PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN URBAN MEGA-PROJECT PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF PACIFIC PLACE VANCOUVER, B.C.

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B.Sc (Hons) Town Planning
M.Sc Urban Planning Studies

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

School of Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

July 1994

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ABSTRACT

The 1980s witnessed a trend toward a new model of urban development, the urban mega-projects (UMPs). These projects have significant impacts on cities, on the way we practice planning and on the way we involve the community in decision-making processes. A critical question from a community standpoint is the degree to which ordinary citizens have the opportunity to influence the nature and shape of such development. In short, how participatory are UMP planning processes? This leads to the question of how we can evaluate the effectiveness of public participation? This leads in turn to the important question of why public participation in UMP planning processes can be effective or not?

To address these questions it is necessary to develop a theoretical categorization of public participation. Three models are identified that each inform a different perspective on the practice of public participation. These range from the current dominant tradition of the rational comprehensive model, through the advocacy model, to the radical planning model. The theory is also used to identify characteristics of effective public participation. It is argued that effective public participation must be equitable, efficient and efficacious. Public participation can only be effective when community organizations have sufficient power in the process to ensure that their priorities are recognised and acted upon.
The research data consists of a case study of one of the largest UMPS currently being developed in North America: the Pacific Place development in Vancouver. This is supplemented by reference to other contemporary UMPS, including Harbourfront and the Railway Lands in Toronto; Battery Park City in New York; the London Docklands and Canary Wharf; and the Mission Bay project in San Francisco. The research methods adopted within the case studies included a literature review, semi-structured interviews with the actors involved, participant observation, and the use of various published sources.

The conclusion that emerges is that public participation in UMP planning is not particularly effective. The necessary components of equity, efficiency and efficacy are missing. A number of principle reasons are outlined: the characteristics of the UMPS themselves, the nature of the public participation process and the theoretical foundations on which it is based. On the contrary the development of more effective public participation must rely on a bottom-up process that should start with citizens groups. It is argued that city governments need to forge stronger links with the community and emphasize the role of locality in determining the nature of UMPS. There is a need to revitalize local democracy and reaffirm the importance of effective public participation as part of this process.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who are responsible for helping me in the process of researching and writing this dissertation. Too many to name in full and to do justice to in these few words.

There is my supervisory committee of Henry Hightower (Chair and Supervisor), Peter Boothroyd, and Gerry Pratt that provided considerable advice and guidance throughout the process. Particular thanks to Henry for all his support during my time in Canada and in helping me finish the work back in England. I would also like to thank the School of Community and Regional Planning and the Centre for Human Settlements at the University of British Columbia for all their support and generous facilities. My sincere thanks also to all my fellow students in the School of Community and Regional Planning who provided such a supportive and stimulating environment to be in.

I made many good and dear friends in my five years in the City of Vancouver. To them I offer my eternal thanks. To Mark, Renee, Jessie, Robbie, Julian, Karen, Alison, John, and to all at the WISE Club. To You-tien for all her support and insightful suggestions. My deep thanks must go to my parents for all the support before, during and after this enterprise, and to Happy and Bud.

I would like to thank all the people who agreed to be interviewed as part of the research and for being so co-operative and open about their views.

Finally, I would like to thank the Association of Commonwealth Universities for the award of the Commonwealth Scholarship that supported my studies for the duration of my stay in Canada.
"Some of us are increasingly struck by what we see as a new trend: an escalation in the scale of new urban development and redevelopment. Whether in big inner-city redevelopments like South of Market or London Docklands, or in big new residential suburban developments, the clear tendency is for a new style of development led by a new style of international developer. There is an obvious need to ask questions about these developments. Who are the mega-developers? What is the relationship between them and the public authorities? What impact do these developments have on the traditional urban streetscape and on traditional ways of using cities" (Hall, 1989).

INTRODUCTION

This research is concerned with the issue of public participation in urban mega-project (UMP) planning processes. UMPS have become an increasingly common form of urban development in recent years and have been described as "a new trend" in urban development (Hall, 1989). These mega-projects are proposed by major international developers who have considerable resources to invest and due to their size and location these projects can have major physical, social and economic impacts on the cities in which they are proposed and on the operation of planning processes within these cities. This chapter sets the scene by introducing the economic context in which UMPS emerged, by looking at what UMPS are, by identifying the research questions to be addressed, and
outlining the research methodology that was adopted to try and address these.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMY

The 1980s was a period of major economic restructuring in the advanced industrial economies. Capital became extremely mobile and there was a massive shift in investment patterns from manufacturing to real estate. The result was mobile international property developers looking worldwide for good speculative investment opportunities (Berry and Huxley, 1992). In short, we witnessed the emergence of the transnational economy. International capital was able to flow freely across national boundaries as new trade and investment agreements were established (Marchak, 1992).

Confronted with worldwide competition and capital mobility, all levels of government in Britain and North America have mobilized in the last decade in an attempt to attract international capital to their localities. In many ways governments have been forced to accept what has been termed as the 'new realities' of this transformed economy (Drucker, 1989). In order to succeed in the international market place governments have become market-orientated and entrepreneurial (Fainstein, 1990). Cities have opened their doors and have adapted their policies to attract UMP development and suit the needs of business and developers (Marchak, 1991). This was
done often at the expense of public services, social programmes and public participation. In terms of controlling urban development this entrepreneurial role has often resulted in "fast track" legislation and secret negotiations with developers to by-pass normal planning controls and established decision-making processes (Alexander, 1987; Berry and Huxley, 1992).

A further factor has been the emergent free market philosophies of the "new right" (Drucker, 1989; Marchak, 1991). This was an ideology that emerged in the industrial democracies in the mid-1970s, and which had become firmly established by the 1980s (Jacobs, 1992; Marchak, 1991; Thornley, 1991). Terms like "privatization", "deregulation", "downsizing", "free trade", "market economy" and "free enterprise" have become commonplace (Marchak, 1991). The message such terms conveyed was that the "government was bad", and "the market was good". Such ideology fully supported free market principles and was antagonistic to regulation:

"It rejects the Keynesian consensus of the post-war era, and extols the virtues of free enterprise and entrepreneurship. It expresses dissatisfaction with democracy, equality, social welfare policies, collective bargaining, and other citizens' rights achieved throughout the previous three decades" (Marchak, 1991, 3).

The potential impact of this philosophy is that community rights are reduced, and anything associated with the public sector is greatly under-valued (Marchak, 1991). Moreover, it
appears that there are few governments who have tried to
direct the dividends of the free enterprise economy to those
sections in the community most in need (Fainstein, 1991).

IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING

These developments have profound implications for the
operation of planning processes in our cities, and for the
practice of public participation.

On the one hand the restructuring of global markets and the
response of governments have brought about significant changes
in the relationship between the public and private sectors. It
has been suggested that this new economy severely limits the
ability of governments to influence urban development. The
public sector was seen to be too bureaucratic and inflexible
to meets the demands of the transnational economy. Moreover,
there has emerged a moral argument about the legitimate role
of government to intervene (Drucker, 1989).

On the other hand the emergent free market philosophies of the
"new right" have questioned the interventionist style of
government that characterized the immediate post-war period.
Redevelopment in the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s was seen as
predominantly a public sector activity. Redevelopment in the
1980s and the 1990s is seen in very different terms with the
private sector at the helm and the public sector playing much
more of a facilitating role (Berry and Huxley, 1992).

A NEW TREND IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT: URBAN MEGA-PROJECTS

Urban mega-projects (UMPS) are a physical manifestation of these trends. The processes of economic restructuring and the shift in investment patterns has resulted in large areas of obsolete industrial land in key central locations ripe for redevelopment. These sites, or "raw chunks of land", as Eckdish Knack (1986) refers to them, are the remnants of the abandoned industrial age: former railway lands, disused shipping yards and docks, and other land once used for industrial purposes. The land is relatively cheap and international developers see an opportunity to make substantial profits in providing developments geared to meeting the needs of the new economy. UMPS are being heralded as great opportunities to regenerate urban cores.

UMPS are large, sites can typically range from 50 to 300 acres and more, and development horizons can be anything up to twenty years. They are usually mixed-use developments, involving a combination of office development, convention and exposition facilities, retail uses, leisure and up-market residential uses (Berry and Huxley, 1992):

"Mega-projects are distinguished, in the first instance, by their huge size and complex mix of land uses, designed to create and capture both differential and monopoly rents. In the second place, these projects tend to depend on and arise
from active state government intervention, facilitation or even partnership" (Berry and Huxley, 1992, 46).

UMPS have other important characteristics:

1. They are on strategically placed sites close to downtown cores. They can have major impacts on the form and structure of the city.

2. They are private sector led projects, albeit with substantial public sector support. This distinguishes UMPS from earlier large scale development projects, like the new towns and the urban renewal programmes of the sixties and seventies, that were more public sector led. The context of UMPS is privatisation and the use of private capital to regenerate and redevelop cities. Contemporary urban policy and UMP planning processes reflect this trend.

3. UMP developers are large powerful corporate development companies with enormous resources at their disposal. Peter Hall has referred to UMP developers as "a new style of international developer" (Hall, 1989). The Canadian-based Olympia and York Developments Ltd. (O&Y), owned by the Reichmann brothers, is a good example. In 1991, this was said to be the biggest property development company in the world.

4. UMPS have changed the nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors. They are brought about by the
alliance between all levels of governments and international property developers. The trend in UMP planning is toward partnership, rather than the more traditional relationship based on regulation (Berry and Huxley, 1992).

5. UMPS have led to the introduction of modified planning processes that not only reflect the theme of partnership, but that are also felt able to handle development on this scale. The two major planning approaches have been the development corporation approach and, what I have termed, the municipal co-operative approach. These planning approaches reflect the close alliance between the public and private sectors and have brought the planners and the developers much closer together in new co-operative relationships, further transforming the traditional adversarial approach.

6. UMP developments impact significantly on the immediately surrounding areas. These are invariably low income neighbourhoods, whose residents have been consistently under-represented in urban planning processes. There is concern about the potential negative impacts the development of these sites might have on these neighbourhoods, including: gentrification and rising land values; the loss of affordable housing units; displacement of low income groups; traffic generation and a lower level of services and support networks for local residents.
7. UMPS generate significant support as they are viewed by governments as a valuable economic development tool in the regeneration of local, regional, and national economies:

"Rampant office, hotel, retail and resort development is being heralded as a key indicator - and, politically, very visible proof - of successful economic restructuring and dynamic, sustainable growth of the regional economy" (Berry and Huxley, 1992, 46).

Consequently, cities are keen to secure UMP development not only to stimulate the local and regional economy, but also as a means of attracting further investment and growth. This helps to explain the significant amount of political support that UMPS seem to generate.

THE CASE STUDY EXAMPLES

There are many UMP developments in various stages of development throughout the world. It was decided to focus on examples from Canada, USA and the UK. UMPS are an international phenomenon, so an international perspective was warranted. Moreover, it was felt a cross-national dimension would prove useful in identifying common themes, threads and responses. It is evident too that the UK approach to large scale urban development has borrowed heavily from the North American experience, which made some kind of cross-Atlantic approach not only interesting, but necessary (Hambleton, 1991). Examples of both the development corporation approach and the municipal co-operative approach were chosen, see Table 1.
Table 1: The Case Study Mega-Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Size Acres</th>
<th>Proposed Development</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harbourfront Toronto (DC)</td>
<td>Harbourfront Corporation and O&amp;Y</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1.2m sq.ft. office 1.0m sq.ft. commercial 250,000 sq.ft. recreational/cultural 3,500 housing units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Lands Toronto (MC)</td>
<td>CN and CPR</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>13m sq.ft. office 5,000 housing units Skydome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Park New York (DC)</td>
<td>BPCA and O&amp;Y</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6m sq.ft. office 12,000 housing units 30 acres park Hotel waterfront walkway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Bay San Francisco (MC)</td>
<td>Catellus Development Corporation</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>4.1m sq.ft. office 200,000 sq.ft. retail 7,577 housing units 19 acre park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Wharf London (DC)</td>
<td>LDDC and O&amp;Y</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>10m sq.ft. office 500,000 sq.ft. commercial/retail/leisure Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Place Vancouver (MC)</td>
<td>Concord Pacific</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>2m sq.ft. office 7,650 housing units 42 acres park waterfront walkway</td>
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DC - Development corporation approach  
MC - Municipal co-operative approach

The development corporation approach

a) Harbourfront, Toronto. This was a 92 acre site situated on the shore of Lake Ontario, adjacent to the Gardiner Expressway, close to the downtown area of the City. It was initiated by the federal government in 1972 and originally intended to be a publicly funded waterfront park. The
developer was the Harbourfront Development Corporation in conjunction with private developers such as Olympia and York. By the late seventies, the plan had changed significantly to incorporate other commercial uses. Harbourfront is now completed and includes 1.2 million square feet of office development; 1.0 million square feet of commercial space; 250,000 square feet of recreational/cultural space; and 3,500 housing units.

b) Battery Park, New York. This is another completed mega-project. The developers were the Battery City Park Authority in conjunction with mega-project specialists Olympia and York. The 92 acre site was created by infill at the tip of Manhattan along the Hudson River. The site is adjacent to another large scale development, the World Trade Centre. The development includes 6 million square feet of office development; 12,000 housing units; 30 acres of park; a hotel; cultural facilities; and a 1.5 mile waterfront walkway.

c) Canary Wharf, London Docklands. This part-completed development has become famous as the project that helped to bankrupt its developer, Olympia and York, in May 1992. It is a 72 acre site located in the centre of the Isle of Dogs in the London Docklands. The London Docklands comprises an area of approximately 8.5 square miles and is regarded as one of the largest urban redevelopment opportunities in Europe today. The
task of the regeneration of this area was given to the London Docklands Development Corporation, a central government appointed development corporation. The Canary Wharf proposal includes 10 million square feet of office development; 500,000 square feet of shops, restaurants and other leisure facilities; and a hotel.

The Municipal Co-operative Approach

a) The Railway Lands, Toronto. This is a 185 acre site close to the downtown core of Toronto. As the name suggests the area is made up of disused railway lands and at the time of writing the site was yet to be developed. This site represents a major redevelopment opportunity for Canada’s largest city. The developers are Canada’s major railway companies, Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), who have been trying to secure the redevelopment of the site since the early 1980s. The current proposals, which were approved in 1986, but modified in a review in 1992, include 13 square feet of office development and 5,000 housing units. Part of the site has been developed with the completion of the Skydome Stadium, a multi-million dollar prestige project that has provided Toronto with a sports arena complete with a retractable roof.

b) The Mission Bay proposal is one of the largest private urban development projects in North America today. The
planning process has been in place since 1981 and a number of plans have been put forward in that time. The current plan, by Catellus Development Corporation, is designed as a mixed use development to be built over the next 20 to 30 years. The redevelopment of the site has generated an enormous community response. A number of previous plans have been resisted and various community organizations have produced their own plans for the development of the site. The result has been that the original proposals for the site have been transformed. The number of affordable housing units has increased; the amount of family housing has doubled; the requirements for open space have been increased; and provisions were included for the developer to fund training programmes, provide childcare facilities, and a range of other community benefits. A further significant factor is that the building heights in the current proposals are restricted to an eight-storey maximum.

c) The Pacific Place development in Vancouver, which forms the focus of the research presented here. Vancouver is one of the fastest growing cities in North America today. It currently experiencing considerable UMP activity. It is in an attractive location on the Pacific Rim and it has been successful at attracting both domestic and mobile international investment in real estate (Goldberg, 1991; Goldberg and Fullerton, 1991; Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992). Other significant development
projects include Coal Harbour\(^1\), the Station/LaFarge site\(^2\), and the Central Waterfront Port Lands\(^3\), see Map 1. This makes Vancouver a good location for the primary case study in this research.

\(^1\) Coal Harbour, is located on the Burrard Peninsula, in close proximity to the Pacific Place site. In fact, Coal Harbour is sited next to Canada Place, which was the location of the Canadian Pavilion in Expo '86. Coal Harbour is a proposal by Marathon Realty, the real estate arm of the Canadian Pacific Railway, who were involved in proposing the redevelopment of the Railway Lands in Toronto. The proposal is for the redevelopment of 82 acres of former industrial/railway lands into 2 million square feet of office space; 2,000 housing units; hotel; and parkland. There is another major project called the Bayshore on the adjacent site.

\(^2\) The Station/LaFarge site at the eastern end of the False Creek Basin is the location of the Citygate development. This is a proposal that is currently under construction by the Bosa Development Corporation and is a mega-project in all but size. It is strategically placed at the end of the False Creek Basin, and is adjacent to the Pacific Place development. Together these projects directly abut the Downtown Eastside area of Vancouver, one of the poorest neighbourhoods in the City. The development as proposed included 1.2 million square feet of residential use, comprising of up to 1,000 dwelling units; 105,000 square feet of office use; up to 70,700 square feet of retail use; and various cultural, recreational, and institutional uses. By 1992, the development was well under construction.

\(^3\) The Central Waterfront Port Lands site is located on the other side of Canada Place to Coal Harbour and the Bayshore development. Taken together these development sites, when complete, will have resulted in the complete redevelopment of the Burrard Inlet shoreline from Stanley Park to Portside Park. The Port Lands is a proposal for the redevelopment of 94 acres of the Port of Vancouver. This is the largest port in Canada, and a major world port. The plan area includes the Seabus Terminal, which provides an important link to North Vancouver, and the Harbour Heliport. The lands are owned by the Vancouver Port Corporation, a federal Crown corporation, whose mandate is to manage port operations, both on land and water, under its jurisdiction. The area is included in the City of Vancouver Central Area Plan and is identified in that plan as an area for offices, hotels, or housing, or any combination thereof.
MAP 1  Vancouver Mega-Projects

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department
The Pacific Place development is a $2.5 billion proposal for
the development of 204 acres of former industrial/railway
lands on the North Shore of False Creek close to the downtown
core of the city. The site had been used in 1986 as the site
of the Vancouver World Exposition, which attracted
international attention and was specifically used as a
development tool. This process has been well documented
elsewhere (Gutstein, 1986; Wachtel, 1986; Olds, 1988). The
current proposals have been put forward by Concord Pacific
Developments Limited, a company controlled by Hong Kong
business Li Ka-shing. The current proposals include 7,650
housing units; 2 million square feet of office development; 42
acres of parkland; and a 1.5 mile waterfront walkway. It is
one of the largest and most valuable development projects in
North America today. The Pacific Place site abuts an area
known as the Downtown Eastside, one of the poorest and most
deprived areas of the city. Actual development commenced in
1992 and the developer has estimated that it will take fifteen
years to complete.

All these projects conform to the typical UMP profile. They
are large mixed use developments of similar character. All
involve major international developers, and all are in
strategic locations close to low income neighbourhoods.
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

UMPS have significant implications for both the management and future well-being of our cities and their residents. Moreover, they impact on the operation of contemporary planning processes and on the way we involve communities in decision-making processes. This dissertation explores the UMP phenomenon and specifically addresses the issue of public participation in UMP planning. UMPS raise important questions about the effectiveness of public involvement in planning and about the ability of city governments to control development on this scale. The overall purpose is to improve our understanding of planning processes in relation to large scale urban redevelopment in both theoretical and practical terms.

Bearing these factors in mind, a critical question is to what degree do ordinary citizens have the opportunity to influence the nature and shape of such development. In short, how participatory are UMP planning processes? This leads to the second question of how do we evaluate the effectiveness of public participation? This leads to the third, and very important question, of why public participation is effective or not effective.

It is critical, therefore, that we look in detail at public participation in UMPS to examine how much public participation goes on in UMP planning processes, and, more importantly to
determine how effective it is. If public participation is effective the outcomes of the planning process must be seen to reflect the public input received. Consequently, from a community perspective public participation will only be judged to be effective when those groups participating have sufficient power in the process to ensure that community priorities prevail.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The general research approach was both exploratory and qualitative. The aim was not to prove or disprove certain hypotheses, but rather, to explore and further knowledge and to generate new avenues for research.

The first methodological challenge was to set up a means of evaluating the effectiveness of public participation in practice. This was not an easy task. The question of the effectiveness of public participation has dogged planning research for years. Few studies have effectively tackled this issue. The measures of cause and effect are not always identifiable in the messy world of planning and politics. Moreover, a common criticism of many previous evaluations of public participation is that they tend to reflect the position of the administration rather than that of the participating citizen (Sewell and Phillips, 1979). There is a need to focus attention on a citizen perspective of the effectiveness of
The effectiveness of public participation is very much influenced by the theoretical foundations on which it is based. It is to the planning theory literature that the research looked to for guidance on this issue. The approach adopted was to identify characteristics from the literature that contributed to the effective practice of public participation from a community perspective. Three such characteristics were identified: equity, efficiency and efficacy.

The second methodological challenge was the development of an analytical framework to connect the theory and the case studies included in the research, and to provide a conceptual linkage between UMPS and the significance of public participation, see Figure 1.

The research itself consisted of a series of case studies. The research covers the period from 1988 to 1992. The case-studies were chosen represented both the development corporation and the municipal co-operative approaches to UMPS. The development corporation approach is represented by Harbourfront, Toronto; the London Docklands and Canary Wharf; and Battery Park City in New York. In addition to Pacific Place, the municipal co-operative approach is represented by the Railway Lands,
Characteristics of UMPS

New Model of Urban Development Models

* development corporation
* municipal co-operation

New relationship between gov't & private developers

Stronger private presence & weaker government role in urban development

International developers

Stronger international presence and weaker community control over the development of the locality

Large-scale and strategic locations close to low income neighbourhoods

Greater impact on neighbouring communities and greater impact on those already under represented in planning processes

The essential conflicts:
1. International vs. Local Community
2. Private developer vs. government

Modified Planning Models

What's missing in the modified planning model?

Revitalisation of local democracy and the reaffirmation of the urgency of effective public participation in planning

Figure 1: Analytical Framework
Toronto and Mission Bay in San Francisco.

The principle techniques used within the case-study method included a series of semi-structured interviews with actors in the process, for example, the developers, the planners, the politicians and representatives from community organizations. These interviews were conducted over the period from 1990 to 1992. The major research was conducted in Vancouver, but field visits were also undertaken to Toronto (1990), San Francisco (1991) and the London Docklands (1991) to gather information on the UMPS located there.

In Vancouver, detailed participant observation was undertaken at various meetings and public hearings during the period 1988 to 1992. During the Spring of 1990, I spent a three month period in the offices of the Downtown Eastside Residents Association making extensive use of their files on Pacific Place and B.C. Place and talking to the workers in the office about the potential impact of UMP development on the neighbourhood. Data drawn from these sources was supplemented by data obtained from secondary sources. These included literature reviews, journal articles, council documents, planning reports and newspaper clippings.
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION

This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the topic and explains the rationale and the research method. Chapter Two presents the theoretical issues of public participation in planning. Three different models are presented and three components of effective participation are identified. This helps to frame much of the subsequent analysis. The third chapter provides a background on public participation on which subsequent chapters attempt to build. This provides important contextual information for the presentation of the research data. Chapter Four attempts to link the material in the previous two chapters by reviewing the secondary case studies used in this research to supplement data obtained from, and to develop questions for, the primary case study. The next two chapters introduce the major case study, the Pacific Place UMP. Chapter Five provides necessary background material for the understanding of the Pacific Place process and the subsequent analysis and Chapter Six focuses more specifically on the Pacific Place planning process. Chapter Seven uses the case study material to address the research questions. The final chapter draws some basic conclusions and considers the implications of the findings for the future of urban mega-project planning processes.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

"No vision of reality is neutral. Different ways of knowing make a difference. There are many ways of seeing the world. Every vision of reality comes out of some set of interests in the world. Every vision of reality suggests a model of acting on reality - even if that model of action is one of letting the reality alone. Ways of looking are tools, parts of making a strategy for action. They identify what's important and what's background. They suggest what is to be changed and what is to be left as is" (Peattie, 1991, 35).

INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the planning theory literature to perform a number of essential tasks. First, to identify and critique the major planning paradigms; second, to identify the theory, or group of theories, that are most supportive of the concept of public participation1; third, to generate categories of analysis and to identify and develop more specific research questions, and finally, to attempt to make the link between the theory and practice of public participation more explicit.

The planning theory literature is legion. There are a number of different classifications or typologies (or meta-theories) of planning theory that can help us navigate our way through this literature. These include Friedmann and Hudson, 1971;

1 Here the intention is to distill certain characteristics that can be adopted as potential indicators of effective public participation.
Galloway and Mahayni, 1977; Hudson, 1979; McConnell, 1981; Healey, et al., 1982; Weaver and Hightower, 1984; and Friedmann, 1987. These classifications are useful as they reflect the range of planning theory and the different political ideologies that lie behind them. Each of these groups of theories treat public participation differently.

THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DIFFERENT PLANNING MODELS

To assist in the process of moving toward a theoretical framework for the understanding of effective public participation I divided the planning theory literature into three major models: 1) rational comprehensive planning; 2) advocacy planning; and 3) radical planning. The first two are located within the liberal democratic view of society, the latter adopts a radical democratic perspective (see Table 2).

The rational comprehensive model is the dominant planning model and constitutes the basis for planning practice in western liberal democracies (Wolfe, 1989). It is frequently referred to as the traditional or mainstream planning theory approach. It supports a practice of planning that tends to be seen as technical, rational, scientific, apolitical and neutral. There is a further tendency for this planning approach to be top-down, with the public being seen as clients. The planner is usually considered to be the 'expert'
who then makes professional decisions in what she/he determines to be the 'public interest'. Generally, this is not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Model</th>
<th>Form of Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rational Comprehensive</td>
<td>Planning process apolitical and top down. Limited public participation based on the belief of rationality and professionalism. (Liberal democracy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy Planning</td>
<td>Public participation within existing institutional constraints and power structures. Co-opted public participation. (Modified liberal democracy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Planning</td>
<td>Planning seen as a political and redistributive mechanism. Concept of equity central. Public participation seen as a fundamental part of the planning process. Community power. Decentralized decision-making structures. (Radical democracy).</td>
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by nature conducive to a practice of planning that supports effective public participation. At best public participation is seen as a form of consultation, rather than as a fundamental element of the planning process. Public participation is seen as a means of legitimating the planning
process and the decisions reached.

Despite challenges, this theory is persistent (Krumholz and Forester, 1990). There was the challenge from the incrementalists (Lindblom, 1959; Etzioni, 1973); from the systems theorists (Churchman, 1968; McLoughlin, 1969; Chadwick, 1970); from advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) and from the social learners (Friedmann, 1973; Schon, 1983). These challengers succeeded in creating turbulent waters, but did not manage to sink the rational comprehensive ship.

Arguably, one of the major flaws of rational comprehensive model is that it propagates the myth that planning is apolitical and neutral. It may further be argued that, ironically, the apolitical view of planning has allowed it to be used in a very political way by politicians and developers to suit to their own advantage:

"...it is clear that conventional theory which describes planning as an objective, technical decision-making process is inaccurate and misleading. While planners may perceive themselves as independent experts, powerful interest groups have fully recognized the political implications of planning proposals and have successfully lobbied for particular types of policies" (Gunton, 1991, 107).

It has been suggested that the decision of planners to try to be apolitical is in fact a political decision in itself in that it serves to maintain the status quo (Piven, 1975;
Beauregard, 1978; Krumholz and Forester, 1990). The logical extension of this view of planning is that planners become little more than facilitators of urban growth and development. They become aligned with those interests that benefit from urban growth (Piven, 1975).

The apolitical view of planning also serves to mask the differential power structure of society. It is assumed that everyone participating has an equal opportunity to influence the outcomes of the planning process. This is a very pluralist interpretation of society. It sees power as being shared between the state and various community interests as well as private individuals. Power is seen as being competitive and diffused, where everybody is seen as having some power and nobody has too much, so no one group of interests can dominate (George and Wilding, 1976).² The theory is that we all have rights, free and regular elections and representative institutions and we can all partake of these elements under full protection of the law, our independent judiciary and our free political culture. The assumption is that the state cannot fail to respond to the wishes and demands of competing interests and ultimately "...everybody, including those at the

² Benington has referred to this view of society in an analogy of a snooker game representing the social system. All the balls are of a different colour and value, but are all jostling in the same game. The competition is seen as being a little unequal, but the rules of the game are regarded as being basically fair (Benington, 1975).
The rational comprehensive model is positivistic. It fits in with the dominant view of society. It essentially deals with "what is" rather than "what could be". There is an in-built resistance to normative theory. Moreover, mainstream planning theory sees planning primarily in physical terms. This is much too restrictive, particularly from a public participation point of view.

What is more, it could be argued that the rational comprehensive model acknowledges and accepts the dominance of private market forces. The activity of planning is seen as being subordinate to the operation of the market (Kravitz, 1970; Ambrose, 1986; Peattie, 1991, Thornley, 1991). The planning process and the contribution of public participation is therefore determined and constrained by this interpretation.

Consequently, this model of planning receives the endorsement of developer-orientated politicians, who favour the market approach to planning. Their view of public participation is that it should be limited, and not allowed to delay development. There is considerable political support at all levels for this approach to planning. It is seen to get the job done. The questions that are rarely asked, however, relate
to equity issues and the impacts of this approach to planning on low income communities.

The advocacy planning movement of the 1960s provided a challenge, if only temporary, to the dominance of the rational comprehensive planning model. The civil rights campaigns and the community action movement led to growing community awareness of distributional consequences of public action and intervention activities like planning (Cullingworth, 1984; Hudspeth, 1982; Oosthuizen, 1984). A new model of advocacy planning emerged aimed at promoting a redistributive and participatory approach to planning (Davidoff, 1965). This could be described as a modified liberal-democratic approach to public participation. The basic rules remained the same, but attempts were made, through the activities of community-based advocate planners, to enable low income communities to participate more effectively in the decision-making processes that affected their neighbourhoods. Public participation was a fundamental element of advocacy planning. The role of the planner was seen not as a neutral arbitrator, but as a committed, and political, community activist.

But, the effort of radical planners was soon challenged by other radicals for being cooptive. It was seen as a useful mechanism for allowing the poor to participate, but not in a manner that improved their situation (Piven, 1970; Kravitz,
1968; Goodman, 1971). According to Piven (1970), although the advocacy planners left government institutions to serve the people whose voices were ignored, the government still had the final say in the allocation of resources. Moreover, the pluralistic assumptions underlying advocacy planning resulted in the power structure remaining unchallenged. Advocacy planning therefore operated within the existing institutional frameworks and power structures.

Kravitz (1968) makes the point that advocacy planning was functional to the system. The poor and the disadvantaged were allowed to "blow off steam", rather than develop into a potential threat to the existing institutional order (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). Moreover, advocacy planning served to create the impression that something radical was indeed happening. In reality, the system remained unchanged. Advocacy planning simply resulted in community groups competing against each other for increasingly scarce resources. Those groups who won concessions with the help of advocacy planners usually did so at the expense of other less well organized groups (Kraushaar, 1988).

It is not clear, then, whose ends advocacy planning serves. At least some community groups are helped to participate more effectively in planning processes, but it is clear that this was achieved at some cost. Kravitz (1968) and Goodman (1971)
argued that advocacy planning simply allowed the poor and disadvantaged to participate in their own poverty and thereby becoming more accepting of it.

A further important point to make is that being given the opportunity to participate does not necessarily ensure that any subsequent input will be acted upon. It is possible to have the appearance of a participatory system without the resulting participation being allowed to impact the outcomes of the planning process:

"While it is helpful to have a voice, its existence doesn't in any way imply that it will be heard. Advocates of what are usually minority positions are thrust into dissenting positions by the nature of the planning process. Dissent is tolerated at public hearings and at private, behind the scenes, hearings. However, tolerance of dissent seldom leads to just consideration unless backed by power. As the interests lacked power or authority they were tolerated, but unheard and unheeded."

(Kravitz, 1968, 41)

This means that dissent is allowed to be expressed, but only within carefully controlled parameters, where it is effectively managed so as not to produce any meaningful threat to the status quo (Goodman, 1971).

While the advocacy planning model has been criticized for being cooptive, at least it succeeded in making the political nature of planning much more explicit. The radical planning model sees its task as following on from this point:
"The advocate began the politicization or normatization of planning; the radical³ seeks to carry this process to its logical conclusion. He seeks to take planning beyond advocacy and pluralism, and to take American democracy beyond representation to total involvement - to active, human participation that is creative, innovative, and effective." (Kravitz, 1968, 39).

The radical planning model then sees planning as a political and redistributive mechanism. Planning is seen as contributing toward social change and the creation of a more equitable society. Public participation is therefore seen to have a completely different role. It is seen as a mechanism for low income communities to improve the quality of their lives, and for local communities generally to gain more effective control over decision-making processes. It is a move in the direction of community power. This model supports the introduction of institutional and administrative change that enables this to happen, for example, the introduction of decentralized decision-making structures.

There is a large literature on innovative examples of progressive city administrations adopting new political approaches that incorporate democratic and participatory structures. Friedmann refers to the work of Jaggi, et al., and

³ Kravitz's idea of the role of the radical was to "radicalize" the environment in which we live, to humanize the society so that all would be free to create and control their own destiny (Kravitz, 1968).
their account of the reformist city administration of Bologna spearheaded as it was by the Italian Communist Party (Friedmann, 1987, 291-292). There is also Clavel's account of progressive city politics in five American cities, which demonstrate that cities can be run on democratic and participatory principles (Clavel, 1986). Krumholz and Forester's account of the equity planning approach in Cleveland is another example (Krumholz and Forester, 1990).

Equity planning is a planning approach that specifically recognises the needs of poor and vulnerable populations. The interesting fact about the Cleveland experience is that equity planning did not emerge from the political agenda of city government, but as an approach that was developed by the planning staff themselves, under Norman Krumholz, the Director of the City of Cleveland Planning Commission. The planners working under Krumholz were committed to an equity approach, and justified it in professional terms as a means of good planning. They prepared a powerful equity planning policy document, the Cleveland Policy Planning Report, which helped to justify the approach and provide support, protection, and direction for the planners. The argument that Krumholz and Forester develop is that there is potential to develop an equity planning approach in most planning administrations if the planners wish to do so. The planners can develop professional justification for such an approach and make good
use of institutional ambiguities that exist within government bureaucracies (Krumholz and Forester, 1990).

The concept of equity planning builds on Forester’s earlier work examining the constraints operating on planners that hinder a more community approach to planning. His argument is that planners can 'plan in the face of power' and adopt certain strategies and communicative processes to make their actions and plans more sensitive to community needs (Forester 1980 and 1989).

There is a literature in the UK on the concept of community or popular planning which is planning by local communities in their own neighbourhoods (Seabrook, 1984; Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989; Short, 1989; Ward, 1989; Nicholson, 1992). Popular planning involves the local community in both the formulation and implementation of planning proposals. This is achieved by close collaboration with city governments, but the essence of popular planning is that the local residents maintain a high degree of direct control over the whole process (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989). Its premise is that cities are places where ordinary citizens can lead dignified and creative lives and have some degree of control over the forces that impact their neighbourhoods. It is a people-based approach to planning, or what has been described as a planning approach "as if people mattered" (Short, 1989),
that puts the needs of poor communities first, but that still enables development to occur.

In the UK context one of the successes of popular planning is Coin Street in Central London (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989; Ward, 1989; Tuckett, 1990). This was a site that witnessed a momentous battle between a major developer and local community groups. In 1984, the battle culminated in a victory for the community, when local residents won control over the site and began to implement their own development plan. The local community was made up of low income residents, with high proportions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers and elderly households (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989).

The community had been well organized since the 1970s under a coalition called the Association of Waterloo Groups (AWG) and had been active in putting forward community orientated plans. One of the member groups of AWG was the Coin Street Action Group that campaigned for a community orientated plan to be developed on the site. These groups found themselves in major planning inquiries opposite the developers, putting their case as best they could. The developer, Greycoat Estates (backed by an international construction company), wanted a mixed development including offices, commercial and residential use, little of which would have been affordable by the local community. The community also wanted a mixed use development,
but one that more closely reflected the needs of the local residents: affordable housing, light industrial workshops, shopping and leisure facilities. After a long drawn out battle the community secured the victory and set about creating the necessary institutional framework to implement their plan, which they did through the Coin Street Community Builders (CSCB). A key factor in the victory proved to be the election in the early 1980s of a progressive Labour administration to the Greater London Council (GLC) committed to the support of community initiative and enterprise. The GLC funded community groups across London; provided support and advice, through groups like the Popular Planning Unit and the London Planning Aid Service; and, significantly set up community-based policy instruments like the Community Areas Policy. This policy established the principle of defending local communities against the threat of commercial development and gentrification (Brindley, Rydin and Stoker, 1989).

Coin Street stands as an impressive landmark to the potential of popular planning. The alliance between local government and the community proved to be powerful enough to defeat a major international developer. Moreover, it stands as proof that

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4 The GLC was the metropolitan level of government for London responsible for strategic issues like housing, planning and transportation. Below the GLC were the 33 London boroughs. The GLC and the other metropolitan counties (all Labour controlled at the time) were abolished by the Conservative Government in 1986. This leaves London as the only capital in Europe without some form of strategic government.
local communities are more than capable of planning for themselves and setting up the necessary institutional arrangements to become developers in their own right. Coin Street is supported by evidence from elsewhere, which demonstrates the potential of popular planning. There have been other examples of community planning. In the London Docklands, a People's Plan was produced for the Royal Docks area, to put forward a community perspective on how the area should be redeveloped. This plan was put together by the Newham Docklands Forum in conjunction with the GLC Popular Planning Unit. It is an impressive document that outlines the need for locally-based jobs, a good infrastructure network and affordable housing units (Newham Docklands Forum/GLC Popular Planning Unit).

Another good example is the community battle over the redevelopment of Kings Cross in London. Since August 1987, a major debate has been taking place over proposals by the landowner, British Rail, and the developers Rosehaugh and Stanhope, to build a massive office-led development on the site and to provide the potential terminus for the Channel Tunnel rail link. Here the community organized and responded to what it saw as insensitive development proposals that contained few benefits for anyone except the developer (Edwards, 1992). When rumours of the redevelopment first leaked out in 1987, the community formed an umbrella group
called the Railway Lands Group to fight the developer's plan and to articulate one of its own. The Group was adept at gaining publicity and at gaining funding to provide technical and professional assistance. The RLG have succeeded in putting its own vision forward for the development of the lands, and have provided sophisticated levels of costings to demonstrate that it is possible (Railway Lands Group, 1989). At the time of writing the project was on hold for two main reasons, first, there was still considerable discussion, and uncertainty, about the route of the Rail Link into Kings Cross. Second, the British Government had been asked by the European Community Environment Minister, to cease work on a number of major projects, including Kings Cross, because they were in breach of an European Community environmental assessment directive. This gave the RLG the opportunity to finalise and submit its own scheme to the local authority for its consideration (Edwards, 1992).

This is supported by substantial US literature documenting the wealth of human activity that is developing alternative ways of organizing society in order to facilitate greater degrees of community control. Boyte (1980) looks optimistically at the potential for new forms of organizing society based on self-reliance and non-market principles (Boyte, 1980). Bouchier (1987) introduces the concept of 'radical citizenship,' which he develops into a theory of action. He
writes enthusiastically about the thousands of small groups he
discovered in America that "were burning with energy and
optimism about rebuilding American society one step at a time
through local action." (Bouchier, 1987). David Morris develops
the concepts of neighbourhood power, self reliant cities and
the potential for new city states (Morris, 1975, 1982).
Doughton refers to the importance and potential of community
power that reduces both state dependency and the dominance of
market principles and promotes the principles of community and
self-government:

"The only alternative consonant with our
fabric of liberty lies in the renewal and
revitalization of our links to one another
among the people who are the community:
not through processes of negative
reinforcement—the huddling of those drawn
together by fear and frustration—but
through new and positive organizational
forms able to employ expertise without
being used by it, able to handle human
problems by bringing them down to a human
scale, forms and systems linking people in
capacity and therefore in self-energizing
power." (Doughton, 1976, 14).

There is a burgeoning literature on citizenship and radical
democracy that point in the direction of more free, democratic
and egalitarian societies (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

This literature supports the principle that communities have
both the ability and the desire to become more involved in
urban development processes. They favour a bottom-up approach
to planning that enables them to have a significant impact on
planning processes. When local communities are involved it demonstrates that the outcomes of planning processes are very different, in that communities secure very tangible gains. Coin Street is a good example. This literature stands as a challenge to the "new realists", and those academics who seem to advocate the needs and desires of the free-marketeers and the developers. It provides an alternative view to the current concept of contemporary urban development as a means of just attracting capital and making cities attractive for capital investors (Short, 1989).

CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

How does this review help us to identify potential mechanisms that can help in our understanding of effective public participation processes? First, the theory helps make explicit the different interpretations of public participation that are possible under each model. Second, the theory does provide guidance as to what some of the potential characteristics of effective public participation might be from a community perspective.

Effective public participation is essentially about the power to influence the outcomes of planning processes in such a way that community priorities prevail. There are a number of key components or characteristics that must be present in a public participation process for such an approach to work.
Equity

This is key as any public participation process must be equitable and allow all groups not only to participate, but participate on an equal basis. In other words, the participation process must be fair and open. Public participation is the mechanism by which citizens and community groups can access the decision-making process and make their voices heard. It is a fundamental element of democratic decision-making (Pateman, 1971). Public participation can stimulate local democracy, encourage an active citizenry, and contribute to an inclusive city.

The equity characteristic was clearly evident in the advocacy and radical planning models. These models explicitly acknowledged the political nature of the planning process and sought to positively discriminate in favour of the most disadvantaged groups in the community. These models further recognised that, within public participation processes, some groups in the community have greater power and access to resources than others. In other words power relations were made explicit.

Moreover, the distributional impacts of urban development is acknowledged. Clearly, in any development process there are going to be greater impacts on certain groups within the community. In relation to mega-projects the communities most
at risk are the poor neighbourhoods that often abut UMP sites and the poor and marginalized communities throughout the city.

There is no explicit equity agenda in the rational comprehensive model of public participation. Public participation is seen in very pluralistic terms, with everyone having some degree of power and influence. This model is not concerned with redistributional issues. It tends to be an apolitical planning approach that serves to maintain the existing power structure. The existing representative democratic structures and the public participation mechanisms adopted in relation to planning processes are deemed to be adequate and functional.

The equity agenda is clearly present in the advocacy model in that the political nature of planning is explicitly identified, and there is an attempt to discriminate in favour of the poor and the marginalized through the activities of advocate planners who work with, and on behalf of, these groups. The problem, as noted above, is that this did not challenge the existing power structures sufficiently well. There was little evidence of redistribution of power and resources from the well off to the least well off, rather it appeared that whatever redistribution occurred was amongst the poor themselves. Hence, the comment that all advocacy planning did was to allow the poor to participate in their own poverty.
and where gains were made they were usually made at the expense of other low income groups.

There is a much stronger equity agenda in the radical planning model. Planning is seen explicitly as a political and redistributive mechanism and as a way of contributing positively toward the creation of a more equitable society. Krumholz and Forester’s equity planning concept is a clear expression of this approach to planning and their book demonstrates its potential in practice (Krumholz and Forester, 1990).

Efficiency

Public participation processes must be efficient in that it is competent and works adequately. The process must be well organized and have a defined timescale with a clear programme of how the process is organized, and contain indications as to what the stage the public process has reached.

The process must also make use of all available information. Public participation can be a useful tool for planners to gather considerable information that can aid the decision-making process about potential plans and projects. Full and active public participation can bring information and data to the table that otherwise might be missed. The concept of equity planning, for example, reviewed under the radical
planning model, was seen as a mechanism for efficient professional planning. It used the argument that full public participation was required to get all available information to input into the decision-making process.

There is often an argument made against public participation that it is time consuming and delays implementation which makes the process less efficient. I would argue that the contrary, namely that public participation can improve the efficiency of planning by making the process much more flexible to change, by improving the quality of the decision, and by facilitating a much quicker implementation of the plan.

The outcome must also in some way relate to the effort put in. Developers and community groups do not have an endless supply of energy or resources, and cannot sustain a long and drawn out participation process. From a community perspective there is a danger that lengthy public processes will result in a level of attrition of interest and attendance at meetings.

Efficacy
The process must be efficacious in that it must be effective and enable citizens and community groups to impact the outcomes of public participation processes. This suggests some level of community power. It means that participating in the
planning process must be seen to make a difference. The outcomes of the planning process must be seen to clearly reflect the public input received. The planning process must be responsive. Individuals and community groups are not going to participate in a process they don’t believe they can influence, or where they feel that the outcomes may be predetermined. If we are looking specifically at whether citizens and community groups impacted by UMP development are able to influence the decision making process, we can evaluate the outcome in terms of whether their expressed needs and concerns (e.g., social housing, community facilities, etc.) were included in the final development. If they are included, this suggests that they had some power and influence over the outcome. If they are not included, then this would suggest that they had little influence or power and that the participation process was ineffective. The public will soon lose confidence in a process that does not seem to take the points they have raised into consideration or if they are seen to be ignored. People must have some sense of efficacy in the planning process if they are going to participate. In democratic theory, there is a whole body of work that demonstrates the link between a sense of political efficacy and political participation (Pateman, 1971). In this sense public participation in planning is no different.
Efficacy is a key component of a democratic and effective public participation process. This characteristic is explicit in the radical planning model, where public participation is seen as a mechanism to bring about social change and as a potential means of enabling local communities to gain much more effective control over their lives. The concept of popular planning is based on the premise that local communities have the ability and desire to plan for themselves. Popular planning demonstrates the high degree of efficacy that is possible in a participatory planning framework and is a clear expression of the potential of community power.

The efficacy characteristic is not so explicit in the rational comprehensive or advocacy models. The top-down, apolitical nature of the rational comprehensive approach in many ways mitigates against the potential for local communities to effect change. Public participation here is usually carried out within well defined parameters on an agenda that is usually set by other actors in the process (developers, politicians, and/or planners) rather than the community themselves. Consequently, there is often little room for any significant community influence in this model.

The advocacy model potentially offered local communities more chance of impacting the outcomes of planning processes, but
again, this tended to be within well defined limits. Advocate planners would work with communities to enable them to have greater influence, but generally, the context was one in which this influence could be easily marginalized. Moreover, as noted previously, advocacy planning would often pit one community group against another to compete for resources or influence, rather than serving to unite groups that potentially could have resulted in more influence and resources.

Figure 2: Characteristics of Effective Public Participation

- **EQUITY**
  - fair
  - open
  - accessible
  - redistributive

- **EFFICIENCY**
  - competent
  - well organized
  - timescale

- **EFFICACY**
  - effective
  - community power
  - impacts outcomes
  - responsive
Finally, there is the interesting question of potential trade-offs between these three characteristics. Do we, for example, have to sacrifice efficiency in pursuit of equity? This is a difficult question to answer. There will inevitably be some give and take between the various elements, but I will argue that all these components have to be present in any public participation process if it is to be judged effective from a community perspective.

CONCLUSION
Planning theory informs planning practice and has a significant influence on the nature and form of public participation. The review of the planning theory literature undertaken here suggests that it is possible to distil out certain characteristics that can be used as an indication of effective public participation from a community perspective. The application of these characteristics to the case study material, will help us to address the question of the effectiveness of public participation in UMP planning processes.

The review also suggests that in modern planning the rational comprehensive model remains dominant, but this has some serious shortcomings in terms of satisfying the identified characteristics. The rational comprehensive planning model supports a planning practice that tends to be top-down,
hierarchical, technical and apolitical. The dominant form that participation takes within this context is consultation, which affords citizens little opportunity to effect the outcomes of planning processes.

This raises some interesting questions. Why is the rational comprehensive planning theory paradigm so strong? How deeply is it embedded in UMP planning? Why does it persist? In what ways is this manifested and translated into practice, and with what consequences for effective public participation in planning? How can the radical planning model considered in this chapter help us to practice an alternative, more participatory, approach to planning? More importantly, is it possible to practice a more participatory style of planning within current political, economic and institutional constraints? These questions will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters.
"Since our satisfaction in life is affected vitally by the character of our cities in all of its greatest detail, it may be appropriate to say that the decisions about building our cities should be made by all of us, and not solely by the developers or the bureaucrats or the legislators or the planners" (Crane, 1973, 93).

INTRODUCTION

Having set up criteria by which to judge the process of public participation the purpose of this chapter is to introduce this issue in more detail and summarize a literature review on the topic. There appears to be little consistency in the nomenclature concerning "public participation"; terms like "public participation", "citizen participation" or "community participation" are found with equal frequency. "Public participation" has been the preferred term used in this research.

Public participation in planning is important because it can improve the quality of the planning process. Furthermore it is a critical element in a healthy democratic society (Pateman, 1970). It is a messy activity that is essentially about politics and values. Public participation in this research refers specifically to the planning processes associated with
UMP development; those processes which have been designed to elicit a public response to urban mega-project proposals. The task of this research is to evaluate how effective these processes have been.

The literature on the subject of public participation in planning is legion (Burton and Wildgoose, 1977; Barker, 1979; Hulchanski, 1984). This is supplemented by a huge literature on the issues of "democracy" and "citizenship" (Pateman, 1970; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Bouchier, 1987). Effective public participation is an integral part of the democratization process. There is a resurgence of interest in the concept of radical democracy (as opposed to the liberal-democratic tradition), whose proponents see their task as deepening and expanding liberal-democratic ideology in the direction of "radical democracy" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY PLANNING PROCESSES

"But we do have to ask ourselves whether "participation" was one of those words of the 1960s and 1970s, which has been quietly abandoned in the 1980s. You will know that the governments of both Britain and the United States, with their ideology of the New Right, when they talk about cities at all, talk in terms of "partnership" of business and government. They do not speak of "participation" of ordinary citizens" (Ward, 1990, 123).

The rhetoric of public participation has become an integral
part of the planning system. The notion of participation in civic affairs dates back many centuries (Pateman, 1970), but the official recognition of participation in planning came as recently as the mid-sixties. Such sanctioning was largely a consequence of community action and the civil rights movement (Cullingworth, 1984). During the 1960s communities were active, creating demands for more public involvement in the running of government that were difficult to ignore. Under-privileged groups, minorities, welfare agencies, women's groups, students and many other bodies began to organize to demand an increased role in decision-making processes (Hudspeth, 1982).

In addition to these demands, there was a growing community movement with organized resistance to urban renewal and freeway proposals that threatened to decimate many communities. These responses were associated with a growing community awareness of distributional consequences of public action and intervention (Cullingworth, 1984; Hudspeth, 1982; Davidoff, 1965; Oosthuizen, 1984). This participation was community-led, and often unwelcomed by planning authorities and city councils. In Canada, Trefann Court in Toronto (Fraser, 1972); Milton Park in Montreal (Helman, 1987) and Strathcona in Vancouver (Gutstein, 1975) are good examples of how communities responded to fight off external threats to preserve the physical fabric of their neighbourhoods.
The official recognition of public participation was aided by the emergence of advocacy planning in the late sixties. This was an explicit recognition of the political and inequitable nature of the planning process. As noted in the previous chapter, there were severe criticisms of the advocacy planning movement in that it ultimately failed to challenge inequity or bring about change. But it did help in promoting and establishing the concept of public participation in planning.

By the 1970s, public participation became institutionalized as part of the planning process. The community activism of the 1960s became institutionalized and mechanisms were introduced to allow citizens to have their say (Cullingworth, 1984). But, as noted in the previous chapter, the existence of mechanisms does not provide any guarantees that the voices will be heard:

"While it is helpful to have a voice, its existence doesn't in any way imply that it will be heard. Advocates of what are usually minority positions are thrust into dissenting positions by the nature of the planning process. Dissent is tolerated at public hearings and at private, behind the scenes, hearings. However, tolerance of dissent seldom leads to just consideration unless backed by power. As the interests lacked power or authority they were tolerated, but unheard and unheeded" (Kravitz, 1968, 41).

This institutionalization process manifested itself in various forms. In the UK, the requirement for public participation became encapsulated into formal planning legislation in the 1968 and 1971 Town and Country Planning Acts. In the U.S.
various federal government initiatives like the Community Action Program (1964) and the Model Cities Program (1966) formally acknowledged the importance of citizen participation (Taylor, 1974). Terms like "maximum feasible participation" became one of the buzz words of the day. In Vancouver, during the seventies, at the municipal level, the concept of local area planning took shape as a means of actively encouraging public participation in planning (Anderson, 1977; Cornejo, 1978). At the same time at the regional level, the Greater Vancouver Regional District was experimenting with some progressive forms of public participation (Lash, 1976).

It has been questioned as to whether effective participation can survive formal institutionalization (Cullingworth, 1984). Arnstein (1969) has suggested that the aim of official participation programs was to contain, rather than facilitate, citizen demands and to ensure that citizens remained passive and non-threatening. These concerns notwithstanding, public participation in planning processes has become the accepted way that individuals and groups can influence the outcome of planning processes and the nature and form of urban development.

The rhetoric of public participation is largely unquestioned. Arnstein (1969) noted that public participation is a bit like eating spinach: we believe it to be good for us, so we are all
accepting of the principle. A consequence of this is that there has been little critical research of public participation in planning and whose ends it really serves.

DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

There are numerous definitions of public participation in the literature. The variety of definitions reflect different ideological perspectives and rationales of participation. Many see it as a means of giving the public an opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process. According to Glass:

"The term citizen participation is an overgeneralization that is often defined simply as providing citizens with opportunities to take part in governmental decision or planning processes" (Glass, 1979, 180).

Others see it more comprehensively as a means of democratizing government decision-making structures and empowering local communities:

"For advocates of participation, citizen involvement in government decision-making is synonymous with (i) democratization of choices involving resource allocation, (ii) decentralization of service systems management, (iii) deprofessionalization of bureaucratic judgements that affect the lives of residents, and (iv) demystification of design and investment decisions" (Susskind and Elliott, 1984).

Definitions of participation are useful because they can indicate the range of potential influence citizens may have in
planning processes. One the best known definitions is Arnstein's populist ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969). In her interpretation public participation ranged from manipulation at the bottom of the ladders to citizen control at the top. Each rung in the ladder corresponded with the degree of citizen power that could influence the outcome of any planning decision. This ranged from non-participation on the bottom rungs of the ladder, through degrees of apparent participation to degrees of actual participation at the top, see Figure 3.

Figure 3: Arnstein's Ladder of Public Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen Control</th>
<th>Degrees of Citizen Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegated Power</td>
<td>Degrees of Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Degrees of Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placation</td>
<td>Degrees of Placation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Degrees of Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informing</td>
<td>Degrees of Informing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapy</td>
<td>Degrees of Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation</td>
<td>Degrees of Manipulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arnstein (1969)
The key concept was citizen power, without such power there could be no meaningful or effective participation. Participation, without the redistribution of power, she argued, was a pointless exercise for the powerless. This typology has been frequently used to demonstrate that public participation in planning has remained firmly entrenched on the bottom rungs of the ladder.

A similar approach was developed by Burke (1968) whose definitions ranged from education to community power, see Figure 4:

1. **Education therapy** which saw participation as a form of education to improve individual citizens.
2. **Behavioural change** which saw participation as a mechanism for influencing individual behaviour through participation as a member of a group.
3. **Staff supplement** saw participation as a means of adding citizen input to the expertise of the particular planning agency.
4. **Co-optation** saw participation as a means of "capturing" or "neutralizing" opposition to various projects or plans. Objectors are involved in the process without being given any influence or control. The public perception is that the process has involved community input.

5. **Community power** saw participation in terms of "the creation
of new power centres to confront established centres as a means of generating social change." (Kasperson and Breitbart, 1974, 6).

Figure 4: Burke’s Typology of Public Participation

Source: Kasperson and Breitbart (1974)

These definitions represent the same continuum that Arnstein’s does, from a point of non-participation (education therapy) through to much fuller interpretation of participation, in which citizens actually have power and control (community
power). The point is made that for participation in planning to be effective it has to be pushed towards a situation where communities do have power and control.

Interesting definitions emerged from an American research project funded in the early 1980s, which looked at public participation in Western Europe and attempted to draw lessons for North American experience. Three different levels of participation were identified:

1. **Paternalism**: this level was where participation remained centralized and closely managed by local government officials. Agendas were set by the local government responsible and decision-making power was kept separate from the participation activity. These approaches were used primarily to legitimize decisions already taken and seen as a supplement and not an alternative to representative democracy.

Participation is therefore seen as a means to serve the needs of local government as opposed to the needs of those who participate. Paternalistic patterns of participation are not redistributive and subjugated the public to the power of the administration. This form of participation, the authors argued, proved ineffective from a community perspective (Susskind and Elliot, 1984).
2. **Conflict**: the second category was one of more direct citizen action that led to changes in policies, the redesign or abandonment of projects or the acceding to citizen demands. Such approaches normally involved various tactics of direct action and the use of the legal and political systems. This approach is used when the community has little faith in the government-sponsored participation mechanisms or when the community itself is under threat.

3. **Coproduction**: this was the third, and according to the authors, the most progressive form of participation where public decisions were made through face to face negotiations between public officials and citizens. This was most likely to occur in a decentralized decision-making structure. But as Susskind and Elliot (1984) point out the approach was not without problems. Its operation was fraught with tension as the different groups fought to protect their turf, but it was discovered that it could be a creative and effective means of enabling communities to participate in decision-making processes.

The authors' noted that coproduction had been used as a strategy to produce urban renewal development plans in Holland. Here government representatives and local residents had worked together to define problems, devise plans and implement renewal strategies. There was a high degree of power sharing and cooperation (Susskind and Elliot, 1984).
THE PROBLEMS AND THE POTENTIAL OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING

The operation of public participation is not without problems; it is clear, for example, that some groups in society are able to participate better than others. There are numerous public participation techniques, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. Different techniques will suit different purposes and most planning processes will incorporate a range of techniques and approaches.

On the positive side public participation has enormous potential that can enable the public to have an active and meaningful say in the decision-making process. It can not only contribute to the democratization of decision-making processes, but also improve the quality of the decisions themselves. The key issue for any public planning process is how far this potential is realized.

We hear much rhetoric about the success and value of participation, but we also hear considerable scepticism and cynicism. Derek Shearer, in an article on citizen participation, referred to a piece of 1960's graffiti he encountered: "I participate/you participate/we participate/they decide" (Shearer, 1984). This is reminiscent of the famous student poster seen in the 1968 student riots in Paris, we find replicated in Arnstein's 1969 article:
Participation processes can be complex, technical, jargonistic and bureaucratic. The process can be top-down. Planners often retain too much control over the participatory process, effectively undermining the potential that such participation offers (Susskind and Elliot, 1984). Cullingworth (1984) quotes Christian-Ruffman and Stuart (1978, 99) in this regard:

"...expert domination undermines the participation and staying power of both individuals and citizen groups. Perhaps it is this professional domination that is the telling blow that sends the once fledgling convert to participatory democracy back to apathy" (Cullingworth, 1984, 6).

The public rarely control the agenda. Participation processes are usually established without public involvement. Agendas can be preset and outcomes pre-determined:

"...citizen participation in America is rapidly emerging as the newest spectator sport; spectators are not participants. Participation does not occur when individuals are attached to institutions or processes where the agendas are already set, the issues defined, and the outcomes limited. Participation is "unreal" when the motivation is legitimation and support rather than creation" (Kasperson and Breitbart, 1974, 5).
Community groups can, therefore, be suspicious and mistrustful of official public participation processes and consequently refuse to participate as they would argue that the very act of participation served to legitimate it. There is a tendency for groups to participate at key points, i.e., at the public hearing stage, as it enables them to get direct access to the politicians.

Moreover, participation processes tend to discriminate against the poor and the marginalized. These groups suffer double discrimination when you consider that they are likely to be politically disenfranchised as well. Moreover, when so much energy is extended in the course of daily survival, there is often little left to attend public meetings or model displays. The low income have the least resources, financial and otherwise, to participate in planning processes.

A significant criticism is that participation processes ignore the question of the distribution of power in society. The dominant rational comprehensive model of participation adopts a pluralistic interpretation of power distribution, and assumes that everybody has an equal opportunity to participate and make their voice heard. What this ignores is the unequal distribution of power and resources in society, which will always allow some groups to participate much more effectively than others.
The equity planning and popular planning concepts outlined in the previous chapter demonstrate that effective public participation has enormous potential in terms of democratizing planning processes and enabling people to have much more control over planning and development issues. It depends largely on how the public participation is conceived and how it is put into practice. For groups in the community to participate effectively in terms of influencing the outcomes of planning processes, they must be afforded the power to do this. The rational comprehensive approach to public participation tends to focus on consultation and the giving of selected information rather than the transfer of power. In other words participation is allowed to go on, but only within closely defined parameters.

Participatory planning processes fall more in line with the concept of participatory democracy, but current approaches to public participation see it as part and parcel of the dominant system of representative democracy (Pateman, 1970). This raises some very important questions about the way we govern ourselves, the practice of planning and how we organize public participation, and the fundamental nature of the current system of democracy. It is argued by some writers on democracy that the creation of an effective participatory environment can lead to the development of a strong sense of political efficacy (Almond and Verba, 1965; Pateman, 1970).
CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the operation of the concept of public participation. It has looked at the development of participation in contemporary planning and reviewed some of the definitions and rationales for public participation. The problems of participation were considered and some questions about the relationship between public participation and democracy were raised.

The concept of public participation in planning is now widely accepted. There are, however, a wide range of interpretations of how that public participation should be organized and the impact that it has. The concept can vary from degrees of tokenism and paternalism, through to more fully fledged interpretations that incorporate varying degrees of community power.

The preceding chapters raise certain important questions regarding both the theoretical underpinnings and current practice in relation to public participation in planning that support and inform the research presented here. The main question being, how effective are citizens and community groups in affecting the outcomes of UMP planning processes? To address this question we have to examine the effectiveness of public participation in specific UMP planning processes. To do this use will be made of the three characteristics identified
in the previous chapter: equity, efficiency and efficacy.

The final question that the research needs to address, given it is possible to come to some conclusions about the effectiveness of public participation in UMP planning, is to look at the issue of why it is judged to be effective or not. Answers to this question will be useful in helping to shape future public participation strategies in UMP planning processes.
CHAPTER FOUR
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN UMP PLANNING: A REVIEW OF NORTH AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE

"...there's nothing like a really big raw chunk of land to spark the imagination of developers - and their planners. Meanwhile, public planners are left to deal with the project's off-site impacts and public concern about density, cost, and potential harm to the environment" (Eckdish Knack, 1986, 16).

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present typical comparison case examples of UMPS in an attempt to provide some flavour of the nature, scope and scale of these projects, as well as the success, or otherwise, of the public participation processes associated with these developments. The purpose of including these examples is to provide additional and illustrative research material to supplement and enrich the data obtained from the primary case study, that will be used and amplified at appropriate points in the subsequent analysis. These case studies were selected due to their high profile, and because together they represent various stages in UMP development from the advanced proposal stage through to completion.

Despite the fact there are different planning traditions in these countries, the context and the approaches taken to deal with UMPS exhibit many interesting similarities that make a cross-national comparison not only possible, but desirable. Moreover, UMPS are a manifestation of the transnational
economy and mega-project developers cross national boundaries with ease, looking for development opportunities. For example, at the time of writing, the Canadian-based O&Y were the developers of Canary Wharf in England and Battery Park City in New York, but also had a major stake in Harbourfront, Toronto and Mission Bay in San Francisco.

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION APPROACH

Harbourfront, Toronto

Toronto has been the centre of considerable mega-project activity in recent years. Harbourfront and the Railway Lands will be the two mega-project proposals considered here, but billions of dollars of public and private money have been spent on a series of other mega-project proposals including, the ballet/opera house, Skydome, the 1996 Olympic bid and the Expo 2000 bid (Shapcott, 1991). These project proposals have generated considerable opposition from Toronto’s low income communities. The major concerns expressed by these communities were the potential negative impacts of these developments on these communities and the lack of a proper public debate and accountability that had surrounded these projects.

Harbourfront, Toronto, is now complete. It was initiated by the federal government in 1972, when it expropriated 92 acres of Toronto’s central waterfront. The site was bounded by York Quay and Stadium Road and the Gardiner Expressway (see Map 2).
Source: Harbourfront Corporation
The objectives were to create a unique public urban park combining the traditional concepts of parkland and open space with a variety of cultural, recreational and commercial activities and to ensure that the public regained access to Lake Ontario (Dale, 1990). The promise was to transform a derelict old harbour into "...a thriving section of the downtown, in a sophisticated park-like setting" (Frampton, 1985). The original project was conceived as a wholly funded public enterprise and viewed as a federal gift to the City of Toronto.

In late 1972, the newly established Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) was instructed to develop programming and institute planning for the site. In terms of the public process, MSUA hired private consultancies to handle the public participation. In 1974, "participation hosts," "monitors" and "ethnic animators" appeared on site to conduct polls and distribute questionnaires. The following year saw high profile public meetings, hosted by celebrities, including broadcaster Peter Gzowski and historian Mike Filey, to discuss tentative development ideas prepared by the Harbourfront planning team. Smaller workshops were held with special interest groups. On

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1 The MSUA shared planning powers for the site with an intergovernmental waterfront committee. This committee was replaced in 1975 (due in part to poor relations between federal and other levels of government) with a new Harbourfront Council. Although the Council had delegated authority, the final authority remained at the federal level (Dale, 1990).
completion of the public consultation the government reported that about 4,000 people had participated in the planning process. This process of public consultation, however, came in for criticism as being "consultant heavy" and "subject to manipulation" (Dale, 1990, 72).

By 1975, more than $60 million of public money had been spent on buying and maintaining the site, with no development yet underway (Frampton, 1985). In July 1976, the Harbourfront Corporation was set up with the mandate to "manage and program the site and further develop recommendations on further development" (Dale, 1990, 75). The development industry was heavily represented on the Corporation. It was also becoming evident that the primarily recreational orientated and publicly-funded project was experiencing severe financial difficulties. The response was the introduction of a market orientation with suggestions for a high level of private investment, including a significant proportion of commercial development and luxury housing. The nature of the project was substantially altered from a publicly-funded waterfront park to a major commercial mixed use development. In the Harbourfront Development Framework of 1978, which essentially became the area’s official development plan, a development-paying-for-programs formula was introduced. The two major principles of the plan were mixed-use development and financial self-sufficiency.
Private market principles began to drive the process. The Corporation began negotiating with private developers, e.g., Toronto-based O&Y for Queen’s Quay, which essentially involved deals on air rights, the interest from which would be used to cover programming and operational costs as well as infrastructure costs and interest on government loans. It was hoped that with public money financing the essential services, significant private investment could be attracted. In 1980, the federal government approved further funding as part of a seven-year plan for the site: $20 million for infrastructure such as roads and sewers and $7 million for operations. The recession of the early eighties, however, severely restricted the attraction of private funds.

Community concerns over the Harbourfront development had emerged by the mid-seventies. The type of development was being criticized as well as concerns over the potential impact. Other concerns included the relationship between the planners and the developers. Dale (1990) refers to a letter written by Allan Sparrow, elected to City Council in 1974, written to an MP outlining such concerns about the Harbourfront development:

"Sparrow also feels an inappropriate closeness between planners and developers aided in the "corruption" of the Harbourfront plan. "There's been an ongoing problem in the city of Toronto with planners who have worked for the city ultimately ending up working for the
development industry." says Sparrow. "That happened with the downtown core as well, where some downtown planners wound up being the advocates of the highest densities, and two years later you'd see them in a senior role with a development company."

The shift in emphasis in Harbourfront to commercial development and luxury housing led to concerns among some Council members about exclusivity and the lack of social housing. Dale (1990) quotes Dale Martin, a Metro councillor for downtown, on the development:

"...we are opposing the privatization and the exclusivity of all that space. In fact, by building condominiums we've ignored all sorts of local community uses that are needed for a viable neighbourhood. We're saying we should have a community centre along the water's edge...What the Harbourfront people are proposing is not a real street-level experience for the average Torontonian."

The provision of social housing on attractive waterfront locations is a recurring problem with UMP development. The development of private condominiums is a much more profitable

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2 It was a common strategy of the Reichmann’s to employ senior public sector officials they had experienced in previous negotiations. The one-time Toronto Housing Commissioner, Michael Dennis, was employed by the Reichmann’s to head up the O&Y’s London team to supervise the Canary Wharf development; and John Zuccotti, former Chairman of New York’s Planning Commission, was employed to head up O&Y’s US operations (Reguly, 1990b).
venture for the developers. There is little or no incentive to build social housing units.

Moreover, at Harbourfront, there was considerable community concern about how little parkland was included in the revamped proposals. This led to a commitment in a review of the Harbourfront plan in 1987 to try to ensure the provision of at least 40 acres of parkland and 15 acres of additional open space. In April 1987, the City of Toronto imposed a moratorium (lifted in November 1987) on further development at Harbourfront causing the Corporation considerable concern and resulted in the Corporation agreeing to more stringent height and density requirements on Harbourfront buildings and to provide much more parkland (Gray, 1987).

The project has received mixed reviews. A review of the proposals by Vancouver Planning Department pointed to some of the positive elements of the development; including, the popularity of the waterfront walkway, the cultural events, shops, restaurants, theatres and the Corporation’s recreation programs (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1988). The negative aspects identified by Vancouver planning Department included significant public dissatisfaction with the small

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3 It was estimated by the Harbourfront Corporation that waterfront locations for private condominiums could be five or six times more profitable than for non-profit units (Dale, 1990).
amount of publicly accessible parks and open space, the high
density nature of the development, the blockage of lake views
from downtown and the Gardiner Expressway, the exclusivity of
the development and the lack of public participation.

In respect of the latter point, considerable concern about the
lack of public process in the planning of Harbourfront was
expressed at a public forum on Harbourside in November 1989,
and that much greater participation was required for future
waterfront projects (Dale, 1990).

Battery Park City, New York

Battery Park City is a 92 acre addition to downtown New York,
built at a cost of $4 billion (Frucher and McMillan, 1989). It
is an entirely new community built at the tip of Lower
Manhattan along the Hudson River, adjacent to the World Trade
Centre, on land created through dredging of New York Harbour.
The development is geared towards offices and top of the
market housing units (Chira, 1989). There are three major
residential areas on either side of the centrally located
commercial centre, see Map 3. Altogether the development
consists of 42% residential development (up to 14,000 units);
9% commercial (6 million square feet of offices); 30% open
space, including public parks, plaza and 1.5 mile waterfront
walkway and 19% streets and avenues (Battery Park City
Authority, 1990). The prestigious office location has
attracted the headquarters of conglomerates like American Express, Merrill Lynch, Dow Jones, Daiwa, Nippon and Nikko Securities (Frucher and McMillan, 1989).

The Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) was established in 1968 by the State of New York, at a cost of $200 million - money raised by a bond issue. The BPCA created and owns the land and is responsible for all the infrastructure and public places (Battery Park City Authority, 1985). The private developers lease the land and build according to the master plan and design guidelines established by BPCA (Frucher and McMillan, 1989; Fainstein, 1991).

The plans for Battery Park City were originally conceived in the 1960s as a mixed income development, supported by the provision of government subsidies (Chira, 1989). During the 1970s the BPCA tried hard to attract developers, but they were unsuccessful. The recession, the depressed property market and New York’s bankruptcy provided few incentives for investors. Developers, it appears, also felt that New York City’s zoning requirements for the site were overly restrictive. BPCA tried to raise money to develop themselves, but ran into problems and in 1979 faced financial insolvency (Frucher and McMillan, 1989). The consequence was that the development was becoming regarded as a white elephant. Various developers had broken ground, but all had abandoned their plans (Foster, 1986).
The BCPA decided to simplify the project and reorganized the financial arrangements (offering attractive tax subsidies) in an attempt to attract private investment. They produced a new plan which gave developers considerable flexibility in how they developed the commercial centre of the site. The plan effectively removed the zoning and promoted flexibility, and the infrastructure and public facilities requirements were dropped. This approach succeeded in attracting O&Y to the development. O&Y had substantial interests in New York real estate and had become one of the largest owners of commercial property in the USA (Frucher and McMillan, 1989). They were commonly regarded as the world's biggest property developers (Foster, 1986). The company had massive holdings in many areas, apart from property development, which included oil and gas, forestry, energy and utilities, and finance.4

Recent media coverage, however, indicates that they are having severe financial difficulties due to the drain of the Canary Wharf development in the London Docklands on their resources. In 1991, the company had to organize a major restructuring on its loans (approximately $14.5 billion) with its major lenders and pursue the off-loading of some of its North American

4 In terms of property development they had substantial equity in many big development companies, including Stanhope Properties PLC (U.K.) (33%); Landmark Land (U.S.) (25%); Rosehaugh PLC (U.K.) (8.25%); Trizec Corporation (Calgary, Canada) (36%) and Campeau Corporation (Toronto, Canada) (11%) (Reguly, 1990a).

In urban design terms, Battery Park is considered a great success, particularly, the treatment of the World Trade Centre and the provision of the glass enclosed Winter Garden (Oppenheimer Dean and Freeman, 1986; Fisher, 1988; Peterson, 1988). The development has received such architectural praise that some say that Battery Park City is the standard by which all future large-scale projects should be judged. The overall design object was to lay out the development in a traditional street pattern connecting to a system of parks, open spaces and a waterfront promenade (Goldberger, 1988).

The development is said to include considerable public benefits. Project revenue has been used to provide parks and open spaces, to fund schools and to provide funds for low income housing. The BCPA was responsible for establishing the Housing New York programme as an attempt to use surplus revenues from the development to provide subsidies to private developers to build low income housing in neighbourhoods in which they would not normally develop (Frucher and McMillan, 1989). Initiatives like this have replaced the traditional formula of U.S. federal subsidies which had stopped by the
early 1980s. Through this programme units have been provided in the South Bronx and Harlem (Angelo, 1989). There is a comprehensive public arts programme, courtesy of American Express, O&Y and Merrill Lynch and a system whereby all the developers contribute to a fund that sends minority students to New York's best private universities to study real estate development (Frucher and McMillan, 1989).

The development has been criticized, however, as being highly exclusive:

"Apartment costs are high at Battery City Park. An 800 ft² apartment costs US$80,000 to build, US$135,000 to develop, and needs to sell for better than this. A typical one-bedroom apartment rents for US$1,600 per month. This means it takes an income of US$80,000 to move to Battery Park City - the Achilles's heel of the project" (Frucher and McMillan, 1989, 51).

In 1988, the BPCA conducted a survey of the 3,200 residents who had moved into completed stages of the project. The average household annual income was in the region of $102,000 (Oser, 1989). Fainstein (1989) makes the point in her research that while Battery Park City may have a heterogeneous group of daily users, its actual residents are extremely wealthy:

Its residents, however, are only the wealthiest of North American corporations and the wealthiest of people. It is a well planned private city shorn of the unruly lower classes that make the public city so conflict-laden and aesthetically displeasing. The Battery Park City Authority has its own security force, and although it is unclear to me how they
discourage the homeless and people who are unwanted, they are clearly not there" (Fainstein, 1989, 48).

In the next 25 years it is estimated that the project will generate $10 billion in revenue for the BCPA, of which only $1 billion is earmarked for low income housing via the "Housing New York" programme. While $1 billion may sound like a considerable and worthwhile contribution, particularly to other cities struggling to provide such housing, the question has to be asked why a larger proportion of the generated revenue is not being directed towards this important task. Fainstein (1991) in her research on Battery Park City makes the point that the cost of the public benefits provided by the developer can be fairly insignificant if compared to the potential profits they are likely to generate.

There have also been concerns about view blockage and a lack of publicly accessible open space (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1988). Moreover, it is said that there has been little or no public participation in the development:

"It is a city of artificial diversity, a city of memory rather than of the spontaneous development of contrast. There has been no public participation of any kind in its creation (Fainstein, 1989, 48).

One of Fainstein’s conclusions from her recent research comparing Battery Park City and the Canary Wharf development in the London Docklands was that such developments are very similar in nature (Fainstein, 1991):
"They are both run by bodies that have been designed to represent business interests, promote secrecy, and provide no effective vehicle for popular participation. Staff activities and project successes are measured exactly as would be the case in a private corporation - by money invested, square feet of space constructed, and revenues attained. BPCA and LDDC both demonstrate the considerable capability of the new style of planning to actually make development happen; they are also limited by a framework that restricts progress to a corporate-style approach, whereby the tastes and interests of investors come first and the rest of the public must be content with whatever side benefits are negotiated or trickle down" (Fainstein, 1991, 30).

According to Zukin, similarities between Battery Park City and developments like Canary Wharf are not surprising considering both developments involve the same "worldly superstars, including developers, architects and private sector institutions" (Zukin, 1992, 203). Moreover, Zukin notes that big projects like Battery Park City "seem only to extend institutional precedents by which developers get to build what they want" (Zukin, 1992, 203).

The London Docklands and Canary Wharf

Such comparisons take us neatly to the London Docklands, an area of about 8.5 square miles located about 2.5 miles east of London’s traditional financial district - see Map 4. London Docklands is commonly regarded as a derelict area, but it has a resident population of around 39,000 people. It contains some of the most deprived areas in Britain (Widgery, 1991).
Source: London Docklands Development Corporation
The London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) was set up in 1981 with a free-reigning mandate to secure the permanent regeneration of the Docklands area by the private sector. It was established by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act, as part of the Conservative Government strategy to simplify and streamline the public planning process and to facilitate a more prominent role for the private sector in urban regeneration (Ambrose, 1986; Thornley, 1991). The imposition of UDC's resulted in considerable community opposition. It was felt that urban development corporations worked to effectively exclude local residents from the planning process (Lawless, 1987; Church, 1988; Fainstein, 1991).

The LDDC is a powerful body. The LDDC Board is the chief decision-making body and operates largely in secret, with twelve members appointed by central government that represent largely business and political interests. There is no requirement on the Corporation to consult with the public. The LDDC saw its mandate in terms of serving the nation rather than the local communities (Wolmar, 1989).

The planning approach has been a marketing one. It funds its operation primarily through government grants and selling land. It attracts private investment to undertake development by offering land below market value and a number of other
incentives, like tax concessions, capital allowances and few planning regulations (Hills, 1992).

Despite the emphasis on the private sector a considerable amount of public sector money has been invested in Docklands. It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1991 the LDDC has invested over $5 billion of public money in order to leverage private property investment (Association of London Authorities/Docklands Consultative Committee, 1991). The public sector investment is expected to rise to over $11 billion by 1995. The LDDC approach is therefore dependent on a massive public spending programme, the biggest undertaken by central government in UK history (Wolmar, 1990). In fact, the London Docklands is said to be one of the most heavily subsidized commercial developments in the world (ALA/DCC, 1991).

O&Y's Canary Wharf development is a 71 acre site located on the Isle of Dogs in the heart of the London Docklands (Foster, 1991). It is said to be the Reichmann's biggest real estate gamble to date (Horsman, 1990). The recent media coverage of the Reichmann's financial difficulties seem to support such a

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5 In the interests of consistency it was decided to use Canadian $ figures for financial information. For figures given in pounds an approximate conversion of $2.0 to the pound was applied. This reflects an average of the conversion rates during the relevant times.
claim. The first proposal for the site was put forward in 1985 by an American developer G. Ware Travelstead and a consortium of American banks (Sudjic, 1987). Financial difficulties with this project resulted in a take-over by O&Y in 1987. The O&Y scheme includes 10 million square feet of offices; 500,000 square feet retail, restaurant and leisure facilities; 6,500 car parking spaces and a 400 room hotel.

It is said to be one of the largest development projects in the UK today. The recently completed tower of Phase One of the development is 800 feet high and has become the tallest building in Britain, and the second tallest building in Europe, after Frankfurt’s Messeturm (Widgery, 1991). It is estimated that the project is costing the Reichmanns $7.86 billion (Prokesch, 1990).

O&Y were provided with a warm welcome from the UK Conservative Government. The LDDC provided extremely favourable terms for O&Y. The development required no planning permission and the land was sold to them very cheaply (Horsman, 1990). O&Y paid approximately $980,000 an acre for land that was estimated to be worth at least $2 million per acre, which rose to roughly $3.2 million per acre when all the wider economic benefits were taken into account (Hencke, 1989). In return O&Y agreed

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6 The increase in the price of Docklands land generally has been dramatic. In 1981 land that was priced at $140,000 per acre could raise as much as $10 million per acre in 1989. Such an
to make financial contributions to road and rail projects to improve the infrastructure connections to the area. They were expected, for example, to contribute $800 million to the cost of extending the Jubilee tube line7 out to the development.

The public contribution to the extension was in the region of $3 billion (Fisher, 1990). These pledges are now worthless in light of the recent collapse of O&Y. At the time of writing, the future of the Jubilee line was open to speculation.

The recession of the early 1990s and the ambitious nature of the Canary Wharf development were key factors in the demise of O&Y. The real estate market worldwide is in recession. According to some reports one of the worst hit cities is London (Foster, 1991). This problem is exacerbated at Canary Wharf because of the locational problems and its relative inaccessibility to the financial heart of the City (Foster, 1991). The Reichmanns experienced considerable difficulty in trying to lease the office space in the development. London is currently experiencing an oversupply of office space (Johnson, 1990). Up until October 1991, only 57 per cent of the first phase of the development had been leased (Foster, 1991). Consequently, the lessors began offering attractive

escalation in land value has resulted in the redevelopment of land that was only developed in the early eighties at much higher densities (Eames, 1989).

7 Part of the London Underground rail network.
inducements to prospective tenants including rent relief, free interior fittings and financial help with the disposition of current leases (Horsman, 1990).

The Reichmanns tried desperately to restructure its debt commitments (estimated to be in the region of $14.3 billion) and renegotiated its agreements with major lenders (Gittins and Reguly, 1992; Flanagan, 1992). In addition, they sought to offload some of their massive US real estate portfolio (Barsky, 1992; Canadian Press, 1992; Yellin, 1991; MacDonald, 1992; Marotte, 1992). In May 1992, such efforts met with defeat and O&Y were forced to hand over the site to court-appointed administrators.

There is no doubt developments like Canary Wharf have helped to transform the physical face of Docklands. Investment has been attracted and considerable development has taken place. But, questions have been raised as to whether the development has been of the right nature, and there is considerable concern about the impacts of this transformation on the local community (Fisher, 1990; Widgery, 1991). There has been the emergence of two distinct communities living side by side. One made up of wealthy newcomers living in luxury converted warehouses, and the other the poorer original residents living on neglected and underfunded public housing estates (Nicolson, 1989; Widgery, 1991). Significant social divisions have
emerged between the existing residents and the newcomers (Hanson, 1988; Wolmar, 1989).

It is argued that the LDDC approach has done considerable damage to community gains in the area made through social welfare policies since the war (Widgery, 1991). The market has controlled the development in the Docklands, and so marketing has been used, as opposed to planning, to create demand rather than meet need:

"As a result, unfortunately, much of the infrastructure has been chosen with an eye to symbolic rather than immediate practical value: a STOLport, satellite earth stations, the DLR, and water-skiing centres" (Fisher, 1990, 34).

The consequences of this lack of planning has led to inappropriate development which has had detrimental effects on the poor and low income groups in these areas. There is a desperate need for low income housing. Yet, in December 1989, it was estimated that there were 3,000 unsold private condominiums in the area and another 3,000 were being built or on the drawing board (Fisher, 1990).

It appears from considering such evidence that the local

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8 A STOLport is an airport for Short Take-Off and Landing planes.

9 DLR - Docklands Light Railway.
residents have benefitted little from LDDC housing strategy, which has been to develop mostly private housing (Wilcock, 1991). A report by the Labour controlled ALA (1991) states that only 2,253 of the total 15,000 housing units built in the Docklands since 1981 have gone to local people. Other areas of intended community benefit have not proved successful. The collapse of the property market and the recession have led to a situation where many of the proposed LDDC community programmes and training schemes have been cut. The LDDC community services budget (which includes social housing) is being cut from $86 million in 1989/90 to $54 million in 1990/91 to $32 million in 1993/94 (Willcock, 1991; ALA/DCC, 1991).

The public benefits offered by developers to secure approval for their plans need careful scrutiny:

"In terms of the "gains" offered, the list of what has been agreed in Docklands may seem impressive, but a closer examination reveals a different story. We need to consider whether what's on offer is anything over and above what a development needs to make it work - in other word, is it really gain?" (Brownill, 1989, 13).

The justification for offering incentives to developers is that the benefits will 'trickle down' to those in most need, via increased tax revenue for the city, the provision of jobs, the construction of new infrastructure, and the development of community facilities. In the London Docklands there is little
evidence, however, to support such claims. There appears instead to be a deepening community polarization between the "new" and the "existing" residents:

"The Docklands experience with UDCs demonstrates that the 'trickle down theory,' which claims that somewhere along the line everyone will benefit, either directly or indirectly, from market-led development, does not work. Unfortunately, the winners or losers are all too obvious" (Nicolson, 1989, 55).

There had been considerable planning done in the area prior to the arrival of the LDDC, by the respective London Boroughs and the Greater London Council. There were also a number of well-informed and active community based organizations (including Joint Docklands Action Group and Docklands Forum) in the area that knew the community concerns and what was needed. These resources were ignored.

The Peoples' Plan for the Royal Docks was put forward by community groups to represent the local viewpoint at a 1983 public inquiry for a proposal for a short take-off and landing airport (STOLport) at the Royal Docks, and met with a negative response. The LDDC barrister at the inquiry was dismissive of the plan, stating:

"We are prepared to listen to alternatives from a statutory body, from the GLC or Newham Council, but from the people...a people's plan...ridiculous. I've never heard of such a thing!" (Newham Docklands Forum and the GLC Popular Planning Unit, 1983).
The 1991 ALA report on the Docklands, produced in consultation with the DCC, was highly critical of the public process:

"Between about 1981 and 1987, the community watched as land earmarked for socially beneficial schemes was taken over for what they saw as lining the pockets of the wealthy - high priced housing, higher and higher office blocks. There were a number of consultation structures in place, but in effect the community had been excluded from the development process. Local interests were seen as an impediment to development. The attempts to consult were often token. Development guidelines produced by the LDDC upon which there was consultation were ignored as developers proposed even larger schemes. Local plans produced by local authorities such as the North Southwark District Plan and the South Docklands Local Plan, and the Peoples' Plan produced by the community around the Royal Docks, were deemed irrelevant.

The various consultation structures such as arrangements with the Docklands Forum, widely recognised as a major representative organization in the Docklands area proved ineffective" (ALA/DCC, 1991, 14).

Community and residents groups in the Docklands impacted by its redevelopment have been active in their opposition to the LDDC approach (Widgery, 1991). Tenants' associations have been diligent in trying to mitigate the negative impacts of developments on their homes; trade unions have been organizing around issues of safety and better wages; and a group called SPLASH (South Poplar and Limehouse Action for Secure Housing) have organized to sue the LDDC and O&Y for the disruption to their lives as a result of the development. This is said to be
the biggest group action in English legal history (Ezard, 1991). Groups such as the Joint Docklands Action Group and the Docklands Consultative Committee have performed a vital role in documenting and analysing many of the development issues and their impacts on local communities. They have not only raised awareness of the impacts of LDDC redevelopment on the local community, but they have produced a series of reports to back up their claims (ALA/DCC, 1991; DCC, 1992).

Local residents have by and large felt excluded from the process of planning in the Docklands. Little public participation has gone on (ALA, 1991; Brownill, 1990; Widgery, 1991). George Nicolson, former Chairman of the Greater London Council Planning Committee, at a talk given to a Royal Town Planning Summer School in the U.K., criticised the property-led activities of LDDC as being "...anti-people, anti-planning, anti-city and anti-language" (Pickering, 1988,

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10 The Greater London Council (GLC) was the elected metropolitan level of government that represented the whole of the London area. It was abolished in 1986 with the other Metropolitan Authorities by the Conservative Government. The GLC of the time, under the leadership of Ken Livingstone (now a Labour Member of Parliament), had developed a reputation for promoting public participation and local democracy. The GLC was a regional strategic body that developed links with local residential groups. This was powerful alliance that served to defeat and hinder property developers. A great example of this is the community battle and subsequent victory over Coin Street in London, waged with the support of the GLC (Tuckett, 1990). This proved to be very threatening to the Thatcher government and the interests it represented. Interestingly, London is now the only capital city in Europe without an elected government (Widgery, 1991).
108). From a community perspective it has been argued that Docklands is a good model of how not to regenerate an urban area (Nicolson, 1989; Docklands Consultative Committee (DCC), 1992).

CO-OPERATIVE MUNICIPAL APPROACH

It is apparent then from this review that the development corporation approach to UMP development has not been that effective in promoting effective public participation. The planning approach has been a marketing one in which the developer's interests appear to dominate. Attention now turns to the co-operative municipal approach.

Railway Lands, Toronto

This site has had a long and contentious planning history. It is bound by Front Street West in the north, by Bathurst Street in the west, the Gardiner Expressway in the south and Yonge Street in the east, see Map 5. The land is publicly owned, but is leased to Canadian National Railways (CN) and Canadian Pacific Railways (CP) for rail rights of way.11 As the railway use has gradually reduced, the railway companies wanted to develop the land. In 1986, after many years of debate and a

11 Canadian National is a public corporation. Canadian Pacific, a private corporation, got its lands in the form of a lease in 1895 from the federal government and now pays rent to the Toronto Harbour Commission, to enable it to use the lands for, as it states in the lease, "the purposes of its railway operations" (Valpy, 1990).
Map 5  The Railway Lands Plan, Toronto

Source: City of Toronto Planning and Development Department
lengthy Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) Hearing,\textsuperscript{12} City Council gave CP's Marathon Realty Co. Ltd. and CN the go-ahead for a major redevelopment scheme despite considerable public opposition. There were over 600 objectors at the Ontario Municipal Board hearing (RLAC, 1990). The plan was heavily orientated toward office development, with a total of 13 million square feet of office space that was estimated to generate a potential 50,000 new commuters. The plan included 20 high-rise office buildings and 17 residential towers, of which some would be as high as 45 storeys (City of Toronto, Planning and Development Department, 1985).

In 1988, a more community-based, reform minded council was elected, as a rejection of the developer's reign at City

\textsuperscript{12} "The Ontario Municipal Board Hearing is an administrative tribunal responsible for hearing appeals and deciding on a variety of contentious municipal matters, including land use planning proposals. Board members are not elected but are appointed by the Ontario Cabinet. They include lawyers, accountants, architects, planners and public administrators. The O.M.B., as it is commonly called, operates with much the same formality as a court of law. Its main role in community planning is to hold public hearings on:
- land use planning issues (such as zoning by-laws, land severances, and minor variances) which have been appealed directly to the O.M.B.;
- planning applications (such as official plans and subdivisions) which have been referred for appeal to the O.M.B. by the Minister of Municipal Affairs or a delegated approval authority. Except where a matter has been declared of provincial interest, the O.M.B. has the final say in all community planning decisions in Ontario, which have been appealed or referred to it" (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1985a).
Council that had resulted in the approval of the 1985 plan. The new council exhibited more of an apparent commitment to encouraging public participation. This served to reactivate the community opposition to the Railway Lands. Groups in the community began to organize. Homeowners, tenants, co-op members, anti-poverty organizations, women's groups, environmentalists and many other groups came together to oppose the plan. The Railway Lands Action Coalition (RLAC) was formed in February 1990, and campaigned for a full review of the plan. Moreover, members were concerned about the environmental impacts of the approved development on both the City and the rest of the metropolitan area. Particular concern was expressed about the potential increase in vehicular traffic that would be generated in terms of increased congestion and pollution. The RLAC had a different vision for how the land should be developed:

"Rather than a solid wall of office towers, imagine a community of people living, working and playing - townhouses, homes and apartment buildings, trees, parks and bicycle paths, schools and churches, access to the waterfront, day care services, and more - an ecologically-sound, healthy, viable community that will be a model for urban planning all over North America. If we build wisely, the result could be a watershed in urban planning" (Railway Lands Action Coalition, 1991).

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13 Interview with Jack Layton, Toronto City Councillor, July 11, 1990.
They pointed to the tremendous changes that had taken place in the city since the developers' plans had been approved in 1985. These included the emergence of a housing crisis in the city, with a paucity of affordable housing and an increasing polarization between the rich and poor; the lack of proper planning at Harbourfront, including the lack of provision for affordable housing and the restrictions on public access to the waterfront; intense office development in the inner core and the overloading of transportation and transit facilities in the downtown.

The RLAC used direct action in support of their case. On April 8, 1990, for example, a sponsored a walk around the Railway Lands was organized with public speakers to highlight the need for more community-based development of the site. On April 24, Toronto City Council’s Land Use Committee received many deputations from groups and individuals, including RLAC, calling for a review. The Deputation from RLAC clearly specified what they wanted City Council to do:

"1. Retain the holding symbol\(^{14}\) on the 200-acre site and freeze the building of any office towers until a new plan can be adopted.
2. Rezone the land primarily for housing with provision for parkland and broad, tree-lined pedestrian and cycling routes to act as green links

\(^{14}\) Holding symbols are a type of zoning by-law, which sets out future use of land or buildings, but restricts development until City Council feel development is appropriate and/or that services such as sewers and water supplies are in place (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1985).
to the lake. Toronto has a housing crisis!
3. Consult with the people as you are doing with Cityplan '91.
4. Include the Railway Lands as part of Cityplan '91. The Railway Lands were not even considered part of the 1991 official plan review process. How can a development of this magnitude and impact not be part of a new official plan" (Railway Lands Action Coalition, 1990, 6).

The call for a review was supported by the Committee who relayed their feelings to City Council and recommended that a review take place. On May 27, the RLAC organized a Green Action on the Railway Lands where a small orchard of trees was planted as a symbol for a human-scale, ecologically sound development on the site. This was despite the efforts of the developers to restrict access to the site and prohibit tree planting. On May 28, City Council agreed by a substantial majority (14-3) to review the Railway Lands Plan in accordance with the recommendations set out in a May 25 report by the Planning Commissioner, Robert Millward (City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 1990).

The decision caused the developers great concern. They accused City Council of reneging on the plan. The whole review process was affected by the legal redress the developers sought. They saw no need for a review and wanted the holding symbols lifted so that the development could commence as approved.

The review process proceeded despite opposition from the developer and included:
* a public meeting on October 22, 1990 chaired by the Planning Advisory Committee to discuss objectives and the preliminary results of the review.
* the creation of a working group, under the auspices of the Planning Advisory Committee, to provide a forum for interested individuals to discuss the plan review with planning staff.
* the use of consultants to report and advise on specific elements of the plan.
* discussions with the developers.
* intergovernmental consultation and workshops to discuss specific issues.

The result of all the deliberations was a weighty 200-page report produced in March 1991 by Commissioner Millward (City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 1991). This document called for changes to the 1985 plan, including:

* more attention given to environmental issues.
* more park space.
* proposals for more public transit, cycling and the possible closure of freeways.
* reduction of proposed land area in the financial district.
* reduction of density and building heights.

(City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 1991).
The RLAC response to this report was one of disappointment. While they acknowledged the changes that were to be made, there was still a strong feeling that the changes did not address the community concerns. In their terms there was still too much space devoted to offices and both the density and building heights were still too high. Consequently, the RLAC felt that the recommended changes were just cosmetic.

By this time the RLAC had been active in drawing up their own proposals and had put forward their own plan for the site. This was a plan that contained less office development and more affordable housing units. The objective was to produce a liveable and healthier development that met the following goals:

* the replacement of office space with affordable and social housing units.
* liveable densities and height limits.
* the development of broad, tree-lined pedestrian and cycle routes.
* less congestion and cleaner air with more people walking to work and using public transit.

The difference between the two plans is illustrated in Table 3.
The RLAC stated that their objective was to put forward an environmentally sustainable plan that was designed to produce a liveable, safe and humane neighbourhood. They identified the negative environmental impacts of the developer's plan on the City and the Metro region as a whole. These included the likelihood of more urban sprawl as the city grew outwards to provide affordable housing; increased car traffic and pollution; increased pressure to build more freeways and the construction of high rise towers that would result in the loss of views and sunlight.

The emphasis on the environment came through in another community plan for the Railways Lands produced by a group of local environmentalists called the Greenlands Plan. This plan was a bold and imaginative attempt at sustainable development. The plan includes sections on innovative and progressive energy policy; ideas on reducing CO2 emissions; how to improve water treatment and supply; how to improve the transportation system by reducing the need to travel to work and by promoting

Despite the community concern, the Railway Lands plan review was approved by City Council in September/October 1991. The site is now divided into East (Marathon) and West (CN). Currently, the City is in dispute with CN over the land title for that half of the site. CN want ownership instead of a perpetual lease. A telephone interview with Toronto City Planning Department in May 1992 indicated that any development prior to 1994 would be unlikely.

At the same time as the RLAC were responding to the Railway Lands plan, another Toronto-based coalition called 'Bread Not Circuses' was opposing a series of other mega-projects, including the bid for the 1996 Olympics, a bid for Expo 2000 and the proposed new ballet-opera house. This coalition, formed in 1989, sought to raise community awareness about the nature of UMP planning in the City. They questioned the sense of spending millions and millions of dollars on such projects in the face of growing poverty and homelessness in the City of Toronto (Shapcott, 1991). The coalition played a major role in defeating the 1996 Olympics (Tierney, 1990) and succeeded in focusing critical public debate on UMPS. By 1991, the coalition represented 50 organizations with a combined membership of several thousand residents (Shapcott, 1991).
Mission Bay, San Francisco

San Francisco, California has seen considerable mega-project activity in recent years. The Mission Bay development proposal is one of the largest private urban development projects in North America today. The developer, Catellus Development Corporation, is one of the biggest real estate companies in the United States.

Mission Bay is a 315 acre former railroad yard on the City's southeastern waterfront, adjacent to San Francisco Bay bounded by Townsend, China Basin, Mariposa and Seventh Streets, see Map 6. It is one of the few relatively undeveloped areas of the City. The plan for this site is for a new urban neighbourhood "with an integrated living and working environment, to be built out over the next 20 to 30 years" (San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1987).

The Mission Bay planning process dates back to 1981, when the landowner, Southern Pacific Land Company, presented an initial development concept to the City (the Warneke Plan of 1982).

15 The site is close to San Francisco's downtown, less than a mile from the financial district. It is close to another mega-project, the Yerba Buena Center in the South of Market area, that resulted in considerable community opposition and a lengthy litigation process in the courts (Hartman, 1974 and 1984; Feagin, 1983).
Map 6  The Mission Bay Plan, San Francisco

Source: San Francisco Department of City Planning
This was followed soon after by an amended plan (the Pei Plan of 1983).\textsuperscript{16}

These two plans advocated a high density, high rise solution, and the creation of a second downtown. This was the traditional high risk, high gain development approach. These plans met with considerable community opposition.\textsuperscript{17}

Subsequently, both plans were turned down by the City as being unacceptable (Bash, 1988). The City responded by outlining what its guidelines were for the development of the site, to which the developer acceded. These guidelines included no buildings over eight stories; at least 7,577 residential units of which 30\% had to be affordable (15\% financed by developer and 15\% by the city); up to 2.6 million square feet of research and development space; up to 4.1 million square feet of office space; up to 200,000 square feet of retail space; a 19 acre park and various public open spaces (San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1987).

\textsuperscript{16} In 1984, Southern Pacific Land Company merged with the Santa Fe railroad company to form Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation. In June 1990, the Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation was renamed Catellus Development Corporation following a company restructuring. This made it one of the largest real estate companies in the United States, with over 2 million acres of land and 223 buildings, and with major land holdings in the downtown areas of cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco (Catellus Development Corporation, 1990).

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Betty Boatright, Mission Creek Harbour Association, June 21, 1991.
In May 1985, the Department of City Planning set in motion the planning process to prepare an agreed development plan for the site. The developers agreed to pay the City Planning Department $1.5 million to set up a planning team and oversee the whole process. The estimated build out value of the development at the time was in the region of $2 billion (Bash, 1988). The process was designed to be interactive and involved the City Planning Department and its consultants, other government agencies, the developers and the community:

"In order to achieve a plan which represented a consensus among interested parties to the extent possible, this interactive process involved dialogue, meetings, exchange of information, public forums, environmental impact report scoping, small issue-orientated group meetings, and open design studio hours where the public could view and respond to ongoing planning and design" (San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1987, 2-6).

The whole process was launched by a two-day charette involving all the major players. The process resulted in the Proposal for Citizen Review in 1987. A revised plan included much of what the city had required. It contained many more public benefits and requirements that the developer had to fulfil than the previous plans. This was put out for public response. The Proposal for Citizen Review was a substantial document,

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18 Interview with Daj Oberg, San Francisco City Planner, San Francisco, June 20, 1991.
providing considerable information on the plan and how it was put together.

San Francisco has a diverse and well informed citizenry that is prepared to become involved in planning and development issues. There is a long history of community organizing in the City. The community and neighbourhood organizations are well organized and have had great influence on city planning and are known for the strength of their challenge to corporate interests (Barton, 1985). The affordable housing activists played a critical role in the process. The Mission Bay Clearinghouse, a broad based information network of community organizations, formed in 1982, played a crucial role in bringing people together and co-ordinating the community response to the plan. The other Mission Bay groups included

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19 I spent several days in San Francisco interviewing committed activists, including Calvin Welch of the Council of Community Housing Organizations; Chuck Turner of the Mission Bay Consortium; and Betty Boatright of the Mission Creek Harbor Association. I conducted a telephone interview with Regina Sneed of the Mission Bay Clearinghouse. Together, they provided me with a full account of the community response to the Mission Bay proposals.

20 Interview with Calvin Welch, Council of Community Housing Organizations, San Francisco, October 2, 1991.

21 ibid.

Mission Bay Consortium, Mission Creek Conservancy and the Community Development Council, but these were supported by many other established and active organizations. These included: Mission Creek Harbor Association, San Francisco Tomorrow, Coalition for San Francisco Neighbourhoods, Potrero League of Active Neighbours, Potrero Hill Community Development Corporation, Council of Community Housing Organizations, San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth and the Community Design Centre (San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1987). The feeling was that this site had considerable potential for a community orientated plan.

An important part of the public process was a comprehensive environmental impact review (EIR) requirement. Californian state legislation requires that such a review is undertaken. The EIR had to be certified by the City Planning Commission before approval and implementation of the project. The Mission Bay EIR, paid for by Catellus, looked at three main development alternatives and a number of variants on each. The review spelled out the implications of each of the development alternatives, the impacts of each alternative on business activity and jobs, on housing and population, on community services, on transportation, on air quality, on noise and on energy and so on. The review also had to identify measures that would mitigate adverse impacts in any of these areas (San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1988).
As a result of the public process the 1987 Plan was subjected to considerable change. At the end of January 1990, the City and the developer had agreed on a proposal. The plan now contained more specific and firm requirements of the developer. The number of affordable housing units was enhanced (from 2,310 to 3,000); the ratio of family housing was doubled and there were more conditions on the developer in relation to maintaining affordability in the development. The requirements for open space were improved and provisions were included for the developer to fund training programmes, to provide child care facilities; to provide a cultural centre, recreation centre, police station, fire station and other infrastructure needs. The revised plan was subject to further public input via information workshops and public hearings. The community was well represented throughout the public process, much more so than in the other examples considered.

There is a regulation in San Francisco that limits the annual rate at which office space can be developed in the City. Each year developers apply to have their office projects included in the city's gross office space limits. Catellus wanted the office development in Mission Bay exempted from this

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23 Interview with Calvin Welch, Council of Community Housing Organizations, San Francisco, October 2, 1991.

24 Interview with Daj Oberg, San Francisco City Planner, San Francisco, June 20, 1991.
requirement. This required a variance (Proposition M), which was defeated by San Francisco voters in November 1990. Not only were the community opposed to the variance, but so were other office developers, who would have been adversely affected should Catellus be exempted from the regulation.\textsuperscript{25}

In February 1991, the final approval of the plan was given by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. The initial work involved necessary soil remediation, with actual construction estimated to commence towards the end of 1992. Following the approval, the planners and the developers began working on all the legal agreements and requirements and on the detailed development negotiations. The Development Agreement is the document that sets out the arrangement between the City and the developer and specifies who does what and when. The Agreement is monitored through the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer at the City and County of San Francisco and is subject to an annual review and a subsequent public hearing.\textsuperscript{26}

The community were active in preparing their own plans. By 1985, there were twelve community plans for Mission Bay in

\textsuperscript{25} ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Interview with David Prowler, Officer of the Chief Administrative Officer, City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco, October 7, 1991.
existence. Plans were put forward by groups such as Mission Creek Conservancy, Mission Bay Clearinghouse, San Francisco Tomorrow, Coalition of San Francisco Neighbourhoods, Council of Community Housing Organizations (CCHO), Potrero League of Active Neighbours (PLAN), the Sierra Club, and San Francisco League of Environmental Voters. They vary in scope and detail, but each supported broad sustainable development principles of affordable housing, public transit, pedestrian and bicycle pathways and local employment opportunities (San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1985). Subsequent plans have included the Peoples’ Plan for Mission Bay. These community plans played an important role in drawing attention to potential alternative development options and helped to identify the issues that were important to the community. Many of these issues were incorporated into the Mission Bay plan. When interviewed Catellus were confident that development would be underway by the end of 1992.

27 Interview with Tom Jones, Mayor’s Office of Housing, City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco, October 4, 1991.


CONCLUSION

This review of UMP planning processes has indicated that while the experience varies, the overall picture is not that encouraging from a public participation point of view. It is clear, however, that the community has tended to fair better where the processes have remained within the jurisdiction of the city planning authority in the co-operative municipal approaches. The development corporation approach has been quite exclusionary in nature. The most extreme case is the London Docklands, where there has been little or no public participation. Public participation in both Harbourfront and Battery Park City was similarly limited.

There was more evidence of public participation in the co-operative municipal approaches, e.g., Railway Lands and Mission Bay. Here, at least the plans remained in the public domain and, in theory, were open to public influence. In both cases local community organizations played a central role in maximizing the use of the public process. The work of the Railway Lands Action Coalition and the community response to Mission Bay is particularly instructive here. These groups took a pro-active stance to change the original development proposals and put forward community-based alternatives. The work of the San Francisco groups is particularly impressive and the impact on the outcome of the process is evident.
It is important, however, to keep in mind the context of UMP planning. The globalization of capital and the increasing competition between cities for investment has meant that economic factors are paramount and drive the whole process. This factor alone constrains any impact a public planning process might have. This is the situation with all private sector led development, but the issue is magnified by the size of the UMPS. Economic forces on this scale are powerful and difficult for public planning processes to influence. Moreover, public agencies are no longer formerly regulating such forces to the same extent that they once were, i.e. according to fixed statutory plans, but are moving more in the direction of collaboration and partnership with the private sector. Such a process reflects changes in the powers of city governments in the 1980s and 1990s and the increased role of the private sector in large scale urban regeneration.
"...a key resource in any vision for the future are the large undeveloped and underdeveloped sites around the downtown peninsula: the Expo site, the Burrard Inlet railway lands, and the underutilised industrial and railway lands on each side of Terminal Avenue. These are the locations where the options are greatest, and the capacity exists for the most striking achievements but also the most serious errors in terms of lost opportunities" (Ley, 1988, 9-10).

INTRODUCTION

The next two chapters introduce and describe the Pacific Place case study. The purpose of this chapter is to provide necessary background material to the understanding of the Pacific Place planning process. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first part of the chapter outlines the history and background to the development of the site. The second part describes the Pacific Place development proposal. The final part reveals the key players in the process.

The Pacific Place site is a large section of derelict, former industrial land situated on the North Shore of False Creek. It was the site of a former mega-event, Vancouver's Expo '86. The site is approximately 204 acres in size and is one of the most desirable and valuable redevelopment sites in North America today. In total size, it represents approximately one-sixth of the downtown peninsula, see Map 7.
Map 7  The Pacific Place Site and the Surrounding Impacted Communities, Vanvouver

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department
The Pacific Place planning process was initiated in 1988, following the sale of the Expo '86 site by the B.C. Provincial Government to the Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing and his Vancouver-based development company Concord Pacific Developments Limited. Although the present process began in 1988, the City of Vancouver had been involved in the planning of this site for nearly twenty years. Concord Pacific’s Pacific Place proposal was the latest in a series of development proposals, which have included Marathon Realty’s 1969 and 1974 proposals and the provincial government’s plan for B.C. Place in the early 1980’s.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Prior to Expo '86, the site was a major industrial area. It had been home to many different types of industrial use, including, railway yards and a roundhouse, a lumber mill, ship-building yards, a manufactured gas plant and a by-product production facility, warehouses and freight transfer operations. It was the industrial heart of the city that once generated much of Vancouver’s wealth. The importance of the area was acknowledged in the Harland Bartholomew Vancouver Plan of 1929:

"...it should be encouraged as an industrial entity of extreme usefulness to Vancouver. Theoretically and practically it contributes to an ideal situation in that it provides a harbour for industrial activities allied to shipping interests, yet permits of a desirable segregation
from the purely commercial water-borne traffic of Burrard Inlet. In other words, Vancouver is fortunate in having both a commercial and industrial harbour.

Emphasis is made of the importance of not only retaining the present industries along the channel, but of encouraging others to locate there" (Harland Bartholomew, 1930, 147.)

The site was originally given to Canadian Pacific Railways (CPR) by the Provincial Government in 1884 as an incentive to extend the trans-Canada railway to the Burrard Inlet. The land was used for both railway purposes and leased out to industry also. The land remained in industrial use until the 1960s, when the idea of redevelopment for residential purposes began to permeate the thinking of the city planners and City Council. Such thoughts were propagated by a number of factors including, the area's demise in industrial terms, the decision by CPR to move the railyards out to Port Coquitlam, the changing economic structure and the forthcoming termination of many of the industrial leases (Hulchanski, 1984).

Consequently, during the 1960s there was considerable debate about the future use of the False Creek basin. There were also questions raised between CPR and the Province regarding who owned what lands. This was settled in 1968 when an agreement between the two bodies consolidated land ownership into two large parcels. The South Shore was awarded to the Province and the North Shore to CPR. The Province subsequently traded this land with the City for land on Burnaby mountain in order to
build Simon Fraser University. The City proceeded to redevelop the South Shore of False Creek into a diverse residential neighbourhood (Hulchanski, 1984).

In April 1969, Marathon Realty Ltd., CPR’s real estate arm, put forward a $250 million mega-project proposal to transform its 190 acres on the North Shore into a residential development for 20,000 people, plus a marina. Marathon subsequently abandoned this plan due to the scale of the project and the difficulty in finding agreement with the City (Lee, 1988a). In April 1974, Marathon followed this with a $150 million residential/commercial proposal to develop 89 acres of the site. This included high-density high rise housing for 8,000 middle to high income people (at 180 people per acre) and 1.5 million square feet of commercial, institutional, and recreational space (Gutstein, 1975).

In June 1974, Marathon offered the city $21 million in land and bonuses if they approved the rezoning and allowed the development to go ahead. This proposal ran aground due to various complications, including disagreements with the City and the high costs of the development at the time of a major international recession that had emerged. But, the rezoning proceeded and the net result was to create massive windfall
profits for CPR (Gutstein, 1975). This was realized when CPR sold the land to the Province in 1980 for $30 million in cash and a further $30 million in downtown property (Trade Union Research Bureau, 1989).

EXPO '86 AND B.C. PLACE

With the land once more in public ownership, the Province embarked on its own mega-project. In January 1980, Premier Bill Bennett announced a major transportation exposition, Transpo '86, as a 'primer' for the redevelopment of the North Shore by the Crown Corporation, B.C. Place Ltd. The proposed redevelopment, B.C. Place, was a $1 billion 20 year development proposal that included thousands of units of residential units, millions of square feet of office and retail development and a major stadium (Gutstein, 1986).

On May 22, 1980, City Council approved, in general terms, the idea of working co-operatively with B.C. Place Ltd. on the plans for B.C. Place. A task force made up of the Deputy City Manager and the Directors of Planning, Engineering and Social Planning was established to work with B.C. Place Corporation officials. Transpo '86 received the official sanction from the International Bureau of Exhibitions in November 1980 (Gutstein, 1986). Transpo '86 was subsequently renamed Expo

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1 Before rezoning, the land had been worth between $33,000 and $43,000 per acre; after rezoning the land was valued at around $500,000 per acre (Gutstein, 1975).
'86. Between 1981-1984, B.C. Place Ltd. negotiated with the City over the plans for the B.C. Place development. As a Crown Corporation, B.C. Place Ltd. was exempt from many of the City's planning regulations, but it did have to consult with it.

It became clear during the negotiations that both parties had quite different visions for the development of the site. B.C. Place Ltd. wanted a high-rise, high density scheme and the City wanted much lower densities and a lower rise scheme. In March 1982, B.C. Place Ltd. produced a master plan calling for housing for 19,000 people, high office component, parks, marina, lake, stadium, hotel and seawall. The city responded in May 1982 with its own plan for B.C. Place, including a range of housing for 16,000 people, including subsidized housing units, more park space, lower building heights, less commercial space and lower densities. The differences between the two visions were clearly laid out in a joint paper prepared by B.C. Place Ltd., and the City of Vancouver (B.C. Place Ltd., and the City of Vancouver, 1982). This paper was produced to inform a series of public meetings at which B.C. Place Ltd. and the City would outline their respective positions.

There were different visions of the public process too. The City supported a full public consultation process and the
setting up of a Citizens Advisory Committee. The attitude of B.C. Place Ltd. to public participation was less extensive. They only agreed to public consultation after a considerable amount of public pressure.

There was significant citizen opposition to B.C. Place Ltd.'s plans. In particular, there was concern over the exclusive nature of the development and the potential impact on surrounding neighbourhoods, such as the Downtown Eastside, Strathcona and Hastings Sunrise. The Downtown Eastside community formed a citizens group called Citizen Action and Participation (CAP) - B.C. Place, to co-ordinate and articulate the opposition (Carr, 1981).

The Downtown Eastside area of Vancouver was particularly threatened by both Expo '86 and the proposals for B.C. Place. By all the usual indicators the Downtown Eastside is the poorest neighbourhood in the Vancouver metropolitan area and one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Canada. It was home to about 10,000 people, many of whom were single, poor, unemployed males, who live in the many residential hotels and rooming houses in the neighbourhood (DERA, 1987):

"The Downtown Eastside is an area of Vancouver that stretches from Victoria Drive in the east to Burrard Street in the west. It is bordered by Burrard Inlet on the north and False Creek on the south. Predominantly a working class neighbourhood, it has a large proportion of poor, elderly men and women on fixed
incomes. It is also the poorest city
neighbourhood, with 91% of the residents
living 40-60% below the poverty rate. If
there is a typical Downtown Eastside
resident, he is an unemployed man, about
55 years old, receiving social assistance,
and living alone in a small housekeeping
room for which he pays $225 a month. He
has probably lived in the community in a
variety of lodging houses, on and off, for
the past 15 years. He previously worked in
primary industries (e.g. logging, mining)
and may have become disabled while
working" (DERA, 1987, 7-8).

The area had traditionally become home to significant numbers
of marginalized groups, including discharged mental patients,
teens[641]e runaways, prostitutes and natives (Ley, Hiebert and
Pratt, 1992). Despite this disparate mix the community is
recognised as one of the most stable in Vancouver. Moreover,
the community is one of the best organized in the city. This
is due in large part to the activities of the Downtown
Eastside Residents Association (DERA), formed in 1973 to
combat the severe problems experienced by local residents and
to challenge the 'skid row' image of the area. DERA has played
a significant role in improving the living conditions in the
area by ensuring by-law enforcement in the hotels and rooming
houses and by exposing owners who flouted the regulations
(Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992). It has campaigned for
community facilities and support services. Despite opposition
from members of City Council they succeeded in opening the
Carnegie Centre, a much needed and well used community centre
(DERA, 1987).
Expo '86 and B.C. Place were put forward by the Province in the context of establishing Vancouver as a "world class city."

Expo '86 had a major impact on the city. The use of world fairs as a redevelopment vehicle has been well-documented (Wachtel, 1986; Olds, 1988). Vancouver's Expo '86 is a good example:

"First came the covered stadium, B.C. Place, which set the tone for Expo '86. Though resisted initially by the city, Expo '86 was propelled into existence as a loss leader, an invitation to international investment and tourism. Construction went ahead during an economic recession while there were severe cutbacks on social programs, resulting in a period of dissenion which included increased labour militancy and the formation of the Solidarity Coalition (an alliance of labour and community groups), which brought the province within a few hours of a general strike in 1983.

Expo '86 exemplified central themes of the 1980s: privatization, polarization, and internationalization. The Expo Board awarded building contracts to non-union companies, a provocative act in the light of the high level of union membership in the building trades. Polarization was particularly evident in off-site impacts on residential hotels in the surrounding districts. In the Downtown Eastside, between 500 and 850 long-term residents were evicted as hotels prepared themselves for a flood of tourists.

Internationalization was the explicit intent of the fair with marketing slogans such as: 'An invitation to the world' and 'What your world is coming to in 1986' (Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992, 239).

Other significant impacts of Expo '86 included the loss of much affordable housing; numerous profitable rezoning of lands surrounding the site and enormous development pressure on
neighbouring communities (Gutstein, 1986). According to other estimates Ley, Hiebert and Pratt's estimate of evictions in the Downtown Eastside might be considered conservative. DERA estimated that there were over 1,000 residents displaced from hotels in the area, during Expo, as owners evicted long term tenants and raised rates to capitalize on Expo visitors. There was considerable concern and anger in the community on this issue, particularly in relation to a lack of an adequate response from either the City or the Province (Sarti, 1986).

There was considerable concern, too, with the public process associated with such a major project:

"There were no public meetings to establish people's aspirations and goals for their city. There was no planning process to come up with the best expenditures of public funds to achieve those goals. Most astonishing, there were no impact studies to assess how Vancouver's neighbourhoods would be affected. Instead, there were unilateral decisions made in secret by the Social Credit government of Bill Bennett about BC Place, about Expo and about Skytrain. Often, City officials were not even invited to the splashy news conferences which announced major projects and they had to find out from the newspapers what the provincial government had in mind for their city" (Gutstein, 1986, 65).

Once Expo '86 was over attention returned to the task of the redevelopment of the site. By the time Expo finished B.C. Place Ltd. had rezoning approval for the development of Southeast Granville Slopes (SEGS Official Development Plan),
the area between Burrard and Granville Bridges. There had also been considerable work undertaken in drawing up what became known as the North Park Plan, a 75 acre area bounded by Beatty Street, Pender Street, Quebec Street and False Creek (City of Vancouver, Planning Dept., 1986).

NORTH PARK PLAN

The development of the North Park Plan took place between 1985–86, and was a collaborative process between B.C. Place Ltd. and the City. The cost of the City Planning Department’s work on the B.C. Place process from 1981–1987 was estimated to be $800,000 (Volkart, 1988). This estimate did not take into account the costs incurred by other city departments during that time.

Once Expo was over, the plans for B.C. Place were abandoned and Grace McCarthy, the Provincial Economic Development Minister at the time, announced a three month moratorium on development of the site to allow the government to consider future options (Lee, 1988a). The decision reached was to privatize the site (Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992, 239). In April 1987, Grace McCarthy announced the cancellation of North

2 In December 1983, B.C. Place Ltd. used the threat of abandoning the whole project if the city refused to approve the rezoning of this site. Council therefore approved the Granville Slopes plan, which contains densities higher than the city wanted, including two 21-storey residential apartment blocks and a 25-storey hotel (Lee, 1988a).
Park, prior to any development commencing, and in September 1987 announced the Province's decision to sell the entire Expo site to a private developer. The reasoning behind the cancellation of North Park was that the Province did not believe that the proposals would be economically viable. It was felt that private development would produce a better return (McMartin, 1987; Cox, 1988).

The cancellation of the project was controversial. It resulted in the resignation of Stanley Kwok, the B.C. Place President, who had played a major role in the North Park plan. There was a request from some City Councillors that the Province should reimburse the City for the $800,000 in costs it had occurred in processing the North Park Plan.3

THE SALE OF THE LAND

The selling of the Expo lands was tied into the provincial government's wider privatization plans. The British Columbia Enterprise Corporation (BCEC)4 was set up in March 1987 to wind up the Province's land development activities and to

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3 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall, August 13, 1991.

4 BCEC was created after the merger of two previous Crown Corporations:
- B.C. Place Corporation
- B.C. Development Corporation.
BCEC split the management functions of the facilities into a separate subsidiary group, the B.C. Pavilion Corporation (Hyme, 1988).
dispose of over half a billion dollars worth of public land and buildings, including the Expo lands. The Corporation had about 3,900 hectares of public land (worth $300-$400 million) to dispose of in twenty different communities across B.C. (Ford, 1988).

A process for the sale of the lands including expressions of interest, tenders, deposit and the selection of successful bidder was laid out in September 1987 by Grace McCarthy, Minister responsible for the BCEC (BCEC, 1987). News filtered through the media that the Provincial Government was keen to seek an off-shore investor to develop the Expo lands (Palmer, 1988a). The Provincial Government was keen to attract an off-shore investor and Hong Kong was a favoured market due to the links with the Pacific Rim.⁵

Furthermore, the Province was keen to sell and develop the site in one piece. The Vancouver Real Estate Board, among many others, was critical of this decision, arguing that a much better and more lucrative development package could have been developed if the land was sold in smaller parcels:

"We understand from the limited information available, that it is the intention of the Provincial Government to offer the entire site to a

⁵ Grace McCarthy had travelled to Hong Kong herself and had met with Li Ka-shing. So it was felt by some commentators that the whole bidding process was geared in favour of Li Ka-shing from the start (Palmer, 1988b).
single developer. While we appreciate the Government's reasons for such an approach to the use of this unique parcel of land, we are very concerned that by granting what would appear to be a planned monopoly to a single developer, the Government is severely restricting the participation of many other worthy developers."\(^6\)

The Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver argued that the more sensible approach would have been to first, involve the City of Vancouver in a public process to determine the best use for the site in the public interest; second, to put in place the appropriate zoning for the whole site and then sub-divide to create zoned enclaves, which could, third, have led to a process of determining which enclaves to sell outright and which to lease to developers. This approach, they argued, would have resulted in the best use of the site (Calder, 1988).

City Council disagreed and sided with the Province in the selling the land in one piece. It became clear from my interviews with individual planners and city councillors, that the rationale appeared to be that it would be easier to deal with one developer on a site of this magnitude and that it would be possible to negotiate a larger package of public benefits. It was argued that there would be less benefits from

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a number of smaller developers. Councillor Price and former Councillor Taylor supported having a single developer, who felt that the City had benefited greatly from such an approach. It was pointed out by Larry Beasley, Associate Director of Planning, and the planner in charge of the False Creek planning team, that with the site in the ownership of one developer it was possible to ensure larger-scale benefits.

There were two major bids for the lands. The first from the Vancouver Land Corporation, a consortium of Vancouver businessmen including Jack Poole, Edgar Kaiser, Jim Pattison and Charles Woodward, who came together to bid on the site. The second was from Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., the company established by Hong Kong businessman, Li Ka-shing.

7 Interview with Gordon Price, Vancouver City Councillor, December 10, 1991.

8 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director of Planning, City of Vancouver, May 8, 1990.

9 Jim Pattison, a well known B.C. businessman and car dealer, was President of Expo '86 and wielded enormous power over the running and shaping of Expo. He became known as "the dollar a year man," as he only charged a dollar a year for his services, as a "thank you" to Canadians for making him so wealthy. But he made considerable amounts of money through the awarding of Expo contracts and franchises to companies in which he had an interest. Kelly (1986) notes that he was known for being very secretive and ran his empire on the "don't-tell-anybody-anything-about nothin'" school of business. The question was raised about whether such an approach was the most appropriate for a public corporation like Expo '86 which had $800 million of public money at its disposal (Kelly, 1986).
A major controversy emerged when it came to light that Premier Vander Zalm had seemingly tried to interfere with the bidding process by introducing a third bid from B.C. businessman, and personal friend, Peter Toigo. Mr. Toigo came late into the process with a $500 million bid for all of BCEC's land holdings, including the Expo lands. The Premier presented this bid directly to the B.C. Cabinet, and not the BCEC, which raised concerns. In addition, his top advisor and principal secretary, David Poole, had arranged a meeting for Toigo with BCEC and had accompanied him to the meeting. This raised all sorts of questions that Mr. Toigo was shown special consideration, about conflicts of interest for the Premier and it also led to divisions in the government between the Premier and Grace McCarthy, who was concerned about the Premier's interference (Cruickshank, 1988; Baldrey and Mason, 1988; Palmer, 1988c; Palmer, 1988d).

Li Ka-shing's tender was the winning bid. It was announced in the press on April 27, 1988.10 Grace McCarthy, quoted in the press, referred to the bidding process as being highly competitive and visible and she felt that the decision to award the bid to Li Ka-shing was a wise one (Minovitz, 1988). The BCEC took out a full page advertisement in the Vancouver Sun to congratulate Concord Pacific, which also purported to

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10 The Vancouver Sun, April 27, 1988, A1.
explain how the agreement for the sale and development of the Expo site was reached. The statement said little about the agreement, except to acknowledge the professional and equitable nature of the process. BCEC President, Kevin Murphy, in giving reasons for choosing the Concord Pacific bid, was quoted in the press as stating that their's was the more "spectacular and aggressive development," that offered "substantially superior" financial terms (Constantineau, 1988).

The final purchase price for the lands, after months of speculation, was $145 million as the list price, with a further $175 million in interest revenue, making a total of $320 million. The payment schedule was to be phased: $50 million to be paid on May 11, 1988 to secure the purchase; $10 million per year for the five years from 1995-1999; $20 million in year 2000; $40 million in 2001; $60 million in 2002 and $100 million in 2003 (Hamilton and Mason, 1988).

It is commonly felt that Li Ka-shing had managed to negotiate one of "the sweetest deals in history" (Gutstein, 1990):

"The judgement in Hong Kong was that Li won the development rights "on extremely cheap terms," as a profile in the Far Eastern Economic Review claimed. "It

11 The Vancouver Sun, 'Welcome to the Future of B.C. Place,' April 28, 1988, B6.
promises to be a veritable gold mine for Li and his partners." Vancouver developer Gordon Wilson, echoed this view: "The net result [of the deal] will put one-sixth of downtown Vancouver under a single owner for peanuts," Gibson wrote in The Financial Post. Li paid $10 a buildable square foot, according to the plan which was formally approved by Vancouver City Council in November 1989, which allowed 12.2 million square feet of residential and commercial development. Prices were $25 to $35 a buildable foot for similar property when Li bought the site. By the time the plan was approved prices in the downtown core had nearly doubled and Li's 91 acres were worth more than $700 million. True, Li has to put in roads, sidewalks and sewers, which will add about $10 a buildable foot, or $120 million, to his costs. And he has to pay for parks, walkway, community centre, library, eight day care centres and other community facilities (which will make the property even more valuable). But he has already earned a paper profit of nearly $500 million, probably much more than that since there is nothing stopping Li from asking for, and receiving, higher densities down the road, as even B.C. finance minister Mel Couvelier has pointed out" (Gutstein, 1990, 137).

The sale of the Expo lands was shrouded in controversy and secrecy (Trade Union Research Bureau, 1989, 11). Little information was produced by the Province about the bids and the bidding process itself was tied up in complex legal confidentiality clauses, which prevented the bidders themselves releasing any information. This created considerable concern in the Vancouver community (The Vancouver Sun, 1988a). Mike Harcourt, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, referred to the process as "undemocratic,
secretive and dangerous" (The Vancouver Sun, 1988b). Harcourt called for a halt to the sale of all BCEC lands, for an independent assessment of their true value and a public inquiry into all proceedings to date. The New Democrats stressed that it was essential that local communities have a say in the development of the Expo lands (Western News, 1988).

A Vancouver Sun editorial stated the concern with the secrecy plainly:

"It is scandalous that the owners of one of North America's choicest pieces of real estate have to rely on street rumours to learn what's happening with the sale of the property" (The Vancouver Sun, 1988c).

The Province's perspective at this time was that B.C. was in a severe recession and that it needed a significant confidence booster. They needed a mechanism to attract major international investment into the Province. Li's purchase of the Expo lands at such a 'sweet' price was considered by the Province to be such a mechanism which would bring in other Hong Kong developers and investors to Vancouver:

"In British Columbia, the Social Credit government has welcomed offshore investors with open arms. By virtually giving away the Expo lands, the government sent a strong message that Eastasian dollars were welcome in B.C." (Gutstein, 1990, 232).

This strategy has succeeded in that considerable investment did come to the Province from Asia which has helped to support
the economy and stave off some of the worst excesses of the recession and keep the development and construction industry going at a time when local investment had tended to dry up (Gutstein, 1990; Goldberg, 1991):

"Since Li Ka-shing’s purchase of the Expo ’86 site in Vancouver, there has been an explosion in interest and investment in Vancouver by Asians from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan. Regrettably, these data do not exist, but by all accounts these investments are significant in scale and provide long lasting ties between Vancouver and the Pacific Rim." (Goldberg, 1991, 23).

In January 1990, Li Ka-shing sold the Plaza of Nations site for $40 million, almost recouping completely the down payment for the entire Expo site of $50 million. The new owner was a Singapore property tycoon called Oei Hong Leong. The justification for this sale by the developer was that Concord Pacific was a development company and not a building management company. In March 1991, it was announced in the press that a Taiwanese Company, Hung Kuo Construction Group, had paid Li Ka shing about $200 million for an indirect interest in Concord Pacific (Ford and Dawson, 1991; Hamilton, 1991).

In May 1990, it was reported in the annual report of B.C.’s Auditor-General that the B.C. government did not make a profit on the sale of the Expo land and could even have taken a loss of up to $150 million. It seemed that there were some
accounting technique differences that ensured certain costs were not attributed to the "net proceeds" from the sale (Baldrey, 1990). According to the report, the government failed to account for $60 million of carrying charges related to the Expo lands prior to 1988; over $42 million in construction costs and the cost of the clean-up estimates for the site which at the time ranged from anything between $40-$60 million. These findings about the Expo deal generated an angry response toward the Auditor-General from the B.C. government, in particular Mel Couvelier, then Finance Minister who was quoted in the media as saying:

"Someone who's got his snout in the public trough should have the wit to deal with issues he's mandated to deal with. I have to question the propriety of Mr. Morfitt - who is basically a bean-counter - dealing with policy issues" (Hauka and Kieran, 1990).

More recent reports suggest the loss is even greater. The Provincial NDP estimated that the Province lost more than $290 million on the sale (Williamson, 1991).

THE PACIFIC PLACE DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL

The initial development concept put forward by Concord Pacific in 1988, as part of its winning bid for the land, was described in the Vancouver press as "breathtaking" (Hamilton, 1988a) and hailed as a "West Coast Venice" (Hamilton, 1988b). The estimated $2 billion proposal included 10,000 dwelling
units; 3 million square feet of commercial space; nearly 50 acres of parkland; a 400-room hotel; parking for 20,000 vehicles and a 630-berth marina. It also initially included a series of residential islands called Marinavista, linked by lagoons and canals, between the Granville and Cambie bridges; a massive residential Gateway on either side of the Cambie Bridge to welcome people into the downtown; a futuristic Financial Centre\textsuperscript{12}, with office towers as high as 45-storeys, between the Georgia and Dunsmuir Viaducts and a large Creekside Park at the eastern end of False Creek (Hamilton, 1988a).

The current development proposal as represented by the False Creek North Official Development Plan, approved in November 1989, is a scaled down and somewhat more conservative version of the above plan that included: 7,650 housing units, which would house up to 13,000 people, of which 20% (1,530 units) were expected to be social housing units; 2 million square feet of office development; 650,000 square feet of retail and service development; 42 acres of park; hotel, cultural, recreational and cultural uses and public open space, including a 1.5 mile continuous waterfront walkway (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1990; City of Vancouver

\textsuperscript{12} One of the architects of the project was quoted in the press as saying: "The proposal contains some science fiction elements." See Vancouver Sun, September 8, 1988. Thanks to Roger Kemble for this quote.
The plan is said to contain considerable public benefits. In fact, it is claimed to be the biggest package of public benefits ever negotiated by the City (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1990). It has been difficult to obtain a detailed financial breakdown to attach to these benefits, but in an interview with one city planner it was estimated to be in the range of $150 million.\textsuperscript{13} The developer is required to pay for the parks, the continuous waterfront walkway, the shoreline improvements, circulation and utility systems, a community centre, eight day care centres, a library, community meeting rooms, a field house, public art facilities and bus shelters.\textsuperscript{14}

THE PACIFIC PLACE ACTORS

It is possible to identify a number of key players in the Pacific Place planning process: the Provincial Government; Vancouver City Council and the City Planning Department; the developer, Concord Pacific Developments Ltd.; and various identifiable groups within the community, including individual citizens, local community groups and city-wide advocacy organizations.

\textsuperscript{13} These figures are not only difficult to quantify, but are highly sensitive. There was also an issue of confidentiality.

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director of Planning, May 8, 1990.
The Provincial Government

Provincial Government in B.C. during the post-war period has been dominated by the Social Credit Party, more commonly known as the Socreds. This party has been in power for the majority of the period, with a brief interlude in the early seventies when the major provincial opposition party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), came to power under the leadership of Dave Barrett. In 1986, in the immediate post-Expo period, Bill Vander Zalm, as the newly appointed leader of the Socreds, became the new Premier, taking over from Bill Bennett. The Socreds reign, however, came to an abrupt halt in the Provincial elections of October 1991, when the NDP were swept into power under the leadership of Mike Harcourt. The Socred Government under Bill Vander Zalm had suffered numerous scandals and questions of impropriety, of which the sale of the Expo lands was part.

The Provincial Government played a key role in the Pacific Place process. It was the Socred Government in 1980, under the leadership of Bill Bennett, that first announced the idea of Expo '86 and the subsequent plans to redevelop the site into B.C Place. It was the Socred Government under Bill Vander Zalm, who orchestrated the sale of the Expo site to Concord Pacific, as part of its mandate of privatization, and signed the deal with Li Ka-shing. As noted previously, the sale of the land was surrounded by considerable controversy and public
concern (Trade Union Research Bureau, 1989).

The Provincial Government, under the Socreds, provided a supportive atmosphere for development of UMPS like Pacific Place. It had a long history of involvement with resource mega-projects as a mechanism for promoting economic development, so was accustomed to facilitating development on this scale (Maki and Meredith, 1983; Knight, 1991). Moreover, as noted previously, the development of the Expo site was seen as a means of encouraging investment and job creation in the Province and of promoting the image of Vancouver as a "world class" city.

Consequently, the Provincial Government saw its role in terms of expediting major downtown redevelopment projects such as Pacific Place (Baldrey, 1991). The supportive role of governments is indicated in the following quote from Li Ka-shing. In an rare interview, with Dave Abbott, the Vancouver based host of Radio CKNW's "Nightline B.C." program, Li Ka-shing was candid about the receptive attitude of both the Provincial and City Governments:

"Vancouver and British Columbia have been doing a great job under the leadership of Premier Vander Zalm, (former Economic Development Minister) Grace McCarthy and Vancouver Mayor Gordon Campbell, and they are represented by a very active office here in Hong Kong. Grace McCarthy, with her hard work and enthusiasm towards her work, deserves special mention. Vancouver
will be a dynamic city, very active in the economy. The successful Pacific Place deal is the best advertisement. We were given fair treatment from the beginning, and this builds investor confidence and B.C.'s reputation."

Vancouver City Council

Vancouver is an anomaly in the Canadian political scene in that it runs an at-large political system, where its Councillors represent the citizens on a city-wide basis. There is pressure to move toward a ward system to bring it into line with other major cities in Canada. At present there is a total of eleven seats on Council: the Mayors position and ten Councillors. There have been two Vancouver civic elections since the start of the Pacific Place process.

Table 4 indicates the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) has retained control of City Council during the Pacific Place process. The NPA is a party that supports private enterprise and is perceived publicly as being aligned with the development industry. Overall, the UMPS are seen as positive developments by the NPA, that are beneficial to the future of the City. NPA councillors have voted consistently in support of the Pacific Place development. They have viewed the public process as being both comprehensive and valid.
Table 4: Vancouver City Council 1986-1992

|----------|-------------|-------------|------------
| **Mayor**|             |             |            |
| Gordon Campbell(N) | Gordon Campbell(N) | Gordon Campbell(N) |
| **Councillors** |             |             |            |
| George Puil(N) | George Puil(N) | George Puil(N) |
| Don Bellamy(N) | Don Bellamy(N) | Don Bellamy(N) |
| Gordon Price(N) | Gordon Price(N) | Gordon Price(N) |
| Carole Taylor(I) | Carole Taylor(I) | Tung Chan(N) |
| Philip Owen(N) | Philip Owen(N) | Philip Owen(N) |
| Ralph Caravetta(N) | Sandra Wilken(N) | Pat Wilson(C) |
| Jonathan Baker(N) | Jonathan Baker(N) | Bruce York(C) |
| Helen Boyce(N) | Harry Rankin(C) | Harry Rankin(C) |
| Libby Davies(C) | Libby Davies(C) | Libby Davies(C) |
| Bruce Ericksen(C) | Bruce Ericksen(C) | Bruce Ericksen(C) |

(N) Non-Partisan Association (NPA)
(C) Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE)
(I) Independent

Throughout the Pacific Place process the NPA majority has been led by Mayor Gordon Campbell who has described in the following way:

"...a 1970s liberal who had become a 1980s conservative, and who had approved unprecedented development in his 1988-90 term of office. A developer and a businessman, young, personable, well-educated, and well-travelled, he epitomized the free market internationalization of the world city" (Ley, Hiebert and Pratt, 1992, 265).

15 In 1990 the term of office for Vancouver City Council members was increased to three years.
He has had a long term relationship with the North Shore of False Creek. In the late 1970s, he was Marathon Realty's project officer for the False Creek lands and had been involved in negotiations with the city on Marathon's behalf.

Prior to joining Marathon, Gordon Campbell had spent four years at City Hall, from 1972-1976, working in various capacities in the Planning, Social Planning and Engineering Departments. He was the city representative in the 1974 negotiations with Marathon that led to a profitable rezoning for the developer. More recently, in the early 1980s with his partner Marty Zoltnik, he developed the Georgian Court Hotel on Beatty Street opposite B.C. Place stadium (Gutstein, 1986).

The Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE) is a progressive civic reform organization formed in 1968, which identified its base as the working people of Vancouver. They have connections with both organized labour and community-based organizations throughout the city. They are publicly perceived as being left of centre. COPE have taken a more critical attitude to Vancouver's False Creek mega-projects. Their substantive concerns have focused on the initial sale of the land, the relative exclusivity of the development and the lack of social housing in the proposals. They have also raised questions

COPE feel that the 20% commitment to social housing in the mega-projects should have been higher, and there is also a concern about the lack of guarantees to ensure that even the 20% will ever
about the validity and extent of the public consultation process.

COPE's representation on Council had increased since the mid-1980s. Prior to the 1988 election, COPE were in a distinct minority situation, with only two seats on Council. In November 1988, COPE stalwart Harry Rankin won his seat back, following his forced sabbatical brought about by the loss of the 1986 Mayoral campaign against the current incumbent Mayor Campbell. In 1990, COPE succeeded in getting all five of its nominated candidates elected in a joint campaign with the Civic New Democrats, with Jim Green, a well-known community organizer with DERA, running unsuccessfully for Mayor.

The Developer

It was noted earlier that the developer is Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., a private development company formed by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing expressly to purchase and develop the site.17 His partners include fellow Hong Kong billionaires Chang Yu-tung and Lee Shau-kee and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Li Ka-shing is the Chairman and President of the company with a fifty percent holding. The vice-presidents included Albert Chow (deputy managing director

get built.

of Cheung Kong Holdings Ltd., Li’s flagship company), Canning K.N. Fox and George Magnus from Hong Kong; Stanley Kwok¹⁸, Richard T.K. Li and Victor T.K. Li (Li Ka-shing’s sons) from Vancouver and Jon Markoulis from Houston, Texas (Power, 1988). Li Ka-shing was no stranger to Vancouver. He had first bought property in there in 1977. His holdings have included West End apartment buildings on Beach Avenue and office towers on Pender Street. His other major Canadian holdings include a majority interest in Husky Oil of Calgary (Gutstein, 1990). His North American property-management company is based in Houston, Texas, where he holds major office properties and development sites (Constantineau and Power, 1988).

The City Planners

The city planners have played a key role in the planning process. They initiated and orchestrated the planning process and the community input. One of their early activities was to review past planning policies for the site and put together a series of development guidelines to inform the Pacific Place process. These became known as the ‘Policy Broadsheets’, which became a central feature of the Pacific Place process. The justification of the approach was to simplify the complexity of development on this scale, in order to promote

¹⁸ Stanley Kwok is a well-known and respected figure in Vancouver’s land development industry. As noted earlier he knows the site very well, having previously been head of B.C. Place Corporation.
understanding and participation in the planning process, by both the politicians and the general public. This approach was used for the Coal Harbour mega-project site on the Burrard Inlet and for the adjacent Bayshore development proposal.

A special team within the Central Areas Division of the City Planning Department was set up to process the Pacific Place development: the False Creek Planning Group. There was a genuine commitment on behalf of the planners to promote and undertake a full consultation process on Pacific Place.

Mega-projects such as the False Creek North development were particularly demanding of city staff resources due to their size, their infrastructure and amenity requirements, and the need for complex and comprehensive legal agreements.

Consequently, the processing of such applications took considerable time and cost. The Vancouver Planning Department estimated that the total processing costs of the Pacific Place development from June 1988 - January 1991 was $1,400,126: see Table 5.19

19 Vancouver City Planning Department, Report to City Manager, Mega-Project Fees, February 20, 1991.
Table 5: Processing Costs of Pacific Place Development, 1988—1996

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Costs(^{20})</td>
<td>720,700</td>
<td>2,561,600</td>
<td>3,282,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancies</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Consultation</td>
<td>27,527</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>69,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Hearings</td>
<td>10,399</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>17,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,400,126</td>
<td>2,640,600</td>
<td>4,040,726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1988—1990 Costs in Actual Dollars

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department

The total revenue received, however, by the City to January 1991 from Concord Pacific was only $162,000, approximately 11.5% of costs incurred: see Table 6.

Table 6: Pacific Place Fee Revenues, 1988—1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Place</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>306,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: 1988—1990 figure includes two lump sum payments of $50,000 made in 1988 and 1989

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department

The reason for the discrepancy was that the size of the development exceeded the normal fee schedules for rezoning and other applications.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\) These staff costs represent the work of the Planning, Engineering, Law, Parks, Social Planning and Housing Departments. Nearly 50 per cent of these costs were generated by the Planning Department.

\(^{21}\) Zoning and Development Fee By-Law No. 5585.
The figure of $162,000 represented the maximum chargeable fee for processing of the development applications (the Official Development Plan and the Comprehensive District (CD-1) applications), plus two negotiated lump sum payments of $50,000 each. This shortfall has since prompted City Council to review and amend its fee schedules to more fully reflect actual costs.22

The Community

The "community" is a difficult body to distinguish. For the purposes of my research I divided the community up into three groups (see Figure 5): first, the general public, a large body of people, who participated individually in the process; second, community groups such as the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA), the Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood Association, that represented residents likely to be impacted by the development; and third, city-wide advocacy groups or organizations like the Tenants Rights Action Coalition and End Legislated Poverty who participated on behalf of their client group.

22 There is an argument to suggest that these costs would be off-set by the tax income generated by the project when the development is completed. No such estimates were available.
In setting out the proposed public participation process for Pacific Place, the Planning Department distinguished three groups in the community: special interest groups, such as the Urban Design Panel, the Vancouver City Planning Commission; neighbouring communities, including those from the West End, the Downtown Eastside, Strathcona, Mount Pleasant and False Creek; and the general public. Different public participation techniques were to be adopted to reach these different communities (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1989).

CONCLUSION
The redevelopment of the Expo lands has had a long and somewhat contentious history. Plans for its development date back nearly twenty years. This chapter has presented important
background material that will be developed in the subsequent chapters. It has presented a brief history of the site, examined the controversies that surrounded the sale of the land, and reviewed the events that led to the current Pacific Place proposals. It has described the Pacific Place development proposal and introduced the actors. There are a number of key players involved in the process, all with competing and often conflicting interests and mandates. The Provincial Government played a key role in selling off the site, the City Council provided a facilitating role for the development, and the community raised some important concerns.

There were significant community concerns with the early stages of the process that had an influence over the public's attitude toward the development itself and their subsequent participation in the public process. There was a public perception that Li Ka-shing had been offered the site on favourable terms. There was certainly a lack of public information about the deal to quell such concern, that did little to promote confidence in the subsequent public process. There was also a concern among groups such as DERA that the B.C. Place process and Expo '86, so unsuccessful from a community perspective, was about to be replicated with Pacific Place. The Pacific Place process got underway amidst this concern, which in many ways served to undermine it right from the outset.
CHAPTER SIX

THE PACIFIC PLACE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS

"The Coalition recommends that all municipalities require that those developments which are of such scale as to have a major impact on the form and social infrastructure of the community provide, as part of their development process, a specific program for the direct involvement of communities affected by the development" (B.C. Housing Coalition statement, November 1988).

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will build on the previous chapter by focusing more specifically on the Pacific Place planning process. The process was initiated in 1987, prior to the sale of the land to Li Ka-shing. The Vancouver City Planning Department took the lead by establishing a series of Policy Broadsheets to guide potential development proposals for the site. Since then, the process has been characterized by considerable public meetings and opportunities for public input. The Pacific Place process has been described by its developer as one of the most participatory and democratic planning processes yet witnessed in Canada. Moreover, the general feeling of the city planners interviewed as part of the

1 The B.C. Housing Coalition included: the Tenants Rights Action Coalition, the Women's Housing Coalition, the Cooperative Housing Federation, the Vancouver and District Public Housing Tenants Coalition and the Downtown Eastside Residents Association.

2 Victor Li, Senior Vice-President of Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., and son of Li Ka-shing, speaking to a class of UBC students, October 19, 1989.
research was that every opportunity was provided for public participation. Section 1.2 of the False Creek North Official Development Plan\(^3\) stated:

"In the preparation of this plan, the concerns and objectives of various property owners, interested groups, and individual members of the public have been considered through an extensive public involvement process" (City of Vancouver Department of Planning, October 1989).

As the previous chapter noted the City has been involved in the planning of the site for nearly twenty years. In a City Planning report on public involvement in the planning of the Expo lands, it was noted that there had already been extensive public input in the planning of False Creek:

"Throughout the 1970’s, discussions focused on the South Shore and through the early 1980’s, discussions focused on the North Shore. The B.C. Place Citizens Advisory Committee,\(^4\) under the auspices of the Vancouver Planning Commission, was active between October 1981 and December 1984. This early work is of significant benefit to today’s planning, enabling the planning to proceed more quickly than otherwise would be the case" (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1988c).

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first part

\(^3\) The False Creek North Official Development Plan, is the overall planning framework that governs the development of the Pacific Place site. It was formally approved in November 1989.

\(^4\) The B.C. Place Citizens Advisory Committee was a committee of prominent Vancouver citizens formed to review the B.C. Place proposals. They would meet regularly and hold public forums to examine the proposals in the plan and put forward their own response.
examines the context of participation in the City: it outlines the model of participation followed, the principles that informed the public process, and identifies the participation techniques adopted. The second part introduces and discusses the Policy Broadsheets, a central feature of the planning process. The third part examines the public participation in the various stages in the public process: a) the overall development plan stage and b) the area rezonings approved to date. The fourth part considers the responses to the Pacific Place planning process by the various actors involved.

THE CONTEXT OF PARTICIPATION

The City of Vancouver identified three broad models of public participation: education, consultation and partnership\(^5\), see Figure 6.

The Education model was based on the idea of a flow of information to the community to promote awareness, discussion and acceptance of policies and proposals. The Consultation model was based more on a two-way flow of information in terms of sharing information, identifying impacts and working with citizens to develop alternatives. The Partnership model was viewed as an extension of the consultation model, but with

\(^5\) A more detailed description of these models can be found in Clause No. 4, City of Vancouver Report to Council, Standing Committee of Council on Neighbourhood Issues and Services, April 6, 1989.
more active citizen involvement in the form of a citizen planning committee (Foulkes, 1989).

Figure 6: City of Vancouver Models of Public Participation

EDUCATION

CONSULTATION

PARTNERSHIP

Source: City of Vancouver Planning Department

These models of participation have been applied to different levels of planning in the City. For example, on individual projects on specific sites the education model tended to be used; for broader area studies, the consultation model was used; and for local area planning, the partnership model was used (City of Vancouver, April 6, 1989). For the Vancouver mega-projects the consultation model became the adopted approach. The role that the consultation was to take was clearly spelled out:
"...the objectives of public consultation are to inform, achieve support, and receive advice from people" (City of Vancouver, April 6, 1989, 9).

Not only are these objectives are very general, but there is also a feeling of passiveness about the statement. Nowhere is it stated that the City has to act on the advice it receives. The mere fact that advice was received would lead some to the conclusion that the objective had been met and that the public process "worked".

The choice of approach was critical, as it established the whole basis of the public participation process. There was a debate at the start of the Pacific Place process over whether a citizens committee should be set up. This was strongly favoured by COPE, because of the size, nature and complexity of the site. This was not favoured by the city planners, nor the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) majority on Council. The justification for not establishing such a committee was that there were already a number of active community groups and organizations to work with and that a citizens committee might lack focus, create duplication, and add to the bureaucracy.

The public involvement process for Pacific Place was set out in a Planning Department report to City Manager dated October 31, 1988 (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1988c). This report was not submitted to Council until January 1989, due a delay as a result of the municipal elections held in November.
1988. The public involvement process was finally approved in February 1989 with a revised and lengthened planning schedule, after the new Council took office.

Within the overall intent of informing the public, achieving support and receiving advice from people certain organizing principles were identified: see Table 7. These were designed to inform an approach that was described as ongoing so people could be informed and influence the plan at all stages; as open and inclusive so people could join in the process at any point and be open to all community groups and individuals; and focused on the understanding and effecting of "mutually supportive changes" with the surrounding areas (City of Vancouver Planning Department, October 31, 1988). Moreover, the organizing principles identified the publics to be consulted in the process: the general public, the neighbouring communities and special interest groups.

The planning process was designed to involve the following stages: issue identification, policy formulation, overall plan preparation, detailed area plans preparation and implementation through rezoning, subdivisions, capital plans, housing programmes, etc., see Figure 7. The public involvement process was intended to key into all the stages.
Table 7: Organizing Principles for Public Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLICS TO BE CONSULTED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decisions about change should be considerate of all those affected by change. To achieve effective consultation, the public can be considered as three groups: the general public, the neighbouring communities and special interest groups.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>PURPOSES OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. One purpose of public involvement is to inform people so they may provide ideas based on knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Another purpose of public involvement is to receive ideas and advice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Public consultation should help everyone learn in order to create a better place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Public consultation should seek to adjust the North Shore of False Creek plans and the surrounding areas to achieve a complementary whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Public consultation should achieve support for the plan through fulfilling needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. By involving Vancourites, public consultation should achieve a place of and for Vancouver.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROCESS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. The process of deciding about change should be considerate of all those affected by change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The process should provide people and organizations effective means and sufficient time to understand the issues and proposals and influence the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Opportunities to understand and influence should be afforded throughout the planning and approvals process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Process should facilitate approvals in a timely way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The process should focus discussion on the development of this new community and its relationships with its neighbours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The process should seek to reach many people and organizations in an unfiltered, open way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The process should be continuously open to new people and seek representative viewpoints of the various publics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The process should include existing community organizations and council appointed advisory groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department
It was envisioned that public participation would occur throughout the planning process. It was decided to use a wide range of traditional public participation techniques.

Figure 7: The Pacific Place Planning Process

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department
These included a regular city newsletter, work in progress displays, public meetings, workshops, informal meetings, guest speaking arrangements, focus groups, surveys, interactive television and radio, community meetings, submission of briefs and formal public hearings (City of Vancouver Planning Department, October 31, 1988). The City maintained a mailing list of over 700 interested persons for the distribution of newsletters and to inform the public about meetings.

A common technique used by both the City was the public information meeting. These were designed to inform the public about 'what was going on' and to seek their views. They usually followed the same format with presentations from either the planners or the developers, or both, followed by questions from the audience. Slide presentations were commonly used by both the planners and the developers. The meetings had well planned agendas, were always chaired by one of the planners from the False Creek Team and minutes were taken. The presentations were followed by a question and answer period where both the planners and the developers would respond to questions from the floor. Maps, models and plans of the development were usually on display for the public to look at. These meetings were well advertised in the press and the mailing list was used to notify people and organizations of the dates.
A popular extension of this approach was the workshop format. This was used by the City to seek public views on the International Village proposal, to obtain a public response to the shoreline configuration of the proposed development, to discuss the planning principles or the "big ideas" for the development of the site, and to examine the development effects of the proposals. For example, on the shoreline issue the debate focused on two potential configurations: "bays" or "lagoons." As noted in the previous chapter, the "lagoons" option was included in the initial design concept submitted by Concord Pacific. It was an attempt by the developer to create a Venice-like feeling and maximise waterfront locations with little islands in False Creek connected by a series of lagoons. The "bays" option was more conventional, essentially retained the existing shoreline. The workshops were organized around a short presentation before breaking up into small groups with a facilitator on hand to stimulate discussion. A further technique used during these sessions was a workbook which could be completed during the session or taken home to be completed and sent in.

THE POLICY BROADSHEETS
As noted previously, one of the central features of the public process was the Policy Broadsheets (City of Vancouver Planning Department, April 1988). A City Planning Department initiative, the Broadsheets were seen by the planners as the
most constructive way of dealing with a project of this size, of serving the public interest, and of consolidating fifteen years of previous policies relating to the area. They took a simple form, outlining the basic issues, the facts, past policy and proposed policy principles for sixteen policy areas: see Appendix 1.

The Policy Broadsheets were a significant part of the process as they set the agenda for all the subsequent public discussion. They led to the identification of seven principles, or what the planners referred to as the "big ideas", for the development of the site. These were:

- to integrate with the city.
- to build on the setting.
- to maintain the sense of a traditional water basin in the centre of the city.
- to use streets as an organizing device.
- to create lively public places with strong imagery.
- to create neighbourhoods.
- to plan for all age groups with a special emphasis on children.

The approach was seen by the planners as a practical mechanism to handle the complexity of development on this scale.6 Craig

6 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director of Planning, City of Vancouver, May 8, 1990.
Rowlands, a Senior Planner on the False Creek team (who subsequently left to join the private sector\(^7\)) played a key role in the formation of the Broadsheets and gave his view of the value of the approach in an interview:

"It was simply a format to communicate what an issue was, what the facts were surrounding that issue, and from there put forward some policy proposals for discussion. A simple format for people to digest, be it the Aldermen, be it the public at large, or be it other staff members...It was really a tool to develop policy and once that policy is developed and adopted, it becomes a tool to communicate the policy and give the public some sense of how we got there."\(^8\)

The planners felt that the conventional planning and rezoning process was not geared to dealing with a project on this scale in the ownership of one single developer. The system had been set up to handle much smaller scale projects. It became clear in interviews with the planners that an important objective of the Broadsheets was to give them much more control over the

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\(^7\) He joined Bosa Development Corporation, a major developer in the Lower Mainland, whose Citygate project forms a significant vista at the eastern end of False Creek, adjacent to the Pacific Place site. This development caused similar concerns to community-based organizations like DERA who were worried about the cumulative impacts of these projects on the Downtown Eastside. In employing Mr. Rowlands Bosa were following O&Y's practice of recruiting former public sector employees that they had significant dealings with.

\(^8\) Interview with Craig Rowlands, former Senior Planner, City of Vancouver, now Vice-President of Bosa Development Corporation, May 1990.
development.

The official aim of the Broadsheets was to guide development in the public interest and to facilitate widespread participation in preparing the Overall Development Plan (ODP) for False Creek North. They set out the planning principles, policies and land use designations that had to be recognized in the development of the site.

While the principal aim of the Broadsheets was to establish public priorities for the development, and to strengthen the arm of the planners, they found favour with the developer too. They served to remove some of the uncertainty developers faced by setting down the broad parameters of the type of development that council was likely to approve and by making clear what was expected in terms of public benefits and contributions. The Broadsheets were seen by Concord Pacific as a good compromise between what the City wanted and what was profitable to develop.9

The Broadsheets were drawn up for internal discussion in 1987. The Planning Department initiated and co-ordinated a three phase process that would culminate in the adoption of the

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Broadsheets as Council policy for the site, see Figure 8.10

Figure 8: The Pacific Place Process: The Development of the Policy Broadsheets

Phase 1
- SERIES OF SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETINGS TO REVIEW POLICIES
  - January-April 1988
- FIRST FORMAL DRAFT OF FALSE CREEK POLICY BROADSHEETS
  - April 1988

Phase 2
- PUBLIC REVIEW PROCESS
  - April-August 1988

Phase 3
- PUBLIC HEARING
  - August 1988
- FORMAL ADOPTION
  - August 1988

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department

10 Memorandum to Mayor Campbell and Members of Council from R.J. Spaxman, Director of Planning on False Creek Policy, January 20, 1988.
Between January and April of 1988, a series of Special Council Meetings were held to review and update these policies (Phase One). Cope Councillor Libby Davies was quoted in the press that these meetings had come about a year too late and should have been initiated immediately after the cancellation of the North Park plan in the previous year (Volkart, 1988). On April 11, 1988 Council received the first formal draft of the False Creek Policy Broadsheets, and then instructed staff to carry out a public review process (Phase Two) (City of Vancouver Planning Department, April 1988). This review included letters to interest groups, media advertisements, public service announcements, six public information meetings\textsuperscript{11}, five special interest workshops\textsuperscript{12}, meetings with interest groups and land owners and submission of written briefs.\textsuperscript{13} Concord Pacific availed themselves of the opportunity to consider the draft policy statements and to respond with their views.\textsuperscript{14} There was

\textsuperscript{11} At False Creek Community Centre, Lord Roberts School, Strathcona Community Centre, King Edward Campus, Carnegie Community Centre, Robson Square.

\textsuperscript{12} There was one workshop session to look at parks, recreation, community facilities and services; one for housing interest groups and three workshops for design, business and development groups.

\textsuperscript{13} City of Vancouver Planning Department, City Policies for False Creek With an Initial Commentary on Concord Pacific's Pacific Place Proposal, Report to City Manager, June 21, 1988.

considerable public interest in the policies and there were high levels of attendance at the meetings. Twenty five written briefs were submitted by individuals and representatives from various groups and organizations.

A variety of issues were raised. The Downtown Vancouver Association were concerned that the demands of the mega-project applications did not adversely affect the approval process for other development applications. A brief from DERA outlined concerns about the potential impact of the Pacific Place development on the area and requested funds from City Council to hire a professional planner/architect for a period of one year to help them undertake an independent review of the potential impact of such development. Other community based organizations, including the Single Mothers Housing Network and the United Church, urged Council to

15 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall May 1, 1990.


17 Letter from Jim Green, DERA Organizer to Alderman Don Bellamy and Members of the Transportation Committee, dated May 19, 1988.


increase the percentage of social housing units in the Broadsheets.

This process culminated in a public hearing on August 23, 1988, which due to the number of delegations went on to the early hours of the next morning. The remaining delegations were heard by Council at its meeting on August 30, 1988.20

Following the public hearing and subsequent amendments, the Policy Broadsheets were adopted by Council on August 30, 1988 (Phase Three). The approach was supported by all the planning officials interviewed for the research, as a means of giving the City more influence over development decisions:

"If you look at the way development happens in this city, generally what happens is that we have a very generalized by-law and developers do their individual developments within that. A lot of the development decisions are left with the developer, once that by-law is in place. The nexus of the decision-making power of what occurs is left with the developer. That becomes a profound liability when you start dealing with big projects, if for no other reason than you start to deal with a lot of public services and public facilities that you don't deal with on an individual case. So we had to find a way to, in a sense, pull the nexus of the power away out of that process and put it where it belongs, with the City."21

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20 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall, May 1, 1990.

21 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director of Planning, May 8, 1990.
The approach was fully endorsed by the planning profession. The Policy Broadsheets and the False Creek North Official Development Plan won the 1990 annual Award for Planning Excellence from the Planning Institute of British Columbia (PIBC). Nonetheless, there was a feeling from the COPE councillors and some of the community representatives interviewed (Jim Green and Stephen Leary from DERA) that there was inadequate opportunity for public involvement at the crucial formulation stage in early 1988. Moreover, there was a feeling expressed by COPE Councillor Libby Davies that the Broadsheets served to constrain changes to the proposals that were wanted by a number of community groups.22

STAGES OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

The Pacific Place Planning Process, outlined in Figure 7, involved five basic stages ranging from issue identification, to policy formulation, to overall plan preparation, to the preparation of detailed area plans, and finally through to implementation. It was a linear process with no feedback loops in place to re-identify issues or reformulate policy.

1. The Overall Development Plan

By the time the public involvement process was approved by council, meetings with the public had already been taking

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22 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall, May 1, 1990.
place. Work was underway on the preparation of the Overall Development Plan (ODP) that would set the parameters for the development of the site. The ODP set out the basic components of the development, including the number of housing units, the mix of housing units, the amount of commercial space, the amount and locations of parks and open space, the circulation patterns and the general form and height of the buildings.

Towards the end of 1988, workshops had been held with special interest groups including the Urban Design Panel and City Council’s Committee on the Disabled to gain early input into the plan’s formative stage (City of Vancouver, January 18, 1989).

From May to November, 1988, Concord Pacific had opened an Information Centre in the Plaza of Nations and through it had organized a series of community workshops and public presentations. Visitors to the Centre were encouraged to fill out questionnaires to solicit their views on Concord’s initial development proposals, see Appendix 2. By October 1988, 16,476 persons had visited the Centre and 4,625 questionnaires had been completed. While the responses indicated overall support for the development, a number of concerns and questions were raised about the high density, the lack of housing mix, the lack of affordability and the impact of the

23 Figures obtained from Concord Pacific Developments Ltd.
proposed development on the surrounding neighbourhoods.

During April and May 1989, the city planners organized a series of meetings and workshops to gauge public response to the choice of the shoreline configuration and to the seven "big ideas" previously outlined. Workshops were held on Granville Island (April 18), at the Chinese Cultural Centre (April 20), Vancouver East Cultural Centre (April 24) and the Robson Square Media Centre (April 26 and May 1). Extensive use was made of the workbooks during these sessions. The public and the planners favoured the bays scheme and overall public support for the "big ideas" (City of Vancouver, May 9, 1989). The Council concurred at the Council meeting on May 16, 1989.

Through May to September 1989 the City organized meetings with special interest groups and neighbouring communities. In addition there were organized sessions for the general public during this period including model displays and drop-ins (June

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These included the False Creek Water Users (May 25), South East Granville Slopes residents (May 29), Vancouver City Planning Commission (May 31 and August 23), City of Vancouver Seniors Committee (June 2 and September 1), City of Vancouver Disabled Committee (June 5 and September 5), Urban Design Panel (June 14, August 9 and September 13), City of Vancouver Bicycle Committee (June 14), DERA and the Tenants’ Rights Coalition (June 27), Strathcona Local Area Planning Program (June 27), Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood Association (July 4), Strathcona Community Centre Association (July 16 and August 16), Yaletown Property Owners and Business Owners (July 18), South Shore False Creek/Fairview Slopes residents (September 7), Mount Pleasant Community Centre Association (September 19) and DERA (September 29).
3, August 24-27 and October 13-14), public information meetings (June 5, August 30 and October 24 and 26) and Council workshops (June 8, July 27 and August 17). The public hearing for the Official Development Plan for False Creek North was scheduled for November 2.

At the public events scheduled between August and September of 1989, a questionnaire was distributed by the Planning Department to further solicit public opinion on the proposed development: see Appendix 4. In total, 126 responses were returned to City staff. The findings were presented at the ODP public hearing. The questions focused specifically on various aspects of the plan, including the pattern and type of development, as well as the public facilities and parks. Overall, the response received was positive, but there were some substantial community concerns evident in the findings. Certain responses contained comments from the public which indicated public concern over the high building heights, the high density of the development, the potential loss of views, the increase in traffic, the lack of parking and the lack of affordable housing.

In sum, public consultation up to this stage appeared to be extensive, incorporating a wide range of approaches including: "public meetings, public workshops, discussion and working groups, questionnaires, displays and open houses, meetings
with interest groups, meetings with advisory committees, neighbourhood meetings, meetings with individuals, newsletters, media coverage and correspondence with numerous individuals and groups" (City of Vancouver City Manager's Report to Vancouver City Council, 1989).

The ODP public hearing, held during November 1989 (see Table 8), generated a considerable public response. Over 300 people turned up at the Sheraton Inn Plaza 500 at Cambie and 12th, opposite City Hall, where the hearing was held. In total, there were so many delegations that the initial hearing had to be extended over a series of three further meetings.25

Table 8: False Creek North Official Development Plan Public Hearings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Time</th>
<th>Location and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2, 1989</td>
<td>Plaza 500 Hotel, 2nd Floor, Granville and Oak Rooms, 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8, 1989</td>
<td>Council Chambers, Third Floor, Vancouver City Council, 7pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 14, 1989</td>
<td>Council Chambers, Third Floor, Vancouver City Council, 7pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 21, 1989</td>
<td>Council Chambers, Third Floor, Vancouver City Council, 7pm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department

The ODP public hearing meetings aired many of the community...

25 Personal Notes taken at the Overall Development Plan Public Hearing, 2 November, 1989
concerns about the process felt by both the organizations representing the impacted communities and the city-wide advocacy organizations.

There were approximately seventy submissions that identified a number of issues:26

* delegations split roughly 50/50 in terms of for and against the proposed development in overall terms.
* those against expressed considerable concern about the planning process itself. Many speakers felt that the planners had worked too closely with the developer and that the planners, as a result, had lost sight of the broader public interest.
* it was argued that there was insufficient core needy housing in the proposal and, in light of the negative attitude of the both the federal and provincial government to social housing, there was serious concern expressed about whether or not the 20 per cent social housing requirement in the plan would ever became a reality.
* it was also argued that the development favoured high-middle to high income earners, leaving little opportunity for the average Canadian to live in the project.
* those against the project spoke about the drastic and damaging impact that the development would have on surrounding

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26 These responses were analysed on the basis of personal notes taken at all the meetings and the City of Vancouver City Council minutes of the hearing.
areas including the Downtown Eastside and the City as a whole.

* the delegates in favour of the project at the public hearing were mainly design professionals and residents from areas not directly impacted by the development. They spoke about the design of the project and the contribution that such a development would make to Vancouver as a "world class city" and its economic growth potential.

At the culmination of the long public hearing process on November 21, 1989 the City Council voted in favour of the development, with some minor amendments. The vote (8-3) split along party lines. The pro-development NPA/Independent majority voting in favour of the proposal with the COPE group in opposition. The amendments to the development were minor and did not reflect the points raised by the impacted communities. The community opposition was centred on the market-orientation of the housing on the site and the lack of concrete mechanisms to ensure the actual construction of social housing in the plan. At the hearing COPE tried to put through some amendments to address these concerns. For example, they moved that 50 per cent housing units be for families; 33 per cent for social housing; 25 per cent for rentals; that the developer provide the land for social housing at no cost to the City; and that the ODP approval be subject to the City obtaining social housing commitments from the provincial and federal governments. This latter point was
seen as a way of forcing Concord Pacific to use their influence with both levels of government. These motions were defeated. The successful amendments included the provision of bus shelters on one of the major roads through the development and the reduction of the parking requirement for B.C. Place from 2,000 spaces to 1,000 and that the money be used to build a downtown pedestrian and cycle route to encourage people to ride or walk to work. This latter amendment was a late suggestion of the Mayor. The amendments did not alter the fundamental premise of the plan, and the developer's representatives present at the final hearing were visibly pleased with the outcome.27

2. The Area Rezonings

The overall plan was divided into ten component Area Plans, see Map 8. At the time of writing (October 1992) three Area Plans were completed: International Village, Yaletown Edge and the Roundhouse. By June 1992, public meetings and model displays were underway for Quayside, the fourth Area Plan. The developer was reported to be keen to get as many of the Area Plans approved as possible prior to the next civic election, scheduled for November 1993.28

27 Personal Notes from the ODP Public Hearing, 21 November, 1989

Map 8  Pacific Place Area Rezonings, Vancouver

Approved Rezonings (1992):
2. Roundhouse
3. Yaletown Edge
8. International Village

Existing Structures:
6b: Plaza of Nations
10. B.C. Place Stadium

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department
International Village (10.75 acres of developable land) was the first Area Plan to come up for rezoning as the area had already been subject to considerable planning activity in the North Park planning process. The International Village site, included the area bounded by Pender and Keefer Streets in the north, Taylor and Quebec in the east, Pacific Boulevard in the south and the lane east of Beatty Street in the west, see Map 9 (City of Vancouver, June 9, 1989). The public hearing was held in June 1989, prior to the formal approval of the ODP. There was some concern expressed about approving an area rezoning ahead of the ODP, but the planners felt it would not be problematic citing the specific and relatively self-sufficient nature of this particular development and the considerable public planning that had already taken place during the North Park process (see Chapter Five).

The basic proposals of the International Village plan included:

- 800 dwelling units (825,000 square feet) of which 20 percent had to be non-market dwellings and 25 per cent available for families with children.

- a maximum of 200,000 square feet of retail use.

- a maximum of 265,000 square feet of office and service uses.

- a hotel of approximately 400 rooms, limited to a maximum
PROPOSED REZONING FROM BCPED (B C PLACE/EXPO DISTRICT) & DD (DOWNTOWN DISTRICT) TO: CD-1 (COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT)

Source: Vancouver City Planning Department

177
of 300,000 square feet.
- institutional uses.
- recreation and cultural uses including a 10.4 acre park.
- a maximum building height requirement - ranging from 100 feet to 300 feet.
- parking provisions (City of Vancouver Planning Department, June 9, 1989).

The development proposal for International Village maintained the basic principles of the North Park Plan. But, there was more housing and park space and less commercial development in the International Village plan\(^{29}\). It was described by the design consortium as a "mixed-use hub". The idea was to create an "international" atmosphere in the development through architectural design and the encouragement of shopping outlets offering food and goods from all over the world (Concord Pacific, 1989).

Towards the end of 1988, Concord Pacific arranged a series of initial meetings/workshops with community groups and special interest groups on the International Village proposals.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{29}\) Personal notes from Public Information Meeting, Rezoning of International Village 22 February 1989.

\(^{30}\) Monday, September 19, 7pm, Mount Pleasant Community Centre. Wednesday, September 20, private meeting with DERA Executive. Wednesday, September 21, 7pm, Robson Square Media Centre. Thursday, September 22, 7pm, Strathcona Community Centre. Friday, September 30, private meeting with DERA membership. Wednesday, October 5,
These meetings were designed to obtain community views on the broad principles behind the proposals. The main feelings expressed by the community at these meetings that were recorded by the author included: the short notice given for the first of these workshops, the vagueness of the proposals for International Village, concerns over densities and traffic, and questions relating to the deliverance and percentage of the social housing component.31

At the beginning of 1989, the City organized a number of public information sessions about the project. The public hearing had to be delayed due to the soils issue not being resolved to the City's satisfaction.32 In February 1989, City Council approved a staff recommendation to send the International Village proposal through to public hearing. The COPE members on council expressed concern that the process was being pushed too fast. For example, at that time, there was still no agreement between the City and the Province regarding the soils issue, which caused concern (Lee, 1989).

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31 Personal Notes taken from the workshops attended, September/October 1988.

32 Personal Notes from Public Information Meeting, Rezoning of International Village, 22 February 1989.
Moreover, I observed that there was considerable concern at the time about the impact of the proposed International Village on the Downtown Eastside, which lay immediately adjacent to the site. Concerns included the potential loss of low income rooming houses in the area due to the forces of gentrification, the influx of high income home owners into the new development and the lack of concrete provision for low income housing in the proposals. There was concern, expressed in a local community newsletter, that social impact studies should have been undertaken so that the planners would have time and knowledge to evaluate the proposals and to assess the potential impacts on the surrounding communities (Crabzilla, 1988). The 20 per cent social housing requirement in the Broadsheets only committed Concord Pacific to ensure that 20 per cent of the space for residential units would be available for social housing. There was no requirement to build, provide or contribute toward the cost of its development. John Shayler of TRAC described social housing component in the plan as a commitment in paper only. He was of the opinion that without funding guarantees for the social housing that the 20 per cent meant nothing (Austin, 1989).³³

During the civic election in November 1988, the plans for

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³³ John Shayler had previously worked with DERA and he had a detailed knowledge of housing and community issues in the City. I met with him on several occasions and he provided me with considerable information on Vancouver's low income communities and the likely impacts of mega-project developments like Pacific Place.
International Village, and indeed the development of the whole Expo site, became an important election issue.\textsuperscript{34} Mayoral candidate Jean Swanson, from End Legislated Poverty (ELP), the Civic New Democrats and the District Labour Council, stated in the election run-up that "a new city Council under her direction would scrap plans for the Expo lands and Coal Harbour and go back and develop a real planning process that enabled people to have more of a say."\textsuperscript{35} She was quoted in the press as saying:

"Rather than having a so-called public information process, which is what Concord Pacific calls its public meetings, people want full involvement in what is planned." (Lee, 1988b).

The election was won by the incumbent Mayor Campbell and the NPA retained the majority of seats on Council. The Pacific Place planning process continued.

The official public hearing for the International Village proposal was held in June 1989, at the Vancouver Playhouse on Dunsmuir Street. In an address at the hearing Concord Vice-President, Stanley Kwok, announced that he was pleased to have participated in such a successful "co-operative planning process" and that this approach to planning was now being

\textsuperscript{34} The broader issue of the perceived housing crisis was a critical election issue also. This set the context for the concern over the mega-project developments.

\textsuperscript{35} Personal notes.
studied as a model for co-operative planning in Australia and Japan. There had been over 105 presentations, including 30 public meetings organized by Concord or the City, and 20 meetings with site neighbours and 15,000 people had visited the development model.  

There were 30 presentations made. Significant community concerns were expressed. Jim Green of DERA stated that the development would have serious implications for the Downtown Eastside in terms of escalating land values, increased rents and displacement. He expressed concern about the lack of any impact studies that had been undertaken. Jack Chalmers, from DERA, and a resident of the Downtown Eastside, expressed concern over increased property values and the potential loss of affordable housing in the existing hotels:  

"The minute you vote to rezone this land, you have taken a giant step towards gentrification" (Jack Chalmers quoted by Bramham, 1989a, A1 & A2).

Other community spokespersons expressed concern that Downtown Eastside residents were considered by the City as second-class citizens, and there were further concerns over the soil remediation measures being proposed. The meeting also heard from a series of experts that questioned the work proposed on the contaminated soils (City of Vancouver, June 22, 1989).  

36 Personal notes taken at the meeting.  
37 Personal notes taken at the meeting.
COPE Councillors Libby Davies, Bruce Eriksen and Harry Rankin tried to postpone the rezoning until the city had a commitment of federal and provincial funds for the proposed social housing units and until an independent consultant had examined the plans to deal with the contaminated soils. This was defeated and the plan was approved by Council, with Councillors voting along party lines.

(ii) Yaletown Edge
The next area of Pacific Place to be considered for re-zoning was the Yaletown Edge district. This area is located on the north side of Pacific Boulevard between the Granville and Cambie Bridges and consists of three blocks bounded by Homer Street and Helmcken Park, see Map 10. The area is immediately adjacent to the historic Yaletown area that contained many early twentieth century industrial buildings.

The public objective for this area was stated as being the creation of a new residential community that offered housing for a variety of ages and incomes. The intention was to create a family neighbourhood that related both to the existing Yaletown and the new False Creek. The developer's plans for this area was mainly residential (800 units proposed, of which 160 would be for families and 150 for the core needy), with some commercial development. It was claimed that the new buildings on the north side of Pacific Boulevard would be
designed in a way to complement the scale and character of Yaletown. Extensive street landscaping and the use of retailing were proposed in the plan in order to give Pacific Boulevard a what the City Planning Department called a "community feeling" (City of Vancouver Planning Department, January 1990).

The same public participation format was used by the Vancouver City Planning Department as for the proposed International Village development's public information meetings, meetings with specific groups and model displays. The attendance at these meetings, however, based on my personal observation was considerably less than those held for the International Village rezoning.

(iii) Roundhouse

The next area rezoning was for the area called The Roundhouse. This area was situated between Davie Street and Homer Street. The proposal here was primarily residential with a mix of housing (1,003 units, including 35% for families and 20% core need), retail and public facilities (school, daycare, family place and nine acres of park and open space). The existing Roundhouse, the only heritage building on the whole Expo site, was to be retained and converted into a community centre by Concord Pacific. This was the first Area Plan to include waterfront development, and the plan contained many of the
public facilities for the whole site, including a community centre, the proposed David Lam Park, an elementary school and a salt-water pumping station\textsuperscript{38}.

On the surface the public process again provided the opportunity for consultation over a period of over 18 months, with approximately 25 public meetings with groups and individuals and culminated in the Public Hearing on February 20, 1992. The overall tone of the public hearing was to support the development. Many speakers spoke in favour of the development and applauded the process. But, again there were few residents from the locally impacted neighbourhoods. Groups such as DERA did not even attend.\textsuperscript{39} There was a feeling in these neighbourhoods that participation in the re-zoning hearings was of little value as the outcome was pre-determined.\textsuperscript{40} The local community perception in areas like the Downtown Eastside was that the NPA majority on Council supported the plans and could not be convinced of making any significant changes to reflect the community concerns.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[38] The need for a salt-water pumping station was a fire security provision brought about by City Council’s previous decision to sell the City’s fire boats.
\item[39] Personal notes taken at the meeting.
\item[40] Interview with Jim Green, DERA, August 13, 1991.
\end{footnotes}
A good indication of the level of debate at the Roundhouse public hearing was the fact that the major issue to dominate the discussion was the future of Engine 374. This famous locomotive was in need of a permanent home. It was agreed that the Engine would go into the Roundhouse, at least temporarily, and if funds were raised it could go into a purpose-built extension on the site. There were no delegations that raised the social housing issue or the potential impact of the development on surrounding neighbourhoods. COPE councillors raised concerns about the lack of an adequate housing mix and the absence of co-operative and assured rental units.

The public attendance at this public hearing was poor. Councillor Davies noted that "it seems like a lot of people with more critical opinions stayed away, almost as if they were tired of the whole process and had given up." The final vote on the Yaletown Edge proposal again followed party lines, with the NPA voting in favour of the development and COPE members voting against.

41 Engine 374 was one of the first engines to pull passengers across Canada in 1870's. Its previous homes had been at Kitsilano Beach and Granville Island and it had been a featured exhibit at Expo '86. It had been given to the City by CPR in 1947.

42 Interview with Councillor Libby Davies, Vancouver City Hall, August 13, 1991.
There can be little question about the extent of opportunity for public input into every stage of the Pacific Place process. Not only were there public meetings, information meetings, model displays and exhibitions, there was the public hearing process which also provided further opportunity for the local community to have its say. There are questions, however, that appear to relate to the efficacy of this opportunity from a local community perspective. The public attendance at the public meetings and public hearings was observed to drop dramatically as the process went on. From my interviews with community representatives it was suggested that the public process provided the opportunity to raise concerns, but little opportunity to ensure that those concerns were acted upon, particularly in relation to the major questions of the provision of social housing and the impacts on the surrounding low income neighbourhoods. This dissatisfaction with the public process led to considerable community activity outside of the formal planning process.

EVALUATION OF THE PROCESS

Views on the process have varied greatly. A number of the city councillors interviewed felt that the process worked extremely well. Former Councillor Carole Taylor, felt that the process had been intensive and that overall the result was good for the City. She felt that ideas and views expressed at meetings percolated through into the final outcomes. The abandoning of
the lagoons option was cited as proof.\textsuperscript{43} Gordon Price, NPA councillor, felt that the process had gone smoothly and that the City had gained a great deal.\textsuperscript{44}

Concord Pacific openly stated that the Pacific Place public involvement process had been extensive:

"I think that the whole process allows for is the greatest opportunity for public involvement...People can say a lot of things about the project. One thing they can't say is that they haven't had a chance to be involved with it."\textsuperscript{45}

At the public hearing for the rezoning of International Village, in June 1989, Concord Pacific Vice-President Stanley Kwok described the process as a new and innovative way of planning, a way that was being studied by other developers from all over the world. In total, they estimated that over 25,000 people have had input into the process that "...has resulted in a liveable development plan that sets new standards in urban design, maximizing views and open space."\textsuperscript{46}

The developers shared some sympathy for the concerns of DERA,

\textsuperscript{43} Interview with Carole Taylor, November 20, 1991.

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Councillor Gordon Price, December 10, 1991.

\textsuperscript{45} Interview with Blair Hagkull, Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., May 31, 1990.

\textsuperscript{46} Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., Pacific Place Up-date, 9 September 1991.
but their response was that the Downtown Eastside lay outside the project boundaries, and consequently they felt unable to do anything about them.\footnote{Interview with Stanley Kwok, Vice President, Concord Pacific Developments Ltd., March, 1992.}

The planners felt as if they did all they could to secure public involvement:

"Certainly, every opportunity was given for public involvement. Concerns were all documented and brought forward. They were reinforced or not reinforced as the case may be through the public hearing process. So given the nature of the projects I am not sure you could have done much more that would have been any more meaningful."\footnote{Interview with Tom Fletcher, Director of Planning, City of Vancouver, September 26, 1990.}

The role of the planners in the Pacific Place process was crucial. The UMP planning processes tend to bring the planners and developers closer together in less adversarial and more co-operative relationships. This raises legitimate concerns about the possibilities of planners being coopted by the developers. Do planners lose sight of the public interest when they work so closely together with the developers? Are planners able to negotiate at the same level as developers? There are no clear answers to such questions. Some people would say that this relationship means that the planners can
extract more public concessions from the developer, whilst others would say that this relationship gives the developer an "inside track" on the planning process. Certainly, the overall local community perception of this closer relationship was not good. The developer was perceived as having regular and direct access to the planners in a way the local community did not.

It must be said that all the planners involved with Pacific Place were all committed professionals who were doing their best to represent the public in the negotiations with the developer. Larry Beasley developed a reputation for being a tough negotiator and was considered by the developer to be a formidable adversary and upholder of the public interest. Unfortunately, such a commitment was not evident to local community groups and the media, due to the close association with the developer.

In the press the planners were accused of being "in bed with the developer" (Matas and York, 1989, A8) and the local community perception was that they were in close collaboration. But, they maintained a professional relationship with the developer:

"From our point of view it was a very arms length relationship. There has been this mythology that somehow we all worked together in the same room and we all got co-opted and everything. It didn’t happen that way. It wasn’t our day to day experience. It was very much them on their
side of the table representing their interests and us on our side of the table representing our interests."\textsuperscript{49}

The planners were operating within a difficult climate. The Pacific Place development was seen to contribute much to the City in terms of stimulating economic development in the region, of attracting international investment, of promoting the world class image of the city and of forging links with the Pacific Rim.

Housing and welfare groups, such as DERA, the DERA Housing Society, TRAC and ELP had serious reservations about the Pacific Place project. It was felt that the project would impact negatively on low income surrounding neighbourhoods. There was concern about the potential of resident displacement and the loss of low income rental stock in the Downtown Eastside in particular. Stephen Leary of DERA was quoted in the community press as saying:

"Now across the street are five hotels that people rent for $250 a month. It’s not on the site but you’ve got to believe that development is going to get rid of those hotels. People are going to say, if I bought that hotel, I could turn it into a fitness centre and make a ton of money from those people over there. I could turn it into a boutique...or another 30-storey hotel. Certainly we don’t want to defend hotels - they’re shitty places to live. The problem is, they’re the only places to

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director, City of Vancouver Planning Department, May 8, 1990.
live and unless there's something else built, you tear down a hotel and you throw people out on the street" (Busheikin, 1990, 1).

It was generally felt by these groups that the proposed development was highly exclusive and contributed little to the desperate needs of their constituents. A comment made during a public workshop with the DERA membership in September 1988 highlighted this concern: "You have designed a development that we can't afford to live, shop or work in." Similar comments were expressed throughout the public process.

There was considerable concern from these groups about the provision of social housing in the project:

"The myth is being perpetuated by the Mayor and Concord Pacific that they are being asked to supply social housing. The truth is Concord Pacific is not putting one nickel into social housing on this site. There is no guarantee that there will ever be social housing and what we are looking at is the displacement of hundreds, if not thousands of people from the Downtown Eastside, with no new social housing coming on stream."51

The extent of the housing crisis facing the City of Vancouver was evident from an examination of DERA's social housing

50 Notes from Public Workshop, DERA Membership, September 30, 1988.

waiting list (see Table 9). As of March 25, 1992, there were over 6,000 people registered on this list alone.

This is just a partial reflection of the total housing need in the City. There are many other residents on other waiting lists in other parts of the City. This did not, for example, represent the need in other areas such as Strathcona and Mount Pleasant.

| Table 9: DERA Housing Wait List: 1991-1992 |
|----------------|-----|-----|------|
| Seniors | 1992 | 1991 | Difference |
| Number of seniors on list | 2,658 | 1,648 | 1,010 (+38%) |
| Number of male seniors | 1,775 | 1,111 | 665 (+38%) |
| Number of female seniors | 882 | 537 | 345 (+39%) |
| Number of male seniors living in hotels as main residence | 883 | 499 | 344 (+40%) |
| Number of female seniors living in hotels as main residence | 183 | 87 | 96 (+52%) |
| Families | 1992 | 1991 | Difference |
| Number of families on list | 568 | 445 | 123 (+20%) |
| Number of children on list | 936 | 728 | 208 (+22%) |
| Number of families living in hotels | 87 | 78 | 9 (+10%) |

Source: DERA

The 20% social housing component was felt by the housing and welfare groups to be inadequate on a site of this size. It was felt that a site of this size could have supported a much
higher proportion of affordable housing. Moreover, there was concern about the lack of provision for a more even income spread within the 80% market housing element on the site. It was felt that a required rental component in the proposals would have helped to secure this.52 DERA was particularly concerned that, even if built, the social housing projects would end up surrounded by luxury condominiums making the residents of the social housing projects feel uncomfortable and alienated. Jim Green of DERA referred to this as a potential "...politically generated ghetto in the middle of a rich person's ghetto."53 Of further concern to housing groups was the fact that the 20 per cent approach to social housing brought no new money into the city for social housing projects, but merely increased the competition over this type of development for what little money there was. It was argued that such an approach depended for its success on the funding and programme budgets of senior levels of government (ie: provincial and federal housing agencies). For such an approach to work, special budget allocations would be required for the mega-project sites in order to ensure that the social housing could be provided without adversely affecting provision in other parts of the City or the Lower Mainland. The City requested additional resources from Federal Government, but

52 This was a requirement that City Council secured from Marathon Realty for the Coal Harbour proposals.

53 Interview with Jim Green, DERA, August 13, 1991.
these were denied (Hulchanski, 1989, 7).

A further major criticism of the Pacific Place process from the community perspective was the lack of any extensive impact assessment of the proposed project. The city planners had been concerned about the potential impacts on neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside, and openly acknowledged that more could have been done in this regard:

"We could have done a lot more pre-planning, a lot more strategic action, I believe that firmly. I am not shy about saying that anyway. But, I think, more importantly, we have to be diligent as things actually start to occur and we start to see how other people react to what is happening, and be prepared to move fairly quickly in that case."

In 1989, the city planners commissioned two consultants to undertake impact studies: the UBC Centre for Human Settlements (J.D. Hulchanski) and Burgess, Austin & Associates. However, as will be shown later in some detail in Chapter 7, it could

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54 In May 1990, a City delegation visited Ottawa to try and change the Minister's mind, but to no avail. This included: Mayor Campbell; Councillors Libby Davies and Gordon Price; John Shayler, Tenants' Rights Action Coalition; Doug Evans, Vancouver and District Labour Council; Andrew Grant, Urban Development Institute; Alice Sundberg, Co-operative Housing Alliance of B.C.; and Jim O'Dea, Terra Housing Consultants (O'Neil, 1989).

55 Interview with Stephen Leary, DERA, April 11, 1990.

56 Interview with Larry Beasley, Associate Director, City of Vancouver Planning Department, May 8, 1990.
be argued that such studies came late in the process.

The Hulchanski Report looked at the issue of low rent housing in those downtown areas likely to be impacted by redevelopment in the Central Area, by projects like Pacific Place. The areas included in the study were Downtown South, Downtown North, Downtown Eastside and Strathcona. The report argued that any loss of stock in these areas would have significant repercussions in terms of increasing homelessness. The report also attempted to develop a dialogue on innovative ways and means by which the city could maintain and develop low rent housing opportunities in the above areas (Hulchanski, 1989).

Hulchanski identified current financial and institutional constraints in the provision of the 20 per cent social housing allocations on the mega-project sites. This confirmed the concerns that had been raised previously by groups such as DERA and TRAC:

"Yet another harsh reality facing the supply of low rent housing in Vancouver is the limited size of the federal/provincial social housing program. There is now very little hope of obtaining the additional social housing unit allocations for implementing the proposed arrangement with Concord Pacific. The City cannot, it appears, both deliver on its portion of the agreement and continue to provide social housing in Downtown South and Downtown Eastside at the rate it has in the past (Hulchanski, 1989, 10)."
The report outlined three policy recommendations and detailed categories of programme options. The policy recommendations were:

a) to maintain and improve the existing central area low rent stock.\(^{57}\)

b) to create innovative shelter-related programs for low income single person households, targeted at special needs.

c) that the beneficiaries of economic growth and rising property values should help pay a fairer share of the social costs incurred by this growth (Hulchanski, 1989).

The Burgess Report took a less critical stance. It stated that the mega-projects were unlikely to impact negatively on the low rent housing stock. The consultants argued that the impact of redevelopment would be positive in terms of bringing additional housing units onstream (Burgess, Austin & Associates, 1989). They acknowledged, however, that an estimated 1,500 rooming house units might be lost over the next ten years:

"The Downtown Eastside, including Gastown, Chinatown and Strathcona, are less likely to be influenced by the major redevelopment projects due to their closely knit social infrastructure and the fact that redevelopment is unlikely to be economically attractive. The proximity of major new developments adjacent to various

\(^{57}\) This proved to be a controversial recommendation as it called for a demolition ban on housing stock, which proved to be totally unacceptable to Mayor Campbell and the NPA.

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parts of the Downtown Eastside will result in gradual up-grading over time" (Burgess, Austin & Associates, 1989).

The main conclusions were that there would be few adverse social impacts from the mega-projects and that they would benefit the area by increasing the supply of social housing units (Burgess, Austin and Associates, 1989). These findings conflicted with both the Hulchanski report and those of the community-based housing agencies operating in the area.

Throughout the study period community organizations such as DERA employed all possible mechanisms to raise concern about the potential impacts on the Downtown Eastside neighbourhood. They used the press (newspapers, radio and television interviews), lobbied politicians, and even ran for political office\textsuperscript{58}. These activities raised public awareness of the potential negative aspects of the Pacific Place development, which were downplayed in the official public process. The emphasis throughout the official public process was placed on the positive contributions that Pacific Place would bring to the City as a whole, including considerable tax revenue,

\textsuperscript{58} In Vancouver’s 1990 civic election, Jim Green ran as the Mayoral candidate for the joint COPE/Civic NDP slate. Part of his reasons for doing so were to ensure that certain issues found their way onto the public agenda: including housing; the mega-projects; and the need for a neighbourhood based, democratic planning system. He ran a very successful campaign in terms of raising issues and came much closer to unseating the incumbent, Mayor Campbell, than many expected. COPE did manage to gain two extra seats on Council, as a result of the issue-based campaign.
improving the City’s image, jobs, 20% social housing (but no mechanisms to ensure it would be provided), community facilities, a huge public park and a 1.5 mile waterfront walkway. The promise of these benefits seemed to overshadow the potential negative impacts that Pacific Place might have on neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside.

CONCLUSION
The overall context of participation adopted by the City was one of consultation. The purpose being to inform the public, achieve support and to receive advice from the people (City of Vancouver, April 6, 1989, 9). The guiding principles for the consultation were that the process be ongoing, open and inclusive and focused. Three groups within the public domain were identified for consultation: the general public, the neighbouring communities and special interest groups.

It was intended that participation occur throughout the process and at all stages of plan preparation. To maximise its effectiveness a wide range of public participation techniques were adopted. There was a commitment on behalf of the planners to make these techniques work and to make themselves available to the public at all times.

The Policy Broadsheets were a key element in the process. Their purpose was to consolidate and up-date all previous
council policies for the site and to establish the basic parameters for its redevelopment. The Broadsheets were seen by the planners as the most constructive way of dealing with sites on this scale and for encouraging public participation.

There were undoubtedly considerable opportunities for public participation at every stage of the planning process. There were hundreds of meetings and interactions with the public. The quantity of public participation opportunity was not an issue. But views on the effectiveness of the process varied considerably. The developers described the process as very participatory and one that was being studied as a model for other cities to follow. The planners were of the opinion that every opportunity for public participation was provided, and there was a commitment shown by them to make the process work from a participation point of view. The planners found themselves operating in a political climate that clearly favoured UMP development in the City, and it was within this context that they tried to facilitate as much participation as possible.

Yet, there appeared to be significant local community concern about the process – particularly from groups such as DERA, TRAC, and ELP that represented large numbers of downtown low income constituents likely to be impacted by the development. Their concerns appeared to include both substantive and
process elements and the fact that, overall, the process had not appeared to favour the low income residents of the City. These concerns included the potential impact of the development, the exclusive nature of the project, the lack of assurances regarding the provision of the social housing, and the lack of adequate impact assessment work. These concerns are important as these groups represented a significant proportion of the Vancouver community and, on balance, are among the most powerless of the city’s population to respond to UMPs such as Pacific Place.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE PACIFIC PLACE PROCESS: RHETORIC OR REALITY?

"We have many types of language for discussing the city. Different academic disciplines even have their own dialects; hence urban geography, urban economics and urban history. In the public sphere, cities have become the arena of public administration and political compromise. Private corporations see cities as significant only within the calculus of profitability. If we want to improve our cities, then it is important to 'see' cities as if people matter. The real development issue of the 1980s is how to create better cities for all the citizens by providing better environments, a sense of engagement in civic life and sustainable, enjoyable employment" (Short, 1989, 136).

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to use the empirical material presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six to address the major research questions outlined in Chapter One. The research indicates that from a community perspective public participation in urban mega-project planning has not been that effective. By itself this is not a startling finding, but what the research does is provide a sound basis for a critical response. And, more importantly, the research helps us to identify why public participation in UMP planning is not effective. Consequently, this chapter is divided into two major sections. The first is an evaluation of public participation in UMPS, based on the three characteristics outlined in Chapter Two. The second part consists of the identification of factors which explain why public participation has not been effective.
EFFECTIVENESS OF UMP PLANNING PROCESSES: EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND EFFICACY

To what degree did the Pacific Place public participation process meet the characteristics set out in Chapter Two of equity, efficiency and efficacy? It is clear that the Pacific Place process offered plenty of opportunity for public input, but the critical issue was to what degree did this translate into effective participation? It is the quality of the process we are interested in, not the quantity. The number of public interactions, meetings and model displays had consistently been used by the developer, certain members of council and some planners to claim that the Pacific Place process had been a participatory one. Yet, it is important to state that the opportunity for public participation is not sufficient by itself. There is a need for mechanisms to be put in place that ensure that the input is not only received, but considered, and acted upon. Not all public/community submissions can be acted upon under our present system of representative democracy, where many trade-offs have to be made. But, in the Pacific Place planning process, it appeared to many of the community groups that the concerns were not given adequate consideration.

Equity

To what degree was the Pacific Place process equitable? Did the process enable all groups to participate equally? There
was no explicit equity agenda in any of the case studies reviewed. In the Pacific Place case study three types of inequity were identified. First, there tended to be political discrimination by Council and the developers towards organized groups in the community, such as DERA. Second, there was inequity, between the developer and the local community, in terms of access to resources and power, including: money, organization, information, influence, expertise and political support. Third, there was inequity in terms of access to planning staff and information. This leads to what I have termed the cycle of inequity that impeded effective participation, see Figure 9.

Figure 9: The Cycle of Inequity
(i) Discrimination against organized groups

In the Pacific Place process little distinction was made between the three "publics" identified by the City Planning Department: the general public, the neighbouring communities and special interest groups. At one level all groups were treated the same; there was no positive discrimination in favour of the neighbouring communities who were those with the least resources, and the least able to participate fully. The process did not acknowledge the differential access to power or resources that groups in the community had. Nor did it recognise the differential impacts that these groups might experience from the Pacific Place development.

There are a number of low income neighbourhoods surrounding the Pacific Place site that are likely to be impacted quite significantly by its development. The Downtown Eastside, for example, was likely to feel the greatest impact from the Pacific Place development. Yet, this was not explicitly recognised within the planning process. Some impact work was done, but as the city planners themselves acknowledged, this was not adequate, nor had it led to concrete proposals as to how these impacts might be mitigated. In an attempt to make the process more equitable DERA had attempted to secure resources from the City Council in order to employ a planner to work with them on the question of the impacts of the mega-projects on the neighbourhood. City Council consistently
refused to meet the request. It became clear from the interviews that there was considerable political discrimination toward DERA from the NPA councillors. As former Councillor Carole Taylor put it during an interview: "The NPA has a real hate for them." She felt that more could have been done to bring them into the planning process.¹ It appeared then that the concerns raised by DERA were finding little sympathy at the political level. This raised the issue about whether important and legitimate concerns were not being addressed or acted upon because of where they came from. One explanation for this was the different visions of the city that these respective groups had. The NPA majority on Council saw the UMPS as part of encouraging economic growth and consequently viewed them in very positive terms. From their perspective, groups such as DERA, for example, were seen as having parochial interests and for not being "strategic" enough in their thinking in that these projects would bring benefits to the entire metropolitan region.²

(ii) Access to resources
Throughout the Pacific Place planning process there appeared to be considerable inequity in terms of access to resources.

¹ Interview with former Councillor Carole Taylor, November 20, 1991.

UMP developers, in general, are powerful international transnational corporations with enormous resources at their disposal. Li Ka-shing was one of the richest men in Hong Kong and emerged in the 1980s as a major international developer. Li and other developers can exert considerable influence over the planning process by their power, resources and links with senior levels of government. Moreover, in most cases the mega-project developers have the ability to sustain long planning processes, whereas most groups in affected communities can not. Developers can afford to buy the necessary legal, financial, design and other professional expertise they may require, whereas community groups often do not. Moreover, the developer has people working full-time on getting approval for the proposal, when community groups have none to work specifically on mega-projects. The participation of community groups and organizations in such planning processes is over and above the role they are mandated with.

A further significant factor is that the developers are often supported by a strong and powerful urban growth coalitions within the city. In Vancouver, Concord Pacific had strong links with developers and other powerful real estate interests through organizations such as Urban Development Institute, the

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3 Some would argue that DERA have a number of full-time employees that could work on these issues. But all DERA staff are funded and committed to work on specific issues and tasks, mainly providing advocacy services to the local community.
Downtown Vancouver Association, the Board of Trade and the Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver. This imbalance in access to resources has a marked implication for the ability of groups in the community to participate.

(iii) Access to Planning Staff

There was inequity in access to planning staff and information. The developer had regular contact with the planners, much more so than in the more traditional adversarial planning processes. The co-operative planning process brought the planners and the developers into a much closer relationship than was usual with development applications. The pattern for the Pacific Place process was set by the previous B.C. Place process, where city planners and B.C. Place Ltd. staff worked closely together. In the Pacific Place process planners and developers met on a regular basis and would be seen together at the public meetings, sharing platforms and model displays. As noted in the previous chapter the planners did their best to maintain a professional distance, but the local community perception was different and arguably served to undermine public confidence in the process:

"It is not good when the city staff work so closely with the developers. Planners end up as salespeople for Concord Pacific and Marathon. It should be an arms length relationship."

4 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.
The local community perception was that considerable decision-making was going on behind closed doors and that there was much information at these meetings that did not enter the public arena. It was felt that deals were being negotiated between the planners and the developers outside of the public process. The community groups felt that many of the key decisions had already been taken prior to the public process. This perceived secrecy further damaged the public trust in the Pacific Place process.

Groups in the local community were not able to develop such a close relationship with the planners due to the way the public process was constructed. This new model of urban development does not facilitate a close working relationship between the community and the planners. In fact, it was difficult for community groups to build any relationship with the planners independent of the developer. At all the public information meetings and other sessions, the developer would be present. There was direct contact in the meetings held with the special interest and residents' groups. But, these tended to be one-off events and not part of a longer term strategy of building an on-going relationship with these groups. These meetings were often seen by the community groups as a palliative or as a means of neutralizing protest.

There was a perception among groups such as DERA that the
planning process was geared to meet the needs of the developer rather than the local community. For a more equitable style of public participation it could be argued that the planners needed to have developed much stronger links with groups in the community. In most cities there is a network of well-informed and organized groups in the community that have much to contribute to mega-project planning processes, in terms of the local knowledge they possess and in identifying the potential impacts of the mega-projects on the surrounding neighbourhoods. In Vancouver, instead of being involved many of these groups felt alienated from and disillusioned with the Pacific Place process.

There is also an important distributional issue here. Not only is equity an important consideration in relation to public participation, it is a critical factor in relation to the outcomes of the development itself. UMPS are frequently justified on the potential public benefits that these projects are supposed to generate. These benefits include potential tax revenue for over-stretched city budgets, jobs, improved city image, and various community benefits. A lot of the current literature on UMP development is beginning to question the fact that such development provides benefits for all groups in the community (Alexander, 1987; Berry and Huxley, 1992;

5 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.
Brownill, 1990; Docklands Consultative Committee, 1992; Fainstein, 1991; and Widgery, 1991). In other words there appears to be a lack of evidence that would suggest that the "trickle-down" theory, often used to justify these projects, does actually work. The question of equity needs to be built into the UMP debate. Questions of who benefits and who loses are important issues, that have tended to be ignored, which need to be addressed in future UMP planning processes. It is apparent from the UMP examples considered here that there is a danger that growth is obtained as the cost of the alienation and marginalization of a significant proportion of the community. This was clearly demonstrated in the Docklands case, where developments like Canary Wharf had served to increase the polarization between the Docklands communities and provide few benefits to those communities most in need. It could be argued that the politics of securing growth and competition in the international market place, via UMPS, has led to inequity and exclusion.

Efficiency

The public participation process must work adequately, be well organized and have a defined timescale. The scale of UMP has meant that the associated planning processes can be long. It is difficult for community-based organizations to sustain the level of interest and involvement in such planning processes. It is important therefore that the process be efficient in
terms of a) a defined time-line, b) clearly identifying how the process is organized and 'where we are' at any given time and c) exactly how public input is going to be incorporated into the proposals. Citizens need to see that their input is being taken seriously and is visibly acted upon.

There was an initial timeline for the Pacific Place public involvement programme drawn up by the City which laid out the proposed timescale for the process in terms of the ODP and the first Area Plan (City of Vancouver, January 18, 1989). For the ODP, the proposal was for the public involvement process to begin in December 1988 and to culminate in a public hearing toward the end of July 1989. The public hearing was actually held in November 1989. Work on the Area Plan was scheduled to start in March 1989 and go to public hearing toward the end of July 1989. The first Area Plan was International Village which went to public hearing in June 1989, ahead of the ODP. The process, therefore, did not conform to the original timescale.

At the end of the study period in 1992, there was no overall time-line on the planning process. At that time the planners were under pressure from the developers to speed up the Area Plan rezoning stage. Concord Pacific were keen to have the entire area west of the Cambie Bridge rezoned prior to the next civic election scheduled for November 1993. The planning process will continue until the rezoning of the last Area Plan
is in place and the Development and Building Permits have been issued. At the end of the study period there was no defined date for the end of the process.

The length of the process can be correlated with the attendance at the various public sessions. There was considerably more public involvement in the early stages of the Pacific Place planning process. Groups in the community appeared to be hungry for information, concerned about what the potential impacts might be and optimistic that their involvement might have some influence. Yet, the longer the process went on, the more the local community groups lost confidence in the process, and the more variable the public attendance became.

It was not clear to groups participating in the process how it was organized, nor what the current situation was at any given time in terms of what Area Plan had been approved and what had not. There were regular meetings in the early stage of the process, particularly leading up to the ODP public hearing. Since then the meetings became much fewer, depending on the progress with the Area Plans. The City of Vancouver Planning Department's newsletter (see Appendix 5) was intended to be published regularly to keep people informed of progress, but its production became sporadic. In the early stages of the process the newsletter appeared as intended. From April to
August 1989, three issues were produced. Since that date only two issues have been produced (January 1990 and June 1992). During this period, it could be argued that the public began to lose touch with the planning process. The attendance at the public meetings and the public hearing of the Roundhouse Area Plan was very minimal.

The public process was not that efficient in the sense that it demanded much of the participants. There were numerous meetings, workshops and model displays to attend. It required many hours of attendance and preparation of presentations. The public hearing for the approval of the ODP extended over four nights and ultimately exhausted public comment. The first night attracts considerable interest and attendance. There was much concern about the proposals expressed at this meeting. The subsequent nights attracted less and less attendance and interest. A further point is that many people found the process intimidating and were not comfortable speaking out into a microphone in front of others\(^6\).

**Efficacy**

The final characteristic in terms of the effectiveness of public participation was that of the degree of impact the public input had on the final outcomes. One essential

\(^6\) This point was made during personal discussions with a number of participants at the various public hearings held during the Pacific Place process.
ingredient of successfully impacting outcomes is sufficient political power. Community groups must have sufficient power to impact fundamental development outcomes, and have a meaningful role in the planning process.

Two levels of impact could be identified in the Pacific Place case study:
1) impacts on the details of the plan.
2) impacts on the fundamental aspects of the plan.

It is true to say that the public process had some impact on the details of the plan. This type of impact would include certain design elements and the identification of certain concessions made of the developers. So there was a discernable impact at this level. There was little evidence to suggest, however, that the public participation process had any effect on the major issues in the plan, such as increasing the amount of social housing or introducing measures to mitigate the potential negative impacts on the Downtown Eastside.

The Pacific Place planning process appeared on the surface to have been participatory, but it failed to give local community groups any real power to influence the outcomes of the process. This confirmed the findings of an earlier study:

"The Pacific Place citizen participation program cannot be described as an empowering exercise for the participants, although some changes were made to the plan. It did maintain the power and
interests of the City and the developer" (Foulkes, 1989, 119).

From my interviews it appeared that a number of community groups such as DERA and advocacy organizations like TRAC and ELP found the participation process frustrating and manipulative. They felt that the process had excluded their concerns and did not represent them well. The process enabled them to voice their concerns, but little more than that. In Vancouver, there was a perception among some groups that participating in the Pacific Place process was a pointless exercise as the key decisions had already been taken. It was felt that the "die had already been cast".7

There was little sense of local community ownership of the public process. The perceived lack of an adequate response from the City or the developer on key issues such as social housing and development impacts seriously undermined the public faith in the process. Their viewpoint was that the process had become little more than a public relations exercise that simply facilitated and legitimized the developer’s proposals. The planners were seen to be doing "a sell job"8 and not adequately representing the public interest.

7 Interview with Stephen Leary, DERA, April 11, 1990.

8 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.
In the other case studies considered the development corporation approach was seen to be even less democratic as it allowed for little or no public input at all. At the least with the co-operative municipal approach there was an identifiable public process that the local community groups could make use of. In San Francisco and Vancouver, community groups had ensured that both public processes were used to their full extent and important issues were publicly aired. As Jim Green put it: "...you can see our finger-print all over the process."9 The San Francisco groups stated that the public process at least provided some "hand-holds" to grip. The Vancouver community groups were able to get issues onto the agenda, but the problem was they were not able to ensure that there would be an adequate response to them. Overall, there was little evidence to suggest that these groups had any major impact on the final outcomes.

The lack of influence on the issues was particularly well illustrated by the social housing issue. As noted earlier, groups like COPE, DERA, TRAC and ELP campaigned for a greater percentage of social housing to be included in the final proposals and requested that mechanisms be identified to ensure the delivery of such housing. There was a proposal to increase the percentage of social housing from 20 per cent to

9 Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.
33 per cent, but this failed.\textsuperscript{10} Housing groups had consistently raised concerns about how and when the social housing would be built. They were worried too about the proposed income split, the 80 per cent market housing and 20 per cent social housing was not felt to be an inadequate income mix. The concern was that it would "ghettoize" the social housing is a sea of luxury condominiums.\textsuperscript{11}

A further indication of the lack of influence community groups had on the process was the lack of response to the concerns expressed about the impacts on the Downtown Eastside. The proposed Pacific Place development will have a significant impact on surrounding low income neighbourhoods such as the Downtown Eastside. Previous experience with the B.C. Place plan and Expo '86 was an indication about what the potential impacts might be. A number of legitimate concerns were raised about the potential of displacement, the process of gentrification and the loss of much valuable affordable housing in the area. All these issues were raised consistently by DERA, ELP, and TRAC throughout the public process, but they met with little or a negative response. As noted earlier, the request by DERA for funds from the City Council to pay for a

\textsuperscript{10} This failed on two counts. First, on the failure to get more of a commitment to social housing in the mega-project developments themselves. Second, the failure to secure adequate funding from senior levels of government to even fund the 20\% commitment.

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.
planner to work with the community to assess the likely impacts on the neighbourhood and to prepare a plan for the area was consistently denied.

The ODP public hearing was a key event and, probably a turning point in the whole planning process. It was the culmination of considerable public interaction between all the actors. The public hearing itself extended over four non-consecutive evenings, due to the public interest. But the most important issue to come out of it was the level of public concern about the development and the process. Numerous speakers raised some fundamental concerns with the proposed plan. But, the plan was approved with minor modifications. The perception of this by groups such as DERA was that the politicians had already made up their minds to support the development prior to the public hearing:

"A planning process doesn't exist when the politicians have clearly made up their mind. The public hearings become show-trials."\textsuperscript{12}

To many of the community organizations present, the ODP public hearing was a visual demonstration of the powerlessness of groups to effect changes to proposals on this scale. There was sufficient support for the development on City Council to approve the plan, despite the concerns of DERA and other

\textsuperscript{12} Interview with Jim Green, August 13, 1991.
community groups. The subsequent public process in the eyes of these groups suffered as a result. Local community groups participating in the process had the ability to raise issues, which they did, but not the power to ensure that something would get done about them.

In short, the Pacific Place public participation process was not effective from a community perspective. There was no explicit equity agenda in the process. Three type of inequity were found: a) political discrimination against organized groups; b) inequity in terms of access to resources, including money, organization and expertise; c) inequity in terms of access to planning staff and information.

In terms of efficiency, the outcomes did not reflect the effort put in. Community groups campaigned tirelessly on issues of social housing and the potential impacts of the development, but such concerns were not addressed. The planning process had no clear time-lines. There was a lack of ongoing information, nor was there any clear indication as to how the public input would be incorporated.

Finally, on the question of efficacy, the impact of the public input on the final outcomes was small. There was some level of impact identified on minor issues within the Pacific Place proposals. But little impact on the fundamental aspects of the
plan, for example, the provision of social housing and the question of impact assessment.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING

Having established that the public participation process did not seem to work well from a community perspective, it is important to explore why and to identify the potential reasons for this. Here the findings fall into two categories:

1. General factors affecting the effectiveness of public participation.

2. Specific factors that relate to the UMPS themselves that affect the effectiveness of public participation.

1. General Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Public Participation

There are a number of general factors that affect the operation of public participation in planning. These include:

a) the global economy

b) central versus local government control

c) the local power structure

   (i) the political composition of the city council.

   (ii) the role of community organizations.

   (iii) the relationship between city planners and community organizations.

   (iv) the relationship between 'professional' planners and
their political leaders.

(v) the relationship between developers and city governments.

d) the theoretical foundations of public participation in planning.

a) The Global Economy

The context of UMP development is the emergence of the transnational economy and the quest of mobile international capital to seek out good investment opportunities in real estate. We have seen the emergence of the concept of the 'entrepreneurial city' as an attempt to attract this capital, and the growth of competition as cities vie with each other in this task. In some senses this has resulted in planning moving away from its traditional regulatory role to that of a mechanism that is instrumental in facilitating international investment into cities. It is taken for granted that this investment is beneficial for the cities and that all groups in the community will benefit from this growth. It is felt that the wealth generated by this investment will 'trickle down' to the most needy groups within the city. This explains the strong level of political support that UMPs appear to enjoy.

This new role for planning has a marked impact on the processes of public participation. At a very crude level it means that the planning process is geared to meet the needs of
the developer and that the process of public participation cannot be allowed to interfere with what the developer wants to do. UMP planning processes are therefore weighted in favour of the developer due to the benefits they are perceived to bring with them. There is little scope, therefore, for public participation to bring about any major changes in developers' proposals. It is possible for changes at the margins, in the detail of the projects, but not over major issues that affect the fundamental premise of the plan. This was evident throughout the Pacific Place process where pressure for change over fundamental issues like the amount of social housing was consistently resisted in favour of the developer, but where relatively minor issues like the provision of bus shelters were acceded to.

b) Central versus local government control

A major issue determining the effectiveness of public participation is how much control city councils have over development projects. The modified planning processes that have been introduced to handle UMPS have generally resulted in a loss of local government control over these projects. Senior levels of government exerted considerable levels of influence over the nature and shape of UMPS. The urban development corporation approach, for example, served to significantly reduce the influence of city councils over urban development. The development of Harbourfront, Battery Park City and the
London Docklands saw a limited role for the local elected city councils. In the London Docklands, the plans that had been produced by local councils in the area were ignored by the LDDC. The lack of control by local councils resulted here in a very limited role for public participation. In the cases reviewed in Chapter Four, the use of the urban development corporation approach generally worked to exclude local residents from the planning process.

There appeared to be more local control in the municipal co-operative approach. Here the planning process remained within the realm of elected councils, but even here the considerable influence from higher levels of government was evident. For example, in the Pacific Place process the provincial government played a major role in shaping and facilitating the development proposal. The provincial government was responsible for the decision to cancel the North Park plan and sell the entire Expo site to a private developer. This was part of the B.C. Government’s broader privatization strategy that saw it abandon the land development business in favour of the private sector. Under this strategy the B.C. Government proceeded to play an active role in seeking out a buyer and in facilitating Li Ka-shing’s purchase of the site.
c) **Local Power Structure**

There were a number of key issues that were identified under this heading:

(i) **Political composition of city council:** In cases where local councils did have influence over urban development the political composition of city council became critically important. The election, for example, of a more community-based council in Toronto was influential in leading to a review of the Railway Lands Plan. The election of this council was seen as an end to the developers’ control of city hall. The new council was much more committed to encouraging public participation from citizens, communities and interest groups and facilitating development that provided tangible benefits for low income communities. San Francisco City Council were responsive to the concerns from community groups concerning the development of Mission Bay. The consequence of this was a much altered proposal from the original schemes, that reflected a response to the concerns raised.

Throughout the Pacific Place process the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) retained control over Vancouver City Council. They are a party that supports private enterprise, and is perceived as being closely aligned with the development industry. Overall, they see the Pacific Place development as being extremely beneficial to the city in terms of improving its image, generating tax dollars, stimulating economic
development, and facilitating future investment, and so have been supportive of the proposal. They believed that they were acting in the best interests of the city and its residents. But, such overt support of mega-projects resulted in the concerns being raised by community groups as not being recognised as valid. Groups such as DERA were frequently dismissed by the NPA as being negative and opposed to change. The NPA members on Council tended to resist or ignore criticisms made of the proposals. Moreover, the NPA had few positive connections with neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside and so were more likely to be out of touch with the issues and problems of such areas. Groups such as DERA were treated with suspicion and seen as being too "negative" and "political". The NPA view of the planning process was a traditional mainstream one that saw it as "neutral and apolitical" one.13

(ii) The role of community organizations was an important factor affecting the effectiveness of public participation in planning processes. Public processes that facilitate more equitable treatment of low income groups or neighbourhoods work better where the community is relatively well organized and where community groups take on a pro-active role. The Railway Lands Action Coalition is a good example of how

13 But the NPA used the planning process in an overtly "political" way to support the mega-projects and their developers.
community groups were able to influence the Railway Lands planning process. They successfully campaigned for a review of the 1985 Plan, but were also pro-active in putting forward proposals of their own. Their plan was substantially different from the developer’s, and was much more orientated toward affordable housing, public transport and sustainable development.

The role of community organizations in the London Docklands was severely limited by the urban development approach and by the negative attitude the LDDC exhibited towards community groups. Local voices were openly ignored. The negative response to the Peoples’ Plan for the Royal Docks was clear evidence of this. The local interest was seen as something to be sacrificed for the greater national interest. Yet, the community response was successful in documenting the negative impacts that the LDDC approach to urban development has had on the Docklands area and the local people.

The Mission Bay process was a good example of how community groups organized to influence the outcomes of the process. Building on many years of community activism, community groups in San Francisco succeeded in negotiating substantial changes to the original proposals for Mission Bay with the inclusion of a greater range of affordable housing units and no building heights over eight stories. They ensured that the public
process was used to the full. A further important factor was the series of community-based plans for the development of the land. The groups were well-informed and were able to negotiate well with both the developers and the planners.

In Vancouver, the community response to the Pacific Place process started early, with concern about the sale of the land. Groups such as DERA, TRAC, ELP, and the Vancouver and District Labour Council took an active role in the Pacific Place process. DERA members in particular was active in responding to a number of mega-project developments, including Pacific Place and Coal Harbour, that were likely impact on the Downtown Eastside. They campaigned to make the city and provincial governments aware of the negative impacts that Expo '86 and the B.C. Place development would have on the neighbourhood. Their participation, at least, ensured that the community concerns about the potential impacts of the development remained on the agenda.

Consequently, the existence of community organizations and the organizational infrastructure at the grassroots level appeared to have a critical impact on the public process. Where community groups and organizations were well organized, they were able to exert considerable influence. This was particularly evident where groups were able to produce more community-orientated plans that reflected very different
priorities to those of the developer.

(iii) The relationship between the city planners and community organizations proved to be a crucial issue. In most cases the city planners were perceived by the community to be on the developer's side rather than that of the community. The Vancouver planners were seen to have a close working relationship with Concord Pacific. This made community groups suspicious of the city planners. As noted previously, the city planners did maintain a proper and professional relationship with the developer. They felt strongly that they were acting in the broad public interest by trying to ensure full opportunity for public participation and to secure the maximum amount of public benefits out if the developer. This was confirmed in my interviews with Blair Hagkull and Stanley Kwok from Concord Pacific. As noted in the previous chapter city planner Larry Beasley had established a reputation as a tough negotiator.

The local community perception of their relationship was very different. Consequently, the planners did not develop close links with the local community groups, particularly from the impacted neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside, and it could be argued that the effectiveness of the public process suffered as a result.
Moreover, there was a strong perception by the local community that the planners did not undertake sufficient impact work. This was a fact acknowledged by the planners themselves. They were, however, instrumental in getting city council to fund the impact studies that were undertaken by Hulchanski and Burgess, Austin and Associates. But, generally, there was a lack of a comprehensive impact assessment process, which should really be essential on a project of this size.

(iv) The relationship between the 'professional' planners and the council was critical. This leads us to a very significant issue, the relationship between the city planners and their political leaders over policy-making. The context for UMP development was very much established by the NPA majority on Council. They were led by a pro-development Mayor, who had considerable development experience and was well connected with the industry. The intention was to create a 'world class' city, and major flagship developments such as Pacific Place were a key element in this strategy. The mega-projects were seen as just the right type of prestige development to create this image. They were viewed as bright and exciting projects that brought with them considerable investment potential. They would also bring in much needed tax revenue and provide an important stimulus to the local and metropolitan economies. This created a pro-development context in which the city planners were forced to work. Their job was to facilitate
development to ensure that the 'world class' city image became a reality. Mayor Campbell was a strong, forceful and personable character and was able to exert considerable power over City Council departments. It could be argued that the planners had little room for manoeuvre. Any overt support by the city planners for the local community perspective would not have found favour among the dominant NPA group.

(v) The nature of the relationship between developers and city government was a further critical factor and was seen to be determined by the approach taken to urban development. One of the key aspects of UMP development is a much stronger private developer presence and a weaker government role in urban development. In the development corporation approach the role of the city government was marginalized to a large degree. In the co-operative municipal approach, the relationship was closer, and based on the concept of partnership between the public and private sectors. This relationship is characterized by "co-operation" between the developer and the city government. The public perception of this relationship in the Pacific Place process was that the developers and the city council were in "each others pockets", and that such a relationship gave the developer an "inside track" on the process. This served to undermine the local community organization's confidence in the process. A more arm's length relationship between the developer and city government was
felt to be more appropriate by these community organizations. This public perception caused the planners considerable concern and led to some rethinking about the City’s relationship with the developer:

"In future projects we would tend to keep the developer in the background a lot more, in terms of saying you are one of many actors, you are going to have your input through the process, but this is where the community really gets to have its say up front as to what the plan should be and what its concerns are."14

d) The theoretical foundations of public participation in UMP planning

There is an argument to suggest that the Pacific Place process was both institutionally and politically constrained from the start by the theory on which it was based. The City decided to adopt a consultation approach, informed by the rational comprehensive model, rather than an approach that facilitated a greater degree of citizen control over development outcomes. If we refer back to the definitions of public participation discussed on Chapter Three consultation would be seen by Arnstein as being a form of tokenism, which does not provide the participating citizen or community group any degree of power (Arnstein, 1969). In Burke’s terms consultation would be viewed as a form of staff supplement, which identifies participation as a means of adding to the expertise of the official planners who remain in control of the process.

14 Interview with Tom Fletcher, Director of Planning, City of Vancouver, September 26, 1990.
(Kaspenson and Breitbart, 1974). In Susskind and Elliot's view, consultation would be described as some form of paternalistic activity as the participation remains highly centralized and closely managed by the local government planners (Susskind and Elliot, 1984).

It was clear that the consultation model did not match up to the local community group expectations of a public participation process. Groups such as DERA wanted a much more active role and to be fully involved in the whole process, and play a part in the detailed negotiations between the developer and the City. Community groups did not have any control over the agenda and the Pacific Place public participation process was established without any public involvement.

Within this consultation approach the Vancouver planners saw their role as the technical experts acting in the overall public interest, advising the politicians who then made the decisions. Despite the appearance of participation the decision-making in the planning process remained top down and centralized. Basically, the Pacific Place planning process remained entrenched within the traditional mainstream planning approach. Such an approach to planning did not adequately support active citizen involvement in the planning process.
As Chapter Two demonstrated the theory is there to support a more participatory approach to planning. The radical planning literature reviewed earlier provided an indication of the rich source of theory that supports a more bottom-up and participatory approach to planning. The practice of planning informed by this theory would require a much greater role for the involvement of the local community, a role that goes beyond more than just being consulted. The role of the planners and the outcomes of the planning process would be different. The practice of equity planning and popular planning, two expressions of planning practice informed by the radical planning model, demonstrated that planning can give local communities a greater degree of power to influence the outcomes of planning processes to ensure that their priorities prevail.

The radical planning model viewed public participation as an integral part of the planning process. Public participation was seen as a mechanism to enable the community to influence the outcome of planning processes. It provided a more democratic and people-orientated approach to the planning of our modern cities. Recent literature on democracy and citizenship points in the direction of participatory democracy as the basis for public participation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The development of effective public participation processes must be a bottom-up process. It must start with the
citizens themselves. The concept of representative democracy often does not provide an adequate framework for effective public participation as the effective power to consider the wishes of community groups lies with the public representatives rather than the groups themselves (Pateman, 1970).

2. Specific Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Public Participation

The effectiveness of public participation is also affected by factors that are much more specific to UMPS as a particular form of urban development.

UMPS are seen as mechanisms to bring about urban and economic regeneration and to attract investment into cities. They are seen as prestige developments designed to enhance the image and the attraction of the city. They are also seen in very pragmatic terms as a means of tax revenue for the city. As noted above the Pacific Place project was designed to contribute to the future of Vancouver as a "world class" city. The aim was to attract international investment and provide a development for citizens from all over the world. It could be argued that the project was not designed for local people, so in some senses was detached from the locality. Despite the fact that the design team was based in Vancouver it could be argued that many of the decisions affecting the Pacific Place
development were made outside of the locality in Hong Kong. This reduced the possibility of the local participation having an impact on the outcomes. Decisions made in a Hong Kong boardroom are not open to local community scrutiny or influence. This is indicative of the strong international context in which UMP decisions take place, and the weaker degree of local control over urban development.

A further important factor about UMPS is that they are generally seen as exclusive developments with high office and commercial components and market housing units. Residents from the low income neighbourhoods surrounding the UMP sites tend to enjoy few benefits from such development. Moreover, the experience with UMPS that are built or in the process of being built would seem to indicate that the negative impacts on surrounding low income communities are quite severe. The experience from the London Docklands, for example, clearly points to the fact that there is now a growing polarization between the new incoming communities and the existing poorer working class residents. Fainstein's work on Battery Park points to many similar impacts in New York (Fainstein, 1991).

UMPS have distinct characteristics that can impede the effectiveness of public participation:

(i) The size and scale of the proposed developments can make it difficult for citizens and community groups to relate to.
It is difficult, for example, to sustain public interest in developments with such a long development time line.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the large scale nature of the projects has invited more intervention from senior levels of government, thereby reducing local government and the community’s control over the development. In principle this may not be a bad thing, but is dangerous when senior levels of government show little commitment to effecting public participation at the local level, and when there is little commitment to equity, as appeared to be the case in the UMPS reviewed here.

(ii) The strategic location of these projects means that the development stakes were high, especially in the high growth decade of the 1980s. The UMPS were located close to downtown cores and frequently incorporated extensive areas of waterfront land. In most cases this made these sites highly attractive to developers. It meant that such sites were destined for high income generating uses. In many ways, it might be argued, then, that the nature of the plans was pre-determined prior to the commencement of any public process, and, consequently, the leeway for local community influence was small.
(iii) The UMP developers were powerful transnational corporations with considerable resources at their disposal to influence local councils and the general public. The developers were able to employ public relations and marketing skills to promote their developments and to secure public and council support. Community groups, on the other hand, often had few resources to put forward their point of view. This discrepancy was rarely explicitly acknowledged in the public process. For example, no special resources were provided for community groups to organize or to put forward their concerns in relation to the mega-projects. DERA had consistently pressed Vancouver City Council for such resources to employ a planner to work on their behalf to evaluate the Pacific Place proposals and to assess the impact on the local community. However, the San Francisco groups were comparatively well-resourced and were able to organize more effectively as a result.

The power of local communities to influence UMP proposals appeared to be greatly enhanced when there was a close alliance between the local community and the city council. The Toronto Railway Lands example demonstrated the potential of how UMP developers can be challenged, when the newly elected reform-minded City Council embarked on the review process of the approved plan. Coin Street in London, considered in Chapter Three, also proves the potential of the alliance
between local government and the local community, where a big international developer was defeated by the plan of the local community acting in concert with the Greater London Council and the development that occurred was determined and controlled by local groups in the community.

(iv) It is evident that UMP planning processes have resulted in "new relationships" between the public and private sectors. The term "partnership" was commonly used in the UMPS to refer to the close links between the public and private sectors. The role of planning has changed from one of regulation to that of facilitation in relation to urban development. The private sector was perceived by senior governments as having the leadership role in urban redevelopment, with the public sector providing a facilitating role. As previously noted, the context of UMPS is a much stronger private presence and a weaker government role in urban development. This was interpreted by community groups that the needs of the developer tended to receive a higher priority than those of other actors in the process.

(v) UMPS are image orientated and have a tendency to generate a distinct momentum of their own that to some extent makes them impervious to the influence of public participation. There appeared to be a general unquestioned assumption by governments that UMPS were a good thing for the city. Their
attractiveness is that they bring disused land into use, they improve the physical appearance of the city, they attract international investment, they are said to create jobs, and they provide much needed tax revenue for local government. Consequently, the projects were often surrounded by considerable hype and publicity about the potential benefits they would bring to the cities concerned. This can help to generate what has been referred to as the 'bandwagon' effect where a decision is made on limited information and where sufficient commitment to a project is made at an early stage which severely restricts the effects of subsequent inputs (Levin, 1976; Masser, 1982). This can result in circumventing the public planning process, and may encourage the public to take a less active role in the process. It may also help to mask faults or gaps in the proposals and give the project a life or momentum of its own. There appeared to be little critical analysis as to what the benefits of UMPS actually were, and, perhaps more importantly, what were the costs in terms of potential disbenefits.\(^{15}\)

This momentum also creates a tendency toward over-optimistic expectations about the benefits that UMPS generate, which have

\(^{15}\) Nancy Knight's study of natural resource mega-project planning processes in Northern British Columbia noted how the hype and the hope generated by overly optimistic expectations, regarding the potential contributions of natural resource projects to regional economic development, led to a situation which submerged rational analysis and stampeded the planning process (Knight, 1990).
not generally been borne out in practice (Brownill, 1990; Docklands Consultative Committee, 1992; Fainstein, 1991). Concord Pacific have promised enormous benefits to the residents of Vancouver, such as parks, open space, waterfront walkways, and community amenities, which act as powerful incentives to accept and ratify the proposals.\(^{16}\)

(vi) UMPS have **significant impacts** on neighbouring low income communities who are already under-represented in planning processes. Residents of low income communities are often the most difficult to get involved in public participation processes. As noted previously, when so much energy is expelled in the course of daily survival, there is often little left to draw on to get involved in a planning process.

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\(^{16}\) There are questions about whether such benefits, promised at the time of rezoning, ever become implemented, as intended. One of the conditions and public benefits offered by the developer at the time of the approval of the Pacific Place ODP was that Concord Pacific would pay fifty percent of the cost of a salt-water pumping station on the site. A salt-water pumping station is an installation to pump water from False Creek to use in the event of fire on the mainland, and was required due in part to the controversial decision of Vancouver City Council to sell their fire-boat. The Council subsequently approved that the developers contribution be reduced to twenty-five percent due to rising costs. This was an estimated loss of $1.5 million to the public purse.

In the Canary Wharf development, O\&Y were expected to contribute in the region of $800 million to the cost of extending the Jubilee underground tube line out to the development. In return for such a commitment the public sector contribution was to be in the region of $3 billion. The recent financial collapse of O\&Y has not only resulted in the loss of that agreement, but also highlights the precarious nature of securing public benefits through the private sector, which is now the common trend in the deficit governments of the 1980s and 1990s.
on the scale of Pacific Place. There was little attendance at the various public meetings, model displays and exhibitions by residents from the directly impacted neighbourhoods. They were represented, by and large, by community organizations operating in the area.

There is little evidence to suggest that the current approach to UMP planning is providing many benefits for the low income residents of our cities. This suggests that the 'trickle down' theory so often used to justify these projects generally has not worked as intended or hoped. Instead, it appeared from the London Docklands and Battery Park City case studies that these developments had served to increase the polarization of the existing low income residents and the incoming residents and users of the new developments. It further suggested that generally UMP planning processes have worked to exclude communities from having an active and meaningful role in the development of UMPS.

CONCLUSION
The analysis of the Pacific Place process, and the other case studies, suggests that public participation in UMP planning processes have not been effective from a community perspective. It was clear that the Pacific Place process provided plenty of opportunity for input, but that the opportunity for participation did not translate into effective
influence on the outcomes of the process. The three characteristics of equity, efficiency and efficacy of effective public participation were found missing from the Pacific Place planning process.

First, the process was found to be inequitable. Three different types of inequity were specifically identified. There was discrimination against organized groups, there was differential access to resources, and there was inequitable access to planning staff and information. Second, from a community perspective the process was inefficient. The scale of the UMPS involved long planning processes, difficult for community groups to sustain involvement. The Pacific Place process did not have a clear time-line, nor was it clear to community groups how the process was organized, or how public input would be incorporated. Third, in terms of efficacy, two levels of impacts were identified. The public were seen to have successfully made an impact with regard to minor issues, but participants were unsuccessful in making major changes to the development proposals. The Pacific Place research cited a number of examples demonstrating the lack of influence on major issues. It could be argued that the community groups found the process frustrating in that it failed to give their constituents any real power to influence the outcomes of the process.
In turning to the question of why the public participation proved ineffective it was possible to make the distinction between general and specific factors. A number of general factors were identified that affected the operation of public participation in the planning system. These included the influence of the transnational economy, the loss of local control over urban development, the nature of the local power structure, and the theoretical foundations on which the practice of public participation is based. It was further determined that the process was constrained by the consultation approach, located within the rational comprehensive model of participation, that was adopted by the City.

Other factors were identified more specific to UMPS that impacted on the effectiveness of public participation in the Pacific Place process. These included the scale of the projects, their strategic location in downtown areas adjacent to low-income communities, the power and resources of UMP developers, the close relationship between the public and private sectors, and the powerful momentum of the projects themselves. Overall, public participation in the Pacific Place planning process failed to give community groups sufficient power to ensure that community priorities prevailed in the final outcomes of the process.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

"Participation calls for a new, broadly conceived planning that is first and foremost a basic community process. In this new planning, the professional planner could take the role of catalyst and facilitator. He could be one who makes both the normative and technical aspects of this process work. We must come to recognize the fundamental connection of planning and action and seek to reintegrate them within the planning process going on in our communities. What we are calling for is the politicization and normatization of planning" (Kravitz, 1968, 46).

INTRODUCTION

The analytical framework introduced in Chapter One (see Figure 1) and the analysis contained in the previous chapters would suggest that public participation in UMP planning has not been effective. This is a critical issue from a community perspective due to the significant impacts that these projects have on cities and their residents. In general terms, the planning processes reviewed in this research have not been equitable, efficient, or efficacious. It is clear then that the appearance of participation and its effectiveness are two different things. It is possible to have the opportunity for participation without that participation affecting the outcomes of the planning process. The three characteristics of effective public participation were missing.
Why was public participation so ineffective? There were a number of reasons identified for this. At a general level there were found to be a number of factors that hindered the effectiveness of the public participation process. These included the global economic context in which UMP planning took place which restricted the potential for local influence; the stronger presence of powerful international developers; the introduction of modified planning processes that facilitated a much stronger private sector presence and weaker local government control in urban development; the local power structure; and the theoretical foundation on which the practice of public participation in UMP planning was based.

At a more specific level, UMPS had particular characteristics that impeded or worked to counteract effective participation. They were big projects with long development horizons, which made effective public participation difficult to sustain. They were in key strategic downtown locations which made the development stakes high and less open to public influence. Moreover, UMPS due to their size and importance generated a momentum of their own, the 'bandwagon' effect as it was called, that served, it could be argued, to submerge rational analysis and stampede the planning process. Their scale and the promise of significant public benefits made them difficult to challenge. These projects are attractive to local government in terms of the benefits they promise in terms of
the much needed tax revenue, the provision of housing and jobs, and their economic development potential.

A further important factor was the recent trend in urban policy toward more "co-operative" relationships with the private sector. The private sector has a much stronger presence in determining the nature and shape of large scale urban development and local government has a correspondingly much weaker role. This had marked implications for public participation in planning processes in that it has changed the fundamental nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors. In the development corporation approach the public planning function was surrendered to the needs of the market in order to promote development. In this situation there was no place for public participation. The only role it could play was to legitimise the process or play a public relations role. This was particularly well-illustrated in the London Docklands. The situation was somewhat better with the co-operative municipal approach, in that the planning processes remained within the public domain, but the private sector was still the dominant force. There was the appearance of public participation, but there was little evidence to suggest that it was effective. The groups involved acknowledged, however, that the public process provided a "hand-hold" on the development proposals and an important channel through which to input their views.
In both the development corporation and the municipal co-operative approaches, market forces determined the nature of the development. All levels of government have been receptive to UMP development as they are seen as making significant contributions to urban and economic regeneration. The most public participation could do in these circumstances was to bring about change at the margins, in the details of the proposal, rather than in the fundamental concepts or form of the development. The efficacy of the process was severely restricted. The planners’ role had been to facilitate development proposals generated by developers, rather than to embark on a public planning process that determined how these sites should be developed. In the Pacific Place case study, the Policy Broadsheets were an attempt to ensure that public priorities were reflected in the proposed development. However, they were drawn up recognising the constraints of the global economy and in a manner so as not to deter developers, rather than as a response to defined public need.

TOWARD NEW PARTNERSHIPS

For the local communities affected by mega-projects to have a greater impact on the outcomes of planning processes we need to rethink the relationships between the actors involved in UMP planning. Co-operative or collaborative planning processes can be problematic for public participation. The development corporation and municipal co-operative approaches placed too
much power in hands of the developer. The public sector was forced into negotiating benefits from profits it has helped to create via rezoning and various public subsidies. One of the opportunities to change such power linkages might be to shift the alliance between local government and international developers to a new partnership between local governments and local communities. Such alliances may have greater potential of supporting and promoting equity, efficiency and efficacy.

There appeared to be a prevailing assumption by governments that UMP development would bring overall benefits for the city and the local economy. Yet, the distribution of potential benefits of such development has to be questioned. The partnerships between the public and private sectors did not appear to work in favour of the low income communities impacted by mega-project development.

A further factor to consider was that many of the UMP sites have taken years to develop. Thus at the end of the study period the Railway Lands site in Toronto and Mission Bay site in San Francisco still lay vacant and were likely to do so for the foreseeable future. A major factor here was the collapse of the property market at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. A different planning approach might have secured an earlier start to development. At the moment none of the actors involved are benefitting. The developers
face increasing carrying costs and frustrating delays, city
governments lose potential tax revenues, and city residents
gaze upon a large derelict site and wander what is taking so
long to bring the land back into effective use.

CHANGING ALLIANCES: A NEW ROLE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

How can this situation be changed? How can public
participation in UMP planning be made more effective? How can
the characteristics of equity, efficiency and efficacy be
established within UMP planning processes? Under such extreme
pressure towards the internationalization of cities, local
governments must reaffirm their role in controlling urban
development. It is only through the reinforcement of this role
that localities will be able to challenge international
developers to restore local control of cities.

This statement runs counter to the widespread belief that the
role of local government will diminish in an international
 economy. Certainly that appears to be the trend in the
development of the UMP examples reviewed here. Higher levels
of government have the ability to influence these
international flows of capital, but choose not to effect it.
There is an argument to suggest that in fact local government
might be best placed to control such development. They can use
locality as a significant bargaining tool with international
developers. What is more it appears to be in the interests of
the UMP developers themselves to have an increased measure of local control over their developments. The UMP developers have considerable resources, but what they usually lack is knowledge about the locality. Moreover, the grand blue-print style of development appeared not to be suited to the recessionary period of the 1990s. An incremental approach more sensitive to local conditions could have resulted in a form of development that was more resilient to world economic changes.

In order to promote more local control local government must take a leadership role and foster much closer ties with local communities impacted by UMP development. City governments have to be in touch with the needs and aspirations of communities, so heavily impacted by UMP development. Community groups impacted by UMPS are generally not opposed to development, but they are opposed to the creation of highly exclusive developments that provide few benefits for low income groups.

A practical reason for city governments to forge much closer working relationships with communities impacted by UMPS and the organizations working within these areas is to access and make use of the knowledge and information they possess. Community groups such as DERA have a detailed and intimate knowledge of the dynamics of communities and of the issues that affect them. Such information can enrich the planning
process and improve the awareness and understanding of the potential impacts of UMP development. It can improve both the efficacy and efficiency elements of the process and lead to a better quality planning process.

If the way forward is for local government to strengthen its ties with local communities two questions immediately come to mind: a) is there the political will to do this? and b) assuming there is how do local governments do it? In response to the first question, I would suggest that it is in interests of all the actors involved to adopt a new approach to UMP planning. The current approach in the current economic climate appears to provide few benefits for the community or the developers. Reaffirming local control might be a means of improving benefits for all concerned.

The second question of how this might be done is more difficult. Community organization and effective public participation are vital elements of the revitalization of local governments as dynamic agents of urban development. Consequently, it is imperative for local government to ally itself more closely to the local community. The partnership of local government and local communities will form a powerful and creative alliance that will facilitate greater power sharing among all the actors involved. The development of effective public participation must start with the community.
The city planners would perform a key role in this new process by helping to mobilize and empower local groups. This could be done by the provision of information about the projects and the intentions of the developers, by spending time in the community and by undertaking detailed impact assessment work on the proposed projects. Planners could be assigned to work directly with community groups in the areas impacted by the development. This would involve incorporating an explicit equity agenda into UMP planning processes, that recognised that these groups need extra resources to enable them to participate on a more equal basis. In the current approaches community groups are at a severe resource disadvantage in comparison the UMP developers such as Concord Pacific and O&Y.

Further, it is important for city governments to maintain an arms-length relationship with the UMP developers. Developing closer working relationships with groups in the community would help this to happen. This would help local groups regain their faith in the public process. The perceived close working relationship between Concord Pacific and Vancouver City Council did considerable harm to public confidence in the Pacific Place process. The public perception of 'fast-tracking' the process and 'working co-operatively' with the developer, whilst not always accurate, undermined the willingness of groups to participate in a process they felt was predetermined.
A further tactic to increase the power and influence of local government would be for city governments and community organizations to develop a network of contacts with their counterparts in other cities faced with similar developments. A much stronger power base may result as well as providing the opportunity for the cross-fertilization of ideas and experience. Links for example between local governments in San Francisco and Vancouver, might have proved informative. While local government and local communities remain isolated, they weaken their ability to control development on this scale.

THE UMP PLANNING PROCESS OF THE FUTURE

The examination of public participation in UMP planning processes has demonstrated the lack of power afforded to community groups in planning processes generally. The necessary ingredients of equity, efficiency and efficacy are missing. UMP planning is no different in principle to other planning processes, except in scale. Where local community groups have had influence it is through their own community organizing, rather than through the official public process. If the conclusions drawn from the study of the case studies in this dissertation hold true generally, it is questionable as to whether public participation can ever be effective within the existing political, institutional and administrative constraints.
UMP public participation processes to date have adopted the rational comprehensive planning model. A liberal democratic view that supports a planning process that tends to be top-down, technical and apolitical. The planners are seen as the experts acting in the public interest. The community is there to be consulted, but its role is essentially a passive one. This model confers no power on groups in the community. They can make representations, but it is up to others as to whether these will be acted upon.

To be effective public participation requires a different theoretical base its foundation within the planning process. There needs to be a shift toward the radical planning model, which sees the planning process as a political and redistributive mechanism. Public participation needs to be seen as a central feature of the planning process which forms a part of the local democratic structure. This model conforms to the radical planning model. The theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two provides an indication of the theory available to draw on, which potentially supports a much more participatory style of planning that is equitable, efficient and efficacious. Public participation in UMP planning is ineffective because the dominant rational comprehensive planning model does not support these characteristics. The planners are forced to adopt this model because it is the model that is supported by the developer-orientated
politicians and the one favoured by the developers.

Future planning processes need to incorporate some of the suggestions outlined above if public participation is to become more effective. They need to recognise the political nature of UMP planning processes and positively discriminate in favour of impacted communities. They need to incorporate the criteria of equity, efficiency and efficacy. New alliances need to be forged between city governments and community groups. It is these alliances that will revitalize local democracy and strengthen local government's ability to control and shape urban development. It is the interests of all those involved in UMP planning to actively question the current approach and begin to think seriously about an alternative. One which sees the public sector, via local government in association with the local community, in the leadership role. There is a need to revitalize local democracy and reaffirm the urgency of effective public participation.
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