GLOBAL EDUCATION AS MORAL EDUCATION:
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF CONCERN

by

LINDA FARR DARLING

B.A., The University of New Hampshire, 1974
M.Ed., The University of New Hampshire, 1984

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Department of Educational Studies

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date August 23, 1994
ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I construct and defend a conception of global education as a moral enterprise. I argue that the ethical and political commitments which should be at the heart of programs have not been made explicit or central. Fundamental commitments to democracy are incompatible with global education that focuses mainly on existing world systems and relationships, and promotes national interests. The foundations of global education should be those that underlie projects of communicative ethics, defined here as frameworks for uncoerced communication between particular individuals in actual contexts. On this view, global education is education toward just and respectful exchanges across social, political, and cultural differences.

A central feature of this conception is the development of a defensible global perspective. To attain such a perspective is, in part, to develop the sensitivities and dispositions that will help one understand and appreciate another's point of view. This kind of understanding can only be partial and is often problematic. There is always the possibility of misunderstanding, even incommensurability. Further, understanding does not entail agreement. Dialogue needs to proceed cautiously and with awareness of the potential for coercion. Nevertheless, it is hoped that educational efforts toward communicating with others will lead to the mutual recognition of some commonalities, and may eventuate in the construction of a limited global community of concern.

There are a number of communicative virtues necessary for listening and speaking to individuals who are beyond the boundaries of our existing local and national concerns. The three moral dispositions presented here are especially important. Empathy, tolerance, and a sense of justice are discussed in terms of meeting the challenges of communicating across differences and distance.
Classrooms are places where these virtues can be carefully cultivated, and where the possibilities for constructing community can be explored through defensible programs of global education.
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INTRODUCTION

All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral.

John Dewey\(^1\)

This dissertation is about the philosophical foundations of global education, what they are now, and more importantly, what they ought to be. It is an argument for global education as a special kind of moral education. I argue that a clear and defensible conception of global education based on moral concerns and ideals has yet to be constructed. Before we can consistently create programs that will develop desirable global perspectives in students, this conceptual work must be taken up. My task is to construct and defend a conception of global education as education for world citizenship, as initiation, in other words, into the human community.

The field of global education is and has been riddled with inconsistencies and confusions. Global educators disagree about the purposes of global education as well as the meaning of its central concepts. Debates about these matters have been with us for decades.\(^2\) As well, there are persistent tensions between those who advocate the kind of global education that will promote national self-interest and those who see this instrumental view as incompatible with the goals of social justice the world over.

Moral foundations of global education that could guide program planning have rarely been made explicit in the literature.\(^3\) Even the clearest of conceptions of global education fail to make their moral commitments central. I argue that any vision of global education that does not take into account the range and depth of our moral responsibilities towards others in the world is deficient. It will not promote the development of defensible global perspectives.
Therefore it will not meet the needs of students who are attempting to understand and grapple with global issues and relate to people of diverse beliefs and backgrounds. Our fundamental moral commitments to democracy are incompatible with global education that simply focuses on existing global systems and relationships. This kind of global education has sought to more effectively promote national self-interest by developing in students certain understandings and dispositions toward the rest of the world.

A new conception of global education is needed, one in which moral commitments are explicitly stated and the acquisition of defensible global perspectives is seen as the central aim. My conception of global education is education for world citizenship. It is education that guides students toward rational, deliberate and responsible political participation based on a commitment to treating people fairly and decently. National citizenship is membership in a political community bounded by the state. In a participatory democracy full membership requires commitment to ideals of justice and to forms of life based on individual freedom and on social cooperation. World citizenship is membership in the human community. It also demands commitment to an ideal; that of creating a more just and compassionate human community where there is at present only the roughest beginning of one.

Given the disparate nature of our backgrounds, our beliefs and our circumstances, the ideal of a global community seems to have only the most fragile chance of realization on a large scale. But considering the magnitude of world crises in all spheres: environmental, political, social, economic and health, some kind of moral global community whose members address common problems and attempt to respond fairly and empathetically to peoples’ concerns is desperately needed. Exploring the possibilities for such a community is a task that can be taken up in schools in programs of global education.
In its broadest sense, global education is initiation into the human community as it is now and as it ought to be, an exploration of what presently exists and what is possible. It is entering into the human conversation and trying to make sense of a multiplicity of voices across the world. It is recognizing the rights and the needs of others and taking their claims seriously. Global education is also the capacity and the inclination to search for connections between oneself and strangers as fellow members of the human community. To this extent, it is moral education with a global frame of reference.

One objective of moral education in any sphere is to develop in students the understanding that community membership entails commitment towards others and towards the viability of the community itself. Membership in a potential global community of concern demands commitment as well and it sets out obligations of its own. In order to meet these obligations, we need to have a clear sense of what they are and on what moral foundations they rest. As yet, this view has not been central to conceptions of global education.

The conception of global education I put forth in this thesis places moral concerns at the centre of a defensible global perspective. A defensible global perspective is based on certain commitments to the human community. These commitments center on recognizing the humanity of others. They include treating people fairly, attempting to understand their situations and points of view, and creating conditions which will allow them opportunity to be heard and considered in matters of common concern. To learn to converse across such differences as ethnicity and social power, is to participate in constructing community. The commitments and perspectives that are necessary for this participation are the subjects of this study.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

In Chapter One (The Problems and Possibilities of Global Education) I examine current confusions and disputes in global education. I also discuss the persistent tension between global education that has as its goal the promotion of national interest and global education that promotes world citizenship. The case has been made that global education exists as a system of slogans and that many disparate interests are represented by the call for global education in schools. Because so many interests are hidden under the banner of global education, it is difficult to begin to lay the foundations for responsible program planning without uncovering them. One such interest is a modern reformulation of manifest destiny. Because this view promotes a narrow set of national interests, the kind of global perspective which follows from it is in direct conflict with the goals of world citizenship as I see them.

We need to go beyond slogans to lay the basis for program planning in global education. Clarifying what is meant by global education is the first step. Building a defensible conception of a global perspective is the next. In Chapter Two (Redefining the Global Perspective) I analyze the most influential of current conceptions of the global perspective, namely Robert Hanvey’s. Although there are valuable elements of this conception that should be kept, the moral foundations which ought to lie at its heart are largely absent. I also explore the moral global perspective offered by Jerrold Coombs and explicate the reasons I have for thinking that it, too, has significant limitations. My own conception of a global perspective is an attempt to offer a clearer and fuller sense of what world citizenship entails and what it means to be a member of a moral community on a global scale. A defensible global perspective is an attitude toward persons that acknowledges their membership in this community as moral agents. Peter
Strawson's description of reactive and objective attitudes forms the basis of this discussion.\textsuperscript{10}

In Chapter Three (The Search for Community in a Global Age) I discuss the nature of moral communities and the traditional foundations on which they are based. Although the contemporary viability of the concept of community is challenged by writers such as MacIntyre and Bellah, I argue that the challenges can be overcome by reexamining our commitments toward communication and our beliefs about the possibilities for human interaction across difference.\textsuperscript{11} A moral community of the kind I advocate is based upon certain beliefs about people and certain attitudes about their needs and concerns. My conception of a moral global perspective entails these beliefs and attitudes. Participating in a global community of concern is entering into relationships with others based on a moral point of view.

In Chapter Four (Constructing a Global Community of Concern) the discussion about moral communities in the previous chapter leads to an argument for the construction of a global community of concern. Its members are attempting to answer the question "How should we live?" This is ultimately a moral question. It speaks first to the kind of communication that is necessary between people who are trying to converse across cultural, political and social differences. Constructing a global community of concern is learning to communicate with people of diverse backgrounds and beliefs. The difficulties inherent in these efforts are acknowledged and discussed. In order to communicate successfully, maxims of communication need to be taught and practiced. We need to insure that all voices will be heard and that the question "How should we live?" remains an open and ongoing one. Kant's three maxims of communication are employed as the framework for conversing across differences, or building community. Beyond adhering to these maxims, people
must pay attention to the particular demands of each context, and the need to proceed with special caution and sensitivity in relations with those who may be speaking from disadvantaged positions in the dialogue.

In Chapter Five (Moral Conversations: Justice, Tolerance and Empathy in Global Education) I argue that individuals who are attempting to communicate across differences and construct moral communities with others need to demonstrate certain moral attitudes and dispositions. At least three moral attributes or communicative virtues are essential elements of a moral global perspective. They are empathy, tolerance and a sense of justice. Preparing students to enter into the human conversation means developing these three attributes within global education. Communication with others is often, if not nearly always, problematic. There is the ever present possibility of radical misunderstanding, and the constant danger of coercion by the more privileged and powerful. A sense of justice is an essential part of participating in a moral community because it helps us to acknowledge and understand the importance of the rights and interests of others. A community of concern is also dependent on the expression of empathy as the recognition of the legitimacy and the moral significance of others as potential participants in dialogue. There are limited but important connections that do exist between people, including some shared moral concepts. Tolerance creates conditions that will make it possible for people to enter into the human conversation. In order for us to act within a community of concern, we must create conditions that will allow all voices to be heard and considered.

In Chapter Six (Children in Communities of Inquiry: Educating for a Global Perspective) I return to the problem with which I began. A revised conception of global education is necessary because present conceptions are inadequate to the task of developing world citizens who will be prepared to converse across
differences and construct a global community of concern. My conception of
global education has as its central aim the attainment of a moral global
perspective that will enable students to take on the task of constructing a moral
community out of our disparate heritages. This is an educational aim that is
compatible with democratic ideals and commitments. Our moral responsibilities
towards others do not stop at our national borders. Classrooms are places
where community building of the kind I have argued for in this thesis, can begin.

In this chapter I discuss classrooms as communities of concern in which the
communicative virtues are cultivated. I also argue that educators in area must
vigilantly maintain a critical stance toward the vision of global education that is
promoted in schools.

I conclude with a caution but also a hope. We do not and cannot know
whether a global community of concern can ever be realized in this world. We
need not assume at the outset that it is an impossible ideal, even as we
acknowledge the obstacles in its way. Whatever the chances for a moral global
community, global education based on the idea of constructing community and
developing communicative virtues is a worthwhile endeavor. Programs that
follow from my conception of global education will keep the ideal of a moral
community alive and powerful. This is justification enough for any conception.


2Willard Kniep, A Critical Review of the Short History of Global Education:
Preparing for New Opportunities (New York: Global Perspectives in Education,
1985).

3See James Becker, "Goals of Global Education," Global Education: From
Thought to Action. ASCD 1991 Yearbook, ed. Kenneth Tye (Alexandria, VA:
Association for Curriculum and Supervision Development, 1991), 67–84; Kniep,
A Critical Review of the Short History of Global Education; Robert Hanvey, An
Attainable Global Perspective (New York: Global Perspectives in Education,
1982).


6The UN is evidence of one such attempt to create community on a global scale.


CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF GLOBAL EDUCATION

I think I value global education, but I am mired in its linguistic confusion.

Thomas Popkewitz¹

1.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I discuss the present state of global education. First, I argue that the various conceptions of global education that currently drive policy and programs compete with each other. Further, each conception has advocates who talk past each other. Clarification of goals and concepts is therefore essential. Second, I argue that while clarification is a necessary first step, there is much more conceptual work to be done. Present justifications for global education are then briefly discussed. The most promising one, global education for world citizenship, is further explored in the last section of the chapter.

1.2. SLOGANS

The field of global education is plagued by confusions and ambiguities. These exist at every level, from policy to implementation in the classroom. What do we mean by global education? Does it mean the same thing to a fourth grade social studies teacher in rural Saskatchewan as it does to the education department in the same province? Does it mean the same thing when it appears in provincial curricula across Canada? Across individual classrooms in the same school? Are the outcomes of global education envisioned by the business community the same outcomes as those understood by academics? What about global education as development
educators define it? Finally, and most importantly for my purposes, what should global education mean?

The case has been made that global education exists as a system of slogans, a bundle of rhetorical devices that rally disciples to a cause not always explicated clearly. To understand the various conceptions of global education is to understand the various sets of interests promoted by its advocates. Sometimes these interests are made explicit, more often they are kept hidden from potential converts. The power of slogans is such that educational policy is often shaped and influenced by them. Israel Scheffler writes that:

slogans provide rallying symbols of the key ideas and attitudes of educational movements. They both express and foster community of spirit, attracting new adherents and providing reassurance and strength to veterans.

Slogans can be colorful, appealing and emotionally charged. But it is the unsystematic nature of a slogan—its vagueness—that is its real strength. A slogan can almost always be interpreted in more than one way, and because it evades careful analysis, a slogan can easily mean different things to different people. An entirely false sense of common purpose can be built up around ambiguous slogans, resulting in solidarity which would not be present if particulars were defined or details expressed. Educators who hold competing, even antagonistic philosophies about what should be taught in schools and how, can wave many of the same banners hailing, for example, creative problem solving, a slogan that contains multiple meanings. In British Columbia, the evolution of the Year 2000 project reveals slogan after slogan, employed to capture the public imagination and at the same time, entice teachers into thinking substantive proposals have been hammered out
concerning concepts which are never defined, concepts such as "individualized learning."4 These are the “rallying symbols” of which Scheffler wrote, powerfully persuasive in tone yet vague and inconclusive when it comes to application.

Komisar and McClellan examined the slogan as an analytic device for understanding how some educational values are defined in policy.5 Initially they liken slogans to generalizations, in that slogans often summarize more particular descriptive assertions. Unlike generalizations however, slogans are “systematically ambiguous,” that is, they do not imply their particulars; they merely “become connected or attached to a more or less clearly specified group of proposals, together with definitions and empirical evidence used as argument in favour of the proposals made.”6 Educational slogans do not just describe, they always contain a prescriptive element.

There is a very good reason for this. Since education is a practical enterprise, aimed at the achievement of certain results through action, the language of education will inevitably be studded with assertions that will be prescriptive. These particular assertions will be proposals and recommendations for action.7

Particular proposals to which global education has attached itself are always put forth as prescriptions. The prescriptive assertion could be for instance: “Think globally, act locally.” But the range of proposals that arises from this simple phrase is overwhelming; global education shares with many educational slogan systems an incredible array of possible particulars. As Komisar and McClellan point out, the ambiguity, even meaninglessness of a slogan does not arise because it has no reference, but because it is so “embarrassingly rich in this commodity”8

The following subjects and courses of study have all laid claim to being
legitimate "particulars" of global education: world history; world geography; international economics and political systems; Pacific Rim studies; global ecology; the study of international and transnational organizations; technology studies; cross-cultural studies of art, literature, music, dance, customs; world religions; comparative education; foreign language studies, area studies, development education, peace education, human rights education, world order studies, future studies and the study of international relations. Although they all attach themselves to the slogan system "global education," each theme or topic contains its own set of particular proposals and programs described (more or less specifically) according to its advocates' purposes, philosophies and beliefs about the world. Therefore what is meant by global education will vary greatly, depending on who is calling for it and why.

According to Komisar and McClellan, between the generalized slogan and its application in particular cases, lies "a somewhat arbitrary act of interpretation." In the act of interpreting, we will almost certainly be required to stipulate definitions and legislate meanings. The generalized slogan system "has the power to charm" although a successful slogan system has both disciples and critics. By attaching themselves to the generalized system these various programs and proposals are guaranteed to draw attention to themselves.

1.3. THE INTERESTS BEHIND SLOGANS

What slogans can do, and do quite effectively, is mask or obscure the agendas of certain interest groups, a potential discussed by Thomas Popkewitz. He writes that, "the potency of a slogan is that it can create the
illusion that an institution is responding to its constituency, whereas the needs and interests actually served are other than those publicly expressed."¹² In the case of global education, a slogan which explains nothing about a course of action that might be called for, teachers use curricular materials that have the same labels but speak to very different, and often conflicting, values and political positions. A wide range of concerns, many of which may not be in the interest of a reflective liberal education, can fit themselves quite neatly into that rather amorphous bundle we call global education. Popkewitz identifies several sets of political interests or agendas that can be hidden under this system of slogans, arguing that these reflect changing political and social beliefs which have influenced pedagogy.

The first is "political pluralism" and, related to it, "cultural pluralism." He describes the former this way:

Within the United States, many people have come to believe that the political system is influenced by the negotiation of various groups in society. This negotiation among various competitive groups is called 'political pluralism'. Businesses, unions, religions, professionals and consumer groups negotiate with and pressure the government in various ways to have laws passed and projects created that are of benefit to their members.¹³

Clearly, the purpose of this process is to make it possible for many different perspectives to be represented and a range of issues to be raised. In the last several decades, the process has made it possible for ethnic minorities to build strong organizations which have both produced and changed laws for the better. The argument against this kind of political advocacy is that it has become the dominant way, sometimes the only way in which any social issues are brought to light. Instead of moral principles guiding public policy, lobbying groups do, so that the basis of justice is who
lobbies the hardest. The good for society should not be defined only by the competition between different groups, but also by a shared understanding or vision of justice, equal opportunity, rights and so on. Teaching political pluralism runs the risk of emphasizing the successes of this process as it responds to changing societal demands, without critically examining the rules and biases which may favour those who can organize the loudest protest.

A related notion is that of "cultural pluralism" which holds that the "richness and creativity of the American experience" has depended upon and continues to depend on, the diversity of the cultural and ethnic backgrounds of its immigrants. Multiculturalism as a school movement is rooted in the belief that diversity itself gives vitality to our society. Study and celebration of cultural differences in our own society soon leads to exploration of other societies, again with an emphasis on positive portrayal of difference. Claims in global education such as "we should recognize the goodness and richness of other cultures" reflect a certain moral perspective toward the world, "a moral stance about difference." But often, diversity appears to be valued as a good by itself without any other principles or definitions of value entering in. As in the case of teaching political pluralism, focusing on an uncritical acceptance of diversity as a good in and of itself, can be an obstacle to development of a better, more just society.

The second set of interests which Popkewitz discusses is the modern reformulation of manifest destiny. In this new form, manifest destiny refers to "the belief that the cultural and economic developments in the United States and Europe are naturally superior and provide the norm by which other societies are judged as being 'developed'". Not surprisingly, it has been used to justify the United State's dominant role in the policies and political
directions of other nations of the world. On this view global education provides:

a pedagogical practice which can enable children to develop the sensitivities and awareness of the position of the United States as an arbiter in the grand scheme of things. Curriculum provides a world perspective in which interrelationships, commitments and involvements are judged by the rules and assumptions of American politics, culture, and history.  

We can find evidence of modern manifest destiny in the way the standard or mainstream model of development is commonly taught in the schools. The social and historical sciences are presently divided into two competing paradigms that view development along with many other issues of global import, quite distinctly. McGowan discusses the dominant paradigm in which market forces and modernizing elites are at the centre of the development process:

The argument is that the poorer elements of society will eventually benefit from the success of modernizing elites and the application of market forces as they did historically in Western Europe and North America. In other words, the results of economic growth and modernization will trickle down to the poor.

A recent survey of five Canadian social studies texts used widely at the secondary level in schools across the provinces, found that the assumptions about the mainstream model of development, are still pervasive. It is generally regarded as inevitable that progress will occur in a predictable way involving a linear sequence of events from primitive to civilized. Words like advanced, technological, and urbanized, are used to describe “us,” making clear that we are operating within a set of very well established assumptions about the ideal “ends” of society. While the kind of polarity identified between political systems, e.g. democratic versus totalitarian, is disappearing from
school texts written in the last decade, other social differences are still expressed as dichotomies, such as developed and underdeveloped, or emerging and modern.

The differences are classified in such a way as to impute, among other things, the moral superiority of North American and European cultures, practices and institutions over others in the world and not only those in the underdeveloped world. Popkewitz uses an example of a curriculum that has the study of Japan as its focus. Traditional Japanese culture, as the story is told, is being challenged as people move to the city and work in industrialized situations. Underlying the discussion of the change are distinctions and categories that dispose the reader to consider certain aspects of social and cultural life as morally superior. Among these could be more freedom and status for women, more choice in occupations, increased opportunity for upward mobility and so on. But the discussion is often oversimplified and overgeneralized leaving the reader ignorant of the cultural past and present context. What the curriculum does, is "establish a disposition to social facts". We are not told, for example, what community or family values people might be putting at risk or that the price of individual freedom just might be solidarity with one's neighbors.

Manifest destiny curriculum can be found in a variety of places and with it certain dispositions to facts. The following remarks are taken from a Canadian social studies text called Political and Economic Systems in which the author begins an article on Latin America by writing:

Although poverty is widespread, it is not universal. Exceptions to the rule of poverty are to be found in Argentina and Uruguay where the lifestyle is not Latin American, but Southern European.

We are led to believe that the "lifestyle" of Latin America is poverty.
Similar assumptions about the alleged superiority of “our” ways appear on the next pages. We are told:

From the Canadian viewpoint, we may conclude that farms of efficient size are needed, and their operators require incentives, technical skills and access to capital to operate them productively.... But Latin Americans do not necessarily hold the Canadian viewpoint. Their attitude toward land derives from their Iberian heritage.22

Iberian heritage would appear to be an obstacle to progress. It is in fact the only reason mentioned which might explain resistance to Canadian agricultural practices. Problems associated with the transfer of inappropriate technologies or the residual effects of agricultural pesticides in other parts of the developing world are ignored. The conclusions drawn by the textbook authors also involve judgments concerning industrial expansion as contrasted to land reform in Latin America. The desirability of modernization (along Canadian lines) is unquestioned.

Industrial expansion...will proceed faster than land reform because the leaders desire more industry and can more easily agree on the means to attain it. The desire for land reform is much less widespread among national leaders. It is also more difficult to achieve because land systems are rooted deeply in Iberian tradition. Modern manufacturing, on the other hand, comes with an imported set of standards and values from the developed nations outside, and is more readily accepted in Latin America.23

The manifest destiny curriculum attempts to legitimate the actions of alleged superior nations including their indispensable contributions to the development of the rest of the world. It also tends to regard this superiority as a natural fact about the world.

Manifest destiny curriculum has been frequently challenged by historians and educators, though all too infrequently in social studies textbooks. Hans Koning, a Columbus biographer, has discussed the
opposition to the 500th anniversary celebration of Columbus’ landfall in America:

Celebrating Columbus means celebrating the start of the “bloody trail of conquest” as its earliest reporter, the friar Bartolome de las Casas, called it. The year 1492 is not only the year of Columbus’ landfall, it is more or less the starting shot of a war which Europe and its white outposts have waged on the rest of the world until quite recently, and, in the judgment of many, are still waging economically.24

In response to the festivities in Spain, the US and elsewhere, many people around the world were involved in “contra-celebrations” in an effort to study history from a perspective apart from the traditional Eurocentric point of view. “Traditionally we have taught that in spite of unfortunate incidents, we have been on the side of the angels, bringers of civilization, industry and Christianity to the primitive nations.”25 The truth of the matter is something else altogether. Columbus’ reign of terror in the new world resulted in the mass suicide of thousands and the murder of between one hundred and twenty five thousand, and half a million people, and within two generations the entire native population of the Caribbean had been wiped off the earth.26 This is not news; as Koning points out the facts about Columbus’ greed and cruelty have been available to us for centuries. But they have not been taught in schools. Recent social studies texts no longer include the phrase, “Columbus discovered the New World in 1492,” yet the accounts of his monstrous deeds in the name of gold quotas for Spain are nearly always omitted. The underlying assumptions about the inevitable march of civilization, the necessary eradication of the primitive, the supremacy of the technological, the advanced, still persist in most classrooms.

Koning’s words and the words of others were echoed in social studies journals and conference proceedings concerned about Columbus Day
festivities. They showed that on one issue at least a substantial critical element had entered the social studies curriculum in Canada and the United States. There are other examples as well. In Canada, the curriculum materials provided by non-government organizations, such as Oxfam, portray a very different picture of development than that found in a manifest destiny curriculum. Not only are the intentions of the developed nations strongly questioned when it comes to foreign aid policies and development schemes, but the very notion of modern industrialization as a good in itself is suspect. The environmental movement has done much to increase public awareness of the disastrous consequences of industrial exploitation of the earth's resources. Dramatic events surrounding aboriginal land claims have also been a force reshaping consciousness about imperialism, colonization and the European role in the history of the world. There is evidence that the movement toward critical consciousness about past policies and actions by dominant nation states is becoming visible in school curriculum, in so far as that curriculum is recognized as reflecting greater societal awareness.

There are classroom teachers who actively resist the standard view, particularly many of those who have travelled extensively and read widely, adopting along the way a critical perspective which they are willing and able to impart to students. These teachers are often in search of alternative explanations and vantage points from which to view the world. There are students, too, who reflect the growing concerns about western societies' historic destruction and present domination of many parts of the world. My concern is not that a critical perspective toward manifest destiny curriculum is entirely absent from the schools. But there are some questions about this critical perspective which need to be asked. What kind of critical perspective
is it? Against what standards are policies and practices being judged? Is there a coherent and defensible account of a moral, or political or social vision which could give focus to the criticism? Could this account guide future revision and change?

In the place of the manifest destiny curriculum we see a jumble of ill-defined and confused stances toward the world and its people. These various stances or perspectives find a motive force as well as a deceptive unity of vision in the slogan system called global education. Educators may well criticize past practices and present policies of a dominating industrialized world over the rest. Yet they may have difficulty adopting a critical perspective that illuminates what is at stake or affords analysis of the issues involved, even a perspective that allows certain questions to be asked. Inquiry is always framed and directed by existing values and commitments. Unless individuals have an enlightened sense of what beliefs and worldviews they themselves hold, their ability to see through an alternative conceptual lens will be severely limited by their own blind spots.

A critical perspective on social and political practices is indispensable. So is a perspective which takes into account the origins and manifestations of ones' own limitations. We need to recognize that we may be unwittingly caught in our own unexamined world view. When a movement such as global education comes along, claiming the possibility of world understanding or international cooperation as its goals, we may be swept up by the slogan itself as it may seem to echo our own hopes for the future. When examination and reflection are needed most phrases like “the value of diversity,” “the new global community,” and “citizens of the world” pass into our vocabulary without pause. Concepts we have begun to refer to daily in the classroom,
such as global interdependence, remain undefined. It is no wonder we are unclear about what to teach in their names.  

Before advocates of global education can begin to engage in meaningful debate about particular aims or about the nature of the activities they wish to promote, they need to find a common language beyond the slogans they have so enthusiastically endorsed. The key terms and concepts should be defined and explicated. They should be subject to critical examination as should subsequent exploration in the field. It is crucial that educators understand various interpretations of the concepts and goals of global education.

They also need to understand the limits of their own interpretations. An essential component of the attainment of perspective consciousness according to Robert Hanvey, is the consciousness of one's own perspective. This is the realization that each of us sees the world from a particular point of view, through a conceptual lens, and that one's own perspective, though socially constructed, is not universally shared. It could also be referred to as the ability and disposition to engage in second order reflection. In education we have begun to learn how to take a critical stance toward established structures and ways of thinking about the world (e.g., manifest destiny) but we are far from realizing an enlightened perspective on our own practices.

Depending on the meanings one attaches to the key terms and concepts in global education, existing values can be maintained by global education programs, or alternative possibilities explored. Some conceptions of global education may look more radical than they are, seeming to promote a vision of social justice when their effect is to maintain western or American hegemony. As we have seen, at least one interpretation of global education
may have the latent function of advancing the interests of the first world over
the third whilst distracting potential critics with emancipatory language. Dialogue about the various values and social commitments of global educators who compete for time and space in the school day is still largely absent. Groups advocating their own brands of global education have not yet engaged in self-reflection about their own motives and interests.

At the 1991 American Forum on Global Education, it became clear that the underlying conflicts between the aims of various groups have not been critically examined in a systematic or reflective way. The most obvious tension exists between those who see global education as a way to sharpen competitive skills in the worldwide marketplace and those who see global education as a force for social justice, for righting the wrongs of exploitive capitalist policies and their effects on the third world. This was evident from the formal program agenda which included guest speakers from multinational corporations alongside spokespersons from development groups, politicians and academicians. All talked past each other; all had their own agendas, causes and beliefs. What their discourse shared was a system of slogans. What it lacked was any consensus on the meaning of the terms contained in the slogans. Caught up in their separate nets of jargon, it was not immediately obvious to the speakers that there were any problems of definition. Thus, the businessman spoke of the study of international economics, the politician about the language of international diplomacy and the development worker about the unacceptable inequities between North and South. From the corporate point of view, global education means learning about global markets in order to compete in them. The following passage is typical of prudential concerns about the lack of globally educated students:
Because relatively few American businessmen understand the culture, the customs, or even the language of the buyer, America's competitive edge is often lost in the tough realities of international buying and selling.30

Government policy recommendations for global education may offer similar rationales. Global education may mean learning other languages so as to promote the American way of life along with American foreign policies around the world. It may mean exporting American values and expertise to another region of the world, an enterprise which would require knowing enough of another country's language and market economy to successfully set up shop. One illustration of the latter is a five million dollar grant which the US government recently gave to Jordan for the establishment of a management training institute based on American business school models.31

Yet from representatives of development agencies a completely different view emerges. Global education means learning about the vast inequalities between rich and poor nations in order to change things for the better. One such view is expressed by Burgess Carr.

When one encounters situations of human poverty—malnutrition in rural areas, or the squalor in which so many urban slum dwellers live—one is both confronted and repulsed by the immorality that is inherent in underdevelopment. For if it is not hideously immoral and unethical for one segment of the population to live in shelters built from the cardboard boxes that hold the luxury items another segment, the affluent elites, pluck from their food and liquor shelves, then I do not know another way to define what is ethical and what is not.32

There are glaring contrasts in visions between those who advocate global education for the promotion of national economic interests and those who advocate global education for social justice around the world. The former are concerned with what we can do in the world as it is now, with its existing structures; the latter in creating more just alternatives to world order. As one
critic puts it, "the first type is concerned mainly with technical, 'how-to' types of questions, while the second goes beyond these questions to deal with ends and consequences and with moral political and spiritual issues." There is little evidence to suggest that advocates of either recognize that they use the same system of slogans to express competing, even antagonistic philosophies and goals.

So the unanswered questions about global education remain, even as programs are adopted and policies are created. Even if we can go beyond problems of meaning, new questions emerge. What ends should global education serve? What does a responsible program include or exclude? What sort of content is educationally worthwhile? Which aims are morally justified?

1.4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION

Many arguments are employed by educators who hope to convince policy makers and school administrators of the importance of global education. At times, some of their justifications have been used by global educators as defense against direct attacks on existing and proposed school programs. Some rationales for global education have also come from outside the field of education, e.g. governments, the UN, private voluntary organizations and business. What the various justifications have in common is the sense of urgency; global education must be instituted in all elementary and secondary schools across North America now. Their common claim is that the world is changing at a rate and on a scale unprecedented in human history and North American education has not responded effectively to this reality.

Both past and present conceptions of global education show that
global education was created as a response to a rapidly changing world, but not primarily or explicitly a moral response. The justifications and mandates for global education programs have, for the most part, been instrumental ones. Certain kinds of knowledge and understanding are required because they will lead to the realization of certain ends. The ends are fixed and relate to the welfare of an individual or the welfare of the society or nation of which she is a part. Welfare is defined in narrow economic terms, terms relevant to the productivity of the agent, the market competitiveness of the country and so on. I argue that prudential justifications for teaching global concepts and issues fail to address a wide range of concerns and interests important to people, concerns and interests that involve ethical questions regarding ends as well as means. To fail to teach global issues from a moral point of view is to eclipse an entire dimension of human experience from the educational realm.

Chadwick Alger and James Hail attempt to pull together various conceptions of global education as a collection of responses to a rapidly changing world. Their initial characterization is typical amongst global educators. They see global education as a diverse and highly decentralized movement which has attempted to “respond” to a variety of events in the world including: “resource shortages; the population explosion; the environmental crisis; arms competition; the influx of refugees, terrorism, human rights; … worldwide inflation…”

Just what is it that constitutes an effective or an adequate response to these crises? Alger and Hail do not make it clear whether or not they believe global education can do more than introduce students to the nature and scope of these problems. No one could expect that students’ increased
awareness and understanding of global issues will necessarily result in changes to these conditions and situations, especially in the short term. Any constructive solutions to these and other problems would certainly require a number of different understandings, abilities and skills, as well as access to, and influence within, established political and institutional structures. It is a question of being in a position of power to affect change, as well as knowing what changes may be called for. Yet global educators like Alger and Harf often refer to global education as a response to world crises. In what way might they mean global education responds to new world realities?

The best explanation might be that there is a widespread belief that an appropriate education will prepare students to participate over a lifetime in various social and political contexts, and that these contexts will vary from the most personal and local to the international and global. An individual’s responses to the challenges and demands in any one or more of these contexts will vary enormously depending on her specific responsibilities, her life plans and her ethical commitments, as well as her understanding of any of the problems at hand. What an appropriate global education should do, is equip students with the knowledge and sensitivities they need to reason well and act responsibly on issues that transcend national borders. Whether or not individuals will be in positions where they can affect change is impossible to predict. Even so, educators have an obligation to help students understand certain facts about the world and develop certain dispositions toward their potential participation in it. The following passage is typical:

On the face of it, there would seem to be little argument that our nation should have an educational system that produces at least a minimal cadre of experts about other people and cultures, as well as professionals and business and government who can transact
negotiations across borders. We should have scientists and technicians who can extend and share human knowledge across the globe.\textsuperscript{39}

Beyond the call for bringing global perspectives into the classroom, consensus disappears. Differing rationales lead to differing conceptions. Various conceptions provide a range of choices in definitions, key concepts, teaching strategies and desired student outcomes. Some writers in the field claim that disagreement is inevitable given the competing world views of the various proponents of global education.\textsuperscript{40} Beginning with the various justifications they offer for its inclusion in the school curriculum, we can see that advocates promote different visions of global education. I will refer to two kinds of justifications, although some overlap between these is acknowledged. They are: Prudential (or self-regarding) justifications and Moral (or other-regarding) justifications. Prudential justifications for global education are those which look to the well-being of an individual or to the well-being of the society of which she is a part for their support.

1.4.1. Global Education as Preparation for National Citizenship.

As it is traditionally, conceived citizenship has been a long-held goal of social studies education. For some educators, this has been part of a functionalist view; education is primarily socialization of children into their cultural and political inheritance, complete with its fixed values, norms and institutions. A wealth of information: historical, geographical, political and so on, is passed on to students who will take up roles in their society. On this reading global education for national citizenship in the twenty-first century is little more than an extension of context; students should now be taught about their responsibilities to their community and country both of which have become "globalized" in the late twentieth century. The primary if not sole
focus for allegiance and duty is still the state.

There are those who believe, however, that citizenship requires both a deeper and broader view of the world. Instead of teaching students history from an ethnocentric or western European perspective, for example, there are many who believe that the stories of non-European nations must be told from their points of view. Students should be taught to view the world through a range of "lenses." As well many educators believe that what students need is the ability to critically reflect on their own political and social institutions and way of life. Only then will they be in a position to act responsibly and intelligently to reform society and create more just and humane conditions for all members. This expanded view of citizenship also emphasizes thoughtful participation in the political processes in place at all levels of government. Global education on this view becomes a new version of political education with social participation as a major goal. In this way it also acknowledges certain other-regarding or moral considerations.

1.4.2. Global Education for Successful International Competition in Trade, Commerce and Industry.

The justification for global education as a tool to sharpen the nation's competitive edge on the world market is also a prudential justification. The benefactors of increased success in trade, commerce and industry on the international scene would be the individual business person, the corporation of which she is a part, and the society in which this flourishing of trade and production is taking place. The ends of global education on this view are compatible with the ends of a successful market economy in a particular nation. It is interesting to note that this argument, which is concerned with
economic superiority, has, in the US, replaced most of the discussions of US'" military might" in the world as an appropriate topic for global education programs. The following passage is from the opening of a handbook on practices in global education published in 1986 by the National Council on Foreign Languages and International Studies.

When it comes to motivating Americans to internationalize education in the United States, the Japanese are doing us a real favor. Just as World War II forced us to be involved in and learn the hard way about distant places and Sputnik spurred the growth of foreign languages and area studies in our colleges and universities, so have Toyota and the issues of trade competitiveness led to a reawakened concern with excellence and international perspectives in education, from kindergarten to postgraduate study.44

To many proponents of this view, reawakening a concern with international perspectives in education is largely synonymous with recapturing markets that have gone to the Japanese and other Asian manufacturers. Pacific Rim studies are often examples of this approach to international education, in both the US and in Canada. The more important the trading partner or the larger the role it plays in western economies, the more pages textbook authors devote to its study. In the recently published social studies text for Saskatchewan grade seven students called Canada and its Pacific Neighbours, the overwhelming majority of topics concern the wealthy industrialized nations on the Asian side of the Pacific Rim. Less developed areas in the South Pacific and along the Western shores of South America are given only a passing glance.45

1.4.3. Global Education for International Cooperation on Global Issues.

This justification has elements of both prudential and moral arguments. Because the very survival of the planet is at stake, according to this view, the
arguments have a prudential base; it is in everyone’s interest to peaceably solve ecological and security crises that threaten our future. Appropriate education will, on this view, equip the next generation of decision-makers with the tools they need to make enlightened choices and come up with inventive solutions to world problems. But this justification is clearly an “other-regarding” argument at the same time. Many of the cooperative solutions to global problems will require sacrifices on the part of affluent North Americans and Europeans as well as great financial outpouring on the part of governments toward massive efforts to clean up the environment and provide health care (immunization for example) on a global scale. In addition, this justification looks to future generations and our potential obligations to their survival and quality of life.

1.4.4. Global Education as Education for Social Justice.

This is the most explicit articulation of a moral justification and as such figures largely in later chapters of this dissertation. This justification gains its force from moral principles such as respect for persons and from a considerable body of literature on human rights. Many programs backed by this justification teach that major transformations in world structures—political, economic and social—are imperative if the lives of the poor and oppressed around the world are to be improved. Many of those who see global education as an ethical response to gross inequities in the world emphasize the need for development education or in-depth studies of third world issues. Not surprisingly it is this justification of global education as a moral enterprise, which is most often attacked by critics who see global education as utopian, or anti-democratic, or unpatriotic.
These justifications differ greatly. Some are directly antagonistic to one another. The four justifications for global education call for programs involving very different objects of study. All reflect certain interests; to be globally educated under one description is to be educationally deficient under another. Not only is there a lack of consensus about the meaning of global education, but there is confusion as to why it should be included in the school curriculum. Yet many global educators act as if the conceptual work is finished and there are no muddles to clear up, no aims or commitments to analyze, no hidden interests to uncover. The unanswered questions about global education remain, even as programs are adopted and policies are created. What ends should it serve? What would a responsible program include or exclude? What sort of content is educationally worthwhile? Which aims are morally justified? Some of these questions are addressed explicitly in the next section in which global education for world citizenship is further explored.

1.5. WORLD CITIZENSHIP

The fundamental moral commitments of democracy are incompatible with global education that simply focuses on world systems as they presently exist. Most often these programs promote a narrowly-defined set of national interests. However, there is no good reason for our morality to stop at our nation's borders. Global education ought to be education for world citizenship. The notion of citizenship itself includes a number of moral attainments and commitments that are often overlooked in education. In this section I will look at what is required for responsible citizenship in a democratic state, following Patricia White's discussion of the subject. By extending White's arguments about the requirements for citizenship within a democracy to requirements for
citizenship on a global scale, I can present a view of world citizenship which takes full account of the moral attainments necessary for responsible participation in the world beyond our democratic borders.

Many writers and educators view global education as a justified part of education for citizenship in a global age. I agree with their claims. As the boundaries of our concept of citizenship have grown, so has our need to prepare students to participate politically in the world. Many global educators have successfully argued that an appropriate global education is in fact, demanded in an interconnected, interdependent world. World citizenship, on their view, is a natural extension of our political and social responsibilities within a particular nation or society. However, it is often the case that these proponents neither explain nor defend their particular conception of citizenship. On my view, citizenship is based on ideals foundational to democratic institutions and these ideals are key to the enterprise of building world community, community in which all participants' interests are considered and all voices are counted. In a sense then, world citizenship means membership in a fledgling global community.

Despite enthusiastic endorsements from many international figures, there has been considerable resistance to the idea of education for global citizenship throughout most of this century. Though Dewey and others advocated education for international understanding and participation as early as 1920, the traditional boundaries in political education have remained national borders. In fact citizenship education programs emphasizing our responsibilities toward a world community have often been viewed as unpatriotic, even subversive. Nearly two decades after the National Council for the Social Studies first stressed the need for social participation on a
global level, North Americans are still reluctant to see their political obligations extend beyond national boundaries. Increasingly we have become aware that our spheres of belonging and obligation no longer match existing realities in the world. But we are uneasy about shifting our loyalties or making room for new ones. Michael Ignatieff writes:

...We can just begin to feel our old attachments, our old citizenship being emptied of its rationale. All the changes which impinge upon the politics of modern states are global in character. The market in which we trade, and in which our economic futures will be shaped, is global; the ecology in which we live and breathe is global. The political life of nation states is being emptied of its rationale by the inconsequence and impotence of national sovereignties. Peoples' attachment to nations depends on their belief that the nation is the relevant arbiter of their private fate. This is less and less so. Political languages which appeal to us only as citizens of a nation and never as common inhabitants of the earth, may find themselves abandoned by those in search of a truer expression of their ultimate attachments.

As we become increasingly aware that the nation is no longer the arbiter of our private fate, many of us look beyond national borders to find a place for ourselves in an international realm. Ignatieff recognizes that we may feel lost in this new world and writes, "Our task is to find a language for our need for belonging which is not just a way of expressing nostalgia, fear and estrangement from modernity."

Despite our reluctance to lose our old attachments, we are finding that they are no longer relevant. And despite our anxieties about living in a global age, about participating in the modern world, we need to find a way of coping with challenges that cross over traditional political boundaries. The continuing depletion of the ozone layer threatens our survival no matter where we live, as does the proliferation of nuclear capabilities, the spread of potent viruses, oil spills on our oceans, and so on. We know that our political and social
obligations do not stop at our nation's borders, but we are unsure what our new responsibilities as global citizens might be. It's an uneasy state.

According to Ignatieff, we need to find a new language to satisfactorily express our needs and concerns as common inhabitants of the earth. It is a multi-faceted task that he has set before us. I understand this new language to mean a new way of communicating our interests as well as a new way of defining our roles as participants in the construction of a world community. This community would ideally be dedicated to addressing our mutual concerns as common inhabitants of the earth. It would recognize the force of the need Ignatieff identified for human beings to express themselves to each other and be understood as members of a common species sharing a world, though not world-views. This ideal community would also provide a forum in which possible solutions to common problems are forged. First of all many of us need to be convinced that possibilities for such exchanges based on mutuality exist. I believe this part of Ignatieff's task is a legitimate task for global education.

Before we can respond to Ignatieff's challenge to find a new language we need to explore what would be involved in educating students to see their responsibilities as "common inhabitants of the earth," and potential members of a world community. First, the standard assumptions about what constitutes an appropriate global education must change. Only when global education is seen as a moral enterprise centrally involved with the development of qualities necessary for responsible world citizenship, will we make any progress in this area. Conceptions of global education that drive current programs and policies are not yet equal to the task of educating our students to be world citizens. What does responsible citizenship in any context
require? At least part of the answer can be found in a brief examination of the requirements for responsible citizenship within a democracy. Responsible world citizenship, I will argue, depends on many of the same requirements. The ideals which allow uncoerced communication between people to flourish, have a central place here too.

1.6. EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP WITHIN A DEMOCRACY

In an essay called "Education, Democracy and the Public Interest," Patricia White takes up the question of whether there must be any agreement on what is in the public interest in a democratic society. Her answer is that there must be an appropriate political education for its citizens. An education of this sort benefits members of the public as it is to everyone's advantage to have their political and social institutions operate effectively and according to democratic ideals of justice. This can only happen if citizens are taught to successfully operate those institutions and understand and appreciate the values underlying them. According to White, a democracy cannot begin to embody the principles of justice, freedom and consideration of interests without an educated citizenry, knowledgeable about such principles and committed to their realization.

One of the foundations of democracy is the idea that the people must have a say in shaping policies which affect them, and further that people must be able to hold the government accountable for decisions made on their behalf. They are only able to do this if they are informed and if they have a sense of what it means to be committed to a democratic way of life. White makes a case for the following to be taught to students:

1. The values of fraternity, justice and tolerance which are central democratic
principles.
2. Knowledge of the political institutions which embody those values and knowledge of their operation.
3. Background knowledge of the sort acquired in a liberal education so that students can judge the adequacy of policy decisions made by governments, and be aware of considerations which define and have a bearing on political problems.

Both the second and third statements on White's list are relatively self-explanatory and would find themselves at home in existing programs of civics or social studies. There will undoubtedly continue to be fierce debate over what counts as background knowledge in a liberal education, debate which I am not entering into here. We should of course be careful to include a range of voices and perspectives in what White calls a liberal education. Too often we forget that the experience and concerns of many people, including those of women and minorities, have not been part of liberal discourse. I would also add that it is important to teach students the nature of political argument and relevant political and legal concepts along with information about the workings of institutions. Students will also need to be able to judge the reliability of expert testimony, since in the majority of cases citizens will not be in a position to judge the substantive issues themselves. But it is the first statement that needs elaboration at this point.

The values of fraternity, justice and tolerance are most importantly, moral attainments, indispensable to a complete and defensible definition of what it means to be a citizen within a democratic state. This is because together they form the necessary features for effective participation in open and uncoerced communication, dialogue in which everyone has the chance to
speak and to be heard. Commitment to this sort of communication, along with the consistent demonstration of all three of these values should insure that those of us in more powerful positions will not impose our conceptions of the good on everyone else. In a democratic system committed to giving people the opportunity to experience “a breadth of views about the conduct of life”\textsuperscript{54}, tolerance and respect and the exercise of just treatment are essential to free exchange.

These three values will be briefly considered here. We will return to each of them as my conception of global education unfolds, for these moral attainments are indispensable for world citizens as well as citizens within democracies. Meaningful communication between people who have diverse histories, traditions and world views will require a strong commitment to work through their differences and find a bit of common ground. Tolerance for other voices, willingness to look for connections with other lives, and determination to treat people justly are the foundations for building community on a global scale.

1.6.1. Fraternity

At first hearing, the notion of fraternity lacks contemporary resonance and it is tempting to substitute “solidarity” or “community” instead. It can be described as the recognition that we are connected to others by virtue of our needs, interests, values or even backgrounds. In fact, there are many possibilities. From these connections arise social obligations. Ignatieff speaks at length of these obligations, claiming that we have allowed the “state” to come between ourselves and others in the discharging of our social obligations, be they financial support, health care, or other services which
used to be found within the domain of the local community. Rather than fostering bonds between people, the welfare structure itself has created deep gulfs, so that as Ignatieff stands in line at the bank, he is struck with the realization that he has no bond whatsoever with the people in the welfare line, no inkling of who they are or where they came from. It is my understanding that what "fraternity" requires is a commitment to establishing more personal links between citizens, something that may be accomplished in schools, one of the few "public spaces" left where such attitudes might be developed in a deliberate and informed and rational way. Fraternity or solidarity depends on a most basic recognition that human beings share some important features and needs, even when expression of these looks quite different. Though I will substitute my definition of empathy for White's notion of fraternity in my discussion of the construction of a global community, both terms capture some of what it means to acknowledge fundamental commonalties and connections between persons.

1.6.2. Tolerance

The claim that tolerance is a value necessary to the successful functioning of a democracy has been given new life as the cornerstone of defensible multicultural and anti-racist education policies. Tolerance is a prerequisite for any productive cooperative ventures in classrooms and community settings. It is essential in an increasingly pluralistic society that the value of tolerance be explicitly taught to children. Schools have always had an important responsibility to develop attitudes of respect and tolerance in students, whatever the context, but this responsibility is even more crucial in a world where prejudice and racial hatred seem to be increasing in such frightful
proportions. In one sense tolerance for others appears to be a minimal requirement for human relations, especially if tolerance is defined, as it often is, as minimal interference in another's life. This is a morally inadequate definition. I take tolerance to imply an active commitment to the freedom of others. This includes participating in the creation and maintenance of conditions necessary for all to pursue a chosen way of life. In terms of global relations, I take tolerance to be the foundation for community that allows all voices to take part in communication that is open and uncoerced, insuring that all viewpoints will have an opportunity to be expressed.

1.6.3. Justice

White's conception of justice is not elaborated in her essay though it is clear that she sees the attainment of a sense of justice as not only foundational for the maintenance of the democratic state but for the development of enlightened and rational human beings as well. A well-developed sense of justice is required for all persons taking part in dialogue about the welfare of persons. Within a political context, just treatment of all persons is the foundation of our formal relations with others, though benevolence, or beneficence, a quality White explicates elsewhere, may be the key to becoming sensitive as well as responsive to, the particular needs and concerns of others. William Frankena argues that while beneficence may be beyond the requirements of justice, the just society is nevertheless concerned about "the goodness of its members lives" in a way that provides positive opportunities for members to "achieve the best lives of which they are capable." Along with other moral dispositions and sensitivities such as compassion, I take it that something akin to benevolence should be
developed within in schools so that students will come to care about what kind of political and social involvement will help fellow human beings to choose better lives for themselves.

1.7. EDUCATION FOR WORLD CITIZENSHIP

White's argument for the necessity of a political education within a democratic state extends quite naturally to education for global citizenship, particularly global citizenship based on building a world community dedicated to solving world problems.

Looking back at her list, we can see that in terms of world citizenship, knowledge of relevant political institutions in the late twentieth century ought to include knowledge of international organizations and political systems beyond our own. Not only will these world institutions have an impact on our domestic economy and national political life, but there will be increased need for us to involve ourselves in the workings of world organizations to solve common problems. An understanding of the mandates, missions, and struggles of international institutions as well as other forms of government will also help students critically assess their own institutions. In short, a political education which reflects present realities in the world will recognize the increasing need for informed citizen participation at all levels, from local to international to transnational.

A liberal education relevant to citizenship on a global scale will include the study of world history, political and social systems and a range of cultures beyond those of Western societies. Some components of such a revised liberal education are taken up in a forthcoming discussion of the substantive dimension of global education. At present, it will suffice to say that whatever
specific content is included, a liberal education for world citizenship will be expanded to include a wealth of perspectives and voices from places in the world that may have been previously eclipsed from view.\textsuperscript{59}

Finally, an understanding and appreciation of the values underlying a democratic way of life should be able to guide us in our relations with people in other societies, relations based on respect and fairness. A genuine commitment to democratic values includes a commitment to respect all human beings, and a belief in just and fair treatment for everyone. These are prerequisites for any genuine cooperative exchange between persons across various nations and societies, exchange that is open and uncoerced. If we accept that one goal of global education is to foster positive, peaceful and constructive relations between people who inhabit a common world and share the task of improving it, democratic principles will be indispensable tools in creating responsible forums for discussion and debate. Democratic procedures and systems are the best way so far found, to allow for diversity among people who are trying to live together.\textsuperscript{60}

Within a democracy, the values of fraternity, tolerance and justice are indispensable. This is because when these values are consistently and vigilantly held by citizens, various conceptions of the good can flourish, insuring that individuals can pursue their own vision of the good life without political impediment, coercion, oppression by the more powerful or paternalistic interference. Freedom, the hallmark of democratic institutions depends on their expression. The values of fraternity, tolerance and justice are best seen as moral attainments which do not arise naturally but are taught.\textsuperscript{61} They are no less essential to human relations on a global scale, if we are genuinely committed to the values underlying democracy.
The demands of citizenship are complex even at the domestic level. The global context increases the complexities many times over. What is needed most of all is political education which guides students toward rational, deliberate, and responsible political participation based on a commitment to treating people fairly and decently.\(^6\) Any version of global education that does not take into account the range and depth of our moral responsibilities toward fellow citizens will be inconsistent with the fundamental values underlying democracy. Therefore it will be morally indefensible.\(^6\)

In the following chapter I will explore several conceptions of the global perspective. My task will be to reformulate the notion of a moral global perspective so that I can construct a morally defensible conception of global education. This conception will have its roots in certain beliefs about people and the ways in which their concerns and needs ought to considered in a potential global community of concern.

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\(^6\)Komisar and McClellan, 200.

\(^7\)Komisar and McClellan, 198.

\(^8\)Ibid., 201.

10Anderson, 200.

11Popkewitz, 303–315.

12Ibid., 304.

13Ibid., 307.

14Ibid., 307.

15Ibid., 308.

16Ibid., 308.

17Ibid., 308.


19Kelvin Beckett and Linda Darling, "The View of the World Portrayed in Social Studies Textbooks," occasional paper #13 (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Studies, University of British Columbia/Simon Fraser University, 1989).

20Popkewitz.


22Ibid., 220.

23Ibid., 221.

25Ibid.

26Ibid.


28Selby uses a number of rather mundane illustrations to convey one facet of global interdependence, that of interconnections in the production and distribution of consumer goods available to the shopper in Britain. But this limited sense of interdependence begs more questions than it addresses. What are the kinds and degrees of various dependencies between countries in the world? If primarily economic, how are these dealt with? What ethical dimensions should we be concerned about? Interdependence suggests some sort of reciprocal relationship; is that always (or ever) the case?


33Carr, 126.


It is by now generally agreed that North Americans and particularly citizens of the United States, fare miserably on world affairs polls, world geography surveys and the like. It is fervently hoped by many that global education can provide the next generation with increased "global competence."


Ibid., 1.


51 Ibid., 139.

52 The notion of a world community will be discussed at greater length in the subsequent chapters.


55 The notion of "community schools," in which links between classrooms (typically in inner-city schools) and local neighborhoods are strengthened through civic participation projects, volunteerism, business apprenticeships, and so on, is an illustration of such an attempt. Though not explicitly addressed in this thesis, community schools of this type seek to foster "fraternal," bonds of the sort White mentions. "Just Community Schools," (Kohlberg's model) are another kind of response to the educational pursuit of creating classroom communities which will eventually (hopefully) transfer to a wider world context.


60Diversity itself is of course, essential to the health of a democracy. Dewey wrote that it is only diversity that makes change and progress possible in a democracy. See John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York: Henry Holt, 1927).


CHAPTER TWO
REDEFINING THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

There is no lofty position above the debate, as perhaps there might be if human reason had a transcendent source. There is only the position of one who strives to reach and understand the perspectives of others, and to communicate with them rather than past them.

Seyla Benhabib

2.0. INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, I argued that the familiar justifications for global education are limited in terms of recognizing and promoting the moral point of view. In this chapter I begin to explore global education as a moral enterprise, offering my conception of global education as a special kind of moral education.

The argument in this chapter is that the central aim of global education ought to be the development of a morally defensible global perspective. I will define what I take to be such a perspective and explain its crucial relation to global education as a special kind of moral education. I will conclude the chapter with an argument for developing an 'interpersonal global perspective' which fully recognizes the moral significance of individuals in the world, and thereby strengthens connections between people. Acknowledgement of these connections will hopefully lead to the construction of a moral community of concern on a global scale.

2.1. THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A perspective is most usefully described as a point of view or a vantage point, a lens through which we look at an object, event or person. In the last instance, a perspective toward a person embodies the attitudes we
hold towards that person.\textsuperscript{2} In this chapter, I want to explore the idea of a global perspective. I believe that it is the heart of global education. This in itself is not a startling or even novel claim. It has been argued that without a defensible global perspective at its centre, a global education program, even one based on knowledge drawn from disciplines such as history, geography and anthropology, is incomplete. Hanvey saw the need for articulating dimensions of a global perspective as did David Selby, Stephen Lamy, Jerrold Coombs, Roland Case and others.\textsuperscript{3} Their work has helped to clarify what we mean when we talk of attaining a global perspective but there is still work to be done, particularly in answering the question of what we ought to mean.

The present vision of a global perspective, even when described in detail, is limited in important ways. Many global educators have consistently overlooked the development of a global perspective as the attainment of a morally defensible stance toward the world.\textsuperscript{4} My claim is that the limitations in our understanding of what a global perspective should be have prevented schools from effectively taking on an essential part of the education of their students, that is education for responsible citizenship in a global age.

My claim goes deeper still. Not only are many global education programs \textit{inadequate} in terms of developing global perspectives, they are in some respects incoherent as well. Without a clear vision of what a global perspective should mean, they are bundles of unrelated information badly in need of organization and a focal point. Without a defensible global perspective to guide them, they exist without point or purpose except in the most narrow, instrumental of senses. Lacking a normative vision and a justified stance toward the world, program content is vulnerable to
manipulation and modification by special interest groups, and program support continually subject to shifting political winds. The range of subject matter called global education is enormous, depending as it does on the varying political and social agendas of advocates. As Walter Werner writes, it is an umbrella that encompasses all kinds of subject matter:

...some lobby groups advocate foreign language competencies on the grounds of enhancing national economic competitiveness. Other groups want discipline-based regional studies, international relations training, peace education, human rights education, world environment education, development education, cross-cultural understanding, comparative religion and the study of pressing controversial issues. The very use of the term "global education" label, then, falsely implies a consensus of content, purpose and worldview.5

It is no surprise to find that teachers are confused about the goals of global education as well as the instructional strategies that might help realize them.6 All of these visions of global education have their own point of view; many express points of view inimical to educational goals. What should global education stand for? What perspective is justifiable? Lacking a coherent, defensible notion of a global perspective, global education ceases to be worthwhile education at all. I argue that a sound global perspective must be at the centre of global education programs for them to be viable, valuable parts of the curriculum. Teachers and students must understand the aims of global education and the elements that define it. The issue now becomes:

1. What counts as a defensible global perspective;
2. Should we teach it in schools; and if so,
3. How?

2.2. DEFINING THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

The first global educator to define a global perspective in detail was
Robert Hanvey. His 1976 paper, “An Attainable Global Perspective” provided the field with a comprehensive treatment of the notion. It is important to give a complete account of Hanvey’s conception because of its profound and enduring influence on global education programs. Many elements of his perspective are worth preserving, and my own conception is partly a response to his efforts. Hanvey identifies and describes five dimensions that are central to a global perspective. I will take up each of the first three dimensions individually. Because the last two dimensions Hanvey discusses are so similar in scope, I have chosen to comment on them together.

2.2.1. The First Dimension of a Global Perspective

“Perspective consciousness” is the first of the dimensions Hanvey identifies. He defines it as:

The recognition or awareness on the part of the individual that he or she has a view of the world that is not universally shared, that this view of the world has been and continues to be shaped by influences that often escape conscious detection, and that others have views of the world that are profoundly different from one’s own.8

What is especially interesting about this definition is what it omits. Hanvey does not explain why consciousness of one’s own limited viewpoint is important. Hanvey suggests that the young can develop a “dim sense, a groping recognition of the fact that they have a perspective.” But how are we to judge the relative merits of our own lens on the world? Like the process of values clarification employed in schools as a way to develop a moral sense in the young, “a groping recognition” does not take us very far in understanding why it is important that we come to realize the limitations of our own world view. Nor is this groping awareness helpful in determining when perspectives are defensible according to standards that already have an established place
in our moral lives. Should we need to question those standards, what guidance is offered? It is important that students have the opportunity to learn the reasons people have for adopting and holding certain attitudes and points of view. The origins of their own perspectives should be subject to similar scrutiny.

2.2.2. Hanvey’s Second Dimension

Hanvey’s second dimension is what he terms “State of the Planet awareness.” I agree that the knowledge that leads to this awareness is an important facet of global education, although I find it difficult to see how it is a dimension of a perspective. As Hanvey describes it, state of the planet awareness is:

Awareness of prevailing world conditions and developments, including emergent conditions and trends, e.g. population growth, migrations, economic conditions, resources and physical environment, political developments, science and technology, law, health, inter-nation and intra-nation conflicts, etc.\(^9\)

What is important is the way in which these events, conditions and demographic trends are described to us. What would turn this “awareness” into a facet of a perspective, would be acknowledgement of the fact that any portrayal of the “state of the planet” is itself dependent on the perspective of the particular chronicler: the historian, economist, political scientist, sociologist, and so on. There is no one true description of the “state of the planet” that will suit Hanvey’s purpose. There are multiple descriptions representing multiple points of view which in turn reflect very different perceptions about even the existence of certain conditions. Consider, for example the ways in which the gross inequalities in living standards between the developed nations of the “north” and the undeveloped nations of the
"south" are described depending on the worldview held by the commentator. For those people who hold to a "mainstream model" of development, the third and fourth worlds are seen to be on the same road to economic development that industrialized Western nations have been on, a view that has been called "politically conservative and Eurocentric."\textsuperscript{10} It assumes that western wealth and modernization will trickle down, even in fact that they are trickling down. On an alternative "dependency model" it is said that practices in the West have caused the poverty in the world and that present policies perpetuate inequalities. Depending on the "model" that is taught, students will come to have a very different awareness of the "state of the planet."

Hanvey does note that our picture of the world is often distorted by the media, and further that much technical information about our world stays in the hands of experts and is not passed on to the ordinary citizen. What Hanvey does not sufficiently stress is the need for schools to equip students with the intellectual tools they need to critically examine the world portraits with which they are presented, particularly the moral or value orientation from which those pictures are created. Nor does he mention the intellectual dispositions that would incline students to question these things.

He is not alone in underplaying the importance of critical analysis to the development of a global perspective. In a recent article, Donald Johnson of New York University's International Graduate Program, explains in some detail that the lack of critical analysis is still a problem with most global education programs, including those designed for teachers who will be trying to promote global perspectives in schools. According to Johnson, what global education programs do not take into account, is the fact that they have been shaped by the dominant discourse in social education which has come out of
the liberal tradition. Programs continue to follow the mainstream liberal worldview without offering any possibility for critical analysis of their own underlying assumptions. He writes:

Students need to understand the major assumptions of the liberal tradition such as its conception of human society as essentially a collection of autonomous individuals who derive their identity from personal mobility within an open social system where each person competes according to her or his own ability to acquire property and other symbols of prestige...11

Without sufficient understanding of these beliefs and where they came from, students at all levels will continue to be trapped within a worldview that sees its own normative assumptions as universal. On Johnson's view these assumptions go way beyond those of liberalism:

The primacy of law, the importance of economic factors such as wealth, ownership of property, trade, economic growth, and the marketplace, values that Americans often erroneously consider normative for all people, are unique cultural values of the modern West. 12

According to Johnson, if we continue to teach "in a bounded system of analysis shaped by the dominant tradition of American liberal reformism"13 we will not produce teachers with a global perspective. Instead we must integrate other paradigms of the world into our teacher education programs.

What Johnson claims is "a bounded system of analysis" would not, on my view, count as analysis at all. Analysis by definition includes criticism that transcends the boundaries of any given system. Yet his worry is one to which I am sympathetic. There is very little time or effort directed toward analysis of liberal reformism in relation to say, foreign aid or analysis of standard (that is, Western) models of development in global education programs for teachers pursuing advanced degrees.14 It is safe to assume that if a lack of critical analysis plagues graduate programs in global education, this lacuna will be
apparent in other school and university efforts to develop global perspectives too. My complaint does not ignore the fact that there are undoubtedly thoughtful, critically reflective teachers who both possess and promote defensible global perspectives. But neither Hanvey's 1976 goals, nor the goals of many global education programs in this decade take sufficient account of the need to carefully analyze and question their own political and moral foundations.

2.2.3. Hanvey's Third Dimension

The third dimension Hanvey points to is "cross-cultural awareness," or:

Awareness of the diversity of ideas and practices to be found in human societies around the world, of how such ideas and practices compare, and including some limited recognition of how the ideas and ways of one's own society might be viewed from other vantage points.\(^{15}\)

Hanvey readily admits to the difficulties inherent in the attainment of this dimension of a global perspective. Among them is the level of myth and prejudice most of us carry when it comes to "understanding" others. He writes that "...fundamental acceptance [of others] seems to be resisted by powerful forces in the human psychosocial system."\(^{16}\) On this point there can be little disagreement. I take the dimension of cross-cultural awareness to be the single most important of those Hanvey has identified thus far. Yet it is not only awareness that we are after, but understanding and acceptance of others. Hanvey comes close to explicitly asserting the importance of learning to meet the other morally, what he calls recognizing the "humanness" of the stranger, or outsider. Yet even here I have a fundamental concern about Hanvey's relatively weak justification for such recognition. Recognition of others as centres of valuation, as human beings worthy of respect and consideration rests on a moral foundation. Is there not in Hanvey's account, a strong
leaning toward a prudential stand instead? He writes:

There was a time when the solidarity of small groups of humans was the basis for the survival of the species. But in the context of mass populations and weapons of mass destructiveness, group solidarity and the associated tendency to deny the full humanness of other peoples pose serious threats to the species.\textsuperscript{17}

If the threat of mutual annihilation were not present, would the obligation to recognize the humanity of others cease to exist? If we were able to escape back into the relatively isolated societies that existed before the industrial revolution, would our responsibilities to address the outsider's claim to basic human rights be justifiably ignored? There is an analogous worry in the claims that in the United States, black demands for equal opportunity and full recognition of their human dignity must be met before they overthrow the present hierarchy and thereby "destroy" white society and a good many whites along with it.\textsuperscript{18} A similar view exists in Canada with regard to the rights claims of the First Nations. Can such a justification which is ultimately \textit{conditional}, that is, based on some assessment of our increased chances of \textit{survival}, be considered anything more than self-regarding?

What is called for instead, is an explicit commitment to justice. There is a very real danger that anything less will cease to have a claim on us if it can be shown that our immediate or even long-term interests are not directly affected. Notions such as our "obligations to future generations" cannot have much force outside a moral framework that has justice and fair treatment at its centre.

2.2.4. Hanvey's Fourth and Fifth Dimensions

The fourth dimension of a global perspective described by Hanvey is Knowledge of Global Dynamics:
some modest comprehension of key traits and mechanisms of the world system, with emphasis on theories and concepts that may increase intelligent consciousness of global change.\textsuperscript{19}

What Hanvey means by a "system" is that the world works in interdependent, interconnected ways, that is, "Things interact in complex and surprising ways. "Effects' loop back and become 'causes' which have 'effects' which loop back.... It means that simple events ramify—unbelievably."\textsuperscript{20}

There is no doubt of the importance of this dimension as it challenges us to question received views, turn over old assumptions, and investigate what Hanvey calls the "concealed wiring." However Hanvey gives us no clear idea of what attitude to take beyond an investigative one. The question remains, what are we to do with the explanations we uncover, and how are we to deal with the complex web of interaction we find? Once we have some glimmer of understanding of the ramifications of events, the unintended consequences of policies, etc. how will our global perspectives help us to cope or respond?

In this and Hanvey's fifth dimension, "Awareness of Human Choices," an important aspect of having a perspective is absent, that is, its value orientation. Not only do we need to reject simplistic answers to complex global problems and question theories of development, we need to recognize when those theories perpetuate inequalities and when policies mask injustices. We need knowledge of moral concepts (and knowledge of what harms people) and of what constitutes morally hazardous situations. We need to ground our investigations of causes and effects in more solid justification than Hanvey provides.

It isn't only that simple solutions to poverty and overpopulation don't work because they are too simple. In some cases proposed solutions have
not taken into account the range of people's needs, and so have not adequately addressed issues of religion, family, spirituality, culture. More than just a matter of ignoring complexity this is a matter of ignoring people's worth and dignity. We need to know what will benefit people, and what would help them find just and fair solutions that do work. In the final analysis, we still need a global perspective that will help us consider value issues responsibly.

Hanvey points out that his global perspective may not be developed to the same extent in all students. His more modest hope is that the realization of the global perspective will be found in the collective rather than the individual. If the population is moving in the direction of a global perspective, it is not crucial that each member of the population exhibit all or most of its characteristics. This implies, he writes, "that diversified talents and inclinations can be encouraged and that standardized educational effects are not required." Although I am sympathetic with Hanvey's desire to protect the freedom of each individual to pursue her own ends, this is a pessimistic statement about the possibility of changing peoples' perspectives. I think we can expect more from teachers and from students, namely that both will have the capacity and the good sense to see that the attainment of a sound global perspective is a necessary prerequisite for everyone. If it is a worthwhile educational aim, we can expect that people can be convinced of its worth on the basis of good reasons. If a global perspective is desirable as well as defensible, then we ought to be able to promote it by rational means.

Hanvey is not willing to make such a strong case for the attainment of a global perspective, in part because he thinks that no one description of such a perspective can illuminate all its potential facets. I see this as a separate issue. We may not be able to anticipate all the factors which will inform and
deepen an individual's global perspective over time, but we know a good deal about what ought to be its foundation. And that is a moral point of view. Whatever else it becomes over time, a defensible global perspective will be an enlightened one. It will be broad enough to encompass a realistic view of the needs and concerns of individuals, and it will be deep enough to compassionately and sensitively act on those individuals' behalf.

When Hanvey wrote “An Attainable Global Perspective” one of his aims was to begin a dialogue among educators concerned with teaching about global problems and world systems. It is unfortunate that, heralded as his work was, it was largely taken up without criticism or question. The conceptual issues which Hanvey raised for global educators were left unanswered. The dialogue which should have clarified and furthered the aims of a defensible and attainable global perspective, never took place. Instead, under the banner of global education (however vaguely conceived) all manner of school programs have been created, serving the interests of various groups to greater and lesser degrees, but never adequately defining the fundamental purposes which Hanvey brought to our attention. Indeed the conceptual confusion about global education was so great that Popkewitz claimed we were “mired in it.” In the last decade, there has been significant work done to define global education’s outcomes and content. Nevertheless confusion still exists, and various (not always defensible) interests continue to be served by the label of global education.

Hanvey’s account is somewhat ironic given what has gone on in the name of global education. He claimed that looking at previously unexamined assumptions, evaluations and explanations is a liberating, educative experience. Global education should develop a critical spirit in students and
reveal the hidden layers of perspective that are so important in orienting peoples' beliefs.

One of the interesting things that reform and protest movements do, is to carry out mining operations in the deep layers. They dredge to the surface aspects of perspective that have never before seen the light of day. Once made visible, these may become the foci of debate, matters of opinion.24

However, if Popkewitz and other critics25 are right, the global education movement may have led us to bury some of our assumptions more deeply, rather than expose them to the light of critical scrutiny. Could further clarification about a global perspective help to get us out of the mire we may be in? If the kind of dialogue Hanvey had in mind had begun in earnest some conceptual confusion may have been avoided. As it is, with a growing interest in global education programs evident in both Canada and the United States, we still have an opportunity, even an obligation to take up where Hanvey left off.

2.3. CLARIFYING ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

One writer who has worked to clarify goals and aims in global education is Roland Case. He has examined key features of the global perspective first outlined by Hanvey, as well as the features described by other writers such as Willard Kniep.26 Case identifies two dimensions of a global perspective which ought to be part and parcel of all global education programs. He calls them the substantive and the perceptual dimensions, distinguishing the "what" from the "how" in global education. He sees the content (subject matter) as distinct from the attitudes and perspectives one adopts towards that content. Not only do we want students to learn about certain world conditions and issues, we also want them to develop certain
dispositions towards people (such as the inclination to imagine another's experience) and certain attitudes towards inquiry about global matters (such as the inclination to rationally reflect and change one's mind on the basis of good reasons.) Case explains that:

...The substantive dimension identifies the 'objects' of a global perspective—those world events, states of affairs, places and things that global educators want students to understand. The perceptual dimension is the 'point of view'—the matrix of concepts, orientations, values, sensibilities and attitudes—from which we want students to perceive the world. Thus, a global perspective refers both to the desired cognitive and affective lenses through which the world is to be viewed, and to the desired range of features and aspects of our global existence that are to be viewed.27

Combining some of Hanvey's elements of a global perspective along with those of Willard Kniep,28 Case lists the following objects of study as key components of his substantive dimension:
1. universal and cultural values and practices
2. global interconnections
3. present concerns and conditions
4. origins and past patterns
5. alternatives and future directions.29

Among those elements critical to developing the perceptual dimension of a global perspective, Case includes open-mindedness, anticipation of complexity, resistance to stereotyping, inclination to empathize and non-chauvinism. Elsie Begler, Director of the International Studies Education Project of San Diego, points out that:

Embedded in Case's discussion of these intellectual values and attitudes are familiar global education concepts such as perspective consciousness, appreciation of diversity, tolerance of ambiguity, dealing with change, managing conflict, and fostering cooperation. Whether we call them concepts, intellectual dispositions or values,
none are specific to any particular body of knowledge. Rather they describe attitudes of mind which most agree are fundamental to a global perspective.30

By adopting Case's two labels, substantive and perceptual, we can begin to see the what the next steps might be in defining a defensible and worthwhile global perspective. We can start to successfully distinguish the "object of attention" from the "point of view"31 we take towards it, surely a positive step in clarifying our purposes and analyzing existing programs. We can see that there are attitudes (such as open-mindedness) to be promoted as well as bodies of knowledge to be taught and material to be "covered," and that these are fundamentally different things.

I would argue that Case's distinction might lead global educators to artificially separate dimensions which are inseparable. The materials and resources chosen in a global education program, the topics selected and omitted, and the media spokespeople chosen to report on world affairs, will all depend on the perceptual "lens" of the teacher, program developer, university instructor, textbook writer. Their viewpoints may not be obvious to, or understood by, students or teachers. At a certain level we cannot unravel the substantive from the perceptual dimension because there is no neutral subject matter to "cover" and there are no value-free lessons from which to choose. Case acknowledges that in many respects the two dimensions "are intertwined"32 but maintains the necessity of distinguishing the two, in part, "to discourage the view that having a global perspective is a single quality that one either has or does not have."33 Certainly it is essential for all who wish to develop a global perspective to keep in mind the complexities of the notion in the face of over-compartmentalization and oversimplification. However, I am not convinced that Case's categorizations will be immune from the ubiquitous
tendency of global educators to substitute labels for careful analysis.

Still, Case has given us a useful organizational tool. Even more importantly he has explained what still needs to be done to reconceptualize global education. The substantive dimension of the global perspective has driven most of what has gone on in global education programs up until now, with little thought given to the perceptual 'lenses' through which content is viewed. It is time that the perceptual dimension is recognized as central to the enterprise. The elements within it need to be brought forward for examination; they need to be made explicit. It is also time for global educators to realize that among the array of intellectual values, dispositions and attitudes that provide the lens through which content is viewed, there are no more important ones than the moral.

2.4. A MORALLY DEFENSIBLE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Hanvey's exploration of the features central to a global perspective had been welcome and enlightening, but it did not give voice to ethical concerns. Only in passing did he address any moral point of view.34 As we have seen in the argument put forth by Case, even as late as 1991, there remained "considerable need for further explication" of all the elements of a global perspective.35 The moral dimensions of such a perspective remain the least explored in the literature.

Jerrold Coombs' work is an important exception.36 Coombs was one of the few respondents to Hanvey's call for a dialogue; his primary interest being in the promotion of an explicitly moral dimension to the global perspective. Coombs constructed a conception of a global perspective which focused on the dispositions and sensitivities students need in order to "meet the other
morally"\textsuperscript{37} in a global realm. His description of what a global perspective ought to include, was built on, but also radically departed from, the conception offered by Hanvey.

In his paper, “Toward a Defensible Global Perspective,” Coombs points to various understandings and beliefs that are key features of a desirable global perspective, including knowledge of world systems and global changes. Awareness of the diversity of people, cultures and worldviews are parts of his perspective as well. He discusses the inclusion of universal values such as respect for human dignity and a belief in human rights, ideas Hanvey had alluded to but never explicated or emphasized. To this point Coombs’ conception is not dissimilar to Hanvey’s. But Coombs has a decidedly different purpose. He wants to incorporate a moral point of view into his description of a global perspective. His conception of a global perspective calls for a belief in the possibility of building a moral world community, one based on shared concerns and a commitment to rational dialogue. He writes:

I believe that we need a conception of a global perspective that incorporates a view of the nature of responsible value deliberation and justification. This new conception, which I will call the constructivist conception, should provide the intellectual resources for approaching value conflict in a responsible manner. A person who has a constructivist global perspective will see all peoples of the world as having equal moral worth. In addition, she will believe that an integral part of the task of bettering the lives of persons is the task of constructing elements of a genuine world moral community out of our disparate moral heritages.\textsuperscript{38}

Coombs’ conception of a global perspective makes a promising start at describing some of the sensitivities students need. We should respect persons and we should care about solving global problems by rational means. We should work toward common moral understandings with peoples whose traditions and values differ greatly from ours. We should try to create ways
and means for people to express their needs, their common concerns, their dilemmas.

But important as these prescriptions are, they are only a rough beginning. Given Coombs' view of the necessary and sufficient elements of a constructivist global perspective, we have only the vaguest idea of who these people are and only a general sense of why we should care about them. It is a distant and abstract account that is offered; we do not have a picture of how we could care about other human beings, remaining as generalized, even idealized, as they do in Coombs' construction. Nor do we have any appreciation of the ways in which their differences could enrich a common search for imaginative solutions to global problems. Finally, we are given very little in the way of proposals as to how these attitudes, sensitivities and commitments could be developed in schools.

Coombs calls for building a world community based on principles of justice and respect for persons. These are important universal ideals, but they remain abstractions if our talk stays at the level of "building a world community." We need a much fuller sense of who will be involved and what particular knowledge and sensitivities we will need in order to communicate sincerely and openly with them. As well, we will need to know what such a community would look like, on what principles it might operate and what roles its various members might pursue. Most importantly in terms of the educational project before us, we need to know what attributes and qualities persons would need to possess in order to participate in such a community and whether the requisite sensitivities and dispositions could be taught as part of attaining a morally defensible global perspective.

Coombs notes that virtually all the writers on this topic agree that a
global perspective is a stance taken toward "the life conditions, projects and aspirations of groups of people, particularly national groups." Coombs is correct to point out that the focus in Hanvey's conception as well as that of Becker and Kniep, has been on groups of people. His own is no exception. I believe that a morally defensible global perspective ought to include the stance that we take toward individuals as well as groups of people. In fact, I argue for the primacy of the individual in this respect. If one of the goals of a global perspective is to foster understanding between persons, then an emphasis on learning about and caring about individuals is paramount. According to Coombs, we want our students to see others in the world as members or potential members of a global moral community. For this to happen, students must first begin to recognize the humanity of people in the world, a goal best achieved by looking at and listening to the experiences of particular individuals, not groups or nations. Individual characteristics, achievements and struggles tend to become obscured underneath a more homogenized description of national or ethnic identity. People, no matter what their origins may be, should not be regarded as distant and shadowy figures who have more in common with Rawls' abstractions behind the veil of ignorance than with humans made of flesh and blood.

The global perspective I believe must be at the center of any worthwhile program of global education is a perspective which focuses primarily on the individual. I call it the interpersonal global perspective. Simply stated, the interpersonal global perspective is a stance toward human beings which recognizes the moral significance of individuals seen as unique beings with particular qualities that cannot be assimilated to more generalized descriptions of "mankind" or "humankind." I contrast this notion with the notion
of a global perspective that focuses on all persons as rights-holders or claimants only. In that light, distinctness is not important. As many feminists, as well as communitarians have pointed out, important differences are filtered out of the picture when people are seen as "generalized others" or mere instances of the universal.\textsuperscript{40} I believe that it is the distinctness of individuals that will first command our notice, and that will compel us, if anything can, to be attentive to their particular needs. Underlying this will be a belief in the dignity of all persons, but an interpersonal global perspective will acknowledge that we are moved to action by particular circumstance and our motivation is strengthened when we encounter the details, or the story of a life that in some way we can connect to our own. In a sense I am employing the distinction Charles Taylor makes between the "politics of equal dignity" and the "politics of difference."\textsuperscript{41}

With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else.\textsuperscript{42}

By directing our attention to the universalist global perspective that views all human beings as identical baskets of "rights and immunities" we have assimilated individual distinctness to a featureless abstraction that is difficult to care about. Too often it is lip service and not genuine commitment that we give to these abstractions. Individuals become disembodied, removed from their own contexts and stripped of their own stories. Without a richer, more meaningful description, students will be unable to connect another life, one that is far from their horizon of experience, to their own. It is simply too easy for those of us in relatively advantaged positions in the developed world
to rest on platitudes and rely on generalized principles when confronted with inequities and injustices elsewhere in the world. We can walk away. It is not only geographical and cultural distance that is significant here, it is the kind of distance that arises when we are able to remove ourselves from the immediacy and the urgency of another’s need. A genuine moral perspective calls for something more.

2.5. ATTITUDES AND THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

As I stated earlier, a useful way of talking about adopting a stance or having a perspective, is in terms of holding an attitude or a set of attitudes toward someone or something. Seen in this light, an attitude becomes the angle or standpoint from which we regard another person. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” will help clarify what I mean by attitudes. His insights about people’s intentions and responses to the intentions of others, are relevant to my conception of a morally defensible desirable global perspective.

Strawson speaks of how important it is to us, how it really matters to us, that we be seen as deserving respect and a certain sort of attention by those with whom we are involved. We want to be regarded as worthy of serious moral consideration, and we want our intentions and our actions to be seen as meaningful and purposeful. Similarly, we are prepared to count the intentions of others towards us as significant, provided we see those individuals as rational, autonomous agents. In a sense, we see those people and ourselves as members of a moral community, linked by shared values and common questions about how to live. As an ideal, it becomes a community of inquirers, in which each member respects the others’ claims to
equality and freedom. We respond in certain ways to those we regard as full participants in human experience, to those who are part of this circle of membership. Strawson says we respond to them with “reactive attitudes.” Toward those we regard as connected to us in this way, reactive attitudes are inescapable. They are part of our humanity; to lose them would be to lose part of ourselves. Reactive attitudes include emotional responses like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and indignation. They can be described as our reactions toward those we consider equal participants in the world, those who are inside our sphere of moral experience and therefore fully responsible for their actions. We take their intentions to be of importance and in that way, as well as other ways, we grant them full status as moral agents.

But there is another stance we can take toward people, people who we view as outside this sphere. This stance involves what Strawson calls “objective attitudes.” Objective attitudes, or what one might call attitudes from a distance, are reserved for those people with whom we share no common world of meanings, or for those we regard as incapable of rational deliberation or freely chosen action. Strawson describes them this way:

To adopt the objective attitude toward another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided....

While the objective attitude may involve some emotions, it cannot involve all emotions. Fear or repulsion might be part of an objective attitude, so might pity or even some kinds of love. It is however a limited stance toward human beings. It cannot involve the kind nor the depth of feelings we have toward those we are involved with in genuine interpersonal relationships.
...it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other. If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him.46

In this essay, Strawson is speaking of the objective attitudes we may take to those we believe are incapable of participating fully and responsibly in our world. Sometimes we are justified in stepping back some distance to respond effectively to those whose own reactive attitudes are wholly inhibited by abnormalities, as in the case of the insane or the retarded. Often there is a tension between falling into the objective stance, sometimes for valid reasons, and otherwise responding with a reactive attitude. Sometimes the strains of responding in this way are too great, and we are forced to take a step back from full participation.

Objective attitudes, I would add, can also be those attitudes towards ‘strangers’ which we adopt in the absence of recognized solidarity. Simply put, objective attitudes are often our responses to people who are not like us, people of different cultures, backgrounds, or societies. We may feel no connection with them at all. Ignatieff writes,

Take one step outside our zone of safety—the developed world—and there they are, hands outstretched, gaunt, speechless or clamouring in the zone of danger. There is no claim of kith and kin to connect us together: only the indeterminate claim of one human being upon another.47

It is the indeterminacy of their claim which puts distance between us and them. We don't know who they are; in some cases we barely recognize them as fellow human beings. There is no claim of the kind that connects us to those who are close and known. It is all too easy to look upon strangers in the same way we look upon those in our own society whom we regard as
beyond the circle of reason. They are dismissed or placed outside our sphere of genuine concern. We step back. The result is a kind of marginalization that allows us to say in Rorty’s words, “They do not feel it as we would” or “There must always be suffering so why not let them suffer?”

Strawson writes that adopting the objective attitude toward someone prevents us from genuinely participating in a rational dialogue with them. This has special relevance for the way in which we respond to people who are not incapable of reasoning with us, but are somehow unlike us. Strawson says of the former: “You can’t reason with him; you can only pretend to.” By denying strangers membership in our moral community, that is by approaching them with objective attitudes, we have put their needs, concerns and demands at a distance. We have deemed their interests as less worthy of consideration than our own. Their reasons, like their claims on us, have little bearing on our world. As well, we have, prima facie, denied these individuals access to a genuine forum for exchange and communication. Instead of seeing possibilities for connection, we see a gulf of unfamiliarity and strangeness.

There is a danger in adopting the objective attitude towards those in the world whom we have mistakenly marginalized or placed outside our circle of membership, toward these people Ignatieff calls strangers. We run the risk of perceiving strangers, in the developing world and elsewhere, as outside of our sphere of concern and compassion. They are then regarded as distant, unfamiliar entities to be treated or dealt with “objectively.” Those of us who adopt these attitudes might well believe that imposing our own values on others is acceptable. By placing these strangers outside the circle of moral membership, we fail to see the possibilities Coombs believes exist for building moral communities on a global scale—communities that may one day
contribute to solving common problems that affect all of us on the earth.

A genuinely global perspective of the kind Coombs begins to describe, calls for something beyond objective attitudes. It calls for building a global community based on respect for persons and commitment to rational exchange. If we are committed to building a moral community of inquirers who will attempt to solve global problems, then a prerequisite to this task is the belief that we are all full participants in that fledgling community. We are all potential citizens with equal rights and position, though we bring with us an amazing diversity of beliefs, hopes, desires, needs. We may be united only by our faith in the possibilities of communication and our hope for eventually creating a world of common meanings, but that is a start. However, even this is impossible if we adopt the objective attitude towards others in the world who do not share our customs, language, and culture. We have already placed them beyond our circle of membership. We cannot reason with them; we can only pretend to. Surely we are not justified in stepping back from the stranger in the way that we step back from those we legitimately regard as outside the circle of reason (such as the insane or retarded.) Yet many of us do, much of the time. I believe this happens a great deal in education, even education which aims at developing perspectives which are morally sound.

2.6. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

A morally sound global perspective reflects a belief in the dignity and worth of all persons as co-workers in the construction of a global moral community. Strawson's description of what is required for us to respond to people with "reactive attitudes" has much in common with such a perspective. We must begin to see people in other parts of the world, including the much
ignored developing world, as potential participants in our own moral lives.
Constructing a global moral community is a project that can be taken up only
by individuals who are willing to listen to strangers, and bring them into their
moral sphere as equals. They will need to develop a range of sensitivities and
dispositions in order to respond to the claims of others with respect and
understanding. It is an enormous challenge for global educators to develop
such attitudes in their students, but it is not an impossible one. The capacity
to care in this way is demonstrated by people over and over again in many
contexts. We can extend our horizon of caring to respond to the needs of
strangers if we can begin to see the connections between their humanity and
our own, if their needs can be seen as personal and compelling. Ignatieff
reminds us that we not only have our own needs, we have needs on behalf of
others:

It is as common for us to need things on behalf of others, to need good
schools for the sake of our children, safe streets for the sake of our
neighbours, decent old peoples' homes for the strangers at our door,
as it is to need them for ourselves. The deepest motivational springs of
political involvement are to be located in this human capacity to feel
needs for others.49

Not only must we extend our moral sense to acknowledge the needs of
others, we must see the lives of others as connected to our own. First, we
need to teach our students how to build connections with other persons in the
world, the strangers who at present stand outside their circle of membership.
By connections, I mean to imply more than the commonalities we ordinarily
recognize—our needs and rights based on universal dignity and equality,
though these are always prerequisites and I do not deny them place or
importance. But I believe we must recognize the humanity of another not in
abstraction but in its particularity. As Charles Taylor puts it:
...we give due acknowledgement only to what is universally present—everyone has an identity—through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand powers an acknowledgement of specificity.\textsuperscript{50}

The human connections I have in mind are particular and personal, though no one would deny their underlying foundation as universal; the shock of recognition that went through me when I heard a Thai teenager describe her lost childhood, the nostalgia I felt when reading an old man's memoirs of Indian mountains I will never see, the sadness in a Peruvian flute song. It is true I cannot come to know or care personally for a great many strangers in my lifetime, but I can listen to the stories of some and share, vicariously at any rate, the memories of others. Above all, I can develop the disposition to listen to a stranger's story, and the sensitivity to respond to a stranger's need. I can be open to the possibility of exchange, and willing to see others as equal participants in dialogue. I can learn to move in a broader horizon, adapting my perspectives so as to see with the perspectives of others, thereby creating in small and intimate ways, meaningful connections with people elsewhere in the world. I can teach my students to do the same.

If we want our students to come to recognize the humanity in all of us, we need to make it recognizable and personally compelling. Though they will obviously be unable to learn the particular circumstances and characters of hundreds, much less millions of strangers in the world, in a lifetime they can come to know more than a handful. My hope is that knowing the stories of a particular few and coming to care about the storytellers and the lives they lead, will persuade our students of the worth of individual identities and the need to enter into dialogue with others whenever possible, as equal, yet distinct participants, each with particular beliefs and struggles to be considered. I hope our students can then openly and willingly bring strangers
into their moral sphere as they encounter them throughout their lives.

Developing an interpersonal global perspective will require many steps. Educators committed to such a task will need to teach their students to reason about global issues using appropriate standards, to listen sincerely and openly to many different voices, and to seek peaceful and constructive solutions to world problems. Students will need to possess a great deal of global knowledge, as well as demonstrate compassion and a commitment to democratic principles which will insure that a multiplicity of voices can be heard in the ongoing dialogue. All of these are prerequisites for building a global moral community.

2.7. CONCLUSION

If students develop ways of relating to others that reflect the moral principles and commitments introduced in this chapter as well as attaining the knowledge which informs commitment and action, they will be well on their way to attaining a defensible global perspective. The characteristics that define such a perspective are many. They include intellectual virtues, such as open-mindedness, and the ability and inclination to use and demand reasons. They include moral virtues, such as benevolence and a sense of justice. They also include beliefs about the equality of human beings and the very possibility of a human community. And finally they include the dispositions and abilities necessary for participation in community building, especially community building across differences.

We are all members of communities from the time we learn to understand and use language. Our connections to communities will be both fluid and multiple. Over the course of lifetime we will define ourselves as
belonging to a number of groups, participants in numerous, sometimes overlapping spheres. In order to see the possibility for new connections, and as yet undiscovered relationships, we need to understand what elements bring us together in communities in the first place. So my task in the following two chapters will be to describe the nature of communities as they relate to a morally defensible global perspective, and to describe in some detail the foundations on which a global moral community ought to be based.

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1Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 47.

2Jerrold Coombs, “Toward a Defensible Conception of a Global Perspective,” occasional paper #1 (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Studies, 1988).


6Ibid., 1.


8Ibid., 4.

9Ibid., 6.

10Werner, “Contradictions in Global Education,” 2.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 17–11.

Ibid., 19.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 2.

Jerrold Coombs, “Towards a Defensible Conception of Global Education,” is a notable exception to such a claim. This paper significantly furthered the debate concerning the moral attainments associated with a desirable global perspective. However this paper stands out as being one of the few direct responses to Hanvey’s original conception. Roland Case, in a paper presented at the annual conference of the American Forum, at Hartford, CT. in 1991, notes that, “the tendency has been to offer lists of general attributes or areas of inquiry, which are often vague and at cross-purposes. It would appear that important aspects of the global perspective have been incompletely or inadequately articulated” (unpublished presentation).


27Ibid., 1.


29Case, "Key Elements of a Global Perspective," 8.


31Jerrold Coombs, Towards a Defensible Conception of a Global Perspective (Vancouver: Research and Development in Global Education. 1989).

32Case, 18.

33Ibid., 18.

34In the section in which Hanvey describes the fifth dimension of a global perspective, "Awareness of Human Choices," it is clear that he assumes certain value positions with regard to feeding the world (we have a moral obligation to contribute) and with regard to future generations (they have rights which must be respected). However, he does not articulate his positions nor does he advocate that teaching for a global perspective is part of a moral enterprise.

35Case, 1.

36Coombs, Towards a Defensible Conception of a Global Perspective.


38Coombs, 4.

39Ibid., 1.
40 Benhabib, 48–177.


42 Taylor, Multiculturalism, 38.


45 Strawson, 79.

46 Ibid., 79.

47 Ignatieff, 29.


49 Ignatieff, 17.

50 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism, 39.
CHAPTER THREE
THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN THE GLOBAL AGE

I regard neither the plurality and variety of goodnesses with which we have to live in a disenchanted universe nor the loss of certainty in moral theory to be a cause of distress. Under conditions of value differentiation, we have to conceive of the unity of reason not in the image of a homogeneous, transparent glass sphere into which we can fit all our cognitive and value commitments, but more as bits and pieces of dispersed crystals whose contours shine out from under the rubble.

Seyla Benhabib

3.1. INTRODUCTION

In the last pages, I argued that the development of a global perspective is essentially a moral perspective on the world and that it is at the heart of global education. I took Coombs’ conception of a global perspective as a departure point for my own, building into my moral perspective a fuller and more explicit focus on individuals. I spoke about the need for connections to be built up between strangers, members of disparate communities who must begin to see themselves as common inhabitants of the planet.

The interpersonal global perspective I argued for is a moral point of view. It will only be possible to attain such a perspective if one is able to extend one’s sphere of moral of concern to a larger community of persons. An understanding of what community means to our moral lives is essential if we are to extend our moral sense beyond familiar boundaries. In this chapter I will discuss what community means to those of us living in a global age. First I will look at the principles and commitments which lie behind our notions of traditional communities. My question is whether there are any features of these communities that can shed light on what a global community of concern
might look like. I will look at several views of traditional communities, including those of Alasdair Maclntyre in After Virtue, and Robert Bellah and the other authors of Habits of the Heart and The Good Society. The communities these authors discuss are based on familiar commitments and connections focused on our relations with and our attitudes toward, individuals whom we know and care about. It is their belief that these kinds of community connections have been destroyed or at least severely weakened in this century.

I hope to show that the concept of community still has meaning for most of us and that some of the moral attainments associated with our membership in communities are key elements for potential relations in other moral spheres, including global ones. Many of the dispositions and sensitivities required for responsible participation at a local level are also needed by people who wish to build connections with strangers, particularly those that call upon our capacities for tolerance, empathy, and justice.

At the same time, I want to dispel notions that what is required in order to restore moral vision in contemporary society is either a return to the civic republican (and Biblical) traditions described by Bellah or the Aristotelian enclaves advocated by Maclntyre. Each of their visions presupposes unified purposes that do not reflect present realities within or beyond our own societies. I believe that we have to combat what has been called the communitarian's "terminal wistfulness". In a pluralistic world, an integrative vision of the good is not possible or defensible. Instead we should direct our energies toward creating new possibilities for moral discourse that better addresses common needs and aspirations we might discover, and does so without losing sight of our important differences. I will conclude by arguing for a "a participationist community," the goal of which is moral conversations
between people who are committed to work through their differences.

A commitment to the construction of a moral community based on common concerns need not mean and should not mean a commitment to a single moral image or vision of the good. A global moral community should accommodate many visions of the good. Similarly, belief in a global moral community does not entail belief in a single global culture, though some global educators talk as if that is our certain future.\textsuperscript{5} I will argue that the possibility of a global moral community founded on recognition of common concerns can and should embrace rather than reject cultural diversity.

3.2. THE LOSS OF TRADITIONAL COMMUNITIES

It seems from the moment one begins to explore the nature and functions of communities in North America, one is told they no longer exist or are at best an endangered species. Like our moral language, communities that foster our moral identity and give rise to the public virtues, are considered by many to be in disarray. In\textit{ Habits of the Heart}, we read that "the language of social responsibility" and the "practices of commitment to the public good" are not generated by the impersonal modern world as they were by the nurturing life of the small town of centuries past.\textsuperscript{6} Instead our first language is "shot through with individualism and is therefore ill-suited to public discourse on the common good or shaping meaningful lives."\textsuperscript{7} It is single-minded commitment to personal gain and individual satisfaction that has come between ourselves and any realization of community connections or obligations. As long as individualism reigns, the public good suffers.

Like Bellah et al in\textit{ Habits of the Heart}, MacIntyre paints a bleak picture with regard to the disintegration of communities in\textit{ After Virtue} and also in an
essay titled "The Idea of an Educated Public." According to MacIntyre, it was the lively exchange between great numbers of the liberally educated public during the Scottish Enlightenment which furthered the political and social debates of the time. Over the years, these open inquiries generated new ways of looking at public policy, and invited a wide range of perspectives on issues of human welfare, perspectives that represented diverse roles in the community.

The modern emphasis on specialized training and education for narrow expertise has left us without such a shared language or common social vision; the experts do not know how to talk to one another about means or ends. According to MacIntyre, modernity itself excludes the possibility of an educated community; "it has no way of taking on life in contemporary society."9

In After Virtue, MacIntyre is concerned with other facets of our moral and social disintegration as well, in particular the moral and spiritual disarray which the failed Enlightenment project left in its wake. As Onora O'Neill notes in a chapter of Constructions of Reason, MacIntyre "diagnoses modern moral discourse as deeply fragmented, condemning us to 'interminability of public argument' and 'disquieting private arbitrariness'."10 Once the moral tradition that had Aristotle's thought at its intellectual centre was abandoned, private arbitrariness was the inevitable result of the shift in our thinking about the good. The very idea of a public with a shared vision of the good was threatened and eventually became extinct once the idea of human flourishing within a setting of traditions, practices and institutions (such as Aristotle's polis) was replaced by post-Enlightenment notions of liberal pluralism, a kind of agnosticism with regard to ends.
We can look at another version of a public that seems to have vanished with the twentieth century if not with the Enlightenment, and that is the local community. (As Maclntyre tells us, “the praise and practices of the virtues still pervaded social life, often in highly traditional ways” for well into the nineteenth century and beyond, even if there were modern, post-Enlightenment problems with justifying their place in that life.) The practice of civic virtues was obviously central to the vitality of these communities. For many of us, the paradigm of these local communities has been nostalgically embodied (or perhaps embedded) in the small New England village or township, particularly as it is viewed around annual town meeting time. Hailed since Tocqueville’s time, the town meeting has been seen as the concretization of ideal participatory democracy. Tocqueville believed that the experience of local self-government transformed self-interested residents into responsible, morally enlightened citizens who went on to exhibit a wealth of public virtues. The annual town meeting, a kind of legislative assembly, and other institutions of the classic New England township also served (and still do in some states) to support a political and social structure backed by generations of tradition.

According to the authors of *Habits of the Heart*, the vision of community ideally represented by these towns is one that looks both forward and back in time:

The traditional institutions of the town express a classic vision of what such a community is and what it must continually strive to become: a self-reliant congregation created and maintained by the voluntary cooperation of self-reliant families. At the same time, forming a fading background to this voluntaristic vision, there is an appreciation of the town as a community of memory linking the destiny of its citizens with their ancestors and descendants.
In part, it was the classic vision of such a community to which town citizens of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries turned for both a sense of self and a sense of solidarity with others. The search for identity was at the same time a search for one's place in the community. The "story of my life," writes Maclntyre, "is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity." The 'natural citizen' of such a town in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a self-employed producer. He found his roles and responsibilities fitted neatly into the context of the community life. (Bellah does not mention women in his characterization of the natural citizen; presumably her primary context was that of the family, but she, too, would have found a meaningful place in certain aspects of community life.) So his life story (and her story) were woven into the tapestry, or historical narrative, of the community, itself seen as a continuum from generations past to generations yet to be born. He became a part of the evolving stories around him, and they became part of him.

Maclntyre writes:

A central thesis then begins to emerge: man in his actions and practice as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but comes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question, 'Of what stories do I find myself a part? We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to others are likely to be construed.15

The 'memory of community' described in Habits of the Heart forms one such collection of stories through which and in which identities were formed. The roles that these past citizens were drafted into were the roles which the communities' institutions and traditions defined for them. It is a relatively easy
matter to see that story-telling was one essential way in which these roles were conveyed. In fact, much of the moral fibre of the community, its social commitments to its members, its patterns of relations and decision making, would necessarily be passed on through stories and the ongoing portrayal of a way of life in a narrative form. The public good would be constructed from these stories and the interpretations given to them by those who participated in community life. Each member's actions, including actions in the moral sphere, were not isolated but played against a backdrop of community life and the narrative that was passed on within it. Continuity within one's own life and a sense of social connection made actions and moral choices intelligible.

But what of twentieth century life, characterized by many (Maclntyre for one, Bellah for another) as fragmented and without a spiritual or moral centre? If we are, or come to be through historical and social circumstance, story-telling beings, where do our contemporary stories, and thus our identities, come from? What has happened to our quests for continuity in our lives or to what Maclntyre calls the intelligibility of our narratives? Do we still have access to membership in the "classic community" or only a nostalgic and illusory attachment to a way of life that no longer exists? Is there something potent and sustaining we can still draw from our traditional notions of community and our places within them?

3.3. THE VIABILITY OF COMMUNITIES IN THE GLOBAL AGE

For both Bellah and Maclntyre our moral vision was lost with the disappearance of traditional communities. On Maclntyre's view, only restoring (through restating) Aristotelian ethics based on virtues within a setting of practices, will bring back "intelligibility and rationality to our moral social
attitudes and commitments." His suggestion is to look once again at the notion of a telos, though he suggests some reformulation of Aristotle's conception. Aristotle's version of what constituted the good for human beings was based on a well-defined set of virtues sustained within the polis as they were based on a public understanding of shared goods. Everyone acknowledged and accepted the role set out for him within the established order. MacIntyre's conception of the good life for man is the life spent in searching for the good life, a quest in other words, in which certain virtues illuminate the way and are themselves strengthened through the search. O'Neill refers to it as an "open-ended, almost procedural vision of the human telos." 

If we accept the interpretation of telos as a quest, I would argue that it is still a viable notion in the modern world. We are still guided by a search for the good, though we may not share conceptions of just what that is. Contrary to MacIntyre's claim, I suggest that our moral vision has not been entirely lost, and we still have a chance to build community that is suited to the demands of our age, including the demands of pluralism. Jeffrey Stout recognizes that there already exists a somewhat "provisional" telos functioning within liberal societies, one that is evidence of our limited but genuine agreement on certain sorts of goods or ends. We agree, for instance, that peaceful rather than violent settlements of disputes are to be preferred, and we agree that restricting someone's freedom without justification is wrong. There is a great deal of commonality in our intentions toward one another, including, importantly enough, "a self-limiting consensus on the good" which preserves a healthy degree of freedom for our individual pursuits of other goods. We have agreed to tolerate a certain amount of moral disagreement for the sake
of living in harmony and for the sake of our shared concepts of liberty and justice. These things demonstrate that common purposes do exist, though they are often eclipsed by the tensions between us (and by philosophers' descriptions). "We have so little sense of common purpose in part because we have become so accustomed to a picture that hides the actual extent of our commonality from view."\textsuperscript{20}

This is not to say that we do not have difficulty communicating or cooperating within present communities or outside of them. Obviously we do. But a return to a kind of premodern polis in which our private selves might well be sacrificed for public ends is not a solution to moral disagreement or even a partial loss of moral vision. The project of recovering even a modified teleological framework of the sort MacIntyre has in mind is problematic. Although not bound to one conception of what constitutes the good for all times and places, MacIntyre's telos nevertheless sounds fixed, grounded in a kind of solidarity that carries the risk of curtailing freedom. For this recovery, according to MacIntyre, can only happen in a society where habits, dispositions and assumptions are shared, in other words a "living community dedicated to the common good."\textsuperscript{21} Collective life of this sort is not possible in the absence of agreement on the good, yet that characterization exactly describes the liberal society in which we live. MacIntyre says that our telos is realized in seeking the good, in finding the good life for ourselves, but we are asked to seek it within communities where much that counts as good and many of our purposes and roles are already defined for us. It would appear that MacIntyre is giving us two versions of a telos.

Not withstanding O'Neill's interpretation, MacIntyre's telos seems to have much in common with Aristotle's fixed conception of the human essence
if one is to accept the last pages of *After Virtue* as his final word on the matter. Here he states that the good for human beings—our telos—can only be pursued within a setting within which the notion of shared goods and common virtues already has central place. Maclntyre writes that there are important parallels to be drawn between the modern predicament and the Dark Ages at the point when Romans turned aside from the task of “shoring up” the empire and began instead, to build new forms of life that could nurture a shared moral vision.

If my account of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to include that for some time now we too have reached that turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope.22

Maclntyre suggests that retreating into close and tightly knit bands of like-minded souls is a viable solution to the moral disarray we find ourselves in, but as a possibility for any of us at the turn of the twenty-first century it sounds almost quaint. As well, there is a disturbing conservative strain in his vision of community, one which sets unjustifiable limits on both our personal projects and the chances for creating new public ones. Communities can enrich us but they can also restrain us in unacceptable ways. Conforming to a single integrative vision of who we are and where we are going denies our capacity and as well as obligation to challenge and criticize our present practices and to see them from another point of view.

Certainly we cannot go back in time. It is neither a possible nor desirable option. Aristotle’s polis with its accepted and fixed telos for humanity is no longer a possibility to consider in this world where so many visions of
the good stand side by side, at times enriching each other, more often competing with one another. It is not even a defensible model of what a community ought to look like, given its restrictions on membership and other limitations. Liberal institutions are premised on a very different notion of collective life, one in which diversity of beliefs, customs, and assumptions about the good, is a reality we must all recognize and work with. The question is not how to recapture what is gone, but how to “enhance the sense of common purpose we already have, limited as it may be, without acting unjustly or making things worse.”

3.4. IDENTITIES AND MORAL DISCOURSE IN COMMUNITIES

The small, cohesive communities that Bellah and his colleagues write about and the ones that MacIntyre wants to restore for us are unlikely options for most people and do not speak to the need for building new moral communities. Though modern counterparts of the historic communities described in Habits of the Heart may exist in village settings in parts of North America, they rarely exist for the purpose of fostering the common good or are underpinned by the same commitments as in generations past. Yet many of us in North America still want to define ourselves, and do define ourselves in part, through our close, local affiliations and memberships; (some such as neighborhood associations, for example, attempt to restore a sense of fellow-feeling between area residents.) For most of us, our sense of heritage and other background identifications form the backdrop for the choices we make and the actions we take. Charles Taylor speaks of being oriented in moral space, of “knowing where I stand with regard to questions of what is good, right and important.”
My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.27

This horizon is made up of spiritual and political commitments, traditions and beliefs we take from our pasts, worldviews that have been shaped by our particular histories, in other words the stories we have heard and of which we are a part. And this is still the case. Even without access to the communities which are described so nostalgically in Habits of the Heart, we do have a moral frame, a horizon as Taylor puts it, that has been shaped by our history and all the people involved in our lives. It is in fact constitutive of our personhood as it forms the background for our present choices, our cherished principles, and all the other ways in which we think about what and whom we value. In other words, it has shaped and will continue to shape our identity. Because this “horizon” is created through our relations with others (our identity is formed dialogically according to Taylor) and because it is partly formed by our understanding of certain commitments we have toward others, I believe that the primary language we use is still one suited to expressing terms of social responsibility, though Bellah, et al, argue otherwise.

It is Bellah’s contention that our primary language is so shot through with individualism that we do not know how to speak or think about any common good nor do we know how to talk about shaping meaningful lives. If Taylor is right and our identity is created dialogically against a cultural and historic backdrop, then it is at least possible that the primary language in which we express our individual needs, ideals and aspirations will be one that can also acknowledge our commitments and debts to others.
Stout takes up the problem of the language of “individualism” with which Bellah et al are so concerned in his criticisms of many of the interviews used as centerpieces for Habits of the Heart. He believes the interviewer’s questioning techniques are in many ways to blame for the inability of interviewee Brian Palmer and others to express their moral beliefs and commitments clearly. Rather than reflecting a preoccupation with self or a lack of moral concern for others, Palmer’s response to supposed Socratic questioning techniques shows understandable confusion about what the questioner is driving at. Brian does not invoke a moral principle to explain the basis of his objection to lying but instead sounds “downright Aristotelian” in talking about lying as a bad habit. The interviewer probes further, prompting Brian’s response that he doesn’t know why lying is wrong. “It just is.”28 When further backed into a corner, Palmer finally says, “Well, some things are bad because… I guess I just feel like everybody on the planet is entitled to have a little bit of space, and things that detract from people’s space are kind of bad…(304-305, ellipses in original)”29 Stout uses this example to show that the interviewer’s conclusion, that Palmer is voicing a moral principle based on American individualism, is a misinterpretation. It is more probable to conclude that Palmer “doesn’t know how to answer questions that aren’t connected to real doubts.”30 Lying is simply a bad thing.

There are several things we can learn from Stout’s reading of Habits of the Heart. One is that in terms of the way people actually live their lives (as opposed to discussing their lives) commitments to others and shared moral concerns have an important place. Another is that an ethic of virtue has not completely disappeared from the modern experience. We recognize and reward certain virtues and try to cultivate a range of virtues in our children.
Lying is a bad thing, integrity is important, family life matters. Civic or public virtues are among those that many parents and teachers of all kinds, try to pass on. Some of these so-called public virtue make communication between us possible (even if it is at times difficult) others make it fruitful. I would argue that the notion of an educated public working for the common good and the related notion of persons whose stories intertwine in communities, are not completely obsolete or antiquated, though they are in great need of major restoration. Our stories still overlap and we still have ways to communicate as well as define ourselves through them.

One way this happens is through participation in what MacIntyre calls our “social practices” forms of complex human activity which have their own standards of excellence. Virtues are defined by MacIntyre, as those qualities which when exhibited in the course of a practice enable us to achieve the goods internal to that particular practice. Commitment to our various social practices is alive and well, as are the virtues associated with practices. The virtues inherent to the practice of medical care for instance, virtues such as practical wisdom and courage are widely acknowledged and exhibited by practitioners. The “goods internal to the practice” are most often acquired through imitating role models, as are the forms of excellence (and thus the virtues that help us realize them) that are particular to other social practices we engage in.

MacIntyre’s own notion of social practices can be used to make an argument about the vitality of our moral language when seen as an expression of goods passed on from teacher to apprentice, parent to child, expert to novice. And it is not the language of individualism or private arbitrariness. On the contrary, the standards of excellence particular to each
practice are valued, imitated, taught, and discussed; in short they are shared.

Stout claims that our moral discourse is not so bleak as MacIntyre or Bellah find it. MacIntyre gives an excessively bleak prognosis concerning the possibility of rational moral discourse in the modern age. He underestimates the level of agreement on the good actually exhibited by our society and overestimates the level required for us to reason coherently with each other on most matters of common concern.32 I believe, as Stout does, that we still have a viable moral language and often, a commitment to communicate with it. I strongly suspect that Stout, however, has overestimated the extent to which the virtues are actually exhibited in our society and explicitly cultivated in our children. We often speak past each other and we do disagree on matters of moral significance. Yet moral discourse in our society, can, as Stout tells us, "be understood as held together by a relatively limited but nonetheless real and significant agreement on the good.... Our disagreement about what human beings are like and what is good for us does not go all the way down."33 If it did, we would not even recognize the disagreement. It only makes sense to talk of moral arguments against a background of agreement.

When we do not share each other's vision of the good or the right, and when moral disagreements prevail, we have both voice and language with which to define and discuss our various predicaments and their potential solutions. When we do not understand each other and must translate foreign concepts into familiar vocabulary, we have the resources to do that. Our language itself is not a static system; it can change and grow to suit our purposes and the particularities of our situations. By collecting and refining the fragments of many moral languages that have been passed down to us, we can enrich "our conceptual resources for dialogue with strangers."34 We
have at hand, as Walzer continually reminds us, the tools we need to ascertain what’s gone wrong and to improve and refine our actions and our deliberations. These tools are found within our existing social practices. As we have seen, the goods internal to our practices carry their own standards of excellence, standards that are tied to virtues and ideals we cherish. Within democratic societies, most of us acknowledge the force of ideals, such as justice, even when we do not live up to them. We recognize the truth in social criticism, because we realize when we have fallen short of ideals to which we are committed and when we have failed to exhibit virtues we believe in.

Many of the virtues that are exhibited by members of existing communities are central to the enterprise of building a community of concern on a global scale. These include a sense of obligation toward others, compassion, commitment to treating others fairly and decently and a willingness to listen to other points of view. Our familiar traditions of caring and mutual support are rooted in certain beliefs about human worth that extend beyond our present spheres of caring. Beliefs about equality and the importance of the welfare of all can form the foundation for new moral communities based on contemporary visions and purposes. These new visions and purposes are not tied to a single idea of the good for human beings. It is also important to point out that they are not tied to a vision of world that is moving inexorably toward a single culture. This is a view that more than occasionally leaps from the pages of writing on global education.

3.5. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY IN COMMUNITIES

Creating a global moral community does not necessitate merging visions of the good into a single version. Neither does it demand
homogenization of traditions and cultures into something akin to a world where all inhabitants speak Esperanto. Yet talk of a monoculture is a persistent theme in the literature of global education. It is found in foundational statements, policy declarations, teacher education materials and textbooks. James Becker speaks of the "increasingly global character of human experience." and Barbara Tye, in the same collection of papers on global education, claims that "systemic interconnectedness is the natural order of things." Often it sounds as if an explicit aim of global education is to push us further in the direction of a homogeneous world culture. In 1973, Lee Anderson declared that, "...most human beings live out there lives in a cocoon of culture whose circumference equals the circumference of the globe. In a word, there is a global culture." Nearly twenty years later, the same author wrote:

The past millennium has witnessed a marked homogenization of human culture. A global culture is developing. The technical language of this emerging culture is English. Its common ideology is science. Its characteristic social institutions are large-scale, globe spanning public and private bureaucracies. Its commonly shared technologies are jet planes, communication satellites, telexes, networks of interconnected computers, facsimile machines and transword telephone systems.

Anderson follows this by mentioning that the world is also filled with "myriad, distinctive microcultures [which] coexist in a set of uneasy, often tense, and constantly shifting relationships" with the looming global culture. Little wonder given the resources, technologies and sheer momentum of the latter as it bulldozes over the former. Anderson may be giving us what he sees as an accurate description of the state of the planet, and not making normative claims about what the world ought to look like. Even so the sheer inevitability of the dominance of global culture that he describes leaves little
room to consider what role the thousands of microcultures might play in the future. It is as if their viability, not to mention their vitality, has been entirely eclipsed from view.

Consider, too, the words of global educator, David Selby, an influential proponent of “world order studies.” In a collection of papers concerned with the implementation of innovative school programs, Selby and co-author Graham Pike, attempt to justify their vision of global education. They begin by referring to the “networks of links, interactions and relationships that circle this planet like a giant and intricate spider’s web.” We are all caught up in the web of global interdependencies that the authors describe as a system. “Relationship is everything: the activity of the system comprises the simultaneous and interdependent interaction of its many component parts, the nature of the system is always more than the sum total of its separate parts.” Education, say Selby and Pike, does not recognize this reality, even though students, like all of earth’s inhabitants, are inextricably bound up in the web.

Selby and Pike are not alone in using the metaphor of a giant web to explain the idea of global systems, including the idea of global culture as a unified system. The interlocking web encompasses and connects various aspects of the world—economic systems of the various nation-states for instance—are now becoming one giant global network. We are asked to look upon the emerging global culture as a web of beliefs, customs, patterns of living, symbols and so on; in other words a coherent, integrated system. Once understood in this way, we have before us, according to Selby and Pike, a theoretical base for understanding the interrelationships, interdependencies, and interconnections within and between cultures as they merge into one cultural net that encircles the globe.
There is reason to suppose that correctly interpreted, the concept of a world "system" and the accompanying metaphor, the web, is a useful construct for describing and analyzing relationships between phenomena. Systems theory can be a powerful explanatory tool. Yet in global education literature, the "web" has on occasion turned into an oversimplified, even misleading way in which to frame understanding of the various aspects and dimensions of world systems. Claiming that the world is like a web may suggest that we are all intertwined, but it does not go very far in explaining the ways in which relationships are unequal, the fact that actions from certain quarters will shake the web violently while others will hardly be felt, that elements within the web seem bent on its destruction, and so on. As one critic of existing forms of global education put it, "Let us not fool ourselves and others. We are not living in a harmoniously interdependent world, but in a deteriorating world" in which unhealthy and destructive relationships continue to exist between the First and Third Worlds. Interdependence between peoples is in no way a mutual condition. Teachers cannot expect that projecting the image of a web onto the world will do much to explain the intricacies and subtleties of systems to their students. Neither will the image help them understand the complexities and inequities of unbalanced development.

Clifford Geertz gives us a different image when he speaks of cultures, one that may be slightly more helpful to us:

The appropriate image if one must have images, of cultural organization is neither the spider web nor the pile of sand. It is rather more the octopus, whose tentacles are in large part separately integrated, neurally quite poorly connected with one another and with what in the octopus passes for a brain, and yet who nonetheless manages to both get around and preserve himself, for a while anyway,
as a viable if somewhat ungainly entity.45

Geertz’s comments suggest a far more slippery, more complex image than the web-like system that Pike and Selby see as an appropriate description of culture, including what they see to be global culture. Oversimplification can lead to serious misunderstandings, in global education as everywhere else. And it is not just oversimplification that is troubling here but that the very notion of homogenization of world cultures is inevitable and even a good thing. The message seems to be that progress is necessarily linked to Western ways of thinking, believing, and viewing the world.

The viability of individual cultures is a permanent feature of our world. Despite much contamination by the West, certain features and dimensions of literally thousands of regional cultural groups remain strong, each with its own voice and face.46 In his most recent book, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Isaiah Berlin speaks of each society or culture as having its “own centre of gravity”47

The ways in which men live, think, feel, speak to one another, the clothes they wear the songs they sing, the gods they worship, the foods they eat, the assumptions, habits, which are intrinsic to them—it is this that creates communities... 48

Between cultural communities values differ widely and there are disagreements among communities often because of the incompatibility of these values. One such example is Berlin’s description of a culture that reveres humility contrasted with a culture that has for its highest virtue courage in adversity. Recognizing the essential incompatibility of these values is not evidence of cultural or moral relativism, rather it should be understood as pluralism—the recognition that there are many ways of life for human beings and many imagined “ends” but they are all found within the
human horizon. Even with our extreme differences, we do recognize certain features about each other; we all have needs that must be satisfied, and we all have life plans, we make choices, we express certain recognizable emotions and so on. We can, given enough imaginative insight, understand what it would be like to live by values other than our own and be guided by purposes we may disagree with but can still identify as legitimate human aims. Pluralism is the conception that there are many different ends that men may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each other and sympathizing and deriving light from each other...”49 There may be no way to completely reconcile our disparate visions into one, but we can learn to converse with compassion, sensitivity and reasonableness across differences.

We are capable of understanding and learning from each other, and at times even changing our points of view. Berlin’s pluralist view does not commit us to silence between communities, nor does it commit us to refraining from judgements once we have made a sincere and reasoned effort to step into another’s perspective as far as we are able. Berlin’s insights here are important:

One can reject a culture because one finds it morally or aesthetically repellent, but on this view, only if one could understand how and why it could, nevertheless be acceptable to a recognizably human society. Only if its behavior is not intelligible at all are we reduced to a mere ‘physicalist’ description and prediction of gestures; the code if there is one, which would yield their meaning remains unbroken. Such men are not fully human for us; we do not know what they are up to; they are not brothers to us...; we can at most only dimly guess at what the point of their acts, if they are acts, may be.50

What seems clear and unassailable is that values clash and are inevitably incompatible with each other, but we can through dialogue and
imaginative understanding try to find the common ground between us. Like Berlin's, my position is not one of cultural relativism but of pluralism. Walzer notes that while our understanding of other people's histories and experiences is never complete, we can always ask them to explain. And often, if not always, we will grasp what they mean. He writes:

Intercommunication between cultures in time and space is only possible because what makes men human is common to them, and acts as a bridge between them. But our values are ours and theirs are theirs. We are free to criticize the values of other cultures, to condemn them but we cannot pretend not to understand them at all, or to regard them simply as subjective, the products of creatures in different circumstances, with different tastes from our own, which do not speak to us at all.

If we are sincere and persevering in our efforts to understand and imagine the lives and struggles of other people, we will, be able to recognize their values as human ones much of the time. If the quest is successful, we shall see that the values of these remote peoples are such as human beings like ourselves—creatures capable of conscious intellectual and moral discrimination—could live by. This may be the most we can hope for in some cases and its importance should not be underestimated. However in matters of shared concern such as human rights, clean water, adequate medical care and so on, we can hope for more. Through dialogue and exchange, the original patch of common ground can grow.

It will not grow into a single vision of what a good life consists in for each of us, nor into a shared cultural vision of experience. As we have seen, MacIntyre wants us to return to small communities that are guided by a single political and social image of the world, one that he believes can unite us against the chaos beyond our spiritual hearths. Not only does it seem extremely unrealistic given the pluralistic nature of the world, it appears as an
undesirable goal as well. By eclipsing diversity from view, we eclipse any chance we have to learn from others who may be very different from us, but may (and likely will in many cases) have valuable insights we can use in living our lives in the best ways we can. In terms of the problems that face all of humanity, MacIntyre’s call for a retreat from the world could even endanger what possibilities there are for saving it, possibilities that demand more cooperation between peoples with disparate views, not less. As Dewey tells us, it is diversity that challenges and provokes us to grow and to change. Not only do we have a moral imperative to listen to other voices, we have an obligation to do the best we can to solve the problems we face, using all the means we have at hand. The plurality of views that exists in a potential global community is a resource we cannot afford to cast aside.

3.6. CONCLUSION: A PARTICIPATIONIST COMMUNITY

In this chapter I have attempted to show that the concept of community is still meaningful in terms of our identities and allegiances. We are not in imminent danger of losing ourselves as social, relational beings. We still operate from a moral horizon that is constituted by our attachments and obligations to others. But we need to reconceptualize what it is to be part of a community and we need to reshape the concept of community itself. The community that we should want is one that can embrace plurality and let each of us contribute to the dialogue in our own ways. We should be able to cross community boundaries far enough to take on new perspectives and challenge received views. According to Seyla Benhabib, there are two communitarian visions of community. One is an integrationist community in which members are united by a single conception of what is good and valuable. The other is
the participationist community in which the bonds between people are simply their shared commitments to communicate in certain ways and to reverse perspectives with others. I argue that the participationist community is the only vision of community that is compatible with pluralism. We cannot recapture an integrationist vision and we should not want to. We can attempt to work through our differences and cultivate some common ground but in doing so we should never forget how valuable those differences are to each of us and to our collective efforts to converse.

In the next chapter I will further discuss the foundations of moral communities and begin to outline the necessary elements for a global community of concern based on respect and reciprocity. There are very few presuppositions necessary for the construction of a moral community compatible with commitments to pluralism and ongoing dialogue. These presuppositions will be explored in light of developing a moral global perspective.

As we begin to construct a community of concern, we will need to extend our moral sense to include those who are presently outside our recognized circle of moral experience. We will need to imagine what life is like for others. We will need to listen to them and ensure that there is a public space where all possible participants in the dialogue can come together. We will need to make sure that all voices are heard and no one voice dominates. We will need to learn how to do all these things as part of attaining a moral global perspective. Learning how to build community across difference then, is the primary task of global education.

\[1\text{Benhabib, 75–76.}\]


4Benhabib, 11.

5Donald Johnson, "Academic and Intellectual Foundations of Teacher Education in Global Perspectives," *Theory Into Practice* 32, no. 1 (Winter, 1993): 5. In a recent article, Donald Johnson, director of international education and Asian studies at New York University, notes that within global education, "a common theme in much of the literature...argues that the world is moving toward a single homogeneous culture."


9Ibid., 34.


14MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 221.
15'Ibid., 216.
16'Ibid., 241.
17'O'Neill, Constructions of Reason, 146.
18'Stout, 212.
19'Ibid., 237.
20'Ibid., 237.
21'Ibid., 211.
22'Maclntyre, After Virtue, 263.
23'It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the limitations of Aristotle's polis beyond citing the obvious inequities such as restricting membership to a small class of males.
24'Stout, 236.
25'Rural communes based on religious ties or shared aspirations about small-scale agricultural sustainability would be exceptions.
27'Ibid., 27.
28'Stout, Ethics After Babel, 195.
29'Ibid., 195.
30'Ibid., 195.
31'Maclntyre, After Virtue, 187. Social practices are defined as "any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, the form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended."
32Stout, 215.

33Ibid., 212.

34Ibid., 65.


38Lee Anderson, Schooling in a Global Age (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1973), 84.


40See Chapter Two: “Redefining the Global Perspective.”


42Ibid., 40.


Geertz argues this way as do many other anthropologists. As well, the resurgence of the voices of indigenous groups from all over the world, many who are trying to actively promote knowledge of their heritage to new generations, would seem to speak against the claims of global educators mentioned here.


Ibid., 10. It is important to note that Berlin is speaking here of cultural communities. Other groups unified around a single purpose or set of interests may be created very differently, e.g. the scientific community.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 87.

Ibid., 117.


Berlin, 88.

Ibid., 88.

Ibid., 76–80.
Passions, then, engagements and imagining: I want to find a way of speaking community, an expanding community, taking shape when diverse people, speaking as who and not what they are, come together in speech and action, as Hannah Arendt puts it, to constitute something in common among themselves.

Maxine Greene

4.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I argue that one important element of a global perspective is the belief in the possibility of a global moral community constructed out of our disparate moral heritages and beliefs. Although I see its construction as crucial to the development of a global perspective, this community would have a limited purpose and place in our moral lives. Its central role would be to highlight common spheres of interest and provide a forum for dialogue about them. As well, such a community would keep a watchful eye on the institutions established to serve human needs. In this way it would function as a kind of community of concern.

Hilary Putnam's discussion of a community of inquirers provides the framework for an examination of principles on which moral communities are based. Following that is a description of features that would be present if the idea of a moral community were applied to a wider context in the world, as in a global community of concern.

4.2. A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERS

Before we can describe features of a global community of concern, it is important to examine the fundamental beliefs about humanity that underlie
moral communities. Hilary Putnam describes these as communities of inquirers attempting to answer the question “How should we live?” I hope to show that the connections we have to others in existing moral communities are based on the same principles as those that can guide construction of new communities.

In the third lecture of Many Faces of Realism, titled “Equality and Our Moral Image of the World,” Putnam takes up the question of what beliefs are necessary (though not sufficient) for the establishment of a genuine moral community. These beliefs take the form of principles, which, he writes, come to us (at least to those of us in the west) from elements of the Jewish and Christian religions. Once detached from their religious roots, an air of mystery surrounds these principles; nevertheless, he takes them to “capture the minimal content that the idea of equality which Western culture took from the Bible, seems to have.” He writes:

(I) There is something about human beings, some aspect of which is of incomparable moral significance, with respect to which all human beings are equal, no matter how unequal they may be in talents, achievements, social contribution etc.

(II) Even those who are least talented, or whose achievements are the least, or whose contribution to society is the least, are deserving of respect.

To these, Putnam adds a third principle, which he says, arose out of the increasing importance which the notion of happiness has had in the evolution of our ethical thinking and our various moral languages. This is the principle that everyone’s happiness or suffering is of equal prima facie moral importance. One can see how this principle arose out of the concern of the first two; as the value of mutual respect came to be understood in terms of the conditions and quality of actual lives of persons, so the consequences of the
treatment of others seemed to take a more prominent place in the ethical landscape.

The value of equality, Putnam rightly points out, can be and in fact, has been, transferred from a religious tenet to a secular claim about the rights which all human beings possess to the same degree. As Stout tells us:

The language of human rights and respect for persons can be seen as a conceptual outgrowth of institutions and compromises pragmatically justified under historical circumstances where a relatively thin conception of the good is the most that people can secure rational agreement on.\(^5\)

This thin conception of the good is the value we recognize in freedom for ourselves and others—freedom to pursue the good of our own choosing without interference or violation of our basic rights to liberty and freedom from harm. To this extent, we have come to agree on a minimal vision of what counts as the good. Perhaps the clearest example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent "declarations" which have been passed by United Nations Assemblies over the years since World War II. The tenets of Amnesty International are another example.

How do we explain our belief that we are all equally entitled to choose our own good life? When we speak of equality we speak of the capacity people have for rational thought, conscious choice, or the deliberate setting of life plans within a community of others.\(^6\) What it is about human beings, what quality or essence we might possess that makes us all equal, has been the subject of much theoretical discussion over centuries, discussion that would take me too far from my present purpose.

We are all equal, in the sense discussed in Putnam's piece, in a way that builds on a belief in our individual freedom and our capacity to be free
thinkers, as Kant (on Putnam's interpretation) saw us. That is, we are all equal with respect to the one question (and it is ultimately a moral question) people must ask themselves: "How shall I live?"

This is not, as Putnam points out, a modern question; we share it with pre-Enlightenment thinkers who in addition thought we could discover the answer through the light of reason and through the exercise of faith (e.g. Aquinas' "natural light.")7 But Putnam brings up a second claim concerning equality, one that departs dramatically from any claims about finding the answer by following the path of faith. On Putnam's reading of Kant, we are all equally in the dark as to how to answer that one question correctly. And we shall remain so. In other words, we are all in precisely the same dubious situation; we are called upon to use our reason and our capacity for free choice to choose who to be and how to live, when no inclusive human end, no telos, can be revealed to us through reason, and no "truths of religion" can be deduced. Putnam puts it like this:

To be blunt, we are called upon to use reason and free will in a situation which is in certain important respects very dark. The situation is dark because reason does not give us such a thing as an "inclusive human end."8 which we should all seek (unless it is morality itself and this is not an end that can determine the content of morality.)

The radical departure from ancient and medieval thinking is the idea that we cannot "discover" what our essence is because there is no predetermined essence to discover. "What Kant is saying," writes Putnam, "to put it positively, is that we have to think for ourselves without the kind of guide that Alasdair MacIntyre wants to restore for us and that fact is itself the most valuable fact about our lives."9 It is the most valuable fact because it is the most important characteristic which we share with one another. It is, in other
words, what makes us equal. We have the capacity for, as well as the need for, "free moral thinking" thinking that will help us decide how to live. Even though we can never come to know what the human essence is, even though there is no telos waiting to be discovered, this is a fact to be celebrated, not grieved over. The medieval picture with its emphasis on a fixed human essence that is temporarily hidden from view, forces us to remain in a heteronomous state; it eclipses our only chance at genuine freedom. However, because we are free to create an answer, and find our own way to live, we become autonomous through our search.

What we share with our own community members as well as those outside, is the single question: "How should we live?" It is a moral question. The stories we create, as well as the stories which were passed down to us and that we will in turn tell our children, are both communal and individual attempts to answer it. As soon as we are able to take up the ethical challenge of creating our own answer to the question "How shall I live?", we are able to join what Putnam calls the community of inquirers who respect our equal capacity for free thought. "If I read him aright," says Putnam,

Kant's community is a community of beings who think for themselves without knowing what the 'human essence' is, without knowing what 'Eudaemonia' is, and who respect one another for doing that. That is Kant's 'Kingdom of Ends'.

Putnam claims that with these assertions about our freedom and our need for free moral thinking as the basis of our equality, Kant has provided us with a "moral image of the world." The moral image of the world we hold in common is inextricably linked to our capacity for free thinking and the value we place on it. It is also linked to the ways we believe we ought to treat others who are on their own quest for an answer. Although it is not finely articulated,
Putnam sees a moral image as a hopeful vision to look to, one which might actually inspire formal principles of morality. He writes:

A moral image, in the sense that I am using the term, is not a declaration that this or that is a virtue, or that this or that is what one ought to do; it is rather a picture of how our virtues and ideals hang together with one another and with what they have to do with the position we are in. It may be as vague as the notions of 'sisterhood and brotherhood'; indeed millions of human beings have found in those metaphors moral images that could organize their moral lives—and this not withstanding the enormous problem of interpreting them and of deciding what it could possibly mean to make them effective.¹³

I am drawn to Putnam's phrase, “our moral image of the world” for several reasons. In one sense I see it linked to Stout's notion of the public background of moral agreement that we share. It is also connected to Taylor's description of the horizon of beliefs and principles within which we make our own choices about the good and the right in particular cases. It is a picture of how our virtues and ideals hang together; as such it can have both an individual and a shared meaning. Putnam claims that this picture or vision is what moral philosophy needs instead of a list of particular virtues or a string of rights, and in this observation I think he is partly right. There is a need to keep the moral image in mind as a reminder of our moral orientation. Perhaps we need both the vision and the list. It is hard to know just how any picture of the "position we are in" could help us much in deciding where we ought to go without a thick description of the virtues we think are important to develop and how those are tied to our particular obligations and commitments. This is especially true given the complex roles and responsibilities we have taken on in our various associations and communities. If I can put Stout’s words to use in a slightly different context, general talk about a moral image of the world does not help us much “in abstraction from what Dewey called the meaning of
the daily detail."^{14}

However it might be that once applied to an actual community of inquirers who respect each other's freedom and believe in each other's equality, a moral image of the world begins to look less hazy and more defined than the metaphors that Putnam attaches to it (such as sisterhood and brotherhood) suggest. Such a community cannot be solely based on pragmatic notions of reasonableness and what might count as the most effective means to a predetermined end. There is no, and can be no, telos waiting for discovery. Ends themselves must be discussed and debated and criticized within view of the various moral "horizons" people bring with them. At first glance pragmatic concerns with procedure may seem to be adequate foundation for the formation of a community of inquirers who are trying to arrive at intersubjective agreements and who are testing the justifiability of statements. But the crucial point here, the one that links the idea of a moral quest with the idea of a special sort of community is the ethical commitment presupposed by Putnam's phase, "the moral image of the world."

This commitment goes far deeper than pragmatic or procedural considerations concerning the way in which rational debate takes place within a group of testers, although these considerations are not irrelevant. Most importantly, the community of inquirers as Putnam envisions it, is committed to certain ideals, among them and perhaps first among them is aiming at the truth. In holding to that commitment, a genuine community of inquirers must make it possible for anyone within its membership to voice concern or criticism with the understanding that it will be heard. Every contribution to the dialogue will be attended to; that is, taken seriously.\textsuperscript{15} A commitment to truth and to freedom of expression are inseparable on this view of community. For
no one can have the final and indisputable word on what is true. As Mill pointed out, no voice can be eclipsed from the discussion if individuals are sincerely committed to the pursuit of the truth. Freedom of expression, seen in this light, means the opportunity to be a full participant in the dialogue, or the ongoing search for intersubjective agreement. As Onora O'Neill emphatically reminds us, we cannot merely allow the possibility of free expression, we must foster conditions of communication such that all voices can be effectively heard. With the commitment to hearing all participants, we are voicing a concern to reach the truth in the company of other inquirers.

The structure of the ideal community of inquirers must be such that other principles are foundational as well. "It must, in short," writes Putnam, "be a community which respects the principles of intellectual freedom and equality." Here the connection between the community of inquirers and the idea of a moral image of the world is finally established. One moral image of the world is a vision of a possible community of inquirers. Not only are members of this community committed to search for answers to the question "How shall I live?" (and "How shall we live?") they are committed to the freedom of others who are involved in the same search.

Putnam's view allows for multiple moral images to be accommodated within a community of inquirers, not only the moral image articulated here which he takes to be Kant's. In the lecture which follows "Equality and Our Moral Image of the World," he writes that we will never be absolutely certain that we are in possession of the one true moral image. There is no way to settle the matter any more than there is a fixed and certain answer to questions about how we ought to live. Yet that kind of uncertainty does not throw us back into the arms of relativism. Putnam tells us that, "one does not
have to believe in a unique best moral version, or a unique best mathematical
version; what we have are better and worse versions, and that is objectivity." It
is as close as we can come to certainty.

Our notions, the notion of a value, the notion of a moral image, the
notion of a standard, the notion of a need, are all so intertwined that
none of them can provide a 'foundation' for ethics. That, I think, is
exactly right. We must come to see that there is no possibility of a
'foundation' for ethics just as we have come to see that there is no
possibility of a 'foundation' for scientific knowledge or any other kind of
knowledge.18

But if there is no foundation, if we cannot be certain about arriving at
the one best moral vision, how can we know which are better and which are
worse versions? Here Putnam borrows a metaphor to explain his position.
Human beings have needs that must be satisfied. We have, for instance the
need for tools that will cut, slice, and chop various materials which will
become food, or clothing or shelter. Although we don't follow a universal
blueprint for the one ideal or perfect knife for all times, places and purposes,
that does not mean we do not know how to choose between better and worse
knives. Lack of such a blueprint does not mean, writes Putnam, that:

the knives we make don't satisfy real needs, and knives may certainly
be better or worse. It is because there are real needs, and not merely
desires, that it makes sense to distinguish between better and worse
values and for that matter between better and worse knives.19

It is the very same thing when we talk about moral images that will
guide our lives. "We are not approximating to The Universes Own Moral
Truths," we are simply doing the best we can with the resources we have.
Moral images, no less than knives are human creations. Putnam goes on to
describe what some of those creations are and have been:

The image of civic republicanism or communitarianism, the moral
image of human fraternity, the moral image of humans made as God's
image and likeness, and the Kantian moral image of the Kingdom of Ends, or of self-legislating agents, are all human creations. But that doesn't mean that the statements we make, using the language of one or another such moral image, cannot be right or wrong.20

We judge the images and the statements and the actions that follow from them, to be right or wrong on the basis of how well they satisfy needs, solve problems, help us live. And it may be that we need not one but many moral images of the world simultaneously. If one central vision is that of a community of inquirers, as Putnam's third lecture suggests, we may still need additional pictures of how our virtues and ideals hang together. We may need them in order to make sense of our questions and our quest and in order to balance our public obligations with our private bonds. We may need them to help us prioritize and order the goods that we seek. We may all be asking how we should live (both collectively and individually) and we may all need to search for our own answers, but along the way there will be many times when our individual paths merge with those of others. At those moments, it may not be autonomy that is most important but solidarity with others, and the most relevant virtues may be those of compassion or sympathy, not simply respect for another's liberty. Putnam states that as human creations that are designed to help us in our quests, moral images can be "superseded, merged, combined, and so on."21 This may be one of the most important features a moral community can have, not just to reconcile disparate moral images, but to create a place where images can creatively and fruitfully combine, forming new visions to guide us.

I believe that it is possible (though challenging) for us to recreate meaningful communities in our own society based on shared interests that we in fact do have—interests in safe and peaceful neighborhoods, clean public spaces, a healthier environment, adequate medical care and so on. Concerns
overlap in many locales and regions and a global community may not be entirely out of reach if we can identify an "overlapping consensus" on any ideals or issues that affect other people as well as ourselves. We can base the construction of these communities on standards already available to us as human beings; among them the need to live together peaceably, the need to be treated with fairness and respect, the need to shape meaningful lives for ourselves in the company of others. Certain responses to these needs will serve us better than others; certain proposed solutions to the problems of sustainability, for example will work better than others. Certain responses to world crises will help us come closer to ideals we already accept in principle. All of these will be tied to public and personal values we hold and our standards for judging the adequacy of solutions to problems will be based on those values. "It is because there are real human needs and not merely desires," writes Hilary Putnam, "that it makes sense to distinguish between better and worse values." Our problems will change over time, and as they do, so will our ways of addressing them. Although we cannot say in advance which of our values will guide us in particular circumstances, we know that as our needs change so will the standards we adopt to judge our decisions and our actions. Putnam writes that:

Standards and practices, pragmatists have always insisted, must be developed together and constantly revised by a procedure of delicate mutual adjustment. The standards by which we judge and compare our moral images are themselves creations as much as the moral images.

I think Stout would say this is as it should be. "We begin in a particular place," he writes, "but that need not and should not condemn us to stay at our starting point. Breadth of vision remains a good to be pursued, even if our perspective can never be eternity." Our moral images represent one
important facet of this vision. It changes and grows as humanity redesigns priorities and searches for commonalities. It begins in full view of the horizon from which it was created but it does not stay there.

4.3. CONVERSING ACROSS DIFFERENCES

Communities are not static entities but constantly evolve and redesign themselves according to our needs. Throughout our lifetimes we may be members of all kinds of communities and associations, each defined by a different purpose or set of interests, each with its own questions and concerns. Human beings ought to share an interest in communicating about global problems because we share an urgent need to solve them. Something like a global moral community, a community of concern as I will call it, may one day be constructed in the world, and the discourse that it employs will not sound unfamiliar to us. Participating in moral discourse is part of what we do and part of what we need to teach our children to do. Some of the participants in the discourse will be from backgrounds and cultures so different from our own that the discourse will be halting and difficult. Where we do not share a world of meanings, to use Walzer's phrase, we will be compelled to invent one. This is the beginning of building community.

We do have a framework for talking about what is needed to construct and participate in moral communities, even a moral community on a global scale. In the last chapter we looked at the notion of community based on traditional bonds of fraternity and united by commonalities that are built up over generations. These were the communities described by Bellah and his colleagues, communities in which moral language was forged out of familiar bonds of caring and compassion for one's family and neighbors, and out of a
vision of the good as seen through Biblical traditions. Though the communities themselves may be lost, certain values that were held by their members continue to have meaning for us in relation to many complex social practices we still cherish. And virtues such as beneficence, compassion and empathy continue to have an important place in our contemporary moral lives, as expressions of what Thomas Nagel terms, “recognition of the full reality of others.”

In this chapter, we looked at the moral foundations of a community of inquirers as Putnam (echoing Kant) sees them, inquirers united by the question of how we ought to live in a world where no telos is given to us. Our hope is to individually and collectively construct the best lives we can with the resources and tools we have, including those that will facilitate uncoerced communication between us. The answers we arrive at will be judged on the basis of how well they meet our needs and how closely they correspond to our moral images of what the world ought to be.

4.4. STANDARDS FOR COMMUNICATION

The possibility of a moral global community is the possibility of dialogue between people who may initially share little more than a commitment to communication of a certain sort. That communication is defined by a limited but nevertheless important number of features that have been discussed by writers from Kant to Dewey to Jurgen Habermas. According to these and other philosophers, the kind of guidelines we establish for communication are crucial. Dwight Boyd, in a persuasive piece on pluralism and moral education claims that collective effort to approximate what Habermas calls the conditions of the ideal speech situation, is the only
chance for genuine dialogue across cultures. He writes:

Part of our understanding of communication within this ideal is that moral statements must always be made from within what Habermas calls the "performative attitude." They are not static truth claims warranted only by how closely they reflect reality according to some privileged epistemic position. Rather they are claims made to others about the best means of regulating overlapping and competing needs and interests for the purpose of a *mutual* "redemption" of their validity. In this sense the locus of what warrants them as better or worse can be found only through the quality of the dialogic activity among persons.28

What could help us in the effort to improve the quality of communication, or redeem the validity of our claims through "dialogic activity"? In a paper titled "Enlightenment as Autonomy," Onora O'Neill discusses what Kant meant by communicative guidelines and how we might approximate an ideal of communication. She begins by summarizing what Kant meant by human communication:

Human communication is not a set of repertoires whose emergence reflects only the evolution of the species and the maturation of individual organisms, but has a history. Neither are the principles of communicating that emerge in the course of this history given from any source that transcends human life. They have to develop and be instituted in the course of human communication. There is neither a natural nor a preestablished harmony in the conversation of mankind.29

According to Kant our practices already commit us to interacting with others who are not like us, as well as those who are. The search for intersubjective agreement cannot be limited to like-minded speakers. It is an open-ended and ongoing search and we cannot fix limits on who the participants might one day be (the totality of possible agents.) I take it that on Kant's view, the possibility of a moral global community already exists—our present practices of inquiry do, in fact, take us beyond the borders of our own familiar moral spheres. In principle, the questions: How shall I live? and How
shall we live? belong to the "conversation of mankind" and that conversation extends across both distance and difference.

But there are no predetermined, fixed guidelines for communicating across differences, "no preestablished harmony in the conversation." As well there are no guarantees of cooperation which exist in advance of the attempt to cooperate. All we can do is construct principles that will allow the dialogue to begin and to continue, and we must do this in the course of the conversation itself. We cannot rely on guidelines that may have directed our communication in other spheres, or on principles that may have been previously agreed to. The difficulty with bringing the "contingently shared principles of some actual plurality" to the construction of possible communities, including a moral community on a global scale, is that we may find that these principles "are not sharable at all, and that our supposed capacities to reason fail and falter at the first boundary.30"

So where are we to start? Kant believed that we are initially compelled to follow only those principles and standards which would not preclude others from following them. Since we are not guaranteed cooperation from others, all we can do is to "avoid principles that could not regulate communication among a plurality of separate, free and potentially reasoning beings."31 O'Neill claims that in Kant's political writings he was less interested in talking about the intentions or goals we must have when we communicate as he was in describing the standards that must be achieved in the practices of communication. "If our communicating is to be genuine, it must, so far as possible meet shared standards of interpretability."32 It was Kant's belief that "those who flout reasoned maxims of communication risk damage to shared standards of reasoning which are essential for addressing the world at
Kant gave us just three maxims for communication. They are all concerned with establishing standards of communication through discourse itself. The first maxim is to think for oneself. (As Putnam reminds us, our capacity and our need for free moral thinking is one of the most important features of our humanity.) The maxim of thinking for oneself, writes O'Neill, "demands only that there be a plurality of parties to any debate, whose thinking and judging are to some extent independent." There can be no genuine communication where there is perfect agreement, only echoes of it. In our search for answers about how we ought to live (and this question encompasses a potentially infinite number of shared concerns about the earth, about conflict resolution, about social justice, about poverty) we need to be embracing a plurality of views and voices. Independent thought is essential to the debate and to the possibility of its continuation. This maxim can also be seen as a way of talking about the role of tolerance in communication across differences. To claim that one should think for oneself is to claim at the same time that everyone should do so (and have the opportunity to do so.) As such it has enormous significance for building a global community based on principles that all possible participants can agree to.

The second maxim is to think from the standpoint of everyone else and to consider your judgments as they are (or would be) regarded by others. We are all in this together and there is no privileged position that any human being can ascend to that is above the debate (as there might be if human reason had a source that transcended itself). There is only the position, writes O'Neill, "of one who strives to reach and understand the perspectives of
others, and to communicate with them rather than past them." A genuine attempt to understand other perspectives could even extend to what Kant called the world at large. In fact, he called this maxim "the maxim of enlarged thought." In terms of building a global moral community, this maxim has particular applicability. It speaks to the need to establish connections with others, to step into their shoes. It speaks to the need for empathy in communication.

The third maxim is to always think consistently. Kant believed that achieving systematic consistency was not a trivial matter.

If there is a possible form of communication between beings who are separate and whose coordination is not naturally given or preestablished, then those beings must guide their attempts at communicating by principles that neither erode their own thinking nor fail to seek to understand and to follow the thinking of others, nor shrink from the task of working through and integrating a constantly revised set of judgements to achieve consistency.

This last maxim is important to the establishment of a global moral community for several reasons. Communication in such a fledgling enterprise is bound to be fragile, and extremely vulnerable to distortion and misinterpretation, both willful and accidental. The search for open, uncoerced and free communication among a plurality of voices is a search for standards that can reliably and helpfully direct that communication. On Kant's view we are searching for standards that insure maximum interpretability. Consistency in thought, in speech and in action is one such standard. The demand for consistency reinforces the first two maxims as well. The maxim, think for oneself, when consistently applied to all communicators, means that everyone must think for himself or herself. In a sense, Kant's maxim of consistency is a demand for just and fair consideration across cases.
For Kant, to enter into the human conversation, to genuinely communicate across differences, is to embark on a journey where no destination is announced in advance. Our compass provides only an approximate moral orientation. We have just a sketch instead of a map of the territory. (Perhaps we could call the sketch a moral image of the world). Our guidebook, if we have one at all, is a small set of warnings that will only keep us away from a few known hazards and pitfalls. These "guidelines" are the maxims of communication that Kant has given us. The distances and gulfs between people may be greater in a global realm than in other contexts in which we try to build community, but I believe the maxims for communication are the same: think for yourself; consider your judgments in light of other perspectives (as well as think from the standpoints of others as far as possible;) and finally, think consistently across cases. If these maxims are used as guidelines for communicating across differences, perhaps the voices that have been excluded from the conversation up until now, could begin to be heard.

4.5. BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF CONCERN

The preceding section of this chapter was a discussion of the standards for communication necessary for people who are building communities beyond their own regional, national and cultural borders. Here the challenge of pluralism is more evident than in any other sphere. The conditions for communication that I laid out need to be created by people genuinely interested in building a community of concern. What would a global community of concern look like? The following section is an attempt to briefly answer this question.
In his book titled *The Public and its Problems*, Dewey addresses the difficulties that a democratic society faces in striving to establish itself as a "Great Community." Many of his insights are relevant to discussion of a possible global community of concern. I believe that the enterprise of constructing a moral global community can be justified within a framework of democratic principles and ideals as laid out by Dewey, here and elsewhere, particularly in *Democracy and Education*.

Though its ideals can never be fully realized and will always be subject to review, the "Great Community" is nevertheless the embodiment and expression of the democratic way of life. This, writes Dewey, is a life of "free and enriching communion" which "will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication." The realization of this goal will take deliberate effort and education, and community members will need to demonstrate commitment to sharing the process of social inquiry (as well as the knowledge that informs it) with a plurality of voices.

Pluralism, in fact, is one of the strongest challenges facing a potential "Great Community"; in any public, there will be numerous and competing conceptions and visions about how people should conduct their lives. What people need in order to form a community in which "genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities" informs desire and directs action, is communication that will build common understanding. "Men live in a community in virtue of the things they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common."

Communication is clearly the cornerstone of community building, inside democratic societies as well as outside of them. Communities are built
through dialogue, through participation in conversation that is free, open-ended and uncoerced. They are, like democracy, like moral images, human creations, in other words, social constructions. A global moral community, and the vision of what such a community ought to be, will not be something we discover. It is something we will have to construct. And we will go on constructing new visions of a global community, generation after generation. The real problem, as Dwight Boyd emphatically tells us in the context of creating a vision of multiculturalism, is how to keep this question an open one. We will not know and cannot know precisely what a global moral community will look like. Any vision put forth or described by me, or Coombs or Putnam or anyone else, will be, must be, essentially contestable. It will require, just as any vision of human development requires, “ongoing communal consideration, critique, confirmation etc.”

What we can hope for in a global realm, is that people will construct a common understanding about the concerns which they already share, concerns that are not primarily attached to their differences but to certain fundamental human needs which connect us all. Diversity will of course present an enormous hurdle (as well as an enormous resource) as the dialogue continues. A community of concern is a community of people willing and prepared to take on the challenge of pluralism, in order to, as Boyd says, “talk through our cultural diversity about how we should make sense of it together.” all the while knowing that many of our shared problems have arisen out of our differences. Concurrently and just as importantly, participants in a community of concern will be coming together in order to talk about making sense of the shared questions we acknowledge we do have, questions about how we ought to live, how we ought to treat one another, how
we ought to remedy conditions of environmental decay, health epidemics, and so on. We will not know in advance what interests a community of concern might share over time, but we do know many of the problems that presently face humans as well as other species. Certainly these problems are justification enough for construction of a community that might help solve them. Many of these concerns have already been brought to light in existing global forums. There is reason to believe we can improve on these first efforts at community.

4.6. THE CHALLENGE TO CONSTRUCTING A COMMUNITY OF CONCERN

There are many articulate critics with strong objections to the kind of project I have just outlined. Postmodernists, communitarians, and a good many feminists would argue against the possibility of a global community of concern for some of the same reasons they argue against the possibility of a universal morality, or even the possibility of dialogue across differences. Though unlike in many, even most ways, these three groups share a powerful critique of the values of the Enlightenment. They are, for both shared and separate reasons, suspicious of any attempt to talk of universalizing in ethics or other aspects of human experience. Because their claims have such a powerful hold on educational, as well as other sorts of political and social discourse, it is important to respond to their arguments at some length, and to offer what I believe is a convincing rationale for taking up the task of teaching students the elements of community building, in essence, ways to communicate within a pluralistic world.

From the point of view of postmodernists, the very idea of absolutes is
rejected outright, whether they be the moral, spiritual, social or epistemological foundations that have been central to the worldviews of modernity. So the possibility of constructing a framework for communication based on ideals of equality and a search for truth or intersubjective understanding, a project like Habermas' communicative ethics for example, is doomed before it is begun, and in fact, should be doomed. Nicholas Burbules and Suzanne Rice identify three recurring trains of thought that seem to characterize postmodern thinking, particularly that found in work relevant to educational studies. First, there are no metanarratives, no single rationality and no grand theory that will explain our situation or for that matter our salvation. All narratives are expressions of particular points of view. All rationalities are local.

Second, all political and social discourses are saturated with power and dominance. Educational discourse, as a kind of political discourse, exists only for the purpose of furthering the interests of some at the expense of the interests of others. On this view, much of what goes on in schools can be regarded as a manifestation of cultural imperialism. There are countless historical and contemporary examples that show this insight is powerful, even several that have been mentioned previously in this thesis.

Third, according to postmodernists, the existence of difference itself is a condition to be celebrated. Diversity amongst people is regarded as an unmitigated good. The plurality of the world is "the constitutive quality of existence" and all forms of life are permitted on principle. There is no reason to value or privilege one set of beliefs, one way of life, over another. This argument is related to the communitarian claim that,

"differences of time, place, history or community have a place in ethical
deliberation. I am situated in a distinct moral space. I have special and
nonuniversalizable obligations to my community. I have a story that is
my own story in terms of which I make decisions. This story is part of
other stories, and the significance of these stories may be articulated
within a particular tradition.47

The viability of local discourses over so-called universal ones are
emphasized by postmodernists, communitarians and feminists alike. They
also share a belief that any attempt to universalize a viewpoint, "masks the
will to power and is an illegitimate attempt at domination."48 Historically, only a
handful of voices have been allowed to join the larger human conversation; all
others have been suppressed. Theories of common morality have been
harmful to all but a few; this is primarily the reason feminists and others resist
them.49

In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young names five
faces of oppression which have kept all but a select few from participating
fully in the world: powerlessness, exploitation, marginalization, silencing and
violence.50 While liberal thinkers may allow, perhaps even encourage all
dominated groups to share their experiences and their perspectives, the
postmodernist argues that this is not nearly enough to change the tide of
human history. We need to ask ourselves who we are unwittingly excluding.
What forms of power and dominance exist that will result in retribution to
those who might break the silence? “Who may want to speak but feel so
demoralized, or intimidated, by their circumstance that they are effectively
‘silenced’?”51

The implications for educational practices are profound if we are to
seriously consider the postmodern view. Many postmodernists would ask that
educators abandon all pretense of authority in light of the domination that has
existed in classrooms as in other societal institutions. Their critiques are
powerful challenges to the well-intentioned liberal who unknowingly perpetuates practices of control. In our claims to knowledge, authority, and expertise, we are acting and speaking against a background of domination and long-held privilege. It is clear that at the very least what is called for is increased sensitivity to the conditions, claims, and concerns of others. As educators, we have a special responsibility to reverse the trend of marginalization. We need to continually ask ourselves if our own positions of power and privilege are interfering with the freedoms of others.

In their critiques on the ills of modernity, many postmodernist views seem justified, and compelling. But there are several troubling features in some accounts, first with regard to the ways in which their objections are expressed, and second with regard to the potential consequences some views have for the possibility of ever communicating across differences. These consequences have relevance for education in general, and especially global education. The first difficulty can be addressed by showing that there are internal contradictions in postmodern rejections of modernist values; the second by showing that although communication between people of various communities is extremely difficult, it is not impossible. The injustices of the past are not inevitable in the future.

Postmodernists, like the rest of us, ultimately have to speak in a language infused with normative terms and concepts in order to make a case that is persuasive. None of us can escape the vocabulary of liberation, equality, and rights when we speak of ways in which people can and should relate to one another. The very solutions to oppression that postmoderns call for have to be framed in discourse that is based on public values of deliberation and democratic participation. They have to be rooted in
commitments to justice. How could it be otherwise?

Yet these are the very values that proponents of one branch of postmodernism, sometimes called anti-modernism, claim to want to reject. Some feminists, too, want to jettison talk of democratic discourse with the aim of intersubjective understanding. But in trying to do so, they risk eliminating any possibility for the common cry of justice to be heard. Social criticism that aims at liberating women is "not even possible without positing the legal, moral and political norms of autonomy, choice, and self-determination."

When they do call for an end to injustices, postmodernists often invoke liberal categories without arguing for them. Their "lightheartedness" in this regard is indeed troubling, and their failure to recognize that they are asserting modernist values does seem more than a little baffling. Elizabeth Ellsworth, for instance, an antimodernist who dismisses all attempts at dialogue about rights and freedom as "impossible in the culture at large" because of unjust power relations, calls for the need to respect everyone's "right to speak and feel safe to speak" in the very same essay.

I argue that we need not abandon or even claim to abandon the ideals of the Enlightenment. We do need to restructure the ways in which we talk about them and think about them. Some postmodernists, feminists, and communitarians also call for the reformulation of modernist values, not the wholesale rejection of them. Modernist values have been used often, but not always, as tools of oppression and domination; it is not inevitable that they must continue to be. They have also been the foundation for liberation. In fact, as we have seen, antimodernists and postmodernists often wind up reaffirming modernist values in their efforts to advocate everyone's right to speak.
There is no doubt that we need to seriously consider those voices who have been excluded from the conversation, not only to bring them in, essential as that it is, but to restructure the framework of the conversation itself so that by its very nature it becomes inclusive. We have to look at the possibilities for constructing communities that do not perpetuate practices of discrimination and oppression. Communities are not necessarily places where only the dominant voices are heard and all others are silenced. It is not inevitable that people will impose their values on others, or that differences themselves will disappear. But we will have to pay close attention to our own participation in order to avoid the dangers of speaking for others. We will need to respect other interpretations of the world, and grant others the validity of their self-understandings. This does not mean we must allow another standpoint to supersede our own, but it does mean we are obliged to consider other standpoints seriously.

There are several ways to view the construction of community and what it might mean in a postmodern world where difference is celebrated and not eliminated or homogenized. We saw that the communitarian critique of modernity was in part directed toward the reaffirmation of the local and particular. There are some communitarians who despair of ever recapturing what Benhabib calls "integrationist communities." I would argue that they are looking at a limited and constraining vision of communicative relations based on the attempt to revive one coherent telos that defines members' connections. But this is not the only way to view community or possibilities for its construction. We can look to John Dewey for a different version of community, one that is far more suited to the realities of pluralism. Dewey's vision of what is possible in democratic relations has much in common with
Benhabib’s notion of the participationist strain of community. The participationist encourages “non-exclusive principles of membership” in, or over, various spheres of concern. Dewey argued that as members of cultural subcommunities, we are democratic only to the extent that we define ourselves “over a range of common concerns, not only over single-issue identifications.” Where broader concerns affect all of us, we should keep the lines of communication open to try to reach workable solutions to problems.

As Rice and Burbules are quick to point out, this is not to say that good intentions, even consistent effort, will guarantee successful communication between subcommunities; that is, across differences. There are dimensions of power operating between and within communities, and public forums are not as open as modernists often assume they are. Learning to communicate with those who have been excluded and marginalized is a particularly difficult task and we should not assume at the outset we will achieve success. However, turning away from the task will certainly guarantee failure.

Not all conflicts can be resolved and not all tensions can be lessened. Such realizations should make us humble but not skeptical about the enterprise of constructing community. There are still good reasons to pursue the possibility of communication across differences. Even if success is partial, it is worth the effort. Through the practice of communicating, we can reasonably hope that we will learn to do it better, less dogmatically, and with more sensitivity. We can learn to grant others “provisional plausibility” and admit the potential fallibility of our own positions. We can learn to see ourselves as others see us, and learn to see some of the world through their eyes. There is value in incorporating other perspectives into our own worldviews, not the least of which is the value of a more inclusive
understanding of ourselves.

What we are ultimately after in communication across differences, and particularly in a global community of concern, is a shared framework for making decisions and solving conflicts. This framework need not be grounded in what postmodernists rightly reject as the imposition of one value system on all others. A community of concern seeks “pragmatic consensus, not rational dominance. It regards the search for a shared civic tongue more as negotiation than as the pursuit of some political truth.” The question we will want to ask is not “What do we already have in common that holds us together?” but, “Is there anything, given time and discussion, we might come to agree on?” If the latter remains our central question, we will have a good chance of avoiding the pitfalls that postmodernism has pointed out without having to abandon efforts to communicate.

4.7. CONCLUSION

Education can and ought to, bring students into the human conversation that they are bound to carry on beyond us. They will be the ones to continue construction of any moral community, to further the dialogue and to extend the membership. “It is through education, at least in part, that human beings work together to realize visions we have of what sort of creatures we should be...” Communicating about what and who we should be will require certain commitments to others who are also trying to create and live by those visions. It will require seeing them as equal participants in the conversation.

My next task is to identify what individuals need in the way of moral dispositions and sensitivities in order to join the conversation, and create
conditions so that others will be able to participate as well. People committed to
the enterprise of community building on a global scale will need to develop
certain communicative virtues. There are at least three communicative virtues
that are essential to human relations within moral communities. They are:
tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice. They are prerequisites for creating
any kind of shared civic language.

A sense of justice is indispensable because it sets the boundaries for
our treatment of other people, placing moral demands on us to prevent harm
to others, and where possible, to correct inequities. Tolerance supports and
promotes the expression of diverse beliefs and worldviews. The disposition to
empathize is the inclination to imagine the perspective and the experience of
another as a morally significant individual, even if my understanding of
another is ultimately provisional.

All three of these communicative virtues can be found in any moral
community, though their expression and emphasis may differ with each
community's particular purposes. In the following chapter, I will discuss
empathy, tolerance and justice in terms of the development of a global
perspective and the construction of a community of concern.

1Maxine Greene, "The Passions of Pluralism: Multiculturalism and the


3Ibid., 45.

4Ibid., 45.

5Stout, 225

7See Michael Ignatieff, *The Needs of Strangers*, 136. St. Augustine, for one believed that we have the freedom to choose how to live but that reason alone cannot provide the right answer. As Ignatieff points out, the certainty of having chosen rightly "could only be granted by the gift of grace." In this way Augustine spoke of two freedoms: the freedom to choose how to live and the freedom of redemption which could only be gotten to by means of faith.

8Putnam says that we can express the medieval point of view concerning our capacity to discover or uncover the human 'function' or 'essence' by turning to Aristotle's thick description of happiness as not just a bundle of gratifications, but as the "inclusive human end," pace MacIntyre, as our telos.

9Putnam, 50.

10Putnam, 51.

11At times we will also be asking, "How shall we live?", though Putnam does not discuss the collective question, only the individual one.

12Putnam, 51.

13Putnam, 51.

14Stout, 242.

15J. S. Mill envisioned the kind of debate where proponents of all views would be given equal opportunity to express their opinion. This was a fundamental part of a free and open society, dedicated to the pursuit of the truth. See *On Liberty*, Chapter 2.


17Putnam, 54.

19Putnam, 79.

20Putnam, 79.

21Putnam, 78.


23Putnam, 79.

24Stout, 73.

25One good example of this process comes out of a recent United Nations Conference on Sustainability (June, 1993) to which over 140 countries sent representatives from various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to hammer out proposals for a policy statement on international sustainable development, one that would take into account their peoples' diverse needs, aspirations, economic conditions etc. The goal was to create a policy document by consensus, a goal that was realized after ten days of intensive debate. The first half of the time was spent in coming to agreement about definitions and relevant terminology. Warren Linds, a delegate from Saskatchewan, was both pleased and surprised to find that after the entire process came to an end, the resulting policy “still had some bite.”


30Ibid., 4–5.

31Ibid., 43.

32Ibid., 49.
33Ibid., 48.

34Ibid., 4.

35Ibid., 47.

36Ibid., 7.


38Ibid., 184.

39Ibid., 155.


42Ibid., 162.

43Ibid., 158.


46Burbules and Rice, 400.

47Strike, 3.


49Farley, 170.

51Burbules and Rice, 397.

52Ibid., 398.


54Farley, 178.


56Ibid., 16.

57Ellsworth, 324 and 316.


59Burbules and Rice, 402–403.

60Benhabib, 77. She writes, “...it is characteristic of the integrationist view that it emphasizes value revival, value reform, or value regeneration and neglects institutional solutions.”

61Ibid., 77.

62Burbules and Rice, 403.

63Strike, 13.

64Ibid., 13. See also Benhabib, 9.

65Boyd, 161.
CHAPTER FIVE
MORAL CONVERSATIONS: JUSTICE, TOLERANCE AND EMPATHY IN GLOBAL EDUCATION

It seems clear that the more continuous and authentic personal encounters can be, the less likely it will be that categorizing and distancing will take place. People are less likely to be treated instrumentally, to be made "other" by those around. I want to speak of pluralism and multiculturalism with concrete engagements in mind, actual and imagined: engagements with young persons and older persons, some suffering from exclusion, some from powerlessness, some from poverty, some from ignorance, some from boredom.

Maxine Greene

5.0. INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, I argued that a global community of concern was a possibility we will have to construct, not discover. Pluralism is the greatest challenge that faces us in our efforts. If the construction of such a community is vital to us, then the language we will have to invent for expressing ourselves and for listening to others, must be one that takes full account of the differences between people. It is imperative that the dispositions and abilities which are necessary for this kind of communication are taught to students. I see the project of teaching the language and tools for this communication as the primary function of global education.

What is central to a global perspective of the sort I am advocating is belief in the possibility of conversations across communities in the world. This dialogue, however halting and fraught with potential misunderstandings, is what a community of concern is all about. The hope for communicating, for constructing community, can only exist when people are both able and inclined to listen to others, to imagine their positions and perspectives, and to
respect the purposes and the process of the dialogue itself. In other words, they need to be committed to the enterprise of community building. Even for those committed to it, the process of learning to communicate across differences, particularly across differences of power and position, is terribly difficult, as the critics of such projects have pointed out. As discussed in the last chapter, many postmodernists, communitarians and feminists believe the enterprise as a whole is doomed to failure. It will be important to continue to argue against their views if the consequence of their criticisms is that we do not try to communicate across differences at all. Failure should not be presumed at the outset. "Beyond the critique of universal norms lies caution and care," writes Margaret Farley, "but not arbitrariness or indifference, and not completely isolated moral systems." We do have hope in this regard. Still, many of these criticisms are important to consider as they have implications for the educational means we employ to develop the communicative virtues. Much of this chapter will be an attempt to present these virtues in light of the criticisms of any project of communicative ethics. Global education itself can be seen as part of such an enterprise when communicative ethics are understood as the ethical precepts that apply when communicating with others.

I have already mentioned three moral attainments or communicative virtues that individuals must demonstrate or express in order to participate in communities. (This includes participation in existing communities to which they already belong as well as participation in the construction of new communities.) The three virtues I referred to are: tolerance, empathy, and a sense of justice. On my view, they are the elements most needed for communication between persons who are close to us as well as those faraway
and with radically different backgrounds and beliefs. These virtues may enable people to begin to converse with members of communities elsewhere as part of the effort to build a shared community of concern.

In this chapter I will discuss empathy, tolerance and justice as communicative virtues that can and should be developed as key elements of a global perspective. I believe that it is the task of education to help students develop the requisite moral commitments and dispositions toward others within their present circles of caring. I believe that it is the task of global education to extend these circles to include others in the world and to help young people come to understand the need for communication between us.

5.1 A SENSE OF JUSTICE

One of the three moral values that I argue is indispensable to the construction of a moral global community is justice. Were I to attempt to provide any account of Rawls' or Walzer's conception of justice in a single chapter, at best I could do no more than present the briefest of distillations. In the background and informing my discussion are their voices and the voices of other philosophers who have made the subject of justice central to their work. I hope they can be heard without great distortion. But instead of focusing on conceptions of justice, I want to examine the role justice plays in communication across differences.

I intend to do two things in this section. The first is to discuss justice as a requirement for conversations across differences. This will help answer the question about the role that justice plays in a global moral community. I will outline the reasons I have for claiming that a sense of justice is essential for people who are committed to communicate with strangers in an effort to build
community. The second thing I want to do is discuss the ways in which a sense of justice is developed, and argue that it is best developed against a background of caring. In part, I will be attempting to bring justice and care together into what Eamonn Callan calls a "common voice" in moral conversations across difference. I will do this in order to give a clearer description of the educational task that lies ahead for those of us committed to the possibility of constructing a moral global community.

5.1.1. Justice in a Global Community

In my earlier discussions concerning the construction of a global moral community, I stressed that communication across differences depends on the demonstration of certain sensitivities and dispositions towards others who are considered potential participants in one's moral life. The bonds that held traditional communities together: bonds of culture, political affiliation, even language, do not exist in a global sphere; therefore new bonds have to be established. Connections, when created, will be created through the ongoing attempts at communication. The search for a common understanding will itself be what draws people together.

In order for communication to take place at all, certain guidelines, similar to Kant's maxims discussed in the last chapter need to be introduced. But these will not be adopted and put to use by people who are not already disposed to treat others, including strangers, as equal participants in the conversation. Developing these dispositions is a goal of global education. Certain moral dispositions or virtues must underlie our practices of communication if we are to achieve any sort of moral community. One of these is a sense of justice, and it is essential to the enterprise for several
reasons:

1. We need to avoid imposing our own values on others when we are engaged in dialogue and problem solving. One of the dangers of trying to create community through dialogue is the danger of speaking for others. When we do not know what the other’s good might be, we are at risk of presuming what the other wants or needs. We need to be alert to the injustices connected to deciding for others. Without a well-developed sense of justice we are continually in danger of viewing persons as objects of social policy, that is with Strawson’s objective attitudes. A sense of justice that is continually and carefully attuned to what others are actually telling us is essential in conversing with people whose values and wishes may not, and probably are not, what we have imagined them to be.

2. We need to prevent the tyranny of the majority, as well as other forms of abuse of power and privilege. I believe in an enabling conception of justice; that is, just treatment should refer to creating conditions necessary for individual flourishing and for collective cooperation. This will necessarily involve certain decision making procedures that are fair and equitable, and do not ride roughshod over people’s interests. Though the tyranny of the majority is a very real problem for democratic forums, it is certainly not the most or even the most pernicious form of abuse of power. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Young talks of five faces of oppression which have resulted in the denial of just treatment to groups of people. They are: powerlessness, exploitation, marginalization, violence and cultural imperialism. These conditions occur even in so called humane and liberal societies, in which structural relations are constituted in ways that perpetuate unequal distribution of benefits, unfair labor practices, the devaluation of entire cultural
groups, and so on. To understand how power operates in modern societies, we have to look beyond the traditional model of sovereign and subject to institutional and social practices such as education, government administration, and the production and distribution of goods. When we speak of justice in a global realm we need to recognize the ways in which power operates across hemispheres between developed and developing societies, between the rich and poor nations of the world, and between transnational organizations and the people they serve.

As people who are attempting to communicate across wide gulfs, we need more than the disposition to treat others fairly. We also need to know how to speak about and confront systemic discrimination and oppression. We need to be able to identify injustices, understand something about their causes, and be ready and willing to listen to those who have been exploited, marginalized and excluded from participation in decisions that affect their lives. While a sense of justice alone will not lead to these understandings, it will increase sensitivity to abuses of power.

3. We need to create fair and equitable arrangements on common matters of concern. This is obviously tied to the matter of building a global community of concern whose participants will share at least a minimal civic language. A sense of justice can guide us to solutions to our shared problems which take into account all points of view. The relevance of all points of view will be presumed at the outset. The goal is a limited and provisional agreement on matters of mutual or overlapping interest. Rawls notion of justice as fairness presumes that an "overlapping consensus" can be achieved on certain moral matters, and that people will share enough concepts and commitments that it can serve as a regulative rather than
He speaks about this conception of justice as one that stays on the surface because it does not override or eclipse people's individual and personal projects. Instead it ensures that the private spheres in which people live much or even most of their lives will remain private and the public sphere (what I call the community of concern) will in part guarantee the freedoms necessary for the pursuit of one's own conception of a good life. A sense of justice will help us avoid the pitfalls or injustices mentioned in the first two statements above, and promote the goal mentioned in the last. Achieving the ends described will require that people respect each other as individuals who have the capacity and the will to define their own possibilities and life plans. Additionally people will need to discover the moral concepts they already share so they can fruitfully discuss the matters they have in common as well as constructively listen to each other's viewpoints when differences arise, as they inevitably well. Constructive listening presupposes the possibility of understanding other contributions to the conversation.

A sense of justice is a background requirement for uncoerced communication. Among philosophers who have described the role justice plays in communication is Seyla Benhabib who outlines several prerequisites for establishing uncoerced communication between people not bound to each other by tradition or a form of life. These prerequisites are moral presuppositions that structure conversation itself. Although close to Habermas' presuppositions for argumentation in an ideal speech situation, Benhabib emphasizes slightly different communicative principles. She says it is because she is interested in communication that aims toward "a reformulated end." For Benhabib, the important goal of communication across differences is not consent between parties or consensus among them,
but the continuation of the moral conversation. Like Noddings and others, she sees the task as one of *keeping the lines of communication open.*¹³

...When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourse to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on *rational agreement* but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as *a way of life* can flourish and continue¹⁴ (italics in original).

Of course, it is not only a matter of keeping the conversation going that is important, but a matter of seeking understanding through conversation. Understanding others includes understanding what they need in order to flourish, and being able and willing to "reverse perspectives" with them. Benhabib stipulates only two moral prerequisites or presuppositions for participation in moral conversations whose goal is moral understanding of the other:

1. that we recognize the right of all human beings capable of speech and action to be participants (*the principle of universal moral respect*)

2. that each participant has the same symmetrical right to various speech acts including initiating topics and asking for reflection. (*the principle of egalitarian reciprocity*)¹⁵

The principle of universal moral respect and the principle of egalitarian reciprocity are considered commitments on the part of people wishing to engage in normative discussions. Justice requires that these two conditions not be suspended or the dialogue itself would cease. What would emerge in its place are the continuing demands of the powerful and the dominant, and the ongoing silencing of those with no power at all.
In conversation, I must know how to listen, I must know how to understand your point of view, I must learn to represent to myself the world and the other as you see them. If I cannot listen, if I cannot understand, the conversation stops, develops into an argument, or maybe never gets started.16

5.1.2. Justice and Care

Of the three communicative virtues to be discussed in this chapter, justice may need the most explication, perhaps even a defense. This is largely due to the fact that until recently, justice has been considered by many to be the predominant voice of modern moral theory, the voice that has spoken the language of universal respect for persons and basic human rights. It has been claimed by feminists and others that it is only one voice, a powerful, mostly male voice, and that it does not express essential elements of a moral point of view. Those elements are connected to the capacity and the need for human beings to care for, and relate to individuals as particular "concrete others," not as generalized rights claimants. Some feminists believe that important differences are "filtered out" of the picture when all selves are regarded as equivalent, as extensions, or even mirrors of one another, "as mere instances of the universal."17

The objection to this construal of other "selves" as "just the same as" oneself is perhaps best articulated by Benhabib who argues that it is the particular nature of other concerns, expressed in the other's own words which allow us to respond to their professed needs, not reflections of our own. Yet, as we have seen, Benhabib does not try to eliminate the need for universal considerations. Carol Gilligan, on the other hand, believes that there are two stances or orientations toward morality: the ethic of justice and the ethic of care and that they are ultimately irreconcilable. Her view is that an ethic of
justice is concerned with "individual freedom, social contracts, a ranked order of values, fairness, and an emphasis on duty.... An ethic of care...focuses on relationships between persons, cooperation, communication and caring." On this view justice represents separation and caring stands for connectedness. Justice concerns the abstracted self (the hypothetical person behind Rawl's veil of ignorance, or an instance of the universal) and caring concerns the particular self, situated in the real world.

It may well be that some feminists (as represented here by Gilligan) have conflated moral theories of justice with what actually goes on in our moral discourse and decision making. In daily life, the notion of justice has no priority over truthfulness, kindness, compassion, and so on. The characterization of justice Gilligan offers is an impoverished one. Justice on this view is defined as little more than a remedial virtue that regulates conflict between universal rights holders with generalizable concerns. The view of caring expressed by some feminists may be limited, too, if we have neither the means nor the inclination to transcend our own situatedness, that is our own inner circle, in order to embrace the possibility of new communities and new connections. My own view of global education and the global perspective reflects a commitment to community building as a moral enterprise between individuals who recognize their differences as well as their basic commonalities, the particulars and also the universals. Both justice and caring have an essential role to play in the ongoing dialogue, from the presuppositions that ground it to the aspirations which carry it forward. It is important then, that I find a way to reconcile justice and caring in a conception of global education as in any moral enterprise.

I argue that a sense of justice would be virtually empty without care
and that caring at all times, needs to be made just. Developing a sense of justice is as much a matter of developing sensitivities to context and the particular details of others’ experiences as it is coming to understand the rights we all have in common. And caring, of the sort we wish to promote in ourselves and our students, is itself grounded in a sense of justice. Caring that is not grounded in a sense of justice can cause harm. There are many examples of this sort of caring. Parents may unwittingly hold their children back from opportunities to grow and become self-reliant in a well intentioned effort to protect them. Teachers may keep students in a state of heteronomy out of a misguided sense of what learning calls for and how to care for young minds. Spouses may prevent each other from realizing their potential as independent people with separate interests and ambitions. We all need to regard others as persons who have their own good and who need certain things for that good to be realized. We should not only be concerned with respecting other persons as they are now, but as they might one day be if encouraged and supported. Justice demands that we see them as more than objects of our own caring. As Eamonn Callan explains,

Persons have a worth that is not reducible to the relationships in which they are embedded, even when the relationships are constituted by bonds of unselfish caring; and their worth creates peremptory claims upon the aid or forbearance of others—moral rights in other words—which are not contingent upon the affections that may or may not bind particular members of the moral community.  

Caring in other words, must be just in order to be morally acceptable. On the other hand, our concept of justice would be empty without the motivation or the disposition to care. We would be less able to respond to the particular concerns of others because we would be less willing to see their needs and wants as important. As Noddings reminds us, we learn and
practice morality in our inner circle. Being immersed in caring relationships in this inner circle allows us to learn about and exercise compassion, benevolence, generosity. Seeing other people’s good as not entirely extrinsic to our own (a basic condition of caring as a relational concept) is fundamental to the motivation to treat others decently and with an eye to their particularity. We need to be continually attuned to the “rich contextual detail that differentiates one moral encounter from another.”

Justice should not be blind to the particular but that does not mean that justice operates without concern for the universal at the same time. Piaget described the difference between a sense of justice based on caring for others and a sense of justice as adjudication between claimants, as the difference between “mere equalitarianism” and a more subtle conception of justice, one “which we may call equity and which consists in never defining equality without taking account of the way in which each individual is situated.” For Piaget, the sense of justice is born out of interaction and cooperation. An individual is just to the extent that his sense of reciprocity and mutual respect are “strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated.”

Moral theorists recognize that the ability to “reverse perspectives” is crucial to moral understanding, beginning with the admonition of parent to child: “How would you feel if the other children threw stones at you?” It is true that at a certain point in our moral development we need to move beyond seeing the other as an extension of ourselves or another instance of the universal, and begin to respond to the “concrete other” on her own terms. Just treatment in actual cases requires this. But it is also true that recognizing the other as a being worthy of respect and deserving of fair treatment presumes
some commonalty between all persons. In this sense, the power of universality is preserved. Without it, there could be no possibility of a common cry for justice.\textsuperscript{26}

5.1.3. Developing a Sense of Justice

In the section of \textit{A Theory of Justice} called "The Sense of Justice," Rawls builds on Piaget's work to construct a stage theory of moral development based on justice as fairness. It is characterized by three stages: the Morality of Authority, the Morality of Association, and the Morality of Principles. Like Piaget, Rawls sees the child moving outward from an egocentric universe to one that embraces others, a decentering from one's own point of view to the point of view of others, what Hannah Arendt would refer to as "enlarged mentality." The growing capacity to see situations from the point of view of others is one that leads to treating them fairly and respectfully.

Certain conditions must be present at each of Rawl's stages for the optimum growth of the sense of justice. First among them is a loving, trusting atmosphere in which the child feels secure:

The parents' love of the child is expressed in their evident intention to care for him, to do for him as his rational self-love would incline, and in the fulfillment of these intentions. Their love is displayed by their taking pleasure in his presence and supporting his sense of competence and esteem.\textsuperscript{27}

There is an explicit obligation for those in authority to act justly and with due regard to what the child would do for herself if she was fully aware of her own interests and able to act on her own behalf. It is presumed that she will grow to be autonomous in this way and will come to agree with decisions made for her. Within the family structure described by Rawls, the child comes
to trust as well as love the authority figures in her life and obeys and follows their rules. As in Piaget's egocentric stage, she looks to significant adults for guidance and moral constraint. These adults therefore should hold justified moral beliefs and treat others with fairness and respect. In Rawl's words, they "should exemplify the morality they enjoin." Further, they must:

...enunciate clear and intelligible (and of course justifiable) rules adapted to the child's level of comprehension. In addition, they should set out reasons for these injunctions as far as they can be understood.26

This last condition is important to Piaget's theory of moral development as well as Dewey's thinking about moral education. The only valuable discipline is that which children understand. They should be able to consent to rules, not just blindly accept them. Asking for and giving justification for one's actions and beliefs is an essential element of the sense of justice.

Within the next stage, The Morality of Association, the social nature of the child becomes increasingly more evident. Here it is cooperation forged in school and neighborhood that combines with family interaction to shape the growing sense of justice. We have natural sympathies with others that in Rawl's view provide an "effective basis for moral sentiments once we have a clear grasp of our relations to our associates from an appropriately general perspective."29 This perspective is developed further in the third stage, the Morality of Principles, when the sense of justice is ideally extended to the human community. Here the sense of justice grows to an understanding of justice as a regulative ideal, one that provides the framework for uncoerced communication. At this stage it is principled reflection which leads to fair treatment of others.

Some feminist critics have argued that Rawl's vision of the ethical self
is not only autonomous but atomistic, that he, along with some other liberal theorists, has left out the equally important human feature called "relationality." But if we take seriously Rawl's characterization of the development of the sense of justice in children, we can immediately see the place of caring and relationality within the stages and conditions of growth. His description focuses on a "self" who is defined and shaped in relation to the significant people around her, not apart from them. A sense of justice does not develop except in an expanding community of persons who are not so much rights claimants as they are participants in the discourse, individuals whose good is intertwined with ours, be they family members, friends or citizens with whom we learn (through practice) to cooperate. The central goal in developing the sense of justice is to understand the rights and claims of others and our responsibilities toward them, but these cannot be understood fully without knowledge of others as distinct individuals with their own particular needs and possibilities.

In the "Sense of Justice" Rawls is concerned with providing a description of the way people come to see the role that justice plays in their actual relations with others. In this aim, he is diverging from the central project of A Theory of Justice, in which his concerns remain with ideal communities and imagined relations. Here, feminist objections to Rawl's "veil of ignorance" seem more grounded. At all times we need to, pay attention to the demands of justice in real contexts, not hypothetical ones. Because we do have knowledge of our own interests and our own situation we have an obligation to transcend our present position to "reverse perspectives." We need to find adequate information about what other lives are like. When we can, we need to ask people about their lives. When we cannot, we need to find out in other
ways. This is not always or even often, an easy thing to do. Margaret Farley writes that:

In its most general and classical sense, justice means giving to each her or his “due.” Broadly speaking, this would seem to require that justice take account of the concrete reality of the one to whom it is due, whether what is relevant in this concrete reality is a contract or a basic human need or the history of a shared commitment or all of the above and more. But theories of common morality have dwindled precisely because we despair of knowing the concrete reality of anything.32

I do not believe that we should despair of ever knowing these things, only be aware that the process of understanding unfamiliar others is likely to be a long and arduous one, requiring both a sense of justice and a sense of care. If Susan Moller Okin is right, it may take even more than these virtues to come to an understanding of others that results in promoting their good as well as our own. It will take a great commitment to benevolence, too.33 Perhaps, as Rawls says, the sense of justice itself is continuous with the love of humankind.34

5.2. ANOTHER LOOK AT TOLERANCE

We must give up the image of society as a battleground of competing groups and formulate an ideal of society more exalted than the mere acceptance of opposed interests and diverse customs. There is a need for a new philosophy of community beyond pluralism and beyond tolerance.35

Tolerance is indispensable to the development of a global perspective and it is important to define just what sort of tolerance is required of students. In this section I am less concerned to present classic defenses of tolerance than I am to argue that tolerance as it relates to a morally defensible global perspective requires more from us than simply allowing others the freedom of expression or the freedom to follow their own conceptions of the good. It
requires more than leaving others alone, or free from interference. It involves contributing to conditions such that people will be better able to realize their own ends. Among these will be creating the conditions necessary for uncoerced communication between ourselves and other people.

5.2.1. Tolerance as an Active Virtue

I want to put forth a conception of tolerance as a moral attainment that goes beyond our ordinary notions of the term. As we ordinarily understand it, tolerance is rather a minimal condition for peaceable relations between persons. There will be limits even then to our toleration of certain practices and opinions, but we are obligated to separate our belief in the worth of a person from our judgment of the opinion he or she espouses. One expression of this view is that you must denounce the heresy but not the heretic. This is important to relations between people who share no common cultural ground. We can condemn falsehood and seek to ascertain and uphold the truth without punishing the holder of false beliefs. In Mill's words to be intolerant of falsehood is to claim infallibility, and this leads to a host of crimes. To tolerate diversity is to allow the free exchange of ideas which can result in one's coming to understand and articulate one's own beliefs more clearly and completely or in changing one's mind on the basis of compelling reasons. Either result is a furthering of communication between people and a reaffirmation of the positive effects of interchange and dialogue.

Some writers, Isaiah Berlin among them, argue that this kind of tolerance is all we can realistically hope for in a pluralistic world with multiple and competing perspectives about the good. Although this is a worthy and achievable goal, it is not a sufficient or satisfactory one for teachers who want
students to understand and adhere to principles of uncoerced communication across communities. A more appropriate or adequate view of tolerance in relation to the attainment of a moral global perspective and to the possibilities for constructive conversations is more active than passive. It requires more than letting people alone to pursue their own ends. Part of our educational task is to help students recognize that we have many purposes and concerns in common with people in the rest of the world; our visions of the good quite naturally encompass at least some mutual or shared "ends" because we live with the same finite resources and the same needs for physical security, food, health and so on. Part of seeing things from a moral global perspective is recognizing the commonalities we do have. Toleration depends on the realization that we do share some basic human interests. This is sometimes dismissed as a rather feeble humanist line: we are all alike under the skin. In fact Wolfe’s claim is that once the possibility for allegiance to a primary group is taken away, we become the "unaffiliated, faceless member of lonely crowd."^{39} But even Wolff does not mean that we should give up hope for forming new allegiances. In the course of a lifetime we will belong to many groups and identify with multiple affiliations. Part of the task for global education will be to give students opportunities to see themselves within an expanded social horizon and see the legitimacy of other groups and even other forms of life.

The most basic reason for the exercise of toleration is our moral responsibility to consider other people as ends in themselves, not merely means to our own. As educators we have a special opportunity to help individuals come to understandings about themselves and about people elsewhere in the world. Among these will be moral understandings; that
others are centres of experience and valuation who are to be respected, that they have legitimate claims to fair treatment, and that their concerns are worthy of consideration and compassionate response even when we disagree with their opinions and beliefs, perhaps especially when we disagree with them. Aristotle noted that justice is not needed among friends; perhaps we could say tolerance is not needed among like minds. We have a moral responsibility in the name of active tolerance to make sure all voices have the opportunity to speak and that they are listened to.

In order to do this, we need a shift in the way we view the ethical landscape with regard to tolerance. What we have been focusing on most intensely in schools, as evidenced by multicultural policies, global education mandates and goals for social studies programs, is a view of tolerance that respects people's freedom to express themselves and maintain distinct cultural identities. We have focused, in other words, on rights and people's exercise of them. We have not focused on our mutual responsibilities to create new communities where possibilities for understanding one another are actively nurtured. I propose to reclaim tolerance as a necessary and viable political and social virtue for life in communities, even as it extends to a potential global community.

5.2.2. Rights and Responsibilities

One way to view tolerance as an active virtue is to consider obligations rather than rights as the most basic ethical category. This is the view of Onora O'Neill who claims that rights-based thinking is concerned with "the treatment to which people are entitled" and is therefore not comprehensive enough in its vision and its ideals to serve as the basic ethical category of liberalism.
Unless we see obligations as basic to any moral enterprise, we overlook many of our essential responsibilities to cooperative practices. Annette Baier maintains a rather different view. On her view, it is the concept of rights that pushes us to see people as individual participants in normative discussion and this is fundamental, even a prerequisite, to any cooperative practice. We must, first of all, be recognized as individual selves having the claim to a voice:

The language of rights pushes us, more insistently than does the language of duties, responsibilities, obligations, legislation and respect for law, to see the participants in the moral practice as single, clamorous living human beings, not as families, clans, tribes, groups, classes, churches, congregations, nations or peoples.42

My own view is that in actual moral conversations, both concepts work together and neither one is more foundational or basic than the other. The language of rights is part of our cooperative practices in which we can all claim a voice as individual participants. The cooperative practices themselves entail obligations and duties which are basic to our identity as relational selves. Both categories are basic to our moral thinking and action. My purpose here is not to argue for one position or the other, however, I do think that a temporary shift away from a discussion of ourselves as first and foremost rights-claimants, will open space for some important questions about what tolerance demands of us in dialogue across differences.

Rights-based ethical theories consider rights as the ultimate justificatory foundation for the way we ought to treat people and the way they ought to treat us. So it is a theory which looks first at the recipient of treatment, not the agent who “treats.” Rights-based theories, by themselves, can only tell us why and when we must leave people alone to realize their
own self-determined ends. On traditional views, the concept of obligation necessarily arises out of rights, which are more basic. If we make obligations the category from which our rights derive, the ethical landscape looks rather different.

Once the focus shifts from rights to obligations as the most basic category, it necessarily shifts the ethical self from a bearer of rights to a bearer of responsibilities. We are then turning to look at the questions of ethical expression and behavior from the perspective of the agent rather than the recipient of treatment. It takes us away from a view of ourselves as individuals primarily pursuing our own ends to a view of ourselves as persons actively involved in the life pursuits of others. We become persons who are partially responsible for contributing to the realization of others' life plans.

Because of this newly perceived partnership, other people's ends (their conceptions of the good or a life worth leading) and our own can be better examined in relation to each other. As a result ends may be reconstructed or at least modified though dialogue. This is an active, ongoing process. Once we have accepted some responsibility for contributing to the welfare of others, we need to know what their conceptions of the good life actually are. They in turn need to know ours. In the course of this collective exchange our own conceptions of the good might well be altered.44

Such a conception of self as first and foremost a social being departs from the independent autonomous agent who is most central to a rights based theory of ethics. The social contract we enter into on that view is one which primarily grants us mutual liberty to pursue our own good. Within that state of affairs we are free from the interference of others and we must tolerate their pursuits and expressions in the same spirit. In no significant way does it
speak of the self in relation to others in what might be called positive terms; that is, toleration is regarded as a negative thing; we have a right not to be interfered with. Our liberty, to that extent, is what gives us rights; without it those rights would obviously collapse into incoherence.

5.2.3. Toleration in Communication

The gulf between a rights based theory of ethics and an obligation based one becomes larger when we start to follow what it means to actively practice toleration in democratic society. It has been argued by many that communication between citizens (and between citizens and the agents of government) is essential in a democracy. The major practical question that arises for persons committed to active toleration is not: "How should I express myself?" but: "How should we communicate with each other?" Communication on this view takes account of its social context and purpose; the possibility for genuine communication demands much more than minimal toleration. Certain conditions for communication opportunities must be realized and maintained. Depending on the context, specific conditions for communication will change. Whether or not the context is one of personal or mass communication for instance, or of the written or spoken word, will make a great difference. Of course, some communicative obligations are common to all contexts.

If citizens are to conduct their communicating on principles that could (not "would": we are considering only universalizability, not uniformity) be shared by all, then their communicating must conform to fundamental principles that do not undermine but, rather, preserve conditions of public communication.

Some acts will obviously undermine or destroy possibilities for
communication; those who silence others’ voices are denying rights to self-expression. And those who deliberately deceive others undermine the trust which is necessary for well intentioned communication. But sometimes it is background conditions which are violated so that communication, even the start of communication, becomes impossible. Without violating individuals’ rights to express themselves, certain technologies as well as attitudes and dominant societal practices, erode the very possibility for two-way communication or reciprocity. Consider the ways in which “the news” is reported for instance, as authoritative, complete and above challenge. Often, the use of particular language and the employment of certain formats precludes response because the information presented is not fully interpretable by its audience or large portions of its audience. When feedback is requested, it is in a terribly limited and often misleading way—the debate is preset, answers are edited and so on.

A large range of techniques can disguise communicators’ fallibility and their latent agenda, and reflect principles that, if acted on, would mislead and ultimately destroy the very possibility of communication. Straightforward lying is, of course, a tried and tested way of misleading; but disinformation is continuous with misinformation, as well as simpler techniques of sensationalism, selective omission, non-coverage and neglect of views that lie beyond the assumed limits of ‘acceptable’ opinion.47

Certain social and political institutions take a view toward those to whom they are “communicating” that has more to do with maintaining the dominant ideology and ideological structures than with providing opportunity for debate and challenge. A commitment to hearing and respecting other voices must go beyond simply noninterference with their private speech. The commitment must take into account the fact that many voices have been silenced for so long and in so many ways, that the “categories of public
discourse" will have to change radically to allow them opportunity to speak and be listened to with understanding. We need to make room for the sorts of protection, access and regulations which public communication requires in order to become truly democratic. Where speech has been stifled, dissent marginalized and criticism eclipsed, toleration is not present at all.

This view is not without difficulties. What we are talking about, after all, is some amount of control over communicators, over communicative content. Coercion in this context would amount to censorship. Is this not a violation of communicators rights? If Annette Baier is correct, Americans in particular have opted for a view of liberty that cannot reconcile itself with protecting the welfare of certain vulnerable parties. Not only is active toleration a matter of ongoing adjustment and balance in particular situations, it is a matter of more generally prioritizing our freedoms, rights and responsibilities in a way we can all live with.

Clearly, public discourse is already regulated in many ways, some obvious and some subtle, including "legal, economic and social structures and traditions as well as conversational and literary forms and conventions." Some regulation is unavoidable in every society and in fact, enables communication. An official policy of strict noninterference only leaves regulation up to nonstate powers and the continual probability that many voices will not be heard. However, certain modes of regulation are open to change once we see the obligations we have toward extending possibilities for communication.

Communication is also obstructed in all sorts of ways and it is up to us to find a path which will obstruct least and still be fair to all parties. A democratic society should always aim toward policies of regulation which will
insure the widest range of public communication for all citizens. The necessary level of regulation may, and most likely will, go beyond a policy of noninterference, though censorship may not be justified except in extreme circumstances. We will have to determine (and be prepared to reexamine) which of our practices can best enable all voices to speak and be heard in the actual situations we find ourselves in.

5.2.4. Tolerance and the Global Perspective

There are many provocative questions concerning the role of schools in teaching tolerance. It seems abundantly clear that a vigilant, educated public is required by a democratic society so that it can successfully institute and preserve communication for all citizens. In fact, without a public educated as to the nature of our obligations toward each other in this regard, we would no doubt be satisfied with viewing toleration of others as synonymous with leaving them alone. We would certainly have difficulty recognizing practices that prevent true exchange from those which allow it. This can be said for voices from within democratic societies, but I believe it applies equally to voices from without.

To practice toleration in a global context is to actively create the conditions whereby all voices can be heard and all claims be taken seriously. To do this students will have to learn much about the existing channels of communication in the world and develop a critical stance toward those channels as potential tools for oppression as well as liberation. If we have a moral obligation to create possibilities for genuine communication between people, this obligation cannot stop at national borders. What would be the justification for doing so? If a case can be made that the spheres of concern
we have overlap the spheres of concern people have elsewhere in the world, then we have good reason to institute and maintain practices of toleration in these realms as well. Tolerance as a part of a global perspective requires that we learn, in the words of Brenda Almond:

...on the one hand to advocate the emphatic denunciation of falsity and evil, and, on the other, to insist on the importance of standing back, listening to others, and not attempting coercion. It means resisting bad opinion with good, false opinion with true, and restraining only the person who will not respect these limits himself.51

Active tolerance—in the form of intervention on behalf of someone else's good as he or she defines it—is a particularly signal aim for global education because North American students will encounter dozens if not hundreds of cases where letting others alone will lead to perpetuation of the same deplorable inequalities that already exist. Leaving people free to pursue their own ends amounts in these cases to a continuation of neglect which can only lead to even worse injustices. Toleration of a passive sort may be required first but it will not do much to contribute to the kinds of opportunities I have in mind to better the lives of people on their own professed terms.

What does this mean to an argument for global education as a moral enterprise? On the one hand, creating conditions for communication on an expanded scale sounds like an overwhelming task, especially considering that within our own democratic societies success in this area has been so limited. However, if the obligation to others exists in this regard, then it must be true that an obligation to prepare students to take on the task of creating those conditions for communication, must also exist. This, in part, is what is meant by developing in students the dispositions that are necessary to participate in as well as create moral communities. Of the three requirements I have set
down for the creation of moral communities, tolerance may seem on the surface, the least difficult to achieve. Yet if the conception I have put forward stands, tolerance takes on significance and complexity not ordinarily embraced by our understanding of the concept. Developing a moral global perspective means giving students the opportunity to construct communities where tolerance along with a sense of justice is practiced and nurtured. In this context, tolerance along with a sense of justice is an essential component for participation in the life of a community and a cornerstone for creating new communities.

5.3. EMPATHY

Empathy is the final communicative virtue which will be discussed in this chapter. It too, has a very special role in community building, one that focuses on recognizing strangers as potential participants within our horizon of moral experience. In this section I will briefly explore the concept of empathy and its relationship to other concepts such as sympathy. Following this, I will stipulate a definition which I believe retains important features of the term as it is ordinarily employed and at the same time focuses on one special sense of empathy, that is, empathy as a requirement of moral competence within a global perspective.

5.3.1. The Concept of Empathy

Empathy demands much in the way of commitment to understand others and yet seems to arise from a natural capacity to “feel with others.” Talk about helping individuals to step into the perspective of another human being (still the most apt description of what goes on when someone empathizes) is not new to moral theory. Walzer calls it a commonplace of
philosophical and practical ethics. Empathetic understanding was one cornerstone of Buber's ethical writings on I-Thou relationships and it has figured largely in contemporary theories, notably in Rawl's formulation of the moral competencies required by those persons committed to making just decisions on moral issues. Rawls writes that one must be able to imaginatively experience the needs and interests of others in order to consider them fairly, and in order to place them appropriately within a moral framework.

There has always been talk in education circles of the need to help students come to respect the needs and interests of others. We want students to learn to recognize or acknowledge others as persons, in the full sense of that word. John Wilson is one contemporary proponent of this view of the imperatives of moral or values education in schools. He sees the capacity to empathize as critical to moral competence.

Empathy can best be regarded as a disposition and ability to imagine that can be cultivated in schools. However, it has sometimes been discussed as if it were an achievement or a process. Empathizing does involve processes whereby we mentally reconstruct other peoples' attitudes, values, beliefs and aspirations, in order to see others from the inside or more simply, to connect their experience with ours. There are limits to this connection, of course, and to the reconstructive process which leads to it, relying as it does on the use of our imagination which itself has limitations and barriers. The nature of these limitations will depend, of course, on our particular backgrounds, the kinds and degrees of sensitivities we express toward others, and our willingness to commit ourselves to the task of imagining. It will of course depend on other factors as well, such as the reliability of the sources.
and the detail of the information we have about others' experiences. To describe empathy as an achievement may be to ascribe to empathy an endpoint where none is actually possible; we won't and can't ever know if we have completely and accurately imagined the feelings, hopes and sufferings of another. Even when we have confirmation that we have come close to "getting it right," the uniqueness of the experience of others necessarily evades us. Still, if Richard Hare is right, empathy can be cultivated, and it is the possibility that we are able to develop at least some amount of empathetic understanding that gives sense to the notion of empathy as a moral achievement or attainment.

Empathy has had a tangled past and may be one of the more confusing terms in our moral vocabulary. Part of the difficulty in sorting through conceptions of empathy is that educators often equate empathy with sympathy. "Because empathy is construed as sympathy," writes Douglas Chismar, "the humanistic yet unrealistic goal of getting people to sympathize (like, care for, be good buddies of) all others is attempted, with dismal results." We then overlook our capacity to empathize with others, in the sense of recognizing them as independent centres of experience or as Downie and Telfer would say, as persons who are ends to be respected. What is also overlooked is the role education can play in increasing our knowledge of and familiarity with, other persons, places and situations. We often misread the signs and this leads to inadequate responses to others. Chismar emphasizes the importance of familiarity.

The problem is that situations are often misread due to inconsistent familiarity with various persons and situations. But these are exactly the problems education addresses.... With the growth of civilization and human cognitive abilities, humans have gained the ability to
familiarize themselves with increasingly diverse and distinct cultural groups. Effective cross-cultural and international education offers the prospect of a broadened and more consistent capacity to empathize.  

The plea for educators to increase children's understandings of their fellow human beings is not new, although Chismar enlarges the sphere of educational concerns so his notion of empathy can encompass international perspectives. His is a more sweeping approach to cross-cultural or global education of this kind. Yet it is not really education for a moral point of view. Although Chismar speaks of the role of education in terms of familiarity with other ways of life, he does not speak of the moral attributes which need to be present in order for students to want to know about others in the world. First among these is the disposition to willingly "step into the other's shoes." I find this a singularly important omission, one that undercuts some important arguments for educating for empathy.

Empathy requires more than becoming sensitive to people in certain situations. Imagining someone else's life is a difficult intellectual task, and ultimately one that is fated to be only partially successful. Just as we cannot, with any certainty, judge the measure of the intimacy achieved between an author and her translator or even between the particular interpretation and the reader, we cannot hope to fully understand the experience of another. As Michael Walzer tells us, "our imaginations, don't in fact reach to true or certain knowledge of the other person's reaction.... We don't, because we can't, reproduce other peoples' ideas; instead we reiterate our own." We reiterate our own ideas to be sure, but, if empathy is possible to any degree, some part of those ideas has been transformed by what we have been able to imagine, even by the fact that we are willing to take on the task of envisioning the life of another.
Empathy, along with a number of other moral virtues is considered essential to our moral lives, even though we develop the capacity to empathize to varying degrees and with varying successes. Empathy is the disposition and the ability to envision what another life is like. We often make moral judgments in situations where we can not literally be in the position of all, or even any, of the persons involved. We are then called upon to imaginatively enter into the role or place of the other in order to arrive at an informed moral decision.

According to Richard Hare, "having a certain power of imagination and readiness to use it" is a requirement of moral competence. That in essence is what empathy is. I define empathy as the inclination and the capacity to use one's imagination in order to understand and appreciate the perspective of another. Both dimensions of empathy can be fostered by educational means. While empathy has a particularly important in a moral decision or choice that affects someone's welfare, the exercise of empathy is not restricted to the realm of social action, whether in a public or private domain. It is or should be a central part of our moral lives, part of the way we are inclined to view things. It is constantly, vigilantly acknowledging the humanity of others. It is stepping into their shoes.

Obviously this will involve a number of things. Paying attention to potentially "morally hazardous" situations as well as orienting oneself to the possibility that one might be called upon to make a judgment or decide a course of action is one component of becoming empathetic, perhaps better described as a prerequisite. Becoming sympathetically or compassionately aware of peoples' circumstances and needs is also a part. We could describe these features as the disposition to notice. Another component is the
willingness to imaginatively enter in to another’s experience in order to better understand or communicate with her or to make a more enlightened decision concerning her welfare or a particular course of action which may affect her. This additionally demands a commitment to search out relevant facts and information about the person and her situation. A further component is knowledge of moral concepts and terms which will enable one to see and ultimately assess the situation from a moral point of view, or impersonal standpoint. Finally, empathy requires the belief in the principle of respect for persons. Without a belief in this principle, any capacity for empathizing would be morally empty, even harmful, as one could “enter in” to the role of another only to achieve one’s own ends. Conversely, without the capacity to “feel with the other,” belief in the principle of respect for persons would leave us ignorant of the most constructive, sensitive means in which to apply it in particular situations. This is what Gilligan refers to as co-feeling, which guides our actions toward another’s good.66

5.3.2. Empathy and the Global Perspective

The aims of empathetic understanding are generally embraced by global education. Global educators such as Kniep, Anderson, Selby and others are agreed on the need for students to step outside their own perspectives in order to come to an understanding of the values, beliefs and ways of life of other people in the world.67 Sometimes the aim goes beyond understanding the perspective of the other, and is translated to a commitment toward social change on the other’s behalf.68 If we are to take Coombs’ global perspective for instance, the aim of coming to understand others is a kind of universal solidarity. The goal of solidarity is to build a world community,
dedicated to solving world problems.

I want to look first at the possibilities for empathy between individual persons separated by geographical and cultural gulfs. I need to make it clear that I am not advocating the sort of empathy which is equated with a particular set of sentiments. I am not asking for students to develop feelings of warmth, fondness, or personal regard for strangers across the globe, even if the possibility exists that some students might, through some combination of exposure, contact or particular circumstance, develop such feelings. This is not a legitimate aim of education, though it may be defensible on some other grounds. On this point, I find myself agreeing, in part at least, with Nel Noddings who, in *Caring*, reminds us of the limitations of our sphere of genuine, personal concern for others; we cannot realistically take care of everyone.69.

Even so, there is no inevitable nor even justifiable limitation on our ability to place others within our ethical sphere as full moral agents. The goal of empathy is the recognition of others as persons who are connected to us by the fact of their personhood and what it implies: we are all worthy of serious moral consideration. Any genuine connections with others must begin with that recognition.

In *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*, Rorty writes at length of the importance of recognizing connections between ourselves and other people elsewhere in the world. He uses the term solidarity. For him, solidarity is not a reality but a goal to be promoted.

...not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of
people...\textsuperscript{70}

In this passage, Rorty calls for increasing our sensitivity to peoples' suffering in order to create bonds. He says we should attend to the specific details of particular persons' pain and humiliation. I think he's pointing us in the wrong direction and his mistake reveals a fundamental flaw in many efforts to promote empathetic understanding in students. What we are after is a sense of connection between our students and the strangers. Is that what we are actually promoting? On Peter Knight's view, teachers fail in their attempts because they have not distinguished feelings of sympathy from empathetic understanding. "The association of empathy with affect and emotions might be expected to lead some teachers to encourage children to sympathize with the sadness of, say, a starving peasant, an oppressed minority or an orphaned child." This, he claims, is a failure to grasp the aim of education, which should instead be seen as the development of understanding.

By focusing on the suffering of a stranger, we portray an incomplete picture of her that does not lead to understanding. The picture may foster distant sympathy for the plight of the unfortunate and an uneasy sense that there are wrongs which ought to be righted in the world. But this does not necessarily lead to empathy or connection. The same thing can happen with historical figures. Focusing on the sufferings of people in the past does not lead to empathy or connection because it does not lead to understanding of what their lives were like. Instead it presents school history that is little more than "repetitive rehearsals of negative emotions."\textsuperscript{71}

That is not to deny that there was a grimness about past (and many present situations) and that sympathy is a common response. It is to note that people in the past (and in the present too) were not
perpetually morose, and that dwelling on the occasions of grief is still some way short of explaining their actions.72.

Emphasizing only one aspect of the other's life, that is, the suffering she has endured, gives students a distorted view of past and present others as victims. While I agree with Rorty that we must understand the suffering of others if solidarity is to be achieved, it is an incomplete understanding of a human life. A person's hopes, beliefs, experiences and emotions are not captured in her image as victim. We may come away from the wide, dazed eyes of a starving refugee with a profound sense of the horror of war and the sad reality of famine, but this could be any one of a million victims, caught up in any one of a thousand tragedies.73 A general sense of pain and suffering in the world is never the same as an empathetic connection to one who suffers.

The incomplete picture we are given of individuals outside the developed world often focuses on a victim with a history but not a person with a story to tell. So the history is one of disaster or war, rarely an account of a richly textured personal past. This tendency is a persistent problem in textbooks that purport to present a realistic view of the world.74 Several negative consequences are likely when the focus is not on the whole person but on his plight and the circumstances that surround it. Students who are initially engaged by the details and images may lose sight of the purpose behind imaginatively envisioning the situation of another; they may fail to appreciate its moral value. Some may be overwhelmed by a sense of powerlessness when confronted by so much suffering in the world. For others, the circumstances may seem so foreign, they fail to see a connection at all. The conditions presented may repel certain students. According to Broudy, "sympathy is limited to a small circle; as the circle is enlarged to include persons and conditions remote in space, the range of sympathy required
outdistances its capacity for empathy. It may, perversely, expand the targets of antipathy.\textsuperscript{75}

There are other, related dangers in portraying the dramatic sufferings of a stranger in crisis. In one analysis of funding campaigns used by some international aid agencies, the author calls into question the advertisements showing harsh images of malnourished, poverty-stricken children, an explicitly "lurid approach" aimed at the consciences of Canadians.\textsuperscript{76} A growing number of development experts are beginning to question what some have labeled "pornography of the poor." John Stackhouse writes:

They say tear-jerking pictures of starving children, barren earth and general misery, while raising money for good works, tend to oversimplify the problems of development, exploit the image of those in need and make lasting solutions more difficult to attain.\textsuperscript{77}

It is lasting solutions which are most needed, not just damage control, but according to recent surveys referenced in the article, most Canadians view the situation in the developing world as "hopeless."\textsuperscript{78} There is some worry that the constant barrage of images of disaster victims has numbed Canadians to the possibility of real improvement in the third world such as that which would be brought about by long-range development schemes and structural changes involving trade, government policies, loans and so on. Oxfam has tried to change the message of hopelessness that seems to be coming across in the "hard sell" ad campaigns. "We try not to portray our partners as victims" remarked one Oxfam spokesperson.

The alternative approach is evident in advertisements which have cooperation in development as their message. One shows an Ethiopian blacksmith working in his shop with the caption, "Together we can make a difference." It asks for a very different response from the viewer, one that
encourages partnership not distance. Showing helpless victims in developing countries estranges their fellow human beings in the developed world. It perpetuates paternalism and can lead to the not uncommon North American belief that the fate of everyone in the developing world rests solely in our hands. I am reminded of Strawson’s description of objective attitudes that keep us apart from strangers; we see subjects for treatment instead of people.

I believe there are ways we can come to understand that although experience differs and our pain is never the same, connections exist between all of us. As Margaret Farley puts it:

Whatever the differences in human lives, however minimal the actuality of human community, it is nonetheless possible for human beings to weep over commonly felt tragedies, laugh over commonly perceived incongruities, yearn for common hopes. 79

It is possible for us and for our students to go beyond objective attitudes toward strangers. We can learn to recognize a person instead of an object for social policy when we encounter someone in the developing world. But I think this understanding is developed gradually. Perhaps we can only achieve the kind of connection we are after, one by one, through one person’s story at a time. There do not seem to be any formulas to tell us when or how this might happen, or how many stories we might have to hear before we can grasp the perspective of another. Empathy may not be the sort of thing you can come right out and teach.

Most likely the development of empathetic understanding begins in unexpected moments when our imaginations are caught by some detail or surprised by some characteristic that moves us toward a connection with others or even a new understanding of something in the human condition. But while acknowledgement of our mutual humanity may be a goal to pursue, it is
not humanity as a whole that we are able to recognize. What we recognize and identify with is particular individuals who are like us in some ways and yet not like us in others. Ignatieff writes that:

We recognize our mutual humanity in our differences, in our individuality, in our history, in our faithful discharge of our obligations. There is no identity we can recognize in our universality. There is no such thing as love of the human race, only the love of this person for that, in this time and not in any other.80

We have to be careful in our role as educators, not to emphasize the rather vague and abstracted commonalties of human beings at the risk of losing sight of our differences. Too often, discussion at this universal level sounds as if we can all step out of our familiar perspectives and take on a view from nowhere. The richness of our various customs and practices, the poetry and the colour of our separate languages, can disappear in the bland and featureless face of the ‘global citizen’.

The question is how to give other individuals in the world the chance to become real in the eyes of our students. On the one hand we want to avoid vague empty descriptions of the universal human being. On the other hand we do not want to dwell on the particulars of suffering in order to establish meaningful connections between ourselves and others. Empathy seems to require more, something like a fuller or richer definition of what it means to be a person.

It will be part of the task of the next chapter to bring the development of empathy into a discussion of global education in schools, to explore ways that students can come to see other people lives more clearly and more fully. The purpose of the discussion so far has been to establish empathy as a communicative virtue necessary for communication across differences.
Empathy is both the disposition and capacity to imagine the experience of another. It arises from a single moral truth, a truth that Walzer, for one, believes we are capable of grasping. The person we do not know and may never meet nevertheless has, "hopes, resentments, loves like ours—as legitimate as ours."81

5.4. CONCLUSION

Although they are obviously intertwined, each of the three communicative virtues that I argue are essential to a global perspective: tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice, contribute in particular ways to its development. A sense of justice was seen as indispensable in fairly regulating discourse between persons with diverse points of view. It guides us in our efforts to begin dialogue and keep it going even when we disagree. Tolerance was considered an active virtue, the disposition to bring all voices into the conversation and to promote opportunities for individuals to express themselves in forums where they will be heard and taken seriously. Finally, empathy was defined as the disposition and capacity to use one’s imagination to understand and appreciate the perspective of another person, recognizing that this first entails seeing the other as a potential participant in one’s moral sphere. Tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice are indispensable to a moral point of view and to uncoerced communication. They are therefore indispensable to the development of an interpersonal global perspective. When global education is understood as the construction of a community of concern, the importance of these virtues becomes clear in all our efforts to speak and listen to others.

All three virtues can work together in what Benhabib calls a
participationist community. All are grounded in respect for persons. All can be developed through constructive interactions with others. But what about compassion, beneficence, sympathy, generosity? Shouldn't these virtues be expressed in moral conversations as well? On my view these are virtues that may be cultivated over time, partly through participation in ongoing dialogue. But as Noddings reminds us, we learn morality first in our inner circle. It is within these inner circles that most of us live out our lives. The virtues of compassion and sympathy are best taught and expressed in close relationships with others who can respond to us directly.\footnote{82} We are immersed in these relationships from early on and it is here that we learn and about and fulfill special, particular obligations. Benhabib envisions our relationships along a continuum between the generalized and the concrete other. At one end of the continuum, we stand in unique ethical relationships with certain people in our lives. "To stand in such an ethical relationship means we as concrete individuals know what is expected of us in virtue of the kind of social bonds which tie us to the other."\footnote{83}

At the other end of the continuum, we have a generalized commitment to consider everyone as worthy of universal moral respect. I argue that this commitment leads to generalized ethical obligations that we can still carry out with a particularized awareness of the other. We are morally obligated in this \textit{wider} circle, to treat others justly, to actively seek ways to bring them into the conversation, and to try to imagine the world from their point of view. We are justified in asking the same of them. These obligations arise out of our fundamental democratic commitments. We can hope that other virtues will flourish, too, and we can work to create conditions so that they can be cultivated over time. But we should not despair if certain virtues continue to
have their home in the inner circles to which we belong.

My final task will be to bring the dialogue I have begun into the realm of educational practice. The conclusion of this dissertation is in part a discussion of the arguments I have presented in relation to global education in the classroom. My conception of global education is fundamentally a conception of moral education with a global outlook. The global perspective I defend is a special articulation of a moral point of view. It entails certain virtues that are indispensable to uncoerced communication and therefore essential to the creation of any community across differences. The construction of community is itself an ethical enterprise. In the case of a global community of concern, this construction is the kind of communication between people who begin with no world of common meanings and are compelled to invent that world. The dispositions and abilities required to invent a world of common meanings need to be taught. I argue that they need to be taught in classrooms, places where community building of all kinds, takes place.

In the concluding chapter I will discuss classrooms as moral communities, places where communication across differences can reflect the commitments addressed in this thesis. In this sense, global education is the foundation for constructing community with individuals elsewhere in the world. It is the context in which conditions for uncoerced communication are created, in which connections between people are discovered and enhanced, and in which a sense of justice leads us to respect the rights of others. Developing an interpersonal global perspective is developing a moral perspective toward the human community.


4See Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992). I am most interested in paying attention to the kinds of cautions Benhabib brings out in several chapters of *Situating the Self*. Her version of communicative ethics is based on actual rather than ideal speech situations. She emphasizes the need for people in communities to pay special attention to the demands of particular contexts and particular "concrete individuals," 148–177.


6 In the Ecuadorian rainforest, a small and relatively isolated tribe called the Huaorani are presently waging a three-pronged war to save their territory from further exploitation by oil companies, their own government and now well-meaning environmentalists. The latter claim to be speaking on the Huaorani's behalf in negotiations where tribal spokespersons are allegedly absent. One writer summed up the problem by saying, "No one knew what the Huaorani wanted because no one really knew who the Huaorani were." See Joe Kane, "With Spears From All Sides," *The New Yorker* (September 27, 1993).


11Benhabib, 29.


14Benhabib, 38

15Ibid., 29.

16Ibid., 52.


18Farley, 183.


20Farley, 184.

21Callan, 434.

22Noddings, The Challenge to Care in the Schools, 110.

23Callan, 437.


25Ibid., 196.

26Farley, 178.

28Ibid., 466.

29Ibid., 460.

30Farley, 182.

31Benhabib, 148–177.

32Farley, 184.


34Rawls, 476.


39Wolff, 138.


On some issues rights do demand more than this. That is because the principle of non-interference can be construed fairly broadly; some conditions must exist so that the liberty of the individual to pursue her own good is guaranteed by the state. But notice that even the broadest interpretation of rights only hints at who is responsible for the correlative responsibilities that rights inevitably entail whenever the discussion moves from the abstract to concrete cases.

Hilary Putnam's remarks on the role of a community of inquirers in determining how we ought to live are useful to this discussion. See "Equality and Our Moral Image of the World," in The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987).


O'Neill, "Practices of Toleration," 170

Ibid., 172.

Ibid., 172. O'Neill refers to the "categories of public discourse," as both the topics which are allowed to be addressed publicly, and the ways in which various media structure discourse through programming, particular kinds of audience participation, public forums etc.

Baier, 152.

O'Neill, "Practices of Toleration," 177


See D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm & A. C. Kazepides, eds., The Domain of Moral Education (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) for several discussions on the importance of empathy to moral education.


61Ibid., 263.


64Richard Hare, quoted in Daniels and Parkinson, 331.

65The phrase “morally hazardous,” as I am using it comes from educational philosopher Jerrold Coombs.


Knight, 46.


Ibid., A4.
78Ibid., A4.

79Farley, 178.

80Ignatieff, 54.


82Noddings, The Challenge to Care in the Schools, 110.

83Benhabib, 10.

CHAPTER SIX
CHILDREN IN COMMUNITIES OF CONCERN: EDUCATING FOR A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A central question for education, then, is how such communicative virtues can be developed and how they can be sustained over time. In our view, these dispositions are created, reflexively, in the kinds of communicative relations in which all of us are engaged, as children and into adult life. The nature of these virtues is that they are only required in relation to communicative partners, and improved by practice. Thus to develop these virtues is to be drawn into certain kinds of communicative relations: one becomes tolerant, patient and respecting of others through association with people who are similarly disposed.

Nicholas Burbules and Suzanne Rice

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The final chapter is in part a discussion of this dissertation's implications for classroom practice. The first section is a summary of the arguments presented in previous chapters of the dissertation. The second part is a description of what is needed for classrooms to become moral communities with a global outlook. In the third section I discuss the special role of literature in cultivating the virtues necessary for participation in a global community of concern. The last section contains my concluding remarks in defense of my conception of global education and the necessity of developing an interpersonal global perspective in students.

Throughout this thesis, I have emphasized the moral commitments and dispositions that students must demonstrate as they develop a defensible global perspective and learn to communicate with others, both in their own communities and across differences in constructing new communities. I have argued that this project is a task for moral education with a global outlook.
Students involved in such an enterprise are entering into conversations with other inquirers in an effort to construct a community across differences. As prerequisites for constructing a global moral community, or community of concern, I stated that three moral attainments, tolerance, empathy and a sense of justice are fundamental to relations between inquirers. Each in its own way grounds communication in a solid moral foundation. Each helps to further the ongoing conversation between people searching for the best ways to live their lives. In the following section, I will bring these views together in a final look at my conception of global education as initiation into the human community.

6.2. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

In Chapter One, I argued that global education is at present, a system of ambiguous slogans. There are many agendas hidden under the banner of global education and it is wise to uncover them before global education's central concepts and purposes can be analyzed. The four major justifications for global education were described. Programs in global education are motivated by a range of concerns, some prudential, some moral, though the latter have not been made explicit or central in the literature. Several persistent tensions in global education were also explored in the first chapter, especially that tension which exists between conceptions of global education which serve to promote national self-interest and conceptions which promote education for world citizenship. My thesis was that the present conceptions of global education, even when carefully articulated about matters of global knowledge, are limited and unclear with respect to a moral point of view.

In Chapter Two, I began to redefine the global perspective as a moral
point of view. Hanvey's conception of the global perspective was examined in detail because of its comprehensiveness and because of its enduring influence on program development. The missing element in Hanvey's conception was the moral dimension. This was all but ignored except for a brief and unsatisfactory mention of the importance of teaching respect for different points of view, a claim that was asserted but not argued.² Coombs' normative conception of the global perspective, the constructivist global perspective, was also explored for its moral content and stance. It was found to be too abstract an account to offer us much help in discovering the particular stance we should take toward individuals. My own conception of a global perspective focuses primarily on potential connections between individuals based on knowledge of their particular situations and the disposition to empathize. I employed Strawson's distinction between reactive and objective attitudes toward persons to further clarify what I mean by the interpersonal global perspective. I argued that the interpersonal global perspective would lead us to see the possibilities for constructing a moral community of concern.

In Chapter Three, I was mainly concerned with the concept of a moral community and what it might mean for global education to be involved with the construction of a global community. I responded to some of the stronger challenges to the very possibility of a moral community in the modern and postmodern world. Bellah and Maclntyre are two critics whose work was discussed in this chapter in relation to the concept of community. I argued that community still has meaning for most of us and that some of the moral attainments associated with our membership in communities are key elements for potential relations in other moral spheres, including global ones. Many of
the dispositions and sensitivities required for responsible participation at a local level are also needed by people who wish to communicate with others at a distance, particularly those that call upon our capacities for tolerance, empathy, and justice. A defensible global perspective depends on commitment to the concept of community itself.

In Chapter Four I explored the concept of community still further. Hilary Putnam's discussion of moral images of the world became one cornerstone of my conception of a moral community of inquirers united by a common question about how to conduct their lives. In this chapter, I argued that one important element of a global perspective is the belief in the possibility of a global moral community constructed out of our disparate moral heritages. Although I see its construction as crucial to the development of a global perspective, this community would have a limited purpose and place in our moral lives. Its central role would be to highlight common spheres of interest and provide a forum for dialogue about them. As well, such a community would keep a watchful eye on the institutions established to serve human needs. In this way it would function as a kind of community of concern. Kant's maxims of communication were introduced as guidelines for beginning respectful and constructive conversations across differences. In this chapter, too, I responded to some of the criticisms of the project of community building. Although the challenges of reaching any kind of understanding in a pluralistic world are great, they are not insurmountable. They are challenges that educators, in particular, must face openly and honestly.

The dispositions and sensitivities necessary for participation in a community of concern were examined in Chapter Five. I argued that certain moral virtues were prerequisites to the task of constructing community and
communicating across differences. The virtues I discussed in this chapter were empathy, tolerance and justice. In all three cases I wanted to go beyond our standard view of what these virtues have meant in moral education and extend their application to a moral global community of concern. I argued that all three can be developed through global education that has as its central aim the acquisition of an interpersonal global perspective based on commitments to the construction of a moral global community.

The concluding chapter will show how the global perspective and the notion of classrooms as moral communities of inquirers are interrelated. I argue that my conception of global education as moral education is education toward the construction of a moral global community of concern. Global education classrooms are places where fruitful conversations across distance and difference can begin and be sustained.

6.3. CHILDREN IN COMMUNITIES OF INQUIRY

Dewey wrote that the essential need in the search for the “Great Community” is the “improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.” These improvements must be grounded in a moral point of view which has democratic principles at its centre. In many places, perhaps most explicitly in Democracy and Education, Dewey emphasized that the methods of debate must be taught and that children must be given opportunities to enter in to the ongoing human conversation about who we ought to be and what kind of world we ought to create. Classrooms must be seen as communities where democratic principles are allowed to take root and where inquiry is conducted with care and with respect for fellow inquirers.
My conception of an interpersonal global perspective depends on moral education directed towards the construction and maintenance of moral communities of inquiry. A belief in the possibility of a global community of concern can only be developed in an educational setting which fosters interpersonal connections between members of existing communities, including classroom communities. Such an educational setting encourages students to see themselves as equal participants in an ongoing dialogue with their peers, a dialogue in which they continually try to learn about each other, and about the possibilities of cooperation to solve common problems. Looking beyond the classroom, perhaps these same students can imagine themselves as world citizens taking part in an ongoing dialogue with neighbours as well as strangers.

As I have argued, my conception has at its centre, questions about how we ought to treat one another and relate to one another in all spheres of concern from the local to the global. Moral education has an important role in helping young people build commitments that make it possible to communicate across differences. Dwight Boyd argues that the task for all of us is to construct those things that, “make it possible to talk through our cultural diversity about how we should make sense of it together,” commitments that “make possible mutual understanding and communication.” It is imperative to bring children on the inside of our moral discourse, to teach them about the necessity of communicating from a moral point of view, to bring them into the ongoing conversation about essentially contestable visions of human development.

It thus requires acknowledging the differences, problematizing the differences as prescriptive claims, conveying the need to maintain the common human conditions of dialogue as the foundation of dealing
with differences, and giving the students whatever language, skills, knowledge and dispositional states necessary to their being equal participants and responsible partners in this conversation.\textsuperscript{6}

It is the educator's task is to develop in children the sensitivities and dispositions necessary for responsible and reflective participation in moral communities. Moral dispositions such as respect, sensitivity to others' concerns, and the commitment to addressing their needs are clearly essential to peaceful resolution of conflict, the reduction of world poverty, and other pressing global problems. I believe that we can start to develop these dispositions and sensitivities in schools. I believe, as Dewey did, that classrooms can become communities of inquiry based on moral foundations.

Writers interested in the possibility of classroom communities of inquiry have often focused on the\textit{ intellectual} virtues children must demonstrate in order to participate in their construction and operation. Much attention has been given to the procedures and methods for conducting particular inquiries as well. Not enough attention has been paid to describing and explaining the moral dispositions and sensitivities that need to be developed in students. The role of the latter in the process of inquiry is clearly essential if we are to accept my account of moral communities.

In an article concerning the nature of communities of inquiry in schools, Ann Margaret Sharp describes the sorts of behaviors associated with participation in a classroom community.\textsuperscript{7} Among them she writes that the child:

- is able to develop ideas and build on those of others
- is able to revise views in light of reasons given by others
- asks relevant questions and asks for reasons and criteria
- verbalizes relationships between ends and means
is capable of detecting underlying assumptions in argument.

In these ways and others, the child demonstrates open-mindedness, concern for consistency and impartiality in discussions, and an understanding of the standards of reasonableness involved in rational inquiry. Sharp also mentions a number of dispositions more explicitly concerned with children's attitudes toward other people as well as to the inquiry itself. Among these she claims that the child:

- shows concern for others' rights to express their views
- is able to listen to others seriously and attentively
- shows respect for persons in the community
- shows sensitivity to context in moral matters

These are all essential to the development of a community of inquiry at a local level, and to meaningful cross-cultural and cross-national dialogue as well. There are more we could add that might refer more explicitly to global citizenship. We could, for instance, extend the requirement to respect those within the community to encompass those outside it as well. Sensitivity to context in moral matters might well be expanded to include cultural sensitivity and the disposition to learn about moral matters as they are seen in other societies.

But taken as they are, the behaviors listed by Sharp do little to get at the integral moral dimensions of a community of inquiry, and the underlying reasons for viewing the construction of communities as first and foremost a moral enterprise. Although clearly interested in what Hilary Putnam has to say on the subject, Sharp fails to integrate Putnam's discussions of communities of inquirers into her prescriptions for school practice. The moral commitments and presuppositions that are the foundation of communities of inquiry also
need to be made explicit to students. As well their application to classroom settings and to the particular demands for participation there, need to be more fully explicated. I believe that if children are to become open to each other's ideas, sensitive to moral matters and so on, then they need to be shown the principles that give force to what Sharp calls behaviors. Understanding and accepting the reasons for demonstrating the traits Sharp identifies, ought to be built into the list itself. The traits or behaviors identified here are crucial to meaningful, open communication because of the beliefs we have about the way people ought to be treated, beliefs that go beyond the borders of particular communities. They are essential because we have good reason to prefer a world in which rational dialogue (in Strawson's reactive sense) and a willingness to listen to each other, prevail over less civilized means of settling disputes.

While much of the discussion about classroom communities of inquiry concentrates on the procedures that must be followed throughout the process of inquiry I would argue that a task of equal importance is that of initiating children into our moral and philosophical traditions. These traditions demand not only an understanding of inquiry but respect for the rights and freedoms of others and knowledge of what that actually means in practice. Our moral traditions emphasize our responsibilities towards others and explicate the reasons that give force to our various obligations within and across communities. These reasons should be explained and their consequences for moral action, directly presented. Together we can make sense of the questions "How should I live?" and "How should we live?," knowing there will be a multitude of perspectives on possible answers, all of which must be seriously considered. Children need to learn why as well as how this
consideration comes about and how far it must extend. It is not consideration that can justifiably stop at national boundaries. What I am arguing for here is, of course, moral education, but it is moral education of a certain kind. It is moral education with a global outlook. The dispositions that are essential to reasoning about global concerns, can be adopted from those learned through the operation of a community of inquiry at a classroom level.

There are both intellectual and moral sensitivities and dispositions which students need to develop for communication with others. Among them, tolerance, receptivity, acceptance, open-mindedness and flexibility seem especially important, as do a sense of justice and a willingness to empathize. Meaningful connections with others are best built up through knowledge that is intellectual, imaginative and (wherever possible) practical. I borrow these categories from Paul Taylor who uses them to describe the three sorts of knowledge necessary for understanding various ways of life. According to Taylor, understanding alternate ways of life will equip people to make enlightened choices for themselves. For my purposes, coming to understand ways of life through the three modes of access: intellectual, imaginative and practical, is a way to sort out how an interpersonal global perspective might be developed in schools.

Intellectual knowledge is the first of Taylor's levels. Here we have access to information about people; their political systems, national histories, customs, languages, and so on. The global perspectives so far described, including my own, recognize that the knowledge dimension (Case's substantive dimension) is crucial. Many global education programs presently in existence make a good start in this area, although a clear idea about the purposes to which this knowledge ought to be put is sorely needed. We need
to be clear about the objects of attention (what we study) and the point of view we take towards them. (how we study them, and with what ends in mind.) Intellectual knowledge also includes the philosophical, "the canons of reasoning that constitute the point of view to which any value system in the way of life belongs."¹⁴

Paul Taylor refers to the next kind of knowledge as "Imaginative." With imaginative knowledge we can begin to imagine subtler and potentially richer parts of peoples' experiences and inner lives: their values, belief systems and world views, their struggles and aspirations. We get some insight (admittedly partial) into these through novels, drama, art, biographies and religious texts. He writes:

The music, the painting and sculpture, the dance, the architecture, the drama and the literature of a culture all present to us the way of life of a culture. A thorough understanding of works of art in these various forms brings us to an imaginative awareness of a way of life which no scientific or philosophical knowledge, however complete, could yield. One of the most interesting aspects of a great novel, poem or drama, for example, is the way its author creates a world in which certain fundamental attitudes, points of view, and ways of life are expressed. A novelist, poet or dramatist does not necessarily attempt to persuade us to accept his world outlook or way of life. He confronts us with one, or sometimes several for our imaginative contemplation.¹⁵

Through this process we gain insight into ways of life we have never lived. There are many ways we can make this possible within classroom settings, providing students with a rich and varied repertoire of cultural experiences that range from storytelling to theatre, to interviews, to demonstrations of craft, dance, music, and food preparation. It is hoped that exposure of this "imaginative kind" will encourage students to pursue more experiences on their own and immerse themselves in the folklore, arts and histories of other cultures. In a global education program that makes its moral
commitments clear, the focus will be on developing a fuller understanding of people in order to treat them justly and fairly, and in order to respond to those in need with compassion and sensitivity. One benefit of an enlightened understanding of what others are like is that students' perspectives on their own lives will be enriched and critical examination of their own worldviews may follow.

The third kind of knowledge is "practical knowledge," in which people immerse themselves in another way of life. This is not unlike Hanvey's last stage of cross-cultural awareness which is immersion into another value system and worldview, what he refers to as transpection. Obviously this cannot often be experienced within schools as they are presently structured. Most knowledge will stay at the imaginative stage since long term exchanges with students in other cultures and societies are not possible for most school children. Yet there is opportunity to come to know many ways of life different from one's own through short-term visits and exchanges. The wealth of heritages present in most North American classrooms provides a multitude of possibilities for meaningful exchange between students and people outside the classroom, including visits to families, ethnic neighborhoods and so on. Learning a language can be an experience in gaining "practical knowledge," and so can participating in letter exchanges with people in distant communities. If the focus is on sincerely and respectfully trying to understand a way of life through participating, even in a limited way, in its cultural or religious customs, its modes of expression, and its daily rituals, the classroom can offer the groundwork for further practical knowledge as well as providing the intellectual and the imaginative kinds. All three can add significant depth to a global perspective.
6.4. THE ROLE OF LITERATURE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Though Taylor's "practical knowledge" may ultimately be the most powerful way to gain understanding of other people and their forms of life, developing a global perspective in schools will necessarily involve more vicarious experiences with others who are at a distance. Therefore it is "imaginative knowledge" which needs to be explored a bit further, especially imaginative knowledge that is acquired through encounters with literature about people in other positions and places. If we are committed to teaching students about the need to develop a global community of concern, we will try to introduce them to many ways of life expressed through the words of novelists, essayists and poets. We want our students to regard other people outside their present circle of relationships as morally significant. We want them to consider people in other parts of the world as potential participants in one facet of their own moral lives. That facet of moral life is communication about shared concerns. Rorty writes:

This process of coming to see other human beings as "one of us" rather than as "them" is a matter of detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and of redescription of what we ourselves are like. This is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalist's report, the comic book, the docudrama, and especially, the novel.16

Literature has a powerful hold on our ability to grasp truths about ourselves and about others who may turn out to have feelings, aspirations and struggles, not entirely unlike our own. Even when experiences are wholly dissimilar, peoples' stories can help us see the world from a different though legitimate perspective. Genres such as those Rorty mentions offer us the
opportunity to discover aspects of our own worlds that we may not have examined carefully as well discover the personal worlds of others.

Literature has been called the primary vehicle of our culture, and not just because it is, "the source of our concepts and our ideals and our heroes."\textsuperscript{17} Literature is an important source of shared emotions and a means of understanding emotions in other people. It can even be a safe a vehicle for expressing emotions. Emotions are "social, imaginative constructions"\textsuperscript{18} not mere reactions, and they involve a creative dimension that is stimulated by literature. Literature demands the exercise of imagination and invites critical participation with ideas, cultures, and people in ways that can extend and even transform emotions. Robert Solomon calls this "participatory literature":

It can come from conversations on the street, lectures and political rallies, but for a variety of reasons, it revolves around the printed word. It has to do with participating in certain basic or even essential experiences—knowing, if only vicariously, a form of life that touches on our own.\textsuperscript{19}

The aim of global education is, in part, coming to know forms of life that may one day touch upon our own. Developing an interpersonal global perspective is coming to understand and respect other lives. Literature can bring us face to face with the fears, hopes, struggles and achievements of people in distant parts of the globe. By recognizing the particularities of their experiences, we may be more inclined to accept their humanity.

Of course there are limitations on what the written word can do to narrow the gulf between people. Our contexts and experiences differ greatly. It is wise to be reminded of pitfalls as well as possibilities in developing a global perspective. We should approach the matter of understanding, particularly cross-cultural understanding, with care. For example, no matter
how vivid Jamaica Kincaid's prose is, I will never know what it was like to grow up as a black child in an Antigua that was powerfully and unremittingly English:

...I did not know then that the statement, "Draw a map of England" was something far worse than a declaration of war, for in fact a flat out declaration of war would have put me on alert, and again in fact, there was no need of war—I was already conquered.... I did not know then that this statement was meant to make me feel in awe and small whenever I heard the word England—in awe at its existence, small because I was not from it.20

My own memories of childhood as well as the pastoral images I carry with me about England are something quite different. It would be a mistake, even an arrogant one, to claim that I could ever know what Cinched knows about subjugation and conquest. This does not mean that I am not changed by her words, or that I am unable to understand something of her experience. She has, after all, communicated brilliantly. But the appropriate stance to take toward the possibility of understanding another's experience, is a humble one.

Literature does have the potential to cultivate communicative virtues, especially empathy, in one significant sense; it helps us recognize a stranger's moral worth. The following passage is a good illustration. It's the story of a young South African girl, a refugee from a small village. In part it's her story of crossing Kruger Park with her brothers and her grandparents and the few others who survived the bandits and the burning of their village. As the narrative closes, she has been living in a large crowded tent with other refugee families who have been there long enough to begin small gardens of mealies and cabbage. Although they are officially banned from seeking work, some of the women have found a bit of employment nearby. The young girl's grandmother has found work carrying bricks on her head for new construction
in a town some distance away. She is able to provide her grandchildren with soap, sugar and a little tea, and she has made sure they can get to a makeshift school. In part the story is a detailed description of loss and suffering. But the author takes us far beyond the image of the victim. We are drawn into the personal world of another human being, and at the same time recognize something of ourselves:

Our grandmother hasn't been able to buy herself a pair of shoes for church yet, but she has bought black school shoes and polish to clean them for my first-born brother and me. Every morning, when people are getting up in the tent, the babies are crying, people are pushing each other at the taps outside and some children are already pulling the crusts of porridge off the pots we ate from last night, my first-born brother and I clean our shoes. Our grandmother makes us sit on our mats with our legs straight out so she can look carefully at our shoes to make sure we have done it properly. No other children in the tent have real school shoes. When we three look at them it's as if we are in a real house again, with no war, no away.21

Walzer says that we don't enter a person's head when we step in his shoes. To think that we do, is to make the mistake of thinking heads have no histories.22 It's not so much a matter of where those shoes are now but of where they have been. We won't ever know the full story of another's life. And we won't come to care for a stranger we will never meet in the same way we care for those people who are in our inner circle. Still, attaining an interpersonal global perspective is possible. Encounters with people through literature are an important part of its development.

6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

When I began to explore the notion of a defensible global perspective, I was already committed to the idea of education as a potential force for social change. I believe that a worthwhile education can help students develop the
intellectual virtues and the moral virtues that are necessary for living life reflectively and responsibly. My conception of global education as moral education contains within it numerous possibilities for helping students learn to communicate with understanding and with respect. It contains the foundations for world citizenship as an extension of our membership in moral communities of which we are already a part. Social participation and social action are important features of this membership.

Students need to be able to examine knowledge with critical eyes and encounter people in the world with open minds. They need to be able to listen thoughtfully and carefully to another point of view, to attempt to take the perspective of the other whenever possible. One of our most basic rights is the right to be heard and to be listened to. This right requires our vigilant attention and protection. It places obligations upon us to treat people with respect and understanding. We need to learn how to do this and do it well. The procedural considerations described in Chapter Four are a start to meeting people as full participants in a moral community of inquirers, to regard them with “reactive attitudes.” The kinds of knowledge necessary for cross-cultural understanding that were described in this chapter are also a start. But the central purpose of this dissertation is to lay the conceptual and moral groundwork, not to design particular programs of global education. Before we can teach for an interpersonal global perspective, we need to know just what one is.

Constructing and defending a conception of global education as a special kind of moral education, is only part of the conceptual work that needs to be completed. Global education, like multicultural education, anti-racist education and others, is a political movement with many dimensions and at
this point in time, a complex history. Each of these dimensions needs to be explored carefully and critically for its underlying assumptions about the ways in which people can and should interact with each other. Programs in global education, development studies, and cross-cultural education could become richer and more meaningful experiences for students if educators and program developers directly confronted the task of creating places for ethical exchange. All of these movements can be seen as part of a wider project of communicative ethics, a framework for uncoerced communication that can be taught as a viable possibility, not a utopian dream.

It should be no surprise to find that the virtues described in this dissertation: empathy, tolerance and justice, have both epistemological and moral dimensions. We are morally bound to try to understand what others are trying to tell us, and to empathize as far as we are able, with their ways of seeing the world. This is the beginning of constructing community. Whether or not a community of concern can ever be achieved on a global scale is an empirical matter that is not for me to speculate on. But education is a normative enterprise. If we did not look to an ideal, a model of a more just, more compassionate world, we would be condemning our students and ourselves to the inevitability of continued political conflict, ethnic strife and environmental decay. We owe the next generation our efforts to teach toward a better future. We need to keep the idea of a global community of concern alive.

There is still the matter of ever finding a common morality in this world, a distant possibility that was touched on in nearly every chapter of this thesis. A core morality relating to uncoerced communication is central to a global community of concern and therefore central to my conception of global
education. It was admitted, however, that a shared morality is likely to be limited to a small number of universals and that its application will be limited to a small sphere of common concerns. Even then, to what extent are we justified in taking our own moral beliefs, including our beliefs in justice and tolerance, to be true ones and ones that can guide the construction of communities? Can they really provide the basis for the kind of communication we want to have across differences? Are we in danger of imposing unwarranted moral principles on others in our attempts to construct community?

I believe, as Jeffrey Stout does, that the appropriate stance to take toward our own moral beliefs, is one of humility. We are bound to consider our own position with regard to moral knowledge as ultimately provisional. That does not mean we are not justified in believing some moral principles. We are justified in believing the moral truths that we do because of the epistemic contexts we find ourselves in. Others are justified in holding to their moral truths, too, and we should always grant them this understanding unless we have reason to believe that they cannot justify their beliefs within the contexts in which they operate, unless we can show that “they have acquired their beliefs improperly or through epistemic negligence.”

Someday even some of our most deeply intuitive moral beliefs may be proven wrong. Some, but not all. That does not mean that we should abandon them or abandon the search for common moral principles between us. The right to be listened to is a strong candidate for a universal principle, and there are a small number of others. This thesis is about building community and about finding the common ground we all share as human beings. I can think of no stronger justification to accept my conception of global education over
others than to say that education is not only about the way the world is, but the way it ought to be. If we are justified in holding to a morality that listens to the common cry for justice, then we cannot turn away when that demand comes from beyond our borders. No matter how great our differences and our situations, I believe that we can learn to listen to one another without coercion and without misunderstanding. A global perspective that recognizes the moral significance of human beings beyond our differences and across the distances that separate us, will bring life to that possibility.

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4John Dewey, Democracy and Education.


6Boyd, 164.


8Sharp does not include an important element here that was pointed out to me by LeRoi Daniels, and that is that the child should be inclined to listen to others.


13 See Case, “The Key Elements of a Global Perspective.”

14 Paul Taylor, 167.

15 Ibid., 169.


18 Ibid., 39.

19 Ibid., 39.


25ibid., 222.
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