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Global education as moral education: building a community of concern Darling, Linda 1994

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GLOBAL EDUCATION AS MORAL EDUCATION:BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF CONCERNbyLINDA FARR DARLINGB.A., The University of New Hampshire, 1974M.Ed., The University of New Hampshire, 1984A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of Social and Educational StudiesWe accept this thesis as conforming to the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAAugust 1994©Linda Farr Darling, 1994In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall riot be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department of YZ/57’jt’di/SThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate______________DE-6 (2)88)ABSTRACTIn this dissertation, I construct and defend a conception of globaleducation as a moral enterprise. I argue that the ethical and politicalcommitments which should be at the heart of programs have not been madeexplicit or central. Fundamental commitments to democracy are incompatiblewith global education that focuses mainly on existing world systems andrelationships, and promotes national interests. The foundations of globaleducation should be those that underlie projects of communicative ethics,defined here as frameworks for uncoerced communication between particularindividuals in actual contexts. On this view, global education is education towardjust and respectful exchanges across social, political, and cultural differences.A central feature of this conception is the development of a defensibleglobal perspective. To attain such a perspective is, in part, to develop thesensitivities and dispositions that will help one understand and appreciateanother’s point of view. This kind of understanding can only be partial and isoften problematic. There is always the possibility of misunderstanding, evenincommensurability. Further, understanding does not entail agreement. Dialogueneeds to proceed cautiously and with awareness of the potential for coercion.Nevertheless, it is hoped that educational efforts toward communicating withothers will lead to the mutual recognition of some commonalities, and mayeventuate in the construction of a limited global community of concern.There are a number of communicative virtues necessary for listening andspeaking to individuals who are beyond the boundaries of our existing local andnational concerns. The three moral dispositions presented here are especiallyimportant. Empathy, tolerance, and a sense of justice are discussed in terms ofmeeting the challenges of communicating across differences and distance.IIIClassrooms are places where these virtues can be carefully cultivated, andwhere the possibilities for constructing community can be explored throughdefensible programs of global education.TABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract iiTable of Contents ivAcknowledgements vtIntroduction IStructure of the Thesis 4Chapter One: The Problems and Possibilities of Global Education 91.1. Introduction 91.2. Slogans 91.3. The Interests Behind Slogans 121.4. Justifications for Global Education 231.4.1. Global Education as Preparation for National Citizenship 261.4.2. Global Education for Successful International Competition inTrade, Commerce and Industry 271.4.3. Global Education for International Cooperation on Global Issues.281.4.4. Global Education as Education for Social Justice 291.5. World Citizenship 301.6. Education for Citizenship within a Democracy 331.6.1. Fraternity 361.6.2. Tolerance 371.6.3. Justice 371.7. Education for World Citizenship 38Chapter Two: Redefining the Global Perspective 462.0. Introduction 462.1. The Need for a Global Perspective 462.2. Defining the Global Perspective 482.2.1. The First Dimension of a Global Perspective 492.2.2. Hanvey’s Second Dimension 502.2.3. Hanvey’s Third Dimension 532.2.4. Hanvey’s Fourth and Fifth Dimensions 542.3. Clarifying Elements of a Global Perspective 582.4. A Morally Defensible Global Perspective 602.5. Attitudes and the Global Perspective 652.6. The Global Perspective and Community Building 692.7. Conclusion 72Chapter Three: The Search for Community in the Global Age 773.1. Introduction 773.2. The Loss of Traditional Communities 79V3.3. The Viability of Communities in the Global Age 833.4. Identities and Moral Discourse in Communities 863.5. The Case for Diversity in Communities 923.6. Conclusion: A Participationist Community 98Chapter Four: Constructing a Global Community of Concern 1044.1. Introduction 1044.2. A Community of Inquirers 1044.3. Conversing Across Differences 1144.4. Standards for Communication 1164.5. Building a Community of Concern 1204.6. The Challenge to Constructing a Community of Concern 1234.7. Conclusion 130Chapter Five: Moral Conversations: Justice, Tolerance and Empathy in GlobalEducation 1365.0. Introduction 1365.1. A Sense of Justice 1385.1.1. Justice in a Global Community 1395.1.2. Justice and Care 1435.1.3. Developing a Sense of Justice 1475.2. Another Look at Tolerance 1505.2.1. Tolerance as an Active Virtue 1515.2.2. Rights and Responsibilities 1535.2.3. Toleration in Communication 1565.2.4. Tolerance and the Global Perspective 1595.3. Empathy 1615.3.1. The Concept of Empathy 1615.3.2. Empathy and the Global Perspective 1665.4. Conclusion 172Chapter Six: Children in Communities of Concern: Educating for a GlobalPerspective 1816.1. Introduction 1816.2. Summary of the Arguments 1826.3. Children in Communities of Inquiry 1856.4. The Role of Literature in the Development of a Global Perspective ... 1926.5. Concluding Remarks 196Bibliography 202viACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI am grateful to the following people who in various and important waysencouraged me and supported my efforts to read more widely, think moreclearly, argue more convincingly, and write from the heart: Virginia, Bill, andSara Farr, Barry Darling, Ann Diller, Edgar and Barbara Wyman, Alan Purves,Shirley Parkinson, Mark Selman, Roland Case, Carol LaBar, Ian Wright, CeliaHaig-Brown, and Angela Ward. My appreciation also goes to Tony Varga andRobin Van Heck who assisted in preparing the final draft. An additional thankyou is offered to my committee members for their help and their patience: mysupervisor, Jerrold Coombs, LeRoi Daniels, and Walter Werner. Finally, my loveand thanks go to Murray Ross who still and always believes in me.IINTRODUCTIONAll education which develops power to share effectively in social life ismoral.John Dewey1This dissertation is about the philosophical foundations of globaleducation, what they are now, and more importantly, what they ought to be. It isan argument for global education as a special kind of moral education. I arguethat a clear and defensible conception of global education based on moralconcerns and ideals has yet to be constructed. Before we can consistentlycreate programs that will develop desirable global perspectives in students, thisconceptual work must be taken up. My task is to construct and defend aconception of global education as education for world citizenship, as initiation, inother words, into the human community.The field of global education is and has been riddled with inconsistenciesand confusions. Global educators_disagree about the purposes of globaleducation as well as the meaning of its central concepts. Debates about thesematters have been with us for decades.2As well, there are persistent tensionsbetween those who advocate the kind of global education that will promotenational self-interest and those who see this instrumental view as incompatiblewith the goals of social justice the world over.Moral foundations of global education that could guide program planninghave rarely been made explicit in the literature.3 Even the clearest ofconceptions of global education fail to make their moral commitments central. Iargue that any vision of global education that does not take into account therange and depth of our moral responsibilities towards others in the world isdeficient. It will not promote the development of defensible global perspectives.2Therefore it will not meet the needs of students who are attempting tounderstand and grapple with global issues and relate to people of diverse beliefsand backgrounds.4 Our fundamental moral commitments to democracy areincompatible with global education that simply focuses on existing globalsystems and relationships. This kind of global education has sought to moreeffectively promote national self-interest by developing in students certainunderstandings and dispositions toward the rest of the world.A new conception of global education is needed, one in which moralcommitments are explicitly stated and the acquisition of defensible globalperspectives is seen as the central aim. My conception of global education iseducation for world citizenship. It is education that guides students towardrational, deliberate and responsible political participation based on acommitment to treating people fairly and decently.5 National citizenship ismembership in a political community bounded by the state. In a participatorydemocracy full membership requires commitment to ideals of justice and to formsof life based on individual freedom and on social cooperation. World citizenshipis membership in the human community. It also demands commitment to anideal; that of creating a more just and compassionate human community wherethere is at present only the roughest beginning of one.6Given the disparate nature of our backgrounds, our beliefs and ourcircumstances, the ideal of a global community seems to have only the mostfragile chance of realization on a large scale. But considering the magnitude ofworld crises in all spheres: environmental, political, social, economic and health,some kind of moral global community whose members address commonproblems and attempt to respond fairly and empathetically to peoples’ concernsis desperately needed. Exploring the possibilities for such a community is a taskthat can be taken up in schools in programs of global education.3In its broadest sense, global education is initiation into the humancommunity as it is now and as it ought to be, an exploration of what presentlyexists and what is possible. It is entering into the human conversation and tryingto make sense of a multiplicity of voices across the world. It is recognizing therights and the needs of others and taking their claims seriously. Globaleducation is also the capacity and the inclination to search for connectionsbetween oneself and strangers as fellow members of the human community. Tothis extent, it is moral education with a global frame of reference.One objective of moral education in any sphere is to develop in studentsthe understanding that community membership entails commitment towardsothers and towards the viability of the community itself. Membership in apotential global community of concern demands commitment as well and it setsout obligations of its own. In order to meet these obligations, we need to have aclear sense of what they are and on what moral foundations they rest. As yet,this view has not been central to conceptions of global education.The conception of global education I put forth in this thesis places moralconcerns at the centre of a defensible global perspective. A defensible globalperspective is based on certain commitments to the human community. Thesecommitments center on recognizing the humanity of others. They include treatingpeople fairly, attempting to understand their situations and points of view, andcreating conditions which will allow them opportunity to be heard and consideredin matters of common concern. To learn to converse across such differences asethnicity and social power, is to participate in constructing community. Thecommitments and perspectives that are necessary for this participation are thesubjects of this study.4STRUCTURE OF THE THESISIn Chapter One (The Problems and Possibilities of Global Education) Iexamine current confusions and disputes in global education. I also discuss thepersistent tension between global education that has as its goal the promotion ofnational interest and global education that promotes world citizenship. The casehas been made that global education exists as a system of slogans and thatmany disparate interests are represented by the call for global education inschools.7 Because so many interests are hidden under the banner of globaleducation, it is difficult to begin to lay the foundations for responsible programplanning without uncovering them. One such interest is a modern reformulationof manifest destiny. Because this view promotes a narrow set of nationalinterests, the kind of global perspective which follows from it is in direct conflictwith the goals of world citizenship as I see them.We need to go beyond slogans to lay the basis for program planning inglobal education. Clarifying what is meant by global education is the first step.Building a defensible conception of a global perspective is the next. In ChapterTwo (Redefining the Global Perspective) I analyze the most influential of currentconceptions of the global perspective, namely Robert Hanvey’s.8Although thereare valuable elements of this conception that should be kept, the moralfoundations which ought to lie at its heart are largely absent. I also explore themoral global perspective offered by Jerrold Coombs and explicate the reasons Ihave for thinking that it, too, has significant limitations.9My own conception of aglobal perspective is an attempt to offer a clearer and fuller sense of what worldcitizenship entails and what it means to be a member of a moral community on aglobal scale. A defensible global perspective is an attitude toward persons thatacknowledges their membership in this community as moral agents. Peter5Strawson’s description of reactive and objective attitudes forms the basis of thisdiscussion.1°In Chapter Three (The Search for Community in a Global Age) I discussthe nature of moral communities and the traditional foundations on which theyare based. Although the contemporary viability of the concept of community ischallenged by writers such as Maclntyre and Bellah, I argue that the challengescan be overcome by reexamining our commitments toward communication andour beliefs about the possibilities for human interaction across difference.11 Amoral community of the kind I advocate is based upon certain beliefs aboutpeople and certain attitudes about their needs and concerns. My conception of amoral global perspective entails these beliefs and attitudes. Participating in aglobal community of concern is entering into relationships with others based ona moral point of view.In Chapter Four (Constructing a Global Community of Concern) thediscussion about moral communities in the previous chapter leads to anargument for the construction of a global community of concern, Its members areattempting to answer the question “How should we live?” This is ultimately amoral question. It speaks first to the kind of communication that is necessarybetween people who are trying to converse across cultural, political and socialdifferences. Constructing a global community of concern is learning tocommunicate with people of diverse backgrounds and beliefs. The difficultiesinherent in these efforts are acknowledged and discussed. In order tocommunicate successfully, maxims of communication need to be taught andpracticed. We need to insure that all voices will be heard and that the question“How should we live?” remains an open and ongoing one. Kant’s three maximsof communication are employed as the framework for conversing acrossdifferences, or building community. Beyond adhering to these maxims, people6must pay attention to the particular demands of each context, and the need toproceed with special caution and sensitivity in relations with those who may bespeaking from disadvantaged positions in the dialogue.In Chapter Five (Moral Conversations: Justice, Tolerance and Empathy inGlobal Education) I argue that individuals who are attempting to communicateacross differences and construct moral communities with others need todemonstrate certain moral attitudes and dispositions. At least three moralattributes or communicative virtues are essential elements of a moral globalperspective. They are empathy, tolerance and a sense of justice. Preparingstudents to enter into the human conversation means developing these threeattributes within global education. Communication with others is often, if notnearly always, problematic. There is the ever present possibility of radicalmisunderstanding, and the constant danger of coercion by the more privilegedand powerful. A sense of justice is an essential part of participating in a moralcommunity because it helps us to acknowledge and understand the importanceof the rights and interests of others. A community of concern is also dependenton the expression of empathy as the recognition of the legitimacy and the moralsignificance of others as potential participants in dialogue. There are limited butimportant connections that do exist between people, including some sharedmoral concepts. Tolerance creates conditions that will make it possible forpeople to enter into the human conversation. In order for us to act within acommunity of concern, we must create conditions that will allow all voices to beheard and considered.In Chapter Six (Children in Communities of Inquiry: Educating for a GlobalPerspective) I return to the problem with which I began. A revised conception ofglobal education is necessary because present conceptions are inadequate tothe task of developing world citizens who will be prepared to converse across7differences and construct a global community of concern. My conception ofglobal education has as its central aim the attainment of a moral globalperspective that will enable students to take on the task of constructing a moralcommunity out of our disparate heritages. This is an educational aim that iscompatible with democratic ideals and commitments. Our moral responsibilitiestowards others do not stop at our national borders. Classrooms are placeswhere community building of the kind I have argued for in this thesis, can begin.In this chapter I discuss classrooms as communities of concern in which thecommunicative virtues are cultivated. I also argue that educators in area mustvigilantly maintain a critical stance toward the vision of global education that ispromoted in schools.I conclude with a caution but also a hope. We do not and cannot knowwhether a global community of concern can ever be realized in this world. Weneed not assume at the outset that it is an impossible ideal, even as weacknowledge the obstacles in its way. Whatever the chances for a moral globalcommunity, global education based on the idea of constructing community anddeveloping communicative virtues is a worthwhile endeavor. Programs thatfollow from my conception of global education will keep the ideal of a moralcommunity alive and powerful. This is justification enough for any conception.lJohn Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1961).2Willard Kniep, A Critical Review of the Short History of Global Education:Preparing for New Opportunities (New York: Global Perspectives in Education,1985).3See James Becker, “Goals of Global Education,” Global Education: FromThought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook, ed. Kenneth Tye (Alexandria, VA:Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development, 1991), 67—84; Kniep,A Critical Review of the Short History of Global Education; Robert Hanvey, AnAttainable Global Perspective (New York: Global Perspectives in Education,1982).84Kenneth Tye, ed., Global Education: From Thought to Action. ASCD1991 Yearbook (Alexandria, VA: Association for Curriculum and SupervisionDevelopment, 1991).5Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and PoliticalCommitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 229.6The UN is evidence of one such attempt to create community on a globalscale.7Thomas Popkewitz, “Global Education as a Slogan System,” CurriculumInquiry 10, no. 3 (1980).8Robert Hanvey, An Attainable Global Perspective (New York: GlobalPerspectives in Education. 1976).9Jerrold Coombs, Toward a Defensible Conception of a GlobalPerspective (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Studies, 1989).10Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the BritishAcademy (1962).11Alasdair Maclntyre, After Wrtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); and Robert Bellah et al., Habits of theHeart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper &Row, 1985).9CHAPTER ONETHE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF GLOBAL EDUCATIONI think I value global education, but I am mired in its linguistic confusion.Thomas Popkewitz11.1. INTRODUCTIONIn this chapter I discuss the present state of global education. First, Iargue that the various conceptions of global education that currently drivepolicy and programs compete with each other. Further, each conception hasadvocates who talk past each other. Clarification of goals and concepts istherefore essential. Second, I argue that while clarification is a necessary firststep, there is much more conceptual work to be done. Present justificationsfor global education are then briefly discussed. The most promising one,global education for world citizenship, is further explored in the last section ofthe chapter.1.2. SLOGANSThe field of global education is plagued by confusions and ambiguities.These exist at every level, from policy to implementation in the classroom.What do we mean by global education? Does it mean the same thing to afourth grade social studies teacher in rural Saskatchewan as it does to theeducation department in the same province? Does it mean the same thingwhen it appears in provincial curricula across Canada? Across individualclassrooms in the same school? Are the outcomes of global educationenvisioned by the business community the same outcomes as thoseunderstood by academics? What about global education as development10educators define it? Finally, and most importantly for my purposes, whatshould global education mean?The case has been made that global education exists as a system ofslogans, a bundle of rhetorical devices that rally disciples to a cause notalways explicated clearly.2 To understand the various conceptions of globaleducation is to understand the various sets of interests promoted by itsadvocates. Sometimes these interests are made explicit, more often they arekept hidden from potential converts. The power of slogans is such thateducational policy is often shaped and influenced by them. Israel Schefflerwrites that:slogans provide rallying symbols of the key ideas and attitudes ofeducational movements. They both express and foster community ofspirit, attracting new adherents and providing reassurance and strengthto veterans.3Slogans can be colorful, appealing and emotionally charged. But it isthe unsystematic nature of a slogan—its vagueness—that is its real strength.A slogan can almost always be interpreted in more than one way, andbecause it evades careful analysis, a slogan can easily mean different thingsto different people. An entirely false sense of common purpose can be built uparound ambiguous slogans, resulting in solidarity which would not be presentif particulars were defined or details expressed. Educators who holdcompeting, even antagonistic philosophies about what should be taught inschools and how, can wave many of the same banners hailing, for example,creative problem solving, a slogan that contains multiple meanings. In BritishColumbia, the evolution of the Year 2000 project reveals slogan after slogan,employed to capture the public imagination and at the same time, enticeteachers into thinking substantive proposals have been hammered out11concerning concepts which are never defined, concepts such as“individualized learning.”4These are the “rallying symbols” of which Schefflerwrote, powerfully persuasive in tone yet vague and inconclusive when itcomes to application.Komisar and McClellan examined the slogan as an analytic device forunderstanding how some educational values are defined in policy.5 Initiallythey liken slogans to generalizations, in that slogans often summarize moreparticular descriptive assertions. Unlike generalizations however, slogans are“systematically ambiguous,” that is, they do not imply their particulars; theymerely “become connected or attached to a more or less clearly specifiedgroup of proposals, together with definitions and empirical evidence used asargument in favour of the proposals made.”6 Educational slogans do not justdescribe, they always contain a prescriptive element.There is a very good reason for this. Since education is a practicalenterprise, aimed at the achievement of certain results through action,the language of education will inevitably be studded with assertionsthat will be prescriptive. These particular assertions will be proposalsand recommendations for action.7Particular proposals to which global education has attached itself arealways put forth as prescriptions. The prescriptive assertion could be forinstance: “Think globally, act locally.” But the range of proposals that arisesfrom this simple phrase is overwhelming; global education shares with manyeducational slogan systems an incredible array of possible particulars. AsKomisar and McClellan point out, the ambiguity, even meaninglessness of aslogan does not arise because it has no reference, but because it is so“embarrassingly rich in this commodity”8The following subjects and courses of study have all laid claim to being12legitimate “particulars” of global education: world history; world geography;international economics and political systems; Pacific Rim studies; globalecology; the study of international and transnational organizations;technology studies; cross-cultural studies of art, literature, music, dance,customs; world religions; comparative education; foreign language studies,area studies, development education, peace education, human rightseducation, world order studies, future studies and the study of internationalrelations.9Although they all attach themselves to the slogan system “globaleducation,” each theme or topic contains its own set of particular proposalsand programs described (more or less specifically) according to its advocates’purposes, philosophies and beliefs about the world. Therefore what is meantby global education will vary greatly, depending on who is calling for it andwhy.According to Komisar and McClellan, between the generalized sloganand its application in particular cases, lies “a somewhat arbitrary act ofinterpretation.”10In the act of interpreting, we will almost certainly be requiredto stipulate definitions and legislate meanings. The generalized slogansystem “has the power to charm” although a successful slogan system hasboth disciples and critics. By attaching themselves to the generalized systemthese various programs and proposals are guaranteed to draw attention tothemselves.1.3. THE INTERESTS BEHIND SLOGANSWhat slogans can, do, and do quite effectively, is mask or obscure theagendas of certain interest groups, a potential discussed by ThomasPopkewitz.11 He writes that, “the potency of a slogan is that it can create the13illusion that an institution is responding to its constituency, whereas the needsand interests actually served are other than those publicly expressed.”12 Inthe case of global education, a slogan which explains nothing about a courseof action that might be called for, teachers use curricular materials that havethe same labels but speak to very different, and often conflicting, values andpolitical positions. A wide range of concerns, many of which may not be in theinterest of a reflective liberal education, can fit themselves quite neatly intothat rather amorphous bundle we call global education. Popkewitz identifiesseveral sets of political interests or agendas that can be hidden under thissystem of slogans, arguing that these reflect changing political and socialbeliefs which have influenced pedagogy.The first is “political pluralism” and, related to it, “cultural pluralism.” Hedescribes the former this way:Within the United States, many people have come to believe that thepolitical system is influenced by the negotiation of various groups insociety. This negotiation among various competitive groups is called‘political pluralism’. Businesses, unions, religions, professionals andconsumer groups negotiate with and pressure the government invarious ways to have laws passed and projects created that are ofbenefit to their members.13Clearly, the purpose of this process is to make it possible for manydifferent perspectives to be represented and a range of issues to be raised. Inthe last several decades, the process has made it possible for ethnicminorities to build strong organizations which have both produced andchanged laws for the better. The argument against this kind of politicaladvocacy is that it has become the dominant way, sometimes the only way inwhich any social issues are brought to light. Instead of moral principlesguiding public policy, lobbying groups do, so that the basis of justice is who14lobbies the hardest. The good for society should not be defined only by thecompetition between different groups, but also by a shared understanding orvision of justice, equal opportunity, rights and so on. Teaching politicalpluralism runs the risk of emphasizing the successes of this process as itresponds to changing societal demands, without critically examining the rulesand biases which may favour those who can organize the loudest protest.A related notion is that of “cultural pluralism” which holds that the“richness and creativity of the American experience” has depended upon andcontinues to depend on, the diversity of the cultural and ethnic backgroundsof its immigrants.14 Multiculturalism as a school movement is rooted in thebelief that diversity itself gives vitality to our society. Study and celebration ofcultural differences in our own society soon leads to exploration of othersocieties, again with an emphasis on positive portrayal of difference. Claimsin global education such as “we should recognize the goodness and richnessof other cultures” reflect a certain moral perspective toward the world, “amoral stance about difference.”15But often, diversity appears to be valued asa good by itself without any other principles or definitions of value entering in.As in the case of teaching political pluralism, focusing on an uncriticalacceptance of diversity as a good in and of itself, can be an obstacle todevelopment of a better, more just society.The second set of interests which Popkewitz discusses is the modernreformulation of manifest destiny. In this new form, manifest destiny refers to“the belief that the cultural and economic developments in the United Statesand Europe are naturally superior and provide the norm by which othersocieties are judged as being ‘developed”16.Not surprisingly, it has beenused to justify the United State’s dominant role in the policies and political15directions of other nations of the world. On this view global educationprovides:a pedagogical practice which can enable children to develop thesensitivities and awareness of the position of the United States as anarbiter in the grand scheme of things. Curriculum provides a worldperspective in which interrelationships, commitments and involvementsare judged by the rules and assumptions of American politics, culture,and history.17.We can find evidence of modern manifest destiny in the way thestandard or mainstream model of development is commonly taught in theschools. The social and historical sciences are presently divided into twocompeting paradigms that view development along with many other issues ofglobal import, quite distinctly. McGowan discusses the dominant paradigm inwhich market forces and modernizing elites are at the centre of thedevelopment process:The argument is that the poorer elements of society will eventuallybenefit from the success of modernizing elites and the application ofmarket forces as they did historically in Western Europe and NorthAmerica. In other words, the results of economic growth andmodernization will trickle down to the poor.18A recent survey of five Canadian social studies texts used widely at thesecondary level in schools across the provinces, found that the assumptionsabout the mainstream model of development, are still pervasive.19 It isgenerally regarded as inevitable that progress will occur in a predictable wayinvolving a linear sequence of events from primitive to civilized. Words likeadvanced, technological, and urbanized, are used to describe “us,” makingclear that we are operating within a set of very well established assumptionsabout the ideal “ends” of society. While the kind of polarity identified betweenpolitical systems, e.g. democratic versus totalitarian, is disappearing from16school texts written in the last decade, other social differences are stillexpressed as dichotomies, such as developed and underdeveloped, oremerging and modern.The differences are classified in such a way as to impute, among otherthings, the moral superiority of North American and European cultures,practices and institutions over others in the world and not only those in theunderdeveloped world. Popkewitz uses an example of a curriculum that hasthe study of Japan as its focus. Traditional Japanese culture, as the story istold, is being challenged as people move to the city and work in industrializedsituations. Underlying the discussion of the change are distinctions andcategories that dispose the reader to consider certain aspects of social andcultural life as morally superior. Among these could be more freedom andstatus for women, more choice in occupations, increased opportunity forupward mobility and so on. But the discussion is often oversimplified andovergeneralized leaving the reader ignorant of the cultural past and presentcontext. What the curriculum does, is “establish a disposition to socialfacts”20.We are not told, for example, what community or family values peoplemight be putting at risk or that the price of individual freedom just might besolidarity with one’s neighbors.Manifest destiny curriculum can be found in a variety of places andwith it certain dispositions to facts. The following remarks are taken from aCanadian social studies text called Political and Economic Systems in whichthe author begins an article on Latin America by writing:Although poverty is widespread, it is not universal. Exceptions to therule of poverty are to be found in Argentina and Uruguay where thelifestyle is not Latin American, but Southern European.21We are led to believe that the “lifestyle” of Latin America is poverty.17Similar assumptions about the alleged superiority of “our’ ways appear on thenext pages. We are told:From the Canadian viewpoint, we may conclude that farms of efficientsize are needed, and their operators require incentives, technical skillsand access to capital to operate them productively.... But LatinAmericans do not necessarily hold the Canadian viewpoint. Theirattitude toward land derives from their Iberian heritage.Iberian heritage would appear to be an obstacle to progress. It is in factthe only reason mentioned which might explain resistance to Canadianagricultural practices. Problems associated with the transfer of inappropriatetechnologies or the residual effects of agricultural pesticides in other parts ofthe developing world are ignored. The conclusions drawn by the textbookauthors also involve judgments concerning industrial expansion as contrastedto land reform in Latin America. The desirability of modernization (alongCanadian lines) is unquestioned.Industrial expansion... will proceed faster than land reform because theleaders desire more industry and can more easily agree on the meansto attain it. The desire for land reform is much less widespread amongnational leaders. It is also more difficult to achieve because landsystems are rooted deeply in Iberian tradition. Modern manufacturing,on the other hand, comes with an imported set of standards and valuesfrom the developed nations outside, and is more readily accepted inLatin America.23The manifest destiny curriculum attempts to legitimate the actions ofalleged superior nations including their indispensable contributions to thedevelopment of the rest of the world. It also tends to regard this superiority asa natural fact about the world.Manifest destiny curriculum has been frequently challenged byhistorians and educators, though all too infrequently in social studiestextbooks. Hans Koning, a Columbus biographer, has discussed the18opposition to the 500th anniversary celebration of Columbus’ landfall inAmerica:Celebrating Columbus means celebrating the start of the “bloody trailof conquest” as its earliest reporter, the friar Bartolome de las Casas,called it. The year 1492 is not only the year of Columbus” landfall, it ismore or less the starting shot of a war which Europe and its whiteoutposts have waged on the rest of the world until quite recently, and,in the judgment of many, are still waging economically.24In response to the festivities in Spain, the US and elsewhere, manypeople around the world were involved in “contra-celebrations” in an effort tostudy history from a perspective apart from the traditional Eurocentric point ofview. “Traditionally we have taught that in spite of unfortunate incidents, wehave been on the side of the angels, bringers of civilization, industry andChristianity to the primitive nations.”25 The truth of the matter is somethingelse altogether. Columbus’ reign of terror in the new world resulted in themass suicide of thousands and the murder of between one hundred andtwenty five thousand, and half a million people, and within two generations theentire native population of the Caribbean had been wiped off the earth.26 Thisis not news; as Koning points out the facts about Columbus’ greed and crueltyhave been available to us for centuries. But they have not been taught inschools. Recent social studies texts no longer include the phrase, “Columbusdiscovered the New World in 1492,” yet the accounts of his monstrous deedsin the name of gold quotas for Spain are nearly always omitted. Theunderlying assumptions about the inevitable march of civilization, thenecessary eradication of the primitive, the supremacy of the technological, theadvanced, still persist in most classrooms.Koning’s words and the words of others were echoed in social studiesjournals and conference proceedings concerned about Columbus Day19festivities. They showed that on one issue at least a substantial criticalelement had entered the social studies curriculum in Canada and the UnitedStates. There are other examples as well. In Canada, the curriculum materialsprovided by non-government organizations, such as Oxfam, portray a verydifferent picture of development than that found in a manifest destinycurriculum. Not only are the intentions of the developed nations stronglyquestioned when it comes to foreign aid policies and development schemes,but the very notion of modern industrialization as a good in itself is suspect.The environmental movement has done much to increase public awareness ofthe disastrous consequences of industrial exploitation of the earth’sresources. Dramatic events surrounding aboriginal land claims have alsobeen a force reshaping consciousness about imperialism, colonization andthe European role in the history of the world. There is evidence that themovement toward critical consciousness about past policies and actions bydominant nation states is becoming visible in school curriculum, in so far asthat curriculum is recognized as reflecting greater societal awareness.There are classroom teachers who actively resist the standard view,particularly many of those who have travelled extensively and read widely,adopting along the way a critical perspective which they are willing and ableto impart to students. These teachers are often in search of alternativeexplanations and vantage points from which to view the world. There arestudents, too, who reflect the growing concerns about western societies’historic destruction and present domination of many parts of the world. Myconcern is not that a critical perspective toward manifest destiny curriculum isentirely absent from the schools. But there are some questions about thiscritical perspective which need to be asked. What kind of critical perspective20is it? Against what standards are policies and practices being judged? Is therea coherent and defensible account of a moral, or political or social visionwhich could give focus to the criticism? Could this account guide futurerevision and change?In the place of the manifest destiny curriculum we see a jumble of ill-defined and confused stances toward the world and its people. These variousstances or perspectives find a motive force as well as a deceptive unity ofvision in the slogan system called global education. Educators may wellcriticize past practices and present policies of a dominating industrializedworld over the rest. Yet they may have difficulty adopting a critical perspectivethat illuminates what is at stake or affords analysis of the issues involved,even a perspective that allows certain questions to be asked. Inquiry isalways framed and directed by existing values and commitments.27 Unlessindividuals have an enlightened sense of what beliefs and worldviews theythemselves hold, their ability to see through an alternative conceptual lens willbe severely limited by their own blind spots.A critical perspective on social and political practices is indispensable.So is a perspective which takes into account the origins and manifestations ofones’ own limitations. We need to recognize that we may be unwittinglycaught in our own unexamined world view. When a movement such as globaleducation comes along, claiming the possibility of world understanding orinternational cooperation as its goals, we may be swept up by the slogan itselfas it may seem to echo our own hopes for the future. When examination andreflection are needed most phrases like “the value of diversity,” “the newglobal community,” and “citizens of the world” pass into our vocabularywithout pause. Concepts we have begun to refer to daily in the classroom,21such as global interdependence, remain undefined. It is no wonder we areunclear about what to teach in their names.28Before advocates of global education can begin to engage inmeaningful debate about particular aims or about the nature of the activitiesthey wish to promote, they need to find a common language beyond theslogans they have so enthusiastically endorsed. The key terms and conceptsshould be defined and explicated. They should be subject to criticalexamination as should subsequent exploration in the field. It is crucial thateducators understand various interpretations of the concepts and goals ofglobal education.They also need to understand the limits of their own interpretations. Anessential component of the attainment of perspective consciousnessaccording to Robert Hanvey, is the consciousness of one’s own perspective.This is the realization that each of us sees the world from a particular point ofview, through a conceptual lens, and that one’s own perspective, thoughsocially constructed, is not universally shared. It could also be referred to asthe ability and disposition to engage in second order reflection. In educationwe have begun to learn how to take a critical stance toward establishedstructures and ways of thinking about the world (e.g., manifest destiny) but weare far from realizing an enlightened perspective on our own practices.Depending on the meanings one attaches to the key terms andconcepts in global education, existing values can be maintained by globaleducation programs, or alternative possibilities expIored. Some conceptionsof global education may look more radical than they are, seeming to promotea vision of social justice when their effect is to maintain western or Americanhegemony. As we have seen, at least one interpretation of global education22may have the latent function of advancing the interests of the first world overthe third whilst distracting potential critics with empancipatory language.Dialogue about the various values and social commitments of globaleducators who compete for time and space in the school day is still largelyabsent. Groups advocating their own brands of global education have not yetengaged in self-reflection about their own motives and interests.At the 1991 American Forum on Global Education, it became clear thatthe underlying conflicts between the aims of various groups have not beencritically examined in a systematic or reflective way. The most obvious tensionexists between those who see global education as a way to sharpencompetitive skills in the worldwide marketplace and those who see globaleducation as a force for social justice, for righting the wrongs of exploitivecapitalist policies and their effects on the third world. This was evident fromthe formal program agenda which included guest speakers from multinationalcorporations alongside spokespersons from development groups, politiciansand academicians. All talked past each other; all had their own agendas,causes and beliefs. What their discourse shared was a system of slogans.What it lacked was any consensus on the meaning of the terms contained inthe slogans. Caught up in their separate nets of jargon, it was not immediatelyobvious to the speakers that there were any problems of definition. Thus, thebusinessman spoke of the study of international economics, the politicianabout the language of international diplomacy and the development workerabout the unacceptable inequities between North and South. From thecorporate point of view, global education means learning about globalmarkets in order to compete in them. The following passage is typical ofprudential concerns about the lack of globally educated students:23Because relatively few American businessmen understand the culture,the customs, or even the language of the buyer, America’s competitiveedge is often lost in the tough realities of international buying andselling.3°Government policy recommendations for global education may offersimilar rationales. Global education may mean learning other languages so asto promote the American way of life along with American foreign policiesaround the world. It may mean exporting American values and expertise toanother region of the world, an enterprise which would require knowingenough of another country’s language and market economy to successfullyset up shop. One illustration of the latter is a five million dollar grant which theUS government recently gave to Jordan for the establishment of amanagement training institute based on American business school models.31Yet from representatives of development agencies a completelydifferent view emerges. Global education means learning about the vastinequalities between rich and poor nations in order to change things for thebetter. One such view is expressed by Burgess Carr.When one encounters situations of human povertymalnutrition in ruralareas, or the squalor in which so many urban slum dwellers live—oneis both confronted and repulsed by the immorality that is inherent inunderdevelopment. For if it is not hideously immoral and unethical forone segment of the population to live in shelters built from thecardboard boxes that hold the luxury items another segment, theaffluent elites, pluck from their food and liquor shelves, then I do notknow another way to define what is ethical and what is not.32There are glaring contrasts in visions between those who advocateglobal education for the promotion of national economic interests and thosewho advocate global education for social justice around the world. The formerare concerned with what we can do in the world as it is now, with its existingstructures; the latter in creating more just alternatives to world order. As one24critic puts it, “the first type is concerned mainly with technical, ‘how-to’ types ofquestions, while the second goes beyond these questions to deal with endsand consequences and with moral political and spiritual issues.” There islittle evidence to suggest that advocates of either recognize that they use thesame system of slogans to express competing, even antagonisticphilosophies and goals.So the unanswered questions about global education remain, even asprograms are adopted and policies are created. Even if we can go beyondproblems of meaning, new questions emerge. What ends should globaleducation serve? What does a responsible program include or exclude? Whatsort of content is educationally worthwhile? Which aims are morally justified?1.4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GLOBAL EDUCATIONMany arguments are employed by educators who hope to convincepolicy makers and school administrators of the importance of globaleducation. At times, some of their justifications have been used by globaleducators as defense against direct attacks on existing and proposed schoolprograms.34 Some rationales for global education have also come fromoutside the field of education, e.g. governments, the UN, private voluntaryorganizations and business.35What the various justifications have in commonis the sense of urgency; global education must be instituted in all elementaryand secondary schools across North America now. Their common claim isthat the world is changing at a rate and on a scale unprecedented in humanhistory and North American education has not responded effectively to thisreality.Both past and present conceptions of global education show that25global education was created as a response to a rapidly changing world, butnot primarily or explicitly a moral response. The justifications and mandatesfor global education programs have, for the most part, been instrumentalones. Certain kinds of knowledge and understanding are required becausethey will lead to the realization of certain ends. The ends are fixed and relateto the welfare of an individual or the welfare of the society or nation of whichshe is a part. Welfare is defined in narrow economic terms, terms relevant tothe productivity of the agent, the market competitiveness of the country andso on. I argue that prudential justifications for teaching global concepts andissues fail to address a wide range of concerns and interests important topeople, concerns and interests that involve ethical questions regarding endsas well as means. To fail to teach global issues from a moral point of view isto eclipse an entire dimension of human experience from the educationalrealm.Chadwick Alger and James Hail attempt to pull together variousconceptions of global education as a collection of responses to a rapidlychanging world37. Their initial characterization is typical amongst globaleducators. They see global education as a diverse and highly decentralizedmovement which has attempted to “respond” to a variety of events in theworld including: “resource shortages; the population explosion; theenvironmental crisis; arms competition; the influx of refugees, terrorism,human rights;...worldwide inflation... “38Just what is it that constitutes an effective or an adequate response tothese crises? Alger and Hail do not make it clear whether or not they believeglobal education can do more than introduce students to the nature andscope of these problems. No one could expect that students’ increased26awareness and understanding of global issues will necessarily result inchanges to these conditions and situations, especially in the short term. Anyconstructive solutions to these and other problems would certainly require anumber of different understandings, abilities and skills, as well as access to,and influence within, established political and institutional structures. It is aquestion of being in a position of power to affect change, as well as knowingwhat changes may be called for. Yet global educators like Alger and Harfoften refer to global education as a response to world crises. In what waymight they mean global education responds to new world realities?The best explanation might be that there is a widespread belief that anappropriate education will prepare students to participate over a lifetime invarious social and political contexts, and that these contexts will vary from themost personal and local to the international and global. An individual’sresponses to the challenges and demands in any one or more of thesecontexts will vary enormously depending on her specific responsibilities, herlife plans and her ethical commitments, as well as her understanding of any ofthe problems at hand. What an appropriate global education should do, isequip students with the knowledge and sensitivities they need to reason welland act responsibly on issues that transcend national borders. Whether or notindividuals will be in positions where they can affect change is impossible topredict. Even so, educators have an obligation to help students understandcertain facts about the world and develop certain dispositions toward theirpotential participation in it. The following passage is typical:On the face of it, there would seem to be little argument that our nationshould have an educational system that produces at least a minimalcadre of experts about other people and cultures, as well asprofessionals and business and government who can transact27negotiations across borders. We should have scientists andtechnicians who can extend and share human knowledge across theglobe.Beyond the call for bringing global perspectives into the classroom,consensus disappears. Differing rationales lead to differing conceptions.Various conceptions provide a range of choices in definitions, key concepts,teaching strategies and desired student outcomes. Some writers in the fieldclaim that disagreement is inevitable given the competing world views of thevarious proponents of global education.4° Beginning with the variousjustifications they offer for its inclusion in the school curriculum, we can seethat advocates promote different visions of global education. I will refer to twokinds of justifications, although some overlap between these is acknowledged.They are: Prudential (or self-regarding) justifications and Moral (or other-regarding) justifications. Prudential justifications for global education arethose which look to the well-being of an individual or to the well-being of thesociety of which she is a part for their support.1.4.1. Global Education as Preparation for National Citizenship.As it is traditionally, conceived citizenship has been a long-held goal ofsocial studies education. For some educators, this has been part of afunctionalist view; education is primarily socialization of children into theircultural and political inheritance, complete with its fixed values, norms andinstitutions. A wealth of information: historical, geographical, political and soon, is passed on to students who will take up roles in their society. On thisreading global education for national citizenship in the twenty-first century islittle more than an extension of context; students should now be taught abouttheir responsibilities to their community and country both of which havebecome “globalized” in the late twentieth century. The primary if not sole28focus for allegiance and duty is still the state.There are those who believe, however, that citizenship requires both adeeper and broader view of the world. Instead of teaching students historyfrom an ethnocentric or western European perspective, for example, there aremany who believe that the stories of non-European nations must be told fromtheir points of view. Students should be taught to view the world through arange of “lenses.”41 As well many educators believe that what students needis the ability to critically reflect on their own political and social institutions andway of life.42 Only then will they be in a position to act responsibly andintelligently to reform society and create more just and humane conditions forall members. This expanded view of citizenship also emphasizes thoughtfulparticipation in the political processes in place at all levels of government.Global education on this view becomes a new version of political educationwith social participation as a major goal. In this way it also acknowledgescertain other-regarding or moral considerations.1.4.2. Global Education for Successful International Competition inTrade, Commerce and Industry.The justification for global education as a tool to sharpen the nation’scompetitive edge on the world market is also a prudential justification. Thebenefactors of increased success in trade, commerce and industry on theinternational scene would be the individual business person, the corporationof which she is a part, and the society in which this flourishing of trade andproduction is taking place. The ends of global education on this view arecompatible with the ends of a successful market economy in a particularnation. It is interesting to note that this argument, which is concerned with29economic superiority, has, in the US, replaced most of the discussions of US.”military might” in the world as an appropriate topic for global educationprograms. The following passage is from the opening of a handbook onpractices in global education published in 1986 by the National Council onForeign Languages and International Studies.When it comes to motivating Americans to internationalize education inthe United States, the Japanese are doing us a real favor. Just asWorld War II forced us to be involved in and learn the hard way aboutdistant places and Sputnik spurred the growth of foreign languagesand area studies in our colleges and universities, so have Toyota andthe issues of trade competitiveness led to a reawakened concern withexcellence and international perspectives in education, fromkindergarten to postgraduate study.To many proponents of this view, reawakening a concern withinternational perspectives in education is largely synonymous with recapturingmarkets that have gone to the Japanese and other Asian manufacturers.Pacific Rim studies are often examples of this approach to internationaleducation, in both the US. and in Canada. The more important the tradingpartner or the larger the role it plays in western economies, the more pagestextbook authors devote to its study. In the recently published social studiestext for Saskatchewan grade seven students called Canada and its PacificNeighbours, the overwhelming majority of topics concern the wealthyindustrialized nations on the Asian side of the Pacific Rim. Less developedareas in the South Pacific and along the Western shores of South Americaare given only a passing glance.1.4.3. Global Education for International Cooperation on Global Issues.This justification has elements of both prudential and moral arguments.Because the very survival of the planet is at stake, according to this view, the30arguments have a prudential base; it is in everyone’s interest to peaceablysolve ecological and security crises that threaten our future. Appropriateeducation will, on this view, equip the next generation of decision-makers withthe tools they need to make enlightened choices and come up with inventivesolutions to world problems. But this justification is clearly an “otherregarding” argument at the same time. Many of the cooperative solutions toglobal problems will require sacrifices on the part of affluent North Americansand Europeans as well as great financial outpouring on the part ofgovernments toward massive efforts to clean up the environment and providehealth care (immunization for example) on a global scale. In addition, thisjustification looks to future generations and our potential obligations to theirsurvival and quality of life.1.4.4. Global Education as Education for Social Justice.This is the most explicit articulation of a moral justification and as suchfigures largely in later chapters of this dissertation. This justification gains itsforce from moral principles such as respect for persons and from aconsiderable body of literature on human rights. Many programs backed bythis justification teach that major transformations in world structures—political,economic and social—are imperative if the lives of the poor and oppressedaround the world are to be improved. Many of those who see global educationas an ethical response to gross inequities in the world emphasize the need fordevelopment education or in-depth studies of third world issues. Notsurprisingly it is this justification of global education as a moral enterprise,which is most often attacked by critics who see global education as utopian,or anti-democratic, or unpatriotic.31These justifications differ greatly. Some are directly antagonistic to oneanother. The four justifications for global education call for programs involvingvery different objects of study. All reflect certain interests; to be globallyeducated under one description is to be educationally deficient under another.Not only is there a lack of consensus about the meaning of global education,but there is confusion as to why it should be included in the school curriculum.Yet many global educators act as if the conceptual work is finished and thereare no muddles to clear up, no aims or commitments to analyze, no hiddeninterests to uncover. The unanswered questions about global educationremain, even as programs are adopted and policies are created. What endsshould it serve? What would a responsible program include or exclude? Whatsort of content is educationally worthwhile? Which aims are morally justified?Some of these questions are addressed explicitly in the next section in whichglobal education for world citizenship is further explored.1.5. WORLD CITIZENSHIPThe fundamental moral commitments of democracy are incompatiblewith global education that simply focuses on world systems as they presentlyexist. Most often these programs promote a narrowly-defined set of nationalinterests. However, there is no good reason for our morality to stop at ournation’s borders. Global education ought to be education for world citizenship.The notion of citizenship itself includes a number of moral attainments andcommitments that are often overlooked in education. In this section I will lookat what is required for responsible citizenship in a democratic state, followingPatricia White’s discussion of the subject.47 By extending White’s argumentsabout the requirements for citizenship within a democracy to requirements for32citizenship on a global scale, I can present a view of world citizenship whichtakes full account of the moral attainments necessary for responsibleparticipation in the world beyond our democratic borders.Many writers and educators view global education as a justified part ofeducation for citizenship in a global age. I agree with their claims. As theboundaries of our concept of citizenship have grown, so has our need toprepare students to participate politically in the world. Many global educatorshave successfully argued that an appropriate global education is in fact,demanded in an interconnected, interdependent world. World citizenship, ontheir view, is a natural extension of our political and social responsibilitieswithin a particular nation or society. However, it is often the case that theseproponents neither explain nor defend their particular conception ofcitizenship. On my view, citizenship is based on ideals foundational todemocratic institutions and these ideals are key to the enterprise of buildingworld community, community in which all participants’ interests areconsidered and all voices are counted. In a sense then, world citizenshipmeans membership in a fledgling global community.Despite enthusiastic endorsements from many international figures,there has been considerable resistance to the idea of education for globalcitizenship throughout most of this century. Though Dewey and othersadvocated education for international understanding and participation as earlyas 1920, the traditional boundaries in political education have remainednational borders. In fact citizenship education programs emphasizing ourresponsibilities toward a world community have often been viewed asunpatriotic, even subversive. Nearly two decades after the National Councilfor the Social Studies first stressed the need for social participation on a33global level, North Americans are still reluctant to see their politicalobligations extend beyond national boundaries. Increasingly we havebecome aware that our spheres of belonging and obligation no longer matchexisting realities in the world. But we are uneasy about shifting our loyalties ormaking room for new ones. Michael lgnatieff writes:We can just begin to feel our old attachments, our old citizenshipbeing emptied of its rationale. All the changes which impinge upon thepolitics of modern states are global in character. The market in whichwe trade, and in which our economic futures will be shaped, is global;the ecology in which we live and breathe is global. The political life ofnation states is being emptied of its rationale by the inconsequenceand impotence of national sovereignties. Peoples’ attachment tonations depends on their belief that the nation is the relevant arbiter oftheir private fate. This is less and less so. Political languages whichappeal to us only as citizens of a nation and never as commoninhabitants of the earth, may find themselves abandoned by those insearch of a truer expression of their ultimate attachments.5°As we become increasingly aware that the nation is no longer thearbiter of our private fate, many of us look beyond national borders to find aplace for ourselves in an international realm. Ignatieff recognizes that we mayfeel lost in this new world and writes, “Our task is to find a language for ourneed for belonging which is not just a way of expressing nostalgia, fear andestrangement from modernity.”51Despite our reluctance to lose our old attachments, we are finding thatthey are no longer relevant. And despite our anxieties about living in a globalage, about participating in the modern world, we need to find a way of copingwith challenges that cross over traditional political boundaries. The continuingdepletion of the ozone layer threatens our survival no matter where we live,as does the proliferation of nuclear capabilities, the spread of potent viruses,oil spills on our oceans, and so on. We know that our political and social34obligations do not stop at our nation’s borders, but we are unsure what ournew responsibilities as global citizens might be. It’s an uneasy state.According to Ignatieff, we need to find a new language to satisfactorilyexpress our needs and concerns as common inhabitants of the earth. It is amulti-faceted task that he has set before us. I understand this new languageto mean a new way of communicating our interests as well as a new way ofdefining our roles as participants in the construction of a world community.52This community would ideally be dedicated to addressing our mutualconcerns as common inhabitants of the earth, It would recognize the force ofthe need Ignatieff identified for human beings to express themselves to eachother and be understood as members of a common species sharing a world,though not world-views. This ideal community would also provide a forum inwhich possible solutions to common problems are forged. First of all many ofus need to be convinced that possibilities for such exchanges based onmutuality exist. I believe this part of Ignatieff’s task is a legitimate task forglobal education.Before we can respond to Ignatieff’s challenge to find a new languagewe need to explore what would be involved in educating students to see theirresponsibilities as “common inhabitants of the earth,” and potential membersof a world community. First, the standard assumptions about what constitutesan appropriate global education must change. Only when global education isseen as a moral enterprise centrally involved with the development ofqualities necessary for responsible world citizenship, will we make anyprogress in this area. Conceptions of global education that drive currentprograms and policies are not yet equal to the task of educating our studentsto be world citizens. What does responsible citizenship in any context35require? At least part of the answer can be found in a brief examination of therequirements for responsible citizenship within a democracy. Responsibleworld citizenship, I will argue, depends on many of the same requirements.The ideals which allow uncoerced communication between people to flourish,have a central place here too.1.6. EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP WITHIN A DEMOCRACYIn an essay called “Education, Democracy and the Public Interest,”Patricia White takes up the question of whether there must be any agreementon what is in the public interest in a democratic society.53 Her answer is thatthere must be an appropriate political education for its citizens. An educationof this sort benefits members of the public as it is to everyone’s advantage tohave their political and social institutions operate effectively and according todemocratic ideals of justice. This can only happen if citizens are taught tosuccessfully operate those institutions and understand and appreciate thevalues underlying them. According to White, a democracy cannot begin toembody the principles of justice, freedom and consideration of interestswithout an educated citizenry, knowledgeable about such principles andcommitted to their realization.One of the foundations of democracy is the idea that the people musthave a say in shaping policies which affect them, and further that people mustbe able to hold the government accountable for decisions made on theirbehalf. They are only able to do this if they are informed and if they have asense of what it means to be committed to a democratic way of life. Whitemakes a case for the following to be taught to students:1. The values of fraternity, justice and tolerance which are central democratic36principles.2. Knowledge of the political institutions which embody those values andknowledge of their operation.3. Background knowledge of the sort acquired in a liberal education so thatstudents can judge the adequacy of policy decisions made bygovernments, and be aware of considerations which define and have abearing on political problems.Both the second and third statements on White’s list are relatively self-explanatory and would find themselves at home in existing programs of civicsor social studies. There will undoubtedly continue to be fierce debate overwhat counts as background knowledge in a liberal education, debate which Iam not entering into here. We should of course be careful to include a rangeof voices and perspectives in what White calls a liberal education. Too oftenwe forget that the experience and concerns of many people, including thoseof women and minorities, have not been part of liberal discourse. I would alsoadd that it is important to teach students the nature of political argument andrelevant political and legal concepts along with information about the workingsof institutions. Students will also need to be able to judge the reliability ofexpert testimony, since in the majority of cases citizens will not be in aposition to judge the substantive issues themselves. But it is the firststatement that needs elaboration at this point.The values of fraternity, justice and tolerance are most importantly,moral attainments, indispensable to a complete and defensible definition ofwhat it means to be a citizen within a democratic state. This is becausetogether they form the necessary features for effective participation in openand uncoerced communication, dialogue in which everyone has the chance to37speak and to be heard. Commitment to this sort of communication, along withthe consistent demonstration of all three of these values should insure thatthose of us in more powerful positions will not impose our conceptions of thegood on everyone else. In a democratic system committed to giving peoplethe opportunity to experience “a breadth of views about the conduct of life””,tolerance and respect and the exercise of just treatment are essential to freeexchange.These three values will be briefly considered here. We will return toeach of them as my conception of global education unfolds, for these moralattainments are indispensable for world citizens as well as citizens withindemocracies. Meaningful communication between people who have diversehistories, traditions and world views will require a strong commitment to workthrough their differences and find a bit of common ground. Tolerance for othervoices, willingness to look for connections with other lives, and determinationto treat people justly are the foundations for building community on a globalscale.1.6.1. FraternityAt first hearing, the notion of fraternity lacks contemporary resonanceand it is tempting to substitute “solidarity” or “community” instead. It can bedescribed as the recognition that we are connected to others by virtue of ourneeds, interests, values or even backgrounds. In fact, there are manypossibilities. From these connections arise social obligations. Ignatieff speaksat length of these obligations, claiming that we have allowed the “state” tocome between ourselves and others in the discharging of our socialobligations, be they financial support, health care, or other services which38used to be found within the domain of the local community. Rather thanfostering bonds between people, the welfare structure itself has created deepgulfs, so that as Ignatieff stands in line at the bank, he is struck with therealization that he has no bond whatsoever with the people in the welfare line,no inkling of who they are or where they came from. It is my understandingthat what “fraternity” requires is a commitment to establishing more personallinks between citizens, something that may be accomplished in schools, oneof the few “public spaces” left where such attitudes might be developed in adeliberate and informed and rational way.55 Fraternity or solidarity depends ona most basic recognition that human beings share some important featuresand needs, even when expression of these looks quite different. Though I willsubstitute my definition of empathy for White’s notion of fraternity in mydiscussion of the construction of a global community, both terms capturesome of what it means to acknowledge fundamental commonalties andconnections between persons.1.6.2. ToleranceThe claim that tolerance is a value necessary to the successfulfunctioning of a democracy has been given new life as the cornerstone ofdefensible multicultural and anti-racist education policies. Tolerance is aprerequisite for any productive cooperative ventures in classrooms andcommunity settings. It is essential in an increasingly pluralistic society that thevalue of tolerance be explicitly taught to children. Schools have always had animportant responsibility to develop attitudes of respect and tolerance instudents, whatever the context, but this responsibility is even more crucial in aworld where prejudice and racial hatred seem to be increasing in such frightful39proportions. In one sense tolerance for others appears to be a minimalrequirement for human relations, especially if tolerance is defined, as it oftenis, as minimal interference in another’s life. This is a morally inadequatedefinition. I take tolerance to imply an active commitment to the freedom ofothers. This includes participating in the creation and maintenance ofconditions necessary for all to pursue a chosen way of Iife. In terms of globalrelations, I take tolerance to be the foundation for community that allows allvoices to take part in communication that is open and uncoerced, insuring thatall viewpoints will have an opportunity to be expressed.1.6.3. JusticeWhite’s conception of justice is not elaborated in her essay though it isclear that she sees the attainment of a sense of justice as not onlyfoundational for the maintenance of the democratic state but for thedevelopment of enlightened and rational human beings as well. A well-developed sense of justice is required for all persons taking part in dialogueabout the welfare of persons. Within a political context, just treatment of allpersons is the foundation of our formal relations with others, thoughbenevolence, or beneficence, a quality White explicates elsewhere, may bethe key to becoming sensitive as well as responsive to, the particular needsand concerns of others.57 William Frankena argues that while beneficencemay be beyond the requirements of justice, the just society is neverthelessconcerned about “the goodness of its members lives” in a way that providespositive opportunities for members to “achieve the best lives of which they arecapable.”58 Along with other moral dispositions and sensitivities such ascompassion, I take it that something akin to benevolence should be40developed within in schools so that students will come to care about what kindof political and social involvement will help fellow human beings to choosebetter lives for themselves.1.7. EDUCATION FOR WORLD CITIZENSHIPWhite’s argument for the necessity of a political education within ademocratic state extends quite naturally to education for global citizenship,particularly global citizenship based on building a world community dedicatedto solving world problems.Looking back at her list, we can see that in terms of world citizenship,knowledge of relevant political institutions in the late twentieth century oughtto include knowledge of international organizations and political systemsbeyond our own. Not only will these world institutions have an impact on ourdomestic economy and national political life, but there will be increased needfor us to involve ourselves in the workings of world organizations to solvecommon problems. An understanding of the mandates, missions, andstruggles of international institutions as well as other forms of government willalso help students critically assess their own institutions. In short, a politicaleducation which reflects present realities in the world will recognize theincreasing need for informed citizen participation at all levels, from local tointernational to transnational.A liberal education relevant to citizenship on a global scale will includethe study of world history, political and social systems and a range of culturesbeyond those of Western societies. Some components of such a revisedliberal education are taken up in a forthcoming discussion of the substantivedimension of global education. At present, it will suffice to say that whatever41specific content is included, a liberal education for world citizenship will beexpanded to include a wealth of perspectives and voices from places in theworld that may have been previously eclipsed from view.59Finally, an understanding and appreciation of the values underlying ademocratic way of life should be able to guide us in our relations with peoplein other societies, relations based on respect and fairness. A genuinecommitment to democratic values includes a commitment to respect all humanbeings, and a belief in just and fair treatment for everyone. These areprerequisites for any genuine cooperative exchange between persons acrossvarious nations and societies, exchange that is open and uncoerced. If weaccept that one goal of global education is to foster positive, peaceful andconstructive relations between people who inhabit a common world and sharethe task of improving it, democratic principles will be indispensable tools increating responsible forums for discussion and debate. Democraticprocedures and systems are the best way so far found, to allow for diversityamong people who are trying to live together.6°Within a democracy, the values of fraternity, tolerance and justice areindispensable. This is because when these values are consistently andvigilantly held by citizens, various conceptions of the good can flourish,insuring that individuals can pursue their own vision of the good life withoutpolitical impediment, coercion, oppression by the more powerful orpaternalistic interference. Freedom, the hallmark of democratic institutionsdepends on their expression. The values of fraternity, tolerance and justiceare best seen as moral attainments which do not arise naturally but aretaught.61 They are no less essential to human relations on a global scale, ifwe are genuinely committed to the values underlying democracy.42The demands of citizenship are complex even at the domestic level.The global context increases the complexities many times over. What isneeded most of all is political education which guides students towardrational, deliberate, and responsible political participation based on acommitment to treating people fairly and decently.62 Any version of globaleducation that does not take into account the range and depth of our moralresponsibilities toward fellow citizens will be inconsistent with the fundamentalvalues underlying democracy. Therefore it will be morally indefensible.In the following chapter I will explore several conceptions of the globalperspective. My task will be to reformulate the notion of a moral globalperspective so that I can construct a morally defensible conception of globaleducation. This conception will have its roots in certain beliefs about peopleand the ways in which their concerns and needs ought to considered in apotential global community of concern.1Thomas Popkewitz, “Global Education as a Slogan System,”Curriculum Inquiry 10, no. 3 (1980): 303.2Thomas Popkewitz, “Global Education as a Slogan System,” 303—323.3lsrael Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Illinois:Charles C. Thomas, 1960), 47—59.4See Walter Werner, “Defining Curriculum Policy Through Slogans,”Journal of Education Policy 6, no. 2 (1991): 225—238.5Paul Komisar and James McClellan, “Slogans in Education,” inLanguage and Concepts in Education, ed. B. 0. Smith and Robert Ennis(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961).6Komisar and McClellan, 200.7Komisar and McClellan, 198.8lbid., 201.439See Lee Anderson, “A Rationale for Global Education,” in GlobalEducation: From Thought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook, ed. Kenneth A.Tye (Alexandria, VA: Association for Curriculum and SupervisionDevelopment, 1991), 13—48, for a very comprehensive listing of the variousthemes and topics taken up by various global educators.10Anderson, 200.11Popkewitz, 303—315.12lbid., 304.13lbid., 307.14Ibid., 307.15Ibid., 308.16lbid., 308.17lbid., 308.18Pat McGowen, “Key Concepts for Development Studies,” in TheInternational Development Crisis and American Education: Challenges,Opportunities and Instructional Strategies, ed. Carrol Joy and Willard M.Kniep (New York: Global Perspectives in Education Inc. 1987).19KeIvin Beckett and Linda Darling, “The View of the World Portrayedin Social Studies Textbooks,” occasional paper #13 (Vancouver: Researchand Development in Global Studies, University of British Columbia/SimonFraser University, 1989).20Popkewitz.21T. L. Powrie, Political and Economic Systems. (Don Mills, Ontario:Academic Press Canada. 1983), 216.22lbid., 220.23Ibid., 221.24Hans Koning, “Scourge of America,” The Manchester GuardianWeekly, 28 July, 1991.44251 bid.26lbid27Thomas Popkewitz, “Educational Research: Ideologies and Visions ofSocial Order,” Paradigm and Ideology in Educational Research (New York:Falmer Press, 1984), 2.28SeIby uses a number of rather mundane illustrations to convey onefacet of global interdependence, that of interconnections in the productionand distribution of consumer goods available to the shopper in Britain. Butthis limited sense of interdependence begs more questions than it addresses.What are the kinds and degrees of various dependencies between countriesin the world? If primarily economic, how are these dealt with? What ethicaldimensions should we be concerned about? Interdependence suggests somesort of reciprocal relationship; is that always (or ever) the case?29Popkewitz, “Slogan System,” 305.30Rose Hayden, “Preface,” in Approaches to International Education,ed. Earl L. Backman (New York: American Council on Education/MacMillanSeries on Higher Education, 1984), viii.31Munir Fasheh, “Talking About What to Cook for Dinner When OurHouse is on Fire: The Poverty of Existing Forms of International Education,”Harvard Educational Review 55, no. 1 (February, 1985): 124.32Burgess Carr, “Development Education in an Ethical/HumanisticFramework,” in The International Development Crisis and AmericanEducation: Challenges, Opportunities and Instructional Strategies, ed. CarrollJoy and Willard Kniep (New York: Global Perspectives in Education), 59.33Carr, 126.34See The Ad Hoc Committee on Global Education, “In Bounds or Out,”Social Education 51, no. 3 (April/May, 1987): 242—249.35See World Commission on the Environment, Our Common Future(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).45361t is by now generally agreed that North Americans and particularlycitizens of the United States, fare miserably on world affairs polls, worldgeography surveys and the like. It is fervently hoped by many that globaleducation can provide the next generation with increased “globalcompetence.”37Chadwick F. Alger and James E. Harf, “Global Education: Why? ForWhom? About What?” in Promising Practices in Global Education: AHandbook with Case Studies, ed. Robert E. Freeman (New York: NationalCouncil on Foreign Language and International Studies in collaboration withGlobal Perspectives in Education. 1986), 1—11.38Ibid., 1.39Rose L. Hayden, “Preface,” in Promising Practices in GlobalEducation: A Handbook with Case Studies, ed. Robert E. Freeman (NationalCouncil on Foreign Languages and International Studies, 1984), vi.Steven Lamy, “Global Education: A Conflict of Images,” GlobalEducation: From Thought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook, ed. Kenneth Tye(Alexandria, VA: Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development,1991). See also Steven Lamy, The Definition of a Discipline: The Objects andMethods of Analysis in Global Education (New York: The American Forum forGlobal Education, 1987).41 Robert G. Hanvey, An Attainable Global Perspective (New York:Global Perspectives in Education, Inc., 1976).42See Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics (New York: BasicBooks, 1988).“See Patricia White, “Education, Democracy and the Public Interest,”in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1973), 217—238.Hayden, “Preface,” v.David N. Evans, Canada and its Pacific Neighbours (Regina, SK:Weigl Educational Publishers, 1989).46See Munir Fasheh, “Talking About What to Cook for Dinner WhenOur House is on Fire: The Poverty of Existing Forms of InternationalEducation,” Haivard Educational Review 55, no. 1 (February, 1985): 121—126.47Patricia White, “Education, Democracy and the Public Interest,” inThe Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1973).John Dewey, Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: RandomHouse, 1939), chapters 8 and 9.49National Council for the Social Studies, Revision of the NCSS SocialStudies Curriculum Guidelines,” Social Education 43, no. 4 (1979): 261.5°Michael lgnatieff, The Needs of Strangers (London: Penguin Books,1984), 29.51lbid., 139.52The notion of a world community will be discussed at greater length inthe subsequent chapters.53Patricia White, “Education, Democracy and the Public Interest,” inThe Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1973), 217—238.54John White, The Aims of Education Restated (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1982), 108.55The notion of “community schools,” in which links betweenclassrooms (typically in inner-city schools) and local neighborhoods arestrengthened through civic participation projects, volunteerism, businessapprenticeships, and so on, is an illustration of such an attempt. Though notexplicitly addressed in this thesis, community schools of this type seek tofoster “fraternal,” bonds of the sort White mentions. “Just CommunitySchools,” (Kohlberg’s model) are another kind of response to the educationalpursuit of creating classroom communities which will eventually (hopefully)transfer to a wider world context.l use this phrase in the sense in which Paul Taylor describes it inPaul Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1986).4757See Patricia White, Beyond Domination: An Essay in the PoliticalPhilosophy of Education (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).58William Frankena, “The Concept of Social Justice,” in Social Justice,ed. Richard Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 21.59Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis, an education moresuited for the twenty-first century than what could be termed a classical liberaleducation, is offerred in detail by David Orr, Ecological Literacy (New York:State University of New York Press, 1991). See also Living Responsibly in theWorld, ed. Joan Bodner (San Francisco: AFSC, 1984).60Diversity itself is of course, essential to the health of a democracy.Dewey wrote that it is only diversity that makes change and progress possiblein a democracy. See John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York:Henry Holt, 1927).615ee Jerrold Coombs, Moral Attainments (Toronto: QISE Press, 1976).Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and PoliticalCommitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 229.63Kenneth Tye, ed., Global Education: From Thought to Action(Alexandria, VA: Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development,1986).48CHAPTER TWOREDEFINING THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVEThere is no lofty position above the debate, as perhaps there might beif human reason had a transcendent source. There is only the positionof one who strives to reach and understand the perspectives of others,and to communicate with them rather than past them.Seyla Benhabib12.0. INTRODUCTIONIn the last chapter, I argued that the familiar justifications for globaleducation are limited in terms of recognizing and promoting the moral point ofview. In this chapter I begin to explore global education as a moral enterprise,offering my conception of global education as a special kind of moraleducation.The argument in this chapter is that the central aim of global educationought to be the development of a morally defensible global perspective. I willdefine what I take to be such a perspective and explain its crucial relation toglobal education as a special kind of moral education. I will conclude thechapter with an argument for developing an ‘interpersonal global perspective’which fully recognizes the moral significance of individuals in the world, andthereby strengthens connections between people. Acknowledgement of theseconnections will hopefully lead to the construction of a moral community ofconcern on a global scale.2.1. THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVEA perspective is most usefully described as a point of view or avantage point, a lens through which we look at an object, event or person. Inthe last instance, a perspective toward a person embodies the attitudes we49hold towards that person.2 In this chapter, I want to explore the idea of aglobal perspective. I believe that it is the heart of global education. This initself is not a startling or even novel claim, It has been argued that without adefensible global perspective at its centre, a global education program, evenone based on knowledge drawn from disciplines such as history, geographyand anthropology, is incomplete. Hanvey saw the need for articulatingdimensions of a global perspective as did David Selby, Stephen Lamy, JerroldCoombs, Roland Case and others.3Their work has helped to clarify what wemean when we talk of attaining a global perspective but there is still work tobe done, particularly in answering the question of what we what we ought tomean.The present vision of a global perspective, even when described indetail, is limited in important ways. Many global educators have consistentlyoverlooked the development of a global perspective as the attainment of amorally defensible stance toward the world.4My claim is that the limitations inour understanding of what a global perspective should be have preventedschools from effectively taking on an essential part of the education of theirstudents, that is education for responsible citizenship in a global age.My claim goes deeper still. Not only are many global educationprograms inadequate in terms of developing global perspectives, they are insome respects incoherent as well. Without a clear vision of what a globalperspective should mean, they are bundles of unrelated information badly inneed of organization and a focal point. Without a defensible globalperspective to guide them, they exist without point or purpose except in themost narrow, instrumental of senses. Lacking a normative vision and ajustified stance toward the world, program content is vulnerable to50manipulation and modification by special interest groups, and programsupport continually subject to shifting political winds. The range of subjectmatter called global education is enormous, depending as it does on thevarying political and social agendas of advocates. As Walter Werner writes, itis an umbrella that encompasses all kinds of subject matter:some lobby groups advocate foreign language competencies on thegrounds of enhancing national economic competitiveness. Othergroups want discipline-based regional studies, international relationstraining, peace education, human rights education, world environmenteducation, development education, cross-cultural understanding,comparative religion and the study of pressing controversial issues.The very use of the term “global education “label, then, falsely impliesa consensus of content, purpose and worldview.5It is no surprise to find that teachers are confused about the goals ofglobal education as well as the instructional strategies that might help realizethem.6 All of these visions of global education have their own point of view;many express points of view inimical to educational goals. What should globaleducation stand for? What perspective is justifiable? Lacking a coherent,defensible notion of a global perspective, global education ceases to beworthwhile education at all. I argue that a sound global perspective must be atthe centre of global education programs for them to be viable, valuable partsof the curriculum. Teachers and students must understand the aims of globaleducation and the elements that define it. The issue now becomes:1. What counts as a defensible global perspective;2. Should we teach it in schools; and if so,3. How?2.2. DEFINING THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVEThe first global educator to define a global perspective in detail was51Robert Hanvey.7His 1976 paper, “An Attainable Global Perspective” providedthe field with a comprehensive treatment of the notion. It is important to give acomplete account of Hanvey’s conception because of its profound andenduring influence on global education programs. Many elements of hisperspective are worth preserving, and my own conception is partly a responseto his efforts. Hanvey identifies and describes five dimensions that are centralto a global perspective. I will take up each of the first three dimensionsindividually. Because the last two dimensions Hanvey discusses are sosimilar in scope, I have chosen to comment on them together.2.2.1. The First Dimension of a Global Perspective“Perspective consciousness” is the first of the dimensions Hanveyidentifies. He defines it as:The recognition or awareness on the part of the individual that he orshe has a view of the world that is not universally shared, that this viewof the world has been and continues to be shaped by influences thatoften escape conscious detection, and that others have views of theworld that are profoundly different from one’s own.8What is especially interesting about this definition is what it omits.Hanvey does not explain why consciousness of one’s own limited viewpoint isimportant. Hanvey suggests that the young can develop a “dim sense, agroping recognition of the fact that they have a perspective.” But how are weto judge the relative merits of our own lens on the world? Like the process ofvalues clarification employed in schools as a way to develop a moral sense inthe young, “a groping recognition” does not take us very far in understandingwhy it is important that we come to realize the limitations of our own worldview. Nor is this groping awareness helpful in determining when perspectivesare defensible according to standards that already have an established place52in our moral lives. Should we need to question those standards, whatguidance is offered? It is important that students have the opportunity to learnthe reasons people have for adopting and holding certain attitudes and pointsof view. The origins of their own perspectives should be subject to similarscruti fly.2.2.2. Hanvey’s Second DimensionHanvey’s second dimension is what he terms “State of the Planetawareness.” I agree that the knowledge that leads to this awareness is animportant facet of global education, although I find it difficult to see how it is adimension of a perspective. As Hanvey describes it, state of the planetawareness is:Awareness of prevailing world conditions and developments, includingemergent conditions and trends, e.g. population growth, migrations,economic conditions, resources and physical environment, politicaldevelopments, science and technology, law, health, inter-nation andintra-nation conflicts, etc.9What is important is the way in which these events, conditions anddemographic trends are described to us. What would turn this “awareness”into a facet of a perspective, would be acknowledgement of the fact that anyportrayal of the “state of the planet” is itself dependent on the perspective ofthe particular chronicler: the historian, economist, political scientist,sociologist, and so on. There is no one true description of the “state of theplanet” that will suit Hanvey’s purpose. There are multiple descriptionsrepresenting multiple points of view which in turn reflect very differentperceptions about even the existence of certain conditions. Consider, forexample the ways in which the gross inequalities in living standards betweenthe developed nations of the “north” and the undeveloped nations of the53“south” are described depending on the worldview held by the commentator.For those people who hold to a “mainstream model” of development, the thirdand fourth worlds are seen to be on the same road to economic developmentthat industrialized Western nations have been on, a view that has been called“politically conservative and Eurocentric.”1°It assumes that western wealthand modernization will trickle down, even in fact that they are trickling down.On an alternative “dependency model” it is said that practices in the Westhave caused the poverty in the world and that present policies perpetuateinequalities. Depending on the “model” that is taught, students will come tohave a very different awareness of the “state of the planet.”Hanvey does note that our picture of the world is often distorted by themedia, and further that much technical information about our world stays inthe hands of experts and is not passed on to the ordinary citizen. WhatHanvey does not sufficiently stress is the need for schools to equip studentswith the intellectual tools they need to critically examine the world portraitswith which they are presented, particularly the moral or value orientation fromwhich those pictures are created. Nor does he mention the intellectualdispositions that would incline students to question these things.He is not alone in underplaying the importance of critical analysis tothe development of a global perspective. In a recent article, Donald Johnsonof New York University’s International Graduate Program, explains in somedetail that the lack of critical analysis is still a problem with most globaleducation programs, including those designed for teachers who will be tryingto promote global perspectives in schools. According to Johnson, what globaleducation programs do not take into account, is the fact that they have beenshaped by the dominant discourse in social education which has come out of54the liberal tradition. Programs continue to follow the mainstream liberalworidview without offering any possibility for critical analysis of their ownunderlying assumptions. He writes:Students need to understand the major assumptions of the liberaltradition such as its conception of human society as essentially acollection of autonomous individuals who derive their identity frompersonal mobility within an open social system where each personcompetes according to her or his own ability to acquire property andother symbols of prestige...11Without sufficient understanding of these beliefs and where they camefrom, students at all levels will continue to be trapped within a worldview thatsees its own normative assumptions as universal, On Johnson’s view theseassumptions go way beyond those of liberalism:The primacy of law, the importance of economic factors such as wealth,ownership of property, trade, economic growth, and the marketplace,values that Americans often erroneously consider normative for allpeople, are unique cultural values of the modern West. 12According to Johnson, if we continue to teach “in a bounded system ofanalysis shaped by the dominant tradition of American liberal reformism”13wewill not produce teachers with a global perspective. Instead we must integrateother paradigms of the world into our teacher education programs.What Johnson claims is “a bounded system of analysis” would not, onmy view, count as analysis at all. Analysis by definition includes criticism thattranscends the boundaries of any given system. Yet his worry is one to whichI am sympathetic. There is very little time or effort directed toward analysis ofliberal reformism in relation to say, foreign aid or analysis of standard (that is,Western) models of development in global education programs for teacherspursuing advanced degrees.14 It is safe to assume that if a lack of criticalanalysis plagues graduate programs in global education, this lacuna will be55apparent in other school and university efforts to develop global perspectivestoo. My complaint does not ignore the fact that there are undoubtedlythoughtful, critically reflective teachers who both possess and promotedefensible global perspectives. But neither Hanvey’s 1976 goals, nor thegoals of many global education programs in this decade take sufficientaccount of the need to carefully analyze and question their own political andmoral foundations.2.2.3. Hanvey’s Third DimensionThe third dimension Hanvey points to is “cross-cultural awareness,” or:Awareness of the diversity of ideas and practices to be found in humansocieties around the world, of how such ideas and practices compare,and including some limited recognition of how the ideas and ways ofone’s own society might be viewed from other vantage points.15Hanvey readily admits to the difficulties inherent in the attainment ofthis dimension of a global perspective. Among them is the level of myth andprejudice most of us carry when it comes to “understanding” others. He writesthat “...fundamental acceptance [of others] seems to be resisted by powerfulforces in the human psychosocial system.”16 On this point there can be littledisagreement. I take the dimension of cross-cultural awareness to be thesingle most important of those Hanvey has identified thus far. Yet it is not onlyawareness that we are after, but understanding and acceptance of others.Hanvey comes close to explicitly asserting the importance of learning to meetthe other morally, what he calls recognizing the “humanness” of the stranger,or outsider. Yet even here I have a fundamental concern about Hanvey’srelatively weak justification for such recognition. Recognition of others ascentres of valuation, as human beings worthy of respect and considerationrests on a moral foundation. Is there not in Hanvey’s account, a strong56leaning toward a prudential stand instead? He writes:There was a time when the solidarity of small groups of humans wasthe basis for the survival of the species. But in the context of masspopulations and weapons of mass destructiveness, group solidarityand the associated tendency to deny the full humanness of otherpeoples pose serious threats to the species.17If the threat of mutual annihilation were not present, would theobligation to recognize the humanity of others cease to exist? If we were ableto escape back into the relatively isolated societies that existed before theindustrial revolution, would our responsibilities to address the outsider’s claimto basic human rights be justifiably ignored? There is an analogous worry inthe claims that in the United States, black demands for equal opportunity andfull recognition of their human dignity must be met before they overthrow thepresent hierarchy and thereby “destroy” white society and a good manywhites along with it.18 A similar view exists in Canada with regard to the rightsclaims of the First Nations. Can such a justification which is ultimatelyconditional, that is, based on some assessment of our increased chances ofsurvival, be considered anything more than self-regarding?What is called for instead, is an explicit commitment to justice. There isa very real danger that anything less will cease to have a claim on us if it canbe shown that our immediate or even long-term interests are not directlyaffected. Notions such as our “obligations to future generations” cannot havemuch force outside a moral framework that has justice and fair treatment at itscentre.2.2.4. Hanvey’s Fourth and Fifth DimensionsThe fourth dimension of a global perspective described by Hanvey isKnowledge of Global Dynamics:57some modest comprehension of key traits and mechanisms of theworld system, with emphasis on theories and concepts that mayincrease intelligent consciousness of global change.19What Hanvey means by a “system” is that the world works ininterdependent, interconnected ways, that is, “Things interact in complex andsurprising ways. “Effects’ loop back and become ‘causes’ which have ‘effects’which loop back.... It means that simple events ramify—unbelievably.”20There is no doubt of the importance of this dimension as it challengesus to question received views, turn over old assumptions, and investigatewhat Hanvey calls the “concealed wiring.” However Hanvey gives us no clearidea of what attitude to take beyond an investigative one. The questionremains, what are we to do with the explanations we uncover, and how are weto deal with the complex web of interaction we find? Once we have someglimmer of understanding of the ramifications of events, the unintendedconsequences of policies, etc. how will our global perspectives help us tocope or respond?In this and Hanvey’s fifth dimension, “Awareness of Human Choices,”an important aspect of having a perspective is absent, that is, its valueorientation. Not only do we need to reject simplistic answers to complex globalproblems and question theories of development, we need to recognize whenthose theories perpetuate inequalities and when policies mask injustices. Weneed knowledge of moral concepts (and knowledge of what harms people)and of what constitutes morally hazardous situations. We need to ground ourinvestigations of causes and effects in more solid justification than Hanveyprovides.It isn’t only that simple solutions to poverty and overpopulation don’twork because they are too simple. In some cases proposed solutions have58not taken into account the range of people’s needs, and so have notadequately addressed issues of religion, family, spirituality, culture. More thanjust a matter of ignoring complexity this is a matter of ignoring people’s worthand dignity. We need to know what will benefit people, and what would helpthem find just and fair solutions that do work. In the final analysis, we stillneed a global perspective that will help us consider value issues responsibly.Hanvey points out that his global perspective may not be developed tothe same extent in all students. His more modest hope is that the realizationof the global perspective will be found in the collective rather than theindividual. If the population is moving in the direction of a global perspective,it is not crucial that each member of the population exhibit all or most of itscharacteristics. This implies, he writes, “that diversified talents andinclinations can be encouraged and that standardized educational effects arenot required.”21 Although I am sympathetic with Hanvey’s desire to protect thefreedom of each individual to pursue her own ends, this is a pessimisticstatement about the possibility of changing peoples’ perspectives. I think wecan expect more from teachers and from students, namely that both will havethe capacity and the good sense to see that the attainment of a sound globalperspective is a necessary prerequisite for everyone. If it is a worthwhileeducational aim, we can expect that people can be convinced of its worth onthe basis of good reasons. If a global perspective is desirable as well asdefensible, then we ought to be able to promote it by rational means.Hanvey is not willing to make such a strong case for the attainment of aglobal perspective, in part because he thinks that no one description of such aperspective can illuminate all its potential facets. I see this as a separateissue. We may not be able to anticipate all the factors which will inform and59deepen an individual’s global perspective over time, but we know a good dealabout what ought to be its foundation. And that is a moral point of view.Whatever else it becomes over time, a defensible global perspective will bean enlightened one. It will be broad enough to encompass a realistic view ofthe needs and concerns of individuals, and it will be deep enough tocompassionately and sensitively act on those individuals’ behalf.When Hanvey wrote “An Attainable Global Perspective” one of hisaims was to begin a dialogue among educators concerned with teachingabout global problems and world systems. it is unfortunate that, heralded ashis work was, it was largely taken up without criticism or question. Theconceptual issues which Hanvey raised for global educators were leftunanswered. The dialogue which should have clarified and furthered the aimsof a defensible and attainable global perspective, never took place.22 Instead,under the banner of global education (however vaguely conceived) all mannerof school programs have been created, serving the interests of various groupsto greater and lesser degrees, but never adequately defining the fundamentalpurposes which Hanvey brought to our attention. Indeed the conceptualconfusion about global education was so great that Popkewitz claimed wewere “mired in it.”23 In the last decade, there has been significant work doneto define global education’s outcomes and content. Nevertheless confusionstill exists, and various (not always defensible) interests continue to be servedby the label of global education.Hanvey’s account is somewhat ironic given what has gone on in thename of global education. He claimed that looking at previously unexaminedassumptions, evaluations and explanations is a liberating, educativeexperience. Global education should develop a critical spirit in students and60reveal the hidden layers of perspective that are so important in orientingpeoples’ beliefs.One of the interesting things that reform and protest movements do, isto carry out mining operations in the deep layers. They dredge to thesurface aspects of perspective that have never before seen the light ofday. Once made visible, these may become the foci of debate, mattersof opinion.24However, if Popkewitz and other critics25 are right, the global educationmovement may have led us to bury some of our assumptions more deeply,rather than expose them to the light of critical scrutiny. Could furtherclarification about a global perspective help to get us out of the mire we maybe in? If the kind of dialogue Hanvey had in mind had begun in earnest someconceptual confusion may have been avoided. As it is, with a growing interestin global education programs evident in both Canada and the United States,we still have an opportunity, even an obligation to take up where Hanvey leftoff.2.3. CLARIFYING ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVEOne writer who has worked to clarify goals and aims in globaleducation is Roland Case. He has examined key features of the globalperspective first outlined by Hanvey, as well as the features described byother writers such as Willard Kniep.26 Case identifies two dimensions of aglobal perspective which ought to be part and parcel of all global educationprograms. He calls them the substanfive and the perceptual dimensions,distinguishing the “what” from the “how” in global education. He sees thecontent (subject matter) as distinct from the attitudes and perspectives oneadopts towards that content. Not only do we want students to learn aboutcertain world conditions and issues, we also want them to develop certain61dispositions towards people (such as the inclination to imagine another’sexperience) and certain attitudes towards inquiry about global matters (suchas the inclination to rationally reflect and change one’s mind on the basis ofgood reasons.) Case explains that:The substantive dimension identifies the ‘objects’ of a globalperspective—those world events, states of affairs, places and thingsthat global educators want students to understand. The perceptualdimension is the ‘point of view’—the matrix of concepts, orientations,values, sensibilities and attitudes—from which we want students toperceive the world. Thus, a global perspective refers both to thedesired cognitive and affective lenses through which the world is to beviewed, and to the desired range of features and aspects of our globalexistence that are to be viewed.27Combining some of Hanvey’s elements of a global perspective alongwith those of Willard Kniep,28 Case lists the following objects of study as keycomponents of his substantive dimension:1. universal and cultural values and practices2. global interconnections3. present concerns and conditions4. origins and past patterns5. alternatives and future directions.29Among those elements critical to developing the perceptual dimensionof a global perspective, Case includes open-mindedness, anticipation ofcomplexity, resistance to stereotyping, inclination to empathize and non-chauvinism. Elsie Begler, Director of the International Studies EducationProject of San Diego, points out that:Embedded in Case’s discussion of these intellectual values andattitudes are familiar global education concepts such as perspectiveconsciousness, appreciation of diversity, tolerance of ambiguity,dealing with change, managing conflict, and fostering cooperation.Whether we call them concepts, intellectual dispositions or values,62none are specific to any particular body of knowledge. Rather theydescribe attitudes of mind which most agree are fundamental to aglobal perspective.30By adopting Case’s two labels, substantive and perceptual, we canbegin to see the what the next steps might be in defining a defensible andworthwhile global perspective. We can start to successfully distinguish the“object of attention” from the “point of vieW’31 we take towards it, surely apositive step in clarifying our purposes and analyzing existing programs. Wecan see that there are attitudes (such as open-mindedness) to be promotedas well as bodies of knowledge to be taught and material to be “covered,” andthat these are fundamentally different things.I would argue that Case’s distinction might lead global educators toartificially separate dimensions which are inseparable. The materials andresources chosen in a global education program, the topics selected andomitted, and the media spokespeople chosen to report on world affairs, will alldepend on the perceptual ‘lens” of the teacher, program developer, universityinstructor, textbook writer. Their viewpoints may not be obvious to, orunderstood by, students or teachers. At a certain level we cannot unravel thesubstantive from the perceptual dimension because there is no neutral subjectmatter to “cover” and there are no value-free lessons from which to choose.Case acknowledges that in many respects the two dimensions “areintertwined”32but maintains the necessity of distinguishing the two, in part, “todiscourage the view that having a global perspective is a single quality thatone either has or does not have.” Certainly it is essential for all who wish todevelop a global perspective to keep in mind the complexities of the notion inthe face of over-compartmentalization and oversimplification. However, I amnot convinced that Case’s categorizations will be immune from the ubiquitous63tendency of global educators to substitute labels for careful analysis.Still, Case has given us a useful organizational tool. Even moreimportantly he has explained what still needs to be done to reconceptualizeglobal education. The substantive dimension of the global perspective hasdriven most of what has gone on in global education programs up until now,with little thought given to the perceptual ‘lenses’ through which content isviewed. It is time that the perceptual dimension is recognized as central to theenterprise. The elements within it need to be brought forward for examination;they need to be made explicit. It is also time for global educators to realizethat among the array of intellectual values, dispositions and attitudes thatprovide the lens through which content is viewed, there are no more importantones than the moral.2.4. A MORALLY DEFENSIBLE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVEHanvey’s exploration of the features central to a global perspective hadbeen welcome and enlightening, but it did not give voice to ethical concerns.Only in passing did he address any moral point of view.34 As we have seen inthe argument put forth by Case, even as late as 1991, there remained“considerable need for further explication” of all the elements of a globalperspective.35The moral dimensions of such a perspective remain the leastexplored in the literature.Jerrold Coombs’ work is an important exception. Coombs was one ofthe few respondents to Hanvey’s call for a dialogue; his primary interest beingin the promotion of an explicitly moral dimension to the global perspective.Coombs constructed a conception of a global perspective which focused onthe dispositions and sensitivities students need in order to “meet the other64morally”37 in a global realm. His description of what a global perspective oughtto include, was built on, but also radically departed from, the conceptionoffered by Hanvey.In his paper, “Toward a Defensible Global Perspective,” Coombs pointsto various understandings and beliefs that are key features of a desirableglobal perspective, including knowledge of world systems and globalchanges. Awareness of the diversity of people, cultures and worldviews areparts of his perspective as well. He discusses the inclusion of universalvalues such as respect for human dignity and a belief in human rights, ideasHanvey had alluded to but never explicated or emphasized. To this pointCoombs’ conception is not dissimilar to Hanvey’s. But Coombs has adecidedly different purpose. He wants to incorporate a moral point of view intohis description of a global perspective. His conception of a global perspectivecalls for a belief in the possibility of building a moral world community, onebased on shared concerns and a commitment to rational dialogue. He writes:I believe that we need a conception of a global perspective thatincorporates a view of the nature of responsible value deliberation andjustification. This new conception, which I will call the constructivistconception, should provide the intellectual resources for approachingvalue conflict in a responsible manner. A person who has aconstructivist global perspective will see alt peoples of the world ashaving equal moral worth. In addition, she will believe that an integralpart of the task of bettering the lives of persons is the task ofconstructing elements of a genuine world moral community out of ourdisparate moral heritages.38.Coombs’ conception of a global perspective makes a promising start atdescribing some of the sensitivities students need. We should respectpersons and we should care about solving global problems by rational means.We should work toward common moral understandings with peoples whosetraditions and values differ greatly from ours. We should try to create ways65and means for people to express their needs, their common concerns, theirdilemmas.But important as these prescriptions are, they are only a roughbeginning. Given Coombs’ view of the necessary and sufficient elements of aconstructivist global perspective, we have only the vaguest idea of who thesepeople are and only a general sense of why we should care about them. It is adistant and abstract account that is offered; we do not have a picture of howwe could care about other human beings, remaining as generalized, evenidealized, as they do in Coombs’ construction. Nor do we have anyappreciation of the ways in which their differences could enrich a commonsearch for imaginative solutions to global problems. Finally, we are given verylittle in the way of proposals as to how these attitudes, sensitivities andcommitments could be developed in schools.Coombs calls for building a world community based on principles ofjustice and respect for persons. These are important universal ideals, but theyremain abstractions if our talk stays at the level of “building a worldcommunity.” We need a much fuller sense of who will be involved and whatparticular knowledge and sensitivities we will need in order to communicatesincerely and openly with them. As well, we will need to know what such acommunity would look like, on what principles it might operate and what rolesits various members might pursue. Most importantly in terms of theeducational project before us, we need to know what attributes and qualitiespersons would need to possess in order to participate in such a communityand whether the requisite sensitivities and dispositions could be taught aspart of attaining a morally defensible global perspective.Coombs notes that virtually all the writers on this topic agree that a66global perspective is a stance taken toward “the life conditions, projects andaspirations of groups of people, particularly national groups.”39 Coombs iscorrect to point out that the focus in Hanvey’s conception as well as that ofBecker and Kniep, has been on groups of people. His own is no exception. Ibelieve that a morally defensible global perspective ought to include thestance that we take toward individuals as well as groups of people. In fact, Iargue for the primacy of the individual in this respect. If one of the goals of aglobal perspective is to foster understanding between persons, then anemphasis on learning about and caring about individuals is paramount.According to Coombs, we want our students to see others in the world asmembers or potential members of a global moral community. For this tohappen, students must first begin to recognize the humanity of people in theworld, a goal best achieved by looking at and listening to the experiences ofparticular individuals, not groups or nations. Individual characteristics,achievements and struggles tend to become obscured underneath a morehomogenized description of national or ethnic identity. People, no matter whattheir origins may be, should not be regarded as distant and shadowy figureswho have more in common with Rawls’ abstractions behind the veil ofignorance than with humans made of flesh and blood.The global perspective I believe must be at the center of anyworthwhile program of global education is a perspective which focusesprimarily on the individual. I call it the interpersonal global perspective. Simplystated, the interpersonal global perspective is a stance toward human beingswhich recognizes the moral significance of individuals seen as unique beingswith particular qualities that cannot be assimilated to more generalizeddescriptions of “mankind” or “humankind.” I contrast this notion with the notion67of a global perspective that focuses on all persons as rights-holders orclaimants only. In that light, distinctness is not important. As many feminists,as well as communitarians have pointed out, important differences are filteredout of the picture when people are seen as “generalized others” or mereinstances of the universal.4°I believe that it is the distinctness of individualsthat will first command our notice, and that will compel us, if anything can, tobe attentive to their particular needs. Underlying this will be a belief in thedignity of all persons, but an interpersonal global perspective willacknowledge that we are moved to action by particular circumstance and ourmotivation is strengthened when we encounter the details, or the story of a lifethat in some way we can connect to our own. In a sense I am employing thedistinction Charles Taylor makes between the “politics of equal dignity” andthe “politics of difference.”41With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to beuniversally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; withthe politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the uniqueidentity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyoneelse.42By directing our attention to the universalist global perspective thatviews all human beings as identical baskets of “rights and immunities” wehave assimilated individual distinctness to a featureless abstraction that isdifficult to care about. Too often it is lip service and not genuine commitmentthat we give to these abstractions. Individuals become disembodied, removedfrom their own contexts and stripped of their own stories. Without a richer,more meaningful description, students will be unable to connect another life,one that is far from their horizon of experience, to their own. It is simply tooeasy for those of us in relatively advantaged positions in the developed world68to rest on platitudes and rely on generalized principles when confronted withinequities and injustices elsewhere in the world. We can walk away. It is notonly geographical and cultural distance that is significant here, it is the kind ofdistance that arises when we are able to remove ourselves from theimmediacy and the urgency of another’s need. A genuine moral perspectivecalls for something more.2.5. ATTITUDES AND THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVEAs I stated earlier, a useful way of talking about adopting a stance orhaving a perspective, is in terms of holding an attitude or a set of attitudestoward someone or something. Seen in this light, an attitude becomes theangle or standpoint from which we regard another person. Strawson’s“Freedom and Resentment” will help clarify what I mean by attitudes. Hisinsights about people’s intentions and responses to the intentions of others,are relevant to my conception of a morally defensible desirable globalperspective.Strawson speaks of how important it is to us, how it really matters tous, that we be seen as deserving respect and a certain sort of attention bythose with whom we are involved. We want to be regarded as worthy ofserious moral consideration, and we want our intentions and our actions to beseen as meaningful and purposeful. Similarly, we are prepared to count theintentions of others towards us as significant, provided we see thoseindividuals as rational, autonomous agents. In a sense, we see those peopleand ourselves as members of a moral community, linked by shared valuesand common questions about how to live. As an ideal, it becomes acommunity of inquirers,44 in which each member respects the others’ claims to69equality and freedom. We respond in certain ways to those we regard as fullparticipants in human experience, to those who are part of this circle ofmembership. Strawson says we respond to them with “reactive attitudes.”Toward those we regard as connected to us in this way, reactive attitudes areinescapable. They are part of our humanity; to lose them would be to lose partof ourselves. Reactive attitudes include emotional responses like resentment,gratitude, forgiveness and indignation. They can be described as ourreactions toward those we consider equal participants in the world, those whoare inside our sphere of moral experience and therefore fully responsible fortheir actions. We take their intentions to be of importance and in that way, aswell as other ways, we grant them full status as moral agents.But there is another stance we can take toward people, people who weview as outside this sphere. This stance involves what Strawson calls“objective attitudes.” Objective attitudes, or what one might call attitudes froma distance, are reserved for those people with whom we share no commonworld of meanings, or for those we regard as incapable of rational deliberationor freely chosen action. Strawson describes them this way:To adopt the objective attitude toward another human being is to seehim, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in awide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainlyto be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to bemanaged or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to beavoided....While the objective attitude may involve some emotions, it cannotinvolve all emotions. Fear or repulsion might be part of an objective attitude,so might pity or even some kinds of love. It is however a limited stance towardhuman beings. It cannot involve the kind nor the depth of feelings we havetoward those we are involved with in genuine interpersonal relationships.70it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or thesort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feelreciprocally, for each other. If your attitude towards someone is whollyobjective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him,and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannotreason with himAIn this essay, Strawson is speaking of the objective attitudes we maytake to those we believe are incapable of participating fully and responsibly inour world. Sometimes we are justified in stepping back some distance torespond effectively to those whose own reactive attitudes are wholly inhibitedby abnormalities, as in the case of the insane or the retarded. Often there is atension between falling into the objective stance, sometimes for valid reasons,and otherwise responding with a reactive attitude. Sometimes the strains ofresponding in this way are too great, and we are forced to take a step backfrom full participation.Objective attitudes, I would add, can also be those attitudes towards‘strangers’ which we adopt in the absence of recognized solidarity. Simplyput, objective attitudes are often our responses to people who are not like us,people of different cultures, backgrounds, or societies. We may feel noconnection with them at all. Ignatieff writes,Take one step outside our zone of safety—the developed world—andthere they are, hands outstretched, gaunt, speechless or clamouring inthe zone of danger. There is no claim of kith and kin to connect ustogether: only the indeterminate claim of one human being uponanother.47It is the indeterminacy of their claim which puts distance between usand them. We don’t know who they are; in some cases we barely recognizethem as fellow human beings. There is no claim of the kind that connects usto those who are close and known. It is all too easy to look upon strangers inthe same way we look upon those in our own society whom we regard as71beyond the circle of reason. They are dismissed or placed outside our sphereof genuine concern. We step back. The result is a kind of marginalization thatallows us to say in Rorty’s words, “They do not feel it as we would” or “Theremust always be suffering so why not let them suffer?”Strawson writes that adopting the objective attitude toward someoneprevents us from genuinely participating in a rational dialogue with them. Thishas special relevance for the way in which we respond to people who are notincapable of reasoning with us, but are somehow unlike us. Strawson says ofthe former: “You can’t reason with him; you can only pretend to.” By denyingstrangers membership in our moral community, that is by approaching themwith objective attitudes, we have put their needs, concerns and demands at adistance. We have deemed their interests as less worthy of considerationthan our own. Their reasons, like their claims on us, have little bearing on ourworld. As well, we have, prima facie, denied these individuals access to agenuine forum for exchange and communication. Instead of seeingpossibilities for connection, we see a gulf of unfamiliarity and strangeness.There is a danger in adopting the objective attitude towards those inthe world whom we have mistakenly marginalized or placed outside our circleof membership, toward these people Ignatieff calls strangers. We run the riskof perceiving strangers, in the developing world and elsewhere, as outside ofour sphere of concern and compassion. They are then regarded as distant,unfamiliar entities to be treated or dealt with “objectively.” Those of us whoadopt these attitudes might well believe that imposing our own values onothers is acceptable. By placing these strangers outside the circle of moralmembership, we fail to see the possibilities Coombs believes exist for buildingmoral communities on a global scale—communities that may one day72contribute to solving common problems that affect all of us on the earth.A genuinely global perspective of the kind Coombs begins to describe,calls for something beyond objective attitudes. It calls for building a globalcommunity based on respect for persons and commitment to rationalexchange. If we are committed to building a moral community of inquirers whowill attempt to solve global problems, then a prerequisite to this task is thebelief that we are all full participants in that fledgling community. We are allpotential citizens with equal rights and position, though we bring with us anamazing diversity of beliefs, hopes, desires, needs. We may be united only byour faith in the possibilities of communication and our hope for eventuallycreating a world of common meanings, but that is a start. However, even thisis impossible if we adopt the objective attitude towards others in the worldwho do not share our customs, language, and culture. We have alreadyplaced them beyond our circle of membership. We cannot reason with them;we can only pretend to. Surely we are not justified in stepping back from thestranger in the way that we step back from those we legitimately regard asoutside the circle of reason ( such as the insane or retarded.) Yet many of usdo, much of the time. I believe this happens a great deal in education, eveneducation which aims at developing perspectives which are morally sound.2.6. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE AND COMMUNITY BUILDINGA morally sound global perspective reflects a belief in the dignity andworth of all persons as co-workers in the construction of a global moralcommunity. Strawson’s description of what is required for us to respond topeople with “reactive attitudes” has much in common with such a perspective.We must begin to see people in other parts of the world, including the much73ignored developing world, as potential participants in our own moral lives.Constructing a global moral community is a project that can be taken up onlyby individuals who are willing to listen to strangers, and bring them into theirmoral sphere as equals. They will need to develop a range of sensitivities anddispositions in order to respond to the claims of others with respect andunderstanding. It is an enormous challenge for global educators to developsuch attitudes in their students, but it is not an impossible one. The capacityto care in this way is demonstrated by people over and over again in manycontexts. We can extend our horizon of caring to respond to the needs ofstrangers if we can begin to see the connections between their humanity andour own, if their needs can be seen as personal and compelling. lgnatieffreminds us that we not only have our own needs, we have needs on behalf ofothers:It is as common for us to need things on behalf of others, to need goodschools for the sake of our children, safe streets for the sake of ourneighbours, decent old peoples’ homes for the strangers at our door,as it is to need them for ourselves. The deepest motivational springs ofpolitical involvement are to be located in this human capacity to feelneeds for others.49Not only must we extend our moral sense to acknowledge the needs ofothers, we must see the lives of others as connected to our own. First, weneed to teach our students how to build connections with other persons in theworld, the strangers who at present stand outside their circle of membership.By connections, I mean to imply more than the commonalties we ordinarilyrecognize—our needs and rights based on universal dignity and equality,though these are always prerequisites and I do not deny them place orimportance. But I believe we must recognize the humanity of another not inabstraction but in its particularity. As Charles Taylor puts it:74we give due acknowledgement only to what is universally present-everyone has an identity—through recognizing what is peculiar toeach. The universal demand powers an acknowledgement ofspecificity.5°The human connections I have in mind are particular and personal,though no one would deny their underlying foundation as universal; the shockof recognition that went through me when I heard a Thai teenager describeher lost childhood, the nostalgia I felt when reading an old man’s memoirs ofIndian mountains I will never see, the sadness in a Peruvian flute song. It istrue I cannot come to know or care personally for a great many strangers inmy lifetime, but I can listen to the stories of some and share, vicariously atany rate, the memories of others. Above all, I can develop the disposition tolisten to a stranger’s story, and the sensitivity to respond to a stranger’s need.I can be open to the possibility of exchange, and willing to see others asequal participants in dialogue. I can learn to move in a broader horizon,adapting my perspectives so as to see with the perspectives of others,thereby creating in small and intimate ways, meaningful connections withpeople elsewhere in the world. I can teach my students to do the same.If we want our students to come to recognize the humanity in all of us,we need to make it recognizable and personally compelling. Though they willobviously be unable to learn the particular circumstances and characters ofhundreds, much less millions of strangers in the world, in a lifetime they cancome to know more than a handful. My hope is that knowing the stories of aparticular few and coming to care about the storytellers and the lives theylead, will persuade our students of the worth of individual identities and theneed to enter into dialogue with others whenever possible, as equal, yetdistinct participants, each with particular beliefs and struggles to beconsidered. I hope our students can then openly and willingly bring strangers75into their moral sphere as they encounter them throughout their lives.Developing an interpersonal global perspective will require manysteps. Educators committed to such a task will need to teach their students toreason about global issues using appropriate standards, to listen sincerelyand openly to many different voices, and to seek peaceful and constructivesolutions to world problems. Students will need to possess a great deal ofglobal knowledge, as well as demonstrate compassion and a commitment todemocratic principles which will insure that a multiplicity of voices can beheard in the ongoing dialogue. All of these are prerequisites for building aglobal moral community.2.7. CONCLUSIONIf students develop ways of relating to others that reflect the moralprinciples and commitments introduced in this chapter as well as attaining theknowledge which informs commitment and action, they will be well on theirway to attaining a defensible global perspective. The characteristics thatdefine such a perspective are many. They include intellectual virtues, such asopen-mindedness, and the ability and inclination to use and demand reasons.They include moral virtues, such as benevolence and a sense of justice. Theyalso include beliefs about the equality of human beings and the verypossibility of a human community. And finally they include the dispositionsand abilities necessary for participation in community building, especiallycommunity building across differences.We are all members of communities from the time we learn tounderstand and use language. Our connections to communities will be bothfluid and multiple. Over the course of lifetime we will define ourselves as76belonging to a number of groups, participants in numerous, sometimesoverlapping spheres. In order to see the possibility for new connections, andas yet undiscovered relationships, we need to understand what elementsbring us together in communities in the first place. So my task in the followingtwo chapters will be to describe the nature of communities as they relate to amorally defensible global perspective, and to describe in some detail thefoundations on which a global moral community ought to be based.1Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self Gender Community andPostmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 47.2Jerrold Coombs, “Toward a Defensible Conception of a GlobalPerspective,” occasional paper #1 (Vancouver: Research and Development inGlobal Studies, 1988).3See Roland Case, “The Key Elements of a Global Perspective,” EDGEseries (Vancouver, 1991), for a clarification of Hanvey’s conception of aglobal perspective.4Jerrold Coombs, “Toward a Defensible Conception of a GlobalPerspective,” occasional paper #1 (Vancouver: Research and Development inGlobal Studies, 1988); Linda Darling, “The Rise of Global Education in NorthAmerica” (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Studies, 1989);Robert Hanvey, An Attainable Global Perspective (New York: GlobalPerspectives in Education, 1976).5Walter Werner, “Contradictions in Global Education,” EDGE Series(Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Studies, 1990).6lbid., 1.7Robert Hanvey, An Attainable Global Perspective (New York: GlobalPerspectives in Education, 1976).8lbid., 4.9lbid., 6.10Werner, “Contradictions in Global Education,” 2.7711Donald Johnson, “Academic and Intellectual Foundations of TeacherEducation in Global Perspectives,” Theory Into Practice 32, no. I (Winter,1993): 11.12Ibid., 13.13lbid., 15.14Short, Joseph, “Learning and teaching Development,” HarvardEducational Review 55, no. 1 (1985): 33—34.15Hanvey, 8.16lbid., 8.17Ibid., 10—11.18See David Brion Davis’ review of Two Nations: Black and White,Separate, Hostile, Unequal, by Andrew Hacker, in The New York Review ofBooks 39, no. 13 (July 16, 1992).19Hanvey, 13.20lbid., 13.21Ibid., 2.22Jerrold Coombs, “Towards a Defensible Conception of GlobalEducation,” is a notable exception to such a claim. This paper significantlyfurthered the debate concerning the moral attainments associated with adesirable global perspective. However this paper stands out as being one ofthe few direct responses to Hanvey’s original conception. Roland Case, in apaper presented at the annual conference of the American Forum, at Hartford,CT. in 1991, notes that, “the tendency has been to offer lists of generalattributes or areas of inquiry, which are often vague and at cross-purposes. Itwould appear that important aspects of the global perspective have beenincompletely or inadequately articulated” (unpublished presentation).Thomas Popkewitz, “Global Education as Slogan System,”Curriculum Inquiry, 303.24Robert Hanvey, An Attainable Global Perspective, 4—5.7825See Walter Werner, “Contradictions in Global Education,” EDGESeries (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Education, 1990).26RoIand Case, “The Key Elements of a Global Perspective,” EDGEseries (Vancouver, 1991).271b1d., 1.28WiIIard Kniep, “Defining a Global Education by its Content,” SocialEducation 50 (1986): 437—446.Case, “Key Elements of a Global Perspective,” 8.30Elsie Begler, “Spinning Wheels and Straw: Balancing Content,Process, and Context in Global Teacher Education Programs,” Theory IntoPractice 32, no. I (Winter, 1993): 15.31Jerrold Coombs, Towards a Defensible Conception of a GlobalPerspective (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Education.1989).32Case, 18.33lbid., 18.341n the section in which Hanvey describes the fifth dimension of aglobal perspective, “Awareness of Human Choices,” it is clear that heassumes certain value positions with regard to feeding the world (we have amoral obligation to contribute) and with regard to future generations (theyhave rights which must be respected). However, he does not articulate hispositions nor does he advocate that teaching for a global perspective is partof a moral enterprise.Case, 1.Coombs, Towards a Defensible Conception of a Global Perspective.37Nel Noddings, Caring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).38Coombs, 4.39lbid., 1.79“°Benhabib, 48—177.41 Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 38.42Taylor, Multiculturalism, 38.P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of theBritish Academy (1962).44HiIary Putnam speaks of a “community of inquirers,” linked by thecommon search for an answer to the question, “How ought we to live?” in“Equality and Our Moral Image of the World,” in The Many Faces of Realism(La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 41—57.Strawson, 79.“lbid., 79.47lgnatieff, 29.Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvi.49lgnatieff, 17.5° Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism, 39.80CHAPTER THREETHE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN THE GLOBAL AGEI regard neither the plurality and variety of goodnesses with which wehave to live in a disenchanted universe nor the loss of certainty in moraltheory to be a cause of distress. Under conditions of valuedifferentiation, we have to conceive of the unity of reason not in theimage of a homogeneous, transparent glass sphere into which we canfit all our cognitive and value commitments, but more as bits and piecesof dispersed crystals whose contours shine out from under the rubble.Seyla Benhabib I3.1. INTRODUCTIONIn the last pages, I argued that the development of a global perspectiveis essentially a moral perspective on the world and that it is at the heart ofglobal education. I took Coombs’ conception of a global perspective as adeparture point for my own, building into my moral perspective a fuller andmore explicit focus on individuals. I spoke about the need for connections tobe built up between strangers, members of disparate communities who mustbegin to see themselves as common inhabitants of the planet.The interpersonal global perspective I argued for is a moral point ofview. It will only be possible to attain such a perspective if one is able toextend one’s sphere of moral of concern to a larger community of persons. Anunderstanding of what community means to our moral lives is essential if weare to extend our moral sense beyond familiar boundaries. In this chapter Iwill discuss what community means to those of us living in a global age. First Iwill look at the principles and commitments which lie behind our notions oftraditional communities. My question is whether there are any features ofthese communities that can shed light on what a global community of concern81might look like. I will look at several views of traditional communities, includingthose of Alasdair Maclntyre in After Virtue, and Robert Bellah and the otherauthors of Habits of the Heart and The Good Society.2The communities theseauthors discuss are based on familiar commitments and connections focusedon our relations with and our attitudes toward, individuals whom we know andcare about. It is their belief that these kinds of community connections havebeen destroyed or at least severely weakened in this century.I hope to show that the concept of community still has meaning formost of us and that some of the moral attainments associated with ourmembership in communities are key elements for potential relations in othermoral spheres, including global ones. Many of the dispositions andsensitivities required for responsible participation at a local level are alsoneeded by people who wish to build connections with strangers, particularlythose that call upon our capacities for tolerance, empathy, and justice.At the same time, I want to dispel notions that what is required in orderto restore moral vision in contemporary society is either a return to the civicrepublican (and Biblical) traditions described by Bellah or the Aristotelianenclaves advocated by Maclntyre. Each of their visions presupposes unifiedpurposes that do not reflect present realities within or beyond our ownsocieties. I believe that we have to combat what has been called thecommunitarian’s “terminal wistfulness”3.In a pluralistic world, an integrativevision of the good is not possible or defensible. Instead we should direct ourenergies toward creating new possibilities for moral discourse that betteraddresses common needs and aspirations we might discover, and does sowithout losing sight of our important differences. I will conclude by arguing fora “a participationist community,”4the goal of which is moral conversations82between people who are committed to work through their differences.A commitment to the construction of a moral community based oncommon concerns need not mean and should not mean a commitment to asingle moral image or vision of the good. A global moral community shouldaccommodate many visions of the good. Similarly, belief in a global moralcommunity does not entail belief in a single global culture, though someglobal educators talk as if that is our certain future.5 I will argue that thepossibility of a global moral community founded on recognition of commonconcerns can and should embrace rather than reject cultural diversity.3.2. THE LOSS OF TRADITIONAL COMMUNITIESIt seems from the moment one begins to explore the nature andfunctions of communities in North America, one is told they no longer exist orare at best an endangered species. Like our moral language, communitiesthat foster our moral identity and give rise to the public virtues, are consideredby many to be in disarray. In Habits of the Heart, we read that “the languageof social responsibility” and the “practices of commitment to the public good”are not generated by the impersonal modern world as they were by thenurturing life of the small town of centuries past.6 Instead our first language is“shot through with individualism and is therefore ill-suited to public discourseon the common good or shaping meaningful lives.”7 It is single-mindedcommitment to personal gain and individual satisfaction that has comebetween ourselves and any realization of community connections orobligations. As long as individualism reigns, the public good suffers.Like Bellah et al in Habits of the Heart, Maclntyre paints a bleak picturewith regard to the disintegration of communities in After Virtue and also in an83essay titled “The Idea of an Educated Public.”8According to Macintyre, it wasthe lively exchange between great numbers of the liberally educated publicduring the Scottish Enlightenment which furthered the political and socialdebates of the time. Over the years, these open inquiries generated new waysof looking at public policy, and invited a wide range of perspectives on issuesof human welfare, perspectives that represented diverse roles in thecommunity.The modern emphasis on specialized training and education for narrowexpertise has left us without such a shared language or common social vision;the experts do not know how to talk to one another about means or ends.According to Maclntyre, modernity itself excludes the possibility of aneducated community; “it has no way of taking on life in contemporarysociety.”9In After Wrtue, Maclntyre is concerned with other facets of our moraland social disintegration as well, in particular the moral and spiritual disarraywhich the failed Enlightenment project left in its wake. As Onora O’Neill notesin a chapter of Constructions of Reason, Macintyre “diagnoses modern moraldiscourse as deeply fragmented, condemning us to ‘interminability of publicargument’ and ‘disquieting private arbitrariness’.”10 Once the moral traditionthat had Aristotle’s thought at its intellectual centre was abandoned, privatearbitrariness was the inevitable result of the shift in our thinking about thegood. The very idea of a public with a shared vision of the good wasthreatened and eventually became extinct once the idea of human flourishingwithin a setting of traditions, practices and institutions (such as Aristotle’spolis) was replaced by post-Englightenment notions of liberal pluralism, a kindof agnosticism with regard to ends.84We can look at another version of a public that seems to havevanished with the twentieth century if not with the Enlightenment, and that isthe local community. (As Maclntyre tells us, “the praise and practices of thevirtues still pervaded social life, often in highly traditional ways”11 for well intothe nineteenth century and beyond, even if there were modern, post-Enlightenment problems with justifying their place in that life.) The practice ofcivic virtues was obviously central to the vitality of these communities. Formany of us, the paradigm of these local communities has been nostalgicallyembodied (or perhaps embedded) in the small New England village ortownship, particularly as it is viewed around annual town meeting time. Hailedsince Tocqueville’s time, the town meeting has been seen as theconcretization of ideal participatory democracy. Tocqueville believed that theexperience of local self-government transformed self-interested residents intoresponsible, morally enlightened citizens who went on to exhibit a wealth ofpublic virtues.12 The annual town meeting, a kind of legislative assembly, andother institutions of the classic New England township also served (and stilldo in some states) to support a political and social structure backed bygenerations of tradition.According to the authors of Habits of the Heart, the vision of communityideally represented by these towns is one that looks both forward and back intime:The traditional institutions of the town express a classic vision of whatsuch a community is and what it must continually strive to become: aself-reliant congregation created and maintained by the voluntarycooperation of self-reliant families. At the same time, forming a fadingbackground to this voluntaristic vision, there is an appreciation of thetown as a community of memory linking the destiny of its citizens withtheir ancestors and descendants.1385In part, it was the classic vision of such a community to which towncitizens of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries turned for both a sense ofself and a sense of solidarity with others. The search for identity was at thesame time a search for one’s place in the community. The “story of my life,”writes Maclntyre, “is always embedded in the story of those communities fromwhich I derive my identity.”14 The ‘natural citizen’ of such a town in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a self-employed producer. He foundhis roles and responsibilities fitted neatly into the context of the communitylife. (Bellah does not mention women in his characterization of the naturalcitizen; presumably her primary context was that of the family, but she, too,would have found a meaningful place in certain aspects of community life.) Sohis life story (and her story) were woven into the tapestry, or historicalnarrative, of the community, itself seen as a continuum from generations pastto generations yet to be born. He became a part of the evolving storiesaround him, and they became part of him.Maclntyre writes:A central thesis then begins to emerge: man in his actions and practiceas well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is notessentially, but comes through his history, a teller of stories that aspireto truth. But the key question for men is not about their own authorship;I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer theprior question, ‘Of what stories do I find myself a part? We enterhuman society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles intowhich we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are inorder to be able to understand how others respond to us and how ourresponses to others are likely to be construed.15The ‘memory of community’ described in Habits of the Heart forms onesuch collection of stories through which and in which identities were formed.The roles that these past citizens were drafted into were the roles which thecommunities’ institutions and traditions defined for them. It is a relatively easy86matter to see that story-telling was one essential way in which these roleswere conveyed. In fact, much of the moral fibre of the community, its socialcommitments to its members, its patterns of relations and decision making,would necessarily be passed on through stories and the ongoing portrayal ofa way of life in a narrative form. The public good would be constructed fromthese stories and the interpretations given to them by those who participatedin community life. Each members actions, including actions in the moralsphere, were not isolated but played against a backdrop of community life andthe narrative that was passed on within it. Continuity within one’s own life anda sense of social connection made actions and moral choices intelligible.But what of twentieth century life, characterized by many (Maclntyre forone, Bellah for another) as fragmented and without a spiritual or moralcentre? If we are, or come to be through historical and social circumstance,story-telling beings, where do our contemporary stories, and thus ouridentities, come from? What has happened to our quests for continuity in ourlives or to what Maclntyre calls the intelligibility of our narratives? Do we stillhave access to membership in the “classic community” or only a nostalgic andillusory attachment to a way of life that no longer exists? Is there somethingpotent and sustaining we can still draw from our traditional notions ofcommunity and our places within them?3.3. THE VIABILITY OF COMMUNITIES IN THE GLOBAL AGEFor both Bellah and Macintyre our moral vision was lost with thedisappearance of traditional communities. On Maclntyre’s view, only restoring(through restating) Aristotelian ethics based on virtues within a setting ofpractices, will bring back “intelligibility and rationality to our moral social87attitudes and commitments.”16 His suggestion is to look once again at thenotion of a telos, though he suggests some reformulation of Aristotle’sconception. Aristotle’s version of what constituted the good for human beingswas based on a well-defined set of virtues sustained within the polis as theywere based on a public understanding of shared goods. Everyoneacknowledged and accepted the role set out for him within the establishedorder. Maclntyre’s conception of the good life for man is the life spent insearching for the good life, a quest in other words, in which certain virtuesilluminate the way and are themselves strengthened through the search.O’Neill refers to it as an “open-ended, almost procedural vision of the humantelos •“ 17If we accept the interpretation of telos as a quest, I would argue that itis still a viable notion in the modern world. We are still guided by a search forthe good, though we may not share conceptions of just what that is. Contraryto Maclntyre’s claim, I suggest that our moral vision has not been entirely lost,and we still have a chance to build community that is suited to the demands ofour age, including the demands of pluralism. Jeffrey Stout recognizes thatthere already exists a somewhat “provisional” telos functioning within liberalsocieties, one that is evidence of our limited but genuine agreement oncertain sorts of goods or ends.18 We agree, for instance, that peaceful ratherthan violent settlements of disputes are to be preferred, and we agree thatrestricting someone’s freedom without justification is wrong. There is a greatdeal of commonality in our intentions toward one another, including,importantly enough, “a self-limiting consensus on the good” which preserves ahealthy degree of freedom for our individual pursuits of other goods.19 Wehave agreed to tolerate a certain amount of moral disagreement for the sake88of living in harmony and for the sake of our shared concepts of liberty andjustice. These things demonstrate that common purposes do exist, thoughthey are often eclipsed by the tensions between us (and by philosophers’descriptions). “We have so little sense of common purpose in part becausewe have become so accustomed to a picture that hides the actual extent ofour commonality from view.”20This is not to say that we do not have difficulty communicating orcooperating within present communities or outside of them. Obviously we do.But a return to a kind of premodern polis in which our private selves mightwell be sacrificed for public ends is not a solution to moral disagreement oreven a partial loss of moral vision. The project of recovering even a modifiedteleological framework of the sort Maclntyre has in mind is problematic.Although not bound to one conception of what constitutes the good for alltimes and places, Maclntyre’s telos nevertheless sounds fixed, grounded in akind of solidarity that carries the risk of curtailing freedom. For this recovery,according to Maclntyre, can only happen in a society where habits,dispositions and assumptions are shared, in other words a “living communitydedicated to the common good.”21 Collective life of this sort is not possible inthe absence of agreement on the good, yet that characterization exactlydescribes the liberal society in which we live. Macintyre says that our telos isrealized in seeking the good, in finding the good life for ourselves, but we areasked to seek it within communities where much that counts as good andmany of our purposes and roles are already defined for us. It would appearthat Maclntyre is giving us two versions of a telos.Not withstanding O’Neill’s interpretation, Maclntyre’s telos seems tohave much in common with Aristotle’s fixed conception of the human essence89if one is to accept the last pages of After Virtue as his final word on the matter.Here he states that the good for human beings—our telos—can only bepursued within a setting within which the notion of shared goods and commonvirtues already has central place. Maclntyre writes that there are importantparallels to be drawn between the modern predicament and the Dark Ages atthe point when Romans turned aside from the task of “shoring up” the empireand began instead, to build new forms of life that could nurture a sharedmoral vision.If my account of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to includethat for some time now we too have reached that turning point. Whatmatters at this stage is the construction of local forms of communitywithin which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustainedthrough the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if thetradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last darkages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope.Maclntyre suggests that retreating into close and tightly knit bands oflike-minded souls is a viable solution to the moral disarray we find ourselvesin, but as a possibility for any of us at the turn of the twenty-first century itsounds almost quaint. As well, there is a disturbing conservative strain in hisvision of community, one which sets unjustifiable limits on both our personalprojects and the chances for creating new public ones. Communities canenrich us but they can also restrain us in unacceptable ways. Conforming to asingle integrative vision of who we are and where we are going denies ourcapacity and as well as obligation to challenge and criticize our presentpractices and to see them from another point of view.Certainly we cannot go back in time. It is neither a possible nordesirable option. Aristotle’s polis with its accepted and fixed telos for humanityis no longer a possibility to consider in this world where so many visions of90the good stand side by side, at times enriching each other, more oftencompeting with one another. It is not even a defensible model of what acommunity ought to look like, given its restrictions on membership and otherlimitations.23 Liberal institutions are premised on a very different notion ofcollective life, one in which diversity of beliefs, customs, and assumptionsabout the good, is a reality we must all recognize and work with. The questionis not how to recapture what is gone, but how to “enhance the sense ofcommon purpose we already have, limited as it may be, without actingunjustly or making things worse.”243.4. IDENTITIES AND MORAL DISCOURSE IN COMMUNITIESThe small, cohesive communities that Bellah and his colleagues writeabout and the ones that Macintyre wants to restore for us are unlikely optionsfor most people and do not speak to the need for building new moralcommunities. Though modern counterparts of the historic communitiesdescribed in Habits of the Heart may exist in village settings in parts of NorthAmerica, they rarely exist for the purpose of fostering the common good or areunderpinned by the same commitments as in generations past.25 Yet many ofus in North America still want to define ourselves, and do define ourselves inpart, through our close, local affiliations and memberships; (some such asneighborhood associations, for example, attempt to restore a sense of fellowfeeling between area residents.) For most of us, our sense of heritage andother background identifications form the backdrop for the choices we makeand the actions we take. Charles Taylor speaks of being oriented in moralspace, of “knowing where I stand with regard to questions of what is good,right and important.”2691My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications whichprovide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine fromcase to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, orwhat I endorse or oppose. In other words it is the horizon within which Iam capable of taking a stand.27This horizon is made up of spiritual and political commitments,traditions and beliefs we take from our pasts, worldviews that have beenshaped by our particular histories, in other words the stories we have heardand of which we are a part. And this is still the case. Even without access tothe communities which are described so nostalgically in Habits of the Heart,we do have a moral frame, a horizon as Taylor puts it, that has been shapedby our history and all the people involved in our lives. It is in fact constitutiveof our personhood as it forms the background for our present choices, ourcherished principles, and all the other ways in which we think about what andwhom we value. In other words, it has shaped and will continue to shape ouridentity. Because this “horizon” is created through our relations with others(our identity is formed dialogically according to Taylor) and because it ispartly formed by our understanding of certain commitments we have towardothers, I believe that the primary language we use is still one suited toexpressing terms of social responsibility, though Bellah, et al, argueotherwise.It is Bellah’s contention that our primary language is so shot throughwith individualism that we do not know how to speak or think about anycommon good nor do we know how to talk about shaping meaningful lives. IfTaylor is right and our identity is created dialogically against a cultural andhistoric backdrop, then it is at least possible that the primary language inwhich we express our individual needs, ideals and aspirations will be one thatcan also acknowledge our commitments and debts to others.92Stout takes up the problem of the language of “individualism” withwhich Bellah et al are so concerned in his criticisms of many of the interviewsused as centerpieces for Habits of the Heart. He believes the interviewer’squestioning techniques are in many ways to blame for the inability ofinterviewee Brian Palmer and others to express their moral beliefs andcommitments clearly. Rather than reflecting a preoccupation with self or a lackof moral concern for others, Palmer’s response to supposed Socraticquestioning techniques shows understandable confusion about what thequestioner is driving at. Brian does not invoke a moral principle to explain thebasis of his objection to lying but instead sounds “downright Aristotelian” intalking about lying as a bad habit. The interviewer probes further, promptingBrian’s response that he doesn’t know why lying is wrong. “It just IS.”28 Whenfurther backed into a corner, Palmer finally says, “Well, some things are badbecause... I guess I just feel like everybody on the planet is entitled to have alittle bit of space, and things that detract from people’s space are kind ofbad... (304—305, ellipses in original)”29 Stout uses this example to show thatthe interviewer’s conclusion, that Palmer is voicing a moral principle based onAmerican individualism, is a misinterpretation. It is more probable to concludethat Palmer “doesn’t know how to answer questions that aren’t connected toreal doubts.” 3° Lying is Simply a bad thing.There are several things we can learn from Stout’s reading of Habits ofthe Heart. One is that in terms of the way people actually live their lives (asopposed to discussing their lives) commitments to others and shared moralconcerns have an important place. Another is that an ethic of virtue has notcompletely disappeared from the modern experience. We recognize andreward certain virtues and try to cultivate a range of virtues in our children.93Lying is a bad thing, integrity is important, family life matters. Civic or publicvirtues are among those that many parents and teachers of all kinds, try topass on. Some of these so-called public virtue make communication betweenus possible (even if it is at times difficult) others make it fruitful. I would arguethat the notion of an educated public working for the common good and therelated notion of persons whose stories intertwine in communities, are notcompletely obsolete or antiquated, though they are in great need of majorrestoration. Our stories still overlap and we still have ways to communicate aswell as define ourselves through them.One way this happens is through participation in what Maclntyre callsour “social practices” forms of complex human activity which have their ownstandards of excellence. Virtues are defined by Macintyre, as those qualitieswhich when exhibited in the course of a practice enable us to achieve thegoods internal to that particular practice.31 Commitment to our various socialpractices is alive and well, as are the virtues associated with practices. Thevirtues inherent to the practice of medical care for instance, virtues such aspractical wisdom and courage are widely acknowledged and exhibited bypractitioners. The “goods internal to the practice” are most often acquiredthrough imitating role models, as are the forms of excellence (and thus thevirtues that help us realize them) that are particular to other social practiceswe engage in.Maclntyre’s own notion of social practices can be used to make anargument about the vitality of our moral language when seen as anexpression of goods passed on from teacher to apprentice, parent to child,expert to novice. And it is not the language of individualism or privatearbitrariness. On the contrary, the standards of excellence particular to each94practice are valued, imitated, taught, and discussed; in short they are shared.Stout claims that our moral discourse is not so bleak as Maclntyre orBellah find it. Maclntyre gives an excessively bleak prognosis concerning thepossibility of rational moral discourse in the modern age. He underestimatesthe level of agreement on the good actually exhibited by our society andoverestimates the level required for us to reason coherently with each otheron most matters of common concern.32 I believe, as Stout does, that we stillhave a viable moral language and often, a commitment to communicate withit. I strongly suspect that Stout, however, has overestimated the extent towhich the virtues are actually exhibited in our society and explicitly cultivatedin our children. We often speak past each other and we do disagree onmatters of moral significance. Yet moral discourse in our society, can, asStout tells us, “be understood as held together by a relatively limited butnonetheless real and significant agreement on the good.... Our disagreementabout what human beings are like and what is good for us does not go all theway down.”33 If it did, we would not even recognize the disagreement. It onlymakes sense to talk of moral arguments against a background of agreement.When we do not share each other’s vision of the good or the right, andwhen moral disagreements prevail, we have both voice and language withwhich to define and discuss our various predicaments and their potentialsolutions. When we do not understand each other and must translate foreignconcepts into familiar vocabulary, we have the resources to do that. Ourlanguage itself is not a static system; it can change and grow to suit ourpurposes and the particularities of our situations. By collecting and refiningthe fragments of many moral languages that have been passed down to us,we can enrich “our conceptual resources for dialogue with strangers.”34 We95have at hand, as Walzer continually reminds us, the tools we need toascertain what’s gone wrong and to improve and refine our actions and ourdeliberations.35These tools are found within our existing social practices. Aswe have seen, the goods internal to our practices carry their own standards ofexcellence, standards that are tied to virtues and ideals we cherish. Withindemocratic societies, most of us acknowledge the force of ideals, such asjustice, even when we do not live up to them. We recognize the truth in socialcriticism, because we realize when we have fallen short of ideals to which weare committed and when we have failed to exhibit virtues we believe in.Many of the virtues that are exhibited by members of existingcommunities are central to the enterprise of building a community of concernon a global scale. These include a sense of obligation toward others,compassion, commitment to treating others fairly and decently and awillingness to listen to other points of view. Our familiar traditions of caringand mutual support are rooted in certain beliefs about human worth thatextend beyond our present spheres of caring. Beliefs about equality and theimportance of the welfare of all can form the foundation for new moralcommunities based on contemporary visions and purposes. These newvisions and purposes are not tied to a single idea of the good for humanbeings. It is also important to point out that they are not tied to a vision ofworld that is moving inexorably toward a single culture. This is a view thatmore than occasionally leaps from the pages of writing on global education.3.5. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY IN COMMUNITIESCreating a global moral community does not necessitate mergingvisions of the good into a single version. Neither does it demand96homogenization of traditions and cultures into something akin to a worldwhere all inhabitants speak Esperanto. Yet talk of a monoculture is apersistent theme in the literature of global education. It is found infoundational statements, policy declarations, teacher education materials andtextbooks. James Becker speaks of the “increasingly global character ofhuman experience.”36 and Barbara Tye, in the same collection of papers onglobal education, claims that “systemic interconnectedness is the naturalorder of things.”37 Often it sounds as if an explicit aim of global education is topush us further in the direction of a homogeneous world culture. In 1973, LeeAnderson declared that, “...most human beings live out there lives in acocoon of culture whose circumference equals the circumference of the globe.In a word, there is a global cuIture.” Nearly twenty years later, the sameauthor wrote:The past millennium has witnessed a marked homogenization ofhuman culture. A global culture is developing. The technical languageof this emerging culture is English. Its common ideology is science. Itscharacteristic social institutions are large—scale, globe spanningpublic and private bureaucracies. Its commonly shared technologiesare jet planes, communication satellites, telexes, networks ofinterconnected computers, facsimile machines and transwordtelephone systems.39Anderson follows this by mentioning that the world is also filled with“myriad, distinctive microcultures [which] coexist in a set of uneasy, oftentense, and constantly shifting relationships” with the looming global culture.Little wonder given the resources, technologies and sheer momentum of thelatter as it bulldozes over the former. Anderson may be giving us what hesees as an accurate description of the state of the planet, and not makingnormative claims about what the world ought to look like. Even so the sheerinevitability of the dominance of global culture that he describes leaves little97room to consider what role the thousands of microcultures might play in thefuture. It is as if their viability, not to mention their vitality, has been entirelyeclipsed from view.Consider, too, the words of global educator, David Selby, an influentialproponent of “world order studies.”4°In a collection of papers concerned withthe implementation of innovative school programs, Selby and co-authorGraham Pike, attempt to justify their vision of global education. They begin byreferring to the “networks of links, interactions and relationships that circle thisplanet like a giant and intricate spider’s web.”41 We are all caught up in theweb of global interdependencies that the authors describe as a system.“Relationship is everything: the activity of the system comprises thesimultaneous and interdependent interaction of its many component parts, thenature of the system is always more than the sum total of its separate parts.”42Education, say Selby and Pike, does not recognize this reality, even thoughstudents, like all of earth’s inhabitants, are inextricably bound up in the web.Selby and Pike are not alone in using the metaphor of a giant web toexplain the idea of global systems, including the idea of global culture as aunified system.43 The interlocking web encompasses and connects variousaspects of the world—economic systems of the various nation-states forinstance—are now becoming one giant global network. We are asked to lookupon the emerging global culture as a web of beliefs, customs, patterns ofliving, symbols and so on; in other words a coherent, integrated system. Onceunderstood in this way, we have before us, according to Selby and Pike, atheoretical base for understanding the interrelationships, interdependencies,and interconnections within and between cultures as they merge into onecultural net that encircles the globe.98There is reason to suppose that correctly interpreted, the concept of aworld “system” and the accompanying metaphor, the web, is a usefulconstruct for describing and analyzing relationships between phenomena.Systems theory can be a powerful explanatory tool. Yet in global educationliterature, the “web” has on occasion turned into an oversimplified, evenmisleading way in which to frame understanding of the various aspects anddimensions of world systems. Claiming that the world is like a web maysuggest that we are all intertwined, but it does not go very far in explaining theways in which relationships are unequal, the fact that actions from certainquarters will shake the web violently while others will hardly be felt, thatelements within the web seem bent on its destruction, and so on. As one criticof existing forms of global education put it, “Let us not fool ourselves andothers. We are not living in a harmoniously interdependent world, but in adeteriorating world” in which unhealthy and destructive relationships continueto exist between the First and Third Worlds. Interdependence betweenpeoples is in no way a mutual condition. Teachers cannot expect thatprojecting the image of a web onto the world will do much to explain theintricacies and subtleties of systems to their students. Neither will the imagehelp them understand the complexities and inequities of unbalanceddevelopment.Clifford Geertz gives us a different image when he speaks of cultures,one that may be slightly more helpful to us:The appropriate image if one must have images, of culturalorganization is neither the spider web nor the pile of sand. It is rathermore the octopus, whose tentacles are in large part separatelyintegrated, neurally quite poorly connected with one another and withwhat in the octopus passes for a brain, and yet who nonethelessmanages to both get around and preserve himself, for a while anyway,99as a viable if somewhat ungainly entity.45Geertz’s comments suggest a far more slippery, more complex imagethan the web-like system that Pike and Selby see as an appropriatedescription of culture, including what they see to be global culture.Oversimplification can lead to serious misunderstandings, in global educationas everywhere else. And it is not just oversimplification that is troubling herebut that the very notion of homogenization of world cultures is inevitable andeven a good thing. The message seems to be that progress is necessarilylinked to Western ways of thinking, believing, and viewing the world.The viability of individual cultures is a permanent feature of our world.Despite much contamination by the West, certain features and dimensions ofliterally thousands of regional cultural groups remain strong, each with its ownvoice and face.45 In his most recent book, The Crooked Timber of Humanity,Isaiah Berlin speaks of each society or culture as having its “own centre ofgravity”47The ways in which men live, think, feel, speak to one another, theclothes they wear the songs they sing, the gods they worship, thefoods they eat, the assumptions, habits, which are intrinsic to them—itis this that creates communities...Between cultural communities values differ widely and there aredisagreements among communities often because of the incompatibility ofthese values. One such example is Berlin’s description of a culture thatreveres humility contrasted with a culture that has for its highest virtuecourage in adversity. Recognizing the essential incompatibility of thesevalues is not evidence of cultural or moral relativism, rather it should beunderstood as pluralism—the recognition that there are many ways of life forhuman beings and many imagined “ends” but they are all found within the100human horizon. Even with our extreme differences, we do recognize certainfeatures about each other; we all have needs that must be satisfied, and weall have life plans, we make choices, we express certain recognizableemotions and so on. We can, given enough imaginative insight, understandwhat it would be like to live by values other than our own and be guided bypurposes we may disagree with but can still identify as legitimate humanaims. Pluralism is the conception that there are many different ends that menmay seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding eachother and sympathizing and deriving light from each other...”49 There may beno way to completely reconcile our disparate visions into one, but we canlearn to converse with compassion, sensitivity and reasonableness acrossdifferences.We are capable of understanding and learning from each other, and attimes even changing our points of view. Berlin’s pluralist view does notcommit us to silence between communities, nor does it commit us to refrainingfrom judgements once we have made a sincere and reasoned effort to stepinto another’s perspective as far as we are able. Berlin’s insights here areimportant:One can reject a culture because one finds it morally or aestheticallyrepellent, but on this view, only if one could understand how and why itcould, nevertheless be acceptable to a recognizably human society.Only if its behavior is not intelligible at all are we reduced to a mere‘physicalist’ description and prediction of gestures; the code if there isone, which would yield their meaning remains unbroken. Such men arenot fully human for us; we do not know what they are up to; they arenot brothers to us...; we can at most only dimly guess at what the pointof their acts, if they are acts, may be.5°What seems clear and unassailable is that values clash and areinevitably incompatible with each other, but we can through dialogue and101imaginative understanding try to find the common ground between us. LikeBerlin’s, my position is not one of cultural relativism but of pluralism. Waizernotes that while our understanding of other people’s histories andexperiences is never complete, we can always ask them to explain.51 Andoften, if not always, we will grasp what they mean. He writes:Intercommunication between cultures in time and space is onlypossible because what makes men human is common to them, andacts as a bridge between them. But our values are ours and theirs aretheirs, we are free to criticize the values of other cultures, to condemnthem but we cannot pretend not to understand them at all, or to regardthem simply as subjective., the products of creatures in differentcircumstances, with different tastes from our own, which do not speakto us at all.52If we are sincere and persevering in our efforts to understand andimagine the lives and struggles of other people, we will, be able to recognizetheir values as human ones much of the time.” If the quest is successful, weshall see that the values of these remote peoples are such as human beingslike ourselves- creatures capable of conscious intellectual and moraldiscrimination—could live by.53 This may be the most we can hope for in somecases and its importance should not be underestimated. However in mattersof shared concern such as human rights, clean water, adequate medical careand so on, we can hope for more. Through dialogue and exchange, theoriginal patch of common ground can grow.It will not grow into a single vision of what a good life consists in foreach of us, nor into a shared cultural vision of experience. As we have seen,Maclntyre wants us to return to small communities that are guided by a singlepolitical and social image of the world, one that he believes can unite usagainst the chaos beyond our spiritual hearths. Not only does it seemextremely unrealistic given the pluralistic nature of the world, it appears as an102undesirable goal as well. By eclipsing diversity from view, we eclipse anychance we have to learn from others who may be very different from us, butmay (and likely will in many cases) have valuable insights we can use in livingour lives in the best ways we can. In terms of the problems that face all ofhumanity, Maclntyre’s call for a retreat from the world could even endangerwhat possibilities there are for saving it, possibilities that demand morecooperation between peoples with disparate views, not less. As Dewey tellsus, it is diversity that challenges and provokes us to grow and to change. Notonly do we have a moral imperative to listen to other voices, we have anobligation to do the best we can to solve the problems we face, using all themeans we have at hand. The plurality of views that exists in a potential globalcommunity is a resource we cannot afford to cast aside.3.6. CONCLUSION: A PARTICIPATIONIST COMMUNITYIn this chapter I have attempted to show that the concept of communityis still meaningful in terms of our identities and allegiances. We are not inimminent danger of losing ourselves as social, relational beings. We stilloperate from a moral horizon that is constituted by our attachments andobligations to others. But we need to reconceptualize what it is to be part of acommunity and we need to reshape the concept of community itself. Thecommunity that we should want is one that can embrace plurality and let eachof us contribute to the dialogue in our own ways. We should be able to crosscommunity boundaries far enough to take on new perspectives and challengereceived views. According to Seyla Benhabib, there are two communitarianvisions of community. One is an integrationist community in which membersare united by a single conception of what is good and valuable. The other is103the participationist community in which the bonds between people are simplytheir shared commitments to communicate in certain ways and to reverseperspectives with others. I argue that the participationist community is theonly vision of community that is compatible with pluralism. We cannotrecapture an integrationist vision and we should not want to. We can attemptto work through our differences and cultivate some common ground but indoing so we should never forget how valuable those differences are to eachof us and to our collective efforts to converse.In the next chapter I will further discuss the foundations of moralcommunities and begin to outline the necessary elements for a globalcommunity of concern based on respect and reciprocity. There are very fewpresuppositions necessary for the construction of a moral communitycompatible with commitments to pluralism and ongoing dialogue. Thesepresuppositions will be explored in light of developing a moral globalperspective.As we begin to construct a community of concern, we will need toextend our moral sense to include those who are presently outside ourrecognized circle of moral experience. We will need to imagine what life is likefor others. We will need to listen to them and ensure that there is a publicspace where all possible participants in the dialogue can come together. Wewill need to make sure that all voices are heard and no one voice dominates.We will need to learn how to do all these things as part of attaining a moralglobal perspective. Learning how to build community across difference then,is the primary task of global education.1Benhabib, 75—76.1042Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed.(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Robert Bellah et al.,Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1986).3Richard Rorty’s phrase is used as part of a chapter heading in JeffreyStout, “Liberal Apologetics and Terminal Wistfulness,” in Ethics After Babel:The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Boston: Beacon Press,1988).4Benhabib, 11.5Donald Johnson, “Academic and Intellectual Foundations of TeacherEducation in Global Perspectives,” Theory Into Practice 32, no. I (Winter,1993): 5. In a recent article, Donald Johnson, director of internationaleducation and Asian studies at New York University, notes that within globaleducation, “a common theme in much of the literature.., argues that the worldis moving toward a single homogeneous culture.”6Robert M. Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism andCommitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).7Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and theirDiscontents (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 191.8Alasdair Maclntyre, “The Idea of an Educated Public,” in Educationand Value, ed. Graham Haydon (London: Duckworth, 1985).9lbid., 34.10Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’sPractical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 145.11Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (NotreDame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 228.12Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrenceand P. Mayer (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1969), 70.13Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart, 169.14Maclntyre, After Wrtue, 221.10515Ibjd 216.16lbid., 241.I O’ Neil I, Constructions of Reason, 146.18Stout, 212.19lbid., 237.2°lbid., 237.21lbid., 211.22Maclntyre, After Virtue, 263.23lt is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the limitations ofAristotle’s polls beyond citing the obvious inequities such as restrictingmembership to a small class of males.24Stout, 236.25Rural communes based on religious ties or shared aspirations aboutsmall-scale agricultural sustainabi I ity would be exceptions.26Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self The Making of Modern Identity(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 27.27lbid., 27.28Stout, Ethics After Babel, 195.lbid., 195.3°lbid., 195.31Maclntyre, After Virtue, 187. Social practices are defined as “anycoherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activitythrough which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the courseof trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to,and partially definitive of, the form of activity, with the result that humanpowers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goodsinvolved, are systematically extended.”10632Stout, 215.:33lbid 212.34lbid., 65.35Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics: Interpretation and SocialCriticism: Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: BasicBooks, 1988).36James Becker, “Goals of Global Education,” Global Education: FromThought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook, ed. Kenneth Tye (Alexandria, VA:Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development, 1991): 74.37Barbara Tye, “Schooling in America Today: Potential for GlobalStudies,” Global Education: From Thought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook,ed. Kenneth Tye (Alexandria, VA: Association for Curriculum and SupervisionDevelopment, 1991), 40.Lee Anderson, Schooling in a Global Age (Evanston, Illinois:Northwestern University, 1973), 84.39Lee Anderson, “A Rationale for Global Education,” in GlobalEducation: From Thought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook, ed. Kenneth Tye(Alexandria, VA: Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development),16.40See Chapter Two: “Redefining the Global Perspective.”41Graham Pike and David Selby, “Global Education: Response to aSystemic World,” in Controversial Issues in the Classroom, ed. J. J.Wellington (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 39.42lbid., 40.See Hanvey’s explanation of “systems consciousness,” in AnAttainable Global Perspective (New York: Global Perspectives in Education,1976), 13—14.Munir J. Fasheh, “Talking about What to Cook for Dinner When OurHouse Is on Fire: The Poverty of Existing Forms of International Education,”Harvard Educational Review 55, no. I (February, 1985): 126.107Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: BasicBooks, 1973), 407—408.Geertz argues this way as do many other anthropologists. As well,the resurgence of the voices of indigenous groups from all over the world,many who are trying to actively promote knowledge of their heritage to newgenerations, would seem to speak against the claims of global educatorsmentioned here.47lsaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: FontanaPress, 1991), 10.lbid., 10. it is important to note that Berlin is speaking here of culturalcommunities. Other groups unified around a single purpose or set of interestsmay be created very differently, e.g. the scientific community.49lbid., 11.50lbid., 87.51Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and PoliticalCommitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 177.52Berlin, 88.53lbid., 88.54Benhabib, 76—80.108CHAPTER FOURCONSTRUCTING A GLOBAL COMMUNITY OF CONCERNPassions, then, engagements and imagining: I want to find a way ofspeaking community, an expanding community, taking shape whendiverse people, speaking as who and not what they are, come togetherin speech and action, as Hannah Arendt puts it, to constitute somethingin common among themselves.Maxine Greene14.1. INTRODUCTIONIn this chapter, I argue that one important element of a globalperspective is the belief in the possibility of a global moral communityconstructed out of our disparate moral heritages and beliefs. Although I seeits construction as crucial to the development of a global perspective, thiscommunity would have a limited purpose and place in our moral lives. Itscentral role would be to highlight common spheres of interest and provide aforum for dialogue about them. As well, such a community would keep awatchful eye on the institutions established to serve human needs. In this wayit would function as a kind of community of concern.Hilary Putnam’s discussion of a community of inquirers provides theframework for an examination of principles on which moral communities arebased. Following that is a description of features that would be present if theidea of a moral community were applied to a wider context in the world, as ina global community of concern.4.2. A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERSBefore we can describe features of a global community of concern, it isimportant to examine the fundamental beliefs about humanity that underlie109moral communities. Hilary Putnam describes these as communities ofinquirers attempting to answer the question “How should we live?.” I hope toshow that the connections we have to others in existing moral communitiesare based on the same principles as those that can guide construction of newcommunities.In the third lecture of Many Faces of Realism, titled “Equality and OurMoral Image of the World,” Putnam takes up the question of what beliefs arenecessary (though not sufficient) for the establishment of a genuine moralcommunity. These beliefs take the form of principles, which, he writes, cometo us (at least to those of us in the west) from elements of the Jewish andChristian religions. Once detached from their religious roots, an air of mysterysurrounds these principles; nevertheless, he takes them to “capture theminimal content that the idea of equality which Western culture took from theBible, seems to have.”2 He writes:(I) There is something about human beings, some aspect of which is ofincomparable moral significance, with respect to which all humanbeings are equal, no matter how unequal they may be in talents,achievements, social contribution etc.(II) Even those who are least talented, or whose achievements are theleast, or whose contribution to society is the least, are deserving ofrespect.3To these, Putnam adds a third principle, which he says, arose out ofthe increasing importance which the notion of happiness has had in theevolution of our ethical thinking and our various moral languages. This is theprinciple that everyone’s happiness or suffering is of equal prima facie moralimportance”4One can see how this principle arose out of the concern of thefirst two; as the value of mutual respect came to be understood in terms of theconditions and quality of actual lives of persons, so the consequences of the110treatment of others seemed to take a more prominent place in the ethicallandscape.The value of equality, Putnam rightly points out, can be and in fact, hasbeen, transferred from a religious tenet to a secular claim about the rightswhich all human beings possess to the same degree. As Stout tells us:The language of human rights and respect for persons can be seen asa conceptual outgrowth of institutions and compromises pragmaticallyjustified under historical circumstances where a relatively thinconception of the good is the most that people can secure rationalagreement on.5This thin conception of the good is the value we recognize in freedomfor ourselves and others—freedom to pursue the good of our own choosingwithout interference or violation of our basic rights to liberty and freedom fromharm. To this extent, we have come to agree on a minimal vision of whatcounts as the good. Perhaps the clearest example is the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and the subsequent “declarations” which havebeen passed by United Nations Assemblies over the years since World WarII. The tenets of Amnesty International are another example.How do we explain our belief that we are all equally entitled to chooseour own good life? When we speak of equality we speak of the capacitypeople have for rational thought, conscious choice, or the deliberate setting oflife plans within a community of others.6What it is about human beings, whatquality or essence we might possess that makes us all equal, has been thesubject of much theoretical discussion over centuries, discussion that wouldtake me too far from my present purpose.We are all equal, in the sense discussed in Putnam’s piece, in a waythat builds on a belief in our individual freedom and our capacity to be free111thinkers, as Kant (on Putnam’s interpretation) saw us. That is, we are allequal with respect to the one question (and it is ultimately a moral question)people must ask themselves: “How shall I live?”This is not, as Putnam points out, a modern question; we share it withpre-Enhightenment thinkers who in addition thought we could discover theanswer through the light of reason and through the exercise of faith (e.g.Aquinas’ “natural light.”)7 But Putnam brings up a second claim concerningequality, one that departs dramatically from any claims about finding theanswer by following the path of faith. On Putnam’s reading of Kant, we are allequally in the dark as to how to answer that one question correctly. And weshall remain so. In other words, we are all in precisely the same dubioussituation; we are called upon to use our reason and our capacity for freechoice to choose who to be and how to live, when no inclusive human end, notelos, can be revealed to us through reason, and no “truths of religion” can bededuced. Putnam puts it like this:To be blunt, we are called upon to use reason and free will in asituation which is in certain important respects very dark. The situationis dark because reason does not give us such a thing as an “inclusivehuman end.”8 which we should all seek (unless it is morality itself andthis is not an end that can determine the content of morality.)The radical departure from ancient and medieval thinking is the ideathat we cannot “discover’ what our essence is because there is nopredetermined essence to discover. “What Kant is saying,” writes Putnam, “toput it positively, is that we have to think for ourselves without the kind of guidethat Alasdair Maclntyre wants to restore for us and that fact is itself the mostvaluable fact about our lives.”9 It is the most valuable fact because it is themost important characteristic which we share with one another. It is, in other112words, what makes us equal. We have the capacity for, as well as the needfor, “free moral thinking” thinking that will help us decide how to live.10 Eventhough we can never come to know what the human essence is, even thoughthere is no telos waiting to be discovered, this is a fact to be celebrated, notgrieved over. The medieval picture with its emphasis on a fixed humanessence that is temporarily hidden from view, forces us to remain in aheteronomous state; it eclipses our only chance at genuine freedom.However, because we are free to create an answer, and find our own way tolive, we become autonomous through our search.What we share with our own community members as well as thoseoutside, is the single question: “How should we live?”11 It is a moral question.The stories we create, as well as the stories which were passed down to usand that we will in turn tell our children, are both communal and individualattempts to answer it. As soon as we are able to take up the ethical challengeof creating our own answer to the question “How shall I live?,” we are able tojoin what Putnam calls the community of inquirers who respect our equalcapacity for free thought. “If I read him aright,” says Putnam,Kant’s community is a community of beings who think for themselveswithout knowing what the ‘human essence’ is, without knowing what‘Eudaemonia’ is, and who respect one another for doing that. That isKant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’.12Putnam claims that with these assertions about our freedom and ourneed for free moral thinking as the basis of our equality, Kant has provided uswith a “moral image of the world.” The moral image of the world we hold incommon is inextricably linked to our capacity for free thinking and the valuewe place on it. It is also linked to the ways we believe we ought to treat otherswho are on their own quest for an answer. Although it is not finely articulated,113Putnam sees a moral image as a hopeful vision to look to, one which mightactually inspire formal principles of morality. He writes:A moral image, in the sense that I am using the term, is not adeclaration that this or that is a virtue, or that this or that is what oneought to do; it is rather a picture of how our virtues and ideals hangtogether with one another and with what they have to do with theposition we are in. It may be as vague as the notions of ‘sisterhood andbrotherhood’; indeed millions of human beings have found in thosemetaphors moral images that could organize their moral lives—and thisnot withstanding the enormous problem of interpreting them and ofdeciding what it could possibly mean to make them effective.13I am drawn to Putnam’s phrase, “our moral image of the world” forseveral reasons. In one sense I see it linked to Stout’s notion of the publicbackground of moral agreement that we share. It is also connected to Taylor’sdescription of the horizon of beliefs and principles within which we make ourown choices about the good and the right in particular cases. It is a picture ofhow our virtues and ideals hang together; as such it can have both anindividual and a shared meaning. Putnam claims that this picture or vision iswhat moral philosophy needs instead of a list of particular virtues or a string ofrights, and in this observation I think he is partly right. There is a need to keepthe moral image in mind as a reminder of our moral orientation. Perhaps weneed both the vision and the list. It is hard to know just how any picture of the“position we are in” could help us much in deciding where we ought to gowithout a thick description of the virtues we think are important to develop andhow those are tied to our particular obligations and commitments. This isespecially true given the complex roles and responsibilities we have taken onin our various associations and communities. If I can put Stout’s words to usein a slightly different context, general talk about a moral image of the worlddoes not help us much “in abstraction from what Dewey called the meaning of114the daily detail.”14However it might be that once applied to an actual community ofinquirers who respect each other’s freedom and believe in each other’sequality, a moral image of the world begins to look less hazy and moredefined than the metaphors that Putnam attaches to it (such as sisterhoodand brotherhood) suggest. Such a community cannot be solely based onpragmatic notions of reasonableness and what might count as the mosteffective means to a predetermined end. There is no, and can be no, teloswaiting for discovery. Ends themselves must be discussed and debated andcriticized within view of the various moral “horizons” people bring with them.At first glance pragmatic concerns with procedure may seem to be adequatefoundation for the formation of a community of inquirers who are trying toarrive at intersubjective agreements and who are testing the justifiability ofstatements. But the crucial point here, the one that links the idea of a moralquest with the idea of a special sort of community is the ethical commitmentpresupposed by Putnam’s phase, “the moral image of the world.”This commitment goes far deeper than pragmatic or proceduralconsiderations concerning the way in which rational debate takes place withina a group of testers, although these considerations are not irrelevant. Mostimportantly, the community of inquirers as Putnam envisions it, is committedto certain ideals, among them and perhaps first among them is aiming at thetruth. In holding to that commitment, a genuine community of inquirers mustmake it possible for anyone within its membership to voice concern orcriticism with the understanding that it will be heard. Every contribution to thedialogue will be attended to; that is, taken seriously.15 A commitment to truthand to freedom of expression are inseparable on this view of community. For115no one can have the final and indisputable word on what is true. As Millpointed out, no voice can be eclipsed from the discussion if individuals aresincerely committed to the pursuit of the truth. Freedom of expression, seen inthis light, means the opportunity to be a full participant in the dialogue, or theongoing search for intersubjective agreement. As Onora O’Neill emphaticallyreminds us, we cannot merely allow the possibility of free expression, we mustfoster conditions of communication such that all voices can be effectivelyheard. 16 With the commitment to hearing all participants, we are voicing aconcern to reach the truth in the company of other inquirers.The structure of the ideal community of inquirers must be such thatother principles are foundational as well. “It must, in short,” writes Putnam, “bea community which respects the principles of intellectual freedom andequality.”17 Here the connection between the community of inquirers and theidea of a moral image of the world is finally established. One moral image ofthe world is a vision of a possible community of inquirers. Not only aremembers of this community committed to search for answers to the question“How shall I live?” (and “How shall we live?”) they are committed to thefreedom of others who are involved in the same search.Putnam’s view allows for multiple moral images to be accommodatedwithin a community of inquirers, not only the moral image articulated herewhich he takes to be Kant’s. In the lecture which follows “Equality and OurMoral Image of the World,” he writes that we will never be absolutely certainthat we are in possession of the one true moral image. There is no way tosettle the matter any more than there is a fixed and certain answer toquestions about how we ought to live. Yet that kind of uncertainty does notthrow us back into the arms of relativism. Putnam tells us that, “one does not116have to believe in a unique best moral version, or a unique best mathematicalversion; what we have are better and worse versions, and that is objectivity.” Itis as close as we can come to certainty.Our notions, the notion of a value, the notion of a moral image, thenotion of a standard, the notion of a need, are all so intertwined thatnone of them can provide a ‘foundation’ for ethics. That, I think, isexactly right. We must come to see that there is no possibility of a‘foundation’ for ethics just as we have come to see that there is nopossibility of a ‘foundation’ for scientific knowledge or any other kind ofknowledge.18But if there is no foundation, if we cannot be certain about arriving atthe one best moral vision, how can we know which are better and which areworse versions? Here Putnam borrows a metaphor to explain his position.Human beings have needs that must be satisfied. We have, for instance theneed for tools that will cut, slice, and chop various materials which willbecome food, or clothing or shelter. Although we don’t follow a universalblueprint for the one ideal or perfect knife for all times, places and purposes,that does not mean we do not know how to choose between better and worseknives. Lack of such a blueprint does not mean, writes Putnam, that:the knives we make don’t satisfy real needs, and knives may certainlybe better or worse. It is because there are real needs, and not merelydesires, that it makes sense to distinguish between better and worsevalues and for that matter between better and worse knives.19It is the very same thing when we talk about moral images that willguide our lives. “We are not approximating to The Universes Own MoralTruths,” we are simply doing the best we can with the resources we have.Moral images, no less than knives are human creations. Putnam goes on todescribe what some of those creations are and have been:The image of civic republicanism or communitarianism, the moralimage of human fraternity, the moral image of humans made as God’s117image and likeness, and the Kantian moral image of the Kingdom ofEnds, or of self-legislating agents, are all human creations. But thatdoesn’t mean that the statements we make, using the language of oneor another such moral image, cannot be right or wrong.2°We judge the images and the statements and the actions that followfrom them, to be right or wrong on the basis of how well they satisfy needs,solve problems, help us live. And it may be that we need not one but manymoral images of the world simultaneously. If one central vision is that of acommunity of inquirers, as Putnam’s third lecture suggests, we may still needadditional pictures of how our virtues and ideals hang together. We may needthem in order to make sense of our questions and our quest and in order tobalance our public obligations with our private bonds. We may need them tohelp us prioritize and order the goods that we seek. We may all be askinghow we should live (both collectively and individually) and we may all need tosearch for our own answers, but along the way there will be many times whenour individual paths merge with those of others. At those moments, it may notbe autonomy that is most important but solidarity with others, and the mostrelevant virtues may be those of compassion or sympathy, not simply respectfor another’s liberty. Putnam states that as human creations that are designedto help us in our quests, moral images can be “superseded, merged,combined, and so on.”21 This may be one of the most important features amoral community can have, not just to reconcile disparate moral images, butto create a place where images can creatively and fruitfully combine, formingnew visions to guide us.I believe that it is possible (though challenging) for us to recreatemeaningful communities in our own society based on shared interests that wein fact do have—interests in safe and peaceful neighborhoods, clean publicspaces, a healthier environment, adequate medical care and so on. Concerns118overlap in many locales and regions and a global community may not beentirely out of reach if we can identify an “overlapping consensus” on anyideals or issues that affect other people as well as ourselves. We can basethe construction of these communities on standards already available to us ashuman beings; among them the need to live together peaceably, the need tobe treated with fairness and respect, the need to shape meaningful lives forourselves in the company of others. Certain responses to these needs willserve us better than others; certain proposed solutions to the problems ofsustainability, for example will work better than others. Certain responses toworld crises will help us come closer to ideals we already accept in principle.All of these will be tied to public and personal values we hold and ourstandards for judging the adequacy of solutions to problems will be based onthose values. “It is because there are real human needs and not merelydesires,” writes Hilary Putnam, “that it makes sense to distinguish betweenbetter and worse values.”22 Our problems will change over time, and as theydo, so will our ways of addressing them. Although we cannot say in advancewhich of our values will guide us in particular circumstances, we know that asour needs change so will the standards we adopt to judge our decisions andour actions. Putnam writes that:Standards and practices, pragmatists have always insisted, must bedeveloped together and constantly revised by a procedure of delicatemutual adjustment. The standards by which we judge and compare ourmoral images are themselves creations as much as the moral images.I think Stout would say this is as it should be. “We begin in a particularplace,” he writes, “but that need not and should not condemn us to stay at ourstarting point. Breadth of vision remains a good to be pursued, even if ourperspective can never be eternity.”24 Our moral images represent one119important facet of this vision. It changes and grows as humanity redesignspriorities and searches for commonalities.25It begins in full view of the horizonfrom which it was created but it does not stay there.4.3. CONVERSING ACROSS DIFFERENCESCommunities are not static entities but constantly evolve and redesignthemselves according to our needs. Throughout our lifetimes we may bemembers of all kinds of communities and associations, each defined by adifferent purpose or set of interests, each with its own questions andconcerns. Human beings ought to share an interest in communicating aboutglobal problems because we share an urgent need to solve them. Somethinglike a global moral community, a community of concern as I will call it, mayone day be constructed in the world, and the discourse that it employs will notsound unfamiliar to us. Participating in moral discourse is part of what we doand part of what we need to teach our children to do. Some of the participantsin the discourse will be from backgrounds and cultures so different from ourown that the discourse will be halting and difficult. Where we do not share aworld of meanings, to use Walzer’s phrase, we will be compelled to inventone.26 This is the beginning of building community.We do have a framework for talking about what is needed to constructand participate in moral communities, even a moral community on a globalscale. In the last chapter we looked at the notion of community based ontraditional bonds of fraternity and united by commonalities that are built upover generations. These were the communities described by Bellah and hiscolleagues, communities in which moral language was forged out of familiarbonds of caring and compassion for one’s family and neighbors, and out of a120vision of the good as seen through Biblical traditions. Though thecommunities themselves may be lost, certain values that were held by theirmembers continue to have meaning for us in relation to many complex socialpractices we still cherish. And virtues such as beneficence, compassion andempathy continue to have an important place in our contemporary moral lives,as expressions of what Thomas Nagel terms, “recognition of the full reality ofothers.”27In this chapter, we looked at the moral foundations of a community ofinquirers as Putnam (echoing Kant) sees them, inquirers united by thequestion of how we ought to live in a world where no telos is given to us. Ourhope is to individually and collectively construct the best lives we can with theresources and tools we have, including those that will facilitate uncoercedcommunication between us. The answers we arrive at will be judged on thebasis of how well they meet our needs and how closely they correspond toour moral images of what the world ought to be.4.4. STANDARDS FOR COMMUNICATIONThe possibility of a moral global community is the possibility ofdialogue between people who may initially share little more than acommitment to communication of a certain sort. That communication isdefined by a limited but nevertheless important number of features that havebeen discussed by writers from Kant to Dewey to Jurgen Habermas.According to these and other philosophers, the kind of guidelines we establishfor communication are crucial. Dwight Boyd, in a persuasive piece onpluralism and moral education claims that collective effort to approximatewhat Habermas calls the conditions of the ideal speech situation, is the only121chance for genuine dialogue across cultures. He writes:Part of our understanding of communication within this ideal is thatmoral statements must always be made from within what Habermascalls the “performative attitude.” They are not static truth claimswarranted only by how closely they reflect reality according to someprivileged epistemic position. Rather they are claims made to othersabout the best means of regulating overlapping and competing needsand interests for the purpose of a mutual “redemption’ of their validity.In this sense the locus of what warrants them as better or worse can befound only through the quality of the dialogic activity among persons.28What could help us in the effort to improve the quality ofcommunication, or redeem the validity of our claims through “dialogicactivity”? In a paper titled “Enlightenment as Autonomy,” Onora O’Neilldiscusses what Kant meant by communicative guidelines and how we mightapproximate an ideal of communication. She begins by summarizing whatKant meant by human communication:Human communication is not a set of repertoires whose emergencereflects only the evolution of the species and the maturation ofindividual organisms, but has a history. Neither are the principles ofcommunicating that emerge in the course of this history given from anysource that transcends human life. They have to develop and beinstituted in the course of human communication. There is neither anatural nor a preestablished harmony in the conversation of mankind.According to Kant our practices already commit us to interacting withothers who are not like us, as well as those who are. The search forintersubjective agreement cannot be limited to like-minded speakers. It is anopen-ended and ongoing search and we cannot fix limits on who theparticipants might one day be (the totality of possible agents.) I take it that onKant’s view, the possibility of a moral global community already exists—ourpresent practices of inquiry do, in fact, take us beyond the borders of our ownfamiliar moral spheres. In principle, the questions: How shall I live? and How122shall we live? belong to the “conversation of mankind” and that conversationextends across both distance and difference.But there are no predetermined, fixed guidelines for communicatingacross differences, “no preestablished harmony in the conversation.” As wellthere are no guarantees of cooperation which exist in advance of the attemptto cooperate. All we can do is construct principles that will allow the dialogueto begin and to continue, and we must do this in the course of theconversation itself. We cannot rely on guidelines that may have directed ourcommunication in other spheres, or on principles that may have beenpreviously agreed to. The difficulty with bringing the “contingently sharedprinciples of some actual plurality” to the construction of possiblecommunities, including a moral community on a global scale, is that we mayfind that these principles “are not sharable at all, and that our supposedcapacities to reason fail and falter at the first boundary.3°”So where are we to start? Kant believed that we are initially compelledto follow only those principles and standards which would not preclude othersfrom following them. Since we are not guaranteed cooperation from others, allwe can do is to “avoid principles that could not regulate communicationamong a plurality of separate, free and potentially reasoning beings.”31 O’Neillclaims that in Kant’s political writings he was less interested in talking aboutthe intentions or goals we must have when we communicate as he was indescribing the standards that must be achieved in the practices ofcommunication. “If our communicating is to be genuine, it must, so far aspossible meet shared standards of interpretability.”32 It was Kant’s belief that“those who flout reasoned maxims of communication risk damage to sharedstandards of reasoning which are essential for addressing the world at123large.“Kant gave us just three maxims for communication. They are allconcerned with establishing standards of communication through discourseitself. The first maxim is to think for oneself. ( As Putnam reminds us, ourcapacity and our need for free moral thinking is one of the most importantfeatures of our humanity.) The maxim of thinking for oneself, writes O’Neill,“demands only that there be a plurality of parties to any debate, whosethinking and judging are to some extent independent.”34 There can be nogenuine communication where there is perfect agreement, only echoes of it.In our search for answers about how we ought to live (and this questionencompasses a potentially infinite number of shared concerns about theearth, about conflict resolution, about social justice, about poverty) we need tobe embracing a plurality of views and voices, Independent thought isessential to the debate and to the possibility of its continuation. This maximcan also be seen as a way of talking about the role of tolerance incommunication across differences. To claim that one should think for oneselfis to claim at the same time that everyone should do so (and have theopportunity to do so.) As such it has enormous significance for building aglobal community based on principles that all possible participants can agreeto.The second maxim is to think from the standpoint of everyone else andto consider your judgments as they are (or would be) regarded by others. Weare all in this together and there is no privileged position that any humanbeing can ascend to that is above the debate (as there might be if humanreason had a source that transcended itself). There is only the position, writesO’Neill, “of one who strives to reach and understand the perspectives of124others, and to communicate with them rather than past them.”36 Genuineattempts to understand other perspectives could even extend to what Kantcalled the world at large. In fact, he called this maxim “the maxim of enlargedthought.” In terms of building a global moral community, this maxim hasparticular applicability. It speaks to the need to establish connections withothers, to step into their shoes. It speaks to the need for empathy incommunication.The third maxim is to always think consistently. Kant believed thatachieving systematic consistency was not a trivial matter.If there is a possible form of communication between beings who areseparate and whose coordination is not naturally given orpreestablished, then those beings must guide their attempts atcommunicating by principles that neither erode their own thinking norfail to seek to understand and to follow the thinking of others, norshrink from the task of working through and integrating a constantlyrevised set of judgements to achieve consistency.36This last maxim is important to the establishment of a global moralcommunity for several reasons. Communication in such a fledgling enterpriseis bound to be fragile, and extremely vulnerable to distortion andmisinterpretation, both willful and accidental. The search for open, uncoercedand free communication among a plurality of voices is a search for standardsthat can reliably and helpfully direct that communication. On Kant’s view weare searching for standards that insure maximum interpretability. Consistencyin thought, in speech and in action is one such standard. The demand forconsistency reinforces the first two maxims as well. The maxim, think foroneself, when consistently applied to all communicators, means that everyonemust think for himself or herself. In a sense, Kant’s maxim of consistency is ademand for just and fair consideration across cases.125For Kant, to enter into the human conversation, to genuinelycommunicate across differences, is to embark on a journey where nodestination is announced in advance. Our compass provides only anapproximate moral orientation. We have just a sketch instead of a map of theterritory. (Perhaps we could call the sketch a moral image of the world). Ourguidebook, if we have one at all, is a small set of warnings that will only keepus away from a few known hazards and pitfalls. These “guidelines” are themaxims of communication that Kant has given us. The distances and gulfsbetween people may be greater in a global realm than in other contexts inwhich we try to build community, but I believe the maxims for communicationare the same: think for yourself; consider your judgments in light of otherperspectives (as well as think from the standpoints of others as far aspossible;) and finally, think consistently across cases. If these maxims areused as guidelines for communicating across differences, perhaps the voicesthat have been excluded from the conversation up until now, could begin tobe heard.4.5. BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF CONCERNThe preceding section of this chapter was a discussion of thestandards for communication necessary for people who are buildingcommunities beyond their own regional, national and cultural borders. Herethe challenge of pluralism is more evident than in any other sphere. Theconditions for communication that I laid out need to be created by peoplegenuinely interested in building a community of concern. What would a globalcommunity of concern look like? The following section is an attempt to brieflyanswer this question.126In his book titled The Public and its Problems, Dewey addresses thedifficulties that a democratic society faces in striving to establish itself as a“Great Community.”37 Many of his insights are relevant to discussion of apossible global community of concern. I believe that the enterprise ofconstructing a moral global community can be justified within a framework ofdemocratic principles and ideals as laid out by Dewey, here and elsewhere,particularly in Democracy and Education.Though its ideals can never be fully realized and will always be subjectto review, the “Great Community” is nevertheless the embodiment andexpression of the democratic way of life. This, writes Dewey, is a life of “freeand enriching communion” which “will have its consummation when free socialinquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication.”The realization of this goal will take deliberate effort and education, andcommunity members will need to demonstrate commitment to sharing theprocess of social inquiry (as well as the knowledge that informs it) with aplurality of voices.Pluralism, in fact, is one of the strongest challenges facing a potential“Great Community”; in any public, there will be numerous and competingconceptions and visions about how people should conduct their lives. Whatpeople need in order to form a community in which “genuinely shared interestin the consequences of interdependent activities”39 informs desire and directsaction, is communication that will build common understanding. “Men live in acommunity in virtue of the things they have in common; and communication isthe way in which they come to possess things in common.”4°Communication is clearly the cornerstone of community building, insidedemocratic societies as well as outside of them. Communities are built127through dialogue, through participation in conversation that is free, open-ended and uncoerced. They are, like democracy, like moral images, humancreations, in other words, social constructions. A global moral community, andthe vision of what such a community ought to be, will not be something wediscover. It is something we will have to construct. And we will go onconstructing new visions of a global community, generation after generation.The real problem, as Dwight Boyd emphatically tells us in the context of acreating a vision of multiculturalism, is how to keep this question an openone.41 We will not know and cannot know precisely what a global moralcommunity will look like. Any vision put forth or described by me, or Coombsor Putnam or anyone else, will be, must be, essentially contestable. It willrequire, just as any vision of human development requires, “ongoingcommunal consideration, critique, confirmation etc.”42What we can hope for in a global realm, is that people will construct acommon understanding about the concerns which they already share,concerns that are not primarily attached to their differences but to certainfundamental human needs which connect us all. Diversity will of coursepresent an enormous hurdle (as well as an enormous resource) as thedialogue continues. A community of concern is a community of people willingand prepared to take on the challenge of pluralism, in order to, as Boyd says,“talk through our cultural diversity about how we should make sense of ittogether-”43 all the while knowing that many of our shared problems havearisen out of our differences. Concurrently and just as importantly,participants in a community of concern will be coming together in order to talkabout making sense of the shared questions we acknowledge we do have,questions about how we ought to live, how we ought to treat one another, how128we ought to remedy conditions of environmental decay, health epidemics, andso on. We will not know in advance what interests a community of concernmight share over time, but we do know many of the problems that presentlyface humans as well as other species. Certainly these problems arejustification enough for construction of a community that might help solvethem. Many of these concerns have already been brought to light in existingglobal forums. There is reason to believe we can improve on these first effortsat community.4.6. THE CHALLENGE TO CONSTRUCTING A COMMUNITY OFCONCERNThere are many articulate critics with strong objections to the kind ofproject I have just outlined. Postmodernists, communitarians, and a goodmany feminists would argue against the possibility of a global community ofconcern for some of the same reasons they argue against the possibility of auniversal morality, or even the possibility of dialogue across differences.Though unlike in many, even most ways, these three groups share a powerfulcritique of the values of the Enlightenment. They are, for both shared andseparate reasons, suspicious of any attempt to talk of universalizing in ethicsor other aspects of human experience. Because their claims have such apowerful hold on educational, as well as other sorts of political and socialdiscourse, it is important to respond to their arguments at some length, and tooffer what I believe is a convincing rationale for taking up the task of teachingstudents the elements of community building, in essence, ways tocommunicate within a pluralistic world.From the point of view of postmodernists, the very idea of absolutes is129rejected outright, whether they be the moral, spiritual, social orepistemological foundations that have been central to the worldviews ofmodernity. So the possibility of constructing a framework for communicationbased on ideals of equality and a search for truth or intersubjectiveunderstanding, a project like Habermas’ communicative ethics for example, isdoomed before it is begun, and in fact, should be doomed. Nicholas Burbulesand Suzanne Rice identify three recurring trains of thought that seem tocharacterize postmodern thinking, particularly that found in work relevant toeducational studies. First, there are no metanarratives, no single rationalityand no grand theory that will explain our situation or for that matter oursalvation. All narratives are expressions of particular points of view. Allrationalities are local.Second, all political and social discourses are saturated with powerand dominance. Educational discourse, as a kind of political discourse, existsonly for the purpose of furthering the interests of some at the expense of theinterests of others. On this view, much of what goes on in schools can beregarded as a manifestation of cultural imperialism. There are countlesshistorical and contemporary examples that show this insight is powerful, evenseveral that have been mentioned previously in this thesis.Third, according to postmodernists, the existence of difference itself isa condition to be celebrated. Diversity amongst people is regarded as anunmitigated good. The plurality of the world is “the constitutive quality ofexistence” and all forms of life are permitted on principle. There is no reasonto value or privilege one set of beliefs, one way of life, over another. Thisargument is related to the communitarian claim that,differences of time, place, history or community have a place in ethical130deliberation. I am situated in a distinct moral space. I have special andnonuniversalizable obligations to my community. I have a story that ismy own story in terms of which I make decisions. This story is part ofother stories, and the significance of these stories may be articulatedwithin a particular tradition.47The viability of local discourses over so-called universal ones areemphasized by postmodernists, communitarians and feminists alike. Theyalso share a belief that any attempt to universalize a viewpoint, “masks thewill to power and is an illegitimate attempt at domination.” Historically, only ahandful of voices have been allowed to join the larger human conversation; allothers have been suppressed. Theories of common morality have beenharmful to all but a few; this is primarily the reason feminists and others resistthem.In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young names fivefaces of oppression which have kept all but a select few from participatingfully in the world: powerlessness, exploitation, marginalization, silencing andviolence.5°While liberal thinkers may allow, perhaps even encourage alldominated groups to share their experiences and their perspectives, thepostmodernist argues that this is not nearly enough to change the tide ofhuman history. We need to ask ourselves who we are unwittingly excluding.What forms of power and dominance exist that will result in retribution tothose who might break the silence? “Who may want to speak but feel sodemoralized, or intimidated, by their circumstance that they are effectively‘silenced’?’51The implications for educational practices are profound if we are toseriously consider the postmodern view. Many postmodernists would ask thateducators abandon all pretense of authority in light of the domination that hasexisted in classrooms as in other societal institutions. Their critiques are131powerful challenges to the well-intentioned liberal who unknowinglyperpetuates practices of control. In our claims to knowledge, authority, andexpertise, we are acting and speaking against a background of dominationand long-held privilege. It is clear that at the very least what is called for isincreased sensitivity to the conditions, claims, and concerns of others. Aseducators, we have a special responsibility to reverse the trend ofmarginalization. We need to continually ask ourselves if our own positions ofpower and privilege are interfering with the freedoms of others.In their critiques on the ills of modernity, many postmodernist viewsseem justified, and compelling. But there are several troubling features insome accounts, first with regard to the ways in which their objections areexpressed, and second with regard to the potential consequences some viewshave for the possibility of ever communicating across differences. Theseconsequences have relevance for education in general, and especially globaleducation. The first difficulty can be addressed by showing that there areinternal contradictions in postmodern rejections of modernist values; thesecond by showing that although communication between people of variouscommunities is extremely difficult, it is not impossible. The injustices of thepast are not inevitable in the future.Postmodernists, like the rest of us, ultimately have to speak in alanguage infused with normative terms and concepts in order to make a casethat is persuasive. None of us can escape the vocabulary of liberation,equality, and rights when we speak of ways in which people can and shouldrelate to one another. The very solutions to oppression that postmoderns callfor have to be framed in discourse that is based on public values ofdeliberation and democratic participation. They have to be rooted in132commitments to justice. How could it be otherwise?Yet these are the very values that proponents of one branch ofpostmodernism, sometimes called anti-modernism,52claim to want to reject.Some feminists, too, want to jettison talk of democratic discourse with the aimof intersubjective understanding.53But in trying to do so, they risk eliminatingany possibility for the common cry of justice to be heard. Social criticism thataims at liberating women is “not even possible without positing the legal,moral and political norms of autonomy, choice, and self-determination.”56When they do call for an end to injustices, postmodernists often invokeliberal categories without arguing for them. Their “lightheartedness” in thisregard is indeed troubling,56 and their failure to recognize that they areasserting modernist values does seem more than a little baffling. ElizabethEllsworth, for instance, an antimodernist who dismisses all attempts atdialogue about rights and freedom as “impossible in the culture at large”because of unjust power relations, calls for the need to respect everyone’s“right to speak and feel safe to speak” in the very same essay.57I argue that we need not abandon or even claim to abandon the idealsof the Enlightenment. We do need to restructure the ways in which we talkabout them and think about them. Some postmodernists, feminists, andcommunitarians also call for the reformulation of modernist values, not thewholesale rejection of them.56 Modernist values have been used often, but notalways, as tools of oppression and domination; it is not inevitable that theymust continue to be. They have also been the foundation for liberation. Infact, as we have seen, antimodernists and postmodernists often wind upreaffirming modernist values in their efforts to advocate everyone’s right tospeak.133There is no doubt that we need to seriously consider those voices whohave been excluded from the conversation, not only to bring them in,essential as that it is, but to restructure the framework of the conversationitself so that by its very nature it becomes inclusive. We have to look at thepossibilities for constructing communities that do not perpetuate practices ofdiscrimination and oppression. Communities are not necessarily places whereonly the dominant voices are heard and all others are silenced. It is notinevitable that people will impose their values on others, or that differencesthemselves will disappear. But we will have to pay close attention to our ownparticipation in order to avoid the dangers of speaking for others. We willneed to respect other interpretations of the world, and grant others the validityof their self-understandings.59.This does not mean we must allow anotherstandpoint to supersede our own, but it does mean we are obliged to considerother standpoints seriously.There are several ways to view the construction of community and whatit might mean in a postmodern world where difference is celebrated and noteliminated or homogenized. We saw that the communitarian critique ofmodernity was in part directed toward the reaffirmation of the local andparticular. There are some communitarians who despair of ever recapturingwhat Benhabib calls “integrationist communities.”6°I would argue that they arelooking at a limited and constraining vision of communicative relations basedon the attempt to revive one coherent telos that defines members’connections. But this is not the only way to view community or possibilities forits construction. We can look to John Dewey for a different version ofcommunity, one that is far more suited to the realities of pluralism. Dewey’svision of what is possible in democratic relations has much in common with134Benhabib’s notion of the participationist strain of community. Theparticipationist encourages “non-exclusive principles of membership” in, orover, various spheres of concern.61 Dewey argued that as members of culturalsubcommunities, we are democratic only to the extent that we defineourselves “over a range of common concerns, not only over single-issueidentifications.”62Where broader concerns affect all of us, we should keep thelines of communication open to try to reach workable solutions to problems.As Rice and Burbules are quick to point out, this is not to say that goodintentions, even consistent effort, will guarantee successful communicationbetween subcommunities; that is, across differences. There are dimensions ofpower operating between and within communities, and public forums are notas open as modernists often assume they are. Learning to communicate withthose who have been excluded and marginalized is a particularly difficult taskand we should not assume at the outset we will achieve success. However,turning away from the task will certainly guarantee failure.Not all conflicts can be resolved and not all tensions can be lessened.Such realizations should make us humble but not skeptical about theenterprise of constructing community. There are still good reasons to pursuethe possibility of communication across differences. Even if success is partial,it is worth the effort. Through the practice of communicating, we canreasonably hope that we will learn to do it better, less dogmatically, and withmore sensitivity. We can learn to grant others “provisional plausibility” andadmit the potential fallibility of our own positions. We can learn to seeourselves as others see us, and learn to see some of the world through theireyes. There is value in incorporating other perspectives into our ownworldviews, not the least of which is the value of a more inclusive135understanding of ourselves.What we are ultimately after in communication across differences, andparticularly in a global community of concern, is a shared framework formaking decisions and solving conflicts. This framework need not be groundedin what postmodernists rightly reject as the imposition of one value system onall others. A community of concern seeks “pragmatic consensus, not rationaldominance. It regards the search for a shared civic tongue more asnegotiation than as the pursuit of some political truth.” The question we willwant to ask is not “What do we already have in common that holds ustogether?” but, “Is there anything, given time and discussion, we might cometo agree on?” If the latter remains our central question, we will have a goodchance of avoiding the pitfalls that postmodernism has pointed out withouthaving to abandon efforts to communicate.4.7. CONCLUSIONEducation can and ought to, bring students into the humanconversation that they are bound to carry on beyond us. They will be the onesto continue construction of any moral community, to further the dialogue andto extend the membership. “It is through education, at least in part, thathuman beings work together to realize visions we have of what sort ofcreatures we should be... “ Communicating about what and who we shouldbe will require certain commitments to others who are also trying to createand live by those visions. It will require seeing them as equal participants inthe conversation.My next task is to identify what individuals need in the way of moraldispositions and sensitivities in order to join the conversation, and create136conditions so that others will be able to participate as well. People committedto the enterprise of community building on a global scale will need to developcertain communicative virtues. There are at least three communicative virtuesthat are essential to human relations within moral communities. They are:tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice. They are prerequisites for creatingany kind of shared civic language.A sense of justice is indispensable because it sets the boundaries forour treatment of other people, placing moral demands on us to prevent harmto others, and where possible, to correct inequities. Tolerance supports andpromotes the expression of diverse beliefs and worldviews. The disposition toempathize is the inclination to imagine the perspective and the experience ofanother as a morally significant individual, even if my understanding ofanother is ultimately provisional.All three of these communicative virtues can be found in any moralcommunity, though their expression and emphasis may differ with eachcommunity’s particular purposes. In the following chapter, I will discussempathy, tolerance and justice in terms of the development of a globalperspective and the construction of a community of concern.1Maxine Greene, “The Passions of Pluralism: Multiculturalism and theExpanding Community,” Educational Researcher 22, no. 1 (1993): 13.2Hilary Putnam, “Equality and Our Moral Image of the World,” LectureThree, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987), 45.3lbid., 45.4lbid., 45.5Stout, 2251376See Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, chapter 14; Charles Taylor, “TheSignificance of Significance”; and Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), especially 151—1 58.7See Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers, 136. St. Augustine, forone believed that we have the freedom to choose how to live but that reasonalone cannot provide the right answer. As Ignatieff points out, the certainty ofhaving chosen rightly “could only be granted by the gift of grace,” In this wayAugustine spoke of two freedoms: the freedom to choose how to live and thefreedom of redemption which could only be gotten to by means of faith.8Putnam says that we can express the medieva’ point of viewconcerning our capacity to discover or uncover the human ‘function’ or‘essence’ by turning to Aristotle’s thick description of happiness as not just abundle of gratifications, but as the “inclusive human end,” pace Maclntyre, asour telos.9Putnam, 50.10Putnam, 51.11At times we will also be asking, “How shall we live?,” though Putnamdoes not discuss the collective question, only the individual one.12Putnam, 51.13Putnam, 51.14Stout, 242.15J S. Mill envisioned the kind of debate where proponents of all viewswould be given equal opportunity to express their opinion. This was afundamental part of a free and open society, dedicated to the pursuit of thetruth. See On Liberty, Chapter 2.16Onora O’Neill, “Practices of Toleration,” in Democracy and the MassMedia, ed. Judith Lichtenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990), 170.17Putnam, 54.18Putnam, “Reasonableness as a Fact and a Value,” Lecture 4, TheMany Faces of Realism, 77.13819Putnam, 79.2°Putnam, 79.21Putnam, 78.22Hilary Putnam, “Equality and Our Moral Image of the World,” LectureThree, The Many Faces of Realism, 79.23Putnam, 79.24Stout, 73.25Qne good example of this process comes out of a recent UnitedNations Conference on Sustainability (June, 1993) to which over 140countries sent representatives from various Non-Governmental Organizations(NGOs) to hammer out proposals for a policy statement on internationalsustainable development, one that would take into account their peoples’diverse needs, aspirations, economic conditions etc. The goal was to create apolicy document by consensus, a goal that was realized after ten days ofintensive debate. The first half of the time was spent in coming to agreementabout definitions and relevant terminology. Warren Linds, a delegate fromSaskatchewan, was both pleased and surprised to find that after the entireprocess came to an end, the resulting policy “still had some bite.”26Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics, 30.27Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1970).28Dwight Boyd, “The Moral Part of Pluralism as the Plural Part of MoralEducation,” in The Challenge of Pluralism, ed. F. Clark Power and Daniel K.Lapsley (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 159.Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’sPractical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43.30Ibid., 4—5.31lbid., 43.32lbid., 49.13933lbid., 48.ibid., 4.lbid., 47.lbid., 7.37John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (New York: Henry Holt,1927), 184.lbid., 184.39lbid., 155.40John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to thePhilosophy of Education (New York: MacMillan, 1963), 4.41Dwight Boyd, “The Moral Part of Pluralism as the Plural Part of MoralEducation,” in The Challenge of Pluralism, ed. F. Clark Power and Daniel K.Lapsley (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 158.42Ibid., 162.1bid., 158.Nicholas Burbules and Suzanne Rice, “Dialogue across Differences:Continuing the Conversation,” Haivard Educational Review 61, no. 4(November, 1991): 395—398.Kenneth Strike, “On the Construction of Public Speech: Pluralism andPublic Reason,” Educational Theory 44, no. 1(1994): 2.Burbules and Rice, 400.47Strike, 3.lbid., 4. See also, Margaret Farley, “Feminism and UniversalMorality,” in Prospects for a Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P.Reeder (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 173—174, Alasdair Maclntyre,After Virtue, 113.Warley, 170.1405°lris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Justice and thePolitics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 39—65.51Burbules and Rice, 397.52lbid., 398.53See Elizabeth Ellsworth, “Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering?Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy,” HarvardEducational Review, 59(1989): 297—324.54Farley, 178.55SeyIa Benhabib, Situating the Selt Genders Community andPostmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 16.lbid., 16.57Ellsworth, 324 and 316.See Farley, 178—1 81.59Burbules and Rice, 402—403.60Benhabib, 77. She writes, “... it is characteristic of the integrationistview that it emphasizes value revival, value reform, or value regeneration andneglects institutional solutions.”61lbid., 77.62Burbules and Rice, 403.Strike, 13.64lbid., 13. See also Benhabib, 9.65Boyd, 161.141CHAPTER FIVEMORAL CONVERSATIONS: JUSTICE, TOLERANCE AND EMPATHY INGLOBAL EDUCATIONIt seems clear that the more continuous and authentic personalencounters can be, the less likely it will be that categorizing anddistancing will take place. People are less likely to be treatedinstrumentally, to be made “other” by those around. I want to speak ofpluralism and multiculturalism with concrete engagements in mind,actual and imagined: engagements with young persons and olderpersons, some suffering from exclusion, some from powerlessness,some from poverty, some from ignorance, some from boredom.Maxine Greene 15.0. INTRODUCTIONIn the last chapter, I argued that a global community of concern was apossibility we will have to construct, not discover. Pluralism is the greatestchallenge that faces us in our efforts. If the construction of such a communityis vital to us, then the language we will have to invent for expressingourselves and for listening to others, must be one that takes full account ofthe differences between people. It is imperative that the dispositions andabilities which are necessary for this kind of communication are taught tostudents. I see the project of teaching the language and tools for thiscommunication as the primary function of global education.What is central to a global perspective of the sort I am advocating isbelief in the possibility of conversations across communities in the world. Thisdialogue, however halting and fraught with potential misunderstandings, iswhat a community of concern is all about. The hope for communicating, forconstructing community, can only exist when people are both able andinclined to listen to others, to imagine their positions and perspectives, and to142respect the purposes and the process of the dialogue itself. In other words,they need to be committed to the enterprise of community building. Even forthose committed to it, the process of learning to communicate acrossdifferences, particularly across differences of power and position, is terriblydifficult, as the critics of such projects have pointed out.2 As discussed in thelast chapter, many postmodernists, communitarians and feminists believe theenterprise as a whole is doomed to failure. It will be important to continue toargue against their views if the consequence of their criticisms is that we donot try to communicate across differences at all. Failure should not bepresumed at the outset. “Beyond the critique of universal norms lies cautionand care,” writes Margaret Farley, “but not arbitrariness or indifference, andnot completely isolated moral systems.”3We do have hope in this regard. Still,many of these criticisms are important to consider as they have implicationsfor the educational means we employ to develop the communicative virtues.Much of this chapter will be an attempt to present these virtues in light of thecriticisms of any project of communicative ethics.4 Global education itself canbe seen as part of such an enterprise when communicative ethics areunderstood as the ethical precepts that apply when communicating withothers.I have already mentioned three moral attainments or communicativevirtues that individuals must demonstrate or express in order to participate incommunities. (This includes participation in existing communities to whichthey already belong as well as participation in the construction of newcommunities.) The three virtues I referred to are: tolerance, empathy, and asense of justice. On my view, they are the elements most needed forcommunication between persons who are close to us as well as those faraway143and with radically different backgrounds and beliefs. These virtues mayenable people to begin to converse with members of communities elsewhereas part of the effort to build a shared community of concern.In this chapter I will discuss empathy, tolerance and justice ascommunicative virtues that can and should be developed as key elements ofa global perspective. I believe that it is the task of education to help studentsdevelop the requisite moral commitments and dispositions toward otherswithin their present circles of caring. I believe that it is the task of globaleducation to extend these circles to include others in the world and to helpyoung people come to understand the need for communication between us.5.1. A SENSE OF JUSTICEOne of the three moral values that I argue is indispensable to theconstruction of a moral global community is justice. Were I to attempt toprovide any account of Rawis’ or Waizer’s conception of justice in a singlechapter, at best I could do no more than present the briefest of distillations. Inthe background and informing my discussion are their voices and the voicesof other philosophers who have made the subject of justice central to theirwork. I hope they can be heard without great distortion. But instead offocusing on conceptions of justice, I want to examine the role justice plays incommunication across differences.I intend to do two things in this section. The first is to discuss justice asa requirement for conversations across differences. This will help answer thequestion about the role that justice plays in a global moral community. I willoutline the reasons I have for claiming that a sense of justice is essential forpeople who are committed to communicate with strangers in an effort to build144community. The second thing I want to do is discuss the ways in which asense of justice is developed, and argue that it is best developed against abackground of caring. In part, I will be attempting to bring justice and caretogether into what Eamonn Callan calls a “common voice”5 in moralconversations across difference. I will do this in order to give a clearerdescription of the educational task that lies ahead for those of us committed tothe possibility of constructing a moral global community.5.1.1. Justice in a Global CommunityIn my earlier discussions concerning the construction of a global moralcommunity, I stressed that communication across differences depends on thedemonstration of certain sensitivities and dispositions towards others who areconsidered potential participants in one’s moral life. The bonds that heldtraditional communities together: bonds of culture, political affiliation, evenlanguage, do not exist in a global sphere; therefore new bonds have to beestablished. Connections, when created, will be created through the ongoingattempts at communication. The search for a common understanding will itselfbe what draws people together.In order for communication to take place at all, certain guidelines,similar to Kant’s maxims discussed in the last chapter need to be introduced.But these will not be adopted and put to use by people who are not alreadydisposed to treat others, including strangers, as equal participants in theconversation. Developing these dispositions is a goal of global education.Certain moral dispositions or virtues must underlie our practices ofcommunication if we are to achieve any sort of moral community. One ofthese is a sense of justice, and it is essential to the enterprise for several145reasons:1. We need to avoid imposing our own values on others when we areengaged in dialogue and problem solving. One of the dangers of trying tocreate community through dialogue is the danger of speaking for others.When we do not know what the other’s good might be, we are at risk ofpresuming what the other wants or needs. We need to be alert to theinjustices connected to deciding for others.6Without a well-developed senseof justice we are continually in danger of viewing persons as objects of socialpolicy, that is with Strawson’s objective attitudes. A sense of justice that iscontinually and carefully attuned to what others are actually telling us isessential in conversing with people whose values and wishes may not, andprobably are not, what we have imagined them to be.2. We need to prevent the tyranny of the majority, as well as otherforms of abuse of power and privilege. I believe in an enabling conception ofjustice; that is, just treatment should refer to creating conditions necessary forindividual flourishing and for collective cooperation.7 This will necessarilyinvolve certain decision making procedures that are fair and equitable, and donot ride roughshod over people’s interests. Though the tyranny of the majorityis a very real problem for democratic forums, it is certainly not the most oreven the most pernicious form of abuse of power. In Justice and the Politics ofDifference, Iris Young talks of five faces of oppression which have resulted inthe denial of just treatment to groups of people. They are: powerlessness,exploitation, marginalization, violence and cultural imperialism. Theseconditions occur even in so called humane and liberal societies, in whichstructural relations are constituted in ways that perpetuate unequaldistribution of benefits, unfair labor practices, the devaluation of entire cultural146groups, and so on. To understand how power operates in modern societies,we have to look beyond the traditional model of sovereign and subject toinstitutional and social practices such as education, governmentadministration, and the production and distribution of goods.8When we speakof justice in a global realm we need to recognize the ways in which poweroperates across hemispheres between developed and developing societies,between the rich and poor nations of the world, and between transnationalorganizations and the people they serve.As people who are attempting to communicate across wide gulfs, weneed more than the disposition to treat others fairly. We also need to knowhow to speak about and confront systemic discrimination and oppression. Weneed to be able to identify injustices, understand something about theircauses, and be ready and willing to listen to those who have been exploited,marginalized and excluded from participation in decisions that affect theirlives. While a sense of justice alone will not lead to these understandings, itwill increase sensitivity to abuses of power.3. We need to create fair and equitable arrangements on commonmatters of concern. This is obviously tied to the matter of building a globalcommunity of concern whose participants will share at least a minimal civiclanguage. A sense of justice can guide us to solutions to our shared problemswhich take into account all points of view. The relevance of all points of viewwill be presumed at the outset. The goal is a limited and provisionalagreement on matters of mutual or overlapping interest. Rawls notion ofjustice as fairness presumes that an “overlapping consensus” can beachieved on certain moral matters, and that people will share enoughconcepts and commitments that it can serve as a regulative rather than147substantive ideal in discourse.9He speaks about this conception of justice asone that stays on the surface because it does not override or eclipse people’sindividual and personal projects. Instead it ensures that the private spheres inwhich people live much or even most of their lives will remain private and thepublic sphere (what I call the community of concern) will in part guarantee thefreedoms necessary for the pursuit of one’s own conception of a good life.’0A sense of justice will help us avoid the pitfalls or injustices mentionedin the first two statements above, and promote the goal mentioned in the last.Achieving the ends described will require that people respect each other asindividuals who have the capacity and the will to define their own possibilitiesand life plans. Additionally people will need to discover the moral conceptsthey already share so they can fruitfully discuss the matters they have incommon as well as constructively listen to each other’s viewpoints whendifferences arise, as they inevitably well. Constructive listening presupposesthe possibility of understanding other contributions to the conversation.A sense of justice is a background requirement for uncoercedcommunication. Among philosophers who have described the role justiceplays in communication is Seyla Benhabib who outlines several prerequisitesfor establishing uncoerced communication between people not bound to eachother by tradition or a form of life.11 These prerequisites are moralpresuppositions that structure conversation itself. Although close toHabermas’ presuppositions for argumentation in an ideal speech situation,Benhabib emphasizes slightly different communicative principles. She says itis because she is interested in communication that aims toward “areformulated end.”2 For Benhabib, the important goal of communicationacross differences is not consent between parties or consensus among them,148but the continuation of the moral conversation. Like Noddings and others, shesees the task as one of keeping the lines of communication open.’3When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethicsfrom consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, webegin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practicaldiscourse to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what wouldbe allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint ofcontinuing and sustaining the practice of moral conversation among us.The emphasis now is less on rational agreement but more onsustaining those normative practices and moral relationships withinwhich reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue14(italics in original).Of course, it is not only a matter of keeping the conversation going thatis important, but a matter of seeking understanding through conversation.Understanding others includes understanding what they need in order toflourish, and being able and willing to “reverse perspectives” with them.Benhabib stipulates only two moral prerequisites or presuppositions forparticipation in moral conversations whose goal is moral understanding of theother:(1) that we recognize the right of all human beings capable of speechand action to be participants (the principle of universal moral respect)(2) that each participant has the same symmetrical right to variousspeech acts including initiating topics and asking for reflection. (theprinciple of egalitarian reciprocity)15The principle of universal moral respect and the principle of egalitarianreciprocity are considered commitments on the part of people wishing toengage in normative discussions. Justice requires that these two conditionsnot be suspended or the dialogue itself would cease. What would emerge inits place are the continuing demands of the powerful and the dominant, andthe ongoing silencing of those with no power at all.149In conversation, I must know how to listen, I must know how tounderstand your point of view, I must learn to represent to myself theworld and the other as you see them. If I cannot listen, if I cannotunderstand, the conversation stops, develops into an argument, ormaybe never gets started.165.1.2. Justice and CareOf the three communicative virtues to be discussed in this chapter,justice may need the most explication, perhaps even a defense. This is largelydue to the fact that until recently, justice has been considered by many to bethe predominant voice of modern moral theory, the voice that has spoken thelanguage of universal respect for persons and basic human rights. It has beenclaimed by feminists and others that it is only one voice, a powerful, mostlymale voice, and that it does not express essential elements of a moral point ofview. Those elements are connected to the capacity and the need for humanbeings to care for, and relate to individuals as particular “concrete others,” notas generalized rights claimants. Some feminists believe that importantdifferences are “filtered out” of the picture when all selves are regarded asequivalent, as extensions, or even mirrors of one another, “as mere instancesof the universal.”17The objection to this construal of other “selves” as “just the same as”oneself is perhaps best articulated by Benhabib who argues that it is theparticular nature of other concerns, expressed in the other’s own words whichallow us to respond to their professed needs, not reflections of our own. Yet,as we have seen, Benhabib does not try to eliminate the need for universalconsiderations. Carol Gilligan, on the other hand, believes that there are twostances or orientations toward morality: the ethic of justice and the ethic ofcare and that they are ultimately irreconcilable. Her view is that an ethic of150justice is concerned with “individual freedom, social contracts, a ranked orderof values, fairness, and an emphasis on duty.... An ethic of care... focuses onrelationships between persons, cooperation, communication and caring.”18 Onthis view justice represents separation and caring stands for connectedness.Justice concerns the abstracted self (the hypothetical person behind Rawl’sveil of ignorance, or an instance of the universal) and caring concerns theparticular self, situated in the real world.It may well be that some feminists (as represented here by Gilligan)have conflated moral theories of justice with what actually goes on in ourmoral discourse and decision making. In daily life, the notion of justice has nopriority over truthfulness, kindness, compassion, and so on. Thecharacterization of justice Gilligan offers is an impoverished one. Justice onthis view is defined as little more than a remedial virtue that regulates conflictbetween universal rights holders with generalizable concerns. The view ofcaring expressed by some feminists may be limited, too, if we have neither themeans nor the inclination to transcend our own situatedness, that is our owninner circle, in order to embrace the possibility of new communities and newconnections.19 My own view of global education and the global perspectivereflects a commitment to community building as a moral enterprise betweenindividuals who recognize their differences as well as their basiccommonalities, the particulars and also the universals. Both justice and caringhave an essential role to play in the ongoing dialogue, from thepresuppositions that ground it to the aspirations which carry it forward. It isimportant then, that I find a way to reconcile justice and caring in a conceptionof global education as in any moral enterprise.I argue that a sense of justice would be virtually empty without care151and that caring at all times, needs to be made just.20 Developing a sense ofjustice is as much a matter of developing sensitivities to context and theparticular details of others’ experiences as it is coming to understand therights we all have in common. And caring, of the sort we wish to promote inourselves and our students, is itself grounded in a sense of justice. Caringthat is not grounded in a sense of justice can cause harm. There are manyexamples of this sort of caring. Parents may unwittingly hold their childrenback from opportunities to grow and become self-reliant in a well intentionedeffort to protect them. Teachers may keep students in a state of heteronomyout of a misguided sense of what learning calls for and how to care for youngminds. Spouses may prevent each other from realizing their potential asindependent people with separate interests and ambitions. We all need toregard others as persons who have their own good and who need certainthings for that good to be realized. We should not only be concerned withrespecting other persons as they are now, but as they might one day be ifencouraged and supported. Justice demands that we see them as more thanobjects of our own caring. As Eamonn Callan explains,Persons have a worth that is not reducible to the relationships in whichthey are embedded, even when the relationships are constituted bybonds of unselfish caring; and their worth creates peremptory claimsupon the aid or forbearance of others—moral rights in otherwords—which are not contingent upon the affections that may or maynot bind particular members of the moral community,21Caring in other words, must be just in order to be morally acceptable.On the other hand, our concept of justice would be empty without themotivation or the disposition to care. We would be less able to respond to theparticular concerns of others because we would be less willing to see theirneeds and wants as important. As Noddings reminds us, we learn and152practice morality in our inner circle. Being immersed in caring relationshipsin this inner circle allows us to learn about and exercise compassion,benevolence, generosity. Seeing other people’s good as not entirely extrinsicto our own (a basic condition of caring as a relational concept) is fundamentalto the motivation to treat others decently and with an eye to their particularity.We need to be continually attuned to the “rich contextual detail thatdifferentiates one moral encounter from another.”23Justice should not be blind to the particular but that does not mean thatjustice operates without concern for the universal at the same time. Piagetdescribed the difference between a sense of justice based on caring forothers and a sense of justice as adjudication between claimants, as thedifference between “mere equalitarianism” and a more subtle conception ofjustice, one “which we may call equity and which consists in never definingequality without taking account of the way in which each individual issituated.”24 For Piaget, the sense of justice is born out of interaction andcooperation. An individual is just to the extent that his sense of reciprocity andmutual respect are “strong enough to make the individual feel from within thedesire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated.”25Moral theorists recognize that the ability to “reverse perspectives” iscrucial to moral understanding, beginning with the admonition of parent tochild: “How would you feel if the other children threw stones at you?” It is truethat at a certain point in our moral development we need to move beyondseeing the other as an extension of ourselves or another instance of theuniversal, and begin to respond to the “concrete other” on her own terms. Justtreatment in actual cases requires this. But it is also true that recognizing theother as a being worthy of respect and deserving of fair treatment presumes153some commonalty between all persons. In this sense, the power ofuniversality is preserved. Without it, there could be no possibility of a commoncry for justice.265.1.3. Developing a Sense of JusticeIn the section of A Theory of Justice called “The Sense of Justice,”Rawls builds on Piaget’s work to construct a stage theory of moraldevelopment based on justice as fairness. It is characterized by three stages:the Morality of Authority, the Morality of Association, and the Morality ofPrinciples. Like Piaget, Rawls sees the child moving outward from anegocentric universe to one that embraces others, a decentering from one’sown point of view to the point of view of others, what Hannah Arendt wouldrefer to as “enlarged mentality.” The growing capacity to see situations fromthe point of view of others is one that leads to treating them fairly andrespectfully.Certain conditions must be present at each of Rawl’s stages for theoptimum growth of the sense of justice. First among them is a loving, trustingatmosphere in which the child feels secure:The parents’ love of the child is expressed in their evident intention tocare for him, to do for him as his rational self-love would incline, and inthe fulfillment of these intentions. Their love is displayed by their takingpleasure in his presence and supporting his sense of competence andesteem 27There is an explicit obligation for those in authority to act justly andwith due regard to what the child would do for herself if she was fully aware ofher own interests and able to act on her own behalf. It is presumed that shewill grow to be autonomous in this way and will come to agree with decisionsmade for her. Within the family structure described by Rawls, the child comes154to trust as well as love the authority figures in her life and obeys and followstheir rules. As in Piaget’s egocentric stage, she looks to significant adults forguidance and moral constraint. These adults therefore should hold justifiedmoral beliefs and treat others with fairness and respect. In Rawl’s words, they“should exemplify the morality they enjoin.” Further, they must:enunciate clear and intelligible (and of course justifiable) rulesadapted to the child’s level of comprehension. In addition, they shouldset out reasons for these injunctions as far as they can beunderstood.This last condition is important to Piaget’s theory of moral developmentas well as Dewey’s thinking about moral education. The only valuablediscipline is that which children understand. They should be able to consentto rules, not just blindly accept them. Asking for and giving justification forone’s actions and beliefs is an essential element of the sense of justice.Within the next stage, The Morality of Association, the social nature ofthe child becomes increasingly more evident. Here it is cooperation forged inschool and neighborhood that combines with family interaction to shape thegrowing sense of justice. We have natural sympathies with others that inRawl’s view provide an “effective basis for moral sentiments once we have aclear grasp of our relations to our associates from an appropriately generalperspective.”29 This perspective is developed further in the third stage, theMorality of Principles, when the sense of justice is ideally extended to thehuman community. Here the sense of justice grows to an understanding ofjustice as a regulative ideal, one that provides the framework for uncoercedcommunication. At this stage it is principled reflection which leads to fairtreatment of others.Some feminist critics have argued that Rawl’s vision of the ethical self155is not only autonomous but atomistic, that he, along with some other liberaltheorists, has left out the equally important human feature called“relationality.”3°But if we take seriously Rawl’s characterization of thedevelopment of the sense of justice in children, we can immediately see theplace of caring and relationality within the stages and conditions of growth.His description focuses on a “self” who is defined and shaped in relation tothe significant people around her, not apart from them. A sense of justicedoes not develop except in an expanding community of persons who are notso much rights claimants as they are participants in the discourse, individualswhose good is intertwined with ours, be they family members, friends orcitizens with whom we learn (through practice) to cooperate. The central goalin developing the sense of justice is to understand the rights and claims ofothers and our responsibilities toward them, but these cannot be understoodfully without knowledge of others as distinct individuals with their ownparticular needs and possibilities.In the “Sense of Justice” Rawls is concerned with providing adescription of the way people come to see the role that justice plays in theiractual relations with others. In this aim, he is diverging from the central projectof A Theory of Justice, in which his concerns remain with ideal communitiesand imagined relations. Here, feminist objections to Rawl’s “veil of ignorance”seem more grounded.31 At all times we need to, pay attention to the demandsof justice in real contexts, not hypothetical ones. Because we do haveknowledge of our own interests and our own situation we have an obligationto transcend our present position to “reverse perspectives.” We need to findadequate information about what other lives are like. When we can, we needto ask people about their lives. When we cannot, we need to find out in other156ways. This is not always or even often, an easy thing to do. Margaret Farleywrites that:In its most general and classical sense, justice means giving to eachher or his “due.” Broadly speaking, this would seem to require thatjustice take account of the concrete reality of the one to whom it is due,whether what is relevant in this concrete reality is a contract or a basichuman need or the history of a shared commitment or all of the aboveand more. But theories of common morality have dwindled preciselybecause we despair of knowing the concrete reality of anything.32I do not believe that we should despair of ever knowing these things,only be aware that the process of understanding unfamiliar others is likely tobe a long and arduous one, requiring both a sense of justice and a sense ofcare. If Susan Moller 0km is right, it may take even more than these virtues tocome to an understanding of others that results in promoting their good aswell as our own. It will take a great commitment to benevolence,, too.33Perhaps, as Rawls says, the sense of justice itself is continuous with the loveof humankind.5.2. ANOTHER LOOK AT TOLERANCEWe must give up the image of society as a battleground of competinggroups and formulate an ideal of society more exalted than the mereacceptance of opposed interests and diverse customs. There is a needfor a new philosophy of community beyond pluralism and beyondtolerance.35Tolerance is indispensable to the development of a global perspectiveand it is important to define just what sort of tolerance is required of students.In this section I am less concerned to present classic defenses of tolerancethan I am to argue that tolerance as it relates to a morally defensible globalperspective requires more from us than simply allowing others the freedom ofexpression or the freedom to follow their own conceptions of the good. It157requires more than leaving others alone, or free from interference. Itinvolves contributing to conditions such that people will be better able torealize their own ends. Among these will be creating the conditions necessaryfor uncoerced communication between ourselves and other people.5.2.1. Tolerance as an Active VirtueI want to put forth a conception of tolerance as a moral attainment thatgoes beyond our ordinary notions of the term. As we ordinarily understand it,tolerance is rather a minimal condition for peaceable relations betweenpersons. There will be limits even then to our toleration of certain practicesand opinions, but we are obligated to separate our belief in the worth of aperson from our judgment of the opinion he or she espouses. One expressionof this view is that you must denounce the heresy but not the heretic.37 This isimportant to relations between people who share no common cultural ground.We can condemn falsehood and seek to ascertain and uphold the truthwithout punishing the holder of false beliefs. In Mill’s words to be intolerant offalsehood is to claim infallibility, and this leads to a host of crimes. To toleratediversity is to allow the free exchange of ideas which can result in one’scoming to understand and articulate one’s own beliefs more clearly andcompletely or in changing one’s mind on the basis of compelling reasons.Either result is a furthering of communication between people and areaffirmation of the positive effects of interchange and dialogue.Some writers, Isaiah Berlin among them, argue that this kind oftolerance is all we can realistically hope for in a pluralistic world with multipleand competing perspectives about the good.38 Although this is a worthy andachievable goal, it is not a sufficient or satisfactory one for teachers who want158students to understand and adhere to principles of uncoerced communicationacross communities. A more appropriate or adequate view of tolerance inrelation to the attainment of a moral global perspective and to the possibilitiesfor constructive conversations is more active than passive. It requires morethan letting people alone to pursue their own ends. Part of our educationaltask is to help students recognize that we have many purposes and concernsin common with people in the rest of the world; our visions of the good quitenaturally encompass at least some mutual or shared “ends” because we livewith the same finite resources and the same needs for physical security, food,health and so on. Part of seeing things from a moral global perspective isrecognizing the commonalities we do have. Toleration depends on therealization that we do share some basic human interests. This is sometimesdismissed as a rather feeble humanist line: we are all alike under the skin. Infact Wolfe’s claim is that once the possibility for allegiance to a primary groupis taken away, we become the “unaffiliated, faceless member of lonelycrowd.”39 But even Wolff does not mean that we should give up hope forforming new allegiances. In the course of a lifetime we will belong to manygroups and identify with multiple affiliations. Part of the task for globaleducation will be to give students opportunities to see themselves within anexpanded social horizon and see the legitimacy of other groups and evenother forms of life.The most basic reason for the exercise of toleration is our moralresponsibility to consider other people as ends in themselves, not merelymeans to our own. As educators we have a special opportunity to helpindividuals come to understandings about themselves and about peopleelsewhere in the world. Among these will be moral understandings; that159others are centres of experience and valuation who are to be respected, thatthey have legitimate claims to fair treatment, and that their concerns areworthy of consideration and compassionate response even when we disagreewith their opinions and beliefs, perhaps especially when we disagree withthem. Aristotle noted that justice is not needed among friends; perhaps wecould say tolerance is not needed among like minds. We have a moralresponsibility in the name of active tolerance to make sure all voices have theopportunity to speak and that they are listened to.In order to do this, we need a shift in the way we view the ethicallandscape with regard to tolerance. What we have been focusing on mostintensely in schools, as evidenced by multicultural policies, global educationmandates and goals for social studies programs,4°is a view of tolerance thatrespects people’s freedom to express themselves and maintain distinctcultural identities. We have focused, in other words, on rights and people’sexercise of them. We have not focused on our mutual responsibilities tocreate new communities where possibilities for understanding one anotherare actively nurtured. I propose to reclaim tolerance as a necessary andviable political and social virtue for life in communities, even as it extends to apotential global community.5.2.2. Rights and ResponsibilitiesOne way to view tolerance as an active virtue is to consider obligationsrather than rights as the most basic ethical category. This is the view of OnoraO’Neill who claims that rights-based thinking is concerned with “the treatmentto which people are entitled” and is therefore not comprehensive enough in itsvision and its ideals to serve as the basic ethical category of liberalism.41160Unless we see obligations as basic to any moral enterprise, we overlookmany of our essential responsibilities to cooperative practices. Annette Baiermaintains a rather different view. On her view, it is the concept of rights thatpushes us to see people as individual participants in normative discussionand this is fundamental, even a prerequisite, to any cooperative practice. Wemust, first of all, be recognized as individual selves having the claim to avoice:The language of rights pushes us, more insistently than does thelanguage of duties, responsibilities, obligations, legislation and respectfor law, to see the participants in the moral practice as single,clamorous living human beings, not as families, clans, tribes, groups,classes, churches, congregations, nations or peoples.42My own view is that in actual moral conversations, both concepts worktogether and neither one is more foundational or basic than the other. Thelanguage of rights is part of our cooperative practices in which we can allclaim a voice as individual participants. The cooperative practices themselvesentail obligations and duties which are basic to our identity as relationalselves. Both categories are basic to our moral thinking and action. Mypurpose here is not to argue for one position or the other, however, I do thinkthat a temporary shift away from a discussion of ourselves as first andforemost rights-claimants, will open space for some important questions aboutwhat tolerance demands of us in dialogue across differences.Rights-based ethical theories consider rights as the ultimatejustificatory foundation for the way we ought to treat people and the way theyought to treat us. So it is a theory which looks first at the recipient oftreatment, not the agent who “treats.” Rights-based theories, by themselves,can only tell us why and when we must leave people alone to realize their161own self-determined ends. On traditional views, the concept of obligationnecessarily arises out of rights, which are more basic. If we make obligationsthe category from which our rights derive, the ethical landscape looks ratherdifferent.Once the focus shifts from rights to obligations as the most basiccategory, it necessarily shifts the ethical self from a bearer of rights to abearer of responsibilities. We are then turning to look at the questions ofethical expression and behavior from the perspective of the agent rather thanthe recipient of treatment. It takes us away from a view of ourselves asindividuals primarily pursuing our own ends to a view of ourselves as personsactively involved in the life pursuits of others. We become persons who arepartially responsible for contributing to the realization of others’ life plans.Because of this newly perceived partnership, other people’s ends (theirconceptions of the good or a life worth leading) and our own can be betterexamined in relation to each other. As a result ends may be reconstructed orat least modified though dialogue. This is an active, ongoing process. Oncewe have accepted some responsibility for contributing to the welfare of others,we need to know what their conceptions of the good life actually are. They inturn need to know ours. In the course of this collective exchange our ownconceptions of the good might well be aItered.Such a conception of self as first and foremost a social being departsfrom the independent autonomous agent who is most central to a rights basedtheory of ethics. The social contract we enter into on that view is one whichprimarily grants us mutual liberty to pursue our own good. Within that state ofaffairs we are free from the interference of others and we must tolerate theirpursuits and expressions in the same spirit. In no significant way does it162speak of the self in relation to others in what might be called positive terms;that is, toleration is regarded as a negative thing; we have a right not to beinterfered with. Our liberty, to that extent, is what gives us rights; without itthose rights would obviously collapse into incoherence.5.2.3. Toleration in CommunicationThe gulf between a rights based theory of ethics and an obligationbased one becomes larger when we start to follow what it means to activelypractice toleration in democratic society. It has been argued by many thatcommunication between citizens (and between citizens and the agents ofgovernment) is essential in a democracy. The major practical question thatarises for persons committed to active toleration is not: “How should I expressmyself?” but: “How should we communicate with each other?” Communicationon this view takes account of its social context and purpose; the possibility forgenuine communication demands much more than minimal toleration. Certainconditions for communication opportunities must be realized and maintained.Depending on the context, specific conditions for communication will change.Whether or not the context is one of personal or mass communication forinstance, or of the written or spoken word, will make a great difference, Ofcourse, some communicative obligations are common to all contexts.If citizens are to conduct their communicating on principles that could(not “would”: we are considering only universalizability, not uniformity) beshared by all, then their communicating must conform to fundamentalprinciples that do not undermine but, rather, preserve conditions of publiccommunication,Some acts will obviously undermine or destroy possibilities for163communication; those who silence others’ voices are denying rights to self-expression. And those who deliberately deceive others undermine the trustwhich is necessary for well intentioned communication. But sometimes it isbackground conditions which are violated so that communication, even thestart of communication, becomes impossible. Without violating individuals’rights to express themselves, certain technologies as well as attitudes anddominant societal practices, erode the very possibility for two-waycommunication or reciprocity. Consider the ways in which “the news” isreported for instance, as authoritative, complete and above challenge. Often,the use of particular language and the employment of certain formatsprecludes response because the information presented is not fullyinterpretable by its audience or large portions of its audience. When feedbackis requested, it is in a terribly limited and often misleading way—the debate ispreset, answers are edited and so on.A large range of techniques can disguise communicators’ fallibility andtheir latent agenda, and reflect principles that, if acted on, wouldmislead and ultimately destroy the very possibility of communication.Straightforward lying is, of course, a tried and tested way ofmisleading; but disinformation is continuous with misinformation, aswell as simpler techniques of sensationalism, selective omission, non-coverage and neglect of views that lie beyond the assumed limits of‘acceptable’ opinion.47Certain social and political institutions take a view toward those towhom they are “communicating” that has more to do with maintaining thedominant ideology and ideological structures than with providing opportunityfor debate and challenge. A commitment to hearing and respecting othervoices must go beyond simply noninterference with their private speech. Thecommitment must take into account the fact that many voices have beensilenced for so long and in so many ways, that the “categories of public164discourse” will have to change radically to allow them opportunity to speakand be listened to with understanding. We need to make room for the sorts ofprotection, access and regulations which public communication requires inorder to become truly democratic. Where speech has been stifled, dissentmarginalized and criticism eclipsed, toleration is not present at all.This view is not without difficulties. What we are talking about, after all,is some amount of control over communicators, over communicative content.Coercion in this context would amount to censorship. Is this not a violation ofcommunicators rights? If Annette Baier is correct, Americans in particularhave opted for a view of liberty that cannot reconcile itself with protecting thewelfare of certain vulnerable parties.49 Not only is active toleration a matter ofongoing adjustment and balance in particular situations, it is a matter of moregenerally prioritizing our freedoms, rights and responsibilities in a way we canall live with.Clearly, public discourse is already regulated in many ways, someobvious and some subtle, including “legal, economic and social structuresand traditions as well as conversational and literary forms and conventions.”5°Some regulation is unavoidable in every society and in fact, enablescommunication. An official policy of strict noninterference only leavesregulation up to nonstate powers and the continual probability that manyvoices will not be heard. However, certain modes of regulation are open tochange once we see the obligations we have toward extending possibilitiesfor communication.Communication is also obstructed in all sorts of ways and it is up to usto find a path which will obstruct least and still be fair to all parties. Ademocratic society should always aim toward policies of regulation which will165insure the widest range of public communication for all citizens. Thenecessary level of regulation may, and most likely will, go beyond a policy ofnoninterference, though censorship may not be justified except in extremecircumstances. We will have to determine (and be prepared to reexamine)which of our practices can best enable all voices to speak and be heard in theactual situations we find ourselves in.5.2.4. Tolerance and the Global PerspectiveThere are many provocative questions concerning the role of schoolsin teaching tolerance. It seems abundantly clear that a vigilant, educatedpublic is required by a democratic society so that it can successfully instituteand preserve communication for all citizens. In fact, without a public educatedas to the nature of our obligations toward each other in this regard, we wouldno doubt be satisfied with viewing toleration of others as synonymous withleaving them alone. We would certainly have difficulty recognizing practicesthat prevent true exchange from those which allow it. This can be said forvoices from within democratic societies, but I believe it applies equally tovoices from without.To practice toleration in a global context is to actively create theconditions whereby all voices can be heard and all claims be taken seriously.To do this students will have to learn much about the existing channels ofcommunication in the world and develop a critical stance toward thosechannels as potential tools for oppression as well as liberation. If we have amoral obligation to create possibilities for genuine communication betweenpeople, this obligation cannot stop at national borders. What would be thejustification for doing so? If a case can be made that the spheres of concern166we have overlap the spheres of concern people have elsewhere in the world,then we have good reason to institute and maintain practices of toleration inthese realms as well. Tolerance as a part of a global perspective requires thatwe learn, in the words of Brenda Almond:on the one hand to advocate the emphatic denunciation of falsity andevil, and, on the other, to insist on the importance of standing back,listening to others, and not attempting coercion. It means resisting badopinion with good, false opinion with true, and restraining only theperson who will not respect these limits himself.51Active tolerance—in the form of intervention on behalf of someoneelse’s good as he or she defines it—is a particularly signal aim for globaleducation because North American students will encounter dozens if nothundreds of cases where letting others alone will lead to perpetuation of thesame deplorable inequalities that already exist. Leaving people free to pursuetheir own ends amounts in these cases to a continuation of neglect which canonly lead to even worse injustices. Toleration of a passive sort may berequired first but it will not do much to contribute to the kinds of opportunities Ihave in mind to better the lives of people on their own professed terms.What does this mean to an argument for global education as a moralenterprise? On the one hand, creating conditions for communication on anexpanded scale sounds like an overwhelming task, especially considering thatwithin our own democratic societies success in this area has been so limited.However, if the obligation to others exists in this regard, then it must be truethat an obligation to prepare students to take on the task of creating thoseconditions for communication, must also exist. This, in part, is what is meantby developing in students the dispositions that are necessary to participate inas well as create moral communities. Of the three requirements I have set167down for the creation of moral communities, tolerance may seem on thesurface, the least difficult to achieve. Yet if the conception I have put forwardstands, tolerance takes on significance and complexity not ordinarilyembraced by our understanding of the concept. Developing a moral globalperspective means giving students the opportunity to construct communitieswhere tolerance along with a sense of justice is practiced and nurtured. In thiscontext, tolerance along with a sense of justice is an essential component forparticipation in the life of a community and a cornerstone for creating newcommunities.5.3. EMPATHYEmpathy is the final communicative virtue which will be discussed inthis chapter. It too, has a very special role in community building, one thatfocuses on recognizing strangers as potential participants within our horizonof moral experience. In this section I will briefly explore the concept ofempathy and its relationship to other concepts such as sympathy. Followingthis, I will stipulate a definition which I believe retains important features of theterm as it is ordinarily employed and at the same time focuses on one specialsense of empathy, that is, empathy as a requirement of moral competencewithin a global perspective.5.3.1. The Concept of EmpathyEmpathy demands much in the way of commitment to understandothers and yet seems to arise from a natural capacity to “feel with others.”52Talk about helping individuals to step into the perspective of another humanbeing (still the most apt description of what goes on when someoneempathizes) is not new to moral theory. Waizer calls it a commonplace of168philosophical and practical ethics.” Empathetic understanding was onecornerstone of Buber’s ethical writings on I-Thou relationships55 and it hasfigured largely in contemporary theories, notably in Rawl’s formulation of themoral competencies required by those persons committed to making justdecisions on moral issues. Rawls writes that one must be able toimaginatively experience the needs and interests of others in order toconsider them fairly, and in order to place them appropriately within a moralframework.There has always been talk in education circles of the need to helpstudents come to respect the needs and interests of others. We want studentsto learn to recognize or acknowledge others as persons, in the full sense ofthat word. John Wilson is one contemporary proponent of this view of theimperatives of moral or values education in schools. He sees the capacity toempathize as critical to moral competence.57Empathy can best be regarded as a disposition and ability to imaginethat can be cultivated in schools. However, it has sometimes been discussedas if it were an achievement or a process58. Empathizing does involveprocesses whereby we mentally reconstruct other peoples’ attitudes, values,beliefs and aspirations, in order to see others from the inside or more simply,to connect their experience with ours. There are limits to this connection, ofcourse, and to the reconstructive process which leads to it, relying as it doeson the use of our imagination which itself has limitations and barriers. Thenature of these limitations will depend, of course, on our particularbackgrounds, the kinds and degrees of sensitivities we express toward others,and our willingness to commit ourselves to the task of imagining, It will ofcourse depend on other factors as well, such as the reliability of the sources169and the detail of the information we have about others’ experiences. Todescribe empathy as an achievement may be to ascribe to empathy anendpoint where none is actually possible; we won’t and can’t ever know if wehave completely and accurately imagined the feelings, hopes and sufferingsof another. Even when we have confirmation that we have come close to“getting it right,” the uniqueness of the experience of others necessarilyevades us. Still, if Richard Hare is right, empathy can be cultivated, and it isthe possibility that we are able to develop at least some amount of empatheticunderstanding that gives sense to the notion of empathy as a moralachievement or attainment.Empathy has had a tangled past and may be one of the more confusingterms in our moral vocabulary.59 Part of the difficulty in sorting throughconceptions of empathy is that educators often equate empathy withsympathy. “Because empathy is construed as sympathy,” writes DouglasChismar, “the humanistic yet unrealistic goal of getting people to sympathize(like, care for, be good buddies of) all others is attempted, with dismalresults.”6°We then overlook our capacity to empathize with others, in thesense of recognizing them as independent centres of experience or asDownie and Telfer would say, as persons who are ends to be respected.What is also overlooked is the role education can play in increasing ourknowledge of and familiarity with, other persons, places and situations. Weoften misread the signs and this leads to inadequate responses to others.Chismar emphasizes the importance of familiarity.The problem is that situations are often misread due to inconsistentfamiliarity with various persons and situations. But these are exactlythe problems education addresses.... With the growth of civilizationand human cognitive abilities, humans have gained the ability to170familiarize themselves with increasingly diverse and distinct culturalgroups. Effective cross-cultural and international education offers theprospect of a broadened and more consistent capacity to empathize.61The plea for educators to increase children’s understandings of theirfellow human beings is not new, although Chismar enlarges the sphere ofeducational concerns so his notion of empathy can encompass internationalperspectives. His is a more sweeping approach to cross-cultural or globaleducation of this kind. Yet it is not really education for a moral point of view.Although Chismar speaks of the role of education in terms of familiarity withother ways of life, he does not speak of the moral attributes which need to bepresent in order for students to want to know about others in the world. Firstamong these is the disposition to willingly “step into the other’s shoes.” I findthis a singularly important omission, one that undercuts some importantarguments for educating for empathy.Empathy requires more than becoming sensitive to people in certainsituations. Imagining someone else’s life is a difficult intellectual task, andultimately one that is fated to be only partially successful. Just as we cannot,with any certainty, judge the measure of the intimacy achieved between anauthor and her translator or even between the particular interpretation and thereader, we cannot hope to fully understand the experience of another.62 AsMichael Waizer tells us, “our imaginations, don’t in fact reach to true orcertain knowledge of the other person’s reaction.... We don’t, because wecan’t, reproduce other peoples’ ideas; instead we reiterate our own.” Wereiterate our own ideas to be sure, but, if empathy is possible to any degree,some part of those ideas has been transformed by what we have been able toimagine, even by the fact that we are willing to take on the task of envisioningthe life of another.171Empathy, along with a number of other moral virtues is consideredessential to our moral lives, even though we develop the capacity toempathize to varying degrees and with varying successes. Empathy is thedisposition and the ability to envision what another life is like. We often makemoral judgments in situations where we can not literally be in the position ofall, or even any, of the persons involved. We are then called upon toimaginatively enter into the role or place of the other in order to arrive at aninformed moral decision.According to Richard Hare, “having a certain power of imagination andreadiness to use it” is a requirement of moral competence. That in essenceis what empathy is. I define empathy as the inclination and the capacity to useone’s imagination in order to understand and appreciate the perspective ofanother. Both dimensions of empathy can be fostered by educational means.While empathy has a particularly important in a moral decision or choice thataffects someone’s welfare, the exercise of empathy is not restricted to therealm of social action, whether in a public or private domain. It is or should bea central part of our moral lives, part of the way we are inclined to view is constantly, vigilantly acknowledging the humanity of others. It is steppinginto their shoes.Obviously this will involve a number of things. Paying attention topotentially “morally hazardous” situations as well as orienting oneself to thepossibility that one might be called upon to make a judgment or decide acourse of action is one component of becoming empathetic, perhaps betterdescribed as a prerequisite. Becoming sympathetically or compassionatelyaware of peoples’ circumstances and needs is also a part. We could describethese features as the disposition to notice. Another component is the172willingness to imaginatively enter in to another’s experience in order to betterunderstand or communicate with her or to make a more enlightened decisionconcerning her welfare or a particular course of action which may affect her.This additionally demands a commitment to search out relevant facts andinformation about the person and her situation. A further component isknowledge of moral concepts and terms which will enable one to see andultimately assess the situation from a moral point of view, or impersonalstandpoint. Finally, empathy requires the belief in the principle of respect forpersons. Without a belief in this principle, any capacity for empathizing wouldbe morally empty, even harmful, as one could “enter in” to the role of anotheronly to achieve one’s own ends. Conversely, without the capacity to “feel withthe other,” belief in the principle of respect for persons would leave usignorant of the most constructive, sensitive means in which to apply it inparticular situations. This is what Gilligan refers to as co-feeling, which guidesour actions toward another’s good.5.3.2. Empathy and the Global PerspectiveThe aims of empathetic understanding are generally embraced byglobal education. Global educators such as Kniep, Anderson, Selby andothers are agreed on the need for students to step outside their ownperspectives in order to come to an understanding of the values, beliefs andways of life of other people in the world.67 Sometimes the aim goes beyondunderstanding the perspective of the other, and is translated to a commitmenttoward social change on the other’s behalf. If we are to take Coombs’ globalperspective for instance, the aim of coming to understand others is a kind ofuniversal solidarity. The goal of solidarity is to build a world community,173dedicated to solving world problems.I want to look first at the possibilities for empathy between individualpersons separated by geographical and cultural gulfs. I need to make it clearthat I am not advocating the sort of empathy which is equated with a particularset of sentiments. I am not asking for students to develop feelings of warmth,fondness, or personal regard for strangers across the globe, even if thepossibility exists that some students might, through some combination ofexposure, contact or particular circumstance, develop such feelings. This isnot a legitimate aim of education, though it may be defensible on some othergrounds. On this point, I find myself agreeing, in part at least, with NelNoddings who, in Caring, reminds us of the limitations of our sphere ofgenuine, personal concern for others; we cannot realistically take care ofeveryone.69.Even so, there is no inevitable nor even justifiable limitation on ourability to place others within our ethical sphere as full moral agents. The goalof empathy is the recognition of others as persons who are connected to usby the fact of their personhood and what it implies: we are all worthy ofserious moral consideration. Any genuine connections with others must beginwith that recognition.In Contingency, irony, and solidarity, Rorty writes at length of theimportance of recognizing connections between ourselves and other peopleelsewhere in the world. He uses the term solidarity. For him, solidarity is not areality but a goal to be promoted.not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to seestrange people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered byreflection but created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to theparticular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of174people.. 70In this passage, Rorty calls for increasing our sensitivity to peoples’suffering in order to create bonds. He says we should attend to the specificdetails of particular persons’ pain and humiliation. I think he’s pointing us inthe wrong direction and his mistake reveals a fundamental flaw in manyefforts to promote empathetic understanding in students. What we are after isa sense of connection between our students and the strangers. Is that whatwe are actually promoting? On Peter Knight’s view, teachers fail in theirattempts because they have not distinguished feelings of sympathy fromempathetic understanding. “The association of empathy with affect andemotions might be expected to lead some teachers to encourage children tosympathize with the sadness of, say, a starving peasant, an oppressedminority or an orphaned child.” This, he claims, is a failure to grasp the aim ofeducation, which should instead be seen as the development ofunderstanding.By focussing on the suffering of a stranger, we portray an incompletepicture of her that does not lead to understanding. The picture may fosterdistant sympathy for the plight of the unfortunate and an uneasy sense thatthere are wrongs which ought to be righted in the world. But this does notnecessarily lead to empathy or connection. The same thing can happen withhistorical figures. Focusing on the sufferings of people in the past does notlead to empathy or connection because it does not lead to understanding ofwhat their lives were like. Instead it presents school history that is little morethan “repetitive rehearsals of negative emotions.”71That is not to deny that there was a grimness about past (and manypresent situations) and that sympathy is a common response. It is tonote that people in the past (and in the present too) were not175perpetually morose, and that dwelling on the occasions of grief is stillsome way short of explaining their actions.72.Emphasizing only one aspect of the other’s life, that is, the sufferingshe has endured, gives students a distorted view of past and present othersas victims. While I agree with Rorty that we must understand the suffering ofothers if solidarity is to be achieved, it is an incomplete understanding of ahuman life. A person’s hopes, beliefs, experiences and emotions are notcaptured in her image as victim. We may come away from the wide, dazedeyes of a starving refugee with a profound sense of the horror of war and thesad reality of famine, but this could be any one of a million victims, caught upin any one of a thousand tragedies.73A general sense of pain and suffering inthe world is never the same as an empathetic connection to one who suffers.The incomplete picture we are given of individuals outside thedeveloped world often focuses on a victim with a history but not a person witha story to tell. So the history is one of disaster or war, rarely an account of arichly textured personal past. This tendency is a persistent problem intextbooks that purport to present a realistic view of the world.74 Severalnegative consequences are likely when the focus is not on the whole personbut on his plight and the circumstances that surround it. Students who areinitially engaged by the details and images may lose sight of the purposebehind imaginatively envisioning the situation of another; they may fail toappreciate its moral value. Some may be overwhelmed by a sense ofpowerlessness when confronted by so much suffering in the world. For others,the circumstances may seem so foreign, they fail to see a connection at all.The conditions presented may repel certain students. According to Broudy,“sympathy is limited to a small circle; as the circle is enlarged to includepersons and conditions remote in space, the range of sympathy required176outdistances its capacity for empathy. It may, perversely, expand the targetsof antipathy.”75There are other, related dangers in portraying the dramatic sufferingsof a stranger in crisis. In one analysis of funding campaigns used by someinternational aid agencies, the author calls into question the advertisementsshowing harsh images of malnourished, poverty-stricken children, an explicitly“lurid approach” aimed at the consciences of Canadians.76A growing numberof development experts are beginning to question what some have labeled“pornography of the poor.” John Stackhouse writes:They say tear-jerking pictures of starving children, barren earth andgeneral misery, while raising money for good works, tend tooversimplify the problems of development, exploit the image of those inneed and make lasting solutions more difficult to attain.77It is lasting solutions which are most needed, not just damage control,but according to recent surveys referenced in the article, most Canadiansview the situation in the developing world as “hopeless.”78 There is someworry that the constant barrage of images of disaster victims has numbedCanadians to the possibility of real improvement in the third world such asthat which would be brought about by long-range development schemes andstructural changes involving trade, government policies, loans and so on.Oxfam has tried to change the message of hopelessness that seems to becoming across in the “hard sell” ad campaigns. “We try not to portray ourpartners as victims” remarked one Oxfam spokesperson.The alternative approach is evident in advertisements which havecooperation in development as their message. One shows an Ethiopianblacksmith working in his shop with the caption, “Together we can make adifference.” It asks for a very different response from the viewer, one that177encourages partnership not distance. Showing helpless victims in developingcountries estranges their fellow human beings in the developed world. Itperpetuates paternalism and can lead to the not uncommon North Americanbelief that the fate of everyone in the developing world rests solely in ourhands. I am reminded of Strawson’s description of objective attitudes thatkeep us apart from strangers; we see subjects for treatment instead of people.I believe there are ways we can come to understand that althoughexperience differs and our pain is never the same, connections exist betweenall of us. As Margaret Farley puts it:Whatever the differences in human lives, however minimal the actualityof human community, it is nonetheless possible for human beings toweep over commonly felt tragedies, laugh over commonly perceivedincongruities, yearn for common hopes.79It is possible for us and for our students to go beyond objectiveattitudes toward strangers. We can learn to recognize a person instead of anobject for social policy when we encounter someone in the developing world.But I think this understanding is developed gradually. Perhaps we can onlyachieve the kind of connection we are after, one by one, through one person’sstory at a time. There do not seem to be any formulas to tell us when or howthis might happen, or how many stories we might have to hear before we cangrasp the perspective of another. Empathy may not be the sort of thing youcan come right out and teach.Most likely the development of empathetic understanding begins inunexpected moments when our imaginations are caught by some detail orsurprised by some characteristic that moves us toward a connection withothers or even a new understanding of something in the human condition. Butwhile acknowledgement of our mutual humanity may be a goal to pursue, it is178not humanity as a whole that we are able to recognize. What we recognizeand identify with is particular individuals who are like us in some ways and yetnot like us in others. Ignatieff writes that:We recognize our mutual humanity in our differences, in ourindividuality, in our history, in our faithful discharge of our obligations.There is no identity we can recognize in our universality. There is nosuch thing as love of the human race, only the love of this person forthat, in this time and not in any other.8°We have to be careful in our role as educators, not to emphasize therather vague and abstracted commonalties of human beings at the risk oflosing sight of our differences. Too often, discussion at this universal levelsounds as if we can all step out of our familiar perspectives and take on aview from nowhere. The richness of our various customs and practices, thepoetry and the colour of our separate languages, can disappear in the blandand featureless face of the ‘global citizen’.The question is how to give other individuals in the world the chance tobecome real in the eyes of our students. On the one hand we want to avoidvague empty descriptions of the universal human being. On the other handwe do not want to dwell on the particulars of suffering in order to establishmeaningful connections between ourselves and others. Empathy seems torequire more, something like a fuller or richer definition of what it means to bea person.It will be part of the task of the next chapter to bring the development ofempathy into a discussion of global education in schools, to explore ways thatstudents can come to see other people lives more clearly and more fully. Thepurpose of the discussion so far has been to establish empathy as acommunicative virtue necessary for communication across differences.179Empathy is both the disposition and capacity to imagine the experience ofanother. It arises from a single moral truth, a truth that Walzer, for one,believes we are capable of grasping. The person we do not know and maynever meet nevertheless has, “hopes, resentments, loves like ours—aslegitimate as ours.”815.4. CONCLUSIONAlthough they are obviously intertwined, each of the threecommunicative virtues that I argue are essential to a global perspective:tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice, contribute in particular ways to itsdevelopment. A sense of justice was seen as indispensable in fairly regulatingdiscourse between persons with diverse points of view. It guides us in ourefforts to begin dialogue and keep it going even when we disagree. Tolerancewas considered an active virtue, the disposition to bring all voices into theconversation and to promote opportunities for individuals to expressthemselves in forums where they will be heard and taken seriously. Finally,empathy was defined as the disposition and capacity to use one’s imaginationto understand and appreciate the perspective of another person, recognizingthat this first entails seeing the other as a potential participant in one’s moralsphere. Tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice are indispensable to amoral point of view and to uncoerced communication. They are thereforeindispensable to the development of an interpersonal global perspective.When global education is understood as the construction of a community ofconcern, the importance of these virtues becomes clear in all our efforts tospeak and listen to others.All three virtues can work together in what Benhabib calls a180participationist community. All are grounded in respect for persons. All can bedeveloped through constructive interactions with others. But what aboutcompassion, beneficence, sympathy, generosity? Shouldn’t these virtues beexpressed in moral conversations as well? On my view these are virtues thatmay be cultivated over time, partly through participation in ongoing dialogue.But as Noddings reminds us, we learn morality first in our inner circle. It iswithin these inner circles that most of us live out our lives. The virtues ofcompassion and sympathy are best taught and expressed in closerelationships with others who can respond to us directly.82 We are immersedin these relationships from early on and it is here that we learn and about andfulfill special, particular obligations. Benhabib envisions our relationshipsalong a continuum between the generalized and the concrete other. At oneend of the continuum, we stand in unique ethical relationships with certainpeople in our lives. “To stand in such an ethical relationship means we asconcrete individuals know what is expected of us in virtue of the kind of socialbonds which tie us to the other.”At the other end of the continuum, we have a generalized commitmentto consider everyone as worthy of universal moral respect. I argue that thiscommitment leads to generalized ethical obligations that we can still carry outwith a particularized awareness of the other. We are morally obligated in thiswider circle, to treat others justly, to actively seek ways to bring them into theconversation, and to try to imagine the world from their point of view. We arejustified in asking the same of them. These obligations arise out of ourfundamental democratic commitments. We can hope that other virtues willflourish, too, and we can work to create conditions so that they can becultivated over time. But we should not despair if certain virtues continue to181have their home in the inner circles to which we belong.My final task will be to bring the dialogue I have begun into the realm ofeducational practice. The conclusion of this dissertation is in part a discussionof the arguments I have presented in relation to global education in theclassroom. My conception of global education is fundamentally a conceptionof moral education with a global outlook. The global perspective I defend is aspecial articulation of a moral point of view. It entails certain virtues that areindispensable to uncoerced communication and therefore essential to thecreation of any community across differences. The construction of communityis itself an ethical enterprise. In the case of a global community of concern,this construction is the kind of communication between people who begin withno world of common meanings and are compelled to invent that world.84 Thedispositions and abilities required to invent a world of common meaningsneed to be taught. I argue that they need to be taught in classrooms, placeswhere community building of all kinds, takes place.In the concluding chapter I will discuss classrooms as moralcommunities, places where communication across differences can reflect thecommitments addressed in this thesis. In this sense, global education is thefoundation for constructing community with individuals elsewhere in the world.It is the context in which conditions for uncoerced communication are created,in which connections between people are discovered and enhanced, and inwhich a sense of justice leads us to respect the rights of others. Developingan interpersonal global perspective is developing a moral perspective towardthe human community.1821Maxine Greene. “The Passions of Pluralism: Multiculturalism and theExpanding Community,” Educational Researcher 22, no. 1 (January-February,1993): 13.2See Nicholas Burbules and Suzanne Rice. “Dialogue AcrossDifferences: Continuing the Conversation,” Harvard Educational Review 61,no. 4 (1991): 393—416.3Margaret Farley, “Feminism and Universal Morality,” Prospects for aCommon Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993), 179.4See Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self Gender Community andPostmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992). I ammost interested in paying attention to the kinds of cautions Benhabib bringsout in several chapters of Situating the Self Her version of communicativeethics is based on actual rather than ideal speech situations. She emphasizesthe need for people in communities to pay special attention to the demands ofparticular contexts and particular “concrete individuals,” 148—177.5Eamonn Callan. “Finding a Common Voice,” Educational Theory 42,no.4 (Fall, 1992): 429—441.6 In the Ecuadorian rainforest, a small and relatively isolated tribecalled the Huaorani are presently waging a three-pronged war to save theirterritory from further exploitation by oil companies, their own government andnow well-meaning environmentalists. The latter claim to be speaking on theHuaorani’s behalf in negotiations where tribal spokespersons are allegedlyabsent. One writer summed up the problem by saying, “No one knew what theHuaorani wanted because no one really knew who the Huaorani were.” SeeJoe Kane, “With Spears From All Sides,” The New Yorker (September 27,1993).7lris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1990), 39.8Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and OtherWritings, 1977—1984 (New York: Routledge, 1988).9John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,”Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (Summer 1985): 223.18310Kenneth Strike, “On the Construction of Public Speech: Pluralism andPublic Reason,” Educational Theory 44, no. 1(1994): 6.11Benhabib, 29.I 2J urgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 86; and Stephen K. White, The Recent Workof Jurgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989), 56—58.13Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in the Schools: An AlternativeApproach to Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1992), 110—125.14Benhabib, 3815b1d., 29.16lbid., 52.17Eamonn Callan, “Finding a Common Voice,” Educational Theory 44,no. 4 (Fall 1992): 434.18FarIey, 183.19Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, Feminism as Critique: On thePolitics of Gender (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 12—13.20Farley, 184.21Callan, 434.Noddings, The Challenge to Care in the Schools, 110.Callan, 437.24Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The FreePress, 1965), 285.25lbid., 196.Farley, 178.18427John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971), 463.28Ibid., 466.lbid., 460.3°Farley, 182.31Benhabib, 148—177.32Farley, 184.Susan MoIler 0km, “Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice,”Ethics 99, no. 2 (1989): 246.34Rawls, 476.35Robert P. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberallsm (Boston: Beacon Press,1968), iv.John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” Three Essays (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1975).37Brenda Almond “The Limits of Toleration,” Moral Concerns (AtlanticHighlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987).See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London:Fontana Press, 1991).39Wolff, 138.40See Kenneth Tye, ed., Global Education: From Thought to Action(Alexandria, VA: Association For Curriculum and Supervision Development,1991).41Onora O’Neill, “Practices of Toleration,” in Lichtenberg, Judith, ed.Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990), 156.42Annette Baier, “Claims, Rights, Responsibilities” Prospects for aCommon Morality, ed. by Gene Outka and John Reeder (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press) 160.185On some issues rights do demand more than this. That is becausethe principle of non-interference can be construed fairly broadly; someconditions must exist so that the liberty of the individual to pursue her owngood is guaranteed by the state. But notice that even the broadestinterpretation of rights only hints at who is responsible for the correlativeresponsibilities that rights inevitably entail whenever the discussion movesfrom the abstract to concrete cases.Hilary Putnam’s remarks on the role of a community of inquirers indetermining how we ought to live are useful to this discussion. See “Equalityand Our Moral Image of the World,” in The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle,IL: Open Court, 1987).See Patricia White, “Education, Democracy and the Public Interest,”in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1973); Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’sPractical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).O’NeiIl, “Practices of Toleration,” 17047lbid., 172.lbid., 172. O’Neill refers to the “categories of public discourse,” asboth the topics which are allowed to be addressed publicly, and the ways inwhich various media structure discourse through programming, particularkinds of audience participation, public forums etc.49Baier, 152.50O’Neill, “Practices of Toleration,” 17751Brenda Almond, Moral Concerns (Atlantic Highlands NJ: HumanitiesPress International, 1987), 53—54.52R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect For Persons (New York:Schocken Books, 1970), 26.53See D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm & A. C. Kazepides, eds., TheDomain of Moral Education (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) for severaldiscussions on the importance of empathy to moral education.Michael Waizer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and PoliticalCommitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 67.186See Martin Buber, “The Way of Response,” in Martin Buber:Selections From His Writings, ed. N. Glatzer (New York: Schoken Books,1966).John Rawis, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971).57John Wilson, The Assessment of Morality (Windsor, Berks: NFERPublishing, 1973).LeRoi Daniels and Shirley Parkinson, “Role X-ing and MoralEducation: Some Conceptual Speculation,” Educational Theory 26, no. 4(1976): 329—336.59Peter Knight, “Empathy: Concept, Confusion and Consequences in aNational Curriculum,” Oxford Review of Education 15, no. 1(1989): 42.60Douglas Chismar, “Empathy and Sympathy: The ImportantDifference,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (1988): 264.61lbjd., 263.62David Helwig, “Lost and Found in Translation,” The Globe and Mall,24 July, 1991.63Michael Waizer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and PoliticalCommitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 68.64Richard Hare, quoted in Daniels and Parkinson, 331.65The phrase “morally hazardous,” as I am using it comes fromeducational philosopher Jerrold Coombs.Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, “The Origins of Morality in EarlyChildhood Relationships,” in The Emergence of Morality in Young Children,ed. Jerome Kagan and Shirley Lamb (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1987), 288—289.18767See Willard Kniep, “Social Studies within a Global Education”Educational Research Journal 8, no. 10 (1986): 324—356; Lee Anderson,Schooling and Citizenship in a Global Age: An Exploration of the Meaning andSignificance of Global Education (Indiana University: Mid-AmericanProgramme for Global Perspectives in Education, 1979). See also GrahamPike and David Selby, Global Teacher Global Learner (London: Hodder andStoughton, 1988).See Burgess Carr, “Development Education in an Ethical/HumanisticFramework,” in The International Development Crisis and AmericanEducation: Challenges, Opportunities and Instructional Strategies, ed. CarrolJoy and Willard M. Kniep (New York: Global Perspectives in Education,1987), 59—68 for a discussion of the ethical imperatives in developmenteducation.69Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & MoralEducation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).70Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvi.71Peter Knight, “Empathy: Concept, Confusion and Consequences in aNational Curriculum,” Oxford Review of Education 15, no. 1(1989): 46.72Knight, 46.73See Amartya Sen, “Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment,”New York Review of Books 37, no. 10 (June 14, 1990): 49—53, for acompelling discussion of suffering and social commitment.74Kelvin Beckett and Linda Darling, The View of the World as Portrayedin Social Studies Textbooks (Vancouver: Research and Development inGlobal Education, 1989).75Harry S. Broudy, “Becoming Educated in Contemporary Society,” inSociety as Educator in an Age of Transition, ed. Kenneth D. Benne andSteven Tozer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 254.76John Stackhouse, “There’s Method in the Misery,” The Globe andMail, 8 October 1991, 1(A) and 4(A).77lbid., A4.18878Ibjd A4.79FarIey, 178.8°Ignatieff, 54.81Mjchael Waizer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and PoliticalCommitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 68.82Noddings, The Challenge to Care in the Schools, 110.Benhabib, 10.MichaeI Waizer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism andEquality (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), 29—30.189CHAPTER SIXCHILDREN IN COMMUNITIES OF CONCERN: EDUCATING FOR AGLOBAL PERSPECTIVEA central question for education, then, is how such communicativevirtues can be developed and how they can be sustained over time. Inour view, these dispositions are createcJ, reflexively, in the kinds ofcommunicative relations in which all of us are engaged, as children andinto adult life. The nature of these virtues is that they are only requiredin relation to communicative partners, and improved by practice. Thusto develop these virtues is to be drawn into certain kinds ofcommunicative relations: one becomes tolerant:, patient and respectingof others through association with people who are similarly disposed.Nicholas Burbules and Suzanne Rice16.1. INTRODUCTIONThe final chapter is in part a discussion of this dissertation’simplications for classroom practice. The first section is a summary of thearguments presented in previous chapters of the dissertation. The secondpart is a description of what is needed for classrooms to become moralcommunities with a global outlook. In the third section I discuss the specialrole of literature in cultivating the virtues necessary for participation in aglobal community of concern. The last section contains my concludingremarks in defense of my conception of global education and the necessity ofdeveloping an interpersonal global perspective in students.Throughout this thesis, I have emphasized the moral commitments anddispositions that students must demonstrate as they develop a defensibleglobal perspective and learn to communicate with others, both in their owncommunities and across differences in constructing new communities. I haveargued that this project is a task for moral education with a global outlook.190Students involved in such an enterprise are entering into conversations withother inquirers in an effort to construct a community across differences. Asprerequisites for constructing a global moral community, or community ofconcern, I stated that three moral attainments, tolerance, empathy and asense of justice are fundamental to relations between inquirers. Each in itsown way grounds communication in a solid moral foundation. Each helps tofurther the ongoing conversation between people searching for the best waysto live their lives. In the following section, I will bring these views together in afinal look at my conception of global education as initiation into the humancommunity.6.2. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTSIn Chapter One, I argued that global education is at present, a systemof ambiguous slogans. There are many agendas hidden under the banner ofglobal education and it is wise to uncover them before global education’scentral concepts and purposes can be analyzed. The four major justificationsfor global education were described. Programs in global education aremotivated by a range of concerns, some prudential, some moral, though thelatter have not been made explicit or central in the literature. Severalpersistent tensions in global education were also explored in the first chapter,especially that tension which exists between conceptions of global educationwhich serve to promote national self-interest and conceptions which promoteeducation for world citizenship. My thesis was that the present conceptions ofglobal education, even when carefully articulated about matters of globalknowledge, are limited and unclear with respect to a moral point of view.In Chapter Two, I began to redefine the global perspective as a moral191point of view. Hanvey’s conception of the global perspective was examined indetail because of its comprehensiveness and because of its enduringinfluence on program development. The missing element in Hanvey’sconception was the moral dimension. This was all but ignored except for abrief and unsatisfactory mention of the importance of teaching respect fordifferent points of view, a claim that was asserted but not argued.2 Coombs’normative conception of the global perspective, the constructivist globalperspective, was also explored for its moral content and stance. It was foundto be too abstract an account to offer us much help in discovering theparticular stance we should take toward individuals. My own conception of aglobal perspective focuses primarily on potential connections betweenindividuals based on knowledge of their particular situations and thedisposition to empathize. I employed Strawson’s distinction between reactiveand objective attitudes toward persons to further clarify what I mean by theinterpersonal global perspective. I argued that the interpersonal globalperspective would lead us to see the possibilities for constructing a moralcommunity of concern.In Chapter Three, I was mainly concerned with the concept of a moralcommunity and what it might mean for global education to be involved with theconstruction of a global community. I responded to some of the strongerchallenges to the very possibility of a moral community in the modern andpostmodern world. Bellah and Maclntyre are two critics whose work wasdiscussed in this chapter in relation to the concept of community. I argued thatcommunity still has meaning for most of us and that some of the moralattainments associated with our membership in communities are key elementsfor potential relations in other moral spheres, including global ones. Many of192the dispositions and sensitivities required for responsible participation at alocal level are also needed by people who wish to communicate with others ata distance, particularly those that call upon our capacities for tolerance,empathy, and justice. A defensible global perspective depends oncommitment to the concept of community itself.In Chapter Four I explored the concept of community still further. HilaryPutnam’s discussion of moral images of the world became one cornerstone ofmy conception of a moral community of inquirers united by a commonquestion about how to conduct their lives. In this chapter, I argued that oneimportant element of a global perspective is the belief in the possibility of aglobal moral community constructed out of our disparate moral heritages.Although I see its construction as crucial to the development of a globalperspective, this community would have a limited purpose and place in ourmoral lives. Its central role would be to highlight common spheres of interestand provide a forum for dialogue about them. As well, such a communitywould keep a watchful eye on the institutions established to serve humanneeds. In this way it would function as a kind of community of concern. Kant’smaxims of communication were introduced as guidelines for beginningrespectful and constructive conversations across differences. In this chapter,too, I responded to some of the criticisms of the project of community building.Although the challenges of reaching any kind of understanding in a pluralisticworld are great, they are not insurmountable. They are challenges thateducators, in particular, must face openly and honestly.The dispositions and sensitivities necessary for participation in acommunity of concern were examined in Chapter Five. I argued that certainmoral virtues were prerequisites to the task of constructing community and193communicating across differences. The virtues I discussed in this chapterwere empathy, tolerance and justice. In all three cases I wanted to go beyondour standard view of what these virtues have meant in moral education andextend their application to a moral global community of concern. I argued thatall three can be developed through global education that has as its centralaim the acquisition of an interpersonal global perspective based oncommitments to the construction of a moral global community.The concluding chapter will show how the global perspective and thenotion of classrooms as moral communities of inquirers are interrelated. Iargue that my conception of global education as moral education is educationtoward the construction of a moral global community of concern. Globaleducation classrooms are places where fruitful conversations across distanceand difference can begin and be sustained.6.3. CHILDREN IN COMMUNITIES OF INQUIRYDewey wrote that the essential need in the search for the “GreatCommunity” is the “improvement of the methods and conditions of debate,discussion and persuasion.”3These improvements must be grounded in amoral point of view which has democratic principles at its centre. In manyplaces, perhaps most explicitly in Democracy and Education, Deweyemphasized that the methods of debate must be taught and that children mustbe given opportunities to enter in to the ongoing human conversation aboutwho we ought to be and what kind of world we ought to create.4 Classroomsmust be seen as communities where democratic principles are allowed to takeroot and where inquiry is conducted with care and with respect for fellowinquirers.194My conception of an interpersonal global perspective depends onmoral education directed towards the construction and maintenance of moralcommunities of inquiry. A belief in the possibility of a global community ofconcern can only be developed in an educational setting which fostersinterpersonal connections between members of existing communities,including classroom communities. Such an educational setting encouragesstudents to see themselves as equal participants in an ongoing dialogue withtheir peers, a dialogue in which they continually try to learn about each other,and about the possibilities of cooperation to solve common problems. Lookingbeyond the classroom, perhaps these same students can imagine themselvesas world citizens taking part in an ongoing dialogue with neighbours as wellas strangers.As I have argued, my conception has at its centre, questions about howwe ought to treat one another and relate to one another in all spheres ofconcern from the local to the global. Moral education has an important role inhelping young people build commitments that make it possible tocommunicate across differences. Dwight Boyd argues that the task for all ofus is to construct those things that, “make it possible to talk through ourcultural diversity about how we should make sense of it together,”commitments that “make possible mutual understanding and communication.”5It is imperative to bring children on the inside of our moral discourse, to teachthem about the necessity of communicating from a moral point of view, tobring them into the ongoing conversation about essentially contestablevisions of human development.It thus requires acknowledging the differences, problematizing thedifferences as prescriptive claims, conveying the need to maintain thecommon human conditions of dialogue as the foundation of dealing195with differences, and giving the students whatever language, skills,knowledge and dispositional states necessary to their being equalparticipants and responsible partners in this conversation.6It is the educator’s task is to develop in children the sensitivities anddispositions necessary for responsible and reflective participation in moralcommunities. Moral dispositions such as respect, sensitivity to others’concerns, and the commitment to addressing their needs are clearly essentialto peaceful resolution of conflict, the reduction of world poverty, and otherpressing global problems. I believe that we can start to develop thesedispositions and sensitivities in schools. I believe, as Dewey did, thatclassrooms can become communities of inquiry based on moral foundations.Writers interested in the possibility of classroom communities of inquiryhave often focused on the intellectual virtues children must demonstrate inorder to participate in their construction and operation. Much attention hasbeen given to the procedures and methods for conducting particular inquiriesas well. Not enough attention has been paid to describing and explaining themoral dispositions and sensitivities that need to be developed in students.The role of the latter in the process of inquiry is clearly essential if we are toaccept my account of moral communities.In an article concerning the nature of communities of inquiry in schools,Ann Margaret Sharp describes the sorts of behaviors associated withparticipation in a classroom community.7Among them she writes that thechild:is able to develop ideas and build on those of othersis able to revise views in light of reasons given by othersasks relevant questions and asks for reasons and criteriaverbalizes relationships between ends and means196is capable of detecting underlying assumptions in argumentIn these ways and others, the child demonstrates open-mindedness,concern for consistency and impartiality in discussions, and an understandingof the standards of reasonableness involved in rational inquiry. Sharp alsomentions a number of dispositions more explicitly concerned with children’sattitudes toward other people as well as to the inquiry itself. Among these sheclaims that the child:shows concern for others’ rights to express their viewsis able to listen to others seriously and attentively8shows respect for persons in the communityshows sensitivity to context in moral mattersThese are all essential to the development of a community of inquiry ata local level, and to meaningful cross-cultural and cross-national dialogue aswell. There are more we could add that might refer more explicitly to globalcitizenship. We could, for instance, extend the requirement to respect thosewithin the community to encompass those outside it as well. Sensitivity tocontext in moral matters might well be expanded to include cultural sensitivityand the disposition to learn about moral matters as they are seen in othersocieties.But taken as they are, the behaviors listed by Sharp do little to get atthe integral moral dimensions of a community of inquiry, and the underlyingreasons for viewing the construction of communities as first and foremost amoral enterprise. Although clearly interested in what Hilary Putnam has to sayon the subject, Sharp fails to integrate Putnam’s discussions of communitiesof inquirers into her prescriptions for school practice.9The moral commitmentsand presuppositions that are the foundation of communities of inquiry also197need to be made explicit to students. As well their application to classroomsettings and to the particular demands for participation there, need to be morefully explicated. I believe that if children are to become open to each other’sideas, sensitive to moral matters and so on, then they need to be shown theprinciples that give force to what Sharp calls behaviors. Understanding andaccepting the reasons for demonstrating the traits Sharp identifies, ought tobe built into the list itself. The traits or behaviors identified here are crucial tomeaningful, open communication because of the beliefs we have about theway people ought to be treated, beliefs that go beyond the borders ofparticular communities. They are essential because we have good reason toprefer a world in which rational dialogue (in Strawson’s reactive sense) and awillingness to listen to each other, prevail over less civilized means of settlingdisputes.While much of the discussion about classroom communities of inquiryconcentrates on the procedures that must be followed throughout the processof inquiry 10 I would argue that a task of equal importance is that of initiatingchildren into our moral and philosophical traditions. These traditions demandnot only an understanding of inquiry but respect for the rights and freedoms ofothers and knowledge of what that actually means in practice. Our moraltraditions emphasize our responsibilities towards others and explicate thereasons that give force to our various obligations within and acrosscommunities.11 These reasons should be explained and their consequencesfor moral action, directly presented. Together we can make sense of thequestions “How should I live?” and “How should we live?,” knowing there willbe a multitude of perspectives on possible answers, all of which must beseriously considered. Children need to learn why as well as how this198consideration comes about and how far it must extend. It is not considerationthat can justifiably stop at national boundaries. What I am arguing for here is,of course, moral education, but it is moral education of a certain kind. It ismoral education with a global outlook. The dispositions that are essential toreasoning about global concerns, can be adopted from those learned throughthe operation of a community of inquiry at a classroom level.There are both intellectual and moral sensitivities and dispositionswhich students need to develop for communication with others. Among them,tolerance, receptivity, acceptance, open-mindedness and flexibility seemespecially important, as do a sense of justice and a willingness to empathize.Meaningful connections with others are best built up through knowledge thatis intellectual, imaginative and (wherever possible) practical. I borrow thesecategories from Paul Taylor who uses them to describe the three sorts ofknowledge necessary for understanding various ways of life.12 According toTaylor, understanding alternate ways of life will equip people to makeenlightened choices for themselves. For my purposes, coming to understandways of life through the three modes of access: intellectual, imaginative andpractical, is a way to sort out how an interpersonal global perspective mightbe developed in schools.Intellectual knowledge is the first of Taylor’s levels. Here we haveaccess to information about people; their political systems, national histories,customs, languages, and so on. The global perspectives so far described,including my own, recognize that the knowledge dimension (Case’ssubstantive dimension) is crucial.13 Many global education programs presentlyin existence make a good start in this area, although a clear idea about thepurposes to which this knowledge ought to be put is sorely needed. We need199to be clear about the objects of attention (what we study) and the point of viewwe take towards them. (how we study them, and with what ends in mind.)Intellectual knowledge also includes the philosophical, “the canons ofreasoning that constitute the point of view to which any value system in theway of life belongs.”14Paul Taylor refers to the next kind of knowledge as “Imaginative.” Withimaginative knowledge we can begin to imagine subtler and potentially richerparts of peoples’ experiences and inner lives: their values, belief systems andworld views, their struggles and aspirations. We get some insight (admittedlypartial) into these through novels, drama, art, biographies and religious texts.He writes:The music, the painting and sculpture, the dance, the architecture, thedrama and the literature of a culture all present to us the way of life of aculture. A thorough understanding of works of art in these variousforms brings us to an imaginative awareness of a way of life which noscientific or philosophical knowledge, however complete, could yield.One of the most interesting aspects of a great novel, poem or drama,for example, is the way its author creates a world in which certainfundamental attitudes, points of view, and ways of life are expressed. Anovelist, poet or dramatist does not necessarily attempt to persuade usto accept his world outlook or way of life. He confronts us with one, orsometimes several for our imaginative contemplation.15Through this process we gain insight into ways of life we have neverlived. There are many ways we can make this possible within classroomsettings, providing students with a rich and varied repertoire of culturalexperiences that range from storytelling to theatre, to interviews, todemonstrations of craft, dance, music, and food preparation. It is hoped thatexposure of this “imaginative kind” will encourage students to pursue moreexperiences on their own and immerse themselves in the folklore, arts andhistories of other cultures. In a global education program that makes its moral200commitments clear, the focus will be on developing a fuller understanding ofpeople in order to treat them justly and fairly, and in order to respond to thosein need with compassion and sensitivity. One benefit of an enlightenedunderstanding of what others are like is that students’ perspectives on theirown lives will be enriched and critical examination of their own worldviewsmay follow.The third kind of knowledge is “practical knowledge,” in which peopleimmerse themselves in another way of life. This is not unlike Hanvey’s laststage of cross-cultural awareness which is immersion into another valuesystem and worldview, what he refers to as transpection. Obviously thiscannot often be experienced within schools as they are presently structured.Most knowledge will stay at the imaginative stage since long term exchangeswith students in other cultures and societies are not possible for most schoolchildren. Yet there is opportunity to come to know many ways of life differentfrom one’s own through short-term visits and exchanges. The wealth ofheritages present in most North American classrooms provides a multitude ofpossibilities for meaningful exchange between students and people outsidethe classroom, including visits to families, ethnic neighborhoods and so on.Learning a language can be an experience in gaining “practical knowledge,”and so can participating in letter exchanges with people in distantcommunities. If the focus is on sincerely and respectfully trying to understanda way of life through participating, even in a limited way, in its cultural orreligious customs, its modes of expression, and its daily rituals, the classroomcan offer the groundwork for further practical knowledge as well as providingthe intellectual and the imaginative kinds. All three can add significant depthto a global perspective.2016.4. THE ROLE OF LITERATURE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBALPERSPECTIVEThough Taylor’s “practical knowledge” may ultimately be the mostpowerful way to gain understanding of other people and their forms of life,developing a global perspective in schools will necessarily involve morevicarious experiences with others who are at a distance. Therefore it is“imaginative knowledge” which needs to be explored a bit further, especiallyimaginative knowledge that is acquired through encounters with literatureabout people in other positions and places. If we are committed to teachingstudents about the need to develop a global community of concern, we will tryto introduce them to many ways of life expressed through the words ofnovelists, essayists and poets. We want our students to regard other peopleoutside their present circle of relationships as morally significant. We wantthem to consider people in other parts of the world as potential participants inone facet of their own moral lives. That facet of moral life is communicationabout shared concerns. Rorty writes:This process of coming to see other human beings as “one of us”rather than as “them” is a matter of detailed description of whatunfamiliar people are like and of redescription of what we ourselves arelike. This is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography,the journalist’s report, the comic book, the docudrama, and especially,the novel.16Literature has a powerful hold on our ability to grasp truths aboutourselves and about others who may turn out to have feelings, aspirationsand struggles, not entirely unlike our own. Even when experiences are whollydissimilar, peoples’ stories can help us see the world from a different thoughlegitimate perspective. Genres such as those Rorty mentions offer us the202opportunity to discover aspects of our own worlds that we may not haveexamined carefully as well discover the personal worlds of others.Literature has been called the primary vehicle of our culture, and notjust because it is, “the source of our concepts and our ideals and ourheroes.”17 Literature is an important source of shared emotions and a meansof understanding emotions in other people. It can even be a safe a vehicle forexpressing emotions. Emotions are “social, imaginative constructions”18 notmere reactions, and they involve a creative dimension that is stimulated byliterature. Literature demands the exercise of imagination and invites criticalparticipation with ideas, cultures, and people in ways that can extend andeven transform emotions. Robert Solomon calls this “participatory literature”:It can come from conversations on the street, lectures and politicalrallies, but for a variety of reasons, it revolves around the printed word.It has to do with participating in certain basic or even essentialexperiences—knowing, if only vicariously, a form of life that touches onour own.19The aim of global education is, in part, coming to know forms of life thatmay one day touch upon our own. Developing an interpersonal globalperspective is coming to understand and respect other lives. Literature canbring us face to face with the fears, hopes, struggles and achievements ofpeople in distant parts of the globe. By recognizing the particularities of theirexperiences, we may be more inclined to accept their humanity.Of course there are limitations on what the written word can do tonarrow the gulf between people. Our contexts and experiences differ greatly.It is wise to be reminded of pitfalls as well as possibilities in developing aglobal perspective. We should approach the matter of understanding,particularly cross-cultural understanding, with care. For example, no matter203how vivid Jamaica Kincaid’s prose is, I will never know what it was like togrow up as a black child in an Antigua that was powerfully and unremittinglyEnglish:I did not know then that the statement, “Draw a map of England” wassomething far worse than a declaration of war, for in fact a flat outdeclaration of war would have put me on alert, and again in fact, therewas no need of war—I was already conquered.... I did not know thenthat this statement was meant to make me feel in awe and smallwhenever I heard the word England—in awe at its existence, smallbecause I was not from it.20My own memories of childhood as well as the pastoral images I carrywith me about England are something quite different. It would be a mistake,even an arrogant one, to claim that I could ever know what Cinched knowsabout subjugation and conquest. This does not mean that I am not changedby her words, or that I am unable to understand something of her experience.She has, after all, communicated brilliantly. But the appropriate stance to taketoward the possibility of understanding another’s experience, is a humble one.Literature does have the potential to cultivate communicative virtues,especially empathy, in one significant sense; it helps us recognize astranger’s moral worth. The following passage is a good illustration. It’s thestory of a young South African girl, a refugee from a small village. In part it’sher story of crossing Kruger Park with her brothers and her grandparents andthe few others who survived the bandits and the burning of their village. Asthe narrative closes, she has been living in a large crowded tent with otherrefugee families who have been there long enough to begin small gardens ofmealies and cabbage. Although they are officially banned from seeking work,some of the women have found a bit of employment nearby. The young girl’sgrandmother has found work carrying bricks on her head for new construction204in a town some distance away. She is able to provide her grandchildren withsoap, sugar and a little tea, and she has made sure they can get to amakeshift school. In part the story is a detailed description of loss andsuffering. But the author takes us far beyond the image of the victim. We aredrawn into the personal world of another human being, and at the same timerecognize something of ourselves:Our grandmother hasn’t been able to buy herself a pair of shoes forchurch yet, but she has bought black school shoes and polish to cleanthem with for my first-born brother and me. Every morning, whenpeople are getting up in the tent, the babies are crying, people arepushing each other at the taps outside and some children are alreadypulling the crusts of porridge off the pots we ate from last night, myfirst-born brother and I clean our shoes. Our grandmother makes us siton our mats with our legs straight out so she can look carefully at ourshoes to make sure we have done it properly. No other children in thetent have real school shoes. When we three look at them it’s as if weare in a real house again, with no war, no away.21Waizer says that we don’t enter a person’s head when we step in hisshoes. To think that we do, is to make the mistake of thinking heads have nohistories. It’s not so much a matter of where those shoes are now but ofwhere they have been. We won’t ever know the full story of another’s life. Andwe won’t come to care for a stranger we will never meet in the same way wecare for those people who are in our inner circle. Still, attaining aninterpersonal global perspective is possible. Encounters with people throughliterature are an important part of its development.6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKSWhen I began to explore the notion of a defensible global perspective,I was already committed to the idea of education as a potential force for socialchange. I believe that a worthwhile education can help students develop the205intellectual virtues and the moral virtues that are necessary for living lifereflectively and responsibly. My conception of global education as moraleducation contains within it numerous possibilities for helping students learnto communicate with understanding and with respect. It contains thefoundations for world citizenship as an extension of our membership in moralcommunities of which we are already a part. Social participation and socialaction are important features of this membership.Students need to be able to examine knowledge with critical eyes andencounter people in the world with open minds. They need to be able to listenthoughtfully and carefully to another point of view, to attempt to take theperspective of the other whenever possible. One of our most basic rights isthe right to be heard and to be listened to. This right requires our vigilantattention and protection. It places obligations upon us to treat people withrespect and understanding. We need to learn how to do this and do it well.The procedural considerations described in Chapter Four are a start tomeeting people as full participants in a moral community of inquirers, toregard them with “reactive attitudes.” The kinds of knowledge necessary forcross-cultural understanding that were described in this chapter are also astart. But the central purpose of this dissertation is to lay the conceptual andmoral groundwork, not to design particular programs of global education.Before we can teach for an interpersonal global perspective, we need to knowjust what one is.Constructing and defending a conception of global education as aspecial kind of moral education, is only part of the conceptual work that needsto be completed. Global education, like multicultural education, anti-racisteducation and others, is a political movement with many dimensions and at206this point in time, a complex history. Each of these dimensions needs to beexplored carefully and critically for its underlying assumptions about the waysin which people can and should interact with each other. Programs in globaleducation, development studies, and cross-cultural education could becomericher and more meaningful experiences for students if educators andprogram developers directly confronted the task of creating places for ethicalexchange. All of these movements can be seen as part of a wider project ofcommunicative ethics, a framework for uncoerced communication that can betaught as a viable possibility, not a utopian dream.It should be no surprise to find that the virtues described in thisdissertation: empathy, tolerance and justice, have both epistemological andmoral dimensions. We are morally bound to try to understand what others aretrying to tell us, and to empathize as far as we are able, with their ways ofseeing the world. This is the beginning of constructing community. Whether ornot a community of concern can ever be achieved on a global scale is anempirical matter that is not for me to speculate on. But education is anormative enterprise. If we did not look to an ideal, a model of a more just,more compassionate world, we would be condemning our students andourselves to the inevitability of continued political conflict, ethnic strife andenvironmental decay. We owe the next generation our efforts to teach towarda better future. We need to keep the idea of a global community of concernalive.There is still the matter of ever finding a common morality in this world,a distant possibility that was touched on in nearly every chapter of this thesis.A core morality relating to uncoerced communication is central to a globalcommunity of concern and therefore central to my conception of global207education. It was admitted, however, that a shared morality is likely to belimited to a small number of universals and that its application will be limitedto a small sphere of common concerns. Even then, to what extent are wejustified in taking our own moral beliefs, including our beliefs in justice andtolerance, to be true ones and ones that can guide the construction ofcommunities? Can they really provide the basis for the kind of communicationwe want to have across differences? Are we in danger of imposingunwarranted moral principles on others in our attempts to constructcommunity?I believe, as Jeffrey Stout does, that the appropriate stance to taketoward our own moral beliefs, is one of humility.24 We are bound to considerour own position with regard to moral knowledge as ultimately provisional.That does not mean we are not justified in believing some moral principles.We are justified in believing the moral truths that we do because of theepistemic contexts we find ourselves in. Others are justified in holding to theirmoral truths, too, and we should always grant them this understanding unlesswe have reason to believe that they cannot justify their beliefs within thecontexts in which they operate, unless we can show that “they have acquiredtheir beliefs improperly or through epistemic negligence.”25Someday even some of our most deeply intuitive moral beliefs may beproven wrong. Some, but not all. That does not mean that we should abandonthem or abandon the search for common moral principles between us. Theright to be listened to is a strong candidate for a universal principle, and thereare a small number of others. This thesis is about building community andabout finding the common ground we all share as human beings. I can thinkof no stronger justification to accept my conception of global education over208others than to say that education is not only about the way the world is, butthe way it ought to be. If we are justified in holding to a morality that listens tothe common cry for justice, then we cannot turn away when that demandcomes from beyond our borders. No matter how great our differences and oursituations, I believe that we can learn to listen to one another without coercionand without misunderstanding. A global perspective that recognizes the moralsignificance of human beings beyond our differences and across thedistances that separate us, will bring life to that possibility.1Nicholas C. Burbules and Suzanne Rice, “Dialogue acrossDifferences: Continuing the Conversation,” Harvard Educational Review 61,no.4(1991): 411.2Robert Hanvey, An Attainable Global Perspective (New York: GlobalPerspectives in Education, Inc., 1982), 8.3John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt.1927), 207—208.4John Dewey, Democracy and Education.5Dwight Boyd, “The Moral Part of Pluralism as the Plural Part of MoralEducation,” in The Challenge of Pluralism, ed. F. Clark Power and DanielLapsley (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1992), 158.6Boyd, 164.7Ann Margaret Sharp, “Children’s Intellectual Liberation,” EducationalTheory 31, no. 2. (1981): 197—214.8Sharp does not include an important element here that was pointedout to me by LeRoi Daniels, and that is that the child should be inclined tolisten to others.9Ann Margaret Sharp, “What is a Community of Inquiry?” in Philosophyin the Classroom, ed. Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp (Temple:Indiana University Press, 1980).20910Ann Margaret Sharp, “Children’s Intellectual Liberation,” EducationalTheory 31, no.2(1981): 197—214.115ee Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1970), 90—98.12Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1986), 166—169.135ee Case, “The Key Elements of a Global Perspective.”14Paul Taylor, 167.15lbjd 169.16Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvi.17Robert Solomon, “Literacy and the Education of the Emotions,” inLiteracy, Society and Schooling: A Reader ed. 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