions • CPC and MNR make decisions • One of the co-chairs makes decisions <u>WSA</u> • WSA members make decisions	26 7 6 39

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Decision-making Authority" in combined research questions #1 and #2 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Decision-making authority	
Interview Question:	<i>Is there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/recommendations made by the agency by the state or any of the key actors?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Members of the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) N=5	• CPC members are likely to be <i>coopted</i> on technical decisions due to a lack of planning & technical background by CPC members- (no specifics)	4
	• CPC <i>preempted</i> on decision <u>not</u> to go to Toronto to meet with special provincial interest groups	4
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• <i>Coopted</i> by the state on involvement in Treaty negotiations and CTMP process	8
	• CPC did not participate in the framing of management scenarios/zoning that were later taken to the public for review, hence <i>coopted</i> by CPP	11
	• CPC <i>coopted</i> by CPP on use of Cross Lakes Road access	8
	• <i>Coopted</i> because we are forced to work within existing provincial policies- no room for innovation	9
	• CPC <i>coopted</i> by CPP because meeting agendas are pre-set by CPP who come to meetings with desired outcomes in mind	3
	• CPC gets <i>coopted</i> by CPP all the time because not enough time is given to the CPC to respond to issues; CPP follows strict schedules	6
	• CPC <i>preempted</i> by CPP/MNR on decision <u>not</u> to go to Toronto to meet with provincial interests	10
	• CPC <i>preempted</i> on decision to plan on watershed basis	7
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• <i>Preempted</i> by the MNR on issuance of a Land use Permit (LUP) to build a dock, and a LUP to renew a lodge owner's licence	10
	• <i>Preempted</i> by the state (MNDM) on renewal of mining leases in WSA area	10
	• <i>Preempted</i> by MNR on Bear Mgmt. Agreement (BMA) applications which MNR decided to handle	10
	• <i>Preempted</i> by the CPP/MNR when CPP decided to zone over WSA area in its planning process	10
	• Both Ontario & TAA did things without consulting the WSA, e.g. WSA was never asked for advice nor participation in discussions on shared stewardship when the WSA was the only body with experience- <i>preempted</i>	9
	• <i>Coopted</i> by both sponsoring bodies (Ontario & TAA) because it was never made clear as to how much WSA was entitled to differ from existing resource management policies.	6

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Decision-making Authority" in combined research questions #1 and #2 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Decision-making authority	
Interview Question:	<i>Is there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/recommendations made by the agency by the state or any of the key actors?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Members of the two establishing agencies: Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (ONAS); and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) N=4	<u>CPC</u>	
	• Since CPP work under schedules, they have gone to the CPC with ideas of the outcome and in the process may have <i>coopted</i> CPC into their decisions in order to meet those schedules	2
	• TAA involvement on CPC was <i>cooptation</i> by Ontario from day one; the TAA never got involved in developing CPC's Terms of Reference	2
	• TAA involvement on the CPC is being used by Ontario to legitimize the process- <i>cooptation</i>	2
	• CPC is not allowed to make decisions/ recommendations outside provincial policy which is another case of <i>cooptation</i> .	2
	• Although CPC is supposed to report to both Ontario and the TAA; recommendations on the CTMP were only sent to the Minister and not the TAA; TAA only received the final plan. This is <i>preemption</i> by Ontario of the TAA.	2
	<u>WSA</u>	
	• Lack of clarity between the roles of WSA and MNR may have prompted <i>preemption</i> of WSA decisions by the MNR (no specifics).	2
Members of the Public N=39	• TAA Executive Council received numerous reports from its reps on the WSA that MNR tried to or had <i>preempted</i> WSA decisions; e.g. on the illegal cut in Delhi Twp., Peter Bates' dock building application, and renewal of Ket-Chun-Eny lodge's licence	2
	• Not that I can recall	1
	<u>CPC</u>	
	• <i>Cooptation</i> because CPP/MNR are making decisions and make them look as if CPC is part of it	23
	• <i>Cooptation</i> because of CPC involvement in Treaty negotiations	22
	• CPC <i>preempted</i> by CPP/MNR on decision not to go to Toronto and meet with interest groups	6
	• I don't know	16
	<u>WSA</u>	
	• Lack of legislation for the WSA means that Ontario will <i>preempt</i> WSA decisions/not implement its plan	24
	• I don't know	15

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Decision-making Authority" in combined research questions #1 and #2 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Decision-making authority	
Interview Question:	<i>Is there evidence of cooptation/preemption of decisions/recommendations made by the agency by the state or any of the key actors?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Key Informants N=5	<u>CPC</u>	
	• Exclusive use of MNR information in the planning process is <i>cooptation</i> of the CPC members	4
	• The CPC/CPD structure makes it possible for MNR/CPD to <i>preempt</i> CPC decisions (advisory without teeth)	3
	• CPC decision not to go to Toronto and meet with environmental groups was <i>preempted</i> by MNR/CPD	3
	<u>WSA</u>	
	• <i>Preempted</i> by both Ontario & TAA because WSA was not consulted on shared stewardship models	5
	• Issuance of two land-use permits by MNR in WSA area was <i>preemption</i> of WSA authority	5
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11 Sources: Order-In-Council 1145/91 Amending OIC 1434/93	• Renewal of mining leases in Delhi Township by MNDR & MNR was <i>preemption</i> of WSA authority	5
	• Attempts by MNR to dismiss WSA's LTSY method of timber allocations was an attempt of <i>cooptation</i> by MNR to use their MAD method.	2
Interview Question:	<i>What are the stated management functions?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11 Sources: Order-In-Council 1145/91 Amending OIC 1434/93	• <i>Recommend</i> to the Minister of Natural Resources and the TAA Executive Council a comprehensive plan; <i>establish and manage</i> the public consultation process in the development of the comprehensive plan; <i>provide advice</i> to the MNR and TAA on ongoing land use planning and resource mgmt. issues and decisions; and <i>provide advice</i> to the Minister of Natural Resources regarding alternative & preferred mechanisms to allow other parties' input into the negotiations between the Temagami Anishnabai & Ontario with respect to the implementation of the MOU.	11 (reference made to two Orders-In-Council by respondents)
Wendapan Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• Plan, decide, implement, enforce, regulate, monitor, and undertake studies of, all uses in the area of its jurisdiction -- and report its findings from time to time to the TAA and Ontario.	10 (reference made to the Order-In-Council 1144/91 and Schedule A of the Addendum to the MOU by respondents)

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Decision-making Authority" in combined research questions #1 and #2 (...continued).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Decision-making authority	
Interview Question:	<i>Which of those functions are actually performed/not performed by the agency?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have advised the minister on Treaty of Co-existence public consultations • Made recommendations on the Contingency Timber Management Planning Process (CTMP) to the Minister of Natural Resources (no response yet) • When recommendations on the CTMP were made to the Minister, they did not go to the TAA • Recommended to the Minister of Natural Resources revised CPC planning objectives and mission goals • We have not recommended a plan yet to the Minister because we are still planning 	<p>11</p> <p>9</p> <p>5</p> <p>5</p> <p>11</p>
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performed all except long-term management (implementation) because WSA was terminated on March 31, 1994 & lacked legislative authority 	10
Members of the two establishing agencies: Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (ONAS); and the Teme-Augama Anishnabai (TAA) N=4	<p><u>CPC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They have provided advice to the Minister on a number of issues but have not recommended a plan yet • They have not provided advice or recommendations to the TAA so far; all we got was a copy of the MNR's CTM Plan <p><u>WSA</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They have performed all functions • They have performed all functions except implementing the plan due to lack of legislation 	<p>4</p> <p>2</p> <p>4</p> <p>2</p>
Interview Question:	<i>How was decision-making authority distributed in the past and how is it distributed now?</i>	
Members of MNR N=5	<p><u>Past:</u> • distributed internally within MNR</p> <p><u>Present:</u> • Now shared with local citizens</p>	<p>5</p> <p>5</p>
Members of the CPC N=11	<p><u>Past:</u> • Decision-making authority held by MNR</p> <p><u>Present:</u> • Not very much different from the past</p> <p>• Now decision-making shared with locals</p>	<p>11</p> <p>6</p> <p>5</p>
Members of the WSA N=10	<p><u>Past:</u> • MNR retained all the authority and made all the decisions with minimal public input</p> <p><u>Present:</u> • Now citizens are able to make decisions</p> <p>• Still MNR, they won't relinquish control</p>	<p>10</p> <p>9</p> <p>1</p>
Members of the Public N=39	<p><u>Present:</u> • It was no distribution at all, MNR decided</p> <p><u>Present:</u> • Now shared with the public</p> <p>• MNR is still making the decisions because they have the legislative basis</p>	<p>39</p> <p>12</p> <p>27</p>

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Types of Decisions" in combined main research questions #1 and #2.

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Types of decisions	
Interview Question: (Past)	<i>What decisions were made in the past?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	• construction of the Red Squirrel Road Extension	5
	• closure of Milne Lumber in 1990 in Temagami	5
	• planning decisions did not consider land use and resource management simultaneously	4
	• establishment of the LESW Park	3
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• Red Squirrel and Goulard Road Extensions	11
	• establishment of LESW Park	11
	• timber was the driving factor in planning decisions	10
	• creation of the Temagami Advisory Council	8
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• construction of the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions	10
	• establishment of the LESW Park	10
	• timber rather than resource management	8
	• establishment of the Temagami Skyline Reserve	6
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	• closure of Milne Lumber	3
	• primacy of timber in planning	4
	• construction of the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions	4
Members of the Public N=39	• Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions	39
	• emphasis on timber management	37
	• closure of Milne Lumber	37
	• a range of values other than timber not considered equally in planning	35
	• establishment of the LESW Park	17
Key Informants N=5	• closure of Milne Lumber	5
	• closure of Sherman Mine	5
	• construction of the Goulard and Red Squirrel Road Extensions	5
	• timber primacy in planning	3

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Types of Decisions" in combined main research questions #1 and #2 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Types of decisions	
Interview Question: (Past)	What were the outcomes of those decisions?	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	· on construction of road extensions = conflicts over diminishing wilderness	5
	· on closure of Milne Lumber = loss of jobs	5
	· on land use & resource mgmt. integration = conflicts	4
	· on establishment of the LESW Park = conflicts	3
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	· on construction of road extensions = conflicts	11
	· on establishment of LESW Park = conflicts	11
	· on timber being driving factor = conflicts	10
	· on TAC = increased public participation	8
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	· on construction of road extensions = conflicts	11
	· on establishment of the LESW Park = conflicts	10
	· on timber rather than resource management = conflicts	8
	· on closure of Milne Lumber = conflicts	11
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	· on closure of Milne Lumber = loss of jobs, conflicts	3
	· on primacy of timber in planning = conflicts	4
	· on construction of road extensions = conflicts	4
Members of the Public N=39	· on construction of road extensions = conflicts	39
	· on emphasis on timber management = conflicts	37
	· on closure of Milne Lumber = joy, conflicts	37
	· on lack of equal consideration of resources in planning = conflicts	35
	· on establishment of the LESW Park = conflicts	17
Key Informants N=5	· on closure of Milne Lumber = loss of jobs	5
	· on closure of Sherman Mine = loss of jobs	5
	· on construction of road Extensions = conflicts	5
	· on timber primacy in planning = conflicts	3

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Types of Decisions" in combined main research questions #1 and #2 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Types of decisions	
Interview Question:	<i>What decisions/recommendations were made by the agencies (CPC and WSA)?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<u>Decisions:</u> • CPC decided <u>not</u> to have a meeting with special interest groups in Toronto but in Temagami	11
	<u>Recommendations:</u> • recommended to the Minister a revised management strategy and 16 objectives for the CPC	10
	• recommended to the Minister a public consultation strategy on Treaty negotiations	10
	• recommended to the Minister the extension of the CPC mandate from March, 1994 to March, 1996	8
	• recommended to the Minister and TAA approval of CTMP's	6
	• CPC recommended to the CPP to take a watershed approach in the planning area	8
	• CPC recommended to the CPP that outside consultants be hired as an alternative source of information from the MNR	7
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<u>Decisions:</u> [reference made to WSA plan by members (WSA 1994:x-xi)]	
	• a ban on importation of live baitfish into WSA area	10
	• implementation of a fish catch-and-release program	10
	• no baiting of holes during winter fishing season	10
	• fishing gear restricted to one fishing rod per angler	10
	• acidified lakes to self-reclaim naturally	10
	• boat motor size restricted to 6 h.p. on lakes ≤ 50 ha	10
	• enforcement of a fishing day user fee in WSA area	10
	• baitfish licence fees based on area of waterbody plus incremental fee based on unit of baitfish harvested over and above area charge	10
	• licence fee of \$200/township charged to bearfitters	10
	• no spring bear hunt	
	• no use of dogs in bear hunting	10
	• suspension of waterfowl hunting	10
	• no use of herbicides	10
	• no new road access in the area	10
	• existing Goulard road in Delhi Twp. to be closed	10
	• development zone to be accessed by Red Sq. Road	10
	• first right of refusal for timber accorded to local entrepreneurs and the TAA	10
	• first priority to timber applicants with innovative timber harvesting techniques and who do not require use of Red Squirrel Road	10
	• If Red Squirrel Road is used, subject to restrictions	10
	• no open-pit mining in the area	10

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Types of Decisions" in combined main research questions #1 and #2 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Types of decisions	
Interview Question:	<i>Were the decisions/recommendations implemented and by whom?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<u>Decisions:</u> • on meeting with special interest groups in Temagami - CPP/MNR rejected the decision.	11
	<u>Recommendations:</u> • on revised management strategy and objectives - Minister has not responded but CPC gone ahead	10
	• on public consultation strategy on Treaty negotiations - Minister said Yes	10
	• on extension of CPC mandate - Minister said Yes	8
	• on approval of CTMP's- Minister and TAA said Yes	6
	• on watershed approach to planning - CPP did not say no but approach has not been implemented	11
	• on hiring of outside consultants - CPP said No	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<u>Decisions:</u> • No, decisions have not been implemented by the WSA due to a unilateral termination of the WSA on March 31, 1994 by the Minister, and the future is not known- also due to lack of legislation for the WSA	10
Interview Question:	<i>How different are current planning processes from those in the past?</i>	
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	• both combine land use and resource management into a single planning framework (+)	5
	• both are comprehensive planning processes (all values are considered) (+)	5
	• all values are considered primary drivers, not just timber (+)	5
	• both use permanent staff assigned to do planning whereas MNR staff are mostly transient (+)	3
	• both have much more proactive public involvement processes than the MNR (+)	4
	• both recognize conflict resolution as part of planning (+)	5
	• amendment process much easier under CPP process than under MNR's DLUGS (+)	5

Appendix 2: Data display for the category "Types of Decisions" in combined main research questions #1 and #2 (....continued).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected distributions of decision-making authority and the substance/types of resource management decisions at local levels?		
Category:	Types of decisions	
Interview Question:	<i>How different are current planning processes from those in the past?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• much more integrative and broad-based (+)	8
	• much more sensitive to local concerns (+)	7
	• data gathering aims at obtaining equal levels of information among all plan components (+)	10
	• partnerships with other government ministries (+)	9
	• uses non conventional staff in planning such as ecologist, fire ecologist, economist (+)	8
	• no decision-making power, just advisory (-)	10
	• TAA participation seen to compromise MNR integrity (-)	5
	• lack of provincial focus (-)	5
	• watershed planning abandoned (-)	5
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• much more participatory (meaningful) (+)	10
	• based on consensus-building (+)	10
	• TAA involved in decision-making (+)	10
	• much more holistic planning (all values) (+)	10
	• more ecologically-based planning (+)	10
	• partnerships with local users and govt. agencies (+)	9
	• prepared in conflict resolution (+)	8
	• watershed-based planning (+)	9
	• lacked provincial focus (-)	5
	• as a new venture, produced uncertainty among members and the public (lack of initial publicity) (-)	4
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u>	
	• more ecologically driven process	39
	• considers all values other than just timber (+)	39
	• CPC now has TAA involvement (+)	28
	• still better advisory process than in the past (+)	23
	• used local knowledge in initial stages (+)	18
	• lacks provincial focus (-)	18
	• public participation still tokenism (-)	11
	<u>WSA</u>	
	• more meaningful public participation (+)	39
	• used local knowledge (+)	35
	• process considered all values not just timber (+)	38
	• more ecologically driven process (+)	39
	• decisions made by local citizens (+)	33
	• decisions still subject to preemption or veto (-)	32
	• lacked provincial focus unlike MNR which lacks local focus (-)	23

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Inclusion" in combined main research questions #3 and #4.

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Inclusion	
Interview Question:	<i>Did the/your agency consult all interests in its decision-making?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	<u>CPC</u> • Provincial interests inadequately consulted (-)	5
	• No, Town of Temagami inadequately consulted (-)	2
	<u>WSA</u> • No, provincial interests ignored (-)	5
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• Yes (+)	4
	• No, timber industry and OFAH ignored (-)	5
	• No, provincial interests inadequately consulted (-)	2
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• Yes (+)	6
	• Provincial interests inadequately consulted (-)	4
	• No, OFAH and mining inadequately consulted (-)	3
	• No, Bear Island Reserve inadequately consulted (-)	1
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	<u>CPC</u> • Yes, it is doing its best to do so (+)	4
	• Bear Island has not been adequately consulted (-)	2
	<u>WSA</u> • Yes, (+)	4
	• Provincially, consultation was not adequate (-)	2
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> • Yes (+)	22
	• OFAH and provincial interests not adequately consulted (-)	8
	• No, provincial interests and Town of Temagami not adequately consulted (-)	10
	<u>WSA</u> • Yes (+)	24
	• No, provincial interests slighted off (-)	13
	• No, mining & OFAH not adequately consulted (-)	15
Key Informants N=5	<u>CPC</u> • Yes (+)	1
	• No, municipalities not adequately consulted (-)	4
	<u>WSA</u> • Yes (+)	3
	• No, provincial interests, mining, OFAH not adequately consulted (-)	2

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Inclusion" in combined main research questions #3 and #4 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Inclusion	
Interview Question:	<i>During the public consultation process, were the public involved in problem definition, generation of alternative solutions, generation of viable solutions, evaluation and selection of final solutions?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• Yes, public involved in problem definition	8
	• Yes, public involved in generation of alternative solutions through review of land use options	8
	• No, - MNR makes all the decisions	3
	- public not involved in problem definition	3
	- public not involved in generation of alternative solutions	3
	- public <u>not yet</u> involved in generation of viable solutions	11
	- public <u>not yet</u> involved in generation of final solutions	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• Yes, public got involved in the process from start to end	10
	- public defined public participation process	10
	- public involved in background information stage	8
	- public involved in resource impact/compatibility analysis	10
	- public got involved in zoning decisions	10
	- public got involved in reviewing draft plan	10
	• No, problem definition was already done by Ontario	6
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u>	
	• Yes, in background information stage	10
	• No, CPP decides what to take to the public	29
	<u>WSA</u>	
Key Informants N=5	• Yes, public got involved throughout the process	20
	• No, Ontario defined the problem	19
	<u>CPC</u>	
	• Yes, the public got involved in identifying the problems and generating solutions (Phases 1 & 2)	5
	• No, because MNR defines the problem then takes it to the public; then MNR makes final decisions	4
Key Informants N=5	• No, the public <u>have not yet</u> been involved in the later stages of identifying and selecting viable and final solutions; and MNR is likely to do that	5
	<u>WSA</u>	
	• Yes, the public got involved in all stages of the planning process	5
	• No, because Ontario already identified the problem	5

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Inclusion" in combined main research questions #3 and #4
(continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Inclusion	
Interview Question:	<i>How were representatives on the management agency (CPC or WSA) selected?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appointed by Ontario through an Order-In-Council Appointed by the TAA Executive Council and approved by TAA General Assembly 	7 4
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appointed by Ontario through an Order-In-Council Appointed by the TAA Executive Council and approved by TAA General Assembly 	5 5
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 5 TAA representatives appointed by TAA <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6 Ontario representatives appointed by Ontario 6 TAA representatives appointed by TAA 	4 4 4 4
<hr/>		
Interview Question:	<i>Is representation on both CPC and WSA adequate?</i>	
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented Town of Temagami not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests and OFAH not represented 	5 5 5
Comprehensive Planning Council members N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented 	11 8
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters (OFAH) not represented 	10 5
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> mining interests not represented Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests and OFAH not represented 	3 4 4
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> inadequate representation from the Temagami/Latchford area, heavily weighted towards Tritowns mining interests not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests not represented 	32 7 39
Key Informants N=5	<u>CPC</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Town of Temagami/Latchford area not represented mining interests not represented <u>WSA</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mining interests not represented 	5 4 5

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Respect and Trust" in combined main research questions #3 and #4.

Main Research Question:	How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?	
Category:	Respect and Trust	
Interview Question:	<i>Did any members of your agency voluntarily quit, and if so, why?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One members voluntarily quit: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GL quit because as a member of Municipal Advisory Group (MAG) which is opposed to TAA involvement on CP, and thus, he was in conflict of interest • Two members were terminated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IH because he moved out of the area - HM quit because as a member and Chief of Bear Island that was opposed to TAA in general, she was in conflict of interest 	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A total of five members voluntarily quit: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MM quit because he was opposed to TAA - DM quit because he was busy with negotiations on behalf of the TAA - AM quit because he was opposed to TAA - RT quit because he was opposed to TAA - TF quit because he was busy with the Elk Lake Community Forest and also because as member of MAG that was opposed to the WSA initiative, he was in conflict of interest • A total of two members were terminated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DA because as chair, he was unpopular among members, tried to apply Robert's rules in decision-making - IH because he moved out of the local area 	10

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Respect and Trust" in combined main research questions #3 and #4
(continued...)

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Respect and Trust	
Interview Question:	<i>What are the fundamental principles of your group?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• resource sustainability, economic development, land preservation, preservation of aboriginal rights (all respondents are TAA representatives on CPC)	4
	• environmental protection, sustainability, equitable access to resources, local governance (all respondents are Ontario representatives on CPC)	7
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• sustained life, sustainable development, co-existence, and public participation in decision-making (same as WSA goals) (all respondents are TAA representatives on WSA)	5
	• socio-economic development, maintaining integrity of Lake Temagami, enhancing wilderness experience, biodiversity, environmental protection (all respondents are Ontario representatives on WSA)	5
Interview Question:	<i>Do you feel those principles have been achieved or abandoned in the process?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<u>TAA side</u> • being achieved • being abandoned	0 4
	<u>Ontario side</u> • being achieved • being abandoned	3 4
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<u>TAA side</u> • achieved • abandoned	4 1
	<u>Ontario side</u> • achieved • abandoned	5 0

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Respect and Trust" in combined main research questions #3 and #4
(continued...)

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Respect and Trust	
Interview Question:	<i>How are reporting relationships between you and your constituency structured?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<u>TAA side</u> • structured • informal • not structured <u>Ontario side</u> • structured • informal • not structured	4 - - - 1 6
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<u>TAA side</u> • structured • informal • not structured <u>Ontario side</u> • structured • informal • not structured	4 1 - 0 1 4
Interview Question:	<i>Is your agency committed to consensus decision-making, and if so, how did it work?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• Yes, but consensus has not been defined and has not been practiced on the CPC- the Chair makes all the decisions plus the MNR	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• Yes, consensus has been defined as minimum of 8/12 in consent but it has never been applied that way- it was always 12/12 in consent and no splits on racial lines.	10

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Cooperation" in combined main research questions #3 and #4.

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Cooperation	
Interview Question:	<i>Have representatives in your agency engaged in joint fact-finding missions or other strategies of trust building?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No <p>Quotes: - "No, we don't even know each other that well after three years"</p> <p>- "It is taken for granted that everybody knows everybody"</p> <p>- "No, we only meet here in this room whenever we are asked to"</p>	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <p>Quotes: - " closer working relationships were fostered through sub-committee structures such as Lands & Resources, Finance, Public Relations"</p> <p>- "We toured our management area together on four occasions to familiarize ourselves with specific resource management issues"</p> <p>- "Individual members were assigned special tasks and reported their findings to the whole Authority"</p> <p>- "A joint committee was formed comprising both TAA & Ontario members to deal with an enforcement issue involving an illegal timber cut in Delhi Twp."</p>	10

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Cooperation" in combined main research questions #3 and #4 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Cooperation	
Interview Question:	<i>Did the/your agency seek technical advice and/or logistical support from the government and was such advice/support accorded?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes, MNR has assisted the WSA in several areas including the provision of background information, using MNR GIS facilities, using MNR board room facilities, flight patrols, road transportation facilities, and printing facilities 	5
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to the nature of the of the working relationships between the CPC and CPP, the CPC gets assistance on whatever they need through the CPP 	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNR provided background information, GIS facilities, printing facilities, and other services covered through our enforcement agreement 	10
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In one instance, MNR refused to provide a flight to the WSA when they were faced with the MKA illegal cut in Delhi Township. Things only changed when the NNR district manager got instructions from Toronto to do so 	9
Interview Question:	<i>What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource users and the agency (CPC or WSA)?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None so far, perhaps that will emerge in the next planning phase 	11
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There may be cooperation if recommendations/decisions are made known to the public before or at the same time they are released to the Minister and the TAA 	1
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes, several partnerships were formed in agreement with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - tourist outfitters, e.g. Obabika Lodge - bearfitters - one baitfish licence operator - timber industry, e.g. Goulard Lumber - environmental groups, e.g. Northwatch and Wildlands League 	10
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation may be lacking from mining interests 	8

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Cooperation" in combined main research questions #3 and #4 (.....continued).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Cooperation	
Interview Question:	<i>What evidence of cooperative behaviour exists in agreement between resource users and the agency (CPC or WSA)?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Members of the Public N=39	<u>CPC</u>	
	• The Temagami Lakes Association is likely to cooperate with the CPC because of assured protection of the Skyline Reserve	3
	• There is no evidence; people are not inclined to cooperate with the CPC because the CPC process is seen to be an MNR process; people are fed up with the MNR	35
	• It remains to be seen once the plan is completed	18
	<u>WSA</u>	
	• cooperation likely to come from municipalities, timber industry, tourist operators, trappers, and guide outfitters	31
	• cooperation not likely from environmental groups because of the proposal/decision to use the Red Squirrel Road	8
	• Cooperation is unlikely from mining interests and Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH)	12

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Conflict resolution" in combined main research questions #3 and #4.

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Conflict resolution	
Interview Question:	<i>What are the conflicts in the area?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	• Native land claim and cautions	5
	• access to resources by different groups	5
	• The splinter group within the TAA	5
	• Road access: Red squirrel/Liskeard Roads	4
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• mining interests want entire land base opened	11
	• Pilots' Association wants fly-in access into the Lady Evelyn Smoothwater Wilderness Park	11
	• the Native Land Cautions	10
	• Elk Lake wants Liskeard Lumber opened	8
	• Temagami Lakes Association's opposition to any development in the Temagami Skyline Reserve	3
	• environmental groups want old-growth preservation	9
	• Road access: Red Squirrel/Liskeard Lumber Roads	9
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• a splinter group of the TAA claiming WSA lands as their family territory (Makominising Anishnabai)	10
	• use of Red Squirrel Road	10
	• old-growth protection	10
	• mining interests wanting all land opened to staking	10
	• West Nipissing Access Group opposed to any road access restrictions	4
	• unsustainable logging practices-- clearcutting	6
	• use of herbicides in timber management	9
	• Native Land Cautions	11
	• recreation-tourism-wilderness versus timber interests	3
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	• the TAA Land Cautions	4
	• Road access	4
	• opposition to Ontario Parks Policy	2
	• mining interests want whole land opened for staking	4
	• timber extraction versus protection	3

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Conflict resolution" in combined main research questions #3 and #4 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Conflict resolution	
Interview Question:	<i>What are the conflicts in the area?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Members of the Public N=39	• lack of meaningful participation in decision-making	22
	• old-growth protection	24
	• protection of viewscapes required	9
	• mining fraternity demanding more land for staking	28
	• Fly-in access into Lady Evelyn Wild. Park	24
	• the MKA splinter group	30
	• Road access (too much of it already)	29
	• Native Land Caution	35
Key Informants N=5	• mining interests all land base opened for staking	5
	• the West Nipissing Access Group want all restrictions on road access removed	1
	• Land cautions placed by the TAA	5
	• Elk Lake wants Liskeard Lumber Road opened through the LESW park	2
	• the MKA splinter group within the TAA	4
	• local & traditional users versus provincial interests	2
	• the parks program	2
	• road access	5
	• timber management (harvest prescriptions, pesticide use, rates of harvest)	5
	• fisheries management (regulation of fishing pressure)	3
	• wildlife management (wildlife population and habitat management)	3
	• Areas of Natural and Scientific Interest (ANSIs)-- (what are permissible uses?)	1
	• Crownland Recreation/Tourism (canoeing, snowmobiling, etc-- access to)	3
	• Aggregate Resources (access to)	1
	• Heritage Resources (identification and protection)	
	• Water management	3
	• Viewscapes	2

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Conflict resolution" in combined main research questions #3 and #4 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Conflict resolution	
Interview Question:	<i>What conflict resolution strategies were adopted by your agency?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	<u>Strategies used:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • members had training opportunities in conflict resolution • more information sought in light of conflicts • ingroup lobbying • presentations by interest groups 	4
	<u>No strategy:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • co-chair makes all the decisions • co-chair does not allow conflicts at the table • option development and zoning all done by CPP 	7
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	<u>Strategies used:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • consensus-decision making • neutral chair • planner as facilitator and collaborator • knowledgeable members • zoning • members received training in conflict resolution and group facilitation • networking with other agencies • working together as members of one family • open planning process 	10
	<u>No strategy:</u> → <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more time could have been spent building stronger relationships with the local MNR 	1
Interview Question:	<i>What are/have been the outcomes of such conflict resolution strategies?</i>	
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• conflicts are currently being played down	10
	• conflicts are likely to surface in the next planning phase dealing with resource allocation	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• consensus was achieved	8
	• produced a good plan within a short period of time at minimal cost	10
	• got cooperation in agreement from local resource users	7
	• co-existence among Native and non-Native members on the WSA was achieved	10
	• resolved the most difficulty issue of road access	10

Appendix 3: Data display for the category "Conflict resolution" in combined main research questions #3 and #4 (continued...).

Main Research Question: How has co-management affected mutual understanding and cooperation among key actors and local resource users, as well as local resource-use conflicts?		
Category:	Conflict resolution	
Interview Question:	<i>Have the conflicts de-escalated or escalated over time and what are the reasons for the de-escalation/escalation?</i>	
Category of Respondents	Responses	Number of Respondents Mentioning Item
Ministry of Natural Resources Staff N=5	• they are escalating because the CPC planning process is taking too long	5
	• conflicts are escalating because Ontario and the TAA have not concluded the negotiations process; it has taken too long and quite costly	5
Comprehensive Planning Council members (CPC) N=11	• conflicts are currently on hold until CPC plan is completed	9
	• conflicts are likely to escalate in the plan implementation stage	11
Wendaban Stewardship Authority members (WSA) N=10	• conflicts are on hold because nothing is happening on the ground (implementation)	10
	• conflicts have de-escalated because of the WSA profile	6
Members of the two establishing agencies: ONAS and the TAA N=4	• conflicts de-escalated due to the profiles of both CPC and WSA	3
	• conflicts are likely to escalate when plans are implemented	4
	• mining interests will raise problems with both the WSA and CPC plans for inadequate lands set aside for staking	3
Members of the Public N=39	• conflicts de-escalated because nothing was happening on the ground	32
	• conflicts are likely to escalate because MNR will not let go of their power	14
	• conflicts are likely to escalate because of no progress on the Agreement-In-Principle reached between Ontario and the TAA	33
	• conflicts are likely to escalate if the WSA plan is not implemented by Ontario	20
Key Informants N=5	• conflicts have escalated due to inaction on the ground	5
	• conflicts are escalating because the CPP processes is taking too long	5
	• conflicts will escalate if the WSA plan is not implemented by some body other than MNR	3
	• conflicts to escalate when CPP plan is implemented	3

APPENDIX 4

REVISED
Page 1

MINUTES

TEMAGAMI ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING #28
SCANDIA INN - TEMAGAMI
JANUARY 10, 1990 - 6:00 P.M.

All council members were present. Also present was the Honourable Lyn McLeod, Minister of Natural Resources, Gillian Morrison the Minister's Special Assistant - Policy and Community Liaison and John Kenrick, Director Temagami Project.

Topics:

1. Temagami Advisory Council: Evolvment
2. Operational Issues
3. Public Participation and the Planning Process
4. Minister Expectation of TAC

1. Temagami Advisory Council: Evolvment

Council members expressed their concern that the council is perceived by the public as a "rubber stamp" for the MNR. The Minister stated that TAC is considered a check on whether the MNR is managing the resources correctly and to become a rubber stamp means that no questions are being asked; in TAC's case, questions are being asked and the MNR is being challenged. The Minister stated that TAC is an important liaison for the public to provide them with public consultation.

Council members also expressed their concern that all their information is supplied by the MNR and they have no way of verifying whether the MNR's information is correct. The Minister agreed that much of TAC's information is supplied by the MNR experts.

Prefasi indicated that TAC needs a staff member coordinator to assist in TAC's independence. Mathews indicated that TAC needs a Policies and Procedures Manual which should be available to TAC members.

Brozowski inquired whether the Minister would object to council seeking public input on their own (without MNR) to establish/redefine new objectives. The Minister said that she has no objections with this request.

2. Operational Issues

The Minister informed council that it was appropriate for them to provide names for replacement members; however, council should not be the only source from which nominations come. The Minister indicated that the final responsibility for selection would be hers in order to ensure that a good representation of the public is maintained. Council was pleased that their nominations will be considered.

Council asked the Minister what she thought would be the best method of reporting to her on contentious issues/decisions. The Minister has no problem with council reporting to her directly via telephone and then this would benefit her as she could respond to media questions immediately.

3. Public Participation and the Planning Process

Council expressed their concern that some organizations are not participating in the Temagami Planning Process. Council informed the Minister of their new initiative where member(s) will meet with individual organizations and even attend some of their meetings. The Minister is encouraged that council is looking at ways to rectify this situation.

Council asked whether the Minister would consider participating in a meeting of TAC, Minister and selected public group representatives in a "controlled environment". Council informed the Minister that details have not yet been worked out but guidelines would have to be established and implemented (i.e. each representative would be allowed a maximum of a 1 page presentation submitted to council prior to the meeting date. The Minister stated that she would not be uncomfortable participating in this situation and would do anything to assist TAC in their role. The Minister questioned council what purpose would she be serving by attending the meetings. Horncastle stated that she would improve public perception verifying that the information does get conveyed to the Minister.

4. Minister's Expectations of TAC

On the whole the Minister is very supportive of TAC's achievements to date and is very optimistic for their future.

The meeting adjourned at 10:00 p.m.

APPENDIX 5

Schedule: Timber Management Plan Production, Review and Approval.

