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Public participation in urban mega-project planning: a case study of Pacific Place Vancouver, B.C. Beazley, Mike 1994

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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN URBAN MEGA-PROJECTPLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF PACIFIC PLACEVANCOUVER, B.C.ByMike BeazleyB.Sc (ions) Town PlanningM.Sc Urban Planning StudiesA THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSchool of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAJuly 1994® Mike Beazley, 1994In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of therequirements for an advanced degree at the University of BritishColumbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely availablefor reference and study. I further agree that permission forextensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may begranted by the head of my department or by his or herrepresentatives. It is understood that copying or publication ofthis thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without mywritten permission.(SignatuIaeii-t of Ctwr it( 0The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDateABSTRACTThe 1980s witnessed a trend toward a new model of urbandevelopment, the urban mega—projects (UMPS). These projectshave significant impacts on cities, on the way we practiceplanning and on the way we involve the community in decision—making processes. A critical question from a communitystandpoint is the degree to which ordinary citizens have theopportunity to influence the nature and shape of suchdevelopment. In short, how participatory are UMP planningprocesses? This leads to the question of how we can evaluatethe effectiveness of public participation? This leads in turnto the important question of why public participation in UMPplanning processes can be effective or not?To address these questions it is necessary to develop atheoretical categorization of public participation. Threemodels are identified that each inform a different perspectiveon the practice of public participation. These range from thecurrent dominant tradition of the rational comprehensivemodel, through the advocacy model, to the radical planningmodel. The theory is also used to identify characteristics ofeffective public participation. It is argued that effectivepublic participation must be equitable, efficient andefficacious. Public participation can only be effective whencommunity organizations have sufficient power in the processto ensure that their priorities are recognised and acted upon.iiThe research data consists of a case study of one of thelargest UMPS currently being developed in North America: thePacific Place development in Vancouver. This is supplementedby reference to other contemporary UMPS, includingHarbourfront and the Railway Lands in Toronto; Battery ParkCity in New York; the London Docklands and Canary Wharf; andthe Mission Bay project in San Francisco. The research methodsadopted within the case studies included a literature review,semi—structured interviews with the actors involved,participant observation, and the use of various publishedsources.The conclusion that emerges is that public participation inUMP planning is not particularly effective. The necessarycomponents of equity, efficiency and efficacy are missing. Anumber of principle reasons are outlined: the characteristicsof the UMPS themselves, the nature of the public participationprocess and the theoretical foundations on which it is based.On the contrary the development of more effective publicparticipation must rely on a bottom-up process that shouldstart with citizens groups. It is argued that city governmentsneed to forge stronger links with the community and emphasizethe role of locality in determining the nature of UMPS. Thereis a need to revitalize local democracy and reaffirm theimportance of effective public participation as part of thisprocess.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract iiTable of Contents ivList of Tables viList of Figures viiList of Maps viiiAcknowledgements ixChapter One IntroductionIntroduction 1The Emergence of the TransnationalEconomy 2Implications for Planning 4A New Trend in Urban Development:Urban Mega-Projects 5The Case Study Examples 8The Research Questions 16Research Methodology 17Organization of Dissertation 21Chapter Two Theoretical Interpretations of PublicParticipationIntroduction 22The Concept of Public Participation inDifferent Planning Models 23Characteristics of EffectiveParticipation 39Conclusion 47Chapter Three Public Participation in PracticeIntroduction 49Public Participation in ContemporaryPlanning Processes 50Definitions of Public Participation 54The Problems and Potential of PublicParticipation in Planning 60Conclusion 64Chapter Four Public Participation in UMP Planning: AReview of North American and BritishExperienceIntroduction 66Development Corporation Approach 67Harbourfront, Toronto 67Battery Park City, New York 74The London Docklands, London 81ivMunicipal Co-operative Approach 93Railway Lands, Toronto 93Mission Bay, San Francisco 103Conclusion 112Chapter Five From B.C. Place to Pacific Place: AnUMP in the MakingIntroduction 114History and Background 116Expo ‘86 and B.C. Place 119North Park Plan 125The Sale of the Land 126The Pacific Place Development Proposal 135The Pacific Place Actors 137Conclusion 148Chapter Six The Pacific Place Public ParticipationProcessIntroduction 150The Context of Participation 152The Policy Broadsheets 159Stages of the Planning Process 167Overall Development Plan 167The Area Rezonings 174Evaluation of the Process 188Conclusion 200Chapter Seven The Effectiveness of Public Participationthe Pacific Place Process: Rhetoricor Reality?Introduction 203Effectiveness of UMP Planning Processes:Equity, Efficiency and Efficacy 204Factors Affecting the Effectiveness ofPublic Participation in Planning 222Conclusion 243Chapter Eight ConclusionIntroduction 246Toward New Partnerships 249Changing Alliances: A New Role forLocal Government 251The UMP Planning Process of the Future 255VLIST OF TABLES1 The Case Study Mega-Projects 92 An Interpretation of Public Participation inDifferent Planning Models 243 Toronto Railway Lands: Alternative Visions 1014 Vancouver City Council, 1986-1992 1415 Processing Costs of the Pacific PlaceDevelopment, 1988—1996 1466 Pacific Place Fee Revenues, 1988—1995 1467 Organizing Principles for Public Involvement 1568 False Creek North Official Development PlanPublic Hearings 1719 DEPA Housing Waiting List, 1992—1993 194viLIST OF FIGURES1 The Analytical Framework 192 Characteristics of Effective PublicParticipation 463 Arnstein’s Ladder of Public Participation 554 Burke’s Typology of Public Participation 575 The Community and the Planning Process 1486 City of Vancouver Models of PublicParticipation 1537 The Pacific Place Planning Process 1578 The Development of the Policy Broadsheets 1639 The Cycle of Inequity 205viiLIST OF MAPS1 Vancouver Mega—Projects 142 Harbourfront, Toronto 683 Battery Park City, New York 754 The London Docklands 825 The Railway Lands Plan, Toronto 946 The Mission Bay Plan, San Francisco 1047 The Pacific Place Site and the SurroundingImpacted Communities 1158 Pacific Place Area Rezonings 1759 International Village Area Site Plan 17710 Yaletown Edge Area Site Plan 184viiiACKNOWLE DGEMENTSThere are many people who are responsible for helping me inthe process of researching and writing this dissertation. Toomany to name in full and to do justice to in these few words.There is my supervisory committee of Henry Hightower (Chairand Supervisor), Peter Boothroyd, and Gerry Pratt thatprovided considerable advice and guidance throughout theprocess. Particular thanks to Henry for all his support duringmy time in Canada and in helping me finish the work back inEngland. I would also like to thank the School of Communityand Regional Planning and the Centre for Human Settlements atthe University of British Columbia for all their support andgenerous facilities. My sincere thanks also to all my fellowstudents in the School of Community and Regional Planning whoprovided such a supportive and stimulating environment to bein.I made many good and dear friends in my five years in the Cityof Vancouver. To them I offer my eternal thanks. To Mark,Renee, Jessie, Robbie, Julian, Karen, Alison, John, and to allat the WISE Club. To You-tien for all her support andinsightful suggestions. My deep thanks must go to my parentsfor all the support before, during and after this enterprise,and to Happy and Bud.I would like to thank all the people who agreed to beinterviewed as part of the research and for being so cooperative and open about their views.Finally, I would like to thank the Association of CommonwealthUniversities for the award of the Commonwealth Scholarshipthat supported my studies for the duration of my stay inCanada.ixCHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION“Some of us are increasingly struck bywhat we see as a new trend: an escalationin the scale of new urban development andredevelopment. Whether in big inner-cityredevelopments like South of Market orLondon Docklands, or in big newresidential suburban developments, theclear tendency is for a new style ofdevelopment led by a new style ofinternational developer. There is anobvious need to ask questions about thesedevelopments. Who are the mega—developers?What is the relationship between them andthe public authorities? What impact dothese developments have on the traditionalurban streetscape and on traditional waysof using cities” (Hall, 1989).INTRODUCTIONThis research is concerned with the issue of publicparticipation in urban mega-project (UNP) planning processes.UMPS have become an increasingly common form of urbandevelopment in recent years and have been described as “a newtrend” in urban development (Hall, 1989). These mega-projectsare proposed by major international developers who haveconsiderable resources to invest and due to their size andlocation these projects can have major physical, social andeconomic impacts on the cities in which they are proposed andon the operation of planning processes within these cities.This chapter sets the scene by introducing the economiccontext in which UMPS emerged, by looking at what UMPS are, byidentifying the research questions to be addressed, and1outlining the research methodology that was adopted to try andaddress these.THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMYThe 1980s was a period of major economic restructuring in theadvanced industrial economies. Capital became extremely mobileand there was a massive shift in investment patterns frommanufacturing to real estate. The result was mobileinternational property developers looking worldwide for goodspeculative investment opportunities (Berry and Huxley, 1992).In short, we witnessed the emergence of the transnationaleconomy. International capital was able to flow freely acrossnational boundaries as new trade and investment agreementswere established (Marchak, 1992).Confronted with worldwide competition and capital mobility,all levels of government in Britain and North America havemobilized in the last decade in an attempt to attractinternational capital to their localities. In many waysgovernments have been forced to accept what has been termed asthe ‘new realities’ of this transformed economy (Drucker,1989). In order to succeed in the international market placegovernments have become market-orientated and entrepreneurial(Fainstein, 1990). Cities have opened their doors and haveadapted their policies to attract UMP development and suit theneeds of business and developers (Marchak, 1991). This was2done often at the expense of public services, socialprogrammes and public participation. In terms of controllingurban development this entrepreneurial role has often resultedin “fast track” legislation and secret negotiations withdevelopers to by—pass normal planning controls and establisheddecision—making processes (Alexander, 1987; Berry and Huxley,1992)A further factor has been the emergent free marketphilosophies of the “new right” (Drucker, 1989; Marchak,1991). This was an ideology that emerged in the industrialdemocracies in the mid-1970s, and which had become firmlyestablished by the 1980s (Jacobs, 1992; Marchak, 1991;Thornley, 1991). Terms like “privatization”, “deregulation”,“downsizing”, “free trade”, “market economy” and “freeenterprise” have become commonplace (Marchak, 1991). Themessage such terms conveyed was that the “government was bad”,and “the market was good”. Such ideology fully supported freemarket principles and was antagonistic to regulation:“It rejects the Keynesian consensus of the post—warera, and extols the virtues of free enterprise andentrepreneurship. It expresses dissatisfaction withdemocracy, equality, social welfare policies,collective bargaining, and other citizens’ rightsachieved throughout the previous three decades”(Marchak, 1991, 3).The potential impact of this philosophy is that communityrights are reduced, and anything associated with the publicsector is greatly under-valued (Marchak, 1991). Moreover, it3appears that there are few governments who have tried todirect the dividends of the free enterprise economy to thosesections in the community most in need (Fainstein, 1991).IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNINGThese developments have profound implications for theoperation of planning processes in our cities, and for thepractice of public participation.On the one hand the restructuring of global markets and theresponse of governments have brought about significant changesin the relationship between the public and private sectors. Ithas been suggested that this new economy severely limits theability of governments to influence urban development. Thepublic sector was seen to be too bureaucratic and inflexibleto meets the demands of the transnational economy. Moreover,there has emerged a moral argument about the legitimate roleof government to intervene (Drucker, 1989).On the other hand the emergent free market philosophies of the“new right” have questioned the interventionist style ofgovernment that characterized the immediate post—war period.Redevelopment in the l950s, 1960s, and the l970s was seen aspredominantly a public sector activity. Redevelopment in thel980s and the 1990s is seen in very different terms with theprivate sector at the helm and the public sector playing much4more of a facilitating role (Berry and Huxley, 1992).A NEW TREND IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT: URBAN MEGA-PROJECTSUrban mega-projects (UMPS) are a physical manifestation ofthese trends. The processes of economic restructuring and theshift in investment patterns has resulted in large areas ofobsolete industrial land in key central locations ripe forredevelopment. These sites, or “raw chunks of land”, asEckdish Knack (1986) refers to them, are the remnants of theabandoned industrial age: former railway lands, disusedshipping yards and docks, and other land once used forindustrial purposes. The land is relatively cheap andinternational developers see an opportunity to makesubstantial profits in providing developments geared tomeeting the needs of the new economy. UMPS are being heraldedas great opportunities to regenerate urban cores.UMPS are large, sites can typically range from 50 to 300 acresand more, and development horizons can be anything up totwenty years. They are usually mixed—use developments,involving a combination of office development, convention andexposition facilities, retail uses, leisure and up—marketresidential uses (Berry and Huxley, 1992):“Mega—projects are distinguished, in the firstinstance, by their huge size and complex mix of landuses, designed to create and capture bothdifferential and monopoly rents. In the secondplace, these projects tend to depend on and arise5from active state government intervention,facilitation or even partnership” (Berry and Huxley,1992, 46).UMPS have other important characteristics:1. They are on strategically placed sites close to downtowncores. They can have major impacts on the form and structureof the city.2. They are private sector led projects, albeit withsubstantial public sector support. This distinguishes UMPSfrom earlier large scale development projects, like the newtowns and the urban renewal programmes of the sixties andseventies, that were more public sector led. The context ofUMPS is privatism and the use of private capital to regenerateand redevelop cities. Contemporary urban policy and UMPplanning processes reflect this trend.3. UMP developers are large powerful corporate developmentcompanies with enormous resources at their disposal. PeterHall has referred to UMP developers as “a new style ofinternational developer” (Hall, 1989). The Canadian—basedOlympia and York Developments Ltd. (O&Y), owned by theReichmann brothers, is a good example. In 1991, this was saidto be the biggest property development company in the world.4. UMPS have changed the nature of the relationship betweenthe public and private sectors. They are brought about by the6alliance between all levels of governments and internationalproperty developers. The trend in UMP planning is towardpartnership, rather than the more traditional relationshipbased on regulation (Berry and Huxley, 1992).5. UMPS have led to the introduction of modified planningprocesses that not only reflect the theme of partnership, butthat are also felt able to handle development on this scale.The two major planning approaches have been the developmentcorporation approach and, what I have termed, the municipalco—operative approach. These planning approaches reflect theclose alliance between the public and private sectors and havebrought the planners and the developers much closer togetherin new co—operative relationships, further transforming thetraditional adversarial approach.6. UMP developments impact significantly on the immediatelysurrounding areas. These are invariably low incomeneighbourhoods, whose residents have been consistentlyunder—represented in urban planning processes. There isconcern about the potential negative impacts the developmentof these sites might have on these neighbourhoods, including:gentrification and rising land values; the loss of affordablehousing units; displacement of low income groups; trafficgeneration and a lower level of services and support networksfor local residents.77. UMPS generate significant support as they are viewed bygovernments as a valuable economic development tool in theregeneration of local, regional, and national economies:“Rampant office, hotel, retail and resortdevelopment is being heralded as a key indicator -and, politically, very visible proof — of successfuleconomic restructuring and dynamic, sustainablegrowth of the regional economy” (Berry and Huxley,1992, 46).Consequently, cities are keen to secure UMP development notonly to stimulate the local and regional economy, but also asa means of attracting further investment and growth. Thishelps to explain the significant amount of political supportthat UMPS seem to generate.THE CASE STUDY EXAMPLESThere are many UMP developments in various stages ofdevelopment throughout the world. It was decided to focus onexamples from Canada, USA and the UK. UMPS are aninternational phenomenon, so an international perspective waswarranted. Moreover, it was felt a cross—national dimensionwould prove useful in identifying common themes, threads andresponses. It is evident too that the UK approach to largescale urban development has borrowed heavily from the NorthAmerican experience, which made some kind of cross—Atlanticapproach not only interesting, but necessary (Hambleton,1991). Examples of both the development corporation approachand the municipal co—operative approach were chosen, see Table1.8Table 1: The Case Study Mega-ProjectsProject Developer Size Proposed DevelopmentAcresHarbourfront Harbourfront 92 l.2m sq.ft. officeToronto Corporation 1.Om sq.ft. commercial(DC) and O&Y 250,000 sq.ft.recreational/cultural3,500 housing unitsRailway Lands CN and CPR 185 13m sq.ft. officeToronto 5,000 housing units(MC) SkydomeBattery Park BPCA and O&Y 92 6m sq.ft. officeNew York 12,000 housing units(DC) 30 acres parkHotelwaterfront walkwayMission Bay Catellus 315 4.lm sq.ft. officeSan Francisco Development 200,000 sq.ft. retail(MC) Corporation 7,577 housing units19 acre parkCanary Wharf LDDC and O&Y 71 lOm sq.ft. officeLondon 500,000 sq.ft.(DC) commercial/retail/leisureHotelPacific Place Concord 204 2m sq.ft. officeVancouver Pacific 7,650 housing units(MC) 42 acres parkwaterfront walkwayDC - Development corporation approachMC — Municipal co—operative approachThe development corporation approacha) Harbourfront, Toronto. This was a 92 acre site situated onthe shore of Lake Ontario, adjacent to the GardinerExpressway, close to the downtown area of the City. It wasinitiated by the federal government in 1972 and originallyintended to be a publicly funded waterfront park. The9developer was the Harbourfront Development Corporation inconjunction with private developers such as Olympia and York.By the late seventies, the plan had changed significantly toincorporate other commercial uses. Harbourfront is nowcompleted and includes 1.2 million square feet of officedevelopment; 1.0 million square feet of commercial space;250,000 square feet of recreational/cultural space; and 3,500housing units.b) Battery Park. New York. This is another completed megaproject. The developers were the Battery City Park Authorityin conjunction with mega-project specialists Olympia and York.The 92 acre site was created by inf ill at the tip of Manhattanalong the Hudson River. The site is adjacent to another largescale development, the World Trade Centre. The developmentincludes 6 million square feet of office development; 12,000housing units; 30 acres of park; a hotel; cultural facilities;and a 1.5 mile waterfront walkway.c) Canary Wharf, London Docklands. This part-completeddevelopment has become famous as the project that helped tobankrupt its developer, Olympia and York, in May 1992. It is a72 acre site located in the centre of the Isle of Dogs in theLondon Docklands. The London Docklands comprises an area ofapproximately 8.5 square miles and is regarded as one of thelargest urban redevelopment opportunities in Europe today. The10task of the regeneration of this area was given to the LondonDocklands Development Corporation, a central governmentappointed development corporation. The Canary Wharf proposalincludes 10 million square feet of office development; 500,000square feet of shops, restaurants and other leisurefacilities; and a hotel.The Municipal Co-operative Approacha) The Railway Lands, Toronto. This is a 185 acre site closeto the downtown core of Toronto. As the name suggests the areais made up of disused railway lands and at the time of writingthe site was yet to be developed. This site represents a majorredevelopment opportunity for Canada’s largest city. Thedevelopers are Canada’s major railway companies, CanadianNational (CN) and Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), who havebeen trying to secure the redevelopment of the site since theearly 1980s. The current proposals, which were approved in1986, but modified in a review in 1992, include 13 square feetof office development and 5,000 housing units. Part of thesite has been developed with the completion of the SkydomeStadium, a multi-million dollar prestige project that hasprovided Toronto with a sports arena complete with aretractable roof.b) The Mission Bay proposal is one of the largest privateurban development projects in North America today. The11planning process has been in place since 1981 and a number ofplans have been put forward in that time. The current plan, byCatellus Development Corporation, is designed as a mixed usedevelopment to be built over the next 20 to 30 years. Theredevelopment of the site has generated an enormous communityresponse. A number of previous plans have been resisted andvarious community organizations have produced their own plansfor the development of the site. The result has been that theoriginal proposals for the site have been transformed. Thenumber of affordable housing units has increased; the amountof family housing has doubled; the requirements for open spacehave been increased; and provisions were included for thedeveloper to fund training programmes, provide childcarefacilities, and a range of other community benefits. A furthersignificant factor is that the building heights in the currentproposals are restricted to an eight—storey maximum.c) The Pacific Place development in Vancouver, which forms thefocus of the research presented here. Vancouver is one of thefastest growing cities in North America today. It currentlyexperiencing considerable UMP activity. It is in an attractivelocation on the Pacific Rim and it has been successful atattracting both domestic and mobile international investmentin real estate (Goldberg, 1991; Goldberg and Fullerton, 1991;Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992). Other significant development12projects include Coal Harbour1, the Station/LaFarge site2, andthe Central Waterfront Port Lands3, see Map 1. This makesVancouver a good location for the primary case study in thisresearch.1 Coal Harbour, is located on the Burrard Peninsula, in closeproximity to the Pacific Place site. In fact, Coal Harbour is sitednext to Canada Place, which was the location of the CanadianPavilion in Expo ‘86. Coal Harbour is a proposal by MarathonRealty, the real estate arm of the Canadian Pacific Railway, whowere involved in proposing the redevelopment of the Railway Landsin Toronto. The proposal is for the redevelopment of 82 acres offormer industrial/railway lands into 2 million square feet ofoffice space; 2,000 housing units; hotel; and parkland. There isanother major project called the Bayshore on the adjacent site.2 The Station/LaFarge site at the eastern end of the FalseCreek Basin is the location of the Citygate development. This is aproposal that is currently under construction by the BosaDevelopment Corporation and is a mega—project in all but size. Itis strategically placed at the end of the False Creek Basin, and isadjacent to the Pacific Place development. Together these projectsdirectly abut the Downtown Eastside area of Vancouver, one of thepoorest neighbourhoods in the City. The development as proposedincluded 1.2 million square feet of residential use, comprising ofup to 1,000 dwelling units; 105,000 square feet of office use; upto 70,700 square feet of retail use; and various cultural,recreational, and institutional uses. By 1992, the development waswell under construction.The Central Waterfront Port Lands site is located on theother side of Canada Place to Coal Harbour and the Bayshoredevelopment. Taken together these development sites, when complete,will have resulted in the complete redevelopment of the BurrardInlet shoreline from Stanley Park to Portside Park. The Port Landsis a proposal for the redevelopment of 94 acres of the Port ofVancouver. This is the largest port in Canada, and a major worldport. The plan area includes the Seabus Terminal, which provides animportant link to North Vancouver, and the Harbour Heliport. Thelands are owned by the Vancouver Port Corporation, a federal Crowncorporation, whose mandate is to manage port operations, both onland and water, under its jurisdiction. The area is included in theCity of Vancouver Central Area Plan and is identified in that planas an area for offices, hotels, or housing, or any combinationthereof.13MAP 1 Vancouver Mega-ProjectsLUCSource: Vancouver City Planning Department14The Pacific Place development is a $2.5 billion proposal forthe development of 204 acres of former industrial/railwaylands on the North Shore of False Creek close to the downtowncore of the city. The site had been used in 1986 as the siteof the Vancouver World Exposition, which attractedinternational attention and was specifically used as adevelopment tool. This process has been well documentedelsewhere (Gutstein, 1986; Wachtel, 1986; Olds, 1988). Thecurrent proposals have been put forward by Concord PacificDevelopments Limited, a company controlled by Hong Kongbusiness Li Ka—shing. The current proposals include 7,650housing units; 2 million square feet of office development; 42acres of parkiand; and a 1.5 mile waterfront walkway. It isone of the largest and most valuable development projects inNorth America today. The Pacific Place site abuts an areaknown as the Downtown Eastside, one of the poorest and mostdeprived areas of the city. Actual development commenced in1992 and the developer has estimated that it will take fifteenyears to complete.All these projects conform to the typical UMP profile. Theyare large mixed use developments of similar character. Allinvolve major international developers, and all are instrategic locations close to low income neighbourhoods.15THE RESEARCH QUESTIONSUMPS have significant implications for both the management andfuture well—being of our cities and their residents. Moreover,they impact on the operation of contemporary planningprocesses and on the way we involve communities in decision—making processes. This dissertation explores the UMPphenomenon and specifically addresses the issue of publicparticipation in UMP planning. UMPS raise important questionsabout the effectiveness of public involvement in planning andabout the ability of city governments to control developmenton this scale. The overall purpose is to improve ourunderstanding of planning processes in relation to large scaleurban redevelopment in both theoretical and practical terms.Bearing these factors in mind, a critical question is to whatdegree do ordinary citizens have the opportunity to influencethe nature and shape of such development. In short, howparticipatory are UMP planning processes? This leads to thesecond question of how do we evaluate the effectiveness ofpublic participation? This leads to the third, and veryimportant question, of why public participation is effectiveor not effective.It is critical, therefore, that we look in detail at publicparticipation in UMPS to examine how much public participationgoes on in UMP planning processes, and, more importantly to16determine how effective it is. If public participation iseffective the outcomes of the planning process must be seen toreflect the public input received. Consequently, from acommunity perspective public participation will only be judgedto be effective when those groups participating havesufficient power in the process to ensure that communitypriorities prevail.RESEARCH METHODOLOGYThe general research approach was both exploratory andqualitative. The aim was not to prove or disprove certainhypotheses, but rather, to explore and further knowledge andto generate new avenues for research.The first methodological challenge was to set up a means ofevaluating the effectiveness of public participation inpractice. This was not an easy task. The question of theeffectiveness of public participation has dogged planningresearch for years. Few studies have effectively tackled thisissue. The measures of cause and effect are not alwaysidentifiable in the messy world of planning and politics.Moreover, a common criticism of many previous evaluations ofpublic participation is that they tend to reflect the positionof the administration rather than that of the participatingcitizen (Sewell and Phillips, 1979). There is a need to focusattention on a citizen perspective of the effectiveness of17public participation processes.The effectiveness of public participation is very muchinfluenced by the theoretical foundations on which it isbased. It is to the planning theory literature that theresearch looked to for guidance on this issue. The approachadopted was to identify characteristics from the literaturethat contributed to the effective practice of publicparticipation from a community perspective. Three suchcharacteristics were identified: equity, efficiency andefficacy.The second methodological challenge was the development of ananalytical framework to connect the theory and the casestudies included in the research, and to provide a conceptuallinkage between UMPS and the significance of publicparticipation, see Figure 1.The research itself consisted of a series of case studies. Theresearch covers the period from 1988 to 1992. The case—studieswere chosen represented both the development corporation andthe municipal co-operative approaches to UMPS. The developmentcorporation approach is represented by Harbourfront, Toronto;the London Docklands and Canary Wharf; and Battery Park Cityin New York. In addition to Pacific Place, the municipal cooperative approach is represented by the Railway Lands,18CharacteristicsofNewModelofUrbanModifiedPlanningUMPSDevelopmentModels_______________________________*developmentcorporation*municipalco-operationNewrelationshipStrongerprivatepresence1betweengov’t&private&weakergovernmentroledevelopersinurbandevelopmentWhat’smissinginThethemodifiedessentialplanningmodel?iconflicts:InternationaldevelopersfStrongerinternationalpresenceandweakercommunitycontroloverl.Internationalthedevelopmentofthevs.IlocalityLocal_______________________-jCommunityRevitalisationoflocaldemocracy2.PrivateandthedeveloperreaffirmationofLarge-scaleandGreaterimpactonvs.theurgencyofstrategiclocationscloseneighbouringcommunitiesgovernmenteffectivepublictolowincomeandgreaterimpactonparticipationinneighbourhoodsthosealreadyunderplanningrepresentedinplanningprocessesFigure1:AnalyticalFrameworkToronto and Mission Bay in San Francisco.The principle techniques used within the case-study methodincluded a series of semi—structured interviews with actors inthe process, for example, the developers, the planners, thepoliticians and representatives from community organizations.These interviews were conducted over the period from 1990 to1992. The major research was conducted in Vancouver, but fieldvisits were also undertaken to Toronto (1990), San Francisco(1991) and the London Docklands (1991) to gather informationon the UMPS located there.In Vancouver, detailed participant observation was undertakenat various meetings and public hearings during the period 1988to 1992. During the Spring of 1990, I spent a three monthperiod in the offices of the Downtown Eastside ResidentsAssociation making extensive use of their files on PacificPlace and B.C. Place and talking to the workers in the officeabout the potential impact of UMP development on theneighbourhood. Data drawn from these sources was supplementedby data obtained from secondary sources. These includedliterature reviews, journal articles, council documents,planning reports and newspaper clippings.20ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATIONThis dissertation is organized into eight chapters. ChapterOne introduces the topic and explains the rationale and theresearch method. Chapter Two presents the theoretical issuesof public participation in planning. Three different modelsare presented and three components of effective participationare identified. This helps to frame much of the subsequentanalysis. The third chapter provides a background on publicparticipation on which subsequent chapters attempt to build.This provides important contextual information for thepresentation of the research data. Chapter Four attempts tolink the material in the previous two chapters by reviewingthe secondary case studies used in this research to supplementdata obtained from, and to develop questions for, the primarycase study. The next two chapters introduce the major casestudy, the Pacific Place UMP. Chapter Five provides necessarybackground material for the understanding of the Pacific Placeprocess and the subsequent analysis and Chapter Six focusesmore specifically on the Pacific Place planning process.Chapter Seven uses the case study material to address theresearch questions. The final chapter draws some basicconclusions and considers the implications of the findings forthe future of urban mega—project planning processes.21CHAPTER TWOTHEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION“No vision of reality is neutral.Different ways of knowing make adifference. There are many ways of seeingthe world. Every vision of reality comesout of some set of interests in the world.Every vision of reality suggests a modelof acting on reality - even if that modelof action is one of letting the realityalone. Ways of looking are tools, parts ofmaking a strategy for action. Theyidentify what’s important and what’sbackground. They suggest what is to bechanged and what is to be left as is”(Peattie, 1991, 35).INTRODUCTIONThis chapter reviews the planning theory literature to performa number of essential tasks. First, to identify and critiquethe major planning paradigms; second, to identify the theory,or group of theories, that are most supportive of the conceptof public participation1;third, to generate categories ofanalysis and to identify and develop more specific researchquestions, and finally, to attempt to make the link betweenthe theory and practice of public participation more explicit.The planning theory literature is legion. There are a numberof different classifications or typologies (or meta-theories)of planning theory that can help us navigate our way throughthis literature. These include Friedmann and Hudson, 1971;1 Here the intention is to distil certain characteristics thatcan be adopted as potential indicators of effective publicparticipation.22Galloway and Mahayni, 1977; Hudson, 1979; McConnell, 1981;Healey, et al., 1982; Weaver and Hightower, 1984; andFriedmann, 1987. These classifications are useful as theyreflect the range of planning theory and the differentpolitical ideologies that lie behind them. Each of thesegroups of theories treat public participation differently.THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DIFFERENT PLANNINGMODELSTo assist in the process of moving toward a theoreticalframework for the understanding of effective publicparticipation I divided the planning theory literature intothree major models: 1) rational comprehensive planning; 2)advocacy planning; and 3) radical planning. The first two arelocated within the liberal democratic view of society, thelatter adopts a radical democratic perspective (see Table 2).The rational comprehensive model is the dominant planningmodel and constitutes the basis for planning practice inwestern liberal democracies (Wolfe, 1989). It is frequentlyreferred to as the traditional or mainstream planning theoryapproach. It supports a practice of planning that tends to beseen as technical, rational, scientific, apolitical andneutral. There is a further tendency for this planningapproach to be top-down, with the public being seen asclients. The planner is usually considered to be the ‘expert’23who then makes professional decisions in what she/hedetermines to be the ‘public interest’. Generally, this is notTable 2: An Interpretation of Public Participation inDifferent Planning ModelsPlanning Model Form of ParticipationRational Comprehensive Planning process apoliticaland top down.Limited public participationbased on the belief ofrationality andprofessionalism.(Liberal democracy).Advocacy Planning Public participation withinexisting institutionalconstraints and powerstructures.Co-opted publicparticipation.(Modified liberal democracy).Radical Planning Planning seen as a politicaland redistributive mechanism.Concept of equity central.Public participation seen asa fundamental part of theplanning process.Community power.Decentralized decision-makingstructures.(Radical democracy).Sources: Davidoff, 1965; Kravitz, 1968; Laclau and Mouffe,1985; Friedmann, 1987; Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989;Wolfe, 1989; Thornley, 1991.by nature conducive to a practice of planning that supportseffective public participation. At best public participationis seen as a form of consultation, rather than as afundamental element of the planning process. Publicparticipation is seen as a means of legitimating the planning24process and the decisions reached.Despite challenges, this theory is persistent (Krumholz andForester, 1990). There was the challenge from theincrementalists (Lindblom, 1959; Etzioni, 1973); from thesystems theorists (Churchman, 1968; McLoughlin, 1969;Chadwick, 1970); from advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) andfrom the social learners (Friedmann, 1973; Schon, 1983). Thesechallengers succeeded in creating turbulent waters, but didnot manage to sink the rational comprehensive ship.Arguably, one of the major flaws of rational comprehensivemodel is that it propagates the myth that planning isapolitical and neutral. It may further be argued that,ironically, the apolitical view of planning has allowed it tobe used in a very political way by politicians and developersto suit to their own advantage:“. . . it is clear that conventional theorywhich describes planning as an objective,technical decision—making process isinaccurate and misleading. While plannersmay perceive themselves as independentexperts, powerful interest groups havefully recognized the politicalimplications of planning proposals andhave successfully lobbied for particulartypes of policies” (Gunton, 1991, 107).It has been suggested that the decision of planners to try tobe apolitical is in fact a political decision in itself inthat it serves to maintain the status quo (Piven, 1975;25Beauregard, 1978; Krumholz and Forester, 1990). The logicalextension of this view of planning is that planners becomelittle more than facilitators of urban growth and development.They become aligned with those interests that benefit fromurban growth (Piven, 1975).The apolitical view of planning also serves to mask thedifferential power structure of society. It is assumed thateveryone participating has an equal opportunity to influencethe outcomes of the planning process. This is a very pluralistinterpretation of society. It sees power as being sharedbetween the state and various community interests as well asprivate individuals. Power is seen as being competitive anddiffused, where everybody is seen as having some power andnobody has too much, so no one group of interests can dominate(George and Wilding, 1976) •2 The theory is that we all haverights, free and regular elections and representativeinstitutions and we can all partake of these elements underfull protection of the law, our independent judiciary and ourfree political culture. The assumption is that the statecannot fail to respond to the wishes and demands of competinginterests and ultimately “...everybody, including those at the2 Benington has referred to this view of society in an analogyof a snooker game representing the social system. All the balls areof a different colour and value, but are all jostling in the samegame. The competition is seen as being a little unequal, but therules of the game are regarded as being basically fair (Benington,1975).26bottom of the queue, get served” (Miliband, 1969, 4).The rational comprehensive model is positivistic. It fits inwith the dominant view of society. It essentially deals with“what is” rather than “what could be”. There is an in—builtresistance to normative theory. Moreover, mainstream planningtheory sees planning primarily in physical terms. This is muchtoo restrictive1 particularly from a public participationpoint of view.What is more, it could be argued that the rationalcomprehensive model acknowledges and accepts the dominance ofprivate market forces. The activity of planning is seen asbeing subordinate to the operation of the market (Kravitz,1970; Ambrose, 1986; Peattie, 1991, Thornley, 1991). Theplanning process and the contribution of public participationis therefore determined and constrained by thisinterpretation.Consequently, this model of planning receives the endorsementof developer-orientated politicians, who favour the marketapproach to planning. Their view of public participation isthat it should be limited, and not allowed to delaydevelopment. There is considerable political support at alllevels for this approach to planning. It is seen to get thejob done. The questions that are rarely asked, however, relate27to equity issues and the impacts of this approach to planningon low income communities.The advocacy planning movement of the 1960s provided achallenge, if only temporary, to the dominance of the rationalcomprehensive planning model. The civil rights campaigns andthe community action movement led to growing communityawareness of distributional consequences of public action andintervention activities like planning (Cullingworth, 1984;Hudspeth, 1982; Oosthuizen, 1984). A new model of advocacyplanning emerged aimed at promoting a redistributive andparticipatory approach to planning (Davidoff, 1965). Thiscould be described as a modified liberal—democratic approachto public participation. The basic rules remained the same,but attempts were made, through the activities of community-based advocate planners, to enable low income communities toparticipate more effectively in the decision-making processesthat affected their neighbourhoods. Public participation was afundamental element of advocacy planning. The role of theplanner was seen not as a neutral arbitrator, but as acommitted, and political, community activist.But, the effort of radical planners was soon challenged byother radicals for being cooptive. It was seen as a usefulmechanism for allowing the poor to participate, but not in amanner that improved their situation (Piven, 1970; Kravitz,281968; Goodman, 1971). According to Piven (1970), although theadvocacy planners left government institutions to serve thepeople whose voices were ignored, the government still had thefinal say in the allocation of resources. Moreover, thepluralistic assumptions underlying advocacy planningresulted in the power structure remaining unchallenged.Advocacy planning therefore operated within the existinginstitutional frameworks and power structures.Kravitz (1968) makes the point that advocacy planning wasfunctional to the system. The poor and the disadvantaged wereallowed to “blow off steam”, rather than develop into apotential threat to the existing institutional order (Bachrachand Baratz, 1970). Moreover, advocacy planning served tocreate the impression that something radical was indeedhappening. In reality, the system remained unchanged. Advocacyplanning simply resulted in community groups competing againsteach other for increasingly scarce resources. Those groups whowon concessions with the help of advocacy planners usually didso at the expense of other less well organized groups(Kraushaar, 1988).It is not clear, then, whose ends advocacy planning serves.At least some community groups are helped to participate moreeffectively in planning processes, but it is clear that thiswas achieved at some cost. Kravitz (1968) and Goodman (1971)29argued that advocacy planning simply allowed the poor anddisadvantaged to participate in their own poverty and therebybecoming more accepting of it.A further important point to make is that being given theopportunity to participate does not necessarily ensure thatany subsequent input will be acted upon. It is possible tohave the appearance of a participatory system without theresulting participation being allowed to impact the outcomesof the planning process:“While it is helpful to have a voice, itsexistence doesn’t in any way imply that itwill be heard. Advocates of what areusually minority positions are thrust intodissenting positions by the nature of theplanning process. Dissent is tolerated atpublic hearings and at private, behind thescenes, hearings. However, tolerance ofdissent seldom leads to just considerationunless backed by power. As the interestslacked power or authority they weretolerated, but unheard and unheeded.”(Kravitz, 1968, 41)This means that dissent is allowed to be expressed, but onlywithin carefully controlled parameters, where it iseffectively managed so as not to produce any meaningful threatto the status quo (Goodman, 1971).While the advocacy planning model has been criticized forbeing cooptive, at least it succeeded in making the politicalnature of planning much more explicit. The radical planningmodel sees its task as following on from this point:30“The advocate began the politicization ornormatization of planning; the radical3 seeksto carry this process to its logicalconclusion. He seeks to take planning beyondadvocacy and pluralism, and to take Americandemocracy beyond representation to totalinvolvement — to active, human participationthat is creative, innovative, and effective.”(Kravitz, 1968, 39).The radical planning model then sees planning as a politicaland redistributive mechanism. Planning is seen as contributingtoward social change and the creation of a more equitablesociety. Public participation is therefore seen to have acompletely different role. It is seen as a mechanism for lowincome communities to improve the quality of their lives, andfor local communities generally to gain more effective controlover decision—making processes. It is a move in the directionof community power. This model supports the introduction ofinstitutional and administrative change that enables this tohappen, for example, the introduction of decentralizeddecision—making structures.There is a large literature on innovative examples ofprogressive city administrations adopting new politicalapproaches that incorporate democratic and participatorystructures. Friedmann refers to the work of Jaggi, et al., andKravitz’s idea of the role of the radical was to“radicalize” the environment in which we live, to humanize thesociety so that all would be free to create and control their owndestiny (Kravitz, 1968).31their account of the reformist city administration of Bolognaspearheaded as it was by the Italian Communist Party(Friedmann, 1987, 291-292). There is also Clavel’s account ofprogressive city politics in five American cities, whichdemonstrate that cities can be run on democratic andparticipatory principles (Clavel, 1986). Krumholz andForester’s account of the equity planning approach inCleveland is another example (Krumholz and Forester, 1990).Equity planning is a planning approach that specificallyrecognises the needs of poor and vulnerable populations. Theinteresting fact about the Cleveland experience is that equityplanning did not emerge from the political agenda of citygovernment, but as an approach that was developed by theplanning staff themselves, under Norman Krumholz, the Directorof the City of Cleveland Planning Commission. The plannersworking under Krumholz were committed to an equity approach,and justified it in professional terms as a means of goodplanning. They prepared a powerful equity planning policydocument, the Cleveland Policy Planning Report, which helpedto justify the approach and provide support, protection, anddirection for the planners. The argument that Krumholz andForester develop is that there is potential to develop anequity planning approach in most planning administrations ifthe planners wish to do so. The planners can developprofessional justification for such an approach and make good32use of institutional ambiguities that exist within governmentbureaucracies (Krumholz and Forester, 1990).The concept of equity planning builds on Forester’s earlierwork examining the constraints operating on planners thathinder a more community approach to planning. His argument isthat planners can ‘plan in the face of power’ and adoptcertain strategies and communicative processes to make theiractions and plans more sensitive to community needs (Forester1980 and 1989)There is a literature in the UK on the concept of community orpopular planning which is planning by local communities intheir own neighbourhoods (Seabrook, 1984; Brindley, Rydin andStoker, 1989; Short, 1989; Ward, 1989; Nicholson, 1992).Popular planning involves the local community in both theformulation and implementation of planning proposals. This isachieved by close collaboration with city governments, but theessence of popular planning is that the local residentsmaintain a high degree of direct control over the wholeprocess (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989). Its premise isthat cities are places where ordinary citizens can leaddignified and creative lives and have some degree of controlover the forces that impact their neighbourhoods. It is apeople—based approach to planning, or what has been describedas a planning approach “as if people mattered” (Short, 1989),33that puts the needs of poor communities first, but that stillenables development to occur.In the UK context one of the successes of popular planning isCoin Street in Central London (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker,1989; Ward, 1989; Tuckett, 1990). This was a site thatwitnessed a momentous battle between a major developer andlocal community groups. In 1984, the battle culminated in avictory for the community, when local residents won controlover the site and began to implement their own developmentplan. The local community was made up of low income residents,with high proportions of unskilled and semi-skilled workersand elderly households (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989).The community had been well organized since the l970s under acoalition called the Association of Waterloo Groups (AWG) andhad been active in putting forward community orientated plans.One of the member groups of AWG was the Coin Street ActionGroup that campaigned for a community orientated plan to bedeveloped on the site. These groups found themselves in majorplanning inquiries opposite the developers, putting their caseas best they could. The developer, Greycoat Estates (backed byan international construction company), wanted a mixeddevelopment including offices, commercial and residential use,little of which would have been affordable by the localcommunity. The community also wanted a mixed use development,34but one that more closely reflected the needs of the localresidents: affordable housing, light industrial workshops,shopping and leisure facilities. After a long drawn out battlethe community secured the victory and set about creating thenecessary institutional framework to implement their plan,which they did through the Coin Street Community Builders(CSCB). A key factor in the victory proved to be the electionin the early 1980s of a progressive Labour administration tothe Greater London Council (GLC)4 committed to the support ofcommunity initiative and enterprise. The GLC funded communitygroups across London; provided support and advice, throughgroups like the Popular Planning Unit and the London PlanningAid Service; and, significantly set up community-based policyinstruments like the Community Areas Policy. This policyestablished the principle of defending local communitiesagainst the threat of commercial development andgentrification (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989).Coin Street stands as an impressive landmark to the potentialof popular planning. The alliance between local government andthe community proved to be powerful enough to defeat a majorinternational developer. Moreover, it stands as proof that‘ The GLC was the metropolitan level of government for Londonresponsible for strategic issues like housing, planning andtransportation. Below the GLC were the 33 London boroughs. The GLCand the other metropolitan counties (all Labour controlled at thetime) were abolished by the Conservative Government in 1986. Thisleaves London as the only capital in Europe without some form ofstrategic government.35local communities are more than capable of planning forthemselves and setting up the necessary institutionalarrangements to become developers in their own right. CoinStreet is supported by evidence from elsewhere, whichdemonstrates the potential of popular planning. There havebeen other examples of community planning. In the LondonDocklands, a People’s Plan was produced for the Royal Docksarea, to put forward a community perspective on how the areashould be redeveloped. This plan was put together by theNewham Docklands Forum in conjunction with the GLC PopularPlanning Unit. It is an impressive document that outlines theneed for locally—based jobs, a good infrastructure network andaffordable housing units (Newham Docklands Forum/GLC PopularPlanning Unit).Another good example is the community battle over theredevelopment of Kings Cross in London. Since August 1987, amajor debate has been taking place over proposals by thelandowner, British Rail, and the developers Rosehaugh andStanhope, to build a massive office-led development on thesite and to provide the potential terminus for the ChannelTunnel rail link. Here the community organized and respondedto what it saw as insensitive development proposals thatcontained few benefits for anyone except the developer(Edwards, 1992). When rumours of the redevelopment firstleaked out in 1987, the community formed an umbrella group36called the Railway Lands Group to fight the developer’s planand to articulate one of its own. The Group was adept atgaining publicity and at gaining funding to provide technicaland professional assistance. The RLG have succeeded in puttingits own vision forward for the development of the lands, andhave provided sophisticated levels of costings to demonstratethat it is possible (Railway Lands Group, 1989). At the timeof writing the project was on hold for two main reasons,first, there was still considerable discussion, anduncertainty, about the route of the Rail Link into KingsCross. Second, the British Government had been asked by theEuropean Community Environment Minister, to cease work on anumber of major projects, including Kings Cross, because theywere in breach of an European Community environmentalassessment directive. This gave the RLG the opportunity tofinalise and submit its own scheme to the local authority forits consideration (Edwards, 1992).This is supported by substantial US literature documenting thewealth of human activity that is developing alternative waysof organizing society in order to facilitate greater degreesof community control. Boyte (1980) looks optimistically at thepotential for new forms of organizing society based onself-reliance and non-market principles (Boyte, 1980).Bouchier (1987) introduces the concept of ‘radicalcitizenship,’ which he develops into a theory of action. He37writes enthusiastically about the thousands of small groups hediscovered in America that “were burning with energy andoptimism about rebuilding American society one step at a timethrough local action.” (Bouchier, 1987). David Morris developsthe concepts of neighbourhood power, self reliant cities andthe potential for new city states (Morris, 1975, 1982).Doughton refers to the importance and potential of communitypower that reduces both state dependency and the dominance ofmarket principles and promotes the principles of community andself—government:“The only alternative consonant with ourfabric of liberty lies in the renewal andrevitalization of our links to one anotheramong the people who are the community:not through processes of negativereinforcement—the huddling of those drawntogether by fear and frustration-butthrough new and positive organizationalforms able to employ expertise withoutbeing used by it, able to handle humanproblems by bringing them down to a humanscale, forms and systems linking people incapacity and therefore in self—energizingpower.” (Doughton, 1976, 14).There is a burgeoning literature on citizenship and radicaldemocracy that point in the direction of more free, democraticand egalitarian societies (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).This literature supports the principle that communities haveboth the ability and the desire to become more involved inurban development processes. They favour a bottom—up approachto planning that enables them to have a significant impact on38planning processes. When local communities are involved itdemonstrates that the outcomes of planning processes are verydifferent, in that communities secure very tangible gains.Coin Street is a good example. This literature stands as achallenge to the “new realists”, and those academics who seemto advocate the needs and desires of the free—marketeers andthe developers. It provides an alternative view to the currentconcept of contemporary urban development as a means of justattracting capital and making cities attractive for capitalinvestors (Short, 1989).CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATIONHow does this review help us to identify potential mechanismsthat can help in our understanding of effective publicparticipation processes? First, the theory helps make explicitthe different interpretations of public participation that arepossible under each model. Second, the theory does provideguidance as to what some of the potential characteristics ofeffective public participation might be from a communityperspective.Effective public participation is essentially about the powerto influence the outcomes of planning processes in such a waythat community priorities prevail. There are a number of keycomponents or characteristics that must be present in a publicparticipation process for such an approach to work.39EquityThis is key as any public participation process must beequitable and allow all groups not only to participate, butparticipate on an equal basis. In other words, theparticipation process must be fair and open. Publicparticipation is the mechanism by which citizens and communitygroups can access the decision—making process and make theirvoices heard. It is a fundamental element of democraticdecision-making (Pateinan, 1971). Public participation canstimulate local democracy, encourage an active citizenry, andcontribute to an inclusive city.The equity characteristic was clearly evident in the advocacyand radical planning models. These models explicitlyacknowledged the political nature of the planning process andsought to positively discriminate in favour of the mostdisadvantaged groups in the community. These models furtherrecognised that, within public participation processes, somegroups in the community have greater power and access toresources than others. In other words power relations weremade explicit.Moreover, the distributional impacts of urban development isacknowledged. Clearly, in any development process there aregoing to be greater impacts on certain groups within thecommunity. In relation to mega—projects the communities most40at risk are the poor neighbourhoods that often abut UMP sitesand the poor and marginalized communities throughout the city.There is no explicit equity agenda in the rationalcomprehensive model of public participation. Publicparticipation is seen in very pluralistic terms, with everyonehaving some degree of power and influence. This model is notconcerned with redistributional issues. It tends to be anapolitical planning approach that serves to maintain theexisting power structure. The existing representativedemocratic structures and the public participation mechanismsadopted in relation to planning processes are deemed to beadequate and functional.The equity agenda is clearly present in the advocacy model inthat the political nature of planning is explicitlyidentified, and there is an attempt to discriminate in favourof the poor and the marginalized through the activities ofadvocate planners who work with, and on behalf of, thesegroups. The problem, as noted above, is that this did notchallenge the existing power structures sufficiently well.There was little evidence of redistribution of power andresources from the well off to the least well off, rather itappeared that whatever redistribution occurred was amongst thepoor themselves. Hence, the comment that all advocacy planningdid was to allow the poor to participate in their own poverty41and where gains were made they were usually made at theexpense of other low income groups.There is a much stronger equity agenda in the radical planningmodel. Planning is seen explicitly as a political andredistributive mechanism and as a way of contributingpositively toward the creation of a more equitable society.Krumholz and Forester’s equity planning concept is a clearexpression of this approach to planning and their bookdemonstrates its potential in practice (Krumholz and Forester,1990)EfficiencyPublic participation processes must be efficient in. that it iscompetent and works adequately. The process must be wellorganized and have a defined timescale with a clear programmeof how the process is organized, and contain indications as towhat the stage the public process has reached.The process must also make use of all available information.Public participation can be a useful tool for planners togather considerable information that can aid the decisionmaking process about potential plans and projects. Full andactive public participation can bring information and data tothe table that otherwise might be missed. The concept ofequity planning, for example, reviewed under the radical42planning model, was seen as a mechanism for efficientprofessional planning. It used the argument that full publicparticipation was required to get all available information toinput into the decision-making process.There is often an argument made against public participationthat it is time consuming and delays implementation whichmakes the process less efficient. I would argue that thecontrary, namely that public participation can improve theefficiency of planning by making the process much moreflexible to change, by improving the quality of the decision,and by facilitating a much quicker implementation of the plan.The outcome must also in some way relate to the effort put in.Developers and community groups do not have an endless supplyof energy or resources, and cannot sustain a long and drawnout participation process. From a community perspective thereis a danger that lengthy public processes will result in alevel of attrition of interest and attendance at meetings.EfficacyThe process must be efficacious in that it must be effectiveand enable citizens and community groups to impact theoutcomes of public participation processes. This suggests somelevel of community power. It means that participating in the43planning process must be seen to make a difterence. Theoutcomes of the planning process must be seen to clearlyreflect the public input received. The planning process mustbe responsive. Individuals and community groups are not goingto participate in a process they don’t believe they caninfluence, or where they feel that the outcomes may bepredetermined. If we are looking specifically at whethercitizens and community groups impacted by UMP development areable to influence the decision making process, we can evaluatethe outcome in terms of whether their expressed needs andconcerns (e.g., social housing, community facilities, etc.)were included in the final development. If they are included,this suggests that they had some power and influence over theoutcome. If they are not included, then this would suggestthat they had little influence or power and that theparticipation process was ineffective. The public will soonlose confidence in a process that does not seem to take thepoints they have raised into consideration or if they are seento be ignored. People must have some sense of efficacy in theplanning process if they are going to participate. Indemocratic theory, there is a whole body of work thatdemonstrates the link between a sense of political efficacyand political participation (Pateman, 1971). In this sensepublic participation in planning is no different.44Efficacy is a key component of a democratic and effectivepublic participation process. This characteristic is explicitin the radical planning model, where public participation isseen as a mechanism to bring about social change and as apotential means of enabling local communities to gain muchmore effective control over their lives. The concept ofpopular planning is based on the premise that localcommunities have the ability and desire to plan forthemselves. Popular planning demonstrates the high degree ofefficacy that is possible in a participatory planningframework and is a clear expression of the potential ofcommunity power.The efficacy characteristic is not so explicit in the rationalcomprehensive or advocacy models. The top—down, apoliticalnature of the rational comprehensive approach in many waysmitigates against the potential for local communities toeffect change. Public participation here is usually carriedout within well defined parameters on an agenda that isusually set by other actors in the process (developers,politicians, and/or planners) rather than the communitythemselves. Consequently, there is often little room for anysignificant community influence in this model.The advocacy model potentially offered local communities morechance of impacting the outcomes of planning processes, but45again, this tended to be within well defined limits. Advocateplanners would work with communities to enable them to havegreater influence, but generally, the context was one in whichthis influence could be easily marginalized. Moreover, asnoted previously, advocacy planning would often pit onecommunity group against another to compete for resources orinfluence, rather than serving to unite groups thatpotentially could have resulted in more influence andresources.Figure 2: Characteristics of Effective Public ParticipationEQUITY* fair* open* accessible* redistributiveEFFICIENCY* competent* well organized* timescaleEFFICACY* effective* community power* impacts outcomes* responsive46Finally, there is the interesting question of potential tradeoffs between these three characteristics. Do we, for example,have to sacrifice efficiency in pursuit of equity? This is adifficult question to answer. There will inevitably be somegive and take between the various elements, but I will arguethat all these components have to be present in any publicparticipation process if it is to be judged effective from acommunity perspective.CONCLUS IONPlanning theory informs planning practice and has asignificant influence on the nature and form of publicparticipation. The review of the planning theory literatureundertaken here suggests that it is possible to distil outcertain characteristics that can be used as an indication ofeffective public participation from a community perspective.The application of these characteristics to the case studymaterial, will help us to address the question of theeffectiveness of public participation in UMP planningprocesses.The review also suggests that in modern planning the rationalcomprehensive model remains dominant, but this has someserious shortcomings in terms of satisfying the identifiedcharacteristics. The rational comprehensive planning modelsupports a planning practice that tends to be top—down,47hierarchical, technical and apolitical. The dominant form thatparticipation takes within this context is consultation, whichaffords citizens little opportunity to effect the outcomes ofplanning processes.This raises some interesting questions. Why is the rationalcomprehensive planning theory paradigm so strong? How deeplyis it embedded in UMP planning? Why does it persist? In whatways is this manifested and translated into practice, and withwhat consequences for effective public participation inplanning? How can the radical planning model considered inthis chapter help us to practice an alternative, moreparticipatory, approach to planning? More importantly, is itpossible to practice a more participatory style of planningwithin current political, economic and institutionalconstraints? These questions will be considered in more detailin subsequent chapters.48CHAPTER THREEPUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE: I PARTICIPATE, YOUPARTICIPATE, THEY DECIDE“Since our satisfaction in life isaffected vitally by the character of ourcities in all of its greatest detail, itmay be appropriate to say that thedecisions about building our cities shouldbe made by all of us, and not solely bythe developers or the bureaucrats or thelegislators or the planners” (Crane, 1973,93)INTRODUCTIONHaving set up criteria by which to judge the process of publicparticipation the purpose of this chapter is to introduce thisissue in more detail and summarize a literature review on thetopic. There appears to be little consistency in thenomenclature concerning “public participation”; terms like“public participation”, “citizen participation” or “communityparticipation” are found with equal frequency. “Publicparticipation” has been the preferred term used in thisresearch.Public participation in planning is important because it canimprove the quality of the planning process. Furthermore it isa critical element in a healthy democratic society (Pateman,1970). It is a messy activity that is essentially aboutpolitics and values. Public participation in this researchrefers specifically to the planning processes associated with49UMP development; those processes which have been designed toelicit a public response to urban mega—project proposals. Thetask of this research is to evaluate how effective theseprocesses have been.The literature on the subject of public participation inplanning is legion (Burton and Wildgoose, 1977; Barker, 1979;Hulchanski, 1984). This is supplemented by a huge literatureon the issues of “democracy” and “citizenship” (Pateman, 1970;Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Bouchier, 1987). Effective publicparticipation is an integral part of the democratizationprocess. There is a resurgence of interest in the concept ofradical democracy (as opposed to the liberal—democratictradition), whose proponents see their task as deepening andexpanding liberal-democratic ideology in the direction of“radical democracy” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY PLANNING PROCESSES“But we do have to ask ourselves whether“participation” was one of those words ofthe 1960s and 1970s, which has beenquietly abandoned in the 1980s. You willknow that the governments of both Britainand the United States, with their ideologyof the New Right, when they talk aboutcities at all, talk in terms of“partnership” of business and government.They do not speak of “participation” ofordinary citizens” (Ward, 1990, 123).The rhetoric of public participation has become an integral50part of the planning system. The notion of participation incivic affairs dates back many centuries (Pateman, 1970), butthe official recognition of participation in planning came asrecently as the mid—sixties. Such sanctioning was largely aconsequence of community action and the civil rights movement(Cullingworth, 1984). During the l960s communities wereactive, creating demands for more public involvement in therunning of government that were difficult to ignore.Under—privileged groups, minorities, welfare agencies, womens’groups, students and many other bodies began to organize todemand an increased role in decision—making processes(Hudspeth, 1982).In addition to these demands, there was a growing communitymovement with organized resistance to urban renewal andfreeway proposals that threatened to decimate manycommunities. These responses were associated with a growingcommunity awareness of distributional consequences of publicaction and intervention (Cullingworth, 1984; Hudspeth, 1982;Davidoff, 1965; Oosthuizen, 1984). This participation wascommunity—led, and often unwelcomed by planning authoritiesand city councils. In Canada, Trefann Court in Toronto(Fraser, 1972); Milton Park in Montreal (Helman, 1987) andStrathcona in Vancouver (Gutstein, 1975) are good examples ofhow communities responded to fight off external threats topreserve the physical fabric of their neighbourhoods.51The official recognition of public participation was aided bythe emergence of advocacy planning in the late sixties. Thiswas an explicit recognition of the political and inequitablenature of the planning process. As noted in the previouschapter, there were severe criticisms of the advocacy planningmovement in that it ultimately failed to challenge inequity orbring about change. But it did help in promoting andestablishing the concept of public participation in planning.By the 1970s, public participation became institutionalized aspart of the planning process. The community activism of the1960s became institutionalized and mechanisms were introducedto allow citizens to have their say (Cullingworth, 1984). But,as noted in the previous chapter, the existence of mechanismsdoes not provide any guarantees that the voices will be heard:“While it is helpful to have a voice, itsexistence doesn’t in any way imply that itwill be heard. Advocates of what areusually minority positions are thrust intodissenting positions by the nature of theplanning process. Dissent is tolerated atpublic hearings and at private, behind thescenes, hearings. However, tolerance ofdissent seldom leads to just considerationunless backed by power. As the interestslacked power or authority they weretolerated, but unheard and unheeded”(Kravitz, 1968, 41)This institutionalization process manifested itself in variousforms. In the UK, the requirement for public participationbecame encapsulated into formal planning legislation in the1968 and 1971 Town and Country Planning Acts. In the U.S.52various federal government initiatives like the CommunityAction Program (1964) and the Model Cities Program (1966)formally acknowledged the importance of citizen participation(Taylor, 1974). Terms like “maximum feasible participation”became one of the buzz words of the day. In Vancouver, duringthe seventies, at the municipal level, the concept of localarea planning took shape as a means of actively encouragingpublic participation in planning (Anderson, 1977; Cornejo,1978). At the same time at the regional level, the GreaterVancouver Regional District was experimenting with someprogressive forms of public participation (Lash, 1976).It has been questioned as to whether effective participationcan survive formal institutionalization (Cullingworth, 1984).Arnstein (1969) has suggested that the aim of officialparticipation programs was to contain, rather than facilitate,citizen demands and to ensure that citizens remained passiveand non—threatening. These concerns notwithstanding, publicparticipation in planning processes has become the acceptedway that individuals and groups can influence the outcome ofplanning processes and the nature and form of urbandevelopment.The rhetoric of public participation is largely unquestioned.Arnstein (1969) noted that public participation is a bit likeeating spinach: we believe it to be good for us, so we are all53accepting of the principle. A consequence of this is thatthere has been little critical research of publicparticipation in planning and whose ends it really serves.DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATIONThere are numerous definitions of public participation in theliterature. The variety of definitions reflect differentideological perspectives and rationales of participation. Manysee it as a means of giving the public an opportunity to beinvolved in the decision-making process. According to Glass:“The term citizen participation is anovergeneralization that is often definedsimply as providing citizens withopportunities to take part in governmentaldecision or planning processes” (Glass,1979, 180)Others see it more comprehensively as a means of democratizinggovernment decision-making structures and empowering localcommunities:“For advocates of participation, citizeninvolvement in government decision—makingis synonymous with (i) democratization ofchoices involving resource allocation,(ii) decentralization of service systemsmanagement, (iii) deprofessionalization ofbureaucratic judgements that affect thelives of residents, and (iv)demystification of design and investmentdecisions” (Susskind and Elliott, 1984).Definitions of participation are useful because they canindicate the range of potential influence citizens may have in54planning processes. One the best known definitions isArnstein’s populist ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969).In her interpretation public participation ranged frommanipulation at the bottom of the ladders to citizen controlat the top. Each rung in the ladder corresponded with thedegree of citizen power that could influence the outcome ofany planning decision. This ranged from non—participation onthe bottom rungs of the ladder, through degrees of apparentparticipation to degrees of actual participation at the top,see Figure 3.Figure 3: Arnstein’s Ladder of Public ParticipationCITIZEN CONTROL DEGREESDELEGATED POWER OFPARTNERSHIP CITIZEN POWERPLACATION DEGREESCONSULTATION OFINFORMING TOKENISMTHERAPY DEGREESMANIPULATION OFNON-PARTICIPATIONSource: Arnstein (1969)55The key concept was citizen power, without such power therecould be no meaningful or effective participation.Participation, without the redistribution of power, sheargued, was a pointless exercise for the powerless. Thistypology has been frequently used to demonstrate that publicparticipation in planning has remained firmly entrenched onthe bottom rungs of the ladder.A similar approach was developed by Burke (1968) whosedefinitions ranged from education to community power, seeFigure 4:1. Education therapy which saw participation as a form ofeducation to improve individual citizens.2. Behavioural change which saw participation as a mechanismfor influencing individual behaviour through participation asa member of a group.3. Staff supplement saw participation as a means of addingcitizen input to the expertise of the particular planningagency.4. Co—optation saw participation as a means of “capturing” or“neutralizing” opposition to various projects or plans.Objectors are involved in the process without being given anyinfluence or control. The public perception is that theprocess has involved community input.5. Community power saw participation in terms of “the creation56of new power centres to confront established centres as ameans of generating social change.” (Kasperson and Breitbart,1974, 6).Figure 4: Burke’s Typology of Public ParticipationEducation TherapyBehavioural ChangeStaff SupplementCo-optionCommunity PowerSource: Kasperson and Breitbart (1974)These definitions represent the same continuum that Arnstein’sdoes, from a point of non-participation (education therapy)through to much fuller interpretation of participation, inwhich citizens actually have power and control (community57power). The point is made that for participation in planningto be effective it has to be pushed towards a situation wherecommunities do have power and control.Interesting definitions emerged from an American researchproject funded in the early l9BOs, which looked at publicparticipation in Western Europe and attempted to draw lessonsfor North American experience. Three different levels ofparticipation were identified:1. Paternalism: this level was where participation remainedcentralized and closely managed by local government officials.Agendas were set by the local government responsible anddecision—making power was kept separate from the participationactivity. These approaches were used primarily to legitimizedecisions already taken and seen as a supplement and not analternative to representative democracy.Participation is therefore seen as a means to serve the needsof local government as opposed to the needs of those whoparticipate. Paternalistic patterns of participation are notredistributive and subjugated the public to the power of theadministration. This form of participation, the authorsargued, proved ineffective from a community perspective(Susskind and Elliot, 1984)582. Conflict: the second category was one of more directcitizen action that led to changes in policies, the redesignor abandonment of projects or the acceding to citizen demands.Such approaches normally involved various tactics of directaction and the use of the legal and political systems. Thisapproach is used when the community has little faith in thegovernment—sponsored participation mechanisms or when thecommunity itself is under threat.3. Coproduction: this was the third, and according to theauthors, the most progressive form of participation wherepublic decisions were made through face to face negotiationsbetween public officials and citizens. This was most likely tooccur in a decentralized decision—making structure. But asSusskind and Elliot (1984) point out the approach was notwithout problems. Its operation was fraught with tension asthe different groups fought to protect their turf, but it wasdiscovered that it could be a creative and effective means ofenabling communities to participate in decision-makingprocesses.The authors’ noted that coproduction had been used as astrategy to produce urban renewal development plans inHolland. Here government representatives and local residentshad worked together to define problems, devise plans andimplement renewal strategies. There was a high degree of powersharing and cooperation (Susskind and Elliot, 1984).59THE PROBLEMS AND THE POTENTIAL OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION INPLANNINGThe operation of public participation is not without problems;it is clear, for example, that some groups in society are ableto participate better than others. There are numerous publicparticipation techniques, each with inherent advantages anddisadvantages. Different techniques will suit differentpurposes and most planning processes will incorporate a rangeof techniques and approaches.On the positive side public participation has enormouspotential that can enable the public to have an active andmeaningful say in the decision—making process. It can not onlycontribute to the democratization of decision—makingprocesses, but also improve the quality of the decisionsthemselves. The key issue for any public planning process ishow far this potential is realized.We hear much rhetoric about the success and value ofparticipation, but we also hear considerable scepticism andcynicism. Derek Shearer, in an article on citizenparticipation, referred to a piece of 1960’s graffiti heencountered: “I participate/you participate/weparticipate/they decide” (Shearer, 1984). This is reminiscentof the famous student poster seen in the 1968 student riots inParis, we find replicated in Arnstein’s 1969 article:60* Je participe (I participate)* Tu participe (You participate)* Nous participons (We participate)* us profitent (They profit)Participation processes can be complex, technical, jargonisticand bureaucratic. The process can be top—down. Planners oftenretain too much control over the participatory process,effectively undermining the potential that such participationoffers (Susskind and Elliot, 1984). Cullingworth (1984) quotesChristian-Ruffman and Stuart (1978, 99) in this regard:.expert domination undermines theparticipation and staying power of bothindividuals and citizen groups. Perhaps itis this professional domination that isthe telling blow that sends the oncefledgling convert to participatorydemocracy back to apathy” (Cullingworth,1984, 6).The public rarely control the agenda. Participation processesare usually established without public involvement. Agendascan be preset and outcomes pre—determined:• .citizen participation in America israpidly emerging as the newest spectatorsport; spectators are not participants.Participation does not occur whenindividuals are attached to institutionsor processes where the agendas are alreadyset, the issues defined, and the outcomeslimited. Participation is “unreal” whenthe motivation is legitimation and supportrather than creation” (Kasperson andBreitbart, 1974, 5).61Community groups can, therefore, be suspicious and mistrustfulof official public participation processes and consequentlyrefuse to participate as they would argue that the very act ofparticipation served to legitimate it. There is a tendency forgroups to participate at key points, i.e., at the publichearing stage, as it enables them to get direct access to thepoliticians.Moreover, participation processes tend to discriminate againstthe poor and the marginalized. These groups suffer doublediscrimination when you consider that they are likely to bepolitically disenfranchised as well. Moreover, when so muchenergy is extended in the course of daily survival, there isoften little left to attend public meetings or model displays.The low income have the least resources, financial andotherwise, to participate in planning processes.A significant criticism is that participation processes ignorethe question of the distribution of power in society. Thedominant rational comprehensive model of participation adoptsa pluralistic interpretation of power distribution, andassumes that everybody has an equal opportunity to participateand make their voice heard. What this ignores is the unequaldistribution of power and resources in society, which willalways allow some groups to participate much more effectivelythan others.62The equity planning and popular planning concepts outlined inthe previous chapter demonstrate that effective publicparticipation has enormous potential in terms of democratizingplanning processes and enabling people to have much morecontrol over planning and development issues. It dependslargely on how the public participation is conceived and howit is put into practice. For groups in the community toparticipate effectively in terms of influencing the outcomesof planning processes, they must be afforded the power to dothis. The rational comprehensive approach to publicparticipation tends to focus on consultation and the giving ofselected information rather than the transfer of power. Inother words participation is allowed to go on, but only withinclosely defined parameters.Participatory planning processes fall more in line with theconcept of participatory democracy, but current approaches topublic participation see it as part and parcel of the dominantsystem of representative democracy (Pateman, 1970). Thisraises some very important questions about the way we governourselves, the practice of planning and how we organize publicparticipation, and the fundamental nature of the currentsystem of democracy. It is argued by some writers on democracythat the creation of an effective participatory environmentcan lead to the development of a strong sense of politicalefficacy (Almond and Verba, 1965; Pateman, 1970).63CONCLUSIONThis chapter has provided a brief overview of the operation ofthe concept of public participation. It has looked at thedevelopment of participation in contemporary planning andreviewed some of the definitions and rationales for publicparticipation. The problems of participation were consideredand some questions about the relationship between publicparticipation and democracy were raised.The concept of public participation in planning is now widelyaccepted. There are, however, a wide range of interpretationsof how that public participation should be organized and theimpact that it has. The concept can vary from degrees oftokenism and paternalism, through to more fully fledgedinterpretations that incorporate varying degrees of communitypower.The preceding chapters raise certain important questionsregarding both the theoretical underpinnings and currentpractice in relation to public participation in planning thatsupport and inform the research presented here. The mainquestion being, how effective are citizens and communitygroups in affecting the outcomes of UMP planning processes? Toaddress this question we have to examine the effectiveness ofpublic participation in specific UMP planning processes. To dothis use will be made of the three characteristics identified64in the previous chapter: equity, efficiency and efficacy.The final question that the research needs to address, givenit is possible to come to some conclusions about theeffectiveness of public participation in UMP planning, is tolook at the issue of why it is judged to be effective or not.Answers to this question will be useful in helping to shapefuture public participation strategies in UMP planningprocesses.65CHAPTER FOURPUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN UMP PLANNING: A REVIEW OF NORTHAMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE“...there’s nothing like a really big raw chunk ofland to spark the imagination of developers— andtheir planners. Meanwhile, public planners are leftto deal with the project’s off-site impacts andpublic concern about density, cost, and potentialharm to the environment” (Eckdish Knack, 1986, 16).INTRODUCTIONThis chapter will present typical comparison case examples ofUMPS in an attempt to provide some flavour of the nature,scope and scale of these projects, as well as the success, orotherwise, of the public participation processes associatedwith these developments. The purpose of including theseexamples is to provide additional and illustrative researchmaterial to supplement and enrich the data obtained from theprimary case study, that will be used and amplified atappropriate points in the subsequent analysis. These casestudies were selected due to their high profile, and becausetogether they represent various stages in UMP development fromthe advanced proposal stage through to completion.Despite the fact there are different planning traditions inthese countries, the context and the approaches taken to dealwith UMPS exhibit many interesting similarities that make across—national comparison not only possible, but desirable.Moreover, UMPS are a manifestation of the transnational66economy and mega—project developers cross national boundarieswith ease, looking for development opportunities. For example,at the time of writing, the Canadian-based O&Y were thedevelopers of Canary Wharf in England and Battery Park City inNew York, but also had a major stake in Harbourfront, Torontoand Mission Bay in San Francisco.DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION APPROACHHarbourfront. TorontoToronto has been the centre of considerable mega—projectactivity in recent years. Harbourfront and the Railway Landswill be the two mega—project proposals considered here, butbillions of dollars of public and private money have beenspent on a series of other inega—project proposals including,the ballet/opera house, Skydome, the 1996 Olympic bid and theExpo 2000 bid (Shapcott, 1991). These project proposals havegenerated considerable opposition from Toronto’s low incomecommunities. The major concerns expressed by these communitieswere the potential negative impacts of these developments onthese communities and the lack of a proper public debate andaccountability that had surrounded these projects.Harbourfront, Toronto, is now complete. It was initiated bythe federal government in 1972, when it expropriated 92 acresof Toronto’s central waterfront. The site was bounded by YorkQuay and Stadium Road and the Gardiner Expressway (see Map 2).67(I) 0 II (D 11 0 I-I 0 rt C-) 0 I-I 0 I-I CtN[Al(051*150HATIIIIRSTQUAYITorontoblendAirportFerry2.WindwardCoopremd.nce.3Cityhomer..idencel4Arc.dieCo-opcadence.Crtyhom.residencestiarboureideCo-opre,rd.nceeHarbourChannel Co-opraerdenca.5LodeNorwayP.,bI.CanadaUall,rrDsilo.SI°AI)INAQUAYISpadinePro,2MarinaDungWealSSpadmaGarden.4kmeLendingcoodomiriwino—BackariPentry—EskimoArtGellary——InlandGalt.ry——Mary.sitaThing.51010*.,Spedineotlicebuilding•ThePrencopkooeCentreMAPlEliAFQUAYI.Harbour Terranc. 000dooimiurn,2.Herbert, Torrec.Restaurant3Ha,bonrfrootConporeriooHeed045cc4.HorboortrorrtAntiqueMark.t5MapleLedGuegape.lirrenteBNeoticilC.nt,.t%J 0 1b 0 Ct i-a 0 I-I 0 Ct 0•Bank---CISC—ARMJOhNQUAYJohoOuayPerk2.MetroPoirceMerineHeedqrierters3.AdnrireltyPointcondominium.—TheDockShoppe—TheNauticalMindbooketor.—OldFirehellSpun.4.HotelAdnriret—Admirer.CoroerGiltShop—Commodore’.DininGRoom—Commodore’.Trend—TheGetey—SterlingPhoto5UerboorPoirrtcondominium.—t.lendFlower.—ItebbaPineFood.—SeoillesCleenersaBoutique—Sue-EllenLeethor,—TeeMentor.Intomnerionel CellTorontoApothmcumy—RentaurentlibelB.P•r4Storehuu.eRestaurant1.TheBinnacleB.Wetlyrnagoo’eMerinebartiThnClrrim,r.limnklIiAmii.lu,duiiitiudgMetine4totormetionKiosksl..eeon.tiPerkiogYORKQUAYI.ShlpdeckStage2.ShipdeckTentle.eeunetl3.AnnTindetPerh4.YorkDuetCentre—InlormetionDisk—Bounty—Breeremey—BrigentinaRoom—CelebretiooTheatre—CommunityGallory—TheCrebStudio—TheLittleCell—The LoB—TheLookout—PhotographyOelt.ry—StudioTheatre—UncommonObject.Kehihite-—Waler’.EdgeCallYorkDuetGalleryThe PondiwinterIceRinkU.ThePowetPlantContempereryArtGallerydoMAURIORTheatreCentreOY,-,im.,iiii,Sin,,oidiOt-La,P.ikumgUeraoetO.RueGt,p.ettItGoe.n’.DulyTerminel—Benk—CISC—ttuChop,andreeteureitte—PremiereDanceTha.rteI3.dRootl12.SlopeProwto0ApproximateScale1MileThe objectives were to create a unique public urban parkcombining the traditional concepts of parkland and open spacewith a variety of cultural, recreational and commercialactivities and to ensure that the public regained access toLake Ontario (Dale, 1990). The promise was to transform aderelict old harbour into “...a thriving section of thedowntown, in a sophisticated park-like setting” (Frampton,1985). The original project was conceived as a wholly fundedpublic enterprise and viewed as a federal gift to the City ofToronto.In late 1972, the newly established Ministry of State forUrban Affairs (MSUA) was instructed to develop programming andinstitute planning for the site.1 In terms of the publicprocess, MSUA hired private consultancies to handle the publicparticipation. In 1974, “participation hosts,” “monitors” and“ethnic animators” appeared on site to conduct polls anddistribute questionnaires. The following year saw high profilepublic meetings, hosted by celebrities, including broadcasterPeter Gzowski and historian Mike Filey, to discuss tentativedevelopment ideas prepared by the Harbourfront planning team.Smaller workshops were held with special interest groups. On1 The MSUA shared planning powers for the site with anintergovernmental waterfront committee. This committee wasreplaced in 1975 (due in part to poor relations between federaland other levels of government) with a new Harbourfront Council.Although the Council had delegated authority, the final authorityremained at the federal level (Dale, 1990).69completion of the public consultation the government reportedthat about 4,000 people had participated in the planningprocess. This process of public consultation, however, came infor criticism as being “consultant heavy” and “subject tomanipulation” (Dale, 1990, 72).By 1975, more than $60 million of public money had been spenton buying and maintaining the site, with no development yetunderway (Frampton, 1985). In July 1976, the HarbourfrontCorporation was set up with the mandate to “manage and programthe site and further develop recommendations on furtherdevelopment” (Dale, 1990, 75). The development industry washeavily represented on the Corporation. It was also becomingevident that the primarily recreational orientated andpublicly—funded project was experiencing severe financialdifficulties. The response was the introduction of a marketorientation with suggestions for a high level of privateinvestment, including a significant proportion of commercialdevelopment and luxury housing. The nature of the project wassubstantially altered from a publicly-funded waterfront parkto a major commercial mixed use development. In theHarbourfront Development Framework of 1978, which essentiallybecame the area’s official development plan, adevelopment—paying—for—programs formula was introduced. Thetwo major principles of the plan were mixed—use developmentand financial self—sufficiency.70Private market principles began to drive the process. TheCorporation began negotiating with private developers, e.g.,Toronto—based O&Y for Queen’s Quay, which essentially involveddeals on air rights, the interest from which would be used tocover programming and operational costs as well asinfrastructure costs and interest on government loans. It washoped that with public money financing the essential services,significant private investment could be attracted. In 1980,the federal government approved further funding as part of aseven—year plan for the site: $20 million for infrastructuresuch as roads and sewers and $7 million for operations. Therecession of the early eighties, however, severely restrictedthe attraction of private funds.Community concerns over the Harbourfront development hademerged by the mid-seventies. The type of development wasbeing criticized as well as concerns over the potentialimpact. Other concerns included the relationship between theplanners and the developers. Dale (1990) refers to a letterwritten by Allan Sparrow, elected to City Council in 1974,written to an NP outlining such concerns about theHarbourfront development:“Sparrow also feels an inappropriatecloseness between planners and developersaided in the “corruption” of theHarbourfront plan. “There’s been anongoing problem in the city of Torontowith planners who have worked for the cityultimately ending up working for the71development industry.” says Sparrow. “Thathappened with the downtown core as well,where some downtown planners wound upbeing the advocates of the highestdensities, and two years later you’d seethem in a senior role with a developmentcompany”2 (Dale, 1990, 75)The shift in emphasis in Harbourfront to commercialdevelopment and luxury housing led to a concerns among someCouncil members about exclusivity and the lack of socialhousing. Dale (1990) quotes Dale Martin, a Metro councillorfor downtown, on the development:.we are opposing the privatization andthe exclusivity of all that space. Infact, by building condominiums we’veignored all sorts of local community usesthat are needed for a viableneighbourhood. We’re saying we should havea community centre along the water’sedge.. .What the Harbourfront people areproposing is not a real street—levelexperience for the average Torontonian”(Dale, 1990, 83)The provision of social housing on attractive waterfrontlocations is a recurring problem with UMP development. Thedevelopment of private condominiums is a much more profitable2 It was a common strategy of the Reichmann’s to employsenior public sector officials they had experienced in previousnegotiations. The one—time Toronto Housing Commissioner, MichaelDennis, was employed by the Reichmann’s to head up the O&Y’sLondon team to supervise the Canary Wharf development; and JohnZuccotti, former Chairman of New York’s Planning Commission, wasemployed to head up O&Y’s US operations (Reguly, 1990b).72venture for the developers.3 There is little or no incentiveto build social housing units.Moreover, at Harbourfront, there was considerable communityconcern about how little parkland was included in the revampedproposals. This led to a commitment in a review of theHarbourfront plan in 1987 to try to ensure the provision of atleast 40 acres of parkland and 15 acres of additional openspace. In April 1987, the City of Toronto imposed a moratorium(lifted in November 1987) on further development atHarbourfront causing the Corporation considerable concern andresulted in the Corporation agreeing to more stringent heightand density requirements on Harbourfront buildings and toprovide much more parkland (Gray, 1987).The project has received mixed reviews. A review of theproposals by Vancouver Planning Department pointed to some ofthe positive elements of the development; including, thepopularity of the waterfront walkway, the cultural events,shops, restaurants, theatres and the Corporation’s recreationprograms (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1988). Thenegative aspects identified by Vancouver planning Departmentincluded significant public dissatisfaction with the smallIt was estimated by the Harbourfront Corporation thatwaterfront locations for private condominiums could be five orsix times more profitable than for non-profit units (Dale, 1990).73amount of publicly accessible parks and open space, the highdensity nature of the development, the blockage of lake viewsfrom downtown and the Gardiner Expressway, the exclusivity ofthe development and the lack of public participation.In respect of the latter point, considerable concern about thelack of public process in the planning of Harbourfront wasexpressed at a public forum on Harbourside in November 1989,and that much greater participation was required for futurewaterfront projects (Dale, 1990).Battery Park City, New YorkBattery Park City is a 92 acre addition to downtown New York,built at a cost of $4 billion (Frucher and McMillan, 1989). Itis an entirely new community built at the tip of LowerManhattan along the Hudson River, adjacent to the World TradeCentre, on land created through dredging of New York Harbour.The development is geared towards offices and top of themarket housing units (Chira, 1989). There are three majorresidential areas on either side of the centrally locatedcommercial centre, see Map 3. Altogether the developmentconsists of 42% residential development (up to 14,000 units);9% commercial (6 million square feet of offices); 30% openspace, including public parks, plaza and 1.5 mile waterfrontwalkway and 19% streets and avenues (Battery Park CityAuthority, 1990). The prestigious office location has74MAP 3 Battery Park City, New YorkSource: Battery Park City AuthorityNorthResidentialAreaCommercialCenterWore Financial CenterRectorPlaceResidentialAreaBatteryPlaceResidentialArea7,5attracted the headquarters of conglomerates like AmericanExpress, Merrill Lynch, Dow Jones, Daiwa, Nippon and NikkoSecurities (Frucher and McMillan, 1989).The Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) was established in 1968by the State of New York, at a cost of $200 million - moneyraised by a bond issue. The BPCA created and owns the land andis responsible for all the infrastructure and public places(Battery Park City Authority, 1985). The private developerslease the land and build according to the master plan anddesign guidelines established by BPCA (Frucher and McMillan,1989; Fainstein, 1991).The plans for Battery Park City were originally conceived inthe 1960s as a mixed income development, supported by theprovision of government subsidies (Chira, 1989). During thel970s the BPCA tried hard to attract developers, but they wereunsuccessful. The recession, the depressed property market andNew York’s bankruptcy provided few incentives for investors.Developers, it appears, also felt that New York City’s zoningrequirements for the site were overly restrictive. BPCA triedto raise money to develop themselves, but ran into problemsand in 1979 faced financial insolvency (Frucher and McMillan,1989). The consequence was that the development was becomingregarded as a white elephant. Various developers had brokenground, but all had abandoned their plans (Foster, 1986).76The BCPA decided to simplify the project and reorganized thefinancial arrangements (offering attractive tax subsidies) inan attempt to attract private investment. They produced a newplan which gave developers considerable flexibility in howthey developed the commercial centre of the site. The planeffectively removed the zoning and promoted flexibility, andthe infrastructure and public facilities requirements weredropped. This approach succeeded in attracting O&Y to thedevelopment. O&Y had substantial interests in New York realestate and had become one of the largest owners of commercialproperty in the USA (Frucher and McMillan, 1989). They werecommonly regarded as the world’s biggest property developers(Foster, 1986). The company had massive holdings in manyareas, apart from property development, which included oil andgas, forestry, energy and utilities, and finance.4Recent media coverage, however, indicates that they are havingsevere financial difficulties due to the drain of the CanaryWharf development in the London Docklands on their resources.In 1991, the company had to organize a major restructuring onits loans (approximately $14.5 billion) with its major lendersand pursue the off—loading of some of its North American“ In terms of property development they had substantialequity in many big development companies, including StanhopeProperties PLC (U.K.) (33%); Landmark Land (U.S.) (25%);Rosehaugh PLC (U.K.) (8.25%); Trizec Corporation (Calgary,Canada) (36%) and Campeau Corporation (Toronto, Canada) (11%)(Reguly, l990a)77holdings to survive (Barsky, 1992; Canadian Press, 1992). InMay 1992, after considerable negotiations to stave off afinancial collapse, O&Y filed for bankruptcy in Canada and theUS (Laurance, 1992).In urban design terms, Battery Park is considered a greatsuccess, particularly, the treatment of the World Trade Centreand the provision of the glass enclosed Winter Garden(Oppenheimer Dean and Freeman, 1986; Fisher, 1988; Peterson,1988). The development has received such architectural praisethat some say that Battery Park City is the standard by whichall future large—scale projects should be judged. The overalldesign object was to lay out the development in a traditionalstreet pattern connecting to a system of parks, open spacesand a waterfront promenade (Goldberger, 1988).The development is said to include considerable publicbenefits. Project revenue has been used to provide parks andopen spaces, to fund schools and to provide funds for lowincome housing. The BCPA was responsible for establishing theHousing New York programme as an attempt to use surplusrevenues from the development to provide subsidies to privatedevelopers to build low income housing in neighbourhoods inwhich they would not normally develop (Frucher and McMillan,1989). Initiatives like this have replaced the traditionalformula of U.S. federal subsidies which had stopped by the78early l980s. Through this programme units have been providedin the South Bronx and Harlem (Angelo, 1989). There is acomprehensive public arts programme, courtesy of AmericanExpress, O&Y and Merrill Lynch and a system whereby all thedevelopers contribute to a fund that sends minority studentsto New York’s best private universities to study real estatedevelopment (Frucher and McMillan, 1989).The development has been criticized, however, as being highlyexclusive:“Apartment costs are high at Battery CityPark. An 800 ft2 apartment costs US$80,000to build, US$135,000 to develop, and needsto sell for better than this. A typicalone—bedroom apartment rents for US$1,600per month. This means it takes an incomeof US$80,000 to move to Battery Park City- the Achilles’s heel of the project”(Frucher and McMillan, 1989, 51).In 1988, the BPCA conducted a survey of the 3,200 residentswho had moved into completed stages of the project. Theaverage household annual income was in the region of $102,000(Oser, 1989). Fainstein (1989) makes the point in her researchthat while Battery Park City may have a heterogeneous group ofdaily users, its actual residents are extremely wealthy:Its residents, however, are only the wealthiest ofNorth American corporations and the wealthiest ofpeople. It is a well planned private city shorn ofthe unruly lower classes that make the public cityso conflict-laden and aesthetically displeasing. TheBattery Park City Authority has its own securityforce, and although it is unclear to me how they79discourage the homeless and people who are unwanted,they are clearly not there” (Fainstein, 1989, 48).In the next 25 years it is estimated that the project willgenerate $10 billion in revenue for the BCPA, of which only $1billion is earmarked for low income housing via the “HousingNew York” programme. While $1 billion may sound like aconsiderable and worthwhile contribution, particularly toother cities struggling to provide such housing, the questionhas to be asked why a larger proportion of the generatedrevenue is not being directed towards this important task.Fainstein (1991) in her research on Battery Park City makesthe point that the cost of the public benefits provided by thedeveloper can be fairly insignificant if compared to thepotential profits they are likely to generate.There have also been concerns about view blockage and a lackof publicly accessible open space (City of Vancouver PlanningDepartment, 1988). Moreover, it is said that there has beenlittle or no public participation in the development:“It is a city of artificial diversity,a city of memory rather than of thespontaneous development of contrast. Therehas been no public participation of anykind in its creation (Fainstein, 1989,48)One of Fainstein’s conclusions from her recent researchcomparing Battery Park City and the Canary Wharf developmentin the London Docklands was that such developments are verysimilar in nature (Fainstein, 1991):80“They are both run by bodies that havebeen designed to represent businessinterests, promote secrecy, and provide noeffective vehicle for popularparticipation. Staff activities andproject successes are measured exactly aswould be the case in a private corporation— by money invested, square feet of spaceconstructed, and revenues attained. BPCAand LDDC both demonstrate the considerablecapability of the new style of planning toactually make development happen; they arealso limited by a framework that restrictsprogress to a corporate—style approach,whereby the tastes and interests ofinvestors come first and the rest of thepublic must be content with whatever sidebenefits are negotiated or trickle down”(Fainstein, 1991, 30).According to Zukin, similarities between Battery Park City anddevelopments like Canary Wharf are not surprising consideringboth developments involve the same “worldly superstars,including developers, architects and private sectorinstitutions” (Zukin, 1992, 203). Moreover, Zukin notes thatbig projects like Battery Park City “seem only to extendinstitutional precedents by which developers get to build whatthey want” (Zukin, 1992, 203)The London Docklands and Canary WharfSuch comparisons take us neatly to the London Docklands, anarea of about 8.5 square miles located about 2.5 miles east ofLondon’s traditional financial district - see Map 4. LondonDocklands is commonly regarded as a derelict area, but it hasa resident population of around 39,000 people. It containssome of the most deprived areas in Britain (Widgery, 1991).81The London DocklandSMAP 4a)r1Ua)4)—10(JSource: London Docklands Development Corporation82The London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) was set upin 1981 with a free—reigning mandate to secure the permanentregeneration of the Docklands area by the private sector. Itwas established by the 1980 Local Government. Planning andLand Act, as part of the Conservative Government strategy tosimplify and streamline the public planning process and tofacilitate a more prominent role for the private sector inurban regeneration (Ambrose, 1986; Thornley, 1991). Theimposition of UDC’s resulted in considerable communityopposition. It was felt that urban development corporationsworked to effectively exclude local residents from theplanning process (Lawless, 1987; Church, 1988; Fainstein,1991)The LDDC is a powerful body. The LDDC Board is the chiefdecision-making body and operates largely in secret, withtwelve members appointed by central government that representlargely business and political interests. There is norequirement on the Corporation to consult with the public. TheLDDC saw its mandate in terms of serving the nation ratherthan the local communities (Wolmar, 1989).The planning approach has been a marketing one. It funds itsoperation primarily through government grants and sellingland. It attracts private investment to undertake developmentby offering land below market value and a number of other83incentives, like tax concessions, capital allowances and fewplanning regulations (Hills, 1992).Despite the emphasis on the private sector a considerableamount of public sector money has been invested in Docklands.It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1991 the LDDC hasinvested over $5 billion of public money in order to leverageprivate property investment (Association of LondonAuthorities/Docklands Consultative Committee, 1991) . Thepublic sector investment is expected to rise to over $11billion by 1995. The LDDC approach is therefore dependent on amassive public spending programme, the biggest undertaken bycentral government in UK history (Wolmar, 1990). In fact, theLondon Docklands is said to be one of the most heavilysubsidized commercial developments in the world (AIA/DCC,1991)O&Y’s Canary Wharf development is a 71 acre site located onthe Isle of Dogs in the heart of the London Docklands (Foster,1991). It is said to be the Reichmann’s biggest real estategamble to date (Horsman, 1990). The recent media coverage ofthe Reichmann’s financial difficulties seem to support such aIn the interests of consistency it was decided to useCanadian $ figures for financial information. For figures givenin pounds an approximate conversion of $2.0 to the pound wasapplied. This reflects an average of the conversion rates duringthe relevant times.84claim. The first proposal for the site was put forward in 1985by an American developer G. Ware Traveistead and a consortiumof American banks (Sudjic, 1987). Financial difficulties withthis project resulted in a take-over by O&Y in 1987. The O&Yscheme includes 10 million square feet of offices; 500,000square feet retail, restaurant and leisure facilities; 6,500car parking spaces and a 400 room hotel.It is said to be one of the largest development projects inthe UK today. The recently completed tower of Phase One of thedevelopment is 800 feet high and has become the tallestbuilding in Britain, and the second tallest building inEurope, after Frankfurt’s Messeturm (Widgery, 1991). It isestimated that the project is costing the Reichmanns $7.86billion (Prokesch, 1990).O&Y were provided with a warm welcome from the UK ConservativeGovernment. The LDDC provided extremely favourable terms forO&Y. The development required no planning permission and theland was sold to them very cheaply (Horsman, 1990). O&Y paidapproximately $980,000 an acre for land that was estimated tobe worth at least $2 million per acre, which rose to roughly$3.2 million per acre when all the wider economic benefitswere taken into account (Hencke, 1989) . In return O&Y agreedThe increase in the price of Docklands land generally hasbeen dramatic. In 1981 land that was priced at $140,000 per acrecould raise as much as $10 million per acre in 1989. Such an85to make financial contributions to road and rail projects toimprove the infrastructure connections to the area. They wereexpected, for example, to contribute $800 million to the costof extending the Jubilee tube line7 out to the development.The public contribution to the extension was in the region of$3 billion (Fisher, 1990). These pledges are now worthless inlight of the recent collapse of O&Y. At the time of writing,the future of the Jubilee line was open to speculation.The recession of the early 1990s and the ambitious nature ofthe Canary Wharf development were key factors in the demise ofO&Y. The real estate market worldwide is in recession.According to some reports one of the worst hit cities isLondon (Foster, 1991). This problem is exacerbated at CanaryWharf because of the locational problems and its relativeinaccessibility to the financial heart of the City (Foster,1991). The Reichmanns experienced considerable difficulty intrying to lease the office space in the development. London iscurrently experiencing an oversupply of office space (Johnson,1990). Up until October 1991, only 57 per cent of the firstphase of the development had been leased (Foster, 1991).Consequently, the lessors began offering attractiveescalation in land value has resulted in the redevelopment ofland that was only developed in the early eighties at much higherdensities (Eames, 1989).‘ Part of the London Underground rail network.86inducements to prospective tenants including rent relief, freeinterior fittings and financial help with the disposition ofcurrent leases (Horsman, 1990).The Reichmanns tried desperately to restructure its debtcommitments (estimated to be in the region of $14.3 billion)and renegotiated its agreements with major lenders (Gittinsand Reguly, 1992; Flanagan, 1992). In addition, they sought tooffload some of their massive US real estate portfolio(Barsky, 1992; Canadian Press, 1992; Yellin, 1991; MacDonald,1992; Marotte, 1992). In May 1992, such efforts met withdefeat and O&Y were forced to hand over the site tocourt—appointed administrators.There is no doubt developments like Canary Wharf have helpedto transform the physical face of Docklands. Investment hasbeen attracted and considerable development has taken place.But, questions have been raised as to whether the developmenthas been of the right nature, and there is considerableconcern about the impacts of this transformation on the localcommunity (Fisher, 1990; Widgery, 1991). There has been theemergence of two distinct communities living side by side. Onemade up of wealthy newcomers living in luxury convertedwarehouses, and the other the poorer original residents livingon neglected and underfunded public housing estates (Nicolson,1989; Widgery, 1991). significant social divisions have87emerged between the existing residents and the newcomers(Hanson, 1988; Wolmar, 1989).It is argued that the LDDC approach has done considerabledamage to community gains in the area made through socialwelfare policies since the war (Widgery, 1991). The market hascontrolled the development in the Docklands, and so marketinghas been used, as opposed to planning, to create demand ratherthan meet need:“As a result, unfortunately, much of theinfrastructure has been chosen with an eyeto symbolic rather than immediatepractical value: a STOLort8, satelliteearth stations, the DLR , and water-skiingcentres” (Fisher, 1990, 34).The consequences of this lack of planning has led toinappropriate development which has had detrimental effects onthe poor and low income groups in these areas. There is adesperate need for low income housing. Yet, in December 1989,it was estimated that there were 3,000 unsold privatecondominiums in the area and another 3,000 were being built oron the drawing board (Fisher, 1990).It appears from considering such evidence that the local8 A STOLport is an airport for Short Take-Off and Landingplanes.DLR - Docklands Light Railway.88residents have benefitted little from LDDC housing strategy,which has been to develop mostly private housing (Wilicock,1991). A report by the Labour controlled ALA (1991) statesthat only 2,253 of the total 15,000 housing units built in theDocklands since 1981 have gone to local people. Other areas ofintended community benefit have not proved successful. Thecollapse of the property market and the recession have led toa situation where many of the proposed LDDC communityprogrammes and training schemes have been cut. The LDDCcommunity services budget (which includes social housing) isbeing cut from $86 million in 1989/90 to $54 million in1990/91 to $32 million in 1993/94 (Willcock, 1991; ALA/DCC,1991)The public benefits offered by developers to secure approvalfor their plans need careful scrutiny:“In terms of the “gains” offered, the listof what has been agreed in Docklands mayseem impressive, but a closer examinationreveals a different story. We need toconsider whether what’s on offer isanything over and above what a developmentneeds to make it work — in other word, isit really gain?” (Brownill, 1989, 13)The justification for offering incentives to developers isthat the benefits will ‘trickle down’ to those in most need,via increased tax revenue for the city, the provision of jobs,the construction of new infrastructure, and the development ofcommunity facilities. In the London Docklands there is little89evidence, however, to support such claims. There appearsinstead to be a deepening community polarization between the“new” and the “existing” residents:“The Docklands experience with UDCsdemonstrates that the ‘trickle downtheory,’ which claims that somewhere alongthe line everyone will benefit, eitherdirectly or indirectly, from market-leddevelopment, does not work. Unfortunately,the winners or losers are all too obvious”(Nicolson, 1989, 55)There had been considerable planning done in the area prior tothe arrival of the LDDC, by the respective London Boroughs andthe Greater London Council. There were also a number ofwell—informed and active community based organizations(including Joint Docklands Action Group and Docklands Forum)in the area that knew the community concerns and what wasneeded. These resources were ignored.The Peoples’ Plan for the Royal Docks was put forward bycommunity groups to represent the local viewpoint at a 1983public inquiry for a proposal for a short take-off and landingairport (STOLport) at the Royal Docks, and met with a negativeresponse. The LDDC barrister at the inquiry was dismissive ofthe plan, stating:“We are prepared to listen to alternativesfrom a statutory body, from the GLC orNewham Council, but from the people. . apeople’s plan. . . ridiculous. I’ve neverheard of such a thing!” (Newham DocklandsForum and the GLC Popular Planning Unit,1983)90The 1991 ALA report on the Docklands, produced in consultationwith the DCC, was highly critical of the public process:“Between about 1981 and 1987, thecommunity watched as land earmarked forsocially beneficial schemes was taken overfor what they saw as lining the pockets ofthe wealthy - high priced housing, higherand higher office blocks. There were anumber of consultation structures inplace, but in effect the community hadbeen excluded from the developmentprocess. Local interests were seen as animpediment to development.The attempts to consult were oftentoken. Development guidelines produced bythe LDDC upon which there was consultationwere ignored as developers proposed evenlarger schemes. Local plans produced bylocal authorities such as the NorthSouthwark District Plan and the SouthDocklands Local Plan, and the Peoples’Plan produced by the community around theRoyal Docks, were deemed irrelevant.The various consultation structuressuch as arrangements with the DocklandsForum, widely recognised as a majorrepresentative organization in theDocklands area proved ineffective”(ALA/DCC, 1991, 14)Community and residents groups in the Docklands impacted byits redevelopment have been active in their opposition to theLDDC approach (Widgery, 1991). Tenants’ associations have beendiligent in trying to mitigate the negative impacts ofdevelopments on their homes; trade unions have been organizingaround issues of safety and better wages; and a group calledSPLASH (South Poplar and Limehouse Action for Secure Housing)have organized to sue the LDDC and O&Y for the disruption totheir lives as a result of the development. This is said to be91the biggest group action in English legal history (Ezard,1991). Groups such as the Joint Docklands Action Group and theDocklands Consultative Committee have performed a vital rolein documenting and analysing many of the development issuesand their impacts on local communities. They have not onlyraised awareness of the impacts of LDDC redevelopment on thelocal community, but they have produced a series of reports toback up their claims (ALA/DCC, 1991; DCC, 1992).Local residents have by and large felt excluded from theprocess of planning in the Docklands. Little publicparticipation has gone on (ALA, 1991; Brownill, 1990; Widgery,1991). George Nicolson, former Chairman of the Greater LondonCouncil10 Planning Committee, at a talk given to a Royal TownPlanning Summer School in the U.K., criticised theproperty-led activities of LDDC as being “. . .anti-people,anti-planning, anti-city and anti-language” (Pickering, 1988,10 The Greater London Council (GLC) was the electedmetropolitan level of government that represented the whole ofthe London area. It was abolished in 1986 with the otherMetropolitan Authorities by the Conservative Government. The GLCof the time, under the leadership of Ken Livingstone (now aLabour Member of Parliament), had developed a reputation forpromoting public participation and local democracy. The GLC was aregional strategic body that developed links with localresidential groups. This was powerful alliance that served todefeat and hinder property developers. A great example of this isthe community battle and subsequent victory over Coin Street inLondon, waged with the support of the GLC (Tuckett, 1990). Thisproved to be very threatening to the Thatcher government and theinterests it represented. Interestingly, London is now the onlycapital city in Europe without an elected government (Widgery,1991).92108). From a community perspective it has been argued thatDocklands is a good model of how not to regenerate an urbanarea (Nicolson, 1989; Docklands Consultative Committee (DCC),1992)CO-OPERATIVE MUNICIPAL APPROACHIt is apparent then from this review that the developmentcorporation approach to UMP development has not been thateffective in promoting effective public participation. Theplanning approach has been a marketing one in which thedeveloper’s interests appear to dominate. Attention now turnsto the co—operative municipal approach.Railway Lands, TorontoThis site has had a long and contentious planning history. Itis bound by Front Street West in the north, by Bathurst Streetin the west, the Gardiner Expressway in the south and YongeStreet in the east, see Map 5. The land is publicly owned, butis leased to Canadian National Railways (CN) and CanadianPacific Railways (CP) for rail rights of way.11 As the railwayuse has gradually reduced, the railway companies wanted todevelop the land. In 1986, after many years of debate and a11 Canadian National is a public corporation. CanadianPacific, a private corporation, got its lands in the form of alease in 1895 from the federal government and now pays rent tothe Toronto Harbour Commission, to enable it to use the landsfor, as it states in the lease, “the purposes of its railwayoperations” (Valpy, 1990).93Map 5 The Railway Lands Plan, TorontoiEHHDL7D-UL1UnILlIHHWI.UEFrn”222 2z ..Source: City of Toronto Planning and Development Departmenta..0Wa.0.10”ciC.)U)0)x0H H U H 094lengthy Ontario Municipal Board (0MB) Hearing,12 City Councilgave CP’s Marathon Realty Co. Ltd. and CN the go-ahead for amajor redevelopment scheme despite considerable publicopposition. There were over 600 objectors at the OntarioMunicipal Board hearing (RLAC, 1990). The plan was heavilyorientated toward office development, with a total of 13million square feet of office space that was estimated togenerate a potential 50,000 new commuters. The plan included20 high-rise office buildings and 17 residential towers, ofwhich some would be as high as 45 storeys (City of Toronto,Planning and Development Department, 1985).In 1988, a more community—based, reform minded council waselected, as a rejection of the developer’s reign at City12“The Ontario Municipal Board Hearing is an administrativetribunal responsible for hearing appeals and deciding on avariety of contentious municipal matters, including land useplanning proposals. Board members are not elected but areappointed by the Ontario Cabinet. They include lawyers,accountants, architects, planners and public administrators.The O.M.B., as it is commonly called, operates with much the sameformality as a court of law. Its main role in community planningis to hold public hearings on:— land use planning issues (such as zoning by—laws, landseverances, and minor variances) which have been appealeddirectly to the 0.M.B.;— planning applications (such as official plans and subdivisions)which have been referred for appeal to the 0.M.B. by the Ministerof Municipal Affairs or a delegated approval authority.Except where a matter has been declared of provincial interest,the O.M.B. has the final say in all community planning decisionsin Ontario, which have been appealed or referred to it” (OntarioMinistry of Municipal Affairs, 1985a).95Council that had resulted in the approval of the 1985 plan.13The new council exhibited more of an apparent commitment toencouraging public participation. This served to reactivatethe community opposition to the Railway Lands. Groups in thecommunity began to organize. Homeowners, tenants, co—opmembers, anti—poverty organizations, women’s groups,environmentalists and many other groups came together tooppose the plan. The Railway Lands Action Coalition (RLAC) wasformed in February 1990, and campaigned for a full review ofthe plan. Moreover, members were concerned about theenvironmental impacts of the approved development on both theCity and the rest of the metropolitan area. Particular concernwas expressed about the potential increase in vehiculartraffic that would be generated in terms of increasedcongestion and pollution. The RLAC had a different vision forhow the land should be developed:“Rather than a solid wall of officetowers, imagine a community of peopleliving, working and playing - townhouses,homes and apartment buildings, trees,parks and bicycle paths, schools andchurches, access to the waterfront, daycare services, and more — anecologically-sound, healthy, viablecommunity that will be a model for urbanplanning all over North America. If webuild wisely, the result could be awatershed in urban planning” (RailwayLands Action Coalition, 1991).13 Interview with Jack Layton, Toronto City Councillor, July11, 1990.96They pointed to the tremendous changes that had taken place inthe city since the developers’ plans had been approved in1985. These included the emergence of a housing crisis in thecity, with a paucity of affordable housing and an increasingpolarization between the rich and poor; the lack of properplanning at Harbourfront, including the lack of provision foraffordable housing and the restrictions on public access tothe waterfront; intense office development in the inner coreand the overloading of transportation and transit facilitiesin the downtown.The RLAC used direct action in support of their case. On April8, 1990, for example, a sponsored a walk around the RailwayLands was organized with public speakers to highlight the needfor more community-based development of the site. On April 24,Toronto City Council’s Land Use Committee received manydeputations from groups and individuals, including RLAC,calling for a review. The Deputation from RLAC clearlyspecified what they wanted City Council to do:“1. Retain the holding symbol14 on the 200-acre siteand freeze the building of any office towers until anew plan can be adopted.2. Rezone the land primarily for housing withprovision for parkiand and broad, tree—linedpedestrian and cycling routes to act as green links14 Holding symbols are a type of zoning by-law, which setsout future use of land or buildings, but restricts developmentuntil City Council feel development is appropriate and/or thatservices such as sewers and water supplies are in place (OntarioMinistry of Municipal Affairs, 1985).97to the lake. Toronto has a housing crisis!3. Consult with the people as you are doing withCityplan ‘91.4. Include the Railway Lands as part of Cityplan‘91. The Railway Lands were not even considered partof the 1991 official plan review process. How can adevelopment of this magnitude and impact not be partof a new official plan” (Railway Lands ActionCoalition, 1990, 6)The call for a review was supported by the Committee whorelayed their feelings to City Council and recommended that areview take place. On May 27, the RLAC organized a GreenAction on the Railway Lands where a small orchard of trees wasplanted as a symbol for a human—scale, ecologically sounddevelopment on the site. This was despite the efforts of thedevelopers to restrict access to the site and prohibit treeplanting. On May 28, City Council agreed by a substantialmajority (14-3) to review the Railway Lands Plan in accordancewith the recommendations set out in a May 25 report by thePlanning Commissioner, Robert Millward (City of TorontoPlanning and Development Department, 1990).The decision caused the developers great concern. They accusedCity Council of reneging on the plan. The whole review processwas affected by the legal redress the developers sought. Theysaw no need for a review and wanted the holding symbols liftedso that the development could commence as approved.The review process proceeded despite opposition from thedeveloper and included:98* a public meeting on October 22, 1990 chaired by thePlanning Advisory Committee to discuss objectives and thepreliminary results of the review.* the creation of a working group, under the auspices ofthe Planning Advisory Committee, to provide a forum forinterested individuals to discuss the plan review withplanning staff.* the use of consultants to report and advise on specificelements of the plan.* discussions with the developers.* intergovernmental consultation and workshops to discussspecific issues.The result of all the deliberations was a weighty 200-pagereport produced in March 1991 by Commissioner Miliward (Cityof Toronto Planning and Development Department, 1991). Thisdocument called for changes to the 1985 plan, including:* more attention given to environmental issues.* more park space.* proposals for more public transit, cycling and thepossible closure of freeways.* reduction of proposed land area in the financialdistrict.* reduction of density and building heights.(City of Toronto Planning and Development Department,1991)99The RLAC response to this report was one of disappointment.While they acknowledged the changes that were to be made,there was still a strong feeling that the changes did notaddress the community concerns. In their terms there was stilltoo much space devoted to offices and both the density andbuilding heights were still too high. Consequently, the RLACfelt that the recommended changes were just cosmetic.By this time the RLAC had been active in drawing up their ownproposals and had put forward their own plan for the site.This was a plan that contained less office development andmore affordable housing units. The objective was to produce aliveable and healthier development that met the followinggoals:* the replacement of office space with affordable andsocial housing units.* liveable densities and height limits.* the development of broad, tree—lined pedestrian andcycle routes.* less congestion and cleaner air with more peoplewalking to work and using public transit.The difference between the two plans is illustrated in Table3.100Table 3: Toronto Railway Lands: Alternative Visions1985 Plan RLAC PlanOffice Space (sq ft) 13 million 3 millionNew Commuters 50,000 13,000Housing Units 5,000 13,000Max. Building Height 452 feet 98 feetNo. of Storeys 45 10Source: Railway Lands Action CoalitionThe RLAC stated that their objective was to put forward anenvironmentally sustainable plan that was designed to producea liveable, safe and humane neighbourhood. They identified thenegative environmental impacts of the developer’s plan on theCity and the Metro region as a whole. These included thelikelihood of more urban sprawl as the city grew outwards toprovide affordable housing; increased car traffic andpollution; increased pressure to build more freeways and theconstruction of high rise towers that would result in the lossof views and sunlight.The emphasis on the environment came through in anothercommunity plan for the Railways Lands produced by a group oflocal environmentalists called the Creenlands Plan. This planwas a bold and imaginative attempt at sustainable development.The plan includes sections on innovative and progressiveenergy policy; ideas on reducing C02 emissions; how to improvewater treatment and supply; how to improve the transportationsystem by reducing the need to travel to work and by promoting101public transit and alternative garbage disposal methods(Allen, et al., 1990).Despite the community concern, the Railway Lands plan reviewwas approved by City Council in September/October 1991. Thesite is now divided into East (Marathon) and West (CN).Currently, the City is in dispute with CN over the land titlefor that half of the site. CN want ownership instead of aperpetual lease. A telephone interview with Toronto CityPlanning Department in May 1992 indicated that any developmentprior to 1994 would be unlikely.At the same time as the RLAC were responding to the RailwayLands plan, another Toronto—based coalition called ‘Bread NotCircuses’ was opposing a series of other mega—projects,including the bid for the 1996 Olympics, a bid for Expo 2000and the proposed new ballet—opera house. This coalition,formed in 1989, sought to raise community awareness about thenature of UMP planning in the City. They questioned the senseof spending millions and millions of dollars on such projectsin the face of growing poverty and homelessness in the City ofToronto (Shapcott, 1991). The coalition played a major role indefeating the 1996 Olympics (Tierney, 1990) and succeeded infocusing critical public debate on UMPS. By 1991, thecoalition represented 50 organizations with a combinedmembership of several thousand residents (Shapcott, 1991).102Mission Bay, San FranciscoSan Francisco, California has seen considerable mega—projectactivity in recent years. The Mission Bay development proposalis one of the largest private urban development projects inNorth America today. The developer, Catellus DevelopmentCorporation, is one of the biggest real estate companies inthe United States.Mission Bay is a 315 acre former railroad yard on the City’ssoutheastern waterfront, adjacent to San Francisco Bay boundedby Townsend, China Basin, Mariposa and Seventh Streets,15 seeMap 6. It is one of the few relatively undeveloped areas ofthe City. The plan for this site is for a new urbanneighbourhood “with an integrated living and workingenvironment, to be built out over the next 20 to 30 years”(San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1987).The Mission Bay planning process dates back to 1981, when thelandowner, Southern Pacific Land Company, presented an initialdevelopment concept to the City (the Warneke Plan of 1982).15 The site is close to San Francisco’s downtown, less than amile from the financial district. It is close to anothermega—project, the Yerba Buena Center in the South of Market area,that resulted in considerable community opposition and a lengthylitigation process in the courts (Hartxnan, 1974 and 1984; Feagin,1983)103C’) 0 C C) CD U) I-Tj C) C) 0 CD—Ioii r1 CD rt 0 I-.”r1 zCD I-i.I-,.0 z U) p., z ti p., C) I-’ C) 0/IIIfIIIIIII/1IIii/1”!//i’nU(I171II/I//Il/1/17.:-I/ilkEiIIf;/fl17/1’I’II!!enseitsinai.///,S111‘I/I/!•I./II..;::,;::/i:’,.1’‘1iiI/It//1/I::y’/iI’’:’’/I//Ii1’—II‘iIIIJPUbJjjParks65AcresResidentiar—8000UnitsKingStreetOffice_—4—8FloorsMuniMetroz 0 Ct 0 C’) C) p., CDPortofSanFranciscoThis was followed soon after by an amended plan (the Pei Planof 1983) 16These two plans advocated a high density, high rise solution,and the creation of a second downtown. This was thetraditional high risk, high gain development approach. Theseplans met with considerable community opposition.17Subsequently, both plans were turned down by the City as beingunacceptable (Bash, 1988). The City responded by outliningwhat its guidelines were for the development of the site, towhich the developer acceded. These guidelines included nobuildings over eight stories; at least 7,577 residential unitsof which 30% had to be affordable (15% financed by developerand 15% by the city); up to 2.6 million square feet ofresearch and development space; up to 4.1 million square feetof office space; up to 200,000 square feet of retail space; a19 acre park and various public open spaces (San FranciscoDepartment of City Planning, 1987).16 In 1984, Southern Pacific Land Company merged with the SantaFe railroad company to form Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation. InJune 1990, the Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation was renamedCatellus Development Corporation following a companyrestructuring.This made it one of the largest real estate companiesin the United States, with over 2 million acres of land and 223buildings, and with major land holdings in the downtown areas ofcities like Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco(Catellus Development Corporation, 1990).17 Interview with Betty Boatright, Mission Creek HarbourAssociation, June 21, 1991.105In May 1985, the Department of City Planning set in motion theplanning process to prepare an agreed development plan for thesite. The developers agreed to pay the City PlanningDepartment $1.5 million to set up a planning team and overseethe whole process. The estimated build out value of thedevelopment at the time was in the region of $2 billion (Bash,1988). The process was designed to be interactive and involvedthe City Planning Department and its consultants, othergovernment agencies, the developers and the community:“In order to achieve a plan whichrepresented a consensus among interestedparties to the extent possible, thisinteractive process involved dialogue,meetings, exchange of information, publicforums, environmental impact reportscoping, small issue—orientated groupmeetings, and open design studio hourswhere the public could view and respond toongoing planning and design” (SanFrancisco Department of City Planning,1987, 2—6).The whole process was launched by a two-day charette involvingall the major players.’8 The process resulted in the Proposalfor Citizen Review in 1987. A revised plan included much ofwhat the city had required. It contained many more publicbenefits and requirements that the developer had to fulfilthan the previous plans. This was put out for public response.The Proposal for Citizen Review was a substantial document,18 Interview with Daj Oberg, San Francisco City Planner, SanFrancisco, June 20, 1991.106providing considerable information on the plan and how it wasput together.San Francisco has a diverse and well informed citizenry thatis prepared to become involved in planning and developmentissues.19 There is a long history of community organizing inthe City.2° The community and neighbourhood organizations arewell organized and have had great influence on city planningand are known for the strength of their challenge to corporateinterests (Barton, 1985). The affordable housing activistsplayed a critical role in the process.21 The Mission BayClearinghouse, a broad based information network of communityorganizations, formed in 1982, played a crucial role inbringing people together and co-ordinating the communityresponse to the plan.22 The other Mission Bay groups included19 spent several days in San Francisco interviewing committedactivists, including Calvin Welch of the Council of CommunityHousing Organizations; Chuck Turner of the Mission Bay Consortium;and Betty Boatright of the Mission Creek Harbor Association. Iconducted a telephone interview with Regina Sneed of the MissionBay Clearinghouse. Together, they provided me with a full accountof the community response to the Mission Bay proposals.20 Interview with Calvin Welch, Council of Community HousingOrganizations, San Francisco, October 2, 1991.21 ibid.22 Telephone Interview with Regina Sneed, Mission Bayclearinghouse, June 25, 1991.107Mission Bay Consortium, Mission Creek Conservancy and theCommunity Development Council, but these were supported bymany other established and active organizations. Theseincluded: Mission Creek Harbor Association, San FranciscoTomorrow, Coalition for San Francisco Neighbourhoods, PotreroLeague of Active Neighbours, Potrero Hill CommunityDevelopment Corporation, Council of Community HousingOrganizations, San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth and theCommunity Design Centre (San Francisco Department of CityPlanning, 1987). The feeling was that this site hadconsiderable potential for a community orientated plan.An important part of the public process was a comprehensiveenvironmental impact review (EIR) requirement. Californianstate legislation requires that such a review is undertaken.The EIR had to be certified by the City Planning Commissionbefore approval and implementation of the project. The MissionBay EIR, paid for by Catellus, looked at three maindevelopment alternatives and a number of variants on each. Thereview spelled out the implications of each of the developmentalternatives, the impacts of each alternative on businessactivity and jobs, on housing and population, on communityservices, on transportation, on air quality, on noise and onenergy and so on. The review also had to identify measuresthat would mitigate adverse impacts in any of these areas (SanFrancisco Department of City Planning, 1988).108As a result of the public process the 1987 Plan was subjectedto considerable change. At the end of January 1990, the Cityand the developer had agreed on a proposal. The plan nowcontained more specific and firm requirements of thedeveloper. The number of affordable housing units was enhanced(from 2,310 to 3,000); the ratio of family housing was doubledand there were more conditions on the developer in relation tomaintaining affordability in the development. The requirementsfor open space were improved and provisions were included forthe developer to fund training programmes, to provide childcare facilities; to provide a cultural centre, recreationcentre, police station, fire station and other infrastructureneeds. The revised plan was subject to further public inputvia information workshops and public hearings. The communitywas well represented throughout the public process,23 muchmore so than in the other examples considered.There is a regulation in San Francisco that limits the annualrate at which office space can be developed in the City. Eachyear developers apply to have their office projects includedin the city’s gross office space limits.24 Catellus wanted theoffice development in Mission Bay exempted from this23 Interview with Calvin Welch, Council of Community HousingOrganizations, San Francisco, October 2, 1991.24 Interview with Daj Oberg, San Francisco City Planner, SanFrancisco, June 20, 1991.109requirement. This required a variance (Proposition M), whichwas defeated by San Francisco voters in November 1990. Notonly were the community opposed to the variance, but so wereother office developers, who would have been adverselyaffected should Catellus be exempted from the regulation.25In February 1991, the final approval of the plan was given bythe San Francisco Board of Supervisors. The initial workinvolved necessary soil remediation, with actual constructionestimated to commence towards the end of 1992. Following theapproval, the planners and the developers began working on allthe legal agreements and requirements and on the detaileddevelopment negotiations. The Development Agreement is thedocument that sets out the arrangement between the City andthe developer and specifies who does what and when. TheAgreement is monitored through the Office of the ChiefAdministrative Officer at the City and County of San Franciscoand is subject to an annual review and a subsequent publichearing.26The community were active in preparing their own plans. By1985, there were twelve community plans for Mission Bay in25 ibid.26 Interview with David Prowler, Officer of the ChiefAdministrative Officer, City and County of San Francisco, SanFrancisco, October 7, 1991.110existence. Plans were put forward by groups such as MissionCreek Conservancy, Mission Bay Clearinghouse, San FranciscoTomorrow, Coalition of San Francisco Neighbourhoods, Councilof Community Housing Organizations (CCHO), Potrero League ofActive Neighbours (PLAN), the Sierra Club, and San FranciscoLeague of Environmental Voters. They vary in scope and detail,but each supported broad sustainable development principles ofaffordable housing, public transit, pedestrian and bicyclepathways and local employment opportunities (San FranciscoDepartment of City Planning, 1985). Subsequent plans haveincluded the Peoples’ Plan for Mission Bay.27 These communityplans played an important role in drawing attention topotential alternative development options and helped toidentify the issues that were important to the community. Manyof these issues were incorporated into the Mission Bay plan.28When interviewed Catellus were confident that developmentwould be underway by the end of 1992.2927 Interview with Tom Jones, Mayor’s Office of Housing, Cityand County of San Francisco, San Francisco, October 4, 1991.28 Interview with Chuck Turner, Mission Bay Consortium, SanFrancsico, June 21, 1991.29 Interview with Kirsteen McGarry, Catellus DevelopmentCorporation, San Francisco, October 3, 1991.111CONCLUS IONThis review of UMP planning processes has indicated that whilethe experience varies, the overall picture is not thatencouraging from a public participation point of view. It isclear, however, that the community has tended to fair betterwhere the processes have remained within the jurisdiction ofthe city planning authority in the co-operative municipalapproaches. The development corporation approach has beenquite exclusionary in nature. The most extreme case is theLondon Docklands, where there has been little or no publicparticipation. Public participation in both Harbourfront andBattery Park City was similarly limited.There was more evidence of public participation in theco—operative municipal approaches, e.g., Railway Lands andMission Bay. Here, at least the plans remained in the publicdomain and, in theory, were open to public influence. In bothcases local community organizations played a central role inmaximizing the use of the public process. The work of theRailway Lands Action Coalition and the community response toMission Bay is particularly instructive here. These groupstook a pro—active stance to change the original developmentproposals and put forward community—based alternatives. Thework of the San Francisco groups is particularly impressiveand the impact on the outcome of the process is evident.112It is important, however, to keep in mind the context of UMPplanning. The globalization of capital and the increasingcompetition between cities for investment has meant thateconomic factors are paramount and drive the whole process.This factor alone constrains any impact a public planningprocess might have. This is the situation with all privatesector led development, but the issue is magnified by the sizeof the UMPS. Economic forces on this scale are powerful anddifficult for public planning processes to influence.Moreover, public agencies are no longer formerly regulatingsuch forces to the same extent that they once were, i.e.according to fixed statutory plans, but are moving more in thedirection of collaboration and partnership with the privatesector. Such a process reflects changes in the powers of citygovernments in the 1980s and 1990s and the increased role ofthe private sector in large scale urban regeneration.113CHAPTER FIVEFROM B.C. PLACE TO PACIFIC PLACE: AN UMP IN THE MAKING“...a key resource in any vision for thefuture are the large undeveloped andunderdeveloped sites around the downtownpeninsula: the Expo site, the BurrardInlet railway lands, and the underutilisedindustrial and railway lands on each sideof Terminal Avenue. These are thelocations where the options are greatest,and the capacity exists for the moststriking achievements but also the mostserious errors in terms of lostopportunities” (Ley, 1988, 9—10).INTRODUCTIONThe next two chapters introduce and describe the Pacific Placecase study. The purpose of this chapter is to providenecessary background material to the understanding of thePacific Place planning process. The chapter is organized intothree sections. The first part of the chapter outlines thehistory and background to the development of the site. Thesecond part describes the Pacific Place development proposal.The final part reveals the key players in the process.The Pacific Place site is a large section of derelict, formerindustrial land situated on the North Shore of False Creek. Itwas the site of a former mega—event, Vancouver’s Expo ‘86. Thesite is approximately 204 acres in size and is one of the mostdesirable and valuable redevelopment sites in North Americatoday. In total size, it represents approximately one—sixth ofthe downtown peninsula, see Map 7.114Map 7 The Pacific Place Site and the surroundingImpacted Communities, Vanvouver41)Iretn_IU) 4)04- C0u2 ct5( (0—cQ CC)C 0—4t.)—I 0 ,clq-4j4J4)C a CCt, 04-) 014QC12ZSource: Vancouver City Planning Department—UJC-115The Pacific Place planning process was initiated in 1988,following the sale of the Expo ‘86 site by the B.C. ProvincialGovernment to the Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing and hisVancouver—based development company Concord PacificDevelopments Limited. Although the present process began in1988, the City of Vancouver had been involved in the planningof this site for nearly twenty years. Concord Pacific’sPacific Place proposal was the latest in a series ofdevelopment proposals, which have included Marathon Realty’s1969 and 1974 proposals and the provincial government’s planfor B.C. Place in the early 1980’s.HISTORY AND BACKGROUNDPrior to Expo ‘86, the site was a major industrial area. Ithad been home to many different types of industrial use,including, railway yards and a roundhouse, a lumber mill,ship-building yards, a manufactured gas plant and a by-productproduction facility, warehouses and freight transferoperations. It was the industrial heart of the city that oncegenerated much of Vancouver’s wealth. The importance of thearea was acknowledged in the Harland Bartholomew VancouverPlan of 1929:• . it should be encouraged as anindustrial entity of extreme usefulness toVancouver. Theoretically and practicallyit contributes to an ideal situation inthat it provides a harbour for industrialactivities allied to shipping interests,yet permits of a desirable segregation116from the purely commercial water—bornetraffic of Burrard Inlet. In other words,Vancouver is fortunate in having both acommercial and industrial harbour.Emphasis is made of the importance ofnot only retaining the present industriesalong the channel, but of encouragingothers to locate there”(Harland Bartholomew, 1930, 147.)The site was originally given to Canadian Pacific Railways(CPR) by the Provincial Government in 1884 as an incentive toextend the trans—Canada railway to the Burrard Inlet. The landwas used for both railway purposes and leased out to industryalso. The land remained in industrial use until the 1960s,when the idea of redevelopment for residential purposes beganto permeate the thinking of the city planners and CityCouncil. Such thoughts were propagated by a number of factorsincluding, the area’s demise in industrial terms, the decisionby CPR to move the railyards out to Port Coquitlam, thechanging economic structure and the forthcoming termination ofmany of the industrial leases (Hulchanski, 1984).Consequently, during the 1960s there was considerable debateabout the future use of the False Creek basin. There were alsoquestions raised between CPR and the Province regarding whoowned what lands. This was settled in 1968 when an agreementbetween the two bodies consolidated land ownership into twolarge parcels. The South Shore was awarded to the Province andthe North Shore to CPR. The Province subsequently traded thisland with the City for land on Burnaby mountain in order to117build Simon Fraser University. The City proceeded to redevelopthe South Shore of False Creek into a diverse residentialneighbourhood (Hulchanski, 1984).In April 1969, Marathon Realty Ltd., CPR’s real estate arm,put forward a $250 million mega-project proposal to transformits 190 acres on the North Shore into a residentialdevelopment for 20,000 people, plus a marina. Marathonsubsequently abandoned this plan due to the scale of theproject and the difficulty in finding agreement with the City(Lee, 1988a). In April 1974, Marathon followed this with a$150 million residential/commercial proposal to develop 89acres of the site. This included high-density high risehousing for 8,000 middle to high income people (at 180 peopleper acre) and 1.5 million square feet of commercial,institutional, and recreational space (Gutstein, 1975).In June 1974, Marathon offered the city $21 million in landand bonuses if they approved the rezoning and allowed thedevelopment to go ahead. This proposal ran aground due tovarious complications, including disagreements with the Cityand the high costs of the development at the time of a majorinternational recession that had emerged. But, the rezoningproceeded and the net result was to create massive windfall118profits for CPR (Gutstein, 1975) •1 This was realized when CPRsold the land to the Province in 1980 for $30 million in cashand a further $30 million in downtown property (Trade UnionResearch Bureau, 1989).EXPO ‘86 AND B.C. PLACEWith the land once more in public ownership, the Provinceembarked on its own mega—project. In January 1980, PremierBill Bennett announced a major transportation exposition,Transpo ‘86, as a ‘primer’ for the redevelopment of the NorthShore by the Crown Corporation, B.C. Place Ltd. The proposedredevelopment, B.C. Place, was a $1 billion 20 yeardevelopment proposal that included thousands of units ofresidential units, millions of square feet of office andretail development and a major stadium (Gutstein, 1986).On May 22, 1980, City Council approved, in general terms, theidea of working co-operatively with B.C. Place Ltd. on theplans for B.C. Place. A task force made up of the Deputy CityManager and the Directors of Planning, Engineering and SocialPlanning was established to work with B.C. Place Corporationofficials. Transpo ‘86 received the official sanction from theInternational Bureau of Exhibitions in November 1980(Gutstein, 1986). Transpo ‘86 was subsequently renamed Expo1 Before rezoning, the land had been worth between $33,000 and$43,000 per acre; after rezoning the land was valued at around$500,000 per acre (Gutstein, 1975).119‘86. Between 1981-1984, B.C. Place Ltd. negotiated with theCity over the plans for the B.C. Place development. As a CrownCorporation, B.C. Place Ltd. was exempt from many of theCity’s planning regulations, but it did have to consult withit.It became clear during the negotiations that both parties hadquite different visions for the development of the site. B.C.Place Ltd. wanted a high-rise, high density scheme and theCity wanted much lower densities and a lower rise scheme. InMarch 1982, B.C. Place Ltd. produced a master plan calling forhousing for 19,000 people, high office component, parks,marina, lake, stadium, hotel and seawall. The city respondedin May 1982 with its own plan for B.C. Place, including arange of housing for 16,000 people, including subsidizedhousing units, more park space, lower building heights, lesscommercial space and lower densities. The differences betweenthe two visions were clearly laid out in a joint paperprepared by B.C. Place Ltd., and the City of Vancouver (B.C.Place Ltd., and the City of Vancouver, 1982). This paper wasproduced to inform a series of public meetings at whichB.C.Place Ltd. and the City would outline their respectivepositions.There were different visions of the public process too. TheCity supported a full public consultation process and the120setting up of a Citizens Advisory Committee. The attitude ofB.C. Place Ltd. to public participation was less extensive.They only agreed to public consultation after a considerableamount of public pressure.There was significant citizen opposition to B.C. Place Ltd.’splans. In particular, there was concern over the exclusivenature of the development and the potential impact onsurrounding neighbourhoods, such as the Downtown Eastside,Strathcona and Hastings Sunrise. The Downtown Eastsidecommunity formed a citizens group called Citizen Action andParticipation (CAP) - B.C. Place, to co—ordinate andarticulate the opposition (Carr, 1981).The Downtown Eastside area of Vancouver was particularlythreatened by both Expo ‘86 and the proposals for B.C. Place.By all the usual indicators the Downtown Eastside is thepoorest neighbourhood in the Vancouver metropolitan area andone of the poorest neighbourhoods in Canada. It was home toabout 10,000 people, many of whom were single, poor,unemployed males, who live in the many residential hotels androoming houses in the neighbourhood (DERA, 1987):“The Downtown Eastside is an area ofVancouver that stretches from VictoriaDrive in the east to Burrard Street in thewest. It is bordered by Burrard Inlet onthe north and False Creek on the south.Predominantly a working classneighbourhood, it has a large proportionof poor, elderly men and women on fixed121incomes. It is also the poorest cityneighbourhood, with 91% of the residentsliving 40-60% below the poverty rate. Ifthere is a typical Downtown Eastsideresident, he is an unemployed man, about55 years old, receiving social assistance,and living alone in a small housekeepingroom for which he pays $225 a month. Hehas probably lived in the community in avariety of lodging houses, on and off, forthe past 15 years. He previously worked inprimary industries (e.g. logging, mining)and may have become disabled whileworking” (DERA, 1987, 7—8).The area had traditionally become home to significant numbersof marginalized groups, including discharged mental patients,teenage runaways, prostitutes and natives (Ley, Hiebert andPratt, 1992). Despite this disparate mix the community isrecognised as one of the most stable in Vancouver. Moreover,the community is one of the best organized in the city. Thisis due in large part to the activities of the DowntownEastside Residents Association (DERA), formed in 1973 tocombat the severe problems experienced by local residents andto challenge the ‘skid row’ image of the area. DERA has playeda significant role in improving the living conditions in thearea by ensuring by—law enforcement in the hotels and roominghouses and by exposing owners who flouted the regulations(Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992). It has campaigned forcommunity facilities and support services. Despite oppositionfrom members of City Council they succeeded in opening theCarnegie Centre, a much needed and well used community centre(DERA, 1987)122Expo ‘86 and B.C. Place were put forward by the Province inthe context of establishing Vancouver as a “world class city.”Expo ‘86 had a major impact on the city. The use of worldfairs as a redevelopment vehicle has been well—documented(Wachtel, 1986; Olds, 1988). Vancouver’s Expo ‘86 is a goodexample:“First came the covered stadium, B.C.Place, which set the tone for Expo ‘86.Though resisted initially by the city,Expo ‘86 was propelled into existence as aloss leader, an invitation tointernational investment and tourism.Construction went ahead during an economicrecession while there were severe cutbackson social programs, resulting in a periodof dissension which included increasedlabour militancy and the formation of theSolidarity Coalition (an alliance oflabour and community groups), whichbrought the province within a few hours ofa general strike in 1983.Expo ‘86 exemplified central themesof the 1980s: privatization, polarization,and internationalization. The Expo Boardawarded building contracts to non—unioncompanies, a provocative act in the lightof the high level of union membership inthe building trades. Polarization wasparticularly evident in off-site impactson residential hotels in the surroundingdistricts. In the Downtown Eastside,between 500 and 850 long-term residentswere evicted as hotels prepared themselvesfor a flood of tourists.Internationalization was the explicitintent of the fair with marketing sloganssuch as: ‘An invitation to the world’ and‘What your world is coming to in 1986’(Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992, 239).Other significant impacts of Expo ‘86 included the loss ofmuch affordable housing; numerous profitable rezoning of landssurrounding the site and enormous development pressure on123neighbouring communities (Gutstein, 1986). According to otherestimates Ley, Hiebert and Pratt’s estimate of evictions inthe Downtown Eastside might be considered conservative. DERAestimated that there were over 1,000 residents displaced fromhotels in the area, during Expo, as owners evicted long termtenants and raised rates to capitalize on Expo visitors. Therewas considerable concern and anger in the community on thisissue, particularly in relation to a lack of an adequateresponse from either the City or the Province (Sarti, 1986).There was considerable concern, too, with the public processassociated with such a major project:“There were no public meetings toestablish people’s aspirations and goalsfor their city. There was no planningprocess to come up with the bestexpenditures of public funds to achievethose goals. Most astonishing, there wereno impact studies to assess howVancouver’s neighbourhoods would beaffected. Instead, there were unilateraldecisions made in secret by the SocialCredit government of Bill Bennett about BCPlace, about Expo and about Skytrain.Often, City officials were not eveninvited to the splashy news conferenceswhich announced major projects and theyhad to find out from the newspapers whatthe provincial government had in mind fortheir city” (Gutstein, 1986, 65).Once Expo ‘86 was over attention returned to the task of theredevelopment of the site. By the time Expo finished B.C.Place Ltd. had rezoning approval for the development ofSoutheast Granville Slopes (SEGS Official Development Plan),124the area between Burrard and Granville Bridges2. There hadalso been considerable work undertaken in drawing up whatbecame known as the North Park Plan, a 75 acre area bounded byBeatty Street, Pender Street, Quebec Street and False Creek(City of Vancouver, Planning Dept., 1986).NORTH PARK PLANThe development of the North Park Plan took place between1985—86, and was a collaborative process between B.C. PlaceLtd. and the City. The cost of the City Planning Department’swork on the B.C. Place process from 1981-1987 was estimated tobe $800,000 (Volkart, 1988). This estimate did not take intoaccount the costs incurred by other city departments duringthat time.Once Expo was over, the plans for B.C. Place were abandonedand Grace Mccarthy, the Provincial Economic DevelopmentMinister at the time, announced a three month moratorium ondevelopment of the site to allow the government to considerfuture options (Lee, 1988a). The decision reached was toprivatize the site (Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992, 239). InApril 1987, Grace Mccarthy announced the cancellation of North2 In December 1983, B.C. Place Ltd. used the threat ofabandoning the whole project if the city refused to approve therezoning of this site. council therefore approved the GranvilleSlopes plan, which contains densities higher than the city wanted,including two 21-storey residential apartment blocks and a25—storey hotel (Lee, l988a).125Park, prior to any development commencing, and in September1987 announced the Province’s decision to sell the entire Exposite to a private developer. The reasoning behind thecancellation of North Park was that the Province did notbelieve that the proposals would be economically viable. Itwas felt that private development would produce a betterreturn (McMartin, 1987; Cox, 1988).The cancellation of the project was controversial. It resultedin the resignation of Stanley Kwok, the B.C. Place President,who had played a major role in the North Park plan. There wasa request from some City Councillors that the Province shouldreimburse the City for the $800,000 in costs it had occurredin processing the North Park Plan.3THE SALE OF THE LANDThe selling of the Expo lands was tied into the provincialgovernment’s wider privatization plans. The British ColumbiaEnterprise Corporation (BCEC)4 was set up in March 1987 towind up the Province’s land development activities and toInterview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall,August 13, 1991.BCEC was created after the merger of two previous CrownCorporations:- B.C. Place Corporation— B.C. Development Corporation.BCEC split the management functions of the facilities into aseparate subsidiary group, the B.C. Pavilion Corporation (Hyme,1988)126dispose of over half a billion dollars worth of public landand buildings, including the Expo lands. The Corporation hadabout 3,900 hectares of public land (worth $300—$400 million)to dispose of in twenty different communities across B.C.(Ford, 1988)A process for the sale of the lands including expressions ofinterest, tenders, deposit and the selection of successfulbidder was laid out in September 1987 by Grace Mccarthy,Minister responsible for the BCEC (BCEC, 1987). News filteredthrough the media that the Provincial Government was keen toseek an off—shore investor to develop the Expo lands (Palmer,1988a). The Provincial Government was keen to attract anoff—shore investor and Hong Kong was a favoured market due tothe links with the Pacific Rim.5Furthermore, the Province was keen to sell and develop thesite in one piece. The Vancouver Real Estate Board, among manyothers, was critical of this decision, arguing that a muchbetter and more lucrative development package could have beendeveloped if the land was sold in smaller parcels:“We understand from the limited informationavailable, that it is the intention of theProvincial Government to offer the entire site to aGrace Mccarthy had travelled to Hong Kong herself and hadmet with Li Ka-shing. So it was felt by some commentators that thewhole bidding process was geared in favour of Li Ka—shing from thestart (Palmer, 1988b).127single developer. While we appreciate theGovernment’s reasons for such an approach to the useof this unique parcel of land, we are very concernedthat by granting what would appear to be a plannedmonopoly to a single developer, the Government isseverely restrictin the participation of many otherworthy developers.”The Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver argued that themore sensible approach would have been to first, involve theCity of Vancouver in a public process to determine the bestuse for the site in the public interest; second, to put inplace the appropriate zoning for the whole site and thensub—divide to create zoned enclaves, which could, third, haveled to a process of determining which enclaves to selloutright and which to lease to developers. This approach, theyargued, would have resulted in the best use of the site(Calder, 1988)City Council disagreed and sided with the Province in theselling the land in one piece. It became clear from myinterviews with individual planners and city councillors, thatthe rationale appeared to be that it would be easier to dealwith one developer on a site of this magnitude and that itwould be possible to negotiate a larger package of publicbenefits. It was argued that there would be less benefits from6 Letter to Honourable Grace N. Mccarthy, Minister of EconomicDevelopment, from E.L. Burnham, President of Real Estate Board ofGreater Vancouver, December 21, 1987.128a number of smaller developers.7Councillor Price and formerCouncillor Taylor supported having a single developer, whofelt that the City had benefited greatly from such anapproach. It was pointed out by Larry Beasley, AssociateDirector of Planning, and the planner in charge of the FalseCreek planning team, that with the site in the ownership ofone developer it was possible to ensure larger—scalebenefits.8There were two major bids for the lands. The first from theVancouver Land Corporation, a consortium of Vancouverbusinessmen including Jack Poole, Edgar Kaiser, Jim Pattison9and Charles Woodward, who came together to bid on the site.The second was from Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., thecompany established by Hong Kong businessman, Li Ka-shing.Interview with Gordon Price, Vancouver City Councillor,December 10, 1991.8 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director ofPlanning, City of Vancouver, May 8, 1990.Jim Pattison, a well known B.C. businessman and car dealer,was President of Expo ‘86 and wielded enormous power over therunning and shaping of Expo. He became known as “the dollar a yearman,” as he only charged a dollar a year for his services, as a“thank you” to Canadians for making him so wealthy. But he madeconsiderable amounts of money through the awarding of Expocontracts and franchises to companies in which he had an interest.Kelly (1986) notes that he was known for being very secretive andran his empire on the “don’t-tell-anybody-anything-about nothin”school of business. The question was raised about whether such anapproach was the most appropriate for a public corporation likeExpo ‘86 which had $800 million of public money at its disposal(Kelly, 1986)129A major controversy emerged when it came to light that PremierVander Zaim had seemingly tried to interfere with the biddingprocess by introducing a third bid from B.C. businessman, andpersonal friend, Peter Toigo. Mr. Toigo came late into theprocess with a $500 million bid for all of BCEC’s landholdings, including the Expo lands. The Premier presented thisbid directly to the B.C. Cabinet, and not the BCEC, whichraised concerns. In addition, his top advisor and principalsecretary, David Poole, had arranged a meeting for Toigo withBCEC and had accompanied him to the meeting. This raised allsorts of questions that Mr. Toigo was shown specialconsideration, about conflicts of interest for the Premier andit also led to divisions in the government between the Premierand Grace Mccarthy, who was concerned about the Premier’sinterference (Cruickshank, 1988; Baldrey and Mason, 1988;Palmer, 1988c; Palmer, 1988d).Li Ka-shing’s tender was the winning bid. It was announced inthe press on April 27, 1988.10 Grace Mccarthy, quoted in thepress, referred to the bidding process as being highlycompetitive and visible and she felt that the decision toaward the bid to Li Ka-shing was a wise one (Minovitz, 1988).The BCEC took out a full page advertisement in the VancouverSun to congratulate Concord Pacific, which also purported toThe Vancouver Sun, April 27, 1988, Al.130explain how the agreement for the sale and development of theExpo site was reached. The statement said little about theagreement, except to acknowledge the professional andequitable nature of the process.11 BCEC President, KevinMurphy, in giving reasons for choosing the Concord Pacificbid, was quoted in the press as stating that their’s was themore “spectacular and aggressive development,” that offered“substantially superior” financial terms (Constantineau,1988).The final purchase price for the lands, after months ofspeculation, was $145 million as the list price, with afurther $175 million in interest revenue, making a total of$320 million. The payment schedule was to be phased: $50million to be paid on May 11, 1988 to secure the purchase; $10million per year for the five years from 1995—1999; $20million in year 2000; $40 million in 2001; $60 million in 2002and $100 million in 2003 (Hamilton and Mason, 1988).It is commonly felt that Li Ka-shing had managed to negotiateone of “the sweetest deals in history” (Gutstein, 1990):“The judgement in Hong Kong was that Liwon the development rights “on extremelycheap terms,” as a profile in the FarEastern Economic Review claimed. “ItThe Vancouver Sun, ‘Welcome to the Future of B.C. Place,’April 28, 1988, B6.131promises to be a veritable gold mine forLi and his partners.” Vancouver developerGordon Wilson, echoed this view: “The netresult [of the deal] will put one-sixth ofdowntown Vancouver under a single ownerfor peanuts,” Gibson wrote inFinancial Post. Li paid $10 a buildablesquare foot, according to the plan whichwas formally approved by Vancouver CityCouncil in November 1989, which allowed12.2 million square feet of residentialand commercial development. Prices were$25 to $35 a buildable foot for similarproperty when Li bought the site. By thetime the plan was approved prices in thedowntown core had nearly doubled and Li’s91 acres were worth more than $700million. True, Li has to put in roads,sidewalks and sewers, which will add about$10 a buildable foot, or $120 million, tohis costs. And he has to pay for parks,walkway, community centre, library, eightday care centres and other communityfacilities (which will make the propertyeven more valuable). But he has alreadyearned a paper profit of nearly $500million, probably much more than thatsince there is nothing stopping Li fromasking for, and receiving, higherdensities down the road, as even B.C.finance minister Mel Couvelier has pointedout” (Gutstein, 1990, 137)The sale of the Expo lands was shrouded in controversy andsecrecy (Trade Union Research Bureau, 1989, 11). Littleinformation was produced by the Province about the bids andthe bidding process itself was tied up in complex legalconfidentiality clauses, which prevented the biddersthemselves releasing any information. This createdconsiderable concern in the Vancouver community (The Vancouver1988a). Mike Harcourt, leader of the opposition NewDemocratic Party, referred to the process as “undemocratic,132secretive and dangerous” (The Vancouver Sun, l9BBb). Harcourtcalled for a halt to the sale of all BCEC lands, for anindependent assessment of their true value and a publicinquiry into all proceedings to date. The New Democratsstressed that it was essential that local communities have asay in the development of the Expo lands (Western News, 1988).A Vancouver Sun editorial stated the concern with the secrecyplainly:“It is scandalous that the owners of one of NorthAmerica’s choicest pieces of real estate have torely on street rumours to learn what’s happeningwith the sale of the property” (The Vancouver Sun,1988c)The Province’s perspective at this time was that B.C. was in asevere recession and that it needed a significant confidencebooster. They needed a mechanism to attract majorinternational investment into the Province. Li’s purchase ofthe Expo lands at such a ‘sweet’ price was considered by theProvince to be such a mechanism which would bring in otherHong Kong developers and investors to Vancouver:“In British Columbia, the Social Creditgovernment has welcomed offshore investorswith open arms. By virtually giving awaythe Expo lands, the government sent astrong message that Eastasian dollars werewelcome in B.C.” (Gutstein, 1990, 232).This strategy has succeeded in that considerable investmentdid come to the Province from Asia which has helped to support133the economy and stave off some of the worst excesses of therecession and keep the development and construction industrygoing at a time when local investment had tended to dry up(Gutstein, 1990; Goldberg, 1991):“Since Li Ka-shing’s purchase of the Expo‘86 site in Vancouver, there has been anexplosion in interest and investment inVancouver by Asians from Hong Kong,Singapore, Taiwan and Japan. Regrettably,these data do not exist, but by allaccounts these investments are significantin scale and provide long lasting tiesbetween Vancouver and the Pacific Rim.”(Goldberg, 1991, 23)In January 1990, Li Ka-shing sold the Plaza of Nations sitefor $40 million, almost recouping completely the down paymentfor the entire Expo site of $50 million. The new owner was aSingapore property tycoon called Oei Hong Leong. Thejustification for this sale by the developer was that ConcordPacific was a development company and not a buildingmanagement company. In March 1991, it was announced in thepress that a Taiwanese Company, Hung Kuo Construction Group,had paid Li Ka shing about $200 million for an indirectinterest in Concord Pacific (Ford and Dawson, 1991; Hamilton,1991)In May 1990, it was reported in the annual report of B.C.’sAuditor-General that the B.C. government did not make a profiton the sale of the Expo land and could even have taken a lossof up to $150 million. It seemed that there were some134accounting technique differences that ensured certain costswere not attributed to the “net proceeds” from the sale(Baidrey, 1990). According to the report, the governmentfailed to account for $60 million of carrying charges relatedto the Expo lands prior to 1988; over $42 million inconstruction costs and the cost of the clean—up estimates forthe site which at the time ranged from anything between$40-$60 million. These findings about the Expo deal generatedan angry response toward the Auditor—General from the B.C.government, in particular Mel Couvelier, then Finance Ministerwho was quoted in the media as saying:“Someone who’s got his snout in the publictrough should have the wit to deal withissues he’s mandated to deal with. I haveto question the propriety of Mr. Morfitt -who is basically a bean—counter — dealingwith policy issues” (Hauka and Kieran,1990)More recent reports suggest the loss is even greater. TheProvincial NDP estimated that the Province lost more than $290million on the sale (Williamson, 1991).THE PACIFIC PLACE DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALThe initial development concept put forward by Concord Pacificin 1988, as part of its winning bid for the land, wasdescribed in the Vancouver press as “breathtaking” (Hamilton,1988a) and hailed as a “West Coast Venice” (Hamilton, 1988b).The estimated $2 billion proposal included 10,000 dwelling135units; 3 million square feet of commercial space; nearly 50acres of parkland; a 400—room hotel; parking for 20,000vehicles and a 630-berth marina. It also initially included aseries of residential islands called Marinavista, linked bylagoons and canals, between the Granville and Cambie bridges;a massive residential Gateway on either side of the CambieBridge to welcome people into the downtown; a futuristicFinancial Centre12, with office towers as high as 45—storeys,between the Georgia and Dunsmuir Viaducts and a largeCreekside Park at the eastern end of False Creek (Hamilton,1988a)The current development proposal as represented by the FalseCreek North Official Development Plan, approved in November1989, is a scaled down and somewhat more conservative versionof the above plan that included: 7,650 housing units, whichwould house up to 13,000 people, of which 20% (1,530 units)were expected to be social housing units; 2 million squarefeet of office development; 650,000 square feet of retail andservice development; 42 acres of park; hotel, cultural,recreational and cultural uses and public open space,including a 1.5 mile continuous waterfront walkway (City ofVancouver Planning Department, 1990; City of Vancouver12 One of the architects of the project was quoted in the pressas saying: “The proposal contains some science fiction elements.”See Vancouver Sun, September 8, 1988. Thanks to Roger Kemble forthis quote.136Planning Department, 1989).The plan is said to contain considerable public benefits. Infact, it is claimed to be the biggest package of publicbenefits ever negotiated by the City (City of VancouverPlanning Department, 1990). It has been difficult to obtain adetailed financial breakdown to attach to these benefits, butin an interview with one city planner it was estimated to bein the range of $150 million.13 The developer is required topay for the parks, the continuous waterfront walkway, theshoreline improvements, circulation and utility systems, acommunity centre, eight day care centres, a library, communitymeeting rooms, a field house, public art facilities and busshelters.14THE PACIFIC PLACE ACTORSIt is possible to identify a number of key players in thePacific Place planning process: the Provincial Government;Vancouver City Council and the City Planning Department; thedeveloper, Concord Pacific Developments Ltd.; and variousidentifiable groups within the community, including individualcitizens, local community groups and city-wide advocacyorganizations.13 These figures are not only difficult to quantify, but arehighly sensitive. There was also an issue of confidentiality.14 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director ofPlanning, May 8, 1990.137The Provincial GovernmentProvincial Government in B.C. during the post—war period hasbeen dominated by the Social Credit Party, more commonly knownas the Socreds. This party has been in power for the majorityof the period, with a brief interlude in the early seventieswhen the major provincial opposition party, the New DemocraticParty (NDP), came to power under the leadership of DaveBarrett. In 1986, in the immediate post-Expo period, BillVander Zalm, as the newly appointed leader of the Socreds,became the new Premier, taking over from Bill Bennett. TheSocreds reign, however, came to an abrupt halt in theProvincial elections of October 1991, when the NDP were sweptinto power under the leadership of Mike Harcourt. The SocredGovernment under Bill Vander Zalm had suffered numerousscandals and questions of impropriety, of which the sale ofthe Expo lands was part.The Provincial Government played a key role in the PacificPlace process. It was the Socred Government in 1980, under theleadership of Bill Bennett, that first announced the idea ofExpo ‘86 and the subsequent plans to redevelop the site intoB.C Place. It was the Socred Government under Bill VanderZalm, who orchestrated the sale of the Expo site to ConcordPacific, as part of its mandate of privatization, and signedthe deal with Li Ka-shing. As noted previously, the sale ofthe land was surrounded by considerable controversy and public138concern (Trade Union Research Bureau, 1989).The Provincial Government, under the Socreds, provided asupportive atmosphere for development of UMPS like PacificPlace. It had a long history of involvement with resourcemega—projects as a mechanism for promoting economicdevelopment, so was accustomed to facilitating development onthis scale (Maki and Meredith, 1983; Knight, 1991). Moreover,as noted previously, the development of the Expo site was seenas a means of encouraging investment and job creation in theProvince and of promoting the image of Vancouver as a “worldclass” city.Consequently, the Provincial Government saw its role in termsof expediting major downtown redevelopment projects such asPacific Place (Baidrey, 1991). The supportive role ofgovernments is indicated in the following quote from LiKa-shing. In an rare interview, with Dave Abbott, theVancouver based host of Radio CKNW’s “Nightline B.C.” program,Li Ka-shing was candid about the receptive attitude of boththe Provincial and City Governments:“Vancouver and British Columbia have beendoing a great job under the leadership ofPremier Vander Zaim, (former EconomicDevelopment Minister) Grace McCarthy andVancouver Mayor Gordon Campbell, and theyare represented by a very active officehere in Hong Kong. Grace McCarthy, withher hard work and enthusiasm towards herwork, deserves special mention. Vancouver139will be a dynamic city, very active in theeconomy. The successful Pacific Place dealis the best advertisement. We were givenfair treatment from the beginning, andthis builds investor confidence and B.C.’sreputation.”Vancouver City CouncilVancouver is an anomaly in the Canadian political scene inthat it runs an at-large political system, where itsCouncillors represent the citizens on a city—wide basis. Thereis pressure to move toward a ward system to bring it into linewith other major cities in Canada. At present there is a totalof eleven seats on Council: the Mayors position and tenCouncillors. There have been two Vancouver civic electionssince the start of the Pacific Place process.Table 4 indicates the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) hasretained control of City Council during the Pacific Placeprocess. The NPA is a party that supports private enterpriseand is perceived publicly as being aligned with thedevelopment industry. Overall, the UMPS are seen as positivedevelopments by the NPA, that are beneficial to the future ofthe City. NPA councillors have voted consistently in supportof the Pacific Place development. They have viewed the publicprocess as being both comprehensive and valid.140Table 4: Vancouver City Council 1986-19921986 — 1988 1988 — 1990 1990_199315MayorGordon Campbell(N) Gordon Campbell(N) Gordon Campbell(N)CouncillorsGeorge Puil(N) George Puil(N) George Puil(N)Don Bellamy(N) Don Bellarny(N) Don Bellamy(N)Gordon Price(N) Gordon Price(N) Gordon Price(N)Carole Taylor(I) Carole Taylor(I) Tung Chan(N)Philip Owen(N) Philip Owen(N) Philip Owen(N)Ralph Caravetta(N) Sandra Wilken(N) Pat Wilson(C)Jonathan Baker(N) Jonathan Baker(N) Bruce York(C)Helen Boyce(N) Harry Rankin(C) Harry Rankin(C)Libby Davies(C) Libby Davies(C) Libby Davies(C)Bruce Ericksen(C) Bruce Ericksen(C) Bruce Ericksen(C)(N) Non—Partisan Association (NPA)(C) Conuriittee of Progressive Electors (COPE)(I) IndependentThroughout the Pacific Place process the NPA majority has beenled by Mayor Gordon Campbell who has described in thefollowing way:.a 1970s liberal who had become a 1980sconservative, and who had approved unprecedenteddevelopment in his 1988-90 term of office. Adeveloper and a businessman, young, personable,well-educated, and well-travelled, he epitomized thefree market internationalization of the world city”(Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992, 265).15 In 1990 the term of office for Vancouver City Councilmembers was increased to three years.141He has had a long term relationship with the North Shore ofFalse Creek. In the late 1970s, he was Marathon Realty’sproject officer for the False Creek lands and had beeninvolved in negotiations with the city on Marathon’s behalf.Prior to joining Marathon, Gordon Campbell had spent fouryears at City Hall, from 1972-1976, working in variouscapacities in the Planning, Social Planning and EngineeringDepartments. He was the city representative in the 1974negotiations with Marathon that led to a profitable rezoningfor the developer. More recently, in the early l980s with hispartner Marty Zoitnik, he developed the Georgian Court Hotelon Beatty Street opposite B.C. Place stadium (Gutstein, 1986).The Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE) is a progressivecivic reform organization formed in 1968, which identified itsbase as the working people of Vancouver. They have connectionswith both organized labour and community-based organizationsthroughout the city. They are publicly perceived as being leftof centre. COPE have taken a more critical attitude toVancouver’s False Creek mega—projects. Their substantiveconcerns have focused on the initial sale of the land, therelative exclusivity of the development and the lack of socialhousing in the proposals.16 They have also raised questions16 COPE feel that the 20% commitment to social housing in themega—projects should have been higher, and there is also a concernabout the lack of guarantees to ensure that even the 20% will ever142about the validity and extent of the public consultationprocess.COPE’s representation on Council had increased since the mid—19805. Prior to the 1988 election, COPE were in a distinctminority situation, with only two seats on Council. InNovember 1988, COPE stalwart Harry Rankin won his seat back,following his forced sabbatical brought about by the loss ofthe 1986 Mayoral campaign against the current incumbent MayorCampbell. In 1990, COPE succeeded in getting all five of itsnominated candidates elected in a joint campaign with theCivic New Democrats, with Jim Green, a well—known communityorganizer with DERA, running unsuccessfully for Mayor.The DeveloperIt was noted earlier that the developer is Concord PacificDevelopments Ltd., a private development company formed byHong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing expressly to purchase anddevelop the site.17 His partners include fellow Hong Kongbillionaires Chang Yu-tung and Lee Shau-kee and the CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce. Li Ka-shing is the Chairman andPresident of the company with a fifty percent holding. Thevice-presidents included Albert Chow (deputy managing directorget built.17 Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., Pacific Place, August 23,1989.143of Cheung Kong Holdings Ltd., Li’s flagship company), CanningK.N. Fox and George Magnus from Hong Kong; Stanley Kwok18,Richard T.K. Li and Victor T.K. Li (Li Ka-shing’s sons) fromVancouver and Jon Markoulis from Houston, Texas (Power, 1988).Li Ka—shing was no stranger to Vancouver. He had first boughtproperty in there in 1977. His holdings have included West Endapartment buildings on Beach Avenue and office towers onPender Street. His other major Canadian holdings include amajority interest in Husky Oil of Calgary (Gutstein, 1990).His North American property—management company is based inHouston, Texas, where he holds major office properties anddevelopment sites (Constantineau and Power, 1988).The City PlannersThe city planners have played a key role in the planningprocess. They initiated and orchestrated the planning processand the community input. One of their early activities was toreview past planning policies for the site and put together aseries of development guidelines to inform the Pacific Placeprocess. These became known as the ‘Policy Broadsheets’, whichbecame a central feature of the Pacific Place process. Thejustification of the approach was to simplify the complexityof development on this scale, in order to promote18 Stanley Kwok is a well-known and respected figure inVancouver’s land development industry. As noted earlier he knowsthe site very well, having previously been head of B.C. PlaceCorporation.144understanding and participation in the planning process, byboth the politicians and the general public. This approach wasused for the Coal Harbour mega—project site on the BurrardInlet and for the adjacent Bayshore development proposal.A special team within the Central Areas Division of the CityPlanning Department was set up to process the Pacific Placedevelopment: the False Creek Planning Group. There was agenuine commitment on behalf of the planners to promote andundertake a full consultation process on Pacific Place.Mega—projects such as the False Creek North development wereparticularly demanding of city staff resources due to theirsize, their infrastructure and amenity requirements, and theneed for complex and comprehensive legal agreements.Consequently, the processing of such applications tookconsiderable time and cost. The Vancouver Planning Departmentestimated that the total processing costs of the Pacific Placedevelopment from June 1988 - January 1991 was $1,400,126: seeTable 51919 Vancouver City Planning Department, Report to City Manager,Mega-Project Fees, February 20, 1991.145Table 5: Processing Costs of Pacific Place Development,1988—19961988—1990 1991—1996 TotalsStaff Costs20 720,700 2,561,600 3,282,300Consultancies 40,000 30,000 70,000Public Consultation 27,527 42,000 69,527Public Hearings 10,399 7,000 17,399TOTALS 1,400,126 2,640,600 4,040,7261988—1990 Costs in Actual Dollars1991—1996 Projected 1990 DollarsSource: Vancouver City Planning DepartmentThe total revenue received, however, by the City to January1991 from Concord Pacific was only $162,000, approximately11.5% of costs incurred: see Table 6.Table 6: Pacific Place Fee Revenues, 1988-19951988—1990 1991—1995 TotalPacific Place 162,000 144,000 306,000NB: 1988-1990 figure includes two lump sum payments of$50,000 made in 1988 and 1989Source: Vancouver City Planning DepartmentThe reason for the discrepancy was that the size of thedevelopment exceeded the normal fee schedules for rezoning andother applications.2120 These staff costs represent the work of the Planning,Engineering, Law, Parks, Social Planning and Housing Departments.Nearly 50 per cent of these costs were generated by the PlanningDepartment.21 Zoning and Development Fee By-Law No. 5585.146The figure of $162,000 represented the maximum chargeable feefor processing of the development applications (the OfficialDevelopment Plan and the Comprehensive District (CD-i)applications), plus two negotiated lump sum payments of$50,000 each. This shortfall has since prompted City Councilto review and amend its fee schedules to more fully reflectactual costs.22The CommunityThe “community” is a difficult body to distinguish. For thepurposes of my research I divided the community up into threegroups (see Figure 5): first, the general public, a large bodyof people, who participated individually in the process;second, community groups such as the Downtown EastsideResidents Association (DERA), the Mount Pleasant NeighbourhoodAssociation, that represented residents likely to be impactedby the development; and third, city-wide advocacy groups ororganizations like the Tenants Rights Action Coalition and EndLegislated Poverty who participated on behalf of their clientgroup.22 There is an argument to suggest that these costs would beoff-set by the tax income generated by the project when thedevelopment is completed. No such estimates were available.147Figure 5: The Community and the Planning ProcessTHE GENERAL PUBLICCOMMUNITY GROUPSANDORGANIZATIONS CITY-WIDEADVOCACY GROUPS/ORGAN I ZAT IONSIn setting out the proposed public participation process forPacific Place, the Planning Department distinguished threegroups in the community: special interest groups, such as theUrban Design Panel, the Vancouver City Planning Commission;neighbouring communities, including those from the West End,the Downtown Eastside, Strathcona, Mount Pleasant and FalseCreek; and the general public. Different public participationtechniques were to be adopted to reach these differentcommunities (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1989).CONCLUSIONThe redevelopment of the Expo lands has had a long andsomewhat contentious history. Plans for its development dateback nearly twenty years. This chapter has presented important148background material that will be developed in the subsequentchapters. It has presented a brief history of the site,examined the controversies that surrounded the sale of theland, and reviewed the events that led to the current PacificPlace proposals. It has described the Pacific Placedevelopment proposal and introduced the actors. There are anumber of key players involved in the process, all withcompeting and often conflicting interests and mandates. TheProvincial Government played a key role in selling off thesite, the City Council provided a facilitating role for thedevelopment, and the community raised some important concerns.There were significant community concerns with the earlystages of the process that had an influence over the public’sattitude toward the development itself and their subsequentparticipation in the public process. There was a publicperception that Li Ka-shing had been offered the site onfavourable terms. There was certainly a lack of publicinformation about the deal to quell such concern, that didlittle to promote confidence in the subsequent public process.There was also a concern among groups such as DERA that theB.C. Place process and Expo ‘86, so unsuccessful from acommunity perspective, was about to be replicated with PacificPlace. The Pacific Place process got underway amidst thisconcern, which in many ways served to undermine it right fromthe outset.149CHAPTER SIXTHE PACIFIC PLACE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS“The Coalition recommends that all municipalitiesrequire that those developments which are of suchscale as to have a major impact on the form andsocial infrastructure of the community provide, aspart of their development process, a specificprogram for the direct involvement of communitiesaffected by the development” (B.C. HousingCoalition1 statement, November 1988).INTRODUCTIONThis chapter will build on the previous chapter by focusingmore specifically on the Pacific Place planning process. Theprocess was initiated in 1987, prior to the sale of the landto Li Ka-shing. The Vancouver City Planning Department tookthe lead by establishing a series of Policy Broadsheets toguide potential development proposals for the site. Sincethen, the process has been characterized by considerablepublic meetings and opportunities for public input. ThePacific Place process has been described by its developer asone of the most participatory and democratic planningprocesses yet witnessed in Canada2. Moreover, the generalfeeling of the city planners interviewed as part of the1 The B.C. Housing Coalition included: the Tenants RightsAction Coalition, the Women’s Housing Coalition, the CooperativeHousing Federation, the Vancouver and District Public HousingTenants Coalition and the Downtown Eastside Residents Association.2 Victor Li, Senior Vice-President of Concord PacificDevelopments Ltd., and son of Li Ica—shing, speaking to a class ofUBC students, October 19, 1989.150research was that every opportunity was provided for publicparticipation. Section 1.2 of the False Creek North OfficialDevelopment Plan3 stated:“In the preparation of this plan, the concerns andobjectives of various property owners, interestedgroups, and individual members of the public havebeen considered through an extensive publicinvolvement process” (City of Vancouver Departmentof Planning, October 1989).As the previous chapter noted the City has been involved inthe planning of the site for nearly twenty years. In a CityPlanning report on public involvement in the planning of theExpo lands, it was noted that there had already been extensivepublic input in the planning of False Creek:“Throughout the 1970’s, discussionsfocused on the South Shore and through theearly 1980’s, discussions focused on theNorth Shore. The B.C. Place CitizensAdvisory Committee,4 under the auspices ofthe Vancouver Planning Commission, wasactive between October 1981 and December1984. This early work is of significantbenefit to today’s planning, enabling theplanning to proceed more quickly thanotherwise would be the case” (City ofVancouver Planning Department, 1988c).This chapter is divided into four sections. The first partThe False Creek North Offical Development Plan, is theoverall planning framework that governs the development of thePacific Place site. It was formally approved in November 1989.‘ The B.C. Place Citizens Advisory Committee was a committeeof prominent Vancouver citizens formed to review the B.C. Placeproposals. They would meet regularly and hold public forums toexamine the proposals in the plan and put forward their ownresponse.151examines the context of participation in the City: it outlinesthe model of participation followed, the principles thatinformed the public process, and identifies the participationtechniques adopted. The second part introduces and discussesthe Policy Broadsheets, a central feature of the planningprocess. The third part examines the public participation inthe various stages in the public process: a) the overalldevelopment plan stage and b) the area rezonings approved todate. The fourth part considers the responses to the PacificPlace planning process by the various actors involved.THE CONTEXT OF PARTICIPATIONThe City of Vancouver identified three broad models of publicparticipation: education, consultation and partnership5,seeFigure 6.The Education model was based on the idea of a flow ofinformation to the community to promote awareness, discussionand acceptance of policies and proposals. The Consultationmodel was based more on a two—way flow of information in termsof sharing information, identifying impacts and working withcitizens to develop alternatives. The Partnership model wasviewed as an extension of the consultation model, but withA more detailed description of these models can be found inClause No. 4, City of Vancouver Report to Council, StandingCommittee of Council on Neighbourhood Issues and Services, April 6,1989.152more active citizen involvement in the form of a citizenplanning committee (Foulkes, 1989).Figure 6: City of Vancouver Models of Public ParticipationEDUCATIONCONSULTATIONPARTNERSHIPSource: City of Vancouver Planning DepartmentThese models of participation have been applied to differentlevels of planning in the City. For example, on individualprojects on specific sites the education model tended to beused; for broader area studies, the consultation model wasused; and for local area planning, the partnership model wasused (City of Vancouver, April 6, 1989). For the Vancouvermega—projects the consultation model became the adoptedapproach. The role that the consultation was to take wasclearly spelled out:153• .the objectives of public consultation are toinform, achieve support, and receive advice frompeople” (City of Vancouver, April 6, 1989, 9).Not only are these objectives are very general, but there isalso a feeling of passiveness about the statement. Nowhere isit stated that the City has to act on the advice it receives.The mere fact that advice was received would lead some to theconclusion that the objective had been met and that the publicprocess “worked”.The choice of approach was critical, as it established thewhole basis of the public participation process. There was adebate at the start of the Pacific Place process over whethera citizens committee should be set up. This was stronglyfavoured by COPE, because of the size, nature and complexityof the site. This was not favoured by the city planners, northe Non—Partisan Association (NPA) majority on Council. Thejustification for not establishing such a committee was thatthere were already a number of active community groups andorganizations to work with and that a citizens committee mightlack focus, create duplication, and add to the bureaucracy.The public involvement process for Pacific Place was set outin a Planning Department report to City Manager dated October31, 1988 (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1988c). Thisreport was not submitted to Council until January 1989, due adelay as a result of the municipal elections held in November1541988. The public involvement process was finally approved inFebruary 1989 with a revised and lengthened planning schedule,after the new Council took office.Within the overall intent of informing the public, achievingsupport and receiving advice from people certain organizingprinciples were identified: see Table 7. These were designedto inform an approach that was described as ongoing so peoplecould be informed and influence the plan at all stages; asopen and inclusive so people could join in the process at anypoint and be open to all community groups and individuals; andfocused on the understanding and effecting of “mutuallysupportive changes” with the surrounding areas (City ofVancouver Planning Department, October 31, 1988). Moreover,the organizing principles identified the publics to beconsulted in the process: the general public, the neighbouringcommunities and special interest groups.The planning process was designed to involve the followingstages: issue identification, policy formulation, overall planpreparation, detailed area plans preparation andimplementation through rezoning, subdivisions, capital plans,housing programmes, etc., see Figure 7. The public involvementprocess was intended to key into all the stages.155Table 7: Organizing Principles for Public InvolvementPUBLICS TO BE CONSULTED1. Decisions about change should be considerate of all thoseaffected by change. To achieve effective consultation, thepublic can be considered as three groups: the generalpublic, the neighbouring communities and special interestgroups.PURPOSES OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT2. One purpose of public involvement is to inform people sothey may provide ideas based on knowledge.3. Another purpose of public involvement is to receive ideasand advice.4. Public consultation should help everyone learn in orderto create a better place.5. Public consultation should seek to adjust the North Shoreof False Creek plans and the surrounding areas to achieve acomplementary whole.6. Public consultation should achieve support for the planthrough fulfilling needs.7. By involving Vancourites, public consultation shouldachieve a place of and for Vancouver.PROCESS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT8. The process of deciding about change should beconsiderate of all those affected by change.9. The process should provide people and organizationseffective means and sufficient time to understand the issuesand proposals and influence the plan.10. Opportunities to understand and influence should beafforded throughout the planning and approvals process.11. Process should facilitate approvals in a timely way.12. The process should focus discussion on the developmentof this new community and its rel’ships with its neighbours.13. The process should seek to reach many people andorganizations in an unfiltered, open way.14. The process should be continuously open to new peopleand seek representative viewpoints of the various publics.15. The process should include existing communityorganizations and council appointed advisory groupsSource: Vancouver City Planning Department156It was envisioned that public participation would occurthroughout the planning process. It was decided to use a widerange of traditional public participation techniques.Figure 7: The Pacific Place Planning ProcessISSUE IDENTIFICATION1987/88POLICY FORMULATION1988OVERALL PLAN PREPARATION1989DETAILED AREA PLANSPREPARATION1989 —>IMPLEMENTATION1990 —>Source: Vancouver City Planning Department157These included a regular city newsletter, work in progressdisplays, public meetings, workshops, informal meetings, guestspeaking arrangements, focus groups, surveys, interactivetelevision and radio, community meetings, submission of briefsand formal public hearings (City of Vancouver PlanningDepartment, October 31, 1988). The City maintained a mailinglist of over 700 interested persons for the distribution ofnewsletters and to inform the public about meetings.A common technique used by both the City was the publicinformation meeting. These were designed to inform the publicabout ‘what was going on’ and to seek their views. Theyusually followed the same format with presentations fromeither the planners or the developers, or both, followed byquestions from the audience. Slide presentations were commonlyused by both the planners and the developers. The meetings hadwell planned agendas, were always chaired by one of theplanners from the False Creek Team and minutes were taken. Thepresentations were followed by a question and answer periodwhere both the planners and the developers would respond toquestions from the floor. Maps, models and plans of thedevelopment were usually on display for the public to look at.These meetings were well advertised in the press and themailing list was used to notify people and organizations ofthe dates.158A popular extension of this approach was the workshop format.This was used by the City to seek public views on theInternational Village proposal, to obtain a public response tothe shoreline configuration of the proposed development, todiscuss the planning principles or the “big ideas” for thedevelopment of the site, and to examine the developmenteffects of the proposals. For example, on the shoreline issuethe debate focused on two potential configurations: “bays” or“lagoons.” As noted in the previous chapter, the “lagoons”option was included in the initial design concept submitted byConcord Pacific. It was an attempt by the developer to createa Venice—like feeling and maximise waterfront locations withlittle islands in False Creek connected by a series oflagoons. The “bays” option was more conventional, essentiallyretained the existing shoreline. The workshops were organizedaround a short presentation before breaking up into smallgroups with a facilitator on hand to stimulate discussion. Afurther technique used during these sessions was a workbookwhich could be completed during the session or taken home tobe completed and sent in.THE POLICY BROADSHEETSAs noted previously, one of the central features of the publicprocess was the Policy Broadsheets (City of Vancouver PlanningDepartment, April 1988). A City Planning Departmentinitiative, the Broadsheets were seen by the planners as the159most constructive way of dealing with a project of this size,of serving the public interest, and of consolidating fifteenyears of previous policies relating to the area. They took asimple form, outlining the basic issues, the facts, pastpolicy and proposed policy principles for sixteen policyareas: see Appendix 1.The Policy Broadsheets were a significant part of the processas they set the agenda for all the subsequent publicdiscussion. They led to the identification of sevenprinciples, or what the planners referred to as the “bigideas”, for the development of the site. These were:- to integrate with the city.- to build on the setting.— to maintain the sense of a traditional water basin in thecentre of the city.— to use streets as an organizing device.- to create lively public places with strong imagery.— to create neighbourhoods.— to plan for all age groups with a special emphasis onchildren.The approach was seen by the planners as a practical mechanismto handle the complexity of development on this scale.6 Craig6 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director ofPlanning, City of Vancouver, May 8, 1990.160Rowlands, a Senior Planner on the False Creek team (whosubsequently left to join the private sector7) played a keyrole in the formation of the Broadsheets and gave his view ofthe value of the approach in an interview:“It was simply a format to communicatewhat an issue was, what the facts weresurrounding that issue, and from there putforward some policy proposals fordiscussion. A simple format for people todigest, be it the Aldermen, be it thepublic at large, or be it other staffmembers. . . It was really a tool to developpolicy and once that policy is developedand adopted, it becomes a tool tocommunicate the policy and give the publicsome sense of how we got there.”8The planners felt that the conventional planning and rezoningprocess was not geared to dealing with a project on this scalein the ownership of one single developer. The system had beenset up to handle much smaller scale projects. It became clearin interviews with the planners that an important objective ofthe Broadsheets was to give them much more control over theHe joined Bosa Development Corporation, a major developer inthe Lower Mainland, whose Citygate project forms a significantvista at the eastern end of False Creek, adjacent to the PacificPlace site. This development caused similar concerns tocommunity—based organizations like DERA who were worried about thecumulative impacts of these projects on the Downtown Eastside. Inemploying Mr. Rowlands Bosa were following O&Y’s practice ofrecruiting former public sector employees that they had significantdealings with.8 Interview with Craig Rowlands, former Senior Planner, Cityof Vancouver, now Vice—President of Bosa Development Corporation,May 1990.161development.The official aim of the Broadsheets was to guide developmentin the public interest and to facilitate widespreadparticipation in preparing the Overall Development Plan (ODP)for False Creek North. They set out the planning principles,policies and land use designations that had to be recognizedin the development of the site.While the principal aim of the Broadsheets was to establishpublic priorities for the development, and to strengthen thearm of the planners, they found favour with the developer too.They served to remove some of the uncertainty developers facedby setting down the broad parameters of the type ofdevelopment that council was likely to approve and by makingclear what was expected in terms of public benefits andcontributions. The Broadsheets were seen by Concord Pacific asa good compromise between what the City wanted and what wasprofitable to develop.9The Broadsheets were drawn up for internal discussion in 1987.The Planning Department initiated and co-ordinated a threephase process that would culminate in the adoption of theInterview with Blair Hagkull, Concord Pacific DevelopmentsLtd., May 31, 1990.162Broadsheets as Council policy for the site, see Figure 8.10Figure 8: The Pacific Place Process: The Development of thePolicy BroadsheetsPUBLIC HEARINGFORMAL ADOPTIONSource: Vancouver City Planning DepartmentJanuary-April198810 Memorandum to Mayor Campbell and Members of Council fromR.J. Spaxman, Director of Planning on False Creek Policy, January20, 1988.SERIES OF SPECIALCOUNCIL MEETINGSTO REVIEW POLICIESFIRST FORMAL DRAFTOF FALSE CREEKPOLICY BROADSHEETSPhase 1Phase 2Phase 3PUBLIC REVIEW PROCESSApril 1988April-August1988August 1988August 1988163Between January and April of 1988, a series of Special CouncilMeetings were held to review and up—date these policies (PhaseOne). Cope Councillor Libby Davies was quoted in the pressthat these meetings had come about a year too late and shouldhave been initiated immediately after the cancellation of theNorth Park plan in the previous year (Volkart, 1988). On April11, 1988 Council received the first formal draft of the FalseCreek Policy Broadsheets, and then instructed staff to carryout a public review process (Phase Two) (City of VancouverPlanning Department, April 1988). This review included lettersto interest groups, media advertisements, public serviceannouncements, six public information meetings11, five specialinterest workshops12, meetings with interest groups and landowners and submission of written briefs.13 Concord Pacificavailed themselves of the opportunity to consider the draftpolicy statements and to respond with their views.14 There wasAt False Creek Community Centre, Lord Roberts School,Strathcona Community Centre, King Edward Campus, Carnegie CommunityCentre, Robson Square.12 There was one workshop session to look at parks, recreation,community facilities and services; one for housing interest groupsand three workshops for design, business and development groups.13 City of Vancouver Planning Department, City Policies forFalse Creek With an Initial Commentary on Concord Pacific’s PacificPlace Proposal, Report to City Manager, June 21, 1988.14 Concord Pacific Response to False Creek Policies Proposedin June 21, 1988 Report to Council, July 6, 1988.164considerable public interest in the policies and there werehigh levels of attendance at the meetings.15 Twenty fivewritten briefs were submitted by individuals andrepresentatives from various groups and organizations.A variety of issues were raised. The Downtown VancouverAssociation were concerned that the demands of themega-project applications did not adversely affect theapproval process for other development applications.16 A brieffrom DERA outlined concerns about the potential impact of thePacific Place development on the area and requested funds fromCity Council to hire a professional planner/architect for aperiod of one year to help them undertake an independentreview of the potential impact of such development.17 Othercommunity based organizations, including the Single MothersHousing Network18 and the United Church19, urged Council to15 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City HallMay 1, 1990.16 Letter from Ronald W. Downey, President of DowntownVancouver Association, to Ray Spaxman, dated June 9, 1988.17 Letter from Jim Green, DERA Organizer to Alderman DonBellamy and Members of the Transportation Committee, dated May 19,1988.18 Letter from Gayle Parypa from Single Mothers HousingNetwork, dated May 30, 1988.19 Letter from Rev. B.D. Thorpe, Chairman of Vancouver BurrardPresbytery, The United Church of Canada, to City Council, datedJune 2, 1988.165increase the percentage of social housing units in theBroadsheets.This process culminated in a public hearing on August 23,1988, which due to the number of delegations went on to theearly hours of the next morning. The remaining delegationswere heard by Council at its meeting on August 30, 1988.20Following the public hearing and subsequent amendments, thePolicy Broadsheets were adopted by Council on August 30, 1988(Phase Three). The approach was supported by all the planningofficials interviewed for the research, as a means of givingthe City more influence over development decisions:“If you look at the way development happens in thiscity, generally what happens is that we have a verygeneralized by—law and developers do theirindividual developments within that. A lot of thedevelopment decisions are left with the developer,once that by-law is in place. The nexus of thedecision—making power of what occurs is left withthe developer. That becomes a profound liabilitywhen you start dealing with big projects, if for noother reason than you start to deal with a lot ofpublic services and public facilities that you don’tdeal with on an individual case. So we had to find away to, in a sense, pull the nexus of the power awayout of that process and put it where it belongs,with the City.”2’20 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall,May 1, 1990.21 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director ofPlanning, May 8, 1990.166The approach was fully endorsed by the planning profession.The Policy Broadsheets and the False Creek North OfficialDevelopment Plan won the 1990 annual Award for PlanningExcellence from the Planning Institute of British Columbia(PIBC). Nonetheless, there was a feeling from the COPEcouncillors and some of the community representativesinterviewed (Jim Green and Stephen Leary from DERA) that therewas inadequate opportunity for public involvement at thecrucial formulation stage in early 1988. Moreover, there was afeeling expressed by COPE Councillor Libby Davies that theBroadsheets served to constrain changes to the proposals thatwere wanted by a number of community groups.22STAGES OF THE PLANNING PROCESSThe Pacific Place Planning Process, outlined in Figure 7,involved five basic stages ranging from issue identification,to policy formulation, to overall plan preparation, to thepreparation of detailed area plans, and finally through toimplementation. It was a linear process with no feedback ioopsin place to re—identify issues or reformulate policy.1. The Overall Development PlanBy the time the public involvement process was approved bycouncil, meetings with the public had already been taking22 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall,May 1, 1990.167place. Work was underway on the preparation of the OverallDevelopment Plan (ODP) that would set the parameters for thedevelopment of the site. The ODP set out the basic componentsof the development, including the number of housing units, themix of housing units, the amount of commercial space, theamount and locations of parks and open space, the circulationpatterns and the general form and height of the buildings.Towards the end of 1988, workshops had been held with specialinterest groups including the Urban Design Panel and CityCouncil’s Committee on the Disabled to gain early input intothe plan’s formative stage (City of Vancouver, January 18,1989).From May to November, 1988, Concord Pacific had opened anInformation Centre in the Plaza of Nations and through it hadorganized a series of community workshops and publicpresentations. Visitors to the Centre were encouraged to fillout questionnaires to solicit their views on Concord’s initialdevelopment proposals, see Appendix 2. By October 1988, 16,476persons had visited the Centre and 4,625 questionnaires hadbeen completed.23 While the responses indicated overallsupport for the development, a number of concerns andquestions were raised about the high density, the lack ofhousing mix, the lack of affordability and the impact of the23 Figures obtained from Concord Pacific Developments Ltd.168proposed development on the surrounding neighbourhoods.During April and May 1989, the city planners organized aseries of meetings and workshops to gauge public response tothe choice of the shoreline configuration and to the seven“big ideas” previously outlined. Workshops were held onGranville Island (April 18), at the Chinese Cultural Centre(April 20), Vancouver East Cultural Centre (April 24) and theRobson Square Media Centre (April 26 and May 1). Extensive usewas made of the workbooks during these sessions. The publicand the planners favoured the bays scheme and overall publicsupport for the “big ideas” (City of Vancouver, May 9, 1989).The Council concurred at the Council meeting on May 16, 1989.Through May to September 1989 the City organized meetings withspecial interest groups and neighbouring communities.24 Inaddition there were organized sessions for the general publicduring this period including model displays and drop-ins (June24 These included the False Creek Water Users (May 25), SouthEast Granville Slopes residents (May 29), Vancouver City PlanningCommission (May 31 and August 23), City of Vancouver SeniorsCommittee (June 2 and September 1), City of Vancouver DisabledCommittee (June 5 and September 5), Urban Design Panel (June 14,August 9 and September 13), City of Vancouver Bicycle Committee(June 14), DERA and the Tenants’ Rights Coalition (June 27),Strathcona Local Area Planning Program (June 27), Mount PleasantNeighbourhood Association (July 4), Strathcona Community CentreAssociation (July 16 and August 16), Yaletown Property Owners andBusiness Owners (July 18), South Shore False Creek/Fairview Slopesresidents (September 7), Mount Pleasant Community CentreAssociation (September 19) and DERA (September 29).1693, August 24-27 and October 13-14), public informationmeetings (June 5, August 30 and October 24 and 26) and Councilworkshops (June 8, July 27 and August 17). The public hearingfor the Official Development Plan for False Creek North wasscheduled for November 2.At the public events scheduled between August and September of1989, a questionnaire was distributed by the PlanningDepartment to further solicit public opinion on the proposeddevelopment: see Appendix 4. In total, 126 responses werereturned to City staff. The findings were presented at the ODPpublic hearing. The questions focused specifically on variousaspects of the plan, including the pattern and type ofdevelopment, as well as the public facilities and parks.Overall, the response received was positive, but there weresome substantial community concerns evident in the findings.Certain responses contained comments from the public whichindicated public concern over the high building heights, thehigh density of the development, the potential loss of views,the increase in traffic, the lack of parking and the lack ofaffordable housing.In sum, public consultation up to this stage appeared to beextensive, incorporating a wide range of approaches including:“public meetings, public workshops, discussion and workinggroups, questionnaires, displays and open houses, meetings170with interest groups, meetings with advisory committees,neighbourhood meetings, meetings with individuals,newsletters, media coverage and correspondence with numerousindividuals and groups” (City of Vancouver City Manager’sReport to Vancouver City Council, 1989).The ODP public hearing, held during November 1989 (see Table8), generated a considerable public response. Over 300 peopleturned up at the Sheraton Inn Plaza 500 at Cambie and 12th,opposite City Hall, where the hearing was held. In total,there were so many delegations that the initial hearing had tobe extended over a series of three further meetings.25Table 8: False Creek North Official Development Plan PublicHearingsNovember 2, 1989Plaza 500 Hotel, 2nd Floor, Granville and Oak Rooms, 7.3Opm19 speakersNovember 8, 1989 (Reconvened)Council Chambers, Third Floor, Vancouver City Council, 7pm24 speakersNovember 14, 1989 (Reconvened)Council Chambers, Third Floor, Vancouver City Council, 7pm29 speakersNovember 21, 1989 (Reconvened)Council Chambers, Third Floor, Vancouver City Council, 7pmSource: Vancouver City Planning DepartmentThe ODP public hearing meetings aired many of the community25 Personal Notes taken at the Overall Development Plan PublicHearing, 2 November, 1989171concerns about the process felt by both the organizationsrepresenting the impacted communities and the city-wideadvocacy organizations.There were approximately seventy submissions that identified anumber of issues:26* delegations split roughly 50/50 in terms of for andagainst the proposed development in overall terms.* those against expressed considerable concern about theplanning process itself. Many speakers felt that the plannershad worked too closely with the developer and that theplanners, as a result, had lost sight of the broader publicinterest.* it was argued that there was insufficient core needyhousing in the proposal and, in light of the negative attitudeof the both the federal and provincial government to socialhousing, there was serious concern expressed about whether ornot the 20 per cent social housing requirement in the planwould ever became a reality.* it was also argued that the development favouredhigh-middle to high income earners, leaving little opportunityfor the average Canadian to live in the project.* those against the project spoke about the drastic anddamaging impact that the development would have on surrounding26 These responses were analysed on the basis of personal notestaken at all the meetings and the City of Vancouver City Councilminutes of the hearing.172areas including the Downtown Eastside and the City as a whole.* the delegates in favour of the project at the publichearing were mainly design professionals and residents fromareas not directly impacted by the development. They spokeabout the design of the project and the contribution that sucha development would make to Vancouver as a “world class city”and its economic growth potential.At the culmination of the long public hearing process onNovember 21, 1989 the City Council voted in favour of thedevelopment, with some minor amendments. The vote (8—3) splitalong party lines. The pro-development NPA/Independentmajority voting in favour of the proposal with the COPE groupin opposition. The amendments to the development were minorand did not reflect the points raised by the impactedcommunities. The community opposition was centred on themarket-orientation of the housing on the site and the lack ofconcrete mechanisms to ensure the actual construction ofsocial housing in the plan. At the hearing COPE tried to putthrough some amendments to address these concerns. Forexample, they moved that 50 per cent housing units be forfamilies; 33 per cent for social housing; 25 per cent forrentals; that the developer provide the land for socialhousing at no cost to the City; and that the ODP approval besubject to the City obtaining social housing commitments fromthe provincial and federal governments. This latter point was173seen as a way of forcing Concord Pacific to use theirinfluence with both levels of government. These motions weredefeated. The successful amendments included the provision ofbus shelters on one of the major roads through the developmentand the reduction of the parking requirement for B.C. Placefrom 2,000 spaces to 1,000 and that the money be used to builda downtown pedestrian and cycle route to encourage people toride or walk to work. This latter amendment was a latesuggestion of the Mayor. The amendments did not alter thefundamental premise of the plan, and the developer’srepresentatives present at the final hearing were visiblypleased with the outcome.272. The Area RezoningsThe overall plan was divided into ten component Area Plans,see Map 8. At the time of writing (October 1992) three AreaPlans were completed: International Village, Yaletown Edge andthe Roundhouse. By June 1992, public meetings and modeldisplays were underway for Quayside, the fourth Area Plan. Thedeveloper was reported to be keen to get as many of the AreaPlans approved as possible prior to the next civic election,scheduled for November 1993.2827 Personal Notes from the ODP Public Hearing, 21 November,198928 Interview with Blair Hagkull, Concord Pacific DevelopmentsLtd., May 31, 1990.174Map 8 Pacific Place Area Rezonings, VancouverSource: Vancouver City Planning Department175Approved Rezonings (1992)2. Roundhouse3. Yaletown Edge8. International VillageExisting Structures:6b: Plaza of Nations10. B.c. Place Stadium(i) International VillageInternational Village (10.75 acres of developable land) wasthe first Area Plan to come up for rezoning as the area hadalready been subject to considerable planning activity in theNorth Park planning process. The International Village site,included the area bounded by Pender and Keefer Streets in thenorth, Taylor and Quebec in the east, Pacific Boulevard in thesouth and the lane east of Beatty Street in the west, see Map9 (city of Vancouver, June 9, 1989). The public hearing washeld in June 1989, prior to the formal approval of the ODP.There was some concern expressed about approving an arearezoning ahead of the ODP, but the planners felt it would notbe problematic citing the specific and relativelyself-sufficient nature of this particular development and theconsiderable public planning that had already taken placeduring the North Park process (see chapter Five).The basic proposals of the International Village planincluded:— 800 dwelling units (825,000 square feet) of which 20percent had to be non—market dwellings and 25 per centavailable for families with children.— a maximum of 200,000 square feet of retail use.— a maximum of 265,000 square feet of office and serviceuses.- a hotel of approximately 400 rooms, limited to a maximum176Map 9 International Village Area Site Plan, VancouverSource: Vancouver City Planning Department: I El •I•lil1;vvi FHtPROPOSED RONING FROM BCPED (S C PUCEIEXPO DISTRICT) & DO (DOWNTOWN DISTRICT)TO:- CD-I (COMPRENENSIVE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT)4 City of VancouverPlanning Department177of 300,000 square feet.- institutional uses.— recreation and cultural uses including a 10.4 acre park.- a maximum building height requirement - ranging from 100feet to 300 feet.— parking provisions (City of Vancouver Planning Department,June 9, 1989).The development proposal for International Village maintainedthe basic principles of the North Park Plan. But, there wasmore housing and park space and less commercial development inthe International Village plan29. It was described by thedesign consortium as a “mixed—use hub”. The idea was to createan “international” atmosphere in the development througharchitectural design and the encouragement of shopping outletsoffering food and goods from all over the world (ConcordPacific, 1989)Towards the end of 1988, Concord Pacific arranged a series ofinitial meetings/workshops with community groups and specialinterest groups on the International Village proposals.3°29 Personal notes from Public Information Meeting, Rezoning ofInternational Village 22 February 1989.30 Monday, September 19, 7pm, Mount Pleasant Community Centre.Wednesday, September 20, private meeting with DERA Executive.Wednesday, September 21, 7pm, Robson Square Media Centre. Thursday,September 22, 7pm, Strathcona Community Centre. Friday, September30, private meeting with DERA membership. Wednesday, October 5,178These meetings were designed to obtain community views on thebroad principles behind the proposals. The main feelingsexpressed by the community at these meetings that wererecorded by the author included: the short notice given forthe first of these workshops, the vagueness of the proposalsfor International Village, concerns over densities andtraffic, and questions relating to the deliverance andpercentage of the social housing component.31At the beginning of 1989, the City organized a number ofpublic information sessions about the project. The publichearing had to be delayed due to the soils issue not beingresolved to the City’s satisfaction,32 In February 1989, CityCouncil approved a staff recommendation to send theInternational Village proposal through to public hearing. TheCOPE members on council expressed concern that the process wasbeing pushed too fast. For example, at that time, there wasstill no agreement between the City and the Province regardingthe soils issue, which caused concern (Lee, 1989).7pm, Robson Square Media Centre. Thursday, October 6, privatemeeting with Chinatown and Gastown Historic Areas Association.31 Personal Notes taken from the worshops attended,September/October 1988.32 Personal Notes from Public Information Meeting, Rezoning ofInternational Village, 22 February 1989.179Moreover, I observed that there was considerable concern atthe time about the impact of the proposed InternationalVillage on the Downtown Eastside, which lay immediatelyadjacent to the site. Concerns included the potential loss oflow income rooming houses in the area due to the forces ofgentrification, the influx of high income home owners into thenew development and the lack of concrete provision for lowincome housing in the proposals. There was concern, expressedin a local community newsletter, that social impact studiesshould have been undertaken so that the planners would havetime and knowledge to evaluate the proposals and to assess thepotential impacts on the surrounding communities (Crabzilla,1988). The 20 per cent social housing requirement in theBroadsheets only committed Concord Pacific to ensure that 20per cent of the space for residential units would be availablefor social housing. There was no requirement to build, provideor contribute toward the cost of its development. John Shaylerof TRAC described social housing component in the plan as acommitment in paper only. He was of the opinion that withoutfunding guarantees for the social housing that the 20 per centmeant nothing (Austin, 1989)During the civic election in November 1988, the plans forJohn Shayler had previously worked with DERA and he had adetailed knowledge of housing and community issues in the City. Imet with him on several occasions and he provided me withconsiderable inforirLation on Vancouver’s low income communities andthe likely impacts of mega-project developments like Pacific Place.180International Village, and indeed the development of the wholeExpo site, became an important election issue.34 Mayoralcandidate Jean Swanson, from End Legislated Poverty (ELP), theCivic New Democrats and the District Labour Council, stated inthe election run—up that “a new city Council under herdirection would scrap plans for the Expo lands and CoalHarbour and go back and develop a real planning process thatenabled people to have more of a say.”35 She was quoted inthe press as saying:“Rather than having a so-called public informationprocess, which is what Concord Pacific calls itspublic meetings, people want full involvement inwhat is planned.” (Lee, 1988b).The election was won by the incumbent Mayor Campbell and theNPA retained the majority of seats on Council. The PacificPlace planning process continued.The official public hearing for the International Villageproposal was held in June 1989, at the Vancouver Playhouse onDunsmuir Street. In an address at the hearing ConcordVice—President, Stanley Kwok, announced that he was pleased tohave participated in such a successful “co—operative planningprocess” and that this approach to planning was now beingThe broader issue of the perceived housing crisis was acritical election issue also. This set the context for the concernover the mega—project developments.Personal notes.181studied as a model for co—operative planning in Australia andJapan. There had been over 105 presentations, including 30public meetings organized by Concord or the City, and 20meetings with site neighbours and 15,000 people had visitedthe development model.36There were 30 presentations made. Significant communityconcerns were expressed. Jim Green of DERA stated that thedevelopment would have serious implications for the DowntownEastside in terms of escalating land values, increased rentsand displacement. He expressed concern about the lack of anyimpact studies that had been undertaken.37 Jack Chalmers, fromDERA, and a resident of the Downtown Eastside, expressedconcern over increased property values and the potential lossof affordable housing in the existing hotels:“The minute you vote to rezone this land, you havetaken a giant step towards gentrification” (JackChalmers quoted by Bramham, l989a, Al & A2).Other community spokespersons expressed concern that DowntownEastside residents were considered by the City as second-classcitizens, and there were further concerns over the soilremediation measures being proposed. The meeting also heardfrom a series of experts that questioned the work proposed onthe contaminated soils (City of Vancouver, June 22, 1989).36 Personal notes taken at the meeting.Personal notes taken at the meeting.182COPE Councillors Libby Davies, Bruce Eriksen and Harry Rankintried to postpone the rezoning until the city had a commitmentof federal and provincial funds for the proposed socialhousing units and until an independent consultant had examinedthe plans to deal with the contaminated soils. This wasdefeated and the plan was approved by Council, withCouncillors voting along party lines.(ii) Yaletown EdgeThe next area of Pacific Place to be considered for re-zoningwas the Yaletown Edge district. This area is located on thenorth side of Pacific Boulevard between the Granville andCambie Bridges and consists of three blocks bounded by HomerStreet and Helmcken Park, see Map 10. The area is immediatelyadjacent to the historic Yaletown area that contained manyearly twentieth century industrial buildings.The public objective for this area was stated as being thecreation of a new residential community that offered housingfor a variety of ages and incomes. The intention was to createa family neighbourhood that related both to the existingYaletown and the new False Creek. The developer’s plans forthis area was mainly residential (800 units proposed, of which160 would be for families and 150 for the core needy), withsome commercial development. It was claimed that the newbuildings on the north side of Pacific Boulevard would be183(12 0 C.) CD 0 0 CD C-) ct l-. CD ‘1 rt CD rt0) C 0) CD r1 0 L’1 CD I-I CD 0) Ct CD I.t 0) C.) 0 CDofVancouverdesigned in a way to complement the scale and character ofYaletown. Extensive street landscaping and the use ofretailing were proposed in the plan in order to give PacificBoulevard a what the City Planning Department called a“community feeling” (City of Vancouver Planning Department,January 1990).The same public participation format was used by the VancouverCity Planning Department as for the proposed InternationalVillage development’s public information meetings, meetingswith specific groups and model displays. The attendance atthese meetings, however, based on my personal observation wasconsiderably less than those held for the InternationalVillage rezoning.(iii) RoundhouseThe next area rezoning was for the area called The Roundhouse.This area was situated between Davie Street and Homer Street.The proposal here was primarily residential with a mix ofhousing (1,003 units, including 35% for families and 20% coreneed), retail and public facilities (school, daycare, familyplace and nine acres of park and open space). The existingRoundhouse, the only heritage building on the whole Expo site,was to be retained and converted into a community centre byConcord Pacific. This was the first Area Plan to includewaterfront development, and the plan contained many of the185public facilities for the whole site, including a communitycentre, the proposed David Lam Park, an elementary school anda salt—water pumping station38.On the surface the public process again provided theopportunity for consultation over a period of over 18 months,with approximately 25 public meetings with groups andindividuals and culminated in the Public Hearing on February20, 1992. The overall tone of the public hearing was tosupport the development. Many speakers spoke in favour of thedevelopment and applauded the process. But, again there werefew residents from the locally impacted neighbourhoods. Groupssuch as DERA did not even attend.39 There was a feeling inthese neighbourhoods that participation in the re-zoninghearings was of little value as the outcome was predetermined.40 The local community perception in areas like theDowntown Eastside was that the NPA majority on Councilsupported the plans and could not be convinced of making anysignificant changes to reflect the community concerns.38 The need for a salt-water pumping station was a firesecurity provision brought about by City Council’s previousdecision to sell the City’s fire boats.Personal notes taken at the meeting.40 Interview with Jim Green, DERA, August 13, 1991.186A good indication of the level of debate at the Roundhousepublic hearing was the fact that the major issue to dominatethe discussion was the future of Engine 374 •41 This famouslocomotive was in need of a permanent home. It was agreed thatthe Engine would go into the Roundhouse, at least temporarily,and if funds were raised it could go into a purpose—builtextension on the site. There were no delegations that raisedthe social housing issue or the potential impact of thedevelopment on surrounding neighbourhoods. COPE councillorsraised concerns about the lack of an adequate housing mix andthe absence of co—operative and assured rental units.The public attendance at this public hearing was poor.Councillor Davies noted that “it seems like a lot of peoplewith more critical opinions stayed away, almost as if theywere tired of the whole process and had given up.”42 The finalvote on the Yaletown Edge proposal again followed party lines,with the NPA voting in favour of the development and COPEmembers voting against.41 Engine 374 was one of the first engines to pull passengersacross Canada in 1870’s. Its previous homes had been at KitsilanoBeach and Granville Island and it had been a featured exhibit atExpo ‘86. It had been given to the City by CPR in 1947.42 Interview with Coucillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall,August 13, 1991.187There can be little question about the extent of opportunityfor public input into every stage of the Pacific Placeprocess. Not only were there public meetings, informationmeetings, model displays and exhibitions, there was the publichearing process which also provided further opportunity forthe local community to have its say. There are questions,however, that appear to relate to the efficacy of thisopportunity from a local community perspective. The publicattendance at the public meetings and public hearings wasobserved to drop dramatically as the process went on. From myinterviews with community representatives it was suggestedthat the public process provided the opportunity to raiseconcerns, but little opportunity to ensure that those concernswere acted upon, particularly in relation to the majorquestions of the provision of social housing and the impactson the surrounding low income neighbourhoods. Thisdissatisfaction with the public process led to considerablecommunity activity outside of the formal planning process.EVALUATION OF THE PROCESSViews on the process have varied greatly. A number of the citycouncillors interviewed felt that the process worked extremelywell. Former Councillor Carole Taylor, felt that the processhad been intensive and that overall the result was good forthe City. She felt that ideas and views expressed at meetingspercolated through into the final outcomes. The abandoning of188the lagoons option was cited as proof.43 Gordon Price, NPAcouncillor, felt that the process had gone smoothly and thatthe City had gained a great deal.44Concord Pacific openly stated that the Pacific Place publicinvolvement process had been extensive:“I think that the whole process allows foris the greatest opportunity for publicinvolvement. . . People can say a lot ofthings about the project. One thing theycan’t say is that they haven’t had achance to be involved with it.”45At the public hearing for the rezoning of InternationalVillage, in June 1989, Concord Pacific Vice-President StanleyKwok described the process as a new and innovative way ofplanning, a way that was being studied by other developersfrom all over the world. In total, they estimated that over25,000 people have had input into the process that “. . .hasresulted in a liveable development plan that sets newstandards in urban design, maximizing views and open space.”46The developers shared some sympathy for the concerns of DERA,‘ Interview with Carole Taylor, November 20, 1991.‘ Interview with Councillor Gordon Price, December 10, 1991.‘ Interview with Blair Hagkull, Concord Pacific DevelopmentsLtd., May 31, 1990.46 Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., Pacific Place Up-date,9 September 1991.189but their response was that the Downtown Eastside lay outsidethe project boundaries, and consequently they felt unable todo anything about them.47The planners felt as if they did all they could to securepublic involvement:“Certainly, every opportunity was givenfor public involvement. Concerns were alldocumented and brought forward. They werereinforced or not reinforced as the casemay be through the public hearing process.So given the nature of the projects I amnot sure you could have done much morethat would have been any moremeaningful. ,,48The role of the planners in the Pacific Place process wascrucial. The UMP planning processes tend to bring the plannersand developers closer together in less adversarial and moreco—operative relationships. This raises legitimate concernsabout the possibilities of planners being coopted by thedevelopers. Do planners lose sight of the public interest whenthey work so closely together with the developers? Areplanners able to negotiate at the same level as developers?There are no clear answers to such questions. Some peoplewould say that this relationship means that the planners can‘‘ Interview with Stanley Kwok, Vice President, Concord PacificDevelopments Ltd., March, 1992.48 Interview with Tom Fletcher, Director of Planning, City ofVancouver, September 26, 1990.190extract more public concessions from the developer, whilstothers would say that this relationship gives the developer an“inside track” on the planning process. Certainly, the overalllocal community perception of this closer relationship was notgood. The developer was perceived as having regular and directaccess to the planners in a way the local community did not.It must be said that all the planners involved with PacificPlace were all committed professionals who were doing theirbest to represent the public in the negotiations with thedeveloper. Larry Beasley developed a reputation for being atough negotiator and was considered by the developer to be aformidable adversary and upholder of the public interest.Unfortunately, such a commitment was not evident to localcommunity groups and the media, due to the close associationwith the developer.In the press the planners were accused of being “in bed withthe developer” (Matas and York, 1989, A8) and the localcommunity perception was that they were in closecollaboration. But, they maintained a professionalrelationship with the developer:“From our point of view it was a very armslength relationship. There has been thismythology that somehow we all workedtogether in the same room and we all gotco-opted and everything. It didn’t happenthat way. It wasn’t our day to dayexperience. It was very much them on their191side of the table representing theirinterests and us on our side of the tablerepresenting our interests.”49The planners were operating within a difficult climate. ThePacific Place development was seen to contribute much to theCity in terms of stimulating economic development in theregion, of attracting international investment, of promotingthe world class image of the city and of forging links withthe Pacific Rim.Housing and welfare groups, such as DERA, the DERA HousingSociety, TRAC and ELP had serious reservations about thePacific Place project. It was felt that the project wouldimpact negatively on low income surrounding neighbourhoods.There was concern about the potential of resident displacementand the loss of low income rental stock in the DowntownEastside in particular. Stephen Leary of DERA was quoted inthe community press as saying:“Now across the street are five hotelsthat people rent for $250 a month. It’snot on the site but you’ve got to believethat development is going to get rid ofthose hotels. People are going to say, ifI bought that hotel, I could turn it intoa fitness centre and make a ton of moneyfrom those people over there. I could turnit into a boutique. . . or another 30-storeyhotel. Certainly we don’t want to defendhotels - they’re shitty places to live.The problem is, they’re the only places to‘ Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director, City ofVancouver Planning Department, May 8, 1990.192live and unless there’s something elsebuilt, you tear down a hotel and you throwpeople out on the street” (Busheikin,1990, 1).It was generally felt by these groups that the proposeddevelopment was highly exclusive and contributed little to thedesperate needs of their constituents. A comment made during apublic workshop with the DERA membership in September 1988highlighted this concern: “You have designed a developmentthat we can’t afford to live, shop or work in.”50 Similarcomments were expressed throughout the public process.There was considerable concern from these groups about theprovision of social housing in the project:“The myth is being perpetuated by theMayor and Concord Pacific that they arebeing asked to supply social housing. Thetruth is Concord Pacific is not puttingone nickel into social housing on thissite. There is no guarantee that therewill ever be social housing and what weare looking at is the displacement ofhundreds, if not thousands of people fromthe Downtown Eastside, with no new socialhousing coming on stream.”51The extent of the housing crisis facing the City of Vancouverwas evident from an examination of DERA’s social housing50 Notes from Public Workshop, DERA Membership, September 30,1988.51 Jim Green interviewed for CBC News Report, November 21,1989.193waiting list (see Table 9). As of March 25, 1992, there wereover 6,000 people registered on this list alone.This is just a partial reflection of the total housing need inthe City. There are many other residents on other waitinglists in other parts of the City. This did not, for example,represent the need in other areas such as Strathcona and MountPleasant.Table 9: DERA Housing Wait List: 1991-1992Seniors 1992 1991 DifferenceNumber of seniors on list 2,658 1,648 1,010 (+38%)Number of male seniors 1,775 1,111 665 (+38%)Number of female seniors 882 537 345 (+39%)Number of male seniors 883 499 344 (+40%)living in hotels as mainresidenceNumber of female seniors 183 87 96 (+52%)living in hotels as mainresidenceFamilies 1992 1991 DifferenceNumber of families on list 568 445 123 (+20%)Number of children on list 936 728 208 (+22%)Number of families living 87 78 9 (+10%)in hotelsSource: DERAThe 20% social housing component was felt by the housing andwelfare groups to be inadequate on a site of this size. It wasfelt that a site of this size could have supported a much194higher proportion of affordable housing. Moreover, there wasconcern about the lack of provision for a more even incomespread within the 80% market housing element on the site. Itwas felt that a required rental component in the proposalswould have helped to secure this.52 DERA was particularlyconcerned that, even if built, the social housing projectswould end up surrounded by luxury condominiums making theresidents of the social housing projects feel uncomfortableand alienated. Jim Green of DERA referred to this as apotential “. . .politically generated ghetto in the middle of arich person’s ghetto.”53 Of further concern to housing groupswas the fact that the 20 per cent approach to social housingbrought no new money into the city for social housingprojects, but merely increased the competition over this typeof development for what little money there was. It was arguedthat such an approach depended for its success on the fundingand programme budgets of senior levels of government (ie:provincial and federal housing agencies). For such an approachto work, special budget allocations would be required for themega—project sites in order to ensure that the social housingcould be provided without adversely affecting provision inother parts of the City or the Lower Mainland. The Cityrequested additional resources from Federal Government, but52 This was a requirement that City Council secured fromMarathon Realty for the Coal Harbour proposals.Interview with Jim Green, DERA, August 13, 1991.195these were denied (Hulchanski, 1989, 7)•54A further major criticism of the Pacific Place process fromthe community perspective was the lack of any extensive impactassessment of the proposed project.55 The city planners hadbeen concerned about the potential impacts on neighbourhoodslike the Downtown Eastside, and openly acknowledged that morecould have been done in this regard:“We could have done a lot morepre—planning, a lot more strategic action,I believe that firmly. I am not shy aboutsaying that anyway. But, I think, moreimportantly, we have to be diligent asthings actually start to occur and westart to see how other people react towhat is happening, and be prepared to movefairly quickly in that case.” 6In 1989, the city planners commissioned two consultants toundertake impact studies: the UBC Centre for Human Settlements(J.D. Hulchanski) and Burgess, Austin & Associates. However,as will be shown later in some detail in Chapter 7, it could“ In May 1990, a City delegation visited Ottawa to try andchange the Minister’s mind, but to no avail. This included: MayorCampbell; Councillors Libby Davies and Gordon Price; John Shayler,Tenants’ Rights Action Coalition; Doug Evans, Vancouver andDistrict Labour Council; Andrew Grant, Urban Development Institute;Alice Sundberg, Co-operative Housing Alliance of B.C.; and JimO’Dea, Terra Housing Consultants (O’Neil, 1989).Interview with Stephen Leary, DERA, April 11, 1990.56 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director, City ofVancouver Planning Department, May 8, 1990.196be argued that such studies came late in the process.The Hulchanski Report looked at the issue of low rent housingin those downtown areas likely to be impacted by redevelopmentin the Central Area, by projects like Pacific Place. The areasincluded in the study were Downtown South, Downtown North,Downtown Eastside and Strathcona. The report argued that anyloss of stock in these areas would have significantrepercussions in terms of increasing homelessness. The reportalso attempted to develop a dialogue on innovative ways andmeans by which the city could maintain and develop low renthousing opportunities in the above areas (Hulchanski, 1989).Hulchanski identified current financial and institutionalconstraints in the provision of the 20 per cent social housingallocations on the mega-project sites. This confirmed theconcerns that had been raised previously by groups such asDERA and TRAC:“Yet another harsh reality facing thesupply of low rent housing in Vancouver isthe limited size of the federal/provincialsocial housing program. There is now verylittle hope of obtaining the additionalsocial housing unit allocations forimplementing the proposed arrangement withConcord Pacific. The City cannot, itappears, both deliver on its portion ofthe agreement and continue to providesocial housing in Downtown South andDowntown Eastside at the rate it has inthe past (Hulchanski, 1989, 10).197The report outlined three policy recommendations and detailedcategories of programme options. The policy recommendationswere:a) to maintain and improve the existing central area low rentstock.57b) to create innovative shelter—related programs for lowincome single person households, targeted at special needs.c) that the beneficiaries of economic growth and risingproperty values should help pay a fairer share of the socialcosts incurred by this growth (Hulchanski, 1989).The Burgess Report took a less critical stance. It stated thatthe mega-projects were unlikely to impact negatively on thelow rent housing stock. The consultants argued that the impactof redevelopment would be positive in terms of bringingadditional housing units onstream (Burgess, Austin &Associates, 1989). They acknowledged, however, that anestimated 1,500 rooming house units might be lost over thenext ten years:“The Downtown Eastside, including Gastown,Chinatown and Strathcona, are less likelyto be influenced by the majorredevelopment projects due to theirclosely knit social infrastructure and thefact that redevelopment is unlikely to beeconomically attractive. The proximity ofmajor new developments adjacent to various‘ This proved to be a controversial recommendation as itcalled for a demolition ban on housing stock, which proved to betotally unacceptable to Mayor Campbell and the NPA.198parts of the Downtown Eastside will resultin gradual up—grading over time” (Burgess,Austin & Associates, 1989).The main conclusions were that there would be few adversesocial impacts from the mega-projects and that they wouldbenefit the area by increasing the supply of social housingunits (Burgess, Austin and Associates, 1989). These findingsconflicted with both the Hulchanski report and those of thecommunity—based housing agencies operating in the area.Throughout the study period community organizations such asDERA employed all possible mechanisms to raise concern aboutthe potential impacts on the Downtown Eastside neighbourhood.They used the press (newspapers, radio and televisioninterviews), lobbied politicians, and even ran for politicaloffice58. These activities raised public awareness of thepotential negative aspects of the Pacific Place development,which were downplayed in the official public process. Theemphasis throughout the official public process was placed onthe positive contributions that Pacific Place would bring tothe City as a whole, including considerable tax revenue,58 In Vancouver’s 1990 civic election, Jim Green ran as theMayoral candidate for the joint COPE/Civic NDP slate. Part of hisreasons for doing so were to ensure that certain issues found theirway onto the public agenda: including housing; the mega-projects;and the need for a neighbourhood based, democratic planning system.He ran a very successful campaign in terms of raising issues andcame much closer to unseating the incumbant, Mayor Campbell, thanmany expected. COPE did manage to gain two extra seats on Council,as a result of the issue—based campaign.199improving the City’s image, jobs, 20% social housing (but nomechanisms to ensure it would be provided), communityfacilities, a huge public park and a 1.5 mile waterfrontwalkway. The promise of these benefits seemed to overshadowthe potential negative impacts that Pacific Place might haveon neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside.CONCLUS IONThe overall context of participation adopted by the City wasone of consultation. The purpose being to inform the public,achieve support and to receive advice from the people (City ofVancouver, April 6, 1989, 9). The guiding principles for theconsultation were that the process be ongoing, open andinclusive and focused. Three groups within the public domainwere identified for consultation: the general public, theneighbouring communities and special interest groups.It was intended that participation occur throughout theprocess and at all stages of plan preparation. To maxiiuise itseffectiveness a wide range of public participation techniqueswere adopted. There was a commitment on behalf of the plannersto make these techniques work and to make themselves availableto the public at all times.The Policy Broadsheets were a key element in the process.Their purpose was to consolidate and up—date all previous200council policies for the site and to establish the basicparameters for its redevelopment. The Broadsheets were seen bythe planners as the most constructive way of dealing withsites on this scale and for encouraging public participation.There were undoubtedly considerable opportunities for publicparticipation at every stage of the planning process. Therewere hundreds of meetings and interactions with the public.The quantity of public participation opportunity was not anissue. But views on the effectiveness of the process variedconsiderably. The developers described the process as veryparticipatory and one that was being studied as a model forother cities to follow. The planners were of the opinion thatevery opportunity for public participation was provided, andthere was a commitment shown by them to make the process workfrom a participation point of view. The planners foundthemselves operating in a political climate that clearlyfavoured UMP development in the City, and it was within thiscontext that they tried to facilitate as much participation aspossible.Yet, there appeared to be significant local community concernabout the process— particularly from groups such as DEPA,TRAC, and ELP that represented large numbers of downtown lowincome constituents likely to be impacted by the development.Their concerns appeared to include both substantive and201process elements arid the fact that, overall, the process hadnot appeared to favour the low income residents of the City.These concerns included the potential impact of thedevelopment, the exclusive nature of the project, the lack ofassurances regarding the provision of the social housing, andthe lack of adequate impact assessment work. These concernsare important as these groups represented a significantproportion of the Vancouver community and, on balance, areamong the most powerless of the city’s population to respondto UMPs such as Pacific Place.202CHAPTER SEVENTHE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE PACIFIC PLACEPROCESS: RHETORIC OR REALITY?“We have many types of language for discussing thecity. Different academic disciplines even have theirown dialects; hence urban geography, urban economicsand urban history. In the public sphere, cities havebecome the arena of public administration andpolitical compromise. Private corporations seecities as significant only within the calculus ofprofitability. If we want to improve our cities,then it is important to ‘see’ cities as if peoplematter. The real development issue of the 1980s ishow to create better cities for all the citizens byproviding better environments, a sense of engagementin civic life and sustainable, enjoyable employment”(Short, 1989, 136).INTRODUCTIONThe purpose of this chapter is to use the empirical materialpresented in Chapters Four, Five and Six to address the majorresearch questions outlined in Chapter One. The researchindicates that from a community perspective publicparticipation in urban inega-project planning has not been thateffective. By itself this is not a startling finding, but whatthe research does is provide a sound basis for a criticalresponse. And, more importantly, the research helps us toidentify y public participation in UNP planning is noteffective. Consequently, this chapter is divided into twomajor sections. The first is an evaluation of publicparticipation in UMPS, based on the three characteristicsoutlined in Chapter Two. The second part consists of theidentification of factors which explain why publicparticipation has not been effective.203EFFECTIVENESS OF UMP PLANNING PROCESSES: EQUITY, EFFICIENCYAND EFFICACYTo what degree did the Pacific Place public participationprocess meet the characteristics set out in Chapter Two ofequity, efficiency and efficacy? It is clear that the PacificPlace process offered plenty of opportunity for public input,but the critical issue was to what degree did this translateinto effective participation? It is the quality of the processwe are interested in, not the quantity. The number of publicinteractions, meetings and model displays had consistentlybeen used by the developer, certain members of council andsome planners to claim that the Pacific Place process had beena participatory one. Yet, it is important to state that theopportunity for public participation is not sufficient byitself. There is a need for mechanisms to be put in place thatensure that the input is not only received, but considered,and acted upon. Not all public/community submissions can beacted upon under our present system of representativedemocracy, where many trade—of fs have to be made. But, in thePacific Place planning process, it appeared to many of thecommunity groups that the concerns were not given adequateconsideration.EquityTo what degree was the Pacific Place process equitable? Didthe process enable all groups to participate equally? There204was no explicit equity agenda in any of the case studiesreviewed. In the Pacific Place case study three types ofinequity were identified. First, there tended to be politicaldiscrimination by Council and the developers towards organizedgroups in the community, such as DERA. Second, there wasinequity, between the developer and the local community, interms of access to resources and power, including: money,organization, information, influence, expertise and politicalsupport. Third, there was inequity in terms of access toplanning staff and information. This leads to what I havetermed the cycle of inequity that impeded effectiveparticipation, see Figure 9.Figure 9: The Cycle of InequityPOLITICALDISCRIMINATIONLACK OF ACCESSTO POWER ANDRESOURCESLACK OF ACCESSTO PLANNING STAAND INFORMATION205(i) Discrimination against organized groupsIn the Pacific Place process little distinction was madebetween the three “publics” identified by the City PlanningDepartment: the general public, the neighbouring communitiesand special interest groups. At one level all groups weretreated the same; there was no positive discrimination infavour of the neighbouring communities who were those with theleast resources, and the least able to participate fully. Theprocess did not acknowledge the differential access to poweror resources that groups in the community had. Nor did itrecognise the differential impacts that these groups mightexperience from the Pacific Place development.There are a number of low income neighbourhoods surroundingthe Pacific Place site that are likely to be impacted quitesignificantly by its development. The Downtown Eastside, forexample, was likely to feel the greatest impact from thePacific Place development. Yet, this was not explicitlyrecognised within the planning process. Some impact work wasdone, but as the city planners themselves acknowledged, thiswas not adequate, nor had it led to concrete proposals as tohow these impacts might be mitigated. In an attempt to makethe process more equitable DERA had attempted to secureresources from the City Council in order to employ a plannerto work with them on the question of the impacts of themega-projects on the neighbourhood. City Council consistently206refused to meet the request. It became clear from theinterviews that there was considerable politicaldiscrimination toward DERA from the NPA councillors. As formerCouncillor Carole Taylor put it during an interview: “The NPAhas a real hate for them.” She felt that more could have beendone to bring them into the planning process.1 It appearedthen that the concerns raised by DEBA were finding littlesympathy at the political level. This raised the issue aboutwhether important and legitimate concerns were not beingaddressed or acted upon because of where they came from. Oneexplanation for this was the different visions of the citythat these respective groups had. The NPA majority on Councilsaw the UMPS as part of encouraging economic growth andconsequently viewed them in very positive terms. From theirperspective, groups such as DERA, for example, were seen ashaving parochial interests and for not being “strategic”enough in their thinking in that these projects would bringbenefits to the entire metropolitan region.2(ii) Access to resourcesThroughout the Pacific Place planning process there appearedto be considerable inequity in terms of access to resources.1 Interview with former Councillor Carole Taylor, November 20,1991.2 Interview with Councillor Gordon Price, December 10, 1991.207UMP developers, in general, are powerful internationaltransnational corporations with enormous resources at theirdisposal. Li Ka—shing was one of the richest men in Hong Kongand emerged in the 1980s as a major international developer.Li and other developers can exert considerable influence overthe planning process by their power, resources and links withsenior levels of government. Moreover, in most cases themega-project developers have the ability to sustain longplanning processes, whereas most groups in affectedcommunities can not. Developers can afford to buy thenecessary legal, financial, design and other professionalexpertise they may require, whereas community groups often donot. Moreover, the developer has people working full—time ongetting approval for the proposal, when community groups havenone to work specifically on mega—projects.3The participationof community groups and organizations in such planningprocesses is over and above the role they are mandated with.A further significant factor is that the developers are oftensupported by a strong and powerful urban growth coalitionswithin the city. In Vancouver, Concord Pacific had stronglinks with developers and other powerful real estate intereststhrough organizations such as Urban Development Institute, theSome would argue that DEPA have a number of full—timeemployees that could work on these issues. But all DERA staff arefunded and committed to work on specific issues and tasks, mainlyproviding advocacy services to the local community.208Downtown Vancouver Association, the Board of Trade and theReal Estate Board of Greater Vancouver. This imbalance inaccess to resources has a marked implication for the abilityof groups in the community to participate.(iii) Access to Planning StaffThere was inequity in access to planning staff andinformation. The developer had regular contact with theplanners, much more so than in the more traditionaladversarial planning processes. The co—operative planningprocess brought the planners and the developers into a muchcloser relationship than was usual with developmentapplications. The pattern for the Pacific Place process wasset by the previous B.C. Place process, where city plannersand B.C. Place Ltd. staff worked closely together. In thePacific Place process planners and developers met on a regularbasis and would be seen together at the public meetings,sharing platforms and model displays. As noted in the previouschapter the planners did their best to maintain a professionaldistance, but the local community perception was different andarguably served to undermine public confidence in the process:“It is not good when the city staff workso closely with the developers. Plannersend up as salespeople for Concord Pacificand Marathon. It should be an arms lengthrelationship. u”‘+ Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.209The local community perception was that considerabledecision—making was going on behind closed doors and thatthere was much information at these meetings that did notenter the public arena. It was felt that deals were beingnegotiated between the planners and the developers outside ofthe public process. The community groups felt that many of thekey decisions had already been taken prior to the publicprocess. This perceived secrecy further damaged the publictrust in the Pacific Place process.Groups in the local community were not able to develop such aclose relationship with the planners due to the way the publicprocess was constructed. This new model of urban developmentdoes not facilitate a close working relationship between thecommunity and the planners. In fact, it was difficult forcommunity groups to build any relationship with the plannersindependent of the developer. At all the public informationmeetings and other sessions, the developer would be present.There was direct contact in the meetings held with the specialinterest and residents’ groups. But, these tended to beone—off events and not part of a longer term strategy ofbuilding an on-going relationship with these groups. Thesemeetings were often seen by the community groups as apalliative or as a means of neutralizing protest.There was a perception among groups such as DERA that the210planning process was geared to meet the needs of the developerrather than the local community.5 For a more equitable styleof public participation it could be argued that the plannersneeded to have developed much stronger links with groups inthe community. In most cities there is a network ofwell—informed and organized groups in the community that havemuch to contribute to mega-project planning processes, interms of the local knowledge they possess and in identifyingthe potential impacts of the mega—projects on the surroundingneighbourhoods. In Vancouver, instead of being involved manyof these groups felt alienated from and disillusioned with thePacific Place process.There is also an important distributional issue here. Not onlyis equity an important consideration in relation to publicparticipation, it is a critical factor in relation to theoutcomes of the development itself. UMPS are frequentlyjustified on the potential public benefits that these projectsare supposed to generate. These benefits include potential taxrevenue for over—stretched city budgets, jobs, improved cityimage, and various community benefits. A lot of the currentliterature on UMP development is beginning to question thefact that such development provides benefits for all groups inthe community (Alexander, 1987; Berry and Huxley, 1992;Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.211Brownill, 1990; Docklands Consultative Committee, 1992;Fainstein, 1991; and Widgery, 1991). In other words thereappears to be a lack of evidence that would suggest that the“trickle—down” theory, often used to justify these projects,does actually work. The question of equity needs to be builtinto the UMP debate. Questions of who benefits and who losesare important issues, that have tended to be ignored, whichneed to be addressed in future UMP planning processes. It isapparent from the UMP examples considered here that there is adanger that growth is obtained as the cost of the alienationand marginalization of a significant proportion of thecommunity. This was clearly demonstrated in the Docklandscase, where developments like Canary Wharf had served toincrease the polarization between the Docklands communitiesand provide few benefits to those communities most in need. Itcould be argued that the politics of securing growth andcompetition in the international market place, via UMPS, hasled to inequity and exclusion.EfficiencyThe public participation process must work adequately, be wellorganized and have a defined timescale. The scale of UMP hasmeant that the associated planning processes can be long. Itis difficult for community-based organizations to sustain thelevel of interest and involvement in such planning processes.It is important therefore that the process be efficient in212terms of a) a defined time-line, b) clearly identifying howthe process is organized and ‘where we are’ at any given timeand c) exactly how public input is going to be incorporatedinto the proposals. Citizens need to see that their input isbeing taken seriously and is visibly acted upon.There was an initial timeline for the Pacific Place publicinvolvement programme drawn up by the City which laid out theproposed timescale for the process in terms of the QDP and thefirst Area Plan (City of Vancouver, January 18, 1989). For theODP, the proposal was for the public involvement process tobegin in December 1988 and to culminate in a public hearingtoward the end of July 1989. The public hearing was actuallyheld in November 1989. Work on the Area Plan was scheduled tostart in March 1989 and go to public hearing toward the end ofJuly 1989. The first Area Plan was International Village whichwent to public hearing in June 1989, ahead of the ODP. Theprocess, therefore, did not conform to the original timescale.At the end of the study period in 1992, there was no overalltime-line on the planning process. At that time the plannerswere under pressure from the developers to speed up the AreaPlan rezoning stage. Concord Pacific were keen to have theentire area west of the Cambie Bridge rezoned prior to thenext civic election scheduled for November 1993. The planningprocess will continue until the rezoning of the last Area Plan213is in place and the Development and Building Permits have beenissued. At the end of the study period there was no defineddate for the end of the process.The length of the process can be correlated with theattendance at the various public sessions. There wasconsiderably more public involvement in the early stages ofthe Pacific Place planning process. Groups in the communityappeared to be hungry for information, concerned about whatthe potential impacts might be and optimistic that theirinvolvement might have some influence. Yet, the longer theprocess went on, the more the local community groups lostconfidence in the process, and the more variable the publicattendance became.It was not clear to groups participating in the process how itwas organized, nor what the current situation was at any giventime in terms of what Area Plan had been approved and what hadnot. There were regular meetings in the early stage of theprocess, particularly leading up to the ODP public hearing.Since then the meetings became much fewer, depending on theprogress with the Area Plans. The City of Vancouver PlanningDepartment’s newsletter (see Appendix 5) was intended to bepublished regularly to keep people informed of progress, butits production became sporadic. In the early stages of theprocess the newsletter appeared as intended. From April to214August 1989, three issues were produced. Since that date onlytwo issues have been produced (January 1990 and June 1992).During this period, it could be argued that the public beganto lose touch with the planning process. The attendance at thepublic meetings and the public hearing of the Roundhouse AreaPlan was very minimal.The public process was not that efficient in the sense that itdemanded much of the participants. There were numerousmeetings, workshops and model displays to attend. It requiredmany hours of attendance and preparation of presentations. Thepublic hearing for the approval of the ODP extended over fournights and ultimately exhausted public comment. The firstnight attracted considerable interest and attendance. Therewas much concern about the proposals expressed at thismeeting. The subsequent nights attracted less and lessattendance and interest. A further point is that many peoplefound the process intimidating and were not comfortablespeaking out into a microphone in front of others6.EfficacyThe final characteristic in terms of the effectiveness ofpublic participation was that of the degree of impact thepublic input had on the final outcomes. One essential6 This point was made during personal discussions with anumber of participants at the various public hearings heldduring the Pacific Place process.215ingredient of successfully impacting outcomes is sufficientpolitical power. Community groups must have sufficient powerto impact fundamental development outcomes, and have ameaningful role in the planning process.Two levels of impact could be identified in the Pacific Placecase study:1) impacts on the details of the plan.2) impacts on the fundamental aspects of the plan.It is true to say that the public process had some impact onthe details of the plan. This type of impact would includecertain design elements and the identification of certainconcessions made of the developers. So there was a discernableimpact at this level. There was little evidence to suggest,however, that the public participation process had any effecton the major issues in the plan, such as increasing the amountof social housing or introducing measures to mitigate thepotential negative impacts on the Downtown Eastside.The Pacific Place planning process appeared on the surface tohave been participatory, but it failed to give local communitygroups any real power to influence the outcomes of theprocess. This confirmed the findings of an earlier study:“The Pacific Place citizen participationprogram cannot be described as anempowering exercise for the participants,although some changes were made to theplan. It did maintain the power and216interests of the City and the developer”(Foulkes, 1989, 119).From my interviews it appeared that a number of communitygroups such as DERA and advocacy organizations like TRAC andELP found the participation process frustrating andmanipulative. They felt that the process had excluded theirconcerns and did not represent them well. The process enabledthem to voice their concerns, but little more than that. InVancouver, there was a perception among some groups thatparticipating in the Pacific Place process was a pointlessexercise as the key decisions had already been taken. It wasfelt that the “die had already been cast”.7There was little sense of local community ownership of thepublic process. The perceived lack of an adequate responsefrom the City or the developer on key issues such as socialhousing and development impacts seriously undermined thepublic faith in the process. Their viewpoint was that theprocess had become little more than a public relationsexercise that simply facilitated and legitimized thedeveloper’s proposals. The planners were seen to be doing “asell job”8 and not adequately representing the publicinterest.‘ Interview with Stephen Leary, DERA, April 11, 1990.8 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.217In the other case studies considered the developmentcorporation approach was seen to be even less democratic as itallowed for little or no public input at all. At the leastwith the co—operative municipal approach there was anidentifiable public process that the local community groupscould make use of. In San Francisco and Vancouver, communitygroups had ensured that both public processes were used totheir full extent and important issues were publicly aired. AsJim Green put it: “. . .you can see our finger-print all overthe process.”9 The San Francisco groups stated that the publicprocess at least provided some “hand-holds” to grip. TheVancouver community groups were able to get issues onto theagenda, but the problem was they were not able to ensure thatthere would be an adequate response to them. Overall, therewas little evidence to suggest that these groups had any majorimpact on the final outcomes.The lack of influence on the issues was particularly wellillustrated by the social housing issue. As noted earlier,groups like COPE, DERA, TRAC and ELP campaigned for a greaterpercentage of social housing to be included in the finalproposals and requested that mechanisms be identified toensure the delivery of such housing. There was a proposal toincrease the percentage of social housing from 20 per cent to‘? Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.21833 per cent, but this failed.10 Housing groups hadconsistently raised concerns about how and when the socialhousing would be built. They were worried too about theproposed income split, the 80 per cent market housing and 20per cent social housing was not felt to be an inadequateincome mix. The concern was that it would “ghettoize” thesocial housing is a sea of luxury condominiums.11A further indication of the lack of influence community groupshad on the process was the lack of response to the concernsexpressed about the impacts on the Downtown Eastside. Theproposed Pacific Place development will have a significantimpact on surrounding low income neighbourhoods such as theDowntown Eastside. Previous experience with the B.C. Placeplan and Expo ‘86 was an indication about what the potentialimpacts might be. A number of legitimate concerns were raisedabout the potential of displacement, the process ofgentrification and the loss of much valuable affordablehousing in the area. All these issues were raised consistentlyby DERA, ELP, and TRAC throughout the public process, but theymet with little or a negative response. As noted earlier, therequest by DERA for funds from the City Council to pay for a10 This failed on two counts. First, on the failure to getmore of a commitment to social housing in the mega—projectdevelopments themselves. Second, the failure to secure adequatefunding from senior levels of government to even fund the 20%commitment.11 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.219planner to work with the community to assess the likelyimpacts on the neighbourhood and to prepare a plan for thearea was consistently denied.The ODP public hearing was a key event and, probably a turningpoint in the whole planning process. It was the culmination ofconsiderable public interaction between all the actors. Thepublic hearing itself extended over four non—consecutiveevenings, due to the public interest. But the most importantissue to come out of it was the level of public concern aboutthe development and the process. Numerous speakers raised somefundamental concerns with the proposed plan. But, the plan wasapproved with minor modifications. The perception of this bygroups such as DERA was that the politicians had already madeup their minds to support the development prior to the publichearing:“A planning process doesn’t exist when thepoliticians have clearly made up theirmind. The public hearings becomeshow—trials. 12To many of the community organizations present, the ODP publichearing was a visual demonstration of the powerlessness ofgroups to effect changes to proposals on this scale. There wassufficient support for the development on City Council toapprove the plan, despite the concerns of DERA and other12 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.220community groups. The subsequent public process in the eyes ofthese groups suffered as a result. Local community groupsparticipating in the process had the ability to raise issues,which they did, but not the power to ensure that somethingwould get done about them.In short, the Pacific Place public participation process wasnot effective from a community perspective. There was noexplicit equity agenda in the process. Three type of inequitywere found: a) political discrimination against organizedgroups; b) inequity in terms of access to resources, includingmoney, organization and expertise; c) inequity in terms ofaccess to planning staff and informati.ori.In terms of efficiency, the outcomes did not reflect theeffort put in. Community groups campaigned tirelessly onissues of social housing and the potential impacts of thedevelopment, but such concerns were not addressed. Theplanning process had no clear time-lines. There was a lack ofongoing information, nor was there any clear indication as tohow the public input would be incorporated.Finally, on the question of efficacy, the impact of the publicinput on the final outcomes was small. There was some level ofimpact identified on minor issues within the Pacific Placeproposals. But little impact on the fundamental aspects of the221plan, for example, the provision of social housing and thequestion of impact assessment.FACTORS AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION INPLANNINGHaving established that the public participation process didnot seem to work well from a community perspective, it isimportant to explore why and to identify the potential reasonsfor this. Here the findings fall into two categories:1. General factors affecting the effectiveness of publicparticipation.2. Specific factors that relate to the UMPS themselvesthat affect the effectiveness of public participation.1. General Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of PublicParticipationThere are a number of general factors that affect theoperation of public participation in planning. These include:a) the global economyb) central versus local government controlc) the local power structure(i) the political composition of the city council.(ii) the role of community organizations.(iii) the relationship between city planners and communityorganizations.(iv) the relationship between ‘professional’ planners and222their political leaders.(v) the relationship between developers and citygovernments.d) the theoretical foundations of public participation inplanning.a) The Global EconomyThe context of UMP development is the emergence of thetransnational economy and the guest of mobile internationalcapital to seek out good investment opportunities in realestate. We have seen the emergence of the concept of the‘entrepreneurial city’ as an attempt to attract this capital,and the growth of competition as cities vie with each other inthis task. In some senses this has resulted in planning movingaway from its traditional regulatory role to that of amechanism that is instrumental in facilitating internationalinvestment into cities. It is taken for granted that thisinvestment is beneficial for the cities and that all groups inthe community will benefit from this growth. It is felt thatthe wealth generated by this investment will ‘trickle down’ tothe most needy groups within the city. This explains thestrong level of political support that UMPS appear to enjoy.This new role for planning has a marked impact on theprocesses of public participation. At a very crude level itmeans that the planning process is geared to meet the needs of223the developer and that the process of public participationcannot be allowed to interfere with what the developer wantsto do. UMP planning processes are therefore weighted in favourof the developer due to the benefits they are perceived tobring with them. There is little scope, therefore, for publicparticipation to bring about any major changes in developers’proposals. It is possible for changes at the margins, in thedetail of the projects, but not over major issues that affectthe fundamental premise of the plan. This was evidentthroughout the Pacific Place process where pressure for changeover fundamental issues like the amount of social housing wasconsistently resisted in favour of the developer, but whererelatively minor issues like the provision of bus shelterswere acceded to.b) Central versus local government controlA major issue determining the effectiveness of publicparticipation is how much control city councils have overdevelopment projects. The modified planning processes thathave been introduced to handle UMPS have generally resulted ina loss of local government control over these projects. Seniorlevels of government exerted considerable levels of influenceover the nature and shape of UMPS. The urban developmentcorporation approach, for e:arnple, served to significantlyreduce the influence of city councils over urban development.The development of Harbourfront, Battery Park City and the224London Docklands saw a limited role for the local elected citycouncils. In the London Docklands, the plans that had beenproduced by local councils in the area were ignored by theLDDC. The lack of control by local councils resulted here in avery limited role for public participation. In the casesreviewed in Chapter Four, the use of the urban developmentcorporation approach generally worked to exclude localresidents from the planning process.There appeared to be more local control in the municipalco—operative approach. Here the planning process remainedwithin the realm of elected councils, but even here theconsiderable influence from higher levels of government wasevident. For example, in the Pacific Place process theprovincial government played a major role in shaping andfacilitating the development proposal. The provincialgovernment was responsible for the decision to cancel theNorth Park plan and sell the entire Expo site to a privatedeveloper. This was part of the B.C. Government’s broaderprivatization strategy that saw it abandon the landdevelopment business in favour of the private sector. Underthis strategy the B.C. Government proceeded to play an activerole in seeking out a buyer and in facilitating Li Ka-shing’spurchase of the site.225c) Local Power StructureThere were a number of key issues that were identified underthis heading:(i) Political composition of city council: In cases wherelocal councils did have influence over urban development thepolitical composition of city council became criticallyimportant. The election, for example, of a morecommunity—based council in Toronto was influential in leadingto a review of the Railway Lands Plan. The election of thiscouncil was seen as an end to the developers’ control of cityhail. The new council was much more committed to encouragingpublic participation from citizens, communities and interestgroups and facilitating development that provided tangiblebenefits for low income communities. San Francisco CityCouncil were responsive to the concerns from community groupsconcerning the development of Mission Bay. The consequence ofthis was a much altered proposal from the original schemes,that reflected a response to the concerns raised.Throughout the Pacific Place process the Non-PartisanAssociation (NPA) retained control over Vancouver CityCouncil. They are a party that supports private enterprise,and is perceived as being closely aligned with the developmentindustry. Overall, they see the Pacific Place development asbeing extremely beneficial to the city in terms of improvingits image, generating tax dollars, stimulating economic226development, and facilitating future investment, and so havebeen supportive of the proposal. They believed that they wereacting in the best interests of the city and its residents.But, such overt support of mega—projects resulted in theconcerns being raised by community groups as not beingrecognised as valid. Groups such as DERA were frequentlydismissed by the NPA as being negative and opposed to change.The NPA members on Council tended to resist or ignorecriticisms made of the proposals. Moreover, the NPA had fewpositive connections with neighbourhoods like the DowntownEastside and so were more likely to ‘e out of touch with theissues and problems of such areas. Groups such as DERA weretreated with suspicion and seen as being too “negative” and“political”. The NPA view of the planning process was atraditional mainstream one that saw it as “neutral andapolitical” one.13(ii) The role of community organizations was an importantfactor affecting the effectiveness of public participation inplanning processes. Public processes that facilitate moreequitable treatment of low income groups or neighbourhoodswork better where the community is relatively well organizedand where community groups take on a pro—active role. TheRailway Lands Action Coalition is a good example of how13 But the NPA used the planning process in an overtly“political” way to support the mega-projects and theirdevelopers.227community groups were able to influence the Railway Landsplanning process. They successfully campaigned for a review ofthe 1985 Plan, but were also pro-active in putting forwardproposals of their own. Their plan was substantially differentfrom the developer’s, and was much more orientated towardaffordable housing, public transport and sustainabledevelopment.The role of community organizations in the London Docklandswas severely limited by the urban development approach and bythe negative attitude the LDDC exhibited towards communitygroups. Local voices were openly ignored. The negativeresponse to the Peoples’ Plan for the Royal Docks was clearevidence of this. The local interest was seen as something tobe sacrificed for the greater national interest. Yet, thecommunity response was successful in documenting the negativeimpacts that the LDDC approach to urban development has had onthe Docklands area and the local people.The Mission Bay process was a good example of how communitygroups organized to influence the outcomes of the process.Building on many years of community activism, community groupsin San Francisco succeeded in negotiating substantial changesto the original proposals for Mission Bay with the inclusionof a greater range of affordable housing units and no buildingheights over eight stories. They ensured that the public228process was used to the full. A further important factor wasthe series of community—based plans for the development of theland. The groups were well—informed and were able to negotiatewell with both the developers and the planners.In Vancouver, the community response to the Pacific Placeprocess started early, with concern about the sale of theland. Groups such as DEPA, TRAC, ELP, and the Vancouver andDistrict Labour Council took an active role in the PacificPlace process. DERA members in particular was active inresponding to a number of mega-project developments, includingPacific Place and Coal Harbour, that were likely impact on theDowntown Eastside. They campaigned to make the city andprovincial governments aware of the negative impacts that Expo‘86 and the B.C. Place development would have on theneighbourhood. Their participation, at least, ensured that thecommunity concerns about the potential impacts of thedevelopment remained on the agenda.Consequently, the existence of community organizations and theorganizational infrastructure at the grassroots level appearedto have a critical impact on the public process. Wherecommunity groups and organizations were well organized, theywere able to exert considerable influence. This wasparticularly evident where groups were able to produce morecommunity-orientated plans that reflected very different229priorities to those of the developer.(iii) The relationship between the city planners and communityorganizations proved to be a crucial issue. In most cases thecity planners were perceived by the community to be on thedeveloper’s side rather than that of the community. TheVancouver planners were seen to have a close workingrelationship with Concord Pacific. This made community groupssuspicious of the city planners. As noted previously, the cityplanners did maintain a proper and professional relationshipwith the developer. They felt strongly that they were actingin the broad public interest by trying to ensure fullopportunity for public participation and to secure the maximumamount of public benefits out if the developer. This wasconfirmed in my interviews with Blair Hagkull and Stanley Kwokfrom Concord Pacific. As noted in the previous chapter cityplanner Larry Beasley had established a reputation as a toughnegotiator.The local community perception of their relationship was verydifferent. Consequently, the planners did not develop closelinks with the local community groups, particularly from theimpacted neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside, and itcould be argued that the effectiveness of the public processsuffered as a result.230Moreover, there was a strong perception by the local communitythat the planners did not undertake sufficient impact work.This was a fact acknowledged by the planners themselves. Theywere, however, instrumental in getting city council to fundthe impact studies that were undertaken by Hulchanski andBurgess, Austin and Associates. But, generally, there was alack of a comprehensive impact assessment process, whichshould really be essential on a project of this size.(iv) The relationship between the ‘professional’ planners andthe council was critical. This leads us to a very significantissue, the relationship between the city planners and theirpolitical leaders over policy-making. The context for UMPdevelopment was very much established by the NPA majority onCouncil. They were led by a pro-development Mayor, who hadconsiderable development experience and was well connectedwith the industry. The intention was to create a ‘world class’city, and major flagship developments such as Pacific Placewere a key element in this strategy. The mega—projects wereseen as just the right type of prestige development to createthis image. They were viewed as bright and exciting projectsthat brought with them considerable investment potential. Theywould also bring in much needed tax revenue and provide animportant stimulus to the local and metropolitan economies.This created a pro-development context in which the cityplanners were forced to work. Their job was to facilitate231development to ensure that the ‘world class’ city image becamea reality. Mayor Campbell was a strong, forceful andpersonable character and was able to exert considerable powerover City Council departments. It could be argued that theplanners had little room for manoeuvre. Any overt support bythe city planners for the local community perspective wouldnot have found favour among the dominant NPA group.(v) The nature of the relationship between developers and citygovernment was a further critical factor and was seen to bedetermined by the approach taken to urban development. One ofthe key aspects of UMP development is a much stronger privatedeveloper presence and a weaker government role in urbandevelopment. In the development corporation approach the roleof the city government was marginalized to a large degree. Inthe co—operative municipal approach, the relationship wascloser, and based on the concept of partnership between thepublic and private sectors. This relationship is characterizedby “co—operation” between the developer and the citygovernment. The public perception of this relationship in thePacific Place process was that the developers and the citycouncil were in “each others pockets”, and that such arelationship gave the developer an “inside track” on theprocess. This served to undermine the local communityorganization’s confidence in the process. A more arm’s lengthrelationship between the developer and city government was232felt to be more appropriate by these community organizations.This public perception caused the planners considerableconcern and led to some rethinking about the City’srelationship with the developer:“In future projects we would tend to keep thedeveloper in the background a lot more, in terms ofsaying you are one of many actors, you are going tohave your input through the process, but this iswhere the community really gets to have its say upfront as to what the plan should be and what itsconcerns are.”14d) The theoretical foundations of public participation in UMPplanningThere is an argument to suggest that the Pacific Place processwas both institutionally and politically constrained from thestart by the theory on which it was based. The City decided toadopt a consultation approach, informed by the rationalcomprehensive model, rather than an approach that facilitateda greater degree of citizen control over development outcomes.If we refer back to the definitions of public participationdiscussed on Chapter Three consultation would be seen byArnstein as being a form of tokenism, which does not providethe participating citizen or community group any degree ofpower (Arnstein, 1969). In Burke’s terms consultation would beviewed as a form of staff supplement, which identifiesparticipation as a means of adding to the expertise of theofficial planners who remain in control of the process14 Interview with Tom Fletcher, Director of Planning, Cityof Vancouver, September 26, 1990.233(Kasperson and Breitbart, 1974). In Susskind and Elliot’sview, consultation would be described as some form ofpaternalistic activity as the participation remains highlycentralized and closely managed by the local governmentplanners (Susskind and Elliot, 1984).It was clear that the consultation model did not match up tothe local community group expectations of a publicparticipation process. Groups such as DERA wanted a much moreactive role and to be fully involved in the whole process, andplay a part in the detailed negotiations between the developerand the City. Community groups did not have any control overthe agenda and the Pacific Place public participation processwas established without any public involvement.Within this consultation approach the Vancouver planners sawtheir role as the technical experts acting in the overallpublic interest, advising the politicians who then made thedecisions. Despite the appearance of participation thedecision—making in the planning process remained top down andcentralized. Basically, the Pacific Place planning processremained entrenched within the traditional mainstream planningapproach. Such an approach to planning did not adequatelysupport active citizen involvement in the planning process.234As Chapter Two demonstrated the theory is there to support amore participatory approach to planning. The radical planningliterature reviewed earlier provided an indication of the richsource of theory that supports a more bottom—up andparticipatory approach to planning. The practice of planninginformed by this theory would require a much greater role forthe involvement of the local community, a role that goesbeyond more than just being consulted. The role of theplanners and the outcomes of the planning process would bedifferent. The practice of equity planning and popularplanning, two expressions of planning practice informed by theradical planning model, demonstrated that planning can givelocal communities a greater degree of power to influence theoutcomes of planning processes to ensure that their prioritiesprevail.The radical planning model viewed pubLic participation as anintegral part of the planning process. Public participationwas seen as a mechanism to enable the community to influencethe outcome of planning processes. It provided a moredemocratic and people—orientated approach to the planning ofour modern cities. Recent literature on democracy andcitizenship points in the direction of participatory democracyas the basis for public participation (Laclau and Mouffe,1985). The development of effective public participationprocesses must be a bottom-up process. It must start with the235citizens themselves. The concept of representative democracyoften does not provide an adequate framework for effectivepublic participation as the effective power to consider thewishes of community groups lies with the publicrepresentatives rather than the groups themselves (Pateman,1970)2. Specific Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of PublicParticipationThe effectiveness of public participation is also affected byfactors that are much more specific to UMPS as a particularform of urban development.UMPS are seen as mechanisms to bring about urban and economicregeneration and to attract investment into cities. The areseen as prestige developments designed to enhance the imageand the attraction of the city. They are also seen in verypragmatic terms as a means of tax revenue for the city. Asnoted above the Pacific Place project was designed tocontribute to the future of Vancouver as a “world class” city.The aim was to attract international investment and provide adevelopment for citizens from all over the world. It could beargued that the project was not designed for local people, soin some senses was detached from the locality. Despite thefact that the design team was based in Vancouver it could beargued that many of the decisions affecting the Pacific Place236development were made outside of the locality in Hong Kong.This reduced the possibility of the local participation havingan impact on the outcomes. Decisions made in a Hong Kongboardroom are not open to local community scrutiny orinfluence. This is indicative of the strong internationalcontext in which UMP decisions take place, and the weakerdegree of local control over urban development.A further important factor about UMPS is that they aregenerally seen as exclusive developments with high office andcommercial components and market housing units. Residents fromthe low income neighbourhoods surrounding the UMP sites tendto enjoy few benefits from such development. Moreover, theexperience with UMPS that are built or in the process of beingbuilt would seem to indicate that the negative impacts onsurrounding low income communities are quite severe. Theexperience from the London Docklands, for example, clearlypoints to the fact that there is now a growing polarizationbetween the new incoming communities and the existing poorerworking class residents. Fainstein’s work on Battery Parkpoints to many similar impacts in New York (Fainstein, 1991).UMPS have distinct characteristics that can impede theeffectiveness of public participation:(i) The size and scale of the proposed developments can makeit difficult for citizens and community groups to relate to.237It is difficult, for example, to sustain public interest indevelopments with such a long development time line.Moreover, as noted earlier, the large scale nature of theprojects has invited more intervention from senior levels ofgovernment, thereby reducing local government and thecommunity’s control over the development. In principle thismay not be a bad thing, but is dangerous when senior levels ofgovernment show little commitment to effecting publicparticipation at the local level, and when there is littlecommitment to equity, as appeared to be the case in the UMPSreviewed here.(ii) The strategic location of these projects means that thedevelopment stakes were high, especially in the high growthdecade of the l980s. The UMPS were located close to downtowncores and frequently incorporated e<tensive areas ofwaterfront land. In most cases this made these sites highlyattractive to developers. It meant that such sites weredestined for high income generating uses. In many ways, itmight be argued, then, that the nature of the plans was predetermined prior to the commencement of any public process,and, consequently, the leeway for local community influencewas small.23(iii) The UMP developers were powerful transnationalcorporations with considerable resources at their disposal toinfluence local councils and the general public. Thedevelopers were able to employ public relations and marketingskills to promote their developments and to secure public andcouncil support. Community groups, on the other hand, oftenhad few resources to put forward their point of view. Thisdiscrepancy was rarely explicitly acknowledged in the publicprocess. For example, no special resources were provided forcommunity groups to organize or to put forward their concernsin relation to the mega-projects. DERA had consistentlypressed Vancouver City Council for such resources to employ aplanner to work on their behalf to evaluate the Pacific Placeproposals and to assess the impact on the local community.However, the San Francisco groups were comparatively well—resourced and were able to organize more effectively as aresult.The power of local communities to influence UMP proposalsappeared to be greatly enhanced when there was a closealliance between the local community and the city council. TheToronto Railway Lands example demonstrated the potential ofhow UMP developers can be challenged, when the newly electedreform-minded City Council embarked on the review process ofthe approved plan. Coin Street in London, considered inChapter Three, also proves the potential of the alliance239between local government and the ]ocal community, where a biginternational developer was defeated by the plan of the localcommunity acting in concert with the Greater London Counciland the development that occurred was determined andcontrolled by local groups in the community.(iv) It is evident that UMP planning processes have resultedin “new relationships” between the public and private sectors.The term “partnership” was commonly used in the UMPS to referto the close links between the public and private sectors. Therole of planning has changed from one of regulation to that offacilitation in relation to urban development. The privatesector was perceived by senior governments as having theleadership role in urban redevelopment, with the public sectorproviding a facilitating role. As previously noted, thecontext of UMPS is a much stronger private presence and aweaker government role in urban development. This wasinterpreted by community groups that the needs of thedeveloper tended to receive a higher priority than those ofother actors in the process.(v) UMPS are image orientated and have a tendency to generatea distinct momentum of their own that to some extent makesthem impervious to the influence of public participation.There appeared to be a general unquestioned assumption bygovernments that UMPS were a good thing for the city. Their240attractiveness is that they bring disused land into use, theyimprove the physical appearance of the city, they attractinternational investment, they are said to create jobs, andthey provide much needed tax revenue for local government.Consequently, the projects were often surrounded byconsiderable hype and publicity about the potential benefitsthey would bring to the cities concerned. This can help togenerate what has been referred to as the ‘bandwagon’ effectwhere a decision is made on limited information and wheresufficient commitment to a project is made at an early stagewhich severely restricts the effects of subsequent inputs(Levin, 1976; Masser, 1982). This can result in circumventingthe public planning process, and may encourage the public totake a less active role in the process. It may also help tomask faults or gaps in the proposals and give the project alife or momentum of its own. There appeared to be littlecritical analysis as to what the benefits of UMPS actuallywere, and, perhaps more importantly, what were the costs interms of potential disbenefits.15This momentum also creates a tendency toward over—optimisticexpectations about the benefits that UMPS generate, which have15 Nancy Knight’s study of natural resource mega—projectplanning processes in Northern British Columbia noted how thehype and the hope generated by overly optimistic expectations,regarding the potential contributions of natural resourceprojects to regional economic development, led to a situationwhich submerged rational analysis and stampeded the planningprocess (Knight, 1990).24:1not generally been borne out in practice (Brownill, 1990;Docklands Consultative Committee, 1992; Fainstein, 1991).Concord Pacific have promised enormous benefits to theresidents of Vancouver, such as parks, open space, waterfrontwalkways, and community amenities, which act as powerfulincentives to accept and ratify the proposals.16(vi) UMPS have significant impacts on neighbouring low incomecommunities who are already under-represented in planningprocesses. Residents of low income communities are often themost difficult to get involved in public participationprocesses. As noted previously, when so much energy isexpelled in the course of daily survival, there is oftenlittle left to draw on to get involved in a planning process16 There are questions about whether such benefits, promisedat the time of rezoning, ever become implemented, as intended.One of the conditions and public benefits offered by thedeveloper at the time of the approval of the Pacific Place ODPwas that Concord Pacific would pay fifty percent of the cost ofa salt-water pumping station on the site. A salt-water pumpingstation is an installation to pump water from False Creek to usein the event of fire on the mainland, and was required due inpart to the controversial decision of Vancouver City Council tosell their fire-boat. The Council subsequently approved that thedevelopers contribution be reduced to twenty—five percent due torising costs. This was an estimated loss of $1.5 million to thepublic purse.In the Canary Wharf development, O&Y were expected tocontribute in the region of $800 million to the cost ofextending the Jubilee underground tube line out to thedevelopment. In return for such a commitment the public sectorcontribution was to be in the region of $3 billion. The recentfinancial collapse of O&Y has not only resulted in the loss ofthat agreement, but also highlights the precarious nature ofsecuring public benefits through the private sector, which isnow the common trend in the deficit governments of the 1980s and1990s.242on the scale of Pacific Place. There was little attendance atthe various public meetings, model displays and exhibitions byresidents from the directly impacted neighbourhoods. They wererepresented, by and large, by community organizationsoperating in the area.There is little evidence to suggest that the current approachto UMP planning is providing many benefits for the low incomeresidents of our cities. This suggests that the ‘trickle down’theory so often used to justify these projects generally hasnot worked as intended or hoped. Instead, it appeared from theLondon Docklands and Battery Park City case studies that thesedevelopments had served to increase the polarization of theexisting low income residents and the incoming residents andusers of the new developments. It further suggested thatgenerally UMP planning processes have worked to excludecommunities from having an active and meaningful role in thedevelopment of UMPS.CONCLUSIONThe analysis of the Pacific Place process, and the other casestudies, suggests that public participation in UMP planningprocesses have not been effective from a communityperspective. It was clear that the Pacific Place processprovided plenty of opportunity for input, but that theopportunity for participation did not translate into effective243influence on the outcomes of the process. The threecharacteristics of equity, efficiency and efficacy ofeffective public participation were found missing from thePacific Place planning process.First, the process was found to be inequitable. Threedifferent types of inequity were specifically identified.There was discrimination against organized groups, there wasdifferential access to resources, and there was inequitableaccess to planning staff and information. Second, from acommunity perspective the process was inefficient. The scaleof the UMPS involved long planning processes, difficult forcommunity groups to sustain involvement. The Pacific Placeprocess did not have a clear time—line, nor was it clear tocommunity groups how the process was organized, or how publicinput would be incorporated. Third, in terms of efficacy, twolevels of impacts were identified. The public were seen tohave successfully made an impact with regard to minor issues,but participants were unsuccessful in making major changes tothe development proposals. The Pacific Place research cited anumber of examples demonstrating the lack of influence onmajor issues. It could be argued that the community groupsfound the process frustrating in that it failed to give theirconstituents any real power to influence the outcomes of theprocess.244In turning to the question of why the public participationproved ineffective it was possible to make the distinctionbetween general and specific factors. A number of generalfactors were identified that affected the operation of publicparticipation in the planning system. These included theinfluence of the transnational economy, the loss of localcontrol over urban development, the nature of the local powerstructure, and the theoretical foundations on which thepractice of public participation is based. It was furtherdetermined that the process was constrained by theconsultation approach, located within the rationalcomprehensive model of participation, that was adopted by theCity.Other factors were identified more specific to UMPS thatimpacted on the effectiveness of public participation in thePacific Place process. These included the scale of theprojects, their strategic location in downtown areas adjacentto low—income communities, the power and resources of UMPdevelopers, the close relationship between the public andprivate sectors, and the powerful momentum of the projectsthemselves. Overall, public participation in the Pacific Placeplanning process failed to give community groups sufficientpower to ensure that community priorities prevailed in thefinal outcomes of the process.245CHAPTER EIGHTCONCLUS ION“Participation calls for a new, broadlyconceived planning that is first andforemost a basic community process. Inthis new planning, the professionalplanner could take the role of catalystand facilitator. He could be one who makesboth the normative and technical aspectsof this process work. We must come torecognize the fundamental connection ofplanning and action and seek toreintegrate them within the planningprocess going on in our communities. Whatwe are calling for is the politicizationand normatization of planning” (Kravitz,1968, 46).INTRODUCTIONThe analytical framework introduced in Chapter One (see Figure1) and the analysis contained in the previous chapters wouldsuggest that public participation in UMP planning has not beeneffective. This is a critical issue from a communityperspective due to the significant impacts that these projectshave on cities and their residents. In general terms, theplanning processes reviewed in this research have not beenequitable, efficient, or efficacious. It is clear then thatthe appearance of participation and its effectiveness are twodifferent things. It is possible to have the opportunity forparticipation without that participation affecting theoutcomes of the planning process. The three characteristics ofeffective public participation were missing.246Why was public participation so ineffective? There were anumber of reasons identified for this. At a general levelthere were found to be a number of factors that hindered theeffectiveness of the public participation process. Theseincluded the global economic context in which UMP planningtook place which retricted the potential for local influence;the stronger presence of powerful international developers;the introduction of modified planning processes thatfacilitated a much stronger private sector presence and weakerlocal government control in urban development; the local powerstructure; and the theoretical foundation on which thepractice of public participation in UMP planning was based.At a more specific level, UMPS had particular characteristicsthat impeded or worked to counteract effective participation.They were big projects with long development horizons, whichmade effective public participation difficult to sustain. Theywere in key strategic downtown locations which made thedevelopment stakes high and less open to public influence.Moreover, UMPS due to their size and importance generated amomentum of their own, the ‘bandwagon’ effect as it wascalled, that served, it could be argued, to submerge rationalanalysis and stampede the planning process. Their scale andthe promise of significant public benefits made them difficultto challenge. These projects are attractive to localgovernment in terms of the benefits they promise in terms of247the much needed tax revenue, the provision of housing andjobs, and their economic development potential.A further important factor was the recent trend in urbanpolicy toward more “co—operative” relationships with theprivate sector. The private sector has a much strongerpresence in determining the nature and shape of large scaleurban development and local government has a correspondinglymuch weaker role. This had marked implications for publicparticipation in planning processes in that it has changed thefundamental nature of the relationship between the public andprivate sectors. In the development corporation approach thepublic planning function was surrendered to the needs of themarket in order to promote development. In this situationthere was no place for public participation. The only role itcould play was to legitimise the process or play a publicrelations role. This was particularly well-illustrated in theLondon Docklands. The situation was somewhat better with theco—operative municipal approach, in that the planningprocesses remained within the public domain, but the privatesector was still the dominant force. There was the appearanceof public participation, but there was little evidence tosuggest that it was effective. The groups involvedacknowledged, however, that the public process provided a“hand—hold” on the development proposals and an importantchannel through which to input their views.248In both the development corporation and the municipal cooperative approaches, market forces determined the nature ofthe development. All levels of government have been receptiveto UMP development as they are seen as making significantcontributions to urban and economic regeneration. The mostpublic participation could do in these circumstances was tobring about change at the margins, in the details of theproposal, rather than in the fundamental concepts or form ofthe development. The efficacy of the process was severelyrestricted. The planners’ role had been to facilitatedevelopment proposals generated by developers, rather than toembark on a public planning process that determined how thesesites should be developed. In the Pacific Place case study,the Policy Broadsheets were an attempt to ensure that publicpriorities were reflected in the proposed development.However, they were drawn up recognising the constraints of theglobal economy and in a manner so as not to deter developers,rather than as a response to defined public need.TOWARD NEW PARTNERSHIPSFor the local communities affected by mega—projects to have agreater impact on the outcomes of planning processes we needto rethink the relationships between the actors involved inUMP planning. Co-operative or collaborative planning processescan be problematic for public participation. The developmentcorporation and municipal co-operative approaches placed too249much power in hands of the developer. The public sector wasforced into negotiating benefits from profits it has helped tocreate via rezoning and various public subsidies. One of theopportunities to change such power linkages might be to shiftthe alliance between local government and internationaldevelopers to a new partnership between local governments andlocal communities. Such alliances may have greater potentialof supporting and promoting equity, efficiency and efficacy.There appeared to be a prevailing assumption by governmentsthat UMP development would bring overall benefits for the cityand the local economy. Yet, the distribution of potentialbenefits of such development has to be questioned. Thepartnerships between the public and private sectors did notappear to work in favour of the low income communitiesimpacted by mega-project development.A further factor to consider was that many of the UMP siteshave taken years to develop. Thus at the end of the studyperiod the Railway Lands site in Toronto and Mission Bay sitein San Francisco still lay vacant and were likely to do so forthe foreseeable future. A major factor here was the collapseof the property market at the end of the 1980s and thebeginning of the l990s. A different planning approach mighthave secured an earlier start to development. At the momentnone of the actors involved are benefitting. The developers250face increasing carrying costs and frustrating delays, citygovernments lose potential tax revenues, and city residentsgaze upon a large derelict site and wander what is taking solong to bring the land back into effective use.CHANGING ALLIANCES: A NEW ROLE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTHow can this situation be changed? How can publicparticipation in UMP planning be made more effective? How canthe characteristics of equity, efficiency and efficacy beestablished within UMP planning processes? Under such extremepressure towards the internationalization of cities, localgovernments must reaffirm their role in controlling urbandevelopment. It is only through the reinforcement of this rolethat localities will be able to challenge internationaldevelopers to restore local control of cities.This statement runs counter to the widespread belief that therole of local government will diminish in an internationaleconomy. Certainly that appears to be the trend in thedevelopment of the UMP examples reviewed here. Higher levelsof government have the ability to influence theseinternational flows of capital, but choose not to effect it.There is an argument to suggest that in fact local governmentmight be best placed to control such development. They can uselocality as a significant bargaining tool with internationaldevelopers. What is more it appears to be in the interests of251the UMP developers themselves to have an increased measure oflocal control over their developments. The UMP developers haveconsiderable resources, but what they usually lack isknowledge about the locality. Moreover, the grand blue-printstyle of development appeared not to be suited to therecessionary period of the 1990s. An incremental approach moresensitive to local conditions could have resulted in a form ofdevelopment that was more resilient to world economic changes.In order to do promote more local control local governmentmust take a leadership role and foster much closer ties withlocal communities impacted by UMP development. Citygovernments have to be in touch with the needs and aspirationsof communities, so heavily impacted by UMP development.Community groups impacted by UMPS are generally not opposed todevelopment, but they are opposed to the creation of highlyexclusive developments that provide few benefits for lowincome groups.A practical reason for city governments to forge much closerworking relationships with communities impacted by UMPS andthe organizations working within these areas is to access andmake use of the knowledge and information they possess.Community groups such as DERA have a detailed and intimateknowledge of the dynamics of communities and of the issuesthat affect them. Such information can enrich the planning252process and improve the awareness and understanding of thepotential impacts of UMP development. It can improve both theefficacy and efficiency elements of the process and lead to abetter quality planning process.If the way forward is for local government to strengthen itsties with local communities two questions immediately come tomind: a) is there the political will to do this? and b)assuming there is how do local governments do it? In responseto the first question, I would suggest that it is in interestsof all the actors involved to adopt a new approach to UMPplanning. The current approach in the current economic climateappears to provide few benefits for the community or thedevelopers. Reaffirming local control might be a means ofimproving benefits for all concerned.The second question of how this might be done is moredifficult. Community organization and effective publicparticipation are vital elements of the revitalization oflocal governments as dynamic agents of urban development.Consequently, it is imperative for local government to allyitself more closely to the local community. The partnership oflocal government and local communities will form a powerfuland creative alliance that will facilitate greater powersharing among all the actors involved. The development ofeffective public participation must start with the community.253The city planners would perform a key role in this new processby helping to mobilize and empower local groups. This could bedone by the provision of information about the projects andthe intentions of the developers, by spending time in thecommunity and by undertaking detailed impact assessment workon the proposed projects. Planners could be assigned to workdirectly with community groups in the areas impacted by thedevelopment. This would involve incorporating an explicitequity agenda into UMP planning processes, that recognisedthat these groups need extra resources to enable them toparticipate on a more equal basis. In the current approachescommunity groups are at a severe resource disadvantage incomparison the UMP developers such as Concord Pacific and O&Y.Further, it is important for city governments to maintain anarms-length relationship with the UMP developers. Developingcloser working relationships with groups in the communitywould help this to happen. This would help local groups regaintheir faith in the public process. The perceived close workingrelationship between Concord Pacific and Vancouver CityCouncil did considerable harm to public confidence in thePacific Place process. The public perception of‘fast—tracking’ the process and ‘working co—operatively’ withthe developer, whilst not always accurate, undermined thewillingness of groups to participate in a process they feltwas predetermined.254A further tactic to increase the power and influence of localgovernment would be for city governments and communityorganizations to develop a network of contacts with theircounterparts in other cities faced with similar developments.A much stronger power base may result as well as providing theopportunity for the cross-fertilization of ideas andexperience. Links for example between local governments in SanFrancisco and Vancouver, might have proved informative. Whilelocal government and local communities remain isolated, theyweaken their ability to control development on this scale.THE UMP PLANNING PROCESS OF THE FUTUREThe examination of public participation in UMP planningprocesses has demonstrated the lack of power afforded tocommunity groups in planning processes generally. Thenecessary ingredients of equity, efficiency and efficacy aremissing. UMP planning is no different in principle to otherplanning processes, except in scale. Where local communitygroups have had influence it is through their own communityorganizing, rather than through the official public process.If the conclusions drawn from the study of the case studies inthis dissertation hold true generally, it is questionable asto whether public participation can ever be effective withinthe existing political, institutional and administrativeconstraints.255UMP public participation processes to date have adopted therational comprehensive planning model. A liberal democraticview that supports a planning process that tends to be top-down, technical and apolitical. The planners are seen as theexperts acting in the public interest. The community is thereto be consulted, but its role is essentially a passive one.This model confers no power on groups in the community. Theycan make representations, but it is up to others as to whetherthese will be acted upon.To be effective public participation requires a differenttheoretical base its foundation within the planning process.There needs to be a shift toward the radical planning model,which sees the planning process as a political andredistributive mechanism. Public participation needs to beseen as a central feature of the planning process which formsa part of the local democratic structure. This model conformsto the radical planning model. The theoretical frameworkdeveloped in Chapter Two provides an indication of the theoryavailable to draw on, which potentially supports a much moreparticipatory style of planning that is equitable, efficientand efficacious. Public participation in UMP planning isineffective because the dominant rational comprehensiveplanning model does not support these characteristics. Theplanners are forced to adopt this model because it is themodel that is supported by the developer-orientated256politicians and the one favoured by the developers.Future planning processes need to incorporate some of thesuggestions outlined above if public participation is tobecome more effective. They need to recognise the politicalnature of UMP planning processes and positively discriminatein favour of impacted communities. They need to incorporatethe criteria of equity, efficiency and efficacy. New alliancesneed to be forged between city governments and communitygroups. 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