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Euripidean rhetoric : a formal and literary study Clausen, Bruce 1997

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EURIPIDEAN RHETORIC A Formal and  Literary Study by  BRUCE C L A U S E N B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1968  A THESIS S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies) W e accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A February, 1997 © Bruce Clausen, 1997  In  presenting  degree at the  this  thesis  in  partial  University of  fulfilment  of  of  department  this thesis for or  by  his  requirements  British Columbia, I agree that the  freely available for reference and study. I further copying  the  her  representatives.  an advanced  Library shall make it  agree that permission for extensive  scholarly purposes may be  or  for  It  is  granted  by the  understood  that  head of copying  my or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department  of  ClftSglcs  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  6 V ^  ™,  W7  ABSTRACT  This study aims (1) to document and classify the materials and techniques of persuasive speech in Euripidean drama, and (2) to develop an understanding of the ways in which the balanced arguments and abstract speculations of Euripidean characters contribute to the construction of plots, themes and characters. The results are intended to be useful both as a contribution to criticism concerned with the "tone" of Euripidean tragedy and as a resource for the study of early oratory and argumentation in the period of the Sophists.  The first two chapters classify and analyse speeches and scenes according to dramatic context. In Chapter I, single speeches of several types are shown to rely on similar techniques of presentation and argument. Chapter II analyses patterns of correspondence between the speeches of a scene. The debate scenes of Alkestis and Hippolytos are discussed with a view to determining how stylised and conventional rhetorical material affects our view of the characters involved.  Analysis is next offered of some common techniques for the presentation of arguments. Chapter III discusses the "probability argument" and related forms involving the use of rhetorical questions and conditional formulations. Chapter IV examines Euripides' use in argumentative contexts of gnomic material and so-called "utopian reflections".  Chapter V considers the use of rhetorical techniques and scenes i n three plays. Phaidra's monologue i n Hippolytos 373-430 is discussed i n terms of its rhetorical purpose and its contribution to important themes and formal relationships i n the play. The rhetorical confrontations of the first half of Suppliant Women are seen to contribute to the delaying and highlighting of the action that follows while exploiting an opportunity for abstract moral and political debate. The playlong rhetorical preparation for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia i n Iphigeneia at Aulis similarly is shown to serve the purpose of enhancing the importance and value of the girl's death, while involving an intricate formal balancing of scenes and speeches that should be appreciated i n its o w n right.  iii  Contents  Abstract Contents  ii iv  Introduction  1  I. Speech and Argument A. Speeches of Appeal B. "Forensic" Speeches C. Monologues of Despair D. Heroic Acceptance of Death E. Two Epideictic Speeches  6 8 18 27 37 44  II. Antilogies and Complex Exchanges A . Appeal and Response B. Accusation and Refutation C. The Debate with Lykos D. "The Rhetoric of the Situation" in Two  49 49 57 68  Forensic Debates E. Three-way Scenes  71 82  III. Probabilities and Possibilities A . Rhetorical Questions B. Elimination of Alternatives: Past C. Elimination of Alternatives: Future D. Hypothetical Arguments  iv  95 95 104 118 125  IV. General Rule and Special Case 135 A . Formal Patterns 136 B. Rhetorical Uses of Gnomic Formulations 146 1. "Opening" Uses 147 2. "Closing" Uses 157 3. "Grounding" Uses 161 C. Realisations and Challenges to Common Sense 164 D. "Utopian Reflection" and "Gotterkritik" 172 V. Rhetoric in Three Plays A . Phaidra's Monologue B. Rhetoric and Action in Suppliant Women C. Rhetoric and Design in Iphigeneia at Aulis  180 180 206 232  VI. Summary and Conclusions  257  Bibliography  263  Appendices A . Some Formal Devices of Euripidean Rhetoric B. Personal Supplication as a Persuasive Technique C. "Portable Arguments"  273  v  273 280 296  Introduction  This study has two main purposes. I have attempted in the first place to assemble a "grammar" of persuasive utterance for Euripidean drama, a catalogue of the techniques of organisation and argument typical of the poet's speeches and debates. I have brought together material drawn from a variety of dramatic situations and speech-types (for example, appeals, monologues, friendly and antagonistic debates), since similar patterns of thought and expression are to be seen wherever Euripides has a character speak in a persuasive mode. The body of information resulting from this study should be useful i n two areas: first, it has a role to play in text criticism. In a number of places, I have suggested that a textual question can be solved only w i t h the help of a clear understanding, based on comparative Euripidean material, of both the rhetorical objective of a passage and the forms typically used in the realisation of that objective. Second, the Euripidean corpus constitutes a very substantial document for the study of some of the experiments in thought and expression typical of the late fifth century; both the size and the quality of Euripides' legacy w o u l d seem to make a clear description of his resources i n these areas an essential prerequisite for the study of the Sophists and the early orators. I have attempted to supply such a groundwork. M y second main purpose is to face some questions of interpretation that arise i n connection w i t h the use of a somewhat stylised and intellectual rhetoric i n tragedy. Critics have differed over the degree to w h i c h the presentation or content of debate speeches convey insight into "character".  A related problem is  whether we are to think Euripides intends to alienate our sympathy from the 1  speaker who demonstrates an easy eloquence or offers arguments of questionable merit or honesty in a debate. These and other questions of tone have too often been discussed in a vacuum, w i t h inadequate reference to context and to comparative material. I have approached them i n the light of the formal apparatus developed i n this study.  A preliminary comparison of a number of speeches and scenes suggested as a point of departure the following principles: s  I  ( 1 ) Euripides writes speeches of a persuasive or argumentative character for a great variety of dramatic situations. Similar techniques of construction and argument are to be seen i n "forensic" speeches, appeals, and various kinds of monologues. (2) Each of these types, however, involves certain patterns and techniques peculiar to itself. (3) In certain types of scene (forensic debate, appeal and response), persuasive speeches are associated w i t h each other i n pairs; occasionally three speeches confront each other. (4) Typical stylistic features of these speeches include self-conscious clarity of form: headlines often announce argumentative points, clear formulas of transition close one argument and open another, arguments are often summarised i n closing. (5)  A n extremely common format for the enunciation of an argument is  the rhetorical question or rhetorical question series (hypophora figure); this is used especially in arguing against the probability of a proposition.  2  (6) Another technique seen constantly i n Euripides' speeches is reference to "gnomic" w i s d o m : a general proposition is stated as an article of common sense for the purpose of headlining, summarising or grounding a contention or an appeal.  O n the basis of these observations, I have adopted the following organisation for this study. Chapters I and II describe Euripidean rhetoric i n terms of the various dramatic contexts in which persuasive speeches are presented. Chapter I presents the basic materials and techniques used by Euripides i n writing speeches for a number of rhetorical situations. Speeches of each of the several types are analysed; attention is called to the distinctions of each type, and to points at w h i c h all the types are similar. Chapter II considers the composition of pairs of opposing speeches (again treating separately the different kinds of scene), and of exchanges involving three characters. Chapters III and IV deal w i t h typical techniques for the presentation of arguments, without regard to the type of speech in which they occur. Chapter III investigates the presentation of probability arguments of various kinds through the use of rhetorical questions; hypothetical arguments are treated as a related form, i n that they apply conditional formulations for the consideration of probabilities or possibilities. Chapter IV deals w i t h the argumentative use of maxims and other general statements, and w i t h other patterns of expression in w h i c h the present situation is implicitly or explicitly compared w i t h a general rule or expectation; these include sudden realisations that contradict common sense and reflections of a "utopian" character. Throughout these first four chapters I have moved freely between purely formal description and interpretive discussion. Chapter V offers extended interpretive discussion of the use of abstract and stylised rhetorical material in three plays. Phaidra's monologue in Hipp 373-430, 3  the four rhetorical confrontations that dominate the first half of Suppliant Women, and all the rhetorical scenes of Iphigeneia at Aulis are studied. The objective here has been to establish, through close analysis and constant reference both to comparative material and to the insights of earlier critics, the relevance of this material for audience appreciation of character, plot and themes. Three appendices further document the stylised character of Euripidean rhetoric. A p p e n d i x A compiles and classifies some aspects of presentation not covered elsewhere i n this study. A p p e n d i x B attempts to define the rhetorical value of announcements of personal supplication. In A p p e n d i x C some passages are compared i n w h i c h similar arguments or argument strategies appear i n different dramatic contexts.  M y conclusions have tended towards a view of Euripidean rhetorical speeches and scenes that emphasises the entertainment value for the public— the same public characterised by Kleon as GeaTcu T&V dro-mov  \6ywv  and  8OU\OL TWV alei  (Thuc. I l l , 38)— of watching the heroes of legend discuss up-to-date topics  using up-to-date techniques of presentation and argumentation. I have resisted an approach that w o u l d see subtle psychology or characterisation i n material that is essentially conventional; and so I argue against, for example, some critics' contentions that such characters as Admetos, Hippolytos, or Theseus (in Hik) are intentionally discredited by Euripides through their o w n words uttered i n rhetorical exchanges. I have also rejected a view of Euripides' monologues, appeal-scenes and debates as setting out i n abstract terms the poet's moral view of the situation; thus for scenes such as Hekabe's debate w i t h Helen (Tro 8951059), or the debate of Polyneikes, Eteokles and Iokaste (Phoin 469-585), I suggest that the audience is guided i n the placing of it sympathies b y the situation itself, and that the debate should be experienced primarily as an interesting and 4  entertaining exposition of the possibilities for eloquence and argument latent i n the story. I do not however see these scenes purely as set pieces, intermezzi inserted at random into the dramas. Thus I have called attention to the presentation of important and enduring themes and associations i n Phaidra's monologue (V.A), to the suitability of the long rhetorical first half of Suppliant Women as a preparation for the glorious action that follows (V. B), and to the interesting formal pattern created b y the rhetorical scenes i n Iphigeneia at Aulis (V.C).  I have dealt i n general only w i t h the eighteen complete and securely Euripidean plays i n the corpus. A great deal of material i n the fragments could find a place i n a purely formal study of Euripidean rhetoric, and on that basis I hope to use the fragments fully i n the next stage of this research. For the present study, i n w h i c h form and literary interpretation go so closely hand-in-hand, their general lack of secure dramatic context constituted a decisive obstacle. The text of Euripides is quoted from James Diggle's O C T edition except where noted; i n lists of passages the sequence is chronological, following Diggle. The use of brackets i n citations of parallels, etc., indicates only that a passage is bracketed b y Diggle, and must therefore be used w i t h caution. The plays are cited by abbreviations of their Greek titles.  5  Chapter I  Speech and Argument  Euripides' resources as a playwright include a "rhetorical" mode of speechwriting:  critics have recognised that similar techniques of construction and  argument appear in speeches written for a variety of dramatic situations, and that these techniques tend to remind one of the political, epideictic and forensic oratory of the poet's period, to the extent that these are known. It is the aim of this first chapter to identify, at the level of the individual Euripidean speech, the materials and techniques that constitute this "rhetorical" manner. W h e n we eliminate speeches whose function is mainly expository (prologue-speech, messenger-speech, deus-speech), we find that most of the remaining speeches have an argumentative purpose. Often the immediate dramatic goal of an argumentative speech is persuasion: e.g., Iolaos tries to persuade D e m o p h o n to champion the cause of the suppliant children of Herakles (Hkld 181-231: speech of appeal), Helen tries to convince Menelaos she does not deserve to die (Tro 914-65: speech of defense). But similar techniques of construction and argument are applied i n situations where there is no real persuasive purpose: e.g., Herakles' monologue justifying his decision to commit suicide (Her 1255-1310), Hippolytos' diatribe against w o m e n (Hipp 616-68), Iphis' acceptance of death (Hik 1080-1113), Theseus' speech of accusation against H i p polytos (Hipp 936-80). Euripides relies repeatedly on a small battery of resources for constructing speeches and conducting arguments in all these dramatic situations.  6  A typical Euripidean rhesis involves various kinds of material. Often a speech follows dialogue, and so begins w i t h a line or two that complete a conversation. Argumentative content itself may be framed by material having a "focusing" function (proems, transitions, summarising epilogues). Expressions of strong emotion sometimes interrupt the rational sequence of thought. Euripidean speeches are seldom neatly disposed; any influence of formal forensic rhetoric on Euripides certainly does not extend to a practice of w r i t i n g speeches to a regular pattern such as prologue— narration— proof— epilogue.  1  But it soon becomes obvious that some clear patterns of Euripidean practice i n speech-writing exist, and that some of these patterns exist also i n the practice of prose-writers and orators contemporary w i t h Euripides. The procedure adopted here is to compare a large number of Euripidean speeches looking for habits of disposition and of argument, while keeping one eye on developments outside the theatre for possible connections w i t h the practice of other writers. I shall occasionally call attention to resemblances between Euripides' techniques and those of other writers, but the questions of Euripides' contact w i t h the fifthcentury "Enlightenment" and w i t h concepts of formal rhetoric developing outside the theatre are not m y main concern.  2  This was the contention of Th. Miller's 1887 diss. Euripides Rhetoricus. F. Tietze's 1933 diss. Die euripideischen Reden und ihre Bedeutung was devoted to a rebuttal of Miller's views. Early work on Euripidean rhetoric is reviewed by G. Goebel in his 1983 diss. Early Greek Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 266-74; see also Collard "Formal Debates" 58-60, M . Lloyd Agon 23f. 1  On these questions see in general Nestle Dichter der Aufklarung (dated approach but bringing together much useful material), Finley "Euripides and Thucydides" and "The Origins of Thucydides' Style" in Three Essays, Solmsen Intellectual Experiments. Some details of Euripides' contact with fifth-century oratory and rhetorical instruction are investigated by Solmsen, Antiphonstudien 54-8, and Goebel, diss. Ch. IV. 2  7  M . L l o y d , whose recent study of Euripidean agon scenes concentrates o n a small number of speeches, has described the disposition of these speeches i n the following terms:  3  There are...only traces of a distinction between narration and argument i n the speeches of Euripides' agones. What usually happens is that, after a rhetorical proem, the speech is divided into a series of more or less selfcontained blocks, each of which makes a particular point These sections are often distinguished from each other i n a self-conscious way....  This gives a fair general description of taxis i n Euripides' argumentative speeches written for a variety of situations besides the "agones" L l o y d has i n m i n d . The typical contents of these argument-blocks and the typical formal devices used to introduce, frame and focus them w i l l be the subject of investigation i n this first chapter. I shall look at relatively independent single speeches, i n this order: speeches of appeal (Section A below), "forensic" speeches (B), monologues expressing despair (C), speeches announcing "heroic acceptance of death" (D), and some speeches of comparison best called "epideictic" (E). In Chapter II, the construction of debates and other rhetorical scenes w i l l be investigated.  "  A . Speeches of A p p e a l  A typical rhetorical opportunity i n Euripidean plays is the "appeal addressed to a champion": this occurs not only i n plays initiated b y a public act of supplication (Hkld , Hik), but i n many places where a single character enlists the Agon 25. Disposition in a larger sample of Euripidean "agon" speeches is analysed by Duchemin, L'ArQN 167-87; Goebel's diss, in spite of its subtitle Proof and Arrangement in the Speeches of Antiphon and Euripides does not discuss arrangement in Euripidean speeches. 3  8  aid of a better-placed character, seeking either to prevent an injustice (Hekabe to Odysseus i n Hek, Klytaimestra to Achilles i n IA) or to enlist help i n an intrigue (Hekabe to A g a m e m n o n i n Hek, Helen and Menelaos to Theonoe i n Hel)A Speeches of appeal are often elaborately developed, and tend to involve a combination of different groundings and justifications for the requested a i d .  5  A good example is Iolaos' speech addressed to Demophon i n Herakleidai. Iolaos is presented as an o l d man protecting the young children of Herakles, w h o have become suppliants at Marathon as a result of being hounded b y Eurystheus and his agents. Eurystheus' herald has attempted to take them into custody, and Demophon has arrived and asked to hear the case on both sides. The H e r a l d speaks first (134-78); his speech is discussed briefly below. The Chorus leader delivers a couplet very correctly reserving judgement (179f). Iolaos n o w makes the appeal on behalf of the children (181-231). H e begins w i t h a short proem alluding to the well-known fairness of Athenians: he knows he w i l l get a fair hearing.  6  H e next announces his first argument for Athenian aid:  f)|ilv 8e teal TWLS ' ouSev  eanv ev  u.eaoH.  (Hkld 184)  H e w i l l argue first against the case that has been presented b y the H e r a l d , a case i n w h i c h points regarding legality and justice were capped w i t h a veiled threat against the Athenians. Iolaos argues (185-90) that the suppliants have been banished b y the Argives, and are therefore £evoL (189), people over w h o m Argos  On "suppliant plots" see esp. Strohm Euripides 17-32, Kopperschmidt Die Hikesie 46-53, Lattimore Story Patterns 46f (dealing with "public" acts of supplication only), Burnett Catastrophe Survived (Chapters IV-IX). 4  5  See Porter Studies 165f.  This kind of captatio benevolentiae is not a very common feature of Euripidean speechmaking. More flattery is offered in 191-204. 6  9  can have no jurisdiction. This leads (with no clear break) to the point that 7  Athens at any rate w i l l not be intimidated by a threat to its sovereignty: thus the second element i n the Herald's case is countered.  8  A t vs. 205 a new section is  clearly introduced:  croi 8'  u>s avdyKT)  aokCeiv, eTreL-rrep  TouaSe (3ou\o[iaL ^pdaaL Tf^aSe TTpoaTaTetg x^ os-  (Hkld  ov  205f)  The speech moves from public considerations— the legal status of the case and the altruistic character of Athenians— to the arguments that can be addressed personally to Demophon. These are of two types: first an appeal to common blood is made (206-213: the relation of Theseus through Aithra to the house of Pelops), and i n 214 another basis of obligation is clearly announced: Herakles' benefactions to Theseus. A brief narrative (lacunose i n our texts) is capped w i t h the declaration 'EXXds Trdaa  TOOTO  fiapTupel (219). Two kinds of argument have  been brought to bear (the justice of the suppliants' case and obligations said to affect Demophon personally), but there are still points to be made. Iolaos i n summarising, notes that to allow suppliants to be removed w o u l d be offensive to the gods, and a disgrace both to Demophon privately (x^pis 223) and to the city. A n d finally he adds to the fact of suppliancy i n a temple precinct the gestures and verbal formulas of personal supplication  (&W  avro\iaL  ere  etc. 226-8).  The argumentative rhetorical question in 189b-90 ("Or do you hold that an exile from Argos must quit all Greece?") might have closed this section; instead it is answered "Not Athens anyway", and the new direction is taken. 7  Praise of Athens is itself, of course, a topos in tragedy and orator}/. So is the reference to the unwelcomeness of overpraising: with 202-4 here cf. Or 1161f, IA 977-80; Thuc. II, 35.2; Dem. XVIII, 3f. 8  10  Iolaos' speech is by no means simply the routine realisation of a standard Euripidean formula; but it does involve certain features we will see over and over in the poet's speeches, some of them no doubt consciously developed, others perhaps existing more as unconscious patterns of thought. The appeal addressed by Hekabe to Agamemnon (Hek 787-845), seeking his complicity in her revenge plan against Polymestor, shows similar features. Hekabe makes the transition from dialogue to rhesis with an introductory formula of a common type: dXX' (Lvrrep  OUVCK'  du.(j)i  obv  TTLTTTOJ  yovv  dKouaov  ' (Hek 787f)  This is followed immediately by a headline giving the general drift of her request: help me achieve revenge against a certain man.  9  The charge against  this man is now specified through a brief highly coloured narrative (791-7), or, if 793-7 are an interpolation, through a succinct relative clause.  10  The success of  Hekabe's appeal depends on creating the impression that her enemy has wronged her; thus her speech must attack as well as appeal, and this accusatory material already goes far in painting the required picture of Polymestor's sordid character and deed. With a resumptive \tev ovv (798) Hekabe takes up the arguments proper in support of her request. First she alludes to "the gods and the law that governs [even] them" (799f). The difficult lines 802-5 seem to say that Agamemnon (that is, should he fail to respect Hekabe's appeal) is the cause of a collapse of the power of law in the cosmos. This direction is not developed;  The positive/negative form of expression seen here is also a typical way of emphasising one's point: "If you think this is just...; but if the opposite...." Cf. e.g. Hipp 377ff. 9  1 0  Diggle follows Nauck in deleting 793-7. Collard ad loc gives the arguments against the  lines.  11  Hekabe simply uses the threat as the basis for an appeal to Agamemnon's ouSoog in the face of her pathetic state (ou8ea9fJTL |ie, oLKTipov f||iag 806f). woes" follows (dra9pr)(70v ot' e x  u  Kara,  11  A "litany of  808): Hekabe is a slave, childless, cityless,  deserted, the most wretched of mortals (809ff).  12  A t vs. 812 Hekabe seems to  realise that her appeal to Agamemnon's sense of law and to his caSios is f a i l i n g ;  13  she interrupts her address to h i m w i t h a reflection on the importance of skill i n persuasion (814-23). This reflection has a decidedly "modern" ring to it, evoking as it does a w o r l d in w h i c h people pay for instruction i n various subjects, among w h i c h (in Hekabe's m i n d at least) Persuasion should have pride of place. The reflection is applied to Hekabe herself w i t h a reprise of her woes (821-4)— she seems to be telling herself a superhuman effort at persuasion is required. A n d now she moves to her next argument, expressing some misgiving:  Kai  \is\v  (taws \i-ev T O U Xoyov  ^evov  ToSe,  KuTrpiv Trpo|3dXAeLv, dXX' o\ux>s eLprjaeTcu)  etc.  (Hek 824f)  She reminds A g a m e m n o n of his "family ties" to her through his affection for Kassandra.  14  The victim Polydoros was i n a sense Agamemnon's  A final point is headlined using the f o r m u l a :  KriSeorfjs  (834).  15  OUSCJS and OIKTOS are the responses one wants to elicit when supplicating: see Gould "Hiketeia" 87-90. Mercier's 1993 note on this speech ("Hekabe's Extended Supplication") attributes too much importance to the gesture of supplication as an instrument of persuasion: see App. B. 1  1  For similar lists, cf. Kyk 304-7, Med 255-8, Hek 667-9, Hipp 1028-[29], IT 220; more leisurely are Andr 8-15, Tro 479-90, Hel 269-86. 1 2  Appeal speeches seem to be interrupted by a reference to the failure of the effort here in Hek 812f and at Kyk 299, and perhaps Or 671f (but di Benedetto ad 672 cautions against this interpetation); the interruption in each case is followed by a new argumentative point. These speeches are followed by refusals. 1 3  1 4  This affection has already been brought out in the Prologue (120ff).  1 5  For the use of forms of ev in focusing arguments, see App. A.  12  ..evog u-Oi [i09og eySefjs e n .  (Hek 835b)  In this case the formula leads to the resumption of a point already made: the desirability of compelling powers of persuasion. Hekabe closes with a summary appeal for assistance, emphasising Agamemnon's greatness and her own debasement (he is [leyicrrov gnome:  "EXXT|CTLV  fydos, she is ur|8ev), and caps this with a  16  eaGXou yap d^Spos Tfji K a i TOVS KaKous Spav  8LKT]I  9 ' uTnpeTelv  TTavTaxoO  KCIKXOS-  del.  (Hek 844f)  Thus she recapitulates the points that vengeance would be just (cf. 800-5), and that her enemy is an evil man. Hekabe's speech, long and complex, nevertheless follows the general shape of that of Iolaos: a proem alludes to the speech-situation and introduces the main objective of the speech; an argument based on law and justice is clearly separated from an argument based on the obligations inherent in family connections (obviously a rather weak point in Hekabe's case); expressions of personal supplication buttress the "rational" arguments; a succinct closing summary (using imperatives: yevoO  §i\os  etc. Hkld 229f;  TTLBOO,  Trapdaxes  Xetpa...Tiu.cop6v Hek 842f) is followed by a closing general statement. Within this framework, Euripides has given Iolaos some flattering comments on the Athenian national character, Hekabe a reflection on education and the desirability of eloquence. Mossmari (Wild Justice 104) notes Hekabe doesn't weaken ("blunt the urgency of") her earlier appeal to Odysseus for a hearing (Hek 229-37) by using a final gnome, as if this were accepted as a cheap trick. The use of the technique both here and in closing the earlier appeal proper (Hek 294f) argues against that view. See Friis Johansen General Reflection 155 with n.17, and IV.B below. 1 6  13  On a smaller scale, Odysseus in Kyklops appeals to Polyphemos on behalf of himself and his men; they would like first of all not to be eaten, and then if possible to go away with handsome gifts. Odysseus in his speech of appeal (Kyk 285-312), after speaking of his various services to Poseidon, and urging them as reasons for Polyphemos to offer hospitality to him and his men, changes tack (299:  6L  Xoyous dTTooTpecjyrii). He moves to a new argument based on the vo^o? 1 7  under which shipwrecked sailors are to be taken in as suppliants and treated well (299-303). This leads with no clear break into a pathetic appeal (304-9a) in which it is claimed that the Greeks have suffered enough at Troy. The first argument, then, appeals to the Cyclops' sense of x<ipis, the second uses a principle of v6u.os to justify the third stage's appeal for  OLKTOS  and evolfteia (310).  18  Hekabe's speech to Odysseus in Hek 251-95 is much more developed, but proceeds similarly, offering two fundamentally distinct arguments against the sacrifice of Polyxene. Following a lengthy reflective proem (251-7), she argues first (258-71) that the sacrifice would be unjust. This point is pursued through an argument sequence we shall meet again: using a disjunctive question (iTOTepa...; f)...;) Hekabe suggests two motives that might have led the Greeks to vote for the sacrifice of Polyxene. Each of these motives is dismissed as unjust, and then a positive proposal is presented for the more fitting course— to sacrifice Helen.  19  This proposal in turn is justified on two grounds (269f). The sequence concluded, Hekabe makes a clear transition announcement:  Is any stage action implied? Seaford ad 299 cites examples of ctTToaTpec|)op.aL at IT 801, Hel 78, S. OK 1272: "these cases refer to the addressee turning away from the speaker".  1  7  1  8  So Porter, Studies 166 n.241.  This type of sequence is discussed in detail in III.A below. I agree with West that there is a problem in the text of Hek 265-8: see "Tragica IV" 12. 1 9  14  di|LXXcap.aL Xoyov a S' dimSoOvcu Set a' dTTaiTouoris efiou TWL  \iev  SIKOUCJI TOILS'  (Hek 271-3)  &KOVOOV.  This introduces a two-fold personal appeal: Hekabe asks Odysseus' pity on grounds both of an old debt of obligation he has towards her (272-8), and of her o w n pathetic weakness and reliance on Polyxene (279-85). That these are distinct but closely bound points is also clearly spelled out: xdpiv T ' dTraiTd) TT]V T69 ' LKeTeuaj Te ae.  (Hek 276)  20  H a v i n g put her two arguments, Hekabe goes on to make a practical proposal (286-95): that Odysseus, whose powers of persuasion led i n the first place to the decision to sacrifice Polyxene, face the troops again and try to reverse that decision. Odysseus' reply w i l l take up these same points, and so I shall return to this scene for further study i n II.A below. A subtler division of argument into two main sections can be seen i n Hkld 134-78, the speech of the A r g i v e herald suing for release into his custody of the children of Herakles. This is not a "supplication" speech, but as it functions i n parallel w i t h Iolaos' appeal (see above), it has similarities of structure and argument. The H e r a l d states briefly his identity and his mission (134-37a), then gives the legal basis for his request (137b-43): the suppliants as A r g i v e citizens are under A r g i v e jurisdiction, and they have been legally sentenced to d e a t h .  21  For the "double headline" clearly announcing two different points cf. Kyk 287, IA 903f (see discussion below). The phrase yapiv crrraiTeiv recurs in Hkld 220, cf. Lys. 21.21. 2  0  There is thus a clear disagreement between the two speeches over the facts: the appeal of Iolaos will refer only to a decree of banishment. Neither side should be regarded as giving the "truth" here. 2 1  15  In what follows a transition is gradually made to the point (explicitly put at 153-5) that Athenian self-interest favours taking the A r g i v e s i d e .  22  Clear contrast of two arguments i n a short speech of appeal is seen i n IT 1056-74, where Iphigeneia appeals to the Chorus for their cooperation i n the intrigue she is p l a n n i n g .  She argues first  23  (-rrpcoTa  \iev  1060) that this is their  duty, alluding to the customary solidarity of women. Then, following a clear enunciation of her request (1063f) and the stark alternatives facing herself and the two men (1065f), she appeals to their self-interest 1067f)— she w i l l return the Greek w o m e n home if she herself gets free. This is followed (1068b) b y expressions of supplication; this has here, as almost always i n Euripides, a function subsidiary to argument.  24  Equally brief is the appeal made b y Klytaimestra to Achilles at IA 900-16, in w h i c h she calls u p o n h i m to champion the cause of preventing Iphigeneia's sacrifice. The argument is prefaced by the comment that Klytaimestra feels no shame i n h u m b l i n g herself before Achilles, since nothing means more to her than protecting her c h i l d .  25  The appeal is argued i n 903-14. A headline  For clear rhetorical distinction between "justice" and "self-interest" see Finley Three Essays 33withn.49. The contrast was a well-worn subject, but TO evSiicov and TO ov\i<\>epov may be held to recommend the same action, as here in Hkld 134-78 (and cf. e.g. S. Phil 925f). On this debate, Kennedy ("Focusing of Arguments" 134f) simplifies the issues: "The Athenians in their decision reject apparent self-interest in favor of justice". But the Herald's first argument is full of "justice" (138, 142) and "law" (141); and Iolaos' appeal leans heavily on arguments of xapis d the disgrace of surrendering suppliants. 2  2  a n  Similar appeals are at Med 260-6, Hipp 710-12. Phaidra appeals but does not argue; in a sense Medeia's entire speech leads up to this request. Cf. also Ion 666f, Hel 1387-9,1A 542.  2  3  Medeia's brief speech of appeal to Aigeus (Med 708-18) is comparable: pity, then advantages.  2  4  This sort of shame is registered by Adrastos (Hik 163-6); some others are too proud to beg (Eurystheus in Hkld 983-5, Menelaos in Hel 947-9). Thus the reference to shame in connection with gestures of supplication forms a topos.  2  5  16  introduces the two grounds on which Klytaimestra w i l l base her appeal; these are cleverly identified w i t h the two women:  a\\' d\i.vvov, TTJL  ci Beds TTOL, TTJL T ' eurji,  Te XexQeicrni 8du.apTi afji iidrnv  8ixjTTpa£iai  \sAv, a\\'  OU.GJS.  (IA 903f)  It is as if she said: "Give your support to me (because I am miserable and merit pity) and to m y daughter (because she was called your bride)". These two points are then developed chiastically: 905-8 make the case that Achilles owes his support because he was i n some sense responsible for the deception that brought Iphigeneia to A u l i s , and 909-14 return to Klytaimestra herself and her misery (though the idea of an obligation returns i n 6vou.a 910).  26  yap  TO  GOV \I ' aTTuXea ' ,  The couplet 915f forms an epilogue, but one of dubious authenticity.  27  A n interesting variant on the binary presentation of argument seen i n the examples so far discussed is the use of two speeches of appeal made on the same side of a case: Adrastos and Aithra both appeal to Theseus i n Hik on behalf of the suppliants, Helen and Menelaos each address a speech to Theonoe i n Hel, A g a m e m n o n hears i n IA appeals from both Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia.  28  In  each scene interesting differences between the tone and content of the two  Stockert (ad loc) sees in 903-8 the expression of a legal claim to Achilles' support, based on his obligation as the putative bridegroom of Iphigeneia, followed in 909-14 by a moral claim based on the hopelessness of Klytaimestra's position should Achilles fail to help. But the important difference between the two halves of the appeal is one of tone: rational argument, then supplication. 2  6  Diggle prints 915f as "vix Euripidei"; I don't know his reasons, but I note that throughout the episode (an episode that occasions many doubts), speeches end with couplets having a similar trait— a gratuitous positive-negative recapitulation of the point of each speech: cf. 973f, 995-7, 1006f, 1034f. See Denniston ad El 1017, where he notes such expressions are "common in the IA". Stockert notes "polare Ausdrucksweise" at 978: characteristic preoccupation of an interpolator?  2  7  For the Hik and IA scenes, see Ch. V below; the Hel scene is discussed in II.E. The stage is set.for such a sequence in the first episode of Hek, but Polyxene's unexpected self-dedication shortcircuits it. 2  8  17  speeches correspond to the binary separation of arguments we have seen i n single speeches. Presentation of arguments i n self-consciously balanced pairs w i l l be noted below i n connection w i t h speeches delivered i n a variety of other situations besides appeal.  B. "Forensic" Speeches  The tendency to organise argument i n "blocks", most often two, w i t h a third section often introducing pathetic or practical points, is seen also i n the chronological organisation of argumentative content particularly common i n forensic speeches. A s an example I shall discuss Menelaos' analysis of his brother's past and present actions i n his speech of accusation addressed to A g a m e m n o n (IA 334-75). The speech vilifies A g a m e m n o n over his indecisiveness i n first encouraging and then attempting to prevent the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Menelaos begins b y announcing i n gnomic form the importance of constancy of m i n d (334) and indicates he wants to conduct a civil discussion of issues. H i s argumentation takes the form of a life-survey.  29  Euripides uses this device i n monologue situ-  ations, where a speaker suffering feelings of d - r r o p i a or loss reviews his o w n life (e.g. Andromache i n Tro 634-83, Herakles i n Her 1255-1310), and i n agonistic speeches where the survey organises a sort of narrative section (e.g. Eurystheus reviewing his o w n life i n Hkld 983-1017, Theseus that of Adrastos i n Hik 195249). In both situations it is natural to compare past and present, or two stages i n the past, and this is the form Menelaos' argument takes. For comments on the type see Strohm Euripides 156-63 ("Sinn und Form des Lebensriickblicks"), Friis Johansen, General Reflection, index s. v. "Chronological survey". 2  9  18  Two stages of Agamemnon's career are brought out: (1) his early eagerness to get command of the expedition to Troy (6T£ etc. 337-48); (2) his subsequent behaviour at A u l i s (cog 8e etc. 350-64). Each of these short narratives involves a contrast that calls attention to Agamemnon's inconstancy; the presentation of these contrasts is strikingly balanced (343  K5LT  ' e-rrei..., 363  KCUT '  both followed w i t h [ieTa|3aXa)v). The first instance of this fault was A g a m e m non's change of external presentation: once installed i n a powerful position he was no longer the friendly accessible man he had been. The second stage of the survey presents the more serious (for Menelaos' case) inconstancy— A g a m e m n o n has waffled over the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and has n o w been caught trying to prevent it. It is to this second lapse that Menelaos addresses the general reflections that follow i n 366-9: (lupioi 8e  TOL  TreTr6v9aa '  avro.  The  following gnome about human failure is illustrated by two contrasting examples, of w h i c h the second applies to Agamemnon. Menelaos then concludes his argument by drawing attention to the serious consequences for all Greece of A g a memnon's disappointing.loss of resolve. A n epilogue follows (probably corrupt in 373) reflecting on the qualities required of leaders, thus looking back to both halves of the life-review.  30  Chronological organisation of argument is also seen i n speeches of accusation at Hik 195-249, Elek 1060-99, Med 465-519, IA 1146-1208, and i n Eurystheus' defense speech at Hkld 983-1017. Generally, these speeches proceed b y reviewing the past or an event i n the past, then move to the present situation or the present outlook; either a pathetic reversal or a pathetic inescapable  Doubts have been expressed about the integrity of the end of this speech. Diggle prints 36675 between his "vix Euripidea" symbols. He finds the use of OOITO (366) anomalous (app. cr.): but cf. e.g. Hek 973, IA 393. On the text of 373-5, see Friis Johansen General Reflection 36, Stockert ad loc. Gibert, Change of Mind 275, points out that the terms of debate have shifted subtly: voDs pepaios of the proem has here become simply vo0?.  3  0  19  continuity is pointed out b y this process. Some of the "acceptance of death" speeches involve a similar contrast of past high status w i t h present or future degradation. Theseus' speech at Hik 195-249, rejecting the appeal of Adrastos, begins w i t h a lengthy general reflection that w i l l be discussed below (V.B). The argumentative content of the speech unfolds i n the same w a y as that of Menelaos' speech at IA 334-75, w i t h two episodes taken from the adversary's past being held u p as evidence of a defective character: 219-28  Adrastos and his sons-in-law: his willingness to associate himself w i t h  229-37  voaovvres  Adrastos and the expedition against Thebes: the damage done by h i m under the influence of hotheads  Theseus formulates his present policy on the basis of these observations of Adrastos' past: 246  KCITT£IT  ' eyco aoi auu.fi.axos yevfjaouai;  (Vs. 246 follows logically on the arguments of 219-37; this however makes no case for deletion of the "demographic" passage 238-45, w h i c h seems entirely i n character for this Theseus and for Euripides. ) 31  Similar is Elek 1060-99, Elektra's speech of accusation addressed to Klytaimestra, who has defended herself i n 1011-50 as a w o m a n forced into the  See Kovacs, "Tyrants" 34; his arguments against the authenticity of 238-45 do not stand up to the strong case for the passage made by Collard ad loc. Reeve, "Interpolation" 148, distinguishes three interpolations within vss. 216-46. Friis Johansen, General Reflection 123 n.68, notes in 238-45 the characteristially Euripidean formulation of a Siaipeoi?.  3 1  20  arms of her husband's enemy through his sacrifice of Iphigeneia and his o w n adultery: 1069-75  y o u showed signs of promiscuity even before  32  Iphigeneia's  sacrifice (this answers Klytaimestra's charge that A g a m e m non's act had driven her into Aigisthos' arms) 1076-85  during the w a r y o u favoured the Trojans, not wanting A g a m e m n o n to return home  These past facts and the portrait of Klytaimestra they paint form the first half of a two-part argumentation;  Elektra moves on at vs. 1086 to Klytaimestra's  treatment of herself and Orestes i n the aftermath of the murder of Agamemnon. Medeia's harangue of Jason (Med 465-519) follows his brief entering speech, a speech w h i c h understandably evokes a violent response, but w h i c h is not (I believe) intended to characterise Jason as a thorough v i l l a i n .  33  Medeia's  speech is organised around a dual argument whose point is to demonstrate that she has been Jason's salvation repeatedly i n the past, and is n o w the victim of his ingratitude and selfishness: 465-74  proem: vilification of Jason  475-98  the past:  499-515  476-87  Medeia's services  488-98  Jason's betrayal  the present and future: Medeia's desperate situation  Sophistic topos? Similarly Medeia discounts the noble motives Jason professes (Med 52275) by reference to the fact (introduced as decisive: ev yap eKTevei a' 6TTOS, 585) he failed to make a persuasive case for the new marriage before proceeding with it. And Hekabe rejects Polymestor's claim to have killed Polydoros as a service to the Greeks (Hek 1132-82) on the basis that he acted only after the Greeks had won the war. In these passages the fact introduced does not directly refute the opponent's contention, but contributes to an impression of sordid motives. Similar arguments are in Antiphon VI. 44-7, Andok. II, 3-4. 3  2  I see the same situation at the entrance of Pheres in Alk; a neutral speech sets off a violent reaction in a character whose volatility is quite understandable under the circumstances. 3  3  21  516-19  closing reflection  The stages of the argument are clearly signposted through the use of temporal expressions (475  CK TGOV  TrpojTtov, 502 vvv), the balancing of the two complex  sentences 476-82 and 483-87, and a break introduced by dye (499). The main argumentative point, Jason's past dependence on Medeia, is announced at beginning and end i n the same phrase (476 eawad ae, 515 r\ T ' eoroad ae). I return to this scene for further discussion i n II.B below. The development i n these examples of two distinct points, each contributing a different nuance to the portrait, seems to suggest a more selfconscious technique of organisation than is found i n simple accusatory narrative, for example Elektra's harangue addressed to the dead Aigisthos i n Elek 907-56.  34  Euripides has characters vaunt their triumph over an enemy i n several scenes. In Elek 907-56, this type is combined w i t h a detailed argumentative speech of accusation.  35  Following the Messenger's report of the death of  Aigisthos (774-858), Orestes arrives (880) bringing the dead man's body. After some preparatory dialogue establishing Elektra's right to speak freely,  36  she  begins her speech w i t h a quite formal proem (907-13). The accusations leveled against Aigisthos are not put i n clear sequence, but come all at once i n 913-17: (a) y o u ruined me, (b) and orphaned me and m y brother, (c) and made a shameful marriage w i t h our mother, (d) and killed Agamemnon. These same lines also  3  4  The somewhat similar rant.of Peleus against Menelaos (Andr 590-641) is discussed in II. B  below. The speech thus associates itself with Elektra's later speech of accusation addressed to Klytaimestra, 1060-99. 3 5  Elektra's reluctance to speak freely returns at 1055-9. This motif occurs elsewhere: Andr 184-91 (Andromache), Hek 736-51 (Hekabe), Hik 293-300 (Aithra).  3  6  22  refer to Aigisthos' lack of a legitimate motive (ou8eu  riSiKnuevos-,  915), and to  Agamemnon's military status and Aigisthos' o w n failure to go to w a r (917). The speech develops mainly the charge of adultery (918-29) and of Aigisthos' status as a kept man, his wife's inferior (930-33a). This i n turn leads to points about the children of a weak man (933b-37), then a new charge is brought against Aigisthos: that mere wealth was confused b y h i m w i t h real stature, w h i c h confer (938-44).  37  equals'  alone can  In 948-51 Elektra suggests that Aigisthos cultivated a "girlish"  appearance. The speech thus offers rather a litany of insults, each supported w i t h general remarks, than a neatly organised series of arguments. Both the scattershot delivery and the insulting tone of the remarks may go some w a y toward portraying the pent-up resentment of Elektra towards Aigisthos. But these features are not essential for our understanding of Elektra's state of m i n d : w e have already seen that strong emotion is not incompatible w i t h neat taxis and highly rational argument. The speech also contributes to the play's portrayal of Aigisthos as a totally inferior and weak person (in spite of his rather humane character i n the Messenger's report). The murder of A g a m e m n o n is not dwelt u p o n here because that crime, i n the play's focal confrontation, w i l l be laid at Klytaimestra's door; but the play's important theme of marriages good and bad, true and false, is given considerable attention here.  The pathetic contrast or similarity of past and present so strongly brought out i n both accusation speeches and monologues (see next section) is developed also i n the appeal/accusation addressed by Klytaimestra to A g a m e m n o n i n I A 1146-1208. A s has been said above, this speech itself forms half of an appeal w h i c h w i l l be continued by Iphigeneia i n her speech following (1211-52). The up-to-date concept of caucus plays a role in Euripidean argument and speculation here in Elek 941 and at Hipp 79, Hek 5971, Elek 368, Tro 672, Ion 642-4, etc.  3  7  23  Klytaimestra's speech contains two large blocks of argument, one concerned w i t h the past, one w i t h the future: 1148-70  The Past  1148-56  I married y o u against m y w i l l when y o u were a murderer and a suppliant  1157-70  still I've been a perfect wife, and borne y o u children, of w h o m y o u now want to k i l l one  1171-93  The F u t u r e  38  1171-84  Klytaimestra and the children at Argos  1185-93  Agamemnon's return from Troy  The speech ends w i t h Klytaimestra's views on what practical steps A g a m e m n o n ought to be taking to correct the situation,  39  and a final appeal.  The defense offered b y Klytaimestra i n Elek 1011-50 deals w i t h these same events, but from a post-war, post-murder perspective. Klytaimestra justifies her killing of her husband b y recalling his two offenses against h e r : 1020-31  (before the war) the sacrifice of Iphigeneia  1032-4  (after the war) Kassandra  40  The second point leads Klytaimestra to reflect on her o w n adultery and the blame it brought upon her (1035-40)  4 1  Note dye, which elsewhere marks a speech-opening after a break (Kyk 590, Tro 782, Hel 734), a change of address (Hipp 288, Hik 258, Her 240), an apostrophe (Med 1244, Ion 1041), used here to point a new direction in an argumentative context: cf. Med 499, Phoin 559. 3  8  xpn is a common formula for this purpose: with IA 1196 cf. Med 586, Andr 650, Hek 1218, Phoin 515, Or 500.  3  9  v  CTe  The passage.could be read as a response to Pindar Pyth 11, 22-4, where the poet asks which offense was the decisive one.  4  0  4 1  This forms a kind of "ring" with the material in her proem (86f '  yuvaiKa..., 1014f).  24  brav  XdfVrii  K&KT]  Chronological organisation serves a slightly different purpose i n Eurystheus' brief apologia i n Hkld 983-1017.  42  A somewhat restrained survey of his  life attempts to demonstrate that his quarrel w i t h Herakles was thrust u p o n h i m by Hera, and that he had no choice but to persecute the hero (991-1004); y o u , he tells A l k m e n e , w o u l d have done the same (1005-8).  43  The move to the present  (vvv ovv 1009) involves here no pathetic contrast, but a simple consideration of the stage that has been reached. Somewhat different again is Phaidra's yv&\ur\s. bbos i n Hipp 391-402. This supplies the narrative element i n the otherwise very abstract consideration of her plight i n her monologue (373-430). The survey of her thinking is marked out i n chronological stages: 391  eTTei...  398  TO SeuTepov...  400  Tpi-rov  8e...  This last introduces her resolve to die, and this is supported b y much reflection (403-18). In 419 she moves on to another topic (her children). The chronological organisation here does not involve a simple likening or contrast of past and present, but shows the stages i n the essentially intellectual process b y w h i c h Phaidra reached her present resolve.  A n important organising principle found i n a number of speeches of refutation (normally "defense" speeches) arises out of the need to produce  Characters review their own lives in a number of Euripidean scenes and speeches (not least in prologue-speeches, not under consideration here). Chronological organisation is an obvious technique in that situation: cf. especially the monologue of Herakles, Her 1255ff, discussed below.  4  2  Orestes, in his speech of defense addressed to Tyndareos (Or 544-604), takes a similar approach: TI XPW M- Spaom; (551).  4  3  e  25  convincing arguments both against the opponent's case and for one's o w n . W e have seen this principle at work i n the appeal speech of Iolaos (Hkld 181-231; see L A above); because this speech follows a speech presenting the A r g i v e side i n the dispute, Iolaos first meets that speech's points head-on (by denying the truth of the Herald's account of the legal position, and denying that Athenians w i l l be intimidated b y a bullying outsider), then makes the positive case for Athenian support for the suppliants, based on blood ties and past services. Similarly Hekabe, i n responding (Hek 1187-1237) to Polymestor's speech defending his murder of Polydoros as a service to the Greeks, w i l l first demonstrate that this was not Polymestor's motive (1196-1205), then show the real reason for the crime (1206-23). Andromache's speech addressed to Hermione at Andr 184-231 provides another good example of this technique. Andromache has been accused of undermining Hermione's marriage w i t h Neoptolemos. F o l l o w i n g a proem that focuses on the speech-situation, i n which she weighs the pros and cons of speaking freely i n answer to her mistress, she addresses the charge Hermione has leveled:  • ,  co veavi, TOJL a' exeyyucoi Xoycoi rreLaGelo"' dTTwBaj yvnaiojv vuuc^euudTCji';  •  £LTT',  (Andr 192f)  In the familiar form of a rhetorical question she suggests she was i n no position to undertake such an act. The further questions that follow (194-204) bolster this suggestion.  44  Hermione's charge has now been refuted; but the best defense is  often a good offense, and Andromache goes on to supply the "true explanation" for her mistress' problems:  For the technique, and a detailed analysis of its use here and elsewhere, see III.B below.  26  e£ eucov a e (fxipu-dKWV c r r u y e l TTOCTLS' dXX' ei, ^vvelvai ux| 'TTLTT8|eL(x Kupets. OUK  (205f)  The first point was supported b y quoting negative facts about Andromache, showing her to be too weak (old, notorious, etc.) to replace Hermione. This second argument is supported by reference to Hermione's o w n behaviour (209212), as w e l l as by generalisations about women and marriage (207f, 213f), the positive example of Andromache's devotion to Hektor (222-6), and the negative example of Helen (229f).  45  C . Monologues of Despair  For characters w h o find themselves i n a desperate position, it is i n Euripides' manner to write monologues using many of the same techniques of organisation and argument found i n his other "rhetorical" speeches. For example, a paradoxical proposition may be enunciated and argued, often using techniques w e tend to identify as "sophistic": sequence of argument is carefully marked out, barrages of rhetorical questions (elsewhere associated w i t h reductio ad absurdum) are released, gnomes (again often paradoxical) and reflections put the situation i n the most general possible light. The following speeches of this type w i l l be discussed i n this section: Admetos' address to the Chorus at Alk 93561, Herakles' review of his life at Her 1255-1310, Andromache's ostensibly consolatory address to Hekabe at Tro 634-83, Helen's address to the Chorus at Hel 255-305.  On a smaller scale, cf. Hek 258-70.  27  Admetos' speech is preceded by his long scenes with Alkestis (244-392) and with Pheres (606-746). In the first of these scenes, he has responded with the "right answers" but without emotion to the dying requests of his wife. In the second, he has angrily expressed his disappointment in his father for allowing Alkestis to go to her death; the scene ended with a complete impasse, each party hurling insults and warnings at the other.  46  Euripides has skilfully varied the  mood of the piece by interlacing between these highly charged scenes the two somewhat lighter Herakles scenes (476-567, 747-860). Just after Herakles learns the truth— that the woman who died was his host's wife— and goes off to recover her from Death, Admetos enters the empty stage. After participating in a moving lyric lament (861-934), he addresses to the Chorus a speech in which 47  his personal reactions to the day's events are exposed;  48  the speech is thus a true  monologue. Admetos reveals that he is devastated by the loss of his wife, and also distressed by the sense that others may see his having allowed his wife's sacrifice in the light in which Pheres has chosen to see it.  49  But this devastation  does not find expression in an emotional tone (we have already had that in the KO(j.[i.6s);  rather Admetos delivers a speech of great order and clarity. He  introduces first the observation that he considers his wife (or her 8a.iu.cov, 935) more fortunate than himself; that he regards this as paradoxical is expressly  4  6  This exchange is discussed in detail in II.D below.  The lament dwells on the hatefulness of life without Alkestis and of the "widowed house" itself (862f, 880f, 911); Admetos wishes to die (864) and regrets he didn't join Alkestis in the grave (897-902); and he compares his happy wedding-day with this sad day (915-25).  4  7  This formal procedure has been called "lyric-iambic sequence": see Schadewaldt Monolog u. Selbstgesprdch 143f, Greenwood Aspects 131-8, Dale ad Alk 280ff, Heath Poetics 126.  4  8  As Strohm says, Admetos can face no more Pheres-scenes (Euripides 6n). It is important to recognise that Admetos does not here accept the substance of the charge of cowardice; rather he sees that (as Strohm ibid and Dale Alcestis xxv have said) he has given his enemies ammunition to use against him (note exQpos 954, rrpos KOCKOLCTL 959).  4  9  28  stated (tcouTTep ou  SOKOUV9  ' 011005,  936). The comparison is n o w expanded and  explained, w i t h two verses devoted to Alkestis and two to Admetos (937-40). The comparison looks to the future: Alkestis' troubles are over, whereas Admetos faces a life of pain (XuTTpov (3LOTOV, 940). In vss. 941-59 Admetos gives the reasons for his bleak outlook. These are of two kinds: he w i l l miss his wife (941-53), and he w i l l be open to his enemies' voicing a charge of cowardice against h i m (954-9). A s Dale notes, the points referred to here are precisely the lessons Admetos has learned ( d p n uavBdvco, 940) from the play's two earlier encounters.  50  Admetos'  sense of bewilderment and loss is conveyed through the quite common device of a barrage of rhetorical questions (941-3). This is a conventional w a y of representing despair and dTTopia; elsewhere the same structure is used to badger or undermine an opponent. Admetos n o w uses a sort of dilemma-argument to corroborate the point: he can i n the future find no happiness at home (944-50a), nor outside his palace (950b-53)— ergo, no happiness.  51  A t 954 a new point is  raised: that of the loss of reputation he expects to suffer. This has not been expressly mentioned earlier i n the speech, but it was said that the "more fortunate" Alkestis has died eikXefjs' (938). Admetos' fears for his future reputation are expressed using another standard device, the direct quote giving an imagined (or remembered) anonymous reproach.  52  The quoted reproach  itself brings two charges against Admetos: his cowardice i n allowing Alkestis to die, and his (in the circumstances) unreasonable contempt for his parents. A Dale ad Alk 953ff. Thus we may think of the two earlier scenes as each addressing a different argumentative point to Admetos, just as many single speeches discussed above involve two independent arguments. That is, an essentially rhetorical process has influenced the construction of the play. Something similar happens in' the first two scenes of Hik ; see V.B below. 5  0  5 1  For the use of informal dilemma arguments such as this by Euripides, see below Ch. Ill n.22.  This device elsewhere: Hkld 517, Andr 932f, Elek 930, Her 1289, Phoin 580. Direct quotes used in slightly different ways: Tro 1182, IA 1228 (both pathetic memories); Hel 962, Phoin 575 (adding pathos to appeal and reproach, respectively). 5  2  29  rhetorical question beginning w i t h  KOUT  ' (957) has here the familiar role of  pointing u p the absurdity or vileness of an opponent's acts or w o r d s .  In 960f,  53  Admetos concludes, using another device we shall often see again i n Euripides: a rhetorical question asks "Why go on l i v i n g ? "  54  In the speech's final verse,  both of its fundamental points are reiterated succinctly:  KOKGJS  KXUOVTL  KOU KCXKCSS  TTEupoiyoTi (961), "as I am i l l spoken of and m y life is i n ruin". The fact that Admetos' speech consists largely of formulas of Euripidean rhetoric takes nothing away from the sincerity of the speaking character. There is no question here of any irony, any discredit Euripides means to bring u p o n Admetos. This is guaranteed by the lyric treatment that precedes the iambic rhesis: each mode of utterance has its particular role to p l a y .  55  Here as elsewhere  in Euripides, a situation that i n real life w o u l d not call forth reasoned arguments and balanced periods is subjected to a rhetorical treatment, a treatment bringing a satisfying clarity of thought and expression to bear on a tragic situation.  The despair expressed i n the monologue of Admetos results from events realised w i t h i n the play. The despair of Helen's similar speech (Hel 255-305) arises out of the play's Trpoyeyevr|M.eva, combined w i t h the (incorrect) news Helen has received from Teukros i n the first scene. Here a "lyric-iambic sequence" of classic shape unfolds. Vss. 167-252 are sung b y Helen and the Chorus i n  Cf. Alk 7Qli,Andr 218f, 666f, Elek 1044f, IA 384 (err'); in monologue at Hik 1095f. See M . Lloyd, Agon 32. Similar cases with erreiTa: Hipp 440, Hik 246, Her 266. 5  3  Compare, in the scenes under study here, Her 1301 (cf. 1146f), Hel 293. Elsewhere in Euripides: Med 145, Andr 405, Hek 349, Hel 56; note also A. Prom 747. The text of the codd. has KUSIOV in 960; this has been doubted (icepSiov, Purgold), but though unexpected seems in line with the concern for reputation that has just been expressed. KepSo? appears in this context in Prom 747 and Med 145; for KUSLOV Diggle (app. cr.) notes Andr 639. 5  4  As Mossman says (Wild Justice 119) of Hekabe's monologue (Hek 585-628): "We know well enough what she feels; now we want to know what she thinks'. 5 5  30  alternating strophes, and lament in extravagantly emotional terms the heroine's sense of loss and of the injustice of her life. In 255-305 she addresses to the Chorus a highly rhetorical iambic speech, in which the same complaints are treated to a rational analysis, using the structures and techniques that are by now familiar to us.  56  In 255f a formula of address (cf. Med 214, Hipp 373, IT 1056) is  followed by a pair of rhetorical questions introducing the speech's subject.  Vss.  57  260f assert that Helen's life and affairs are indeed a -repas, and assign two reasons: Hera and the beauty of Helen. A n impossible wish follows (262-6), in which Helen expresses her willingness to give up her beauty, if she could thereby reverse the fortune (and reputation) she has been dealt. She now proceeds to 58  argue just how bad things are: when a person fails in a single undertaking, it is hard enough (267f); Helen is the victim of many disastrous circumstances.  59  These are enumerated, with the stages neatly marked: 270-2 273-6 277-86  TTpcoTov [iev: undeserved disrepute eTreiTa: slave's existence in a barbarous land 8': loss of family 276-9 husband's death 280f 282f 284-85a  mother's suicide daughter growing old unmarried brothers  In the following discussion, the text to be assumed is that printed by Murray: i.e., 287-92 are in, 298 has a rhetorical question with TTCJS...OIJ KOACOS (see Wilamowitz Analecta 243), 299-302 are out. On these points Kannicht's and Alt's texts agree with Murray's; Diggle's text deletes 28792 and 298-302. 5 6  5 7  The parenthetical reflection in 257-9 is well defended by Dale; other editors bracket.  The passage is dense and the transmitted text corrupt (in addition to impossible syntax in 263, the codd. give KaXds for KaKds in 265 and 266). Helen wishes not that she had not the T U X O U she has, but that the Greeks would forget the T U X O U she has; i.e., no real distinction is made between "fortune" and "reputation". 5 8  Compare Andromache's briefer list (Andr 96-9), presented following the announcement Trdpecm 8' oux ev dXXd TToXXd uoi oreveiv. 5 9  31  285b-6 287-92  I may as well be dead TO 8 ' eaxcxTov: can't go h o m e  60  The speech n o w offers two pathetic rhetorical questions (TL SfJT' <ETL  £W;  T  LV'  uTroXei.Trou.otL Ti3xr|v;), then a third question suggests a possible scenario for the future (294-96a). This question is i n effect answered b y a gnome that suggests the scenario is unacceptable. Helen announces her decision to die:  Qavelv KpomaTOv Trios' Gdvoiu.' av ou KaXtos;  (Hel  298)  61  I take 298b to mean "Surely there can be nothing cowardly i n preferring death to life under these circumstances"; vss. 299-302 w i l l have been supplied b y someone w h o understood 298b differently (or read a different text there). The speech ends b y confirming that Helen's situation warrants this remedy (303), for beauty, even though i n the case of other women a blessing, has paradoxically spelled r u i n for H e l e n (304f)  6 2  The speech's argument thus begins and ends w i t h Helen's beauty as the explanation for her troubles. The argument is presented using three familiar Euripidean devices: impossible wish, list, rhetorical question series. The list (of Helen's auu.cj)opai) is the centrepiece;  it is introduced b y the somewhat fatuous  observation that a single woe may be endured, but not a great multiplicity of woes. The first item on the list makes again a rather specious point, viz., that an  The passage is none too coherent; SoKoOvTe? in 289 is very harsh, but the sense of the passage is clear and makes a good rhetorical supplement to what has preceded. Discussions: ad 287-92, Kannicht ad 287-92, Zuntz "Three Conjectures" 69f. 6  0  Dale  The text is Wilamowitz's conjecture: L gives rrpo9dvoifi' etc. Stephanus printed TTUJS Qdvo\.\i ' av ovv KaXw?; This reading makes sense of the following lines; but it is difficult to believe Euripides intended this sense. In favour of Stephanus' text, see Fowler, "Rhetoric of Desperation 913. 6 1  62  With aiiTO  TODT  ' drruXeaev (305) cf. Phaidra's CIUTO  32  TOUT  ' aTTOKTeivei, Hipp 419.  undeserved bad reputation is a worse thing than a fully merited one. Item two tells us not that Helen misses Sparta, nor that she detests her Egyptian prison, but that to dwell in Egypt is inherently to live as a slave, whereas she was born of free parents. The list continues with a litany of familial woes; here the content is more personal, but the sense that this is a list is always present (compare the more expansive lyric treatment of these same points, especially in 191-228). This list is followed by a series of questions in which an alternative scenario for the future (other than death) is mentioned and rejected. Here again, as in the monologue of Admetos, abstract points are made by the suffering protagonist using highly artificial rhetorical techniques. In each case, we have just seen the same person's suffering depicted in a lyrical mode. The two presentations must be regarded as emotionally complementary: one aim of this type of sequence must be to present a fuller view of the suffering person than could otherwise be achieved. At the same time, the value of the repetition of points must be appreciated; the clear iambic rehearsal of the facts follows upon what must have been difficult going for many theatre listeners. That is, to some extent the iambic section of the "sequence" might relate to the lyric as Surtitles do to sung operatic scenes. But neither of these considerations can explain the highly artificial character of the rhetoric: one can only assume a genuine taste for such things on the part of Euripides' audience.  A similar scene occurs in Herakles. Following the hero's murder of his wife and children, a powerful lyric lament is sung by Amphitryon and the Chorus while Herakles, bound, sleeps in full view of the audience. As his delirium begins to subside, and he realises the awful truth, Herakles naturally experiences despair and thoughts of suicide.  33  Herakles' monologue does not follow immediately upon the lyrical scene in which he plays so pathetic a role. Between the two, Theseus has arrived, and, after hearing of Herakles' tragedy, offered friendship and asylum. The rhesis of Herakles presents itself as a reply to these offers. Two conventional phrases introduce the speech: an appeal to "Listen!", and an announcement he will "contest in words" Theseus' suggestions (1255).  63  The point to be argued is next  headlined: "Herakles' life unlivable in present and past alike" (1257). The objective is now to demonstrate not that Herakles is presently miserable— this is obvious— but that he has always been so. A life-review is presented, taking a form similar to that of Helen's litany of woes (see above).  64  1259-62  TTptoTov \iev I was the son of ill-fated Amphitryon  1263-8  Zeus begot in me an enemy of Hera, who sent snakes to kill me  1269-78  as a young man, I suffered many ordeals  1279f 1281-1302  and this killing was the last of my labours the argument moves to the present: Herakles describes, in line with the program he has announced, the grim life he now faces, concluding TL  8fJTd  ae Cfjv Set;  Herakles now returns-to the cause of his woes: Hera's jealousy. She figured in the incident described in 1263-8, and is here credited with the (3ouXr|o-is (1305) that led to Herakles' ruin (cf. also 1253). Conventional techniques met with are the chronological review itself, here clearly marked out with connectives (-rrpcoTov \iev—OTCTV  8e—ene! 8e); the stock-taking flurry of rhetorical questions, in  ciKOue Sr| vvv: cf. Hik 857, Hel 1035, Or 237,1181, IA 1009,1146. ci? duiMr|9to Xoyoi?: cf. Hipp 971, Hek 271, Hik 195. 6  3  Throughout the speech the chronological stages are clear, but much less pointed than in, e.g., Peleus' speech at Andr 590-641. Wilamowitz's note ad loc exaggerates the neatness of form and underestimates the pathos. 6  4  34  w h i c h options for the future are tested; the direct quote containing an imagined reproach; the rhetorical question proposing suicide. Repeated references to Herakles' o w n greatness and importance have the effect of deepening the tone of despair (1299f,  65  1306, 1309f); this is one of the play's important themes,  developed especially i n the debate of A m p h i t r y o n and Lykos (151-61, 174-87) and in the first stasimon (348-450).  Herakles has set out to prove his life unlivable i n order to support a decision to die. In Troades, Andromache addresses a similar "proof" to Hekabe, ostensibly for the purpose of consoling her mother-in-law over the recent death of Polyxene. But Andromache's past is used to demonstate not the constancy of her troubles, nor again the proverbial idea that wealth and power once enjoyed make slavery or degradation harder to endure,  66  but the paradoxical and ironic  notion that it was her very virtue and high reputation that got her into the particularly bitter position of being, i n effect, the slave of her husband's murderer.  67  The speech begins w i t h the text "Death is preferable to a life of pain". This is supported b y further general statements, and at 641 f the case of Polyxene is introduced, the simple fact of whose death may now be contrasted w i t h the complexities of Andromache's life:  The couplet 1299f is corrupt in the codd., but should be repaired, not deleted (del. Wilamowitz, Diggle). Wilamowitz's objection (ad 1297) to 1291-3 and 1299f, viz., that they contradict the essential argument announced in 1256f, is not decisive. On a trivial level we may compare Tro 869f with 876f. More seriously, Her 1340-6 have been said to contradict the apparent assumptions of the play itself. Such objections arise when the rhetorical context of a passage is ignored. 6 5  For this idea cf. Hek 375-8, Her [1291-3], Hel 417-19 (and see Kannicht's note ad loc). In Tro 472f the same idea is presented stripped of all pathos.  6  6  The idea returns in [742-3]: Astyanax's inherited evye.veia attracted death to him, instead of saving him.  6  7  35  643f  I failed b y striving after e u 8 o £ i a  645-56  past— I was a perfect wife  657-72  present— this was m y downfall, I am a slave  673-6  recapitulation: past— Hektor and m y marriage  677f  recapitulation: present— Hektor dead, I a slave bound for Greece  679-83  recapitulation of proem: Polyxene more fortunate  Like the other speeches under consideration here, this one follows a lyric scene (Tro 577-607) i n which the same pathetic situation has been presented through a different set of technical conventions: both the dialogue i n 610-33 and Andromache's rhesis repeat some of the points made earlier i n song. U n l i k e the three speeches discussed above, this one doesn't contemplate the speaker's death— naturally enough, since Polyxene's death is being called a preferable estate to Andromache's s u r v i v a l .  68  But the speech has other familiar  features, most notably the use of comparison as a springboard for argument: Admetos began b y comparing his o w n fortune w i t h that of his wife, Helen's speech compared herself— a beautiful multisufferer— w i t h plain w o m e n and unisufferers, Herakles compared his- o w n past and present and found them to be of a piece; so Andromache's argument takes the death of Polyxene as its point of departure, and compares the lot of the two women. Another feature these speeches share is the paradoxical character of their main argumentative points: Death more satisfactory than Life (Admetos, Andromache); Beauty (Helen) and auifypoovvr} (Andromache) the cause of misfortune for a w o m a n , Herakles miserable at the moment of his great victories. This aspect i n particular should tell us that speeches of this type played more than a purely functional role i n their plays; these speeches belong to a genre that* had appeal i n its o w n right— At this point, of course, she is still the mother of a helpless child; suicide is not an option. Note, though, vs. 594: KOLUICTOU [Burges: KOjiiaai codd.] u' es "AiSou. 6  8  36  just as d i d , no doubt, the choral odes of these plays. So long as w e do not expect a character's abject misery to be portrayed i n a "realistic" (rather than an artistic) way, it takes nothing away from these scenes to see that their presentation involves stylish techniques of argument. The four speeches just discussed seem to form a group through sharing the traits I have mentioned. Some other speeches use some of these devices to paint a picture of misery and despair, i n a context where this is not the speech's only or main p u r p o s e .  69  D. Heroic Acceptance of Death  Acceptance of death is the subject of many speeches i n Euripides, often speeches of quite rhetorical character. This is especially true of the speeches made by a character who is offering to die as a sacrificial victim i n circumstances where there is some element of choice (Makaria i n Hkld 500-34, Menoikeus i n Phoin 985-1018, Iphigeneia i n IA 1369-1401), or accepting the necessity where there isn't (Polyxene i n Hek 342-78).  70  A somewhat similar case is that of  Andromache, w h o offers herself up i n Andr 384-420, believing she is saving her son's life b y doing so. The self-sacrifice motif i n these speeches has been much studied. There are rhetorical similarities i n other speeches accepting or embracing death, e.g. Megara's farewell speech (Her 451-96), and the despondent E.g. Med 214-66, Hipp 373-430 (see V . A below), Andr 384-420, Hek 585-628, Hik 1080-1113 (for which see next section), Her 451-96. Some formal and rhetorical aspects of the representation of despair are traced in a variety of ancient authors and genres by R.L. Fowler in "Rhetoric of Desperation". 6  9  A sub-type is the offer by another character to die as a substitute for the chosen victim: Hkld 451-60, Hek 382-8, Phoin 962-9. Strohm (Euripides 50) emphasises the wide range of the theme of self-sacrifice in Euripidean dramaturgy. 7  0  37  soliloquies of Herakles and Helen (Her 1255-1310, Hel 255-305: see above), and of Iphis (Hik 1080-1113: see below). Makaria's speech in Hkld is a particularly neat and abstract construction; yet it arises quite naturally out of the preceding conversation. A brief formal proem marked Makaria's entrance: 474-7 asked whether a woman ought to speak among men; 478-81 gave her reasons for joining the conversation; 482f asked a question. The information supplied in answer (484-99) leads her to continue on these lines: 500-2 503-10  I volunteer to die it would be unworthy to shirk death 503-6 when the Athenians are championing our cause 507-10 when we are suppliants and children of Herakles 511-19 the alternatives 511-14 suffer degradation as a captive, then die anyway 515-19 suffer exile, and insult as a known coward 520-24 in any case, I have no future (husband, children) 525-7 need to act worthily 528-34 take me, etc.; references to coming victory, benefit to her family, fame It is in this moment, the decision to die and its rationalisation, that Euripides exploits resources of argument and persuasion.  71  Here the speaker examines the  case first on the basis of justice and honour, then moves to pragmatic considerations; life is excluded on both grounds.  72  Some of the techniques used have  been seen above in other contexts: the topical headline (501f), use of rhetorical questions to open (503-6) and close (510b) an argument, systematic elimination of  7 1  See Schmitt, Freiwilliger Opfertod Ch. Ill: "Die Entscheidenden Reden".  Schmitt emphasises (Opfertod 29) that the case is presented entirely through techniques of refutation. 7  2  38  alternatives for the future (cf. Med 502-8, Her 1281-90), use of direct quotation giving an imagined reproach (see above, n.52). Menoikeus' shorter dedication speech i n Phoin 991-1018 follows the reluctant announcement b y Teiresias that Thebes can be saved only through his death, and a brief conversation (977-90) i n which the boy seems to agree to Kreon's p l a n to spirit h i m out of danger. After Kreon's departure to make the necessary arrangements, Menoikeus, speaking to the Chorus only, takes some time to make a clear announcement of his intentions. H e indicates that he has tricked K r e o n , then that Kreon's plans for his escape were forgivable but dishonourable— Menoikeus w i l l not prove a traitor to the land that gave h i m birth (995f). H e then announces he w i l l die and save the city (997f);  73  the speech  continues: 999-1005  the disgrace (of fleeing): others w i l l fight and willingly die, while I prove a coward  1006-12  description of the sacrifice  [1013-18]  reflection: the value of selfless citizens  Here the "practical" aspect explored i n Makaria's second section is absent— the possibility of Menoikeus' betraying his country and living i n exile is not explored, but simply dismissed.  74  In place of a fantasy image of his future we get a  very brief "advance messenger-speech" describing the scenario that w i l l actually take place. But the idea of escape and a life i n exile has already been developed i n the stichomythia preceding Menoikeus' speech (977-90); i n embracing death he  The coup de theatre achieved by the deception and gradual revelation is brilliant; something similar happens with Iphigeneia's change of mind in IA. 7  3  De Romilly, "Les Pheniciennes" 43, notes the relative absence of "rhetoric" here: "Le fils de Creon ne raisonne pas, ne calcule pas; il n'exprime que deux sentiments: un certain sens de l'honneur et l'amour de sa patrie". 7  4  39  at the same time rejects the plans that have been proposed for h i m . Thus Euripides can write a speech concentrating exclusively on honour and good citizenship, w i t h no need to waste time on consideration of "alternatives".  75  Where Menoikeus has been offered an opportunity to escape Thebes and his o w n death, Iphigeneia i n IA must decide whether to encourage Achilles to fight to save her, w i t h all the repercussions this w o u l d have for her father and the Trojan campaign. She begins her speech of self-dedication (as d i d Menoikeus) b y revealing gradually her decision to die. The announcement is clearly made at vs. 1375a. It is supported by a medley of arguments: 1375b-76  headline: glory, not ignominy  1377-84  I have it i n m y hands to prevent further abductions of Greek women, and to achieve revenge against Paris, fame for myself  1385-91  i n any case I mustn't cling to life: thousands stand ready to die, and I mustn't interfere w i t h the course of things  1392-6  miscellaneous points: we must prevent Achilles' being at odds w i t h the a r m y ;  76  men are worth more than women; I  a mortal cannot resist a goddess' w i l l 1397-1401  I give myself to Greece, etc.  This differs strikingly from the earlier speeches i n its involvement w i t h the details of the plot: Iphigeneia is not a colourless figure produced i n order to make a speech and die. Rather she is allowed to speak of the specific practical goals her death w i l l serve— not "I w i l l save the city" but "I w i l l secure revenge The speech ends very abruptly with e'ipr|Tai Xoyos (1012); as Mastronarde says ad loc, the phrase does not automatically exclude a following epilogue, but that of 1013-18 begins awkwardly by repeating the thought of 1009f. One misses a general summing up: possibly 1013-18 were composed as an alternative to 1009-12 (or vice versa). 7  5  7  6  This point was raised earlier in 1372f (reading Hartung's 5iaf!XT|8f|i 1372).  40  for Paris' abduction of Helen". These practical political considerations ("my role i n history") give w a y at 1385 to a personal argument: Iphigeneia compares herself to any other soldier involved i n the war effort (cf. Hkld 999-1002), and concludes she cannot justly shirk d e a t h .  503-6, Phoin  77  W h e n w e turn to Polyxene i n Hek the situation is somewhat different.  In  no w a y w i l l Polyxene's sacrifice serve to promote the interests of her o w n family or state. A n d she is no volunteer like Makaria and Menoikeus; even i n the case of Iphigeneia, a real heroic choice is involved, though it comes only after m u c h resistance.  78  Yet Euripides has given Polyxene a speech highlighting the nobility  of her decision to accept the necessity of death: 342-5  Polyxene hints at the resolve she is about to reveal  346-8  I must die and I wish to d i e ,  349a  topical question: TL ydp .tie Set £fjv;  349b-56  m y past  357-66  m y present and future  367f  I reject life on these terms  369-74  instructions to Odysseus and Hekabe  375-8  reflection on reversal  79  and w i l l not appear a coward  Polyxene's account of her past emphasises her royal status and expectations of a royal marriage; her outlook for the future (if the sacrifice could somehow be See Gibert diss., esp. p. 286. I note that the patriotic and heroic view of her act returns in her words at 1420,1446,1471f, 1502, and is extended to Agamemnon's act as well in 1454-6. 7  7  Thus I disagree with statements to the effect that Iphigeneia simply yields to overwhelming necessity (e.g., O'Connor-Visser Aspects of Sacrifice 122-4). Euripides has delayed her act of heroism to get the strongest possible effect from it; he has in fact made a whole play out of what provides only a scene in the other three plays discussed here. 7  8  The positive formulation here makes a striking contrast to the refutation approach seen in the Hkld scene: Polyxene has no reason to die, only the desire. Schmitt notes (Opfertod 32) similarities to Aias' speech at S. Aias 430-80. 7  9  41  prevented) is that of a menial slave facing a degrading marriage. Polyxene's speech shares with Makaria's this contemplation of the slave's life one will not be forced to live.  80  But there are differences as well as similarities; the mood of  Polyxene's speech is closer to that of the "monologues of despair" I have discussed above.  81  The Evadne/Iphis scene in Hik 990-1113 is, like the scenes of selfdedication in Hkld and Phoin, self-contained and inessential. Formally the scene resembles the "lyric-iambic sequences" discussed above (Alk 244-392, Hel 167-329, etc.), in that human reactions to a tragic situation are developed first in a lyrical, then in a rhetorical mode. But here there are two sufferers, involved. A lyric lament is sung by Evadne (990-1030), who has lost her husband Kapaneus in the war at Thebes. Then her father Iphis, who has lost his son Eteoklos, arrives (1031); he attempts in dialogue (1048-71) to prevent Evadne's suicide, but without success. Iphis, who has thus lost son, son-in-law, and daughter, now delivers an iambic speech rejecting life (1080-1113). The speech begins, like some other Euripidean monologues, with a lengthy general reflection involving an impossible wish.  82  Iphis wishes men could go twice through the cycle of youth  and age (1080-86), then explains how his own life has brought him to wish this: he has been destroyed by his own desire to have children, for having fathered a son he has now lost him (1087-93). 8  0  83  In 1094-7 Iphis considers his alternatives,  So Schmitt, Opfertod 31.  Yet though the speech is not a heroic self-dedication embracing patriotic goals and personal glory, it must be said that the sacrifice itself (as reported by Talthybios, 818-82) is presented in heroic and ennobling terms. Strohm (Euripides 54-7) notes similarities between Polyxene's scene and the farewell of Megara in Herakles. 8 1  8  2  The passage is discussed in IV.D below.  This is the sense of 1092f, which Diggle was the first editor to delete; Collard ad 1092-3 defends the couplet against earlier attacks by W. Gilbert and by Wilamowitz. The lack of any  8  3  42  using the common device of a series of rhetorical questions, and concludes that he can have no pleasure i n returning either to his o w n home or to that of Kapaneus. This second option is rejected on account of his daughter's death, and she n o w returns to his thoughts. H e generalises about the virtues of daughters as against sons, and remembers w i t h fondness his intimacy w i t h Evadne (10991103).  84  H i s decision to die is revealed i n a striking way:  oux cos TdxiaTa SfJTd u.' d£eT' eg Sou-Oii? CTKOTCOL Te SokreTevQ' d c r m a i s eu.6v 8eu.as yepaiov awTaKeis dTKxj)9epco;  (Hik 1104-6)  This combines a delayed announcement of the intention to die (cf. Menoikeus, Iphigeneia) w i t h a call to action such as we saw opening the final section of several speeches discussed above.  85  Iphis concludes w i t h a reflection o n the  uselessness of o l d people trying to extend their lives for no good purpose (110813): "they ought to get out of the w a y of the y o u n g " .  86  Iphis' speech thus shares  essential features w i t h other speeches by characters w h o , whether from despair or heroic intentions, decide to accept death: comparison of a happy past w i t h a bleak future; demonstration that the future is bleak through an examination of possible alternatives; reflection to the effect that death is preferable to life.  reference to Evadne here is to be explained in terms of balance: Iphis mourns first his son (1092-6), then his daughter (1097-1103). ' We find similar language in the reminiscences of Iphigeneia about her childhood intimacy with her father, IA 1220-2.  8  4  8 5  Hkld 528 (iVyeEo-9' OTTOU 8ei...), IA 1398 (9ueT ', eKTrop9eiTe Tpoiav...), Hek 369 (ay ' ouv  u.e...). This makes an interesting frame with the reflection on youth and age that opened the speech; moreover, the characters of the young and the old form a theme throughout Hik, and here as often "general" material used in a rhetorical setting reflects a basic concern of the play. 8  6  43  E. Two Epideictic Speeches  In a number of speeches discussed above, a balanced chronological presentation helps emphasise a pathetic contrast between past and present or present and future. Comparison not of points in time but of places or peoples forms the organising principle in two very interesting argumentative speeches: Ion 585647 and Tro 353-405. Upon learning that the oracle has identified him as Xouthos' son, Ion greets with mixed feelings the invitation to move to Athens and assume his rightful place in his (supposed) father's household. His doubts about the change are expressed (589-645) as a highly developed description of the life he would anticipate in Athens and then of the life he has enjoyed at Delphi. There is no direct comparison of the two, but life at Athens is imagined with a good many negative aspects, life at Delphi presented as idyllic: 589-632 589-606 607-17 618-20 621-32  633-45 634-7 638-9  Athens Ion's disadvantages there in public life as an outsider the turmoil he will cause in Xouthos' household— possible retaliation by Kreousa his pity for her general rejection of the desirability of royal status (6218), wealth (629-31) Delphi agreeable pace and civility of life there the cheerful character of his sacred and civic intercourse 87  So Verrall in his translation, Diggle in his note at Studies 102f.  44  640-41  variety of human contact  642-44a  summarises his good fortune there  644b-45  comparison favours life at D e l p h i  A s w e have seen i n some speeches earlier, two balanced blocks of argument are developed to very different lengths. Two factors have combined to expand the first block: Euripides' proclivity for political reflection and speculation, and his desire to demonstrate warmth and good feeling on Ion's part towards Kreousa. It is also true that much of the play so far has served to present the image of Ion's life at D e l p h i that the speech promotes— that it is a paradise, and Ion a sensitive but carefree innocent; the speech therefore needn't d w e l l on that i d e a .  88  Ion's initial objection to going to Athens "as the son of an immigrant father, and myself a bastard" (592: i.e., a citizen on neither side) raises precisely the problem that w i l l be solved b y the play's second and authentic recognitionaction. The disadvantages of this situation are explored i n relation to each of three political g r o u p s : Tot T T p d y u a T a  89  ol dSwaToi  (598-601), and  ol X P ^ ^  (597), those who 0  1  T  'n  L  TToXei  aiywai  (602-4).  KOU a T r e u S o u a i v  es  90  F r o m public life Ion moves to his potential impact o n Xouthos' o w n household. The distinction between public and private for purposes of argument has already been seen above i n the appeals of Hekabe to Odysseus (Hek 251-  Good discussions of this aspect are offered by Erbse Studien zum Prolog 76f, Burnett Catastrophe 104f.  8  8  Owen (ad 596-603) speaks of "(1) the dSuva-roi who have no political influence, (2) the really capable people who keep out of politics, (3) those who do take part in public life". Discussion: Friis Johansen General Reflection 136f, Kovacs "Tyrants" 35f; see also Collard ad Hik 238-45. I am not at all convinced Herwerden's ovTes in 598 (received by Diggle) is necessary for eivou codd.; it introduces a profile of 6 diTpdyutov that may or may not be accurate, but which we should not assume Euripides meant to promote here. (Collard ad Hik 438-41 quotes the vs. reading elvcu without comment.) 8  9  These are also called ol Xoyioi in the codd. (vs. 602), for which many corrections have been proposed. 9  0  45  95) and Iolaos to Demophon (Hkld 181-231).  91  Kovacs has proposed deletions (of  595-606 and 621-32) that w o u l d deprive the speech of this distinction. Ion is left arguing o n purely personal and family grounds: I w o u l d be an outsider, a nobody, and a nuisance i n your household. This seems remarkably limited scope for discussing an invitation to join the household of the k i n g of A t h e n s .  92  The play is about an innocent youth who w i l l i n fact at the end of the day be invited b y the goddess herself to assume the throne at Athens; surely it makes sense to think Euripides thought of showing at this point i n his metamorphosis a virtuous lack of greed and ambition, and a certain resistance to political activity — informed b y a good sense of political demographics— w h i c h the further events of the day w i l l overcome.  93  Kassandra's speech to Hekabe at Tro 353-405 begins (as w i l l Andromache's at 634-83) b y offering consolation; Hekabe has expressed regret over Kassandra's "marriage" to Agamemnon. Kassandra, after prophesying enigmatically the end she and A g a m e m n o n both face, offers (367-9) to prove the paradoxical (we may as w e l l say "sophistic") proposition: "The war was a better thing for the defeated  Note also Orestes' defense addressed to Tydareos (Or 544-604): "I had to avenge my father; I have performed a service to Greece". Without emphasis, the Delphi section of this speech also moves from public ("no one knocks you off the sidewalk" 635f) to private ("by habit and character I am righteous towards the god" 643f). 9 1  This is so even if the play portrays Xouthos' royal power as restrained by certain limitations— for example it is not implied that Ion would, as his son, inherit the throne: note 659f (and cf. 577-[78]). Burnett, Catastrophe 106n, discusses these points in terms of Attic law, but our starting point should rather be Euripides' decision to marginalise Xouthos for story-telling purposes. 9  2  It must also be noted that Kovacs' pronouncement, "[the claim] that a wise man will not attempt to become a tyrant... betray[s] a point of view hard to parallel in the fifth century" ("Tyrants", 35f), is contradicted not only by passages he deletes (Hipp 1012-15, Phoin 549-54) but by S. O T 587ff. On the OT passage, Kovacs (p. 47) wilfully ignores the philosophical element in Kreon's argument— an argument much like that of Ion here, in which the advantages of a simple life are held preferable to the complexities and dangers of rvpavvis. On Ion 595-606 Kovacs identifies (p. 35) "both the general tendency of the passage and its identification (598) of the wise with the inactive" as "Epicurean". 9  3  46  (  Trojans than for the Greek victors". She proceeds b y analysing each side's position: 368-85  The Greeks 368-9  lost thousands of men over one w o m a n  370-3  their general was forced to slay his daughter  374-6a  they died not defending their o w n country  376b-79  they lie far from their loved ones (and vice versa)  380-83  no proper funerals or offerings  384-5  closing reflection  386-402  94  The Trojans  386- 7  died defending their o w n country  387- 90  were properly tended and buried b y relatives  391-3  enjoyed family life w h e n not fighting  394-7  the Greek invasion brought Hektor fame  398-9  Paris married a daughter of Zeus  400-2  when war comes, it is no shame for a city to perish nobly  She concludes w i t h an epilogue (403-5) uniting the two themes of her speech: neither her marriage to A g a m e m n o n nor the Trojans' loss of the w a r should be an occasion for pity. In closing she promises she w i l l herself bring about vengeance.  95  W h i l e thoroughly grounded i n the story of the fall of Troy as Euripides has conceived it for Troad.es, this speech (that is, the comparison i n 365-403)  Diggle deletes 383-5, following Wilamowitz (383) and Reichenberger (384-5); Lee receives them without comment.  9  4  Wilamowitz's attack on vss. 365-83 is at Analecta 221-4. He sees the speech as dealing originally only with the Trojans, citing (among other objections) similar expressions in the two halves that suggest to him the Greek half was cobbled together using the Trojan material. Wilamowitz's resistance to the speech's finely balanced presentation has not attracted any modern champions. 9 5  47  more than any other we have b y the playwright seems detachable from its context, a sophistic set piece. This impression arises partly from the speech's lack of necessity. Nothing i n the play has led us to expect a speech dissenting from the v i e w of the defeated Trojans as pitiful victims, least of all from a Trojan speaker. Yet it makes an astonishing impact, and must be regarded as a brilliant stroke b y Euripides. The speech's "detachability" also owes something to the formal and emotionally restrained character of the presentation: the clear headline (365-7); the relative brevity and symmetry of the points raised (Greeks 18 verses, Trojans 17), touching about equally on k n o w n individuals, common soldiers, and civilians, and w i t h no pathetic outbursts and no express application to persons present. V s . 403 clearly closes the comparative argument (cov ouveK' ov xpr\, ufJTep,  OLKTipeiv  o~e y f j v ) ; the continuation w i t h oi> T d u d Aeicrpa (404)  then reaches back further i n the speech and associates for the first time its two topics— the general and the personal.  96  Theseus' comparison of democracy and tyranny at Hik 429-55 shares some features with these two "epideictic" speeches: see Ch. V.B below. 9  6  48  Chapter II  Antilogies and Complex Exchanges  Thus far I have been concentrating on single speeches: speeches of appeal, "epideictic" speeches, monologues of despair, speeches embracing a glorious death or accepting death as the lesser of two evils. In all of these situations Euripides uses sophisticated techniques of argument, typically building u p the speaker's case i n blocks more or less self-consciously distinguished. These blocks often present arguments of different character: for example, an argument about abstract justice may be followed b y one about practical consequences, or b y an appeal for pity, or a reference to past services, etc. Turning n o w to the face-to-face debates of w h i c h Euripides is such a master, I shall continue to call attention to these techniques i n the composition of individual speeches; and I shall note various types of correspondence between the two speeches of a pair. Some observations w i l l also be made regarding the "tone" of debate scenes and their function w i t h i n the play.  A . A p p e a l and Response  Scenes of supplication or other types of appeal can be treated as a special class.  1  Speeches of appeal tend to be long and neatly argued; responses are often  substantially shorter than the appeal they answer, may make little reference to I make no distinction based on the presence of a formal announcement of supplication; such announcements normally have no effect on the progress of the action. See App. B. 1  49  the terms of the request, and are generally of a less "rhetorical" character (Hkld 236-52, Hek 850-63, Hik 334-48,1A 1255-75). There are some important exceptions (Kyk 316-46, Hek 299-331, Hik 195-249, Hel 998-1029, Or 682-716) .  2  I  shall discuss here the more rhetorically developed appeal-response exchanges i n  Kyk, Hek, Or?  Odysseus' appeal to Polyphemos for hospitality (see L A above) offers two grounds of justification, alluding first to favours rendered to Poseidon b y the sailors (Kyk 290-8), and then suggesting that vou.og and  evoefieia  require respectful  treatment of suppliants (299-312). The answering speech is a bit longer than the appeal (31 lines to 28), and unlike some other speeches of refusal (Odysseus i n Hek 299-331, Menelaos i n Or 682-716, A g a m e m n o n i n IA 1255-75) it splits no hairs and makes no excuses. The Cyclops' first words announce his alignment w i t h a philosophy of selfish materialism that admits neither sentiment nor l a w : 6 ra  TTXOUTOS, dv9pwTTLo-Ke,  8 ' dXka  KOLLTTOI/ K a l  ao(j>oIs Qeos, Xoyoov euu.opc|)La. TOLS  (Kyk 316f)  H e goes on to state first (318-21) that Poseidon and Zeus mean nothing to h i m ; this claim is illustrated b y a humourous description of the insular and selfreliant character of his life (323-38a).  4  W i t h 338b-41 he dismisses the institution  of laws as likewise inconsistent w i t h his lifestyle. A final section states ironically  2  It is worth noting that the most elaborate speeches of response are refusals.  The remaining scenes of this type (Hik, Hel) are treated below in V.B and II.E respectively.  3  Details here owe much to passages in the Odyssey (note especially ix. 273-8), though there the Cyclops boasts of his relation to Poseidon (ix. 517-21), and is the very personification of gullibility and unsophistication. For comparison of the Homeric and the Euripidean Cyclops, see pp. 51-9 in Seaford's Introduction to his ed.  4  50  the practical outcome of the confrontation: "fire and the ancestral cauldron" w i l l be made available to Odysseus and his men as £evia, and they are to approach the altar where they w i l l themselves provide the feast (342-6).  5  A l t h o u g h i n its humourous tone this speech is unlike any other E u r i pidean example, it conforms i n rhetorical terms to a general pattern w e shall see below i n another speech of refusal: the two arguments posed b y Odysseus are answered (the first at much greater length than the second), and after the refusal has been justified the practical outcome is announced. The exchange of Hekabe and Odysseus i n Hek 251-331 offers another example of a balanced rhetorical sequence, but on a larger scale. F o l l o w i n g Odysseus' entrance and announcement that Polyxene is to be sacrificed at Achilles' tomb, Hekabe first obtains his consent for a debate (234-7), then raises 6  the issue of a personal obligation she says Odysseus has towards her. This matter is discussed i n stichomythia; Hekabe's long rhesis begins at vs. 251, its first lines serving to close the stichomythic conversation. She then offers her formal plea: 7  254-71  the injustice of the proposed sacrifice  272-87a  pathetic appeal, w i t h a reminder of obligation  287b-95  alternative proposal, w i t h reasons  The clear signposting (271f) of the transition from rational argument to pathetic appeal has been noted i n L A above. The third section, i n w h i c h a positive  For the speech's possible "sophistic" connections, see esp. Paganelli, Echi Storico-politici: Part I (21-60) is devoted to an analysis of this speech and its contact with contemporary thought. See also Seaford's Introduction, ed. 52-6. Ussher dissents (ed. 187f): "One doubts if he [the Cyclops] has framed his primitive code in answer to contemporary sophists". 5  Here as elsewhere the line between "appeal" and "debate" is blurred; suppliants debate their persecutors in Andr 184-230, 319-63, and in Her 170-235. So Helen's appeal to Menelaos to spare her life is cast in the form of a debate with Hekabe in Tro 906-13. 6  7  Speeches open similarly at Kyk 285, Andr 920, Hek 786, etc.  51  practical proposal is made, is a frequent feature of appeals; similarly many accusation speeches close w i t h a pointed reference to alternate action the opponent might have taken.  8  Odysseus' response takes i n order the issues raised i n Hekabe's speech, w i t h a clear transition from point to point. H e begins w i t h a brief acknowledgement of his obligation to Hekabe, then proceeeds to answer at length her two m a i n arguments: 303-20  the sacrifice is necessary and just  321-26  the misery of war is universal and must be endured  The transition between these two points is made using a transition formula (321), roughly: " A n d as for your reference to your o w n sufferings, I have this to say about that". A generalising epilogue (328-31) supports the first of Odysseus' arguments. These arguments have been regarded b y many critics as self-evidently empty and base.  9  But it is important to distinguish between the sympathy the  characters themselves attract and the resources of argument they a p p l y .  10  There  is no question but that we sympathise w i t h Hekabe; moreover, we recognise the personal obligation of Odysseus to her— it should be added that we recognise it because Odysseus himself acknowledges it (301f). 8  n  But the arguments made b y  E.g. IA 1196-1202, Hek 1217-23; Tyndareos begins with such a statement in Or 496-503.  Cf. e.g. Kitto Greek Tragedy 226f, Conacher Euripidean Drama 157f, Michelini Euripides 146f. Mossman reviews the speech in great detail (Wild Justice 113-7) and concludes (117): "Euripides ruthlessly undercuts [Odysseus'] moral standing by clever manipulation of the standard rhetorical ploys he gives him to speak". I don't see this; a view closer to the neutral one that will be presented here is that of Collard (ed., p. 142 and ad 299-331).  9  1 0  In App. C below I have assembled some Euripidean material to support this distinction.  Such claims raised in argument have little force when they pass without comment from the other party; cf. Menelaos' charges in IA 358-60, contradicted by Agamemnon elsewhere in the play. 1 1  52  Odysseus are not i n themselves discreditable. In the first sequence (303-20) he states that he w i l l not i n a private deal contravene his public stand (303-5); a TTOXLS  owes proper recognition to the heroes who have died for it (306-10); if w e  exploit our soldiers living and dishonour them dead, men w i l l have no incentive to fight (311-16); a short life is acceptable if one gains eternal honour and gratitude (317-20). H i s second sequence points out i n m o v i n g language that war is a horror that must be endured b y the women on both sides.  12  I see  Odysseus i n this scene as making the strongest possible case, using arguments that w o u l d occur to anyone i n his position, for a distasteful but necessary action. Likewise Hekabe i n her appeal has used the best arguments available to her, including some extra ammunition (the debt of obligation) that Euripides has supplied to even the field a bit and create a more exciting scene. A s I have suggested, the relatively detailed response of Odysseus, i n w h i c h the points of Hekabe's appeal are directly addressed, is somewhat unusual for a Euripidean appeal-scene (though common i n "forensic" exchanges: see below). The brief and tangential responses of Aigeus (Med 719-30), Demophon (Hkld 236-52), A g a m e m n o n (Hek 850-63), Theseus (Hik 334-48) are more typical. A variation o n the pattern i n w h i c h a suppliant puts two contrasting arguments into a single speech of appeal is offered i n some three-person scenes found i n the later plays: i n Hel, speeches appealing for assistance are addressed to Theonoe b y Helen and Menelaos (see II.E below); i n I A, A g a m e m n o n hears a pair of appeals voiced b y Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia (see V . C ) . The separation of arguments noted above i n L A as a typical feature of appeal speeches tends i n these scenes to be exaggerated, due to the fact that separate persons are voicing two different aspects (e.g., rational and emotional) of the appeal. To some extent,  12-  The thought returns through the Chorus' poignant words in vss. 650-8.  53  this effect is also achieved i n the two speeches of Orestes, the first a defense (Or 544-604) emphasising rational argument, the second an appeal (640-79) emphasising obligation.  13  Discussion of Orestes' appeal and Menelaos' response  follows; for the larger sequence see II.E below. Orestes, sick and exhausted following his murder of his mother, sees Menelaos, just returned from the war, as his best protector against threatened civil punishment for his act. Menelaos enters (Or 348) and the two men discuss the situation i n stichomythia; Orestes initiates a formal appeal for protection w i t h 448-55, which have the character of a proem. This appeal is interrupted b y the arrival of Tyndareos (456) and the entire "forensic" scene w i t h h i m (491-631). In vs. 640 Orestes resumes his appeal to Menelaos.  14  In the text of the codd. his  speech of 40 lines is answered b y Menelaos w i t h a speech of 35; Diggle's text gives Orestes 37 lines, Menelaos 26— still a substantial response compared to others I have mentioned. Orestes' speech (640-79) begins b y insisting on the desirability of a full discussion of the issues. The p u z z l i n g couplet 644f follows, lines w h i c h seem completely irrelevant:  perhaps, as the scholion suggests, they involved some  stage business. Orestes' main argument involves a survey (unehronological and not very clearly marked out) of benefits Menelaos has enjoyed at the expense of A g a m e m n o n and Orestes, each subjected to a comparative treatment:  I owe this observation to Porter, Studies 165-7. Porter sees in the somewhat desperate character of Orestes' appeal speech a result of the failure of his earlier rational argumentation addressed to Tyndareos, just as (in Porter's view) Hekabe in the second part of her appeal to Agamemnon (Hek 787-845) resorts to desperate tactics in the face of the failure of her more moderate opening arguments. But rhetorical contrasts that are to be seen everywhere do not require explanation in these psychological terms. 1 3  Similar separation of proem from body of speech is seen in Makaria's self-dedication in Hkld 474-83, 500-34. The effect of the interruption is for us a gain in realism. 1 4  54  647-51  15  A g a m e m n o n mobilised an army, not i n consequence of his o w n fault but of your wife's  652-4  he gave his life fighting at your s i d e , so y o u might 16  regain your wife 655-7  his fight was ten years long, yours w o u l d be but a day  658-9  I lost m y sister when Agamemenon sacrificed Iphigeneia, no need for y o u to sacrifice Hermione  660-4  summarising argument  The first part of this seems to involve a paradoxical critique of the concept of  dSiKia (note dSiKuj 646, aSiKov 647, dSiKWs 648, dSixiav 650);  17  an argument "from  justice" is thus presented. In the comparisons that follow the emphasis is on Menelaos' bonds of obligation to his brother.  In 665-8 Orestes raises the question  of the practical possibility of a successful resistance.  18  The argument is supported  only b y the philosophical observation that "friendship" has no meaning w h e n the gods are o n one's side— it is friends i n trouble one must h e l p .  19  This leads  to a final section i n w h i c h Orestes supplicates Menelaos i n Helen's name and begs for help (669-79). Orestes' appeal, then, consists of a pair of rational arguments, neatly presented, combined w i t h anticipation of a practical objection  1 5  I follow here the codd. order against Paley's transposition of 651 (accepted by Diggle).  Here I note again an important principle: the fact no one contradicts a claim made in a rhetorical situation does not make it true. Orestes attributes to Agamemnon the noble act he is asking of Menelaos. 1 6  I prefer the punctuation in Weil's text: question mark after d8iK(3 in 646. The point is that z/ Menelaos sees Orestes as "in the wrong" for killing Klytaimestra on behalf of Agamemnon (as he may be apt to do following the harsh verdict Tyndareos has just rendered), this fact will offer him no argument against assisting Orestes, since Agamemnon will have been equally in the wrong campaigning to correct not a misdeed of his own (OUK a^apTcov OOITOS) but a misdeed and a wrong of Helen's. Orestes now asks Menelaos for the favour of a similar "wrong"— that is, he defines dSiKia, for purposes of confronting Menelaos' possible objection, as a selfless service done a friend. Weil (ad loc): "Euripide s'est ingenie pour trouver des arguments specieux a l'appui d'un paradoxe". 1  7  1 8  epets opens such arguments elsewhere: see App. A.  1 9  Cf. the similar "definition" of friendship Orestes gave earlier in 454f.  55  and w i t h supplication. A "sophistic" strain is perhaps to be noticed i n the treatment of dSnda (646-50), and i n the reflection on friendship i n adversity (6658). Menelaos n o w answers. H e states two reasons w h y his inclination is to help Orestes: aLSoog (681f: this w i l l refer to Orestes' announcement of supplication)  20  and the obligation inherent i n a family tie (684-6). But this obligation  seems to exist only 8wau.iv f\v SiSooi Qeos (685), and Menelaos makes it clear (687) he lacks the possibility of helping. Refusal of a suppliant is not common i n tragedy, and Menelaos' decision w i l l be justified at length (cf. Theseus i n Hik 195249).  H e lacks sufficient force to w i n an armed confrontation (688-92a). But  words may prevail (692b-93): that is, he proposes an alternative course, i n w h i c h he seems to be w i l l i n g to help. H e compares (694-701) the two tactics i n a reflection involving politics and wildfire, and decides the second course alone is appropriate: he w i l l speak to Tyndareos (as effective king of the Argives) o n Orestes' behalf. The reflection i n 706-13 seems again to compare the effects of force and subtler means, and decides for the latter; then i n 714-16 Menelaos apparently recalls that the Argives have never been easily mollified, and adds that the wise recognise they are slaves to fate.  21  Clearly there are problems of coherence i n this speech; one looks i n vain for a clear sense of what Menelaos' actual intentions are, and on what basis they  2 0  On aiScus in connection with supplication, see Gould, "Hiketeia" 87-90 and App. B below.  Weil ad loc reads (with Schaefer) TTpouriyo^eaG ' av for TTpo<nyy6uea9a, and understands the lines to conclude that without a substantial force behind one, even negotiation will lead nowhere. West (ad 714) seems to understand Menelaos to say he accepts that he is a slave to fate in virtue of his obligation to attempt a novel policy of persuasion; but in spite of his earlier clear commitment to make the attempt (704f), these lines seem rather to argue against it. Diggle follows Dindorf in deleting 714-6. Perhaps the best sense is achieved by Murray (and di Benedetto) through the deletion of 716 alone: "I have not been successful in the past at winning the Argives over, but now I must". But I doubt whether this would elicit the immediate negative response from Orestes that we see in 717-21. 2 1  56  have been formed. Doubts about the text do not help matters.  22  Some have  assumed w e are to understand that Menelaos, despite his apparent offer to help through negotiation, has been decisively intimidated b y Tyndareos' earlier threats (621-5). Strohm, for example, speculates (Euripides 42) o n the qualities an actor requires to convey w i t h no lines the change of heart that Menelaos undergoes over the course of the scene, and notes that this same character has been presented as an unreliable waverer already i n Troades, and has retreated ignobly i n Andromache. I find this a very unsatisfactory solution, but have no positive interpretation w i t h w h i c h to counter i t  2 3  B. Accusation and Refutation  Euripidean "forensic" debates, like appeal scenes, involve varying degrees of correspondence i n length and content between the two speeches. A t one extreme w e have the exchange of tetrameter speeches b y Menelaos and A g a m e m n o n i n the first episode of I A.  Both speeches offer clear examples of  two-part argumentation, and there is a general correspondence of structure; but Agamemnon's reply is short b y comparison w i t h Menelaos' charges, and does not directly counter the points he has made.  Diggle offers an unduly pessimistic text. The texts of Weil and West receive all the transmitted verses. Murray and di Benedetto both delete only vss. 695 and 716. Diggle deletes a total of nine verses. 2  2  Critics have not been eager to interpret Menelaos' speech; neither Burnett nor M . Lloyd discuss the speech at all. Strohm (Euripides 42f) notes an attention to considerations of power over those of piety, and speaks of Menelaos' indulgence in "grave, embarrassed generalisations... designed merely to cover his withdrawal". Porter comments briefly, calling the speech (Studies 71) "a masterful example of betrayal by equivocation, unmatched outside of Jason's arguments to Medea"; he concludes (72) that "Tyndareus' threats have succeeded in intimidating [Menelaos]". The speech's interesting political reflections (696-701, [706f]) are ignored by Friis Johansen.  2  3  57  Menelaos  334-75  Proem  334-6  Argument I  337-49  Argument II  350-65  Summarising reflection  366-72  Peroration  373-5  Agamemnon  378-401  Proem  378-80  Argument I  381-90  Argument II  391-95  S u m m a r i s i n g conclusion  396-9  Peroration  400-1  The inequality of length may seem remarkable; Euripides is capable of w r i t i n g antilogies i n w h i c h the two speeches are of almost identical length, but he does not insist on this.  24  Here, I w o u l d think, he has written w i t h the entire scene i n  m i n d ; there w i l l be speeches by Agamemnon and Menelaos again following the Messenger's report and through the whole complex sequence the issues w i l l be examined from various perspectives. A good pace is to be maintained, and not all the ammunition fired i n the first engagement. One may compare other complex scenes i n which lines of conflict are drawn and redrawn: Hik 100-364, O r 380-724. Menelaos' speech was discussed above i n L B : its argument that A g a m e m non lacked the singlemindedness required of good leaders is supported by two examples taken from Agamemnon's past.  Agamemnon's response is of a quite  similar structure, but shorter in its argumentation.  H i s proem repeats the idea of  civilised debate (378-80, cp. 334-6), putting the emphasis— important to his position— on aiSoo?, modesty and respect, where Menelaos had announced 2  4  See Bond ad Her 140-251.  "  58  vovs  (3e (Bonos, firmness of purpose, as his chief value. Agamemnon's argument is prefaced w i t h a cluster of rhetorical questions that set a tone of frustration and exasperation (three questions i n 381-82a); the first argument proper is opened w i t h a fourth question, answered (OUK exoiu. '  a  XPT|O-T& v  °"  0L  Aeicrp ' epcus XajMv; (382b). That question is  na.paox.eiv) and the answer supported b y reference  to a fact (Menelaos' failure as a husband). This leads to a second argumentative question whose dependence on the first is indicated w i t h el TO. (384) — it is the "deflating" type of question and here ends the sequence.  25  M o v i n g to the  offensive, A g a m e m n o n first states that Menelaos' irrational and base desire for H e l e n , and not any real concern over Agamemnon's exercise of power (TO (JUXOTILIOV  TOULIOV  385: cf. the charge i n 337-43) is the cause of his complaints.  Then, w i t h regard to Menelaos' second point— the change of m i n d at A u l i s — he asks whether it is insanity to change one's m i n d from a worse policy to a better, and suggests it is rather Menelaos w h o suffers from that affliction, i n wanting Helen back. In a second argumentative sequence (391-5) A g a m e m n o n moves his focus back from Menelaos to the whole expedition, and from Menelaos' self-serving charges to larger questions of justice. The Oath of the Suitors provides a neat vehicle for this purpose, involving as it does the origins of the expedition, and raising questions of right and wrong that were not mentioned earlier. A g a m e m non makes the points that the oath was taken b y men who were out of their minds w i t h desire for marriage w i t h Helen, and that "divinity" (TO Qelov 394) is capable of recognising such an oath as taken under compulsion. It is implied that the generals are not properly bound, under principles of l a w or justice, to fight for Menelaos. In a final sentence (396-9), A g a m e m n o n summarises his two This is a common device for calling attention to the absurdity of a suggestion; see Ch. I n.53. On "deflating" rhetorical questions in Herodotos, see Lang Herodotean N and D 47-9. 2  5  59  arguments i n announcing the practical outcome of his resolve for each of the brothers, emphasising the fact that justice is on his side: Menelaos is not going to achieve, contrary to justice, vengeance over the loss of his worst of wives; A g a m e m n o n is not going to suffer constant misery over having unjustly brought about the death of his child. In a brief epilogue he indicates he has fulfilled the terms of his proem. We see i n these speeches two types of two-part organisation. The charges brought against A g a m e m n o n are of two kinds of inconsistent behavior, and are presented through two chronologically distinguished narratives. The chronological device here as elsewhere gives a very clear two-part division. A g a m e m non's response consists of an argument ad hominem, i n effect denying the charges and laying responsibility at the adversary's door, followed by an argument involving justice and divinity.  This speech is less obviously con-  ceived as two distinct arguments; but the final summarising sentence (396b-99) clearly sets out the dual character of Agamemnon's case. A similar somewhat relaxed coherence of content through two speeches is seen i n Med  465-575. Jason's entrance and somewhat unsatisfactory attempt at a  conciliatory address to Medeia (446-64) unleashes a barrage of resentment: 465-74  proem: abuse  475-99  the past  499-519  (CK TCOV TTPOJTCOV)  476-82  I saved y o u in Kolchis  483-7  and killed your enemy Pelias i n Greece  488-98  you betrayed me, the children, your oath  the present and future 499-508  where am I to turn? (elimination of alternatives)  509-15 516-19  the reality of exile ,  reflection on real and counterfeit  60  Jason's response: 522-5  proem: difficulties facing speaker  526-33  Aphrodite deserves the credit y o u claim  534-44  what you i n return received  545-50  transition to question of the new marriage  551-67  defense of new marriage  568-75  reflection on w o m e n  Medeia's speech has been discussed i n L B above. Jason meets head-on Medeia's arguments about her services to h i m , and supplies a counter-argument: the benefits she has received. We may describe both of his points (Aphrodite's role i n the affair, the positive value of civilisation and fame) as specious and sophistic, but they are nevertheless offered as a direct refutation of Medeia's contention that Jason is i n her debt. The second claim made i n Medeia's chronological survey was that Jason's new marriage constituted a betrayal of herself and the children. This charge again Jason seems to face squarely; but it is interesting that not a w o r d is said (after yeyo6s...aoL [xeyas (^LXOS, 548f) about Medeia's place ,  i n the new arrangement.  26  A n d so likewise he has no answer for the second part  of her speech, the concerns about her o w n future. The rhetorical strategy here is to make a show of answering the points one has an answer for, and ignore the rest. Does the rhetorical character of this speech (i.e. its formality and its willingness to gloss over embarrassing details) bring discredit upon Jason? A c c o r d i n g to Finley, "Jason, an accomplished pleader, uses words only to deceive". For Mastronarde, "Euripidean figures w h o reflect contemporary Earlier (458-61) Jason spoke of Medeia's imminent exile as including the children (as she too envisions it in 512-5); he speaks here (562-5) only of his original intention to keep the children with him. His speech thus avoids mentioning the actual situation that has arisen with the order of banishment for Medeia and the children alike (352ff). 2  6  61  intellectual culture i n such a w a y as to arouse shock and disapproval" include Jason.  27  I disagree: I a m more shocked by Medeia's revelation (364-75) that her  pleas and supplication addressed to Kreon were part of a plan to k i l l h i m , and by her plainly deceptive speech to Jason (869-905), i n w h i c h she feigns shame over her earlier harshness. Jason's speech, like that of Odysseus i n Hek 299-331 and others I shall discuss below, gives the character's "best case"; if these speeches don't w i n our sympathy this does no discredit to their manner of arguing, w h i c h is not dissimilar to that of "sympathetic" speeches elsewhere. A n d , as always, sheer ingenuity of argument must be considered to hold positive interest for the audience.  These two scenes (Menelaos and Agamemnon, Jason and Medeia) are often thought of as "forensic": a speech of accusation is followed b y one of refutation and defense. This situation recurs i n Euripides at:  Alk  629-72 675-705  Admetos accuses Pheres defends  Hipp  936-80 983-1035  Theseus accuses Hippolytos defends  Andr  147-80 183-231  Hermione accuses Andromache defends  Andr  590-641 645-90  Peleus accuses Menelaos defends  Or  491-541 544-604  Tyndareos accuses Orestes defends  Finley, Three Essays 24; Mastronarde, "Optimistic Rationalist" 202. M . Lloyd takes a similar view, Agon 43.  2  7  62  In all of these exchanges, techniques of refutation and countercharge are used i n the second speech. O n l y i n the second Andr scene (analysed below) do we find close correspondence i n the arguments advanced. Euripides also has a few forensic scenes i n w h i c h the first speaker is technically the "defendant". In these the second speech proceeds to demolish the defense:  28  Hek  1132-82 1187-1237  Polymestor defends Hekabe refutes  Elek  1011-50 1060-99  Klytaimestra defends Elektra refutes  Tro  914-65 969-1032  Helen defends Hekabe refutes  The Tro scene presents another antilogy i n w h i c h arguments are carefully matched (see below).  In Andr Peleus comes to the rescue of Andromache and Molossos w i t h a speech cataloguing the mistakes and shortcomings of Menelaos i n mostly chronological sequence: 590-1  introductory  vilification  592-604  charges: y o u are the foolish husband of a bad wife (Helen and all Spartan w o m e n attacked)  605-18  y o u started a war over her; caused Achilles' death and m y misery; came home unscathed  619-23  your daughter is no better  624-6  y o u caused your brother to kill Iphigeneia  627-31  after the war y o u accepted Helen back  632-41  defense of Andromache and Molossos  On the literary considerations leading Euripides to vary the order of the speakers, see Duchemin V AfQN 189f, Dale ad Alk 697. 2  8  63  Menelaos' response: 645-51  proem: y o u are a fool to defend this w o m a n  652-67  attack o n Andromache and Molossos  [668-77] 9 2  I am only protecting m y daughter  678-9  m y war service does me credit  681-4  Helen was victim of gods, benefactress of Greece  685-7  I used moderation i n not killing her; y o u lacked it i n k i l l i n g Phokos  688-90  protestation of goodwill, and warning  Here there is a loosely chiastic correspondence between the main topics: Peleus speaks of H e l e n , the war, Hermione, Andromache; Menelaos (if I am right i n retaining some or all of 668-77) takes these same topics i n reverse order. The chiasm, I w o u l d think, is not a pattern chosen for its o w n sake, but results naturally from each speaker beginning w i t h an attack and ending w i t h a defense of H e l e n or Andromache.  Menelaos' speech lacks clear references to Peleus'  points, but covers them all. There are verbal echoes (f|v XP^\  V  applied b y each speaker to the w o m a n he is attacking;  KfjSog  a  €  607 and 650,  awa^ou  620, cf.  648 ) and telling rephrasings (the "gathering of such a great mob" i n 605f 30  becomes rr\v eu.fjv aTpaTnyicu' i n 678; Menelaos was "weaker than K y p r i s " i n 631, but  aoj(})pGov  i n 686); and the question of responsibility for the death of Achilles,  such a steady undercurrent i n this play, is answered i n both speeches (614f blame Delete 672-6 only? The lines seem sound, indeed "Euripidean" in the neat antithesis they develop, but foreign to the context here, whereas 668-71 seem to me entirely appropriate. Perhaps 671 should end with a colon. 677 will then finish the thought: "you make all this fuss on a stranger's behalf; isn't it right then that I help my own daughter ?" The argument would thus be a fortiori: cf. Her 578-81. 2  '  9  Stevens (ad 648) notes Musgrave and others have taken the second occurrence of the phrase to refer to Peleus' marriage to Thetis. But Menelaos speaks as an insulted relative (cf. 671, if that line is genuine), and so the KfjSos linking Menelaos and Peleus gives an additional reason why Peleus' remarks have been unwise and inappropriate. 3 0  64  Menelaos, 654-6 A n d r o m a c h e ) .  31  The scene continues w i t h a second long speech  by Peleus (693-726: mainly vilification and intimidation) and Menelaos' farewell speech (729-46).  32  Helen's defense i n Troades is expressly introduced as a reply to the charges Menelaos might be expected to make against her (914-18);  33  thus Helen takes the  initiative i n defining the character of the debate. This technique (called b y rhetoricians  TrpoKaTdXri4<L9—  "anticipation of arguments") is frequently met w i t h  i n Euripidean debates. She proceeds: 919-22  attack o n Hekabe over birth and survival of P a r i s  923-30  the three goddesses and the Judgement of Paris  931-7  I was Kypris' victim  34  932-4 this was good for Greece 935-7 but bad for me 938-44  Paris, and your negligence, are to blame for m y leaving Sparta  Burnett, Catastrophe 150n, notes the persistence of this issue. I see as well a neat balancing of family skeletons: Iphigeneia and Phokos. 3 1  Thus the scene consists of two pairs of speeches, and content within each pair is closely parallel: "The subordinate pair of speeches corresponds to the angry dialogue that normally concludes an agon" (Lloyd, Agon 79). But the two exchanges are not experienced as distinct "blocks": Friis Johansen, General Reflection 131, notes the close parallelism of the reflections opening Menelaos' first speech and Peleus' second. This seems to give the scene a certain fluidity. 3  2  33 Verse 918 is widely deleted as an unnecessary and confused completion of 916f; but dvTiQeia' in 917 seems to me to need some object in the dative. Jackson, Marg. Seen. 201, discusses the options; Lee ad loc defends the received text. This argument takes the audience momentarily back to Alexandros, the first play of the trilogy. Scodel, Trojan Trilogy 20-42 & 83-90, and Stinton, Judgement of Paris 64-71, offer speculative reconstructions of that play's contents.  3  4  65  945-50  was this betrayal? no, blame the goddess  951-8 [959-60]  after Paris' death I tried to escape Deiphobos  35  961-4  summary: I don't deserve to die  The anticipated charges are put i n chronological sequence. The stages of the argument are very carefully marked out: Xoyov  931, TOUTTI  TOOLS  TrpcoTa  \x.ev  919, ev9ev8e 923, rbv  evQev  ' 945, ev9ev 951; ovv 961 introduces the summarising  rhetorical question. Hekabe's refutation: 969-70  intention to refute first argument (Judgement of Paris)  971-82  refutation of "Judgement" argument  983-6  refutes claim Kypris came w i t h Paris  987-97  proposes alternative explanation  998-1001  (3iaL abduction doubted: no witnesses  1002-9  Helen's fence-straddling during the w a r  1010-19a  refutes claim to have attempted escape 1012-4  no witness to suicide attempt  1015-19a  I tried to persuade you to go  1019b-28  real reason you stayed: luxury  1029-32  epilogue addressed to Menelaos  Hekabe keeps close to the chronological sequence Helen used: the Judgement, Paris at Sparta, Helen at Troy before and after Paris' death.  36  The stages are again  These lines seem out of place after 952-8: they propose a second and unnecessary reason for Helen's remaining in Troy after the death of Paris. And it is the earlier story that will be taken up by Hekabe in her answering speech. For a different view, in which a reference to Deiphobos is required in Helen's speech, see Scodel, Trojan Trilogy 143f. Scodel argues in part that Hekabe must not be allowed to misrepresent Helen's arguments. This seems to me a weak assumption a priori: Hekabe's goal is to defeat her enemy. I think, in spite of the fact Helen has not earlier spoken of |3ia in describing her abduction by Paris, that 6 Liev in 962 must be Paris, and that Hekabe picks this up in 998. Lee ad loc defends 959-60, but without reference to Hekabe's speech. 3  5  Not surprisingly, Hekabe has no answer to Helen's first claim— that Paris should not have been allowed to survive. Similarly Helen has not spoken of her loyalties during the war, the subject of one of Hekabe's charges. 3  6  66  clearly marked b y references to Helen's speech (verbs of speaking i n 970, 983, 998, 1010); there are verbal repetitions:  elkv  (945/998),  oti\ia  KA6TTT£LV  o"recj)avos (937/1030, i n two strikingly different suggestions).  37  (958/1010),  A t two different  points Hekabe uses the familiar technique of disproving the adversary's contention, then producing the "true" explanation for the observed facts.  38  Hekabe may be guilty of distortion at two points: if Helen refers i n 962 to Deiphobos, then she did not say that she was abducted by force (998, cf. 940-50);  39  and Helen's claim she was prevented from escaping (for w h i c h she claims witnesses) is not properly refuted b y the fact no one saw her attempt s u i c i d e .  40  In this scene more than any other i n Euripides w e have two speeches designed from start to finish as partners, giving "the best case" for each side of a dispute. It is perhaps no accident that the issue here is the abduction of Helen, a topic w e k n o w to have been constantly discussed i n the context of the Sophists' teaching of eloquence.  41  With Tro 937 cf. Or 923ff (an anonymous speaker defends Orestes in the Argive assembly): in both places the paradoxical statement is made that the defendant should be not punished but rewarded. That the events that followed upon the abduction of Helen were a good thing is claimed elsewhere by Menelaos (Andr 680-4), Kassandra (Tro 386-402). 3  7  3  8  Cf. e.g. Andr 205ff, Hek 1206ff.  This discrepancy leads Scodel to argue for the deletion of 998-1001 (Trojan Trilogy 143f). But see note 35 above. Lloyd, Agon 105, takes 998-1001 as blatant misrepresentation by Hekabe. 3  9  The thought in 1010-14 must be: If in fact you were prevented from escaping, suicide alone would give adequate proof that you were a yewoua ywf), TToGouaa TOV ndpog TTOCJIV. Hekabe denies the consequent— no suicide attempt, therefore no escape attempt— and then goes on to claim that had Helen wanted to she could have left at any time. 4  0  For us the debate surfaces in Herodotos (I. 3f, II. 112-20) and in all of Euripides' Trojan War plays, besides the sophistic tracts on the subject by Gorgias and Isokrates. We get a glimpse of the beginnings of Helen as a debating topic in Iliad III. 146-60, the old men on the walls of Troy. 4  1  67  C. The Debate w i t h Lykos  The first episode of Herakles is a suppliant scene of a type Euripides favoured: the protagonists have taken refuge at an altar, an enemy is standing by, the potential champion is far a w a y .  42  The "enemy" is impatient for an  opportunity to k i l l the suppliants, and debates their situation w i t h them. Lykos' speech is loosely organised o n these lines: 140-2  proem  143-50  your death is inevitable— to wait is unworthy of the so-called auyyaiiog of Zeus, and the spouse of the great Herakles  151-64  165-9  Herakles is not so great 151-8  his sham animal victories  159-64  the cowardice of archers  reasons w h y I must k i l l his family  This cannot really be described as an effort at persuasion; rather it presents Lykos as badgering and baiting the suppliants. Amphitryon's response is a model of construction: 170-73  proem: charges must be answered: that of Herakles' paternity by Zeus, the rest b y me  174-87  the charge of cowardice i n the labours  188-203  the charge against archery  204-5  this concludes m y answer to your charges  See Jakel, "TTA90NTI" 37f; Kopperschmidt, "Hikesie" 339-43; Burnett, Catastrophe 15860. The situation at the beginning of Andr is very similar: there too the badgering of the "enemy" is answered by a speech of defiance, not of supplication. 4  2  68  206-16  the children: it makes no sense to k i l l them; rather let them go into exile  217-26  reproaches addressed to Thebes and Greece  227-35  apology to children for his o w n impotence  43  This goes w e l l beyond a simple response to Lykos' speech, but is remarkable for the clarity w i t h which it addresses all the points Lykos has raised  4 4  In the debate  over Herakles' greatness, each side brings forward examples from his labours; the arguments o n archery vs. hoplite fighting give the impression this was a standard debating topic.  The arguments on both sides include points whose  verbal cleverness or paradoxical character w i l l have had great entertainment value,  45  and the terms i n w h i c h A m p h i t r y o n defends the archer ("he doesn't  depend on his mates, and does his killing from a safe distance") do not i n any sense compromise his o w n character or that of Herakles: they are precisely "debating points". But the issues touched upon i n this debate— the greatness of Herakles, the nature of bravery and cowardice, the inevitability of his family's death— are the central issues of the play. The very complex first half of Herakles, i n w h i c h the attitudes of Megara and A m p h i t r y o n towards Herakles, the family, and death are developed rhetorically, leads to a second panel i n which action replaces rhetoric,  It is interesting that Herakles too will address reproaches to Thebes in closing his great speech (1389-93).  4  3  The exchange is "formally puzzling": M . Lloyd, Agon lOf. Bond (ad 140-251): "The purpose of Lycus' speech is, as Wilamowitz saw, to provide an opportunity for Amphitryon's splendid reply". Thus we have a somewhat lopsided debate; this seems consonant with the play's general treatment of Lykos as a marginal and unsympathetic character, one whose death can be treated as a simple triumph of good over evil, in complete contrast to the deaths that will follow it. 4  4  E.g., word-play in 152 (i)8pav eXeiov) and 153f (ppoxois/ppaxiovo?), the fine distinction between dvaiSeia and evXafieia in 165f, the ironic view of oofyla in 206-9, and the general paradoxes of an attack on Herakles as unheroic and a debate over archery vs. hoplite warfare set in the context of an altar scene. 4  5  •69  then a final act subjecting events to a rhetorical analysis.  46  Throughout, w e are  reminded of the subjects first introduced i n this debate: the problem of Herakles' double paternity, the benefits for all mankind of his career, the proper 47  definition of bravery as against cowardice; and the play w i l l return to the weapons of Herakles, the club and bow w i t h which he w i l l kill his family, and w h i c h become almost characters i n their o w n right at 1378-85.  48  Thus, for  example, the greatness of Herakles is denied i n somewhat silly terms b y Lykos i n 151-61; A m p h i t r y o n rebuts this w i t h examples from the Labours (177-84), and w i t h the observation that all Hellas owes much to Herakles (222-6). Elsewhere i n the play Herakles is celebrated as a great benefactor to Greece and all mankind (264f, 348-441, 687-700, 849-54, 875-9); even his young sons are praised as important allies for Hellas (131-7). But i n the aftermath of the tragedy, i n a second debate scene, Herakles himself w i l l dwell upon the cost of such a life, while Theseus w i l l promote endurance and compassion. The earlier debate is n o w elevated to a m u c h more serious level, but the question is still "What does  4  6  On the form of Her, see Cropp "Heracles, Electra..." 187-9, Burnett Catastrophe 157.  The first episode (140-347) develops the relations of Herakles to Zeus, and to mankind (cf. also the ode in 348-441); his relation to his own family comes to our attention elsewhere (71-9, 46096, 629-36). Herakles' "public" and "private" lives don't come together until his monologue in 12551310. 4  7  I do not suggest that the use of bow and arrows in the killing in any way justifies the earlier statements of Lykos or Amphitryon; the killing of Herakles' family is of course, whether done with bow, spear, or sword, an act of neither valour nor cowardice, but of madness. Nevertheless, the prominence given early in the play to the weapons that will do the killing must be significant. Bond notes (ad 1379) language that puts his weapons in the same relation to Herakles as old friends, or indeed his children (cf. esp. 79). Michelini (Euripides 242-6) emphasises the bow as an essential element in the play's portrayal of Herakles as "a modern and revisionist hero" (244)— I don't see this. Nor can I agree with R. Hamilton when he suggests ("Slings and Arrows" 23f) that at the end of the play Lykos' view of bravery has been vindicated, that Herakles accepts the loss of freedom implied in friendship (with Theseus) and hoplite fighting: "Amphitryon's argument for the bow" is "fully...refuted" (25). 4  8  70  it mean to be a great m a n ? "  49  Thus the somewhat "sophistic" debate w i t h L y k o s  has been for Euripides one more way of presenting the themes the play ponders.  D. "The Rhetoric of the Situation" i n T w o Forensic Debates  A t this point I shall look more closely at two somewhat similar debates, and attempt to draw conclusions about the "tone" and function of such scenes, i n the light of the stylising tendency I have been documenting. In Alkestis, the arrival of Pheres comes at a moment of deep personal suffering for Admetos: Alkestis has just died and is being carried out for funeral observances. In response to his father's initial consolatory speech praising A l k e s t i s ,  50  Admetos  attacks Pheres over his well-known refusal to agree to die for his son: 629-32  introduction:  expressions of hostility  633-5  argumentative headline:  636-47  1st argument: Pheres' lack of courage and  rore...  appropriate observance of c|)iX.ia 648-61  2nd argument: his death w o u l d have been just and reasonable  662-68  consequences of his refusal  669-72  gnomic epilogue  In the second debate (1213-1393) note especially 1252,1299f, 1308-10,1334f. Vss. 1349f seem to have the earlier debate in mind (162-4: the archer doesn't stand his ground; 1349f: one must stand up to misfortune as to the casts of an enemy in battle).  4  9  See Dale ad 614ff, Burnett Catastrophe 40, Lloyd Agon 37f, for less complimentary views of Pheres' speech. My more neutral view resembles that of Conacher (ed., p. 181f). 5  0  71  These sections are not clearly signposted, but changes of direction are indicated by KCUTOL  (648),  KaXov  (648). The two-part argument comes close to a positive-negative formu-  TOiydp  (662).  The two basic points are set out i n  51  d^uxla  (642) and  lation of a single point: (1) y o u acted ignobly, (2) yet y o u had reason to do the noble thing. A n d there is emphasis i n both halves on family relationships and duties. But the section 636-47 dwells on the imputation of cowardice, lack of ToXu.a  (644), where i n the next part (648-61) the point is Pheres' failure to appre-  ciate the rational good sense and objective fairness of his making the sacrifice. Pheres' speech of rebuttal begins w i t h a hostile proem of a similar sort to that of Admetos, repaying the scornful reference there to his o w n old age  (yepcov  div 635, proposed as a reason w h y he should have been w i l l i n g to die) by characterising Admetos' speech as  veavias  Xoyous (679). H e then takes up the  mai n points of Admetos' argument in reverse order.  52  In 681-90 he replies to the  charge that justice and the duties proper to family relationships have been violated by Pheres, saying that no traditional or Greek law imposes the obligation to die for one's child; i n 691-702 he answers the charge of  atyvxia  by conceding  that he loves life and so avoids death, but adding that Admetos is in no position to level this charge, since it is precisely the trait he himself is convicted of.  53  Admetos ended by speaking of the future consequences of Pheres' selfishness (662-8); Pheres ends w i t h a comment on the consequences of Admetos' angry words:  el  epeis, dKouoT|i TroXXd  8' KOU  f\[ia<s  KaKoo?  i^euSf)  KaKd.  (714f)  M . Lloyd, Agon 37f, sees two main argumentative sections but divides them after 650. Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments 25f, analyses the speech as a number of shorter blocks. 5 1  5  2  So Lloyd, Agon 39, with slightly different emphasis.  5  3  Cf. e.g. IA 388-90 for the "pot calling the kettle black" type of reply.  72  Thus the two speeches follow the same general plan: hostile p r o e m — two contrasting arguments— a warning for the future;  54  the arguments correspond  chiastically. This exchange is formally similar to others we have encountered: two speeches of approximately the same length, having similar shapes, address the same issues from opposite sides. A s w i t h other debates of this sort, w e may ask to what extent the points made by the agitated and argumentative speakers are points of importance to the play as a whole, and to what extent they represent what A . M . Dale called "the rhetoric of the situation".  55  This question is perhaps complicated i n the case of Alkestis by the play's recognised combination of tragic and non-tragic levels of meaning: the scenes i n v o l v i n g Herakles seem to be less "serious" than those i n v o l v i n g the other characters.  56  I hesitate to identify this lowering of tone as a "satyric" or "pro-  satyric" quality, but I think w e all sense a certain playfulness i n (particularly) the final "friendly debate" between Herakles and Admetos, i n w h i c h irony plays a major role. This irony involves not the undercutting of Admetos, not the serious suggestion that he proves, i n accepting the gift of the veiled w o m a n , false to the promise he made to Alkestis; rather we are reminded that Admetos' great  5  4  The scene ends with further threats on either side: 730-3 (Pheres), 734-40 (Admetos).  The phrase seems to have been coined by Dale for use in the Introduction to her Alcestis, where she argues that criticism of Greek tragedy that seeks to find evidence for "character" (i.e. a consistent, realistic personality) in every utterance is usually "not allowing enough for two considerations always very important to the Greek dramatist, the trend of the action and the rhetoric of the situation" (xxv); Dale goes oh to apply this principle especially to the interpretation of agon speeches. The idea (which owes something to the earlier formalist criticism of T. von Wilamowitz and others) has been promoted in a somewhat narrow form by Gould ("Dramatic Character"), Heath (Poetics 130-7) and others; Conacher's "Rhetoric and Relevance" addresses Gould in particular. 5 5  5  6  See Conacher's introduction to his ed. of the play; and cf. Buxton "Five aspects" 27-9.  73  virtue, his sense of obligation towards friends, can sometimes get one into trouble. Admetos has earlier prevailed upon Herakles himself to accept an unwanted gift of hospitality; Herakles now prevails upon Admetos to accept the woman. O u r attention is focused o n the friendly but somewhat a w k w a r d relationship of the two men, and we realise w i t h amusement that Admetos' sense of x P s is causing h i m great discomfiture as he attempts to refuse the gift a  L  of — his w i f e .  57  To recognise this playful and ironic aspect i n the play is not to deny the seriousness of the scenes i n which Admetos faces first Alkestis, then Pheres; but we are forced to admit that at the end of the play Alkestis' concerns over a "stepmother" for her children (304-10), and Admetos' promises to give u p entertaining (343-7), have been nullified b y the course the action has taken. I w o u l d suggest that the debate w i t h Pheres is likewise far from our minds at the close of the play. We are not asked to consider whether Admetos w i l l i n fact refuse to care for his aged parents; the happy ending is not compromised b y any sense that the affair has created a rift within Admetos' family. A modern playwright might have added a scene i n w h i c h father and son "make up"; Euripides was capable of resolving this strand of his tale through a reflective monologue or a deus ex machina. But his approach to story-telling doesn't demand this— Pheres drops out of this story as completely as Makaria drops out i n Hkld, or Xouthos i n Ion.  58  Euripides has not bothered about Pheres' further story because  ' I cannot agree with Burnett that Alkestis' return represents a "reward" for Admetos' "aristocratic piety", which has brought about the "salvation of Alcestis" (Catastrophe 45f). Rather he benefits from a friendly gesture on the part of an embarrassed guest. Burnett takes the play too seriously; Kitto (Greek Tragedy 339f) likewise thinks in terms of a serious demonstration of the fidelity of Admetos, focusing— mistakenly, I think— on the feelings we are to impute to the silent figure of the veiled woman. 5  These are characters who have served their limited purpose; compare Andromache, whose story must be wound up in the deus-speech (Andr 1243-52).  5  8  74  to do so could only complicate his fairy-tale ending; and precisely because the ending has this character, we must consider the bitterness of the debate simply cancelled.  59  The scene between Pheres and Admetos then must be thought of as no more than a scene, a dramatisation of one aspect of the conflict over Alkestis' death. In Admetos' speech w e are reminded of his agitation and his bitterness towards his parents,  60  and at the same time treated to an orderly exposition (of a  type w e have met elsewhere) of the factors that might have made Pheres accept death. But i n Pheres' speech we are shown (and Admetos is shown) that not everyone is going to recognise this resentment as justified. Pheres' arguments are not "good" arguments: (1) I've broken no law, (2) w h o wouldn't cling to life as long as possible? But the fact he evinces no shame over his refusal to die, and turns the charge of d ^ u x t a against his accuser (696f), is a shock to A d m e t o s .  61  A s i d e from the realisation that this occasions (and w h i c h w e learn of only later, i n Admetos' monologue), I don't see the points raised i n the debate as reaching beyond the confines of this highly charged scene: Pheres' charge that Admetos "killed" Alkestis (696) is an extravagant exaggeration of the facts as presented elsewhere i n the play; Admetos' promise not to bury Pheres (665) has likewise been produced b y Euripides as a token of the over-heated character of the debate.  M . Dyson, "Alcestis' Children" 22, notes an effect of the final scene's intense focus on Admetos' sincere devotion to Alkestis: "The humdrum issue of the children's future, along with the ugliness of the quarrel with Pheres, is stripped away". 5  9  60 We l d y knew of this resentment from 338f (and perhaps 432-4); it is surely given some legitimacy by Alkestis' concurrence, 290-2, and that of the Chorus, 466-70. Dyson, ibid, sees the energy of Admetos' attack as emphasising his devastation: "his grief brushes aside even filial piety". Lloyd, Agon 40, sees in his charges against his parents one expression of a thematic "tension between the correctness and the inappropriateness of everything that Admetus does". a  r e a  Dale (ad 697) describes the impact this has on Admetos: "Sorrow and ill fame are what he has gained by living on; the first he has begun to feel already, the second only the malice of Pheres could bring home to him". 6 1  75  These, then, are details for w h i c h the phrase "rhetoric of the situation" is perfectly apt.  Another heated debate between father and son, w i t h a "forensic" character similar to that of the debate i n Alk, occurs i n Hipp. The discovery by Theseus of Phaidra's letter inculpating Hippolytos leads to a trial-like confrontation between the two men. Theseus' extremely agitated state is dramatised through a series of three abstract reflections uttered i n response to Hippolytos' expressions of concern: to TTOXX'  cj)eO, XPW  cj)eu  rf\g  dfiapTdvoyTes-  PpOTdlai  PpoTeiag-  dvBpcoTroL  TQV (juXtov  \idrr\v...  TeKu.fipiov'...  TTOL TTpo(3rjaeTaL;  -  fypevos  (916-20) •(925-31) (936-42)  The last of these serves as a sort of proem for a lengthy speech of accusation: 943-7  expressions of hostility  948-57  attack on Hippolytos' personal character  958-72  the incontrovertible character of the evidence counters any rational arguments Hippolytos might put  973-80  consequences:  e£eppe  etc.  Here as i n Admetos' speech of accusation (see above) two basic arguments are followed by an announcement of the consequences of the imputed criminal act for the accused. The two arguments are i n this case quite distinct, but no clear rhetorical focusing device separates them. The first, an attack on Hippolytos' character, arises quite naturally out of the proem and is not alleged as a fact corroborating the charge; rather it serves to p u l l the r u g from under any defense 76  Hippolytos might make on the grounds of his auj(j)poo-uvr|— precisely the defense Hippolytos w i l l first offer (948-51, cf. 994f, 1007). It is important not to seek here a "relevance" that goes beyond the rhetorical objective of convicting Hippolytos. We are reminded through Theseus' references to O r p h i s m and vegetarianism (952-4) that he and Hippolytos are being presented as characters w i t h some differences of life-style; we are not informed of a history of hatred or resentment.  62  Theseus' second argument against Hippolytos refers to the unimpeachable character of the evidence: the fact Phaidra has killed herself speaks far louder than any oath or rational argument Hippolytos might offer— and he w i l l offer both (rational argument, 1008-20; oath, 1025-7). Theseus' speech has said all that needs saying against Hippolytos— that his notorious evae^eia and atoctpoauvri lend themselves to being regarded as a false front, and that the case against h i m is strong. The epilogue (973-80) amounts to conviction and sentencing.  63  Theseus' speech began w i t h strong emotion (cj)e0 936) and was broken off i n the middle b y an impatient outburst (971f), but it has brought forward clearly the case against Hippolytos and has used a formal pattern well k n o w n to us i n doing so.  Gould ("Dramatic Character" 57): "Theseus' jibes at Hippolytus, his sneering allusion to Orphic ritual and religious cant afford, I take it, no invitation to consider the religious attitudes of himself or Hippolytus (or, it may be worth adding, of Euripides)". This much is quite true, but Gould's conclusion— that "character" is simply suspended for the duration of the debate— doesn't follow. Contrast Goebel, diss. 303: "[Theseus] has obviously never been sympathetic with his son's religious beliefs, and now he is happy to dismiss them as a sham". A middle course between these two approaches would be to say that having father attack son on this very personal level supports the general sense of Theseus' frustration and anger; that is, the emotional colouring is more important than the specific content. On another level, I would not rule out the resonance for the audience that would result from seeing ascetic or "philosophic" young men around Athens who angered their fathers by rejecting their values: see Ostwald on "The Generation Gap and the Sophists", Popular Sovereignty 229ff. 6  2  Thus there is no realistic reason Hippolytos should offer a defense, nor that Theseus should hear it through. Euripides is never concerned to motivate the actual making of the speeches. Motivation of the debates in Hik and Tro is especially artificial, that of the first debate in Her ludicrous. M . Lloyd (Agon 47) says of Theseus: "He proceeds immediately to sentence Hippolytus to exile (973-80). The perversion of legal processes could not be more manifest". But there is no pretense in this or any other Euripidean debate that "legal processes" are being followed; the decree here displays Theseus' anger without bringing any discredit upon him. 6  3  77  Here as elsewhere Euripides has not written a realistic agitated speech, but a neatly patterned formal speech into which reminders of the speaker's agitation have been inserted.  64  Hippolytos' reply begins w i t h a proem that has divided commentators, and w h i c h requires a slight digression here. H e begins b y denying that the subject of Theseus' concern, though permitting of eloquent expression (exov KOXOVS  Xoyous'), has real excellence of substance (983-5).  65  H e proceeds to portray  himself as a man unskilled at speaking i n public settings (els oxAov 986), being used to a more intimate and learned audience (986f); the converse proposition is then stated, that speakers w h o fail i n such situations often make a better impression w i t h the public at large (988f). H e then agrees to reply to Theseus' speech, indicating he w i l l begin where Theseus began; this w i l l refer to Theseus' comments about Hippolytos' character. Grube wrote of Hippolytos' defense:  66  In his answer to all this [sc. Theseus' charges and emotional agitation], Hippolytus surpasses himself i n tactlessness, frigidity, and self-conceit. The first ten lines, w h i c h are i n effect an elaboration of the Greek equivalent for 'Unaccustomed as I am to public speaking', nevertheless contain a profound truth about him: he is incapable of expressing even such feelings as he has except when praying to Artemis.  Similar comments have been made b y many scholars, o l d and n e w .  67  In  contrast, Heath speaks of the "anachronistic intuitions" w e wrongly apply "when we think w e can recognise welcome and familiar touches of characterisation i n 6  4  Cf. especially Hekabe's agitation in Hek 786-845.  6  5  Cf. the similar opening of Teiresias' reply to Pentheus, Bak 266-9.  6 6  Drama of Euripides, 188.  Barrett (ad 986-7) speaks of "peculiar priggishness", Conacher ("Rhetoric and Relevance" 15) of "characteristic haughtiness"; Goebel (diss. 306) finds the comments of Hippolytos "singularly tactless".  6  7  78  rhetorical commonplaces, such as the opening of Hippolytus' self-defence before Theseus". G o u l d notes the "jury-directed" tone of this o p e n i n g ;  68  it is implied  that once w e notice i n a Euripidean debate mannerisms of Athenian oratory, w e have no reason to expect any other kind of meaning from the passage. It seems to me that neither of these positions is quite satisfactory. A l l o w a n c e must certainly be made for Euripidean "formalism" and the stylised nature of rhetorical passages I have been calling attention t o .  69  But the original  audience's perception of plot and characters may not have shifted gears quite so easily, w i t h every change of meter and " m o d e " , as Heath and G o u l d seem to imagine. I have suggested that Theseus' outbursts before and during his speech remind the audience that this character, though delivering a neatly-formed iambic speech of accusation, is to be thought of as emotionally agitated. There are suggestive details i n Hippolytos' speech as well. The speech begins w i t h expressions of drreipia and reluctance to enter into debate; such expressions may be "conventional" i n Greek oratory, though they are certainly not obligatory. But I see nothing conventional i n Hippolytos' comparison of speaking to the public w i t h speaking to a small, elite, learned g r o u p .  70  Moreover, the Athenian  audience may w e l l have sensed some incongruity i n having a son address to his Heath, Poetics 132; Gould "Dramatic Character" 57. Gould also sees in this exchange "that same analytical mode of expression we saw earlier as characterising Phaidra's speech [at 373-430]" (ibid). 6  8  I note here the use of introductory comments referring to "difficulties affecting the speaker" in the speeches beginning at Andr 183, Hik 297, Elek 1013, Tro 914, Or 544, IA 1211, as well as Hipp 983; see IV.B below. 6  9  Ober, Mass and Elite 43f and passim, notes the necessity recognised by Athenian political and dicanic orators of presenting their message in a way that suggested that the values of the (normally "elite") speaker coincided with those of the mass audience. Allusions to the dangers of (the opponent's) sophisticated rhetoric, and to the unsophistication and drreipia of the speaker are very frequent (165-77). But Ober points out also (183) that the politician sometimes praises his own privileged upbringing and education. He cites examples in Isokrates (5. 81-2) and Demosthenes (18. 256-7); in both cases the speaker expresses some reticence in calling attention to his own advantages. Hipp 986-9 would seem to be quite out of step with these observed conventions. 7  0  79  agitated and grieving father remarks whose conventional context was public and inherently artificial. That is, (1) I contest the assertion that the proem remarks made here are everyday topoi of Athenian oratory; (2) I do not regard it as certain that topoi that were genuinely "conventional" i n one context w o u l d necessarily be accepted i n a very different context w i t h no sense of incongruity. But i n any case, we have no reason to expect that conventional expressions, w h e n used i n a play, represent a random choice made b y the poet from among a field of available conventional materials. I think rather that i n this case material w h i c h is to a limited degree and i n a limited context conventional has been used to remind us of a certain aloofness w e have already seen i n this character. Because there is a conventional element, both i n the  d-rreipia  topos and i n the debate  form, I wouldn't go much further than that— certainly not as far as G r u b e .  71  We  k n o w that Hippolytos is innocent, and wonder whether he w i l l keep the oath w e learned of at 61 If: the question where the plot w i l l go has us on the edge of our stone benches. But at the same time Euripides takes some trouble to show us an isolating quality i n Hippolytos' au<\>poovvr\, a quality that we can believe angered the love goddess. M o v i n g to the argumentative content of the speech, Hippolytos addresses first of all the charge made against his character. H e senses (at 1007) that this approach is ineffective; he offers a different defense  7 2  A s J. H . Finley has de-  Grube describes the argumentative content of Hippolytos' speech as "eager selfglorification, for it can hardly be called a defence" (Drama 189). He ignores the fact it is a good speech, elegant and thorough in its presentation. M . Lloyd also misses this point, when he concludes (Agon 50) "the tragic point is that these feeble arguments are the only ones [Hippolytos] can use". 7 1  Often we see two different arguments brought to bear in the same case. Here, unusually, the impression is given that the second argument is being put because the first has failed— this violates a certain static quality we expect in such speeches, the sense of the speech as a single spontaneous utterance, not something which unfolds in 'dramatic time'. Somewhat similar: Kyk 299, Hek 813. 7  2  80  scribed the two arguments: "The hero [argues] ... i n lines 993-1006, that a person of his aco^poCTuvr) w o u l d not have been likely to commit such a crime and, i n lines 1007-20, that the crime itself w o u l d have brought h i m no advantage".  73  We may describe both of these arguments, w i t h Finley, as probability arguments. The first attacks the probability of a virginal rapist, the second eliminates one by one any probable motive. (The formal and quite characteristic presentation of this second argument is the subject of close study i n III.B below.) Hippolytos' speech moves to a third argument: a strong oath to his innocence.  74  Comments  alluding mysteriously to the oath that prevents Hippolytos from defending himself properly (whether or not this is to be regarded as a practical possibility) are i n the vicinity (1032f), and this is no accident. Certainly Euripides has given each speaker i n this contest arguments "as good and as hard-hitting as his case allows", i n Dale's phrase; she says elsewhere "Fertility i n arguments, a delight i n logical analysis— these are the essentials." Euripides is "a kind of A.oyoypdcj)os w h o promises to do his best for each of his clients i n t u r n " .  75  But to note the "jury-directed tone" (Gould) of such speeches  is not to circumscribe exhaustively their content. I have rejected above the idea that Theseus' personal attack on Hippolytos represents the bursting forth of years of pent-up resentment (Goebel); likewise, the patience and clarity w i t h w h i c h Hippolytos argues his case should not be taken as showing us a maddening impassivity or self-absorption (Grube). But this doesn't necessarily leave us w i t h no more than an analytical consideration of the two sides, presented using  Three Essays 65, n.28; Finley notes (ibid) connections with approaches to argument seen in the Sophists and orators of the late fifth century. 7 3  As often, a third section contains "non-rational" argument. Oaths supporting the truth of their statements are offered by Euripidean speakers at Her 858, IA 473ff.  7  4  7 5  Dale, Alcestis: ad 636ff (first quote); xxviii (second and third).  81  formal conventions of Athenian public debate and from a '"third person' perspective" (Gould's phrase) b y the figures of Theseus and Hippolytos. W e 76  must not doubt that such a presentation already holds considerable intrinsic interest; but w e needn't assume that Euripides has no other purpose here. I have noted details that go beyond the "analytical" (Theseus' agitation and impatience); rhetorical material that is not quite "conventional" (Hippolytos' proem); points raised i n argument that resonate w i t h important themes i n the play (the positive and negative aspects of aoo^poawr], the oath Hippolytos is 77  under); points that may be assumed to resonate w i t h the everyday experience of the Athenian audience ("generation gap")— as indeed the rhetorical techniques themselves must. In each case Euripides has steered this "conventional" debate i n directions that can't be explained purely as serving the interests of each client in turn. We must be as wary of underinterpreting the rhetorical utterances of Euripidean characters as of overinterpreting them.  E. Three-Way Scenes  I have classified loosely some one-person rhetorical passages as "monologues of despair", "speeches of self-dedication", "epideictic speeches", some two-person exchanges as "appeal scenes", "forensic debates"; similar techniques of rhetoric are found i n all, though the types are quite distinct at the level of 7  6  "Dramatic Character" 58.  Conacher, "Rhetoric & Relevance" 15: "The repeated occurrences of the word awc^ptov, in one form or another (995, 1007, 1013, 1034), provide sinister reminders that this "virtue", linked with Hippolytus' aeuvoTris, has been played up throughout as the catastrophic element in this tragedy". This goes too far; I would say that the play offers us, among other things, an invitation to think about what constitutes true cj(jjcj>pocjiJvr|, and that the rhetoric of this scene plays a part in presenting that theme. 7  7  82  scenic function and effect. Three-person scenes are rarer and fall less easily into set t y p e s .  78  Large-scale rhetorical confrontations involving three characters i n  Euripides include the first episodes in Hik (where Theseus responds first to an appeal for help from Adrastos, then to a second appeal b y Aithra on behalf of the suppliants)  79  and Her (where A m p h i t r y o n and Megara respond differently to  the threats of Lykos). In the former, one confrontation simply follows the other, w i t h a choral interlude that is not "act-dividing" separating them. The Herakles scene is more interwoven. A difference i n the attitudes of Megara and A m p h i t r y o n towards the situation i n w h i c h they find themselves is already developed i n the Prologue scene (1-106), where Amphitryon's faith his son w i l l rescue the helpless suppliant family (95-7) is contrasted w i t h the pessimism of Megara (92). The episode that begins w i t h the arrival of L y k o s (138) involves first the debate of Lykos and A m p h i t r y o n (140-235, discussed above i n II.C), i n w h i c h Amphitryon's spirit of stubborn resistance is dramatised. This leads Lykos to call for fuel to be brought to burn the suppliants; the Chorus of impotent o l d men voice their solidarity w i t h the victims. But n o w Megara delivers a speech (275-311) addressed to A m p h i t r y o n objecting to further resistance and arguing for the inevitability of their death. This leads to two important shifts of direction. A m p h i t r y o n agrees to accept death, but asks only to die before the children are killed (316-26). Megara asks that the suppliants be given time to prepare for the grave (327-31); Lykos indicates this request is granted (332-5). It is important to note that at this point Megara and A m p h i t r y o n are no longer at odds w i t h each other; the spectacle of the two of them b o w i n g  On the opportunities with which in general the third actor presents the playwright, see Kitto Greek Tragedy 156-63 (discussing Sophokles). On three-way confrontations in Euripides: Strohm Euripides 16f and 148f, Duchemin L' ATQN 140ff. 7  8  7 9  See detailed study below, V.B.  83  before Lykos and beseeching h i m (LKvoi3u.e9a 321, Kayto a ' emphasises this fact.  LKVOULLOU  327)  The earlier presentation of their differing attitudes has  made for an interesting three-way scene, but should not be taken as casting either character i n a negative l i g h t .  80  Despite the scene's formal complexity, w e still see essentially two separate confrontations: A m p h i t r y o n and Megara conduct a "friendly debate",  81  inter-  rupted but not materially affected by a hostile debate w i t h Lykos. In Orestes there is a similar interweaving of two essentially different kinds of debate. Orestes, threatened w i t h death i n the aftermath of his murder of Klytaimestra, begins to pitch an appeal to Menelaos (as a "champion") for help against the angry Argives (448); this appeal is i n strikingly realistic fashion interrupted b y the arrival of Tyndareos, who here represents the right of city and family to justice. Orestes n o w must play out a "forensic" scene (470-631), defending his action i n killing his mother. The failure of this effort necessitates the continuation of his appeal to Menelaos (discussed above, II.A), w h i c h is based not on a defense of the justice of his act, but on bonds of obligation and mutual interest between Menelaos and A g a m e m n o n .  82  This arrangement, developing  Burnett (Catastrophe 160) has taken the scene as discrediting Megara: "Megara and Amphitryon dispute, she is victorious, and as a result the suppliants abandon sanctuary and deliver themselves to their pursuer". It is in fact her time-buying request for a change of clothes that makes possible the rescue by Herakles, and so Megara's negative attitude ironically produces positive consequences; but in Burnett's view, the betrayal by Megara of the conventions of the suppliant plot is to blame for the family's ultimate murder by Herakles (ibid 172). Heath (Poetics 161ff) rightly plays down the importance of Megara's and Amphitryon's differences. 8  0  Cf. the debates of Herakles and Admetos in Alk 509-45 and 1008-1118, of Herakles and Theseus in Her 1214-1420, and the short exchange of Orestes and Pylades in IT 674-722. 8 1  Burnett (Catastrophe 207): "Orestes apparently judges the Aeschylean defence [i.e., the defense based on the justice of placing his father's interest before his mother's] to have been discredited by Tyndareus' angry exit. When he makes his next appeal to Menelaus he ignores Apollo...and argues with a dazzling sophistry from the aristocratic concept of repayment". I am not sure whether Burnett means to suggest that Euripides wanted the audience to think of the character Orestes as changing strategies for utilitarian reasons; this would be an unwarranted and unnecessary inference, as (1) the speech to Menelaos is an appeal, not a defense, (2) the audience would expect, in the theatre as in the courts and the assembly, that a second speech arguing the 8  2  84  out of a realistic series of circumstances, and leading into a remarkable series of plot-twists,  83  makes possible the exploration of Orestes' act from a number of  perspectives, while maximising suspense.  84  The three-way conception of the scene goes deeper here than i n the Herakles scene i n that the differing positions and interests of the three parties are emphasised. Thus Tyndareos' speech accusing Orestes is mainly addressed to Menelaos; this has the psychological effect of isolating Orestes while promoting the speech's secondary aim of discouraging Menelaos from intervening o n Orestes' behalf.  85  A more integrated formal approach to three-way debate is seen i n Hel 8651029 (the appeal scene) and Phoin 469-585 (the "agon" debate)  8 6  In both these  scenes a third party responds to a pair of speeches that contrast w i t h each other i n interesting ways. F o l l o w i n g the recognition and reunion of Menelaos and Helen (Hel 622), the problem of their escape from Egypt becomes the play's central concern. Euripides has constructed a complex series of obstacles the two must overcome; same side of a case would offer an interesting contrast with the first. I also question whether the audience is expected to hear anything particularly "aristocratic" in Orestes' speech. Cf. Burnett's apt description of the amazing shifts of direction in the plot (Catastrophe 183-95): "Euripides' long experimentation with distorted and aberrant stage forms culminates here in a fantastical plot machine that artfully sticks and jams, until finally it begins to smoke and is replaced by a divine conveyance" (184). 8  3  Here as elsewhere (see discussions of Hik and IA in Ch. V below), the suspense involves the question how Euripides will manage to restore the plot to the known course of the old tale. See Winnington-Ingram "Poietes Sophos", esp. 133f. 8  4  This aim is evident (vss. 622-8) whether or not we conclude that Euripides means us to take Menelaos' retreat as resulting from intimidation: see discussion above in II.A. 8  5  The scene in Bak involving Pentheus, Kadmos and Teiresias is discussed in these terms by Strohm (Euripides 46f). Formally it is similar, but lacks the kind of rhetorical content I am mainly interested in. The double appeal of IA is discussed in V.C below.  8  6  85  this is the essence of a good adventure story. The first obstacle is the prophetess daughter of the dead K i n g Proteus; she is under orders to inform her brother Theoklymenos i n the event Menelaos arrives i n Egypt. The truth cannot be hidden from her; thus everything depends upon the couple's ability to persuade her to disobey her brother's command. F o l l o w i n g her brief entrance speech Theonoe, it seems, agrees to listen to the couple's a p p e a l .  87  Helen speaks first (894-943), then Menelaos (947-95). I note  first a general difference of tone i n the two speeches; Helen begs, Menelaos intimidates. Helen's argument, accompanied by gestures of supplication, is based on the obligation undertaken b y Theonoe's father Proteus to return Helen to Menelaos (900-23), and on the pathetic condition to w h i c h Helen herself has been reduced (924-38).  88  Menelaos' speech contrasts w i t h both of these points, and  complements them i n interesting ways. First, he emphasises that his heroic stature precludes his supplicating (946-53), and so puts his request to Theonoe i n terms of her freedom of decision 6p9ws  (el  955) and of her o w n reputation  SoKel  ooi  (KO.KT\  954) and her sense of justice (note  cjxivfJL 958); his prayers to Proteus  (962-8) and to Hades (969-74) continue the note of humility implied i n Helen's supplication, but there is no humility i n the content of these prayers. Menelaos moves to a second strategy i n 975, specifically announcing it as something Helen's speech left out: the dire consequences of a refusal to help. These are developed under two headings: Menelaos' intentions if Theoklymenos should On the problem of the apparently ignored command in 892-3 see Wilamowitz Analecta 243 (who first suspected the lines were an actor's interpolation aimed at creating cheap tension), Zuntz "Theology & Irony" 206-8 (whose solution based on values of rhetorical fulness and balance is very attractive), Kannicht ad 892-3, Dale ad 892-3, Mastronarde Cont. and Disc. 112f.  8  7  In Kannicht's analysis, a plea urrep MeveXew is followed by a plea imep eauTfjs; he sees the formal arrangement announced in urrep T ' ejiauTfis ToOSe 9', 895. I don't see this phrase as necessarily pointing to two distinct arguments. There is a clear transition to Helen's pathetic condition at 924, but the argument before does not seem to focus on Menelaos— rather on obligations and righteousness. 8  8  86  offer to fight h i m (977-9), and if instead he attempts to starve H e l e n and Menelaos at the tomb where they sit (980-90). The speech's epilogue (991-5) recapitulates Menelaos' unwillingness to grovel and his readiness to die, a n d the consequences for both Theonoe and himself of a favourable d e c i s i o n .  89  The two speakers have thus made speeches of similar form, offering separate arguments i n favour of the same outcome. Dale notes (ad 993) that the arguments made are complementary, and offer a contrast of style: "Euripides has made Helen's an appeal, Menelaus' a demand, for justice". The distinction here is perhaps more extreme than the use w e saw above (LA) of contrasting arguments i n a single speech of appeal, but it results from the same rhetorical impulse o n Euripides' part to present the fullest case for the requested help. Theonoe's response is brief, but it too offers two arguments, i n justification of the decision she announces. She begins w i t h a complex proem:  eyw  TrecJ)UKd  4>lXw T ' OUK d v 8oir\v  dv  T '  £[LaVTX}V, \iidvai\i', e£  evae^eiv  Kdi ouSe  KCU  |3ouXoum  KXeOS TOUU.OU TTOlTpOS caiyyovwi  fjs 8tKXKXef]s  ydpiv  ^avfjaoiioa.  (Hel  998-1001)  It is m y nature and m y w i s h to practise righteousness, and I care for myself, and w o u l d (therefore) bring no disgrace u p o n m y father's reputation, nor allow m y o w n reputation to suffer through indulging m y brother.  Diggle follows Schenkl in deleting the entire epilogue; but, as Dale says (ad 993), the speech loses balance without it. Kannicht receives the lines, but gives them an emotional interpretation out of touch with the rhetorical character of such an epilogue (ad 991-5): he speaks of an "inner struggle", and suggests that Menelaos' vivid evocation of himself and Helen lying dead at the tomb of Proteus has brought him to the verge of tears. But the tears of 991 are none other than those of 948, a conventional adjunct of supplication.  8  9  87  The question is first defined i n terms of evoefieia. grounds for her practising  evoefieia:  Theonoe gives two positive  her nature and her desire.  90  She adds that  regard for herself (self-esteem, a kind of cpLXCa) must also play a part i n her 91  decision, and gives two cases of the negative consequences that w o u l d follow on a failure to heed this imperative: the attraction of S u c J K X e i a to her father and to herself. This second point seems to involve a contrast of real and false obligation: Theonoe's duty towards her father is a legitimate obligation; that towards her brother is not, since its exercise involves a loss of K X e o s . This contrast w i l l lend the speech's arguments an additional element of antithesis. The arguments unfold i n three sequences: 1002-8  m y nature favours justice  1009-16  m y father w o u l d do the same: riais  1017-21  better not to assist m y brother's  affects all alike  [icopia  A s i n the proem, the sequence is Theonoe, her father, her brother. But the arguments are two: justice requires the reunion of H e l e n and Menelaos (1002, 1010), and Theoklymenos' intentions are base (1018, 1021). The two points are not given neatly balanced presentations, but some repeated words seem to call attention to them: Theonoe is reluctant to perform a compromising x « P S for L  her brother (1000), and indicates X d p i g (1006) plays no role i n her life;  92  Hera  intends to serve the interests of Menelaos (euepyeTetv, 1005), but Theonoe's The idea one's c j a i a i s might or might not be in agreement with other aspects of one's life is seen also in Ion 642ff: see Ch. I n.37. 9  0  "Self-esteem" is cited as a reason for speaking out in a just cause by Andromache in Andr 191: e\iavTr\v ou TTpo8o0cr' dXcoaouai.  9 1  Xdpis LP, Murray, Alt, Kannicht; Kimpis Canter, Dale (ad 998-1008), Diggle. If the reading of the codd. is correct, the rhetorical point may be that matters of reputation and justice (here treated as equivalent goods) count for more with Theonoe than the everyday human exchanges of which a favour done her brother would be an instance. But note the contrast set up between Hera and Kypris in 880-91 and again in 1093-1106, which favours Canter's conjecture. 9  2  88  decision is paradoxically a service to her brother  (euepyeTto,  1020). Theonoe's  speech ends w i t h a brief "practical" section (1022-7), giving the immediate consequences of her decision, followed by a couplet addressed to Proteus, i n w h i c h the problem of  evoefieia  and 8uo-ae(3eia and its connection i n Theonoe's  m i n d w i t h the risk of a compromised reputation are recapitulated:  ov S \ ouTTOTe  to  Qavdiv \ioi  TTcrrep, ocrov y '  KeKA.fjoT)i 8uo"0"e(3f)s dvr'  eyco  93  aBevco,  euae(3o0s.  (Hel 1028f)  In Phoin the debate of Polyneikes and Eteokles culminates in a detailed response from their mother Iokaste. The stage for the debate is set i n a scene in w h i c h the essential outlook of all three characters is mooted. Polyneikes enters Thebes under a truce and Iokaste voices in lyrics her anguish over his long absence and the danger in w h i c h the royal house stands (301-54); then i n a long conversation Polyneikes is presented as a man w i t h a legitimate grievance against his brother, Iokaste as a concerned mother. Eteokles on his entrance (446) immediately establishes his rather impatient and volatile character, w i t h Iokaste assuming a position of authority, attempting to calm h i m , and prefiguring the coming debate by speaking abstractly about justice, speech, w i s d o m :  emaxes' OUTOI T O TCLXV TT\V 8LKT\V exei, (3pa8etg 8e LIOGOI. TrXelaTov avvrovoiv oo<\>6v. -  (Phoin 452f)  She invites Polyneikes to speak first (thus taking on the role of "moderator"), and expresses the hope some god w i l l bring about a reconciliation (465-9).  93  A "double appeal" is played out in miniature in Her 316-35, Tro 1042-59.  94  All quotations from Phoin follow Mastronarde's text.  89  Polyneikes begins his speech w i t h a proem meant to characterise the simple morality of his o w n case: d.TTXoOs' 6 [iOBog rf\s dXr)9eLag KOI) TTOLKLXGJV 6X  e L  Y P  voawv  a  8el ravdix'  currd  Kcapov  ecj)u,  epux|veuu.dTcov'  6 8'  dSiKOs  Xoyos  ev airrak (j)ap(idKoov S e i T c u aocjxoV.  ,  (469-72)  H e puts his case i n the form of a narratio, unusual i n Euripidean debate but here supplying necessary exposition. This is given a binary organisation through the device of contrasting Polyneikes' o w n righteous behaviour (473-80 e y w 8e etc.) w i t h the unjust actions of his brother (481-3 6 8' etc.). H e continues w i t h a practical suggestion: he stands ready to compromise, and settle for less than is properly due h i m (484-9), but w i l l not settle for nothing (490). H e n o w appeals to the gods to witness the injustice he suffers (491-3), and closes by assuring Iokaste—he never addresses Eteokles— that he has given a simple and honest statement of the facts:  95  TOIOT '  au9'  Xoywv  d G p o i c r a s eiTrov, d X X d  KOU T o l a i  eKaora,  U-fJTep, o u x i  (^auXoLS e v S i x ' ,  tea!  oog  TrepirrXoKds' aoc))ols  euoi  SoKet.  (494-6)  The speech thus eschews "sophistry"; yet it is typical of Euripidean speechmaking i n both the organization of its argument and the rhetorical selfconsciousness of proem and epilogue. The choral couplet (497f) shows approval of Polyneikes' presentation.  96  With the protestations of simplicity here and in the proem, cf. Agamemnon at IA 400 (to Menelaos): TaOTd aoi ppaxea XeXeKTcu icai oa$f\ icai pdiSia. 9 5  Note how different this Polyneikes is from the same character in the "normal" telling of the story (e.g., in S. OK). The Euripidean impulse to portray the traditional villain paradoxically in a good light (cf. Eurystheus in Hkld, Aigisthos in Elek) has here led to a major shift of presentation. 9 6  90  Eteokles' speech (it cannot be called a "response") begins likewise w i t h an abstract proem:  el  net01  OVK r\v  TOLUTO KotXov av  ecfnj  oofyov 9' cxLia,  a L L ^ i X e t c r o s ' dv9pcjTT0LS'  epis  -  vvv 8 ' ou9' OLLOLOV o u S e v O U T ' loov P p o T O i s TTXTIV 6vo\idoai T O 8 ' e p y o v OIIK e o r i v rode. m  (499-502)  H e takes a position diametrically opposed to that of his brother: words can express no simple truth, as no two people perceive the w o r l d i n the same w a y .  97  H i s argument proceeds: 503-510a  Tvpavvis the greatest of goddesses  510b-14  the shame of losing to foreigners  515-19a  practical points:  519b-23  515-7  what Polyneikes ought to be doing  518-19a  I allow h i m to return  reiteration of Eteokles' devotion to Tvpavvi-s  H e closes w i t h a sinister maxim:  eiTrep  ydp  KaXXiorov  dSiKelf dSLKelv,  XP !1  TaXXa  TupawtSos  8'  Trepi  euae(3eiv x P ° J e  y  (524f)  Thus the same general plan is followed; abstract proem, argument taking a binary form, practical suggestion (here preceded by a recrimination introduced  One thinks here of the pronouncements with which Gorgias opened his On the NonExistent (B3). Guthrie paraphrases these (HGP III. 196ff): "(a) Nothing exists, (b) If anything exists it cannot be known or thought of by man. (c) Even, if it can be apprehended, it cannot be communicated to another". Mastronarde ad Phoin 499-525: "Both the language and the content of Et.'s speech are meant to associate Et. with the clever young men who used the training of the sophists to discomfit their traditionally minded elders and to justify selfish and aggressive behaviour". 9  7  91  w i t h xpfJ )/ v  98  abstract epilogue. Both proems present a view of verbal  communication, both epilogues concern "fairness". The choral comment (526f) seems once again to take sides: eloquence (sc. such as that of Eteokles) ought to be used only i n the service of fine deeds; this present case is not fine, but offensive to justice." Iokaste's long speech follows: she responds first to Eteokles' 27 lines w i t h 40, then to Polyneikes' 28 w i t h 1 6 ;  100  a two-line epilogue appeals to both brothers. H e r speech begins, like those of her sons, w i t h a gnomic p r o e m :  GO TEKVOV,  ovx aTravTa  101  TOOL  yf)pai KaKa,  'ETeoKXees, T T p o a e o r i v dXX' f)LiTTeipia eX^L TL Xe£cu TOOV veoov aoa^coTepov.  She answers Eteokles' attachment to Tvpavvis  (528-30)  by renaming that goddess  OiXoTLLila, a much less attractive abstraction. The damage 4>iAoTi|iLa does to households and cities (Iokaste broadens the context) is contrasted to the good done b y ' IaoTris, who is praised at length (535b- 4 8 ) .  102  This first section devoted  to discrediting royal power as a goal is closed b y a short epilogue (549-51). Iokaste 9  Examples of this device are collected in App. A.3.  8  Misuse of eloquence forms a topos within debates: note esp. Med 580f, Hipp 486-9, Hek 1187-94, and see Collard ad Hik 426. For the treatment of this subject by the orators, see Ober Mass and Elite 165-74. 9  9  Both the unequal length and the chiastic presentation of Iokaste's comments point to the more offensive character of Eteokles' position. 1  0  0  1 0 1  The three proem reflections are discussed further in IV.B below.  Iokaste recommends Equality as the natural, "normal" ( v o u i u o v ) state of man and the enemy of excess and want (538ff), and associates it with uepr) OTOQ\IG>V (541), "due proportion". As M . Lloyd notes (Agon 90): "Jocasta's speech is, indeed, a defence of democracy against tyranny, which has only superficial relevance to the immediate issue". It is significant that the democratic ideology presented here has been anticipated in the speech of the sympathetic Polyneikes: note laov 487, dva uepos 478 [del. Diggle] and 486. Similar language appears in a purely Athenian context in Thuc. II. 37,1. Thucydidean parallels with Iokaste's speech are discussed by de Romilly, "Les Pheniciennes " 36f. 1  0  2  92.  moves n o w to discrediting the goal of wealth, a goal that was not mentioned i n Eteokles' speech, but w h i c h seems entirely consistent w i t h the attitudes of that speech (and, perhaps just as importantly, w i t h the attitudes of antidemocratic Athenians, men w h o w o u l d choose Tupavvig over LaoTng).  103  This section  concludes at 557 or [558], and i n a summarising epilogue the pathetic potential effects of these goals of his are put before Eteokles: the city sacked, the w o m e n enslaved.  104  Yet he has the choice rather to  TTOXLV  a&iaai  (560).  Iokaste turns n o w to Polyneikes. H i s position too she rejects: Adrastos undertook a "foolish" obligation toward h i m , and the campaign against Thebes is "unintelligent" (569f). N o w , i n a passage structurally similar to her last argument against Eteokles, she asks h i m to visualise the consequences: 573-7  if you w i n : what boast could you make?  578-82a  if you lose: h o w return to Argos?  The familiar technique of supporting an argument through direct quotation of an imagined comment is employed twice here: i n 575f Iokaste suggests ironically a triumphal inscription for the victorious Polyneikes that w o u l d constitute a most dishonourable b o a s t ;  105  in 580-2a she quotes the reproaches that w o u l d be  addressed to Adrastos should Polyneikes lose the war. This process gives balance and amplification to the treatment of the two possible outcomes; both of these  Kovacs would delete the entire section 549-67 ("Tyrants" 42-5); see Mastronarde's response to his arguments (comm. ad loc). Diggle deletes 555-8, 563-5, 567, Mastronarde only 558. 1  0  3  It seems to me that if 563-5 are genuine (del. Willink, Diggle) Iokaste perhaps overstates the likely effects of a successful campaign to install Polyneikes as king of Thebes (though some sort of "sack" was envisioned by Polyneikes himself in 489f): the "rhetoric of the situation" has taken over. 1  0  4  1  0  5  Cf. Hekabe's similar suggestion in Tro 1188-91.  93  are demonstrated through a k i n d of informal dilemma argument to be unacceptable, i n that both invite d e r i s i o n .  106  In the double appeal scene i n Helen, we saw subtle differences of approach i n the two appeal speeches, and a response that addressed the points made i n only a very general way, introducing Theonoe's o w n character and that of her brother as her main reasons for complying w i t h the request of Helen and Menelaos. Here i n Phoin, there is real antagonism between the first two speeches (which, however, do not address each other's arguments). Iokaste rejects Eteokles' case both on its merits (by discrediting Tvpavvis)  and b y evoking  the consequences of his stubbornness. Polyneikes' case has been presented, and accepted b y the Chorus, as just, and so Iokaste attacks the "intelligence" of a campaign i n w h i c h he loses no matter what the outcome. The scene has been m u c h concerned w i t h w o r d and speech, w i s d o m , justice; w i t h the words  u.fjTep,  oil Xoycov e9 ' ayuv (588), Eteokles closes the debate and w e move toward the physical confrontation that w i l l end w i t h both brothers' deaths.  106 T^g double question addressed to Eteokles asked (1) will you forego a chance to save the city (sc. by reconciling)? (2) what of the consequences if you lose? The "downside" of a victory for Eteokles had to be presented not as a personal defeat, but as a lost opportunity, a base favouring of personal over public values. With Polyneikes it is easier to show a true dilemma: in a sense he loses either way.  94  Chapter III  Probabilities and Possibilities  In this and the following chapter I shall look in detail at some of E u r i pides' resources for the presentation of arguments. Chapter III w i l l survey the various argumentative applications of rhetorical questions, w h i c h Euripides often uses i n challenging (in "forensic" contexts) the probability of each of a series of suggestions, or in testing (in "deliberative" contexts) the feasibility of each of several alternative scenarios. Related techniques involving hypothetical formulations (likewise used to consider past or present alternatives) w i l l also be discussed. Chapter IV w i l l treat the use in argument of general statements (gnomes or maxims), introduced as common sense or as the speaker's opinion, and of such corollary phenomena as challenges to common sense and "Utopian reflections". M y objective is again to gain a clear view of the resources used by Euripides in a variety of situations; and again I assume that techniques that w i l l have been accepted by the original audience as merely conventional should not be treated by us as fraught w i t h meaning, but that the untypical or unconventional w i l l have to be explained.  A . Rhetorical Questions and the "Probability A r g u m e n t "  The important use of rhetorical questions in connection w i t h probability arguments makes a brief introduction here to that subject desirable. The use of an appeal to "probability" i n argumentation seems to have been a new resource 95  i n the fifth century.  O u r first reference to such an appeal (as distinct from  1  examples of its use) comes from Plato, who tells us (Phaidr 272D-73C) that Tisias, k n o w n from other sources to have been a mid-fifth-century rhetorician, wrote a sample argument i n w h i c h a weak brave man charged w i t h assaulting a strong coward was advised to argue the improbability of such an attack, asking  TTWS  8'  dv eyd) ToioaSe TOLcoiSe erfexeipriaa; Tisias is also said (273B) to have defined TO eLKog as ov  TL  dXXo  f\ T O TCOL TT\fj9ei  SOKOW.  Elsewhere i n the Phaidr w e hear  (267A) that Tisias and Gorgias "saw that probabilities are to be more highly regarded than truth."  2  Aristotle i n the Rhet (1402a3-28) likewise associates the  appeal to probability w i t h the early Sicilian rhetoricians, and gives an example of its use that may rest on the same authentic early Techne as that i n the Phaidr.  3  In addition to this historic note, Aristotle gives advice o n the use of probability i n practical speech situations (02b20-03al). There are also theoretical comments on etKOTa designed to fit the concept into the quasi-dialectical system the Rhet is concerned to b u i l d (57a22-57b21).  4  General discussions: G. Lloyd P and A 424f, Solmsen Antiphonstudien 47-63, Gagarin "Proofs in Antiphon" 30f, "Probability and Persuasion" 46-51. 1  Plato presents probability arguments used by orators as subversive and inherently untruthful, but this is mere sophistry on his part: the decision between opposing accounts of an incident must, in the absence of some oracular account of the "truth", depend on comparison with a standard of probability. If rhetoricians developed topoi for arguing either side of a case (such that the probabilities on one side are in conflict with those on the other), this was a useful exercise in the development of critical thinking for orators and dikasts alike. 2  On this point see Gagarin "Probability and Persuasion" 51. Kuebler diss. 8-10 speculates on the extent to which the early technical instruction of the Sicilians survived to influence the theoretical writings of Anaximenes and Aristotle; Goebel diss. 109-35 attempts to reconstruct the Sicilian teaching on probability. Although Aristotle too finds fault with the abuse of probability by rhetoricians— he singles out Protagoras (1402a 3-28)— his objection is that they make no distinction between dXr|9e? and <^aiv6[ievov ELKOS; that is (as his own theoretical apparatus bears out with its dependence on eiKOTa), he recognises the need to assess probability in cases where the facts are not clearly known. 3  4  For discussion of eiKOTa in this context, see Grimaldi Studies 104ff.  96  The third important early Greek work on rhetoric, >Rhetorica ad Alexandrum,  5  introduces the concept of eiKog i n discussing (Ch. VII) two classes  of m a r e i s : there are proofs, we are told (28al7-19), that proceed directly from "words and actions and persons", and others that are supplementary (em9eT0i) to things said and done. The first class includes eiKOTa along w i t h maxims, tokens, examples. The second group correspond roughly to the aTex^oi moreLs of mature Aristotelian theory, and include witnesses, oaths, pdaavot, opinions. The detailed description of eiKos (28a26f) states:  CLKOS  \iev ovv  eoriv ov XeyoLievou  TTapaSeiyixaTa eu Tats Siavoiats exouaiv ol dicouovTeg. The author goes on to -  emphasise that "probabilities" rest on shared experiences (such as patriotism, friendship). Three classes of these are distinguished: rrdGr), e9os, KepSog. That is, the speaker m a y hope to exploit common emotions, common assumptions about character, and the common interest of his hearers.  6  The argument from probability i n Euripides and i n fifth-century  oratory  and early rhetoric has been much discussed. It seems likely that w e are here, more than elsewhere i n this study, i n the presence of a contemporary trend i n intellectual analysis and argumentation, a trend that found fertile ground i n philosophy, rhetoric, drama, and historiography.  7  One may imagine that, apart  On the treatise's character and its likely date and purpose, see Kennedy Art 114-24; see also Goebel diss. 74 n. 2, Cole Origins 177 n. 15.  5  The great importance of Rhet ad Alex for scholars studying fifth-century oratory and argumentation lies in its representing a much more down-to-earth approach to the art of persuasion than either Plato's (in Phaidr) or Aristotle's (in the Rhet): one easily forms the impression one is hearing the practical advice of an orator, not the speculations of a philosopher. This impression has its dangers, since Rhet ad Alex is both systematic and late. Goebel (diss. 154-9) has attempted to show that it preserves a certain amount of authentic fifth-century instruction; Kennedy finds (Art 115) "It represents better than anything else the tradition of sophistic rhetoric". Cole (Origins 139-58) on the other hand sees the entire enterprise of descriptive rhetoric as essentially a fourth-century and philosophical one. 6  "Probabilistic" thinking as an aspect of Euripidean dramaturgy is the subject of some interesting comments by Solmsen, Antiphonstudien 54-8. 7  97  from a few conventional proem topoi and focusing devices I have described, it is especially i n hearing Euripides' probability arguments that the Athenian audience w i l l have experienced the sense of a reference to contemporary modes of debate. Writers contemporary w i t h Euripides seem to use three different patterns for calling attention to the probability or (more often) improbability of a proposition: (1) the w o r d eiKOs may be used i n describing a proposition. So Gorgias has Palamedes deny the putative charge of betraying the Greeks for money b y arguing i n part (Pal 9):  8  dXX' OUK eiKOs d i m LieydXtov uTroupynu.dTtov' oXiya xpr\\xara  \a\ifidveiv.  (2) Conditional expressions may be used to deny that something " w o u l d " or "could" happen. Thus Thucydides supports his contention the Achaean force w o n an early engagement i n the Troad b y pointing out that otherwise they could not have built the Homeric w a l l (Thuc. I, 11.1):  8fjXov 8e  -  TO  ydp epuu.a  TCOL  arpaTOTreSau  OUK  dv eTeixLcravTO.  (3) Rhetorical questions may challenge the listener to assent to a proposition palpably false, or to a series of such propositions: the impossibility of assenting is taken as demonstrating the improbability of a scenario (etc.) whose reality has been presented as depending o n the truth of the proposition(s). So A n t i p h o n has the defendant charged w i t h the murder of Herodes ask, b y w a y of refuting the notion he had killed as a favour to a third man (V. 57):  ° Gagarin usefully distinguishes between this "explicit" form of probability argument ("Probability and Persuasion" 66 n. 19), and "indirect" arguments without the word CIKOS (ibid 54); but all the forms reviewed here appeal equally clearly to the hearers' sense of probability.  98  TLS  x P Co|J. ' S' eTepooi a  TTcoTTOTe  L  EV 0  elpydaaro;  TOUTO  Such a motivation is simply defined as outside the realm of h u m a n experience. Often the second two types ("indirect" appeals to probability) are combined: questions beginning (e.g.) rrcos y d p dv... are seen i n many refutation arguments. A l l three of the forms I have mentioned are seen together i n H d t . II. 22,2— the argument o n the source of the N i l e :  K&S  GOV 8f)Ta  L  rd rroXXd ecn~i;  i\ivx6repa eovTL,  peoi dv drro x 6 ° S > drro  cog oi)8e  LiapTupLOv  oiKog  drro  dvSpi  ye  XoyLCea9cu  x '-' ? M-LV 10  TGJV 9ep[iOTdTGJV p e w v  V  0  peeiv,  TOIOUTGOV rrepL  rrpooToy \iev  e g T&V OLGJL T e  ica! Lieyiorov'  etc.  Euripides favours the use of rhetorical questions and conditional formulations to i m p l y probability and improbability.  9  Rhetorical questions i n tragedy have many uses.  10  For Euripides a tone of  antagonism or surprise, insult (taken or delivered), ridicule, incredulity or perplexity may be valuable i n many situations. Often rhetorical questions have a purely pathetic effect:  OLLiOL' TGJV  TL SfJTOl (j)ei8o|i.CU  ^^X^S'  cjuXTaTGov u.01 yev6u.evos  €|J.fi^  TTCUSGJV  oJ)OveiJs;  OUK el [it TTeTpa? XiaadSos' rrpo? dXiiaTa f] fydoyavov rrpos rj-rrap e^aKOVTiaag  Pasiphae's e/ei ydp ov&ev elKos in the Kretes fragment (see below) is perhaps the only Euripidean example of eiicos used in the "technical" sense, rather than in its normal sense of "morally fitting".  9  Mastronarde, C and D Ch. 1, presents an interesting typological study of rhetorical questons in tragedy; he takes however no interest in questions used in argumentation. 1  0  99  TeKvoig SiKacrrfis- cuU.O.TOS'  yevriaoLiaL,  f| adpra + rr\v eu.f)v + eLiTrpriaas Trupl SuaKXeiav f) [ievei u.' dTraJaoiiai |3LOU;  {Her 1146-52)  11  Elsewhere they may express a sense of outrage and derision:  to TToa,  AuSov f\ Opuya KctKoXs eXaweiv dpyuptovn-roi' aeOev; OVK olaBa GeaaaXov u .e K a i r o GeaaaXoO rraTpos yeywTa yvriaicog IXevQepov; TLV  ' auxeiS', TTOTepa  (Alk 675-8)  Here as often a pair of questions is used to lay a proposition on the table, then comment o n it. Proposition: " Y o u seem to think y o u are addressing a foreigner, a slave". Comment: "But i n fact I'm a native-born free Thessalian". The rhetorical question format of the sequence contributes to the tone of frenzy and antagonism that runs through Pheres' entire speech to Admetos. It w i l l be important i n discussing the arguments that are presented i n the form of a string of questions constantly to be aware of this emotional and insistent aspect of the utterance. A t the same time, it w o u l d be w r o n g to assume that the 6pyf| i m p l i e d i n rhetorical question formulations is meant to cast the speaker as hot-headed or bullying. The form i n w h i c h the arguments are presented brings rather a sense of urgency and animation to the debate itself w h i c h it might otherwise lack. This consideration no doubt explains equally w e l l the use of this device by logographers— a sense of animation and of involving the listener was certainly desirable to A n t i p h o n , Lysias and other writers of political and forensic speeches.  The passage is a striking reminder of the ease with which desperate emotion and rhetorical clarity and patterning may coexist. 1 1  100  '  Rhetorical questions used i n argument most often stand for a statement. Klytaimestra defends her association w i t h Aigisthos i n these terms:  €KT€iv',  eTpe<{)9r|v fjiTrep fjv TropeuaLLiov  Trpo? T O U ? eKetvcoL TToXeLiLOus. CJUXOJV yap av TLS" dv cbovou aoO rraTpos eKOLvt6vr|ae U.OL;  (Elek 1046-8)  "I found help among Agamemnon's enemies; for no friend of his w o u l d have shared i n the deed". Note that the question delivers an argumentative point, and that the argument denies the probability of Klytaimestra's receiving support elsewhere. Such a question may be followed b y a statement confirming the position of the speaker. So Medeia, considering her prospects for an escape should she succeed i n murdering her three enemies, asks rhetorically TLS Lie 8e£eTaL  TTOXLS;  (Med 386), and answers OUK eon (389). But such statements are  often (as i n Elek 1046-8) omitted. A very frequent pattern is the use of a rhetorical question to open a point, then a statement of the "correct" answer to guide the listener and i m p l y the speaker's argument: ov ydp TL u.' T]8iKr|aas'; OTOJL ae QULLOS fjyev.  e£e8ou Kopr|V  (Med 309f)  What w r o n g have y o u done me? Y o u [merely] gave your daughter to the man it pleased y o u to.  Medeia asks K r e o n to consider whether he has done her any offense, and then supplies an answer that implies he has not. Very common too is a pair of rhetorical questions i n w h i c h the second question guides the listener to the  101  correct answer to the first and so sets out an argumentative p o i n t .  A simple  12  example: f}£eiv vouiCeis rralSa abv yodels' UTTO; Kai T L S BavofTcov fjXGev e£ "AiSou TTCXXLV;  (Her 296f)  This is a crisp and efficient way of saying: (1) Perhaps y o u think your son w i l l return; (2) but that is an unreasonable expectation; (3) for no one has ever returned from Hades. The argument here is "from probability" i n that Megara asks A m p h i t r y o n to compare the likelihood of Herakles' return from Hades w i t h a k n o w n fact about the nature of the w o r l d . The rhetorical question w i t h  TTCOS  13  (implying negation) or TTWS  OV  (implying  affirmation) is an i d i o m frequently associated w i t h probability arguments.  14  What w e seem to have here is a common Greek expression that was taken over by orators as an available and effective way of emphasizing the inconsistency of a proposition w i t h everyday experience.  15  Herodotos (for w h o m Powell's Lexicon  lists 12 instances of rhetorical question w i t h KWS i m p l y i n g negative) five times  Lang, Herodotean N and D Ch. 3 (37-51), studies the use of rhetorical questions in Homer and Herodotos. She analyses a number of argumentative two-question sequences in Herodotos that have no parallels in Homer but which resemble many such sequences in Euripides. In these sequences [commenting on in. 82,5] "the Herodotean [second] question initiates a process of logical reasoning which makes the rhetorical question less a weapon of personal confrontation than a means of argument and proof" (43). 1  2  This is what Solmsen would call a probability argument effected through "Fundierung in einer Behauptung von allgemeiner Gultigkeit" (Antiphonstudien 50). Most Euripidean arguments are of this type. A second type (not entirely distinct) involves "rationale Analyse der rrpacj is" (ibid); in Euripides, cf. e.g. Med 502-8, where the reasons Medeia offers to refute the probability of a warm welcome awaiting her in Kolchis and Iolkos cite her own acts, not general truths. 1  3  Bateman, writing of probability arguments in Lysias, notes (diss. 41), "A favorite device for intensifying such arguments is the rhetorical question, especially that introduced by rrdis"; he refers to Kuebler, diss. 33 and 62 (q.v.). 1 4  1 5  Thus rhetorical questions with TTU? are common in Homer— but rrcLs ov does not seem to  occur.  102  makes an appeal to probability using this i d i o m .  16  In Euripides the rroog-question  often contains w i t h i n it reference to a circumstance that is presented as decisive for the speaker's argument:  17  TToog 8 ' dv yevoiT' dv ev KpaTouXeoji rreSooL youag TTOSCOV eKfiaKTpov;  (Elek 534f)  ...TTOjg dv ovv os ou8' dKouaas ToidS' dyveueiv  (Hipp 654f)  eLT|v  KCCKO?,  SOKOO;  Sometimes such a question attacks a proposition not on grounds of a practical improbability but of a logical impossibility: KCli TTGJS  dv aVTOS KClTGdvOL  T6  18  Kal (3A.6TT0L;  rroos dv Lif| 8iop9ei3oov Xoyous 6p9tos 8UVO.LT' dv Sfju-os evQvveiv TTOXLV; 1  (Alk 142)  (Hik 417f)  The probability argument quoted b y Plato from Tisias was rroos 8 ' dv eyob ToioaSe TOLcotSe errexeLpriCTa;  Its formal similarity to the Euripidean examples above is striking.  I. 75,6; II. 45,2 and 45,3; V. 106,2; VII. 103,3. On probability arguments in Herodotos in general see Lateiner Historical Method 97f, 193. 1  6  For TTcos-questions containing a full conditional protasis (e.g. IT 1012ff) see below under "Hypothetical Arguments". 1  7  These arguments rest on questions of definition: cf. Alk 525, Andr 1165, and the two questions in Hel 912f. Somewhat similar is Antiphon's refutation of the claim that a man's death was due to the doctor's poor treatment rather than the defendant's attack: TTOJ? av dXXo? TL? i} 6 Piaaduevos T|M-ds xP"n 9 auTwi [sc. TWL LaTpak] cj)oveus eir\ dvr(IV. y,5). The existence of arguments like Alk 142 apparently predates the development of a clear conceptual distinction between logical and practical impossibility: see G. Lloyd P and A 423. 1  8  CT  aL  103  B. E l i m i n a t i o n of Alternatives: Past  F r o m these building blocks (hanging question w i t h answer i m p l i e d , question-statement sequence, question-question sequence, conditional question w i t h TTCOS') large arguments are constructed. Quite frequently Euripides uses a series of rhetorical questions to give shape and focus to the process of examining an issue from several sides, especially for the consideration of a series of alternative possibilities (explanations for past actions, options for future actions). The technique is often applied i n forensic contexts to the consideration of motive. In this situation the technique ("hypophora" i n later rhetorical terminology) is aimed at refuting a series of points w h i c h are presented as underlying the opponent's case.  19  Thus Andromache i n Andr 192-204 counters Hermione's  charge she is undermining Hermione's marriage b y eliminating one b y one a series of suggested motives, and the rhetorical fiction is that one or other of these w o u l d form an essential condition for Andromache's undertaking such a scheme. So i n Tro 975-82 Hekabe refutes the case made b y H e l e n for Aphrodite's culpability as the ultimate cause of the Trojan War b y demolishing successively a suggested (and absurd) motive w h y Hera and Athene should have betrayed their devotees i n the Judgement of Paris. A d d i t i o n a l passages of this sort discussed below are: Hipp 958-70, Hipp 1007-15, Hek 1197-1205, Her 295-300, and a section of Pasiphae's defense speech from Kretes.  See Solmsen's discussion of "in utramque partem discutare", Intellectual Experiments 10-46. Examples from the early orators of hypophoric arguments similar to those of Euripides: Antiphon V. 28, 57f, Apol 2; Lysias XXIV. 23-5. Gorg. Pal 6-21 constitutes an extremely elaborate example of the use of this technique. See Goebel (diss. 146.-54) on the arguments, Cole (Origins 75f) on the piece's purpose. 1 9  104  In Andr the argument between Hermione and A n d r o m a c h e involves the question whether Andromache has been trying to sabotage Hermione's marriage w i t h Neoptolemos. Andromache denies the "charge" vigorously, insisting first she could not reasonably have thought herself capable of replacing H e r m i o n e , then that she w o u l d not have wanted to. This is argued using hypophora. A n d r o m a c h e opens the subject w i t h a question:  eLTT',  to  veavi,  TreLa9eLa'  TOOL a'  CXTTOOGOO  eyeyyvusi  Xoyou  (Andr 192f)  yvncatov vuLuj)euLuiToov;  This leads to a series of six rhetorical questions that each demand an answer i n the negative (such as  OUK CLKOS  eon, "of course not"). Each question envisions a  hypothetical circumstance that might lend credibility to the charge; thus the procedure is a k i n d of T^poKaTdX'nlJjLs•. Some of the points here are stronger than others,  20  but all are presented as i m p l y i n g the improbability of Hermione's  charge. The whole course of the argument is, as Goebel has pointed out, similar to that of Gorgias' Palamedes;  21  but here there is no technical "dilemma", i.e., no  implication that the alternatives offered are exhaustive.  22  A similar argument, likewise concerned w i t h motive, occurs i n the agon of Hipp: Hippolytos has argued against his guilt on the basis of his k n o w n  2  0  See Stevens ad 199-202.  I am in agreement with Goebel ("The Pattern of Argument") on the Andr passage (which has mild corruption in 195 but otherwise seems coherent): the transition from possibility to desire is marked by the change from ci)? (194: "believing that") to Iva (199: "desiring to"), and is precisely paralleled in the progression of the argument in Gorg. Pal from possibility (6-12) to desire (13-21). 2 1  See Schupp "Beweistopik" 28 for a list of passages in the orators involving dilemma. He wrongly cites Andr 785ff as a Euripidean example (ibid 183). I find no clearly announced dilemmas in Euripides of the sort "If X, then either Y or Z; but..." (cf. Gorg. Pal 26, Ant. IV |3 6, Lysias XIII 75); but I note less formal dilemmas in Alk 945/950: evSov / e£to9ev; Phoin 571/578: fjv eX-nts / f\v 8' av KpaTT|9fJLs; Andr 344-8, Her 1385, Tro 661-4, Phoin 954-8. Cf. also Soph. Ant 921-4. 2  2  1  105  oufypoovvT] (993-1006);  23  at 1007 he notes this line of argument is failing to  persuade Theseus, and he moves to insisting on his lack of a motive (1008). In 1009-13 three rhetorical questions are put, each of which needs a negative answer. In this case (unlike the Andr passage) the speaker supplies an answer to the second and third question (LidTcuos dv r\v 1012, and f|Kicn-a. 1014, if that w o r d is correct i n that disputed verse). Vss. 1014f offer an argument clearly intended to stress the improbability of the hypothesis implicit i n the question put i n 1013, but the reasoning seems unsatisfactory: thus the attempts to repair or remove vs. 1014 or m o r e .  24  This k i n d of format is used again i n Hek 1199-1205 for the investigation of motive. Polymestor has claimed (1138-44 and esp. 1175-7) that he killed Polydoros out of a desire to serve the interests of the Greeks. Hekabe i n her refutation discredits this motive using two rhetorical questions, each positing a hypothetical answer to the initial question riva Se Kal aTreuScov xdpiv TrpoOuu.os' fjaGa; (1201f). The improbability of the second of these proposed explanations is emphasised w i t h yet another question": Tiva SoKets ueioeiv rd8e; (1205).  25  This  section is followed b y Hekabe's exposition of the true motive (6 xpvoos etc., 1206ff). Similarly i n Tro 975-82 Helen's account of the judgement of Paris (as responsible for her coming to Troy) is attacked by Hekabe on the basis of the  This answers Theseus' challenge in vs. 949. The subject receives a balanced treatment: Hippolytos' high morality in his dealings with gods and friends (996-1001); his sexual chastity (1002-6).  2  3  2  4  See further discussion below.  2  5  A similar brief final question drives home the argument in Hkld 510.  106  improbability of its underlying assumptions.  26  Formally the argument begins  w i t h a clear statement of the proposition to be proved: Hera and Athene ou T r a i S L a i c f L fjX9ov rrpos  Km  x^-8f]i iiopciyfjs  Trepi  (Tro 975f)  "I8T]I>-  Then a rhetorical question asks w h y Hera should want the victory i n such a contest. A second question implies a patently absurd motive— that she might thus gain a better husband than Zeus. Another question, likewise demanding a negative answer, demolishes Athene's involvement (979-81a); then a final sentence (here i n the imperative, 981b-82) emphasises the absurdity of Helen's entire hypothesis. This completes the refutation sequence, and Hekabe moves on to propose her o w n explanation of the events. In the defense speech of Pasiphae from Kretes a similar technique is used to refute the charge against the queen. Pasiphae argues that she is not responsible for her actions in pursuing a love-affair w i t h a b u l l — the attraction was clearly the work of a god:  exei  ydp  ovSev  pXeiJjaa' e S f ^ r i v ws  euTTpeTrfis  u.ev  TTupcrfjs Se x LTT)s a  eg TL y d p Poo? 9uu.6v alaxio~Tr|L v o a w i ; ev TTeTrXoLcav fjv LSetv;  eiKOs-  K<xi T r a p '  OLVCLITTOV e£eXau.TTe TrepKaLvtov  ov u.f)v. 8eu.ag  y '  eup[u9Li.ov  6u.u.dTcov aeXas  yevvv; .  . ".  vJuLixjnoir  (Kret 11-16)  27  Specifically, the notion that either Hera or Athene would have paid a high price (cf. vss. 971-4) to gain the title for beauty is exposed as improbable. As Stinton points out (Judgement of Paris 38n), Hekabe does not deny the reality of the contest. 2  6  The fragment is no. 82 in C. Austin's Nova Fragmenta Euripidea (Berlin, 1968). I quote Austin's text, but without noting gaps and supplements of minor importance. etipuOLipv in vs. 16 is Wilamowitz's conjecture. 2  7  107  A g a i n the question is one of motive. Two motives are suggested (each outrageously "unlikely",  OUK EIKOS).  The first receives no further comment; a  closing statement confirms that the second is to be rejected. In the following lines Pasiphae, like Andromache (Andr 205-12) and Hekabe (Hek 1206-16), takes the offensive: . dXX' ou8e 8ea9ar 8Q.LU.OOV  TTGUSGOV  TL  cj)[iJTop' eiKos r\v]  SfJTa Tfji[8' eum]vour|v  6 ToOSe  TTOCUV  VOCTCJL;  etc.  (19-21)  28  The defense thus has two phases: (1) Pasiphae had no motive for seeking such an alliance; (2) M i n o s ' offense against Poseidon (in failing to sacrifice the b u l l as promised) was the real cause of her passion. <ji) TOL LI' dTToXXus, or] ydp f) ' £a[iapTia, 6K aoO voaoOLiev.  (34f)  Goebel comments: "The two parts are logically complementary, the first showing that a natural explanation of her passion is unlikely, the second showing that a supernatural explanation is l i k e l y " .  29  A l l of these passages exploit some combination of the following features: (1) rhetorical question (or statement) to open a topic; (2) rhetorical question to moot a possible (but often self-evidently improbable) motive or scenario; (3) rhetorical question (or statement) to imply the speaker's negative, often contemptuous, attitude toward the alternative just mentioned. This last The supplements are by Wilamowitz. I don't have great confidence in ELKO? r\v in vs. 19; but the rhetorical shape of the passage is quite clear.  2  8  Diss. 300; Goebel's discussion however bogs down in a dubious attempt to distinguish between elements of "judicial" and of "sophistic" rhetoric in the speech (ibid 296-301). 2  9  108  contains the "argument from probability" i n Euripides' preferred form. Discussion of some less elaborate examples follows. Hekabe asks Odysseus what motive led the Greeks to condemn Polyxene to death:  TTOTepa T O XPA b' a<  Trpos  eTrfjyay'  dvBptoTToa^ayetv  Tv\ifiov, evQafiovQvrelvLLaXXov  TrpeTrei;  f\ T O U S KTOLVOVTOLS dyTOLTTOKTelvoiL GeXojy es  TT\V8 '  'AxiXXeu?  evSiKtos  re'ivei  ou8ev  aiiTov  fj8e y ' eipyaoTaL  'EXevr\v viv  aiTetv  XP^\  dXX'  Keivn  ydp t o X e a e v viv  V  Td(|)toL  cbovov; KOIKOV.  TTpoCT<j)dy|j.aTcr  eg Tpotav  T '  (Hek 260-6)  dyeL.  Here two alternative motives, clearly marked as such by TTOTepa...fj, are proposed.  30  The first question contains its o w n answer i n the relative clause  (ev9ot...); the second is answered i n the statement introduced by d X X ' (implying an objection). The sequence closes w i t h the proposal of a new and better alternative (sacrifice Helen), and a brief justification for this.  31  The argument here does not  discredit imputed motives b y pointing u p their improbability, but denies the morality of the sacrifice, whatever its motivation. Theseus i n his debate w i t h the Theban herald i n Suppliant Women challenges the Theban edict against burial for the Seven b y pointing u p the absurdity of any fear the Thebans might have vis-a-vis the dead:  The first of a pair of alternative questions is introduced by rroTepa in Alk 1051, Med 499, Hipp 1009, Hek 260,1202; by TTOTepov in Andr 199, 345, Tro 978. All of these are followed by an fj. The second in a pair is introduced by r\ without preceding rroTepa/rroTepov in Hkld 189, Andr 196, 721, Hik 545, Elek [375]; bydXX' (without rroTepa/ov) in Hipp 966, Her 298,1382 (and cf. variations in Hkld 515, Elek [377]). In Hipp 1009-13 three alternatives are introduced by TTOTepa... f\... dXX'... (This use of dXXd sometimes rubs up against dXXd used to register an objection, e.g. in Elek [375], Phoin 1618, cf. Gorg. Pal 10, Thuc. I. 80,4.) Some notes on disjunctive questions in Euripides are to be found in Rijksbaron Grammatical Observations App. 4. 3  0  3  1  Note use of xpfjv for this purpose; cf. passages collected in App. A . 5  109  Kccuol  u.ev  fjX9eg Seiv'  ctTTeLXfiaojv  errr},  veKpovg Se Tap(3etT' el Kpu4>fjaovTai x 9 ° l ; y  TL  uf)  Lif| KaTaaicdiJiOjaL  yevnTou;  Tac|)evTes  ULUSV;  (JJUO-GOCTLV, e£ aKaLov  f)  TCKV '  GOV e t a l  ev  yfjv  LLUXOLS  X^  O  V  O  ^  T L ? TLLiGopta;  y e jTavaXcoLia  Tfjg  c))6(3oug TTOvripoug Kai  yXwaaris  Kevous  ToSe,  8e8oLKevaL.  (Hz/: 542-8)  A rhetorical question suggests that threats and fears are inappropriate; a second serves to introduce a list of proposed fears; a third and fourth present these; a final statement dismisses them as both cowardly and unfounded. V e r y similar but less developed is the sequence given to Hekabe in her monologue i n Troades that follows the death of Astyanax; Hekabe asks what fear led the Greeks to k i l l that helpless child:  TL T O V S ' A X O U O L  , TTolSa  8L6Lpydaaa9e;  KOUVOV  SeLoavres fyovov  \ir\ Tpolav  rroTe  TrecroOaav opBooaeLev;  (Tro 1159-61)  She continues by dismissing this as an absurd fear; no alternative motivation is considered. Medeia uses a somewhat similar structure to dismiss Kreon's fear of her as ungrounded:  au  8 ' ovv cpo(3f)L Lie  -  oux oo8' e\ei COOT'  ov  \ir\  TL TfXr]LiLieXes'  7Ta9f)Ls;  u r n , LXT| TpeoT|is fJLias, Kpeov,  es rvpavvovs dv8pas 6£a|iapTdveLv.  yap  OTCOL a e  TL  LI. ' r)8LKTiaas;  9u[i6s fjyev.  e£e8ou  K6OT\V  dXX' e\ibv TTOCTLV  Luciar  (Med  110  306-11)  The first question and its answer dismiss the likelihood of Kreon's coming to any harm as a result Medeia's character or situation  (ov\  108  ' exeL  l  101  );  m  e  second question removes any offense committed b y Kreon as a basis for fear. That is: (1) Medeia is not likely to harm Kreon; (2) i n any case he has done nothing to attract such treatment. The third stage reached i n the passage above ("It is m y husband I hate") has the familiar rhetorical function of substituting a "correct" explanation or scenario for the "incorrect" one that is being refuted. A tone of ridicule and reductio ad absurdum is present i n the denunciation of Menelaos spoken by Peleus as he frees Andromache:  toS',  co KotKLCTTe, T f j c r S '  <k\v\Lr\vu> x ^ P S ; a  |3o0v f\ XeovT' rjXmCes' evre'iveiv f] fif] £L4>OS Xa(3o0a' d u . u v d 9 o L T 6  ppoxoLj; ae  (Andr 719-22)  eSeLaas;  32  The suggested motives are too absurd to require any comment, and the speech moves o n immediately to address Andromache's son. The process pursued i n all the passages thus far discussed is that of testing a proposition b y examining i n turn a series of circumstances w h i c h are presented (tacitly) as implicit i n the proposition. These "circumstances" may be logically antecedent (as normally i n the motive arguments) or consequent (as i n e.g. Tro 1010-14) to the proposition being tested; there is never any claim made' for logical rigour.  33  Here a sequence designed to broaden the rhetorical view by bringing in alternative explanations contains (in vs. 720) alternatives within one leg of the larger alternatives: cf. Hek 1202ff, Her 1146-52. In Andr 192ff the same effect of fulness is achieved through Te...Kou in 195 (probably), 196,197, 204, and Te in 200. 3  2  This process is put to a different use in Hel 490, where Menelaos seems gradually to persuade himself that there could in fact be two Helens, two Spartas, etc. (see discussion in IV.B below). The process of refuting or dismissing successive suggestions is also seen in Elek [373-9]. 3  3  Ill  W i t h all these hypophora passages n o w i n view, I return to the argument on motive i n Hippolytos' speech of defense: Set  8et£cu TOOL TPOTTCOL 8Lec|)9dpr|V.  STJ a e  TfOTepa  TO TfjaSe  Traaoov  yuvaiKtov;  eyKXrjpoy  crcou-' f) obv  eL  9vr|Tcov o a o L o a v  TOLOI  ovv  fypevtiv.  aioc^poaLv;  8Lecj)9opev avSdvei aovapxLa.  LIT)  Ta?  SOLIOV  eTirjXTaaa;  OUSOLLIOU \iev  dXX' cos Tiipcuvveiv f|8u y',  oiKT\oeiv  rrpocrXaPobv  evvr\v  liaTaLOs d p ' fjv, fJKLaTd  eKaXXLoreueTO  fypevas  (Hipp 1008-15)  34  The passage has troubled scholars for several reasons. But i n the light of the similar Euripidean passages discussed above, I can see no problem aside from minor corruption i n 1014. Hippolytos is attempting to prove that he could have had no motive to seduce or marry Phaidra (this i n spite of the fact that her letter has charged h i m rather w i t h rape). H e is going to make his point b y mooting a number of possible motives, but he is under no obligation to suggest motives that might i n fact have been strong ones.  35  Far from it:  i n the scenes I have dis-  cussed the speaker often demolishes motives w h i c h are self-evidently flimsy. The motives proposed here are: (1009-10a) a physical attraction such as great beauty might inspire; (1010b-ll) the possibility of acquiring wealth through connection w i t h an heiress; (1013) the possibility of acquiring political power. Clearly these three motives are the standard ones that might be expected to attract a y o u n g man into a liaison w i t h a queen; whether they make m u c h sense Text of 1013f: Diggle punctuates after aco(|)pOCTLv and obelises f^KLCTTa y', el af|; Barrett puts an obelus before eL ufi; Stockert punctuates after T\8V and obelises et |ir|. 3 4  This is where Kovacs' attack on the text goes wrong ("Tyrants" 47); he insists on a defense consisting of forensically sound points that suit the situation in detail. 3 5  112  given the details of Hippolytos' and Theseus' relationship, or of Attic estate l a w , counts for little.  36  O n the basis of content, then, w e do not require that Hippolytos' proposed motives be strong ones. But are these three motives plausible i n rhetorical terms? Barrett says of the three stages (ad 1007-20): "The last two are neither effectively distinguished... nor easily separable, and it is possible... that a single motive has been split into two b y the interpolation of 1012-15". But I have noted both a tendency towards fulness of expression i n arguments of this type, and a general pattern of treating public and private motivation separately (a pattern realised variously i n Hkld 181-230, Tro 353-405, Ion 585-647).  37  I take 1010-2 to mean: "Did I expect I w o u l d be gaining an estate through the affair— that I w o u l d come into control of your property?" The question allows of no inference as to whether Phaidra might through marriage have transmitted an estate,  38  and the answer i n 1012, though not strictly required for  sense, adds a satisfying tone of impatience. The next stage speaks of royal power, a slight raising of the stakes and a subject that allows for the voicing of some stereotyped quietist comments of a sort w e have met elsewhere.  39  Recently  Sommerstein has suggested we are to understand that i n Hippolytos' abv Barrett (ad 1110-11) and Kells ("Women's Property") discuss the matter of Phaidra's status under traditions and laws respecting Greek estates as if this were an important point for interpretation. 3  6  Moreover, we have seen discussions of political power in Ion 629-32 and Phoin 549-67 (see Mastronarde ad loc) take a detour into points regarding personal wealth. The two are explicitly associated in Ion [578-81]. 3  7  The lines may suggest that Hippolytos is above grubbing for wealth, or that Phaidra could legally be no source of wealth, or that the SOLIO? belongs securely and unarguably to Theseus— or all three. I incline to think the first of these is the main point (he has begun by asking TWL TPOTTWL 8iec(>9dpTiv, 1008). The consideration that Hippolytos as a young prince requires money to maintain his lifestyle (Barrett ad 1012) should play no part in the interpretation of this rhetorical material.3  8  3  9  Pace Kovacs ("Tyrants" 36): cf. Ch. I.E above, with n.93.  113  olKfjaeiv  S6|ioy (1010) the murder of Theseus is implied as a necessary pre-  requisite.  40  Sommerstein takes the third stage that follows as representing a  stronger motive not for seducing a stepmother but for k i l l i n g a father. The cogency of Hippolytos' argument is not improved b y this gratuitous subtlety. O n the interpretation of the second motive, Kells finds that the answer to Hippolytos' question (lOlOf) w o u l d be self-evident to an audience familiar w i t h patterns of inheritance i n Greek society, and that therefore vs. 1012 is redundant.  41  H e goes on to suggest the passage consisted originally (he excises also  1014f) of "a series of swift rhetorical questions, each suggesting a possible motive..., each containing w i t h i n itself the refutation of that motive" (183). H e compares Andr 192-204, and i n a footnote mentions, as examples of the application of the hypophora technique to the analysis of "psychological situations and motives", Alk 1049f, Med 386f and 499f. The Andr passage has a unique series of six rhetorical questions (not "swift", since some are rather complex); each question is followed by the next w i t h no intervening comment. The other three passages Kells mentions are more representative of Euripides' normal practice. One question may pass without comment (e.g., Med 502f), but the next w i l l not. A n d the manner of comment w i l l be varied: this may take the form of a further rhetorical question (Alk 1056), a statement (Med 504f), or a brief formula (such as OUK e c m i n Med 389, fjiao-Ta i n Hik 538, Her 299) Hipp passage as transmitted has an entirely normal f o r m :  43  4 2  The  motive no. 1 passes  "Notes on Hipp " 33f; Sommerstein suggests this point is "both too obvious and too unpleasant to put into words".  4  0  4  1  "Women's Property" 182f.  4  2  On this use of f|iaaTa, see Stevens Colloquial Expressions 14.  Solmsen appreciates the variety of expression in the passage (Int. Exp. 15n): "Three possible motives, each disproved in a different fashion, are most appropriate". But this being the case, it is unnecessary to ascribe Hippolytos' failure to comment on Phaidra's beauty to "tact" (ibid 15).  4  3  114  without comment, motive no. 2 gets a brief comment ("I w o u l d have to have been a fool"), motive no. 3 is denied w i t h  fJKioTa,  and subjected to a developed  argument (1014-20) whose point is spoiled i n the transmitted text of 1014-5. Clearly these lines (interpolated or not, and whether we punctuate before or after TolaiCTcoc|)poaLv)must give a reason w h y ol Grooves  take no pleasure i n ruling.  W i t h ei. LIT] i n 1014 we cannot get this sense. Thus Barrett suggested: f]KLO"T',  6TT6L T O i  rag fypevas 8ie4>9opev etc.  It is hard to see h o w this could have been corrupted to our text, but the sense it gives is the right o n e .  44  W e have seen a number of argumentative passages i n w h i c h a single rhetorical technique is presented w i t h variations. It is legitimate to ask whether the variations observed represent decisions made b y Euripides for purposes of characterising the speaker or the relationship between the two interlocutors. J. M o s s m a n has seen subtle nuances i n the application of this technique; speaking of Hek 258-64, she notes:  45  ...Hecuba proceeds w i t h a series of three two-line rhetorical questions (2601 and 262-3 constituting alternative answers to the question at 259-60) answered b y a single line stressing Polyxena's innocence. A comparison w i t h other passages of rhetorical questions is interesting: Med. 499ff. give a more agitated and angry effect because of their more irregular arrangement and conversational tone.... And. 192ff., on the other hand, has more frequent, shorter questions, which are more appropriate than longer, more elaborate ones w o u l d be i n Andromache's reply to Hermione's furious tirade: they are less reasoned than our passage because Andromache's opponent is less reasonable than Odysseus. And.  44 45  Barrett suspected, though, that vss. 1012-5 were interpolated. Wild Justice, 106f.  115  387ff., too, show a barrage of very quick, staccato questions (five i n three lines at 388-90), which reflect Andromache's distress. Here Hecuba is fighting an intellectual battle...: she needs to use, and does use, a more reasoned and cerebral approach. Andromache, on the other hand, is preparing for a death w h i c h seems inevitable if her son is to be saved, and is correspondingly less rational and more emotional. That said, I w o u l d suggest that this difference is not due entirely to the difference i n their circumstances, and that it w o u l d not be going too far to suggest that b y making Hecuba respond i n this superbly rational way, Euripides is laying d o w n one of her fundamental character traits, and one w h i c h he w i l l develop further later on.  I quote at length here because the point under consideration is such a central one for this study. M o s s m a n demonstrates elsewhere her general sympathy w i t h ideas about the stylised character of the different "modes" of tragic presentation (lyric, stichomythia, rhesis, etc.), but suggests that every detail of presentation serves complex purposes, which may include the b u i l d i n g u p of complex characters through a composite process: "the same character presents itself throught the different filters i n turn, but none the less can be seen as a consistent entity".  46  She concludes:  47  ...I w o u l d w i s h to see rhetoric and other formal elements of tragedy (diction, metre, lyric, structure), w i t h all their 'stylisation of reality', as advantages for, rather than.constraints on, the poets. W i t h skilful manipulation they can delineate a portrait of a character that not only convinces on a psychological level...but w h i c h also appeals to our intellects because it is expressed w i t h a clarity of articulation rarely achieved i n real life but necessary i n the theatre to avoid obscurity, boredom, and waste of valuable dramatic time.... In achieving this the poet w i l l utilize, rather than be bound by, the stylization of speech and the formal structural framework of tragedy. 48  Ibid 94-103. The quotation (97f) comes in a discussion of A. M . Dale's view that consistency of character was not a primary goal of the tragic poets.  4  6  4  7  Ibid l O l f .  4  8  The phrase is quoted from O. de Mourgues' 1967 book Racine or the Triumph of Relevance.  116  This general statement seems entirely acceptable. But w i t h respect to Mossman's detailed treatment of characterisation through rhetorical mannerisms, I w o u l d make several comments: I see no problem i n the idea that Euripides gives his characters (or some of them) "fundamental character traits" that are developed through a play; and, as I have shown above (II.D), the tone of a rhetorical exchange may contribute to our impression of the relationship of the t w o speakers (e.g., i n the confrontations of Admetos and Pheres, Hippolytos and Theseus). But a stylised format for argument, frequently used, is not the place where one should expect to see subtleties of the type Mossman refers to. I see other pointers present i n the scenes she compares. Hekabe's response may be "superbly rational", but she is i n the weakest position of the three characters under discussion, utterly defeated at every turn. Medeia, elsewhere coolly confident of her ability to prevail through deception or witchcraft, begins and ends her speech (Med 465-519) b y heaping contempt on Jason; Andromache's p r o u d defiance is spelled out clearly i n the preambles to her speeches to both Hermione (Andr 18491) and Menelaos (319f). If the slight variations i n the use of hypophora argument i n these four passages were intended b y Euripides to convey information about character and situation, I w o u l d think that the sheer virtuoso exhaustiveness of A n d r o mache's sequence i n Andr 192ff w o u l d characterise the speaker as a truly regal person, accustomed to withering her inferiors through her personal (not intellectual) superiority: Hermione, young and half-cocked, and the cowardly Menelaos are no match. Hekabe, b y contrast, conveys no sense of command; she makes i n the course of her speech a number of points that seem inevitable given the situation (that human sacrifice is wrong, that i n any case Polyxene is not the appropriate victim, that she herself merits both pity and the observance of an obligation, that Odysseus has the prestige to bring about a reversal of the verdict). 117  Neither Hekabe nor either of the other women argues w i t h any real sense argument w i l l p r e v a i l .  49  Unlike the others, Hekabe never really takes the  offensive, and her rational points are interrupted b y appeals for pity. In spite of the highly rational thought processes that the arguments presented presuppose, none of the three w o m e n is characterised as an unusually "rational" person. But perhaps to some extent the details of the argument-sequences enhance the sense of personal status and relationship that is already present i n the scenes.  50  C. E l i m i n a t i o n of Alternatives: Future  The hypophora technique we have seen used i n probability arguments dealing w i t h past events is also set to work i n deliberative situations, where typically it is used to argue there is no viable course of action available, and i n situations where the pathetic quality of self-addressed rhetorical questions emphasises the despair of the character and the impossibility of any happy outcome. Admetos attempts i n Alk 1049-61 to decline Herakles' offer to leave the veiled w o m a n w i t h h i m b y showing that there are no appropriate quarters for her to occupy i n his palace:  Andromache has spoken of people being put in their place by their inferiors (Andr 189f); Medeia says she is speaking of her exile only to put Jason in the worst possible light (Med 500f). 4  9  The question whether Euripides produces in these situations arguments whose content is uniquely suited to speaker or interlocutor is a separate one, and one for which I think there is no general answer. Sometimes the argument seems to express an element of the speaking character's "psychology", or of the relationship between the two characters; as often one is struck by the abstract and impersonal quality of the thought. For example, Gould rightly comments on the speech of the Nurse in Hipp 433-81 that "it is the shaping pressure of rhetorical form which determines the movement of the speech more than any sense that these arguments are native to the Nurse, or that they are chosen to penetrate the defences of this opponent" ("Dramatic Character" 56). 5  0  118  1049  Where could I even keep a young woman?  1050  (for I observe she is young)  1051  (a) among men? 1052-4  rhetorical question and answer argue against this option  1055  (b) i n Alkestis' quarters? 1056-57a  rhetorical question introduces argument  against this option: double blame 1057b-59  (a) from 8nu.G)Tat  1060-61  ((3) from r\ Gavouaa  The symmetry of the sequence is striking. A sort of dilemma is presented: Admetos implies there are only two options for housing the guest, then argues both are impossible. A very similar technique is used b y Herakles i n deliberating over the question whether he should keep or discard the weapons w i t h w h i c h he has killed his family. Here the dilemma is initially posed using an indirect question (Her 1378: d|j.Tixotvto ydp rroTep' ex  w Ta  §  TJ  u.e9co). Herakles then imagines his  weapons addressing h i m (1379-81a), and asks:  eiT' eycb Td8' (hXevaig  OLaw; TL fyaoKW, dXXd yuu.voj9eis OTTXGJV £w olg Td KaXXior' e£erfpa£' ev ' EXXdSi ex9pots en,auToy urroXaPuJU ataxpcos 9avco; ou XeiTTTeov Ta8', d9X[tos' Se acoaTeov.  (Her 1381-85)  Rhetorical questions are used to introduce the two alternatives. In the first leg, a further rhetorical question suggests the impossibility of the option being considered; i n the second, the initial question implies this.  119  Orestes i n IT 95-103 expresses to Pylades his insecurity over the possibilities for gaining entrance to Artemis' shrine. I quote the very problematic text as printed b y Diggle:  TL  8piou.ev;  wJmXd  -  dLKjupXrioTpa  rroTepa  ydp  KXILUIKCOV  eu.(3r|CTO|iea9a;  TTCOS' < d v  f\ x a X K O T e u K T a  KXf]L9pa  T  tov  oi>8ev  XT|cj)9a)LJ.ey  la\i.ev + ;  eapdaeLs  Te  TOLXCOV  opais  TTpoaau-PdaeLs> o u v Xd9oL|iev  Xvoavreg  dv;  u.oxXols'  r\v 8 ' d v o i y o v T e s TruXas'  Li.rixoivc6u.evoL,  9avouu.e9'.  (IT 96-102)  97 KXILKIKCOV Kayser: 98  XdGoLLLev  Scou-dTcov  L  Sallier: u.d9- L (quo servato 99 del. Dindorf)  The passage seems to conform to the pattern we have seen elsewhere. A rhetorical question expresses  du.T]xavLa.  One course of action is introduced b y a  rhetorical question (here m u c h improved b y Kayser's conjecture),  51  then rejected  through a further question (if Sallier's Xd9oLu.ev is correct). A second alternative course is next suggested, and this is rejected through a statement rather than a question. The two conjectures mentioned both serve to strengthen the contrast between the two alternatives. I don't have complete confidence i n either of them, but it seems clear at any rate that a sequence i n w h i c h two alternative courses are mooted and rejected underlies our text. 5 1  52  See Platnauer's thorough discussion ad 97.  Dindorf's deletion of vs. 99 (designed to make sense of the difficult u>v ovSev io~\iev) would thus destroy the whole point of the passage. I think it is just possible that Euripides wrote cov ovSev io\iev with reference to KXfjiOpa (so Murray, app. crit.); in this case the phrase offers a further argument against the second course. Markland added a question mark at the end of vs. 103, as if a third alternative were there considered (flee by ship). As we have seen, dXXd often introduces the final alternative in a series; but in this case the final alternative would be the practical course, a solution to the d\ir\x ^ , rather than another occasion for pessimism. It thus makes more sense as a positive suggestion (despite Weil's contention [critical note ad loc] it is "unworthy" of Orestes). 5 2  av  a  120  We have been looking at passages i n w h i c h alternative questions are used to give what is essentially a pathetic situation an argumentative underpinning. Alternative questions are also used by Euripides in a purely deliberative context (i.e., the alternatives are mentioned not merely for the purpose of rejecting them): uc()di|!Oj 8(3|j.a VUU.CJHKOV' rrupL,  TTOTepov f|  OnKTov  toCTOj c f i d a y a v o v 8L '  rjrraTos  . . .  (Med 378f)  Medeia asks what form her revenge should take (cf. Her 1146ff, discussed above). A few lines later she uses a hypophora sequence (but without alternative question) to express the hopelessness of her plans:  KCU  8f)  TIS  yfjv  TeOvdov  dovXov  tievos r r a p a a x c b v oik e o n .  rig KOU  \ie  Se^eTcu  86U.OUS  puaeTcu  TTOAIS;  exeyyuous'  TOULIOV  SeLias;  (Med 386-9)  The second question here amplifies the first rather than introducing an argumentative point (cf. Lykos' badgering questions in Her 143f). This seems to give a more natural effect than i n the passages reviewed above.  53  Menelaos i n a speech of self-condemnation employs a variation that seems unique i n Euripides. H e sets out to demonstrate not that he lacks alternative courses, but that he has ignored the logical course:  But a tone of formal argument seems present in the use of Km 8f| to introduce a hypothetical proposition whose consequences will be considered. See Denniston GP 253: Denniston's Euripidean examples of this usage are the present passage and Hipp 1007, Hel 1059, Med 1107 (chorus); K-G add (I. 202f) Or 1108. Arguments similar to that of Med 386-9 proceed from hypothetical statements in the indicative without this introduction in Andr 334 (whose strangeness is noted by Stevens ad loc) and IA 1185. 5 3  121  TL  pouXoum ydp; ou ydaoug e^aLpeToug  dXXoug Xd(3oL|i' dv, el ydLixov lueLpoum; dXX' d'rroXeaas' d8eXc|xSv, ov \i' fJKLOT' expfj'A 'EXevr\v eXcoLiaL, T O KOLKOV dvrl TayaSoO;  (IA 485-8)  T w o alternative courses are considered, but one is expressly identified as preferable. A common tragic situation i n w h i c h a character considers alternatives for the future is the prospect of exile. The character recognises the pathetic lack of choices open to h i m by testing a number of alternatives. In accusing Jason, Medeia uses a hypophoric sequence to argue that her future as an exile is bleak:  VVV  TTOL TpdlTOOLiOtL; rroTepa Trpos  -  rfcrrpos SoLioug,  ovs aoi rrpoSouaa Kal rrdTpav d(JHK6|ir|V; f\ Trpog TaXalvas TTeXLaSag; KaXoog y' dv ovv -  Se^aLVTO \x' ex^L  ydp  OLKOLS  OUTGO•  &v rraTepa KaTeKTavoiA  rolg |iev OLKoBev  (JHAOIS'  exQpd KaGeaTrix', ou? 8e \i' O U K expfiv KaKCos8pdv, aol x.dp\.v fyepovoa TroXe|iLOug e x w  (Med 502-8)  The two groups identified i n the alternative question (Medeia's family i n Kolchis, Jason's i n Iolkos) are resumed i n the explanatory statement that follows. The play w i l l develop a third alternative: Athens. Herakles uses a similar form i n demonstrating his lack of options for the future:  f)KGo 8' dvdyKag eg T 6 8 '  -  O U T ' 6(10X9 cjxXoug  8fj(3aLs evoLKetv O C T L O V f\v~ 8e Kal u_evto, e<s TTOIOV iepbv f] TTavriyupLV cjuXcov el|i'; ou ydp aTag eurrpooTiyopoug exoo.  122  dXX' "Apyos eX9co; TTCOS, errel (j)euyco rrdTpav; (|>ep' dXX' es d\\r]v 8r) T L V ' opu-fiaw TroXiy; KaueiS'  (Her 1281-7)  etc.  A g a i n , specific destinations are ruled out. Theseus w i l l offer an alternative that has not occurred to Herakles. A s i n the elimination of motives i n Hipp 1008-15 discussed above, the final point is argued at some length; thus a fuller treatment is achieved without compromising the rhetorical effect of the series of questions. O i d i p o u s i n Phoin faces exile w i t h similar misgivings:  eiev TL Spdaco 8fj9' 6 SuaSaLu.coL' eyio; T L £ fiyeLiojy LLOL 7 10869 6u.apTTiaei TucbXoD; f\8' f] Qavovaa; Cakrd y' av o"dcj)' ol8' O T L . dXX' euTeKvos ^uvcopLg; dXX' OVK eau U.OL. dXX' e n vedCoiv avrbs e l i p o L U . ' dv (3LOV; 7769ev;  .  ,  (Phoin 1615-20)  Here the lack of a supporting individual (parent, sons, self) makes better rhetoric than the lack of a destination: Oidipous in exile is to be a blind wandering beggar, to w h o m no place is hospitable. A n d the fact that Antigone w i l l n o w offer to accompany her father makes a satisfying outcome for the quandary.  54  Iphis, w h o has lost both a son (Eteoklos) and a daughter (Evadne the wife of Kapaneus) through the Theban War, surveys his alternatives for the future:  elev TL 8f) XP! TaXaiTrtopov |ie Spdv; areixeiv TTpos O L K O U S ; KOLLT ' eprjLiLav tSto TroXXf]v LLeXd9pa)v drropLay T ' eLiwi |3LCOL; 1  T 0 V  -  A n opportunity for a similar consideration of exile is realised quite differently in Her 6. Note also the treatment of this topic in "Opfertod" speeches and in Phoin 387-407.  5  4  123  302-  f] rrpos' LteXaGpa ToDSe Karravecog uoAco; f)8LOTa rrplv ye 8fj0' 6 T ' r\v rratg fjSe \ioi. dXX'  OUKCT  ' eoriv  etc.  (Hik 1094-9)  A s often, the first alternative is rejected w i t h a question, the second w i t h a statement; and here again the final alternative develops into an extended argument (comparing the qualities of sons and daughters).  55  In all of the above passages, there is a pathetic realisation b y the speaker that choice is limited or excluded. The same formal pattern serves the purposes of a speaker arguing that the interlocutor is i n a desperate situation. In Andr 34449 Andromache poses a series of questions to Menelaos, mooting and then eliminating the two options he may assume he has i n dealing w i t h Hermione, should he remove her from Neoptolemos' household: 344b-47a  Impossible to find her a new husband  347b-48a  Intolerable to have her growing o l d at home  A n d Iokaste i n Phoin addresses a similar sequence to Polyneikes to demonstrate the stupidity of his campaign:  571-77  .  if you w i n :  572  what trophy can y o u raise?  573  h o w can you lead the sacrifices?  574  what inscription can y o u write?  578-82a 579 582b-83  but if you lose: h o w can y o u return to Argos? both outcomes are evil  A somewhat similar sequence begins at Alk 941: Admetos asks how in the future he may take any pleasure from his domestic surroundings— but no alternatives are listed. The alternative question beginning at Alk 1051 (see above) is unusual in separating the two questions posing the alternatives by three lines of argument dismissing at length the first alternative.  5  5  124  In these t w o passages, the effect is that of a dilemma argument.  56  In a similar  situation, Klytaimestra uses a much more loosely constructed series of questions (IA 1185-95) to demonstrate the bleakness of Agamemnon's future, should he carry out the sacrifice of Iphigeneia.  D. Hypothetical Arguments  W e have seen a number of passages i n w h i c h hypothetical alternatives are reviewed, normally for the sake of a pathetic demonstration of the bleakness of the speaker's or the interlocutor's outlook. Euripides' favoured form for this purpose is the series of rhetorical questions, a form inherently conducive to pathos. In some other situations, conditional formulations are used to present a comparison for various rhetorical purposes. Simplest among these are statements expressing an impotent threat ("If I were not prevented [by old age, weakness, the law, etc.], y o u w o u l d suffer for your treatment of m e " ) .  57  Conditional formulations are used i n argumentative situations i n a number of passages i n w h i c h an unreal condition is contrasted w i t h the factual situation, often i n order to highlight the bleakness of the present outlook or to point to sordid motives. A n example occurs i n Klytaimestra's speech to Elektra  Iokaste's final comments to Eteokles just before this passage also pose a dilemma, but this is not put in the form of a series of rhetorical questions. Iokaste asks first (560f), "If I ask whether you would rather rule or save the city, will you say rule?" This of itself makes the point that to rule is an ignoble choice in the circumstances. She continues (561b), f\v Se VIKT)OT|I. a' oSe..., and this leads to a description of the devastating consequences of a defeat. The passage has been understood differently; see Mastronarde ad 561-5, 562 (whose text and interpretation I follow). 5  6  E.g., Hik 458, Her 211, 232, Tro 408, Hel 75. More developed arguments using a simple contrary-to-fact condition are in Or 564-71, Soph. Ant 905-12. 5  7  125  defending her action i n killing Agamemnon. W h y , she asks, d i d he sacrifice Iphigeneia? KGL \L€V TTOAeiOS dXtOCTlV e^LCOLieVOS  -  f] SOJU. ' ovfjacov rdXka eicreive  TTOXXGJV  vuv 8 ' oiivex'  T  ' eKaokCwv TeKva  [ilav urrep, auyyvcooT' ay rjv. ' EXevri udpyos fjv 1  6 T ' aS XafJtov  aXoxov KoXdCeiv rrpoSoTLy OVK rimoTaTO, T O U T O J V eKaTL TTOLS ' e|if)v 8ui)\€<J€v.  (Elek 1024-30)  t  The contrast here is between circumstances Klytaimestra says w o u l d have been acceptable, and the "true", discreditable circumstances. The rhetorical purpose is to present Klytaimestra as a reasonable and tolerant w o m a n ; this line continues in the sequel (1030-4: "but even this event didn't cause me to k i l l h i m — no, it was the fact he brought Kassandra into the house"). The argument is thus a fortiori and proceeds i n three stages: Klytaimestra describes (a) a hypothetical offense that w o u l d have been forgivable; (b) an unforgivable offense that nevertheless d i d not provoke revenge; (c) the greater offense that provoked revenge. V e r y similar arguments occur elsewhere. Medeia tells Jason that his new marriage w o u l d be acceptable if it arose out of a legitimate complaint of childlessness: el ydp r\oQ' dmus e n , caiyyvcooT' dv fjv aoi TO08 ' epaaGfjvai Xexoug.  (Med 490f)  A n d the O l d M a n i n Ion, attempting to persuade Kreousa to plot against her husband, explains under what circumstances the offense he has committed against her w o u l d have been mitigated:  126  drrXoOi'  dv  Lnyrpos,  fjv y d p T O KCIKOV,  TTLGOJV a e ,  eacoLKia'  OLKOUS  or\v  Xeycov  ei  Trap'  euyevoDg  aTraiSiav,  (Ion 839-41)  -  In all these passages, the speaker seeks to give an impression that a reasonable person has been the victim of a gross insult.  58  The contrast of hypothetical and real situations is emphasised i n the Elek passage above using vvv 8e. This expression follows a contrary-to-fact condition i n some 23 other places i n E u r i p i d e s .  59  In a number of these passages the  prevailing tone is one of regret (e.g. Her 314, Tro 1171); i n a few others the formulation serves the purpose of exposition b y explaining a direction the plot w i l l take (Hipp 659, Hek 900, Hel 1624). But w e also find the structure used to frame an abstract reflection (Phoin 501). Forensic use of this sequence is seen i n , besides Elek 1024: Hipp 1025 (Hippolytos explaining w h y he can't defend himself properly), Hek 1230 (Hekabe accusing Polymestor); IA 1214 (Iphigeneia's variation of the  dTreipLa  topos).  60  Deliberative uses appear i n Hipp 496, Hik 306,  Or 1134 (in each case justifying a decision or a proposed action). For arguments of this form i n the speeches of Lysias, J. Bateman has distiguished three classes that differ i n the character of the final term (the vvv 8e statement).  61  In his first class, the final statement offers a factual point that  undermines the opponent's case (Batemen uses the term  aT]u.eTov).  Something of  the sort occurs i n the Kretes fragment, vs. 9. In the second group are statements 5  8  A similar argument is made in different terms by Polyneikes, Phoin 484-90: KOI vvv ETOLLIOS  6LLLL —  Viz. Hipp 496, [625], 659, 1025, Hek 900, 1230, Hik 306, 792 (lyric), Her 314, 440 (lyric), 669 (lyric), Tro 1171, Hel 292, 938,1924, Phoin 501, Or 1134, IA 968,1214, Kret 9, frr. 636.7, 821.5, 978.3.  5  9  6  0  6 1  IA 1214 as a proem reflection shares its form with Phoin 501; cf. Hik 1084ff, Hipp 618-[26]. Diss. 28-32.  127  w h i c h represent "a conflict i n the sphere of human action" (28). These occur i n connection w i t h arguments about conduct (30): "In the conditional clause some course of conduct is assumed, whose consequent w o u l d be an action worthy of approbation.  The truth of the matter is then presented, and the judges are left i n  no doubt of the moral viciousness of the opponent..." (cf. Hek 1230). In the third type, the final statement squarely contradicts one part of the syllogism implied i n the condition (32).  62  A trivial example of this i n Euripides is Her 312-4 (Chorus:  "If w e still had our strength and someone were outraging y o u , w e w o u l d stop them; but w e have no strength  [oi)8ev eau.ev]"). I find no example of forensic  use of this type for the purpose of refutation. In general Euripides doesn't seem to use the vvv Se clause for logical argument, but to summarise the situation (e.g. Hik 306: "but since that is not the case...") or move to a new stage of narrative (Hel 1624).  Unreal conditions are often combined w i t h rhetorical questions to emphasise the correct conclusion to be drawn from an implied comparison. Often there is a tone of derision, as when Klytaimestra asks Elektra: el 8' 6K Sou.uJi' TpTraoTO MeveXecos AdGpcu,  Kravelv u.' ' Opeamv x P ^ .  Kaoay VT)rr|S' Troaiv  MeveXaov cos CTc6aaLLU; aos 8e Trios Trcrrfip f|veo~xeT' dv  TCXOT  ';  KTetvovTa XPW Tdu.',  eiTa rbv \iev ov Qavelv eu.e 8e Trpos' Keivov naQelv;  (Elek 1041-5)  63  Bateman refers to this argument as "destructive hypothetical syllogism", but adds (32n): "there is no evidence [in Lysias and the other orators] of any awareness of the logical basis and requirements of this type of syllogism since they deny indifferently the antecedent and the consequent". 6  2  Denniston (ad loc) finds the absolute use of rraGetv here anomalous; Diggle agrees and posits a lacuna after 1045 (Euripidea 165-7). Cropp in his 1982 L C M note (51f) reviews the rhetorical presentation of the argument (comparing Andr 663-7) and the problem of TTaQeiv: he envisions "hesitantly" the possibility of corruption along the lines suggested by Denniston; but he is "not convinced that emendation is necessary" (52). 6  3  128  The first question presents hypothetically the idea Klytaimestra w o u l d have been obligated to kill Orestes i n the event of an abduction of Menelaos;  this idea's  self-evident absurdity implies a negative view of the analogous actual case. The rrtog-question drives home the point b y emphasising the disastrous consequences of such a scenario. The same sequence may present a positive argument: . el TTpocravTes fjv ToSe 'ApTeLuSi, TTcog dv Ao£lag eGeamaev K O L u a m u.' dyaXu.a Beds TroXiau.' eg TTaXXdSog  (IT 1012-4)  64  The combination of hypothetical scenario and rhetorical question is also found w i t h other types of condition: fjv 8 ' ovv eyd) u.ev \xr\ Gavetv urfeKSpdu-Oj, TralSd LXOU K T e v e i T e ; K a i T a rrcog TeKvou GavovTog paiSloog dve^eTai; TOV  rraTrip  (Andr 338-40)  Here again a second rhetorical question points to a decisive obstacle. In Helen's appeal to Theonoe this form is used to present an a fortiori argument: Kel  \iev  Qav6)v  68'  kv  rrupdi  i  KaTeac|)dyr| 1"  rrpoato acj)' d r r o v T a SaKpuoig dv fiydrrcov vuv S ' o v T a K a l acoQevT' d^aipeGriaoLiaL;  (Hel 936-8)  Similar arguments are used b y Elektra i n refuting the "tokens" suggested as evidence of Orestes' return. In Elek 534-7 Elektra tells the O l d M a n first that there could be no footprint left o n the hard ground at the tomb, then that even if  Diggle follows Koechly in assuming a lacuna after 1014; therefore punctuation is uncertain. Weil's critical note ad 1015 puts the problem succinctly. 6  4  129  such a mark were present, it could not identify Orestes through comparison w i t h Elektra's o w n foot: 8 ' dv. yevoiT' dv ev  TTGOS  yalas  TTOSOJV  £K(iaKTpov;  K p a T o u A e c o i rreScoi el  8 ' eonv  dv ov yevoLT' dv8pog re K a l y u v a i K O s , dXX' a p a r i v S u o X v d8e\c|)OLV r r o u g  ToSe,.  Laos KpaTel.  (Elek 534-7)  The condition thus introduces a second, remoter stage to the argument: all bases are covered i n a systematic w a y .  65  Similarly i n 541-6 Elektra denies first that she  could as a youngster have produced any clothing for Orestes, then adds that even if she had, he could no longer be wearing an item made for h i m as a little boy: ola9\  OUK  veav  IT'  'Opearng  t]viK'  ovoav; el 8e  eKTrlTrreL  x9° os, v  KaKpeKOv rrerrXoug, ^P !.  Trio? dv T O T ' GOV T r d l g T a u T a vvv  ex  el  aoouaTL;  u.f) ^ u y a u ^ 0 L v 9 '  o l rreTrXoL  01  TOOL  1  (Elek 541-4)  The first question dismisses the probability of a young girl making c l o t h i n g .  66  But again w i t h e l 8e Elektra concedes the point for the sake of a further argument. This scene, w i t h its undoubted reference to the recognition scene i n Choephoroi, has p u z z l e d many critics.  67  Various views of the passage's tone  A similar procedure unfolds differently in the first response of Elektra in this scene (Elek 524-31): she disputes the evidence of the lock of hair by arguing first (524-6) that a secret return to Argos by Orestes is out of the question, then that in any case (eneLTa 527) male and female locks would not match. A third stage (530f) then makes the further point that hair that matches is no sure evidence of a blood relationship. The thoroughness of these arguments is striking. 6  5  That young girls can make clothing, and that the et;v<\>ao\ia <jf\s xepidSog mentioned by the Old Man (vs. 539) needn't necessarily refer to clothing, are points of no importance in the analysis of Elektra's argument. 6  6  I rely in the following particularly on the comments ad loc of Denniston (ed.) and Cropp (ed.), and on the discussion of Goebel, diss. 347-56.  6  7  130  have been put forward: the scene is a vicious and dishonest send-up of Aischylos' scene (Wilamowitz); it is a self-conscious "improvement" of that scene (Denniston); it contains justified criticism of Aischylos' unacceptable naivety (Page); it is a bold violation of the genre (Michelini), or an innocent comedic spoof (Bond); it involves subtle psychology i n evincing Elektra's fears and forebodings (Murray); it forms part of the ongoing characterisation of Elektra as "ill-tempered, arrogant, and self-pitiful" (Lloyd-Jones); it attacks neither Aischylos nor Elektra, but the "argument from probability" itself (Goebel).  68  It seems to me likely that the virtuoso character of the argumentation itself is designed to draw our attention. The Aischylean scene has been adopted as a familiar framework.  69  The process of recognition has been delayed, here as  elsewhere, through the introduction of a series of obstacles; there is irony and humour (not serious criticism of Aischylos) i n the failure of the familiar tokens to finish the job. Instead these tokens are subjected to a thoroughly up-to-date critique; the sophistication of the arguments Elektra puts, together w i t h the unexpectedness of the entire idea of such a critique, give that process its interest. That she is being unpleasant to an old family retainer, and that she is w r o n g i n her conclusions, are facts that contribute to other aspects of the scene's effect. H e r unpleasantness is consistent w i t h the presentation of her character elsewhere i n the play (cf. e.g. 404-19, another passage that performs a vital function i n service of the plot). I see this quality as a realistic manifestation of the misery of a Wilamowitz Hermes 18 (1883): 236n; Denniston ed. p. 114; Page apud Denniston p. 115; Michelini Euripides 206; Bond Hermathena CXVIII (1974): 7; Murray tr. pp. 89-91; Lloyd-Jones CQ 11 (1961): 180; Goebel diss. 355. The arguments for regarding the entire passage as an interpolation have been reviewed systematically by West ("Tragica IV" 17-21) and Kovacs (BICS 36 [1989]: 67-78). 6  8  On the process by which Euripides arrived at his variant treatment of the recognition, see West's interesting speculation ("Tragica IV" 17). 6  9  131  sympathetic character, rather than as alienating sympathy: thus I find some truth i n Murray's view of the passage. A s for the fact her arguments lead her to the w r o n g conclusion, this is precisely what the plot requires— doubts and delays.  .  70  A hypothetical reversal of the positions of the interested parties (whether achieved w i t h or without conditional formulations) is a common procedure i n Greek oratory, and not infrequent i n Euripides. In its simplest form, a defendant excuses his actions b y noting that his victim w o u l d have reacted i n the same way to the pressures that led h i m to commit the offensive act. Eurystheus tells A l k m e n e she w o u l d have responded as he d i d to the unfortunate lot that befell him: ov y' dvaXa(3o0aa Tag eiids Tuxas  OUKOUV  exQpou Xeovros Svo\xevf\ (3XaaTrju.aTa f]\avves dv KCXKOIOTV dXXd acoctpovtos etaaas- oiKelv "Apyos o i m v ' dv mOois. -  (Hkld 1005-8)  So Menelaos asks Peleus (in Andr 668-70, lines I have elsewhere defended as Euripidean)  71  whether he, having given his daughter i n marriage, w o u l d sit  quietly b y while she suffered insult. Hippolytos tells Theseus he w o u l d have taken strong action i n his father's p l a c e :  7  0  7 1  72  Cf. the many near-misses in the recognition plots of IT and Ion. See above, Ch. II n. 29.  A subtle example of the same sort of argument is Menelaos' comment to Peleus, who has harangued him in part for failing to kill Helen when she was returned to him: "I exercised selfcontrol (eaa)c|>p6vow); I wish you had done the same and not killed your brother Phokos" (Andr 6857). 7  2  132  el ydp ov [lev Trots fjaQ', eyw 8e obs TraTfip, eKTetvd TOL a ' ay KOU ("juyats eCr]Luouv, eiTrep yuvaLKOs T ) £ L O U S e|rfjs Qiyelv.  (Hipp 1042-4)  Klytaimestra's speech to Elektra defending her murder of A g a m e m n o n contains a similar argument:  73  el 8 ' eK 86[i0jy fjpTraoro MeveXecos XdGpaL, KTavetv u.' 'OpeaTnv xpf\ < MeveXaov tog ackraLLU; v  KaaLyvfjrns  TTOCTLV  (Elek 1041-3)  Orestes' argument i n defense of his murder of Klytaimestra involves the same reversal of points of view: eL 8e 8f) Td LxriTepos' oiy&v OUK  €TTT\IVOVV,  dv u.e  TL  LiLccov  p.' dy eSpaa' 6 KaTGavcov;  dvexdpeu' 'Epivucav;  fj u.r|Tpi [lev rrdpeLca aujxLiaxoL Geat, TCOL 8 ' ou TrdpeLaL, LidXXov fi8LKr)LLevojL;  (Or 580-4)  Hypothetical arguments have been treated here w i t h arguments presented in rhetorical question form. This grouping stems naturally from the fact that Euripides' use i n argument of rhetorical questions is inextricably bound to his use of arguments from probability. These arguments tend to involve conditional formulations, asking "Given X [the assumption may be clearly stated as a fact or merely implied as a normal expectation, a "probability"], h o w could Y These shocking reversals of point of view seem to have fascinated Euripides. At IA 1201f Klytaimestra suggests Hermione is the more reasonable victim than Iphigeneia (and cf. Hek 265f, where Hekabe proposes sacrificing Helen, not Polyxene); in Or 658f Orestes tells Menelaos there is no need for Hermione to be sacrificed in compensation for the loss of Iphigeneia. I see no essential difference between the passage quoted and the other examples collected here that should cause M . Lloyd to refer to Elek 1041-5 as the only Euripidean example of an argument involving "hypothetical role-reversal" (Agon 32 n.50). Note also ironic reversals like that of Tro 1180-6: Hekabe buries Astyanax instead of the reverse. 7  3  133  possibly occur?" The hypothetical arguments surveyed i n this section are similarly used in applying a process of comparison to the present situation; but n o w the comparison is w i t h neither factual circumstances nor probabilities, but w i t h an imaginary possibility, an unreal alternative scenario. W e have seen Euripidean characters use this kind of argument to define the conditions under w h i c h an action w o u l d be appropriate (e.g. Med 490f), to draw a conclusion based on observed facts (IT 1012-4), to add a second stage of security to conclusions reached using a normal probability argument (Elek 534-7), and to pose arguments based on a hypothetical reversal of roles (Hipp 1042-4).  134  Chapter I V  General R u l e and Special Case  Euripides was notoriously fond of introducing gnomic and abstract pronouncements and reflections into his plays; since antiquity he has been regarded as the "philosopher" among the three tragedians, and doubts about the relevance and function of some gnomic and reflective passages have loomed large i n E u r i pidean criticism ancient and modern.  1  Speeches having a persuasive or deli-  berative intention are particularly likely to be peppered w i t h general material used to frame or buttress arguments, and Euripides has a number of characteristic techniques for bringing general rules and observations to bear o n the particular dramatic situation. Before exploring Euripides' use of gnomic material i n rhetorical situations, I shall describe fully the various ways i n w h i c h he formulates general statements (Section A below). I shall next investigate the typical rhetorical uses of general or gnomic statements (B), then look at two special applications of gnomic material: the expression i n general terms of a realisation that contradicts expectation or common sense (C), and the expression of impossible wishes having general content— the so-called "utopian reflections" (D). A s some of these reflections are expressed as complaints addressed to Zeus or "the  Schmid (Gesch. d. griech. Lit. I, iii. 734 n. 8) notes scholia ad Tro 634 (ou crroxdCeTai TWV uTTOKeiaevcov TTpoacuTTcav Kal ydp vvv r\ 'AvSpoadxT) < Ta > auTd (j>iXocrocj)ei duep euTTpoaBev r\ KaadvSpa), Phoin 388 (OUK ev Seovn yvto|ioXoyet...). Schmid's own view of Euripidean generalising is that Euripides' "need to instruct" caused him to interject material that "inhibits the flow of the action" and "spoils the presentation of character" (ibid 769). 1  135  gods", some comments w i l l be made on the degree to w h i c h these reflections represent a departure from traditional religious beliefs.  A . Formal Patterns  1. S i m p l e and "connected" gnomes  I begin w i t h free-standing aphorisms, sententiae that express i n a stylish w a y what one might think of as common sense or experience: (juXouai TTalSas oi T ' du.eivoves' (3poTt3v OL T ' oiidev ovTeg  (Her 634f)  -  TO  Chios'  Td  vepQe  TOS  2  ' dvGpGJTTOioTV TJSLCTTOV pXeTreiy,  8'  (IA 1250f)  ovSev  These may be introduced asyndetically, and so make a particularly epigrammatic effect; more often particles connect them to the rhetorical context: u.dTT|v dp' oi yepovTes euxovTou yipa?  i\iiyovTes  Td Pappapcov  Kai (laKpov  Qavelv,  xpovov  ydp SoOXa TrdvTa  TTXT]V  ftiov evos.  (Alk 669f) (Hel 276)  The antithetical form of both these examples is quite common in Euripides: see Wilamowitz ad Her 1106, Denniston ad El 1017, Mastronarde ad Phoin 479-80. Other examples of simple ev8o£ov aphorism: Alk 1008, Med 964, Andr 207f, Hek [831f], Hik 509, Her 299f, Or 70. Pithy enough to be "proverbs": Hik 509b (fjauxo? Kaipdh, oofyos), IA 333b, 387b; cf. Her 561 (acjnXov... TO SuoruxeS'). 2  .136  Here the particle ties the gnome to the preceding material, i n the first case as a conclusion to be drawn, i n the second as a corroborating rule. The latter situation is especially common. The content is often decidedly  6  TTXOUTOS\  Kpelaaov  dv9pwTTLO"Ke,  8e  vooeiv  f\  rdls  rrapd  86£av:  aocfjo'is'  9e6s  (Kyk 316) (Hipp 186)  BepaTreueiv  In this case (as Aristotle tells us) an explanatory "epilogue" may be wanted, i n w h i c h are expressed f)  TO  u.€v  XVTTT]  OLLTLCX  mi  TO  ecmv drrXoOv,  TOOL  8e  Te  fypevtiv  xepo"Lv  re  Sid  T L . Thus the last example continues: 3  ovvaTTTei  (Hipp 187f)  TTOVOS'.  Connection of the gnome to its context may involve the loss of one or more words, w h i c h must then be supplied from the surroundings:  Kdyto  \xev  riOSiov TCOL  Kf|8os  ovvaityai  KaKfjg  yuvcuKOs  pT|TpcoL'  yau.ouim  8uJLiaaLV TTCUXOV  LLT]T£  4  aol  Xafieiv  6K(j)epouaL  ydp  (Andr 619-22)  6V€L8T|.  Aristotle's example (Rhet 94al9-94b24) is Med 294-7. Cf. Hkld 458-60, Hek 864-7, Her 299-301, etc. But two-stage gnomes are not always paradoxical: Hik 361-4, Her 303-6, 309-11, Phoin 526f (particularly flat). 3  4  Similar are Her 57, Or 300.  137  2. M a n n e r of presentation  The gnomes cited above take the form of grammatically complete statements; variety is achieved through alternate types of presentation. Quite often a gnomic idea is expressed i n a relative clause:  5  euol ydp 01)8' o rrdcu XeirreTai (3poTots ^vveariv  eXrris  (Tro 681-2a)  For I lack even hope, and hope is what remains for all mortals.  rroO  8f)T' eXricbQrjS" fj ppoxois dpTtoLievri  f| fydayavov Qfjyoua', a yevvaia y wf| dpdoeiev dv TroGouaa T O V Trdpos -nooiv;  (Tro 1012-4)  H o w is it no one ever caught you hanging from a noose or sharpening a sword? Yet these are the things a noble w o m a n w o u l d do w h o missed the husband she had had before.  A l s o very compressed are some gnomes given parenthetically:  86£GJ 8e  Tots' TroXXotca  (uoXXol yap  6  KOKOL)  TrpoSous aeacoaGai a'...  (IT 678f)  Generalisations may take the form of a rhetorical question: cru-iKpotca  Liev  ydp LieydXa  TTOJS  eXoi  TLS  dv;  (Or 694)  7  Cf. Med 1080, Hik 190-2, 232, Elek 38, Her 58f, Or 525, 652, 679, etc. Similar compression is to be seen in Ion 634-6. 5  6  Cf. Elek 300.  Text as printed by Murray, who brackets 695 with Brunck; Diggle brackets 694f with Weil. More gnomic rhetorical questions are at Hipp 462f, 464f, IT 1478f (but 1479 del. Diggle). 7  138  M a n y general statements involve a moral rule and are introduced b y xp^l (e.g.  Kyk 527, Alk 1008, Med 294, 1018, Hipp 120, 467, Andr 944, Hik 223, 506, Elek 1052, Her 92, Or 666, Bak 892) or, less often, 8el (e.g. Andr 1052, Elek 1074). The same 8  effect is often achieved through an imperative: TOOTO Kal 0"K0TT6LT6 U.OL, \ivr\orf\pes, eaGXfjs Guycrrep' EK LLrjTpos Xa|3eXv.  (Andr 622f)  Similar are Andr 950f, Hik 504f, 916f, Or 804; one may compare also Ion 373 (TCOL  Gecoi TdvavTL' ov \iavrevreov), Phoin 395 (eg  KepSog Trapd fyvoiv  TO  SouXeuTeov).  3. " A p p l i c a t i o n " of general rules  M y paraphrases of Tro 681f and 1012-14 above incorporate the expansion of thought b y w h i c h the general rule is brought into relation w i t h the special case. Euripides very often expresses this relationship explicitly. The present instance may be adduced (usually using ydp) as if it were the example that caused the speaker to formulate the rule; or again the rule may be stated, then simply "applied" (usually using cos or 8e) to the present case: OUK eoriv ovSev Kpetaaoy f\ §L\os  8  ou  TTXOOTOS',  TO  TTXTI.GOS'  OV  Tupavvts"  oa$r\s,  dXoyiaTOv  avTaXXayLia yewaiou  9  8e T L  C()LXOU.  "Utopian reflections" introduced by \pf\v are discussed in Section D below.  The two forms have been studied in great detail by H . Friis Johansen in General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis ; he terms them napd8eLyp.a oi.Kelov and Descriptive Application respectively. For my purposes the distinction is of no importance. Examples with ydp: Med 448, Hkld 6,303, Andr 959. With (is: Med 584, Hipp 651, Andr 703; variants in Andr 647, Hik 219. With8e: Med 302, Tro 641, IT 1477, Ion 587; cf. Andr 324 (8fj). 9  139  au ydp T d Kal etc.  T  ' eLg AlyiaGov e£r|upes  KaKd  (Or 1155-9)  Less often a rule is quoted, then the present situation or person adduced as out of step w i t h i t :  OU  10  XP'h CTKuGpGOTTOV T O l s  elvai, au  8execr9ai 8'  8' dvSp'  arvyv&i  eTalpov  TTpoaojTTGJi  ^€VOl£ TOV  euTrpoaiyyopioL  TTpOaTToXoV  fypevi.  SearroTou rrapovG'  opcov  K a i auvtocppucoLievcoL  (Alk 774-8)  But the formulation of a general rule may itself imply the "application", b y associating the interlocutor explicitly w i t h the group that is the topic of the gnome:  oi  |3dp(3apoi 8e  fiyelaGe  u.fJTe  u-riTe T O U S  TOUS  KaXcos  C|>IAOUS  CJJLXOUS'  TeBvriKOTas'  (Hek 328-30)  GauLidCeQ',  In this second-person example the speaker associates the interlocutor w i t h the group discredited i n the gnomic statement (cf. Med 569-73, Hek 253-7). In some first-person plural gnomes the speaker associates himself or herself w i t h the group characterised.  11  Gnomes are also formulated i n the first or second person  plural w i t h an application to "people i n general" i m p l i e d :  12  Friis Johansen terms this Contrast Application (see General Reflection 144-50); examples include Med 222-6, Andr 207-12, Bak 266-9. 1 0  Women characterise the group "women": positively in Med 407-9, Hipp 480f, IT 1061f; negatively in Med 230f, Ion 398ff. 1 1  First person plural indicative in Hipp 380-3, 701, Hek 623ff, 814-9, Hik 214, 492, 1082-6, Phoin [555f]; second person plural indicative Hik 744-9, Elek 383-5; imperative Or 804. 1 2  140  KOUTOL TOV  oacoL  a  8'  Trpos  Svblv y e T r d v T e s dv9pcuTTOi  Kpeicrcrov'  KOU T d  Te  TroXeu.ou  dv  u.d9r)L T L S , T a u T a  yfjpas.  Aoyoiv  Kara Kpeiaaov eipf)vr| (3poToIg.  i<j\iev  OUTCO  XP "! " '^ 1  0  1  at6iCea9ai  TraXSas' e u  KOtL  (Hik 486-8)  cbiXel  TraiSeueTe.  (Hik 916f)  A n interesting confusion of special and general formulation is to be seen in such passages a s :  13  b (3ou\ou.cu y d p , f)8u K a l 8td a T o u . a  TTTT)voIaL  U.U9OLS'  dSairdvcos'  e y t o cbtXco u.ev T e K v c r  dTiKTov,  repeat  TTLOS y d p  cj)peva.  (Or 1175f)  o u 4>LXIO  (Her 280f)  du.6x9r)aa;  4. Second-person formulation  Occasionally general statements are put i n the second person singular ("gnomic ov"):  ouSe  oTeyni'  ydp  fji  KaTripe^ets'  KaX&s aKpipioaais dv  SOLIOL  (Hipp 468f)  14  There is a strange mingling of general and special in Hel 954f, where see Kannicht. Striking also is Hek 820, where a general reflection is closed with "What hope could one still have then to prosper in the future?" The thought moves abruptly back to Hekabe's own case: "For my children are gone..." etc. (821). 1 3  aKpipwacus dv is Hadley's conjecture here for aKpifkiicreiav codd., and is accepted by Barrett, Diggle, and Stockert (Teubner text). Barrett states (ad 468-9) that optative without dv here is "impossible". Bers' discussion of the evidence for a poetic potential optative without dv (Syntax 128ff) concludes that the construction is not impossible but seldom used; for Euripides he cites (131) Hipp 1186 (where see Barrett), Andr 929, and IT 1055, but does not discuss Hipp 469. None of the examples he cites seems quite analogous to this last; therefore I will assume (with some reservation) that Hadley was correct in identifying an example of "gnomic av" that had got lost in the transmission. 1 4  141  Barrett writes ad loc: "The second person can be used i n a potential statement to typify an indefinite subject (i.e. as a more v i v i d equivalent of ns)".  This prin-  ciple could be supported (Barrett cites no parallels) by reference to Her 301, Or 700f; other examples I find i n Euripides of "gnomic ov" are not potential statements (Med 297-301, Or 314f). In all these passages the speaker moves easily between the indefinite use of the second person forms and the application of the same forms to the interlocutor.  15  It seems possible that this k i n d of facile trans-  ition may explain the transmitted text of Klytaimestra's proem addressed to Elektra: T O TTpct'yu.a 8e u.a96vTa a ' , f|v |xev dittos' uxaeXv exT-S. oriryelv  SLKOUOV  el  8e  urj,  There is no individual to w h o m  TL  8eX orvyelv;  \iaQ6vra  (Elek 1015-7)  oe could refer, and i n any case the  context seems to require a general statement. Reiske's conjecture  \iaQ6vras,  with  Seidler's ex ! -/ satisfies this requirement; but perhaps Euripides wrote oe and 1 1  ex^Ls w i t h an indefinite reference i n m i n d (in spite of the clearly personal reference of Q O L i n 1011 and passages mentioned above.  TOJL  CTOJL  i n 1018), using the same freedom as i n the  16  This effect is particularly bold in Hipp 467-70 and Or 314f (both of which have, admittedly, text problems). On the latter see the comments ad loc by di Benedetto, who reads voar|Ls...8o£d£r|Ls in 314 with the majority of the codd. 1 5  Denniston ad Elek 1016 argues against the interpretation offered here; see also Cropp, "Eur. Elektra 1013-7 and 1041-4",53. K-G I. 557, Anm. 3 discuss indefinite use of ov as a generally late phenomenon, but they ignore such Homeric examples as Iliad V. 85. I mention here also the very dubious line IA 1408 (see Page Actors' Interpolations ad loc), in which I think it possible the author intended the relative clause 6 aov KpaTeX to convey a general statement about TO 9eouaxelv: "struggling against the gods defeats one". The same expression occurs in Hipp 696 (TO ydp Sdicvov aov Tx\v SLdyvoxjiv KpctTet), where the sense may again be general: a colloquial expression? 1 6  142  5. " D o u b l e comparison"  A striking device i n the formulation of general statements is the creation of a "double comparison": fyavXov X9 \ OeXoiLU u.dXXov fj KOIKOV T GT0V  a  v  Xafielv cjxXov (Ion 834f)  aocbtoTepov.  I w o u l d rather have a simple but honest m a n for a friend than a clever m a n of bad character.  V e r y similar are Andr 639ft frr. 290, 326. 6-7, 552, 825, 842.  17  One side of the  comparison may be only implied: ws eu.oi Trevrig eiT) TTpoOuLLog TTXOUCTLOU LidXXov £evos.  (Elek 394f)  I w o u l d w i s h as m y host a poor but solicitous m a n rather than a (negligent) rich m a n .  1 8  It seems to be a stylishly clever device.  6. A t t r i b u t i o n of authority  Euripidean characters frequently voice maxims whose sense affects, or is acknowledged by, a specified elite group, especially people of w i s d o m or good sense (oi. ao(j)Oi,ol oufypoves, oi ev cj>poK)uvT€s, etc.).  19  Rarely is a real contrast  Denniston ad Elek 253 has discussed the noun-with-two-adjectives phrases these passages involve. 1  7  1 8  Ci. Med 319f.  oi cjo<j>oC (etc.): Kyk 316, Hkld 458f, Hipp 264-6, 465f, Andr 643f, Hik 40f, 223 (TOV CTOC^OV), 506-8, Or 488, fr. 683; oi oufypoves: Kyk 336-8, Phoin 554, Or 1509; oaois evecrn vous: Andr 231. 1 9  143  intended w i t h other groups; the point made is simply given additional authority through this association. Similarly many gnomes include a reference to "men" or "mortals" that adds no point to the s a y i n g .  20  Gnomes may also be put i n "attributed" form: a source for the statement is identified, normally either as "people i n general" or as the speaker himself, who thus presents the gnome as his considered opinion. (There is usually no implication that it is an original or unusual thought: but cf. Med 579-81.) "People i n general' are cited as the authority for gnomes introduced using: 1  Xeyouo-L  (Tro 665, Hik 735, Hel 950); fyaoLv (Her 306);  eifao-iv (Hel 497).  Similar effect is achieved b y identifying the general statement as a Xoyog: TrelGeiv Soopa K a l Geoug Xoyog.  21  (Med 964b)  The speaker is identified as the source of the rule voiced through the use of: Xeyto (Tro 636); yv<s>\yx\v e x  w  (Hik 198); XoylCoum (Alk 692f);  282); fiyoCuai (Her 283, Med 1224); urn  SOKOOCTI  VOLUCOJ  (Her  (Hipp 377); earn (Med 580,  sim. Elek 954); ol6u.ea9a (Hkld 746, sim. Bak 1150); KaT€i8ov (Med 446); olSa  (Med 215), K p l v c o (Andr 370). Negative rules are formulated w i t h  OVK  erraLveaco  (Hkld [300], sim. Med 223, Hipp 264), drreTTTuaa (Tro 667f). A gnomic idea may be phrased as a wish, for which Euripides uses eu-ol elr\ (with slight variations) i n Hipp 403f, 640f, Med 542-4, Elek 394f, 948f, Ion 632. It  Somewhat different are gnomes that define wisdom, etc.: e.g. Her 1425f (ooTig Se aQevog (ldXXov CJHXWV dyaQ&v TTeTTdcrGai (3oiiXeTcu K&KCJS" 4>povel).  TTXOUTOV  fj  Gnomes with PpoTols, dvSpojTTOis, 6vr|ToIs, etc.: Med 965,1018, Hipp 465f, Andr 184f, 270, 418, Her 57, Hel 1617f, Or 1545, and many more; cf. in the same sense f)(iTv, IA 1370. 2 0  Cf. Hel 513ff, Phoin 396, 438 (i)\ivT\Qev). In fr. 668 a similar statement is described as a TTapoijiia. tiJCTTTep r\ Trapoijiia appears likewise in A. Ag 264; see Fraenkel ad loc for other instances. a!vo9 is similarly used: in frr. 25, 333, 508 a gnomic saying is characterised as a TTaXcuos- alvo? (cf. also fr. 321). See further Schmid 770 n.l. 2 1  144  is important to recognise these as essentially gnomes for w h i c h the speaker assumes authority, like those discussed above.  22  7. G n o m e and reflection  W e cannot think of all these expressions of general truth (or rather, "expressions presented as general truths i n a rhetorical context") as "maxims" i n the traditional sense— they mostly lack both the moral element and the status of folk w i s d o m generally associated w i t h that t e r m .  23  N o t all are even "aphor-  isms", but all are references, however compact or casual, to a larger more general context than that of the immediate scene, and most use concise and memorable phrases to put a general idea before the audience. A b o v e all, it must not be assumed that they represent any philosophical views of the poet— each "gnome" (as I w i l l n o w call them all indiscriminately) has been put i n the mouth of a particular character i n a particular situation for purposes of analysis or persuasion. I shall use the w o r d "reflection" here to refer to passages of some length i n w h i c h the speaker seems to be working w i t h general rules and concepts, not  Denniston ad Elek 948 stops just short of recognising this idiomatic formulation (he cites frr. 412 and 360.25, but not the other passages above). It worries him that Elektra, a married woman, should wish for a husband (euoiy ' elr\ TTOCTL?) of such-and-such a character. But similarly in Hipp 640f Hippolytos, confirmed bachelor, rules out a too-brainy wife using the expression uf| ydp ev y' euols So^ois etr).... Both speakers are simply stating a general rule. Friis Johansen (General Reflection 140) discusses Hipp 403f (euol ydp eir| (iTJTe XavGdveiv KaXd... 8pojor|i etc.) as a gnomic formulation, followed immediately by application to the speaker Phaidra. De Grouchy (diss. 37 with n. 24) recognises euot (etc.) as a formula for identifying the source of a thought, but cites no examples of gnomes expressed as wishes. 2  2  Aristotle, for example, in his discussion of yvcouou (Rhet 1394al9ff) speaks of maxims as general statements, "but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided" (tr Rhys Roberts). He goes on to speak (1395a 2ff) of the kind of speakers who can appropriately use maxims— elderly men, and even then only in speaking of subjects in which they are experienced. Euripidean speakers' use of gnomes conforms better to the more relaxed sense in which the Rhet ad Alex uses the term (Ch. XI). 2  3  145  merely stating them for a rhetorical or argumentative purpose: passages where the fuller implications of a general statement are investigated (e.g. Hik 176-83), or reasons giving for making the statement (e.g. Hik 195ff, Hipp 616ff), or where a gnomic statement influences a reasoning process (e.g. Hel 483-99). In every case the sympathetic reader w i l l find "relevance" to the drama and indeed to the immediate situation i n these passages. But the energy some of these passages devote to abstract speculation gives a sense of detachment from their surroundings, and this detachment that has not escaped the notice of text critics; and so some comments w i l l be made below on the relatively loose limits of relevance Euripides seems to allow himself.  B. Rhetorical Uses of Gnomic Utterances  The ancient Greeks clearly had available, as we have, a large store of conventional w i s d o m on w h i c h to draw i n supporting or opposing almost any position. Moreover, w e often find Euripides (perhaps more than other Greek writers) presenting maxims whose form is conventional but whose content cannot have been traditional.  24  The study of Euripidean gnomic material for the  purpose of understanding the shared attitudes and assumptions of Athenian society has therefore a very limited usefulness.  25  We should perhaps think of  I am thinking especially of those self-consciously "sophistic" maxims celebrating power and wealth (e.g., Kyk 316, Phoin 524f); cf. also paradoxes like Hipp 411f, Med 294f, philosophical speculations like Her 1345f.  2  4  Lang's discussion (Herodotean N and D 58-67) of maxims and proverbs in Herodotos says of such expressions that they "may, in some degree at least, reflect the genius, wit, and spirit of the Greek nation". She looks for signs of "the extent to which [Herodotos'] interpretation of events and view of causation were shaped by this inherited folk wisdom" (ibid 58f). Such an approach to Euripidean gnomes would seem unpromising.  2  5  146  the maxims under study here not as general observations about life, agreed upon by the people who use them, but as abstract forms of argument, arguments stripped of any context.  26  I therefore focus not on the content of Euripidean  gnomes, though this is a fascinating topic, but on their rhetorical or persuasive uses.  Just as the rhetorical questions, disjunct questions, potential and con-  27  ditional formulations discussed i n Chapter III above assume typical arrangements for employment i n probability arguments and hypothetical arguments, so gnomic expressions appear again and again i n typical sequences designed to present or bolster an argumentative position. Euripides gives his characters gnomic expressions (1) to open a speech or an argument b y offering a succinct "headline"; (2) to close or summarise a speech or an argument; (3) to corroborate or support an argumentative point, appeal, or parainesis just uttered.  1. " O p e n i n g " Uses  Polyphemos' reply to Odysseus' appeal i n Kyklops offers a good example of a simple gnome opening an argument b y announcing i n general terms the point to be made: 6  TTXOOTOS,  dvQpbimaKe, rolg oofyols 9e6g.  (Kyk 316)  On this subject M . Heath's discussion of "Tragic Wisdom" (Poetics 157-62) is very stimulating. He cites, for example, a bewildering variety of sentiments expressed in tragedy on the preferability of accepting death or enduring a life of slavery or disgrace (161): all these examples of "wisdom" (as Heath points out) are produced to suit an argument and a context. 2  6  A catalogue of gnomic material from all three tragedians organised according to content forms the bulk of G. A. De Grouchy's 1984 diss. Proverbial and Gnomic Material in Greek Tragedy. 2  7  147  The statement, decidedly of the rrapd8o^ov type, deflates Odysseus' arguments for mercy and hospitality more effectively than any direct answer to them could. Odysseus has based his appeal (Kyk 285-312, discussed i n L A above) o n assumptions of shared values and interests; an argument that hospitality w o u l d constitute fair reciprocity for services he and his men have performed for Poseidon was followed by an appeal to the universal rules regarding shipwrecked sailors, suppliants, hospitality.  Polyphemos' announcement encapsulates immediately  his distance from these shared assumptions (amusingly it is not his primitivism but his sophistication that creates the gulf), providing at the same time a springboard for his disquisition on the gods and the rugged individual. A few other speeches begin w i t h an argument-headline cast i n gnomic form: Herakles i n Alkestis opens his harangue addressed to Admetos' servant, following an entrance-announcing verse that instantly sets an antagonistic tone, by stating a general rule of behaviour:  OUTOS,  ov  TL oeLivov  XP !  elvaL,  1  K a l Tre^poimKOs  CTKuGptorrov  Sexea9at 8 '  TOLS  ^evois  pXerreLg;  TOV  euTrpoariyopojL  TrpoarfoXoy  4>pevl.  (Alk 773-5)  In what follows, the servant's failure to adhere to this rule is stated, and this leads to Herakles' philosophical homily on life and death, the moral of w h i c h is summarised i n a rule of behaviour that reinforces the first: €ikj)paLV€ omrrov, mve, TOV Ka9' r\\iepav p l o y Xoyl£ou a o v , T a 8 ' dXXa rf\g rvxr\S-  (Alk 788f)  Similarly Herakles' speech to Admetos following his final entrance w i t h the veiled w o m a n begins by announcing i n gnomic form the topic of the first half of the speech: 148  <fyi\ov  rrpos dvSpa  xpi)  Xeyeiv eAeu9eptos,  " AS|ir]Te, u.ou.(j>ds' 8 ' oux  UTTO  aTTXayxvois exetv  aiytovT ' •  (Alk 1008-10)  Similar gnomic headlines open speeches at Hkld 297-303, Med 446f, Andr 957f, Ion 585f  28  (cf. also the prologue-speeches of Hkld, Or, and S. Trach).  A frequent pattern for opening an argument is the sequence i n w h i c h a gnome is stated, then its antithesis or converse, followed immediately b y the application of one leg of the antithesis to the present person or case.  29  Thus for  example A g a m e m n o n laments the lack of freedom w h i c h his high status imposes b y means of a reflection comparing euyeveia and Suayeveia:  T] Suayeveia 8 ' to? ex^L TL XP 1 -I - ' T  CTI  J  W  K a l y d p 8aKp0aai paiSta)? auToIs exeL aTTavTa T ' eiTretV avoX|3a TrdvTcr TOV  oyKov  eycb y d p  TOOL  8e yevraitoi fyvoiv  TrpocrrdTriv  exoLiev etc.  TCOL  T '  8e  TOO  OX^WL  (3LOU  8ouXeuon.ev. (IA 446-51)  For the sake of a full and balanced treatment contrasting gnomes are voiced, then each is applied to a group (auToXs i n 447 are the low-born, and i n 450 A g a m e m -  Ion reacts to Xouthos' request he come to Athens: "Things look different at a distance and up close". The headline indicates (a bit mysteriously) Ion will subject the invitation to a cautious examination; the following couplet confirms this, and then the examination is carried out (see discussion in I.E above). Friis Johansen notes that the "near vs. far" theme is recapitulated in 621-3 (General Reflection 136f). 2  8  This has been called "foil-antithesis" by Friis Johansen (General Reflection 31, and index s.v.): Euripidean passages he discusses are Med 215-21, Hkld 1-5, Andr 319-23, Hik 1082f, Tro 68896, Hel 713-5, Phoin 469-72, Or 126-31, IA 446-50. The type is perhaps not so well-established as this list would suggest, since (1) Friis Johansen himself finds the required antithesis poorly realised in Hkld lii and Hel 713-5, and argues for lacunae in those passages; (2) Diggle's text deletes Andr 321-3, Hel 713-9, Or 127. But Friis Johansen argues convincingly for an antithesis that adds force to the following argument in a number of these passages.  2  9  149  non speaks of the high-born, explicitly including himself i n that class), and finally the present case of Agamemnon's o w n predicament is brought u p .  Often an opening verse or two serve (as does Alk 773, quoted above) to highlight the gnomic utterance that w i l l headline a speech's subject or open its first argument. In Med 215f, Hipp 373-6, Her 60-2 this function is filled b y not m u c h more than a vocative formula and a bit of narrative; i n Hik 195-7 a bit of narrative and the statement to be refuted precede the headline proper; Her 1313 constitutes or completes a proem highlighting the gnome of 1314f; Hkld 1 and Tro [634-5] similarly point the following gnome. This attention-getting device may grow from a simple Xe£co 8e (Elek 1013), Aeyoiu.' dv (IT 939), aKovoar  ' (IT  578), to an elaborate introduction i n w h i c h a comment on the preceding speech leads to a formal justification of the speaker's right to make answer, followed i n turn b y a gnomic headline:  KOLU[S6S  errel  y' 6  Kfjpu£  8 ' dyalva  K a l TrapepydT'ns'  Aoytov.  K a l CTU T O V S ' riyoovlaoo,  au.iXkav ydp a u Trpou9r|Kas Aoytov. ouSev Tupdvvou 8uo"LieveoTepov rroXei, etc. aKOu' •  (Hik 426-9)  Proems referring to the speech-situation or the interlocutor m a y grow into independent reflections w h i c h themselves involve gnomic material.  Often  these reflections apply such topoi as the dangerous character of the adversary's too facile eloquence, or various kinds of disadvantage the speaker himself faces. A s w e have seen w i t h other material of a similarly "conventional" nature, these reflections m a y contribute interesting details to Euripides' presentation of the characters involved, but we must not expect to find "portraiture" i n every detail presented i n a rhetorical context. 150  A s an example of a succinct opening gnome that is clearly applied to the present case, w e may consider the beginning of Teiresias' reply to Pentheus: brav Xa$r\i TIS T W V Xoyuiv dvr\p oo$b<s KaXds d<f)opu.ds\ ov \i.ey' epyov ev Xeyeiv ov 8 ' euTpoxov \xev yXtiooav fypov&v exets ev Tots Xoyoiai 8 ' OUK eveioi 001 fypeveg.  (Bak 266-9)  Before answering Pentheus' speech, he w i l l comment o n speech-making i n general. Eloquence i n the absence of a sound case  (raXou  ac^opum)  is criticised,  though Pentheus' speech has hardly been eloquent or self-consciously rhetorical. Teiresias goes on to identify abuse of eloquence w i t h the  KCCKO?  TroXtTris  (270f),  30  although he is addressing the king of Thebes. This material is thus "conventional".  31  Other proem references to the dangers of (the opponent's) eloquence,  or the simplicity and honesty of one's o w n presentation: cf. Med 579-83, Hipp 486f (here again, even less appropriately than i n Bak 270f, eloquence is identified as a danger affecting political life), 984f, Hek 1187-94, Phoin 469-72  3 2  Characters begin rhetorical speeches by expressing doubts about whether to speak at all i n Andr 184-91, Hik 297-300,  33  and b y calling attention to particular  disadvantages affecting them i n Hipp 983-91, Elek 1013-7, Tro 914f, Or 544-50  3 4  In  The tranmitted text seems faulty and even with the usual remedies it makes difficult sense. See Dodds' note ad loc. 3  0  If anyone comes off looking like a slick-speaking Sophist here, it is Teiresias— but I don't think Euripides intends us to form that view of him. Neither is it his intention though to attack here in his own voice "the greatest danger of ancient as of modern democracies", as Dodds supposes (ad 266-71). 3 1  These ideas elsewhere: choral comments in Tro 966-8 and Phoin 526f charge the preceding speakers with eloquence in a bad cause; in Hek 1238f Hekabe's speech is greeted as a case of eloquence in a good cause. The eloquence of demagogues: Hek 254-7, Hik 412-6, Or [904-13]. See Ober Mass and Elite 170-7 for the orators' exploitation of these themes. 3  2  3  3  Similar doubts are realised in Hek 736-53 and Elek 900-6 through dialogue.  3  4  In Hkld 181-3, Iolaos cites rather advantages: a rare case of "flattering the court".  151  all these passages the common rhetorical topos, "difficulties facing the speaker", is present.  This may be presented through a straightforward reference to the  35  details of the case. For example, i n Or 544-50 Orestes, reluctant to make answer to Tyndareos' charges, refers to his accuser's "venerability" (yfjpas 549) as inhibiting h i m , as w e l l as his o w n undoubted guilt (dvoaLOs ei\ii 546); no generalising is involved.  Speakers call attention to disadvantages i n various other ways: at  36  IA 1211 Iphigeneia utters a pathetic impossible w i s h , indicating she knows she lacks the powers of persuasion necessary to turn Agamemnon's m i n d against the sacrifice;  37  Jason's proem i n Med 522 gamely accepts the challenge of answering  Medeia's charges, noting only he w i l l need to navigate like a KeSvo? vabs OLaKoaTpo^os through the tempest of her rancour. But this motif often lends itself to treatment i n general terms. A n d r o mache i n Andr 184ff, i n deciding whether to answer Hermione's speech of accusation and insult, introduces comparisons that w i d e n the context: 184-5  The rash injustice of youth:  186-8  I fear harm as your slave,  189-90  for arrogant people hate being bested b y inferiors.  191  But I w i l l not betray myself.  Solmsen (Antiphonstudien 65-9) reviews examples of this motif in Euripides, Antiphon and Plato's Apology. He finds close similarities between Hipp 986-91 (see II.D above) and Ant. V. Iff, Hek 1187-94 (see IV.D below) and Ant. V. 5, Eur. fr. 67 and Ant. V. 6. Solmsen concludes that although one cannot entirely exclude the possibility of direct influence of Antiphon on Euripides in these passages (though he notes that the early date of Alkmaion in Psophis, the assumed source of fr. 67, would seem to rule this out), more likely the two authors are both drawing on material that was already conventional in the opening of defense speeches. 3  5  It is not certain, however, that the transmitted text gives the correct order of lines. The transposition of vss. 546f found in edd. (post 550 trai. Hartung, post 556 Diggle) arises from the fact that the point made there seems more naturally to open the speech's argumentation than to belong to the proem proper. See Diggle (Euripidea 364-70) for, di Benedetto (ad 545-50) against the transposition. 3  6  Cf. the wish expressed by Hekabe in Hek 836-40: euoi Xepca etc. , 3  7  152  yevoiTO  ^Ooyyos  ev  Ppaxiocri Kal  The points made here form no part of Andromache's rational rebuttal of Hermione's charges; they focus entirely on the speech-situation itself. But the reflection has, besides its context-broadening function, a clear "rhetorical" (i.e. "point-scoring") purpose; it creates prejudice against Hermione's case b y undermining her personally while portraying Andromache as an underdog whose resources are limited to maturity, righteousness and self-respect.  38  In her apologia addressed to Elektra i n Elek 1011-50, Klytaimestra refers to the KotKT) 86£a that affects her and makes it difficult for her to defend herself. H e r speech begins w i t h a couplet that follows naturally from the preceding dialogue, but also provides a headline for the speech's argumentative content: A g a m e m non was himself to blame for his o w n death.  39  But before arguing this point i n  detail, Klytaimestra pauses to focus attention on the disadvantage under w h i c h she labours. Here is the most generally accepted text:  Ae£co  8e  -  yuvalica, cos  -  M-€V  KCUTOI  y\c6aoT|L rrap'  SiKaiov  OTav  TTLKpoTng  rjiiLV,  L i a B o v T a s , r\v \iev oruyelv  86£'  40  KOLKT\  eveori  o u KaXcos'  -  TO  TIS'  Trpdy|j.a  8e  Luaetv exr)L, 8e u-fj, T L 8el oTuyetv;  d£[.cog el  (Elek 1013-17)  Somewhat similar is Hik 297-300, where Aithra overcomes, again for the sake of her own self-esteem, the inhibitions she feels against speaking out to Theseus; she recognises people assume the rule dxpetov Tds y u v d i K a s eS Xeyeiv. But in that passage there is no implied antagonism. 3  8  Point well made by M . Lloyd, Agon 61. He notes also that the speech ends with a balancing couplet suggesting it was just to kill Agamemnon (1049f). 3  9  I have commented above (IV.A) on the two conjectures in vs. 1016. The text as quoted here is printed by Paley, Weil (1st ed.), Nauck (3rd ed.); it is accepted also in notes ad loc by Denniston (whose comm. prints Murray's text) and Cropp (whose ed. uses Diggle's text). Weil later had doubts (Diggle Euripidea 164 n.19). Murray differs only in printing ex ! ? 1016; for Diggle's view see below. 4  0  1  153  1  m  Klytaimestra clearly associates herself w i t h women affected b y an evil reputation, and clearly appeals for a proper hearing of the facts of her case. A s to details of interpretation, editors differ. Denniston paraphrases (ad 1013-7): I w i l l tell y o u what I think of Agamemnon. But a maligned w o m a n has a sharp edge to her tongue. In m y opinion, such bitterness is to be deplored. But she should not be condemned out of hand on account of it: she should be judged on the facts alone.  O n this interpretation, Klytaimestra concedes that her o w n account of the case may seem harsh, but insists it should not be judged o n its tone alone. Diggle finds this fails to make sense of the \iev/8l relationship i n 1015;  41  moreover he  feels Klytaimestra should not concede the point implicit i n ov  KCIXUJS  emends to ou  .  KO.KCOS',  translating:  4 2  He  W h e n a w o m a n gets a bad reputation, there is a certain bitterness i n her tongue: i n m y opinion, not improperly. But people should learn the facts before deciding. If the facts justify hatred, then it is right to hate; otherwise, w h y hate?  C r o p p , i n his 1988 notes on the play, like Denniston sees Klytaimestra conceding that a w o m a n suffering a poor reputation may (but w o u l d do better not to) adopt a harsh w a y of speaking. H e criticises Diggle's interpretation, w h i c h he says "gives an o d d argument", i n that it has Klytaimestra invite us to examine the facts of her o w n case before deciding whether to hate her for displaying the outward signs of a w o m a n suffering from a KOKT] 86£a  4 3  H e adds the possibility  "This paraphrase misses the direction in which the reader is pointed by the Liev and Se of 1015. These particles suggest that two opinions or attitudes are to be balanced". Diggle's discussion is at Euripidea 163-5 (the chapter is his 1977 ICS paper).  4 1  4  2  For the same reason, Wecklein wrote ii[ilv in 1015.^  Cropp (ad Elek 1013-7 ) paraphrases Diggle's argument: "My bad reputation causes me to speak harshly..., but I should not be hated for that (i.e, speaking harshly), unless the facts (about my quarrel with Ag.) justify my bad reputation".  4  3  154  yXcoaariL i n 1014 may refer to the speech of others, i.e. the woman's detractors.  44  C r o p p sees the essential contrast as between talk and facts: people are to learn the facts before deciding whether the maligned woman's sharp talk (or others' sharp talk about her) justifies hatred. But if yXtoao-rj i n 1014 refers to talk about the w o m a n , then 1013f say only: " A w o m a n w i t h a bad reputation is apt to be i l l spoken of". This w o u l d not be Euripides at his best. W h e n the rhetorical function of the passage is considered, it seems to me that Klytaimestra must make a concession of exactly the sort that Diggle rules out, and that yXcoaari as essentially a synonym for 86£a likewise rules out: she must call attention to a problem that w i l l tend to compromise her presentation of her case. Klytaimestra suggests that her o w n "bitterness" constitutes a barrier making a fair assessment difficult, and asks (like many another Greek orator)  45  that the flaws and imperfections of her presentation be overlooked and the truth of her case alone used as a basis for judgement. The phrase i n vs. 1015a is quasiparenthetical, and follows a gnome about maligned women that is to be contrasted w i t h a gnome about fair hearing. This gives the following sense: " A maligned w o m a n may speak bitterly, and I concede that is not a pretty thing. But the rule to follow is this: hear the facts and then either hate or don't hate o n the merits of the case".  46  4  4  The idea (an earlier suggestion of Matthiae) is dismissed by Diggle (ibid 164 n. 21).  4  5  Cf., e.g., Antiphon V. 5, Plato Apology 17 C-D. Cropp (LCM 7[1982]: 53) compares Ar. Ach  368ff. The contrast is thus not between the "opinions or attitudes" of Klytaimestra herself (Trap ' r\ulv) and the unspecified person or persons forming the subject of oTuyetv, but between the bitterness typical of the maligned woman's presentation and the necessity of reaching a fair judgement based on the facts. Thus I see the Se of 1015 as introducing adversatively a gnome that contradicts the implications of the material in 1013f; the \iev of the parenthetical phrase in 1015 should be regarded as u.ev solitarium of the type Denniston documents at GP 381f. See further Cropp, loc. cit. 4  6  155  The series of reflections on the speech-situation opening the agon speeches i n Phoin are of a more philosophical cast. Polyneikes' proem makes the point that slick eloquence is antipathetic to truth: otTrXoOs 6 u.09os rf\s dXr|9eias' ect>u, KOU  TTOIKIXCJV  eX y P voo&v ev £L  a  Set TavSix' ep\ir\vev\i.dTU)v Kcapov  OLVTOL auTcoL  6 8 ' dSiKos- X6yo<s cj)apu.dKcov 8eiTai ao<j)tov.  (Phoin 469-72)  Mastronarde (ad 469-72) suggests that this proem constitutes "an attack on sophistic conceptions of truth and on positive evaluations of rhetoric"; it is this, but it is also an instance of up-to-date speech-making in the approved sophistic manner. I think we sympathise w i t h Polyneikes in spite of this posturing, not because of it: that is, it is "neutral" for our understanding of the character. The proem of Eteokles that follows is "sophistic" not only i n form but i n its provocative content, and so forms part of the unsympathetic presentation of this character. Eteokles begins his speech: el  TTdai  TauTO KaXov e<j)u oofyov T ' du.a,  OUK r\v dv duxfnXeKTOs dv9panTOig epis' vvv 8 ' oi)9'  6u.0L0f  TrXf]v 6iA3|idaa.L  -  ou8ev  OUT '  loov PpoToI?  T O 8 ' epyov OUK eariv ToSe.  (Phoin 499-502)  47  Friis Johansen paraphrases: "Discord arises because there is no objective truth".  48  The proem here virtually affirms that there can be no meaningful  debate between the two brothers; and in fact Eteokles' speech w i l l not attempt to address any of the points Polyneikes raised. Iokaste gives the third speech i n this 4  7  Text as printed by Mastronarde; Diggle reads Markland's ovo^aaw in 502.  General Reflection 78. Mastronarde (ad Phoin 499-502) sees the thought inverted in Or 492ff: Tyndareos' opening words imply the claim that "good and evil are plain to all". 4  8  156  series a gnomic opening: "The experience that comes w i t h age gives one an advantage i n w i s d o m over the young". In this scene, Euripides has used these abstract formulations to contrast the three speakers' points of v i e w i n the strongest possible terms.  49  2. " C l o s i n g " Uses  W e have seen some of the ways i n which gnomic statements and longer general reflections may open a topic w i t h i n a persuasive or argumentative speech. Often an argument is summarised or concluded through a general utterance.  50  Thus Admetos closes his speech condemning Pheres' unwillingness  to die on his son's behalf w i t h a general observation about old age and death:  lidrnv d p ' ol  yepovres euxovTou Qavelv,  yfjpas ityeyovres Kal LiaKpov XP  0V0V  Plou  -  fjv 8 ' eyyug eX9r|i 9dvaTog, oi)8elg |3ouA.eTai 9vfjiaKeLV, T O yfjpas' 8 ' OVKIT ' e a r ' ai)Tols (3api3.  (Alk 669-72)  Similar accusatory generalisations close speeches at Med 569-75 ("But y o u w o m e n have reached the point of thinking that..."), Hek 328-31 ("But y o u barbarians don't treat your o w n people w e l l , nor..."); i n each case the interlocutor is subsumed into a group whose besetting vice is described. In a more reflective vein, Phaidra closes her troubled thoughts o n the suffering children endure over the vices of parents w i t h the ominous observation that "time w i l l reveal all" (Hipp 428-30). Theseus closes his speech acceding to the appeal of Aithra on behalf of the suppliants w i t h a gnome o n the 4  9  The scene is discussed in II.E above.  Note that proem-reflections too may be rounded off with concluding gnomic material: cf. Hipp 988f, Hek 254-7, Bak 270f, IA 380b, etc. 5  0  157  duties children have to their parents (Hik 361-4). Eteokles justifies his u n w i l lingness to accommodate his brother's legitimate demands w i t h a gnome that puts his position i n the strongest possible light: elrrep ydp dSiKeiv XP !. TupavnSos' ire pi e v KdXXiaTov d8iKe1>, TdXXa 8 ' euae fietV xP <^ 1  (Phoin 524f)  Andromache's farewell to her small son, for whose safety she is offering to trade her o w n life, ends w i t h an affirmation of the blessings of parenthood (Andr 41820).  51  Elektra's diatribe addressed to the dead Aigisthos closes w i t h a finely-  wrought variation o n the "look to the end" motif (Elek 953-6). Occasionally though w e are offered a platitude that makes the effect of being the merest formality:  "Not many a man is as good as his father" (Hkld 327f), "Helpless is the  house of unlucky folk" (Or 70).  52  The process of concluding w i t h a gnome is sometimes given additional weight through a formula focusing attention o n the pronouncement:  'ev ovvre\iovaa  TrdvTa  viKfjaio Xoyov  TO 4>tOS T08 ' dv8p(jJTTOLO"LV f]8LO"TOV (3X£TT6ll', Td  vepQe  8'  (IA 1249-51)  ovbev  53  The thought is voiced again in a conclusive reflection by Herakles, just before madness strikes (Her 634-6). Cf. Her 280f, IA 902.  5  1  More speech-closing gnomes that summarise the speaker's position: Hik 953f, Ion 1045-7, Hel 757, 1617f, Or [602-4], IA 373-5, etc. Empty platitudes are the rule rather than the exception in choral couplets. De Grouchy (diss. 27-9) defends the triteness of many gnomic passages, supposing that this represents a conscious choice.of the poet aimed at arousing pathos: "In the case of Tro 1203-6, for instance, the 'threadbare' quality may itself produce a powerful impression by throwing into relief the sheer intensity of Hecuba's suffering and the inadequacy of any 'normal' consolation in the horrific abnormality of genocide" (28f). But, as we have seen, Euripidean characters suffering from profound grief and despair are yet capable of very sophisticated expression and argumentation. It would therefore seem that Euripides has simply not placed a high value on cleverness or aptness in writing gnomes, especially those that conclude a speech. 5  2  5  3  Cf. Hek 1177-82 (where the focusing process is very elaborate), Hel 513f, Phoin [438-40].  158  A gnomic "tag" introduced by 8e may close an argument. The function is sometimes to contradict something i n the preceding material, for e x a m p l e : e[iol yap ou8' o rrpd^eiv  TL  (3poTotg  TTCKTL XeLTreTcu  eXfTis, ouSe  £weoTiv  54  KAeTTTO|j.aL  fypevas  KeSvov f)8u 8 ' ecm  Kal  SoKelv.  (Tro 681-3)  O r it may introduce a final stage of the argument (e.g. Elek 530f, discussed i n III.C above), or point out the relevance of a point just made (e.g. Andr 684f, Her 201-3).  Closing gnomic thoughts expand i n a few speeches to become reflections of some length. argument.  55  These may serve to summarise or fortify the speaker's  Hermione, suffering a crisis of nerves over her mistreatment of  Andromache and fearing for her safety, identifies at once (Andr 929-42) the cause of her o w n failure as a wife: elaoSoL  KaKcov  yuyaLKcov  were to blame for her  arrogance and complacency. H a v i n g acknowledged this truth about her o w n life, she proceeds to develop the same point i n general terms (943-53): a man w i t h a wife should never let other women come and go i n his household, instructors i n vice; n o , keep the doors barred, or you're inviting trouble! Some other closing reflections rise above this level. Polyxene, i n her speech of self-dedication (discussed i n I.D above), has made much of her high status and the expectations she has grown up w i t h for a royal marriage; even if she could evade death, she has lost all this. She closes b y telling her mother not to offer the Greeks any further resistance, but rather to endorse her decision. She  5  4  This function is more strongly emphasised using  KCUTOI:  note Hik 484, Elek 932,1013, Tro 671.  Some of these lack the kind of coherent development that properly merits the name "reflection": e.g. Hik 506-10 is better regarded as a medley of gnomic pronouncements.  5 5  159  grounds this request w i t h a reflection in w h i c h the person unused to suffering is implicitly compared w i t h the lower status person, accustomed to the yoke:  6OTIS  yap  OUK  elio9e yeuea9ai  KCIKIOV  c|)6pei \iev, dXyel 8' auxev' eimGeis Cuyak -  Qavihv 8 '  fj  £GJV  TO  -  dv e'ir\ \idXXov eiiTuxeaTepos  ydp Cnv  M-T)  KaXtos u.eyag  (Hek 375-8)  TTOVOS.  For a person such as Polyxene, death constitutes a  TUXTI  superior to life. The  reflection uses a general context and highly charged terms (dXyos, T T O V O S , Cuyov, Cf\v u.f) KaX&s on the one side, euTuxiis on the other) to recapitulate the argument earlier made on a personal level. Some closing reflections serve not to recast an argument already put, but to comment on a general issue. Teiresias in Phoin has to tell K r e o n that Menoikeus must be sacrificed if Thebes is to be saved. The entire scene (Phoin 834-959) demonstrates v i v i d l y the difficulties of being a prophet, a theme that attaches to Teiresias in nearly all his appearances in tragedy. Teiresias' final speech i n the scene addresses to Kreon arguments in favour of the sacrifice (93052); w i t h a formula of transition  (Td  \ikv Trap'  T\\LU>V T r d v T '  ex s> 953a) he closes eL  this section, then addresses an order to his attendant, asking to be led away. A s Teiresias departs, he reflects ruefully on his trade. The reflection takes the form of a d i l e m m a :  56  the prophet may tell people the bitter truth and make enemies,  or offend the god by telling compassionate lies. Therefore A p o l l o alone should prophesy, who needs fear no one. Here the reflection takes as its point of departure not the arguments put in the preceding speech and scene, but a problem arising out of the situation. Comparable reflections likewise follow breaks i n a speech: Medeia's reflection on the lack of a clear xapaKTfjp indicating  5  6  See  Ch.  Ill,  n.22.  160  the worth of a man (Med 516-9, following an apostrophe to Z e u s ) ;  57  Hekabe's  reflections on the fickleness of fate (Hek 623-8, following an apostrophe at 619) and on the skill of persuasion (Hek 814-20, following a pathetic self-apostrophe at 812); Adrastos' disquisition on valour and education (Hik 911-7, following a change of address at 909).  58  3. " G r o u n d i n g " Uses  V e r y often gnomes are used to support or corroborate points made w i t h i n an argument or appeal. The connection to the preceding material is usually made w i t h ydp. So Medeia argues, i n response to Jason's offer of material aid:  OUT'  dv £evoio"L  TOLCTL  csdls  xPWa' ^® 1  dv TL 8e£aLLiea9a, u.riS' fiulv 8L8OIT KOIKOD ydp dvSpos Scop' 6vr\oiv OVK e x  OUT'  e u  (Med 616-8)  The gnome, "The gifts of a base man bring no benefit", is put forward as giving the underlying reason for her refusal. Medeia thus offers i n support of her decision the authority of a statement presenting (it is implied) common wisdom.  5 9  The statement corroborated may itself be gnomic. The ydp-gnome i n that case gives the Aristotelian "epilogue" i n w h i c h the gnome is e x p l a i n e d :  5  7  The passage is discussed below (IV.D) as a "utopian reflection".  5  8  See note 78 below.  60  Similar are: (with ydp) Hkld 200f, 327f, Hipp 988f, Andr 159f, 189f, 213f, 370f, Hik 481-3, Elek 1084f, Tro 989f, IT 391, 678b, Ion 597b, Hel [906-8], etc.; (with cog) Her 305f; (with asyndeton, cf. K - G II.344f) Med 462f, Andr 173-6, 207f, 639f, Or 665f.  5  9  6  0  See above n.3. With the quoted passage cf. Hipp 912f, Hek 378, Elek 1074f, Or 668, etc.  161  fyeiiyeiv OKOLIOV dvdp' e x 9 p ° X P ^ y , oo^oloi 8 ' e i K e i v ral Te9pau.u.eK)Ls KaXtos p a i o v y d p aLSoI o' \mo$a\(±>v cbCX' dv re\LOi<s. e  y  -  (Her 299-301)  The point being corroborated may be merely i m p l i e d , e.g. i n Admetos' argument addressed to Herakles o n the matter of the veiled w o m a n :  Kal  Trios a K p a i ^ v f i s  eoTai;  ev viois  aTpcodjtoLievTi  rbv f^Piov9', 'HpaKXeis, o u pdiSiov  (Alk 1052-4)  e'ipyeiv  The rhetorical question implies the w o m a n could not be safely kept among y o u n g men; the gnome supports this w i t h a general statement about the latter. A difficult passage is that i n Hel where Menelaos convinces himself there is nothing surprising i n the apparent coincidences w i t h w h i c h he has been confronted. After doubting whether there can be a second Zeus i n Egypt (Hel 489-91), or another Sparta, Tyndareos, and so on (492-6a), he seems befuddled (496b) until a gnomic thought resolves (incorrectly and so ironically) his dTropCa:  eyoj TTOXXOI  \iev  ydp,  exu>  TL XP ! 1  ais el^aaiv, ev TroXXf|i  6v6u.aTa ravr'  yvvr\ y u v a i K L  OVK  x®  0Vi  ex TTOXLS TroXei ' • oi)8ev ovv B a u L L a a T e o v . 0 U C T L  T  Xeyeiv.  K a L  (Hel 496-9)  A s Kannicht points out (ad 496-500) the connection of thought between 496 and 497 is not immediately clear. H e suggests the y d p - g n o m e here refers itself to an unspoken 8e-clause implied b y the u.ev-clause of 496: e y w [lev OVK exco TL XP ! 1  XeyeLv  < dXXoL 8 ' dv exoLey >.  I find it simpler to understand as implied i n  OUK exto TL xP ! XeyeLv the sense: "These arguments (of 489-96a) seem strong but 1  not decisive". V s . 496b then expresses not a paralyzing sense of d-rropLa but a suspension of judgement for the moment; the following words voice the 162  argument o n the other side and therewith the reason for this suspension (hence ydp), and i n voicing this argument Menelaos immediately finds it convincing. A very common sequence is the gnome following a final appeal, comm a n d or parainesis; since this is often at speech-end it may take on some of the "conclusive" function I have discussed above, i n summarising or pointing the speaker's case. A good example is the close of Odysseus' speech of appeal addressed to Polyphemos: Trapes  Lidpyov  TO  afjg yvdQou,  TO  8 ' euo-e(3es  rf\s SuaaePeias dv9eAo£>' rroXXolaL ydp KepSr) TTOvripd £r)uiai> f|LLeu[>aTO.  (Kyk 310-2)  A monitory gnome, presenting as common w i s d o m the proposition that those w h o reap evil gains come to a bad end, is offered i n support of Odysseus' desperate p l e a .  61  Often a rule is introduced i n order to contradict or ridicule an argument or some behaviour that has been described, or to w h i c h the preceding constitutes an exception or abuse: such a rule is normally introduced w i t h 8e. The function is the opposite of corroboration, i n that a general truth is offered i n opposition to rather than i n support of the preceding. Thus Lykos attacks Herakles, the archer,  OS O U T T O T  ' damS' eax  e  Trpos  Xaidi.  xP e  i  oi)8' fjX9e X6yxr)s eyyus dXXd TO£ ' exwv, KaKiOTOv  orrXov,  rf\i  c|)uyf|i Trpoxeipos- fjv.  Similar are Med 263-5, Hipp 120, 474f, Andr 177-80, 230f, 621f, 952f, Hek 375-8, 844f, Hik 331, 911, Her 309-11, Ion 373, 398-400, 646f, Hel 941-3, Or 454f. Generally these gnomes follow directly on an imperative, or an expression summarising an appeal already made; are introduced by ydp; come at speech-end. The connection is made with t o s in Alk 800, Or 805f; with asyndeton in IT 1064, Phoin 584. The same grounding of an imperative with a gnome is achieved using the reverse order (gnome preceding appeal, etc.) in Hik 917, fr. 609. The normal sequence is seen also in appeals at other points in a speech: Alk 304-10, Hik 476-80, Hel 898-904, IA 1218f. Note that speechconcluding imperatives may be supported by ydp-statements that are not of a general but a specific character (e.g. Tro 403-5). 6  1  163  dvSpos 8 ' eXeyx ? ouxi TO£ ' eiRJjuxias' 0  dXX'  dg  Lievcov  fiXeirei  Sopog Taxelav dXoKa  re  KmrnSepKeTou  TO^IV  eu.(3epwg.  (Her  159-64)  "The archer keeps his distance, ready for flight; but the real test of manhood comes i n face-to-face battle". Gnomes are similarly brought up i n arguing against a position or a trait attributed to the opponent in Andr 207, 594-9, Hipp 426, 911, Elek [390], Hel 636-8.  We have seen a number of formal patterns exploited by Euripides for the introduction of gnomic material into rhetorical speeches and arguments. A few points may be stressed by w a y of summary: (1) Euripides puts "general rules" into the speeches of his characters w i t h great frequency; (2) these rules are presented using a small number of formal patterns ("opening" gnomes offer a headline i n advance of an argument, "closing" gnomes summarise a speaker's position, "grounding" gnomes support a point just made); (3) certain rhetorical situations particularly lend themselves to gnomic treatment (e.g., proem reflections on speech and debate, closing accusatory reflections, the grounding of an appeal w i t h a moral maxim); (4) on the level of content, these patterns are applied without distinction in the presentation of gnomes having a very wide range of reference. In the next sections I shall discuss some forms for the presentation of general rules and reflections in two specialised situations.  C. Realisations and Challenges to Common Sense  G n o m i c expressions are normally called into service for the purpose of illuminating the present special case; the latter is seen as an instance of the rule 164  stated i n the former. It is implicit i n the unargued presentation of the gnomes used i n persuasive contexts that the speaker wishes the thought to be accepted as "common sense". Thus the Tutor i n Medeia introduces a gnome w i t h a formula that could apply everywhere: ToSe, tos rrdg T L S auTov T O U rreXas LidXXov cbiXel etc. ctpn  yLyvcoaKeLS  (Med 85f)  "Are y o u just realising that...?": that is, everyone knows. Though selfconsciously paradoxical statements may be given an "epilogue" to clarify their meaning, they w i l l seldom be corroborated w i t h examples or supported b y further argument. Occasionally, the present case is specifically identified as a violation of a general rule (Alk 77Ai, Andr 595f); or a tenet of common sense is rejected, for the sake of scoring points i n a heated argument, on the basis of its failure to cover the present case (Alk 669ff, Andr 645f). But i n a number of passages whose dramatic character is reflective rather than persuasive a character seems to respond to a situation b y drawing a general conclusion that is clearly at odds w i t h normal expectations, and for a moment it seems common sense is inadequate for explaining the w o r l d . Passages of this type discussed below are Hek 864-8, Hik 734-6, Elek 367-90, Hek 956-61, Or 1155-62, Hek 592-602.  62  Hekabe, after hearing Agamemnon's embarrassed reply (Hek 850-63) to her appeal for help i n her revenge plot against Polymestor, quickly comes to a shocking conclusion about the nature of the w o r l d :  Hkld 297-303 is a reflection that arises out of the action in a similar way to these; but the content is uncontroversial and nothing marks it (as expressions like 4>e0 do elsewhere) as a sudden realisation. 6  2  165  OVK e o n 9vr|Tcui' 6 O T L S e o T ' eXeu9epos" fj xpTlM-aTcov y d p 800X65 e o T i v fj TrXfj9os eipyouca  CLVTOV  xP^\ ^ G  a[  T r o X e o g f\  f\  VOLXCOV  TUX^S  ypac|)ai  (Hek 864-7)  f ! K a T a yvwLrryi> T p o T r o i g . 11  Solmsen writes: " A s so often, Euripides is going out of his way. N o n e of the obstacles mentioned actually applies to A g a m e m n o n (although comes close to  cn-potTos).  TrXf|9os  rroXeos  It cannot help Hecuba's case to theorize about the fact  that nobody is 'free'.... N o t to Hecuba, but to Euripides has this realization come, and he sees fit at this juncture to announce it".  63  This is an entirely reasonable  view of the passage, so long as it is not implied that the announcement someh o w spoils the scene: i n fact, Agamemnon's reply has taken the shape it has i n order to provide for the insertion of this interesting reflection. Similar is the realisation Adrastos experiences u p o n hearing the news of the just victory of Theseus i n the battle to recover' the corpses of the A r g i v e heroes. W i t h a sober reflection o n the vanity of human wishes, he implicitly acknowledges the injustice of his o w n war against Thebes:  to Z e O ,  TL  SfJTa  robs  TaXaiTTtopous'  ppOTOus  <\>povelv X e y o u a i ; CTOU y d p edjripTfJLLeBa 8pco|iev re T O L C U ) 9 ' dv oi) T u y x d i r i L s 9eXtov.  (Hik 734-6)  In Elek Orestes, faced w i t h the noble character of the  auTOupyog  64  w h o is his  sister's husband, delivers a reflective monologue that has no persuasive purpose  6  3  Intellectual Experiments 147.  This, like the Hek passage just above, has the form of a "paradoxical" gnome, with explanatory epilogue; for an impatient rhetorical question implying a statement at odds with common wisdom, cf. Andr 645f. 6  4  166  i n the play, but w h i c h nevertheless uses familiar rhetorical techniques of presentation and argument. The speech begins w i t h an introductory extrametrum cpeu that sets the tone of "sudden realisation".  65  Orestes then states a  general rule (367): OUK ear ' d.Kpi|3es ovSev els euavSplav. A gnomic epilogue (368) clarifies this somewhat obscure claim, by indicating that a T a p a y u . 6 s  TOJV  (J)i3creGJV p p o T c o v is behind the problem. A series of examples follows, substan-  tiating the rule (369-72). Then the matter is investigated using a hypophora sequence of a familiar sort: three alternative criteria for discerning euav8pia are proposed i n rhetorical question form (viz., wealth, poverty, prowess i n war), and each is rejected, w i t h neat variation i n the manner of arguing against each (3738). In 380-2 the application to the present case is made. Next Orestes chides those (his imaginary interlocutors, addressed i n second person) w h o maintain the conventional w i s d o m (383-5).  66  In 386-90 the class of people the  auToupyos'  represents are praised as the best householders and citizens, and contrasted w i t h cu  adpKeg  ai  Kevai  4>pevtov, dydA.Lj.aT ' dyopdg. The final point is made that it is  (j)uaLs and evi\ivxla (that is, natural euavSpla) that make a man brave i n battle, not sheer brawn. In 391 Orestes decides to accept the man's poor hospitality, then addresses servants, thus ending the soliloquy. The form of the speech may be tabulated as follows: 367f 369-72 373-9 380-2 383-5 386-90  paradoxical gnome w i t h epilogue substantiating examples hypophora sequence considering and rejecting each of three alternative criteria application of general rule to present case challenge to common sense "demographic" reflection  For ()>e0 used in this context compare, besides passages discussed here (Hek 864, 956, Or 1155), Hkld 552, fr. 401.  6  5  6  6  Similar apostrophes: (1st person) Hek 814, 959f, Hik 492, (2nd person) Hik 744-7.  167  The text of this reflection has been attacked b y W i l a m o w i t z , w h o deleted 373-79 and 386-90; his arguments are approved b y Friis Johansen and the deletions accepted b y D i g g l e .  67  A s i d e from the rather weak argument that 379 is  quoted b y Diogenes Laertius as a verse from Auge, the objections are to the two passages' relevance and fit. Vss. 373-9 are said by Friis Johansen to be redundant i n sense and to interrupt the natural fit of 372 w i t h 380: i n the earlier passage (368-72) birth and wealth are rejected as sure criteria of euavSpLct, whereas the following lines envision and dismiss three alternative criteria (with "wealth" and "poverty" n o w treated separately). Vss. 386-90 are attacked as simplyirrelevant to the play situation, i n that neither athleticism nor intelligence have been held u p as attainments of the classes Orestes is discussing. But the following considerations argue for the integrity of 367-85: (1) the formal process i n 36782 is that of raising and illustrating a problem (367-72), investigating it (373-8), announcing the solution (379-82);  68  (2) the hypophoric sequence is a set piece, a  unit very commonly inserted into Euripidean arguments and very commonly i n v o l v i n g three alternatives; (3) there is (pace W i l a m o w i t z , Analecta 191) no contradiction between the observation (377f) that prowess i n battle is not a useful criterion for judging euavSpia and the point (388-90) that braving the enemy's spears depends u p o n the presence of that quality  6 9  In favour of 386-90, one may  Wilamowitz, Analecta 190-3; Friis Johansen, General Reflection 95 n.140. Schadewaldt (M. u. S. 139 n.4) argued for 373-9 but against 386-90. Murray and Denniston both receive all the lines: Friis Johansen's note is largely a rebuttal to the arguments Denniston offers in favour of the lines ad locc. See also Reeve "Interpolation" 151-3; Reeve rejects 368-79, 386-90 and 396-400. 6  7  It is admittedly unparalleled to have the "illustration" of the problem anticipate (in its reference to wealth and poverty) much of the point of the investigation that will follow. See Denniston ad 373-9. 6  8  Denniston suggests (ad 377) that the rejection of military prowess in 377f as a criterion stems purely from the impracticability of its application. Cropp (ad 377-8) sees the lines in a different light, noting the importance of the fact that "military achievement and sacrifice were celebrated 6  9  168  point out that w e have seen and w i l l see other Euripidean passages where precisely this sort of content— speculation about society, class, wealth, and the good citizen— leads us far from the play situation.  70  W i t h this type of material  especially Euripides seems to have been w i l l i n g to indulge a taste— presumably an Athenian and not merely a personal taste— for rhetoric at the expense of relevance. But the lines seem poorly prepared by 384f, and very far from the point of Oresetes' reflection.  71  Something like the Tapayfios to which Orestes refers (Elek 368) is noted by Polymestor i n his initial reaction to the pathetic sight of H e k a b e :  OUK OUT'  eoTLV ouSev au  KaXoos  TTLOTOV,  OUT '  TrpdaaovTa u.f)  72  eu8o£la Trpd£eiv  KaKCJS.  c))upouai 8 ' auTa 9eol TrdXiv re K a l Trpoato TapayLiov  evTiBevTes , 1  cos  dyvioaiai  ae(3oju.ev. auTOug. dXXd TauTa \iev TL del Gpriyetv, T T P O K O T T T O V T ' . ouSev es TrpoaBev  KaKwv;  (Hek 956-61)  communally rather than individually at Athens...and the old tradition of awards for excellence...and calling on witnesses to one's valour...were in question". Citizen and state are the subject of reflections and speculations in, e.g., Med 223f, Hipp 486f, Andr [699-702], Hek 306-8, Hik 191f, 238-45, 312f, 423-5, 479f, 749f, Elek [386-90], Ion 595-606, Phoin 533-8, [1015-8], Or [907-11], Bak 270f; political demographics also surfaces in a surprising way at Her 588-92. Brackets here indicate as usual passages unacceptable to Diggle. See Schmid's survey of this material, Gesch. d. griech. Lit. I, iii. 726-32. Quite a lot of this sort of material has been attacked by Kovacs in his art. "Tyrants & Demagogues"; I have argued elsewhere in this study against some of Kovacs' conclusions. 7 0  See Cropp ad 386-90. Goldhill, "Rhetoric and Relevance" 169, argues for the lines as intended by their very ineptness and irrelevance to contribute to the presentation of Orestes as a "penny philosopher"; he concludes that "[Orestes'] poorly conceived and expressed speech comes up with utterances that seem all too easily to condemn him from his own mouth" (171). I do not see this kind of subtlety operating here. 7 1  7  2  Tapayp.os'  occurs again in a context of Gotterkritik in IT 570ff:  KeK\r|uevoi/TTTTIVCJV  ovelpwv eLalv  0118' o l  dtJjeuSeaTepoL./TTOXUS' T a p a y u o ? e v T e TOLS  PpoTeloLS.  169  oofyoi y e 0eot? evi/  Scuuoves KAV  TOTS  Here the confusion is expressly blamed upon the gods. I suspect we should regard this rather as rhetorical hyperbole, intended to sharpen our sense of the pathos of Hekabe's situation, than as an expression of a considered and enduring theology.  I shall return below to the question of criticism of the gods.  73  The same sense of a "realisation" is present i n Orestes' response to the generosity of Pylades: cpefj • ecmv  OUK  ouSev  Kpelaaov  f| (juXos cracf)fjs,  rrXoOTog, ou rvpavvis' aXoyiorov 8e TO TrXfjGog dvTdXXayu.a yevvatou cjuXou.  ov  TOL  (Or 1155f)  Orestes is suddenly reminded of the fact that wealth and power are less important than friendship, just as Polymestor has been reminded h o w ephemeral they a r e .  74  A n d here again (if W e i l is correct i n seeing i n TrXfjGos a  reference to democracy designed to balance the reference to monarchy i n TupawLsO  75  a taste for political comment has taken us i n an unexpected direction.  Hekabe's scene-closing speech (Hek 585-628) following Talthybios' report of the sacrifice of Polyxene divides neatly into three parts: a pathetic-reflective section addressed to Polyxene is separated by a clear transition (603f) from a Cf. Talthybios' reproachful address to Zeus at 488-91, and the choral observation about the gods' failing to measure up to a human standard of avveais and crania, Her 655-68. Complaints about the behaviour of individual gods as characters in the plot are a different matter: Amphitryon to Zeus (Her 339-47), Orestes of Apollo (IT 711-5, Or 285-7), Ion to Apollo (Ion 436-51). I attribute no importance to the fact that Polymestor is from his entrance an extremely unwelcome character. Schadewaldt speaks of his "feigned sympathy" (M. u. S. 138). I'm not sure even this is an appropriate point: the reflection forms a link in a chain of sympathetic reactions to the plight of the fallen queen. 7  3  Cf. Amphitryon's final words in Her : ocms S e TTXOUTOV f\ oQevos u d X X o v CJJIXCOV d y a Q t o v PouXeTai K a K t o ? <j>pov€l (1425f). Note also Elek [1097-9], where wealth and nobility in a wife are no guarantee of. o"aKJ>pova XexTV 7  4  TTeTTdcrGai  75 Weil writes (ad 1156-1157): "Le poete dit que l'amitie vaut mieux que le pouvoir, soit dans une monarchie, soit dans une republique".  170  practical section i n w h i c h servants are addressed, then an apostrophe to home, husband and self (619ff) opens another reflective section. The reflection closing the speech is of a conventional "look to the end" type: Priam's death and Hekabe's misery demonstrate that wealth and power are not sure signs of happiness, a point w e have heard before i n the play (488-96) and w i l l hear again i n Polymestor's words quoted above.  The reflection on Polyxene's death is  76  more striking:  OVKOVV  Tuxouaa XpriaTT]  Koupoi)  8'  Seivov, el  yfj  \iev  9e69ev ev cjrdxvv fyepei,  du.apToOa'  avTr\v rvxelv  coy x P v etJ  KaKOf  SLSIOCTL KotpTTOv, dv9pcoTTOL 8 '  6 \iev  rrovripos'  ouSev dXXo  TT\T\V  del  KCXKOS',  6 8 ' ea9X6s- eoQXbs ou8e auLuj)opds'  UTTO  8ie(j)9eLp' dXXd xP ! " " ? eo"T' deC; 1  $VOLV  dp'  KCIKXI  ol  0  1  0  reKovreg SLa^epouaLy r]  ex^L y e LievTOL K a l  TO  Tpo^al;  9pec|)9fii'aL  KaXcos  SiSa^LV ea9Xotr T O U T O 8 ' fjy TIS ev \s.dQr\i, oldev T O y ' . a L a x p o v K a v o v i . T O U KaXoO LJ.a9cov.  (Hek 592-602)  The nobility and grace w i t h w h i c h Polyxene has accepted death lead Hekabe to reflect that human nature has a permanence that even the earth itself lacks, i n that good soil may yet give a poor crop when conditions are unfavourable, and vice versa;  7 7  the insight is expressly described as surprising (Seivov 592). This  thought leads to consideration of the further (and highly philosophical) question whether the nobility of human individuals comes from their parents or from nurture, then to some very abstract thoughts about the nature of moral The "look to the end" motif in Euripides: with Hek 628f cf. Hkld 863-6, Andr 100-2, Elek 953-6, Tro 509f, 1203-6. 7  6  Another interesting comparison between human and plant development is made by Peleus in Andr 636-8. 7  7  171  education.  78  Neither the abstraction and apparent "irrelevance" of these final  stages of the reflection, nor any supposed contradiction of the point made i n 5925, should lead us to suspect 599-602.  79  The entire passage demonstrates v i v i d l y  Euripides' willingness to follow a point where it leads h i m , and to bring u p topics that were bound, as w i t h the political material I have mentioned, to strike his audience as bold and new-fangled— and we can infer from Aristophanes that he made such an impression. That Euripides was w i l l i n g to indulge i n this k i n d of reflection at a moment of such focused pathos is a fact w e must take as a sobering reminder of the distance between our literary conventions and his.  D. "Utopian Reflection" and "Gotterkritik"  We have seen general statements, whether of a factual or an ethical nature, offered without apparent reflection or justification i n presenting and buttressing arguments. Next w e looked at "reflective" passages i n w h i c h a character seems to develop a general statement or view i n response to a present situation: it is often stated or implied that this view contradicts expectation or common sense, and so I have referred to these reflections as "realisations". These seem generally to have an epideictic, almost extra-dramatic quality rather  Cf. the important reflection of Adrastos, Hik 911-7. There it is said that TO Tpa^fjvai u.f| KOIKWS confers aiSojs, and that this quality guarantees valour. This point is followed by the announcement that f) euavSpia is learned from instruction, like language, and that the things one is taught stay with one through life. 7  8  599-602 del. Sakorraphos, Diggle. In favour of the lines see Weil ad loc, Schadewaldt Mon. u. Selbst. 138f, Collard ad 592-602. 7  9  172  than a persuasive purpose. I turn now to passages i n w h i c h a character wishes for a fundamental change i n some aspect of the w o r l d .  80  Euripidean Utopian wishes and reflections resolve themselves into three important groups: characters wish for (1) existence of a clear indicator of honesty, righteousness, etc.; (2) a w o r l d without women; (3) a second passage through life. Without denying the up-to-date quality of these reflections, their undoubted relation to trends i n contemporary thought and expression— and without discounting the appeal they have on this score a l o n e — I w o u l d emphasise the purely "rhetorical" value of these Euripidean utterances. Hekabe attacks the specious arguments of Polymestor's defense speech b y beginning her rebuttal w i t h a reflection o n honest speech: 'Aydu.eu.vov, dvGptoTTOiaiv OUK expfjv TroTe Ttov Trpayu-dTtov rr\v yXwaaav Laxueiv TrXeov dXX' eiT' Kai  eiTe X P A  O T  ' eSpaae X P A °  ' eSei Xeyeiv,  T  av TTOvripd TOVS Xoyou? elvai aaGpous', [if] SuvaaBai TaSiK' eS Xeyeiv TroTe.  (Hek 1187-91)  Similar is the first stage of Theseus' attack on the apparently devious impassivity of Hippolytos:  cf>eu, xpTF  cages' oaTig  TL  T'  PpoTotca  TCOV CJHXCOV  TeKuxjpiov  KeiaGai Kal SidyvcoaLv  dXr|9fis  dioods re (j)Covds  eaTiv  6g T e  u.f)  c()pevwv, C))LXOS,  T r d v T a s dv9pojTrous  exei-v,  I am not concerned here with expressions of regret over a specific action, event, etc. (e.g. Med 1-15), nor again with the identification of "faulty practices" (e.g. IT 380-91). Solmsen has included both these classes in his discussion of "Utopian Wishes and Schemes of Reform", Int. Exp. 66-82. Critical comments and impossible wishes of various sorts are sometimes addressed to a god; but I am not interested here in criticism by human characters of gods as individuals (see note 72 above). 8  0  173  TTJV  \iev 8iKalav rr\v 8 '  07100?  ervyxavev,  cos f) <t)povouaa TOISLK ' e£r|XeyxeTo rrpos Tfjs SiKalas, K O U K av f]TraTo6|j.e9a..  (Hipp 925-31)  A n d Ion, exasperated by the impossibility of physically attacking his tormentor due to the protection Kreousa has claimed as a suppliant, wishes for a similar physical manifestation of good and evil:  Seivov ye  9VT|TOIS  TOUS  VOLIOUS  cos oil  KOACOS  e9r)KGv 6 9e6s oi>8' drro yvcoLiris cro^fjs TOUS  Liev ydp dStKous  |3COLX6V OI>X L C ^ L V  -  expiiv  dXX' e^eXavveiv ou8e ydp tyaveiv KOLXOV 9ecov TTOvripdL x P - TOLOL 8 ' ev-SLKOis' eL  L  (Ion 1312-16)  There are striking similarities of form i n these three passages. A n d the "utopian" idea, though not a new thought, may w e l l have been a stylish o n e .  81  But all three of these "wishes" form part of a rhetorical attack o n an opponent w h o is to be perceived as so vile that i n a just w o r l d his true nature w o u l d be plain for a l l to see. This is neither a philosophical, nor— i n spite of ol 9eol i n Ion 1313— a religious idea, but a rhetorical tactic. The same idea expressed i n these three passages as a w i s h appears elsewhere, w i t h a no less rhetorical function, as a reproach addressed to Zeus:  Commentators note related ideas in earlier poetry (Theogn. 119-24, Pind. Pyth 10. 67f, Attic Skolia 6 and 33 Diehl) and in Aesop fab. 102 Hausrath. In Euripides cf. frr. 388, 439. A n d in a lyric reflection the Chorus of old men in Her wish one could have a second life as a visible stamp of one's d p e T T | . I would suggest the idea of a true and a false voice in Hipp 925ff owes something to Homer's two gates of dreams (Od xix, 562-7). 8 1  174  to Zeu,  Sri  TL  TCKLitipL'  X P  V  I  J  0  M^ev  V  dvGpwTTOLcav  dvSptov S ' ou8eis x P a  fji  lorfaaas' aac|)fi,  XPTQ w K O K O V SLeiSevaL l P eLLTrecj)UKe aioLiaTi; T  OTUJL a K T T  6g KLpSnXos  (Med 516-9)  Medeia has begun b y saying she w i l l speak out so as to give herself relief and Jason pain through vilifying h i m (473f), and this final reproach— not really a complaint against Zeus but against Jason— completes that program. The passages wishing for a "utopian" w o r l d without w o m e n likewise occur i n heated rhetorical contexts. Jason rebutting Medeia's charges against h i m closes: ydp dXXoOev TfoGev PpoToug  XP?\  V  TTaiSa? TeKvoOaGou, BfjXu 8 ' OUK elvai yevos' XOUTto?  dv  OUK  fjv  ouSev  (Med 573-5)  di'QpcofTOLS' KotKOv.  Hippolytos reacting vehemently to the proposition made b y the Nurse o n Phaidra's behalf begins:  to  Zed,  8f]  TL  ywa.LKas'  KL(38T|XOV  Is §&s  T)XLOU  dvGpcoTroLs  KOLKOV  KaTtoLKiaas;  el ydp (3poTeLOv fjGeXes aTrelpaL yevos, OUK  dXX'  IK  yuydLKtov XPW  TrapaaxeaBai To8e,  etc.  (Hipp 616-20)  In these two passages w e see again an impossible w i s h expressed using  XPW>  A  N  C  L  a similar idea for change put as a reproach addressed to Zeus. A n d again we find the underlying ideas differently formulated elsewhere.  82  These utterances then,  Misogyny: frr. 666,1059. Marriage is rejected (in very different terms) in Alk 882-8, Med 230-7. Finley (Three Essays 92-7) calls attention to Euripidean connections with Antiphon B 49 (from TTepl ' OLtovoias). 8  2  175  like the group regretting the lack of a sure sign of virtue, should be thought of neither as serious criticism of the gods, nor as serious "utopian" reflections, but as examples of rhetorical ploys and strategems, more elaborate than some others but serving the same basic purpose. The same points may be made of Iphis' "utopian" w i s h people could go a second time through life, so as to benefit from the lessons of the first life:  Sf] ( 3 p 0 T 0 L 0 " L V OUK 6 0 T L V To8e, veovg Sis elvou K a l yepoi/Tas ai> TTCIXLV; dXX' Iv 86U.OLS \iev f\v TL u.f| KaXuis exr|L OLLlOl'  TL  yvcoumaLV altova  8lg  8'  ixjTepaLaLy OUK  e£eorLv.  6^op9oiJLLe9a, el  8'  r\\iev veoi  yepoirres, e l T L S e^ri|j.dpTavev p i o u XaxdvTes e£cop9ou|j.e9' dv.  Kal  SLTTXOO  (Hik 1080-6)  The idea, w h i c h can like those discussed above be paralleled i n both earlier and contemporary Greek thought,  83  serves to introduce the somewhat paradoxical  regret Iphis feels over his having begot children, who have n o w died. This regret becomes a rationale for Iphis' decision to embrace death himself, and the justification of a decision to accept death is, as we saw i n I.D above, a typical occasion for the exercise of rhetorical resourcefulness i n Euripidean tragedy. These "utopian" reflections, like the escapist fantasies sometimes expressed i n l y r i c s , play a dual role: within the economy of the play, they 84  contribute to our sense of a character's antagonism, frustration, despair; at the same time w e may assume that, like the fancy proems, sophisticated probability Cf. Theogn. 1007-12, Bacchyl. 3, 88, Soph. fr. 67 (where Pearson cites Iliad IX. 408f, a distant relative of our passage). Some see a connection of Hik 1080-6 with the thought of Antiphon B 52 (which Collard ad Hik 1080-1 adduces as evidence the idea "may have been a sophists' talking-point"; cf. Bond ad Her 665-72). 8  3  "Escapist fantasies": choral wishes to undertake impossible journeys at Alk 455-9, Hik 617-25, Hel 1479-86; cf. Phaidra at Hipp 230f, Hermione at Andr 861-5, Kreousa at Ion 796-9.  8  4  176  arguments and political reflections I have discussed elsewhere i n this study, they held a certain fascination i n their o w n right for the original audience. W h i l e they may be common topics of discussion i n sophistic circles, they represent no real contemporary "schemes of reform" (in Solmsen's phrase), and all three of the notions above can be found i n some form i n earlier Greek literature. But they are w e l l fitted to their rhetorical context and stylishly expressed. A s for the idea that such passages represent serious criticism of the gods, we have seen that criticism of the ways of the w o r l d may or may not refer the fault to a god or "the gods". It makes little difference when they do. For example, Hippolytos addresses to Zeus his reflection on the desirability of a w o r l d without w o m e n (Hipp 616ff), but Jason opens his similar reflection (Med 573ff) w i t h an impersonal X P " ^ ; Medeia addresses to Zeus her impossible w i s h for a clear infallible sign of quality i n men (Med 516-9), but Theseus i n Hipp 92531 opens a similar thought w i t h $ev (registering emotion) and xPW'r Polymestor blames the T a p a y L i o s that renders human prosperity unreliable o n "the gods"  (Hek 958f), but the  Tapayu.6s  that Orestes finds makes virtue hard to predict is  said to reside i n a l (j)uaeis ppOTcov (Elek 368). So Schadewaldt, speaking of Menelaos' monologue, Hel 483-514, notes:  85  Das Pathos ist wie ublich am Anfang des Selbstgesprachs bezeichnet (483): TL 4>to; TL A.e£to, wofiir auch ein co 9eoL oder $ev d>eO, TL Xe£to hatte stehen konnen, denn Pathos bedeutet hier nur Affiziertsein, u n d dieses ist, da es den Menschen des Alltags betrifft, nicht wahlerisch i m Ausdruck. In spite of this view, Schadewaldt finds, i n earlier passages addressed to Zeus (Med 516-9, Hipp 616-24, Hek 488-500), genuine religious content and serious c r i t i c i s m .  86  H e overestimates the force of the name Zeus, and under-  8  5  Mon. und Selbst. 231.  8  6  Ibid 120ff.  177  estimates the rhetorical character of such utterances.  87  Consider the following  passages. Euripides has characters express perplexity i n lines beginning:  88  442  OLLiOL, TL (|)00  IA  TL (j)co, TL Xe£oo  Hel 483  co ZeO, TL Xe£co  Kyk 375, Hek 488  co 9eoL, TL Xe£co  Alk 1123  $ev c|>eO, TL Xe£co  Hkld 535  Impatient or surprised questions begin:  elev, TL S r i  Hik 1094  elev, TL 8f)Ta  Hek 313  OLLCOL, TL Sf)  Hik  O'L>OL, TL S f j T a  Hkld 433, Andr 443, Her 1146  co Zed, TL 8fj  M e d 516, Hzpp 616  co Zei), TL 8f|Ta  Hik  co 9eo[,  Hipp 1060  TL S f j T a  1080  734  Of the passages opening co Zeu, KyA: 375 and Med 516 involve no further re