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The ruling party and the transition to democracy : the case of the Chinese Nationalist Party (The KMT)… Hao, Paul W. 1996

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THE RULING PARTY AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST PARTY (THE KMT) ON TAIWAN by PAULW. HAO L.L.B., Beijing University, 1984 L.L.M., Beijing University, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept this thesis as conforming t£i^ eqmreg^standaj;d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1996 © Paul W. Hao, 1996 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, L agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of /( Y'r^rCcf The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada D a,e fiJ. DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T The Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) has been a major agent of Taiwan's transition to democracy. It is rare that a ruling party initiates the transition to democracy from within an authoritarian regime, therefore it is interesting to explore how and why the KMT has played a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. A historical approach is employed to analyze the role of the KMT in Taiwan's transition to democracy and to explain the reasons that led the KMT to play such a role. The thesis demonstrates that socioeconomic, external and other "ecological" factors have had only an indirect impact on Taiwan's transition to democracy. It finds that the KMT made several crucial decisions that started Taiwan down the path to democracy. The KMT's ability to play a positive role is explained by the party's own nature and characteristics. Firstly, the KMT's ideology guided it to play a positive role in Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy, because Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are fundamentally democratic, although tutelary and pragmatic in terms of the means to achieve the democratic end. Secondly, the KMT was able to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy because the top leaders of the party generally agreed on the need for change, although they had different opinions about the timing and pace of change. Chiang Ching-kuo and a group of reformers contributed most to the establishment of democratic values and procedures in the KMT party-state. The co-existence of conservative and reformist factions in the party balanced the needs for stability and change, and resulted in a gradual process of transition. Thirdly, the KMT's recruitment and organization helped the party to play a positive role in the transition to democracy. Through Taiwanization and technocratization, the KMT made itself more representative and capable. The KMT has a huge and well-coordinated organization which was used mainly as a tool of social control in the earlier authoritarian period and then as a tool of electoral mobilization in the later period on Taiwan. The adaptability and strength of the KMT contributed to the party's confidence in initiating and leading the transition to democracy on Taiwan. ii T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract ii Table of Contents iii List of Tables v Introduction 1 Chapter One Research Method and Relevant Theories 8 1. Research Method and Data Sources 8 2. Relevant Theories 11 Democracy 12 Liberalization and Democratization 15 Party Systems 17 The Role of the Ruling Party in Transition to Democracy 19 Ideology 20 Leadership and Divisions within the Ruling Party..... 24 Organization 26 Summary 29 Chapter Two The Role of Socioeconomic and Other Factors 31 1. Economic Development 31 2. Middle Class 37 3. Confucian Culture 41 4. International Pressure 44 5. The Relationship with Mainland China 48 6. Conclusion 52 Chapter Three Taiwan's Transition to Democracy and the Interaction between the KMT and the Opposition 53 1. Introduction 53 2. The Hard Authoritarian Period (the 1950s and 1960s) 55 Local Self-governance and Elections 60-3. The Soft Authoritarian Period (the 1970s and Early 1980s) 64 4. The Competitive Period (Since the Mid-1980s) 79 The Legalization of the Opposition 79 The Constitutional Reforms 90 Taiwan Independence Issue 99 5. Conclusion 106 Chapter Four The KMT's Ideology 110 1. Introduction 110 2. The Three Principles of the People 112 3. The KMT's People's Livelihood on Taiwan 116 4. The KMT's People's Rights on Taiwan 124 Lee's Democratic Ideas and Practices 133 Hao's Democratic Ideas and Practices 136 5. The KMT's Nationalism on Taiwan 140 6. Conclusion.... 144 iii Chapter Five Leadership and Divisions within the KMT 151 1. Introduction 151 2. Chiang Kai-shek Period (1949-1969) 154 3. Chiang Ching-kuo and the Rise of the Reformers Period (1970-1985) 160 4. Internal Balance of Power Period (Since the Mid-1980s) 169 Conflict Settlement between the Reformers and the Conservatives 169 Conflict between Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Factions 178 Different Views in the KMT about Constitutional Revision 183 The Rise of Elected KMT Legislators 190 The Achievements of the Fourteenth Congress 197 5. Conclusion 200 Chapter Six The KMT's Recruitment and Organization 204 1. Introduction 204 2. Party Background and Basic Structure 205 Basic Structure and Operation 206 3. The Party Consolidation Period (1949-1969) 212 Overall Organizational Reform 212 Recruitment: Membership 216 Organization 217 4. The Party Adaptation Period (1970-1985) 219 Overall Organizational Change 219 Recruitment 221 Organization 229 5. The Party Transformation Period (Since the Mid-1980s) 233 Overall Organizational Change 233 Recruitment 236 Organization 244 6. Conclusion 255 Chapter Seven Conclusion and Theoretical Rethinking 257 1. The Role of the KMT 257 2. Theoretical Rethinking 261 3. Relevance of the KMT experience 268 4. Prospects for the KMT 272 Appendix One A Chronology of the KMT on Taiwan 279 Appendix Two Individuals Interviewed 291 Bibliography 292 iv L I S T O F T A B L E S Table 2.1 Number of Nations with whom the ROC and the PRC Have Diplomatic Relations 51 Table 3.1 KMT, Opposition and Independent Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout 89 Table 3.2 Distribution of Elected Seats Among KMT, Tangwai/DPP, and Independents 89 Figure 6.1 Primary Organizational Structure of the KMT 206 Table 6.2 Professional Background of the Members of the CSC 225 Table 6.3 Taiwanese in KMT CSC 237 Table 6.4 Background of the Thirteenth Central Committee, KMT 239 Table 6.5 Membership of the KMT 242 Figure 6.6 Simplified Central Organizational Structure of the Contemporary KMT 250 v I N T R O D U C T I O N Taiwan has developed rapidly both economically and politically in the last five decades. Western scholars have paid more attention to the economic aspects of Taiwan's development than to the political aspects. Along with its rapid economic growth, Taiwan has also experienced a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, with democratization culminating in the 1996 presidential election. The March 1996 presidential election on Taiwan was the first direct popular presidential election ever held on the island. Since it was the first one in Chinese history, it attracted world wide attention. The People's Republic of China's missile and military exercises in Taiwan Strait also contributed to the,international attention to Taiwan's, presidential election. Two things are noteworthy about this election. First, despite mainland China's military threat, the election was held and conducted peacefully and in an orderly manner. Second, the ruling party Kuomintang's (KMT, the Nationalist Party) candidate Lee Teng-hui garnered 54 percent of the votes, while the major opposition party DPP's candidate got only 21 percent of the votes; thus the ruling party maintained its dominance on Taiwan. The argument of this thesis is that it was the KMT which brought about Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy and that the KMT permitted, facilitated and led the transition process. While the 1996 presidential election is the most visible sign of democratization, it may give people the false impression that Taiwan's transition to democracy is being rapidly realized. This thesis will show that Taiwan's emerging democracy is the result of decades of gradual political development; 1 democratization was preceded by the KMT-initiated liberalization, and this liberalization was preceded by two decades of the KMT's self consolidation and tight social control. In recent years, political scientists have recorded and analyzed the overall process of political transition on Taiwan. Although no one could avoid mentioning the ruling party K M T in the study of political change on Taiwan, this author feels that we need a more thorough and in-depth study of i t . l The K M T has been a leading force in economic, social, and political changes on Taiwan. As John F. Copper points out, "Understanding the Nationalist Party's structure and influence on politics at all levels is a sine qua non for understanding the political processes in Taiwan. "2 According to Peter R. Moody, Jr., a party-state system is the most difficult to democratize, and "the major obstacle to democratization often comes down to a determination to preserve the ruling position of the party. Yet on Taiwan the K M T has been a major agent of democratization."^ It is rare that, a ruling party initiates .the transition to democracy from within an authoritarian regime,^ therefore it is interesting to 1 There is much research on the KMT during the mainland period, but little research on the KMT on Taiwan. For instance, Yu, George T., Party Politics in Republican China: the Kuomintang, 1912-1924 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China 1923-30 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Pichon Pei Yung Loh, ed., The Kuomintang Debacle of1949: Collapse or Conquest? (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1965). Peter R. Moody, Jr.'s study of political change on Taiwan, though general, is an exception; cf. Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992). 2. John F. Copper, A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China (Washington: the Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1988), p. 3. 3 Peter R. Moody, Jr., Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 13. 4 Alfred Stepan summarizes eight paths toward redemocratization. The fourth path is redemocratization initiated from within the authoritarian regime, and within this path redemocratization initiated by the civilian leadership is one of three subtypes. He only includes Spain after the death in 1975 of General Franco in this subtype. Therefore, such a case is really rare in the world. See "Paths toward Redemocratization," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Boltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part III, pp. 64-84. Also note that what Stepan studies are all cases of redemocratization. If peaceful transition is difficult in cases of redemocratization, it is probably more difficult in countries that have never experienced democracy. Considering that Taiwan has no prior democratic experience, the KMT case is even more peculiar. 2 explore why the KMT could play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. This author believes that there are intra-party reasons for the KMT's positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. Furthermore, Taiwan's transition to democracy has been basically peaceful. Violence is often associated with democratization. But as David E. Apter points out, there are important exceptions. He gives the examples of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.^ It is well-known that in the economic realm Taiwan realized rapid economic growth without serious inequality.^ Similarly, in the political realm, Taiwan has been liberalizing and democratizing without serious instability up to the present. We need to explore why Taiwan has become an exception. This author believes that the peacefulness of Taiwan's transition to democracy has much to do with the role played by the ruling party. This study examines the following questions. How has Taiwan been able to achieve the peaceful transition to democracy? Why has the KMT been willing to initiate liberalization and democratization? What reform measures has the KMT taken in liberalizing and democratizing the Taiwanese political system? What is the role of the KMT's official ideology (the "Three Principles of the People") in Taiwan's transition to democracy? Why did the conservatives in the KMT not succeed in stopping the transition 5 David E. Apter, Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency, and Postmodern Politics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 32-40. 6 The Gini coefficient (a major indicator of the distribution of wealth) fell from 0.558 in 1953 to 0.303 in 1980, reflecting a steady annual decline of disparity in the distribution of wealth on Taiwan. Since 1981, the Gini coefficient has begun to rise, reaching 0.323 by 1988, but is still relatively low when compared with other newly industrialized countries. See Republic of China Yearbook 1991-92 (Taiwan: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1991), p. 178. Hill Gates presents a slightly different picture of Taiwanese working class. Nevertheless, she agrees that "they [Taiwanese working class] are not especially poor or burdened with troubles, compared with people in many countries." Hill Gates, Chinese Working Class Lives: Getting by in Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 228. See also John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: the Taiwan Case (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979); Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis, and John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the ROC, 1952-79 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981). 3 to democracy, if they made such an effort? What changes have happened within the KMT that encouraged the party to take the lead in the transition to democracy? What lessons can we draw for other developing countries from the KMT's experiences? There are several explanations given in the literature for Taiwan's transition to democracy. The socioeconomic explanation is the one most often advanced. Other explanations point to such factors as Taiwan's peculiar situational conditions, international pressure, etc. Since the emergence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), many scholars have attributed democratization to the dynamic pressure of an opposition party. These single-factor explanations all have some merit. Indeed, Taiwan's transition to democracy is closely interrelated with the socioeconomic changes, and we shall discuss the role of these factors in Chapter Two. However, these factors are not sufficient to explain Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy by themselves. This study will focus on factors internal to the KMT (such as ideology, leadership and organization) and their importance in preparing the party to play a positive role in the overall transition to democracy on Taiwan. We shall discuss how the KMT dealt with external factors and mediated their impact on the internal changes in the KMT. Socioeconomic and other factors play a role in Taiwan's transition to democracy mainly through their influence on the KMT's decisions regarding whether to maintain authoritarian rule or to liberalize and democratize. This study will not argue that the nature and characteristics of the ruling party KMT are the only explanation for Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. What this study argues is that the KMT has had a more direct impact than other factors on Taiwan's transition to democracy, and has played an important and positive role in Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. Without the KMT's readiness to take the initiative, to adapt and to compromise, Taiwan's peaceful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system would have been very difficult, if not .^ impossible. The KMT's emphasis on stability, its gradual approach to political development, and its ability to 4 maintain its dominance are the keys to understanding the peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan. Enlightened by Charles Andrain's suggestion that political changes involve transformations in three basic parts of the political regime ~ beliefs, process, and structures,? I shall focus my discussion of the KMT on the following aspects: official ideology, leadership and internal divisions, and organization and recruitment. Through a discussion of these aspects we will show the internal reasons for the KMT's role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. We believe that the nature of and changes in the ruling KMT have great impacts on Taiwan's political system. The role of the ruling party in the transition to democracy is determined by the nature of and adaptive changes in the ruling party's ideology, leadership and internal divisions, and organization and recruitment. Whether the authoritarian regime is transformed peacefully depends on (1) whether the official ideology of the ruling party is fundamentally democratic and pragmatic, (2), whether the party leadership is enlightened and the reformers and the conservatives can reach a balance and compromise regarding the timing and pace of the transition to democracy, and (3) whether the party is strong enough and adaptive enough to maintain its dominance through changing environment as it makes the change from a quasi-Leninist organization to an election machine more representative of the population. This study is limited in scope. If the transition to democracy can be discussed at four levels (ideology, institutions, civil society, and culture),8 this study focuses almost exclusively on the political ideological and institutional levels. It does not examine the 7 Charles F. Andrain, Political Change in the Third World (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1988), p. 9. 8 Francis Fukuyama believes that "there are four levels on which the consolidation of democracy must occur..." Level one is ideology, level two is institutions, level three is civil society, and level four is culture. Cf. "The Primacy of Culture," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 7-8. We should note that Fukuyama is discussing the consolidation of democracy. It seems that level four and three are more important than level one and two in the discussion of the consolidation of democracy. In contrast, this study focuses on the emergence of democracy; thus it is concerned exclusively with level one and two. 5 degree to which democratization has or has not occurred within the broader society or culture. Besides this introduction, there are seven chapters to this thesis. Chapter One defines key terms used by this thesis and introduces relevant theories. The thesis mainly applies the theories of transition to democracy, but also incorporates some other theories to supplement the former theories. Chapter Two deals with socioeconomic, cultural, international, and mainland China factors. It attempts to show that these "ecological" factors, though providing important conditions for democracy, are not the directly determining factors that have caused Taiwan's transition to democracy, and that, in comparison, the ruling KMT has played a more determining role in the process. Chapter Three discusses the dependent factor. It tries to show that through four decades of political development Taiwan has basically democratized and that the KMT has played an adaptive and positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. This is shown mainly by a discussion of the interaction of the KMT with the opposition. The following chapters explain why the KMT has been able to play such a role, discussing such independent factors as official ideology, party leadership and divisions within the party, and party recruitment and organization. Both the nature of and the adaptive changes in these factors will be discussed. Chapter Four deals with the KMT's official ideology, the Three Principles of the People. It attempts to show that Sun Yat-sen's doctrine facilitated the KMT's implementation of tutelage in its early periods on Taiwan, but also guided the party to carry out liberalization and democratization when other compelling interests did not preclude acting on it. Chapter Five deals with the political process within the KMT, including the top leadership and the divisions within the party. It attempts to show that the top KMT leaders had a decisive influence on Taiwan's political development in different periods, and enlightened leaders, with the assistance of the reformers, greatly facilitated Taiwan's transition to democracy. At the same time, the co-existence of the reformers and the conservatives in the party balanced 6 the need for change and stability. Chapter Six deals with the KMT's recruitment and organization. It attempts to show that the KMT's inclusive recruitment and strong organization contributed to its confidence in opening up, and that the KMT transformed itself from an authoritarian party to a competitive party mainly geared for elections, thus making it possible for the party to play a positive role in the transition to democracy. These chapters are closely interconnected. For instance, the interaction between the KMT and the opposition is closely related to the internal politicking in the KMT. We discuss them in separate chapters only for analytical convenience. On the basis of empirical studies, we shall in the last chapter attempt to do theoretical rethinking and to analyze the applicability of the KMT's experience to other parts of the world. The experience of the KMT may well be used to further our understanding of the development of party politics in the Third World, and to enrich our theories of political parties. I shall also discuss the possible future of the KMT and party politics on Taiwan. But let me first introduce some useful theories in the following chapter. 7 C H A P T E R O N E R E S E A R C H M E T H O D A N D R E L E V A N T T H E O R I E S 1. Research Method and Data Sources A historical approach will be employed in this dissertation. Only through a historical analysis can we see clearly Taiwan's long course of transition to democracy and the role of the KMT in the transition. Only through historical analysis, can we identify factors that determine the process of institutional and systemic change. A historical case study, however, always involves risk. The researcher may enter too far into the analysis of the case, and so forget or think it impossible to generalize in a theoretically comparative way. Often, a case study tends to investigate so thoroughly the specific and unrepeatable characteristics of the case that it falls into the idiosyncratic fallacy. The transition to democracy on Taiwan does have its own specific characteristics. It happened in a peculiar domestic and international context, and has been initiated by the ruling party. These uniquely differentiating features would seem to imply that the analysis of Taiwan's transition to democracy has no general relevance. They tempt one to answer the question, 'Can Taiwan's transition be imitated?' with a straightforward 'No.' Yet this, as we shall see, is to take too simplistic an approach to the question. Taiwan was not the only authoritarian regime in the world. During the past two decades* certain other authoritarian regimes have been experiencing transitions to democracy. Emerging theories of transition to democracy provide us some explanations that can be used to analyze the case of Taiwan. Although some conditions are specific to Taiwan's transition to democracy, we can still draw some lessons from the case. While the unique 8 developmental process of a country cannot be imitated, the general principles and the strategy which lie behind the process may certainly have lessons for similar authoritarian regimes. I shall explore specific information on the nature and changes of the interaction between the KMT and the opposition, the KMT's official ideology, the party's leadership and internal divisions, and its recruitment and organization. Only based on the judgment of these aspects, can we discover the full role the KMT has played in Taiwan's transition to democracy and the internal dynamics that caused it to play such a role. Data will be drawn from 4 sources: (1) previous literature on the KMT, (2) official files, (3) newspapers and magazines, and (4) interviews. Previous Literature Western interest in Taiwanese politics is a very recent development. There were very few English books on Taiwan's politics published before the rapid change, during the mid-1980s on Taiwan. In recent years, literature on Taiwan has become abundant, for instance, the book series Taiwan in the Modern World published by M. E. Sharpe, Inc. Many facts used in this thesis are drawn from these books. However, although no book on contemporary Taiwanese politics can avoid mentioning the KMT, there are very few books specifically dealing with the ruling party and its role in Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy, with the exception of Peter Moody's general account.* Also, the majority of these works focus on contemporary Taiwan, while this thesis examines the KMT in historical perspective. Official Files Supplementary to the sources in English, I went to Taiwan to do field research and collected materials in Chinese. These include official files, books, pamphlets, magazines, and M. A. and Ph. D. dissertations. Official files include the KMT party documents, statistical data, and some Republic of China (ROC) yearbooks. They also include publications given by the Cultural Department of the KMT's Central 1 Peter R. Moody, Jr., Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992). 9 Committee and Government Information Office. Some basic materials such as data about KMT party congresses and elections are drawn from official files. These materials provided information to construct organizational charts of the KMT and statistical tables to support this thesis' arguments. Newspapers and Magazines The most frequently referred to newspaper in researching this thesis was Lien-ho Pao (United news). Although the publisher oiLien-ho Pao (Wang T'i-wu, died in April 1996) was a high-ranking KMT member, it is a private newspaper. 2 Other Newspapers referred to in researching this thesis include Chung-yang Jih-pao (The central daily news), which is the KMT's official party paper, and Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China times), another major private newspaper. In addition, the following magazines and journals, including Hsin Hsin-wen (New news weekly) in Taiwan, Taiwan Yen-chiu (Taiwan studies) and Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly) in mainland China, and Chiu-shih Nien-tai (The nineties) and Ching-pao Yueh-k'an (The mirror) in Hong Kong, provided research data. Interviews A dozen relevant persons were interviewed on Taiwan in the summer of 1994. People from four categories were interviewed. First are the KMT party officials, such as former director of KMT Organizational Department Kuan Chung (John C. Kuan). Next are KMT representatives in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, such as legislator Hung Hsiu-chu (female) and National Assemblyman Feng Ting-kuo. The third category of interviewees are opposition party members, such as former KMT and then New Party legislators Chao Shao-k'ang and Li Ch'ing-hua (a son of Li Huan), and former DPP Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh. The final category of interviewees are political science professors, such as Ming Chu-cheng (who also serves as deputy secretary general of China Reunification Alliance), Yang Tai-shuen (who also serves as president of the Democracy Foundation), Lin Bih-jaw (who also served as head 2 Lien-ho Pao was created in 1949, with a merger of three newspapers in response to adverse economic conditions. 10 of the Institute of International Relations), etCi While these interviews are not the main sources of data for this dissertation, they serve to provide impressions about political development on Taiwan and as a basis to judge previous literature on the KMT. Some interviewees have very good educational backgrounds, and they facilitated this research by providing copies of their works. I had planned to interview people of various categories. The realities of accessibility to party members and officials resulted in the interviews being focused on young party elites rather than veterans, on non-mainstreamers rather than mainstreamers, and on mainlanders rather than native Taiwanese. Realizing this limitation, I paid attention to viewpoints of veterans, mainstreamers and Taiwanese from other sources. 2. Relevant Theories This thesis attempts to elaborate on the role of the ruling party in the peaceful transition to democracy, and to examine how the nature and adaptive changes of the ruling party influenced its role in this process. The role of the ruling party in the transition to democracy is determined by its nature and adaptive changes. Throughout the thesis, transition to democracy means transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system. We are especially interested in peaceful transitions. Furthermore, our interest focuses on the type of transition that is, to a large extent, initiated by the ruling party. This type of transition is the opposite of replacement.^  3 In this sense, I agree with Samuel Huntington. He argues that "transformation (or, in Linz's phrase, reforma) occurred when the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democracy. Replacement (Linz's ruptura) occurred when opposition groups took the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was overthrown." The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 114. 11 There are not many theories about the role of the ruling party in the peaceful transition to democracy. The surge of democratization is quite a recent phenomenon and there are not many cases of ruling party-initiated transitions to democracy. Theories are just emerging from these cases: However, concepts and explanations can be drawn or borrowed from theories about the transition to democracy, and from theories about single party systems. We shall first discuss the definitions of democracy, liberalization and democratization. Then explanations and theories of the transition to democracy will be introduced and discussed in the light of the KMT case. Theories about political parties and political change are abundant. However, no single theory can adequately explain the KMT case without modification. This thesis will mainly apply theories of the transition to democracy, but at the same time introduce other relevant theories, and draw from them useful concepts,.classifications, and explanations to analyze the case of the KMT. Democracy In the most general sense, democracy means rule by the people. Although rule by the people is the essence of democracy, in reality this definition can hardly distinguish authoritarian from democratic regimes. All Communist regimes claim that they are democratic, believing that proletarian dictatorship is the only true form of rule by the people. On the other hand, studies of the American political system, which most of us regard as democratic, show that "the key political, economic, and social decisions are made by 'tiny minorities'."4 Thus the definition "rule by the people" can hardly be used to analyze a specific political system, and we need more specific criteria in judging whether a political system is democratic or not. 4 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 2. 12 It is not difficult to find other definitions of democracy. There are broad and narrow, and normative and operative definitions. David Held presents a very comprehensive definition of democracy. He bases his definition on the principle of autonomy. He argues that "individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives," civil society should be protected from the state, and the state should be accountable to the people.^  A broad definition would include honest elections, impartial laws, civil and political freedoms, indefeasible rights of private parties against political powers, and an independent judicial system.^ A narrow and operative definition does not include every item. Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy simply as a mechanism for choosing political leadership.? Robert Dahl continues this operative line of definition and emphasizes the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens. But he includes more institutional guarantees in his notion of democracy. These include the freedom to form and join organizations, the freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes.8 These eight conditions outlined by Dahl are condensed by some authors into three main dimensions of democracy, namely competition, participation, and civil and political liberties.^ Other scholars seem to choose from these three elements in their definition of democracy. Huntington's definition is simply based on the concepts of contestation and participation. He believes that the civil and political freedoms of speech, assembly and press are only ancillary principles that make the democratic system work. He classifies a 5 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 271. 6 Robert Wesson, ed., Democracy: A Worldwide Survey (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 3. ? Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 269. 8 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 3. 9 Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 12. 13 system as democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote." 10 Share and Mainwaring would like to include civil and political freedoms, but exclude participation in their definition. According to them, a democracy is a political regime with free competitive elections, and with universal adult suffrage. Democratic regimes afford freedom of speech and the press, freedom of political association, and individual rights. These institutions ensure the basic rights and political competition that are essential to democracy. "Democracy implies the possibility of an alternation in power." Free competitive elections, universal adult suffrage, freedom of speech, of press, and of political association make possible such an alternation.! 1 This thesis uses Share and Mainwaring's definition, and does not use participation in this definition because its relationship with democracy is obscure. Democracy does not necessarily have a high rate of participation, while authoritarian regimes may reach over 99 percent participation. Likewise, a fall in voter turn-out does not necessarily imply a corresponding decline in democracy. Following the operative line of definition, this study regards competitiveness as the main element in democracy. As we have confined our discussion of the transition to democracy only to the ideological and institutional levels, we also limit the definition of competitiveness to the institutional level. Competitiveness means that all effective positions of government power can be competed for by individuals and organized groups. Competition "enables citizens to constrain governments because they can dismiss a government;" furthermore, "competition provides for citizen control, in the sense that, because of competition, citizens can develop preferences about social objectives and then 1 0 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 7. 11 Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," in Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects, ed. Wayne A. Selcher (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 177. 14 express these preferences through devices (like voting) which provide some kind of connection between preferences and outcomes. "12 in modern time competitiveness is realized mainly by party competition through elections. As Schattschneider proclaimed, democracy was unthinkable without party competition. 13 Furthermore, for competition to be meaningful, citizens must enjoy basic political and civil rights. These basic political and civil rights include freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form and join organizations. Liberalization and Democratization Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring believe, "Transitions to democracy involve both liberalization and democratization." 14 However, like the definition of democracy, there are also competing definitions of liberalization and democratization. We shall first discuss the definition of liberalization, which will make it easier for us to then define democratization. Some authors give the term liberalization a broad definition which includes the right to form political parties. In Kevin J. Middlebrook's account, political liberalization involves "the expansion of alternative mobilization channels through legalizing additional opposition parties and creating new opportunities for political competition and representation in the electoral and legislative arenas. "15 Georg Sorensen argues that "increasing liberalization means increasing the possibility for political opposition and competition for government power." 16 However, this broad definition of liberalization is 12 Alan Ware, The Logic of Party Democracy (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1979), p. 50. 13 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942). 1^ Share and Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction," p. 177. 15 Kevin J. Middlebrook, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Mexico," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philipppe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Boltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part II, p. 124. 16 Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, p. 14. 15 almost equivalent to some definitions of democratization, and later this thesis will define democratization in terms of an institutionalized guarantee of competitiveness. Others would rather exclude competition from the definition of liberalization. O'Donnell and Schmitter restrict the definition of liberalization to include only "the process of redefining and extending rights" to individuals and social groups. 1? Space for oppositional political activity is thereby created, albeit within a framework still controlled by the authoritarian regime. Huntington has a similar point of view, and he argues that "liberalization...is the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections." 18 Share and Mainwaring use virtually the same definition, and argue that "liberalization refers to a decline in repression and the reestablishment of most basic civil and political rights but without permitting competitive elections that would allow for an alternation in power." 19 These definitions of liberalization emphasize different aspects of democracy. Some emphasize competition, while others emphasize civil and political rights. Those who define liberalization in terms of rights tend to believe that competition should be excluded so as to be used to define democratization. Among those who emphasize rights, some include every kind of rights, including the right to life, security, the ownership of property, and the right to form a political party; while others believe only freedoms of speech, assembly and press ought to be included. The definition used in this thesis is based on O'Donnell, Schmitter, Huntington, Share and Mainwaring's definitions. In our context liberalization means political liberalization. It is the process of extending basic political freedoms (i.e., freedoms of speech, assembly and press) to the people and loosening the control of oppositional 1? Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philipppe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part IV, p. 7. i 8 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 9. 1^ Share and Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction," p. 177. 16 political activity. In the liberalization process, the electoral system may be partially opened, but freely competitive elections are not instituted. Correspondingly, we also use Share and Mainwaring's definition of democratization; thus "Democratization refers to the establishment of institutional arrangements that make possible an alternation [in power]. "20 Liberalization and democratization have close relations. O'Donnell and Schmitter point out that without the guarantees of basic freedoms realized through liberalization, democratization "risks degenerating into mere formalism." On the other hand, without the establishment of institutional arrangements realized through democratization, "liberalization may prove to be easily manipulated and retracted at the convenience of those in government. "21 According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, however, liberalization and democratization may not occur simultaneously. The transition usually starts with liberalization, which tends to accumulate and lead to democratization. Democratization is not the only possible outcome of liberalization. Liberalization can exist without democratization. Nevertheless, "once some individual and collective rights have been granted, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify withholding others." They find that "in all the experiences examined, the attainment of political democracy was preceded by a significant, if unsteady, liberalization."22 Party Systems We have defined democracy in terms of competitiveness and freedoms, and we have argued that competitiveness is usually enacted via party competition. In fact, the political system is closely related to the party system. Authoritarian political systems 2 0 Ibid. 21 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," p. 9. 2 2 Ibid., p. 10. 17 usually employ noncompetitive party systems, while democratic systems usually employ competitive party systems. The transition to democracy is, in part, the transition from a noncompetitive to a competitive party system. Consequently, we need to classify party systems. Giovani Sartori provides us with an overall framework for classification of party systems. Sartori's typology of party polities is as follows:^ noncompetitive competitive one-party~hegemonic predominant~twopartism~multipartism totalitarian authoritarian pragmatic Sartori maintains that in the political arena it is not actual competition which is the most important feature but the existence of potential competition. Based on this notion, he distinguishes states where only one party is permitted to contest elections from those states where opposition parties may form. Thus, the one-party regimes in the USSR and Yugoslavia were not comparable with the one-party regimes in Mexico or the southern states of the USA. He argues that "the critical juncture lies between the hegemonic systems, on the one hand, and the predominant systems, on the other. Hence the pertinent question is: Can these two systems be converted into one another without breakdown, i.e., continuously, via inner transformation?" He answers that "while the one party can be easily transformed into a hegemonic party, the step that follows is a most 2 3 Giovani Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 283. 18 difficult one. "24 He doubts that unipartism can transform itself (i) by itself and (ii) successfully, into a competitive party system.25 The Role of the Ruling Party in Transition to Democracy Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter argue that the transition to democracy usually starts with liberalization when authoritarian incumbents begin to modify their own rules and loosen political control. Liberalization has the effect of lowering the costs of opposition. If the process of liberalization is not reversed, it tends to accumulate and lead to democratization. Another possible outcome of liberalization is that the regime loses control of liberalization and liberalization leads to the collapse of the regime. It seems that whether liberalization can smoothly transit to democratization depends on the strength and tactics of the regime. The "transition to democracy" school stresses the political choices and tactics of regime and opposition leaders. A peaceful transition requires the "careful, sensible tactics adopted by both the government and the opposition parties to avoid violent clashes."26 It requires communication, negotiation and compromise between regime and opposition. It requires "a sequence of piecemeal reforms" on the part of regime and the willingness on the part of opposition "to play within the initially very restricted games allowed them by authoritarian regimes."^? While the regime agrees to restore basic individual rights and tolerate some civic contestation over policy, the opposition will agree to give up violence and the claim to govern immediately. The regime and the opposition may negotiate a pact 2 4 Ibid., p. 276 and p. 281. 2 5 Ibid., p. 277. 2*> Leo E. Rose, "Pakistan: Experiments with Democracy," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 140. 2? Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 43. 19 "which seeks to define ... rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it. "28 Share and Mainwaring call this type of transition "transition through transaction."29 The process is a difficult one, because usually after the opening of liberalization people from all walks of life begin to test the limit of liberalization and partial democratization. In some cases popular upsurges ensue. Although the process of transition can partly show how the ruling party can play a positive role, there are more factors we can find within the ruling party. These factors include the ruling party's ideology, leadership and divisions within the ruling party, and the strength and adaptability of party organization. Ideology Ideology or the ruling elites' attitude toward official ideology is a determining factor in the fate of transition to democracy. A pro-democracy ideology can be easily used by leadership and reformers to justify the transition to democracy. When discussing the failure of democratization in Latin America after World War II till the 1970s, O'Donnell points out two ideological factors: "One of them was that most intellectuals were actively hostile to those exercises in democracy. The second factor was the ambiguity and opportunism with which major political parties assessed the very idea of democracy."^ O In assessing the future of newly established democracies in Latin America, O'Donnell is confident because he discovers that "most political and cultural forces of any weight now attribute high intrinsic value to the achievement and 28 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," p. 37. 29 Share and Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction." 30 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American Cases," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philipppe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part II, p. 16. 20 consolidation of political democracy."^ However, despite the importance of ideology, O'Donnell and others who study the transition to democracy never elaborate the role of ideology in the transition to democracy. In the following paragraphs, we first define ideology, and then borrow some theories about ideology in one-party system studies. Ideology is a system of beliefs that aspires to explain, to prescribe, and to change the world. There are two basic dimensions of ideology. One is the cognitive dimension and the other is the programmatic dimension.32 The cognitive dimension refers to an ideology's world view. Leon P. Baradat believes that ideology includes an assessment of the status quo and a view of the future. It envisages the future as something better than the present or the past.33 The programmatic dimension of ideology contains a definite plan of action by which this better future can be attained. As Rejai points out, "The action or program of an ideology may be directed toward the maintenance and perpetuation of the status quo or, more characteristically, toward changing the existing social order. The needed change, in turn, may be either reformist or radical in nature. Reformist, peaceful, or gradual change is the way of democratic ideologies: we must persuade and educate the people to help us reach our limited objectives.... Radical, violent, and rapid change is the way of totalitarian ideologies."34 Thus, ideologies are action-related systems of beliefs. They give specific directions about the steps that must be taken to realize their beliefs. "In its policy-related aspects, ideology shapes the purposes and priorities of political action."35 On the other hand, ideologies can be used to defend a particular established 3 1 Ibid., p. 15. 32 Mostafa Rejai, Political Ideologies: A Comparative Approach (Armonk, New York: M . E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995), p. 4. 33 Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies: their Origins and Impact (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 33-34. 34 Rejai, Political Ideologies, p. 9. 35 Charles Andrain, "Ideology," in Academic American Encyclopedia (Danbury: Grolier Inc., 1990), Vol. 11, pp. 30-31. 21 order, because, by definition, ideologies are intended to legitimate certain activities or arrangements.^ ^ Thus, ideology can also play an important role in political stability. In many Third World countries, the official ideology is so-called "guided democracy" or "tutelary democracy." In this context, "official" means that the ideology is the authoritative, formal, and often sole ideology. This kind of ideology is authoritarian ideology. It is different from both Western democratic and totalitarian ideologies, but stays somewhere in between these two poles. On the cognitive dimension, authoritarian ideology shares with the democratic ideology the vision of a good society and future. Basically its goal is the realization of democracy. However, it differs from democratic ideology in the programmatic dimension. Since democracy is yet to be realized, stages to democracy have to be envisaged, and some restrictions have to be maintained in the early stages. On the other hand, authoritarian ideology is also quite different from totalitarian ideology. For one thing, unlike a totalitarian ideology, which seeks to control every aspect of the society, be it cultural, economic, historical, social, or political, authoritarian ideology seeks limited — typically political — control. For another, totalitarian ideology seeks, at least initially, mass mobilization, while authoritarianism seeks "only pacified and submissive populations."37 An authoritarian ideology leaves much more room for potential development of democracy than does a totalitarian ideology. There are different types of authoritarian ideologies. James Coleman and Carl Rosberg distinguish between the "pragmatic-pluralistic pattern" and the "revolutionary-centralizing trend. "38 The differentiating factors include the degree of ideological preoccupation, and the scope, depth, and tempo of modernization objectives. Thus, ideologies of the pragmatic-pluralistic pattern have limited preoccupation, and are adaptive and aggregative of a tolerated but controlled pluralism. Ideologies of the 36 Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, p. 8. 37 Rejai, Political Ideologies, p. 74. 38 James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 5. 22 revolutionary-centralizing type have heavy preoccupation, and are revolutionary, transformative, and anti-traditional.39 Coleman and Rosberg's account is necessarily static. But we can use it to discern the dynamic change of ideology. Actually, Huntington does just this task. Huntington believes that the evolution from a revolutionary one-party system into an established one-party system goes through three phases: transformation, consolidation, and adaptation. Correspondingly, ideology of the one-party system also changes. Ideology is manifest and strong in the first phase, but it becomes pragmatic in the second phase, and it becomes more open in the third phase. Thus, in the established one-party system "ideology is less important in shaping its goals and the decisions of its leaders."40 Coleman, Rosberg and Huntington notice that some ideologies contain pragmatic elements. While it seems that pragmatism and ideology are the opposites of each other, they are actually compatible. Ideologies can be pragmatic or dogmatic. Furthermore, different ideologies definitely have different impacts on political outcomes. A pragmatic ideology will render a political party less preoccupied with ideology, adaptive to its circumstances, and tolerant to some degree of different ideas. As for why ideology changes, we find that Martin Seliger's theory is helpful. He distinguishes between the fundamental and operative levels of ideology. Seliger believes that the beliefs and principles of ideology are constantly confronted with the need to make it feasible in the real world. Such a need compromises the principles. He points out that "Compromises cause ideology to bifurcate into the purer, and hence more dogmatic, fundamental dimensions of argumentation and the more diluted, and hence more 3 9 Ibid. 40 Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-party System," in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established One-party Systems, eds. Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970). 23 pragmatic, operative dimension. "41 The tension between fundamental and operative dimensions of ideology may lead to the change of the ideology. Leadership and Divisions within the Ruling Party In addition to ideology, another factor that determines the outcome of the transition to democracy is the leadership and divisions within the ruling party. Theories of the transition to democracy note the importance of the ruling elite's decision to pursue democracy. This is an aspect that needs further elaboration. Almost everyone studying the transition to democracy agrees that the role of political leadership is an important factor in the transition process. The actions, values, choices, and skills of the leaders matter a lot. A leadership firmly committed to democracy is always helpful. One obvious case is that of Mustafa Kemal and later President Inonu in Turkey. But the self-aggrandizing ambitions and authoritarian styles of the leaders may turn a democratic system into an authoritarian rule, such as the rule of Marcos in the Philippines and Indira Gandhi in India. Without an enlightened leadership, a strong democratic movement from below may increase the authoritarian control from above.42 Why is leadership willing to initiate democratization? Huntington argues that "the motives of political leaders are varied and variable, mixed and mysterious, and often unclear to themselves. Leaders may produce democracy because they believe democracy is an end in itself, because they see it as a means to other goals, or because democracy is the by-product of their pursuit of other goals." Like other writers, he also stresses that 41 Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976), p. 120. 42 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 8-10, and p. 43; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 156-244. 24 "whatever their motives, some political leaders have to want it to happen or be willing to take steps, such as partial liberalization, that may lead to it happening."43 Top leaders usually do not act by themselves. They are helped or urged by a group of reformers within the regime. Liberalizing and democratizing efforts may come from within the ruling regime. Peaceful liberalization and democratization would be impossible if soft-liners or, in our case, reformers, fail to grow and gain the upper hand in the authoritarian regime. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter believe that there has been "no transition whose beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners. "44 The soft-liners or reformers are those who believe that it will be less costly for a regime to maintain its rule by making use of some degree of electoral legitimation. They hope that they can protect their interests by modifying the rules themselves and putting the process under their control. They may also be prompted by a sense of "history" and the prospect of gaining a reputation for leading democratization. On the other hand, soft-liners try to keep the opposition within limits by warning that hard-liners or conservatives would gain an upper hand in the governing regime and would suppress the opposition if it pushes to extremes. The explosion of political participation may exceed the soft-liners' ability to control developments and endanger their position in the regime. Therefore, in a peaceful transition to democracy, the interaction between the reformers and the conservatives within the regime or the ruling party is of central importance. According to Huntington, a peaceful transition only occurs if the regime is stronger than the opposition and if reformers are stronger than "standpatters."45 The first 43 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 107-108. 44 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," p. 19. 45 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 124. 25 step in a peaceful transition is the emergence of reformers within the authoritarian regime. Next reformers have to acquire power. There are three ways that they may come to power. First, when the founding authoritarian leaders die, they succeed to the mantle. Second, they may come to power through regular changes in leadership provided by the authoritarian system itself. Third, they may oust the ruler.46 i n order to strengthen their power, reformers usually appeal for a "return to legitimacy," and argue that it is "time to go back, after a necessary but limited authoritarian interlude, to the democratic principles that were the basis of their country's political system. "47 if the reformers can subdue the conservatives, a smooth transition process may occur. Organization Pro-democracy ideology can urge a ruling party to liberalize and democratize, and the enlightened leadership and the reformers can be the major forces driving the implementation of liberalization and democratization. Nevertheless, a ruling party would not be willing to lose its governing status during the transition to democracy. If a ruling party's organization is not strong enough to withstand the impact of liberalization and democratization, the party would probably be reluctant to initiate these developments. O'Donnell and Schmitter point out that "ironically, the more episodic and incoherent authoritarian experiences of Latin America, as well as that of Greece, seem to have done more to undermine the institutions of the more-or-less democratic regimes which preceded them than the longer-lived and ideologically stronger authoritarianisms of Italy, Spain, and Portugal. "48 They seem to imply that strong authoritarian regimes may be even better prepared to adapt to liberalization and democratization, and the reason may lie 4 6 Ibid., p. 129-131. 4 7 Ibid., p. 138. 48 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions," p. 22. 26 in the longevity and strength of authoritarian organizations. However, just like their treatment of ideology, O'Donnell and others who study the transition to democracy never elaborate on the role of the ruling party's organization in the transition to democracy. In the following paragraphs, we will first define organization and then borrow some theories about organization from political party studies. According to Franz Schurmann, "Organizations are structures of differentiated roles which require the ordered exercise of power."49 As far as the political party is concerned, the organization is usually made up of party members, congress and standing executive body, and a system of nomination, discipline, finance, etc. Thus, a study of party organization has to include the study of these elements. Angelo Panebianco argues that organizations are instruments for the realization of goals. But at the same time they need conscious efforts to survive.50 He describes two opposing theories regarding the relationship between a party and.its environment. One theory posits that party tends to dominate its environment. The other posits that party tends to adapt.itself more or less passively to its environment..Panebianco argues that interests of self-preservation push the organization to adapt to its environment, and the loyalties tied to organizational ideology push it to dominate it. Panebianco believes that dominance and adaptability have differing degrees of importance in different phases of the organizational evolution of political parties. He envisages a three-phase model of evolution of parties: genesis, institutionalization, and maturity. In phase one, the goal of the political parties is the realization of the common cause, and strategy is domination of the environment. Through the institutionalization of phase two, political parties enter phase three and show features that are symmetrically opposed to the features of phase one. In phase three, the goal of the political parties is 49 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 3. 50 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 8-9. 27 survival, and strategy is adaptation to the environment.51 He argues that "In a well-established organization, the importance attached to the survival of the organization generally prevails over that attached to the pursuit of its original aims. "52 Thus adaptation is a symbol of maturity, and only the party that can adapt to the environment can survive. Similarly, Huntington also regards adaptability as a major factor in the institutionalization of a political system. Institutionalization is a process by which organizations acquire value and stability. "The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. "53 Adaptability can be measured by longevity, renewal and reprogramming. While stressing adaptability, Huntington also stresses the strength of the dominant political party in the process of political change. He.believes that the strength of the dominant political party directly contributes to the stability of the political system. He emphasizes the function of political parties in political institutionalization. He points out that "the distinctive institution of the modern polity...is the political party. ...Political parties exist in the modern polity because only modern political systems require institutions to organize mass participation in politics."54 Thus, Huntington argues that "political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics. "55 He argues that party systems are more stable than non-party systems. One-party systems tend to be more stable than pluralistic party systems in developing countries. While his theory focuses on the political order, rather than on the transition to democracy, it can be extended to 5 1 Ibid., pp. 18-20. 52 ibid., p. 8. 53 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12. 54 ibid., pp. 89-90. 55 Ibid., p. vii. 28 explain the role of the ruling party in the transition to democracy as well. We can especially extend his theory to explain the peacefulness of Taiwan's transition to democracy. On the other hand, Huntington's theory deals with the whole political system. We will narrow his theory to analyze only the ruling party's organization. Both Huntington and Panebianco stress adaptability or adaptation. In the process of evolution, both the ruling single-parties in the Third World and democratic parties in the West may change themselves by downgrading their organizational rigidity. An important contribution of those studying single parties has been their success in demonstrating that not all parties in single-party systems are monolithic and strongly disciplined. Strength and adaptability not only determine the survival of the ruling party, but also influence the process of the transition to democracy. In this study, we will be examining the strength and adaptability of the party organization through an analysis of its recruitment, nomination procedures, discipline, etc. Summary Many concepts, classification schemes, and hypotheses provided by these theories in the literature can be used to enlighten our analysis of the Taiwan case. Distinctions between soft-liners and hard-liners in the regime, between moderates and radicals in the opposition, between noncompetitive and competitive (especially between hegemonic and predominant) party systems, hypotheses that the regime and the opposition can create a peaceful transition to democracy through transactions, that a strong party system is beneficial for stability, etc., can be applied to the KMT case. Despite their imperfections, emerging theories of the transition to democracy can be very helpful. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, the transition to democracy is not simply the result of societal opposition and/or international pressure, etc. Rather, it also depends upon the ruling party's willingness and capacities to reform. The ruling party has to 29 consolidate its ruling power before it adopts liberalization and democratization measures. In other words, liberalization and democratization will most likely be carried out under conditions such that the party's ruling position would not be vulnerable to damage. A party's willingness to reform is generated from both its ideology and its organizational strength and adaptability, although domestic and international stimuli are necessary. The enlightened top leaders and the reformers in the party are major agents of liberalization and democratization. If positive changes occur within the ruling party, it is quite likely that the ruling party can take a lead in the overall liberalization and democratization process. Liberalization and democratization initiated by the ruling party may decrease the autonomy and capacities of the ruling party. However, the initiative of liberalization and democratization on the part of the ruling party may enhance its legitimacy and thus make it possible to enjoy the continuous governing status through competitive elections, despite facing a legal opposition both in the society and the legislature. The legitimacy and strength of the ruling party contribute directly to the peacefulness of the transition process. The transition to democracy in a strong one-party system seems to be smoother than in a military regime. 30 C H A P T E R T W O T H E R O L E O F S O C I O E C O N O M I C A N D O T H E R F A C T O R S The theme of this thesis is that the KMT has played a more or less positive role in Taiwan's liberalization and democratization, and this is a direct explanation for Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. Such an approach is in contrast to "ecological" explanations that point to such factors as economic development, middle class, political culture, international pressure and relations with mainland China. The impression that these factors are not sufficient to explain Taiwan's peaceful transition prompts me to think that there must have been a more direct factor. To some extent, to show the insufficiency of these explanations is to justify my emphasis on the role of the ruling party. This chapter purports to do this job. In this chapter, we discuss the role of the following factors in Taiwan's transition to democracy: economic development, the middle class, political culture, international pressure, and the relationship with mainland China. Existing literature focusing on these factors contribute to our understanding of Taiwan's democratization, but we shall show that it is insufficient to explain the Taiwan's transition to democracy, thus it needs to be supplemented by a research focus on the role of the KMT. 1. Economic Development The importance of the economic factor in political development was first emphasized early in the 1950s by development theories. Development theorists believe 31 that the level of economic development has a pronounced effect on political democracy. Based on Western development experience, they argue that the rise of democracy is associated with capitalist development, and democracy is compatible with economic vitality. This is because, on the one hand, "modernization stimulates participatory demands;" on the other, "democratic practice and philosophy helped to spur the individualism and entrepreneurship seen as central to social modernization."! Economic development results in high levels of urbanization, industrialization, high literacy rates, and mass communication, and these factors facilitate the emergence of democracies. In Taiwan, economic development does bring in its wake many socioeconomic changes. Through more than four decades of development, Taiwan's economy has been transformed from an agricultural to an industrial one. The share of agriculture in GDP (gross domestic product) has decreased as the economy has continued to grow, from 32.4 percent in 1951 to only 6.5 percent in 1984. During, the same period, the share of the industrial sector in GDP increased from 23.9 percent to 50.6 percent. The contribution of manufacturing is undoubtedly the most important factor in the industry sector. If only the manufacturing sector is considered, the average annual growth rate was 13.3 percent.^  GNP has grown by almost 9 percent annually for three and a half decades. This growth rate is quite high as compared with the other countries. As a result, in the mid-1980s when Taiwan started democratization, per capita income reached the range of U.S. $4,000,3 and there was no serious economic or social crisis on Taiwan. Better economic conditions also contributed to an increased literacy rate and intensified mass communication. 1 Cal Clark, Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 20. 2 Rong-I Wu, "The Distinctive Features of Taiwan's Development," in In Search of An East Asian Development Model, eds. Peter L. Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 179-187. 3 Per capita income was U.S.$3,748 in 1986, and U.S.$4,991 in 1987. Cf. Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the ROC (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 17. 32 Given that Taiwan has achieved so much in the economic field, some scholars use development theories to analyze Taiwan's political transition.^ Lucian Pye suggests that Taiwan is "possibly the best working example of theory that economic progress should bring in its wake democratic inclinations and healthy surge of pluralism, which in time will undercut the foundations of the authoritarian rule common to developing countries. "5 Hung-mao Tien's comprehensive analysis of Taiwan's political transition is also based on a socioeconomic approach, although he notices the role of the party-state in Taiwan's modernization.^ That Taiwan's economic miracle occurred before political miracle seems to support the argument that economic development brings about political democratization. This author agrees that a higher level of economic development is more favourable for democracy than a poor economic situation. However, democratization is not simply a function of economic growth. We do not have an exact formula that can tell us at what level of GNP a country turns into a democracy. In the late 1960s, there were already many scholars pointing out the economic success on Taiwan. But Taiwan did not become democratized then.7 Singapore, a more affluent Chinese society, has not been fully democratized even as of 1995. Wealthy Middle East states are not.democratic, but poverty-stricken India is. Economic growth does not necessarily bring about democracy directly, rather it may furnish the government with more sophisticated technics of social control. Economic development may be a necessary condition for democracy, but not a 4 See, for example, Christopher J. Lucas, "The Politics of National Development and Education in Taiwan," Comparative Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January 1982), pp. 211-225. 5 Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: the Belknap Press, 1985), p. 233. 6 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the ROC (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989). 7 Cf. P'eng Huai-en, Taiwan Cheng-tang T'i-hsi te Fen-hsi: 1950-1986 (An analysis of Taiwan's party system, 1950-1986) (Taipei: Tung-ts'a Press, 1989), p. 63. 33 sufficient one. Socioeconomic preconditions have positive impacts for democratic development, but they do not automatically lead to democracy.^  One theorem of political science is that "experience with economic autonomy can lead to the expectation or desire for political autonomy and ultimately to the end of quiet acquiescence to political control from above."9 This may be the underlying rational for the hypothesis that economic modernization leads to democratization. The hypothesis may be correct in the long run, but is not necessarily true at least in the short run. Experience with economic autonomy may not lead to the expectation or desire for political autonomy, or this desire may not translate into political action. This is because people, especially in developing countries, have many serious problems to solve other than the political one. Daya Krishna, an Indian scholar, argues that society has to perform functions other than the political one, and most of these functions are fairly time-consuming. There are substantial economic costs to political activity. People both have to and prefer to engage in other activities.10 People may simply enjoy their economic autonomy and be busy with their business without any concern about politics. On the other hand the authoritarian government can confine people's activities in the economic realm by the strategy of depoliticization. The following factors may lead to depoliticization and people's contribution to modernization. (1) By limiting the opportunities of mobility or promotion in the political arena, government can force social elites and masses to seek mobility in the economic field. After the retreat to Taiwan, mainlanders monopolized the government. Native Taiwanese access to the high political echelon was denied. However, the KMT government left the economic field open to 8 It seems that Hung-mao Tien realizes the complex relationship between the economic growth and political development in this later article; See "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition", in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 105. 9 Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), p. 221. 10 Daya Krishna, Political Development: A Critical Perspective (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 13. 34 natives. (2) The high cost of political opposition in an authoritarian state may make people lose interest in politics. This and the above factor become the pushing factors that force people out of political arena. (3) The abundance of opportunities during modernization may attract many people, and absorb them into economic activities. The KMT government on Taiwan implemented capitalist development policies. It especially encouraged family business. Everybody could become his or her own boss. Especially since the implementation of the outward looking strategy in the mid-1960s, Taiwanese found plenty of business opportunities. This is a pulling factor that attracted people from political arena. Therefore, Taiwan's economic development was controlled by the KMT government. By tightening political control and providing economic opportunities, the KMT in the early years directed the Taiwanese populace to devote themselves to the business world. Thomas Gold points out that "the island's people responded in the direction desired by the authorities to the incentives offered them, even if they might have been seething with frustration at the limited options available to them at the same time." 11 Political competition was aroused only when the KMT gradually loosened its control and started liberalization and democratization, as we shall demonstrate in next chapter. After the economy prospered and people began demanding political rights, the KMT government was in an advantageous position to deliver economic and political goods. The KMT wanted continued economic growth, and in order to achieve this end, it needed political stability. So the need for economic growth prompted the KMT regime to maintain stability by any means. In the earlier period, the KMT mainly used authoritarian means to achieve stability, supplemented by means of co-optation and local elections. In the later period, the KMT mainly used elections to achieve stability. Indeed, political change on Taiwan has much to do with the KMT's concern with economic modernization, 11 Thomas Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity," inCultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, eds. Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 49. 35 but the KMT carefully controlled when and how to respond to socioeconomic changes. One of the research interests in this thesis is the KMT's statecraft of responsiveness and adaptability. Economic structure probably is more important than the GNP level for the transition to democracy. Taiwan's economy, especially the export and industrial sections, has been dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, which are beyond the reach of the government. The rise of the private sector enabled individuals to sever their dependence on KMT patronage. As Cheng and Haggard point out, "Capitalist development itself undermined the KMT's institutional capacity for mobilization and control." 12 However, as we shall show in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, the ruling party did not oppose capitalist development on Taiwan. If private economy is the basis for democracy, it is the KMT government that has laid down this basis. The speed of economic growth also has an impact on political change. High-speed economic growth may result in either peaceful or turbulent transition to democracy. It does not necessarily result in peaceful transition because it may create socioeconomic crises that lead to turbulent political change. Huntington points out three different kinds of result in high-growth countries: democracy, repression, and revolution. 13 Constant high-speed economic development on Taiwan has not resulted in violent transition. It is interesting to discuss why Taiwan has tended to take a democratic approach rather than repression or revolution. Learning from four decades of development experiences of the Third World since World War II, many theorists realize that while there is a strong correlation between economic and political development, the causal relationship between them cannot be 12 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), pp. 9-10. 13 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 72. 36 determined. 14 Thus there must have been other decisive factors involved in Taiwan's transition to democracy. 2. Middle Class There was a small middle class when Taiwan was returned to China after the Japanese rule. The KMT regime repressed those Taiwanese urban elites who demanded democratic rights, while co-opting those urban elites who previously collaborated with the Japanese. Land reform weakened the Taiwanese rural elites. Afterwards, the KMT established a corporatist system in the early postwar period. 15 Organized interest groups have operated as the party-state's "transmission belts." At the same time they also have become part of the authorities' social control mechanism. The KMT organization penetrated not only occupational associations (industry, commerce, labor, farmers and fishermen), but also functional associations (women, youth, and retired servicemen). By the 1970s, a new middle class had grown up. It was composed mainly of intellectuals, professionals, business people, upper-middle-level party and government bureaucrats, and elected representatives in the national and local legislatures.^ This new group of elites was predominantly composed of Taiwanese from the countryside. Intellectuals were the most politically active agents in this group. They associated ' themselves with small and medium-sized businesses, which offered them financial support and fallback career positions. 17 Some people from the middle class were well-educated and Westernized in their values and attitudes. However, as Metzger finds, 14 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 222. 15 For a discussion of the KMT's corporatism, see Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, p. 44-45. 16 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, p. 33. 17 Cheng and Haggard, ed., Political Change in Taiwan, p. 11. 37 generally speaking, the Taiwanese middle class was "little interested in any of the ideological positions or even in political events, except as they affected the economic climate. Prudently avoiding any confrontation with the government and seeking stability more than reform, people with this 'petty bourgeois' outlook have exhibited an authoritarian and passive attitude toward politics." 18 Some writers argue that the middle class helps the development of the opposition by contributing to its leadership, activists and social base. 19 But on the other hand, the KMT also recruited significant numbers of people from social elites of the middle class into the party and government. Chiang Ching-kuo did this by implementing self-conscious policies of Taiwanization and technocratization. As we shall see later, the KMT's co-optation policy has had the effect of attracting social elites to work within the system and of dividing the opposition. There were instances in which KMT members joined the opposition camp, such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung. But generally speaking, the KMT's co-optation policy was quite effective, and most of the social elites were recruited into the party. Thus, the middle class was by no means politically cohesive. By the early 1980s Taiwan's social structure had been substantially transformed from an agrarian to an industrial urban society. The KMT party-state began to permit the emergence of an increasingly autonomous and large bourgeoisie. Civic and economic associations proliferated with rapid economic growth. Secondary associations rose from 2,560 in 1952 to 13,766 in 1990.2 0 Since the 1980s, these civic groups have demanded 18 Thomas A. Metzger, "The Chinese Reconciliation of Moral-Sacred Values with Modem Pluralism: Political Discourse in the ROC, 1949-1989," in Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years, ed. Ramon H. Myers (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institutions Press, 1991), p. 52. 19 Alexander Ya-li Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: the Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, pp. 122-123. 20 Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1991), p. 299. 38 changes in the existing arrangement of the state-society relations. Some groups, such as the Association for Taiwan Farmers' Rights and the Autonomous Workers' Federation, have close links to the opposition parties. Taiwan's society has become more and more pluralist. The KMT found out that the organized conflict in society did not necessarily challenge its rule.21 In the 1990s, the KMT has attempted to transform its role from that of a manipulator into that of a mediator. Middle classes are usually characterized as being democratic. In reality they may also support an autocracy. This is especially true in the early phase of modernization. As Huntington points out, "At times in Latin America and elsewhere, middle-class groups acquiesced in or actively supported military coups designed to overthrow radical government and to reduce the political influence of labor and peasant organizations. "22 In Taiwan, the middle class benefited from the established political and economic order. It has been noted that "the KMT regime provided few channels of access for business, yet it also pursued policies that were generally conducive to private sector growth. There were thus few incentives for the private sector to attempt to reshape the political order. "23 One characteristic of the Taiwanese economy is that small family firms abound, and many people are their own bosses. They were dependent on the KMT state, "as the economic recessions of 1973-74 and 1980-81 amply demonstrated."24 Furthermore, one third of the total adult population belong to the middle class,25 and more people tend to regard themselves as middle class than not. This fact enhanced political support for the KMT, the party that had brought about the prosperity. The rise of the middle class, therefore, did not quickly produce popular demands for political reform. While members 21 Edwin A. Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" mPolitical Change in Taiwan, eds. Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 242. 22 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 66. 23 Cheng and Haggard, ed., Political Change in Taiwan, p. 10. 24 Edwin Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on .Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" China Quarterly, No. 99 (September 1984), p. 492. 25 Estimates of the size of Taiwanese middle class vary from 25 to 40 percent of the total adult population. Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, p. 33. 39 of the middle class wanted a more open political environment, they also wanted social stability. They disapproved of radical opposition, as shown during the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 (the Incident will be discussed in next Chapter). This is one of the reasons that the KMT government dared punish radical oppositionists with harsh sentences, and that the opposition turned moderate in the 1980s. In recent years, the Taiwanese middle class has associated the opposition with disorder, and the KMT with order. The middle class has distanced itself from the DPP, especially on the issue of independence, because the DPP has caused internal disorder by its persistent calls for independence. On the whole, the KMT has the support of the middle class. This support is demonstrated in election results before the 1990s. As Metzger argues, "the KMT's ability to attract a majority of the voters (usually around 60-70 %) would be impossible without middle-class support."2^ The support of the middle class for the KMT facilitated the peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan. As Moody points out, a party-state, "if not threatened by democracy, is not constrained by responsiveness to elite social interests from implementing democracy. "27 In the final analysis, the Taiwanese middle class has not been very active politically, and when it did become involved in political activities, it did not participate as a united social stratum. It did not struggle for democracy by itself. As Gold argues, "the existence of a middle class by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratization. "28 The KMT's co-optation resulted in cooperation, or at least, acquiescence of middle classes. Some social elites support the opposition, but as a whole the middle class is supportive of the KMT regime. This is one of the reasons that the KMT maintained its rule during Taiwan's transition to democracy. 26 Metzger, "The Chinese Reconciliation," p. 53. 2 7 Peter R. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 182. 28 Thomas Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity," p. 53. 40 3. Confucian Culture There are different views about the effect of political culture on democracy on Taiwan. Huntington points out that "almost no scholarly disagreement exists on the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic." "In practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy. "29 He also believes that one obstacle to democracy is that the state has no previous experience with democracy. The fifty year colonial rule of Taiwan by Japan enhanced Chinese authoritarian tradition, and then the KMT succeeded to the tradition. Thus, the Confucian culture on Taiwan impedes democratization. However, he maintains that Confucianism on Taiwan is not as strong as in mainland China. Copper basically agrees with Huntington. He believes that "Chinese political culture is basically conservative (in the sense, of slowing and moderating political change) and dampens radical policies or agendas."30 China's bureaucratic tradition did not take root in pre-colonization Taiwan, but Japanese transmitted Confucian culture into the island. Obedience and loyalty were esteemed; individualism was not. Centralized political authority was established after the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan. He argues that the small size of the island and the modern means of transportation and political communication facilitated KMT authoritarianism.31 Unlike Huntington, Copper argues that the conservative nature of Chinese political culture is beneficial for Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy. The Chinese people fear anarchy and have a long history of emphasizing the value of order. He points out that "when critics or opponents of the government go too far, particularly in the 2 9 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 300-301. 30 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 73. 3 1 Ibid. 41 direction of destroying the system or using violence, the people respond with a demand for caution. When some advocate overthrowing the system the people respond by siding with the government. The electorate wants democracy, but it does not want it to come through the destruction of the government (unless the government is worse than anarchy or is itself promoting chaos, and that has not been the case on Taiwan). Some say government officials on Taiwan know that if the opposition becomes too extreme or threatens violence the people will turn against them. Thus, they are more tolerant of opposition antics and demands than governments in most countries. "32 It is true that the populace's dislike of disorder turned out to be a support for the ruling party. Lucian Pye believes that Confucianism generally is not beneficial to democracy, but Confucian authoritarianism has diminished on Taiwan. He argues that the KMT's defeat on the mainland in 1949 made it impossible "for most Nationalist leaders to uphold the posture of arrogance associated with traditional Confucian notions of authority." Economic modernization overwhelmed a relatively weak Confucian legacy, and Taiwan's political culture evolved into a Western-inspired democracy.33 However, Pye thinks that this is a democracy with Chinese characteristics. It "differs from Western systems in being more conservative while protecting the society more than the individual.... In general the concept means democracy that preserves social stability, maintains strong law enforcement, preserves the family, better treats the elderly and has less government interference and bureaucracy."^^ Taiwanese political scientist Hu Fu finds that Chinese political culture is more inclined to subject than to participant political culture.35 But he also finds that, along 32 John F. Copper, Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1991), p. 91. 33 Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 228-236. 34 Copper, Taiwan, p. 55. 35 Fu Hu uses Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's concept of subject competence. Almond and Verba define it as follows: "The competence of the subject is more a matter of being aware of his 42 with the socioeconomic change, political culture on Taiwan has evolved more towards pluralism, which is favourable for democracy.36 One belief shared by the above writers is that traditional Confucian culture is incompatible with democracy. In the Weberian perspective, Confucian values of deference to authority and group conformity resist democracy. This leads us to ask how Taiwan could democratize despite such an unfavourable political culture. Here we should stress once more that the present study focuses primarily on the levels of political ideology and institutions. Whether or not democratization at these levels is ultimately compatible with Confucian values pervading the more general society and culture is an important question, but one which lies outside our scope of interest. This does not mean that traditional culture has no influence at all. The conservative nature of Confucianism is supportive of peaceful political change on Taiwan, but at the same time slows down the process of change. Like socioeconomic factors, however, cultural factors do not necessarily have a causal relationship with democratization, and so do not have a direct impact (positive or negative) on the transition to democracy. While the existence of a pro-democracy culture is undoubtedly a propitious condition for democracy, cultural conditions, like socioeconomic conditions, do not have a determining impact on the outcome of the transition to democracy. Instead, theorists of the transition to democracy believe, a democratic culture or "rules of game" is a product, not a precondition, of democratization. As Wachman puts it, "The qualities that are commonly seen as preconditions of democracy are qualities that more probably emerge from the establishment of democracy. "37 rights under the rules than of participating the making of the rules." The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 185. 36 Fu Hu, "Taipei Shih-min Cheng-chih Ts'an-yu Hsing-wei te Pi-chiao Fen-hsi" (A comparative analysis of political participation of Taipei residents), inTaiwan Ti-ch'u She-hui Fa-changyu Wen-hua Pian-ch'ian (Social development and cultural change on Taiwan), ed.Chung-kuo Lun-t'an (China tribune) (Taipei: Lien-ching Press, 1985), pp. 107-109, and p. 131. 37 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 36. 43 Socioeconomic and political changes have brought about cultural change. In recent years, Taiwan has been developing its own political culture. As Winckler summarizes, "Already in 1960-1975 Taiwan's increasing involvement with the outside world increased its cosmopolitanism. However, in 1975-1990 this accelerated. "38 The influence of Confucian ethics is diminishing but still alive. Taiwanese people are talking about a cultural crisis on the island. Such a situation is a result of socioeconomic and political change. This political cultural change on Taiwan is basically in accordance with the argument that democratic culture is a result of the transition to democracy. Therefore while Taiwanese political culture has not been an obstacle to Taiwan's transition to democracy, it also has not played a decisive role in it. In comparison, as we shall show in latter chapters, ideological and institutional factors have played a more decisive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. 4. International Pressure Numerous scholars have ascribed Taiwan's democratization to the international demonstration effect.39 They point out that the international atmosphere in the 1980s was pervaded by a renewed trend toward democratization, and the change on Taiwan is mentioned as part of this trend.^ O They argue that democratic movements in South Korea and the Philippines and the downfall of Marcos may have had a psychological influence 3 8 Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" p. 229. 39 Cf. Jonathan Moore, "Diffused Voice of the New Middle Class," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 1988, p. 32; Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 214-215; Yu-shan Wu, "Marketization of Politics," p. 386. 4 0 Huntington, The Third Wave. 44 on Chiang Ching-kuo, as these developments seemed to have "prophetic effect" for Taiwan.4! However, no evidence has been found regarding Chiang's reflection on or interpretation of these events. While diffusion and demonstration effects may influence the transition to democracy, the diffusion effect may be positive or negative. The downfall of the Communism in Soviet Union did not prompt Chinese Communists to carry out democratic reform. Rather, the chaotic results of the democratic transition in the Soviet Union and the East European countries enhanced Chinese Communists' convictions that democratization was not beneficial for modernization. Thus, the effect that external events have on domestic politics depends on how the leadership interprets them. External political developments may have contradictory domestic effects on democracy.42 Some scholars argue that foreign intervention, particularly the influence of the United States, is an important stimulus toward democratization. Gregory A. Fossedal says that "America has powerful tools with which to influence how our neighbors will be governed" and that "America has played an active role in promoting democracy elsewhere around the world." 4 3 Was American intervention a major factor in the transition to democracy on Taiwan? The following short historical account will show that despite the efforts of the United States at times to press the Nationalist regime to democratize, American pressure has not been a major factor in the transition to democracy on Taiwan. When the KMT regime lost the mainland, the United States government assessed responsibility for the loss to the KMT itself, due to its corruption and incompetence. The United States anticipated that the Communists would eventually take the island and wanted to avoid getting involved in a war against mainland China. The Korean war saved 41 Daniel K. Berman, Words Like Colored Glass: the Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 91. 4 2 Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" p. 227. 4 3 Gregory A. Fossedal, The Democratic Imperative (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 16. 45 the KMT regime. President Truman was determined that Taiwan not fall under Communist control. Taiwan became strategically important in the containment of Communism. But the Truman administration did not want Chiang to attack the mainland, fearing that such action might trigger a world war. 4 4 The lack of U.S. support for Chiang's ambitions to retake the mainland was a factor in directing Chiang to focus on Taiwan's modernization. During China's bombardment of Quemoy in 1958, the U.S. declared clearly that it would not assist the ROC to return to the mainland. In a joint communique issued on October 23, 1958, the two governments recalled that the Mutual Defense Treaty signed on December 2, 1954, was "defensive in character."4^ Although the KMT government was still determined to retake the mainland, it ceased to stress achieving this by force. Rather it shifted its focus from strengthening might to accelerating socioeconomic development. The KMT regime did have to consider American expectations in its domestic politics. In the early years the KMT claimed that, in contrast to the Communist regime on the mainland, the ROC on Taiwan was a "free China." In order to win U.S. support, which was important throughout most of the postwar period, the KMT had to maintain a veneer of liberal democracy, thus keeping open the possibilities of liberalization and democratization. However, Chiang Kai-shek tried to be as independent as possible. Chiang's determination to be independent from the United States influence can be seen in the purge of General Sun Li-jen, a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. Chiang purged him because Chiang suspected that the Americans attempted to replace him with General Sun.4^ The anti-American riot in May 1957 also showed Taiwan's willingness to be 4 4 Martin L. Lasater, U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 6-9. 4 5 Cf. "ROC-US Joint Communique, October 23, 1958," in Hung-dah Chiu, ed.,China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 288. 4(> Li Sung-lin, Chiang-shih Fu-ts'u Tsai Taiwan (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo on Taiwan) (Peking: Chung-kuo You-i Ch'u-pan Kung-tzu, 1993), pp. 199-202. 46 independent. A mob broke into the United States embassy when an American soldier who killed a Chinese was acquitted by a U.S. court-martial. The KMT government was lethargic in restoring public order. It was suspected that the government took advantage of the riot to demonstrate its independence from the U.S., or to "devalue the image of the United States in the popular mind and so decrease U.S. leverage over the regime's internal affairs."47 During the 1950s, American aid advisors often emphasized to the Taiwan authorities that successful capitalist modernization required expanding political and civil freedoms. The KMT government ignored that advice and continued its authoritarian rule. Generally speaking, the Americans made few demands on the KMT regime to soften its control, since Taiwan's strategic position in the global struggle against Communism necessitated continued United States support. In the 1960s, when United States support began to fade, the KMT made effort to put its roots in Taiwanese soil in order to survive.4^ In the 1970s the United States was forced to pull back from Vietnam and Asia in general. Abandoning the policy of containment, the United States also began to normalize relations with mainland China. The establishment of diplomatic relationships between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States was a heavy blow for the KMT regime. The withdrawal of support for the Taiwanese government, however, resulted in a strengthening of authoritarian rule in the short run, because the KMT used it as an excuse to postpone the 1978 national supplementary elections, and to halt reforms until the end of 1980. The American Congress declared its expectations for Taiwan's democratization and improvement of human rights situation in the Taiwan Relations Act, in order to justify its continued support for Taiwan. The United States Congress threatened to cut arms sales to Taiwan in order to force Taipei to obey the human rights provisions in the 4 7 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 74. 4 8 Ibid., p. 186. 47 Act. The American Institute on Taiwan reported regularly on the human rights situation on Taiwan to the United States government.^9 However, the United States never directly pressed the KMT regime to promote democracy as it pressed the regimes of the Philippines and South Korea. According to Chiang's secretary Ma Ying-chiu, international pressure was not a major factor in Chiang's decision to democratize.^ Opposition leader K'ang Ning-hsiang also pointed out that "the KMT's strongman era was coming to an end. If they wanted their third generation to continue ruling Taiwan, they had immediately to adjust their relations with Taiwanese society or suffer severe problems.... The question of foreign evaluations and the international situation was secondary. If they could get good international reviews while guaranteeing the survival of their regime, so much the better."51 Generally speaking, domestic, actors can exploit the geopolitical opportunities to consolidate either authoritarian or democratic rule. The United States' main contribution to Taiwan's transition to democracy has been in providing a secure environment, which was achieved by means of a common defense pact signed in 1954 and later the Taiwan Relations Act. Within this secure environment,,democracy indeed developed more easily on Taiwan. 5. The Relationship with Mainland China 4 9 John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 121. 50 Andrew J. Nathan and Helena V. S. Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," in Chiang Ching-kuo's Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, ed. Shao-chuan Leng (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), p. 36 and p. 39. 51 Cited in Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," p. 46. 48 What happens in mainland China always has implications for Taiwan's politics. The relationship with mainland China is another factor that influences Taiwan's transition to democracy, but obviously does not have a determining impact on it. This section will briefly describe the extent of mainland China's influence on Taiwan's transition. Initially, the Communist threat after World War II contributed to the KMT's hard authoritarianism. The KMT took advantage of the threat from across the strait, using it as an excuse to maintain martial law. The KMT rationalized its authoritarian rule under martial law during most of postwar period by stressing the fact that it had to face the Communist threat from the mainland. According to Diamond, "a perception of serious threat to the country's military security, from either external invasion or external support for subversion or insurgency, tends to strengthen the hand of military-bureaucratic forces. In particular, it legitimates the augmentation and centralization of state power, the militarization of society, and the restriction of civil and political liberties as matters of necessity for national security."^2 This is exactly what happened on Taiwan in the first two or three decades of the postwar period. On the other hand, the situational pressure has tended to motivate the KMT to do better in its domestic affairs on Taiwan. The desire to outpace the mainland in various aspects of development is a major motive for Taiwan to do everything better. Since 1949, the KMT had attempted to develop Taiwan as a "model province under the Three Principles of the People." In 1981, Chiang Ching-kuo argued that "it is more important than ever for us to strengthen the construction of constitutional government to demonstrate clearly that the strong contrast between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is basically due to the fact that one side has implemented a Constitution based on the Three Principles of the People while the other has not. "53 52 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 40. 53 Quoted in Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," pp. 38-39. 49 Since 1978, the PRC has undertaken a progressive and promising programme of economic and political development.^4 During this time the PRC has taken a conciliatory approach toward the KMT and propagated a third united front with the KMT and peaceful reunification. In 1983 Teng Hsiao-p'ing proposed the so-called "one country, two systems" scheme.55 The KMT's "three no's" ~ no contacts, no negotiations, no compromise with the Communists - appeared obsolete. The authorities on Taiwan wanted to evade the mainland's reunification overtures and retain national sovereignty by democratization. The KMT's Guidelines for National Reunification announces that the mainland has to implement both democracy and the rule of law before it can reunite with Taiwan. While Taiwan started to democratize, the June 4 1989 Event occurred on the mainland. The Event stimulated the KMT to speed up reforms. As one author points out, "the KMT was gratified that its depiction of the Communist regime on the mainland was reinforced by events in Peking, but also pressured into demonstrating how differently it treated political dissidence and opposition on Taiwan. This, too, may have influenced the way the KMT dealt with the opposition on Taiwan once reform was under way."56 The PRC has held the KMT government responsible for keeping the DPP's independent tendency under control. The PRC refuses to abandon the possible use of military means to solve Taiwan issue. Taiwanese authorities have stressed that Taiwan should not provoke the PRC, thus implying that a continuous KMT government is better than the DPP in maintaining peace over the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese electorate understands that a formal declaration of independence would be a costly and risky 5 4 1978 was the year when the CCP held its third session of the Eleventh Congress, in which Teng Hsiao-p'ing proposed a series of political and economic reforms. 55 "One country, two systems" scheme is a peaceful reunification proposal put forwarded by Teng Hsiao-p'ing. According to this scheme, after China is reunited, people in the area presently controlled by the PRC will follow the socialist system while people in Taiwan will continue their capitalist ways of life. 56 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 227. 50 venture. The threat from the mainland has also made the opposition reduce its agitation so as not to endanger Taiwan's security.^? Democratization is also a response on the part of Taiwan to the mainland's diplomatic offensive. Since the 1970s, the PRC's aggressive international activities has almost completely squeezed the ROC out of the international arena (see Table 2.1). Most of the nations with whom the ROC now has diplomatic relations are small nations in Central America and Africa. Maintaining ties with the United States and expanding ties with the rest of the world require that Taiwan consolidate its emerging democracy. Table 2.1 Number of Nations with whom the ROC and the PRC Have Diplomatic Relations 1952 1960 1970 1975 1980 1990 1993 ROC 40 52 66 26 . 22 28 29 PRC 24 38 57 113 127 134 156 Source: Table created from data adopted from Huang Yuan-mo, Chung-kuo Kuomintang chi Chuan-hsing: Ti Shih-szu Tz'u Tai-piao Ta-hui Yen-chiu (The transformation of the KMT: a research on the Fourteenth National. Party Congress), (M.A. Thesis, Taiwan University, 1994), p. 45. In a word, the influence of the PRC is a situational factor that influences, but does not determine, political change on Taiwan. It has contributed to a greater degree of authoritarianism in the Taiwanese political system during most of the postwar period. In recent years, the threat from the mainland has been a supplementary factor in Taiwan's democratization. However, Chinese Communists have no reason to press the KMT to democratize, and the mainland threat alone is not sufficient to push the KMT to democratize. 57 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 183. 51 6. Conclusion This chapter demonstrates that none of the ecological factors seems to have been decisive in Taiwan's transition to democracy, nor can they explain "why any regime with a monopoly on political power ultimately decides to share it."58 Even if these single factors could be correlated with the transition to democracy on Taiwan, no one factor could explain the peacefulness of the process. The peaceful nature of Taiwan's transition to democracy has more to do with the role of the ruling party there. The generalized influence of these single factors must pass through the filter of the ruling party before resulting in certain outcomes. Thus, we need to discuss political reasons for Taiwan's transition to democracy. Robert Dahl criticizes the "'reductionism' that seeks to reduce political factors to something more 'basic,'" such as "social, economic, cultural, or psychological factors."59 These "ecological" factors do contribute to Taiwan's transition to democracy in one way or another, but they are not sufficient to explain it. Political factors have had a more direct and decisive impact on Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. Compared with other factors, the KMT is apparently the most salient political factor. All we can say is that without the necessary preconditions and the opposition pressure, the KMT would have been unable or would have had little motive to initiate the transition to democracy; but if the KMT had taken a reactionary response to social pressure, Taiwan's transition to democracy would have been difficult and/or tumultuous. In the following chapter we will examine the exact role the KMT has played in Taiwan's transition to democracy. 58 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 2. 59 Robert A. Dahl, ed. Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), p. 349. 52 C H A P T E R T H R E E T A I W A N ' S T R A N S I T I O N T O D E M O C R A C Y A N D T H E I N T E R A C T I O N B E T W E E N T H E K M T A N D T H E O P P O S I T I O N 1. Introduction This chapter will discuss how Taiwan has been liberalized and democratized, and what role the ruling KMT has played in Taiwan's transition to democracy. This will be done through a discussion of the interaction between the ruling party KMT and the opposition, since democracy has been defined in terms of competitiveness and freedom. It will be demonstrated that from the start the KMT enjoyed control of political change on Taiwan, and to a large extent Taiwan's transition to democracy has been initiated and controlled by the ruling party. In several crucial historical periods, the KMT regime made some crucial decisions which started and moved Taiwan down the path to democracy. Since the transition to democracy has much to do with the interaction between the ruling party and the opposition, it is necessary to first clarify the term "opposition." In the Western tradition of opposition studies, opposition is usually defined in terms of the institution. For instance, Ghita lonescu and Isabel de Madariaga define opposition in this way.l Robert Dahl also emphasizes the importance of institutionalizing opposition in his 1 They regard "the presence or absence of institutionalized political opposition" as "the criterion for the classification of any political society in one of two categories: liberal or dictatorial, democratic or authoritarian, pluralistic-constitutional or monolithic." Ghita lonescu and Isabel de Madariaga, Opposition (London: C.A.Watts, 1968), p. 16. 53 studies of Western democracies.^  However, in an authoritarian system, opposition exists as a movement. As Peter Moody points out, "Given the nature of regimes like the Chinese, it is probably not useful to take too narrow a view of what constitutes opposition." In his definition, "opposition is a dangerous activity, ... is a political act, designed to change policies or power relationships. "3 The term opposition will be used throughout the thesis to refer to both the activity of private citizens designed to change policies or power relationships, and to institutions of opposition and efforts to institutionalize opposition. On the one hand, this definition acknowledges that in Taiwan's political history, opposition previously had a low degree of institutionalization and existed as a movement. On the other hand, this definition pays attention to the opposition from both below and within the regime. We distinguish two kinds of opposition: electoral opposition and opposition movement (or movement opposition). Our definition allows for the possibility that opposition transforms itself from a movement to electoral opposition. This study will show how Taiwanese opposition has grown from a movement into an institutionalized party. The KMT's success has been in introducing the opposition to work within the system through elections. We shall use some parameters Dahl provided to analyze the characteristics of the relationship between the ruling party and political opposition on Taiwan.4 The following parameters will be useful: (1) the site for the encounter between the ruling party and the opposition; (2) the goals of the ruling party and the opposition; and (3) the strategies of both sides.5 2 Robert A. Dahl, "Governments and Political oppositions," in Macropolitical Theory {Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3), eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), p. 116. 3 Peter R. Moody, Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary Chinese Politics (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 2-3. 4 For the purpose of this paper, I adjust Dahl's parameters and use three out of his six parameters. 5 Robert A. Dahl, ed. Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), p. 75. 54 We shall examine the KMT's role in Taiwan's transition to democracy in three different periods: the "hard authoritarian" period (the 1950s and 1960s), the "soft authoritarian" period (the 1970s and early 1980s), and the competitive period (since the mid-1980s).6 2. The Hard Authoritarian Period (the 1950s and 1960s) This was a period of the consolidation and stable existence of KMT authoritarian rule. Security and stability were the key concepts in the postwar Taiwan. As this section will show, the KMT did not allow institutionalized opposition to exist at the national level; but it did implement limited democracy at the local level. The first opposition movement against the KMT rule in postwar Taiwan occurred in 1947. This is the so-called February 28 Incident. The trigger for the movement was the beating of a widow who was selling contraband cigarettes on the street. Members of the uprising took over radio stations and controlled a number of regions. Ch'en I, governor of Taiwan province, acceded to a proposal for reform. But on March 8, he moved more than 15,000 troops from the mainland to Taiwan to quell rioting. Thousands were killed in the weeks of violence that followed. The Taiwanese intellectual and social elites were effectively liquidated. For instance, when the Taiwan Provincial Assembly reconvened after the Incident, only 18 of the original 30 members were in attendance.? 6 I borrow the terminology of hard and soft authoritarianism from Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?"CA/«a Quarterly, No. 99 (September 1984), pp. 481-499. Jurgen Domes divides the political history of the ROC on Taiwan into slightly different three stages. Cf. Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition", in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), pp. 117-133. ? Cf. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou,i4 Tragic Beginning: the Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991); Daniel K. Berman, Words Like Colored Glass: the Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), Ch. 6. 55 The Incident was very destructive of mainlander-Taiwanese relations. It caused "a severe sense of victimization" in Taiwanese, and created lasting tension between the mainlanders and Taiwanese.^  As CL. Chiou points out, ever since the Incident, "the Taiwan independence advocates have always used the 28 February Uprising as the spiritual inspiration, the ideological raison d'etre, of their movement. "9 However, despite this unfortunate political legacy, the KMT maintained its rule on Taiwan by suppressing the Uprising. Although Ch'en I was removed as the governor, he had accomplished the historic function of suppressing the local Taiwanese opposition for the KMT regime. Had the KMT rule been overthrown by Taiwanese during the Uprising, the KMT government would have lost the chance to build up "the overall record of progress which by now has won so much Taiwanese support." 10 To tighten the control of Taiwanese society, the KMT carried out a reorganization in 1949-52 (we shall discuss this in detail in the chapter on KMT organization). After that, the KMT enjoyed total control of Taiwanese society. The China Youth Party (CYP) and the Democratic Social Party (DSP) moved to Taiwan with the KMT regime in 1949. Each of them had a few seats in the three central representative organs (the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly and the Control Yuan), thus giving the Republic the appearance of a multi-party system. However, under the KMT "one party" policy, these two parties had little real power, and did not have any grass roots support. The KMT prevented their organizational development. The KMT used to call them "the friendly parties," and their influence on Taiwan politics has always been minimal. 8 Alan M . Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), p. 100. 9 C L . Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 74. 10 Lai, et al., A Tragic Beginning, p. 192. 56 The KMT regime imposed martial law on May 20, 1949, which deprived the people of the right to form political parties. H New parties were not allowed to be formed. National elections for the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan were suspended. The Constitution of 1947 and the members of these three representative organs elected in 1947/1948 on the mainland formed the so-called fa-t'ung, literally, the tradition of legitimacy. The stress on the immutability of the fa-t'ung implied serious limitations on the scope of legal political activities, because the fa-t'ung served the needs of the whole of China, and led to the ossification of the membership of these representative organs. The KMT claimed that it represented the legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan. Repression was not only directed against Communists but also against any who dared to declare the island an independent country. Provincial and municipal elections were also stopped. As Moody notes, "The Constitution stipulates that provincial governors should be elected, but under the emergency the governor of Taiwan was appointed by the president. Later, after Taipei and Kaohsiung showed too eager a propensity to elect mayors critical of the KMT, these two largest cities on the island were elevated to special municipalities having the same status as provinces and their mayors were then appointed as well, rather than elected."12 After the February 28 Incident, opposition from society was eliminated. However, some high level KMT liberals attempted to organize an opposition party in 1960. This was attempted around the journal Free China (Tzu-yu chung-kuo pan-yueh-k'an). The founders of the journal were two high officials of the KMT, Hu Shih and Lei Chen. Hu Shih was a noted scholar-diplomat who had a good relationship with Chiang. He was the most prominent figure in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and a representative of 11 Lu Ya-li, "Political Developments in the Republic of China," in Democracy and Development in East Asia: Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, ed. Thomas W. Robinson (Washington, D. C: The EAI Press, 1991), pp. 36-37. 12 Peter R. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 44. 57 liberal democratic tradition in China. Lei had been a deputy secretary general of the National Assembly and national policy advisor to President Chiang Kai-shek. The original aim of Free China when it was published in 1949 was to promote liberal democratic beliefs in the face of the Communist challenge. At first, the journal had a close relationship with the KMT. The KMT subsidized the publication, in the hope that this liberal journal could garner sympathy and support from the United States. By the mid 1950s, when hopes for recovery of the mainland faded, Free China shifted its interest to Taiwan's internal political affairs. It attracted literary contributions from a group of liberal intellectuals. Their reform programme bore the strong imprint of Western liberalism. Articles in the magazine were often highly critical of the KMT. The Free China group wanted the KMT authorities to replace the one-party dictatorship with a constitutional democracy, to stop party interference in education and the military, and to eliminate the corruption in government. Lei Chen especially demanded honest elections and an independent court system. They argued for a return to a cabinet system, which is intended by the Constitution. This would make the presidency mainly symbolic, thus undermining the power of President Chiang Kai-shek. Perhaps what irritated Chiang most was Lei's demand that Chiang give up seeking a third straight term in office. As Free China became increasingly critical of the authorities, the KMT began to employ various measures to restrict it. The party newspapers no longer accepted its advertising for publication. Party media began a concerted attack against it. Contributors to Free China were persecuted by the KMT. For instance, philosophy professor Yin Hai-kuang was removed from his teaching position at National Taiwan University. 13 In 1957, Lei's mainlander group formed an alliance with independent Taiwanese politicians. They set up an informal electoral coordination committee among the anti-13 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 176. 58 KMT candidates in elections.!^ In 1960, they attempted to form the China Democratic Party. In September 1960, the KMT ruthlessly smashed the attempt. Lei Chen was sentenced to ten years in jail for allegedly harbouring a Communist agent on his staff. 15 In this early stage on Taiwan, the liberal opposition was generally accused of having Communist connections or sympathies, and thus suppressed by the KMT authorities.!6 Besides Free China, another journal, Apollo (Wen hsing), also had opposed the KMT. It was published from 1957 to 1965. Since direct criticism of the regime would not be tolerated, Apollo used the concept of culture as a metaphor for politics. It was critical of the Chinese tradition to which the KMT considered itself heir. In order to counterattack opposition, the KMT systematically cultivated the Confucian ethic on Taiwan. It maintained such a stance because it could take advantage of traditionalism both to marginalize cultural Westernization and Taiwanese localism. In response to liberal criticism of the KMT's one-party rule and martial law in the 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek proposed a revival of Confucianism on Taiwan. The KMT sponsored a Cultural Renaissance movement and explicitly reaffirmed Chinese culture.!7 In order to carry out the movement, the party established the Confucius and Mencius Studies Association on April 10,1960. The KMT authorities accused Apollo of "indiscriminately embracing full-scale Westernization as a panacea for all of Taiwan's problems." 18 when Li Ao, a graduate of National Taiwan University, became the chief editor, the journal turned radical. He was jailed and the journal was closed. 14 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the ROC (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), pp. 93-94. 15 Cf. Simon Long, Taiwan: China's Last Frontier (London: Macmillan Press, 1991), p. 65. 16 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 72. I? Warren Tozer, "Taiwan's 'Cultural Renaissance': A Preliminary Survey,"China Quarterly, No. 43 (July/September, 1970), pp. 61-99. For documentation, seeWen-hua Fu-hsingyu Chong-kuo Wen-hua (The Culture renaissance and Chinese culture) (Taipei: Chung-kuo Kuang-po Kung-ssu, 1970). Also see Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, pp. 76-77. 18 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 180. 59 Thus, according to Sartori's criteria, the KMT was quite authoritarian in this period, because it ruthlessly destroyed subsystem autonomy. Consolidation of the party-state left the party with great discretion both politically and economically. However, in one aspect the KMT distinguished itself from most other authoritarian regimes, that is, it institutionalized local self-governance. It is local self-governance that sowed the seeds for the KMT's transformation and Taiwan's transition to democracy. Local Self-governance and Elections After the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT could have chosen oppressive approaches to local administration rather than local self-governance. It could have destroyed local elites and replaced them with mainlanders. Instead, the KMT opted to institutionalize local self-governance. From the very beginning on Taiwan, the KMT implemented the local elections. Local politics was actually the politics of the local Taiwanese people. As we shall discuss in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, the KMT implemented the local self-governance and elections because these are major tenets of Sun Yat-sen's political doctrine. The KMT tried to build Taiwan as a model province of the Three Principles of the People. Of course, the KMT maintained local democracy not only because of Sunism, but also because it needed to maintain the appearance of popular support. In addition to ideological considerations, the KMT implemented the local elections because it was preoccupied with recovery of the mainland at that time. Mainlanders had no interest in participating in local affairs on Taiwan and they hoped that they could return to the mainland in the near future. The KMT local organizations performed five functions: service to the people, nomination and election of its candidates, communications with higher levels, 60 coordination among local political institutions and mediation between local factions.Ay At first, the electoral function was not very important. The KMT simply let the local Taiwanese manage electoral affairs. Gradually, with the fading belief in mainland recovery, the KMT paid more and more attention to local elections. In 1960, although the KMT suppressed Lei Chen's attempt to found an opposition party and other opposition activities, it did not suspend the local elections. On October 17, 1960, the KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) passed a resolution to continue to support the non-partisan social elite in competing for positions in county and city councils.20 However, the KMT's ideal of local democracy was quite different from the actual functioning of local self-governance. Edwin Winckler summarizes Arthur Lerman's finding regarding "the cultural discrepancies between the national elite's ideals of local democracy and the actual functioning of local democracy" as follows: The national elite would like democracy to liberate the energies of the people, channel them into public affairs, and discipline them into the orderly pursuit of,a unified general will.... In contrast to these ideals, the exigencies of recruiting votes in competitive elections have resulted in unprincipled, particularistic, divisive, and corrupt behavior on the part of both elite political managers and local politicians.2! This gave the KMT an excuse to restrict the scope and frequency of elections along with the duration and issues of campaign activities. Campaigns were subject to stringent legal requirements. For instance, campaign forums could only be scheduled by the electoral authorities, and privately sponsored campaign forums were not allowed until 19 J. Bruce Jacobs, Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Setting: a Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), p. 30. 20 Li Sung-lin, et al. ed.,Chung-kuo Kuomintang Ta-shih-chi, 1894.11-1986.12 (Chronology of the KMT, November 1894-December 1986), (Peking: People's Liberation Army Press, 1988), p. 466. 2 1 Edwin A. Winckler, "National, Regional, and Local Politics," in The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, ed., Emily Martin Ahem and Hill Gates (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 23-24. 61 1972. Local politicians had to meet the KMT's ideals before they could fully enjoy democratic rights. Opposition in this first stage, therefore, was confined to activities at the local level. Local people enjoyed limited opportunities to participate in local and provincial elections. Despite restrictions, local elections were carried out continuously. These elections were competitive and attracted great popular interest. Nearly all the candidates at the local level were Taiwanese rather than mainlanders. Independents could contest all kinds of local elections. For instance, Kao Yu-shu, a Japanese-educated engineer, contended for the mayorship of Taipei in 1954, 1957 and 1964. He capitalized on both Taiwanese solidarity and the KMT's disunity to upset the party candidate in 1954. The KMT candidate defeated him in 1957 only after a massive effort. In the 1964 elections, the KMT granted Kao's request for poll observers. He took advantage of the anti-party sentiment and the KMT's complacency,, and won again. The KMT regime turned Taipei into a special municipality whose mayor would be directly appointed by the Executive Yuan. Kao was the first mayor appointed, probably because Chiang hoped that Kao would be grateful to him for this offer. Kao was brought into the cabinet in 1971 and gradually faded from prominence.22 Other local politicians who emerged from local elections included Wu San-lien, Li Wan-chu, Kao Yu-shih, Yang Chin-fu, Kuo Yu-hsin, and Kuo Kuo-chi. They organized the Association for the Study of China's Local Self-government as their forum in 1958.23 In elections for city mayors and county magistrates, independent candidates gained one out of twenty-one seats in 1957 and four out of twenty-one in 1964. Regarding elections for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, it has been noted that "opposition representation reached its highest point with fifteen out of seventy seats in 2 2 Ibid., pp. 105-106; Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 79. 2 3 P'eng Huai-en, Taiwan Cheng-tang T'i-hsi te Fen-hsi: 1950-1986 (An analysis of Taiwan's party system, 1950-1986) (Taipei: Tung-ts'a Press, 1989), p. 74. 62 1960, and its lowest with ten out of sixty-seven in 1968, the percentage of popular vote received by non-KMT candidates varying between 34.9 percent in 1960 and 21.9 percent in 1968."2 4 Local democracy contributed to democratic development on Taiwan. It provided the KMT an experimental forum in which to learn how to act in part as a competitive party. The party had to link itself to grass roots support in order to secure votes. It also gave the Taiwanese people some practical experience with competitive politics. More than 160,000 people became public office holders through the elections held before 1989,25 a n £ j their election to office sowed the seeds of democracy in Taiwanese society. The function of local self-government in Taiwan's political development is comparable to that of land reform in economic development. Local self-government laid down the basis for later liberalization and democratization just like land reform laid down the basis for. Taiwan's economic miracle. Further the condition for successful implementation of local self-government is the same as that for land reform. The KMT could implement land reform because they had no vested interest in Taiwanese land. Similarly, the KMT could implement local self-government because they had no interest in the existing local power structure. The KMT simply could not supply enough mainlanders to control local affairs. However, if the principle of local self-government was not enshrined in Sunism, the KMT would have had less incentive to implement it. Self-government might not have been deemed as important as land reform for the urgent economic recovery and the recovery of the mainland. Local units of government became the prototypes for democracy nationwide.26 We shall further discuss this in the Chapter on the KMT's ideology. 2 4 Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition", in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 120. 25 John Kuan, The Modernization of the Kuomintang: Observations and Expectations (Taipei: the Democracy Foundation, 1992), p. 96. 26 Copper observes that "whether national or local officials deserve greater credit for creating democracy is now an academic question." John Copper, A Quiet Revolution: Political 63 Local elections after 1949 nurtured a group of highly educated and mostly Taiwanese politicians. Not all local elected politicians were oppositionists, and the KMT managed to occupy most positions at the local level. Nevertheless, local elections provided people in the island the channel to contest the KMT. Local elected politicians began to enter the national political scene when the KMT regime liberalized politics at the national level. 3. The Soft Authoritarian Period (the 1970s and Early 1980s) This period was characterized by political liberalization initiated and implemented by the KMT. Liberalization was manifested in the partial opening of national elections and the granting of some freedoms such as to publish critical magazines. The National Elections and the Awakening of the Opposition In 1969 the KMT authorities convoked the first island-wide supplementary elections to fill the seats vacated by deceased mainlander parliamentarians in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Fifteen new members of the National Assembly and eleven new members of the Legislative Yuan were elected on Taiwan. Among independents, Huang Hsin-chieh was elected. Earlier in 1969, K'ang Ning-hsiang had been elected to the Taipei city council. Opening of the national elections was an important decision for the KMT. Why did the KMT choose to liberalize rather than maintain the status quo? Firstly, the KMT needed to keep parliaments alive to continue the fa-t'ung. Although the KMT was not ready to completely give up its authoritarianism, it tried to do so within a constitutional Development in the Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), p. xii. 64 arrangement. Secondly, the newly elected members, making up only a small portion of the total, could not affect the KMT's hold on power. Thirdly, Taiwan's electoral system favoured the ruling party. Taiwanese government employs two types of electoral system for different elections. A single-vote, single-member plurality system is used for the election of mayors and magistrates. Like in the Great Britain, this system clearly benefits the dominant party KMT candidates. In the election of delegates to the representative organs, Taiwan employs a single-nontransferable-vote, multi-member election system. The system requires that a candidate collect only enough votes in a particular district to pass over a certain threshold to be elected. As we will demonstrate in the Chapter on the KMT's organization, the KMT's organization had the capacity to assign candidates to districts and to apportion votes for each candidate "in such a manner that its candidates receive just enough votes to win, but not so many that they sap strength from others who need to accumulate enough to get over the threshold, too." 2 7 Thus the multi-member system enabled the KMT to maximize its victory in the elections. With the onset of liberalization, opposition began to awaken after two decades of silence. Signs of renewed opposition appeared in 1971, initially as spontaneous protests against the American decision to return the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands to Japan despite the ROC's claim to them. Later the movement advocated more effective foreign policies and more internal democratization. Independent candidates criticized the government with increasing intensity starting in the early 1970s. It set a precedent for open protest on Taiwan. The movement was tolerated by the KMT. Intellectuals conducted several social surveys, and questioned the political deficiencies of the regime, especially over the issue of the competence and legitimacy of the "Long Parliament. "28 2 7 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 203. 2 ^ Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 11. 65 Like in the last period, the opposition movement developed around a journal, The Intellectual (Ta-hsueh tsa-chih). The party-state directly controlled mass media, especially the television networks and newspapers. It applied strict legal restrictions to contain the reach of anti-system propaganda. However, the KMT regime left magazines less restricted as a channel for transmitting opposition viewpoints. Publishers of political opinion journals could register several similar titles at a time, and activate spare-tire publications after a functioning title was temporarily or permanently banned. With such a strategy, publishers could publish almost continuously. Political opinion journals were used as a base for opposition political activities.2^ The Intellectual was first published in 1968, and began to have significant influence after a major reform in 1971. The KMT central headquarters contributed positively to the reform of the journal. At the time, Chiang was to assume the premiership, and he encouraged youth to give advice to . the party. The central headquarters invited some scholars and editors of The Intellectual to attend two seminars, and asked some of them to publish a youth magazine that could carry youth's advice. The seminar participants preferred to reform The Intellectual and let it carry youth's advice. Many young liberal KMT members joined the editorial board, as did liberal mainlanders and Taiwanese nonparty intellectuals. The KMT's liberalizing efforts encouraged political participation by intellectuals. In a more liberal environment than in the hard authoritarian period, the discussion in The Intellectual was more frank than that of Free China. It discussed political issues such as an end to martial law, the establishment of an opposition party, the rejuvenation of the government, etc. It became a training ground for future opposition leaders such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung.^ O The Intellectual also arranged many political activities. On December 7, 1971, it held a public debate on the subject of re-electing all 29 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, passim. 3 0 Ibid., p. 181. 66 national parliamentarians. It was also closely linked with the patriotic movement to reclaim the Tiao-yu-t'ai islands. Many members of The Intellectual participated in the election campaigns for the Taipei city council in 1973.31 As The Intellectual became increasingly critical, the KMT regime responded to the challenge in several ways. First, it tolerated "charges of corruption, undemocratic practices, and election fixing (when there is some substance to the comments); criticism of government policy on a wide range of domestic (especially local) issues; and comments on the age of government officials. Even human rights can be discussed openly within certain limits."32 Second, the KMT attempted to dismantle The Intellectual mainly by co-optation. Chiang Ching-kuo opened channels of communication with The Intellectual group, and co-opted some intellectuals by offering them party and government positions.33 However, he failed to establish regular communication with the opposition as a whole. Third, the KMT treated unruly intellectuals with a strong hand. It chose not to tolerate those who advocated the overthrow of the system, negotiation with Peking, or Taiwan independence. Fourteen faculty members in the department of philosophy of National Taiwan University were fired for their involvement in the opposition in 1973.34 At the same time, the KMT continued liberalization, as the KMT government gradually enlarged supplementary elections. In 1972, the year that Chiang Ching-kuo became the premier, 51 new seats were added to the Legislative Yuan to represent the free areas of China (i.e., Taiwan and several small islands under the ROC government control). In the National Assembly, the number of delegates newly elected increased to 53 31 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 78. 32 Copper, A Quiet Revolution, p. 5. 33 At the same time some KMT members quitted the party and joined opposition, like Chang Chun-hung. 34 Li Hsiao-feng, Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien (The democratic movement, for 40 years in Taiwan) (Taipei: Tzi-li Wan-pao Wen-hua Ch'u-pan-pu, 1987), pp. 89-108; Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reform in Taiwan, 1971-1973 (Ann Arbor: Papers in Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976). 67 in 1972.35 The party left room for non-partisan candidates by not nominating full slates of candidates in those elections. For instance, in Peacock County, the party nominated only one candidate for the two National Assembly seats, and for the five Provincial Assembly seats, the party made no nomination for the seat guaranteed to a female.36 in the Legislative Yuan election K'ang Ning-hsiang was elected. These two men, Chiang and K'ang, would have a great impact on the interaction between the KMT and the opposition in this period. K'ang Ning-hsiang established the Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan cheng-lun) in 1975. Its premier issue stated clearly that it would assume the mantle handed down from Free China and The Intellectual. K'ang used this magazine to generate change within the system. As Berman points out, "Without K'ang's contribution, it is quite possible that frustration over the inability to function within the existing system would have given predominance to radical elements whose activities in turn would have prompted a backlash from KMT conservatives, setting back the process of reform considerably. "37 As the Legislative Yuan elections of late 1975 approached, the Review's rhetoric intensified. In its fifth issue, both Yao Chia-wen's "May Not the Constitution and National Policy be Criticized?" and Ch'en Ku-ying's "Lift Martial Law Soon" were very critical. The KMT authorities closed the journal, accusing that another article appearing in the same issue touched the taboo subject of mainland policies.38 In the winter of 1976, Premier Chiang asked the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan to research issues of political reform. Some Western-educated social scientists were chosen for the work. They provided many internal recommendations, including the abolition of the emergency decree and press 35 The total number of the National Assemblymen is 1,411 in 1972. Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 122. 36 Jacobs, Local Politics, p. 150. 37 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 183. 38 Li, Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien, p. 117. 68 censorship, gradual total renewal of the central parliamentary bodies, and gradual legalization of opposition political parties. They suggested the government implement these measures over a period of fifteen years.39 The Chung-li Incident Sensing the further liberalization, oppositionists became increasingly active. In preparation for the 1977 local elections, Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Hsin-chieh shuttled all over the island campaigning on behalf of all independent candidates as the first step to link the opposition forces in a united front. These campaign activities initiated the formation of the Tang-wai (literally, "outside the party") movement. A prominent figure in the opposition during this phase was Hsu Hsin-liang, who had been a KMT provincial assemblyman. In the Assembly, he was very critical of the government, and he criticized most of his assembly colleagues in a published memoir of his years in the Provincial Assembly, entitled The Sound of the Storm. The aggrieved assemblymen retaliated by pressuring the KMT to block his nomination as the party's candidate for the magistracy of his home county. He was denied the KMT's nomination. He quit the KMT, joined the radical opposition, and ran for the position of T'ao-yuan County magistrate in 1977 as an independent. During the election, a crowd of some 10,000 attacked a police station in Chung-li, burned a police van and went on a rampage in response to an alleged attempt by the KMT to steal the election from Hsu. This was the so-called Chung-li Incident. No KMT government crackdown was forthcoming and despite the Incident Hsu was declared the winner. The Tang-wai won four of the twenty positions of mayors and county magistrates on Taiwan. Opposition candidates also did well in the polling for the 3 9 Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 122. 69 Taiwan Provincial Assembly. They won one-third of the popular vote and twenty-one out of seventy-seven supplementary seats in the Provincial Assembly. The KMT's lenient treatment of the Chung-li Incident had the effect of radicalizing the opposition. The opposition was also encouraged by potential social support revealed in the 1977 election. The discovery by newly elected opposition parliamentarians that they had little influence in the KMT-dominated Provincial Assembly, also led some of them to turn radical. In 1978, the opposition formed a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Corps (Chu hsuan tuan), which organized joint advertisements and meetings staged by several candidates. The government tolerated the officially illegal establishment of the Campaign Corps. The 1978 national supplementary elections were postponed for a year by the KMT regime on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, with the US acknowledging the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. There had been no warning from the United States. The United States' decision astonished the Taiwanese authorities, and it made Peking's threats against Taiwan seem more imminent. The postponement aroused disagreement among the opposition. K'ang Ning-hsiang believed that it was not an appropriate time to have active demonstrations during the period of uncertainty created by the withdrawal of US support. However most of the oppositionists believed that the postponement was simply the KMT's attempt to suppress the opposition. Although the elections were postponed, the KMT government did not stop reform. The year 1979 became a period of further liberalization on Taiwan. The KMT expanded the "Nation Building Study Group" (Kuo-chia chien-she yan-chiu-hui), and established communication channels with the social forces.4^ The KMT also sought to negotiate with the opposition. From September 2 to October 11, deputy secretaries general of the KMT 40 Kao Yu-jen, Taiwan Ching-yan (Taiwan experience), (Taipei: the Twenty First Century Foundation, 1989), p. 29, pp. 66-69. 70 and major opposition leaders attended a series of four dinner parties arranged by an independent newspaper publisher Wu San-lien. They also attended a "seminar on political communication" arranged by Yellow River, a KMT youth magazine. Meanwhile, many editorials discussing political communication appeared in the newspapers.4* In response to the Chung-li Incident, the establishment of US-PRC diplomatic relations, and the KMT's negotiation offensive, the opposition began to differentiate into moderate and radical factions. K'ang Ning-hsiang represented the moderates in the opposition. His strategy was to change the system by working constructively within it. He thought that the opposition could transform the political system through existing legal means and elections. As Berman tells us, "One of the best examples of K'ang's long-term, moderate approach is his avowed willingness to retain the name Republic of China if the reality of majority rule is conceded. 'In American cities,' he explains philosophically, 'zoning laws may require that you keep the facade of a historic building, even if you renovate the interior. We can do this to save face for the Kuomintang and to avoid precipitating a crisis in relations between China and the United States.'"42 In June 1979, K'ang Ning-hsiang began publishing The Eighties (Pa-shih nien-tai), a successor publication to the Taiwan Political Review. He became the actual leader of the Tahg-wai in the late 1970s. Chiang Ching-kuo authorized informal contacts with the opposition, and he chose to meet and confer with K'ang in private.4^ In contrast to K'ang's moderate approach, the radicals in the opposition promoted a more confrontational approach. In August 1979, Huang began publishing Formosa (Mei-li tao), which represented the radicals in the opposition. He realized the disadvantages of opposition candidates in election campaigns who faced KMT opponents 4 * Lin Cheng-feng, Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsi yu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong (Relations of political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 3. 4 2 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 189. 4 3 Ibid., p. 189. 71 supported by the party's high-powered organization. He tried to use the journal as an organizational core for the opposition. Kang Ning-hsiang did not join the group, but almost all other important Tang-wai figures showed up in its editorial board. They began in October to establish local offices of the journal. In addition to its main office in Taipei, it maintained 11 "service offices" throughout the island.44 In its early days, the Formosa group preferred popular demonstrations and direct confrontation. The Kaohsiung Incident Encouraged by the victory in the Chung-li Incident, and being barred from challenging the KMT through elections in 1978, the radicals in the opposition focused their tactics on street demonstrations. After the 1978 supplementary elections were delayed, Huang Hsin-chieh staged a series of demonstrations across the island. Throughout 1979, the Formosa group organized 13 mass meetings and demonstrations all over Taiwan. On December 10, 1979, a large demonstration in. Kaohsiung sponsored by the Formosa group broke up, and developed into a riot known as the Kaohsiung Incident. President Chiang instructed that "neither respond to verbal abuses nor strike back against attacks. " 4 5 The police did not react with force. Few demonstrators were hurt, but 183 policemen were injured.4^ The KMT blamed the Tang-wai leaders for the failure to handle the situation. The leaders of the Formosa group were arrested. The KMT court gave eight of them stiff sentences. On April 18, 1980, the court martial sentenced Huang Hsin-chie to 14 years and Shih Ming-te to a life term in prison. Six other persons were given sentences of 12 years.47 Hsu Hsing-liang fled to the United States. Later in 1980 when the mother-in-law 4 4 Li, Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien, pp. 142-152. 45 Hao Pei-tsun, Straight Talk (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993), p. 6. 46 Lu Ya-li, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 125. There are different interpretations about the Kaohsiung Incident. But unlike T'ienanmen Event in mainland China in 1989, no one was killed during the riot. 4 7 Li, Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien, p. 155. 72 and twin baby daughters of Lin I-hsiung were brutally murdered in their homes, people suspected the KMT regime of manipulating underground society to terrify the opposition, although no evidence of official involvement was found. Almost simultaneously, the regime launched another wave of liberalization, focusing on expanding electoral democracy. In May 1980, the KMT government enacted the Public Officials Election and Recall Law, which combined and simplified seventeen old laws and regulations. The new Law described the rights and responsibilities of candidates, loosened restrictions on campaign bahaviour, eliminated the maximum age regulation, and lowered education requirements for eligibility. The Law also vested investigative power in a nonpartisan election committee. Most importantly, the Law provided the Tang-wai with a legal foundation to participate in electoral politics. Furthermore, the KMT government increased the number of parliamentary seats subject to electoral competition. The KMT intended to use these measures to incorporate the opposition into electoral politics.4^ On the other hand, the KMT regime did not soften restrictions on the extra-parliamentary activities. The Election and Recall Law prohibited acts of violence during elections, vote buying, and illegal campaign activities. Candidates were prohibited from setting off firecrackers, assembling a crowd for a parade, engaging in campaign activities outside the candidate's constituency, etc. However, enforcement of these provisions was selective, and the authorities did not stringently enforce the campaign rules. The situation also changed on the part of the opposition. The Kaohsiung Incident had several effects on the opposition. First, the Formosa group became more moderate, probably in order to avoid any further loss of their forces. Second, the occupational composition of the opposition changed. The need for lawyers to defend those prosecuted by the authorities brought increasing numbers of lawyers into participation in the 4 8 Cheng and Haggard, "Regime Transformation," p. 13. 73 opposition movement. As Berman notes, "During the 1970s, elected representatives and lawyers made up approximately 20 percent of the Tang-wai's leadership cadre. After the Kaohsiung Incident, this figure increased to more than 50 percent. "49 Other social scientists also began to enter opposition leadership. They sought to introduce Western ideas and institutions, and they adopted political techniques, specific democratic procedures, institutional designs, and legal frameworks from the West. They were equipped with organizational skills, and were sophisticated in exploiting the system for maximum benefit, while minimizing their own personal political risk.50 Third, as Lu notes, "the harsh treatment meted out to the Tang-wai leaders by the authorities generated much sympathy for the opposition, of which they made very good use in the supplementary election held in 1980."51 In the 1980 supplementary elections, the KMT and the Tang-wai, based on behind-the-scenes bargaining, agreed that the former would not harass the opposition and the latter would not publicly air certain sensitive issues (e.g., Taiwan independence). The sentencing of the radical leaders of the Formosa group after the Kaohsiung Incident allowed K'ang's group some respite in the campaign. K'ang was the only key opposition leader who was not prosecuted by the authorities in the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident. While the Formosa leaders were in jail, their wives and defense attorneys took their places in the elections, and they won much sympathy from people. Despite censorship following the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT regime later allowed more opposition journals to appear. The opposition used these journals to demand individual liberty from martial-law constraints, political freedoms to associate and to dissent, direct elections for the chief executive positions, etc. At that time the KMT did not want to go that far. The KMT, following its own liberalization agenda, only 4 9 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 190. 50 Cheng and Haggard, "Regime Transformation," pp. 10-11. 51 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 126. 74 wanted to increase the scope of the supplementary elections, but disallow all opposition parties.52 Nevertheless, the opposition became better organized. They "recommended" (a euphemism for nomination) candidates, developed a unified platform, and in many other ways assisted each other. The elections were deemed reasonably fair. In the supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan on December 6, 1980, the Tang-wai garnered 27.6 percent of the popular vote. In the election of substitute delegates to the National Assembly, the Tang-wai won 34.7 percent. The KMT did better than before. The Tang-wai found that its success depended on avoiding extreme positions, being more pragmatic, and being better organized and disciplined.53 Factionalist Strife in the Opposition The KMT further liberalized the island's politics after the 1980 supplementary elections. It also sought to negotiate with the opposition. The KMT's liberalizing efforts created sharp differences within the opposition. The moderates and the radicals in the opposition had different points of view regarding legislative strategy, the relationship between the opposition and the KMT, and the national identity issue. By this time, the moderates in the opposition consisted of elected Tang-wai officeholders and legislators. The Formosa group also adopted the electoral route after the Kaohsiung Incident and became moderates. As far as.legislative strategy was concerned, moderate oppositionists "believed that to win as many seats as possible in the supplementary and local elections was the only way for the opposition to grow and to influence the political process. A mass strategy should be used only for the limited purpose of supplementing the electoral and parliamentary strategy.... Tang-wai's participation in [the legislature] might give the opposition some leverage to pressure the 52 Cf. Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, pp. 489-491. 53 John. F. Copper, "Taiwan's Recent Election: Progress Toward a Democratic System,"Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 10 (October 1981), pp. 1029-1039. 75 authorities. "54 On the relationship of the opposition to the KMT, the elected oppositionists argued that maintaining normal channels of communication with the ruling party was in the interest of the survival and growth of the opposition. They believe that a confrontational attitude might be taken for tactical reasons, but that it should not be a principle of the opposition. The moderates position on the issue of national identity favoured Taiwan autonomy or self-determination, rather than explicit Taiwan independence.55 In contrast, the radicals of the opposition held more extreme view points. The radicals were called the "New Tide" (Hsin ch'ao-liu) group. It was a group of writers and intellectuals who organized around a magazine called New Generation (Hsin sheng tai). Radical oppositionists were impatient with compromise and ambiguity. They believed that Tang-wai elected politicians could have little influence in the KMT-dominated political system. Therefore, they believed that the Tang-wai should use mass protests as its main strategy, and that the parliament should be used only as a place to expose the injustice of the system. On the relationship of the opposition to the KMT, the radicals in. the opposition believed that "the Tang-wai had to maintain a confrontational stance toward the Kuomintang as a matter of principle, as long as the basic structure of the political system remained unchanged. They attacked the officeholders' willingness to compromise with the Kuomintang in the Legislative Yuan as unprincipled capitulation."^6 On the national identity issue, the New Tide group advocated straight forward Taiwan independence. Opposition radicals used their journals such as New Generation and Cultivate (Shen-keng) to criticize the moderates, giving rise to the expression "Tang-wai versus Tang-wai."57 5 4 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 126. 5 5 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, pp. 81 -82 . 5 6 L U ( "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 127. 5 7 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 1 9 1 . The founder of the journal was Huang Shih-ch'eng. Hsu Jung-shu, wife of Chang Chun-hung, succeeded to him. 76 As the 1983 supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan approached, the Tang-wai created a Tang-wai Editors and Writers Association and a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Association (Hou yuan hui). The authorities allowed it to nominate candidates officially. Both the KMT and the Tang-wai tested new election strategies and tactics. However, the radical Editors and Writers Association and moderate Campaign Assistance Association continued to split the Tang-wai camp.58 Abundant factionalist strife in the opposition cost the opposition dearly in the elections. In the December 3, 1983 supplementary elections, candidates from K'ang's mainstream, the Formosa and the New Tide groups ran as competitors in the same districts. Despite his effort, K'ang failed to hold the Tang-wai together. K'ang and his group were defeated. Tang-wai candidates rallied 29.1 percent of the popular vote, but the Tang-wai won only six legislative seats compared to thirteen in 1980.59 K'ang's influence began to decline and he was isolated from the opposition's core leadership, which by that time was dominated by more activist elements. 60 After the 1983 elections, the Tang-wai attempted to improve its organization. In the spring of 1984, those oppositionists who held elective offices formed the Association of Public Policy Studies (Kung-kung cheng-ts'e yan-chiu hui) as the coordination centre of their movement. It was formed to replace the campaign assistance organization that only operated during the election time, and to accumulate knowledge in substantive policy areas. This move was pronounced illegal by the government on a legal technicality. However, the KMT government tolerated the Association's formation and did not take any measures to eliminate it. The KMT invited the opposition to negotiate on 58 c.L. Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 95. 59 Domes, "China's Modernization and the Doctrine of Democracy," p. 217; Moody,Political Change on Taiwan, pp. 83-84. 60 After the formation of the DPP, Formosa group became the mainstream. K'ang lost his interest in politics and declined to run again for the 1989 election. The Legislative Yuan held a retirement tribute for K'ang. Li Huan praised him for his contributions to the promotion of democracy. See, Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 163. 77 the procedures and restrictions regarding the new organization. The opposition accepted the invitation, but eschewed compromise.^! The KMT seemed confident in dealing with the Tang-wai after the 1983 elections. Thus, it further liberalized politics on Taiwan, as it loosened control of the media. From January 1984 to September 1986, the opposition published more new journals. Political opinion magazines multiplied and saturated the market. Although the KMT did not allow the existence of opposition political parties, it allowed the existence of public opinion magazines, which functioned as a channel to integrate new social forces. Through these magazines dissenting opposition elites participated in the political process "on the fringes of acceptability." As Berman notes, "The medium of the magazine allowed for the substitution, of printer's ink for bloodshed. The opposition floated trial balloons and the regime responded. The corpus of the publication served as proxy for more direct, person-to-person conflict. "62 Thus, according to Sartori's criteria, the KMT regime was a pragmatic one-party system in this period because it allowed room for some peripheral subsystem autonomy. Chiang Ching-kuo's "new deal" integrated the social elites into the existing political system. Liberalization was carried out according to the KMT's terms. The opposition had to play the game within the confines set by the KMT. If the opposition became too extreme, as in the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT regime clamped down. But the ever-existing opportunities to challenge the ruling party in elections attracted many in the opposition to work within the system and caused division within the opposition. Confident that they could control the situation, the KMT began to move even further forward in political reforms. 61 Cheng and Haggard, "Regime Transformation," p. 15. 62 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 43 and p. 195. 78 4. The Competitive Period (Since the Mid-1980s) This has been a period of rapid democratization on Taiwan. The cumulative efforts toward political liberalization since the 1970s led to a dramatic democratic breakthrough in 1986. The KMT's policy toward the opposition changed from mainly repression to toleration and competition. In contrast to its traditional way of dealing with the opposition by suppression and co-optation, the KMT began to carry out democratization on Taiwan. We discuss this period in three parts. In the first part, we shall see how the KMT legitimized the opposition. In the second we discuss constitutional reforms. In the third we discuss the Taiwan independence issue and the establishment of a new type of party politics on Taiwan. Through discussion of these topics we shall see how the KMT carried out democratization and at the same time managed to maintain its position of political dominance. The Legalization of the Opposition The 1985 Elections The new stage started with Chiang Ching-kuo's speech regarding succession. In a Time magazine interview published in September 1985, Chiang declared that "he had 'never given any consideration1 to the possibility that he might be succeeded by a family member and that the succession would be handled in accordance with 'democracy and the rule of law.'" On Constitution Day, December 25, 1985, Chiang said again that members of Chiang family "could not and would not" run for the office of president and that military rule "could not and would not" take place either.63 63 Time, 16 September 1985, p. 46; cited from Andrew J. Nathan and Helena V. S. Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," in Chiang Ching-kuo's Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, ed. Shao-chuan Leng (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), p. 48. 79 In this more open political environment, the KMT and the Tang-wai reached a "gentlemen's agreement" again for the 1985 elections. The island-wide local elections of November 16, 1985 were to elect 21 city mayors and county magistrates, 77 members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 51 members of the Taipei City Council, and 42 members of the Kaohsiung City Council. In these elections, the opposition founded a Campaign Assistance Association, which served as a de facto political party to support those Tang-wai candidates officially nominated by the opposition. According to the Temporary Provisions to the Constitution, such an action was illegal. But the KMT did not ban this new organization of the opposition. Incidents of violence occurred during the campaign. In Chung-li, Tang-wai supporters overturned a car and threw rocks when one of their candidates lost by a narrow margin. But the government did not punish the offenders with harsh sentences as in the Kaohsiung Incident. Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated the attacks made by a Tang-wai candidate who charged him with nepotism. When the Election Commission was about to press charges, Chiang prevented the charges by saying that he did not mind personal criticism. For the 1985 local elections, the Tang-wai formulated a 20 article platform, which included (1) the future of Taiwan should be collectively decided by its residents; (2) abolish the Temporary Provisions and thoroughly carry out democratic constitutionalism; (3) enact the Local Self-government Law as stipulated in the Constitution, which provides that the provincial governor be directly elected by the people; and (4) lift the Emergency Decree and immediately release all political prisoners, etc.64 During the campaign, as Copper describes, "The opposition charged the government and the KMT with misgovernment and incompetence, as well as dishonesty, corruption, authoritarianism, and dictatorial practices, some asserting that the KMT was no longer qualified to rule the country. KMT officials cited the party's past record and played down 64 Joseph P. L. Jiang, "The Development of Social Pluralism and Political Liberalization in the Republic of China on Taiwan," Area Studies, Vol. LX, No. 2 (Winter 1988), p. 76. 80 most the problems, attributing them to bad luck or coincidence. "65 The election went well for the two sides. The Tang-wai won some satisfying victories, while the KMT still won a majority of the popular vote. The Tang-wai did extremely well in the Taipei City Council race where all 11 of the Campaign Assistance Association candidates won. Although the KMT still did not allow the formation of an opposition party, the Tang-wai became to a greater degree than before a legitimate opposition through the 1985 elections.66 t After the elections, the Association of Public Policy Studies decided to set up branches in the various cities of the island. The Association became the forerunner of a new opposition party. The authorities became worried and warned several times that such action would not be tolerated. But the KMT authorities actually did not take any action to ban the association. At this time, senior liberal KMT politician T'ao Pai-ch'uan came back from overseas to attend the third session of the Twelfth Congress, and took advantage of a meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo to recommend to him the necessity and significance of negotiation with the opposition.67 Influenced by T'ao and supported by the reformers in the party, Chiang urged the party to tolerate the opposition's move. At the third session of the KMT's Twelfth Congress in March 1986, Chiang directed the KMT to open a dialogue with the Tang-wai leaders for the purpose of making the Tang-wai legal. In April 1986, the CSC of the KMT decided to study six reform issues: (1) the restructuring of the National Assembly, (2) local self governance, (3) martial law, (4) civic organizations, (5) social reform, and (6) internal party reform. In anticipating the supplementary elections at the end of 1986, the KMT conducted its preparatory work on its own initiative, rather than being forced to react to events. Chiang hinted at the possibility of lifting the Emergency Decree and legalizing new political parties. On May 65 Copper, A Quiet Revolution, p. 30. 6 6 Cal Clark, Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 135. 67 Li , Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien, pp. 220-226. 81 7, he instructed in a KMT CSC meeting that "we must have sincerity of heart and mind and undertake communications with personages from all segments of society to promote political harmony and the welfare of the people. "68 The Commission of Policy Coordination of the KMT immediately decided to invite opposition leaders and some professors to a dinner party in which the two sides reached three points of consensus. "First, both sides accept the Constitution of the ROC, but will negotiate how to reform the political system; Second, both sides accept the establishment of branches of the Association of Public Policy Studies, but will negotiate about its name and registration; Third, both sides agree to strive for political harmony during negotiation. "69 The KMT later organized a series of formal meetings with the Tang-wai. As a party functionary in charge of communication with the Tang-wai pointed out, in order to maintain a harmonious political climate, the government had consistently taken a tolerant attitude toward organized activity by Tang-wai persons.70 The KMT's democratization created more room for the opposition. In the later half of 1986, the opposition staged a series of street demonstrations. The KMT did not crack down on these demonstrations. It seemed that the KMT believed that vocal popular protest could not do much harm to its rule. The police forces were mainly used to set limits to the opposition on the issues such as Taiwan independence and street violence. Repression was used only intermittently. For instance, Hsu Ts'ao-te and Ts'ai You-chuan were arrested for their ardent separatist activities. Facing the armed threat from the mainland, the opposition generally exercised restraint. 68 Cited in Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 90. 69 Lin Cheng-feng, Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsiyu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong (Relations of political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 3. 70 Li , Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien, p. 221. 82 The Establishment of the DPP and the 1986 Elections The KMT's negotiation initiative was viewed by the opposition as an indirect recognition of the opposition. Anticipating the supplementary elections at the end of 1986, the Tang-wai moved to further strengthen its organization. To preempt the KMT, 132 opposition leaders unilaterally announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at a meeting of the Association of Public Policy Studies on September 28, 1986.7* The KMT-controlled media denounced the formation of the DPP as an illegal act according to the Temporary Provisions to the Constitution, stating that the DPP was not qualified as a legal opposition party because of its separatist orientation. However, since legalization of the opposition was already on the KMT agenda, the KMT government did not attempt to block the establishment of the DPP. On October 15,1986, the CSC passed bills entitled "National Security in the Period of Mobilization" and "Civil Associations in the Period of Mobilization." In his October 1986 interview with an American reporter, KMT Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo announced that martial law and the ban on the formation of new parties would soon be ended. Political parties could be formed as long as they supported the ROC Constitution and renounced Communism and separatism. As Nathan and Ho point out, by setting the limits he actually "invited the DPP to the negotiating table,... [and] put the burden on the DPP either to fit within the framework Chiang was establishing or to take on the risks of challenging the framework."72 Chiang could take such an approach because it was supported by much of the party, and the reasons for this are the changes that we shall detail in later chapters. The DPP then held a Congress in early November and adopted a political platform on November 10, 1986, which was modified by the Second National Congress on April 17, 1988. Among the DPP's goals were: basic human rights, freedom of the press, responsible government administration, the rule of law and people's sovereignty. The 7 * Copper./l Quiet Revolution, pp. 36-37. 7 2 Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," p. 44. 83 concrete suggestions include: prohibiting political activity for government employees and teachers; prohibiting political party intervention in military, police or security affairs; protecting human rights and legal equality; and protecting freedom of thought. The hastiness of the founding of the DPP may be explained by three reasons. First, the opposition tried to outmaneuver the KMT. It did not want the populace to get the impression that democratization was led by the KMT without the opposition's pressure. Second, the opposition sought to take advantage of the relatively liberal environment under Chiang's rule. Opposition leaders assessed that it would be easier to get organized while Chiang was in power, rather than risk the uncertainty of his successor. "Otherwise," as Nathan and Ho put it, "it will be hard to predict the attitudes of the authorities in that post-CCK era towards a TW [Tang-wai] political party. "73 with the benefit of hindsight we know that the opposition leaders' assessments were not precise because the ruling KMT did further democratize after the death of Chiang. Nevertheless their political judgment was one factor that led to the September 1986 creation of the DPP. Third, the creation of the DPP was also a response to Hsu Hsin-liang. In 1980, after the Kaohsiung Incident, Hsu moved to the United States and called for revolution and Taiwan independence. In May 1984, he formed a Taiwan Democratic Party in New York, and tried to bring the party back to Taiwan to contest the elections. The KMT simply refused his entry.7 4 Hsu did not give up his effort to bring the party back to Taiwan, but the Tang-wai on Taiwan hoped that they could found the first opposition party domestically, rather than import one from abroad. In December 1986, the DPP and the KMT competed as the two principal parties in the national elections, and the KMT behaved as an ordinary party in an emerging two-party system. The DPP put up 20 candidates for Legislative Yuan seats and 22 candidates for National Assembly seats in the December 6 elections. While registered on the official 7 3 Ibid., p. 49. 7 4 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 79, and p. 91. 84 ballots as nonpartisan, the DPP candidates used the name and emblem of the new party during the campaign. The authorities did not interfere with the DPP's campaign. The DPP came out of the election with 12 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 11 in the National Assembly. The KMT won 59 seats in the Legislative Yuan, and 68 seats in the National Assembly.7-* As Copper points out, the 1986 election "was the first election in which the KMT formally competed with another political party.... In other words, formal party competition ~ generally a prerequisite for a truly democratic system ~ was born." 7 6 The success the KMT enjoyed in the supplementary elections assuaged its leaders' fears that further reforms would be tantamount to a loss of power. On July 14, 1987, the Legislative Yuan adopted the National Security Law, and after 39 years, the state of emergency was lifted. The Law provided a legal basis for certain limitations to the freedom of speech and for a number of controls that the government deemed necessary as long as the conflict with the mainland was not resolved. Nevertheless, the KMT party state had clearly modified its own rules for political competition. Ending the emergency decree removed an issue that the opposition had used to challenge the ruling party: After the state of emergency was lifted, the DPP staged a series of street demonstrations on such issues as reorganization of the national legislature, popular election of the provincial governor, judicial inequity, political persecution of advocates of Taiwan independence, etc. Lin Chin-chieh, a moderate in the DPP, complained that "street demonstrations have made all of us exhausted, the treasury of our party empty, many of our comrades in prison or facing prosecution. At such cost, nearly all of the objectives which we sought to achieve have not been attained."7? 7 5 Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 126. 7 6 Copper, A Quiet Revolution, p. 39. 7 7 Lin Chin-chieh, "Kei Yao Chu-hsi te Kung-k'ai-hsin" (An open letter to Chairman Yao), Democratic Progress Weekly, No. 154 (September 3-9, 1988); cited in Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 141. 85 Democratization also created social movements. Numerous groups took to the streets to air grievances.78 However, these groups have not developed close ties with the political opposition. The student movement of 1989 even stressed its distinction from the DPP. The KMT state did not discipline these protests. Rather, after the lifting of martial law the KMT began drafting legislation to govern political activities. The ban on newspapers was lifted on January 1, 1988. The DPP created its own official newspaper the Democratic Progressive Weekly. It also applied to operate its own broadcasting stations. As Copper points out, "The KMT is itself trying to restrict its activities in these [media] areas in order to shed the image of an overreaching party. "79 A bill governing demonstrations was passed in January 1988. In the first four months of 1988, police counted 729 demonstrations; but the government by and large did not molest the demonstrators.80 In January 1989, The Law on Civic Organization was enacted and the formation of opposition parties was legitimated. It provided a legal basis for the establishment of new political parties, albeit with restrictions concerning their political programmes (they had to abstain from advocating Communism or Taiwan independence). This law essentially formalized the party competition that already existed. Nevertheless, it legally changed Taiwan's political system from a one-party to a multiparty system. New parties proliferated. As of March 1991, sixty-one old and new parties were reported to have registered with the Ministry of the Interior. In 1992 the number of parties was around seventy.81 The Election and Recall Law was revised at the same time that the Law on Civic Organization was enacted. It lifted many restrictions on campaign activities. The KMT debated and negotiated with the DPP on all these bills. 78 Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992). 79 Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? p. 68. 8 0 James Seymour, "Taiwan in 1988," Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (January, 1989), p. 57. 81 Ping-lung Jiang and Wen-cheng Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," in Political Change in Taiwan, ed. Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 86. 86 When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, the KMT accelerated political reforms rather than stopping democratization, as some feared. This fact demonstrates that Taiwan's transition to democracy was not the masterpiece of Chiang alone, and that the KMT as a whole was a democratizing force. On February 3, 1988, the CSC approved the political reform plan. At the Thirteenth National Congress of the Party held in July 1988, the new party platform stressed the continuation of the democratization and liberalization processes in politics and the economy. Even a very critical writer notes that "The government seemed to show even greater tolerance for the expression of dissent and for opposition street rallies. The authorities promised substantial parliamentary restructuring, and agreed to consider subjecting the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung to election once again. "82 Negotiation The KMT and the DPP also began a regular process of negotiation. Negotiation was gradually institutionalized. It became a normal channel for dispute resolution between the KMT and DPP caucuses in the legislature. It evolved from informal to formal and from individual to collective negotiation. The communication became more and more rationalized. Both sides were serious about it and prepared well for these sessions. The media tended to focus on these negotiations, and both sides tried to appear rational before the public. On February 2, 1988, Liang Su-jung, the deputy secretary general of the KMT Commission of Policy Coordination, invited the DPP caucus in the legislature to negotiations concerning the KMT's plan to reform the central parliamentary system. Both sides agreed to negotiate on other topics as well. On March 17, the KMT and the DPP held another negotiation. Before the discussion of political issues, they first negotiated over the procedures to be followed during the policy negotiation. The KMT thought that the eleven issues raised by the DPP could not be 82 Marc J. Cohen, Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development and Social Change on the Beautiful Island (Washington, DC: Asia Resource Center, 1988), p. 71. 87 finished in one meeting, and suggested that future negotiation agendas should not include more than 3 issues. The DPP argued that because negotiation did more good for the KMT in terms of its image of openness, the negotiation should allow for more time to discuss issues raised by the DPP. On political issues, the two parties basically reached agreement. For instance, on the issue of national identity, the ruling party insisted that in the new environment created by the ending the emergency decree the opposition still should obey the ROC Constitution and should not destroy national integrity. The DPP argued that it identified itself with the ROC and Constitution, but that the Temporary Provisions should be abolished as soon as possible.83 These negotiations were made possible by private relations between members of the ruling party and the opposition. Despite fighting on the floor, personal friendship developed across party lines.84 Sometimes, when formal negotiation met a deadlock, informal negotiation took place. For instance, at one point in the legislative process of the Assembly and Rally Act when the two parties' special negotiating teams were deadlocked over a provision, other members presented an alternative set of proposals and counterproposals that allowed the negotiations to continue. The 1989 and 1992 Elections The December 1989 elections were the first elections since the lifting of martial law. The supplementary elections for the Legislative Yuan and the elections for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, as well as those for Taipei and Kaohsiung city councils and those for county magistrates and mayors were all held on December 2,1989. One hundred and one seats were to be filled in the Legislative Yuan to 8 3 Lin Cheng-feng, Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsiyu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong (Relations of the political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 60. 84 Kao Yu-jen, Taiwan Ching-yan (Taiwan experience) (Taipei: Twenty First Century Foundation, 1989), pp. 174-175. The DPP waged fightings with the intention to expose the defects of the political institutions dramatically, and/or to attract media attention. The authorities tolerated such confrontational behavior in the legislature. 88 represent the free areas of China in 1989. The KMT ran in 1989 on its record of success in ruling Taiwan and in taking the lead in reforms. Because political parties were legalized, the scope of their activities increased. The election results showed that the KMT was losing ground to the DPP (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). The DPP made major advances. The DPP's candidate You Ch'ing, a law Ph.D. trained in West Germany, captured the Taipei county magistrate's seat. It upset the KMT very much, because Taipei county is President Lee's home town. The KMT held an emergency meeting after the election to discuss the results. The outcome of the meeting was that the KMT accepted the results and stated that it would learn some lessons from this election.85 Table 3.1 KMT, Tang-wai/DPP and Independent Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout. KMT TW/DPP Independent Source: Central Election Commission, Executive Yuan. Table 3.2 Distribution of Elected Seats in Legislative Yuan among KMT, Tang-wai/DPP and Independents. 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 KMT Number of seats 56 61 58 72 102 Percentage 81.2 87.1 80.6 71.3 63.4 Tang-wai/DPP Number of seats 6 6 12 21 50 Percentage 8.7 8.6 16.7 20.8 31.1 Independent Number of seats Percentage Total Source: Ibid. 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 73.6 72.9 69.1 60.6 61.7 8.3 16.6 22.2 28.2 36.1 18.1 10.5 8.7 11.2 2.2 7 3 2 8 9 10.1 4.3 2.8 7.9 5.5 69 70 72 101 161 85 Cf. Long, Taiwan: China's Last Frontier, pp. 195-197. 89 The electorate on Taiwan experienced the first full re-election of the Legislative Yuan on December 19,1992. The DPP made further progress in the election, although the KMT was still dominant. The KMT won 102 out of 161 seats, (61.67 percent of the votes) and the DPP won 50 seats (36.09 percent of the votes). Compared with the results of three years previously, the DPP progressed in several aspects. It not only increased its percentage of popular vote from 28 percent to 36 percent, but also increased its percentage of the seats in the Legislative Yuan from 21 percent to 31 percent. Three years previously, the KMT had won 60.6 percent of votes, but managed to capture 71 percent of seats in the legislature. In 1992, the KMT won 61.7 percent of the votes, but only 63.4 percent of the seats. In 1989, the DPP won 28.3 percent of votes and 21 percent of seats. In 1992, it won 36.1 percent of the votes and 31.1 percent of the seats. These statistics revealed that the. DPP's improvement of its organizational structure paid off in electoral gains. The election was significant because it allowed the DPP the opportunity to gain enough seats to effectively oppose the ruling party.86 Nevertheless, the ruling party. KMT still maintained majority in the Legislative Yuan. The 1992 election showed that democracy was being consolidated on Taiwan. The Constitutional Reforms The formal establishment of democracy on Taiwan involved revision of the ROC Constitution and laws in the authoritarian period. The following discussion shows that the 86 Li Ch'iang, "Erh-chieh Li-wei Hsuan-chu P'ing-hsi" (On the election of Taiwan's Second Legislative Yuan), Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 2, 1993, pp. 23-32; John F. Copper, "Taiwan's 1992 Legislative Yuan Election," World Affairs, Vol. 155, No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 71. 90 constitutional reforms on Taiwan have been basically directed and implemented by the ruling party KMT. The party has carried out the constitutional reforms according to the fa-t'ung, and such an approach has facilitated the gradual transition to democracy on Taiwan. After the 1989 elections, the most urgent task on the Taiwanese political agenda was the reform of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. Without a thorough reform of parliament, the opposition's hard-won seats amounted to only a small percentage in a parliament that was filled mainly by old delegates elected more than forty years earlier on the mainland. In the Legislative Yuan, the proportion of the elected seats to the total seats was 17 percent in 1980, 19 percent in 1983, 22 percent in 1986 and 35 percent in 1989. The Tang-wai gained twelve seats in the Legislative Yuan and eleven in the National Assembly in the 1986 supplementary elections. But its members comprised only about 4 percent of the Legislative Yuan and a little more than 1 percent of the National Assembly.87 in 1989 old mainlanders still occupied the majority of seats (200) in the Legislative Yuan, while Taiwan-elected members had 74 seats and appointed overseas Chinese representatives had 27 seats.88 However, since the senior KMT mainlander legislators were too old to participate actively in the legislative process, the DPP legislators played a very effective role. 89 Comparatively, the National Assembly needed more urgent reform. It was a constitutional institution, the carrier of the ROC fa-t'ung. In 1990 the average age of the mainland-elected representatives was over eighty. They were seen as the last bastion of an autocratic system, and were called "old thieves" by many Taiwanese. 8 7 Cited in Jiang and Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," p. 88. 8 8 Tien, Great Transition, p. 146; 8 9 Fu Hu and Yan-han Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 185. 91 The KMT and the DPP had conflicting proposals regarding parliamentary reform. The DPP demanded an immediate complete re-election of the parliaments. In contrast, the KMT proposed the phasing out of the veterans. The Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians was passed in early 1989 by the Legislative Yuan. It gave the senior parliamentarians a dignified retirement, as it urged old parliamentarians to retire in three stages within two years. It provided strong financial incentives (NT $4 million, about U.S. $147,000, per person) for the senior legislators to retire. The KMT argued that phasing out the veterans was the only proper way to handle the issue. Since the veterans were elected or had legally replaced an elected representative, they should not be forced to retire. It argued that a forced retirement was a violation of the fa-t'ung. The KMT also wanted the change to be gradual because it did not want to give the impression that Taipei was adopting a two-China policy, which might have irritated Peking to the point of using force against Taiwan. The DPP was highly critical of the KMT's plan. They demanded that all the veteran parliamentarians step down immediately, and that all seats be elected from Taiwan only. They also denounced the size of the severance pay proposed by the KMT. They saw it as an issue that allowed them to make political capital. The veteran parliamentarians thus became the focus of opposition attacks on the system. The veterans were not willing to comply. This caused a constitutional crisis in March 1990 during the eighth session of the First National Assembly. Veteran parliamentarians ignored the CSC's plan regarding the revision of the Temporary Provisions, voted to increase their pay and passed amendment bills to extend their term of office from six to nine years, to reconfirm the right to initiate and veto parliamentary resolutions, and to have a meeting of the Assembly every year. The self-aggrandizement of these parliamentarians was strongly opposed by the KMT, the DPP and ordinary people. Their action was perceived as political regression by the society. The students were especially angered. They protested in downtown Taipei, imitating the mainland 92 student demonstrations at T'ien-an-men Square. Lee Teng-hui met student representatives s and promised to speed up political reforms. He also held a historic meeting with the chairman of the DPP, Huang Hsin-chieh, and put forward concrete suggestions concerning a draft schedule for ending the Mobilization Period and revising the Constitution. Lee also agreed to hold a National Affairs Conference to discuss further democratization with the representatives of the DPP and all other political forces and intellectuals at home and abroad. The National Assembly backed down from its demands under the pressure. The Judicial Yuan issued Constitutional Interpretation No. 261, which decreed that the current Legislative and Assembly terms would have to end by 1991 and new Legislators and Assemblymen would be elected on Taiwan by 1992.90 The crisis was a turning point in Taiwan's constitutional reforms. The KMT leaders adeptly dealt with opposition leaders, students, and veteran parliamentarians, thus pushing the reform of the representative system forward within the constraints of legal procedures. Additionally, the KMT employed social pressure to overcome the internal resistance to reform, and to reach a degree of consensus concerning complete re-election of the parliamentary organs and revision of the Constitution. On May 20, 1990, Lee Teng-hui declared in his presidential inauguration speech that the constitutional reforms would be completed within two years. Lee promised to abolish the Temporary Provisions within a year. He met with DPP Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh, and agreed to meet many DPP demands, including direct election of all legislators and a national health insurance programme. The DPP demanded that the governor of Taiwan Province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the two biggest cities on Taiwan, be subject to popular elections. The KMT did not agree at that time. From the end of June till early July 1990, the National Affairs Conference was convened. Its participants included people holding divergent political views. The DPP 9 0 Jiang and Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," p. 90. 93 Central Committee voted sixteen to six to participate in the conference. Before the conference was held, the authorities consulted a wide range of people, with a total of 119 discussion meetings being held at home and abroad. It also conducted two public opinion polls to identify people's attitudes toward constitutional reforms.91 The Conference reached consensus on following five subjects: (1) full re-election of the National Assembly; (2) legalization of local institutions; (3) the president be elected directly; (4) abolishment of the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Communist Rebellion and amending the Constitution; (5) promoting the relationship with the mainland with the priority of the welfare of Taiwanese people.92 As James Robinson points out, "the National Affairs Conference served the objectives of crisis-defusion and consensus-formation. "93 With the National Affairs Conference, the KMT re-gained the initiative. Immediately after the conference the KMT formed a "Planning Group for Constitutional Reforms," as the return to constitutional rule required reform of the old ROC Constitution. As we shall discuss in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, the Constitution has contributed to liberalization and democratization on Taiwan. However, the Constitution designed for the whole of China contains provisions that might hamper the future process of democratization on Taiwan in particular. Jaushieh Wu notes, "These provisions include the division between the presidency and the premiership, the need to retain the National Assembly and the Control Yuan, and the need to appoint Mongolian, Tibetan, overseas Chinese, and minority representatives to the three chambers of the parliament."^4 The KMT felt compelled to make the Constitution more applicable to 91 Kuo-shih Hui-i Shih-lu (Faithful record of the National Affairs Conference) (Taipei: Secretariat of the National Affairs Conference, 1990), Vol. 3, pp. 3007-3062. 92 Central Daily, July 12,1990. 93 James Robinson, "The ROC's 1990 National Affairs Conference," Issues & Studies, Vol. 26, No. 12 (December 1990), p. 24. 9 4 Jaushieh Wu, "Politics of Constitutional Reform in the Republic of China: Problems, Process, and Prospects," Issues & Studies, Vol. 28, No. 9 (September 1992), p. 89. 94 Taiwan's current situation. Therefore, entering the 1990s, constitutional reforms became the most urgent item on the KMT's political reform agenda. The KMT planned a two stage Constitution revision, arguing that two stages were necessary to guarantee continuation of the fa-t'ung. According to the KMT's scheme, the first stage of constitutional revision was to "use the existing National Assembly for one last time to legitimize the constitutional reform to be carried out by its successor; "95 and then the second stage of substantial revision was to be done by the newly elected National Assembly. On April 8, 1991, the National Assembly convened a temporary meeting to debate the initial constitutional amendments. During the debates the DPP delegates walked out of the meeting, and staged street protests in Taipei. Lee Teng-hui stressed in a television address that "a responsible political party should follow legal procedures in voicing political views to solicit voters."96 The National Assembly adopted ten additional constitutional provisions proposed by the KMT. These provisions allowed for the retirement of veteran parliamentarians, and provided a legal basis for the election of a new assembly with the sole function of revising the Constitution. All seats were to be contested in the free areas of the ROC, with the exception of a few mandates for overseas Chinese. While the total number of seats of the three representative bodies was reduced, the number of representatives to be elected on Taiwan was greatly increased.97 A constituency at the national level was created to represent the whole of China. The procedural revision in the first stage by the First National Assembly legitimized the election of the Second Assembly. The National Assembly also abolished the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Communist Rebellion, thus completing the first stage of the Constitution 9 5 Ibid., p. 94. 9(> Cited in Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition", p. 129. 9 7 Hermann Halbeisen, "In Search of a New Political Order?" in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 83. ! • 95 revision. In so doing the KMT depleted the DPP's major political capital. The problem of the long parliament and veteran parliamentarians had been the focus of the DPP's attack on the authoritarian regime. The ending of the mobilization period eliminated the long parliament, and the veterans had to retire. The KMT escaped from a heavy political burden, and laid down the basis for the essential revision of the Constitution in the next stage. The election of the Second National Assembly took place on December 21, 1991. It marked the end of 43 years of rule by the First National Assembly. The size of the National Assembly was reduced from 3,000 to 403 members to make it more responsive to Taiwan's electorate.98 The KMT obtained 254 seats and the DPP got 66 seats. According to Article 174 of the Constitution, an amendment to the Constitution must be adopted by a resolution of three-quarters of the members of the National Assembly at a meeting having a quorum of two-thirds of the entire Assembly. So, the KMT enjoyed total control of the process of constitutional reforms in the National Assembly. On May 6, 1992, the KMT's CSC approved another nine additional provisions, which generally "increased the power of the president and the National Assembly at the expense of the premier and the Control Yuan. The president, under the new design, had the power to nominate members of the Control Yuan, the Council of Grand Justices, and the Examination Yuan, and his nominations were subject to the approval of the National Assembly."99 The National Assembly was to receive regular reports from the president on the state of the nation, and deliberate on national affairs and offer advice. The Control Yuan had not only lost these powers to the National Assembly, but also lost its status as one of the three parliamentary bodies of the ROC. Its powers were now limited to auditing government budgets and to censuring and impeaching public servants. But due 9 8 June Teufel Dreyer, "Taiwan's December 1991 election," World Affairs, Vol. 155, No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 67. 9 9 Jaushieh Wu, "Politics of Constitutional Reform in the Republic of China," p. 105. to the disputes within the ruling party, the KMT did not reach a consensus regarding the method of presidential election. Opposition leaders were not satisfied with the results. They threatened to initiate public protests against the delaying tactics of the ruling party regarding the method of presidential election. On May 27, 1992, however, the Second National Assembly passed the KMT's Constitution amendment bill. Although some problems remained unresolved, this second stage of constitutional revision made Taiwan's political system more democratic and simplified the parliamentary procedure by removing the Control Yuan from people's representative bodies. DPP factions seemed to be able to contain their differences on the matter of constitutional reforms and coordinated their activities both in the National Assembly and on the streets. Instead of the revision of the old Constitution, the DPP argued for the writing of a new one. At times it threatened to boycott the revision process. However, fearing exclusion from the process of constitutional reforms and the adverse results that could have on the party, the DPP made efforts to participate in the process. The DPP originally hoped to form a coalition with some KMT members to push for the direct election of the president. It took the strategy of "revising the Constitution in form and creating a new one in essence." It disassembled the Draft Constitution of Taiwan into 28 amendment bills and proposed them in the Assembly. The DPP proposed that Taiwan adopt a presidential system and that the president should be popularly elected. The DPP's minority position has prevented it from making a significant impact on the drafting of the new constitutional provisions. All its 28 bills were defeated by the KMT dominated Assembly. In May 1992, unable to influence the outcome, the DPP withdrew from the National Assembly. In 1994, the KMT and the DPP continued to argue about the constitutional reforms. The DPP demanded a presidential system in the hope that they could control the state by running a popular candidate for that post. A directly elected presidency would be politically strong, and the president would owe his advancement' not to the party 97 organization but to his own personal appeal. The 1991 constitutional amendment set the date for the presidential election as 1996. The DPP wanted the election moved up to 1995 or 1994 lest the presidency be undermined by the governorship, which became a popularly elected office in 1994.100 In April 1994, the DPP proposed that the two parties negotiate over the constitutional reform. Lee Teng-hui gave a positive response. The two sides exchanged their constitutional reform proposals. 101 The KMT believed that there was no need to talk about national sovereignty, a single parliament or the central governmental system. These were the issues that the DPP wanted most to discuss. The DPP demanded that in the third stage of Constitutional revision the authorities declare Taiwan to be an independent democratic state; the president of Taiwan be elected directly by Taiwanese people as soon as possible; a single parliament be created and a presidential system be enacted; the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan be abolished and the five-power Constitution be replaced with a three-power one; and the superfluous provincial government be reduced. 102 On April 30, caucuses of the KMT and the DPP in the National Assembly negotiated over the revision procedure, but failed to reach an agreement. 103 In response, the DPP stressed that it would hold the second People's Constitution-Making Conference, and prepared to take to street. Although the KMT and the DPP had very different constitutional proposals, both sides saw benefits to cooperative negotiations. Because of the KMT's internal disagreements on constitutional issues, the KMT could not guarantee the passing of its proposal, despite the fact that it enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. The KMT perceived that negotiation with the opposition would probably win 100 Frank Ching, "A Man for All Seasons," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 157, No. 5 (February 3,1994), p. 27. 101 Lien-ho Pao, April 17,1994. 102Lien-ho Pao, April 19,1994. 1 0 3 Lien-ho Pao, May 1,1994. 98 it some supporting votes from opposition members. As for the DPP, it had softened its stance regarding the rewriting of the Constitution, because the proposal did not get much public support. Despite differences on many points, the DPP did share with the KMT centre the desire for direct election of the president. 104 From the above analysis we conclude that constitutional reforms on Taiwan have been dominated by the KMT. The KMT did concede to accept some ideas of the DPP, and compromised with the DPP on such subjects as complete re-election of the National Assembly and direct election of the president. On the other hand, the KMT was very concerned about the continuity of thefa-t'ung. To continue thefa-t'ung, the KMT insisted that the constitutional revision be done by one institution, that was the National Assembly, because according to the Constitution only the National Assembly has the right to revise the Constitution; and the KMT also designed a two stage procedure to guarantee the continuity. The KMT insisted that, constitutional revision proceed according to legal procedures. Furthermore, to maintain the fa-t'ung, the KMT insisted on constitutional revision rather than writing a new Constitution. President Lee stated in April 1990 that "the Constitution represents the spirit of the Republic of China, therefore it should not be revised dramatically;... The main body of the Constitution should not be changed, and temporary provisions can be revised and appended to the Constitution as amendment articles." 105 Such an approach to the constitutional revision facilitated Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy. Despite its imperfection, Taiwan's political system has been essentially democratized. Taiwan Independence Issue 104 Lien-ho Pao, April 21,1994. 105 Lien-ho Pao, April 28,1990. 99 In the authoritarian period in Taiwan, the opposition could challenge the ruling party simply by struggling for democratic ideals. The progress of continuous democratization has deprived the DPP of its major political appeal. The DPP, therefore, tried to find other issues to distinguish itself from the ruling party. The KMT and the DPP do not have major socioeconomic policy differences. Thus the DPP began to raise the issue of independence. The idea of Taiwan independence became a major tenet in its programme, although some moderates in the DPP do not want to push too far on this issue. In earlier periods, Taiwan independence was a political taboo, and the KMT authorities severely punished the proponents of Taiwan independence. In the current era, the KMT government has given up its suppressive measures toward independence proponents. The KMT's thrust of democratization provided the suitable conditions for the DPP's promotion of Taiwan independence, because democratization has increased freedoms of speech and human rights on Taiwan. The opposition has begun to enjoy the freedom to promote its ideas for independence. After the lifting of the emergency decree, the DPP found a more tolerant political environment in which it could promote independence. In the 1989 elections, New Country Alliance members of the DPP (formerly the New Tide faction) staged public burning of PRC flags. Some proponents of Taiwan independence returned to Taiwan from abroad. Lin I-hsiung published a "basic law" for the "Republic of Taiwan." However, generally the DPP did not use Taiwan independence as a major campaign appeal. It listed "political order based on democracy and freedom" as its first campaign platform issue. The DPP tried to generate the perception among the electorate that a DPP victory was a victory for democracy. The election results, however, showed that the majority of DPP winners were of the New Country Alliance. The results encouraged the proponents of Taiwan independence in the DPP. Since the latter half of 1991, the DPP has begun to stress its Taiwan independence scheme to distinguish itself from the KMT and to counter the promulgation of President 100 Lee's Guidelines for National Reunification. The DPP subsequently formed a committee called the Independence of Taiwan Sovereignty to counter the Council for National Reunification, which was created by the KMT government. On August 25, the DPP and other opposition groups held a "People's Constitution-Making Conference," and passed a "Draft Constitution of Taiwan," asserting Taiwan's de facto sovereignty and proposing "Taiwan" as the name of the new nation-state. The DPP argued that real democracy was only possible in an independent Taiwan. Actually, it tried to use democracy as a shortcut to achieve independence. 106 ft also mobilized an island-wide drive to promote a new application for admission to the United Nations. The KMT immediately communicated with the DPP and persuaded it to give up its insistence on Taiwan independence. President Lee invited politicians of both parties and independents to discuss the issue, and tried to persuade the DPP to change its stance. The KMT argued that "the president does not have the constitutional power to abrogate the present Constitution and pass a new-one." Moreover, because the Chinese Communists had threatened to use force to prevent Taiwan independence, the enactment of a new Constitution applicable solely to Taiwan could inevitably increase tensions in the Taiwan Strait. 107 " In October 1991, however, in the Fifth National Congress, the DPP added an article to its platform, stating that "based on the principle of people's sovereignty, the establishment of an independent and sovereign Republic of Taiwan should be decided by the people's vote. "108 The KMT denounced this article, but in consideration of the forthcoming election of the Second National Assembly, it did not take any action against the DPP and tolerated the DPP's inclusion of this issue in the campaign. The KMT 106" Tun-jen Cheng, "Democracy and Taiwan-mainland China Ties," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No.l (Spring 1993), p. 72. 107 Hungdah Chiu, "Constitutional Development in the Republic of China in Taiwan," in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 36. 1° 8 Lin Chin, "Min-chin-tang Cheng-chih Chu-chang Chou-hsiang," (The trend of the DPP's political programme) Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 1 (1993), p. 27. 101 mainstream, therefore, did not adhere to Chiang Ching-kuo's three political principles for reforms that included the principle of reunification of China. Even Premier Hao Pei-tsun tried to achieve a consensus with the opposition. On November 4, he "met for the first time with five Legislative Yuan members from the DPP for extensive discussions, described by the latter as 'frank and constructive.' During the talks, Hao indicated that the government would not make any move against the DPP because of its promotion of Taiwan independence before the elections, and the opposition agreed with him that the threat from the PRC to take action in the event of a declaration of Taiwan independence must be regarded seriously. "109 The election of the Second National Assembly at the end of 1991 was seen as a show-down between those in favour of and those opposed to Taiwan independence. The KMT called for "reform, stability and prosperity" and ultimate reunification with the mainland. It warned the public that supporting the DPP's cause could only lead Taiwan into a confrontation with the Communists on the mainland, which would bring disaster to all the people of Taiwan. The DPP failed in its effort to wrest a greater number of seats from the ruling party in the 1991 election. The DPP received 22.78 percent of the votes, but only 66 seats constituting 20.3 percent of the total seats, and thus reduced influence over the constitutional revision process. The DPP's pro-independence New Tide faction won only 8 seats. The KMT took 67.72 percent of the votes and 254 seats. Several small parties shared the rest of the seats. Because there were 78 members of the National Assembly (the KMT had 64, the DPP 9 and other parties 5) who had been elected in 1986 on Taiwan and who were also to join the Second National Assembly, the total membership of the Assembly was 403. The KMT held 318 seats or 78.9 percent of the total 1 0 9 Jurgen Domes, "Taiwan in 1991," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (January 1992), p. 49. 102 membership.HO The 1991 election of the National Assembly was a severe blow to the proposal for Taiwan independence. Since the KMT clearly won the election, it gained confidence in dealing with the opposition party, m Nevertheless, the KMT continued to temporize with the DPP, hoping that it could also win the election of the Second Legislative Yuan in 1992. In early 1992, trying to further temporize with the opposition, the KMT "granted four of the twelve committee chairmanships in the Legislative Yuan to the DPP when that body assembled for its 89th session on February 21."H2 On February 28,1992, President Lee and Premier Hao Pei-tsun staged a solemn reconciliation rally with the families of those who had been killed in the February 28 Incident in 1947. The government decided to erect a monument commemorating the tragedy and to compensate the families of those who were killed. In May 1992, the Legislative Yuan modified the Criminal Law, which deals with the crime of sedition, stipulating that sedition cannot be charged if there is no evidence of overt violent action. This modification actually gave the DPP the freedom to promote Taiwan independence.! 13 it a i s o allowed the release of 19 Taiwan independence activists who had been arrested over the previous three years. The government also reduced the blacklist of persons who were excluded from returning to Taiwan from 282 to 5. On November 2, one of the best-known promoters of the idea of Taiwan independence, Dr. P'eng Ming-min, returned legally to the island after 22 years in exile abroad. H 4 HO Tseng Chian-feng, "Taiwan 'Tong-tu' Li-liang Fen-hsi," (An analysis of the forces for the unification of China and for Taiwan Independence on Taiwan), Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 1 (1992), p. 55. H I Julian Baum, "KMT Bares Its Teeth," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 155, No. 8 (February 27,1992), p. 21. 112 Jurgen Domes, "Taiwan in 1992: on the Verge of Democracy,"Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January 1993), p. 59. H3 Liu Kuo-shen, "1986 Nien I-lai te Taiwan Cheng-chih Pien-chien," (Political changes in Taiwan since 1986) Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-kan (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 41, (Autumn 1993), pp. 1-9. 1 1 4 Domes, "Taiwan in 1992," p. 59. 103 Although at times the KMT government arrested advocates of Taiwan independence, it was generally tolerant toward the DPP on the matter of national identity. The KMT's mainland policy and foreign policy became more and more practical. Lee Teng-hui was accused an autonomist in the KMT. Under Lee's guidance, Taiwan is following the principle of practical diplomacy. The KMT government tried to be flexible and realistic. Premier Lien Chan argued that "the Republic of China on Taiwan is the alternative authority to the Chinese government and claims sovereignty over China but has no control. It wishes to be accepted into international organizations, and in particular the United Nations of which China is a member. The ROC on Taiwan does not seek to replace China on the council, but accepts that the two may co-exist."1 ^ In the 1992 elections the DPP did not stress its independence proposals, having learned of their unpopularity in the National Assembly election setback of the previous year.H6 This modified stance brought clear progress for the DPP in electoral terms. (DPP votes and seats won are listed in the tables in the section on "The Legalization of the Opposition" in this chapter). A well-known pollster on Taiwan analyzed that the reason the DPP made progress was that "the DPP was not talking as openly about independence, and the populace did not seem to think it likely that the DPP would do well enough to become the majority in the legislature."117 This condition contributed to a popular willingness to vote for the DPP. After the 1992 election, the DPP focused more on examination of the proposed bills. It became more and more policy-oriented. This diffused its image as a proponent of Taiwan independence. However the issue of national identity is not yet resolved, and it is still a polarizing issue and a focus of conflict among the political parties of Taiwan from time to time. 115 Lien Chan, "The Republic of China on Taiwan Belongs in the United Nations," ORBIS, Vol. 37, No.4 (Fall 1993), p. 633. 116 Wachman, Taiwan, pp. 212-213. 1 1 7 Ibid., p. 214. 104 The issue of national identity has not only differentiated the KMT and the DPP, but also caused the splitting of the ruling party. Some KMT pro-reunification lawmakers formed the "New KMT Front" (Hsin Kuomintang lien-hsien) before the 1989 elections. They opposed Taiwan independence and urged earnestly a more radical internal democratization of the party. In August 1993, the New KMT Front separated themselves from the KMT and formed the New Party. They sought to form a more pro-mainland party, after failing to reform the KMT from within. Specifically, Chao Shao-k'ang and Wang Chien-hsuan favoured a quick start to negotiations with mainland China, the opening of transportation between the mainland and Taiwan, and the establishment of an economic zone comprising Hong Kong, Taiwan and southeastern China.HS j n ns manifesto the New Party proposes (1) to safeguard the security of Taiwan; (2) to negotiate with mainland China; (3) to establish a greater China economic circle; (4) to support medium and small sized enterprises; (5) to establish a directly elected presidential system; (6) to found an anti-corruption bureau directly under the Executive Yuan; and (7) to give weak social groups favourable treatment. * ^ Generally speaking, Taiwan's political parties have spread across the spectrum on the national identity issue. On the spectrum of reunification/independence (T'ung-tu), the DPP represents the pole of Taiwan independence, the New Party represents the pole of reunification, and the KMT represents the "independent Taiwan" stand, a central position. The KMT's Independent Taiwan proposal opposes straight forward Taiwan independence, but tries to shape Taiwan as an independent political entity, while maintaining a friendly relationship with mainland China on the basis of equality and 1 1 8 Pete Engardio and George Wehrfritz, "Suddenly, All Bets Are off in Taiwan," Business Week, No. 3333 (August 23,1993), p. 40. 1 1 9 Julian Baum, "Adapt or Perish," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 33 (August 19,1993), p. 10. 105 mutual benefits. 120 As the majority of Taiwanese people expect neither quick reunification nor quick independence, the KMT's position is quite representative. 5. Conclusion In the first period on Taiwan the KMT practiced hard authoritarianism. By bloody suppression of the Taiwanese uprising, the KMT dramatically dominated the Taiwanese society. It set a stage that gave no room for opposition. By doing so, the KMT created for itself a great deal of discretion to engineer political development, and objectively this gave the KMT much room to maneouvre in its later liberalization and democratization. When the KMT began to liberalize in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the opposition had been only an indirect source of the KMT's liberalizing policy. Opposition forces remained weak throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.l21 Popular pressure grew gradually as a result of the KMT nurtured local self-governance, and it became effective only when the regime allowed it to. The KMT anticipated the increasing popular pressure and in a preemptive effort exposed the party to it. According to Moody, "the regime has kept control both of the timing of the concessions and even of the kinds of pressures to which it will allow itself to be subject. "122 n m a v be that Moody attributes more efficacy to the KMT's control than is warranted, but our findings demonstrate that the KMT's capacity to regulate political behaviour overall has been stronger than the opposition's capacity to force change. Taiwan's transition to democracy, especially in the early stages 120 For more discussion of the "independent Taiwan" stand, please refer to the section on the KMT's nationalism in the next chapter. 121 Many Taiwanese scholars point out the weakness of the opposition. Cf. Luo Hao, "Chiang Ching-kuo Ta-k'ai Cheng-chih Chiang-chiu" (Chiang Ching-kuo's political breakthrough), in Ta-k'ai Cheng-chih Chiang-chiu, ed. Feng-yun Lun-t'an (Taipei, Feng-yun Lun-t'an Press, 1986), p. 12; P'eng Huai-en, Taiwan Cheng-tang T'i-hsi te Fen-hsi: 1950-1986 (An analysis of Taiwan's party system, 1950-1986) (Taipei: Tung-ts'a Press, 1989), pp. 63-104. 122 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 9. 106 of liberalization, was basically initiated and directed by the ruling party. This is not to say that the opposition had no role at all. The opposition strengthened itself and pushed for democratization. However, in the interaction, the KMT has managed to maintain its superior position vis-a-vis the opposition. The electoral system is a major institution that the KMT has used to induce the opposition to work within the KMT dominated system. Having utilized elections at the local level since 1946, elections had become institutionalized. The KMT had been able to remain dominant through the electoral process by co-opting local elites and by superior electioneering. The KMT regime then had to deal with increasing pressure for the opening of elections at the national level. The announcement by the KMT of elections for representative positions of national significance was an important step in the political transition. Although the opening was limited, it started the process of transition to democracy. By institutionalizing elections, the ruling party channelled new social forces into the existing political system, and successfully maintained political order on Taiwan. The KMT sought negotiation with the opposition at various times, but the opposition did not accept each invitation. The KMT had advantages over the opposition in negotiation, as "the negotiators for the ruling party came to the bargaining table with strictly delegated authority. Their counterparts, by contrast, formed a loose coalition of forces that had to balance competing positions without the benefit of a hierarchical structure for ultimately resolving them. "124 They also have to risk being regarded as selling out. The initial stage of the negotiation process was not smooth, and lacked institutionalized operation. This was not only because both sides needed to adjust their roles and sentiment in the changing political environment, but also because the topics of negotiation were politically highly complicated. These topics were not public policies, or 123 cf. Hu and Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization." 124 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 17. 107 parliamentary agenda, but key issues regarding political reforms, rules of political party competition and the pace of transition to democracy. Gradually, negotiation was institutionalized, with both parties having established special teams responsible for it. Both parties wanted to show the populace that despite their contempt for each other, they were willing to maintain their channels of communication. The KMT demonstrated its openness, and the DPP demonstrated that it could be an opposition party on an equal footing with the ruling party. The results of negotiation had a direct impact on the process of democratization and on the social cost of reforms. Although there seems to have been no clear "pact" reached by the two sides, a phenomenon which occurred in some other transitional countries, these negotiations benefited the process of peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan. When the Tang-wai grew stronger, the KMT government took a conciliatory attitude and legitimated the opposition. By so doing, the KMT channelled the opposition to work within the existing system. It suppressed the radicals and accommodated the moderates of the opposition, thereby changing the goal, the site, and the strategy of the opposition. The KMT and the opposition also changed their political behaviour. It has been noted that "several times after stormy outbursts in the Legislative Yuan, leaders of the caucuses of the two parties are soon seen sitting together in a side room or over a hotel dinner to iron out their differences. " l 2 5 Members of both sides often communicate with each other informally. The opposition has adopted three main strategies: (1) parliamentary strategy, (2) the magazine strategy, and (3) the mass movement. Since the KMT did allow elections, the opposition used mainly the first strategy. Moderate oppositionists argued that the principal mission of the opposition should be to mobilize the people to exert pressure upon the ruling KMT to democratize the political structure, and that it may also play the 1 2 5 Ibid., p. 89. 108 role of agitating and educating the masses. The DPP mainly played the role of monitor in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it has grown to become a real institutionalized opposition party. Working within the system can have many advantages. It can decrease the cost of opposition, and directly contribute to the development of democratic institutions from within. 126 The magazine strategy was used to work both within the system and against the system. It was used both as an instrument to propagate political ideas of the opposition and as an organizational core for a quasi-party. Some oppositionists favoured mass movements, but the movements were emasculated by the ever-existent opportunities to work within the system. The third strategy was used mainly at the end of the 1970s, and with disastrous consequences. 127 Taiwan's experiences demonstrate that a more democratic political system can originate from within an authoritarian political system. Both the ruling party and the opposition can take advantage of the existing elections and legislative institutions, and through these legal channels the opposition can be legitimized and led into competitive politics. 128 126 w . Hao, "Chung-kuo Min-chu-hua Fa-chan Chen-lueh Hsin Ssu-k'ao" (On new strategy for democratization in China), Tan-so (The quest) September, 1991, pp. 47-52. 127 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," pp. 123-124, and p. 129. 128 Daniel K. Berman has a similar view. He points out that "political parties need not originate within the legislature and opposition movements which eventually are legitimized by the system may develop outside a traditional political party structure." Words Like Colored Glass: the Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 93. 109 C H A P T E R F O U R T H E K M T ' s I D E O L O G Y 1. Introduction Why has the KMT been able to play such an important role in the transition to democracy on Taiwan, and where have those decisions to liberalize and democratize come from? While this study agrees that domestic and international stimuli and socioeconomic conditions are necessary, it intends to argue that there were dynamic factors within the ruling party that drove the party to modify its role and to make some important decisions which started Taiwan down the path to democracy. Among these factors, the KMT's tutelary but fundamentally democratic ideology is an obvious factor that has guided the party to play a positive and adaptive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. According to the "end of ideology" school, ideology plays a less important role in the contemporary world. However, this school also points out that ideology serves a stronger function in developing countries than in developed democracies.1 Indeed, party leaders in the Third World themselves usually emphasize their party's ideology.2 Until recently, this had also been the case on Taiwan. A study of the ideology of a political party should answer the following questions: "What does this party stand for? How intensely and persistently does it make that stand? 1 Andrew Vincent, "Introduction" to Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). 2 Key Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 15. 110 ... Are its concerns short range and pragmatic, median range and programmatic, or long range and messianic?"3 In the case of the KMT on Taiwan, we shall answer the following questions. What is the role of the Sunist doctrine of the Three Principles of the People in Taiwan's transition to democracy? Did it influence the KMT's decision to liberalize and democratize? Did the KMT's interpretation of Sunism (the Three Principles of the People) evolve, and if so were the changes supportive of a peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan? There are three points of view as to the answer to these questions. The first is that the official doctrine, the Three Principles of the People, played a positive and instructive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. KMT officials and some scholars believe that this is the correct answer.4 The second is that the KMT, to a large extent, has ignored the Three Principles of the People, and the real driving principle of policy making has been pragmatism.^ The third states that the Three Principles of the People played a role, but the ideology that led to the Taiwanese success was a mixed ideology of five trends: the official doctrine, a "petty bourgeois" outlook, modern Confucian humanism, Chinese liberalism, and the Taiwan Independence Movement "saga."6 It is this author's view that the KMT's ideology consisted of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, but the interpretation of Sunism was influenced by some elements such as revolutionary spirit. The resulting ideology played an important role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. The KMT's official ideology prevailed in situations 3 Ibid. 4 For instance, A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman,Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981). 5 Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (New York: University Press of America, 1988); Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the ROC (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989). 6 Thomas A. Metzger, "The Chinese Reconciliation of Moral-Sacred Values with Modem Pluralism: Political Discourse in the ROC, 1949-1989," in Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years, ed. Ramon H. Myers (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institutions Press, 1991), pp. 3-56. I l l where other compelling interests did not preclude acting on it. Thus, most of the tenets of the Three Principles of the People were followed strictly, and others were interpreted according to practical needs. The influence of Sunism, in its original interpretation, declined over time, partly due to its being less restrictive than the Communist ideology, and partly due to the situational change. This chapter will first introduce the content of the Three Principles of the People, and then analyze the three principles in Taiwan's context one by one. Then we will analyze generally the role of the KMT's ideology in Taiwan's transition to democracy. 2. The Three Principles of the People The doctrine of the Three Principles of the People (San-min chu-i) was proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The three principles are people's nationality (Min-tsu chu-i or nationalism), the people's rights (Min-ch'uan chu-i or democracy), and the people's livelihood (Min-sheng chu-i). Sun Yat-sen proposed the principle of nationalism in the late Ch'ing Dynasty, with the aim of overthrowing the Manchu rulers and restoring the Chinese governance. He hoped that nationalism could serve as a rousing creed to unite dissident individuals and groups throughout China. As a way to promote nationalism, he required the restoration and renaissance of traditional Chinese culture. He maintained that Confucian moral ideals, political philosophy, and method of personal cultivation were all superior to their Western counterparts. After the downfall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911, his nationalism became more and more anti-imperialist. He attacked the great powers for their exploitation and suppression of the nonwhite races. He worried about the threat of the foreign partition of China, and proposed revolution to strengthen China and prevent 112 partition. However, Sun's anti-imperialism was not extreme.7 For instance, his concern with the threat of foreign oppression did not lead him to refuse foreign investment. The principle of the people's rights means constitutional democracy. Thus, on the cognitive dimension, Sunism identifies itself with democracy. Sun recognized that democracy was the universal trend in the world. However, on the programmatic dimension, Sunism proposes tutelage. Sun theorized in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction for the National Government of China, published in 1924, that the ROC would go through three stages of development to realize democracy. The first would be a military administration to unite the country. The second would be political tutelage under the KMT. The third would be constitutional democracy. Sun maintained that tutelage was the way to democracy. He did not emphasize liberty and equality. He felt that China needed to emphasize the collective struggle for national equality with other states. He complained that Chinese people were a "heap of loose sand," with too much selfish freedom and too little patriotic unity. He argued that tutelary democracy was a necessary "stage by stage" approach to political democracy. The reason was that the destruction of revolution had to be succeeded by extraordinary construction. Another reason was that people were not yet trained or ready to accept their responsibilities as citizen-participants. The masses had to learn the basics of democracy. He pointed out that assembly was the first step to democracy. Then people had to learn self-governance at the local level, and tutelage had to be implemented at the national level. Sun emphasized the role of local self-governance in the tutelary period. Among his 35 Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, 11 dealt with local self-governance. f Sun's theory of the political party was consistent with his ideas about democratization. The purpose of building a political party, according to Sun, is to carry out revolution. The party is used to rouse the masses and to consolidate the revolutionary 7 Sidney H. Chang and Leonard H. D. Gorden, All Under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 96-107. 113 forces. So, the KMT was called a revolutionary party. However, Sun did not insist that this revolutionary party remain after the revolution succeeded. Rather, he argued that a political party should transform itself and adapt to the changing environment. Influenced by the party politics of the United States and United Kingdom, Sun proposed a two-party system for the Republic of China.8 The third component of Sun's doctrine is the people's livelihood. Sun anticipated that economic development would come first. He envisioned that economic growth would evoke social change and political modernization would lead to democracy; progress would occur in that order. Based on his own study of capitalism, Sun was familiar with both its rigor and evils. Thus, he tried to take advantage of capitalist incentives to stimulate a free-enterprise economy, but he also tried to avoid the unfair division of wealth. While he proposed retention private ownership, he also proposed equalization of land ownership and the regulation of capital. Since a major source of inequality was the concentrated ownership of land, Sun proposed land reform that would give land to the tillers, The capital accumulated as a result of land reform would be directed toward industrial and commercial use. Regarding the regulation of capital, he emphasized the need for the development of national capital and the limitation of private enterprises. By development of national capital he meant "state operation of industries, state control of capital, and state ownership of profits."^ Other measures he proposed included the introduction of progressive taxation and public ownership of major industries and utilities. 8 Ke Yung-kuang, "Kuo-fu Cheng-tang Cheng-chih Szu-hsiang yu Shih-chien" (National father's idea of political party and practice), in his collection, Cheng-chih Pian-ch'ianyu Cheng-chih Fa-chan: Taiwan Ching-yan Tan-so (Political change and development: the quest of Taiwan experiences) (Taipei: You-shi Press, 1989). 9 Quoted in Tai Hung-chao, "The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan," in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 411. 114 Sun insisted that in the early stages of modernization the authorities would have to impose restrictive tariffs on foreign imports and put into effect a protective policy in order to develop domestic industries. Sun constructed the state as a central management agency for the entire economy. The state would foster the establishment and growth of initially cost-inefficient industries. It would also assume the responsibility of more equitable income and welfare distribution. Sun embraced socialism, but his socialism was composed of traditional Chinese ethical principles as well as Western ideas. He called it "state socialism," which he defined to be characterized by the interventions of a tutelary state in the national economy, government monopolies of public utilities and special sectors of the economy, a general concern with industrial growth, the regulation of capital, and the provision of innovative social welfare programmes.10 The aim of socialism is to realize what Confucius described as a "great Commonwealth."11 The KMT tried to implement a development programme according to the stages designed by Sun Yat-sen when it was on the mainland. In the first stage of military government, the KMT forces overthrew the Manchu rulers and accomplished national unification by the Northern Expedition. After that, it attempted to start the second stage of tutelary government. The KMT Central Executive Committee adopted "The Fundamentals for Tutelary Government" in October, 1929. However, there were forces in both the party and society arguing for an earlier enactment of constitution, which, according to Sun's scheme, could be enacted only at the beginning of the third stage of constitutional government. In response to their demands, the KMT government enacted a 1° Sun Yat-sen, "T'i-ch'ang Kuo-chia She-hui Chu-i" (Promote state socialism), Kuo-fu Ch'uan-chi (The complete works of Sun Yat-sen), (Taipei: Kuomintang Party History Department, 1973), Vol. 2, p. 261. 11 Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 9. 115 provisional constitution in 1931.12 From the mid-1930s to 1945 the KMT government was occupied with resisting Japan. After the anti-Japanese War the stage of constitutional government started, and the KMT enacted a constitution based on Sunism in 1947. However, the KMT's military defeat provided it no chance to focus on political construction on the mainland before it retreated to Taiwan. Taiwan historically did not have an indigenous political philosophy or ideology. The island was influenced by both mainland China and Japan. Sun Yat-sen propagated his political ideals on Taiwan before the Japanese colonized it in 1895, but his influence at the time was limited. 13 After the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT erected the Three Principles of the People as its official ideology for the Taiwanese people. Its failure on the mainland made the party to rethink how to realize Sunism properly on Taiwan. To make Taiwan strong enough to survive and to return to the mainland, the Nationalist leadership believed that they had to indoctrinate the official ideology. So, Chiang Kai-shek urged the party and the people to study Sunism. The KMT on Taiwan has basically followed Sun's teachings, but it has also adapted its ideology to the circumstances on Taiwan. The following discussion is arranged according to the people's livelihood, the people's rights and nationalism. The principle of the people's livelihood will be discussed first because this is what the KMT most emphasized on Taiwan. 3. The KMT's People's Livelihood on Taiwan 12 Hermann Halbeisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism and Politics in Early Republican China," in Ideology and Politics in Twentieth Century China, ed., King-yuh Chang (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1988), pp. 3-5. 13 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 55. 116 At the first glance, the principle of the people's livelihood concerns economic matters and is not directly related to Taiwan's transition to democracy. However, since the KMT emphasized economic development first, such a decision had a direct impact on Taiwan's developmental priorities and the stages of political development. This section will demonstrate the extent to which the KMT followed the principle of the people's livelihood, and will analyze the political implications of the KMT's application of this principle. The economic officials of the KMT government often claim that they formulate economic policies according to Sunism and that Taiwan's economic miracle is the result of following Sunism. 14 Indeed, the KMT on Taiwan has followed Sunism most closely in the economic sphere, although there have been deviations in this regard. The KMT's emphasis on economic construction itself is a shift from Sun's order of emphasis that put nationalism first and the people's livelihood third. The shift was a response to Chiang's realization that without such a switch his regime might not survive on Taiwan, and he might lose power again. Immediately after its defeat on the mainland, the KMT defined its first priority as returning to the mainland. However, the KMT had to make a shift of emphasis from mainland recovery to the people's livelihood, because the party and its army lacked the strength to retake the mainland. Party pragmatists recommended that the government concentrate on economic construction on Taiwan so as to be better-prepared for later retaking of the mainland. Learning from the failure on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek 14 See, for example, K.Y. Yin, Wo tui Taiwan Ching-chi ti k'an-fa (My views on Taiwan's economy), Vol. 2 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 1973); Wang Tso-jung, Taiwan Ching-chi Fa-chan Lun-wen Shuan-chi (Selected essays on Taiwan's economic development) (Taipei: China Times, 1981); Sun Chen, Min-sheng Chu-i ti Ching-chi Cheng-ts'e (Economic policies of the Min-sheng principle) (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book Company, 1981); C. K. Yen, "The Fundamentals and Conditions of Postwar Economic Development in Taiwan," in Experiences and Lessons of Postwar Economic Development in Taiwan, eds. Kwoh-ting Li and Tzung-shian Yu (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1982); and K.T. Li, Prospects for Taiwan's Economic Development: A collection of Essays from 1980-1984 (Taipei, 1985). 117 gave priority to economic growth and education, although he was eager to realize the goal of mainland recovery. 15 He contended that "almost every one of our comrades knows that our failure in the anti-Communist struggle is due to our neglect of the Min-sheng principle on the mainland.... We should realize the Min-sheng principle through practical action, not theoretical discussion."!6 j n 1953, Chiang Kai-shek wrote two chapters to complete Sun's Min-sheng principle. The first chapter elaborated on goals for education, and the second was on happiness. This demonstrates that Chiang began to think about education and social development in the early 1950s. By 1954, the KMT government showed the shift in its emphasis to modernization in a joint communique issued on October 23 with the United States. It declared that "the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles and not the use of force."!? This demonstrates the shift of focus from strengthening might to accelerating socioeconomic development. In this early stage on Taiwan, the KMT followed the older interpretations of Sunism and its mainland development strategies. Land reform, one major element in Sun's Min-sheng principle, was implemented on Taiwan. Ch'en Ch'eng, who was sent to Taiwan by Chiang before the mainland was completely taken by the Communists, advocated land reform according to Sun's teachings. 18 He wrote that "anyone who studies land reform in recent decades must begin with Dr. Sun's teachings." 19 He believed that the failure to carry out Sun's land reform policy on the mainland was one of 15 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 45. 16 Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien 1950 (Yearbook of the Republic of China 1950) (Taipei: Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien-she, 1951), p. 123. 1? Hung-dah Chiu, ed., China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 288. 18 Chang and Gorden, All Under Heaven, p. 157. 19 Ch'en Ch'eng, Land Reform in Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 10-13. 118 the principal reasons for the KMT's defeat. Ch'en Ch'eng's land reform plan received the full approval of the Central Committee (CC) of the KMT and the explicit support of Chiang Kai-shek.20 The first step in the land reform was a rent reduction programme, an idea found in Sun's teachings. Rents were reduced from 50-70 percent of the anticipated harvest to a maximum of 37.5 percent. The second step was the sale of public land. Twenty percent of the farm families purchased public land.21 The third step was the "land-to-the-tiller" programme, an idea also advanced by Sun. In January 1953, the Legislative Yuan passed the legislation that requested that the landlords who owned more than three hectares of paddy fields or six hectares of dry land sell to the government all extra tenanted land at a price equal to two-and-one-half times the annual crop yields. In return the landlords were paid in bonds and stocks of four state enterprises. The land was then sold to its original tenants at the same prices the government had paid the landlords. Land reform not only improved the living standard of the rural area in Taiwan, but also accumulated initial capital for industrialization. Capital outflow from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector amounted to about 22 percent of the total value of agricultural production between 1950 and 1955.22 Furthermore, it also had profound political implications. Land reform won the support of the farmers, thus greatly enhancing the KMT regime's legitimacy in Taiwanese society. It created a class of small landholders, and had a function of equalizing social wealth on Taiwan. Therefore land reform created a favourable social conditions for the emergence of democracy on Taiwan, because a peaceful transition to democracy is more likely to occur in an equal society. Of course, the success of the land reform would not have been possible if the KMT regime had been an indigenous force. The KMT regime was able to carry out the reform because 20 Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 30. 21 E. Thorbecke, "Agricultural Development," in Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan, ed. W. Galemson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). 22 Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 34. 119 it was not "colonized" by the local landed interests. In any event, Sun's detailed plan of land reform directed and facilitated the KMT in carrying out the land reform. The KMT also followed Sun's teachings regarding the stages of modernization. It first promoted import substitution and emphasized state ownership. In the 1950s, the government promoted a variety of light consumer industries by sealing off the domestic market: import quotas for specific goods, especially luxury items, were implemented; foreign exchange rates were fixed to discourage imports; nondurable consumer goods received the greatest protection and imports of plant equipment received favourable treatment.23 In the 1960s, especially after the termination of U.S. aid, ideas of neo-liberalism appeared in the party's platform, particularly in the area of economic policies.24 Thus started the export-oriented stage in the decade of 1963-1973. By 1965 Taiwan's domestic market was saturated. To sustain economic growth and to reduce foreign indebtedness and dependency on American aid, the authorities on Taiwan decided to change course. Tariffs were cut substantially, the New Taiwanese dollar was depreciated to make foreign trade and exporting more profitable, and export processing zones (EPZs) were established. Stimulated by these new measures, foreign investment poured into Taiwan.2^ In the 1970s, the surge in oil prices created massive inflation in the Taiwanese economy. The government responded quickly by applying conservative fiscal measures and a one-time price increase. In addition, the government started the "Ten Major Construction Projects," which included steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, and infrastructure projects, which helped the structural transformation and overcame transportation and supply bottlenecks. Entering the 1980s and early 1990s, the KMT 2 3 Samuel P. S. Ho, Economic Development in Taiwan, 1860-1970 (Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 190-193. 2 4 Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," in/« the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 119. 25 W. Hao, "Foreign Investment and the State in Postwar Japan and Taiwan,"Issues & Studies Vol. 29, No.6 (June, 1993), 80-96. 120 government made an effort to promote high-tech industries. The Science-Based Industrial Park was opened in Hsin-chu in 1980. The government further liberalized regulations to attract foreign investment in the hope of promoting technology transfer. During these stages of development, the KMT regime fulfilled almost all the elements insisted upon by Sun ~ a transfer of capital from agricultural to industrial sectors, decentralization of industry, income equity, and mass education. Regarding income equity for example, it has been noted that "during the 1960s the 40 percent of the population on Taiwan with the lowest income received about 20 percent of the nation's income. By comparison, the average income share of the lowest 40 percent of the population in all less-developed countries (LDCs) was 12.5 percent."26 Through these stages, Taiwan developed a mixed economy with the private sector enjoying a major share. Taiwan's postwar economic situation was favourable to the KMT government's promotion of state capital. The KMT government confiscated the Japanese properties on Taiwan after the war, and this provided the government ownership of a major share of the Taiwanese economy. Intense antagonism with the mainland made it quite likely that the KMT state would further increase its control of the economy. However, in reality a mixed economy developed with the private sector enjoying a major share. The outcome was basically in accordance to Sun's teachings, since he encouraged the development of both private enterprise and state capital. Sun argued that "The industrial development of China should be carried out along two lines: (1) by private enterprises and (2) by national undertaking. All matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws.... All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should be taken up as national undertakings. "27 26 Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 78. 27 Quoted in Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 20. 121 In addition to Sun's fundamentally capitalist approach to economic development, another factor that prompted the KMT to emphasize the development of the private sector was the pressure of the American aid agencies who believed that "a shift from state to private ownership would contribute to the operating efficiency of ... enterprises, hasten over-all economic development and decrease the financial burden in subsidizing [public] activities."28 As Neil Jacoby observed, behind this belief "lay the political aim of demonstrating the superiority of free economic institutions as instruments of social progress.... By far the most important consequence of U.S. influence was the creation on Taiwan of a booming private enterprise system."29 To obtain American aid, the KMT followed the American advice. K. T. Li, one of the principal architects of Taiwan's economic miracle, testified that the state's basic strategy has moved continually toward market liberalization and depoliticization of the economy.30 Nevertheless, as Sun espoused capitalism, the KMT's acceptance of American liberal advice did not contradict Sun's teachings. However, market liberalization did not mean that the KMT adopted a laissez-faire policy toward capitalist development. One major element in Taiwan's economic success has been state intervention. The capitalist economic development on Taiwan has been planned and directed by KMT economic officials, and in this aspect, it seems that KMT economic officials were guided by Sun's teachings. They have argued that Sun's doctrine supported an active state role in promoting economic development and in preventing the concentration of economic power in a few hands. However, government management of the economy has been based on modern economic means rather than 28 Quoted in Tai, "The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan," p. 431. 29 Neil H. Jacoby, US. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-help, and Development (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 137-138. 30 K. T. Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan's Development Success (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), Chap. 5; and K. T. Li, Economic Transformation of Taiwan ROC (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1988), Chap. 4. 122 administrative directives as the KMT centre seldom interfered in economic officials' plans. The KMT's shift of focus from mainland recovery to economic development was, to some extent, required by military need, as the government had to support the military establishment to defend Taiwan and hopefully to retake the mainland. Thus circumstances prompted Taiwan's political leadership to begin a programme of overall economic development. Some conditions on Taiwan were favourable for implementing some of Sun's tenets. For instance, the KMT enjoyed autonomy from the influence of the local landlord classes, making it possible to initiate the land reform programme that had been attempted but failed on the mainland. Under these conditions, Sun's principle of the people's livelihood facilitated Taiwan's modernization and laid down the economic basis for the transition to democracy. This discussion of the principle of the people's livelihood demonstrates that the principle did direct the KMT to focus on some basic economic constructions such as land reform and state-directed industrialization. The KMT followed Sun's teaching that economic development should come first. The need for economic growth, American pressure, and some favourable conditions for economic reforms combined to produce the KMT's shift of priority to economic growth. By choosing economic growth as its priority, the KMT intentionally neglected democracy building at least at the national level. However, the more liberal interpretation of Sun's state capitalism by the KMT economic officials allowed Taiwan to develop a type of Western style market economy which laid down the socioeconomic basis for Taiwan's transition to democracy. The success in applying the principle of the people's livelihood provided the KMT regime some degree of legitimacy, and helped the KMT to maintain stability. At the same time the KMT won itself a crucial period of time to build itself into a strong ruling machine during the first two decades. 123 4. The KMT's People's Rights on Taiwan After the 8 year Anti-Japanese War, the KMT on the mainland did attempt to follow Sun Yat-sen's principle of people's rights as it wrote a Constitution founded on the Three Principles of the People. The Constitution was passed by the National Assembly on December 25, 1946, and went into effect on December 25, 1947. It guaranteed civil rights, which included equality before the law; invulnerability of individuals; freedom of residence and movement; freedom of speech, teaching, and publication; freedom of religion, assembly, and association; and the rights of election, recall, initiative and referendum.31 The Constitution required direct elections of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the provincial assemblies, the governors of the provinces and the mayors of centrally administered cities, as well as the county councils and the county magistrates. However, article 23 of the Constitution stated that "all these freedoms and rights ... shall not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary ... to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare." This article gave Chiang Kai-shek unlimited power in the face of the Communist threat.32 On April 18, 1948, when the Nationalist regime faced increasing challenge from the Communists, it had the National Assembly pass the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion and promulgated it on May 10, 1948. These provisions gave the president extraordinary powers, and provided that the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan elected in 3 1 The Constitution of the Republic of China, 1947; English in The China Yearbook 1980 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 594-610, art. 1-17. 3 2 Jurgen Domes, "China's Modernization and the Doctrine of Democracy," in Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World, ed. Chu-yuan Cheng (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 217. 124 1947/1948 would remain in office until the termination of the Period of Mobilization had been declared by the president.33 The additional Emergency Law, which was* promulgated on May 19, 1948, gave "military and security organs the right to arrest and detain persons, and civilian government authorities the right to outlaw periodical publications and books without the publisher having a chance to appeal such decisions to the judiciary."34 The jurisdiction of the civil court was limited as most serious civilian crimes were tried by courts-martial. When the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, it implemented the Temporary Provisions and the Emergency Law on the island. The KMT justified the restrictions on civil rights of Taiwanese people by pleading that a condition of civil war existed between the Nationalist and Communist regimes. Freedoms of speech, the press, association, and assembly were severely restricted. Berman demonstrates in detail how the KMT restricted the freedom of press on Taiwan. First, the KMT regime imposed the legal requirement for registration of new publications. The number of newspapers on Taiwan was fixed at 31, and no new newspaper was allowed to publish. Second, a newspaper could only have a fixed number of pages. Third, the location of a newspaper's printing facility was limited to the vicinity of its intended area of distribution. Fourth, the regime controlled the price of all newspapers, and the publication had no freedom for adjustment. Finally and most importantly the KMT censored the content of publications.35 That the political leadership on Taiwan restricted freedoms and political competition could be explained by the KMT's ideological orientation in this early postwar period. Sunism itself was influenced by both Chinese traditional culture and Western democratic culture. Thus, the KMT's attitude toward freedoms and political competition reflected these mixed influences. First, the KMT leaders believed that freedoms were one 3 3 The China Yearbook 1980, p. 610f. 3 4 Domes, "China's Modernization," p. 217. 35 Daniel K. Berman, Words Like Colored Glass (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 129-130. 125 of the aims of political development, but that the masses had to be trained before they could responsibly wield their rights. Second, they maintained that freedoms and competition should not be used to promote selfish interest, but rather that citizens should fulfill their political obligations and promote public interest. Third, they believed that freedoms and political competition could contribute to the public interest only when they occurred in an organized, disciplined way and that they should not lead to social conflicts or disorder. Fourth, in the eyes of the leadership the enlargement of freedoms and competition was a long term goal, and if it conflicted with the state's current goals, such as national security or political stability, it should give way to the latter.36 Fifth, the KMT leaders tried to combine traditional Chinese ethics with democratic ideals, as Sun did himself. They maintained that Chinese ethics were in accordance with the essence of the Three Principles of the People, and the spirit of freedom meant obeying the.law and performing one's role (Shou-fa shou-fen). The KMT's restrictions on freedoms and political competition were also influenced by Sun Yat-sen's tutelary approach to democracy building. As a student and successor of Sun, Chiang Kai-shek also thought that democracy could not be realized in one step. He seemed to think that the application of the five-power Constitution was one of the reasons for the KMT's defeat on the mainland. He thought that the immediate application of constitutional democracy after the Anti-Japanese War created opportunity for the Communists to instigate the masses and eventually overthrow the KMT government on the mainland. In other words, he thought that the constitutional democracy was realized too early and that China should still be in the tutelary stage. Once on Taiwan, therefore, Chiang stressed that democracy could only be guaranteed by revolutionary spirit and organization.37 For Chiang and the KMT as a whole, 3 6 Chu Yun-han, Taiwan Ti-ch'u Cheng-chih Chan-yu chih Yen-chiu (A Research on the political participation in Taiwan) (M.A.. thesis, Taiwan University, 1979), pp. 175-176. 3 7 Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Tsung-t'ong Cheng-tang Cheng-chi Chiang-tz'u (President Chiang on party politics) (Taipei: Yu-tai Kung-szu, 1971), pp. 808-809. 126 revolutionary spirit meant that party members should strictly follow party instructions and that the party should be a vanguard party that educates and organizes the masses. Chiang's opinion was generally accepted by the party. In 1950 the Central Reform Committee of the KMT adopted six guidelines, with the first one explicitly defining the party as a democratic revolutionary party. In 1952, the Seventh Congress of the KMT wrote this into the Party Charter. By stressing the revolutionary spirit, the KMT actually revived more authoritarian ingredients in Sunism. Facing the Communist threat, the KMT devoted most of its efforts toward defending Taiwan, and did little to build democracy at the national level in the early postwar period on Taiwan. Nevertheless the KMT's ideological commitment to democratic ideals imposed some limitations on its ability to control the masses, providing KMT liberal reformers and political opposition with the opportunity to advocate democracy, and freedom in the KMT's own language. The opposition has rarely attacked the Three Principles of the People and the fundamental organization of the political system. They wish to make it more democratic, but not.destroy and rebuild it. They have been able to use the constitutional provisions protecting civil liberties to challenge government restrictions. Furthermore, Sun's teachings did guide the KMT to make some basic preparations for democracy. The KMT did implement Sun Yat-sen's proposal of local democracy and electoral politics. The Taiwanese people had no political rights during 50 years of colonization by Japan. From the KMT's beginning on Taiwan, the KMT implemented local elections. The first thing Taiwan provincial authorities did after Taiwan was returned to China in 1945 was to enact citizenship registration. The authorities then examined qualifications of those candidates who were interested in public positions. In March 1946, township councils were elected. In April, county and provincial councils and assemblies were elected indirectly. In December 1946, the ROC government enacted a Constitution that accepted Sun's idea of local governance. In August 1949, the Taiwan 127 Provincial government formed a Research Group on Taiwan's Local Self-Governance, and promulgated a series of regulations on local elections.3** In 1949, the same year that the KMT moved to Taiwan following its defeat on the mainland, six local elections were held. The next year, island-wide local elections were held. Before the lifting of martial law in July 1987, Taiwan held nine elections for members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, five elections for the Taipei City Council, and two for the Kaohsiung City Council. In addition, ten elections were held for city mayors and eleven elections for county magistrates. Several reasons can be observed for the KMT's implementation of local democracy. First, as we noted earlier, the KMT implemented local self-government because they simply could not supply enough mainlanders to control local affairs. However, if the principle of local self-government had not been enshrined in Sunism, the KMT would have had less incentive to implement it. Since Sun Yat-sen stressed the importance of local self-governance in political development and designed a three-stage democratic building scheme, it is quite natural that the KMT started implementing democracy at the local level first. Second, the KMT intentionally implemented local democracy because it wanted to build Taiwan into a model province of the Three Principles of the People. The Japanese invasion and the ensuing civil war with the Communists are the reasons often cited by the KMT regime for its failure to implement local democracy on the mainland. Once the KMT regime enjoyed firm control of the island of Taiwan, it wanted to begin building democratic institutions at the local level. Therefore, in the absence of constraining factors, the KMT acted on Sun's teachings on local democracy. Third, the KMT wanted to build up legitimacy at the grassroots level. When the KMT regime recovered Taiwan from the Japanese after World War II, it found that it had no basis in Taiwanese society. Local democracy was used by the KMT regime 3 8 Fu Jen-yan, Taiwan Ti-fung Hsuan-chu Yen-chiu (Research on Taiwan's local elections) (Taiwan: Cultural Foundation of Chia-hsin Cement Co., 1969), p. 16. 128 to differentiate its rule from the Japanese colonial rule. The KMT leaders realized that to be perceived as different from Japanese practice and their own practice on the mainland, they had to put Sun's teachings about political development into practice. This is why the KMT carried out local elections even before its retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Following Sun's teachings, the KMT on Taiwan held elections at the local level but not at the national level for the first two decades. Liberalizing reforms at the national level on Taiwan started in 1969, when a limited number of legislative and assembly seats were opened to contestation. The new seats all represented Taiwan. This can be seen as the beginning of the liberalization of national politics on Taiwan. Liberalization speeded up when Chiang Kai-shek died in April 1975, and his son Ching-kuo, serving as the premier, became the top leader. In contrast to his father, Chiang Ching-kuo began to speak more about democracy. In a speech to the National Assembly on Constitution Day, December 25, he affirmed his commitment to the goals of democracy, rule of law, and full implementation of the Constitution. He said, "We have already established an excellent basis for putting democratic politics into effect in the recovery base [Taiwan]. Five days ago we smoothly completed the election for supplementary Legislative Yuan members. In this election, not only did the election organs fulfill the requirements of 'fair, just, and open,1 but also we could see from the candidates' excellent political comportment and the voters' enthusiasm that our citizens are full of keenness for political participation and concern for national affairs, and that they have a high level of commitment to electing virtuous and capable candidates that a democratic country's citizens should have when they exercise their citizens' rights. "39 in an address to the National Assembly on Constitution Day, 1984, Chiang Ching-kuo stated that because of the "uncompleted efforts for the eradication of Chinese Communism, we 3 9 Cited in Andrew J. Nathan and Helena V. S. Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," in Chiang Ching-kuo's Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, ed. Shao-chuan Leng (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), pp. 50-51. 129 are forced to adopt certain expedient measures dictated by time and circumstance. However, we will not deviate from constitutional rule; that is our unchangeable principle."4^ In this address, Chiang recognized the existence of a "pluralist" society with diverse interests, and affirmed the legitimacy of people holding different points of view. According to Lee Teng-hui, Chiang Ching-kuo believed that only party politics could guarantee the stability in the long term, and thus an opposition party was needed.4 * In the 1980s, the KMT seemed to believe that the time had come to end tutelage and to start democratization. For instance, Kao Yu-jen, member of the CSC and speaker of Taiwan Provincial Assembly, suggested some important political reforms in 1984: modifying the Temporary Provisions, consolidating central representative institutions, and directly electing provincial governors and city magistrates, etc. 4 2 Chiang Ching-kuo himself supported the idea that the time was ripe for realizing Sun's ideal of constitutional democracy, as he proclaimed in a speech delivered to a meeting of the CSC on October 15, 1985, that "times are changing, conditions are changing, and tides are changing. The KMT must adopt new approaches to carry out reforms on the basis of a democratic constitutional system. Only in this way can we integrate with the trends of the time and stand on the side of the people."43 In that speech, he asked the party to adopt new approaches to carry out democratic reforms. In an interview with an American reporter in October 1986, Chiang stated that "abolishing the emergency decrees is for the purpose of speeding up democratic progress here. We must serve as a beacon light for the hopes of one billion Chinese so that they will want to emulate our political system."44 In his will he urged political leaders on Taiwan to put their full efforts into implementing 4 ^ Cited in Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), p. 130. 4 1 Lien-ho Pao, February 10,1993. 4 2 Kao Yu-jen, Taiwan Ching-yan (The Taiwan experience)) (Taipei: the Twenty-first Century Foundation, 1989), pp. 30-31. 4 3 Quoted, among other sources, in Berman, Words like Colored Glass, p. 153. 4 4 Cited in Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision," p. 39. 130 constitutional democracy and to accomplish China's reunification under the Three Principles of the People. Chiang Ching-kuo's speeches and actions show that at this time he was relying more on democratic principles to guide or justify his political liberalization than in the earlier period. In contrast to his father, Ching-kuo used more democratic ingredients of Sunism, while accepting Sun's emphasis on gradual and orderly change. When the situation changed at the national level, the party did not refrain from gradually opening up according to Sun's principle of the people's rights. By the early 1980s, changed circumstances meant that acting on the principle of the people's rights was not precluded by the compelling competing interest of maintaining power and security. This allowed Chiang to conclude that it was time to start the transition from tutelary democracy to fully constitutional democracy. Each time the party called supplementary elections, it claimed that this was the fulfillment of Sun's principle of the people's rights. While the socioeconomic changes provided the conditions for political changes, the KMT's adherence to Sunism facilitated the top-down gradual political reform. After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, KMT leaders rejected a suggestion that martial law be reimposed in spite of violent clashes between police and i demonstrators. They believed that the violence of demonstrators and social tensions were but birth pains of democracy. The KMT is now confident in competing with other parties peacefully and on an equal footing. In the post-Chiang era, the influence of Sunism, in its original interpretation, declined. The KMT toned down its ideological rhetoric. It tended to talk less about the Three Principles of the People; instead the party simply talked about democracy. Democratic principles were widely accepted in the KMT. The prevalence of democratic principles prompted the KMT to end the Temporary Provisions and the Emergency Law, thus leaving more room for liberalization and democratization. Furthermore, the KMT used its democratic achievements to distinguish itself from the authoritarian mainland 131 China political system. Democracy was not only to be instituted on Taiwan, but also on the mainland. Democracy became a precondition for reunification, as the KMT's Guidelines for National Reunification requires that before Taiwan can be united with the mainland, "the expression of public opinion there [the mainland] should gradually be allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be implemented." The influence of democratic principles is also revealed in the KMT's redefinition of itself. Due to its origin as a revolutionary movement, the KMT had taken pride in labeling itself a "revolutionary democratic" party. However, the opposition argued that the KMT's labeling itself a "revolutionary" party was a clear sign that the KMT would under no circumstances relinquish its monopoly on power. Thus, in order to shed the authoritarian image of the party, many KMT party members demanded, with increasing intensity, a change from "revolutionary democratic" to simply "democratic" party. Before the Thirteenth Party Congress in July 1988, this controversy became a hot issue, since people expected that the Party Congress would reach a decision on it. At the Thirteenth Congress, although the KMT did not drop the term "revolutionary," it did emphasize its democratic nature rather than its revolutionary nature, and claimed that party's commitment to democracy remained unchanged. Lee Teng-hui explained that the party only used the term "revolutionary" in remembrance of its glorious revolutionary past, and in essence the party was a purely democratic one. Also, by retaining the term "revolutionary," the party expected its members to maintain the tradition of putting the interests of the nation and the party above their personal interests. Lee argued that the term "revolutionary" contains no other meaning and should not cause unnecessary concern. With democratic principles being widely accepted in the party, the KMT consciously implemented democratic reforms in line with the requirements of democracy. The KMT directed more attention to winning elections and its revolutionary mission was replaced with a commitment to constitutional democracy. The Congress gave its support to fully competitive politics, as its platform now provided for the promotion of a "healthy 132 competition among political parties on a fair and rational basis,"45 while citing a need for stability and law. Most of the party goals are directly related to campaign issues. At the Fourteenth National Congress, the KMT finally defined itself as a democratic party. It only described its revolutionary spirit in the preface of the Party Charter. This definition was by and large embraced by party members. According to a survey, 63 percent of the party members agreed to change the party from revolutionary to democratic, while 17 percent disagreed; 53 percent thought that the reforms were not fast enough, while 33 percent thought that the pace of reform was adequate.4** In any event, it seems plausible that the KMT as a whole consciously ended its tutelage and adopted purely democratic principles as its guiding principles in the transition to democracy on Taiwan. The above discussion demonstrates that democratic ideology provided the party with guiding principles during the transition to democracy. We want to further the discussion of how democratic ideology affected the party's role in this transition by examining its influence on its major leaders since the mid-1980s. In the post-Chiang period, Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pei-tsun are two prominent political leaders of the KMT who have had profound impacts on the outcome of Taiwan's transition to democracy. The following discussion demonstrates how their democratic beliefs influenced their behaviour. Lee's Democratic Ideas and Practices Lee Teng-hui was born on January 15, 1923, in Sanchih Hsiang, Taipei County. He pursued his undergraduate studies at the Kyoto Imperial University in Japan. In 1946, he returned to Taiwan and continued to study at National Taiwan University. In 1949, he 4 ^ Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 128. 4 6 Lien-ho Pao, August 17,1993. 133 obtained a bachelor's degree in agronomy. In 1951, he was the recipient of a Siho-American scholarship, and traveled to the University of Iowa to study agronomy. He later returned to teach at National Taiwan University. In 1965, he went on to pursue advanced studies again in the United States, and returned in 1968 with a doctorate in agronomy from Cornell University. This educational background likely influenced his political thought. Before assuming the presidency, he served as minister without portfolio in the Executive Yuan (1972-1978), mayor of Taipei (1978-1981), provincial governor of Taiwan (1981-1984), and vice president of the ROC (1984-1988). Lee has been frequently criticized for his arrogance, caprice and strong action within the party. His opponents, however, are mainly the members of the non-mainstream faction within the KMT. Lee's dedication to democratization has been a positive factor in the transformation of the KMT and Taiwan's transition to democracy. The Three Principles of the People did have an impact on Lee Teng-hui. The impact was revealed in a series of speeches made after he succeeded to the Presidency on the same day Chiang Ching-kuo died. Shortly after, in his first international press conference, he pointed out that the Republic of China had "a high ideal, namely, to establish a free, egalitarian, democratic China that enjoys an equal distribution of wealth." He thought that "this is a great and difficult task; but Dr. Sun Yat-sen has provided us with the blueprint to accomplish it." He urged people "to work with sincerity and unity and continue to put our ideals into practice." He argued that to accomplish this final goal, "it is important to keep the channels of communication between the government and people functioning smoothly."47 Lee stressed that Chiang Ching-kuo's greatest contribution was his effort to implement constitutional democracy. He repeatedly stated that the course of democratization was determined by the late President Chiang, and that 4 7 Lee Teng-hui, President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages: 1988 (Taipei: government Information Office, 1989), pp. 1-5. 134 it was his responsibility to carry out the late president's unfulfilled w i l l . 4 8 In various speeches and interviews, Lee demonstrated his determination to implement democratization on Taiwan. Democratic principles directed Lee Teng-hui to think about Taiwan's political development in terms of democracy. Before the 1989 elections, Lee expressed that there would always be a winning party and a losing party in a political competition; all political parties should seek democratic attainments. He further stressed that the winning party should be responsible to the voters, and the losing party should accept the decision of the majority.4^ In his presidential inauguration address delivered on May 20, 1990, Lee Teng-hui defined his aim as shaping the ROC on Taiwan into a democratic state. He promised to end the period of mobilization for the suppression of the Communist rebellion. In other words, he was willing to give up the extraordinary power granted to the president under the Temporary Provisions and return to normal constitutional rule. After his inauguration, he promoted a series of political reforms, holding the National Affairs Conference, lifting martial law, encouraging the retirement of senior legislators, etc. In order to establish an efficient two-party system, he tolerated the aggressiveness of the Democratic Progressive Party. His tolerance of the DPP created a "Lee Teng-hui sentiment" in some DPP members and in society. 50 Lee has repeatedly proclaimed that the party will play the role of a competitor, not a dominator, adding that there will be no real party politics if there is no opposition party, and the KMT should help the opposition mature. He has compared himself to an engineer and has devoted his greatest efforts to promoting democracy on Taiwan. His statements concerning nurturing the opposition reveal the KMT's efforts to 4 8 Lien-ho Pao, February 10,1993. 4 9 Lee Teng-hui, Li Tsung-t'ung Teng-hui Hsian-sheng Ch'i-shih-p'a-nien Yen-luan Hsuan-chi (Selected speeches of President Lee Teng-hui in 1989) (Taipei: News Bureau, Executive Yuan, 1990), p. 153. 50 Ou-yang Sheng, "Li Tsung-t'ung te Chih-kuo Li-nien yu Ke-hsin Ts'e-lue" (President Lee's ideal of governance and reform strategies), The Elite, Vol. 4, No. 5 (June, 1993), pp. 4-9. 135 encourage democratization from the top down. Under Lee's leadership, the KMT has demonstrated a spirit not only of toleration but also of positive willingness to accommodate at least some opposition demands.5T As for the chaotic situation after the lifting of martial law, Lee believed that this was not a negative phenomenon, and the party should not return to authoritarian rule because of this situation. He thought that in a democratic society every citizen could freely express himself, and pluralization could stimulate people's participation and guarantee human rights.52 Lee is quite aware of what he is doing and he often discusses Taiwan's political change in Western political science terminology. In a speech to the Seminar on the ROC's Democratization in January 1989, he pointed out that Taiwan could realize democratization after its economic miracle. He has argued on other occasions that the experiences of the ROC on Taiwan demonstrate that national security and social stability .. are the prerequisites for political development, while democratization can also help to guarantee national security, stimulate economic growth and prevent Communism.53 He has argued that the KMT has the capability to adapt, and that the KMT has led a "quiet revolution. "54 Hao's Democratic Ideas and Practices Hao Pei-tsun was a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy. He built his reputation as a major general during the 44-day shelling engagement with the mainland in 51 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 89. 52 Lee Teng-hui, Li Tsung-t'ung Teng-huiHsian-sheng Ch'i-shih-p'a-nien Yen-luan Hsuan-chi, p. 132. 53 ibid., p. 4. 54 Lee borrows "quiet revolution" from John Copper. See John Franklin Copper, A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1988). 136 1958. He was promoted to commander-in-chief in 1978.55 During the late years of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule, Hao brought the Political Warfare Department (a party organization in the army) under his control. He became Chief of the General Staff between 1981 and 1989. Under Hao's guidance, the army became less politicized and more professional. The continuation of his term as chief of the General Staff beyond the normal tenure indicates that he was a strong man in the military sector. At one time, Hao was widely regarded as a major conservative figure. Before the Thirteenth National Party Congress, he was deemed a leading figure of the conservative camp. However, at the critical moment of leadership succession, Hao immediately pledged loyalty as chief of the General Staff to new President Lee. Afterwards, he stated eight times that the military would support the legitimate successor of the ROC.56 In the Thirteenth Congress, Hao finished fourteenth in the Central Committee election, doing relatively well compared to other old conservatives. Hao was moved to a civilian post when he was appointed minister of defense in 1989. He quickly adjusted to his new role. When he first became the premier in the spring of 1990, he met bitter opposition from students and DPP supporters because of his military- background. People feared that the military would interfere in civilian politics and liberalization and democratization would be impeded. Students staged massive protests. Hao thus decided to give up his life-time military rank as a four-star general, and demonstrated his adept coordinating skills both within the government and with the public. He even earned the respect of his toughest opponents for his performance during legislative sessions. A month after his inauguration, public opinion polls showed that 70 percent of the public was confident in his administration.57 Despite his disagreement with President Lee, "most of Hao's behaviour can be interpreted as proper deference to 55 Hao Pei-tsun, Straight Talk (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993), p. iv. 56 Ssu-ma Wen-wu, "Hao Pei-tsun Pu Tsai Cho Ch'iang-jen?" (Hao Pei-tsun, no longer a strongman?), Hsin Hsin-wen, No. 4 (February 15,1988), pp. 44-45. 5 7 Hao, Straight Talk, p. iv. 137 his constitutional superior."58 He stated that "Lee is invested with historic responsibilities at this crucial time in the nation's democratic and constitutional development. I not only must act aggressively in consonance with him, but also render him wholehearted support to complete this chapter in history."5^ Hao is a staunch opponent of Taiwan independence. He had stormy relations with opposition lawmakers who support Taiwan independence. However he agreed to deal with this issue by the rule of law, stating that "in consideration of human rights and due legal process, we must be cautious in using the label of separatism. We will, however, deal with illegal behavior in accordance with the law."60 In an interview with William Buckley, host of the United States television programme, Firing Line, he agreed that "the advocacy or discussion of separatism itself does not constitute a criminal offense now. Especially recently, with the revision of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, some people who had advocated separatism and were punished under the original Criminal Code have had their cases dropped. Except for those using violence, all others have been released."61 Thus, generally speaking Hao played a supportive role in the peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan and worked positively for KMT intra-party democracy. His supportive role in the peaceful transition can be partly explained by his ideological belief. Hao regards himself as a "disciple" of the Three Principles of the People. He recognizes that "the fundamental ideal of a government in the Three Principles of the People is the establishment of a democratic political system ruled by law." According to his understanding, "the systems that existed during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and the Emergency Decree are part of a transition process; they were carried out under extremely formidable circumstances, in 58 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 104. 5 9 Ibid., p. 11. 6 0 Ibid., p. 27. 6 1 Hao, Straight Talk, p. 58. 138 pursuit of change and the restoration of constitutional rule, and can be considered a step in the democratic development in Taiwan." He argued that without these measures, Taiwan would have been subverted and swallowed by the communists. He believed that over the past several decades, the government had consistently carried out its policy of democratization.62 He stated in an address on the occasion of Journalists Day, 1992 that "I believe that the democracy we pursue should be the same as that of developed countries,"63 and he argued that "the democratic path that we have been pursuing is the same as taken by other advanced and democratic countries in the world." 6 4 While this statement may not be factual, the message it sends is that Hao has been willing to follow a Western style democratic path. The above discussion of the principle of the people's rights demonstrates that Sun Yat-sen's emphasis on local democracy, his tutelary approach to democratic development, and his ultimate goal of democracy have had an impact on the KMT; but the KMT interpreted its ideology regarding the extent to which people's rights should be restrained and the time at which full constitutional democracy should be restored according to its governing needs. Rivalry with the Communists on the mainland provided the KMT regime with an expedient excuse to delay Taiwan's transition to democracy. The KMT's anti-Communism has had two consequences. On the one hand, it has given the KMT the time to implement gradual liberalization and democratization. On the other hand, anti-Communism has required the KMT to build a more democratic political system than that existing on the mainland. Although at times the principle of the people's rights was little more than rhetoric to the KMT, it has in practice set the outer limit of the KMT's 6 2 Ibid., p. 7. 6 3 Ibid, p. 123 6 4 Ibid., p. 7. 139 authoritarian practice and guided the party to carry out democratic reforms when it ran out of excuses. 5. The KMT's Nationalism on Taiwan Nationalism is "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." 65 A nation is linked to a specific territory, "either to the motherland of antiquity or to the current domain over which those people who consider themselves a nation. "66 The KMT's nationalism at first followed Sun's teachings; it identified its territory with the whole of China. The following discussion will show that in the earlier years, the adherence to Chinese nationalism gave the KMT legitimacy to. rule Taiwan as part of China, but in the later years, the KMT has tended to shift to Taiwanese nationalism, which has facilitated Taiwan's transition to democracy. The retum-to-the-mainland policy was a symbol of the KMT's nationalism., The_ goal of recovering the mainland from the Communists was the first priority for Chiang Kai-shek immediately after the defeat on the mainland, although the party shifted the emphasis from mainland recovery to economic growth beginning in the mid-1950s. In the words of Thomas Gold, "All other parochial interests had to be sacrificed in order that all forces be mobilized for this overriding sacred mission. In the terms of Antonio Gramsci, the KMT constructed a 'collective national-popular will,1 articulating what it determined was the dominant ideology. It did not tolerate heterodox challenges to this orthodoxy."67 According to Chiang's Chinese nationalism, it was impossible to realize national democracy before the national reunification was achieved. 65 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1. 66 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 26. 6 7 Thomas B. Gold, "Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China," in In the Shadow of China, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), pp. 170-171. 140 In the 1960s, the ideal of recovering the mainland slowly faded to a near impossibility, although Chiang still insisted that the KMT would complete the historical task of recovering the mainland. Many still paid lip service to the goal, but few took it seriously. Under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership, although the KMT authorities still emphasized reunification, it now put more emphasis on Taiwan. Reunification would be achieved not through military means, but rather it would be achieved through political means. In its Eleventh Party Congress in March 1981, the KMT passed a resolution entitled "Reunification of China under the Three Principles of the People." Since then, this resolution has become the KMT's criterion for action on reunification.6^ This policy is clearly a retreat from the earlier policies of "reconquer the mainland" in the 1950s and "develop Taiwan, gloriously recover the mainland" in the 1960s and 1970s. Since Chiang Ching-kuo's death, "reunification of China under the Three Principles of the People" has remained the official policy. Some scholars think that nationalism "still formed an integral part of the regime's self-legitimation and Lee was in no position to repudiate it;" 6^ and that Sun's nationalism could provide the ideological grounds for reunification. In reality, under Lee's guidance, Taiwan has moved more and more to a sort of quasi-independence. People on the island describe it as the "independent Taiwan" stance, to distinguish it from the opposition's "Taiwan independence." Lee has attempted to shape Taiwan into an independent political entity, given that it is impossible to realize independence under the current reality. He wants to maintain a friendly relationship with mainland China based on equality and mutual benefits, a relationship like that between two countries. He also pushes for Taiwan's re-acceptance by the United Nations. Of course, the Independent Taiwan stance also hopes that the mainland 6 8 Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 89. 6 9 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 158. 141 undergoes substantial change; however, its aim is not to replace the CCP's regime, but to ensure Taiwan's survival. Several developments reveal Lee's independent Taiwan sentiment. The Guidelines for National Reunification, adopted in March 1991 by the National Reunification Council, is a brainchild of Lee. One principle of the Guidelines is, "The timing and manner of China's reunification should first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare." The KMT government now admits that the ROC's current jurisdiction does not include China proper, and it effectively controls the territories of Taiwan, the P'eng-hu Pescadores and two island groups of Kin-men and Ma-tsu. It only identifies its territory with these limited areas. It supports now and then such ideas as "one China, two governments," "one country, two regions" and so forth. All these deviations from Chinese nationalism have been justified by the need to be more pragmatic and flexible in dealing with the mainland. In an official statement on "Relations across the Taiwan Strait" released by the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan on July 5, 1994, the KMT authorities argue that the existence of separatism on Taiwan is a reality and that the mainland is responsible because of its antagonistic attitudes toward Taiwan. The statement argues that separatism may become the mainstream of public opinion, and that the KMT government . has to follow public opinion, implying that the government is likely to embrace Taiwan Independence or an Independent Taiwan. In important aspects, the KMT's mainland policy is in agreement with the DPP's demands. They both agree that mainland relations should not undermine Taiwan's security; cross-Strait relations should be conducted on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefits; and any negotiations between the two sides should be conducted at a government-to-government rather than party-to-party level. Generally speaking, nationalism, in Sun's original interpretation, has declined. Taiwanese nationalism is developing in the KMT. Facing the mainland's military threat, 142 the KMT is using Chinese nationalism as rhetoric to demonstrate the KMT's superficial commitment to one China, but it is trying hard to delay reunification with the PRC. Only some non-mainstreamers in the KMT and the army still believe in Chinese nationalism. The army has a long nationalistic tradition. Although the army is mainly composed of Taiwanese, it retains this tradition.^ However, generally speaking, Chinese nationalism is declining and Taiwanese nationalism is rising in the KMT on Taiwan. The KMT is no longer interested in rapid reunification with the Communist mainland, but it cannot abandon the idea of reunification. As one author puts it, "Without it, the KMT would be an emperor with no ideological clothes. As it is, the KMT is wearing far fewer ideological robes than it once did."71 Seen from the above discussion, KMT nationalism has had a great impact on Taiwan's modernization and political development; at the same time it also endured changes and adaptation. KMT nationalism is less and less centred on the whole of China, and more centred on Taiwan. This point is clearly revealed in its mainland relations. Any serious attempt to reconquer the mainland would have risked destroying the prosperity and stability that were so crucial to Taiwan's political development. The KMT has apparently taken a pragmatic attitude toward nationalism. Its compromise on Chinese nationalism facilitated its liberalizing and democratizing efforts on Taiwan. The issue of national identity on Taiwan is closely linked with democratization. With the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, native Taiwanese, the majority of the population, gain more and more power. The KMT government now bases its legitimacy almost completely on the support of the Taiwanese electorate, rather than on the hollow claim of representing the whole of China. 70 Ping-lung Jiang and Wen-cheng Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 91. 71 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 234. But we must note that nationalism is only one part of Sunism. 143 6. Conclusion When we compare Communist with non-Communist political systems, we find that ideology is one of the most salient factors that distinguishes them from each other. Ideologies define the nature of political systems. The KMT's ideology falls in the category of "guided democracy" ideologies; it is the most obvious factor that distinguishes the KMT from Leninist parties, and the KMT's efforts to liberalize and democratize, therefore, can be partly explained by the nature of Sunism. On the cognitive dimension, the KMT's ideology is committed to private ownership and a market economy, albeit with state intervention. As we saw earlier, the KMT embraces capitalism as an important ideological tenet. Taiwan had a large public-sector economy until the late 1950s; the private sector grew in importance thereafter, and capitalism has thus grown with the Nationalist rule of Taiwan. Democracy is most likely to grow with capitalism. The KMT's essentially capitalist approach to economic development increases the likelihood that it would take the democratic path eventually. Of more direct relevance, politically the KMT's ideology opposes proletariat dictatorship and embraces Western democracy. In terms of ultimate goal, the KMT's ideology has had a positive impact on political changes on Taiwan. Sunism and the Constitution of the ROC require that the KMT realize democracy in the end. Sun's tutelary approach to democracy provided the KMT with an easy excuse to maintain its authoritarian rule, but the tutelary stage could not be prolonged forever. As long as the KMT alleged its ideological commitment to Sunism, it could not legitimately maintain its authoritarian rule in extreme form or forever. As Berman observes, "Restrictions of civil rights were neither represented as necessities of the revolutionary state nor embodied in the basic constitutional order. Rather, these restrictions were presented as temporary 144 measures arising from the condition of civil war with the Communists."^ Peter Moody has a similar observation when he points out that "Kuomintang quasi-fascism was a fascism more of expediency than of principle, a sense that one must be tough because the times are tough. The ideology had no pretensions of metaphysical or permanent historical truth."73 When the immediate military threat from the mainland receded and Taiwan prospered, the KMT lost its excuse to maintain authoritarian rule. Sunism required that it goes back to constitutional order. Such a commitment was required by the regime's need to maintain its legitimacy. Therefore, the KMT's ideology contains elements that push the party to control or dominate its internal affairs and external environment, but also contains an affirmation of democracy that requires that the party always rationalize its authoritarianism by reference to extraordinary circumstances and take a lead in Taiwan's transition to democracy when such circumstances change. Indeed, the KMT has used the Three Principles of the People both to defend its earlier authoritarian rule and to justify its recent democratic reforms. Sunism also contains a programmatic dimension that has guided the KMT's approach to Taiwan's transition to democracy. Following Sun's teachings, the KMT on Taiwan took a tutelary and gradual approach to political development. As we saw earlier, the KMT applied Sun's idea of local democracy as a start to political development, but maintained authoritarian rule nationally and concentrated its efforts on economic development. The KMT's reluctance to apply democratic ideology at the national level was one reason why Lei Chen's efforts to form an opposition party failed. When the party began political reforms at the national level, it started with liberalization, and then followed with democratization. The KMT used Sun's tutelary teachings to defend its established order and to legitimate its restriction on political freedoms and political competition. The KMT also used its official ideology to achieve political stability and 7 2 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 154. 73 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 23. 145 orderly political changes. The official ideology is never purely and simply a facade. A clear and definite ideology is necessary for the party-state to control people's minds. The KMT authorities formulated a Nationalistic curriculum to indoctrinate its official ideology. By insisting on the Sunism, especially in its earlier stages, the KMT regime imposed at least a superficial "consensus on the fundamentals of politics and precluded the advocacy of any alternative ideology."74 By doing so, the KMT regime created a peaceful environment in which it could carry out political reforms according to its own agenda. Therefore, Sun's teachings did guide the KMT at least in terms of the ultimate goal of political development and the approach to achieve it. However, partly due to its tutelary approach, the influence of Sunism, in its original interpretation, declined. The relative significance of the KMT's ideology has varied during the past 45 years. In its first two decades, the KMT's ideology can be described as "revolutionary-centralizing," as its ideology was manifest and strong then. Nowadays it is less important on Taiwan. We should also note that the KMT on Taiwan actually was never as preoccupied with ideology as the Communists were. This is also a factor that has contributed to the peaceful political change on Taiwan, because when ideology is taken very seriously, the result may be intense intra-party struggles or even totalitarian efforts to ensure complete popular conformity to the party's ideology, which can be highly destabilizing. The KMT avoided such tragedy by intentionally downplaying the importance of ideology. In this aspect, the KMT can be described as a mature political party, because, as we discussed in Chapter One, ideology normally plays a crucial role in shaping the newly formed organization and in determining its collective identity, but a lesser role in directing a mature party. 7 4 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 6. 146 In addition to the general decline of ideological influence, the relative importance of the three principles has also changed. In the early postwar period, the KMT emphasized the principle of the people's livelihood. With the dramatic socioeconomic changes, the KMT might have thought that conditions were ripe for implementing full constitutional democracy according to Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. Especially in the post-Chiang era, the KMT's ideology underwent an obvious shift of emphasis, emphasizing democracy more than tutelage. The principle of nationalism declined in influence most significantly. The Thirteenth National Congress witnessed the new explanation of the Three Principles of the People. The order of the Three Principles was changed at that time to the people's rights, the people's livelihood and nationalism. The democratic principles have become the guideline for Taiwan's continuous democratizing efforts. The changing emphasis of the KMT's ideology can be explained by generational change within the party and society in general. The second generation of KMT leaders has been more influenced by Western political thought. A very high proportion of the KMT elite received advanced graduate degrees in the United States and are familiar with American democratic practices, and thus are even more sensitive than other adherents to Sunism to calls for democracy.75 Intellectuals have also contributed to the democratic ideology. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard note that "a close connection exists between the development of the discipline of political science and the development of democracy. Historically, these two have gone hand in hand. Taiwan, like Korea, has a healthy and vigorous political science profession. "76 In addition, the shift of emphasis of the Three Principles is also in part due to the opposition's pressure. The opposition has pushed the KMT to bring behaviour into line with Sun's democratic teachings. Political opposition groups on Taiwan espouse Sun's teachings, especially his principles of the people's rights and the people's livelihood. They 75 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 16. 76 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. xiv. 147 criticized the KMT for its failure to fulfill Sun's prescriptions about democratic government. For instance, oppositionists argued that the period of tutelage should have ended much earlier and the Constitution should be revived. Furthermore, the KMT had to compete with the opposition on the ideological battleground. Daniel Berman notes, "To many, the KMT's shopworn, unexciting Three Principles of the People paled by comparison."?7 Clearly, however, the ideological gap between the KMT and the opposition has narrowed in recent years. The KMT has accepted the need for more democracy and the legitimacy of the opposition. Meanwhile, the KMT has taken increasingly pragmatic positions on any issues that polls showed the electorate was concerned about. It now faces a choice in the left-right continuum. It can no longer claim that it represents the interests of all the people on Taiwan. Sunism, in its original interpretation, does not seem to attract voters. The election system requires the KMT to be constituent-oriented. However, the shift of emphasis in the KMT's ideology can also be explained by the eclectic, flexible, and pragmatic character of Sunism. Sun himself admitted that "among the various revolutionary ideas I hold, some are adopted from traditional Chinese thought, and some from Western thought..."?8 As George P. Jan points out, "Sun was one of the few Chinese revolutionary leaders of his time who did not denounce traditional Chinese culture."79 Furthermore, Sun regarded the Three Principles of the People as "an ideology that would grow and change according to the needs of the times. "80 As Lu points out, "There was no ideological basis for establishing a closed system of beliefs and 7 7 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 197 7 8 Cited in Ying-shih Yu, "Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine and Traditional Chinese Culture," in Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World, ed. Chu-yuan Cheng (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 79. 7 9 George P. Jan, "The Doctrine of Nationalism and the Chinese Revolution," inSun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World, ed. Chu-yuan Cheng (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 146. 80 Chang and Gorden, All Under Heaven, p. 96. 148 values."**! The eclectic nature of Sunism facilitated the KMT's manipulation of ideology. It offers the KMT significant leeway in managing society in a pragmatic way. Sun's tutelary design has the most pragmatic nature. It undoubtedly facilitated the KMT's rule on Taiwan, and the KMT used Sun's proposition of tutelage as a nation-building blueprint. Through tutelage, Sun meant to educate people to enjoy their freedoms and. rights. In contrast, the KMT used it mainly as a method to limit people's freedoms and rights, and to rationalize its authoritarian rule. But tutelage itself requires a shift of emphasis from political control to democracy. The changing emphasis Of the KMT's ideology reflects the natural transition from a tutelary stage of political rule to the stage of full democracy. Furthermore, Sun's original design was for the whole of China. The KMT on Taiwan was bound to modify it to some degree to accommodate Taiwan's situation. The need to accommodate to Taiwan's conditions requires the KMT to compromise, to some degree, its principles, and the KMT has done that. Thus, it is the programmatic dimension or the operative level of the KMT's ideology that causes its shift of emphasis. Therefore, the KMT's ideology has had an essentially positive impact on Taiwan's political development which has fed back to cause the ideology itself to experience some changes. Sun's teachings provided Taiwan with a political model. In the initial stage, the principle of the people's livelihood encouraged the KMT to carry out land reform that strengthened the KMT's legitimacy and laid down the basis for later rapid economic growth. Sun's preference for economic growth first encouraged the KMT to concentrate on economic development that laid down the economic basis for political development. Sun's stress on equality urged the state to invest in education which later provided people "the equality of opportunity," and enabled Taiwan to grow without serious inequality. In the meantime, the principle of the people's rights and Sun's tutelary approach to 81 Lu Ya-li, "Political Modernization in the ROC," in Two Societies in Opposition: the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years, ed. Ramon H. Myers (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), p. 112. 149 democratic development encouraged local self-governance that laid down the basis for dramatic democratization in recent years. Sun put elections in a central position in his design for political development, and this design has been largely fulfilled by the KMT on Taiwan. Over the years, the KMT's ideology experienced the shift of emphasis from tutelary notion of democracy toward notion of Western-style liberal democracy. The KMT's elitist ideology has been transformed to a constituent-oriented ideology. In adapting to electoral politics, the KMT is also converting from mainland-oriented nationalism to Taiwan-oriented nationalism. Its concerns have shifted from long range and messianic ones to short range and pragmatic ones. The fundamentally democratic nature of the KMT's ideology along with these shifts of emphasis has facilitated and promoted Taiwan's transition to democracy. 150 CHAPTER FIVE LEADERSHIP AND DIVISIONS WITHIN THE K M T 1. Introduction Up to this point this research has examined the ruling party KMT as a whole. We have discussed how the KMT as a ruling party interacted with the opposition and which ideological tenets were shared within the KMT. However, the fact that a ruling party adheres to a fundamentally democratic ideology does not mean it has no internal differences concerning the timing and pace of liberalization and democratization. Different groups within the ruling party are very likely to have different opinions regarding the transition to democracy, and the balance and compromise between these groups determine the timing and pace of the party's initiatives toward liberalization and democratization. This chapter will examine how the KMT's internal policy differences affected the party's decisions on how and when to liberalize and democratize, how the KMT's top leaders have influenced Taiwan's political development in different periods, and how the reformers have gradually gained the upper hand within the party and helped top leaders to liberalize and democratize. Since divisions in the party (the reformers vs. the conservatives) often lead to the formation of factions, this chapter will analyze the KMT's factions and their effects on the party's role in Taiwan's political development. This author argues that the orientation and actions of the top leaders and divisions in the ruling party have had a direct impact on the outcome of Taiwan's transition to democracy. Groups within the KMT who held different tactical positions on political reforms balanced each other to prevent stasis or excessively 151 rapid change. The balance and compromise between them helped promote Taiwan's peaceful and gradual transition to democracy. Before discussing the KMT's internal politics, let us first define "faction." Faction is a "grouping of persons of a different orientation than that of other members of the party."! However, some scholars writing about factionalism in mainland China state that Chinese factions differ from this definition and have some special characteristics. Lucian Pye argues that Chinese factions are not formed primarily in response to policy issues, bureaucratic interests, generational differences, or geographical bases, although these considerations do play a part. The primary basis for the formation of factions among cadres is the search for career security and the protection of power. Chinese factions are more latent than manifest, more capable of bureaucratic obstructionism than of policy initiation or implementation, and generally diffuse and imprecise concerning policy matters.2 In the case of the KMT on Taiwan, we shall find that Pye's analysis is a more appropriate description of factionalism during the first two decades of the KMT's government of Taiwan, and that policy orientation had an increasing impact on divisions in the party thereafter, although other factors have also influenced the formation of factions. Factions in Taiwan in the later periods were not so "culturally fixed" as Pye would have us believe. Thus, policy orientation will be used as a major differentiating factor in the definition of faction. It is the policy generating function of factions that has much to do with a party's role in the transition to democracy. Of course, intra-party divisions in the later periods also had something to do with power, because different groups need power to promote their policies. A change in the balance of power in the ruling party, therefore, usually also means a change of policy orientation. 1 Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 20. 2 Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlagerm Gunn & Hain, 1981). 152 Factions can be organized or unorganized. Unorganized factions are latent opinion groups formed around disputes about certain political issues, and may or may not have alternative platforms and exclusive claims for political power. Angelo Panebianco calls these kinds of factions "tendencies," as he argues that when "the groups are barely organized: they represent tendencies in a pure state."^ Factions of this kind tend to be exaggerated by the media. Actually they have a temporary and spontaneous nature, and they may disperse and reorganize when new issues appear or situations change. In the KMT's case, we shall see that in the early period on Taiwan, organized groups were purged from the party centre, and they existed only in the legislature; but unorganized or intangible groups existed throughout the party history. The KMT on Taiwan tends to be factionalized at two levels: at the local level in rural areas and at the central level. Factionalism at these two levels is quite different. Local factionalism, is based on the ethnic divisions between Hokkien and Hakka on many parts of the island, and it has little influence on the KMT's direction of political reforms. Here we are solely interested in the central level, because it is closely related to our theme of transition to democracy on Taiwan. At the central level, the KMT factions were not highly organized, especially before the mid-1980s. For the following discussion we divide the KMT's history on Taiwan into three different periods: the period of Chiang Kai-shek (the 1950s and 1960s), the period of Chiang Ching-kuo and the rise of the reformers (the 1970s and early 1980s), and the internal balance of power period (since the mid-1980s). 3 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 60; original italics. 153 2. Chiang Kai-shek Period (1949=1969) Before the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT itself was riven with factionalism. Chiang Kai-shek was a strong leader, but his power was challenged by many factions.4 There was the conservative CC clique (named after Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu) that controlled the party, the Whampoa faction in the military, and the Political Study Group of professionals and businessmen. After the retreat, Chiang kept the brothers Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu out of the reorganization scheme. The KMT leaders from the mainland who were at odds with Chiang (e.g., T.V. Sung and H.H. Kung) were ousted from the KMT's CSC. Many of the faction leaders did not follow Chiang to Taiwan, but instead fled to Hong Kong or the United States. Chiang constantly warned against the revival of factionalism, and these groups had apparently given up their efforts to maintain close knit organizations within the party. Some of the leaders of these groups remained in the Central Committee and the Central Standing Committee, but they appeared to participate in these high party organs as individuals. Chiang enjoyed absolute authority Jn.matters of appointing top party and government posts and of formulating high policies. He used personal intervention and appeal to remove differences and to soften discontent. Thus, Chiang successfully established his own paramount authority and kept the factions under control. As Tai Hungchao points out, "It is this charismatic and paternalistic quality of leadership that furnishes the basis of unity among the high echelons of the party and the government. "5 Under Chiang, however, potential factions, or in Panebianco's term, tendencies still existed. Factions were underground and the factional struggle was checked and 4 Cal Clark, Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 70. 5 Tai Hungchao, "The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan," in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 429. 154 balanced by Chiang Kai-shek with his personal authority and prestige. Moody describes the situation as follows: "The overall KMT system might perhaps be thought of as a trunk (Chiang Kai-shek) with two major branches (the Ch'en Ch'eng and Chiang Ching-kuo 'systems')."6 Personal associates of Chiang Kai-shek formed a palace faction. As the older factions, such as the CC and Whampoa groups, lost their footing on Taiwan, some of their surviving members joined the palace faction.? Chiang Kai-shek endeavoured to promote his son Chiang Ching-kuo into important positions. It had been psychologically difficult for old Chiang to trust anybody since his defeat on the mainland. Ching-kuo naturally became the most trusted aid of old Chiang. He was put in charge of suppressing opposition and implementing social control. He quickly established his power base in the party, security, military, and the youth work system. He first penetrated the party through the Central Reform Committee. Edwin Winckler notes, in the 1950s, "of the six sections of the party Central Committee, he personally directed Political Warfare, controlled Propaganda through a subordinate, and had allies running Mainland Operations. In the crucial Organizational Department and in Overseas Chinese party affairs, CCK [Chiang Ching-kuo] had to rest content with a subordinate as deputy director. "8 Ching-kuo controlled security through a Political Action Committee. He was not the formal director of the Committee, but actually ran it. The Committee integrated intelligence works under the Judicial Department and Defense Department. According to Winckler, the Committee had two organs: a secretariat and a training school; "the secretariat of the committee eventually became institutionalized as a confidential branch of the Presidential Office, while its training school became institutionalized as the 6 Peter R. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 115. 7 Ibid., p. 117 8 Edwin A. Winckler, "Elite Political Struggle, 1945-1985," in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, eds. Edwin Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988), p. 157. 1 5 5 National Security Bureau.... [This Bureau] became the core of Chiang Ching-kuo's power and an inner sanctum to which reportedly he continued to retreat for key decisions even after becoming premier and president."^ To control the army, Ching-kuo built a new General Political Warfare Department, a party organization in the army. The Department took over the political and intelligence operations previously under the control of the Whampoa clique. Ching-kuo's control of the Department helped him in the competition for political supremacy in the party-state, as well as helping the party in gaining social and political stability. General Wang Sheng became the head of this Department after Ching-Kuo. To control the young people, Ching-Kuo founded in 1952 the Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps, and he served as its first general director until 1973. The Corps had a very close relationship with the party. Ching-Kuo used it to identify and nurture his own supporters. The Youth Corps, later headed by Li Huan, became the communication bridge between Chiang Ching-kuo and intellectual circles. Ching-kuo also cultivated supporters among engineers, agricultural experts, and other technocrats when he was in charge of settling the retired soldiers in the public construction projects in the 1960s.10 In this early period the main threat to Chiang Ching-kuo's rising power came from Ch'en Ch'eng. Ch'en had been the head of the south-eastern regional administration before the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. The army Chiang brought to Taiwan was mainly from that region. Ch'en was governor of Taiwan from 1949 to 1950, a member of Central Reform Committee from 1950 to 1952, the premier from 1950 to 1954 and from 1958 to 1963, and vice chairman of the KMT and concurrently vice president of the ROC from 1954 to 9 Ibid. 1 0 Hsu Cho-yun, "Historical Setting for the Rise of Chiang Ching-kuo," mChiang Ching-kuo's Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, ed. Shao-chuan Leng (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1993), pp. 11-13. 156 1965.11 Ch'en's people included mainland technocrats and "half-mountain men," Taiwanese who worked for the KMT on the mainland before 1949. Ch'en Ch'eng's follower Wu Kuo-chen, governor of Taiwan, disliked Ching-kuo especially. In 1953 Wu resigned and moved to the United States, where he denounced the single-party dictatorship, Ching-kuo's political commissar system in the army, and the lack of democracy on Taiwan. 12 There was the rumor that Ch'en had disputes with the highest authorities regarding the personnel arrangement in his cabinet. Ch'en maintained good relationships with intellectuals, even winning the heart of Hu Shih, a liberal scholar-diplomat. Ch'en was not informed about the crackdown on Free China, an opposition journal which Hu supported.13 However, Ch'en's potential threat to Ching-kuo disappeared when he died of cancer in 1965. Ch'en's faction did not survive his death. Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo even resorted to outright purges in order to consolidate their power. The purge of General Sun Li-jen was such a case. Sun built up his reputation in the Burma campaigns during World War II. In 1949 Chiang put him in charge of military training on Taiwan. Sun was reportedly approached by U.S. agents who proposed that he take control of Taiwan with U.S. support.14 Although he refused the proposal out of personal loyalty to Chiang, he was marked as pro-American and lost Chiang's trust. Further, when he opposed the creation of the General Political Warfare Department in the military, he came into conflict with Chiang Ching-kuo. In 1955 he was purged based on charges of harbouring a Communist agent on his staff. Both Ch'en 1 1 Chien-kuo Pang, The State and Economic Transformation: the Taiwan Case (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), Appendix A, "Capsule Biographies of Policy Makers," p. 277. 12 Chiang Nan, Chiang Ching-kuo Chuan (Biography of Chiang Ching-Kuo) (Montebelo, CA.: Mei-kuo Lun-t'an She, 1984), pp. 218-219. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 73. 1 3 Huang Chia-yu, "Ch'ien-tai Tsao-ch'i te Ch'uan-li Ching-chu" (Power game in early period in Taiwan), in T'ou-shih Tang-nei P'ai-hsi (Inside factionalism in the Party), ed. Yang Hsu-sheng (Taipei, Feng-yun Lun-t'an, 1985), p. 68. 1 4 Li Sung-lin, Chiang-shih Fu-ts'u Tsai Taiwan (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo on Taiwan) (Peking: Chung-kuo You-i Ch'u-pan Kung-tzu, 1993), pp. 199-202. While it is hard to prove this point, but after the Communists took over the mainland, the United States was unsatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek and did try to replace him with somebody else. 157 Ch'eng and Chiang Ching-kuo benefited from Sun's purge, because Sun belonged neither to Ch'en's Whampoa clique nor Chiang Ching-kuo's Political Warfare system. They both wanted to keep the army free of American influence. 15 Thus, factionalism in the KMT was strictly forbidden during this period. Chiang Kai-shek especially restricted the liberal tendency in the party, as shown in his crackdown on Free China's democratizing push. Forbidding factionalism did not necessarily eliminate it, and liberal tendency always existed within the party. Actually, although Chiang imprisoned Lei Chen and some of his followers, he offered Hu Shih, the founder of Free China and the symbol of liberalism on Taiwan, the presidency of the Academia Sinica, the highest academic position in the ROC. 16 T'ao Pai-chuan, a typical May Fourth liberal intellectual who was also a member of the Control Yuan and an advisor to both Chiangs, was virtually unaffected by the issue. He even tried to help Sun Li-jen and Lei Chen when he worked as a member of the investigation team on their cases. The existence of different tendencies explains why different policy opinions could re-emerge in later periods. Nevertheless, by strictly forbidding factionalism, Chiang Kai-shek asserted his own authority and could plan the ROC's political development according to his own scheme. Organized factions of the KMT survived only in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan was dominated by the KMT. In the 1950s and 1960s, KMT members were basically divided into two factions in the Legislative Yuan: the seminar faction and the CC faction. Major figures of the former faction included Ni Wen-ya, Chao Tzu-chi, and Chang Pao-shu. Major figures of the later faction included Liang Su-jung, and Chang Tzu-yang. The CC faction was dominant in the KMT in the mainland era, and thus was held responsible for the KMT's failure on the mainland. The seminar group supported 15 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 73. 16 C.L. Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 79. 158 Ch'en Ch'eng and was the mainstream faction in the legislature. The CC faction, repudiating the old image of dictatorship, began to play the role of the opposition within the party. They often allied themselves with other old non-KMT members. They argued for reform, democracy and the rule of law in the legislature. In 1958, the Executive Yuan proposed amendments to the publication law which would further restrict publications. The CC clique strongly opposed the proposal, which was passed with some minor revisions. In the same year the CC group also succeeded in reducing a proposed utilities price hike from 54 percent to 32. percent, demonstrating its sympathy with the grassroots. 17 In contrast, the mainstream faction always supported the bills submitted by the Executive Yuan. KMT factionalism also extended to another par