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Euripidean rhetoric : a formal and literary study Clausen, Bruce 1997

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EURIPIDEAN RHETORIC A Formal and Literary Study by B R U C E C L A U S E N B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A February, 1997 © Bruce Clausen, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of ClftSglcs The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 6 V ^ ™, W7 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT This study aims (1) to document and classify the materials and techniques of persuasive speech in Euripidean drama, and (2) to develop an understanding of the ways in which the balanced arguments and abstract speculations of Euripidean characters contribute to the construction of plots, themes and characters. The results are intended to be useful both as a contribution to criticism concerned with the "tone" of Euripidean tragedy and as a resource for the study of early oratory and argumentation in the period of the Sophists. The first two chapters classify and analyse speeches and scenes according to dramatic context. In Chapter I, single speeches of several types are shown to rely on similar techniques of presentation and argument. Chapter II analyses patterns of correspondence between the speeches of a scene. The debate scenes of Alkestis and Hippolytos are discussed with a view to determining how stylised and conventional rhetorical material affects our view of the characters involved. Analysis is next offered of some common techniques for the presentation of arguments. Chapter III discusses the "probability argument" and related forms involving the use of rhetorical questions and conditional formulations. Chapter IV examines Euripides' use in argumentative contexts of gnomic material and so-called "utopian reflections". Chapter V considers the use of rhetorical techniques and scenes in three plays. Phaidra's monologue in Hippolytos 373-430 is discussed in terms of its rhetorical purpose and its contribution to important themes and formal relationships in the play. The rhetorical confrontations of the first half of Suppliant Women are seen to contribute to the delaying and highlighting of the action that follows whi le exploiting an opportunity for abstract moral and polit ical debate. The play-long rhetorical preparation for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in Iphigeneia at Aulis similarly is shown to serve the purpose of enhancing the importance and value of the girl's death, while involving an intricate formal balancing of scenes and speeches that should be appreciated in its own right. i i i Contents Abstract i i Contents i v Introduction 1 I. Speech and Argument 6 A. Speeches of Appeal 8 B. "Forensic" Speeches 18 C. Monologues of Despair 27 D. Heroic Acceptance of Death 37 E. Two Epideictic Speeches 44 II. Antilogies and Complex Exchanges 49 A . Appeal and Response 49 B. Accusation and Refutation 57 C. The Debate with Lykos 68 D. "The Rhetoric of the Situation" in Two Forensic Debates 71 E. Three-way Scenes 82 III. Probabilities and Possibilities 95 A . Rhetorical Questions 95 B. Elimination of Alternatives: Past 104 C. Elimination of Alternatives: Future 118 D. Hypothetical Arguments 125 iv IV. General Rule and Special Case 135 A . Formal Patterns 136 B. Rhetorical Uses of Gnomic Formulations 146 1. "Opening" Uses 147 2. "Closing" Uses - 157 3. "Grounding" Uses 161 C. Realisations and Challenges to Common Sense 164 D. "Utopian Reflection" and "Gotterkritik" 172 V. Rhetoric in Three Plays 180 A . Phaidra's Monologue 180 B. Rhetoric and Action in Suppliant Women 206 C. Rhetoric and Design in Iphigeneia at Aulis 232 VI. Summary and Conclusions 257 Bibliography 263 Appendices 273 A . Some Formal Devices of Euripidean Rhetoric 273 B. Personal Supplication as a Persuasive Technique 280 C. "Portable Arguments" 296 v Introduction This study has two main purposes. I have attempted in the first place to assemble a "grammar" of persuasive utterance for Euripidean drama, a catalogue of the techniques of organisation and argument typical of the poet's speeches and debates. I have brought together material drawn from a variety of dramatic situations and speech-types (for example, appeals, monologues, friendly and antagonistic debates), since similar patterns of thought and expression are to be seen wherever Euripides has a character speak in a persuasive mode. The body of information resulting from this study should be useful in two areas: first, it has a role to play in text criticism. In a number of places, I have suggested that a textual question can be solved only wi th the help of a clear understanding, based on comparative Euripidean material, of both the rhetorical objective of a passage and the forms typically used in the realisation of that objective. Second, the Euripidean corpus constitutes a very substantial document for the study of some of the experiments in thought and expression typical of the late fifth century; both the size and the quality of Euripides' legacy would seem to make a clear description of his resources in these areas an essential prerequisite for the study of the Sophists and the early orators. I have attempted to supply such a groundwork. M y second main purpose is to face some questions of interpretation that arise in connection wi th the use of a somewhat stylised and intellectual rhetoric in tragedy. Critics have differed over the degree to which the presentation or content of debate speeches convey insight into "character". A related problem is whether we are to think Euripides intends to alienate our sympathy from the 1 speaker who demonstrates an easy eloquence or offers arguments of questionable merit or honesty in a debate. These and other questions of tone have too often been discussed in a vacuum, wi th inadequate reference to context and to comparative material. I have approached them in the light of the formal apparatus developed in this study. A preliminary comparison of a number of speeches and scenes suggested as a point of departure the fol lowing principles: s I ( 1 ) Euripides writes speeches of a persuasive or argumentative character for a great variety of dramatic situations. Similar techniques of construction and argument are to be seen in "forensic" speeches, appeals, and various kinds of monologues. (2) Each of these types, however, involves certain patterns and techniques peculiar to itself. (3) In certain types of scene (forensic debate, appeal and response), persuasive speeches are associated wi th each other in pairs; occasionally three speeches confront each other. (4) Typical stylistic features of these speeches include self-conscious clarity of form: headlines often announce argumentative points, clear formulas of transition close one argument and open another, arguments are often summarised in closing. (5) A n extremely common format for the enunciation of an argument is the rhetorical question or rhetorical question series (hypophora figure); this is used especially in arguing against the probability of a proposition. 2 (6) Another technique seen constantly in Euripides' speeches is reference to "gnomic" wisdom: a general proposition is stated as an article of common sense for the purpose of headlining, summarising or grounding a contention or an appeal. O n the basis of these observations, I have adopted the fol lowing organi-sation for this study. Chapters I and II describe Euripidean rhetoric in terms of the various dramatic contexts in which persuasive speeches are presented. Chapter I presents the basic materials and techniques used by Euripides in wri t ing speeches for a number of rhetorical situations. Speeches of each of the several types are analysed; attention is called to the distinctions of each type, and to points at which all the types are similar. Chapter II considers the composition of pairs of opposing speeches (again treating separately the different kinds of scene), and of exchanges involving three characters. Chapters III and IV deal wi th typical techniques for the presentation of arguments, without regard to the type of speech in which they occur. Chapter III investigates the presentation of probability arguments of various kinds through the use of rhetorical questions; hypothetical arguments are treated as a related form, in that they apply con-dit ional formulations for the consideration of probabilities or possibilities. Chapter IV deals wi th the argumentative use of maxims and other general statements, and wi th other patterns of expression in which the present situation is implicit ly or explicitly compared wi th a general rule or expectation; these include sudden realisations that contradict common sense and reflections of a "utopian" character. Throughout these first four chapters I have moved freely between purely formal description and interpretive discussion. Chapter V offers extended interpretive discussion of the use of abstract and stylised rhetorical material in three plays. Phaidra's monologue in Hipp 373-430, 3 the four rhetorical confrontations that dominate the first half of Suppliant Women, and all the rhetorical scenes of Iphigeneia at Aulis are studied. The ob-jective here has been to establish, through close analysis and constant reference both to comparative material and to the insights of earlier critics, the relevance of this material for audience appreciation of character, plot and themes. Three appendices further document the stylised character of Euripidean rhetoric. Appendix A compiles and classifies some aspects of presentation not covered elsewhere in this study. Appendix B attempts to define the rhetorical value of announcements of personal supplication. In Appendix C some passages are compared in which similar arguments or argument strategies appear in different dramatic contexts. M y conclusions have tended towards a view of Euripidean rhetorical speeches and scenes that emphasises the entertainment value for the publ ic— the same public characterised by Kleon as GeaTcu T&V \ 6 y w v and 8OU\OL TWV alei dro-mov (Thuc. I l l , 38)— of watching the heroes of legend discuss up-to-date topics using up-to-date techniques of presentation and argumentation. I have resisted an approach that would see subtle psychology or characterisation in material that is essentially conventional; and so I argue against, for example, some critics' contentions that such characters as Admetos, Hippolytos, or Theseus (in Hik) are intentionally discredited by Euripides through their own words uttered in rhetorical exchanges. I have also rejected a view of Euripides' monologues, appeal-scenes and debates as setting out in abstract terms the poet's moral v iew of the situation; thus for scenes such as Hekabe's debate wi th Helen (Tro 895-1059), or the debate of Polyneikes, Eteokles and Iokaste (Phoin 469-585), I suggest that the audience is guided in the placing of it sympathies by the situation itself, and that the debate should be experienced primari ly as an interesting and 4 entertaining exposition of the possibilities for eloquence and argument latent in the story. I do not however see these scenes purely as set pieces, intermezzi inserted at random into the dramas. Thus I have called attention to the presentation of important and enduring themes and associations in Phaidra's monologue (V.A), to the suitability of the long rhetorical first half of Suppliant Women as a prepa-ration for the glorious action that follows (V. B), and to the interesting formal pattern created by the rhetorical scenes in Iphigeneia at Aulis (V.C). I have dealt in general only wi th the eighteen complete and securely Euripidean plays in the corpus. A great deal of material in the fragments could f ind a place in a purely formal study of Euripidean rhetoric, and on that basis I hope to use the fragments fully in the next stage of this research. For the present study, in which form and literary interpretation go so closely hand-in-hand, their general lack of secure dramatic context constituted a decisive obstacle. The text of Euripides is quoted from James Diggle's O C T edition except where noted; in lists of passages the sequence is chronological, fol lowing Diggle. The use of brackets in citations of parallels, etc., indicates only that a passage is bracketed by Diggle, and must therefore be used wi th caution. The plays are cited by abbreviations of their Greek titles. 5 Chapter I Speech and Argument Euripides' resources as a playwright include a "rhetorical" mode of speech-writ ing: critics have recognised that similar techniques of construction and argument appear in speeches written for a variety of dramatic situations, and that these techniques tend to remind one of the polit ical, epideictic and forensic oratory of the poet's period, to the extent that these are known. It is the aim of this first chapter to identify, at the level of the indiv idual Euripidean speech, the materials and techniques that constitute this "rhetorical" manner. When we eliminate speeches whose function is mainly expository (prologue-speech, messenger-speech, deus-speech), we f ind that most of the remaining speeches have an argumentative purpose. Often the immediate dramatic goal of an argumentative speech is persuasion: e.g., Iolaos tries to per-suade Demophon to champion the cause of the suppliant children of Herakles (Hkld 181-231: speech of appeal), Helen tries to convince Menelaos she does not deserve to die (Tro 914-65: speech of defense). But similar techniques of con-struction and argument are applied in situations where there is no real persua-sive purpose: e.g., Herakles' monologue justifying his decision to commit sui-cide (Her 1255-1310), Hippolytos' diatribe against women (Hipp 616-68), Iphis' acceptance of death (Hik 1080-1113), Theseus' speech of accusation against H ip -polytos (Hipp 936-80). Euripides relies repeatedly on a small battery of resources for constructing speeches and conducting arguments in all these dramatic situations. 6 A typical Euripidean rhesis involves various kinds of material. Often a speech follows dialogue, and so begins with a line or two that complete a conversation. Argumentative content itself may be framed by material having a "focusing" function (proems, transitions, summarising epilogues). Expressions of strong emotion sometimes interrupt the rational sequence of thought. Euripidean speeches are seldom neatly disposed; any influence of formal forensic rhetoric on Euripides certainly does not extend to a practice of wri t ing speeches to a regular pattern such as prologue— narration— proof— epilogue. 1 But it soon becomes obvious that some clear patterns of Euripidean practice in speech-writing exist, and that some of these patterns exist also in the practice of prose-writers and orators contemporary with Euripides. The procedure adopted here is to compare a large number of Euripidean speeches looking for habits of disposit ion and of argument, while keeping one eye on developments outside the theatre for possible connections wi th the practice of other writers. I shall occasionally call attention to resemblances between Euripides' techniques and those of other writers, but the questions of Euripides' contact wi th the fifth-century "Enlightenment" and wi th concepts of formal rhetoric developing outside the theatre are not my main concern. 2 1 This was the contention of Th. Miller's 1887 diss. Euripides Rhetoricus. F. Tietze's 1933 diss. Die euripideischen Reden und ihre Bedeutung was devoted to a rebuttal of Miller's views. Early work on Euripidean rhetoric is reviewed by G. Goebel in his 1983 diss. Early Greek Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 266-74; see also Collard "Formal Debates" 58-60, M . Lloyd Agon 23f. 2 On these questions see in general Nestle Dichter der Aufklarung (dated approach but bringing together much useful material), Finley "Euripides and Thucydides" and "The Origins of Thucydides' Style" in Three Essays, Solmsen Intellectual Experiments. Some details of Euripides' contact with fifth-century oratory and rhetorical instruction are investigated by Solmsen, Antiphonstudien 54-8, and Goebel, diss. Ch. IV. 7 M . L loyd , whose recent study of Euripidean agon scenes concentrates on a small number of speeches, has described the disposition of these speeches in the fol lowing terms: 3 There are...only traces of a distinction between narration and argument in the speeches of Euripides' agones. What usually happens is that, after a rhetorical proem, the speech is divided into a series of more or less self-contained blocks, each of which makes a particular point These sections are often distinguished from each other in a self-conscious way.... This gives a fair general description of taxis in Euripides' argumentative speeches written for a variety of situations besides the "agones" L loyd has in mind. The typical contents of these argument-blocks and the typical formal devices used to introduce, frame and focus them w i l l be the subject of inves-tigation in this first chapter. I shall look at relatively independent single speeches, in this order: speeches of appeal (Section A below), "forensic" speeches (B), monologues expressing despair (C), speeches announcing "heroic acceptance of death" (D), and some speeches of comparison best called "epideictic" (E). In Chapter II, the construction of debates and other rhetorical scenes w i l l be investigated. " A . Speeches of Appeal A typical rhetorical opportunity in Euripidean plays is the "appeal addressed to a champion": this occurs not only in plays initiated by a public act of supplication (Hkld , Hik), but in many places where a single character enlists the 3 Agon 25. Disposition in a larger sample of Euripidean "agon" speeches is analysed by Duchemin, L'ArQN 167-87; Goebel's diss, in spite of its subtitle Proof and Arrangement in the Speeches of Antiphon and Euripides does not discuss arrangement in Euripidean speeches. 8 aid of a better-placed character, seeking either to prevent an injustice (Hekabe to Odysseus in Hek, Klytaimestra to Achil les in IA) or to enlist help in an intrigue (Hekabe to Agamemnon in Hek, Helen and Menelaos to Theonoe in Hel)A Speeches of appeal are often elaborately developed, and tend to involve a combination of different groundings and justifications for the requested a id . 5 A good example is Iolaos' speech addressed to Demophon in Herakleidai. Iolaos is presented as an old man protecting the young children of Herakles, who have become suppliants at Marathon as a result of being hounded by Eurystheus and his agents. Eurystheus' herald has attempted to take them into custody, and Demophon has arrived and asked to hear the case on both sides. The Herald speaks first (134-78); his speech is discussed briefly below. The Chorus leader delivers a couplet very correctly reserving judgement (179f). Iolaos now makes the appeal on behalf of the children (181-231). He begins wi th a short proem al luding to the wel l -known fairness of Athenians: he knows he w i l l get a fair hear ing. 6 He next announces his first argument for Athenian aid: f)|ilv 8e teal TWLS ' ouSev eanv ev u.eaoH. (Hkld 184) He w i l l argue first against the case that has been presented by the Herald, a case in which points regarding legality and justice were capped wi th a veiled threat against the Athenians. Iolaos argues (185-90) that the suppliants have been banished by the Argives, and are therefore £evoL (189), people over whom Argos 4 On "suppliant plots" see esp. Strohm Euripides 17-32, Kopperschmidt Die Hikesie 46-53, Lattimore Story Patterns 46f (dealing with "public" acts of supplication only), Burnett Catastrophe Survived (Chapters IV-IX). 5 See Porter Studies 165f. 6 This kind of captatio benevolentiae is not a very common feature of Euripidean speech-making. More flattery is offered in 191-204. 9 can have no jurisdiction. This leads (with no clear break) 7 to the point that Athens at any rate w i l l not be intimidated by a threat to its sovereignty: thus the second element in the Herald's case is countered. 8 A t vs. 205 a new section is clearly introduced: croi 8' u>s avdyKT) TouaSe (3ou\o[iaL p^daaL aokCeiv, eTreL-rrep Tf^ aSe TTpoaTaTetg x^ovos- (Hkld 205f) The speech moves from public considerations— the legal status of the case and the altruistic character of Athenians— to the arguments that can be addressed personally to Demophon. These are of two types: first an appeal to common blood is made (206-213: the relation of Theseus through Ai thra to the house of Pelops), and in 214 another basis of obligation is clearly announced: Herakles' benefactions to Theseus. A brief narrative (lacunose in our texts) is capped wi th the declaration 'EXXds Trdaa TOOTO fiapTupel (219). Two kinds of argument have been brought to bear (the justice of the suppliants' case and obligations said to affect Demophon personally), but there are still points to be made. Iolaos in summarising, notes that to allow suppliants to be removed would be offensive to the gods, and a disgrace both to Demophon privately (x^pis 223) and to the city. A n d finally he adds to the fact of suppliancy in a temple precinct the gestures and verbal formulas of personal supplication (&W avro\iaL ere etc. 226-8). 7 The argumentative rhetorical question in 189b-90 ("Or do you hold that an exile from Argos must quit all Greece?") might have closed this section; instead it is answered "Not Athens anyway", and the new direction is taken. 8 Praise of Athens is itself, of course, a topos in tragedy and orator}/. So is the reference to the unwelcomeness of overpraising: with 202-4 here cf. Or 1161f, IA 977-80; Thuc. II, 35.2; Dem. XVIII, 3f. 10 Iolaos' speech is by no means simply the routine realisation of a standard Euripidean formula; but it does involve certain features we wil l see over and over in the poet's speeches, some of them no doubt consciously developed, others perhaps existing more as unconscious patterns of thought. The appeal addressed by Hekabe to Agamemnon (Hek 787-845), seeking his complicity in her revenge plan against Polymestor, shows similar features. Hekabe makes the transition from dialogue to rhesis with an introductory formula of a common type: dXX' (Lvrrep O U V C K ' du.(j)i obv TTLTTTOJ yovv dKouaov ' (Hek 787f) This is followed immediately by a headline giving the general drift of her request: help me achieve revenge against a certain man.9 The charge against this man is now specified through a brief highly coloured narrative (791-7), or, if 793-7 are an interpolation, through a succinct relative clause.10 The success of Hekabe's appeal depends on creating the impression that her enemy has wronged her; thus her speech must attack as well as appeal, and this accusatory material already goes far in painting the required picture of Polymestor's sordid character and deed. With a resumptive \tev ovv (798) Hekabe takes up the arguments proper in support of her request. First she alludes to "the gods and the law that governs [even] them" (799f). The difficult lines 802-5 seem to say that Agamemnon (that is, should he fail to respect Hekabe's appeal) is the cause of a collapse of the power of law in the cosmos. This direction is not developed; 9 The positive/negative form of expression seen here is also a typical way of emphasising one's point: "If you think this is just...; but if the opposite...." Cf. e.g. Hipp 377ff. 1 0 Diggle follows Nauck in deleting 793-7. Collard ad loc gives the arguments against the lines. 11 Hekabe simply uses the threat as the basis for an appeal to Agamemnon's ouSoog in the face of her pathetic state (ou8ea9fJTL |ie, oLKTipov f||iag 806f). 1 1 A "litany of woes" follows (dra9pr)(70v ot' e x u K a r a , 808): Hekabe is a slave, childless, cityless, deserted, the most wretched of mortals (809ff).12 A t vs. 812 Hekabe seems to realise that her appeal to Agamemnon's sense of law and to his caSios is fa i l ing; 1 3 she interrupts her address to h im wi th a reflection on the importance of ski l l in persuasion (814-23). This reflection has a decidedly "modern" r ing to it, evoking as it does a wor ld in which people pay for instruction in various subjects, among which (in Hekabe's mind at least) Persuasion should have pride of place. The reflection is applied to Hekabe herself wi th a reprise of her woes (821-4)— she seems to be telling herself a superhuman effort at persuasion is required. A n d now she moves to her next argument, expressing some misgiving: Kai \is\v (taws \i-ev TOU Xoyov ^evov ToSe, KuTrpiv Trpo|3dXAeLv, dXX' o\ux>s eLprjaeTcu) etc. (Hek 824f) She reminds Agamemnon of his "family ties" to her through his affection for Kassandra . 1 4 The vict im Polydoros was in a sense Agamemnon's KriSeorfjs (834). A final point is headlined using the formula: 1 5 1 1 OUSCJS and OIKTOS are the responses one wants to elicit when supplicating: see Gould "Hiketeia" 87-90. Mercier's 1993 note on this speech ("Hekabe's Extended Supplication") attributes too much importance to the gesture of supplication as an instrument of persuasion: see App. B. 1 2 For similar lists, cf. Kyk 304-7, Med 255-8, Hek 667-9, Hipp 1028-[29], IT 220; more leisurely are Andr 8-15, Tro 479-90, Hel 269-86. 1 3 Appeal speeches seem to be interrupted by a reference to the failure of the effort here in Hek 812f and at Kyk 299, and perhaps Or 671f (but di Benedetto ad 672 cautions against this interpetation); the interruption in each case is followed by a new argumentative point. These speeches are followed by refusals. 1 4 This affection has already been brought out in the Prologue (120ff). 1 5 For the use of forms of ev in focusing arguments, see App. A. 12 ..evog u-Oi [i09og eySefjs e n . (Hek 835b) In this case the formula leads to the resumption of a point already made: the desirability of compelling powers of persuasion. Hekabe closes with a summary appeal for assistance, emphasising Agamemnon's greatness and her own debasement (he is [leyicrrov "E X X T | C T L V fydos, she is ur|8ev), and caps this with a gnome: 1 6 eaGXou yap d^Spos Tfji 8LKT]I 9 ' uTnpeTelv K a i TOVS KaKous Spav TTavTaxoO KCIKXOS- del. (Hek 844f) Thus she recapitulates the points that vengeance would be just (cf. 800-5), and that her enemy is an evil man. Hekabe's speech, long and complex, nevertheless follows the general shape of that of Iolaos: a proem alludes to the speech-situation and introduces the main objective of the speech; an argument based on law and justice is clearly separated from an argument based on the obligations inherent in family connections (obviously a rather weak point in Hekabe's case); expressions of personal supplication buttress the "rational" arguments; a succinct closing summary (using imperatives: yevoO §i\os etc. Hkld 229f; TTLBOO, Trapdaxes Xetpa...Tiu.cop6v Hek 842f) is followed by a closing general statement. Within this framework, Euripides has given Iolaos some flattering comments on the Athenian national character, Hekabe a reflection on education and the desirability of eloquence. 1 6 Mossmari (Wild Justice 104) notes Hekabe doesn't weaken ("blunt the urgency of") her earlier appeal to Odysseus for a hearing (Hek 229-37) by using a final gnome, as if this were accepted as a cheap trick. The use of the technique both here and in closing the earlier appeal proper (Hek 294f) argues against that view. See Friis Johansen General Reflection 155 with n.17, and IV.B below. 13 On a smaller scale, Odysseus in Kyklops appeals to Polyphemos on behalf of himself and his men; they would like first of all not to be eaten, and then if possible to go away with handsome gifts. Odysseus in his speech of appeal (Kyk 285-312), after speaking of his various services to Poseidon, and urging them as reasons for Polyphemos to offer hospitality to him and his men, changes tack (299: 6L Xoyous dTTooTpecjyrii).17 He moves to a new argument based on the vo^ o? under which shipwrecked sailors are to be taken in as suppliants and treated well (299-303). This leads with no clear break into a pathetic appeal (304-9a) in which it is claimed that the Greeks have suffered enough at Troy. The first argument, then, appeals to the Cyclops' sense of x<ipis, the second uses a principle of v6u.os to justify the third stage's appeal for OLKTOS and evolfteia (310).18 Hekabe's speech to Odysseus in Hek 251-95 is much more developed, but proceeds similarly, offering two fundamentally distinct arguments against the sacrifice of Polyxene. Following a lengthy reflective proem (251-7), she argues first (258-71) that the sacrifice would be unjust. This point is pursued through an argument sequence we shall meet again: using a disjunctive question (iTOTepa...; f)...;) Hekabe suggests two motives that might have led the Greeks to vote for the sacrifice of Polyxene. Each of these motives is dismissed as unjust, and then a positive proposal is presented for the more fitting course— to sacrifice Helen. 1 9 This proposal in turn is justified on two grounds (269f). The sequence concluded, Hekabe makes a clear transition announcement: 1 7 Is any stage action implied? Seaford ad 299 cites examples of ctTToaTpec|)op.aL at IT 801, Hel 78, S. OK 1272: "these cases refer to the addressee turning away from the speaker". 1 8 So Porter, Studies 166 n.241. 1 9 This type of sequence is discussed in detail in III.A below. I agree with West that there is a problem in the text of Hek 265-8: see "Tragica IV" 12. 14 TWL \iev SIKOUCJI TOILS' d|iLXXcap.aL Xoyov a S' dimSoOvcu Set a' dTTaiTouoris efiou &KOVOOV. (Hek 271-3) This introduces a two-fold personal appeal: Hekabe asks Odysseus' pity on grounds both of an old debt of obligation he has towards her (272-8), and of her own pathetic weakness and reliance on Polyxene (279-85). That these are distinct but closely bound points is also clearly spelled out: xdpiv T ' dTraiTd) TT]V T69 ' LKeTeuaj Te ae. (Hek 276) 2 0 Hav ing put her two arguments, Hekabe goes on to make a practical proposal (286-95): that Odysseus, whose powers of persuasion led in the first place to the decision to sacrifice Polyxene, face the troops again and try to reverse that decision. Odysseus' reply w i l l take up these same points, and so I shall return to this scene for further study in II.A below. A subtler divis ion of argument into two main sections can be seen in Hkld 134-78, the speech of the Argive herald suing for release into his custody of the children of Herakles. This is not a "supplication" speech, but as it functions in parallel wi th Iolaos' appeal (see above), it has similarities of structure and argument. The Herald states briefly his identity and his mission (134-37a), then gives the legal basis for his request (137b-43): the suppliants as Argive citizens are under Argive jurisdiction, and they have been legally sentenced to death. 2 1 2 0 For the "double headline" clearly announcing two different points cf. Kyk 287, IA 903f (see discussion below). The phrase yapiv crrraiTeiv recurs in Hkld 220, cf. Lys. 21.21. 2 1 There is thus a clear disagreement between the two speeches over the facts: the appeal of Iolaos will refer only to a decree of banishment. Neither side should be regarded as giving the "truth" here. 15 In what follows a transition is gradually made to the point (explicitly put at 153-5) that Athenian self-interest favours taking the Argive s ide . 2 2 Clear contrast of two arguments in a short speech of appeal is seen in IT 1056-74, where Iphigeneia appeals to the Chorus for their cooperation in the intrigue she is p lanning. 2 3 She argues first (-rrpcoTa \iev 1060) that this is their duty, al luding to the customary solidarity of women. Then, fol lowing a clear enunciation of her request (1063f) and the stark alternatives facing herself and the two men (1065f), she appeals to their self-interest 1067f)— she w i l l return the Greek women home if she herself gets free. This is followed (1068b) by expressions of supplication; this has here, as almost always in Euripides, a function subsidiary to argument. 2 4 Equally brief is the appeal made by Klytaimestra to Achil les at IA 900-16, in which she calls upon h im to champion the cause of preventing Iphigeneia's sacrifice. The argument is prefaced by the comment that Klytaimestra feels no shame in humbl ing herself before Achi l les, since nothing means more to her than protecting her ch i ld . 2 5 The appeal is argued in 903-14. A headline 2 2 For clear rhetorical distinction between "justice" and "self-interest" see Finley Three Essays 33withn.49. The contrast was a well-worn subject, but TO evSiicov and TO ov\i<\>epov may be held to recommend the same action, as here in Hkld 134-78 (and cf. e.g. S. Phil 925f). On this debate, Kennedy ("Focusing of Arguments" 134f) simplifies the issues: "The Athenians in their decision reject apparent self-interest in favor of justice". But the Herald's first argument is full of "justice" (138, 142) and "law" (141); and Iolaos' appeal leans heavily on arguments of xapis a n d the disgrace of surrendering suppliants. 2 3 Similar appeals are at Med 260-6, Hipp 710-12. Phaidra appeals but does not argue; in a sense Medeia's entire speech leads up to this request. Cf. also Ion 666f, Hel 1387-9,1A 542. 2 4 Medeia's brief speech of appeal to Aigeus (Med 708-18) is comparable: pity, then advantages. 2 5 This sort of shame is registered by Adrastos (Hik 163-6); some others are too proud to beg (Eurystheus in Hkld 983-5, Menelaos in Hel 947-9). Thus the reference to shame in connection with gestures of supplication forms a topos. 16 introduces the two grounds on which Klytaimestra w i l l base her appeal; these are cleverly identified wi th the two women: a\\' d\i.vvov, ci Beds TTOL, TTJL T ' eurji, 8ixjTTpa£iai TTJL Te XexQeicrni 8du .apTi afji iidrnv \sAv, a\\' OU.GJS. (IA 903f) It is as if she said: "Give your support to me (because I am miserable and merit pity) and to my daughter (because she was called your bride)". These two points are then developed chiastically: 905-8 make the case that Achi l les owes his support because he was in some sense responsible for the deception that brought Iphigeneia to Au l is , and 909-14 return to Klytaimestra herself and her misery (though the idea of an obligation returns in 6vou.a y a p TO GOV \I ' aTTuXea ' , 910). 2 6 The couplet 915f forms an epilogue, but one of dubious authenticity. 2 7 A n interesting variant on the binary presentation of argument seen in the examples so far discussed is the use of two speeches of appeal made on the same side of a case: Adrastos and Aithra both appeal to Theseus in Hik on behalf of the suppliants, Helen and Menelaos each address a speech to Theonoe in Hel, Agamemnon hears in IA appeals from both Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia. 2 8 In each scene interesting differences between the tone and content of the two 2 6 Stockert (ad loc) sees in 903-8 the expression of a legal claim to Achilles' support, based on his obligation as the putative bridegroom of Iphigeneia, followed in 909-14 by a moral claim based on the hopelessness of Klytaimestra's position should Achilles fail to help. But the important difference between the two halves of the appeal is one of tone: rational argument, then supplication. 2 7 Diggle prints 915f as "vix Euripidei"; I don't know his reasons, but I note that throughout the episode (an episode that occasions many doubts), speeches end with couplets having a similar trait— a gratuitous positive-negative recapitulation of the point of each speech: cf. 973f, 995-7, 1006f, 1034f. See Denniston ad El 1017, where he notes such expressions are "common in the IA". Stockert notes "polare Ausdrucksweise" at 978: characteristic preoccupation of an interpolator? 2 8 For the Hik and IA scenes, see Ch. V below; the Hel scene is discussed in II.E. The stage is set.for such a sequence in the first episode of Hek, but Polyxene's unexpected self-dedication short-circuits it. 17 speeches correspond to the binary separation of arguments we have seen in single speeches. Presentation of arguments in self-consciously balanced pairs w i l l be noted below in connection wi th speeches delivered in a variety of other situations besides appeal. B. "Forensic" Speeches The tendency to organise argument in "blocks", most often two, wi th a third section often introducing pathetic or practical points, is seen also in the chronological organisation of argumentative content particularly common in forensic speeches. A s an example I shall discuss Menelaos' analysis of his brother's past and present actions in his speech of accusation addressed to Agamemnon (IA 334-75). The speech vil if ies Agamemnon over his indecisiveness in first en-couraging and then attempting to prevent the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Menelaos begins by announcing in gnomic form the importance of constancy of mind (334) and indicates he wants to conduct a civi l discussion of issues. H is argumentation takes the form of a l i fe-survey. 2 9 Euripides uses this device in monologue situ-ations, where a speaker suffering feelings of d - r rop ia or loss reviews his own life (e.g. Andromache in Tro 634-83, Herakles in Her 1255-1310), and in agonistic speeches where the survey organises a sort of narrative section (e.g. Eurystheus reviewing his own life in Hkld 983-1017, Theseus that of Adrastos in Hik 195-249). In both situations it is natural to compare past and present, or two stages in the past, and this is the form Menelaos' argument takes. 2 9 For comments on the type see Strohm Euripides 156-63 ("Sinn und Form des Lebensriickblicks"), Friis Johansen, General Reflection, index s. v. "Chronological survey". 18 Two stages of Agamemnon's career are brought out: (1) his early eagerness to get command of the expedition to Troy (6T£ etc. 337-48); (2) his subsequent behaviour at Au l is (cog 8e etc. 350-64). Each of these short narratives involves a contrast that calls attention to Agamemnon's inconstancy; the presentation of these contrasts is strikingly balanced (343 K5LT ' e-rrei..., 363 KCUT ' both fol lowed wi th [ieTa|3aXa)v). The first instance of this fault was Agamem-non's change of external presentation: once installed in a powerful posit ion he was no longer the friendly accessible man he had been. The second stage of the survey presents the more serious (for Menelaos' case) inconstancy— Agamemnon has waffled over the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and has now been caught trying to prevent it. It is to this second lapse that Menelaos addresses the general reflections that follow in 366-9: (lupioi 8e TOL TreTr6v9aa ' avro. The fol lowing gnome about human failure is illustrated by two contrasting examples, of which the second applies to Agamemnon. Menelaos then concludes his argument by drawing attention to the serious consequences for all Greece of Aga-memnon's disappointing.loss of resolve. A n epilogue follows (probably corrupt in 373) reflecting on the qualities required of leaders, thus looking back to both halves of the l i fe-review. 3 0 Chronological organisation of argument is also seen in speeches of accusation at Hik 195-249, Elek 1060-99, Med 465-519, IA 1146-1208, and in Eurys-theus' defense speech at Hkld 983-1017. Generally, these speeches proceed by reviewing the past or an event in the past, then move to the present situation or the present outlook; either a pathetic reversal or a pathetic inescapable 3 0 Doubts have been expressed about the integrity of the end of this speech. Diggle prints 366-75 between his "vix Euripidea" symbols. He finds the use of OOITO (366) anomalous (app. cr.): but cf. e.g. Hek 973, IA 393. On the text of 373-5, see Friis Johansen General Reflection 36, Stockert ad loc. Gibert, Change of Mind 275, points out that the terms of debate have shifted subtly: voDs pepaios of the proem has here become simply vo0?. 19 continuity is pointed out by this process. Some of the "acceptance of death" speeches involve a similar contrast of past high status wi th present or future degradation. Theseus' speech at Hik 195-249, rejecting the appeal of Adrastos, begins wi th a lengthy general reflection that w i l l be discussed below (V.B). The argumentative content of the speech unfolds in the same way as that of Menelaos' speech at IA 334-75, wi th two episodes taken from the adversary's past being held up as evidence of a defective character: 219-28 Adrastos and his sons-in-law: his will ingness to associate himself wi th voaovvres 229-37 Adrastos and the expedition against Thebes: the damage done by h im under the influence of hotheads Theseus formulates his present policy on the basis of these observations of Adrastos' past: 246 KCITT£IT ' eyco aoi auu.fi.axos yevfjaouai; (Vs. 246 follows logically on the arguments of 219-37; this however makes no case for deletion of the "demographic" passage 238-45, which seems entirely in character for this Theseus and for Euripides. 3 1) Similar is Elek 1060-99, Elektra's speech of accusation addressed to Klytaimestra, who has defended herself in 1011-50 as a woman forced into the 3 1 See Kovacs, "Tyrants" 34; his arguments against the authenticity of 238-45 do not stand up to the strong case for the passage made by Collard ad loc. Reeve, "Interpolation" 148, distinguishes three interpolations within vss. 216-46. Friis Johansen, General Reflection 123 n.68, notes in 238-45 the characteristially Euripidean formulation of a Siaipeoi?. 20 arms of her husband's enemy through his sacrifice of Iphigeneia and his own adultery: 1069-75 you showed signs of promiscuity even before32 Iphigeneia's sacrifice (this answers Klytaimestra's charge that Agamem-non's act had driven her into Aigisthos' arms) 1076-85 during the war you favoured the Trojans, not wanting Agamemnon to return home These past facts and the portrait of Klytaimestra they paint form the first half of a two-part argumentation; Elektra moves on at vs. 1086 to Klytaimestra's treatment of herself and Orestes in the aftermath of the murder of Agamemnon. Medeia's harangue of Jason (Med 465-519) follows his brief entering speech, a speech which understandably evokes a violent response, but which is not (I believe) intended to characterise Jason as a thorough v i l l a in . 3 3 Medeia's speech is organised around a dual argument whose point is to demonstrate that she has been Jason's salvation repeatedly in the past, and is now the vict im of his ingratitude and selfishness: 465-74 proem: vil i f ication of Jason 475-98 the past: 476-87 Medeia's services 488-98 Jason's betrayal 499-515 the present and future: Medeia's desperate situation 3 2 Sophistic topos? Similarly Medeia discounts the noble motives Jason professes (Med 522-75) by reference to the fact (introduced as decisive: ev yap eKTevei a' 6TTOS, 585) he failed to make a persuasive case for the new marriage before proceeding with it. And Hekabe rejects Polymestor's claim to have killed Polydoros as a service to the Greeks (Hek 1132-82) on the basis that he acted only after the Greeks had won the war. In these passages the fact introduced does not directly refute the opponent's contention, but contributes to an impression of sordid motives. Similar arguments are in Antiphon VI. 44-7, Andok. II, 3-4. 3 3 I see the same situation at the entrance of Pheres in Alk; a neutral speech sets off a violent reaction in a character whose volatility is quite understandable under the circumstances. 21 516-19 closing reflection The stages of the argument are clearly signposted through the use of temporal expressions (475 CK TGOV TrpojTtov, 502 vvv), the balancing of the two complex sentences 476-82 and 483-87, and a break introduced by dye (499). The main argu-mentative point, Jason's past dependence on Medeia, is announced at beginning and end in the same phrase (476 eawad ae, 515 r\ T ' eoroad ae). I return to this scene for further discussion in II.B below. The development in these examples of two distinct points, each con-tributing a different nuance to the portrait, seems to suggest a more self-conscious technique of organisation than is found in simple accusatory nar-rative, for example Elektra's harangue addressed to the dead Aigisthos in Elek 907-56. 3 4 Euripides has characters vaunt their tr iumph over an enemy in several scenes. In Elek 907-56, this type is combined wi th a detailed argumentative speech of accusation. 3 5 Fol lowing the Messenger's report of the death of Aigisthos (774-858), Orestes arrives (880) bringing the dead man's body. After some preparatory dialogue establishing Elektra's right to speak freely, 3 6 she begins her speech wi th a quite formal proem (907-13). The accusations leveled against Aigisthos are not put in clear sequence, but come all at once in 913-17: (a) you ruined me, (b) and orphaned me and my brother, (c) and made a shameful marriage wi th our mother, (d) and ki l led Agamemnon. These same lines also 3 4 The somewhat similar rant.of Peleus against Menelaos (Andr 590-641) is discussed in II. B below. 3 5 The speech thus associates itself with Elektra's later speech of accusation addressed to Klytaimestra, 1060-99. 3 6 Elektra's reluctance to speak freely returns at 1055-9. This motif occurs elsewhere: Andr 184-91 (Andromache), Hek 736-51 (Hekabe), Hik 293-300 (Aithra). 22 refer to Aigisthos' lack of a legitimate motive (ou8eu riSiKnuevos-, 915), and to Agamemnon's mil itary status and Aigisthos' own failure to go to war (917). The speech develops mainly the charge of adultery (918-29) and of Aigisthos' status as a kept man, his wife's inferior (930-33a). This in turn leads to points about the children of a weak man (933b-37), then a new charge is brought against Aigisthos: that mere wealth was confused by h im with real stature, which equals ' alone can confer (938-44).3 7 In 948-51 Elektra suggests that Aigisthos cultivated a "girl ish" appearance. The speech thus offers rather a litany of insults, each supported wi th general remarks, than a neatly organised series of arguments. Both the scatter-shot delivery and the insulting tone of the remarks may go some way toward portraying the pent-up resentment of Elektra towards Aigisthos. But these features are not essential for our understanding of Elektra's state of mind: we have already seen that strong emotion is not incompatible wi th neat taxis and highly rational argument. The speech also contributes to the play's portrayal of Aigisthos as a totally inferior and weak person (in spite of his rather humane character in the Messenger's report). The murder of Agamemnon is not dwelt upon here because that crime, in the play's focal confrontation, w i l l be laid at Klytaimestra's door; but the play's important theme of marriages good and bad, true and false, is given considerable attention here. The pathetic contrast or similarity of past and present so strongly brought out in both accusation speeches and monologues (see next section) is developed also in the appeal/accusation addressed by Klytaimestra to Agamemnon in I A 1146-1208. As has been said above, this speech itself forms half of an appeal which w i l l be continued by Iphigeneia in her speech fol lowing (1211-52). 3 7 The up-to-date concept of caucus plays a role in Euripidean argument and speculation here in Elek 941 and at Hipp 79, Hek 5971, Elek 368, Tro 672, Ion 642-4, etc. 23 Klytaimestra's speech contains two large blocks of argument, one concerned wi th the past, one wi th the future: 1148-70 The Past 1157-70 1148-56 I married you against my wi l l when you were a murderer and a suppliant still I've been a perfect wife, and borne you children, of whom you now want to k i l l one 1171-93 The Fu tu re 3 8 1185-93 1171-84 Klytaimestra and the children at Argos Agamemnon's return from Troy The speech ends wi th Klytaimestra's views on what practical steps Agamemnon ought to be taking to correct the situation, 3 9 and a final appeal. The defense offered by Klytaimestra in Elek 1011-50 deals wi th these same events, but from a post-war, post-murder perspective. Klytaimestra justifies her ki l l ing of her husband by recalling his two offenses against her : 4 0 1020-31 (before the war) the sacrifice of Iphigeneia 1032-4 (after the war) Kassandra The second point leads Klytaimestra to reflect on her own adultery and the blame it brought upon her (1035-40) 4 1 3 8 Note dye, which elsewhere marks a speech-opening after a break (Kyk 590, Tro 782, Hel 734), a change of address (Hipp 288, Hik 258, Her 240), an apostrophe (Med 1244, Ion 1041), used here to point a new direction in an argumentative context: cf. Med 499, Phoin 559. 3 9 xpnv CTe is a common formula for this purpose: with IA 1196 cf. Med 586, Andr 650, Hek 1218, Phoin 515, Or 500. 4 0 The passage.could be read as a response to Pindar Pyth 11, 22-4, where the poet asks which offense was the decisive one. 4 1 This forms a kind of "ring" with the material in her proem (86f ' brav XdfVrii K&KT] yuvaiKa..., 1014f). 24 Chronological organisation serves a slightly different purpose in Eurys-theus' brief apologia in Hkld 983-1017.4 2 A somewhat restrained survey of his life attempts to demonstrate that his quarrel wi th Herakles was thrust upon h im by Hera, and that he had no choice but to persecute the hero (991-1004); you, he tells A lkmene, wou ld have done the same (1005-8).43 The move to the present (vvv ovv 1009) involves here no pathetic contrast, but a simple consideration of the stage that has been reached. Somewhat different again is Phaidra's yv&\ur\s. bbos in Hipp 391-402. This supplies the narrative element in the otherwise very abstract consideration of her plight in her monologue (373-430). The survey of her thinking is marked out in chronological stages: 391 eTTei... 398 TO SeuTepov... 400 Tpi-rov 8e... This last introduces her resolve to die, and this is supported by much reflection (403-18). In 419 she moves on to another topic (her children). The chronological organisation here does not involve a simple l ikening or contrast of past and present, but shows the stages in the essentially intellectual process by which Phaidra reached her present resolve. A n important organising principle found in a number of speeches of refutation (normally "defense" speeches) arises out of the need to produce 4 2 Characters review their own lives in a number of Euripidean scenes and speeches (not least in prologue-speeches, not under consideration here). Chronological organisation is an obvious technique in that situation: cf. especially the monologue of Herakles, Her 1255ff, discussed below. 4 3 Orestes, in his speech of defense addressed to Tyndareos (Or 544-604), takes a similar approach: TI XPW M-e Spaom; (551). 25 convincing arguments both against the opponent's case and for one's own. We have seen this principle at work in the appeal speech of Iolaos (Hkld 181-231; see L A above); because this speech follows a speech presenting the Argive side in the dispute, Iolaos first meets that speech's points head-on (by denying the truth of the Herald's account of the legal position, and denying that Athenians w i l l be intimidated by a bul ly ing outsider), then makes the positive case for Athenian support for the suppliants, based on blood ties and past services. Similarly Hekabe, in responding (Hek 1187-1237) to Polymestor's speech defending his murder of Polydoros as a service to the Greeks, w i l l first demonstrate that this was not Polymestor's motive (1196-1205), then show the real reason for the crime (1206-23). Andromache's speech addressed to Hermione at Andr 184-231 provides another good example of this technique. Andromache has been accused of undermining Hermione's marriage wi th Neoptolemos. Fol lowing a proem that focuses on the speech-situation, in which she weighs the pros and cons of speaking freely in answer to her mistress, she addresses the charge Hermione has leveled: • , • £ L T T ' , co veavi, TOJL a' exeyyucoi Xoycoi rreLaGelo"' dTTwBaj yvnaiojv vuuc^euudTCji'; (Andr 192f) In the familiar form of a rhetorical question she suggests she was in no position to undertake such an act. The further questions that follow (194-204) bolster this suggest ion. 4 4 Hermione's charge has now been refuted; but the best defense is often a good offense, and Andromache goes on to supply the "true explanation" for her mistress' problems: For the technique, and a detailed analysis of its use here and elsewhere, see III.B below. 26 OUK e£ eucov ae (fxipu-dKWV crruyel TTOCTLS' dXX' ei, ^ vvelvai ux| 'TTLTT|8eL(x Kupets. (205f) The first point was supported by quoting negative facts about Andromache, showing her to be too weak (old, notorious, etc.) to replace Hermione. This second argument is supported by reference to Hermione's own behaviour (209-212), as wel l as by generalisations about women and marriage (207f, 213f), the positive example of Andromache's devotion to Hektor (222-6), and the negative example of Helen (229f).4 5 C . Monologues of Despair For characters who find themselves in a desperate position, it is in Euripides' manner to write monologues using many of the same techniques of organisation and argument found in his other "rhetorical" speeches. For example, a paradoxical proposition may be enunciated and argued, often using techniques we tend to identify as "sophistic": sequence of argument is carefully marked out, barrages of rhetorical questions (elsewhere associated wi th reductio ad absurdum) are released, gnomes (again often paradoxical) and reflections put the situation in the most general possible light. The fol lowing speeches of this type w i l l be discussed in this section: Admetos' address to the Chorus at Alk 935-61, Herakles' review of his life at Her 1255-1310, Andromache's ostensibly consolatory address to Hekabe at Tro 634-83, Helen's address to the Chorus at Hel 255-305. On a smaller scale, cf. Hek 258-70. 27 Admetos' speech is preceded by his long scenes with Alkestis (244-392) and with Pheres (606-746). In the first of these scenes, he has responded with the "right answers" but without emotion to the dying requests of his wife. In the second, he has angrily expressed his disappointment in his father for allowing Alkestis to go to her death; the scene ended with a complete impasse, each party hurling insults and warnings at the other.46 Euripides has skilfully varied the mood of the piece by interlacing between these highly charged scenes the two somewhat lighter Herakles scenes (476-567, 747-860). Just after Herakles learns the truth— that the woman who died was his host's wife— and goes off to recover her from Death, Admetos enters the empty stage. After participating in a moving lyric lament (861-934),47 he addresses to the Chorus a speech in which his personal reactions to the day's events are exposed;48 the speech is thus a true monologue. Admetos reveals that he is devastated by the loss of his wife, and also distressed by the sense that others may see his having allowed his wife's sacrifice in the light in which Pheres has chosen to see i t . 4 9 But this devastation does not find expression in an emotional tone (we have already had that in the KO(j.[i.6s); rather Admetos delivers a speech of great order and clarity. He introduces first the observation that he considers his wife (or her 8a.iu.cov, 935) more fortunate than himself; that he regards this as paradoxical is expressly 4 6 This exchange is discussed in detail in II.D below. 4 7 The lament dwells on the hatefulness of life without Alkestis and of the "widowed house" itself (862f, 880f, 911); Admetos wishes to die (864) and regrets he didn't join Alkestis in the grave (897-902); and he compares his happy wedding-day with this sad day (915-25). 4 8 This formal procedure has been called "lyric-iambic sequence": see Schadewaldt Monolog u. Selbstgesprdch 143f, Greenwood Aspects 131-8, Dale ad Alk 280ff, Heath Poetics 126. 4 9 As Strohm says, Admetos can face no more Pheres-scenes (Euripides 6n). It is important to recognise that Admetos does not here accept the substance of the charge of cowardice; rather he sees that (as Strohm ibid and Dale Alcestis xxv have said) he has given his enemies ammunition to use against him (note exQpos 954, rrpos KOCKOLCTL 959). 28 stated (tcouTTep ou SOKOUV9 ' 011005, 936). The comparison is now expanded and explained, wi th two verses devoted to Alkestis and two to Admetos (937-40). The comparison looks to the future: Alkestis' troubles are over, whereas Admetos faces a life of pain (XuTTpov (3LOTOV, 940). In vss. 941-59 Admetos gives the reasons for his bleak outlook. These are of two kinds: he w i l l miss his wife (941-53), and he w i l l be open to his enemies' voicing a charge of cowardice against h im (954-9). As Dale notes, the points referred to here are precisely the lessons Admetos has learned (dpn uavBdvco, 940) from the play's two earlier encounters. 5 0 Admetos' sense of bewilderment and loss is conveyed through the quite common device of a barrage of rhetorical questions (941-3). This is a conventional way of repre-senting despair and dTTopia; elsewhere the same structure is used to badger or undermine an opponent. Admetos now uses a sort of dilemma-argument to corroborate the point: he can in the future find no happiness at home (944-50a), nor outside his palace (950b-53)— ergo, no happiness. 5 1 A t 954 a new point is raised: that of the loss of reputation he expects to suffer. This has not been expressly mentioned earlier in the speech, but it was said that the "more fortunate" Alkestis has died eikXefjs' (938). Admetos' fears for his future reputation are expressed using another standard device, the direct quote giving an imagined (or remembered) anonymous reproach. 5 2 The quoted reproach itself brings two charges against Admetos: his cowardice in al lowing Alkestis to die, and his (in the circumstances) unreasonable contempt for his parents. A 5 0 Dale ad Alk 953ff. Thus we may think of the two earlier scenes as each addressing a different argumentative point to Admetos, just as many single speeches discussed above involve two independent arguments. That is, an essentially rhetorical process has influenced the construction of the play. Something similar happens in' the first two scenes of Hik ; see V.B below. 5 1 For the use of informal dilemma arguments such as this by Euripides, see below Ch. Ill n.22. 5 2 This device elsewhere: Hkld 517, Andr 932f, Elek 930, Her 1289, Phoin 580. Direct quotes used in slightly different ways: Tro 1182, IA 1228 (both pathetic memories); Hel 962, Phoin 575 (adding pathos to appeal and reproach, respectively). 29 rhetorical question beginning wi th KOUT ' (957) has here the familiar role of pointing up the absurdity or vileness of an opponent's acts or words . 5 3 In 960f, Admetos concludes, using another device we shall often see again in Euripides: a rhetorical question asks "Why go on l i v ing?" 5 4 In the speech's final verse, both of its fundamental points are reiterated succinctly: KOKGJS KXUOVTL KOU KCXKCSS TTEupoiyoTi (961), "as I am i l l spoken of and my life is in ruin". The fact that Admetos' speech consists largely of formulas of Euripidean rhetoric takes nothing away from the sincerity of the speaking character. There is no question here of any irony, any discredit Euripides means to bring upon Admetos. This is guaranteed by the lyric treatment that precedes the iambic rhesis: each mode of utterance has its particular role to p lay . 5 5 Here as elsewhere in Euripides, a situation that in real life would not call forth reasoned arguments and balanced periods is subjected to a rhetorical treatment, a treatment bringing a satisfying clarity of thought and expression to bear on a tragic situation. The despair expressed in the monologue of Admetos results from events realised within the play. The despair of Helen's similar speech (Hel 255-305) arises out of the play's Trpoyeyevr|M.eva, combined wi th the (incorrect) news Helen has received from Teukros in the first scene. Here a "lyric-iambic sequence" of classic shape unfolds. Vss. 167-252 are sung by Helen and the Chorus in 5 3 Cf. Alk 7Qli,Andr 218f, 666f, Elek 1044f, IA 384 (err'); in monologue at Hik 1095f. See M . Lloyd, Agon 32. Similar cases with erreiTa: Hipp 440, Hik 246, Her 266. 5 4 Compare, in the scenes under study here, Her 1301 (cf. 1146f), Hel 293. Elsewhere in Euripides: Med 145, Andr 405, Hek 349, Hel 56; note also A. Prom 747. The text of the codd. has KUSIOV in 960; this has been doubted (icepSiov, Purgold), but though unexpected seems in line with the concern for reputation that has just been expressed. KepSo? appears in this context in Prom 747 and Med 145; for KUSLOV Diggle (app. cr.) notes Andr 639. 5 5 As Mossman says (Wild Justice 119) of Hekabe's monologue (Hek 585-628): "We know well enough what she feels; now we want to know what she thinks'. 30 alternating strophes, and lament in extravagantly emotional terms the heroine's sense of loss and of the injustice of her life. In 255-305 she addresses to the Chorus a highly rhetorical iambic speech, in which the same complaints are treated to a rational analysis, using the structures and techniques that are by now familiar to us. 5 6 In 255f a formula of address (cf. Med 214, Hipp 373, IT 1056) is followed by a pair of rhetorical questions introducing the speech's subject.57 Vss. 260f assert that Helen's life and affairs are indeed a -repas, and assign two reasons: Hera and the beauty of Helen. A n impossible wish follows (262-6), in which Helen expresses her willingness to give up her beauty, if she could thereby reverse the fortune (and reputation)58 she has been dealt. She now proceeds to argue just how bad things are: when a person fails in a single undertaking, it is hard enough (267f); Helen is the victim of many disastrous circumstances.59 These are enumerated, with the stages neatly marked: 270-2 TTpcoTov [iev: undeserved disrepute 273-6 eTreiTa: slave's existence in a barbarous land 277-86 8': loss of family 276-9 husband's death 280f mother's suicide 282f daughter growing old unmarried 284-85a brothers 5 6 In the following discussion, the text to be assumed is that printed by Murray: i.e., 287-92 are in, 298 has a rhetorical question with TTCJS...OIJ KOACOS (see Wilamowitz Analecta 243), 299-302 are out. On these points Kannicht's and Alt's texts agree with Murray's; Diggle's text deletes 287-92 and 298-302. 5 7 The parenthetical reflection in 257-9 is well defended by Dale; other editors bracket. 5 8 The passage is dense and the transmitted text corrupt (in addition to impossible syntax in 263, the codd. give KaXds for KaKds in 265 and 266). Helen wishes not that she had not the T U X O U she has, but that the Greeks would forget the T U X O U she has; i.e., no real distinction is made between "fortune" and "reputation". 5 9 Compare Andromache's briefer list (Andr 96-9), presented following the announcement Trdpecm 8' oux ev dXXd TToXXd uoi oreveiv. 31 285b-6 I may as wel l be dead TO 8 ' eaxcxTov: can't go home 6 0 287-92 The speech now offers two pathetic rhetorical questions (TL SfJT' <ETL £W; T L V ' uTroXei.Trou.otL Ti3xr|v;), then a third question suggests a possible scenario for the future (294-96a). This question is in effect answered by a gnome that suggests the scenario is unacceptable. Helen announces her decision to die: I take 298b to mean "Surely there can be nothing cowardly in preferring death to life under these circumstances"; vss. 299-302 w i l l have been supplied by someone who understood 298b differently (or read a different text there). The speech ends by confirming that Helen's situation warrants this remedy (303), for beauty, even though in the case of other women a blessing, has paradoxically spelled ru in for Helen (304f) 6 2 The speech's argument thus begins and ends wi th Helen's beauty as the explanation for her troubles. The argument is presented using three familiar Euripidean devices: impossible wish, list, rhetorical question series. The list (of Helen's auu.cj)opai) is the centrepiece; it is introduced by the somewhat fatuous observation that a single woe may be endured, but not a great multipl icity of woes. The first item on the list makes again a rather specious point, viz. , that an 6 0 The passage is none too coherent; SoKoOvTe? in 289 is very harsh, but the sense of the passage is clear and makes a good rhetorical supplement to what has preceded. Discussions: Dale ad 287-92, Kannicht ad 287-92, Zuntz "Three Conjectures" 69f. 6 1 The text is Wilamowitz's conjecture: L gives rrpo9dvoifi' etc. Stephanus printed TTUJS Qdvo\.\i ' av ovv KaXw?; This reading makes sense of the following lines; but it is difficult to believe Euripides intended this sense. In favour of Stephanus' text, see Fowler, "Rhetoric of Desperation 9-Qavelv KpomaTOv Trios' Gdvoiu.' av ou KaXtos; (Hel 298) 6 1 13. 62 With aiiTO TODT ' drruXeaev (305) cf. Phaidra's CIUTO TOUT ' aTTOKTeivei, Hipp 419. 32 undeserved bad reputation is a worse thing than a fully merited one. Item two tells us not that Helen misses Sparta, nor that she detests her Egyptian prison, but that to dwell in Egypt is inherently to live as a slave, whereas she was born of free parents. The list continues with a litany of familial woes; here the content is more personal, but the sense that this is a list is always present (compare the more expansive lyric treatment of these same points, especially in 191-228). This list is followed by a series of questions in which an alternative scenario for the future (other than death) is mentioned and rejected. Here again, as in the monologue of Admetos, abstract points are made by the suffering protagonist using highly artificial rhetorical techniques. In each case, we have just seen the same person's suffering depicted in a lyrical mode. The two presentations must be regarded as emotionally complementary: one aim of this type of sequence must be to present a fuller view of the suffering person than could otherwise be achieved. At the same time, the value of the repetition of points must be appreciated; the clear iambic rehearsal of the facts follows upon what must have been difficult going for many theatre listeners. That is, to some extent the iambic section of the "sequence" might relate to the lyric as Surtitles do to sung operatic scenes. But neither of these considerations can explain the highly artificial character of the rhetoric: one can only assume a genuine taste for such things on the part of Euripides' audience. A similar scene occurs in Herakles. Following the hero's murder of his wife and children, a powerful lyric lament is sung by Amphitryon and the Chorus while Herakles, bound, sleeps in full view of the audience. As his delirium begins to subside, and he realises the awful truth, Herakles naturally experiences despair and thoughts of suicide. 33 Herakles' monologue does not follow immediately upon the lyrical scene in which he plays so pathetic a role. Between the two, Theseus has arrived, and, after hearing of Herakles' tragedy, offered friendship and asylum. The rhesis of Herakles presents itself as a reply to these offers. Two conventional phrases introduce the speech: an appeal to "Listen!", and an announcement he wi l l "contest in words" Theseus' suggestions (1255).63 The point to be argued is next headlined: "Herakles' life unlivable in present and past alike" (1257). The objective is now to demonstrate not that Herakles is presently miserable— this is obvious— but that he has always been so. A life-review is presented, taking a form similar to that of Helen's litany of woes (see above).64 1259-62 TTptoTov \iev I was the son of ill-fated Amphitryon 1263-8 Zeus begot in me an enemy of Hera, who sent snakes 1281-1302 the argument moves to the present: Herakles describes, in line with the program he has announced, the grim life he now faces, concluding TL 8fJTd ae Cfjv Set; Herakles now returns-to the cause of his woes: Hera's jealousy. She figured in the incident described in 1263-8, and is here credited with the (3ouXr|o-is (1305) that led to Herakles' ruin (cf. also 1253). Conventional techniques met with are the chronological review itself, here clearly marked out with connectives (-rrpcoTov \iev—OTCTV 8e—ene! 8e); the stock-taking flurry of rhetorical questions, in 6 3 ciKOue Sr| vvv: cf. Hik 857, Hel 1035, Or 237,1181, I A 1009,1146. ci? duiMr|9to Xoyoi?: cf. Hipp 971, Hek 271, Hik 195. 6 4 Throughout the speech the chronological stages are clear, but much less pointed than in, e.g., Peleus' speech at Andr 590-641. Wilamowitz's note ad loc exaggerates the neatness of form and underestimates the pathos. to kill me 1279f 1269-78 as a young man, I suffered many ordeals and this killing was the last of my labours 34 which options for the future are tested; the direct quote containing an imagined reproach; the rhetorical question proposing suicide. Repeated references to Herakles' own greatness and importance have the effect of deepening the tone of despair (1299f,65 1306, 1309f); this is one of the play's important themes, developed especially in the debate of Amphi t ryon and Lykos (151-61, 174-87) and in the first stasimon (348-450). Herakles has set out to prove his life unlivable in order to support a decision to die. In Troades, Andromache addresses a similar "proof" to Hekabe, ostensibly for the purpose of consoling her mother-in-law over the recent death of Polyxene. But Andromache's past is used to demonstate not the constancy of her troubles, nor again the proverbial idea that wealth and power once enjoyed make slavery or degradation harder to endure, 6 6 but the paradoxical and ironic notion that it was her very virtue and high reputation that got her into the par-ticularly bitter position of being, in effect, the slave of her husband's murderer. 6 7 The speech begins wi th the text "Death is preferable to a life of pain". This is supported by further general statements, and at 641 f the case of Polyxene is introduced, the simple fact of whose death may now be contrasted wi th the complexities of Andromache's life: 6 5 The couplet 1299f is corrupt in the codd., but should be repaired, not deleted (del. Wilamowitz, Diggle). Wilamowitz's objection (ad 1297) to 1291-3 and 1299f, viz., that they contradict the essential argument announced in 1256f, is not decisive. On a trivial level we may compare Tro 869f with 876f. More seriously, Her 1340-6 have been said to contradict the apparent assumptions of the play itself. Such objections arise when the rhetorical context of a passage is ignored. 6 6 For this idea cf. Hek 375-8, Her [1291-3], Hel 417-19 (and see Kannicht's note ad loc). In Tro 472f the same idea is presented stripped of all pathos. 6 7 The idea returns in [742-3]: Astyanax's inherited evye.veia attracted death to him, instead of saving him. 35 643f I failed by striving after e u 8 o £ i a past— I was a perfect wife present— this was my downfal l , I am a slave recapitulation: past— Hektor and my marriage recapitulation: present— Hektor dead, I a slave bound 645-56 657-72 673-6 677f 679-83 for Greece recapitulation of proem: Polyxene more fortunate Like the other speeches under consideration here, this one follows a lyric scene (Tro 577-607) in which the same pathetic situation has been presented through a different set of technical conventions: both the dialogue in 610-33 and Andromache's rhesis repeat some of the points made earlier in song. Unl ike the three speeches discussed above, this one doesn't contemplate the speaker's death— naturally enough, since Polyxene's death is being called a preferable estate to Andromache's surv iva l . 6 8 But the speech has other familiar features, most notably the use of comparison as a springboard for argument: Admetos began by comparing his own fortune wi th that of his wife, Helen's speech compared herself— a beautiful multisufferer— with plain women and unisufferers, Herakles compared his- own past and present and found them to be of a piece; so Andromache's argument takes the death of Polyxene as its point of departure, and compares the lot of the two women. Another feature these speeches share is the paradoxical character of their main argumentative points: Death more satisfactory than Life (Admetos, Andromache); Beauty (Helen) and auifypoovvr} (Andromache) the cause of misfortune for a woman, Herakles miserable at the moment of his great victories. This aspect in particular should tell us that speeches of this type played more than a purely functional role in their plays; these speeches belong to a genre that* had appeal in its own right— 6 8 At this point, of course, she is still the mother of a helpless child; suicide is not an option. Note, though, vs. 594: KOLUICTOU [Burges: KOjiiaai codd.] u' es "AiSou. 36 just as d id , no doubt, the choral odes of these plays. So long as we do not expect a character's abject misery to be portrayed in a "realistic" (rather than an artistic) way, it takes nothing away from these scenes to see that their presentation involves stylish techniques of argument. The four speeches just discussed seem to form a group through sharing the traits I have mentioned. Some other speeches use some of these devices to paint a picture of misery and despair, in a context where this is not the speech's only or main purpose. 6 9 D. Heroic Acceptance of Death Acceptance of death is the subject of many speeches in Euripides, often speeches of quite rhetorical character. This is especially true of the speeches made by a character who is offering to die as a sacrificial v ict im in circumstances where there is some element of choice (Makaria in Hkld 500-34, Menoikeus in Phoin 985-1018, Iphigeneia in IA 1369-1401), or accepting the necessity where there isn't (Polyxene in Hek 342-78). 7 0 A somewhat similar case is that of Andromache, who offers herself up in Andr 384-420, believing she is saving her son's life by doing so. The self-sacrifice motif in these speeches has been much studied. There are rhetorical similarities in other speeches accepting or embracing death, e.g. Megara's farewell speech (Her 451-96), and the despondent 6 9 E.g. Med 214-66, Hipp 373-430 (see V.A below), Andr 384-420, Hek 585-628, Hik 1080-1113 (for which see next section), Her 451-96. Some formal and rhetorical aspects of the representation of despair are traced in a variety of ancient authors and genres by R.L. Fowler in "Rhetoric of Desperation". 7 0 A sub-type is the offer by another character to die as a substitute for the chosen victim: Hkld 451-60, Hek 382-8, Phoin 962-9. Strohm (Euripides 50) emphasises the wide range of the theme of self-sacrifice in Euripidean dramaturgy. 37 soliloquies of Herakles and Helen (Her 1255-1310, Hel 255-305: see above), and of Iphis (Hik 1080-1113: see below). Makaria's speech in Hkld is a particularly neat and abstract construction; yet it arises quite naturally out of the preceding conversation. A brief formal proem marked Makaria's entrance: 474-7 asked whether a woman ought to speak among men; 478-81 gave her reasons for joining the conversation; 482f asked a question. The information supplied in answer (484-99) leads her to continue on these lines: 500-2 I volunteer to die 503-10 it would be unworthy to shirk death 503-6 when the Athenians are championing our cause 507-10 when we are suppliants and children of Herakles 511-19 the alternatives 511-14 suffer degradation as a captive, then die anyway 515-19 suffer exile, and insult as a known coward 520-24 in any case, I have no future (husband, children) 525-7 need to act worthily 528-34 take me, etc.; references to coming victory, benefit to her family, fame It is in this moment, the decision to die and its rationalisation, that Euripides ex-ploits resources of argument and persuasion.71 Here the speaker examines the case first on the basis of justice and honour, then moves to pragmatic considera-tions; life is excluded on both grounds.7 2 Some of the techniques used have been seen above in other contexts: the topical headline (501f), use of rhetorical questions to open (503-6) and close (510b) an argument, systematic elimination of 7 1 See Schmitt, Freiwilliger Opfertod Ch. Ill: "Die Entscheidenden Reden". 7 2 Schmitt emphasises (Opfertod 29) that the case is presented entirely through techniques of refutation. 38 alternatives for the future (cf. Med 502-8, Her 1281-90), use of direct quotation giv ing an imagined reproach (see above, n.52). Menoikeus' shorter dedication speech in Phoin 991-1018 follows the reluctant announcement by Teiresias that Thebes can be saved only through his death, and a brief conversation (977-90) in which the boy seems to agree to Kreon's p lan to spirit h im out of danger. After Kreon's departure to make the necessary arrangements, Menoikeus, speaking to the Chorus only, takes some time to make a clear announcement of his intentions. He indicates that he has tricked Kreon, then that Kreon's plans for his escape were forgivable but dis-honourable— Menoikeus w i l l not prove a traitor to the land that gave h im birth (995f). He then announces he wi l l die and save the city (997f);7 3 the speech continues: 999-1005 the disgrace (of fleeing): others w i l l fight and wi l l ingly die, while I prove a coward 1006-12 description of the sacrifice [1013-18] reflection: the value of selfless citizens Here the "practical" aspect explored in Makaria's second section is absent— the possibil ity of Menoikeus' betraying his country and l iv ing in exile is not ex-plored, but simply dismissed. 7 4 In place of a fantasy image of his future we get a very brief "advance messenger-speech" describing the scenario that w i l l actually take place. But the idea of escape and a life in exile has already been developed in the stichomythia preceding Menoikeus' speech (977-90); in embracing death he 7 3 The coup de theatre achieved by the deception and gradual revelation is brilliant; something similar happens with Iphigeneia's change of mind in IA. 7 4 De Romilly, "Les Pheniciennes" 43, notes the relative absence of "rhetoric" here: "Le fils de Creon ne raisonne pas, ne calcule pas; il n'exprime que deux sentiments: un certain sens de l'honneur et l'amour de sa patrie". 39 at the same time rejects the plans that have been proposed for h im. Thus Euripides can write a speech concentrating exclusively on honour and good cit izenship, wi th no need to waste time on consideration of "alternatives". 7 5 Where Menoikeus has been offered an opportunity to escape Thebes and his own death, Iphigeneia in IA must decide whether to encourage Achi l les to fight to save her, wi th all the repercussions this would have for her father and the Trojan campaign. She begins her speech of self-dedication (as d id Menoikeus) by revealing gradually her decision to die. The announcement is clearly made at vs. 1375a. It is supported by a medley of arguments: 1375b-76 headline: glory, not ignominy 1377-84 I have it in my hands to prevent further abductions of Greek women, and to achieve revenge against Paris, fame for myself 1385-91 in any case I mustn't cling to life: thousands stand ready to die, and I mustn't interfere wi th the course of things 1392-6 miscellaneous points: we must prevent Achi l les' being at odds wi th the army; 7 6 men are worth more than women; I a mortal cannot resist a goddess' w i l l 1397-1401 I give myself to Greece, etc. This differs strikingly from the earlier speeches in its involvement wi th the details of the plot: Iphigeneia is not a colourless figure produced in order to make a speech and die. Rather she is allowed to speak of the specific practical goals her death w i l l serve— not "I w i l l save the city" but "I w i l l secure revenge 7 5 The speech ends very abruptly with e'ipr|Tai Xoyos (1012); as Mastronarde says ad loc, the phrase does not automatically exclude a following epilogue, but that of 1013-18 begins awkwardly by repeating the thought of 1009f. One misses a general summing up: possibly 1013-18 were composed as an alternative to 1009-12 (or vice versa). 7 6 This point was raised earlier in 1372f (reading Hartung's 5iaf!XT|8f|i 1372). 40 for Paris' abduction of Helen". These practical polit ical considerations ("my role in history") give way at 1385 to a personal argument: Iphigeneia compares herself to any other soldier involved in the war effort (cf. Hkld 503-6, Phoin 999-1002), and concludes she cannot justly shirk death. 7 7 When we turn to Polyxene in Hek the situation is somewhat different. In no way w i l l Polyxene's sacrifice serve to promote the interests of her own family or state. A n d she is no volunteer like Makaria and Menoikeus; even in the case of Iphigeneia, a real heroic choice is involved, though it comes only after much resistance. 7 8 Yet Euripides has given Polyxene a speech highlighting the nobility of her decision to accept the necessity of death: 342-5 Polyxene hints at the resolve she is about to reveal 346-8 I must die and I wish to d ie , 7 9 and w i l l not appear a coward 349a topical question: TL ydp .tie Set £fjv; 349b-56 my past 357-66 my present and future 367f I reject life on these terms 369-74 instructions to Odysseus and Hekabe 375-8 reflection on reversal Polyxene's account of her past emphasises her royal status and expectations of a royal marriage; her outlook for the future (if the sacrifice could somehow be 7 7 See Gibert diss., esp. p. 286. I note that the patriotic and heroic view of her act returns in her words at 1420,1446,1471f, 1502, and is extended to Agamemnon's act as well in 1454-6. 7 8 Thus I disagree with statements to the effect that Iphigeneia simply yields to over-whelming necessity (e.g., O'Connor-Visser Aspects of Sacrifice 122-4). Euripides has delayed her act of heroism to get the strongest possible effect from it; he has in fact made a whole play out of what provides only a scene in the other three plays discussed here. 7 9 The positive formulation here makes a striking contrast to the refutation approach seen in the Hkld scene: Polyxene has no reason to die, only the desire. Schmitt notes (Opfertod 32) similarities to Aias' speech at S. Aias 430-80. 41 prevented) is that of a menial slave facing a degrading marriage. Polyxene's speech shares with Makaria's this contemplation of the slave's life one wi l l not be forced to l ive. 8 0 But there are differences as well as similarities; the mood of Polyxene's speech is closer to that of the "monologues of despair" I have discussed above.8 1 The Evadne/Iphis scene in Hik 990-1113 is, like the scenes of self-dedication in Hkld and Phoin, self-contained and inessential. Formally the scene resembles the "lyric-iambic sequences" discussed above (Alk 244-392, Hel 167-329, etc.), in that human reactions to a tragic situation are developed first in a lyrical, then in a rhetorical mode. But here there are two sufferers, involved. A lyric lament is sung by Evadne (990-1030), who has lost her husband Kapaneus in the war at Thebes. Then her father Iphis, who has lost his son Eteoklos, arrives (1031); he attempts in dialogue (1048-71) to prevent Evadne's suicide, but without success. Iphis, who has thus lost son, son-in-law, and daughter, now delivers an iambic speech rejecting life (1080-1113). The speech begins, like some other Euripidean monologues, with a lengthy general reflection involving an impossible wish. 8 2 Iphis wishes men could go twice through the cycle of youth and age (1080-86), then explains how his own life has brought him to wish this: he has been destroyed by his own desire to have children, for having fathered a son he has now lost him (1087-93).83 In 1094-7 Iphis considers his alternatives, 8 0 So Schmitt, Opfertod 31. 8 1 Yet though the speech is not a heroic self-dedication embracing patriotic goals and personal glory, it must be said that the sacrifice itself (as reported by Talthybios, 818-82) is presented in heroic and ennobling terms. Strohm (Euripides 54-7) notes similarities between Polyxene's scene and the farewell of Megara in Herakles. 8 2 The passage is discussed in IV.D below. 8 3 This is the sense of 1092f, which Diggle was the first editor to delete; Collard ad 1092-3 defends the couplet against earlier attacks by W. Gilbert and by Wilamowitz. The lack of any 42 using the common device of a series of rhetorical questions, and concludes that he can have no pleasure in returning either to his own home or to that of Kapaneus. This second option is rejected on account of his daughter's death, and she now returns to his thoughts. He generalises about the virtues of daughters as against sons, and remembers wi th fondness his intimacy wi th Evadne (1099-1103). 8 4 H is decision to die is revealed in a striking way: oux cos TdxiaTa SfJTd u.' d£eT' eg Sou-Oii? CTKOTCOL Te SokreTevQ' d c r m a i s eu.6v 8eu.as yepaiov awTaKeis dTKxj)9epco; (Hik 1104-6) This combines a delayed announcement of the intention to die (cf. Menoikeus, Iphigeneia) wi th a call to action such as we saw opening the final section of several speeches discussed above. 8 5 Iphis concludes wi th a reflection on the uselessness of old people trying to extend their lives for no good purpose (1108-13): "they ought to get out of the way of the young" . 8 6 Iphis' speech thus shares essential features wi th other speeches by characters who, whether from despair or heroic intentions, decide to accept death: comparison of a happy past wi th a bleak future; demonstration that the future is bleak through an examination of possible alternatives; reflection to the effect that death is preferable to life. reference to Evadne here is to be explained in terms of balance: Iphis mourns first his son (1092-6), then his daughter (1097-1103). ' 8 4 We find similar language in the reminiscences of Iphigeneia about her childhood intimacy with her father, IA 1220-2. 8 5 Hkld 528 (iVyeEo-9' OTTOU 8ei...), IA 1398 (9ueT ', eKTrop9eiTe Tpoiav...), Hek 369 (ay ' ouv u.e...). 8 6 This makes an interesting frame with the reflection on youth and age that opened the speech; moreover, the characters of the young and the old form a theme throughout Hik, and here as often "general" material used in a rhetorical setting reflects a basic concern of the play. 43 E. Two Epideictic Speeches In a number of speeches discussed above, a balanced chronological presen-tation helps emphasise a pathetic contrast between past and present or present and future. Comparison not of points in time but of places or peoples forms the organising principle in two very interesting argumentative speeches: Ion 585-647 and Tro 353-405. Upon learning that the oracle has identified him as Xouthos' son, Ion greets with mixed feelings the invitation to move to Athens and assume his rightful place in his (supposed) father's household. His doubts about the change are expressed (589-645) as a highly developed description of the life he would anticipate in Athens and then of the life he has enjoyed at Delphi. There is no direct comparison of the two, but life at Athens is imagined with a good many negative aspects, life at Delphi presented as idyllic: Athens Ion's disadvantages there in public life as an outsider the turmoil he wil l cause in Xouthos' household— possible retaliation by Kreousa his pity for her general rejection of the desirability of royal status (621-8), wealth (629-31) Delphi agreeable pace and civility of life there the cheerful character of his sacred and civic intercourse 8 7 So Verrall in his translation, Diggle in his note at Studies 102f. 44 589-632 589-606 607-17 618-20 621-32 633-45 634-7 638-9 640-41 variety of human contact summarises his good fortune there comparison favours life at Delphi 642-44a 644b-45 A s we have seen in some speeches earlier, two balanced blocks of argument are developed to very different lengths. Two factors have combined to expand the first block: Euripides' proclivity for political reflection and speculation, and his desire to demonstrate warmth and good feeling on Ion's part towards Kreousa. It is also true that much of the play so far has served to present the image of Ion's life at Delphi that the speech promotes— that it is a paradise, and Ion a sensitive but carefree innocent; the speech therefore needn't dwel l on that i dea . 8 8 Ion's init ial objection to going to Athens "as the son of an immigrant father, and myself a bastard" (592: i.e., a citizen on neither side) raises precisely the problem that w i l l be solved by the play's second and authentic recognition-action. The disadvantages of this situation are explored in relation to each of three polit ical groups: 8 9 o l d S w a T o i (597), those who a i y w a i KOU a T r e u S o u a i v es Tot T T p d y u a T a (598-601), and o l X P ^ ^ 0 1 T 'n L TToXei (602-4).90 From public life Ion moves to his potential impact on Xouthos' own household. The distinction between public and private for purposes of argu-ment has already been seen above in the appeals of Hekabe to Odysseus (Hek 251-8 8 Good discussions of this aspect are offered by Erbse Studien zum Prolog 76f, Burnett Catastrophe 104f. 8 9 Owen (ad 596-603) speaks of "(1) the dSuva-roi who have no political influence, (2) the really capable people who keep out of politics, (3) those who do take part in public life". Dis-cussion: Friis Johansen General Reflection 136f, Kovacs "Tyrants" 35f; see also Collard ad Hik 238-45. I am not at all convinced Herwerden's ovTes in 598 (received by Diggle) is necessary for eivou codd.; it introduces a profile of 6 diTpdyutov that may or may not be accurate, but which we should not assume Euripides meant to promote here. (Collard ad Hik 438-41 quotes the vs. reading elvcu without comment.) 9 0 These are also called ol Xoyioi in the codd. (vs. 602), for which many corrections have been proposed. 45 95) and Iolaos to Demophon (Hkld 181-231).91 Kovacs has proposed deletions (of 595-606 and 621-32) that would deprive the speech of this distinction. Ion is left arguing on purely personal and family grounds: I would be an outsider, a nobody, and a nuisance in your household. This seems remarkably l imited scope for discussing an invitation to join the household of the king of A thens . 9 2 The play is about an innocent youth who w i l l in fact at the end of the day be invited by the goddess herself to assume the throne at Athens; surely it makes sense to think Euripides thought of showing at this point in his metamorphosis a virtuous lack of greed and ambition, and a certain resistance to polit ical activity — informed by a good sense of political demographics— which the further events of the day w i l l overcome. 9 3 Kassandra's speech to Hekabe at Tro 353-405 begins (as w i l l Andromache's at 634-83) by offering consolation; Hekabe has expressed regret over Kassandra's "marriage" to Agamemnon. Kassandra, after prophesying enigmatically the end she and Agamemnon both face, offers (367-9) to prove the paradoxical (we may as wel l say "sophistic") proposition: "The war was a better thing for the defeated 9 1 Note also Orestes' defense addressed to Tydareos (Or 544-604): "I had to avenge my father; I have performed a service to Greece". Without emphasis, the Delphi section of this speech also moves from public ("no one knocks you off the sidewalk" 635f) to private ("by habit and character I am righteous towards the god" 643f). 9 2 This is so even if the play portrays Xouthos' royal power as restrained by certain limitations— for example it is not implied that Ion would, as his son, inherit the throne: note 659f (and cf. 577-[78]). Burnett, Catastrophe 106n, discusses these points in terms of Attic law, but our starting point should rather be Euripides' decision to marginalise Xouthos for story-telling purposes. 9 3 It must also be noted that Kovacs' pronouncement, "[the claim] that a wise man will not attempt to become a tyrant... betray[s] a point of view hard to parallel in the fifth century" ("Tyrants", 35f), is contradicted not only by passages he deletes (Hipp 1012-15, Phoin 549-54) but by S. OT 587ff. On the OT passage, Kovacs (p. 47) wilfully ignores the philosophical element in Kreon's argument— an argument much like that of Ion here, in which the advantages of a simple life are held preferable to the complexities and dangers of rvpavvis. On Ion 595-606 Kovacs identifies (p. 35) "both the general tendency of the passage and its identification (598) of the wise with the inactive" as "Epicurean". 46 ( Trojans than for the Greek victors". She proceeds by analysing each side's posi t ion: 368-85 The Greeks 368-9 lost thousands of men over one woman 370-3 their general was forced to slay his daughter 374-6a they died not defending their own country 376b-79 they lie far from their loved ones (and vice versa) 380-83 no proper funerals or offerings 384-5 closing ref lect ion 9 4 386-402 The Trojans 386- 7 died defending their own country 387- 90 were properly tended and buried by relatives 391-3 enjoyed family life when not fighting 394-7 the Greek invasion brought Hektor fame 398-9 Paris married a daughter of Zeus 400-2 when war comes, it is no shame for a city to perish nobly She concludes wi th an epilogue (403-5) uniting the two themes of her speech: neither her marriage to Agamemnon nor the Trojans' loss of the war should be an occasion for pity. In closing she promises she w i l l herself br ing about vengeance. 9 5 While thoroughly grounded in the story of the fall of Troy as Euripides has conceived it for Troad.es, this speech (that is, the comparison in 365-403) 9 4 Diggle deletes 383-5, following Wilamowitz (383) and Reichenberger (384-5); Lee receives them without comment. 9 5 Wilamowitz's attack on vss. 365-83 is at Analecta 221-4. He sees the speech as dealing originally only with the Trojans, citing (among other objections) similar expressions in the two halves that suggest to him the Greek half was cobbled together using the Trojan material. Wilamowitz's resistance to the speech's finely balanced presentation has not attracted any modern champions. 47 more than any other we have by the playwright seems detachable from its context, a sophistic set piece. This impression arises partly from the speech's lack of necessity. Nothing in the play has led us to expect a speech dissenting from the v iew of the defeated Trojans as pit i ful victims, least of all from a Trojan speaker. Yet it makes an astonishing impact, and must be regarded as a bril l iant stroke by Euripides. The speech's "detachability" also owes something to the formal and emotionally restrained character of the presentation: the clear headline (365-7); the relative brevity and symmetry of the points raised (Greeks 18 verses, Trojans 17), touching about equally on known individuals, common soldiers, and civil ians, and wi th no pathetic outbursts and no express application to persons present. Vs. 403 clearly closes the comparative argument (cov ouveK' ov xpr\, ufJTep, O L K T i p e i v o~e y f j v ) ; the continuation wi th oi> T d u d Aeicrpa (404) then reaches back further in the speech and associates for the first time its two topics— the general and the personal . 9 6 9 6 Theseus' comparison of democracy and tyranny at Hik 429-55 shares some features with these two "epideictic" speeches: see Ch. V.B below. 48 Chapter II Ant i logies and Complex Exchanges Thus far I have been concentrating on single speeches: speeches of appeal, "epideictic" speeches, monologues of despair, speeches embracing a glorious death or accepting death as the lesser of two evils. In all of these situations Euripides uses sophisticated techniques of argument, typically bui ld ing up the speaker's case in blocks more or less self-consciously distinguished. These blocks often present arguments of different character: for example, an argument about abstract justice may be followed by one about practical consequences, or by an appeal for pity, or a reference to past services, etc. Turning now to the face-to-face debates of which Euripides is such a master, I shall continue to call attention to these techniques in the composition of indiv idual speeches; and I shall note various types of correspondence between the two speeches of a pair. Some observations w i l l also be made regarding the "tone" of debate scenes and their function wi th in the play. A . Appeal and Response Scenes of supplication or other types of appeal can be treated as a special class. 1 Speeches of appeal tend to be long and neatly argued; responses are often substantially shorter than the appeal they answer, may make little reference to 1 I make no distinction based on the presence of a formal announcement of supplication; such announcements normally have no effect on the progress of the action. See App. B. 49 the terms of the request, and are generally of a less "rhetorical" character (Hkld 236-52, Hek 850-63, Hik 334-48,1A 1255-75). There are some important exceptions (Kyk 316-46, Hek 299-331, Hik 195-249, Hel 998-1029, Or 682-716) . 2 I shall discuss here the more rhetorically developed appeal-response exchanges in Kyk, Hek, Or? Odysseus' appeal to Polyphemos for hospitality (see L A above) offers two grounds of justification, al luding first to favours rendered to Poseidon by the sailors (Kyk 290-8), and then suggesting that vou.og and evoefieia require respectful treatment of suppliants (299-312). The answering speech is a bit longer than the appeal (31 lines to 28), and unlike some other speeches of refusal (Odysseus in Hek 299-331, Menelaos in Or 682-716, Agamemnon in IA 1255-75) it splits no hairs and makes no excuses. The Cyclops' first words announce his alignment wi th a phi losophy of selfish materialism that admits neither sentiment nor law: 6 TTXOUTOS, dv9pwTTLo-Ke, TOLS ao(j>oIs Qeos, ra 8 ' dXka KOLLTTOI/ K a l Xoyoov euu.opc|)La. (Kyk 316f) He goes on to state first (318-21) that Poseidon and Zeus mean nothing to h im; this claim is illustrated by a humourous description of the insular and self-reliant character of his life (323-38a).4 Wi th 338b-41 he dismisses the institution of laws as likewise inconsistent wi th his lifestyle. A final section states ironically 2 It is worth noting that the most elaborate speeches of response are refusals. 3 The remaining scenes of this type (Hik, Hel) are treated below in V.B and II.E respectively. 4 Details here owe much to passages in the Odyssey (note especially ix. 273-8), though there the Cyclops boasts of his relation to Poseidon (ix. 517-21), and is the very personification of gullibility and unsophistication. For comparison of the Homeric and the Euripidean Cyclops, see pp. 51-9 in Seaford's Introduction to his ed. 50 the practical outcome of the confrontation: "fire and the ancestral cauldron" w i l l be made available to Odysseus and his men as £evia, and they are to approach the altar where they w i l l themselves provide the feast (342-6).5 Al though in its humourous tone this speech is unlike any other Eur i -pidean example, it conforms in rhetorical terms to a general pattern we shall see below in another speech of refusal: the two arguments posed by Odysseus are answered (the first at much greater length than the second), and after the refusal has been justified the practical outcome is announced. The exchange of Hekabe and Odysseus in Hek 251-331 offers another example of a balanced rhetorical sequence, but on a larger scale. Fol lowing Odysseus' entrance and announcement that Polyxene is to be sacrificed at Achil les' tomb, Hekabe first obtains his consent for a debate (234-7),6 then raises the issue of a personal obligation she says Odysseus has towards her. This matter is discussed in stichomythia; Hekabe's long rhesis begins at vs. 251, its first lines serving to close the stichomythic conversation. 7 She then offers her formal plea: 254-71 the injustice of the proposed sacrifice 272-87a pathetic appeal, wi th a reminder of obligation 287b-95 alternative proposal, wi th reasons The clear signposting (271f) of the transition from rational argument to pathetic appeal has been noted in L A above. The third section, in which a positive 5 For the speech's possible "sophistic" connections, see esp. Paganelli, Echi Storico-politici: Part I (21-60) is devoted to an analysis of this speech and its contact with contemporary thought. See also Seaford's Introduction, ed. 52-6. Ussher dissents (ed. 187f): "One doubts if he [the Cyclops] has framed his primitive code in answer to contemporary sophists". 6 Here as elsewhere the line between "appeal" and "debate" is blurred; suppliants debate their persecutors in Andr 184-230, 319-63, and in Her 170-235. So Helen's appeal to Menelaos to spare her life is cast in the form of a debate with Hekabe in Tro 906-13. 7 Speeches open similarly at Kyk 285, Andr 920, Hek 786, etc. 51 practical proposal is made, is a frequent feature of appeals; similarly many accusation speeches close with a pointed reference to alternate action the opponent might have taken. 8 Odysseus' response takes in order the issues raised in Hekabe's speech, wi th a clear transition from point to point. He begins wi th a brief acknowledge-ment of his obligation to Hekabe, then proceeeds to answer at length her two main arguments: 303-20 the sacrifice is necessary and just 321-26 the misery of war is universal and must be endured The transition between these two points is made using a transition formula (321), roughly: "And as for your reference to your own sufferings, I have this to say about that". A generalising epilogue (328-31) supports the first of Odysseus' arguments. These arguments have been regarded by many critics as self-evidently empty and base. 9 But it is important to distinguish between the sympathy the characters themselves attract and the resources of argument they app ly . 1 0 There is no question but that we sympathise wi th Hekabe; moreover, we recognise the personal obligation of Odysseus to her— it should be added that we recognise it because Odysseus himself acknowledges it (301f). n But the arguments made by 8 E.g. IA 1196-1202, Hek 1217-23; Tyndareos begins with such a statement in Or 496-503. 9 Cf. e.g. Kitto Greek Tragedy 226f, Conacher Euripidean Drama 157f, Michelini Euripides 146f. Mossman reviews the speech in great detail (Wild Justice 113-7) and concludes (117): "Euripides ruthlessly undercuts [Odysseus'] moral standing by clever manipulation of the standard rhetorical ploys he gives him to speak". I don't see this; a view closer to the neutral one that will be presented here is that of Collard (ed., p. 142 and ad 299-331). 1 0 In App. C below I have assembled some Euripidean material to support this distinction. 1 1 Such claims raised in argument have little force when they pass without comment from the other party; cf. Menelaos' charges in IA 358-60, contradicted by Agamemnon elsewhere in the play. 52 Odysseus are not in themselves discreditable. In the first sequence (303-20) he states that he w i l l not in a private deal contravene his public stand (303-5); a TTOXLS owes proper recognition to the heroes who have died for it (306-10); if we exploit our soldiers l iv ing and dishonour them dead, men w i l l have no incentive to fight (311-16); a short life is acceptable if one gains eternal honour and gratitude (317-20). H is second sequence points out in moving language that war is a horror that must be endured by the women on both s ides. 1 2 I see Odysseus in this scene as making the strongest possible case, using arguments that wou ld occur to anyone in his position, for a distasteful but necessary action. Likewise Hekabe in her appeal has used the best arguments available to her, including some extra ammunit ion (the debt of obligation) that Euripides has supplied to even the field a bit and create a more exciting scene. A s I have suggested, the relatively detailed response of Odysseus, in which the points of Hekabe's appeal are directly addressed, is somewhat unusual for a Euripidean appeal-scene (though common in "forensic" exchanges: see below). The brief and tangential responses of Aigeus (Med 719-30), Demophon (Hkld 236-52), Agamemnon (Hek 850-63), Theseus (Hik 334-48) are more typical. A variation on the pattern in which a suppliant puts two contrasting arguments into a single speech of appeal is offered in some three-person scenes found in the later plays: in Hel, speeches appealing for assistance are addressed to Theonoe by Helen and Menelaos (see II.E below); in I A, Agamemnon hears a pair of appeals voiced by Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia (see V.C) . The separation of arguments noted above in L A as a typical feature of appeal speeches tends in these scenes to be exaggerated, due to the fact that separate persons are voicing two different aspects (e.g., rational and emotional) of the appeal. To some extent, 12- The thought returns through the Chorus' poignant words in vss. 650-8. 53 this effect is also achieved in the two speeches of Orestes, the first a defense (Or 544-604) emphasising rational argument, the second an appeal (640-79) empha-sising obl igat ion. 1 3 Discussion of Orestes' appeal and Menelaos' response follows; for the larger sequence see II.E below. Orestes, sick and exhausted fol lowing his murder of his mother, sees Menelaos, just returned from the war, as his best protector against threatened civ i l punishment for his act. Menelaos enters (Or 348) and the two men discuss the situation in stichomythia; Orestes initiates a formal appeal for protection wi th 448-55, which have the character of a proem. This appeal is interrupted by the arrival of Tyndareos (456) and the entire "forensic" scene wi th h im (491-631). In vs. 640 Orestes resumes his appeal to Menelaos. 1 4 In the text of the codd. his speech of 40 lines is answered by Menelaos wi th a speech of 35; Diggle's text gives Orestes 37 lines, Menelaos 26— still a substantial response compared to others I have mentioned. Orestes' speech (640-79) begins by insisting on the desirability of a ful l discussion of the issues. The puzzl ing couplet 644f follows, lines which seem completely irrelevant: perhaps, as the scholion suggests, they involved some stage business. Orestes' main argument involves a survey (unehronological and not very clearly marked out) of benefits Menelaos has enjoyed at the expense of Agamemnon and Orestes, each subjected to a comparative treatment: 1 3 I owe this observation to Porter, Studies 165-7. Porter sees in the somewhat desperate character of Orestes' appeal speech a result of the failure of his earlier rational argumentation addressed to Tyndareos, just as (in Porter's view) Hekabe in the second part of her appeal to Agamemnon (Hek 787-845) resorts to desperate tactics in the face of the failure of her more moderate opening arguments. But rhetorical contrasts that are to be seen everywhere do not require explanation in these psychological terms. 1 4 Similar separation of proem from body of speech is seen in Makaria's self-dedication in Hkld 474-83, 500-34. The effect of the interruption is for us a gain in realism. 54 647-51 1 5 Agamemnon mobil ised an army, not in consequence of 652-4 his own fault but of your wife's he gave his life fighting at your s ide, 1 6 so you might 658-9 655-7 regain your wife his fight was ten years long, yours would be but a day I lost my sister when Agamemenon sacrificed Iphige-660-4 neia, no need for you to sacrifice Hermione summaris ing argument The first part of this seems to involve a paradoxical critique of the concept of dSiKia (note dSiKuj 646, aSiKov 647, dSiKWs 648, dSixiav 650); 1 7 an argument "from justice" is thus presented. In the comparisons that fol low the emphasis is on Menelaos' bonds of obligation to his brother. In 665-8 Orestes raises the question of the practical possibility of a successful resistance. 1 8 The argument is supported only by the philosophical observation that "friendship" has no meaning when the gods are on one's side— it is friends in trouble one must he lp . 1 9 This leads to a final section in which Orestes supplicates Menelaos in Helen's name and begs for help (669-79). Orestes' appeal, then, consists of a pair of rational arguments, neatly presented, combined with anticipation of a practical objection 1 5 I follow here the codd. order against Paley's transposition of 651 (accepted by Diggle). 1 6 Here I note again an important principle: the fact no one contradicts a claim made in a rhetorical situation does not make it true. Orestes attributes to Agamemnon the noble act he is asking of Menelaos. 1 7 I prefer the punctuation in Weil's text: question mark after d8iK(3 in 646. The point is that z/ Menelaos sees Orestes as "in the wrong" for killing Klytaimestra on behalf of Agamemnon (as he may be apt to do following the harsh verdict Tyndareos has just rendered), this fact will offer him no argument against assisting Orestes, since Agamemnon will have been equally in the wrong campaigning to correct not a misdeed of his own (OUK a^ apTcov OOITOS) but a misdeed and a wrong of Helen's. Orestes now asks Menelaos for the favour of a similar "wrong"— that is, he defines dSiKia, for purposes of confronting Menelaos' possible objection, as a selfless service done a friend. Weil (ad loc): "Euripide s'est ingenie pour trouver des arguments specieux a l'appui d'un paradoxe". 1 8 epets opens such arguments elsewhere: see App. A. 1 9 Cf. the similar "definition" of friendship Orestes gave earlier in 454f. 55 and wi th supplication. A "sophistic" strain is perhaps to be noticed in the treatment of dSnda (646-50), and in the reflection on friendship in adversity (665-8). Menelaos now answers. He states two reasons why his inclination is to help Orestes: aLSoog (681f: this w i l l refer to Orestes' announcement of suppl i -cat ion) 2 0 and the obligation inherent in a family tie (684-6). But this obligation seems to exist only 8wau.iv f\v SiSooi Qeos (685), and Menelaos makes it clear (687) he lacks the possibility of helping. Refusal of a suppliant is not common in tragedy, and Menelaos' decision w i l l be justified at length (cf. Theseus in Hik 195-249). He lacks sufficient force to w in an armed confrontation (688-92a). But words may prevail (692b-93): that is, he proposes an alternative course, in which he seems to be wi l l ing to help. He compares (694-701) the two tactics in a reflection involv ing politics and wildf ire, and decides the second course alone is appropriate: he wi l l speak to Tyndareos (as effective king of the Argives) on Orestes' behalf. The reflection in 706-13 seems again to compare the effects of force and subtler means, and decides for the latter; then in 714-16 Menelaos apparently recalls that the Argives have never been easily moll i f ied, and adds that the wise recognise they are slaves to fate. 2 1 Clearly there are problems of coherence in this speech; one looks in vain for a clear sense of what Menelaos' actual intentions are, and on what basis they 2 0 On aiScus in connection with supplication, see Gould, "Hiketeia" 87-90 and App. B below. 2 1 Weil ad loc reads (with Schaefer) TTpouriyo^eaG ' av for TTpo<nyy6uea9a, and understands the lines to conclude that without a substantial force behind one, even negotiation will lead nowhere. West (ad 714) seems to understand Menelaos to say he accepts that he is a slave to fate in virtue of his obligation to attempt a novel policy of persuasion; but in spite of his earlier clear commitment to make the attempt (704f), these lines seem rather to argue against it. Diggle follows Dindorf in deleting 714-6. Perhaps the best sense is achieved by Murray (and di Benedetto) through the deletion of 716 alone: "I have not been successful in the past at winning the Argives over, but now I must". But I doubt whether this would elicit the immediate negative response from Orestes that we see in 717-21. 56 have been formed. Doubts about the text do not help matters. 2 2 Some have assumed we are to understand that Menelaos, despite his apparent offer to help through negotiation, has been decisively intimidated by Tyndareos' earlier threats (621-5). Strohm, for example, speculates (Euripides 42) on the qualities an actor requires to convey wi th no lines the change of heart that Menelaos undergoes over the course of the scene, and notes that this same character has been presented as an unreliable waverer already in Troades, and has retreated ignobly in Andromache. I f ind this a very unsatisfactory solution, but have no positive interpretation wi th which to counter i t 2 3 B. Accusation and Refutation Euripidean "forensic" debates, like appeal scenes, involve varying degrees of correspondence in length and content between the two speeches. A t one extreme we have the exchange of tetrameter speeches by Menelaos and Agamemnon in the first episode of I A. Both speeches offer clear examples of two-part argumentation, and there is a general correspondence of structure; but Agamemnon's reply is short by comparison wi th Menelaos' charges, and does not directly counter the points he has made. 2 2 Diggle offers an unduly pessimistic text. The texts of Weil and West receive all the trans-mitted verses. Murray and di Benedetto both delete only vss. 695 and 716. Diggle deletes a total of nine verses. 2 3 Critics have not been eager to interpret Menelaos' speech; neither Burnett nor M . Lloyd discuss the speech at all. Strohm (Euripides 42f) notes an attention to considerations of power over those of piety, and speaks of Menelaos' indulgence in "grave, embarrassed generalisations... designed merely to cover his withdrawal". Porter comments briefly, calling the speech (Studies 71) "a masterful example of betrayal by equivocation, unmatched outside of Jason's arguments to Medea"; he concludes (72) that "Tyndareus' threats have succeeded in intimidating [Menelaos]". The speech's interesting political reflections (696-701, [706f]) are ignored by Friis Johansen. 57 Menelaos 334-75 Proem 334-6 Argument I 337-49 Argument II 350-65 Summaris ing reflection 366-72 Perorat ion 373-5 A g a m e m n o n 378-401 Proem 378-80 Argument I 381-90 Argument II 391-95 Summaris ing conclusion 396-9 Perorat ion 400-1 The inequality of length may seem remarkable; Euripides is capable of wri t ing antilogies in which the two speeches are of almost identical length, but he does not insist on th is. 2 4 Here, I wou ld think, he has written wi th the entire scene in mind; there w i l l be speeches by Agamemnon and Menelaos again fol lowing the Messenger's report and through the whole complex sequence the issues w i l l be examined from various perspectives. A good pace is to be maintained, and not all the ammunit ion fired in the first engagement. One may compare other com-plex scenes in which lines of conflict are drawn and redrawn: Hik 100-364, Or 380-724. Menelaos' speech was discussed above in LB: its argument that Agamem-non lacked the singlemindedness required of good leaders is supported by two examples taken from Agamemnon's past. Agamemnon's response is of a quite similar structure, but shorter in its argumentation. H is proem repeats the idea of civi l ised debate (378-80, cp. 334-6), putting the emphasis— important to his posit ion— on aiSoo?, modesty and respect, where Menelaos had announced vovs 2 4 See Bond ad Her 140-251. " 58 (3e (Bonos, firmness of purpose, as his chief value. Agamemnon's argument is prefaced wi th a cluster of rhetorical questions that set a tone of frustration and exasperation (three questions in 381-82a); the first argument proper is opened wi th a fourth question, XPT |O-T& Aeicrp ' epcus XajMv; (382b). That question is answered (OUK exoiu. ' a v °" 0 L na.paox.eiv) and the answer supported by reference to a fact (Menelaos' failure as a husband). This leads to a second argumentative question whose dependence on the first is indicated wi th el TO. (384) — it is the "deflating" type of question and here ends the sequence. 2 5 Mov ing to the offensive, Agamemnon first states that Menelaos' irrational and base desire for Helen, and not any real concern over Agamemnon's exercise of power (TO (JUXOTILIOV TOULIOV 385: cf. the charge in 337-43) is the cause of his complaints. Then, wi th regard to Menelaos' second point— the change of mind at A u l i s — he asks whether it is insanity to change one's mind from a worse policy to a better, and suggests it is rather Menelaos who suffers from that affliction, in wanting Helen back. In a second argumentative sequence (391-5) Agamemnon moves his focus back from Menelaos to the whole expedition, and from Menelaos' self-serving charges to larger questions of justice. The Oath of the Suitors provides a neat vehicle for this purpose, involving as it does the origins of the expedition, and raising questions of right and wrong that were not mentioned earlier. Agamem-non makes the points that the oath was taken by men who were out of their minds wi th desire for marriage wi th Helen, and that "divinity" (TO Qelov 394) is capable of recognising such an oath as taken under compulsion. It is impl ied that the generals are not properly bound, under principles of law or justice, to fight for Menelaos. In a final sentence (396-9), Agamemnon summarises his two 2 5 This is a common device for calling attention to the absurdity of a suggestion; see Ch. I n.53. On "deflating" rhetorical questions in Herodotos, see Lang Herodotean N and D 47-9. 59 arguments in announcing the practical outcome of his resolve for each of the brothers, emphasising the fact that justice is on his side: Menelaos is not going to achieve, contrary to justice, vengeance over the loss of his worst of wives; Agamemnon is not going to suffer constant misery over having unjustly brought about the death of his child. In a brief epilogue he indicates he has fulf i l led the terms of his proem. We see in these speeches two types of two-part organisation. The charges brought against Agamemnon are of two kinds of inconsistent behavior, and are presented through two chronologically distinguished narratives. The chrono-logical device here as elsewhere gives a very clear two-part division. Agamem-non's response consists of an argument ad hominem, in effect denying the charges and laying responsibility at the adversary's door, fol lowed by an argument involv ing justice and divinity. This speech is less obviously con-ceived as two distinct arguments; but the final summarising sentence (396b-99) clearly sets out the dual character of Agamemnon's case. A similar somewhat relaxed coherence of content through two speeches is seen in Med 465-575. Jason's entrance and somewhat unsatisfactory attempt at a conciliatory address to Medeia (446-64) unleashes a barrage of resentment: 465-74 proem: abuse 475-99 the past (CK TCOV TTPOJTCOV) 476-82 I saved you in Kolchis 483-7 and ki l led your enemy Pelias in Greece 488-98 you betrayed me, the children, your oath 499-519 the present and future 499-508 where am I to turn? (elimination of alternatives) 509-15 the reality of exile , 516-19 reflection on real and counterfeit 60 Jason's response: 568-75 551-67 526-33 534-44 545-50 522-5 proem: difficulties facing speaker Aphrodite deserves the credit you claim what you in return received transition to question of the new marriage defense of new marriage reflection on women Medeia's speech has been discussed in LB above. Jason meets head-on Medeia's arguments about her services to h im, and supplies a counter-argument: the benefits she has received. We may describe both of his points (Aphrodite's role in the affair, the positive value of civilisation and fame) as specious and sophistic, but they are nevertheless offered as a direct refutation of Medeia's con-tention that Jason is in her debt. The second claim made in Medeia's chrono-logical survey was that Jason's new marriage constituted a betrayal of herself and the children. This charge again Jason seems to face squarely; but it is interesting that not a word is said (after yeyo6s,...aoL [xeyas (^LXOS, 548f) about Medeia's place in the new arrangement. 2 6 A n d so likewise he has no answer for the second part of her speech, the concerns about her own future. The rhetorical strategy here is to make a show of answering the points one has an answer for, and ignore the rest. Does the rhetorical character of this speech (i.e. its formality and its wil l ingness to gloss over embarrassing details) bring discredit upon Jason? According to Finley, "Jason, an accomplished pleader, uses words only to deceive". For Mastronarde, "Euripidean figures who reflect contemporary 2 6 Earlier (458-61) Jason spoke of Medeia's imminent exile as including the children (as she too envisions it in 512-5); he speaks here (562-5) only of his original intention to keep the children with him. His speech thus avoids mentioning the actual situation that has arisen with the order of banishment for Medeia and the children alike (352ff). 61 intellectual culture in such a way as to arouse shock and disapproval" include Jason. 2 7 I disagree: I am more shocked by Medeia's revelation (364-75) that her pleas and supplication addressed to Kreon were part of a plan to k i l l h im, and by her plainly deceptive speech to Jason (869-905), in which she feigns shame over her earlier harshness. Jason's speech, like that of Odysseus in Hek 299-331 and others I shall discuss below, gives the character's "best case"; if these speeches don't w in our sympathy this does no discredit to their manner of arguing, which is not dissimilar to that of "sympathetic" speeches elsewhere. A n d , as always, sheer ingenuity of argument must be considered to hold positive interest for the audience. These two scenes (Menelaos and Agamemnon, Jason and Medeia) are often thought of as "forensic": a speech of accusation is followed by one of refutation and defense. This situation recurs in Euripides at: Alk 629-72 675-705 Admetos accuses Pheres defends Hipp 936-80 983-1035 Theseus accuses Hippolytos defends Andr 147-80 183-231 Hermione accuses Andromache defends Andr 590-641 645-90 Peleus accuses Menelaos defends Or 491-541 544-604 Tyndareos accuses Orestes defends 2 7 Finley, Three Essays 24; Mastronarde, "Optimistic Rationalist" 202. M . Lloyd takes a similar view, Agon 43. 62 In all of these exchanges, techniques of refutation and countercharge are used in the second speech. Only in the second Andr scene (analysed below) do we f ind close correspondence in the arguments advanced. Euripides also has a few forensic scenes in which the first speaker is technically the "defendant". In these the second speech proceeds to demolish the defense: 2 8 Hek 1132-82 Polymestor defends 1187-1237 Hekabe refutes Elek 1011-50 Klytaimestra defends 1060-99 Elektra refutes Tro 914-65 Helen defends 969-1032 Hekabe refutes The Tro scene presents another antilogy in which arguments are carefully matched (see below). In Andr Peleus comes to the rescue of Andromache and Molossos wi th a speech cataloguing the mistakes and shortcomings of Menelaos in mostly chronological sequence: 590-1 introductory vi l i f ication 592-604 charges: you are the foolish husband of a bad wife (Helen and all Spartan women attacked) 605-18 you started a war over her; caused Achil les' death and my misery; came home unscathed 619-23 your daughter is no better 624-6 you caused your brother to k i l l Iphigeneia 627-31 after the war you accepted Helen back 632-41 defense of Andromache and Molossos 2 8 On the literary considerations leading Euripides to vary the order of the speakers, see Duchemin V AfQN 189f, Dale ad Alk 697. 63 Menelaos' response: 645-51 proem: you are a fool to defend this woman attack on Andromache and Molossos I am only protecting my daughter my war service does me credit Helen was vict im of gods, benefactress of Greece I used moderation in not ki l l ing her; you lacked it 652-67 [668-77]29 678-9 681-4 685-7 688-90 in k i l l ing Phokos protestation of goodwi l l , and warning Here there is a loosely chiastic correspondence between the main topics: Peleus speaks of Helen, the war, Hermione, Andromache; Menelaos (if I am right in retaining some or all of 668-77) takes these same topics in reverse order. The chiasm, I wou ld think, is not a pattern chosen for its own sake, but results naturally from each speaker beginning wi th an attack and ending wi th a defense of Helen or Andromache. Menelaos' speech lacks clear references to Peleus' points, but covers them all. There are verbal echoes (f|v XP^\V a € 607 and 650, applied by each speaker to the woman he is attacking; Kf jSog a w a ^ o u 620, cf. 648 3 0) and telling rephrasings (the "gathering of such a great mob" in 605f becomes rr\v eu.fjv aTpaTnyicu' in 678; Menelaos was "weaker than Kypr is" in 631, but aoj(})pGov in 686); and the question of responsibility for the death of Achi l les, such a steady undercurrent in this play, is answered in both speeches (614f blame 2 9 Delete 672-6 only? The lines seem sound, indeed "Euripidean" in the neat antithesis they develop, but foreign to the context here, whereas 668-71 seem to me entirely appropriate. Perhaps 671 should end with a colon. 677 will then finish the thought: "you make all this fuss on a stranger's behalf; isn't it right then that I help my own daughter ?" The argument would thus be a fortiori: cf. Her 578-81. ' 3 0 Stevens (ad 648) notes Musgrave and others have taken the second occurrence of the phrase to refer to Peleus' marriage to Thetis. But Menelaos speaks as an insulted relative (cf. 671, if that line is genuine), and so the KfjSos linking Menelaos and Peleus gives an additional reason why Peleus' remarks have been unwise and inappropriate. 64 Menelaos, 654-6 Andromache). 3 1 The scene continues wi th a second long speech by Peleus (693-726: mainly vil i f ication and intimidation) and Menelaos' farewell speech (729-46).32 Helen's defense in Troades is expressly introduced as a reply to the charges Menelaos might be expected to make against her (914-18);33 thus Helen takes the initiative in defining the character of the debate. This technique (called by rhetoricians T r p o K a T d X r i 4 < L 9 — "anticipation of arguments") is frequently met wi th in Euripidean debates. She proceeds: 919-22 attack on Hekabe over birth and survival of Pa r i s 3 4 923-30 the three goddesses and the Judgement of Paris 931-7 I was Kypr is ' vict im 932-4 this was good for Greece 935-7 but bad for me 938-44 Paris, and your negligence, are to blame for my leaving Sparta 3 1 Burnett, Catastrophe 150n, notes the persistence of this issue. I see as well a neat balancing of family skeletons: Iphigeneia and Phokos. 3 2 Thus the scene consists of two pairs of speeches, and content within each pair is closely parallel: "The subordinate pair of speeches corresponds to the angry dialogue that normally concludes an agon" (Lloyd, Agon 79). But the two exchanges are not experienced as distinct "blocks": Friis Johansen, General Reflection 131, notes the close parallelism of the reflections opening Menelaos' first speech and Peleus' second. This seems to give the scene a certain fluidity. 33 Verse 918 is widely deleted as an unnecessary and confused completion of 916f; but dvTiQeia' in 917 seems to me to need some object in the dative. Jackson, Marg. Seen. 201, discusses the options; Lee ad loc defends the received text. 3 4 This argument takes the audience momentarily back to Alexandros, the first play of the trilogy. Scodel, Trojan Trilogy 20-42 & 83-90, and Stinton, Judgement of Paris 64-71, offer speculative reconstructions of that play's contents. 65 945-50 was this betrayal? no, blame the goddess 951-8 after Paris' death I tried to escape [959-60]35 Deiphobos 961-4 summary: I don't deserve to die The anticipated charges are put in chronological sequence. The stages of the argument are very carefully marked out: TrpcoTa \x.ev 919, ev9ev8e 923, rbv evQev Xoyov 931, TOUTTI TOOLS ' 945, ev9ev 951; ovv 961 introduces the summarising rhetorical question. Hekabe's refutation: 969-70 intention to refute first argument (Judgement of Paris) 971-82 refutation of "Judgement" argument 983-6 refutes claim Kypr is came with Paris 987-97 proposes alternative explanation 998-1001 (3iaL abduction doubted: no witnesses 1002-9 Helen's fence-straddling during the war 1010-19a refutes claim to have attempted escape 1012-4 no witness to suicide attempt 1015-19a I tried to persuade you to go 1019b-28 real reason you stayed: luxury 1029-32 epilogue addressed to Menelaos Hekabe keeps close to the chronological sequence Helen used: the Judgement, Paris at Sparta, Helen at Troy before and after Paris' death. 3 6 The stages are again 3 5 These lines seem out of place after 952-8: they propose a second and unnecessary reason for Helen's remaining in Troy after the death of Paris. And it is the earlier story that will be taken up by Hekabe in her answering speech. For a different view, in which a reference to Deiphobos is required in Helen's speech, see Scodel, Trojan Trilogy 143f. Scodel argues in part that Hekabe must not be allowed to misrepresent Helen's arguments. This seems to me a weak assumption a priori: Hekabe's goal is to defeat her enemy. I think, in spite of the fact Helen has not earlier spoken of |3ia in describing her abduction by Paris, that 6 Liev in 962 must be Paris, and that Hekabe picks this up in 998. Lee ad loc defends 959-60, but without reference to Hekabe's speech. 3 6 Not surprisingly, Hekabe has no answer to Helen's first claim— that Paris should not have been allowed to survive. Similarly Helen has not spoken of her loyalties during the war, the subject of one of Hekabe's charges. 66 clearly marked by references to Helen's speech (verbs of speaking in 970, 983, 998, 1010); there are verbal repetitions: elkv (945/998), oti\ia KA6TTT£LV (958/1010), o"recj)avos (937/1030, in two strikingly different suggestions). 3 7 A t two different points Hekabe uses the familiar technique of disproving the adversary's contention, then producing the "true" explanation for the observed facts. 3 8 Hekabe may be guilty of distortion at two points: if Helen refers in 962 to Deiphobos, then she did not say that she was abducted by force (998, cf. 940-50);3 9 and Helen's claim she was prevented from escaping (for which she claims wit-nesses) is not properly refuted by the fact no one saw her attempt suic ide. 4 0 In this scene more than any other in Euripides we have two speeches designed from start to finish as partners, giving "the best case" for each side of a dispute. It is perhaps no accident that the issue here is the abduction of Helen, a topic we know to have been constantly discussed in the context of the Sophists' teaching of eloquence. 4 1 3 7 With Tro 937 cf. Or 923ff (an anonymous speaker defends Orestes in the Argive assembly): in both places the paradoxical statement is made that the defendant should be not punished but rewarded. That the events that followed upon the abduction of Helen were a good thing is claimed elsewhere by Menelaos (Andr 680-4), Kassandra (Tro 386-402). 3 8 Cf. e.g. Andr 205ff, Hek 1206ff. 3 9 This discrepancy leads Scodel to argue for the deletion of 998-1001 (Trojan Trilogy 143f). But see note 35 above. Lloyd, Agon 105, takes 998-1001 as blatant misrepresentation by Hekabe. 4 0 The thought in 1010-14 must be: If in fact you were prevented from escaping, suicide alone would give adequate proof that you were a yewoua ywf), TToGouaa TOV ndpog TTOCJIV. Hekabe denies the consequent— no suicide attempt, therefore no escape attempt— and then goes on to claim that had Helen wanted to she could have left at any time. 4 1 For us the debate surfaces in Herodotos (I. 3f, II. 112-20) and in all of Euripides' Trojan War plays, besides the sophistic tracts on the subject by Gorgias and Isokrates. We get a glimpse of the beginnings of Helen as a debating topic in Iliad III. 146-60, the old men on the walls of Troy. 67 C. The Debate wi th Lykos The first episode of Herakles is a suppliant scene of a type Euripides favoured: the protagonists have taken refuge at an altar, an enemy is standing by, the potential champion is far away. 4 2 The "enemy" is impatient for an opportunity to k i l l the suppliants, and debates their situation wi th them. Lykos' speech is loosely organised on these lines: 140-2 proem 143-50 your death is inevitable— to wait is unworthy of the so-called auyyaiiog of Zeus, and the spouse of the great Herakles 151-64 Herakles is not so great 151-8 his sham animal victories 159-64 the cowardice of archers 165-9 reasons why I must k i l l his family This cannot really be described as an effort at persuasion; rather it presents Lykos as badgering and baiting the suppliants. Amphitryon's response is a model of construction: 170-73 proem: charges must be answered: that of Herakles' paternity by Zeus, the rest by me 174-87 the charge of cowardice in the labours 188-203 the charge against archery 204-5 this concludes my answer to your charges 4 2 See Jakel, "TTA90NTI" 37f; Kopperschmidt, "Hikesie" 339-43; Burnett, Catastrophe 158-60. The situation at the beginning of Andr is very similar: there too the badgering of the "enemy" is answered by a speech of defiance, not of supplication. 68 206-16 the children: it makes no sense to k i l l them; rather let them go into exile 217-26 reproaches addressed to Thebes 4 3 and Greece 227-35 apology to children for his own impotence This goes wel l beyond a simple response to Lykos' speech, but is remarkable for the clarity wi th which it addresses all the points Lykos has raised 4 4 In the debate over Herakles' greatness, each side brings forward examples from his labours; the arguments on archery vs. hoplite fighting give the impression this was a standard debating topic. The arguments on both sides include points whose verbal cleverness or paradoxical character w i l l have had great entertainment va lue , 4 5 and the terms in which Amphi t ryon defends the archer ("he doesn't depend on his mates, and does his ki l l ing from a safe distance") do not in any sense compromise his own character or that of Herakles: they are precisely "debating points". But the issues touched upon in this debate— the greatness of Herakles, the nature of bravery and cowardice, the inevitability of his family's death— are the central issues of the play. The very complex first half of Herakles, in which the attitudes of Megara and Amphi t ryon towards Herakles, the family, and death are developed rhetorically, leads to a second panel in which action replaces rhetoric, 4 3 It is interesting that Herakles too will address reproaches to Thebes in closing his great speech (1389-93). 4 4 The exchange is "formally puzzling": M . Lloyd, Agon lOf. Bond (ad 140-251): "The pur-pose of Lycus' speech is, as Wilamowitz saw, to provide an opportunity for Amphitryon's splendid reply". Thus we have a somewhat lopsided debate; this seems consonant with the play's general treatment of Lykos as a marginal and unsympathetic character, one whose death can be treated as a simple triumph of good over evil, in complete contrast to the deaths that will follow it. 4 5 E.g., word-play in 152 (i)8pav eXeiov) and 153f (ppoxois/ppaxiovo?), the fine distinction between dvaiSeia and evXafieia in 165f, the ironic view of oofyla in 206-9, and the general paradoxes of an attack on Herakles as unheroic and a debate over archery vs. hoplite warfare set in the context of an altar scene. •69 then a final act subjecting events to a rhetorical analysis. 4 6 Throughout, we are reminded of the subjects first introduced in this debate: the problem of Herakles' double paternity, the benefits for all mankind of his career, 4 7 the proper definition of bravery as against cowardice; and the play w i l l return to the weapons of Herakles, the club and bow with which he wi l l k i l l his family, and which become almost characters in their own right at 1378-85. 4 8 Thus, for example, the greatness of Herakles is denied in somewhat sil ly terms by Lykos in 151-61; Amphi t ryon rebuts this wi th examples from the Labours (177-84), and wi th the observation that all Hellas owes much to Herakles (222-6). Elsewhere in the play Herakles is celebrated as a great benefactor to Greece and all mankind (264f, 348-441, 687-700, 849-54, 875-9); even his young sons are praised as important allies for Hellas (131-7). But in the aftermath of the tragedy, in a second debate scene, Herakles himself w i l l dwel l upon the cost of such a life, whi le Theseus w i l l promote endurance and compassion. The earlier debate is now elevated to a much more serious level, but the question is stil l "What does 4 6 On the form of Her, see Cropp "Heracles, Electra..." 187-9, Burnett Catastrophe 157. 4 7 The first episode (140-347) develops the relations of Herakles to Zeus, and to mankind (cf. also the ode in 348-441); his relation to his own family comes to our attention elsewhere (71-9, 460-96, 629-36). Herakles' "public" and "private" lives don't come together until his monologue in 1255-1310. 4 8 I do not suggest that the use of bow and arrows in the killing in any way justifies the earlier statements of Lykos or Amphitryon; the killing of Herakles' family is of course, whether done with bow, spear, or sword, an act of neither valour nor cowardice, but of madness. Nevertheless, the prominence given early in the play to the weapons that will do the killing must be significant. Bond notes (ad 1379) language that puts his weapons in the same relation to Herakles as old friends, or indeed his children (cf. esp. 79). Michelini (Euripides 242-6) emphasises the bow as an essential element in the play's portrayal of Herakles as "a modern and revisionist hero" (244)— I don't see this. Nor can I agree with R. Hamilton when he suggests ("Slings and Arrows" 23f) that at the end of the play Lykos' view of bravery has been vindicated, that Herakles accepts the loss of freedom implied in friendship (with Theseus) and hoplite fighting: "Amphitryon's argument for the bow" is "fully...refuted" (25). 70 it mean to be a great man?" 4 9 Thus the somewhat "sophistic" debate wi th Lykos has been for Euripides one more way of presenting the themes the play ponders. D. "The Rhetoric of the Situation" in Two Forensic Debates A t this point I shall look more closely at two somewhat similar debates, and attempt to draw conclusions about the "tone" and function of such scenes, in the light of the stylising tendency I have been documenting. In Alkestis, the arrival of Pheres comes at a moment of deep personal suffering for Admetos: Alkestis has just died and is being carried out for funeral observances. In response to his father's init ial consolatory speech praising A lkest is , 5 0 Admetos attacks Pheres over his wel l -known refusal to agree to die for his son: 629-32 introduction: expressions of hostility 633-5 argumentative headline: rore... 636-47 1st argument: Pheres' lack of courage and appropriate observance of c|)iX.ia 648-61 2nd argument: his death would have been just and reasonable 662-68 consequences of his refusal 669-72 gnomic epilogue 4 9 In the second debate (1213-1393) note especially 1252,1299f, 1308-10,1334f. Vss. 1349f seem to have the earlier debate in mind (162-4: the archer doesn't stand his ground; 1349f: one must stand up to misfortune as to the casts of an enemy in battle). 5 0 See Dale ad 614ff, Burnett Catastrophe 40, Lloyd Agon 37f, for less complimentary views of Pheres' speech. My more neutral view resembles that of Conacher (ed., p. 181f). 71 These sections are not clearly signposted, but changes of direction are indicated by KCUTOL (648), T O i y d p (662).5 1 The two basic points are set out in d ^ u x l a (642) and K a X o v (648). The two-part argument comes close to a positive-negative formu-lation of a single point: (1) you acted ignobly, (2) yet you had reason to do the noble thing. A n d there is emphasis in both halves on family relationships and duties. But the section 636-47 dwells on the imputation of cowardice, lack of T o X u . a (644), where in the next part (648-61) the point is Pheres' failure to appre-ciate the rational good sense and objective fairness of his making the sacrifice. Pheres' speech of rebuttal begins wi th a hostile proem of a similar sort to that of Admetos, repaying the scornful reference there to his own old age (yepcov div 635, proposed as a reason why he should have been wi l l ing to die) by characterising Admetos' speech as veavias Xoyous (679). He then takes up the main points of Admetos' argument in reverse order. 5 2 In 681-90 he replies to the charge that justice and the duties proper to family relationships have been violated by Pheres, saying that no traditional or Greek law imposes the obligation to die for one's chi ld; in 691-702 he answers the charge of atyvxia by conceding that he loves life and so avoids death, but adding that Admetos is in no position to level this charge, since it is precisely the trait he himself is convicted of. 5 3 Admetos ended by speaking of the future consequences of Pheres' selfishness (662-8); Pheres ends wi th a comment on the consequences of Admetos' angry words: el 8' f\[ia<s KaKoo? epeis, dKouoT|i TroXXd KOU i^ euSf) KaKd. (714f) 5 1 M . Lloyd, Agon 37f, sees two main argumentative sections but divides them after 650. Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments 25f, analyses the speech as a number of shorter blocks. 5 2 So Lloyd, Agon 39, with slightly different emphasis. 5 3 Cf. e.g. IA 388-90 for the "pot calling the kettle black" type of reply. 72 Thus the two speeches follow the same general plan: hostile proem— two contrasting arguments— a warning for the future; 5 4 the arguments correspond chiastically. This exchange is formally similar to others we have encountered: two speeches of approximately the same length, having similar shapes, address the same issues from opposite sides. A s with other debates of this sort, we may ask to what extent the points made by the agitated and argumentative speakers are points of importance to the play as a whole, and to what extent they represent what A . M . Dale called "the rhetoric of the situation". 5 5 This question is perhaps complicated in the case of Alkestis by the play's recognised combination of tragic and non-tragic levels of meaning: the scenes involv ing Herakles seem to be less "serious" than those involv ing the other characters. 5 6 I hesitate to identify this lowering of tone as a "satyric" or "pro-satyric" quality, but I think we all sense a certain playfulness in (particularly) the final "friendly debate" between Herakles and Admetos, in which irony plays a major role. This irony involves not the undercutting of Admetos, not the serious suggestion that he proves, in accepting the gift of the veiled woman, false to the promise he made to Alkestis; rather we are reminded that Admetos' great 5 4 The scene ends with further threats on either side: 730-3 (Pheres), 734-40 (Admetos). 5 5 The phrase seems to have been coined by Dale for use in the Introduction to her Alcestis, where she argues that criticism of Greek tragedy that seeks to find evidence for "character" (i.e. a consistent, realistic personality) in every utterance is usually "not allowing enough for two con-siderations always very important to the Greek dramatist, the trend of the action and the rhetoric of the situation" (xxv); Dale goes oh to apply this principle especially to the interpretation of agon speeches. The idea (which owes something to the earlier formalist criticism of T. von Wilamowitz and others) has been promoted in a somewhat narrow form by Gould ("Dramatic Character"), Heath (Poetics 130-7) and others; Conacher's "Rhetoric and Relevance" addresses Gould in particular. 5 6 See Conacher's introduction to his ed. of the play; and cf. Buxton "Five aspects" 27-9. 73 virtue, his sense of obligation towards friends, can sometimes get one into trouble. Admetos has earlier prevailed upon Herakles himself to accept an unwanted gift of hospitality; Herakles now prevails upon Admetos to accept the woman. Our attention is focused on the friendly but somewhat awkward relationship of the two men, and we realise wi th amusement that Admetos' sense of x a P L s is causing h im great discomfiture as he attempts to refuse the gift of — his w i fe . 5 7 To recognise this playful and ironic aspect in the play is not to deny the seriousness of the scenes in which Admetos faces first Alkestis, then Pheres; but we are forced to admit that at the end of the play Alkestis' concerns over a "stepmother" for her children (304-10), and Admetos' promises to give up entertaining (343-7), have been null i f ied by the course the action has taken. I wou ld suggest that the debate wi th Pheres is likewise far from our minds at the close of the play. We are not asked to consider whether Admetos w i l l in fact refuse to care for his aged parents; the happy ending is not compromised by any sense that the affair has created a rift within Admetos' family. A modern play-wright might have added a scene in which father and son "make up"; Euripides was capable of resolving this strand of his tale through a reflective monologue or a deus ex machina. But his approach to story-telling doesn't demand this— Pheres drops out of this story as completely as Makaria drops out in Hkld, or Xouthos in Ion.58 Euripides has not bothered about Pheres' further story because 5 ' I cannot agree with Burnett that Alkestis' return represents a "reward" for Admetos' "aristocratic piety", which has brought about the "salvation of Alcestis" (Catastrophe 45f). Rather he benefits from a friendly gesture on the part of an embarrassed guest. Burnett takes the play too seriously; Kitto (Greek Tragedy 339f) likewise thinks in terms of a serious demonstration of the fidelity of Admetos, focusing— mistakenly, I think— on the feelings we are to impute to the silent figure of the veiled woman. 5 8 These are characters who have served their limited purpose; compare Andromache, whose story must be wound up in the deus-speech (Andr 1243-52). 74 to do so could only complicate his fairy-tale ending; and precisely because the ending has this character, we must consider the bitterness of the debate simply cancel led. 5 9 The scene between Pheres and Admetos then must be thought of as no more than a scene, a dramatisation of one aspect of the conflict over Alkestis' death. In Admetos' speech we are reminded of his agitation and his bitterness towards his parents, 6 0 and at the same time treated to an orderly exposition (of a type we have met elsewhere) of the factors that might have made Pheres accept death. But in Pheres' speech we are shown (and Admetos is shown) that not everyone is going to recognise this resentment as justified. Pheres' arguments are not "good" arguments: (1) I've broken no law, (2) who wouldn't cl ing to life as long as possible? But the fact he evinces no shame over his refusal to die, and turns the charge of d^uxta against his accuser (696f), is a shock to Admetos . 6 1 Aside from the realisation that this occasions (and which we learn of only later, in Admetos' monologue), I don't see the points raised in the debate as reaching beyond the confines of this highly charged scene: Pheres' charge that Admetos "ki l led" Alkestis (696) is an extravagant exaggeration of the facts as presented elsewhere in the play; Admetos' promise not to bury Pheres (665) has likewise been produced by Euripides as a token of the over-heated character of the debate. 5 9 M . Dyson, "Alcestis' Children" 22, notes an effect of the final scene's intense focus on Admetos' sincere devotion to Alkestis: "The humdrum issue of the children's future, along with the ugliness of the quarrel with Pheres, is stripped away". 60 We a l r e a d y knew of this resentment from 338f (and perhaps 432-4); it is surely given some legitimacy by Alkestis' concurrence, 290-2, and that of the Chorus, 466-70. Dyson, ibid, sees the energy of Admetos' attack as emphasising his devastation: "his grief brushes aside even filial piety". Lloyd, Agon 40, sees in his charges against his parents one expression of a thematic "tension between the correctness and the inappropriateness of everything that Admetus does". 6 1 Dale (ad 697) describes the impact this has on Admetos: "Sorrow and ill fame are what he has gained by living on; the first he has begun to feel already, the second only the malice of Pheres could bring home to him". 75 These, then, are details for which the phrase "rhetoric of the situation" is perfectly apt. Another heated debate between father and son, wi th a "forensic" character similar to that of the debate in Alk, occurs in Hipp. The discovery by Theseus of Phaidra's letter inculpating Hippolytos leads to a trial-like confrontation between the two men. Theseus' extremely agitated state is dramatised through a series of three abstract reflections uttered in response to Hippolytos' expressions of concern: to TTOXX ' d f i a p T d v o y T e s - dvBpcoTroL \idrr\v... cj)eO, XPW P p O T d l a i TQV (juXtov TeKu . f ipiov' . . . cj)eu rf\g P p o T e i a g - TTOL TTpo(3rjaeTaL; - fypevos The last of these serves as a sort of proem for a lengthy speech of accusation: 943-7 expressions of hostility 948-57 attack on Hippolytos' personal character 958-72 the incontrovertible character of the evidence counters any rational arguments Hippolytos might put 973-80 consequences: e £ e p p e etc. Here as in Admetos' speech of accusation (see above) two basic arguments are fol lowed by an announcement of the consequences of the imputed criminal act for the accused. The two arguments are in this case quite distinct, but no clear rhetorical focusing device separates them. The first, an attack on Hippolytos' character, arises quite naturally out of the proem and is not alleged as a fact corro-borating the charge; rather it serves to pul l the rug from under any defense 76 (916-20) •(925-31) (936-42) Hippolytos might make on the grounds of his auj(j)poo-uvr|— precisely the defense Hippolytos w i l l first offer (948-51, cf. 994f, 1007). It is important not to seek here a "relevance" that goes beyond the rhetorical objective of convicting Hippolytos. We are reminded through Theseus' references to Orphism and vegetarianism (952-4) that he and Hippolytos are being presented as characters wi th some dif-ferences of life-style; we are not informed of a history of hatred or resentment. 6 2 Theseus' second argument against Hippolytos refers to the unimpeachable character of the evidence: the fact Phaidra has ki l led herself speaks far louder than any oath or rational argument Hippolytos might offer— and he w i l l offer both (rational argument, 1008-20; oath, 1025-7). Theseus' speech has said all that needs saying against Hippolytos— that his notorious evae^eia and atoctpoauvri lend themselves to being regarded as a false front, and that the case against h im is strong. The epilogue (973-80) amounts to conviction and sentencing. 6 3 Theseus' speech began wi th strong emotion (cj)e0 936) and was broken off in the middle by an impatient outburst (971f), but it has brought forward clearly the case against Hippolytos and has used a formal pattern wel l known to us in doing so. 6 2 Gould ("Dramatic Character" 57): "Theseus' jibes at Hippolytus, his sneering allusion to Orphic ritual and religious cant afford, I take it, no invitation to consider the religious attitudes of himself or Hippolytus (or, it may be worth adding, of Euripides)". This much is quite true, but Gould's conclusion— that "character" is simply suspended for the duration of the debate— doesn't follow. Contrast Goebel, diss. 303: "[Theseus] has obviously never been sympathetic with his son's religious beliefs, and now he is happy to dismiss them as a sham". A middle course between these two approaches would be to say that having father attack son on this very personal level supports the general sense of Theseus' frustration and anger; that is, the emotional colouring is more important than the specific content. On another level, I would not rule out the resonance for the audience that would result from seeing ascetic or "philosophic" young men around Athens who angered their fathers by rejecting their values: see Ostwald on "The Generation Gap and the Sophists", Popular Sovereignty 229ff. 6 3 Thus there is no realistic reason Hippolytos should offer a defense, nor that Theseus should hear it through. Euripides is never concerned to motivate the actual making of the speeches. Motivation of the debates in Hik and Tro is especially artificial, that of the first debate in Her ludicrous. M . Lloyd (Agon 47) says of Theseus: "He proceeds immediately to sentence Hippolytus to exile (973-80). The perversion of legal processes could not be more manifest". But there is no pretense in this or any other Euripidean debate that "legal processes" are being followed; the decree here displays Theseus' anger without bringing any discredit upon him. 77 Here as elsewhere Euripides has not written a realistic agitated speech, but a neatly patterned formal speech into which reminders of the speaker's agitation have been inserted. 6 4 Hippolytos' reply begins wi th a proem that has div ided commentators, and which requires a slight digression here. He begins by denying that the subject of Theseus' concern, though permitting of eloquent expression (exov KOXOVS Xoyous'), has real excellence of substance (983-5).65 He proceeds to portray himself as a man unskil led at speaking in public settings (els oxAov 986), being used to a more intimate and learned audience (986f); the converse proposit ion is then stated, that speakers who fail in such situations often make a better impression wi th the public at large (988f). He then agrees to reply to Theseus' speech, indicating he w i l l begin where Theseus began; this w i l l refer to Theseus' comments about Hippolytos' character. Grube wrote of Hippolytos' defense: 6 6 In his answer to all this [sc. Theseus' charges and emotional agitation], Hippolytus surpasses himself in tactlessness, frigidity, and self-conceit. The first ten lines, which are in effect an elaboration of the Greek equivalent for 'Unaccustomed as I am to public speaking', nevertheless contain a profound truth about him: he is incapable of expressing even such feelings as he has except when praying to Artemis. Similar comments have been made by many scholars, o ld and new. 6 7 In contrast, Heath speaks of the "anachronistic intuitions" we wrongly apply "when we think we can recognise welcome and familiar touches of characterisation in 6 4 Cf. especially Hekabe's agitation in Hek 786-845. 6 5 Cf. the similar opening of Teiresias' reply to Pentheus, Bak 266-9. 6 6 Drama of Euripides, 188. 6 7 Barrett (ad 986-7) speaks of "peculiar priggishness", Conacher ("Rhetoric and Relevance" 15) of "characteristic haughtiness"; Goebel (diss. 306) finds the comments of Hippolytos "singularly tactless". 78 rhetorical commonplaces, such as the opening of Hippolytus' self-defence before Theseus". Gou ld notes the "jury-directed" tone of this opening; 6 8 it is impl ied that once we notice in a Euripidean debate mannerisms of Athenian oratory, we have no reason to expect any other k ind of meaning from the passage. It seems to me that neither of these positions is quite satisfactory. Al lowance must certainly be made for Euripidean "formalism" and the stylised nature of rhetorical passages I have been calling attention to . 6 9 But the original audience's perception of plot and characters may not have shifted gears quite so easily, wi th every change of meter and "mode" , as Heath and Gou ld seem to imagine. I have suggested that Theseus' outbursts before and dur ing his speech remind the audience that this character, though delivering a neatly-formed iambic speech of accusation, is to be thought of as emotionally agitated. There are suggestive details in Hippolytos' speech as wel l . The speech begins wi th expressions of drreipia and reluctance to enter into debate; such expressions may be "conventional" in Greek oratory, though they are certainly not obligatory. But I see nothing conventional in Hippolytos' comparison of speaking to the public w i th speaking to a small, elite, learned group. 7 0 Moreover, the Athenian audience may wel l have sensed some incongruity in having a son address to his 6 8 Heath, Poetics 132; Gould "Dramatic Character" 57. Gould also sees in this exchange "that same analytical mode of expression we saw earlier as characterising Phaidra's speech [at 373-430]" (ibid). 6 9 I note here the use of introductory comments referring to "difficulties affecting the speaker" in the speeches beginning at Andr 183, Hik 297, Elek 1013, Tro 914, Or 544, IA 1211, as well as Hipp 983; see IV.B below. 7 0 Ober, Mass and Elite 43f and passim, notes the necessity recognised by Athenian political and dicanic orators of presenting their message in a way that suggested that the values of the (normally "elite") speaker coincided with those of the mass audience. Allusions to the dangers of (the opponent's) sophisticated rhetoric, and to the unsophistication and drreipia of the speaker are very frequent (165-77). But Ober points out also (183) that the politician sometimes praises his own privileged upbringing and education. He cites examples in Isokrates (5. 81-2) and Demosthenes (18. 256-7); in both cases the speaker expresses some reticence in calling attention to his own advantages. Hipp 986-9 would seem to be quite out of step with these observed conventions. 79 agitated and grieving father remarks whose conventional context was public and inherently artificial. That is, (1) I contest the assertion that the proem remarks made here are everyday topoi of Athenian oratory; (2) I do not regard it as certain that topoi that were genuinely "conventional" in one context wou ld necessarily be accepted in a very different context wi th no sense of incongruity. But in any case, we have no reason to expect that conventional expressions, when used in a play, represent a random choice made by the poet from among a field of available conventional materials. I think rather that in this case material which is to a limited degree and in a limited context conventional has been used to remind us of a certain aloofness we have already seen in this character. Be-cause there is a conventional element, both in the d - r r e i p i a topos and in the debate form, I wouldn't go much further than that— certainly not as far as Grube . 7 1 We know that Hippolytos is innocent, and wonder whether he w i l l keep the oath we learned of at 61 If: the question where the plot w i l l go has us on the edge of our stone benches. But at the same time Euripides takes some trouble to show us an isolating quality in Hippolytos' au<\>poovvr\, a quality that we can believe angered the love goddess. Mov ing to the argumentative content of the speech, Hippolytos addresses first of all the charge made against his character. He senses (at 1007) that this approach is ineffective; he offers a different defense 7 2 A s J. H . Finley has de-7 1 Grube describes the argumentative content of Hippolytos' speech as "eager self-glorification, for it can hardly be called a defence" (Drama 189). He ignores the fact it is a good speech, elegant and thorough in its presentation. M . Lloyd also misses this point, when he concludes (Agon 50) "the tragic point is that these feeble arguments are the only ones [Hippolytos] can use". 7 2 Often we see two different arguments brought to bear in the same case. Here, unusually, the impression is given that the second argument is being put because the first has failed— this violates a certain static quality we expect in such speeches, the sense of the speech as a single spontaneous utterance, not something which unfolds in 'dramatic time'. Somewhat similar: Kyk 299, Hek 813. 80 scribed the two arguments: "The hero [argues] ... in lines 993-1006, that a person of his aco^poCTuvr) wou ld not have been likely to commit such a crime and, in lines 1007-20, that the crime itself wou ld have brought h im no advantage". 7 3 We may describe both of these arguments, wi th Finley, as probability arguments. The first attacks the probability of a virginal rapist, the second eliminates one by one any probable motive. (The formal and quite characteristic presentation of this second argument is the subject of close study in III.B below.) Hippolytos' speech moves to a third argument: a strong oath to his innocence. 7 4 Comments al luding mysteriously to the oath that prevents Hippolytos from defending himself properly (whether or not this is to be regarded as a practical possibility) are in the vicinity (1032f), and this is no accident. Certainly Euripides has given each speaker in this contest arguments "as good and as hard-hitting as his case allows", in Dale's phrase; she says elsewhere "Fertility in arguments, a delight in logical analysis— these are the essentials." Euripides is "a k ind of A.oyoypdcj)os who promises to do his best for each of his clients in turn" . 7 5 But to note the "jury-directed tone" (Gould) of such speeches is not to circumscribe exhaustively their content. I have rejected above the idea that Theseus' personal attack on Hippolytos represents the bursting forth of years of pent-up resentment (Goebel); l ikewise, the patience and clarity wi th which Hippolytos argues his case should not be taken as showing us a maddening impassivity or self-absorption (Grube). But this doesn't necessarily leave us wi th no more than an analytical consideration of the two sides, presented using 7 3 Three Essays 65, n.28; Finley notes (ibid) connections with approaches to argument seen in the Sophists and orators of the late fifth century. 7 4 As often, a third section contains "non-rational" argument. Oaths supporting the truth of their statements are offered by Euripidean speakers at Her 858, IA 473ff. 7 5 Dale, Alcestis: ad 636ff (first quote); xxviii (second and third). 81 formal conventions of Athenian public debate and from a '"third person' perspective" (Gould's phrase) 7 6 by the figures of Theseus and Hippolytos. We must not doubt that such a presentation already holds considerable intrinsic interest; but we needn't assume that Euripides has no other purpose here. I have noted details that go beyond the "analytical" (Theseus' agitation and impatience); rhetorical material that is not quite "conventional" (Hippolytos' proem); points raised in argument that resonate wi th important themes in the play (the positive and negative aspects of aoo^poawr],77 the oath Hippolytos is under); points that may be assumed to resonate wi th the everyday experience of the Athenian audience ("generation gap")— as indeed the rhetorical techniques themselves must. In each case Euripides has steered this "conventional" debate in directions that can't be explained purely as serving the interests of each client in turn. We must be as wary of underinterpreting the rhetorical utterances of Euripidean characters as of overinterpreting them. E. Three-Way Scenes I have classified loosely some one-person rhetorical passages as "mono-logues of despair", "speeches of self-dedication", "epideictic speeches", some two-person exchanges as "appeal scenes", "forensic debates"; similar techniques of rhetoric are found in al l , though the types are quite distinct at the level of 7 6 "Dramatic Character" 58. 7 7 Conacher, "Rhetoric & Relevance" 15: "The repeated occurrences of the word awc^ ptov, in one form or another (995, 1007, 1013, 1034), provide sinister reminders that this "virtue", linked with Hippolytus' aeuvoTris, has been played up throughout as the catastrophic element in this tragedy". This goes too far; I would say that the play offers us, among other things, an invitation to think about what constitutes true cj(jjcj>pocjiJvr|, and that the rhetoric of this scene plays a part in presenting that theme. 82 scenic function and effect. Three-person scenes are rarer and fall less easily into set types. 7 8 Large-scale rhetorical confrontations involving three characters in Euripides include the first episodes in Hik (where Theseus responds first to an appeal for help from Adrastos, then to a second appeal by Ai thra on behalf of the suppl iants) 7 9 and Her (where Amphi t ryon and Megara respond differently to the threats of Lykos). In the former, one confrontation simply follows the other, w i th a choral interlude that is not "act-dividing" separating them. The Herakles scene is more interwoven. A difference in the attitudes of Megara and Amphi t ryon towards the situation in which they f ind themselves is already developed in the Prologue scene (1-106), where Amphitryon's faith his son w i l l rescue the helpless suppliant family (95-7) is contrasted wi th the pessimism of Megara (92). The episode that begins wi th the arrival of Lykos (138) involves first the debate of Lykos and Amphi t ryon (140-235, discussed above in II.C), in which Amphitryon's spirit of stubborn resistance is dramatised. This leads Lykos to call for fuel to be brought to burn the suppliants; the Chorus of impotent old men voice their solidarity wi th the victims. But now Megara delivers a speech (275-311) addressed to Amphi t ryon objecting to further resistance and arguing for the inevitability of their death. This leads to two important shifts of direction. Amphi t ryon agrees to accept death, but asks only to die before the children are ki l led (316-26). Megara asks that the suppliants be given time to prepare for the grave (327-31); Lykos indicates this request is granted (332-5). It is important to note that at this point Megara and Amphi t ryon are no longer at odds wi th each other; the spectacle of the two of them bowing 7 8 On the opportunities with which in general the third actor presents the playwright, see Kitto Greek Tragedy 156-63 (discussing Sophokles). On three-way confrontations in Euripides: Strohm Euripides 16f and 148f, Duchemin L' ATQN 140ff. 7 9 See detailed study below, V.B. 83 before Lykos and beseeching h im (LKvoi3u.e9a 321, Kayto a ' LKVOULLOU 327) emphasises this fact. The earlier presentation of their differing attitudes has made for an interesting three-way scene, but should not be taken as casting either character in a negative l ight. 8 0 Despite the scene's formal complexity, we still see essentially two separate confrontations: Amphi t ryon and Megara conduct a "friendly debate", 8 1 inter-rupted but not materially affected by a hostile debate wi th Lykos. In Orestes there is a similar interweaving of two essentially different kinds of debate. Orestes, threatened wi th death in the aftermath of his murder of Klytaimestra, begins to pitch an appeal to Menelaos (as a "champion") for help against the angry Argives (448); this appeal is in strikingly realistic fashion interrupted by the arrival of Tyndareos, who here represents the right of city and family to justice. Orestes now must play out a "forensic" scene (470-631), defending his action in ki l l ing his mother. The failure of this effort necessitates the continuation of his appeal to Menelaos (discussed above, II.A), which is based not on a defense of the justice of his act, but on bonds of obligation and mutual interest between Menelaos and Agamemnon. 8 2 This arrangement, developing 8 0 Burnett (Catastrophe 160) has taken the scene as discrediting Megara: "Megara and Amphitryon dispute, she is victorious, and as a result the suppliants abandon sanctuary and deliver themselves to their pursuer". It is in fact her time-buying request for a change of clothes that makes possible the rescue by Herakles, and so Megara's negative attitude ironically produces positive consequences; but in Burnett's view, the betrayal by Megara of the conventions of the suppliant plot is to blame for the family's ultimate murder by Herakles (ibid 172). Heath (Poetics 161ff) rightly plays down the importance of Megara's and Amphitryon's differences. 8 1 Cf. the debates of Herakles and Admetos in Alk 509-45 and 1008-1118, of Herakles and Theseus in Her 1214-1420, and the short exchange of Orestes and Pylades in IT 674-722. 8 2 Burnett (Catastrophe 207): "Orestes apparently judges the Aeschylean defence [i.e., the defense based on the justice of placing his father's interest before his mother's] to have been discredited by Tyndareus' angry exit. When he makes his next appeal to Menelaus he ignores Apollo...and argues with a dazzling sophistry from the aristocratic concept of repayment". I am not sure whether Burnett means to suggest that Euripides wanted the audience to think of the character Orestes as changing strategies for utilitarian reasons; this would be an unwarranted and unnecessary inference, as (1) the speech to Menelaos is an appeal, not a defense, (2) the audience would expect, in the theatre as in the courts and the assembly, that a second speech arguing the 84 out of a realistic series of circumstances, and leading into a remarkable series of plot- twists, 8 3 makes possible the exploration of Orestes' act from a number of perspectives, whi le maximising suspense. 8 4 The three-way conception of the scene goes deeper here than in the Herakles scene in that the differing positions and interests of the three parties are emphasised. Thus Tyndareos' speech accusing Orestes is mainly addressed to Menelaos; this has the psychological effect of isolating Orestes whi le promoting the speech's secondary aim of discouraging Menelaos from intervening on Orestes' behalf. 8 5 A more integrated formal approach to three-way debate is seen in Hel 865-1029 (the appeal scene) and Phoin 469-585 (the "agon" debate) 8 6 In both these scenes a third party responds to a pair of speeches that contrast wi th each other in interesting ways. Fol lowing the recognition and reunion of Menelaos and Helen (Hel 622), the problem of their escape from Egypt becomes the play's central concern. Euripides has constructed a complex series of obstacles the two must overcome; same side of a case would offer an interesting contrast with the first. I also question whether the audience is expected to hear anything particularly "aristocratic" in Orestes' speech. 8 3 Cf. Burnett's apt description of the amazing shifts of direction in the plot (Catastrophe 183-95): "Euripides' long experimentation with distorted and aberrant stage forms culminates here in a fantastical plot machine that artfully sticks and jams, until finally it begins to smoke and is replaced by a divine conveyance" (184). 8 4 Here as elsewhere (see discussions of Hik and IA in Ch. V below), the suspense involves the question how Euripides will manage to restore the plot to the known course of the old tale. See Winnington-Ingram "Poietes Sophos", esp. 133f. 8 5 This aim is evident (vss. 622-8) whether or not we conclude that Euripides means us to take Menelaos' retreat as resulting from intimidation: see discussion above in II.A. 8 6 The scene in Bak involving Pentheus, Kadmos and Teiresias is discussed in these terms by Strohm (Euripides 46f). Formally it is similar, but lacks the kind of rhetorical content I am mainly interested in. The double appeal of IA is discussed in V.C below. 85 this is the essence of a good adventure story. The first obstacle is the prophetess daughter of the dead K ing Proteus; she is under orders to inform her brother Theoklymenos in the event Menelaos arrives in Egypt. The truth cannot be hidden from her; thus everything depends upon the couple's ability to persuade her to disobey her brother's command. Fol lowing her brief entrance speech Theonoe, it seems, agrees to listen to the couple's appeal . 8 7 Helen speaks first (894-943), then Menelaos (947-95). I note first a general difference of tone in the two speeches; Helen begs, Menelaos intimidates. Helen's argument, accompanied by gestures of supplication, is based on the obligation undertaken by Theonoe's father Proteus to return Helen to Menelaos (900-23), and on the pathetic condition to which Helen herself has been reduced (924-38).8 8 Menelaos' speech contrasts wi th both of these points, and complements them in interesting ways. First, he emphasises that his heroic stature precludes his supplicating (946-53), and so puts his request to Theonoe in terms of her freedom of decision (el SoKel ooi 954) and her sense of justice (note 6p9ws 955) and of her own reputation (KO.KT\ cjxivfJL 958); his prayers to Proteus (962-8) and to Hades (969-74) continue the note of humil i ty impl ied in Helen's supplication, but there is no humil i ty in the content of these prayers. Menelaos moves to a second strategy in 975, specifically announcing it as something Helen's speech left out: the dire consequences of a refusal to help. These are developed under two headings: Menelaos' intentions if Theoklymenos should 8 7 On the problem of the apparently ignored command in 892-3 see Wilamowitz Analecta 243 (who first suspected the lines were an actor's interpolation aimed at creating cheap tension), Zuntz "Theology & Irony" 206-8 (whose solution based on values of rhetorical fulness and balance is very attractive), Kannicht ad 892-3, Dale ad 892-3, Mastronarde Cont. and Disc. 112f. 8 8 In Kannicht's analysis, a plea urrep MeveXew is followed by a plea imep eauTfjs; he sees the formal arrangement announced in urrep T ' ejiauTfis ToOSe 9', 895. I don't see this phrase as necessarily pointing to two distinct arguments. There is a clear transition to Helen's pathetic condition at 924, but the argument before does not seem to focus on Menelaos— rather on obligations and righteousness. 86 offer to fight h im (977-9), and if instead he attempts to starve Helen and Menelaos at the tomb where they sit (980-90). The speech's epilogue (991-5) recapitulates Menelaos' unwill ingness to grovel and his readiness to die, and the consequences for both Theonoe and himself of a favourable decis ion. 8 9 The two speakers have thus made speeches of similar form, offering separate arguments in favour of the same outcome. Dale notes (ad 993) that the arguments made are complementary, and offer a contrast of style: "Euripides has made Helen's an appeal, Menelaus' a demand, for justice". The distinction here is perhaps more extreme than the use we saw above (LA) of contrasting argu-ments in a single speech of appeal, but it results from the same rhetorical impulse on Euripides' part to present the fullest case for the requested help. Theonoe's response is brief, but it too offers two arguments, in justifica-tion of the decision she announces. She begins wi th a complex proem: e y w TrecJ)UKd T ' evae^eiv KCU |3ouXoum 4>lXw T ' £[LaVTX}V, Kdi KXeOS TOUU.OU TTOlTpOS OUK d v \iidvai\i', ouSe c a i y y o v w i ydpiv 8oir\v dv e £ fjs 8tKXKXef]s ^ a v f j a o i i o a . (Hel 998-1001) It is my nature and my wish to practise righteousness, and I care for myself, and would (therefore) bring no disgrace upon my father's reputation, nor al low my own reputation to suffer through indulging my brother. 8 9 Diggle follows Schenkl in deleting the entire epilogue; but, as Dale says (ad 993), the speech loses balance without it. Kannicht receives the lines, but gives them an emotional interpretation out of touch with the rhetorical character of such an epilogue (ad 991-5): he speaks of an "inner struggle", and suggests that Menelaos' vivid evocation of himself and Helen lying dead at the tomb of Proteus has brought him to the verge of tears. But the tears of 991 are none other than those of 948, a conventional adjunct of supplication. 87 The question is first defined in terms of evoefieia. Theonoe gives two positive grounds for her practising evoefieia: her nature and her desire. 9 0 She adds that regard for herself (self-esteem, a kind of cpLXCa)91 must also play a part in her decision, and gives two cases of the negative consequences that wou ld fol low on a failure to heed this imperative: the attraction of S u c J K X e i a to her father and to herself. This second point seems to involve a contrast of real and false obliga-tion: Theonoe's duty towards her father is a legitimate obligation; that towards her brother is not, since its exercise involves a loss of K X e o s . This contrast w i l l lend the speech's arguments an additional element of antithesis. The arguments unfold in three sequences: 1002-8 my nature favours justice 1009-16 my father would do the same: riais affects all alike 1017-21 better not to assist my brother's [icopia A s in the proem, the sequence is Theonoe, her father, her brother. But the arguments are two: justice requires the reunion of Helen and Menelaos (1002, 1010), and Theoklymenos' intentions are base (1018, 1021). The two points are not given neatly balanced presentations, but some repeated words seem to call attention to them: Theonoe is reluctant to perform a compromising x « P L S for her brother (1000), and indicates Xdpig (1006) plays no role in her l i fe; 9 2 Hera intends to serve the interests of Menelaos (euepyeTetv, 1005), but Theonoe's 9 0 The idea one's c j a i a i s might or might not be in agreement with other aspects of one's life is seen also in Ion 642ff: see Ch. I n.37. 9 1 "Self-esteem" is cited as a reason for speaking out in a just cause by Andromache in Andr 191: e\iavTr\v ou TTpo8o0cr' dXcoaouai. 9 2 Xdpis LP, Murray, Alt, Kannicht; Kimpis Canter, Dale (ad 998-1008), Diggle. If the reading of the codd. is correct, the rhetorical point may be that matters of reputation and justice (here treated as equivalent goods) count for more with Theonoe than the everyday human ex-changes of which a favour done her brother would be an instance. But note the contrast set up between Hera and Kypris in 880-91 and again in 1093-1106, which favours Canter's conjecture. 88 decision is paradoxically a service to her brother ( e u e p y e T t o , 1020). Theonoe's speech ends wi th a brief "practical" section (1022-7), giving the immediate consequences of her decision, followed by a couplet addressed to Proteus, in which the problem of evoefieia and 8uo-ae(3eia and its connection in Theonoe's mind wi th the risk of a compromised reputation are recapitulated: 9 3 ov S \ to Qavdiv \ioi TTcrrep, ocrov y ' eyco aBevco, ouTTOTe KeKA.fjoT)i 8uo"0"e(3f)s dvr' euae(3o0s. (Hel 1028f) In Phoin the debate of Polyneikes and Eteokles culminates in a detailed response from their mother Iokaste. The stage for the debate is set in a scene in which the essential outlook of all three characters is mooted. Polyneikes enters Thebes under a truce and Iokaste voices in lyrics her anguish over his long ab-sence and the danger in which the royal house stands (301-54); then in a long conversation Polyneikes is presented as a man wi th a legitimate grievance against his brother, Iokaste as a concerned mother. Eteokles on his entrance (446) immediately establishes his rather impatient and volatile character, wi th Iokaste assuming a position of authority, attempting to calm h im, and pre-f iguring the coming debate by speaking abstractly about justice, speech, wisdom: emaxes'- OUTOI TO TCLXV TT\V 8LKT\V exei, (3pa8etg 8e LIOGOI. TrXelaTov avvrovoiv oo<\>6v. (Phoin 452f) She invites Polyneikes to speak first (thus taking on the role of "moderator"), and expresses the hope some god w i l l bring about a reconciliation (465-9). 93 94 A "double appeal" is played out in miniature in Her 316-35, Tro 1042-59. All quotations from Phoin follow Mastronarde's text. 89 Polyneikes begins his speech wi th a proem meant to characterise the simple morality of his own case: d.TTXoOs' 6 [iOBog rf\s dXr)9eLag ecj)u, KOI) TTOLKLXGJV 8el ravdix' epux|veuu.dTcov' 6 X e L Y a P c u r r d Kcapov 6 8 ' d S i K O s X o y o s , v o a w v ev airrak (j)ap(idKoov S e i T c u aocjxoV. (469-72) He puts his case in the form of a narratio, unusual in Euripidean debate but here supply ing necessary exposition. This is given a binary organisation through the device of contrasting Polyneikes' own righteous behaviour (473-80 e y w 8e etc.) wi th the unjust actions of his brother (481-3 6 8' etc.). He continues wi th a practical suggestion: he stands ready to compromise, and settle for less than is properly due h im (484-9), but w i l l not settle for nothing (490). He now appeals to the gods to witness the injustice he suffers (491-3), and closes by assuring Iokaste—he never addresses Eteokles— that he has given a simple and honest statement of the facts: 9 5 TOIOT ' au9' e K a o r a , U-fJTep, o u x i Trepi r rXoKds ' X o y w v d G p o i c r a s e iTrov, d X X d tea! aoc))ols KOU T o l a i (^auXoLS e v S i x ' , oog e u o i S o K e t . (494-6) The speech thus eschews "sophistry"; yet it is typical of Euripidean speech-making in both the organization of its argument and the rhetorical self-consciousness of proem and epilogue. The choral couplet (497f) shows approval of Polyneikes' presentation. 9 6 9 5 With the protestations of simplicity here and in the proem, cf. Agamemnon at I A 400 (to Menelaos): TaOTd aoi ppaxea XeXeKTcu icai oa$f\ icai pdiSia. 9 6 Note how different this Polyneikes is from the same character in the "normal" telling of the story (e.g., in S. OK). The Euripidean impulse to portray the traditional villain paradoxically in a good light (cf. Eurystheus in Hkld, Aigisthos in Elek) has here led to a major shift of presentation. 90 Eteokles' speech (it cannot be called a "response") begins likewise wi th an abstract proem: el net01 TOLUTO KotXov ecfnj oofyov 9' cxLia, OVK r\v av aLL^ iXe tc ros ' dv9pcjTT0LS' e p i s -vvv 8 ' ou9' OLLOLOV o u S e v OUT ' loov P p o T O i s TTXTIV 6vo\idoaim TO 8 ' e p y o v OIIK e o r i v rode. (499-502) He takes a position diametrically opposed to that of his brother: words can express no simple truth, as no two people perceive the wor ld in the same w a y . 9 7 His argument proceeds: 503-510a Tvpavvis the greatest of goddesses 510b-14 the shame of losing to foreigners 515-19a practical points: 515-7 what Polyneikes ought to be doing 518-19a I allow h im to return 519b-23 reiteration of Eteokles' devotion to Tvpavvi-s He closes wi th a sinister maxim: e iTrep y d p d S i K e l f XP1!- T u p a w t S o s Trepi K a X X i o r o v d S L K e l v , T a X X a 8 ' euae(3eiv xP e °J y - (524f) Thus the same general plan is fol lowed; abstract proem, argument taking a binary form, practical suggestion (here preceded by a recrimination introduced 9 7 One thinks here of the pronouncements with which Gorgias opened his On the Non-Existent (B3). Guthrie paraphrases these (HGP III. 196ff): "(a) Nothing exists, (b) If anything exists it cannot be known or thought of by man. (c) Even, if it can be apprehended, it cannot be communicated to another". Mastronarde ad Phoin 499-525: "Both the language and the content of Et.'s speech are meant to associate Et. with the clever young men who used the training of the sophists to discomfit their traditionally minded elders and to justify selfish and aggressive behaviour". 91 with xpfJ v ) / 9 8 abstract epilogue. Both proems present a view of verbal communicat ion, both epilogues concern "fairness". The choral comment (526f) seems once again to take sides: eloquence (sc. such as that of Eteokles) ought to be used only in the service of fine deeds; this present case is not fine, but offensive to just ice." Iokaste's long speech follows: she responds first to Eteokles' 27 lines wi th 40, then to Polyneikes' 28 wi th 16 ; 1 0 0 a two-line epilogue appeals to both brothers. Her speech begins, l ike those of her sons, w i th a gnomic p roem: 1 0 1 GO TEKVOV, ovx aTravTa TOOL yf)pai KaKa, 'ETeoKXees, TTpoaeor iv dXX' f)LiTTeipia eX^L TL Xe£cu TOOV veoov aoa^coTepov. (528-30) She answers Eteokles' attachment to Tvpavvis by renaming that goddess OiXoTLLila, a much less attractive abstraction. The damage 4>iAoTi|iLa does to households and cities (Iokaste broadens the context) is contrasted to the good done b y ' IaoTris, who is praised at length (535b- 48). 1 0 2 This first section devoted to discrediting royal power as a goal is closed by a short epilogue (549-51). Iokaste 9 8 Examples of this device are collected in App. A.3. 9 9 Misuse of eloquence forms a topos within debates: note esp. Med 580f, Hipp 486-9, Hek 1187-94, and see Collard ad Hik 426. For the treatment of this subject by the orators, see Ober Mass and Elite 165-74. 1 0 0 Both the unequal length and the chiastic presentation of Iokaste's comments point to the more offensive character of Eteokles' position. 1 0 1 The three proem reflections are discussed further in IV.B below. 1 0 2 Iokaste recommends Equality as the natural, "normal" (vouiuov) state of man and the enemy of excess and want (538ff), and associates it with uepr) OTOQ\IG>V (541), "due proportion". As M . Lloyd notes (Agon 90): "Jocasta's speech is, indeed, a defence of democracy against tyranny, which has only superficial relevance to the immediate issue". It is significant that the democratic ideology presented here has been anticipated in the speech of the sympathetic Polyneikes: note laov 487, dva uepos 478 [del. Diggle] and 486. Similar language appears in a purely Athenian context in Thuc. II. 37,1. Thucydidean parallels with Iokaste's speech are discussed by de Romilly, "Les Pheniciennes " 36f. 92. moves now to discrediting the goal of wealth, a goal that was not mentioned in Eteokles' speech, but which seems entirely consistent wi th the attitudes of that speech (and, perhaps just as importantly, wi th the attitudes of antidemocratic Athenians, men who wou ld choose Tupavvig over LaoTng). 1 0 3 This section concludes at 557 or [558], and in a summarising epilogue the pathetic potential effects of these goals of his are put before Eteokles: the city sacked, the women ens laved . 1 0 4 Yet he has the choice rather to TTOXLV a&iaai (560). Iokaste turns now to Polyneikes. H is position too she rejects: Adrastos undertook a "foolish" obligation toward h im, and the campaign against Thebes is "unintelligent" (569f). N o w , in a passage structurally similar to her last argument against Eteokles, she asks h im to visualise the consequences: 573-7 if you win: what boast could you make? 578-82a if you lose: how return to Argos? The familiar technique of supporting an argument through direct quotation of an imagined comment is employed twice here: in 575f Iokaste suggests ironically a tr iumphal inscription for the victorious Polyneikes that wou ld constitute a most dishonourable boast ; 1 0 5 in 580-2a she quotes the reproaches that wou ld be addressed to Adrastos should Polyneikes lose the war. This process gives balance and amplification to the treatment of the two possible outcomes; both of these 1 0 3 Kovacs would delete the entire section 549-67 ("Tyrants" 42-5); see Mastronarde's response to his arguments (comm. ad loc). Diggle deletes 555-8, 563-5, 567, Mastronarde only 558. 1 0 4 It seems to me that if 563-5 are genuine (del. Willink, Diggle) Iokaste perhaps overstates the likely effects of a successful campaign to install Polyneikes as king of Thebes (though some sort of "sack" was envisioned by Polyneikes himself in 489f): the "rhetoric of the situation" has taken over. 1 0 5 Cf. Hekabe's similar suggestion in Tro 1188-91. 93 are demonstrated through a kind of informal di lemma argument to be unacceptable, in that both invite der is ion. 1 0 6 In the double appeal scene in Helen, we saw subtle differences of approach in the two appeal speeches, and a response that addressed the points made in only a very general way, introducing Theonoe's own character and that of her brother as her main reasons for complying wi th the request of Helen and Menelaos. Here in Phoin, there is real antagonism between the first two speeches (which, however, do not address each other's arguments). Iokaste rejects Eteokles' case both on its merits (by discrediting Tvpavvis) and by evoking the consequences of his stubbornness. Polyneikes' case has been presented, and accepted by the Chorus, as just, and so Iokaste attacks the "intelligence" of a campaign in which he loses no matter what the outcome. The scene has been much concerned wi th word and speech, wisdom, justice; wi th the words u.fjTep, oil Xoycov e9 ' ayuv (588), Eteokles closes the debate and we move toward the physical confrontation that w i l l end wi th both brothers' deaths. 106 T^g double question addressed to Eteokles asked (1) will you forego a chance to save the city (sc. by reconciling)? (2) what of the consequences if you lose? The "downside" of a victory for Eteokles had to be presented not as a personal defeat, but as a lost opportunity, a base favouring of personal over public values. With Polyneikes it is easier to show a true dilemma: in a sense he loses either way. 94 Chapter III Probabilities and Possibilit ies In this and the fol lowing chapter I shall look in detail at some of Eur i -pides' resources for the presentation of arguments. Chapter III w i l l survey the various argumentative applications of rhetorical questions, which Euripides often uses in challenging (in "forensic" contexts) the probability of each of a se-ries of suggestions, or in testing (in "deliberative" contexts) the feasibility of each of several alternative scenarios. Related techniques involv ing hypothetical for-mulations (likewise used to consider past or present alternatives) w i l l also be discussed. Chapter IV w i l l treat the use in argument of general statements (gnomes or maxims), introduced as common sense or as the speaker's opinion, and of such corollary phenomena as challenges to common sense and "Utopian reflections". M y objective is again to gain a clear view of the resources used by Euripides in a variety of situations; and again I assume that techniques that w i l l have been accepted by the original audience as merely conventional should not be treated by us as fraught wi th meaning, but that the untypical or unconven-tional w i l l have to be explained. A . Rhetorical Questions and the "Probabi l i ty Argument" The important use of rhetorical questions in connection wi th probabil ity arguments makes a brief introduction here to that subject desirable. The use of an appeal to "probability" in argumentation seems to have been a new resource 95 in the fifth century. 1 Our first reference to such an appeal (as distinct from examples of its use) comes from Plato, who tells us (Phaidr 272D-73C) that Tisias, known from other sources to have been a mid-fifth-century rhetorician, wrote a sample argument in which a weak brave man charged wi th assaulting a strong coward was advised to argue the improbability of such an attack, asking TTWS 8 ' dv eyd) ToioaSe TOLcoiSe erfexeipriaa; Tisias is also said (273B) to have defined T O eLKog as ov TL dXXo f\ TO TCOL TT \ f j9ei S O K O W . Elsewhere in the Phaidr we hear (267A) that Tisias and Gorgias "saw that probabilities are to be more highly regarded than truth." 2 Aristotle in the Rhet (1402a3-28) l ikewise associates the appeal to probability with the early Sicilian rhetoricians, and gives an example of its use that may rest on the same authentic early Techne as that in the Phaidr.3 In addit ion to this historic note, Aristotle gives advice on the use of probability in practical speech situations (02b20-03al). There are also theoretical comments on etKOTa designed to fit the concept into the quasi-dialectical system the Rhet is concerned to bui ld (57a22-57b21).4 1 General discussions: G. Lloyd P and A 424f, Solmsen Antiphonstudien 47-63, Gagarin "Proofs in Antiphon" 30f, "Probability and Persuasion" 46-51. 2 Plato presents probability arguments used by orators as subversive and inherently untruthful, but this is mere sophistry on his part: the decision between opposing accounts of an incident must, in the absence of some oracular account of the "truth", depend on comparison with a standard of probability. If rhetoricians developed topoi for arguing either side of a case (such that the probabilities on one side are in conflict with those on the other), this was a useful exercise in the development of critical thinking for orators and dikasts alike. 3 On this point see Gagarin "Probability and Persuasion" 51. Kuebler diss. 8-10 speculates on the extent to which the early technical instruction of the Sicilians survived to influence the theoretical writings of Anaximenes and Aristotle; Goebel diss. 109-35 attempts to reconstruct the Sicilian teaching on probability. Although Aristotle too finds fault with the abuse of probability by rhetoricians— he singles out Protagoras (1402a 3-28)— his objection is that they make no distinction between dXr|9e? and <^aiv6[ievov ELKOS; that is (as his own theoretical apparatus bears out with its dependence on eiKOTa), he recognises the need to assess probability in cases where the facts are not clearly known. 4 For discussion of eiKOTa in this context, see Grimaldi Studies 104ff. 96 The third important early Greek work on rhetoric, >Rhetorica ad Alexandrum,5 introduces the concept of eiKog in discussing (Ch. VII) two classes of mare is : there are proofs, we are told (28al7-19), that proceed directly from "words and actions and persons", and others that are supplementary (em9eT0i) to things said and done. The first class includes eiKOTa along wi th maxims, tokens, examples. The second group correspond roughly to the aTex^oi moreLs of mature Aristotelian theory, and include witnesses, oaths, pdaavot, opinions. The detailed description of eiKos (28a26f) states: CLKOS \iev ovv eoriv ov XeyoLievou TTapaSeiyixaTa eu Tats Siavoiats - exouaiv ol dicouovTeg. The author goes on to emphasise that "probabilities" rest on shared experiences (such as patriotism, friendship). Three classes of these are distinguished: rrdGr), e9os, KepSog. That is, the speaker may hope to exploit common emotions, common assumptions about character, and the common interest of his hearers. 6 The argument from probability in Euripides and in fifth-century oratory and early rhetoric has been much discussed. It seems likely that we are here, more than elsewhere in this study, in the presence of a contemporary trend in intellectual analysis and argumentation, a trend that found fertile ground in phi losophy, rhetoric, drama, and historiography. 7 One may imagine that, apart 5 On the treatise's character and its likely date and purpose, see Kennedy Art 114-24; see also Goebel diss. 74 n. 2, Cole Origins 177 n. 15. 6 The great importance of Rhet ad Alex for scholars studying fifth-century oratory and argumentation lies in its representing a much more down-to-earth approach to the art of persuasion than either Plato's (in Phaidr) or Aristotle's (in the Rhet): one easily forms the impression one is hearing the practical advice of an orator, not the speculations of a philosopher. This impression has its dangers, since Rhet ad Alex is both systematic and late. Goebel (diss. 154-9) has attempted to show that it preserves a certain amount of authentic fifth-century instruction; Kennedy finds (Art 115) "It represents better than anything else the tradition of sophistic rhetoric". Cole (Origins 139-58) on the other hand sees the entire enterprise of descriptive rhetoric as essentially a fourth-century and philosophical one. 7 "Probabilistic" thinking as an aspect of Euripidean dramaturgy is the subject of some interesting comments by Solmsen, Antiphonstudien 54-8. 97 from a few conventional proem topoi and focusing devices I have described, it is especially in hearing Euripides' probability arguments that the Athenian audience w i l l have experienced the sense of a reference to contemporary modes of debate. Writers contemporary wi th Euripides seem to use three different patterns for call ing attention to the probability or (more often) improbabil i ty of a proposition: (1) the word eiKOs may be used in describing a proposition. So Gorgias has Palamedes deny the putative charge of betraying the Greeks for money by arguing in part (Pal 9): 8 dXX' OUK eiKOs d im LieydXtov uTroupynu.dTtov' oXiya xpr\\xara \a\ifidveiv. (2) Condit ional expressions may be used to deny that something "would" or "could" happen. Thus Thucydides supports his contention the Achaean force won an early engagement in the Troad by pointing out that otherwise they could not have built the Homeric wal l (Thuc. I, 11.1): 8fjXov 8e- TO ydp epuu.a TCOL arpaTOTreSau OUK dv eTeixLcravTO. (3) Rhetorical questions may challenge the listener to assent to a proposit ion palpably false, or to a series of such propositions: the impossibil ity of assenting is taken as demonstrating the improbability of a scenario (etc.) whose reality has been presented as depending on the truth of the proposition(s). So Ant iphon has the defendant charged with the murder of Herodes ask, by way of refuting the notion he had ki l led as a favour to a third man (V. 57): ° Gagarin usefully distinguishes between this "explicit" form of probability argument ("Probability and Persuasion" 66 n. 19), and "indirect" arguments without the word CIKOS (ibid 54); but all the forms reviewed here appeal equally clearly to the hearers' sense of probability. 98 T L S TTcoTTOTe xaPLCo|J.EV'0S' eTepooi TOUTO elpydaaro; Such a motivation is simply defined as outside the realm of human experience. Often the second two types ("indirect" appeals to probability) are combined: questions beginning (e.g.) rrcos y d p dv... are seen in many refutation arguments. A l l three of the forms I have mentioned are seen together in Hdt . II. 22,2— the argument on the source of the Ni le: K&S GOV 8f)Ta peoi dv drro x L 6 V °S> drro TGJV 9ep[iOTdTGJV p e w v e g T&V i\ivx6repa rd rroXXd ecn~i; dvSpi y e XoyLCea9cu TOIOUTGOV rrepL OLGJL T e e o v T L , cog oi)8e o i K o g d r r o x1 0'-'0? M-LV p e e i v , rrpooToy \iev i c a ! L i e y i o r o v ' L i apTupLOv etc. Euripides favours the use of rhetorical questions and conditional formulations to imply probability and improbabil ity. 9 Rhetorical questions in tragedy have many uses. 1 0 For Euripides a tone of antagonism or surprise, insult (taken or delivered), ridicule, incredulity or perplexity may be valuable in many situations. Often rhetorical questions have a purely pathetic effect: OLLiOL' TL SfJTOl (j)ei8o|i.CU ^ ^ X ^ S ' € |J . f i^ TGJV cjuXTaTGov u.01 yev6u.evos TTCUSGJV oJ)OveiJs; OUK el [it TTeTpa? XiaadSos' rrpo? dXiiaTa f] fydoyavov rrpos rj-rrap e^aKOVTiaag 9 Pasiphae's e/ei ydp ov&ev elKos in the Kretes fragment (see below) is perhaps the only Euripidean example of eiicos used in the "technical" sense, rather than in its normal sense of "morally fitting". 1 0 Mastronarde, C and D Ch. 1, presents an interesting typological study of rhetorical questons in tragedy; he takes however no interest in questions used in argumentation. 99 TeKvoig SiKacrrfis- cuU.O.TOS' yevriaoLiaL, f| adpra + rr\v eu.f)v + eLiTrpriaas Trupl SuaKXeiav f) [ievei u.' dTraJaoiiai |3LOU; {Her 1146-52)1 1 Elsewhere they may express a sense of outrage and derision: to TToa, TLV ' auxeiS', TTOTepa AuSov f\ Opuya KctKoXs eXaweiv dpyuptovn-roi' aeOev; OVK olaBa GeaaaXov u.e K a i r o GeaaaXoO rraTpos yeywTa yvriaicog IXevQepov; (Alk 675-8) Here as often a pair of questions is used to lay a proposition on the table, then comment on it. Proposition: "You seem to think you are addressing a foreigner, a slave". Comment: "But in fact I'm a native-born free Thessalian". The rhetorical question format of the sequence contributes to the tone of frenzy and antagonism that runs through Pheres' entire speech to Admetos. It w i l l be important in discussing the arguments that are presented in the form of a string of questions constantly to be aware of this emotional and insistent aspect of the utterance. A t the same time, it wou ld be wrong to assume that the 6pyf| imp l ied in rhetorical question formulations is meant to cast the speaker as hot-headed or bul ly ing. The form in which the arguments are presented brings rather a sense of urgency and animation to the debate itself which it might otherwise lack. This consideration no doubt explains equally wel l the use of this device by logographers— a sense of animation and of involving the listener was certainly desirable to Ant iphon, Lysias and other writers of political and forensic speeches. 1 1 The passage is a striking reminder of the ease with which desperate emotion and rhetorical clarity and patterning may coexist. 100 ' Rhetorical questions used in argument most often stand for a statement. Klytaimestra defends her association wi th Aigisthos in these terms: €KT€iv', eTpe<{)9r|v fjiTrep fjv TropeuaLLiov Trpo? TOU? eKetvcoL TToXeLiLOus. CJUXOJV yap av TLS" dv cbovou aoO rraTpos eKOLvt6vr|ae U.OL; (Elek 1046-8) "I found help among Agamemnon's enemies; for no friend of his wou ld have shared in the deed". Note that the question delivers an argumentative point, and that the argument denies the probability of Klytaimestra's receiving support elsewhere. Such a question may be followed by a statement confirming the posit ion of the speaker. So Medeia, considering her prospects for an escape should she succeed in murdering her three enemies, asks rhetorically T L S Lie 8e£eTaL TTOXLS; (Med 386), and answers OUK eon (389). But such statements are often (as in Elek 1046-8) omitted. A very frequent pattern is the use of a rhetorical question to open a point, then a statement of the "correct" answer to guide the listener and imply the speaker's argument: ov ydp TL u.' T]8iKr|aas'; e£e8ou Kopr|V OTOJL ae QULLOS fjyev. (Med 309f) What wrong have you done me? You [merely] gave your daughter to the man it pleased you to. Medeia asks Kreon to consider whether he has done her any offense, and then supplies an answer that implies he has not. Very common too is a pair of rhetorical questions in which the second question guides the listener to the 101 correct answer to the first and so sets out an argumentative point . 1 2 A simple example: f}£eiv vouiCeis rralSa abv yodels' UTTO; Kai T L S BavofTcov fjXGev e£ "AiSou TTCXXLV; (Her 296f) This is a crisp and efficient way of saying: (1) Perhaps you think your son w i l l return; (2) but that is an unreasonable expectation; (3) for no one has ever returned from Hades. The argument here is "from probability" in that Megara asks Amphi t ryon to compare the l ikel ihood of Herakles' return from Hades wi th a known fact about the nature of the wor ld . 1 3 The rhetorical question wi th TTCOS ( implying negation) or TTWS OV ( implying affirmation) is an id iom frequently associated wi th probability arguments. 1 4 What we seem to have here is a common Greek expression that was taken over by orators as an available and effective way of emphasizing the inconsistency of a proposit ion wi th everyday experience. 1 5 Herodotos (for whom Powell 's Lexicon lists 12 instances of rhetorical question wi th KWS imply ing negative) five times 1 2 Lang, Herodotean N and D Ch. 3 (37-51), studies the use of rhetorical questions in Homer and Herodotos. She analyses a number of argumentative two-question sequences in Herodotos that have no parallels in Homer but which resemble many such sequences in Euripides. In these sequences [commenting on in. 82,5] "the Herodotean [second] question initiates a process of logical reasoning which makes the rhetorical question less a weapon of personal confrontation than a means of argument and proof" (43). 1 3 This is what Solmsen would call a probability argument effected through "Fundierung in einer Behauptung von allgemeiner Gultigkeit" (Antiphonstudien 50). Most Euripidean arguments are of this type. A second type (not entirely distinct) involves "rationale Analyse der rrpacj is" (ibid); in Euripides, cf. e.g. Med 502-8, where the reasons Medeia offers to refute the probability of a warm welcome awaiting her in Kolchis and Iolkos cite her own acts, not general truths. 1 4 Bateman, writing of probability arguments in Lysias, notes (diss. 41), "A favorite device for intensifying such arguments is the rhetorical question, especially that introduced by rrdis"; he refers to Kuebler, diss. 33 and 62 (q.v.). 1 5 Thus rhetorical questions with TTU? are common in Homer— but rrcLs ov does not seem to occur. 102 makes an appeal to probability using this id iom. 1 6 In Euripides the rroog-question often contains wi th in it reference to a circumstance that is presented as decisive for the speaker's argument: 1 7 TToog 8 ' dv yevoiT' dv ev KpaTouXeoji rreSooL youag TTOSCOV eKfiaKTpov; (Elek 534f) ...TTOjg dv ovv eLT|v KCCKO?, os ou8' dKouaas ToidS' dyveueiv SOKOO; (Hipp 654f) Sometimes such a question attacks a proposition not on grounds of a practical improbabil i ty but of a logical impossibi l i ty: 1 8 KCli TTGJS dv aVTOS KClTGdvOL T6 Kal (3A.6TT0L; (Alk 142) rroos dv Lif| 8iop9ei3oov Xoyous 6p9tos 8UVO.LT ' dv Sfju-os1 evQvveiv TTOXLV; (Hik 417f) The probability argument quoted by Plato from Tisias was rroos 8 ' dv eyob ToioaSe TOLcotSe errexeLpriCTa; Its formal similarity to the Euripidean examples above is striking. 1 6 I. 75,6; II. 45,2 and 45,3; V. 106,2; VII. 103,3. On probability arguments in Herodotos in general see Lateiner Historical Method 97f, 193. 1 7 For TTcos-questions containing a full conditional protasis (e.g. IT 1012ff) see below under "Hypothetical Arguments". 1 8 These arguments rest on questions of definition: cf. Alk 525, Andr 1165, and the two questions in Hel 912f. Somewhat similar is Antiphon's refutation of the claim that a man's death was due to the doctor's poor treatment rather than the defendant's attack: TTOJ? av dXXo? TL? i} 6 Piaaduevos T|M-ds xP"nCT9aL auTwi [sc. TWL LaTpak] cj)oveus eir\ dvr(IV. y,5). The existence of arguments like Alk 142 apparently predates the development of a clear conceptual distinction between logical and practical impossibility: see G. Lloyd P and A 423. 103 B. El iminat ion of Alternatives: Past From these bui ld ing blocks (hanging question wi th answer impl ied, question-statement sequence, question-question sequence, condit ional question wi th TTCOS') large arguments are constructed. Quite frequently Euripides uses a series of rhetorical questions to give shape and focus to the process of examining an issue from several sides, especially for the consideration of a series of alter-native possibilities (explanations for past actions, options for future actions). The technique is often applied in forensic contexts to the consideration of motive. In this situation the technique ("hypophora" in later rhetorical terminology) is aimed at refuting a series of points which are presented as underlying the opponent's case. 1 9 Thus Andromache in Andr 192-204 counters Hermione's charge she is undermining Hermione's marriage by eliminating one by one a series of suggested motives, and the rhetorical fiction is that one or other of these wou ld form an essential condit ion for Andromache's undertaking such a scheme. So in Tro 975-82 Hekabe refutes the case made by Helen for Aphrodite's culpabil ity as the ultimate cause of the Trojan War by demolishing successively a suggested (and absurd) motive why Hera and Athene should have betrayed their devotees in the Judgement of Paris. Addi t ional passages of this sort discussed below are: Hipp 958-70, Hipp 1007-15, Hek 1197-1205, Her 295-300, and a section of Pasiphae's defense speech from Kretes. 1 9 See Solmsen's discussion of "in utramque partem discutare", Intellectual Experiments 10-46. Examples from the early orators of hypophoric arguments similar to those of Euripides: Antiphon V. 28, 57f, Apol 2; Lysias XXIV. 23-5. Gorg. Pal 6-21 constitutes an extremely elaborate example of the use of this technique. See Goebel (diss. 146.-54) on the arguments, Cole (Origins 75f) on the piece's purpose. 104 In Andr the argument between Hermione and Andromache involves the question whether Andromache has been trying to sabotage Hermione's marriage wi th Neoptolemos. Andromache denies the "charge" vigorously, insisting first she could not reasonably have thought herself capable of replacing Hermione, then that she wou ld not have wanted to. This is argued using hypophora. Andromache opens the subject wi th a question: eLTT' , to veavi, TOOL a' eyeyyvusi X o y o u TreLa9eLa' CXTTOOGOO yvncatov vuLuj)euLuiToov; (Andr 192f) This leads to a series of six rhetorical questions that each demand an answer in the negative (such as OUK CLKOS eon, "of course not"). Each question envisions a hypothetical circumstance that might lend credibility to the charge; thus the procedure is a k ind of T^poKaTdX'nlJjLs•. Some of the points here are stronger than others, 2 0 but all are presented as imply ing the improbabil ity of Hermione's charge. The whole course of the argument is, as Goebel has pointed out, similar to that of Gorgias' Palamedes;21 but here there is no technical "di lemma", i.e., no implicat ion that the alternatives offered are exhaustive. 2 2 A similar argument, l ikewise concerned wi th motive, occurs in the agon of Hipp: Hippolytos has argued against his guilt on the basis of his known 2 0 See Stevens ad 199-202. 2 1 I am in agreement with Goebel ("The Pattern of Argument") on the Andr passage (which has mild corruption in 195 but otherwise seems coherent): the transition from possibility to desire is marked by the change from ci)? (194: "believing that") to Iva (199: "desiring to"), and is precisely paralleled in the progression of the argument in Gorg. Pal from possibility (6-12) to desire (13-21). 2 2 See Schupp "Beweistopik" 28 for a list of passages in the orators involving dilemma. He wrongly cites Andr 785ff as a Euripidean example (ibid 183). I find no clearly announced dilemmas in Euripides of the sort "If X, then either Y or Z; but..." (cf. Gorg. Pal 26, Ant. IV |3 6, Lysias XIII 75); but I note less formal dilemmas in Alk 945/950: evSov / e£to9ev; Phoin 571/578: fjv eX-nts1 / f\v 8' av KpaTT|9fJLs; Andr 344-8, Her 1385, Tro 661-4, Phoin 954-8. Cf. also Soph. Ant 921-4. 105 oufypoovvT] (993-1006);23 at 1007 he notes this line of argument is fail ing to persuade Theseus, and he moves to insisting on his lack of a motive (1008). In 1009-13 three rhetorical questions are put, each of which needs a negative answer. In this case (unlike the Andr passage) the speaker supplies an answer to the second and third question (LidTcuos dv r\v 1012, and f |Kicn-a. 1014, if that word is correct in that disputed verse). Vss. 1014f offer an argument clearly intended to stress the improbabil ity of the hypothesis implicit in the question put in 1013, but the reasoning seems unsatisfactory: thus the attempts to repair or remove vs. 1014 or more. 2 4 This k ind of format is used again in Hek 1199-1205 for the investigation of motive. Polymestor has claimed (1138-44 and esp. 1175-7) that he ki l led Polydoros out of a desire to serve the interests of the Greeks. Hekabe in her refutation discredits this motive using two rhetorical questions, each posit ing a hypothetical answer to the initial question riva Se Kal aTreuScov xdpiv TrpoOuu.os' fjaGa; (1201f). The improbability of the second of these proposed explanations is emphasised wi th yet another question": Tiva SoKets ueioeiv rd8e; (1205). 2 5 This section is fol lowed by Hekabe's exposition of the true motive (6 xpvoos etc., 1206ff). Similarly in Tro 975-82 Helen's account of the judgement of Paris (as responsible for her coming to Troy) is attacked by Hekabe on the basis of the 2 3 This answers Theseus' challenge in vs. 949. The subject receives a balanced treatment: Hippolytos' high morality in his dealings with gods and friends (996-1001); his sexual chastity (1002-6). 2 4 See further discussion below. 2 5 A similar brief final question drives home the argument in Hkld 510. 106 improbabil i ty of its underlying assumptions. 2 6 Formally the argument begins wi th a clear statement of the proposition to be proved: Hera and Athene ou Tra iSLaicfL K m x^-8f]i iiopciyfjs Trepi fjX9ov rrpos "I8T]I>- (Tro 975f) Then a rhetorical question asks why Hera should want the victory in such a contest. A second question implies a patently absurd motive— that she might thus gain a better husband than Zeus. Another question, l ikewise demanding a negative answer, demolishes Athene's involvement (979-81a); then a final sentence (here in the imperative, 981b-82) emphasises the absurdity of Helen's entire hypothesis. This completes the refutation sequence, and Hekabe moves on to propose her own explanation of the events. In the defense speech of Pasiphae from Kretes a similar technique is used to refute the charge against the queen. Pasiphae argues that she is not respon-sible for her actions in pursuing a love-affair wi th a bu l l— the attraction was clearly the work of a god: exei y d p ovSev e i K O s - eg TL y d p Poo? pXeiJjaa' e S f ^ r i v 9uu.6v alaxio~Tr|L v o a w i ; ws euTTpeTrfis u.ev ev TTeTrXoLcav fjv LSetv; TTupcrfjs Se xaLTT)s K<xi T r a p ' 6u.u.dTcov aeXas OLVCLITTOV e£eXau.TTe TrepKaLvtov yevvv; ov u.f)v. 8eu.ag y ' eup[u9Li.ov . . ". vJuLix jno i r (Kret 11-16) 2 7 2 6 Specifically, the notion that either Hera or Athene would have paid a high price (cf. vss. 971-4) to gain the title for beauty is exposed as improbable. As Stinton points out (Judgement of Paris 38n), Hekabe does not deny the reality of the contest. 2 7 The fragment is no. 82 in C. Austin's Nova Fragmenta Euripidea (Berlin, 1968). I quote Austin's text, but without noting gaps and supplements of minor importance. etipuOLipv in vs. 16 is Wilamowitz's conjecture. 107 Aga in the question is one of motive. Two motives are suggested (each outrageously "unlikely", OUK EIKOS). The first receives no further comment; a closing statement confirms that the second is to be rejected. In the fol lowing lines Pasiphae, l ike Andromache (Andr 205-12) and Hekabe (Hek 1206-16), takes the offensive: . dXX' ou8e TTGUSGOV cj)[iJTop' eiKos r\v] TTOCUV 8ea9ar TL SfJTa Tfji[8' eum]vour|v VOCTCJL; 8Q.LU.OOV 6 ToOSe etc. (19-21) 2 8 The defense thus has two phases: (1) Pasiphae had no motive for seeking such an alliance; (2) Minos' offense against Poseidon (in fail ing to sacrifice the bul l as promised) was the real cause of her passion. <ji) TOL LI ' dTToXXus, or] ydp f) ' £a[iapTia, 6K aoO voaoOLiev. (34f) Goebel comments: "The two parts are logically complementary, the first showing that a natural explanation of her passion is unl ikely, the second showing that a supernatural explanation is l ike ly" . 2 9 A l l of these passages exploit some combination of the fol lowing features: (1) rhetorical question (or statement) to open a topic; (2) rhetorical question to moot a possible (but often self-evidently improbable) motive or scenario; (3) rhetorical question (or statement) to imply the speaker's negative, often contemptuous, attitude toward the alternative just mentioned. This last 2 8 The supplements are by Wilamowitz. I don't have great confidence in ELKO? r\v in vs. 19; but the rhetorical shape of the passage is quite clear. 2 9 Diss. 300; Goebel's discussion however bogs down in a dubious attempt to distinguish between elements of "judicial" and of "sophistic" rhetoric in the speech (ibid 296-301). 108 contains the "argument from probability" in Euripides' preferred form. Discussion of some less elaborate examples follows. Hekabe asks Odysseus what motive led the Greeks to condemn Polyxene to death: TTOTepa T O XPA a<b' eTrfjyay' d v B p t o T T o a ^ a y e t v Trpos Tv\ifiov, evQa fiovQvrelv LLaXXov TrpeTrei; f\ T O U S KTOLVOVTOLS dyTOLTTOKTelvoiL GeXojy e s TT\V8 ' ' A x i X X e u ? e v S i K t o s re'ivei cbovov; d X X ' ou8ev a i i T o v fj8e y ' eipyaoTaL KOIKOV. 'EXevr\v viv a i T e t v X P ^ \ V Td(|)toL TTpoCT<j)dy|j.aTcr K e i v n ydp t o X e a e v viv e g T p o t a v T ' dyeL. (Hek 260-6) Here two alternative motives, clearly marked as such by TTOTepa...fj, are p roposed . 3 0 The first question contains its own answer in the relative clause (ev9ot...); the second is answered in the statement introduced by d X X ' ( implying an objection). The sequence closes wi th the proposal of a new and better alternative (sacrifice Helen), and a brief justification for this. 3 1 The argument here does not discredit imputed motives by pointing up their improbability, but denies the morality of the sacrifice, whatever its motivation. Theseus in his debate wi th the Theban herald in Suppliant Women challenges the Theban edict against burial for the Seven by pointing up the absurdity of any fear the Thebans might have vis-a-vis the dead: 3 0 The first of a pair of alternative questions is introduced by rroTepa in Alk 1051, Med 499, Hipp 1009, Hek 260,1202; by TTOTepov in Andr 199, 345, Tro 978. All of these are followed by an fj. The second in a pair is introduced by r\ without preceding rroTepa/rroTepov in Hkld 189, Andr 196, 721, Hik 545, Elek [375]; bydXX' (without rroTepa/ov) in Hipp 966, Her 298,1382 (and cf. variations in Hkld 515, Elek [377]). In Hipp 1009-13 three alternatives are introduced by TTOTepa... f\... dXX'... (This use of dXXd sometimes rubs up against dXXd used to register an objection, e.g. in Elek [375], Phoin 1618, cf. Gorg. Pal 10, Thuc. I. 80,4.) Some notes on disjunctive questions in Euripides are to be found in Rijksbaron Grammatical Observations App. 4. 3 1 Note use of xpfjv for this purpose; cf. passages collected in App. A. 5 109 Kccuol u.ev fjX9eg Seiv' ctTTeLXfiaojv errr}, veKpovg Se Tap(3etT' el Kpu4>fjaovTai x9° y l ; TL uf) y e v n T o u ; Lif| KaTaaicdiJ iOjaL yfjv T a c | ) e v T e s ULUSV; f) TCKV ' e v LLUXOLS X ^ O V O ^ (JJUO-GOCTLV, e£ GOV e t a l T L ? TLLiGopta; a K a L o v y e j T a v a X c o L i a Tfjg y X w a a r i s T o S e , c))6(3oug TTOvripoug Kai K e v o u s 8e8oLKevaL. (Hz/: 542-8) A rhetorical question suggests that threats and fears are inappropriate; a second serves to introduce a list of proposed fears; a third and fourth present these; a final statement dismisses them as both cowardly and unfounded. Very similar but less developed is the sequence given to Hekabe in her monologue in Troades that follows the death of Astyanax; Hekabe asks what fear led the Greeks to k i l l that helpless chi ld: TL T O V S ' A X O U O L , TTolSa SeLoavres fyovov KOUVOV 8L6Lpydaaa9e; \ir\ Tpolav r roTe TrecroOaav opBooaeLev; (Tro 1159-61) She continues by dismissing this as an absurd fear; no alternative motivation is considered. Medeia uses a somewhat similar structure to dismiss Kreon's fear of her as ungrounded: a u 8 ' ovv cpo(3f)L Lie- \ir\ TL TfXr]LiLieXes' 7Ta9f)Ls; oux oo8' e\ei u r n , LXT| TpeoT|is fJLias, Kpeov, COOT' es rvpavvovs dv8pas 6£a|iapTdveLv. ov y a p TL LI. ' r)8LKTiaas; e£e8ou K6OT\V OTCOL a e 9u[i6s fjyev. dXX' e\ibv TTOCTLV Luciar (Med 306-11) 110 The first question and its answer dismiss the l ikel ihood of Kreon's coming to any harm as a result Medeia's character or situation (ov\ 108 ' exeL l 1 0 1 ) ; m e second question removes any offense committed by Kreon as a basis for fear. That is: (1) Medeia is not likely to harm Kreon; (2) in any case he has done nothing to attract such treatment. The third stage reached in the passage above ("It is my husband I hate") has the familiar rhetorical function of substituting a "correct" explanation or scenario for the "incorrect" one that is being refuted. A tone of ridicule and reductio ad absurdum is present in the denun-ciation of Menelaos spoken by Peleus as he frees Andromache: t o S ' , co KotKLCTTe, Tf jc rS ' <k\v\Lr\vu> x^P a S; |3o0v f\ XeovT' rjXmCes' evre'iveiv ppoxoLj; f] fif] £L4>OS Xa(3o0a' d u . u v d 9 o L T 6 a e e S e L a a s ; (Andr 719-22) 3 2 The suggested motives are too absurd to require any comment, and the speech moves on immediately to address Andromache's son. The process pursued in all the passages thus far discussed is that of testing a proposit ion by examining in turn a series of circumstances which are presented (tacitly) as implicit in the proposition. These "circumstances" may be logically antecedent (as normally in the motive arguments) or consequent (as in e.g. Tro 1010-14) to the proposition being tested; there is never any claim made' for logical r igour . 3 3 3 2 Here a sequence designed to broaden the rhetorical view by bringing in alternative explanations contains (in vs. 720) alternatives within one leg of the larger alternatives: cf. Hek 1202ff, Her 1146-52. In Andr 192ff the same effect of fulness is achieved through Te...Kou in 195 (probably), 196,197, 204, and Te in 200. 3 3 This process is put to a different use in Hel 490, where Menelaos seems gradually to persuade himself that there could in fact be two Helens, two Spartas, etc. (see discussion in IV.B below). The process of refuting or dismissing successive suggestions is also seen in Elek [373-9]. I l l With all these hypophora passages now in view, I return to the argument on motive in Hippolytos' speech of defense: Set STJ a e 8et£cu TOOL TPOTTCOL 8Lec|)9dpr|V. TfOTepa TO Tf jaSe crcou-' e K a X X L o r e u e T O Traaoov y u v a i K t o v ; f) obv oiKT\oeiv SOLIOV e y K X r j p o y evvr\v rrpocrXaPobv e T i r j X T a a a ; liaTaLOs d p ' fjv, OUSOLLIOU \iev ovv fypevtiv. dXX' cos Tiipcuvveiv f|8u TOLOI aioc^poaLv; f J K L a T d y ' , eL LIT) Ta? fypevas 8Lecj)9opev 9vr|Tcov o a o L o a v avSdvei aovapxLa. (Hipp 1008-15) 3 4 The passage has troubled scholars for several reasons. But in the light of the similar Euripidean passages discussed above, I can see no problem aside from minor corruption in 1014. Hippolytos is attempting to prove that he could have had no motive to seduce or marry Phaidra (this in spite of the fact that her letter has charged h im rather wi th rape). He is going to make his point by mooting a number of possible motives, but he is under no obligation to suggest motives that might in fact have been strong ones. 3 5 Far from it: in the scenes I have dis-cussed the speaker often demolishes motives which are self-evidently f l imsy. The motives proposed here are: (1009-10a) a physical attraction such as great beauty might inspire; (1010b-ll) the possibility of acquiring wealth through connection wi th an heiress; (1013) the possibility of acquiring polit ical power. Clearly these three motives are the standard ones that might be expected to attract a young man into a liaison wi th a queen; whether they make much sense 3 4 Text of 1013f: Diggle punctuates after aco(|)pOCTLv and obelises f^ KLCTTa y', el af|; Barrett puts an obelus before eL ufi; Stockert punctuates after T\8V and obelises et |ir|. 3 5 This is where Kovacs' attack on the text goes wrong ("Tyrants" 47); he insists on a defense consisting of forensically sound points that suit the situation in detail. 112 given the details of Hippolytos' and Theseus' relationship, or of Att ic estate law, counts for l i t t le. 3 6 O n the basis of content, then, we do not require that Hippolytos' proposed motives be strong ones. But are these three motives plausible in rhetorical terms? Barrett says of the three stages (ad 1007-20): "The last two are neither effectively distinguished... nor easily separable, and it is possible... that a single motive has been split into two by the interpolation of 1012-15". But I have noted both a tendency towards fulness of expression in arguments of this type, and a general pattern of treating public and private motivation separately (a pattern realised variously in Hkld 181-230, Tro 353-405, Ion 585-647). 3 7 I take 1010-2 to mean: "Did I expect I would be gaining an estate through the affair— that I wou ld come into control of your property?" The question allows of no inference as to whether Phaidra might through marriage have transmitted an estate, 3 8 and the answer in 1012, though not strictly required for sense, adds a satisfying tone of impatience. The next stage speaks of royal power, a slight raising of the stakes and a subject that allows for the voicing of some stereotyped quietist comments of a sort we have met elsewhere. 3 9 Recently Sommerstein has suggested we are to understand that in Hippolytos' abv 3 6 Barrett (ad 1110-11) and Kells ("Women's Property") discuss the matter of Phaidra's status under traditions and laws respecting Greek estates as if this were an important point for interpretation. 3 7 Moreover, we have seen discussions of political power in Ion 629-32 and Phoin 549-67 (see Mastronarde ad loc) take a detour into points regarding personal wealth. The two are explicitly associated in Ion [578-81]. 3 8 The lines may suggest that Hippolytos is above grubbing for wealth, or that Phaidra could legally be no source of wealth, or that the SOLIO? belongs securely and unarguably to Theseus— or all three. I incline to think the first of these is the main point (he has begun by asking TWL TPOTTWL 8iec(>9dpTiv, 1008). The consideration that Hippolytos as a young prince requires money to maintain his lifestyle (Barrett ad 1012) should play no part in the interpretation of this rhetorical material.-3 9 Pace Kovacs ("Tyrants" 36): cf. Ch. I.E above, with n.93. 113 o l K f j a e i v S6|ioy (1010) the murder of Theseus is implied as a necessary pre-requisi te. 4 0 Sommerstein takes the third stage that follows as representing a stronger motive not for seducing a stepmother but for k i l l ing a father. The cogency of Hippolytos' argument is not improved by this gratuitous subtlety. O n the interpretation of the second motive, Kells finds that the answer to Hippolytos' question (lOlOf) wou ld be self-evident to an audience familiar wi th patterns of inheritance in Greek society, and that therefore vs. 1012 is redun-dant . 4 1 He goes on to suggest the passage consisted originally (he excises also 1014f) of "a series of swift rhetorical questions, each suggesting a possible motive..., each containing wi th in itself the refutation of that motive" (183). He compares Andr 192-204, and in a footnote mentions, as examples of the application of the hypophora technique to the analysis of "psychological situations and motives", Alk 1049f, Med 386f and 499f. The Andr passage has a unique series of six rhetorical questions (not "swift", since some are rather complex); each question is fol lowed by the next wi th no intervening comment. The other three passages Kells mentions are more representative of Euripides' normal practice. One question may pass without comment (e.g., Med 502f), but the next w i l l not. A n d the manner of comment w i l l be varied: this may take the form of a further rhetorical question (Alk 1056), a statement (Med 504f), or a brief formula (such as OUK e c m in Med 389, fjiao-Ta in Hik 538, Her 299) 4 2 The Hipp passage as transmitted has an entirely normal fo rm: 4 3 motive no. 1 passes 4 0 "Notes on Hipp " 33f; Sommerstein suggests this point is "both too obvious and too unpleasant to put into words". 4 1 "Women's Property" 182f. 4 2 On this use of f|iaaTa, see Stevens Colloquial Expressions 14. 4 3 Solmsen appreciates the variety of expression in the passage (Int. Exp. 15n): "Three possible motives, each disproved in a different fashion, are most appropriate". But this being the case, it is unnecessary to ascribe Hippolytos' failure to comment on Phaidra's beauty to "tact" (ibid 15). 114 without comment, motive no. 2 gets a brief comment ("I wou ld have to have been a fool"), motive no. 3 is denied wi th f J K i o T a , and subjected to a developed argument (1014-20) whose point is spoiled in the transmitted text of 1014-5. Clearly these lines (interpolated or not, and whether we punctuate before or after Tolai CTcoc|)poaLv) must give a reason why ol Grooves take no pleasure in rul ing. Wi th ei. LIT] in 1014 we cannot get this sense. Thus Barrett suggested: f]KLO"T', 6TT6L T O i rag fypevas 8ie4>9opev etc. It is hard to see how this could have been corrupted to our text, but the sense it gives is the right one. 4 4 We have seen a number of argumentative passages in which a single rhetorical technique is presented wi th variations. It is legitimate to ask whether the variations observed represent decisions made by Euripides for purposes of characterising the speaker or the relationship between the two interlocutors. J. Mossman has seen subtle nuances in the application of this technique; speaking of Hek 258-64, she notes: 4 5 ...Hecuba proceeds wi th a series of three two-line rhetorical questions (260-1 and 262-3 constituting alternative answers to the question at 259-60) answered by a single line stressing Polyxena's innocence. A comparison wi th other passages of rhetorical questions is interesting: Med. 499ff. give a more agitated and angry effect because of their more irregular arrangement and conversational tone.... And. 192ff., on the other hand, has more frequent, shorter questions, which are more appropriate than longer, more elaborate ones would be in Andromache's reply to Hermione's furious tirade: they are less reasoned than our passage because Andromache's opponent is less reasonable than Odysseus. And. 44 45 Barrett suspected, though, that vss. 1012-5 were interpolated. Wild Justice, 106f. 115 387ff., too, show a barrage of very quick, staccato questions (five in three lines at 388-90), which reflect Andromache's distress. Here Hecuba is fighting an intellectual battle...: she needs to use, and does use, a more reasoned and cerebral approach. Andromache, on the other hand, is preparing for a death which seems inevitable if her son is to be saved, and is correspondingly less rational and more emotional. That said, I wou ld suggest that this difference is not due entirely to the difference in their circumstances, and that it would not be going too far to suggest that by making Hecuba respond in this superbly rational way, Euripides is laying down one of her fundamental character traits, and one which he w i l l develop further later on. I quote at length here because the point under consideration is such a central one for this study. Mossman demonstrates elsewhere her general sym-pathy wi th ideas about the stylised character of the different "modes" of tragic presentation (lyric, stichomythia, rhesis, etc.), but suggests that every detail of presentation serves complex purposes, which may include the bui ld ing up of complex characters through a composite process: "the same character presents itself throught the different filters in turn, but none the less can be seen as a consistent enti ty". 4 6 She concludes: 4 7 ...I wou ld wish to see rhetoric and other formal elements of tragedy (diction, metre, lyric, structure), wi th all their 'stylisation of reali ty' , 4 8 as advantages for, rather than.constraints on, the poets. Wi th ski l ful manipulation they can delineate a portrait of a character that not only convinces on a psychological level...but which also appeals to our intellects because it is expressed with a clarity of articulation rarely achieved in real life but necessary in the theatre to avoid obscurity, boredom, and waste of valuable dramatic time.... In achieving this the poet w i l l uti l ize, rather than be bound by, the stylization of speech and the formal structural framework of tragedy. 4 6 Ibid 94-103. The quotation (97f) comes in a discussion of A. M . Dale's view that consistency of character was not a primary goal of the tragic poets. 4 7 Ibid l O l f . 4 8 The phrase is quoted from O. de Mourgues' 1967 book Racine or the Triumph of Relevance. 116 This general statement seems entirely acceptable. But wi th respect to Mossman's detailed treatment of characterisation through rhetorical mannerisms, I wou ld make several comments: I see no problem in the idea that Euripides gives his characters (or some of them) "fundamental character traits" that are developed through a play; and, as I have shown above (II.D), the tone of a rhetorical ex-change may contribute to our impression of the relationship of the two speakers (e.g., in the confrontations of Admetos and Pheres, Hippolytos and Theseus). But a stylised format for argument, frequently used, is not the place where one should expect to see subtleties of the type Mossman refers to. I see other pointers present in the scenes she compares. Hekabe's response may be "superbly rational", but she is in the weakest position of the three characters under dis-cussion, utterly defeated at every turn. Medeia, elsewhere coolly confident of her ability to prevail through deception or witchcraft, begins and ends her speech (Med 465-519) by heaping contempt on Jason; Andromache's proud defiance is spelled out clearly in the preambles to her speeches to both Hermione (Andr 184-91) and Menelaos (319f). If the slight variations in the use of hypophora argument in these four passages were intended by Euripides to convey information about character and situation, I wou ld think that the sheer virtuoso exhaustiveness of Andro-mache's sequence in Andr 192ff would characterise the speaker as a truly regal person, accustomed to withering her inferiors through her personal (not intellectual) superiority: Hermione, young and half-cocked, and the cowardly Menelaos are no match. Hekabe, by contrast, conveys no sense of command; she makes in the course of her speech a number of points that seem inevitable given the situation (that human sacrifice is wrong, that in any case Polyxene is not the appropriate vict im, that she herself merits both pity and the observance of an obligation, that Odysseus has the prestige to bring about a reversal of the verdict). 117 Neither Hekabe nor either of the other women argues wi th any real sense argument w i l l p reva i l . 4 9 Unl ike the others, Hekabe never really takes the offensive, and her rational points are interrupted by appeals for pity. In spite of the highly rational thought processes that the arguments presented presuppose, none of the three women is characterised as an unusually "rational" person. But perhaps to some extent the details of the argument-sequences enhance the sense of personal status and relationship that is already present in the scenes. 5 0 C. El iminat ion of Alternatives: Future The hypophora technique we have seen used in probability arguments dealing wi th past events is also set to work in deliberative situations, where typically it is used to argue there is no viable course of action available, and in situations where the pathetic quality of self-addressed rhetorical questions emphasises the despair of the character and the impossibility of any happy outcome. Admetos attempts in Alk 1049-61 to decline Herakles' offer to leave the veiled woman with h im by showing that there are no appropriate quarters for her to occupy in his palace: 4 9 Andromache has spoken of people being put in their place by their inferiors (Andr 189f); Medeia says she is speaking of her exile only to put Jason in the worst possible light (Med 500f). 5 0 The question whether Euripides produces in these situations arguments whose content is uniquely suited to speaker or interlocutor is a separate one, and one for which I think there is no general answer. Sometimes the argument seems to express an element of the speaking character's "psychology", or of the relationship between the two characters; as often one is struck by the abstract and impersonal quality of the thought. For example, Gould rightly comments on the speech of the Nurse in Hipp 433-81 that "it is the shaping pressure of rhetorical form which determines the movement of the speech more than any sense that these arguments are native to the Nurse, or that they are chosen to penetrate the defences of this opponent" ("Dramatic Character" 56). 118 1049 Where could I even keep a young woman? 1050 (for I observe she is young) 1051 (a) among men? 1052-4 rhetorical question and answer argue against this option 1055 (b) in Alkestis' quarters? 1056-57a rhetorical question introduces argument against this option: double blame 1057b-59 (a) from 8nu.G)Tat 1060-61 ((3) from r\ Gavouaa The symmetry of the sequence is striking. A sort of di lemma is presented: Admetos implies there are only two options for housing the guest, then argues both are impossible. A very similar technique is used by Herakles in deliberating over the question whether he should keep or discard the weapons wi th which he has ki l led his family. Here the di lemma is initially posed using an indirect question (Her 1378: d|j.Tixotvto ydp rroTep' exw Ta§ TJ u.e9co). Herakles then imagines his weapons addressing h im (1379-81a), and asks: eiT' eycb Td8' (hXevaig OLaw; TL fyaoKW, dXXd yuu.voj9eis OTTXGJV £w olg Td KaXXior' e£erfpa£' ev ' EXXdSi ex9pots en,auToy urroXaPuJU ataxpcos 9avco; ou XeiTTTeov Ta8', d9X[tos' Se acoaTeov. (Her 1381-85) Rhetorical questions are used to introduce the two alternatives. In the first leg, a further rhetorical question suggests the impossibil ity of the option being con-sidered; in the second, the initial question implies this. 119 Orestes in IT 95-103 expresses to Pylades his insecurity over the possibilities for gaining entrance to Artemis' shrine. I quote the very problematic text as printed by Diggle: TL 8piou.ev; d L K j u p X r i o T p a y d p TOLXCOV opais w J m X d - r r o T e p a KXILUIKCOV TTpoaau-PdaeLs-eu.(3r|CTO|iea9a; TTCOS' < d v > o u v Xd9oL|iev d v ; f\ x a X K O T e u K T a KXf]L9pa Xvoavreg u . o x X o l s ' T tov oi>8ev la\i.ev + ; r\v 8 ' d v o i y o v T e s TruXas' XT|cj)9a)LJ.ey e a p d a e L s Te Li.rixoivc6u.evoL, 9avouu.e9'. (IT 96-102) 97 KXILKIKCOV Kayser: Scou-dTcov L 98 XdGoLLLev Sallier: u.d9- L (quo servato 99 del. Dindorf) The passage seems to conform to the pattern we have seen elsewhere. A rhetorical question expresses d u . T ] x a v L a . One course of action is introduced by a rhetorical question (here much improved by Kayser's conjecture), 5 1 then rejected through a further question (if Sallier's Xd9oLu.ev is correct). A second alternative course is next suggested, and this is rejected through a statement rather than a question. The two conjectures mentioned both serve to strengthen the contrast between the two alternatives. I don't have complete confidence in either of them, but it seems clear at any rate that a sequence in which two alternative courses are mooted and rejected underlies our text. 5 2 5 1 See Platnauer's thorough discussion ad 97. 5 2 Dindorf's deletion of vs. 99 (designed to make sense of the difficult u>v ovSev io~\iev) would thus destroy the whole point of the passage. I think it is just possible that Euripides wrote cov ovSev io\iev with reference to KXfjiOpa (so Murray, app. crit.); in this case the phrase offers a further argument against the second course. Markland added a question mark at the end of vs. 103, as if a third alternative were there considered (flee by ship). As we have seen, dXXd often introduces the final alternative in a series; but in this case the final alternative would be the practical course, a solution to the d\ir\xav^a, rather than another occasion for pessimism. It thus makes more sense as a positive suggestion (despite Weil's contention [critical note ad loc] it is "unworthy" of Orestes). 120 We have been looking at passages in which alternative questions are used to give what is essentially a pathetic situation an argumentative underpinning. Alternative questions are also used by Euripides in a purely deliberative context (i.e., the alternatives are mentioned not merely for the purpose of rejecting them): TTOTepov uc()di|!Oj 8(3|j.a VUU.CJHKOV' rrupL, f| O n K T o v toCTOj c f i d a y a v o v 8L ' r j r r a T o s . . . (Med 378f) Medeia asks what form her revenge should take (cf. Her 1146ff, discussed above). A few lines later she uses a hypophora sequence (but without alternative question) to express the hopelessness of her plans: KCU 8f) T e O v d o v rig \ie S e ^ e T c u TTOAIS; TIS y f jv dovXov KOU 86U.OUS e x e y y u o u s ' tievos r r a p a a x c b v p u a e T c u T O U L I O V S e L i a s ; oik e o n . (Med 386-9) The second question here amplifies the first rather than introducing an argu-mentative point (cf. Lykos' badgering questions in Her 143f). This seems to give a more natural effect than in the passages reviewed above. 5 3 Menelaos in a speech of self-condemnation employs a variation that seems unique in Euripides. He sets out to demonstrate not that he lacks alternative courses, but that he has ignored the logical course: 5 3 But a tone of formal argument seems present in the use of Km 8f| to introduce a hypothetical proposition whose consequences will be considered. See Denniston GP 253: Denniston's Euripidean examples of this usage are the present passage and Hipp 1007, Hel 1059, Med 1107 (chorus); K-G add (I. 202f) Or 1108. Arguments similar to that of Med 386-9 proceed from hypothetical statements in the indicative without this introduction in Andr 334 (whose strangeness is noted by Stevens ad loc) and IA 1185. 121 T L pouXoum ydp; ou ydaoug e^ aLpeToug dXXoug Xd(3oL|i' dv, el ydLixov lueLpoum; dXX' d'rroXeaas' d8eXc|xSv, ov \i' fJKLOT' expfj'A 'EXevr\v eXcoLiaL, T O KOLKOV dvrl TayaSoO; (IA 485-8) Two alternative courses are considered, but one is expressly identified as preferable. A common tragic situation in which a character considers alternatives for the future is the prospect of exile. The character recognises the pathetic lack of choices open to h im by testing a number of alternatives. In accusing Jason, Medeia uses a hypophoric sequence to argue that her future as an exile is bleak: VVV TTOL TpdlTOOLiOtL; rroTepa Trpos- rfcrrpos SoLioug, ovs aoi rrpoSouaa Kal rrdTpav d(JHK6|ir|V; f\ Trpog TaXalvas- TTeXLaSag; KaXoog y' dv ovv Se^ aLVTO \x' O L K O L S &v rraTepa KaTeKTavoiA ex^L ydp OUTGO• rolg |iev OLKoBev (JHAOIS' exQpd KaGeaTrix', ou? 8e \i' O U K expfiv KaKCos-8pdv, aol x.dp\.v fyepovoa TroXe|iLOug ex w - (Med 502-8) The two groups identified in the alternative question (Medeia's family in Kolchis, Jason's in Iolkos) are resumed in the explanatory statement that follows. The play w i l l develop a third alternative: Athens. Herakles uses a similar form in demonstrating his lack of options for the future: f)KGo 8' dvdyKag eg T 6 8 ' - O U T ' 6(10X9 cjxXoug 8fj(3aLs evoLKetv OCTLOV f\v~ 8e Kal u_evto, e<s TTOIOV iepbv f] TTavriyupLV cjuXcov el | i ' ; ou ydp aTag eurrpooTiyopoug exoo. 122 dXX' "Apyos eX9co; TTCOS, errel (j)euyco rrdTpav; (|>ep' dXX' es d\\r]v 8r) T L V ' opu-fiaw TroXiy; K a u e i S ' etc. (Her 1281-7) Aga in , specific destinations are ruled out. Theseus w i l l offer an alternative that has not occurred to Herakles. A s in the elimination of motives in Hipp 1008-15 discussed above, the final point is argued at some length; thus a fuller treatment is achieved without compromising the rhetorical effect of the series of questions. Oidipous in Phoin faces exile wi th similar misgivings: eiev T L Spdaco 8fj9' 6 SuaSaLu.coL' eyio; T L £ fiyeLiojy LLOL 710869 6u.apTTiaei TucbXoD; f\8' f] Qavovaa; Cakrd y' av o"dcj)' ol8' O T L . dXX' euTeKvos u^vcopLg; dXX' OVK eau U.OL. dXX' e n vedCoiv avrbs e l i p o L U . ' dv (3LOV; . , 7769ev; (Phoin 1615-20) Here the lack of a supporting indiv idual (parent, sons, self) makes better rhetoric than the lack of a destination: Oidipous in exile is to be a bl ind wandering beggar, to whom no place is hospitable. A n d the fact that Antigone w i l l now offer to accompany her father makes a satisfying outcome for the quandary. 5 4 Iphis, who has lost both a son (Eteoklos) and a daughter (Evadne the wife of Kapaneus) through the Theban War, surveys his alternatives for the future: elev T L 8f) XP1! T 0 V TaXaiTrtopov |ie Spdv; areixeiv TTpos- O L K O U S ; KOLLT ' epr jLiLav tSto TroXXf]v LLeXd9pa)v drropLay T ' eLiwi |3LCOL; 5 4 A n opportunity for a similar consideration of exile is realised quite differently in Her 302-6. Note also the treatment of this topic in "Opfertod" speeches and in Phoin 387-407. 123 f] rrpos' LteXaGpa ToDSe Karravecog uoAco; f)8LOTa rrplv ye 8fj0' 6 T ' r\v rratg fjSe \ioi. dXX' O U K C T ' eoriv etc. (Hik 1094-9) A s often, the first alternative is rejected wi th a question, the second wi th a statement; and here again the final alternative develops into an extended argument (comparing the qualities of sons and daughters). 5 5 In all of the above passages, there is a pathetic realisation by the speaker that choice is l imited or excluded. The same formal pattern serves the purposes of a speaker arguing that the interlocutor is in a desperate situation. In Andr 344-49 Andromache poses a series of questions to Menelaos, mooting and then eliminating the two options he may assume he has in dealing wi th Hermione, should he remove her from Neoptolemos' household: 344b-47a Impossible to f ind her a new husband 347b-48a Intolerable to have her growing old at home A n d Iokaste in Phoin addresses a similar sequence to Polyneikes to demonstrate the stupidity of his campaign: 571-77 . if you win: 572 what trophy can you raise? 573 how can you lead the sacrifices? 574 what inscription can you write? 578-82a but if you lose: 579 how can you return to Argos? 582b-83 both outcomes are evi l 5 5 A somewhat similar sequence begins at Alk 941: Admetos asks how in the future he may take any pleasure from his domestic surroundings— but no alternatives are listed. The alternative question beginning at Alk 1051 (see above) is unusual in separating the two questions posing the alternatives by three lines of argument dismissing at length the first alternative. 124 In these two passages, the effect is that of a di lemma argument. 5 6 In a similar situation, Klytaimestra uses a much more loosely constructed series of questions (IA 1185-95) to demonstrate the bleakness of Agamemnon's future, should he carry out the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. D. Hypothetical Arguments We have seen a number of passages in which hypothetical alternatives are reviewed, normally for the sake of a pathetic demonstration of the bleakness of the speaker's or the interlocutor's outlook. Euripides' favoured form for this purpose is the series of rhetorical questions, a form inherently conducive to pathos. In some other situations, conditional formulations are used to present a comparison for various rhetorical purposes. Simplest among these are statements expressing an impotent threat ("If I were not prevented [by old age, weakness, the law, etc.], you would suffer for your treatment of me") . 5 7 Condit ional formulations are used in argumentative situations in a number of passages in which an unreal condition is contrasted wi th the factual situation, often in order to highlight the bleakness of the present outlook or to point to sordid motives. A n example occurs in Klytaimestra's speech to Elektra 5 6 Iokaste's final comments to Eteokles just before this passage also pose a dilemma, but this is not put in the form of a series of rhetorical questions. Iokaste asks first (560f), "If I ask whether you would rather rule or save the city, will you say rule?" This of itself makes the point that to rule is an ignoble choice in the circumstances. She continues (561b), f\v Se VIKT)OT|I. a' oSe..., and this leads to a description of the devastating consequences of a defeat. The passage has been understood differently; see Mastronarde ad 561-5, 562 (whose text and interpretation I follow). 5 7 E.g., Hik 458, Her 211, 232, Tro 408, Hel 75. More developed arguments using a simple contrary-to-fact condition are in Or 564-71, Soph. Ant 905-12. 125 defending her action in ki l l ing Agamemnon. Why, she asks, d id he sacrifice Iphigeneia? KGL \L€V TTOAeiOS dXtOCTlV e^ LCOLieVOS-f] SOJU. ' ovfjacov rdXka T ' eKaokCwv TeKva eicreive TTOXXGJV [ilav urrep, auyyvcooT ' ay rjv. vuv 8 ' oiivex' ' EXevri udpyos1 fjv 6 T ' aS XafJtov aXoxov KoXdCeiv rrpoSoTLy OVK rimoTaTO, T O U T O J V eKaTL TTOLS ' e|if)v 8ui)\€<J€v. (Elek 1024-30) t The contrast here is between circumstances Klytaimestra says wou ld have been acceptable, and the "true", discreditable circumstances. The rhetorical purpose is to present Klytaimestra as a reasonable and tolerant woman; this line continues in the sequel (1030-4: "but even this event didn't cause me to k i l l h im— no, it was the fact he brought Kassandra into the house"). The argument is thus a fortiori and proceeds in three stages: Klytaimestra describes (a) a hypothetical offense that would have been forgivable; (b) an unforgivable offense that nevertheless d id not provoke revenge; (c) the greater offense that provoked revenge. Very similar arguments occur elsewhere. Medeia tells Jason that his new marriage wou ld be acceptable if it arose out of a legitimate complaint of childlessness: el ydp r\oQ' dmus e n , caiyyvcooT' dv fjv aoi TO08 ' epaaGfjvai Xexoug. (Med 490f) A n d the O ld M a n in Ion, attempting to persuade Kreousa to plot against her husband, explains under what circumstances the offense he has committed against her wou ld have been mitigated: 126 d r r X o O i ' d v fjv y d p T O KCIKOV , e i T r a p ' e u y e v o D g L n y r p o s , TTLGOJV a e , or\v Xeycov a T r a i S i a v , e a c o L K i a ' O L K O U S - (Ion 839-41) In all these passages, the speaker seeks to give an impression that a reasonable person has been the vict im of a gross insul t . 5 8 The contrast of hypothetical and real situations is emphasised in the Elek passage above using vvv 8e. This expression follows a contrary-to-fact condition in some 23 other places in Eur ip ides. 5 9 In a number of these passages the prevai l ing tone is one of regret (e.g. Her 314, Tro 1171); in a few others the formulation serves the purpose of exposition by explaining a direction the plot w i l l take (Hipp 659, Hek 900, Hel 1624). But we also f ind the structure used to frame an abstract reflection (Phoin 501). Forensic use of this sequence is seen in , besides Elek 1024: Hipp 1025 (Hippolytos explaining why he can't defend himself properly), Hek 1230 (Hekabe accusing Polymestor); IA 1214 (Iphigeneia's variation of the d T r e i p L a topos). 6 0 Deliberative uses appear in Hipp 496, Hik 306, Or 1134 (in each case justifying a decision or a proposed action). For arguments of this form in the speeches of Lysias, J. Bateman has distiguished three classes that differ in the character of the final term (the vvv 8e statement). 6 1 In his first class, the final statement offers a factual point that undermines the opponent's case (Batemen uses the term aT]u.eTov) . Something of the sort occurs in the Kretes fragment, vs. 9. In the second group are statements 5 8 A similar argument is made in different terms by Polyneikes, Phoin 484-90: KOI vvv ETOLLIOS 6LLLL — 5 9 Viz. Hipp 496, [625], 659, 1025, Hek 900, 1230, Hik 306, 792 (lyric), Her 314, 440 (lyric), 669 (lyric), Tro 1171, Hel 292, 938,1924, Phoin 501, Or 1134, IA 968,1214, Kret 9, frr. 636.7, 821.5, 978.3. 6 0 IA 1214 as a proem reflection shares its form with Phoin 501; cf. Hik 1084ff, Hipp 618-[26]. 6 1 Diss. 28-32. 127 which represent "a conflict in the sphere of human action" (28). These occur in connection wi th arguments about conduct (30): "In the conditional clause some course of conduct is assumed, whose consequent would be an action worthy of approbation. The truth of the matter is then presented, and the judges are left in no doubt of the moral viciousness of the opponent..." (cf. Hek 1230). In the third type, the final statement squarely contradicts one part of the syl logism impl ied in the condit ion (32). 6 2 A trivial example of this in Euripides is Her 312-4 (Chorus: "If we still had our strength and someone were outraging you, we wou ld stop them; but we have no strength [oi)8ev eau.ev]"). I f ind no example of forensic use of this type for the purpose of refutation. In general Euripides doesn't seem to use the vvv Se clause for logical argument, but to summarise the situation (e.g. Hik 306: "but since that is not the case...") or move to a new stage of narrative (Hel 1624). Unreal conditions are often combined wi th rhetorical questions to emphasise the correct conclusion to be drawn from an impl ied comparison. Often there is a tone of derision, as when Klytaimestra asks Elektra: el 8' 6K Sou.uJi' TpTraoTO MeveXecos AdGpcu, Kravelv u.' ' Opeamv x P ^ . Kaoay VT)rr|S' Troaiv MeveXaov cos CTc6aaLLU; aos 8e Trios Trcrrfip f|veo~xeT' dv TCXOT ' ; eiTa rbv \iev ov Qavelv KTetvovTa XPW Tdu.', eu.e 8e Trpos' Keivov naQelv; (Elek 1041-5) 6 3 6 2 Bateman refers to this argument as "destructive hypothetical syllogism", but adds (32n): "there is no evidence [in Lysias and the other orators] of any awareness of the logical basis and requirements of this type of syllogism since they deny indifferently the antecedent and the consequent". 6 3 Denniston (ad loc) finds the absolute use of rraGetv here anomalous; Diggle agrees and posits a lacuna after 1045 (Euripidea 165-7). Cropp in his 1982 L C M note (51f) reviews the rhetorical presentation of the argument (comparing Andr 663-7) and the problem of TTaQeiv: he envisions "hesitantly" the possibility of corruption along the lines suggested by Denniston; but he is "not convinced that emendation is necessary" (52). 128 The first question presents hypothetically the idea Klytaimestra wou ld have been obligated to k i l l Orestes in the event of an abduction of Menelaos; this idea's self-evident absurdity implies a negative view of the analogous actual case. The rrtog-question drives home the point by emphasising the disastrous consequences of such a scenario. The same sequence may present a positive argument: . el TTpocravTes fjv ToSe 'ApTeLuSi, TTcog dv Ao£lag eGeamaev K O L u a m u.' dyaXu.a Beds TroXiau.' eg TTaXXdSog (IT 1012-4) 6 4 The combination of hypothetical scenario and rhetorical question is also found wi th other types of condition: fjv 8 ' ovv eyd) u.ev \xr\ Gavetv urfeKSpdu-Oj, T O V TralSd LXOU K T e v e i T e ; K a i T a rrcog r r aTr ip TeKvou GavovTog paiSloog dve^eTai; (Andr 338-40) Here again a second rhetorical question points to a decisive obstacle. In Helen's appeal to Theonoe this form is used to present an a fortiori argument: K e l \iev Qav6)v 68' kv rrupdi i KaTeac|)dyr| 1" rrpoato acj) ' d r r o v T a SaKpuoig dv fiydrrcov v u v S ' o v T a K a l acoQevT ' d ^ a i p e G r i a o L i a L ; (Hel 936-8) Similar arguments are used by Elektra in refuting the "tokens" suggested as evidence of Orestes' return. In Elek 534-7 Elektra tells the O ld M a n first that there could be no footprint left on the hard ground at the tomb, then that even if 6 4 Diggle follows Koechly in assuming a lacuna after 1014; therefore punctuation is uncertain. Weil's critical note ad 1015 puts the problem succinctly. 129 such a mark were present, it could not identify Orestes through comparison wi th Elektra's own foot: TTGOS 8 ' dv. yevoiT' dv ev KpaTouAecoi rreScoi y a l a s TTOSOJV £ K ( i a K T p o v ; e l 8 ' eonv ToSe , . SuoXv d8e\c|)OLV r roug dv ov yevoLT' L a o s dv8pog re K a l y u v a i K O s , dXX' a p a r i v K p a T e l . (Elek 534-7) The condition thus introduces a second, remoter stage to the argument: all bases are covered in a systematic way . 6 5 Similarly in 541-6 Elektra denies first that she could as a youngster have produced any clothing for Orestes, then adds that even if she had, he could no longer be wearing an item made for h im as a little boy: OUK o l a 9 \ 'Opearng t]viK' eKTrlTrreL x 9 ° v o s , veav IT' ovoav; el 8e K a K p e K O v r re r rXoug , Trio? dv T O T ' GOV T r d l g T a u T a vvv ex01 ^ P 1 ! . e l u.f) ^uyau^0Lv9 ' o l rreTrXoL TOOL aoouaTL; (Elek 541-4) The first question dismisses the probability of a young gir l making c lothing. 6 6 But again wi th e l 8e Elektra concedes the point for the sake of a further argument. This scene, wi th its undoubted reference to the recognition scene in Choephoroi, has puzzled many cri t ics. 6 7 Various views of the passage's tone 6 5 A similar procedure unfolds differently in the first response of Elektra in this scene (Elek 524-31): she disputes the evidence of the lock of hair by arguing first (524-6) that a secret return to Argos by Orestes is out of the question, then that in any case (eneLTa 527) male and female locks would not match. A third stage (530f) then makes the further point that hair that matches is no sure evidence of a blood relationship. The thoroughness of these arguments is striking. 6 6 That young girls can make clothing, and that the et;v<\>ao\ia <jf\s xepidSog mentioned by the Old Man (vs. 539) needn't necessarily refer to clothing, are points of no importance in the analysis of Elektra's argument. 6 7 I rely in the following particularly on the comments ad loc of Denniston (ed.) and Cropp (ed.), and on the discussion of Goebel, diss. 347-56. 130 have been put forward: the scene is a vicious and dishonest send-up of Aischylos' scene (Wilamowitz); it is a self-conscious "improvement" of that scene (Denniston); it contains justified criticism of Aischylos' unacceptable naivety (Page); it is a bold violation of the genre (Michelini), or an innocent comedic spoof (Bond); it involves subtle psychology in evincing Elektra's fears and forebodings (Murray); it forms part of the ongoing characterisation of Elektra as "ill-tempered, arrogant, and self-pitiful" (Lloyd-Jones); it attacks neither Aischylos nor Elektra, but the "argument from probabil ity" itself (Goebel). 6 8 It seems to me likely that the virtuoso character of the argumentation itself is designed to draw our attention. The Aischylean scene has been adopted as a familiar framework. 6 9 The process of recognition has been delayed, here as elsewhere, through the introduction of a series of obstacles; there is irony and humour (not serious criticism of Aischylos) in the failure of the familiar tokens to finish the job. Instead these tokens are subjected to a thoroughly up-to-date critique; the sophistication of the arguments Elektra puts, together wi th the unexpectedness of the entire idea of such a critique, give that process its interest. That she is being unpleasant to an old family retainer, and that she is wrong in her conclusions, are facts that contribute to other aspects of the scene's effect. Her unpleasantness is consistent wi th the presentation of her character elsewhere in the play (cf. e.g. 404-19, another passage that performs a vital function in service of the plot). I see this quality as a realistic manifestation of the misery of a 6 8 Wilamowitz Hermes 18 (1883): 236n; Denniston ed. p. 114; Page apud Denniston p. 115; Michelini Euripides 206; Bond Hermathena CXVIII (1974): 7; Murray tr. pp. 89-91; Lloyd-Jones CQ 11 (1961): 180; Goebel diss. 355. The arguments for regarding the entire passage as an interpolation have been reviewed systematically by West ("Tragica IV" 17-21) and Kovacs (BICS 36 [1989]: 67-78). 6 9 On the process by which Euripides arrived at his variant treatment of the recognition, see West's interesting speculation ("Tragica IV" 17). 131 sympathetic character, rather than as alienating sympathy: thus I f ind some truth in Murray's view of the passage. A s for the fact her arguments lead her to the wrong conclusion, this is precisely what the plot requires— doubts and delays. 7 0 . A hypothetical reversal of the positions of the interested parties (whether achieved wi th or without conditional formulations) is a common procedure in Greek oratory, and not infrequent in Euripides. In its simplest form, a defendant excuses his actions by noting that his vict im would have reacted in the same way to the pressures that led h im to commit the offensive act. Eurystheus tells A lkmene she would have responded as he did to the unfortunate lot that befell h i m : O U K O U V ov y' dvaXa(3o0aa Tag eiids Tuxas exQpou Xeovros Svo\xevf\ (3XaaTrju.aTa f]\avves dv KCXKOIOTV dXXd acoctpovtos etaaas- oiKelv "Apyos - o imv ' dv mOois. (Hkld 1005-8) So Menelaos asks Peleus (in Andr 668-70, lines I have elsewhere defended as Eur ip idean) 7 1 whether he, having given his daughter in marriage, wou ld sit quietly by whi le she suffered insult. Hippolytos tells Theseus he would have taken strong action in his father's p lace: 7 2 7 0 Cf. the many near-misses in the recognition plots of IT and Ion. 7 1 See above, Ch. II n. 29. 7 2 A subtle example of the same sort of argument is Menelaos' comment to Peleus, who has harangued him in part for failing to kill Helen when she was returned to him: "I exercised self-control (eaa)c|>p6vow); I wish you had done the same and not killed your brother Phokos" (Andr 685-7). 132 el ydp ov [lev Trots fjaQ', eyw 8e obs TraTfip, eKTetvd T O L a ' ay K O U ("juyats eCr]Luouv, eiTrep yuvaLKOs T ) £ L O U S e|rfjs Qiyelv. (Hipp 1042-4) Klytaimestra's speech to Elektra defending her murder of Agamemnon contains a similar argument: 7 3 el 8 ' eK 86[i0jy fjpTraoro MeveXecos XdGpaL, KTavetv u.' 'OpeaTnv xpf\v< KaaLyvfjrns TTOCTLV MeveXaov tog ackraLLU; (Elek 1041-3) Orestes' argument in defense of his murder of Klytaimestra involves the same reversal of points of view: eL 8e 8f) Td LxriTepos' oiy&v €TTT\IVOVV, T L p.' dy eSpaa' 6 KaTGavcov; O U K dv u.e LiLccov dvexdpeu' 'Epivucav; fj u.r|Tpi [lev rrdpeLca aujxLiaxoL Geat, TCOL 8 ' ou TrdpeLaL, LidXXov fi8LKr)LLevojL; (Or 580-4) Hypothetical arguments have been treated here wi th arguments presented in rhetorical question form. This grouping stems naturally from the fact that Euripides' use in argument of rhetorical questions is inextricably bound to his use of arguments from probability. These arguments tend to involve con-dit ional formulations, asking "Given X [the assumption may be clearly stated as a fact or merely impl ied as a normal expectation, a "probability"], how could Y 7 3 These shocking reversals of point of view seem to have fascinated Euripides. At I A 1201f Klytaimestra suggests Hermione is the more reasonable victim than Iphigeneia (and cf. Hek 265f, where Hekabe proposes sacrificing Helen, not Polyxene); in Or 658f Orestes tells Menelaos there is no need for Hermione to be sacrificed in compensation for the loss of Iphigeneia. I see no essential difference between the passage quoted and the other examples collected here that should cause M . Lloyd to refer to Elek 1041-5 as the only Euripidean example of an argument involving "hypo-thetical role-reversal" (Agon 32 n.50). Note also ironic reversals like that of Tro 1180-6: Hekabe buries Astyanax instead of the reverse. 133 possibly occur?" The hypothetical arguments surveyed in this section are similarly used in applying a process of comparison to the present situation; but now the comparison is wi th neither factual circumstances nor probabilities, but w i th an imaginary possibility, an unreal alternative scenario. We have seen Euripidean characters use this k ind of argument to define the conditions under which an action would be appropriate (e.g. Med 490f), to draw a conclusion based on observed facts (IT 1012-4), to add a second stage of security to conclusions reached using a normal probability argument (Elek 534-7), and to pose arguments based on a hypothetical reversal of roles (Hipp 1042-4). 134 Chapter IV General Rule and Special Case Euripides was notoriously fond of introducing gnomic and abstract pro-nouncements and reflections into his plays; since antiquity he has been regarded as the "philosopher" among the three tragedians, and doubts about the relevance and function of some gnomic and reflective passages have loomed large in Eur i -pidean crit icism ancient and modern. 1 Speeches having a persuasive or deli-berative intention are particularly l ikely to be peppered wi th general material used to frame or buttress arguments, and Euripides has a number of characteris-tic techniques for bringing general rules and observations to bear on the parti-cular dramatic situation. Before exploring Euripides' use of gnomic material in rhetorical situations, I shall describe ful ly the various ways in which he formu-lates general statements (Section A below). I shall next investigate the typical rhetorical uses of general or gnomic statements (B), then look at two special applications of gnomic material: the expression in general terms of a realisation that contradicts expectation or common sense (C), and the expression of impos-sible wishes having general content— the so-called "utopian reflections" (D). A s some of these reflections are expressed as complaints addressed to Zeus or "the 1 Schmid (Gesch. d. griech. Lit. I, iii. 734 n. 8) notes scholia ad Tro 634 (ou crroxdCeTai TWV uTTOKeiaevcov TTpoacuTTcav Kal ydp vvv r\ 'AvSpoadxT) < Ta > auTd (j>iXocrocj)ei duep euTTpoaBev r\ KaadvSpa), Phoin 388 (OUK ev Seovn yvto|ioXoyet...). Schmid's own view of Euripidean generalising is that Euripides' "need to instruct" caused him to interject material that "inhibits the flow of the action" and "spoils the presentation of character" (ibid 769). 135 gods", some comments w i l l be made on the degree to which these reflections represent a departure from traditional religious beliefs. A . Formal Patterns 1. S imple and "connected" gnomes I begin wi th free-standing aphorisms, sententiae that express in a stylish way what one might think of as common sense or experience: 2 (juXouai TTalSas oi T ' du.eivoves' (3poTt3v OL T ' oiidev ovTeg- (Her 634f) T O Chios' T O S ' dvGpGJTTOioTV TJSLCTTOV pXeTreiy, Td vepQe 8 ' ovSev (IA 1250f) These may be introduced asyndetically, and so make a particularly epigrammatic effect; more often particles connect them to the rhetorical context: u.dTT|v dp' oi yepovTes euxovTou Qavelv, y ipa? i\iiyovTes Kai (laKpov xpovov ftiov (Alk 669f) Td Pappapcov ydp SoOXa TrdvTa TTXT]V evos. (Hel 276) 2 The antithetical form of both these examples is quite common in Euripides: see Wilamowitz ad Her 1106, Denniston ad El 1017, Mastronarde ad Phoin 479-80. Other examples of simple ev8o£ov aphorism: Alk 1008, Med 964, Andr 207f, Hek [831f], Hik 509, Her 299f, Or 70. Pithy enough to be "proverbs": Hik 509b (fjauxo? Kaipdh, oofyos), IA 333b, 387b; cf. Her 561 (acjnXov... TO SuoruxeS'). .136 Here the particle ties the gnome to the preceding material, in the first case as a conclusion to be drawn, in the second as a corroborating rule. The latter situation is especially common. The content is often decidedly r r a p d 86£av: 6 TTXOUTOS\ dv9pwTTLO"Ke, rdls aocfjo'is' 9e6s (Kyk 316) Kpelaaov 8e vooeiv f\ B e p a T r e u e i v (Hipp 186) In this case (as Aristotle tells us) an explanatory "epilogue" may be wanted, in which are expressed f) OLLTLCX mi T O Sid T L . 3 Thus the last example continues: TO u.€v ecmv drrXoOv, TOOL 8e ovvaTTTei XVTTT] Te fypevtiv xepo"Lv re TTOVOS'. (Hipp 187f) Connection of the gnome to its context may involve the loss of one or more words, which must then be supplied from the surroundings: 4 K d y t o \xev riOSiov TCOL y a u . o u i m LLT]T£ a o l Kf|8os ovvaityai 8uJLiaaLV Xafieiv K a K f j g y u v c u K O s TTCUXOV 6K(j)epouaL y d p pT|TpcoL' 6V€L8T|. (Andr 619-22) 3 Aristotle's example (Rhet 94al9-94b24) is Med 294-7. Cf. Hkld 458-60, Hek 864-7, Her 299-301, etc. But two-stage gnomes are not always paradoxical: Hik 361-4, Her 303-6, 309-11, Phoin 526f (particularly flat). 4 Similar are Her 57, Or 300. 137 2. Manner of presentation The gnomes cited above take the form of grammatically complete statements; variety is achieved through alternate types of presentation. Quite often a gnomic idea is expressed in a relative clause: 5 euol ydp 01)8' o rrdcu XeirreTai (3poTots ^vveariv eXrris (Tro 681-2a) For I lack even hope, and hope is what remains for all mortals. rroO 8f)T ' eXricbQrjS" fj ppoxois dpTtoLievri f| fydayavov Qfjyoua', a yevvaia y wf| dpdoeiev dv TroGouaa T O V Trdpos -nooiv; (Tro 1012-4) H o w is it no one ever caught you hanging from a noose or sharpening a sword? Yet these are the things a noble woman would do who missed the husband she had had before. A lso very compressed are some gnomes given parenthetically: 6 86£GJ 8e Tots' TroXXotca (uoXXol yap K O K O L ) TrpoSous aeacoaGai a'... (IT 678f) Generalisations may take the form of a rhetorical question: cru-iKpotca Liev ydp LieydXa TTOJS eXoi T L S dv; (Or 694)7 5 Cf. Med 1080, Hik 190-2, 232, Elek 38, Her 58f, Or 525, 652, 679, etc. Similar compression is to be seen in Ion 634-6. 6 Cf. Elek 300. 7 Text as printed by Murray, who brackets 695 with Brunck; Diggle brackets 694f with Weil. More gnomic rhetorical questions are at Hipp 462f, 464f, IT 1478f (but 1479 del. Diggle). 138 Many general statements involve a moral rule and are introduced by xp^l (e.g. Kyk 527, Alk 1008, Med 294, 1018, Hipp 120, 467, Andr 944, Hik 223, 506, Elek 1052, Her 92, Or 666, Bak 892) or, less often, 8el (e.g. Andr 1052, Elek 1074).8 The same effect is often achieved through an imperative: TOOTO Kal 0"K0TT6LT6 U.OL, \ivr\orf\pes, eaGXfjs Guycrrep' EK LLrjTpos Xa|3eXv. (Andr 622f) Similar are Andr 950f, Hik 504f, 916f, Or 804; one may compare also Ion 373 (TCOL Gecoi TdvavTL' ov \iavrevreov), Phoin 395 (eg T O KepSog Trapd fyvoiv SouXeuTeov). 3. "App l ica t ion" of general rules M y paraphrases of Tro 681f and 1012-14 above incorporate the expansion of thought by which the general rule is brought into relation wi th the special case. Euripides very often expresses this relationship explicitly. The present instance may be adduced (usually using ydp) as if it were the example that caused the speaker to formulate the rule; or again the rule may be stated, then simply "applied" (usually using cos or 8e) to the present case: 9 O U K eoriv ovSev Kpetaaoy f\ §L\os oa$r\s, ou TTXOOTOS', OV Tupavvts" dXoyiaTOv 8e T L T O TTXTI.GOS' avTaXXayLia yewaiou C()LXOU. 8 "Utopian reflections" introduced by \pf\v are discussed in Section D below. 9 The two forms have been studied in great detail by H. Friis Johansen in General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis ; he terms them napd8eLyp.a oi.Kelov and Descriptive Application respectively. For my purposes the distinction is of no importance. Examples with ydp: Med 448, Hkld 6,303, Andr 959. With (is: Med 584, Hipp 651, Andr 703; variants in Andr 647, Hik 219. With8e: Med 302, Tro 641, IT 1477, Ion 587; cf. Andr 324 (8fj). 139 au ydp T d T ' eLg AlyiaGov e£r|upes K a K d K a l etc. (Or 1155-9) Less often a rule is quoted, then the present situation or person adduced as out of step wi th i t : 1 0 O U XP'h CTKuGpGOTTOV T O l s ^€VOl£ TOV TTpOaTToXoV e l v a i , 8execr9ai 8' euTrpoaiyyopioL fypevi. a u 8' dvSp' e T a l p o v SearroTou rrapovG' opcov arvyv&i TTpoaojTTGJi K a i auvtocppucoLievcoL But the formulation of a general rule may itself imply the "application", by associating the interlocutor explicitly wi th the group that is the topic of the gnome: o i |3dp(3apoi 8e u.fJTe T O U S C|>IAOUS CJJLXOUS' f i y e l a G e u-riTe T O U S KaXcos T e B v r i K O T a s ' In this second-person example the speaker associates the interlocutor wi th the group discredited in the gnomic statement (cf. Med 569-73, Hek 253-7). In some first-person plural gnomes the speaker associates himself or herself wi th the group characterised. 1 1 Gnomes are also formulated in the first or second person plural w i th an application to "people in general" imp l ied : 1 2 1 0 Friis Johansen terms this Contrast Application (see General Reflection 144-50); examples include Med 222-6, Andr 207-12, Bak 266-9. 1 1 Women characterise the group "women": positively in Med 407-9, Hipp 480f, IT 1061f; negatively in Med 230f, Ion 398ff. 1 2 First person plural indicative in Hipp 380-3, 701, Hek 623ff, 814-9, Hik 214, 492, 1082-6, Phoin [555f]; second person plural indicative Hik 744-9, Elek 383-5; imperative Or 804. (Alk 774-8) GauLidCeQ', (Hek 328-30) 140 K O U T O L Svblv y e T r d v T e s dv9pcuTTOi A o y o i v T O V K p e i c r c r o v ' i<j\iev KOU T d X P 1 " ! 0 " 1 ' ^ K O t L Kara oacoL T e TroXeu.ou Kpeiaaov eipf)vr| (3poToIg. (Hik 486-8) a 8' d v u.d9r)L T L S , T a u T a at6iCea9ai cb iXel Trpos y f j p a s . OUTCO TraXSas' e u T r a i S e u e T e . (Hik 916f) A n interesting confusion of special and general formulation is to be seen in such passages as : 1 3 b (3ou\ou.cu y d p , f)8u K a l 8td a T o u . a TTTT)voIaL U.U9OLS' dSa i rdvcos ' repeat cj)peva. (Or 1175f) eyto cbtXco u.ev T e K v c r TTLOS y d p o u 4>LXIO dTiKTov, du.6x9r)aa; (Her 280f) 4. Second-person formulat ion Occasionally general statements are put in the second person singular ("gnomic ov"): o u S e oTeyni' y d p fji K a T r i p e ^ e t s ' SOLIOL KaX&s aKpipioaais dv (Hipp 468f) 1 4 1 3 There is a strange mingling of general and special in Hel 954f, where see Kannicht. Striking also is Hek 820, where a general reflection is closed with "What hope could one still have then to prosper in the future?" The thought moves abruptly back to Hekabe's own case: "For my children are gone..." etc. (821). 1 4 aKpipwacus dv is Hadley's conjecture here for aKpifkiicreiav codd., and is accepted by Barrett, Diggle, and Stockert (Teubner text). Barrett states (ad 468-9) that optative without dv here is "impossible". Bers' discussion of the evidence for a poetic potential optative without dv (Syntax 128ff) concludes that the construction is not impossible but seldom used; for Euripides he cites (131) Hipp 1186 (where see Barrett), Andr 929, and IT 1055, but does not discuss Hipp 469. None of the examples he cites seems quite analogous to this last; therefore I will assume (with some reser-vation) that Hadley was correct in identifying an example of "gnomic av" that had got lost in the transmission. 141 Barrett writes ad loc: "The second person can be used in a potential statement to typify an indefinite subject (i.e. as a more v iv id equivalent of ns)". This pr in-ciple could be supported (Barrett cites no parallels) by reference to Her 301, Or 700f; other examples I f ind in Euripides of "gnomic ov" are not potential state-ments (Med 297-301, Or 314f). In all these passages the speaker moves easily between the indefinite use of the second person forms and the application of the same forms to the interlocutor. 1 5 It seems possible that this k ind of facile trans-it ion may explain the transmitted text of Klytaimestra's proem addressed to Elektra: T O TTpct'yu.a 8e u.a96vTa a ' , f|v |xev dittos' uxaeXv exT-S. oriryelv S L K O U O V el 8e urj, T L 8eX orvyelv; (Elek 1015-7) There is no indiv idual to whom \iaQ6vra oe could refer, and in any case the context seems to require a general statement. Reiske's conjecture \iaQ6vras, wi th Seidler's ex1!1-/ satisfies this requirement; but perhaps Euripides wrote oe and ex^Ls wi th an indefinite reference in mind (in spite of the clearly personal reference of Q O L in 1011 and TOJL CTOJL in 1018), using the same freedom as in the passages mentioned above. 1 6 1 5 This effect is particularly bold in Hipp 467-70 and Or 314f (both of which have, admittedly, text problems). On the latter see the comments ad loc by di Benedetto, who reads voar|Ls...8o£d£r|Ls in 314 with the majority of the codd. 1 6 Denniston ad Elek 1016 argues against the interpretation offered here; see also Cropp, "Eur. Elektra 1013-7 and 1041-4",53. K-G I. 557, Anm. 3 discuss indefinite use of ov as a generally late phenomenon, but they ignore such Homeric examples as Iliad V. 85. I mention here also the very dubious line IA 1408 (see Page Actors' Interpolations ad loc), in which I think it possible the author intended the relative clause 6 aov KpaTeX to convey a general statement about TO 9eouaxelv: "struggling against the gods defeats one". The same expression occurs in Hipp 696 (TO ydp Sdicvov aov Tx\v SLdyvoxjiv KpctTet), where the sense may again be general: a colloquial expression? 142 5. "Doub le comparison" A striking device in the formulation of general statements is the creation of a "double comparison": fyavXov X9T\GT0V a v Xafielv cjxXov OeXoiLU u.dXXov fj KOIKOV aocbtoTepov. (Ion 834f) I wou ld rather have a simple but honest man for a friend than a clever man of bad character. Very similar are Andr 639ft frr. 290, 326. 6-7, 552, 825, 842. 1 7 One side of the comparison may be only implied: ws eu.oi Trevrig eiT) TTpoOuLLog TTXOUCTLOU LidXXov £evos. (Elek 394f) I wou ld wish as my host a poor but solicitous man rather than a (negligent) r ich m a n . 1 8 It seems to be a stylishly clever device. 6. At t r ibut ion of authority Euripidean characters frequently voice maxims whose sense affects, or is acknowledged by, a specified elite group, especially people of wisdom or good sense (oi. ao(j)Oi,ol oufypoves, oi ev cj>poK)uvT€s, etc.). 1 9 Rarely is a real contrast 1 7 Denniston ad Elek 253 has discussed the noun-with-two-adjectives phrases these passages involve. 1 8 Ci. Med 319f. 1 9 oi cjo<j>oC (etc.): Kyk 316, Hkld 458f, Hipp 264-6, 465f, Andr 643f, Hik 40f, 223 (TOV CTOC^OV), 506-8, Or 488, fr. 683; oi oufypoves: Kyk 336-8, Phoin 554, Or 1509; oaois evecrn vous: Andr 231. 143 intended wi th other groups; the point made is simply given addit ional authority through this association. Similarly many gnomes include a reference to "men" or "mortals" that adds no point to the say ing. 2 0 Gnomes may also be put in "attributed" form: a source for the statement is identif ied, normally either as "people in general" or as the speaker himself, who thus presents the gnome as his considered opinion. (There is usually no implication that it is an original or unusual thought: but cf. Med 579-81.) "People in general'1 are cited as the authority for gnomes introduced using: Xeyouo-L (Tro 665, Hik 735, Hel 950); fyaoLv (Her 306); eifao-iv (Hel 497). Similar effect is achieved by identifying the general statement as a Xoyog: 2 1 TrelGeiv Soopa K a l Geoug Xoyog. (Med 964b) The speaker is identified as the source of the rule voiced through the use of: Xeyto (Tro 636); yv<s>\yx\v e x w (Hik 198); XoylCoum (Alk 692f); V O L U C O J (Her 282); fiyoCuai (Her 283, Med 1224); urn SOKOOCTI (Hipp 377); earn (Med 580, sim. Elek 954); ol6u.ea9a (Hkld 746, sim. Bak 1150); KaT€i8ov (Med 446); olSa (Med 215), Kp lvco (Andr 370). Negative rules are formulated wi th OVK erraLveaco (Hkld [300], sim. Med 223, Hipp 264), drreTTTuaa (Tro 667f). A gnomic idea may be phrased as a wish, for which Euripides uses eu-ol elr\ (with slight variations) in Hipp 403f, 640f, Med 542-4, Elek 394f, 948f, Ion 632. It Somewhat different are gnomes that define wisdom, etc.: e.g. Her 1425f (ooTig Se TTXOUTOV fj aQevog (ldXXov CJHXWV dyaQ&v TTeTTdcrGai (3oiiXeTcu K&KCJS" 4>povel). 2 0 Gnomes with PpoTols, dvSpojTTOis, 6vr|ToIs, etc.: Med 965,1018, Hipp 465f, Andr 184f, 270, 418, Her 57, Hel 1617f, Or 1545, and many more; cf. in the same sense f)(iTv, IA 1370. 2 1 Cf. Hel 513ff, Phoin 396, 438 (i)\ivT\Qev). In fr. 668 a similar statement is described as a TTapoijiia. tiJCTTTep r\ Trapoijiia appears likewise in A. Ag 264; see Fraenkel ad loc for other instances. a!vo9 is similarly used: in frr. 25, 333, 508 a gnomic saying is characterised as a TTaXcuos- alvo? (cf. also fr. 321). See further Schmid 770 n.l. 144 is important to recognise these as essentially gnomes for which the speaker assumes authority, like those discussed above. 2 2 7. Gnome and reflection We cannot think of all these expressions of general truth (or rather, "expressions presented as general truths in a rhetorical context") as "maxims" in the traditional sense— they mostly lack both the moral element and the status of folk w isdom generally associated wi th that term. 2 3 Not all are even "aphor-isms", but all are references, however compact or casual, to a larger more general context than that of the immediate scene, and most use concise and memorable phrases to put a general idea before the audience. Above al l , it must not be as-sumed that they represent any philosophical views of the poet— each "gnome" (as I w i l l now call them all indiscriminately) has been put in the mouth of a particular character in a particular situation for purposes of analysis or persuasion. I shall use the word "reflection" here to refer to passages of some length in which the speaker seems to be working wi th general rules and concepts, not 2 2 Denniston ad Elek 948 stops just short of recognising this idiomatic formulation (he cites frr. 412 and 360.25, but not the other passages above). It worries him that Elektra, a married woman, should wish for a husband (euoiy ' elr\ TTOCTL?) of such-and-such a character. But similarly in Hipp 640f Hippolytos, confirmed bachelor, rules out a too-brainy wife using the expression uf| ydp ev y' euols So^ois etr).... Both speakers are simply stating a general rule. Friis Johansen (General Reflection 140) discusses Hipp 403f (euol ydp eir| (iTJTe XavGdveiv KaXd... 8pojor|i etc.) as a gnomic formulation, followed immediately by application to the speaker Phaidra. De Grouchy (diss. 37 with n. 24) recognises euot (etc.) as a formula for identifying the source of a thought, but cites no examples of gnomes expressed as wishes. 2 3 Aristotle, for example, in his discussion of yvcouou (Rhet 1394al9ff) speaks of maxims as general statements, "but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided" (tr Rhys Roberts). He goes on to speak (1395a 2ff) of the kind of speakers who can appropriately use maxims— elderly men, and even then only in speaking of subjects in which they are experienced. Euripidean speakers' use of gnomes conforms better to the more relaxed sense in which the Rhet ad Alex uses the term (Ch. XI). 145 merely stating them for a rhetorical or argumentative purpose: passages where the fuller implications of a general statement are investigated (e.g. Hik 176-83), or reasons giv ing for making the statement (e.g. Hik 195ff, Hipp 616ff), or where a gnomic statement influences a reasoning process (e.g. Hel 483-99). In every case the sympathetic reader w i l l f ind "relevance" to the drama and indeed to the immediate situation in these passages. But the energy some of these passages devote to abstract speculation gives a sense of detachment from their sur-roundings, and this detachment that has not escaped the notice of text critics; and so some comments w i l l be made below on the relatively loose limits of relevance Euripides seems to allow himself. B. Rhetorical Uses of Gnomic Utterances The ancient Greeks clearly had available, as we have, a large store of conventional wisdom on which to draw in supporting or opposing almost any position. Moreover, we often f ind Euripides (perhaps more than other Greek writers) presenting maxims whose form is conventional but whose content cannot have been tradit ional. 2 4 The study of Euripidean gnomic material for the purpose of understanding the shared attitudes and assumptions of Athenian society has therefore a very l imited usefulness. 2 5 We should perhaps think of 2 4 I am thinking especially of those self-consciously "sophistic" maxims celebrating power and wealth (e.g., Kyk 316, Phoin 524f); cf. also paradoxes like Hipp 411f, Med 294f, philosophical speculations like Her 1345f. 2 5 Lang's discussion (Herodotean N and D 58-67) of maxims and proverbs in Herodotos says of such expressions that they "may, in some degree at least, reflect the genius, wit, and spirit of the Greek nation". She looks for signs of "the extent to which [Herodotos'] interpretation of events and view of causation were shaped by this inherited folk wisdom" (ibid 58f). Such an approach to Euripidean gnomes would seem unpromising. 146 the maxims under study here not as general observations about life, agreed upon by the people who use them, but as abstract forms of argument, arguments stripped of any context. 2 6 I therefore focus not on the content of Euripidean gnomes, though this is a fascinating topic, but on their rhetorical or persuasive uses . 2 7 Just as the rhetorical questions, disjunct questions, potential and con-dit ional formulations discussed in Chapter III above assume typical arrange-ments for employment in probability arguments and hypothetical arguments, so gnomic expressions appear again and again in typical sequences designed to pre-sent or bolster an argumentative position. Euripides gives his characters gnomic expressions (1) to open a speech or an argument by offering a succinct "headline"; (2) to close or summarise a speech or an argument; (3) to corroborate or support an argumentative point, appeal, or parainesis just uttered. 1. "Open ing" Uses Polyphemos' reply to Odysseus' appeal in Kyklops offers a good example of a simple gnome opening an argument by announcing in general terms the point to be made: 6 TTXOOTOS, dvQpbimaKe, rolg oofyols 9e6g. (Kyk 316) 2 6 On this subject M . Heath's discussion of "Tragic Wisdom" (Poetics 157-62) is very stimulating. He cites, for example, a bewildering variety of sentiments expressed in tragedy on the preferability of accepting death or enduring a life of slavery or disgrace (161): all these examples of "wisdom" (as Heath points out) are produced to suit an argument and a context. 2 7 A catalogue of gnomic material from all three tragedians organised according to content forms the bulk of G. A. De Grouchy's 1984 diss. Proverbial and Gnomic Material in Greek Tragedy. 147 The statement, decidedly of the rrapd8o^ov type, deflates Odysseus' arguments for mercy and hospitality more effectively than any direct answer to them could. Odysseus has based his appeal (Kyk 285-312, discussed in L A above) on assump-tions of shared values and interests; an argument that hospitality wou ld con-stitute fair reciprocity for services he and his men have performed for Poseidon was fol lowed by an appeal to the universal rules regarding shipwrecked sailors, suppliants, hospitality. Polyphemos' announcement encapsulates immediately his distance from these shared assumptions (amusingly it is not his pr imit iv ism but his sophistication that creates the gulf), providing at the same time a spring-board for his disquisition on the gods and the rugged indiv idual . A few other speeches begin wi th an argument-headline cast in gnomic form: Herakles in Alkestis opens his harangue addressed to Admetos' servant, fol lowing an entrance-announcing verse that instantly sets an antagonistic tone, by stating a general rule of behaviour: O U T O S , T L o e L i v o v K a l T r e ^ p o i m K O s pXer r eLg ; ov X P 1 ! CTKuGptorrov T O L S ^evois TOV T rpoar foXoy e l v a L , Sexea9at 8 ' euTrpoar iyopojL 4>pevl. (Alk 773-5) In what follows, the servant's failure to adhere to this rule is stated, and this leads to Herakles' philosophical homily on life and death, the moral of which is summarised in a rule of behaviour that reinforces the first: €ikj)paLV€ omrrov, mve, TOV Ka9' r\\iepav p l o y Xoyl£ou a o v , T a 8' dXXa rf\g rvxr\S- (Alk 788f) Similarly Herakles' speech to Admetos fol lowing his final entrance wi th the veiled woman begins by announcing in gnomic form the topic of the first half of the speech: 148 <fyi\ov rrpos dvSpa xpi) Xeyeiv eAeu9eptos, " AS|ir]Te, u.ou.(j>ds' 8 ' oux UTTO aTTXayxvois exetv aiytovT ' • (Alk 1008-10) Similar gnomic headlines open speeches at Hkld 297-303, Med 446f, Andr 957f, Ion 585f 2 8 (cf. also the prologue-speeches of Hkld, Or, and S. Trach). A frequent pattern for opening an argument is the sequence in which a gnome is stated, then its antithesis or converse, followed immediately by the application of one leg of the antithesis to the present person or case. 2 9 Thus for example Agamemnon laments the lack of freedom which his high status imposes by means of a reflection comparing euyeveia and Suayeveia: T] Suayeveia 8 ' to? ex^L T L XP T1 C T I-I J-W ' K a l y d p 8aKp0aai paiSta)? auToIs exeL aTTavTa T ' eiTretV TOOL 8e yevraitoi fyvoiv avoX|3a TrdvTcr Trpocr rdTr iv 8e T O O (3LOU T O V o y K o v exoLiev TCOL T ' OX^WL 8ouXeuon.ev. eycb y d p etc. (IA 446-51) For the sake of a ful l and balanced treatment contrasting gnomes are voiced, then each is applied to a group (auToXs in 447 are the low-born, and in 450 Agamem-2 8 Ion reacts to Xouthos' request he come to Athens: "Things look different at a distance and up close". The headline indicates (a bit mysteriously) Ion will subject the invitation to a cautious examination; the following couplet confirms this, and then the examination is carried out (see discussion in I.E above). Friis Johansen notes that the "near vs. far" theme is recapitulated in 621-3 (General Reflection 136f). 2 9 This has been called "foil-antithesis" by Friis Johansen (General Reflection 31, and index s.v.): Euripidean passages he discusses are Med 215-21, Hkld 1-5, Andr 319-23, Hik 1082f, Tro 688-96, Hel 713-5, Phoin 469-72, Or 126-31, IA 446-50. The type is perhaps not so well-established as this list would suggest, since (1) Friis Johansen himself finds the required antithesis poorly realised in Hkld lii and Hel 713-5, and argues for lacunae in those passages; (2) Diggle's text deletes Andr 321-3, Hel 713-9, Or 127. But Friis Johansen argues convincingly for an antithesis that adds force to the following argument in a number of these passages. 149 non speaks of the high-born, explicitly including himself in that class), and finally the present case of Agamemnon's own predicament is brought up. Often an opening verse or two serve (as does Alk 773, quoted above) to highlight the gnomic utterance that w i l l headline a speech's subject or open its first argument. In Med 215f, Hipp 373-6, Her 60-2 this function is fi l led by not much more than a vocative formula and a bit of narrative; in Hik 195-7 a bit of narrative and the statement to be refuted precede the headline proper; Her 1313 constitutes or completes a proem highlighting the gnome of 1314f; Hkld 1 and Tro [634-5] similarly point the fol lowing gnome. This attention-getting device may grow from a simple Xe£co 8e (Elek 1013), Aeyoiu.' dv (IT 939), aKovoar ' (IT 578), to an elaborate introduction in which a comment on the preceding speech leads to a formal justification of the speaker's right to make answer, fol lowed in turn by a gnomic headline: KOLU[S6S y ' 6 Kfjpu£ Kal TrapepydT'ns' Aoytov. errel 8 ' dyalva Kal CTU T O V S ' riyoovlaoo, aKOu' • au.iXkav ydp a u Trpou9r|Kas Aoytov. ouSev Tupdvvou 8uo"LieveoTepov rroXei, etc. (Hik 426-9) Proems referring to the speech-situation or the interlocutor may grow into independent reflections which themselves involve gnomic material. Often these reflections apply such topoi as the dangerous character of the adversary's too facile eloquence, or various kinds of disadvantage the speaker himself faces. A s we have seen wi th other material of a similarly "conventional" nature, these reflections may contribute interesting details to Euripides' presentation of the characters involved, but we must not expect to f ind "portraiture" in every detail presented in a rhetorical context. 150 A s an example of a succinct opening gnome that is clearly applied to the present case, we may consider the beginning of Teiresias' reply to Pentheus: brav Xa$r\i TIS T W V Xoyuiv dvr\p oo$b<s KaXds d<f)opu.ds\ ov \i.ey' epyov ev Xeyeiv ov 8 ' euTpoxov \xev yXtiooav fypov&v exets ev Tots Xoyoiai 8 ' O U K eveioi 001 fypeveg. (Bak 266-9) Before answering Pentheus' speech, he w i l l comment on speech-making in general. Eloquence in the absence of a sound case ( r a X o u a c ^ o p u m ) is criticised, though Pentheus' speech has hardly been eloquent or self-consciously rhetorical. Teiresias goes on to identify abuse of eloquence with the KCCKO? T r o X t T r i s (270f),3 0 although he is addressing the king of Thebes. This material is thus "conven-t iona l " . 3 1 Other proem references to the dangers of (the opponent's) eloquence, or the simplicity and honesty of one's own presentation: cf. Med 579-83, Hipp 486f (here again, even less appropriately than in Bak 270f, eloquence is identified as a danger affecting political life), 984f, Hek 1187-94, Phoin 469-72 3 2 Characters begin rhetorical speeches by expressing doubts about whether to speak at all in Andr 184-91, Hik 297-300, 3 3 and by call ing attention to particular disadvantages affecting them in Hipp 983-91, Elek 1013-7, Tro 914f, Or 544-50 3 4 In 3 0 The tranmitted text seems faulty and even with the usual remedies it makes difficult sense. See Dodds' note ad loc. 3 1 If anyone comes off looking like a slick-speaking Sophist here, it is Teiresias— but I don't think Euripides intends us to form that view of him. Neither is it his intention though to attack here in his own voice "the greatest danger of ancient as of modern democracies", as Dodds supposes (ad 266-71). 3 2 These ideas elsewhere: choral comments in Tro 966-8 and Phoin 526f charge the preceding speakers with eloquence in a bad cause; in Hek 1238f Hekabe's speech is greeted as a case of eloquence in a good cause. The eloquence of demagogues: Hek 254-7, Hik 412-6, Or [904-13]. See Ober Mass and Elite 170-7 for the orators' exploitation of these themes. 3 3 Similar doubts are realised in Hek 736-53 and Elek 900-6 through dialogue. 3 4 In Hkld 181-3, Iolaos cites rather advantages: a rare case of "flattering the court". 151 all these passages the common rhetorical topos, "difficulties facing the speaker", is present. 3 5 This may be presented through a straightforward reference to the details of the case. For example, in Or 544-50 Orestes, reluctant to make answer to Tyndareos' charges, refers to his accuser's "venerability" (yfjpas 549) as inhibit ing h im, as wel l as his own undoubted guilt (dvoaLOs ei\ii 546); no generalising is i nvo l ved . 3 6 Speakers call attention to disadvantages in various other ways: at IA 1211 Iphigeneia utters a pathetic impossible wish, indicating she knows she lacks the powers of persuasion necessary to turn Agamemnon's mind against the sacri f ice; 3 7 Jason's proem in Med 522 gamely accepts the challenge of answering Medeia's charges, noting only he w i l l need to navigate like a KeSvo? vabs OLaKoaTpo^os through the tempest of her rancour. But this motif often lends itself to treatment in general terms. Andro-mache in Andr 184ff, in deciding whether to answer Hermione's speech of accusation and insult, introduces comparisons that widen the context: 184-5 The rash injustice of youth: 186-8 I fear harm as your slave, 189-90 for arrogant people hate being bested by inferiors. 191 But I w i l l not betray myself. 3 5 Solmsen (Antiphonstudien 65-9) reviews examples of this motif in Euripides, Antiphon and Plato's Apology. He finds close similarities between Hipp 986-91 (see II.D above) and Ant. V. Iff, Hek 1187-94 (see IV.D below) and Ant. V. 5, Eur. fr. 67 and Ant. V. 6. Solmsen concludes that although one cannot entirely exclude the possibility of direct influence of Antiphon on Euripides in these passages (though he notes that the early date of Alkmaion in Psophis, the assumed source of fr. 67, would seem to rule this out), more likely the two authors are both drawing on material that was already conventional in the opening of defense speeches. 3 6 It is not certain, however, that the transmitted text gives the correct order of lines. The transposition of vss. 546f found in edd. (post 550 trai. Hartung, post 556 Diggle) arises from the fact that the point made there seems more naturally to open the speech's argumentation than to belong to the proem proper. See Diggle (Euripidea 364-70) for, di Benedetto (ad 545-50) against the transposition. 3 7 Cf. the wish expressed by Hekabe in Hek 836-40: euoi yevoiTO ^Ooyyos ev Ppaxiocri Kal Xepca etc. , 152 The points made here form no part of Andromache's rational rebuttal of Hermione's charges; they focus entirely on the speech-situation itself. But the reflection has, besides its context-broadening function, a clear "rhetorical" (i.e. "point-scoring") purpose; it creates prejudice against Hermione's case by undermining her personally whi le portraying Andromache as an underdog whose resources are l imited to maturity, righteousness and self-respect. 3 8 In her apologia addressed to Elektra in Elek 1011-50, Klytaimestra refers to the KotKT) 86£a that affects her and makes it difficult for her to defend herself. Her speech begins wi th a couplet that follows naturally from the preceding dialogue, but also provides a headline for the speech's argumentative content: Agamem-non was himself to blame for his own death. 3 9 But before arguing this point in detail, Klytaimestra pauses to focus attention on the disadvantage under which she labours. Here is the most generally accepted text: 4 0 Ae£co 8e - K C U T O I 86£' O T a v KOLKT\ y u v a l i c a , y\c6aoT |L TTLKpoTng e v e o r i TIS' cos- M-€V r r a p ' rjiiLV, o u KaXcos ' - T O Trpdy | j . a 8e L i a B o v T a s , r\v \iev d£[.cog Luaetv exr)L, o r u y e l v S i K a i o v e l 8e u-fj, T L 8el oTuyetv; (Elek 1013-17) 3 8 Somewhat similar is Hik 297-300, where Aithra overcomes, again for the sake of her own self-esteem, the inhibitions she feels against speaking out to Theseus; she recognises people assume the rule dxpetov Tds yuvdiKas eS Xeyeiv. But in that passage there is no implied antagonism. 3 9 Point well made by M . Lloyd, Agon 61. He notes also that the speech ends with a balancing couplet suggesting it was just to kill Agamemnon (1049f). 4 0 I have commented above (IV.A) on the two conjectures in vs. 1016. The text as quoted here is printed by Paley, Weil (1st ed.), Nauck (3rd ed.); it is accepted also in notes ad loc by Denniston (whose comm. prints Murray's text) and Cropp (whose ed. uses Diggle's text). Weil later had doubts (Diggle Euripidea 164 n.19). Murray differs only in printing ex1!1? m 1016; for Diggle's view see below. 153 Klytaimestra clearly associates herself wi th women affected by an evi l reputation, and clearly appeals for a proper hearing of the facts of her case. A s to details of interpretation, editors differ. Denniston paraphrases (ad 1013-7): I w i l l tell you what I think of Agamemnon. But a maligned woman has a sharp edge to her tongue. In my opinion, such bitterness is to be deplored. But she should not be condemned out of hand on account of it: she should be judged on the facts alone. O n this interpretation, Klytaimestra concedes that her own account of the case may seem harsh, but insists it should not be judged on its tone alone. Diggle finds this fails to make sense of the \iev/8l relationship in 1015; 4 1 moreover he feels Klytaimestra should not concede the point implicit in ov KCIXUJS 4 2 He emends to ou KO.KCOS', translating: . When a woman gets a bad reputation, there is a certain bitterness in her tongue: in my opinion, not improperly. But people should learn the facts before deciding. If the facts justify hatred, then it is right to hate; otherwise, why hate? Cropp, in his 1988 notes on the play, like Denniston sees Klytaimestra conceding that a woman suffering a poor reputation may (but would do better not to) adopt a harsh way of speaking. He criticises Diggle's interpretation, which he says "gives an odd argument", in that it has Klytaimestra invite us to examine the facts of her own case before deciding whether to hate her for displaying the outward signs of a woman suffering from a KOKT] 86£a 4 3 He adds the possibility 4 1 "This paraphrase misses the direction in which the reader is pointed by the Liev and Se of 1015. These particles suggest that two opinions or attitudes are to be balanced". Diggle's discussion is at Euripidea 163-5 (the chapter is his 1977 ICS paper). 4 2 For the same reason, Wecklein wrote ii[ilv in 1015.^  4 3 Cropp (ad Elek 1013-7 ) paraphrases Diggle's argument: "My bad reputation causes me to speak harshly..., but I should not be hated for that (i.e, speaking harshly), unless the facts (about my quarrel with Ag.) justify my bad reputation". 154 yXcoaariL in 1014 may refer to the speech of others, i.e. the woman's detractors. 4 4 Cropp sees the essential contrast as between talk and facts: people are to learn the facts before deciding whether the maligned woman's sharp talk (or others' sharp talk about her) justifies hatred. But if yXtoao-rj in 1014 refers to talk about the woman, then 1013f say only: " A woman with a bad reputation is apt to be i l l spoken of". This would not be Euripides at his best. When the rhetorical function of the passage is considered, it seems to me that Klytaimestra must make a concession of exactly the sort that Diggle rules out, and that yXcoaari as essentially a synonym for 86£a likewise rules out: she must call attention to a problem that w i l l tend to compromise her presentation of her case. Klytaimestra suggests that her own "bitterness" constitutes a barrier making a fair assessment difficult, and asks (like many another Greek orator) 4 5 that the flaws and imperfections of her presentation be overlooked and the truth of her case alone used as a basis for judgement. The phrase in vs. 1015a is quasi-parenthetical, and follows a gnome about maligned women that is to be con-trasted wi th a gnome about fair hearing. This gives the fol lowing sense: " A maligned woman may speak bitterly, and I concede that is not a pretty thing. But the rule to fol low is this: hear the facts and then either hate or don't hate on the merits of the case". 4 6 4 4 The idea (an earlier suggestion of Matthiae) is dismissed by Diggle (ibid 164 n. 21). 4 5 Cf., e.g., Antiphon V. 5, Plato Apology 17 C-D. Cropp (LCM 7[1982]: 53) compares Ar. Ach 368ff. 4 6 The contrast is thus not between the "opinions or attitudes" of Klytaimestra herself (Trap ' r\ulv) and the unspecified person or persons forming the subject of oTuyetv, but between the bitterness typical of the maligned woman's presentation and the necessity of reaching a fair judgement based on the facts. Thus I see the Se of 1015 as introducing adversatively a gnome that contradicts the implications of the material in 1013f; the \iev of the parenthetical phrase in 1015 should be regarded as u.ev solitarium of the type Denniston documents at GP 381f. See further Cropp, loc. cit. 155 The series of reflections on the speech-situation opening the agon speeches in Phoin are of a more philosophical cast. Polyneikes' proem makes the point that slick eloquence is antipathetic to truth: otTrXoOs 6 u.09os rf\s dXr|9eias' ect>u, KOU TTOIKIXCJV Set TavSix' ep\ir\vev\i.dTU)v eX £ L yaP OLVTOL Kcapov 6 8 ' dSiKos- X6yo<s voo&v ev auTcoL cj)apu.dKcov 8eiTai ao<j)tov. (Phoin 469-72) Mastronarde (ad 469-72) suggests that this proem constitutes "an attack on sophistic conceptions of truth and on positive evaluations of rhetoric"; it is this, but it is also an instance of up-to-date speech-making in the approved sophistic manner. I think we sympathise wi th Polyneikes in spite of this posturing, not because of it: that is, it is "neutral" for our understanding of the character. The proem of Eteokles that follows is "sophistic" not only in form but in its provocative content, and so forms part of the unsympathetic presentation of this character. Eteokles begins his speech: el TTdai TauTO KaXov e<j)u oofyov T ' du.a, OUK r\v dv duxfnXeKTOs dv9panTOig epis' vvv 8 ' oi)9' 6u.0L0f ou8ev O U T ' loov PpoToI? TrXf]v 6iA3|idaa.L- T O 8 ' epyov O U K eariv ToSe. (Phoin 499-502) 4 7 Friis Johansen paraphrases: "Discord arises because there is no objective t ru th" . 4 8 The proem here virtually affirms that there can be no meaningful debate between the two brothers; and in fact Eteokles' speech w i l l not attempt to address any of the points Polyneikes raised. Iokaste gives the third speech in this 4 7 Text as printed by Mastronarde; Diggle reads Markland's ovo^aaw in 502. 4 8 General Reflection 78. Mastronarde (ad Phoin 499-502) sees the thought inverted in Or 492ff: Tyndareos' opening words imply the claim that "good and evil are plain to all". 156 series a gnomic opening: "The experience that comes wi th age gives one an advantage in wisdom over the young". In this scene, Euripides has used these abstract formulations to contrast the three speakers' points of v iew in the strongest possible terms. 4 9 2. "C los ing " Uses We have seen some of the ways in which gnomic statements and longer general reflections may open a topic wi thin a persuasive or argumentative speech. Often an argument is summarised or concluded through a general utterance. 5 0 Thus Admetos closes his speech condemning Pheres' unwil l ingness to die on his son's behalf wi th a general observation about old age and death: lidrnv dp ' ol yepovres euxovTou Qavelv, yfjpas ityeyovres Kal LiaKpov XP0V0V Plou -fjv 8 ' eyyug eX9r|i 9dvaTog, oi)8elg |3ouA.eTai 9vfjiaKeLV, T O yfjpas' 8 ' OVKIT ' ea r ' ai)Tols (3api3. (Alk 669-72) Similar accusatory generalisations close speeches at Med 569-75 ("But you women have reached the point of thinking that..."), Hek 328-31 ("But you barbarians don't treat your own people wel l , nor..."); in each case the interlocutor is subsumed into a group whose besetting vice is described. In a more reflective vein, Phaidra closes her troubled thoughts on the suffering children endure over the vices of parents wi th the ominous obser-vation that "time w i l l reveal al l" (Hipp 428-30). Theseus closes his speech acceding to the appeal of Ai thra on behalf of the suppliants wi th a gnome on the 4 9 The scene is discussed in II.E above. 5 0 Note that proem-reflections too may be rounded off with concluding gnomic material: cf. Hipp 988f, Hek 254-7, Bak 270f, IA 380b, etc. 157 duties children have to their parents (Hik 361-4). Eteokles justifies his unwi l -lingness to accommodate his brother's legitimate demands wi th a gnome that puts his posit ion in the strongest possible light: elrrep ydp dSiKeiv XP1!. TupavnSos' ire pi KdXXiaTov d8iKe1>, TdXXa 8 ' euae fietV xPe<^v- (Phoin 524f) Andromache's farewell to her small son, for whose safety she is offering to trade her own life, ends wi th an affirmation of the blessings of parenthood (Andr 418-20). 5 1 Elektra's diatribe addressed to the dead Aigisthos closes wi th a finely-wrought variation on the "look to the end" motif (Elek 953-6). Occasionally though we are offered a platitude that makes the effect of being the merest formality: "Not many a man is as good as his father" (Hkld 327f), "Helpless is the house of unlucky folk" (Or 70). 5 2 The process of concluding wi th a gnome is sometimes given addit ional weight through a formula focusing attention on the pronouncement: 'ev ovvre\iovaa T r d v T a viKfjaio Xoyov TO 4>tOS T08 ' dv8p(jJTTOLO"LV f]8LO"TOV (3X£TT6ll', T d vepQe 8 ' ovbev (IA 1249-51)5 3 5 1 The thought is voiced again in a conclusive reflection by Herakles, just before madness strikes (Her 634-6). Cf. Her 280f, IA 902. 5 2 More speech-closing gnomes that summarise the speaker's position: Hik 953f, Ion 1045-7, Hel 757, 1617f, Or [602-4], IA 373-5, etc. Empty platitudes are the rule rather than the exception in choral couplets. De Grouchy (diss. 27-9) defends the triteness of many gnomic passages, supposing that this represents a conscious choice.of the poet aimed at arousing pathos: "In the case of Tro 1203-6, for instance, the 'threadbare' quality may itself produce a powerful impression by throwing into relief the sheer intensity of Hecuba's suffering and the inadequacy of any 'normal' consolation in the horrific abnormality of genocide" (28f). But, as we have seen, Euripidean characters suf-fering from profound grief and despair are yet capable of very sophisticated expression and argu-mentation. It would therefore seem that Euripides has simply not placed a high value on clever-ness or aptness in writing gnomes, especially those that conclude a speech. 5 3 Cf. Hek 1177-82 (where the focusing process is very elaborate), Hel 513f, Phoin [438-40]. 158 A gnomic "tag" introduced by 8e may close an argument. The function is sometimes to contradict something in the preceding material, for example: 5 4 e[iol yap ou8' o TTCKTL XeLTreTcu (3poTotg £ w e o T i v eXfTis, ouSe KAeTTTO|j.aL fypevas rrpd^eiv T L KeSvov f)8u 8 ' ecm K a l SoKelv. (Tro 681-3) Or it may introduce a final stage of the argument (e.g. Elek 530f, discussed in III.C above), or point out the relevance of a point just made (e.g. Andr 684f, Her 201-3). Closing gnomic thoughts expand in a few speeches to become reflections of some length. 5 5 These may serve to summarise or fortify the speaker's argument. Hermione, suffering a crisis of nerves over her mistreatment of Andromache and fearing for her safety, identifies at once (Andr 929-42) the cause of her own failure as a wife: elaoSoL KaKcov y u y a L K c o v were to blame for her arrogance and complacency. Hav ing acknowledged this truth about her own life, she proceeds to develop the same point in general terms (943-53): a man wi th a wife should never let other women come and go in his household, instructors in vice; no, keep the doors barred, or you're invit ing trouble! Some other closing reflections rise above this level. Polyxene, in her speech of self-dedication (discussed in I.D above), has made much of her high status and the expectations she has grown up with for a royal marriage; even if she could evade death, she has lost all this. She closes by telling her mother not to offer the Greeks any further resistance, but rather to endorse her decision. She 5 4 This function is more strongly emphasised using K C U T O I : note Hik 484, Elek 932,1013, Tro 671. 5 5 Some of these lack the kind of coherent development that properly merits the name "reflection": e.g. Hik 506-10 is better regarded as a medley of gnomic pronouncements. 159 grounds this request wi th a reflection in which the person unused to suffering is implici t ly compared wi th the lower status person, accustomed to the yoke: 6 O T I S yap O U K elio9e yeuea9ai KCIKIOV c|)6pei \iev, dXyel 8 ' auxev' eimGeis - Cuyak-Qavihv 8 ' dv e'ir\ \idXXov eiiTuxeaTepos fj £GJV TO ydp Cnv M-T) KaXtos u.eyag TTOVOS. (Hek 375-8) For a person such as Polyxene, death constitutes a T U X T I superior to life. The reflection uses a general context and highly charged terms (dXyos, T T O V O S , Cuyov, Cf\v u.f) KaX&s on the one side, euTuxiis on the other) to recapitulate the argument earlier made on a personal level. Some closing reflections serve not to recast an argument already put, but to comment on a general issue. Teiresias in Phoin has to tell Kreon that Menoikeus must be sacrificed if Thebes is to be saved. The entire scene (Phoin 834-959) demonstrates v iv id ly the difficulties of being a prophet, a theme that attaches to Teiresias in nearly all his appearances in tragedy. Teiresias' final speech in the scene addresses to Kreon arguments in favour of the sacrifice (930-52); wi th a formula of transition ( T d \ikv Trap' T\\LU>V TrdvT ' exe Ls> 953a) he closes this section, then addresses an order to his attendant, asking to be led away. A s Teiresias departs, he reflects ruefully on his trade. The reflection takes the form of a d i lemma: 5 6 the prophet may tell people the bitter truth and make enemies, or offend the god by telling compassionate lies. Therefore Apo l lo alone should prophesy, who needs fear no one. Here the reflection takes as its point of departure not the arguments put in the preceding speech and scene, but a problem arising out of the situation. Comparable reflections l ikewise fol low breaks in a speech: Medeia's reflection on the lack of a clear xapaKTfjp indicating 5 6 See Ch. Ill, n.22. 160 the worth of a man (Med 516-9, fol lowing an apostrophe to Zeus) ; 5 7 Hekabe's reflections on the fickleness of fate (Hek 623-8, fol lowing an apostrophe at 619) and on the ski l l of persuasion (Hek 814-20, fol lowing a pathetic self-apostrophe at 812); Adrastos' disquisit ion on valour and education (Hik 911-7, fol lowing a change of address at 909). 5 8 3. "G round ing " Uses Very often gnomes are used to support or corroborate points made wi th in an argument or appeal. The connection to the preceding material is usually made wi th ydp. So Medeia argues, in response to Jason's offer of material aid: O U T ' dv £evoio"L TOLCTL csdls xPWa'1^® O U T ' dv TL 8e£aLLiea9a, u.riS' fiulv 8L8OIT KOIKOD ydp dvSpos Scop' 6vr\oiv OVK e x e u (Med 616-8) The gnome, "The gifts of a base man bring no benefit", is put forward as giv ing the underlying reason for her refusal. Medeia thus offers in support of her decision the authority of a statement presenting (it is implied) common w i s d o m . 5 9 The statement corroborated may itself be gnomic. The ydp-gnome in that case gives the Aristotelian "epilogue" in which the gnome is expla ined: 6 0 5 7 The passage is discussed below (IV.D) as a "utopian reflection". 5 8 See note 78 below. 5 9 Similar are: (with ydp) Hkld 200f, 327f, Hipp 988f, Andr 159f, 189f, 213f, 370f, Hik 481-3, Elek 1084f, Tro 989f, IT 391, 678b, Ion 597b, Hel [906-8], etc.; (with cog) Her 305f; (with asyndeton, cf. K-G II.344f) Med 462f, Andr 173-6, 207f, 639f, Or 665f. 6 0 See above n.3. With the quoted passage cf. Hipp 912f, Hek 378, Elek 1074f, Or 668, etc. 161 fyeiiyeiv OKOLIOV dvdp' ex9p° y XP e ^y, oo^oloi 8 ' e i K e i v ral Te9pau.u.eK)Ls KaXtos-p a i o v y d p aLSoI o' \mo$a\(±>v cbCX' dv re\LOi<s. (Her 299-301) The point being corroborated may be merely impl ied, e.g. in Admetos' argument addressed to Herakles on the matter of the veiled woman: K a l Trios a K p a i ^ v f i s ev viois aTpcodjtoLievTi eoTai; rbv f^Piov9', 'HpaKXeis, o u pdiSiov e ' i p y e i v (Alk 1052-4) The rhetorical question implies the woman could not be safely kept among young men; the gnome supports this wi th a general statement about the latter. A difficult passage is that in Hel where Menelaos convinces himself there is nothing surprising in the apparent coincidences wi th which he has been confronted. After doubting whether there can be a second Zeus in Egypt (Hel 489-91), or another Sparta, Tyndareos, and so on (492-6a), he seems befuddled (496b) unti l a gnomic thought resolves (incorrectly and so ironically) his dTropCa: e y o j \iev OVK exu> T L X P 1 ! Xeyeiv. TTOXXOI y d p , ais el^aaiv, ev TroXXf|i x®0Vi 6v6u.aTa ravr' e x 0 U C T L K a L TTOXLS TroXei yvvr\ y u v a i K L T ' • oi)8ev ovv B a u L L a a T e o v . (Hel 496-9) A s Kannicht points out (ad 496-500) the connection of thought between 496 and 497 is not immediately clear. He suggests the ydp -gnome here refers itself to an unspoken 8e-clause impl ied by the u.ev-clause of 496: e y w [lev OVK exco T L XP1! XeyeLv < dXXoL 8 ' dv exoLey >. I f ind it simpler to understand as impl ied in O U K exto T L xP 1! XeyeLv the sense: "These arguments (of 489-96a) seem strong but not decisive". Vs. 496b then expresses not a paralyzing sense of d-rropLa but a suspension of judgement for the moment; the fol lowing words voice the 162 argument on the other side and therewith the reason for this suspension (hence ydp), and in voicing this argument Menelaos immediately finds it convincing. A very common sequence is the gnome fol lowing a final appeal, com-mand or parainesis; since this is often at speech-end it may take on some of the "conclusive" function I have discussed above, in summarising or point ing the speaker's case. A good example is the close of Odysseus' speech of appeal addressed to Polyphemos: Trapes T O Lidpyov afjg yvdQou, T O 8 ' euo-e(3es rf\s SuaaePeias dv9eAo£>' rroXXolaL ydp KepSr) TTOvripd £r)uiai> f|LLeu[>aTO. (Kyk 310-2) A monitory gnome, presenting as common wisdom the proposit ion that those who reap evil gains come to a bad end, is offered in support of Odysseus' desperate p lea . 6 1 Often a rule is introduced in order to contradict or ridicule an argument or some behaviour that has been described, or to which the preceding constitutes an exception or abuse: such a rule is normally introduced wi th 8e. The function is the opposite of corroboration, in that a general truth is offered in opposition to rather than in support of the preceding. Thus Lykos attacks Herakles, the archer, OS OUTTOT ' damS' eax e Trpos Xaidi. xePi oi)8' fjX9e X6yxr)s eyyus dXXd TO£ ' exwv, KaKiOTOv orrXov, rf\i c|)uyf|i Trpoxeipos- fjv. 6 1 Similar are Med 263-5, Hipp 120, 474f, Andr 177-80, 230f, 621f, 952f, Hek 375-8, 844f, Hik 331, 911, Her 309-11, Ion 373, 398-400, 646f, Hel 941-3, Or 454f. Generally these gnomes follow directly on an imperative, or an expression summarising an appeal already made; are introduced by ydp; come at speech-end. The connection is made with t o s in Alk 800, Or 805f; with asyndeton in IT 1064, Phoin 584. The same grounding of an imperative with a gnome is achieved using the reverse order (gnome preceding appeal, etc.) in Hik 917, fr. 609. The normal sequence is seen also in appeals at other points in a speech: Alk 304-10, Hik 476-80, Hel 898-904, IA 1218f. Note that speech-concluding imperatives may be supported by ydp-statements that are not of a general but a specific character (e.g. Tro 403-5). 163 dvSpos 8 ' eXeyx 0? ouxi TO£ ' eiRJjuxias' dXX' dg Lievcov fiXeirei re KmrnSepKeTou Sopog Taxelav dXoKa TO^IV eu.(3epwg. (Her 159-64) "The archer keeps his distance, ready for flight; but the real test of manhood comes in face-to-face battle". Gnomes are similarly brought up in arguing against a posit ion or a trait attributed to the opponent in Andr 207, 594-9, Hipp 426, 911, Elek [390], Hel 636-8. We have seen a number of formal patterns exploited by Euripides for the introduction of gnomic material into rhetorical speeches and arguments. A few points may be stressed by way of summary: (1) Euripides puts "general rules" into the speeches of his characters with great frequency; (2) these rules are presented using a small number of formal patterns ("opening" gnomes offer a headline in advance of an argument, "closing" gnomes summarise a speaker's posit ion, "grounding" gnomes support a point just made); (3) certain rhetorical situations particularly lend themselves to gnomic treatment (e.g., proem reflec-tions on speech and debate, closing accusatory reflections, the grounding of an appeal wi th a moral maxim); (4) on the level of content, these patterns are applied without distinction in the presentation of gnomes having a very wide range of reference. In the next sections I shall discuss some forms for the pre-sentation of general rules and reflections in two specialised situations. C. Realisations and Challenges to Common Sense Gnomic expressions are normally called into service for the purpose of i l luminating the present special case; the latter is seen as an instance of the rule 164 stated in the former. It is implicit in the unargued presentation of the gnomes used in persuasive contexts that the speaker wishes the thought to be accepted as "common sense". Thus the Tutor in Medeia introduces a gnome wi th a formula that could apply everywhere: c t p n y L y v c o a K e L S ToSe, tos rrdg T L S auTov T O U rreXas LidXXov cbiXel etc. (Med 85f) "Are you just realising that...?": that is, everyone knows. Though self-consciously paradoxical statements may be given an "epilogue" to clarify their meaning, they w i l l seldom be corroborated wi th examples or supported by further argument. Occasionally, the present case is specifically identified as a violation of a general rule (Alk 77Ai, Andr 595f); or a tenet of common sense is rejected, for the sake of scoring points in a heated argument, on the basis of its failure to cover the present case (Alk 669ff, Andr 645f). But in a number of passages whose dramatic character is reflective rather than persuasive a character seems to respond to a situation by drawing a general conclusion that is clearly at odds wi th normal expectations, and for a moment it seems common sense is inadequate for explaining the wor ld. Passages of this type discussed below are Hek 864-8, Hik 734-6, Elek 367-90, Hek 956-61, Or 1155-62, Hek 592-602. 6 2 Hekabe, after hearing Agamemnon's embarrassed reply (Hek 850-63) to her appeal for help in her revenge plot against Polymestor, quickly comes to a shocking conclusion about the nature of the wor ld: 6 2 Hkld 297-303 is a reflection that arises out of the action in a similar way to these; but the content is uncontroversial and nothing marks it (as expressions like 4>e0 do elsewhere) as a sudden realisation. 165 (Hek 864-7) Solmsen writes: "As so often, Euripides is going out of his way. None of the obstacles mentioned actually applies to Agamemnon (although TrXf|9os r r o X e o s comes close to cn -po tTos ) . It cannot help Hecuba's case to theorize about the fact that nobody is 'free'.... Not to Hecuba, but to Euripides has this realization come, and he sees fit at this juncture to announce it". 6 3 This is an entirely reasonable v iew of the passage, so long as it is not implied that the announcement some-how spoils the scene: in fact, Agamemnon's reply has taken the shape it has in order to provide for the insertion of this interesting reflection. Similar is the realisation Adrastos experiences upon hearing the news of the just victory of Theseus in the battle to recover' the corpses of the Arg ive heroes. Wi th a sober reflection on the vanity of human wishes, he impl ici t ly acknowledges the injustice of his own war against Thebes: to Z e O , T L S f JTa robs TaXaiTTtopous ' ppOTOus <\>povelv X e y o u a i ; CTOU y d p edjripTfJLLeBa 8pco | iev re T O L C U ) 9 ' dv oi) T u y x d i r i L s 9eXtov. (Hik 734-6) 6 4 OVK e o n 9vr |Tcui ' 6 O T L S e o T ' eXeu9epos" fj xpTlM-aTcov y d p 800X65 e o T i v f\ T U X ^ S fj TrXfj9os CLVTOV TroXeog f\ VOLXCOV ypac | ) a i e i p y o u c a xP^\G^a[- f 1 1! K a T a yvwLrryi> T p o T r o i g . In Elek Orestes, faced wi th the noble character of the a u T O u p y o g who is his sister's husband, delivers a reflective monologue that has no persuasive purpose 6 3 Intellectual Experiments 147. 6 4 This, like the Hek passage just above, has the form of a "paradoxical" gnome, with ex-planatory epilogue; for an impatient rhetorical question implying a statement at odds with common wisdom, cf. Andr 645f. 166 in the play, but which nevertheless uses familiar rhetorical techniques of presentation and argument. The speech begins wi th an introductory extra-metrum cpeu that sets the tone of "sudden realisation". 6 5 Orestes then states a general rule (367): O U K ear ' d.Kpi|3es ovSev els euavSplav. A gnomic epilogue (368) clarifies this somewhat obscure claim, by indicating that a T a p a y u . 6s TOJV (J)i3creGJV ppoTcov is behind the problem. A series of examples follows, substan-tiating the rule (369-72). Then the matter is investigated using a hypophora sequence of a familiar sort: three alternative criteria for discerning euav8pia are proposed in rhetorical question form (viz., wealth, poverty, prowess in war), and each is rejected, wi th neat variation in the manner of arguing against each (373-8). In 380-2 the application to the present case is made. Next Orestes chides those (his imaginary interlocutors, addressed in second person) who maintain the conventional wisdom (383-5).6 6 In 386-90 the class of people the a u T o u p y o s ' represents are praised as the best householders and citizens, and contrasted wi th cu a d p K e g a i K e v a i 4>pevtov, dydA.Lj.aT ' dyopdg. The final point is made that it is (j)uaLs and evi\ivxla (that is, natural euavSpla) that make a man brave in battle, not sheer brawn. In 391 Orestes decides to accept the man's poor hospitality, then addresses servants, thus ending the soliloquy. The form of the speech may be tabulated as follows: 367f paradoxical gnome wi th epilogue 369-72 substantiating examples 373-9 hypophora sequence considering and rejecting each of three alternative criteria 380-2 application of general rule to present case 383-5 challenge to common sense 386-90 "demographic" reflection 6 5 For ()>e0 used in this context compare, besides passages discussed here (Hek 864, 956, Or 1155), Hkld 552, fr. 401. 6 6 Similar apostrophes: (1st person) Hek 814, 959f, Hik 492, (2nd person) Hik 744-7. 167 The text of this reflection has been attacked by Wi lamowitz, who deleted 373-79 and 386-90; his arguments are approved by Friis Johansen and the deletions accepted by Digg le . 6 7 Aside from the rather weak argument that 379 is quoted by Diogenes Laertius as a verse from Auge, the objections are to the two passages' relevance and fit. Vss. 373-9 are said by Friis Johansen to be redundant in sense and to interrupt the natural fit of 372 wi th 380: in the earlier passage (368-72) birth and wealth are rejected as sure criteria of euavSpLct, whereas the fol lowing lines envision and dismiss three alternative criteria (with "wealth" and "poverty" now treated separately). Vss. 386-90 are attacked as simply-irrelevant to the play situation, in that neither athleticism nor intelligence have been held up as attainments of the classes Orestes is discussing. But the follow-ing considerations argue for the integrity of 367-85: (1) the formal process in 367-82 is that of raising and illustrating a problem (367-72), investigating it (373-8), announcing the solution (379-82);68 (2) the hypophoric sequence is a set piece, a unit very commonly inserted into Euripidean arguments and very commonly involv ing three alternatives; (3) there is (pace Wi lamowitz, Analecta 191) no contradiction between the observation (377f) that prowess in battle is not a useful criterion for judging euavSpia and the point (388-90) that braving the enemy's spears depends upon the presence of that quality 6 9 In favour of 386-90, one may 6 7 Wilamowitz, Analecta 190-3; Friis Johansen, General Reflection 95 n.140. Schadewaldt (M. u. S. 139 n.4) argued for 373-9 but against 386-90. Murray and Denniston both receive all the lines: Friis Johansen's note is largely a rebuttal to the arguments Denniston offers in favour of the lines ad locc. See also Reeve "Interpolation" 151-3; Reeve rejects 368-79, 386-90 and 396-400. 6 8 It is admittedly unparalleled to have the "illustration" of the problem anticipate (in its reference to wealth and poverty) much of the point of the investigation that will follow. See Denniston ad 373-9. 6 9 Denniston suggests (ad 377) that the rejection of military prowess in 377f as a criterion stems purely from the impracticability of its application. Cropp (ad 377-8) sees the lines in a different light, noting the importance of the fact that "military achievement and sacrifice were celebrated 168 point out that we have seen and w i l l see other Euripidean passages where precisely this sort of content— speculation about society, class, wealth, and the good cit izen— leads us far from the play situation. 7 0 Wi th this type of material especially Euripides seems to have been wi l l ing to indulge a taste— presumably an Athenian and not merely a personal taste— for rhetoric at the expense of relevance. But the lines seem poorly prepared by 384f, and very far from the point of Oresetes' reflection. 7 1 Something like the Tapayfios to which Orestes refers (Elek 368) is noted by Polymestor in his initial reaction to the pathetic sight of Hekabe: 7 2 O U K eoTLV ouSev T T L O T O V , O U T ' eu8o£la O U T ' a u KaXoos TrpdaaovTa u.f) T r p d £ e i v KaKCJS. c))upouai 8 ' auTa 9eol TrdXiv re K a l Trpoato TapayLiov e v T i B e v T e s 1 , cos d y v i o a i a i ae(3oju.ev. auTOug. dXXd TauTa \iev T L del Gpriyetv, T T PO K O T T T O VT ' . ouSev es TrpoaBev K a K w v ; (Hek 956-61) communally rather than individually at Athens...and the old tradition of awards for excel-lence...and calling on witnesses to one's valour...were in question". 7 0 Citizen and state are the subject of reflections and speculations in, e.g., Med 223f, Hipp 486f, Andr [699-702], Hek 306-8, Hik 191f, 238-45, 312f, 423-5, 479f, 749f, Elek [386-90], Ion 595-606, Phoin 533-8, [1015-8], Or [907-11], Bak 270f; political demographics also surfaces in a surprising way at Her 588-92. Brackets here indicate as usual passages unacceptable to Diggle. See Schmid's survey of this material, Gesch. d. griech. Lit. I, iii. 726-32. Quite a lot of this sort of material has been attacked by Kovacs in his art. "Tyrants & Demagogues"; I have argued elsewhere in this study against some of Kovacs' conclusions. 7 1 See Cropp ad 386-90. Goldhill, "Rhetoric and Relevance" 169, argues for the lines as intended by their very ineptness and irrelevance to contribute to the presentation of Orestes as a "penny philosopher"; he concludes that "[Orestes'] poorly conceived and expressed speech comes up with utterances that seem all too easily to condemn him from his own mouth" (171). I do not see this kind of subtlety operating here. 7 2 T a p a y p . o s ' occurs again in a context of Gotterkritik in IT 570ff: 0118' o l oofyoi y e S c u u o v e s KeK \ r|uevoi/TTTTIVCJV o v e l p w v e L a l v dtJjeuSeaTepoL./TTOXUS' T a p a y u o ? e v T e TOLS 0eot? evi/ KAV TOTS P p o T e l o L S . 169 Here the confusion is expressly blamed upon the gods. I suspect we should regard this rather as rhetorical hyperbole, intended to sharpen our sense of the pathos of Hekabe's situation, than as an expression of a considered and enduring theology. 7 3 I shall return below to the question of criticism of the gods. The same sense of a "realisation" is present in Orestes' response to the generosity of Pylades: cpefj • OUK e c m v ouSev K p e l a a o v f| (juXos cracf)fjs, ov rrXoOTog, ou rvpavvis' aXoyiorov 8e TOL TO TrXfjGog dvTdXXayu.a yevvatou cjuXou. (Or 1155f) Orestes is suddenly reminded of the fact that wealth and power are less important than friendship, just as Polymestor has been reminded how ephemeral they are. 7 4 A n d here again (if Wei l is correct in seeing in TrXfjGos a reference to democracy designed to balance the reference to monarchy in TupawLsO 7 5 a taste for polit ical comment has taken us in an unexpected direction. Hekabe's scene-closing speech (Hek 585-628) fol lowing Talthybios' report of the sacrifice of Polyxene divides neatly into three parts: a pathetic-reflective section addressed to Polyxene is separated by a clear transition (603f) from a 7 3 Cf. Talthybios' reproachful address to Zeus at 488-91, and the choral observation about the gods' failing to measure up to a human standard of avveais and crania, Her 655-68. Complaints about the behaviour of individual gods as characters in the plot are a different matter: Amphitryon to Zeus (Her 339-47), Orestes of Apollo (IT 711-5, Or 285-7), Ion to Apollo (Ion 436-51). I attribute no importance to the fact that Polymestor is from his entrance an extremely unwelcome character. Schadewaldt speaks of his "feigned sympathy" (M. u. S. 138). I'm not sure even this is an appropriate point: the reflection forms a link in a chain of sympathetic reactions to the plight of the fallen queen. 7 4 Cf. Amphitryon's final words in Her : ocms Se TTXOUTOV f\ oQevos u d X X o v CJJIXCOV d y a Q t o v TTeTTdcrGai PouXeTai KaKto? <j>pov€l (1425f). Note also Elek [1097-9], where wealth and nobility in a wife are no guarantee of. o"aKJ>pova XexTV 75 Weil writes (ad 1156-1157): "Le poete dit que l'amitie vaut mieux que le pouvoir, soit dans une monarchie, soit dans une republique". 170 practical section in which servants are addressed, then an apostrophe to home, husband and self (619ff) opens another reflective section. The reflection closing the speech is of a conventional "look to the end" type: Priam's death and Hekabe's misery demonstrate that wealth and power are not sure signs of happiness, a point we have heard before in the play (488-96) and w i l l hear again in Polymestor's words quoted above. 7 6 The reflection on Polyxene's death is more str iking: OVKOVV Seivov, el yfj \iev KCIKXI T u x o u a a Koupoi) 9e69ev ev cjrdxvv fyepei, Xpr iaTT] 8 ' d u . a p T o O a ' coy xP e t J v avTr\v rvxelv K a K O f SLSIOCTL KotpTTOv, dv9pcoTTOL 8 ' d e l 6 \iev r rovr ipos ' ouSev dXXo TT\T\V KCXKOS', 6 8 ' ea9X6s- eoQXbs ou8e auLuj)opds' UTTO $VOLV 8ie(j)9eLp' dXXd xP 1 ! 0" 1" 0? eo"T' deC; d p ' o l reKovreg SLa^epouaLy r] T p o ^ a l ; ex^L y e LievTOL K a l T O 9pec|)9fii'aL KaXcos SiSa^ LV ea9Xotr T O U T O 8 ' fjy TIS ev \s.dQr\i, oldev T O y ' .aLaxpov K a v o v i . T O U KaXoO LJ.a9cov. (Hek 592-602) The nobil ity and grace wi th which Polyxene has accepted death lead Hekabe to reflect that human nature has a permanence that even the earth itself lacks, in that good soil may yet give a poor crop when conditions are unfavourable, and vice versa; 7 7 the insight is expressly described as surprising (Seivov 592). This thought leads to consideration of the further (and highly philosophical) question whether the nobil i ty of human individuals comes from their parents or from nurture, then to some very abstract thoughts about the nature of moral 7 6 The "look to the end" motif in Euripides: with Hek 628f cf. Hkld 863-6, Andr 100-2, Elek 953-6, Tro 509f, 1203-6. 7 7 Another interesting comparison between human and plant development is made by Peleus in Andr 636-8. 171 educat ion. 7 8 Neither the abstraction and apparent "irrelevance" of these f inal stages of the reflection, nor any supposed contradiction of the point made in 592-5, should lead us to suspect 599-602.7 9 The entire passage demonstrates v iv id ly Euripides' wil l ingness to follow a point where it leads h im, and to bring up topics that were bound, as wi th the political material I have mentioned, to strike his audience as bold and new-fangled— and we can infer from Aristophanes that he made such an impression. That Euripides was wi l l ing to indulge in this k ind of reflection at a moment of such focused pathos is a fact we must take as a sobering reminder of the distance between our literary conventions and his. D. "Utopian Reflection" and "Gotterkritik" We have seen general statements, whether of a factual or an ethical nature, offered without apparent reflection or justification in presenting and buttressing arguments. Next we looked at "reflective" passages in which a character seems to develop a general statement or v iew in response to a present situation: it is often stated or impl ied that this view contradicts expectation or common sense, and so I have referred to these reflections as "realisations". These seem generally to have an epideictic, almost extra-dramatic quality rather 7 8 Cf. the important reflection of Adrastos, Hik 911-7. There it is said that TO Tpa^fjvai u.f| KOIKWS confers aiSojs, and that this quality guarantees valour. This point is followed by the announcement that f) euavSpia is learned from instruction, like language, and that the things one is taught stay with one through life. 7 9 599-602 del. Sakorraphos, Diggle. In favour of the lines see Weil ad loc, Schadewaldt Mon. u. Selbst. 138f, Collard ad 592-602. 172 than a persuasive purpose. I turn now to passages in which a character wishes for a fundamental change in some aspect of the wo r l d . 8 0 Euripidean Utopian wishes and reflections resolve themselves into three important groups: characters wish for (1) existence of a clear indicator of honesty, righteousness, etc.; (2) a wor ld without women; (3) a second passage through life. Without denying the up-to-date quality of these reflections, their undoubted relation to trends in contemporary thought and expression— and without discounting the appeal they have on this score a lone— I wou ld emphasise the purely "rhetorical" value of these Euripidean utterances. Hekabe attacks the specious arguments of Polymestor's defense speech by beginning her rebuttal wi th a reflection on honest speech: 'Aydu.eu.vov, dvGptoTTOiaiv O U K expfjv TroTe Ttov Trpayu-dTtov rr\v yXwaaav Laxueiv TrXeov dXX' eiTe X P A O T ' eSpaae X P A ° T ' eSei Xeyeiv, eiT' av TTOvripd TOVS Xoyou? elvai aaGpous', Kai [if] SuvaaBai TaSiK' eS Xeyeiv TroTe. (Hek 1187-91) Similar is the first stage of Theseus' attack on the apparently devious impassivity of Hippolytos: cf>eu, xpTF PpoTotca TCOV CJHXCOV TeKuxjpiov cages' TL KeiaGai Kal SidyvcoaLv c()pevwv, o a T i g T ' dXr|9fis e a T i v 6g Te u.f) C))LXOS, dioods re (j)Covds T r d v T a s dv9pojTrous exei-v, 8 0 I am not concerned here with expressions of regret over a specific action, event, etc. (e.g. Med 1-15), nor again with the identification of "faulty practices" (e.g. IT 380-91). Solmsen has included both these classes in his discussion of "Utopian Wishes and Schemes of Reform", Int. Exp. 66-82. Critical comments and impossible wishes of various sorts are sometimes addressed to a god; but I am not interested here in criticism by human characters of gods as individuals (see note 72 above). 173 TTJV \iev 8iKalav rr\v 8 ' 07100? ervyxavev, cos f) <t)povouaa TOISLK ' e£r|XeyxeTo rrpos Tfjs SiKalas, K O U K av f]TraTo6|j.e9a.. (Hipp 925-31) A n d Ion, exasperated by the impossibility of physically attacking his tormentor due to the protection Kreousa has claimed as a suppliant, wishes for a similar physical manifestation of good and evil: Seivov ye 9V T | T O I S T O U S V O L I O U S cos oil KOACOS e9r)KGv 6 9e6s oi>8' drro yvcoLiris cro^fjs-T O U S Liev ydp dStKous |3COLX6V OI>X L C ^ L V expiiv dXX' e^eXavveiv ou8e ydp tyaveiv KOLXOV 9ecov TTOvripdL x e L P L - TOLOL 8 ' ev-SLKOis' (Ion 1312-16) There are striking similarities of form in these three passages. A n d the "utopian" idea, though not a new thought, may wel l have been a stylish one. 8 1 But all three of these "wishes" form part of a rhetorical attack on an opponent who is to be perceived as so vile that in a just wor ld his true nature wou ld be plain for al l to see. This is neither a philosophical, nor— in spite of ol 9eol in Ion 1313— a religious idea, but a rhetorical tactic. The same idea expressed in these three passages as a wish appears elsewhere, wi th a no less rhetorical function, as a reproach addressed to Zeus: 8 1 Commentators note related ideas in earlier poetry (Theogn. 119-24, Pind. Pyth 10. 67f, Attic Skolia 6 and 33 Diehl) and in Aesop fab. 102 Hausrath. In Euripides cf. frr. 388, 439. And in a lyric reflection the Chorus of old men in Her wish one could have a second life as a visible stamp of one's d p e T T | . I would suggest the idea of a true and a false voice in Hipp 925ff owes something to Homer's two gates of dreams (Od xix, 562-7). 174 to Zeu, T L Sri X P V I J 0 V M e^v 6g KLpSnXos fji TCKLitipL' dvGpwTTOLcav lorfaaas' aac|)fi, dvSptov S ' OTUJL XPTQ T w K O K O V SLeiSevaL ou8eis x a P a K T T l P eLLTrecj)UKe aioLiaTi; (Med 516-9) Medeia has begun by saying she w i l l speak out so as to give herself relief and Jason pain through vi l i fy ing h im (473f), and this final reproach— not really a complaint against Zeus but against Jason— completes that program. The passages wishing for a "utopian" wor ld without women likewise occur in heated rhetorical contexts. Jason rebutting Medeia's charges against h im closes: XP?\V ydp dXXoOev TfoGev PpoToug TTaiSa? TeKvoOaGou, BfjXu 8 ' O U K elvai yevos' XOUTto? dv O U K fjv ouSev di'QpcofTOLS' KotKOv. (Med 573-5) Hippolytos reacting vehemently to the proposition made by the Nurse on Phaidra's behalf begins: to Zed, T L 8f] KL(38T|XOV dvGpcoTroLs KOLKOV ywa.LKas' Is §&s T)XLOU KaTtoLKiaas; el ydp (3poTeLOv fjGeXes aTrelpaL yevos, O U K IK yuydLKtov XPW TrapaaxeaBai To8e, dXX' etc. (Hipp 616-20) In these two passages we see again an impossible wish expressed using XPW> A N C L a similar idea for change put as a reproach addressed to Zeus. A n d again we find the underly ing ideas differently formulated elsewhere. 8 2 These utterances then, 8 2 Misogyny: frr. 666,1059. Marriage is rejected (in very different terms) in Alk 882-8, Med 230-7. Finley (Three Essays 92-7) calls attention to Euripidean connections with Antiphon B 49 (from TTepl ' OLtovoias). 175 l ike the group regretting the lack of a sure sign of virtue, should be thought of neither as serious criticism of the gods, nor as serious "utopian" reflections, but as examples of rhetorical ploys and strategems, more elaborate than some others but serving the same basic purpose. The same points may be made of Iphis' "utopian" wish people could go a second time through life, so as to benefit from the lessons of the first life: OLLlOl ' TL Sf] (3p0T0L0"LV OUK 6 0 T L V To8e, veovg Sis elvou K a l yepoi/Tas ai> TTCIXLV; dXX' Iv 86U.OLS \iev f\v TL u.f| KaXuis exr|L y v c o u m a L V i x j T e p a L a L y 6^op9oiJLLe9a , a l t o v a 8' OUK e£eorLv. e l 8' r\\iev veoi 8lg K a l yepoirres, e l T L S e^ri|j.dpTavev SLTTXOO p i o u XaxdvTes e£cop9ou|j.e9' dv. (Hik 1080-6) The idea, which can like those discussed above be paralleled in both earlier and contemporary Greek thought, 8 3 serves to introduce the somewhat paradoxical regret Iphis feels over his having begot children, who have now died. This regret becomes a rationale for Iphis' decision to embrace death himself, and the justification of a decision to accept death is, as we saw in I.D above, a typical occasion for the exercise of rhetorical resourcefulness in Euripidean tragedy. These "utopian" reflections, like the escapist fantasies sometimes expressed in lyr ics, 8 4 play a dual role: within the economy of the play, they contribute to our sense of a character's antagonism, frustration, despair; at the same time we may assume that, like the fancy proems, sophisticated probabil ity 8 3 Cf. Theogn. 1007-12, Bacchyl. 3, 88, Soph. fr. 67 (where Pearson cites Iliad IX. 408f, a distant relative of our passage). Some see a connection of Hik 1080-6 with the thought of Antiphon B 52 (which Collard ad Hik 1080-1 adduces as evidence the idea "may have been a sophists' talking-point"; cf. Bond ad Her 665-72). 8 4 "Escapist fantasies": choral wishes to undertake impossible journeys at Alk 455-9, Hik 617-25, Hel 1479-86; cf. Phaidra at Hipp 230f, Hermione at Andr 861-5, Kreousa at Ion 796-9. 176 arguments and polit ical reflections I have discussed elsewhere in this study, they held a certain fascination in their own right for the original audience. Whi le they may be common topics of discussion in sophistic circles, they represent no real contemporary "schemes of reform" (in Solmsen's phrase), and all three of the notions above can be found in some form in earlier Greek literature. But they are wel l fitted to their rhetorical context and stylishly expressed. A s for the idea that such passages represent serious criticism of the gods, we have seen that criticism of the ways of the wor ld may or may not refer the fault to a god or "the gods". It makes little difference when they do. For example, Hippolytos addresses to Zeus his reflection on the desirability of a wor ld without women (Hipp 616ff), but Jason opens his similar reflection (Med 573ff) wi th an impersonal XP"^ ; Medeia addresses to Zeus her impossible wish for a clear infallible sign of quality in men (Med 516-9), but Theseus in Hipp 925-31 opens a similar thought wi th $ev (registering emotion) and xPW'r Polymestor blames the T a p a y L i o s that renders human prosperity unreliable on "the gods" (Hek 958f), but the T a p a y u . 6 s that Orestes finds makes virtue hard to predict is said to reside in a l (j)uaeis ppOTcov (Elek 368). So Schadewaldt, speaking of Menelaos' monologue, Hel 483-514, notes: 8 5 Das Pathos ist wie ublich am Anfang des Selbstgesprachs bezeichnet (483): TL 4>to; TL A.e£to, wofi ir auch ein co 9eoL oder $ev d>eO, TL Xe£to hatte stehen konnen, denn Pathos bedeutet hier nur Affiziertsein, und dieses ist, da es den Menschen des All tags betrifft, nicht wahlerisch im Ausdruck. In spite of this view, Schadewaldt finds, in earlier passages addressed to Zeus (Med 516-9, Hipp 616-24, Hek 488-500), genuine religious content and serious cr i t ic ism. 8 6 He overestimates the force of the name Zeus, and under-8 5 Mon. und Selbst. 231. 8 6 Ibid 120ff. 177 estimates the rhetorical character of such utterances. 8 7 Consider the fol lowing passages. Euripides has characters express perplexity in lines beginning: 8 8 OLLiOL, TL (|)00 I A 442 TL (j)co, TL Xe£oo Hel 483 co ZeO, TL Xe£co Kyk 375, Hek 488 co 9eoL, TL Xe£co Alk 1123 $ev c|>eO, TL Xe£co Hkld 535 Impatient or surprised questions begin: elev, TL S r i Hik 1094 elev, TL 8f)Ta Hek 313 OLLCOL, TL Sf) Hik 1080 O'L>OL, TL S f j T a Hkld 433, Andr 443, Her 1146 co Zed, TL 8fj Med 516, Hzpp 616 co Zei), TL 8f |Ta Hik 734 co 9eo[, TL S f j T a Hipp 1060 Of the passages opening co Zeu, KyA: 375 and Med 516 involve no further reference to Zeus: that is, the expression is a mere expletive. In Hipp 616, Hek 488, and Hik 734 the sequel shows the address to Zeus to be more genuine. But in no case is a point made using co Zeu that we do not see made in another way elsewhere. There seems to be no basis on which to conclude that this formulaic pattern has a stronger sense when Zeus is named than when another addressee or expletive is involved. 8 7 See Friis Johansen, General Reflection 86 n.105, for a dissent from Schadewaldt over this point. But Friis Johansen seems to see in these expressions stylised formulas for marking a pathos that is largely conventional; I see them as stylised formulas in a system of eristic and persuasive rhetoric. 8 8 A complete study of the formular shape seen here would cover also examples with personal address and with similar questions such as TL Spdacu; (e.g., Hipp 782, Hek 737, Her 1157, IT 777, Ion 756, etc.). I give above examples that open with <3 Zeu and their closest relations only. 178 The Euripidean "utopian reflection", then, should be thought of pr imari ly as a form of rhetorical argument in which the opponent's position is attacked, or the speaker's position promoted, through the device of creating an alternate wor ld that lends itself to a striking comparison wi th the reality of the present situation. This procedure resembles the use of gnomic "rules" in argument, in bringing a general idea to bear on a special case; but these reflections draw upon a pool of utopian images rather than a pool of maxims and proverbs. These utopian images, though undoubtedly stylish in Euripides' period, rest on "tra-dit ional" ideas just as do most Euripidean maxims, and the arguments formed using them have the normal rhetorical purpose of defeating an opponent. The use of an apostrophe to Zeus or the gods in presenting these arguments seems to contribute a sense of rhetorical urgency rather than serious religious content. 179 Chapter V Rhetoric i n Three Plays I propose in this final chapter to discuss in detail the use of rhetorical material in one scene of Hippolytos, the first half of Suppliant Women, and the whole of Iphigeneia at Aulis. M y purpose is to explore the ways in which argu-mentative speeches, debates, and complex rhetorical scenes relate to other parts of the play and to the play as a whole: the extent to which they reveal character, reinforce themes, contribute to large formal patterns. M y results w i l l suggest that critics who v iew rhetorical material in tragedy as essentially conventional and non-integral are apt to ignore important aspects of this material; but I w i l l note as wel l points at which critics who see subtle psychology or irony in neutral rhetorical material seem to be in error. A . Phaidra's Monologue In the second episode of Hippolytos, Phaidra has decided upon suicide as the only way of relieving the agony of her passion for Hippolytos, and of avoiding the disgrace that would affect her and her children if her love became known . 1 Her speech to the Chorus (373-430) explains her yvu\ir\s 6869, the 1 In this discussion, the following contributions will be cited by author's name only: E.R. Dodds, "AIAQZ of Phaedra" (1925); R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "A Study in Causation" (1957); W.S. Barrett's comm. (1964); C. Willink, "Some Problems" (1968); C. Segal, "Shame and Purity" (1970); F. Solmsen, "Bad Shame" (1973); J. Gould, "Dramatic Character" (1978); B. Manuwald, "Phaidras Irrtum" (1979); D. Conacher, "Rhetoric and Relevance" (1981); A. Michelini, Euripides (1987); D. Cairns, AI AOS (1993); E. Craik, "AIAQ2" (1993). For complete citations see Bibliography. 180 course of thought through which she arrived at this decision. But the speech begins wi th a long reflection that considers general problems of morality. Phaidra's speech, though formally addressed to the "public", is not designed to persuade so much as to justify a decision in rational terms (cf. the "Opfertod" speeches discussed in I.D above). She w i l l do this through a number of stages: she focuses first on an abstract view of vice and virtue (373-87), then traces the course of her own reaction to the problem (388-402); next her decision to die is justified by a somewhat pragmatic moral rule (403f), and some reflections on bad women; then the focus returns to herself, Theseus, and her children (419-23); the speech ends wi th a series of gnomic statements (424-30). She begins: "I have at times in the past reflected in a general way, in long stretches of night, on the way by which a human life is spoiled. A n d they (people) seem to me to go wrong 2 not in accordance wi th the (defective) nature of their intentions— after al l , many people have good sense (yet go wrong). Rather, one must look at it this way: We know and recognise the good, but we don't take the trouble to practise it;3 some as a result of laziness, some by putting some other pleasure before the good. 4 Life has many pleasures: long chats and 2 TTpdaaeiv Kaiciov (codd) or Kaidov' (Herwerden): both Barrett (ad 377-81) and Willink (12, 17) overstate the difference between the two. Phaidra is talking about loss of control over one's life: "faring worse" and "doing wrong" are two sides of that coin. The person fails to do or not do something, and Sie<j>9apTai Bios. But failure to achieve or realise "the good life" is not the topic (see below). 3 The idea of enduring a TTOVOS to achieve Td xp^ord, with laziness and (other?) pleasures identified as obstacles, puts us clearly in a moral context. Thus any ambiguity present in 378 is here removed— Phaidra is speaking of moral behaviour, not "the good life", "success" (as Willink [12] would like). 4 A pleasure other than laziness, or other than the good? Willink (14): "The word-order clearly identifies TO KCIXOV as a r|8ovrj" . Barrett (ad 381-5) takes "something else" as implying "than dpyia", but feels the phrase doesn't imply that "dpyia" is a "pleasure". Friis Johansen (General Reflection 124) states that Phaidra's scheme of divisions (of which this is the first) "employs f)8ovf| as a superior genus in two successive Siaipeaei?", noting that this is implied in aXXriv riv' 383— i.e., he understands "laziness or some other pleasure is put before the good". See also Michelini 208 (ambivalent); Cairns 323 n.218 ("the 'other pleasure' will be TO xaXov...", citing additional literature). My ambiguous paraphrase resembles that of Winnington-Ingram (174). 181 leisure— pleasant but ev i l— and cuStos. There are two kinds: 5 the one not a bad thing, but the other drags down houses. If the distinction (of each) were clear, they wouldn't be two things wi th the same letters". Formal ly we have here an elaborate argumentation process, though there is at this stage some doubt what point w i l l emerge. Phaidra is setting out to demonstrate that people "do wrong" through personal weakness of w i l l . She introduces the point by first denying a proposition that is roughly its opposite, v iz . the idea that wrong-doers act KCITCX yvtoLiris <\>V<JIV, whatever precisely that means. This formal procedure highlights the argument Phaidra is going to put; if it happens (as is not impossible) to involve negating a viewpoint that Socrates or others may have been promoting in their teaching around the year 430, then Euripides may have chosen a verbal formula here that would ring a bell wi th some audience members, but this would be quite incidental to the purpose of Phaidra's speech. 6 In 380f Phaidra states her real point: people don't struggle hard enough to follow what they recognise as the right course (TCI xpTl 0"™)- N o w we get a series of divisions: 7 (1) people may not struggle enough due either to laziness or to pursuing some other pleasure they have set before TO KCLXOV; (2) pleasures are many— talk and leisure— and c d S t o s is another thing that some have set before TO K O A O V ; 8 (3) a i o w s is of two sorts, one good and one bad. 9 In 388-5 Sc. of alScos; Willink introduced (15f) the idea that two kinds of pleasure are meant, and this has been taken up by Cairns (324-7), who cites Claus and Kovacs as also taking this view. As Craik points out (47), even if two kinds of pleasure are meant, aiSoj? will remain ambivalent. 6 On the placing of this speech in relation to contemporary philosophical debate, see most recently T.H. Irwin, "Euripides and Socrates". 7 This technique elsewhere in Euripides: Med 215ff (two successive divisions); see Collard ad Hik 238 for other examples. 8 Barrett (ad 381-5) suggests this interpretation, as necessitated by the fact that aLSws cannot be described as a "pleasure"; Solmsen (424f) finds the idea somewhat difficult but attractive. Craik, whose understanding of aiSoj? (discussed below) removes the problem, goes too far in calling Barrett's view a "breathtaking disregard of grammar and syntax" (47). 182 90, she begins to suggest a connection between these thoughts and her own case: "Since then this is my (general) view, I was bound (on a specific occasion?) not to use any cpdpLiaKOv to spoil it, and so slide back in my thinking". There are problems here for interpreters. It w i l l be helpful to state first the points that seem clear. Phaidra is aware that moral behaviour requires strenuous effort, and she sees idleness, pleasures of various sorts, and atScos' (whether or not this too is a "pleasure") as potentially discouraging that effort. Beyond that, doubts intrude. A s to the particular pleasures she mentions, there seem to be three different approaches taken by critics: (1) Phaidra names as obstacles people place before TO KCIXOV a list of items chosen virtually at random by Euripides from those that one might expect her to be aware of (Solmsen, 421). 1 0 That is, the list "long talks and leisure and a i S t o g " has a realistic r ing on Phaidra's tongue but no necessary relation to her own case. (2) The list represents precisely the temptations confronting Phaidra, and to which she feels vulnerable (Barrett ad 381-5). (3) Another possibility is that Phaidra is naming weaknesses she is able to disavow; if her decision to die is understood as a triumphant case of eKTrovelv x d X P 1 ! 0 " ™ , then perhaps she is claiming to be unaffected by these weaknesses (Michelini, 300). There are other problems of the relation of the general points to the situation in Hipp. The application of general rule to special case is not so clearly pointed as we would expect from similar passages. 1 1 A strong break separates 9 Before raising the question what is meant by ai.8ws, we may ask whether there can really be a good aiSius that prevents people from doing good. If Phaidra were speaking more strictly, she might say that the cuSw? of the second division ("things that prevent people from acting morally") is the bad aLSus only. Michelini (300) characterises this third division in the series: "Phaidra drifts from her apparent theme... into musings on aidos". I see neither drift nor musing here. 1 0 Solmsen compares Med 215ff, where a number of generalisations made about women clearly don't apply to Medeia herself. 1 1 I rely here on Friis Johansen's discussion, General Reflection 122ff. 183 this passage from the continuation (\e£io Se KOU OOI... 391), where elsewhere long speech-opening reflections are followed by a clear formula of application (e.g. S. Ant 184, E. Elek 380, Andr 703). Furthermore Phaidra has not given us as clear a logical framework as we might like: does OUK eKrroi'ouu.ev (381) imply we all fail to carry out TO. xPr\OTa^ She has spoken of different reasons for moral failure without any reference to the possibility of moral success. Thus we w i l l be listening to the sequel very carefully to learn what these general pronounce-ments are leading up to. Where w i l l Phaidra fit in? Is she thinking of a good deed she is preventing herself from carrying out, or an evi l deed she is struggling not to commit? H o w is alStos involved? A n d what is meant by her refusing to resort to "any sort of ^dpu-aKoi/'? Phaidra has taken us through a moral system in which people's failure to act moral ly was connected wi th pleasures and (or including) cdSojs; and she now insists that, having this point of view, she would not want to destroy it by using any ^dpu.a.Koi' and so reverse her frame of mind. The word cj)dpu.aKov w i l l return in Hipp (at vs. 479), wi th a specific sense. Here it is used quite generally of any "cure"; the sentence means superficially "there is no way I wou ld want to give up these insights". But one suspects an element of irony in Euripides' choice of words: Phaidra by using a <j>dpu.aKov (in the sense "love charm") could be "cured" of her craving for Hippolytos, and this would involve TOUU.TTCIALV' rreaelV (j)pevtov. We have heard Phaidra's exposition of her moral ideas, and of her deter-mination to cl ing to them. She now moves to her own immediate situation, and reveals the steps by which she reached her resolve to die (391-401). The chronological character of this section was mentioned above (LB) as an unusual application of chronological organization: Phaidra is describing the stages in a 184 progression rather than recalling a past moment for its value as a springboard for an argumentative point. In this case three stages are reviewed. Phaidra resolved at first to deal wi th her affliction through silence, then through TO aoj^poyelv, and finally she decided upon death. 1 2 The first of these decisions she supports wi th a gnome: the tongue (i.e., that of the secret-keeper, and that of any confidant) can't be trusted; it can correct others' faulty ideas, but itself gathers more trouble than anything. The second stands wi th no argument, but we are told it was an unsatisfactory solution. In the third stage, the decision to die is called the "strongest of plans", and supported wi th a general rule: €u .o i y d p elr\ \LT\T€ XavQaveiv KaXa LLTJT ' o u a x p d SpcoanL u.dpTupas' TTOAAOUS ex^iv. (403f) For let me have it thus: not to go unseen in a noble act, nor to have many witnesses in a disgraceful one. This is not a shocking or paradoxical moral rule, when its argumentative purpose of justifying death before disgrace is recognised, and allowance is made for its rather rhetorical positive-negative formulat ion; 1 3 but it does introduce that concern for good appearances (eikA-eia) that is going to prove decisive for Phaidra's thoughts later in the play. Phaidra is defending her decision to die on 1 2 It is clear that Phaidra did not pass through these three stages in connection with the events of the previous episode; we learned in the Prologue that she is dying in silence (39f), and in the Parodos ode that she is starving herself (138ff). Euripides has dramatised the danger of a complete loss of reputation through the two incidents in which Phaidra's secret gradually comes out in the presence of the Nurse and Chorus, but these two incidents were not the occasion for her decision to die. Cairns, 323, thinks otherwise; but vss. 400f tell us not that Phaidra failed to keep silence or practise aw4>poawr|, but that these were no cure. 1 3 J.H. Finley, Three Essays 99, notes the similarity of a moral precept found in the ' AXfjGeia of Antiphon the Sophist. (Craik, 49-52, notes a variety of other points of contact in Phaidra's speech with contemporary sophistic thought.) Willink wilfully manipulates the sense: "TO cuaxpd Spay... was not excluded, provided there were few enough 'witnesses'. It is a chilling expression of the ideal of eikXeia in its crudest form" (20). His assumption throughout is that Euripides' intention is subtly to undercut Phaidra, but this would not be subtle. 185 the grounds that her shame would otherwise be bound eventually to become publ ic knowledge; 1 4 therefore the "relevant" half of the antithesis is the second l ine . 1 5 I shall return to this striking couplet below. Phaidra's speech continues wi th reflections on passion and adultery, including the deliciously Euripidean observation (409-12) that this crime must have originated in the best houses, since in that case it wou ld pass by example to the lower classes (whereas presumably the reverse wou ld not happen). A n d yet nothing need prevent us from seeing "relevance" in such epigrams— one thinks immediately of Phaidra's own royal blood, and of her mother. She wonders how any woman could face her husband while having a lover, addressing the appeal (3 SeCTrroLva rrovTia KurrpL. A t 419 she returns to her own case. She w i l l never be caught (|!T]TTOT ' ...dAto 420) betraying her husband, nor her chi ldren. 1 6 A reflection fol lows, important for the unfolding of the plot, on the status of children: how some may have freedom and glory "on their mother's account"; others may experience something like slavery, due to their awareness of the Kara of a parent. A gnome closes these thoughts: time w i l l reveal the base. Her final words again (cf. 403f) express an everyday moral sentiment in a way which we may later in retrospect realise was tailored to reflect the obsession bui ld ing wi th in her: may I never be seen (noticed, recognised) among the base. The speech divides into two halves, each of which begins wi th general material, then moves to Phaidra's own case: 1 4 She is not, however, making a pitch for the Chorus' silence, as Willink suggests (11); that issue never comes up. The fact the women of the Chorus know her secret is completely ignored for now, and so of no importance. And when at 710-12 she asks for their silence, there is no persuading to be done. 1 5 Michelini has suggested (301) she is trying to call attention to a noble act here. But her purpose is entirely negative: avoid 8 u a K \ e i a . 1 6 The passage has led her very naturally to think of her children. They assume greater importance over the course of the play: note 305-10, 715-21, 847, 858f. 186 373-90 391-402 403-18 419-30, my view of virtue and vice my resolve to die adultery, shame and reputation my husband and children Wi th the whole speech now in view, I return to a detailed look at prob-lems of interpretation in its first half. We have seen in IV.A above that it is Euripides' normal practice, when he opens a speech using gnomic material or a substantial general reflection, to follow this material wi th a passage more or less clearly pointing out the relationship of the general rule to the specific play-s i tuat ion. 1 7 A s Friis Johansen has noted, the present passage (Hipp 373-402) formally considered doesn't yield up as clear a correspondence as we wou ld expect from similar passages. 1 8 But if the passage is formally unusual it does not necessarily fol low that the normal dramatic function of general reflection is abandoned. If we may assume that the function of the general passage (373-90) is to give a large context to the special material of 391-402, then we must f ind, at the min imum, a sense in which Phaidra's decision to die results from her awareness of ouStos (or some other pleasure or temptation?) 1 9 as tending to keep her from TO KOLXOV. What, first of al l , is the meaning of TO KCLXOV in 382? That is, what "good" does Phaidra imply she is or is not fail ing to achieve? Here already there is a woeful lack of consensus: at the fringes are Wi l l ink ("the good life" in the sense of general happiness and success) and Cairns (the suicide through which Phaidra 1 7 Euripidean examples of clear application of a general rule expressed in a proem: Andr 324, 703, Elek 367, Bak 268, etc. Application strikingly absent (because obvious): Hek 1186-94 . 1 8 General Reflection 122f: the "initial section [vss. 373-90] is most expressly set off from the sequel by an elaborate frame" formed by 375f and 388-90. For the structure Friis Johansen compares S. Ant 175-206. 1 9 I add this in defer