THE RULING PARTY AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: 
THE CASE OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST PARTY (THE KMT) ON TAIWAN 

by 

PAUL W. HAO 

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Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date Oct. 10, 1996
ABSTRACT

The Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) has been a major agent of Taiwan's transition to democracy. It is rare that a ruling party initiates the transition to democracy from within an authoritarian regime, therefore it is interesting to explore how and why the KMT has played a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. A historical approach is employed to analyze the role of the KMT in Taiwan's transition to democracy and to explain the reasons that led the KMT to play such a role. The thesis demonstrates that socioeconomic, external and other "ecological" factors have had only an indirect impact on Taiwan's transition to democracy. It finds that the KMT made several crucial decisions that started Taiwan down the path to democracy. The KMT's ability to play a positive role is explained by the party's own nature and characteristics. Firstly, the KMT's ideology guided it to play a positive role in Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy, because Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are fundamentally democratic, although tutelary and pragmatic in terms of the means to achieve the democratic end. Secondly, the KMT was able to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy because the top leaders of the party generally agreed on the need for change, although they had different opinions about the timing and pace of change. Chiang Ching-kuo and a group of reformers contributed most to the establishment of democratic values and procedures in the KMT party-state. The co-existence of conservative and reformist factions in the party balanced the needs for stability and change, and resulted in a gradual process of transition. Thirdly, the KMT's recruitment and organization helped the party to play a positive role in the transition to democracy. Through Taiwanization and technocratization, the KMT made itself more representative and capable. The KMT has a huge and well-coordinated organization which was used mainly as a tool of social control in the earlier authoritarian period and then as a tool of electoral mobilization in the later period on Taiwan. The adaptability and strength of the KMT contributed to the party's confidence in initiating and leading the transition to democracy on Taiwan.
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Taiwan has developed rapidly both economically and politically in the last five decades. Western scholars have paid more attention to the economic aspects of Taiwan's development than to the political aspects. Along with its rapid economic growth, Taiwan has also experienced a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, with democratization culminating in the 1996 presidential election.

The March 1996 presidential election on Taiwan was the first direct popular presidential election ever held on the island. Since it was the first one in Chinese history, it attracted worldwide attention. The People's Republic of China's missile and military exercises in Taiwan Strait also contributed to the international attention to Taiwan's presidential election. Two things are noteworthy about this election. First, despite mainland China's military threat, the election was held and conducted peacefully and in an orderly manner. Second, the ruling party Kuomintang's (KMT, the Nationalist Party) candidate Lee Teng-hui garnered 54 percent of the votes, while the major opposition party DPP's candidate got only 21 percent of the votes; thus the ruling party maintained its dominance on Taiwan. The argument of this thesis is that it was the KMT which brought about Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy and that the KMT permitted, facilitated and led the transition process. While the 1996 presidential election is the most visible sign of democratization, it may give people the false impression that Taiwan's transition to democracy is being rapidly realized. This thesis will show that Taiwan's emerging democracy is the result of decades of gradual political development;
democratization was preceded by the KMT-initiated liberalization, and this liberalization was preceded by two decades of the KMT's self consolidation and tight social control.

In recent years, political scientists have recorded and analyzed the overall process of political transition on Taiwan. Although no one could avoid mentioning the ruling party KMT in the study of political change on Taiwan, this author feels that we need a more thorough and in-depth study of it.¹ The KMT has been a leading force in economic, social, and political changes on Taiwan. As John F. Copper points out, "Understanding the Nationalist Party's structure and influence on politics at all levels is a sine qua non for understanding the political processes in Taiwan."²

According to Peter R. Moody, Jr., a party-state system is the most difficult to democratize, and "the major obstacle to democratization often comes down to a determination to preserve the ruling position of the party. Yet on Taiwan the KMT has been a major agent of democratization."³ It is rare that a ruling party initiates the transition to democracy from within an authoritarian regime,⁴ therefore it is interesting to

⁴ Alfred Stepan summarizes eight paths toward redemocratization. The fourth path is redemocratization initiated from within the authoritarian regime, and within this path redemocratization initiated by the civilian leadership is one of three subtypes. He only includes Spain after the death in 1975 of General Franco in this subtype. Therefore, such a case is really rare in the world. See "Paths toward Redemocratization," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part III, pp. 64-84. Also note that what Stepan studies are all cases of redemocratization. If peaceful transition is difficult in cases of redemocratization, it is probably more difficult in countries that have never experienced democracy. Considering that Taiwan has no prior democratic experience, the KMT case is even more peculiar.
explore why the KMT could play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. This author believes that there are intra-party reasons for the KMT's positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

Furthermore, Taiwan's transition to democracy has been basically peaceful. Violence is often associated with democratization. But as David E. Apter points out, there are important exceptions. He gives the examples of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. It is well-known that in the economic realm Taiwan realized rapid economic growth without serious inequality. Similarly, in the political realm, Taiwan has been liberalizing and democratizing without serious instability up to the present. We need to explore why Taiwan has become an exception. This author believes that the peacefulness of Taiwan's transition to democracy has much to do with the role played by the ruling party.

This study examines the following questions. How has Taiwan been able to achieve the peaceful transition to democracy? Why has the KMT been willing to initiate liberalization and democratization? What reform measures has the KMT taken in liberalizing and democratizing the Taiwanese political system? What is the role of the KMT's official ideology (the "Three Principles of the People") in Taiwan's transition to democracy? Why did the conservatives in the KMT not succeed in stopping the transition

to democracy, if they made such an effort? What changes have happened within the KMT that encouraged the party to take the lead in the transition to democracy? What lessons can we draw for other developing countries from the KMT's experiences?

There are several explanations given in the literature for Taiwan's transition to democracy. The socioeconomic explanation is the one most often advanced. Other explanations point to such factors as Taiwan's peculiar situational conditions, international pressure, etc. Since the emergence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), many scholars have attributed democratization to the dynamic pressure of an opposition party.

These single-factor explanations all have some merit. Indeed, Taiwan's transition to democracy is closely interrelated with the socioeconomic changes, and we shall discuss the role of these factors in Chapter Two. However, these factors are not sufficient to explain Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy by themselves. This study will focus on factors internal to the KMT (such as ideology, leadership and organization) and their importance in preparing the party to play a positive role in the overall transition to democracy on Taiwan. We shall discuss how the KMT dealt with external factors and mediated their impact on the internal changes in the KMT. Socioeconomic and other factors play a role in Taiwan's transition to democracy mainly through their influence on the KMT's decisions regarding whether to maintain authoritarian rule or to liberalize and democratize. This study will not argue that the nature and characteristics of the ruling party KMT are the only explanation for Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. What this study argues is that the KMT has had a more direct impact than other factors on Taiwan's transition to democracy, and has played an important and positive role in Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. Without the KMT's readiness to take the initiative, to adapt and to compromise, Taiwan's peaceful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system would have been very difficult, if not impossible. The KMT's emphasis on stability, its gradual approach to political development, and its ability to
maintain its dominance are the keys to understanding the peaceful transition to
democracy on Taiwan.

Enlightened by Charles Andrain's suggestion that political changes involve
transformations in three basic parts of the political regime -- beliefs, process, and
structures,7 I shall focus my discussion of the KMT on the following aspects: official
ideology, leadership and internal divisions, and organization and recruitment. Through a
discussion of these aspects we will show the internal reasons for the KMT's role in
Taiwan's transition to democracy. We believe that the nature of and changes in the ruling
KMT have great impacts on Taiwan's political system. The role of the ruling party in the
transition to democracy is determined by the nature of and adaptive changes in the ruling
party's ideology, leadership and internal divisions, and organization and recruitment.
Whether the authoritarian regime is transformed peacefully depends on (1) whether the
official ideology of the ruling party is fundamentally democratic and pragmatic, (2)
whether the party leadership is enlightened and the reformers and the conservatives can
reach a balance and compromise regarding the timing and pace of the transition to
democracy, and (3) whether the party is strong enough and adaptive enough to maintain
its dominance through changing environment as it makes the change from a quasi-
Leninist organization to an election machine more representative of the population.

This study is limited in scope. If the transition to democracy can be discussed at
four levels (ideology, institutions, civil society, and culture),8 this study focuses almost
exclusively on the political ideological and institutional levels. It does not examine the

7 Charles F. Andrain, Political Change in the Third World (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin,
8 Francis Fukuyama believes that "there are four levels on which the consolidation of democracy
must occur..." Level one is ideology, level two is institutions, level three is civil society, and level
1995, pp. 7-8. We should note that Fukuyama is discussing the consolidation of democracy. It
seems that level four and three are more important than level one and two in the discussion of the
consolidation of democracy. In contrast, this study focuses on the emergence of democracy; thus
it is concerned exclusively with level one and two.
degree to which democratization has or has not occurred within the broader society or culture.

Besides this introduction, there are seven chapters to this thesis. Chapter One defines key terms used by this thesis and introduces relevant theories. The thesis mainly applies the theories of transition to democracy, but also incorporates some other theories to supplement the former theories. Chapter Two deals with socioeconomic, cultural, international, and mainland China factors. It attempts to show that these "ecological" factors, though providing important conditions for democracy, are not the directly determining factors that have caused Taiwan's transition to democracy, and that, in comparison, the ruling KMT has played a more determining role in the process.

Chapter Three discusses the dependent factor. It tries to show that through four decades of political development Taiwan has basically democratized and that the KMT has played an adaptive and positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. This is shown mainly by a discussion of the interaction of the KMT with the opposition.

The following chapters explain why the KMT has been able to play such a role, discussing such independent factors as official ideology, party leadership and divisions within the party, and party recruitment and organization. Both the nature of and the adaptive changes in these factors will be discussed. Chapter Four deals with the KMT's official ideology, the Three Principles of the People. It attempts to show that Sun Yat-sen's doctrine facilitated the KMT's implementation of tutelage in its early periods on Taiwan, but also guided the party to carry out liberalization and democratization when other compelling interests did not preclude acting on it. Chapter Five deals with the political process within the KMT, including the top leadership and the divisions within the party. It attempts to show that the top KMT leaders had a decisive influence on Taiwan's political development in different periods, and enlightened leaders, with the assistance of the reformers, greatly facilitated Taiwan's transition to democracy. At the same time, the co-existence of the reformers and the conservatives in the party balanced
the need for change and stability. Chapter Six deals with the KMT's recruitment and organization. It attempts to show that the KMT's inclusive recruitment and strong organization contributed to its confidence in opening up, and that the KMT transformed itself from an authoritarian party to a competitive party mainly geared for elections, thus making it possible for the party to play a positive role in the transition to democracy. These chapters are closely interconnected. For instance, the interaction between the KMT and the opposition is closely related to the internal politicking in the KMT. We discuss them in separate chapters only for analytical convenience.

On the basis of empirical studies, we shall in the last chapter attempt to do theoretical rethinking and to analyze the applicability of the KMT's experience to other parts of the world. The experience of the KMT may well be used to further our understanding of the development of party politics in the Third World, and to enrich our theories of political parties. I shall also discuss the possible future of the KMT and party politics on Taiwan. But let me first introduce some useful theories in the following chapter.
CHAPTER ONE  RESEARCH METHOD AND RELEVANT THEORIES

1. Research Method and Data Sources

A historical approach will be employed in this dissertation. Only through a historical analysis can we see clearly Taiwan's long course of transition to democracy and the role of the KMT in the transition. Only through historical analysis, can we identify factors that determine the process of institutional and systemic change. A historical case study, however, always involves risk. The researcher may enter too far into the analysis of the case, and so forget or think it impossible to generalize in a theoretically comparative way. Often, a case study tends to investigate so thoroughly the specific and unrepeatable characteristics of the case that it falls into the idiosyncratic fallacy. The transition to democracy on Taiwan does have its own specific characteristics. It happened in a peculiar domestic and international context, and has been initiated by the ruling party. These uniquely differentiating features would seem to imply that the analysis of Taiwan's transition to democracy has no general relevance. They tempt one to answer the question, 'Can Taiwan's transition be imitated?' with a straightforward 'No.' Yet this, as we shall see, is to take too simplistic an approach to the question. Taiwan was not the only authoritarian regime in the world. During the past two decades, certain other authoritarian regimes have been experiencing transitions to democracy. Emerging theories of transition to democracy provide us some explanations that can be used to analyze the case of Taiwan. Although some conditions are specific to Taiwan's transition to democracy, we can still draw some lessons from the case. While the unique
developmental process of a country cannot be imitated, the general principles and the
strategy which lie behind the process may certainly have lessons for similar authoritarian
regimes.

I shall explore specific information on the nature and changes of the interaction
between the KMT and the opposition, the KMT's official ideology, the party's leadership
and internal divisions, and its recruitment and organization. Only based on the judgment
of these aspects, can we discover the full role the KMT has played in Taiwan's transition
to democracy and the internal dynamics that caused it to play such a role.

Data will be drawn from 4 sources: (1) previous literature on the KMT, (2) official
files, (3) newspapers and magazines, and (4) interviews.

Previous Literature Western interest in Taiwanese politics is a very recent
development. There were very few English books on Taiwan's politics published before
the rapid change during the mid-1980s on Taiwan. In recent years, literature on Taiwan
has become abundant, for instance, the book series Taiwan in the Modern World
published by M. E. Sharpe, Inc. Many facts used in this thesis are drawn from these
books. However, although no book on contemporary Taiwanese politics can avoid
mentioning the KMT, there are very few books specifically dealing with the ruling party
and its role in Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy, with the exception of Peter
Moody's general account.\(^1\) Also, the majority of these works focus on contemporary
Taiwan, while this thesis examines the KMT in historical perspective.

Official Files Supplementary to the sources in English, I went to Taiwan to do
field research and collected materials in Chinese. These include official files, books,
pamphlets, magazines, and M. A. and Ph. D. dissertations. Official files include the KMT
party documents, statistical data, and some Republic of China (ROC) yearbooks. They
also include publications given by the Cultural Department of the KMT's Central

\(^1\) Peter R. Moody, Jr., Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New
Committee and Government Information Office. Some basic materials such as data about KMT party congresses and elections are drawn from official files. These materials provided information to construct organizational charts of the KMT and statistical tables to support this thesis' arguments.

Newspapers and Magazines The most frequently referred to newspaper in researching this thesis was *Lien-ho Pao* (United news). Although the publisher of *Lien-ho Pao* (Wang Ti-wu, died in April 1996) was a high-ranking KMT member, it is a private newspaper. Other Newspapers referred to in researching this thesis include *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (The central daily news), which is the KMT's official party paper, and *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China times), another major private newspaper. In addition, the following magazines and journals, including *Hsin Hsin-wen* (New news weekly) in Taiwan, *Taiwan Yen-chiu* (Taiwan studies) and *Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an* (Taiwan research quarterly) in mainland China, and *Chiu-shih Nien-tai* (The nineties) and *Ching-pao Yueh-k'an* (The mirror) in Hong Kong, provided research data.

Interviews A dozen relevant persons were interviewed on Taiwan in the summer of 1994. People from four categories were interviewed. First are the KMT party officials, such as former director of KMT Organizational Department Kuan Chung (John C. Kuan). Next are KMT representatives in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, such as legislator Hung Hsiu-chu (female) and National Assemblyman Feng Ting-kuo. The third category of interviewees are opposition party members, such as former KMT and then New Party legislators Chao Shao-k'ang and Li Ch'ing-hua (a son of Li Huan), and former DPP Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh. The final category of interviewees are political science professors, such as Ming Chu-cheng (who also serves as deputy secretary general of China Reunification Alliance), Yang Tai-shuen (who also serves as president of the Democracy Foundation), Lin Bih-jaw (who also served as head

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2 *Lien-ho Pao* was created in 1949, with a merger of three newspapers in response to adverse economic conditions.
of the Institute of International Relations), etc. While these interviews are not the main sources of data for this dissertation, they serve to provide impressions about political development on Taiwan and as a basis to judge previous literature on the KMT. Some interviewees have very good educational backgrounds, and they facilitated this research by providing copies of their works. I had planned to interview people of various categories. The realities of accessibility to party members and officials resulted in the interviews being focused on young party elites rather than veterans, on non-mainstreamers rather than mainstreamers, and on mainlanders rather than native Taiwanese. Realizing this limitation, I paid attention to viewpoints of veterans, mainstreamers and Taiwanese from other sources.

2. Relevant Theories

This thesis attempts to elaborate on the role of the ruling party in the peaceful transition to democracy, and to examine how the nature and adaptive changes of the ruling party influenced its role in this process. The role of the ruling party in the transition to democracy is determined by its nature and adaptive changes. Throughout the thesis, transition to democracy means transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system. We are especially interested in peaceful transitions. Furthermore, our interest focuses on the type of transition that is, to a large extent, initiated by the ruling party. This type of transition is the opposite of replacement.³

³ In this sense, I agree with Samuel Huntington. He argues that "transformation (or, in Linz's phrase, reforma) occurred when the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democracy. Replacement (Linz's ruptura) occurred when opposition groups took the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was overthrown." The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 114.
There are not many theories about the role of the ruling party in the peaceful transition to democracy. The surge of democratization is quite a recent phenomenon and there are not many cases of ruling party-initiated transitions to democracy. Theories are just emerging from these cases. However, concepts and explanations can be drawn or borrowed from theories about the transition to democracy, and from theories about single party systems. We shall first discuss the definitions of democracy, liberalization and democratization. Then explanations and theories of the transition to democracy will be introduced and discussed in the light of the KMT case. Theories about political parties and political change are abundant. However, no single theory can adequately explain the KMT case without modification. This thesis will mainly apply theories of the transition to democracy, but at the same time introduce other relevant theories, and draw from them useful concepts, classifications, and explanations to analyze the case of the KMT.

Democracy

In the most general sense, democracy means rule by the people. Although rule by the people is the essence of democracy, in reality this definition can hardly distinguish authoritarian from democratic regimes. All Communist regimes claim that they are democratic, believing that proletarian dictatorship is the only true form of rule by the people. On the other hand, studies of the American political system, which most of us regard as democratic, show that "the key political, economic, and social decisions are made by 'tiny minorities'." Thus the definition "rule by the people" can hardly be used to analyze a specific political system, and we need more specific criteria in judging whether a political system is democratic or not.

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It is not difficult to find other definitions of democracy. There are broad and narrow, and normative and operative definitions. David Held presents a very comprehensive definition of democracy. He bases his definition on the principle of autonomy. He argues that "individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives," civil society should be protected from the state, and the state should be accountable to the people.⁵ A broad definition would include honest elections, impartial laws, civil and political freedoms, indefeasible rights of private parties against political powers, and an independent judicial system.⁶

A narrow and operative definition does not include every item. Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy simply as a mechanism for choosing political leadership.⁷ Robert Dahl continues this operative line of definition and emphasizes the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens. But he includes more institutional guarantees in his notion of democracy. These include the freedom to form and join organizations, the freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes.⁸ These eight conditions outlined by Dahl are condensed by some authors into three main dimensions of democracy, namely competition, participation, and civil and political liberties.⁹

Other scholars seem to choose from these three elements in their definition of democracy. Huntington's definition is simply based on the concepts of contestation and participation. He believes that the civil and political freedoms of speech, assembly and press are only ancillary principles that make the democratic system work. He classifies a

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⁸ Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 3.
system as democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."\textsuperscript{10}

Share and Mainwaring would like to include civil and political freedoms, but exclude participation in their definition. According to them, a democracy is a political regime with free competitive elections, and with universal adult suffrage. Democratic regimes afford freedom of speech and the press, freedom of political association, and individual rights. These institutions ensure the basic rights and political competition that are essential to democracy. "Democracy implies the possibility of an alternation in power." Free competitive elections, universal adult suffrage, freedom of speech, of press, and of political association make possible such an alternation.\textsuperscript{11}

This thesis uses Share and Mainwaring's definition, and does not use participation in this definition because its relationship with democracy is obscure. Democracy does not necessarily have a high rate of participation, while authoritarian regimes may reach over 99 percent participation. Likewise, a fall in voter turn-out does not necessarily imply a corresponding decline in democracy.

Following the operative line of definition, this study regards competitiveness as the main element in democracy. As we have confined our discussion of the transition to democracy only to the ideological and institutional levels, we also limit the definition of competitiveness to the institutional level. Competitiveness means that all effective positions of government power can be competed for by individuals and organized groups. Competition "enables citizens to constrain governments because they can dismiss a government;" furthermore, "competition provides for citizen control, in the sense that, because of competition, citizens can develop preferences about social objectives and then

\textsuperscript{10} Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave}, p. 7.
express these preferences through devices (like voting) which provide some kind of connection between preferences and outcomes.\textsuperscript{12} In modern time competitiveness is realized mainly by party competition through elections. As Schattschneider proclaimed, democracy was unthinkable without party competition.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, for competition to be meaningful, citizens must enjoy basic political and civil rights. These basic political and civil rights include freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form and join organizations.

**Liberalization and Democratization**

Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring believe, "Transitions to democracy involve both liberalization and democratization."\textsuperscript{14} However, like the definition of democracy, there are also competing definitions of liberalization and democratization. We shall first discuss the definition of liberalization, which will make it easier for us to then define democratization.

Some authors give the term liberalization a broad definition which includes the right to form political parties. In Kevin J. Middlebrook's account, political liberalization involves "the expansion of alternative mobilization channels through legalizing additional opposition parties and creating new opportunities for political competition and representation in the electoral and legislative arenas."\textsuperscript{15} Georg Sorensen argues that "increasing liberalization means increasing the possibility for political opposition and competition for government power."\textsuperscript{16} However, this broad definition of liberalization is

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\textsuperscript{14} Share and Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction," p. 177.


almost equivalent to some definitions of democratization, and later this thesis will define democratization in terms of an institutionalized guarantee of competitiveness.

Others would rather exclude competition from the definition of liberalization. O'Donnell and Schmitter restrict the definition of liberalization to include only "the process of redefining and extending rights" to individuals and social groups.17 Space for oppositional political activity is thereby created, albeit within a framework still controlled by the authoritarian regime. Huntington has a similar point of view, and he argues that "liberalization...is the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections."18 Share and Mainwaring use virtually the same definition, and argue that "liberalization refers to a decline in repression and the reestablishment of most basic civil and political rights but without permitting competitive elections that would allow for an alternation in power."19

These definitions of liberalization emphasize different aspects of democracy. Some emphasize competition, while others emphasize civil and political rights. Those who define liberalization in terms of rights tend to believe that competition should be excluded so as to be used to define democratization. Among those who emphasize rights, some include every kind of rights, including the right to life, security, the ownership of property, and the right to form a political party; while others believe only freedoms of speech, assembly and press ought to be included.

The definition used in this thesis is based on O'Donnell, Schmitter, Huntington, Share and Mainwaring's definitions. In our context liberalization means political liberalization. It is the process of extending basic political freedoms (i.e., freedoms of speech, assembly and press) to the people and loosening the control of oppositional

18 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 9.
political activity. In the liberalization process, the electoral system may be partially opened, but freely competitive elections are not instituted. Correspondingly, we also use Share and Mainwaring's definition of democratization; thus "Democratization refers to the establishment of institutional arrangements that make possible an alternation [in power]."20

Liberalization and democratization have close relations. O'Donnell and Schmitter point out that without the guarantees of basic freedoms realized through liberalization, democratization "risks degenerating into mere formalism." On the other hand, without the establishment of institutional arrangements realized through democratization, "liberalization may prove to be easily manipulated and retracted at the convenience of those in government."21 According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, however, liberalization and democratization may not occur simultaneously. The transition usually starts with liberalization, which tends to accumulate and lead to democratization. Democratization is not the only possible outcome of liberalization. Liberalization can exist without democratization. Nevertheless, "once some individual and collective rights have been granted, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify withholding others." They find that "in all the experiences examined, the attainment of political democracy was preceded by a significant, if unsteady, liberalization."22

Party Systems

We have defined democracy in terms of competitiveness and freedoms, and we have argued that competitiveness is usually enacted via party competition. In fact, the political system is closely related to the party system. Authoritarian political systems

20 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 10.
usually employ noncompetitive party systems, while democratic systems usually employ competitive party systems. The transition to democracy is, in part, the transition from a noncompetitive to a competitive party system. Consequently, we need to classify party systems.

Giovani Sartori provides us with an overall framework for classification of party systems. Sartori's typology of party polities is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>noncompetitive</th>
<th>competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one-party--hegemonic</td>
<td>predominant--twopartism--multipartism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totalitarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pragmatic</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Sartori maintains that in the political arena it is not actual competition which is the most important feature but the existence of potential competition. Based on this notion, he distinguishes states where only one party is permitted to contest elections from those states where opposition parties may form. Thus, the one-party regimes in the USSR and Yugoslavia were not comparable with the one-party regimes in Mexico or the southern states of the USA. He argues that "the critical juncture lies between the hegemonic systems, on the one hand, and the predominant systems, on the other. Hence the pertinent question is: Can these two systems be converted into one another without breakdown, i.e., continuously, via inner transformation?" He answers that "while the one party can be easily transformed into a hegemonic party, the step that follows is a most

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difficult one."\textsuperscript{24} He doubts that unipartism can transform itself (i) \textit{by itself} and (ii) \textit{successfully}, into a competitive party system.\textsuperscript{25}

The Role of the Ruling Party in Transition to Democracy

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter argue that the transition to democracy usually starts with liberalization when authoritarian incumbents begin to modify their own rules and loosen political control. Liberalization has the effect of lowering the costs of opposition. If the process of liberalization is not reversed, it tends to accumulate and lead to democratization. Another possible outcome of liberalization is that the regime loses control of liberalization and liberalization leads to the collapse of the regime. It seems that whether liberalization can smoothly transit to democratization depends on the strength and tactics of the regime.

The "transition to democracy" school stresses the political choices and tactics of regime and opposition leaders. A peaceful transition requires the "careful, sensible tactics adopted by both the government and the opposition parties to avoid violent clashes."\textsuperscript{26} It requires communication, negotiation and compromise between regime and opposition. It requires "a sequence of piecemeal reforms" on the part of regime and the willingness on the part of opposition "to play within the initially very restricted games allowed them by authoritarian regimes."\textsuperscript{27} While the regime agrees to restore basic individual rights and tolerate some civic contestation over policy, the opposition will agree to give up violence and the claim to govern immediately. The regime and the opposition may negotiate a pact

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 276 and p. 281.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 277.
\textsuperscript{26} Leo E. Rose, "Pakistan: Experiments with Democracy," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 140.
\textsuperscript{27} Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 43.
"which seeks to define ... rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it."28 Share and Mainwaring call this type of transition "transition through transaction."29 The process is a difficult one, because usually after the opening of liberalization people from all walks of life begin to test the limit of liberalization and partial democratization. In some cases popular upsurges ensue.

Although the process of transition can partly show how the ruling party can play a positive role, there are more factors we can find within the ruling party. These factors include the ruling party's ideology, leadership and divisions within the ruling party, and the strength and adaptability of party organization.

Ideology

Ideology or the ruling elites' attitude toward official ideology is a determining factor in the fate of transition to democracy. A pro-democracy ideology can be easily used by leadership and reformers to justify the transition to democracy. When discussing the failure of democratization in Latin America after World War II till the 1970s, O'Donnell points out two ideological factors: "One of them was that most intellectuals were actively hostile to those exercises in democracy. The second factor was the ambiguity and opportunism with which major political parties assessed the very idea of democracy."30 In assessing the future of newly established democracies in Latin America, O'Donnell is confident because he discovers that "most political and cultural forces of any weight now attribute high intrinsic value to the achievement and

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29 Share and Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transaction."
consolidation of political democracy.31 However, despite the importance of ideology, O'Donnell and others who study the transition to democracy never elaborate the role of ideology in the transition to democracy. In the following paragraphs, we first define ideology, and then borrow some theories about ideology in one-party system studies.

Ideology is a system of beliefs that aspires to explain, to prescribe, and to change the world. There are two basic dimensions of ideology. One is the cognitive dimension and the other is the programmatic dimension.32 The cognitive dimension refers to an ideology's world view. Leon P. Baradat believes that ideology includes an assessment of the status quo and a view of the future. It envisages the future as something better than the present or the past.33 The programmatic dimension of ideology contains a definite plan of action by which this better future can be attained. As Rejai points out, "The action or program of an ideology may be directed toward the maintenance and perpetuation of the status quo or, more characteristically, toward changing the existing social order. The needed change, in turn, may be either reformist or radical in nature. Reformist, peaceful, or gradual change is the way of democratic ideologies: we must persuade and educate the people to help us reach our limited objectives.... Radical, violent, and rapid change is the way of totalitarian ideologies."34 Thus, ideologies are action-related systems of beliefs. They give specific directions about the steps that must be taken to realize their beliefs. "In its policy-related aspects, ideology shapes the purposes and priorities of political action."35 On the other hand, ideologies can be used to defend a particular established

31 Ibid., p. 15.
34 Rejai, Political Ideologies, p. 9.
order, because, by definition, ideologies are intended to legitimate certain activities or arrangements. Thus, ideology can also play an important role in political stability.

In many Third World countries, the official ideology is so-called "guided democracy" or "tutelary democracy." In this context, "official" means that the ideology is the authoritative, formal, and often sole ideology. This kind of ideology is authoritarian ideology. It is different from both Western democratic and totalitarian ideologies, but stays somewhere in between these two poles. On the cognitive dimension, authoritarian ideology shares with the democratic ideology the vision of a good society and future. Basically its goal is the realization of democracy. However, it differs from democratic ideology in the programmatic dimension. Since democracy is yet to be realized, stages to democracy have to be envisaged, and some restrictions have to be maintained in the early stages. On the other hand, authoritarian ideology is also quite different from totalitarian ideology. For one thing, unlike a totalitarian ideology, which seeks to control every aspect of the society, be it cultural, economic, historical, social, or political, authoritarian ideology seeks limited -- typically political -- control. For another, totalitarian ideology seeks, at least initially, mass mobilization, while authoritarianism seeks "only pacified and submissive populations." An authoritarian ideology leaves much more room for potential development of democracy than does a totalitarian ideology.

There are different types of authoritarian ideologies. James Coleman and Carl Rosberg distinguish between the "pragmatic-pluralistic pattern" and the "revolutionary-centralizing trend." The differentiating factors include the degree of ideological preoccupation, and the scope, depth, and tempo of modernization objectives. Thus, ideologies of the pragmatic-pluralistic pattern have limited preoccupation, and are adaptive and aggregative of a tolerated but controlled pluralism. Ideologies of the

36 Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, p. 8.
37 Rejai, Political Ideologies, p. 74.
revolutionary-centralizing type have heavy preoccupation, and are revolutionary, transformative, and anti-traditional. Coleman and Rosberg's account is necessarily static. But we can use it to discern the dynamic change of ideology. Actually, Huntington does just this task.

Huntington believes that the evolution from a revolutionary one-party system into an established one-party system goes through three phases: transformation, consolidation, and adaptation. Correspondingly, ideology of the one-party system also changes. Ideology is manifest and strong in the first phase, but it becomes pragmatic in the second phase, and it becomes more open in the third phase. Thus, in the established one-party system "ideology is less important in shaping its goals and the decisions of its leaders."40

Coleman, Rosberg and Huntington notice that some ideologies contain pragmatic elements. While it seems that pragmatism and ideology are the opposites of each other, they are actually compatible. Ideologies can be pragmatic or dogmatic. Furthermore, different ideologies definitely have different impacts on political outcomes. A pragmatic ideology will render a political party less preoccupied with ideology, adaptive to its circumstances, and tolerant to some degree of different ideas.

As for why ideology changes, we find that Martin Seliger's theory is helpful. He distinguishes between the fundamental and operative levels of ideology. Seliger believes that the beliefs and principles of ideology are constantly confronted with the need to make it feasible in the real world. Such a need compromises the principles. He points out that "Compromises cause ideology to bifurcate into the purer, and hence more dogmatic, fundamental dimensions of argumentation and the more diluted, and hence more

39 Ibid.
pragmatic, operative dimension. The tension between fundamental and operative dimensions of ideology may lead to the change of the ideology.

Leadership and Divisions within the Ruling Party

In addition to ideology, another factor that determines the outcome of the transition to democracy is the leadership and divisions within the ruling party. Theories of the transition to democracy note the importance of the ruling elite's decision to pursue democracy. This is an aspect that needs further elaboration. Almost everyone studying the transition to democracy agrees that the role of political leadership is an important factor in the transition process. The actions, values, choices, and skills of the leaders matter a lot. A leadership firmly committed to democracy is always helpful. One obvious case is that of Mustafa Kemal and later President Inonu in Turkey. But the self-aggrandizing ambitions and authoritarian styles of the leaders may turn a democratic system into an authoritarian rule, such as the rule of Marcos in the Philippines and Indira Gandhi in India. Without an enlightened leadership, a strong democratic movement from below may increase the authoritarian control from above.

Why is leadership willing to initiate democratization? Huntington argues that "the motives of political leaders are varied and variable, mixed and mysterious, and often unclear to themselves. Leaders may produce democracy because they believe democracy is an end in itself, because they see it as a means to other goals, or because democracy is the by-product of their pursuit of other goals." Like other writers, he also stresses that

41 Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976), p. 120.
"whatever their motives, some political leaders have to want it to happen or be willing to take steps, such as partial liberalization, that may lead to it happening."43

Top leaders usually do not act by themselves. They are helped or urged by a group of reformers within the regime. Liberalizing and democratizing efforts may come from within the ruling regime. Peaceful liberalization and democratization would be impossible if soft-liners or, in our case, reformers, fail to grow and gain the upper hand in the authoritarian regime. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter believe that there has been "no transition whose beginning is not the consequence--direct or indirect--of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners."44 The soft-liners or reformers are those who believe that it will be less costly for a regime to maintain its rule by making use of some degree of electoral legitimation. They hope that they can protect their interests by modifying the rules themselves and putting the process under their control. They may also be prompted by a sense of "history" and the prospect of gaining a reputation for leading democratization. On the other hand, soft-liners try to keep the opposition within limits by warning that hard-liners or conservatives would gain an upper hand in the governing regime and would suppress the opposition if it pushes to extremes. The explosion of political participation may exceed the soft-liners' ability to control developments and endanger their position in the regime.

Therefore, in a peaceful transition to democracy, the interaction between the reformers and the conservatives within the regime or the ruling party is of central importance. According to Huntington, a peaceful transition only occurs if the regime is stronger than the opposition and if reformers are stronger than "standpatters."45

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step in a peaceful transition is the emergence of reformers within the authoritarian regime. Next reformers have to acquire power. There are three ways that they may come to power. First, when the founding authoritarian leaders die, they succeed to the mantle. Second, they may come to power through regular changes in leadership provided by the authoritarian system itself. Third, they may oust the ruler. In order to strengthen their power, reformers usually appeal for a "return to legitimacy," and argue that it is "time to go back, after a necessary but limited authoritarian interlude, to the democratic principles that were the basis of their country's political system." If the reformers can subdue the conservatives, a smooth transition process may occur.

Organization

Pro-democracy ideology can urge a ruling party to liberalize and democratize, and the enlightened leadership and the reformers can be the major forces driving the implementation of liberalization and democratization. Nevertheless, a ruling party would not be willing to lose its governing status during the transition to democracy. If a ruling party's organization is not strong enough to withstand the impact of liberalization and democratization, the party would probably be reluctant to initiate these developments. O'Donnell and Schmitter point out that "ironically, the more episodic and incoherent authoritarian experiences of Latin America, as well as that of Greece, seem to have done more to undermine the institutions of the more-or-less democratic regimes which preceded them than the longer-lived and ideologically stronger authoritarianisms of Italy, Spain, and Portugal." They seem to imply that strong authoritarian regimes may be even better prepared to adapt to liberalization and democratization, and the reason may lie

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in the longevity and strength of authoritarian organizations. However, just like their
treatment of ideology, O'Donnell and others who study the transition to democracy never
elaborate on the role of the ruling party's organization in the transition to democracy. In
the following paragraphs, we will first define organization and then borrow some theories
about organization from political party studies.

According to Franz Schurmann, "Organizations are structures of differentiated
roles which require the ordered exercise of power."49 As far as the political party is
concerned, the organization is usually made up of party members, congress and standing
executive body, and a system of nomination, discipline, finance, etc. Thus, a study of
party organization has to include the study of these elements.

Angelo Panebianco argues that organizations are instruments for the realization of
goals. But at the same time they need conscious efforts to survive.50 He describes two
opposing theories regarding the relationship between a party and its environment. One
theory posits that party tends to dominate its environment. The other posits that party
tends to adapt itself more or less passively to its environment. Panebianco argues that
interests of self-preservation push the organization to adapt to its environment, and the
loyalties tied to organizational ideology push it to dominate it.

Panebianco believes that dominance and adaptability have differing degrees of
importance in different phases of the organizational evolution of political parties. He
envisages a three-phase model of evolution of parties: genesis, institutionalization, and
maturity. In phase one, the goal of the political parties is the realization of the common
cause, and strategy is domination of the environment. Through the institutionalization of
phase two, political parties enter phase three and show features that are symmetrically
opposed to the features of phase one. In phase three, the goal of the political parties is

49 Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of
50 Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge
survival, and strategy is adaptation to the environment.\textsuperscript{51} He argues that "In a well-established organization, the importance attached to the survival of the organization generally prevails over that attached to the pursuit of its original aims."\textsuperscript{52} Thus adaptation is a symbol of maturity, and only the party that can adapt to the environment can survive.

Similarly, Huntington also regards adaptability as a major factor in the institutionalization of a political system. Institutionalization is a process by which organizations acquire value and stability. "The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures."\textsuperscript{53} Adaptability can be measured by longevity, renewal and reprogramming.

While stressing adaptability, Huntington also stresses the strength of the dominant political party in the process of political change. He believes that the strength of the dominant political party directly contributes to the stability of the political system. He emphasizes the function of political parties in political institutionalization. He points out that "the distinctive institution of the modern polity...is the political party. ...Political parties exist in the modern polity because only modern political systems require institutions to organize mass participation in politics."\textsuperscript{54} Thus, Huntington argues that "political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics."\textsuperscript{55} He argues that party systems are more stable than non-party systems. One-party systems tend to be more stable than pluralistic party systems in developing countries. While his theory focuses on the political order, rather than on the transition to democracy, it can be extended to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., pp. 89-90.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. vii.
\end{footnotesize}
explain the role of the ruling party in the transition to democracy as well. We can especially extend his theory to explain the peacefulness of Taiwan's transition to democracy. On the other hand, Huntington's theory deals with the whole political system. We will narrow his theory to analyze only the ruling party's organization.

Both Huntington and Panebianco stress adaptability or adaptation. In the process of evolution, both the ruling single-parties in the Third World and democratic parties in the West may change themselves by downgrading their organizational rigidity. An important contribution of those studying single parties has been their success in demonstrating that not all parties in single-party systems are monolithic and strongly disciplined. Strength and adaptability not only determine the survival of the ruling party, but also influence the process of the transition to democracy. In this study, we will be examining the strength and adaptability of the party organization through an analysis of its recruitment, nomination procedures, discipline, etc.

Summary

Many concepts, classification schemes, and hypotheses provided by these theories in the literature can be used to enlighten our analysis of the Taiwan case. Distinctions between soft-liners and hard-liners in the regime, between moderates and radicals in the opposition, between noncompetitive and competitive (especially between hegemonic and predominant) party systems, hypotheses that the regime and the opposition can create a peaceful transition to democracy through transactions, that a strong party system is beneficial for stability, etc., can be applied to the KMT case. Despite their imperfections, emerging theories of the transition to democracy can be very helpful.

Contrary to the traditional wisdom, the transition to democracy is not simply the result of societal opposition and/or international pressure, etc. Rather, it also depends upon the ruling party's willingness and capacities to reform. The ruling party has to
consolidate its ruling power before it adopts liberalization and democratization measures. In other words, liberalization and democratization will most likely be carried out under conditions such that the party's ruling position would not be vulnerable to damage. A party's willingness to reform is generated from both its ideology and its organizational strength and adaptability, although domestic and international stimuli are necessary. The enlightened top leaders and the reformers in the party are major agents of liberalization and democratization. If positive changes occur within the ruling party, it is quite likely that the ruling party can take a lead in the overall liberalization and democratization process. Liberalization and democratization initiated by the ruling party may decrease the autonomy and capacities of the ruling party. However, the initiative of liberalization and democratization on the part of the ruling party may enhance its legitimacy and thus make it possible to enjoy the continuous governing status through competitive elections, despite facing a legal opposition both in the society and the legislature. The legitimacy and strength of the ruling party contribute directly to the peacefulness of the transition process. The transition to democracy in a strong one-party system seems to be smoother than in a military regime.
CHAPTER TWO  THE ROLE OF SOCIOECONOMIC AND OTHER FACTORS

The theme of this thesis is that the KMT has played a more or less positive role in Taiwan's liberalization and democratization, and this is a direct explanation for Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. Such an approach is in contrast to "ecological" explanations that point to such factors as economic development, middle class, political culture, international pressure and relations with mainland China. The impression that these factors are not sufficient to explain Taiwan's peaceful transition prompts me to think that there must have been a more direct factor. To some extent, to show the insufficiency of these explanations is to justify my emphasis on the role of the ruling party. This chapter purports to do this job.

In this chapter, we discuss the role of the following factors in Taiwan's transition to democracy: economic development, the middle class, political culture, international pressure, and the relationship with mainland China. Existing literature focusing on these factors contribute to our understanding of Taiwan's democratization, but we shall show that it is insufficient to explain the Taiwan's transition to democracy, thus it needs to be supplemented by a research focus on the role of the KMT.

1. Economic Development

The importance of the economic factor in political development was first emphasized early in the 1950s by development theories. Development theorists believe
that the level of economic development has a pronounced effect on political democracy. Based on Western development experience, they argue that the rise of democracy is associated with capitalist development, and democracy is compatible with economic vitality. This is because, on the one hand, "modernization stimulates participatory demands;" on the other, "democratic practice and philosophy helped to spur the individualism and entrepreneurship seen as central to social modernization." Economic development results in high levels of urbanization, industrialization, high literacy rates, and mass communication, and these factors facilitate the emergence of democracies.

In Taiwan, economic development does bring in its wake many socioeconomic changes. Through more than four decades of development, Taiwan's economy has been transformed from an agricultural to an industrial one. The share of agriculture in GDP (gross domestic product) has decreased as the economy has continued to grow, from 32.4 percent in 1951 to only 6.5 percent in 1984. During the same period, the share of the industrial sector in GDP increased from 23.9 percent to 50.6 percent. The contribution of manufacturing is undoubtedly the most important factor in the industry sector. If only the manufacturing sector is considered, the average annual growth rate was 13.3 percent. GNP has grown by almost 9 percent annually for three and a half decades. This growth rate is quite high as compared with the other countries. As a result, in the mid-1980s when Taiwan started democratization, per capita income reached the range of U.S. $4,000, and there was no serious economic or social crisis on Taiwan. Better economic conditions also contributed to an increased literacy rate and intensified mass communication.


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Given that Taiwan has achieved so much in the economic field, some scholars use development theories to analyze Taiwan's political transition.\(^4\) Lucian Pye suggests that Taiwan is "possibly the best working example of theory that economic progress should bring in its wake democratic inclinations and healthy surge of pluralism, which in time will undercut the foundations of the authoritarian rule common to developing countries."\(^5\) Hung-mao Tien's comprehensive analysis of Taiwan's political transition is also based on a socioeconomic approach, although he notices the role of the party-state in Taiwan's modernization.\(^6\) That Taiwan's economic miracle occurred before political miracle seems to support the argument that economic development brings about political democratization.

This author agrees that a higher level of economic development is more favourable for democracy than a poor economic situation. However, democratization is not simply a function of economic growth. We do not have an exact formula that can tell us at what level of GNP a country turns into a democracy. In the late 1960s, there were already many scholars pointing out the economic success on Taiwan. But Taiwan did not become democratized then.\(^7\) Singapore, a more affluent Chinese society, has not been fully democratized even as of 1995. Wealthy Middle East states are not democratic, but poverty-stricken India is. Economic growth does not necessarily bring about democracy directly, rather it may furnish the government with more sophisticated technics of social control. Economic development may be a necessary condition for democracy, but not a

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sufficient one. Socioeconomic preconditions have positive impacts for democratic development, but they do not automatically lead to democracy.\(^8\)

One theorem of political science is that "experience with economic autonomy can lead to the expectation or desire for political autonomy and ultimately to the end of quiet acquiescence to political control from above."\(^9\) This may be the underlying rational for the hypothesis that economic modernization leads to democratization. The hypothesis may be correct in the long run, but is not necessarily true at least in the short run. Experience with economic autonomy may not lead to the expectation or desire for political autonomy, or this desire may not translate into political action. This is because people, especially in developing countries, have many serious problems to solve other than the political one. Daya Krishna, an Indian scholar, argues that society has to perform functions other than the political one, and most of these functions are fairly time-consuming. There are substantial economic costs to political activity. People both have to and prefer to engage in other activities.\(^{10}\) People may simply enjoy their economic autonomy and be busy with their business without any concern about politics. On the other hand the authoritarian government can confine people's activities in the economic realm by the strategy of depoliticization. The following factors may lead to depoliticization and people's contribution to modernization. (1) By limiting the opportunities of mobility or promotion in the political arena, government can force social elites and masses to seek mobility in the economic field. After the retreat to Taiwan, mainlanders monopolized the government. Native Taiwanese access to the high political echelon was denied. However, the KMT government left the economic field open to

\(^8\) It seems that Hung-mao Tien realizes the complex relationship between the economic growth and political development in this later article; See "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition", in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 105.


natives. (2) The high cost of political opposition in an authoritarian state may make people lose interest in politics. This and the above factor become the pushing factors that force people out of political arena. (3) The abundance of opportunities during modernization may attract many people, and absorb them into economic activities. The KMT government on Taiwan implemented capitalist development policies. It especially encouraged family business. Everybody could become his or her own boss. Especially since the implementation of the outward looking strategy in the mid-1960s, Taiwanese found plenty of business opportunities. This is a pulling factor that attracted people from political arena.

Therefore, Taiwan's economic development was controlled by the KMT government. By tightening political control and providing economic opportunities, the KMT in the early years directed the Taiwanese populace to devote themselves to the business world. Thomas Gold points out that "the island's people responded in the direction desired by the authorities to the incentives offered them, even if they might have been seething with frustration at the limited options available to them at the same time."\(^\text{11}\) Political competition was aroused only when the KMT gradually loosened its control and started liberalization and democratization, as we shall demonstrate in next chapter. After the economy prospered and people began demanding political rights, the KMT government was in an advantageous position to deliver economic and political goods. The KMT wanted continued economic growth, and in order to achieve this end, it needed political stability. So the need for economic growth prompted the KMT regime to maintain stability by any means. In the earlier period, the KMT mainly used authoritarian means to achieve stability, supplemented by means of co-optation and local elections. In the later period, the KMT mainly used elections to achieve stability. Indeed, political change on Taiwan has much to do with the KMT's concern with economic modernization,

but the KMT carefully controlled when and how to respond to socioeconomic changes. One of the research interests in this thesis is the KMT’s statecraft of responsiveness and adaptability.

Economic structure probably is more important than the GNP level for the transition to democracy. Taiwan’s economy, especially the export and industrial sections, has been dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, which are beyond the reach of the government. The rise of the private sector enabled individuals to sever their dependence on KMT patronage. As Cheng and Haggard point out, "Capitalist development itself undermined the KMT's institutional capacity for mobilization and control." However, as we shall show in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, the ruling party did not oppose capitalist development on Taiwan. If private economy is the basis for democracy, it is the KMT government that has laid down this basis.

The speed of economic growth also has an impact on political change. High-speed economic growth may result in either peaceful or turbulent transition to democracy. It does not necessarily result in peaceful transition because it may create socioeconomic crises that lead to turbulent political change. Huntington points out three different kinds of result in high-growth countries: democracy, repression, and revolution. Constant high-speed economic development on Taiwan has not resulted in violent transition. It is interesting to discuss why Taiwan has tended to take a democratic approach rather than repression or revolution.

Learning from four decades of development experiences of the Third World since World War II, many theorists realize that while there is a strong correlation between economic and political development, the causal relationship between them cannot be

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12 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), pp. 9-10.
determined. Thus there must have been other decisive factors involved in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

2. Middle Class

There was a small middle class when Taiwan was returned to China after the Japanese rule. The KMT regime repressed those Taiwanese urban elites who demanded democratic rights, while co-opting those urban elites who previously collaborated with the Japanese. Land reform weakened the Taiwanese rural elites. Afterwards, the KMT established a corporatist system in the early postwar period. Organized interest groups have operated as the party-state's "transmission belts." At the same time they also have become part of the authorities' social control mechanism. The KMT organization penetrated not only occupational associations (industry, commerce, labor, farmers and fishermen), but also functional associations (women, youth, and retired servicemen).

By the 1970s, a new middle class had grown up. It was composed mainly of intellectuals, professionals, business people, upper-middle-level party and government bureaucrats, and elected representatives in the national and local legislatures. This new group of elites was predominantly composed of Taiwanese from the countryside. Intellectuals were the most politically active agents in this group. They associated themselves with small and medium-sized businesses, which offered them financial support and fallback career positions. Some people from the middle class were well-educated and Westernized in their values and attitudes. However, as Metzger finds,

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14 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 222.
15 For a discussion of the KMT's corporatism, see Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, p. 44-45.
17 Cheng and Haggard, ed., Political Change in Taiwan, p. 11.
generally speaking, the Taiwanese middle class was "little interested in any of the ideological positions or even in political events, except as they affected the economic climate. Prudently avoiding any confrontation with the government and seeking stability more than reform, people with this 'petty bourgeois' outlook have exhibited an authoritarian and passive attitude toward politics." \(^{18}\)

Some writers argue that the middle class helps the development of the opposition by contributing to its leadership, activists and social base. \(^{19}\) But on the other hand, the KMT also recruited significant numbers of people from social elites of the middle class into the party and government. Chiang Ching-kuo did this by implementing self-conscious policies of Taiwanization and technocratization. As we shall see later, the KMT's co-optation policy has had the effect of attracting social elites to work within the system and of dividing the opposition. There were instances in which KMT members joined the opposition camp, such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung. But generally speaking, the KMT's co-optation policy was quite effective, and most of the social elites were recruited into the party. Thus, the middle class was by no means politically cohesive.

By the early 1980s Taiwan's social structure had been substantially transformed from an agrarian to an industrial urban society. The KMT party-state began to permit the emergence of an increasingly autonomous and large bourgeoisie. Civic and economic associations proliferated with rapid economic growth. Secondary associations rose from 2,560 in 1952 to 13,766 in 1990. \(^{20}\) Since the 1980s, these civic groups have demanded

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changes in the existing arrangement of the state-society relations. Some groups, such as
the Association for Taiwan Farmers' Rights and the Autonomous Workers' Federation,
have close links to the opposition parties. Taiwan's society has become more and more
pluralist. The KMT found out that the organized conflict in society did not necessarily
challenge its rule.21 In the 1990s, the KMT has attempted to transform its role from that
of a manipulator into that of a mediator.

Middle classes are usually characterized as being democratic. In reality they may
also support an autocracy. This is especially true in the early phase of modernization. As
Huntington points out, "At times in Latin America and elsewhere, middle-class groups
acquiesced in or actively supported military coups designed to overthrow radical
government and to reduce the political influence of labor and peasant organizations."22
In Taiwan, the middle class benefited from the established political and economic order.
It has been noted that "the KMT regime provided few channels of access for business, yet
it also pursued policies that were generally conducive to private sector growth. There
were thus few incentives for the private sector to attempt to reshape the political
order."23 One characteristic of the Taiwanese economy is that small family firms abound,
and many people are their own bosses. They were dependent on the KMT state, "as the
economic recessions of 1973-74 and 1980-81 amply demonstrated."24 Furthermore, one
third of the total adult population belong to the middle class,25 and more people tend to
regard themselves as middle class than not. This fact enhanced political support for the
KMT, the party that had brought about the prosperity. The rise of the middle class,
therefore, did not quickly produce popular demands for political reform. While members

21 Edwin A. Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Cheng Tun-jen
and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 242.
22 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 66.
23 Cheng and Haggard, ed., Political Change in Taiwan, p. 10.
24 Edwin Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft
25 Estimates of the size of Taiwanese middle class vary from 25 to 40 percent of the total adult
of the middle class wanted a more open political environment, they also wanted social stability. They disapproved of radical opposition, as shown during the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 (the Incident will be discussed in next Chapter). This is one of the reasons that the KMT government dared punish radical oppositionists with harsh sentences, and that the opposition turned moderate in the 1980s. In recent years, the Taiwanese middle class has associated the opposition with disorder, and the KMT with order. The middle class has distanced itself from the DPP, especially on the issue of independence, because the DPP has caused internal disorder by its persistent calls for independence. On the whole, the KMT has the support of the middle class. This support is demonstrated in election results before the 1990s. As Metzger argues, "the KMT's ability to attract a majority of the voters (usually around 60-70 %) would be impossible without middle-class support." The support of the middle class for the KMT facilitated the peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan. As Moody points out, a party-state, "if not threatened by democracy, is not constrained by responsiveness to elite social interests from implementing democracy."

In the final analysis, the Taiwanese middle class has not been very active politically, and when it did become involved in political activities, it did not participate as a united social stratum. It did not struggle for democracy by itself. As Gold argues, "the existence of a middle class by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratization." The KMT's co-optation resulted in cooperation, or at least, acquiescence of middle classes. Some social elites support the opposition, but as a whole the middle class is supportive of the KMT regime. This is one of the reasons that the KMT maintained its rule during Taiwan's transition to democracy.

28 Thomas Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity," p. 53.
3. Confucian Culture

There are different views about the effect of political culture on democracy on Taiwan. Huntington points out that "almost no scholarly disagreement exists on the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic." "In practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy."29 He also believes that one obstacle to democracy is that the state has no previous experience with democracy. The fifty year colonial rule of Taiwan by Japan enhanced Chinese authoritarian tradition, and then the KMT succeeded to the tradition. Thus, the Confucian culture on Taiwan impedes democratization. However, he maintains that Confucianism on Taiwan is not as strong as in mainland China.

Copper basically agrees with Huntington. He believes that "Chinese political culture is basically conservative (in the sense of slowing and moderating political change) and dampens radical policies or agendas."30 China's bureaucratic tradition did not take root in pre-colonization Taiwan, but Japanese transmitted Confucian culture into the island. Obedience and loyalty were esteemed; individualism was not. Centralized political authority was established after the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan. He argues that the small size of the island and the modern means of transportation and political communication facilitated KMT authoritarianism.31

Unlike Huntington, Copper argues that the conservative nature of Chinese political culture is beneficial for Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy. The Chinese people fear anarchy and have a long history of emphasizing the value of order. He points out that "when critics or opponents of the government go too far, particularly in the

29 Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 300-301.
31 Ibid.
direction of destroying the system or using violence, the people respond with a demand for caution. When some advocate overthrowing the system the people respond by siding with the government. The electorate wants democracy, but it does not want it to come through the destruction of the government (unless the government is worse than anarchy or is itself promoting chaos, and that has not been the case on Taiwan). Some say government officials on Taiwan know that if the opposition becomes too extreme or threatens violence the people will turn against them. Thus, they are more tolerant of opposition antics and demands than governments in most countries.\textsuperscript{32} It is true that the populace's dislike of disorder turned out to be a support for the ruling party.

Lucian Pye believes that Confucianism generally is not beneficial to democracy, but Confucian authoritarianism has diminished on Taiwan. He argues that the KMT's defeat on the mainland in 1949 made it impossible "for most Nationalist leaders to uphold the posture of arrogance associated with traditional Confucian notions of authority." Economic modernization overwhelmed a relatively weak Confucian legacy, and Taiwan's political culture evolved into a Western-inspired democracy.\textsuperscript{33} However, Pye thinks that this is a democracy with Chinese characteristics. It "differs from Western systems in being more conservative while protecting the society more than the individual.... In general the concept means democracy that preserves social stability, maintains strong law enforcement, preserves the family, better treats the elderly and has less government interference and bureaucracy."\textsuperscript{34}

Taiwanese political scientist Hu Fu finds that Chinese political culture is more inclined to subject than to participant political culture.\textsuperscript{35} But he also finds that, along

\textsuperscript{34} Copper, \textit{Taiwan}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{35} Fu Hu uses Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's concept of \textit{subject competence}. Almond and Verba define it as follows: "The competence of the subject is more a matter of being aware of his
with the socioeconomic change, political culture on Taiwan has evolved more towards pluralism, which is favourable for democracy.36

One belief shared by the above writers is that traditional Confucian culture is incompatible with democracy. In the Weberian perspective, Confucian values of deference to authority and group conformity resist democracy. This leads us to ask how Taiwan could democratize despite such an unfavourable political culture. Here we should stress once more that the present study focuses primarily on the levels of political ideology and institutions. Whether or not democratization at these levels is ultimately compatible with Confucian values pervading the more general society and culture is an important question, but one which lies outside our scope of interest. This does not mean that traditional culture has no influence at all. The conservative nature of Confucianism is supportive of peaceful political change on Taiwan, but at the same time slows down the process of change. Like socioeconomic factors, however, cultural factors do not necessarily have a causal relationship with democratization, and so do not have a direct impact (positive or negative) on the transition to democracy. While the existence of a pro-democracy culture is undoubtedly a propitious condition for democracy, cultural conditions, like socioeconomic conditions, do not have a determining impact on the outcome of the transition to democracy. Instead, theorists of the transition to democracy believe, a democratic culture or "rules of game" is a product, not a precondition, of democratization. As Wachman puts it, "The qualities that are commonly seen as preconditions of democracy are qualities that more probably emerge from the establishment of democracy."37

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37 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 36.
Socioeconomic and political changes have brought about cultural change. In recent years, Taiwan has been developing its own political culture. As Winckler summarizes, "Already in 1960-1975 Taiwan's increasing involvement with the outside world increased its cosmopolitanism. However, in 1975-1990 this accelerated." The influence of Confucian ethics is diminishing but still alive. Taiwanese people are talking about a cultural crisis on the island. Such a situation is a result of socioeconomic and political change. This political cultural change on Taiwan is basically in accordance with the argument that democratic culture is a result of the transition to democracy. Therefore while Taiwanese political culture has not been an obstacle to Taiwan's transition to democracy, it also has not played a decisive role in it. In comparison, as we shall show in latter chapters, ideological and institutional factors have played a more decisive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

4. International Pressure

Numerous scholars have ascribed Taiwan's democratization to the international demonstration effect. They point out that the international atmosphere in the 1980s was pervaded by a renewed trend toward democratization, and the change on Taiwan is mentioned as part of this trend. They argue that democratic movements in South Korea and the Philippines and the downfall of Marcos may have had a psychological influence

38 Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" p. 229.
40 Huntington, The Third Wave.
on Chiang Ching-kuo, as these developments seemed to have "prophetic effect" for Taiwan. However, no evidence has been found regarding Chiang's reflection on or interpretation of these events.

While diffusion and demonstration effects may influence the transition to democracy, the diffusion effect may be positive or negative. The downfall of the Communism in Soviet Union did not prompt Chinese Communists to carry out democratic reform. Rather, the chaotic results of the democratic transition in the Soviet Union and the East European countries enhanced Chinese Communists' convictions that democratization was not beneficial for modernization. Thus, the effect that external events have on domestic politics depends on how the leadership interprets them. External political developments may have contradictory domestic effects on democracy.

Some scholars argue that foreign intervention, particularly the influence of the United States, is an important stimulus toward democratization. Gregory A. Fossedal says that "America has powerful tools with which to influence how our neighbors will be governed" and that "America has played an active role in promoting democracy elsewhere around the world." Was American intervention a major factor in the transition to democracy on Taiwan? The following short historical account will show that despite the efforts of the United States at times to press the Nationalist regime to democratize, American pressure has not been a major factor in the transition to democracy on Taiwan.

When the KMT regime lost the mainland, the United States government assessed responsibility for the loss to the KMT itself, due to its corruption and incompetence. The United States anticipated that the Communists would eventually take the island and wanted to avoid getting involved in a war against mainland China. The Korean war saved

42 Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" p. 227.
the KMT regime. President Truman was determined that Taiwan not fall under Communist control. Taiwan became strategically important in the containment of Communism. But the Truman administration did not want Chiang to attack the mainland, fearing that such action might trigger a world war.\footnote{Martin L. Lasater, \textit{U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 6-9.} The lack of U.S. support for Chiang's ambitions to retake the mainland was a factor in directing Chiang to focus on Taiwan's modernization. During China's bombardment of Quemoy in 1958, the U.S. declared clearly that it would not assist the ROC to return to the mainland. In a joint communiqué issued on October 23, 1958, the two governments recalled that the Mutual Defense Treaty signed on December 2, 1954, was "defensive in character."\footnote{Cf. "ROC-US Joint Communiqué, October 23, 1958," in Hung-dah Chiu, ed., \textit{China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis} (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 288.} Although the KMT government was still determined to retake the mainland, it ceased to stress achieving this by force. Rather it shifted its focus from strengthening might to accelerating socioeconomic development.

The KMT regime did have to consider American expectations in its domestic politics. In the early years the KMT claimed that, in contrast to the Communist regime on the mainland, the ROC on Taiwan was a "free China." In order to win U.S. support, which was important throughout most of the postwar period, the KMT had to maintain a veneer of liberal democracy, thus keeping open the possibilities of liberalization and democratization.

However, Chiang Kai-shek tried to be as independent as possible. Chiang's determination to be independent from the United States influence can be seen in the purge of General Sun Li-jen, a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. Chiang purged him because Chiang suspected that the Americans attempted to replace him with General Sun.\footnote{Li Sung-lin, \textit{Chiang-shih Fu-ts'u Tsai Taiwan} (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo on Taiwan) (Peking: Chung-kuo You-i Ch'u-pan Kung-tzu, 1993), pp. 199-202.} The anti-American riot in May 1957 also showed Taiwan's willingness to be
independent. A mob broke into the United States embassy when an American soldier who killed a Chinese was acquitted by a U.S. court-martial. The KMT government was lethargic in restoring public order. It was suspected that the government took advantage of the riot to demonstrate its independence from the U.S., or to "devalue the image of the United States in the popular mind and so decrease U.S. leverage over the regime's internal affairs." 47

During the 1950s, American aid advisors often emphasized to the Taiwan authorities that successful capitalist modernization required expanding political and civil freedoms. The KMT government ignored that advice and continued its authoritarian rule. Generally speaking, the Americans made few demands on the KMT regime to soften its control, since Taiwan's strategic position in the global struggle against Communism necessitated continued United States support.

In the 1960s, when United States support began to fade, the KMT made effort to put its roots in Taiwanese soil in order to survive. 48 In the 1970s the United States was forced to pull back from Vietnam and Asia in general. Abandoning the policy of containment, the United States also began to normalize relations with mainland China. The establishment of diplomatic relationships between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States was a heavy blow for the KMT regime. The withdrawal of support for the Taiwanese government, however, resulted in a strengthening of authoritarian rule in the short run, because the KMT used it as an excuse to postpone the 1978 national supplementary elections, and to halt reforms until the end of 1980.

The American Congress declared its expectations for Taiwan's democratization and improvement of human rights situation in the Taiwan Relations Act, in order to justify its continued support for Taiwan. The United States Congress threatened to cut arms sales to Taiwan in order to force Taipei to obey the human rights provisions in the

47 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 74.
48 Ibid., p. 186.
The American Institute on Taiwan reported regularly on the human rights situation on Taiwan to the United States government. However, the United States never directly pressed the KMT regime to promote democracy as it pressed the regimes of the Philippines and South Korea.

According to Chiang's secretary Ma Ying-chiu, international pressure was not a major factor in Chiang's decision to democratize. Opposition leader K'ang Ning-hsiang also pointed out that "the KMT's strongman era was coming to an end. If they wanted their third generation to continue ruling Taiwan, they had immediately to adjust their relations with Taiwanese society or suffer severe problems.... The question of foreign evaluations and the international situation was secondary. If they could get good international reviews while guaranteeing the survival of their regime, so much the better."  

Generally speaking, domestic actors can exploit the geopolitical opportunities to consolidate either authoritarian or democratic rule. The United States' main contribution to Taiwan's transition to democracy has been in providing a secure environment, which was achieved by means of a common defense pact signed in 1954 and later the Taiwan Relations Act. Within this secure environment, democracy indeed developed more easily on Taiwan.

5. The Relationship with Mainland China

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51 Cited in Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," p. 46.
What happens in mainland China always has implications for Taiwan's politics. The relationship with mainland China is another factor that influences Taiwan's transition to democracy, but obviously does not have a determining impact on it. This section will briefly describe the extent of mainland China's influence on Taiwan's transition.

Initially, the Communist threat after World War II contributed to the KMT's hard authoritarianism. The KMT took advantage of the threat from across the strait, using it as an excuse to maintain martial law. The KMT rationalized its authoritarian rule under martial law during most of postwar period by stressing the fact that it had to face the Communist threat from the mainland. According to Diamond, "a perception of serious threat to the country's military security, from either external invasion or external support for subversion or insurgency, tends to strengthen the hand of military-bureaucratic forces. In particular, it legitimates the augmentation and centralization of state power, the militarization of society, and the restriction of civil and political liberties as matters of necessity for national security."\(^2\) This is exactly what happened on Taiwan in the first two or three decades of the postwar period.

On the other hand, the situational pressure has tended to motivate the KMT to do better in its domestic affairs on Taiwan. The desire to outpace the mainland in various aspects of development is a major motive for Taiwan to do everything better. Since 1949, the KMT had attempted to develop Taiwan as a "model province under the Three Principles of the People." In 1981, Chiang Ching-kuo argued that "it is more important than ever for us to strengthen the construction of constitutional government to demonstrate clearly that the strong contrast between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is basically due to the fact that one side has implemented a Constitution based on the Three Principles of the People while the other has not."\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Quoted in Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," pp. 38-39.
Since 1978, the PRC has undertaken a progressive and promising programme of economic and political development.\(^4\) During this time the PRC has taken a conciliatory approach toward the KMT and propagated a third united front with the KMT and peaceful reunification. In 1983 Teng Hsiao-p'ing proposed the so-called "one country, two systems" scheme.\(^5\) The KMT's "three no's" -- no contacts, no negotiations, no compromise with the Communists -- appeared obsolete. The authorities on Taiwan wanted to evade the mainland's reunification overtures and retain national sovereignty by democratization. The KMT's *Guidelines for National Reunification* announces that the mainland has to implement both democracy and the rule of law before it can reunite with Taiwan.

While Taiwan started to democratize, the June 4 1989 Event occurred on the mainland. The Event stimulated the KMT to speed up reforms. As one author points out, "the KMT was gratified that its depiction of the Communist regime on the mainland was reinforced by events in Peking, but also pressured into demonstrating how differently it treated political dissidence and opposition on Taiwan. This, too, may have influenced the way the KMT dealt with the opposition on Taiwan once reform was under way."\(^5\)\(^6\)

The PRC has held the KMT government responsible for keeping the DPP's independent tendency under control. The PRC refuses to abandon the possible use of military means to solve Taiwan issue. Taiwanese authorities have stressed that Taiwan should not provoke the PRC, thus implying that a continuous KMT government is better than the DPP in maintaining peace over the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese electorate understands that a formal declaration of independence would be a costly and risky

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\(^{4}\) 1978 was the year when the CCP held its third session of the Eleventh Congress, in which Teng Hsiao-p'ing proposed a series of political and economic reforms.  
\(^{5}\) "One country, two systems" scheme is a peaceful reunification proposal put forwarded by Teng Hsiao-p'ing. According to this scheme, after China is reunited, people in the area presently controlled by the PRC will follow the socialist system while people in Taiwan will continue their capitalist ways of life.  
\(^{5}\) Wachman, *Taiwan*, p. 227.
venture. The threat from the mainland has also made the opposition reduce its agitation so as not to endanger Taiwan's security.\(^\text{57}\)

Democratization is also a response on the part of Taiwan to the mainland's diplomatic offensive. Since the 1970s, the PRC's aggressive international activities has almost completely squeezed the ROC out of the international arena (see Table 2.1). Most of the nations with whom the ROC now has diplomatic relations are small nations in Central America and Africa. Maintaining ties with the United States and expanding ties with the rest of the world require that Taiwan consolidate its emerging democracy.

Table 2.1  Number of Nations with whom the ROC and the PRC Have Diplomatic Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ROC</th>
<th>PRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>113</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In a word, the influence of the PRC is a situational factor that influences, but does not determine, political change on Taiwan. It has contributed to a greater degree of authoritarianism in the Taiwanese political system during most of the postwar period. In recent years, the threat from the mainland has been a supplementary factor in Taiwan's democratization. However, Chinese Communists have no reason to press the KMT to democratize, and the mainland threat alone is not sufficient to push the KMT to democratize.

\(^{57}\) Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 183.
6. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that none of the ecological factors seems to have been decisive in Taiwan's transition to democracy, nor can they explain "why any regime with a monopoly on political power ultimately decides to share it." Even if these single factors could be correlated with the transition to democracy on Taiwan, no one factor could explain the peacefulness of the process. The peaceful nature of Taiwan's transition to democracy has more to do with the role of the ruling party there. The generalized influence of these single factors must pass through the filter of the ruling party before resulting in certain outcomes. Thus, we need to discuss political reasons for Taiwan's transition to democracy.

Robert Dahl criticizes the "reductionism' that seeks to reduce political factors to something more 'basic,'" such as "social, economic, cultural, or psychological factors." These "ecological" factors do contribute to Taiwan's transition to democracy in one way or another, but they are not sufficient to explain it. Political factors have had a more direct and decisive impact on Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. Compared with other factors, the KMT is apparently the most salient political factor. All we can say is that without the necessary preconditions and the opposition pressure, the KMT would have been unable or would have had little motive to initiate the transition to democracy; but if the KMT had taken a reactionary response to social pressure, Taiwan's transition to democracy would have been difficult and/or tumultuous. In the following chapter we will examine the exact role the KMT has played in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

58 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 2.
CHAPTER THREE  TAIWAN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE KMT AND THE OPPOSITION

1. Introduction

This chapter will discuss how Taiwan has been liberalized and democratized, and what role the ruling KMT has played in Taiwan's transition to democracy. This will be done through a discussion of the interaction between the ruling party KMT and the opposition, since democracy has been defined in terms of competitiveness and freedom. It will be demonstrated that from the start the KMT enjoyed control of political change on Taiwan, and to a large extent Taiwan's transition to democracy has been initiated and controlled by the ruling party. In several crucial historical periods, the KMT regime made some crucial decisions which started and moved Taiwan down the path to democracy.

Since the transition to democracy has much to do with the interaction between the ruling party and the opposition, it is necessary to first clarify the term "opposition." In the Western tradition of opposition studies, opposition is usually defined in terms of the institution. For instance, Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga define opposition in this way.¹ Robert Dahl also emphasizes the importance of institutionalizing opposition in his

¹ They regard "the presence or absence of institutionalized political opposition" as "the criterion for the classification of any political society in one of two categories: liberal or dictatorial, democratic or authoritarian, pluralistic-constitutional or monolithic." Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga, Opposition (London: C.A.Watts, 1968), p. 16.
studies of Western democracies. However, in an authoritarian system, opposition exists as a movement. As Peter Moody points out, "Given the nature of regimes like the Chinese, it is probably not useful to take too narrow a view of what constitutes opposition." In his definition, "opposition is a dangerous activity, ... is a political act, designed to change policies or power relationships."

The term opposition will be used throughout the thesis to refer to both the activity of private citizens designed to change policies or power relationships, and to institutions of opposition and efforts to institutionalize opposition. On the one hand, this definition acknowledges that in Taiwan's political history, opposition previously had a low degree of institutionalization and existed as a movement. On the other hand, this definition pays attention to the opposition from both below and within the regime. We distinguish two kinds of opposition: electoral opposition and opposition movement (or movement opposition). Our definition allows for the possibility that opposition transforms itself from a movement to electoral opposition. This study will show how Taiwanese opposition has grown from a movement into an institutionalized party. The KMT's success has been in introducing the opposition to work within the system through elections.

We shall use some parameters Dahl provided to analyze the characteristics of the relationship between the ruling party and political opposition on Taiwan. The following parameters will be useful: (1) the site for the encounter between the ruling party and the opposition; (2) the goals of the ruling party and the opposition; and (3) the strategies of both sides.


4 For the purpose of this paper, I adjust Dahl's parameters and use three out of his six parameters.

We shall examine the KMT's role in Taiwan's transition to democracy in three different periods: the "hard authoritarian" period (the 1950s and 1960s), the "soft authoritarian" period (the 1970s and early 1980s), and the competitive period (since the mid-1980s).

2. The Hard Authoritarian Period (the 1950s and 1960s)

This was a period of the consolidation and stable existence of KMT authoritarian rule. Security and stability were the key concepts in the postwar Taiwan. As this section will show, the KMT did not allow institutionalized opposition to exist at the national level; but it did implement limited democracy at the local level.

The first opposition movement against the KMT rule in postwar Taiwan occurred in 1947. This is the so-called February 28 Incident. The trigger for the movement was the beating of a widow who was selling contraband cigarettes on the street. Members of the uprising took over radio stations and controlled a number of regions. Ch'en I, governor of Taiwan province, acceded to a proposal for reform. But on March 8, he moved more than 15,000 troops from the mainland to Taiwan to quell rioting. Thousands were killed in the weeks of violence that followed. The Taiwanese intellectual and social elites were effectively liquidated. For instance, when the Taiwan Provincial Assembly reconvened after the Incident, only 18 of the original 30 members were in attendance.

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The Incident was very destructive of mainlander-Taiwanese relations. It caused "a severe sense of victimization" in Taiwanese, and created lasting tension between the mainlanders and Taiwanese. As C.L. Chiou points out, ever since the Incident, "the Taiwan independence advocates have always used the 28 February Uprising as the spiritual inspiration, the ideological raison d'etre, of their movement." However, despite this unfortunate political legacy, the KMT maintained its rule on Taiwan by suppressing the Uprising. Although Ch'en I was removed as the governor, he had accomplished the historic function of suppressing the local Taiwanese opposition for the KMT regime. Had the KMT rule been overthrown by Taiwanese during the Uprising, the KMT government would have lost the chance to build up "the overall record of progress which by now has won so much Taiwanese support."

To tighten the control of Taiwanese society, the KMT carried out a reorganization in 1949-52 (we shall discuss this in detail in the chapter on KMT organization). After that, the KMT enjoyed total control of Taiwanese society. The China Youth Party (CYP) and the Democratic Social Party (DSP) moved to Taiwan with the KMT regime in 1949. Each of them had a few seats in the three central representative organs (the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly and the Control Yuan), thus giving the Republic the appearance of a multi-party system. However, under the KMT "one party" policy, these two parties had little real power, and did not have any grass roots support. The KMT prevented their organizational development. The KMT used to call them "the friendly parties," and their influence on Taiwan politics has always been minimal.

The KMT regime imposed martial law on May 20, 1949, which deprived the people of the right to form political parties. New parties were not allowed to be formed. National elections for the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan were suspended. The Constitution of 1947 and the members of these three representative organs elected in 1947/1948 on the mainland formed the so-called fa-t'ung, literally, the tradition of legitimacy. The stress on the immutability of the fa-t'ung implied serious limitations on the scope of legal political activities, because the fa-t'ung served the needs of the whole of China, and led to the ossification of the membership of these representative organs. The KMT claimed that it represented the legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan. Repression was not only directed against Communists but also against any who dared to declare the island an independent country. Provincial and municipal elections were also stopped. As Moody notes, "The Constitution stipulates that provincial governors should be elected, but under the emergency the governor of Taiwan was appointed by the president. Later, after Taipei and Kaohsiung showed too eager a propensity to elect mayors critical of the KMT, these two largest cities on the island were elevated to special municipalities having the same status as provinces and their mayors were then appointed as well, rather than elected."12

After the February 28 Incident, opposition from society was eliminated. However, some high level KMT liberals attempted to organize an opposition party in 1960. This was attempted around the journal Free China (Tzu-yu chung-kuo pan-yueh-k'an). The founders of the journal were two high officials of the KMT, Hu Shih and Lei Chen. Hu Shih was a noted scholar-diplomat who had a good relationship with Chiang. He was the most prominent figure in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and a representative of

liberal democratic tradition in China. Lei had been a deputy secretary general of the National Assembly and national policy advisor to President Chiang Kai-shek. The original aim of *Free China* when it was published in 1949 was to promote liberal democratic beliefs in the face of the Communist challenge. At first, the journal had a close relationship with the KMT. The KMT subsidized the publication, in the hope that this liberal journal could garner sympathy and support from the United States. By the mid 1950s, when hopes for recovery of the mainland faded, *Free China* shifted its interest to Taiwan's internal political affairs. It attracted literary contributions from a group of liberal intellectuals. Their reform programme bore the strong imprint of Western liberalism. Articles in the magazine were often highly critical of the KMT. The *Free China* group wanted the KMT authorities to replace the one-party dictatorship with a constitutional democracy, to stop party interference in education and the military, and to eliminate the corruption in government. Lei Chen especially demanded honest elections and an independent court system. They argued for a return to a cabinet system, which is intended by the Constitution. This would make the presidency mainly symbolic, thus undermining the power of President Chiang Kai-shek. Perhaps what irritated Chiang most was Lei's demand that Chiang give up seeking a third straight term in office.

As *Free China* became increasingly critical of the authorities, the KMT began to employ various measures to restrict it. The party newspapers no longer accepted its advertising for publication. Party media began a concerted attack against it. Contributors to *Free China* were persecuted by the KMT. For instance, philosophy professor Yin Hai-kuang was removed from his teaching position at National Taiwan University.13

In 1957, Lei's mainlander group formed an alliance with independent Taiwanese politicians. They set up an informal electoral coordination committee among the anti-

13 Berman, *Words Like Colored Glass*, p. 176.
KMT candidates in elections.\textsuperscript{14} In 1960, they attempted to form the China Democratic Party. In September 1960, the KMT ruthlessly smashed the attempt. Lei Chen was sentenced to ten years in jail for allegedly harbouring a Communist agent on his staff.\textsuperscript{15} In this early stage on Taiwan, the liberal opposition was generally accused of having Communist connections or sympathies, and thus suppressed by the KMT authorities.\textsuperscript{16}

Besides \textit{Free China}, another journal, \textit{Apollo} (Wen hsing), also had opposed the KMT. It was published from 1957 to 1965. Since direct criticism of the regime would not be tolerated, \textit{Apollo} used the concept of culture as a metaphor for politics. It was critical of the Chinese tradition to which the KMT considered itself heir. In order to counterattack opposition, the KMT systematically cultivated the Confucian ethic on Taiwan. It maintained such a stance because it could take advantage of traditionalism both to marginalize cultural Westernization and Taiwanese localism. In response to liberal criticism of the KMT's one-party rule and martial law in the 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek proposed a revival of Confucianism on Taiwan. The KMT sponsored a Cultural Renaissance movement and explicitly reaffirmed Chinese culture.\textsuperscript{17} In order to carry out the movement, the party established the Confucius and Mencius Studies Association on April 10, 1960. The KMT authorities accused \textit{Apollo} of "indiscriminately embracing full-scale Westernization as a panacea for all of Taiwan's problems."\textsuperscript{18} When Li Ao, a graduate of National Taiwan University, became the chief editor, the journal turned radical. He was jailed and the journal was closed.

\textsuperscript{16} Moody, \textit{Political Change on Taiwan}, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{18} Berman, \textit{Words Like Colored Glass}, p. 180.
Thus, according to Sartori's criteria, the KMT was quite authoritarian in this period, because it ruthlessly destroyed subsystem autonomy. Consolidation of the party-state left the party with great discretion both politically and economically. However, in one aspect the KMT distinguished itself from most other authoritarian regimes, that is, it institutionalized local self-governance. It is local self-governance that sowed the seeds for the KMT's transformation and Taiwan's transition to democracy.

Local Self-governance and Elections

After the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT could have chosen oppressive approaches to local administration rather than local self-governance. It could have destroyed local elites and replaced them with mainlanders. Instead, the KMT opted to institutionalize local self-governance. From the very beginning on Taiwan, the KMT implemented the local elections. Local politics was actually the politics of the local Taiwanese people. As we shall discuss in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, the KMT implemented the local self-governance and elections because these are major tenets of Sun Yat-sen's political doctrine. The KMT tried to build Taiwan as a model province of the Three Principles of the People. Of course, the KMT maintained local democracy not only because of Sunism, but also because it needed to maintain the appearance of popular support. In addition to ideological considerations, the KMT implemented the local elections because it was preoccupied with recovery of the mainland at that time. Mainlanders had no interest in participating in local affairs on Taiwan and they hoped that they could return to the mainland in the near future.

The KMT local organizations performed five functions: service to the people, nomination and election of its candidates, communications with higher levels,
coordination among local political institutions and mediation between local factions. At first, the electoral function was not very important. The KMT simply let the local Taiwanese manage electoral affairs. Gradually, with the fading belief in mainland recovery, the KMT paid more and more attention to local elections. In 1960, although the KMT suppressed Lei Chen's attempt to found an opposition party and other opposition activities, it did not suspend the local elections. On October 17, 1960, the KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) passed a resolution to continue to support the non-partisan social elite in competing for positions in county and city councils.

However, the KMT's ideal of local democracy was quite different from the actual functioning of local self-governance. Edwin Winckler summarizes Arthur Lerman's finding regarding "the cultural discrepancies between the national elite's ideals of local democracy and the actual functioning of local democracy" as follows:

The national elite would like democracy to liberate the energies of the people, channel them into public affairs, and discipline them into the orderly pursuit of a unified general will.... In contrast to these ideals, the exigencies of recruiting votes in competitive elections have resulted in unprincipled, particularistic, divisive, and corrupt behavior on the part of both elite political managers and local politicians.

This gave the KMT an excuse to restrict the scope and frequency of elections along with the duration and issues of campaign activities. Campaigns were subject to stringent legal requirements. For instance, campaign forums could only be scheduled by the electoral authorities, and privately sponsored campaign forums were not allowed until

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1972. Local politicians had to meet the KMT's ideals before they could fully enjoy democratic rights.

Opposition in this first stage, therefore, was confined to activities at the local level. Local people enjoyed limited opportunities to participate in local and provincial elections. Despite restrictions, local elections were carried out continuously. These elections were competitive and attracted great popular interest. Nearly all the candidates at the local level were Taiwanese rather than mainlanders. Independents could contest all kinds of local elections. For instance, Kao Yu-shu, a Japanese-educated engineer, contended for the mayorship of Taipei in 1954, 1957 and 1964. He capitalized on both Taiwanese solidarity and the KMT's disunity to upset the party candidate in 1954. The KMT candidate defeated him in 1957 only after a massive effort. In the 1964 elections, the KMT granted Kao's request for poll observers. He took advantage of the anti-party sentiment and the KMT's complacency, and won again. The KMT regime turned Taipei into a special municipality whose mayor would be directly appointed by the Executive Yuan. Kao was the first mayor appointed, probably because Chiang hoped that Kao would be grateful to him for this offer. Kao was brought into the cabinet in 1971 and gradually faded from prominence.22 Other local politicians who emerged from local elections included Wu San-lien, Li Wan-chu, Kao Yu-shih, Yang Chin-fu, Kuo Yu-hsin, and Kuo Kuo-chi. They organized the Association for the Study of China's Local Self-government as their forum in 1958.23

In elections for city mayors and county magistrates, independent candidates gained one out of twenty-one seats in 1957 and four out of twenty-one in 1964. Regarding elections for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, it has been noted that "opposition representation reached its highest point with fifteen out of seventy seats in

22 Ibid., pp. 105-106; Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 79.
Local democracy contributed to democratic development on Taiwan. It provided the KMT an experimental forum in which to learn how to act in part as a competitive party. The party had to link itself to grass roots support in order to secure votes. It also gave the Taiwanese people some practical experience with competitive politics. More than 160,000 people became public office holders through the elections held before 1989, and their election to office sowed the seeds of democracy in Taiwanese society.

The function of local self-government in Taiwan's political development is comparable to that of land reform in economic development. Local self-government laid down the basis for later liberalization and democratization just like land reform laid down the basis for Taiwan's economic miracle. Further the condition for successful implementation of local self-government is the same as that for land reform. The KMT could implement land reform because they had no vested interest in Taiwanese land. Similarly, the KMT could implement local self-government because they had no interest in the existing local power structure. The KMT simply could not supply enough mainlanders to control local affairs. However, if the principle of local self-government was not enshrined in Sunism, the KMT would have had less incentive to implement it. Self-government might not have been deemed as important as land reform for the urgent economic recovery and the recovery of the mainland. Local units of government became the prototypes for democracy nationwide. We shall further discuss this in the Chapter on the KMT's ideology.

24 Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition", in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), p. 120.
26 Copper observes that "whether national or local officials deserve greater credit for creating democracy is now an academic question." John Copper, A Quiet Revolution: Political
Local elections after 1949 nurtured a group of highly educated and mostly Taiwanese politicians. Not all local elected politicians were oppositionists, and the KMT managed to occupy most positions at the local level. Nevertheless, local elections provided people in the island the channel to contest the KMT. Local elected politicians began to enter the national political scene when the KMT regime liberalized politics at the national level.

3. The Soft Authoritarian Period (the 1970s and Early 1980s)

This period was characterized by political liberalization initiated and implemented by the KMT. Liberalization was manifested in the partial opening of national elections and the granting of some freedoms such as to publish critical magazines.

*The National Elections and the Awakening of the Opposition* In 1969 the KMT authorities convoked the first island-wide supplementary elections to fill the seats vacated by deceased mainland parliamentarians in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Fifteen new members of the National Assembly and eleven new members of the Legislative Yuan were elected on Taiwan. Among independents, Huang Hsin-chieh was elected. Earlier in 1969, K'ang Ning-hsiang had been elected to the Taipei city council.

Opening of the national elections was an important decision for the KMT. Why did the KMT choose to liberalize rather than maintain the status quo? Firstly, the KMT needed to keep parliaments alive to continue the fa-t'ung. Although the KMT was not ready to completely give up its authoritarianism, it tried to do so within a constitutional...
arrangement. Secondly, the newly elected members, making up only a small portion of the total, could not affect the KMT's hold on power. Thirdly, Taiwan's electoral system favoured the ruling party. Taiwanese government employs two types of electoral system for different elections. A single-vote, single-member plurality system is used for the election of mayors and magistrates. Like in the Great Britain, this system clearly benefits the dominant party KMT candidates. In the election of delegates to the representative organs, Taiwan employs a single-nontransferable-vote, multi-member election system. The system requires that a candidate collect only enough votes in a particular district to pass over a certain threshold to be elected. As we will demonstrate in the Chapter on the KMT's organization, the KMT's organization had the capacity to assign candidates to districts and to apportion votes for each candidate "in such a manner that its candidates receive just enough votes to win, but not so many that they sap strength from others who need to accumulate enough to get over the threshold, too." Thus the multi-member system enabled the KMT to maximize its victory in the elections.

With the onset of liberalization, opposition began to awaken after two decades of silence. Signs of renewed opposition appeared in 1971, initially as spontaneous protests against the American decision to return the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands to Japan despite the ROC's claim to them. Later the movement advocated more effective foreign policies and more internal democratization. Independent candidates criticized the government with increasing intensity starting in the early 1970s. It set a precedent for open protest on Taiwan. The movement was tolerated by the KMT. Intellectuals conducted several social surveys, and questioned the political deficiencies of the regime, especially over the issue of the competence and legitimacy of the "Long Parliament."  

27 Wachman, *Taiwan*, p. 203.
Like in the last period, the opposition movement developed around a journal, *The Intellectual* (Ta-hsueh tsa-chih). The party-state directly controlled mass media, especially the television networks and newspapers. It applied strict legal restrictions to contain the reach of anti-system propaganda. However, the KMT regime left magazines less restricted as a channel for transmitting opposition viewpoints. Publishers of political opinion journals could register several similar titles at a time, and activate spare-tire publications after a functioning title was temporarily or permanently banned. With such a strategy, publishers could publish almost continuously. Political opinion journals were used as a base for opposition political activities.29

*The Intellectual* was first published in 1968, and began to have significant influence after a major reform in 1971. The KMT central headquarters contributed positively to the reform of the journal. At the time, Chiang was to assume the premiership, and he encouraged youth to give advice to the party. The central headquarters invited some scholars and editors of *The Intellectual* to attend two seminars, and asked some of them to publish a youth magazine that could carry youth's advice. The seminar participants preferred to reform *The Intellectual* and let it carry youth's advice. Many young liberal KMT members joined the editorial board, as did liberal mainlanders and Taiwanese nonparty intellectuals.

The KMT's liberalizing efforts encouraged political participation by intellectuals. In a more liberal environment than in the hard authoritarian period, the discussion in *The Intellectual* was more frank than that of *Free China*. It discussed political issues such as an end to martial law, the establishment of an opposition party, the rejuvenation of the government, etc. It became a training ground for future opposition leaders such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung.30 *The Intellectual* also arranged many political activities. On December 7, 1971, it held a public debate on the subject of re-electing all

29 Berman, *Words Like Colored Glass*, passim.
30 Ibid., p. 181.
national parliamentarians. It was also closely linked with the patriotic movement to reclaim the Tiao-yu-t'ai islands. Many members of *The Intellectual* participated in the election campaigns for the Taipei city council in 1973.31

As *The Intellectual* became increasingly critical, the KMT regime responded to the challenge in several ways. First, it tolerated "charges of corruption, undemocratic practices, and election fixing (when there is some substance to the comments); criticism of government policy on a wide range of domestic (especially local) issues; and comments on the age of government officials. Even human rights can be discussed openly within certain limits."32 Second, the KMT attempted to dismantle *The Intellectual* mainly by co-optation. Chiang Ching-kuo opened channels of communication with *The Intellectual* group, and co-opted some intellectuals by offering them party and government positions.33 However, he failed to establish regular communication with the opposition as a whole. Third, the KMT treated unruly intellectuals with a strong hand. It chose not to tolerate those who advocated the overthrow of the system, negotiation with Peking, or Taiwan independence. Fourteen faculty members in the department of philosophy of National Taiwan University were fired for their involvement in the opposition in 1973.34

At the same time, the KMT continued liberalization, as the KMT government gradually enlarged supplementary elections. In 1972, the year that Chiang Ching-kuo became the premier, 51 new seats were added to the Legislative Yuan to represent the free areas of China (i.e., Taiwan and several small islands under the ROC government control). In the National Assembly, the number of delegates newly elected increased to 53

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31 Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 78.
32 Copper, *A Quiet Revolution*, p. 5.
33 At the same time some KMT members quitted the party and joined opposition, like Chang Chun-hung.
in 1972.\textsuperscript{35} The party left room for non-partisan candidates by not nominating full slates of candidates in those elections. For instance, in Peacock County, the party nominated only one candidate for the two National Assembly seats, and for the five Provincial Assembly seats, the party made no nomination for the seat guaranteed to a female.\textsuperscript{36} In the Legislative Yuan election K'ang Ning-hsiang was elected. These two men, Chiang and K'ang, would have a great impact on the interaction between the KMT and the opposition in this period.

K'ang Ning-hsiang established the \textit{Taiwan Political Review} (Taiwan cheng-lun) in 1975. Its premier issue stated clearly that it would assume the mantle handed down from \textit{Free China} and \textit{The Intellectual}. K'ang used this magazine to generate change within the system. As Berman points out, "Without K'ang's contribution, it is quite possible that frustration over the inability to function within the existing system would have given predominance to radical elements whose activities in turn would have prompted a backlash from KMT conservatives, setting back the process of reform considerably."\textsuperscript{37}

As the Legislative Yuan elections of late 1975 approached, the \textit{Review}'s rhetoric intensified. In its fifth issue, both Yao Chia-wen's "May Not the Constitution and National Policy be Criticized?" and Ch'en Ku-ying's "Lift Martial Law Soon" were very critical. The KMT authorities closed the journal, accusing that another article appearing in the same issue touched the taboo subject of mainland policies.\textsuperscript{38}

In the winter of 1976, Premier Chiang asked the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan to research issues of political reform. Some Western-educated social scientists were chosen for the work. They provided many internal recommendations, including the abolition of the emergency decree and press

\textsuperscript{35} The total number of the National Assemblymen is 1,411 in 1972. Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 122.
\textsuperscript{36} Jacobs, \textit{Local Politics}, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{37} Berman, \textit{Words Like Colored Glass}, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{38} Li, \textit{Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien}, p. 117.
censorship, gradual total renewal of the central parliamentary bodies, and gradual legalization of opposition political parties. They suggested the government implement these measures over a period of fifteen years.\footnote{Jurgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 122.}

**The Chung-li Incident** Sensing the further liberalization, oppositionists became increasingly active. In preparation for the 1977 local elections, Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Hsin-chieh shuttled all over the island campaigning on behalf of all independent candidates as the first step to link the opposition forces in a united front. These campaign activities initiated the formation of the Tang-wai (literally, "outside the party") movement.

A prominent figure in the opposition during this phase was Hsu Hsin-liang, who had been a KMT provincial assemblyman. In the Assembly, he was very critical of the government, and he criticized most of his assembly colleagues in a published memoir of his years in the Provincial Assembly, entitled *The Sound of the Storm*. The aggrieved assemblymen retaliated by pressuring the KMT to block his nomination as the party's candidate for the magistracy of his home county. He was denied the KMT's nomination. He quit the KMT, joined the radical opposition, and ran for the position of T'ao-yuan County magistrate in 1977 as an independent. During the election, a crowd of some 10,000 attacked a police station in Chung-li, burned a police van and went on a rampage in response to an alleged attempt by the KMT to steal the election from Hsu. This was the so-called Chung-li Incident.

No KMT government crackdown was forthcoming and despite the Incident Hsu was declared the winner. The Tang-wai won four of the twenty positions of mayors and county magistrates on Taiwan. Opposition candidates also did well in the polling for the
Taiwan Provincial Assembly. They won one-third of the popular vote and twenty-one out of seventy-seven supplementary seats in the Provincial Assembly.

The KMT's lenient treatment of the Chung-li Incident had the effect of radicalizing the opposition. The opposition was also encouraged by potential social support revealed in the 1977 election. The discovery by newly elected opposition parliamentarians that they had little influence in the KMT-dominated Provincial Assembly, also led some of them to turn radical. In 1978, the opposition formed a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Corps (Chu hsuan tuan), which organized joint advertisements and meetings staged by several candidates. The government tolerated the officially illegal establishment of the Campaign Corps.

The 1978 national supplementary elections were postponed for a year by the KMT regime on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, with the US acknowledging the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. There had been no warning from the United States. The United States' decision astonished the Taiwanese authorities, and it made Peking's threats against Taiwan seem more imminent. The postponement aroused disagreement among the opposition. K'ang Ning-hsiang believed that it was not an appropriate time to have active demonstrations during the period of uncertainty created by the withdrawal of US support. However most of the oppositionists believed that the postponement was simply the KMT's attempt to suppress the opposition.

Although the elections were postponed, the KMT government did not stop reform. The year 1979 became a period of further liberalization on Taiwan. The KMT expanded the "Nation Building Study Group" (Kuo-chia chien-she yan-chiu-hui), and established communication channels with the social forces. The KMT also sought to negotiate with the opposition. From September 2 to October 11, deputy secretaries general of the KMT

and major opposition leaders attended a series of four dinner parties arranged by an independent newspaper publisher Wu San-lien. They also attended a "seminar on political communication" arranged by Yellow River, a KMT youth magazine. Meanwhile, many editorials discussing political communication appeared in the newspapers.\textsuperscript{41}

In response to the Chung-li Incident, the establishment of US-PRC diplomatic relations, and the KMT's negotiation offensive, the opposition began to differentiate into moderate and radical factions. K'ang Ning-hsiang represented the moderates in the opposition. His strategy was to change the system by working constructively within it. He thought that the opposition could transform the political system through existing legal means and elections. As Berman tells us, "One of the best examples of K'ang's long-term, moderate approach is his avowed willingness to retain the name Republic of China if the reality of majority rule is conceded. 'In American cities,' he explains philosophically, 'zoning laws may require that you keep the facade of a historic building, even if you renovate the interior. We can do this to save face for the Kuomintang and to avoid precipitating a crisis in relations between China and the United States.'\textsuperscript{42}

In June 1979, K'ang Ning-hsiang began publishing \textit{The Eighties} (Pa-shih nien-tai), a successor publication to the \textit{Taiwan Political Review}. He became the actual leader of the Tahg-wai in the late 1970s. Chiang Ching-kuo authorized informal contacts with the opposition, and he chose to meet and confer with K'ang in private.\textsuperscript{43}

In contrast to K'ang's moderate approach, the radicals in the opposition promoted a more confrontational approach. In August 1979, Huang began publishing \textit{Formosa} (Mei-li tao), which represented the radicals in the opposition. He realized the disadvantages of opposition candidates in election campaigns who faced KMT opponents

\textsuperscript{41} Lin Cheng-feng, \textit{Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsi yu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong} (Relationships of political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Berman, \textit{Words Like Colored Glass}, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 189.
supported by the party's high-powered organization. He tried to use the journal as an organizational core for the opposition. Kang Ning-hsiang did not join the group, but almost all other important Tang-wai figures showed up in its editorial board. They began in October to establish local offices of the journal. In addition to its main office in Taipei, it maintained 11 "service offices" throughout the island. In its early days, the *Formosa* group preferred popular demonstrations and direct confrontation.

*The Kaohsiung Incident* Encouraged by the victory in the Chung-li Incident, and being barred from challenging the KMT through elections in 1978, the radicals in the opposition focused their tactics on street demonstrations. After the 1978 supplementary elections were delayed, Huang Hsin-chieh staged a series of demonstrations across the island. Throughout 1979, the *Formosa* group organized 13 mass meetings and demonstrations all over Taiwan. On December 10, 1979, a large demonstration in Kaohsiung sponsored by the *Formosa* group broke up, and developed into a riot known as the Kaohsiung Incident. President Chiang instructed that "neither respond to verbal abuses nor strike back against attacks." The police did not react with force. Few demonstrators were hurt, but 183 policemen were injured.

The KMT blamed the Tang-wai leaders for the failure to handle the situation. The leaders of the *Formosa* group were arrested. The KMT court gave eight of them stiff sentences. On April 18, 1980, the court martial sentenced Huang Hsin-chie to 14 years and Shih Ming-te to a life term in prison. Six other persons were given sentences of 12 years. Hsu Hsing-liang fled to the United States. Later in 1980 when the mother-in-law

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44 Li, *Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien*, pp. 142-152.
46 Lu Ya-li, "Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 125. There are different interpretations about the Kaohsiung Incident. But unlike T'ienanmen Event in mainland China in 1989, no one was killed during the riot.
47 Li, *Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien*, p. 155.
and twin baby daughters of Lin I-hsiung were brutally murdered in their homes, people suspected the KMT regime of manipulating underground society to terrify the opposition, although no evidence of official involvement was found.

Almost simultaneously, the regime launched another wave of liberalization, focusing on expanding electoral democracy. In May 1980, the KMT government enacted the Public Officials Election and Recall Law, which combined and simplified seventeen old laws and regulations. The new Law described the rights and responsibilities of candidates, loosened restrictions on campaign behaviour, eliminated the maximum age regulation, and lowered education requirements for eligibility. The Law also vested investigative power in a nonpartisan election committee. Most importantly, the Law provided the Tang-wai with a legal foundation to participate in electoral politics. Furthermore, the KMT government increased the number of parliamentary seats subject to electoral competition. The KMT intended to use these measures to incorporate the opposition into electoral politics.48

On the other hand, the KMT regime did not soften restrictions on the extra-parliamentary activities. The Election and Recall Law prohibited acts of violence during elections, vote buying, and illegal campaign activities. Candidates were prohibited from setting off firecrackers, assembling a crowd for a parade, engaging in campaign activities outside the candidate's constituency, etc. However, enforcement of these provisions was selective, and the authorities did not stringently enforce the campaign rules.

The situation also changed on the part of the opposition. The Kaohsiung Incident had several effects on the opposition. First, the Formosa group became more moderate, probably in order to avoid any further loss of their forces. Second, the occupational composition of the opposition changed. The need for lawyers to defend those prosecuted by the authorities brought increasing numbers of lawyers into participation in the

opposition movement. As Berman notes, "During the 1970s, elected representatives and lawyers made up approximately 20 percent of the Tang-wai's leadership cadre. After the Kaohsiung Incident, this figure increased to more than 50 percent." Other social scientists also began to enter opposition leadership. They sought to introduce Western ideas and institutions, and they adopted political techniques, specific democratic procedures, institutional designs, and legal frameworks from the West. They were equipped with organizational skills, and were sophisticated in exploiting the system for maximum benefit, while minimizing their own personal political risk. Third, as Lu notes, "the harsh treatment meted out to the Tang-wai leaders by the authorities generated much sympathy for the opposition, of which they made very good use in the supplementary election held in 1980."

In the 1980 supplementary elections, the KMT and the Tang-wai, based on behind-the-scenes bargaining, agreed that the former would not harass the opposition and the latter would not publicly air certain sensitive issues (e.g., Taiwan independence). The sentencing of the radical leaders of the Formosa group after the Kaohsiung Incident allowed K'ang's group some respite in the campaign. K'ang was the only key opposition leader who was not prosecuted by the authorities in the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident. While the Formosa leaders were in jail, their wives and defense attorneys took their places in the elections, and they won much sympathy from people.

Despite censorship following the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT regime later allowed more opposition journals to appear. The opposition used these journals to demand individual liberty from martial-law constraints, political freedoms to associate and to dissent, direct elections for the chief executive positions, etc. At that time the KMT did not want to go that far. The KMT, following its own liberalization agenda, only

49 Berman, *Words Like Colored Glass*, p. 190.
51 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 126.
wanted to increase the scope of the supplementary elections, but disallow all opposition parties.52

Nevertheless, the opposition became better organized. They "recommended" (a euphemism for nomination) candidates, developed a unified platform, and in many other ways assisted each other. The elections were deemed reasonably fair. In the supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan on December 6, 1980, the Tang-wai garnered 27.6 percent of the popular vote. In the election of substitute delegates to the National Assembly, the Tang-wai won 34.7 percent. The KMT did better than before. The Tang-wai found that its success depended on avoiding extreme positions, being more pragmatic, and being better organized and disciplined.53

Factionalist Strife in the Opposition  

The KMT further liberalized the island's politics after the 1980 supplementary elections. It also sought to negotiate with the opposition. The KMT's liberalizing efforts created sharp differences within the opposition. The moderates and the radicals in the opposition had different points of view regarding legislative strategy, the relationship between the opposition and the KMT, and the national identity issue. By this time, the moderates in the opposition consisted of elected Tang-wai officeholders and legislators. The Formosa group also adopted the electoral route after the Kaohsiung Incident and became moderates. As far as legislative strategy was concerned, moderate oppositionists "believed that to win as many seats as possible in the supplementary and local elections was the only way for the opposition to grow and to influence the political process. A mass strategy should be used only for the limited purpose of supplementing the electoral and parliamentary strategy.... Tang-wai's participation in [the legislature] might give the opposition some leverage to pressure the

52 Cf. Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, pp. 489-491.
On the relationship of the opposition to the KMT, the elected oppositionists argued that maintaining normal channels of communication with the ruling party was in the interest of the survival and growth of the opposition. They believe that a confrontational attitude might be taken for tactical reasons, but that it should not be a principle of the opposition. The moderates position on the issue of national identity favoured Taiwan autonomy or self-determination, rather than explicit Taiwan independence.

In contrast, the radicals of the opposition held more extreme view points. The radicals were called the "New Tide" (Hsin ch'ao-liu) group. It was a group of writers and intellectuals who organized around a magazine called New Generation (Hsin sheng tai). Radical oppositionists were impatient with compromise and ambiguity. They believed that Tang-wai elected politicians could have little influence in the KMT-dominated political system. Therefore, they believed that the Tang-wai should use mass protests as its main strategy, and that the parliament should be used only as a place to expose the injustice of the system. On the relationship of the opposition to the KMT, the radicals in the opposition believed that "the Tang-wai had to maintain a confrontational stance toward the Kuomintang as a matter of principle, as long as the basic structure of the political system remained unchanged. They attacked the officeholders' willingness to compromise with the Kuomintang in the Legislative Yuan as unprincipled capitulation."

On the national identity issue, the New Tide group advocated straightforward Taiwan independence. Opposition radicals used their journals such as New Generation and Cultivate (Shen-keng) to criticize the moderates, giving rise to the expression "Tang-wai versus Tang-wai."

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54 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 126.
55 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, pp. 81-82.
56 Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 127.
57 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 191. The founder of the journal was Huang Shih-ch'eng. Hsu Jung-shu, wife of Chang Chun-hung, succeeded to him.
As the 1983 supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan approached, the Tang-wai created a Tang-wai Editors and Writers Association and a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Association (Hou yuan hui). The authorities allowed it to nominate candidates officially. Both the KMT and the Tang-wai tested new election strategies and tactics. However, the radical Editors and Writers Association and moderate Campaign Assistance Association continued to split the Tang-wai camp.58

Abundant factionalist strife in the opposition cost the opposition dearly in the elections. In the December 3, 1983 supplementary elections, candidates from K'ang's mainstream, the Formosa and the New Tide groups ran as competitors in the same districts. Despite his effort, K'ang failed to hold the Tang-wai together. K'ang and his group were defeated. Tang-wai candidates rallied 29.1 percent of the popular vote, but the Tang-wai won only six legislative seats compared to thirteen in 1980.59 K'ang's influence began to decline and he was isolated from the opposition's core leadership, which by that time was dominated by more activist elements.60

After the 1983 elections, the Tang-wai attempted to improve its organization. In the spring of 1984, those oppositionists who held elective offices formed the Association of Public Policy Studies (Kung-kung cheng-ts'e yan-chiu hui) as the coordination centre of their movement. It was formed to replace the campaign assistance organization that only operated during the election time, and to accumulate knowledge in substantive policy areas. This move was pronounced illegal by the government on a legal technicality. However, the KMT government tolerated the Association's formation and did not take any measures to eliminate it. The KMT invited the opposition to negotiate on

60 After the formation of the DPP, Formosa group became the mainstream. K'ang lost his interest in politics and declined to run again for the 1989 election. The Legislative Yuan held a retirement tribute for K'ang. Li Huan praised him for his contributions to the promotion of democracy. See, Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 163.
the procedures and restrictions regarding the new organization. The opposition accepted
the invitation, but eschewed compromise.61

The KMT seemed confident in dealing with the Tang-wai after the 1983 elections. Thus, it further liberalized politics on Taiwan, as it loosened control of the media. From January 1984 to September 1986, the opposition published more new journals. Political opinion magazines multiplied and saturated the market. Although the KMT did not allow the existence of opposition political parties, it allowed the existence of public opinion magazines, which functioned as a channel to integrate new social forces. Through these magazines dissenting opposition elites participated in the political process "on the fringes of acceptability." As Berman notes, "The medium of the magazine allowed for the substitution of printer's ink for bloodshed. The opposition floated trial balloons and the regime responded. The corpus of the publication served as proxy for more direct, person-to-person conflict."62

Thus, according to Sartori's criteria, the KMT regime was a pragmatic one-party system in this period because it allowed room for some peripheral subsystem autonomy. Chiang Ching-kuo's "new deal" integrated the social elites into the existing political system. Liberalization was carried out according to the KMT's terms. The opposition had to play the game within the confines set by the KMT. If the opposition became too extreme, as in the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT regime clamped down. But the ever-existing opportunities to challenge the ruling party in elections attracted many in the opposition to work within the system and caused division within the opposition. Confident that they could control the situation, the KMT began to move even further forward in political reforms.

62 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 43 and p. 195.
4. The Competitive Period (Since the Mid-1980s)

This has been a period of rapid democratization on Taiwan. The cumulative efforts toward political liberalization since the 1970s led to a dramatic democratic breakthrough in 1986. The KMT's policy toward the opposition changed from mainly repression to toleration and competition. In contrast to its traditional way of dealing with the opposition by suppression and co-optation, the KMT began to carry out democratization on Taiwan. We discuss this period in three parts. In the first part, we shall see how the KMT legitimized the opposition. In the second we discuss constitutional reforms. In the third we discuss the Taiwan independence issue and the establishment of a new type of party politics on Taiwan. Through discussion of these topics we shall see how the KMT carried out democratization and at the same time managed to maintain its position of political dominance.

The Legalization of the Opposition

The 1985 Elections

The new stage started with Chiang Ching-kuo's speech regarding succession. In a *Time* magazine interview published in September 1985, Chiang declared that "he had 'never given any consideration' to the possibility that he might be succeeded by a family member and that the succession would be handled in accordance with 'democracy and the rule of law.'" On Constitution Day, December 25, 1985, Chiang said again that members of Chiang family "could not and would not" run for the office of president and that military rule "could not and would not" take place either.63

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In this more open political environment, the KMT and the Tang-wai reached a "gentlemen's agreement" again for the 1985 elections. The island-wide local elections of November 16, 1985 were to elect 21 city mayors and county magistrates, 77 members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 51 members of the Taipei City Council, and 42 members of the Kaohsiung City Council. In these elections, the opposition founded a Campaign Assistance Association, which served as a de facto political party to support those Tang-wai candidates officially nominated by the opposition. According to the Temporary Provisions to the Constitution, such an action was illegal. But the KMT did not ban this new organization of the opposition. Incidents of violence occurred during the campaign. In Chung-li, Tang-wai supporters overturned a car and threw rocks when one of their candidates lost by a narrow margin. But the government did not punish the offenders with harsh sentences as in the Kaohsiung Incident. Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated the attacks made by a Tang-wai candidate who charged him with nepotism. When the Election Commission was about to press charges, Chiang prevented the charges by saying that he did not mind personal criticism.

For the 1985 local elections, the Tang-wai formulated a 20 article platform, which included (1) the future of Taiwan should be collectively decided by its residents; (2) abolish the Temporary Provisions and thoroughly carry out democratic constitutionalism; (3) enact the Local Self-government Law as stipulated in the Constitution, which provides that the provincial governor be directly elected by the people; and (4) lift the Emergency Decree and immediately release all political prisoners, etc.64 During the campaign, as Copper describes, "The opposition charged the government and the KMT with misgovernment and incompetence, as well as dishonesty, corruption, authoritarianism, and dictatorial practices, some asserting that the KMT was no longer qualified to rule the country. KMT officials cited the party's past record and played down

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most the problems, attributing them to bad luck or coincidence. The election went well for the two sides. The Tang-wai won some satisfying victories, while the KMT still won a majority of the popular vote. The Tang-wai did extremely well in the Taipei City Council race where all 11 of the Campaign Assistance Association candidates won. Although the KMT still did not allow the formation of an opposition party, the Tang-wai became to a greater degree than before a legitimate opposition through the 1985 elections.

After the elections, the Association of Public Policy Studies decided to set up branches in the various cities of the island. The Association became the forerunner of a new opposition party. The authorities became worried and warned several times that such action would not be tolerated. But the KMT authorities actually did not take any action to ban the association. At this time, senior liberal KMT politician T'ao Pai-ch'uan came back from overseas to attend the third session of the Twelfth Congress, and took advantage of a meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo to recommend to him the necessity and significance of negotiation with the opposition. Influenced by T'ao and supported by the reformers in the party, Chiang urged the party to tolerate the opposition's move. At the third session of the KMT's Twelfth Congress in March 1986, Chiang directed the KMT to open a dialogue with the Tang-wai leaders for the purpose of making the Tang-wai legal. In April 1986, the CSC of the KMT decided to study six reform issues: (1) the restructuring of the National Assembly, (2) local self governance, (3) martial law, (4) civic organizations, (5) social reform, and (6) internal party reform. In anticipating the supplementary elections at the end of 1986, the KMT conducted its preparatory work on its own initiative, rather than being forced to react to events. Chiang hinted at the possibility of lifting the Emergency Decree and legalizing new political parties. On May

7, he instructed in a KMT CSC meeting that "we must have sincerity of heart and mind and undertake communications with personages from all segments of society to promote political harmony and the welfare of the people."\(^{68}\)

The Commission of Policy Coordination of the KMT immediately decided to invite opposition leaders and some professors to a dinner party in which the two sides reached three points of consensus. "First, both sides accept the Constitution of the ROC, but will negotiate how to reform the political system; Second, both sides accept the establishment of branches of the Association of Public Policy Studies, but will negotiate about its name and registration; Third, both sides agree to strive for political harmony during negotiation."\(^{69}\) The KMT later organized a series of formal meetings with the Tang-wai. As a party functionary in charge of communication with the Tang-wai pointed out, in order to maintain a harmonious political climate, the government had consistently taken a tolerant attitude toward organized activity by Tang-wai persons.\(^{70}\)

The KMT's democratization created more room for the opposition. In the later half of 1986, the opposition staged a series of street demonstrations. The KMT did not crack down on these demonstrations. It seemed that the KMT believed that vocal popular protest could not do much harm to its rule. The police forces were mainly used to set limits to the opposition on the issues such as Taiwan independence and street violence. Repression was used only intermittently. For instance, Hsu Ts'ao-te and Ts'ai You-chuan were arrested for their ardent separatist activities. Facing the armed threat from the mainland, the opposition generally exercised restraint.

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\(^{68}\) Cited in Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 90.
\(^{69}\) Lin Cheng-feng, *Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsi yu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong* (Relations of political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 3.
\(^{70}\) Li, *Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szu-shi-nien*, p. 221.
The Establishment of the DPP and the 1986 Elections

The KMT's negotiation initiative was viewed by the opposition as an indirect recognition of the opposition. Anticipating the supplementary elections at the end of 1986, the Tang-wai moved to further strengthen its organization. To preempt the KMT, 132 opposition leaders unilaterally announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at a meeting of the Association of Public Policy Studies on September 28, 1986.\(^7\) The KMT-controlled media denounced the formation of the DPP as an illegal act according to the Temporary Provisions to the Constitution, stating that the DPP was not qualified as a legal opposition party because of its separatist orientation. However, since legalization of the opposition was already on the KMT agenda, the KMT government did not attempt to block the establishment of the DPP. On October 15, 1986, the CSC passed bills entitled "National Security in the Period of Mobilization" and "Civil Associations in the Period of Mobilization." In his October 1986 interview with an American reporter, KMT Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo announced that martial law and the ban on the formation of new parties would soon be ended. Political parties could be formed as long as they supported the ROC Constitution and renounced Communism and separatism. As Nathan and Ho point out, by setting the limits he actually "invited the DPP to the negotiating table, ... [and] put the burden on the DPP either to fit within the framework Chiang was establishing or to take on the risks of challenging the framework."\(^7\) Chiang could take such an approach because it was supported by much of the party, and the reasons for this are the changes that we shall detail in later chapters.

The DPP then held a Congress in early November and adopted a political platform on November 10, 1986, which was modified by the Second National Congress on April 17, 1988. Among the DPP's goals were: basic human rights, freedom of the press, responsible government administration, the rule of law and people's sovereignty. The

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\(^7\) Copper, *A Quiet Revolution*, pp. 36-37.
\(^7\) Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform," p. 44.
concrete suggestions include: prohibiting political activity for government employees and
teachers; prohibiting political party intervention in military, police or security affairs;
protecting human rights and legal equality; and protecting freedom of thought.

The hastiness of the founding of the DPP may be explained by three reasons. First, the opposition tried to outmaneuver the KMT. It did not want the populace to get
the impression that democratization was led by the KMT without the opposition's
pressure. Second, the opposition sought to take advantage of the relatively liberal
environment under Chiang's rule. Opposition leaders assessed that it would be easier to
get organized while Chiang was in power, rather than risk the uncertainty of his
successor. "Otherwise," as Nathan and Ho put it, "it will be hard to predict the attitudes of
the authorities in that post-CCK era towards a TW [Tang-wai] political party." With
the benefit of hindsight we know that the opposition leaders' assessments were not precise
because the ruling KMT did further democratize after the death of Chiang. Nevertheless
their political judgment was one factor that led to the September 1986 creation of the
DPP. Third, the creation of the DPP was also a response to Hsu Hsin-liang. In 1980, after
the Kaohsiung Incident, Hsu moved to the United States and called for revolution and
Taiwan independence. In May 1984, he formed a Taiwan Democratic Party in New York,
and tried to bring the party back to Taiwan to contest the elections. The KMT simply
refused his entry. Hsu did not give up his effort to bring the party back to Taiwan, but
the Tang-wai on Taiwan hoped that they could found the first opposition party
domestically, rather than import one from abroad.

In December 1986, the DPP and the KMT competed as the two principal parties in
the national elections, and the KMT behaved as an ordinary party in an emerging two-
party system. The DPP put up 20 candidates for Legislative Yuan seats and 22 candidates
for National Assembly seats in the December 6 elections. While registered on the official

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73 Ibid., p. 49.
74 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 79, and p. 91.
ballots as nonpartisan, the DPP candidates used the name and emblem of the new party during the campaign. The authorities did not interfere with the DPP's campaign. The DPP came out of the election with 12 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 11 in the National Assembly. The KMT won 59 seats in the Legislative Yuan, and 68 seats in the National Assembly. As Copper points out, the 1986 election "was the first election in which the KMT formally competed with another political party.... In other words, formal party competition -- generally a prerequisite for a truly democratic system -- was born."

The success the KMT enjoyed in the supplementary elections assuaged its leaders' fears that further reforms would be tantamount to a loss of power. On July 14, 1987, the Legislative Yuan adopted the National Security Law, and after 39 years, the state of emergency was lifted. The Law provided a legal basis for certain limitations to the freedom of speech and for a number of controls that the government deemed necessary as long as the conflict with the mainland was not resolved. Nevertheless, the KMT party state had clearly modified its own rules for political competition. Ending the emergency decree removed an issue that the opposition had used to challenge the ruling party.

After the state of emergency was lifted, the DPP staged a series of street demonstrations on such issues as reorganization of the national legislature, popular election of the provincial governor, judicial inequity, political persecution of advocates of Taiwan independence, etc. Lin Chin-chieh, a moderate in the DPP, complained that "street demonstrations have made all of us exhausted, the treasury of our party empty, many of our comrades in prison or facing prosecution. At such cost, nearly all of the objectives which we sought to achieve have not been attained."

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75 Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 126.
76 Copper, A Quiet Revolution, p. 39.
77 Lin Chin-chieh, "Kei Yao Chu-hsi te Kung-k'ai-hsin" (An open letter to Chairman Yao), Democratic Progress Weekly, No. 154 (September 3-9, 1988); cited in Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," p. 141.
Democratization also created social movements. Numerous groups took to the streets to air grievances. However, these groups have not developed close ties with the political opposition. The student movement of 1989 even stressed its distinction from the DPP. The KMT state did not discipline these protests. Rather, after the lifting of martial law the KMT began drafting legislation to govern political activities. The ban on newspapers was lifted on January 1, 1988. The DPP created its own official newspaper the *Democratic Progressive Weekly*. It also applied to operate its own broadcasting stations. As Copper points out, "The KMT is itself trying to restrict its activities in these [media] areas in order to shed the image of an overreaching party." A bill governing demonstrations was passed in January 1988. In the first four months of 1988, police counted 729 demonstrations; but the government by and large did not molest the demonstrators. In January 1989, The Law on Civic Organization was enacted and the formation of opposition parties was legitimated. It provided a legal basis for the establishment of new political parties, albeit with restrictions concerning their political programmes (they had to abstain from advocating Communism or Taiwan independence). This law essentially formalized the party competition that already existed. Nevertheless, it legally changed Taiwan's political system from a one-party to a multiparty system. New parties proliferated. As of March 1991, sixty-one old and new parties were reported to have registered with the Ministry of the Interior. In 1992 the number of parties was around seventy. The Election and Recall Law was revised at the same time that the Law on Civic Organization was enacted. It lifted many restrictions on campaign activities. The KMT debated and negotiated with the DPP on all these bills.

79 Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* p. 68.
When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, the KMT accelerated political reforms rather than stopping democratization, as some feared. This fact demonstrates that Taiwan's transition to democracy was not the masterpiece of Chiang alone, and that the KMT as a whole was a democratizing force. On February 3, 1988, the CSC approved the political reform plan. At the Thirteenth National Congress of the Party held in July 1988, the new party platform stressed the continuation of the democratization and liberalization processes in politics and the economy. Even a very critical writer notes that "The government seemed to show even greater tolerance for the expression of dissent and for opposition street rallies. The authorities promised substantial parliamentary restructuring, and agreed to consider subjecting the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung to election once again."^82

Negotiation

The KMT and the DPP also began a regular process of negotiation. Negotiation was gradually institutionalized. It became a normal channel for dispute resolution between the KMT and DPP caucuses in the legislature. It evolved from informal to formal and from individual to collective negotiation. The communication became more and more rationalized. Both sides were serious about it and prepared well for these sessions. The media tended to focus on these negotiations, and both sides tried to appear rational before the public. On February 2, 1988, Liang Su-jung, the deputy secretary general of the KMT Commission of Policy Coordination, invited the DPP caucus in the legislature to negotiations concerning the KMT's plan to reform the central parliamentary system. Both sides agreed to negotiate on other topics as well. On March 17, the KMT and the DPP held another negotiation. Before the discussion of political issues, they first negotiated over the procedures to be followed during the policy negotiation. The KMT thought that the eleven issues raised by the DPP could not be

finished in one meeting, and suggested that future negotiation agendas should not include more than 3 issues. The DPP argued that because negotiation did more good for the KMT in terms of its image of openness, the negotiation should allow for more time to discuss issues raised by the DPP. On political issues, the two parties basically reached agreement. For instance, on the issue of national identity, the ruling party insisted that in the new environment created by the ending the emergency decree the opposition still should obey the ROC Constitution and should not destroy national integrity. The DPP argued that it identified itself with the ROC and Constitution, but that the Temporary Provisions should be abolished as soon as possible.  

These negotiations were made possible by private relations between members of the ruling party and the opposition. Despite fighting on the floor, personal friendship developed across party lines. Sometimes, when formal negotiation met a deadlock, informal negotiation took place. For instance, at one point in the legislative process of the Assembly and Rally Act when the two parties' special negotiating teams were deadlocked over a provision, other members presented an alternative set of proposals and counterproposals that allowed the negotiations to continue.

The 1989 and 1992 Elections  

The December 1989 elections were the first elections since the lifting of martial law. The supplementary elections for the Legislative Yuan and the elections for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, as well as those for Taipei and Kaohsiung city councils and those for county magistrates and mayors were all held on December 2, 1989. One hundred and one seats were to be filled in the Legislative Yuan to  

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83 Lin Cheng-feng, Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsi yu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong (Relations of the political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 60.  
84 Kao Yu-jen, Taiwan Ching-yan (Taiwan experience) (Taipei: Twenty First Century Foundation, 1989), pp. 174-175. The DPP waged fightings with the intention to expose the defects of the political institutions dramatically, and/or to attract media attention. The authorities tolerated such confrontational behavior in the legislature.
represent the free areas of China in 1989. The KMT ran in 1989 on its record of success in ruling Taiwan and in taking the lead in reforms. Because political parties were legalized, the scope of their activities increased. The election results showed that the KMT was losing ground to the DPP (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). The DPP made major advances. The DPP's candidate You Ch'ing, a law Ph.D. trained in West Germany, captured the Taipei county magistrate's seat. It upset the KMT very much, because Taipei county is President Lee's home town. The KMT held an emergency meeting after the election to discuss the results. The outcome of the meeting was that the KMT accepted the results and stated that it would learn some lessons from this election.85

Table 3.1 KMT, Tang-wai/DPP and Independent Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TW/DPP</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Election Commission, Executive Yuan.

Table 3.2 Distribution of Elected Seats in Legislative Yuan among KMT, Tang-wai/DPP and Independents.

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang-wai/DPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.

The electorate on Taiwan experienced the first full re-election of the Legislative Yuan on December 19, 1992. The DPP made further progress in the election, although the KMT was still dominant. The KMT won 102 out of 161 seats, (61.67 percent of the votes) and the DPP won 50 seats (36.09 percent of the votes). Compared with the results of three years previously, the DPP progressed in several aspects. It not only increased its percentage of popular vote from 28 percent to 36 percent, but also increased its percentage of the seats in the Legislative Yuan from 21 percent to 31 percent. Three years previously, the KMT had won 60.6 percent of votes, but managed to capture 71 percent of seats in the legislature. In 1992, the KMT won 61.7 percent of the votes, but only 63.4 percent of the seats. In 1989, the DPP won 28.3 percent of votes and 21 percent of seats. In 1992, it won 36.1 percent of the votes and 31.1 percent of the seats. These statistics revealed that the DPP's improvement of its organizational structure paid off in electoral gains. The election was significant because it allowed the DPP the opportunity to gain enough seats to effectively oppose the ruling party. Nevertheless, the ruling party KMT still maintained majority in the Legislative Yuan. The 1992 election showed that democracy was being consolidated on Taiwan.

The Constitutional Reforms

The formal establishment of democracy on Taiwan involved revision of the ROC Constitution and laws in the authoritarian period. The following discussion shows that the
constitutional reforms on Taiwan have been basically directed and implemented by the ruling party KMT. The party has carried out the constitutional reforms according to the fa-t'ung, and such an approach has facilitated the gradual transition to democracy on Taiwan.

After the 1989 elections, the most urgent task on the Taiwanese political agenda was the reform of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. Without a thorough reform of parliament, the opposition's hard-won seats amounted to only a small percentage in a parliament that was filled mainly by old delegates elected more than forty years earlier on the mainland. In the Legislative Yuan, the proportion of the elected seats to the total seats was 17 percent in 1980, 19 percent in 1983, 22 percent in 1986 and 35 percent in 1989. The Tang-wai gained twelve seats in the Legislative Yuan and eleven in the National Assembly in the 1986 supplementary elections. But its members comprised only about 4 percent of the Legislative Yuan and a little more than 1 percent of the National Assembly. In 1989 old mainlanders still occupied the majority of seats (200) in the Legislative Yuan, while Taiwan-elected members had 74 seats and appointed overseas Chinese representatives had 27 seats. However, since the senior KMT mainlander legislators were too old to participate actively in the legislative process, the DPP legislators played a very effective role. Comparatively, the National Assembly needed more urgent reform. It was a constitutional institution, the carrier of the ROC fa-t'ung. In 1990 the average age of the mainland-elected representatives was over eighty. They were seen as the last bastion of an autocratic system, and were called "old thieves" by many Taiwanese.

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88 Tien, Great Transition, p. 146;
89 Fu Hu and Yan-han Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 185.
The KMT and the DPP had conflicting proposals regarding parliamentary reform. The DPP demanded an immediate complete re-election of the parliaments. In contrast, the KMT proposed the phasing out of the veterans. The Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians was passed in early 1989 by the Legislative Yuan. It gave the senior parliamentarians a dignified retirement, as it urged old parliamentarians to retire in three stages within two years. It provided strong financial incentives (NT $4 million, about U.S. $147,000, per person) for the senior legislators to retire. The KMT argued that phasing out the veterans was the only proper way to handle the issue. Since the veterans were elected or had legally replaced an elected representative, they should not be forced to retire. It argued that a forced retirement was a violation of the fa-t'ung. The KMT also wanted the change to be gradual because it did not want to give the impression that Taipei was adopting a two-China policy, which might have irritated Peking to the point of using force against Taiwan.

The DPP was highly critical of the KMT's plan. They demanded that all the veteran parliamentarians step down immediately, and that all seats be elected from Taiwan only. They also denounced the size of the severance pay proposed by the KMT. They saw it as an issue that allowed them to make political capital. The veteran parliamentarians thus became the focus of opposition attacks on the system.

The veterans were not willing to comply. This caused a constitutional crisis in March 1990 during the eighth session of the First National Assembly. Veteran parliamentarians ignored the CSC's plan regarding the revision of the Temporary Provisions, voted to increase their pay and passed amendment bills to extend their term of office from six to nine years, to reconfirm the right to initiate and veto parliamentary resolutions, and to have a meeting of the Assembly every year. The self-aggrandizement of these parliamentarians was strongly opposed by the KMT, the DPP and ordinary people. Their action was perceived as political regression by the society. The students were especially angered. They protested in downtown Taipei, imitating the mainland
student demonstrations at T'ien-an-men Square. Lee Teng-hui met student representatives and promised to speed up political reforms. He also held a historic meeting with the chairman of the DPP, Huang Hsin-chieh, and put forward concrete suggestions concerning a draft schedule for ending the Mobilization Period and revising the Constitution. Lee also agreed to hold a National Affairs Conference to discuss further democratization with the representatives of the DPP and all other political forces and intellectuals at home and abroad. The National Assembly backed down from its demands under the pressure. The Judicial Yuan issued Constitutional Interpretation No. 261, which decreed that the current Legislative and Assembly terms would have to end by 1991 and new Legislators and Assemblymen would be elected on Taiwan by 1992.90

The crisis was a turning point in Taiwan's constitutional reforms. The KMT leaders adeptly dealt with opposition leaders, students, and veteran parliamentarians, thus pushing the reform of the representative system forward within the constraints of legal procedures. Additionally, the KMT employed social pressure to overcome the internal resistance to reform, and to reach a degree of consensus concerning complete re-election of the parliamentary organs and revision of the Constitution.

On May 20, 1990, Lee Teng-hui declared in his presidential inauguration speech that the constitutional reforms would be completed within two years. Lee promised to abolish the Temporary Provisions within a year. He met with DPP Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh, and agreed to meet many DPP demands, including direct election of all legislators and a national health insurance programme. The DPP demanded that the governor of Taiwan Province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the two biggest cities on Taiwan, be subject to popular elections. The KMT did not agree at that time.

From the end of June till early July 1990, the National Affairs Conference was convened. Its participants included people holding divergent political views. The DPP

90 Jiang and Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," p. 90.
Central Committee voted sixteen to six to participate in the conference. Before the conference was held, the authorities consulted a wide range of people, with a total of 119 discussion meetings being held at home and abroad. It also conducted two public opinion polls to identify people's attitudes toward constitutional reforms. The Conference reached consensus on following five subjects: (1) full re-election of the National Assembly; (2) legalization of local institutions; (3) the president be elected directly; (4) abolishment of the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Communist Rebellion and amending the Constitution; (5) promoting the relationship with the mainland with the priority of the welfare of Taiwanese people. As James Robinson points out, "the National Affairs Conference served the objectives of crisis-defusion and consensus-formation."

With the National Affairs Conference, the KMT re-gained the initiative. Immediately after the conference the KMT formed a "Planning Group for Constitutional Reforms," as the return to constitutional rule required reform of the old ROC Constitution. As we shall discuss in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, the Constitution has contributed to liberalization and democratization on Taiwan. However, the Constitution designed for the whole of China contains provisions that might hamper the future process of democratization on Taiwan in particular. Jaushieh Wu notes, "These provisions include the division between the presidency and the premiership, the need to retain the National Assembly and the Control Yuan, and the need to appoint Mongolian, Tibetan, overseas Chinese, and minority representatives to the three chambers of the parliament." The KMT felt compelled to make the Constitution more applicable to

92 Central Daily, July 12, 1990.
Taiwan's current situation. Therefore, entering the 1990s, constitutional reforms became the most urgent item on the KMT's political reform agenda.

The KMT planned a two stage Constitution revision, arguing that two stages were necessary to guarantee continuation of the fa-t'ung. According to the KMT's scheme, the first stage of constitutional revision was to "use the existing National Assembly for one last time to legitimize the constitutional reform to be carried out by its successor;"\(^95\) and then the second stage of substantial revision was to be done by the newly elected National Assembly. On April 8, 1991, the National Assembly convened a temporary meeting to debate the initial constitutional amendments. During the debates the DPP delegates walked out of the meeting, and staged street protests in Taipei. Lee Teng-hui stressed in a television address that "a responsible political party should follow legal procedures in voicing political views to solicit voters."\(^96\) The National Assembly adopted ten additional constitutional provisions proposed by the KMT. These provisions allowed for the retirement of veteran parliamentarians, and provided a legal basis for the election of a new assembly with the sole function of revising the Constitution. All seats were to be contested in the free areas of the ROC, with the exception of a few mandates for overseas Chinese. While the total number of seats of the three representative bodies was reduced, the number of representatives to be elected on Taiwan was greatly increased.\(^97\) A constituency at the national level was created to represent the whole of China. The procedural revision in the first stage by the First National Assembly legitimized the election of the Second Assembly.

The National Assembly also abolished the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Communist Rebellion, thus completing the first stage of the Constitution

\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 94.
\(^{96}\) Cited in Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition", p. 129.
revision. In so doing the KMT depleted the DPP's major political capital. The problem of
the long parliament and veteran parliamentarians had been the focus of the DPP's attack
on the authoritarian regime. The ending of the mobilization period eliminated the long
parliament, and the veterans had to retire. The KMT escaped from a heavy political
burden, and laid down the basis for the essential revision of the Constitution in the next
stage.

The election of the Second National Assembly took place on December 21, 1991.
It marked the end of 43 years of rule by the First National Assembly. The size of the
National Assembly was reduced from 3,000 to 403 members to make it more responsive
to Taiwan's electorate.98 The KMT obtained 254 seats and the DPP got 66 seats.
According to Article 174 of the Constitution, an amendment to the Constitution must be
adopted by a resolution of three-quarters of the members of the National Assembly at a
meeting having a quorum of two-thirds of the entire Assembly. So, the KMT enjoyed
total control of the process of constitutional reforms in the National Assembly.

On May 6, 1992, the KMT's CSC approved another nine additional provisions,
which generally ''increased the power of the president and the National Assembly at the
expense of the premier and the Control Yuan. The president, under the new design, had
the power to nominate members of the Control Yuan, the Council of Grand Justices, and
the Examination Yuan, and his nominations were subject to the approval of the National
Assembly."99 The National Assembly was to receive regular reports from the president
on the state of the nation, and deliberate on national affairs and offer advice. The Control
Yuan had not only lost these powers to the National Assembly, but also lost its status as
one of the three parliamentary bodies of the ROC. Its powers were now limited to
auditing government budgets and to censuring and impeaching public servants. But due

98 June Teufel Dreyer, "Taiwan's December 1991 election," World Affairs, Vol. 155, No. 2 (Fall
to the disputes within the ruling party, the KMT did not reach a consensus regarding the method of presidential election. Opposition leaders were not satisfied with the results. They threatened to initiate public protests against the delaying tactics of the ruling party regarding the method of presidential election. On May 27, 1992, however, the Second National Assembly passed the KMT's Constitution amendment bill. Although some problems remained unresolved, this second stage of constitutional revision made Taiwan's political system more democratic and simplified the parliamentary procedure by removing the Control Yuan from people's representative bodies.

DPP factions seemed to be able to contain their differences on the matter of constitutional reforms and coordinated their activities both in the National Assembly and on the streets. Instead of the revision of the old Constitution, the DPP argued for the writing of a new one. At times it threatened to boycott the revision process. However, fearing exclusion from the process of constitutional reforms and the adverse results that could have on the party, the DPP made efforts to participate in the process. The DPP originally hoped to form a coalition with some KMT members to push for the direct election of the president. It took the strategy of "revising the Constitution in form and creating a new one in essence." It disassembled the Draft Constitution of Taiwan into 28 amendment bills and proposed them in the Assembly. The DPP proposed that Taiwan adopt a presidential system and that the president should be popularly elected. The DPP's minority position has prevented it from making a significant impact on the drafting of the new constitutional provisions. All its 28 bills were defeated by the KMT dominated Assembly. In May 1992, unable to influence the outcome, the DPP withdrew from the National Assembly.

In 1994, the KMT and the DPP continued to argue about the constitutional reforms. The DPP demanded a presidential system in the hope that they could control the state by running a popular candidate for that post. A directly elected presidency would be politically strong, and the president would owe his advancement not to the party
organization but to his own personal appeal. The 1991 constitutional amendment set the date for the presidential election as 1996. The DPP wanted the election moved up to 1995 or 1994 lest the presidency be undermined by the governorship, which became a popularly elected office in 1994.\(^{100}\)

In April 1994, the DPP proposed that the two parties negotiate over the constitutional reform. Lee Teng-hui gave a positive response. The two sides exchanged their constitutional reform proposals.\(^{101}\) The KMT believed that there was no need to talk about national sovereignty, a single parliament or the central governmental system. These were the issues that the DPP wanted most to discuss. The DPP demanded that in the third stage of Constitutional revision the authorities declare Taiwan to be an independent democratic state; the president of Taiwan be elected directly by Taiwanese people as soon as possible; a single parliament be created and a presidential system be enacted; the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan be abolished and the five-power Constitution be replaced with a three-power one; and the superfluous provincial government be reduced.\(^{102}\) On April 30, caucuses of the KMT and the DPP in the National Assembly negotiated over the revision procedure, but failed to reach an agreement.\(^{103}\) In response, the DPP stressed that it would hold the second People's Constitution-Making Conference, and prepared to take to street.

Although the KMT and the DPP had very different constitutional proposals, both sides saw benefits to cooperative negotiations. Because of the KMT's internal disagreements on constitutional issues, the KMT could not guarantee the passing of its proposal, despite the fact that it enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. The KMT perceived that negotiation with the opposition would probably win

\(^{101}\) Lien-ho Pao, April 17, 1994.
\(^{102}\) Lien-ho Pao, April 19, 1994.
\(^{103}\) Lien-ho Pao, May 1, 1994.
it some supporting votes from opposition members. As for the DPP, it had softened its
stance regarding the rewriting of the Constitution, because the proposal did not get much
public support. Despite differences on many points, the DPP did share with the KMT
centre the desire for direct election of the president.104

From the above analysis we conclude that constitutional reforms on Taiwan have
been dominated by the KMT. The KMT did concede to accept some ideas of the DPP,
and compromised with the DPP on such subjects as complete re-election of the National
Assembly and direct election of the president. On the other hand, the KMT was very
concerned about the continuity of the fa-t'ung. To continue the fa-t'ung, the KMT insisted
that the constitutional revision be done by one institution, that was the National
Assembly, because according to the Constitution only the National Assembly has the
right to revise the Constitution; and the KMT also designed a two stage procedure to
guarantee the continuity. The KMT insisted that constitutional revision proceed according
to legal procedures. Furthermore, to maintain the fa-t'ung, the KMT insisted on
constitutional revision rather than writing a new Constitution. President Lee stated in
April 1990 that "the Constitution represents the spirit of the Republic of China, therefore
it should not be revised dramatically; ... The main body of the Constitution should not be
changed, and temporary provisions can be revised and appended to the Constitution as
amendment articles."105 Such an approach to the constitutional revision facilitated
Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy. Despite its imperfection, Taiwan's political
system has been essentially democratized.

Taiwan Independence Issue

104 Lien-ho Pao, April 21, 1994.
In the authoritarian period in Taiwan, the opposition could challenge the ruling party simply by struggling for democratic ideals. The progress of continuous democratization has deprived the DPP of its major political appeal. The DPP, therefore, tried to find other issues to distinguish itself from the ruling party. The KMT and the DPP do not have major socioeconomic policy differences. Thus the DPP began to raise the issue of independence. The idea of Taiwan independence became a major tenet in its programme, although some moderates in the DPP do not want to push too far on this issue. In earlier periods, Taiwan independence was a political taboo, and the KMT authorities severely punished the proponents of Taiwan independence. In the current era, the KMT government has given up its suppressive measures toward independence proponents. The KMT's thrust of democratization provided the suitable conditions for the DPP's promotion of Taiwan independence, because democratization has increased freedoms of speech and human rights on Taiwan. The opposition has begun to enjoy the freedom to promote its ideas for independence.

After the lifting of the emergency decree, the DPP found a more tolerant political environment in which it could promote independence. In the 1989 elections, New Country Alliance members of the DPP (formerly the New Tide faction) staged public burning of PRC flags. Some proponents of Taiwan independence returned to Taiwan from abroad. Lin I-hsiung published a "basic law" for the "Republic of Taiwan." However, generally the DPP did not use Taiwan independence as a major campaign appeal. It listed "political order based on democracy and freedom" as its first campaign platform issue. The DPP tried to generate the perception among the electorate that a DPP victory was a victory for democracy. The election results, however, showed that the majority of DPP winners were of the New Country Alliance. The results encouraged the proponents of Taiwan independence in the DPP.

Since the latter half of 1991, the DPP has begun to stress its Taiwan independence scheme to distinguish itself from the KMT and to counter the promulgation of President
Lee's *Guidelines for National Reunification*. The DPP subsequently formed a committee called the Independence of Taiwan Sovereignty to counter the Council for National Reunification, which was created by the KMT government. On August 25, the DPP and other opposition groups held a "People's Constitution-Making Conference," and passed a "Draft Constitution of Taiwan," asserting Taiwan's *de facto* sovereignty and proposing "Taiwan" as the name of the new nation-state. The DPP argued that real democracy was only possible in an independent Taiwan. Actually, it tried to use democracy as a shortcut to achieve independence.\(^{106}\) It also mobilized an island-wide drive to promote a new application for admission to the United Nations. The KMT immediately communicated with the DPP and persuaded it to give up its insistence on Taiwan independence. President Lee invited politicians of both parties and independents to discuss the issue, and tried to persuade the DPP to change its stance. The KMT argued that "the president does not have the constitutional power to abrogate the present Constitution and pass a new one." Moreover, because the Chinese Communists had threatened to use force to prevent Taiwan independence, the enactment of a new Constitution applicable solely to Taiwan could inevitably increase tensions in the Taiwan Strait.\(^{107}\)

In October 1991, however, in the Fifth National Congress, the DPP added an article to its platform, stating that "based on the principle of people's sovereignty, the establishment of an independent and sovereign Republic of Taiwan should be decided by the people's vote."\(^{108}\) The KMT denounced this article, but in consideration of the forthcoming election of the Second National Assembly, it did not take any action against the DPP and tolerated the DPP's inclusion of this issue in the campaign. The KMT

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mainstream, therefore, did not adhere to Chiang Ching-kuo's three political principles for reforms that included the principle of reunification of China. Even Premier Hao Pei-tsun tried to achieve a consensus with the opposition. On November 4, he "met for the first time with five Legislative Yuan members from the DPP for extensive discussions, described by the latter as 'frank and constructive.' During the talks, Hao indicated that the government would not make any move against the DPP because of its promotion of Taiwan independence before the elections, and the opposition agreed with him that the threat from the PRC to take action in the event of a declaration of Taiwan independence must be regarded seriously."109

The election of the Second National Assembly at the end of 1991 was seen as a show-down between those in favour of and those opposed to Taiwan independence. The KMT called for "reform, stability and prosperity" and ultimate reunification with the mainland. It warned the public that supporting the DPP's cause could only lead Taiwan into a confrontation with the Communists on the mainland, which would bring disaster to all the people of Taiwan.

The DPP failed in its effort to wrest a greater number of seats from the ruling party in the 1991 election. The DPP received 22.78 percent of the votes, but only 66 seats constituting 20.3 percent of the total seats, and thus reduced influence over the constitutional revision process. The DPP's pro-independence New Tide faction won only 8 seats. The KMT took 67.72 percent of the votes and 254 seats. Several small parties shared the rest of the seats. Because there were 78 members of the National Assembly (the KMT had 64, the DPP 9 and other parties 5) who had been elected in 1986 on Taiwan and who were also to join the Second National Assembly, the total membership of the Assembly was 403. The KMT held 318 seats or 78.9 percent of the total seats.

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The 1991 election of the National Assembly was a severe blow to the proposal for Taiwan independence. Since the KMT clearly won the election, it gained confidence in dealing with the opposition party. Nevertheless, the KMT continued to temporize with the DPP, hoping that it could also win the election of the Second Legislative Yuan in 1992.

In early 1992, trying to further temporize with the opposition, the KMT "granted four of the twelve committee chairmanships in the Legislative Yuan to the DPP when that body assembled for its 89th session on February 21."

On February 28, 1992, President Lee and Premier Hao Pei-tsun staged a solemn reconciliation rally with the families of those who had been killed in the February 28 Incident in 1947. The government decided to erect a monument commemorating the tragedy and to compensate the families of those who were killed.

In May 1992, the Legislative Yuan modified the Criminal Law, which deals with the crime of sedition, stipulating that sedition cannot be charged if there is no evidence of overt violent action. This modification actually gave the DPP the freedom to promote Taiwan independence. It also allowed the release of 19 Taiwan independence activists who had been arrested over the previous three years. The government also reduced the blacklist of persons who were excluded from returning to Taiwan from 282 to 5. On November 2, one of the best-known promoters of the idea of Taiwan independence, Dr. Peng Ming-min, returned legally to the island after 22 years in exile abroad.

110 Tseng Chian-feng, "Taiwan 'Tong-tu' Li-liang Fen-hsi," (An analysis of the forces for the unification of China and for Taiwan Independence on Taiwan), Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 1 (1992), p. 55.
Although at times the KMT government arrested advocates of Taiwan independence, it was generally tolerant toward the DPP on the matter of national identity. The KMT's mainland policy and foreign policy became more and more practical. Lee Teng-hui was accused an autonomist in the KMT. Under Lee's guidance, Taiwan is following the principle of practical diplomacy. The KMT government tried to be flexible and realistic. Premier Lien Chan argued that "the Republic of China on Taiwan is the alternative authority to the Chinese government and claims sovereignty over China but has no control. It wishes to be accepted into international organizations, and in particular the United Nations of which China is a member. The ROC on Taiwan does not seek to replace China on the council, but accepts that the two may co-exist."  

In the 1992 elections the DPP did not stress its independence proposals, having learned of their unpopularity in the National Assembly election setback of the previous year. This modified stance brought clear progress for the DPP in electoral terms. (DPP votes and seats won are listed in the tables in the section on "The Legalization of the Opposition" in this chapter). A well-known pollster on Taiwan analyzed that the reason the DPP made progress was that "the DPP was not talking as openly about independence, and the populace did not seem to think it likely that the DPP would do well enough to become the majority in the legislature." This condition contributed to a popular willingness to vote for the DPP. After the 1992 election, the DPP focused more on examination of the proposed bills. It became more and more policy-oriented. This diffused its image as a proponent of Taiwan independence. However the issue of national identity is not yet resolved, and it is still a polarizing issue and a focus of conflict among the political parties of Taiwan from time to time.

116 Wachman, Taiwan, pp. 212-213.
117 Ibid., p. 214.
The issue of national identity has not only differentiated the KMT and the DPP, but also caused the splitting of the ruling party. Some KMT pro-reunification lawmakers formed the "New KMT Front" (Hsin Kuomintang lien-hsien) before the 1989 elections. They opposed Taiwan independence and urged earnestly a more radical internal democratization of the party. In August 1993, the New KMT Front separated themselves from the KMT and formed the New Party. They sought to form a more pro-mainland party, after failing to reform the KMT from within. Specifically, Chao Shao-k'ang and Wang Chien-hsuan favoured a quick start to negotiations with mainland China, the opening of transportation between the mainland and Taiwan, and the establishment of an economic zone comprising Hong Kong, Taiwan and southeastern China.

In its manifesto the New Party proposes (1) to safeguard the security of Taiwan; (2) to negotiate with mainland China; (3) to establish a greater China economic circle; (4) to support medium and small sized enterprises; (5) to establish a directly elected presidential system; (6) to found an anti-corruption bureau directly under the Executive Yuan; and (7) to give weak social groups favourable treatment.

Generally speaking, Taiwan's political parties have spread across the spectrum on the national identity issue. On the spectrum of reunification/independence (T'ung-tu), the DPP represents the pole of Taiwan independence, the New Party represents the pole of reunification, and the KMT represents the "independent Taiwan" stand, a central position. The KMT's Independent Taiwan proposal opposes straight forward Taiwan independence, but tries to shape Taiwan as an independent political entity, while maintaining a friendly relationship with mainland China on the basis of equality and...
mutual benefits.\textsuperscript{120} As the majority of Taiwanese people expect neither quick reunification nor quick independence, the KMT's position is quite representative.

5. Conclusion

In the first period on Taiwan the KMT practiced hard authoritarianism. By bloody suppression of the Taiwanese uprising, the KMT dramatically dominated the Taiwanese society. It set a stage that gave no room for opposition. By doing so, the KMT created for itself a great deal of discretion to engineer political development, and objectively this gave the KMT much room to manoeuvre in its later liberalization and democratization.

When the KMT began to liberalize in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the opposition had been only an indirect source of the KMT's liberalizing policy. Opposition forces remained weak throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.\textsuperscript{121} Popular pressure grew gradually as a result of the KMT nurtured local self-governance, and it became effective only when the regime allowed it to. The KMT anticipated the increasing popular pressure and in a preemptive effort exposed the party to it. According to Moody, "the regime has kept control both of the timing of the concessions and even of the kinds of pressures to which it will allow itself to be subject."\textsuperscript{122} It may be that Moody attributes more efficacy to the KMT's control than is warranted, but our findings demonstrate that the KMT's capacity to regulate political behaviour overall has been stronger than the opposition's capacity to force change. Taiwan's transition to democracy, especially in the early stages

\textsuperscript{120} For more discussion of the "independent Taiwan" stand, please refer to the section on the KMT's nationalism in the next chapter.


\textsuperscript{122} Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 9.
of liberalization, was basically initiated and directed by the ruling party. This is not to say that the opposition had no role at all. The opposition strengthened itself and pushed for democratization. However, in the interaction, the KMT has managed to maintain its superior position vis-a-vis the opposition.

The electoral system is a major institution that the KMT has used to induce the opposition to work within the KMT dominated system. Having utilized elections at the local level since 1946, elections had become institutionalized. The KMT had been able to remain dominant through the electoral process by co-opting local elites and by superior electioneering. The KMT regime then had to deal with increasing pressure for the opening of elections at the national level. The announcement by the KMT of elections for representative positions of national significance was an important step in the political transition. Although the opening was limited, it started the process of transition to democracy. By institutionalizing elections, the ruling party channelled new social forces into the existing political system, and successfully maintained political order on Taiwan.

The KMT sought negotiation with the opposition at various times, but the opposition did not accept each invitation. The KMT had advantages over the opposition in negotiation, as "the negotiators for the ruling party came to the bargaining table with strictly delegated authority. Their counterparts, by contrast, formed a loose coalition of forces that had to balance competing positions without the benefit of a hierarchical structure for ultimately resolving them." They also have to risk being regarded as selling out. The initial stage of the negotiation process was not smooth, and lacked institutionalized operation. This was not only because both sides needed to adjust their roles and sentiment in the changing political environment, but also because the topics of negotiation were politically highly complicated. These topics were not public policies, or

123 Cf. Hu and Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization."
124 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 17.
parliamentary agenda, but key issues regarding political reforms, rules of political party competition and the pace of transition to democracy. Gradually, negotiation was institutionalized, with both parties having established special teams responsible for it. Both parties wanted to show the populace that despite their contempt for each other, they were willing to maintain their channels of communication. The KMT demonstrated its openness, and the DPP demonstrated that it could be an opposition party on an equal footing with the ruling party. The results of negotiation had a direct impact on the process of democratization and on the social cost of reforms. Although there seems to have been no clear "pact" reached by the two sides, a phenomenon which occurred in some other transitional countries, these negotiations benefited the process of peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan.

When the Tang-wai grew stronger, the KMT government took a conciliatory attitude and legitimated the opposition. By so doing, the KMT channelled the opposition to work within the existing system. It suppressed the radicals and accommodated the moderates of the opposition, thereby changing the goal, the site, and the strategy of the opposition. The KMT and the opposition also changed their political behaviour. It has been noted that "several times after stormy outbursts in the Legislative Yuan, leaders of the caucuses of the two parties are soon seen sitting together in a side room or over a hotel dinner to iron out their differences." Members of both sides often communicate with each other informally.

The opposition has adopted three main strategies: (1) parliamentary strategy, (2) the magazine strategy, and (3) the mass movement. Since the KMT did allow elections, the opposition used mainly the first strategy. Moderate oppositionists argued that the principal mission of the opposition should be to mobilize the people to exert pressure upon the ruling KMT to democratize the political structure, and that it may also play the

125 Ibid., p. 89.
role of agitating and educating the masses. The DPP mainly played the role of monitor in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it has grown to become a real institutionalized opposition party. Working within the system can have many advantages. It can decrease the cost of opposition, and directly contribute to the development of democratic institutions from within.\textsuperscript{126} The magazine strategy was used to work both within the system and against the system. It was used both as an instrument to propagate political ideas of the opposition and as an organizational core for a quasi-party. Some oppositionists favoured mass movements, but the movements were emasculated by the ever-existent opportunities to work within the system. The third strategy was used mainly at the end of the 1970s, and with disastrous consequences.\textsuperscript{127} 

Taiwan's experiences demonstrate that a more democratic political system can originate from within an authoritarian political system. Both the ruling party and the opposition can take advantage of the existing elections and legislative institutions, and through these legal channels the opposition can be legitimized and led into competitive politics.\textsuperscript{128}

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{126} W. Hao, "Chung-kuo Min-chu-hua Fa-chan Chen-lueh Hsin Ssu-k'ao" (On new strategy for democratization in China), \textit{Tan-so (The quest)} September, 1991, pp. 47-52.
\textsuperscript{127} Lu, "Political Opposition in Taiwan," pp. 123-124, and p. 129.
\textsuperscript{128} Daniel K. Berman has a similar view. He points out that "political parties need not originate within the legislature and opposition movements which eventually are legitimized by the system may develop outside a traditional political party structure." \textit{Words Like Colored Glass: the Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 93.
\end{quotation}
CHAPTER FOUR  THE KMT'S IDEOLOGY

1. Introduction

Why has the KMT been able to play such an important role in the transition to democracy on Taiwan, and where have those decisions to liberalize and democratize come from? While this study agrees that domestic and international stimuli and socioeconomic conditions are necessary, it intends to argue that there were dynamic factors within the ruling party that drove the party to modify its role and to make some important decisions which started Taiwan down the path to democracy. Among these factors, the KMT's tutelary but fundamentally democratic ideology is an obvious factor that has guided the party to play a positive and adaptive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

According to the "end of ideology" school, ideology plays a less important role in the contemporary world. However, this school also points out that ideology serves a stronger function in developing countries than in developed democracies.¹ Indeed, party leaders in the Third World themselves usually emphasize their party's ideology.² Until recently, this had also been the case on Taiwan.

A study of the ideology of a political party should answer the following questions: "What does this party stand for? How intensely and persistently does it make that stand?

... Are its concerns short range and pragmatic, median range and programmatic, or long range and messianic?"³ In the case of the KMT on Taiwan, we shall answer the following questions. What is the role of the Sunist doctrine of the Three Principles of the People in Taiwan's transition to democracy? Did it influence the KMT's decision to liberalize and democratize? Did the KMT's interpretation of Sunism (the Three Principles of the People) evolve, and if so were the changes supportive of a peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan?

There are three points of view as to the answer to these questions. The first is that the official doctrine, the Three Principles of the People, played a positive and instructive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. KMT officials and some scholars believe that this is the correct answer.⁴ The second is that the KMT, to a large extent, has ignored the Three Principles of the People, and the real driving principle of policy making has been pragmatism.⁵ The third states that the Three Principles of the People played a role, but the ideology that led to the Taiwanese success was a mixed ideology of five trends: the official doctrine, a "petty bourgeois" outlook, modern Confucian humanism, Chinese liberalism, and the Taiwan Independence Movement "saga."⁶

It is this author's view that the KMT's ideology consisted of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, but the interpretation of Sunism was influenced by some elements such as revolutionary spirit. The resulting ideology played an important role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. The KMT's official ideology prevailed in situations

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³ Ibid.
⁴ For instance, A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman, Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981).
where other compelling interests did not preclude acting on it. Thus, most of the tenets of the Three Principles of the People were followed strictly, and others were interpreted according to practical needs. The influence of Sunism, in its original interpretation, declined over time, partly due to its being less restrictive than the Communist ideology, and partly due to the situational change.

This chapter will first introduce the content of the Three Principles of the People, and then analyze the three principles in Taiwan's context one by one. Then we will analyze generally the role of the KMT's ideology in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

2. The Three Principles of the People

The doctrine of the Three Principles of the People (San-min chu-i) was proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The three principles are people's nationality (Min-tsu chu-i or nationalism), the people's rights (Min-ch'uan chu-i or democracy), and the people's livelihood (Min-sheng chu-i).

Sun Yat-sen proposed the principle of nationalism in the late Ch'ing Dynasty, with the aim of overthrowing the Manchu rulers and restoring the Chinese governance. He hoped that nationalism could serve as a rousing creed to unite dissident individuals and groups throughout China. As a way to promote nationalism, he required the restoration and renaissance of traditional Chinese culture. He maintained that Confucian moral ideals, political philosophy, and method of personal cultivation were all superior to their Western counterparts. After the downfall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911, his nationalism became more and more anti-imperialist. He attacked the great powers for their exploitation and suppression of the nonwhite races. He worried about the threat of the foreign partition of China, and proposed revolution to strengthen China and prevent
partition. However, Sun's anti-imperialism was not extreme.\(^7\) For instance, his concern with the threat of foreign oppression did not lead him to refuse foreign investment.

The principle of the people's rights means constitutional democracy. Thus, on the cognitive dimension, Sunism identifies itself with democracy. Sun recognized that democracy was the universal trend in the world. However, on the programmatic dimension, Sunism proposes tutelage. Sun theorized in his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction for the National Government of China*, published in 1924, that the ROC would go through three stages of development to realize democracy. The first would be a military administration to unite the country. The second would be political tutelage under the KMT. The third would be constitutional democracy. Sun maintained that tutelage was the way to democracy. He did not emphasize liberty and equality. He felt that China needed to emphasize the collective struggle for national equality with other states. He complained that Chinese people were a "heap of loose sand," with too much selfish freedom and too little patriotic unity. He argued that tutelary democracy was a necessary "stage by stage" approach to political democracy. The reason was that the destruction of revolution had to be succeeded by extraordinary construction. Another reason was that people were not yet trained or ready to accept their responsibilities as citizen-participants. The masses had to learn the basics of democracy. He pointed out that assembly was the first step to democracy. Then people had to learn self-governance at the local level, and tutelage had to be implemented at the national level. Sun emphasized the role of local self-governance in the tutelary period. Among his 35 *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, 11 dealt with local self-governance.

Sun's theory of the political party was consistent with his ideas about democratization. The purpose of building a political party, according to Sun, is to carry out revolution. The party is used to rouse the masses and to consolidate the revolutionary

forces. So, the KMT was called a revolutionary party. However, Sun did not insist that
this revolutionary party remain after the revolution succeeded. Rather, he argued that a
political party should transform itself and adapt to the changing environment. Influenced
by the party politics of the United States and United Kingdom, Sun proposed a two-party
system for the Republic of China.8

The third component of Sun's doctrine is the people's livelihood. Sun anticipated
that economic development would come first. He envisioned that economic growth would
evoke social change and political modernization would lead to democracy; progress
would occur in that order. Based on his own study of capitalism, Sun was familiar with
both its rigor and evils. Thus, he tried to take advantage of capitalist incentives to
stimulate a free-enterprise economy, but he also tried to avoid the unfair division of
wealth. While he proposed retention private ownership, he also proposed equalization of
land ownership and the regulation of capital. Since a major source of inequality was the
concentrated ownership of land, Sun proposed land reform that would give land to the
tillers. The capital accumulated as a result of land reform would be directed toward
industrial and commercial use. Regarding the regulation of capital, he emphasized the
need for the development of national capital and the limitation of private enterprises. By
development of national capital he meant "state operation of industries, state control of
capital, and state ownership of profits."9 Other measures he proposed included the
introduction of progressive taxation and public ownership of major industries and
utilities.

8 Ke Yung-kuang, "Kuo-fu Cheng-tang Cheng-chih Szu-hsiang yu Shih-chien" (National father's
idea of political party and practice), in his collection, Cheng-chih Pian-ch'ian yu Cheng-chih Fa-
chan: Taiwan Ching-yan Tan-so (Political change and development: the quest of Taiwan
9 Quoted in Tai Hung-chao, "The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan," in Authoritarian
Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds. Samuel P.
Sun insisted that in the early stages of modernization the authorities would have to impose restrictive tariffs on foreign imports and put into effect a protective policy in order to develop domestic industries. Sun constructed the state as a central management agency for the entire economy. The state would foster the establishment and growth of initially cost-inefficient industries. It would also assume the responsibility of more equitable income and welfare distribution.

Sun embraced socialism, but his socialism was composed of traditional Chinese ethical principles as well as Western ideas. He called it "state socialism," which he defined to be characterized by the interventions of a tutelary state in the national economy, government monopolies of public utilities and special sectors of the economy, a general concern with industrial growth, the regulation of capital, and the provision of innovative social welfare programmes. The aim of socialism is to realize what Confucius described as a "great Commonwealth."11

The KMT tried to implement a development programme according to the stages designed by Sun Yat-sen when it was on the mainland. In the first stage of military government, the KMT forces overthrew the Manchu rulers and accomplished national unification by the Northern Expedition. After that, it attempted to start the second stage of tutelary government. The KMT Central Executive Committee adopted "The Fundamentals for Tutelary Government" in October, 1929. However, there were forces in both the party and society arguing for an earlier enactment of constitution, which, according to Sun's scheme, could be enacted only at the beginning of the third stage of constitutional government. In response to their demands, the KMT government enacted a

10 Sun Yat-sen, "Ti-ch'ang Kuo-chia She-hui Chu-i" (Promote state socialism), Kuo-fu Ch'uan-chi (The complete works of Sun Yat-sen), (Taipei: Kuomintang Party History Department, 1973), Vol. 2, p. 261.
provisional constitution in 1931. From the mid-1930s to 1945 the KMT government was occupied with resisting Japan. After the anti-Japanese War the stage of constitutional government started, and the KMT enacted a constitution based on Sunism in 1947. However, the KMT's military defeat provided it no chance to focus on political construction on the mainland before it retreated to Taiwan.

Taiwan historically did not have an indigenous political philosophy or ideology. The island was influenced by both mainland China and Japan. Sun Yat-sen propagated his political ideals on Taiwan before the Japanese colonized it in 1895, but his influence at the time was limited. After the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT erected the Three Principles of the People as its official ideology for the Taiwanese people. Its failure on the mainland made the party to rethink how to realize Sunism properly on Taiwan. To make Taiwan strong enough to survive and to return to the mainland, the Nationalist leadership believed that they had to indoctrinate the official ideology. So, Chiang Kai-shek urged the party and the people to study Sunism.

The KMT on Taiwan has basically followed Sun's teachings, but it has also adapted its ideology to the circumstances on Taiwan. The following discussion is arranged according to the people's livelihood, the people's rights and nationalism. The principle of the people's livelihood will be discussed first because this is what the KMT most emphasized on Taiwan.

3. The KMT's People's Livelihood on Taiwan

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At the first glance, the principle of the people's livelihood concerns economic matters and is not directly related to Taiwan's transition to democracy. However, since the KMT emphasized economic development first, such a decision had a direct impact on Taiwan's developmental priorities and the stages of political development. This section will demonstrate the extent to which the KMT followed the principle of the people's livelihood, and will analyze the political implications of the KMT's application of this principle.

The economic officials of the KMT government often claim that they formulate economic policies according to Sunism and that Taiwan's economic miracle is the result of following Sunism. Indeed, the KMT on Taiwan has followed Sunism most closely in the economic sphere, although there have been deviations in this regard. The KMT's emphasis on economic construction itself is a shift from Sun's order of emphasis that put nationalism first and the people's livelihood third. The shift was a response to Chiang's realization that without such a switch his regime might not survive on Taiwan, and he might lose power again.

Immediately after its defeat on the mainland, the KMT defined its first priority as returning to the mainland. However, the KMT had to make a shift of emphasis from mainland recovery to the people's livelihood, because the party and its army lacked the strength to retake the mainland. Party pragmatists recommended that the government concentrate on economic construction on Taiwan so as to be better-prepared for later retaking of the mainland. Learning from the failure on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek

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gave priority to economic growth and education, although he was eager to realize the goal of mainland recovery. He contended that "almost every one of our comrades knows that our failure in the anti-Communist struggle is due to our neglect of the Min-sheng principle on the mainland.... We should realize the Min-sheng principle through practical action, not theoretical discussion." In 1953, Chiang Kai-shek wrote two chapters to complete Sun's Min-sheng principle. The first chapter elaborated on goals for education, and the second was on happiness. This demonstrates that Chiang began to think about education and social development in the early 1950s.

By 1954, the KMT government showed the shift in its emphasis to modernization in a joint communiqué issued on October 23 with the United States. It declared that "the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles and not the use of force." This demonstrates the shift of focus from strengthening might to accelerating socioeconomic development.

In this early stage on Taiwan, the KMT followed the older interpretations of Sunism and its mainland development strategies. Land reform, one major element in Sun's Min-sheng principle, was implemented on Taiwan. Ch'en Ch'eng, who was sent to Taiwan by Chiang before the mainland was completely taken by the Communists, advocated land reform according to Sun's teachings. He wrote that "anyone who studies land reform in recent decades must begin with Dr. Sun's teachings." He believed that the failure to carry out Sun's land reform policy on the mainland was one of

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18 Chang and Gorden, All Under Heaven, p. 157.
The principal reasons for the KMT's defeat. Ch'en Ch'eng's land reform plan received the full approval of the Central Committee (CC) of the KMT and the explicit support of Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{20}

The first step in the land reform was a rent reduction programme, an idea found in Sun's teachings. Rents were reduced from 50-70 percent of the anticipated harvest to a maximum of 37.5 percent. The second step was the sale of public land. Twenty percent of the farm families purchased public land.\textsuperscript{21} The third step was the "land-to-the-tiller" programme, an idea also advanced by Sun. In January 1953, the Legislative Yuan passed the legislation that requested that the landlords who owned more than three hectares of paddy fields or six hectares of dry land sell to the government all extra tenanted land at a price equal to two-and-one-half times the annual crop yields. In return the landlords were paid in bonds and stocks of four state enterprises. The land was then sold to its original tenants at the same prices the government had paid the landlords.

Land reform not only improved the living standard of the rural area in Taiwan, but also accumulated initial capital for industrialization. Capital outflow from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector amounted to about 22 percent of the total value of agricultural production between 1950 and 1955.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, it also had profound political implications. Land reform won the support of the farmers, thus greatly enhancing the KMT regime's legitimacy in Taiwanese society. It created a class of small landholders, and had a function of equalizing social wealth on Taiwan. Therefore land reform created a favourable social conditions for the emergence of democracy on Taiwan, because a peaceful transition to democracy is more likely to occur in an equal society. Of course, the success of the land reform would not have been possible if the KMT regime had been an indigenous force. The KMT regime was able to carry out the reform because

\textsuperscript{22} Gregor, et al., \textit{Ideology and Development}, p. 34.
it was not "colonized" by the local landed interests. In any event, Sun's detailed plan of land reform directed and facilitated the KMT in carrying out the land reform.

The KMT also followed Sun's teachings regarding the stages of modernization. It first promoted import substitution and emphasized state ownership. In the 1950s, the government promoted a variety of light consumer industries by sealing off the domestic market: import quotas for specific goods, especially luxury items, were implemented; foreign exchange rates were fixed to discourage imports; nondurable consumer goods received the greatest protection and imports of plant equipment received favourable treatment.23

In the 1960s, especially after the termination of U.S. aid, ideas of neo-liberalism appeared in the party's platform, particularly in the area of economic policies.24 Thus started the export-oriented stage in the decade of 1963-1973. By 1965 Taiwan's domestic market was saturated. To sustain economic growth and to reduce foreign indebtedness and dependency on American aid, the authorities on Taiwan decided to change course. Tariffs were cut substantially, the New Taiwanese dollar was depreciated to make foreign trade and exporting more profitable, and export processing zones (EPZs) were established. Stimulated by these new measures, foreign investment poured into Taiwan.25

In the 1970s, the surge in oil prices created massive inflation in the Taiwanese economy. The government responded quickly by applying conservative fiscal measures and a one-time price increase. In addition, the government started the "Ten Major Construction Projects," which included steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, and infrastructure projects, which helped the structural transformation and overcame transportation and supply bottlenecks. Entering the 1980s and early 1990s, the KMT

25 W. Hao, "Foreign Investment and the State in Postwar Japan and Taiwan," Issues & Studies Vol. 29, No.6 (June, 1993), 80-96.
government made an effort to promote high-tech industries. The Science-Based Industrial Park was opened in Hsin-chu in 1980. The government further liberalized regulations to attract foreign investment in the hope of promoting technology transfer.

During these stages of development, the KMT regime fulfilled almost all the elements insisted upon by Sun -- a transfer of capital from agricultural to industrial sectors, decentralization of industry, income equity, and mass education. Regarding income equity for example, it has been noted that "during the 1960s the 40 percent of the population on Taiwan with the lowest income received about 20 percent of the nation's income. By comparison, the average income share of the lowest 40 percent of the population in all less-developed countries (LDCs) was 12.5 percent."26

Through these stages, Taiwan developed a mixed economy with the private sector enjoying a major share. Taiwan's postwar economic situation was favourable to the KMT government's promotion of state capital. The KMT government confiscated the Japanese properties on Taiwan after the war, and this provided the government ownership of a major share of the Taiwanese economy. Intense antagonism with the mainland made it quite likely that the KMT state would further increase its control of the economy. However, in reality a mixed economy developed with the private sector enjoying a major share. The outcome was basically in accordance to Sun's teachings, since he encouraged the development of both private enterprise and state capital. Sun argued that "The industrial development of China should be carried out along two lines: (1) by private enterprises and (2) by national undertaking. All matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws.... All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should be taken up as national undertakings."27

26 Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 78.
27 Quoted in Gregor, et al., Ideology and Development, p. 20.
In addition to Sun's fundamentally capitalist approach to economic development, another factor that prompted the KMT to emphasize the development of the private sector was the pressure of the American aid agencies who believed that "a shift from state to private ownership would contribute to the operating efficiency of ... enterprises, hasten over-all economic development and decrease the financial burden in subsidizing [public] activities." As Neil Jacoby observed, behind this belief "lay the political aim of demonstrating the superiority of free economic institutions as instruments of social progress.... By far the most important consequence of U.S. influence was the creation on Taiwan of a booming private enterprise system." To obtain American aid, the KMT followed the American advice. K. T. Li, one of the principal architects of Taiwan's economic miracle, testified that the state's basic strategy has moved continually toward market liberalization and depoliticization of the economy. Nevertheless, as Sun espoused capitalism, the KMT's acceptance of American liberal advice did not contradict Sun's teachings.

However, market liberalization did not mean that the KMT adopted a laissez-faire policy toward capitalist development. One major element in Taiwan's economic success has been state intervention. The capitalist economic development on Taiwan has been planned and directed by KMT economic officials, and in this aspect, it seems that KMT economic officials were guided by Sun's teachings. They have argued that Sun's doctrine supported an active state role in promoting economic development and in preventing the concentration of economic power in a few hands. However, government management of the economy has been based on modern economic means rather than

30 K. T. Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan's Development Success (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), Chap. 5; and K. T. Li, Economic Transformation of Taiwan ROC (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1988), Chap. 4.
administrative directives as the KMT centre seldom interfered in economic officials' plans.

The KMT's shift of focus from mainland recovery to economic development was, to some extent, required by military need, as the government had to support the military establishment to defend Taiwan and hopefully to retake the mainland. Thus circumstances prompted Taiwan's political leadership to begin a programme of overall economic development. Some conditions on Taiwan were favourable for implementing some of Sun's tenets. For instance, the KMT enjoyed autonomy from the influence of the local landlord classes, making it possible to initiate the land reform programme that had been attempted but failed on the mainland. Under these conditions, Sun's principle of the people's livelihood facilitated Taiwan's modernization and laid down the economic basis for the transition to democracy.

This discussion of the principle of the people's livelihood demonstrates that the principle did direct the KMT to focus on some basic economic constructions such as land reform and state-directed industrialization. The KMT followed Sun's teaching that economic development should come first. The need for economic growth, American pressure, and some favourable conditions for economic reforms combined to produce the KMT's shift of priority to economic growth. By choosing economic growth as its priority, the KMT intentionally neglected democracy building at least at the national level. However, the more liberal interpretation of Sun's state capitalism by the KMT economic officials allowed Taiwan to develop a type of Western style market economy which laid down the socioeconomic basis for Taiwan's transition to democracy. The success in applying the principle of the people's livelihood provided the KMT regime some degree of legitimacy, and helped the KMT to maintain stability. At the same time the KMT won itself a crucial period of time to build itself into a strong ruling machine during the first two decades.
4. The KMT's People's Rights on Taiwan

After the 8 year Anti-Japanese War, the KMT on the mainland did attempt to follow Sun Yat-sen's principle of people's rights as it wrote a Constitution founded on the Three Principles of the People. The Constitution was passed by the National Assembly on December 25, 1946, and went into effect on December 25, 1947. It guaranteed civil rights, which included equality before the law; invulnerability of individuals; freedom of residence and movement; freedom of speech, teaching, and publication; freedom of religion, assembly, and association; and the rights of election, recall, initiative and referendum. The Constitution required direct elections of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the provincial assemblies, the governors of the provinces and the mayors of centrally administered cities, as well as the county councils and the county magistrates. However, article 23 of the Constitution stated that "all these freedoms and rights ... shall not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary ... to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare." This article gave Chiang Kai-shek unlimited power in the face of the Communist threat.

On April 18, 1948, when the Nationalist regime faced increasing challenge from the Communists, it had the National Assembly pass the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion and promulgated it on May 10, 1948. These provisions gave the president extraordinary powers, and provided that the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan elected in

1947/1948 would remain in office until the termination of the Period of Mobilization had been declared by the president.\textsuperscript{33} The additional Emergency Law, which was promulgated on May 19, 1948, gave "military and security organs the right to arrest and detain persons, and civilian government authorities the right to outlaw periodical publications and books without the publisher having a chance to appeal such decisions to the judiciary."\textsuperscript{34} The jurisdiction of the civil court was limited as most serious civilian crimes were tried by courts-martial.

When the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, it implemented the Temporary Provisions and the Emergency Law on the island. The KMT justified the restrictions on civil rights of Taiwanese people by pleading that a condition of civil war existed between the Nationalist and Communist regimes. Freedoms of speech, the press, association, and assembly were severely restricted. Berman demonstrates in detail how the KMT restricted the freedom of press on Taiwan. First, the KMT regime imposed the legal requirement for registration of new publications. The number of newspapers on Taiwan was fixed at 31, and no new newspaper was allowed to publish. Second, a newspaper could only have a fixed number of pages. Third, the location of a newspaper's printing facility was limited to the vicinity of its intended area of distribution. Fourth, the regime controlled the price of all newspapers, and the publication had no freedom for adjustment. Finally and most importantly the KMT censored the content of publications.\textsuperscript{35}

That the political leadership on Taiwan restricted freedoms and political competition could be explained by the KMT's ideological orientation in this early postwar period. Sunism itself was influenced by both Chinese traditional culture and Western democratic culture. Thus, the KMT's attitude toward freedoms and political competition reflected these mixed influences. First, the KMT leaders believed that freedoms were one

\textsuperscript{33} The China Yearbook 1980, p. 610f.
\textsuperscript{34} Domes, "China's Modernization," p. 217.
of the aims of political development, but that the masses had to be trained before they
could responsibly wield their rights. Second, they maintained that freedoms and
competition should not be used to promote selfish interest, but rather that citizens should
fulfill their political obligations and promote public interest. Third, they believed that
freedoms and political competition could contribute to the public interest only when they
occurred in an organized, disciplined way and that they should not lead to social conflicts
or disorder. Fourth, in the eyes of the leadership the enlargement of freedoms and
competition was a long term goal, and if it conflicted with the state's current goals, such
as national security or political stability, it should give way to the latter. Third, the
KMT leaders tried to combine traditional Chinese ethics with democratic ideals, as Sun
did himself. They maintained that Chinese ethics were in accordance with the essence of
the Three Principles of the People, and the spirit of freedom meant obeying the law and
performing one's role (Shou-fa shou-fen).

The KMT's restrictions on freedoms and political competition were also
influenced by Sun Yat-sen's tutelary approach to democracy building. As a student and
successor of Sun, Chiang Kai-shek also thought that democracy could not be realized in
one step. He seemed to think that the application of the five-power Constitution was one
of the reasons for the KMT's defeat on the mainland. He thought that the immediate
application of constitutional democracy after the Anti-Japanese War created opportunity
for the Communists to instigate the masses and eventually overthrow the KMT
government on the mainland. In other words, he thought that the constitutional
democracy was realized too early and that China should still be in the tutelary stage. Once
on Taiwan, therefore, Chiang stressed that democracy could only be guaranteed by
revolutionary spirit and organization.

36 Chu Yun-han, *Taiwan Ti-ch' u Cheng-chih Chan-yu chih Yen-chiu* (A Research on the political
participation in Taiwan) (M.A.. thesis, Taiwan University, 1979), pp. 175-176.
37 Chiang Kai-shek, *Chiang Tsung-t'ong Cheng-tang Cheng-chi Chiang-tzu* (President Chiang
revolutionary spirit meant that party members should strictly follow party instructions and that the party should be a vanguard party that educates and organizes the masses. Chiang's opinion was generally accepted by the party. In 1950 the Central Reform Committee of the KMT adopted six guidelines, with the first one explicitly defining the party as a democratic revolutionary party. In 1952, the Seventh Congress of the KMT wrote this into the Party Charter. By stressing the revolutionary spirit, the KMT actually revived more authoritarian ingredients in Sunism.

Facing the Communist threat, the KMT devoted most of its efforts toward defending Taiwan, and did little to build democracy at the national level in the early postwar period on Taiwan. Nevertheless the KMT's ideological commitment to democratic ideals imposed some limitations on its ability to control the masses, providing KMT liberal reformers and political opposition with the opportunity to advocate democracy and freedom in the KMT's own language. The opposition has rarely attacked the Three Principles of the People and the fundamental organization of the political system. They wish to make it more democratic, but not destroy and rebuild it. They have been able to use the constitutional provisions protecting civil liberties to challenge government restrictions.

Furthermore, Sun's teachings did guide the KMT to make some basic preparations for democracy. The KMT did implement Sun Yat-sen's proposal of local democracy and electoral politics. The Taiwanese people had no political rights during 50 years of colonization by Japan. From the KMT's beginning on Taiwan, the KMT implemented local elections. The first thing Taiwan provincial authorities did after Taiwan was returned to China in 1945 was to enact citizenship registration. The authorities then examined qualifications of those candidates who were interested in public positions. In March 1946, township councils were elected. In April, county and provincial councils and assemblies were elected indirectly. In December 1946, the ROC government enacted a Constitution that accepted Sun's idea of local governance. In August 1949, the Taiwan
Provincial government formed a Research Group on Taiwan's Local Self-Governance, and promulgated a series of regulations on local elections.38 In 1949, the same year that the KMT moved to Taiwan following its defeat on the mainland, six local elections were held. The next year, island-wide local elections were held. Before the lifting of martial law in July 1987, Taiwan held nine elections for members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, five elections for the Taipei City Council, and two for the Kaohsiung City Council. In addition, ten elections were held for city mayors and eleven elections for county magistrates.

Several reasons can be observed for the KMT's implementation of local democracy. First, as we noted earlier, the KMT implemented local self-government because they simply could not supply enough mainlanders to control local affairs. However, if the principle of local self-government had not been enshrined in Sunism, the KMT would have had less incentive to implement it. Since Sun Yat-sen stressed the importance of local self-governance in political development and designed a three-stage democratic building scheme, it is quite natural that the KMT started implementing democracy at the local level first. Second, the KMT intentionally implemented local democracy because it wanted to build Taiwan into a model province of the Three Principles of the People. The Japanese invasion and the ensuing civil war with the Communists are the reasons often cited by the KMT regime for its failure to implement local democracy on the mainland. Once the KMT regime enjoyed firm control of the island of Taiwan, it wanted to begin building democratic institutions at the local level. Therefore, in the absence of constraining factors, the KMT acted on Sun's teachings on local democracy. Third, the KMT wanted to build up legitimacy at the grassroots level. When the KMT regime recovered Taiwan from the Japanese after World War II, it found that it had no basis in Taiwanese society. Local democracy was used by the KMT regime

38 Fu Jen-yan, Taiwan Ti-fung Hsuan-chu Yen-chiu (Research on Taiwan's local elections) (Taiwan: Cultural Foundation of Chia-hsin Cement Co., 1969), p. 16.
to differentiate its rule from the Japanese colonial rule. The KMT leaders realized that to be perceived as different from Japanese practice and their own practice on the mainland, they had to put Sun's teachings about political development into practice. This is why the KMT carried out local elections even before its retreat to Taiwan in 1949.

Following Sun's teachings, the KMT on Taiwan held elections at the local level but not at the national level for the first two decades. Liberalizing reforms at the national level on Taiwan started in 1969, when a limited number of legislative and assembly seats were opened to contestation. The new seats all represented Taiwan. This can be seen as the beginning of the liberalization of national politics on Taiwan.

Liberalization speeded up when Chiang Kai-shek died in April 1975, and his son Ching-kuo, serving as the premier, became the top leader. In contrast to his father, Chiang Ching-kuo began to speak more about democracy. In a speech to the National Assembly on Constitution Day, December 25, he affirmed his commitment to the goals of democracy, rule of law, and full implementation of the Constitution. He said, "We have already established an excellent basis for putting democratic politics into effect in the recovery base [Taiwan]. Five days ago we smoothly completed the election for supplementary Legislative Yuan members. In this election, not only did the election organs fulfill the requirements of 'fair, just, and open,' but also we could see from the candidates' excellent political comportment and the voters' enthusiasm that our citizens are full of keenness for political participation and concern for national affairs, and that they have a high level of commitment to electing virtuous and capable candidates that a democratic country's citizens should have when they exercise their citizens' rights."39 In an address to the National Assembly on Constitution Day, 1984, Chiang Ching-kuo stated that because of the "uncompleted efforts for the eradication of Chinese Communism, we

are forced to adopt certain expedient measures dictated by time and circumstance. However, we will not deviate from constitutional rule; that is our unchangeable principle."40 In this address, Chiang recognized the existence of a "pluralist" society with diverse interests, and affirmed the legitimacy of people holding different points of view. According to Lee Teng-hui, Chiang Ching-kuo believed that only party politics could guarantee the stability in the long term, and thus an opposition party was needed.41

In the 1980s, the KMT seemed to believe that the time had come to end tutelage and to start democratization. For instance, Kao Yu-jen, member of the CSC and speaker of Taiwan Provincial Assembly, suggested some important political reforms in 1984: modifying the Temporary Provisions, consolidating central representative institutions, and directly electing provincial governors and city magistrates, etc.42 Chiang Ching-kuo himself supported the idea that the time was ripe for realizing Sun's ideal of constitutional democracy, as he proclaimed in a speech delivered to a meeting of the CSC on October 15, 1985, that "times are changing, conditions are changing, and tides are changing. The KMT must adopt new approaches to carry out reforms on the basis of a democratic constitutional system. Only in this way can we integrate with the trends of the time and stand on the side of the people."43 In that speech, he asked the party to adopt new approaches to carry out democratic reforms. In an interview with an American reporter in October 1986, Chiang stated that "abolishing the emergency decrees is for the purpose of speeding up democratic progress here. We must serve as a beacon light for the hopes of one billion Chinese so that they will want to emulate our political system."44 In his will he urged political leaders on Taiwan to put their full efforts into implementing

constitutional democracy and to accomplish China's reunification under the Three Principles of the People.

Chiang Ching-kuo's speeches and actions show that at this time he was relying more on democratic principles to guide or justify his political liberalization than in the earlier period. In contrast to his father, Ching-kuo used more democratic ingredients of Sunism, while accepting Sun's emphasis on gradual and orderly change. When the situation changed at the national level, the party did not refrain from gradually opening up according to Sun's principle of the people's rights. By the early 1980s, changed circumstances meant that acting on the principle of the people's rights was not precluded by the compelling competing interest of maintaining power and security. This allowed Chiang to conclude that it was time to start the transition from tutelary democracy to fully constitutional democracy. Each time the party called supplementary elections, it claimed that this was the fulfillment of Sun's principle of the people's rights. While the socioeconomic changes provided the conditions for political changes, the KMT's adherence to Sunism facilitated the top-down gradual political reform.

After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, KMT leaders rejected a suggestion that martial law be reimposed in spite of violent clashes between police and demonstrators. They believed that the violence of demonstrators and social tensions were but birth pains of democracy. The KMT is now confident in competing with other parties peacefully and on an equal footing.

In the post-Chiang era, the influence of Sunism, in its original interpretation, declined. The KMT toned down its ideological rhetoric. It tended to talk less about the Three Principles of the People; instead the party simply talked about democracy. Democratic principles were widely accepted in the KMT. The prevalence of democratic principles prompted the KMT to end the Temporary Provisions and the Emergency Law, thus leaving more room for liberalization and democratization. Furthermore, the KMT used its democratic achievements to distinguish itself from the authoritarian mainland
China political system. Democracy was not only to be instituted on Taiwan, but also on the mainland. Democracy became a precondition for reunification, as the KMT's *Guidelines for National Reunification* requires that before Taiwan can be united with the mainland, "the expression of public opinion there [the mainland] should gradually be allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be implemented."

The influence of democratic principles is also revealed in the KMT's redefinition of itself. Due to its origin as a revolutionary movement, the KMT had taken pride in labeling itself a "revolutionary democratic" party. However, the opposition argued that the KMT's labeling itself a "revolutionary" party was a clear sign that the KMT would under no circumstances relinquish its monopoly on power. Thus, in order to shed the authoritarian image of the party, many KMT party members demanded, with increasing intensity, a change from "revolutionary democratic" to simply "democratic" party. Before the Thirteenth Party Congress in July 1988, this controversy became a hot issue, since people expected that the Party Congress would reach a decision on it. At the Thirteenth Congress, although the KMT did not drop the term "revolutionary," it did emphasize its democratic nature rather than its revolutionary nature, and claimed that party's commitment to democracy remained unchanged. Lee Teng-hui explained that the party only used the term "revolutionary" in remembrance of its glorious revolutionary past, and in essence the party was a purely democratic one. Also, by retaining the term "revolutionary," the party expected its members to maintain the tradition of putting the interests of the nation and the party above their personal interests. Lee argued that the term "revolutionary" contains no other meaning and should not cause unnecessary concern. With democratic principles being widely accepted in the party, the KMT consciously implemented democratic reforms in line with the requirements of democracy. The KMT directed more attention to winning elections and its revolutionary mission was replaced with a commitment to constitutional democracy. The Congress gave its support to fully competitive politics, as its platform now provided for the promotion of a "healthy
competition among political parties on a fair and rational basis," while citing a need for stability and law. Most of the party goals are directly related to campaign issues.

At the Fourteenth National Congress, the KMT finally defined itself as a democratic party. It only described its revolutionary spirit in the preface of the Party Charter. This definition was by and large embraced by party members. According to a survey, 63 percent of the party members agreed to change the party from revolutionary to democratic, while 17 percent disagreed; 53 percent thought that the reforms were not fast enough, while 33 percent thought that the pace of reform was adequate. In any event, it seems plausible that the KMT as a whole consciously ended its tutelage and adopted purely democratic principles as its guiding principles in the transition to democracy on Taiwan.

The above discussion demonstrates that democratic ideology provided the party with guiding principles during the transition to democracy. We want to further the discussion of how democratic ideology affected the party's role in this transition by examining its influence on its major leaders since the mid-1980s. In the post-Chiang period, Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pei-tsun are two prominent political leaders of the KMT who have had profound impacts on the outcome of Taiwan's transition to democracy. The following discussion demonstrates how their democratic beliefs influenced their behaviour.

Lee's Democratic Ideas and Practices

Lee Teng-hui was born on January 15, 1923, in Sanchih Hsiang, Taipei County. He pursued his undergraduate studies at the Kyoto Imperial University in Japan. In 1946, he returned to Taiwan and continued to study at National Taiwan University. In 1949, he

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46 Lien-ho Pao, August 17, 1993.
obtained a bachelor's degree in agronomy. In 1951, he was the recipient of a Sino-American scholarship, and traveled to the University of Iowa to study agronomy. He later returned to teach at National Taiwan University. In 1965, he went on to pursue advanced studies again in the United States, and returned in 1968 with a doctorate in agronomy from Cornell University. This educational background likely influenced his political thought. Before assuming the presidency, he served as minister without portfolio in the Executive Yuan (1972-1978), mayor of Taipei (1978-1981), provincial governor of Taiwan (1981-1984), and vice president of the ROC (1984-1988).

Lee has been frequently criticized for his arrogance, caprice and strong action within the party. His opponents, however, are mainly the members of the non-mainstream faction within the KMT. Lee's dedication to democratization has been a positive factor in the transformation of the KMT and Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The Three Principles of the People did have an impact on Lee Teng-hui. The impact was revealed in a series of speeches made after he succeeded to the Presidency on the same day Chiang Ching-kuo died. Shortly after, in his first international press conference, he pointed out that the Republic of China had "a high ideal, namely, to establish a free, egalitarian, democratic China that enjoys an equal distribution of wealth." He thought that "this is a great and difficult task; but Dr. Sun Yat-sen has provided us with the blueprint to accomplish it." He urged people "to work with sincerity and unity and continue to put our ideals into practice." He argued that to accomplish this final goal, "it is important to keep the channels of communication between the government and people functioning smoothly." Lee stressed that Chiang Ching-kuo's greatest contribution was his effort to implement constitutional democracy. He repeatedly stated that the course of democratization was determined by the late President Chiang, and that

it was his responsibility to carry out the late president's unfulfilled will. In various speeches and interviews, Lee demonstrated his determination to implement democratization on Taiwan.

Democratic principles directed Lee Teng-hui to think about Taiwan's political development in terms of democracy. Before the 1989 elections, Lee expressed that there would always be a winning party and a losing party in a political competition; all political parties should seek democratic attainments. He further stressed that the winning party should be responsible to the voters, and the losing party should accept the decision of the majority.

In his presidential inauguration address delivered on May 20, 1990, Lee Teng-hui defined his aim as shaping the ROC on Taiwan into a democratic state. He promised to end the period of mobilization for the suppression of the Communist rebellion. In other words, he was willing to give up the extraordinary power granted to the president under the Temporary Provisions and return to normal constitutional rule. After his inauguration, he promoted a series of political reforms, holding the National Affairs Conference, lifting martial law, encouraging the retirement of senior legislators, etc. In order to establish an efficient two-party system, he tolerated the aggressiveness of the Democratic Progressive Party. His tolerance of the DPP created a "Lee Teng-hui sentiment" in some DPP members and in society. Lee has repeatedly proclaimed that the party will play the role of a competitor, not a dominator, adding that there will be no real party politics if there is no opposition party, and the KMT should help the opposition mature. He has compared himself to an engineer and has devoted his greatest efforts to promoting democracy on Taiwan. His statements concerning nurturing the opposition reveal the KMT's efforts to

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50 Ou-yang Sheng, "Li Tsung-t'ung te Chih-kuo Li-nien yu Ke-hsin Ts'e-lue" (President Lee's ideal of governance and reform strategies), The Elite, Vol. 4, No. 5 (June, 1993), pp. 4-9.
encourage democratization from the top down. Under Lee's leadership, the KMT has demonstrated a spirit not only of toleration but also of positive willingness to accommodate at least some opposition demands.\textsuperscript{51}

As for the chaotic situation after the lifting of martial law, Lee believed that this was not a negative phenomenon, and the party should not return to authoritarian rule because of this situation. He thought that in a democratic society every citizen could freely express himself, and pluralization could stimulate people's participation and guarantee human rights.\textsuperscript{52}

Lee is quite aware of what he is doing and he often discusses Taiwan's political change in Western political science terminology. In a speech to the Seminar on the ROC's Democratization in January 1989, he pointed out that Taiwan could realize democratization after its economic miracle. He has argued on other occasions that the experiences of the ROC on Taiwan demonstrate that national security and social stability are the prerequisites for political development, while democratization can also help to guarantee national security, stimulate economic growth and prevent Communism.\textsuperscript{53} He has argued that the KMT has the capability to adapt, and that the KMT has led a "quiet revolution."\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Hao's Democratic Ideas and Practices}

Hao Pei-tsun was a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy. He built his reputation as a major general during the 44-day shelling engagement with the mainland in

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\textsuperscript{51} Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., \textit{Political Change in Taiwan} (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 89.
\textsuperscript{52} Lee Teng-hui, \textit{Li Tsung-t'ung Teng-hui Hsian-sheng Ch'i-shih-p'a-nien Yen-luan Hsuan-chi}, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{54} Lee borrows "quiet revolution" from John Copper. See John Franklin Copper, \textit{A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China} (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1988).
\end{flushright}
1958. He was promoted to commander-in-chief in 1978. During the late years of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule, Hao brought the Political Warfare Department (a party organization in the army) under his control. He became Chief of the General Staff between 1981 and 1989. Under Hao's guidance, the army became less politicized and more professional. The continuation of his term as chief of the General Staff beyond the normal tenure indicates that he was a strong man in the military sector.

At one time, Hao was widely regarded as a major conservative figure. Before the Thirteenth National Party Congress, he was deemed a leading figure of the conservative camp. However, at the critical moment of leadership succession, Hao immediately pledged loyalty as chief of the General Staff to new President Lee. Afterwards, he stated eight times that the military would support the legitimate successor of the ROC. In the Thirteenth Congress, Hao finished fourteenth in the Central Committee election, doing relatively well compared to other old conservatives.

Hao was moved to a civilian post when he was appointed minister of defense in 1989. He quickly adjusted to his new role. When he first became the premier in the spring of 1990, he met bitter opposition from students and DPP supporters because of his military background. People feared that the military would interfere in civilian politics and liberalization and democratization would be impeded. Students staged massive protests. Hao thus decided to give up his life-time military rank as a four-star general, and demonstrated his adept coordinating skills both within the government and with the public. He even earned the respect of his toughest opponents for his performance during legislative sessions. A month after his inauguration, public opinion polls showed that 70 percent of the public was confident in his administration. Despite his disagreement with President Lee, "most of Hao's behaviour can be interpreted as proper deference to

his constitutional superior." He stated that "Lee is invested with historic responsibilities at this crucial time in the nation's democratic and constitutional development. I not only must act aggressively in consonance with him, but also render him wholehearted support to complete this chapter in history."59

Hao is a staunch opponent of Taiwan independence. He had stormy relations with opposition lawmakers who support Taiwan independence. However he agreed to deal with this issue by the rule of law, stating that "in consideration of human rights and due legal process, we must be cautious in using the label of separatism. We will, however, deal with illegal behavior in accordance with the law."60 In an interview with William Buckley, host of the United States television programme, Firing Line, he agreed that "the advocacy or discussion of separatism itself does not constitute a criminal offense now. Especially recently, with the revision of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, some people who had advocated separatism and were punished under the original Criminal Code have had their cases dropped. Except for those using violence, all others have been released."61

Thus, generally speaking Hao played a supportive role in the peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan and worked positively for KMT intra-party democracy. His supportive role in the peaceful transition can be partly explained by his ideological belief. Hao regards himself as a "disciple" of the Three Principles of the People. He recognizes that "the fundamental ideal of a government in the Three Principles of the People is the establishment of a democratic political system ruled by law." According to his understanding, "the systems that existed during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and the Emergency Decree are part of a transition process; they were carried out under extremely formidable circumstances, in

58 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 104.
59 Ibid., p. 11.
60 Ibid., p. 27.
61 Hao, Straight Talk, p. 58.
pursuit of change and the restoration of constitutional rule, and can be considered a step in the democratic development in Taiwan." He argued that without these measures, Taiwan would have been subverted and swallowed by the communists. He believed that over the past several decades, the government had consistently carried out its policy of democratization. He stated in an address on the occasion of Journalists Day, 1992 that "I believe that the democracy we pursue should be the same as that of developed countries," and he argued that "the democratic path that we have been pursuing is the same as taken by other advanced and democratic countries in the world." While this statement may not be factual, the message it sends is that Hao has been willing to follow a Western style democratic path.

The above discussion of the principle of the people's rights demonstrates that Sun Yat-sen's emphasis on local democracy, his tutelary approach to democratic development, and his ultimate goal of democracy have had an impact on the KMT; but the KMT interpreted its ideology regarding the extent to which people's rights should be restrained and the time at which full constitutional democracy should be restored according to its governing needs. Rivalry with the Communists on the mainland provided the KMT regime with an expedient excuse to delay Taiwan's transition to democracy. The KMT's anti-Communism has had two consequences. On the one hand, it has given the KMT the time to implement gradual liberalization and democratization. On the other hand, anti-Communism has required the KMT to build a more democratic political system than that existing on the mainland. Although at times the principle of the people's rights was little more than rhetoric to the KMT, it has in practice set the outer limit of the KMT's

62 Ibid., p. 7.
63 Ibid., p. 123.
64 Ibid., p. 7.
authoritarian practice and guided the party to carry out democratic reforms when it ran out of excuses.

5. The KMT's Nationalism on Taiwan

Nationalism is "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." A nation is linked to a specific territory, "either to the motherland of antiquity or to the current domain over which those people who consider themselves a nation." The KMT's nationalism at first followed Sun's teachings; it identified its territory with the whole of China. The following discussion will show that in the earlier years, the adherence to Chinese nationalism gave the KMT legitimacy to rule Taiwan as part of China, but in the later years, the KMT has tended to shift to Taiwanese nationalism, which has facilitated Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The return-to-the-mainland policy was a symbol of the KMT's nationalism. The goal of recovering the mainland from the Communists was the first priority for Chiang Kai-shek immediately after the defeat on the mainland, although the party shifted the emphasis from mainland recovery to economic growth beginning in the mid-1950s. In the words of Thomas Gold, "All other parochial interests had to be sacrificed in order that all forces be mobilized for this overriding sacred mission. In the terms of Antonio Gramsci, the KMT constructed a 'collective national-popular will,' articulating what it determined was the dominant ideology. It did not tolerate heterodox challenges to this orthodoxy." According to Chiang's Chinese nationalism, it was impossible to realize national democracy before the national reunification was achieved.

66 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 26.
In the 1960s, the ideal of recovering the mainland slowly faded to a near impossibility, although Chiang still insisted that the KMT would complete the historical task of recovering the mainland. Many still paid lip service to the goal, but few took it seriously. Under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership, although the KMT authorities still emphasized reunification, it now put more emphasis on Taiwan. Reunification would be achieved not through military means, but rather it would be achieved through political means. In its Eleventh Party Congress in March 1981, the KMT passed a resolution entitled "Reunification of China under the Three Principles of the People." Since then, this resolution has become the KMT's criterion for action on reunification. This policy is clearly a retreat from the earlier policies of "reconquer the mainland" in the 1950s and "develop Taiwan, gloriously recover the mainland" in the 1960s and 1970s.

Since Chiang Ching-kuo's death, "reunification of China under the Three Principles of the People" has remained the official policy. Some scholars think that nationalism "still formed an integral part of the regime's self-legitimation and Lee was in no position to repudiate it;" and that Sun's nationalism could provide the ideological grounds for reunification. In reality, under Lee's guidance, Taiwan has moved more and more to a sort of quasi-independence. People on the island describe it as the "independent Taiwan" stance, to distinguish it from the opposition's "Taiwan independence." Lee has attempted to shape Taiwan into an independent political entity, given that it is impossible to realize independence under the current reality. He wants to maintain a friendly relationship with mainland China based on equality and mutual benefits, a relationship like that between two countries. He also pushes for Taiwan's re-acceptance by the United Nations. Of course, the Independent Taiwan stance also hopes that the mainland

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69 Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 158.
undergoes substantial change; however, its aim is not to replace the CCP's regime, but to ensure Taiwan's survival.

Several developments reveal Lee's independent Taiwan sentiment. *The Guidelines for National Reunification*, adopted in March 1991 by the National Reunification Council, is a brainchild of Lee. One principle of the *Guidelines* is, "The timing and manner of China's reunification should first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare." The KMT government now admits that the ROC's current jurisdiction does not include China proper, and it effectively controls the territories of Taiwan, the Peng-hu Pescadores and two island groups of Kin-men and Ma-tsu. It only identifies its territory with these limited areas. It supports now and then such ideas as "one China, two governments," "one country, two regions" and so forth. All these deviations from Chinese nationalism have been justified by the need to be more pragmatic and flexible in dealing with the mainland.

In an official statement on "Relations across the Taiwan Strait" released by the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan on July 5, 1994, the KMT authorities argue that the existence of separatism on Taiwan is a reality and that the mainland is responsible because of its antagonistic attitudes toward Taiwan. The statement argues that separatism may become the mainstream of public opinion, and that the KMT government has to follow public opinion, implying that the government is likely to embrace Taiwan Independence or an Independent Taiwan.

In important aspects, the KMT's mainland policy is in agreement with the DPP's demands. They both agree that mainland relations should not undermine Taiwan's security; cross-Strait relations should be conducted on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefits; and any negotiations between the two sides should be conducted at a government-to-government rather than party-to-party level.

Generally speaking, nationalism, in Sun's original interpretation, has declined. Taiwanese nationalism is developing in the KMT. Facing the mainland's military threat,
the KMT is using Chinese nationalism as rhetoric to demonstrate the KMT's superficial commitment to one China, but it is trying hard to delay reunification with the PRC. Only some non-mainstreamers in the KMT and the army still believe in Chinese nationalism. The army has a long nationalistic tradition. Although the army is mainly composed of Taiwanese, it retains this tradition. However, generally speaking, Chinese nationalism is declining and Taiwanese nationalism is rising in the KMT on Taiwan. The KMT is no longer interested in rapid reunification with the Communist mainland, but it cannot abandon the idea of reunification. As one author puts it, "Without it, the KMT would be an emperor with no ideological clothes. As it is, the KMT is wearing far fewer ideological robes than it once did."71

Seen from the above discussion, KMT nationalism has had a great impact on Taiwan's modernization and political development; at the same time it also endured changes and adaptation. KMT nationalism is less and less centred on the whole of China, and more centred on Taiwan. This point is clearly revealed in its mainland relations. Any serious attempt to reconquer the mainland would have risked destroying the prosperity and stability that were so crucial to Taiwan's political development. The KMT has apparently taken a pragmatic attitude toward nationalism. Its compromise on Chinese nationalism facilitated its liberalizing and democratizing efforts on Taiwan. The issue of national identity on Taiwan is closely linked with democratization. With the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, native Taiwanese, the majority of the population, gain more and more power. The KMT government now bases its legitimacy almost completely on the support of the Taiwanese electorate, rather than on the hollow claim of representing the whole of China.

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70 Ping-lung Jiang and Wen-cheng Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 91.
71 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 234. But we must note that nationalism is only one part of Sunism.
6. Conclusion

When we compare Communist with non-Communist political systems, we find that ideology is one of the most salient factors that distinguishes them from each other. Ideologies define the nature of political systems. The KMT's ideology falls in the category of "guided democracy" ideologies; it is the most obvious factor that distinguishes the KMT from Leninist parties, and the KMT's efforts to liberalize and democratize, therefore, can be partly explained by the nature of Sunism.

On the cognitive dimension, the KMT's ideology is committed to private ownership and a market economy, albeit with state intervention. As we saw earlier, the KMT embraces capitalism as an important ideological tenet. Taiwan had a large public-sector economy until the late 1950s; the private sector grew in importance thereafter, and capitalism has thus grown with the Nationalist rule of Taiwan. Democracy is most likely to grow with capitalism. The KMT's essentially capitalist approach to economic development increases the likelihood that it would take the democratic path eventually.

Of more direct relevance, politically the KMT's ideology opposes proletariat dictatorship and embraces Western democracy. In terms of ultimate goal, the KMT's ideology has had a positive impact on political changes on Taiwan. Sunism and the Constitution of the ROC require that the KMT realize democracy in the end. Sun's tutelary approach to democracy provided the KMT with an easy excuse to maintain its authoritarian rule, but the tutelary stage could not be prolonged forever. As long as the KMT alleged its ideological commitment to Sunism, it could not legitimately maintain its authoritarian rule in extreme form or forever. As Berman observes, "Restrictions of civil rights were neither represented as necessities of the revolutionary state nor embodied in the basic constitutional order. Rather, these restrictions were presented as temporary
measures arising from the condition of civil war with the Communists."72 Peter Moody has a similar observation when he points out that "Kuomintang quasi-fascism was a fascism more of expediency than of principle, a sense that one must be tough because the times are tough. The ideology had no pretensions of metaphysical or permanent historical truth."73 When the immediate military threat from the mainland receded and Taiwan prospered, the KMT lost its excuse to maintain authoritarian rule. Sunism required that it goes back to constitutional order. Such a commitment was required by the regime's need to maintain its legitimacy. Therefore, the KMT's ideology contains elements that push the party to control or dominate its internal affairs and external environment, but also contains an affirmation of democracy that requires that the party always rationalize its authoritarianism by reference to extraordinary circumstances and take a lead in Taiwan's transition to democracy when such circumstances change. Indeed, the KMT has used the Three Principles of the People both to defend its earlier authoritarian rule and to justify its recent democratic reforms.

Sunism also contains a programmatic dimension that has guided the KMT's approach to Taiwan's transition to democracy. Following Sun's teachings, the KMT on Taiwan took a tutelary and gradual approach to political development. As we saw earlier, the KMT applied Sun's idea of local democracy as a start to political development, but maintained authoritarian rule nationally and concentrated its efforts on economic development. The KMT's reluctance to apply democratic ideology at the national level was one reason why Lei Chen's efforts to form an opposition party failed. When the party began political reforms at the national level, it started with liberalization, and then followed with democratization. The KMT used Sun's tutelary teachings to defend its established order and to legitimize its restriction on political freedoms and political competition. The KMT also used its official ideology to achieve political stability and

72 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 154.
73 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 23.
orderly political changes. The official ideology is never purely and simply a facade. A clear and definite ideology is necessary for the party-state to control people's minds. The KMT authorities formulated a Nationalistic curriculum to indoctrinate its official ideology. By insisting on the Sunism, especially in its earlier stages, the KMT regime imposed at least a superficial "consensus on the fundamentals of politics and precluded the advocacy of any alternative ideology." By doing so, the KMT regime created a peaceful environment in which it could carry out political reforms according to its own agenda.

Therefore, Sun's teachings did guide the KMT at least in terms of the ultimate goal of political development and the approach to achieve it. However, partly due to its tutelary approach, the influence of Sunism, in its original interpretation, declined. The relative significance of the KMT's ideology has varied during the past 45 years. In its first two decades, the KMT's ideology can be described as "revolutionary-centralizing," as its ideology was manifest and strong then. Nowadays it is less important on Taiwan. We should also note that the KMT on Taiwan actually was never as preoccupied with ideology as the Communists were. This is also a factor that has contributed to the peaceful political change on Taiwan, because when ideology is taken very seriously, the result may be intense intra-party struggles or even totalitarian efforts to ensure complete popular conformity to the party's ideology, which can be highly destabilizing. The KMT avoided such tragedy by intentionally downplaying the importance of ideology. In this aspect, the KMT can be described as a mature political party, because, as we discussed in Chapter One, ideology normally plays a crucial role in shaping the newly formed organization and in determining its collective identity, but a lesser role in directing a mature party.

74 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 6.
In addition to the general decline of ideological influence, the relative importance of the three principles has also changed. In the early postwar period, the KMT emphasized the principle of the people's livelihood. With the dramatic socioeconomic changes, the KMT might have thought that conditions were ripe for implementing full constitutional democracy according to Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. Especially in the post-Chiang era, the KMT's ideology underwent an obvious shift of emphasis, emphasizing democracy more than tutelage. The principle of nationalism declined in influence most significantly. The Thirteenth National Congress witnessed the new explanation of the Three Principles of the People. The order of the Three Principles was changed at that time to the people's rights, the people's livelihood and nationalism. The democratic principles have become the guideline for Taiwan's continuous democratizing efforts.

The changing emphasis of the KMT's ideology can be explained by generational change within the party and society in general. The second generation of KMT leaders has been more influenced by Western political thought. A very high proportion of the KMT elite received advanced graduate degrees in the United States and are familiar with American democratic practices, and thus are even more sensitive than other adherents to Sunism to calls for democracy.\(^75\) Intellectuals have also contributed to the democratic ideology. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard note that "a close connection exists between the development of the discipline of political science and the development of democracy. Historically, these two have gone hand in hand. Taiwan, like Korea, has a healthy and vigorous political science profession."\(^76\)

In addition, the shift of emphasis of the Three Principles is also in part due to the opposition's pressure. The opposition has pushed the KMT to bring behaviour into line with Sun's democratic teachings. Political opposition groups on Taiwan espouse Sun's teachings, especially his principles of the people's rights and the people's livelihood. They

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\(^{75}\) Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 16.

\(^{76}\) Cheng and Haggard, *Political Change in Taiwan*, p. xiv.
criticized the KMT for its failure to fulfill Sun's prescriptions about democratic government. For instance, oppositionists argued that the period of tutelage should have ended much earlier and the Constitution should be revived. Furthermore, the KMT had to compete with the opposition on the ideological battleground. Daniel Berman notes, "To many, the KMT's shopworn, unexciting Three Principles of the People paled by comparison." 77 Clearly, however, the ideological gap between the KMT and the opposition has narrowed in recent years. The KMT has accepted the need for more democracy and the legitimacy of the opposition. Meanwhile, the KMT has taken increasingly pragmatic positions on any issues that polls showed the electorate was concerned about. It now faces a choice in the left-right continuum. It can no longer claim that it represents the interests of all the people on Taiwan. Sunism, in its original interpretation, does not seem to attract voters. The election system requires the KMT to be constituent-oriented.

However, the shift of emphasis in the KMT's ideology can also be explained by the eclectic, flexible, and pragmatic character of Sunism. Sun himself admitted that "among the various revolutionary ideas I hold, some are adopted from traditional Chinese thought, and some from Western thought..." 78 As George P. Jan points out, "Sun was one of the few Chinese revolutionary leaders of his time who did not denounce traditional Chinese culture." 79 Furthermore, Sun regarded the Three Principles of the People as "an ideology that would grow and change according to the needs of the times." 80 As Lu points out, "There was no ideological basis for establishing a closed system of beliefs and

77 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 197
80 Chang and Gorden, All Under Heaven, p. 96.
The eclectic nature of Sunism facilitated the KMT's manipulation of ideology. It offers the KMT significant leeway in managing society in a pragmatic way. Sun's tutelary design has the most pragmatic nature. It undoubtedly facilitated the KMT's rule on Taiwan, and the KMT used Sun's proposition of tutelage as a nation-building blueprint. Through tutelage, Sun meant to educate people to enjoy their freedoms and rights. In contrast, the KMT used it mainly as a method to limit people's freedoms and rights, and to rationalize its authoritarian rule. But tutelage itself requires a shift of emphasis from political control to democracy. The changing emphasis of the KMT's ideology reflects the natural transition from a tutelary stage of political rule to the stage of full democracy. Furthermore, Sun's original design was for the whole of China. The KMT on Taiwan was bound to modify it to some degree to accommodate Taiwan's situation. The need to accommodate to Taiwan's conditions requires the KMT to compromise, to some degree, its principles, and the KMT has done that. Thus, it is the programmatic dimension or the operative level of the KMT's ideology that causes its shift of emphasis.

Therefore, the KMT's ideology has had an essentially positive impact on Taiwan's political development which has fed back to cause the ideology itself to experience some changes. Sun's teachings provided Taiwan with a political model. In the initial stage, the principle of the people's livelihood encouraged the KMT to carry out land reform that strengthened the KMT's legitimacy and laid down the basis for later rapid economic growth. Sun's preference for economic growth first encouraged the KMT to concentrate on economic development that laid down the economic basis for political development. Sun's stress on equality urged the state to invest in education which later provided people "the equality of opportunity," and enabled Taiwan to grow without serious inequality. In the meantime, the principle of the people's rights and Sun's tutelary approach to

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democratic development encouraged local self-governance that laid down the basis for dramatic democratization in recent years. Sun put elections in a central position in his design for political development, and this design has been largely fulfilled by the KMT on Taiwan. Over the years, the KMT's ideology experienced the shift of emphasis from tutelary notion of democracy toward notion of Western-style liberal democracy. The KMT's elitist ideology has been transformed to a constituent-oriented ideology. In adapting to electoral politics, the KMT is also converting from mainland-oriented nationalism to Taiwan-oriented nationalism. Its concerns have shifted from long range and messianic ones to short range and pragmatic ones. The fundamentally democratic nature of the KMT's ideology along with these shifts of emphasis has facilitated and promoted Taiwan's transition to democracy.
CHAPTER FIVE  LEADERSHIP AND DIVISIONS WITHIN THE KMT

1. Introduction

Up to this point this research has examined the ruling party KMT as a whole. We have discussed how the KMT as a ruling party interacted with the opposition and which ideological tenets were shared within the KMT. However, the fact that a ruling party adheres to a fundamentally democratic ideology does not mean it has no internal differences concerning the timing and pace of liberalization and democratization. Different groups within the ruling party are very likely to have different opinions regarding the transition to democracy, and the balance and compromise between these groups determine the timing and pace of the party's initiatives toward liberalization and democratization. This chapter will examine how the KMT's internal policy differences affected the party's decisions on how and when to liberalize and democratize, how the KMT's top leaders have influenced Taiwan's political development in different periods, and how the reformers have gradually gained the upper hand within the party and helped top leaders to liberalize and democratize.

Since divisions in the party (the reformers vs. the conservatives) often lead to the formation of factions, this chapter will analyze the KMT's factions and their effects on the party's role in Taiwan's political development. This author argues that the orientation and actions of the top leaders and divisions in the ruling party have had a direct impact on the outcome of Taiwan's transition to democracy. Groups within the KMT who held different tactical positions on political reforms balanced each other to prevent stasis or excessively
rapid change. The balance and compromise between them helped promote Taiwan's peaceful and gradual transition to democracy.

Before discussing the KMT's internal politics, let us first define "faction." Faction is a "grouping of persons of a different orientation than that of other members of the party." However, some scholars writing about factionalism in mainland China state that Chinese factions differ from this definition and have some special characteristics. Lucian Pye argues that Chinese factions are not formed primarily in response to policy issues, bureaucratic interests, generational differences, or geographical bases, although these considerations do play a part. The primary basis for the formation of factions among cadres is the search for career security and the protection of power. Chinese factions are more latent than manifest, more capable of bureaucratic obstructionism than of policy initiation or implementation, and generally diffuse and imprecise concerning policy matters.

In the case of the KMT on Taiwan, we shall find that Pye's analysis is a more appropriate description of factionalism during the first two decades of the KMT's government of Taiwan, and that policy orientation had an increasing impact on divisions in the party thereafter, although other factors have also influenced the formation of factions. Factions in Taiwan in the later periods were not so "culturally fixed" as Pye would have us believe. Thus, policy orientation will be used as a major differentiating factor in the definition of faction. It is the policy generating function of factions that has much to do with a party's role in the transition to democracy. Of course, intra-party divisions in the later periods also had something to do with power, because different groups need power to promote their policies. A change in the balance of power in the ruling party, therefore, usually also means a change of policy orientation.

Factions can be organized or unorganized. Unorganized factions are latent opinion groups formed around disputes about certain political issues, and may or may not have alternative platforms and exclusive claims for political power. Angelo Panebianco calls these kinds of factions "tendencies," as he argues that when "the groups are barely organized: they represent tendencies in a pure state."\(^3\) Factions of this kind tend to be exaggerated by the media. Actually they have a temporary and spontaneous nature, and they may disperse and reorganize when new issues appear or situations change. In the KMT's case, we shall see that in the early period on Taiwan, organized groups were purged from the party centre, and they existed only in the legislature; but unorganized or intangible groups existed throughout the party history.

The KMT on Taiwan tends to be factionalized at two levels: at the local level in rural areas and at the central level. Factionalism at these two levels is quite different. Local factionalism is based on the ethnic divisions between Hokkien and Hakka on many parts of the island, and it has little influence on the KMT's direction of political reforms. Here we are solely interested in the central level, because it is closely related to our theme of transition to democracy on Taiwan. At the central level, the KMT factions were not highly organized, especially before the mid-1980s.

For the following discussion we divide the KMT's history on Taiwan into three different periods: the period of Chiang Kai-shek (the 1950s and 1960s), the period of Chiang Ching-kuo and the rise of the reformers (the 1970s and early 1980s), and the internal balance of power period (since the mid-1980s).

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Before the retreat to Taiwan, the KMT itself was riven with factionalism. Chiang Kai-shek was a strong leader, but his power was challenged by many factions.\(^4\) There was the conservative CC clique (named after Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu) that controlled the party, the Whampoa faction in the military, and the Political Study Group of professionals and businessmen. After the retreat, Chiang kept the brothers Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu out of the reorganization scheme. The KMT leaders from the mainland who were at odds with Chiang (e.g., T.V. Sung and H.H. Kung) were ousted from the KMT's CSC. Many of the faction leaders did not follow Chiang to Taiwan, but instead fled to Hong Kong or the United States. Chiang constantly warned against the revival of factionalism, and these groups had apparently given up their efforts to maintain close knit organizations within the party. Some of the leaders of these groups remained in the Central Committee and the Central Standing Committee, but they appeared to participate in these high party organs as individuals. Chiang enjoyed absolute authority in matters of appointing top party and government posts and of formulating high policies. He used personal intervention and appeal to remove differences and to soften discontent. Thus, Chiang successfully established his own paramount authority and kept the factions under control. As Tai Hungchao points out, "It is this charismatic and paternalistic quality of leadership that furnishes the basis of unity among the high echelons of the party and the government."\(^5\)

Under Chiang, however, potential factions, or in Panebianco's term, tendencies still existed. Factions were underground and the factional struggle was checked and


balanced by Chiang Kai-shek with his personal authority and prestige. Moody describes
the situation as follows: "The overall KMT system might perhaps be thought of as a trunk
(Chiang Kai-shek) with two major branches (the Ch'en Ch'eng and Chiang Ching-kuo
'systems')."6 Personal associates of Chiang Kai-shek formed a palace faction. As the older
factions, such as the CC and Whampoa groups, lost their footing on Taiwan, some of
their surviving members joined the palace faction.7

Chiang Kai-shek endeavoured to promote his son Chiang Ching-kuo into
important positions. It had been psychologically difficult for old Chiang to trust anybody
since his defeat on the mainland. Ching-kuo naturally became the most trusted aid of old
Chiang. He was put in charge of suppressing opposition and implementing social control.
He quickly established his power base in the party, security, military, and the youth work
system. He first penetrated the party through the Central Reform Committee. Edwin
Winckler notes, in the 1950s, "of the six sections of the party Central Committee, he
personally directed Political Warfare, controlled Propaganda through a subordinate, and
had allies running Mainland Operations. In the crucial Organizational Department and in
Overseas Chinese party affairs, CCK [Chiang Ching-kuo] had to rest content with a
subordinate as deputy director."8

Ching-kuo controlled security through a Political Action Committee. He was not
the formal director of the Committee, but actually ran it. The Committee integrated
intelligence works under the Judicial Department and Defense Department. According to
Winckler, the Committee had two organs: a secretariat and a training school; "the
secretariat of the committee eventually became institutionalized as a confidential branch
of the Presidential Office, while its training school became institutionalized as the

6 Peter R. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan: a Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York:
7 Ibid., p. 117
8 Edwin A. Winckler, "Elite Political Struggle, 1945-1985," in Contending Approaches to the
Political Economy of Taiwan, eds. Edwin Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk: M. E.
National Security Bureau.... [This Bureau] became the core of Chiang Ching-kuo's power and an inner sanctum to which reportedly he continued to retreat for key decisions even after becoming premier and president.9

To control the army, Ching-kuo built a new General Political Warfare Department, a party organization in the army. The Department took over the political and intelligence operations previously under the control of the Whampoa clique. Ching-kuo's control of the Department helped him in the competition for political supremacy in the party-state, as well as helping the party in gaining social and political stability. General Wang Sheng became the head of this Department after Chiang-Kuo.

To control the young people, Ching-Kuo founded in 1952 the Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps, and he served as its first general director until 1973. The Corps had a very close relationship with the party. Ching-Kuo used it to identify and nurture his own supporters. The Youth Corps, later headed by Li Huan, became the communication bridge between Chiang Ching-kuo and intellectual circles. Ching-kuo also cultivated supporters among engineers, agricultural experts, and other technocrats when he was in charge of settling the retired soldiers in the public construction projects in the 1960s.10

In this early period the main threat to Chiang Ching-kuo's rising power came from Ch'en Ch'eng. Ch'en had been the head of the south-eastern regional administration before the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. The army Chiang brought to Taiwan was mainly from that region. Ch'en was governor of Taiwan from 1949 to 1950, a member of Central Reform Committee from 1950 to 1952, the premier from 1950 to 1954 and from 1958 to 1963, and vice chairman of the KMT and concurrently vice president of the ROC from 1954 to

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9 Ibid.
1965,¹¹ Ch'en's people included mainland technocrats and "half-mountain men," Taiwanese who worked for the KMT on the mainland before 1949. Ch'en Ch'eng's follower Wu Kuo-chen, governor of Taiwan, disliked Ching-kuo especially. In 1953 Wu resigned and moved to the United States, where he denounced the single-party dictatorship, Ching-kuo's political commissar system in the army, and the lack of democracy on Taiwan.¹² There was the rumor that Ch'en had disputes with the highest authorities regarding the personnel arrangement in his cabinet. Ch'en maintained good relationships with intellectuals, even winning the heart of Hu Shih, a liberal scholar-diplomat. Ch'en was not informed about the crackdown on Free China, an opposition journal which Hu supported.¹³ However, Ch'en's potential threat to Ching-kuo disappeared when he died of cancer in 1965. Ch'en's faction did not survive his death.

Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo even resorted to outright purges in order to consolidate their power. The purge of General Sun Li-jen was such a case. Sun built up his reputation in the Burma campaigns during World War II. In 1949 Chiang put him in charge of military training on Taiwan. Sun was reportedly approached by U.S. agents who proposed that he take control of Taiwan with U.S. support.¹⁴ Although he refused the proposal out of personal loyalty to Chiang, he was marked as pro-American and lost Chiang's trust. Further, when he opposed the creation of the General Political Warfare Department in the military, he came into conflict with Chiang Ching-kuo. In 1955 he was purged based on charges of harbouring a Communist agent on his staff. Both Ch'en

¹² Chiang Nan, Chiang Ching-kuo Chuan (Biography of Chiang Ching-Kuo) (Montebelo, CA.: Mei-kuo Lun-t'an She, 1984), pp. 218-219. Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 73.
¹⁴ Li Sung-lin, Chiang-shih Fu-ts'u Tsai Taiwan (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo on Taiwan) (Peking: Chung-kuo You-i Ch'u-pan Kung-tzu, 1993), pp. 199-202. While it is hard to prove this point, but after the Communists took over the mainland, the United States was unsatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek and did try to replace him with somebody else.
Ch'eng and Chiang Ching-kuo benefited from Sun's purge, because Sun belonged neither to Ch'en's Whampoa clique nor Chiang Ching-kuo's Political Warfare system. They both wanted to keep the army free of American influence.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, factionalism in the KMT was strictly forbidden during this period. Chiang Kai-shek especially restricted the liberal tendency in the party, as shown in his crackdown on Free China's democratizing push. Forbidding factionalism did not necessarily eliminate it, and liberal tendency always existed within the party. Actually, although Chiang imprisoned Lei Chen and some of his followers, he offered Hu Shih, the founder of Free China and the symbol of liberalism on Taiwan, the presidency of the Academia Sinica, the highest academic position in the ROC.\textsuperscript{16} T'ao Pai-chuan, a typical May Fourth liberal intellectual who was also a member of the Control Yuan and an advisor to both Chiangs, was virtually unaffected by the issue. He even tried to help Sun Li-jen and Lei Chen when he worked as a member of the investigation team on their cases. The existence of different tendencies explains why different policy opinions could re-emerge in later periods. Nevertheless, by strictly forbidding factionalism, Chiang Kai-shek asserted his own authority and could plan the ROC's political development according to his own scheme.

Organized factions of the KMT survived only in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan was dominated by the KMT. In the 1950s and 1960s, KMT members were basically divided into two factions in the Legislative Yuan: the seminar faction and the CC faction. Major figures of the former faction included Ni Wen-ya, Chao Tzu-chi, and Chang Pao-shu. Major figures of the later faction included Liang Su-jung, and Chang Tzu-yang. The CC faction was dominant in the KMT in the mainland era, and thus was held responsible for the KMT's failure on the mainland. The seminar group supported

\textsuperscript{15} Moody, \textit{Political Change on Taiwan}, p. 73.
Ch'en Ch'eng and was the mainstream faction in the legislature. The CC faction, repudiating the old image of dictatorship, began to play the role of the opposition within the party. They often allied themselves with other old non-KMT members. They argued for reform, democracy and the rule of law in the legislature. In 1958, the Executive Yuan proposed amendments to the publication law which would further restrict publications. The CC clique strongly opposed the proposal, which was passed with some minor revisions. In the same year the CC group also succeeded in reducing a proposed utilities price hike from 54 percent to 32 percent, demonstrating its sympathy with the grassroots.\(^{17}\) In contrast, the mainstream faction always supported the bills submitted by the Executive Yuan. KMT factionalism also extended to another parliamentary organ, the Control Yuan. In 1957, eleven members with CC backgrounds in the Control Yuan proposed to impeach premier Yu Hung-chun. They refused mediation by the party centre. Yu finally had to resign.\(^{18}\)

Chiang Kai-shek was not happy to see these activities. In 1962, the KMT carried out a general registration of party members. Some members of the Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan had their party membership revoked. In 1966, some members of the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan again proposed impeachment bills. Their party memberships were revoked because of their connection with bribes. On the other hand, the KMT centre also co-opted some members of opposition factions by recruiting them to central positions. After the mid-1960s, factionalism in the legislature almost disappeared.

Generally speaking, the main concerns of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo in this initial stage were with party unity and the consolidation of their own power. The strong power position enjoyed by the Chiangs allowed them discretion to implement political construction according to their own plan. Factions in this early period were


based primarily on personal ties. Other high ranking KMT officials on the whole agreed with Chiang Kai-shek regarding policy considerations and the need for party unity and tight social control, and on one objected to the implementation of local democracy. Thus there was basically no division within the party in this early period. Little liberalization occurred at the national level during this period because the top leaders did not think the time was right and the appeal for it was extremely weak in the party. Nevertheless, some of the liberals did survive in the party and the Legislative Yuan as long as they did not challenge Chiang's authority. The liberal tradition never died in the KMT, and this was the basis for its reemergence in the next period.


In 1969 Chiang Ching-kuo was promoted from minister of defense to deputy premier, and then to premier in 1972. By assuming the premiership, he actually became the top leader on Taiwan. When his father died in April 1975, he succeeded to the KMT chairmanship. Vice President Yen Chia-kan succeeded to the presidency, but he was largely a figurehead. In 1978, upon the recommendation of Yen, Ching-kuo was nominated by the KMT for the presidency and was elected by the National Assembly. With his power and position secured, he implemented a series of liberalizing policies in this period.

Chiang Ching-kuo and the Reformers  As we know from Chapter Three, the major liberalizing policies involved rejuvenating the representative organs and giving some room to opposition journals. Ironically, the modest liberalization drive was initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo, who had earlier managed much of the KMT's repression. Upon assuming the premiership, Chiang did not continue his iron fist ruling, but opted for
liberalization. The explanation for this change may be that Chiang seemed to believe that limited opening up would not threaten his authority, and that it could increase his reputation. He wanted, therefore, to create a new kind of political situation. The central policy under Chiang's leadership was "To Protect Taiwan by Reforms" (Ke-hsin pao-tai).\(^{19}\) His liberalizing efforts were supported by other high-level KMT officials and were welcomed by the public. In fact, opening up did increase Chiang's reputation.

To implement his "Ke-hsin Pao-tai" policies, Chiang Ching-kuo made an effort to rejuvenate the party. Increasing numbers of young, liberal, and Taiwanese people were promoted. Li Huan was in effective control of the party organization. He had been Ching-kuo's student in 1944 when Ching-kuo took charge of a young cadets school, the aim of which was to train Chiang Kai-shek's own followers.\(^{20}\) In the mid-1960s Li Huan concurrently served in three positions: head of the Youth Corps, director of the KMT's Organizational Department, and director of the Yangming Institution on National Revolution and Development. He was the architect of Chiang's policies of rejuvenation and Taiwanization.

During this period, a number of technocrats entered Ching-kuo's Cabinet. Technocrats such as Sun Yun-hsuan, Y. S. Tsiang, and S. T. Tao, were to become the government leaders.\(^{21}\) Overseas returnees were preferred by the party. When Li Huan was in charge of the Youth Corps he promoted some overseas returnee scholars to work in the Corps. Ch'en Lu-an, Kuan Chung, Hsu Hsin-liang and Cheng Hsin-hsiung were their representatives. They were quite familiar with Western democratic practice, and they tried to apply it. For instance, Hsu Hsin-liang was sent by the KMT to Great Britain for further studies from 1967 to 1969. Because he had a thorough understanding of

\(^{19}\) There are some explanations for Chiang's decision to democratize in 1986, but there are few explanations for his decision to liberalize in the early 1970s.


\(^{21}\) Hsu, "Historical Setting," p. 13.
electoral systems, he was put in charge of campaign mobilization by Li Huan. In 1972, he was nominated as the KMT candidate for the fifth Provincial Assembly election. Hsu believed that earlier campaigns overlooked the younger generation, and voters below the age of 35 constituted one fourth of the total voters. Thus he catered especially to the younger generation, and he was elected with the highest number of votes.**22**

Among these younger elites, some belonged to the KMT's second generation. Their promotion was facilitated by their family background. For instance, Ch'en Lu-an is Ch'en Ch'eng's son. He was appointed director of the Organizational Department in February 1979. Kuan Chung assumed the post of deputy secretary general of the Commission of Policy Coordination. Ting Mao-shih was appointed director of the Cultural Department in 1976. Some of them, e.g., Sun Tsen, Lin Ch'ing-chiang, Shih Ch'i-yang, and Chang Ching-yu, were promoted rather quickly. By the end of the 1970s, many younger, better educated, and more liberal politicians, of whom a number were Taiwanese, entered into powerful positions in the KMT. As a result, a new generation of KMT politicians was born, and became the symbol of regime's political reforms.

*Different Policy Orientations between the Reformers and the Conservatives* In the second half of the 1970s three groups developed under Chiang Ching-kuo: the reformers, the conservatives, and the centrists. The reformist camp consisted of younger cadres in the Organizational Department, overseas returnees, some of the developmental technocrats, regional and local politicians, young members of the central parliamentary bodies who had emerged from supplementary elections, and Taiwanese recruits throughout the party. Li Huan was the representative of this camp. They argued for the pluralization of the political system, believing that the party could continue to defeat the opposition through elections, and that "national security and social stability could best be

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**22** Li Sung-lin, *Chiang-shih Fu-ts'u Tsai Taiwan* (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo on Taiwan) (Peking: Chung-kuo You-i Ch'u-pan Kung-tzu, 1993).
guaranteed by an expansion of the parameters of participation and political competition in a controlled and managed process."  

In theory they agreed with the goal of reunification of China, but they thought that conditions for reunification would not likely be met in the near future.

The conservative camp consisted of Political Warfare workers, many military leaders, a number of older bureaucrats, and some of the old guard who had a good relationship with the Chiang family. Wang Sheng was the representative of this group. They insisted on staunch anti-Communism, continued commitment to recapturing the mainland, and the KMT's dominance on Taiwan. They were concerned with the potential social disorder accompanying the liberalization process, and stressed the importance of national security.

The centrists consisted of most of the technocrats and some politicians. They were not as active as other two factions politically, and were primarily concerned with economic growth. This group had more members than other two factions, and it was a stabilizing force in the party.

The conservatives were not happy with the rise of the reformers. Party veterans supported Political Warfare workers, and attacked Li Huan and the Youth Corps system. They thought that Li was creating factions in the party. On the other hand, some of the Taiwanese elites felt that the faster way to increase their political power was to win elections. Some of them quit the party and campaigned by themselves. For instance, Hsu Hsin-liang, who was elected provincial assemblyman with Li's support, quit the KMT and was a central figure during the Chung-li Incident in 1977. Li, as director of the Organizational Department, was blamed for their wrong doing. He was temporarily removed from the power centre after the Chung-li Incident. It has been noted that "as the

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24 Ibid., p. 124.
soft-liners took the blame for these unanticipated events, the hard-liners argued that the political opposition should be contained before it became uncontrollable.  

25 General Wang Sheng, the head of the Political Warfare Department, ascended. However, the Youth Corps system was still powerful. Li was replaced by Sung Shih-hsuan, who was director of Youth Corps. Especially at the local level the Youth Corps was stronger than the Political Warfare system.  

26 When Sung worked as chairman of the Provincial Party Committee, he appointed many Taiwanese with college degrees to head the party's local branches. Local KMT functionaries were instructed to foster social harmony through mediation with the opposition.

Wang Sheng strengthened his forces on the occasion of the establishment of the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States on January 1, 1979. He took advantage of the opportunity of anti-united front to enlarge his own forces in the party. As Moody notes, "He first founded a State Consolidation Group, and then a secret group code-named the 'Liu Shao-k'ang office,' under the nominal control of the KMT secretariat. Its ostensible purpose was to investigate connections between the opposition and the Communists, but it was mainly a covert political machine for Wang, bridging the party and the army."  

27 Bills discussed in the CSC had to be first approved by this office.

In early 1979 the reformist forces tolerated a number of newly established opposition monthlies and bi-weeklies, like the magazine Formosa (Mei-li-tao). The Formosa went to extremes in the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979. The military again stressed the importance of solidarity and identified the opposition as a threat to Taiwan's stability. It has been noted that "several signs indicated popular disapproval of

25 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 13.
27 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 87.
opposition violence, thus partly vindicating the hard-liners' advocacy of social order.\textsuperscript{28} The Kaohsiung Incident strengthened the conservatives within the KMT. Wang Sheng's influence rose after the Kaohsiung Incident. Wang became a member of the CSC in the fourth session of the Eleventh Congress on December 14, 1979. Another member with a Political Warfare background, Liang Hsiao-huang, replaced Ch'en Lu-an as director of the Organizational Department.

As factionalism developed in the party, Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the task of balancing intra-party divisions, thus balancing the demands for liberalization and stability. He gave support to either the reformers or the conservatives as he viewed appropriate. When liberalization seemed not to threaten stability, as was the case most of the time prior to 1979, he gave his support to the reformers. When the opposition pressed for more extreme changes, he gave his support to the conservatives, as was the case after the Kaohsiung Incident. The balance reached between the reformers and the conservatives helped the ruling party to keep the timing and pace of liberalization under its control.

The tendencies towards liberalization did not stop because of the party's emphasis on security after the Kaohsiung Incident. The party sought to prevent further direct confrontations with the opposition. As a compromise between the conservative and reformist views, the KMT was to gradually liberalize the political process while maintaining various constraints on the activities of the opposition. After June 1980, the KMT centre decided to hold, in December 1980, the supplementary elections for the representative bodies which had been postponed in late 1978. The election results might have prompted Chiang to further liberalize, because he seemed to realize that imprisonment of key leaders in the Kaohsiung Incident did not prevent the voters from supporting their relatives and attorneys.

\textsuperscript{28} Cheng and Haggard, \textit{Political Change in Taiwan}, p. 13.
Chiang was very sensitive to the rapid growth of Wang Sheng's forces. To check and balance Wang, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed Chiang Yen-shih to the position of secretary general of the party in December 1979. Yen-shih was an enlightened agronomist with an American Ph. D. He was the mentor of Lee Teng-hui who also was an agronomist with an American Ph. D. Yen-shih had been secretary general of the Executive Yuan, minister of education, secretary general of the Presidency, and minister of foreign affairs. He was seen as the leader of the overseas returnees. He promoted Kuan Chung and Cheng Hsin-hsiung as chairmen for Taipei and Kao-hsiung party committees in May 1981. In turn, they promoted many overseas returnees at the local level. In the early 1980s, the factional manoeuvre was between conservatives headed by Wang Sheng and enlightened reformers headed by Chiang Yen-shih. Yen-shih maintained a low profile, because he lacked strong organizational support within the party. However, by instituting a Liu Shaok'ang Office, Wang Sheng overreached. The Whampoa faction in the military could not tolerate Wang's ambition, and Ching-kuo was also displeased to see the rapid ascendance of Wang's forces. In 1983 he sent Wang Sheng to Paraguay.²⁹ Xu Li-nung, who had no personal relationship in the military, replaced Wang. After the downfall of Wang Sheng, Chiang Yen-shih gained real power.

*The Reorganization in 1984 and 1985* In 1984, a series of scandals occurred on Taiwan. The scandal of the Tenth Credit Cooperative in 1984 involved a number of high ranking officials, including Chiang Yen-shih. Henry Liu, a Taiwanese American who wrote an unauthorized biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was killed by Bamboo Union thugs under the direction of Taiwan's military intelligence. The Henry Liu incident involved Chiang's son Hsiao-wu, who was widely accused of being the man behind the

murder.30 According to Ma Ying-chiu, who had been Chiang's English-language secretary, Chiang "was very grieved that things like this had occurred during his second term as president. That was why he decided to hold the third session. Although there was no clear declaration, the comrades inside the party knew that although it would not be called an overhaul (Kai-tsao), it would be an overhaul in effect."31

President Chiang Ching-kuo also began to consider the succession matter. In February 1984, during his re-election, he named as his running mate Lee Teng-hui. The main reason that Lee was chosen by Chiang was that he embodied the principles of Taiwanization and technocratization. In the June personnel reshuffle, Yen-shih's men became a new mainstream force in the party. After the reorganization of the party in 1984, the Political Warfare forces were eliminated. Chiang Yen-shih, despite his contribution to Ching-kuo's policy, was said to have problems in his private life. In February 1985, his resignation was accepted by Chiang, and Ma Shu-li, the former ROC representative in Japan, was appointed the secretary general. Liang Hsiao-huang was shifted to deputy secretary general, a consultative position. These arrangements paved the road for Ching-kuo's successor and created favourable conditions for continuous political reforms.32

At the end of 1985 Chiang declared that the next ROC leader would not be a Chiang, and the succession would strictly follow the provisions of the Constitution. He sent his son Hsiao-wu, who headed the China Broadcasting Corporation and served as secretary to the National Security Council, to Singapore as a trade representative of the ROC.

Party veterans in the KMT still had some influence regarding national policies. However, they did not all aspire to be the successor. Yen Chia-kan (C. K. Yen), vice president from 1966 to 1975 and then president from 1975 to 1978, was modest. Premier Sun Yun-hsuan was a very able technocrat who took democracy and human rights seriously, but he lost his chance to become the successor as he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and died in 1984. Yu Kuo-hua, a former governor of the Central Bank of China, succeeded Sun. Yu was rather conservative, but he was very loyal to Chiang, and he was nick-named Chiang's housekeeper. After the downfall of Wang Sheng, Hao Pei-tsun gradually unified all the military functions under his office, but his purely military background prevented him from becoming a national leader. The head of the Judicial Yuan, Huang Shao-ku, kept his power for almost half a century, and while he had no ambitions to national leadership, he lost his position because he was opposed to Chiang's proposal to end the Martial Law. Ni Wen-ya served in the Youth Corps in the mainland era, and started to follow Chiang Ching-kuo before the KMT moved to Taiwan. Most of these veterans were older than Chiang, and they did not aspire to be Chiang's successor. When policy was decided by Chiang, these veterans would usually follow without objection.

In this period liberalization was initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo with the reformers' assistance. The reformers promoted the partial opening of electoral system as a means to compete with the opposition. The conservatives were concerned with the potential instability that the opposition might cause. Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to conclude that the conservatives merely played a reactionary role in liberalization. They were helpful in keeping the radical opposition under control, and thus keeping the pace of change under control. Furthermore, many conservatives were not die-hard opponents to liberalization. Although with reservations, they usually complied with the top leadership
when liberalizing policies were decided. This explains why the liberalizing process was by and large gradual and peaceful.

4. Internal Balance of Power Period (Since the Mid-1980s)

In this period the KMT experienced dramatic internal transformation. We shall discuss five aspects of this period. First, we shall see how the reformers and the conservatives settled their conflicts. Second, we shall discuss how mainstream and non-mainstream factions check and balance each other. Third, we shall discuss different views in the party about constitutional reforms. Fourth, we shall look at how the legislators rise in the KMT. Fifth, we shall discuss the achievements of the KMT's Fourteenth Congress. Through discussion of these topics we shall see how the internal changes in the KMT have influenced its role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

Conflict Settlement between the Reformers and the Conservatives

The year 1986 was a watershed in Taiwan's political development, as the KMT decided to implement substantial political reform. The top leader Chiang Ching-kuo changed from a balancer of opposing factions to an open advocate of reform. The reformers in the KMT clearly prevailed. As a result, the KMT as a whole took the lead in democratization. Political reform gained such momentum that it continued even after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo.

The third session of the KMT's Twelfth Central Committee in March 1986 formally started the process of political reform. Chiang hand-picked a task force to
secretly discuss the feasibility of legalizing the opposition. This task force consisted of twelve members who were selected from different opinion groups within the party. It comprised both the conservatives and the reformers, of both mainland and Taiwanese origins. Chiang tried to integrate divergent interests and build a consensus in the party. In June, the task force made its first report, which advocated large-scale elections to fill posts in the three representative organs, permission for the formation of "civic associations," etc.

The reformers and the conservatives had different views about the further opening up of the political system. The reformers tried to further open the electoral process and take a conciliatory attitude towards the opposition. They wanted to transform the KMT into a political machine geared to electoral competition. They argued that "it was no longer feasible to suppress opposition but it was feasible for the Nationalists to continue to defeat the opposition through elections."  

The conservatives thought that the termination of martial law would endanger national security. They correctly pointed out that the opposition would not be satisfied by the KMT's concessions, and it would organize a political party. Premier Yu Kuo-hua asserted that any new party would damage social peace and destroy political harmony. Other KMT politicians opposed an organized opposition because it had separatist ideas, i.e., Taiwan independence proposals. They still thought that Taiwan was not ready for competition in elections. Some moderates among them thought that "it was simply a good precautionary move to keep them illegal, while simultaneously allowing them to operate

35 Edwin A. Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 243.
36 Li Hsiao-feng, Taiwan Min-chu Yun-tung Szü-shi-nien (The democratic movement for 40 years in Taiwan) (Taipei: Tzi-li Wan-pao Wen-hua Ch'ü-pan-pu, 1987), p. 221.
as a *de facto* competing party."37 Other conservatives resisted reforms because they were afraid that democratization would undermine their status, or simply because they were not used to the new situation.

Chiang persuaded the conservatives.38 When the opposition established the Democratic Progressive Party, Chiang instructed that "we should not take an angry attitude, rather, we should take a moderate attitude." He held several meetings with civilian and military leaders to hold off a possible crackdown on the opposition leaders. At a meeting of the KMT CSC on October 15, 1986, Chiang stated that to meet the challenge of changing environment "the ruling party must adopt new concepts and new methods and on the basis of the democratic and constitutional political order, push forward measures of reform and renewal."39

Many people are astonished that Chiang Ching-kuo turned himself from a ruthless autocrat in his earlier years into a liberal reformer in his later years. Chiang's transformation is a mystery or a puzzle for many people.40 What ultimately drew Chiang to the cause of democratizing reforms? Political considerations seemed unimportant in this regard because Chiang had consolidated his power and he did not need to advocate reform as a way to consolidate his power against the conservative forces. There are several reasons for his transformation. First, his populist political style and his experience in local activities may have influenced him. In the early 1960s, Ching-kuo was in charge of settling retired soldiers in the public construction projects. In this capacity, he came into contact with many modern technocratic experts, and got acquainted with local conditions. He began to move away from the influence of the intelligence network, and

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became more and more liberal-oriented. Second, succession considerations may have influenced him. In the early 1980s, Ching-kuo's health deteriorated. He suffered from diabetes. In 1981 and 1982 he underwent eye surgery. In 1985 he had cataract removal surgery. The succession issue became increasingly urgent as Chiang's health deteriorated. As Nathan and Ho note, "With his retirement or death the political system would lose a popular leader whose personal legitimacy... was important to bolster the regime. Chiang may have wished to begin the process of giving that regime greater long-term security based on its ability to win competitive elections.... [Further] Chiang probably realized that it would be harder for a successor to implement reforms over the opposition of conservative forces in the KMT and the military than for him to do so himself." Third, Chiang's democratizing efforts in 1986 may be explained as the natural extension of his liberalization policies. By the mid-1980s, liberalization had developed such momentum that it could not be stopped without resorting to harsh measures. Chiang was keen to see the process of liberalization continue. According to Wachman, "It is unlikely that Chiang Ching-kuo viewed himself as a ruthless autocrat, and he probably did not wish that to be his legacy." Fourth, as we discuss in the chapter on the KMT's ideology, Chiang's adherence to the Three Principles of the People and his sense of mission also motivated him to speed up political reforms on Taiwan.

Under the aegis of Chiang, the strength of the younger reformers grew steadily. In 1986 Lee Teng-hui was ranked number three in the CSC, and Li Huan reentered the CSC. In July 1987 Li was appointed secretary general of the party, a position usually occupied by KMT veterans. With Kuan Chung as director of the Organizational Department, many elected politicians and people with grassroots support were recruited and promoted in the

42 Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision," pp. 47-49.
43 Wachman, Taiwan, p. 141.
party. This indicated the growing strength of the liberal reformers. This group of reformers supported negotiation with the Tang-wai and later the DPP.

When Chiang died on January 13, 1988, Lee Teng-hui succeeded to the Presidency. Since Chiang had already set the guidelines for political reforms, democratization accelerated. The reformers, now headed by their new leader Lee Teng-hui, carried out a series of political and constitutional reforms, and they claimed that they did these according to late President Chiang's political will. Nobody could play Chiang's role any more. The reformers had lost a decisive source of support, and now had to make concessions to the numerous interests to commit these groups to support reforms. They had to negotiate and strike compromises with the conservatives and other forces. The CSC was no longer a meeting gathered to listen to Chiang's instructions. It was filled with lively discussion and debates on various issues. The party operated with a form of collective leadership in the early post-Chiang period, and the party's policy toward the opposition was the result of balance and compromise between the reformers and the conservatives.

Immediately after the death of Chiang, the conservatives formed the so-called "palace faction." It included party veterans and the Chiang family. Premier Yu Kuo-hua was an active member, and Sung Mei-ling was the symbolic head of this group. At the age of 90, Sung was sister-in-law of Sun Yat-sen, widow of Chiang Kai-shek, and stepmother of Chiang Ching-kuo. Besides her personal stature, she had connections with KMT veteran party leaders still in power and she herself had the position as head of the advisory committee. Other Chiang family members included Chiang Wei-kuo and Chiang Hsiao-wu. Other members of the faction included aged veterans. In the 150 member Central Committee, half were aged legislators and retired government officers. Many of they were no longer active in the Taiwan political arena. In the Central Standing

44 Halbeisen, "In Search of a New Political Order?" p. 89.
Committee, only those over 80 years of age could be counted as old men, including Hsieh Tung-min, Yan Chia-kan, Ku Cheng-kang, Ni Wen-ya, Yuan Shou-ch'ian, Kao K'ui-yuan, Hung Shou-nan. However, the conservative camp was a rather loose coalition.

The conservatives attempted to deny the party chairmanship to the new President, Lee Teng-hui. It was reported that Madame Chiang sent a letter to Secretary General Li Huan, asking that the selection of a party chairman be postponed until the party congress in July. Li Huan held a meeting of the CSC to discuss the matter. The discussion was heated. Sung Ch'u-yu, a young deputy secretary general of the KMT, firmly opposed Madame's proposal. Some party veterans, like Yu Chi-sung, publisher of the China Times, also supported Sung. Finally, for the sake of stability the party decided to appoint Lee Teng-hui as acting chairman of the KMT as well as president of the ROC. Madame Chiang's alleged interference was reported by the media, which had the effect of discrediting the conservatives.

The Thirteenth Congress

The conflict between the reformers and the conservatives had to be settled in the Thirteenth Congress, and President Lee had to consolidate his power. Lee was not a mighty figure in the KMT, but a technocrat promoted rapidly by the late President Chiang. He had no followers of his own. Many observers doubted that he could seize the real power, and saw him as only a transitional figure. The Thirteenth Party Congress was an important test of his capability to consolidate his power.

Lee Teng-hui took advantage of the situation at the Thirteenth Congress to advocate political reforms and nurture his own reformist followers. Elections to the

45 Ch'in Kuan-hai, "Kuomintang Shih-san-ta yu Hsin te Chuan-li Tou-cheng" (The 13th Congress of the KMT and new power struggle), Ching-pao Yueh-k'an (The mirror) (Hong Kong), December, 1987, p. 66.
46 Cal Clark, Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (NY: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 139-140.
47 Berman, Words Like Colored Glass, p. 151.
48 W. Hao, "Kuomintang P'ai-hsi Cheng-chih Su-p'ing" (On factionalism in the KMT), Taiwan Yen-chiu (Taiwan studies), February 1993, pp. 9-13.
Central Committee and Central Standing Committee and the following dramatic reorganization of the Executive Yuan were all carried out according to his will. At the same time, Lee placated the party veterans. For instance, although Yu Kuo-hua was opposed by many young party members, Lee insisted on leaving him in his original position. Among his 180 nominees for membership of the CC, Lee listed Yu in the third place, after the KMT veterans Hsieh Tung-min and Sun Yun-hsuan. When Yu ended up 35th in the CC election, Lee still ranked him fourth in his nomination of candidates for the CSC. Later, in the reform of the Executive Yuan, Lee let Yu remain in office in spite of strong popular sentiment against him. Perhaps Lee made such arrangements because the conservatives still had influence and Lee had to compromise with them. Or perhaps Lee used Yu to ward off Li Huan's challenge, because otherwise he would have had to put Li Huan, who was previously Lee Teng-hui's senior, in Yu's position. Knowing Yu's unpopularity in the party, Lee did not regard him as a real danger. On the other hand, Lee excluded other veterans. His dealing with Chiang Wei-kuo was an example. Chiang Wei-kuo, Ching-kuo's half-brother, was commander of the Rear Services Section of the military and former secretary general of the State Security Council. He was supported by the KMT old guards to challenge Lee Teng-hui. They had no expectation that Wei-kuo could eventually replace Lee, but they hoped that a new vice chairmanship could be created for him and offset Lee's power. They argued that the party's solidarity could only be attained through a balance in provincial origins. However, Lee did not include Wei-kuo's name in his list of candidates for the Central Committee. Later, some delegates of the Thirteenth Congress jointly proposed to elect Chiang Wei-kuo as a member of Central Committee, but Lee also managed stop them.

49 Sung K'e-han, "Li Teng-hui Chuan-li An-p'ai te Ts'e-lue" (Lee's tactic of power arrangement), Ching-pao Yueh-k'an (The mirror), August, 1988, pp. 88-9.
50 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 115.
51 Ibid., pp. 158-9.
Madame Chiang did not attend the opening session of the Thirteenth Congress. When she attended the second session she admonished the members to remember the "old roots" from which grow the "new branches." However, old roots had lost influence in the Congress. The reformers scored unprecedented gains in the CC and the CSC. They not only increased their CSC seats from one to three (Li Huan, Sung Ch'u-yu, and Chao Tze-ch'i), but also captured the largest number of votes in the CC election. Lee was elected chairman of the KMT. The reformers prevailed in the Congress. Their gains signified that their reform ideas were widely welcomed in the Congress.

The Thirteenth National Congress took intra-party democracy as one of its themes. It was the most democratic one in KMT history. The Congress broke with several past practices. Firstly, most delegates to the Congress were directly elected by party rank and file, and these delegates attended the Congress without direction or interference from above. The number of overseas and mainland delegates was cut back drastically. Indirect election was reserved for use as a supplementary procedure. Those not directly elected were ex officio or appointed. To increase the base of representation in the congress, guaranteed quotas were maintained for workers, fishermen, farmers, students, women, owners of small- and medium-sized enterprises and certain other specified professions. The number of delegates was increased from 571 at the Twelfth National Congress to 829 at the Thirteenth National Congress.

Secondly, delegates nominated one half of the candidates to the Central Committee. Traditionally, the candidates for the CC were nominated solely by the chairman of the KMT. The Thirteenth Congress was the first one to give delegates a choice. In the Thirteenth Congress, for the 180 positions on the CC, the chairman

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53 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 1.
nominated 180 candidates, and party members could also freely nominate 180. Thirty-three candidates nominated by Lee Teng-hui failed to be elected to the CC. Most of them were party veterans. Li Huan achieved the first place in the overall vote. The Congress also decided that "the new committee members should participate more actively in the areas of responsibility of their own choice, either at the central or at the local level."56

Thirdly, delegates also used the principle of intra-party democracy to challenge the traditional method of electing the chairman. Traditionally the selection of the party leader was by acclamation, with all delegates rising to their feet. This time Chao Shao-k'ang and Li Sheng-feng moved that the chairman be elected by secret ballot. Although they expressed their support for Lee Teng-hui, they remained seated during the vote to protest the manner of the election. In spite of the disagreement about the election method, Lee was elected chairman of the KMT with almost all the votes. The Congress also decided that "Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of local party committees would be elected from among committee members rather than by appointment from above."57 Although the new spirit of intra-party democracy was not realized in the election of the party chairman, these changes had a profound effect in opening the party to grassroots influences.

Fourth, delegates also had greater say in discussing bills. Before the Party Congress, rank and file members were encouraged to participate in various forums to discuss the proposed party platform. In the Congress, delegates voiced their support for democracy and reform of the party and the state, although they were not specific about reform measures. Delegates showed great interest in local affairs, and many of them made

57 Ibid., p. 80.
efforts to represent their local economic and social interests. They were no longer simply tools for the party's societal control.

Intra-party democracy greatly enhanced the strength of the reformers, and the conservatives lost ground in the Thirteenth Congress. We saw in Chapter Three that the Thirteenth Congress made many important democratizing decisions. These decisions would have been impossible had the democratic appeal been weak within the ruling party and had the reformers not been able to overcome the obstructions from the conservatives.

One crucial question in this crucial time of democratization is why the conservatives did not succeed in blocking the reformers. There are several reasons. First, the reformers had become more powerful. New elites of the KMT appeared in key positions in central, provincial and local governments. Most of them were elected from various elections for public positions and they had solid financial and grassroots support. Second, Chiang Ching-kuo's role was important. He endorsed the principles of political reform before he died. Even after his death, some veterans did not want to disobey his political will. Third, some veterans did not oppose political reforms in principle, but differed with the reformers only with regard to the timing and pace of democratization. Fourth, many veterans were so old that they were not able to compete with young reformers. The historical stage was set up for the KMT's younger generation to move into the forefront.

Conflict between Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Factions

After the Thirteenth Congress, the reformist forces became the mainstream in the party. Headed by Lee Teng-hui, they tried to consolidate their position. The non-mainstream became a mixture of some veterans and some reformers who disliked Lee

Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, pp. 113-114.
Teng-hui. It is interesting that those who did not support dramatic political reforms earlier were now using the principle of intra-party democracy to vie for power within the party. The non-mainstream faction advocated further democratization within the party.

The conflict between these two loose groups was closely related to the reunification vs. independence argument, as well as to political reforms. Echoing the opposition party's demands, Lee's mainstream faction proposed a more radical reform of the political system, and pursued the shaping of Taiwan as an independent political entity (Tu-li te cheng-chih shih-t'i). Critics believed that Lee Teng-hui, Sung Ch'u-yu, and members of the Wisdom Association (Chi szu hui) in the legislature belonged to this group. The non-mainstreamers did not oppose reforms, but they wanted the reforms to be implemented according to the fa-t'ung, or the tradition of legitimacy. On mainland policy, they upheld the principle of "three no-ism." They hoped that during the long period of non-reunification and non-independence, the mainland would undergo dramatic changes that were favourable to Taiwan and which would enable Taiwan to reunify China under the Three Principles of the People. This group includes Li Huan, Hao Pei-tsun, Chiang Wei-kuo, Lin Yang-kang, Liang Su-jung, and members of the New KMT Front (Hsin Kuomintang lien-hsien) in the legislature. In the 1990s, the Independent Taiwan stance has been more popular than the traditional stance in the KMT.

The conflicts broke out in the KMT's temporary central session in February 1990. Non-mainstreamers challenged Lee Teng-hui over the method of nomination for the presidency. The traditional method was to vote by standing up. However, this time many people asked to vote by ballot. Secretary General Sung Ch'u-yu insisted on the old

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59 Lee Teng-hui argues that ROC government on Taiwan is an independent political entity. Critics believe that such a stance is covert Taiwan independence.

60 "Wisdom Association" was formed by Jao Ying-ch'i, Huang Chu-wen and a group of legislators who were unhappy with Li Huan in April 1988. It consisted of 15 reformist members.

61 The "New KMT Front" was formed by Young Turks Chao Shao-k'ang and Li Sheng-feng and six others before the 1989 elections. All 8 members were elected. After the election of the second Legislative Yuan, the Front increased its number of members to 25. It opposed Taiwan Independence and urged earnestly a more radical internal democratization of the Party.
method, denouncing some party members for forming a secret coalition and charging that their demands damaged party solidarity. His speech invited sharp attack. Chang Yusheng, head of the Pacific Cultural Foundation, charged that the party was monopolized by a few hands, and implied that Sung was the backstage manipulator. He asked: "who should be responsible for the decadence of the party?" Many important figures, such as Lin Yang-kang, Yu Kuo-hua, Li Huan and Hao Pei-tsun, opposed the vote by standing up. This degree of antagonism within the party had never been seen before. However, the dissenters were not prepared to push things too far. Although the session finally passed the original proposal of voting by standing up by 99 to 70, the result demonstrated that non-mainstream forces were powerful and the demand for further intra-party democracy was strong.62

Just after the session, Sung divulged in a news conference that the party needed structural reform, which would of course lead to personnel changes. The message demonstrated that the internal political manoeuvring would continue. The DPP even thought that the KMT would take advantage of the Conference on National Affairs to purge the party.63 Indeed, the conference enhanced Lee Teng-hui's prestige in Taiwanese society and served his partisan purposes. The delegate list to the conference was decided by Lee himself. He invited many opposition leaders to attend the conference, but excluded the non-mainstream members of the KMT.

Mainstream and non-mainstream factions also set up foundations to promote their ideas of political reform. Major foundations include the National Policy Centre, which has a close relationship with Lee Teng-hui; the Democracy Foundation, which is a major non-mainstream foundation; the Twenty-first Century Foundation, which is headed by the former speaker of the provincial legislature Kao Yu-jen; the Knowledge and Action

63 Hsu Han, "Taiwan Cheng-t'an Ta Ching-hsih?" (Is there going to be a purge in Taiwanese political arena?) K'ai-fang (Opening up), April, 1990, p. 61.
Cultural and Educational Foundation, which is controlled directly by the party centre; the Looking Forward Foundation, which was created by Wei Yung, former Director of the Institute of Revolutionary Practice and Research (the KMT's party school), etc.

Among these foundations the Democracy Foundation is the one with the most factional character and political function. It was founded on November 10, 1990. It included intellectuals, politicians, and entrepreneurs. The chairman of its board was Kuan Chung, former deputy secretary general of the KMT's Central Committee and director of the Organizational Department. He was removed from these positions and appointed to the position of chairman of the Board of the KMT-owned China Broadcasting Corporation after the KMT suffered a setback in the elections in late 1989. Kuan Chung was picked as the scapegoat for the KMT's less than lustrous performance, while Sung Ch'u-yu did not take any responsibility at all. Thus Kuan joined the non-mainstream faction. Among the 1381 sponsors of the Democracy Foundation, 270 had Ph.D. degrees, 261 had master's degrees and 53 were legislators. More than half of its board had strong financial backing.64

The Democracy Foundation has its own ideology. With respect to the KMT, it argues for intra-party democracy and rank and file participation by the party members; with respect to the DPP, it opposes Taiwan independence and thinks that such a proposal will bring disaster to Taiwan. It urges the DPP to improve its opposition and to compete with the KMT rationally. The Democracy Foundation also proposes that the CCP on mainland China "rebuild China by democracy."65

The party centre did not want to see the formation of the Democracy Foundation, and published a number of critical articles on it. On July 20, 1990, the Central Daily, the

64 Liu Fang, "Li Teng-hui Mien-lin te San-ta Nan-ti" (Lee Teng-hui's three dilemma), Ching-pao Yueh-kan (The mirror), December, 1990, p. 68.
65 Nan Fang-suo, "Min-chu Chih-chin-hui: Fei-chu-liu te Ta T'uan-chie" (the Democracy Foundation: the unification of the anti-mainstream factions), The Nineties (The nineties), December, 1990, p. 44.
party newspaper of the KMT, criticized the Democracy Foundation for forming a faction and Kuan Chung for forgetting party discipline and losing moral integrity as a party member. Kuan immediately protested to the head of the Central Daily, Shih Yung-kui. He said, "I cannot imagine and understand why our party newspaper was so ruthless towards its own comrades." Lee did not want to see the internal conflict enlarged and managed to ease the tension. When the Democracy Foundation was eventually established, Lee had a talk with Kuan Chung, stressing the importance of tolerance. Secretary General Sung Ch'u-yu attended its founding ceremony.

After these waves of political turmoil, the two sides agreed to create harmony in the party. Some influential figures mediated between the two sides. Lee appointed Hao Pei-tsun, a prominent figure in the non-mainstream camp, to the premiership. Lee claimed that the reasons for appointing Hao to the head of the Executive Yuan were that Hao was loyal to him and that Hao was capable of cracking down on criminal activity, which was a serious social problem at the time. In reality the appointment was a compromise between the two sides. Lee compromised because otherwise the opposition in the party would have reacted fiercely, potentially leading to split of the KMT. By doing so Lee removed his major political opponent Li Huan, and potentially dismantled the alliance between Li and Hao. Lee also still needed the support of the military. Other prominent non-mainstream figures, such as Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-kuo, supported Hao's appointment to the office. The cooperation between Lee and Hao formed the so-called "Lee-Hao system." They claimed repeatedly that they cooperated very well and the arrangement temporarily pacified Taiwanese politics.

66 Huang Yu-min, "Kuan Chung Shih-chien yu Kuomintang te Kai-ke" (Kuan Chung Event and the Reform of the KMT), K'ai-fang (Opening up), August, 1990, p. 71.
68 Liu Fang, "Li-Hao Ti-chih yu T'ung-tu Pien-lun" (Lee-Hao system and the argument of reunification vs. independence), Ching-pao Yueh-k'an (The mirror), June, 1990, p. 70.
This period demonstrated that the old method of suppressing factional activities was no longer effective. The superficial party coherence of the past had been shattered. The existence of the non-mainstreamers and various foundations checks and balances the KMT centre, and thus makes it difficult for the KMT to revert to an authoritarian party. The reformers and the conservatives alike utilized "intra-party democracy" to air their policies and vie for power. Despite political manoeuvring between them, there was a consensus on the need to fully implement democratization. But since the mainstream holds the dominant political power in the party and it is composed of mainly young Taiwanese reformers, their reform policies are more radical and Taiwan-oriented. This can be further demonstrated in the following discussion of constitutional revision.

Different Views in the KMT about Constitutional Revision

As we demonstrated in Chapter Three, the DPP was unable to exert a great influence on the constitutional revision process because of their weak presence in the National Assembly. The constitutional revision was mainly shaped by a compromise between the mainstreamers and the non-mainstreamers within the KMT. Once again, we shall see that the bargaining and compromises within the party resulted in a gradual democratizing process within the existing constitutional framework.

The need to revise the Constitution arose not only from the democratizing trend at that time, but also from the institutional confrontation between the president and the premier. The peaceful co-existence between President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Hao Pei-tsun did not last long. In the summer of 1991, Lee and Hao disagreed over jurisdiction on military affairs. Hao tried to enlarge his role in policy making to include responsibility for military affairs and relations with the mainland, areas Lee had reserved for himself when he named Hao as the premier in May 1990. Hao apparently believed that the Constitution concentrated power in the hands of the premier, including the power
to control the army, and that this constitutional rule should be resurrected since emergency provisions were abolished.

The confrontation between Lee and Hao can be explained partly by the institutional arrangements of Taiwanese politics. A major flaw in the government's organizational structure is the vague roles of the president and the premier. There is a large "gray area" between the president's and the premier's responsibilities.

The mainstreamers and the non-mainstreamers had totally different opinions regarding revision of the Constitution. The mainstreamers advocated a two-stage constitutional revision. The two stages meant to be the procedural revision of the first stage which would be done by the First National Assembly, and the essential revision of the second stage which would be done by the new Second Assembly, which would be elected in Taiwan. Non-mainstreamers argued that revision should be executed by the National Assembly in one stage, because the old parliamentarians had the right to revise the Constitution, and it would be difficult to pass the KMT's revision proposal in the Second National Assembly if the DPP elected enough members to the Assembly. They argued that one-stage revision presented the least risk for the KMT's constitutional proposal. Mainstreamers believed that although one-stage revision could avoid having to compromise with the DPP it lacked public support and could cause a constitutional crisis later. To implement the two-stage revision, Lee Teng-hui compromised with the non-mainstreamers on the issues of mainland representatives in the National Assembly and the arrangement of retired parliamentarians.69

After the election of the Second National Assembly in 1991, the KMT had 79 percent of the total seats and enjoyed control over the constitutional modification process. Although the DPP was effectively excluded from the process, it did not mean that revision of the Constitution became an easy issue, because it aroused serious controversy

69 Wang Sheng, "Taiwan Hsien-cheng Kai-ke" (Constitutional reform in Taiwan), *Taiwan Yenchiu Chi-kan* (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 3, 1992, p. 23.
within the party. Under Lee Teng-hui's guidance, the party centre proposed a constitutional revision bill which aroused disputes within the party concerning the following:

(1) Parliamentary or presidential system. Under the old constitutional setup, the president is elected indirectly by the National Assembly, and the premier and his cabinet are appointed by the president. The president is the head of state and the supreme commander of the military. He/she has the power to declare a national emergency, and must co-sign all laws and orders issued by the premier. The premier heads the Executive Yuan which is the highest administrative organ of the nation. It reports to the Legislative Yuan about important government decisions and policies, and the members of the Legislative Yuan have the right to interpellate the premier and ministers. However, the premier and ministers are not members of the Legislative Yuan. The non-mainstreamers believed that the essence of the old Constitution tended to be a parliamentary system, and that any revision of the Constitution should not violate this basic constitutional principle. Premier Hao stressed several times in the Legislative Yuan that "our system is not a presidential system, and it should not be a presidential system in future."\(^7\) However, according to the KMT's constitutional-revision proposal, the premier is nominated by the president and ratified by the Legislative Yuan. Critics point out that this procedure means that the premier cannot have different points of view from the president, but he has to receive interpellation on behalf of the president. The premier has the responsibility but no power and the president has power but no responsibility.

(2) The position of the Control Yuan. Under the old constitutional setup, the function of the Control Yuan is impeachment. Under the KMT's constitutional revision proposal, members of the Control Yuan would be nominated by the president and be ratified by the National Assembly. Critics point out that this procedure makes the

\(^7\) Liu Fang, "Li-Hao Tsai-tu tui-lei," (Lee and Hao oppose each other again) *Ching-pao Yueh-k'an* (The mirror), No. 177, p. 70.
members of the Control Yuan into political resources in the hands of the president, because it would be hard for the members of the Control Yuan who were nominated by the president to impeach the president. The president can also use the Control Yuan to check executive officials.

(3) The position of the National Assembly. According to the KMT's constitutional revision proposal, the National Assembly will convene every year, thus it becomes a standing institution. It has the right to listen to the president's state of union report. If the president refers to executive affairs, the premier is also asked to attend the meeting. The National Assembly has the right to offer counsel to the president. The critics point out that empowering the National Assembly created two parallel governmental systems: one is the president and the National Assembly, one is the premier and the Legislative Yuan. The division of the administrative power will lead to the confusion of responsibility and power, and political conflicts. It would cause conflicts of jurisdiction and competition between the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.

(4) The method of presidential election. Before the second National Assembly, the KMT's "constitutional reform designing group" reached a consensus in favour of indirect election of the president (proxy voting). This is an electoral college system, where voters cast ballots for electoral college delegates representing the electorate's view as proxies. However, in March 1992, Lee unexpectedly spoke openly in support of direct elections for the presidency. His change of mind was not discussed within the party. Ma Ying-chiu, a member of the designing group, complained "can anybody believe in what I say later?" The non-mainstreamers alleged that Lee Teng-hui was attempting to enlarge his own power and to win a second term. They proposed that direct election of the president would require the National Assembly to amend the Constitution to relinquish its own power to elect the president, which would also make the National Assembly obsolete. It

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71 Lin Ying-Chiu, "Wo Hen Yi-wei, Kao-ch'eng Mei-you Jen Kao-shu Wo" (I am surprised, because I am not informed by the high level), *Hsin Hsin-wen* (New news weekly), No. 271, p. 12.
would change the current system to a presidential system, which would contradict the principle of Constitutional revision. From March 14 to 16, 1992, the mainstream and non-mainstream factions heatedly debated the election method at the CC meetings. Non-mainstreamers argued that a president elected by a direct popular vote could give the impression of being a "president of Taiwan," thus implying independence. The mainstreamers argued that direct election would be in keeping with recent popular trends demonstrating the people's desire to have more participation in the government. The session failed to decide which method should be taken. It ended by stating that the president would be elected by the ROC citizens in free areas (i.e., Taiwan and several small islands under the ROC government control) and the method of election would be decided later according to public opinion. The party also instructed its National Assembly members to postpone any decision on the electoral procedures until May 20, 1995.

The KMT caucus in the National Assembly coordinated their efforts for a month. In the end, the KMT's 21 proposed items of revision were reduced to 8 and passed on May 27, 1992, by an extraordinary session of the second National Assembly. The revision increased the power of the president, and gave the National Assembly the authority, at its annual meeting, to hear a report on the state of the nation by the president, to discuss national affairs and to offer counsel to the president. Decisions on other major issues such as the method of presidential election, the position of the National Assembly, and the term of the legislators were all delayed.

The delay had the effect of cooling down emotions surrounding the issue, and when the issue was debated again after the Fourteenth Congress, the conflict between the mainstream and non-mainstream had become less serious. In the third stage of the constitutional revision, Hao Pei-tsun did not oppose direct election of the president. He

72 From academic point of view, indirect election of the president can be as democratic as direct election, provided the National Assembly, from which the president is elected, is open to party competition. Taiwan does not need to reform on this matter to be more democratic.
believed that if the premier's right of co-signature on personnel affairs was maintained, the central governmental system, to a large degree, would still be a parliamentary system. But others criticized the party centre's proposal. For instance, Yu Kuo-hua doubted the necessity of creating the position of the speaker in the National Assembly.  

What the non-mainstream faction opposed most was the proposal by some KMT mainstream and DPP members for early election of the president. On December 8, 1993, Hao in the CSC meeting opposed early election of the president. He thought that early election was unconstitutional. Some DPP legislators commented that the purpose of non-mainstreamers' opposition to early election of the president was to pave the road for Lin Yang-kang's presidential campaign, because Lin needed time for preparation.  

Lin Yang-kang insisted that he should be nominated by the KMT as the candidate for the next presidential election if the KMT was concerned about honesty, ethics and public opinion. He said that Lee Teng-hui had stated to him several times in private meetings that Lee agreed to nominate him as presidential candidate. As for the charge that he would damage the party's unity by insisting on the nomination, Lin said: "we can not accommodate to him every time when we need party unity." He thought that the growth of Taiwan depended on the unity of local born Taiwanese and mainlanders and a neutral leadership. Any conflict between Taiwanese and mainlanders would put Taiwan in danger. Taiwan, therefore, needed a leader like him.  

On April 24, 1994, the KMT temporary session of the CC finally passed seven principles of the Constitution revision. These principles include: first, that the president be elected directly by Chinese in free areas and overseas Chinese of the ROC; second, that the premier not co-sign the president's appointment or dismissal of personnel to the Grand Council of Justice, the Control Yuan, and the Examination Yuan that are passed by

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74 Lien-ho Pao, April 19, 1994.  
75 Lien-ho Pao, December 9, 1993.  
76 Lien-ho Pao, December 9, 1993.
the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan; third, that the National Assembly institute the position of speaker and deputy speaker; fourth, that starting from the third Legislative Yuan, the term of the legislators be four years, etc.77

The session demonstrated that the non-mainstream faction was losing power. The KMT reached a consensus decision to support direct election of the president which was favoured by 197 votes out of 214, or 96.6 percent of the CC. Many non-mainstreamers, including Li Huan and Hao Pei-tsun, agreed to this proposal by the time of its adoption. Non-mainstreamers only succeeded in having overseas Chinese granted the right to vote in the election of the president. After the session the mainstream clearly dominated the Taiwanese political arena.

Thus, in this phase of transition, problems of reform were intermingled with struggles for influence within the post-Chiang power structure. Both factions agreed on the need for constitutional reforms, but they differed as to how and to what extent the Constitution should be revised. Both agreed that reunification was the party's ultimate goal, but mainstreamers were more inclined than non-mainstreamers to emphasize that Taiwan was an independent political identity. The conflict between Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pei-tsun demonstrates the existence of different reform ideas in the party, but both Lee and Hao agreed on constitutional reforms, as we have demonstrated in the chapter on the KMT's ideology. Whether they support a presidential system or a parliamentary system, they both supported democratic reforms. The non-mainstream faction in the party stressed the continuity of the fa-t'ung, while the mainstream faction stressed adaptive change of the Constitution to accommodate the specifics of the Taiwan situation. KMT policies were the result of compromises struck by various intra-party groups. Although their compromises did not result in a perfectly-revised Constitution, they did result in a more democratic Constitution while maintaining its continuity.

The Rise of Elected KMT Legislators

In the post-Chiang era, democratization has been promoted not only by Lee Teng-hui and some other reformers, but also increasingly by elected KMT legislators (members of the Legislative Yuan). Elected KMT legislators proposed many political reform measures in the legislature, sometimes competing with and sometimes cooperating with the opposition. They also promoted intra-party reforms and often joined forces with the non-mainstream faction in vying for political power within the party. The rising importance of elected legislators in the KMT indicates that the KMT was becoming increasingly parliament-oriented, basing its legitimacy on the parliament. In this section we shall examine how KMT legislators promoted democratic reforms in the Legislative Yuan, and then see how they interacted with the party centre. This discussion will demonstrate how KMT legislators have contributed to the more liberal reforms in both the legislature and the party.

KMT Legislators in the Legislative Yuan    Since 1969, the year in which the KMT started supplementary elections, the Legislative Yuan has seen increasing numbers of newly elected KMT legislators. These members were all young Taiwanese or second generation mainlanders. Although their number was increasing, they were still a minority in the veteran-dominated legislature. Senior KMT legislators controlled most party resources. Junior party legislators had little power, which motivated them to join forces with the opposition in promoting reforms of the parliamentary organs and the overall political system. Further, unlike the senior legislators, the new legislators had to face re-election periodically in their constituencies. Therefore they were more responsive to the interests and views of their constituents.
Backed by their constituencies, this younger generation of KMT Legislators has tended to propose more radical reform measures than has the party centre. It has become a major force for reform in the party since the mid 1980s. In the 1986 election, popular and younger KMT candidates openly criticized party policies, and seemed to agree with the DPP that there was a need for more democracy. Some expressed a willingness to accept the newly established DPP as legitimate. These KMT candidates were very successful in the elections.7

Since the 1986 election, the sessions of the Legislative Yuan have been raucous, as KMT young turks like Chao Shao-kang openly criticized government policies and asked for more radical political reforms. In the 1987 session, they helped to remove some of the harshest language from the National Security Law. In examining the 1988 budget, KMT legislators pressed for a reduction of the budget for defense.79

When there was a policy disagreement between the KMT and the Taiwan-elected KMT legislators, the latter tended to defy their party. The KMT refrained from disciplining these party members, partly due to their awareness of the increasing importance of the new legislators.80 In 1991, KMT new legislators disagreed with the party centre on the matter of the first full re-election of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan-elected KMT legislators and assemblymen openly opposed the party centre's decision by calling for involuntary retirement of the life-time mainland parliamentarians in both chambers. When veteran parliamentarians all resigned by the end of 1991, the party centre could no longer use them as a "voting troop" to outnumber its

own new delegates, and newly elected parliamentarians gained increased influence over the party.

At times KMT legislators cooperated with the DPP legislators in proposing reform measures. One example occurred when passing the so-called Sunshine Bill. On January 8, 1993, both KMT and DPP members of the Legislative Yuan enacted the Sunshine Bill, which included very restrictive rules for financial disclosure. The law required the listing of 10 types of wealth and authorized fines and prison sentences for false disclosure. The KMT suffered its first significant legislative setback in 40 years.\(^{81}\) Because of constant disagreement between the party centre and legislators, the KMT's majority at times turned into a minority in the legislature when specific bills were discussed. The alliance between the KMT and DPP legislators over the reforms forced the KMT to further democratize.\(^{82}\)

In addition to their demands for more rapid democratic reforms, KMT legislators also asked for more autonomy in the Legislative Yuan. In the election of the speakers of the Legislative Yuan in January 1992, legislators strongly opposed the centre-dominated nomination style, and asked for a free vote. The New KMT Front proposed that the KMT candidates for speaker and vice speaker of the Legislative Yuan be elected by KMT legislators.\(^{83}\) The centre failed to persuade them otherwise and yielded to their demand. The candidate for the deputy speaker who was nominated by the centre was not elected.

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**Legislators in the Party** The KMT legislators, elected in successive supplementary elections in the 1970s and 1980s, promoted reforms not only in the legislature, but also in their governing party. Those elected legislators thought that the party should recognize

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their increasing importance and correspondingly let them take more responsibilities within the party. Chao Shao-k'ang was consistently among the biggest vote-getters in Taipei, yet he had no position in the party. As Moody points out, "By the time of the Thirteenth National Congress, elected politicians at both the local and national levels had come to resent what they perceived as their lack of influence in the party as a whole, particularly their lack of proper representation on the Central Committee."^84 Legislators, therefore, pushed for reform of the party structure and policy making process. In response the KMT centre rejuvenated the Commission of Policy Coordination (Cheng-ts'e hui) in March 1989,^85 and let some parliamentarians join the Commission. The Commission was put under the leadership of the secretary general, and became a parallel institution to the other party departments. However, KMT legislators wanted to increase its authority and put it directly under the leadership of the party chairman.

KMT legislators promoted the reform of the CC and the CSC and attempted to obtain representation in these party policy making organs. In early 1990, they urged that the third session of the Thirteenth CC be held on schedule. The Charter of the KMT stipulates that the central session should be held once a year. The second session was held in June 1989. KMT legislators thought that the CC and the CSC needed to be reformed immediately, so the session should be held on time. In order to promote the reform, Liang Su-jung, speaker of the Legislative Yuan, formed a "Democratic Constitutional Seminar," demanding that half of the members of the CSC be elected by vote, and that a vice chairmanship, to be filled by a non-Taiwanese, be created. The New KMT Front and the Democracy Foundation organized a series of political discussions and planned an around the island lecture tour.

The party centre responded by stressing that the session was not urgent. The real reason behind its opposition was that the reform of the CSC was a dilemma for the party

^84 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 121.
^85 To see the changes of this Commission, please refer to the chapter on the KMT's organization.
centre. The CSC indeed needed to be adjusted dramatically, because among the 31 members of the CSC, 21 of them had changed their portfolios and about one third of them had stepped down from their positions. But party leaders feared that if all the members were to be elected, some high-level government officials would be excluded from the CSC. If part of the CSC were to be elected, then it would be hard to define the proportion. If the proportion to be elected was too high, some government officials would still be excluded. If the proportion to be nominated was too high, it would be criticized as undemocratic. In late 1990, the party centre decided to defer the session. In early 1991, party centre cancelled the session and decided to reform the CC and CSC in the Fourteenth Party Congress planned to be held in 1992.86

To appease the legislators, the KMT centre, in February 1992, promoted the Commission of Policy Coordination to report directly to the party chairman. However, Secretary General Sung Ch'u-yu stated that the KMT centre would not allow any unit to check and balance the CC under any circumstance.87 The routine business of the Commission is managed by the CC. Legislators complained that the party workers refused to give up their power to party legislators, and many executive officials declined to attend the Commission's meetings.88 Thus, KMT legislators continued to press for democratization of policy making within the party.

Before the Fourteenth Congress, the party centre again tried to appease the legislators. The party centre proposed including central and provincial legislators and assemblymen as ex officio. It argued that such an arrangement could facilitate the third stage revision of the Constitution in the National Assembly.89 Confident that they could control the Fourteenth Congress, the party centre also tried to co-opt the New KMT

88 Chung-kuo Shib-pao (China times), January 5, 1993.
Front. Secretary General Hsu offered two seats in the CSC to the New KMT Front, in exchange for its support for the party centre. The Front declined and claimed that it was not seeking power but rather wanted to promote party ideals in the Congress. It charged that the Congress would be a spoiled meeting. At that time the Front was openly preparing to separate from the KMT.

Some of Lee Teng-hui’s supporters believed that the departure of the New KMT Front dissenters would strengthen his authority. The party centre was afraid that a split would endanger its ruling position, so it stressed the solidarity of the party and attempted to unite the party. The centre preached that anybody who split the party would be labeled a sinner in history. Kuan Chung, elected to the Second Legislative Yuan in 1992, countercharged that if the party centre did not unite the party in a democratic way, it was creating the split itself. Actually Kuan has been the most active proponent of the idea of intra-party democracy in the KMT. He argues that intra-party democracy is the prerequisite for inter-party democracy, and a party that can synthesize different opinions is much more cohesive than one that suppresses its differences.

On August 10, 1993, just before the Fourteenth National Congress, the New KMT Front broke off from the KMT and formed the New Party. Most of these legislators won the 1992 election without the electoral support of the KMT centre. They stressed that they had different ideals from the KMT. The New Party manifesto stressed that it would represent ordinary people. Its goals included renovating the political system, stabilizing Taiwan politics, and checking and balancing the other two major parties. The New Party also wanted to curb political corruption and to change the way industrial policy is made. In its own words, the New Party wanted to destroy and rebuild the KMT.

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92 Interview with Kuan Chung.
After the Front walked out, those party legislators remaining in the KMT continued to force themselves into the power centre in the Fourteenth Congress. They were not content to be only ex officio to the Congress, and they attempted to be elected to the CC and CSC. When the party centre proposed limiting the number of nominations of legislators, they charged that that would be anti-democratic. Some observed threateningly that if the KMT lost 15 more legislators the party would lose its majority status in the legislature, and that if the party centre did not respect the legislators, it would be difficult for them to carry out the party's policies in the legislature. The speaker and the deputy speaker of the legislature promised that they would support those legislators who were not nominated by the party centre. The legislators formed a vote-exchange alliance, headed by the speaker and deputy speaker of the legislature, to compete for the CC membership.93

As a result, legislators made substantial progress in the Fourteenth Party Congress and the political strength of the KMT's legislators rose in the party. Four legislators, as well as the secretary general of the National Assembly, speaker of the Provincial Assembly and the speakers of Taipei and Kaohsiung City Councils, became members of the CSC. To accommodate to the increasingly powerful legislature, the KMT appointed some legislators to important party positions. Legislators Hsieh Shen-shan and Jao Ying-ch'i became deputy secretaries general. The former was also director of the Organizational Department, and the latter was also the head of the Commission of Policy Coordination. This demonstrates that legislators had become an important force in the party. As the legislators in Western democracies usually play an important role in political parties, the rise of legislators in the KMT made the party more representative and democratic.

93 Lien-ho Pao, August 14, 1993.
In the final analysis, the KMT legislators contributed significantly to the democratization of both Taiwan's political system and the ruling party. Since KMT legislators have constituents' support, their ascent in the ruling party makes the party more representative. The opposition legislators failed to be the only democratizing force, as many reforms were proposed by KMT legislators, and it is these legislators who urged the party to implement more democratizing policies. The party has been increasingly influenced by its legislators. For instance, at the Fourteenth Congress, the KMT implemented the meeting procedures exactly in accordance with the operating model of the legislature. The weakening of the party centre has coincided with the growing autonomy of party legislators who claim to represent a certain proportion of the population. The rise of the legislators in the KMT caused a significant change in the party's physical structure, in that the party no longer consisted of only party workers and bureaucrats, but rather it also included many legislators. It is this renovated party that has recently guided the transition to democracy on Taiwan.

The Achievements of the Fourteenth Congress

In addition to the ascent of KMT legislators, the Fourteenth Congress of the KMT also witnessed the further democratization of the party, consolidation of Lee Teng-hui's position, and increases in the influence of the local party members. These achievements enabled the KMT to continue playing a leading role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

After a one year delay, the Fourteenth Party Congress was scheduled in 1993. The KMT formulated several regulations describing the method of delegate selection. At first, the party centre planned that all the delegates would be directly elected.94 This change to direct election of all delegates would have dramatically democratized the party

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operations. However the party centre later decided that 180 members of the Thirteenth CC and all parliamentarians could attend the congress as ex officio. The total number of ex officio was 700. Non-mainstreamers opposed this change. They argued that it was against democratic principles to have unelected members in the Congress. After a series of negotiations between the two sides, a compromise was reached. The number of ex officio would still be 700, but the number of elected delegates would be increased to 1,400.95

Before the Congress, the non-mainstreamers asked to modify the Party Charter. They wanted the Charter to clearly stipulate that the party chairman be elected by ballet; that the party chairman not be the president of the ROC at the same time; that the vice chairmanship be created and that there not be more than two vice chairmen of the party.

To promote their ideas, some non-mainstreamers formed the New Alliance Association (Hsin t'ung-meng hui) in the party. It claimed that it succeeded to the spirit of the Chung-kuo Ke-ming T'ung-meng Hui (Chinese revolutionary alliance) which was reorganized from the Hsing-chung Hui by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1905 in Tokyo, Japan. Its aim is to realize the Three Principles of the People, maintain the five-power Constitution, and help to reunite China. It decided that it would attempt to arouse the rank and file party members and renew the party from within.96

The Fourteenth Congress accepted some of the non-mainstreamers' suggestions. Lee proposed the creation of the positions of vice chairman. When voting took place in the Congress, 1007 delegates approved the creation of the vice chairmanships. Although this number was less than the required two thirds (1098) majority, it demonstrated that more than half the delegates agreed to create the position. The support was much greater than the mainstreamers had estimated. Expecting that many of the 1007 delegates would

95 Liu Kuo-shen, "1986 Nien I-lai te Taiwan Cheng-chih Bien-chien" (Political changes in Taiwan since 1986), Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 41 (Autumn 1993), pp. 1-9.
96 Interview with Hsu Li-nung, head of Hsin T'ung-meng Hui.
vote against Lee for the party chairmanship if the vice chairmanship was not created, Lee proposed that the Congress re-vote, by the raising of hands, and nominated Li Yuan-ts'u, Hao Pei-tsun, Lin Yang-kang and Lien Chan as the vice chairman candidates. The Congress passed his proposal. By having four vice Chairmen rather than one, two or three, Lee still could gain an upper hand because Li and Lien were on his side.

Delegates apparently gained more autonomy in the Congress. They strongly demanded intra-party democracy. The party centre's control of the delegates and local party organizations was weakened. In the CC election, the chairman nominated 210 candidates and the delegates nominated 159. Of those who were nominated by the chairman, one hundred and fifty-two, or 72.38 percent, were elected, which is lower than the 81.67 percent for the same election in the previous Congress. Delegates to the Fourteenth Congress asked for an open election for the CSC. The party centre agreed to the open election of 16 members with the remaining 15 to be nominated, but it would provide the delegates a suggested list of candidates for the 16 members to be elected. To prevent the possibility of a further split in the party, Lee placated some non-mainstreamers. He nominated Li Huan to the CSC to appease the party veterans. He also put Kuan Chung on the suggested list for the CSC to attract legislators and other young non-mainstreamers to remain with the party rather than joining the New Party. Despite the party centre's arrangement, two self-promoted candidates were elected to the CSC.97

On balance, Lee Teng-hui further consolidated his political position at the Fourteenth Congress. Mainstreamers maintained nearly complete control of the party centre. Superficially the non-mainstream faction managed to survive, but its veterans were dependent upon the party to maintain their established interests, and its young members were required to distance themselves from the New Party in order to remain in

97 Li Ch'iang, "Ts'ung 'Shi-szu-chun' K'ang Kuomintang Nei-pu Mao-tuan" (Viewing the conflicts within the KMT from its Fourteenth National Congress), Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k'an (Taiwan research quarterly), No. 42 (Winter 1993), pp. 53-58.
the party. However, Lee had to yield to opponents on several issues. Lee acceded to the appointment of several non-mainstreamers to important party posts, including newly created vice chairmanships. For the first time Lee was re-elected by vote rather than by acclamation. The party chairman can never be a dictator with the strong presence of opposing factions. The KMT had become more democratic.

After the Fourteenth Congress, the political ecology of the KMT changed. One distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream factions since 1990 has been their provincial lines (Taiwanese vs. mainlanders). This distinction was obscured at the Fourteenth Congress. Among those who supported the vice chairmanship proposal, more than half did not belong to the non-mainstream faction. They were the delegates who represented local interests and attempted to have greater autonomy. Original non-mainstreamers and local forces formed a loose alliance against the mainstream party centre.98

5. Conclusion

Constance Squires Meaney believes that internal party organizational and leadership renewals "should not be counted as indicators of liberalization or democratization of the system."99 Moody points out that the main thing in a democracy is that the rulers be responsible to the people, not that the rulers be democratic among themselves, and a divided ruling group can blur lines of responsibility.100

98 Interview with non-mainstream legislator Hong Hsiu-tsu.
100 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 122.
Nevertheless, although leadership renewals are not liberalization or
democratization per se, the KMT's internal divisions and the appeal for intra-party
democracy have had a major impact on the ruling party and the overall transition to
democracy on Taiwan. In the Chiang Kai-shek period, there were no divisions within the
party, and the higher echelon of the party basically agreed with Chiang that it was not the
time to implement liberalization or democratization at the national level on Taiwan.
Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his own power, and promoted his son as his successor.
Consolidation of Chiang Ching-kuo's authority allowed him to initiate gradual
liberalization, and later, democratization. It is widely acknowledged that Ching-kuo, with
the assistance of the reformers, played an important role in Taiwan's transition to
democracy. The party leadership, headed by Lee Teng-hui, carried out Chiang's initiatives
even after his death.

Comparing the current KMT with the KMT in the earlier periods, we find
obvious changes. First, intra-party divisions are publicized; their existence is a matter of
fact in the party. Second, intra-party democracy has become a principle for the KMT.
Third, there is no longer a top leader who can control factions, rather factions become
balancing forces in the party that can check and balance the top leader. Because of these
recent changes, it would be very difficult for the KMT to revert to being an authoritarian
party. Policy alternatives are now proposed within the party by contending factions. The
rising importance of the elected legislators has gradually changed the nature of a quasi-
Leninist party. The elected politicians depend more and more on support of their
constituents, rather than on the party centre. They form alliances with the opposition in
resisting the KMT centre. For instance, they formed a cross party alliance to force the
retirement of veteran parliamentarians. All these demonstrate that democratization has
also prevailed in the governing party.

Furthermore, internal divisions in the ruling party lent the opposition more
leverage on political reforms. Facing the opposition from within the party, the KMT
centre has been willing to form a tacit coalition with the DPP on other issues, as we see in the case of the Conference of National Affairs. The KMT is not as strong as it appears, and internal divisions provide the DPP the opportunities to exert stronger influence in political reforms. The existence and the growth of the factions in the KMT have been destructive for the established KMT party state. Therefore, the existence of intra-party opposition not only increased intra-party democracy, but also contributed to democratization of the whole political system.

Intra-party conflicts are often power struggles between the ins and the outs. This fits the definition of factionalism on the mainland as described by Lucian Pye. When they were excluded from the power centre, many conservatives and non-mainstreamers called for intra-party democracy, and democrats who secured top leadership posts reverted to authoritarian modes to protect their power. However, KMT factionalism has also been closely related to policy differences, especially since the 1970s. Factions have different policy alternatives. In the 1970s and 1980s, the reformers favoured liberalization, while the conservatives stressed security and stability. In the 1990s the non-mainstream stresses reunification with the mainland, while the mainstream wants some sort of independent Taiwan. Differences on policy are straining the relationships between the conservatives and the reformers within the party. Expecting probable strong opposition from the conservatives, the reformers have never argued for abrupt thorough reform of the political system. In the face of the changing situation, the conservatives did not oppose certain reforms as strongly as ordinary people expected. Their compromises have had positive results for social and political stability and for the gradual transition to democracy on Taiwan. The checking and balancing of the two major factions has resulted in an incremental pace of change of the Taiwanese political system.

101 Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" p. 222.
Our discussion demonstrates that the party's policy toward the opposition is a result of intra-party compromise. The proliferation of ideas and the open contest for power by the intra-party factions are natural phenomena in a time of dramatic political transition. Factionalism has declined in the KMT since the Fourteenth National Congress. We can say that it has completed its historical role, and the KMT is internally democratized to a great extent.
CHAPTER SIX  THE KMT'S RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATION

1. Introduction

Ideology can guide a ruling party to take a lead in the transition to democracy, and an enlightened leadership along with the reformers in the ruling party can be the major agents in implementing the transition; but if the ruling party does not have competent personnel and a strong and well-adapted organization, its initiative to liberalize and democratize may result in its downfall. Such a prospect could cause the ruling party to defer beginning the transition to democracy. Alternately, if the ruling party has a strong organization and competent candidates to fight in the elections, it would be more willing to initiate the transition to democracy. The KMT on Taiwan has recruited social elites into the party and it has been well organized, and this has had a profound impact on the party's role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. The KMT's organization used to be a major authoritarian institution, and its strength and adaptability have influenced the party's decision to liberalize and democratize. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the KMT has transformed itself from a party that mainly controlled the environment to a party that is mainly adapted to the environment. As Wu points out, "Internal changes in the KMT are not merely a response to social trends but are an attempt to preempt the new political market."¹ The KMT has created an organizational context that enables it to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

Three questions have to be answered in order to analyze a party's organization: "(1) Is power concentrated or dispersed within the party? (2) Do active members have a role in forming party policy? And (3) do active members have a role in carrying out party decisions?" In an authoritarian single party, power is concentrated at the top, and party structure does not encourage members' participation in policy making but requires them to carry out party policy. In a democratic party, power is dispersed among the members, organization and discipline are loose, and organization is mainly geared for competitive campaigns.\(^2\)

In this chapter, we shall discuss the KMT's recruitment (membership, Taiwanization, and technocratization) and organization (discipline, nomination system, and source of finance). Through discussion of these aspects, we shall see that the KMT has always had a strong organization, that its organizational strength has contributed to its confidence in opening up, and that the KMT has adapted to the changing situation and transformed itself from an authoritarian party to a democratic party mainly geared for competitive elections, thereby enabling itself to play a positive role in the transition to democracy.

2. Party Background and Basic Structure

To understand the source of the strength and autonomy of the KMT organization, we need to put the party organization in a historical framework.

The KMT was founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the loosely organized *Hsin-chung Hui* (Society for rebuilding China) in 1894 in Hawaii. When Sun invited the Soviet advisors to help him to renovate the party in 1924, the KMT became a Leninist party in

Born in and for the revolution, the KMT naturally based its power on the use of military means to establish its rule over all of China. A revolutionary movement and a military establishment led to the concentration of power of the party. The Party Charter embraced the Leninist principle of democratic centralism: "In organizational life the individual obeys the organization and the minority obeys the majority. Prior to a decision there is free discussion. After a decision has been made it must be obeyed in full. Thus is realized organized democracy and disciplined liberty."

Basic Structure and Operation

Since 1924, the basic structure of the KMT has seldom changed, although the names of some units have been changed. First, we will diagram the KMT organization, and then analyze its transformations during different periods. For most of its existence on Taiwan, the KMT organization looked as follows:

Figure 6.1 Primary Organizational Structure of the KMT

- National Congress
- Chairman
- Central Committee
- Central Standing Committee
- Central Advisory Committee
- Party Councilors

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Secretary General
Three Deputy Secretaries General

The Secretariat, Seven Departments (Organizational, Mainland, Overseas, Cultural, Social, Youth, and Women's Affairs), Four Commissions (Finance, Party History, Evaluation and Discipline, and Policy Coordination), and the Yangming Institution on National Revolution and Development.

Provincial Congress
   Chairman
Provincial Committees
County/City Congresses
   Chairman
County/City Committees
   District Congresses
   District Committees
   Party Cells (Basic Unit)
   Individual members

Source: Department of Cultural Affairs, Central Committee of Kuomintang, *A Brief Introduction to the Kuomintang of China (II)*, (KMT's Thirteenth National Congress Series, No. 4) (Taipei: China Cultural Services Co., Ltd., 1988), pp. 4-5.

(1) Chairman

The organizational structure of the KMT is hierarchical, starting at the lowest level with local cells, then subdistrict, district, county, provincial, and finally national headquarters. Nominally, the National Congress is the highest organ of the KMT, but in reality, the chairmanship is the highest position. This position was called director-general (Tsung-tsai) for Chiang Kai-shek, who held this post from 1938 until his death in 1975, and that title was used solely for him. The chairman is elected by the National Party Congress and holds the concurrent posts of chairman of the National Congress, the Central Committee and the Central Standing Committee. The chairman is assisted by the Central Advisory Committee, a secretary general, and three deputy secretaries general.

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(2) National Congress

National Congress is the highest organ of the KMT. It has the right to revise the Party Charter and platform, approve party and government affairs reports, discuss and pass new resolutions and policies, and elect the party chairman and members of the Central Committee. National Congress delegates also approve members of the Central Advisory Committee as nominated by the chairman. According to the Party Charter, national congresses are held every four years in principle at the seat of the central party headquarters. However, congresses are seldom convened in line with the schedule called for by the Party Charter. In practice intervals between congresses average six years. The KMT's Thirteenth National Congress, for example, was convened seven years after the Twelfth National Congress. An extraordinary national congress may be convened if necessary or at the request of more than half the provincial level party branches.

(3) The Central Committee (CC)

The CC executes resolutions passed by the National Congress, organizes and administers party and political affairs, trains and appoints party cadres, enforces party discipline, and raises funds and controls the party budget. The CC elects from among its members a certain number to form a Standing Committee that will function during the recess of the plenary session of the Central Committee, to which the Standing Committee shall be responsible. Theoretically, the Central Committee holds a plenary session every year, but like the National Congress it actually meets less frequently.

(4) The Central Standing Committee

The Central Standing Committee (CSC) makes policy and approves the regime's major decisions when the CC is not in session. The CSC is the party's power centre; it has vast power to screen and approve all important party and government policies and to name political appointees to important government and party posts. The CSC is
composed of representatives from business, media, labour, academia, etc.; and also includes top officials in the party, army and central and provincial governments. This committee is headed by director-general or chairman of the party.

(5) Central Party Headquarters

The CC is too large to be responsible for everyday routine. The CC's daily affairs are handled by the secretary general and his staff. The central Secretariat is headed by a secretary general and three deputy secretaries general. Central party headquarters has seven departments and four commissions. Every department and commission at the central party headquarters has a director and three deputy directors. Organizational and cultural departments are the most powerful organs in the party. A central work conference is held weekly to draft policy proposals and to solve interdepartmental conflicts. Departments and commissions under jurisdiction of the CC do the work of the CC, and they report to the secretary general, who is nominated by the chairman, and approved by the CC. The secretary general becomes influential in the policy making process, because he has close contact with the chairman, and is in charge of agendas for CSC meetings. He also has significant influence over personnel appointments in the party organization. "As in other Leninist parties, policies and even specific decisions are often made by the secretary general of the party in concert with the chairman and other top-ranking members and are then confirmed by the CSC and the CC."8

(6) Central Advisory Committee

Members of the Central Advisory Committee are nominated by the party chairman and approved immediately or retrospectively by the National Congress. The

7 Huang Yuan-mo, Chung-kuo Kuomintang chi Chuan-hsing: Ti Shih-szu Te'u Tai-piao Ta-hui Yen-chiu (The transformation of the KMT: a research on the Fourteenth National Party Congress), (M.A. Thesis, Taiwan University, 1994).
8 John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 68.
duties of the Central Advisory Committee include offering advice and suggestions on important changes in party or political matters, supervising the political activities of party members to see that they are in conformity with party principles, platform and policies, supervising the enforcement of discipline, and giving advice on such matters as may be referred to it by the chairman.

(7) Provincial and Local Levels

At the provincial and local levels, party affairs are handled by committees. In addition to Taiwan provincial party committee, Taipei and Kaohsiung party committees have provincial status. Like central party headquarters, these three provincial-level headquarters also have several functional departments. Local party organizations below the provincial level are much simpler. At each level except that of the cells, a party committee is elected by the plenary meeting or congress at the corresponding level to represent the plenary meeting or congress when it is not in session. According to the KMT's Charter, the subdistrict plenary meetings are held every six months, and district congresses or plenary meetings once a year. The county or city congresses meet every two years. The provincial congresses meet every three years. The indirectly elected committee members are the titular leaders of the party; they have little power. The committees meet infrequently and usually only for a short time. "The committee members may have other jobs outside of the party; they are not paid, permanent party cadres." Every provincial, city, and county committee is headed by a chairman and up to three vice chairmen. Committees at the bottom or lower levels are elected by party members; at higher levels they are elected indirectly by party congresses. Except at the local level, delegates to congresses are not elected directly by members but are elected indirectly by...
congresses or plenary meetings at the next lower level. Indirect representation is a way of guaranteeing control while maintaining the appearance of democracy.

(7) Cells

The basic unit of the KMT is the cell. They are the smallest grassroots units of the party's organization. Basically cells are organized on an occupational basis rather than geographical basis. Major vocational groups, such as journalists, seamen, and various labor groups have their own branches, as do some women's groups. In some places, area cells exist side by side with workplace cells. The functions of the cells are to carry out the directives of higher-level party committees to ensure the completion of tasks given by the party, to recruit new members and develop party organization, to initiate educational programmes for party members so as to enhance their organizational consciousness, to cultivate comradeship and promote mutual assistance and cooperation, and to reflect party members' opinions and any complaints of the general public as well as to study and make recommendations on ways and means to improve party and government administrative matters. The size of the cell is limited, composed of from 3 to 29 persons. According to the KMT's Charter, the cells meet once a month.

The nature and size of the cell give it a much greater hold on its members than have the branches of other kind of parties. The branch allows for only a superficial and intermittent discipline. The cell, in contrast, is characterized by tight discipline and is organized not only for electoral mobilization, but for agitation, propaganda, and discipline.

The KMT's basic organizational structure remained unchanged until the late 1980s. However, it did endure observable changes during the KMT's more than forty years on Taiwan. This time is subdivided into three periods: the party consolidation
period (1949-1969), the party adaptation period (1970-1985), and the party transformation period (since 1986).


Overall Organizational Reform

The defeat of the KMT on the mainland crippled the party organization. Desperate and painstaking reflection during the retreat made Chiang Kai-shek determine to reform party organization. In May 1949 he appointed an ad hoc group of ten men personally loyal to him to study reorganization measures. On July 22, 1950, the CSC of the KMT passed the reform measures. On August 5, Chiang Kai-shek created a Central Reform Committee to reorganize the KMT in the light of the party's defeat on the mainland. The committee included, among others, Ch'en Ch'eng and Chiang Ching-kuo. The committee adopted six guidelines to reshape the party according to Chiang's will:

1. The KMT would be a revolutionary democratic party.
2. Its membership would be substantially enlarged to cover farmers, workers, youths, and the intelligentsia.
3. Party structure would continue to follow democratic centralism.
4. Party cells would serve as fundamental organization units.
5. The KMT would provide political leadership throughout society; all decisions would be made through the party's organizational procedures.
6. Members would be required to believe in Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, obey the party, and follow party policies.\(^{11}\)

After the reorganization, all party members were organized into about 30,000 cells, structured mainly by functional representation. These cells were established

throughout the island in rural villages, government offices, schools, enterprises, military units, and transportation operations, including representatives of both management and labor. The party maintained farmers' associations, neighbourhood groups, associations of workers and businessmen, and the Anti-Communist Youth Corps. It has been noted that "the principle of organizational parallelism operated between party and state. Party organs controlled administrative units at various levels of government." A political commissar system was built in the military to keep it firmly under the control of the party. Thus the KMT penetrated Taiwanese society at every level. By doing so, the KMT "increased its organizational capacity and developed a semicorporatist structure." As Moody points out, such a structure does not mean democracy; "The role of the party organization is to penetrate society and the functional representation may work more for social control than for 'interest articulation.'"

The KMT Seventh Party Congress of October 10, 1952, formally terminated the reorganization campaigns. The Congress modified the Party Charter. The Central Executive Committee and Central Control Committee from the mainland period were combined to form a new Central Committee, and a new Central Advisory Council was created under the party central headquarters. Advisory Councilors were appointed by party chairman and approved by congress. The Congress elected 32 members to a Central Committee and 48 members to the Central Advisory Committee. The CC in turn elected 10 persons recommended by Chiang to serve in the Central Standing Committee, including Ch'en Ch'eng and Chiang Ching-kuo. Final power remained in Chiang's own hands, as the positions of director-general of the party, president of state and commander in chief of the army were all assumed by Chiang himself.

13 Ibid., p. 4.
14 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 21.
15 Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 67-68.
Taiwanese had virtually no representation in the CSC. The KMT was insulated from local social pressures. Positions at the central level were held almost exclusively by mainlanders. The only Taiwanese who could hold important positions were "half-mountain men," Taiwanese natives who had spent much of their life on the mainland. They tended to be those who joined the KMT during the anti-Japanese War on the mainland and followed the KMT retreat to Taiwan after the Nationalist regime lost the war against the Communists on the mainland. The KMT regime tried to eradicate any sense of a separate Taiwanese identity.

In the 1950s and 1960s the CSC met twice a week. A regular meeting should be attended by no less than one-half of the entire members. In principle, policy making in the CSC followed the rule of simple majority vote by raising hands. But in reality, as Pang describes,

the CSC did not adopt the method of vote as a conventional way for any policy making except personnel appointment. The policy making process in CSC usually follows a pattern of mixing what James March and Herbert Simon define as 'problem-solving' and 'persuasion.' In normal situations, if a proposal involves technical or professional knowledge that highly relies on information collecting and fact judgment, the resolution is likely to be decided by the way of 'problem-solving' which stresses the principle of respecting expertise. For those policies involving value judgment and arousing controversy between members, the resolutions tend to be obtained by 'persuasion' in order to attain a certain degree of consensus among members. Bitter debate and lasting bargaining rarely happen. Basically, the CSC is quite a cohesive organization. This is also a crucial reason for the persistent stability and coherence of the KMT state.16

The KMT paid constant attention to its organization in this period. In October 1955, the sixth session of the Seventh National Congress passed the "Headlines for Central Committee Reforms." The KMT Eighth National Congress, held in October 1957, increased the membership of the CC to 50, created the office of deputy director-general,

and elected Ch'en Ch'eng to the post. Since Ch'en's death in 1965 the post has been left vacant. In July 1958, Chiang gave a speech on the nature of the revolutionary democratic party and the significance of the re-registration of the party membership.\(^\text{17}\) In the fourth session of the KMT Eighth Congress held in November 12, 1961, Chiang proposed "renovation, mobilization and struggle" as the goals for the then current works. The Ninth National Congress, held in 1963, further increased the membership of the CC to 75 and that of the Central Advisory Committee to 144. The membership of the CSC was increased to 19. Among them were Vice President and Premier C. K. Yen, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, Governor of Taiwan Province Huang Chieh, and Speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly Hsieh Tung-ming. Of the 75 members of the CC, one-fifth were men with prolonged military background or senior officers on active duty, six of whom were on the CSC.\(^\text{18}\) In the Ninth Congress, the Party Charter, political programme and headlines for current works were modified. In December 1966, the second session of the Ninth Congress passed the "organizational improvement proposal." In March 1969, the KMT held the Tenth National Congress, and again modified the Party Charter and political programme.

The purpose of these efforts by the party was to make the KMT organization strong and vigorous. Through the reorganization campaigns the party consolidated its position on Taiwan. The KMT in this first period is, therefore, similar to what Panebianco describes as the party in the genesis phase, because the goal of the KMT in this period was the realization of the common cause, the leaders' freedom of choice was broad, and the party's strategy was to dominate the environment. The consolidation of the party organization enabled the KMT to stabilize the political and social arena, and to play a


significant role in Taiwan's transition to democracy in later periods. To demonstrate the KMT's organizational consolidation in detail and to facilitate comparison with later periods, the party's recruitment and the organization in this first period are discussed next.

Recruitment: Membership

Prior to 1949, the KMT recruited almost exclusively from social elites (capitalists, land owners, intellectuals and students, etc.). When it retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it had 34,382 members who were mostly mainlanders, representing less than 1 percent of the adult population on Taiwan. After the reorganization on Taiwan in 1952, the KMT membership rose to 380,000 or 4.7 percent of the island's population and 9.9 percent of the adult population. Of these people 55 percent were in the military and 45 percent were civilians. Only 14.47 percent were of Taiwanese origin. However, after the reorganization the party endeavoured to expand itself into local Taiwanese society. The later growth in the numbers of native Taiwanese members was impressive.

The increase in the party membership was continuous: from 509,000 in 1957, to 667,000, or 5.6 percent of the population in 1963. On December 20, 1962, the KMT carried out the general registration of its members. Some KMT members of the Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan were deprived of their party membership because of their factionalist activities. The registration was finished on January 15, 1963. Chiang Kai-shek delivered a speech entitled "The Significance of the Registration and the Major Tasks of the Party Renovation" in which he asked the party members to obey party

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discipline and keep party secrets. Distribution of the total membership in 1963 included 150,000 (or 23 percent) farmers and labourers and 56,000 (or 9 percent), businessmen. Thus in terms of distribution of membership by profession, one third of the total belonged to non-governmental groups, and the other two thirds were composed of politicians, civil servants, and the military.

Party membership reached 800,000, amounted to 6.9 percent of the population in 1968. A full 60 percent of these members were politicians, civil servants, and military officers, and 61 percent of all KMT members were mainlanders. Thus, in the first two decades, despite the efforts to recruit ordinary Taiwanese people, the KMT on Taiwan remained an elite and predominantly a mainlanders' party.

Taiwanese had a major share only of the elected provincial and local offices, a share which corresponded approximately with their proportion in the population. Taiwanese also served in provincial and local administrative positions. For instance, of the total of 191,162 persons employed by the provincial government in 1965, 119,613 (62.57 percent) were Taiwanese and 71,549 (37.43 percent) were mainlanders.

Organization

Discipline The KMT implemented strict discipline in this period. According to the Party Charter, all party members were required to cultivate virtues befitting the party. They were required to faithfully abide by the Party Charter, obey party orders, carry out party policies and resolutions, safeguard party secrets, adhere to the basic party organization, refrain from making attacks from outside the party on the party or comrades, abstain from acts impairing party honour, refuse to join other political parties,

and resist the formation of factions or cliques within the party. Party members violating these provisions were subject to warning, serious warning, suspension of party rights, and expulsion. Party members were asked to condemn those who were expelled from the party due to disloyalty. Party committees violating party discipline were to be dissolved. The KMT instituted Disciplinary Commissions in party committees at various levels to supervise investigation and impeachment in disciplinary cases, and auditing and screening of budgetary matters. Therefore, during this early period on Taiwan, power in the KMT was highly concentrated, and party members had no role in forming party policy while they were obliged to carry out party decisions.

Although the party centre could have very strict discipline over the party, it encountered some difficulties in assuring discipline during election times. It has been noted that "up to the early 1960's, candidates who did not win KMT endorsement could withdraw temporarily from the party and run as independents against the party nominee, and then, win or lose, be re-admitted to the party afterwards. However, in the late 1960's this practice was disallowed, and party members who run against the party nominees now lose their membership for a period of years."23

Nomination of Candidates

The KMT chose nominees for elected positions 59 times between 1953 and 1986. For the first two decades on Taiwan, elections were all held at the local levels. Since the KMT controlled enormous resources, its nomination of candidates for elective positions was usually decisive. Local party committees had the power to decide who would be nominated for city or county council and subcounty executive elections.

In its early years on Taiwan, the KMT adopted the strategy of selective support as a nomination system. Candidates could be party members or independents, but they were

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chosen by the cadres of party central and provincial headquarters without the participation of ordinary party members.\textsuperscript{24} When the KMT institutionalized its grassroots organizations in the mid 1950s, local party committees adopted a kind of "phony poll," similar to a party "semi-primary," to help with the nomination process. The party centre did not interfere in local decisions unless local electoral disputes needed higher level mediation.\textsuperscript{25}

The KMT welcomed local elites to join the party to win elected office. To guarantee stability at the local level, local party committees used their power over nomination to alternate elected posts between local factions or elites. Local committees did not want any single faction to dominate local politics, and their nomination strategy guaranteed its influence in local politics. Meanwhile, as Bruce Dickson points out, "This co-optation of local leaders into the party made the local party committees stronger and increased the priority of nomination in the committees' work." "Although co-opting local leaders expanded and consolidated KMT power on Taiwan, the practice of co-optation subsequently facilitated the KMT's evolution away from its Leninist origins."\textsuperscript{26}


Overall Organizational Change

During the 1970s and early 1980s the mainlander-dominated exclusionary and authoritarian party gradually evolved into an inclusive authoritarian party. Chiang Ching-

\textsuperscript{24} Huang, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," p. 124. \\
kuo made serious efforts to reform the KMT. The most significant efforts included Taiwanization and technocratization, and at the same time, there were also adaptive changes in terms of discipline, finance, and nomination of candidates for elections, which will be discussed later in this section.

The KMT reformed the central party organs in 1972. Departments responsible for running elections and for recruitment gained more resources and influence in the party. The most significant reform was the reform of the Organizational Department. This Department became increasingly involved in nominating candidates for elected offices and supervising election strategy. The Department encouraged the nomination of younger and better-educated Taiwanese. To allow the Organizational Department to devote a greater share of its resources to elections, the KMT reassigned responsibility for some tasks and created a new office. As Dickson notes, "two of its previous tasks were assigned to other central organs. First, the secretariat became responsible for cadre management so that the Organizational Department could concentrate on more important discretionary matters.... Second, a new central level organ, the Youth Department, was created to take primary responsibility for recruiting and training new members."27

Another general trend after the 1972 reform of the central party organs was that the tenure of directors of the central organs grew shorter. It has been noted that "Those appointed before the 1972 reforms held their posts for an average of just under six years, while those appointed after 1976 averaged roughly three years." Dickson argues that "the more frequent turnover of directors substantially alleviated the stagnation and conservatism of the party bureaucracy during the previous two decades."28

27 Ibid., pp. 48-51.
28 Ibid., p. 51.
Recruitment

Taiwanization In the 1970s, Taiwan found itself in a very different domestic and international environment. Hopes of mainland recovery faded to the vanishing point. It experienced economic crises following the end of the Vietnam War and the oil crisis in the early 1970s. Western support for the KMT regime was slowly withdrawn. The first generation of mainlanders was dying or becoming more and more inactive in politics. After more than two decades of coexistence, mainlanders and Taiwanese found their differences were decreasing, albeit still clear. The second generation of mainlanders became more accommodated to Taiwanese society. Unable to stand on the hollow claim of its representation of the whole of China, the KMT had to find itself a new basis of legitimacy. As elections became more important, the KMT had to find competent Taiwanese candidates for elective office. In November 1973, in the fourth session of the Tenth National Congress, Chiang Kai-shek called on the party to understand the situation and to renovate the party continuously. He endeavoured to make the party responsive to public demands and concerns. Steps were taken to get rid of corruption and nepotism and to make the KMT more efficient in carrying out public policy.

Taiwanization is a major characteristic in this period. The aim of Taiwanization was to promote native Taiwanese to leading positions in the party and the government. Native Taiwanese are those whose parents were born on Taiwan. They comprise about 85 percent of the population. But the ruling elites were mainly mainlanders. In 1967, of the 75 members of the CC 4 were Taiwanese, 2 of whom were on the nineteen-member CSC.29 In party central headquarters, even employees were mainlanders. In 1975, all 19 secretaries were mainlanders.30 Mainlanders also predominated in the army.

Chiang Ching-kuo carried out a self-conscious policy of Taiwanization. He said that: "I am Chinese; I am also Taiwanese." Ching-kuo's efforts to recruit Taiwanese started from as early as 1952, when he founded the Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth Corps. Under his populist leadership the Corps recruited many talented Taiwanese youth. The Taiwanese were associated with Li Huan, who was Ching-kuo's lieutenant in youth work. In the late 1960s, Chiang Ching-kuo, working through Li Huan, began to appoint more Taiwanese to local party chairmanship. The Tenth National Congress, held on March 29, 1969, adopted a party reform programme for improving party work styles, recruiting young talent, and cultivating new cadres to broaden the party's social basis.

In March 1970, Chiang Kai-shek demanded a thorough renovation of the party in the second session of the Tenth Congress. The objective was to promote local Taiwanese leaders who could win popular support in elections. In the provincial headquarters, 37 percent of the total staff retired or left office between 1968 and 1971. More and more Taiwanese were appointed to chair county- and municipal-level party committees. On March 6, 1972, the third session of the Tenth National Congress of the KMT modified the "Organization Regulations of the Central Committee." In April, the CSC decided to streamline party organization. Five guiding groups were removed. Secretary general Chang Pao-su revealed that the purpose of streamlining was to make room for promoting new cadres.

In 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the premiership. For the first time a Taiwanese, previous speaker of the Provincial Assembly, Hsieh Tung-min, was appointed provincial governor. A vice premiership was also assumed by a Taiwanese. The positions of Mayor of Taipei and Kao-hsiung were from the beginning held by Taiwanese.

Before 1969, two Taiwanese members in the CSC were "half-maintain men" (i.e. Taiwanese who had spent much of their life on the mainland). The CSC included the first

31 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 59.
real native Taiwanese in 1969. However he never took any initiative in the CSC. In 1972, the proportion of Taiwanese to mainlanders was 3 out of 27 (18.52 percent). The situation began to change in 1976 when Chiang Ching-kuo became chairman of the party. The number of Taiwanese members accelerated after the mid-1970s. In 1976, 2 more native Taiwanese were elected to the CSC. According to Pang, "This raised the number of Taiwanese members in the CSC to 5 and the proportion to 22 percent. Among these 5 members, 2 of them were local capitalists. [They were recruited] because they served as the speakers of Taipei City Council and Taiwan Provincial Assembly."^35

In the early 1970s, Ch'iu Chuang-huan, director of Social Department, was the only native Taiwanese at the level of chief party executive. In the 1976 party personnel adjustment, five native Taiwanese became chief executives. They were deputy secretary general Ch'en Chi-lu, director of the Secretariat Ch'en Shui-feng, director of the Overseas Department Lin Ch'ing-chiang, director of the Social Department Ch'iu Chuang-huan, and director of the Youth Department Lien Chan.^36

In December 1979, the fourth session of the Eleventh Congress elected 9 Taiwanese into the 27-member CSC, or exactly one-third. In March 1981, the Twelfth National Congress elected 227 to the Advisory Committee, 150 to the CC, 27 to the CSC. The recruitment of a Taiwanese businessman into the CSC signified that the party had begun to invite the local capitalists into the power centre.^37 In February 1984, the CSC increased to 31 members, and 12 Taiwanese entered it (38.7 percent). The enlargement of the CSC increased Taiwanese representation at no risk to the old mainlanders. Furthermore, Chiang Ching-kuo nominated Lee Teng-hui as a candidate for vice president. Lee was fully eligible according to the party's criteria on Taiwanization.

^35 Ibid.
rejuvenation and technocratization. He is a native Taiwanese; he was young; and he was also a technocrat. As for the percentage of Taiwanese in the CC, in 1969 after the Tenth Party Congress, 9.3 percent of the CC members were Taiwanese. "The Eleventh in 1976 increased this share to 17.9 percent, and the Twelfth in 1981 to 20.7 percent."38

Taiwanization had profound implications for the party. It increased the rights and power of native Taiwanese. Taiwanese members were generally young, well-educated, pragmatic and enlightened. They preferred promoting economic development to strengthening military power, and the increase in Taiwanese members in the CSC led to the rearrangement of the state's priorities.39 They may not have an immediate impact on the political system, however, they had the potential to affect policy making, and their power was increasing. They benefited from Taiwanization, and they were the main forces within the party that supported later democratization.

Furthermore, by Taiwanization, the party became more inclusive and representative. It resulted in inter-ethnic power sharing, and softened the Nationalist authoritarian rule. As Tien points out, "Through co-optation, the roles of Taiwanese in decision making are steadily enhanced, which results in raising their common stake in the regime's fortunes."40 Taiwanization won the support of native Taiwanese, and thus increased the electoral fortune of the KMT. Through Taiwanization, the KMT based its legitimacy "increasingly on its effective governance of Taiwan rather than a fictitious claim to sovereignty over the China mainland."41 As a result of this newly established legitimacy, the KMT no longer feared gradual liberalization at the national level. The KMT's control of, and successes in, the supplementary elections encouraged it to further liberalize.

38 Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition", pp. 121-122.
41 Ibid.
Technocratization  The policy making of the CSC should be strongly influenced by its members' career background and professional knowledge. The professional background of CSC members remained virtually unchanged until 1969. The CSC had been continuously dominated by the military in the KMT's early period on Taiwan. The military was rather conservative regarding political reforms. Yet in this period the military began to give way in the CSC to economic and cultural officials. In 1969, "the number of the members with economic profession jumped from 1 to 5, whereas the number of the members with military profession remained at 6.... From 1969 onward, the influence of the members with economic background evidently extended. In contrast, the number of military officers decreased steadily while there has been an increase of cultural elites and professional politicians from elective offices."42 The economic and cultural officials prevailed in the CSC in the mid-1970s.

Table 6.2  Professional Background of the Members of the CSC

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<th>Year</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Chiang Kai-shek (1952-73) and Ch'en Ch'eng (1952-64) are put in this category.
** Chiang Ching-kuo (1952-88) is put in this category.


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In February 1984, the second session of the Twelfth Congress was held. An analysis of the composition of the CSC demonstrated the continuous trend of rejuvenation and technocratization. The number of members of the CSC from representative institutions (the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the provincial and city councils) increased. The number of members of the CSC with military background decreased.

In June 1984, the CSC passed an important personnel bill proposed by Chiang. Wu Chun-ts'ai became deputy director of the Yangming Institution on National Revolution and Development, Liang Hsiao-huang and Ma Ying-chiu (a Harvard University graduate) became deputy general secretaries of the Central Committee, Sung Shih-hsuan became director of the Organizational Department, Cheng Hsing-hsiung became director of the Overseas Department, Kuo Tse became director of the Social Department, and Kao Ming-hui became director of the Youth Department. Kuan Chung was promoted to chairman of the Provincial Party Committee, and Ch'en Chin-jang to chairman of the Taipei Municipal Party Committee. Sung Ch'u-yu became director of the Cultural Department in August. Vice President Lee Teng-hui was awarded Taiwan's highest civilian honor before the 1985 election. He became Chiang's formal successor. This group of reformers, such as Ma Ying-chu, Sung Shih-hsuan and Kuan Chung, was young and open-minded. For instance, Kuan relied heavily on modern technology (the use of computers to store and analyze party data) and organization theories in his management of provincial party affairs. He intended to meet the opposition's electoral challenges with technological innovations and organizational techniques. At the same time, Kuan also supported dialogue between the KMT and the Tang-wai.

44 Copper, Quiet Revolution, p. 33.
More significantly, many so-called technocrats in the party centre have degrees in the social sciences and humanities rather than in the natural sciences and engineering. It has been noted that "of the seventy-seven individuals who served as directors of central party organs between 1972 and 1984, forty-four had college or graduate degrees in the social sciences, thirteen in the humanities; and only six in natural sciences and five in military affairs." 46

The rise of technocrats in the party may have had important impacts on the KMT's willingness to undertake liberalizing and democratizing reforms, although it is hard to find direct evidence confirming this. First, like Taiwanization, technocratization also strengthened the KMT's organization. Technocrats brought with them into the party the modern way of running business, strengthening the party organization and adapting it to the electoral environment. Second, as Dickson hypothesizes, "the combination of foreign education and social sciences backgrounds among central leaders enhanced the adaptability of the KMT." 47 Third, technocrats were supportive of the KMT's incremental development strategy, because such an approach was best for their socioeconomic planning. 48 Fourth, KMT technocrats were very successful in developing Taiwan's economy, and as a result they enjoyed popularity among the Taiwanese populace. Recruitment of these people into the party increased the popularity of the party. These factors likely contributed to the party's confidence in playing a more active role in liberalization and democratization.

Membership In the 1970s and early 1980s, party membership increased rapidly, with an average annual growth rate exceeding 20 percent. People from all walks of life were recruited. However, to accommodate the rising demands for participation by young

46 Ibid., p. 52.
47 Ibid.
intellectuals, the party put a greater emphasis on recruiting intellectuals. In the early 1970s, 85 percent of the new recruits had at least a high-school education.49

On June 18, 1975, the CSC passed the "Major Points for Renewing Membership." In that year, the KMT membership reached the figure of 1,450,000 or 16.3 percent of the adult population, with 58 percent of it Taiwanese.50 "Membership of the KMT reached the figure of 1,886,000 in 1980, which was 17.98 percent of all adults on the island. At that time, 67.23 percent of the members were locally born Taiwanese. They almost completely dominated positions in the local and provincial representative bodies, as well as headships of administrations at the local level that were held by the KMT."51

By the end of 1983, KMT membership had reached 2,121,000, or 11.37 percent of the population and 19.45 percent of the electorate, with 70 percent of the membership being Taiwanese. The share of workers increased from 12.9 percent in 1974 to 18 percent in 1986, "as the party sought to defuse rising labor activism and to prevent the political opposition from appealing to workers for their support."52 The makeup of the membership became younger, better educated, and more balanced in terms of provincial origin. KMT members occupied most leading positions in various sections of Taiwanese society. Workers constituted the largest vocational group in the party, followed by government and KMT employees, businessmen and industrialists, peasants and fishermen, students, and teachers. Thus, the KMT had changed from an elite party to a mass party during this period.

49 Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization," p. 57.
51 Ibid., p. 121.
52 Dickson, "The Kuomintang before Democratization," p. 58.
Organization

Discipline  In this period the central leadership of the party generally kept the party under its control. Since the mid-1970s, however, the party has faced increasing difficulties in disciplining its members during election years. As the proportion of party nominees failing to be elected increased, party members could no longer depend solely on the party for campaign and election success. Candidates began to rely on themselves, and arrange extra funding and personnel to assist them. Some party members who failed to win party nomination ran "against party discipline" (Wei-chi chen-hsun). The unjust nomination procedures of the party organization for the 1977 elections angered many party members and the party suffered an electoral setback in 1977. It has been noted that "After the 1977 elections, party members could run for office without official nomination and not be subject to party discipline. Party leaders recognized that because social support for these candidates did not derive from their KMT affiliation, expulsion from the party would not diminish their popularity. The KMT accordingly responded to incidents of exit by adjusting its policies to better suit the aspirations of its legislators."53

The KMT gradually lost control of its members in the legislature. KMT legislators tended to become autonomous from the party centre. When party members were elected, they were obliged to return good will and financial support to their constituencies. The mobilization capacity of the KMT caucus decreased. KMT legislators tended to support their constituencies, rather than the party. Their viewpoints and attitude diverged from the party's ideal. Party discipline could not effectively constrain party members. When the decision of party committee diverged from individual member's views and interests, there was no guarantee, as in the past, that they would follow the party's decision. KMT

53 Ibid., p. 61.
legislators went so far as to join forces with the opposition in proposing bills that previously would only have been supported by opposition members.54

The party also had difficulties in controlling local party members. Local party organization was closely related to the elections. The basic responsibility of the local party chairman was to see that KMT candidates win local elections. Local party chairmen complained that "Quite often local politicians are undisciplined, antiparty, or otherwise difficult to persuade, particularly if the next election for which they will need the Party Chairman's nomination is still far in the future."55

Finance  The KMT had several kinds of revenues. These included membership fees, profits from KMT owned and/or operated business, and government subsidies. In 1971, provincial assemblyman Kuo Yu-hsin pointed out during questioning that the province contributed to the party's provincial headquarters over 30 million new Taiwanese (NT) dollars. The county party branches were also supported financially by the county governments. In districts, party branches became the affiliated units of the county governments in the name of "service stations." They used government's premises but never paid rent. Party centre spent one billion NT dollars each year (not including allowances to local branches). Income from party operated business could only provide one third of this cost, and party membership fees accounted for one tenth. The rest was covered by covert government budget appropriations.56 The party occasionally solicited donations from party members who were successful businessmen, but donations were not a major source of finance. Members of the opposition also pointed out that some KMT owned enterprises received public funds from administrative and security authorities. To

be fair, in many cases the KMT enterprises received public funds because the party
invested in high-risk industries which were crucial for Taiwan's economic development,
and which private investors were reluctant to or incapable of investing in. As for service
stations, they played various social and political functions. Services the party provided
ranged from "the establishment and management of a trust fund for children orphaned by
a traffic accident" to "the building of a privy at a roadside bus stop." Jacobs believes that
these services, "by filling gaps created by emergencies and public welfare regulations,
definitely increases social stability." 57

Nomination of Candidates With the opening of supplementary elections at the
national level the KMT began to put more emphasis on nomination of candidates. For
higher level offices, the KMT followed formal procedure of nomination. All KMT
candidates for mayors of major cities, magistrates, provincial assemblymen, and national
parliamentarians were designated by a higher echelon. Aspirants for party nomination had
to register with the KMT's county or city office. The chairman of local party committee
consulted with party cadres and rank-and-file members to rank the registered aspirants.
From 1957 to 1975, the party used a "group opinion response system" with group leaders
conveying the opinions formed in group meetings to higher party echelons. The results of
the system were advisory. They did not determine the nomination, and gradually the
system became only a formality. From 1977 to 1980, the "group opinion response
system" required calling a group meeting to fill out opinion response forms, but whether
these forms genuinely reflected the group's opinion was unknown. From 1981 to 1986, a
"party members' opinion response" and "evaluation of cadres" became the determining
factors in nominating party candidates. It was similar to a party primary system, with the

57 J. Bruce Jacobs, Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Setting: a Field Study of Mazu Township,
main difference being that results of the opinion responses were not published.\textsuperscript{58} The general trend was that the grass roots in the party became increasingly influential in the nomination process. This symbolized the increasing dispersion of power within the party.

When a city or county party committee finished assembling a slate of candidates, it forwarded the slate to Taiwan Provincial Party Committee for scrutiny. The order of potential candidates might be altered there. The Provincial Committee then presented the slates to the central party headquarters for final approval. Central party headquarters would form an ad hoc committee to assess the slates. Finally the nomination would be finalized in the CSC.\textsuperscript{59}

In this period, one important change in the KMT's recruitment and organization was that they were not merely tools of social control, but began to become the means which enabled the KMT to successfully manage elections. Taiwanization and technocratization provided the KMT popular and able candidates for the elections. These people were helped by the KMT's political machine. The KMT's superb organizational skill was a residue of the Leninist consolidation of the party in the earlier period. This election machine reached down into every residential alley to ensure popular support for the party candidates. When elections approached, the KMT established campaign coordinating councils at each level of the organizational hierarchy to direct its electoral activities. These councils plotted election strategy, issued instructions, and established timetables for the elections. The strong presence of party organization in elections sometimes worked against the party candidates. As in the 1977 elections, the activity of the party organization generated conflict between the party organization and local

\textsuperscript{58} Liang Ch'in-jao, \textit{Cheng-chih Fa-chan yu Cheng-tang Chuan-hsing} (Political development and party transformation) (M.A. thesis, Taiwan University, 1990); Jiang and Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," p. 84.

\textsuperscript{59} Tien, \textit{The Great Transition}, p. 174.
political leaders. This led to the "defeat" of the party in the elections. Nevertheless, when the party organization arranged its election campaigns well, it could win a clear victory, as in the 1983 elections. As Winckler points out, "The principal reason why the Kuomintang did better in 1983 than it did in 1980 was that it carefully concentrated its votes behind fewer candidates, exhaustively analyzed the territorial and functional structure of the electorate, and clearly assigned voters to the resulting candidates." The KMT's Taiwanized and technocratized recruitment and its organizational strength guaranteed the party's victory in the elections and gave the party confidence that it could maintain its governing position in the process of the transition to democracy.

5. The Party Transformation Period (Since the Mid-1980s)

Overall Organizational Change

At the third session of the KMT's Twelfth Central Committee in March 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo announced that the time had come to implement the KMT's goal of constitutional democracy. Organizational reforms were carried out to guarantee the realization of the party's goal. Four new members were appointed to the party's CSC, two of them Taiwanese, and all of them younger and better educated party stalwarts. All four departing members were mainlanders. Chiang appointed twelve CSC members to examine crucial political issues and to draw up a reform package. In the CSC meeting on December 31 Chiang asked KMT members to transfer from the role of leading to the role of serving.

The death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988 did not stop the organizational reform of the KMT. The Thirteenth National Congress of the KMT passed the "Guidelines for Party Reform" in July 1988. The objective of the reform was to streamline the central headquarters, to integrate the provincial headquarters, and to strengthen the local offices. The Guidelines consisted of several reform measures that changed the nature of the KMT organization.

At the central level, the KMT stressed broadening representation on the Central Committee, with an emphasis on injecting new blood into it. The Guidelines directed the CC to focus its efforts on the formulation of policy, organizational development, and personnel mobilization for elections. The work of some CC units was transferred to appropriate governmental agencies. Besides its permanent organization, the CC organized special units for policy coordination, organization-mobilization, and administrative management. The policy coordination unit was composed of groups responsible for policy study, communication and coordination among the three parliamentary bodies, and contacts with other political parties. The organization-mobilization unit was composed of groups responsible for party organization, culture, social affairs, youth, women, training, elections, overseas activities, and Chinese mainland affairs. The administrative management unit included those groups responsible for administration, financing, party-owned enterprises, and compilation of the party's history. Every CC member could participate in the planning and operations of party organizations at different levels based on his preference and on his specialized expertise. He/she would be given an area of responsibility and put in charge of party organizations at the lower levels.62

As for the local level, the Guidelines required following reforms: "First, all special party headquarters that are organized on an occupational basis, including

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62 Department of Cultural Affairs, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, *Current Party Reforms* (Getting to Know the KMT Series, No. 13) (Taipei: China Cultural Services Co., Ltd., 1989), p. 5.
parliamentary party headquarters, will be changed into party caucuses. All party members, including parliamentarians, will be affiliated with local party headquarters, which will be organized on a geographical basis. Second, the cell system will be transformed into a subdistrict branch system, which will constitute the basic unit of the party. Third, a drive has been launched to double the membership of the party.63 The implementation of the first measure was facilitated by the capitalist development on Taiwan. In the past, the KMT did make an effort to organize the cadre system along occupational-functional lines, but it is still largely based on administrative regions.64

While the reforms at the central and local levels were not easy, the reform at the provincial level was most difficult. There were three provincial-level headquarters. There were also headquarters in the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, and the Control Yuan, plus administrative offices in Kinmen and Matsu. Failure to cooperate at the provincial level was a major headache for the party. In Kuan Chung's word, provincial-level headquarters were "like the feudal lords of the Chou Dynasty, or the warlords of the Tang Dynasty - they are parties within the party, and as such are too strong to be controlled."65 Provincial-level headquarters had well-run offices that were superior to the local party offices in terms of organization, regulated activities, and constructive subgroup meetings. At earlier times, provincial-level headquarters were functionally oriented, that is, their primary task was developing and promoting work within the party structure. High-level officers became accustomed to working in comfortable offices. Nowadays their primary mission is to aid in election campaigns and in mobilizing local offices. The KMT is streamlining provincial-level party headquarters, and asking members of all party headquarters to take part in local party activities. It is forcing high-

63 Jiang and Wu, "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System," p. 81.
64 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 910.
level officers from all branches to transfer to the local offices to work and live among the people.

The major purpose of organizational reform is to win elections. To prepare the party for the 1989 elections, the Organizational Department prepared an "Agenda and List of Important Issues for Strengthening Organizational and Training Work," and the working guidelines for improving the management of important responsibility areas. The Department formed three task forces to make inspection trips to various party committees. To ensure that all cadres would pay attention to, and understand, election and campaign mobilization work, the Department implemented "Key Points for the Training of Cadres in Government" in 1989. The party centre asked the Party Committees of Taiwan Province, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City to hold 22 working seminars for KMT cadres employed by the government. To ensure that all party committees would develop their own integration capabilities, the KMT set up the "Practical Guidelines for Grassroots Organizations under Various Party Committees Regarding Duty Assignment." The KMT was self-conscious about what it was doing. Director of the Organizational Department Kuan Chung said that "the preliminary, or primary, election plan within the party not only changes the rules, but also amounts to reform of the party system.... I would like to stress this is not a technical but rather a physical change in the system."66

Recruitment

Taiwanization The trends towards Taiwanization and rejuvenation gathered further momentum in this period. In the Thirteenth CC in 1988, the proportion of the local-born Taiwanese increased to 38.7 percent, compared to 19.3 percent in the previous one. Their proportion in the CSC was much higher. For the first time Taiwanese constituted a

66 Ibid., p. 70.
majority (51.6 percent) in the CSC. The average age of CSC members was 63.7. Thirteen of the 31 members were 60 years or younger, compared with ten before 1988.

Table 6.3 Taiwanese in the KMT's CSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Members*</th>
<th>Number Taiwanese of Total</th>
<th>Percentage Taiwanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total numbers do not include chairman of the party.


The Fourteenth National Congress continued the trend of Taiwanization and rejuvenation. The number of members of the CC increased from 180 to 210. One hundred and twenty-six new members were elected to the CC. Of 31 CSC members, 19 were newly elected, and Taiwanese members increased to 19. The average age of the CSC members decreased from 64 to 61.

Taiwanization was also realized in government. Domes notes that "between late 1986 and the summer of 1988 the number of local-born Taiwanese members of the cabinet increased from seven to nine, out of a total of nineteen ministers." especially, the ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs were assumed by two Taiwanese for the first time. The position of Vice Premier was also assumed by a Taiwanese. Furthermore, as Tien notes, "in 1987, Lin Yang-kang was appointed president of the Judicial Yuan, the

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highest judicial organ of the state, and Huang Tsun-ch'iu became president of the Control Yuan. Both positions, considered parallel to the premier in official ranking though not as powerful, had been previously monopolized by mainlanders.  

President Lee Teng-hui appointed Lien Chan as the first native Taiwanese premier in 1993. Lien was born in mainland China but he is considered Taiwanese since his father and grandfather were more closely affiliated with Taiwan. Lien has a Ph. D. in political science from the University of Chicago. After the early 1993 personnel reshuffle, the four most important positions in the state and the party, i.e., the presidency, the premiership, the KMT chairmanship, and the secretary general, were all assumed by Taiwanese. Hsu Sui-te is the first Taiwanese to become secretary general of the KMT.

Taiwanization of the party has contributed significantly to Taiwan's peaceful democratization. In the previous period, the role of Taiwanese in liberalization was not clear. In this period it became clear that many Taiwanese figures who occupied important positions in the party and government became the leading figures in Taiwan's democratization. Furthermore, as we find in the discussion of Taiwanization in the last period, Taiwanization continued to foster ethnic harmony in this period. The relative absence of violence during political democratization on Taiwan can be explained in part by the ethnic harmony that was brought about by Taiwanization. In the eyes of the Taiwanese people, the KMT is no longer a party that represents only mainlanders' interests. Power within the party has been dispersed from the mainlanders to the Taiwanese. One survey demonstrates that 66 percent of respondents agree that the KMT is not such a party, while only 18 percent disagree. Such an image is undoubtedly favourable for the KMT's continuing governance.

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70 Lien-ho Pao, June 1, 1993.
Technocratization  The professional background of the KMT centre also changed greatly in this period. In 1988, eleven new members joined the CSC. Among them, two were from the central party organization, six from the central government, two from local government, and one from the legislature.71

Table 6.4  Background of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the KMT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature, Natl. Ass.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elected Politicians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Work</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Economics</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and Commerce</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Education</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the Thirteenth Central Committee, persons working in the central government predominated in the membership, followed by individuals from the "culture and education" section. Full-time party workers also held significant numbers of seats. A woman was elected to the CC for the first time. In the Thirteenth Congress, elected politicians did not force themselves into the party leadership.72 Parliamentarians improved their positions in the party in the Fourteenth Congress, and sixty-four parliamentarians were elected to the CC (30.5 percent). In the CSC, parliamentarians gained four additional seats for a total of eight in the Thirteenth Congress. The military lost influence in the party. Only 6 military delegates entered the CC, and their ranking

among the elected was quite low. No delegate from the Political Warfare system was elected.

The party was further rejuvenated in the Thirteenth Congress: the average age of the members of the Central Committee fell to between 58 and 60, 12 years younger than that of the members of the Twelfth Central Committee. Of the 150 members of the previous CC, 121 were over 60 years of age, whereas of the 180 members of the Thirteenth CC, only 75 were over 60 years of age. One hundred and seventeen of the elected members, or 65 percent, were new blood. The new generation of the KMT gained considerable power in the Congress by achieving a high percentage of the votes. The top 10 vote-getters in the CC were all young KMT politicians, including Wu Po-hsiung, Sung Ch'u-yu, Shih Ch'i-yang, Hsu Shui-te, Ma Ying-chiu and Ch'ien Fu. Fifty six veteran CC members transferred to the Advisory Committee. The Taiwanese members were on the whole younger than the mainlanders.

The educational background of the delegates was impressive. Forty four percent of the Thirteenth CC members had masters or doctoral degrees. Eighty six percent of them had a college education. As for educational background of the CSC, it had 9 Ph. D.s, 6 Masters, and 16 Bachelors in 1991.\footnote{Liu Kuo-shen, "Taiwan Cheng-chi Chin-ying" (Political elites on Taiwan), Taiwan Yen-chiu Chi-k' an (Taiwan research quarterly) No. 1, 1992, p. 59.} The high level of education of the KMT members and elites has been a contributing factor to the KMT's role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. Especially, those who obtained their degrees in the West brought with them democratic values and practical knowledge of democratic government.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 185-186.} They supported the party's initiative to democratize when conditions were ripe. On the other hand, as we noted earlier, KMT technocrats made especially important contributions to the incremental changes on Taiwan. Furthermore, their expertise increased the reputation
of the party as the designer of Taiwan's modernization, and this reputation increased the party's political capital that it has used in the competition with the opposition.

Membership There was also a dramatic change in the KMT's membership in this period. In 1981, the KMT had nearly two million members, or about 11 percent of the population. Twenty percent of the KMT party membership was female, 65 percent was under age forty, about 70 percent was Taiwanese, and about 85 percent of the new members were Taiwanese. By the late 1980s, the KMT had 2.4 million members, or 12 percent of the population. Its membership represented virtually all classes and segments of the population.

Although the KMT claims that it has 2.4 million members, actually it has been losing contact with many of its members in recent years. According to the 19th overall examination conducted in 1987, the KMT had about 1.9 million party members. The difference is a result of losing contact with members. In some places, the party cells lost contact with about a third of their members. About 75 percent of the cells were not sufficiently active and about 80 percent of the total did not hold party meetings on time. The number of KMT members in August 1991 was 1,949,000, constituting 14.53 percent of the adult population of the island. This share was much lower than the 1980 figure of 17.89 percent. Taiwanese members increased rapidly. As Domes notes, "Locally born Taiwanese comprise 70.4 percent of the party's membership, still less but much closer than in the 1960s and 1970s to the 83 percent of the island's overall population that they account for." Comparatively, the DPP, with approximately 40,000 members, is still an elite party.

75 Copper, Quiet Revolution, pp. 13-14.  
76 Kuan, The Modernization of the Kuomintang, p. 29.  
77 Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," p. 132.
### Table 6.5 Membership of the KMT

**Membership as of June 1987:**

**Total Membership 2,400,705**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituents</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,840,458</td>
<td>76.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>560,247</td>
<td>23.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 35</td>
<td>1,471,280</td>
<td>61.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>211,985</td>
<td>8.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>243,877</td>
<td>10.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>293,760</td>
<td>12.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 61</td>
<td>179,803</td>
<td>7.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>579,849</td>
<td>24.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Academy</td>
<td>295,645</td>
<td>12.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>1,123,884</td>
<td>46.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>349,284</td>
<td>14.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>52,043</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; Fishermen</td>
<td>258,685</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>417,789</td>
<td>17.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>271,511</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>219,177</td>
<td>9.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Employees*</td>
<td>610,926</td>
<td>25.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>147,738</td>
<td>6.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>104,471</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>135,550</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>234,853</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including Officers, Teachers and Army Services.

**Source:** Department of Cultural Affairs, Central Committee of Kuomintang, *A Brief Introduction to the Kuomintang of China* (II) (The KMT's Thirteenth National Congress Series, No. 4) (Taipei: China Cultural Services Co., Ltd., 1988), p. 5.

Party membership was 1.54 million in 1993.78 Hsin T'ung-meng Hui (New Alliance Association), a non-mainstream group in the KMT, estimated that the party

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might have less than a million members. The Association appealed to the party to have a
general re-registration. The party centre canvassed the party members informally by
phone and got in touch with only 1.3 million. Yet the KMT claimed that it had a
membership of 2.6 million.79

The recruitment of new party members has become a challenge for the KMT. There was an approximately 10 percent yearly drop in the number of new members admitted to the party in the last several years of the 1980s. In order to recruit more members, the KMT lowered its qualifications for party membership. In the past, before someone was admitted into the party he/she had to receive training in a study group, read various materials and pass evaluation tests. The process took six months to a year. The party had been very critical and punitive toward party members who discontinued their party activities. Many party members complained that they were charged with heavy responsibilities but had few rights. Nowadays, the KMT welcomes all people who approve of the party principles to join the party. In March 1988, the KMT promulgated the "Working Instructions on Organizational Development," and demanded that each party branch implement the principles of making standards less restrictive, simplifying formalities, shortening time limits, and improving work style. The KMT has tried to reduce the obligations of party members, and to give them more options, such as the choice of contributing money or services. In fact, to attract members, the party has had to offer them tangible material rewards, such as shopping club coupons.80 In addition, the KMT assists party cadres standing for elections, and helps party members obtain transfers to government-operated, private-owned, and party-owned enterprises and institutions. To provide better channels for upward mobility of party cadres, the party tries to make it possible for senior professional cadres to apply for early retirement. The relationship between the party and its members has changed from the former controlling the latter to

79 Interview with Hsu Li-nung, head of Hsin T'ung-meng Hui.
80 Interview with the Organizational Department of the KMT.
the latter demanding services of the former. The party centre has lost the tight control of its members, and party members have gained more power within the party. Consequently, the party organization can no longer be used as a tool for social penetration.

Party membership declined at a time when Taiwan's democratization was already irreversible. And by the early 1990s, the KMT had become a competitive party. Furthermore, despite the decrease in membership in recent years, the KMT is still the largest party in terms of membership. It is also more representative than other opposition parties in terms of membership composition. These characteristics of the KMT have undoubtedly helped the party to maintain its governing position and to basically control the course of political change on Taiwan.

Organization

**Discipline** Party discipline weakened further during this period. More KMT candidates disobeyed party discipline in the 1989 elections. Nineteen persons ran without party authorization. 81 “The party has allowed unendorsed candidates to run under its banner for the Legislative Yuan elections to undermine the Democratic Progressive Party. Approximately 45 such candidates are in the running for the December 19, 1992 elections. These candidates are depending on the support of the KMT's local factions, the party's vote allocation system and vote-buying towards the last days.” 82

Criticizing the party by the party members has become common. Meetings of party cells are held irregularly and attended by fewer members. The KMT shows no interest in disciplinary investigations or measures. The party has intentionally relaxed its disciplinary standards. This is a sign that the KMT is becoming a more democratic party.

81 Moody, *Political Change on Taiwan*, p. 168.
Nomination

The KMT has also changed its nomination policies and processes. "Changes have been made in the rules governing the selection of candidates who run for public office on the KMT ticket, of delegates to the party congress, and even of the party leadership." In 1989, the KMT adopted a primary system to choose its nominees for the general elections of 1989. The party formed a seven-member candidate screening committee, which had the final authority to recommend candidates for official endorsement by the CSC. Kuan Chung, director of the Organizational Department of the KMT, organized and implemented the primary system thoroughly. He argued that "through party primaries, the KMT can move toward intra-party democracy and democratize itself so all the party's talent can be fully utilized and members' opinions can be fully expressed." Those seeking nomination must have held non-paid party posts such as cell leader or above, and received endorsement from at least 0.5 percent to 1 percent of the party members in county or city executive primaries, or, in the case of legislative primaries, 0.2 to 0.5 percent of the party members in the constituency. This was to avoid a "participation explosion" and to ensure the primary process remained manageable by limiting the number of would-be candidates. Nomination seekers are only permitted to solicit support at forums sponsored by the party. In order to save money and avoid internal division, no one was allowed to hold self-sponsored rallies. To be valid, a primary was required to have a minimum turnout of 50 percent. The KMT asked party officials to maintain neutrality and not favour one would-be candidate over another. Those party officials seeking public offices themselves had to resign from party posts prior to the primary process.

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83 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), pp. 496-497.
84 Kuan, The Modernization of the Kuomintang, p. 81.
85 Department of Cultural Affairs, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, July Primaries (Getting to Know the KMT Series, No. 8), (Taipei: China Cultural Services Co., Ltd., 1989), p. H-4.
This system gave both KMT central and local organizations a great impact. In the 1989 elections, although the party centre still made the final decision on who would be nominated, more than 85 percent of the candidates winning the primary vote were subsequently nominated by the party. The KMT also sent details of its primary measures to other political parties for their reference, and encouraged them to follow suit. The DPP decided to adopt the primary system.

From the KMT perspective the primary practice was not very successful. Many primaries were carried by strong local factions. Some party officials already in elective office failed in their bids for nomination. Military and veterans had a large impact on the nominating process, since their turnout rate was high. Many second generation mainlanders won their nominations. They did very well in the elections. They were elected because they became the symbol of reform of the KMT. But some winners of the nomination did not win the election. Some KMT leaders attributed the setback in the 1989 elections to the primaries. Actually, the setback was the result of popular sentiment favouring making the system more democratic by voting for the opposition.

In later years the KMT uses primaries only in some areas. Other areas used other nomination methods such as the recruitment of able government officials. The next time that the KMT used primaries was in 1991 for the direct election of the new National Assembly. Because the preferential primaries were not binding, only one third of the party members participated. The KMT CSC formally nominated 173 candidates who had won in the primaries, and a total of 192 candidates for the 225 direct National Assembly seats. This time the KMT won the election clearly.

The KMT nomination system is still in the process of development. Nevertheless, one thing is sure, i.e., the KMT has accepted democratic practice and has really taken it seriously. As Cheng and Haggard observe, "Nomination is no longer a top-down process,

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but proceeds from the bottom up, beginning with open registration, a kind of nonbinding primary reflecting the preferences of rank-and-file members, and the selection of candidates by a nominating committee largely based on the results of the primary.\footnote{Cheng and Haggard, \textit{Political Change in Taiwan}, pp. 496-497.} James Robinson and Julian Baum also point out that "primary elections have become institutionalized on Taiwan. Despite their effects, primaries are now a text, not merely a footnote, to democracy in Taiwan."\footnote{James Robinson and Julian Baum, "Party Primaries in Taiwan: Footnote or Text in Democratization?" \textit{Asian Affairs}, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 88-99.} The evolution of the KMT's nomination system is reflective of the increasing demands of the citizenry for democratization. The initiation of primaries and democratization of the KMT nomination process demonstrate clearly that the party has adapted to electoral politics and transformed the party organization from a tool of social control to a machine geared for competitive elections. The practice obviously has a positive impact on the transition to democracy on Taiwan.

\textit{The Commission of Policy Coordination and Vice Chairmanship} Another important change in the KMT organization is the elevation of the Commission of Policy Coordination (Cheng-ts'e hui). It was set up in 1955, and was first headed by a secretary general. It was mainly used to convey the KMT's messages to its satellite parties. Since the early 1970s, it has assumed an increasingly active role in liaison with opposition parties and other branches of the political system. It was this organ that often reached the opposition to correct misunderstandings and alleviate political tension. In 1985, the Commission formulated "Major Points of Party-Government Relations in the Legislatures," which required the incorporation of the opinions of the other parties into the KMT's bills. In 1989 the title of the head of the Commission was changed to director. In 1990, the Commission created standing committees corresponding to committees in the Legislative Yuan. These committees are composed of both party legislators and
government officials. All bills are first discussed in the Commission's respective committees. Ensuring the swift passage of bills and the annual government budget on the legislative floor has been the top priority of the Commission. In March 1992, the CSC promoted the Commission of Policy Coordination to higher level.

The newest Organizational Charter of the Central Committee passed in the Fourteenth National Congress on August 23, 1993, institutes several "policy guidance commissioners" for the Commission of Policy Coordination. They are in charge of the discussion and screening of important policies and the coordination of important bills. The Charter also states that the Commission be headed by an executive head (Chih-hsing-chang), who is responsible for the coordination of party and government affairs and management of the Commission, and that the position of executive head be assumed by deputy secretary general of the KMT. The Commission of Policy Coordination now has four departments under its control: the Department of Political Party Public Relations, and three Coordination Departments for the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan respectively. The party cells in these three representative institutions were reformed into a KMT caucus. In April 1993, the Coordination Department for the Control Yuan was dismantled, and instead the Department of Policy Research was set up. These four departments are at the same level as other departments under the CC, like the Organizational Department. The Coordination Department for the National Assembly is responsible for coordination between the party and the National Assembly, connection with delegates, and guidance of the party caucus in the National Assembly. The Coordination Department for the Legislative Yuan is responsible for coordination between the party and the Legislative Yuan, bill discussion and screening, connection with the legislators, and guidance of the party caucus in the Legislative Yuan. The

90 Lin Cheng-feng, Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsi yu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong (Relations of the political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), (Taipei: San-sheng Ltd., 1994), p. 50.
Department of Political Party Public Relations is responsible for connection with other political parties and social elites. The Department of Policy Research is responsible for the analysis of the political situation and policy research, and other affairs and bills that are not related with the other three Departments. Since these four departments are at the same level as other CC departments, they are each headed by one director and one to four deputy director(s). Correspondingly, the party caucuses in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly are headed by secretaries general (Shu-chi-chang).91

Although the Commission of Policy Coordination is an old institution and the KMT did not change its name, it has now been given real power. Secretary General Hsu Sui-te argues that the KMT should not only have the determination to compete with other parties, but also the skills of negotiation and coordination.92 Under the intra- and inter-party pressure, the KMT has empowered it to coordinate the bills raised by the KMT members, to communicate with KMT officials and legislators, and to communicate with other political parties. The elevation of the Commission demonstrates the KMT's adaptability to the electoral politics and party politics.

Another structural change is the creation of the vice chairmanship of the party by the Fourteenth Congress in 1993. The implication for the KMT organization is that the creation of the vice chairmanship has decreased the function of the CSC and encouraged collective leadership. When the chairman cannot attend the CSC meeting, the vice chairman chairs the meeting. However, the CSC has only a limited influence over policy making in the actual policy process, and mainly acts to ratify decisions. The CSC is too large in size for manageable discussion. Some of its members are too old. Membership in the CSC is a form of political reward or honour. Some CSC members have stepped down

92 Lin Cheng-feng, Chung Taiwan Cheng-chih Sheng-t'ai lun Cheng-tang Kuan-hsi yu Cheng-tang Ko-t'ong (Relations of the political parties and negotiation in Taiwan's political ecology), Preface.
from government positions, but remain in the CSC, while many incumbents remain outside the CSC.

Figure 6.6  Simplified Central Organizational Structure of the Contemporary KMT
Important policies and personnel recruitment are often decided by some of the non-permanent groups. For instance, in every election year since the 1970s, the party chairman has nominated a screening group to finalize the party's candidate list. In August 1987, Ching-kuo tried to reactivate the CSC and formed six functional groups (Political, Party Affairs, Economic, Social, Education, and Judicial) in the CSC, and members of the CSC were asked to voluntarily participate in at least one of the groups. This kind of functional division of labour was Chiang's method of preparing for collective leadership in the post-Chiang era. After Chiang died in 1988, the CSC became much more compromising. Since then, non-permanent policy making groups have become a usual method of policy making in the party. In 1991 the "big seven policy group" briefly became the central policy making body. The "constitutional reform designing group" was formed to direct constitutional reforms, etc. The creation of the vice chairmanship further enhances the trend toward collective policy making.

The Fourteenth Congress also modified the Party Charter to state that the party congress will be convened every two years, rather than every four years, the CC will be convened every year, and the CSC be re-elected every year. Implementation of these regulations will break down power concentration in the party centre. Frequent elections will increase the personnel turnover faster, and enhance the KMT's intra-party democracy.

Finance In the new era, the KMT has to find new sources of financial revenues. The old practice of government allocation was ridiculed by the opposition as "government
treasury equals party treasury." The increasing cost of elections also requires the party to find new ways to support itself. Kuan Chung, former director of Organizational Department, argued that the party should use modern corporate management concepts, such as cost-benefit analysis and techniques of marketing and promotion, and should carry out fund-raising campaigns. The KMT has also tried to streamline its permanent work staff, increase the use of volunteers, and invite experts, scholars, and leaders from all walks of life to participate in its work. Campaign consultants are becoming popular and they try hard to keep down costs. The party owned- and operated-business has become increasingly important for its revenues. In 1993 the Management Commission for Party-run Business was set up under the CC. It is in charge of the party's investment strategy, investment decisions, and evaluation of the party-run business.

The KMT has eighteen major business enterprises, including eight in the media and cultural fields. Among these are the Central News Agency, the Central Daily News, the Broadcasting Corporation of China, and the Chung Cheng Book Company. The KMT also owns other businesses such as electrical appliance companies and computer firms. It is indirectly linked to many more businesses. Profits from these enterprises are an important source of revenue.

As of the close of business on December 31, 1994, the KMT's net assets were valued at 37.7 billion NT dollars. Net profits of the KMT's businesses totaled 2.6 billion in 1992, 5.2 billion in 1993, and 7.9 billion in 1994. The KMT relies heavily on business profits to finance its activities. In the KMT's 1995 budget, 4.1 billion will be expended for party affairs, which amounts to 78 percent of the budget. The KMT attempts to provide disclosure by publicly listing its businesses on the stock market. At the present time the KMT engages in business mainly in consideration of its funding requirements.

Some Taiwanese scholars point out the negative effects of the KMT's deep involvement in business. They argue that most other ruling parties in the world do not operate large scale business, and that the KMT is probably the biggest financial legal entity of all the political parties in the world. They claim that party interests may be in conflict with public interest and the private economy, and that consequently party members in the government have a conflict of interest on issues in which there is a conflict between party business and private business. In addition, it is too easy for party businessmen to obtain inside information. Some party leaders argue that a party with enormous economic resources will attract many opportunists into the party, and that such a party may degrade itself into an economic leviathan. They argue that the party's appeal to the people should be based more on its ideology and policy than on its economic strength.

Despite these possible problems, there are positive effects resulting from the KMT's financial strength for the party's role in Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy. The KMT does not receive covert government allocations any more, and is self-reliant financially. The financial strength gives the party the resources to win elections. In other words, the KMT was not "helped" to do well, rather it is able to win elections by itself. As Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter point out, if the "Right" party or parties cannot stay in the game, they are likely to resort to anti-democratic conspiracy or coup. The KMT does not need to resort to anti-democratic means, because it has the financial and organizational capability to survive democratization.

Of course, the KMT is in a powerful position to buy votes and survive through corrupt practices. From time to time there were reports that the KMT candidates purchased votes during the campaigns. The opposition was also involved in corrupt practices. For instance, as Ts'ai Ling and Ramon Myers described, in Chung-ho district of Taipei County during the 1989 elections, "the KMT candidates running for county magistrate, the Legislative Yuan, and the provincial assembly allegedly cooperated to sponsor 7,000 banquet tables to attract voters in the nine-day period from November 17 to 26. The DPP strongly protested this action, but responded by hosting 2,000 tables." However, there was no evidence that the party supported vote-buying with the money from the party treasury. As Ling and Myers point out, "most of the candidates running for the Legislative Yuan accepted money from businessmen to pay for their costly campaigning." Furthermore, the KMT is fighting against the corrupt practices. In early 1995, Justice Minister Ma Ying-chiu launched a major investigation into vote buying. The Ministry prosecuted councillors who resorted to bribery to win election as speaker in local legislatures. Among them, the vice speaker of the Provincial Assembly Yang Wenhsin was prosecuted.

Generally speaking, the strong financial resources enabled the KMT to support its candidates in various ways such as establishing campaign headquarters, gathering information about their opponents, coordinating their campaigns, disseminating information about their opponents' flaws, etc. Despite the instances of vote-buying by its candidates, the KMT as a party has not adopted vote-buying as a major campaign strategy. The fact remains that the KMT is now responding to the opposition's challenge through the electoral system, rather than resorting to outright authoritarian means.

6. Conclusion

Our discussion has discerned many organizational changes within the KMT. Through the three-phase development, the goal of the KMT has become survival in the elections, and its leaders' freedom of choice has become restricted. Power is no longer concentrated in a few hands. Party members have gained more influence in policy making as the party congress is convened more often and the CC and the CSC are re-elected frequently. The most obvious change is Taiwanization. Taiwanization is far from democratization, but it directly changed the alien nature of the KMT regime, and helped to articulate Taiwanese popular interests. The continuous recruitment of Taiwanese from all walks of life into the party transformed the KMT from an exclusive party into an inclusive party, and from an elite party into a mass party. Technocratization and rejuvenation policies have contributed to the strengthening and invigoration of the party. Both Taiwanization and technocratization improved the KMT's electoral fortunes.

The KMT has built a highly sophisticated organization. It used this political machine in the authoritarian period to control society and in the competitive era to support the party's electoral campaigns. It is thus adaptive. Contrary to Sartori's argument, the KMT has transformed itself by itself. Its organizational strength was very helpful in maintaining the KMT's continuous governance. The KMT's adaptability has been conducive to Taiwan's peaceful political development.

Of course, organizational reform of the KMT does not occur in a vacuum. Internal organizational change by the KMT was interlinked with the overall liberalization and democratization process. Internal party recruitment and organizational changes (Taiwanization, technocratization, primaries, etc.) laid down the basis for the systemic

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change. The need to win elections required and enhanced further organizational changes. The point is that the KMT has basically maintained its strong organization and adapted to sociopolitical changes on Taiwan, and this has helped it to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The organizational structure of the party is closely related to the governmental structure of the polity. In Western democracies, party organizations are different in presidential and parliamentary systems. In the presidential system, the central committees of the parties have no real power, and party caucuses in the parliament have no autonomy and decision making power. Party organization and discipline are loose. In the parliamentary system, the central committees are formed by party legislators, and they have real decision making power. The political system on Taiwan is still in the process of transition to democracy, and right now it is neither a presidential nor a parliamentary system, although recent developments seem to indicate that it is heading towards a presidential system. Thus the organization of the KMT is still in the process of transformation.
CHAPTER SEVEN  CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL RETHINKING

This final chapter will first summarize the KMT's role in Taiwan's transition to democracy and the reasons that the KMT could play this role. The second section will rethink the theoretical perspectives. The third section will discuss whether the KMT model can be learned by ruling parties in other developing countries. The last section will discuss the prospects for the KMT.

1. The Role of the KMT

This section aims to summarize major findings of the thesis.

This thesis has discussed and explained the crucial role played by the KMT in Taiwan's transition to democracy. While various, international and other "ecological" factors have been important, they have mainly provided preconditions for Taiwan's transition to democracy. The generalized influence of these factors has to pass through the filter of the ruling party before resulting in certain outcomes. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the KMT has been pro-active and has taken a lead in recent political developments on Taiwan, and has exploited the geopolitical opportunities and situation across the Taiwan Strait to its advantage in the process.

In the examination of the interaction between the ruling party and the opposition, the thesis finds that the opposition did make efforts to develop itself and push the KMT to democratize. It adopted mainly the parliamentary strategy to compete with the KMT.
Without the opposition pressure, the KMT would have been unable or would have had less motive to initiate the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, it is the KMT who made several crucial decisions that started Taiwan down the path to democracy, and that it has largely controlled the liberalization and democratization process on Taiwan. Copper points out three characteristics of the Taiwanese model of political development:

First is the order of precedence: economic development, then social change, then political modernization. Second, it instituted democracy "from the bottom-up" (at the local level) as a precondition for democratizing the system at the national level. And third, it followed cautious rather than dramatic political development, in an environment where safety and security are the higher priorities.¹

The outcomes of political development on Taiwan are probably not exactly what the KMT expected, and in some cases the KMT probably did not realize the full implications of its initiatives. Nevertheless, the KMT did accomplish one initiative after another, and each time it did adapt to the outcomes of its initiatives and implement new policies accordingly. The above three characteristics of Taiwan's political development are the results of the political engineering of the governing party.

By political engineering, I do not mean that the KMT regime had absolute power to direct historical development. Reforms were in part the ruling party's response to popular pressures. The KMT's responses could have been reactionary or adaptive. The KMT's response was adaptive. If there had been no pressure at all, the regime would have had little motivation to initiate reforms. If the KMT's response had been reactionary, Taiwan would have had greater difficulty making the peaceful transition to democracy. While socioeconomic factors and internal and external pressure did play an important role in this transition to democracy, our evidence demonstrates that the KMT's willingness and strength have resulted in a peaceful transition to democracy on Taiwan. The KMT

transformed itself from a highly authoritarian party to a competitive party, and played an important role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. At times the opposition has been frustrated by the liberalization measures and democratization reforms carried out by the KMT. The KMT has basically succeeded in controlling the timing and pace of Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The KMT's ability to play such a role can be explained by the party's own nature and characteristics. As far back as in the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT was fundamentally different from Communist parties. First, the KMT did not subscribe to the principle of proletarian dictatorship. As Moody puts it, the KMT "has been content to limit its ambitions to political control without any aspirations to permeate all aspects of society and of the daily lives of those subject to it." Second, it did not oppose private ownership. Third, the KMT regime did implement local self-governance, and independent candidates were allowed to run for office. Fourth, the consolidation of political power was instrumental to high speed economic growth, which laid down the socioeconomic foundation for later democratization.

Specifically, the KMT's role in Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy has been supported by its ideology. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are fundamentally democratic, but tutelary and pragmatic in terms of means to achieve the democratic end. Sun's tutelary approach to democracy provided the KMT with a ready excuse to maintain its authoritarian rule, but the tutelary stage could not be prolonged forever. Sun's principle of people's rights prevailed where other compelling interests did not preclude acting on it. Sun Yat-sen's emphasis on local democracy, his tutelary approach to democratic development, and his ultimate goal of democracy guided the KMT to build democracy accordingly on Taiwan. Meanwhile the KMT's pragmatic adaptation of Sunism made it

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more applicable to Taiwan. KMT elites claim that Taiwan's democratic achievement testified to their self-proclaimed long time commitment to Sun's ideal of democracy. Although this is not the whole story, the KMT's ideology did have a positive impact on the KMT.

The KMT was able to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy also because the top leaders of the party basically agreed on the need of change, although they had different opinions about the timing and pace of change. Chiang Ching-kuo, as the chairman of the KMT, played an important role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. Chiang's case demonstrates the importance of enlightened leadership in leading a peaceful transition to democracy. Chiang nurtured a generation of reformers. It is this group of reformers who have contributed most to the establishment of democratic values and procedures in the KMT party-state. Foremost among this group is Chiang's successor Lee Teng-hui who has also made great contribution to Taiwan's democratization, especially after the death of Chiang. However, it would be too simplistic to conclude that the conservatives played only a negative role in liberalization and democratization. The co-existence of conservative and reformist factions in the party balanced the needs of stability and change, and resulted in gradual and basically peaceful process of transition. The internal changes of the KMT make the party adaptable to social changes and the challenge of the opposition.

The KMT's recruitment and organization helped the party to play a progressive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. Through Taiwanization and technocratization, the KMT made itself more representative and capable. The KMT has a huge and well-coordinated organization that was used mainly as a tool of social control in the earlier authoritarian period and as a tool of electoral mobilization in the later period on Taiwan. Its organization changed slowly, but adapted to the new socio-political situation as required. The adaptability and strength of the KMT allowed the party a degree of continuity of governance during the transition to democracy on Taiwan.
The KMT was willing to carry out liberalization and democratization because it anticipated that it could still maintain its predominance despite the opening up. The KMT, as the ruling party for four decades, has accumulated much power and enjoys enormous prestige for its contribution to rapid economic growth and social security. In Kuan Chung's words, "through years of uninterrupted political development, we have acquired enough strength, enough wisdom, and enough confidence to bring about a series of breakthroughs." The KMT's willingness to open up was also encouraged by the weakness of the Tang-wai and later the DPP. When the KMT decided to open up the political system in 1986, the opposition forces were in serious disarray. The Tang-wai and its successor the DPP had been plagued with serious factional disputes and power struggles and insufficient organizational strength and financial power to challenge the KMT's dominance. It had never been able to break the 30 percent barrier in electoral turnout before the 1990s and its electoral base was not wide. In contrast, the KMT, with about two million members, has the resources and the organizational framework to maintain itself island-wide. In the late 1980s, one third of the public identified themselves with the KMT but at most a tenth with the DPP. Thus, the KMT could show the world that it is democratic, without losing its dominance. Nevertheless, it was the KMT that "redesigned the rules of the game so that loss of power is a possibility." The KMT's contribution to Taiwan's transition to democracy should not be underestimated.

2. Theoretical Rethinking

6 Edwin A. Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 243.
7 Moody, Political Change on Taiwan, p. 180.
Reality is a mixture made up of various nuanced parts. Taiwan's transition to democracy cannot be explained only by socioeconomic factors or by any other single factor. Among various factors, such political factors as the ruling party's ideology and organization are particularly important in Taiwan's transition to democracy. The KMT's ideology guided the KMT to implement local democracy from the start and urged it to liberalize and democratize at the national level eventually. The KMT's adaptive strategy for handling challenges from Taiwanese society gradually leads to its own intra-party changes. The accumulation of the intra-party changes facilitated the overall transition to democracy. The KMT's move to open up the system to multi-party competition was the outcome not simply of having to yield to pressures from society, but was also a consequence of its gradual internal organizational and leadership transformation and the practical use of the official ideology that mandated and legitimated such a move.

Theories of democratic transitions contribute a lot to the understanding of the Taiwan case. The general significance of prodemocracy leadership is confirmed. Just as Juan Linz, Larry Diamond, and others demonstrated, breakdowns of democracy in developing countries have not been inevitable occurrences; "Rather, the choices, decisions, values, and actions of political and institutional leaders have figured prominently -- and in many cases, quite clearly decisively -- in the decline or fall of democracy."\(^8\) In a similar vein, a democratic breakthrough on Taiwan was not an inevitable occurrence in the mid 1980s, and at that time the KMT could have succeeded in continuing authoritarian rule if it had chosen to do so. However, guided by its official ideology and based on its organizational strength, the KMT did not refrain from initiating

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Taiwan's transition to democracy. The democratic breakthrough is due to the adaptive approach of the KMT.

O'Donnell and Schmitter's emphasis on the role of the soft-liners and the importance of the strategies of the soft-liners is borne out by the case. KMT reformers did not try to carry out political reforms all at once. They took a gradual approach. They first implemented local elections, then gradually opened up supplementary elections at the national level. The thorough reform of the parliamentary system came only in the early 1990s. The skillful management of intra-party divisions is a specific characteristic of the KMT's transformation. The compromise between factions in the party is a key to the longevity of the ruling party. Facing the threat of the opposition, the coexistence of the reformers and conservatives brought out the best in the ruling party. On the one hand, without the rise of the reformers in the ruling party, it would have been difficult to reform the whole political system. Divisions within the party led to the toleration of an opposition party, thus breaking through the one-party system. On the other hand, without the check and balance of the conservatives, liberalization could have gotten out of control, resulting in chaotic political changes.

The theories of transition to democracy also direct attention to the interaction between the liberal reformers in the ruling party and moderates in the opposition. The theories state that it is the cooperation between these two groups that underlines the successful transition to democracy, while the confrontation between extremists in both establishment and opposition tends to undermine the transition to democracy. On Taiwan, before each major election, KMT reformers and opposition moderates communicated with each other behind the scene. Despite occasional breaks, the dialogue was maintained. The cooperation between the reformers of the establishment and the opposition culminated in the 1990 National Affairs Conference. After the DPP's adoption of a more radical stance on the independence issue and President Lee's active assistance to the KMT candidates in the 1993 election, the relationship between the KMT
mainstream and opposition moderates began to cool down, although they still cooperate at times. But by this time the transition to democracy on Taiwan was well underway. Generally speaking, during Taiwan's transition to democracy, both the interaction between the KMT and the Tang-wai (later the DPP), and the interaction between the reformers and the conservatives in the ruling KMT were important. These two processes were intertwined and formed a general picture of Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The Taiwan case also confirms, to some extent, another axiom of transition theory. O'Donnell and Schmitter observe that for a newly established democracy to be stable in the long run, the results of democratization cannot be too detrimental to the interests of parties of the Right-Centre and Right. The Right forces must be "helped" to do well, and the Left forces should not eliminate the Right forces altogether. If the Right party or parties cannot be persuaded to stay in the game, they are likely to resort to "anti-democratic conspiracy or coup."9 The KMT's experience demonstrates that the continuous governance of the ruling party is indeed beneficial to peaceful and gradual transition to democracy. However, the ruling party on Taiwan is different from those Right parties in other transitional countries in that the KMT did not need to be "helped" to do well; it has had the prestige and strength to maintain its governing status. The KMT initiated liberalization and democratization partly because it had solid legitimacy. This characteristic of the KMT contributed to the party's confidence during the transition and consequently to the peacefulness of Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The Taiwan case shares some similarities with the Southern European and Latin American cases on which theories of the transition to democracy are based. These similarities include that all cases are concerned with the transition from an authoritarianism of the "right," they all basically embrace Western ideologies,

geopolitically they all find themselves within the Western system of postwar alliances, etc. This is why many elements of theories of the transition to democracy can be appropriately applied to the Taiwan case.

There are, however, differences between the Taiwan case and the Southern European and Latin American cases. For instance, political traditions in Southern European and Latin American countries included a substantial amount of liberalism and constitutionalism, and some of them had democratic experiences after World War II. On the other hand, Taiwan has been under authoritarian rule constantly, and this is the first time that it has experienced the transition to democracy. Another difference is that in most Southern European and Latin American countries military or paramilitary regimes prevail, while on Taiwan a single political party, rather than the military, predominates. Thus, the reforms initiated by the party did not meet serious challenges from the military on Taiwan. Spain was not ruled by the military, but it did not have a well-organized political party, and the civilian dictatorship also failed to survive the dictator. On Taiwan, the authoritarian regime changed itself before its top leader died, as Chiang Ching-kuo initiated the transition himself.¹⁰ Theories based on Southern European and Latin American cases, therefore, cannot be neatly applied to the Taiwanese case. Rather, the Taiwan case can contribute to the enrichment of the transition theories in this aspect. A one-party state can first stabilize the system by manipulating parliamentary institutions and social groups with an appearance of democracy. Unlike in the military regimes, the party also controls the military and security agencies. The KMT controlled the military through the Political Warfare Department in the military and by virtue of a system of regular rotation among the military leaders. Party states are more likely than military regimes to maintain parliamentary institutions and electoral systems, thus facilitating the

transition to democracy. Despite popular cynicism about these institutions, they provide channels for development and expression of democratic forces. When the ruling party begins to liberalize, new democratic forces can grow from these institutions and work within the system, decreasing the chance of an abrupt destabilizing outburst.\textsuperscript{11}

The relative neglect of party-state cases by theorists of democratic transitions may well be the result of their neglect of the Taiwan case. The editors of \textit{Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia} select 10 Asian countries but omit Taiwan. Of course, when the book was published in 1989, the future of Taiwan's transition to democracy was still in doubt to many outside observers. Possibly scholars did not pay much attention to the Taiwan case because a ruling party directed transition to democracy is not as exciting as a democratizing movement from below.

Analysis of the nature of the party-state on Taiwan requires application of political party theories. Sartori's typology of party polities have been used to discern the different developmental stages of the KMT. The KMT first developed from a hard authoritarian to a soft authoritarian party, and then from a non-competitive to a competitive party. Sartori predicts that the transition from a non-competitive to a competitive party system would be very difficult. The Taiwan case, however, differs from Sartori's assertions in that (i) a non-competitive party system can convert into a competitive party system \textbf{without a breakdown}; (ii) a ruling party may transform itself \textbf{by itself} under certain circumstances; (iii) unipartism can evolve into a competitive party system successfully and, especially, \textbf{peacefully}.\textsuperscript{12} During the transition, Taiwan indeed seemed a little chaotic, with frequent demonstrations on the streets and occasional


fighting in the Legislative Yuan. Nevertheless, these activities were within legal restraints and the democratization process has not been reversed. It also seems that there is a close relationship between transformation on the part of the ruling party itself and successful overall transition to democracy. In other words, if the single ruling party can transform itself by itself, the conversion process from noncompetitive into competitive party politics, to a great extent, will be successful and peaceful. Taiwan's experience in this respect is encouraging for other developing countries.

The Taiwan case confirms Huntington's analysis of the evolution from revolutionary to established one-party system. The KMT experienced consolidation and adaptation on Taiwan. But on Taiwan, in the latter phase of the established one-party system, some characteristics emerged that differ from Huntington's description. First, with respect to ideology, while revolutionary ideology was waning, there was the trend of "returning to the Constitution." Although the new emphasis on democratic ideology is not as intense as that on the revolutionary ideology was, it has been widely accepted by both upper echelon and ordinary members of the KMT. This democratic ideology plays a crucial role in guiding Taiwan's transition to democracy. Second, the political leadership has tended to be more open-minded, enlightened and tolerant, rather than oligarchic as Huntington suggests. Third, the intellectuals not only criticize the system, but also participate in the ruling of it. Many of them were recruited into the ruling party, and they tried to reform the system from within. Others have joined the opposition movement and some of them have succeeded in winning elections. They have been tolerated by the KMT. Finally, contrary to Huntington's prediction that the established one-party system will remain undemocratic and fail to develop a political formula whereby power is dispersed and group autonomy encouraged, the KMT case demonstrates that a party such as the KMT can transform itself into a competitive party and lead the democratization process. Since the KMT has gradually become an election-oriented party, its lower level party members and elected politicians are no longer a docile party machine. Adaptation
and pragmatism of the single party laid down the foundation for its role in the peaceful transition to democracy. In fact, Huntington himself notices this fact in his recent work.\textsuperscript{13}

Taiwan's experience also demonstrates the importance of political stability. Huntington believes that political institutionalization is the key to political stability. The KMT case justifies his emphasis on the degree of fit between political institutionalization and political participation. The KMT fine-tuned its party machine and the electoral system to ensure orderly opening up. The KMT case demonstrates clearly that a strong ruling party provides an important degree of political stability during the transition to democracy.

The KMT case further demonstrates the significance of the ruling party's adaptability for the transition to democracy. The KMT's adaptability is high according to Huntington's criteria of longevity, leadership renewal and reprogramming. Adaptation to the changing environment requires the functional change of the party, i.e., from a societal control machine to an electoral machine. The KMT used its party machine to control the society in the authoritarian period and to support the party's electoral campaign in the competitive era. It has made consistent efforts in vote-getting and adapted to the environment of electoral politics that it initiated. When a ruling party becomes adapted to the electoral politics, it will not be afraid of competing with the opposition in the elections. A ruling party's adaptability, therefore, is conducive to a peaceful transition to democracy.

In addition to the above theoretical implications, the case of the KMT also has practical implications that we now turn to.

\section*{3. Relevance of the KMT experience}

In a comparative perspective, the KMT's experience is distinctive both historically and cross-culturally. There has never been a democratic polity in China's history. The KMT on Taiwan is the first ruling party in Chinese history that willingly competes with legitimate opposition political parties. On a cross-cultural level, authoritarian regimes have seldom given up their power voluntarily, especially when they have consolidated their rule during a long period. The change and collapse of authoritarian one-party systems are usually accompanied by violence. The KMT is among very few ruling parties that made a peaceful transition to democracy.

One aim of comparative or case studies is to draw experiences from the success of a particular area studied, and to use them in other countries. Quite often scholars find that the success of a country is based on so many distinctive characteristics and situational conditions of that particular society that it is totally impossible for other countries to duplicate the success. As for Taiwan's experience, ROC authorities believe that its success can be a model for other third world countries, especially for mainland China. Mainland authorities disagree. In academic circles, scholars also have different viewpoints.

16 For instance, Chalmers Johnson points out that Japan's excellent institutional arrangement (MITI) can stimulate high growth even in a resource-short and highly populated country, and he tries to introduce this experience to the United States. But he finds it difficult to have MITI-style practice in the U.S. because of the strength of American interest groups. Nevertheless, he argues that the Japanese model is "not replicable, but might be matched." Cf. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 314.
Some scholars believe that Taiwan achieved its success under an extremely adverse environment. The island does not have abundant natural resources. It was bombed by the American army in World War II. When the Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan was a backward agricultural island, and the Taiwanese work force was largely unskilled. At first, Taiwan was a high-risk place for savings and investment. The political and economic future of Taiwan was in doubt immediately after the war, and has been in doubt for many of the 40 years thereafter. So the argument goes, "If Taiwan under such adverse conditions could succeed so splendidly, it is natural to wonder, perhaps other countries in equivalent circumstances can achieve the same ultimate results if they study Taiwan's example."\(^{17}\)

Many scholars, however, point out many propitious factors that contributed to Taiwan's success. First, the 50 year colonization by Japan left Taiwan an infrastructure, even though it was damaged in the War. Another legacy of the Japanese colonial rule to Taiwan was a basis, preliminary as it was, of the manufacturing industry. Japan also invested heavily in education. Second, American aid played an important role in the initial stabilization of and later development of Taiwan's economy. America extended approximately $1.5 billion in economic aid to Taiwan over the 16 years from 1950 through 1965. Total U.S. aid averaged $16 per person per year.\(^{18}\) In the 1950s, Taiwan financed well over half of its investment with foreign aid. It has been estimated that Taiwan's growth rate would have been cut in half during the 1950s and early 1960s without American aid.\(^{19}\) The Korean War and the Vietnam War also helped Taiwan. Third, when the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, it brought with it capital and human resources to the island. Politically, the retreat facilitated the radical reform of the

\(^{17}\) Berman, *Words Like Colored Glass*, p. 205.
KMT, as the most corrupt elements and opponent factions did not follow Chiang to Taiwan. That is to say, the KMT government had both economic and political advantages to start. Thus, it would be difficult for other developing countries to emulate Taiwan if they do not enjoy similar favourable conditions.

Then what we can learn from the KMT case? This author contends that although some conditions are specific to Taiwan's transition to democracy, we can still learn some lessons from the KMT case. Although these lessons may not be exactly applicable to other countries, nevertheless, they are illuminating. The KMT case is an encouraging example, because it shows ruling parties in other developing countries that they can take a lead in the process of liberalization and democratization without losing their governing position under certain conditions. The first condition is that the ruling party makes a success of directing the nation's economic modernization. Another necessary condition is that the ruling party maintain its strength and adaptability. Probably no ruling party would willingly weaken its power when its legitimacy is at the lowest point. Ever since the first open electoral competition in 1986, support for the KMT has been declining. However, the KMT still enjoys the support of the majority of Taiwanese. The declining support for the party is a natural phenomenon in the democratic transition era. If a ruling party is better prepared for the opening up of the political system and competitive elections, then it has a better chance of continuing to govern. Third, the ruling party's decisions to liberalize and democratize can enhance its reputation and legitimacy, thus contributing to its continuous governance. Fourth, the ruling party can opt for cooperation with or co-optation of the opposition, making it work within the system, rather than against the system. Providing channels for participation and suppressing radical opposition are integral parts of this strategy. Nurturing a moderate rather than radical opposition is helpful for the peaceful transition to democracy.

Finally, the KMT case also demonstrates that political development can be engineered. Despite the danger that tutelage might be used by the ruling party as an
excuse to prevent democratization, a step by step approach is beneficial for a peaceful transition to democracy, and probably also good for consolidation of an emerging democracy. The experiences of postwar democratization in many developing countries -- most noticeably Nigeria -- tell us that an abrupt transition to democracy or sudden downfall of an authoritarian regime may result in disorder, which in turn may give birth to another authoritarian regime. While many other countries hurried into democracy after World War II, Taiwan implemented hard authoritarianism, but it gradually softened its authoritarianism and made some important decisions that started Taiwan down the path to democracy. Such an incremental development approach is not only good for economic and political development, but also favourable for the ruling party's continuous governance.

4. Prospects for the KMT

Comparing the present KMT with the KMT of the 1950s, we find that it has undergone fundamental changes. It is no longer a hard authoritarian party that has tight control over both the opposition and its own members. Rather, it has become a governing party that faces a strong challenge from a legitimate opposition party, and also from balancing forces within. The KMT is losing ground to its major competitor the DPP. The KMT, however, is still the strongest party on Taiwan, and is likely to remain strong in the near future. It is still the biggest party in terms of the number of the party members and the strongest party in terms of financial background and organization. The strong financial background of the KMT is a supportive factor for the KMT to maintain its continuous ruling in the face of increasing electoral costs. The DPP has only about 20,000 card-carrying members. The KMT's other competitor the New Party has even fewer members, and mainly consists of legislators. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Chu
Kao-cheng, was combined with the New Party in 1994. But the combination did not add much weight to the New Party.

In terms of leadership, the KMT and the DPP are quite similar. The leaderships are mostly middle-class intellectuals and professionals. Since both are catch-all parties, which do not claim to represent any particular social classes and attempt to recruit members from all strata, they have supporters in all economic and social groups. But in terms of social class, an average KMT member is usually several steps higher than an average DPP member, as "the KMT has more millionaires and successful business leaders in its ranks."\(^{20}\) The DPP receives support from four kinds of people: (1) low-income people in the urban areas who feel deprived; (2) intellectuals who desire a competitive party system; (3) Taiwanese middle-class elements who are dissatisfied with the dominance of mainlanders at the top echelon of the government; and (4) Taiwanese people who support the Taiwan independence movement. However, there are no intense class divisions on Taiwan. Neither the KMT nor the DPP is a class party. Both present themselves as a mass party. However, the KMT enjoys a broader base of support on Taiwan. It has solid base in various sections of the community, such as business, farmers, labour, and professional groups. The KMT is a multi-ethnic party, and appeals to all ethnic groups.

The DPP seems to have suffered from two major weaknesses: factionalism and lack of positive programmes. There are at least three factions in the DPP. Factionalism is caused not only by personality differences of leaders, but also by their different positions on a key issue, namely the implementation of the DPP's stand on "self-determination." To some leaders, "self-determination" simply means that the residents of Taiwan should have the right to determine the future of Taiwan; and it does not imply that Taiwan should

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become independent, though this option is not ruled out. Some others believe that self-determination is the code word for independence.

Like the KMT, factionalism in the DPP also led to splits in the party. The Labour Party was inaugurated in Kaohsiung in 1987. The majority of its leaders are former members or supporters of the DPP, and thus the new party may be considered as a splinter of the DPP. It sought support from Taiwan's nearly eight million industrial workers. Chu Kao-cheng quit the DPP and formed his own Social Democratic Party. In 1988, the DPP and other opposition forces attempted to organize the farmers. This resulted in two rival organizations within the opposition, indicating that the opposition as a whole has yet to overcome its teething problems.

The other weakness of the DPP is that the party has not presented the electorate with an alternative programme of public policies. Traditionally, the Tang-wai and later the DPP have emphasized democratic reform and the emotional issue of "self-determination." The DPP lacks economic and financial experts and policy planners. Comparatively, the KMT has a rich experience of policy making and implementation through more than four decades of governance. One characteristic of the ROC's development experience is that Taiwan's modernization has been directed by the instructive and innovative policies of the KMT. On issues such as crime, pollution and traffic, the KMT has been seen by the electorate as more competent to handle the problems. Taiwanese populace generally wants stability and strong leadership. In this regard, the KMT has no difficulty in claiming itself as a party of law and order. The DPP realizes its weakness in the policy field and is taking measures to strengthen its capabilities.

The economic situation has also been favourable for the KMT's continuous ruling. Taiwan registered an average real GNP growth rate of 6 percent in recent years. It still keeps the unemployment rate low. In the new era, socioeconomic issues will increasingly be at the centre of party politics. Opposition politicians have usually advocated more
social welfare and better pay for workers, and have even called for European style socialist welfare state systems. In recent years in order to cater to constituents, the KMT has been implementing social-democratic programmes, which were previously advocated by the opposition parties. This made the opposition's welfare proposals less appealing to ordinary Taiwanese people. In addition, the populace agrees with the KMT's anti-Communism, though without supporting it as an ideology as strongly as the government does. This implies that the populace is not supportive of the policies that have socialist colour.

The KMT also has many problems, such as "money politics" and violence in the elections. Business leaders have a great influence over law makers. Political campaign costs are rising rapidly and most candidates are exceeding the official campaign budget limits imposed by the Central Election Commission. Candidates spend as much as US$ 8 million, either to buy votes or to engage the services of a campaign consultant. Rampant bribery occurred during March 1, 1994 elections for county and city councils. In Tai-chung city's election, candidates reportedly spent $7.5 million to win the speakership. KMT members were deeply involved in this scandal. But the other parties face the same problems.

It should be noted that corruption, if developed without restraints, could undermine an emerging democracy in a developing country. Militaries in many developing countries replace civil governments in the name of eradicating corruption. Fighting corruption is definitely an important task during the consolidation of democracy. Fortunately, the government on Taiwan acknowledges the problems and the Ministry of

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Justice of the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan are taking measures to curb corruption.

Generally speaking, therefore, the KMT has the capability to maintain its governing status. After the KMT's setback in 1989 elections, some scholars pointed out that "the electoral performance of the DPP in 1989 may well be a onetime gain in the wake of political decontrol rather than a long-term trend." This judgment has been by and large proved by later developments, as the KMT defeated both the DPP and the New Party in 15 of 23 city and county elections in 1993. Polls that had indicated declining popular support for the KMT made the victory a strong boost for the party.

What do the relative strength and weakness of the KMT and opposition parties mean for party politics on Taiwan? At the very initial stage of democratization, popular views about the prospects for Taiwanese party politics suggested that it would resemble the LDP's factionalist politics in Japan. The Japanese model is constituted by following factors: (1) the ruling party dominates the political scene, (2) the ruling party maintains regular consultation with smaller, fragmented opposition parties, and (3) there is pervasive factionalism within the ruling party. Taiwan's conditions in the early 1990s seemed favourable for development of a Japanese style of party politics. As it has been noted, "The qualifications for the formation of new parties are minimal. Thus the entry barriers to political competition are low, resulting in a fragmented opposition.... The existing single-vote, multiple-seat electoral system does provide space for smaller parties... [to] pool their votes to get some seats and therefore are likely to be kept in the electoral game." This situation seems favourable for the emergence of the Japanese type of party politics on Taiwan.

24 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, p. 23.
26 Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan, pp. 22-23.
After the 1992 elections, scholars think that the elections indicated a trend towards a two-party political system, as the minor opposition parties failed to register significant returns. The KMT and DPP have worked together to exclude other minor parties. Some scholars predict that one day the DPP will become a governing party. Recent development, especially the separation of the New KMT Front from the KMT, seems to foretell different developments.

The New Party mainly consists of legislators. It has modelled its operations on those of American political parties. To demonstrate its democratic nature, the New Party is headed by a convener, instead of a chairman. It keeps distance from each of the other major parties. The founding of the New Party further weakened the KMT's control of the Legislative Yuan. While the separation of the New Party from the KMT apparently weakened the KMT, it was not necessarily good for the DPP, because it also encroached on the voter support of the DPP.

Since the formation of the New Party, Taiwanese party politics has become a "big, medium and small" tri-party system. In the December 2, 1995 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT gained 85 seats, the DPP 54 seats, the New Party 21 seats, and other parties and the independents 4 seats. Their relationship is based on their attitude toward issues of democratic reform and independence. Traditionally, the DPP and the New KMT Front cooperated on the issue of democratic reform. Since the DPP strengthened its Taiwan independence stance, it does not want to cooperate with the New Party any more. It has stated that it would rather get closer to the KMT mainstream on the matter of the national identity issue. However, the DPP and the New Party still cooperate on social and economic issues.

30 Interview with New Party legislator Li Ch'ing-hua.
Whether or not the tri-party system on Taiwan can last is a matter of question. But one thing is certain. The weakening cohesion of the KMT and the vigorous challenge of the DPP and the New Party has not yet led to a change in power. The KMT has adapted to the fundamental socio-political changes and is still the dominant and governing party. The Taiwanese electorate has acknowledged the KMT's contribution to the transition to democracy, and has granted the party continuous governing status as of 1996. The KMT may not indefinitely remain the governing party, but it will remain a major political actor in Taiwan's politics.

In the final analysis, the KMT has been able to maintain its dominance in Taiwan's politics while making an alternation of power legally possible. Its willingness and ability to initiate and control first liberalization and then democratization were an important factor that helped ensure a peaceful and successful transition to democracy on Taiwan. The KMT's tutelary ideology, enlightened leadership, and strong and adaptable organization have allowed the party to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. Adapting to the changes that it initiated itself, the KMT has transformed itself from a hard authoritarian to a competitive party. However, I do not intend to argue that Taiwan's emerging democracy was simply granted by the ruling KMT. Other factors have also influenced the liberalizing and democratizing process. However, the KMT played a particularly important role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. The long-time ruling party has not only survived the transition to democracy; further, based on its own strength, it has been willing and able to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy.
APPENDIX ONE  A CHRONOLOGY OF THE KMT ON TAIWAN

1894

November  

*Hsin-chung Hui* (Society for rebuilding China) is founded by Sun Yet-sen in Hawaii.

1912

January  

The Republic of China is founded, with Sun Yat-sen as the first provisional president.

1919

October  

Sun Yat-sen founds the Nationalist Party (KMT) in Shanghai.

1924

January  

The KMT holds the first National Congress. Sun Yat-sen invites the Soviet advisors to help him to renovate the party.

1945

October  

Taiwan is formally retroceded to China after 50 years of Japanese occupation.

1947

January  

The ROC government promulgates the Constitution.

February  

February 28 Incident occurs on Taiwan. Thousands are killed, and the Taiwanese intellectual and social elite are effectively liquidated.

1948

March  

China's First National Assembly under the Constitution opens with 1,629 delegates attending.
April
The First National Assembly approves Temporary Provisions granting emergency powers to the president during the period of the anti-Communist campaign.

May
Martial law is imposed on Taiwan.

1949
January
General Ch'en Ch'eng is sworn in as governor of Taiwan.

December
The KMT government moves its seat to Taipei.

1950
July
Chiang Kai-shek creates a Central Reform Committee to reorganize the KMT.

October
The KMT Seventh Party Congress formally terminates the reorganization campaigns. Taiwanese have virtually no representation in the party centre.

1952
October
Chiang Ching-kuo founds the Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps.

1953
September
President Chiang recommends an extension of the term of office of the delegates to the First National Assembly, elected in 1947, until the Second National Assembly can be elected.

1954
March
Chiang Kai-shek is re-elected president for a second six-year term.

December
Kao Yu-shu, an independent, is elected mayor of Taipei.

1955
August
General Sun Li-jen is purged.

October
The sixth session of the Seventh National Congress passes the "Headlines for Central Committee Reforms."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>The KMT's Eighth National Congress meets. Chiang is re-elected Tsung-tsai of the KMT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>The Taiwanese authorities sponsors the establishment of the Confucius and Mencius Studies Association.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>The KMT smashes the attempt at founding the China Democratic Party. Lei Chen is sentenced to ten years in jail.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>The KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) passes a resolution which decides to continue to support the non-party social elite to compete for the positions in county and city legislatures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>In the fourth session of the KMT Eighth Congress, Chiang proposed &quot;renovation, mobilization and struggle&quot; as the goals for the current works.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>The KMT carries out the general registration of its members. It is finished in January 15, 1963.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td>The KMT begins to implement export-oriented economic policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>The Ninth National Congress increases the membership of the Central Committee (CC) to 75 and that of the Central Advisory Committee to 144. The membership of the CSC was increased to 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Kao Yu-shu wins the election of the mayor of Taipei again.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Ch'en Ch'eng dies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>The National Assembly elects Chiang Kai-shek to a fourth term as president.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>The second session of the Ninth Congress passes the &quot;Organizational Improvement Proposal.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>The National Security Council is established by Chiang Kai-shek.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>The CSC ratifies the organizational charter of the Committee of Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement. Chiang Kai-shek assumes director of the Committee. Of the 75 members of the CC four are Taiwanese, two of whom are on the nineteen-member CSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>The first conference of the World Anti-Communist League opens in Taipei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Seventh provincial elections are held for 847 county and city councilors and 312 mayors and town chiefs.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Taiwan voters go to the polls to elect provincial assemblymen, county magistrates, and mayors.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>26 new members are elected to the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan from among 52 candidates. Party membership amounts to 6.9 percent of the population. 61 percent of all KMT members are mainlanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January</td>
<td><em>The Intellectual</em> is published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>The Tenth National Congress meets and modifies the Party Charter and political programme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
June  
Chiang Ching-kuo is promoted from minister of defense to deputy premier.

December  
A limited number of legislative and assembly seats are open to contestation on Taiwan to supplement the mainland seats.

1970

March  
Chiang Kai-shek demands a thorough renovation of the party in the second session of the Tenth Congress.

1971

October  
The Republic of China withdraws from the United Nations.

April  
Tiao-yu-t'ai movement occurs.

1972

February  
*Shanghai Communiqué* is issued by the United States and the PRC.

March  
The third session of the Tenth National Congress of the KMT modifies the "Organization Regulations of the Central Committee." 21 persons are elected to the CSC.

April  
The CSC decides to streamline party organization.

May  
Chiang Ching-kuo assumes the premiership.

December  
Elections of additional members to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, and of new mayors and county magistrates are held on Taiwan.

1973

November  
In the fourth session of the Tenth National Congress, Chiang Kai-shek calls on the party to understand the situation and to renovate the party continuously.

1975

April  
Chiang Kai-shek dies. Yen Chia-kan succeeds as president.

May  
Chiang Ching-kuo becomes chairman of the party.
June
The CSC passes the "Main Points for Renewing Party Membership."

August
The *Taiwan Political Review* (Taiwan cheng-lun) is published by K'ang Ning-hsiang. Tang-wai (literally, "outside the party") democratic movement starts.

1976
November
The Eleventh Congress meets. Li Huan is appointed director of the Organizational Department.

1977
November
The Chung-li Incident occurs.

1978
March
The National Assembly elected Chiang Ching-kuo as the president.

May
The CSC decides that Lin Yang-kang be chairman of Taiwan Province, and Lee Teng-hui as mayor of Taipei.

August
The opposition forms a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Corps.

December
National elections are postponed on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States.

1979
January
The PRC and the United States establishes diplomatic relationship.

April
U.S. President Jimmy Carter signs legislation permitting continued commercial and cultural relations between the United States government and the ROC following the break in diplomatic ties.

June
K'ang Ning-hsiang begins to publish *The Eighties*.

August
Huang Hsin-chieh begins to publish *Formosa*, which represents the radicals in the opposition.

December
The new CSC increases to 27 members.
The Kaohsiung Incident occurs.

1980

February

The mother-in-law and twin baby daughters of Lin I-hsiung are murdered in their homes.

April

The court martial sentences Huang Hsin-chieh 14 years and Shih Ming-te life-time in prison. Other six persons 12 years.

December

The KMT and the Tang-wai reaches a "gentlemen's agreement." In the supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan, the Tang-wai wins 27.6 percent of the popular vote. In the election of substitute delegates to the National Assembly, they win 34.66 percent.

1981

March

The Twelfth National Congress stresses rejuvenation of Chinese culture, building of democracy and rule of law, and reunification of China under the Three Principles of the People.

July

Ch'en Wen-ch'eng, a Taiwanese mathematician from Carnegie-Mellon University, is murdered.

The KMT has nearly two million members, or about 11 percent of the population. 20 percent of the membership are women, 65 percent under age forty, 65 to 70 percent Taiwanese, and 85 percent new members Taiwanese.

1982

January

In the CSC meeting Chiang asks those KMT members who were elected for public positions to serve the people.

1983

December

Tang-wai candidates rallies 29.1 percent of the popular vote in the supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan.

General Wang Sheng is sent as ROC ambassador to Paraguay.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Chiang chooses Lee Teng-hui as the KMT's vice presidential nominee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Elected oppositionists form the Association of Public Policy Studies as the coordination centre of their movement. The KMT government tolerates the formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>The CSC passes a personnel bill proposed by Chiang: Liang Hsiao-huang and Ma Ying-chiu as deputy general secretaries of the Central Committee, Sung Shih-hsuan as director of Organizational Department, Kao Ming-hui as director of the Youth Department, and Kuan Chung as director of the Provincial Party Branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Henry Liu, a Taiwanese American who publishes an unauthorized biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, is killed by Bamboo Union thugs under the direction of Taiwan's military intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The KMT and the Tang-wai once again reaches a &quot;gentlemen's agreement&quot; in the nationwide local elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>At the third session of the KMT's Twelfth Central Committee, Chiang Ching-kuo directs the KMT to open a dialogue with the Tang-wai leaders. Four new members are appointed to the party's CSC, two of them Taiwanese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Chiang instructs the CSC to study the ways and means to implements reforms, and he hints at the possibility of lifting the Emergency Decree and legalizing new political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Chiang orders his party's functionaries to &quot;sincerely communicate (consult) with people from different segments of society.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Association of Public Policy Studies is for the first time allowed to establish local branches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo instructs to study six political reform issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) announces its establishment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
October

Chiang interviews American reporters and announces that martial law and the ban on the formation of new parties will soon be ended.

The CSC passes bills of "National Security in the Period of Communist Rebellion" and "Civil Associations in the Period of Communist Rebellion."

November

The DPP holds its First Congress and releases a draft of its charter and platform.

December

The DPP and the KMT compete as the two principal parties in the national election for the first time.

Chiang Ching-kuo declares in the 38th anniversary of the Constitution that his family members cannot and will not compete for the next presidency.

In the CSC meeting Chiang Ching-kuo asks KMT members to transfer from the role of leading to the role of serving.

1987

July

The Legislative Yuan adopts the National Security Law, and after 39 years, the status of emergency is lifted.

Reformist Li Huan is appointed secretary general of the party.

September

KMT Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo proposes at the party's Central Standing Committee meeting that a task force of five be formed to study the possibility of allowing Taiwan residents to visit relatives on mainland China.

1988

January

Registrations for new newspapers are opened, and restrictions on the number of pages per issue are relaxed.

The Legislative Yuan passes the Law on Assembly and Parades during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, which outlines three fundamental principles and specifies areas that will be off-limits to demonstrators.
Chiang Ching-kuo dies. Lee Teng-hui succeeds to the Presidency. The CSC decides that Lee Teng-hui be the acting chairman of the KMT.

**July**

The Thirteenth National Congress passes a "Guideline for Party Reform." Lee Teng-hui is elected chairman. The Party Charter drops the term "democratic centralism."

**1989**

**January**

The Law for Civic Organizations legitimizes the formation of opposition parties. The Legislative Yuan also passes the revised Law on the Election and Recall of Public Officials and the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians.

**July**

The KMT stages its first-ever primaries to elect candidates for the 1989 elections for legislators, Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen, members of the Taipei and Kaohsiung municipal councils, county magistrates, and mayors of provincial-level cities. The DPP also adopts a primary system to choose its nominees.

**December**

In the first election since the lifting of martial law, the DPP garners 35 percent of the popular vote.

The DPP's Yu Ch'ing captures the Taipei county magistrate's seat.

**1990**

**January**

Low-ranking government employees are permitted to visit relatives across the Strait, and native Taiwanese who moved to the mainland before 1949 are allowed to visit relatives on Taiwan.

**February**

KMT's temporary central session meets.

**March**

Thousands of university students stage a sit-down protest at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Plaza to express opposition to the National Assembly's attempt to expand its authority.

The National Assembly elects Lee Teng-hui as president and Li Yuan-ts'u as vice president.
The CSC passes a three-stage plan to thoroughly implement the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians, and to have 125 senior parliamentarians retire by the end of 1991.

Lee Teng-hui declares in his inauguration speech that the constitutional reforms will be completed within two years.

Premier nominee Hao Pei-tsun is approved by the Legislative Yuan, and is appointed premier by President Lee Teng-hui.

The National Affairs Conference is convened.

The Democracy Foundation is founded.

The Temporary Provisions during the Period of Communist Rebellion is abolished.

The KMT wins the Second National Assembly election.

The Second National Assembly passes the constitution amendment bill proposed by the KMT.

In the election of the Second Legislative Yuan the KMT gets 102 out of 161 seats, and the DPP gets 50 seats.

Central Policy Guiding Group is formed in the KMT in order to realize collective policy making.

Both KMT and DPP members of the Legislative Yuan enacts the Sunshine Bill, which encloses very restrictive rules for financial disclosure of government officials.

Hao Pei-tsun resigns premiership.

Some non-mainstreamers separate themselves from the KMT and form the New Party.

The Fourteenth National Congress creates the office of deputy party chairmanship and elects four persons to the posts.
December 1994
The KMT defeats both the DPP and the New Party in 15 of 23 city and county elections.

1994 March
KMT members heavily involve in election bribery during elections for county and city councils.

April
KMT temporary session of the CC passes seven principles of the revision of constitution.

July
The Declaration of the Relationship between Two Sides of Taiwan Straits is published by the Mainland Commission of the Executive Yuan.

1995 December
In the Legislative Yuan election, the KMT gains 85 seats, the DPP 54 seats, the New Party 21 seats, and other parties and the independents 4 seats.

1996 March
In the first direct popular presidential election on Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui garners 54 percent of the votes, while the DPP's candidate gets 21 percent of the votes.
APPENDIX TWO INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

The following is a list of individuals with whom I conducted interviews. It does not include all those individuals who provided information and insight about the KMT on Taiwan.

Ch'en Chung-shin, director, Policy Research Centre, DPP.

Ch'en Lu-an, a son of Ch'en Ch'eng; former director, KMT Organizational Department; former KMT secretary general.

Chao Shao-k'ang, former KMT legislator, Legislative Yuan; head, Environmental Protection Administration, the Executive Yuan (for a very short period); New Party legislator, Legislative Yuan.

Feng Ting-kuo, National Assemblyman (KMT).

Hsiao Hsing-i, deputy director, Mainland Affairs Department; professor, National Taiwan Normal University.

Huang Hsin-chieh, former DPP Chairman; former publisher, Formosa Magazine.

Hung Hsiu-chu (female), legislator (KMT), Legislative Yuan.

Kuan Chung (John C. Kuan), former director, KMT Organizational Department and deputy secretary general.

Li Ch'ing-hua, a son of Li Huan, New Party legislator, Legislative Yuan.

Lin Bih-jaw, former head, the Institute of International Relations;

Ma Ying-chiu, a Harvard University Law School graduate; Chiang Ching-kuo's English-language secretary; former KMT deputy general secretary.

Ming Chu-cheng, political science professor; deputy secretary general, China Reunification Alliance.

Yang Tai-shuen, political science professor; president, the Democracy Foundation.
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