EURIPIDEAN RHETORIC

A Formal and Literary Study

by

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This study aims (1) to document and classify the materials and techniques of persuasive speech in Euripidean drama, and (2) to develop an understanding of the ways in which the balanced arguments and abstract speculations of Euripidean characters contribute to the construction of plots, themes and characters. The results are intended to be useful both as a contribution to criticism concerned with the "tone" of Euripidean tragedy and as a resource for the study of early oratory and argumentation in the period of the Sophists.

The first two chapters classify and analyse speeches and scenes according to dramatic context. In Chapter I, single speeches of several types are shown to rely on similar techniques of presentation and argument. Chapter II analyses patterns of correspondence between the speeches of a scene. The debate scenes of Alkestis and Hippolytos are discussed with a view to determining how stylised and conventional rhetorical material affects our view of the characters involved.

Analysis is next offered of some common techniques for the presentation of arguments. Chapter III discusses the "probability argument" and related forms involving the use of rhetorical questions and conditional formulations. Chapter IV examines Euripides' use in argumentative contexts of gnomic material and so-called "utopian reflections".
Chapter V considers the use of rhetorical techniques and scenes in three plays. Phaidra's monologue in *Hippolytos* 373-430 is discussed in terms of its rhetorical purpose and its contribution to important themes and formal relationships in the play. The rhetorical confrontations of the first half of *Suppliant Women* are seen to contribute to the delaying and highlighting of the action that follows while exploiting an opportunity for abstract moral and political debate. The play-long rhetorical preparation for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in *Iphigeneia at Aulis* similarly is shown to serve the purpose of enhancing the importance and value of the girl's death, while involving an intricate formal balancing of scenes and speeches that should be appreciated in its own right.
# Contents

Abstract                   ii
Contents                    iv

Introduction               1

I. Speech and Argument     6
   A. Speeches of Appeal    8
   B. "Forensic" Speeches  18
   C. Monologues of Despair 27
   D. Heroic Acceptance of Death  37
   E. Two Epideictic Speeches 44

II. Antilogies and Complex Exchanges  49
   A. Appeal and Response  49
   B. Accusation and Refutation  57
   C. The Debate with Lykos  68
   D. "The Rhetoric of the Situation" in Two Forensic Debates  71
   E. Three-way Scenes     82

III. Probabilities and Possibilities  95
   A. Rhetorical Questions  95
   B. Elimination of Alternatives: Past 104
   C. Elimination of Alternatives: Future 118
   D. Hypothetical Arguments 125
IV. General Rule and Special Case
   A. Formal Patterns
   B. Rhetorical Uses of Gnomic Formulations
      1. "Opening" Uses
      2. "Closing" Uses
      3. "Grounding" Uses
   C. Realisations and Challenges to Common Sense
   D. "Utopian Reflection" and "Götterkritik"

V. Rhetoric in Three Plays
   A. Phaidra's Monologue
   B. Rhetoric and Action in *Suppliant Women*
   C. Rhetoric and Design in *Iphigeneia at Aulis*

VI. Summary and Conclusions

Bibliography

Appendices
   A. Some Formal Devices of Euripidean Rhetoric
   B. Personal Supplication as a Persuasive Technique
   C. "Portable Arguments"
Introduction

This study has two main purposes. I have attempted in the first place to assemble a "grammar" of persuasive utterance for Euripidean drama, a catalogue of the techniques of organisation and argument typical of the poet's speeches and debates. I have brought together material drawn from a variety of dramatic situations and speech-types (for example, appeals, monologues, friendly and antagonistic debates), since similar patterns of thought and expression are to be seen wherever Euripides has a character speak in a persuasive mode. The body of information resulting from this study should be useful in two areas: first, it has a role to play in text criticism. In a number of places, I have suggested that a textual question can be solved only with the help of a clear understanding, based on comparative Euripidean material, of both the rhetorical objective of a passage and the forms typically used in the realisation of that objective. Second, the Euripidean corpus constitutes a very substantial document for the study of some of the experiments in thought and expression typical of the late fifth century; both the size and the quality of Euripides' legacy would seem to make a clear description of his resources in these areas an essential prerequisite for the study of the Sophists and the early orators. I have attempted to supply such a groundwork.

My second main purpose is to face some questions of interpretation that arise in connection with the use of a somewhat stylised and intellectual rhetoric in tragedy. Critics have differed over the degree to which the presentation or content of debate speeches convey insight into "character". A related problem is whether we are to think Euripides intends to alienate our sympathy from the
speaker who demonstrates an easy eloquence or offers arguments of questionable merit or honesty in a debate. These and other questions of tone have too often been discussed in a vacuum, with inadequate reference to context and to comparative material. I have approached them in the light of the formal apparatus developed in this study.

A preliminary comparison of a number of speeches and scenes suggested as a point of departure the following principles:

1. Euripides writes speeches of a persuasive or argumentative character for a great variety of dramatic situations. Similar techniques of construction and argument are to be seen in "forensic" speeches, appeals, and various kinds of monologues.

2. Each of these types, however, involves certain patterns and techniques peculiar to itself.

3. In certain types of scene (forensic debate, appeal and response), persuasive speeches are associated with each other in pairs; occasionally three speeches confront each other.

4. Typical stylistic features of these speeches include self-conscious clarity of form: headlines often announce argumentative points, clear formulas of transition close one argument and open another, arguments are often summarised in closing.

5. An extremely common format for the enunciation of an argument is the rhetorical question or rhetorical question series (hypophora figure); this is used especially in arguing against the probability of a proposition.
(6) Another technique seen constantly in Euripides' speeches is reference to "gnomic" wisdom: a general proposition is stated as an article of common sense for the purpose of headlining, summarising or grounding a contention or an appeal.

On the basis of these observations, I have adopted the following organisation for this study. Chapters I and II describe Euripidean rhetoric in terms of the various dramatic contexts in which persuasive speeches are presented. Chapter I presents the basic materials and techniques used by Euripides in writing speeches for a number of rhetorical situations. Speeches of each of the several types are analysed; attention is called to the distinctions of each type, and to points at which all the types are similar. Chapter II considers the composition of pairs of opposing speeches (again treating separately the different kinds of scene), and of exchanges involving three characters. Chapters III and IV deal with typical techniques for the presentation of arguments, without regard to the type of speech in which they occur. Chapter III investigates the presentation of probability arguments of various kinds through the use of rhetorical questions; hypothetical arguments are treated as a related form, in that they apply conditional formulations for the consideration of probabilities or possibilities. Chapter IV deals with the argumentative use of maxims and other general statements, and with other patterns of expression in which the present situation is implicitly or explicitly compared with a general rule or expectation; these include sudden realisations that contradict common sense and reflections of a "utopian" character. Throughout these first four chapters I have moved freely between purely formal description and interpretive discussion.

Chapter V offers extended interpretive discussion of the use of abstract and stylised rhetorical material in three plays. Phaidra's monologue in Hipp 373-430,
the four rhetorical confrontations that dominate the first half of *Suppliant Women*, and all the rhetorical scenes of *Iphigeneia at Aulis* are studied. The objective here has been to establish, through close analysis and constant reference both to comparative material and to the insights of earlier critics, the relevance of this material for audience appreciation of character, plot and themes.

Three appendices further document the stylised character of Euripidean rhetoric. Appendix A compiles and classifies some aspects of presentation not covered elsewhere in this study. Appendix B attempts to define the rhetorical value of announcements of personal supplication. In Appendix C some passages are compared in which similar arguments or argument strategies appear in different dramatic contexts.

My conclusions have tended towards a view of Euripidean rhetorical speeches and scenes that emphasises the entertainment value for the public—the same public characterised by Kleon as θεαται τῶν λόγων and δούλοι τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων (Thuc. III, 38)—of watching the heroes of legend discuss up-to-date topics using up-to-date techniques of presentation and argumentation. I have resisted an approach that would see subtle psychology or characterisation in material that is essentially conventional; and so I argue against, for example, some critics' contentions that such characters as Admetos, Hippolytos, or Theseus (in *Hik*) are intentionally discredited by Euripides through their own words uttered in rhetorical exchanges. I have also rejected a view of Euripides' monologues, appeal-scenes and debates as setting out in abstract terms the poet's moral view of the situation; thus for scenes such as Hekabe's debate with Helen (*Tro* 895-1059), or the debate of Polyneikes, Eteokles and Iokaste (*Phoin* 469-585), I suggest that the audience is guided in the placing of it sympathies by the situation itself, and that the debate should be experienced primarily as an interesting and
entertaining exposition of the possibilities for eloquence and argument latent in
the story.

I do not however see these scenes purely as set pieces, *intermezzi* inserted
at random into the dramas. Thus I have called attention to the presentation of
important and enduring themes and associations in Phaidra's monologue (V.A),
to the suitability of the long rhetorical first half of *Suppliant Women* as a prepa-
ration for the glorious action that follows (V. B), and to the interesting formal
pattern created by the rhetorical scenes in *Iphigeneia at Aulis* (V.C).

I have dealt in general only with the eighteen complete and securely
Euripidean plays in the corpus. A great deal of material in the fragments could
find a place in a purely formal study of Euripidean rhetoric, and on that basis I
hope to use the fragments fully in the next stage of this research. For the present
study, in which form and literary interpretation go so closely hand-in-hand, their
general lack of secure dramatic context constituted a decisive obstacle.

The text of Euripides is quoted from James Diggle's OCT edition except
where noted; in lists of passages the sequence is chronological, following Diggle.
The use of brackets in citations of parallels, etc., indicates only that a passage is
bracketed by Diggle, and must therefore be used with caution. The plays are cited
by abbreviations of their Greek titles.
Chapter I

Speech and Argument

Euripides' resources as a playwright include a "rhetorical" mode of speechwriting: critics have recognised that similar techniques of construction and argument appear in speeches written for a variety of dramatic situations, and that these techniques tend to remind one of the political, epideictic and forensic oratory of the poet's period, to the extent that these are known. It is the aim of this first chapter to identify, at the level of the individual Euripidean speech, the materials and techniques that constitute this "rhetorical" manner.

When we eliminate speeches whose function is mainly expository (prologue-speech, messenger-speech, deus-speech), we find that most of the remaining speeches have an argumentative purpose. Often the immediate dramatic goal of an argumentative speech is persuasion: e.g., Iolaos tries to persuade Demophon to champion the cause of the suppliant children of Herakles (Hkld 181-231: speech of appeal), Helen tries to convince Menelaos she does not deserve to die (Tro 914-65: speech of defense). But similar techniques of construction and argument are applied in situations where there is no real persuasive purpose: e.g., Herakles' monologue justifying his decision to commit suicide (Her 1255-1310), Hippolytos' diatribe against women (Hipp 616-68), Iphis' acceptance of death (Hik 1080-1113), Theseus' speech of accusation against Hippolytos (Hipp 936-80). Euripides relies repeatedly on a small battery of resources for constructing speeches and conducting arguments in all these dramatic situations.
A typical Euripidean rhesis involves various kinds of material. Often a speech follows dialogue, and so begins with a line or two that complete a conversation. Argumentative content itself may be framed by material having a "focusing" function (proems, transitions, summarising epilogues). Expressions of strong emotion sometimes interrupt the rational sequence of thought. Euripidean speeches are seldom neatly disposed; any influence of formal forensic rhetoric on Euripides certainly does not extend to a practice of writing speeches to a regular pattern such as prologue—narration—proof—epilogue.¹ But it soon becomes obvious that some clear patterns of Euripidean practice in speech-writing exist, and that some of these patterns exist also in the practice of prose-writers and orators contemporary with Euripides. The procedure adopted here is to compare a large number of Euripidean speeches looking for habits of disposition and of argument, while keeping one eye on developments outside the theatre for possible connections with the practice of other writers. I shall occasionally call attention to resemblances between Euripides' techniques and those of other writers, but the questions of Euripides' contact with the fifth-century "Enlightenment" and with concepts of formal rhetoric developing outside the theatre are not my main concern.²

¹ This was the contention of Th. Miller's 1887 diss. Euripides Rhetoricus. F. Tietze's 1933 diss. Die euripideischen Reden und ihre Bedeutung was devoted to a rebuttal of Miller's views. Early work on Euripidean rhetoric is reviewed by G. Goebel in his 1983 diss. Early Greek Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 266-74; see also Collard "Formal Debates" 58-60, M. Lloyd Agon 23f.

² On these questions see in general Nestle Dichter der Aufklärung (dated approach but bringing together much useful material), Finley "Euripides and Thucydides" and "The Origins of Thucydides' Style" in Three Essays, Solmsen Intellectual Experiments. Some details of Euripides' contact with fifth-century oratory and rhetorical instruction are investigated by Solmsen, Antiphonstudien 54-8, and Goebel, diss. Ch. IV.
M. Lloyd, whose recent study of Euripidean agon scenes concentrates on a small number of speeches, has described the disposition of these speeches in the following terms:3

There are...only traces of a distinction between narration and argument in the speeches of Euripides' agones. What usually happens is that, after a rhetorical proem, the speech is divided into a series of more or less self-contained blocks, each of which makes a particular point. These sections are often distinguished from each other in a self-conscious way.

This gives a fair general description of taxis in Euripides' argumentative speeches written for a variety of situations besides the "agones" Lloyd has in mind. The typical contents of these argument-blocks and the typical formal devices used to introduce, frame and focus them will be the subject of investigation in this first chapter. I shall look at relatively independent single speeches, in this order: speeches of appeal (Section A below), "forensic" speeches (B), monologues expressing despair (C), speeches announcing "heroic acceptance of death" (D), and some speeches of comparison best called "epideictic" (E). In Chapter II, the construction of debates and other rhetorical scenes will be investigated.

A. Speeches of Appeal

A typical rhetorical opportunity in Euripidean plays is the "appeal addressed to a champion": this occurs not only in plays initiated by a public act of supplication (Hkld, Hik), but in many places where a single character enlists the

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3 Agon 25. Disposition in a larger sample of Euripidean "agon" speeches is analysed by Duchemin, L’Akt 167-87; Goebel's diss. in spite of its subtitle Proof and Arrangement in the Speeches of Antiphon and Euripides does not discuss arrangement in Euripidean speeches.
aid of a better-placed character, seeking either to prevent an injustice (Hekabe to Odysseus in *Hek*, Klytaimestra to Achilles in *IA*) or to enlist help in an intrigue (Hekabe to Agamemnon in *Hek*, Helen and Menelaos to Theonoe in *Hel*). Speeches of appeal are often elaborately developed, and tend to involve a combination of different groundings and justifications for the requested aid.

A good example is Iolaos’ speech addressed to Demophon in *Herakleidai*. Iolaos is presented as an old man protecting the young children of Herakles, who have become suppliants at Marathon as a result of being hounded by Eurystheus and his agents. Eurystheus’ herald has attempted to take them into custody, and Demophon has arrived and asked to hear the case on both sides. The Herald speaks first (134-78); his speech is discussed briefly below. The Chorus leader delivers a couplet very correctly reserving judgement (179f). Iolaos now makes the appeal on behalf of the children (181-231). He begins with a short proem alluding to the well-known fairness of Athenians: he knows he will get a fair hearing. He next announces his first argument for Athenian aid:

\[ \text{ὁμιν δὲ καὶ τῶιδ' οὔδὲν ἐστὶν ἐν μέσω.} \quad (Hkld \ 184) \]

He will argue first against the case that has been presented by the Herald, a case in which points regarding legality and justice were capped with a veiled threat against the Athenians. Iolaos argues (185-90) that the suppliants have been banished by the Argives, and are therefore χένοι (189), people over whom Argos

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4 On "suppliant plots" see esp. Strohm *Euripides* 17-32, Kopperschmidt *Die Hikesie* 46-53, Lattimore *Story Patterns* 46f (dealing with "public" acts of supplication only), Burnett *Catastrophe Survived* (Chapters IV-IX).

5 See Porter *Studies* 165f.

6 This kind of captatio benevolentiae is not a very common feature of Euripidean speech-making. More flattery is offered in 191-204.
can have no jurisdiction. This leads (with no clear break)\(^7\) to the point that Athens at any rate will not be intimidated by a threat to its sovereignty: thus the second element in the Herald's case is countered.\(^8\) At vs. 205 a new section is clearly introduced:

\[
\text{σοὶ δ' ὡς ἀνάγκη τούσδε βούλομαι φράσαι}
\text{σῶλειν, ἐπείπερ τῆςδε προστατεῖς χθονός. (Hkld 205f)}
\]

The speech moves from public considerations—the legal status of the case and the altruistic character of Athenians—to the arguments that can be addressed personally to Demophon. These are of two types: first an appeal to common blood is made (206-213: the relation of Theseus through Aithra to the house of Pelops), and in 214 another basis of obligation is clearly announced: Herakles' benefactions to Theseus. A brief narrative (lacunose in our texts) is capped with the declaration 'Ελλάς πάσα τούτο μαρτυρεῖ (219). Two kinds of argument have been brought to bear (the justice of the suppliants' case and obligations said to affect Demophon personally), but there are still points to be made. Iolaos in summarising notes that to allow suppliants to be removed would be offensive to the gods, and a disgrace both to Demophon privately (χωρίς 223) and to the city. And finally he adds to the fact of suppliancy in a temple precinct the gestures and verbal formulas of personal supplication (ἀλλ' ἀντομαί σε etc. 226-8).

\(^7\) The argumentative rhetorical question in 189b-90 ("Or do you hold that an exile from Argos must quit all Greece?") might have closed this section; instead it is answered "Not Athens anyway", and the new direction is taken.

\(^8\) Praise of Athens is itself, of course, a topos in tragedy and oratory. So is the reference to the unwelcomeness of overpraising: with 202-4 here cf. Or 1161f, IA 977-80; Thuc. II, 35.2; Dem. XVIII, 3f.
Iolaos' speech is by no means simply the routine realisation of a standard Euripidean formula; but it does involve certain features we will see over and over in the poet's speeches, some of them no doubt consciously developed, others perhaps existing more as unconscious patterns of thought. The appeal addressed by Hekabe to Agamemnon (Hek 787-845), seeking his complicity in her revenge plan against Polymestor, shows similar features. Hekabe makes the transition from dialogue to rhesis with an introductory formula of a common type:

\[
\text{άλλ' ὄντω } \text{όφει } \text{άμφι οὖν πίπτω γόνυ}
\]

\[
\text{άκουσον.} \quad (\text{Hek 787f})
\]

This is followed immediately by a headline giving the general drift of her request: help me achieve revenge against a certain man. The charge against this man is now specified through a brief highly coloured narrative (791-7), or, if 793-7 are an interpolation, through a succinct relative clause. The success of Hekabe's appeal depends on creating the impression that her enemy has wronged her; thus her speech must attack as well as appeal, and this accusatory material already goes far in painting the required picture of Polymestor's sordid character and deed. With a resumptive \( \text{μὲν } \text{oὖν } (798) \) Hekabe takes up the arguments proper in support of her request. First she alludes to "the gods and the law that governs [even] them" (799f). The difficult lines 802-5 seem to say that Agamemnon (that is, should he fail to respect Hekabe's appeal) is the cause of a collapse of the power of law in the cosmos. This direction is not developed;

9 The positive/negative form of expression seen here is also a typical way of emphasising one's point: "If you think this is just...; but if the opposite...." Cf. e.g. Hipp 377ff.

10 Diggle follows Nauck in deleting 793-7. Collard ad loc gives the arguments against the lines.
Hekabe simply uses the threat as the basis for an appeal to Agamemnon's αἰδώς in the face of her pathetic state (αἰδεσθητί με, οἴκτιρον ἡμᾶς 806f). A "litany of woes" follows (ἀνάθητον οί, ἔχω κακά, 808): Hekabe is a slave, childless, cityless, deserted, the most wretched of mortals (809ff). At vs. 812 Hekabe seems to realise that her appeal to Agamemnon's sense of law and to his αἰδώς is failing; she interrupts her address to him with a reflection on the importance of skill in persuasion (814-23). This reflection has a decidedly "modern" ring to it, evoking as it does a world in which people pay for instruction in various subjects, among which (in Hekabe's mind at least) Persuasion should have pride of place. The reflection is applied to Hekabe herself with a reprise of her woes (821-4)—she seems to be telling herself a superhuman effort at persuasion is required. And now she moves to her next argument, expressing some misgiving:

καὶ μὴν ὑπὸς μὲν τοῦ λόγου ξένου τόδε,
Κύπριν προβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ὁμώς εἰρήσεται) etc. (Hek 824f)

She reminds Agamemnon of his "family ties" to her through his affection for Kassandra. The victim Polydoros was in a sense Agamemnon's κηδεστής (834).

A final point is headlined using the formula:

11 αἰδώς and οἴκτος are the responses one wants to elicit when supplicating: see Gould "Hiketeia" 87-90. Mercier's 1993 note on this speech ("Hekabe's Extended Supplication") attributes too much importance to the gesture of supplication as an instrument of persuasion: see App. B.

12 For similar lists, cf. Kyk 304-7, Med 255-8, Hek 667-9, Hipp 1028-[29], IT 220; more leisurely are Andr 8-15, Tro 479-90, Hel 269-86.

13 Appeal speeches seem to be interrupted by a reference to the failure of the effort here in Hek 812f and at Kyk 299, and perhaps Or 671f (but di Benedetto ad 672 cautions against this interpretation); the interruption in each case is followed by a new argumentative point. These speeches are followed by refusals.

14 This affection has already been brought out in the Prologue (120ff).

15 For the use of forms of ἐν in focusing arguments, see App. A.
In this case the formula leads to the resumption of a point already made: the desirability of compelling powers of persuasion. Hekabe closes with a summary appeal for assistance, emphasising Agamemnon’s greatness and her own debasement (he is μέγιστον "Ελλησιν φάος, she is μηδέν), and caps this with a gnome:  

εσθολοὺ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τῇ δίκῃ θ’ ὑπηρετεῖν
καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς δρᾶν πανταχοῦ κακῶς ἄει. (Hek 844f)

Thus she recapitulates the points that vengeance would be just (cf. 800-5), and that her enemy is an evil man.

Hekabe’s speech, long and complex, nevertheless follows the general shape of that of Iolaos: a proem alludes to the speech-situation and introduces the main objective of the speech; an argument based on law and justice is clearly separated from an argument based on the obligations inherent in family connections (obviously a rather weak point in Hekabe’s case); expressions of personal supplication buttress the “rational” arguments; a succinct closing summary (using imperatives: γενοῦ φιλος etc. Hkld 229f; πιθοῦ, παράσχες χεῖρα...τιμωρῶν Hek 842f) is followed by a closing general statement. Within this framework, Euripides has given Iolaos some flattering comments on the Athenian national character, Hekabe a reflection on education and the desirability of eloquence.

16 Mossman (Wild Justice 104) notes Hekabe doesn’t weaken ("blunt the urgency of") her earlier appeal to Odysseus for a hearing (Hek 229-37) by using a final gnome, as if this were accepted as a cheap trick. The use of the technique both here and in closing the earlier appeal proper (Hek 294f) argues against that view. See Friis Johansen General Reflection 155 with n.17, and IV.B below.
On a smaller scale, Odysseus in *Kyklops* appeals to Polyphemos on behalf of himself and his men; they would like first of all not to be eaten, and then if possible to go away with handsome gifts. Odysseus in his speech of appeal (*Kyk* 285-312), after speaking of his various services to Poseidon, and urging them as reasons for Polyphemos to offer hospitality to him and his men, changes tack (299: *ei λόγους ἀποστρέφημι*). He moves to a new argument based on the *νόμος* under which shipwrecked sailors are to be taken in as suppliants and treated well (299-303). This leads with no clear break into a pathetic appeal (304-9a) in which it is claimed that the Greeks have suffered enough at Troy. The first argument, then, appeals to the Cyclops' sense of *χάρις*, the second uses a principle of *νόμος* to justify the third stage's appeal for *οἶκτος* and *εὐσέβεια* (310).

Hekabe's speech to Odysseus in *Hek* 251-95 is much more developed, but proceeds similarly, offering two fundamentally distinct arguments against the sacrifice of Polyxene. Following a lengthy reflective proem (251-7), she argues first (258-71) that the sacrifice would be *unjust*. This point is pursued through an argument sequence we shall meet again: using a disjunctive question (*πότερα...; ἦ...*) Hekabe suggests two motives that might have led the Greeks to vote for the sacrifice of Polyxene. Each of these motives is dismissed as unjust, and then a positive proposal is presented for the more fitting course— to sacrifice Helen. This proposal in turn is justified on two grounds (269f). The sequence concluded, Hekabe makes a clear transition announcement:

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17 Is any stage action implied? Seaford ad 299 cites examples of ἀποστρέφωμαι at *IT* 801, *Hel* 78, S. OK 1272: "these cases refer to the addressee turning away from the speaker".


19 This type of sequence is discussed in detail in III.A below. I agree with West that there is a problem in the text of *Hek* 265-8: see "Tragica IV" 12.
This introduces a two-fold personal appeal: Hekabe asks Odysseus' pity on grounds both of an old debt of obligation he has towards her (272-8), and of her own pathetic weakness and reliance on Polyxene (279-85). That these are distinct but closely bound points is also clearly spelled out:

\[\chiαριν \tau' \\alphaπαίτω \tauην \tauδ' \ικετεύω \tau\varepsilon \sigmaε. \quad (Hek \ 276)\]

Having put her two arguments, Hekabe goes on to make a practical proposal (286-95): that Odysseus, whose powers of persuasion led in the first place to the decision to sacrifice Polyxene, face the troops again and try to reverse that decision. Odysseus' reply will take up these same points, and so I shall return to this scene for further study in II.A below.

A subtler division of argument into two main sections can be seen in Hkld 134-78, the speech of the Argive herald suing for release into his custody of the children of Herakles. This is not a "supplication" speech, but as it functions in parallel with Iolaos' appeal (see above), it has similarities of structure and argument. The Herald states briefly his identity and his mission (134-37a), then gives the legal basis for his request (137b-43): the suppliants as Argive citizens are under Argive jurisdiction, and they have been legally sentenced to death.21

20 For the "double headline" clearly announcing two different points cf. Kyk 287, IA 903f (see discussion below). The phrase \(χαριν \ α'παίτειν\) recurs in Hkld 220, cf. Lys. 21.21.

21 There is thus a clear disagreement between the two speeches over the facts: the appeal of Iolaos will refer only to a decree of banishment. Neither side should be regarded as giving the "truth" here.
In what follows a transition is gradually made to the point (explicitly put at 153-5) that Athenian self-interest favours taking the Argive side.\textsuperscript{22}

Clear contrast of two arguments in a short speech of appeal is seen in \textit{IT} 1056-74, where Iphigeneia appeals to the Chorus for their cooperation in the intrigue she is planning.\textsuperscript{23} She argues first ($\pi\rho\alpha\tau\alpha\ \mu\varepsilon\nu$ 1060) that this is their \textit{duty}, alluding to the customary solidarity of women. Then, following a clear enunciation of her request (1063f) and the stark alternatives facing herself and the two men (1065f), she appeals to their self-interest 1067f)— she will return the Greek women home if she herself gets free. This is followed (1068b) by expressions of supplication; this has here, as almost always in Euripides, a function subsidiary to argument.\textsuperscript{24}

Equally brief is the appeal made by Klytaimestra to Achilles at \textit{IA} 900-16, in which she calls upon him to champion the cause of preventing Iphigeneia's sacrifice. The argument is prefaced by the comment that Klytaimestra feels no shame in humbling herself before Achilles, since nothing means more to her than protecting her child.\textsuperscript{25} The appeal is argued in 903-14. A headline

\textsuperscript{22} For clear rhetorical distinction between "justice" and "self-interest" see Finley \textit{Three Essays} 33 with n.49. The contrast was a well-worn subject, but τὸ ἑυδίκον and τὸ συμφέρον may be held to recommend the same action, as here in \textit{Hkld} 134-78 (and cf. e.g. \textit{S. Phil} 925f). On this debate, Kennedy ("Focusing of Arguments" 134f) simplifies the issues: "The Athenians in their decision reject apparent self-interest in favor of justice". But the Herald's first argument is full of "justice" (138, 142) and "law" (141); and Iolaos' appeal leans heavily on arguments of $\chiάρις$ and the disgrace of surrendering suppliants.

\textsuperscript{23} Similar appeals are at \textit{Med} 260-6, \textit{Hipp} 710-12. Phaidra appeals but does not argue; in a sense Medea's entire speech leads up to this request. Cf. also \textit{Ion} 666f, \textit{Hel} 1387-9, \textit{IA} 542.

\textsuperscript{24} Medea's brief speech of appeal to Aigeus (\textit{Med} 708-18) is comparable: pity, then advantages.

\textsuperscript{25} This sort of shame is registered by Adrastos (\textit{Hik} 163-6); some others are too proud to beg (Eurystheus in \textit{Hkld} 983-5, Menelaos in \textit{Hel} 947-9). Thus the reference to shame in connection with gestures of supplication forms a topos.
introduces the two grounds on which Klytaimestra will base her appeal; these are cleverly identified with the two women:

ἀλλ’ ἀμνον, ὦ θεάς παί, τῇ τ’ ἐμῇ δυσπραξίαι
τῇ τε λεχθείση δάμαρτι σῆ ἡ πάτην μέν, ἀλλ’ ἐμος.  (IA 903f)

It is as if she said: "Give your support to me (because I am miserable and merit pity) and to my daughter (because she was called your bride)". These two points are then developed chiastically: 905-8 make the case that Achilles owes his support because he was in some sense responsible for the deception that brought Iphigeneia to Aulis, and 909-14 return to Klytaimestra herself and her misery (though the idea of an obligation returns in ὅνομα γὰρ τὸ σὸν μὴ ἀπώλεσ’, 910). The couplet 915f forms an epilogue, but one of dubious authenticity.

An interesting variant on the binary presentation of argument seen in the examples so far discussed is the use of two speeches of appeal made on the same side of a case: Adrastos and Aithra both appeal to Theseus in Hik on behalf of the suppliants, Helen and Menelaos each address a speech to Theonoe in Hel, Agamemnon hears in IA appeals from both Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia. In each scene interesting differences between the tone and content of the two

26 Stockert (ad loc) sees in 903-8 the expression of a legal claim to Achilles' support, based on his obligation as the putative bridegroom of Iphigeneia, followed in 909-14 by a moral claim based on the hopelessness of Klytaimestra's position should Achilles fail to help. But the important difference between the two halves of the appeal is one of tone: rational argument, then supplication.

27 Diggle prints 915f as "vix Euripidei"; I don't know his reasons, but I note that throughout the episode (an episode that occasions many doubts), speeches end with couplets having a similar trait—a gratuitous positive-negative recapitulation of the point of each speech: cf. 973f, 995-7, 1006f, 1034f. See Denniston ad El 1017, where he notes such expressions are "common in the IA". Stockert notes "polare Ausdrucksweise" at 978: characteristic preoccupation of an interpolator?

28 For the Hik and IA scenes, see Ch. V below; the Hel scene is discussed in II.E. The stage is set for such a sequence in the first episode of Hek, but Polyxene's unexpected self-dedication short-circuits it.
speeches correspond to the binary separation of arguments we have seen in single speeches. Presentation of arguments in self-consciously balanced pairs will be noted below in connection with speeches delivered in a variety of other situations besides appeal.

B. "Forensic" Speeches

The tendency to organise argument in "blocks", most often two, with a third section often introducing pathetic or practical points, is seen also in the chronological organisation of argumentative content particularly common in forensic speeches. As an example I shall discuss Menelaos' analysis of his brother's past and present actions in his speech of accusation addressed to Agamemnon (IA 334-75).

The speech vilifies Agamemnon over his indecisiveness in first encouraging and then attempting to prevent the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Menelaos begins by announcing in gnomic form the importance of constancy of mind (334) and indicates he wants to conduct a civil discussion of issues. His argumentation takes the form of a life-survey.29 Euripides uses this device in monologue situations, where a speaker suffering feelings of ἀπορία or loss reviews his own life (e.g. Andromache in Tro 634-83, Herakles in Her 1255-1310), and in agonistic speeches where the survey organises a sort of narrative section (e.g. Eurystheus reviewing his own life in Hkld 983-1017, Theseus that of Adrastos in Hik 195-249). In both situations it is natural to compare past and present, or two stages in the past, and this is the form Menelaos' argument takes.

29 For comments on the type see Strohm Euripides 156-63 ("Sinn und Form des Lebensrückblicks"), Friis Johansen, General Reflection, index s. v. "Chronological survey".
Two stages of Agamemnon's career are brought out: (1) his early eagerness to get command of the expedition to Troy (ὅτε etc. 337-48); (2) his subsequent behaviour at Aulis (ὅσ δὲ etc. 350-64). Each of these short narratives involves a contrast that calls attention to Agamemnon's inconstancy; the presentation of these contrasts is strikingly balanced (343 καὶ τ' ἐπει...; 363 καὶ τ' ..., both followed with μεταβαλὼν). The first instance of this fault was Agamemnon's change of external presentation: once installed in a powerful position he was no longer the friendly accessible man he had been. The second stage of the survey presents the more serious (for Menelaos' case) inconstancy—Agamemnon has waffled over the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and has now been caught trying to prevent it. It is to this second lapse that Menelaos addresses the general reflections that follow in 366-9: μῦροι δὲ τοι πεπόνθας ἀυτό. The following gnome about human failure is illustrated by two contrasting examples, of which the second applies to Agamemnon. Menelaos then concludes his argument by drawing attention to the serious consequences for all Greece of Agamemnon's disappointing loss of resolve. An epilogue follows (probably corrupt in 373) reflecting on the qualities required of leaders, thus looking back to both halves of the life-review.30

Chronological organisation of argument is also seen in speeches of accusation at Hik 195-249, Elek 1060-99, Med 465-519, IA 1146-1208, and in Eurystheus' defense speech at Hkld 983-1017. Generally, these speeches proceed by reviewing the past or an event in the past, then move to the present situation or the present outlook; either a pathetic reversal or a pathetic inescapable

30 Doubts have been expressed about the integrity of the end of this speech. Diggle prints 366-75 between his "vix Euripidea" symbols. He finds the use of ἀυτό (366) anomalous (app. cr.): but cf. e.g. Hek 973, IA 393. On the text of 373-5, see Friis Johansen General Reflection 36, Stockert ad loc. Gibert, Change of Mind 275, points out that the terms of debate have shifted subtly: νοῦς βέβαιος of the proem has here become simply νοῦς.
continuity is pointed out by this process. Some of the "acceptance of death" speeches involve a similar contrast of past high status with present or future degradation.

Theseus' speech at Hik 195-249, rejecting the appeal of Adrastos, begins with a lengthy general reflection that will be discussed below (V.B). The argumentative content of the speech unfolds in the same way as that of Menelaos' speech at IA 334-75, with two episodes taken from the adversary's past being held up as evidence of a defective character:

219-28 Adrastos and his sons-in-law: his willingness to associate himself with νοσοῦντες
229-37 Adrastos and the expedition against Thebes: the damage done by him under the influence of hotheads

Theseus formulates his present policy on the basis of these observations of Adrastos' past:

246 καὶ εἰς ἑαυτῷ ἐγὼ συμμαχοί γενήσομαι;

(Vs. 246 follows logically on the arguments of 219-37; this however makes no case for deletion of the "demographic" passage 238-45, which seems entirely in character for this Theseus and for Euripides.31)

Similar is Elek 1060-99, Elektra's speech of accusation addressed to Klytaimnestra, who has defended herself in 1011-50 as a woman forced into the

31 See Kovacs, "Tyrants" 34; his arguments against the authenticity of 238-45 do not stand up to the strong case for the passage made by Collard ad loc. Reeve, "Interpolation" 148, distinguishes three interpolations within vss. 216-46. Friis Johansen, General Reflection 123 n.68, notes in 238-45 the characteristically Euripidean formulation of a θαίρεως.
arms of her husband's enemy through his sacrifice of Iphigeneia and his own adultery:

1069-75 you showed signs of promiscuity even before Iphigeneia's sacrifice (this answers Klytaimestra's charge that Agamemnon's act had driven her into Aigisthos' arms)

1076-85 during the war you favoured the Trojans, not wanting Agamemnon to return home

These past facts and the portrait of Klytaiemestra they paint form the first half of a two-part argumentation; Elektra moves on at vs. 1086 to Klytaiemestra's treatment of herself and Orestes in the aftermath of the murder of Agamemnon.

Medea's harangue of Jason (Med 465-519) follows his brief entering speech, a speech which understandably evokes a violent response, but which is not (I believe) intended to characterise Jason as a thorough villain. Medea's speech is organised around a dual argument whose point is to demonstrate that she has been Jason's salvation repeatedly in the past, and is now the victim of his ingratitude and selfishness:

465-74 proem: vilification of Jason
475-98 the past:
476-87 Medea's services
488-98 Jason's betrayal
499-515 the present and future: Medea's desperate situation

Sophistic topos? Similarly Medea discounts the noble motives Jason professes (Med 522-75) by reference to the fact (introduced as decisive: ἐν γὰρ ἐκτενεῖ σ' ἔποιες, 585) he failed to make a persuasive case for the new marriage before proceeding with it. And Hekabe rejects Polymestor's claim to have killed Polydoros as a service to the Greeks (Hek 1132-82) on the basis that he acted only after the Greeks had won the war. In these passages the fact introduced does not directly refute the opponent's contention, but contributes to an impression of sordid motives. Similar arguments are in Antiphon VI. 44-7, Andok. II, 3-4.

I see the same situation at the entrance of Pheres in Alk; a neutral speech sets off a violent reaction in a character whose volatility is quite understandable under the circumstances.
The stages of the argument are clearly signposted through the use of temporal expressions (475 ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων, 502 νῦν), the balancing of the two complex sentences 476-82 and 483-87, and a break introduced by ἂγε (499). The main argumentative point, Jason's past dependence on Medea, is announced at beginning and end in the same phrase (476 ἐσωσάσε, 515 ἦ τ' ἐσωσάσε). I return to this scene for further discussion in II.B below.

The development in these examples of two distinct points, each contributing a different nuance to the portrait, seems to suggest a more self-conscious technique of organisation than is found in simple accusatory narrative, for example Elektra's harangue addressed to the dead Aigisthos in Elek 907-56.34

Euripides has characters vaunt their triumph over an enemy in several scenes. In Elek 907-56, this type is combined with a detailed argumentative speech of accusation.35 Following the Messenger's report of the death of Aigisthos (774-858), Orestes arrives (880) bringing the dead man's body. After some preparatory dialogue establishing Elektra's right to speak freely, she begins her speech with a quite formal proem (907-13). The accusations leveled against Aigisthos are not put in clear sequence, but come all at once in 913-17: (a) you ruined me, (b) and orphaned me and my brother, (c) and made a shameful marriage with our mother, (d) and killed Agamemnon. These same lines also

34 The somewhat similar rant of Peleus against Menelaos (Andr 590-641) is discussed in II. B below.
35 The speech thus associates itself with Elektra's later speech of accusation addressed to Klytaimestra, 1060-99.
36 Elektra's reluctance to speak freely returns at 1055-9. This motif occurs elsewhere: Andr 184-91 (Andromache), Hek 736-51 (Hekabe), Hik 293-300 (Aithra).
refer to Aigisthos' lack of a legitimate motive (οὐδὲν ἡδικημένος, 915), and to Agamemnon's military status and Aigisthos' own failure to go to war (917). The speech develops mainly the charge of adultery (918-29) and of Aigisthos' status as a kept man, his wife's inferior (930-33a). This in turn leads to points about the children of a weak man (933b-37), then a new charge is brought against Aigisthos: that mere wealth was confused by him with real stature, which φύσις alone can confer (938-44). In 948-51 Elektra suggests that Aigisthos cultivated a "girlish" appearance. The speech thus offers rather a litany of insults, each supported with general remarks, than a neatly organised series of arguments. Both the scatter-shot delivery and the insulting tone of the remarks may go some way toward portraying the pent-up resentment of Elektra towards Aigisthos. But these features are not essential for our understanding of Elektra's state of mind: we have already seen that strong emotion is not incompatible with neat taxis and highly rational argument. The speech also contributes to the play's portrayal of Aigisthos as a totally inferior and weak person (in spite of his rather humane character in the Messenger's report). The murder of Agamemnon is not dwelt upon here because that crime, in the play's focal confrontation, will be laid at Klytaimestra's door; but the play's important theme of marriages good and bad, true and false, is given considerable attention here.

The pathetic contrast or similarity of past and present so strongly brought out in both accusation speeches and monologues (see next section) is developed also in the appeal/accusation addressed by Klytaimestra to Agamemnon in IA 1146-1208. As has been said above, this speech itself forms half of an appeal which will be continued by Iphigeneia in her speech following (1211-52).

37 The up-to-date concept of φύσις plays a role in Euripidean argument and speculation here in Elek 941 and at Hipp 79, Hek 597f, Elek 368, Tro 672, Ion 642-4, etc.
Klytaimestra's speech contains two large blocks of argument, one concerned with the past, one with the future:

1148-70  The Past
1148-56  I married you against my will when you were a murderer and a suppliant
1157-70  still I've been a perfect wife, and borne you children, of whom you now want to kill one

1171-93  The Future
1171-84  Klytaimestra and the children at Argos
1185-93  Agamemnon's return from Troy

The speech ends with Klytaimestra's views on what practical steps Agamemnon ought to be taking to correct the situation, and a final appeal.

The defense offered by Klytaimestra in Elek 1011-50 deals with these same events, but from a post-war, post-murder perspective. Klytaimestra justifies her killing of her husband by recalling his two offenses against her:

1020-31  (before the war) the sacrifice of Iphigeneia
1032-4  (after the war) Kassandra

The second point leads Klytaimestra to reflect on her own adultery and the blame it brought upon her (1035-40).

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38 Note διὰ, which elsewhere marks a speech-opening after a break (Kykeon 590, Troy 782, Hecuba 734), a change of address (Hippolytus 288, Hekabe 258, Helen 240), an apostrophe (Medea 1244, Ion 1041), used here to point a new direction in an argumentative context: cf. Medea 499, Phoinix 559.

39 χρὴν σε is a common formula for this purpose: with IA 1196 cf. Medea 586, Andromache 650, Helen 1218, Phoinix 515, Orestes 500.

40 This passage could be read as a response to Pindar Pyth 11, 22-4, where the poet asks which offense was the decisive one.

41 This forms a kind of "ring" with the material in her proem (ὅδε ὁ ταύτα λάβητε κακή γυναῖκα..., 1014f).
Chronological organisation serves a slightly different purpose in Eurystheus' brief apologia in *Hkld* 983-1017. A somewhat restrained survey of his life attempts to demonstrate that his quarrel with Herakles was thrust upon him by Hera, and that he had no choice but to persecute the hero (991-1004); you, he tells Alkmene, would have done the same (1005-8). The move to the present (νῦν οὖν 1009) involves here no pathetic contrast, but a simple consideration of the stage that has been reached. Somewhat different again is Phaidra's γνώµης ὑδός in *Hipp* 391-402. This supplies the narrative element in the otherwise very abstract consideration of her plight in her monologue (373-430). The survey of her thinking is marked out in chronological stages:

391 επεί...
398 τὸ δεύτερον...
400 τρίτον δὲ...

This last introduces her resolve to die, and this is supported by much reflection (403-18). In 419 she moves on to another topic (her children). The chronological organisation here does not involve a simple likening or contrast of past and present, but shows the stages in the essentially intellectual process by which Phaidra reached her present resolve.

An important organising principle found in a number of speeches of refutation (normally "defense" speeches) arises out of the need to produce

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42 Characters review their own lives in a number of Euripidean scenes and speeches (not least in prologue-speeches, not under consideration here). Chronological organisation is an obvious technique in that situation: cf. especially the monologue of Herakles, *Her* 1255ff, discussed below.

43 Orestes, in his speech of defense addressed to Tyndareos (Or 544-604), takes a similar approach: τὶ χρῆν μὲ δρᾶσαι; (551).
convincing arguments both against the opponent's case and for one's own. We have seen this principle at work in the appeal speech of Iolaos (Hkld 181-231; see I.A above); because this speech follows a speech presenting the Argive side in the dispute, Iolaos first meets that speech's points head-on (by denying the truth of the Herald's account of the legal position, and denying that Athenians will be intimidated by a bullying outsider), then makes the positive case for Athenian support for the suppliants, based on blood ties and past services. Similarly Hekabe, in responding (Hek 1187-1237) to Polymestor's speech defending his murder of Polydoros as a service to the Greeks, will first demonstrate that this was not Polymestor's motive (1196-1205), then show the real reason for the crime (1206-23).

Andromache's speech addressed to Hermione at Andr 184-231 provides another good example of this technique. Andromache has been accused of undermining Hermione's marriage with Neoptolemos. Following a proem that focuses on the speech-situation, in which she weighs the pros and cons of speaking freely in answer to her mistress, she addresses the charge Hermione has leveled:

\[
eiπ', \ ω \ νεᾶν, \ τῶι \ σ' \ εχεγγύωι \ λόγῳ
\]
\[
πεισθείσ' \ ἀπωθό \ γνησίων \ ἰμφειμάτων; \quad (Andr 192f)
\]

In the familiar form of a rhetorical question she suggests she was in no position to undertake such an act. The further questions that follow (194-204) bolster this suggestion.\textsuperscript{44} Hermione's charge has now been refuted; but the best defense is often a good offense, and Andromache goes on to supply the "true explanation" for her mistress' problems:

\textsuperscript{44} For the technique, and a detailed analysis of its use here and elsewhere, see III.B below.
The first point was supported by quoting negative facts about Andromache, showing her to be too weak (old, notorious, etc.) to replace Hermione. This second argument is supported by reference to Hermione's own behaviour (209-212), as well as by generalisations about women and marriage (207f, 213f), the positive example of Andromache's devotion to Hektor (222-6), and the negative example of Helen (229f).

C. Monologues of Despair

For characters who find themselves in a desperate position, it is in Euripides' manner to write monologues using many of the same techniques of organisation and argument found in his other "rhetorical" speeches. For example, a paradoxical proposition may be enunciated and argued, often using techniques we tend to identify as "sophistic": sequence of argument is carefully marked out, barrages of rhetorical questions (elsewhere associated with *reductio ad absurdum*) are released, gnomes (again often paradoxical) and reflections put the situation in the most general possible light. The following speeches of this type will be discussed in this section: Admetos' address to the Chorus at *Alk* 935-61, Herakles' review of his life at *Her* 1255-1310, Andromache's ostensibly consolatory address to Hekabe at *Tro* 634-83, Helen's address to the Chorus at *Hel* 255-305.

45 On a smaller scale, cf. *Hek* 258-70.
Admetos' speech is preceded by his long scenes with Alkestis (244-392) and with Pheres (606-746). In the first of these scenes, he has responded with the "right answers" but without emotion to the dying requests of his wife. In the second, he has angrily expressed his disappointment in his father for allowing Alkestis to go to her death; the scene ended with a complete impasse, each party hurling insults and warnings at the other. Euripides has skilfully varied the mood of the piece by interlacing between these highly charged scenes the two somewhat lighter Herakles scenes (476-567, 747-860). Just after Herakles learns the truth— that the woman who died was his host's wife— and goes off to recover her from Death, Admetos enters the empty stage. After participating in a moving lyric lament (861-934), he addresses to the Chorus a speech in which his personal reactions to the day's events are exposed; the speech is thus a true monologue. Admetos reveals that he is devastated by the loss of his wife, and also distressed by the sense that others may see his having allowed his wife's sacrifice in the light in which Pheres has chosen to see it. But this devastation does not find expression in an emotional tone (we have already had that in the κομμός); rather Admetos delivers a speech of great order and clarity. He introduces first the observation that he considers his wife (or her ἀγαμός, 935) more fortunate than himself; that he regards this as paradoxical is expressly

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46 This exchange is discussed in detail in II.D below.

47 The lament dwells on the hatefulness of life without Alkestis and of the "widowed house" itself (862f, 880f, 911); Admetos wishes to die (864) and regrets he didn't join Alkestis in the grave (897-902); and he compares his happy wedding-day with this sad day (915-25).

48 This formal procedure has been called "lyric-ibamic sequence": see Schadewaldt Monolog u. Selbstgespräch 143f, Greenwood Aspects 131-8, Dale ad Alk 280ff, Heath Poetics 126.

49 As Strohm says, Admetos can face no more Pheres-scenes (Euripides 6n). It is important to recognise that Admetos does not here accept the substance of the charge of cowardice; rather he sees that (as Strohm ibid and Dale Alcestis xxv have said) he has given his enemies ammunition to use against him (note ἐχθρὸς 954, πρὸς κακοί 959).
stated (καὶ περ οὐ δοκοῦν θ᾽ ὁμος, 936). The comparison is now expanded and explained, with two verses devoted to Alkestis and two to Admetos (937-40). The comparison looks to the future: Alkestis' troubles are over, whereas Admetos faces a life of pain (λυπρὸν βίοτον, 940). In vss. 941-59 Admetos gives the reasons for his bleak outlook. These are of two kinds: he will miss his wife (941-53), and he will be open to his enemies' voicing a charge of cowardice against him (954-9). As Dale notes, the points referred to here are precisely the lessons Admetos has learned (ἀρτι μανθάνω, 940) from the play's two earlier encounters. Admetos' sense of bewilderment and loss is conveyed through the quite common device of a barrage of rhetorical questions (941-3). This is a conventional way of representing despair and ἀπορία; elsewhere the same structure is used to badger or undermine an opponent. Admetos now uses a sort of dilemma-argument to corroborate the point: he can in the future find no happiness at home (944-50a), nor outside his palace (950b-53)— ergo, no happiness. At 954 a new point is raised: that of the loss of reputation he expects to suffer. This has not been expressly mentioned earlier in the speech, but it was said that the "more fortunate" Alkestis has died εὐκλετής (938). Admetos' fears for his future reputation are expressed using another standard device, the direct quote giving an imagined (or remembered) anonymous reproach. The quoted reproach itself brings two charges against Admetos: his cowardice in allowing Alkestis to die, and his (in the circumstances) unreasonable contempt for his parents. A

50 Dale ad Alk 953ff. Thus we may think of the two earlier scenes as each addressing a different argumentative point to Admetos, just as many single speeches discussed above involve two independent arguments. That is, an essentially rhetorical process has influenced the construction of the play. Something similar happens in the first two scenes of Hik; see V.B below.

51 For the use of informal dilemma arguments such as this by Euripides, see below Ch. III n.22.

52 This device elsewhere: Hkld 517, Andr 932f, Elek 930, Her 1289, Phoin 580. Direct quotes used in slightly different ways: Tro 1182, IA 1228 (both pathetic memories); Hel 962, Phoin 575 (adding pathos to appeal and reproach, respectively).
A rhetorical question beginning with καίτ' (957) has here the familiar role of pointing up the absurdity or vileness of an opponent's acts or words. In 960f, Admetos concludes, using another device we shall often see again in Euripides: a rhetorical question asks "Why go on living?" In the speech's final verse, both of its fundamental points are reiterated succinctly: κακώς κλέοντι καὶ κακώς πεπραγότι (961), "as I am ill spoken of and my life is in ruin".

The fact that Admetos' speech consists largely of formulas of Euripidean rhetoric takes nothing away from the sincerity of the speaking character. There is no question here of any irony, any discredit Euripides means to bring upon Admetos. This is guaranteed by the lyric treatment that precedes the iambic rhesis: each mode of utterance has its particular role to play. Here as elsewhere in Euripides, a situation that in real life would not call forth reasoned arguments and balanced periods is subjected to a rhetorical treatment, a treatment bringing a satisfying clarity of thought and expression to bear on a tragic situation.

The despair expressed in the monologue of Admetos results from events realised within the play. The despair of Helen's similar speech (Hel 255-305) arises out of the play's προγεγενμένα, combined with the (incorrect) news Helen has received from Teukros in the first scene. Here a "lyric-iambic sequence" of classic shape unfolds. Vss. 167-252 are sung by Helen and the Chorus in

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53 Cf. Alk 701f, Andr 218f, 666f, Elek 1044f, IA 384 (είτ'); in monologue at Hik 1095f. See M. Lloyd, Agon 32. Similar cases with ἐπείτα: Hipp 440, Hik 246, Her 266.

54 Compare, in the scenes under study here, Her 1301 (cf. 1146f), Hel 293. Elsewhere in Euripides: Med 145, Andr 405, Hek 349, Hel 56; note also A. Prom 747. The text of the codd. has κύδων in 960; this has been doubted (κέρδος, Purgold), but though unexpected seems in line with the concern for reputation that has just been expressed. κέρδος appears in this context in Prom 747 and Med 145; for κύδων Diggle (app. cr.) notes Andr 639.

55 As Mossman says (Wild Justice 119) of Hekabe's monologue (Hek 585-628): "We know well enough what she feels; now we want to know what she thinks".

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30
alternating strophes, and lament in extravagantly emotional terms the heroine's sense of loss and of the injustice of her life. In 255-305 she addresses to the Chorus a highly rhetorical iambic speech, in which the same complaints are treated to a rational analysis, using the structures and techniques that are by now familiar to us.\footnote{In the following discussion, the text to be assumed is that printed by Murray: i.e., 287-92 are in, 298 has a rhetorical question with \(\pi\omega\delta...\omega\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\delta\) (see Wilamowitz Analecta 243), 299-302 are out. On these points Kannicht's and Alt's texts agree with Murray's; Diggle's text deletes 287-92 and 298-302.}

In 255f a formula of address (cf. Med 214, Hipp 373, IT 1056) is followed by a pair of rhetorical questions introducing the speech's subject.\footnote{The parenthetical reflection in 257-9 is well defended by Dale; other editors bracket.} Vss. 260f assert that Helen's life and affairs are indeed a \(\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma\), and assign two reasons: Hera and the beauty of Helen. An impossible wish follows (262-6), in which Helen expresses her willingness to give up her beauty, if she could thereby reverse the fortune (and reputation)\footnote{The passage is dense and the transmitted text corrupt (in addition to impossible syntax in 263, the codd. give \(\kappa\alpha\lambda\alpha\varsigma\) for \(\kappa\alpha\kappa\alpha\varsigma\) in 265 and 266). Helen wishes not that she had not the \(\tau\upsilon\chi\alpha\iota\) she has, but that the Greeks would forget the \(\tau\upsilon\chi\alpha\iota\) she has; i.e., no real distinction is made between "fortune" and "reputation".} she has been dealt. She now proceeds to argue just how bad things are: when a person fails in a single undertaking, it is hard enough (267f); Helen is the victim of many disastrous circumstances.\footnote{Compare Andromache's briefer list (Andr 96-9), presented following the announcement \(\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \delta\iota\ \o\upsilon\chi\ \varepsilon\nu\ \alpha\lambda\alpha\ \pi\omega\lambda\alpha\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \sigma\tau\epsilon\nu\epsilon\nu\iota\nu\).}

These are enumerated, with the stages neatly marked:

\begin{align*}
270-2 & \quad \pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\omicron\nu: \text{undeserved disrepute} \\
273-6 & \quad \epsilon\pi\epsilon\lambda\tau\alpha: \text{slave's existence in a barbarous land} \\
277-86 & \quad \delta': \text{loss of family} \\
276-9 & \quad \text{husband's death} \\
280f & \quad \text{mother's suicide} \\
282f & \quad \text{daughter growing old unmarried} \\
284-85a & \quad \text{brothers}
\end{align*}
The speech now offers two pathetic rhetorical questions (τί δήτ' ἔτι ζω; τίν' ὑπολείπομαι τύχην;), then a third question suggests a possible scenario for the future (294-96a). This question is in effect answered by a gnome that suggests the scenario is unacceptable. Helen announces her decision to die:

θανεῖν κράτιστον' πῶς θάνωμ' ἀν οὐ καλῶς;       (Hel 298)

I take 298b to mean "Surely there can be nothing cowardly in preferring death to life under these circumstances"; vss. 299-302 will have been supplied by someone who understood 298b differently (or read a different text there). The speech ends by confirming that Helen's situation warrants this remedy (303), for beauty, even though in the case of other women a blessing, has paradoxically spelled ruin for Helen (304f).

The speech's argument thus begins and ends with Helen's beauty as the explanation for her troubles. The argument is presented using three familiar Euripidean devices: impossible wish, list, rhetorical question series. The list (of Helen's ἀδύνατα) is the centrepiece; it is introduced by the somewhat fatuous observation that a single woe may be endured, but not a great multiplicity of woes. The first item on the list makes again a rather specious point, viz., that an
undeserved bad reputation is a worse thing than a fully merited one. Item two tells us not that Helen misses Sparta, nor that she detests her Egyptian prison, but that to dwell in Egypt is inherently to live as a slave, whereas she was born of free parents. The list continues with a litany of familial woes; here the content is more personal, but the sense that this is a list is always present (compare the more expansive lyric treatment of these same points, especially in 191-228). This list is followed by a series of questions in which an alternative scenario for the future (other than death) is mentioned and rejected.

Here again, as in the monologue of Admetos, abstract points are made by the suffering protagonist using highly artificial rhetorical techniques. In each case, we have just seen the same person's suffering depicted in a lyrical mode. The two presentations must be regarded as emotionally complementary: one aim of this type of sequence must be to present a fuller view of the suffering person than could otherwise be achieved. At the same time, the value of the repetition of points must be appreciated; the clear iambic rehearsal of the facts follows upon what must have been difficult going for many theatre listeners. That is, to some extent the iambic section of the "sequence" might relate to the lyric as Surtitles do to sung operatic scenes. But neither of these considerations can explain the highly artificial character of the rhetoric: one can only assume a genuine taste for such things on the part of Euripides' audience.

A similar scene occurs in Herakles. Following the hero's murder of his wife and children, a powerful lyric lament is sung by Amphitryon and the Chorus while Herakles, bound, sleeps in full view of the audience. As his delirium begins to subside, and he realises the awful truth, Herakles naturally experiences despair and thoughts of suicide.
Herakles' monologue does not follow immediately upon the lyrical scene in which he plays so pathetic a role. Between the two, Theseus has arrived, and, after hearing of Herakles' tragedy, offered friendship and asylum. The rhesis of Herakles presents itself as a reply to these offers. Two conventional phrases introduce the speech: an appeal to "Listen!", and an announcement he will "contest in words" Theseus' suggestions (1255). The point to be argued is next headlined: "Herakles' life unlivable in present and past alike" (1257). The objective is now to demonstrate not that Herakles is presently miserable— this is obvious— but that he has always been so. A life-review is presented, taking a form similar to that of Helen's litany of woes (see above).

1259-62 πρῶτον μὲν I was the son of ill-fated Amphitryon
1263-8 Zeus begot in me an enemy of Hera, who sent snakes to kill me
1269-78 as a young man, I suffered many ordeals
1279f and this killing was the last of my labours
1281-1302 the argument moves to the present: Herakles describes, in line with the program he has announced, the grim life he now faces, concluding τί δὴ τὰ μὲ ζῆν δεῖ;

Herakles now returns to the cause of his woes: Hera's jealousy. She figured in the incident described in 1263-8, and is here credited with the βούλησις (1305) that led to Herakles' ruin (cf. also 1253). Conventional techniques met with are the chronological review itself, here clearly marked out with connectives (πρῶτον μὲν— ὅταν δὲ— ἐπεὶ δὲ); the stock-taking flurry of rhetorical questions, in

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64 Throughout the speech the chronological stages are clear, but much less pointed than in, e.g., Peleus' speech at Andr 590-641. Wilamowitz's note ad loc exaggerates the neatness of form and underestimates the pathos.
which options for the future are tested; the direct quote containing an imagined reproach; the rhetorical question proposing suicide. Repeated references to Herakles’ own greatness and importance have the effect of deepening the tone of despair (1299f, 1306, 1309f); this is one of the play’s important themes, developed especially in the debate of Amphitryon and Lykos (151-61, 174-87) and in the first stasimon (348-450).

Herakles has set out to prove his life unlivable in order to support a decision to die. In Troades, Andromache addresses a similar “proof” to Hekabe, ostensibly for the purpose of consoling her mother-in-law over the recent death of Polyxene. But Andromache’s past is used to demonstrate not the constancy of her troubles, nor again the proverbial idea that wealth and power once enjoyed make slavery or degradation harder to endure, but the paradoxical and ironic notion that it was her very virtue and high reputation that got her into the particularly bitter position of being, in effect, the slave of her husband’s murderer.

The speech begins with the text “Death is preferable to a life of pain”. This is supported by further general statements, and at 641f the case of Polyxene is introduced, the simple fact of whose death may now be contrasted with the complexities of Andromache’s life:

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65 The couplet 1299f is corrupt in the codd., but should be repaired, not deleted (del. Wilamowitz, Diggie). Wilamowitz’s objection (ad 1297) to 1291-3 and 1299f, viz., that they contradict the essential argument announced in 1256f, is not decisive. On a trivial level we may compare Tro 869f with 876f. More seriously, Her 1340-6 have been said to contradict the apparent assumptions of the play itself. Such objections arise when the rhetorical context of a passage is ignored.

66 For this idea cf. Hek 375-8, Her [1291-3], Hel 417-19 (and see Kannicht’s note ad loc). In Tro 472f the same idea is presented stripped of all pathos.

67 The idea returns in [742-3]: Astyanax’s inherited εὐγένεια attracted death to him, instead of saving him.
I failed by striving after εὐδοξία
past— I was a perfect wife
present— this was my downfall, I am a slave
recapitulation: past— Hektor and my marriage
recapitulation: present— Hektor dead, I a slave bound for Greece
recapitulation of proem: Polyxene more fortunate

Like the other speeches under consideration here, this one follows a lyric scene (Tro 577-607) in which the same pathetic situation has been presented through a different set of technical conventions: both the dialogue in 610-33 and Andromache's rhesis repeat some of the points made earlier in song.

Unlike the three speeches discussed above, this one doesn't contemplate the speaker's death— naturally enough, since Polyxene's death is being called a preferable estate to Andromache's survival. But the speech has other familiar features, most notably the use of comparison as a springboard for argument: Admetos began by comparing his own fortune with that of his wife, Helen's speech compared herself— a beautiful multisufferer— with plain women and unisufferers, Herakles compared his own past and present and found them to be of a piece; so Andromache's argument takes the death of Polyxene as its point of departure, and compares the lot of the two women. Another feature these speeches share is the paradoxical character of their main argumentative points: Death more satisfactory than Life (Admetos, Andromache); Beauty (Helen) and σωφροσύνη (Andromache) the cause of misfortune for a woman, Herakles miserable at the moment of his great victories. This aspect in particular should tell us that speeches of this type played more than a purely functional role in their plays; these speeches belong to a genre that had appeal in its own right—

At this point, of course, she is still the mother of a helpless child; suicide is not an option. Note, though, vs. 594: κοιμίσαι [Burges: κόμησαι codd.] μ᾽ ἐστὶν Αίδου.
just as did, no doubt, the choral odes of these plays. So long as we do not expect a character's abject misery to be portrayed in a "realistic" (rather than an artistic) way, it takes nothing away from these scenes to see that their presentation involves stylish techniques of argument.

The four speeches just discussed seem to form a group through sharing the traits I have mentioned. Some other speeches use some of these devices to paint a picture of misery and despair, in a context where this is not the speech's only or main purpose.69

D. Heroic Acceptance of Death

Acceptance of death is the subject of many speeches in Euripides, often speeches of quite rhetorical character. This is especially true of the speeches made by a character who is offering to die as a sacrificial victim in circumstances where there is some element of choice (Makaria in Hkld 500-34, Menoikeus in Phoin 985-1018, Iphigeneia in IA 1369-1401), or accepting the necessity where there isn't (Polyxene in Hek 342-78).70 A somewhat similar case is that of Andromache, who offers herself up in Andr 384-420, believing she is saving her son's life by doing so. The self-sacrifice motif in these speeches has been much studied. There are rhetorical similarities in other speeches accepting or embracing death, e.g. Megara's farewell speech (Her 451-96), and the despondent

69 E.g. Med 214-66, Hipp 373-430 (see V.A below), Andr 384-420, Hek 585-628, Hik 1080-1113 (for which see next section), Her 451-96. Some formal and rhetorical aspects of the representation of despair are traced in a variety of ancient authors and genres by R.L. Fowler in "Rhetoric of Desperation".

70 A sub-type is the offer by another character to die as a substitute for the chosen victim: Hkld 451-60, Hek 382-8, Phoin 962-9. Strohm (Euripides 50) emphasises the wide range of the theme of self-sacrifice in Euripidean dramaturgy.
soliloquies of Herakles and Helen (Her 1255-1310, Hel 255-305: see above), and of Iphis (Hik 1080-1113: see below).

Makaria's speech in Hkld is a particularly neat and abstract construction; yet it arises quite naturally out of the preceding conversation. A brief formal proem marked Makaria's entrance: 474-7 asked whether a woman ought to speak among men; 478-81 gave her reasons for joining the conversation; 482f asked a question. The information supplied in answer (484-99) leads her to continue on these lines:

500-2 I volunteer to die  
503-10 it would be unworthy to shirk death  
503-6 when the Athenians are championing our cause  
507-10 when we are suppliants and children of Herakles  
511-19 the alternatives  
511-14 suffer degradation as a captive, then die anyway  
515-19 suffer exile, and insult as a known coward  
520-24 in any case, I have no future (husband, children)  
525-7 need to act worthily  
528-34 take me, etc.; references to coming victory, benefit to her family, fame

It is in this moment, the decision to die and its rationalisation, that Euripides exploits resources of argument and persuasion. Here the speaker examines the case first on the basis of justice and honour, then moves to pragmatic considerations; life is excluded on both grounds. Some of the techniques used have been seen above in other contexts: the topical headline (501f), use of rhetorical questions to open (503-6) and close (510b) an argument, systematic elimination of

71 See Schmitt, Freiwilliger Opfertod Ch. III: "Die Entscheidenden Reden".

72 Schmitt emphasises (Opfertod 29) that the case is presented entirely through techniques of refutation.
alternatives for the future (cf. *Med* 502-8, *Her* 1281-90), use of direct quotation giving an imagined reproach (see above, n.52).

Menoikeus' shorter dedication speech in *Phoin* 991-1018 follows the reluctant announcement by Teiresias that Thebes can be saved only through his death, and a brief conversation (977-90) in which the boy seems to agree to Kreon's plan to spirit him out of danger. After Kreon's departure to make the necessary arrangements, Menoikeus, speaking to the Chorus only, takes some time to make a clear announcement of his intentions. He indicates that he has tricked Kreon, then that Kreon's plans for his escape were forgivable but dishonourable—Menoekeus will not prove a traitor to the land that gave him birth (995f). He then announces he will die and save the city (997f);73 the speech continues:

999-1005 the disgrace (of fleeing): others will fight and willingly die, while I prove a coward
1006-12 description of the sacrifice
[1013-18] reflection: the value of selfless citizens

Here the "practical" aspect explored in Makaria's second section is absent—the possibility of Menoikeus' betraying his country and living in exile is not explored, but simply dismissed.74 In place of a fantasy image of his future we get a very brief "advance messenger-speech" describing the scenario that will actually take place. But the idea of escape and a life in exile has already been developed in the stichomythia précéding Menoikeus' speech (977-90); in embracing death he

73 The coup de théâtre achieved by the deception and gradual revelation is brilliant; something similar happens with Iphigeneia's change of mind in IA.

74 De Romilly, "Les Phéniciennes" 43, notes the relative absence of "rhetoric" here: "Le fils de Créon ne raisonne pas, ne calcule pas; il n'exprime que deux sentiments: un certain sens de l'honneur et l'amour de sa patrie".

39
at the same time rejects the plans that have been proposed for him. Thus Euripides can write a speech concentrating exclusively on honour and good citizenship, with no need to waste time on consideration of "alternatives".75

Where Menoiketus has been offered an opportunity to escape Thebes and his own death, Iphigeneia in IA must decide whether to encourage Achilles to fight to save her, with all the repercussions this would have for her father and the Trojan campaign. She begins her speech of self-dedication (as did Menoiketus) by revealing gradually her decision to die. The announcement is clearly made at vs. 1375a. It is supported by a medley of arguments:

1375b-76 headline: glory, not ignominy
1377-84 I have it in my hands to prevent further abductions of Greek women, and to achieve revenge against Paris, fame for myself
1385-91 in any case I mustn't cling to life: thousands stand ready to die, and I mustn't interfere with the course of things
1392-6 miscellaneous points: we must prevent Achilles' being at odds with the army;76 men are worth more than women; I a mortal cannot resist a goddess' will
1397-1401 I give myself to Greece, etc.

This differs strikingly from the earlier speeches in its involvement with the details of the plot: Iphigeneia is not a colourless figure produced in order to make a speech and die. Rather she is allowed to speak of the specific practical goals her death will serve— not "I will save the city" but "I will secure revenge

75 The speech ends very abruptly with εἰρήνα λόγος (1012); as Mastronarde says ad loc, the phrase does not automatically exclude a following epilogue, but that of 1013-18 begins awkwardly by repeating the thought of 1009f. One misses a general summing up: possibly 1013-18 were composed as an alternative to 1009-12 (or vice versa).

76 This point was raised earlier in 1372f (reading Hartung's διαβληθῇ 1372).
for Paris' abduction of Helen”. These practical political considerations ("my role in history") give way at 1385 to a personal argument: Iphigeneia compares herself to any other soldier involved in the war effort (cf. Hkld 503-6, Phoin 999-1002), and concludes she cannot justly shirk death.\footnote{See Gibert diss., esp. p. 286. I note that the patriotic and heroic view of her act returns in her words at 1420, 1446, 1471f, 1502, and is extended to Agamemnon's act as well in 1454-6.}

When we turn to Polyxene in Hek the situation is somewhat different. In no way will Polyxene's sacrifice serve to promote the interests of her own family or state. And she is no volunteer like Makaria and Menoikeus; even in the case of Iphigeneia, a real heroic choice is involved, though it comes only after much resistance.\footnote{Thus I disagree with statements to the effect that Iphigeneia simply yields to overwhelming necessity (e.g., O'Connor-Visser Aspects of Sacrifice 122-4). Euripides has delayed her act of heroism to get the strongest possible effect from it; he has in fact made a whole play out of what provides only a scene in the other three plays discussed here.}

Yet Euripides has given Polyxene a speech highlighting the nobility of her decision to accept the necessity of death:

\begin{verbatim}
342-5 Polyxene hints at the resolve she is about to reveal
346-8 I must die and I wish to die, and will not appear a coward
349a topical question: τι γάρ με δεῖν ζην;
349b-56 my past
357-66 my present and future
367f I reject life on these terms
369-74 instructions to Odysseus and Hekabe
375-8 reflection on reversal
\end{verbatim}

Polyxene's account of her past emphasises her royal status and expectations of a royal marriage; her outlook for the future (if the sacrifice could somehow be

\footnote{The positive formulation here makes a striking contrast to the refutation approach seen in the Hkld scene: Polyxene has no reason to die, only the desire. Schmitt notes (Opfertod 32) similarities to Aias' speech at S. Aias 430-80.}
prevented) is that of a menial slave facing a degrading marriage. Polyxene's speech shares with Makaria's this contemplation of the slave's life one will not be forced to live. But there are differences as well as similarities; the mood of Polyxene's speech is closer to that of the "monologues of despair" I have discussed above.

The Evadne/Iphis scene in Hik 990-1113 is, like the scenes of self-dedication in Hkld and Phoin, self-contained and inessential. Formally the scene resembles the "lyric-iambic sequences" discussed above (Alk 244-392, Hel 167-329, etc.), in that human reactions to a tragic situation are developed first in a lyrical, then in a rhetorical mode. But here there are two sufferers involved. A lyric lament is sung by Evadne (990-1030), who has lost her husband Kapaneus in the war at Thebes. Then her father Iphis, who has lost his son Eteoklos, arrives (1031); he attempts in dialogue (1048-71) to prevent Evadne's suicide, but without success. Iphis, who has thus lost son, son-in-law, and daughter, now delivers an iambic speech rejecting life (1080-1113). The speech begins, like some other Euripidean monologues, with a lengthy general reflection involving an impossible wish. Iphis wishes men could go twice through the cycle of youth and age (1080-86), then explains how his own life has brought him to wish this: he has been destroyed by his own desire to have children, for having fathered a son he has now lost him (1087-93). In 1094-7 Iphis considers his alternatives,

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80 So Schmitt, Opfertod 31.
81 Yet though the speech is not a heroic self-dedication embracing patriotic goals and personal glory, it must be said that the sacrifice itself (as reported by Talthybios, 818-82) is presented in heroic and ennobling terms. Strohm (Euripides 54-7) notes similarities between Polyxene's scene and the farewell of Megara in Herakles.
82 The passage is discussed in IV.D below.
83 This is the sense of 1092f, which Diggle was the first editor to delete; Collard ad 1092-3 defends the couplet against earlier attacks by W. Gilbert and by Wilamowitz. The lack of any
using the common device of a series of rhetorical questions, and concludes that he can have no pleasure in returning either to his own home or to that of Kapaneus. This second option is rejected on account of his daughter's death, and she now returns to his thoughts. He generalises about the virtues of daughters as against sons, and remembers with fondness his intimacy with Evadne (1099-1103). His decision to die is revealed in a striking way:

οὐχ ὡς τὰχιστὰ δῆτα μ᾽ ἄξετ' ἐς δόμους
σκότωι τε δώσετ', ἐνθ' άσπιαις ἐμὸν
dέμας γεραίον συντακείς ἀποφθερῷ;

(Hik 1104-6)

This combines a delayed announcement of the intention to die (cf. Menoikeus, Iphigeneia) with a call to action such as we saw opening the final section of several speeches discussed above. Iphis concludes with a reflection on the uselessness of old people trying to extend their lives for no good purpose (1108-13): "they ought to get out of the way of the young". Iphis' speech thus shares essential features with other speeches by characters who, whether from despair or heroic intentions, decide to accept death: comparison of a happy past with a bleak future; demonstration that the future is bleak through an examination of possible alternatives; reflection to the effect that death is preferable to life.

reference to Evadne here is to be explained in terms of balance: Iphis mourns first his son (1092-6), then his daughter (1097-1103).

84 We find similar language in the reminiscences of Iphigeneia about her childhood intimacy with her father, IA 1220-2.

85 Hkld 528 (ἳγειὸν ὑπὸν δεῖ...), IA 1398 (θύετ', ἐκπορθεῖτε Τρόιαν...), Hek 369 (ἄγ' οὖν με...).

86 This makes an interesting frame with the reflection on youth and age that opened the speech; moreover, the characters of the young and the old form a theme throughout Hik, and here as often "general" material used in a rhetorical setting reflects a basic concern of the play.
E. Two Epideictic Speeches

In a number of speeches discussed above, a balanced chronological presentation helps emphasise a pathetic contrast between past and present or present and future. Comparison not of points in time but of places or peoples forms the organising principle in two very interesting argumentative speeches: Ion 585-647 and Tro 353-405.

Upon learning that the oracle has identified him as Xouthos' son, Ion greets with mixed feelings the invitation to move to Athens and assume his rightful place in his (supposed) father's household. His doubts about the change are expressed (589-645) as a highly developed description of the life he would anticipate in Athens and then of the life he has enjoyed at Delphi. There is no direct comparison of the two, but life at Athens is imagined with a good many negative aspects, life at Delphi presented as idyllic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>589-632</th>
<th>Athens</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>589-606</td>
<td>Ion's disadvantages there in public life as an outsider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>607-17</td>
<td>the turmoil he will cause in Xouthos' household—possible retaliation by Kreousa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>618-20</td>
<td>his pity for her</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>621-32</td>
<td>general rejection of the desirability of royal status (621-8), wealth (629-31)</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>633-45</th>
<th>Delphi</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>634-7</td>
<td>agreeable pace and civility of life there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638-9</td>
<td>the cheerful character of his sacred and civic intercourse(^\text{87})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{87}\) So Verrall in his translation, Diggle in his note at Studies 102f.
variety of human contact
summarises his good fortune there
comparison favours life at Delphi

As we have seen in some speeches earlier, two balanced blocks of argument are developed to very different lengths. Two factors have combined to expand the first block: Euripides' proclivity for political reflection and speculation, and his desire to demonstrate warmth and good feeling on Ion's part towards Kreousa. It is also true that much of the play so far has served to present the image of Ion's life at Delphi that the speech promotes— that it is a paradise, and Ion a sensitive but carefree innocent; the speech therefore needn't dwell on that idea.88

Ion's initial objection to going to Athens "as the son of an immigrant father, and myself a bastard" (592: i.e., a citizen on neither side) raises precisely the problem that will be solved by the play's second and authentic recognition-action. The disadvantages of this situation are explored in relation to each of three political groups:89 οἱ ἀδύνατοι (597), those who συγώσι κού σπεύδουσιν ἐς τὰ πράγματα (598-601), and οἱ χρώμενοι τῷ πόλει (602-4).90

From public life Ion moves to his potential impact on Xouthos' own household. The distinction between public and private for purposes of argument has already been seen above in the appeals of Hekabe to Odysseus (Hek 251-

88 Good discussions of this aspect are offered by Erbse Studien zum Prolog 76f, Burnett Catastrophe 104f.
89 Owen (ad 596-603) speaks of "(1) the ἀδύνατοι who have no political influence, (2) the really capable people who keep out of politics, (3) those who do take part in public life". Discussion: Friis Johansen General Reflection 136f, Kovacs 'Tyrants' 35f; see also Collard ad Hik 238-45. I am not at all convinced Herwerden's δυτεσ in 598 (received by Diggle) is necessary for εἶναι codd.; it introduces a profile of ὁ ἄραγμων that may or may not be accurate, but which we should not assume Euripides meant to promote here. (Collard ad Hik 438-41 quotes the vs. reading εἶναι without comment.)
90 These are also called οἱ λόγοι in the codd. (vs. 602), for which many corrections have been proposed.
95) and Iolaos to Demophon (Hkld 181-231). Kovacs has proposed deletions (of 595-606 and 621-32) that would deprive the speech of this distinction. Ion is left arguing on purely personal and family grounds: I would be an outsider, a nobody, and a nuisance in your household. This seems remarkably limited scope for discussing an invitation to join the household of the king of Athens. The play is about an innocent youth who will in fact at the end of the day be invited by the goddess herself to assume the throne at Athens; surely it makes sense to think Euripides thought of showing at this point in his metamorphosis a virtuous lack of greed and ambition, and a certain resistance to political activity — informed by a good sense of political demographics— which the further events of the day will overcome.

Kassandra's speech to Hekabe at Tro 353-405 begins (as will Andromache's at 634-83) by offering consolation; Hekabe has expressed regret over Kassandra's "marriage" to Agamemnon. Kassandra, after prophesying enigmatically the end she and Agamemnon both face, offers (367-9) to prove the paradoxical (we may as well say "sophistic") proposition: "The war was a better thing for the defeated

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91 Note also Orestes' defense addressed to Tydareos (Or 544-604): "I had to avenge my father; I have performed a service to Greece". Without emphasis, the Delphi section of this speech also moves from public ('no one knocks you off the sidewalk' 635f) to private ('by habit and character I am righteous towards the god' 643f).

92 This is so even if the play portrays Xouthos' royal power as restrained by certain limitations— for example it is not implied that Ion would, as his son, inherit the throne: note 659f (and cf. 577-78]). Burnett, Catastrophe 106n, discusses these points in terms of Attic law, but our starting point should rather be Euripides' decision to marginalise Xouthos for story-telling purposes.

93 It must also be noted that Kovacs' pronouncement, "[the claim] that a wise man will not attempt to become a tyrant... betray[s] a point of view hard to parallel in the fifth century" ("Tyrants", 35f), is contradicted not only by passages he deletes (Hipp 1012-15, Phein 549-54) but by S. OT 587ff. On the OT passage, Kovacs (p. 47) wilfully ignores the philosophical element in Kreon's argument— an argument much like that of Ion here, in which the advantages of a simple life are held preferable to the complexities and dangers of τυφανίς. On Ion 595-606 Kovacs identifies (p. 35) "both the general tendency of the passage and its identification (598) of the wise with the inactive" as "Epicurean".
Trojans than for the Greek victors”. She proceeds by analysing each side's position:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Greeks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>368-85</td>
<td>lost thousands of men over one woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>368-9</td>
<td>their general was forced to slay his daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370-3</td>
<td>they died not defending their own country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374-6a</td>
<td>they lie far from their loved ones (and vice versa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>376b-79</td>
<td>no proper funerals or offerings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380-83</td>
<td>closing reflection⁹⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Trojans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>386-7</td>
<td>died defending their own country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387-90</td>
<td>were properly tended and buried by relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>391-3</td>
<td>enjoyed family life when not fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>394-7</td>
<td>the Greek invasion brought Hektor fame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>398-9</td>
<td>Paris married a daughter of Zeus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-2</td>
<td>when war comes, it is no shame for a city to perish nobly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

She concludes with an epilogue (403-5) uniting the two themes of her speech: neither her marriage to Agamemnon nor the Trojans' loss of the war should be an occasion for pity. In closing she promises she will herself bring about vengeance.⁹⁵

While thoroughly grounded in the story of the fall of Troy as Euripides has conceived it for *Troades*, this speech (that is, the comparison in 365-403)

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⁹⁴ Diggle deletes 383-5, following Wilamowitz (383) and Reichenberger (384-5); Lee receives them without comment.

⁹⁵ Wilamowitz's attack on vss. 365-83 is at *Analecta* 221-4. He sees the speech as dealing originally only with the Trojans, citing (among other objections) similar expressions in the two halves that suggest to him the Greek half was cobbled together using the Trojan material. Wilamowitz's resistance to the speech's finely balanced presentation has not attracted any modern champions.
more than any other we have by the playwright seems detachable from its context, a sophistic set piece. This impression arises partly from the speech's lack of necessity. Nothing in the play has led us to expect a speech dissenting from the view of the defeated Trojans as pitiful victims, least of all from a Trojan speaker. Yet it makes an astonishing impact, and must be regarded as a brilliant stroke by Euripides. The speech's "detachability" also owes something to the formal and emotionally restrained character of the presentation: the clear headline (365-7); the relative brevity and symmetry of the points raised (Greeks 18 verses, Trojans 17), touching about equally on known individuals, common soldiers, and civilians, and with no pathetic outbursts and no express application to persons present. Vs. 403 clearly closes the comparative argument (δὲν οὐνὲκ' οὐ χρῆ, μὴτερ, οἰκτίρειν σὲ γῆν); the continuation with οὐ τὰμὰ λέκτρα (404) then reaches back further in the speech and associates for the first time its two topics— the general and the personal.96

96 Theseus' comparison of democracy and tyranny at Hik 429-55 shares some features with these two "epideictic" speeches: see Ch. V.B below.
Chapter II

Antilogies and Complex Exchanges

Thus far I have been concentrating on single speeches: speeches of appeal, "epideictic" speeches, monologues of despair, speeches embracing a glorious death or accepting death as the lesser of two evils. In all of these situations Euripides uses sophisticated techniques of argument, typically building up the speaker's case in blocks more or less self-consciously distinguished. These blocks often present arguments of different character: for example, an argument about abstract justice may be followed by one about practical consequences, or by an appeal for pity, or a reference to past services, etc. Turning now to the face-to-face debates of which Euripides is such a master, I shall continue to call attention to these techniques in the composition of individual speeches; and I shall note various types of correspondence between the two speeches of a pair. Some observations will also be made regarding the "tone" of debate scenes and their function within the play.

A. Appeal and Response

Scenes of supplication or other types of appeal can be treated as a special class.¹ Speeches of appeal tend to be long and neatly argued; responses are often substantially shorter than the appeal they answer, may make little reference to

¹ I make no distinction based on the presence of a formal announcement of supplication; such announcements normally have no effect on the progress of the action. See App. B.
the terms of the request, and are generally of a less "rhetorical" character
(Hkld 236-52, Hek 850-63, Hik 334-48, IA 1255-75). There are some important
eXceptions (Kykh 316-46, Hek 299-331, Hik 195-249, Hel 998-1029, Or 682-716). I
shall discuss here the more rhetorically developed appeal-response exchanges in
Kykh, Hek, Or.

Odysseus' appeal to Polyphemos for hospitality (see IA above) offers two
grounds of justification, alluding first to favours rendered to Poseidon by the
sailors (Kyk 290-8), and then suggesting that νόμος and εὐσέβεια require respectful
treatment of suppliants (299-312). The answering speech is a bit longer than the
appeal (31 lines to 28), and unlike some other speeches of refusal (Odysseus in
Hek 299-331, Menelaos in Or 682-716, Agamemnon in IA 1255-75) it splits no
hairs and makes no excuses. The Cyclops' first words announce his alignment
with a philosophy of selfish materialism that admits neither sentiment nor law:

ο θηλτός, ἀνθρώπινος, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεὸς,
tὰ δ' ἄλλα κόμποι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφία. (Kyk 316f)

He goes on to state first (318-21) that Poseidon and Zeus mean nothing to him;
this claim is illustrated by a humourous description of the insular and self-
reliant character of his life (323-38a). With 338b-41 he dismisses the institution
of laws as likewise inconsistent with his lifestyle. A final section states ironically

2 It is worth noting that the most elaborate speeches of response are refusals.

3 The remaining scenes of this type (Hik, Hel) are treated below in V.B and II.E
respectively.

4 Details here owe much to passages in the Odyssey (note especially ix. 273-8), though there
the Cyclops boasts of his relation to Poseidon (ix. 517-21), and is the very personification of
gullibility and unsophistication. For comparison of the Homeric and the Euripidean Cyclops, see
pp. 51-9 in Seaford's Introduction to his ed.
the practical outcome of the confrontation: "fire and the ancestral cauldron" will be made available to Odysseus and his men as ἐκένα, and they are to approach the altar where they will themselves provide the feast (342-6).⁵

Although in its humourous tone this speech is unlike any other Euripidean example, it conforms in rhetorical terms to a general pattern we shall see below in another speech of refusal: the two arguments posed by Odysseus are answered (the first at much greater length than the second), and after the refusal has been justified the practical outcome is announced.

The exchange of Hekabe and Odysseus in Hek 251-331 offers another example of a balanced rhetorical sequence, but on a larger scale. Following Odysseus' entrance and announcement that Polyxene is to be sacrificed at Achilles' tomb, Hekabe first obtains his consent for a debate (234-7),⁶ then raises the issue of a personal obligation she says Odysseus has towards her. This matter is discussed in stichomythia; Hekabe's long rhesis begins at vs. 251, its first lines serving to close the stichomythic conversation.⁷ She then offers her formal plea:

254-71 the injustice of the proposed sacrifice
272-87a pathetic appeal, with a reminder of obligation
287b-95 alternative proposal, with reasons

The clear signposting (271f) of the transition from rational argument to pathetic appeal has been noted in I.A above. The third section, in which a positive

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⁵ For the speech's possible "sophistic" connections, see esp. Paganelli, Echi Storico-politici: Part I (21-60) is devoted to an analysis of this speech and its contact with contemporary thought. See also Seaford's Introduction, ed. 52-6. Ussher dissents (ed. 187f): "One doubts if he [the Cyclops] has framed his primitive code in answer to contemporary sophists".

⁶ Here as elsewhere the line between "appeal" and "debate" is blurred; suppliants debate their persecutors in Andr 184-230, 319-63, and in Her 170-235. So Helen's appeal to Menelaos to spare her life is cast in the form of a debate with Hekabe in Tro 906-13.

⁷ Speeches open similarly at Kyk 285, Andr 920, Hek 786, etc.
practical proposal is made, is a frequent feature of appeals; similarly many accusation speeches close with a pointed reference to alternate action the opponent might have taken.⁸

Odysseus’ response takes in order the issues raised in Hekabe’s speech, with a clear transition from point to point. He begins with a brief acknowledgement of his obligation to Hekabe, then proceeds to answer at length her two main arguments:

303-20 the sacrifice is necessary and just
321-26 the misery of war is universal and must be endured

The transition between these two points is made using a transition formula (321), roughly: "And as for your reference to your own sufferings, I have this to say about that". A generalising epilogue (328-31) supports the first of Odysseus’ arguments.

These arguments have been regarded by many critics as self-evidently empty and base.⁹ But it is important to distinguish between the sympathy the characters themselves attract and the resources of argument they apply.¹⁰ There is no question but that we sympathise with Hekabe; moreover, we recognise the personal obligation of Odysseus to her— it should be added that we recognise it because Odysseus himself acknowledges it (301f).¹¹ But the arguments made by

⁸ E.g. IA 1196-1202, Hek 1217-23; Tyndareos begins with such a statement in Or 496-503.

⁹ Cf. e.g. Kitto Greek Tragedy 226f, Conacher Euripidean Drama 157f, Michelini Euripides 146f. Mossman reviews the speech in great detail (Wild Justice 113-7) and concludes (117): "Euripides ruthlessly undercuts [Odysseus’] moral standing by clever manipulation of the standard rhetorical ploys he gives him to speak". I don’t see this; a view closer to the neutral one that will be presented here is that of Collard (ed., p. 142 and ad 299-331).

¹⁰ In App. C below I have assembled some Euripidean material to support this distinction.

¹¹ Such claims raised in argument have little force when they pass without comment from the other party; cf. Menelaos’ charges in IA 358-60, contradicted by Agamemnon elsewhere in the play.
Odysseus are not in themselves discreditable. In the first sequence (303-20) he states that he will not in a private deal contravene his public stand (303-5); a πόλις owes proper recognition to the heroes who have died for it (306-10); if we exploit our soldiers living and dishonour them dead, men will have no incentive to fight (311-16); a short life is acceptable if one gains eternal honour and gratitude (317-20). His second sequence points out in moving language that war is a horror that must be endured by the women on both sides. I see Odysseus in this scene as making the strongest possible case, using arguments that would occur to anyone in his position, for a distasteful but necessary action. Likewise Hekabe in her appeal has used the best arguments available to her, including some extra ammunition (the debt of obligation) that Euripides has supplied to even the field a bit and create a more exciting scene.

As I have suggested, the relatively detailed response of Odysseus, in which the points of Hekabe’s appeal are directly addressed, is somewhat unusual for a Euripidean appeal-scene (though common in "forensic" exchanges: see below). The brief and tangential responses of Aigeus (Med 719-30), Demophon (Hkld 236-52), Agamemnon (Hek 850-63), Theseus (Hik 334-48) are more typical.

A variation on the pattern in which a suppliant puts two contrasting arguments into a single speech of appeal is offered in some three-person scenes found in the later plays: in Hel, speeches appealing for assistance are addressed to Theonoe by Helen and Menelaos (see II.E below); in IA, Agamemnon hears a pair of appeals voiced by Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia (see V.C). The separation of arguments noted above in I.A as a typical feature of appeal speeches tends in these scenes to be exaggerated, due to the fact that separate persons are voicing two different aspects (e.g., rational and emotional) of the appeal. To some extent,

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12 The thought returns through the Chorus’ poignant words in vss. 650-6.
this effect is also achieved in the two speeches of Orestes, the first a defense (Or 544-604) emphasising rational argument, the second an appeal (640-79) emphasising obligation. Discussion of Orestes' appeal and Menelaos' response follows; for the larger sequence see II.E below.

Orestes, sick and exhausted following his murder of his mother, sees Menelaos, just returned from the war, as his best protector against threatened civil punishment for his act. Menelaos enters (Or 348) and the two men discuss the situation in stichomythia; Orestes initiates a formal appeal for protection with 448-55, which have the character of a proem. This appeal is interrupted by the arrival of Tyndareos (456) and the entire "forensic" scene with him (491-631). In vs. 640 Orestes resumes his appeal to Menelaos. In the text of the codd. his speech of 40 lines is answered by Menelaos with a speech of 35; Diggle's text gives Orestes 37 lines, Menelaos 26— still a substantial response compared to others I have mentioned.

Orestes' speech (640-79) begins by insisting on the desirability of a full discussion of the issues. The puzzling couplet 644f follows, lines which seem completely irrelevant: perhaps, as the scholion suggests, they involved some stage business. Orestes' main argument involves a survey (unchronological and not very clearly marked out) of benefits Menelaos has enjoyed at the expense of Agamemnon and Orestes, each subjected to a comparative treatment:

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13 I owe this observation to Porter, Studies 165-7. Porter sees in the somewhat desperate character of Orestes' appeal speech a result of the failure of his earlier rational argumentation addressed to Tyndareos, just as (in Porter's view) Hekabe in the second part of her appeal to Agamemnon (Hek 787-845) resorts to desperate tactics in the face of the failure of her more moderate opening arguments. But rhetorical contrasts that are to be seen everywhere do not require explanation in these psychological terms.

14 Similar separation of proem from body of speech is seen in Makaria's self-dedication in Hkld 474-83, 500-34. The effect of the interruption is for us a gain in realism.
647-51 Agamemnon mobilised an army, not in consequence of his own fault but of your wife's
652-4 he gave his life fighting at your side,\(^\text{16}\) so you might regain your wife
655-7 his fight was ten years long, yours would be but a day
658-9 I lost my sister when Agamemnon sacrificed Iphigeneia, no need for you to sacrifice Hermione
660-4 summarising argument

The first part of this seems to involve a paradoxical critique of the concept of \(\delta\delta\kappa\iota\alpha\) (note \(\delta\delta\iota\kappa\omega\) 646, \(\delta\delta\iota\kappa\omega\nu\) 647, \(\delta\delta\iota\kappa\omega\varsigma\) 648, \(\delta\delta\iota\kappa\iota\alpha\nu\) 650);\(^\text{17}\) an argument "from justice" is thus presented. In the comparisons that follow the emphasis is on Menelaos' bonds of obligation to his brother. In 665-8 Orestes raises the question of the practical possibility of a successful resistance.\(^\text{18}\) The argument is supported only by the philosophical observation that "friendship" has no meaning when the gods are on one's side— it is friends in trouble one must help.\(^\text{19}\) This leads to a final section in which Orestes supplicates Menelaos in Helen's name and begs for help (669-79). Orestes' appeal, then, consists of a pair of rational arguments, neatly presented, combined with anticipation of a practical objection

\(^{15}\) I follow here the codd. order against Paley's transposition of 651 (accepted by Diggle).

\(^{16}\) Here I note again an important principle: the fact no one contradicts a claim made in a rhetorical situation does not make it true. Orestes attributes to Agamemnon the noble act he is asking of Menelaos.

\(^{17}\) I prefer the punctuation in Weil's text: question mark after \(\delta\delta\iota\kappa\kappa\) in 646. The point is that if Menelaos sees Orestes as "in the wrong" for killing Klytaimestra on behalf of Agamemnon (as he may be apt to do following the harsh verdict Tyndareos has just rendered), this fact will offer him no argument against assisting Orestes, since Agamemnon will have been equally in the wrong campaigning to correct not a misdeed of his own (\(\omega\kappa\kappa\varepsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\rho\alpha\tau\tau\omega\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma\) but a misdeed and a wrong of Helen's. Orestes now asks Menelaos for the favour of a similar "wrong"— that is, he defines \(\delta\delta\kappa\iota\alpha\), for purposes of confronting Menelaos' possible objection, as a selfless service done a friend. Weil (ad loc): "Euripide s'est ingénié pour trouver des arguments spécieux à l'appui d'un paradoxe".

\(^{18}\) \(\varepsilon\rho\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\) opens such arguments elsewhere: see App. A.

\(^{19}\) Cf. the similar "definition" of friendship Orestes gave earlier in 454f.
and with supplication. A "sophistic" strain is perhaps to be noticed in the treatment of ἀδίκια (646-50), and in the reflection on friendship in adversity (665-8).

Menelaos now answers. He states two reasons why his inclination is to help Orestes: αἰδώς (681f: this will refer to Orestes' announcement of supplication) and the obligation inherent in a family tie (684-6). But this obligation seems to exist only δύναμιν ἤν δίδωι θεός (685), and Menelaos makes it clear (687) he lacks the possibility of helping. Refusal of a suppliant is not common in tragedy, and Menelaos' decision will be justified at length (cf. Theseus in Hik 195-249). He lacks sufficient force to win an armed confrontation (688-92a). But words may prevail (692b-93): that is, he proposes an alternative course, in which he seems to be willing to help. He compares (694-701) the two tactics in a reflection involving politics and wildfire, and decides the second course alone is appropriate: he will speak to Tyndareos (as effective king of the Argives) on Orestes' behalf. The reflection in 706-13 seems again to compare the effects of force and subtler means, and decides for the latter; then in 714-16 Menelaos apparently recalls that the Argives have never been easily mollified, and adds that the wise recognise they are slaves to fate.

Clearly there are problems of coherence in this speech; one looks in vain for a clear sense of what Menelaos' actual intentions are, and on what basis they

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20 On αἰδώς in connection with supplication, see Gould, "Hiketeia" 87-90 and App. B below.

21 Weil ad loc reads (with Schaefer) προσηγόμεοθ' ἤν for προσηγόμεοθα, and understands the lines to conclude that without a substantial force behind one, even negotiation will lead nowhere. West (ad 714) seems to understand Menelaos to say he accepts that he is a slave to fate in virtue of his obligation to attempt a novel policy of persuasion; but in spite of his earlier clear commitment to make the attempt (704f), these lines seem rather to argue against it. Diggle follows Dindorf in deleting 714-6. Perhaps the best sense is achieved by Murray (and di Benedetto) through the deletion of 716 alone: "I have not been successful in the past at winning the Argives over, but now I must". But I doubt whether this would elicit the immediate negative response from Orestes that we see in 717-21.
have been formed. Doubts about the text do not help matters. Some have assumed we are to understand that Menelaos, despite his apparent offer to help through negotiation, has been decisively intimidated by Tyndareos' earlier threats (621-5). Strohm, for example, speculates (Euripides 42) on the qualities an actor requires to convey with no lines the change of heart that Menelaos undergoes over the course of the scene, and notes that this same character has been presented as an unreliable waverer already in Troades, and has retreated ignobly in Andromache. I find this a very unsatisfactory solution, but have no positive interpretation with which to counter it.

B. Accusation and Refutation

Euripidean "forensic" debates, like appeal scenes, involve varying degrees of correspondence in length and content between the two speeches. At one extreme we have the exchange of tetrameter speeches by Menelaos and Agamemnon in the first episode of IA. Both speeches offer clear examples of two-part argumentation, and there is a general correspondence of structure; but Agamemnon's reply is short by comparison with Menelaos' charges, and does not directly counter the points he has made.

22 Diggle offers an unduly pessimistic text. The texts of Weil and West receive all the transmitted verses. Murray and di Benedetto both delete only vss. 695 and 716. Diggle deletes a total of nine verses.

23 Critics have not been eager to interpret Menelaos' speech; neither Burnett nor M. Lloyd discuss the speech at all. Strohm (Euripides 42f) notes an attention to considerations of power over those of piety, and speaks of Menelaos' indulgence in "grave, embarrassed generalisations... designed merely to cover his withdrawal". Porter comments briefly, calling the speech (Studies 71) "a masterful example of betrayal by equivocation, unmatched outside of Jason's arguments to Medea"; he concludes (72) that "Tyndareus' threats have succeeded in intimidating [Menelaos]". The speech's interesting political reflections (696-701, [706f]) are ignored by Friis Johansen.
The inequality of length may seem remarkable; Euripides is capable of writing antilogies in which the two speeches are of almost identical length, but he does not insist on this. Here, I would think, he has written with the entire scene in mind; there will be speeches by Agamemnon and Menelaos again following the Messenger's report and through the whole complex sequence the issues will be examined from various perspectives. A good pace is to be maintained, and not all the ammunition fired in the first engagement. One may compare other complex scenes in which lines of conflict are drawn and redrawn: Hik 100-364, Or 380-724.

Menelaos' speech was discussed above in I.B: its argument that Agamemnon lacked the singlemindedness required of good leaders is supported by two examples taken from Agamemnon's past. Agamemnon's response is of a quite similar structure, but shorter in its argumentation. His proem repeats the idea of civilised debate (378-80, cp. 334-6), putting the emphasis—important to his position—on αἰδώς, modesty and respect, where Menelaos had announced νοῦς

24 See Bond ad Her 140-251.
béβαιος, firmness of purpose, as his chief value. Agamemnon's argument is preaced with a cluster of rhetorical questions that set a tone of frustration and exasperation (three questions in 381-82a); the first argument proper is opened with a fourth question, χρηστά λέκτρον ἐραίς λαβεῖν; (382b). That question is answered (οὐκ ἔχωμι ἄν σοι παρασχεῖν) and the answer supported by reference to a fact (Menelaos' failure as a husband). This leads to a second argumentative question whose dependence on the first is indicated with εἶτα (384) — it is the "deflating" type of question and here ends the sequence.25 Moving to the offensive, Agamemnon first states that Menelaos' irrational and base desire for Helen, and not any real concern over Agamemnon's exercise of power (τὸ φιλότιμον τοῦμον 385: cf. the charge in 337-43) is the cause of his complaints. Then, with regard to Menelaos' second point— the change of mind at Aulis— he asks whether it is insanity to change one's mind from a worse policy to a better, and suggests it is rather Menelaos who suffers from that affliction, in wanting Helen back.

In a second argumentative sequence (391-5) Agamemnon moves his focus back from Menelaos to the whole expedition, and from Menelaos' self-serving charges to larger questions of justice. The Oath of the Suitors provides a neat vehicle for this purpose, involving as it does the origins of the expedition, and raising questions of right and wrong that were not mentioned earlier. Agamemnon makes the points that the oath was taken by men who were out of their minds with desire for marriage with Helen, and that "divinity" (τὸ θεῖον 394) is capable of recognising such an oath as taken under compulsion. It is implied that the generals are not properly bound, under principles of law or justice, to fight for Menelaos. In a final sentence (396-9), Agamemnon summarises his two

25 This is a common device for calling attention to the absurdity of a suggestion; see Ch. I n.53. On "deflating" rhetorical questions in Herodotos, see Lang Herodotean N and D 47-9.
arguments in announcing the practical outcome of his resolve for each of the brothers, emphasising the fact that justice is on his side: Menelaos is not going to achieve, contrary to justice, vengeance over the loss of his worst of wives; Agamemnon is not going to suffer constant misery over having unjustly brought about the death of his child. In a brief epilogue he indicates he has fulfilled the terms of his proem.

We see in these speeches two types of two-part organisation. The charges brought against Agamemnon are of two kinds of inconsistent behavior, and are presented through two chronologically distinguished narratives. The chronological device here as elsewhere gives a very clear two-part division. Agamemnon's response consists of an argument *ad hominem*, in effect denying the charges and laying responsibility at the adversary's door, followed by an argument involving justice and divinity. This speech is less obviously conceived as two distinct arguments; but the final summarising sentence (396b-99) clearly sets out the dual character of Agamemnon's case.

A similar somewhat relaxed coherence of content through two speeches is seen in *Med* 465-575. Jason's entrance and somewhat unsatisfactory attempt at a conciliatory address to Medeia (446-64) unleashes a barrage of resentment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Range</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>465-74</td>
<td>proem: abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475-99</td>
<td>the past (<em>ἐκ τῶν πρωτῶν</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>476-82</td>
<td>I saved you in Kolchis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>483-7</td>
<td>and killed your enemy Pelias in Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>488-98</td>
<td>you betrayed me, the children, your oath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>499-519</td>
<td>the present and future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>499-508</td>
<td>where am I to turn? (elimination of alternatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>509-15</td>
<td>the reality of exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516-19</td>
<td>reflection on real and counterfeit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jason's response:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Line(s)</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>522-5</td>
<td>proem: difficulties facing speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>526-33</td>
<td>Aphrodite deserves the credit you claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>534-44</td>
<td>what you in return received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545-50</td>
<td>transition to question of the new marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>551-67</td>
<td>defense of new marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>568-75</td>
<td>reflection on women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Medeia's speech has been discussed in I.B above. Jason meets head-on Medeia's arguments about her services to him, and supplies a counter-argument: the benefits she has received. We may describe both of his points (Aphrodite's role in the affair, the positive value of civilisation and fame) as specious and sophistic, but they are nevertheless offered as a direct refutation of Medeia's contention that Jason is in her debt. The second claim made in Medeia's chronological survey was that Jason's new marriage constituted a betrayal of herself and the children. This charge again Jason seems to face squarely; but it is interesting that not a word is said (after γεγώς...σοι μέγας φίλος, 548f) about Medeia's place in the new arrangement.26 And so likewise he has no answer for the second part of her speech, the concerns about her own future. The rhetorical strategy here is to make a show of answering the points one has an answer for, and ignore the rest.

Does the rhetorical character of this speech (i.e. its formality and its willingness to gloss over embarrassing details) bring discredit upon Jason? According to Finley, "Jason, an accomplished pleader, uses words only to deceive". For Mastronarde, "Euripidean figures who reflect contemporary

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26 Earlier (458-61) Jason spoke of Medeia's imminent exile as including the children (as she too envisions it in 512-5); he speaks here (562-5) only of his original intention to keep the children with him. His speech thus avoids mentioning the actual situation that has arisen with the order of banishment for Medeia and the children alike (352ff).
intellectual culture in such a way as to arouse shock and disapproval" include Jason. I disagree: I am more shocked by Medeia's revelation (364-75) that her pleas and supplication addressed to Kreon were part of a plan to kill him, and by her plainly deceptive speech to Jason (869-905), in which she feigns shame over her earlier harshness. Jason's speech, like that of Odysseus in Hek 299-331 and others I shall discuss below, gives the character's "best case"; if these speeches don't win our sympathy this does no discredit to their manner of arguing, which is not dissimilar to that of "sympathetic" speeches elsewhere. And, as always, sheer ingenuity of argument must be considered to hold positive interest for the audience.

These two scenes (Menelaos and Agamemnon, Jason and Medeia) are often thought of as "forensic": a speech of accusation is followed by one of refutation and defense. This situation recurs in Euripides at:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alk</td>
<td>629-72</td>
<td>Admetos accuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>675-705</td>
<td>Pheres defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipp</td>
<td>936-80</td>
<td>Theseus accuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>983-1035</td>
<td>Hippolytos defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andr</td>
<td>147-80</td>
<td>Hermione accuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>183-231</td>
<td>Andromache defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andr</td>
<td>590-641</td>
<td>Peleus accuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>645-90</td>
<td>Menelaos defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or</td>
<td>491-541</td>
<td>Tyndareos accuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>544-604</td>
<td>Orestes defends</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In all of these exchanges, techniques of refutation and countercharge are used in the second speech. Only in the second Andr scene (analysed below) do we find close correspondence in the arguments advanced. Euripides also has a few forensic scenes in which the first speaker is technically the "defendant". In these the second speech proceeds to demolish the defense.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>First Speaker</th>
<th>Argument</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hek</td>
<td>1132-82</td>
<td>Polymestor defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1187-1237</td>
<td>Hekabe refutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elek</td>
<td>1011-50</td>
<td>Klytaimestra defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1060-99</td>
<td>Elektra refutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tro</td>
<td>914-65</td>
<td>Helen defends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>969-1032</td>
<td>Hekabe refutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Tro scene presents another antilogy in which arguments are carefully matched (see below).

In Andr Peleus comes to the rescue of Andromache and Molossos with a speech cataloguing the mistakes and shortcomings of Menelaos in mostly chronological sequence:

590-1 introductory vilification
592-604 charges: you are the foolish husband of a bad wife
       (Helen and all Spartan women attacked)
605-18 you started a war over her; caused Achilles' death
       and my misery; came home unscathed
619-23 your daughter is no better
624-6 you caused your brother to kill Iphigeneia
627-31 after the war you accepted Helen back
632-41 defense of Andromache and Molossos

28 On the literary considerations leading Euripides to vary the order of the speakers, see Duchemin L' AION 189f, Dale ad Alk 697.
Menelaos' response:

645-51     proem: you are a fool to defend this woman
652-67     attack on Andromache and Molossos
\[668-77\] I am only protecting my daughter
678-9      my war service does me credit
681-4      Helen was victim of gods, benefactress of Greece
685-7      I used moderation in not killing her; you lacked it
in killing Phokos
688-90     protestation of goodwill, and warning

Here there is a loosely chiastic correspondence between the main topics: Peleus speaks of Helen, the war, Hermione, Andromache; Menelaos (if I am right in retaining some or all of 668-77) takes these same topics in reverse order. The chiasm, I would think, is not a pattern chosen for its own sake, but results naturally from each speaker beginning with an attack and ending with a defense of Helen or Andromache. Menelaos' speech lacks clear references to Peleus' points, but covers them all. There are verbal echoes (\(\eta \chi \rho \eta \nu \sigma \epsilon 607\) and 650, applied by each speaker to the woman he is attacking; \(\kappa \nu \delta \sigma \varsigma \sigma \nu \alpha \zeta \tau \iota \alpha \iota \alpha \upsilon 620,\) cf. 648) and telling rephrasings (the "gathering of such a great mob" in 605f becomes \(\tau \eta \nu \epsilon \mu \eta \nu \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \gamma \alpha \upsilon \alpha \nu 678;\) Menelaos was "weaker than Kyris" in 631, but \(\sigma \omega \phi \rho \omega \nu 686;\) and the question of responsibility for the death of Achilles, such a steady undercurrent in this play, is answered in both speeches (614f blame

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\[29\] Delete 672-6 only? The lines seem sound, indeed "Euripidean" in the neat antithesis they develop, but foreign to the context here, whereas 668-71 seem to me entirely appropriate. Perhaps 671 should end with a colon. 677 will then finish the thought: "you make all this fuss on a stranger's behalf; isn't it right then that I help my own daughter?" The argument would thus be a fortiori: cf. Her 578-81.

\[30\] Stevens (ad 648) notes Musgrave and others have taken the second occurrence of the phrase to refer to Peleus' marriage to Thetis. But Menelaos speaks as an insulted relative (cf. 671, if that line is genuine), and so the \(\kappa \nu \delta \sigma \varsigma\) linking Menelaos and Peleus gives an additional reason why Peleus' remarks have been unwise and inappropriate.
Menelaos, 654-6 Andromache). The scene continues with a second long speech by Peleus (693-726: mainly vilification and intimidation) and Menelaos' farewell speech (729-46).

Helen's defense in Troades is expressly introduced as a reply to the charges Menelaos might be expected to make against her (914-18); thus Helen takes the initiative in defining the character of the debate. This technique (called by rhetoricians προκατάληψις — "anticipation of arguments") is frequently met with in Euripidean debates. She proceeds:

919-22 attack on Hekabe over birth and survival of Paris
923-30 the three goddesses and the Judgement of Paris
931-7 I was Kypris' victim
932-4 this was good for Greece
935-7 but bad for me
938-44 Paris, and your negligence, are to blame for my leaving Sparta

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31 Burnett, Catastrophe 150n, notes the persistence of this issue. I see as well a neat balancing of family skeletons: Iphigeneia and Phokos.

32 Thus the scene consists of two pairs of speeches, and content within each pair is closely parallel: 'The subordinate pair of speeches corresponds to the angry dialogue that normally concludes an agon' (Lloyd, Agon 79). But the two exchanges are not experienced as distinct "blocks": Friis Johansen, General Reflection 131, notes the close parallelism of the reflections opening Menelaos' first speech and Peleus' second. This seems to give the scene a certain fluidity.

33 Verse 918 is widely deleted as an unnecessary and confused completion of 916f; but αὐτοθεία in 917 seems to me to need some object in the dative. Jackson, Marg. Scen. 201, discusses the options; Lee ad loc defends the received text.

34 This argument takes the audience momentarily back to Alexandros, the first play of the trilogy. Scodel, Trojan Trilogy 20-42 & 83-90, and Stinton, Judgement of Paris 64-71, offer speculative reconstructions of that play's contents.
945-50 was this betrayal? no, blame the goddess
951-8 after Paris' death I tried to escape
[959-60] Deiphobos
961-4 summary: I don't deserve to die

The anticipated charges are put in chronological sequence. The stages of the argument are very carefully marked out: πρῶτα μὲν 919, ἐνθένθε 923, τόν ἐνθεν λόγον 931, τοῦτο τῶ ἁ 945, ἐνθεν 951; οὖν 961 introduces the summarising rhetorical question.

Hekabe's refutation:

969-70 intention to refute first argument (Judgement of Paris)
971-82 refutation of "Judgement" argument
983-6 refutes claim Kypris came with Paris
987-97 proposes alternative explanation
998-1001 βία abduction doubted: no witnesses
1002-9 Helen's fence-straddling during the war
1010-19a refutes claim to have attempted escape
1012-4 no witness to suicide attempt
1015-19a I tried to persuade you to go
1019b-28 real reason you stayed: luxury
1029-32 epilogue addressed to Menelaos

Hekabe keeps close to the chronological sequence Helen used: the Judgement, Paris at Sparta, Helen at Troy before and after Paris' death. The stages are again

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35 These lines seem out of place after 952-8: they propose a second and unnecessary reason for Helen's remaining in Troy after the death of Paris. And it is the earlier story that will be taken up by Hekabe in her answering speech. For a different view, in which a reference to Deiphobos is required in Helen's speech, see Scodel, Trojan Trilogy 143f. Scodel argues in part that Hekabe must not be allowed to misrepresent Helen's arguments. This seems to me a weak assumption a priori: Hekabe's goal is to defeat her enemy. I think, in spite of the fact Helen has not earlier spoken of βία in describing her abduction by Paris, that o μὲν in 962 must be Paris, and that Hekabe picks this up in 998. Lee ad loc defends 959-60, but without reference to Hekabe's speech.

36 Not surprisingly, Hekabe has no answer to Helen's first claim—that Paris should not have been allowed to survive. Similarly Helen has not spoken of her loyalties during the war, the subject of one of Hekabe's charges.
clearly marked by references to Helen's speech (verbs of speaking in 970, 983, 998, 1010); there are verbal repetitions: εἶν (945/998), σῶμα κλέπτειν (958/1010), στέφανος (937/1030, in two strikingly different suggestions). At two different points Hekabe uses the familiar technique of disproving the adversary's contention, then producing the "true" explanation for the observed facts. Hekabe may be guilty of distortion at two points: if Helen refers in 962 to Deiphobos, then she did not say that she was abducted by force (998, cf. 940-50); and Helen's claim she was prevented from escaping (for which she claims witnesses) is not properly refuted by the fact no one saw her attempt suicide.

In this scene more than any other in Euripides we have two speeches designed from start to finish as partners, giving "the best case" for each side of a dispute. It is perhaps no accident that the issue here is the abduction of Helen, a topic we know to have been constantly discussed in the context of the Sophists' teaching of eloquence.

37 With Tro 937 cf. Or 923ff (an anonymous speaker defends Orestes in the Argive assembly): in both places the paradoxical statement is made that the defendant should be not punished but rewarded. That the events that followed upon the abduction of Helen were a good thing is claimed elsewhere by Menelaos (Andr 680-4), Kassandra (Tro 386-402).

38 Cf. e.g. Andr 205ff, Hek 1206ff.

39 This discrepancy leads Scodel to argue for the deletion of 998-1001 (Trojan Trilogy 143f). But see note 35 above. Lloyd, Agon 105, takes 998-1001 as blatant misrepresentation by Hekabe.

40 The thought in 1010-14 must be: If in fact you were prevented from escaping, suicide alone would give adequate proof that you were a γενναία γυνη, ποθούσα τὸν πάρος πόσιν. Hekabe denies the consequent— no suicide attempt, therefore no escape attempt— and then goes on to claim that had Helen wanted to she could have left at any time.

41 For us the debate surfaces in Herodotos (I. 3f, II. 112-20) and in all of Euripides' Trojan War plays, besides the sophistic tracts on the subject by Gorgias and Isokrates. We get a glimpse of the beginnings of Helen as a debating topic in Iliad III. 146-60, the old men on the walls of Troy.
C. The Debate with Lykos

The first episode of *Herakles* is a suppliant scene of a type Euripides favoured: the protagonists have taken refuge at an altar, an enemy is standing by, the potential champion is far away. The "enemy" is impatient for an opportunity to kill the suppliants, and debates their situation with them. Lykos' speech is loosely organised on these lines:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Line Numbers</th>
<th>Lines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140-2</td>
<td>proem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143-50</td>
<td>your death is inevitable— to wait is unworthy of the so-called ( \sigma \nu \gamma \alpha \mu \sigma ) of Zeus, and the spouse of the great Herakles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151-64</td>
<td>Herakles is not so great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151-8</td>
<td>his sham animal victories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159-64</td>
<td>the cowardice of archers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165-9</td>
<td>reasons why I must kill his family</td>
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This cannot really be described as an effort at persuasion; rather it presents Lykos as badgering and baiting the suppliants. Amphitryon's response is a model of construction:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Line Numbers</th>
<th>Lines</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170-73</td>
<td>proem: charges must be answered: that of Herakles' paternity by Zeus, the rest by me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174-87</td>
<td>the charge of cowardice in the labours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188-203</td>
<td>the charge against archery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204-5</td>
<td>this concludes my answer to your charges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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42 See Jäkel, "ΠΑΘΟΝΤΙ" 37f; Kopperschmidt, "Hikesie" 339-43; Burnett, *Catastrophe* 158-60. The situation at the beginning of *Andr* is very similar: there too the badgering of the "enemy" is answered by a speech of defiance, not of supplication.
This goes well beyond a simple response to Lykos' speech, but is remarkable for the clarity with which it addresses all the points Lykos has raised. In the debate over Herakles' greatness, each side brings forward examples from his labours; the arguments on archery vs. hoplite fighting give the impression this was a standard debating topic. The arguments on both sides include points whose verbal cleverness or paradoxical character will have had great entertainment value, and the terms in which Amphitryon defends the archer ("he doesn't depend on his mates, and does his killing from a safe distance") do not in any sense compromise his own character or that of Herakles: they are precisely "debating points".

But the issues touched upon in this debate—the greatness of Herakles, the nature of bravery and cowardice, the inevitability of his family's death—are the central issues of the play. The very complex first half of Herakles, in which the attitudes of Megara and Amphitryon towards Herakles, the family, and death are developed rhetorically, leads to a second panel in which action replaces rhetoric,

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43 It is interesting that Herakles too will address reproaches to Thebes in closing his great speech (1389-93).

44 The exchange is "formally puzzling": M. Lloyd, *Agon* 10f. Bond (ad 140-251): "The purpose of Lycus' speech is, as Wilamowitz saw, to provide an opportunity for Amphitryon's splendid reply". Thus we have a somewhat lopsided debate; this seems consonant with the play's general treatment of Lykos as a marginal and unsympathetic character, one whose death can be treated as a simple triumph of good over evil, in complete contrast to the deaths that will follow it.

45 E.g., word-play in 152 (υδραν ἐλευ) and 153f (βρώχος/βραχίων), the fine distinction between αὐλαίεια and εὐλαίεια in 165f, the ironic view of σοφία in 206-9, and the general paradoxes of an attack on Herakles as unheroic and a debate over archery vs. hoplite warfare set in the context of an altar scene.
then a final act subjecting events to a rhetorical analysis. Throughout, we are reminded of the subjects first introduced in this debate: the problem of Herakles' double paternity, the benefits for all mankind of his career, the proper definition of bravery as against cowardice; and the play will return to the weapons of Herakles, the club and bow with which he will kill his family, and which become almost characters in their own right at 1378-85. Thus, for example, the greatness of Herakles is denied in somewhat silly terms by Lykos in 151-61; Amphitryon rebuts this with examples from the Labours (177-84), and with the observation that all Hellas owes much to Herakles (222-6). Elsewhere in the play Herakles is celebrated as a great benefactor to Greece and all mankind (264f, 348-441, 687-700, 849-54, 875-9); even his young sons are praised as important allies for Hellas (131-7). But in the aftermath of the tragedy, in a second debate scene, Herakles himself will dwell upon the cost of such a life, while Theseus will promote endurance and compassion. The earlier debate is now elevated to a much more serious level, but the question is still "What does

46 On the form of Her, see Cropp "Heracles, Electra..." 187-9, Burnett Catastrophe 157.

47 The first episode (140-347) develops the relations of Herakles to Zeus, and to mankind (cf. also the ode in 348-441); his relation to his own family comes to our attention elsewhere (71-9, 460-96, 629-36). Herakles' "public" and "private" lives don't come together until his monologue in 1255-1310.

48 I do not suggest that the use of bow and arrows in the killing in any way justifies the earlier statements of Lykos or Amphitryon; the killing of Herakles' family is of course, whether done with bow, spear, or sword, an act of neither valour nor cowardice, but of madness. Nevertheless, the prominence given early in the play to the weapons that will do the killing must be significant. Bond notes (ad 1379) language that puts his weapons in the same relation to Herakles as old friends, or indeed his children (cf. esp. 79). Michelini (Euripides 242-6) emphasises the bow as an essential element in the play's portrayal of Herakles as "a modern and revisionist hero" (244)--- I don't see this. Nor can I agree with R. Hamilton when he suggests ("Slings and Arrows" 23f) that at the end of the play Lykos' view of bravery has been vindicated, that Herakles accepts the loss of freedom implied in friendship (with Theseus) and hoplite fighting: "Amphitryon's argument for the bow" is 'fully...refuted' (25).
it mean to be a great man?" Thus the somewhat "sophistic" debate with Lykos has been for Euripides one more way of presenting the themes the play ponders.

D. "The Rhetoric of the Situation" in Two Forensic Debates

At this point I shall look more closely at two somewhat similar debates, and attempt to draw conclusions about the "tone" and function of such scenes, in the light of the stylising tendency I have been documenting. In Alkestis, the arrival of Pheres comes at a moment of deep personal suffering for Admetos: Alkestis has just died and is being carried out for funeral observances. In response to his father's initial consolatory speech praising Alkestis, Admetos attacks Pheres over his well-known refusal to agree to die for his son:

629-32 introduction: expressions of hostility
633-5 argumentative headline: τὸτε...
636-47 1st argument: Pheres' lack of courage and appropriate observance of φιλία
648-61 2nd argument: his death would have been just and reasonable
662-68 consequences of his refusal
669-72 gnomic epilogue

49 In the second debate (1213-1393) note especially 1252, 1299f, 1308-10, 1334f. Vss. 1349f seem to have the earlier debate in mind (162-4: the archer doesn't stand his ground; 1349f: one must stand up to misfortune as to the casts of an enemy in battle).

50 See Dale ad 614ff, Burnett Catastrophe 40, Lloyd Agon 37f, for less complimentary views of Pheres' speech. My more neutral view resembles that of Conacher (ed., p. 181f).
These sections are not clearly signposted, but changes of direction are indicated by καίτοι (648), τοιγάρ (662). The two basic points are set out in ἀψυχία (642) and καλόν (648). The two-part argument comes close to a positive-negative formulation of a single point: (1) you acted ignobly, (2) yet you had reason to do the noble thing. And there is emphasis in both halves on family relationships and duties. But the section 636-47 dwells on the imputation of cowardice, lack of τόλμα (644), where in the next part (648-61) the point is Pheres' failure to appreciate the rational good sense and objective fairness of his making the sacrifice.

Pheres' speech of rebuttal begins with a hostile proem of a similar sort to that of Admetos, repaying the scornful reference there to his own old age (γέρων ὄν 635, proposed as a reason why he should have been willing to die) by characterising Admetos' speech as νεανιᾶς λόγους (679). He then takes up the main points of Admetos' argument in reverse order. In 681-90 he replies to the charge that justice and the duties proper to family relationships have been violated by Pheres, saying that no traditional or Greek law imposes the obligation to die for one's child; in 691-702 he answers the charge of ἀψυχία by conceding that he loves life and so avoids death, but adding that Admetos is in no position to level this charge, since it is precisely the trait he himself is convicted of. Admetos ended by speaking of the future consequences of Pheres' selfishness (662-8); Pheres ends with a comment on the consequences of Admetos' angry words:

εἰ δ' ἡμάς κακῶς ἐρεῖς, ἀκούσῃ πολλὰ κοῦ ψευδὴ κακά.

(714f)

51 M. Lloyd, *Agon* 37f, sees two main argumentative sections but divides them after 650. Solmsen, *Intellectual Experiments* 25f, analyses the speech as a number of shorter blocks.

52 So Lloyd, *Agon* 39, with slightly different emphasis.

53 Cf. e.g. *IA* 388-90 for the "pot calling the kettle black" type of reply.
Thus the two speeches follow the same general plan: hostile proem—two contrasting arguments—a warning for the future; the arguments correspond chiastically.

This exchange is formally similar to others we have encountered: two speeches of approximately the same length, having similar shapes, address the same issues from opposite sides. As with other debates of this sort, we may ask to what extent the points made by the agitated and argumentative speakers are points of importance to the play as a whole, and to what extent they represent what A. M. Dale called "the rhetoric of the situation".

This question is perhaps complicated in the case of Alkestis by the play's recognised combination of tragic and non-tragic levels of meaning: the scenes involving Herakles seem to be less "serious" than those involving the other characters. I hesitate to identify this lowering of tone as a "satyric" or "prosatyric" quality, but I think we all sense a certain playfulness in (particularly) the final "friendly debate" between Herakles and Admetos, in which irony plays a major role. This irony involves not the undercutting of Admetos, not the serious suggestion that he proves, in accepting the gift of the veiled woman, false to the promise he made to Alkestis; rather we are reminded that Admetos' great

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54 The scene ends with further threats on either side: 730-3 (Pheres), 734-40 (Admetos).

55 The phrase seems to have been coined by Dale for use in the Introduction to her Alcestis, where she argues that criticism of Greek tragedy that seeks to find evidence for "character" (i.e. a consistent, realistic personality) in every utterance is usually "not allowing enough for two considerations always very important to the Greek dramatist, the trend of the action and the rhetoric of the situation" (xxv); Dale goes on to apply this principle especially to the interpretation of agon speeches. The idea (which owes something to the earlier formalist criticism of T. von Wilamowitz and others) has been promoted in a somewhat narrow form by Gould ("Dramatic Character"), Heath (Poetics 130-7) and others; Conacher's "Rhetoric and Relevance" addresses Gould in particular.

56 See Conacher's introduction to his ed. of the play; and cf. Buxton "Five aspects" 27-9.
virtue, his sense of obligation towards friends, can sometimes get one into trouble. Admetos has earlier prevailed upon Herakles himself to accept an unwanted gift of hospitality; Herakles now prevails upon Admetos to accept the woman. Our attention is focused on the friendly but somewhat awkward relationship of the two men, and we realise with amusement that Admetos' sense of χαρίσμα is causing him great discomfiture as he attempts to refuse the gift of — his wife.57

To recognise this playful and ironic aspect in the play is not to deny the seriousness of the scenes in which Admetos faces first Alkestis, then Pheres; but we are forced to admit that at the end of the play Alkestis' concerns over a "stepmother" for her children (304-10), and Admetos' promises to give up entertaining (343-7), have been nullified by the course the action has taken. I would suggest that the debate with Pheres is likewise far from our minds at the close of the play. We are not asked to consider whether Admetos will in fact refuse to care for his aged parents; the happy ending is not compromised by any sense that the affair has created a rift within Admetos' family. A modern playwright might have added a scene in which father and son "make up"; Euripides was capable of resolving this strand of his tale through a reflective monologue or a deus ex machina. But his approach to story-telling doesn't demand this—Pheres drops out of this story as completely as Makaria drops out in Hkld, or Xouthos in Ion.58 Euripides has not bothered about Pheres' further story because

57 I cannot agree with Burnett that Alkestis' return represents a "reward" for Admetos' "aristocratic piety", which has brought about the "salvation of Alcestis" (Catastrophe 45f). Rather he benefits from a friendly gesture on the part of an embarrassed guest. Burnett takes the play too seriously; Kitto (Greek Tragedy 339f) likewise thinks in terms of a serious demonstration of the fidelity of Admetos, focusing—mistakenly, I think—on the feelings we are to impute to the silent figure of the veiled woman.

58 These are characters who have served their limited purpose; compare Andromache, whose story must be wound up in the deus-speech (Andr 1243-52).
to do so could only complicate his fairy-tale ending; and precisely because the ending has this character, we must consider the bitterness of the debate simply cancelled.  

The scene between Pheres and Admetos then must be thought of as no more than a scene, a dramatisation of one aspect of the conflict over Alkestis' death. In Admetos' speech we are reminded of his agitation and his bitterness towards his parents, and at the same time treated to an orderly exposition (of a type we have met elsewhere) of the factors that might have made Pheres accept death. But in Pheres' speech we are shown (and Admetos is shown) that not everyone is going to recognise this resentment as justified. Pheres' arguments are not "good" arguments: (1) I've broken no law, (2) who wouldn't cling to life as long as possible? But the fact he evinces no shame over his refusal to die, and turns the charge of ἄψυχος against his accuser (696f), is a shock to Admetos.  

Aside from the realisation that this occasions (and which we learn of only later, in Admetos' monologue), I don't see the points raised in the debate as reaching beyond the confines of this highly charged scene: Pheres' charge that Admetos "killed" Alkestis (696) is an extravagant exaggeration of the facts as presented elsewhere in the play; Admetos' promise not to bury Pheres (665) has likewise been produced by Euripides as a token of the over-heated character of the debate.

59 M. Dyson, "Alcestis' Children" 22, notes an effect of the final scene's intense focus on Admetos' sincere devotion to Alkestis: "The humdrum issue of the children's future, along with the ugliness of the quarrel with Pheres, is stripped away".

60 We already knew of this resentment from 338f (and perhaps 432-4); it is surely given some legitimacy by Alkestis' concurrence, 290-2, and that of the Chorus, 466-70. Dyson, ibid, sees the energy of Admetos' attack as emphasising his devastation: "his grief brushes aside even filial piety". Lloyd, Agon 40, sees in his charges against his parents one expression of a thematic "tension between the correctness and the inappropriateness of everything that Admetus does".

61 Dale (ad 697) describes the impact this has on Admetos: "Sorrow and ill fame are what he has gained by living on; the first he has begun to feel already, the second only the malice of Pheres could bring home to him".

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These, then, are details for which the phrase "rhetoric of the situation" is perfectly apt.

Another heated debate between father and son, with a "forensic" character similar to that of the debate in *Alk*, occurs in *Hipp*. The discovery by Theseus of Phaidra's letter inculpating Hippolytus leads to a trial-like confrontation between the two men. Theseus' extremely agitated state is dramatised through a series of three abstract reflections uttered in response to Hippolytus' expressions of concern:

1. ο πόλλα ἀμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην... (916-20)
2. ο, κρήν βροτοίς τῶν φιλῶν τεκμήριον... (925-31)
3. ο τῆς βροτείας—ποῖ προβήσεται; - φρενός... (936-42)

The last of these serves as a sort of proem for a lengthy speech of accusation:

- 943-7 expressions of hostility
- 948-57 attack on Hippolytus' personal character
- 958-72 the incontrovertible character of the evidence counters any rational arguments Hippolytus might put
- 973-80 consequences: ἑξερρῇ etc.

Here as in Admetos' speech of accusation (see above) two basic arguments are followed by an announcement of the consequences of the imputed criminal act for the accused. The two arguments are in this case quite distinct, but no clear rhetorical focusing device separates them. The first, an attack on Hippolytus' character, arises quite naturally out of the proem and is not alleged as a fact corroborating the charge; rather it serves to pull the rug from under any defense...
Hippolytos might make on the grounds of his σωφροσύνη—precisely the defense Hippolytos will first offer (948-51, cf. 994f, 1007). It is important not to seek here a "relevance" that goes beyond the rhetorical objective of convicting Hippolytos. We are reminded through Theseus' references to Orphism and vegetarianism (952-4) that he and Hippolytos are being presented as characters with some differences of life-style; we are not informed of a history of hatred or resentment.62 Theseus' second argument against Hippolytos refers to the unimpeachable character of the evidence: the fact Phaidra has killed herself speaks far louder than any oath or rational argument Hippolytos might offer—and he will offer both (rational argument, 1008-20; oath, 1025-7). Theseus' speech has said all that needs saying against Hippolytos—that his notorious εὐσέβεια and σωφροσύνη lend themselves to being regarded as a false front, and that the case against him is strong. The epilogue (973-80) amounts to conviction and sentencing.63 Theseus' speech began with strong emotion (ϕεῦ 936) and was broken off in the middle by an impatient outburst (971f), but it has brought forward clearly the case against Hippolytos and has used a formal pattern well known to us in doing so.

62 Gould ("Dramatic Character" 57): 'Theseus' jibes at Hippolytus, his sneering allusion to Orphic ritual and religious cant afford, I take it, no invitation to consider the religious attitudes of himself or Hippolytus (or, it may be worth adding, of Euripides)'. This much is quite true, but Gould's conclusion—that "character" is simply suspended for the duration of the debate—doesn't follow. Contrast Goebel, diss. 303: '[Theseus] has obviously never been sympathetic with his son's religious beliefs, and now he is happy to dismiss them as a sham'. A middle course between these two approaches would be to say that having father attack son on this very personal level supports the general sense of Theseus' frustration and anger; that is, the emotional colouring is more important than the specific content. On another level, I would not rule out the resonance for the audience that would result from seeing ascetic or "philosophic" young men around Athens who angered their fathers by rejecting their values: see Ostwald on "The Generation Gap and the Sophists", Popular Sovereignty 229ff.

63 Thus there is no realistic reason Hippolytos should offer a defense, nor that Theseus should hear it through. Euripides is never concerned to motivate the actual making of the speeches. Motivation of the debates in Hik and Tro is especially artificial, that of the first debate in Her ludicrous. M. Lloyd (Agon 47) says of Theseus: 'He proceeds immediately to sentence Hippolytus to exile (973-80). The perversion of legal processes could not be more manifest'. But there is no pretense in this or any other Euripidean debate that "legal processes" are being followed; the decree here displays Theseus' anger without bringing any discredit upon him.
Here as elsewhere Euripides has not written a realistic agitated speech, but a neatly patterned formal speech into which reminders of the speaker's agitation have been inserted.\footnote{Cf. especially Hekabe's agitation in Hek 786-845.}

Hippolytos' reply begins with a proem that has divided commentators, and which requires a slight digression here. He begins by denying that the subject of Theseus' concern, though permitting of eloquent expression (ἐχον καλους λόγους), has real excellence of substance (983-5).\footnote{Cf. the similar opening of Teiresias' reply to Pentheus, Bak 266-9.} He proceeds to portray himself as a man unskilled at speaking in public settings (ἐἰς ὀχλον 986), being used to a more intimate and learned audience (986f); the converse proposition is then stated, that speakers who fail in such situations often make a better impression with the public at large (988f). He then agrees to reply to Theseus' speech, indicating he will begin where Theseus began; this will refer to Theseus' comments about Hippolytos' character. Grube wrote of Hippolytos' defense:\footnote{Drama of Euripides, 188.}

> In his answer to all this [sc. Theseus' charges and emotional agitation], Hippolytus surpasses himself in tactlessness, frigidity, and self-conceit. The first ten lines, which are in effect an elaboration of the Greek equivalent for 'Unaccustomed as I am to public speaking', nevertheless contain a profound truth about him: he is incapable of expressing even such feelings as he has except when praying to Artemis.

Similar comments have been made by many scholars, old and new.\footnote{Barrett (ad 986-7) speaks of "peculiar priggishness", Conacher ("Rhetoric and Relevance" 15) of "characteristic haughtiness"; Goebel (diss. 306) finds the comments of Hippolytos "singularly tactless".} In contrast, Heath speaks of the "anachronistic intuitions" we wrongly apply "when we think we can recognise welcome and familiar touches of characterisation in
rhetorical commonplaces, such as the opening of Hippolytus' self-defence before Theseus". Gould notes the "jury-directed" tone of this opening;^68 it is implied that once we notice in a Euripidean debate mannerisms of Athenian oratory, we have no reason to expect any other kind of meaning from the passage.

It seems to me that neither of these positions is quite satisfactory. Allowance must certainly be made for Euripidean "formalism" and the stylised nature of rhetorical passages I have been calling attention to.^69 But the original audience's perception of plot and characters may not have shifted gears quite so easily, with every change of meter and "mode", as Heath and Gould seem to imagine. I have suggested that Theseus' outbursts before and during his speech remind the audience that this character, though delivering a neatly-formed iambic speech of accusation, is to be thought of as emotionally agitated. There are suggestive details in Hippolytos' speech as well. The speech begins with expressions of ἀπειρία and reluctance to enter into debate; such expressions may be "conventional" in Greek oratory, though they are certainly not obligatory. But I see nothing conventional in Hippolytos' comparison of speaking to the public with speaking to a small, elite, learned group.^70 Moreover, the Athenian audience may well have sensed some incongruity in having a son address to his

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^68 Heath, Poetics 132; Gould "Dramatic Character" 57. Gould also sees in this exchange "that same analytical mode of expression we saw earlier as characterising Phaidra's speech [at 373-430]" (ibid).

^69 I note here the use of introductory comments referring to "difficulties affecting the speaker" in the speeches beginning at Andr 183, Hik 297, Elek 1013, Tro 914, Or 544, IA 1211, as well as Hipp 983; see IV.B below.

^70 Ober, Mass and Elite 43f and passim, notes the necessity recognised by Athenian political and dicanic orators of presenting their message in a way that suggested that the values of the (normally "elite") speaker coincided with those of the mass audience. Allusions to the dangers of (the opponent's) sophisticated rhetoric, and to the unsophistication and ἀπειρία of the speaker are very frequent (165-77). But Ober points out also (183) that the politician sometimes praises his own privileged upbringing and education. He cites examples in Isokrates (5. 81-2) and Demosthenes (18. 256-7); in both cases the speaker expresses some reticence in calling attention to his own advantages. Hipp 986-9 would seem to be quite out of step with these observed conventions.
agitated and grieving father remarks whose conventional context was public and inherently artificial. That is, (1) I contest the assertion that the proem remarks made here are everyday topoi of Athenian oratory; (2) I do not regard it as certain that topoi that were genuinely "conventional" in one context would necessarily be accepted in a very different context with no sense of incongruity. But in any case, we have no reason to expect that conventional expressions, when used in a play, represent a random choice made by the poet from among a field of available conventional materials. I think rather that in this case material which is to a limited degree and in a limited context conventional has been used to remind us of a certain aloofness we have already seen in this character. Because there is a conventional element, both in the δρέπανα topos and in the debate form, I wouldn't go much further than that—certainly not as far as Grube. We know that Hippolytos is innocent, and wonder whether he will keep the oath we learned of at 611f: the question where the plot will go has us on the edge of our stone benches. But at the same time Euripides takes some trouble to show us an isolating quality in Hippolytos' σωφροσύνη, a quality that we can believe angered the love goddess.

Moving to the argumentative content of the speech, Hippolytos addresses first of all the charge made against his character. He senses (at 1007) that this approach is ineffective; he offers a different defense. As J. H. Finley has de-

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71 Grube describes the argumentative content of Hippolytos' speech as "eager self-glorification, for it can hardly be called a defence" (Drama 189). He ignores the fact it is a good speech, elegant and thorough in its presentation. M. Lloyd also misses this point, when he concludes (Agon 50) "the tragic point is that these feeble arguments are the only ones [Hippolytos] can use".

72 Often we see two different arguments brought to bear in the same case. Here, unusually, the impression is given that the second argument is being put because the first has failed—this violates a certain static quality we expect in such speeches, the sense of the speech as a single spontaneous utterance, not something which unfolds in 'dramatic time'. Somewhat similar: Kyk 299, Hek 813.
scribed the two arguments: "The hero [argues] ... in lines 993-1006, that a person of his σωφροσύνη would not have been likely to commit such a crime and, in lines 1007-20, that the crime itself would have brought him no advantage".  

We may describe both of these arguments, with Finley, as probability arguments. The first attacks the probability of a virginal rapist, the second eliminates one by one any probable motive. (The formal and quite characteristic presentation of this second argument is the subject of close study in III.B below.) Hippolytos' speech moves to a third argument: a strong oath to his innocence. Comments alluding mysteriously to the oath that prevents Hippolytos from defending himself properly (whether or not this is to be regarded as a practical possibility) are in the vicinity (1032f), and this is no accident.

Certainly Euripides has given each speaker in this contest arguments "as good and as hard-hitting as his case allows", in Dale's phrase; she says elsewhere "Fertility in arguments, a delight in logical analysis— these are the essentials." Euripides is "a kind of λογογράφος who promises to do his best for each of his clients in turn".  

But to note the "jury-directed tone" (Gould) of such speeches is not to circumscribe exhaustively their content. I have rejected above the idea that Theseus' personal attack on Hippolytos represents the bursting forth of years of pent-up resentment (Goebel); likewise, the patience and clarity with which Hippolytos argues his case should not be taken as showing us a maddening impassivity or self-absorption (Grube). But this doesn't necessarily leave us with no more than an analytical consideration of the two sides, presented using

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73 Three Essays 65, n.28; Finley notes (ibid) connections with approaches to argument seen in the Sophists and orators of the late fifth century.

74 As often, a third section contains "non-rational" argument. Oaths supporting the truth of their statements are offered by Euripidean speakers at Her 858, IA 473ff.

75 Dale, Alcestis: ad 636ff (first quote); xxviii (second and third).
formal conventions of Athenian public debate and from a "third person' perspective" (Gould's phrase)\textsuperscript{76} by the figures of Theseus and Hippolytos. We must not doubt that such a presentation already holds considerable intrinsic interest; but we needn't assume that Euripides has no other purpose here. I have noted details that go beyond the "analytical" (Theseus' agitation and impatience); rhetorical material that is not quite "conventional" (Hippolytos' proem); points raised in argument that resonate with important themes in the play (the positive and negative aspects of $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\omega\nu\nu$,\textsuperscript{77} the oath Hippolytos is under); points that may be assumed to resonate with the everyday experience of the Athenian audience ("generation gap")— as indeed the rhetorical techniques themselves must. In each case Euripides has steered this "conventional" debate in directions that can't be explained purely as serving the interests of each client in turn. We must be as wary of underinterpreting the rhetorical utterances of Euripidean characters as of overinterpreting them.

\textbf{E. Three-Way Scenes}

I have classified loosely some one-person rhetorical passages as "monologues of despair", "speeches of self-dedication", "epideictic speeches", some two-person exchanges as "appeal scenes", "forensic debates"; similar techniques of rhetoric are found in all, though the types are quite distinct at the level of

\textsuperscript{76} "Dramatic Character" 58.

\textsuperscript{77} Conacher, "Rhetoric & Relevance" 15: "The repeated occurrences of the word $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\omega\nu$, in one form or another (995, 1007, 1013, 1034), provide sinister reminders that this "virtue", linked with Hippolytus' $\sigma\varepsilon\nu\nu\nu\nu\tau\tau\nu\nu\nu$, has been played up throughout as the catastrophic element in this tragedy". This goes too far; I would say that the play offers us, among other things, an invitation to think about what constitutes true $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\omega\nu\nu$, and that the rhetoric of this scene plays a part in presenting that theme.
scenic function and effect. Three-person scenes are rarer and fall less easily into set types. Large-scale rhetorical confrontations involving three characters in Euripides include the first episodes in *Hik* (where Theseus responds first to an appeal for help from Adrastos, then to a second appeal by Aithra on behalf of the suppliants) and *Her* (where Amphitryon and Megara respond differently to the threats of Lykos). In the former, one confrontation simply follows the other, with a choral interlude that is not "act-dividing" separating them.

The *Herakles* scene is more interwoven. A difference in the attitudes of Megara and Amphitryon towards the situation in which they find themselves is already developed in the Prologue scene (1-106), where Amphitryon's faith his son will rescue the helpless suppliant family (95-7) is contrasted with the pessimism of Megara (92). The episode that begins with the arrival of Lykos (138) involves first the debate of Lykos and Amphitryon (140-235, discussed above in II.C), in which Amphitryon's spirit of stubborn resistance is dramatised. This leads Lykos to call for fuel to be brought to burn the suppliants; the Chorus of impotent old men voice their solidarity with the victims. But now Megara delivers a speech (275-311) addressed to Amphitryon objecting to further resistance and arguing for the inevitability of their death. This leads to two important shifts of direction. Amphitryon agrees to accept death, but asks only to die before the children are killed (316-26). Megara asks that the suppliants be given time to prepare for the grave (327-31); Lykos indicates this request is granted (332-5). It is important to note that at this point Megara and Amphitryon are no longer at odds with each other; the spectacle of the two of them bowing

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78 On the opportunities with which in general the third actor presents the playwright, see Kitto *Greek Tragedy* 156-63 (discussing Sophokles). On three-way confrontations in Euripides: Strohm *Euripides* 16f and 148f, Duchemin L' *ΑΓΩΝ* 140ff.

79 See detailed study below, V.B.
before Lykos and beseeching him (ικνούμεθα 321, κάγω σ’ ικνούμαι 327) emphasises this fact. The earlier presentation of their differing attitudes has made for an interesting three-way scene, but should not be taken as casting either character in a negative light.80

Despite the scene's formal complexity, we still see essentially two separate confrontations: Amphitryon and Megara conduct a "friendly debate",81 interrupted but not materially affected by a hostile debate with Lykos. In Orestes there is a similar interweaving of two essentially different kinds of debate. Orestes, threatened with death in the aftermath of his murder of Klytaimestra, begins to pitch an appeal to Menelaos (as a "champion") for help against the angry Argives (448); this appeal is in strikingly realistic fashion interrupted by the arrival of Tyndareos, who here represents the right of city and family to justice. Orestes now must play out a "forensic" scene (470-631), defending his action in killing his mother. The failure of this effort necessitates the continuation of his appeal to Menelaos (discussed above, II.A), which is based not on a defense of the justice of his act, but on bonds of obligation and mutual interest between Menelaos and Agamemnon.82 This arrangement, developing

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80 Burnett (Catastrophe 160) has taken the scene as discrediting Megara: "Megara and Amphitryon dispute, she is victorious, and as a result the suppliants abandon sanctuary and deliver themselves to their pursuer". It is in fact her time-buying request for a change of clothes that makes possible the rescue by Herakles, and so Megara's negative attitude ironically produces positive consequences; but in Burnett's view, the betrayal by Megara of the conventions of the suppliant plot is to blame for the family's ultimate murder by Herakles (ibid 172). Heath (Poetics 161ff) rightly plays down the importance of Megara's and Amphitryon's differences.

81 Cf. the debates of Herakles and Admetos in Alk 509-45 and 1008-1118, of Herakles and Theseus in Her 1214-1420, and the short exchange of Orestes and Pylades in IT 674-722.

82 Burnett (Catastrophe 207): "Orestes apparently judges the Aeschylean defence [i.e., the defense based on the justice of placing his father's interest before his mother's] to have been discredited by Tyndareus' angry exit. When he makes his next appeal to Menelaus he ignores Apollo...and argues with a dazzling sophistry from the aristocratic concept of repayment". I am not sure whether Burnett means to suggest that Euripides wanted the audience to think of the character Orestes as changing strategies for utilitarian reasons; this would be an unwarranted and unnecessary inference, as (1) the speech to Menelaos is an appeal, not a defense, (2) the audience would expect, in the theatre as in the courts and the assembly, that a second speech arguing the
out of a realistic series of circumstances, and leading into a remarkable series of plot-twists,\(^{83}\) makes possible the exploration of Orestes' act from a number of perspectives, while maximising suspense.\(^{84}\)

The three-way conception of the scene goes deeper here than in the \textit{Herakles} scene in that the differing positions and interests of the three parties are emphasised. Thus Tyndareos' speech accusing Orestes is mainly addressed to Menelaos; this has the psychological effect of isolating Orestes while promoting the speech's secondary aim of discouraging Menelaos from intervening on Orestes' behalf.\(^{85}\)

A more integrated formal approach to three-way debate is seen in \textit{Hel} 865-1029 (the appeal scene) and \textit{Phoin} 469-585 (the "agon" debate).\(^{86}\) In both these scenes a third party responds to a pair of speeches that contrast with each other in interesting ways.

Following the recognition and reunion of Menelaos and Helen (\textit{Hel} 622), the problem of their escape from Egypt becomes the play's central concern. Euripides has constructed a complex series of obstacles the two must overcome;

\(^{83}\) Cf. Burnett's apt description of the amazing shifts of direction in the plot (\textit{Catastrophe} 183-95): "Euripides' long experimentation with distorted and aberrant stage forms culminates here in a fantastical plot machine that artfully sticks and jams, until finally it begins to smoke and is replaced by a divine conveyance" (184).

\(^{84}\) Here as elsewhere (see discussions of \textit{Hik} and \textit{IA} in Ch. V below), the suspense involves the question how Euripides will manage to restore the plot to the known course of the old tale. See Winnington-Ingram "Poïêtês Sophos", esp. 133f.

\(^{85}\) This \textit{aim} is evident (vss. 622-8) whether or not we conclude that Euripides means us to take Menelaos' retreat as resulting from intimidation: see discussion above in II.A.

\(^{86}\) The scene in \textit{Bak} involving Pentheus, Kadmos and Teiresias is discussed in these terms by Strohm (\textit{Euripides} 46f). Formally it is similar, but lacks the kind of rhetorical content I am mainly interested in. The double appeal of \textit{IA} is discussed in V.C below.
this is the essence of a good adventure story. The first obstacle is the prophetess daughter of the dead King Proteus; she is under orders to inform her brother Theoklymenos in the event Menelaos arrives in Egypt. The truth cannot be hidden from her; thus everything depends upon the couple's ability to persuade her to disobey her brother's command.

Following her brief entrance speech Theonoe, it seems, agrees to listen to the couple's appeal. Helen speaks first (894-943), then Menelaos (947-95). I note first a general difference of tone in the two speeches; Helen begs, Menelaos intimidates. Helen's argument, accompanied by gestures of supplication, is based on the obligation undertaken by Theonoe's father Proteus to return Helen to Menelaos (900-23), and on the pathetic condition to which Helen herself has been reduced (924-38). Menelaos' speech contrasts with both of these points, and complements them in interesting ways. First, he emphasises that his heroic stature precludes his supplicating (946-53), and so puts his request to Theonoe in terms of her freedom of decision (εἰ δοκεῖ σοι 954) and her sense of justice (note ὀρθῶς 955) and of her own reputation (κακὴ φανῆ 958); his prayers to Proteus (962-8) and to Hades (969-74) continue the note of humility implied in Helen's supplication, but there is no humility in the content of these prayers. Menelaos moves to a second strategy in 975, specifically announcing it as something Helen's speech left out: the dire consequences of a refusal to help. These are developed under two headings: Menelaos' intentions if Theoklymenos should

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87 On the problem of the apparently ignored command in 892-3 see Wilamowitz Analecta 243 (who first suspected the lines were an actor's interpolation aimed at creating cheap tension), Zuntz "Theology & Irony" 206-8 (whose solution based on values of rhetorical fulness and balance is very attractive), Kannicht ad 892-3, Dale ad 892-3, Mastronarde Cont. and Disc. 112f.

88 In Kannicht's analysis, a plea ύπερ Μενέλαω is followed by a plea ύπερ ἑαυτῆς; he sees the formal arrangement announced in ύπερ τ' ἑαυτῆς τοῦδε θ', 895. I don't see this phrase as necessarily pointing to two distinct arguments. There is a clear transition to Helen's pathetic condition at 924, but the argument before does not seem to focus on Menelaos— rather on obligations and righteousness.
offer to fight him (977-9), and if instead he attempts to starve Helen and Menelaos at the tomb where they sit (980-90). The speech's epilogue (991-5) recapitulates Menelaos' unwillingness to grovel and his readiness to die, and the consequences for both Theonoe and himself of a favourable decision.89

The two speakers have thus made speeches of similar form, offering separate arguments in favour of the same outcome. Dale notes (ad 993) that the arguments made are complementary, and offer a contrast of style: "Euripides has made Helen's an appeal, Menelaus' a demand, for justice". The distinction here is perhaps more extreme than the use we saw above (I.A) of contrasting arguments in a single speech of appeal, but it results from the same rhetorical impulse on Euripides' part to present the fullest case for the requested help.

Theonoe's response is brief, but it too offers two arguments, in justification of the decision she announces. She begins with a complex proem:

\[
\text{ἐγὼ πέφυκά τ’ εὐσεβείν καὶ βούλομαι}
\]
\[
\text{φιλὼ τ’ ἐμαυτήν, καὶ κλέος τούμου πατρός}
\]
\[
\text{οὐκ ἂν μιάναμ’, οὔδὲ συγγόνωι χάριν}
\]
\[
\text{δοίην ἂν ἐξ ἡς δυσκλήθης φανήσομαι.} \quad (\text{Hel 998-1001})
\]

It is my nature and my wish to practise righteousness, and I care for myself, and would (therefore) bring no disgrace upon my father's reputation, nor allow my own reputation to suffer through indulging my brother.

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89 Diggle follows Schenk! in deleting the entire epilogue; but, as Dale says (ad 993), the speech loses balance without it. Kannicht receives the lines, but gives them an emotional interpretation out of touch with the rhetorical character of such an epilogue (ad 991-5): he speaks of an "inner struggle", and suggests that Menelaos' vivid evocation of himself and Helen lying dead at the tomb of Proteus has brought him to the verge of tears. But the tears of 991 are none other than those of 948, a conventional adjunct of supplication.
The question is first defined in terms of εὐσεβεία. Theonoe gives two positive grounds for her practising εὐσεβεία: her nature and her desire. She adds that regard for herself (self-esteem, a kind of φιλία) must also play a part in her decision, and gives two cases of the negative consequences that would follow on a failure to heed this imperative: the attraction of δυσκλεία to her father and to herself. This second point seems to involve a contrast of real and false obligation: Theonoe's duty towards her father is a legitimate obligation; that towards her brother is not, since its exercise involves a loss of κλέος. This contrast will lend the speech's arguments an additional element of antithesis. The arguments unfold in three sequences:

1002-8  my nature favours justice
1009-16  my father would do the same: τίσις affects all alike
1017-21  better not to assist my brother's μωρία

As in the proem, the sequence is Theonoe, her father, her brother. But the arguments are two: justice requires the reunion of Helen and Menelaos (1002, 1010), and Theoklymenos' intentions are base (1018, 1021). The two points are not given neatly balanced presentations, but some repeated words seem to call attention to them: Theonoe is reluctant to perform a compromising χάρις for her brother (1000), and indicates Χάρις (1006) plays no role in her life; Hera intends to serve the interests of Menelaos (εὐδοκεῖτείν, 1005), but Theonoe's

90 The idea one's φίλος might or might not be in agreement with other aspects of one's life is seen also in Ion 642ff: see Ch. I n.37.
91 "Self-esteem" is cited as a reason for speaking out in a just cause by Andromache in Andr 191: ἐμαυτὴν ὡς προδοσίαν ἀλώσωμαι.
92 Χάρις LP, Murray, Alt, Kannicht; Κύρης Canter, Dale (ad 998-1008), Diggle. If the reading of the codd. is correct, the rhetorical point may be that matters of reputation and justice (here treated as equivalent goods) count for more with Theonoe than the everyday human exchanges of which a favour done her brother would be an instance. But note the contrast set up between Hera and Kypris in 880-91 and again in 1093-1106, which favours Canter's conjecture.
decision is paradoxically a service to her brother (εὐφρετῷ, 1020). Theonoe's speech ends with a brief "practical" section (1022-7), giving the immediate consequences of her decision, followed by a couplet addressed to Proteus, in which the problem of εὐσέβεια and δυσσέβεια and its connection in Theonoe's mind with the risk of a compromised reputation are recapitulated:

σὺ δ', ὡ θανὼν μοι πάτερ, ὅσον γ' ἐγὼ σθένω,
οὐποτε κεκλήσῃ δυσσέβης ἀντ' εὐσέβοις.  (Hel 1028f)

In Phoin the debate of Polyneikes and Eteokles culminates in a detailed response from their mother Iokaste. The stage for the debate is set in a scene in which the essential outlook of all three characters is mooted. Polyneikes enters Thebes under a truce and Iokaste voices in lyrics her anguish over his long absence and the danger in which the royal house stands (301-54); then in a long conversation Polyneikes is presented as a man with a legitimate grievance against his brother, Iokaste as a concerned mother. Eteokles on his entrance (446) immediately establishes his rather impatient and volatile character, with Iokaste assuming a position of authority, attempting to calm him, and pre­figuring the coming debate by speaking abstractly about justice, speech, wisdom:

ἐπίσχες· οὐτοι τὸ ταχὺ τὴν δίκην ἔχει,
βραδεῖς δὲ μὴθοι πλεῖστον ἀνύτουσιν σοφόν.  (Phoin 452f)

She invites Polyneikes to speak first (thus taking on the role of "moderator"), and expresses the hope some god will bring about a reconciliation (465-9).

---

93 A "double appeal" is played out in miniature in Her 316-35, Tro 1042-59.

94 All quotations from Phoin follow Mastronarde's text.
Polyneikes begins his speech with a proem meant to characterise the simple morality of his own case:

\[
\text{άπλούς ὁ μύθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ,}
\]
\[
κοὐ ποικίλων δεῖ τάνδιχ' ἐρμηνευμάτων,
\]
\[
ἐχει γὰρ αὐτὰ καίρων ὁ δὲ ἄδικος λόγος,
\]
\[
νοσῶν ἐν αὐτῶι φαρμάκων δεῖται σοφῶν. \quad (469-72)
\]

He puts his case in the form of a narratio, unusual in Euripidean debate but here supplying necessary exposition. This is given a binary organisation through the device of contrasting Polyneikes' own righteous behaviour (473-80 ἔγω δὲ etc.) with the unjust actions of his brother (481-3 ὁ δ' ἄδικος λόγος etc.). He continues with a practical suggestion: he stands ready to compromise, and settle for less than is properly due him (484-9), but will not settle for nothing (490). He now appeals to the gods to witness the injustice he suffers (491-3), and closes by assuring Iokaste—he never addresses Eteokles—that he has given a simple and honest statement of the facts:95

\[
\text{ταῦτα αὖθι ἔκαστα, μὴτερ, οὐχὶ περιπλοκᾶς}
\]
\[
λόγων ἄθροίσας εἴποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφίς
\]
\[
καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις ἔνδιχ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. \quad (494-6)
\]

The speech thus eschews "sophistry"; yet it is typical of Euripidean speech-making in both the organization of its argument and the rhetorical self-consciousness of proem and epilogue. The choral couplet (497f) shows approval of Polyneikes' presentation.96

95 With the protestations of simplicity here and in the proem, cf. Agamemnon at IA 400 (to Menelaos): ταῦτα σοι βραχέα ἐλέκτας καὶ σαφῆ καὶ ράδια.

96 Note how different this Polyneikes is from the same character in the "normal" telling of the story (e.g., in S. OK). The Euripidean impulse to portray the traditional villain paradoxically in a good light (cf. Eurystheus in Hkld, Aigisthos in Elek) has here led to a major shift of presentation.
Eteokles' speech (it cannot be called a "response") begins likewise with an abstract proem:

\[
\begin{align*}
e & \text{πάσι ταύτῳ καλὸν ἔφυ σοφὸν θ' ἀμα,} \\
o & \text{οὐκ ἦν ἀν αμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις.} \\
v & \text{νῦν δ' οὐθ' ὀμολογούν οὐδὲν οὗτ' ἵσον βροτοῖς} \\
& \text{πλὴν ὀνομάσαι: τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε. (499-502)}
\end{align*}
\]

He takes a position diametrically opposed to that of his brother: words can express no simple truth, as no two people perceive the world in the same way.97

His argument proceeds:

503-510a  Τυραννίς the greatest of goddesses
510b-14  the shame of losing to foreigners
515-19a  practical points:
          515-7  what Polyneikes ought to be doing
          518-19a I allow him to return
519b-23  reiteration of Eteokles' devotion to Τυραννίς

He closes with a sinister maxim:

\[
\begin{align*}
e & \text{ἴπερ γὰρ ἄδικεῖν χρῆ, τυραννόδος πέρι} \\
& \text{kάλλιστον ἄδικεῖν, τάλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρεύων. (524f)}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus the same general plan is followed; abstract proem, argument taking a binary form, practical suggestion (here preceded by a recrimination introduced

97 One thinks here of the pronouncements with which Gorgias opened his On the Non-Existent (B3). Guthrie paraphrases these (HGP III. 196ff): "(a) Nothing exists. (b) If anything exists it cannot be known or thought of by man. (c) Even if it can be apprehended, it cannot be communicated to another". Mastronarde ad Phoin 499-525: "Both the language and the content of Et.'s speech are meant to associate Et. with the clever young men who used the training of the sophists to discomfit their traditionally minded elders and to justify selfish and aggressive behaviour".
with χρήσις,abstract epilogue. Both proems present a view of verbal communication, both epilogues concern "fairness".

The choral comment (526f) seems once again to take sides: eloquence (sc. such as that of Eteokles) ought to be used only in the service of fine deeds; this present case is not fine, but offensive to justice. Iokaste’s long speech follows: she responds first to Eteokles' 27 lines with 40, then to Polyneikes' 28 with 16; a two-line epilogue appeals to both brothers. Her speech begins, like those of her sons, with a gnomic proem:

\[ \omega \tau\epsilon\kappa\nu\nu, \omega\chi \delta\alpha\nu\alpha\tau\alpha \tau\omega \gamma\eta\rho\alpha \kappa\kappa\alpha\kappa, \]
\[ 'E\tau\epsilon\o\kappa\lambda\varepsilon\varepsilon, \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\sigma\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\nu \ \alpha\lambda\lambda \ '\omicron\mu\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\iota\a, \]
\[ \varepsilon\chi\varepsilon \ \tau\iota \lambda\varepsilon\zeta\alpha \tau\omicron \nu\nu \nu\varepsilon\omicron \ \sigma\sigma\omicron\omega\iota\tau\iota\nu\varepsilon\nu. \quad (528-30) \]

She answers Eteokles’ attachment to Τυραννίς by renaming that goddess Φιλοτιμία, a much less attractive abstraction. The damage Φιλοτιμία does to households and cities (Iokaste broadens the context) is contrasted to the good done by 'Ισότης, who is praised at length (535b-48). This first section devoted to discrediting royal power as a goal is closed by a short epilogue (549-51). Iokaste

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98 Examples of this device are collected in App. A.3.

99 Misuse of eloquence forms a topos within debates: note esp. Med 580f, Hipp 486-9, Hek 1187-94, and see Collard ad Hik 426. For the treatment of this subject by the orators, see Ober Mass and Elite 165-74.

100 Both the unequal length and the chiastic presentation of Iokaste’s comments point to the more offensive character of Eteokles’ position.

101 The three proem reflections are discussed further in IV.B below.

102 Iokaste recommends Equality as the natural, "normal" (νόμιμον) state of man and the enemy of excess and want (538ff), and associates it with μέρη σταθμῶν (541), "due proportion". As M. Lloyd notes (Agon 90): "Iocasta’s speech is, indeed, a defence of democracy against tyranny, which has only superficial relevance to the immediate issue". It is significant that the democratic ideology presented here has been anticipated in the speech of the sympathetic Polyneikes: note ισον 487, ανά μέρος 478 [del. Diggle] and 486. Similar language appears in a purely Athenian context in Thuc. II. 37.1. Thucydidean parallels with Iokaste’s speech are discussed by de Romilly, "Les Phéniciennes " 36f.
moves now to discrediting the goal of wealth, a goal that was not mentioned in Eteokles' speech, but which seems entirely consistent with the attitudes of that speech (and, perhaps just as importantly, with the attitudes of antidemocratic Athenians, men who would choose τυραννίς over ἰσότης).\textsuperscript{103} This section concludes at 557 or [558], and in a summarising epilogue the pathetic potential effects of these goals of his are put before Eteokles: the city sacked, the women enslaved.\textsuperscript{104} Yet he has the choice rather to πόλιν σώσαι (560).

Iokaste turns now to Polyneikes. His position too she rejects: Adrastos undertook a "foolish" obligation toward him, and the campaign against Thebes is "unintelligent" (569f). Now, in a passage structurally similar to her last argument against Eteokles, she asks him to visualise the consequences:

573-7 if you win: what boast could you make?
578-82a if you lose: how return to Argos?

The familiar technique of supporting an argument through direct quotation of an imagined comment is employed twice here: in 575f Iokaste suggests ironically a triumphal inscription for the victorious Polyneikes that would constitute a most dishonourable boast;\textsuperscript{105} in 580-2a she quotes the reproaches that would be addressed to Adrastos should Polyneikes lose the war. This process gives balance and amplification to the treatment of the two possible outcomes; both of these

\textsuperscript{103} Kovacs would delete the entire section 549-67 ("Tyrants" 42-5); see Mastronarde's response to his arguments (comm. ad loc). Diggle deletes 555-8, 563-5, 567, Mastronarde only 558.

\textsuperscript{104} It seems to me that if 563-5 are genuine (del. Willink, Diggle) Iokaste perhaps overstates the likely effects of a successful campaign to install Polyneikes as king of Thebes (though some sort of "sack" was envisioned by Polyneikes himself in 489f); the "rhetoric of the situation" has taken over.

\textsuperscript{105} Cf. Hekabe's similar suggestion in Th 1188-91.
are demonstrated through a kind of informal dilemma argument to be unacceptable, in that both invite derision.\textsuperscript{106}

In the double appeal scene in \textit{Helen}, we saw subtle differences of approach in the two appeal speeches, and a response that addressed the points made in only a very general way, introducing Theonoe's own character and that of her brother as her main reasons for complying with the request of Helen and Menelaos. Here in \textit{Phoin}, there is real antagonism between the first two speeches (which, however, do not address each other's arguments). Iokaste rejects Eteokles' case both on its merits (by discrediting \textit{Τυραννίς}) and by evoking the consequences of his stubbornness. Polyneikes' case has been presented, and accepted by the Chorus, as just, and so Iokaste attacks the "intelligence" of a campaign in which he loses no matter what the outcome. The scene has been much concerned with word and speech, wisdom, justice; with the words \textit{μητηρ}, \textit{οὐ λόγων ἐθ' ἀγών} (588), Eteokles closes the debate and we move toward the physical confrontation that will end with both brothers' deaths.

\textsuperscript{106} The double question addressed to Eteokles asked (1) will you forego a chance to save the city (sc. by reconciling)? (2) what of the consequences if you lose? The "downside" of a victory for Eteokles had to be presented not as a personal defeat, but as a lost opportunity, a base favouring of personal over public values. With Polyneikes it is easier to show a true dilemma: in a sense he loses either way.
Chapter III

Probabilities and Possibilities

In this and the following chapter I shall look in detail at some of Euripides' resources for the presentation of arguments. Chapter III will survey the various argumentative applications of rhetorical questions, which Euripides often uses in challenging (in "forensic" contexts) the probability of each of a series of suggestions, or in testing (in "deliberative" contexts) the feasibility of each of several alternative scenarios. Related techniques involving hypothetical formulations (likewise used to consider past or present alternatives) will also be discussed. Chapter IV will treat the use in argument of general statements (gnomes or maxims), introduced as common sense or as the speaker's opinion, and of such corollary phenomena as challenges to common sense and "utopian reflections". My objective is again to gain a clear view of the resources used by Euripides in a variety of situations; and again I assume that techniques that will have been accepted by the original audience as merely conventional should not be treated by us as fraught with meaning, but that the untypical or unconventional will have to be explained.

A. Rhetorical Questions and the "Probability Argument"

The important use of rhetorical questions in connection with probability arguments makes a brief introduction here to that subject desirable. The use of an appeal to "probability" in argumentation seems to have been a new resource
in the fifth century.\(^1\) Our first reference to such an appeal (as distinct from examples of its use) comes from Plato, who tells us (*Phaidr* 272D-73C) that Tisias, known from other sources to have been a mid-fifth-century rhetorician, wrote a sample argument in which a weak brave man charged with assaulting a strong coward was advised to argue the improbability of such an attack, asking πώς δ' ἄν ἐγὼ τοιόσοδε τοιώδε ἐπεχείρησα; Tisias is also said (273B) to have defined τὸ εἰκός as οὐ τι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ τῶι πλήθει δοκοῦν. Elsewhere in the *Phaidr* we hear (267A) that Tisias and Gorgias "saw that probabilities are to be more highly regarded than truth."\(^2\) Aristotle in the *Rhet* (1402a3-28) likewise associates the appeal to probability with the early Sicilian rhetoricians, and gives an example of its use that may rest on the same authentic early *Techne* as that in the *Phaidr.*\(^3\) In addition to this historic note, Aristotle gives advice on the use of probability in practical speech situations (02b20-03a1). There are also theoretical comments on εἰκότα designed to fit the concept into the quasi-dialectical system the *Rhet* is concerned to build (57a22-57b21).\(^4\)

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2. Plato presents probability arguments used by orators as subversive and inherently untruthful, but this is mere sophistry on his part: the decision between opposing accounts of an incident must, in the absence of some oracular account of the "truth", depend on comparison with a standard of probability. If rhetoricians developed topoi for arguing either side of a case (such that the probabilities on one side are in conflict with those on the other), this was a useful exercise in the development of critical thinking for orators and dikasts alike.

3. On this point see Gagarin "Probability and Persuasion" 51. Kuebler diss. 8-10 speculates on the extent to which the early technical instruction of the Sicilians survived to influence the theoretical writings of Anaximenes and Aristotle; Goebel diss. 109-35 attempts to reconstruct the Sicilian teaching on probability. Although Aristotle too finds fault with the abuse of probability by rhetoricians— he singles out Protagoras (1402a 3-28)— his objection is that they make no distinction between ἄληθες and φαινόμενον εἰκός; that is (as his own theoretical apparatus bears out with its dependence on εἰκότα), he recognises the need to assess probability in cases where the facts are not clearly known.

4. For discussion of εἰκότα in this context, see Grimaldi *Studies* 104ff.
The third important early Greek work on rhetoric, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*,\(^5\) introduces the concept of εἰκός in discussing (Ch. VII) two classes of πίστεις: there are proofs, we are told (28a17-19), that proceed directly from "words and actions and persons", and others that are supplementary (ἐπὶθετοῖ) to things said and done. The first class includes εἰκότα along with maxims, tokens, examples. The second group correspond roughly to the ἀτεχνοῦ πίστεις of mature Aristotelian theory, and include witnesses, oaths, βάσανοι, opinions. The detailed description of εἰκός (28a26f) states: εἰκός μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐ λεγομένου παραδείγματα ἐν ταῖς διανοίασιν ἐχουσίν οἱ ἀκούοντες. The author goes on to emphasise that "probabilities" rest on shared experiences (such as patriotism, friendship). Three classes of these are distinguished: πάθη, ἔθος, κέρδος. That is, the speaker may hope to exploit common emotions, common assumptions about character, and the common interest of his hearers.\(^6\)

The argument from probability in Euripides and in fifth-century oratory and early rhetoric has been much discussed. It seems likely that we are here, more than elsewhere in this study, in the presence of a contemporary trend in intellectual analysis and argumentation, a trend that found fertile ground in philosophy, rhetoric, drama, and historiography.\(^7\) One may imagine that, apart

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5. On the treatise's character and its likely date and purpose, see Kennedy *Art* 114-24; see also Goebel diss. 74 n. 2, Cole *Origins* 177 n. 15.

6. The great importance of *Rhet ad Alex* for scholars studying fifth-century oratory and argumentation lies in its representing a much more down-to-earth approach to the art of persuasion than either Plato's (in *Phaidr*) or Aristotle's (in the *Rhet*): one easily forms the impression one is hearing the practical advice of an orator, not the speculations of a philosopher. This impression has its dangers, since *Rhet ad Alex* is both systematic and late. Goebel (diss. 154-9) has attempted to show that it preserves a certain amount of authentic fifth-century instruction; Kennedy finds (*Art* 115) "It represents better than anything else the tradition of sophistic rhetoric". Cole (*Origins* 139-58) on the other hand sees the entire enterprise of descriptive rhetoric as essentially a fourth-century and philosophical one.

from a few conventional proem topoi and focusing devices I have described, it is especially in hearing Euripides' probability arguments that the Athenian audience will have experienced the sense of a reference to contemporary modes of debate.

Writers contemporary with Euripides seem to use three different patterns for calling attention to the probability or (more often) improbability of a proposition: (1) the word *eikós* may be used in describing a proposition. So Gorgias has Palamedes deny the putative charge of betraying the Greeks for money by arguing in part (*Pal* 9):

> ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκόσ ἀντὶ μεγάλων ὑπορρημάτων ὀλίγα χρήματα λαμβάνειν.

(2) Conditional expressions may be used to deny that something "would" or "could" happen. Thus Thucydides supports his contention the Achaean force won an early engagement in the Troad by pointing out that otherwise they could not have built the Homeric wall (*Thuc*. I, 11.1):

> δῆλον δὲ· τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἄν ἐτειχίσαντο.

(3) Rhetorical questions may challenge the listener to assent to a proposition palpably false, or to a series of such propositions: the impossibility of assenting is taken as demonstrating the improbability of a scenario (etc.) whose reality has been presented as depending on the truth of the proposition(s). So Antiphon has the defendant charged with the murder of Herodes ask, by way of refuting the notion he had killed as a favour to a third man (*V*. 57):

---

8 Gagarin usefully distinguishes between this "explicit" form of probability argument ("Probability and Persuasion" 66 n. 19), and "indirect" arguments without the word *eikós* (*ibid* 54); but all the forms reviewed here appeal equally clearly to the hearers' sense of probability.
Such a motivation is simply defined as outside the realm of human experience.

Often the second two types ("indirect" appeals to probability) are combined: questions beginning (e.g.) πῶς γὰρ ἂν... are seen in many refutation arguments. All three of the forms I have mentioned are seen together in Hdt. II. 22,2— the argument on the source of the Nile:

κὼς ὥν δὴ τὰ ῥέου ἀν ἀπὸ χίλιον, ἀπὸ τῶν τερμοτάτων ρέων ἐς τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ πολλά ἐστι; ἀνδρὶ γε λογίζεσθαι τοιούτων πέρι οἴων τε ἐστιν, ὡς οὐδὲ οἰκός ἀπὸ χίλιον μὲν ῥέειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον μαρτύριον etc.

Euripides favours the use of rhetorical questions and conditional formulations to imply probability and improbability.⁹

Rhetorical questions in tragedy have many uses.¹⁰ For Euripides a tone of antagonism or surprise, insult (taken or delivered), ridicule, incredulity or perplexity may be valuable in many situations. Often rhetorical questions have a purely pathetic effect:

οἶμοι· τί δή τα φείδομαι ψυχής ἐμῆς
τῶν φιλτάτων μοι γενόμενος παιδῶν φονεύς;
οὐκ εἴμι πέτρας λισσάδος πρὸς ἀλματα
ἡ φάσγανον πρὸς ἡπαρ ἐξακοντίσας

⁹ Pasiphae's ἕξει γὰρ οὐδὲν εἰκὸς in the Kretes fragment (see below) is perhaps the only Euripidean example of εἰκός used in the "technical" sense, rather than in its normal sense of "morally fitting".

¹⁰ Mastronarde, C and D Ch. 1, presents an interesting typological study of rhetorical questions in tragedy; he takes however no interest in questions used in argumentation.
Elsewhere they may express a sense of outrage and derision:

Where as often a pair of questions is used to lay a proposition on the table, then comment on it. Proposition: "You seem to think you are addressing a foreigner, a slave". Comment: "But in fact I'm a native-born free Thessalian". The rhetorical question format of the sequence contributes to the tone of frenzy and antagonism that runs through Pheres' entire speech to Admetos. It will be important in discussing the arguments that are presented in the form of a string of questions constantly to be aware of this emotional and insistent aspect of the utterance. At the same time, it would be wrong to assume that the ὁργή implied in rhetorical question formulations is meant to cast the speaker as hot-headed or bullying. The form in which the arguments are presented brings rather a sense of urgency and animation to the debate itself which it might otherwise lack. This consideration no doubt explains equally well the use of this device by logographers— a sense of animation and of involving the listener was certainly desirable to Antiphon, Lysias and other writers of political and forensic speeches.

11 The passage is a striking reminder of the ease with which desperate emotion and rhetorical clarity and patterning may coexist.
Rhetorical questions used in argument most often stand for a statement. Klytaimestra defends her association with Aigisthos in these terms:

\[ \varepsilon k t e i n ' , \varepsilon t r e f \theta \nu \, \dot{\eta} \mu e r \, \dot{\eta} \upsilon \, \pi o r e u s i m o u n \]  
\[ \pi r o s \, t o u s \, \varepsilon k e i n w a i \, \pi o l e m i o u s . \, \phi i l w n \, \gamma \alpha r \, \dot{a} n \]  
\[ t i s \, \dot{a} n \, f \theta n w o n \, s o u \, \pi a t r o s \, \varepsilon k o l w \iota n w i s e \, \mu o i ; \]  

(Elek 1046-8)

"I found help among Agamemnon's enemies; for no friend of his would have shared in the deed". Note that the question delivers an argumentative point, and that the argument denies the probability of Klytaimestra's receiving support elsewhere. Such a question may be followed by a statement confirming the position of the speaker. So Medeia, considering her prospects for an escape should she succeed in murdering her three enemies, asks rhetorically \[ t i s \, \mu e \]  
\[ d e \xi e t a i \, \pi o l i s ; \]  
(Med 386), and answers \[ o u k \, \dot{e} s t i \]  
(389). But such statements are often (as in Elek 1046-8) omitted.

A very frequent pattern is the use of a rhetorical question to open a point, then a statement of the "correct" answer to guide the listener and imply the speaker's argument:

\[ \sigma u \, \gamma \alpha r \, t i \, \mu \, \dot{e} d i k n o s a s ; \]  
\[ \dot{e} x e d o u \, k o r h n \]  
\[ \ddot{o} t w i \, s e \, \theta u m o s \, \dot{e} g e n . \]  

(Med 309f)

What wrong have you done me? You [merely] gave your daughter to the man it pleased you to.

Medeia asks Kreon to consider whether he has done her any offense, and then supplies an answer that implies he has not. Very common too is a pair of rhetorical questions in which the second question guides the listener to the
correct answer to the first and so sets out an argumentative point. A simple example:

›ξείν νομίζεις παῖδα σῶν γαῖας ὑπο;
καὶ τίς θανόντων ἠλθέν ἐξ Ἅιδοι πάλιν;  
(Her 296f)

This is a crisp and efficient way of saying: (1) Perhaps you think your son will return; (2) but that is an unreasonable expectation; (3) for no one has ever returned from Hades. The argument here is "from probability" in that Megara asks Amphitryon to compare the likelihood of Herakles' return from Hades with a known fact about the nature of the world. The rhetorical question with πῶς (implying negation) or πῶς οὔ (implying affirmation) is an idiom frequently associated with probability arguments. What we seem to have here is a common Greek expression that was taken over by orators as an available and effective way of emphasizing the inconsistency of a proposition with everyday experience. Herodotos (for whom Powell's Lexicon lists 12 instances of rhetorical question with κῶς implying negative) five times

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12 Lang, Herodotean N and D Ch. 3 (37-51), studies the use of rhetorical questions in Homer and Herodotos. She analyses a number of argumentative two-question sequences in Herodotos that have no parallels in Homer but which resemble many such sequences in Euripides. In these sequences (commenting on III. 82,5) "the Herodotean [second] question initiates a process of logical reasoning which makes the rhetorical question less a weapon of personal confrontation than a means of argument and proof" (43).

13 This is what Solmsen would call a probability argument effected through "Fundierung in einer Behauptung von allgemeiner Gültigkeit" (Antiphonstudien 50). Most Euripidean arguments are of this type. A second type (not entirely distinct) involves "rationale Analyse der πράξεως" (ibid); in Euripides, cf. e.g. Med 502-8, where the reasons Medea offers to refute the probability of a warm welcome awaiting her in Kolchis and Iolkos cite her own acts, not general truths.

14 Bateman, writing of probability arguments in Lysias, notes (diss. 41), "A favorite device for intensifying such arguments is the rhetorical question, especially that introduced by πῶς"; he refers to Kuebler, diss. 33 and 62 (q.v.).

15 Thus rhetorical questions with πῶς are common in Homer— but πῶς οὔ does not seem to occur.
makes an appeal to probability using this idiom.\textsuperscript{16} In Euripides the πῶς-question often contains within it reference to a circumstance that is presented as decisive for the speaker’s argument:\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{quote}
πῶς δ' ἂν γένοιτ' ἂν ἐν κραταιλέωι πέδωι
gαίας ποδῶν ἐκμακτρευ; 
\textit{(Elek 534f)}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
...πῶς ἂν οὖν εἴην κακός,

.osgi οὔδ' ἀκούσας τοιάδ' ἀγνεύειν δοκῶ;
\textit{(Hipp 654f)}
\end{quote}

Sometimes such a question attacks a proposition not on grounds of a practical improbability but of a logical impossibility:\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{quote}
καὶ πῶς ἂν αὐτὸς κατάναι τε καὶ βλέποι; 
\textit{(Alk 142)}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
πῶς ἂν μὴ διορθεών λόγος

ὁρθῶς δύναιτ' ἂν δῆμος εὐθύνειν πόλιν;
\textit{(Hik 417f)}
\end{quote}

The probability argument quoted by Plato from Tisias was

\begin{quote}
πῶς δ' ἂν ἑγὼ τολόσδε τοιώδε ἐπεχείρησα;
\end{quote}

Its formal similarity to the Euripidean examples above is striking.

\textsuperscript{16} I. 75,6; II. 45,2 and 45,3; V. 106,2; VII. 103,3. On probability arguments in Herodotos in general see Lateiner \textit{Historical Method} 97f, 193.

\textsuperscript{17} For πῶς-questions containing a full conditional protasis (e.g. \textit{IT} 1012ff) see below under "Hypothetical Arguments".

\textsuperscript{18} These arguments rest on questions of definition: cf. \textit{Alk} 525, \textit{Andr} 1165, and the two questions in \textit{Hel} 912f. Somewhat similar is Antiphon’s refutation of the claim that a man’s death was due to the doctor’s poor treatment rather than the defendant’s attack: πῶς ἂν ἄλος τις ἢ ὁ βιασάμενος ἡμᾶς χρῆσαί, αὐτῶι [sc. τῷ ιατρῷ] φονεῖς εἰη ἂν; (\textit{IV. γ,5}). The existence of arguments like \textit{Alk} 142 apparently predates the development of a clear conceptual distinction between logical and practical impossibility: see G. Lloyd \textit{P and A} 423.
B. Elimination of Alternatives: Past

From these building blocks (hanging question with answer implied, question-statement sequence, question-question sequence, conditional question with πῶς) large arguments are constructed. Quite frequently Euripides uses a series of rhetorical questions to give shape and focus to the process of examining an issue from several sides, especially for the consideration of a series of alternative possibilities (explanations for past actions, options for future actions). The technique is often applied in forensic contexts to the consideration of motive. In this situation the technique ("hypophora" in later rhetorical terminology) is aimed at refuting a series of points which are presented as underlying the opponent's case.19 Thus Andromache in Andr 192-204 counters Hermione's charge she is undermining Hermione's marriage by eliminating one by one a series of suggested motives, and the rhetorical fiction is that one or other of these would form an essential condition for Andromache's undertaking such a scheme. So in Tro 975-82 Hekabe refutes the case made by Helen for Aphrodite's culpability as the ultimate cause of the Trojan War by demolishing successively a suggested (and absurd) motive why Hera and Athene should have betrayed their devotees in the Judgement of Paris. Additional passages of this sort discussed below are: Hipp 958-70, Hipp 1007-15, Hek 1197-1205, Her 295-300, and a section of Pasiphae's defense speech from Kretes.

19 See Solmsen's discussion of "in utramque partem discutare", Intellectual Experiments 10-46. Examples from the early orators of hypophoric arguments similar to those of Euripides: Antiphon V. 28, 57f, Apol 2; Lysias XXIV. 23-5. Gorg. Pal 6-21 constitutes an extremely elaborate example of the use of this technique. See Goebel (diss. 146-54) on the arguments, Cole (Origins 75f) on the piece's purpose.
In *Andr* the argument between Hermione and Andromache involves the question whether Andromache has been trying to sabotage Hermione's marriage with Neoptolemos. Andromache denies the "charge" vigorously, insisting first she could not reasonably have thought herself capable of replacing Hermione, then that she would not have wanted to. This is argued using hypophora. Andromache opens the subject with a question:

\[ \text{εἰπ' ὦ νεᾶνι, τῶι σ' ἐχεγγύωι λόγωι πεισθεῖσ' ἀπωθῶ γνησίων νυμφευμάτων;} \quad \text{(Andr 192f)} \]

This leads to a series of six rhetorical questions that each demand an answer in the negative (such as \textit{oὐκ εἰκὸς ἔστι, "of course not"}). Each question envisions a hypothetical circumstance that might lend credibility to the charge; thus the procedure is a kind of προκατάληψις. Some of the points here are stronger than others, but all are presented as implying the improbability of Hermione's charge. The whole course of the argument is, as Goebel has pointed out, similar to that of Gorgias' *Palamedes*; but here there is no technical "dilemma", i.e., no implication that the alternatives offered are exhaustive.

A similar argument, likewise concerned with motive, occurs in the agon of *Hipp*: Hippolytros has argued against his guilt on the basis of his known

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21 I am in agreement with Goebel ("The Pattern of Argument") on the *Andr* passage (which has mild corruption in 195 but otherwise seems coherent): the transition from possibility to desire is marked by the change from \textit{ὡς} (194: "believing that") to \textit{ίνα} (199: "desiring to"), and is precisely paralleled in the progression of the argument in Gorg. *Pal* from possibility (6-12) to desire (13-21).

22 See Schupp "Beweistopik" 28 for a list of passages in the orators involving dilemma. He wrongly cites *Andr* 785ff as a Euripidean example (*ibid* 183). I find no clearly announced dilemmas in Euripides of the sort "If X, then either Y or Z; but..." (cf. Gorg, *Pal* 26, Ant. IV 6, Lysias XIII 75); but I note less formal dilemmas in *Alk* 945/950: \textit{ένθεξέν / ἔξωθεν}; *Phoin* 571/578: \textit{ὥν ἔλης / ἥν ἰ' αὖ κρατηθῆσι}; *Andr* 344-8, *Her* 1385, *Tro* 661-4, *Phoin* 954-8. Cf. also Soph. *Ant* 921-4.
σωφροσύνη (993-1006); at 1007 he notes this line of argument is failing to persuade Theseus, and he moves to insisting on his lack of a motive (1008). In 1009-13 three rhetorical questions are put, each of which needs a negative answer. In this case (unlike the Andr passage) the speaker supplies an answer to the second and third question (μάταιος ὅτι 1012, and ἤκιστα 1014, if that word is correct in that disputed verse). Vss. 1014f offer an argument clearly intended to stress the improbability of the hypothesis implicit in the question put in 1013, but the reasoning seems unsatisfactory: thus the attempts to repair or remove vs. 1014 or more.

This kind of format is used again in Hek 1199-1205 for the investigation of motive. Polymestor has claimed (1138-44 and esp. 1175-7) that he killed Polydoros out of a desire to serve the interests of the Greeks. Hekabe in her refutation discredits this motive using two rhetorical questions, each positing a hypothetical answer to the initial question τίνα δὲ καὶ σπεύδων χάριν πρόθυμος ἡσθα; (1201f). The improbability of the second of these proposed explanations is emphasised with yet another question: τίνα δοκεῖς πείσειν τάδε; (1205). This section is followed by Hekabe's exposition of the true motive (ὁ χρυσός etc., 1206ff).

Similarly in Tro 975-82 Helen's account of the judgement of Paris (as responsible for her coming to Troy) is attacked by Hekabe on the basis of the

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23 This answers Theseus' challenge in vs. 949. The subject receives a balanced treatment: Hippolytus' high morality in his dealings with gods and friends (996-1001); his sexual chastity (1002-6).

24 See further discussion below.

25 A similar brief final question drives home the argument in Hkld 510.
improbability of its underlying assumptions. Formally the argument begins with a clear statement of the proposition to be proved: Hera and Athene

> οὐ παιδιαίσι καὶ ἔλθῃ μορφῆς πέρι Ἄθηναν πρὸς Ἰδήν. (Tro 975f)

Then a rhetorical question asks why Hera should want the victory in such a contest. A second question implies a patently absurd motive—that she might thus gain a better husband than Zeus. Another question, likewise demanding a negative answer, demolishes Athene's involvement (979-81a); then a final sentence (here in the imperative, 981b-82) emphasises the absurdity of Helen's entire hypothesis. This completes the refutation sequence, and Hekabe moves on to propose her own explanation of the events.

In the defense speech of Pasiphae from Kretes a similar technique is used to refute the charge against the queen. Pasiphae argues that she is not responsible for her actions in pursuing a love-affair with a bull—the attraction was clearly the work of a god:

> ἔχει γὰρ οὐδὲν εἰκός· ἐστὶ γὰρ βοῶς βλέψασ' ἐδήχθην θυμὸν αἰσχρῷτη νόσῳ; ὡς εὐπρεπῆς μὲν ἐν πέπλοισιν ἴδειν; πυρὸς δὲ χαίτης καὶ παρ' ὀμμάτων σέλας οἰνωποῦ ἐξελαμμεν περκαίνων γένοιν; οὐ μὴν δέμας γ' εὐρ[υθῆμον . . . ν]υμφίοιν. (Kret 11-16)27

26 Specifically, the notion that either Hera or Athene would have paid a high price (cf. vss. 971-4) to gain the title for beauty is exposed as improbable. As Stinton points out (Judgement of Paris 38n), Hekabe does not deny the reality of the contest.

27 The fragment is no. 82 in C. Austin’s Nova Fragmenta Euripidea (Berlin, 1968). I quote Austin’s text, but without noting gaps and supplements of minor importance. εὐρ[υθῆμον in vs. 16 is Wilamowitz’s conjecture.
Again the question is one of motive. Two motives are suggested (each outrageously "unlikely", οὐκ εἰκός). The first receives no further comment; a closing statement confirms that the second is to be rejected. In the following lines Pasiphae, like Andromache (Andr 205-12) and Hekabe (Hek 1206-16), takes the offensive:

\[
\text{άλλ' οúde παίδων φ[ύτορ' εἰκός ἢν] πόσιν}
\text{θέσθαι: τί δὴ τῇ[δ' ἐμαίνόμην νόσῳ;}
\text{δαίμων ὁ τοῦδε etc.}
\]

(19-21)\(^{28}\)

The defense thus has two phases: (1) Pasiphae had no motive for seeking such an alliance; (2) Minos' offense against Poseidon (in failing to sacrifice the bull as promised) was the real cause of her passion.

\[
\text{σὺ τοί μ' ἀπόλλυς, σὴ γὰρ ἢ ἕξαρπτη,}
\text{ἐκ σοῦ νοσοῦμεν.}
\]

(34f)

Goebel comments: "The two parts are logically complementary, the first showing that a natural explanation of her passion is unlikely, the second showing that a supernatural explanation is likely".\(^{29}\)

All of these passages exploit some combination of the following features:
(1) rhetorical question (or statement) to open a topic; (2) rhetorical question to moot a possible (but often self-evidently improbable) motive or scenario; (3) rhetorical question (or statement) to imply the speaker's negative, often contemptuous, attitude toward the alternative just mentioned. This last

\(^{28}\) The supplements are by Wilamowitz. I don't have great confidence in εἰκός ἢν in vs. 19; but the rhetorical shape of the passage is quite clear.

\(^{29}\) Diss. 300; Goebel's discussion however bogs down in a dubious attempt to distinguish between elements of "judicial" and of "sophistic" rhetoric in the speech (ibid 296-301).
contains the "argument from probability" in Euripides' preferred form.
Discussion of some less elaborate examples follows.

Hekabe asks Odysseus what motive led the Greeks to condemn Polyxene
to death:

πότερα τὸ χρή σφ' ἐπῆγαγ ἀνθρωποσφαγεῖν
πρὸς τὺμβον, ἐνθα βουθυτεῖν μάλλον πρέπει;
ἡ τοὺς κτανόντας ἀνταποκτεῖναι θέλων
ἐς τῆμν' Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐνδίκως τείνει φόνον;
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἤδε γ' εἰργασταὶ κακὸν.
'Ελένην μίν αἰτεῖν χρῆν τάφῳ προσφάγματα:
κεῖνη γὰρ ὀλέσεν μίν ἐς Τροίαν τ' ἄγει.

(Hek 260-6)

Here two alternative motives, clearly marked as such by πότερα..., are
proposed. The first question contains its own answer in the relative clause
(ἐνθα...); the second is answered in the statement introduced by ἀλλ' (implying an
objection). The sequence closes with the proposal of a new and better alternative
(sacrifice Helen), and a brief justification for this. The argument here does not
discredit imputed motives by pointing up their improbability, but denies the
morality of the sacrifice, whatever its motivation.

Theseus in his debate with the Theban herald in Suppliant Women
challenges the Theban edict against burial for the Seven by pointing up the
absurdity of any fear the Thebans might have vis-à-vis the dead:

30 The first of a pair of alternative questions is introduced by πότερα in Alk 1051, Med 499,
Hipp 1009, Hek 260, 1202; by πότερον in Andr 199, 345, Tro 978. All of these are followed by an ἃ.
The second in a pair is introduced by ἃ without preceding πότερα/πότερον in Hkld 189, Andr 196,
721, Hik 545, Elek [375]; by ἀλλ' (without πότερα/οὐ) in Hipp 966, Her 298, 1382 (and cf.
variations in Hkld 515, Elek [377]). In Hipp 1009-13 three alternatives are introduced by πότερα...
ἀλλ'... (This use of ἀλλά sometimes rubs up against ἀλλά used to register an objection, e.g. in Elek
[375], Phoin 1618, cf. Gorg. Pal 10, Thuc. I. 80,4.) Some notes on disjunctive questions in Euripides are
to be found in Rijksbaron Grammatical Observations App. 4.

31 Note use of χρήν for this purpose; cf. passages collected in App. A.
A rhetorical question suggests that threats and fears are inappropriate; a second serves to introduce a list of proposed fears; a third and fourth present these; a final statement dismisses them as both cowardly and unfounded. Very similar but less developed is the sequence given to Hekabe in her monologue in *Troades* that follows the death of Astyanax; Hekabe asks what fear led the Greeks to kill that helpless child:

\[
\text{τί τόνδ', 'Αχαίοι, παιδὸν δείχαντες φόνον}
\text{kaiνὸν διείργασασθε; μὴ Τροίαν ποτὲ}
\text{πεσοῦσαν ὀρθῶσειν;} \quad (\text{Tro 1159-61})
\]

She continues by dismissing this as an absurd fear; no alternative motivation is considered.

Medeia uses a somewhat similar structure to dismiss Kreon's fear of her as ungrounded:

\[
\text{σὺ δὴ οὖν φοβήθη με' μὴ τί πλημμελές παθῆς;}
\text{oὐχ ὁδ' ἔχει μοι, μὴ τρέσησις ἡμᾶς, Κρέον,}
\text{ὡστ' ἐστὶν τυράννος ἀνδρὰς ἐξαμαρτάνειν.}
\text{σὺ γὰρ τί μ' ἡδίκησας; ἐξέδου κόρην}
\text{ότωι σε θυμὸς ἦγεν. ἀλλ' ἐμὸν πόσιν}
\text{μισῶ:'} \quad (\text{Med 306-11})
\]
The first question and its answer dismiss the likelihood of Kreon's coming to any harm as a result Medea's character or situation (οὐχ ὃδ' ἔχει μόνοι); the second question removes any offense committed by Kreon as a basis for fear. That is: (1) Medea is not likely to harm Kreon; (2) in any case he has done nothing to attract such treatment. The third stage reached in the passage above ("It is my husband I hate") has the familiar rhetorical function of substituting a "correct" explanation or scenario for the "incorrect" one that is being refuted.

A tone of ridicule and reductio ad absurdum is present in the denunciation of Menelaus spoken by Peleus as he frees Andromache:

\[
\begin{align*}
\omega\delta', \ \omega \ \kappa\acute{\alpha}i\omega\acute{\iota}e, \ \tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\delta' \ \epsilon\lambda\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}e\nu \chi'\acute{e}\rho\acute{a}i; \ \\
\beta\omega\upsilon \ \eta \ \lambda\acute{e}o\upsilon\tau' \ \eta\acute{l}\pi\upsilon\acute{e}\epsilon's \ \epsilon\nu\tau\acute{e}i\nu\epsilon\nu \ \beta\rho\acute{o}\acute{\alpha}i\upsilon\epsilon's; \ \\
\eta \ \mu\acute{e} \ \xi\acute{i}\phi\acute{o}\upsilon \ \lambda\alpha\beta\omega\upsilon\acute{u} \ \alpha\mu\nu\mu\acute{a}\delta\omega\iota\iota\tau\acute{o} \ \sigma\epsilon \ \\
\epsilon\acute{e}d\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\varsigma; \ \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Andr 719-22)\(^{32}\)

The suggested motives are too absurd to require any comment, and the speech moves on immediately to address Andromache's son.

The process pursued in all the passages thus far discussed is that of testing a proposition by examining in turn a series of circumstances which are presented (tacitly) as implicit in the proposition. These "circumstances" may be logically antecedent (as normally in the motive arguments) or consequent (as in e.g. Tro 1010-14) to the proposition being tested; there is never any claim made for logical rigour.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{32}\) Here a sequence designed to broaden the rhetorical view by bringing in alternative explanations contains (in vs. 720) alternatives within one leg of the larger alternatives: cf. Hek 1202ff, Her 1146-52. In Andr 192ff the same effect of fulness is achieved through τε...καί in 195 (probably), 196, 197, 204, and τε in 200.

\(^{33}\) This process is put to a different use in Hel 490, where Menelaus seems gradually to persuade himself that there could in fact be two Helens, two Spartas, etc. (see discussion in IV.B below). The process of refuting or dismissing successive suggestions is also seen in Elek [373-9].
With all these hypophora passages now in view, I return to the argument on motive in Hippolytos’ speech of defense:

δεὶ δὴ σε δεῖξαι τῷ τρόπῳ διεφθάρην.
πότερα τὸ τῆςμε σῶμ᾽ ἐκαλλιστεύετο
πασῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ σὸν οἰκήσειν δόμον
ἐγκληρων εὖν ᾧ προσλαβὼν ἑπίλπισα;
μάταιος ἁρ ἢν, οὐδαμοῦ μὲν οὖν φρενῶν.
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τυραννεῖν ἦδυ τοῖς σῶφροσιν;
ηκιστὰ γ’, εἰ μὴ τὰς φρένας διέφθορεν
θυτῶν ὃσοιαν ἀνθάνει μοναρχία.

(Hipp 1008-15)\(^{34}\)

The passage has troubled scholars for several reasons. But in the light of the similar Euripidean passages discussed above, I can see no problem aside from minor corruption in 1014. Hippolytos is attempting to prove that he could have had no motive to seduce or marry Phaidra (this in spite of the fact that her letter has charged him rather with rape). He is going to make his point by mooting a number of possible motives, but he is under no obligation to suggest motives that might in fact have been strong ones.\(^{35}\) Far from it: in the scenes I have discussed the speaker often demolishes motives which are self-evidently flimsy.

The motives proposed here are: (1009-10a) a physical attraction such as great beauty might inspire; (1010b-11) the possibility of acquiring wealth through connection with an heiress; (1013) the possibility of acquiring political power. Clearly these three motives are the standard ones that might be expected to attract a young man into a liaison with a queen; whether they make much sense

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\(^{34}\) Text of 1013f: Diggle punctuates after σῶφρονιν and obelises ἡκιστα γ’, εἰ μὴ; Barrett puts an obelus before εἰ μὴ; Stockert punctuates after ἦδυ and obelises εἰ μὴ.

\(^{35}\) This is where Kovacs’ attack on the text goes wrong ("Tyrants" 47); he insists on a defense consisting of forensically sound points that suit the situation in detail.

112
given the details of Hippolytos' and Theseus' relationship, or of Attic estate law, counts for little.\textsuperscript{36}

On the basis of content, then, we do not require that Hippolytos' proposed motives be strong ones. But are these three motives plausible in \textit{rhetorical} terms? Barrett says of the three stages (ad 1007-20): "The last two are neither effectively distinguished... nor easily separable, and it is possible... that a single motive has been split into two by the interpolation of 1012-15". But I have noted both a tendency towards fulness of expression in arguments of this type, and a general pattern of treating public and private motivation separately (a pattern realised variously in \textit{Hkld} 181-230, \textit{Tro} 353-405, \textit{Ion} 585-647).\textsuperscript{37}

I take 1010-2 to mean: "Did I expect I would be gaining an estate through the affair— that I would come into control of your property?" The question allows of no inference as to whether Phaidra might through marriage have transmitted an estate,\textsuperscript{38} and the answer in 1012, though not strictly required for sense, adds a satisfying tone of impatience. The next stage speaks of royal power, a slight raising of the stakes and a subject that allows for the voicing of some stereotyped quietist comments of a sort we have met elsewhere.\textsuperscript{39} Recently Sommerstein has suggested we are to understand that in Hippolytos' οὖν

\textsuperscript{36} Barrett (ad 1110-11) and Kells ("Women's Property") discuss the matter of Phaidra's status under traditions and laws respecting Greek estates as if this were an important point for interpretation.

\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, we have seen discussions of political power in \textit{Ion} 629-32 and \textit{Phoin} 549-67 (see Mastronarde ad loc) take a detour into points regarding personal wealth. The two are explicitly associated in \textit{Ion} [578-81].

\textsuperscript{38} The lines may suggest that Hippolytos is above grubbing for wealth, or that Phaidra could legally be no source of wealth, or that the δῶμος belongs securely and unarguably to Theseus—or all three. I incline to think the first of these is the main point (he has begun by asking τῶι τρόπωι διεφθάρμεν, 1008). The consideration that Hippolytos as a young prince requires money to maintain his lifestyle (Barrett ad 1012) should play no part in the interpretation of this rhetorical material.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Pace} Kovacs ("Tyrants" 36): cf. Ch. I.E above, with n.93.
the murder of Theseus is implied as a necessary prerequisite. Sommerstein takes the third stage that follows as representing a stronger motive not for seducing a stepmother but for killing a father. The cogency of Hippolytos' argument is not improved by this gratuitous subtlety.

On the interpretation of the second motive, Kells finds that the answer to Hippolytos' question (1010f) would be self-evident to an audience familiar with patterns of inheritance in Greek society, and that therefore vs. 1012 is redundant. He goes on to suggest the passage consisted originally (he excises also 1014f) of "a series of swift rhetorical questions, each suggesting a possible motive..., each containing within itself the refutation of that motive" (183). He compares Andr 192-204, and in a footnote mentions, as examples of the application of the hypophora technique to the analysis of "psychological situations and motives", Alk 1049f, Med 386f and 499f. The Andr passage has a unique series of six rhetorical questions (not "swift", since some are rather complex); each question is followed by the next with no intervening comment. The other three passages Kells mentions are more representative of Euripides' normal practice. One question may pass without comment (e.g., Med 502f), but the next will not. And the manner of comment will be varied: this may take the form of a further rhetorical question (Alk 1056), a statement (Med 504f), or a brief formula (such as oǐκ ἔστι in Med 389, ἠκόλούθων in Hik 538, Her 299). The Hipp passage as transmitted has an entirely normal form: motive no. 1 passes

40 "Notes on Hipp" 33f; Sommerstein suggests this point is "both too obvious and too unpleasant to put into words".

41 "Women's Property" 182f.

42 On this use of ἠκόλοθς, see Stevens Colloquial Expressions 14.

43 Solmsen appreciates the variety of expression in the passage (Int. Exp. 15n): "Three possible motives, each disproved in a different fashion, are most appropriate". But this being the case, it is unnecessary to ascribe Hippolytos' failure to comment on Phaidra's beauty to "tact" (ibid 15).
without comment, motive no. 2 gets a brief comment ("I would have to have been a fool"), motive no. 3 is denied with ἢκιστα, and subjected to a developed argument (1014-20) whose point is spoiled in the transmitted text of 1014-5. Clearly these lines (interpolated or not, and whether we punctuate before or after τοῖς σώφροσιν) must give a reason why οἱ σώφρονες take no pleasure in ruling. With εἰ μὴ in 1014 we cannot get this sense. Thus Barrett suggested:

‚ηκιστ‛, ἐπεὶ τοῖς φρένας διέφθορεν etc.

It is hard to see how this could have been corrupted to our text, but the sense it gives is the right one.44

We have seen a number of argumentative passages in which a single rhetorical technique is presented with variations. It is legitimate to ask whether the variations observed represent decisions made by Euripides for purposes of characterising the speaker or the relationship between the two interlocutors. J. Mossman has seen subtle nuances in the application of this technique; speaking of Hek 258-64, she notes:45

...Hecuba proceeds with a series of three two-line rhetorical questions (260-1 and 262-3 constituting alternative answers to the question at 259-60) answered by a single line stressing Polyxena's innocence. A comparison with other passages of rhetorical questions is interesting: Med. 499ff. give a more agitated and angry effect because of their more irregular arrangement and conversational tone.... And. 192ff., on the other hand, has more frequent, shorter questions, which are more appropriate than longer, more elaborate ones would be in Andromache's reply to Hermione's furious tirade: they are less reasoned than our passage because Andromache's opponent is less reasonable than Odysseus. And.

44 Barrett suspected, though, that vss.1012-5 were interpolated.
45 Wild Justice, 106f.
387ff., too, show a barrage of very quick, staccato questions (five in three lines at 388-90), which reflect Andromache's distress. Here Hecuba is fighting an intellectual battle... she needs to use, and does use, a more reasoned and cerebral approach. Andromache, on the other hand, is preparing for a death which seems inevitable if her son is to be saved, and is correspondingly less rational and more emotional. That said, I would suggest that this difference is not due entirely to the difference in their circumstances, and that it would not be going too far to suggest that by making Hecuba respond in this superbly rational way, Euripides is laying down one of her fundamental character traits, and one which he will develop further later on.

I quote at length here because the point under consideration is such a central one for this study. Mossman demonstrates elsewhere her general sympathy with ideas about the stylised character of the different "modes" of tragic presentation (lyric, stichomythia, rhesis, etc.), but suggests that every detail of presentation serves complex purposes, which may include the building up of complex characters through a composite process: "the same character presents itself through the different filters in turn, but none the less can be seen as a consistent entity". She concludes:

...I would wish to see rhetoric and other formal elements of tragedy (diction, metre, lyric, structure), with all their 'stylisation of reality', as advantages for, rather than constraints on, the poets. With skilful manipulation they can delineate a portrait of a character that not only convinces on a psychological level... but which also appeals to our intellects because it is expressed with a clarity of articulation rarely achieved in real life but necessary in the theatre to avoid obscurity, boredom, and waste of valuable dramatic time.... In achieving this the poet will utilize, rather than be bound by, the stylization of speech and the formal structural framework of tragedy.

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46 *Ibid* 94-103. The quotation (97f) comes in a discussion of A. M. Dale's view that consistency of character was not a primary goal of the tragic poets.

47 *Ibid* 101f.

48 The phrase is quoted from O. de Mourgues' 1967 book *Racine or the Triumph of Relevance*. 

116
This general statement seems entirely acceptable. But with respect to Mossman's detailed treatment of characterisation through rhetorical mannerisms, I would make several comments: I see no problem in the idea that Euripides gives his characters (or some of them) "fundamental character traits" that are developed through a play; and, as I have shown above (II.D), the tone of a rhetorical exchange may contribute to our impression of the relationship of the two speakers (e.g., in the confrontations of Admetos and Pheres, Hippolytos and Theseus). But a stylised format for argument, frequently used, is not the place where one should expect to see subtleties of the type Mossman refers to. I see other pointers present in the scenes she compares. Hekabe's response may be "superbly rational", but she is in the weakest position of the three characters under discussion, utterly defeated at every turn. Medeia, elsewhere coolly confident of her ability to prevail through deception or witchcraft, begins and ends her speech (Med 465-519) by heaping contempt on Jason; Andromache's proud defiance is spelled out clearly in the preambles to her speeches to both Hermione (Andr 184-91) and Menelaos (319f).

If the slight variations in the use of hypophora argument in these four passages were intended by Euripides to convey information about character and situation, I would think that the sheer virtuoso exhaustiveness of Andromache's sequence in Andr 192ff would characterise the speaker as a truly regal person, accustomed to withering her inferiors through her personal (not intellectual) superiority: Hermione, young and half-cocked, and the cowardly Menelaos are no match. Hekabe, by contrast, conveys no sense of command; she makes in the course of her speech a number of points that seem inevitable given the situation (that human sacrifice is wrong, that in any case Polyxene is not the appropriate victim, that she herself merits both pity and the observance of an obligation, that Odysseus has the prestige to bring about a reversal of the verdict).
Neither Hekabe nor either of the other women argues with any real sense
argument will prevail. Unlike the others, Hekabe never really takes the
offensive, and her rational points are interrupted by appeals for pity. In spite of
the highly rational thought processes that the arguments presented presuppose,
none of the three women is characterised as an unusually "rational" person. But
perhaps to some extent the details of the argument-sequences enhance the sense
of personal status and relationship that is already present in the scenes.

C. Elimination of Alternatives: Future

The hypophora technique we have seen used in probability arguments dealing
with past events is also set to work in deliberative situations, where typically it is
used to argue there is no viable course of action available, and in situations
where the pathetic quality of self-addressed rhetorical questions emphasises the
despair of the character and the impossibility of any happy outcome.

Admetos attempts in Alk 1049-61 to decline Herakles' offer to leave the
veiled woman with him by showing that there are no appropriate quarters for
her to occupy in his palace:

49 Andromache has spoken of people being put in their place by their inferiors (Andr 189f);
Medea says she is speaking of her exile only to put Jason in the worst possible light (Med 500f).

50 The question whether Euripides produces in these situations arguments whose content is
uniquely suited to speaker or interlocutor is a separate one, and one for which I think there is no
general answer. Sometimes the argument seems to express an element of the speaking character's
"psychology", or of the relationship between the two characters; as often one is struck by the
abstract and impersonal quality of the thought. For example, Gould rightly comments on the
speech of the Nurse in Hipp 433-81 that "it is the shaping pressure of rhetorical form which
determines the movement of the speech more than any sense that these arguments are native to the
Nurse, or that they are chosen to penetrate the defences of this opponent" ("Dramatic Character"
56).
Where could I even keep a young woman? (for I observe she is young) (a) among men? rhetorical question and answer argue against this option. (b) in Alkestis' quarters? rhetorical question introduces argument against this option: double blame. (a) from δημωταί. (b) from ἡ θανοῦσα.

The symmetry of the sequence is striking. A sort of dilemma is presented: Admetos implies there are only two options for housing the guest, then argues both are impossible.

A very similar technique is used by Herakles in deliberating over the question whether he should keep or discard the weapons with which he has killed his family. Here the dilemma is initially posed using an indirect question (Her 1378: ἃμηχαρω γὰρ πότερ' ἕχω τάδ' ἡ μεθώ). Herakles then imagines his weapons addressing him (1379-81a), and asks:

εἶτ' ἕγω τάδ' ὡλέναις
οἶσω; τί φάσκων; ἄλλα γυμνωθεῖς ὁπλων
ἐξίν οἷς τὰ κάλλιστ' ἑξέπραξ' ἐν Ἑλλάδι
ἐχθρός ἐμαυτὸν ὑπολαύων αἰσχρῶς θανῶ;
οὐ λειτέου τάδ', ἄθλως δὲ σωστέων. (Her 1381-85)

Rhetorical questions are used to introduce the two alternatives. In the first leg, a further rhetorical question suggests the impossibility of the option being considered; in the second, the initial question implies this.
Orestes in *IT* 95-103 expresses to Pylades his insecurity over the possibilities for gaining entrance to Artemis’ shrine. I quote the very problematic text as printed by Diggle:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{τί δρώμεν; ἀμφίβληστρα γὰρ τοῖχων ὀραῖς} \\
\text{ὑψηλά: πότερα κλιμάκων προσαμβάσεις} \\
\text{ἐμβησόμεθα; πῶς < ἀν > οἵν λάθωμεν ἄν;} \\
\text{ἡ χαλκότευκτα κλήθρα λύσαντες μοχλοῖς} \\
\text{† ὥν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν † ; ἢν δ' ἀνοίγοντες πύλας} \\
\text{ληθώμεν ἐσβάσεις τε μηχανώμενοι,} \\
\text{θανοῦμεθ'.} \quad (IT \, 96-102)
\end{align*}
\]

97 κλιμάκων Kayser: δωμάτων L
98 λάθωμεν Sallier: μάθ- L (quo servato 99 del. Dindorf)

The passage seems to conform to the pattern we have seen elsewhere. A rhetorical question expresses ἀμηχανία. One course of action is introduced by a rhetorical question (here much improved by Kayser’s conjecture), then rejected through a further question (if Sallier’s λάθωμεν is correct). A second alternative course is next suggested, and this is rejected through a statement rather than a question. The two conjectures mentioned both serve to strengthen the contrast between the two alternatives. I don’t have complete confidence in either of them, but it seems clear at any rate that a sequence in which two alternative courses are mooted and rejected underlies our text.52

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51 See Platnauer’s thorough discussion ad 97.

52 Dindorf’s deletion of vs. 99 (designed to make sense of the difficult ὥν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν) would thus destroy the whole point of the passage. I think it is just possible that Euripides wrote ὥν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν with reference to κλήθρα (so Murray, app. crit.); in this case the phrase offers a further argument against the second course. Markland added a question mark at the end of vs. 103, as if a third alternative were there considered (flee by ship). As we have seen, ἄλλα often introduces the final alternative in a series; but in this case the final alternative would be the practical course, a solution to the ἀμηχανία, rather than another occasion for pessimism. It thus makes more sense as a positive suggestion (despite Weil’s contention [critical note ad loc] it is “unworthy” of Orestes).
We have been looking at passages in which alternative questions are used to give what is essentially a pathetic situation an argumentative underpinning. Alternative questions are also used by Euripides in a purely deliberative context (i.e., the alternatives are mentioned not merely for the purpose of rejecting them):

\[
p\text{ότερον ύφασμα νυμφικόν πυρί,}
\]
\[
\text{ἡ θεκτόν ὡσο φάσγανον δὲ ἤπατος . . .} \quad (Med 378f)
\]

Medeia asks what form her revenge should take (cf. *Her* 1146ff, discussed above). A few lines later she uses a hypophora sequence (but without alternative question) to express the hopelessness of her plans:

\[
\text{kαὶ δὴ τεθνασὲ τίς μὲ δέξεται πόλις;}
\]
\[
\text{τίς γῆν ἁσυλον καὶ δόμους ἔχεγγύους}
\]
\[
\text{ἐξένος παρασχὼν ῥυσεται τούμον δέμας;}
\]
\[
\text{οὐκ ἐστὶ.} \quad (Med 386-9)
\]

The second question here amplifies the first rather than introducing an argumentative point (cf. Lykos' badgering questions in *Her* 143f). This seems to give a more natural effect than in the passages reviewed above.53

Menelaos in a speech of self-condemnation employs a variation that seems unique in Euripides. He sets out to demonstrate not that he lacks alternative courses, but that he has ignored the logical course:

---

53 But a tone of formal argument seems present in the use of καὶ δὴ to introduce a hypothetical proposition whose consequences will be considered. See Denniston GP 253: Denniston's Euripidean examples of this usage are the present passage and *Hipp* 1007, *Hel* 1059, *Med* 1107 (chorus); K-G add (I. 202f) Or 1108. Arguments similar to that of *Med* 386-9 proceed from hypothetical statements in the indicative without this introduction in *Andr* 334 (whose strangeness is noted by Stevens ad loc) and *IA* 1185.
Two alternative courses are considered, but one is expressly identified as preferable.

A common tragic situation in which a character considers alternatives for the future is the prospect of exile. The character recognises the pathetic lack of choices open to him by testing a number of alternatives. In accusing Jason, Medeia uses a hypophoric sequence to argue that her future as an exile is bleak:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{νῦν ποὶ τράπωμαι; πότερα πρὸς πατρὸς δόμους, oūς σοὶ προδοῦσα καὶ πάτραν ἀφικόμην; ή πρὸς ταλαίνας Πελιάδας; καλῶς γὰρ ἀν ὦν δέξαιντό μὲν οἶκοις ᾠν πατέρα κατέκτανον. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως τοῖς μὲν οἰκοθεν φίλοις ἐχθρα καθέστηκτι, οὕς δὲ μὲν ἐχρῆν κακῶς δράν, σοὶ χάριν φέρουσα πολεμίους ἔχω. (Med 502-8)\end{align*}
\]

The two groups identified in the alternative question (Medeia's family in Kolchis, Jason's in Iolkos) are resumed in the explanatory statement that follows. The play will develop a third alternative: Athens.

Herakles uses a similar form in demonstrating his lack of options for the future:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἦκω δὲ ἀνάγκας ἐς τὸδ᾽: οὔτ᾽ ἐμαῖς φίλαις Θήβαις ἐνοικεῖν ὄσιον; ἤν δὲ καὶ μένω, ἐς ποίον ἱερὸν ἐπὶ πανήγυριν φίλων ἐῖμ᾽; οὔ γὰρ ἄτας εὐπροσηγόρους ἔχω. (IA 485-8)\end{align*}
\]
Again, specific destinations are ruled out. Theseus will offer an alternative that has not occurred to Herakles. As in the elimination of motives in *Hipp* 1008-15 discussed above, the final point is argued at some length; thus a fuller treatment is achieved without compromising the rhetorical effect of the series of questions.

Oidipous in *Phoin* faces exile with similar misgivings:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{εἰέν': } & \text{τι δράσω δὴ οὐ δυσδαίμων ἐγώ;} \\
\text{τίς ήγεμών μοι, ποδὸς ομαρτήσει τυφλοῦ;} \\
\text{ἡδ' ήθανώσα; } & \text{ζώσα γ' ἄν σάφ' οἴδ' ὤτι.} \\
\text{ἀλλ' εὐτεκνός ξυνώρις;} & \text{ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶ μοι.} \\
\text{ἀλλ' ἔτι νεᾶξων αὐτός εὑρομ' ἄν βίον;} & \text{πόθεν;}
\end{align*}
\]

(Phoin 1615-20)

Here the lack of a supporting individual (parent, sons, self) makes better rhetoric than the lack of a destination: Oidipous in exile is to be a blind wandering beggar, to whom no place is hospitable. And the fact that Antigone will now offer to accompany her father makes a satisfying outcome for the quandary.\footnote{An opportunity for a similar consideration of exile is realised quite differently in *Her* 302-6. Note also the treatment of this topic in ‘Opfertod’ speeches and in *Phoin* 387-407.}

Iphiss, who has lost both a son (Éteoklos) and a daughter (Evadne the wife of Kapaneus) through the Theban War, surveys his alternatives for the future:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{εἰέν': } & \text{τι δὴ χρῆ τὸν ταλαίπωρόν με δράν;} \\
\text{στείχειν πρὸς οἴκους; } & \text{kαίτ' ἔρημιαν ἵδω} \\
\text{πολλὴν μελάθρων ἀπορίαν τ' ἐμώι βίω;} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\footnote{An opportunity for a similar consideration of exile is realised quite differently in *Her* 302-6. Note also the treatment of this topic in ‘Opfertod’ speeches and in *Phoin* 387-407.}
As often, the first alternative is rejected with a question, the second with a statement; and here again the final alternative develops into an extended argument (comparing the qualities of sons and daughters).

In all of the above passages, there is a pathetic realisation by the speaker that choice is limited or excluded. The same formal pattern serves the purposes of a speaker arguing that the interlocutor is in a desperate situation. In Andr 344-49 Andromache poses a series of questions to Menelaos, mooting and then eliminating the two options he may assume he has in dealing with Hermione, should he remove her from Neoptolemos' household:

344b-47a Impossible to find her a new husband
347b-48a Intolerable to have her growing old at home

And Iokaste in Phoin addresses a similar sequence to Polyneikes to demonstrate the stupidity of his campaign:

571-77 if you win:
572 what trophy can you raise?
573 how can you lead the sacrifices?
574 what inscription can you write?
578-82a but if you lose:
579 how can you return to Argos?
582b-83 both outcomes are evil

A somewhat similar sequence begins at Alk 941: Admetos asks how in the future he may take any pleasure from his domestic surroundings— but no alternatives are listed. The alternative question beginning at Alk 1051 (see above) is unusual in separating the two questions posing the alternatives by three lines of argument dismissing at length the first alternative.
In these two passages, the effect is that of a dilemma argument. In a similar situation, Klytaimestra uses a much more loosely constructed series of questions (IA 1185-95) to demonstrate the bleakness of Agamemnon’s future, should he carry out the sacrifice of Iphigeneia.

D. Hypothetical Arguments

We have seen a number of passages in which hypothetical alternatives are reviewed, normally for the sake of a pathetic demonstration of the bleakness of the speaker’s or the interlocutor’s outlook. Euripides’ favoured form for this purpose is the series of rhetorical questions, a form inherently conducive to pathos. In some other situations, conditional formulations are used to present a comparison for various rhetorical purposes. Simplest among these are statements expressing an impotent threat (“If I were not prevented [by old age, weakness, the law, etc.], you would suffer for your treatment of me”).

Conditional formulations are used in argumentative situations in a number of passages in which an unreal condition is contrasted with the factual situation, often in order to highlight the bleakness of the present outlook or to point to sordid motives. An example occurs in Klytaimestra’s speech to Elektra

56 Iokaste’s final comments to Eteokles just before this passage also pose a dilemma, but this is not put in the form of a series of rhetorical questions. Iokaste asks first (560f), “If I ask whether you would rather rule or save the city, will you say rule?” This of itself makes the point that to rule is an ignoble choice in the circumstances. She continues (561b), ἂν δὲ νικήσῃ σ’ ὀδε..., and this leads to a description of the devastating consequences of a defeat. The passage has been understood differently; see Mastronarde ad 561-5, 562 (whose text and interpretation I follow).

57 E.g., Hik 458, Her 211, 232, Tro 408, Hel 75. More developed arguments using a simple contrary-to-fact condition are in Or 564-71, Soph. Ant 905-12.
defending her action in killing Agamemnon. Why, she asks, did he sacrifice Iphigeneia?

κεῖ μὲν πόλεως ἂλωσιν ἔξιώμενος
เหรัญญ์ อนุญาติ ทั่ว ที่ เอกซิจ์อน ท้าย
ἐκεῖνε πολλῶν μίαν ὑπὲρ, συγγνώστ φαν Ἰν.
นี่ว ดี อย่าง จีนห์ มาร์ จู pisa เก้า ที่ ท้าย
ἄλοχον κολάζειν προδότιν οὐκ ἡπίστατο,
τούτων ἐκατ' παῖδ' ἐμὴ διώλεσεν.  

(Elek 1024-30)

The contrast here is between circumstances Klytaimestra says would have been acceptable, and the "true", discreditable circumstances. The rhetorical purpose is to present Klytaimestra as a reasonable and tolerant woman; this line continues in the sequel (1030-4: "but even this event didn't cause me to kill him— no, it was the fact he brought Kassandra into the house"). The argument is thus *a fortiori* and proceeds in three stages: Klytaimestra describes (a) a hypothetical offense that would have been forgivable; (b) an unforgivable offense that nevertheless did not provoke revenge; (c) the greater offense that provoked revenge.

Very similar arguments occur elsewhere. Medeia tells Jason that his new marriage would be acceptable if it arose out of a legitimate complaint of childlessness:

εἰ γὰρ ἥσθ' ἀπαίς ἐτι,
συγγνώστ φαν Ἰν  ἤν σοι τούδ' ἐρασθήναι λέχους.  

(Med 490f)

And the Old Man in *Ion*, attempting to persuade Kreousa to plot against her husband, explains under what circumstances the offense he has committed against her would have been mitigated:

126
In all these passages, the speaker seeks to give an impression that a reasonable person has been the victim of a gross insult.58

The contrast of hypothetical and real situations is emphasised in the Elek passage above using νῦν δὲ. This expression follows a contrary-to-fact condition in some 23 other places in Euripides.59 In a number of these passages the prevailing tone is one of regret (e.g. Her 314, Tro 1171); in a few others the formulation serves the purpose of exposition by explaining a direction the plot will take (Hipp 659, Hek 900, Hel 1624). But we also find the structure used to frame an abstract reflection (Phoin 501). Forensic use of this sequence is seen in, besides Elek 1024: Hipp 1025 (Hippolytos explaining why he can’t defend himself properly), Hek 1230 (Hekabe accusing Polymestor); IA 1214 (Iphigeneia’s variation of the ἀπειρία topos).60 Deliberative uses appear in Hipp 496, Hik 306, Or 1134 (in each case justifying a decision or a proposed action).

For arguments of this form in the speeches of Lysias, J. Bateman has distinguished three classes that differ in the character of the final term (the νῦν δὲ statement).61 In his first class, the final statement offers a factual point that undermines the opponent’s case (Batemen uses the term σημεῖον). Something of the sort occurs in the Kretes fragment, vs. 9. In the second group are statements

---

58 A similar argument is made in different terms by Polyneikes, Phoin 484-90: καὶ νῦν ἔτοιμος εἶμι....

59 Viz. Hipp 496, [625], 659, 1025, Hek 900, 1230, Hik 306, 792 (lyric), Her 314, 440 (lyric), 669 (lyric), Tro 1171, Hel 292, 938, 1924, Phoin 501, Or 1134, IA 968, 1214, Kret 9, frr. 636.7, 821.5, 978.3.

60 IA 1214 as a proem reflection shares its form with Phoin 501; cf. Hik 1084ff, Hipp 618-[26].

61 Diss. 28-32.
which represent "a conflict in the sphere of human action" (28). These occur in connection with arguments about conduct (30): "In the conditional clause some course of conduct is assumed, whose consequent would be an action worthy of approbation. The truth of the matter is then presented, and the judges are left in no doubt of the moral viciousness of the opponent..." (cf. Hek 1230). In the third type, the final statement squarely contradicts one part of the syllogism implied in the condition (32).

A trivial example of this in Euripides is Her 312-4 (Chorus: "If we still had our strength and someone were outraging you, we would stop them; but we have no strength [οὐδὲν ἔσμεν]"). I find no example of forensic use of this type for the purpose of refutation. In general Euripides doesn't seem to use the νῶν ἀδρ clause for logical argument, but to summarise the situation (e.g. Hik 306: "but since that is not the case...") or move to a new stage of narrative (Hel 1624).

Unreal conditions are often combined with rhetorical questions to emphasise the correct conclusion to be drawn from an implied comparison. Often there is a tone of derision, as when Klytaimestra asks Elektra:

εἰ δὲ ἐκ δόμων ἐκπαστὸ πενελεως λάθραι,
κτανεῖν μὲ ὀρέστην χρῆν, κασιγνήτης πόσιν
Μενέλαοι ως σώσαμι; σῶς δὲ πῶς πατὴρ
ἡμέσχετ' ἄν ταύτ'; εἶτα τὸν μὲν οὖ θανεῖν
κτείνουτα χρῆν τάμ', ἐμὲ δὲ πρὸς κείνου παθεῖν; (Elek 1041-5)

Bateman refers to this argument as "destructive hypothetical syllogism", but adds (32n): "there is no evidence [in Lysias and the other orators] of any awareness of the logical basis and requirements of this type of syllogism since they deny indifferently the antecedent and the consequent".

Denniston (ad loc) finds the absolute use of παθεῖν here anomalous; Diggle agrees and posits a lacuna after 1045 (Euripidea 165-7). Cropp in his 1982 LCM note (51f) reviews the rhetorical presentation of the argument (comparing Andr 663-7) and the problem of παθεῖν: he envisions "hesitantly" the possibility of corruption along the lines suggested by Denniston; but he is "not convinced that emendation is necessary" (52).
The first question presents hypothetically the idea Klytaimestra would have been obligated to kill Orestes in the event of an abduction of Menelaos; this idea's self-evident absurdity implies a negative view of the analogous actual case. The πῶς-question drives home the point by emphasising the disastrous consequences of such a scenario. The same sequence may present a positive argument:

\[ \text{ei πρόσαντες ἢν τόδε} \]
\[ 'Αρτέμιδι, πῶς ἀν Ἀδησίας έθέσπιςεν \]
\[ κομίσαι μ' ἁγαλμα θεᾶς πόλισμ' ἐς Παλλάδος \]

(IT 1012-4)\(^64\)

The combination of hypothetical scenario and rhetorical question is also found with other types of condition:

\[ ἢν δ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν μὴ θανεῖν ὑπεκδράμω, \]
\[ τὸν παῖδα μου κτενεῖτε; καὶ τὰ πῶς πατὴρ \]
\[ τέκνου θανόντος ραδίως ἀνέξεται; \]

(Andr 338-40)

Here again a second rhetorical question points to a decisive obstacle. In Helen's appeal to Theonoe this form is used to present an a fortiori argument:

\[ κεῖ μὲν θανῶν δὴ ἐν πυραί + κατεσφάγη + \]
\[ πρόσω σφ' ἀπόντα δακρύοις ἀν ἡγάπων' \]
\[ νῦν δ' ὄντα καὶ σωθεύτ' ἀφαιρεθήσομαι; \]

(Hel 936-8)

Similar arguments are used by Elektra in refuting the "tokens" suggested as evidence of Orestes' return. In Elek 534-7 Elektra tells the Old Man first that there could be no footprint left on the hard ground at the tomb, then that even if

\(^{64}\) Diggle follows Koechly in assuming a lacuna after 1014; therefore punctuation is uncertain. Weil's critical note ad 1015 puts the problem succinctly.
such a mark were present, it could not identify Orestes through comparison with Elektra's own foot:

\[
\text{πώς δ' ἀν γένοιτ' ἀν ἐν κραταίλεωι πέδωι}
\]
\[
\text{γαίας ποδών ἐκμακτρον; εἰ δ' ἔστιν τόδε,}
\]
\[
\text{δύοιν ἀδελφόιν πούς ἂν οὐ γένοιτ' ἵος}
\]
\[
\text{ἀνδρός τε καὶ γυναικός, ἀλλ' ἄρσην κρατεῖ.} \quad (\text{Elek 534-7})
\]

The condition thus introduces a second, remoter stage to the argument: all bases are covered in a systematic way.\(^{65}\) Similarly in 541-6 Elektra denies first that she could as a youngster have produced any clothing for Orestes, then adds that even if she had, he could no longer be wearing an item made for him as a little boy:

\[
\text{οὐκ οἶσθ' ἢ Ὀρέστης ἤνικ' ἐκπίπτει χθονός,}
\]
\[
\text{νέαν μ' ἔτ' οὐσαν; εἰ δὲ κάκρεκον πέπλους,}
\]
\[
\text{πώς ἄν τότ' ὃν παῖς ταύτα νῦν ἔχοι φάρη,}
\]
\[
\text{εἰ μὴ ἐναὐσουθ' οἱ πέπλοι τῶι σώματι;} \quad (\text{Elek 541-4})
\]

The first question dismisses the probability of a young girl making clothing.\(^{66}\) But again with εἰ δὲ Elektra concedes the point for the sake of a further argument.

This scene, with its undoubted reference to the recognition scene in \textit{Choephoroi}, has puzzled many critics.\(^{67}\) Various views of the passage's tone

---

\(^{65}\) A similar procedure unfolds differently in the first response of Elektra in this scene (\textit{Elek} 524-31): she disputes the evidence of the lock of hair by arguing first (524-6) that a secret return to Argos by Orestes is out of the question, then that in any case (ἐπειτα 527) male and female locks would not match. A third stage (530f) then makes the further point that hair that matches is no sure evidence of a blood relationship. The thoroughness of these arguments is striking.

\(^{66}\) That young girls can make clothing, and that the ἐξώφασια σῆς κερκίδος mentioned by the Old Man (vs. 539) needn't necessarily refer to clothing, are points of no importance in the analysis of Elektra's argument.

\(^{67}\) I rely in the following particularly on the comments ad loc of Denniston (ed.) and Cropp (ed.), and on the discussion of Goebel, diss. 347-56.
have been put forward: the scene is a vicious and dishonest send-up of Aischylos' scene (Wilamowitz); it is a self-conscious "improvement" of that scene (Denniston); it contains justified criticism of Aischylos' unacceptable naivety (Page); it is a bold violation of the genre (Michelini), or an innocent comedic spoof (Bond); it involves subtle psychology in evincing Elektra's fears and forebodings (Murray); it forms part of the ongoing characterisation of Elektra as "ill-tempered, arrogant, and self-pitiful" (Lloyd-Jones); it attacks neither Aischylos nor Elektra, but the "argument from probability" itself (Goebel).68

It seems to me likely that the virtuoso character of the argumentation itself is designed to draw our attention. The Aischylean scene has been adopted as a familiar framework.69 The process of recognition has been delayed, here as elsewhere, through the introduction of a series of obstacles; there is irony and humour (not serious criticism of Aischylos) in the failure of the familiar tokens to finish the job. Instead these tokens are subjected to a thoroughly up-to-date critique; the sophistication of the arguments Elektra puts, together with the unexpectedness of the entire idea of such a critique, give that process its interest. That she is being unpleasant to an old family retainer, and that she is wrong in her conclusions, are facts that contribute to other aspects of the scene's effect. Her unpleasantness is consistent with the presentation of her character elsewhere in the play (cf. e.g. 404-19, another passage that performs a vital function in service of the plot). I see this quality as a realistic manifestation of the misery of a

68 Wilamowitz Hermes 18 (1883): 236n; Denniston ed. p. 114; Page apud Denniston p. 115; Michelini Euripides 206; Bond Hermathena CXVIII (1974): 7; Murray tr. pp. 89-91; Lloyd-Jones CQ 11 (1961): 180; Goebel diss. 355. The arguments for regarding the entire passage as an interpolation have been reviewed systematically by West ("Tragica IV" 17-21) and Kovacs (BICS 36 [1989]: 67-78).

69 On the process by which Euripides arrived at his variant treatment of the recognition, see West's interesting speculation ("Tragica IV" 17).
sympathetic character, rather than as alienating sympathy: thus I find some truth in Murray's view of the passage. As for the fact her arguments lead her to the wrong conclusion, this is precisely what the plot requires—doubts and delays.70

A hypothetical reversal of the positions of the interested parties (whether achieved with or without conditional formulations) is a common procedure in Greek oratory, and not infrequent in Euripides. In its simplest form, a defendant excuses his actions by noting that his victim would have reacted in the same way to the pressures that led him to commit the offensive act. Eurystheus tells Alkmene she would have responded as he did to the unfortunate lot that befell him:

οὐκοὺν σὺ γ’ ἀναλαβοῦσα τὰς ἐμὰς τύχας
ἐχθροῦ λέοντος δυσμενὴ βλαστήματα
ήλαυνες ἃν κακοίσιν ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως
εἶσας οἰκεῖν "Ἀργὸς: οὔτων ἄν πίθοις.

(Hkld 1005-8)

So Menelaos asks Peleus (in Andr 668-70, lines I have elsewhere defended as Euripidean)71 whether he, having given his daughter in marriage, would sit quietly by while she suffered insult. Hippolytus tells Theseus he would have taken strong action in his father's place:72

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70 Cf. the many near-misses in the recognition plots of IT and Ion.
71 See above, Ch. II n. 29.
72 A subtle example of the same sort of argument is Menelaos' comment to Peleus, who has harangued him in part for failing to kill Helen when she was returned to him: "I exercised self-control (ἐσωφρόνου); I wish you had done the same and not killed your brother Phokos" (Andr 685-7).
Klytaimestra's speech to Elektra defending her murder of Agamemnon contains a similar argument:

\[\text{Hipp 1042-4}\]

Orestes' argument in defense of his murder of Klytaimestra involves the same reversal of points of view:

\[\text{Or 580-4}\]

Hypothetical arguments have been treated here with arguments presented in rhetorical question form. This grouping stems naturally from the fact that Euripides' use in argument of rhetorical questions is inextricably bound to his use of arguments from probability. These arguments tend to involve conditional formulations, asking "Given X [the assumption may be clearly stated as a fact or merely implied as a normal expectation, a "probability"], how could Y

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73 These shocking reversals of point of view seem to have fascinated Euripides. At IA 1201f Klytaimestra suggests Hermione is the more reasonable victim than Iphigeneia (and cf. Hek 265f, where Hekabe proposes sacrificing Helen, not Polyxene); in Or 658f Orestes tells Menelaos there is no need for Hermione to be sacrificed in compensation for the loss of Iphigeneia. I see no essential difference between the passage quoted and the other examples collected here that should cause M. Lloyd to refer to Elek 1041-5 as the only Euripidean example of an argument involving "hypothetical role-reversal" (Agon 32 n.50). Note also ironic reversals like that of Tro 1180-6: Hekabe buries Astyanax instead of the reverse.
possibly occur?" The hypothetical arguments surveyed in this section are similarly used in applying a process of comparison to the present situation; but now the comparison is with neither factual circumstances nor probabilities, but with an imaginary possibility, an unreal alternative scenario. We have seen Euripidean characters use this kind of argument to define the conditions under which an action would be appropriate (e.g. Med 490f), to draw a conclusion based on observed facts (IT 1012-4), to add a second stage of security to conclusions reached using a normal probability argument (Elek 534-7), and to pose arguments based on a hypothetical reversal of roles (Hipp 1042-4).
Euripides was notoriously fond of introducing gnomic and abstract pronouncements and reflections into his plays; since antiquity he has been regarded as the "philosopher" among the three tragedians, and doubts about the relevance and function of some gnomic and reflective passages have loomed large in Euripidean criticism ancient and modern.\footnote{Schmid (Gesch. d. griech. Lit. I, iii. 734 n. 8) notes scholia ad Tro 634 (οὗ στοχάζεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων), καὶ γὰρ μὲν ἡ Ἀνδρόμαχῃ < τὰ > αὐτὰ φιλοσοφεῖ ἀπερ ἐμπροσθεν ἡ Κασάνδρα), Phoin 388 (οὐκ ἐν δέοντι γνωμολογεῖ...). Schmid's own view of Euripidean generalising is that Euripides' "need to instruct" caused him to interject material that "inhibits the flow of the action" and "spoils the presentation of character" (ibid. 769).} Speeches having a persuasive or deliberative intention are particularly likely to be peppered with general material used to frame or buttress arguments, and Euripides has a number of characteristic techniques for bringing general rules and observations to bear on the particular dramatic situation. Before exploring Euripides' use of gnomic material in rhetorical situations, I shall describe fully the various ways in which he formulates general statements (Section A below). I shall next investigate the typical rhetorical uses of general or gnomic statements (B), then look at two special applications of gnomic material: the expression in general terms of a realisation that contradicts expectation or common sense (C), and the expression of impossible wishes having general content—the so-called "utopian reflections" (D). As some of these reflections are expressed as complaints addressed to Zeus or "the
gods", some comments will be made on the degree to which these reflections represent a departure from traditional religious beliefs.

A. Formal Patterns

1. Simple and "connected" gnomes

I begin with free-standing aphorisms, sententiae that express in a stylish way what one might think of as common sense or experience:

\[
\text{φιλούσι παιδας οἱ τὰ ἀμείνονες βροτῶν}
\]
\[
\text{oἱ τὰ οὐδὲν ὄντες.} \quad (\text{Her 634f})
\]

\[
\text{τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀνθρώποισιν ἡδιστοὺν βλέπειν,}
\]
\[
\text{τὰ νέρθε δὲ οὐδὲν:} \quad (\text{IA 1250f})
\]

These may be introduced asyndetically, and so make a particularly epigrammatic effect; more often particles connect them to the rhetorical context:

\[
\text{μάτην ἀρ’ οἱ γέροντες εὐχοῦται θανεῖν,}
\]
\[
\text{γῆρας ψέγοντες καὶ μακρόν χρόνον βίον.} \quad (\text{Alk 669f})
\]
\[
\text{τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δούλα πάντα πλὴν ἑνὸς.} \quad (\text{Hel 276})
\]

---

\(^2\) The antithetical form of both these examples is quite common in Euripides: see Wilamowitz ad Her 1106, Denniston ad El 1017, Mastronarde ad Phoin 479-80. Other examples of simple ἐνδοξον aphorism: Alk 1008, Med 964, Andr 207f, Hek [831f], Hik 509, Her 299f, Or 70. Pithy enough to be "proverbs": Hik 509b (ἡσυχὸς καρπῶ, σοφός), IA 333b, 387b; cf. Her 561 (ἄφιλον... τὸ δυστυχῆς).
Here the particle ties the gnome to the preceding material, in the first case as a conclusion to be drawn, in the second as a corroborating rule. The latter situation is especially common.

The content is often decidedly παρά δόξαν:

ό πλοῦτος, ἀνθρωπίσκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός
κρείσσον δὲ νοσεῖν ἢ θεραπεύειν.

(Kyk 316) (Hipp 186)

In this case (as Aristotle tells us) an explanatory "epilogue" may be wanted, in which are expressed ἢ αἰτία καὶ τὸ διὰ τί. ⁳ Thus the last example continues:

tὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν, τῷ δὲ συνάπτει
λύπη τε φρενῶν χερσίν τε πόνος.

(Hipp 187f)

Connection of the gnome to its context may involve the loss of one or more words, which must then be supplied from the surroundings:⁴

κάγω μὲν ηὔδων τῷ γαμοῦντι μήτε σοι
κῆδος συνάψαι μήτε δώμασιν λαβεῖν
κακής γυναικὸς πῶλον; ἐκφέρουσι γὰρ
μητρώι ἀνείδη.

(Andr 619-22)

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³ Aristotle’s example (Rhet 94a19-94b24) is Med 294-7. Cf. Hkld 458-60, Hek 864-7, Her 299-301, etc. But two-stage gnomes are not always paradoxical: Hik 361-4, Her 303-6, 309-11, Phoin 526f (particularly flat).

⁴ Similar are Her 57, Or 300.
2. Manner of presentation

The gnomes cited above take the form of grammatically complete statements; variety is achieved through alternate types of presentation. Quite often a gnomic idea is expressed in a relative clause:

\[ \text{ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὁ πᾶσι λείπεται βροτοῖς} \]
\[ \text{ξύνεστιν ἐλπὶς} \quad (\text{Tro 681-2a}) \]

For I lack even hope, and hope is what remains for all mortals.

\[ \text{ποῦ δὴτ ἐλήφθης ἢ βρόχως ἀρτωμένη} \]
\[ \text{ἡ φάσγανον δήγουσ' ἂ γενναία γυνὴ} \]
\[ \text{δράσειν ἂν ποδοῦσα τὸν πάρος πόσιν;} \quad (\text{Tro 1012-4}) \]

How is it no one ever caught you hanging from a noose or sharpening a sword? Yet these are the things a noble woman would do who missed the husband she had had before.

Also very compressed are some gnomes given parenthetically:

\[ \text{δόξω δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς (πολλοὶ γὰρ κακοὶ)} \]
\[ \text{προδοὺς σεσωσθαί σ'...} \quad (\text{IT 678f}) \]

Generalisations may take the form of a rhetorical question:

\[ \text{συμκροῖσι μὲν γὰρ μεγάλα πῶς ἔλοι τις ἂν;} \quad (\text{Or 694}) \]

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5 Cf. Med 1080, Hik 190-2, 232, Elek 38, Her 58f, Or 525, 652, 679, etc. Similar compression is to be seen in Ion 634-6.

6 Cf. Elek 300.

7 Text as printed by Murray, who brackets 695 with Brunck; Diggle brackets 694f with Weil. More gnomic rhetorical questions are at Hipp 462f, 464f, IT 1478f (but 1479 del. Diggle).
Many general statements involve a moral rule and are introduced by χρή (e.g. Kyk 527, Alk 1008, Med 294, 1018, Hipp 120, 467, Andr 944, Hik 223, 506, Elek 1052, Her 92, Or 666, Bak 892) or, less often, δεί (e.g. Andr 1052, Elek 1074). The same effect is often achieved through an imperative:

τούτο καὶ σκοπεῖτε μοι,
μνηστήρες, ἐσθλὴς θυγατέρ' ἐκ μητρὸς λαβεῖν.  
(Andr 622f)

Similar are Andr 950f, Hik 504f, 916f, Or 804; one may compare also Ion 373 (τῶλ θεῶ τάναντι' οὐ μαντευτέον), Phoin 395 (ἐς τὸ κέρδος παρὰ φύσιν δουλευτέον).

3. "Application" of general rules

My paraphrases of Tro 681f and 1012-14 above incorporate the expansion of thought by which the general rule is brought into relation with the special case. Euripides very often expresses this relationship explicitly. The present instance may be adduced (usually using γάρ) as if it were the example that caused the speaker to formulate the rule; or again the rule may be stated, then simply "applied" (usually using ὡς or δέ) to the present case:9

οὐκ ἔστιν ὡδὲν κρείσσον ἢ φίλος σαφῆς,
οὐ πλοῦτος, οὐ τυραννίς· ἀλόγιστον δὲ τι
tὸ πλῆθος ἀντάλλαγμα γενναῖον φίλου.

8 "Utopian reflections" introduced by χρή are discussed in Section D below.

9 The two forms have been studied in great detail by H. Friis Johansen in General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis; he terms them παράδειγμα οἴκειον and Descriptive Application respectively. For my purposes the distinction is of no importance. Examples with γάρ: Med 448, Hkld 6, 303, Andr 959. With ὡς: Med 584, Hipp 651, Andr 703; variants in Andr 647, Hik 219. With δέ: Med 302, Tro 641, IT 1477, Ion 587; cf. Andr 324 (ὅτι).
Less often a rule is quoted, then the present situation or person adduced as out of
step with it:  

\[ \text{σὺ γὰρ τὰ τ᾽ εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐξῆφης κακὰ καὶ etc.} \quad \text{(Or 1155-9)} \]

But the formulation of a general rule may itself imply the "application", by
associating the interlocutor explicitly with the group that is the topic of the
gnome:

\[ \text{οἱ βάρβαροι δὲ μήτε τοὺς φίλους φίλους} \]
\[ \text{ήγείσθε μήτε τοὺς καλῶς τεθνηκότας} \]
\[ \text{θαυμάζεθ'} \quad \text{(Hek 328-30)} \]

In this second-person example the speaker associates the interlocutor with the
group discredited in the gnomic statement (cf. Med 569-73, Hek 253-7). In some
first-person plural gnomes the speaker associates himself or herself with the
group characterised.  

Gnomes are also formulated in the first or second person
plural with an application to "people in general" implied:  

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10 Friis Johansen terms this Contrast Application (see General Reflection 144-50); examples
include Med 222-6, Andr 207-12, Bak 266-9.

11 Women characterise the group "women": positively in Med 407-9, Hipp 480f, IT 1061f;
negatively in Med 230f, Ion 398ff.

12 First person plural indicative in Hipp 380-3, 701, Hek 623ff, 814-9, Hik 214, 492, 1082-6,
Phoin [555f]; second person plural indicative Hik 744-9, Elek 383-5; imperative Or 804.
An interesting confusion of special and general formulation is to be seen in such passages as:\(^{13}\)

\[ \text{δ' \ αν \ μάθη \\ τις \ ταύτα \ σώζεσθαι \ φιλεί \\ πρός \ γήρας. \ οὔτω \ παίδας \ εὖ \ παιδεύετε.} \quad (\text{Hik 916f}) \]

4. Second-person formulation

Occasionally general statements are put in the second person singular ("gnomic σ\'u"):\(^{14}\)

\[ \text{οὐδὲ \ στέγην \ γὰρ \ ἢ \ κατηρεφεῖς \ δόμοι \ καλῶς \ ἀκριβώσαις \ ἀν' } \quad (\text{Hipp 468f}) \]

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13 There is a strange mingling of general and special in Hel 954f, where see Kannicht. Striking also is Hek 820, where a general reflection is closed with "What hope could one still have then to prosper in the future?" The thought moves abruptly back to Hekabe's own case: "For my children are gone..." etc. (821).

14 ἀκριβώσαις ἀν' is Hadley's conjecture here for ἀκριβώσειαν codd., and is accepted by Barrett, Diggle, and Stockert (Teubner text). Barrett states (ad 468-9) that optative without ἀν here is "impossible". Bers' discussion of the evidence for a poetic potential optative without ἀν (Syntax 128ff) concludes that the construction is not impossible but seldom used; for Euripides he cites (131) Hipp 1186 (where see Barrett), Andr 929, and IT 1055, but does not discuss Hipp 469. None of the examples he cites seems quite analogous to this last; therefore I will assume (with some reservation) that Hadley was correct in identifying an example of "gnomic σ\'u" that had got lost in the transmission.
Barrett writes ad loc: "The second person can be used in a potential statement to typify an indefinite subject (i.e. as a more vivid equivalent of τίς)". This principle could be supported (Barrett cites no parallels) by reference to Her 301, Or 700f; other examples I find in Euripides of "gnomic σοῦ" are not potential statements (Med 297-301, Or 314f). In all these passages the speaker moves easily between the indefinite use of the second person forms and the application of the same forms to the interlocutor. It seems possible that this kind of facile transition may explain the transmitted text of Klytaimestra's proem addressed to Elektra:

\[ \tauο \piράγμα δε \muαθόντα σ', \ \etaν \muεν \αξίως \muισεὶν \εξης, \\
\sigmaτυγεὶν \δίκαλον' \ ει \δε \μη', \ τι \ δει \στυγείν; \quad (Elek 1015-7) \]

There is no individual to whom μαθόντα σε could refer, and in any case the context seems to require a general statement. Reiske's conjecture μαθόντας, with Seidler's εξης, satisfies this requirement; but perhaps Euripides wrote σε and εξης with an indefinite reference in mind (in spite of the clearly personal reference of σοι in 1011 and τωι σοι in 1018), using the same freedom as in the passages mentioned above.16

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15 This effect is particularly bold in Hipp 467-70 and Or 314f (both of which have, admittedly, text problems). On the latter see the comments ad loc by di Benedetto, who reads νόσης...δοξαξής in 314 with the majority of the codd.

16 Denniston ad Elek 1016 argues against the interpretation offered here; see also Cropp, "Eur. Elektra" 1013-7 and 1041-4",53. K-G I. 557, Anm. 3 discuss indefinite use of σοῦ as a generally late phenomenon, but they ignore such Homeric examples as Iliad V. 85. I mention here also the very dubious line IA 1408 (see Page Actors' Interpolations ad loc), in which I think it possible the author intended the relative clause δο σου κρατεί to convey a general statement about το θεομαχείν: "struggling against the gods defeats one". The same expression occurs in Hipp 696 (το γαρ διάκνοι σου την διάγρωσιν κρατεί), where the sense may again be general: a colloquial expression?
5. "Double comparison"

A striking device in the formulation of general statements is the creation of a "double comparison":

φαύλον χρηστὸν ἀν λαβεῖν φίλον
θέλομι μᾶλλον ἢ κακὸν σοφῶτερον. (Ion 834f)

I would rather have a simple but honest man for a friend than a clever man of bad character.

Very similar are Andr 639ff, frr. 290, 326, 6-7, 552, 825, 842. One side of the comparison may be only implied:

ψ ός ε ὶ μοι πένης
εἶ ἦ πρόθυμος πλουσίου μᾶλλον ξένος. (Elek 394f)

I would wish as my host a poor but solicitous man rather than a (negligent) rich man.

It seems to be a stylishly clever device.

6. Attribution of authority

Euripidean characters frequently voice maxims whose sense affects, or is acknowledged by, a specified elite group, especially people of wisdom or good sense (οἱ σοφοὶ, οἱ σώφρονες, οἱ εἰ ἐφονώντες, etc.). Rarely is a real contrast

17 Denniston ad Elek 253 has discussed the noun-with-two-adjectives phrases these passages involve.
18 Cf. Med 319f.
19 οἱ σοφοὶ (etc.): Kyk 316, Hkld 458f, Hipp 264-6, 465f, Andr 643f, Hik 40f, 223 (τῶν σοφῶν), 506-8, Or 488, fr. 683; οἱ σώφρονες: Kyk 336-8, Phoin 554, Or 1509; ὁσίες ἐνεστὶ νοῦς: Andr 231.
intended with other groups; the point made is simply given additional authority through this association. Similarly many gnomes include a reference to "men" or "mortals" that adds no point to the saying.  

Gnomes may also be put in "attributed" form: a source for the statement is identified, normally either as "people in general" or as the speaker himself, who thus presents the gnome as his considered opinion. (There is usually no implication that it is an original or unusual thought: but cf. Med 579-81.) "People in general" are cited as the authority for gnomes introduced using:

λέγοντι (Tro 665, Hik 735, Hel 950); φασίν (Her 306); ὃς εἴξασιν (Hel 497).

Similar effect is achieved by identifying the general statement as a λόγος:  

πείθειν δώρα καὶ θεοῦς λόγος.  

(Med 964b)

The speaker is identified as the source of the rule voiced through the use of: λέγω (Tro 636); γνώμην ἔχω (Hik 198); λογίζομαι (Alk 692f); νομίζω (Her 282); ἡγοῦμαι (Her 283, Med 1224); μοι δοκοῦσι (Hipp 377); ἐμοί (Med 580, sim. Elek 954); οἴμεσθα (Hkld 746, sim. Bak 1150); κατείδον (Med 446); οίδα (Med 215), κρίνω (Andr 370). Negative rules are formulated with οὐκ ἐπανέσω (Hkld [300], sim. Med 223, Hipp 264), ἀπέπτυσα (Tro 667f).

A gnomic idea may be phrased as a wish, for which Euripides uses ἐμοὶ εἴη (with slight variations) in Hipp 403f, 640f, Med 542-4, Elek 394f, 948f, Ion 632. It

Somewhat different are gnomes that define wisdom, etc.: e.g. Her 1425f (δοτις δὲ πλοῦτον ἡ σοφίας μᾶλλον φίλων ἀγάθων πεπόνθη βούλεται κακῶς φρονεῖ).  

20 Gnomes with βροτοῖς, ἄνθρωποις, θυτοῖς, etc.: Med 965, 1018, Hipp 465f, Andr 184f, 270, 418, Her 57, Hel 1617f, Or 1545, and many more; cf. in the same sense ἡμῖν, IA 1370.

21 Cf. Hel 513ff, Phoin 396, 438 (ὑμνηθέν). In fr. 668 a similar statement is described as a παρομία. ὀπέρ ἡ παρομία appears likewise in A. Ag 264; see Fraenkel ad loc for other instances. ἀλός is similarly used: in fr. 25, 333, 508 a gnomic saying is characterised as a παλαιός ἀλός (cf. also fr. 321). See further Schmid 770 n.1.
is important to recognise these as essentially gnomes for which the speaker assumes authority, like those discussed above.\textsuperscript{22}

### 7. Gnome and reflection

We cannot think of all these expressions of general truth (or rather, "expressions presented as general truths in a rhetorical context") as "maxims" in the traditional sense—they mostly lack both the moral element and the status of folk wisdom generally associated with that term.\textsuperscript{23} Not all are even "aphorisms", but all are references, however compact or casual, to a larger more general context than that of the immediate scene, and most use concise and memorable phrases to put a general idea before the audience. Above all, it must not be assumed that they represent any philosophical views of the poet—each "gnome" (as I will now call them all indiscriminately) has been put in the mouth of a particular character in a particular situation for purposes of analysis or persuasion.

I shall use the word "reflection" here to refer to passages of some length in which the speaker seems to be working with general rules and concepts, not

\textsuperscript{22} Denniston ad Elek 948 stops just short of recognising this idiomatic formulation (he cites frr. 412 and 360.25, but not the other passages above). It worries him that Elektra, a married woman, should wish for a husband (\textit{ἐμοὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ πόσις}) of such-and-such a character. But similarly in Hipp 640f Hippolytos, confirmed bachelor, rules out a too-brainy wife using the expression \textit{μὴ γὰρ ἐν γ' ἐμοὶ δόμους εἴη...}. Both speakers are simply stating a general rule. Friis Johansen (General Reflection 140) discusses Hipp 403f (\textit{ἐμοὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ μήτε λαυθάνειν καλὰ... ἐρώτημα etc.) as a gnomic formulation, followed immediately by application to the speaker Phaidra. De Grouchy (diss. 37 with n. 24) recognises \textit{ἐμοὶ} (etc.) as a formula for identifying the source of a thought, but cites no examples of gnomes expressed as wishes.

\textsuperscript{23} Aristotle, for example, in his discussion of \textit{γνῶμαι} (Rhet 1394a19ff) speaks of maxims as general statements, "but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided" (tr Rhys Roberts). He goes on to speak (1395a 2ff) of the kind of speakers who can appropriately use maxims—elderly men, and even then only in speaking of subjects in which they are experienced. Euripidean speakers' use of gnomes conforms better to the more relaxed sense in which the Rhet ad Alex uses the term (Ch. XI).
merely stating them for a rhetorical or argumentative purpose: passages where
the fuller implications of a general statement are investigated (e.g. *Hik* 176-83), or
reasons giving for making the statement (e.g. *Hik* 195ff, *Hipp* 616ff), or where a
gnomic statement influences a reasoning process (e.g. *Hel* 483-99). In every case
the sympathetic reader will find "relevance" to the drama and indeed to the
immediate situation in these passages. But the energy some of these passages
devote to abstract speculation gives a sense of detachment from their sur­
roundings, and this detachment that has not escaped the notice of text critics;
and so some comments will be made below on the relatively loose limits of
relevance Euripides seems to allow himself.

**B. Rhetorical Uses of Gnomic Utterances**

The ancient Greeks clearly had available, as we have, a large store of
conventional wisdom on which to draw in supporting or opposing almost any
position. Moreover, we often find Euripides (perhaps more than other Greek
writers) presenting maxims whose form is conventional but whose content
cannot have been traditional.24 The study of Euripidean gnomic material for the
purpose of understanding the shared attitudes and assumptions of Athenian
society has therefore a very limited usefulness.25 We should perhaps think of

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24 I am thinking especially of those self-consciously "sophistic" maxims celebrating power
and wealth (e.g., *Kyk* 316, *Phoin* 524f); cf. also paradoxes like *Hipp* 411f, *Med* 294f, philosophical
speculations like *Her* 1345f.

25 Lang's discussion (*Herodotean N and D* 58-67) of maxims and proverbs in Herodotos says of
such expressions that they "may, in some degree at least, reflect the genius, wit, and spirit of the
Greek nation". She looks for signs of "the extent to which [Herodotos'] interpretation of events and
view of causation were shaped by this inherited folk wisdom" (*ibid* 58f). Such an approach to
Euripidean gnomes would seem unpromising.
the maxims under study here not as general observations about life, agreed upon by the people who use them, but as abstract forms of argument, arguments stripped of any context.\textsuperscript{26} I therefore focus not on the content of Euripidean gnomes, though this is a fascinating topic, but on their rhetorical or persuasive uses.\textsuperscript{27} Just as the rhetorical questions, disjunct questions, potential and conditional formulations discussed in Chapter III above assume typical arrangements for employment in probability arguments and hypothetical arguments, so gnomic expressions appear again and again in typical sequences designed to present or bolster an argumentative position.

Euripides gives his characters gnomic expressions (1) to open a speech or an argument by offering a succinct "headline"; (2) to close or summarise a speech or an argument; (3) to corroborate or support an argumentative point, appeal, or parainesis just uttered.

1. "Opening" Uses

Polyphemos' reply to Odysseus' appeal in \textit{Kyklops} offers a good example of a simple gnome opening an argument by announcing in general terms the point to be made:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ό πλοῦτος, ἀνθρώπισκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός.} \quad (\textit{Kyk} 316)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{26} On this subject M. Heath's discussion of "Tragic Wisdom" (\textit{Poetics} 157-62) is very stimulating. He cites, for example, a bewildering variety of sentiments expressed in tragedy on the preferability of accepting death or enduring a life of slavery or disgrace (161): all these examples of "wisdom" (as Heath points out) are produced to suit an argument and a context.

\textsuperscript{27} A catalogue of gnomic material from all three tragedians organised according to content forms the bulk of G. A. De Grouchy's 1984 diss. \textit{Proverbial and Gnomic Material in Greek Tragedy}. 147
The statement, decidedly of the παράδοξον type, deflates Odysseus' arguments for mercy and hospitality more effectively than any direct answer to them could. Odysseus has based his appeal (Kyk 285-312, discussed in I.A above) on assumptions of shared values and interests; an argument that hospitality would constitute fair reciprocity for services he and his men have performed for Poseidon was followed by an appeal to the universal rules regarding shipwrecked sailors, suppliants, hospitality. Polyphemos' announcement encapsulates immediately his distance from these shared assumptions (amusingly it is not his primitivism but his sophistication that creates the gulf), providing at the same time a springboard for his disquisition on the gods and the rugged individual.

A few other speeches begin with an argument-headline cast in gnomic form: Herakles in Alkestis opens his harangue addressed to Admetos' servant, following an entrance-announcing verse that instantly sets an antagonistic tone, by stating a general rule of behaviour:

оὗτος, τί σεμνόν καὶ πεφροντικὸς βλέπεις;
οὐ χρὴ σκυθρῶπον τοῖς ξένοις τὸν πρόσπολον
eἶναι. δέχεσθαι δὲ εὐπροσηγόρωι φρενί.

(Alk 773-5)

In what follows, the servant's failure to adhere to this rule is stated, and this leads to Herakles' philosophical homily on life and death, the moral of which is summarised in a rule of behaviour that reinforces the first:

εὐφραίνει σαυτόν, πίνε, τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν
βίον λογίζου σὸν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῆς τύχης.

(Alk 788f)

Similarly Herakles' speech to Admetos following his final entrance with the veiled woman begins by announcing in gnomic form the topic of the first half of the speech:
Similar gnomic headlines open speeches at *Hkld* 297-303, *Med* 446f, *Andr* 957f, *Ion* 585f28 (cf. also the prologue-speeches of *Hkld*, *Or*, and *S. Trach*).

A frequent pattern for opening an argument is the sequence in which a gnome is stated, then its antithesis or converse, followed immediately by the application of one leg of the antithesis to the present person or case.29 Thus for example Agamemnon laments the lack of freedom which his high status imposes by means of a reflection comparing εὐγένεια and δυσγένεια:

![](image)

For the sake of a full and balanced treatment contrasting gnomes are voiced, then each is applied to a group (αὐτοῖς in 447 are the low-born, and in 450 Agamem-

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28 Ion reacts to Xouthos' request he come to Athens: "Things look different at a distance and up close". The headline indicates (a bit mysteriously) Ion will subject the invitation to a cautious examination; the following couplet confirms this, and then the examination is carried out (see discussion in I.E above). Friis Johansen notes that the "near vs. far" theme is recapitulated in 621-3 (*General Reflection* 136f).

29 This has been called "foil-antithesis" by Friis Johansen (*General Reflection* 31, and index s.v.): Euripidean passages he discusses are *Med* 215-21, *Hkld* 1-5, *Andr* 319-23, *Hik* 1082f, *Tro* 688-96, *Hel* 713-5, *Phoin* 469-72, *Or* 126-31, *IA* 446-50. The type is perhaps not so well-established as this list would suggest, since (1) Friis Johansen himself finds the required antithesis poorly realised in *Hkld* 1ff and *Hel* 713-5, and argues for lacunae in those passages; (2) Diggle's text deletes *Andr* 321-3, *Hel* 713-9, *Or* 127. But Friis Johansen argues convincingly for an antithesis that adds force to the following argument in a number of these passages.
non speaks of the high-born, explicitly including himself in that class), and finally the present case of Agamemnon's own predicament is brought up.

Often an opening verse or two serve (as does Alk 773, quoted above) to highlight the gnomic utterance that will headline a speech's subject or open its first argument. In Med 215f, Hipp 373-6, Her 60-2 this function is filled by not much more than a vocative formula and a bit of narrative; in Hik 195-7 a bit of narrative and the statement to be refuted precede the headline proper; Her 1313 constitutes or completes a proem highlighting the gnome of 1314f; Hkld 1 and Tro [634-5] similarly point the following gnome. This attention-getting device may grow from a simple λέξω δέ (Elek 1013), λέγομεν δὲν (IT 939), ἀκούσατ’ (IT 578), to an elaborate introduction in which a comment on the preceding speech leads to a formal justification of the speaker's right to make answer, followed in turn by a gnomic headline:

κομψός γ’ οί κήρυξ καὶ παρεργάτης λόγων.
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἄγωνα καὶ σὺ τόνδ’ ἡγωνίσω,
ἀκοῦ’ ἀμιλλαν γὰρ σὺ προῦθηκας λόγων.
oὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει, etc.
(Hik 426-9)

Proems referring to the speech-situation or the interlocutor may grow into independent reflections which themselves involve gnomic material. Often these reflections apply such topoi as the dangerous character of the adversary's too facile eloquence, or various kinds of disadvantage the speaker himself faces. As we have seen with other material of a similarly "conventional" nature, these reflections may contribute interesting details to Euripides' presentation of the characters involved, but we must not expect to find "portraiture" in every detail presented in a rhetorical context.
As an example of a succinct opening gnome that is clearly applied to the present case, we may consider the beginning of Teiresias' reply to Pentheus:

\[
\text{οταν λάβητι τις τών λόγων ἀνήρ σοφὸς}
\]
\[
\text{καλὰς ἀφορμὰς, οὐ μέγ' ἐργον εὖ λέγειν·}
\]
\[
\text{σὺ δ' ἐὑροχον μὲν γλώσσαν ὡς φρονῶν ἔχεις}
\]
\[
\text{ἐν τοῖς λόγοις δ' οὐκ ἐνεισὶ σοι φρένες.}
\]

(Bak 266-9)

Before answering Pentheus' speech, he will comment on speech-making in general. Eloquence in the absence of a sound case (καλὰς ἀφορμὰ) is criticised, though Pentheus' speech has hardly been eloquent or self-consciously rhetorical. Teiresias goes on to identify abuse of eloquence with the κακὸς πολίτης (270f), although he is addressing the king of Thebes. This material is thus "conventional". Other proem references to the dangers of (the opponent's) eloquence, or the simplicity and honesty of one's own presentation: cf. Med 579-83, Hipp 486f (here again, even less appropriately than in Bak 270f, eloquence is identified as a danger affecting political life), 984f, Hek 1187-94, Phoin 469-72.

Characters begin rhetorical speeches by expressing doubts about whether to speak at all in Andr 184-91, Hik 297-300, and by calling attention to particular disadvantages affecting them in Hipp 983-91, Elek 1013-7, Tro 914f, Or 544-50. In

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30 The transmitted text seems faulty and even with the usual remedies it makes difficult sense. See Dodds' note ad loc.

31 If anyone comes off looking like a slick-speaking Sophist here, it is Teiresias— but I don't think Euripides intends us to form that view of him. Neither is it his intention though to attack here in his own voice "the greatest danger of ancient as of modern democracies", as Dodds supposes (ad 266-71).

32 These ideas elsewhere: choral comments in Tro 966-8 and Phoin 526f charge the preceding speakers with eloquence in a bad cause; in Hek 1238f Hekabe's speech is greeted as a case of eloquence in a good cause. The eloquence of demagogues: Hek 254-7, Hik 412-6, Or [904-13]. See Ober Mass and Elite 170-7 for the orators' exploitation of these themes.

33 Similar doubts are realised in Hek 736-53 and Elek 900-6 through dialogue.

34 In Hkld 181-3, Iolaos cites rather advantages: a rare case of "flattering the court".

151
all these passages the common rhetorical topos, "difficulties facing the speaker", is present. This may be presented through a straightforward reference to the details of the case. For example, in Or 544-50 Orestes, reluctant to make answer to Tyndareos' charges, refers to his accuser's "venerability" (γῆρας 549) as inhibiting him, as well as his own undoubted guilt (ἀνόσιος εἰμί 546): no generalising is involved. Speakers call attention to disadvantages in various other ways: at IA 1211 Iphigeneia utters a pathetic impossible wish, indicating she knows she lacks the powers of persuasion necessary to turn Agamemnon's mind against the sacrifice; Jason's proem in Med 522 gamely accepts the challenge of answering Medea's charges, noting only he will need to navigate like a κεδνός ναὸς οἰκοστρόφος through the tempest of her rancour.

But this motif often lends itself to treatment in general terms. Andromache in Andr 184ff, in deciding whether to answer Hermione's speech of accusation and insult, introduces comparisons that widen the context:

184-5 The rash injustice of youth:
186-8 I fear harm as your slave,
189-90 for arrogant people hate being bested by inferiors.
191 But I will not betray myself.

35 Solmsen (Antiphonstudien 65-9) reviews examples of this motif in Euripides, Antiphon and Plato's Apology. He finds close similarities between Hipp 986-91 (see II.D above) and Ant. V. 1ff, Hek 1187-94 (see IV.D below) and Ant. V. 5, Eur. fr. 67 and Ant. V. 6. Solmsen concludes that although one cannot entirely exclude the possibility of direct influence of Antiphon on Euripides in these passages (though he notes that the early date of Alkmaion in Psophis, the assumed source of fr. 67, would seem to rule this out), more likely the two authors are both drawing on material that was already conventional in the opening of defense speeches.

36 It is not certain, however, that the transmitted text gives the correct order of lines. The transposition of vss. 546f found in edd. (post 550 trai. Hartung, post 556 Diggle) arises from the fact that the point made there seems more naturally to open the speech's argumentation than to belong to the proem proper. See Diggle (Euripidea 364-70) for, di Benedetto (ad 545-50) against the transposition.

37 Cf. the wish expressed by Hekabe in Hek 836-40: ἐμοὶ γένοιτο φθόγγος ἐν βραχίονι καὶ χερσὶ etc.
The points made here form no part of Andromache's rational rebuttal of Hermione's charges; they focus entirely on the speech-situation itself. But the reflection has, besides its context-broadening function, a clear "rhetorical" (i.e. "point-scoring") purpose; it creates prejudice against Hermione's case by undermining her personally while portraying Andromache as an underdog whose resources are limited to maturity, righteousness and self-respect.38

In her apologia addressed to Elektra in Elek 1011-50, Klytaimestra refers to the κακή δόξα that affects her and makes it difficult for her to defend herself. Her speech begins with a couplet that follows naturally from the preceding dialogue, but also provides a headline for the speech's argumentative content: Agamemnon was himself to blame for his own death.39 But before arguing this point in detail, Klytaimestra pauses to focus attention on the disadvantage under which she labours. Here is the most generally accepted text:40

λέξω δὲ: καίτοι δόξ', ὅταν λάβηι κακή
gυναῖκα, γλώσσῃ πικρότης ἐνεστὶ τις·
ὡς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς· τὸ πρᾶγμα δὲ
μαδῶντας, ἣν μὲν ἄξιος μισεῖν ἔχην,
στυγείν δίκαιον· εἰ δὲ μή, τί δεῖ στυγείν;  

(Elek 1013-17)

38 Somewhat similar is Hik 297-300, where Aithra overcomes, again for the sake of her own self-esteem, the inhibitions she feels against speaking out to Theseus; she recognises people assume the rule ἄξρειον τῶς γυναίκας εὖ λέγειν. But in that passage there is no implied antagonism.

39 Point well made by M. Lloyd, Agon 61. He notes also that the speech ends with a balancing couplet suggesting it was just to kill Agamemnon (1049f).

40 I have commented above (IV.A) on the two conjectures in vs. 1016. The text as quoted here is printed by Paley, Weil (1st ed.), Nauck (3rd ed.); it is accepted also in notes ad loc by Denniston (whose comm. prints Murray's text) and Cropp (whose ed. uses Diggle's text). Weil later had doubts (Diggle Euripidea 164 n.19). Murray differs only in printing ἔχην in 1016; for Diggle's view see below.
Klytaimestra clearly associates herself with women affected by an evil reputation, and clearly appeals for a proper hearing of the facts of her case. As to details of interpretation, editors differ. Denniston paraphrases (ad 1013-7):

I will tell you what I think of Agamemnon. But a maligned woman has a sharp edge to her tongue. In my opinion, such bitterness is to be deplored. But she should not be condemned out of hand on account of it: she should be judged on the facts alone.

On this interpretation, Klytaimestra concedes that her own account of the case may seem harsh, but insists it should not be judged on its tone alone. Diggle finds this fails to make sense of the μέν/δέ relationship in 1015; moreover he feels Klytaimestra should not concede the point implicit in οὐ καλῶς. He emends to οὐ κακῶς, translating:

When a woman gets a bad reputation, there is a certain bitterness in her tongue: in my opinion, not improperly. But people should learn the facts before deciding. If the facts justify hatred, then it is right to hate; otherwise, why hate?

Cropp, in his 1988 notes on the play, like Denniston sees Klytaimestra conceeding that a woman suffering a poor reputation may (but would do better not to) adopt a harsh way of speaking. He criticises Diggle’s interpretation, which he says "gives an odd argument", in that it has Klytaimestra invite us to examine the facts of her own case before deciding whether to hate her for displaying the outward signs of a woman suffering from a κακὴ δοξα. He adds the possibility

41 "This paraphrase misses the direction in which the reader is pointed by the μέν and δέ of 1015. These particles suggest that two opinions or attitudes are to be balanced". Diggle’s discussion is at Euripidean 163-5 (the chapter is his 1977 ICS paper).

42 For the same reason, Wecklein wrote οὐμέν in 1015.

43 Cropp (ad Elek 1013-7) paraphrases Diggle’s argument: “My bad reputation causes me to speak harshly..., but I should not be hated for that (i.e, speaking harshly), unless the facts (about my quarrel with Ag.) justify my bad reputation".

154
γλῶσση in 1014 may refer to the speech of others, i.e. the woman's detractors.\footnote{The idea (an earlier suggestion of Matthiae) is dismissed by Diggle (\textit{ibid} 164 n. 21).} Cropp sees the essential contrast as between \textit{talk} and \textit{facts}: people are to learn the facts before deciding whether the maligned woman's sharp talk (or others' sharp talk about her) justifies hatred. But if γλῶσση in 1014 refers to talk \textit{about} the woman, then 1013\textit{f} say only: "A woman with a bad reputation is apt to be ill spoken of". This would not be Euripides at his best.

When the rhetorical function of the passage is considered, it seems to me that Klytaimestra must make a concession of exactly the sort that Diggle rules out, and that γλῶσση as essentially a synonym for δόξα likewise rules out: she must call attention to a problem that will tend to compromise her \textit{presentation} of her case. Klytaimestra suggests that her own "bitterness" constitutes a barrier making a fair assessment difficult, and asks (like many another Greek orator)\footnote{Cf., e.g., Antiphon V. 5, Plato \textit{Apology} 17 C-D. Cropp (\textit{LCM} 7[1982]: 53) compares Ar. \textit{Ach} 368ff.} that the flaws and imperfections of her presentation be overlooked and the truth of her case alone used as a basis for judgement. The phrase in vs. 1015\textit{a} is quasi-parenthetical, and follows a gnome about maligned women that is to be contrasted with a gnome about fair hearing. This gives the following sense: "A maligned woman may speak bitterly, and I concede that is not a pretty thing. But the rule to follow is this: hear the facts and then either hate or don’t hate on the merits of the case".\footnote{The contrast is thus not between the "opinions or attitudes" of Klytaimestra herself (παρ’ ἥμας) and the unspecified person or persons forming the subject of στυγείη, but between the bitterness typical of the maligned woman's presentation and the necessity of reaching a fair judgement based on the facts. Thus I see the ἕκ of 1015 as introducing adversatively a gnome that contradicts the implications of the material in 1013\textit{f}; the \textit{μὲν} of the parenthetical phrase in 1015 should be regarded as \textit{μὲν solitarium} of the type Denniston documents at \textit{GP} 381f. See further Cropp, \textit{loc. cit.}}
The series of reflections on the speech-situation opening the agon speeches in *Phoin* are of a more philosophical cast. Polyneikes' proem makes the point that slick eloquence is antipathetic to truth:

\begin{quote}
άπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ,
kοῦ ποικίλων δεὶ τάνδιχ' ἐρμηνευμάτων·
ἐχεὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ καιρῶν· ὁ δ' ἄδικος λόγος
νοσῶν ἐν αὐτῶι φαιμάκων δεῖται σοφῶν.
\end{quote}

(*Phoin 469-72*)

Mastronarde (ad 469-72) suggests that this proem constitutes "an attack on sophistic conceptions of truth and on positive evaluations of rhetoric"; it is this, but it is also an instance of up-to-date speech-making in the approved sophistic manner. I think we sympathise with Polyneikes *in spite* of this posturing, not because of it: that is, it is "neutral" for our understanding of the character.

The proem of Eteokles that follows is "sophistic" not only in form but in its provocative content, and so forms part of the unsympathetic presentation of this character. Eteokles begins his speech:

\begin{quote}
eἰ πᾶσιν ταύτα καλὸν ἔφυ σοφῶν τ' ἁμα,
οὐκ ἦν ἄν ἀμφιλεκτος ἀνθρώπους ἔρις·
νῦν δ' οὖθ' ὁμοίων οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἴσον βροτοῖς
πλὴν ὄνομάσαι· τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε.
\end{quote}

(*Phoin 499-502*)

Friis Johansen paraphrases: "Discord arises because there is no objective truth". The proem here virtually affirms that there can be no meaningful debate between the two brothers; and in fact Eteokles' speech will not attempt to address any of the points Polyneikes raised. Iokaste gives the third speech in this
series a gnomic opening: "The experience that comes with age gives one an advantage in wisdom over the young". In this scene, Euripides has used these abstract formulations to contrast the three speakers' points of view in the strongest possible terms.49

2. "Closing" Uses

We have seen some of the ways in which gnomic statements and longer general reflections may open a topic within a persuasive or argumentative speech. Often an argument is summarised or concluded through a general utterance.50 Thus Admetos closes his speech condemning Pheres' unwillingness to die on his son's behalf with a general observation about old age and death:

μάτην ἄρ' οἱ γέροντες εὐχονται θανεῖν,
γῆρας πέροντες καὶ μακρὸν χρόνον βίου·
ἥν δ' ἐγγὺς ἐλθὼν θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται
θυμίσκειν, τὸ γῆρας δ' οὐκέτ' ἐστ' αὐτοῖς βαρύ.  (Alk 669-72)

Similar accusatory generalisations close speeches at Med 569-75 ("But you women have reached the point of thinking that..."), Hek 328-31 ("But you barbarians don't treat your own people well, nor..."); in each case the interlocutor is subsumed into a group whose besetting vice is described.

In a more reflective vein, Phaidra closes her troubled thoughts on the suffering children endure over the vices of parents with the ominous observation that "time will reveal all" (Hipp 428-30). Theseus closes his speech acceding to the appeal of Aithra on behalf of the suppliants with a gnome on the

49 The scene is discussed in II.E above.

50 Note that proem-reflections too may be rounded off with concluding gnomic material: cf. Hipp 988f, Hek 254-7, Bak 270f, IA 380b, etc.
duties children have to their parents (Hik 361-4). Eteokles justifies his unwillingness to accommodate his brother's legitimate demands with a gnome that puts his position in the strongest possible light:

εἴπερ γὰρ ἄδικείν χρῆ, τυπανύδος πέρι
cάλλιστον ἄδικείν, τάλλα δ᾽ εὐσεβείν χρεών. 
(Phoin 524f)

Andromache's farewell to her small son, for whose safety she is offering to trade her own life, ends with an affirmation of the blessings of parenthood (Andr 418-20).51 Elektra's diatribe addressed to the dead Aigisthos closes with a finely-wrought variation on the "look to the end" motif (Elek 953-6). Occasionally though we are offered a platitude that makes the effect of being the merest formality: "Not many a man is as good as his father" (Hkld 327f), "Helpless is the house of unlucky folk" (Or 70).52

The process of concluding with a gnome is sometimes given additional weight through a formula focusing attention on the pronouncement:

ἐν συντεμοῦσα πάντα νικήσω λόγον:
τὸ φῶς τὸδ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ἥδιστον βλέπειν,
τὰ νέρθε δ᾽ οὐδέν. 
(IA 1249-51)53

51 The thought is voiced again in a conclusive reflection by Herakles, just before madness strikes (Her 634-6). Cf. Her 280f, IA 902.

52 More speech-closing gnomes that summarise the speaker's position: Hik 953f, Ion 1045-7, Hel 757, 1617f, Or [602-4], IA 373-5, etc. Empty platitudes are the rule rather than the exception in choral couplets. De Grouchy (diss. 27-9) defends the triteness of many gnomic passages, supposing that this represents a conscious choice of the poet aimed at arousing pathos: "In the case of Tro 1203-6, for instance, the 'threadbare' quality may itself produce a powerful impression by throwing into relief the sheer intensity of Hecuba's suffering and the inadequacy of any 'normal' consolation in the horrific abnormality of genocide" (28f). But, as we have seen, Euripidean characters suffering from profound grief and despair are yet capable of very sophisticated expression and argumentation. It would therefore seem that Euripides has simply not placed a high value on cleverness or aptness in writing gnomes, especially those that conclude a speech.

53 Cf. Hek 1177-82 (where the focusing process is very elaborate), Hel 513f, Phoin [438-40].
A gnomic "tag" introduced by δέ may close an argument. The function is sometimes to contradict something in the preceding material, for example:\footnote{54}

\vspace{1em}

\begin{align*}
\text{ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ πάσι λείπεται βροτὸς} \\
\text{ξύνεστιν ἐλπὶς, οὐδὲ κλέπτομαι φρένας} \\
\text{πράξειν τι κεδυνόν: ἥδυ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ δοκεῖν.} \\
\end{align*}

\textit{(Tro 681-3)}

Or it may introduce a final stage of the argument (e.g. \textit{Elek} 530f, discussed in III.C above), or point out the relevance of a point just made (e.g. \textit{Andr} 684f, \textit{Her} 201-3).

Closing gnomic thoughts expand in a few speeches to become reflections of some length.\footnote{55} These may serve to summarise or fortify the speaker's argument. Hermione, suffering a crisis of nerves over her mistreatment of Andromache and fearing for her safety, identifies at once (\textit{Andr} 929-42) the cause of her own failure as a wife:\footnote{54} eἰσοδοὶ κακῶν γυναῖκῶν were to blame for her arrogance and complacency. Having acknowledged this truth about her own life, she proceeds to develop the same point in general terms (943-53): a man with a wife should never let other women come and go in his household, instructors in vice; no, keep the doors barred, or you're inviting trouble!

Some other closing reflections rise above this level. Polyxene, in her speech of self-dedication (discussed in I.D above), has made much of her high status and the expectations she has grown up with for a royal marriage; even if she could evade death, she has lost all this. She closes by telling her mother not to offer the Greeks any further resistance, but rather to endorse her decision. She

\footnote{54} This function is more strongly emphasised using καὶ τοι: note \textit{Hik} 484, \textit{Elek} 932, 1013, \textit{Tro} 671.

\footnote{55} Some of these lack the kind of coherent development that properly merits the name "reflection": e.g. \textit{Hik} 506-10 is better regarded as a medley of gnomic pronouncements.
grounds this request with a reflection in which the person unused to suffering is implicitly compared with the lower status person, accustomed to the yoke:

οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἔισθε γεύεσθαι κακῶν
φέρει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄφεν' ἐντιθεῖς ζυγῶι.
θανὼν δ' ἄν εἰς ἄλλον εὐτυχέστερος
ἡ ζών· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν μὴ καλῶς μέγας πόνος.  (Hek 375-8)

For a person such as Polyxene, death constitutes a τύχη superior to life. The reflection uses a general context and highly charged terms (ἀλγος, πόνος, ζυγόν, ζῆν μὴ καλῶς on the one side, εὐτυχής on the other) to recapitulate the argument earlier made on a personal level.

Some closing reflections serve not to recast an argument already put, but to comment on a general issue. Teiresias in Phoin has to tell Kreon that Menoikeus must be sacrificed if Thebes is to be saved. The entire scene (Phoin 834-959) demonstrates vividly the difficulties of being a prophet, a theme that attaches to Teiresias in nearly all his appearances in tragedy. Teiresias’ final speech in the scene addresses to Kreon arguments in favour of the sacrifice (930-52); with a formula of transition (τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἡμῶν πάντ’ ἔχεις, 953a) he closes this section, then addresses an order to his attendant, asking to be led away. As Teiresias departs, he reflects ruefully on his trade. The reflection takes the form of a dilemma: the prophet may tell people the bitter truth and make enemies, or offend the god by telling compassionate lies. Therefore Apollo alone should prophesy, who needs fear no one. Here the reflection takes as its point of departure not the arguments put in the preceding speech and scene, but a problem arising out of the situation. Comparable reflections likewise follow breaks in a speech: Medea’s reflection on the lack of a clear χαρακτήρ indicating

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56 See Ch. III, n.22.
the worth of a man (Med 516-9, following an apostrophe to Zeus); Hekabe's reflections on the fickleness of fate (Hek 623-8, following an apostrophe at 619) and on the skill of persuasion (Hek 814-20, following a pathetic self-apostrophe at 812); Adrastos' disquisition on valour and education (Hik 911-7, following a change of address at 909).58

3. "Grounding" Uses

Very often gnomes are used to support or corroborate points made within an argument or appeal. The connection to the preceding material is usually made with γάρ. So Medeia argues, in response to Jason's offer of material aid:

\[
\text{οὔτ' ἂν ξένοισι τοῖς σοῖς χρησαίμεθ' ἂν}
\text{οὔτ' ἂν τι δεξαίμεσθα, μὴ δ' ἡμῖν δίδουν·}
\text{κακοῦ γάρ ἀνδρός δῶρ' ἓνησιν οὐκ ἔχει.} \quad (\text{Med 616-8})
\]

The gnome, "The gifts of a base man bring no benefit", is put forward as giving the underlying reason for her refusal. Medeia thus offers in support of her decision the authority of a statement presenting (it is implied) common wisdom.59

The statement corroborated may itself be gnomic. The γάρ-gnome in that case gives the Aristotelian "epilogue" in which the gnome is explained:60

---

57 The passage is discussed below (IV.D) as a "utopian reflection".

58 See note 78 below.

59 Similar are: (with γάρ) Hkl 200f, 327f, Hipp 988f, Andr 159f, 189f, 213f, 370f, Hik 481-3, Elek 1084f, Tro 989f, IT 391, 678b, lon 597b, Hel [906-8], etc.; (with ὡς) Her 305f; (with asyndeton, cf. K-G II.344f) Med 462f, Andr 173-6, 207f, 639f, Or 665f.

60 See above n.3. With the quoted passage cf. Hipp 912f, Hek 378, Elek 1074f, Or 668, etc.
The point being corroborated may be merely implied, e.g. in Admetos' argument addressed to Herakles on the matter of the veiled woman:

καὶ πῶς ἄκραυγνής ἐν νέοις στρωφωμένη
ἐσται; τὸν ἡβώεθ', Ἡράκλεισ, οὐ ῥαίδιον
εἴργειν'.

(Alk 1052-4)

The rhetorical question implies the woman could not be safely kept among young men; the gnome supports this with a general statement about the latter.

A difficult passage is that in Hel where Menelaos convinces himself there is nothing surprising in the apparent coincidences with which he has been confronted. After doubting whether there can be a second Zeus in Egypt (Hel 489-91), or another Sparta, Tyndareos, and so on (492-6a), he seems befuddled (496b) until a gnomic thought resolves (incorrectly and so ironically) his ἀπορία:

ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.
πολλοὶ γὰρ, ὡς εἶχασιν, ἐν πολλῇ χθονί
ὀνόματα ταῦτ᾽ ἔχουσι καὶ πόλεις πόλει
γυνὴ γυναικί τ᾽: οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστέον.

(Hel 496-9)

As Kannicht points out (ad 496-500) the connection of thought between 496 and 497 is not immediately clear. He suggests the γάρ-gnome here refers itself to an unspoken δὲ-clause implied by the μὲν-clause of 496: ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν. <ἀλλ' δὲ νῦν ἔχοιον>. I find it simpler to understand as implied in οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν the sense: "These arguments (of 489-96a) seem strong but not decisive". Vs. 496b then expresses not a paralyzing sense of ἀπορία but a suspension of judgement for the moment; the following words voice the
argument on the other side and therewith the reason for this suspension (hence γάρ), and in voicing this argument Menelaos immediately finds it convincing.

A very common sequence is the gnome following a final appeal, command or parainesis; since this is often at speech-end it may take on some of the "conclusive" function I have discussed above, in summarising or pointing the speaker's case. A good example is the close of Odysseus' speech of appeal addressed to Polyphemos:

πάρες τὸ μάργον σῆς γνάθου, τὸ δ’ εὖσεβές
tῆς δυσσεβείας ἄνθελον’ πολλοῖσι γάρ
kέρδη ποιηρά ζημίαν ἱμεῖσατο. (Kyk 310-2)

A monitory gnome, presenting as common wisdom the proposition that those who reap evil gains come to a bad end, is offered in support of Odysseus' desperate plea.61

Often a rule is introduced in order to contradict or ridicule an argument or some behaviour that has been described, or to which the preceding constitutes an exception or abuse: such a rule is normally introduced with δέ. The function is the opposite of corroboration, in that a general truth is offered in opposition to rather than in support of the preceding. Thus Lykos attacks Herakles, the archer,

ός οὖσοτ’ ἀσπίδ’ ἐσχε πρὸς λαϊκ  χερί
οὖθ’ ἠλθε λόγχης ἐγγὺς ἀλλὰ τὸξ’ ἔχων,
kάκλοτον ὀπλοῦν, τὴν φυγὴν πρόχειρος ἣν.

61 Similar are Med 263-5, Hipp 120, 474f, Andr 177-80, 230f, 621f, 952f, Hek 375-8, 844f, Hik 331, 911, Her 309-11, Iom 373, 398-400, 646f, Hel 941-3, Or 454f. Generally these gnomes follow directly on an imperative, or an expression summarising an appeal already made; are introduced by γάρ; come at speech-end. The connection is made with ὅσ in Alk 800, Or 805f; with asyndeton in IT 1064, Phoin 584. The same grounding of an imperative with a gnome is achieved using the reverse order (gnome preceding appeal, etc.) in Hik 917, fr. 609. The normal sequence is seen also in appeals at other points in a speech: Alk 304-10, Hik 476-80, Hel 898-904, IA 1218f. Note that speech-concluding imperatives may be supported by γάρ-statements that are not of a general but a specific character (e.g. Tro 403-5).
"The archer keeps his distance, ready for flight; but the real test of manhood comes in face-to-face battle". Gnomes are similarly brought up in arguing against a position or a trait attributed to the opponent in Andr 207, 594-9, Hipp 426, 911, Elek [390], Hel 636-8.

We have seen a number of formal patterns exploited by Euripides for the introduction of gnomic material into rhetorical speeches and arguments. A few points may be stressed by way of summary: (1) Euripides puts "general rules" into the speeches of his characters with great frequency; (2) these rules are presented using a small number of formal patterns ("opening" gnomes offer a headline in advance of an argument, "closing" gnomes summarise a speaker's position, "grounding" gnomes support a point just made); (3) certain rhetorical situations particularly lend themselves to gnomic treatment (e.g., proem reflections on speech and debate, closing accusatory reflections, the grounding of an appeal with a moral maxim); (4) on the level of content, these patterns are applied without distinction in the presentation of gnomes having a very wide range of reference. In the next sections I shall discuss some forms for the presentation of general rules and reflections in two specialised situations.

C. Realisations and Challenges to Common Sense

Gnomic expressions are normally called into service for the purpose of illuminating the present special case; the latter is seen as an instance of the rule 164
stated in the former. It is implicit in the unargued presentation of the gnomes used in persuasive contexts that the speaker wishes the thought to be accepted as "common sense". Thus the Tutor in *Medeia* introduces a gnome with a formula that could apply everywhere:

\[ \text{αρτι γιγνώσκεις τόδε}, \]
\[ ως πᾶς τις αὐτὸν τοῦ πέλας μᾶλλον φιλεί etc. } \quad (Med \ 85f) \]

"Are you just realising that...?": that is, everyone knows. Though self-consciously paradoxical statements may be given an "epilogue" to clarify their meaning, they will seldom be corroborated with examples or supported by further argument.

Occasionally, the present case is specifically identified as a violation of a general rule (*Alk 774f, Andr 595f*); or a tenet of common sense is rejected, for the sake of scoring points in a heated argument, on the basis of its failure to cover the present case (*Alk 669ff, Andr 645f*). But in a number of passages whose dramatic character is reflective rather than persuasive a character seems to respond to a situation by drawing a general conclusion that is clearly at odds with normal expectations, and for a moment it seems common sense is inadequate for explaining the world. Passages of this type discussed below are *Hek 864-8, Hik 734-6, Elek 367-90, Hek 956-61, Or 1155-62, Hek 592-602.*

Hekabe, after hearing Agamemnon's embarrassed reply (*Hek 850-63*) to her appeal for help in her revenge plot against Polymestor, quickly comes to a shocking conclusion about the nature of the world:

---

62 *Hkl* 297-303 is a reflection that arises out of the action in a similar way to these; but the content is uncontroversial and nothing marks it (as expressions like φεύ do elsewhere) as a sudden realisation.
Solmsen writes: "As so often, Euripides is going out of his way. None of the obstacles mentioned actually applies to Agamemnon (although πλήθος πόλεος comes close to στρατός). It cannot help Hecuba's case to theorize about the fact that nobody is 'free'.... Not to Hecuba, but to Euripides has this realization come, and he sees fit at this juncture to announce it".63 This is an entirely reasonable view of the passage, so long as it is not implied that the announcement somehow spoils the scene: in fact, Agamemnon's reply has taken the shape it has in order to provide for the insertion of this interesting reflection.

Similar is the realisation Adrastos experiences upon hearing the news of the just victory of Theseus in the battle to recover the corpses of the Argive heroes. With a sober reflection on the vanity of human wishes, he implicitly acknowledges the injustice of his own war against Thebes:

ω Ζεύ, τι δήτα τούς ταλαιπώρους βρωτοὺς
φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἔξηρτήμεθα
δρώμεν τε τοιαθ’ ἀν σὺ τυγχάνησις θέλων. (Hik 734-6)64

In Elek Orestes, faced with the noble character of the αὐτούργος who is his sister's husband, delivers a reflective monologue that has no persuasive purpose

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63 Intellectual Experiments 147.

64 This, like the Hek passage just above, has the form of a "paradoxical" gnome, with explanatory epilogue; for an impatient rhetorical question implying a statement at odds with common wisdom, cf. Andr 645f.
in the play, but which nevertheless uses familiar rhetorical techniques of presentation and argument. The speech begins with an introductory extra-metrum φεῦ that sets the tone of "sudden realisation". Orestes then states a general rule (367): οὐκ ἔστ' ἀκριβές οὐδὲν εἶς εὐανδρίαν. A gnomic epilogue (368) clarifies this somewhat obscure claim, by indicating that a ταραγμός τῶν φύσεων βροτῶν is behind the problem. A series of examples follows, substantiating the rule (369-72). Then the matter is investigated using a hypophora sequence of a familiar sort: three alternative criteria for discerning εὐανδρία are proposed in rhetorical question form (viz., wealth, poverty, prowess in war), and each is rejected, with neat variation in the manner of arguing against each (373-8). In 380-2 the application to the present case is made. Next Orestes chides those (his imaginary interlocutors, addressed in second person) who maintain the conventional wisdom (383-5). In 386-90 the class of people the αὐτουργός represents are praised as the best householders and citizens, and contrasted with αἱ σάρκες αἱ κεναι φρενῶν, ἀγάλματ' ἀγορᾶς. The final point is made that it is φύσις and εὐφυχία (that is, natural εὐανδρία) that make a man brave in battle, not sheer brawn. In 391 Orestes decides to accept the man's poor hospitality, then addresses servants, thus ending the soliloquy. The form of the speech may be tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>367f</td>
<td>paradoxical gnome with epilogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>369-72</td>
<td>substantiating examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373-9</td>
<td>hypophora sequence considering and rejecting each of three alternative criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380-2</td>
<td>application of general rule to present case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>383-5</td>
<td>challenge to common sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386-90</td>
<td>&quot;demographic&quot; reflection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For φεῦ used in this context compare, besides passages discussed here (Hek 864, 956, Or 1155), Hkld 552, fr. 401.

Similar apostrophes: (1st person) Hek 814, 959f, Hik 492, (2nd person) Hik 744-7.
The text of this reflection has been attacked by Wilamowitz, who deleted 373-79 and 386-90; his arguments are approved by Friis Johansen and the deletions accepted by Diggle.67 Aside from the rather weak argument that 379 is quoted by Diogenes Laertius as a verse from Auge, the objections are to the two passages' relevance and fit. Vss. 373-9 are said by Friis Johansen to be redundant in sense and to interrupt the natural fit of 372 with 380: in the earlier passage (368-72) birth and wealth are rejected as sure criteria of εὐανδρία, whereas the following lines envision and dismiss three alternative criteria (with "wealth" and "poverty" now treated separately). Vss. 386-90 are attacked as simply irrelevant to the play situation, in that neither athleticism nor intelligence have been held up as attainments of the classes Orestes is discussing. But the following considerations argue for the integrity of 367-85: (1) the formal process in 367-82 is that of raising and illustrating a problem (367-72), investigating it (373-8), announcing the solution (379-82);68 (2) the hypophoric sequence is a set piece, a unit very commonly inserted into Euripidean arguments and very commonly involving three alternatives; (3) there is (pace Wilamowitz, Analecta 191) no contradiction between the observation (377f) that prowess in battle is not a useful criterion for judging εὐανδρία and the point (388-90) that braving the enemy's spears depends upon the presence of that quality.69 In favour of 386-90, one may

67 Wilamowitz, Analecta 190-3; Friis Johansen, General Reflection 95 n.140. Schadewaldt (M. u. S. 139 n.4) argued for 373-9 but against 386-90. Murray and Denniston both receive all the lines: Friis Johansen's note is largely a rebuttal to the arguments Denniston offers in favour of the lines ad locc. See also Reeve "Interpolation" 151-3; Reeve rejects 368-79, 386-90 and 396-400.

68 It is admittedly unparalleled to have the "illustration" of the problem anticipate (in its reference to wealth and poverty) much of the point of the investigation that will follow. See Denniston ad 373-9.

69 Denniston suggests (ad 377) that the rejection of military prowess in 377f as a criterion stems purely from the impracticability of its application. Cropp (ad 377-8) sees the lines in a different light, noting the importance of the fact that "military achievement and sacrifice were celebrated
point out that we have seen and will see other Euripidean passages where precisely this sort of content— speculation about society, class, wealth, and the good citizen— leads us far from the play situation. With this type of material especially Euripides seems to have been willing to indulge a taste— presumably an Athenian and not merely a personal taste— for rhetoric at the expense of relevance. But the lines seem poorly prepared by 384f, and very far from the point of Orestes’ reflection.

Something like the ταραγμός to which Orestes refers (Elek 368) is noted by Polymestor in his initial reaction to the pathetic sight of Hekabe:

φεῦ.
οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πνεῦτον, οὐτ’ εὐδοξία
οὐτ’ αὖ καλῶς πράσσουσα μὴ πράξειν κακῶς.
φύσει δ’ αὐτὰ τείχι πάλιν τε καὶ πρὸς
ταραγμὸν ἐντιθέντες, ὡς ἀγνωσίαι
σέβωμεν αὐτούς. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν τί δεῖ
θρηνεῖν, προκόπτοντ’ οὐδὲν ἔσ πρόσθεν κακῶν;

(Hek 956-61)

communally rather than individually at Athens... and the old tradition of awards for excellence... and calling on witnesses to one’s valour... were in question”.

70 Citizen and state are the subject of reflections and speculations in, e.g., Med 223f, Hipp 486f, Andr [699-702], Hek 306-8, Hik 191f, 238-45, 312f, 423-5, 479f, 749f, Elek [386-90], Ion 595-606, Phoin 533-8, [1015-8], Or [907-11], Bak 270f; political demographics also surfaces in a surprising way at Her 588-92. Brackets here indicate as usual passages unacceptable to Diggle. See Schmid’s survey of this material, Gesch. d. griech. Lit. I, iii. 726-32. Quite a lot of this sort of material has been attacked by Kovacs in his art. “Tyrants & Demagogues”; I have argued elsewhere in this study against some of Kovacs’ conclusions.

71 See Cropp ad 386-90. Goldhill, “Rhetoric and Relevance” 169, argues for the lines as intended by their very ineptness and irrelevance to contribute to the presentation of Orestes as a “penny philosopher”; he concludes that “[Orestes] poorly conceived and expressed speech comes up with utterances that seem all too easily to condemn him from his own mouth” (171). I do not see this kind of subtlety operating here.

72 ταραγμός occurs again in a context of Götterkritik in IT 570ff: οὐδ’ οἱ σοφοὶ γε δαίμονες κεκλημένοι/ πτηνῶν ὄνειροι εἰσιν ἀφευδέστεροι./ πολίς ταραγμός ἐν τε τοῖς θεοῖς ἐνα/ κάν τοῖς βροτεῖοις.
Here the confusion is expressly blamed upon the gods. I suspect we should regard this rather as rhetorical hyperbole, intended to sharpen our sense of the pathos of Hekabe's situation, than as an expression of a considered and enduring theology.\(^73\) I shall return below to the question of criticism of the gods.

The same sense of a "realisation" is present in Orestes' response to the generosity of Pylades:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Orestes is suddenly reminded of the fact that wealth and power are less important than friendship, just as Polymestor has been reminded how ephemeral they are.}^74
\end{align*}
\]

And here again (if Weil is correct in seeing in πλῆθος a reference to democracy designed to balance the reference to monarchy in τυραννίς)\(^75\) a taste for political comment has taken us in an unexpected direction.

Hekabe's scene-closing speech (Hek 585-628) following Talthybios' report of the sacrifice of Polyxene divides neatly into three parts: a pathetic-reflective section addressed to Polyxene is separated by a clear transition (603f) from a

\(^73\) Cf. Talthybios' reproachful address to Zeus at 488-91, and the choral observation about the gods' failing to measure up to a human standard of σοφία, Her 655-68. Complaints about the behaviour of individual gods as characters in the plot are a different matter: Amphitryon to Zeus (Her 339-47), Orestes of Apollo (IT 711-5, Or 285-7), Ion to Apollo (Ion 436-51). I attribute no importance to the fact that Polymestor is from his entrance an extremely unwelcome character. Schadewaldt speaks of his "feigned sympathy" (M. u. S. 138). I'm not sure even this is an appropriate point: the reflection forms a link in a chain of sympathetic reactions to the plight of the fallen queen.

\(^74\) Cf. Amphitryon's final words in Her: ὅστις δὲ πλουτὸν ἢ σθείνος μᾶλλον φίλων ἁγαθῶν πεπάσθαι βούλεται κακῶς φρονεῖ (1425f). Note also Elek [1097-9], where wealth and nobility in a wife are no guarantee of σώφρονα λέχη.

\(^75\) Weil writes (ad 1156-1157): "Le poète dit que l'amitié vaut mieux que le pouvoir, soit dans une monarchie, soit dans une république".
practical section in which servants are addressed, then an apostrophe to home, husband and self (619ff) opens another reflective section. The reflection closing the speech is of a conventional "look to the end" type: Priam's death and Hekabe's misery demonstrate that wealth and power are not sure signs of happiness, a point we have heard before in the play (488-96) and will hear again in Polymestor's words quoted above.\textsuperscript{76} The reflection on Polyxene's death is more striking:

\begin{quote}
oūkousi δελνόν, εἰ γῇ μὲν κακῇ

τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θέσθεν εὖ στάχυν φέρει,

χρηστὴ δ᾽ ἀμαρτοῦσ᾽ ὄν χρεῖν αὐτὴν τύχεῖν

κακῶν δίδωσι καρπόν, ἄνθρωποι δ᾽ ἀεὶ

ὁ μὲν ποιητός οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ πλὴν κακὸς,

ὁ δ᾽ ἔσθλος ἔσθλος οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὑπὸ

φύσιν διέφθειρ᾽ ἀλλὰ χρηστὸς ἔστ᾽ ἀεὶ;

ἀρ᾽ οἱ τεκόντες διαφέρουσιν ἢ τροφαὶ;

ἐχεὶ γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς

δίδαξι ἔσθλον: τούτο δ᾽ ἦν τις εὖ μάθηι,

οἶδεν τὸ γ᾽ αἰσχρὸν κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθών. \hfill (Hek 592-602)
\end{quote}

The nobility and grace with which Polyxene has accepted death lead Hekabe to reflect that human nature has a permanence that even the earth itself lacks, in that good soil may yet give a poor crop when conditions are unfavourable, and vice versa;\textsuperscript{77} the insight is expressly described as surprising (δελνόν 592). This thought leads to consideration of the further (and highly philosophical) question whether the nobility of human individuals comes from their parents or from nurture, then to some very abstract thoughts about the nature of moral

\textsuperscript{76} The "look to the end" motif in Euripides: with Hek 628f cf. Hklq 863-6, Andr 100-2, Elek 953-6, Tro 509f, 1203-6.

\textsuperscript{77} Another interesting comparison between human and plant development is made by Peleus in Andr 636-8.
Neither the abstraction and apparent "irrelevance" of these final stages of the reflection, nor any supposed contradiction of the point made in 592-5, should lead us to suspect 599-602. The entire passage demonstrates vividly Euripides' willingness to follow a point where it leads him, and to bring up topics that were bound, as with the political material I have mentioned, to strike his audience as bold and new-fangled— and we can infer from Aristophanes that he made such an impression. That Euripides was willing to indulge in this kind of reflection at a moment of such focused pathos is a fact we must take as a sobering reminder of the distance between our literary conventions and his.

D. "Utopian Reflection" and "Götterkritik"

We have seen general statements, whether of a factual or an ethical nature, offered without apparent reflection or justification in presenting and buttressing arguments. Next we looked at "reflective" passages in which a character seems to develop a general statement or view in response to a present situation: it is often stated or implied that this view contradicts expectation or common sense, and so I have referred to these reflections as "realisations". These seem generally to have an epideictic, almost extra-dramatic quality rather

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78 Cf. the important reflection of Adrastos, Hik 911-7. There it is said that τὸ τραφήμαι μὴ κακῶς confers αἰδώς, and that this quality guarantees valour. This point is followed by the announcement that ἡ ἐνανθρίσια is learned from instruction, like language, and that the things one is taught stay with one through life.

79 599-602 del. Sakorraphos, Diggle. In favour of the lines see Weil ad loc, Schadewaldt Mon. u. Selbst. 138f, Collard ad 592-602.
than a persuasive purpose. I turn now to passages in which a character wishes for a fundamental change in some aspect of the world.80

Euripidean utopian wishes and reflections resolve themselves into three important groups: characters wish for (1) existence of a clear indicator of honesty, righteousness, etc.; (2) a world without women; (3) a second passage through life. Without denying the up-to-date quality of these reflections, their undoubted relation to trends in contemporary thought and expression— and without discounting the appeal they have on this score alone— I would emphasise the purely "rhetorical" value of these Euripidean utterances. Hekabe attacks the specious arguments of Polymestor's defense speech by beginning her rebuttal with a reflection on honest speech:

'Αγάμεμνον, ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἔχρην ποτε
τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἱσχύειν πλέον;
ἀλλ' εἴτε χρήστ' ἐδρασε χρήστ' ἔδει λέγειν,
εἴτ' αὖ ποιηρά τοὺς λόγους εἶναι σαθροὺς,
καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι τάδικ' εὖ λέγειν ποτέ.  (Hek 1187-91)

Similar is the first stage of Theseus' attack on the apparently devious impassivity of Hippolytus:

φεῦ, χρήν βροτοῦσι τῶν φίλων τεκμήριον
σαφῆς τι κείσθαι καὶ διάγνωσιν φρενῶν,
ὅστις τ' ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν ὡς τε μὴ φίλος,
δισσάς τε φωνᾶς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν,

80 I am not concerned here with expressions of regret over a specific action, event, etc. (e.g. Med 1-15), nor again with the identification of "faulty practices" (e.g. IT 380-91). Solmsen has included both these classes in his discussion of "Utopian Wishes and Schemes of Reform", Int. Exp. 66-82. Critical comments and impossible wishes of various sorts are sometimes addressed to a god; but I am not interested here in criticism by human characters of gods as individuals (see note 72 above).
And Ion, exasperated by the impossibility of physically attacking his tormentor due to the protection Kreousa has claimed as a suppliant, wishes for a similar physical manifestation of good and evil:

\[
\text{φεῦ}
\text{δεινόν γε θυντοῖς τοὺς νόμους ὡς οὐ καλῶς}
\text{ἐθήκεν ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ γνώμης σοφῆς}
\text{τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄδικους βωμὸν οὐχ ἱζεῖν ἔχρην}
\text{ἀλλὰ ἐξελαύνειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ φαύειν καλὸν}
\text{θεῶν ποιηράι χειρί, τοῖς δὲ ἐνδίκοις.}
\]

(Ion 1312-16)

There are striking similarities of form in these three passages. And the "utopian" idea, though not a new thought, may well have been a stylish one. But all three of these "wishes" form part of a rhetorical attack on an opponent who is to be perceived as so vile that in a just world his true nature would be plain for all to see. This is neither a philosophical, nor—in spite of οἱ θεοὶ in Ion 1313—a religious idea, but a rhetorical tactic. The same idea expressed in these three passages as a wish appears elsewhere, with a no less rhetorical function, as a reproach addressed to Zeus:

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81 Commentators note related ideas in earlier poetry (Theogn. 119-24, Pind. Pyth. 10. 67f, Attic Skolia 6 and 33 Diehl) and in Aesop fab. 102 Hausrat. In Euripides cf. frr. 388, 439. And in a lyric reflection the Chorus of old men in Her wish one could have a second life as a visible stamp of one’s ἀφετήρ. I would suggest the idea of a true and a false voice in Hipp 925ff owes something to Homer’s two gates of dreams (Od xix, 562-7).
Medea has begun by saying she will speak out so as to give herself relief and Jason pain through vilifying him (473f), and this final reproach— not really a complaint against Zeus but against Jason— completes that program.

The passages wishing for a "utopian" world without women likewise occur in heated rhetorical contexts. Jason rebutting Medea's charges against him closes:

ο γὰρ ἀλλοθέν ποθὲν βροτοὺς
παῖδας τεκνοῦσαι, θῆλυ δ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι γένος.
χούτως ἂν οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις κακὸν. (Med 573-5)

Hippolytus reacting vehemently to the proposition made by the Nurse on Phaidra's behalf begins:

ο Ζεὺς, τι δὴ κίβδηλον ἀνθρώποις κακὸν
γυναῖκας ἐς φῶς ἡλίου κατώκισας;
εἰ γὰρ βρότεσθοι ἡθελες σπεῖραι γένος,
οὐκ ἐκ γυναικῶν χρῆν παρασχέσθαι τόδε,
ἀλλ’ ἐκ. (Hipp 616-20)

In these two passages we see again an impossible wish expressed using χρῆν, and a similar idea for change put as a reproach addressed to Zeus. And again we find the underlying ideas differently formulated elsewhere.82 These utterances then,

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82 Misogyny: frr. 666, 1059. Marriage is rejected (in very different terms) in Alk 882-8, Med 230-7. Finley (Three Essays 92-7) calls attention to Euripidean connections with Antiphon B 49 (from Περὶ Ὀμονοίας).
like the group regretting the lack of a sure sign of virtue, should be thought of neither as serious criticism of the gods, nor as serious "utopian" reflections, but as examples of rhetorical ploys and strategems, more elaborate than some others but serving the same basic purpose.

The same points may be made of Iphis' "utopian" wish people could go a second time through life, so as to benefit from the lessons of the first life:

\[\text{oιμοί τί δή βροτοίςν οὐκ ἔστιν τὸδε,}
\text{νέους δίς εἶναι καὶ γέροντας αὖ πάλιν;}
\text{ἀλλ' ἐν δόμοις μὲν ἢν τι μὴ καλῶς ἔχῃ}
\text{γνώμαισιν ὑστέραισιν ἐξορθούμεθα,}
\text{αἰώνα δ' οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δ' ἤμεν νέοι}
\text{δίς καὶ γέροντες, εἰ τις ἐξεμάρτανεν}
\text{διπλοῦ βίου λαχώντες ἐξωρθούμεθ' ἀν.} \quad (\text{Hik 1080-6})

The idea, which can like those discussed above be paralleled in both earlier and contemporary Greek thought,\(^83\) serves to introduce the somewhat paradoxical regret Iphis feels over his having begot children, who have now died. This regret becomes a rationale for Iphis' decision to embrace death himself, and the justification of a decision to accept death is, as we saw in I.D above, a typical occasion for the exercise of rhetorical resourcefulness in Euripidean tragedy.

These "utopian" reflections, like the escapist fantasies sometimes expressed in lyrics,\(^84\) play a dual role: within the economy of the play, they contribute to our sense of a character's antagonism, frustration, despair; at the same time we may assume that, like the fancy proems, sophisticated probability

\(^83\) Cf. Theogn. 1007-12, Bacchyl. 3, 88, Soph. fr. 67 (where Pearson cites Iliad IX. 408f, a distant relative of our passage). Some see a connection of Hik 1080-6 with the thought of Antiphon B 52 (which Collard ad Hik 1080-1 adduces as evidence the idea "may have been a sophists' talking-point"; cf. Bond ad Her 665-72).

\(^84\) "Escapist fantasies": choral wishes to undertake impossible journeys at Alk 455-9, Hik 617-25, Hel 1479-86; cf. Phaidra at Hipp 230f, Hermione at Andr 861-5, Kreousa at Ion 796-9.
arguments and political reflections I have discussed elsewhere in this study, they held a certain fascination in their own right for the original audience. While they may be common topics of discussion in sophistic circles, they represent no real contemporary "schemes of reform" (in Solmsen's phrase), and all three of the notions above can be found in some form in earlier Greek literature. But they are well fitted to their rhetorical context and stylishly expressed.

As for the idea that such passages represent serious criticism of the gods, we have seen that criticism of the ways of the world may or may not refer the fault to a god or "the gods". It makes little difference when they do. For example, Hippolytus addresses to Zeus his reflection on the desirability of a world without women (Hipp 616ff), but Jason opens his similar reflection (Med 573ff) with an impersonal χρῆν; Medea addresses to Zeus her impossible wish for a clear infallible sign of quality in men (Med 516-9), but Theseus in Hipp 925-31 opens a similar thought with φεῦ (registering emotion) and χρῆν; Polymestor blames the ταραγμός that renders human prosperity unreliable on "the gods" (Hek 958ff), but the ταραγμός that Orestes finds makes virtue hard to predict is said to reside in αὐτοις βροτῶν (Elek 368). So Schadewaldt, speaking of Menelaos' monologue, Hel 483-514, notes:85

Das Pathos ist wie üblich am Anfang des Selbstgesprächs bezeichnet (483): τι φω; τι λέξω, wofür auch ein ὦ θεοί oder φεῦ φεῦ, τι λέξω hätte stehen können, denn Pathos bedeutet hier nur Affiziertsein, und dieses ist, da es den Menschen des Alltags betrifft, nicht wählereich im Ausdruck.

In spite of this view, Schadewaldt finds, in earlier passages addressed to Zeus (Med 516-9, Hipp 616-24, Hek 488-500), genuine religious content and serious criticism.86 He overestimates the force of the name Zeus, and under-

85 Mon. und Selbst. 231.
86 Ibid 120ff.
estimates the rhetorical character of such utterances. Consider the following passages. Euripides has characters express perplexity in lines beginning:

οἷμοι, τί φῶ
λίγο, τί λέξω
ὁ Ζεῦ, τί λέξω
ὁ θεῖοι, τί λέξω

Impatient or surprised questions begin:

ἐιὲν, τί δῆ
ἐιὲν, τί δῆτα
οἷμοι, τί δῆ
οἷμοι, τί δῆτα
ὁ Ζεῦ, τί δῆ
ὁ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα
ὁ θεῖοι, τί δῆτα

Of the passages opening ὁ Ζεῦ, Kyk 375 and Med 516 involve no further reference to Zeus: that is, the expression is a mere expletive. In Hipp 616, Hek 488, and Hik 734 the sequel shows the address to Zeus to be more genuine. But in no case is a point made using ὁ Ζεῦ that we do not see made in another way elsewhere. There seems to be no basis on which to conclude that this formulaic pattern has a stronger sense when Zeus is named than when another addressee or expletive is involved.

87 See Friis Johansen, General Reflection 86 n.105, for a dissent from Schadewaldt over this point. But Friis Johansen seems to see in these expressions stylised formulas for marking a pathos that is largely conventional; I see them as stylised formulas in a system of eristic and persuasive rhetoric.

88 A complete study of the formular shape seen here would cover also examples with personal address and with similar questions such as τι δράσω: (e.g., Hipp 782, Hek 737, Her 1157, IT 777, Ion 756, etc.). I give above examples that open with ὁ Ζεῦ and their closest relations only.
The Euripidean "utopian reflection", then, should be thought of primarily as a form of rhetorical argument in which the opponent's position is attacked, or the speaker's position promoted, through the device of creating an alternate world that lends itself to a striking comparison with the reality of the present situation. This procedure resembles the use of gnomic "rules" in argument, in bringing a general idea to bear on a special case; but these reflections draw upon a pool of utopian images rather than a pool of maxims and proverbs. These utopian images, though undoubtedly stylish in Euripides' period, rest on "traditional" ideas just as do most Euripidean maxims, and the arguments formed using them have the normal rhetorical purpose of defeating an opponent. The use of an apostrophe to Zeus or the gods in presenting these arguments seems to contribute a sense of rhetorical urgency rather than serious religious content.
Chapter V

Rhetoric in Three Plays

I propose in this final chapter to discuss in detail the use of rhetorical material in one scene of *Hippolytos*, the first half of *Suppliant Women*, and the whole of *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. My purpose is to explore the ways in which argumentative speeches, debates, and complex rhetorical scenes relate to other parts of the play and to the play as a whole: the extent to which they reveal character, reinforce themes, contribute to large formal patterns. My results will suggest that critics who view rhetorical material in tragedy as essentially conventional and non-integral are apt to ignore important aspects of this material; but I will note as well points at which critics who see subtle psychology or irony in neutral rhetorical material seem to be in error.

A. Phaidra's Monologue

In the second episode of *Hippolytos*, Phaidra has decided upon suicide as the only way of relieving the agony of her passion for Hippolytos, and of avoiding the disgrace that would affect her and her children if her love became known. Her speech to the Chorus (373-430) explains her γνώμης ὀδός, the

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1 In this discussion, the following contributions will be cited by author's name only: E.R. Dodds, "A ΔΩΣ of Phaedra" (1925); R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "A Study in Causation" (1957); W.S. Barrett’s comm. (1964); C. Willink, "Some Problems" (1968); C. Segal, "Shame and Purity" (1970); F. Solmsen, "Bad Shame" (1973); J. Gould, "Dramatic Character" (1978); B. Manuwald, "Phaidras Irrtum" (1979); D. Conacher, "Rhetoric and Relevance" (1981); A. Michelini, *Euripides* (1987); D. Cairns, *A ΔΩΣ* (1993); E. Craik, "A ΔΩΣ" (1993). For complete citations see Bibliography.
course of thought through which she arrived at this decision. But the speech begins with a long reflection that considers general problems of morality.

Phaidra's speech, though formally addressed to the "public", is not designed to persuade so much as to justify a decision in rational terms (cf. the "Opfertod" speeches discussed in I.D above). She will do this through a number of stages: she focuses first on an abstract view of vice and virtue (373-87), then traces the course of her own reaction to the problem (388-402); next her decision to die is justified by a somewhat pragmatic moral rule (403f), and some reflections on bad women; then the focus returns to herself, Theseus, and her children (419-23); the speech ends with a series of gnomic statements (424-30).

She begins: "I have at times in the past reflected in a general way, in long stretches of night, on the way by which a human life is spoiled. And they (people) seem to me to go wrong not in accordance with the (defective) nature of their intentions—after all, many people have good sense (yet go wrong). Rather, one must look at it this way: We know and recognise the good, but we don't take the trouble to practise it; some as a result of laziness, some by putting some other pleasure before the good. Life has many pleasures: long chats and

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2 πράσσειν κάκιον (codd) or κακίου (Herwerden): both Barrett (ad 377-81) and Willink (12, 17) overstate the difference between the two. Phaidra is talking about loss of control over one's life: 'faring worse' and 'doing wrong' are two sides of that coin. The person fails to do or not do something, and διέφθαρται βίος. But failure to achieve or realise "the good life" is not the topic (see below).

3 The idea of enduring a πόνος to achieve τὰ χρηστά, with laziness and (other?) pleasures identified as obstacles, puts us clearly in a moral context. Thus any ambiguity present in 378 is here removed—Phaidra is speaking of moral behaviour, not "the good life", "success" (as Willink [12] would like).

4 A pleasure other than laziness, or other than the good? Willink (14): "The word-order clearly identifies τὸ καλὸν as a ἡδονή". Barrett (ad 381-5) takes "something else" as implying "than ἄργια", but feels the phrase doesn't imply that "ἄργια" is a "pleasure". Friis Johansen (General Reflection 124) states that Phaidra's scheme of divisions (of which this is the first) "employs ἡδονή as a superior genus in two successive διαφέρεσις", noting that this is implied in ἄλλην τιν—i.e., he understands "laziness or some other pleasure is put before the good". See also Michelini 208 (ambivalent); Cairns 323 n.218 ('the 'other pleasure' will be τὸ καλὸν...", citing additional literature). My ambiguous paraphrase resembles that of Winnington-Ingram (174).
leisure— pleasant but evil— and \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \). There are two kinds: the one not a bad thing, but the other drags down houses. If the distinction (of each) were clear, they wouldn't be two things with the same letters".

Formally we have here an elaborate argumentation process, though there is at this stage some doubt what point will emerge. Phaidra is setting out to demonstrate that people "do wrong" through personal weakness of will. She introduces the point by first denying a proposition that is roughly its opposite, viz. the idea that wrong-doers act \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \; \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \varsigma \; \phi \upsilon \sigma \nu \), whatever precisely that means. This formal procedure highlights the argument Phaidra is going to put; if it happens (as is not impossible) to involve negating a viewpoint that Socrates or others may have been promoting in their teaching around the year 430, then Euripides may have chosen a verbal formula here that would ring a bell with some audience members, but this would be quite incidental to the purpose of Phaidra's speech. In 380f Phaidra states her real point: people don't struggle hard enough to follow what they recognise as the right course (\( \tau \alpha \; \chi \rho \eta \sigma \tau \alpha \)). Now we get a series of divisions: (1) people may not struggle enough due either to laziness or to pursuing some other pleasure they have set before \( \tau \alpha \; \kappa \alpha \lambda \omicron \nu \); (2) pleasures are many— talk and leisure— and \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \) is another thing that some have set before \( \tau \alpha \; \kappa \alpha \lambda \omicron \nu \); (3) \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \) is of two sorts, one good and one bad. In 388-

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5 Sc. of \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \); Willink introduced (15f) the idea that two kinds of pleasure are meant, and this has been taken up by Cairns (324-7), who cites Claus and Kovacs as also taking this view. As Craik points out (47), even if two kinds of pleasure are meant, \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \) will remain ambivalent.

6 On the placing of this speech in relation to contemporary philosophical debate, see most recently T.H. Irwin, "Euripides and Socrates".

7 This technique elsewhere in Euripides: Med 215ff (two successive divisions); see Collard ad Hik 238 for other examples.

8 Barrett (ad 381-5) suggests this interpretation, as necessitated by the fact that \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \) cannot be described as a "pleasure"; Solmsen (424f) finds the idea somewhat difficult but attractive. Craik, whose understanding of \( \alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma \) (discussed below) removes the problem, goes too far in calling Barrett's view a "breathtaking disregard of grammar and syntax" (47).
90, she begins to suggest a connection between these thoughts and her own case: "Since then this is my (general) view, I was bound (on a specific occasion?) not to use any φάρμακον to spoil it, and so slide back in my thinking".

There are problems here for interpreters. It will be helpful to state first the points that seem clear. Phaidra is aware that moral behaviour requires strenuous effort, and she sees idleness, pleasures of various sorts, and αἰδώς (whether or not this too is a "pleasure") as potentially discouraging that effort. Beyond that, doubts intrude. As to the particular pleasures she mentions, there seem to be three different approaches taken by critics: (1) Phaidra names as obstacles people place before τὰ καλὰ a list of items chosen virtually at random by Euripides from those that one might expect her to be aware of (Solmsen, 421). That is, the list "long talks and leisure and αἰδώς" has a realistic ring on Phaidra's tongue but no necessary relation to her own case. (2) The list represents precisely the temptations confronting Phaidra, and to which she feels vulnerable (Barrett ad 381-5). (3) Another possibility is that Phaidra is naming weaknesses she is able to disavow; if her decision to die is understood as a triumphant case of ἐκπονεῖν τά χρηστά, then perhaps she is claiming to be unaffected by these weaknesses (Michelini, 300).

There are other problems of the relation of the general points to the situation in Hipp. The application of general rule to special case is not so clearly pointed as we would expect from similar passages. A strong break separates

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9 Before raising the question what is meant by αἰδώς, we may ask whether there can really be a good αἰδώς that prevents people from doing good. If Phaidra were speaking more strictly, she might say that the αἰδώς of the second division ("things that prevent people from acting morally") is the bad αἰδώς only. Michelini (300) characterises this third division in the series: "Phaidra drifts from her apparent theme... into musings on αἰδώς". I see neither drift nor musing here.

10 Solmsen compares Med 215ff, where a number of generalisations made about women clearly don't apply to Medea herself.

11 I rely here on Friis Johansen's discussion, General Reflection 122ff.
this passage from the continuation (λέξω δὲ καὶ σοι… 391), where elsewhere long speech-opening reflections are followed by a clear formula of application (e.g. S. Ant 184, E. Elek 380, Andr 703). Furthermore Phaidra has not given us as clear a logical framework as we might like: does οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν (381) imply we all fail to carry out τὰ χρηστά? She has spoken of different reasons for moral failure without any reference to the possibility of moral success. Thus we will be listening to the sequel very carefully to learn what these general pronouncements are leading up to. Where will Phaidra fit in? Is she thinking of a good deed she is preventing herself from carrying out, or an evil deed she is struggling not to commit? How is αἰδως involved? And what is meant by her refusing to resort to "any sort of φάρμακον"?

Phaidra has taken us through a moral system in which people’s failure to act morally was connected with pleasures and (or including) αἰδως; and she now insists that, having this point of view, she would not want to destroy it by using any φάρμακον and so reverse her frame of mind. The word φάρμακον will return in Hipp (at vs. 479), with a specific sense. Here it is used quite generally of any "cure"; the sentence means superficially "there is no way I would want to give up these insights". But one suspects an element of irony in Euripides’ choice of words: Phaidra by using a φάρμακον (in the sense "love charm") could be "cured" of her craving for Hippolytus, and this would involve τοῦμπαλιν πεσεῖν φρενῶν.

We have heard Phaidra’s exposition of her moral ideas, and of her determination to cling to them. She now moves to her own immediate situation, and reveals the steps by which she reached her resolve to die (391-401). The chronological character of this section was mentioned above (I.B) as an unusual application of chronological organization: Phaidra is describing the stages in a
progression rather than recalling a past moment for its value as a springboard for an argumentative point. In this case three stages are reviewed. Phaidra resolved at first to deal with her affliction through silence, then through τὸ σωφρονεῖν, and finally she decided upon death. The first of these decisions she supports with a gnome: the tongue (i.e., that of the secret-keeper, and that of any confidant) can't be trusted; it can correct others' faulty ideas, but itself gathers more trouble than anything. The second stands with no argument, but we are told it was an unsatisfactory solution. In the third stage, the decision to die is called the "strongest of plans", and supported with a general rule:

εὖοι γὰρ εἰτὶ μὴτε λαλθάνειν καλὰ
μὴτ' αἰσχρὰ δρώσῃ μάρτυρας πολλοὺς ἔχειν. (403f)

For let me have it thus: not to go unseen in a noble act, nor to have many witnesses in a disgraceful one.

This is not a shocking or paradoxical moral rule, when its argumentative purpose of justifying death before disgrace is recognised, and allowance is made for its rather rhetorical positive-negative formulation; but it does introduce that concern for good appearances (ἐὐκλεῖα) that is going to prove decisive for Phaidra's thoughts later in the play. Phaidra is defending her decision to die on

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12 It is clear that Phaidra did not pass through these three stages in connection with the events of the previous episode; we learned in the Prologue that she is dying in silence (39f), and in the Parodos ode that she is starving herself (138ff). Euripides has dramatised the danger of a complete loss of reputation through the two incidents in which Phaidra's secret gradually comes out in the presence of the Nurse and Chorus, but these two incidents were not the occasion for her decision to die. Cairns, 323, thinks otherwise; but vss. 400f tell us not that Phaidra failed to keep silence or practise σωφροσύνη, but that these were no cure.

13 J.H. Finley, Three Essays 99, notes the similarity of a moral precept found in the Ἀλήθεια of Antiphon the Sophist. (Craik, 49-52, notes a variety of other points of contact in Phaidra's speech with contemporary sophistic thought.) Willink wilfully manipulates the sense: "τὸ αἰσχρὰ δρᾶν... was not excluded, provided there were few enough 'witnesses'. It is a chilling expression of the ideal of εὐκλεῖα in its crudest form" (20). His assumption throughout is that Euripides' intention is subtly to undercut Phaidra, but this would not be subtle.
the grounds that her shame would otherwise be bound eventually to become public knowledge;\(^\text{14}\) therefore the "relevant" half of the antithesis is the second line.\(^\text{15}\) I shall return to this striking couplet below.

Phaidra's speech continues with reflections on passion and adultery, including the deliciously Euripidean observation (409-12) that this crime must have originated in the best houses, since in that case it would pass by example to the lower classes (whereas presumably the reverse would not happen). And yet nothing need prevent us from seeing "relevance" in such epigrams—one thinks immediately of Phaidra's own royal blood, and of her mother. She wonders how any woman could face her husband while having a lover, addressing the appeal \(\omega \ \delta\epsilon\sigma\pi\omicron\omega\ \pi\omicron\tau\iota\iota\ K\upsilon\pi\omicron\). At 419 she returns to her own case. She will never be caught (\(\mu\nu\pi\omicron\tau\omicron\ ...\alpha\lambda\omicron\ 420\)) betraying her husband, nor her children.\(^\text{16}\) A reflection follows, important for the unfolding of the plot, on the status of children: how some may have freedom and glory "on their mother's account"; others may experience something like slavery, due to their awareness of the \(\kappa\alpha\kappa\alpha\) of a parent. A gnome closes these thoughts: time will reveal the base. Her final words again (cf. 403f) express an everyday moral sentiment in a way which we may later in retrospect realise was tailored to reflect the obsession building within her: may I never be seen (noticed, recognised) among the base.

The speech divides into two halves, each of which begins with general material, then moves to Phaidra's own case:

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\(^{14}\) She is not, however, making a pitch for the Chorus' silence, as Willink suggests (11); that issue never comes up. The fact the women of the Chorus know her secret is completely ignored for now, and so of no importance. And when at 710-12 she asks for their silence, there is no persuading to be done.

\(^{15}\) Michelini has suggested (301) she is trying to call attention to a noble act here. But her purpose is entirely negative: avoid \(\delta\upsilon\omicron\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\epsilon\omicron\alpha\).

\(^{16}\) The passage has led her very naturally to think of her children. They assume greater importance over the course of the play: note 305-10, 715-21, 847, 858f.
373-90  my view of virtue and vice
391-402  my resolve to die
403-18   adultery, shame and reputation
419-30   my husband and children

With the whole speech now in view, I return to a detailed look at problems of interpretation in its first half. We have seen in IV.A above that it is Euripides' normal practice, when he opens a speech using gnomic material or a substantial general reflection, to follow this material with a passage more or less clearly pointing out the relationship of the general rule to the specific play-situation.\(^{17}\) As Friis Johansen has noted, the present passage (Hipp 373-402) formally considered doesn't yield up as clear a correspondence as we would expect from similar passages.\(^{18}\) But if the passage is formally unusual it does not necessarily follow that the normal dramatic function of general reflection is abandoned. If we may assume that the function of the general passage (373-90) is to give a large context to the special material of 391-402, then we must find, at the minimum, a sense in which Phaidra's decision to die results from her awareness of \(\alpha\iota\delta\omega\varsigma\) (or some other pleasure or temptation?)\(^{19}\) as tending to keep her from \(\tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu\). What, first of all, is the meaning of \(\tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu\) in 382? That is, what "good" does Phaidra imply she is or is not failing to achieve? Here already there is a woeful lack of consensus: at the fringes are Willink ("the good life" in the sense of general happiness and success) and Cairns (the suicide through which Phaidra

\(^{17}\) Euripidean examples of clear application of a general rule expressed in a proem: \textit{Andr} 324, 703, \textit{Elek} 367, \textit{Bak} 268, etc. Application strikingly absent (because obvious): \textit{Hek} 1186-94.

\(^{18}\) \textit{General Reflection} 122f: the "initial section [vss. 373-90] is most expressly set off from the sequel by an elaborate frame" formed by 375f and 388-90. For the structure Friis Johansen compares \textit{S. Ant} 175-206.

\(^{19}\) I add this in deference to Solmsen, who denies both that the points mentioned by Phaidra along the way need relate to her own case (420f), and that \(\alpha\iota\delta\omega\varsigma\), because named last, must therefore be the "relevant" or "effective" member of the list (422). But I think \(\alpha\iota\delta\omega\varsigma\) is the culprit.
will escape her passion). That these views are deeply flawed may be quickly demonstrated: Willink's view has Phaidra announce that pleasures of various sorts are among the obstacles preventing one from achieving a life of comfort and pleasure; Cairns' view seems to require Phaidra to have spontaneously hit upon suicide as a "good", then to have recognised that \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) connected with her sexual passion for her stepson was keeping her from achieving this good.\(^{20}\)

Most critics seem to assume (without discussion) that marital fidelity is the "good" that is threatened in Phaidra's case, and one can easily imagine that Phaidra recognises this as a good, but feels she is risking allowing some temptation, pleasure, or \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) to spoil it. The passage, in fact, would make excellent and immediate sense if this word \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) were not so troublesome. The fact, incidentally, that two kinds of \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) are mentioned should be regarded as the result of two purely rhetorical procedures; it was necessary, having included \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) (in whatever sense) in a list of "things that inhibit the good", to add a "footnote" to explain that not all \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) is of this type, and then the temptation to continue the passage's virtuosity with a third \( \delta \alpha \iota \rho \varepsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma \) was not resisted.\(^{21}\) So the sense is no more than: "Life's evil pleasures include long talks, leisure, \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \); though come to think of it, some \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) is not bad". The quest for a matching pair of instances of \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \) in the play, which can then be held up as the contents of Phaidra's thought here, is based on a misunderstanding of the poet's desire for

\(^{20}\) Cairns 324 n. 218. But clearly suicide can only have presented itself to Phaidra's mind as a moral act in connection with some impulse to do wrong; it is this prior stage of moral conflict that must be explained.

\(^{21}\) Barrett (ad 385-6): "It is only with this bad \( \alpha \delta \omega \varsigma \), of course, that Ph. is concerned (she mentions the good one only for the sake of the distinction)". The distinction between "two things spelled the same way" intrudes a bit of fifth-century cleverness; but does it also perhaps plant a useful seed in our minds, a seed that makes it easier later in the play for us to accept that a Bronze Age queen can write a letter?
fulness and precision in rhetoric. As for the word's meaning, Solmsen wrote, after reviewing some fairly complex theories designed to explain what good and bad $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ are here, "How much better it would be if everybody present at the performance knew immediately what $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ was bad" (423). Conacher, in his 1967 book, proposed with some reluctance a sense of $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ for this passage, admittedly unparalleled: $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ as a pleasurable obstacle to good might be "the distracting enjoyment of 'taboo' subjects which, when not treated with reverence, leads to shame". Recently Craik, in a very thorough review of the problems and proposed solutions, suggests a simpler idea along these same lines: that $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ as used here is "a euphemistic metonymy for $\epsilon \rho \omega \varsigma$" (45). In spite of the lack of good parallels, Craik's suggestion merits serious consideration: the context here so clearly requires a sense on the lines suggested by Conacher or Craik (even aside from the problem of how the general statement is to be applied to the situation in the play), that such a solution should be adopted. I understand the sequence of thought to be as follows: We tend not to carry out the good we recognise, and this is due to various pleasures we put before the good— such pleasures as plea-

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22 This was a concern of Dodds' article: "At v. 244 $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ saves Phaedra; at v. 335 it destroys her" (103). Segal sees (283f) a tension between an external $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ ("Phaedra's 'respect' for the opinion of others") and an internal one ("her inward sense of modesty, shame, chastity"). The former is connected with Phaidra's exaggerated attachment to $\varepsilon \rho \chi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \iota$. Segal suggests her intention to die is here presented as leading to "a desired union and reconciliation" of the two kinds of $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ (287).

23 Solmsen suggested a kind of paralysing inhibition that might be called $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ or $\alpha i\sigma \chi \varepsilon \iota \eta$ (423f); but he had doubts whether this could ever be described as a pleasure.

24 Euripidean Drama 54f. Conacher seems to have given up this idea in his 1981 article, where he speaks of bad $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ as "diffidence or indecisiveness" (11), adding (n.13) that he follows Barrett's interpretation, but with "continuing uncertainty". Cairns comments on the earlier idea in A1AQZ 322 n. 208.

25 Craik notes a range of quasi-sexual usages of words related to $\alpha i\sigma \chi \varepsilon \iota \eta$, the seeming interchangeability in certain contexts of $\alpha i\delta \omega \varsigma$ and $\alpha i\sigma \chi \varepsilon \iota \eta$, the Homeric $\alpha i\sigma \delta \alpha \iota =$ genitalia. The nearest parallel she quotes is Theog. 1265f: 'I've done you many favours, but I get no 'respect'.

189
sant company and the stuff of shame.\textsuperscript{26} Having this view, I was bound to resist when a forbidden love afflicted me. And here is how I resisted....

It remains to consider whether Phaidra presents her resistance as a success or a failure; that is, whether her suicide is presented here as a case of \(\varepsilon \kappa \nu \nu \nu \varepsilon i \nu \ \tau \alpha \chi \rho \eta \sigma \tau \alpha\), or as a failure to achieve the good; a third view might be that suicide represents an escape from the problem of achieving or failing to achieve the good.\textsuperscript{27} This question can't be decided by the form of Phaidra's pronouncement: she does not explicitly identify herself with a group of people who succeed or fail in moral action; in fact she has said "We [sc. people in general] fail to carry out the good we recognise". But this does not give us a basis for inferring she regards all attempts at moral behaviour as doomed to failure, only that failure is a frequent outcome of the attempt. A similar rhetorical device is used in \textit{Hik} 216-18, where Theseus describes a common human failing: "Possessed of arrogance we think ourselves wiser than gods". But the sequel there ("You [Adrastos] belong to this sort of people", with "and I don't" clearly implied) suggests that here too "we" merely gives a rhetorical way of phrasing a gnome, and shouldn't be taken as strictly inclusive. But if form doesn't decide the question, the general drift of Phaidra's thought does: She says she has formed in her general thinking (\(\delta \lambda \lambda \omega \varsigma\ 375\)) a certain conception, and is determined in the present situation not to fall back in her views (388-90). The \(\gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \varsigma \ \delta \delta \varsigma\) through which she then takes

\textsuperscript{26} My phrase is intended to be both euphemistic and vague. Craik seems to be thinking of "love affairs", Conacher of "guilty thoughts of love"; the latter seems to pinpoint what is immobilizing Phaidra, and involves an easy extension of the idea of "shame" (the \(\alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma\) of vs. 244, for example). But the passage is general and would work with either sense, and Craik's bold stroke involving \(\alpha \iota \delta \omega \varsigma\) and colloquialism may be right.

\textsuperscript{27} The positive view is upheld by Manuwald (142), Michelini (300f), Cairns (323). Dodds (102) sees failure: "The attempt to achieve a truer solution...proves too hard for her... There remains only death". Friis Johansen seems to take my third approach when he speaks of "the defeat of the \(\gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta\) by the \(\varepsilon \rho \omega \varsigma\)", and of "the desperate expedient of suicide" (\textit{General Reflection} 122).

190
us presents a series of measures: plan A, silence; plan B, τὸ σωφρονεῖν28 plan C ("the strongest of all"), death. Nothing is said here to suggest death represents a surrender of the effort to overcome her affliction (Kύπριν κρατῆσαι 401); rather it is presented as the logical measure to resort to when earlier plans have failed. As Cairns says: "Phaedra is not explaining to the chorus the reasons for her own failure in conceiving an illegitimate passion for her stepson, but rather insisting that she intends to behave entirely properly now that she has conceived such a passion".29

A speech by the Nurse now initiates the process of breaking down Phaidra's second layer of resistance. The queen has now confessed her love, and will next agree to seek a "cure" other than death for the problem. The speech of the Nurse is not really an "answer" to that of Phaidra; a monologue formally addressed to the chorus is followed by a paraenetic speech. But the Nurse's entire purpose is to dissuade Phaidra from the course she has just announced, and to accomplish this she will introduce some striking echoes of Phaidra's words.

28 The sense must be "keeping my thoughts pure", rather than "practising sexual continence", since this is adopted as a second measure, and since the goal is Kύπριν κρατῆσαι, to overcome Desire.

29 AΔΩΣ 323. Cairns is mistaken though in supposing that Phaidra's decision has been taken in the light of her recent revelation to Nurse and Chorus (i.e. that the failures of plans A & B have been enacted during the play): see n. 13 above. As Winnington-Ingram well says (178) "There is no sign whatever that she regrets the revelation". But Winnington-Ingram (179f) feels that Phaidra's sense of ἐυδικεῖα is gratified by the opportunity to call attention here to her passion and her way of overcoming it. I don't see this at all; the revelation of her secret was simply the required first step in motivating the death of Hippolytos, and the debate here is in no real sense public. That the Chorus witness both is a purely conventional fact, and even this will be effectively cancelled through the oath they will take in 713f. Manuwald (142) understands vs. 329 to mean suicide will bring honour to Phaidra. But πρᾶγμα there has a more general sense: see Barrett ad loc. Cairns' statement (323) that the "ultimate point" of Phaidra's "optimism" is that it will prove to fail is factually dubious (she will commit suicide, and her intrigue against Hippolytos will succeed) and has no relevance for the interpretation of the rhetorical situation in this episode.
A four-line proem refers to speaker and listener and headlines the speech's rather abstract argument: "Second thoughts somehow are wiser". The idea is fleshed out in 437f; Phaidra's suffering is not unique, but a common fact of life. Where Phaidra spoke of morality, honour, disgrace, the Nurse focuses on love:

\[
\text{ἐφαίς (τί τούτο θαύμα;) σὺν πολλοῖς βροτῶν'}
\text{kαπειτ' ἐρωτὸς οὕνεκα ψυχῆν ὀλεῖς; (439f)}
\]

First she grants the point, then pulls the rug from under it with a pair of rhetorical questions, the first suggesting impatience and condescension, the second (like many questions beginning with \(\varepsilon\iota\tau\alpha\) or \(\varepsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\)) ridiculing the idea it presents. The speech continues:

- 441-2 gnome: no reason lovers should die
- 443-6 corroboration through a "foil-antithesis": Kypris may be accepted or (at peril) resisted
- 447-8 she is everywhere, and everything is born of her
- 449-50 Kypris confers \(\epsilon\rho\omega\sigma\), to which all owe existence
- 451-8 examples demonstrating the power of Kypris: Zeus, Eōs loved, yet go on
- 459-61 then will you resist? In this world, one must obey this law
- 462-5a examples of "obedience to law": two rhetorical questions implying general statements

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30 We already noticed the Nurse's resilience and optimism at 288-92, and will see it again (509-12, 705). Here she uses the example of her own change of mind (she reacted too strongly at first to Phaidra's talk of death, but is not now worried) to suggest a change in Phaidra's mind. This is logically circular, since her own worries can only end when she has persuaded Phaidra to abandon her plan to die; the second thoughts she refers to are her own, but the phrase becomes immediately the headline for her argument to Phaidra.

31 Note the first of these applies itself (as so often) to "people of good sense".
the rule illustrated: \( \lambda \alpha \nu \theta \alpha \nu \epsilon i \nu \ \tau \alpha \ \mu \eta \ \kappa a l \alpha \)
life should not be a struggle
example and \textit{a fortiori} inference
conditions under which a person may prosper
to resist is \( \ddot{\upsilon} \beta r i \varsigma \); have the courage to accept the
goddess' will
(points to next scene: we women have ways . . .)

The resources are many and varied here; the arguments involve abstractions and generalisations, applied infrequently to Phaidra's case (after 440 only at 459 and from 470 on). The Nurse's badgering and interfering personality is present in her references to Phaidra, but we should not think of the arguments themselves as designed for "the Nurse", so much as for "the situation"; this speech is to stand as the play's fullest rational exposition of the case against Phaidra's resistance. Phaidra has announced she will die. The case for "yielding"\textsuperscript{32} can thus be presented as a case for life. Phaidra's love for Hippolytus is first associated with the experiences of all lovers and all lovers to come (442); the importance of love in the world is stated. Examples from mythology are adduced. Generalisations are made to the effect that everyone overlooks little peccadilloes. "Things mustn't be taken too seriously", and to try to be stronger than the gods is to be guilty of \( \ddot{\upsilon} \beta r i \varsigma \). The speech as a whole does not bring a variety of arguments to bear, but uses a variety of devices of comparison and example to put Phaidra's love into the category of natural catastrophes that are better endured by courageous acceptance than by stubborn denial or resistance.

The device used in 443-6 is what Friis Johansen has termed "foil-antithesis":\textsuperscript{33} a general rule is stated with its foil (here "Love is easy on those

\textsuperscript{32} What exactly this is to entail is not spelled out in the speech (though \( \tau \omicron \lambda \mu \omicron \alpha \ \varepsilon \rho \omicron \omicron \sigma \alpha \ 476 \) is highly suggestive); Phaidra will now reject the Nurse's proposal out of hand, and later yield to a slightly different and ambiguous one.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{General Reflection} 31; see above, IV.B with n.29.
who yield—and hard on those who resist”). In this case the second, negative member implies a warning that strengthens the positive advice implied in the first member. This affirmation of the strength of Kypris is followed with assertions of her ubiquity (447-50); then a long sequence brings examples forward to demonstrate these points. Euripides requires examples of love involving gods (for the sake of an *a fortiori* argument) and love outside marriage, affairs not too serious or debilitating from the point of view of the god who was overcome by desire; he has the Nurse cite the examples of Zeus and Semele and of Eôs and Kephalos. The simple "superior rule" embracing these two cases would be "the gods too are subject to Love"; but the speech’s paraenetic purpose is to urge Phaidra to go on living, and so the Nurse points out that Zeus and Eôs continue to dwell among the gods, and accept the catastrophe they suffered. (That their remaining among the gods was in doubt, or their erotic affairs viewed by them as "catastrophes", seems no more likely than that Niobe "remembered to eat"; here as in the Homeric examples the details of the παράδειγμα may betray some adjustment to a paraenetic context.) The moral can now be drawn: if the gods bow to this sort of thing, surely you must.

Next, two examples of human behaviour are adduced (the two rhetorical questions in 462-6 suggest: "many affect not to notice marriage troubles, and many a father has helped an errant son..."). A general rule is then stated. It is

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34 There may be some irony in the choices Euripides hit upon, since the beloved in each case suffered tragically and unfairly. See Brown, "Wretched Tales" 24, on the choice of examples in the similar passage at *Her* 1314-21.

35 *Iliad* 24. 602: see discussion of this and other Homeric mythological παράδειγμα, with emphasis on the creative adaptation of myth to epic situation, in M.M. Willcock, "Mythological Paradeigma in the Iliad ", *CQ* 14 (1964): 141-54.

36 Note that the two situations chosen are suggestive of the actual situation in *Hipp.*
no accident that the Nurse has hit upon, as the climax of her disquisition, a rule that parodies and distorts that which Phaidra stated earlier:

... μήτε λαυθάνειν καλά
μήτε αἰσχρά δρώσην μάρτυρας πολλοῖς ἔχειν. (403f)

... λαυθάνειν τά μὴ καλά. (466)

Neither of these rules represents a very idealistic approach to morality. But Phaidra has formulated hers as a reason for accepting death: "I would not want to be seen in a disgraceful act" (expressed with its foil, "nor fail to be seen in a noble one", which is here the quite incidental by-product of Euripides' urge to fulness of thought and rhetorical balance). The Nurse's version is roughly "Disgraceful acts are best not seen". The Nurse's final point is made in 467-70; the gnome "Life should not involve too much straining after perfection" is corroborated by an example from building. The speech then moves to advice and appeal, before closing with an ominous reference to "remedies and charms".

Aside from the striking parody by the Nurse in 466 of the general rule Phaidra has announced in 403f, there are a number of other echoes in this speech of phrases heard in that of Phaidra. These are of great importance in defining the Nurse's speech as a rebuttal to Phaidra's; the two speeches are clearly to be heard as a pair, even more so than many of the "agon" pairs, with points raised in the first subtly undermined rather than directly attacked in the second. Examples:

376 I have pondered (ἐφόντις)
436 second ponderings are wiser (φροντίδες)

378f many have good sense (ἔστι... πολλοῖσιν)
439 many are in love like you (σῶν πολλοῖς)

381 we don't struggle (οὐκ ἐκπονεῖμεν)
467 one mustn't struggle (ἐκπονεῖν)

195
(wouldn't) use any device (φαρμάκων) to spoil...

some cure (φάρμακον) for this disease

(avoid) falling back in my ideas (φρενῶν)

abandon your bad ideas (φρενῶν)

I tried to bear it well (εὖ φέρειν)

not to be borne (οὐ φορητόν)

impossible to defeat Kypris (Κυπρίνον κρατήσαι)

arrogant, to want to be stronger than gods (κρείσσων δαιμόνων)

how can they look in their husbands’ faces?

how many do you think affect not to see?

I would particularly call attention to pairs here in which important themes of the play are seen from two sides. The idea of trying to be "stronger than a god" is a familiar one in Euripidean rhetoric, and it takes on a particular resonance in this play where, in a real sense, the action has been determined by a goddess. Phaidra decides to die because she can't prevail over Kypris; and so it suits the Nurse to characterise any refusal to give in to the goddess as a case of an arrogant will to be stronger than gods. Also thematic in Hipp is reputation, what people see and how people are seen. This strong concern of Phaidra's is seriously undermined by the Nurse's rhetorical questions and "superior rule" in 462-6.

When these techniques have been appreciated and Euripides' resourcefulness in applying them all in this speech have been noted, one may still say that the speech doesn't convince; that is, entertaining as it is, it doesn't reverse

37 E.g., Hik 504, Her 1320f, Tro 948, 964.

38 The Nurse's δ'αίμονες in 475 perhaps include the gods mentioned earlier in her speech as other victims of Kypris (451-8), but also the goddess herself: θεὸς ἐβουλήθη τάδε 476. The idea of "defeating Kypris" returns in 1304.
the audience's or the chorus' sympathies. Phaidra has spoken of honour and
death, the Nurse has used the gods and specious comparisons and generali-
sations to recommend (without actually saying so) adultery. In this scene
Euripides may have written the "best speech" for the Nurse's case, but he has
first arranged things so that not only do we sympathise with Phaidra's plight, but
we admire her courage and sense of honour. Here as elsewhere the arguments
themselves do not really determine our response. Nor does the Nurse's
rhetoric have any real effect on the progress of the plot. The device by which
Phaidra's defenses will eventually be broken down has yet to be used; and when
it is, we cannot easily say just why Phaidra has yielded. Gould has well described
the end of the episode: "The whole sequence of 'movements'...abruptly
crystallises in one of those moments of theatrical legerdemain (the 'purple' scene
of Agamemnon, I would say, is another) in which by ambiguity and sheer
swiftness of movement persuasion is effected and acted upon before it can be
analysed".

Phaidra's speech and that of the Nurse, though not formally set off as a
ἀμίλλα λόγων, form a pair in terms of the issues they discuss, and the many verbal
echoes I have noted emphasise their close relation. But Phaidra's speech has
important connections with other utterances in the play. We first met Phaidra

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39 I take it that the Chorus, which occasionally must have guided thicker members of the
original audience in the placing of their sympathy, speaks in 482-5 for all of us except Michelini,
who advances (303) the rather perverse idea that the Nurse has delivered here a "perfect
contemporary refutation for this tangle of moral confusions, revealing the folly of Phaidra's efforts
to be 'strong'". Heath (Poetics 80f) has strong words about the folly of judging rhetorical arguments
in tragedy on their merits.

40 A striking demonstration of this principle is that Theseus in Her 1314-21 uses an argu-
mentative sequence concerning "the gods", very similar to Hipp 451-61, in an attempt to relieve
Herakles of some of the guilt he feels. There is no question of our rejecting Theseus' argument as a
"sophistic ploy", the sort of phrase often used of the Nurse's tactics. See further App. C.

41 Gould 56.
in a delirious state, exchanging irregular anapaestic stanzas with the Nurse (176-266). In that scene we witness the effects of Phaidra's passion; she is semi-conscious, set upon death, and raving about running wild in the forests and hills. This is not a different Phaidra from the character who speaks the later monologue, but another view of the same character. As with the notorious (because rather harsh) juxtaposition of two views of Alkestis as she is about to die, Euripides has presented a non-rational and a rational scene in order to develop as fully as possible the forces at work upon the character in the play. Conacher calls this change of presentation "as psychologically 'impossible' as it is dramatically effective". We saw in I.A above something analogous to this splitting of modes of presentation in the tendency of individual speeches (especially appeals) to resolve into sections presenting purely rational argument and sections in which pity, obligations, blood ties are invoked. In this case, the anapaestic scene presents "the secret, passionate Phaedra", and the iambic monologue the "rational Phaedra, with her sense of public reputation" (Conacher).

Between the anapaestic scene and the monologue of 373-430 we have the iambic scene during which Phaidra's secret is wrested from her. This scene, in which the Nurse's powers of suggestion over Phaidra first become evident, contains some striking verbal points of contact with Phaidra's later speech:

42 The passage is well discussed by Dale (ad Alk 280ff). On the phenomenon in general ("lyric-iambic sequence") see above Ch. I n.48.

43 "Some Questions", 202f.

44 Ibid. I would point out, though, that Phaidra's "rationality" and concern for social mores do surface in the earlier scene at 239-49, where I take it she is to be played as "coming out" of her delirium. Craik rightly observes, "This short stanza encapsulates the content of the long rhesis" (49).

45 Craik (49) notes these similarities and others.
The idea of the Nurse's power over Phaidra may be suggested through Phaidra's borrowing of some words and phrases. In one case (305-6) the Nurse has been the first to introduce a point that will become thematic in the play: Phaidra's determination not to allow her children to suffer is the deciding factor in her intrigue against Hippolytos (715ff).

Thus in terms both of form and content, Phaidra's monologue has long-range importance in the first half of Hipp. I have noted the formal device of showing Phaidra's affliction first in an ecstatic anapaestic scene, then in a rhetorical iambic exchange of speeches, and called attention to some devices that bind the rhetorical speeches together, and to others that seem to show the concerns of Phaidra's monologue anticipated in the Nurse's words of the scene just preceding it. "Mirror scenes", pairs of scenes whose connection to each other may not depend upon direct reference or obvious verbal echoes, are another resource for long-range design in tragedy; the framing scenes in Hipp with the

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46 Solmsen, however, AJP 88 (1967): 87, warns against the view (of Barrett: q.v. ad 377-81) that Phaidra's monologue is in some sense intended as an answer to the Nurse's comment in 358ff: "The distinction between voluntary and involuntary wrong-doing is not at all the issue [sc. in Phaidra's speech]".
two goddesses are an obvious case. I see the mirroring of the monologues of Phaidra (373-430) and Hippolytos (616-68) as of equal importance for the play. Hippolytos like Phaidra begins with the general and moves to the specific; the adulterous woman is again the topic, but now Phaidra—on stage but silent—is tacitly identified with that class, where earlier she was presented as a woman with the strength (though it meant death) to resist the temptation. And there are verbal reminders of the earlier speech. Phaidra’s γυνή...μίσημα πάσιν (406f), besides giving the text for Hippolytos’ initial reflection (which leads to the demonstration in 628ff of the proposition γυνή κακόν μέγα), is echoed in Hippolytos’ μισῶ (640, cp. 664); ἐκπονεῖν (381) returns in 632. Phaidra has spoken of long talks and leisure and (perhaps) thoughts of love (384f); Hippolytos repackages these ideas in a most uncomplimentary way in 645-50. Most strikingly, Phaidra and Hippolytos both express their shock and dismay at the very idea of sexual transgressions with incredulous rhetorical questions:

αἱ [sc. adulteresses] πῶς ποτ’, ὡ δέσποινα ποντία Κύπρι, ἐλεποσκοῦσα ἐς πρόσωπα τῶν ἐυνευμετῶν ὀἴδε σκότων φύσισομε τῶν ἐυνέργατην τέραμα τ’ οίκων μὴ ποτε φθογγὴν ἀφῇ; (415-18)

...πῶς ἀν οὖν εἶνα κακός, ὥς οὖθ’ ἀκούσας τοιάδ’ ἀγνεύειν δοκῶ; (654-5)

47 See in general Taplin, Tragedy in Action Ch. 8. He notes for Hipp the first entrance of Phaidra and the last of Hippolytos; both are carried on, near death.

48 Phaidra has spoken of her abstract ideas of morality and the course of her γυνή (375-87, 391), and Hippolytos now vents his spleen in particular against the γυνή ἁπάτη (640-44). I am not so sure as Barrett that this class is meant to include Phaidra. He notes (ad 616ff) "As the generalities proceed they narrow themselves down more and more to fit Ph. and the particular wickedness he regards as hers". Along the way Hippolytos will speak (ad 638-44) "in censure of the...brainless decorative woman; but Ph. is not the brainless woman but the clever one". (Barrett does not say in what sense he takes Phaidra to be "clever"). I think the rhetorical process has taken on its own logic, and that Barrett is therefore wrong to see a purposeful narrowing of focus through the passage. But if Phaidra is being described as ἁπάτη I take it this would refer to her cleverness in trying to arrange a tryst through a go-between, not to any propensity (which I don't see as an enduring feature of her character) for speculation. (The ἁπάτα of Medea, on the other hand, is her very essence: Med 285.) So γυνή ἁπάτη here is not meant to "resonate" with Phaidra's monologue.
And Hippolytos' speech, like Phaidra's, reaches a climax with the thought of Phaidra's passion becoming known to Theseus (656-8, cf. 419-21).

On a purely formal and theatrical level, then, the audience must experience this scene as a distorted echo of the earlier one. Conacher goes further than this and suggests that our moral view of Hippolytos in this scene is meant to be determined by our knowledge that he is wrong about Phaidra; he feels we are to be revulsed by the injustice of Hippolytos' tirade, and that this negative response will help us accept his eventual ruin as deserved (12f). But this leads paradoxically to a fragmented view of the play, just the sort of view Conacher is reacting against in his article's criticism of Gould and others; for if we feel "a certain justification... about [Hippolytos'] death" (13) how can we share in the grief with which the play will end? Hippolytos is not Polymestor in Hek, a villain whose just downfall will restore to a queen some of her lost dignity, but the son of King Theseus, and a character we know to be a victim of divine anger; Euripides requires us to sympathise with both Phaidra and Hippolytos. I think we are rather meant, as we hear 616-68, to appreciate the irony that Hippolytos doesn't know what we know, and also to appreciate Euripides' skill in bringing about this situation—and no doubt to appreciate the rhetoric of the speech itself, misplaced though it is.

Friis Johansen (General Reflection 124f) sees important formal and verbal points of contact between Hippolytos' speech and the three pathetic reflective outbursts of Theseus later in the play (916ff, etc.), but adds: "The compositon of the entire speech, lines 616ff, rather resembles that of Phaedra's speech in lines 373ff". Thus as the play's focus moves from Phaidra to Hippolytos to Theseus, we see each character in succession uttering reflections that resonate with each other, but with a progression from the cool philosophical tone of Phaidra's speech to the disjointed pathos of Theseus'.

Winnington-Ingram (181f) quotes with approval Lesky's comment "Unser Stuck ist die Tragödie einer Doppelschicksals". Similarly, Dodds (103f) sees Phaidra's and Hippolytos' personalities as "complementary and interdependent".
A second point raised by Conacher in his discussion of the "relevance" of Phaidra's monologue is that the speech helps us to understand the motivation for her last act, the intrigue that will cause Hippolytos' death. Here there can be no disagreement. Euripides has introduced very skilfully Phaidra's concern for her children and for reputation generally. Though these may be assumed to be values of every civilised person, the gentle emphasis they are given at points along the way to the dénouement certainly helps the audience to accept the direction the plot takes—that is, to accept it as being consistent with the character that Phaidra has been given for this telling of the tale. This kind of concinnity of plot and character does not figure in every Greek play, but it would be perverse to claim, for example, that Sophokles in OT has not endowed his Oidipous with a palette of personality traits that give "human intelligibility" (in Easterling's phrase) to the action of the play.

Conacher has set out to study the relationships that may be discerned between the content of Euripidean rhetorical speeches and "the theme of the play as a whole" (5), and to ask whether such speeches can "tell us something significant about the speaker" (5). He is reacting against what he sees as an over-emphasis on local effect and on plot and incident in the criticism of Dale, Jones and Gould. Dale and others reacted against earlier "novelising" views of tragic character, and against the idea that points raised in the heat of the moment in a rhetorical situation may be used out of context to produce an objective "portrait" of the character speaking or the character spoken of. But Gould's discussion of

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52 Dale's introduction to her Alk commentary contains the classic statement of the problems she saw. J.C. Gibert ably reviews the history of this critical controversy in the first chapter of his 1991 Harvard diss. Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy.
our scene (in the article Conacher is particularly addressing) goes further than this sort of reaction would seem to require:

One of the features which defines the peculiar tone and atmosphere of this play is the constant variation in the presentation of the stage figures which results from the use of a whole range of different forms of persuasive speech. The sharp difference in dramatic texture, and hence in our conception of the characters involved, between the persuasion scene involving Phaedra and the Nurse and the confrontation between Theseus and Hippolytus results from the fact that the earlier scene exploits a different image of human personality from that which is presented by the forensic framework of the later, with the finality of its fixed and public modes of speech. And yet the first is itself not a uniform and undifferentiated structure, and the continuity of 'character' is correspondingly broken. (54: my italics)

It may be conceded that Greek tragedians do not indulge in gratuitous "characterisation", that they do not give us information that would help us predict how the "stage figure" might behave or react in any other situation than that of the play: the character has no existence outside the plot. But it does not follow that Phaidra (for example) is given no enduring character traits that would help us understand her actions in this situation. Thus, when we have recognised the "modal" nature of tragic play-writing, we have given ourselves a basis for appreciating the complex and composite nature of tragic characterisation. The problem becomes one of identifying the purely conventional aspects of the presentation; this gives us the key for understanding that which is specific to the individual speaking. We should not, for example, regard rhetorical mannerisms or a "philosophical" tone as necessarily specific to the speaking character, nor should rhetorical moralising be removed from its persuasive

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53 Thus different characters are fleshed out in different degrees: Vickers Towards Greek Tragedy 53, Griffin "Characterization" 138f.

54 Here we must be careful: proems such as those of Hippolytos to Theseus (Hipp 986-91), of Klytaimestra to Elektra (Elek 1013-17), of Orestes to Tyndareos (Or 544-50), seem to tell us something about the speaking character or the relationship of the two characters. This impression
context; and so Gould says rightly of the Nurse's speech (56): "...here it is the shaping pressure of rhetorical form which determines the movement of the speech more than any sense that these arguments are native to the Nurse, or that they are chosen to penetrate the defenses of this opponent". The Nurse, like Aphrodite, has a certain role to play in the πρᾶξις; but this (critically important) insight does not exhaustively explain Euripides' creation. Nothing in Greek literary tradition requires us to think tragedians were interested only in the mechanics of plot, and in Hipp it seems obvious that the human relationship of these two women is of interest to the poet. Euripides has—beginning, to be sure, with a story to tell—imagined some personality features Phaidra should have in order for this story to arouse feelings in a human audience; and one of these features will have been susceptibility to intimidation by a meddlesome and overbearing nurse. Another is a somewhat over-developed concern for reputation, and as Conacher notes (12) Euripides has made the audience aware of this concern in the "rhetorical" monologue; we hear of it elsewhere in the play as well (e.g., 244, 321, 687, 717). It is precisely by virtue of their endurance may result from slightly jarring details in the rhetoric itself (Elek, Or), or from a sense that Euripides is calling attention to the inappropriateness of the utterance (Hipp). "Philosophical" tone: see below on Hik 195ff.

Thus I disagree with Conacher when he suggests ("Some Questions" 204f) that Hekabe's rhetorical reflection on Polyxene in Hek 597f ("The noble is ever noble") is to be rendered ironic by the revenge action, ignoble in Conacher's view, that Hekabe will herself undertake. This logic might equally be applied to Phaidra; i.e. one might make of her reflection on moral action an anticipatory condemnation of her own action against Hippolytos. This would be to ignore the formal, stylised, and contextual (and so of only "local" importance) nature of such utterances. This sort of approach has caused havoc in the interpretation of Herakles' words at Her 1341-6; see Heath, Poetics 60f.

Heath (Poetics 96): '[The Nurse] is there to ensure that things go wrong without blame attaching to the principals'; more discussion 84-6. The same comment could be made of the Old Man in Ion.

For Gould this "human" element seems scarcely to exist: and so his 1973 article 'Hiketeia' adopts (86f) a somewhat mechanical explanation of the process by which the Nurse causes Phaidra to tell her secret.
through the play, their surfacing in different forms within different "modes", that such elements become "themes".58

Jasper Griffin has given us an imaginative appreciation of the process by which a poet such as Euripides might, working with mythological material, have produced original and interesting stories and characters. He begins with plot: Euripides, he thinks, may have begun work on Hipp as a result of doubts about the artistic success of his earlier play on the subject:59

Was it possible...to write a play on that age-old theme that would be better? That would mean getting away from the traditional schema of the tale. Was it, for instance, possible to create a good play in which Phaedra did not attempt the seduction, and in which she did not denounce him to her husband? As Euripides continued to reflect, he came to be seized by the idea of a play on the theme in which Phaedra should actually not come face to face with either of the two male characters vital to the plot. She should not speak to Hippolytus, and she should not speak to Theseus: the two big and striking scenes would be sacrificed to a subtler conception.

From this entirely theatrical germ, Griffin suggests, the elements of the great play we know developed: the goddess Aphrodite was introduced, in order to give the audience the secret; then the other goddess, to complete the frame; the Nurse, to bring about the misunderstanding; Hippolytos' virginal and somewhat arrogant personality, to motivate the goddess' anger (this could be subtly associated with his status as a bastard in the house); Phaidra's own extreme sensitivity to sexual misconduct and disgrace (this could be subtly associated with her family background).60 This I find a very satisfying insight, and one which in no way

58 Cf. Medea's sensitivity to being made the butt of her enemies' laughter: Med 383, 404f, 797, 1049f, 1354ff, 1362.
59 "Characterization" 132.
60 Ibid 138. Winnington-Ingram would agree: "Both the principal characters have hereditary backgrounds relevant to their character and behaviour" (176).
contradicts the insights we gain from an appreciation of the conventional techniques of scene-making and logography.

In conclusion: Phaidra's monologue involves difficulties that arise from (1) the abstractness of its thought, (2) certain unusual formal features, (3) confusion on our part as to the exact sense in which αἰθωσ is used. But its rhetorical function of presenting Phaidra's decision to die as a rational choice made in the framework of a coherent moral system is clear. At the same time its importance for introducing and exploring an aspect of Phaidra's personality that will prove decisive as the action progresses cannot be ignored. Finally, the monologue's structural relationships with other parts of the play (the earlier anapaestic scene, the Nurse's rebuttal, Hippolytos' monologue) are important.

B. Rhetoric and Action in Suppliant Women

Greek plays in general offer much talk and little action. In a number of Euripidean plays, the action that is the play's main focus follows only after a very extended rhetorical consideration of all aspects of the situation, the various characters' interests, etc. Suppliant Women is such a play. The Athenian expedition to retrieve by force the corpses of the heroes of the Theban war (reported by messenger in vss. 634-730) can take place only after a thorough lyric and rhetorical preparation, involving several stages: (1) the suppliant women seek Aithra's pity and ask her to help them influence Theseus in their favour (42-86); (2) the case for Athenian assistance is put by Adrastos (163-192) and rejected by Theseus (195-249); (3) an appeal made in contrasting terms by Aithra (297-331) is accepted by Theseus (334-48); (4) the decision of Theseus is ratified by
the Athenian public (349-58, 393f); (5) the justice of the Athenian decision is then confirmed through a debate whose main objective is to illustrate the injustice and stubbornness of the Theban position (399-580). Thus, the determination of Theseus and the Athenians to act in favour of the suppliants is developed gradually and by carefully paced stages, over an expanse of more than 500 lines.

As this first half of Ηίκ contains three highly developed rhetorical scenes, it offers an excellent terrain on which to study the varieties of Euripidean rhetoric, and the functions of such scenes within a play. This section will investigate the rhetorical and dramaturgical techniques deployed in this part of Ηίκ, in an effort to reach an understanding of Euripides' reasons for constructing the play in this way. In particular the question will be considered to what extent and in what way Theseus is "characterised" by his rhetorical pronouncements and his delayed decision to champion the suppliants' cause.61

I shall focus on the three "rhetorical" confrontations: Adrastos and Theseus, Aithra and Theseus, Herald and Theseus. For purposes of preparing Theseus' decision to champion the suppliants, Aithra's prologue speech and the parodos ode have the function mainly of developing a bond of sympathy between Aithra and the suppliants which will bring about her intervention on their behalf.62 The fact it is the suppliant women that elicit this sympathy and not Adrastos himself is important: throughout the first half of the play Euripides isolates Adrastos himself (a man convicted of rash arrogance) from the questions of justice for the dead, duties to gods, civic pride, and it is consideration

61 The following studies used here are cited by author's name only: Schmid (1940); Greenwood, Aspects Ch. IV (1953); Zuntz, Political Plays (1955); Fitton, "Suppliant Women..." (1961); Smith, "Expressive Form" (1966); Conacher, Euripidean Drama Ch. 5 (1967); Kerscher, Handlungsmotive (1969); Gamble, "Decision & Ambivalence" (1970); Collard's comm. (1975); Shaw, "ἩΘΩΣ of Theseus" (1982); Burian, "Logos & Pathos" (1985); Mastronarde, "Optimistic Rationalist" (1986). For full citations see Bibliography.

62 This bond is especially emphasized by Gamble, 386f.
of these points that will lead Theseus to champion the suppliants' cause. Euripides has contrived to deny the survivors of the Theban War strong natural claims on Athenian assistance such as he gave, for example, to the children of Herakles (whose ties of blood and χάρις count for much in Ἰκλίδ); he has as well chosen to cast the Theban expedition of Adrastos as an ill-considered and immoral adventure, thus depriving Adrastos of any entitlement to Athenian sympathy. The result of these two decisions is the complex process of appeal outlined above, in which Theseus' initial rejection is followed by a consideration of the larger reasons why he should involve his city in the suppliants' struggle. Euripides could easily have invented compelling ties of obligation or sympathy between Adrastos and Theseus had it not occurred to him that a delayed decision would be dramatically effective.

Adrastos' appeal to Theseus is preceded by a stichomythic interrogation whose main function is to bring out some necessary information about the expedition and its aftermath; we learn of the unwillingness of the Thebans to give up the corpses (Adrastos explains this as the smugness of success, 124), of the role of his two foreign sons-in-law in the affair (131-54), and of his failure to heed an oracle regarding the expedition (155-8). It also develops from this exchange that Theseus does not regard the matter as an Athenian problem (127), even though he recognises that the return of the corpses was a holy duty of the

63 The distinction between the righteousness of Athenian involvement and the injustice of the Argive expedition is preserved in Lysias' funeral speech (Or II. 7-10), for which Euripides is presumably one source.

64 For example, Theseus (if the lines are correctly attributed to Theseus) will speak of a ἕβεια tying himself to Polyneikes (vss. 928-31). Euripides invents such details freely: another is in 739-41. A family tie surfaces briefly at 263-70.
Thebans (123); he also evinces an attachment to democratic procedures (129). All of these points will return in the play.65

Adrastos' speech of appeal (163-92) involves (in common with many such speeches) a pair of arguments, giving two separate grounds for Theseus' intervention:66

163-7 proem: I must humble myself
168f headline: rescue the corpses out of pity for me
and these mothers
170-5 argument for pitying the mothers
176-83 "general 'humanitarian' argument"67
184-92 answer to possible objection: only Athens can help

Appeals made in the names of two parties have been seen above in connection with IA 903-4 and Hel 894-7; there too the dual headline is followed by two contrasting grounds of appeal. Here, the appeal in favour of the mothers is based on their palpably pathetic state; Adrastos then pronounces a somewhat abstract reflection regarding the wisdom of unlikes associating with each other. As we have seen in a number of other appeals, a practical consideration (here the unavailability of other champions) forms a third argumentative point.68

Theseus' response begins with a long digression on the nature of the world and the place of men in it. He begins with a comment to the effect he has

65 I do not see this exchange as putting either Theseus (Kerscher 82) or Adrastos (Burian 131) in a bad light; it takes care of some necessary preliminaries. Schwinge (Verwendung der Stichomythie 198) treats the passage as a typical case of the "zielgerichtete Erzählung" that precedes speeches of appeal.

66 My analysis of the arguments differs somewhat from that of Collard (ad 163-92), who treats 168-75 as forming part of the proem.

67 The phrase is Collard's (ad loc). The text is subject to doubts at several points, but the argumentative point proposed is clear enough.

68 The last place in a chain of arguments is given to a practical motive in Her 165, the removal of such a motive in Hkld 169, a practical suggestion in Hek 286, Her 206, IA 1194, threats of dire practical consequences in Alk 662, Hel 975.
not developed his view purely *ad hoc*, then states a proposition opposite to the one he will argue (195-7). His own view (199f) is that mortals have a greater portion of good than of ill. He praises the god who removed us from a confused and bestial state by instilling the blessings of intelligence, language, agriculture, the alternating seasons, commerce by sea, and the art of prophecy (201-13). With all this supplied to us, we are arrogant fools to be unsatisfied, to attempt to supplant the gods' wisdom with our own (214-8). The point of this lengthy reflection is reached with its application to Adrastos: you are this sort of person (219). Adrastos has failed to accept the basic conditions of human life.

Two examples from his own life are brought up in support of this: (1) his willingness to marry his daughters to violent young men violates the principle that one should not associate with wrongdoers, lest one suffer the gods' wrath (220-8). (2) Adrastos, in leading the expedition against Thebes in spite of oracular warnings, both disregarded the gods and (again) associated himself with

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69 Both these details parallel the presentation of Phaidra's reflection in *Hipp* 373ff (cf. Friis Johansen, *General Reflection* 126f). The first tends to deny that the speaker is taking a position out of sheer belligerence; the second puts the speaker's point in strong relief (cf. also *Med* 579). There is no need to think a particular contemporary thinker (Prodikos has been suggested) is rebutted here, though a casual reference to a controversy known to the public is not impossible.

70 The use of θηρασίδες (202) for "primitive" has thematic importance: commentators note reference to the 'beasts' of 140-5. Note also 579: bestial origins of the Thebans. Other beasts in *Hik*: 47, 282 (the dogs of the Theban plain), 267 (wild creatures that may take refuge in a cave).

71 Do his words at 112 anticipate this point? Smith's tr. of that vs. (157) seems to assume so: "Your only means of progress is language". See also Shaw 6, Burian 131.

72 On the contact of this celebration of Progress with other fifth-century treatments of the subject, see esp. Nestle *Dichter der Aufklärung* 66-72, Guthrie, *HGP* III. 79-84, Dodds *Concept of Progress* 7-13, Collard ad 201-13. For prophecy as the culmination of the list, see Burian 132.

73 The common device of presenting a pair of examples from the speaker's or interlocutor's past in speeches of accusation and monologues of despair was discussed in Ch. I above.

74 Interpretation: see Friis Johansen, *General Reflection* 38-42. The point contradicts Adrastos' argument in 176ff, without making any reference to the fact. On the theme of association of likes and unlikes in *Hik*, see Gamble, 386-93.
unsavoury young men;\textsuperscript{75} this is supported by a general condemnation of the tendencies of the young, followed by a general discussion of political demographics, in which the "middle class" is praised.\textsuperscript{76} Theseus summarily dismisses the idea of alliance with Adrastos (246), noting he could not properly defend the idea before his people (247). Now Adrastos is sent packing (248); Theseus' final comment (249f) returns to Adrastos' lack of εὐθυλία (cf. 161; the point is made again in 336).

The "relevance" of this speech has been variously appraised. Several generations ago it was commonly spoken of as a manifesto representing Euripides' own "enlightened" thought; that is, the speech was seen as having considerable intrinsic interest but only a tenuous connection to the situation in \textit{Hik}, or to the characterization of Theseus.\textsuperscript{77} More recently, the trend has been to see purely authorial pronouncement nowhere in Euripides, and to treat abstract material in speeches either as having "thematic" significance, or as representing "the rhetoric of the situation".\textsuperscript{78} In the present case, a number of scholars have seen Theseus' remarks (particularly in 195-218, the "theodicy") as having thematic importance for the entire play, but with little agreement on detailed interpretation.

\textsuperscript{75} Zuntz (7): "He neglected reason and experience..." (= the first point above); "Divination... he threw to the wind" (= the second).

\textsuperscript{76} Kovacs' attack on this passage ("Tyrants" 34f.) does not stand up to the points made in its favour by Collard (ad 238-45).

\textsuperscript{77} See e.g. Schmid 456.

\textsuperscript{78} An idea of "authorial pronouncement" does in fact flourish among critics who see Euripides as giving his characters speeches whose ironic intent the audience (or some of the audience) cannot fail to recognise. For \textit{Hik}, this approach is taken by Greenwood and by Vellacott (\textit{Ironic Drama}, 25-32). The irony seen in the play by (e.g.) Conacher, Gamble, and Mastronarde is of a different sort: these critics assume the poet excites doubts as part of an essentially literary process of challenging the audience, rather than to present his own coded manifesto.
Zuntz (7) takes Theseus' speech to represent an enlightened Athenian outlook which the successful completion of the action will justify:

Theseus (v. 195ff) substantiates his rejection by propounding a general view of the world. He shows it to be a well-ordered whole, the life of which is safeguarded, for the good of man, by wholesome, rational laws. Man's existence is secure as long as he conforms to them. This conception is at the basis of the whole play; every detail derives its significance from it and in turn supplements it.

A number of others take it that Theseus here spells out a personal position which the subsequent course of the play will discredit, and that Theseus will be shown to abandon the philosophy contained in the theodicy, or will himself be discredited as a man with an inadequate grasp of the world. As for a "rhetoric of the situation" approach, some scholars have noted the relevance of the individual points raised in the speech to Adrastos' case, but there seems to be general reluctance to interpret Theseus' abstract speculations as improvised ad hoc for the sake of a strong refusal. But in terms of formal values, Euripides' dramatic priority was precisely to produce a strong refusal, which would stand in contrast with the subsequent acceptance.

Given this formal mirroring of two appeal scenes, combined with the agonistic character of the confrontation between Theseus and Adrastos, we should not demand an inappropriate sort of relevance. Theseus' "philosophical" speech may form a neat and fitting rhetorical response to Adrastos' appeal, but the philosophy enunciated is not necessarily to be thought of as an enduring quality of Theseus' character—here one may compare the

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79 Gamble (389n): "The entire play works towards the nullification of Theseus' view of the world". Mastronarde (203): "Theseus' speech... [is] shown to be inadequate to the realities of the tragic world". Cf. Fitton 430f, M. Lloyd Agon 78.

80 Zuntz 7, Smith 158, Burian 132f. Smith seems to come close to an ad hoc interpretation (ibid.): "...Theseus refutes the suppliants' claims by usurping their symbols".
pronouncements of Phaidra (*Hipp* 373-430) and of her Nurse (*Hipp* 443-81). The actual content of such reflections may be accounted for in another way: without denying the general relevance of Theseus' speech to Adrastos' situation, we should not underestimate the willingness of poet and audience to take a detour into purely epideictic discourse.\(^{81}\) The topic of this discourse is, first (195-218, 223b-28), the proper humility of men in relation to the gifts of a benevolent deity (an "optimistic" but not radically "enlightened" outlook),\(^{82}\) and second (232-45), the appropriate roles of individuals in a state. The function of the abstract material in *Hik* 195-249 may then be not to represent the "philosophy" of the character Theseus, but to spell out in rational terms the grounds upon which a Greek head of state refuses to involve his people in a situation that has been presented as morally dubious and physically dangerous. I shall return to this question below.

Objections have also been raised to the tone of Theseus' response to what is seen as a pathetic appeal.\(^{83}\) But Adrastos' appeal is only in part pathetic. It too depends on a very abstract reflection (176-83), to which one may see a direct answer in Theseus' treatment of relationships: to Adrastos' "The weak should associate with the strong (etc.)", Theseus replies "The righteous must not as-

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\(^{81}\) See the stimulating comments of Heath, *Poetics* 134.

\(^{82}\) Schmid (450) speaks of Theseus as the "Träger [einer] im wesentlichen altattischen, doch etwas aufgeklärten Religiosität und Sittlichkeit". *Progress* was one of the "Topics of the day", in Guthrie's phrase, but Theseus' profession of traditional values in connection with a theory of progress involves "modern dress" rather than modern morality. Dodds (*Concept of Progress* 7f) compares the divine emphasis in *Hik* 195-218 with the human in *S. Ant* 332-75. Conacher (97-105) subjects Theseus' beliefs to an overly subtle analysis in which the gods are found to be treated ironically. Mastronarde (202) sees Theseus here combining "traditional values and intellectual modernity"; as will emerge below, I regard the traditional values as inherent and enduring in the character, the intellectual modernity (like that of Phaidra's monologue) as essentially a function of the rhetorical situation.

\(^{83}\) Mastronarde 203, Gamble 389, Fitton 430, M. Lloyd *Agon* 77f.
sociate with the foolish". Theseus' reflections form the basis for a rejection of
the proposed association of Adrastos with Theseus: in effect he answers only
Adrastos' second argument.

It should be pointed out here that Adrastos has nowhere proposed a
συμμαχία: Theseus has in effect recast the appeal in these terms. This
accomplishes two purposes. First, it creates a sound basis for his refusal to help;
second, it looks forward to the alliance that will in fact be consummated at the
play's end. Euripides has thus used Theseus' sense of pious caution (not
"optimistic rationalism") and his antipathy to Adrastos as an obstacle not only to
the realisation of an Athenian action on behalf of the suppliants, but as an
obstacle likewise to any alliance of Athens and Argos. The play becomes at the
end an aetiology of an Athenian-Argive alliance, and Euripides has prepared us
for this while at the same time suggesting its impossibility.

The play as a whole involves a gradual movement towards accom­
modation and alliance, with Theseus yielding first to Aithra's arguments

84 Burian 133 (sim. Smith 158) goes further and suggests Theseus' three-part demography
(238ff) is designed to demolish a two-part view of society presupposed in the dichotomies of 176-9,
as if Theseus began "For there are three groups in society, not just the two extremes you've
mentioned...". I think this view assumes too great a subtlety of reference, and I would suggest rather
that Euripides has allowed one political rumination to lead into another, without great attention
to the context. Collard (ad 238-45) understands the passage's recommendation of the middle class
as continuing the condemnation of young extremists in 232ff: "If you want advice, get it from the
middlemen (244-5), not extremists". Kovacs' arguments for deleting the whole demography
("Tyrants" 34f) are not convincing; Kovacs' "themes... characteristic of the interpolator" (32, cf. 48)
are clearly themes that interested Euripides too.

85 Burian (133): Theseus' speech is "clearly designed to demonstrate Adrastos' responsibility
for his own misfortune and to provide a reasoned answer to his emotional plea". The first part of
this is correct; but the idea Theseus somehow stands for reason as against emotion (Burian [131] sees
ένιόσχαλτον... ἀντὶ... ἔνθελος in 161 as suggesting this thematic "antinomy") is simplistic and
unnecessary. In any case Adrastos' appeal has used reason no less than emotion. I cannot agree with
Smith's view (158): "Theseus responds with great emotion to each of Adrastus' points".

86 Thus, the refusal here and the subsequent acceptance are made to answer not only different
arguments, but slightly different proposals, as Theseus will emphasize in vss. 334-6. Gibert rightly
speaks of a "modulation of the issue" in connection with the acceptance (Change of Mind 128).
regarding νόμος and πόνοι (337-42), and Adrastos later experiencing a corresponding (but more strongly highlighted) change toward humility (734-49) and ἡσυχία (949-54). This fact I find somewhat more easily understood on the assumption that an actual or prospective fifth century alliance with Argos is in the play's background, much as in the case of Eumenides. I do not see Euripides as an advocate (or opponent) of such an alliance, but simply as using a contemporary situation for the resonance it has with the legends of the past.

The choral couplet 251f seeks sympathy for Adrastos, and now Adrastos tells Theseus (253-62) his answer has been inappropriate, but must be respected. The suppliants will leave the shrine; their suit has been refused. Scholars have noted the striking effect of this refusal: it violates the rules of the "suppliant plot". Burian speaks of the need for a "second plea scene to reverse the 'impossible' consequences of the first"; for Mastronarde the violation of the plot-type represents "a surprising, even shocking, development". I see the situation rather as a striking variation on one of the constant features of suppliant plays, the contriving of difficulties that threaten the security of the suppliants or the success of their suit. In any case the Athenian audience (who may not have thought much about "suppliant plots") knew that Theseus was the king who retrieved the corpses of the Seven; here as so often they will have

87 For the Argive alliance of 461 and its relation to A. Eum see A. J. Podlecki, Political Background 80-100. Zuntz discusses the political "mood" of Euripides' play and questions of its possible connections with contemporary events, pp. 71-81, 88-94.

88 Are we already seeing a chastened Adrastos? Or is he "rehabilitated" only in the light of the subsequent Athenian action? In any case, his words here cannot discredit Theseus; Fitton's comment (430) "Adrastus is rightly annoyed" is only half right.

89 Burian 133, Mastronarde 203.
admired Euripides' boldness in creating a situation that it would no doubt require great invention to reverse.\(^{90}\)

At this point we are victims of a textual lacuna. If only a line or two are missing after 262, the Chorus now immediately address a plea to Theseus.\(^{91}\) It is Euripides' habit to give appeals multiple grounding, and the Chorus here introduce an argument that played no part in Adrastos' speech: a blood relationship ties them (that is, the house of Pelops) to Theseus through Aithra's father Pittheus, ὅς Πέλοπος ἦν παῖς (263). This argument is given little emphasis, and is followed by a warning that happiness cannot be counted on to continue, then by expressions of pathos and supplication (271-85). These might have turned the tide, and Theseus allows he is somewhat softened by the Chorus' address (κἂν γὰρ διῆλθε τι, 288); but Euripides has in mind a fuller exposition of the arguments for and against Athenian intervention (and continued suspense—intellectual, theatrical, emotional values are in complete harmony here), and so our attention is drawn to Aithra, who has been reduced to tears by the Chorus. She expresses pity for them, and Theseus answers with two half-lines to which I must in due course return.\(^{92}\)

\[\text{τὰ τούτων οὐχὶ σοὶ στενακτέον.}\]
\[\text{(291b)}\]
\[\text{οὐ σὺ τῶνδ᾽ ἐφὺς.}\]
\[\text{(292b)}\]

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90 Euipides' mastery in the manipulation of audience expectations is well appraised by W.G. Arnott, "Red Herrings", R.P. Winnington-Ingram "Poiētēs sophos".

91 This is the assumption of Collard ad loc.

92 These pronouncements by Theseus loom large in the discussion of Gamble (389ff); he sees them as proposing an "isolationist" position which the subsequent course of the play will discredit.
Aithra begins her speech of appeal on behalf of the mothers with reluctance; I
would regard this reluctance as one more obstacle Euripides has introduced in
order to emphasise the importance and the seriousness of the decision that must
be made. The speech proceeds:

297-300 proem: reluctance to speak overcome
301-303 general point: the gods
304-13 first argument: injustice, law, honour
314-20 second argument: danger of loss of reputation
316-20 for Theseus
321-25 for Athens
326-331 summation: go with justice on your side

The purpose of this speech is to propose reasons for Theseus' intervention that
have not been proposed earlier, and to give these new arguments the particular
force that only a parent's words can have. Aithra reminds Theseus that the gods
are involved, lest he commit some offense against them. The first argument
in favour of accepting their appeal is an argument from justice (and the τιμή that
just acts attract): "I would say nothing if one had no obligation to take bold
action on behalf of people being wronged; but in the present situation, it brings
you honour to force men of violence who are trampling on the laws of all Greece
to desist". Aithra introduces a second and quite distinct point in vs. 314 with ἔρειν

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93 The two legs are neatly balanced: Theseus risks incurring the charge of ἀνανομία (314),
Athens of ἀβουλία (321); boar-hunting is a φαῖλος πόνος in 317, πόνοι increase the city in 323.

94 This I take to refer to the supplication as such; respect for the gods is given as a reason for
complying with suppliants in Med 720 (Aigeus to Medea) and Hkl 238f (Demophon to Iolaos).
Burian (135) sees Aithra at two points recalling language here from Theseus' rejection of Adrastos' suit,
and understands her tone as mildly critical.

95 No distinction is made here in 304-13 between fighting injustice and the honour it brings,
and Aithra moves clearly at vs. 314 from justice and law to the risks for Theseus' reputation.
Fitzon (431f) promotes the idea that Aithra appeals to self-evidently base instincts (and that Theseus'
"ordered cosmos" is therewith destroyed); he is well answered by Gamble, 390n.

217
Theseus' failure to act will arouse legitimate criticism against himself, and deprive Athens of an opportunity to improve itself through the performance of a πόνος. In her summarising epilogue Aithra reiterates that Athenian action would have justice on its side (328), and adds that the Thebans cannot continue indefinitely to prosper (329-31).

Theseus now responds. Does he reverse his earlier position? Not exactly. A fine distinction (but an important one) is made: Theseus stands by his earlier contention that Adrastos is guilty of faulty judgement, and therefore merits no sympathy (334-6). But he accepts the points that Aithra has raised, since ἕνεγκελεν τὰ δεινά is something foreign to his character (337-39a). He adds that it has been his habit to do good deeds and to take on the job of punishing wrongdoing (339b-41), rather than avoid πόνοι (342). He adds a reference to imagined reproaches: what will my enemies say, when my own mother bids me take this on? With vs. 346 Theseus moves from responding to an appeal to announcing a plan of action. He will try negotiation, but stands ready to use force (346-8); he will consult with the Athenians and have his plan ratified (349-55); he will conscript...
a force and send a herald to Thebes (355-8). Theseus asks the women of the
Chorus to take back their στρεφη from Aithra (thus formally closing the suppliant
action), as he would personally conduct her home; this leads to a reflection on
the duties a son owes his mother. No doubt the reflection explains not only
Theseus' graciousness in escorting Aithra home, but his openness to her
arguments on behalf of the suppliants; but his reasons for accepting the
supplication have been spelled out in 334-45, and go beyond merely repaying a
debt of gratitude to his mother.100

The decision has been taken, and a plan is being put into action; we have
no reason to doubt the approval of the populace, and so the stage would seem to
be fully set for the continuation Theseus has mooted in 355-8. But Euripides
frequently gives the audience a false scent. As Theseus is in the process of
dispatching his herald, a Theban herald arrives (395), and a substantial debate be­
gins. Unusually, each speaker will speak two rheses; this gives the opportunity
for separate consideration of general differences between the two states (tyranny
vs. democracy, 409-62), and the specific difference over the Argive dead (465-563).
The dramatic objective is the fullest possible justification for the military action
Athens will take: there is not only a legitimate grievance, but also an essential
difference of outlook that makes any other solution impossible. But there is no
need to deny that the debate on democracy (like the earlier "theodicy") has an
intrinsic interest; it belongs to a genre that clearly was popular in the period of
the play (cf. for example the debate in Hdt. III. 80-2, the debate over the
contrasting "styles" of Athens and Sparta in Thucydides' first book, the
examination of the democracy in the Periklean funeral oration, the pseudo-

100 Fitton 432 says otherwise. The sententia in 361f (τοῖς τεκοῦσι γὰρ δύστηνος ὡςις μὴ
ἀντιδουλεύει τέκνῳ) has thematic resonance for the play.
Xenophontic Constitution of the Athenians). That such a debate should occur within a play need not spoil the play, and this debate contributes importantly to the development and justification of Athenian resolve within the play, while at the same time standing as a rhetorical tour-de-force; and it is not after all inappropriate that the re-enactment of a famous Athenian exploit should be combined with arguments of a patriotic character for presentation at a civic festival. The great scale of the debate also lends scale and importance to the action that will follow.

First, the "democracy debate": the Herald, upon learning that Athens lacks a τυραννος, launches into a brief (and somewhat surprising, given his station) tirade against democracy. No "mob" rules at Thebes (410f). A few examples demonstrate the drawbacks: (1) demagogues can't gain power under a tyranny, men who use rhetorical skill to gain power and advantages, harm the city, and escape punishment through fresh διαβολαι (412-6); (2) the δημος is uneducated and cannot govern properly (417-20a); (3) a poor man, even μη ἄμαθης, is too busy to invest the necessary time in public business (420b-22). A last point sums up: it is irksome to his betters when a man of no importance gains status through seducing the public with speech (423-5). As Zuntz says (8): "The herald... stresses the dangerous παρεκβάςεις (faulty materialisations) of democracy. He is not contradicted..."

101 For connections of thought in these works with Euripidean material, see esp. Finley, Three Essays Ch. I ("Euripides and Thucydides").

102 I can't see that any certain element in the Athenian political spectrum is being promoted or criticised here or elsewhere in the play. Theseus stands for Athens, and despite the (assumed) presence of more activist and more quietist groups and individuals there, the qualities celebrated in Hik must be qualities that Athenians in general would recognise as characterising their city (in the fifth century, to be sure) as opposed to some others, just as the action itself was an object of general, not partisan, praise in the public funeral orations.

103 Collard on this Herald: p. 208f.
Theseus' response to this is more than twice as long. Rather than answer the Herald's objections to democracy, he offers a comparison of democracy and tyranny:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>429-41</td>
<td>status of citizens in law and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429-32</td>
<td>under tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433-37</td>
<td>under democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>442-55</td>
<td>security of life and property</td>
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<tr>
<td>442f</td>
<td>under democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>444-6</td>
<td>under tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>447-55</td>
<td>reflections on family life under tyranny</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The treatment of the comparison is formal and chiastic. In the first part, equality of citizens in a democracy with regard to law and government is emphasised. This is put in terms of the meaninglessness of social class and wealth (434f, 437). There is no common ground here with the Herald's argument, which presupposes a class system in which oi ἀμείνονες have a monopoly on μάθησις and ἀξίωμα; there is simply no basis for meaningful contact between the two speakers. Theseus' second comparison begins with the important place young men hold in a democratic state (442-3), but wanders from this point a bit. Instead of the undervaluing or insecurity of the young under a tyranny, he speaks in 445 of the tyrant's antipathy toward possible rivals from among "the best and the

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104 This fact led Wilamowitz to posit a lacuna in the Herald's speech (in Analecta ad 423-25). But it is a case similar to the exchange of Lykos and Amphitryon in Her, where, as Wilamowitz himself pointed out (Herakles III. 38 [ad 138.39]), the first speech merely creates an opening for the more developed second. Kovacs ('Tyrants' 38f) finds in this disparity an argument for drastic cuts to Theseus' speech.

105 Interestingly, the Herald, who has made no positive argument in favour of one-man rule, speaks in terms that seem rather to recommend oligarchy than tyranny; and the opposition of democracy and oligarchy was of course a genuine issue among Athenians. But there is no question of an audience-dividing debate here (Heath, Poetics 81, and see below). Collard notes that both sides get good points in (p. 211; cf. Fyton 433).
brightest", and in 450f it is personal wealth that is insecure. No doubt the explanation is that a number of stock arguments regarding tyranny have come together. The emphasis on youth, which does not seem to belong to such topoi, has thematic significance for Hik, but a significance hard to assess: the dead are young men, Theseus is a young man; the young are rash (this is said both of the dead [250f] and of Theseus [580]); but the democracy (as this passage tells us) promotes youth, family life, family values in a way tyranny does not. Was there some contemporary sense in which Athens was thought of as a city of the young, in distinction to Sparta or other cities generally? Theseus closes his speech with a firm command to get to the point.

Two general questions may now be raised. Has the play so far presented a single, coherent "philosophy" through Theseus' words (whether this be thought of as the philosophy of a character or of a city)? And is there any irony to be detected in the treatment of democracy?

Zuntz suggests that the terms in which Theseus has spoken of democracy (and will presently speak of justice) build upon the "theodicy" of his speech to Adrastos (195ff); that is, that the rationalism and optimism of the earlier speech form an intellectual basis for the political preferences and policies later

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106 Or "the brightest of the best", if we choose not to adopt Markland's supplemental <t'>; in either case the subject is no longer youth. Wilamowitz obelized δριατούς in 445, noting "debebant iuvenes nominari".

107 Collard points out parallels for some of these ad 444-6, 447-9, 452-4a.

108 This theme in the play is certainly confusing: Theseus is praised as a young and energetic leader in 190-2, but has the rashness of youth in 580 (cf. also 508, where the text is however in doubt); Iphis and the sons of the Seven dramatise other aspects. See Gamble (esp. 394-7), Shaw 5f.

109 It is no solution to excise 442-55, as Kovacs has proposed ("Tyrants" 36-9). The comparison of democracy and tyranny is carried out in a balanced form that proceeds from public life to private life, a rhetorical pattern well known in Euripides; Kovacs attacks words and phrases but shows no reasons to doubt that the shape or content of the speech as a whole is faulty.
developed. Mastronarde and others also see this passage as presenting Theseus' essential attitudes, but find that these are shown changing through the first episode, and that the hard-nosed rationalism they see in 195ff is "corrected" in the subsequent course of the play. The insights gained in this study into Euripides' use of rhetorical material can be of help here. The very elaborate general reflection of 195-218 is offered in a rhetorical situation in support of Theseus' argument against associating himself as a σύμμαχος with Adrastos. One is not quite justified in seeing a "philosophy" there; I have shown above that similar reflections by Phaidra and others do not qualify their speakers as philosophically-disposed characters, but rather introduce a rhetorical and intellectual underpinning for an argument or a decision. But just as Phaidra's monologue, abstract as it is, contributes importantly to the audience's understanding of Phaidra as a deeply troubled woman grappling with an ongoing moral dilemma, so here Theseus' "optimism" and sense of the proper limits of human ambition contribute to our sense of an enduring character: his willingness to yield to the appeal of Aithra and to fight Thebes over violated laws of human conduct are entirely consistent with the attitudes expressed in 195ff.

These attitudes are essentially those of conventional Greek religion and morality (given, to be sure, modern dress). The arguments advanced in

110 Zuntz (8): "Against the background of tyrannis, democracy stands out as being in harmony with the universal principle which Theseus had proclaimed".

111 See references in n. 83 above. If this is the case, the arguments Theseus makes for war against Thebes (513-63) will reflect his new outlook; but presumably the defense of democracy has nothing new in it.


113 I must add that I don't think Theseus as a character is fleshed out to anything like the extent Phaidra is— the plot of Hik simply has no need for a strongly individualised king.

114 It bears asking to what extent Euripides has the same Theseus in mind in Her; there too some strikingly modern-sounding notions combine with a solid Greek morality. Is the modernity of
favour of democracy and against tyranny are not inconsistent with the religious views Theseus has voiced, but they do not in any way depend on them. Moreover (pace Zuntz 8f) I see no attempt to connect either the "theodicy" or the democratic ideology to a policy of peace.115 Theseus has blamed Adrastos for undertaking a war unwisely and without the gods' support, not for going to war tout court.116 From the moment he accepted Aithra's appeal in favour of the suppliants, he has foreseen that war may be necessary, and he has expressed no reluctance to go to war if it comes to that (336ff). He will exercise the euboulia Adrastos lacked, and he will have the gods with him. War properly undertaken is not inconsistent with democracy; indeed, given the record of democratic Athens (where oligarchic groups tended to be anti-war against the majority), one would tend to assume the opposite. And so it is the Herald from the tyrant Kreon who will portray the blessings of peace and the folly of war (486-93), using phrases that must sometimes have been heard in the Athenian assembly from conservative speakers. 

As for an ironic presentation of democracy:117 some have been troubled by the fact Theseus functions more like a tyrant (note esp. 349-55, 393f) than a democratic leader. But he is never called a democratic leader, nor could he be:

115 Zuntz sees the Argive experience as bearing out the tendency of tyrannies to go to war (8); war is "the apparent negation of all that [democracy] stands for" (9). But Argos is not explicitly identified as a tyrannical state, and we will learn (739f) that the tyrant Eteokles attempted to avoid war through diplomatic compromise (a detail produced purely for the light it casts upon Adrastos). The Herald himself is no pacifist; his arguments in favour of peace (486-93) must be understood as having purely rhetorical value (see below).

116 Dover discusses the limits of Greek pacifism in Aristophanic Comedy, 84f.

117 The arguments of Greenwood (110-13) and Fitton (432f) are well answered by Burian, 216f n.26.
he is king of Athens. This fact of Athenian mythology should not affect our sympathy for the ideology presented; if Theseus represents false democracy here, he does so everywhere. But Theseus is everywhere a paradox: the king who founded the democracy—and went on ruling. There is no reason to think that because *Euripides* presents this paradoxical situation, attention is being called to the inconsistencies of the myth.

Now the debate turns to the present situation. The Herald delivers his message (462-75), with a clear warning that failure to comply means war. Two arguments follow offering grounds for Athenian cooperation:

- 476-93 general argument against war
- 494-505 the dead men deserve no solicitude

One may compare the speech of the Argive herald in *Hkld* 134-78, whose case against Athenian support for the suppliants was based on an argument for the legality of their persecution, and an argument about the problems the Athenians would be bringing upon themselves (see IA above). The two points made here are the obvious ones that would occur to anyone debating against Athenian military action on behalf of the Argives. Fitton's assertion (433f), "The particular

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118 Euripides understandably avoids titling him. The Argives call him ἄναξ in 113, 164, 625 (in 190f he is ποιμήν, suggesting for Schmid [450 n.2] "patriarchal kingship"). There is no effort to contradict this title; the resistance to the title τύραννος at 403f must be put down to the "rhetoric of the situation", and, presumably, to the somewhat more negative connotations of that title. (On this see Podlecki, "The Hybris of Oedipus", esp. 24-9.)

119 Nauck's attempt to make better sense of vs. 352 (by reading ἐκ μοναρχίας for ἐς μοναρχίαν codd.) proceeds from a failure to grasp this paradox: Theseus is king, but the δῆμος is "monarch" (cf. 406: δῆμος δύνασε). See Burian, 216 n. 25.

120 Friis Johansen (General Reflection 102 n.2) treats 494 as a "paraenetic application" of the preceding reflection; that is, he sees the advice in 494f as developing out of the general reflection on war. But 494f make a new point, in arguing the lack of justification for a particular case of war, and thus contribute to the thematic contrast between Athenian righteousness and Argive hybris, just and unjust war.
point that war is the enemy of culture, we may be sure, was an authentic Euripidean sentiment", is therefore irrelevant. Again, the negative portrayal of the realities of democratic process (481-5: "When war comes to a vote, no man thinks of his own death") says more about the requirements of a well-matched debate than about the author’s politics. Yet both these points have a tragic truth to them, and contribute to our sense of the seriousness of the commitment Athens has assumed. As for the Herald’s second argument, the unworthiness and unrighteousness of the Seven, we have already seen (but the Herald has not) the acknowledgement of this point; the paradox of an expedition apparently undertaken on behalf of arrogant adventurers gains emphasis from its second treatment here. One aspect of this emphasis, in my view, is the return of a "theological" argument against involvement (504f, cf. 223-8): "You, a mortal, must respect the judgement the gods have rendered on these men".121 The Herald’s speech ends with reflections on proper duties, in which isolationism and quietism are recommended. But the Herald defines these positions in terms incompatible with Theseus’ outlook: his quietist doctrine πατρίδα αὐξεῖν χρεών καὶ μὴ κατάξαι (507f) ignores the Athenian reality of Aithra’s ἐν τοῖς πόνοισιν αὐξεῖται πατρίς (323).

Theseus begins his response by silencing Adrastos, once more emphasising that there is no συμμαχία, rather the Athenians are assuming a πόνος in response to an injustice. He then proceeds first to answer the Herald’s ultimatum:122 Kreon has no authority or power to give Theseus orders. In 522-3

121 See Mastronarde 204 for echoes in this debate of Theseus’ earlier refusal. But Mastronarde’s interpretation, viz. that these echoes reflect an ironic treatment of Theseus’ character, ignores the rhetorical nature of the two scenes: the same arguments against involvement suggest themselves regardless of which side is arguing against involvement (see App. C below).

122 Collard takes 517 as an announcement that the Herald’s arguments will be answered point for point in sequence, comparing such announcements elsewhere in Euripides (see Collard ad 517, Denniston ad Ἐλεκτ. 907-8). But Theseus says only that he will begin by countering the first point the Herald raised; Collard’s analysis of the speech goes wrong subsequently due to this error.
he expressly separates his own interest in the matter from that of the Argive invaders (thus in effect dispensing with the need to answer the argument of 494-505). He now introduces his positive arguments with the claim that justice and law (δικαίωμα and νόμον, 526) demand the burial of these men. This contention is supported with a number of short arguments:

528-30 your war with them is over
531-6 burial is the natural end of life
537-41 your offense in preventing this
542-8 reductio ad absurdum: the dead no danger

These arguments for the burial are followed by a reflection on the mutability of fortune (549-57), the rhetorical purpose of which seems to be to counter the Herald's allusions to the uncertainties of war (479-93). Theseus closes with an ultimatum of his own (558-63): hand over the corpses or face war. But here again the righteousness of the Athenian claim is emphasised (εὖσεβεῖν 559, νόμος 563).

The stichomythia that closes the confrontation clearly spells out the issue of πολυπραγμοσύνη (esp. 573-7). Theseus stands by Athens' tradition of righting wrongs, and notes the εὐδαιμονία that this policy brings about.

Through this lengthy process of rhetorical examination, Euripides has been at pains to portray the Athenian decision as not easily reached. The Athenians fight injustice, but they do not ally themselves with fools. The separation of the question of support for the suppliants from that of identi-

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123 One notices here again a rational and "modern" strain in Theseus' rhetoric. Nestle (Dichter der Aufklärung 71) speaks of a "Widerspruch zwischen der konservativ-frommen Stimmung, die über dem ganzen Drama lagert, und den philosophischen Theorien, die doch da und dort auftauchen".

124 So Collard, p. 247.
fication with Adrastos' unjust war created the need for a two-stage appeal process, and caused Euripides also to develop at length the confrontation of Theseus and the Theban herald, so as to demonstrate the impossibility of any accommodation there. The three parties stand in mutually antagonistic relationships, and Athens fights purely for justice, law, εὐσέβεια.

The rhetoric is over and the action may proceed. And it is soon finished; following a brief ode (598-633) a messenger arrives with news of the outcome. A few details bear mention here: before the battle Theseus had his herald offer the Thebans a last opportunity to give up the corpses without bloodshed, alluding again to the violation of "the law of all Greeks" (669-72); Kreon made no answer to this; following the victory Theseus refused to enter Thebes and sack the town, insisting that the purpose of his campaign had been satisfied (723-5).

I return now to the question of Theseus' character: (1) are his various pronouncements in his encounters with Adrastos, Aithra, and the Herald, and his actions later, intended to present a consistent characterisation, in which Theseus is a man living his life in accordance with certain conscious principles? Or (2) do

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125 This separation of issues stands in strong contrast to Euripides' treatment of the similar situation of Ἥκτη, where Athenians fight side by side with Iolaos and Hyllus, who have won a true συμμαχία with Athens through the justice of their cause and the various ties developed in the appeal of Iolaos. But the separation in Φοίνη of the troubles of the Labdakids and those of Thebes as a city is something similar; see Mastronarde, Φοίνη pp. 4ff.

126 Two troubling details: the language used of Theseus' own onslaught (714-7) seems to recall his words about the tyrant's killing off young rivals (447-9); the Messenger's final lines praise the general who (like Theseus) "hates the arrogant mob that loses its chance at happiness by trying to get to the top of the ladder when it has an advantage"—a sentiment suiting the act of Theseus just described, but also recalling the ladder of Kapanes (496-9, 639f), who will in a moment be praised by Adrastos. On these dissonances see Smith 160f. I have little to say about the rest of Ηήκος. In general I agree with Smith's two-panel view (153) of Ηήκος: the Athenian outlook of the first half is replaced after the messenger speech by a new focus on the grief of the Argives and the aetiology of the second Theban War. I do not agree with Smith's view of the "message" of the second half cancelling that of the first; nor can I subscribe to Gamble's idea (386) that the play as a whole requires an ambivalent response to its characters and action.
they point up a discontinuity of character (that is, a profound change of outlook), whether this change has positive or negative results for our appraisal of Theseus? Or (3) should we perhaps regard the arguments and reflections in each speech as relevant mainly to the immediate context, while not inconsistent with a general picture of Theseus as a man whose great virtues are moral earnestness, caution, piety towards gods and parents, and an unwillingness to be intimidated by fools and bullies?

I reject the first of these interpretations (that of Zuntz) chiefly because I see no effort by Euripides to relate any subsequent words or actions of Theseus to his "philosophical" reflection in vss. 195ff. The reasons for Athenian intervention on behalf of the suppliants are very clearly developed, and they are reasons of public policy and basic morality; I see no attention to any personal impulse, beyond a quite conventional concern over loss of face, that might be understood as activating Theseus. Similarly, the view that Theseus is shown at first to be a coldly rational and insensitive quietist who subsequently corrects his outlook in favour of compassion and action, puts too great a burden on the pronouncements of 195ff (seeing there a smugness that precludes compassion), and oversimplifies or misrepresents the content of Aithra's appeal.

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127 For this reason, Shaw's attempt to portray Hik as "a play about character" (4) fails. To show Theseus as an ideally intelligent ruler and general whose actions are informed by a high morality is not to "characterise" him. Cf. Gamble (400 n.3): "I believe that Euripides is very little interested in the character of Theseus..." See also Collard p. 30.

128 Theseus' concern for his reputation surfaces in the appeal of Aithra (314-20) and in Theseus' answer just after (343-5); it assumes nothing like the importance of Phaidra's obsession with ekklēia. Smith (159) offers good comments.

129 Fitton (431f), Gamble (389), Mastronarde (203) see Aithra's appeal as correcting Theseus in such a way as to discredit him. Smith (159) sees some irony in the fact that the personal tone of Aithra's appeal is what tips the scale (cf. Greenwood 108f). Aithra's appeal is well discussed by Burian, 133-6.
I suggest the correct view is implied in the third question above. Theseus has answered the appeal of Adrastos a bit discursively, no doubt, but in terms appropriate for that situation; his brief answer to Aithra is likewise rhetorically appropriate to the context. In between he has indicated that he feels compassion for the women of the Chorus (288). When he tells Aithra (in 291b and 292b, quoted above) that the Chorus' sufferings need not concern her, he is shown to be a man of caution. This caution is precisely that εὐβουλία that Adrastos lacked when he associated himself too easily with strangers (220-8), and it proves throughout the play to be a good quality of Theseus'. \(^{130}\)

On the level of dramaturgy, Theseus' caution motivates the next stage of the long appeal scene; thus theatrical and thematic purposes coincide.

The strongest argument against the view that Euripides shows a real change of attitude on Theseus' part is the fact that elsewhere he makes such changes quite explicit. I have discussed earlier in this study monologues and announcements expressing shaken assumptions and sudden realisations. \(^{131}\)

These demonstrate Euripides' practice in this kind of situation: a character whose basic outlook has been challenged by events tells us so. These passages involve no essential change of character, just an acknowledgement that a belief has been shaken. But in a few cases, Euripides has a character dwell on how wrong he has been, and the character seems "rehabilitated" by the process. One example is the monologue of Admetos expressing regret over his having allowed Alkestis to die (Alk 935ff); another is Adrastos' response to the news

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130. So Thucydides has Perikles emphasise (II. 40, 2f) that Athenian activism is not inconsistent with prudent caution.

from Thebes (Hik 734-49).\textsuperscript{132} It seems certain to me that Euripides would have given Theseus an opportunity to tell us of any essential change of heart that was meant to explain his decision to champion the suppliants. No explanation is given because the decision is not inconsistent with either his earlier pronouncements or the general sense we have formed of his character.\textsuperscript{133} Indeed, Theseus explicitly stands by his earlier view (334-6).\textsuperscript{134}

In conclusion: Euripides has, in the first half of Hik, portrayed a famous patriotic action, subjecting it first to a lengthy rhetorical examination, in which the reasons for Athenian participation are fully explored. Both the action and its rationale are shown in an entirely positive light.\textsuperscript{135} Theseus is not characterised in a deeply personal way. He is shown responding with caution to the initial, somewhat discreditable appeal of Adrastos; to Aithra's appeal based on principles of law, justice, and honour, he readily assents. In the subsequent debate with the Theban Herald, he shows forbearance: in spite of essential differences between Athenian and Theban assumptions, every avenue will be exhausted before Athens goes to war. And in the war, Theseus is again a model of

\textsuperscript{132} The "rehabilitation" of Adrastos: Zuntz 13, Collard pp. 30f. The idea is rejected by Smith (161f): "The audience may feel... that Adrastus has been made wise and dignified by suffering, or they may feel irritated at the implications of Adrastus' moralising and the terms in which he explains his departure from reason. Irritation seems to me to be the more appropriate response".

\textsuperscript{133} Note also the pains Medeia takes to explain her feigned change of outlook, Med 869-83.

\textsuperscript{134} One may agree with Gibert (diss. 128f) that there is an element of "face-saving" here without assuming disingenuousness in Theseus' distinction between the positive reasons for Athenian intervention and the negative character of Adrastos' war. The distinction is maintained in 522f and 589-97, where there is no question of saving face.

\textsuperscript{135} This is not to deny there are negative aspects to the play's second half. But I reject completely such an assessment as Burian's (138): "Theseus' ordered world of intellect will yield to the mothers' world of emotions, bringing into question the assumptions upon which it was founded". I see a general tone of optimism in the play's first half balanced (not spoiled) by grief and pessimism in the second.
moderation, in refusing to enter defeated Thebes. Suggestions that the play undermines its hero proceed from failure to assess properly the rhetorical character of some pronouncements (especially 195-218), and failure to appreciate the positive dramatic value of the long rhetorical preparation.

C. Rhetoric and Design in *Iphigeneia at Aulis*

In *Suppliant Women* a long rhetorical preparation precedes the play's focal action, the expedition of Theseus to recover the corpses of the Argive heroes. We hear already in the prologue speech that Theseus' aid is being sought and that he has been sent for; the messenger who comes to report the action arrives at vs. 634. Similarly, in *Iphigeneia at Aulis* we learn in the prologue that a plan for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia has been set in motion; the messenger who comes to report the sacrifice arrives at vs. 1532. Where *Hik* has a two-part form in which a long first act leading to a glorious action is followed by a contrasting second panel (cf. *Her, Andr*), *IA* is a play entirely devoted to the preparation of a single action. But unlike some other plays of which this could be said (*A. Ag, S. OT*), the preparation here is almost entirely rhetorical: the whole play is dominated by the enunciation of arguments for and against the sacrifice and for and against various plans for preventing it.

For *Hik*, Euripides presents a formally balanced series of rhetorical events. The making of the decision to champion the cause of the suppliants involves

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136 For purposes of this study it is assumed that the play to Iphigeneia's exit (1509) unfolds substantially as Euripides intended. Serious doubts exist regarding the authorship of the prologue iambics (49-114), the messenger speech of 414b-39, and Achilles' long speech (919-74), but the play seems to require the content of these parts. On these matters see Stockert's comm., p. 63-79 and ad locc. On the problems of the play's exodos, see Stockert p. 79-87 and M. L. West, "Tragica V" 73-6.
two formal appeals and two responses by Theseus, and the confrontation of Theseus and the Theban enemy involves two formal debates:

Appeal (Adrastos)
Negative response (Theseus)

Appeal (Aithra)
Positive response (Theseus)

Attack on democracy (Herald)
Defense of democracy (Theseus)

Against Athenian aid (Herald)
For Athenian aid (Theseus)

This structure achieves, as I have said, a variety of goals: dramatic suspense and the patriotic celebration of one of Athens' great moments go hand in hand with some very stylish and entertaining debate, even as the pathetic situation of the mothers of the dead is presented. It takes nothing away from Euripides to recognise this range of values in his work.

In IA, the structure developed for delaying and debating the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is larger and more complex. Through a series of scenes having a similarity of general shape, a great variety of rhetorical structures are deployed with great virtuosity. Both the argumentative content of the rhetorical scenes and the formal arrangement of their parts serve the purpose of a novel and decidedly Euripidean retelling of the old story. The play merits serious study focusing both on the rhetorical design of its plot and on its exploitation of the known formal resources of Euripidean rhetoric.137

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137 The following studies used here are cited by author's name only: Wassermann, "A Man in an Age of Crisis" (1949); Friedrich, Eur. u. Diphilos (1953); Strohm, Euripides (1957); Funke, "Aristoteles zu..." (1964); Conacher Euripidean Drama Ch. 14 (1967); Siegel, "Self-Delusion" (1980); Lawrence, "Characterization & Psychology" (1988); Gibert, Change of Mind (diss., 1991); Stockert's comm. (1992). For complete citations see Bibliography.
I begin with a bare summary of the play. In the prologue we learn that Agamemnon earlier summoned Iphigeneia to Aulis on the pretext of marriage to Achilles, but in fact for sacrifice to propitiate Artemis and secure a successful expedition against Troy. He now regrets that decision, and intends to prevent the sacrifice through a letter forestalling his daughter's setting out for Aulis. The Chorus of local women sing a long ode celebrating the heroes assembled for the Trojan expedition (164-300). Menelaos enters with the Servant who was to carry Agamemnon's letter, reads the letter and accuses Agamemnon (334-75) of lacking the firm resolve required of leaders. Agamemnon answers with counter-accusations, and refuses to sacrifice his daughter.

The two brothers are at an angry impasse when a messenger arrives bringing the news that Iphigeneia and her mother are nearby, and that the army knows of their coming—there are rumours of a wedding, and other rumours of a προτέλεια, a sacrifice to Artemis (430-4). Agamemnon now in a monologue speaks of a "yoke of necessity" and a δαιμόν that has outsmarted his σοφίσματα; he regrets that as a king he lacks the freedom to shed tears freely and to speak his mind. He imagines the confrontation with his wife, his daughter's begging for her life, his little son's tears. Iphigeneia will be wed to Hades (461); Agamemnon blames Paris (467f). Menelaos, affected by the emotional collapse of his brother, takes back his angry words and advises against the sacrifice; he sees the injustice of Agamemnon's losing a child so that he may regain his wife, a bad wife at that. Agamemnon thanks Menelaos but points out that events have gone too far for a change of plan: Kalchas may inform the army of the prophecy requiring Iphigeneia's death; even if this were prevented, Odysseus too knows

138 On προτέλεια, see Foley, Ritual Irony 68-78 ("The Intertwining of Rituals: Marriage and Sacrifice").
of the plan, and will incite the army to kill the Atreidai and sack Argos, and Iphigeneia will not be saved. The best Agamemnon can hope for is to get the job done before Klytaimestra learns of it (538-41).

The Chorus now sing of Paris and love (543-89), and celebrate in anapaests the arrival of Iphigeneia and Klytaimestra. The scene in which Agamemnon greets his family is full of ironic tension between the women's excitement (Klytaimestra over the "wedding", Iphigeneia at seeing her father) and Agamemnon's guilty secret. Klytaimestra is adamant about staying at Aulis and participating in the "ceremony". Following the women's withdrawal, Agamemnon regrets that he has been unable to keep Klytaimestra away, and says he feels defeated, even as he practises intrigue against his own family (744ff). Nevertheless, he will perform the sacrifice, which he describes as τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φίλον, but a μόχθος Ἑλλάδος and a thing οὐκ εὕτυχες for himself (746-8).

A song about Troy follows (751-800). Achilles now enters, and in a short monologue touches upon the effects of the long ἀπλοία on the bachelors and married men of the fleet. Α δεινός ἔρως for war is upon the army, and the gods are involved (808ff). His own men are restless, and insist on moving on to Troy or returning home, blaming the delay on τὰ τῶν Ἀτρείδῶν μελλήματα (814-18). Klytaimestra enters, and a kind of recognition scene unfolds, in which Achilles learns of the deceptive offer of marriage to him that brought Iphigeneia to Aulis. Agamemnon's servant comes out and reveals the plan to sacrifice Iphigeneia. Klytaimestra now addresses a short speech to Achilles (900-16), appealing for his help in preventing the sacrifice. Achilles' response is lengthy

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139 τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φίλον, Rauchenstein, Diggle. The goddess has been very little mentioned as a reason for the sacrifice. The interpretation given here depends on England's conjecture ἐξευπορήσων in vs. 748 against Triclinius' ἐξιστορήσων.

140 Strohm 139 discusses the scene in these terms.
(919-74), complex, and heavily challenged by text critics. At the minimum, it seems clear that Euripides intends Achilles to offer Iphigeneia his protection; if the speech is authentic, this is at least partly due to annoyance over the unauthorised use of his name as bait. Klytaimestra expresses gratitude (977ff); Achilles suggests that the first avenue taken should be a direct approach by Klytaimestra to Agamemnon (1015ff), and Klytaimestra praises this as good advice (1024). The army as an insensitive mob is alluded to in 1000f, 1028ff.

Achilles is celebrated in a choral song recalling the marriage of Peleus and Thetis (1036-97). Klytaimestra enters (1098) and reveals that Iphigeneia now knows the truth. Agamemnon enters (1106) and after some tense dialogue Klytaimestra challenges him to deny that Iphigeneia is to be killed (1131). Agamemnon admits that the secret is out (ἀπολύμεθα, 1140). Klytaimestra addresses to her husband a long speech filled with vilification, recriminations, threats. Iphigeneia supplicates her father and reminds him of the close loving relationship they have shared. Agamemnon tells the women he can do nothing to prevent the sacrifice, and that it constitutes a service to Greece.

Agamemnon departs and Iphigeneia sings a monody expressing bitterness over her treatment by her father; the idea of rescue by Achilles is not mentioned. Achilles arrives, pursued by the angry army. Iphigeneia is ashamed to face him (1341f), but Klytaimestra sees some advantage in staying to speak to him. Achilles reports the army has demanded the sacrifice of Iphigeneia; he, in attempting to oppose this, was stoned by "all the Greeks" (1352). He called Iphigeneia his bride-to-be, but was shouted down; nevertheless he wants to protect her as well as he can. As Achilles and Klytaimestra plan their resistance, Iphigeneia interrupts (1368b). She is ready to die for Greece.

Achilles, deeply moved, responds that he would have been proud to marry Iphigeneia: she has shown great patriotism, proper humility before the
gods, intelligence (1407-9). He looks at her and is even more eager to marry her, more determined to save her; he asks her to reconsider. Iphigeneia answers that she would not wish Achilles to die or kill on her own behalf, but simply to allow her to save Greece. Achilles admires her nobility. He will stand by in case of any last-minute loss of resolve. Iphigeneia and Klytaimestra in stichomythia say farewell. Iphigeneia sings with the Chorus, then goes to her death.

I have characterised IA as a play dominated by rhetoric; I must now describe an interesting feature of its plot. We are to imagine that at some point in the past, the Greek leaders (Agamemnon, Menelaos, Odysseus, and Kalchas only, according to 106f) agreed on the plan to sacrifice Iphigeneia. Achilles was left ignorant of the plan,¹⁴¹ as were Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia. In the prologue we learn that Agamemnon has "changed his mind", that is, he cannot go through with the sacrifice. After his attempt to prevent it has failed, and news has come that Iphigeneia is approaching the camp, he again "changes his mind", convinced that the sacrifice cannot be avoided; now Menelaos "changes his mind", and tries to persuade Agamemnon to call off the entire expedition. Some subtler changes of position are also to be noted: the Servant faithful to Agamemnon in the prologue is faithful rather to Klytaimestra in the third episode; Achilles is thought by some to acquiesce rather too readily in the sacrifice of the girl he has sworn to protect. And the position of the army itself is presented in such a way that we don't know what to expect of them: they are alternately presented as brilliant and disciplined heroes assembled for the purpose of a just war (e.g. in the parodos ode) and as a hysterical and blood-thirsty mob (e.g. in Aga-

¹⁴¹ See Friedrich 96ff for interesting comments on the implications of this fact.
memnon's words at 528-35 and 1259-68). Finally, Iphigeneia herself will "change her mind." Only Clytemnestra and the unseen Odysseus show real constancy.

Scholars have generally understood these vacillations primarily in terms of character. Agamemnon is a man adrift, a man too weak for the position in which history has placed him, a man struggling to be both father and general. Menelaos and Achilles are often treated as selfish, cowardly, or insincere characters; the Greek leaders are men of weak resolve, eager to save face but easily intimidated by rumours and outlandish fears. Similarly, Iphigeneia offers to die because she is in love with Achilles, or cowed by her father into mimicking pan-Hellenic rhetoric she cannot possibly understand.

I would prefer to think of the various changes of position in the play more in terms of plot. Euripides has decided to keep the question of the sacrifice up in the air for virtually the entire play, and to resolve it only with a self-dedication

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142 The rescue of Iphigeneia by the goddess (outside my view here) is the culmination of this pattern of reversals and manipulation of audience expectations. "Change of mind" as a motif in IA is the touchstone of Gibert's discussion of the play (259-324); he sees these changes as an important plot-structuring element throughout (260-3), and as one of several motifs providing an environment in which the play's focal reversal, that of Iphigeneia, becomes acceptable (305-21).

143 Wassermann 175-8. There is of course much truth in this view of Agamemnon, but Wassermann goes too far in treating his characterisation as a "message" of the play. That is, he takes the play as concerned to project by negative example an ideal of political/military leadership: "Agamemnon is no Pericles" (177); "his own distress is a symptom of the general moral catastrophe" (178). Wassermann sees Agamemnon as rehabilitated by taking the "right decision" (180) in going through with the sacrifice.

144 Lawrence 97: Menelaos "might appear almost a succession of unrelated emotional states with sexual infatuation tending to dominate"; Achilles "seems to hover between hypocrisy and self-deception". Blaiklock (Male Characters 118) sees Achilles as "a spoilt and bragart boy". We have come a long way since Weil wrote (Sept Tragedies 306) of "le rôle d'Achille, rôle si noble, si généreux..."

145 Siegel speaks (310) of "the characterization of Agamemnon, Menelaus, Odysseus and Calchas as weak, ambitious, selfish, crazed and unreasonable".

146 Smith, "Iphigenia in Love".

147 Siegel (316): "Iphigenia is to be seen as a dupe"; cf. Blaiklock, Male Characters 120, Funke 292f.
by Iphigeneia; the self-dedication is to come as a surprise and break a great
impasse near the end of the play, much like the deus-speech in Orestes.\textsuperscript{148} This
plan requires that a fine balance be maintained throughout between the forces
tending to promote and those tending to resist the sacrifice. At the beginning,
only two agents are in play—Menelaos for, Agamemnon against. The
messenger speech brings about a change in Agamemnon that must be countered
by a change in Menelaos. As soon as Klytaimestra arrives, she assumes the role
of Iphigeneia's champion against Agamemnon's despondent determination to
carry out the sacrifice. She will enlist the aid of Achilles, but not before we have
been reminded (814-8) that the army too has an interest in the matter. In the
great confrontation of the fourth episode, Klytaimestra and Iphigeneia speak
against the sacrifice, with Achilles in the wings, and it seems that only Aga­
memnon, whose ambivalence we have seen, supports it.\textsuperscript{149}

Euripides has succeeded in putting as many obstacles as possible in the way
of the inevitable outcome. We may compare the situation in Hik, where the
well-known expedition of Theseus to Thebes seems to be rejected out of hand
early in the play; or in Hek, where Hekabe is given strong ammunition with
which to persuade Odysseus to spare Polyxene; or in intrigue plays like IT, Hel,
Or, where the ultimate escape of the heroes is prevented at every point by new
obstacles; or in Ion, where the ultimate goal of the plot, the reuniting of mother
and son, is frustrated by a series of misunderstandings.

With Agamemnon's final speech (1255ff) the matter is not settled, for
Achilles has offered to be the champion of last resort. But he is not simply to
walk on stage and take charge. His opposition to the sacrifice will now be

\textsuperscript{148} Iphigeneia as a kind of deus ex machina: Foley, \textit{Ritual Irony} 66; Strohm warns against the
idea (146 n. 2).

\textsuperscript{149} Strohm: "Im Grunde wollen ja alle die Königstochter retten" (140).
balanced by that other party that has been held in reserve: Odysseus the rabble-rouser. Achilles stands by his offer, but he is in danger.\textsuperscript{150} Thus Iphigeneia's decision will not be announced in the context of a debate-scene, where it could serve only a rhetorical, not a practical end; rather, she speaks out just as violence is about to erupt, as Achilles prepares to die fighting to save her. It hardly needs saying that this is dramatically effective and a very satisfying conclusion to the long crescendo of anticipation and foreboding.\textsuperscript{151}

But my subject is rhetoric. How do the rhetorical scenes, and the actual arguments made concerning the sacrifice and the war, contribute to this long crescendo, and to this balancing of forces? I shall now focus on these scenes. The doubtful iambics of the prologue (49-114) give the background to the debate over the sacrifice.\textsuperscript{152} We learn in 87-93 that the fleet was stranded at Aulis, \textit{dπλoιαὶ χρωμενοὶ} (88),\textsuperscript{153} and that Kalchas announced that sacrificing Iphigeneia to the local goddess would bring about a successful campaign. Agamemnon's impulse

\textsuperscript{150} Achilles' function in the plot is well appreciated by Ritchie, "Iph. Aul. 919-74" 182: 'The resistance of the parents to the sacrifice, though selfish in its motives, is entirely natural. Achilles' resistance, the motive for which is more artificially contrived, is needed for dramatic reasons: he must provide the opposition which puts the feelings of the army to the test. His failure precipitates the crisis which brings about Iphigenia's decision and at the same time vindicates Agamemnon for having yielded to pressure in consenting to the sacrifice'.

\textsuperscript{151} Funke distinguishes (296) between "Bühnenwirksamkeit" and consistency of character in defending Aristotle's criticism alleging inconsistency in Iphigeneia's character; but if the scene is conceded to be "effective" without Aristotelian consistency of \textit{μνήμη}, this would seem to demonstrate vividly how inessential such consistency is for drama. I shall argue below that Iphigeneia's change of mind is not psychologically implausible.

\textsuperscript{152} I defer to the judgement of others that the iambics are not Euripidean; see Stockert's recent thorough survey of the arguments (I. 66-79). But I agree with Stockert (I. 74) that these iambics contain material that must have appeared in an original Prologue, and I discuss their content here on that basis.

\textsuperscript{153} It is of no importance whether there were adverse winds (1323f), light winds (813), or no winds (9-11, 352), or whether the sailors could have rowed. These questions have exercised Kitto (\textit{Greek Tragedy} 385), Vellacott (\textit{Ironic Drama} 43), Siegel ("Agamemnon" 268).
was to announce an end to the expedition, but Menelaos dissuaded him, πάντα
προσφέρων λόγον (97).\(^{154}\) Agamemnon himself characterises the act with δεινά
τλήναι (98), and says elsewhere in the Prologue γνώμαις ἔξεστων, αἰαῖ, πίπτω δ᾽
eἰς ἄταυ (136-8). There is as yet no "argument" for or against the sacrifice, just
the factual knowledge that the act would produce such-and-such a result, that
Menelaos favours proceeding, and that Agamemnon realises it would be wrong.

With the debate between Menelaos and Agamemnon (334-401), we first
see a rhetorical justification for the sacrifice (and the war), but it is not given
great emphasis. Menelaos, in accusing his brother of back-sliding, recalls that
Agamemnon eagerly sought the position of commander-in-chief (337-42), and
eagerly embraced the idea of the sacrifice when it was first proposed by Kalchas
(358-62); the latter charge is inconsistent with Agamemnon's statements in the
prologue (94-8).\(^{155}\) Menelaos' speech aims primarily at showing, in an accusatory
mode, how indecisive a leader Agamemnon is. That this quality (a quality of
Agamemnon's that goes back to the \textit{Iliad} and \textit{A. Ag}) is connected with images
taken from the political life of fifth-century Athens (campaigning politician,
337ff; reasons why politicians fail, 366ff; generals and politicians, 373ff) will not
have shocked Euripides' audience. Near the end of his speech, Menelaos refers
to Agamemnon's inconstancy as preventing Hellas from performing a good
service (δρᾶν τι κεδνόν, 371) and allowing good-for-nothing barbarians to laugh
at her. We meet here for the first time the "panhellenic" argument that will

\(^{154}\) Cf. \textit{Hek} 840, ἐπισκήπτων παντοίως λόγοις; in neither place are we asked to imagine the
content of the putative medley of arguments.

\(^{155}\) We are not asked to sort out the "truth" here, but to appreciate that not everyone will see
Agamemnon's conduct in the light in which he sees it; cf. Pheres' charges against Admetos in \textit{Alk}
(see II.D above).
Agamemnon in answer argues that the expedition to Troy arose out of Menelaos' own failure as a husband (385-90). He blames the war on Menelaos and defends his change of mind, then speaks of the mood and motives of the suitors who are under oath to Menelaos: the Oath of the Suitors does not properly bind the Greeks to the committal of such an act as the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (391-5). They are not truly bound by the oath: οὐ γὰρ ἀσώνετον τὸ θεῖον (394a). The sacrifice would be unjust, and would cause Agamemnon personal misery (396-9); to kill his child would be to do things ἀνομα...κοῦ δίκαια (399).

Following the messenger's report that Iphigeneia has arrived, Agamemnon and Menelaos speak further of the sacrifice. Agamemnon's pathetic monologue indicates simply that he can now see no way of averting it. Menelaos answers with a remarkable reversal of his earlier position: he argues that his own personal eagerness to get Helen back has been both a mistake and a selfish injustice, and urges that the expedition be terminated. He excuses his own volte-face in terms that recall the angry words of Agamemnon on the same subject (500f, cf. 388f). And now Agamemnon explains the ἀνάγκη that makes the sacrifice inevitable: the argument is a practical one, viz. that the brothers are powerless to prevent the sacrifice, and can only lose everything in the attempt. Agamemnon will follow through with the plan.

156 I cannot see any "panhellenic argument" implied in 97 (πάντα λόγον, see n. 154 above), as Mellert-Hoffmann does (Untersuchungen 34f). In vs. 308 we find, as in 965ff and the remarkable 1352, a theme of common Greek interest, of which the panhellenic argument is an instance.

157 The oath figures in the Prologue iambics at 58-65. With the quoted phrase cf. 1189.

158 See discussion by R. Bogaert, "Le revirement de Ménelas".

159 One may contrast the readiness of Achilles later on to undertake a futile resistance, but I don't think Euripides means to call attention to any real cowardice here on Agamemnon's part— he is simply a different man, older, wiser, less a romantic.
The scene in which Klytaimestra, having just learned of this plan, appeals to Achilles for his help adds interesting new perspectives to the case for and against. Agamemnon has earlier spoken of the tears he must shed, of his own misery in the event Iphigeneia is killed (398f); now we hear of Klytaimestra's misery (δυσπραξία, 903). But Klytaimestra dwells especially on the obligation that Achilles has toward Iphigeneia, since his name was the bait: ἐκληθῆς... ταλαίνης παρθένου φίλος πόσις (908). Achilles' long speech of reply takes this idea in an unexpected direction: Achilles accepts the obligation to Iphigeneia not because his name was used to further an injustice (though he acknowledges in 932 and 942 that the deception and sacrifice are an injustice), but because he wasn't asked: the loss of status this represents gnaws at him (944-54). He volunteers (959-67) that he would readily have given his consent for the sake of the common good to any plan that would get the army to Troy.

We have by now heard speeches from four characters opposing the sacrifice, each giving reasons appropriate to the speaker and the person addressed. Klytaimestra in her long speech to Agamemnon (1146-1208) breaks new ground by introducing, in addition to much material whose purpose is to build up her own character and slander his, the matter of the personal consequences her husband faces (1171-84). Klytaimestra vilifies her husband,161 defends herself as a perfect wife, argues against the justice of the sacrifice, issues dark warnings for the future,162 and suggests an alternative course Agamemnon ought to have

160 Here again we are reminded of the situation in the Iliad.

161 This is the function of the material in 1148-56. Women remind men of their humiliation as suppliants in past episodes at Med 496f, Hek 245. The detail of Agamemnon's murder of an earlier child of Klytaimestra's should not be treated as a 'fact', but as rhetorical ammunition Euripides has given her that (like Menelaos' charges in 337-63) resonates with a theme of the play. Cf. similar innovations in Hik 739f, Tro 925-8.

162 The σύνεσις of the gods: 1189, cf. 394a. Diggle's conjecture in 1034 elevates the idea virtually to a "theme".
followed (1196-1202: 'hold a lottery or sacrifice Hermione'). The speech has combined elements familiar elsewhere in speeches of accusation and speeches of appeal. Iphigeneia, who has not spoken since greeting her father upon arriving at Aulis, now makes a speech of pure appeal (1211-52). She recalls the mutual affection of father and daughter, appeals on Klytaimestra's behalf, argues that the marriage of Helen and Paris has nothing to do with her, enlists the silent support of little Orestes. Her speech, which began with ἤδιδε γὰρ τὸ φῶς βλέπειν (1218f), ends with κακῶς ζῆν κρείσσουν ἤ καλῶς θανεῖν (1252).

Agamemnon in answer (1255-75) says that he loves his children and is not unaffected by pity. But: the continuation of the expedition is impossible without the sacrifice (1259-63, where reference is made to the large size of the force and the fact the men are armed, and to the authority of Kalchas); the army is gripped by a passion to get on with the war, and to put a stop to the abduction of Greek wives (1264-6), and they will kill us all if I fail to carry out the goddess' command (1267f); I do this not for Menelaos, but for Greece (1269-72), whose freedom is at stake (1272-5). Two main points have been made: the army's menacing mood (this recalls his own worries expressed at 528-35), and the positive value for Greece of the expedition (this recalls Menelaos' words at 370ff). The goddess' demand is mentioned with no emphasis, and treated purely as a condition for the continuation of the expedition.

Following her monody and Achilles' desperate entrance, Iphigeneia makes her famous speech of self-dedication. She begins by excusing her father,

163 Cf. Or 659, and Klytaimestra's words in Elek 1041-5.

164 It seems possible to me that this decidedly unheroic line is enough in the audience's mind to suggest the change of mind that will follow. Given the other examples we know in Euripides of self-sacrifice, it is perhaps inevitable, once she has been put on stage as a character, that Iphigeneia will in some sense "volunteer". The two speeches of Iphigeneia may then be seen as offering and then removing an obstacle to the expected course of the plot, like the two responses of Theseus to the appeals of Adrastos and Aithra in Hik.
"for one cannot resist the irresistible" (1370). We should thank Achilles for his solicitude, but must see to it he does not reap disaster on our behalf, where we can in any case gain nothing. She announces in 1375 her decision not to resist.\(^{165}\) This is supported (as in the various speeches of self-dedication discussed in I.D above) with arguments for death and against life; thus the speech stands in the strongest possible contrast to the pronouncement of vs. 1252.\(^{166}\) Iphigeneia argues the positive benefits of her sacrifice: the success of the expedition, an end to barbarian crimes against Greece, vengeance on Paris, personal glory for herself as the liberator of Greece (1378-84). She recognises her destiny as a benefactress, her duty to the thousands of men who will do the fighting (1385-91).\(^{167}\) Some miscellaneous points follow: Achilles must not be at odds with the rest of the army, one man is worth many women, I cannot stand in the way of the goddess' will; the sacking of Troy will stand as a monument through the ages to me—my marriage, my children.\(^{168}\) A closing gnomic couplet adds that it is only normal that Greeks rule barbarians, not the reverse.\(^{169}\)

This long rehearsal of the arguments used on either side provides us with necessary perspective for understanding Iphigeneia's speech. The speech com-

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165 Iphigeneia's decision is not between life and death (see Stockert ad loc); she makes the heroic choice of a brave and glorious endurance over a messy resistance.

166 Lawrence (101): "Euripides does everything to point the contrast between her attitudes before and after the change, which suggests that he intends that change to reflect a view of character and psychology". I would think it suggests the opposite; see below.

167 The presence of this motif in other speeches of dedication should guarantee against an ironic interpretation here: \textit{Hkld} 503-6, \textit{Phoin} 999-1005.

168 It bears stressing how little emphasis has been placed on the goddess' command, and how little emphasis on Iphigeneia as bride: cf. Polyxene and Sophokles' \textit{Antigone} facing death, Sophokles' \textit{Elektra} enduring life.

169 The idea that the Trojan dispute involved a risk of Greece's falling under foreign rule seems implied here and in 1273f; cf. \textit{Tro} 924-34, where Helen claims Aphrodite's victory in the Judgement of Paris prevented the invasion of Greece by barbarians. These are "rhetorical" points that will not bear close scrutiny. With the gnome here cf. \textit{Hel} 276.

245
bines a "panhellenic" (I would rather say "patriotic") argument with references to the threatened position of Achilles, to her father's predicament, and to the will of the goddess. Critics have long sought "the real motive" for Iphigeneia's change of mind, and the reasons for her enunciating these particular points. I shall offer a solution to this problem below; first I must comment on the "panhellenic" argument.

Menelaos in his first speech (334-75) brought only one argument in favour of the expedition to Troy (and hence of the sacrifice): the notion that it would be a good deed performed by Greece, a blow against the arrogance of barbarians (370-2). In his reversal (473-503) he argued that the expedition had as its goal only the recovery of a wayward wife. A great deal has been written about these two "arguments". Funke contends (288f) that the panhellenic argument quite suddenly and quite late in the day replaces the idea of a war over Helen. Some have seen the "Helen" argument for the war giving way to the "panhellenic" argument over the course of the play; Strohm finds "panhellenism" a recurrent motif in the play. Knox and others have suggested the play carries a serious panhellenic message. The use of a patriotic appeal by Agamemnon has been variously explained: (1) as cynical deception of Iphigeneia by her father, or (2)

170 Funke is answered in great detail by Mellert-Hoffmann, Untersuchungen 9-90.
171 E.g., R.L. Murray, Persuasion 289.
172 Strohm 141f: he finds Iphigeneia alone embraces the idea freely.
173 Knox says of the panhellenic appeal ("Second Thoughts" 232): "When Iphigeneia states it so simply and nobly there can have been few in the audience who did not feel its power" (cf. Conacher 264). I find it easier to believe that here, as in the democracy debate in Hik (and even the archery debate in Her), the audience was surprised and delighted to hear something so contemporary cleverly joined to an old heroic story.
174 E.g. Funke (294): "In...Blindheit und Unkenntnis spricht Iphigenie die Worte Agamemmons nach, ohne zu merken, dass dieser sie nur als Vorwand fur ganz andere Beweggründe genommen hatte"; cf. Jouan (ed., 32). Gibert (283) rightly points out that "an unsignalled deception such as this would be rare if not completely without parallel in tragedy".

246
as self-deception by an Agamemnon afraid of his army or blinded by ambition, or (3) as the righteous triumph of general over father, of public duty over private feelings.

But Menelaos' use of the same argument suggests the true explanation. The "Helen" argument and the "panhellenic" argument are not really two arguments but two ways of viewing the same facts— one might say a δισσόσ λόγος. A difference of emphasis slants the argument for or against the war:

against: "Why should all Greece go to war to restore a husband's dignity whose wife abandoned him and went to Troy?"

for: "All Greece has lost dignity through the abduction of a Greek wife and must fight to deter such crimes and restore its honour."

One side will tend to suggest that Helen went willingly, the other that she was abducted, but that is not a main point of contention in this play. What is important here is that the war can be put in a good or a bad light simply by emphasizing "Helen" (bad) or "Greece" (good). Other arguments are scarcely used. It is true that Achilles seems to oppose the sacrifice (not the war) mainly through a sense of personal insult, and Agamemnon argues the sacrifice cannot be stopped owing to the volatility of the troops. But no one argues that Greece should rescue the suffering victim Helen, or fight out of sheer compassion for

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175 Something of the sort results from the psychiatrics of Lawrence, 94f; similar comments by Blaiklock (Male Characters 119-20), Siegel ("Agamemnon" 264f).

176 Wassermann 185; Conacher takes a similar view, but with some reservations (262): he concludes "Agamemnon is now to be considered simply as the voice of authority informing Iphigenia of a noble cause in which she is called upon to join her fellow Greeks".

177 Stockert sees something similar in the way in which the army itself is described: "...das Heer, das bisher als 'Masse' (δύοσ) gesehen wurde" may also be seen "unter einem positivem Gesichtswinkel als das Aufgebot der Besten ganz Griechenlands" (p. 44f), and this is precisely the view Iphigeneia will present.

247
the offended husband Menelaos; nor is the glory or wealth a conquering army may acquire mentioned. Thus when Menelaos favours the sacrifice, he speaks of a righteous Greek retaliation against the barbarians (**Ἐλλάς** ἑλοῦσα δρᾶν τι κεδνόν 371); when he opposes it he denigrates Helen (**τὸ κακὸν** 488). When Agamemnon in the first episode argues against the sacrifice, he denigrates Helen (**κακὸν ἱχος** 389); when he later argues that it must take place, he speaks of a service to Greece (**ἐλευθέραν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν** [sc. Ἐλλάδα] ...γενέσθαι 1273f).

So Iphigeneia herself speaks against the sacrifice by asking what every opponent of the war could be expected to ask:

\[τί μοι μέτεστι τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου γάμων

'Ελευνης τε;\]

(1236f)

When she decides to offer herself up willingly, she speaks of the historic opportunity she has to deal a blow to the barbarians and "save Greece" (1378-86). But Iphigeneia goes further in support of the expedition than anyone else has done: she alone praises the army (1387-90), and she alone speaks of the goddess' command as compelling obedience (1395f). Two points must be made. First, the fact that Iphigeneia's use of a negative "Helen" argument and a positive "panhellenic" argument conforms

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178 Gibert (281) notes that Agamemnon in arguing (vss. 442-68) for the sacrifice "does not say a word in favor of the cause which he so effectively demolished earlier".

179 Menelaos perhaps implies (337-42) that Agamemnon had earlier seen the war in some such light; but this is said in a negative way and by way of insult—no one proposes such an argument within the play as a positive reason for the war. Another argument that might have been pressed by Menelaos and others is the sacred oath the suitors took; instead this is expressly thrown out of court by Agamemnon (391-5). As with the failure to argue for the sacrifice by reference to the goddess' demand, we see here a secularisation of the situation: the human agents must sort this out themselves.

180 It is of no importance that the command was elsewhere expressed as "conditional"; here in this speech Artemis' desire for a sacrifice is respected.
exactly to that of her uncle and her father suggests that the arguments are simply the appropriate instruments to use in speaking against or in favour of the war;\textsuperscript{181} Iphigeneia is not "mimicking" Agamemnon any more than she is mimicking Menelaos.\textsuperscript{182} Second, the fact she goes beyond this single argument and brings a variety of points to bear, including the acknowledgement of the goddess' role in the matter, suggests to me that Euripides has sought to create a crescendo of rhetoric that parallels the crescendo of emotion and activity I spoke of above. As we approach the exciting dénouement, we hear Klytaimestra's insults and threats, then Iphigeneia's heart-breaking pleas, Agamemnon's dire fears regarding the army, coupled with his voicing of a patriotic argument in a fuller and more coloured treatment than that of Menelaos earlier. And now we hear from Iphigeneia the most elaborate expression yet of the arguments in favour of the sacrifice and the war.

If we ask now what the "real reason" is for Iphigeneia's change of mind, I think we are asking an inappropriate question. Certainly there is no psychological improbability to the change; Aristotle's complaint has not attracted great sympathy among modern critics.\textsuperscript{183} As in the other plays under study in this chapter, Euripides has fleshed out his characters in such a way that their actions and decisions seem consistent with our impression of them as people.

\textsuperscript{181} Cf. my comments on the "divine" argument against Athenian intervention on behalf of the suppliants in \textit{Hik}, V.B above.

\textsuperscript{182} Funke's argument (294f) that Iphigeneia, as a princess, would have had no education in moral and political principles ("wie sie die Knaben erhielten"), would rob many other Euripidean heroines of their moral authority.

\textsuperscript{183} See the comments collected by Funke (284 n. 5), and add Knox ("Second Thoughts" 229): "One cannot help feeling that [Aristotle] might have picked a better example". Funke's article defends Aristotle's judgement; virtually every other study of this question suggests a rationale for Iphigeneia's change of mind that is proposed as readily available to the audience. But it must be conceded that the variety and dissonance of these "solutions" indicates that the change is a real critical problem.
Agamemnon (already a somewhat insecure leader in the *Iliad*)\textsuperscript{184} is a man plagued by hesitation and doubt and prone to changes of attitude,\textsuperscript{185} a father who adores his daughter, a man genuinely torn between a public and a private duty—the fact he has brought the dilemma upon himself makes it no less tragic.

As for Iphigeneia, her character is less fully developed than Agamemnon's; but she is not, like Makaria in *Hkld* or Menoikeus in *Phoin*, a person who exists only to make a heroic speech and die. Euripides has allowed us to see her at several points in what I think should be understood as a maturing process; in this she is very similar to the Antigone of *Phoin*. Iphigeneia in her first scene is an innocent child, apparently unaware even of her "betrothal" to Achilles, eager to embrace her father, full of questions, oblivious of the dark meaning of her father's answers.\textsuperscript{186} In her second scene, now knowing the plan her father has made for her, she recalls her childhood world (which now includes talk of her marriage and Agamemnon's old age), but her field of awareness is larger: her mother's birth-pains, Paris and Helen, the relative values of life and death. In her monody we hear the expression of bitterness towards her father.\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{184} See Griffin's excellent remarks in *Homer on Life and Death*, 70-3. He finds Agamemnon "prone to despair" (71), and notes he twice suggests abandoning the entire expedition.

\textsuperscript{185} See esp. 34-41; the charges levelled by Menelaos (337-64) are not to be thought of as "true" or "false", but they cannot help contributing to our impression of Agamemnon.

\textsuperscript{186} The question of exactly what Iphigeneia knows is a tricky one. J. Schmitt finds Euripides has contrived to keep her in complete ignorance of the proposed marriage in order to emphasize her youthful innocence (*Freiwilliger Opfertod* 19); but this seems contradicted by Klytaimestra's public remarks in 607-26. Stockert (ad 670): Iphigeneia "can 'officially' know nothing" of the wedding, but cautiously raises the subject in questioning Agamemnon. I see blissful and ironic oblivion rather in her exchange with Agamemnon: she is too young to care about anything but seeing her father.

\textsuperscript{187} Lawrence (101) sees Iphigeneia through all these scenes as "consistently a naive, innocent, life-loving girl": that is, no process of development foreshadows the change, which Lawrence regards as heroic but essentially irrational.
But faced with the reality of the sacrifice, and with the valour of Achilles, who is willing to risk death to save her, she sees all these things in a different light—her father, her death, the war, even Helen. 188

There is no need to think of "Iphigeneia in love" with Achilles, 189 nor of clever brainwashing by a cynical Agamemnon. The little girl has grown up, just as Antigone has grown up when, a few hours after the naive little girl watched the troops from the walls of Thebes, she takes on the role of caring for her miserable old father in a wandering marriageless exile (Phoin 1690). 190 From a "psychological" perspective, Iphigeneia may be thought of as responding to the immediate threat of violence and chaos, and also to Achilles' example of valour, and perhaps to inner conflict arising from her deep love for her father; all of these factors could in real life contribute to such a sudden change of attitude.

188 Iphigeneia's comments in 1378-82 and 1417f seem to represent a reconciliation with the idea of fighting for Helen. Siegel (312) however sees 1417f as criticism of Helen and evidence for a tenuous self-delusion behind Iphigeneia's resolve.

189 This approach has been argued most recently by W.D. Smith ("Iphigenia in Love"). His idea depends on risky assumptions about staging (174), and on the dubious idea that the audience will assume insincerity in Iphigeneia's speech of dedication (180). Smith's explanation for this insincerity (174): "Such is the modesty of maidens". This and other "psychological models" proposed to explain Iphigeneia's decision are reviewed by Gibert, 299-305.

190 The comparison of the two Antigones and the two Iphigeneias is interesting: Sophokles' Antigone is keenly aware of the marriage she is renouncing (cf. Ant 806-16, etc.); compare the easy dismissal of marriage in Phoin 1673-84. Schmitt (Freiwilliger Opfertod 19) calls attention to the blushing bride of IT 372ff, contrasting this to the innocence of our Iphigeneia. Maturing process: Menelaos used this metaphor in explaining his own change of mind: ἄφρων νέος τ' ἡ (489).
The change is thus "humanly intelligible". But this change must not only be acceptable in terms of psychology: it must satisfy also on a formal plane.

I have been concerned throughout this study with matters of "design". The tendency to formalism in the making of speeches, scenes and plays is a recognised aspect of Euripides' art. Speeches conform to the conventions of the various types (prologue speech, deus speech, messenger speech, debate speech, etc.); especially in the later plays, we often see a self-conscious balancing between speeches of maxims, reflections, arguments; whole scenes may confront each other in what can fairly be called a rhetorical way. I called attention above to the formal patterns created by the early scenes of Hik: an appeal sequence with a negative result is balanced by one with a positive result; a debate on abstract differences between democracy and tyranny is balanced by a debate on specific differences between Athens and Thebes; and these two pairs of exchanges balance each other as the development and confirmation of a policy.

In I A, Euripides has used a single complex scene-type three times. Each scene involves a reversal of the outlook for the sacrifice following the interruption of the scene by someone bringing new information to the situation:

Agamemnon intends to prevent sacrifice
(Messenger informs him of presence of Iphigeneia)
Agamemnon sees sacrifice as unavoidable

Klytaimestra and Achilles know nothing of sacrifice
(Servant informs them of plan)
Achilles intends to prevent sacrifice

Agamemnon will sacrifice Iphigeneia against her will
(Achilles informs her of army riot)
Iphigeneia offers herself willingly

252
The pattern of reversals itself is no less important than the question what "causes" each one. These causes involve interesting subtleties: Agamemnon offers as the reason for his initial change of attitude not a panhellenic vision of the Trojan War but an imagined scenario involving an army riot (528-35); Achilles offers his aid not because he is supplicated by Klytaiimestra (1002f) but because he feels insulted by Agamemnon; Iphigeneia, with the army rioting and Odysseus about to lay hands upon her (1365f), speaks of the valiant heroes who stand ready to die for Greece.191 Of parallel interest to these points is the way in which a large structure has been built up out of familiar materials arranged in symmetrical groups:192

debate
  (messenger-speech)
monologue193

"recognition"
  (report in stichomythia)
appeal sequence (single)
appeal sequence (double) & monody
  (report in hemistichomythia)
dedication speech

191 I do not think Euripides was insensitive to the ironies I am bringing out here; neither do I think he intended to alienate sympathy for the characters he created. The fabric he weaves is extremely rich.

192 I am leaving the second episode out of the picture here, as the sacrifice does not surface as an issue there. One of that scene’s functions is to bring home to the audience the depth of Agamemnon’s despondency over the way events are turning out; to this extent it corresponds formally to Iphigeneia’s monody expressing her misery.

193 This monologue (442-68) is followed by Menelaos’ striking reversal (473-503), on which see below. Strohm (143): "The words of the divided and of the reconciled brothers group themselves around an axis (317-414, 442-542); that about 100 verses stand on either side can be no accident". He notes that at the end of this long sequence there has been no real forward motion in the situation; but "knowledge has broadened, pain deepened".

253
Thus a great variety of resources come into play, but these well-worn devices of Euripidean play-making form a pattern of great integrity.

The reversals that will form the high points of the play are already to be seen in embryo in the hesitations of Agamemnon in the Prologue. They culminate in the goddess' reversal of the sacrifice itself, if that episode forms part of Euripides' play. The reversal of Menelaos, which should be seen as essentially a fully-argued apology to Agamemnon, is of no importance to the large design (since Menelaos will now drop completely out of the play), but resonates with the "change of mind" motif. Yet it achieves two important purposes: first, it gives legitimacy to the criticism of Helen heard from the other characters (just as Iphigeneia's acceptance of a patriotic motivation for the war gives that argument its legitimacy); second, it restores the solidarity of the Atreidai demanded by the old story (just as Iphigeneia's willing sacrifice makes possible the well-known continuation, the war in which Achilles fights for the Greeks, but with some resentment towards Agamemnon).

One final formal aspect I must notice here is the use of the trochaic tetrameter for certain speeches and exchanges. To what extent an ancient audience could be expected to associate with each other utterances in the same meter delivered at wide intervals is a question than cannot be answered with certainty. But the various tetrameter parts of IA suggest a pattern of long-range association. In the three episodes I have been discussing (the only parts of our text of IA in which the tetrameter appears), we find:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>Meter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>317-401</td>
<td>tetrameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402-542</td>
<td>trimeter</td>
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<tr>
<td>801-54</td>
<td>trimeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>855-916</td>
<td>tetrameter</td>
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<tr>
<td>917-1035</td>
<td>trimeter</td>
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The tetrameter sequences are (1) the debate of Agamemnon and Menelaos (with preceding stichomythia), (2) the Servant’s report to Achilles and Klytaimestra, with Klytaimestra’s short speech of appeal, (3) the scene of Achilles’ pursuit, with Iphigeneia’s speech announcing her decision. These are not the moments of deepest feeling in the play (those would be Agamemnon’s monologue in 442-68, his conversation with Iphigeneia in the second episode, Iphigeneia’s appeal to him in 1211-52), but perhaps they are the moments of greatest excitement: a heated argument, shocking news, a scene of imminent violence and sudden reversal. It seems likely to me that the change to tetrameter in the second and third of these scenes will have tended to recall the earlier tetrameter sequences; in particular, the use of tetrameter for Iphigeneia’s speech will have reminded the audience of her father’s futile attempt to avoid the sacrifice, and of her mother’s futile appeal to Achilles.194

In conclusion: *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, like *Suppliant Women*, involves a long rhetorical preparation preceding the play’s focal action. In both cases, the formal organization of this preparation is complex and involves obstacles and reversals the primary purpose of which is to delay and emphasise the action. The characters of IA are rather more developed than those of *Hik* (though less than those of *Hipp*), but the playwright’s point of departure seems again to have

194 Friedrich (104f) sees great significance in the “concentric rings” formed by the pattern of iambics and trochaics through the play, a pattern he notes also in *Alk* and *Ion*. The meeting of Klytaimestra and Achilles becomes for him the focal point of the play through this device: these two “stand in the middle, with Agamemnon on one side, Iphigeneia on the other. The play is constructed like a scale that holds the lot [Anteil] of father and daughter in the balance”. I find it hard to imagine a theatre audience experiencing the changes of meter in this way.
been the design of his plot: in each case, the plot dictated the degree to which it would be desirable to "characterise". For IA Euripides decided to anchor the plot with a balancing pair of complex rhetorical scenes (the first and fourth episodes), in each of which there would be an important reversal of attitude toward the sacrifice of Iphigeneia following upon the arrival of news from offstage. Thus Agamemnon's reversal in the first episode is structurally balanced by Iphigeneia's in the fourth. The circumstances under which Iphigeneia accepts death and the arguments she makes for the sacrifice seem designed to vindicate Agamemnon morally, and to return the Greek army which has run amok to the idealised state in which it was first described by the Chorus.
Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusions

In Chapter I some typical aspects of Euripides' composition of speeches in the "rhetorical" manner were investigated. Formal similarities of presentation were noted for various types of speech: appeals, forensic speeches, monologues expressing despair, speeches embracing a heroic death, and purely epideictic speeches. With respect to argument proper, two common modes of organisation were studied. One is a binary organisation in which two different grounds of justification or censure are covered (e.g., arguments from justice, advantage, φιλία, pity). The second mode brings a chronological or comparative presentation to bear; argumentative points are developed through a process of illustration referring to two different times, places, or groups. Both of these modes of organisation lend themselves to a variant in which two different stages of "rational" argument are capped by an emotional outburst, appeal for pity, threat, or reference to a practical point. It was noted (I.C) that in some places where rhetorical presentation seems extremely formal, self-conscious, and even "sophistic", Euripides has given us clear pointers (often in lyric material preceding the formal rhesis) that preclude our seeing these traits as undercutting the speaker.

In Chapter II formal confrontations involving pairs of speeches, as well as a few more complex exchanges, were subjected to a similar study. Exchanges discussed were of various situational types: appeal and response sequences, agonistic confrontations, "friendly" debates, and three-way exchanges. Various kinds of correspondence between the arguments of the opposing speeches were noted: in a few cases the second speech responds to the first point for point (e.g.
Her 140-235); the sequence may be chiastic (Andr 590-690). Sometimes however very little contact between the two speeches is to be detected (Phoin 469-525).

In these chapters I recognised and documented the stylised character of Euripidean rhetoric, noting in particular that similar strategies and arguments appear now on the sympathetic side in a debate, now on the unsympathetic side (see App. C). The following general picture emerged: (1) Euripides uses certain typical patterns of speech construction in a variety of situations; (2) certain typical argumentative grounds are advanced in a variety of situations; (3) in light of the conventional character of much of this rhetoric, it is unwise to expect the argumentative utterances of Euripidean characters to carry great weight in the portrayal of character.

An important critical question arises in connection with these observations: do the argumentative points made in Euripidean speeches represent choices made by the playwright in the light of the immediate persuasion situation only (Euripides as λογογράφος, in Dale's phrase), or do they involve aspects of dramatic treatment whose importance goes beyond the local context? Any answer to this question necessarily involves for each case the play of subjective factors. In most cases, I see the pronouncements of debating characters as designed to make persuasive points in the immediate context; I therefore see no problem with Herakles making in one context an announcement about divinity (Her 1345f) that seems to contradict the bitter reproach of Hera he has voiced in another (1303-10). But occasionally, it seems to me, Euripides has departed from a "conventional" presentation in such a way as to convey some insights into characters or relationships. Thus I have suggested (II.D) that the proem of Hippolytos' defense speech (Hipp 983-91), without discrediting the speaker or alienating our sympathy, yet calls our attention to a certain aloofness of character.
that to a limited extent helps us understand the tragedy of his relationships both to Theseus and to Aphrodite.

Chapters III and IV investigated a number of the most characteristic usages of Euripidean rhetoric. I presented first (III.A) the various ways in which rhetorical questions are used in the presentation of probability arguments, surveying examples of simple arguments achieved through a single question or question-and-answer pair. Next I discussed the "hypophora" figure, consisting of a series of rhetorical questions designed to eliminate alternative explanations or scenarios. The latter is very frequently exploited by Euripides in two situations: (1) (III.B) a series of motives or assumptions are demolished one by one in a speech that aims to refute an accusation or discredit an opponent (Andr 192-204); (2) (III.C) a series of options for the future are exposed as impossible in a speech presenting a character's sense of despair or ἀπορία (Alk 1049-61), or a speech that aims to demonstrate the weakness of the opponent's position (Phoin 571-83). These arguments involve "probabilities"; related are the hypothetical arguments in which "possibilities" are considered (III.D). Typical Euripidean uses of these formulations discussed were: (1) the argument that under certain unreal circumstances an act would have been tolerable, but in the actual case it is not (Elek 1024-30); (2) the use of an unreal condition for a comparison designed to demonstrate the absurdity of the opponent's position (Elek 1041-5). Another typical rhetorical use of hypothetical formulations was seen in such "role-reversal" arguments as Hipp 1042-4.

One important aspect of these rhetorical questions and hypothetical arguments is their usefulness in enlarging the perspective in a scene by introducing a comparison with general expectations or "probabilities", and with unrealised "possibilities". The uses of gnomic formulations in argument, studied in Chap-
ter IV, contribute importantly to this element in Euripidean drama. I have described (IV.A) the various ways in which Euripides expresses "general rules" and applies them to the "special case" of the play-situation. In addition to the very frequent use of gnomic formulations in opening, closing, and grounding functions (IV.B), certain specialised patterns were seen: (1) (IV.C) the use of gnomic material in connection with "realisations" in which a character seems to become aware of a breach or limitation of common sense (Elek 367-90); (2) (IV.D) reflections, often of a polemic nature, in which a wish is expressed for a fundamental change in the way the world works (Med 573-5). These "utopian reflections" were characterised as designed essentially to make a strong rhetorical point, using language and images familiar from other Greek sources (i.e., not as essentially novel or truly "philosophical"). Stress was laid upon the rather limited range of patterns within which these various resources are used.

In Chapter V the principles developed in the first four chapters were tested against the conclusions of other critics in relation to three plays. The rhetoric and content of the monologue of Phaidra was analysed in detail (V.A). In considering the tone and purpose of the speech, I argued against the ideas that Phaidra is presented as confused and self-deluding, that she is shown arrogantly claiming credit for a heroic resistance to passion, and that Euripides has spoiled the presentation of her character by writing a "philosophical" speech. While recognising the highly formal and detached character of the speech, I emphasised its contribution, and that of the Nurse's answering speech, to the establishment of some important themes of the play.

Suppliant Women similarly involves a very intellectual, speculative speech (Theseus' answer to Adrastos, Hik 195-249) that has been held by some critics to undercut the moral authority of its speaker. In discussing the play
(V.B), I characterised this intellectualism as (like that of Phaidra's monologue) a typical Euripidean mode of presentation, an aspect of the poet's constant striving to enlarge the context of the traditional tales he sets. And I emphasised the positive effect Euripides has achieved through his decision to use a series of elaborate rhetorical debates to delay and highlight the heroic and patriotic action that forms the play's centrepiece.

For *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, there has been no critical consensus on the moral status of Agamemnon; another major critical problem has been that of the reasons for Iphigeneia's decision to go willingly to her death. In analysing the scenes of debate and appeal that dominate the play, I noted again a pattern of obstacles and delays, more developed here than in *Suppliant Women*. The series of scenes through which the prospects for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia repeatedly rise and fall involves interesting patterns of formal repetition; there are interesting variations, too, in the realisation of this cycle. And through the whole progression, from the prologue to Iphigeneia's speech of self-dedication, there is a crescendo of anticipation that is mirrored in the rhetorical crescendo to be seen in the speeches the various characters make for and against the sacrifice; Iphigeneia's speech, with its elaborate medley of arguments, is the climax of this process. My discussion of the play suggested that these complex formal and rhetorical patterns, and the use once again of rhetorical analysis and argument to prepare and amplify a noble action, are more important for an appreciation of the play than questions of character.

My objectives have been: (1) to document the features of presentation and argument typical of Euripidean persuasive speech; (2) to develop a critical interpretation of the tone and function of the speeches and scenes that display these features. The first has been achieved through classification of speeches and
scenes by type (Chapters I and II), close analysis of arguments (Chapters III and IV), and collection of parallels for details of presentation (Appendices). For the second, the interpretive material presented throughout this study, and especially in Chapter V, offers an approach that attempts to recognise the stylised and conventional character of Euripidean rhetoric, the entertainment value of sophisticated monologues and debates for the Athenian audience, and the importance of rhetorical scenes in preparing, delaying or reviewing important actions, but without neglecting the ingenuity and flexibility with which Euripides has presented in his rhetorical speeches and scenes material of more direct relevance for our appreciation of themes and characters.
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Appendices

A. Some Formal Devices of Euripidean Rhetoric

Hallmarks of Euripidean rhetoric include (1) frequent expressions of "rhetorical self-consciousness", (2) a battery of devices for focusing attention on the sequence of argument and on important points, (3) a repertoire of formulas for the presentation of arguments proper.

1. "Rhetorical Self-consciousness"

M. Lloyd sees self-consciousness as a regular feature of the Euripidean agon speeches he has studied. He states: "This self-consciousness manifests itself in formal statements of the subject of the speech, concern for τὰ ἔξοχα, enumeration of points, explicit references to the act of speaking itself, and point-by-point refutation of the opponent".¹ I compile here examples of "self-consciousness" in a narrower sense— references to the speech itself, the roles of speaker and listener, the debate as such. Other devices mentioned by Lloyd are treated in the next section as focusing techniques.

Euripidean speakers often begin a speech with a clear announcement of an intention to speak: λέξω (Elek 1013); λέξω θέλω σοι (Alk 281); λέγω μ' ἄν (Hek

¹ Agon 34. Lloyd sees in these facts evidence for "the impact of contemporary rhetoric" on Euripides, noting that "this kind of thing is not, on the whole, to be found in speeches that are, or purport to be, natural pieces of self-expression" (ibid). But literary speech can never be really naturalistic; thus Homeric "rhetoric" includes the opening line τοι γὰρ ἔγων ἔρεω, σὺ δέ σώθεο καὶ μεν ἀκουστον (Od xvi. 259, etc.) and the transitional or "focusing" line ἄλλο δε τοι ἔρεω, σὺ δ' ἐνι φρέσι βάλλεο σῆμα (Od xvi. 281, etc.). "Rhetorical self-consciousness" is therefore not a new phenomenon in the fifth century.
Imperative forms of ἀκούω, more often used to focus attention within an argument (see below), open speeches at: Hek 788, Her 1255, Tro [635], Phoin 1586, IA 1368f (εἰσακουστέα τῶν ἐμὸν λόγων). These simple formulas may stand alone (e.g., Hek 1132), or expand into headlines announcing the general or first argument of the speech (e.g., Her 1255). The same formulas frequently form part of a headline introducing a change of direction or a new point within a speech: Hkld 848, Hel 23 (λέγομεν ἄν); Kyk 323, Hek 273, 788, 1137, 1217, Her 279, Tro 394, 923, IT 1012, Ion 589, 633, Or 565, IA 1374 (ἀκουσοῦν). Some characters insist self-consciously on speaking unwelcome or unpleasant truths: Hipp 664f, Elek 909-12, Or 559f.

The process of speaking and listening is closed explicitly by Eurystheus in Hkld 1014: προσεῖπας, ἀντήκουσας. So Menoikeus closes with εἰρηται λόγος (Phoin 1012). A demonstrative may assist in opening a section (τάδ᾽ ἀντάκουέ μου, Hek 321), or in closing a section (τοσαῦτα μὲν σοι τῶν ἐμῶν πόνων περὶ ἔλεξα, Med 545f; cf. Elek 696, 1276, Her 204) or a speech (Phoin 494, IA 400).

Parts of the speech are referred to: προοίμιον, Elek 1060. Reference is made to the need for a fit "beginning, middle and end" in Elek 907f, IA 1124-6.

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2 See Denniston ad Elek 300, Fraenkel ad Ag 838. Fuller expressions of the intention of speaking or questioning open speeches at Med 475, 522, Her 140-2, IA 335, 378.

3 The development of the ideas of speaking or listening into a proem topic referring to the speech-situation is common (see below).

4 In light of the frequency with which speeches and arguments are so opened, I cannot agree with Mossman's assessment of the tone of this passage (Wild Justice 108): "Hecuba speaks solemnly: note ἀκουσοὺν ('hear') emphatically placed at the beginning of 273".

5 Cf. Hek 321, τάδ᾽ ἀντάκουέ μου.

6 On formulas introducing "constructs" (argument sequences) in Lysias, see Bateman diss. 139ff.

7 Elsewhere the word seems not to have this technical sense: Med 663, Hek 181, Her 538, etc.
A speaker's objective is often to demonstrate or prove a point. This intention is sometimes expressly stated: *Med* 548-50, *Her* 171-3, *Tro* 365f, 970; cf. διδαξει *Hkld* 1022, διδασκον *Hek* 299. Iphigeneia introduces her arguments in favour of her sacrifice with a self-conscious claim for their cogency:

δευρο δή σκέψαι μεθ' ἡμῶν, μήτερ, ώς καλῶς λέγω. (IA 1377)

Speakers refer to the need to persuade, in each case denying that the speaker or the adversary will succeed in the effort: *Hkld* 1008, *Hipp* 1007, *Hek* 813-20, *Tro* 981f, *Kretes* 4.

The idea of a "contest" is raised using expressions like ἀμιλλα λόγον: *Med* 546, *Hik* 428; cf. *Hik* 195f, fr. 334.3. The idea of "stronger" and "weaker" λόγοι: *Andr* 189f, *Hik* 486f, *Hel* 138f, fr. 189 (from *Antiope*).


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8 As Barrett notes ad *Hipp* 487, the expressions καλῶς λέγειν and εὖ λέγειν may characterise either the content or the presentation of a speech. Here clearly the content is being recommended. In *Tro* [634f], where Andromache begins her speech with καλλιστον λόγον ἀκουσον, the sequel (ὡς σοι τέρψειν ἐμβάλω φρενί) suggests an emphasis rather on clever presentation. This emphasis is hard to square with the serious, pathetic content of the speech that follows; and the formula of address in 634 seems inappropriate. The lines are rightly deleted.


10 Similar points are made in reflective monologues preceding speeches, in which doubts about the advisability of speaking out are raised: *Andr* 184-91, *Hek* 736-9, *Hik* 297-300.
2. Focusing of Arguments

Speeches are built up of more or less self-contained sections: introductory material of various kinds, blocks of argument (often appearing in balanced pairs), pathetic sequences in which despair or impotence are expressed, closing reflections and summarising epilogues. It is on basic contrasts of style and content that we distinguish these sections. But Euripides has at his disposal a number of devices for helping his audience to follow the construction of a speech or follow the sequence of thought within an argument, and for focusing attention on important points.

This is especially noticeable in speeches whose argument involves chronological organisation. The use of adverbial expressions to mark out the sequence in time of an argumentative narratio is a frequent feature. This is particularly elaborate in Helen's defense at Tro 914-65, Herakles' monologue in Her 1255-1310; less clearly marked chronology is seen in the heated diatribes of Peleus against Menelaos (Andr 590-641), Elektra against Aigisthos (Elek 907-56). Adverbs are also employed to mark the logical sequence in a chain of arguments: Hek 357-60 (πρῶτα μέν...ἐπείτα), Med 548-50, Her 174-89, Hel 270-305.11

Attention is called to a change of topic or argument using μέν and δὲ (the μέν-clause closing one argument, the δὲ-clause announcing the next): Med 545-7, Hek 271-3, Hik 456f, 542f, Her 204-6, Phoin 568.12 A relative clause assists in making such a transition in Med 547, Hek 272, Ion 633, Hel 22f, 1009f.13

11 For rhetorical questions with εἰτα and ἐπείτα used in closing an argument by reductio ad absurdum, see above, Ch. I n.53.

12 In Phoin 568 the change of argument corresponds with a change of addressee; see Mastronarde ad loc for more examples of the latter device.

13 In these passages a second stage of argument is opened with a relative clause; first stage of argument is so opened in Hek 787.
Important points are often anticipated with an announcement using \( \epsilon \nu \): *Med* 585, *Hipp* 1021 (\( \epsilon \nu \ \omega \ \lambda e \lambda e k t a i \ \tau \nu \ \epsilon \mu \omega \nu \)), *Andr* 362, *Her* 196, 207, 1386, *IT* 1016 (\( \sigma u n \theta e i s \ \tau \dot{a} \dot{d} \ \epsilon i s \ \epsilon \nu \)), *Ion* 668, 854, *Hel* 1063, *Or* 530, *IA* 1249 (\( \epsilon \nu \ \sigma u n t e m o u i s a \ \pi \acute{a} n t a \ \nu k \acute{h} i s o \ \lambda \acute{g} o u \)), etc.\(^\text{14}\)

Speakers use \( \dot{o}p\acute{a}i\varepsilon \) to fix attention on a pathetic aspect of the present situation (*Alk* 280, *Med* 404, *Hkl\'{d} 579, *Her* 1358f, *Bak* 1329) or to cite facts or examples in support of a contention or parainesis (*IT* 96, *Or* [588], 591, *Bak* 337). Gnomes are so introduced in frr. 301, 420, 1052. Similar uses of \( \dot{o}p\acute{a}i\varepsilon \) are seen in rhetorical questions, both positive (*Andr* 195, *Hik* 321) and negative (*Hkl\'{d} 734, *Andr* 349, frr. 152, 217, 898). Points are offered for consideration with \( \sigma k\acute{e}p\acute{a}i \) (*Her* 295, *Tro* 931, *IA* 1377; variations of person or tense in *Andr* 622, 755, *Tro* 729, *Hel* [914]). An argument is introduced with \( \sigma k\acute{o}\pi\acute{e}i\nu \ \chi r\acute{h}\acute{e} \ \nu e l \ \text{sim.} \): *Phoin* 463, *Bak* 317, *Tro* 729. In fr. 332.8 an argument is closed with \( \tau \acute{a}t\acute{a} \ \delta \varepsilon \ \sigma k\acute{o}\pi\acute{e}i\nu \ \chi r\acute{e}i\nu \).


A self-conscious "ring" unifies the argument of a speech: Medeia begins her diatribe against Jason with \( \epsilon \sigma \omega \sigma \acute{a} \ \sigma e \) (*Med* 476), and ends with \( \dot{\eta} \ \tau \ ' \ \epsilon \sigma \omega \sigma \acute{a} \ \sigma e \) (515); Orestes begins his defense by asking Tyndareos \( \tau \iota \ \chi r\acute{h}\acute{e} \mu \epsilon \ \delta r\acute{a}\sigma \acute{a}i \); (*Or* 551), and closes with \( \tau \iota \ \chi r\acute{h}\acute{e} \mu \epsilon \ \delta r\acute{a}\nu \) (596).\(^\text{15}\)

For the focusing uses of \( \dot{a}g\acute{e} \), see above, Ch. I n.38.

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\(^\text{14}\) Similar emphatic use of \( \epsilon \nu \) in other contexts: *Hipp* 919, *Hek* 285, *Tro* 425, *Hel* 535, etc.

\(^\text{15}\) Cf. the interesting variant in *Phoin* 989 and 997: Menoikeus begins, in Kreon's presence, with \( \dot{e} \dot{i}m\acute{u} \ \kappa a i \ \sigma \omega \acute{a} \ \varphi \iota \nu \), but corrects the record after his father's departure: \( \dot{e} \dot{i}m\acute{u} \ \kappa a i \ \sigma \omega \acute{a} \ \pi \acute{o}l\acute{i}n \). An interesting ring is formed around a pair of speeches by \( \varphi \omega \lambda e \nu m\acute{a}i\varsigma \nu \) in *Hek* 251 (opening Hekabe's appeal) and 331 (closing Odysseus' response).
3. Formulas of argument

In addition to the foregoing techniques for focusing new points and calling attention to the sequence of argument, there are characteristic ways of presenting persuasive details. Euripides constantly resorts to rhetorical question sequences and to gnomic expressions in argument, and these have been studied in detail in Chapters III and IV above. Some additional techniques are noted here.

Relative clauses (particularly clauses introduced by forms of ὅστις) are used to spell out the detailed basis of a charge or reproach: this is the dominant form of argument, for example, in Peleus' tirade against Menelaos (Andr 590-641, where such clauses occur at 592, 597, 602, 607, 616).

The word χρὴν has several characteristic uses in argument: (1) it frequently introduces an abstract reflection (see discussion in IV.D above); (2) an alternate course the interlocutor should or should not take or have taken may complete a chain of arguments in forensic contexts (χρὴν σε... in Med 586, Hek 1218, IA 1196); (3) a relative clause containing χρὴν (or ἐχρὴν) enhances a point by emphasizing inappropriateness (IA 487 ἀπολέσας ἀδελφόν, ὅν μ. ἡκιστήρ ἐχρὴν; cf. Med 507, 886, Hek 1224, 1234, Elek 973, 1012, Bak 26) or irony (ἐγὼ δ', ὅν οὔ χρὴν ζην. Alk 939; cf. Hik 174, Her 211, Tro 1218, Bak 1345).

Formulas for "anticipation of arguments": (1) second person expressions are normally used to mention a possible accusation or objection (ἐπεισ Alk 658, Or 665, Hkld 169; φήσεις Hipp 962; τάχ' οὖν ἄν εἰπον Hik 184; εἰπος ἄν Ion 813, IT 381, Hel 847, Or 286, 494, 573. Clauses opened by forms of ὅς are similarly used: Andr 607, 616, Hek 252, 791, Her 1308, Ion 863.

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16 See Friis Johansen, General Reflection 126 with n. 80. He cites the following Euripidean examples for ὅστις: Alk 620, Med 1130, 1325, Andr 8, 326, 399, 592, 602, Hik 220, 1092, Elek 1006, Ion 813, IT 381, Hel 847, Or 286, 494, 573. Clauses opened by forms of ὅς are similarly used: Andr 607, 616, Hek 252, 791, Her 1308, Ion 386.

17 Recriminations of a more casual sort are similarly expressed in Alk 633, Hipp 459, 1072, Andr 607, 650, Her 224, 709. "Third party" recriminations (using χρὴν αὐτὸν) are in Phoin 515, Or 500.

278
629). (2) In the third person λεγουων introduces an abstract point that is then negated by argument (Med 248, Tro 665; cf. Hel 950); potential reproaches put forward in argument are introduced by ἐπεὶ τίς (vel sim.) in Alk 954, Hik 314, Phoin 580.

Introduction of direct quotes serves various rhetorical purposes: anonymous reproaches are quoted by a speaker who imagines the negative reaction a discreditable act will or may bring upon himself in Alk 955, Hkld 517, Her 1289. In Elek 931ff Elektra quotes to Klytaimestra the anonymous reproaches her conduct attracted; in IA 1177-9 Klytaimesta quotes to Agamemnon reproaches she herself will in the future voice. In Her 1380 the hero quotes reproaches he fears his weapons may address to him. Direct quotes enhance the force of an argument also at Phoin 575 (Iokaste quotes the ironic σκόλα on which Polyneikes will announce his victory) and 581 (a reproach that will be uttered against Adrastos should Polyneikes lose the war). In a pathetic context, Hermione recalls anonymous reproaches that she says caused her to mistreat Andromache (Andr 932); Hekabe recalls words addressed to her by Astyanax (Tro 1182); Iphigeneia recalls a long-ago conversation with her father (IA 1223-30).

18 Note also Helen's speech of defense in Tro 914-65, which is expressly introduced as anticipating charges Hekabe might make against her (916-18); second person formulas of anticipation are in 938, 945, 951. ἐπεὶ τίς in Phoin 561 is not anticipation of an argument (contra M. Lloyd Agon 31), but occurs in a scornful rhetorical question.

19 An anticipated question is marked with ὅσος εἶποι τίς (Andr 929), and ἐπεὶ τίς occurs in Bak 204, not in argument but in a rather insecure question: "Will someone object that...?". Friis Johansen (General Reflection 99 n. 148, discussing Hel [752]) suggests for Euripides a distinction between the use of third person "for introducing a hypothetical objection in reflective contexts" and the second person "in argumentative contexts". But (1) the second person form used in a general context (as at lon 629) seems to have the same force as a third person indefinite; (2) the character of third-person passages like Hik 314 (ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τίς ...) may fairly be called "argumentative". Thus I disagree with M. Lloyd when he speaks of "the not especially rhetorical process of imagining what a third party might say" (Agon 31 n. 45).

20 Direct quotes are a regular feature of messenger speeches; for a catalogue of Euripidean instances, see I. de Jong Narrative in Drama 199-201. Anonymous speeches in the Iliad are studied in de Jong's interesting article "Voice of Anonymity".

279
B. Personal Supplication as a Persuasive Technique

It has often been pointed out that the rhetorical debates in Euripides, for all their sophisticated techniques of persuasion, never bring about any change in the participants' positions—no one is ever "persuaded". While rhetorical argument is conceded to have no impact on the trend of the action, it has been suggested by some that gestures or acts of supplication have a peculiar persuasive force, and that tragic plots are sometimes decisively redirected through acts of supplication. It is the purpose of this section to investigate the Euripidean evidence for that idea.

The rituals of altar supplication and personal supplication have been studied in detail by J. Kopperschmidt in his 1967 diss. *Die Hikesie als dramatische Form*. Kopperschmidt discusses (20-5) the gestures of personal supplication, with emphasis on the religious significance of knees, chin, hair, etc., as well as the "attributes" of altar supplication (στέμματα, κλάδοι, etc. pp. 25-31). His discussion of personal supplication begins with Odysseus' encounter with Nausikaa (*Od* vi. 141-4), where the naked hero hesitates whether to supplicate the girl by grasping her knees or from a distance; Kopperschmidt notes (p. 21) that personal suplication may be completed as a formal action (Odysseus' γούνων λαβὼν λίσσεσθαι), or through the "formless" entreaties implied in αὐτῶς λίσσεσθαι. He

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21 This is not to say that Euripides never has one character "persuaded" by another to do or not do something; but this occurs most often between characters who are "friends", and without rhetorical fireworks. R. L. Murray's 1964 diss. *Persuasion in Euripides* (App. B, 383-7) surveys scenes in Euripides involving successful and unsuccessful persuasion.
describes this "stricter form" of supplication as "more binding— one cannot ignore it" (ibid).

Kopperschmidt's interest is in the use of supplication as a motif in tragedy, and this subject has been pursued by a number of other critics before and since.\footnote{Strohm Euripides 3-49, Lattimore Story Patterns 46f, Burnett Catastrophe Chapters IV-IX, Gould "Hiketeia" passim, Jäkel "ΠΑΘΟΝΤΙ ΑΝΤΙΔΠΑΝ" passim, Vickers Towards Greek Tragedy 438-94, Heath Poetics 145-8, Gibert diss. 126-31. I have not seen C. Mercier's 1990 Columbia diss. Suppliant Ritual in Euripidean Tragedy.}

John Gould in his 1973 article "Hiketeia" treats altar supplication and personal supplication as two species of a single socio-religious ritual, noting that in spite of differences in the forms of the two actions, they share the same Greek name and "there is both a parallelism of function and a network of resemblances between the two" (p. 75). As examples of the two types he cites Thetis' supplication of Zeus in \textit{II. I.} 498-527 and the accounts of the Kylonian conspirators (75-8). He concludes on the strength of a number of examples that physical contact is an essential feature of the full form of the ritual. He notes however that under certain circumstances the language of supplication seems to be used figuratively, either because "the situation requires no more than an intensification of the language of diplomatic appeal" (e.g., Telemachos asking Nestor for information about Odysseus, \textit{Od. iii.} 92ff), or "where circumstances rule out or make unwise the completed ritual" (e.g., Odysseus to Nausikaa, \textit{Od} vii. 141ff).\footnote{Here Gould notes the striking fact that after deciding not to physically supplicate, Odysseus nevertheless begins his address to Nausikaa with \textit{γοννοῦμαι σε, ἀνασασα} (vi. 149).}

Gould is certainly right in seeing a range of urgency in the reported examples of supplication. But his general conclusion— that supplication when properly and fully conducted creates an irresistible obligation— is impossible to accept. It is first of all on the face of it unlikely that the completion of a simple
ritual could have such force.\textsuperscript{24} (I am thinking here especially of real-life situations: unfortunately Gould makes no distinction between supplication as a ritual of ancient Greek life and as a literary topos; it is not inconceivable that the theatre audience would have a conditioned response to stage supplication, in which turning down a suppliant cast one automatically as a villain.\textsuperscript{25})

Secondly, Gould's own examples do not support the conclusion that the person (or literary character) who completed the ritual was virtually assured of success. On one hand we see a large number of suppliants (including all the battlefield suppliants of the \textit{Iliad}) killed, and many others failing to gain the benefit they seek: Gould counts 35 occurrences of supplication in Homer, of which 22 clearly succeed, 10 fail.\textsuperscript{26} The explanations he offers for many of the failed cases—contact was not achieved or was broken, the suppliant was killed by someone other than the person supplicated, vengeance was an overriding value—do not seem persuasive. The rejections are not in any way signaled as unusual or offensive occurrences. Moreover it is a feature of Homeric style to expand a passage to emphasise the importance of the scene, and this is certainly the case with \textit{II XXI. 34-135} (Lykaon's encounter with Achilles): Lykaon's supplication should not be thought of as more "complete" than another, but as more completely described.\textsuperscript{27} Thus does Homer focus attention on Achilles'

\textsuperscript{24} J. Griffin ("Characterization" 134): "Life would be impossible if anybody could make anybody do anything they chose simply by going through the forms of supplication, a privileged gesture which existed for the desperate to save their lives when on the run or menaced with death". This view would seem consistent with the idea that in all but life-and-death situations the announcement of supplication is not much more than a figure of speech.

\textsuperscript{25} See Heath's discussion of tragedy's "repertoire of types": the "types" exploited in the theatre may or may not conform to rituals or experiences of real life (\textit{Poetics} 145-50).

\textsuperscript{26} "Hiketeia" 80 with n. 39. These scenes are treated together by Fenik, \textit{Battle Scenes} 83f.

\textsuperscript{27} For the "expansion" technique see N. Austin, "The Function of Digressions in the \textit{Iliad}", \textit{BICS} 7 (1966): 295-312. Edwards (\textit{Homer: Poet of the Iliad}, 74f) notes the Lykaon scene is expanded to great length "to match the importance of Achilles' unforgettable words about the inevitability of death".
eloquent and important answer to Lykaon, and his speech over the dead body. Though the scene shows a bitter and vengeful Achilles, he is not cast as impious, nor is emphasis laid on the details of Lykaon's gestures in such a way as to exculpate Achilles (as Gould suggests, p. 81).

Mention must also be made of all the persuasive resources almost invariably brought to bear by a suppliant in addition to the act of supplication itself. To confine the discussion for now to Gould's examples, Thetis in supplicating Zeus (II I. 498-527; cf. Gould 75f) begins by pointing out she has done Zeus favors in the past, then gives arguments why Achilles deserves Zeus' solicitude (he is ωκυμορώτατος ἄλλων; Agamemnon has robbed him of his γέρας). When Zeus fails to answer, she adds that if he refuses she will regard herself as the ἄτιμοτάτη of all the gods. This is neither a purely physical ritual nor a desperate appeal for pity, but the application of a sophisticated persuasive strategy, involving arguments from past services, justice, and consequences. So in other Homeric passages we see supplication bolstered with offers of ransom (e.g., II VI. 45ff), a strong legal defense (Od xxi. 145-7), and Lykaon's argument to Achilles that he is only a half-brother to Hektor (II XXI. 74-96, side by side with an abject appeal for αἰδώς and ἔλεος). I take the child held by Themistokles when he supplicated Admetos (Thuc. I. 136) to be another form of strong argument for good treatment.28

Turning to Gould's discussion of examples from tragedy, I see the same pattern. Gould analyses in some detail Med 324-56 (my passage no. 3 below) and Hipp 311-52 (no. 11). He sees Medea's triumph in persuading Kreon to allow her an extra day in Corinth as due essentially to the successful completion of a physical act of supplication, though he adds that at the critical moment (vs. 338)

28 Gould discusses this and similar stories p. 99f.
Medea modifies her demand, asking (340-3) to be allowed not to reside in Corinth but just to stay a single day longer (p. 85f). As Gould notes, Schwinge's discussion of the exchange focuses on this modification of her demand as the decisive factor in her success.\(^{29}\) Although I see the use of additional persuasive resources as a constant accompaniment to supplication (often, in fact, supplication is merely an adjunct strategy, bolstering solider resources of persuasion), I think it is likely that in this case we are meant to understand that the suppliant language has created a predisposition to yield in Kreon. This may be implicit in his reference to \(\alpha i\delta\omega\)\(^{30}\) in his response to Medea, and it is strongly suggested in her later boast that she would not have "groveled" so before Kreon except to gain something (368f). \(^{31}\) Thus it seems Medea herself counts supplication of some sort at least partly responsible for her success.\(^{32}\)

The case in *Hipp* 311-52 is somewhat different and seems unique in Euripides, in that a character says unequivocally that she is yielding purely as the result of supplication (vs. 335);\(^{33}\) it is also one of the few passages where physical

\(^{29}\) Schwinge *Verwendung der Stich*. 68-70. Gibert (diss., 87f): "It is Medea's appeal to pity for her children ('for you too are a father', 344-5) which apparently carries the day." Gibert connects this with thematic emphasis throughout the play on family and children.

\(^{30}\) That \(\alpha i\delta\omega\) is the response one hopes to awaken in supplicating is well documented by Gould; see esp. 87-90.

\(^{31}\) The word \(\thetaωπευσει\) seems elsewhere to be associated with supplication: see passages nos. 70 and 71 below, and Gould p. 75 with n. 10. It is not likely to refer in *Med* 368 to the "flattery" of 306-15, since this proved distinctly unsuccessful.

\(^{32}\) What action are we to imagine? Medea has begged "by your knees and your daughter" (324: clearly figurative), appealed for \(\alpha i\delta\omega\) (326), and "supplicated" (\(\kappa\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\nu\sigma\) 338); whether Wilamowitz's conjecture \(\chi\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\sigma\) is right or wrong in 339, she speaks in 370 of having grasped Kreon's hand. But this hardly allows us to speak of a "completed ritual". The text does not confirm Gould's hypothesis of success following rather mechanically on the execution of a complex ritual action, yet it seems impossible to deny that Euripides has intended the *language* of supplication to contribute to the breaking down of Kreon's well-founded resistance.

\(^{33}\) The other cases where supplication seems to be referred to in the supplicated's response: *Med* 349f (Kreon's \(\alpha i\delta\omega\), but note the generality of the statement— "I've often been the victim of
contact is clearly involved: thus it would seem strongly to favour Gould's hypothesis. Gould summarises the scene (p. 86) by noting that the Nurse's efforts to learn Phaidra's secret have been unsuccessful up to the mention of Hippolytos' name in vs. 310; in the stichomythia that now begins, Phaidra continues to resist until "suddenly, the Nurse falls at Phaidra's knees and takes her hand (324). Phaidra pleads with the Nurse to let go, that is to abandon physical contact and thus break off the ἵκετεία (325; more strongly still 333): there is a moment in which a tense equilibrium prevails; then Phaidra gives way: αἰδων prevents rejection of the suppliant (335). "I think this is correct as far as it goes—that is, the suppliant action clearly puts pressure on Phaidra\(^34\)—but it ignores the possibility pressure may exist within Phaidra to reveal her secret. That supplication does not here simply short-circuit Phaidra's resistance is clear from the continuation: she attempts to hint at the truth (337-43), asks how she may get the truth out without divulging it herself (345), raises a general question about love (347), and finally contrives (by a trick exploiting the stichomythia convention: she manages to get to the end of vs. 351 without saying "Hippolytos") to get the Nurse to utter the dreadful name (352).

There is subtle psychology in this passage: if the game were really won at vs. 335 would we see all this confusion and hesitation in the sequel? That Euripides intends us to see Phaidra as experiencing an emotional conflict, in which she wants and doesn't want to share her secret, has been the conclusion of

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\(^34\) A sceptic, though, might ask how this pressure differs from that of any other act of insistent badgering of an exhausted and overwrought person: Barrett speaks (ad 333-5) of Phaidra's "collapse in face of the Nurse's insistence"; he does not regard the outcome as due to supplication as such.

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my own sense of decency"—and the lack of scholarly consensus that it refers to supplication; Med 709f (Aigeus cites "the gods" among "many" reasons for offering to help Medeia); Ηκλ 226f (Demophon lists three reasons for complying, including "Zeus, at whose altar you sit"); Hel 939 (Theonoe cites her natural εὔεἰξεία among several reasons for agreeing to keep quiet).
many scholars. I think this must be correct; that is, as in the Med scene, supplication forms a weakening influence within a complex of persuasive pressures, but here we are forced to infer that much of the pressure comes from within.

Although I thus do not see supplication functioning in Euripidean scenes as a game-like ritual action such as Gould describes, it is clear from the material he has assembled that within the literary conventions of Athens supplication was felt as a powerful persuasive resource for a person in a weak position to bring to bear on a stronger individual. I have described as an "excuse" Phaidra's reference to supplication as her reason for yielding, but the availability of this excuse points clearly to supplication's conventional persuasive power. Passages like that in which Odysseus strains physically to avoid any effort at supplication by Polyxene (no. 67 below), or where Achilles assures Klytaimestra he would have agreed to champion Iphigeneia even without being supplicated (IA 1002f), offer further evidence for the special value of supplication as a persuasive resource.

35 Winnington-Ingram ('Study in Causation' 179) speaks of "the deep longing that she has to make the revelation". Knox ('The Hippolytus' 7) notes the "relief" Phaidra experiences as she begins to reveal the secret. Griffin ('Characterization', 134) goes a bit far: "As we all know, those in love always have a strong desire to talk about it". But he follows very convincingly the course of Phaidra's gradual revelation, showing her as both weak and manipulating the situation. Heath (Poetics, 146) rejects this psychological view, and emphasises the supplication as a plot device that "takes away from Phaedra the initiative in revealing the truth". Heath is certainly correct in connecting the manner of the revelation to a requirement of the πράξις, but his approach here is too narrow in that it fails to explain the lengths Euripides has gone to to show us a confused and ashamed heroine.

36 I would add that the fact that only here in Euripides is supplication cited as the single essential reason for yielding supports the view that the outcome suited Phaidra's secret desire: she gives readily as her reason for complying a reason out of keeping with observed conventions. We may see this as grasping at the first excuse that offers itself: as Barrett has put it (ad 333-5), "She finds a virtue in her very weakness".

37 G. Freyburger "Supplication" covers much of the same ground as Kopperschmidt and Gould on the description of the altar and personal rituals themselves. He analyses no tragic scenes, but emphasises (512f) that the supplicated person has a real decision to make, that protection is not "automatic": "une réflexion s'impose pour le supplié, car d'autres devoirs peuvent interférer".

286
I turn now to a close study of Euripides' exploitation of the rhetoric of personal supplication. I list below passages in which the technical vocabulary of supplication is used in connection with pleas to an individual for mercy, protection, help, silence or speech. This vocabulary includes the verb ἱκτεύω, expressions implying falling to the ground before the person supplicated, and references to touching or grasping knees, hand, chin, or beard.38 This should not be considered a definitive list for "supplication in Euripides"; it is presented rather as a starting-point for a discussion of persuasion resources.

1)  *Kyk* 286f: Odysseus to Polyphemos, to spare the lives of himself and his men.

2)  *Med* 65: Nurse to Tutor, to share a secret.

3)  *Med* 324, 338: Medea to Kreon, to be allowed one extra day in Corinth.

4)  *Med* 496f: Jason to Medea (recalled by Medea), for help.

5)  *Med* 709f: Medea to Aigeus, for help.

6)  *Med* 853f: Chorus to Medea, not to kill her children.


8)  *Med* 971: children to princess (suggested by Medea), for her help.

9)  *Hklıd* 226f: Iolaos to Demophon, for help.

10)  *Hklıd* 844: Iolaos to Hyllos (reported by messenger), to board Hyllos' chariot.

11)  *Hipp* 325f: Nurse to Phaidra, to tell secret (note also 333, 335).

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38 I know of no thorough situational study of this material. F. Letoublon's article "Le vocabulaire de la supplication en grec" (*Lingua* 52 [1980]: 325-34) confines itself to a linguistic study of the Greek ramifications of the roots hik- and lit-.
12) *Hipp* 605, 607: Nurse to Hippolytos, not to tell secret.

13) *Andr* 164f: Andromache to Hermione (suggested by Hermione), for better treatment.

14) *Andr* 529f: child to Menelaos (suggested by Andromache), for his life.

15) *Andr* 530f, 537f: child to Menelaos, for his life.

16) *Andr* 572ff: Andromache (bound) to Peleus, for help.

17) *Andr* 860: Hermione to Andromache (imagined by Hermione), for forgiveness.

18) *Andr* 892, 894f: Hermione to Orestes, for help.

19) *Hek* 145 (del. Heimsoeth, Diggle): Hekabe to Agamemnon (suggested by Chorus), to prevent the sacrifice of Polyxene.

20) *Hek* 245, 273f: Odysseus to Hekabe (recalled by Hekabe), for his life.

21) *Hek* 275f, 286: Hekabe to Odysseus, to prevent the sacrifice of Polyxene.

22) *Hek* 339-41: Polyxene to Odysseus (suggested by Hekabe), to prevent sacrifice.

23) *Hek* 737, 741f: Hekabe to Agamemnon (imagined by Hekabe), for help.

24) *Hek* 752f, 787f (cf. 836ff, 850f): Hekabe to Agamemnon, for help.

25) *Hik* 10: Chorus to Aithra (reported by Aithra), for help.

26) *Hik* 42: Chorus to Aithra, for help.

27) *Hik* 68: Chorus to Theseus (absent), for help.

28) *Hik* 114,165: Adrastos to Theseus, for help.

29) *Hik* 272: Aithra to Theseus (suggested by Chorus), to help the women of the Chorus.

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In 812, Hekabe's πολεμεῖαιν οὐκ... has been held to refer to an attempted physical escape from Hekabe's embrace by Agamemnon: Mercier "Extended Supplication" 149ff.
30)  *Hik* 278, 283, 284f: Chorus to Theseus, for help.

31)  *Elek* 302, 332: Elektra to Orestes (as stranger), to take a message.

32)  *Her* 321: Amphitryon to Lykos, requesting that he and Megara be killed before the children.

33)  *Her* 327: Megara to Lykos, requesting that the family be allowed to change clothes before dying.  

34)  *Her* 968: The exangelos reports that Amphitryon touched the raving Herakles and spoke to him; Herakles imagined it was Eurystheus’ father supplicating him on his son’s behalf.

35)  *Her* 986f: Child to Herakles (reported by exangelos), for his life.

36)  *Her* 1206f: Amphitryon to Herakles, to unveil.

37)  *Tro* 1042f: Helen to Menelaos, for forgiveness.

38)  *IT* 362f: Iphigeneia to Agamemnon (recalled by Iphigeneia), for her life.

39)  *IT* 1068-71: Iphigeneia to Chorus, for their silence.

40)  *Ion* 1119: Chorus to Old Retainer, to tell story.

41)  *Hel* 825, 831: Helen and Menelaos to Theonoe (imagined by Helen), to keep secret.

42)  *Hel* 894f, 939: Helen to Theonoe, to keep secret.

43)  *Hel* 1237f: Helen to Theoklymenos, deceitfully seeking permission to bury Menelaos at sea.

44)  *Phoin* 91: Antigone to Iokaste (recalled by Tutor), for permission to view army.

45)  *Phoin* 923f: Kreon to Teiresias, for his silence.

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40 The requests of Amphitryon and Megara to Lykos form an interesting pair: one imagines staging with both characters bowed before Lykos, perhaps one on either side of him. Cf. *Tro* 1042-5 (Helen and Hekabe begging Menelaos), where however the two suppliants seek opposite outcomes.

41 Hekabe’s couplet immediately following (1044f) uses not ικετεύω but λιπσομαι; but it is clearly designed as an appeal of equal force to Helen’s.
46) Or 255: Orestes to Klytaimestra (imagined by Orestes), to avert Furies.

47) Or 290: Agamemnon to Orestes (imagined by Orestes), not to kill Klytaimestra.

48) Or 382f: Orestes to Menelaos, for help.

49) Or 527: Klytaimestra to Orestes (imagined by Tyndareos), for her life.

50) Or 673: Orestes to Menelaos, for help.

51) Or 797: Orestes to Agamemnon (imagined by Orestes), for help.

52) Or 1332: Elektra reports Orestes is supplicating Helen within, ostensibly for his life.42

53) Or 1337f: Elektra deceitfully urges Hermione to join Orestes in supplicating Helen.

54) Or 1414f: Phrygian slave reports Orestes' and Pylades' sham supplication.

55) Or 1507: Phrygian slave to Orestes, for his life.

56) IA 462: Iphigeneia to Agamemnon (imagined by Agamemnon), for her life.

57) IA 900, 909, 911: Klytaimestra to Achilles, for help.43

58) IA 992: Iphigeneia to Achilles (imagined by Klytaimestra), for help.

59) IA 1015: Klytaimestra to Agamemnon (suggested by Achilles), to spare Iphigeneia.

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42 The sham supplication apparently realises Pylades' suggestion in vs. 1121 (where supplication is not mentioned). Cf. Her 715, where the deceptive claim that Megara is within supplicating Hestia forms part of the intrigue against Lykos.

43 Of great interest here: (a) the idea αἰδώς (ὁδὲ εἴπαλε θηρομαι 900) may inhibit the adoption of a suppliant attitude (see examples below of characters declining to supplicate); (b) the association explicitly made between the two types of supplication. This association is hinted at in, e.g., Hkld 226f, Andr 859f, 894f, Or 383, 567f; altar and personal supplication are simultaneously announced in Hik 114.
60) IA 1156: Agamemnon to Tyndareos (recalled by Klytaimestra), for his life.\(^{44}\)

61) IA 1216f: Iphigeneia to Agamemnon, for her life.

62) IA 1242: Iphigeneia suggests little Orestes join her in supplicating Agamemnon, to spare her life.\(^{45}\)

Women are referred to as begging for mercy or other consideration by baring their breasts (without use of the vocabulary we have been investigating)\(^{46}\) in:

63) Andr 629: Andromache imagines Menelaos sparing Helen (ὡς ἐσείδες μαστόν, ἐκβαλὼν ἔφως φίλημ' ἐδεξω).\(^{47}\)

64) Elek 1206: Orestes recalls Klytaimestra baring her breast in begging him to spare her (κατείδες ὄιον ἀ τάλαιν' ἔξω πέπλων ἐβαλεν ἐδείξε μαστόνι).

65) Phoin 1568: Antigone recalls Iokaste's appeal to her fallen sons (τέκεσι μαστόν ἐφερεν ἐφερεν ἰκέτις ἰκέτιν ὀρομένα).

66) Or 567f: Orestes imagines women killing their husbands, then seeking their children's pity (καταφυγὰς ποιοῦμεναί ἐσ τέκνα, μαστοῖς τὸν ἔλεον θηρώμεναι).

In addition to these sixty-six passages, where supplication is \textit{announced} (32 cases), \textit{reported} (6), \textit{suggested} (9), \textit{recalled} (7), or \textit{imagined} (12), there are

\(^{44}\) Agamemnon, having murdered Klytaimestra's first husband, has apparently been defeated in war by the Dioskouroi. Is he supplicating Tyndareos for his own life, or for Klytaimestra's hand in marriage? Perhaps we are to imagine a mutually beneficial package deal. Cf. Her 1258-60, where Amphitryon, having killed Alkmene's father, was προστρόπαιος — apparently an unpurified killer, not a suppliant (see Fraenkel ad Ag 1587 for the word's range of meaning)— when he married Alkmene.

\(^{45}\) This has been foreshadowed in 465f.

\(^{46}\) But note Or 527 (no. 49 above), where Klytaimestra is said to bare her breast while supplicating Orestes.

\(^{47}\) Note that of the five places where a woman is mentioned baring her breast, only here is the gesture made to someone other than her own child.
three places where a character announces using the language of supplication he will not beg for mercy:

67) Polyxene in Hek 342-5 declines to supplicate Odysseus:

ορῶ σ', ὦ Ὁδυσσεῦ, δεξιὰν ύφ' εἰματος
κρύψτοντα χεῖρα καὶ πρόσωπον ἐμπαλίν
στρέφοντα, μὴ σου προσθίγω γενειάδος.
θάρσει· πέφευγας τὸν ἐμὸν Ἰκέσθον Δία·

68) Menelaos in Hel 947-9 will not supplicate Theonoe (Helen has just done so at 939):

ἐγὼ σὸν οὐτ' ἀν προσπεσεῖν τλαῆν γόνυ
οὐτ' ἀν δακρύσαι βλέφαρα· τὴν Τροίαν γὰρ ἀν
dειλοὶ γενόμενοι πλεῖστον αἰσχύνομεν ἂν.

69) Oidipous in Phoin 1622-4 will not supplicate Kreon:

οὗ μὴν ἐλίξας γ' ἀμφὶ σὸν χεῖρας γόνυ
κακὸς φανόμασι· τὸ γὰρ ἐμὸν ποτ' εὐγενὲς
οὐκ ἀν προδοήη, οὐδὲ· περ πράσσον κακῶς.

In two more passages defeated characters accept defeat graciously or defiantly with a refusal to θωπεύσαι:

70) Eurystheus addresses Alkmene (Hkld 983-5):

γύναι, σάφ' ἵσθι μὴ με θωπεύσοντα σε
μὴδ' ἀλλο μηδὲν τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς πέρι
λέξοιθ' ὅθεν χρή δειλίαν ὀφλεῖν τινα.

71) Andromache (Andr 459f):

...ἀπόκτειν'· ὡς θωπευτών γέ σε
γλώσσης ἀφήςω τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ παιδα σήν.
Vocabulary very similar to that of supplication is used several times of gestures of intimacy between child and father:  

72)  *Alk* 947f: Admetos foresees his children falling about his knees and crying "mother" (expressing grief over Alkestis).  

73)  *Hik* 1099-1101: Iphis remembers Eudane (ἡ γ´ ἐμῆ γενεάδα προσήγετ' αἰεὶ στόματι καὶ κάρα τόδε κατείχε χερσίν).  

74)  *Her* 77-79: Megara tells how her sons eagerly await Herakles' return, ὡς πρὸς πατρίου προσπεσοῦμενοι γόνω.  

75)  *Bak* 1316-22: Kadmos recalls how Pentheus used to speak soothing words to him, γενείου τοῦδε θλγάνων χερί.  

76)  *IA* 1221-30: Iphigeneia recalls to Agamemnon old conversations (πρώτη δὲ γόνασι σοίσι σῶμα δοσ' ἐμοῖ φίλας χάριτας ἐδώκα.... οὐμὸς [sc. λόγος] δ' ὅδ' ἦν αὖ περὶ σοῦ ἐξαρτωμένη γένειον).  

In two chilling passages (nos. 35 and 38 above), this language is used by child to father, when the father is about to kill the child.  

In the Euripidean passages collected above, the humility or degradation of the suppliant is sometimes emphasised using words like πτηξαί (in no.13), δούλα ε

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48 There is evidence here to contradict Gould's claim that "touching the knee is found exclusively in the act of supplication" ("Hiketeia" 76).  

49 Cf. προσπίπτωσα...ἐκλαλε in *Phoin* 1433f (Iokaste grieving over her fallen sons). On the various uses of προσπίπτω, see Mercier "Hekabe's Extended Supplication" 152f.  

50 This passage has been regarded as problematic for the characterisation of Pentheus, in showing a solicitous grandson where we have seen in the play only a hostile one. Heath suggests (*Poetics* 117) the difficulty is mitigated somewhat by the fact *Bak* 1316-22 gives only a report of Pentheus' conduct, and by the distance separating this passage from the earlier scene of interaction between Kadmos and Pentheus. In the light of the similar passages noted above, I would suggest that Euripides has given us simply a conventional representation of affection between an old man and a youth, having little connection to the characters of the play, but great importance for establishing the pathetic sense of loss this scene requires.  

51 οὗ νῦν ἀντιλάζομαι χερί, she continues, referring to her present supplicant attitude.

293
(no. 17, no. 20 with Hek 249), ταπελνός (no. 20), δειλαία (no. 30), 52 and is implied in the frequent verbs of falling (πίπτω, προσπίπτω) and clinging (ἐξαρτωμένη). 53 Crying by the suppliant is mentioned in connection with nos. 24 (κλαοίντα), 54 36 (δάκρυν τέκμαλων), 61 (δάκρυν παρέξω), 62 (συνδάκρυσον), 65 (δάκρυα γοερά) and 68 (δακρύσαι). The suppliant’s speech contains an appeal for pity (οίκτος) in nos. 5, 18, 21, 24; in no. 22 Hekabe tells Polyxene to supplicate Odysseus οίκτρως. 55 Virtually all the suppliants we meet or hear described are women, children, slaves, old men (and these last are normally entreating in someone else’s interest: nos. 9, 28, 32, 45), except Orestes in Or (nos. 48 and 50). Other exceptions (nos. 4, 20, 60) are places where a woman is putting a man down a rung by reminding him of a degrading incident in his past.

Conversely, a person is inhibited from supplicating by αἰδως (no. 57), a desire to avoid αἰσχύνη (no. 68), and a sense of his own nobility (ἐὔγενες in no. 69); at Hik 164 (no. 28) Adrastos supplicates, but notes the αἰσχύνη it involves for a man who has been a τύραννος ἐυδαίμων (166).

The act of supplication is seldom acknowledged by the person supplicated; but note nos. 15, 45 (where the appeal is refused). In a very few cases the person supplicated seems to refer to this as a reason for granting the favour sought: nos. 3, 5, 9, 11, 42. 56

The rejection of a suppliant is described (or imagined) using forms of ὤθέω in connection with nos. 9, 23, 34.

52 δειλαία in Hik 279 is Hermann’s conj. for δειλαίαν codd; see Collard ad loc.
53 This verb in nos. 11, 38, 76. It seems to imply more than Barrett indicates ad Hipp 325.
54 κλαίω occurs with verbs of falling in a different context (grief) at Alk 947f, Phoin 1433f.
55 And at 289f she reminds Odysseus the Trojan woman were "pitied" (웠ίτιρατε) by the Greeks when they supplicated at altars.
56 See n.33 above.
In most of the cases where the expression of supplication is extensive or urgent enough to suggest more than a mere formula of polite request (Gould's "intensification of the language of diplomatic appeal": examples above include nos. 2, 10, 31, 37), supplication is supported by other persuasive strategies. In several passages, blood-ties or other bonds of obligation are alluded to (e.g., nos. 9, 21, 39, 61); sometimes the disgrace the champion would bring upon himself by failing to help the suppliants is emphasised (nos. 16, 38, 57); reciprocal aid may be offered (nos. 5, 39); Medea's children (no. 8) are to supplicate but also offer gifts, and it is on these that Medea pretends to be counting: \( \pi\epsilon\theta\epsilon\nu \ \delta\omega\rho\alpha \ \kappa\alpha \ \theta\epsilon\omicron\omega\varsigma \ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron \ (\textit{Med} \ 964). \) In some highly developed debates (cf. nos. 9, 37, 42, 50) supplication seems to cap a lengthy medley of arguments, much like the \textit{pro forma} supplication of the orators' epilogues.\textsuperscript{57}

A life-and-death appeal couched in the terms of personal supplication is unsuccessful in nos. 1, 15, 21, 38, 49, 50, 61, 64. Other unsuccessful appeals include nos. 28, 45. In some cases success is difficult to assess: in nos. 24, 30, 50 and 57 the character supplicated seems softened by the appeal, but does not in fact offer assistance.

In conclusion, these points must be stressed: (a) personal supplication is announced in a great variety of plot situations having a great range of urgency; (b) seldom can any \textit{action} be certainly inferred from the vocabulary used, let alone the completion of a complex physical ritual; (c) very often supplication forms part of an appeal in which a variety of other persuasive resources are brought to bear (in some of these cases, supplication has a clearly indicated softening effect on the person to whom it is addressed); (d) in cases of "un-

\textsuperscript{57} E.g., Lys. 4.20, 18.27, 21.21 (and cf. 6.55, 22.21); Dem. 42.32, 43.83, 46.28, 48.57.
successful supplication”, Euripides does not seem to lay any stress on this failure as such—for example, Menelaos’ refusal to help Orestes is described (Or 718-21) in terms of cowardice and abandonment of his obligation to Agamemnon, not of, say, an offense against Zeus or Orestes’ status as a supplicant.

Personal supplication, then, seems to be exploited by Euripides as a natural adjunct to rhetorical appeals, an element in the repertoire of persuasive devices that is available to characters in a wide range of situations in which the cooperation or pity of the interlocutor is sought. But this resource has certain constraining associations: thus on one hand a character’s sense of pride or status may be displayed through a refusal to supplicate, on the other a character agreeing to a concession that runs contrary to rational considerations of self-interest may invoke the act of supplication as creating an irresistible compulsion to yield.

C. "Portable Arguments"

I have suggested above (II.A with n.8), against the judgement of a number of other critics, that the arguments made by Odysseus in response to Hekabe’s appeal opposing the sacrifice of Polyxene constitute the "best case" in favour of the sacrifice, the inevitable arguments that must be produced given the circumstances, and that they are therefore not to be seen as intended in and of themselves to discredit the character of Odysseus. We sympathise with Hekabe, not Odysseus; but this fact arises from the situation, not the content of the speeches. As this distinction is not a self-evident one, I offer in this section some material in support of it.

My view that rhetorical strategies and arguments are not necessarily pointers for audience sympathy or for "character" arises from the portability of
these patterns of expression: a given strategy or argument may occur in a variety of contexts, voiced by a variety of characters. For example, we find the strategy of shifting blame away from oneself to the interlocutor used in the following situations:

1) Admetos implies Pheres has caused the death of Alkestis (Alk 642-7, cf. 718f); Pheres retorts that Admetos is the real killer (730f).

2) Andromache, charged by Hermione with trying to disrupt her marriage, argues that Hermione herself is the cause of her marital problems (Andr 205-14).

3) Helen accuses Hekabe of being the real cause of the Trojan War, through having borne Paris (Tro 919f); Hekabe argues that Helen herself was the cause (987-97).

4) Pasiphae, charged by her husband with adultery, says the blame rightly belongs to Minos (δαιμονι τονδη, Kret 21), due to his failure to sacrifice a bull.

5) Similarly, Peleus in championing Andromache calls Menelaos the murderer of Achilles (Andr 614f); Menelaos answers that Andromache herself shares in the blame (650-4).

A weaker form of the same kind of reversing strategy occurs in Eurystheus' "You would have done the same as I" (Hkld 1005-8), and in Agamemnon's "I'm not crazy—you are!" (IA 389f).

Characters also shift blame (or credit) to a god or the gods:

1) Odysseus tells Polyphemos a god, not men, should be blamed for the destruction of the Trojan War (Kyk 285).

2) Jason claims that not Medeia but Kypris deserves credit for saving him (Med 526-8).

3) Eurystheus says not he but Hera is to blame for the persecution of Herakles (Hkld 989f).

4) The Nurse tells Phaidra that Kypris is responsible for Phaidra's passion for Hippolytos (Hipp 439-46).
5) Peleus charges that Helen willingly abandoned her husband (*Andr* 602-4); Menelaos claims that gods are to blame (681f).

6) Herakles says that Hera was responsible for all his troubles, including the madness that caused him to slay his family (*Her* 1305-7).

7) Helen says not she herself but Aphrodite was responsible for her removal to Troy (*Tro* 923-34).

8) Pasiphae says her insane passion for the bull was caused by a god (νῦν δ’, ἐκ θεοῦ γὰρ προσβολῆς ἐμπνάμην, ἀλગὼ μὲν, ἐστὶ δ’ οὐχ ἕκοισιν κακὸν, *Kret* 9f).

Aside from these examples of similar approaches to debate taken by very different characters, we see cases of the same argument used in more than one context. The Trojan War and the culpability of Helen offered, as we have already seen, fertile ground for debate. Euripides has characters claim that the war was a good thing for Greece (Menelaos in *Andr* 680-84, Helen in *Tro* 935-7), and that the Trojans were the beneficiaries (Kassandra in *Tro* 365-405: see I.E above). In *IA* Menelaos argues for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and the war by speaking of a valiant service rendered by Greece (370-2), then against it by denigrating Helen (485-8); Agamemnon speaks against the sacrifice by denigrating Helen (385-90), then for it by casting the campaign in a patriotic light (1269-75). As I have argued in V.C above, neither character is discredited by these arguments; rather, the

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58 Vickers writes (*Towards Greek Tragedy* 137): "Such disclaimers in Euripides normally operate to damn those who make them, as, for instance, Helen in the *Trojan Women*". The examples collected here do not bear this out. Goebel (diss. 297-300) attempts to compare the arguments of Eurystheus, Helen and Pasiphae: "In the cases both of Eurystheus and Helen 'divine compulsion' is clearly no more than a reflection of self-interest and self-indulgence" (299), whereas Pasiphae's use of the same argument rests on truth. One might see self-indulgence also in the Nurse's argument in *Hipp* 439-46; yet the play clearly presents her explanation of Phaidra's ailment as true. We will get farther by seeing in these arguments a standard rhetorical strategem (for the "character") that contributes to a broadening of perspective (for the playwright), serving to remind us that the divine level provides another context within which to view human acts and responsibility.
arguments are to be seen as simply the appropriate and inevitable means for taking one side or the other.

We have seen a similar case in Hik (see above, V.B), again connected with a change of mind. Theseus, in rejecting the appeal of Adrastos, argues the need to disassociate oneself from malefactors, who typically attract divine punishment (223-8). Later, with Theseus now favouring the side of Adrastos and the suppliants, the Theban herald argues (504f) that Zeus has justly punished the Seven, and therefore it would be folly to champion their cause. The argument has no objective validity: it simply serves the purpose of anyone arguing against taking up the Argive cause.59

Many critics have noted the striking similarity of the arguments at Hipp 451-61 and Her 1314-21. In both places one character tries to persuade another that a misfortune has been brought about by irresistible divine forces and must therefore be accepted; in each case examples of gods who have suffered similar misfortunes are presented as παραδειγματα, and the lesson is drawn that if the gods must accept such disasters, so must mortals. It is important to note that the Nurse's words in the Hipp passage attempt to derail Phaidra's heroic effort to master her passion for Hippolytus, whereas Theseus in Her is trying to help Herakles overcome feelings of guilt following a disaster in which we know he was not at fault. We may resent the Nurse's meddling and admire that of Theseus; but Euripides gives both the same argument.

I return to Odysseus in Hek. Odysseus tells Hekabe that the sacrifice of Polyxene in tribute to Achilles is essential for the maintenance of good army

59 Cf. Heath's treatment of "tragic wisdom" (Poetics 157-62); he speaks of a "pool of commonplace ideas" (160) from which tragic characters (and real people) draw arguments that suit their situation. I agree, and therefore see (e.g.) Iphigeneia's κακός ζητεῖν κρίσεων ἢ καλός θανεῖν (IA 1252) not as compromising the speaker's character, but as dramatising her desire to live.
morale, saying that if soldiers could not count on being honoured in death they
would be unwilling to fight (303-20). Bravery in battle must be rewarded:

εν τῳδε γὰρ κάμνουσιν αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις,
ὅταν τὸν ἐσθλὸν καὶ πρόθυμον ὅν ἀνήρ
μηδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακίων πλέον.  
(Hek 306-8)

In an age that views military values with suspicion and regards the idea of
sacrifice (human or other) to dead heroes as ignorant and superstitious, this
argument may seem absurd. But we cannot assume that the ancient audience
heard it in that light. I suspect that the argument itself “rang a bell”, that it struck
the audience as an acceptable position to take, but without creating any sympathy
for Odysseus and his case. That Odysseus’ position was “acceptable” cannot be
proved, but it seems not unlikely in the light of what we learn elsewhere in
literature and history about honours paid to Greek heroes. And it squares with
the patriotic arguments offered in favour of human sacrifice by voluntary vic­
tims in Phoin and IA, and by a victim’s mother in fr. 360.60

Another important clue for the proper assessment of Odysseus' speech is
furnished by Euripides' use of the same sort of argument in a situation where
there can be no question of ironic undercutting of the speaker. Theseus in Hik
537-41 argues that Athenian efforts to secure the burial of the seven Argive
heroes who fell at Thebes constitute a service to all Greece, in that brave men
would turn cowards if they couldn’t count on the performance of proper rites
following their death in battle. The issue is in one case burial of the dead and in
the other human sacrifice; and it happens that we are meant in one case to
sympathise with the speaker's side, in the other with the side the speaker is

60 Praxithea’s speech in Erechtheus: see in general Webster Tragedies 127-30, and on the
rhetoric of the sacrifice theme here and elsewhere Wilkins "State and Individual" passim.
opposing. But the appropriate argument in both cases emphasises the importance of maintaining morale and fighting spirit.

The examples collected here seem to confirm Dale’s view of Euripides as seeking to provide his speakers with arguments appropriate to the situation, rather than to the character.\textsuperscript{61} We are not invited to judge the validity of each argument, nor to ask whether the use of such-and-such an argument compromises the presentation of a realistic and consistent personality. “Fertility in argument, a delight in logical analysis—these are the essentials...”\textsuperscript{62} But the palette is not unlimited, and so we find the same arguments used in various situations, by characters who have been established through other means as sympathetic or unsympathetic.

\textsuperscript{61} Alcestis xxviii.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.