O N THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY A N D T H E DE FACTO STATE by SCOTT M c D O N A L D P E G G B.A. (Hons.), University of Richmond, Virginia, USA, 1987 M . S c , London School of Economics, U K , 1991 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as confonriing to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A September 1997 © Scott McDonald Pegg, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) Abstract This study explores the phenomenon of de facto statehood in contemporary international relations. In essence, the de facto state is almost the inverse of what Robert Jackson has termed the "quasi-state." The quasi-state has a flag, a capital city, an ambassador, and a seat at the United Nations but it does not function positively as a viable governing entity. It is generally incapable of delivering services to its population and the scope of its governance often does not extend beyond the capital city, if even there. The quasi-state's empirical limitations, however, do not detract from its de jure sovereign legitimacy which is externally guaranteed by the other members of international society. The de facto state, on the other hand, though lacking de jure legitimacy, does effectively control a given territorial area and provide governmental services to a specific population which accords it a degree of popular support. In spite of the vast literature on such topics as sovereignty, the state, secession, and self-determination, there has not yet been any systematic study of the causes and implications of de facto statehood for international relations. It is this gap in the literature which this study aims to redress. It does so in four main ways. First, this study addresses the question "What is the de facto state?" It advances a working definition and ten theoretical criteria to delineate the de facto state as a separate category of actor in international politics worthy of analysis in its own right. This theoretical endeavor is then fleshed out and operationalized through a detailed focus on four case studies: (1) Eritrea before it won its independence from Ethiopia; (2) the parts of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; (3) the Republic of Somaliland; and (4) the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Second, the study engages in a birth, life, and death or evolution examination of the de facto state. Here we are concerned with such questions as "What factors in the contemporary international system produce the phenomenon of de facto statehood?"; "What impact do de facto states have on international law and international society?"; "How are de facto states dealt with by other actors in international politics?"; and "What sort of transformations might we expect to see these entities undergo in the future?" Third, the study evaluates the potential impact of this phenomenon on the academic study of international relations. In particular, it assesses the significance of de facto statehood for international theory as a whole and for specific theoretical perspectives such as realism, rationalism, feminism, and post-modernism. Finally, the study considers the practical and policy implications of these entities. Specifically, it asks "What, if anything, can or should be done about this phenomenon?" The study concludes by offering a series of policy recommendations designed to facilitate the accommodation of de facto states within the contemporary international system. iv Table of Contents Abstract ii List of Tables vii List of Abbreviations Used in This Study viii Acknowledgments x Chapter One ~ Introduction 1 Setting the Stage 2 The De Facto State in the Wider Academic Context 11 Methodology 16 Value Biases and Assumptions of the Author 22 Outline for the Remainder of the Study 34 Chapter Two — Defining the De Facto State . 3 6 Introduction 37 Defining the De Facto State 37 Theoretical Criteria to Distinguish the De Facto State from Other Entities 39 The Ethical and Political Logics Behind the De Facto State 58 Sovereign States, De Facto States, and the Criteria for Statehood 60 Sovereign States, De Facto States, and Their Limitations 68 Conclusion 71 Chapter Three - Eritrea and the LTTE-Controlled Parts of Sri Lanka Introduction Eritrea Before Independence Background Information Eritrea as a De Facto State Territory Relations With Society Capabilities Relations With International Society Tamil Eelam, the LTTE-Controlled Areas of Sri Lanka Background Information Tamil Eelam as a De Facto State Territory Relations With Society Capabilities Relations With International Society 73 74 75 75 80 80 82 86 88 90 90 101 101 106 108 110 Chapter Four ~ Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 111 The Republic of Somaliland 112 V Background Information 112 Somaliland as a De Facto State 119 Territory 119 Relations With Society 121 Capabilities 124 Relations With International Society 127 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 128 Background Information 128 Northern Cyprus as a De Facto State 139 Territory 139 Relations With Society 141 Capabilities 145 Relations With International Society 149 Conclusion 150 Chapter Five — Macro-Level Factors Implicated in the Birth of De Facto States 152 Introduction 153 The Changing Normative Environment on Territory 153 Changing Conceptions of Sovereignty 158 From Empirical to Juridical Statehood 161 Recognition Policies 163 Weak State Security Dynamics 169 Self-Determination 176 Conclusion 184 Chapter Six — Micro-Level Factors Implicated in the Birth of De Facto States 189 Introduction 190 The Different Etiologies of Quasi-States and De Facto States 190 Foreign Invasions 191 External Political Interest in Creating a De Facto State 194 External Humanitarian Interest in Creating a De Facto State 199 Indigenous Secession Attempts 204 State Collapse 208 The Role of the U N in Freezing the Status Quo 212 The Demonstration Effect of Other De Facto States 216 Conclusion 220 Chapter Seven — The De Facto State in International Society 222 Introduction 223 The De Facto State's Impact on International Society 223 How Does International Society Deal With the De Facto State? 228 Three Potential Alternatives 234 International Law and the De Facto State 241 Does the De Facto State Have Utility for International Society? 249 Conclusion 259 vi Chapter Eight — Potential Transformations of the De Facto State 262 Introduction 263 Three Different Types of Military Defeat 263 Continued Existence as a De Facto State 269 Evolution into Some Alternate Status Short of Sovereign Statehood 272 Successful Graduation to Sovereign Statehood 285 What Determines Success or Failure in Securing Recognition 290 Conclusion 293 Chapter Nine — The De Facto State and International Theory 296 Introduction 297 International Theory and the De Facto State 297 The De Facto State and Specific Theoretical Traditions 304 Realism 304 Rationalism 306 Revolutionism 309 Feminism 312 Critical or Post-Modern Approaches 315 International Law 318 Conclusion 320 Chapter Ten ~ Conclusion 322 Main Objectives 323 Key Findings of This Study 323 Future Prospects for These Entities 327 What, if Anything, Can or Should Be Done About This Phenomenon? 332 Select Bibliography 347 List of Tables Table # 1 — Theoretical Criteria Table #2- The Diversity of Facto States viii List of Abbreviations Used in This Study A D B — Asian Development Bank AIT ~ American Institute in Taiwan APEC — Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation C C N A A ~ Coordination Council for North American Affairs CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now OSCE) DRET ~ Democratic Republic of East Timor EC ~ European Community (now EU) E C J ~ European Court of Justice E L F ~ Eritrean Liberation Front E O K A — Ethniki Orgdnosis Kipriakou Agonos E P L A — Eritrean People's Liberation Army (military wing of EPLF) EPLF — Eritrean People's Liberation Front (now PFDJ) EPRDF — Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRLF ~ Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front E U ~ European Union (formerly EC) F M L N — Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front FRETELIN ~ Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente GATT — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now WTO) GNP — Gross national product ICRC — International Committee of the Red Cross IMF — International Monetary Fund IPKF — Indian Peace-Keeping Force (in Sri Lanka) JVP — Janatha Vimukti Peramuna L T T E — Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam N A T O ~ North Atlantic Treaty Organization OAS ~ Organization of American States O A U ~ Organization of African Unity OSCE ~ Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly CSCE) P A ~ Palestinian Authority PAIGC — Partido Ajricano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde PFDJ ~ People's Front for Democracy and Justice (formerly EPLF) PGE — Provisional Government of Eritrea (1991 - 1993) PLO — Palestinian Liberation Organization PLOTE — People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam PRC — People's Republic of China ROC — Republic of China (Taiwan) SADR — Saharan Arab Democratic Republic SEF ~ Straits Exchange Foundation SNL — Somali National League S N M — Somali National Movement SPM — Somali Patriotic Movement SWAPO - South West Africa People's Organization TELO ~ Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization ix TFSC - Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975 - 1983) T M T ~ Turk Mukavemet Teskilati TPLF — Tigrean People's Liberation Front T R A — Taiwan Relations Act TRNC — Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983 - present) TULF — Tamil United Liberation Front UDI — Unilateral declaration of independence U K — United Kingdom U N — United Nations UNDP ~ United Nations Development'Program UNFICYP ~ United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus UNITA — Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola U N O S O M — United Nations Operation in Somalia US — United States USAID — United States Agency for International Development use — United Somali Congress WTO ~ World Trade Organization (formerly GATT) Acknowledgments This dissertation could not have been written without the support and cooperation of a number of people both inside and outside of the academic community. For their various forms of assistance, I am eternally grateful. In particular, I would like to thank the inter-library loan staff at the University of British Columbia. Ken Shivers and Siria Lopez at the US Department of State and Dr. Sazil Korkut at the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus representative office in New York were gracious in sharing their thoughts with me in interviews. Don Payzant and Donald Arnone were extremely helpful in regard to Somaliland's currency, as was Suzanne Hirsch in regard to Cypriot tourism. Federico Chachagua assisted me with translation and offered a number of useful editing suggestions. Uli Rauch provided me with vital technical computer assistance. For their contributions to my mental and physical health, I would also like to thank the members and staff of the Nanaksar Gurdwara and the Marpole-Oakridge Fitness Center. For financial assistance, I am grateful to the University of British Columbia for a University Graduate Fellowship and a teaching assistantship. Special thanks to Jim Crawley and the New York Stock Exchange for enabling me to complete this degree. In 1993,1 entered the PhD program in political science with seven other students. I would like to acknowledge the five students from my class who did not finish their PhD's at UBC: Janet Alford, Gideon Rahat, Carol Rice, Ian Wallace and Jeremy Iveson. I would also like to extend my best wishes to my two remaining colleagues, Haider Nizamani and Elizabeth Speed, in completing their dissertations. A number of other students in the U B C political science program offered valuable support and advice during the course of my doctoral studies. My thanks go out to Tony Sayers, Robert Crawford, Darryl Jarvis, Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, Julie Fieldhouse, Kevin Dwyer, Kim Williams, Matt James, Amir Abedi and Lorraine Rigo. For their encouragement and moral support, I thank my family xi and friends, Bruce Chapman, Larry Turner, Alan Tilchen, Ayesha Nizamani, Gerry Gelley and the late Reverend Dr. Odie Davis Brown. Before entering the University of British Columbia, I completed my bachelor of arts degree at the University of Richmond, Virginia—an institution where undergraduate education remains a priority. I would like to thank John Outland, David Evans and Richard Mateer there. I also had the distinct privilege of completing my master's degree at the London School of Economics. The late John Vincent remains an inspiration, as do Fred Halliday and James Mayall. Thanks also go to Michael Hodges and Michael Yahuda. Tom Lawton, Kevin Michaels, Bjarae Tellmann and Garth Davis from the L S E also provided valuable support and encouragement. Special thanks are due to the members of my dissertation committee: Robert Jackson, Brian Job and Kal Holsti. Brian Job, in particular, offered a number of constructive suggestions and much positive feedback. Kal Holsti was an outstanding thesis supervisor who afforded me tremendous freedom and support to pursue my own ideas and interests. I would also like to thank Michael Wallace, Maurice Copithorne, Peter Remnant and Alan James for their helpful comments and suggestions. This dissertation could not have been written without the consistent and unflagging emotional and financial support of my mother, Sharon Pegg. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my father, Gil M . Pegg (1935-1989), who constantly encouraged me to pursue higher education and who remains with me to this day. Chapter One Introduction 2 1.1 Setting the Stage If one takes 1960 as a convenient shorthand date for the ending of the vast majority of the decolonization process, then it can be argued that the three decades which followed that year were characterized by the greatest level of territorial stability ever seen in the history of international relations. With very few exceptions, the political map of the world's sovereign states remained unchanged during this period. As Fred Halliday put it, "For all the talk of secession and unification that marked the post-1945 epoch, it is striking how, until 1989, the map more or less held. States became independent, some lost bits of territory, but the actual division into 170-odd states was more or less frozen."1 James Mayall attributes this state of affairs to an ironic historical fate of the once-revolutionary principle of national self-determination which, in its post-World War II variant, has emphasized the sanctity of existing territorial boundaries and ended up "attempting to freeze the political map in a way which has never previously been attempted."2 The delegitimization of territorial aggrandizement and the almost religious sanctity placed on existing borders marks a profound change in international relations. Whereas entities once had to demonstrate and maintain a certain level of military, economic, and governmental effectiveness in order to preserve their position in a competitive international system, the post-war era has witnessed the wholesale granting of statehood to large numbers of former colonies with few, if any, demonstrated empirical capabilities. Once acquired, sovereign statehood has become almost impossible to lose. Small and/or weak states which, in earlier eras, would have been carved up, colonized, or swallowed by larger powers, now have a guaranteed existence in international society. In the words of Robert Jackson, "once sovereignty is acquired by virtue of independence from colonial rule, then extensive civil strife or breakdown of order or governmental immobility or any ^red Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), p. 221. 2James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 56. 3 other failures are not considered to detract from it."3 A lack of empirical viability no longer matters in a world where juridical statehood is underwritten and guaranteed by the new normative structures of international society. One of the earliest and most influential attempts to analyze this novel situation of normatively-sanctified fixed territorial borders and internationally-guaranteed sovereignty appeared in a 1982 World Politics article by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg.4 In subsequent years, one might view the academic work which built upon Jackson and Rosberg's original work as branching out into three or four separate, yet interrelated, sub-fields of analysis. Perhaps the most fertile or vibrant area here has been the literature which has grown up around the subject of "Third World" or "weak state" security.5 While this diverse sub-field covers a wide range of topics, the security implications of fixed territorial borders and juridically-guaranteed statehood are central to its analysis. A second main area of focus has been the impact of internationally-maintained sovereign boundaries on economic development. Jeffrey Herbst, for example, notes that the absence of a truly competitive states system that penalizes military weakness means that even those states that have no other prospects than long-term dependence on international aid will survive in their crippled form for the foreseeable future.... The presence of permanently weak states that will not be eliminated... poses novel development challenges.6 3Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), p. 531. 4Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35 (October 1982), pp. 1-24. 5See, for example, Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 257-283; Barry Buzan, People. States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-491; K. J. Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security ofThird World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 37-60; K. J. Holsti, The State. War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries. Adelphi Paper no. 251 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990). 6Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," International Security 14 (Spring 1990), p. 137. This line of thinking is also further developed in Jeffrey Herbst, "Is Nigeria a Viable State?," The Washington Quarterly 19 (Spring 1996), pp. 151-172. 4 In this regard, Jackson and Rosberg maintain that juridically-guaranteed statehood has had a profound socio-economic impact on the development process. Specifically referring to sub-Saharan Africa, these authors do not claim that juridical statehood provides an adequate explanation for economic underdevelopment. They do, however, argue that juridical statehood "is a significant partial explanation that has hitherto gone largely unnoticed" and that "its impact has frequently been more adverse than favourable."7 In some ways, this examination of the impact of fixed territorial borders on the economic prospects of poorer states is merely a unique sub-set of a larger critique of the impact of sovereignty on the global political economy. Charles Beitz, for example, sees the sovereign states system's respect for each state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction as a kind of collective property right which "effectively sanctions the existing international distribution of wealth as well as that of power."8 Similarly, Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt view the collective acceptance of the principle of sovereignty without any commitment to material equality as constituting "a structurally coercive mechanism of decentralized social control that institutionalizes territorial and therefore resource inequalities."9 A third major focus of recent research has been on the international implications of the growing number of "collapsed" or "failed" states. Much of the work in this regard has proceeded from the conventional assumption that these states must and should be reconstituted as viable entities within their existing territorial boundaries; debate in this 7Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Sovereignly and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis," Journal of Modern African Studies 24 (March 1986), p. 28. 8Charles R. Beitz, "Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs," in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 243. This is also a major theme developed in Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 9Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt, "The Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian L. Job, p. 104. 5 area has mainly centered around the question of how best to go about this difficult task of state reconstruction.10 Finally, the fourth, and most ambitious, line of inquiry that can be identified is Jackson's own attempt to broaden and develop his ideas into a general study of international relations.11 As Jackson sees it, what is novel about the way international relations is practiced today is not the existence of inequality between the states of the world. Inequality has always been a feature of the states system and there is nothing particularly recent or unique about significant empirical differences in state capabilities. What is distinctive about international relations in the post-1945 era is: 1) how statehood is acquired; and 2) how international society deals with weak and underdeveloped states. In the traditional era of international law ("the old sovereignty game"), recognition was acquired only after successfully demonstrating the capacity to govern. To acquire sovereignty, one had first to be sovereign: "states historically were empirical realities before they were legal personalities." In the new era, however, "rulers can acquire independence solely in virtue of being successors of colonial governments."12 Independence need not positively be earned; rather it now comes as a moral entitlement. Factors like a lack of qualified personnel, small territories and/or small populations, questions of economic viability or inadequate military defenses no longer rnilitate against sovereign recognition. The second novel feature of this new system concerns the ways in which international society deals with its weakest members. States may no longer be deprived of their sovereignty through colonialism, conquest, or partition. The sanctity of existing borders and the international aid regime (albeit as limited as it is) combine to operate as a 10See, for example, Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992 - 1993), pp. 3-20 and the various contributions in I. William Zartman, ed., Collansed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). "This attempt is made in Robert H. Jackson, Ouasi-States: Sovereignty. International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 12Jackson, Quasi-States. p. 34. 6 kind of safety net propping up states which earlier would have fallen prey to the imperial ambitions of other, more successful states. Jackson concludes that What is different, therefore, is the existence of an international society that has presided over the birth of numerous marginal entities, guarantees their survival, and seeks at least to compensate them for underdevelopment if not to develop them into substantial independent countries.13 This "new sovereignty game" thus produces a world characterized by large numbers of "quasi-states": states which are internationally recognized as full juridical equals, possessing the same rights and privileges as any other state, yet which manifestly lack all but the most rudimentary empirical capabilities. In Jackson's terms, these states possess "negative sovereignty"—a formal-legal condition that can be equated with non-intervention and the freedom from outside interference. What they lack is "positive sovereignty"—a substantive condition that allows governments actively to function and to deliver political goods and services to their citizens. International society confers and maintains these states' juridical equality and their negative sovereignty. It does little, however, to assist them in developing their empirical capabilities so they can acquire positive sovereignty.14 In Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney's terminology, these quasi-states are unable to "realize" their sovereignty substantively.15 Quasi-states exist. They can be located on a map. They possess flags, capital cities, ambassadors, national anthems, seats in the U N General Assembly and other such paraphernalia of independent sovereign statehood in the late twentieth century. It is what quasi-states lack in terms of providing governance and mamtaining effective territorial control of their own jurisdictions, however, that has stimulated my research. The existence of large numbers of recognized sovereign states that fundamentally lack many of the capabilities traditionally associated with independent statehood brings 13Ibid., p. 24. 14Ibid., pp. 27-30. 15See Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, "Realizing Sovereignty," Review of International Studies 21 (January 1995), pp. 3-20 for more on this. 7 forward a number of questions. If sovereignty is now granted as a moral right and not earned on the battlefield or through a demonstrated capacity to govern, and i f existing state boundaries have acquired such a sanctity so as to "freeze" the political map, then what happens to the various groups who are fundamentally dissatisfied at the way they have been "frozen" off the political map and denied admission to the exclusive club of sovereign states? If scores of existing sovereign states are, as it seems, so manifestly lacking in terms of legitimacy, effectiveness, power, popular support, and the ability to provide governmental services, what happens when a breakaway state group is able to establish some sort of effective territorial control and demonstrate governance capabilities of the sort that once led to full recognition as an independent sovereign state? This is not a study of secession or setf-deterrnination per se and it is not a general assessment of governmental breakdowns in weak or failed states. M y aim is to investigate another facet of the "new sovereignty game" which has not received sufficient attention in the existing literature. This is the "de facto state." In essence, these are entities which feature long-term, effective, and popularly-supported organized political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area. They seek international recognition and view themselves as capable of meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood. They are, however, unable to secure widespread juridical recognition and therefore function outside the boundaries of international legitimacy. The de facto state can be seen as the flip side of the quasi-state coin. This is not to suggest that for every quasi-state there must be a de facto state; indeed, even the most cursory research would reveal that there are far more quasi-states than there are de facto states—at least in the way that I define them. Rather, it is to suggest that some of the same normative logic in international society that produces quasi-states may also facilitate the creation of something that is more or less their inverse: the de facto state. The quasi-state's independence and its juridical equality were internationally enfranchised by the existing society of states. Previously, colonialism was predicated on 8 the fact that independence was a question of empirical conditions—levels of development, qualified personnel, military capabilities, national unity, and the like. It was only when the anti-colonial movement succeeded in normatively defeating this intellectual framework and turning independence into a natural right of all dependencies that quasi-states were able to come into being with full juridical equality.16 Once they succeeded in changing the criterion for independence from empirical viability to a categorical moral right of all former dependencies regardless of their assorted lack of qualifications, the international consensus against the dismemberment of existing states or the redrawing of territorial borders acted as a foundation which supported the quasi-state regardless of its failings. Even if the government's writ did not run throughout most of its territory, as happened in many cases from Afghanistan to Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, the existence of the state in juridical terms was guaranteed. International norms which thus served to support existing quasi-states also deny the legitimacy of any would-be challengers. The same logic that supports the quasi-state also prevents the acceptance of other groups regardless of how legitimate their grievances, how broad their popular support, or how effective their governance. Quasi-states and de facto states are thus both children of the new sovereignty regime. Whereas the quasi-state has recognized territorial borders, a seat at the U N , and the ability to participate in intergovernmental organizations, in many cases it does not effectively control large swathes of its own countryside. Though it seeks recognition, the de facto state, on the other hand, has been denied its seat at the U N and its place at the international table. No matter how long or how effective its territorial control of a given area has been, that control is neither recognized nor is it considered legitimate. The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no matter how effective it is. The quasi-state's juridical equality is not 16For more on this, see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs. Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 117-125. 9 contingent on any performance criteria. Even if the entire state apparatus has collapsed, the quasi-state (a la Cambodia and Lebanon) will be supported and maintained through international efforts. At times, it may be more of an abstract idea than it is a hard reality. The de facto state, on the other hand, is a functioning reality with effective territorial control of a given area that is denied legitimacy by the rest of international society. One way to distinguish these two very different entities is to conceptualize them in terms of power versus recognition. According to Janice Thomson, "if recognition without power capabilities characterizes most contemporary states, cases of power capabilities without recognition exist as well." 1 7 Following this terminology, the quasi-state or the failed state would have recognition and lack power capabilities while the de facto state would have power capabilities but lack recognition. The work of Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck is also helpful here. Though they ultimately fall back on the position that sovereignty accords to whomever international society grants widespread recognition to, they argue that it is actually composed of two constituent parts: de facto autonomy and de jure independence.18 Following their scheme, the de facto state possesses autonomy yet lacks de jure independence while the quasi-state retains its de jure independence even though it lacks de facto autonomy. This distinction can also be conceptualized in terms of authority versus control. Thomson makes the distinction here "between the claim to exclusive right to make rules (authority) and the capability of enforcing that claim (control).... Authority... is contingent on recognition; control depends on concrete capabilities to monitor and enforce compliance with the rules that are made under that authority."19 This is similar to Michael Oakeshott's objections to the misuse of the word sovereign: "Invoked to specify 'authority1, it has been used to specify the 'power' which may partner authority in an office 17Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research," International Studies Quarterly 39 (June 1995), p. 220. 18Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, "What Constitutes the Sovereign State?" Review of International Studies 22 (October 1996). p. 400. See also pp. 403-404. 19Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations," p. 223 10 of rule...."20 In these terms, it is the authority of quasi-states that is so actively supported by the other members of international society. Having that authority, however, does not mean that they will be able to exercise any meaningful degree of control over their jurisdictions. De facto states, on the other hand, despite lacking (recognized) authority are still able to exercise some degree of control through their empirical capabilities. Finally, another distinction might be made using Jackson's terminology of negative sovereignty vs. positive sovereignty. Negative sovereignty, in the sense of non-intervention and the recognition of a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction, is an absolute formal-legal condition that one either has or does not have. Quasi-states have full negative sovereignty; de facto states do not. Positive sovereignty, in the sense of actual capabilities which allow governments to act and to "realize" their sovereignty, is a relative and substantive condition that one can have or not have in varying degrees. The argument here is not that quasi-states have absolutely no positive sovereignty and that de facto states are in full possession of it. Rather, quasi-states generally lack positive sovereignty. Conversely, it would not make sense to speak of a de facto state which did not have some degree of positive capacity for governmental action. In essence then, we have a distinction between a large number of sovereign states that have full juridical recognition but lack substantive empirical capabilities and a much smaller number of non-sovereign entities that lack any form of widespread juridical recognition yet are able, more or less effectively, to function as governing authorities over specific territorial domains. It is this latter group that we refer to as die facto states. This study examines four de facto states: Eritrea before it won its independence from Ethiopia; the Republic of Somaliland; the areas of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, popularly known as the "Tamil Tigers"); and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At various points in time, and depending 20Michael Oakeshott, "The Vocabulary of a Modern European State," Political Studies XXTJI (June and September 1975), p. 323, my italics. 11 on the criteria one were to use, or the interpretation placed on the criteria I set forth in chapter two, other potential de facto states might include Biafra; Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); Charles Taylor's Liberia; Chechnya; Krajina; the Bosnian Serb Republic; the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova; the Abkhazia region of Georgia; the Karen and Shan states of Myanmar; the Muslim-controlled areas of Mindanao in the Philippines; the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas of Cambodia; and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The term "de facto state" is intended to be descriptive and informative. It has been used prior to this study. Hussein Adam has referred to Somaliland as a de facto state.21 R. Sean Randolph has also used the term in reference to Taiwan. 2 2 His choice of this terminology was subsequently criticized by Y a Qin. 2 3 In the popular media, The Guardian1* and Agence France Presse25 have both used this term in reference to the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. The Economist has also used it in reference to Somaliland.26 I first used this term in a 1994 article.27 1.2 The De Facto State in the Wider Academic Context Despite the vast extent of the academic literature on such topics as international society, secession, self-determination, sovereignty, the state, ethnic conflict, and weak state security, the de facto state has received scant academic attention to date. While some work has been done, for example, on Northern Cyprus or on the Tamil conflict in Sri 21Hussein M. Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea," Review of African Political Economy 21 (March 1994), p. 21. 2 2 R Sean Randolph, "The Status of Agreements Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs," The International Lawyer 15 (Spring 1981), p. 257. 2 3 Ya Qin, "GATT Membership for Taiwan: An Analysis in International Law," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 24 (Spring 1992), pp. 1081-1082. 24"Sri Lankan Forces Launch Heavy Assault on Tigers," The Guardian. 10 July 1995, p. 8. 25The phrase "a sprawling de facto state" is used in "Sri Lankan Troops Take Two Towns, Reward on Tiger Chief Raised," Agence France Presse. 15 November 1995; and the phrase "the former de facto state" is used in "Roman Catholics Call for Sri Lanka Truce: Rebels," Agence France Presse. 28 April 1996. 2 6 " Africa's Bizarre Borders," The Economist. 25 January 1997. 27Scott Pegg, "Interposition and the Territorial Separation of Warring Forces: Time for a Rethink?," Peacekeeping and International Relations 23 (May-June 1994), p. 5. 12 Lanka, there is no general analysis of de facto states as a category of actor in international politics. It is this gap in the literature that this study aims to fill. Before doing this, however, one must first examine the reasons for this near-complete academic neglect to date. One leading reason has to do with the inherently imprecise or nebulous nature of the concept de facto state. In an academic discipline that rewards precise clarity and quantifiable empirical work, the de facto state may be too fuzzy a concept for many scholars. In reference to juridically sovereign states, James Mayall contends that The important point to note is that all these formal states, whose governments take part in the ritual quadrille of international diplomacy and enjoy the dignity of mutual recognition and membership of the United Nations, actually exist: they can be located on the map; they have more or less defined boundaries; they have settled populations and identifiable social and political institutions.28 While one might contest Mayan's point on settled populations and identifiable institutions, his larger message remains valid: juridical states actually exist and they can be analyzed by social scientists in a variety of ways. The de facto state, however, often has a more tenuous existence. The date of Chad's independence or Andorra's accession to membership in the United Nations (UN) are much easier to deal with than trying to decide at what point did Chechnya graduate from being a dissatisfied Russian republic to becoming a de facto state. De facto states are often much harder to analyze precisely and quantify than are juridical states. Even if one were to argue that the entire category of "states" was an intellectual construct, the juridical state would still be a more readily grasped construct than the de facto state. The inherent ambiguity and lack of precision that adheres to this concept must, in some ways, discourage rigorous academic analysis. Another reason for the de facto state's academic neglect relates to international society's prior success at freezing the territorial map. This attempt to preserve the territorial status quo was so successful and the degree of consensus supporting it so strong 2 8Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, p. 7. 13 that very little discussion of other options even occurred. Former U N Secretary-General U Thant's famous quote from a 1970 press conference in Dakar, Senegal perhaps best sums up the international community's thinking in this regard: As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned, the United Nations' attitude is unequivocable. As an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe that it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member States.29 Rather than being phenomenon worthy of careful study, places like Biafra and Northern Cyprus merely became problems to be solved and situations to be ritually denounced in U N resolutions. If the territorial map is seen as unalterable, there is little incentive to devote much attention to de facto states because their ultimate defeat and reincorporation into existing states is both assumed and sought. While there were some academics who questioned whether or not the post-war interpretation of self-determination, with its emphasis on fixed territorial borders, really promoted stability30 or who argued that the international community needs to develop consistent criteria by which to assess secessionist claims rationally,31 most were content to view any challenges to existing sovereign states as problems in need of solutions. The prevailing international consensus on the sanctity of existing borders can thus be cited as another reason for the academic neglect of de facto states. Since 1989 this situation has, of course, altered considerably. In addition to the reunifications of the Germanys and the Yemens, the post-Cold War period has also seen the peaceful dissolutions of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and the violent break-2 9 U Thant, cited in Eisuke Suzuki, "Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation," Virginia Journal of International Law 16 (Spring 1976), p. 845. 30Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U. Dilemma," Journal of Modern African Studies 12 (September 1974), p. 359. 3 •Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Setf-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). Two attempts to develop criteria for secession within the context of liberal democracy are Harry Beran, "A Liberal Theory of Secession," Political Studies XXXH (March 1984), pp. 21-31; and Anthony H. Birch, "Another Liberal Theory of Secession," Political Studies XXXII (December 1984), pp. 596-602. 14 ups of Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. In all, more than twenty new states have assumed U N membership during this period. The exact significance of the ending of the Cold War on irrevocably fixed territorial borders remains open to question. As Barry Buzan puts it, It is not yet clear whether it is the norm of fixed boundaries that is under assault or only the practice in specific locations. But it is clear that this norm is vulnerable to the counter-norm of national self-determination, and that some of the restraints on boundary change have been weakened by the ending of the Cold War. 3 2 This new situation has naturally stimulated or renewed academic interest in a number of areas pertinent to the subject of this thesis. Ethnic conflict and ethnic identity formation has once again become a salient topic in the study of international relations.33 The principle of national self-determination has been revisited,34 with strong arguments made both for 3 5 and against36 the concept. The adequacy or inadequacy of international relations' treatment of the state is again a lively topic of debate.37 The changing nature of sovereignty has been examined,38 with particular emphasis placed on the question of what are the limits to non-intervention.39 Similarly, the role of territoriality in international 32Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs 67 (July 1991), p. 441. See also Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis," Journal of International Affairs 45 (Winter 1992), p. 399. 3 3Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38 (September 1994), pp. 347-377; Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945," International Political Science Review 14 (April 1993), pp. 161-201; and Barry R Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47. 34Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992). 35Guyora Binder, "The Case for Self-Determination," Stanford Journal of International Law 29 (Summer 1993), pp. 223-270. 36Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992 - 1993), pp. 21-35. 37Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, chapter four; Cornelia Navari, "Introduction: The State as a Contested Concept in International Relations," in The Condition of States: A Study in International Political Theory, ed. Cornelia Navari (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), pp. 1-18; and Martin Shaw, "State Theory and the Post-Cold War World," in State and Society in International Relations, ed. Michael Banks and Martin Shaw (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 1-17. 3 8 J . Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48 (Winter 1994), pp. 107-130; Ruth Lapidoth, "Sovereignty in Transition," Journal of International Affairs 45 (Winter 1992), pp. 325-346. 39Terry L. Deibel, "Internal Affairs and International Relations in the Post-Cold War World," The Washington Quarterly 16 (Summer 1993), pp. 13-33; Simon Duke, "The State and Human Rights: Sovereignty Versus Humanitarian Intervention," International Relations XII (August 1994), pp. 25-48; R J. Vincent and Peter Wilson, "Beyond Non-intervention," in Political Theory. International Relations and 15 relations has again come under renewed scrutiny.40 One can even find authors who now argue that territorial boundaries in Africa may need to be changed.41 This is a significant departure from the earlier consensus against even considering such an action. Perhaps the area which has been most affected by the changing international environment has been the academic study of secession. The earlier reflex opposition to anything relating to secession has now given way to a series of efforts designed to illurninate specific criteria under which "just" or "legitimate" secession attempts may be distinguished from "unjust" or "illegitimate" attempts.42 Clearly, the end of the Cold War has sparked or reignited vigorous intellectual debate in a number of areas pertinent to the subject matter of this study. And yet, little or no work has been done on the de facto state per se. One suspects that this might point to a third reason for the de facto state's academic neglect: it is simply not the sexiest or most important topic in the field of international relations. The four de facto states examined in this study, and many of the other ones not examined in this study, are all fairly small places with minor populations. This is not to say that de facto states are uriimportant. Yet, all the de facto states in the world put together and their impact on the international system would not rank in importance alongside the US-Soviet strategic rivalry during the Cold War or issues such as migration flows, economic development, global governance, foreign the Ethics of Intervention, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 122-130; and Cynthia Weber, "Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary," Review of International Studies 18 (July 1992), pp. 199-216. 40David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); and John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174. 41Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa," Foreign Affairs 71 (America and the World 1991/92), pp. 152-53; and Herbst, "Is Nigeria a Viable State?," pp. 168-169. 4 2 Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., "Secession: State Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 341-349; Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention," pp. 408-410; and Ronald K. McMullen, "Secession in Asia: The Emerging Criteria for International Acceptance," Asian Thought and Society XVII (May-August 1992), pp. 118-123. 16 direct investment, or nuclear proliferation today. Their relatively peripheral importance to international politics thus counts as a third reason for the general academic neglect of this topic. Why then study the de facto state? Although small in numbers and generally small in size, the evidence indicates that many de facto states can survive for quite extended durations of time. One reason to study this phenomenon therefore is to evaluate the ways in which international society copes with the presence of such non-juridical entities. Spelling out the advantages and disadvantages of particular methods of dealing with this phenomenon should be of some policy relevance to international decision-makers. A second reason to study de facto states is that these entities do have measurable impacts on world politics. Their impact can be felt in the area of global political economy but is most readily apparent in regard to conflict and war. The sheer numbers of refugees and fatalities produced in the assorted struggles that result in the creation of these entities is, in and of itself, a compelling reason to study this phenomenon. In this sense, a greater focus on de facto states would be one part of what K . J. Holsti identifies as a shift in the study of international politics "from exclusive focus on the activities of the great powers to a concern with what have traditionally been considered peripheral actors."43 A third reason to examine de facto statehood is to assess its potential significance for academic international relations theory. De facto states may be useful vehicles from which to generate insights on such larger questions as are we witnessing a return to a more diverse international system?; and what are the extent of challenges facing the states system today? The existence of these entities may also suggest interesting avenues of future inquiry within specific theoretical traditions as realism, rationalism, and post-modernism. 1.3 Methodology While there was not necessarily any hard and fast separation between them, my research was essentially composed of two main components: 1) general academic and 43Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War, p. 207. 17 theoretical work; and 2) more detailed empirical research on the four specific case studies themselves. In regards to the general theoretical section, as there is no academic literature on the de facto state per se, my research draws upon a wide range of other existing literatures. A number of the literatures consulted, such as secession, self-determination, sovereignty, territoriality, and weak state security have already been mentioned. Another literature revolves around the state: theories of the state; the criteria and requirements for statehood; the state-making and nation-building processes; challenges to the state; and federalism and other forms of autonomy designed to accommodate national or minority demands for greater representation within the state. Ethnic conflict, ethnic identity formation, and the problems of national minorities within sovereign states constituted another major focus. On a more systemic level, my general research also covered such topics as the nature of international society; various aspects of international law; the legitimization and recognition process; the potential transformation of the states system; and the changing nature of conflict. Obviously, many of these assorted works are interrelated and intertwined. I selected the four specific case studies for three main reasons. The first concerns geography. The selection of two African, one Asian, and one European case study is intended to show that the de facto state is a generic phenomenon not limited to one region of the globe. The second, and more important, line of reasoning behind the selection has to do with some of the unique characteristics of each case. As the only de facto state ever to graduate successfully to sovereign statehood, Eritrea stands out for this reason alone. Northern Cyprus merits attention both for its extended longevity and for its unique degree of dependence on external support—in this case from Turkey. The more than 30-year U N peacekeeping presence on Cyprus also distinguishes this case. Somaliland offers a particularly sharp lens from which to view the workings of international society. Despite its comparatively strong democratic credentials, its former separate colonial status, and its functional effectiveness, the international community still insists that this de facto state 18 remain harnessed to the collapsed functional bankruptcy that is Somalia today. This case certainly indicates some of the limits to the supposedly changed attitudes toward secession and fixed territorial boundaries. The LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka were selected for two main reasons: 1) the LTTE's impressive ability to survive under adverse conditions, and 2) its uniquely brutal, violent, and intolerant leadership. A third reason for the selection of these four case studies is that all four are contemporary examples of the de facto state phenomenon. The four cases selected have all been in existence long enough that adequate literature has grown up around them.44 I excluded other potential case studies such as Chechnya and the Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia on the grounds that their situation was evolving too fast and that they were already receiving substantial attention from other scholars and media commentators. The selection of only contemporary case studies leads to the question: Is the de facto state only a contemporary phenomenon of the post-war era or do its roots go back further in the international system? The answer is probably yes to both parts of this question. Following Robert Jackson, I argue that the post-1945 international consensus on the preservation of existing states within their fixed territorial borders marks a dramatic break in the history of international relations. The de facto state is one of the unintended by-products of this new normative environment. The various macro-level factors discussed in chapter five that help create a setting conducive to the emergence of these entities are all unique to the postwar era. Historically, though, the de facto state does have antecedents. Disputed, yet effective de facto political control of a given territorial area has most likely been a recurrent feature of international relations for centuries. Thus, one might argue that the etiology of these entities can be traced back to such things as recalcitrant barons who refused to submit to sovereign authority in the transition from the middle ages or unincorporated parts of the warring states system outside the control of the ^The volume of literature on Cyprus and Sri Lanka is clearly much greater than the volume of literature on Eritrea or Somaliland. Of the four case studies considered, it is Somaliland that suffers the most from having the fewest academic resources available. 19 emperor in ancient China. Yet, the de facto state itself—at least in the way it is conceptualized in this study—is limited in time to the contemporary postwar decolonization era. One problem doing research on contemporary cases is the frequency of highly-biased or polemical narratives. The static-to-noise ratio of emotional passion versus detached analysis is often quite high. Wherever possible, to minimize the ill-effects of this, I consulted a variety of sources that included local sources from both sides of the issue (i.e., Greek and Turkish Cypriot scholars; Sinhalese and Tamil scholars); "outside" scholars (usually westerners); and media sources (again, frequently western). The strongly pro-whichever group articles have more or less been balanced out by the strongly anti-whichever group articles.45 A few caveats are, however, in order here. First, as one might expect, the mere fact that someone is a Sinhalese scholar does not make them pro-government and the fact that someone is a Tamil scholar does not make them pro-LTTE. Second, in some cases it is difficult to find opposing views. For example, the Egal administration in Somaliland is frequently praised and it has not been subjected to much more than mild criticism. On the other hand, one struggles to find anyone who is even moderately positive about the LTTE. Third, my aim is only to ensure that all views are represented and considered. No attempt has been made to balance out the respective number of scholars consulted. First-hand or primary source material is available for all four cases. For example, Rauf Denktash, the president of the TRNC, has written a book, 4 6 as has the TRNC's former attorney-general47 On the other side of this particular ledger, Andreas Jacovides, 45Compare, for example, Anthony J. Carroll and B. Rajagopal, "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland," American University Journal of International Law and Policy 8 (Winter/Spring 1992/93), pp. 653-681 which quite strongly sets out the case for Somaliland's independence with Minasse Haile, "Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea," Emory International Law Review 8 (Fall 1994), pp. 479-537 which quite strongly sets out the Ethiopian case against Eritrean independence. 4 6R. R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. 2nd ed. (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988). 47Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 20 the Cypriot ambassador to the United States and Canada has ably set out the Republic of Cyprus's viewpoint.48 Other examples found along these lines include a variety of Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) documents stating policy priorities for the Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) in the period before independence;49 an interview with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the president of Somaliland;50 and a first-hand account of life in the Jaffna Peninsula from four Tamil scholars at the University of Jaffna.51 No field visits were undertaken during the course of my research. A few telephone interviews were conducted but this was not a primary focus of my research effort. At this point, I need to offer a positivist disclaimer. The de facto state is an inherently more imprecise concept than the juridical state. Therefore, while I will attempt to use empirical data on such things as human rights violations, population, refugee flows, per capita gross national product (GNP), and the extent of territory controlled to buttress the arguments in this study, much of the analysis will inevitably remain arguable. This should not come as a surprise, for many of the key concepts remain what W. B. Gallie has termed "essentially contested."52 For example, in reference to sovereignty, Alan James argues that "there is in existence on this subject a substantial intellectual quagmire...."53 Similarly, when considering the state, James Rosenau remains "disconcerted by the 48Andreas J. Jacovides, "Cyprus—The International Law Dimension," American University Journal of International Law and Policy 10 (Summer 1995), pp. 1221-1231. See also his remarks in various issues of the "Cyprus Newsletter," published by the Embassy of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Washington, D.C. 49These documents can be found in Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, ed., Emergent Eritrea: Challenges of Economic Development (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1993). 50Matt Bryden, "Interview: President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal," Africa Report 39 (November-December 1994), pp. 41-42. 51Rajan Hoole, Daya Somasundaram, K. Sritharan, and Rajani Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka - An Inside Account. 2nd ed. (Claremont: The Sri Lanka Studies Institute, 1990). 5 2 W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in The Importance of Language, ed. Max Black (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 121-146. 5 3 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 3. See also Inayatullah and Blaney, "Realizing Sovereignty," p. 3; and Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations," p. 213. 21 wavering, multiple uses and elusive formulations of this concept...."54 One might also add here the seemingly eternal debate within international law over the question of whether self-determination is a legal right or merely a political principle.55 Therefore, as this study fundamentally revolves around a number of essentially contested concepts and unresolved debates, I do not claim that my work will irrefutably "prove" anything. This is not, however, a cause for despair. As Barry Buzan elaborates on essentially contested concepts, "Paradoxically, the utility of these concepts stems in part from whatever it is that makes them inherently ambiguous, not least because ambiguity stimulates theoretical discussion about them."56 The intent of this study is to stimulate that theoretical discussion. It is also to advance knowledge on de facto states, thereby hopefully leading to small advances in knowledge or clarifications of thought in other, larger subject areas. Finally, this study examines a particular subject matter in a particular way. No claim to exclusivity is made: my way is not the only way and it is not necessarily the "best" way. For example, one of the criteria to be elaborated in chapter two distinguishes the de facto state from peaceful secession movements. This, therefore, rules out any substantial consideration of Quebec in this study. Someone else, however, might decide that they wish to compare Northern Cyprus not with the three other case studies here, but with 54James N. Rosenau, "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988), p. 21. See also Sabino Cassese, "The Rise and Decline of the Notion of State," International Political Science Review 7 (April 1986), p. 125. 5 5 A concise introduction to this debate can be found in David B. Knight, "Territory and People or People and Territory? Thoughts on Postcolonial Self-Determination," International Political Science Review 6 (1985), p. 260. One author who argues that self-determination is a legal right is Alexandre Kiss, "The Peoples' Right to Self-Detennination," Human Rights Law Journal 7 (1986), p. 167 and pp. 173-174. An author who strongly argues against this position is Leo Gross, "The Right of Self-Determination in International Law," in New States in the Modern World, ed. Martin Kilson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 139-143. Heather A. Wilson. International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 78-79 argues that self-determination can simultaneously be both a legal right and a political principle. 56Buzan, People. States and Fear. 2nd ed., p. 7. 22 Quebec. Considering the similarities readily discerned between these two situations,57 this would be perfectly valid research to undertake. It is not, however, the research that I have chosen to undertake. My claim is not that my research program is "better" than the Northern Cyprus-Quebec research program or any other; merely that it is different. 1.4 Value Biases and Assumptions of the Author The study incorporates several significant assumptions. The theoretical framework that informs the analysis is the Grotian, rationalist, or "English" school of international relations. The extensive literature on this topic 5 8 is too well-known to go into much detail here. Suffice it to say that the specific conception from which I am working views the international society of sovereign states as a practical association with mutual recognition of sovereignty as its foundation. The distinction between international society as either a purposive or a practical association comes from Terry Nardin. According to Nardin, a purposive association consists of those "who are associated in a cooperative enterprise to promote shared values, beliefs, or interests...."59 A practical association, on the other hand, is not defined or governed by the pursuit of shared goals. Rather, it is based upon "a framework of 57Each case features two major nations in one state; the smaller of which views itself as a distinct co-founder of the country and desires to be treated as a confederal equal; the larger of which views the national question in terms of majorities and minorities and believes that it can best be addressed through some form of federalism. 58Some of the most useful overviews of this tradition include Chris Brown, "International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?" Review of International Studies 21 (April 1995), pp. 183-196; Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in Diplomatic Investigations, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 51-73; A. Claire Cutler, "The 'Grotian Tradition' in International Relations," Review of International Studies 17 (January 1991), pp. 41-65; Timothy Dunne, "International Society — Theoretical Promises Fulfilled?" Cooperation and Conflict 30 (June 1995), pp. 125-154; Hidemi Suganami, "The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations," International Relations VII (May 1983), pp. 2363-2381; and Peter Wilson, "The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader," Review of International Studies 15 (January 1989), pp. 49-58. More critical perspectives can be found in Sheila Grader, "The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation," Review of International Studies 14 (January 1988), pp. 29-44; Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, chapter five; and Ole Waever, "International Society — Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?" Cooperation and Conflict 27 (March 1992), pp. 97-128. 59Terry Nardin, Law. Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 9. 23 common practices and rules capable of providing some unifying bond where shared purposes are lacking."6 0 Thus, in the practical conception of international society, what unites the separate states in a larger society is not any similarity of language, religion or government. Nor is there unity to be found in geographical proximity, in their transactions with one another, or in any interests they may happen to share. It is, rather, the formal unity of an association of independent political communities each pursuing its own way of life within certain acknowledged limits: that is, according to generally recognized rules through which cultural individuality and communal liberty are guaranteed, subject only to the constraints of mutual toleration and mutual accommodation.61 This view of international society sees sovereign states as the primary actors in world politics. They form a society that is based not on shared goals or purposes, but on a set of rmnimal rules that allows each state to pursue its own particular aims, subject only to mutually reciprocal constraints on how those aims may legitimately be pursued. Does such a society of states actually exist? Evidence that it does comes from both Hedley Bull and Thomas Franck. Bull contends that Most states at most times pay some respect to the basic rules of coexistence in international society, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, the rule that agreements should be kept, and rules limiting resort to violence. In the same way, most states at most times take part in the working of common institutions....62 Franck focuses his argument specifically on individual states' compliance with international law. As he puts it, The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its strictures or carry out its mandates...: That they should do so is much more interesting than, say, the fact that most citizens usually obey their nation's laws, because the international system is organized in a voluntarist fashion, supported by so little coercive authority. This unenforced rule system can obligate states to profess, i f not always to manifest, a significant level of day-to-day compliance even, at times, when that is not in their short-term self-interest.63 60Ibid., p. 5. 61Ibid., p. 50. 62Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 42. 63Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System," American Journal of International Law 82 (October 1988), p. 705. 24 The final thing that must be said in regards to my conception of international society is that it is based upon the mutual recognition of sovereignty. In other words, each individual state claims exclusive domestic jurisdiction subject to no higher governing body (authority in Oakeshott or Thomson's terms) over a specific territory and it correspondingly recognizes other states' claims to their own exclusive domestic jurisdictions. The entire states-system is premised upon this mutual recognition of sovereignty. Diplomacy, international law, treaties, and all the other institutions that enable states to communicate and interact with each other rest upon "the mutual recognition among government leaders that they represent a specific society within an exclusive jurisdictional domain."64 A corollary of this mutual recognition of sovereignty is some sort of general non-intervention principle. In this regard, John Vincent describes non-intervention as a "first principle" of international society because the observance of such a principle demonstrates "the recognition by states of the existence of others and the legitimacy of their separateness in a society bound together only by the mutual acknowledgment of the autonomy of its parts...."65 A second assumption of this study is that state sovereignty is neither permanent nor inevitable. Sovereignty is not divinely ordained; it is an artificially-created political arrangement that can be reformed or radically uprooted. While there are strong institutional and practical reasons not to expect its imminent demise, sovereignty may be viewed as a socially constructed concept which can, perhaps within certain limits, be deconstructed and/or reconstructed. Sovereignty is a distinct historical phenomenon, not an inevitable feature of human life. F. H . Hinsley captures the essence of this sentiment when he argues that, Although we speak of it as something concrete that may be lost or acquired, eroded or increased, sovereignty is not a fact. It is an assumption about 64Barkin and Cronin, "The State and the Nation," p. 110. 6 5R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 330-331. 25 authority—a concept men have applied in certain circumstances to the political power that they or other men were exercising.66 Rob Walker shares this sentiment but also emphasizes that sovereignty is more than just an ephemeral reification: Despite all appearances, sovereignty is not a permanent principle of political order; the appearance of permanence is simply an effect of complex practices working to affirm continuities and to shift disruptions and dangers to the margin. Nor can it be said that sovereignty is simply passe as if it were here today and gone tomorrow.6 7 A third assumption relates to boundaries: current state borders are neither natural nor inevitable. In short, there are no territorial givens. As Ravi Kapil notes, "Boundaries demarcate sharp discontinuities in political jurisdictions; except where land reaches the sea, such sharp breaks do not occur either in topography and vegetation or in the natural distribution of social, economic, linguistic, or cultural traits of human populations."68 Even when it comes to islands, there is nothing particularly natural or definitive about existing political boundaries. The islands of Hispaniola (divided between the Dominican Republic and Haiti) and Borneo (divided between Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia) could each be governed as single entities; as entities with even more subdivisions (i.e., more than two governments on Hispaniola, more than three on Borneo); or as entities with the same number of sub-divisions but with different territorial jurisdictions (i.e., Hispaniola divided between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but with different borders than at present). There are no compelling natural reasons for the planet to be divided into its present 185+ sovereign states. International society could exist in a more or less similar fashion with either fewer than 100 sovereign jurisdictions or with more than 300. A l l political borders 6 6 F . H. Hinsley, "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States," Journal of International Affairs 21 (1967). p. 242. 6 7R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 163. See also Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (Summer 1988), pp. 233-234. 68Ravi I. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," World Politics XVTfl (July 1966), p. 657. 26 are mutable human constructs that can be altered or abolished; none is sacrosanct. This is not to deny that there may be compelling arguments for maintaining existing territorial jurisdictions; it is merely to state that such arguments must be based on something other than the "naturalness" or the "inevitability" of existing boundaries. A fourth assumption is that both territory and statehood still matter. This may seem so obvious as not to bear mentioning, but in an era when it is increasingly fashionable to talk about the myriad challenges facing the state and the states system, it is worth stating explicitly: the possession of territory and recognition as a sovereign state both remain fundamentally important. This is not to deny that the sovereign state may increasingly have to share the world stage with multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, social movements, ethnic groups, and even individuals. Rather, it is to argue that statehood still counts as the ultimate prize in international relations. The presence of so many secessionist movements in the world today bears witness to this fact. Similarly, in regards to territory, my point is not to deny that non-territorial forms of organization may be increasing in importance or that modern technology has opened up new ways to organize governmental services on non-territorial bases.69 It is not even to deny that territory may at times be a limiting factor that hinders adaptation and highlights state vulnerabilities.70 Instead, it is to argue that territory remains a valuable commodity in international relations. In contrast to Richard Rosecrance, territory is not seen as becoming "passe."71 Rather, even in an era of quasi-states and negative sovereignty, the possession of territory remains "the pre-condition for the exercise of legitimate political authority on the international level." 7 2 69These arguments are put forward in Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty. 70James Rosenau, for example, refers to states as "sovereignty-bound actors" in order to call attention "to the ways in which states are limited by the very considerations that are usually regarded as the source of their strengths." See James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 36. 71Richard Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Virtual State," Foreign Affairs 75 (July/August 1996), p. 45. 72Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich and Harpreet Mahajan, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict over Territory (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1985), p. 3. 27 Fifth, this study explicitly rejects the traditional bias against secession. Integration is not necessarily a "good" and disintegration is not necessarily a "bad." Depending on one's perspective, particular forms of integration may be disastrous while other forms of disintegration might lead to lasting benefits. The point is that secession should not automatically be prejudged in all cases. Similarly, the preservation of certain states within their existing territorial borders may not necessarily advance the human condition in those states. As Robert Jackson argues, "The state is not an end; it is only a means. Individuals and their well-being is the end."73 Conversely, as secession is quite a complicated process which often descends into mass violence and necessarily entails substantial restructuring, it is not something to be flippantly supported in all cases either. One of the main arguments against secession is the so-called "domino theory"—essentially a fear of unlimited and never-ending "Balkanization" due to an unqualified right to secede that is exercised by increasing numbers of ethnic or national groups. I reject the domino theory for both intellectual and empirical reasons. From the intellectual or philosophical viewpoint, Allen Buchanan points out that This argument proceeds by sleight of hand. It assumes, quite without warrant, that a right to secede must be an unlimited right—a right of virtually anyone to secede for virtually any reason. But one doesn't have to allow everything just because one allows something.... the right to secede cannot be an unlimited right.7 4 Perhaps even more compelling is the empirical evidence to date. One could cite Norway's secession from Sweden; Iceland's secession from Denmark; Singapore's secession from Malaysia; and Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan as examples of cases where one successful secession did not lead to further secessions either from the newly independent state, the former parent state, or from any other states in the regions concerned. Conversely, the failure of the Katangans and the Southern Sudanese did not 73Robert H. Jackson, "The Security Dilemma in Africa," in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian Job, p. 94. 74Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce, p. 102. See also Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97), p. 137. 28 seem to have any substantial deterrent effect on Biafra. 7 5 The demonstration effects of both successful and unsuccessful secession attempts are limited. While the Eritrean example may offer modest encouragement to Somaliland, it has definitely not led to any wholesale redrawing of the political map in Africa. Rejecting the domino theory does not mean that one has to support independence for either Quebec or Northern Cyprus. It merely requires that the opposition to these group's independence be based on something more substantial than the fear of unlimited secession in North America or the Mediterranean. A seventh assumption of this study is that the post-1945 interpretation of self-determination has either: a) not promoted international stability, or b) has promoted a particular kind of international stability that is not necessarily the only or the best kind of stability available. I believe that the empirical evidence available supports proposition (a) above. Even if one does not accept that, proposition (b), which is the weaker form of the argument, is a sufficiently compelling reason to temper any religious-like reverence attributed to the contemporary interpretation of self-determination. To simplify the history of self-determination, one can view the principle as having widespread international acceptance or popularity in two main periods: the Wilsonian era after World War I and the anti-colonial period after World War U. The essential underpinning of self-determination, the question of who is the "self," has shifted dramatically between these two periods. In essence, the earlier Wilsonian concept which was based on ethnic, cultural, or national groups has given way to a new territorial conception of self-determination where the eligible units are primarily former colonies and non-self-governing territories as defined under Chapter X I of the U N Charter. As Rupert Emerson has argued, the point of contradiction between these two periods lies 75See Beran, "A Liberal Theory of Secession," pp. 29-30 and Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination," pp. 366-367 for more on this. 29 in the fact that the peoples involved in the Wilsonian period were ethnic communities, nations or nationalities primarily defined by language and culture, whereas in the present era of decolonization, ethnic identity is essentially irrelevant, the decisive, indeed, ordinarily the sole, consideration being the existence of a political entity in the guise of a colonial territory.76 Along with this shift in emphasis from national peoples to colonial territories has come the belief that self-determination is now not a process, but rather a one-off event. Once an acceptable form of self-determination77 takes places at the time of decolonization, the issue is permanently settled. No further exercises of self-deterrnination need take place. The readily-apparent irony in this situation is that precisely the condition which was held to justify self-determination in the earlier period, i.e., that ethnically different peoples were subjected to alien rule, is now wholly unacceptable as a justification once the colonial territory has achieved its independence.... once the newly created or newly independent state is in existence, no resort to further self-deterrriination is tolerable 7 8 The driving force behind the new interpretation of self-determination was an attempt to restrict the scope of who was entitled to be a "self" Considering the potentially revolutionary nature of an unlimited right to self-determination and the ethnic heterogeneity so prevalent in many of the former colonies, it is not surprising that this attempt to limit self-determination received such widespread international support. In the post-war era, the "selves" eligible for self-determination essentially came to comprise three main groups: former colonies or other similar non-self-governing territories; territories under military occupation; and territories where majority colored populations were subjected to institutionalized racism or apartheid by Europeans.79 This latter category 76Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," American Journal of International Law 65 (July 1971), p. 463. 77While self-determination is usually associated with full independence as a sovereign state, General Assembly Resolution 1541 of 15 December 1960 also included free association with an independent state and integration with an independent state as acceptable forms of self-deterrnination. The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion in the Western Sahara case also makes reference to these other options. See Michla Pomerance, "Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal," Israel Law Review 19 (Summer-Autumn 1984), p. 327; and Robin C. A. White, "Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?" Netherlands International Law Review XXVTU (1981/82), p. 149 for more on this. 78Emerson, "Self-Determination," pp. 463-464. 79See Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention," pp. 404-405; and Hakan Wiberg, "Self-Deterrnination as an International Issue," in Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa, ed. I. M. Lewis (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p. 49 for more on these three categories. 30 was defined quite narrowly so as to exclude all forms of institutionalized racism or discrimination by one non-European group against another non-European group. Thus, while black South Africans and Rhodesians were entitled to self-determination, other groups such as Tibetans, Tamils, and black southern Sudanese who also suffered from institutionalized discrimination were not entitled to this same right. Most U N members hoped that this novel and quite limited interpretation of self-determination would promote international stability. After all, an international society of sovereign states does seem more stable than an international society of (much more nebulously defined) sovereign nations. One must, however, question the success of the post-war interpretation of self-determination in this regard from both empirical and intuitive perspectives. Empirically, the post-1945 world has seen more than 21 million civilian and military casualties resulting from interstate wars and internationalized civil wars. More than 99 percent of these casualties have been in the so-called Third World. 8 0 Certainly not all of these casualties can be blamed on the post-war interpretation of self-determination. Yet, in a study of 58 conflicts from 1945 - 1989, K . J. Holsti finds that "The combined issues of national liberation, national unification/consolidation, and secession - all designed to create and establish states - were major sources of war in 52 percent of the fifty-eight conflicts."81 He goes on to conclude that "In terms of the relative frequency of issues it [state-creation] ranks highest by a considerable margin."82 Clearly this doctrine's intended message of severely restricting the number of eligible "selves" has not quite gotten through to many of those supposedly non-eligible "selves." From an intuitive perspective, Onyeonoro Kamanu questions whether the attempt to ban the right of self-determination from all but majorities in accepted political units has really enhanced stability. He believes that 80Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," p. 37. 81Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648 - 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 282. 82Ibid.,p. 311. 31 It has probably had the reverse effect since it leaves no choice to minorities seeking separate nationhood except resort to force. An anarchic situation now prevails whereby the only solution to a demand for secession in other than a colonial context is armed conflict, a condition that, far from discouraging impermissible use of force across state boundaries, multiplies the opportunities and temptations for such action.83 Denied the possibility of pursuing their (often legitimate) grievances in any other manner, disaffected groups are forced to turn to armed struggle. The consensus around freezing the map that the new interpretation of self-determination helped promote thus fails to ensure international stability. One can certainly argue against this point. Counterfactually, it is difficult to refute the possibility that the levels of both conflicts and casualties would have been much higher in a world where self-determination applied to entities other than just former colonies, areas under military occupation, or majority colored populations suffering from institutionalized apartheid at the hands of Europeans. Maybe a looser interpretation of self-determination would have led to more instability. But, just as easily, maybe it would not have. Maybe it would have forced governments to come to terms with dissident groups within their midst and find peaceful solutions to their problems. It is impossible to resolve this question adequately. Whatever one's position here, I believe that the weaker form of the argument (proposition (b) above) is irrefutable. Even if one firmly believes that this new interpretation of self-determination has produced international stability, the fact remains that it has produced only one particular kind of international stability. Judging from the myriad conflicts that have arisen and the vast array of political, social, and economic problems that still plague so many Third World and former socialist countries, it is doubtful that this form of international stability was the best one available. It was certainly not the only possibility. Therefore, this study will not be worshipping in the temple of fixed territorial borders and seh°-determination only for former colonies. 83Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination," p. 359. 32 The eighth assumption or premise that this study works from is that self-determination claims need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and not on the basis of abstract principle alone. Self-determination remains an essentially contested concept. Consensus or agreement has never been reached on such key points as who is the self?; is self-determination a political principle or a legal right?; and if self-determination is a legal right, does it include secession? Al l of these intellectual questions are compounded by the traditional inconsistency with which the principle of self-determination has been applied.84 As such, it is extremely difficult to translate from the abstract principle of national self-determination into the cold, hard reality of whether or not Biafra or Bangladesh has a legitimate right to secede. As French and Gutman put it, there may be instances where it is quite justifiable for a population to try to secede from the state of which it is part.... Such arguments should be considered on their own merits.... national self-determination cannot be sanctioned by appeal to the principle of national self-determination.85 One can argue over what criteria should be applied in assessing the legitimacy of a particular secession attempt. My point is merely that the answer to the question "Who has the right to self-determination?" will not be found solely in abstract formulations of the principle of national self-determination. Self-determination may be generally supported or generally opposed for a variety of reasons. Specific attempts at exercising the right of self-determination must, however, be evaluated on an individual case-by-case basis. My ninth premise is that just as particular self-determination claims may be deemed more worthy of support than others, so may particular de facto states be deemed more worthy of support (or less worthy of active opposition) than others. These entities form a diverse group. Particular readers may find some de facto states more "just" or morally 8 4 0n some of these inconsistencies see Pomerance, "Self-Determination Today," pp. 322-327 and Hurst Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 36-37. 85Stanley French and Andres Gutman, "The Principle of National Self-Deterrrunation," in Philosophy. Morality and International Affairs, ed. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser and Thomas Nagel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 153. 33 appealing than others. This author, for example, would object far less strenuously to being described as a "friend" of the EPLF or of the Egal administration in Somaliland than he would to being considered a "friend" of the Tamil Tigers. Al l de facto states are not created equal. One might thus object strenuously to some and yet support others. Similarly, all sovereign governments that face de facto state challenges are not created equal. One might, for example, feel that the Cypriot government is perfectly justified in maintaining an economic embargo against the TRNC while simultaneously condemning the Russian military campaign against Chechen separatists as reprehensible. The final assumption concerns the ability of the states system to cope with change. In essence, for at least the short to medium term future, the states system is viable and able to accommodate territorial change and change in the status of its units without being thrown into crisis. The empirical evidence on this point is, I believe, quite compelling. Since 1989, the states system has managed to cope quite well with the dissolutions of Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, as well as with the reunifications of the two Germanys and the two Yemens. Going back even further, one could add the dissolution of Pakistan, the division of Korea, and the division and subsequent reunification of Vietnam. Perhaps even more impressive than all of this, however, was the ability of the states system to cope with the massive increase in the number of sovereign states which accompanied the decolonization process. Changes in territorial boundaries and in the status of its units have clearly not overwhelmed the states system before and there is no reason to expect them to do so now. Regardless of whether or not Somaliland achieves independence or the entire island of Cyprus is or is not reunited under one government, the institutions of the international society of states will continue to function more or less as they have in the past. 1.5 Outline for the Remainder of the Study The discussion so far has introduced the concept of the de facto state and placed it within a wider academic context. I have also attempted to outline the methodology 34 followed in pursuit of my research, and I have explicitly stated some of the assumptions or value biases that underlie my work. The remainder of this chapter outlines the plan for the rest of this study. Chapter two defines the de facto state. It outlines the specific theoretical criteria used to distinguish the de facto state from other entities in international politics. It also delineates the ethical foundations and the political logic of the de facto state. Chapters three and four offer more detailed information on the four case studies. Chapter three considers Eritrea and the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. Chapter four examines Somaliland and the TRNC. General historical, geographic and demographic background information will be provided for each. Additionally, I will assess how well each case study fits the various theoretical criteria outlined in chapter two. Chapters five through eight essentially comprise a birth, life and death or evolution look at the de facto state. Chapters five and six consider separate aspects of the birth phase. Chapter five examines the systemic or macro-level factors that contribute to the emergence of de facto states in general. Chapter six, on the other hand, analyzes the micro-level factors that lead to the emergence of specific de facto states. Chapter seven investigates the life phase of the de facto state. It examines questions such as what, i f any, impact does the de facto state have on international society?; can international law successfully cope with the existence of de facto states?; and does the de facto state serve any useful purpose for the international society of sovereign states? Recognizing the inherent instability so characteristic of life as a de facto state, chapter eight assesses various possibilities for the future evolution or transformation of these entities. From the perspective of the de facto state, these range from the dismal (cmshing military defeat) to the ultimately prized (successful "graduation" to sovereign statehood), with many others in-between. Chapter eight scrutinizes all of these assorted potential transformations. The ninth chapter explores the impact of de facto states on international theory. In particular, it assesses what explanations for these entities can be found in existing 35 international theories and what challenges the existence of de facto states poses to those same theories. A variety of theoretical perspectives such as realism, rationalism, structural economic viewpoints, and post-modernism will be analyzed here. Further research agendas within each tradition will be delineated. This chapter also considers what, if any, changes would need to be made to existing international theories if the de facto state were to remain a permanent fixture in international politics with an indeterminate status. Chapter ten serves as a general conclusion to this work. Beyond this, it also evaluates the future prospects for the de facto state and answers the question what, i f anything, can or should be done about this phenomenon? Chapter Two Defining the De Facto State 37 2.1 Introduction This chapter is designed to answer the question "What is the de facto state?" Section 2.2 below begins this task by offering a working definition. This sets the stage for the following section which elaborates various theoretical criteria used to distinguish the de facto state from other entities in international politics. After putting forth the theoretical criteria underlying the de facto state concept, the fourth section of this chapter considers the ethical and the political logics behind this phenomenon. In doing this, some of the rationale which guides the leadership of the de facto state should become clearer. The fifth section considers the criteria and requirements for statehood. In particular, it compares the respective position of quasi-states and de facto states under these criteria. This section explains why the use of the term "state" in de facto state is justified and it explores what these entities have and lack in terms of the contemporary requirements for statehood in the late twentieth century. Section 2.6 evaluates how the limitations of the de facto state affect it. Correspondingly, it also considers the position of recognized sovereign states which face a de facto state challenge. Finally, the last section summarizes this chapter and looks forward to chapters three and four. 2.2 Defining the De Facto State The following working definition is designed to provide a useful lens from which to view the de facto state. Rather than being considered a fully self-sufficient, stand-alone entity, this working definition should be used in conjunction with the theoretical criteria elaborated below in section 2.3. That said, a de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. 38 It is, however, unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society. This definition obviously comprises a number of different elements. In part, it is derived from the traditional criteria for statehood in international law, the most famous statement of which is probably Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. According to this convention, "The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states:"1 Population and territory are clearly covered in the working definition of the de facto state. For government, I use the somewhat weaker formulation of "organized political leadership." Similarly, point (d) above is also qualified to indicate that the de facto state leaders view themselves as having this capacity to enter into relations with other states; an opinion not necessarily shared by other states. In terms of subject matter, some of the elements of this definition deal with the de facto state's capabilities: it has an organized leadership; it has reached such a level that it is able to provide a degree of governmental services; it is able to control a given territorial area for extended periods of time. Other elements focus on the logic, intent, or desired goals of the de facto state: it is territorially-based and in the business of providing governance; it sees itself as capable of entering into relations with other states; it seeks recognition as a sovereign state. Another set of elements delineates the de facto state's relationship with its society: it has arisen to power through a degree of indigenous ability, and it receives popular support. Finally, the last part considers how the de facto state is received by the larger international society of sovereign states: it is unable to attain any degree of substantive recognition and thus is perceived to be illegitimate. The large number of disparate elements present in this definition and the use of somewhat imprecise ^his can be found in James Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," British Year Book of International Law 48 (1976-77), p. Ill; and Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory," p. 529. 39 phrases such as "some degree of indigenous capability" and "a significant period of time" indicate the limitations inherent in this working definition of the de facto state. The working definition offered above and the theoretical criteria to follow below are intended to illustrate an ideal type of de facto state. One should not be surprised to see variations or deviations from this model. Just as the umbrella term "capitalist state" can cover such a wide range of entities as Canada, France, Japan, Singapore, and the United States, so too can the term de facto state stretch to embrace a variety of situations. Chapter one has already noted that some de facto states may be considered more "just" or morally appealing than others. Similarly, some are larger or smaller, richer or poorer, more or less ethnically homogeneous than others. Adam Watson's warning is prescient here: while the division of reality into categories can assist our understanding of what actually happens, there is the inherent danger that our categories may come between us and reality. We may slip into the assumption that phenomena lumped together in a category are more alike than they really are, or that because some things are true about all of them, other things are true also.2 This chapter's division of reality into the category de facto state is intended to assist our understanding of what actually happens. The reader has been forewarned so as not to slip into the assumption that de facto states are more alike than they really are. 2.3 Theoretical Criteria to Distinguish the De Facto State from Other Entities In this section, ten separate criteria will be advanced to sharpen our focus on the de facto state and to distinguish it from other entities in international relations. In order to aid future references back to these criteria, they will be numbered from one to ten. The numbering system is used merely as an organizing device, not as an indication of relative importance. These ten criteria, which can be broken down into three or four larger sub-headings, are shown graphically in the table below. 2Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 18. 40 Theoretical Criteria Criterion # General Focus Specific concern one capacity/ability de facto states vs. a power vacuum or state-less situation two capacity/ability de facto states vs. riots, terrorists, sporadic violence and random banditry three capacity/ability perseverance, length of time four goals/motives there is a goal; the goal is sovereignty as constitutional independence five goals/motives secession vs. emigration; the need for a territorial justification six distinction/difference de facto states vs. puppet states seven distinction/difference de facto states vs. peaceful secession movements eight distmction/difference de facto states vs. other non-sovereign entities with greater international legitimacy nine distinction/difference de facto states vs. the premature recognition of colonial liberation movements ten legitimacy/likelihood of success or acceptance democratic accountability Essentially, criteria one, two, and three speak to the level of capacity or ability required for a de facto state. Criteria four and five focus on its goals and motives. Criteria six through nine distinguish the de facto state from other entities in international politics. Criterion number ten indirectly speaks to capacity but is most relevant toward detenriining a de facto state's likelihood of success or acceptance by the other members of the international society of sovereign states. Criterion number one distinguishes the de facto state from a power vacuum or a state-less situation. Herbert Weiss, in his attempt to compare Zaire [now Congo] with other "collapsed" African states, is helpful in illustrating this point. According to Weiss, Zaire [at least pre-Kabila] cannot be compared with Sudan because "Although one cannot say that Kinshasa really controls the interior, it cannot be claimed that a substantial part of 41 the state's territory is under the control of another authority. The same conclusion can be made regarding a comparison with Liberia."3 In this regard, quasi-states and de facto states are not found in anything approaching a 1:1 ratio. Indeed, most quasi-states do not face de facto state challengers. While it would be difficult to prove empirically, one suspects that the ratio of quasi-states to de facto states would be somewhere in the range of 15:1 or 20:1. A de facto state requires some sort of viable, organized, functioriing governing entity. The mere fact that a sovereign state's control does not run throughout its entire country should in no way be interpreted as indicating the presence of a de facto state. Power vacuums, unorganized polities, control by local strongmen, state-less situations, and the like would not qualify as de facto states. Our second criterion also speaks to the de facto state's capabilities. This criterion distinguishes it from other groups and situations such as terrorists, riots, sporadic violence, or random banditry. Unlike our first criterion, this second criterion contains a large number of elements that can be viewed in many different ways. This section will attempt to use a number of different lenses from such areas as traditional international law, the Geneva Conventions, and guerrilla war theory to try to bring these distinctions into clearer focus. The easiest distinction to be made under this criterion concerns random banditry. The de facto state is a political ariimal. Its organized political leadership seeks to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territory, with the ultimate aim of securing sovereignty. The de facto state is thus not to be confused with bandits, drug lords, or norninally-political groups whose main intent is to line their own pockets with profit, plunder, or taxes. It is distinguished from such groups by its goals (political versus monetary or non-political goals), its capabilities (providing some sort of governmental 3Herbert Weiss, "Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Polity," in Collapsed States, ed. I. William Zartman, p. 158. 42 services versus solely parasitic extraction), and its degree of popular support (presumably much higher in the case of de facto states). Separating the de facto state from terrorists, sporadic uprisings or other lesser forms of violence is not quite as clear-cut. In this case, all such groups may share similar political goals and may receive comparable levels of popular support. The main distinction here thus comes in the area of capabilities. Let us first consider the traditional international law distinction between the conditions of rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency. While these distinctions are imprecise, contested, and "highly theoretical and devoid of practice in support of theory,"4 they may still be of use to us in conceptualizing the de facto state. Under this scheme, rebellion "is understood to entail sporadic violence which is capable of containment by the national police or militia."5 This is the lowest of the three conditions considered here. International law offers no protection to the rebels and international society is not required to take any formal notice of them. By contrast, "certain traditional norms of international law are—or are said to be—relevant to internal hostilities which are deemed either insurgency or belligerency."6 Insurgency is considered the next level up from rebellion. Its formal recognition can be seen as an international acknowledgment of internal war. While there are supposedly some international legal obligations concerning the ill-defined and elusive status of insurgency, "recognition as an insurgent has comparatively few formal legal consequences."7 As such, our focus will be on the distinction between rebellion and belligerency. The recognition of belligerency is more than a mere international acknowledgment of an internal war; it imposes a duty of neutrality on outside parties. Our concern here is not with the alleged legal consequences of recognizing belligerency. Indeed, as Rosalyn 4Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, p. 37. 5Rosalyn Higgins, "Internal War and International Law," in The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume HI. ed. Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 86. 6Ibid. 7W. Michael Reisman and Eisuke Suzuki, "Recognition and Social Change in International Law: A Prologue for Decisionmaking," in Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal. ed. W. Michael Reisman and Burns H. Weston (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 426. 43 Higgins notes, the near-total reluctance to accord this status in contemporary international relations means that this is "a legal concept fast becoming irrelevant...."8 Rather, our concern is with the criteria traditionally advanced to identify a state of belligerency. Higgins identifies four such criteria which must be met for there to be a status of belligerency. These criteria are: 1) the existence within a state of widely spread armed conflict; 2) the occupation and administration by rebels of a substantial portion of territory; 3) the conduct of hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through armed forces responsible to an identifiable authority; and 4) the existence of circumstances which make it necessary for third parties to define their attitude by acknowledging the status of belligerency.9 W. Michael Reisman and Eisuke Suzuki also identify four criteria, but they are somewhat different from Higgins's. In their scheme, the concept "belligerent1 "is a term of art referring cumulatively to (1) an organized group within a nation-state (2) which seeks control by force of arms within that state and (3) which has already acquired stable control over a significant segment of territory and (4) which has undertaken the operations of a regular government in that sector."10 The infrequency of Higgins's points 3 and 4 ever being realized is clearly what makes belligerency a legal concept of such declining importance. That said, however, the first two points of Higgins's formulation and the four points of Reisman and Suzuki's formulation can be used to help distinguish the de facto state from lesser "rebellions" and from more sporadic uprisings. Another lens which can be adapted for our purposes here comes from the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Among many other things, the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 recorded a number of "convenient criteria" which are useful for "distinguishing a genuine [internal] armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection." The first criterion here is "That the party in revolt against the de jure 8Higgins, "Internal War and International Law," p. 94. 'Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law and Civil Conflict," in The International Regulation of Civil Wars. ed. Evan Luard (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 171. 10Reisman and Suzuki, "Recognition and Social Change in International Law," p. 426. 44 government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention." The fourth criterion expands on these requirements further so "(a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a state; (b) that the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; (c) that the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; (d) that the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the terms of the Convention."11 Depending on the specific de facto state considered, points (c) and (d) above may be problematic. The first criterion and points (a) and (b) of the fourth criterion, however, do assist in distmguishing the de facto state from other less capable entities. In 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, meeting in Geneva, adopted two Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 1 of Protocol II deals with the applicability of that Protocol. Five conditions are set forth which must be met before additional Protocol II becomes applicable. The fifth condition is that "They[the dissident or separatist group] have control over a part of the territory of the High Contracting Party so as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement Protocol II." Additionally, there is a negative qualification which, in the words of Thomas Fleiner-Gerster and Michael Meyer, "provides that Protocol II does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."12 A de facto state would meet the fifth condition above and is therefore distinct from the other entities excluded by Article l's negative qualification. uThese criteria can be found in Higgins, "Internal War and International Law," pp. 86-87. 12Thomas Fleiner-Gerster and Michael A. Meyer, "New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 34 (April 1985), p. 276. 45 Our final lens here comes from guerrilla war theory. In People's War People's Army, Vo Nguyen Ciap distinguishes between four different phases of guerrilla fighting. The first phase is terrorist activity. This is designed to make the existence of the movement known and to create uncertainty amongst the government. The second phase sees the guerrillas moving amongst the population like the proverbial fish in water. The third and fourth phases see military units openly operating in territory they control, thus reaching the stage of normal warfare.13 Following this scheme, a de facto state could arise only in the third or fourth phase. Groups in the first two stages would not qualify. Criterion number three also speaks to the de facto state's capability. This is what might be called the perseverance or length-of-time criterion. Clearly, for it to make sense to speak of a de facto state, the entity so labeled must be more than something which is here today and gone tomorrow. Exactly where to set this criterion, however, is not readily apparent. Obviously, an entity like the TRNC which has existed for more than a decade in its present form (it was proclaimed on 15 November 1983) and for more than twenty years if its predecessor, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC, proclaimed on 13 February 1975), is considered would exceed whatever time threshold was set. Similarly, one can exclude an entity like the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET), which was proclaimed by the Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETELIN) on 28 November 1975 after it had occupied a substantial part of the territory on East Timor. The DRET failed to secure any international recognition before it met its demise in December 1975 at the hands of the invading Indonesian army.14 An entity in existence for less than one month definitely fails to qualify as a de facto state. 1 3 See the discussion in Bert V. A. Roling, "The Legal Status of Rebels and Rebellions," Journal of Peace Research XUI (1976), p. 157. 14For more on this situation see Kwaw Nyameke Blay, "Self-Detennination Versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization Revisited," Indian Journal of International Law 25 (July-December 1985), pp. 395-398; and Roger S. Clark, "The "Decolonization' of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression," Yale Journal of World Public Order 7 (Fall 1980), pp. 2-44. 46 Between the two extremes of less than one month and more than twenty years, the exact point at which to set the perseverance criterion for the de facto state is somewhat arbitrary. Intuitively, a minimum perseverance criterion of one year seems to be necessary. Much more than that risks excluding potential de facto states such as Biafra (officially proclaimed on 30 May 1967 and officially disbanded on 12 January 1970) and the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (established in the fall of 1991 and militarily crushed in August 1995). The argument made here is that both Biafra and Krajina were substantial enough entities with large enough impacts on international relations to merit serious academic study. Therefore, this study arbitrarily will establish two years as the rninimum time period necessary to qualify as a fife facto state. The fourth criterion for the de facto state addresses its goals. This criterion is broken down into three parts. The first part considers the existence or non-existence of a goal itself. The second and third parts distinguish the de facto state from other entities based on the types of goals that are held. In regard to the existence or non-existence of a goal itself, part of this distinction has already been made above in criterion number two which separated the de facto state from bandits, drug lords, and others who either completely lack a goal or who have predominantly non-political goals. Another distinction can be made here, though, between the de facto state and groups which have de facto territorial control of a given area but do not seek sovereign statehood. One example of the latter phenomenon might be the Eastern Kasai region of Zaire, home of Mbuji-Mayi, the country's second-largest city. While this region's leaders are able to maintain a large amount of autonomy and de facto independence from the central government in Kinshasa, they do not advocate secession for fear of unnecessarily antagonizing the center and having more ethnic violence directed against the Luba people of the region. Many of these people were killed in or fled from earlier violence in neighboring Shaba province.15 Thus, while the levels of territorial control, provision of governmental services, and degree 15For more on this situation, see "Zaire: A Provincial Gem," The Economist. 27 April 1996. 47 of popular support may be similar to other de facto states, the lack of a political goal distinguishes situations like Eastern Kasai from Northern Cyprus or Somaliland. Another possible example here might be the parts of Liberia controlled by Charles Taylor. At one time, Taylor's territory boasted its own currency and banking system, a television and radio network, a number of airfields, and a deep water port. In some ways, Taylor found his lack of international recognition advantageous as it freed him from legal entanglements and creditor demands arising from sovereign Liberia's US$ four billion debt. Ironically, as William Reno argues, "Taylor's freedom from creditors and his access to foreign firms put him in a better position to generate foreign exchange quickly than the Monrovia enclave, with its international recognition."16 As such, with their extremely limited political goals, "Taylor the rebel leader and those like him do not seek or need immediate formal recognition as members of international society. They do need intermediaries who can be used to help exploit resources and gain access to international commercial networks."17 Again, an entity which might otherwise meet many of the criteria for a de facto state is excluded due to its lack of political goals. The second and third parts of our fourth criterion distinguish the de facto state from other politically-oriented groups with different goals. The second part of this criterion revolves around Alan James's notion of sovereignty as constitutional independence. For James, sovereignty "consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme."18 It is this constitutional independence which separates Tuvalu from Texas. While both have denned territories, populations, and governments, and Texas is the much more substantial entity, it is only Tuvalu that is considered sovereign in international relations. Why? Because Tuvalu is constitutionally independent and Texas is not. In terms of its goals, the de facto 16William Reno, "Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor's Liberia," Third World Quarterly 16 (March 1995), p. 113. 17Ibid. 18James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 24. 48 state seeks sovereignty as full constitutional independence. It does not seek a different role within a federal system (although, if unsuccessful, it may ultimately be compelled to accept such a role). Therefore, the de facto state can be distinguished from such sub-federal events as Jura splitting from the Berne Canton in Switzerland in the 1970s or Staten Island's proposed secession from New York City. Allen Buchanan refers to this distinction as being between national and local secession.19 In his terms, the de facto state seeks national secession; Jura and Staten Island only seek local secession. Obviously, the de facto state can be distinguished from Jura or Staten Island in a number of other ways; the point here is that it seeks sovereignty as constitutional independence, not a change in its position within an existing sovereign state. The third part of criterion number four distinguishes between similarly capable political groups on the basis of their ultimate end-goals. The distinction made here is between the de facto state which seeks sovereignty for its part of an existing state and other explicitly political groups which do not seek independence. Thus, the distinction is made between a group seeking to secede and a group seeking to "capture" the existing state or change its government. Buchanan conceptualizes this distinction in terms of secessionists and revolutionaries. As he puts it, Unlike the revolutionary, the secessionist's primary goal is not to overthrow the existing government, nor to make fundamental constitutional, economic or sociopolitical changes within the existing state. Instead, she wishes to restrict the jurisdiction of the state in question so as not to include her own group and the territory it occupies.20 Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell frame this same distinction in terms of governmental conflict versus territorial conflict. The former is characterized by an incompatibility "concerning type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition." The latter is characterized by an incompatibility "concerning 19Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce, p. 15. 20Ibid., p. 10. 49 the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (inter-state conflict), secession or autonomy (intra-state conflict)."21 Thus, the effect of this distinction is to separate de facto states from groups such as the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru or the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in E l Salvador. At various times, the latter two groups, particularly the F M L N , have fit many of the characteristics of the de facto state. The fact that they did not, however, seek full constitutional independence and international recognition as a sovereign state distinguishes them from the de facto state. Our fifth criterion also relates to the goals of the de facto state. The de facto state seeks to secede from the existing state and to take its territory with it. One thus comes here to the distinction between secession and emigration. Under the latter, disaffected people seek to leave an existing state, but they make no claim on its territory. Opting for secession places a higher burden on the de facto state. As Lea Brilmayer argues, "By choosing secession rather than emigration, secessionists assume a duty of justification that refugees [emigrants] need not bear. Secessionists must somehow establish a claim to the territory on which they would found their new state."22 Thus, our fifth criterion is that the de facto state, based as it is on territory, must provide a territorial justification to underpin its claim to secession and recognition as a sovereign state. It is impossible to understand or to evaluate the relative merits of its claims without reference to territory. In seeking sovereign statehood as its goal, the de facto state "is claiming a right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily inquire into why it is entitled to that particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land — or to no land at all ." 2 3 Criteria six through nine are all designed specifically to separate the de facto state from other entities in international relations with which it may be confused. Criterion 21Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, "Armed Conflict at the End of the Cold War, 1989-92," Journal of Peace Research 30 (August 1993), p. 343. 2 2Lea Brilmayer, "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation," Yale Journal of International Law 16 (Winter 1991), p. 188. 23Ibid., p. 201. 50 number six focuses on the difference between de facto states and puppet states. According to James Crawford, "The term 'puppet State' is used to describe nominal sovereigns under effective foreign control, especially in cases where the establishment of the puppet State is intended as a cloak for manifest illegality."24 Crawford argues that there is frequently a presumption of puppet character when regimes are constituted under belligerent occupation, or subsequent to illegal intervention or to the threat or use of force. Additionally, other factors that Crawford maintains should be taken into account when assessing whether or not an entity is a puppet state have included the following: that the entity concerned was established illegally, by the threat or use of external armed force; that it did not have the support of the vast majority of the population it claimed to govern; that in important matters it was subject to foreign direction or control; that is was staffed, especially in more important positions, by nationals of the dominant State.25 For Alan James, puppet states are defined as such "because their relationship with another and more powerful state is regarded as so close that it justifies their treatment as mere appendages of the larger state, entities which move at its will and only at its wi l l . " 2 6 He distinguishes here between puppet states and dependent states. The latter group might include countries such as Bhutan and Nepal which habitually avoid certain courses of action so as not to upset their much larger neighbor India, but which cannot properly be considered Indian puppet states. In James's scheme, The line between a dependent and a puppet state may not always be easy to draw.... The crucial element is the staffing of all the key positions in a state's decision-making apparatus by nationals of another state, those nationals being known to be there for the purpose of seeing that the will of their state is done.27 Crawford and James both offer Manchukuo and the Nazi-dominated states of Slovakia and Croatia during World War JJ as examples of puppet states. James also includes Egypt after its independence in 1922, Iraq after its independence in 1930, 24Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," p. 130. 25Ibid., pp. 132-133. 26James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 139. 27Ibid., p. 140. 51 Cambodia after the Vietnamese invasion in 1978, and Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979 as other possible puppet states. Most interesting from the perspective of this study is his inclusion of the TRNC as a probable puppet state.28 Whether this assessment is correct or not is a question that will be considered in chapter four. As for the distinction between de facto states and puppet states, two parts of the working definition of the de facto state offered earlier speak to this question: its leadership has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability, and it receives popular support. The de facto state has a much more organic and symbiotic relationship with its population than the puppet state does. A n entity with an externally-imposed leadership that lacks strong indigenous roots and is bereft of all but the most minimal popular support would not qualify as a de facto state. Since both of these entities are somewhat imprecise constructions, this is a distinction based more on artful interpretation than it is on scientific evidence. Still, it is a distinction worth making. While Manchukuo and Biafra may both merit further study, they are clearly different types of entities. Criterion number seven distinguishes the de facto state from peaceful secession movements because the logic of these movements is clearly different from that of violently-contested secession movements. As Robert Young notes, in peaceful secessions, the declaration of one state or group to end the union or federation "is accepted by the other government, in principle, a move that obviously distinguishes peaceful from contested secessions, since the only other alternative is to attempt violent repression."29 This acceptance of the idea in principle and the reluctance to undertake military countermeasures has not been the case with any of the de facto states considered here, although the situation in Northern Cyprus is somewhat anomalous in terms of the general lack of violence there since the Turkish military invasions of 1974. 28Ibid., pp. 140-142; Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," pp. 130-133. 29Robert A. Young, "How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?" Canadian Journal of Political Science XXVT1 (December 1994), pp. 774-775. 52 Young has identified thirteen stages which are characteristic of peaceful secessions. His first two stages, which are: 1) "secession follows protracted constitutional and political disputes," and 2) "the secessor state declares its intent to withdraw," could be shared with any de facto state. His third stage, however, separates peaceful secessions from de facto states. That stage is "the predecessor state accepts the principle of secession: negotiations follow." This simply does not happen with de facto states. Additionally, Young's stages seven, ten and thirteen (respectively "the settlement is made quickly"; "the secession is accomplished constitutionally"; and "secession is irrevocable") also distinguish de facto state situations from peaceful secessions. While stage thirteen ("secession is irrevocable") could be true if a fife facto state succeeds militarily, a la Eritrea, the fundamental divergence of stage three means that the existing state will do everything it can to prevent things from ever approaching this stage.30 In addition to the non-use of force from both sides, there are two additional factors which separate fife facto states from peaceful secession movements. First, the types of devolved powers obtained by groups such as the Catalans or the Scots in a federal system and the consensual manner in which those powers are exercised are different from the types of power obtained by the de facto state and the manner in which it exercises them. Second, peaceful secession movements face a qualitatively different level of challenges than fife facto states do. For example, while political uncertainty might have a diversionary or negative impact on foreign direct investment in Quebec, that impact is of a substantially lower magnitude than the negative impact on investment in the illegal or juridically dubious areas of Somaliland and Northern Cyprus. Similarly, whatever happens in Quebec, it is difficult to contemplate that province ever facing anything like the challenges Eritrea encountered at the end of its thirty-year war with Ethiopia. Our eighth criterion distinguishes the de facto state from other non-sovereign or questionable/disputed-sovereign entities which have a much higher degree of international 30See the discussion in Young, "How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?" pp. 773-792. 53 legitimacy. Although the de facto state seeks widespread recognition as a sovereign state, it is unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition. The qualifier "substantive" is used to indicate, for example, that an entity like the TRNC which has secured recognition from one state (Turkey) is still deemed illegitimate by the wider world. The question of where to draw the line between substantive and non-substantive recognition comes into play most clearly with the case of Taiwan or, as it is formally known, the Republic of China (ROC). At present, the ROC maintains formal diplomatic relations with 29 countries, 16 of which are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. It also maintains what it calls "substantive relations"—economic, trade, technological and/or cultural ties—with over 140 countries and regional bodies. The ROC has 90 representative offices in 60 countries with which it does not have formal diplomatic relations and 37 of those countries have established representative offices in Taiwan.3 1 As this is a magnitude of international acceptance qualitatively different than any of the four other cases analyzed here, this study will exclude Taiwan from consideration as a de facto state even though it fits many of the other criteria advanced. That said, however, lessons or examples from the Taiwanese situation will be drawn wherever appropriate. In addition to the ROC, criterion number eight is also relevant to a few other entities in contemporary international relations. The Kurdish "safe haven" in northern Iraq, for example, meets some of the criteria for inclusion as a de facto state. While there are serious questions as to the legality of establishing these safe havens against the expressed wishes of the Iraqi government,32 the Kurdish safe haven does appear to have secured a much greater degree of international acceptance than any of the de facto states discussed here. Similarly, whatever its exact legal status and whether it ever achieves sovereign statehood or not, the Palestinian Authority also clearly has a degree of legitimacy not approached by the TRNC or the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. "Republic of China, The Republic of China Yearbook. 1994 (Taipei: Government brformation Office, 1993), pp. 172-174. 32See the discussion in Simon Duke, "The State and Human Rights," p. 41. 54 Therefore, our consideration of de facto states will not include such entities as the Kurdish safe havens or the Palestinian Authority. Criterion number eight can also be used to distinguish the de facto state from other "exceptions to sovereignty" such as the handful of remaining colonies, protectorates, trust territories, and possessions which have voluntarily chosen to remain constitutionally-associated with another state. Thus, unless they were to 1) begin demanding sovereignty as full constitutional independence, and 2) have this demand rejected by the parent state, entities such as Bermuda, the Cook Islands, Martinique, Puerto Rico, Tahiti, and the US Pacific Islands Trust Territory would not qualify as de facto states. Another such exception, albeit for different reasons, might be the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)—which has been recognized by more than seventy states and admitted as a full member of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) even though Morocco effectively controls most of the Western Sahara.33 A last distinction that is made in criterion number nine separates the de facto state from the historical phenomenon of prematurely recognizing colonial liberation movements. In the case of Algeria, for example, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was recognized by 29 states even though its headquarters were not in Algeria itself, but in neighboring Tunisia. Another case that is of relevance here is Guinea-Bissau. In that situation, Amilcar Cabral's Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) declared Guinea-Bissau's independence from Portugal on 26 September 1973. As Heather Wilson puts it, "There is little doubt that the PAIGC did not have firm control in the territory. Under traditional international law, recognition of the State of Guinea-Bissau would probably have been premature. Nevertheless, by the end of 1973 forty States had recognized the Republic...."34 On 2 November 1973, the U N General Assembly passed a resolution welcoming "the recent accession to independence of the people of Guinea-Bissau thereby creating the sovereign State of the Republic of Guinea-33Fowler and Bunck, "What Constitutes the Sovereign State?" pp. 401-402. 34Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, p. 112. 55 Bissau...." by a vote of 93 in favor to 7 against with 30 abstentions. This vote took place almost a year before the new Portuguese government de jure recognized the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on 10 September 1974. In summarizing Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and other cases, Wilson reaches the conclusion that the willingness of Third World States to recognize a State prematurely when the territory involved is or was a colony contrasts sharply with the practice of these States when a territory secedes which is part of a self-governing State as in Biafra or Katanga. In these cases, the principle of territorial integrity and fear for their own vulnerability determines their policies.35 The fact that de facto states must contend with the latter practice while some colonial liberation movements have benefited from the former clearly illustrates that they are two distinct phenomena. Additionally, the liberation movements referred to above certainly had nowhere near the same level of empirical capabilities that de facto states do. Our tenth criterion is not so much a standard for defining the de facto state as it is a means of evaluating its legitimacy and assessing its likely prospects for acceptance in international society. This is what might be called the democratic accountability criterion. In some ways, this is a forward-looking criterion—something that appears to be of increasing political and legal importance, rather than something that is a well-established canon of international law or something that has been consistently demonstrated by the actual practices of sovereign states. Thomas Franck speaks here of what he calls "the emerging right to democratic governance."36 Increasingly, as Franck sees it, governments recognize that their legitimacy depends on meeting a normative expectation of the community of states. This recognition has led to the emergence of a community expectation: that those who seek the validation of their empowerment patently govern with the consent of the governed. Democracy, 35Ibid.,p. 117. 36Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International Law 86 (January 1992), pp. 46-91. 56 thus, is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes.37 Franck does not claim that this emerging global entitlement to democratic governance has yet become a fully-established international legal right. Referencing the Organization of American States (OAS) turning the 'democratic entitlement' into binding legal obligations on its member states in regard to the Haitian coup that deposed President Aristide, Franck concludes that the "transformation of the democratic entitlement from moral prescription to international legal obligation has evolved gradually. In the past decade, however, the tendency has accelerated."38 This vision of an emerging right to democratic governance is clearly most advanced and codified in Europe. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's (CSCE, now the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) Copenhagen Document of June 1990 and its Charter of Paris for a New Europe in November 1990 both specifically elaborate an assortment of democratic criteria that aspiring members must meet before they will be accepted into the European club. The result is that "the legal principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is beginning to be eclipsed in Europe by a commitment to promote democratic pluralism, human rights, and fundamental freedoms."39 Additional evidence of this emerging democratic entitlement in Europe comes from the European Community's (EC, now European Union, EU) criteria for recognizing the former Yugoslavian republics during that country's dissolution. The first condition put forward by the EC for recognition was "respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with 37Ibid., p. 46. 38Ibid., p. 47. 39Halperin and Scheffer with Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order, p. 62. 57 regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights." Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national minorities also featured prominently in the EC's criteria.40 None of this should be taken to imply that there currently exists a global entitlement to democracy or that international recognition will objectively be accorded to groups with strong democratic credentials and denied to those without them. Indeed, the EC's criteria for the Yugoslav republics can be cited as a paradigmatic example of the continued importance of subjective political concerns in the recognition process. In that case, the EC appointed French lawyer Robert Badinter to adjudicate the various requests for recognition it received based on the criteria it had established. Badinter recommended that two republics, Macedonia and Slovenia, met the EC's criteria and should be recognized. He recommended against recognizing Croatia because its legal provisions for minorities were unsatisfactory. While it did recognize Slovenia, the EC gave into Greek pressure and declined to recognize Macedonia. It also gave into German pressure and went ahead and recognized Croatia despite Badinter's prescient objections 4 1 Whatever the rhetoric to the contrary, politics clearly trumped principle in this case. As Inis Claude noted thirty years ago, "the process of legitimization is ultimately a political phenomenon, a crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles." 4 2 In spite of this patchy and nascent moral framework, the importance of democratic accountability for recognition should be noted. In a broad sense, the democratic accountability criterion addresses the de facto state's need for some form of popular '"'For a full listing of the EC's criteria for recognizing the former Yugoslav republics, see Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," American Journal of International Law 86 (July 1992), pp. 587-588. 4 1 See the discussion in James Gow and Lawrence Freedman, "Intervention in a Fragmenting State: The Case of Yugoslavia," in To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defense of Human Rights, ed. Nigel Rodley (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 124-126. 42Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," International Organization XX (Summer 1966), pp. 368-369. See also Yossi Shain, "Governments-in-Exile and International Legitimization," in Governments-in-Exile in Contemporary World Politics, ed. Yossi Shain (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 219. 58 support. It does not, though, speak to its capabilities or its goals. Nor does it help to distinguish the de facto state from other entities in contemporary international relations. It does, however, have much to say about its likely acceptance or degree of toleration in international society. Quite simply, even if it still cannot attain widespread recognition, a de facto state with strong democratic credentials has a much better chance of achieving success (defined here as either quasi-acceptance, reluctant toleration, or less than wholehearted opposition) in today's international society than one without strong democratic credentials. 2.4 The Ethical and Political Logics Behind the De Facto State In regard to its ethical logic, David Mapel and Terry Nardin's distinction between rule-based and consequence-based ethical traditions can be brought to bear on the de facto state. In their view, Arguably, the most fundamental distinction between these traditions is whether they link judgments of right and wrong to consequences or to rules.... For the first group, an act, policy, or institution is right or just according to its causal contribution (actual or expected) to bringing about a desired state of affairs; for the second, its lightness depends on the interpretation of rules, the question being whether or not the act or practice in question falls under the rule.4 3 While the de facto state may wish to act in accordance with international law and certain recognized rules, its ethical foundation is consequence-based. Acts, policies, and institutions are judged according to their expected causal contribution to mamtaining the de facto state's existence and securing it widespread international acceptance. Within the various consequence-based ethical traditions, Mapel and Nardin argue that "the most basic divergence is between realism, which reckons the value of consequences in terms of the survival and well-being of particular communities, and utilitarianism and Marxism, which reckon the value of consequences in terms of the well-being of humanity at large."44 43David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, "Convergence and Divergence in International Ethics," in Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 297. '"Ibid., p. 298. 59 Utilizing this distinction, the de facto state's ethical logic is akin to realism's focus on the survival and well-being of particular communities. The TRNC, for example, was established to safeguard and promote the interests of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alone. Therefore, one can say that the de facto state's ethical foundations are consequence-based and focused only on particular communities. As for the de facto state's political logic, this section will only focus on two elements of it. The first of those elements concerns the relative primacy of political and economic goals in the thinking of its leadership. Essentially, the de facto state is characterized by a willingness to trade economic benefits for political separation or survival. In other words, its primary focus is political; economic considerations play a subsidiary role. This is not to deny that economic considerations may constitute a major part of a de facto state's perceived grievances or that they may affect substantially the way in which its secessionist claims are put forward. It is to argue that the economic costs of non-recognition are quite substantial and that these costs are incurred because the positive economic benefits of integration are less important than the political goals of separation and independence. Eritrea before independence and Somaliland today accept the denied or massively delayed international aid that comes along with their uncertain status in order to preserve their political freedom of action. Similarly, depending on which year is compared and whose figures are used, the Greek Cypriots now have a per capita income that is three to four times higher than that of the Turkish Cypriots. An overall Cypriot settlement would obviously alleviate many of their economic problems, yet "economic factors have always been perceived by the political leadership of the Turkish Cypriots as being subservient to political considerations."45 So it goes with the other de facto states considered here as well. 45Francois Lafreniere and Robert Mitchell, Cyprus - Visions for the Future, working paper 21 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, March 1990), p. 82. 60 The second element considered under the political logic category is whether the de facto state is organized under what Anthony Smith terms the "state principle" or the "national principle."46 Essentially, the state principle is primarily defined by a recognized territorial boundary. Under the state principle, everyone residing within the boundary is inclusively considered to be a part of the group regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, religious, or racial background. Under the national principle, communities are organized along cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial, or other such lines. One either is or is not ethnically a member of community x. Those who are not members are either expelled, discriminated against, ignored, or marginalized. The group is not organized by or for them; rather it is established solely for the benefit of community x. De facto states can and have been organized under both principles. Of the four cases considered here, two (Somaliland and Eritrea) illustrate the state principle while the other two (Northern Cyprus and the Tamil "homelands" in Sri Lanka) are examples of the national principle. 2.5 Sovereign States, De Facto States, and the Criteria for Statehood At this point, we need to consider why the use of the term "state" in de facto state is justified. For if this term is not warranted, then this study should be using a different term such as "de facto entity" or "aspiring separatist group." Since it is not, we must explain why the use of the term state is merited. This can be done in two very different ways. The first line of argument centers around the essential similarities of states. The second line of argument takes the almost polar opposite tack and focuses on the tremendous diversity of entities considered states. Despite the essentially contested nature of the concept "state," Jackson and James argue that "The essential components of the generally accepted definition of a State in international law are population and territory along with an effective government."47 They 4 6 A. D. Smith, "States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10 (Autumn 1981), p. 192. 47Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, "The Character of Independent Statehood," in States in a Changing World, ed. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 17. 61 then go on to note that the legal definition of a State takes no notice of such things as its religious mix, ethnicity, economic system, and the like. While such factors may be crucial for understanding the domestic politics or the foreign relations of a particular state, they are not essential to defining statehood itself. Perhaps the most famous exponent of the viewpoint that states are essentially similar is Kenneth Waltz. Waltz begins by assuming that states seek to ensure their own survival. This assumption is a radical simplification made to assist him in constructing a theory of international politics. As he acknowledges, "Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied...."48 From this starting point, Waltz argues that as long as the international system remains anarchical, states (whatever their vast differences in resources and capabilities) will remain "like units." In Waltz's conception, States vary widely in size, wealth, power, and form. And yet variations in these and in other respects are variations among like units.... States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function. States perform or try to perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them; the ends they aspire to are similar.49 One could argue that de facto states meet the criteria of population, territory and effective government and that they are "like units" in terms of the functional tasks they face. Therefore, they deserve to be classified as "states." This position would probably encounter strong objections from those who feel that international society's refusal to accept or recognize the de facto state should be interpreted as denying it the very use of the term "state." The refusal to recognize an entity like the TRNC, however, does not necessarily mean that it is not a state. Common sense tells us that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were states long before they were recognized as such by most of the western world. Citing Article 19 of the OAS Charter, Ahmed Sheikh maintains that "the existence of a state or government under international law is generally 48Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Pubhshing Company, 1979), p. 91. 49Ibid., p. 96. 62 a question independent of its recognition by one or more other countries."50 Alan James is also helpful here. Discussing the near-universal shunning of UDI Rhodesia, Taiwan, and the TRNC, he concludes that these entities clearly are not members of international society. He goes on to note that many lawyers would deny the term "state" to such entities and that this approach would be endorsed by all those who are politically opposed to the relevant entity in question. In James's view, however, "This is going rather far, for the word 'state' has a clear meaning which would appear to be entirely applicable to Taiwan and the rest. It could easily be qualified by 'illegal' or some such word by those who wish to make that kind of point."51 This study chooses to qualify "state" with de facto, thus indicating that the entity in question has not achieved de jure acceptance. De facto is seen as a less charged or judgmental term than illegal. Having made such a qualification, there is no doubt that these entities merit the appellation "state." The second way that the use of the term "state" in de facto state may be justified is almost the exact opposite of the first line of argument discussed above. In contrast to the Jackson and James position, this perspective would start from James Crawford's view that there is "no generally accepted and satisfactory contemporary legal definition of statehood."52 It would go on to highlight the tremendous variety and diversity of entities which are lumped together under the label "state." As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach insist, "by any standard—territory, ethnicity, GNP, industrialization, military capability, governing capacity—contemporary 'states' have little in common. They are as different as persons, dogs, and whales in the 'mammal' category."53 This tremendous heterogeneity so characteristic of modern states thus fundamentally limits the utility of the entire "state" concept. Sabino Cassese argues that "Since 1931, when 145 usages of it 50Ahmed Sheikh, "The United States and Taiwan After Derecognition: Consequences and Legal Remedies," Washington and Lee Law Review XXXVII (Spring 1980); p. 324. See also p. 328. 51James, Sovereign Statehood, pp. 272-273. 52Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," p. 107. 53Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory," International Studies Quarterly 35 (December 1991), p. 381. 63 were found, the word 'state,' like all terms with too many meanings, has ceased to distinguish any concept useful for purposes of study."54 Therefore, the term "state," in and of itself, "is almost useless. That is why it always takes a qualifying noun or adjective: 'Rechtstaat,' 'Standestaat,1 'Etat-providence,1 'welfare state,' absolute state, representative state, democratic state,... and so on;" 5 5 Again, the qualifier of choice in this study is de facto. The argument advanced here is that the term de facto state is as useful or more useful than other widely-accepted academic terms such as capitalist state, developmental state, puppet state, weak state, or welfare state. It might be helpful to compare de facto states and sovereign states here in terms of the traditional empirical criteria for statehood. Mention has already been made of the criteria elaborated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Let us begin here with the three criteria singled out by Jackson and James: population, territory, and effective government. First, in regard to population, "there must be people identifying themselves with the territory if it is to be regarded as a state."56 Crawford goes on to argue that the population under consideration must be permanent, though it need not be of any particular nationality.57 The popular support component of the de facto state's working definition addresses the people's identification with the state. The permanence requirement is also addressed by the perseverance criterion. Crucially, there is no longer any kind of minimum population size requirement that goes along with these criteria. Andorra, Liechtenstein, Nauru, Sao Tome and Principe, San Marino, Tuvalu, and many others are widely recognized as sovereign states despite their small populations. Therefore, none of the de facto states considered in this study would have problems due to the respective size of their populations. 54Cassese, "The Rise and Decline of the Notion of State," p. 120. 55Ibid., p. 125. 5 6Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, "Africa and International Law - The Emergence to Statehood," Journal of Modern African Studies 23 (December 1985), p. 590. "Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," p. 114. 64 In terms of the territorial requirement, two points need to be made. First, there is no minimum size requirement for the territory concerned. Nauru is recognized as a sovereign state even though its entire territory comprises only about 21 square kilometers. San Marino and Tuvalu are other diminutive states. Again, none of the de facto states analyzed in this study would have any problems qualifying as sovereign states merely because of the size of the territory they control. The second point on territory is perhaps even more applicable to the de facto state. The extent of territory effectively controlled by most of these entities has varied over time. The lack of fixed or definite borders, however, has not traditionally been a suitable reason to exclude an entity from statehood. The most cited legal precedent here comes from the ruling of the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the 1928 case of Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschqft v. Polish State. According to that ruling, "In order to say that a state exists... it is enough that this territory has a significant consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited and that the state actually exercises independent public authority over that territory."58 Practice in this area has been quite consistent. Albania was admitted to the League of Nations without fully delimited or defined boundaries. Yemen was similarly admitted to the United Nations in 1947. The Congo (Zaire) was admitted to the U N in 1960 although part of its territory, Katanga, was actively engaged in a secessionist attempt. Perhaps even more tellingly, Israel, Kuwait, and Mauritania have all been recognized as sovereign states even though disputed claims to their entire respective territories have been raised. In arguing for Israel's admission to the U N in 1949, the United States representative to the Security Council maintained that "both reason and history demonstrate that the concept of territory does not necessarily include precise delimitation of the boundaries...."59 Based on all of the above practice, 58Cited in David A. Ijalaye, "Was Biafra at Any Time a State?" American Journal of International Law 65 (July 1971), p. 552; Wallace-Bruce, "Africa and International Law," p. 590; and Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," p. 113. 59Cited in Wallace-Bruce, "Africa and International Law," footnote # 1, p. 590. 65 Crawford concludes "that even a substantial boundary or territorial dispute with a new State is not enough to bring statehood into question. The only requirement is that the State must consist of a certain coherent territory effectively governed."60 Thus, the mere fact that the territory controlled by a de facto state might shift over time does not, in and of itself, preclude it from being considered a sovereign state. The effective government criterion is another one which does not pose insurmountable problems for the de facto state. Recent U N practice in this area is again quite clear and consistent. The Congo (Zaire) was admitted to the U N in 1960 even though a civil war was raging at the time and its governing structures were completely ineffective for a number of years. Rwanda and Burundi were admitted even though the General Assembly acknowledged that they did not fulfill the traditional criterion of effective government. In these two cases, the General Assembly even recommended to Belgium, the former colonial power, that it keep its troops stationed in the territory for a month after independence. In 1975, Angola was admitted to the U N in spite of the fact that the country was plagued by a civil war with three competing would-be governments all proclaiming their rule. Cambodia and Lebanon have kept their seats at the U N even during their periods of near-total collapse as viable entities. Again, arguments that the somewhat patchy forms of governance which may characterize particular de facto states should preclude them from recognition as sovereign states will not stand alone on their own merits. Indeed, a number of de facto states fare better under this criterion than many sovereign states do. Another criterion that is sometimes postulated as a requirement for statehood is independence. The most famous definition of independence is that given by Judge Anzilotti in the 1931 Austro-German Customs Union case at the Permanent Court of International Justice. According to James Crawford, there are two main elements involved in this definition of independence: "the separate existence of an entity within 60Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," p. 114. 66 reasonably coherent frontiers; and the fact that the entity is 'not subject to the authority of any other State or group of States', which is to say, that it has over it 'no other authority than that of international law'."6 1 The de facto state clearly meets the first of these two elements. The second part, which is similar in form to James's notion of sovereignty as constitutional independence, is what the de facto state is denied by international society: de jure acceptance of not just its control, but its authority to exercise that control. In Crawford's interpretation, when an entity meets the first condition, "the area concerned is potentially a 'State-area', but as Judge Anzilotti made clear, some further element—the absence of subjection to the authority of another State or States—is necessary."62 Thus, here we have a clear difference between de facto states and sovereign states. While the de facto state positively may be free from "subjection to the authority of another state," this empirical freedom is juridically negated by the international society of sovereign states. It should be noted that not all authorities regard independence as an essential criterion for statehood. Adam Watson, for example, contends that "it obscures our understanding of the nature of states to maintain dogmatically that to count as states they must be independent."63 The dichotomizing of entities into "independent" and "dependent" is one that obviously is based on a considerable degree of subjectivity. Still, the point remains that this is one of the few traditional criteria for statehood that can be said to pose any sort of problem for most de facto states. The problematic nature of the de facto state's independence leads us into the most substantive problem facing these entities when it comes to the criteria for statehood. This is the question of legality or illegality of origin. In essence, this question is simply part of the shift from empirical to juridical criteria for statehood. The fact that "the juridical cart is now before the empirical horse"64 makes the de facto state's ability to meet the 61Ibid., p. 122. 62Ibid., pp. 122-123. 63Watson, The Evolution of International Society, p. 16. 64Jackson, Quasi-States. pp. 23-24. 67 traditional criteria for statehood worthless in today's international society. The consensus seems to be that an entity which has emerged either (a) outside of the accepted rules of international law, particularly in regards to the use of force and the principle ex injuria jus non oritur ('a right cannot originate in an illegal act'); (b) in violation of a colonial entity's right to self-determination; (c) without the consent of the existing sovereign state; or (d) is based fundamentally on the denial of certain civil and political rights to the large majority of its population (i.e., apartheid regimes) will not be recognized juridically as a sovereign state.65 The profound implications of this shift from empirical to juridical criteria for statehood should not be minimized. For Jackson, the fact that the acquisition of territory by force or against the will of an existing sovereign government no longer has legal effect "represents a fundamental change in international orthodoxy" which is "underestimated by many students of contemporary international relations, who have perhaps not yet adjusted theories which are still based very considerably on historical power politics."6 6 It is possible to argue against this position. Metin Tamkoc, for example, maintains that the legality of a state's origin does not guarantee its future legitimacy, nor does the illegality of a state's origin preclude its future legitimacy. He goes on to argue that all States established as a consequence of the successful conclusion of a civil war initiated by 'nationalists' or 'revolutionaries' against the existing State and its legal order (whether that legal order is legitimate or not) must be considered to have 'illegal' origin. In fact the illegality of the origin of the State is not an exception but an established rule in international politics.6 7 Indeed, the stricture against illegality of origin is far from universal. One can cite here the international community's recognition of Bangladesh despite the fact that its creation was substantially dependent upon Indian military intervention. More recent examples are the 65Compare in this regard Wallace-Bruce, "Africa and International Law," p. 590; Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law," pp. 164-165; and James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 160. 66Robert H. Jackson, "Continuity and Change in the States System," in States in a Changing World, ed. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, p. 350. 67Metin Tamkoc, The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988), p. 29. 68 widespread recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence without the consent of Belgrade. Arguably, the widespread acceptance of Eritrean independence could be included here, even though Ethiopian consent was ultimately secured.68 Still, the post-1945 consensus on fixed territorial borders and the preservation of existing states is a fundamental sea change in the history of international relations. One of the products of this new normative framework is the de facto state. These entities are distinguished from sovereign states not by their population, territory, government, level of popular support, or military capability. Rather, they are distinguished by the existing international society's unwillingness to accept them into the club as new members with full juridical equality and the mutual recognition of legitimate authority which that implies. As this "new sovereignty game" has only existed since 1945 and, most forcefully, since 1960, that is the time period from which this study begins to consider de facto states. While there have probably always been various groups throughout history which have maintained contested, yet effective de facto territorial control of a given area, the de facto state is a contemporary phenomenon of the postwar decolonization period. 2.6 Sovereign States, De Facto States, and Their Limitations At this point, we need briefly to sum up what the de facto state has and lacks and how these limitations affect it. These entities do not lack much in terms of the traditional empirical criteria for statehood. They function, more or less, as effective governing authorities over particular territorial areas. They also have some popular support and internal legitimacy. What the de facto state most lacks is international legitimacy. Whatever its successes in building internal legitimacy, that is not enough to overcome its external illegality. The de facto state's lack of international acceptance affects it in a variety of ways. It limits the de facto state's ability to participate in international affairs. Most of these 68The argument here being that Ethiopian consent was secured only after Eritrea had militarily won its independence on the battlefield and presented the Ethiopians with a fait accompli they could not ignore. 69 entities are not allowed membership in intergovernmental organizations. They generally cannot turn to the U N or any other international organization for verbal or material assistance in a time of crisis. Similarly, they are unlikely to benefit from bilateral or multilateral treaties and alliances. They are substantially limited in their ability to capitalize on the benefits offered by the international aid regime. Their uncertain legal status deters investment and may make it impossible for their products to be accepted in world export markets. A reluctance on the part of private firms to offend the de jure sovereign government may prevent de facto states from being able to capitalize on the natural resources under their control—although as examples from Angola, Cambodia, and Liberia show, this problem may be overcome if the de facto authority is in possession of sufficiently lucrative resources. Al l of this leads J. D. B. Miller to conclude that the prospects for what I am terming de facto states are dismal. Considering Taiwan, Biafra, and UDI Rhodesia, Miller argues that the fact that each of these three was able to establish a government which exercised full domestic control of a particular territory is uriimportant in comparison with the refusal of large numbers of sovereign states, and through them of the United Nations, to acknowledge that a sovereign state exists. Without this acknowledgment, a government of a particular area... exists and may seem to possess the loyalty of groups of people, but its opportunities for intercourse with other communities are restricted, and the likelihood that it will retain its position is remote, unless influential states give it support.69 What of sovereign states faced with a de facto state challenge? These states obviously benefit from the normative consensus around fixed territorial borders and the preservation of existing states which serves as a kind of safety net to prop them up whatever their sundry other failings might be. This may, in cases like Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, even extend to the idea of supporting and preserving the state when it is not much more than an idea completely bereft of any institutional foundation. Unlike the de facto state, these failed sovereign states can turn to the U N for assistance and they can 6 9 J . D. B. Miller, "Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for the State," Review of International Studies 12 (April 1986), pp. 79-80. 70 draw upon whatever limited benefits are available to them from the international aid regime. Still, they have fundamentally lost control of a part of their territory. It may be useful to conceptualize their dilemma in terms of the oft-made distinction between internal and external sovereignty. According to Martin Wight, internal sovereignty refers to "a supreme law-making authority in each community" while external sovereignty is "the claim to be politically and juridically independent of any superior."70 In essence, internal sovereignty is a claim to domestic supremacy whereas external sovereignty is a claim to juridical equality and independence from any outside authorities. Sovereign states that are faced with a de facto state challenge still have full external sovereignty. Their internal sovereignty is also theoretically intact and internationally recognized, but in practice their writ has ceased to run over a part of their territory. The sustained and substantial benefits of international recognition, however, are such that their problems really pale in comparison to those faced by the de facto state. As Miller puts it, "Sovereignty's role in providing vitality to a state has no parallel."71 Let us consider finally the respective arguments put forward by Janice Thomson and Robert Jackson in this area. Looking at the historical example of the Soviet Union and the contemporary example of Taiwan, Thomson concludes that these states have been able to manage quite well without international recognition. In her view, "This suggests that power capabilities are equally as or more important than outside recognition."72 Jackson distinguishes here between the sociological potential and the political prospects for would-be sovereign states. As he sees it, Even if governmental force is not sufficient to put down rebellions, and separatists become in effect a State within a State, the international community can thwart the inner State's international emergence by refusing to recognize it or enter into overt 70Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 129-130. 71Miller, "Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for the State," p. 87. 72Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations," p. 220. 71 relations with it. In short, international recognition and participation can 'trump' sociological determination or armed force in the game of sovereign statehood.73 These positions are not necessarily divergent. Thomson's view can be sustainable, but only for a finite number of extremely successful de facto states—the only two examples which come to mind are Taiwan's tremendous economic success (which initially developed under a widely-recognized sovereignty and an American military umbrella) and Eritrea's arguably unparalleled military prowess and ability to mobilize a broad mass of popular support. These two cases might thus be seen as the exceptions which prove Jackson's rule. As for Jackson's position, his vision allows for the emergence of what he calls "a State within a State" and what is referred to here as the de facto state. His argument that these entities will be trumped in the game of sovereign statehood does not necessarily preclude Thomson's possibility that some of these same groups might be able to succeed without outside recognition. Similarly, his vision can allow for the possibility of an entity like the TRNC which gets trumped in the game of sovereign statehood but grudgingly accepts this fate because its political logic places a higher value on freedom, survival, and independence than it does on the prestige and the profound economic, cultural, and diplomatic benefits associated with widely recognized sovereign statehood. 2.7 Conclusion This chapter answers the question "what is the de facto state?" It does so in four main ways. First, it advances a working definition of the de facto state. Second, it puts forward ten theoretical criteria designed to facilitate clearer academic analysis of this concept. The chapter also distinguishes the de facto state from other entities in contemporary international relations such as peaceful secession movements and puppet states. Third, the chapter reviews the ethical and political logics behind the de facto state. Finally, it assesses this phenomenon in terms of the traditional criteria for statehood and compares the de facto state here with the sovereign state. The chapter also evaluates the 73Jackson, "Continuity and Change in the States System," p. 353. 72 actual limitations and challenges facing both de facto states and their sovereign parents. The use of the term "state" in de facto state is justified. In the next two chapters, our discussion shifts from the theoretical to the empirical plane. Historical, geographic, demographic, and other such background information will be provided on the four case studies considered—Eritrea before independence; the L T T E -controlled areas of Sri Lanka; the Republic of Somaliland; and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. An attempt will also be made to analyze how each of these case studies fits into the general or ideal model of the de facto state advanced in this chapter. Chapter Three Eritrea and the LTTE-Controlled Parts of Sri Lanka 74 3.1 Introduction The next two chapters delve into our case studies. This chapter examines Eritrea before independence and the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka, while chapter four assesses the Republic of Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This section provides the general introduction for both chapters. Chapter four includes a general conclusion summarizing the findings from both chapters. Our analysis of each of the case studies will consist of two main parts: the provision of general geographic, demographic, and historical background information; and an assessment of how well each of these entities fits the various theoretical criteria for de facto statehood. To assist this evaluation, our theoretical criteria and a few of the other considerations from chapter two have been reorganized under four main headings. These headings are: territory; the organized political leadership's relations with its own society; its capabilities; and its relations with international society. The territory category incorporates the need for a territorial justification (criterion number five) and assesses the extent of territory controlled by these entities at various points in time. The relations with its own society heading refers to popular support (part of criterion number two), democratic accountability (criterion number ten), and also considers whether the de facto state is organized under the "state" or the "nation" principle. The capabilities category subsumes criteria one, three, and six, as well as part of criterion number two. In essence, the capabilities referred to here are governance capabilities, including policy initiatives and directions; military capabilities; the perseverance criterion; and the question of external dependency—i.e., whether the entity in question should more properly be labeled a puppet state. The relations with international society heading examines how these entities have been received by sovereign states and also analyzes whether they should more properly be considered exceptions to sovereignty with greater degrees of legitimacy than as de facto states (criterion number eight). Each of the case studies will be evaluated following this same pattern of categories. 75 No reference is made to criteria four, seven or nine in the above quadripartite scheme. While these criteria are helpful in distinguishing the de facto state from other entities in international relations, they are not germane to this detailed exploration of our four case studies. As will be made clear, none of these cases could be considered a peaceful secession movement. Similarly, none has benefited from the type of premature recognition that was given to some colonial liberation movements. A l l of them also share the ultimate goal of sovereignty as constitutional independence and thus need not be distinguished further in this regard. Eritrea Before Independence 3.2 Background information Located in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea (a Greek word for the Red Sea) comprises approximately 50,000 square miles in area. It is bordered to the south by Ethiopia, to the east by Djibouti, to the west by the Sudan, and to the north by the Red Sea. The current population of Eritrea is usually thought to be somewhere above 3,000,000.! Religiously, the population is almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims. Geographically, a major division occurs between highland (mainly-Christian) and lowland (mainly-Muslim) regions. The EPLF, now renamed the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), officially recognizes nine nationalities. This particular scheme is contestable but, as Lionel Cliffe points out, the ethnic situation in Eritrea "is complex and fluid enough for arbitrariness to occur with any classification."2 The country's tremendous heterogeneity is aptly summarized by Paul Henze, who argues that "Eritrea is Lebanon squared. It has more languages, more ethnic diversity, more religious differences."3 •Alan Zarembo estimates Eritrea's population to be 3.2 million people. The U.S. Department of State believes it to be 3.6 million people. See Alan Zarembo, "Controlled Democracy," Africa Report 40 (May-June 1995), p. 52; and U.S. Department of State, "Eritrea Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996" (Washington, D.C., February 1997). 2Lionel Cliffe, "Forging a Nation: The Eritrean Experience," Third World Quarterly 11 (October 1989), p. 132. 3Paul B. Henze, "Eritrea: The Endless War," The Washington Quarterly 9 (Spring 1986), p. 34. 76 Eritrea first became a political-legal jurisdiction in 1890 when it was proclaimed an Italian colony. The Italians ruled Eritrea from 1890 until 1941, when they were militarily defeated in Africa during World War n. Britain then established a temporary wartime administration in Eritrea. At the end of the war, various options were proposed for Eritrea's future. The British favored partitioning Eritrea between Ethiopia and the Sudan. Italy wished to resume its colonial mission in Eritrea, while Ethiopia wanted to annex Eritrea. The matter was referred to the U N General Assembly in 1948. On 21 November 1949, the General Assembly established the U N Commission for Eritrea with a mandate to ascertain the wishes of the Eritrean people. Depending on whose account is accepted, one finds arguments that there was majority support for independence; majority support for a link with Ethiopia; no clear majority support for any option; and/or that no adequate assessment of Eritrean popular opinion was ever undertaken.4 The outlines of a "compromise" plan began to emerge in 1950. The compromise, seen as occupying a middle ground somewhere between independence and annexation, was for Eritrea to be linked with Ethiopia through an internationally-guaranteed federalism. The United States backed this plan in order to secure for itself a military base on the western shores of the Red Sea.5 Resolution 390 A (V) was ultimately approved in 1952 by the General Assembly, the Eritrean assembly, and the Ethiopian government. This resolution contained a section known as the "Federal Act," which provided the juridical basis for the Eritrean-Ethiopian federal relationship. Under the resolution, Eritrea was characterized as "an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown." It was thus not considered a 4Various perspectives on Eritrean history from 1890-1950 can be found in Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination. pp. 337-341; Minasse Haile, "Legality of Secessions," pp. 484-486; and Crawford Young, "Comparative Claims to Political Sovereignty: Biafra, Katanga, Eritrea," in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 211-215. 5See Edmond J. Keller, "The United States, Ethiopia and Eritrean Independence," in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, ed. Amare Tekle (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 173; and Okbazghi Yohannes, "Eritrea: A Country in Transition," Review of African Political Economy 20 (July 1993), pp. 8-10 for more on this. 77 state in a federal union, but rather an autonomous region. Eritrea was to have its own constitution, budget, parliament, executive and judiciary. It would handle all governmental functions except foreign affairs, defense, currency, communications, and trade. It would also have its own flag, police, and languages (Tigrinya and Arabic). Residual powers rested with Eritrea, although it could not withdraw unilaterally from the federation. The U N resolution did not provide for the creation of a "federal" government—i.e., a government separate from those of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Rather, the Ethiopian emperor was the federal head of state, and the Ethiopian government ministries were the federal ministries. There were no provisions for future U N or international involvement should Ethiopia violate Eritrea's autonomous status.6 The Eritrean-Ethiopian federation formally lasted a decade until 1962 when the Eritrean assembly voted to dissolve itself and Eritrea was annexed to Ethiopia as its fourteenth province, subject to direct rule under Ethiopia's 1955 constitution. However, as Mesfin Araya argues, Eritrean autonomy "was gradually undennined by Haile Selassie, notably by banning its trade unions in 1953, by replacing its President in 1955, by suspending its Parliament in 1956, and by removing its flag in 1959, so that well before 1962 the 'federation' had been de facto dismantled."7 In the view of Tesfatsion Medhanie, "The 'federation' failed because it was designed to fail."8 Ethiopia's repressive actions against Eritrea's press, opposition parties, and trade-unions, along with its suspension of the Eritrean assembly in 1956 and its attempts to impose Amharic as the sole national language helped produce a growing backlash against the federation. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) launched its first military attack in September 1961. Until 1965, there were very few Christians in the predominantly-Muslim 6Tesfatsion Medhanie, "Remarks on Eritrea and a Possible Framework for Peace," in Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and Its Alternatives, ed. Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 19-22; Young, "Comparative Claims to Political Sovereignty," pp. 214-215; andHannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination. pp. 340-341. 7Mesfin Araya, "The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation," Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (March 1990), p. 81. 8Tesfatshion Medhanie, "Remarks on Eritrea and a Possible Framework for Peace," p. 22. 78 ELF. Increasing deprivations under Ethiopian rule gradually led to a hardening of Christian attitudes and to more participation in the liberation struggle. In the early 1970s, a number of different movements splintered off from the ELF. Christians dissatisfied with the ELF's Muslim dominance, Muslims upset at its limited progress, and a variety of more radical ideologues ultimately merged to form the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). From 1972 - 1974, the E L F and the EPLF fought a vicious civil war against each other. In the mid-1970s, the EPLF emerged as the dominant Eritrean liberation movement and by 1981 the E L F was finished as a credible military force.9 In summarizing the Eritrean liberation struggle, Crawford Young maintains that there has been a short-term pattern of cyclical fluctuations in the nature and intensity of conflict and a long-term trend toward increasingly massive confrontation between the Ethiopian state and the Eritrean people.... The long-term trend was determined by the incorporation into the struggle of widening segments of the Eritrean population, transformation of the insurgency from quasi-shifta [bandit] skirmishes to a people's war, a progressive polarization and ideological radicalization at all levels..., and increasing violence.10 This assessment is more or less echoed by Lionel Cliffe. Militarily, he sees the Eritreans moving from "bandit groups in the early 1960s, to a guerrilla movement fighting a people's war in the late 1970s..., to the emergence of a powerful conventional army able to win well-conceived campaigns in 'positional warfare' by the late 1980s...." In terms of popular mobilization, the initial support for the liberation struggle was predominantly limited to Muslims in the north and west of the country. From this small base evolved "a broad mobilisation where peoples from all regions contributed taxes, conscripts, intelligence and no doubt enthusiasm to a liberation army which provided increasing numbers of them with some protection, social and administrative services and, eventually, food." 1 1 ^or a variety of perspectives on the history of the various liberation movements, see the discussions in John Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," Journal of Modern African Studies 26 (March 1988), pp. 51-70; Young, "Comparative Claims to Political Sovereignty," pp. 215-216; Henze, "Eritrea: The Endless War," pp. 23-27; and Lionel Cliffe, "Eritrea: Prospects for Self-Determination," in Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, ed. Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth, pp. 52-69. 10Young, "Comparative Claims to Political Sovereignty," pp. 215-216. 11Cliffe, "Eritrea: Prospects for Self-Determination," p. 58. 79 In 1977, the Eritreans appeared to be on the brink of military victory against Ethiopia, but they were repulsed in a savage counter-attack by the Ethiopian forces of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Final military victory for the now EPLF-dominated forces would not come until 24 May 1991. On that date, following the collapse of Mengistu's regime and his flight to exile, forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA, the military wing of the EPLF) entered the capital city of Asmara. Upon entering Asmara, the EPLF did not immediately proclaim Eritrean independence. On 29 May 1991, Isaias Afwerki, 1 2 the Secretary-General of the EPLF announced the formation of the Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE). The PGE was essentially an amalgamation of established EPLF departments along with former ministries of the Ethiopian-run administration. Its key decision-making posts were staffed by senior EPLF figures, but its overall composition was broadened to include some former E L F members and some returning exiles. The primary task of the PGE was to prepare Eritrea for a referendum which would be held two years later to determine its ultimate political status. The decision not to declare independence immediately and to hold a referendum in two years was taken for two main reasons: 1) it was felt the waiting period and the referendum itself would contribute substantially to Eritrea's legitimacy and greatly ease its future international acceptance and de jure recognition; and 2) it was felt that a precipitous declaration of independence might destabilize the transitional government in Ethiopia, lead to a resurgence of Ethiopian nationalism, and thus to renewed military conflict.13 The costs of Eritrea's thirty year war were tremendous. An estimated 50 - 60,000 Eritrean fighters were killed. The number of civilian deaths is uncertain, but estimates range from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands. The combination of war damage and recurrent drought means that Eritrea is now only able to feed about 20 12This gentleman's name is variously spelled as Isayas Afeworq, Isayas Afeworki, Isaias Afwerki, Issayas Afewerki and various permutations thereof. This study will standardize his name to Isaias Afwerki. "Compare, for example, David Pool, "Eritrean Independence: The Legacy of the Derg and the Politics of Reconstruction," African Affairs 92 (July 1993), p. 392; Okbazghi Yohannes, "Eritrea: A Country in Transition," p. 19; and Cliffe, "Eritrea: Prospects for Self-Determination," pp. 55-61. 80 percent of its population. The country's annual per capita income is less than US$ 150. War casualties and land-mines have produced tens of thousands of disabled people. Estimates of the number of refugees produced range from 750,000 to upwards of 1,000,000. The country's bridges, roads, factories, and other components of its economic infrastructure were also devastated by the fighting.14 The UN-supervised referendum on independence was held from 23 - 25 April 1993. More than one million Eritreans registered to vote, and of those registered, 98.5 percent cast their ballots in the referendum. Of these, 99.8 percent voted for Eritrean independence; only 1,822 people voted against it. While the PGE was criticized for the electoral imagery associated with voting yes or no, the referendum was certified as free and fair by the U N and other outside observers. Independence was formally proclaimed on 24 May 1993, two years to the day after E P L A forces entered Asmara. Eritrea was admitted to the U N on 28 May 1993.15 3.3 Eritrea as a de facto state 3.3.1 Territory The Eritrean territorial justification was based upon its former colonial borders. As this unit was administered separately from Ethiopia for more than 60 years (1890 -1952), the Eritrean territorial justification is comparatively quite strong. Eritrea's borders were also accepted unaltered as the basis for its incorporation into a federation with Ethiopia in 1952. The fact that Eritrea was once a colony allowed the EPLF to argue that Eritrean independence would not violate the self-determination of a colonial entity, nor 14For more on the costs of the war and the problems of reconstruction, see Pool, "Eritrean Independence," pp. 389-402; Roy Pateman, "Eritrea Takes the World Stage," Current History 93 (May 1994), pp. 229-230; "Drought, Landmines, Greet Refugees Returning Home," The Christian Science Monitor. 15 January 1992, p. 11; and the various discussions in Emergent Eritrea: Challenges of Economic Development, ed. Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1993). The per capita income figure comes from U.S. Department of State, "Eritrea Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996." 15General information on the referendum can be found in Pateman, "Eritrea Takes the World Stage," pp. 228-230; and Pool, "Eritrean Independence," footnote # 23, p. 401. Criticisms of the PGE's handling of the referendum can be found in Peter Biles, "Eritrea: Birth of a Nation," Africa Report 38 (July-August 1993), p. 17; and Minasse Haile, "Legality of Secessions," pp. 526-528. 81 would it result in any change to existing frontiers. Thus, the precedent set by granting Eritrea independence would be quite limited and the Pandora's box of endlessly redrawing any and all African borders would remain unopened. The extent of territory controlled by the Eritrean liberation forces varied quite substantially over the course of the thirty-year war. In the initial phases of the war, the Eritreans did not have anything like the kind of territorial control required of a de facto state. By September 1970, however, guerrilla activity in Barka, Sahel, and Senhit provinces had reached such a level that the Ethiopian government placed them under martial law. 1 6 As the liberation movements grew in strength after 1974, so too did the amount of territory they controlled. By the end of 1977, the EPLF and the E L F controlled approximately 90 percent of Eritrea. The only areas remaining in Ethiopian hands at this time were four cities: Barentu, Asmara, and the ports of Massawa and Assab. During this period, separate administrations were established, the population was mobilized in mass organizations and what Crawford Young refers to as an "embryonic state" was set up. 1 7 The Ethiopians launched a major counter-offensive in 1978. By May of that year, 95 percent of the land captured by the EPLF and the E L F had been retaken. The only area remaining firmly under Eritrean control was Sahel province; Nacfa was the only city remaining in Eritrean hands.18 From their low point after the Ethiopian counter-offensive of 1978, the Eritrean liberation movements (increasingly, only the EPLF) gradually built up the amount of territory under their control. Looking at Eritrea and the neighboring Ethiopian province of Tigre, Barbara Hendrie notes that by 1984, forces of the EPLF and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) "were active in up to 85% of the countryside, while government troops were located in garrisoned towns along the main highway running north-south from 16Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," pp. 60-61. 17Young, "Comparative Claims to Political Sovereignty," p. 216; and Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," pp. 63-65. 18Keller, "The United States, Ethiopia and Eritrean Independence," p. 178; and Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," p. 66. 82 Asmara to Addis Ababa." 1 9 By the late 1980s, the E P L A openly operated in vast areas of the countryside. Before 1991, the only two cities never to fall into Eritrean hands were Asmara (located at a height of some 6,000 feet in the central highlands) and Assab (Ethiopia's principal sea-port). In regards to its level of territorial control before 1991, Roy Pateman points out that "The E P L A has shown its ability to capture towns and hold them for long periods of time; however, as it cannot deny the Ethiopians control of the air, it rarely attempts to maintain permanent control of urban areas—not wanting to risk civilian lives or the lives of the fighters."20 Learning from the devastating aerial bombardment of Massawa, the EPLF decided not to enter Asmara as soon as it could have for fear of bringing subsequent destruction upon that city. From 24 May 1991 until its declaration of independence two years later, the EPLF controlled all of Eritrea's territory. Thus, the extent of territory controlled by the Eritrean forces ("liberated areas" in the EPLF's jargon) varied considerably during the thirty-year war. While some areas such as Nacfa have been controlled for most of this period, others such as Asmara only came under EPLF control in 1991. Certainly the period from 1991 - 1993 would count as the highest possible level of territorial control that a de facto state could ever hope to achieve. Similarly, the post-1977 rebel offensive period would also score quite highly on the possible scale of territorial achievement. During other periods, though, the extent to which one could speak of an Eritrean de facto state was quite limited. 3.3.2 Relations with society In regard to the question of whether the de facto state is organized under the state or the nation principle, Eritrea is interesting in that its two leading liberation movements (the EPLF and the ELF) were fundamentally different here. The E L F was a predominantly-Muslim organization. Its chosen form of mobilization was akin to what we are calling the nation principle. The E L F initially organized itself into four autonomous 19Barbara Hendrie, "Cross-Border Relief Operations in Eritrea and Tigray," Disasters 13 (December 1989), p. 352. 20Roy Pateman, "The Eritrean War," Armed Forces and Society 17 (Fall 1990), pp. 83-84. 83 zones, each under a local commander who in turn drew recruits from the area. According to Lionel Cliffe, "There was no central recruitment or training, no common strategy—the zones acted like 'competing fiefs controlled by rival ethnic groups'."21 The ELF's national conception failed to win broad support amongst Christians. The EPLF, on the other hand, organized under the state principle. It officially recognized nine nationalities. In mobilizing this diverse population, the EPLF took a number of measures designed to make everyone feel as if they were part of a single, larger Eritrean project, rather than just an Afar, a Beni Amir, a Christian highlander, or a Muslim lowlander. So as not to elevate either Islam or Christianity, Wednesday was adopted as a common holiday instead of Friday or Sunday. To avoid Tigrinya language dominance, EPLF radio broadcast in a variety of languages and schools were taught (at great expense) in the local language. The EPLF consciously attempted to balance the number of Muslims and Christians in its Political Bureau and Central Committee.22 These practices have carried through to the present as the Eritrean government remains sensitive to keeping a balance in the cabinet and top government positions between Christians, Muslims, and various ethnic groups—all nine of which were represented in 1994.23 The EPLF leadership thus chose to define and organize its polity on the basis of inclusive, non-ethnic "state" territorial lines. As the EPLF ultimately superseded the E L F and became the dominant political leadership in Eritrea, one can thus cite the Eritrean de facto state as a clear and successful example of organization under the state principle. In terms of its popular support, there can be no doubt that the EPLF, the Eritrean de facto state, and the political goal of sovereignty as constitutional independence all had massive support. With the exception of the rabidly pro-Ethiopian author Minasse Haile, 2 4 21Cliffe, "Forging a Nation," p. 136. 22Ibid., pp. 140-141. 23United States Department of State Dispatch, "Eritrea Human Rights Practices, 1994" (Washington, D.C., March 1995). 24See Haile, "Legality of Secessions," pp. 525-526 for an argument that neither the EPLF nor the goal of independence had widespread support. 84 one struggles to find any account of the Eritrean situation that disputes this fact. The EPLF could not have defeated one of the largest armies in Africa without sustained popular support. This is evidenced by the myriad hardships endured by the Eritrean population during the liberation struggle, the assistance provided to the EPLF, the joyous celebrations which greeted the EPLA's entry into Asmara, and the huge yes vote in the 1993 referendum. It is hard to envision any de facto state's organized political leadership receiving greater popular support than the EPLF's leadership has received. The last heading considered under the relations with society category is democratic accountability. In terms of democratic achievements, Eritrea's draft constitution provides for such things as the rights of free assembly, free speech, and free association. The Eritreans' lack of discrimination against minority groups and their sensitive handling of the country's volatile ethnic mix certainly compares favorably to the vast majority of other governments in the world today. The EPLF's commitments to broad-based land reform and to advancing the status of women also deserve praise. During the 1984 - 1985 famine, the Eritrean de facto state leadership drew accolades for its organizational prowess, its fairness, and its lack of corruption in distributing relief supplies.25 The general lack of major human rights violations should also count strongly in favor of Eritrea's democratic accountability. While the government has recently been criticized for its persecution of the small Jehovah's Witnesses community (discriminated against because they refused to fight in the liberation struggle, refused to vote in the 1993 referendum, and currently refuse to participate in national service on religious grounds), there have been no reports of political or extrajudicial killings, disappearance, or torture.26 While it is dangerous to extrapolate backwards from present behavior, one does not find accusations 25For more on the famine-relief effort, see Cliffe, "Eritrea: Prospects for Self-Determination," p. 59; and Hendrie, "Cross-Border Relief Operations in Eritrea and Tigray," p. 355. 26See the annual United States Department of State reports on Eritrean Human Rights Practices. The 1993,1994, 1995, and 1996 reports were consulted for my research. 85 of disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and the like in accounts of the Eritrean liberation struggle. One big question remains to be answered as far as Eritrean democratic accountability goes. That question is whether or not the EPLF, now renamed the PFDJ, will ever put its leadership to the test in open, multi-party, democratic elections. The EPLF committed itself to multi-party democracy as far back as 1987. As Isaias Afwerki notes, this was a time when the world-wide trend toward multi-party electoral democracy had not yet started.27 Recently, however, Isaias has declared that Eritrea needs "a political climate which will guarantee stability" and stated that he does not advocate "a European or US-style democracy which would not be suitable for our society...."28 Tight government control of the media, vague allusions to the 'chaotic political situation,' already-announced bans on the formation of any religious or ethnically-based political parties, and the fact that no election has yet been held lead some observers to question the Eritrean leadership's democratic credentials. It should be noted that this question has arisen only in the period since Eritrea achieved its independence. During its de facto state period, Pateman characterized the EPLF's style of decision-making as being akin to "democratic centralism." While this Leninist phrase is usually dismissed as an oxymoron, in the case of the EPLF, there did appear to be both strong democratic elements and strong centralist elements. Though he warns against the potential dangers of authoritarianism, Pateman concludes that "there is a well established and vigorous practice... of open and free discussion, including criticism of the leadership, by the rank-and-file."29 Along similar lines, Hussein Adam characterizes the EPLF as a "radical social democracy." In Adam's conception, radical social democracy tends toward 27See Isaias' remarks in "Eritrean Leader Answers Public's Questions on Occasion of Takeover Anniversary," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 22 May 1992. 28See Isaias' remarks in "President Rejects Reconciliation With Opposition 'Agents' Abroad," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 26 July 1996. 29Roy Pateman, "Liberty Egalite, Fraternite: Aspects of the Eritrean Revolution." Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (September 1990). p. 461. 86 one partyism and it often neglects the need to establish detailed systems of checks and balances. It does, however, merit the label "democracy." As Adam puts it, "While radical social democracy neglects electoral competition and related mechanisms, it stresses the substantive issues — emancipation of women, combating poverty, broadly based participation and social transformation."30 Thus, one might conclude that while Eritrea is not yet a western-style, multi-party, parliamentary democracy, it did have a fairly high degree of democratic accountability during its period of de facto statehood. 3.3.3 Capabilities The EPLF's organizational abilities and prowess during the 1984 - 1985 famine has already been discussed. Militarily, the Eritreans' achievements are arguably unparalleled. Pateman contends that the Eritreans' ability to wage guerrilla war "matches the achievements of the Chinese Red Army and the North Vietnamese.... The fighters of the E P L A can be compared only to the Israelis of the 1967 and 1973 campaigns for morale, brilliant improvisation, and dedication."31 Politically, the Eritrean de facto state was also quite highly evolved. Referring to a 1984 visit to the "liberated areas" of Eritrea, Mohammed Hassen characterizes the EPLF as "a formidable organization, a de facto government with ten or more pre-state departments." He bases this assessment on a number of things, including the EPLF's 1 "growing industrial base in Sahel"; its "sophisticated medical establishments (which have no parallel in the history of liberation struggles in Africa)"; its "progressive educational system"; and "garages, which are as modern as any in Africa...." Hassen concludes that by 1984, "the EPLF was already stronger and better organized than many governments in Africa." 3 2 Probably the biggest limitation on the EPLF's governance abilities was the necessity of directing its efforts toward the armed struggle. The EPLF's construction 3 0 Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 34. 31Pateman, "The Eritrean War," p. 95. 32Mohammed Hassen, "Eritrean Independence and Democracy in the Horn of Africa," in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, ed. Amare Tekle, pp. 93-94. 87 commission, for example, built, rehabilitated, and/or maintained over 4,000 kilometers of roads during Eritrea's period of de facto statehood. However, as that commission itself frankly acknowledges, "given the general war situation, the main aim of the Construction Sector was to promote the armed struggle.... Thus, construction programs implemented were specific and short-lived, with limited contributions to the bases of infrastructure."33 In 1983, the EPLF launched a widespread literacy campaign in the areas under its control. Two of the other policies for which it was most noted were land reform and efforts to improve the status of women. The EPLF began instituting a program of land reform in 1975. By 1988, land reform had been carried out in about one-third of Eritrea's 1,800 villages. As for women's rights, in 1977, the EPLF decreed a marriage law banning dowry, polygamy, child betrothal, and concubinage. Women and children were given full legal equality with men and every people's assembly was required to have women on its executive. During the liberation struggle, women constituted some forty percent of the EPLF's total membership and they comprised approximately one-quarter of its front-line fighting troops.34 In 1991, the PGE codified a broad range of rights for women that included guarantees of equal educational opportunity, land ownership, legal sanctions against domestic violence, and equal pay for equal work. 3 5 The EPLF, the PGE, and the PFDJ have all taken consistently strong stands against female genital mutilation. Another subject considered under the capabilities sub-heading is the degree of external dependency. The E L F and/or the EPLF certainly did receive some external financial and material assistance from a variety of sources, including China, Cuba, Egypt, 33The Construction Commission, EPLF, "Construction: Plan of Action and Policies," in Emergent Eritrea. ed. Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, p. 254. Similar assessments can also be found in the chapters in that volume by the EPLF's Commerce Commission and its Manufacturing Commission. 3 4For more on this, see Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," p. 65; and Pateman, "Liberty Fraternite, Egalite\" pp. 464-466. 3 5U.S. Department of State Dispatch, "Eritrea Human Rights Practices, 1993" (Washington, D.C., February 1994). 88 Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, and the Sudan.36 However, the EPLF was not dependent upon this aid, nor was it a significant recipient of such aid. According to Veronica Rentmeesters, "the Eritrean struggle, to a much greater extent than any other contemporary movement, was genuinely self-reliant. Foreign assistance was miniscule."37 Hassen argues that, in the area of self-reliance, "the EPLF has made a truly remarkable achievement unsurpassed even by the Algerian revolution."38 Pateman also points out that, unique among African liberation movements, the entire infrastructure of the EPLF was located inside the "liberated areas."39 Thus, the Eritrean de facto state cannot be considered an entity dependent upon outside support or one that lacks indigenous roots. If the question of excessive external dependency that detracts from domestic legitimacy is to be raised, it should be directed at Mengistu's Ethiopian regime, the beneficiaries of at least US$ 12 billion in military assistance from the Soviet Union. 4 0 The final question considered under the capabilities section is the perseverance or time criterion. An Eritrean de facto state can be said to have existed continuously in Sahel province since the early 1970s. Many other areas of the country also came under EPLF-control for a decade or more. While the extent of territory controlled by the Eritreans certainly ebbed and flowed over time, there can be no doubt that the Eritrean de facto state successfully demonstrated its perseverance. 3.3.4 Relations with international society For the most part, the Eritrean situation did not figure high on international society's priority list. With this case, our main interest here is in whether or not this particular entity should more accurately be considered a legitimate "exception to 36For more on this support, see Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement," International Organization 44 (Summer 1990), p. 350; and Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," pp. 56-62. 37Veronica Rentmeesters, "Women and Development Planning," in Emergent Eritrea, ed. Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, p. 79. See also Pool, "Eritrean Independence," p. 391. 38Hassen, "Eritrean Independence and Democracy in the Horn of Africa," pp. 93-94. 39Pateman, "The Eritrean War," p. 82. 40Paul B. Henze, "Eritrea: The Economic Challenge," in Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, ed. Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth, p. 71; and Pateman, "Eritrea Takes the World Stage," p. 228. 89 sovereignty," rather than an illegitimate de facto state. This question did not arise until the E P L A entered Asmara on 24 May 1991. One might, however, argue that from that point until the declaration of independence two years later, Eritrea ceased to be a die facto state and instead became something else. The evidence for this proposition is, however, scant. Unlike the Palestinians today, the Eritreans' status from May 1991 - May 1993 was not the subject of any international treaties. Similarly, unlike the Kurdish safe havens, their status in this period was not premised upon any U N Security Council resolutions. The closest thing one finds to a formal acceptance of the Eritreans1 legitimacy to rule during this period comes from the May 1991 London Conference. This was a failed attempt at peace negotiations in the waning days of Mengistu's regime which, according to Okbazghi Yohannes, "endorsed the formation of the Provisional Government of Eritrea and implicitly recognised the de facto independence of the territory."41 Endorsing the formation of the PGE did not, however, imply recognition of Eritrea as a sovereign state and there is a huge difference between implicitly recognizing a territory's de facto independence and explicitly recognizing its de jure independence. There are two other reasons for arguing that Eritrea still remained a de facto state during this period. The first concerns the existence of a scholarly consensus in this regard. Kidane Mengisteab, for example, refers to this period as being "two years of de facto independence."42 Andreas Eschete describes it as a period of "de facto separation" which would enable Eritrea to prepare itself for future de jure separation.43 Lionel Cliffe refers to Eritrea's "new status of de facto and unchallenged independence."44 The second concerns international practice at this time. The PGE's ambiguous status prevented Eritrea from qualifying for bilateral aid or loans from the International Monetary Fund 41Okbazghi Yohannes, "Eritrea: A Country in Transition," pp. 17-18. 42Kidane Mengisteab, "Ethio-Eritrean Cooperation in National Reconstruction and Development," in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, ed. Amare Tekle, p. 75. 43Andreas Eschete, "Why Ethio-Eritrean Relations Matter: A Plea for Future Political AGination,'' in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, ed. Amare Tekle, pp. 25-26. ^Cliffe, "Eritrea: Prospects for Self-Determination," p. 52. 90 (IMF) or the World Bank. Eritrea was not allowed to join the International Telecommunications Union, something which greatly hindered the PGE's ability to establish telephone, postal, and other such links to the outside world. In June 1992, an Eritrean delegation was denied observer status at the O A U summit meeting in Senegal.45 Also, foreign aid agencies were reluctant to commit money to Eritrea due to its uncertain status. From 1991 - 1993, the overall aid commitment for Ethiopia exceeded US$ 2 billion, while that for Eritrea in the same period amounted to less than US$ 200 million 4 6 Thus, while Eritrea may have moved up in the ranks of fife facto states, its lack of juridical acceptance in this period still means that it should be considered a de facto state and not a more legitimate exception to sovereignty. Tamil Eelam, the LTTE-Controlled Areas of Sri Lanka 3.4 Background information Sri Lanka translates as "Resplendent Island." With a total area of 25,332 square miles, it lies in the Indian Ocean just off the southern tip of India. These two countries are separated by the narrow Palk Strait. In 1992, Sri Lanka had a population of approximately 17.5 million people. This is composed of three main groups. About 74 percent of the population are Sinhalese Buddhists. Tamils make up the next largest group at approximately 18 percent. The majority of Tamils are Hindus, but there are also Christian Tamils. The third major group are the Muslims, who comprise about seven percent of the population. The Muslims use the Tamil language but are considered a distinct and separate group. The remaining one percent or so of the population is made up of a variety of smaller groups including Burghers (Eurasians), Malays, and Sindhis.47 45Ibid., pp. 62-64; and "Eritrea: Africa's Longest Struggle Creeping to an End?" Inter Press Service. 12 September 1992. ^Araia Tseggai, "A New Perspective of Ethio-Eritrean Partnership," in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, ed. Amare Tekle, footnote # 2, p. 65. 4 7S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism: The Case of Sri Lanka," in Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ralph R Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 49; and Raju G. C. Thomas, "Secessionist Movements in South Asia," Survival 36 (Summer 1994), p. 95. 91 Though the combined number of Tamil-speakers is approximately 25 percent of the total population, there are significant divisions among this group. The Tamil-speaking Muslims have traditionally had very little in common politically with the island's other Tamils. They generally do not support the separatist movement. Of the remaining 18 percent Tamil population, this group is also further divided. "Ceylon" or "Sri Lanka" Tamils have been living on the island for hundreds, i f not thousands, of years. Comprising approximately 11 percent of the island's total population, this group is often further divided into Jaffna Tamils (those who live in the Jaffna Peninsula and the Northern Province), Batticaloa Tamils (those who live in the Eastern Province) and Colombo Tamils (those who have emigrated to the capital city from either the north or the east). "Hill country," "Indian" or "plantation" Tamils are much more recent arrivals, brought over by the British from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu to work on the country's tea and rubber plantations. They comprise approximately eight percent of the country's total population and have rarely shared any common political cause with the Ceylon Tamils.4 8 Although they comprise nearly three-quarters of Sri Lanka's total population, the Sinhalese tend to view themselves as a besieged minority. This is because there are nearly 60 million Tamils in southern India, just across the Palk Strait from Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese believe that they have only Sri Lanka in which to preserve their language, culture, and religion, whereas the Ceylon Tamils have Tamil Nadu as well. The Sinhalese genuinely appear to fear the prospect of being engulfed and marginalized by a united front of Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils. 4 9 Sri Lanka thus is characterized by a "double minority'' problem. The Tamils are minorities because the Sinhalese are dominant in Sri Lanka itself. 48Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination. pp. 280-281; and Bryan Pfaffenberger, "Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils," in The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 6-7. 49Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," pp. 54-55; A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Chelvadurai Manogaran, "Afterword: The Future of Sinhala-Tamil Relations," in The Sri Lankan Tamils, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, p. 238; and A. Sivarajah, "Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis: The Tamil Nadu Factor," in South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives, ed. Shelton U. Kodikara (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 138. 92 The Sinhalese, though, also perceive themselves as minorities because Tamils have much greater numerical strength in the region than they do. Where a double minority problem exists, each group has a heightened sense of its own vulnerability which makes it harder to bargain with the other group in good faith. The Sinhalese are concentrated mainly in the southwest of the island. The Ceylon Tamils are mainly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Muslims comprise a major part of the Eastern Province's population, but they are also widely scattered throughout the island. The Indian Tamils are concentrated in the central highlands, particularly around Nuwara Eliya. Using figures from the 1981 census, Robert Kearney finds that in 13 of Sri Lanka's 24 districts, the Sinhalese constitute more than 80 percent of the population. They are a majority in all districts except Nuwara Eliya and the seven districts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Ceylon Tamils formed a majority of the populations in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, and Mullaitivu districts in the north and Batticaloa district in the east. They were also large rninorities in the eastern districts of Trincomalee and Amparai. Jaffna district is 95 percent Ceylon Tamil. Almost three-quarters of all Ceylon Tamils live in the seven districts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces; their other major concentration of population occurs in the urbanized region around Colombo. 5 0 With the exception of larger numbers of Sinhalese in the eastern districts, one suspects that Kearney's assessment is accurate today. Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict is a relatively recent phenomenon. The Tamils and Sinhalese did, as the British colonial official Cleghorn observed in 1799, live in separate territories. They were in sufficient proximity to each other, however, that each group influenced the other's language and caste system. Bryan Pfaffenberger maintains that Sri Lanka's colonial history "is remarkable for the absence of ethnic conflict qua ethnic conflict, with the notable exception of the 1915 Buddhist-Muslim conflict—in which, to 50Robert N. Kearney, "Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," Pacific Affairs 60 (Winter 1987-88), pp. 563-565.. 93 testify to the newly-constructed character of Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, the Tamil leadership took the side of the Sinhalese." As such, "it is reading history backwards to suppose that today's problems stem from yesterday's divisions. They are of recent origin."5 1 At independence, the removal of external British control changed the political dynamics between the country's two principal ethnic groups. Under the British, the Tamils had done quite well in a number of areas such as higher education and civil service employment. They would soon find themselves to be a minority group constituted under a system of Sinhalese majority rule. A variety of events, policies, decisions or actions can be cited as initially fueling the start of the conflict or magnifying its intensity later on. While many factors played a role, our account here will focus on just four. These factors are: 1) the "Sinhala only" language policy; 2) the "standardization" policy for the country's universities; 3) the 1972 constitution; and 4) the Sinhalese "colonization" of Sri Lanka's Eastern Province. In 1956, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike instituted the Sinhala Only Act. This was designed to make Sinhala the country's only official language. Tamils responded to this act with civil disobedience and protest. Subsequently, a 1957 pact was signed between Bandaranaike and Tamil political leader S. J. V . Chelvanayakam. Among other things, this pact provided for the use of the Tamil language in Tamil areas but it was poorly implemented. It also produced a strong counter-reaction from Sinhalese extremists that ultimately led to the first major outbreak of communal violence in 1958. The university "standardization" policy gave preference to Sinhala-medium students over Tamil-medium students. It was seen by Sinhalese as a positive affirmative action measure designed to redress years of comparative disadvantages. To Tamils, it was seen as a discriminatory measure that denied meritorious students access to higher education. Whatever one's perception, the overall Tamil share of admissions to science-51Pfaffenberger, "Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils," pp. 3-4. 94 based university faculties fell from nearly 40 percent in 1969 on a merit system to less than 20 percent in 1974 - 1975 on the "standardized" system.52 The country's 1972 constitution which established Sri Lanka as a republic was another major sore point for the Tamil community. Essentially, the Tamils had four main objections to this constitution. First, it constitutionally entrenched the Sinhala Only language policy, which until now had only been a piece of legislation. Second, it dropped Article 29 of the 1947 constitution which had specifically prohibited discrimination against Sri Lanka's minority communities. Third, in spite of Sri Lanka's professed secularism, it recognized "the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism." Finally, the Tamils feel that this constitution was imposed upon them without their consent. This claim is made for two main reasons. First, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party campaigned in the 1970 elections by asking the people for a mandate to end the dominion constitution and to establish Sri Lanka as a republic. They received only 14 percent of the combined vote in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Thus, it is argued that these proposed changes received a mandate from the seven Sinhalese provinces, but not from the two Tamil provinces. Second, 15 out of 19 Tamil MPs boycotted the constituent assembly which ratified this constitution. Additionally, S. J. V . Chelvanayakam resigned his seat in parliament and challenged the government to contest him on the validity of the 1972 constitution. He was subsequently re-elected with the largest majority of his career.53 Perhaps the most contentious issue of all has been the state-sponsored "colonization" of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The stated aims of this program were to alleviate the problems of landless peasants in the overcrowded southwestern wet zone and to increase food production by bringing marginal lands in the northern and eastern dry zone into greater usage. The Tamils' major sense of grievance here comes 5 2 A . Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict Q^ ondon: C. Hurst & Company, 1988), p. 47; and Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," p. 52. 33Somasundaram Vanniasingham, Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989), pp. 19-20 and p. 141; Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka, pp. 87-88; and Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination. pp. 283-284. 95 from the fact that the Sinhalese settlers were not directed toward existing Sinhalese-populated districts in the region but rather toward districts with strong concentrations of Tamils, particularly Amparai, Trincomalee, and Mannar. Ceylon Tamils, who were once a majority in each district of the Northern and Eastern Provinces have now been reduced to minority status in Amparai and Trincomalee districts and to slim majorities in Mannar and Vavuniya districts. Of particular importance here is the Trincomalee district, which separates the large Tamil populations in Jaffna and Batticaloa from each other. In the sixty years from 1921 - 1981, the Tamil share of the population in Trincomalee declined from 53.2 percent to 33.8 percent. Over the same period, the Sinhalese share of the population grew from 4.4 percent to 33.6 percent. The vast majority of this change occurred after independence in 1947. To the Tamils, this "colonization" is a deliberate program designed to make their concept of a Tamil homeland unworkable.54 In spite of these and other assorted grievances, the Tamil political leadership did not advocate secession until nearly 30 years after Sri Lanka won its independence. Looking at this, K . M . de Silva contends that "the striking feature of the emergence of Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka... is its late development."55 Tamil aspirations initially centered around greater autonomy or the desire to shift from a unitary to a federal state. At first, the Tamils pushed for their goals through peaceful political pressure. Later, civil disobedience appeared, as did sporadic acts of violence. It was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the use of violence became more systemic and deliberately organized.56 54Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," p. 53; Kearney, "Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," pp. 572-576; Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka, pp. 219-220; Chelvadurai Manogaran, "Colonization as Politics: Political Use of Space in Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," in The Sri Lankan Tamils, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, pp. 99-116; and Amita Shastri, "The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka," in The Sri Lankan Tamils, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, pp. 215-224. 5 5 K . M. de Silva, "Separatism in Sri Lanka: The 'Traditional Homelands' of the Tamils," in Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, p. 32. 5 6 0n the various phases of the Tamil separatist movement, see Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," p. 48; and de Silva, "Separatism in Sri Lanka," p. 32. 96 In both 1965 and 1970, the leading Tamil political party, the Federal Party, contested elections on explicitly non-secessionist manifestos. In 1974, this party joined with a number of others to form the Tamil United Front. In 1976, at a party congress in Vaddukoddai, this party formally adopted a resolution demanding the secession of the Northern and Eastern Provinces which would then be consolidated into a separate sovereign state called "Tamil Eelam." Subsequently changing its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), this party asked the electorate to grant it a mandate for secession in the 1977 general election. The TULF won 72 percent of the vote and all eleven seats in the Jaffna district. It also won all three seats in the other two northern districts and 58 percent of the votes there. The TULF won four seats in the Eastern Province but captured only 32 percent of the vote. In the combined Northern and Eastern Provinces as a whole, it won 50 percent of the votes cast, but received the support of only 42 percent of the eligible electorate—the difference being due to absenteeism.57 At this point, civil war in Sri Lanka was far from inevitable. Unfortunately, though, the Sri Lankan government's response to the Tamil demand for separatism was to increase substantially the military presence in Tamil areas and, in March 1982, to pass the Prevention of Terrorism Act, allowing, among other things, for suspects to be detained without charges for up to 18 months. By comparison, the legislation of the same name in Northern Ireland only allows suspects to be detained without charges for seven days. The result, according to Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, was that "Indiscriminate arrests and torture of prisoners followed this legislation and caused even more Tamil resentment.... Militant Tamil nationalism emerged as a response to entrenched Sinhala domination."58 The government also passed the Sixth Amendment to the constitution in 1983. This required 57Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka, pp. 85-86; Kearney, "Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," pp. 569-571; and Shastri, "The Material Basis for Separatism," footnote # 11, p. 233. 58Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, "The Boundaries of the State and the State of Ethnic Boundaries: Sinhala-Tamil Relations in Sri Lankan History," Ethnic and Racial Studies 10 (July 1987), p. 314. 97 all members of parliament to take an oath against separatism and it ultimately led to the TULFs collective resignation from parliament. July 1983 is the date generally used to refer to the start of the Sri Lankan civil war. The spark which set off the communal violence at that time came when L T T E forces ambushed and killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers on 23 July 1983. While the phrase "communal violence" might be misconstrued to imply sometliing that is random or haphazard, the anti-Tamil pogroms in 1983 were clearly state-directed. Between 140 (official figures) and 600 (unofficial estimates) Tamils were killed and thousands more were forced to flee their homes during five days of violence. During this entire period, the government did not broadcast one call for order. Two separate massacres of Tamil prisoners occurred in Welikade Prison in which more than 50 people were killed while guards failed to intervene. Organized gangs were allegedly provided with electoral lists and other lists of Tamil addresses and Tamil shops from government officials. Even the government press acknowledged that these events were centrally planned and coordinated.59 The Sri Lankan civil war can be seen as having gone through five phases so far. The first, from the early-mid 1970s until mid-1983, was characterized by sporadic or isolated incidents of violence and really should not be considered a civil war. The second, from July 1983 - July 1987, marks the initial phase of what one could call a civil war. Initially, the Sri Lankan government was faced with military threats from a variety of Tamil groups including the LTTE, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). In 1986, however, the L T T E began waging war against these other groups in a bid for supremacy. By early 1987, it had virtually succeeded in eliminating all rival groups, except the EPRLF which retained a strong base 59For more on the July 1983 violence, see Kumar Rupesinghe, "Ethnic Conflict in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF)," Journal of Peace Research 25 (December 1988), pp. 344-345; Marshal R. Singer, "New Realities in Sri Lankan Politics," Asian Survey XXXVII (April 1990), p. 413; and Edgar O'Ballance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88 (London: Brassey's, 1989), pp. 23-28. 98 of support in the Eastern Province. Consensus estimates are that about 7,000 people were killed in the fighting that occurred between 1983 and 1987.60 The third phase of this civil war started in July 1987 when the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed. Prompted by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Jaffna Peninsula and a number of its own strategic considerations, India unilaterally air-dropped relief supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula in early 1987. This led the Sri Lankan government to begin negotiating with the Indians on a number of issues.61 The result was the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 which, among other things, attempted to delineate a basis for a future resolution of this conflict within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and also provided for the introduction of Indian "peace-keeping" troops into Sri Lanka. 6 2 The Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), though, was soon seen as a military occupation force by the Tamils. Its initial deployment of 3,000 troops was ultimately increased to nearly 50,000 troops as fighting between the IPKF and the L T T E grew increasingly violent. By the time its forces withdrew from Sri Lanka in March 1990, the rPKF, on one account, had suffered 1,155 fatalities and 2,984 wounded. The L T T E suffered 2,220 fatalities and 1,220 wounded. Between 3 - 4,000 civilians were also killed in this fighting.63 The IPKF intervention can also be blamed for sparking new violence in the Sinhalese southwest of the country. The Indian presence infuriated the extreme nationalist and left-wing Janatha Vimuktt Perqmuna (JVP) which launched its own insurrection against the Sri Lankan government in the south. The government responded with death squads and terror tactics. Success was claimed as the JVP was ultimately defeated, but it 60Singer, "New Realities in Sri Lankan Politics," pp. 409-410 and pp. 416-417. 61For more on the events leading up to the accord, see Alan Bullion, "The Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka," International Peacekeeping 1 (Summer 1994), p. 149; Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," pp. 56-59; Shelton U. Kodikara, "The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 1987: Retrospect," in South Asian Strategic Issues, ed. Shelton U. Kodikara, pp. 163-165; and Bertram E. S. J. Bastiampillai, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia and Inter-State Relations Especially in Relation to Sri Lanka," in South Asian Strategic Issues, ed. Shelton U. Kodikara, pp. 97-101. 62Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," pp. 60-61; O'Ballance, The Cyanide War, p. 91; Bastiampillai, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia," pp. 101-106; and P. Saravanamuttu, "Ethnic Conflict and Nation-Building in Sri Lanka," Third World Quarterly 11 (October 1989), p. 314. 63Bullion, "The Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka," p. 155. 99 came at an extremely high cost: some estimates place the number of people killed in the south between 1987 and 1990 at up to 60,000 people. If true, this figure would equal or exceed the number of fatalities produced by the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict from its inception to the present day.6 4 After the withdrawal of the IPKF in March 1990, the government and the L T T E appeared to have reached some sort of agreement amongst themselves. For a time in April - May 1990, civilian life almost seemed to return to normal in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This calmer state of affairs would, however, only last until June 1990. In that month, tensions between the L T T E and the police in the Eastern Province led to the start of what the Sri Lankan press called "Tamil War II" and what we are calling the fourth phase of the civil war in Sri Lanka. This phase of the conflict was characterized by sharply higher levels of violence and more systemic human rights violations by all sides to the conflict. Robert Oberst captures the war's increasing escalation in violence quite well: Before 1987 the conflict was small-scale, and caused relatively few casualties. After Indian troops arrived in 1987 the mortality level increased. And after the war between the Liberation Tigers and the government resumed in June 1990, the death toll rose to levels that made the Sri Lankan conflict among the most violent worldwide in the last 20 years.65 This phase of the war effectively ended the second week of January 1995 when a new cease-fire came into play. The fifth phase of this civil war started on 19 April 1995 when the L T T E abrogated the cease-fire arrangement and launched an attack on a government naval base in Trincomalee. The government responded in July 1995 with the launch of Operation Leap Forward. This saw the massing of huge numbers of troops for an assault on the Tigers' stronghold, the Jaffna Peninsula. Operation Rivirasa (Sunshine) was then launched 64The up to 60,000 figure comes from "Murder and Mystery in Sri Lanka," The Economist 29 October 1994. For more on the JVP insurrection, see also Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., pp. 414421; and Robert C. Oberst, "A War Without Winners in Sri Lanka," Current History 91 (March 1992), pp. 128-129. 650berst, "A War Without Winners in Sri Lanka," p. 130. 100 on 17 October 1995. On 2 December 1995, Sri Lankan troops succeeded in capturing the city of Jaffna, long the most-important L T T E stronghold. This renewed fighting has produced an estimated 480,000 new displaced persons. In essence, the contest between the government and the L T T E has now turned into a fight over who will control this population. The government is trying to convince these people to return home to areas now under its control. The LTTE, though, is trying to keep these same people within the areas of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka still under its control. Though the loss of Jaffna was a major blow, the L T T E still has an extensive network of jungle bases in the Vanni region of northern Sri Lanka and it remains a formidable fighting force. Any premature thoughts of its demise were put to rest when a group of 2,000+ Tigers overran an army base at Mullaitivu in July 1996 after a surprise attack.66 The costs of Sri Lanka's civil war have been enormous. If one leaves aside the violence associated with the JVP insurrection, the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict is now estimated to have killed more than 50,000 people.67 The number of refugees and displaced persons produced by this conflict could be more than 1,000,000.68 The financial costs have also been huge: at various points in time, the Sri Lankan government has been spending about US$ 1,000,000 a day on the war. 6 9 The Sri Lankan civil war has also become one of the "dirtiest" conflicts in the world today. For its part, the litany of L T T E human rights abuses includes such things as extrajudicial killings (including civilian massacres and the assassinations of political opponents); terrorist bombings; the use of 66Taken from a variety of media reports in Agence France Presse. The Economist. The Guardian, and The New York Times. The displaced persons figures come from U. S. Department of State, "Sri Lanka Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996" (Washington, D. C , February 1997). The Mullaitivu attack information comes from "Sri Lanka: On the Warpath," The Economist 27 July 1996. 67This figure is cited in "Army-Rebel Fighting Kills 140 in Sri Lanka," The New York Times. 29 June 1995; "Colombo to Offer Devolution Package to Tamils," Financial Times 25 July 1995; and "Free Trade and the Tigers," The Economist 26 August 1995. 68The U. S. Department of State estimates 600,000 displaced persons had been produced before the October 1995 offensive with another 480,000 since that offensive. See U. S. Department of State, "Sri Lanka Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996." 69Marshall R Singer, "Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict: Alternative Solutions," Asian Survey XXXTI (August 1992), p. 716; "Widows of Civil War Promise Peace to Sri Lankan Voters," Financial Times. 9 November 1994; and "Truce With the Tigers," Far Eastern Economic Review. 19 January 1995. 101 civilian shelter areas as munitions storage depots; the use of child soldiers; the forced expulsion of civilian populations; the use of civilians as "human shields"; and rape. The government's ledger includes such things as indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas; torture; arbitrary arrest; disappearances; reprisal attacks on civilians that have included burning, looting, raping, and mass killings; and the use of so-called barrel bombs or "poor man's napalm"—drums of fuel with strips of rubber placed inside which are thrown from aircraft. Upon impact, the fuel explodes, sending forth burning pieces of rubber which can then attach themselves to a person's skin. 7 0 There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to find a solution to this conflict. The establishment of District Development Councils in 1981; talks at Thimpu, Bhutan in 1985; the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord; the establishment of Provincial Councils by the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution in 1987; and the present devolution schemes being proposed by Chandrika Kumaratunga's government—none of these has produced any kind of a lasting solution. As Marshall Singer notes, when it comes to a political solution, between the two extremes of a unitary state and total independence for Tamil Eelam, "there exists an almost endless variety of options."71 Unfortunately, agreement on any one of these options does not appear to be imminent. 3.5 Tamil Eelam as a de facto state 3.5.1 Territory The Tamil territorial demand is for the secession of today's Northern and Eastern Provinces, united together to form an independent Tamil Eelam. This demand is formulated on the basis of centuries of Tamil occupation of these regions—the so-called "traditional homelands" of the Tamils. For the Tamils, this claim "is based on more than seven centuries of uriinterrupted Tamil settlements in a territorially demarcated area of the 70See any of the annual Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or US State Department human rights reports. One recent report is Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Sri Lanka: Stop Killings of Civilians," Human Rights Watch/Asia Newsletter 7 (July 1995). CBallance, The Cvanide War: and Oberst, "A War Without Winners in Sri Lanka" are also good here. 71Singer, "Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict," p. 713. 102 island where towns, villages, natural and human-made features are known by Tamil-derived words of ancient origin...."7 2 In their conception, the Tamils have historically occupied the northern and eastern dry zone, while the Sinhalese have occupied the southwestern wet zone and the central highlands. These territories were physically separated from each other by jungle and abandoned irrigation works. As evidence, Tamil scholars point to the independent existence of the ancient Tamil kingdom of Jaffna; the 1799 "Cleghorn Minute" in which a British colonial official describes the existence of two separate nations on the island and details where each group lives; the predominance of ethnic Tamils in the Northern Province and the fact that, at the time of independence, approximately 90 percent of the Eastern Province's population was Tamil-speaking (this includes Tamil-speaking Muslims). Subsequent changes in the Eastern Province's demographic mix are due to state colonization schemes and thus should not detract from the traditional homelands claim. 7 3 For reasons of economic viability, the inclusion of the Eastern Province in Tamil Eelam is considered essential by the separatists. The Sinhalese essentially raise four main objections to the Tamil traditional homelands concept. First, the proposed Tamil homeland includes nearly 30 percent of the country's land and 60 percent of its coastline while the Tamils (many of whom now live outside the "traditional homeland" in Colombo) only comprise 18 percent of the island's population. Second, they believe that while the Tamils have another homeland in south India, the Sinhalese have only Sri Lanka in which to preserve their language, culture, and unique version of Theravada Buddhism. Third, numerous objections are raised in regards to the Eastern Province. Much of the eastern seaboard was never part of the ancient Tamil kingdom of Jaffna. The ethnic heterogeneity of the Eastern Province is a contemporary reality and Tamil-speaking Muslims have not shown any desire to be a part of an independent Tamil Eelam. Fourth, the Tamil version of history is disputed. Much of 72Manogaran, "Colonization as Politics," p. 90. 73Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination. p. 297. 103 the Eastern Province was an integral part of the Kandyan kingdom. The Tamil kingdom of Jaffna did exist, but its four centuries of life needs to be placed in the context of Sri Lanka's over 2,000 years of recorded history. There is no direct or unbroken link between that kingdom and the "traditional homelands" today.74 Perhaps even more important than these objections is the fact that the Tamil territorial justification, unlike those put forward in Eritrea and Somaliland, has no colonial basis from which to draw upon. What about the extent of territory controlled by the LTTE's de facto state? As with Eritrea, this has varied over time. In the case of the LTTE, its level of territorial control has also differed quite substantially between the Northern Province (particularly the Jaffna Peninsula) and the Eastern Province—with its control generally being much higher in the former than the latter. By early-mid 1985, the L T T E effectively controlled almost the entire Jaffna Peninsula (including Jaffna city), with Sri Lankan troops there generally confined to barracks and forced to receive supplies by air. This situation prevailed throughout the rest of 1985 and 1986. During this time, though, the LTTE's control of the Eastern Province was contested and much less effective. In the east, the most powerful Tamil group was the EPRLF. Neither they nor the L T T E , though, were able to win control of the main cities or roads in the Eastern Province. The government generally controlled these areas with the Tamil rebel groups controlling much of the countryside, small villages, and jungle areas outside the main towns.7 5 During this 1985 - 1986 period, an interesting pattern of accommodation developed between the L T T E and the Sri Lankan government. Although the government was unable to exercise any authority or administrative control over the Jaffna Peninsula, its staff continued to work in various government offices and Colombo continued to pay their salaries. The L T T E encouraged these officials to remain on the job as their salaries 7 4For more on these objections, see de Silva, "Separatism in Sri Lanka," pp. 35-46. 75Samarasinghe, "The Dynamics of Separatism," p. 59; Pfaffenberger, "Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils," pp. 14-15; and Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., p. 72. 104 were an economically beneficial influx of money. These government officials while nominally continuing to occupy their posts would either a) take direct instructions from the LTTE, or b) ensure that they did nothing to displease local L T T E officials.76 The L T T E now effectively operated as the de facto government of the Jaffna Peninsula and other parts of the Northern Province. On 27 October 1986, it announced that, from 1 January 1987, an L T T E civil administration would begin ruling the Jaffna Peninsula district (one of 24 districts in the country). This administration was to be organized into 20 divisions, encompassing such things as education, health, transportation, and policing. The Sri Lankan government responded by announcing an embargo on all fuel shipments to the north. Cutting off electricity and food supplies was threatened later. These actions prevented the formal establishment of this L T T E civil administration, but the L T T E still maintained its de facto control of the Jaffna Peninsula.77 The Sri Lankan government launched Operation Liberation against the L T T E in May 1987. The L T T E suffered a number of losses during this campaign, particularly in terms of its positions in the Northern Province outside of the Jaffna Peninsula. Just before the IPKF intervention, the LTTE-controlled area had effectively shrank to most of the Jaffna Peninsula, including Jaffna city. 7 8 With the launch of the JJPKF's Operation Pawan against the L T T E in October 1987, further losses were suffered. Much of the LTTE's leadership and fighting forces withdrew from the Jaffna Peninsula to the jungles of the Vanni. The IPKF was gradually able to extend its control over most of the towns in the Jaffna Peninsula, but the L T T E remained in control of much of the countryside, villages, and outlying areas. Despite the IPKF's relative success, by order of the L T T E government offices, banks and other institutions were only allowed to function three days of the week. ^CBallance, The Cyanide War, p. 60; and Vanniasingham, Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within, p. 7. 77Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self-Determination. p. 298; O'Ballance, The Cyanide War, p. 72. 780'Ballance, The Cyanide War, p. 83; and Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., pp. 350-351. 105 This order was widely followed in the Jaffna Peninsula and in parts of the Northern Province while it was almost completely ignored in the Eastern Province.7 9 With the withdrawal of the IPKF in March 1990, the L T T E assumed virtual control of most of the northeast. Its position was somewhat analogous to that which it enjoyed in the 1985 - 1986 period, except that it was stronger in the Eastern Province where the departure of the IPKF severely weakened the EPRLF. At the time hostilities resumed in June 1990, "the government was limited to control of a few army outposts in the Jaffna peninsula and several cities south of the peninsula."80 This situation would prevail for the next five years. During this period, Jaffna city served as the nerve-center of the LTTE's de facto state. The government continued to send food to the peninsula and to pay its civil servants there, but the Tigers effectively ran the administration—controlling the police force, appointing their own judges, regulating the economy, and the like. 8 1 Things changed dramatically in late 1995 when the government captured Jaffna city on 2 December. While this was a severe blow to the LTTE, it does not necessarily mark the end of an LTTE-run de facto state in Sri Lanka. First, much of the civilian population fled Jaffna (some against their will) for Tiger-controlled territory in the Northern Province outside of the peninsula. Second, the Sri Lankan army's focus on recapturing Jaffna has forced them to shift troops out of the Eastern Province. This has allowed the L T T E to operate freely in the east—something it could not do before. Thus, even now the L T T E remains in control of large areas in Sri Lanka's north and east. 79Dagmar-Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," in The Sri Lankan Tamils, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, p. 183; Lieutenant General S. C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), pp. 71-72; and O'Ballance, The Cyanide War, pp. 107-108. 80Oberst, "A War Without Winners in Sri Lanka," p. 130. See also, Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," p. 200. 8 1 "No Kite Flying in Jaffna," The Economist 2 July 1994; and "Sri Lanka: The Victory Still to Come," The Economist 9 December 1995. 106 Finally, though sustained losses have been suffered, the LTTE's military apparatus appears more or less intact, with its primary base of operations now in the Vanni jungles.82 3.5.2 Relations with society The L T T E has organized its de facto state under what we are calling the nation principle. While a territorial demand has been made in terms of merging the country's existing Northern and Eastern Provinces, the LTTE's focus is not so much on borders as it is on a particular sub-set of ethnic Tamils. The LTTE's national principle is drawn so exclusively that it has generated little support amongst either the Indian Tamils or the Tamil-speaking Muslims, let alone amongst any Sinhalese who live in the Northern or Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. Many Batticaloa Tamils also fear they would suffer discrimination in an independent Tamil Eelam dominated by Jaffna Tamils. Thus, unlike the EPLF which tried inclusively to integrate a variety of groups under a broad Eritrean state umbrella, the L T T E has vilified Sinhalese as the ethnic enemy; ignored the Indian Tamils and the Colombo Tamils; marginalized the Batticaloa Tamils; and expelled tens of thousands of Tamil-speaking Muslims from their homes. Four Tamil critics of the L T T E have described its guiding ideology as "a nationalism of extreme narrowness, deriving its energies from primitive instinctive loyalties - in our case to language and race." These authors go on to note that this ideology "leads to fanaticism, since the imagery is in absolutes - the Nation, the Language, and the Movement. They are intolerant of others...."83 The L T T E is a paradigmatic example of a particularly narrow form of organization based on the national principle. Considering its intolerance of dissenting views and its violent practices, one might suspect that the L T T E does not have much in the way of popular support. This appears to be wrong. The LTTE's 1985 - 1987 de facto administration appeared popular and found 82"Sri Lankan Military Worried by Lull in Fighting," Agence France Presse. 15 December 1995; "Sri Lanka: People Power," The Economist 11 May 1996; and "Sri Lanka's Civil War: What Chance for Peace?" The Straits Times. 16 April 1997. 83Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., pp. 360-361. 107 widespread acceptance.84 The JPKFs Lieutenant General Sardeshpande believes that "90 percent" of the population of the Jaffna Peninsula is "pro-LTTE." While he attributes this support to a combination of brainwashing, terror, and helplessness, he does see it as a solid reality.85 Sardeshpande's 90 percent figure is more or less confirmed by Marshall Singer. In his view, "perhaps 80% to 90% of the population of the north supports the LTTE." Singer explains that "The people admit that the L T T E is ruthless, authoritarian, and completely ideological, but they also believe its members to be honest, incorruptible, and true nationalists; they respect the Tigers for having protected them from the excesses of both the Sri Lankan and Indian armies."86 The situation in the east is dramatically different—the L T T E has far less support there than it does in the north. In terms of democratic accountability, the L T T E has none. It is not a democratic organization and its leadership is philosophically opposed to the idea of multi-party democracy. Its persistent pattern of massive human rights abuses clearly violates any possible construction of democratic accountability. The L T T E has not only brutally eliminated rival Tamil militant groups, it has also suppressed dissent within its own ranks through extrajudicial executions. Civilian dissidents are branded as traitors and killed; trade unions, citizens' committees, and other local organizations are suppressed or cowed into supporting the LTTE's line through fear of violent reprisals. Print and broadcast media are tightly restricted in areas under the LTTE's control and freedom of expression is not tolerated. Academic freedom is not respected and many intellectuals who have criticized the L T T E have been killed. 8 7 It would be hard to envision another de facto state with a worse record in terms of democratic accountability. 84Vanniasingham, Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within, p. 182; Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., p. 107; and Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," p. 182. 85Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna, pp. 17-18,27, and 160-161. 86Singer, "New Realities in Sri Lankan Politics," p. 417. 87For more on these areas, see Pfaffenberger, "Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils," pp. 16-17; Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., pp. xi, xiv, 17,73, and 349; and U. S. Department of State Dispatch, "Sri Lanka Human Rights Practices, 1995." 108 3.5.3 Capabilities In terms of the provision of governance services, Dagmar-Hellmann Rajanayagam maintains that, "Wherever the L T T E is in control, it has set up people's committees, people's law courts, etc., and the grassroots infrastructure that it established is alive and efficient. Since 1985, the L T T E had virtually taken over the administration in Jaffna, down to petty justice and traffic regulations."88 This is more or less echoed by the IPKF's Sardeshpande. According to him, no government agency, public service, or financial activity functioned outside of the LTTE's control. The leaders of the L T T E "held court, dispensed justice, awarded punishment, collected taxes, managed farms and small industries... and ran transport."89 Although they had to pay taxes and reach agreements with the L T T E , business leaders generally found its administration acceptable because "people could make money unmolested."90 The LTTE's capabilities in the 1990 - 1995 period appear broadly similar to those it exercised in the 1985 - 1987 period. The LTTE's military capabilities are also quite well-developed. Its forces have frequently engaged the Sri Lankan army in open, conventional warfare. L T T E cadres are renown for their dedication and motivation. The L T T E operates its own munitions factories and repair facilities, and it maintains a sophisticated network of bases and supply caches in the Vanni jungles. It has engaged in naval warfare and brought down Sri Lankan army helicopters. Its capacity for surprise attacks is great. In terms of logistics, IPKF General Sardeshpande argues that the L T T E has "enviable expertise in flexible, innovative, reliable and effective communications systems including codes and ciphers, rarely matched by any other insurgent group the world over."91 To date, neither rival Tamil militant groups, the Sri Lankan government, or the 40,000+ soldiers of the IPKF have been able militarily to eradicate the LTTE. 88Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," p. 182. 89Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna, p. 26. 90Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra, 2nd ed., p. 107. 9 1 Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna, p. 28. 109 We now come to the question of the level of dependence on external support. A l l of the various Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, did receive some external support from India in the 1983 - 1986 period. Though exact figures are unavailable, Singer concludes that after 1983, there is no doubt that "the Indian central government, Indian intelligence... and the Tamil Nadu state government in South India all were supporting one or another of these militant groups with arms, money, training, and most important of all for a time, safe sanctuary."92 Such support dried up after 1986. With the exception of this three-year period of Indian support, the L T T E has relied primarily on the Tamil community for its sustenance. Essentially this support has come in two main ways. The first is from fund-raising efforts among expatriate Tamil communities in countries such as Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). The second is from its own direct economic activity, as well as levies, taxes and other fees assessed on domestic Tamils in the areas under its control. Tamils who wish to leave LTTE-controlled areas are charged large "exit taxes." The L T T E has also made a number of mutually beneficial arrangements with the Tamil business community. It levies taxes on some goods arriving from the south and it also directly operates a number of its own businesses.93 Thus, while the L T T E has received some external support from India, it would be difficult to label it a puppet state. The last question considered under the capabilities section is the perseverance or time criterion. The L T T E has survived 13 years of civil war against a variety of opponents. Its perseverance, resourcefulness, and ability to adjust to changing situations are impressive. While it might not equal the longevity of the Eritrean or Turkish Cypriot examples, it is certainly possible to talk about the existence of an L T T E de facto state in parts of Sri Lanka for more than a decade. 92Singer, "New Realities in Sri Lankan Politics," p. 419. 9 3 A. Sivarajah, "Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis," p. 154; CBallance, The Cyanide War, p. 71; Hoole, Somasundaram, Sritharan, and Thiranagama, The Broken Palmyra. 2nd ed., pp. 85-86; and U. S. Department of State Dispatch, "Sri Lanka Human Rights Practices, 1995." 110 3.5.4 Relations with international society For the most part, international society has been content to view the question of the L T T E de facto state as an internal matter for Sri Lanka. Should any international action ever be considered, the wishes of India as the regional great power are likely to be deferred to. 9 4 While some aid donors such as Norway have cut funding to Sri Lanka to express their displeasure with its human rights record and its inability to find a political solution to the conflict, there is no evidence of any support for the L T T E in these decisions. Unlike the Eritrean case, there is no question as to whether or not the L T T E de facto state has attained some sort of higher standing in international society. Rather, there is clearly a perception in some quarters of international society that the L T T E is nothing more than a group of outlaw terrorists. While they do engage in terrorism, this viewpoint neglects the governance provided by the LTTE, particularly in the Jaffna Peninsula. It also neglects the fact that the L T T E easily meet most of the criteria that would once have accorded them the legal status of belligerency.95 This status, though, is generally not accorded on a de jure basis in the modern era. Certainly, there is no sense in the international community that the L T T E and the Sri Lankan government are to be treated as equals with a strict duty of neutrality imposed on outside parties in regard to the conflict—as would be required under traditional international law if the L T T E had belligerent status.96 Considering their atrocious human rights record, it is unlikely that the L T T E can ever hope to attain any higher status in international society other than passive neglect of its de facto statehood. 94This can be seen from the international community's total unwillingness to condemn India's unilateral humanitarian airdrop of relief supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula against the expressed wishes of the Sri Lankan government. See Bastiampillai, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia," pp. 110-111; and Singer, "New Realities in Sri Lankan Politics," p. 420 for more on this. 9 5 0f the eight different criteria postulated by Reisman & Suzuki and Rosalyn Higgins, the LTTE meet six and at least partially meet the other two. See the text at footnotes # 9-10 in chapter two. 96For more on the legal duties imposed by the recognition of belligerency, see Higgins, "International Law and Civil Conflict," p. 171; Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, pp. 286-287; and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 96. Ill Chapter Four Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus This chapter follows the same basic format as chapter three and considers our two remaining case studies: the Republic of Somaliland and the TRNC. An overall conclusion summarizing the findings of these two chapters is included as well. 112 The Republic of Somaliland 4.1 Background information A former British colony located in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland comprises a total area of approximately 68,000 square miles. It is bordered to the west by Djibouti, to the south by Ethiopia, to the east by Somalia, and to the north by the Gulf of Aden. The current population of Somaliland is usually thought to be somewhere in the two to three million range.1 According to Hussein Adam, "The people are homogeneous in language, religion (Islam) and customs: social pluralism manifests itself in clan rather than ethnic cleavages."2 Approximately two-thirds of the population belongs to the Isaaq3 clan. The Isaaq's traditional land comprises all of Somaliland except the extreme eastern and western reaches. Toward the western border with Djibouti, the Dir clan predominates. This clan itself comprises two main sub-clans: the Gadabursi and the Issa. These two groups account for approximately 15 percent of Somaliland's total population. Toward the eastern border, the Darod clan predominates. This clan is also divided into two main sub-clans: the Dulbahantes and the Warsangelis. These two groups account for approximately 20 percent of the population.4 Somaliland's economy is based primarily on nomadic pastoralism. Its major source of income derives from the export of livestock (camels, cattle, goats, and sheep) to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States through the port of Berbera. Somaliland first became a legal and political jurisdiction in the late nineteenth century when the European colonial powers divided the Somali peninsula into five separate zones. The French established the colony of Djibouti. The British established the •Ronald McMullen estimates 2.7 million people; John Drysdale figures "two million or so"; and Hussein Adam refers to "approximately three million." See Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 22; John Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, revised ed. (Hove, U.K.: Global-Stats Ltd., 1992), p. 1; and Ronald K. McMullen, "Somaliland: The Next Eritrea?" Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 2 (Winter 1993), p. 428. 2Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 22. 3This clan's name is variously spelled Isaak, Isaaq, and Isaq. This dissertation will standardize its spelling to Isaaq unless it appears inside a quotation. Note: the Issa are a completely separate group. 4McMullen, "Somaliland: The Next Eritrea?" p. 428; and Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 22. 113 Protectorate of Somaliland in the north and they also occupied the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, which is now the northern province of Kenya. The Ethiopians ruled the Ogaden region and the Italians established their colony of Somalia along the remainder of the southern coast.5 Somaliland would remain a British protectorate until 1960. As independence approached, all of the parties and candidates participating in Somaliland's pre-independence legislative elections advocated union with Somalia, then a U N trust territory and itself about to be granted independence. Ronald McMullen observes that "The contending Somaliland parties differed on the issue of unification only in the speed and timing of the merger, but unification was nearly universally favored by party leaders and the man-in-fhe-street alike."6 While the proposed unification initially had widespread support in Somaliland, it soon ran into problems. Foremost among these problems was the decision to advance the dates of independence for both Somaliland and Somalia due to U N pressure. This put severe pressure on the internal administrations of both territories, particularly as no one had yet been given the responsibility for drafting the legal basis of this proposed union. The U N voted to move up Somalia's independence date from 2 December to 1 July 1960. The British government subsequently announced that Somaliland would be granted its independence on 26 June 1960. Somaliland's five days of sovereign statehood (26 June -1 July 1960) would later feature prominently in its attempt to formulate a justification for secession. Originally, the plan was for delegates from Somaliland and Somalia to sign an international treaty between the two states to form a union. On 27 June 1960, Somaliland's legislative assembly passed the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law. This was sent to Mogadishu, but it was never signed. Instead, on 30 June 1960, the legislative assembly of Somalia passed its own, substantially different, Atto di Unione (Act of Union). 5Rakiya Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," Current History 93 (May 1994), p. 232. 6McMullen, "Somaliland: The Next Eritrea?" p. 423. 114 Then, on 31 January 1961, the Somali assembly repealed the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law and proclaimed a new Act of Union, retroactive as from 1 July 1960. The validity of the union between Somaliland and Somalia is brought into question for three main reasons. First, both parties never gave their consent to the same agreement. Second, the new Act of Union was subject to approval in a referendum. In the June 1961 referendum on the unified country's new constitution, the north's leading party, the Somali National League (SNL) campaigned against ratification and called for a boycott of the referendum. More than half of the eligible electorate heeded the boycott call. Of the 100,000 people who did vote, well over one-half voted against the constitution. Third, a subsequent court case held that the Act of Union was not valid in Somaliland. In that case, the judge acquitted a group of military officers implicated in a coup attempt because, in the absence of a valid Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland.7 Somaliland's union with Somalia did go ahead, though. Northern grievances against southern Somali domination began appearing almost immediately. A key northern complaint was that the south monopolized all the key political posts. Southern Somalia provided the new country's president, prime minister, commander of the army, head of the police, and ten out of its fourteen cabinet ministers. The centralization of government in Mogadishu (1,500 miles from Hargeisa, the north's former capital) meant that economic and political opportunities also became concentrated there. Additionally, the south provided the country's flag, its constitution, and its national anthem: Somaliland, which had been accustomed to British administration and whose official language was English, was forced to adapt to a much different Italian system of administration and to the use of written and spoken Italian. Popular resentment of this southern domination was 7For various perspectives on this period, see Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of Secession, pp. 11-12; Carroll and Rajagopal, "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland," pp. 660-661; and Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," pp. 23-26. 115 manifested in the north's decisive rejection of the constitutional referendum and in a failed coup attempt led by northern officers in late 1961.8 Events took a dramatic turn for the worse in 1969 when Mohamed Siad Barre came to power in a military coup. Siad Barre's military dictatorship intensified the politicization of clan identities. His government's misdirected interventions in the economy also contributed to the impoverishment of all Somalis. The Isaaq came in for particularly bad treatment from his regime. Hussein Adam argues that under his rule, the country's "inequality in power-sharing exploded and reached neofascist proportions with Siad treating the majority clan-family in the north, the Isaaq, as if they were aliens...."9 Isaaq grievances intensified following the conclusion of Somalia's 1977 - 1978 Ogaden war with Ethiopia. After that war, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis fled Ethiopia for Somalia. Siad Barre's regime organized them into militia units and then resettled them in the north where they terrorized the local population. The refugees' preferential treatment in terms of jobs, land, and allocation of services reduced the Issaq "to the status of second-class citizens in their own region."10 In 1981, Isaaq opponents of Siad Barre's regime formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London. Shortly thereafter, the S N M moved its base of operations to Ethiopia. The S N M was not much of a military threat to the Siad Barre regime until 1988. It had conducted a number of cross-border military incursions from Ethiopia into the former Somaliland, but its main base of operations remained inside Ethiopia. In 1988, Ethiopian leader Mengistu told the S N M to cease its military activities from Ethiopian soil. 8Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 24; Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, pp. 13-18; and Hussein M. Adam, "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?" in Collapsed States, ed. I. William Zarunan, p. 74. 9Hussein M. Adam, "Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination," in Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, ed. Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth, p. 122. 10Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," p. 233. 116 This led to the SNM's decision to take all of its forces and launch surprise military attacks against the northern Somaliland cities of Hargeisa and Burao in May 1988.11 Siad Barre's forces responded to these S N M attacks with a brutal counter-offensive. Hargeisa and Burao were subjected to intense and mdiscrirninate artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. Most estimates are that between 70 and 80 percent of Hargeisa was razed by the government's indiscriminate shelling. Between 50 - 60,000 people were killed and another 400 - 500,000 refugees fled to Ethiopia. As these people fled, their property was looted and/or destroyed by government troops. The Siad Barre regime's myriad human rights violations in former Somaliland also included summary executions, rape, torture, imprisonment without charges, and the laying of more than one million unmarked land-mines in the region. Livestock were slaughtered, and some refugees were even strafed by Somali planes after they had already crossed into Ethiopia. 1 2 The May 1988 S N M offensive and the brutal retaliation it provoked marked a taming point in Somaliland's history in two ways. First, by producing hundreds of thousands of refugees, Siad Barre inadvertently brought the S N M into a much more direct relationship with the people it claimed to represent than anything it had previously experienced. Second, the sheer brutality of the human rights violations led to a dramatic hardening of attitudes among the northern population. Throughout the 1980s, the leadership of the S N M had consistently maintained that it was not advocating secession. In part, this was a tactical decision designed to placate the fears of Mengistu who, in February 1982, had explicitly warned the S N M that a secessionist movement would not receive support or toleration from Ethiopia. 1 3 In larger part, though, this non-secessionist stance was taken because it was genuinely felt that northern grievances could be addressed uFor more on this period, see Hussein M. Adam, "Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland and the Horn of Africa," in Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation, ed. Amare Tekle, pp. 150-151. 12Carroll and Rajagopal, "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somalia," pp. 665-666; Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," p. 233; Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 29; Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, pp. 15-18; and Matt Bryden, "Somaliland: Fiercely Independent," Africa Report 39 (November-December 1994), p. 39. 13Bryden, "Somaliland: Fiercely Independent," p. 37. 117 within a reformed Somalia under a new leader. Al l of this changed after 1988. As Rakiya Omaar puts it, Somaliland's population "crossed the Rubicon of secession in May 1988. The scale and ferocity of the war in the north had nurtured a visceral hatred not only of the regime but of everything it represented, including the union."1 4 As in the Ethiopian case, it was not one guerrilla movement that defeated Siad Barre, but rather a loose coalition of groups, foremost among whom were the SNM, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). In January 1991, USC forces under the leadership of General Mohamed Farah Aideed scored a major victory against the government. Their gains ultimately led to Siad Barre's flight from Mogadishu on 27 January 1991. Before his fall, the SNM, USC, and S P M had all agreed to cooperate with each other in the formation of a provisional government. However, while General Aideed was in pursuit of Siad Barre's retreating forces, another USC faction, under the leadership of hotel owner Al i Mahdi Mohamed, declared itself to be the new government of all of Somalia. This decision would ultimately prove to be the straw that broke the Somaliland camel's back in terms of secession.15 Even as late as early 1991, the S N M was not advocating secession. In a series of documents in early 1991, it proposed a sort of devolved regionalism for Somalia. Similarly, no mention of secession was made at a conference of four northern political parties held in Berbera from 15-27 February 1991. After witnessing the total devastation of their cities and hearing of Al i Mahdi's unilateral decision to declare himself president, however, Somaliland's general population wanted nothing to do with the south. The S N M called a popular congress in Burao, which started in May 1991. When radio reports suggested that S N M leaders would attend reconciliation meetings with political leaders in the south, crowds of civilians and soldiers surrounded the congress hall in Burao to 14Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," pp. 233-234. 15Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, pp. 19-23; Bryden, "Somaliland: Fiercely Independent," p. 39; and Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia: The Best Chance for Peace," Africa Report 38 (May-June 1993), p. 45. 118 demand secession. The SNM's formal declaration of Somaliland's independence was issued on 18 May 1991. The measure passed without abstention or dissent.16 S N M chairman Abdiraham Ahmed Al i "Tur" (Tur is a nom de guerre which translates as the hunchback) became Somaliland's first president on 26 May 1991. His adrninistration soon came under severe criticism. Rakiya Omaar referred to it as "a haphazard creation without coherent administrative structures," while Julie Flint argued that Tur's "political leadership was both inert and incompetent."17 Foremost among Tur's problems was the inter-clan fighting which took place in 1992. In January of that year, fighting broke out in Burao and, in March, even more serious hostilities broke out in Berbera. This fighting in Berbera led a group of clan elders to embark upon a series of local and regional conferences that ultimately culminated in a grand national conference, held in Borama from January - May 1993. This conference not only sought to find solutions to the inter-clan fighting; it also developed a constitutional format for Somaliland and led to a change of government. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland's former prime minister, was elected by a group of clan elders to replace Tur as president in May 1993.1 8 While much of the world's attention at this point was devoted to the chaos, famine, and banditry of southern Somalia, Somaliland itself was a comparative picture of stability and good governance. Anthony Carroll and B . Rajagopal characterize it as "the most stable region in the Horn...." while Peter Biles notes that "the peace and stability which has been restored in Somaliland... is a stark contrast to the continuing chaos in Mogadishu."1 9 In spite of its relative success, Somaliland has failed to secure any international recognition. Indeed, it has had a variety of clashes with the United Nations Operation in 16Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, pp. 24-26; Omaar, "Somalia: The Best Chance for Peace," p. 45; Bryden, "Somaliland: Fiercely Independent," pp. 38-39; and Adam, "Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination," pp. 117-119. 17Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," p. 234; and Julie Flint, "Somaliland: Struggling to Survive," Africa Report 39 (January-February 1994), p. 37. 18Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 33; and Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," pp. 234-235. 19Carroll and Rajagopal, "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland," p. 680; and Peter Biles, "Somalia: Going it Alone," Africa Report 37 (January-February 1992), p. 58. 119 Somalia (UNOSOM). U N O S O M has been accused of focusing all of its attention on Mogadishu; not offering any assistance to Somaliland; and working to undermine its independence bid by bankrolling disaffected forces loyal to Abdirahman Ahmed Al i Tur, who now campaigns for a united Somalia. In August 1994, the Egal administration expelled U N O S O M from Somaliland territory.20 In spite of its lack of international recognition, the Republic of Somaliland continues to survive, having recently celebrated the sixth anniversary of its declaration of independence. The Egal administration does not have unchallenged authority over the entire country, but the writ of Mogadishu is nowhere to be felt in Somaliland. 4.2 Somaliland as a de facto state 4.2.1 Territory The Somaliland territorial justification, like Eritrea's, is based on its former colonial borders. As this unit was administered separately from Somalia for more than 70 years (1887 - 1960), the Somaliland territorial justification is comparatively quite strong. Unlike the Eritrean case, Somaliland was even a sovereign state, albeit only for five days. Thus, in addition to arguing that a reversion to colonial borders would not violate the self-determination of a colonial entity, nor result in any change to existing frontiers, Somaliland can also argue that its independence would not be secession, but rather a reversion to sovereignty.21 Granting Somaliland independence would thus create a much weaker precedent for other ethnonationalist movements than, say, the granting of independence to Biafra or Katanga would have done. Still, as McMullen argues, "This narrower 'reestablishment' window... might still provide rationale for potential separatist conflicts in south Yemen, Zanzibar, northwestern Cameroon, the Hejaz, and elsewhere."22 20Bryden, "Somaliland: Fiercely Independent," p. 40; Flint, "Somaliland: Struggling to Survive," pp. 37-38; and Bryden, "Interview: President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal," p. 42. 21For more on the concept of reversion to sovereignty, see Charles H. Alexandrowicz, "New and Original States:The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty," International Affairs 45 (July 1969), pp. 465-480. 22McMullen, "Somaliland: The Next Eritrea?" p. 430. 120 The extent of territory controlled by the S N M has varied considerably in the years since 1988. Prior to its May 1988 offensive, the S N M did not have any substantive territorial control inside Somaliland itself. The initial high point of the S N M s territorial control probably came in 1989 and 1990, in the aftermath of its surprise invasion in 1988. During that time period, only the main cities such as Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera remained under Siad Barre's control. The S N M controlled virtually the entire countryside outside of these few cities.23 According to Hussein Adam, "After 1988 the SNM, for all practical purposes, came to constitute a counter-government with all the responsibilities that go with that transformation."24 One can see parallels here between the 1989 -1990 S N M and the 1977 - 1978 EPLF. Though ferocious, from a military perspective, Siad Barre's counter-offensive was not nearly as effective as the 1978 Ethiopian counter-offensive against the EPLF. The S N M remained in control of most of the countryside. In 1991, as Siad Barre's regime was collapsing, the S N M captured Hargeisa on 31 January, and controlled all of Somaliland's major cities by 5 February.25 At the time it declared independence in May 1991, the S N M either controlled or faced no effective opposition in all of Somaliland. This situation was not, however, to last for long. The decision of clan elders to replace Somaliland's first president, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tur, with Mohamed mrahim Egal in May 1993 plunged Somaliland's fledgling administration into deep trouble. Tur aligned himself with Mohamed Farah Aideed and began fighting for a unified Somalia. In November 1994, troops loyal to Tur and to Egal fought a pitched battle in the streets of Hargeisa. This and other subsequent fighting was serious enough to send up to 90,000 refugees fleeing from Somaliland to Ethiopia.2 6 It is difficult to state with any exact 23Adam, "Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination," p. 117; and Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, p. 12. 24Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 29. 25Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, p. 20. 26Amnesty International refers to "tens of thousands"; Reuters World Service estimates 85,000; and the U.S. Department of State puts the figure at 90,000 refugees. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1995 (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1995), pp. 261-262; "New Influx of 121 certainty how much of Somaliland the Egal administration now controls. Certainly, Egal controls Hargeisa, the port city of Berbera, and the road connecting them. Areas in the far east of Somaliland are apparently not hostile to Egal's government, but are presently unadministered. Tur's opposition forces are now based around Burao, to the south-east of Hargeisa.27 One of Tur's lieutenants has boasted that Egal's administration only controls one-third of the country's area,28 while the US State Department believes that the Republic of Somaliland has "created functional administrative institutions, albeit in only a small portion of the territory it claims to rule."2 9 Against this, however, a number of aid officials and government ministers dismiss the threat from Tur's forces as a mere nuisance. His forces are, in this conception, not seen as capable of posing any real threat to the Egal administration. They can, however, harass it and hinder its campaign for international recognition.30 While the exact extent of the administration's present degree of territorial control in Somaliland is a matter of dispute, it is certain that the government does not control all of Somaliland and that its rule is contested. 4.2.2 Relations with society The S N M has chosen to organize Somaliland according to what we are calling the state principle. This can be shown in a number of ways. First, the S N M bases its territorial claim on Somaliland's colonial frontiers; it is not seeking to achieve independence for an "Isaaq homeland," nor does it want to redraw Somaliland's borders to exclude other non-Isaaq groups. Second, upon achieving its military victories in 1991, the S N M carefully pursued a policy of non-retaliation against other clans, some of whom (especially the Dulbahante, Gadabursi, and Warsangeli) had been quite friendly with the Somali Refugees to Ethiopia," Reuters World Service. 12 May 1995; and U. S. Department of State Dispatch, "Somalia Human Rights Practices, 1995" (Washington, D.C., March 1996). 27"Somalia: Somaliland They Call It," The Economist. 8 April 1995; and "Somaliland: Another Country," The Economist. 18 May 1996. 28"Rival Somaliland Group Scorns Ceasefire Call," Reuters World Service. 21 May 1995. 2 9 U . S. Department of State Dispatch, "Somalia Human Rights Practices, 1995." 30"Rebels Attack Government Forces in Somaliland," Reuters World Service. 20 January 1996; and "In Somaliland, a New State Rises From the Ruins," Reuters World Service. 27 January 1996. 122 Siad Barre regime. Its decision not to seek vengeance may have been taken merely on the basis of its own rational self-interest. It did, however, help Somaliland avoid the factional fighting and internecine warfare that so devastated southern Somalia.31 Third, the S N M leadership has practiced a version of consociational democracy (discussed below) which places a premium on the use of clan elders in mediation efforts and which seeks to ensure that all clans are represented in government. The 1993 grand national conference was deliberately held in Borama (a non-Isaaq town) to emphasize inclusivity. The Guurti (council of elders) which elected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal president also elected Abdirahman Al i Farah (a Gadabursi) as his vice-president. The speaker of Somaliland's parliament is a Dulbahante. President Egal has promised that any referendum on secession would require at least 70 percent approval to ensure that there was minority support for independence. Somaliland has given up the fiction of pretending that clan loyalties no longer matter. In acknowledging the reality of clans, however, the SNMs leadership has gone some way toward ensuring that all clans are represented within the Somaliland de facto state.32 On the question of popular support, the Republic of Somaliland has a mixed record. On the one hand, there was clear popular support for the declaration of independence. The skillful use of clan elders and traditional methods of mediation has also given the Somaliland regime a legitimate historical continuity with its own society's practices that many governments in the so-called Third World manifestly lack. The continuing conflict in southern Somalia also provides Somaliland with a negative form of popular support. On the other hand, the S N M has failed to establish its authority over all of its purported sovereign state. The tens of thousands of refugees produced by the inter-clan fighting in Somaliland can be seen as tens of thousands of people voting against the 31Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," p. 236; and Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, p. 24. 32Biyden, "Interview: President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal," p. 42; McMullen, "Somaliland: The Next Eritrea?" p. 429; Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," pp. 32-33; and Bryden, "Somaliland: Fiercely Independent," p. 40. 123 Egal administration with their feet. In addition to Abdirahman Ahmed Al i Tur, the S N M also faces small, but well-organized Islamic fundamentalist opposition to its rule. 3 3 President Egal's introduction of a new currency, the Somaliland shilling, and his attempt to make it the country's sole currency have also drawn widespread opposition from businessmen and aid groups. The Somaliland shilling, which was introduced at an official rate of 80 Somaliland shillings to one US dollar was soon trading in the markets at a rate of480 shillings to the dollar. It currently trades at a rate of more than 500 shillings to the dollar.3 4 The Somaliland regime does, however, appear to have made substantial progress recently in mollifying the opposition to its rule. The government has made peace with a number of armed opposition groups and the relative calm thus produced has led to thousands of refugees voluntarily returning from Ethiopia.3 5 Perhaps at this point the most that one can say is that the Somaliland de facto state has secured broad popular support but also generated some opposition. The last question considered under the relations with its own society category is that of democratic accountability. The Somaliland de facto state does have a number of accomplishments here. First, its lack of retaliation against non-Isaaq clans that supported the Siad Barre regime and its attempt to include all clan groups in the workings of its government both count strongly in its favor. Second, its constitutional structure of government has evolved in a democratic manner. The 1993 Borama conference formally endorsed a structure which separates executive, legislative, and judicial powers from one another. It also adopted a president/vice-president style of executive branch and a bicameral legislature with the upper house being a Council of Elders and the lower house 33See McMullen, "Somaliland: The Next Eritrea?" pp. 429-430; and Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 38. 34See "Agencies Warn Over Northwest Somali Currency Law," Reuters World Service. 12 January 1996; "Somaliland: New Currency Law," The Indian Ocean Newsletter. # 702,20 January 1996; "European Aid for Berbera," The Indian Ocean Newsletter. # 706,17 February 1996; and "Somaliland: Another Country," The Economist 18 May 1996. 35See "Somaliland: All Eyes on Egal," The Indian Ocean Newsletter. # 765,17 May 1997; and " 'Somaliland' Leader Says a Nation Is Being Built," Agence France Presse. 15 June 1997. 124 being an elected Chamber of Representatives.36 The National Communities Conference in Hargeisa formally adopted a new constitution in February 1997 which maintains these features and provides for future presidential elections to be carried out by universal suffrage. The same conference, acting as an electoral college, also re-elected President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal for a five-year term. Egal won what his leading opponent termed a "fair and open" election by securing 223 votes from the 315 delegates present.37 Finally, Somaliland's use of traditional clan elders in what Adam terms a "consociational or power-sharing democracy" deserves mention. Unlike the EPLF, the S N M has not attempted to initiate any broad-based policy reforms. Whereas the EPLF attempted to transform its society, "The S N M tends to accept its own civil society and to rely on its elders and its politics of compromise."38 The SNM's use of neo-traditional structures involving religious and clan elders is most apparent at its national conferences, such as those held in Berbera, Burao, Borama, and Hargeisa. The search for consensus dictates that " S N M congresses be open, at times chaotic, always full of surprises, because they are full of compromises."39 Unlike Eritrea's radical social democracy which concentrates on substantive issues at the expense of electoral competition, Somaliland's consociational democracy "concentrates on procedures and mechanisms, as well as elaborate traditional protocol... at the expense of democratic content."40 4.2.3 Capabilities Of the four cases considered here, the Somaliland de facto state arguably has the least governing capabilities of all. As this entity is trying to break away from one of the poorest and most war-devastated countries in the world and is itself located in one of the poorest regions of the world, this lack of resources and capabilities should not come as a 36Adam, "Formation and Recogniuon of New States," p. 33. 37"Somaliland President Re-Elected in Landslide Vote," Reuters World Service. 23 February 1997; and "Egal Re-Elected," The Indian Ocean Newsletter. # 755,1 March 1997. 38Adam, "Formation and Recognition of New States," p. 30. 39Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 34. 125 great surprise. It is acknowledged forthrightly by the S N M leadership. According to President Egal, if Somaliland establishes an effective administration that can collect revenue, "then we will be able to sustain at least our recurrent expenses, in a skeletal form, for several years. We will not develop the country, we will not rebuild our ruined infrastructure, but I think we can subsist as a government."41 Presently, most government employees are still unsalaried, relying on outside sources of income for their sustenance. In spite of its many limitations, it does still make sense to speak of Somaliland as a de facto state in the sense of an organized political leadership that provides some degree of governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area. In addition to its grand national conferences and constitutional structure, Hussein Adam argues that whatever ultimately happens, "the independent administration in former British Somaliland would have served a useful purpose: it has facilitated relief efforts and the renewal of the formerly vital private sector."42 To these two main achievements, one might also add a third: the government's initiatives in the areas of security and demobilization. The Somaliland leadership are strong supporters of free market economics. This belief in the free market is not simply because the government's limited capabilities prevent it from doing anything else. Rather, it stems from the capitalist orientation of the Somali people themselves and a genuine belief "that the 'self-correction', incentive-promoting mechanism of the profit motive can assist the new nation in its recovery/rehabilitation and propel it forward towards meaningful development."43 The results of this commitment to the free market have been impressive. Livestock exports have more than tripled in the past two years and, in one twelve-month period from 1994 - 1995, the port of Berbera exported some US$ 100 million worth of livestock. The Somaliland de facto state derives its main source of revenue from taxes levied on these livestock exports. Recently these 4lBryden, "Interview: President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal," p. 42. 42Adam, "Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination," p. 121. 4 3 Adam, "Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland and the Horn of Africa," p. 158. 126 taxes have amounted to about US$ 30,000 a day.4 4 The main exception to the government's free market policy has been the attempt to force traders to use the new currency, the Somaliland shilling, as the country's exclusive currency. In terms of security, the S N M is attempting to demobilize the country's clan-based militias so it can retrain them and reorganize them into mixed-clan or multi-clan units. The S N M hopes to demobilize 50,000 militia members. Unfortunately, this is a costly process as work and training needs to be provided for the demobilized soldiers. Also, moving from a clan-based system to a mixed-clan system of organization increases costs as mixed-clan units will no longer be able to depend upon their home regions for food and other necessities. The Somaliland regime does not have sufficient funding to cover its needs and the response from the international community has been disappointing. As Julie Flint puts it, "The United Nations, which is spending $1.5 billion on the forcible disarming of the rest of Somalia, has so far promised much but delivered little. Non-governmental organizations can help, but cannot rehabilitate 6,000 men—far less 50,000."43 The lack of progress on demobilization is arguably the greatest single threat to Somaliland's stability. The S N M regime does, though, deserve credit for making Somaliland one of the safest regions in the Horn of Africa. In terms of its military capabilities, the S N M never really advanced beyond the stage of guerrilla warfare to the type of open, conventional warfare seen periodically in Sri Lanka and in Eritrea from the mid-1980s onward. Even today, the government is not in complete control of all its territory. This may, however, have something to do with Somaliland's consensus-based politics. According to The Economist, "Ill-armed gangs of no more than a few hundred should be little match for Somaliland's army of 15,000. But M r Egal says he does not want to humiliate his opponents and so ruin any chance of ^"Somalia: Somaliland They Call It," The Economist. 8 April 1995; and "Somaliland: Another Country," The Economist. 18 May 1996. 45Flint, "Somaliland: Struggling to Survive," pp. 36-37. See also Drysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, p. 30; and "Somalia: Drifting," The Economist 16 April 1994. 127 political reconciliation."46 Exactly how much of this is a lack of desire to humiliate and how much is a lack of ability to humiliate remains unclear. Our capabilities section also considers the question of external dependency. In this regard, Somaliland clearly cannot be labeled a puppet state. The S N M was dependent upon Ethiopia for bases from 1982 - 1988. It was forced to rely primarily on funding from expatriate Somali Isaaq communities in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, the Middle East, East Africa, and assorted Western countries.47 After 1988, the S N M ceased depending on Ethiopia for bases. The movement received comparatively little outside assistance and is noted for its self-reliance. Since 1991, the Somaliland de facto state has suffered from a distinct lack of external assistance. The fact that it remains unrecognized makes it ineligible to receive government-to-government loans and grants. As Rakiya Omaar explains, "Neither the government nor the public can comprehend the refusal of the U N and donor countries to assist Somaliland. The folly of spending millions to wage a military conflict in Mogadishu while withholding the thousands that could sustain peace in Somaliland has given their criticism a sharper edge."48 The Republic of Somaliland has received some external assistance—the European Union, for example, is providing about US$ 1.5 million to help upgrade Berbera's port—but the sums involved are quite small. We now come to the question of perseverance. Formally proclaimed in May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland has now been in existence for six years. If one considers particular areas or regions of Somaliland, then one might say that parts of this de facto state have been in existence since 1988. Considering its chaotic surrounding environment, its limited resources, and its lack of outside recognition, six years of de facto statehood for the Republic of Somaliland is no small accomplishment. 4.2.4 Relations with international society ^"Somaliland: Another Country," The Economist. 18 May 1996. 47Adam, "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?" p. 76. 480maar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time," p. 236. 128 Unlike the Eritreans from 1991 - 1993, there is really no question of Somaliland having any other status more advanced or accepted than de facto statehood. One could, however, argue that some of the initial hostility directed at the Somaliland secessionist bid has now given way to a more neutral viewpoint. According to John Drysdale, "The understandable international impetus, initially, for Somaliland to reunite with southern Somalia... appears to have faded."49 Non-governmental and governmental aid agencies are increasingly willing to deal with the Egal administration. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) now maintains a representative office in Hargeisa. In the fall of 1995, the US sent a fact-finding mission to Somaliland that included State Department officials, the American ambassador to Djibouti, and the head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAJD). The subtle shift in US policy appeared to be related to bellicose statements made at the time by now-deceased Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed. Aideed, who wanted forcibly to reunite Somaliland to Somalia, had been in alliance with Abdirahman Ahmed Al i Tur. Both leaders were reportedly being funded by Libya. When put in the context of potential domination by Libyan-financed warlords from the anarchical south, Somaliland's de facto statehood apparently no longer seemed so offensive.50 The US now deals with the Egal administration through the American embassy in Djibouti and, for aid projects, through the USAID office in Nairobi. 5 1 The Republic of Somaliland remains largely ignored and it has not advanced beyond de facto statehood. It does seem, however, to have won for itself a degree of toleration and grudging acceptance by the members of international society. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 4.3 Background information 49Diysdale, Somaliland: The Anatomy of a Secession, p. 31. 5 0 On the UNDP, see "Somaliland; President Tells UN Official Aid Agencies Doing More Harm Than Good," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 6 June 1995. On the American visit, see "Somalia Breakthrough as Americans Visit Somaliland," Africa News. September 1995; and "Somalia; Somaliland: Egal Receives Visiting US Delegation," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 11 November 1995. 5 •Telephone interview with Mr. Ken Shivers, US State Department desk officer for Djibouti and Somalia, 10 April 1997. 129 The third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, Cyprus has a total area of 3,572 square miles. It lies some 40 miles south of Turkey, 77 miles west of Syria, and 650 miles south-east of Greece. Today, the UN-patrolled "Green Line" which separates the island into the areas controlled by the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC comprises approximately three percent of Cyprus's total area. Depending upon whether one includes that land or not, the amount of territory controlled by the TRNC is between 34 and 37 percent of the island's total area. Demography is one of the most contentious issues in the entire Cyprus conflict. Greek and Turkish Cypriots comprise over 95 percent of the entire population, with the remainder being made up of Armenians, Maronites, British, and others. At the time of the Turkish invasion in 1974, Turkish Cypriots were thought to have numbered some 120,000—about 18 percent of the island's total population of 650,000. The TRNC's 1992 census estimated the population in Northern Cyprus to be 176,127 and the residents of Northern Cyprus may now account for almost 25 percent of the island's population. Like Sri Lanka, Cyprus is an example of the "double minority" problem—Greeks are a majority on the island itself, but there are far more Turks in the region than there are Greeks. There are two major arguments over Cypriot demography today. The first concerns refugees. Estimates of the number of Greek Cypriot refugees who left the north for the south range from 140,000 to 250,000. If it could be called that, a consensus view seems to put the number of Greek Cypriot refugees at around 160,000. Estimates of the number of Turkish Cypriot refugees who fled to the north range from "as many as 37,000" to "possibly 65,000," with a sort of consensus again emerging around a figure of about 45,000. The second major point of contention concerns the number of mainland Turks who have now settled in the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriot leadership does not acknowledge the presence of even 20,000 Turkish immigrants (Turkiyeli) in Northern Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, on the other hand, now claims that "more than 85,000 130 Turkish colonists" live in Northern Cyprus. A consensus figure on the number of Turkiyeti does not exist, but 40 - 45,000 would probably be a good estimate.52 At various times Cyprus has come under the rule of Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Greeks, Venetians, and the French. In 1571, the Ottomans conquered Cyprus and the first Turkish settlers arrived on the island—before, as the Turkish Cypriots like to point out, the Pugrims landed at Plymouth Rock. The Ottomans ruled Cyprus for over 300 years. In 1878, the British took over running Cyprus with the consent of the Ottoman government. Though administered by the British, Cyprus still remained under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman empire at this time. With the outbreak of World War I, the British formally annexed Cyprus in 1914. In 1925, it was made a crown colony.5 3 Turkish Cypriots find the roots of the island's pre-independence violence in the British decision to establish municipal councils in 1944. The manner in which these councils were run led the Turkish Cypriots to fear that the ultimate Greek Cypriot goal was enosis (union with Greece) and the elimination of all vestiges of Turkish culture from Cyprus. The demand for enosis gained strength in the 1950s under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios. During this time, the nationalist Greek Cypriot organization Ethniki Orgdnosis Kipriakou Agonos (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, E O K A ) began militarily pursuing independence from Britain. E O K A also began targeting Turkish Cypriots, who established the Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish Resistance Organization, TMT) in November 1957 to defend themselves. Greek Cypriots date the 52The above two paragraphs are based on a variety of sources including: Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus. Adelphi Papers, no. 234 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1988/9), pp. 20-21; Donis Christofinis, "The Partition of Cyprus: A Threat to International Security," World Marxist Review 27 (December 1984), p. 85; Behrooz Morvaridi, "Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd QHuntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1993), pp. 219-220; the editor's acknowledgments section in the same volume, p. x; Leonard W. Doob, "Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30 (June 1986), p. 385; Reed Coughlan, "Negotiating the Cyprus Problem: Leadership Perspectives from Both Sides of the Green Line," The Cyprus Review 3 (Fall 1991), p. 82; and Cyprus Newsletter (Washington, D. C : Embassy of Cyprus Press and Information Office), 6 July 1994, p. 1. 5 3 C . H. Dodd, "Historical Introduction," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, pp. 1-2; and Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 2,7, and 29. 131 start of the communal violence from 7 June 1958. In their view, the Turkish Cypriots started the communal violence by exploding a bomb at the Turkish consulate in Nicosia—an act which they then falsely blamed on Greek Cypriots. This gave them the excuse to burn and loot Greek Cypriot homes. The Greek Cypriots responded and fighting spread throughout the island.5 4 Whichever view one subscribes to, intercommunal violence was an established part of Cypriot life during its crown colony period. Cyprus became an independent republic on 16 August 1960. Unlike the vast majority of other colonies, Cyprus did not receive its independence by a unilateral act of the colonial power. Rather, its independence was the result of a series of negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and the U K carried out at two conferences (in Zurich and London) held during February 1959. These conferences produced three main documents. The first was the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus"—an outline of the essential provisions of the constitution. The second was the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus on the one hand and Greece, Turkey, and the U K on the other. The third was the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. The basic articles of the Cypriot constitution were unamendable and the constitution itself, as well as the independence, security, and territorial integrity of the island were guaranteed by Greece, Turkey, and the U K . Britain was allowed to retain sovereignty over two military bases and Greece and Turkey were each allowed to station limited numbers of troops on the island. Partition and union with any other state were prohibited. These documents were signed by representatives from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well as by officials from the three guarantor countries. The 199-article 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus contained a number of sui generis provisions. It provided for separate elections in each of the two main communities. Greek Cypriots would elect the president as well as 35 of the 50 members 54Eugene T. Rossides, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 17 (Spring 1991), p. 31. 132 of the legislature (70 percent). The Turkish Cypriot community would elect the vice-president and the other 15 (30 percent) members of the legislature. Each community would also elect its own Communal Chamber which would be empowered to deal with cultural, religious and educational affairs. There would also be separate municipal administrations (the Turkish Cypriots originally established their own municipal administrations in June 1958) for the island's five largest cities. The Council of Ministers was to be composed of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, with at least one of the key posts of defense, finance, or foreign affairs allocated to a Turkish Cypriot. In legislative matters dealing with changes to the electoral law, taxes, and municipal affairs, separate majorities from both communities are needed. Posts in the judiciary, civil service and police were to be allotted between the two communities on the basis of a 7:3 ratio and the army was to be formed on the basis of a 6:4 ratio.5 5 The Greek Cypriots argue that this constitution was imposed upon Cyprus from outside and that its provisions were inherently unworkable. They also believe that it was undemocratic in that it provided for minority veto government. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, see the 1960 constitution not as a dictated settlement, but rather as the product of mutual concessions and compromises. It was an innovative document which could have worked had there been sufficient cooperation between the two communities.56 A number of major controversies struck Cyprus soon after its independence. Greek and Turkish Cypriots had strong differences of opinions over such things as the composition of the civil service and the armed forces, the proper structuring of municipal government, the constitutional court, and taxes. Things came to a head on 30 November 55The above two paragraphs draw from a variety of sources including: Sakir Alemdar, "International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus. ed. C. H. Dodd, p. 79; Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," Survival 35 (Spring 1993), p. 120; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 10-11; Zaim M. Necatigil, "The Cyprus Conflict in International Law," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, p. 47; and Oberling, The Road to Bellapais. pp. 63-65. 56Lafreniere and Mitchell, "Cyprus: Visions for the Future," p. 12. For the Greek view see Rossides, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," p. 86. For the Turkish view, see Tamkoc, The Turkish Cypriot State, p. 57; and Alemdar, "International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem," p. 79. 133 1963, when President Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the constitution. These amendments would have deprived the president and vice-president of their veto powers; abolished the requirement of separate majorities for the passage of certain laws; established unified municipalities; and modified the stipulated ratios of Greek to Turkish Cypriots in the civil service, army, and security forces to reflect the island's actual ethnic composition. Seven of these proposed amendments involved changing the constitution's basic, supposedly unamendable, articles.57 The Turkish Cypriots refused to go along with these proposed constitutional changes. Their three ministers withdrew from the council of ministers and their 15 deputies left the legislature. The Greek Cypriots now refused to recognize Dr. Fazil Kiicuk as the country's vice-president. Violence between the two communities broke out on 21 December 1963. Four days later, three Turkish fighter planes flew over Nicosia as a warning. By 30 December, a neutral zone (the so-called green line) had been agreed upon in Nicosia and was being patrolled by British troops from the UK's two sovereign base areas on the island. Between 20 - 25,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their homes and villages during this initial fighting to seek safety in the larger Turkish enclaves. On 4 March 1964, the U N Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 186 authorizing the deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This force became operational on 27 March 1964. UNFICYP could not, however, stop the intercommunal violence. In 1964, the now exclusively Greek Cypriot government of President Makarios launched blockades against the Turkish Cypriot enclaves in Nicosia, Lefke, Limnitis, Kokkina, Famagusta, and Larnaca. Twice that year, the Turkish military threatened to invade Cyprus unless all attacks against the Turkish Cypriot community stopped. Also in 1964, the Cyprus Supreme Court approved the actions taken by the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives in the 57For more on this, see Dodd, "Historical Introduction," p. 7; Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 17-24; Oberling, The Road to Bellapais. pp. 71-84; and Rossides, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," pp. 31-32. 134 absence of the Turkish Cypriot members to amend unilaterally the country's constitution. This was justified on the basis of the "doctrine of necessity."58 Similarly offensive to the Turkish Cypriots was Resolution 186 referring to the "Cyprus Government" in such a way as to recognize the now exclusively Greek Cypriot administration as constituting the legitimate government of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. From the Turkish Cypriot point of view, the Republic of Cyprus ceased to exist after December 1963.59 The next ten years were characterized by continued intercommunal violence. One of the more serious crises occurred in 1967 when the presence of Greek troops well in excess of what was permitted under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance led Turkey again to threaten an invasion of Cyprus if the violence continued. By this point, the Turkish Cypriots had largely withdrawn from isolated positions or mixed villages to their own enclaves. From December 1963 forward, they had been governing themselves under the leadership of a 13-member General Committee headed by vice-president Kucuk. On 28 December 1967, this Committee was transformed into the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration, complete with its own constitution, legislative assembly, and communal chamber drawn from those established under the 1960 constitution. The Turkish Cypriots dissolved their legislature to hold elections for new members on 5 July 1970—the first time they were able to do so since the initial violence broke out in December 1963.6 0 In July 1974, a Greek-backed coup attempt was launched against the government of President Makarios. Though Makarios escaped, his government was deposed. Nicos Sampson, a former E O K A assassin, was installed as president on 15 July 1974. The Turkish government then invited the British to join them in intervening under the Treaty of 58The above two paragraphs are drawn from a variety of sources including: Cooper and Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," p. 120; Dodd, "Historical Introduction," pp. 7-9; Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 35-37 and 52-56; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 12-14; and Oberling, The Road to Bellapais. pp. 98-127. 59Dodd, "Historical Introduction," p. 8; Alemdar, "International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem," p. 81; and Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. 2nd ed., p. 13. 60McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 15-16; Necatigil, "The Cyprus Conflict in International Law," p. 56; and C. H. Dodd, "From Federated State to Republic: 1975-1984," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, pp. 103-104. 135 Guarantee. The British declined and the Turkish army launched its initial invasion of Cyprus on 20 July 1974. After establishing a beachhead on the island, the Turkish forces agreed to a cease-fire on 22 July 1974. Under the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, the two sides were to exchange prisoners and hostages and Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were supposed to evacuate the Turkish Cypriot enclaves that they had occupied. Numerous Turkish Cypriot villages remained under siege, though, and attacks continued to be launched against the enclaves. Arguing that the Turkish Cypriot humanitarian situation continued to worsen, the Turkish army launched a second invasion of Cyprus from 14-16 August 1974. This second invasion dramatically expanded the amount of territory under Turkish control and led to the partition of Cyprus which exists today.61 The Turkish attempt to justify their invasions of Cyprus is composed of a number of elements. First, citing a letter that President Makarios wrote to the president of Greece on 2 July 1974 and an appearance that he made before the U N Security Council on 19 July 1974, the Turks argue that the Greek-backed coup was an invasion of Cyprus, a flagrant violation of its independence, and an attempt to abolish the state. Therefore, the Turkish interventions were in response to prior Greek interventions. Second, the grave condition of the Turkish Cypriot community is used to provide a humanitarian justification. Third, the legal claim is based on Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee which gives each contracting party the unilateral "right to take action" if the other parties do not agree to undertake joint action. In the Turkish view, the procedural requirements were met in their consultations with the British, which the Greeks refused to attend. Fourth, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots failed to implement the provisions of the Geneva Declaration.62 The Greek Cypriot objections to the Turkish invasions are also composed of a number of different parts. First, the Sampson coup was overturned on 23 July 1974 and 61Cooper and Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," pp. 120-121; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 18-19; Oberling, The Road to Bellapais. pp. 168-181; Dodd, "Historical Introduction," pp. 10-11; and Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. 2nd ed., pp. 72-74. 62Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 74-123. 136 the legitimate constitutional order in Cyprus was reestablished. Second, Article IVs use of the word "action" does not authorize the use of "force" or "military action." Even if it did, the Treaty of Guarantee could not take precedence over Article 2 (4) of the U N Charter. If Article IV is construed as authorizing the use of "force" (a word not mentioned in the entire Treaty) it is inconsistent with the U N Charter and consequently void ab initio under Article 103 of the Charter. Third, Turkey consulted with the U K , but not with Greece. Therefore, the procedural requirements of Article IV were not met. Fourth, the Treaty of Guarantee specifically prohibits partition—which is what the second invasion imposed upon Cyprus. Fifth, the Treaty of Guarantee only provides for action to restore the status quo ante. This had been done by 23 July 1974. The second invasion clearly established a new situation.63 Following a series of population exchange agreements, nearly all of the Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south moved north and most Greek Cypriots left for the south. In February 1975, the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). A fifty-member constituent assembly drew up a constitution for the TFSC which was overwhelrningly approved in a popular referendum held on 8 June 1975. Rauf Denktash64 was elected president of the TFSC the following year. The TFSC was presented by the Turkish Cypriots not as a breakaway state, but rather as a constituent member of a future federated Cyprus. It did not ask for international recognition. U N Security Council Resolution 376 of 12 March 1975 noted that this proclamation was not intended to prejudge a final settlement. The establishment of the TFSC was not seen as a UDI and Resolution 376 did not call on states to withhold recognition as the relevant resolutions on UDI Rhodesia had done.65 63Jacovides, "Cyprus—The International Law Dimension," p. 1227; and Rossides, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," pp. 48-60. 64This gentleman's last name is also spelled Denktas or Denktas with a cedilla on the s. This study will standardize the spelling to Denktash. 65McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 21-22; Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, p. 89-92; and Dodd, "From Federated State to Republic: 1975-1984," pp. 104-106. 137 On 17 June 1983, the TFSC assembly passed a declaration asserting that the Turkish Cypriots' right to self-detennination. In November 1983, President Denktash decided to declare independence. In his opinion, nothing short of a declaration of independence would make the world see that there were two nations in Cyprus. Such a declaration would also force the Greek Cypriots to move towards a negotiated settlement. The decision was taken at this time because it was the interim period in Turkey between the election and the taking of office of Prime Minister Tiirgut Ozal. Denktash felt that the outgoing military administration would be unable to stop the declaration while the incoming government would be presented with a fait accompli. He told all of the party leaders that if they did not vote for independence they would automatically exclude themselves from participation in the future republic. This was interpreted by some opposition leaders as a threat to exile them if they voted against independence. On 15 November 1983, the TFSC assembly unanimously approved a declaration of independence and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This decision was later ratified by 70.16 percent of the electorate in a referendum held on 5 May 1985. Denktash was reelected president the following month.66 The Turkish Cypriots tried to formulate their declaration of independence in such a way that the establishment of the TRNC would not be seen as precluding a bi-communal settlement of the Cyprus problem. The declaration stipulates that the TRNC will not unite with any other state, except with the southern part of Cyprus, to form a federal union. While it is presented as an exercise of the Turkish Cypriots' right of self-determination, it also reserves for them the right to exercise that same right once more to establish a federal 66Dodd, "From Federated State to Republic: 1975-1984," pp. 125-132; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, p. 43; Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. 2nd ed., pp. 116-121; and Jonathan Warner, "Political Choice: Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, pp. 203-204. 138 republic of Cyprus. As the declaration itself puts it, "The proclamation of the new State will not hinder, but facilitate the establishment of a genuine federation."67 The U N Security Council responded by passing Resolution 541 on 18 November 1983 with 13 votes in favor, one against (Pakistan) and one abstention (Jordan). Resolution 541 deplores "the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus..., Considers the declaration... as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal." It also "Calls upon all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus." The language of this resolution was much stronger than the comparable language of Resolution 376 on the formation of the TFSC. Only one state, Turkey, recognized the new entity. A variety of international negotiations aimed at finding an overall solution to the Cyprus conflict have failed to produce any comprehensive settlement. The first face to face summit meeting between the two presidents took place in 1977. Major negotiating efforts also took place in 1979, and from 1984 - 1986, and from 1988 - 1989. U N Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced a multi-faceted "Set of Ideas" which was endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 750 of 1992 "as an appropriate basis for reaching an overall framework agreement." Unfortunately, the Set of Ideas has not produced a settlement nor has agreement even been reached on its modest "Confidence Building Mechanisms."68 Though both communities have committed themselves to a bi-communal and bi-regional federal republic, wide disparities still characterize each side's position. Essentially, the Greek Cypriots seek a strong federal government with substantial and residual authority over most matters of importance. In their vision, the regional governments would only cover such specifically defined matters as education and social 67The TRNC's declaration of independence is reproduced in appendix 16 of Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. 2nd ed. See also Denktash's comments on p. 149 of that book and Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 174-175, 197-198, and 279. 6 8 A . J. R. Groom, "The Process of Negotiation, 1974-1993," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, pp. 15-45; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 24 and 76-77; and Coughlan, "Negotiating the Cyprus Problem," pp. 80-100. 139 services. The implementation of the so-called "three freedoms"—the rights to own property, to settle, and to have freedom of movement—throughout the entire island are crucial for the Greek Cypriots. Confederal solutions, borders between the two federated units, and any restrictions on the three freedoms are unacceptable. Greek Cypriots also insist on the immediate withdrawal of all Turkish troops and they refuse to countenance any form of future Turkish military guarantee. The Turkish Cypriots accuse the Greek Cypriots of seeking a centralized, unitary state that is federal in name alone. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots believe that the regional governments should be paramount with the powers of the federal government sharply limited to a few specific areas. Residual powers would belong to the federated states. If this weak federation proved itself to be effective, then future powers could be devolved to it by the regional units—a sort of federation by accretion. The implementation of the three freedoms would be qualified for fear of their federated unit being overwhelmed by the more numerous Greek Cypriots. They insist on some sort of continued Turkish military guarantee and believe that a settlement should precede any withdrawal of the Turkish troops On the island. The Greek Cypriots accuse the Turkish Cypriots of seeking a confederation of two partitioned independent states that is genuinely federal in name alone.69 4.4 Northern Cyprus as a de facto state 4.4.1 Territory Of the four cases considered here, the Turkish Cypriots clearly have the weakest territorial justification of all. Their territorial claim is based neither on historical occupancy (as with the Tamils), on former colonial status, or on pre-existing internal boundaries (i.e., the northern and eastern provinces for the Tamils). Historically, one can 69The above two paragraphs are drawn from: Jay Rothman, "Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus," in Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives, ed. I. William Zartman (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 98-105; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 22-23; Lafreniere and Mitchell, "Cyprus: Visions for the Future," pp. 15-16,40 and 70; Jacovides, "Cyprus—The International Law Dimension," pp. 1223 and 1229; Coughlan, "Negotiating the Cyprus Problem," pp. 91-96; Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, pp. 147-151; and Robert McDonald, "Cyprus: The UN Tries Again," The World Today 40 (October 1984), pp. 421-423. 140 argue that the island's two communities maintained their own separate religions, cultures, languages and local governing institutions in spite of more than four centuries of shared coexistence on Cyprus.7 0 The Turkish Cypriots, though, cannot point to distinct parts of the island that they have historically occupied. Nor can they base their claim on any internal boundaries. The two communities lived interspersed throughout the whole island and approximately 80 percent of the original inhabitants of what is now Northern Cyprus were Greek Cypriots. In essence, the Turkish Cypriot territorial claim is based on two main factors—one theoretical and the other factual. The theoretical basis for the territorial claim is the belief that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together peacefully. Therefore, to ensure their communal security, the Turkish Cypriots require a separate territory of their own. The factual part of this territorial justification is that the Turkish Cypriots have indeed had their own territory in Northern Cyprus since 1974. However illegitimate the existence of the TRNC is deemed to be, this actual possession of territory is a hard cold reality which cannot be ignored. As Pierre Oberling puts it, "Inasmuch as they already occupy the area being contested and have the full military and political backing of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots have been in the enviable position of arguing from strength."71 In terms of the extent of territory that they have controlled at various periods of time, the Turkish Cypriots are somewhat of an anomaly when compared to other de facto states. Whereas the other three case studies considered in this study (with the exception of Eritrea from 1991 - 1993) have all been characterized by fluctuating levels of territorial control, the extent of territory controlled by the Turkish Cypriot de facto state has remained constant for more than twenty years now. Prior to the second Turkish invasion 70See, for example, Rothman, "Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus," p. 101; Doob, "Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism," pp. 386-387; Alemdar, "International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem," p. 76; and Alan Branthwaite, "The Psychological Basis of Independent Statehood," in States in a Changing World, ed. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, p. 56. 71Oberling, The Road to Bellapais. pp. 195-196. See also McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 30-31. 141 in August 1974, though, the Turkish Cypriot case can be seen as somewhat more similar to the other de facto states considered here. The historical etiology of the TRNC does not date from 1983 or even from 1975; rather it goes back at least to the General Committee in 1963 and to the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration in 1967. Certainly from at least 1963 forward, when twenty some thousand Turkish Cypriots left their smaller villages for the security of enclaves in the larger cities, one can speak of the Turkish Cypriots as having de facto territorial control over parts of Cyprus. While these areas of control were small, non-contiguous enclaves, they did exist. Indeed, their existence has been recognized internationally at least twice. In his report to the Security Council, S/6228 of 11 March 1965, U N Secretary-General U Thant noted that the writ of the Greek Cypriot government had not run in the areas under Turkish Cypriot control since December 1963. Similarly, the 1974 Geneva Agreement, signed by the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the U K in the period between the two Turkish invasions, "noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community."72 4.4.2 Relations with society The Turkish Cypriot de facto state is clearly organized under what we are calling the national principle. The 200,000+ Cypriots of both communities who fled either from or to the Turkish-controlled areas are clear illustrations of the national orientation on which the Turkish Cypriot de facto state is based. The identity basis of the TRNC is Turkish Cypriot and no attempts are made to integrate the remaining Greek Cypriot and Maronite minority communities into any larger, more inclusive conception of identity. There is no doubt that the TRNC has the support of the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots. Opposition within the TRNC centers mainly around questions internal to 72Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, p. 60; and Oberling, The Road to Bellapais. p. 175. 142 Northern Cyprus itself. Al l of the major political parties support a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution to the Cyprus problem and there is a strong consensus around the need for a Turkish security guarantee in any future settlement. The electorate has also consistently demonstrated its support for Rauf Denktash as their chosen representative to the outside world and their chief negotiator on the Cyprus issue.73 We now come to the question of democratic accountability. From a larger perspective, the facts that: 1) the Turkish Cypriot de facto state's territory was created after an outside military invasion and is maintained by tens of thousands of foreign troops; 2) its creation produced more than 100,000 Greek Cypriot refugees; and 3) its poor treatment of small minority Greek Cypriot and Maronite populations leaves much to be desired all militate against its democratic accountability. From an internal perspective, however, the TRNC does quite well in this regard. The TRNC's internal democratic accountability can be demonstrated by focusing on three areas: constitutional provisions; the actual practice of democracy; and the de facto state's human rights record. First, in terms of its constitution, with the exception of its disenfranchised Greek Cypriot and Maronite minorities, the TRNC's basic law grants its citizens an extensive range of civil and political liberties. According to Article 1, the state is a secular republic based on the principles of democracy, social justice, and the supremacy of law. Citizens are guaranteed the right to liberty and security of person; the right to a fair and public trial within a reasonable time; the right to form associations; freedom of religion, conscience, thought, speech, and expression; and the right to a free press. Citizens can freely form political parties, although those parties must not "violate the indivisibility or the integrity of the State...." and they must not act against "the principles of a democratic and secular republic and the principles of Ataturk." The rights to establish trade unions, to collective 73Denktash has now won five presidential elections in 1976, 1981,1985,1990, and 1995. 143 agreement, and to strike are also provided for, although these rights may be restricted for purposes of national security or public order.74 Second, in terms of the actual practice of democracy, general and presidential elections have been held in the Turkish Cypriot de facto state every five years or less since 1976. At one point, there were 12 political parties in existence and several parties of differing ideologies have been represented in the TRNC national assembly. The political spectrum includes the far-right New Dawn Party, the center-right Democratic Party and National Unity Party, the center-left Communal Liberation Party, and the far-left Republican Turkish Party. Voter turnout is consistently high and compares favorably to many western democracies. While President Denktash's five electoral victories often lead to allegations of strong-man rule, one can see his percentage share of the vote fluctuating from a high of 76.4 percent in 1976 to 51.3 percent in 1981, 70.5 percent in 1985, 66.7 percent in 1990, and then down to 40.4 percent in 1995, thus forcing a second round of voting in which he was reelected with just over 62 percent of the vote. The national assembly has been characterized by a number of minority governments and volatile coalitions which have frequently collapsed. The most serious threat to democracy in the TRNC probably came in 1990 when changes in the electoral law designed to produce stronger coalitions led to a decision by two major parties to boycott the national assembly. While this had a noticeable effect on the level of debate in the assembly, each of these parties' newspapers continued to air their views and the trade unions remained politically active. Jonathan Warner argues that while democracy itself seems entrenched in the TRNC, its final form has not yet taken shape. C. H . Dodd concludes that "Elections in the North are in fact free, the press is not muzzled, and there is a good deal of informed Birol Ali Yesilada, "Social Progress and Political Development in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," The Cyprus Review 1 (Fall 1989), pp. 105-108; C. H. Dodd, "Political and Administrative Structures," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus ed. C. H. Dodd, pp 167-192; and Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International law p p . 259-270 144 political discussion in what is a politically aware society.... the electorate of Northern Cyprus votes freely for its political leaders and gives them substantial support."75 Third, in terms of its actual human rights record, the US State Department finds that "there is a generally strong regard for democratic principles" in the Turkish Cypriot community. There were no reports of political prisoners and no public allegations of police brutality in the TRNC. Representatives from international human rights groups have access to the TRNC, international broadcasts are available without interference, academic freedom is respected, opinions circulate freely, and independent trade unions regularly take stands on public policy issues.76 In its 1995 annual report on human rights, Amnesty International makes only one mention of the TRNC and that is in reference to Salih Askerogul, a conscientious objector who was imprisoned in 1993.7 7 Every year Freedom House ranks countries and territories in the two categories of political rights and civil liberties. This is done on a scale from one to seven, with one being the best and seven being the worst. These two ratings are then combined into an overall "Combined Average Rating" which leads to a freedom rating. The three options for the freedom rating are "free," "partly free," and "not free." In 1995, 1996, and 1997, Freedom House gave the TRNC a four for political rights and a two for civil liberties. This leads to a combined average rating of three, which is the highest possible score for countries and territories whose freedom rating is "partly free." For comparative purposes, other 7 5 C . H. Dodd, "Conclusion," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, p. 377. See also Warner, "Political Choice: Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," pp. 193-217; McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, pp. 41-42; Dodd, "From Federated State to Republic: 1975-1984," pp. 106-135; Yesilada, "Social Progress and Political Development in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," pp. 105-108; and C. H. Dodd, "The Ascendancy of the Right: 1985-1993," in The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, ed. C. H. Dodd, pp. 136-154. 7 6 U . S. Department of State, "Cyprus Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996" (Washington, D. C , February 1997). 77Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1995 (New York: Amnesty International USA 1995), p. 113. 145 countries which also received a combined average rating of three for those three years include Brazil, E l Salvador, Madagascar, and Papua New Guinea.7 8 4.4.3 Capabilities In terms of its governing capability, the TRNC has reached an advanced level well beyond that attained by many sovereign states. It clearly meets or exceeds any plausible criteria for effective governance. The TRNC is characterized by a mixed parliamentary and presidential system where the president is head of state. The Council of Ministers is formed by ten ministers and the prime minister and is responsible to the national assembly. The judiciary is independent from any military or executive influence. In addition to the ten ministries, there are also extra-departmental organizations such as the State Planning Organization, the Public Service Commission, and the Radio and Television Authority. The TRNC also operates a number of economic enterprises including a tobacco monopoly, the state airline, and Cypruvex which exports citrus fruit. Locally, there are 26 municipalities and 186 villages divided amongst three districts. Local government is run by popularly elected mayors and councils. In 1990, the entire public service (central and local government as well as state-owned enterprises) employed nearly 16,000 people—approximately 22 percent of the TRNC's total workforce.79 In terms of military capabilities, the TRNC's own indigenous capabilities are quite limited. While it maintains its own police and security forces, the entire area of military security has essentially been sub-contracted out to the Turkish army. The TRNC's limited military capabilities stand in sharp contrast to its much more developed political and governmental infrastructure. More than any of the other de facto states considered in this study, the TRNC is characterized by a substantial degree of external dependence—in this case, dependence on 78See Freedom House's annual Comparative Survey of Freedom. This account is based on the summaries of this provided in Freedom Review 26 (January-February 1995); Freedom Review 27 (January-February 1996); and Freedom Review 28 (January-February 1997). 79Dod