Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

On the margins : international society and the De facto state Pegg, Scott McDonald 1997

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-ubc_1997-251365.pdf [ 21.01MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0088261.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0088261-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0088261-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0088261-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0088261-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0088261-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0088261-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

O N THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY A N D T H E DE FACTO STATE by SCOTT M c D O N A L D P E G G B.A. (Hons.), University of Richmond, Virginia, USA, 1987 M . S c , London School of Economics, U K , 1991 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as confonriing to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A September 1997 © Scott McDonald Pegg, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) Abstract This study explores the phenomenon of de facto statehood in contemporary international relations. In essence, the de facto state is almost the inverse of what Robert Jackson has termed the "quasi-state." The quasi-state has a flag, a capital city, an ambassador, and a seat at the United Nations but it does not function positively as a viable governing entity. It is generally incapable of delivering services to its population and the scope of its governance often does not extend beyond the capital city, if even there. The quasi-state's empirical limitations, however, do not detract from its de jure sovereign legitimacy which is externally guaranteed by the other members of international society. The de facto state, on the other hand, though lacking de jure legitimacy, does effectively control a given territorial area and provide governmental services to a specific population which accords it a degree of popular support. In spite of the vast literature on such topics as sovereignty, the state, secession, and self-determination, there has not yet been any systematic study of the causes and implications of de facto statehood for international relations. It is this gap in the literature which this study aims to redress. It does so in four main ways. First, this study addresses the question "What is the de facto state?" It advances a working definition and ten theoretical criteria to delineate the de facto state as a separate category of actor in international politics worthy of analysis in its own right. This theoretical endeavor is then fleshed out and operationalized through a detailed focus on four case studies: (1) Eritrea before it won its independence from Ethiopia; (2) the parts of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; (3) the Republic of Somaliland; and (4) the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Second, the study engages in a birth, life, and death or evolution examination of the de facto state. Here we are concerned with such questions as "What factors in the contemporary international system produce the phenomenon of de facto statehood?"; "What impact do de facto states have on international law and international society?"; "How are de facto states dealt with by other actors in international politics?"; and "What sort of transformations might we expect to see these entities undergo in the future?" Third, the study evaluates the potential impact of this phenomenon on the academic study of international relations. In particular, it assesses the significance of de facto statehood for international theory as a whole and for specific theoretical perspectives such as realism, rationalism, feminism, and post-modernism. Finally, the study considers the practical and policy implications of these entities. Specifically, it asks "What, if anything, can or should be done about this phenomenon?" The study concludes by offering a series of policy recommendations designed to facilitate the accommodation of de facto states within the contemporary international system. iv Table of Contents Abstract ii List of Tables vii List of Abbreviations Used in This Study viii Acknowledgments x Chapter One ~ Introduction 1 Setting the Stage 2 The De Facto State in the Wider Academic Context 11 Methodology 16 Value Biases and Assumptions of the Author 22 Outline for the Remainder of the Study 34 Chapter Two — Defining the De Facto State . 3 6 Introduction 37 Defining the De Facto State 37 Theoretical Criteria to Distinguish the De Facto State from Other Entities 39 The Ethical and Political Logics Behind the De Facto State 58 Sovereign States, De Facto States, and the Criteria for Statehood 60 Sovereign States, De Facto States, and Their Limitations 68 Conclusion 71 Chapter Three - Eritrea and the LTTE-Controlled Parts of Sri Lanka Introduction Eritrea Before Independence Background Information Eritrea as a De Facto State Territory Relations With Society Capabilities Relations With International Society Tamil Eelam, the LTTE-Controlled Areas of Sri Lanka Background Information Tamil Eelam as a De Facto State Territory Relations With Society Capabilities Relations With International Society 73 74 75 75 80 80 82 86 88 90 90 101 101 106 108 110 Chapter Four ~ Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 111 The Republic of Somaliland 112 V Background Information 112 Somaliland as a De Facto State 119 Territory 119 Relations With Society 121 Capabilities 124 Relations With International Society 127 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 128 Background Information 128 Northern Cyprus as a De Facto State 139 Territory 139 Relations With Society 141 Capabilities 145 Relations With International Society 149 Conclusion 150 Chapter Five — Macro-Level Factors Implicated in the Birth of De Facto States 152 Introduction 153 The Changing Normative Environment on Territory 153 Changing Conceptions of Sovereignty 158 From Empirical to Juridical Statehood 161 Recognition Policies 163 Weak State Security Dynamics 169 Self-Determination 176 Conclusion 184 Chapter Six — Micro-Level Factors Implicated in the Birth of De Facto States 189 Introduction 190 The Different Etiologies of Quasi-States and De Facto States 190 Foreign Invasions 191 External Political Interest in Creating a De Facto State 194 External Humanitarian Interest in Creating a De Facto State 199 Indigenous Secession Attempts 204 State Collapse 208 The Role of the U N in Freezing the Status Quo 212 The Demonstration Effect of Other De Facto States 216 Conclusion 220 Chapter Seven — The De Facto State in International Society 222 Introduction 223 The De Facto State's Impact on International Society 223 How Does International Society Deal With the De Facto State? 228 Three Potential Alternatives 234 International Law and the De Facto State 241 Does the De Facto State Have Utility for International Society? 249 Conclusion 259 vi Chapter Eight — Potential Transformations of the De Facto State 262 Introduction 263 Three Different Types of Military Defeat 263 Continued Existence as a De Facto State 269 Evolution into Some Alternate Status Short of Sovereign Statehood 272 Successful Graduation to Sovereign Statehood 285 What Determines Success or Failure in Securing Recognition 290 Conclusion 293 Chapter Nine — The De Facto State and International Theory 296 Introduction 297 International Theory and the De Facto State 297 The De Facto State and Specific Theoretical Traditions 304 Realism 304 Rationalism 306 Revolutionism 309 Feminism 312 Critical or Post-Modern Approaches 315 International Law 318 Conclusion 320 Chapter Ten ~ Conclusion 322 Main Objectives 323 Key Findings of This Study 323 Future Prospects for These Entities 327 What, if Anything, Can or Should Be Done About This Phenomenon? 332 Select Bibliography 347 List of Tables Table # 1 — Theoretical Criteria Table #2- The Diversity of Facto States viii List of Abbreviations Used in This Study A D B — Asian Development Bank AIT ~ American Institute in Taiwan APEC — Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation C C N A A ~ Coordination Council for North American Affairs CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now OSCE) DRET ~ Democratic Republic of East Timor EC ~ European Community (now EU) E C J ~ European Court of Justice E L F ~ Eritrean Liberation Front E O K A — Ethniki Orgdnosis Kipriakou Agonos E P L A — Eritrean People's Liberation Army (military wing of EPLF) EPLF — Eritrean People's Liberation Front (now PFDJ) EPRDF — Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRLF ~ Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front E U ~ European Union (formerly EC) F M L N — Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front FRETELIN ~ Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente GATT — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now WTO) GNP — Gross national product ICRC — International Committee of the Red Cross IMF — International Monetary Fund IPKF — Indian Peace-Keeping Force (in Sri Lanka) JVP — Janatha Vimukti Peramuna L T T E — Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam N A T O ~ North Atlantic Treaty Organization OAS ~ Organization of American States O A U ~ Organization of African Unity OSCE ~ Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly CSCE) P A ~ Palestinian Authority PAIGC — Partido Ajricano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde PFDJ ~ People's Front for Democracy and Justice (formerly EPLF) PGE — Provisional Government of Eritrea (1991 - 1993) PLO — Palestinian Liberation Organization PLOTE — People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam PRC — People's Republic of China ROC — Republic of China (Taiwan) SADR — Saharan Arab Democratic Republic SEF ~ Straits Exchange Foundation SNL — Somali National League S N M — Somali National Movement SPM — Somali Patriotic Movement SWAPO - South West Africa People's Organization TELO ~ Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization ix TFSC - Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975 - 1983) T M T ~ Turk Mukavemet Teskilati TPLF — Tigrean People's Liberation Front T R A — Taiwan Relations Act TRNC — Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983 - present) TULF — Tamil United Liberation Front UDI — Unilateral declaration of independence U K — United Kingdom U N — United Nations UNDP ~ United Nations Development'Program UNFICYP ~ United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus UNITA — Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola U N O S O M — United Nations Operation in Somalia US — United States USAID — United States Agency for International Development use — United Somali Congress WTO ~ World Trade Organization (formerly GATT) Acknowledgments This dissertation could not have been written without the support and cooperation of a number of people both inside and outside of the academic community. For their various forms of assistance, I am eternally grateful. In particular, I would like to thank the inter-library loan staff at the University of British Columbia. Ken Shivers and Siria Lopez at the US Department of State and Dr. Sazil Korkut at the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus representative office in New York were gracious in sharing their thoughts with me in interviews. Don Payzant and Donald Arnone were extremely helpful in regard to Somaliland's currency, as was Suzanne Hirsch in regard to Cypriot tourism. Federico Chachagua assisted me with translation and offered a number of useful editing suggestions. Uli Rauch provided me with vital technical computer assistance. For their contributions to my mental and physical health, I would also like to thank the members and staff of the Nanaksar Gurdwara and the Marpole-Oakridge Fitness Center. For financial assistance, I am grateful to the University of British Columbia for a University Graduate Fellowship and a teaching assistantship. Special thanks to Jim Crawley and the New York Stock Exchange for enabling me to complete this degree. In 1993,1 entered the PhD program in political science with seven other students. I would like to acknowledge the five students from my class who did not finish their PhD's at UBC: Janet Alford, Gideon Rahat, Carol Rice, Ian Wallace and Jeremy Iveson. I would also like to extend my best wishes to my two remaining colleagues, Haider Nizamani and Elizabeth Speed, in completing their dissertations. A number of other students in the U B C political science program offered valuable support and advice during the course of my doctoral studies. My thanks go out to Tony Sayers, Robert Crawford, Darryl Jarvis, Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, Julie Fieldhouse, Kevin Dwyer, Kim Williams, Matt James, Amir Abedi and Lorraine Rigo. For their encouragement and moral support, I thank my family xi and friends, Bruce Chapman, Larry Turner, Alan Tilchen, Ayesha Nizamani, Gerry Gelley and the late Reverend Dr. Odie Davis Brown. Before entering the University of British Columbia, I completed my bachelor of arts degree at the University of Richmond, Virginia—an institution where undergraduate education remains a priority. I would like to thank John Outland, David Evans and Richard Mateer there. I also had the distinct privilege of completing my master's degree at the London School of Economics. The late John Vincent remains an inspiration, as do Fred Halliday and James Mayall. Thanks also go to Michael Hodges and Michael Yahuda. Tom Lawton, Kevin Michaels, Bjarae Tellmann and Garth Davis from the L S E also provided valuable support and encouragement. Special thanks are due to the members of my dissertation committee: Robert Jackson, Brian Job and Kal Holsti. Brian Job, in particular, offered a number of constructive suggestions and much positive feedback. Kal Holsti was an outstanding thesis supervisor who afforded me tremendous freedom and support to pursue my own ideas and interests. I would also like to thank Michael Wallace, Maurice Copithorne, Peter Remnant and Alan James for their helpful comments and suggestions. This dissertation could not have been written without the consistent and unflagging emotional and financial support of my mother, Sharon Pegg. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my father, Gil M . Pegg (1935-1989), who constantly encouraged me to pursue higher education and who remains with me to this day. Chapter One Introduction 2 1.1 Setting the Stage If one takes 1960 as a convenient shorthand date for the ending of the vast majority of the decolonization process, then it can be argued that the three decades which followed that year were characterized by the greatest level of territorial stability ever seen in the history of international relations. With very few exceptions, the political map of the world's sovereign states remained unchanged during this period. As Fred Halliday put it, "For all the talk of secession and unification that marked the post-1945 epoch, it is striking how, until 1989, the map more or less held. States became independent, some lost bits of territory, but the actual division into 170-odd states was more or less frozen."1 James Mayall attributes this state of affairs to an ironic historical fate of the once-revolutionary principle of national self-determination which, in its post-World War II variant, has emphasized the sanctity of existing territorial boundaries and ended up "attempting to freeze the political map in a way which has never previously been attempted."2 The delegitimization of territorial aggrandizement and the almost religious sanctity placed on existing borders marks a profound change in international relations. Whereas entities once had to demonstrate and maintain a certain level of military, economic, and governmental effectiveness in order to preserve their position in a competitive international system, the post-war era has witnessed the wholesale granting of statehood to large numbers of former colonies with few, if any, demonstrated empirical capabilities. Once acquired, sovereign statehood has become almost impossible to lose. Small and/or weak states which, in earlier eras, would have been carved up, colonized, or swallowed by larger powers, now have a guaranteed existence in international society. In the words of Robert Jackson, "once sovereignty is acquired by virtue of independence from colonial rule, then extensive civil strife or breakdown of order or governmental immobility or any ^red Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), p. 221. 2James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 56. 3 other failures are not considered to detract from it."3 A lack of empirical viability no longer matters in a world where juridical statehood is underwritten and guaranteed by the new normative structures of international society. One of the earliest and most influential attempts to analyze this novel situation of normatively-sanctified fixed territorial borders and internationally-guaranteed sovereignty appeared in a 1982 World Politics article by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg.4 In subsequent years, one might view the academic work which built upon Jackson and Rosberg's original work as branching out into three or four separate, yet interrelated, sub-fields of analysis. Perhaps the most fertile or vibrant area here has been the literature which has grown up around the subject of "Third World" or "weak state" security.5 While this diverse sub-field covers a wide range of topics, the security implications of fixed territorial borders and juridically-guaranteed statehood are central to its analysis. A second main area of focus has been the impact of internationally-maintained sovereign boundaries on economic development. Jeffrey Herbst, for example, notes that the absence of a truly competitive states system that penalizes military weakness means that even those states that have no other prospects than long-term dependence on international aid will survive in their crippled form for the foreseeable future.... The presence of permanently weak states that will not be eliminated... poses novel development challenges.6 3Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), p. 531. 4Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35 (October 1982), pp. 1-24. 5See, for example, Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 257-283; Barry Buzan, People. States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-491; K. J. Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security ofThird World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 37-60; K. J. Holsti, The State. War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries. Adelphi Paper no. 251 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990). 6Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," International Security 14 (Spring 1990), p. 137. This line of thinking is also further developed in Jeffrey Herbst, "Is Nigeria a Viable State?," The Washington Quarterly 19 (Spring 1996), pp. 151-172. 4 In this regard, Jackson and Rosberg maintain that juridically-guaranteed statehood has had a profound socio-economic impact on the development process. Specifically referring to sub-Saharan Africa, these authors do not claim that juridical statehood provides an adequate explanation for economic underdevelopment. They do, however, argue that juridical statehood "is a significant partial explanation that has hitherto gone largely unnoticed" and that "its impact has frequently been more adverse than favourable."7 In some ways, this examination of the impact of fixed territorial borders on the economic prospects of poorer states is merely a unique sub-set of a larger critique of the impact of sovereignty on the global political economy. Charles Beitz, for example, sees the sovereign states system's respect for each state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction as a kind of collective property right which "effectively sanctions the existing international distribution of wealth as well as that of power."8 Similarly, Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt view the collective acceptance of the principle of sovereignty without any commitment to material equality as constituting "a structurally coercive mechanism of decentralized social control that institutionalizes territorial and therefore resource inequalities."9 A third major focus of recent research has been on the international implications of the growing number of "collapsed" or "failed" states. Much of the work in this regard has proceeded from the conventional assumption that these states must and should be reconstituted as viable entities within their existing territorial boundaries; debate in this 7Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Sovereignly and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis," Journal of Modern African Studies 24 (March 1986), p. 28. 8Charles R. Beitz, "Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs," in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 243. This is also a major theme developed in Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 9Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt, "The Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian L. Job, p. 104. 5 area has mainly centered around the question of how best to go about this difficult task of state reconstruction.10 Finally, the fourth, and most ambitious, line of inquiry that can be identified is Jackson's own attempt to broaden and develop his ideas into a general study of international relations.11 As Jackson sees it, what is novel about the way international relations is practiced today is not the existence of inequality between the states of the world. Inequality has always been a feature of the states system and there is nothing particularly recent or unique about significant empirical differences in state capabilities. What is distinctive about international relations in the post-1945 era is: 1) how statehood is acquired; and 2) how international society deals with weak and underdeveloped states. In the traditional era of international law ("the old sovereignty game"), recognition was acquired only after successfully demonstrating the capacity to govern. To acquire sovereignty, one had first to be sovereign: "states historically were empirical realities before they were legal personalities." In the new era, however, "rulers can acquire independence solely in virtue of being successors of colonial governments."12 Independence need not positively be earned; rather it now comes as a moral entitlement. Factors like a lack of qualified personnel, small territories and/or small populations, questions of economic viability or inadequate military defenses no longer rnilitate against sovereign recognition. The second novel feature of this new system concerns the ways in which international society deals with its weakest members. States may no longer be deprived of their sovereignty through colonialism, conquest, or partition. The sanctity of existing borders and the international aid regime (albeit as limited as it is) combine to operate as a 10See, for example, Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992 - 1993), pp. 3-20 and the various contributions in I. William Zartman, ed., Collansed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). "This attempt is made in Robert H. Jackson, Ouasi-States: Sovereignty. International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 12Jackson, Quasi-States. p. 34. 6 kind of safety net propping up states which earlier would have fallen prey to the imperial ambitions of other, more successful states. Jackson concludes that What is different, therefore, is the existence of an international society that has presided over the birth of numerous marginal entities, guarantees their survival, and seeks at least to compensate them for underdevelopment if not to develop them into substantial independent countries.13 This "new sovereignty game" thus produces a world characterized by large numbers of "quasi-states": states which are internationally recognized as full juridical equals, possessing the same rights and privileges as any other state, yet which manifestly lack all but the most rudimentary empirical capabilities. In Jackson's terms, these states possess "negative sovereignty"—a formal-legal condition that can be equated with non-intervention and the freedom from outside interference. What they lack is "positive sovereignty"—a substantive condition that allows governments actively to function and to deliver political goods and services to their citizens. International society confers and maintains these states' juridical equality and their negative sovereignty. It does little, however, to assist them in developing their empirical capabilities so they can acquire positive sovereignty.14 In Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney's terminology, these quasi-states are unable to "realize" their sovereignty substantively.15 Quasi-states exist. They can be located on a map. They possess flags, capital cities, ambassadors, national anthems, seats in the U N General Assembly and other such paraphernalia of independent sovereign statehood in the late twentieth century. It is what quasi-states lack in terms of providing governance and mamtaining effective territorial control of their own jurisdictions, however, that has stimulated my research. The existence of large numbers of recognized sovereign states that fundamentally lack many of the capabilities traditionally associated with independent statehood brings 13Ibid., p. 24. 14Ibid., pp. 27-30. 15See Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, "Realizing Sovereignty," Review of International Studies 21 (January 1995), pp. 3-20 for more on this. 7 forward a number of questions. If sovereignty is now granted as a moral right and not earned on the battlefield or through a demonstrated capacity to govern, and i f existing state boundaries have acquired such a sanctity so as to "freeze" the political map, then what happens to the various groups who are fundamentally dissatisfied at the way they have been "frozen" off the political map and denied admission to the exclusive club of sovereign states? If scores of existing sovereign states are, as it seems, so manifestly lacking in terms of legitimacy, effectiveness, power, popular support, and the ability to provide governmental services, what happens when a breakaway state group is able to establish some sort of effective territorial control and demonstrate governance capabilities of the sort that once led to full recognition as an independent sovereign state? This is not a study of secession or setf-deterrnination per se and it is not a general assessment of governmental breakdowns in weak or failed states. M y aim is to investigate another facet of the "new sovereignty game" which has not received sufficient attention in the existing literature. This is the "de facto state." In essence, these are entities which feature long-term, effective, and popularly-supported organized political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area. They seek international recognition and view themselves as capable of meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood. They are, however, unable to secure widespread juridical recognition and therefore function outside the boundaries of international legitimacy. The de facto state can be seen as the flip side of the quasi-state coin. This is not to suggest that for every quasi-state there must be a de facto state; indeed, even the most cursory research would reveal that there are far more quasi-states than there are de facto states—at least in the way that I define them. Rather, it is to suggest that some of the same normative logic in international society that produces quasi-states may also facilitate the creation of something that is more or less their inverse: the de facto state. The quasi-state's independence and its juridical equality were internationally enfranchised by the existing society of states. Previously, colonialism was predicated on 8 the fact that independence was a question of empirical conditions—levels of development, qualified personnel, military capabilities, national unity, and the like. It was only when the anti-colonial movement succeeded in normatively defeating this intellectual framework and turning independence into a natural right of all dependencies that quasi-states were able to come into being with full juridical equality.16 Once they succeeded in changing the criterion for independence from empirical viability to a categorical moral right of all former dependencies regardless of their assorted lack of qualifications, the international consensus against the dismemberment of existing states or the redrawing of territorial borders acted as a foundation which supported the quasi-state regardless of its failings. Even if the government's writ did not run throughout most of its territory, as happened in many cases from Afghanistan to Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, the existence of the state in juridical terms was guaranteed. International norms which thus served to support existing quasi-states also deny the legitimacy of any would-be challengers. The same logic that supports the quasi-state also prevents the acceptance of other groups regardless of how legitimate their grievances, how broad their popular support, or how effective their governance. Quasi-states and de facto states are thus both children of the new sovereignty regime. Whereas the quasi-state has recognized territorial borders, a seat at the U N , and the ability to participate in intergovernmental organizations, in many cases it does not effectively control large swathes of its own countryside. Though it seeks recognition, the de facto state, on the other hand, has been denied its seat at the U N and its place at the international table. No matter how long or how effective its territorial control of a given area has been, that control is neither recognized nor is it considered legitimate. The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no matter how effective it is. The quasi-state's juridical equality is not 16For more on this, see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs. Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 117-125. 9 contingent on any performance criteria. Even if the entire state apparatus has collapsed, the quasi-state (a la Cambodia and Lebanon) will be supported and maintained through international efforts. At times, it may be more of an abstract idea than it is a hard reality. The de facto state, on the other hand, is a functioning reality with effective territorial control of a given area that is denied legitimacy by the rest of international society. One way to distinguish these two very different entities is to conceptualize them in terms of power versus recognition. According to Janice Thomson, "if recognition without power capabilities characterizes most contemporary states, cases of power capabilities without recognition exist as well." 1 7 Following this terminology, the quasi-state or the failed state would have recognition and lack power capabilities while the de facto state would have power capabilities but lack recognition. The work of Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck is also helpful here. Though they ultimately fall back on the position that sovereignty accords to whomever international society grants widespread recognition to, they argue that it is actually composed of two constituent parts: de facto autonomy and de jure independence.18 Following their scheme, the de facto state possesses autonomy yet lacks de jure independence while the quasi-state retains its de jure independence even though it lacks de facto autonomy. This distinction can also be conceptualized in terms of authority versus control. Thomson makes the distinction here "between the claim to exclusive right to make rules (authority) and the capability of enforcing that claim (control).... Authority... is contingent on recognition; control depends on concrete capabilities to monitor and enforce compliance with the rules that are made under that authority."19 This is similar to Michael Oakeshott's objections to the misuse of the word sovereign: "Invoked to specify 'authority1, it has been used to specify the 'power' which may partner authority in an office 17Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research," International Studies Quarterly 39 (June 1995), p. 220. 18Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, "What Constitutes the Sovereign State?" Review of International Studies 22 (October 1996). p. 400. See also pp. 403-404. 19Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations," p. 223 10 of rule...."20 In these terms, it is the authority of quasi-states that is so actively supported by the other members of international society. Having that authority, however, does not mean that they will be able to exercise any meaningful degree of control over their jurisdictions. De facto states, on the other hand, despite lacking (recognized) authority are still able to exercise some degree of control through their empirical capabilities. Finally, another distinction might be made using Jackson's terminology of negative sovereignty vs. positive sovereignty. Negative sovereignty, in the sense of non-intervention and the recognition of a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction, is an absolute formal-legal condition that one either has or does not have. Quasi-states have full negative sovereignty; de facto states do not. Positive sovereignty, in the sense of actual capabilities which allow governments to act and to "realize" their sovereignty, is a relative and substantive condition that one can have or not have in varying degrees. The argument here is not that quasi-states have absolutely no positive sovereignty and that de facto states are in full possession of it. Rather, quasi-states generally lack positive sovereignty. Conversely, it would not make sense to speak of a de facto state which did not have some degree of positive capacity for governmental action. In essence then, we have a distinction between a large number of sovereign states that have full juridical recognition but lack substantive empirical capabilities and a much smaller number of non-sovereign entities that lack any form of widespread juridical recognition yet are able, more or less effectively, to function as governing authorities over specific territorial domains. It is this latter group that we refer to as die facto states. This study examines four de facto states: Eritrea before it won its independence from Ethiopia; the Republic of Somaliland; the areas of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, popularly known as the "Tamil Tigers"); and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At various points in time, and depending 20Michael Oakeshott, "The Vocabulary of a Modern European State," Political Studies XXTJI (June and September 1975), p. 323, my italics. 11 on the criteria one were to use, or the interpretation placed on the criteria I set forth in chapter two, other potential de facto states might include Biafra; Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); Charles Taylor's Liberia; Chechnya; Krajina; the Bosnian Serb Republic; the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova; the Abkhazia region of Georgia; the Karen and Shan states of Myanmar; the Muslim-controlled areas of Mindanao in the Philippines; the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas of Cambodia; and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The term "de facto state" is intended to be descriptive and informative. It has been used prior to this study. Hussein Adam has referred to Somaliland as a de facto state.21 R. Sean Randolph has also used the term in reference to Taiwan. 2 2 His choice of this terminology was subsequently criticized by Y a Qin. 2 3 In the popular media, The Guardian1* and Agence France Presse25 have both used this term in reference to the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. The Economist has also used it in reference to Somaliland.26 I first used this term in a 1994 article.27 1.2 The De Facto State in the Wider Academic Context Despite the vast extent of the academic literature on such topics as international society, secession, self-determination, sovereignty, the state, ethnic conflict, and weak state security, the de facto state has received scant academic attention to date. While some work has been done, for example, on Northern Cyprus or on the Tamil conflict in Sri 21Hussein M. Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea," Review of African Political Economy 21 (March 1994), p. 21. 2 2 R Sean Randolph, "The Status of Agreements Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs," The International Lawyer 15 (Spring 1981), p. 257. 2 3 Ya Qin, "GATT Membership for Taiwan: An Analysis in International Law," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 24 (Spring 1992), pp. 1081-1082. 24"Sri Lankan Forces Launch Heavy Assault on Tigers," The Guardian. 10 July 1995, p. 8. 25The phrase "a sprawling de facto state" is used in "Sri Lankan Troops Take Two Towns, Reward on Tiger Chief Raised," Agence France Presse. 15 November 1995; and the phrase "the former de facto state" is used in "Roman Catholics Call for Sri Lanka Truce: Rebels," Agence France Presse. 28 April 1996. 2 6 " Africa's Bizarre Borders," The Economist. 25 January 1997. 27Scott Pegg, "Interposition and the Territorial Separation of Warring Forces: Time for a Rethink?," Peacekeeping and International Relations 23 (May-June 1994), p. 5. 12 Lanka, there is no general analysis of de facto states as a category of actor in international politics. It is this gap in the literature that this study aims to fill. Before doing this, however, one must first examine the reasons for this near-complete academic neglect to date. One leading reason has to do with the inherently imprecise or nebulous nature of the concept de facto state. In an academic discipline that rewards precise clarity and quantifiable empirical work, the de facto state may be too fuzzy a concept for many scholars. In reference to juridically sovereign states, James Mayall contends that The important point to note is that all these formal states, whose governments take part in the ritual quadrille of international diplomacy and enjoy the dignity of mutual recognition and membership of the United Nations, actually exist: they can be located on the map; they have more or less defined boundaries; they have settled populations and identifiable social and political institutions.28 While one might contest Mayan's point on settled populations and identifiable institutions, his larger message remains valid: juridical states actually exist and they can be analyzed by social scientists in a variety of ways. The de facto state, however, often has a more tenuous existence. The date of Chad's independence or Andorra's accession to membership in the United Nations (UN) are much easier to deal with than trying to decide at what point did Chechnya graduate from being a dissatisfied Russian republic to becoming a de facto state. De facto states are often much harder to analyze precisely and quantify than are juridical states. Even if one were to argue that the entire category of "states" was an intellectual construct, the juridical state would still be a more readily grasped construct than the de facto state. The inherent ambiguity and lack of precision that adheres to this concept must, in some ways, discourage rigorous academic analysis. Another reason for the de facto state's academic neglect relates to international society's prior success at freezing the territorial map. This attempt to preserve the territorial status quo was so successful and the degree of consensus supporting it so strong 2 8Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, p. 7. 13 that very little discussion of other options even occurred. Former U N Secretary-General U Thant's famous quote from a 1970 press conference in Dakar, Senegal perhaps best sums up the international community's thinking in this regard: As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned, the United Nations' attitude is unequivocable. As an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe that it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member States.29 Rather than being phenomenon worthy of careful study, places like Biafra and Northern Cyprus merely became problems to be solved and situations to be ritually denounced in U N resolutions. If the territorial map is seen as unalterable, there is little incentive to devote much attention to de facto states because their ultimate defeat and reincorporation into existing states is both assumed and sought. While there were some academics who questioned whether or not the post-war interpretation of self-determination, with its emphasis on fixed territorial borders, really promoted stability30 or who argued that the international community needs to develop consistent criteria by which to assess secessionist claims rationally,31 most were content to view any challenges to existing sovereign states as problems in need of solutions. The prevailing international consensus on the sanctity of existing borders can thus be cited as another reason for the academic neglect of de facto states. Since 1989 this situation has, of course, altered considerably. In addition to the reunifications of the Germanys and the Yemens, the post-Cold War period has also seen the peaceful dissolutions of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and the violent break-2 9 U Thant, cited in Eisuke Suzuki, "Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation," Virginia Journal of International Law 16 (Spring 1976), p. 845. 30Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U. Dilemma," Journal of Modern African Studies 12 (September 1974), p. 359. 3 •Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Setf-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). Two attempts to develop criteria for secession within the context of liberal democracy are Harry Beran, "A Liberal Theory of Secession," Political Studies XXXH (March 1984), pp. 21-31; and Anthony H. Birch, "Another Liberal Theory of Secession," Political Studies XXXII (December 1984), pp. 596-602. 14 ups of Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. In all, more than twenty new states have assumed U N membership during this period. The exact significance of the ending of the Cold War on irrevocably fixed territorial borders remains open to question. As Barry Buzan puts it, It is not yet clear whether it is the norm of fixed boundaries that is under assault or only the practice in specific locations. But it is clear that this norm is vulnerable to the counter-norm of national self-determination, and that some of the restraints on boundary change have been weakened by the ending of the Cold War. 3 2 This new situation has naturally stimulated or renewed academic interest in a number of areas pertinent to the subject of this thesis. Ethnic conflict and ethnic identity formation has once again become a salient topic in the study of international relations.33 The principle of national self-determination has been revisited,34 with strong arguments made both for 3 5 and against36 the concept. The adequacy or inadequacy of international relations' treatment of the state is again a lively topic of debate.37 The changing nature of sovereignty has been examined,38 with particular emphasis placed on the question of what are the limits to non-intervention.39 Similarly, the role of territoriality in international 32Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs 67 (July 1991), p. 441. See also Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis," Journal of International Affairs 45 (Winter 1992), p. 399. 3 3Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38 (September 1994), pp. 347-377; Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945," International Political Science Review 14 (April 1993), pp. 161-201; and Barry R Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47. 34Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992). 35Guyora Binder, "The Case for Self-Determination," Stanford Journal of International Law 29 (Summer 1993), pp. 223-270. 36Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992 - 1993), pp. 21-35. 37Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, chapter four; Cornelia Navari, "Introduction: The State as a Contested Concept in International Relations," in The Condition of States: A Study in International Political Theory, ed. Cornelia Navari (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), pp. 1-18; and Martin Shaw, "State Theory and the Post-Cold War World," in State and Society in International Relations, ed. Michael Banks and Martin Shaw (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 1-17. 3 8 J . Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48 (Winter 1994), pp. 107-130; Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," Journal of International Affairs 45 (Winter 1992), pp. 325-346. 39Terry L. Deibel, "Internal Affairs and International Relations in the Post-Cold War World," The Washington Quarterly 16 (Summer 1993), pp. 13-33; Simon Duke, "The State and Human Rights: Sovereignty Versus Humanitarian Intervention," International Relations XII (August 1994), pp. 25-48; R J. Vincent and Peter Wilson, "Beyond Non-intervention," in Political Theory. International Relations and 15 relations has again come under renewed scrutiny.40 One can even find authors who now argue that territorial boundaries in Africa may need to be changed.41 This is a significant departure from the earlier consensus against even considering such an action. Perhaps the area which has been most affected by the changing international environment has been the academic study of secession. The earlier reflex opposition to anything relating to secession has now given way to a series of efforts designed to illurninate specific criteria under which "just" or "legitimate" secession attempts may be distinguished from "unjust" or "illegitimate" attempts.42 Clearly, the end of the Cold War has sparked or reignited vigorous intellectual debate in a number of areas pertinent to the subject matter of this study. And yet, little or no work has been done on the de facto state per se. One suspects that this might point to a third reason for the de facto state's academic neglect: it is simply not the sexiest or most important topic in the field of international relations. The four de facto states examined in this study, and many of the other ones not examined in this study, are all fairly small places with minor populations. This is not to say that de facto states are uriimportant. Yet, all the de facto states in the world put together and their impact on the international system would not rank in importance alongside the US-Soviet strategic rivalry during the Cold War or issues such as migration flows, economic development, global governance, foreign the Ethics of Intervention, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 122-130; and Cynthia Weber, "Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary," Review of International Studies 18 (July 1992), pp. 199-216. 40David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); and John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174. 41Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa," Foreign Affairs 71 (America and the World 1991/92), pp. 152-53; and Herbst, "Is Nigeria a Viable State?," pp. 168-169. 4 2 Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., "Secession: State Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 341-349; Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention," pp. 408-410; and Ronald K. McMullen, "Secession in Asia: The Emerging Criteria for International Acceptance," Asian Thought and Society XVII (May-August 1992), pp. 118-123. 16 direct investment, or nuclear proliferation today. Their relatively peripheral importance to international politics thus counts as a third reason for the general academic neglect of this topic. Why then study the de facto state? Although small in numbers and generally small in size, the evidence indicates that many de facto states can survive for quite extended durations of time. One reason to study this phenomenon therefore is to evaluate the ways in which international society copes with the presence of such non-juridical entities. Spelling out the advantages and disadvantages of particular methods of dealing with this phenomenon should be of some policy relevance to international decision-makers. A second reason to study de facto states is that these entities do have measurable impacts on world politics. Their impact can be felt in the area of global political economy but is most readily apparent in regard to conflict and war. The sheer numbers of refugees and fatalities produced in the assorted struggles that result in the creation of these entities is, in and of itself, a compelling reason to study this phenomenon. In this sense, a greater focus on de facto states would be one part of what K . J. Holsti identifies as a shift in the study of international politics "from exclusive focus on the activities of the great powers to a concern with what have traditionally been considered peripheral actors."43 A third reason to examine de facto statehood is to assess its potential significance for academic international relations theory. De facto states may be useful vehicles from which to generate insights on such larger questions as are we witnessing a return to a more diverse international system?; and what are the extent of challenges facing the states system today? The existence of these entities may also suggest interesting avenues of future inquiry within specific theoretical traditions as realism, rationalism, and post-modernism. 1.3 Methodology While there was not necessarily any hard and fast separation between them, my research was essentially composed of two main components: 1) general academic and 43Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War, p. 207. 17 theoretical work; and 2) more detailed empirical research on the four specific case studies themselves. In regards to the general theoretical section, as there is no academic literature on the de facto state per se, my research draws upon a wide range of other existing literatures. A number of the literatures consulted, such as secession, self-determination, sovereignty, territoriality, and weak state security have already been mentioned. Another literature revolves around the state: theories of the state; the criteria and requirements for statehood; the state-making and nation-building processes; challenges to the state; and federalism and other forms of autonomy designed to accommodate national or minority demands for greater representation within the state. Ethnic conflict, ethnic identity formation, and the problems of national minorities within sovereign states constituted another major focus. On a more systemic level, my general research also covered such topics as the nature of international society; various aspects of international law; the legitimization and recognition process; the potential transformation of the states system; and the changing nature of conflict. Obviously, many of these assorted works are interrelated and intertwined. I selected the four specific case studies for three main reasons. The first concerns geography. The selection of two African, one Asian, and one European case study is intended to show that the de facto state is a generic phenomenon not limited to one region of the globe. The second, and more important, line of reasoning behind the selection has to do with some of the unique characteristics of each case. As the only de facto state ever to graduate successfully to sovereign statehood, Eritrea stands out for this reason alone. Northern Cyprus merits attention both for its extended longevity and for its unique degree of dependence on external support—in this case from Turkey. The more than 30-year U N peacekeeping presence on Cyprus also distinguishes this case. Somaliland offers a particularly sharp lens from which to view the workings of international society. Despite its comparatively strong democratic credentials, its former separate colonial status, and its functional effectiveness, the international community still insists that this de facto state 18 remain harnessed to the collapsed functional bankruptcy that is Somalia today. This case certainly indicates some of the limits to the supposedly changed attitudes toward secession and fixed territorial boundaries. The LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka were selected for two main reasons: 1) the LTTE's impressive ability to survive under adverse conditions, and 2) its uniquely brutal, violent, and intolerant leadership. A third reason for the selection of these four case studies is that all four are contemporary examples of the de facto state phenomenon. The four cases selected have all been in existence long enough that adequate literature has grown up around them.44 I excluded other potential case studies such as Chechnya and the Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia on the grounds that their situation was evolving too fast and that they were already receiving substantial attention from other scholars and media commentators. The selection of only contemporary case studies leads to the question: Is the de facto state only a contemporary phenomenon of the post-war era or do its roots go back further in the international system? The answer is probably yes to both parts of this question. Following Robert Jackson, I argue that the post-1945 international consensus on the preservation of existing states within their fixed territorial borders marks a dramatic break in the history of international relations. The de facto state is one of the unintended by-products of this new normative environment. The various macro-level factors discussed in chapter five that help create a setting conducive to the emergence of these entities are all unique to the postwar era. Historically, though, the de facto state does have antecedents. Disputed, yet effective de facto political control of a given territorial area has most likely been a recurrent feature of international relations for centuries. Thus, one might argue that the etiology of these entities can be traced back to such things as recalcitrant barons who refused to submit to sovereign authority in the transition from the middle ages or unincorporated parts of the warring states system outside the control of the ^The volume of literature on Cyprus and Sri Lanka is clearly much greater than the volume of literature on Eritrea or Somaliland. Of the four case studies considered, it is Somaliland that suffers the most from having the fewest academic resources available. 19 emperor in ancient China. Yet, the de facto state itself—at least in the way it is conceptualized in this study—is limited in time to the contemporary postwar decolonization era. One problem doing research on contemporary cases is the frequency of highly-biased or polemical narratives. The static-to-noise ratio of emotional passion versus detached analysis is often quite high. Wherever possible, to minimize the ill-effects of this, I consulted a variety of sources that included local sources from both sides of the issue (i.e., Greek and Turkish Cypriot scholars; Sinhalese and Tamil scholars); "outside" scholars (usually westerners); and media sources (again, frequently western). The strongly pro-whichever group articles have more or less been balanced out by the strongly anti-whichever group articles.45 A few caveats are, however, in order here. First, as one might expect, the mere fact that someone is a Sinhalese scholar does not make them pro-government and the fact that someone is a Tamil scholar does not make them pro-LTTE. Second, in some cases it is difficult to find opposing views. For example, the Egal administration in Somaliland is frequently praised and it has not been subjected to much more than mild criticism. On the other hand, one struggles to find anyone who is even moderately positive about the LTTE. Third, my aim is only to ensure that all views are represented and considered. No attempt has been made to balance out the respective number of scholars consulted. First-hand or primary source material is available for all four cases. For example, Rauf Denktash, the president of the TRNC, has written a book, 4 6 as has the TRNC's former attorney-general47 On the other side of this particular ledger, Andreas Jacovides, 45Compare, for example, Anthony J. Carroll and B. Rajagopal, "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland," American University Journal of International Law and Policy 8 (Winter/Spring 1992/93), pp. 653-681 which quite strongly sets out the case for Somaliland's independence with Minasse Haile, "Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea," Emory International Law Review 8 (Fall 1994), pp. 479-537 which quite strongly sets out the Ethiopian case against Eritrean independence. 4 6R. R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. 2nd ed. (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988). 47Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 20 the Cypriot ambassador to the United States and Canada has ably set out the Republic of Cyprus's viewpoint.48 Other examples found along these lines include a variety of Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) documents stating policy priorities for the Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) in the period before independence;49 an interview with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the president of Somaliland;50 and a first-hand account of life in the Jaffna Peninsula from four Tamil scholars at the University of Jaffna.51 No field visits were undertaken during the course of my research. A few telephone interviews were conducted but this was not a primary focus of my research effort. At this point, I need to offer a positivist disclaimer. The de facto state is an inherently more imprecise concept than the juridical state. Therefore, while I will attempt to use empirical data on such things as human rights violations, population, refugee flows, per capita gross national product (GNP), and the extent of territory controlled to buttress the arguments in this study, much of the analysis will inevitably remain arguable. This should not come as a surprise, for many of the key concepts remain what W. B. Gallie has termed "essentially contested."52 For example, in reference to sovereignty, Alan James argues that "there is in existence on this subject a substantial intellectual quagmire...."53 Similarly, when considering the state, James Rosenau remains "disconcerted by the 48Andreas J. Jacovides, "Cyprus—The International Law Dimension," American University Journal of International Law and Policy 10 (Summer 1995), pp. 1221-1231. See also his remarks in various issues of the "Cyprus Newsletter," published by the Embassy of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Washington, D.C. 49These documents can be found in Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, ed., Emergent Eritrea: Challenges of Economic Development (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1993). 50Matt Bryden, "Interview: President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal," Africa Report 39 (November-December 1994), pp. 41-42. 51Rajan Hoole, Daya Somasundaram, K. Sritharan, and Rajani Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka - An Inside Account. 2nd ed. (Claremont: The Sri Lanka Studies Institute, 1990). 5 2 W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in The Importance of Language, ed. Max Black (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 121-146. 5 3 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 3. See also Inayatullah and Blaney, "Realizing Sovereignty," p. 3; and Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations," p. 213. 21 wavering, multiple uses and elusive formulations of this concept...."54 One might also add here the seemingly eternal debate within international law over the question of whether self-determination is a legal right or merely a political principle.55 Therefore, as this study fundamentally revolves around a number of essentially contested concepts and unresolved debates, I do not claim that my work will irrefutably "prove" anything. This is not, however, a cause for despair. As Barry Buzan elaborates on essentially contested concepts, "Paradoxically, the utility of these concepts stems in part from whatever it is that makes them inherently ambiguous, not least because ambiguity stimulates theoretical discussion about them."56 The intent of this study is to stimulate that theoretical discussion. It is also to advance knowledge on de facto states, thereby hopefully leading to small advances in knowledge or clarifications of thought in other, larger subject areas. Finally, this study examines a particular subject matter in a particular way. No claim to exclusivity is made: my way is not the only way and it is not necessarily the "best" way. For example, one of the criteria to be elaborated in chapter two distinguishes the de facto state from peaceful secession movements. This, therefore, rules out any substantial consideration of Quebec in this study. Someone else, however, might decide that they wish to compare Northern Cyprus not with the three other case studies here, but with 54James N. Rosenau, "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988), p. 21. See also Sabino Cassese, "The Rise and Decline of the Notion of State," International Political Science Review 7 (April 1986), p. 125. 5 5 A concise introduction to this debate can be found in David B. Knight, "Territory and People or People and Territory? Thoughts on Postcolonial Self-Determination," International Political Science Review 6 (1985), p. 260. One author who argues that self-determination is a legal right is Alexandre Kiss, "The Peoples' Right to Self-Detennination," Human Rights Law Journal 7 (1986), p. 167 and pp. 173-174. An author who strongly argues against this position is Leo Gross, "The Right of Self-Determination in International Law," in New States in the Modern World, ed. Martin Kilson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 139-143. Heather A. Wilson. International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 78-79 argues that self-determination can simultaneously be both a legal right and a political principle. 56Buzan, People. States and Fear. 2nd ed., p. 7. 22 Quebec. Considering the similarities readily discerned between these two situations,57 this would be perfectly valid research to undertake. It is not, however, the research that I have chosen to undertake. My claim is not that my research program is "better" than the Northern Cyprus-Quebec research program or any other; merely that it is different. 1.4 Value Biases and Assumptions of the Author The study incorporates several significant assumptions. The theoretical framework that informs the analysis is the Grotian, rationalist, or "English" school of international relations. The extensive literature on this topic 5 8 is too well-known to go into much detail here. Suffice it to say that the specific conception from which I am working views the international society of sovereign states as a practical association with mutual recognition of sovereignty as its foundation. The distinction between international society as either a purposive or a practical association comes from Terry Nardin. According to Nardin, a purposive association consists of those "who are associated in a cooperative enterprise to promote shared values, beliefs, or interests...."59 A practical association, on the other hand, is not defined or governed by the pursuit of shared goals. Rather, it is based upon "a framework of 57Each case features two major nations in one state; the smaller of which views itself as a distinct co-founder of the country and desires to be treated as a confederal equal; the larger of which views the national question in terms of majorities and minorities and believes that it can best be addressed through some form of federalism. 58Some of the most useful overviews of this tradition include Chris Brown, "International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?" Review of International Studies 21 (April 1995), pp. 183-196; Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in Diplomatic Investigations, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 51-73; A. Claire Cutler, "The 'Grotian Tradition' in International Relations," Review of International Studies 17 (January 1991), pp. 41-65; Timothy Dunne, "International Society — Theoretical Promises Fulfilled?" Cooperation and Conflict 30 (June 1995), pp. 125-154; Hidemi Suganami, "The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations," International Relations VII (May 1983), pp. 2363-2381; and Peter Wilson, "The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader," Review of International Studies 15 (January 1989), pp. 49-58. More critical perspectives can be found in Sheila Grader, "The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation," Review of International Studies 14 (January 1988), pp. 29-44; Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, chapter five; and Ole Waever, "International Society — Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?" Cooperation and Conflict 27 (March 1992), pp. 97-128. 59Terry Nardin, Law. Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 9. 23 common practices and rules capable of providing some unifying bond where shared purposes are lacking."6 0 Thus, in the practical conception of international society, what unites the separate states in a larger society is not any similarity of language, religion or government. Nor is there unity to be found in geographical proximity, in their transactions with one another, or in any interests they may happen to share. It is, rather, the formal unity of an association of independent political communities each pursuing its own way of life within certain acknowledged limits: that is, according to generally recognized rules through which cultural individuality and communal liberty are guaranteed, subject only to the constraints of mutual toleration and mutual accommodation.61 This view of international society sees sovereign states as the primary actors in world politics. They form a society that is based not on shared goals or purposes, but on a set of rmnimal rules that allows each state to pursue its own particular aims, subject only to mutually reciprocal constraints on how those aims may legitimately be pursued. Does such a society of states actually exist? Evidence that it does comes from both Hedley Bull and Thomas Franck. Bull contends that Most states at most times pay some respect to the basic rules of coexistence in international society, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, the rule that agreements should be kept, and rules limiting resort to violence. In the same way, most states at most times take part in the working of common institutions....62 Franck focuses his argument specifically on individual states' compliance with international law. As he puts it, The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its strictures or carry out its mandates...: That they should do so is much more interesting than, say, the fact that most citizens usually obey their nation's laws, because the international system is organized in a voluntarist fashion, supported by so little coercive authority. This unenforced rule system can obligate states to profess, i f not always to manifest, a significant level of day-to-day compliance even, at times, when that is not in their short-term self-interest.63 60Ibid., p. 5. 61Ibid., p. 50. 62Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 42. 63Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System," American Journal of International Law 82 (October 1988), p. 705. 24 The final thing that must be said in regards to my conception of international society is that it is based upon the mutual recognition of sovereignty. In other words, each individual state claims exclusive domestic jurisdiction subject to no higher governing body (authority in Oakeshott or Thomson's terms) over a specific territory and it correspondingly recognizes other states' claims to their own exclusive domestic jurisdictions. The entire states-system is premised upon this mutual recognition of sovereignty. Diplomacy, international law, treaties, and all the other institutions that enable states to communicate and interact with each other rest upon "the mutual recognition among government leaders that they represent a specific society within an exclusive jurisdictional domain."64 A corollary of this mutual recognition of sovereignty is some sort of general non-intervention principle. In this regard, John Vincent describes non-intervention as a "first principle" of international society because the observance of such a principle demonstrates "the recognition by states of the existence of others and the legitimacy of their separateness in a society bound together only by the mutual acknowledgment of the autonomy of its parts...."65 A second assumption of this study is that state sovereignty is neither permanent nor inevitable. Sovereignty is not divinely ordained; it is an artificially-created political arrangement that can be reformed or radically uprooted. While there are strong institutional and practical reasons not to expect its imminent demise, sovereignty may be viewed as a socially constructed concept which can, perhaps within certain limits, be deconstructed and/or reconstructed. Sovereignty is a distinct historical phenomenon, not an inevitable feature of human life. F. H . Hinsley captures the essence of this sentiment when he argues that, Although we speak of it as something concrete that may be lost or acquired, eroded or increased, sovereignty is not a fact. It is an assumption about 64Barkin and Cronin, "The State and the Nation," p. 110. 6 5R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 330-331. 25 authority—a concept men have applied in certain circumstances to the political power that they or other men were exercising.66 Rob Walker shares this sentiment but also emphasizes that sovereignty is more than just an ephemeral reification: Despite all appearances, sovereignty is not a permanent principle of political order; the appearance of permanence is simply an effect of complex practices working to affirm continuities and to shift disruptions and dangers to the margin. Nor can it be said that sovereignty is simply passe as if it were here today and gone tomorrow.6 7 A third assumption relates to boundaries: current state borders are neither natural nor inevitable. In short, there are no territorial givens. As Ravi Kapil notes, "Boundaries demarcate sharp discontinuities in political jurisdictions; except where land reaches the sea, such sharp breaks do not occur either in topography and vegetation or in the natural distribution of social, economic, linguistic, or cultural traits of human populations."68 Even when it comes to islands, there is nothing particularly natural or definitive about existing political boundaries. The islands of Hispaniola (divided between the Dominican Republic and Haiti) and Borneo (divided between Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia) could each be governed as single entities; as entities with even more subdivisions (i.e., more than two governments on Hispaniola, more than three on Borneo); or as entities with the same number of sub-divisions but with different territorial jurisdictions (i.e., Hispaniola divided between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but with different borders than at present). There are no compelling natural reasons for the planet to be divided into its present 185+ sovereign states. International society could exist in a more or less similar fashion with either fewer than 100 sovereign jurisdictions or with more than 300. A l l political borders 6 6 F . H. Hinsley, "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States," Journal of International Affairs 21 (1967). p. 242. 6 7R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 163. See also Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (Summer 1988), pp. 233-234. 68Ravi I. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," World Politics XVTfl (July 1966), p. 657. 26 are mutable human constructs that can be altered or abolished; none is sacrosanct. This is not to deny that there may be compelling arguments for maintaining existing territorial jurisdictions; it is merely to state that such arguments must be based on something other than the "naturalness" or the "inevitability" of existing boundaries. A fourth assumption is that both territory and statehood still matter. This may seem so obvious as not to bear mentioning, but in an era when it is increasingly fashionable to talk about the myriad challenges facing the state and the states system, it is worth stating explicitly: the possession of territory and recognition as a sovereign state both remain fundamentally important. This is not to deny that the sovereign state may increasingly have to share the world stage with multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, social movements, ethnic groups, and even individuals. Rather, it is to argue that statehood still counts as the ultimate prize in international relations. The presence of so many secessionist movements in the world today bears witness to this fact. Similarly, in regards to territory, my point is not to deny that non-territorial forms of organization may be increasing in importance or that modern technology has opened up new ways to organize governmental services on non-territorial bases.69 It is not even to deny that territory may at times be a limiting factor that hinders adaptation and highlights state vulnerabilities.70 Instead, it is to argue that territory remains a valuable commodity in international relations. In contrast to Richard Rosecrance, territory is not seen as becoming "passe."71 Rather, even in an era of quasi-states and negative sovereignty, the possession of territory remains "the pre-condition for the exercise of legitimate political authority on the international level." 7 2 69These arguments are put forward in Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty. 70James Rosenau, for example, refers to states as "sovereignty-bound actors" in order to call attention "to the ways in which states are limited by the very considerations that are usually regarded as the source of their strengths." See James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 36. 71Richard Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Virtual State," Foreign Affairs 75 (July/August 1996), p. 45. 72Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich and Harpreet Mahajan, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict over Territory (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1985), p. 3. 27 Fifth, this study explicitly rejects the traditional bias against secession. Integration is not necessarily a "good" and disintegration is not necessarily a "bad." Depending on one's perspective, particular forms of integration may be disastrous while other forms of disintegration might lead to lasting benefits. The point is that secession should not automatically be prejudged in all cases. Similarly, the preservation of certain states within their existing territorial borders may not necessarily advance the human condition in those states. As Robert Jackson argues, "The state is not an end; it is only a means. Individuals and their well-being is the end."73 Conversely, as secession is quite a complicated process which often descends into mass violence and necessarily entails substantial restructuring, it is not something to be flippantly supported in all cases either. One of the main arguments against secession is the so-called "domino theory"—essentially a fear of unlimited and never-ending "Balkanization" due to an unqualified right to secede that is exercised by increasing numbers of ethnic or national groups. I reject the domino theory for both intellectual and empirical reasons. From the intellectual or philosophical viewpoint, Allen Buchanan points out that This argument proceeds by sleight of hand. It assumes, quite without warrant, that a right to secede must be an unlimited right—a right of virtually anyone to secede for virtually any reason. But one doesn't have to allow everything just because one allows something.... the right to secede cannot be an unlimited right.7 4 Perhaps even more compelling is the empirical evidence to date. One could cite Norway's secession from Sweden; Iceland's secession from Denmark; Singapore's secession from Malaysia; and Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan as examples of cases where one successful secession did not lead to further secessions either from the newly independent state, the former parent state, or from any other states in the regions concerned. Conversely, the failure of the Katangans and the Southern Sudanese did not 73Robert H. Jackson, "The Security Dilemma in Africa," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job, p. 94. 74Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce, p. 102. See also Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97), p. 137. 28 seem to have any substantial deterrent effect on Biafra. 7 5 The demonstration effects of both successful and unsuccessful secession attempts are limited. While the Eritrean example may offer modest encouragement to Somaliland, it has definitely not led to any wholesale redrawing of the political map in Africa. Rejecting the domino theory does not mean that one has to support independence for either Quebec or Northern Cyprus. It merely requires that the opposition to these group's independence be based on something more substantial than the fear of unlimited secession in North America or the Mediterranean. A seventh assumption of this study is that the post-1945 interpretation of self-determination has either: a) not promoted international stability, or b) has promoted a particular kind of international stability that is not necessarily the only or the best kind of stability available. I believe that the empirical evidence available supports proposition (a) above. Even if one does not accept that, proposition (b), which is the weaker form of the argument, is a sufficiently compelling reason to temper any religious-like reverence attributed to the contemporary interpretation of self-determination. To simplify the history of self-determination, one can view the principle as having widespread international acceptance or popularity in two main periods: the Wilsonian era after World War I and the anti-colonial period after World War U. The essential underpinning of self-determination, the question of who is the "self," has shifted dramatically between these two periods. In essence, the earlier Wilsonian concept which was based on ethnic, cultural, or national groups has given way to a new territorial conception of self-determination where the eligible units are primarily former colonies and non-self-governing territories as defined under Chapter X I of the U N Charter. As Rupert Emerson has argued, the point of contradiction between these two periods lies 75See Beran, "A Liberal Theory of Secession," pp. 29-30 and Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination," pp. 366-367 for more on this. 29 in the fact that the peoples involved in the Wilsonian period were ethnic communities, nations or nationalities primarily defined by language and culture, whereas in the present era of decolonization, ethnic identity is essentially irrelevant, the decisive, indeed, ordinarily the sole, consideration being the existence of a political entity in the guise of a colonial territory.76 Along with this shift in emphasis from national peoples to colonial territories has come the belief that self-determination is now not a process, but rather a one-off event. Once an acceptable form of self-determination77 takes places at the time of decolonization, the issue is permanently settled. No further exercises of self-deterrnination need take place. The readily-apparent irony in this situation is that precisely the condition which was held to justify self-determination in the earlier period, i.e., that ethnically different peoples were subjected to alien rule, is now wholly unacceptable as a justification once the colonial territory has achieved its independence.... once the newly created or newly independent state is in existence, no resort to further self-deterrriination is tolerable 7 8 The driving force behind the new interpretation of self-determination was an attempt to restrict the scope of who was entitled to be a "self" Considering the potentially revolutionary nature of an unlimited right to self-determination and the ethnic heterogeneity so prevalent in many of the former colonies, it is not surprising that this attempt to limit self-determination received such widespread international support. In the post-war era, the "selves" eligible for self-determination essentially came to comprise three main groups: former colonies or other similar non-self-governing territories; territories under military occupation; and territories where majority colored populations were subjected to institutionalized racism or apartheid by Europeans.79 This latter category 76Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," American Journal of International Law 65 (July 1971), p. 463. 77While self-determination is usually associated with full independence as a sovereign state, General Assembly Resolution 1541 of 15 December 1960 also included free association with an independent state and integration with an independent state as acceptable forms of self-deterrnination. The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion in the Western Sahara case also makes reference to these other options. See Michla Pomerance, "Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal," Israel Law Review 19 (Summer-Autumn 1984), p. 327; and Robin C. A. White, "Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?" Netherlands International Law Review XXVTU (1981/82), p. 149 for more on this. 78Emerson, "Self-Determination," pp. 463-464. 79See Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention," pp. 404-405; and Hakan Wiberg, "Self-Deterrnination as an International Issue," in Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa, ed. I. M. Lewis (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p. 49 for more on these three categories. 30 was defined quite narrowly so as to exclude all forms of institutionalized racism or discrimination by one non-European group against another non-European group. Thus, while black South Africans and Rhodesians were entitled to self-determination, other groups such as Tibetans, Tamils, and black southern Sudanese who also suffered from institutionalized discrimination were not entitled to this same right. Most U N members hoped that this novel and quite limited interpretation of self-determination would promote international stability. After all, an international society of sovereign states does seem more stable than an international society of (much more nebulously defined) sovereign nations. One must, however, question the success of the post-war interpretation of self-determination in this regard from both empirical and intuitive perspectives. Empirically, the post-1945 world has seen more than 21 million civilian and military casualties resulting from interstate wars and internationalized civil wars. More than 99 percent of these casualties have been in the so-called Third World. 8 0 Certainly not all of these casualties can be blamed on the post-war interpretation of self-determination. Yet, in a study of 58 conflicts from 1945 - 1989, K . J. Holsti finds that "The combined issues of national liberation, national unification/consolidation, and secession - all designed to create and establish states - were major sources of war in 52 percent of the fifty-eight conflicts."81 He goes on to conclude that "In terms of the relative frequency of issues it [state-creation] ranks highest by a considerable margin."82 Clearly this doctrine's intended message of severely restricting the number of eligible "selves" has not quite gotten through to many of those supposedly non-eligible "selves." From an intuitive perspective, Onyeonoro Kamanu questions whether the attempt to ban the right of self-determination from all but majorities in accepted political units has really enhanced stability. He believes that 80Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," p. 37. 81Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648 - 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 282. 82Ibid.,p. 311. 31 It has probably had the reverse effect since it leaves no choice to minorities seeking separate nationhood except resort to force. An anarchic situation now prevails whereby the only solution to a demand for secession in other than a colonial context is armed conflict, a condition that, far from discouraging impermissible use of force across state boundaries, multiplies the opportunities and temptations for such action.83 Denied the possibility of pursuing their (often legitimate) grievances in any other manner, disaffected groups are forced to turn to armed struggle. The consensus around freezing the map that the new interpretation of self-determination helped promote thus fails to ensure international stability. One can certainly argue against this point. Counterfactually, it is difficult to refute the possibility that the levels of both conflicts and casualties would have been much higher in a world where self-determination applied to entities other than just former colonies, areas under military occupation, or majority colored populations suffering from institutionalized apartheid at the hands of Europeans. Maybe a looser interpretation of self-determination would have led to more instability. But, just as easily, maybe it would not have. Maybe it would have forced governments to come to terms with dissident groups within their midst and find peaceful solutions to their problems. It is impossible to resolve this question adequately. Whatever one's position here, I believe that the weaker form of the argument (proposition (b) above) is irrefutable. Even if one firmly believes that this new interpretation of self-determination has produced international stability, the fact remains that it has produced only one particular kind of international stability. Judging from the myriad conflicts that have arisen and the vast array of political, social, and economic problems that still plague so many Third World and former socialist countries, it is doubtful that this form of international stability was the best one available. It was certainly not the only possibility. Therefore, this study will not be worshipping in the temple of fixed territorial borders and seh°-determination only for former colonies. 83Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination," p. 359. 32 The eighth assumption or premise that this study works from is that self-determination claims need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and not on the basis of abstract principle alone. Self-determination remains an essentially contested concept. Consensus or agreement has never been reached on such key points as who is the self?; is self-determination a political principle or a legal right?; and if self-determination is a legal right, does it include secession? Al l of these intellectual questions are compounded by the traditional inconsistency with which the principle of self-determination has been applied.84 As such, it is extremely difficult to translate from the abstract principle of national self-determination into the cold, hard reality of whether or not Biafra or Bangladesh has a legitimate right to secede. As French and Gutman put it, there may be instances where it is quite justifiable for a population to try to secede from the state of which it is part.... Such arguments should be considered on their own merits.... national self-determination cannot be sanctioned by appeal to the principle of national self-determination.85 One can argue over what criteria should be applied in assessing the legitimacy of a particular secession attempt. My point is merely that the answer to the question "Who has the right to self-determination?" will not be found solely in abstract formulations of the principle of national self-determination. Self-determination may be generally supported or generally opposed for a variety of reasons. Specific attempts at exercising the right of self-determination must, however, be evaluated on an individual case-by-case basis. My ninth premise is that just as particular self-determination claims may be deemed more worthy of support than others, so may particular de facto states be deemed more worthy of support (or less worthy of active opposition) than others. These entities form a diverse group. Particular readers may find some de facto states more "just" or morally 8 4 0n some of these inconsistencies see Pomerance, "Self-Determination Today," pp. 322-327 and Hurst Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 36-37. 85Stanley French and Andres Gutman, "The Principle of National Self-Deterrrunation," in Philosophy. Morality and International Affairs, ed. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser and Thomas Nagel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 153. 33 appealing than others. This author, for example, would object far less strenuously to being described as a "friend" of the EPLF or of the Egal administration in Somaliland than he would to being considered a "friend" of the Tamil Tigers. Al l de facto states are not created equal. One might thus object strenuously to some and yet support others. Similarly, all sovereign governments that face de facto state challenges are not created equal. One might, for example, feel that the Cypriot government is perfectly justified in maintaining an economic embargo against the TRNC while simultaneously condemning the Russian military campaign against Chechen separatists as reprehensible. The final assumption concerns the ability of the states system to cope with change. In essence, for at least the short to medium term future, the states system is viable and able to accommodate territorial change and change in the status of its units without being thrown into crisis. The empirical evidence on this point is, I believe, quite compelling. Since 1989, the states system has managed to cope quite well with the dissolutions of Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, as well as with the reunifications of the two Germanys and the two Yemens. Going back even further, one could add the dissolution of Pakistan, the division of Korea, and the division and subsequent reunification of Vietnam. Perhaps even more impressive than all of this, however, was the ability of the states system to cope with the massive increase in the number of sovereign states which accompanied the decolonization process. Changes in territorial boundaries and in the status of its units have clearly not overwhelmed the states system before and there is no reason to expect them to do so now. Regardless of whether or not Somaliland achieves independence or the entire island of Cyprus is or is not reunited under one government, the institutions of the international society of states will continue to function more or less as they have in the past. 1.5 Outline for the Remainder of the Study The discussion so far has introduced the concept of the de facto state and placed it within a wider academic context. I have also attempted to outline the methodology 34 followed in pursuit of my research, and I have explicitly stated some of the assumptions or value biases that underlie my work. The remainder of this chapter outlines the plan for the rest of this study. Chapter two defines the de facto state. It outlines the specific theoretical criteria used to distinguish the de facto state from other entities in international politics. It also delineates the ethical foundations and the political logic of the de facto state. Chapters three and four offer more detailed information on the four case studies. Chapter three considers Eritrea and the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. Chapter four examines Somaliland and the TRNC. General historical, geographic and demographic background information will be provided for each. Additionally, I will assess how well each case study fits the various theoretical criteria outlined in chapter two. Chapters five through eight essentially comprise a birth, life and death or evolution look at the de facto state. Chapters five and six consider separate aspects of the birth phase. Chapter five examines the systemic or macro-level factors that contribute to the emergence of de facto states in general. Chapter six, on the other hand, analyzes the micro-level factors that lead to the emergence of specific de facto states. Chapter seven investigates the life phase of the de facto state. It examines questions such as what, i f any, impact does the de facto state have on international society?; can international law successfully cope with the existence of de facto states?; and does the de facto state serve any useful purpose for the international society of sovereign states? Recognizing the inherent instability so characteristic of life as a de facto state, chapter eight assesses various possibilities for the future evolution or transformation of these entities. From the perspective of the de facto state, these range from the dismal (cmshing military defeat) to the ultimately prized (successful "graduation" to sovereign statehood), with many others in-between. Chapter eight scrutinizes all of these assorted potential transformations. The ninth chapter explores the impact of de facto states on international theory. In particular, it assesses what explanations for these entities can be found in existing 35 international theories and what challenges the existence of de facto states poses to those same theories. A variety of theoretical perspectives such as realism, rationalism, structural economic viewpoints, and post-modernism will be analyzed here. Further research agendas within each tradition will be delineated. This chapter also considers what, if any, changes would need to be made to existing international theories if the de facto state were to remain a permanent fixture in international politics with an indeterminate status. Chapter ten serves as a general conclusion to this work. Beyond this, it also evaluates the future prospects for the de facto state and answers the question what, i f anything, can or should be done about this phenomenon? Chapter Two Defining the De Facto State 37 2.1 Introduction This chapter is designed to answer the question "What is the de facto state?" Section 2.2 below begins this task by offering a working definition. This sets the stage for the following section which elaborates various theoretical criteria used to distinguish the de facto state from other entities in international politics. After putting forth the theoretical criteria underlying the de facto state concept, the fourth section of this chapter considers the ethical and the political logics behind this phenomenon. In doing this, some of the rationale which guides the leadership of the de facto state should become clearer. The fifth section considers the criteria and requirements for statehood. In particular, it compares the respective position of quasi-states and de facto states under these criteria. This section explains why the use of the term "state" in de facto state is justified and it explores what these entities have and lack in terms of the contemporary requirements for statehood in the late twentieth century. Section 2.6 evaluates how the limitations of the de facto state affect it. Correspondingly, it also considers the position of recognized sovereign states which face a de facto state challenge. Finally, the last section summarizes this chapter and looks forward to chapters three and four. 2.2 Defining the De Facto State The following working definition is designed to provide a useful lens from which to view the de facto state. Rather than being considered a fully self-sufficient, stand-alone entity, this working definition should be used in conjunction with the theoretical criteria elaborated below in section 2.3. That said, a de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. 38 It is, however, unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society. This definition obviously comprises a number of different elements. In part, it is derived from the traditional criteria for statehood in international law, the most famous statement of which is probably Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. According to this convention, "The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states:"1 Population and territory are clearly covered in the working definition of the de facto state. For government, I use the somewhat weaker formulation of "organized political leadership." Similarly, point (d) above is also qualified to indicate that the de facto state leaders view themselves as having this capacity to enter into relations with other states; an opinion not necessarily shared by other states. In terms of subject matter, some of the elements of this definition deal with the de facto state's capabilities: it has an organized leadership; it has reached such a level that it is able to provide a degree of governmental services; it is able to control a given territorial area for extended periods of time. Other elements focus on the logic, intent, or desired goals of the de facto state: it is territorially-based and in the business of providing governance; it sees itself as capable of entering into relations with other states; it seeks recognition as a sovereign state. Another set of elements delineates the de facto state's relationship with its society: it has arisen to power through a degree of indigenous ability, and it receives popular support. Finally, the last part considers how the de facto state is received by the larger international society of sovereign states: it is unable to attain any degree of substantive recognition and thus is perceived to be illegitimate. The large number of disparate elements present in this definition and the use of somewhat imprecise ^his can be found in James Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," British Year Book of International Law 48 (1976-77), p. Ill; and Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory," p. 529. 39 phrases such as "some degree of indigenous capability" and "a significant period of time" indicate the limitations inherent in this working definition of the de facto state. The working definition offered above and the theoretical criteria to follow below are intended to illustrate an ideal type of de facto state. One should not be surprised to see variations or deviations from this model. Just as the umbrella term "capitalist state" can cover such a wide range of entities as Canada, France, Japan, Singapore, and the United States, so too can the term de facto state stretch to embrace a variety of situations. Chapter one has already noted that some de facto states may be considered more "just" or morally appealing than others. Similarly, some are larger or smaller, richer or poorer, more or less ethnically homogeneous than others. Adam Watson's warning is prescient here: while the division of reality into categories can assist our understanding of what actually happens, there is the inherent danger that our categories may come between us and reality. We may slip into the assumption that phenomena lumped together in a category are more alike than they really are, or that because some things are true about all of them, other things are true also.2 This chapter's division of reality into the category de facto state is intended to assist our understanding of what actually happens. The reader has been forewarned so as not to slip into the assumption that de facto states are more alike than they really are. 2.3 Theoretical Criteria to Distinguish the De Facto State from Other Entities In this section, ten separate criteria will be advanced to sharpen our focus on the de facto state and to distinguish it from other entities in international relations. In order to aid future references back to these criteria, they will be numbered from one to ten. The numbering system is used merely as an organizing device, not as an indication of relative importance. These ten criteria, which can be broken down into three or four larger sub-headings, are shown graphically in the table below. 2Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 18. 40 Theoretical Criteria Criterion # General Focus Specific concern one capacity/ability de facto states vs. a power vacuum or state-less situation two capacity/ability de facto states vs. riots, terrorists, sporadic violence and random banditry three capacity/ability perseverance, length of time four goals/motives there is a goal; the goal is sovereignty as constitutional independence five goals/motives secession vs. emigration; the need for a territorial justification six distinction/difference de facto states vs. puppet states seven distinction/difference de facto states vs. peaceful secession movements eight distmction/difference de facto states vs. other non-sovereign entities with greater international legitimacy nine distinction/difference de facto states vs. the premature recognition of colonial liberation movements ten legitimacy/likelihood of success or acceptance democratic accountability Essentially, criteria one, two, and three speak to the level of capacity or ability required for a de facto state. Criteria four and five focus on its goals and motives. Criteria six through nine distinguish the de facto state from other entities in international politics. Criterion number ten indirectly speaks to capacity but is most relevant toward detenriining a de facto state's likelihood of success or acceptance by the other members of the international society of sovereign states. Criterion number one distinguishes the de facto state from a power vacuum or a state-less situation. Herbert Weiss, in his attempt to compare Zaire [now Congo] with other "collapsed" African states, is helpful in illustrating this point. According to Weiss, Zaire [at least pre-Kabila] cannot be compared with Sudan because "Although one cannot say that Kinshasa really controls the interior, it cannot be claimed that a substantial part of 41 the state's territory is under the control of another authority. The same conclusion can be made regarding a comparison with Liberia."3 In this regard, quasi-states and de facto states are not found in anything approaching a 1:1 ratio. Indeed, most quasi-states do not face de facto state challengers. While it would be difficult to prove empirically, one suspects that the ratio of quasi-states to de facto states would be somewhere in the range of 15:1 or 20:1. A de facto state requires some sort of viable, organized, functioriing governing entity. The mere fact that a sovereign state's control does not run throughout its entire country should in no way be interpreted as indicating the presence of a de facto state. Power vacuums, unorganized polities, control by local strongmen, state-less situations, and the like would not qualify as de facto states. Our second criterion also speaks to the de facto state's capabilities. This criterion distinguishes it from other groups and situations such as terrorists, riots, sporadic violence, or random banditry. Unlike our first criterion, this second criterion contains a large number of elements that can be viewed in many different ways. This section will attempt to use a number of different lenses from such areas as traditional international law, the Geneva Conventions, and guerrilla war theory to try to bring these distinctions into clearer focus. The easiest distinction to be made under this criterion concerns random banditry. The de facto state is a political ariimal. Its organized political leadership seeks to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territory, with the ultimate aim of securing sovereignty. The de facto state is thus not to be confused with bandits, drug lords, or norninally-political groups whose main intent is to line their own pockets with profit, plunder, or taxes. It is distinguished from such groups by its goals (political versus monetary or non-political goals), its capabilities (providing some sort of governmental 3Herbert Weiss, "Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Polity," in Collapsed States, ed. I. William Zartman, p. 158. 42 services versus solely parasitic extraction), and its degree of popular support (presumably much higher in the case of de facto states). Separating the de facto state from terrorists, sporadic uprisings or other lesser forms of violence is not quite as clear-cut. In this case, all such groups may share similar political goals and may receive comparable levels of popular support. The main distinction here thus comes in the area of capabilities. Let us first consider the traditional international law distinction between the conditions of rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency. While these distinctions are imprecise, contested, and "highly theoretical and devoid of practice in support of theory,"4 they may still be of use to us in conceptualizing the de facto state. Under this scheme, rebellion "is understood to entail sporadic violence which is capable of containment by the national police or militia."5 This is the lowest of the three conditions considered here. International law offers no protection to the rebels and international society is not required to take any formal notice of them. By contrast, "certain traditional norms of international law are—or are said to be—relevant to internal hostilities which are deemed either insurgency or belligerency."6 Insurgency is considered the next level up from rebellion. Its formal recognition can be seen as an international acknowledgment of internal war. While there are supposedly some international legal obligations concerning the ill-defined and elusive status of insurgency, "recognition as an insurgent has comparatively few formal legal consequences."7 As such, our focus will be on the distinction between rebellion and belligerency. The recognition of belligerency is more than a mere international acknowledgment of an internal war; it imposes a duty of neutrality on outside parties. Our concern here is not with the alleged legal consequences of recognizing belligerency. Indeed, as Rosalyn 4Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, p. 37. 5Rosalyn Higgins, "Internal War and International Law," in The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume HI. ed. Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 86. 6Ibid. 7W. Michael Reisman and Eisuke Suzuki, "Recognition and Social Change in International Law: A Prologue for Decisionmaking," in Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal. ed. W. Michael Reisman and Burns H. Weston (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 426. 43 Higgins notes, the near-total reluctance to accord this status in contemporary international relations means that this is "a legal concept fast becoming irrelevant...."8 Rather, our concern is with the criteria traditionally advanced to identify a state of belligerency. Higgins identifies four such criteria which must be met for there to be a status of belligerency. These criteria are: 1) the existence within a state of widely spread armed conflict; 2) the occupation and administration by rebels of a substantial portion of territory; 3) the conduct of hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through armed forces responsible to an identifiable authority; and 4) the existence of circumstances which make it necessary for third parties to define their attitude by acknowledging the status of belligerency.9 W. Michael Reisman and Eisuke Suzuki also identify four criteria, but they are somewhat different from Higgins's. In their scheme, the concept "belligerent1 "is a term of art referring cumulatively to (1) an organized group within a nation-state (2) which seeks control by force of arms within that state and (3) which has already acquired stable control over a significant segment of territory and (4) which has undertaken the operations of a regular government in that sector."10 The infrequency of Higgins's points 3 and 4 ever being realized is clearly what makes belligerency a legal concept of such declining importance. That said, however, the first two points of Higgins's formulation and the four points of Reisman and Suzuki's formulation can be used to help distinguish the de facto state from lesser "rebellions" and from more sporadic uprisings. Another lens which can be adapted for our purposes here comes from the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Among many other things, the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 recorded a number of "convenient criteria" which are useful for "distinguishing a genuine [internal] armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection." The first criterion here is "That the party in revolt against the de jure 8Higgins, "Internal War and International Law," p. 94. 'Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law and Civil Conflict," in The International Regulation of Civil Wars. ed. Evan Luard (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 171. 10Reisman and Suzuki, "Recognition and Social Change in International Law," p. 426. 44 government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention." The fourth criterion expands on these requirements further so "(a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a state; (b) that the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; (c) that the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; (d) that the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the terms of the Convention."11 Depending on the specific de facto state considered, points (c) and (d) above may be problematic. The first criterion and points (a) and (b) of the fourth criterion, however, do assist in distmguishing the de facto state from other less capable entities. In 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, meeting in Geneva, adopted two Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 1 of Protocol II deals with the applicability of that Protocol. Five conditions are set forth which must be met before additional Protocol II becomes applicable. The fifth condition is that "They[the dissident or separatist group] have control over a part of the territory of the High Contracting Party so as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement Protocol II." Additionally, there is a negative qualification which, in the words of Thomas Fleiner-Gerster and Michael Meyer, "provides that Protocol II does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."12 A de facto state would meet the fifth condition above and is therefore distinct from the other entities excluded by Article l's negative qualification. uThese criteria can be found in Higgins, "Internal War and International Law," pp. 86-87. 12Thomas Fleiner-Gerster and Michael A. Meyer, "New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 34 (April 1985), p. 276. 45 Our final lens here comes from guerrilla war theory. In People's War People's Army, Vo Nguyen Ciap distinguishes between four different phases of guerrilla fighting. The first phase is terrorist activity. This is designed to make the existence of the movement known and to create uncertainty amongst the government. The second phase sees the guerrillas moving amongst the population like the proverbial fish in water. The third and fourth phases see military units openly operating in territory they control, thus reaching the stage of normal warfare.13 Following this scheme, a de facto state could arise only in the third or fourth phase. Groups in the first two stages would not qualify. Criterion number three also speaks to the de facto state's capability. This is what might be called the perseverance or length-of-time criterion. Clearly, for it to make sense to speak of a de facto state, the entity so labeled must be more than something which is here today and gone tomorrow. Exactly where to set this criterion, however, is not readily apparent. Obviously, an entity like the TRNC which has existed for more than a decade in its present form (it was proclaimed on 15 November 1983) and for more than twenty years if its predecessor, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC, proclaimed on 13 February 1975), is considered would exceed whatever time threshold was set. Similarly, one can exclude an entity like the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET), which was proclaimed by the Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETELIN) on 28 November 1975 after it had occupied a substantial part of the territory on East Timor. The DRET failed to secure any international recognition before it met its demise in December 1975 at the hands of the invading Indonesian army.14 An entity in existence for less than one month definitely fails to qualify as a de facto state. 1 3 See the discussion in Bert V. A. Roling, "The Legal Status of Rebels and Rebellions," Journal of Peace Research XUI (1976), p. 157. 14For more on this situation see Kwaw Nyameke Blay, "Self-Detennination Versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization Revisited," Indian Journal of International Law 25 (July-December 1985), pp. 395-398; and Roger S. Clark, "The "Decolonization' of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression," Yale Journal of World Public Order 7 (Fall 1980), pp. 2-44. 46 Between the two extremes of less than one month and more than twenty years, the exact point at which to set the perseverance criterion for the de facto state is somewhat arbitrary. Intuitively, a minimum perseverance criterion of one year seems to be necessary. Much more than that risks excluding potential de facto states such as Biafra (officially proclaimed on 30 May 1967 and officially disbanded on 12 January 1970) and the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (established in the fall of 1991 and militarily crushed in August 1995). The argument made here is that both Biafra and Krajina were substantial enough entities with large enough impacts on international relations to merit serious academic study. Therefore, this study arbitrarily will establish two years as the rninimum time period necessary to qualify as a fife facto state. The fourth criterion for the de facto state addresses its goals. This criterion is broken down into three parts. The first part considers the existence or non-existence of a goal itself. The second and third parts distinguish the de facto state from other entities based on the types of goals that are held. In regard to the existence or non-existence of a goal itself, part of this distinction has already been made above in criterion number two which separated the de facto state from bandits, drug lords, and others who either completely lack a goal or who have predominantly non-political goals. Another distinction can be made here, though, between the de facto state and groups which have de facto territorial control of a given area but do not seek sovereign statehood. One example of the latter phenomenon might be the Eastern Kasai region of Zaire, home of Mbuji-Mayi, the country's second-largest city. While this region's leaders are able to maintain a large amount of autonomy and de facto independence from the central government in Kinshasa, they do not advocate secession for fear of unnecessarily antagonizing the center and having more ethnic violence directed against the Luba people of the region. Many of these people were killed in or fled from earlier violence in neighboring Shaba province.15 Thus, while the levels of territorial control, provision of governmental services, and degree 15For more on this situation, see "Zaire: A Provincial Gem," The Economist. 27 April 1996. 47 of popular support may be similar to other de facto states, the lack of a political goal distinguishes situations like Eastern Kasai from Northern Cyprus or Somaliland. Another possible example here might be the parts of Liberia controlled by Charles Taylor. At one time, Taylor's territory boasted its own currency and banking system, a television and radio network, a number of airfields, and a deep water port. In some ways, Taylor found his lack of international recognition advantageous as it freed him from legal entanglements and creditor demands arising from sovereign Liberia's US$ four billion debt. Ironically, as William Reno argues, "Taylor's freedom from creditors and his access to foreign firms put him in a better position to generate foreign exchange quickly than the Monrovia enclave, with its international recognition."16 As such, with their extremely limited political goals, "Taylor the rebel leader and those like him do not seek or need immediate formal recognition as members of international society. They do need intermediaries who can be used to help exploit resources and gain access to international commercial networks."17 Again, an entity which might otherwise meet many of the criteria for a de facto state is excluded due to its lack of political goals. The second and third parts of our fourth criterion distinguish the de facto state from other politically-oriented groups with different goals. The second part of this criterion revolves around Alan James's notion of sovereignty as constitutional independence. For James, sovereignty "consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme."18 It is this constitutional independence which separates Tuvalu from Texas. While both have denned territories, populations, and governments, and Texas is the much more substantial entity, it is only Tuvalu that is considered sovereign in international relations. Why? Because Tuvalu is constitutionally independent and Texas is not. In terms of its goals, the de facto 16William Reno, "Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor's Liberia," Third World Quarterly 16 (March 1995), p. 113. 17Ibid. 18James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 24. 48 state seeks sovereignty as full constitutional independence. It does not seek a different role within a federal system (although, if unsuccessful, it may ultimately be compelled to accept such a role). Therefore, the de facto state can be distinguished from such sub-federal events as Jura splitting