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Bhā-viveka (A.D. c. 490-570)’s Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, Tattvajñānaiṣanā, verses 137-266 : an.. Watanabe, Chikafumi 1994-12-31

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Bhã-viveka (A.D. c. 490-570)’s Madhyamaka-hdaya kãrikã, Tattvajñãnaisanã, verses 137-266 An English translation and Explanation  by CHIKAFUMI WATANABE B.A. Ryukoku University, 1990 M.A. Ryukoku University, 1992 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  Department of Asian Studies  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  September 1994 © Chikafumi Watanabe, 1994  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department  or  by  his  or  her  representatives.  It  is  understood  that  copying  or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  Department of  ,4;$j’4”  9?2ZU(  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2188)  O&t’.  it, i//v  II  Abstract The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the third chapter, Tattvajnt1naianã, (vv. 137-266 ) of Madhyamaka-hdaya-kãrikt (MHK)of Bhãviveka (A.D. c. 490-570). Bhaviveka was one of the commentators of Madhyamaka-kãrik of Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamika, and, at the same time, was a significant philosopher. MHK is one of Bhãviveka’s most important works. In the MHK, Bhaviveka gives a his own philosophy in chapters 1-3, and thereafter, presents and criticizes Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems opposing Madhyamaka philosophy in chapters 4-9. The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima. Shotaro lida, also, published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of Madhyamaka-hrdaya-tarkajvala (TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding to those verses, and produced an English translation. The main subject of verses 137-256 is “the non-production of all dharmas.” This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nagarjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoint. Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (unyata) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Madhyamikas, basic and very important among the Buddha’s teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea, no understanding of the philosophy of the Madhyamika is possible. Therefore, I have decided to translate and explain in this thesis Bha-viveka’s views on “non-production of entities.” Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita and Candrakirti used prasañga-anumana in order to clarify the philosophy of emptiness. That is to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent’s opinion, they tried to demonstrate the philosophy of emptiness. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in order to have consensus by other schools. Bhãviveka, on the other hand, was not satisfied with prasaHga-anumana, and tried to clarify the philosophy of emptiness by means of independent syllogism (svatantra-anumãna), including the three modifications: (1) adding of the word paramãrthataz (from the standpoint of the highest truth) to propositions in syllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in syllogisms should be understood as prasajya-pratiedha (the negation of a proposition or the simple negation of a  ‘‘U  proposition) and (3) the condition that no counter-example (vipaka) is to be given. In other words, he positively demonstrated the philosophy of emptiness by using independent syllogism.  Table of Contents Abstract Table of Contents List of Tables Acknowledgement Chapter One. Introduction  ii iv vi viii 1  Basic Standpoint of Madhyamika Thought The thought of ‘emptiness’ (anyata) “Dependent origination” (pratitya-samutpada) “Own-being” of “intrinsic nature” (sva-bhãva) Bhã-viveka The works of Bhãviveka Bhãviveka’s logic Adding the restriction paramarthataz to the proposition The negation in the proposition should be understood as prasajya pratiedha Fallacy of proposition Negation in the ultimate reality No counter-example (vipaka) is available Chapter Two.  Bhãviveka’s Madhyamaka-hdaya-karikã,Tattva-jñãnaiaiza, verses 137-256 An English translation and Explanation 26 Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas Non-production from itself Non-production from others The criticism of the four pratyayas or conditions The criticism of the hetu-pratyaya or the primary or material causal factor The criticism of the dlambana-pratyaya or the objective causal factor The criticism of the samanantara-pratyaya or the sequential causal factor The criticism of the adhipati-pratyaya or the dominant causal factor  V  The problem of the pratyaka and pratiti The criticism of the theory of the Sathkhya system Non-production from itself and others Non-production from ahetu or without cause Non-production from without (the criticism of Lokayatas) The criticism of acceptance of God, etc. drsti “view” duzkha “suffering” The examination of the Buddha Seeing pratityasamutpada and seeing the Buddha Conclusi9n  Chapter Three. Conclusion  87  Appendix  97  Bibliography  ‘102  vi List of Tables ALB BS JATS  IBK  IIJ JA JBORS JIP JOR KDBKN KDKKK KDR MB MCB NBKR NIBK OKDK ON OsG Ota.  Adyar Library Bulletin Bukkyogaku Seminã (Biddhist Seminar, Kyoto: Otani University) International Association for Tibetan Studies, Vol. 1 Buddhist Philosophy and Literature, ed. by ShOren Ihara and ZuihO Yamaguchi, Naritasan ShishOji, 1992 Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyü (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, University of Tokyo) Indo-Iranian Jounal Journal Asiatique Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society Journal of Indian Philosophy Journal of Oriental Research Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu Nenpo (Tokyo: Komazawa University) Kinki Daigaku Kyoyobu Kenkyu KiyO (Osaka: Kinki University) KOyasan Daigaku RonsO (Wakayama: Koyasan University) Mikkyo Bunka Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques Nagoya (Daigaku) Bungakubu Kenkyã Ronshã (Aichi: Nagoya University) Nagoya (Daigaku) Indogaku BukkyOgaku Kenkyukai Osaka KyOiku Daigaku KiyO (Osaka: Osaka Kyoiku University) Otani NenpO (Kyoto: Otani University) Osaki GakuhO (Tokyo: RisshO University) The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto Catalogue and Index), Suzuki Research Foundation, 1962. Otani Gakuhö (Kyoto: Otani University) Pali Text Society Ryukoku Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyu Kiyo (Kyoto: Ryukoku University) RisshO Daigaku Daigakuin Nenpo (Tokyo: RisshO University) -  -  OtG PTS RDDKK RDDN TD TDK  TaishO DaizOkyO (Chinese Tripitaka) Tsurumi Daigaku KiyO (Kanagawa: Tsurumi University)  vi I TDT TDTK TJDTK Toh.  WZKSO  Tsukuba Daigaku Tetsugaku (S)hisOkei (R)onshü (Chiba: Tsukuba University) Tsurumi Daigaku Tankidaigakubu KiyO Tsurumi Jyoshi Daigaku Tanki (Daigakubu) Kiyo A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkab gyur and Bstan-Iigyur), ed. by H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, T. Tada). Tohoku University Indogaku Kenkyükai, 1953. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens Abbreviations and signs in the translation chapter  Ms  [1 ( ) + = o  SC k. v. vv. K KS KT TJ  Manuscript of MHK The syllables are not clear but ligible. The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed. Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible. The space for one syllable is damaged. The syllable is divided, e.g. ‘tasy=asti’ in ms. The syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted. The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering made by Sankrtyayana. kãrika or kãrikã = verse(s) of the main text verse verses The Kãrikã text The Kärikã text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima. The Kãrikã text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima. Tarka-jvãla  Viii  Acknowledgement I am in debted to Professor A. N. Aklujkar, my major professor, who introduced me to Bhãviveka’s Madhyamaka-hrdaya-karika. As a graduate student of the University of British Columbia, I was much influenced by Professor A. N. Aklujkar’s lectures on Indian Linguistics, philosophy and literature. Here I wish to express my deepest obligations to Professor A. N. Aklujkar for critically reading my thesis and tirelessly making suggestions. The suggestions were invaluable. I also would like to thank Dr. Karin Preisendanz, now of Hamburg University, who was my supervisor when I was a first year in the master’s student at the University of British Columbia. I was given much useful information and helpful advice in her classes and in private consultations. Thanks are also due to Professor Kenneth Bryant for allowing me to use his computer font and for helpful advice in private consultations. I would like to acknowledge the generaous advice and help of thesis committee, Professor Daniel L. Overmyer, Professor Jerry Schmidt and Professor Laurence Preston in shaping my thesis into more presentable form. I am deeply grateful to both Professor Yuichi Kajiyama and Mr. Yusho Wakahara for their invaluable suggestions. Nowadays, I realize the significance of the words kalyaiamitra. Mr. Tsunenori Ito who gave me much useful information and materials has been my kalyäi.zamitra. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my mother for her constant encouragement. I believe that my late father has been protecting me with blessings of the Triple Gem these years. C. Watanabe  i Chapter One. Introduction The Mahayana movement originated in India around the first century B.C. and developed gradually over the succeeding few centuries. Mahayana Buddhism is represented by the two great schools, namely, the Mãdhyamika and Yogacara (Vijñanavãda). The founder of the Mädhyamika is Nagãrjuna (A.D. c. 150-250), who developed and established the thought of anyatã (emptiness) that is an important aspect of Buddhist thought. The Madhyamika may be divided into three stages, early, middle and late. The early stage in the Madhyamika is marked by two great figures, the founder Nagarjuna and Arya-deva (A.D. c. 170-270). In the middle stage various commentaries on Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka-ktrika (hereafter, MK) were written by many scholars. In this stage, moreover, two sub-schools arose. One of them is the Prasangika (known for its reductio ad absurdum method), and the other is the Svãtantrika (known for its acceptance of independent syllogism). The late stage is characterized by the writings of two great figures, anta-rakita (A.D. c. 725-784) and his disciple Jnana-garbha (eighth century). According to Tibetan tradition , eight Indian scholars wrote commentaries 1 on Nagarjuna’s MK: Nagarjuna himself (Akutobhaya, exists only in Tibetan translation), Buddha-palita (A.D. c. 470-540; Buddhapilita-Mu1amadhyamaka-vjrtti, exists only in variant Tibetan translations), Candra-kirti (A.D. c. 600-650; Prasanna-padã, exists in Sanskrit manuscripts and variant Tibetan translations), Deva-arman (fifth to sixth centuries; Dkar-po ichar-ba, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Guita-rI (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known), Guia-mati (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Sthira-mati (A.D. c. 510-570; Ta-Sheng Chung-Kuan Shih-lun, exists only in variant Chinese translations) and Bhãviveka  1 Avalokita-vrata, a commentator of Bhaviveka’s Prajna-pradipa-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti, enumerates eight commentators of Nagarjuna’s Mad hyamaka-karikd in his Prajfiu-pradipa-mala madhyamaka-tika. (Prajnapradipa, 85a8.)  2  (A.D. c. 49O57O)2 (Prajna-pradipa-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti (hereafter, PP), exists in variant Tibetan and Chinese translations). The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the third chapter: vv. 137-256 of Madhyamaka-hrdaya-karika (hereafter, MHK) of Bha-viveka. Bhã-viveka was one of the commentators of MK and, at the same time, was a significant philosopher. In this thesis, Bhã-viveka’s idea of unyatd (emptiness) is focused on through an English translation of the third chapter of his MHK. The MHK is probably Bhã-viveka’s most important work. In this decade some of its chapters have been edited and published by various scholars (see Apendix). The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima. 3 Shotaro lida also published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of Madhyamaka-hdaya tarkajvala (hereafter, TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding to those verses, and produced an English translation. Verses 137-256 which I have selected for translation in this thesis have not been translated into English before. My English translation is based upon the Sanskrit text edited by Ejima. The main subject of verses 137-256 is ‘the non-production of all dharmas.” This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nagarjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoint. Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (unyata) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Madhyamikas, basic and very important among the Buddha’s teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea no understanding of the philosophy of the Madhyamika is possible. Therefore, I will translate and explain in this thesis Bhá viveka’s views on “non-production.”  2 Kajiyama has investigated the relation of Bháviveka to Sthiramati and Dharmapala, and as a result, calculated the date of Bhäviveka given here. For details see Kajiyama 1968/1969: 193203; Kajiyama 1989: 177-187 3 Ejima 1980: 259-361  3 Basic Standpoint of Mãdhyamika Thought As mentioned above, Bhã-viveka was a Madhyamika philosopher. I will base my discussion of the background of his thought on the Nagarjuna’s MK. ‘emptiness’ The intention of the Mahayana Buddhists can be said to be the rediscovery of the truth realized by Gautama Buddha. Therefore, they sought to point out the contradictions of Hinayana Buddhism and return to what they claimed was the Buddha’s teaching. As far as we know now, it was Nagarjuna who established and formulated the thought of “emptiness” upon the basis of the Prajna-pThamita sütra, the Daa-bhãmika Sãtra, the Kaáyapa-parivarta 4 etc. The thought of emptiness, however, can be said to be found even in early Buddhist sütras such as the Cãla-suññata-sutta, the Mahã-suññata-sutta (Majjhima Niktya, no. 121, 122) 5 Nagarjuna claimed just to revive the true teaching of the Buddha. His etc. philosophy of emptiness was also a criticism against Indian realism, as presented by systems such as the Sathkhya, Vaieika and Nyaya, and other Buddhist schools such as the Sarvãstivada, Vaibhäsika, Sauträntika etc. The Sanskrit word “unya” literally means “empty,” “hollow,” absent.” 6 Indian mathematicians called zero “anya,” but “unya” in their usages did not mean solely the non-being of entities. Nagarjuna also did not mean that emptiness indicates the non-being or non-existence of entities, but rather that everything is void of sva-bhäva (“own being,” “intrinsic nature”). All things in our world are neither substantially existent nor non-existent absolutely: they are just like images in a dream or an illusion. We assume that all things in our world are substantially existent. According to Buddhist thought, however, they are just ‘dependently co-arisen.’ See Kajiyama 1982: 6 5 “Seyyathapi ayath Migãramatu pasado sunflo hatthi-gavassa-valavena, sunño jãtarupa rajatena, suflflarh itthi-purisa-sannipatena; atthi cev idath asuflflatath yad idath bhikkhu sathghath paticca ekattath (P1’S, Majjhima-Nikdya, vol. 3, Ci4a-sunnata-suttath. 1960). Thus the idea of anyata is already found in the Nikayas. See Fujita 1983 6 Monier-Williams 1899: 1085  4  They are empty of inherent existence. In other words, all entities have no intrinsic nature (sva-bhava). The negation of a self-dependent substance is thus derived from the traditional Buddhist idea of dependent origination (pratitya samutpada), the idea that whatever exists arises and exists dependent on other things. Nagarjuna declares that it is dependent origination that we call emptiness.” (MK, 24’I8ab, Prasannapada p. 503: yai pratitya-samutpMai anyatärh tiiz pracakmahe/). That is to say, something in existence has no intrinsic nature (sva-bhava), which means entities originate in dependence on others. In other words, something which is ‘dependent co-arisen’ is emptiness.  “Dependent origination” Nagarjuna claims as follows in his MK: 7 “He who taught dependent origination (pratityasamutpMa), [which is] without cessation, without origination, Without annihilation, without permanence, without coming, without going, Not something manifold, not one thing, the quiescence of conceptual proliferation, tranquil (diva), [Is] the perfect Buddha (sathbuddha). I pay homage to that best of speakers.” (Tr. by William 1993: 214) The above eightfold negation, according to Nagarjuna, is the truth that the Buddha realized. In other words, having recognized that the most important idea in Buddhism is dependent origination, Nagarjuna transmitted it. His idea was not formulated in a vacuum. Basically, the idea of “dependent origination,” for Nagarjuna, means aloofness from existence and non-existence. That is, it demands transcendence of the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism.  ‘  anirodham anutpadam anucchedam aávatam/ anekartham ananrtham anagamam anirgamam/ / yali pratitya-samutpadam prapañcopaamath ivam/ deayamasa sathbuddhas tad vande vadatath varam// (Poussin, Prasannapadi, p. 11.)  5 The word “pratityasamutptda” is a compound of the Sanskrit words “pratitya” and “samutpdda.” The gerund “pratitya” derives from the root qi which means “to go” or “to walk.” 8 The prefix “prati” means “towards” or “near to.” 9 The root ‘Ipad with the prefix “sam-ut” means “to arise,” “to appear,” “to occur” ° Consequently, the word “pratityasamutpada” means the arising of entities 1 etc. after having reached toward an antecedent, a cause, a basis. In other words, it means that everything which exists depends completely on causal relations.” Nagarjuna declares that dependent origination, emptiness, and the middle path (madhyamtl-pratipad), are all synonymous.’ 2 It is, however, true that the Buddha’s statement of the middle path itself did not expressly include dependent origination or emptiness. Yet, as far as we know, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path in order to deny eternalism and nihilism. Accordingly, there is no contradiction between the middle path and dependent origination or emptiness. Rather, as Nagarjuna declares, the idea of the middle path and that of dependent origination are identical and both are a means to lead the ignorant person to absolute truth, that is, Nirvana.  “Own-being” or “intrinsic nature” (svabhãva) According to the Madhyamikas, “own-being” or “intrinsic nature”is not to be found in our world where everything that exists is based on other things and where everything is in a constant flux.  8 Monier-Williams 1899: 163 Monier-Williams 1899: 661 O Monier-Williams 1899: 1166 This interpretation of the word pratityasamutpada is based on Candrakirti’s interpretation who is later than Bhäviveka. See appendix of Stcherbatsky 1927. 12 sã prajflaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyamà/ /24-l8cd/ / (Prasannapada, 503.) p.  6 Nagarjuna states as follows in his MK.’ 3 It is not proper to hold that own-being (sva-bhãva) is originated by conditions and causes. [If] own-being is originated by causes and conditions, [own-being] would be what is made.//15.1// And, how could own-being be what is made? For, own-being is not what is made; it does not depend on others (nirpekaz paratra).//15•2// If there is existence as essence (prakrti=sva-bhava), this would never be non-existence. For, it is never possible that the essence (prakrti= sva-bhdva) changes.//15•8// If there is no own-being, what would the changing (anyatha-bhava) be in. And if there is own-being, even then what would the changing be in.//15.9// (my translation) From the above verses, own-being (svabhäva), in Nagarjuna’s understanding, can be seen as (1) an independent, (2) eternal and (3) unchanging substance. That everything is emptiness can be easily recognized. Emptiness, however, does not mean the negation of our world. Our real world is conceptualized through the use of words. In this world, that is, on the conventional level, conception through words is the only reality that has “ownbeing” or “intrinsic nature.” The conception through words is an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. For example, even if we burned down a chair, or even if we died, the word “chair” would still exist. The conception which the word “chair” indicates is an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. A “word,” however, does not point out the essence of a thing. What a word indicates and the entity itself are essentially different from each other. 13 na sathbhavaI sva-bhavasya yuktah pratyaya-hetubhi/ hetu-pratyaya-sarhbhutah sva-bhavah krtako bhavet/ / 15-1 / / svabhavab lqtako näma bhaviyati punab katham/ akrtrimal3 svabhavo hi nirapekab paratra cal / 15-2/ / yady astitvam prakrtya syan na bhaved asya nãstitã/ prakrter anyatha-bhavo na hi jatupapadyate/ / 15-8/ / prakrtau kasya casatyäm anyathatvath bhaviyati/ prakrtau kasya ca satyäm anyathatvath bhaviyati/ / 15-9/ / (Prasannapadd, pp. 259-272.). de Jong reads vä satyam. I adopt vã satyam.  7 Consequently, we must not become attached to the “conceptions” produced through language or words. At the same time, language or words are, of course, very important for us. It would be difficult to live in this world without language. After all, Nagarjuna composed MK and elucidated unyata using language. In other words, everything exists in our ordinary world but everything is “anyata” in the world which is beyond our ordinary world the highest reality. -  Bhã-viveka As mentioned in the preceding section, Bha-viveka was one of the eight known commentators of Nagarjuna’s MK and one of the most prominent figures in the Madhyamaka school. He is known as the author of the PP. MHK “Ta-Shên Chan-Chêng lun,”etc. His name, however, is a subject of debate due to the various forms found in different texts. 14 The names “Bhãva-viveka,” “Bhã-viveka,” “Bhagavad-viveka,” “Bhavya-viveka,” “Bhã-vivikta,” “Bhavya,” “Bhavyaka,” “Bhavya-kara” and “Bhãvin” are assumed based upon Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan materials. In Chinese materials the names “Fen-pieh ming,” “Ch’ing-p’ieh,” “Ming-pien,” “Yuch’ing-fen,” “P’o-p’i-fei-chia” appear. In Tibetan materials “Legs ldan libyed,” “Legs ldan,” “Skia ldan, Snañ bral,” “Bha vya” etc. are used. The names Bhã-viveka and Bhãva-viveka, however, appear in Chandrakirti’s Prasanna-padã’ 5 (hereafter, Pras.), and the name “Bhãvin” appears in Madhyamaka-dstra-stuti.’ 6 The name Bhagavad-viveka is also used in the manuscript of MHK’ . Nowadays the names Bhava-viveka, Bha-viveka or 7 Bhavya are commonly used by scholars. Ejima, however, after examining the manuscripts of Pras., and the Tibetan and Chinese sources, suggests that the name of the author of MHK, PP and “Ta-Shên Chan-Cheng lun” should be Bhã 8 His collected evidence may be summarized as follows: viveka.’  14 For details of this matter, see Poussin 1933: 60-61. Yamaguchi 1941: 49-51. Gokhale 1958: 166. 15 Prasannapada, 36. p. 16 de Jong 1962: 47-56. de Jong 1979: 541-550. 17 Gokhale 1958: 166 18 Ejima 1990: 846-838.  Teramoto and Hiramatsu 1935: 5-7.  8 (1) The names “Bhãva-viveka” and ‘ Bhã-viveka” appear four times in the 1 manuscripts of Pras.. The name”Bhavya” never appears in these manuscripts. r a/i_(JYuâ-JYji-b’jwai -ka=P’o-p’i-fei (2) The transliteration chia)” and the Chinese translation “Ching-p’ieh” appear in the Chinese materials. The former” refers to Bhã-viveka, not Bhava-viveka or Bhavya-viveka. It is, moreover obvious that the name of the author of MHK, TJ, PP etc. was translated as” “and was identified with Bhã-viveka by Hsuan-tsang (A.D. 600-664). Furthr, there is no indication in Chinese materials of the names “Bhãva-viveka,” “Bhavya-viveka”or “Bhavya” which are assumed based upon the Tibetan and Sanskrit materials for the author of MHK, etc. (3) The name of the author of MHK is “sNañ bral” or “sKal idan” in the Tibetan translation of Madhyamakalathkãra-tikã (P. No. 5286: D. No. 3886).’ The original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sNan bral” should be “Bhã-viveka” or “Bhã-vivikta.” On the other hand, the original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sKal ldan” can be assumed to be “Bhavya.” ° 2 The name of the author of PP is given as “Legs idan byed” or “Legs idan 1byed” in the Tibetan translation of PP and Prajnt-pradipa-tika, the subcommentary of PP by Jf’iãna-garbha (Kiuhi rgyal mtshan). However, “Legs idan byed” is probably the Tibetan translator’s error. It should be corrected to “Legs idan byed.” The original sanskrit word of the latter would be “Bhavyaviveka” corraborating the part “viveka.” (4) Atia (Dipathkara-rijñäna. AD. 982-1054) calls the author of MHK and PP “Bhavya”or “Bhavya sNafl bral (Bhavya-Bhãviveka)” in his Bodhi-patha pradipa-pafljika (P. No. 5344: D. No. 3948.), the autocommentary of Bodhi-patha 21 Besides his own treatise, AtIa translated Madhyamaka-ratna-pradipa pradipa. (hereafter, M RP), M H K, Madhyamaka -hrdaya-vrtti-tarka-jvalä (hereafter, TJ), Nikaya-bheda-vibhanga-vyakhyana (hereafter, NBVV) and Madhyamakartha-sathgraha (hereafter, MAS) into Tibetan from Sanskrit with the Tibetan translator Tshul khrims rgyal ba. He calls the author of MRP, MHK, TJ and NBVV “Bhavya,” and Tshul thrims rgyal ba calls him “Legs idan Iibyed (Bhavya-viveka)” in MAS. ‘I  )  “  4  19 P. Sa.126b-4, 136b-6: D. Sa. 119b-6, 128a-2. 20 Maya-vyutpatti 1916, no. 3495. 21 Cf. P. Ki. 323b7, 329a8, 324a8, 324b2: D. Khi. 280a6, 285a1, 280b4, 280b6.  9 Assuming the correctness of Ejima’s investigation, I adopt the name “Bhã viveka” in this thesis.  The Works of Bhã-viveka According to Tibetan tradition, the following works are ascribed to Bha viveka 22 Pradipa-uddyotana-nãma-tikã Pañca-krama-pañjikã Prajnã-pradipa-mala-madhyamaka.-vtti Madhyamaka-ratna-pradipa Madhyamakartha-sathgraha Nikãya-bheda-vibhaiiga-vyakhyãn a Madhyamaka-hdaya-kãrikã Madhyamaka-hrdaya-vrtti-tarka-jvãlã Besides the above treatises, Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun is ascribed to Bhã viveka in the Chinese Tripitaka. P. L. Vaidya (1923:51-52) ascribes Madhyamaka-pratitya-samutpãda to Bha-viveka. In the Tibetan Tripitaka, however, this treatise is attributed to Kra. Accordingly, nowadays this treatise is not ascribed to Bhã-viveka (see Yamaguchi, 1941:57-58). Pradipa-uddyotana-nãma-ikã and Pañca-krama-pañjikã are also not attributed to Bhã-viveka in the Tibetan Tripitaka. Therefore, scholars do not at present consider them to be Bhä-viveka’s works.  Madhyamaka-ratna-pradipa (=MRP)  Tibetan title: Dbu ma nfl po cheii sgron ma es bya ba. 22 Taranãtha 1970: 401.  10 The Sde dge edition; No. 3854 The Peking edition; No. 5254 This treatise consists of nine chapters, in which Madhyamaka thought, especially the theory of the two truths, is well summarized. This treatise is attributed to Bhã-viveka in Tibet, but there must have been considerable doubt as to whether it should really be ascribed to him. As a result of his investigation, S. Yamaguchi concluded that the author of MRP is not Bha-viveka, and that the text was written around 700 A.D. 23 He points out that, firstly, there are some places where the author salutes three acaryas, namely Nagarjuna (A.D. C. 150250), Aryadeva (A.D. c. 170-270) and Candra-kirti (A.D. c. 600-650). Candra-kirti was a founder of the Prasangika school (Tib. Thal gyur pa) and was in a position of opposition to Bhã-viveka. It is thus hardly probable that Bhä-viveka saluted Candrakirti. Secondly, a statement by Dharma-kirti is quoted in MRP. Dharma-kIrti lived around 600-660 A.D. Therefore, it is impossible that Bhã viveka knew Dharma-kirti’s works. For these reasons, nowadays MRP is no longer ascribed to Bha-viveka. 24  Madhyamakarthasathgraha (=MAS) Tibetan title: Dbu mahi don bsdus pa. The Sde dge edition; No.3857 The Peking edition; No.5258. This treatise consists of thirteen kãrikãs. As the title shows, it is a summary of Madhyamaka thought. The main subject of this treatise is the theory of two truths. According to the Tibetan translation, its author is Bhã viveka. As a result of his investigation, however, Ejima pointed out: (1) the statement regarding the theory of the two truths in MAS does not fit the statement regarding the same theory in MHK, PP and TJ. (2) In order to solve the differences between MAS and MHK, PP and TJ, a mediation of the theory of  23 Yamaguchi 1941: 54-57. 24 Kajiyama 1983: 13. Ruegg 1981: 66. Lindner asserts in his articler (1982: 167-194) that MRP should be attributed to Bhävaviveka.  11 the Yogacara-Madhyamaka, such as the theory of Jnana-garbha, a later century, is neccesary. (3) It is difficult to understand the theory of MAS without first assuming knowledge of the theory of Dipathkara-ri-jnana. (4) Avalokita-vrata, commentator of PP. does not mention MAS as Bha-viveka’s work. (5) Kamalaila, also, does not mention MAS as Bhã-viveka’s work. In his Madhyamakalathkara-pañjikä, Kamalaila’s statement with regards to the theory of the two truths depends on MHK, not MAS. On the basis of these considerations, Ejima does not attribute MAS to Bhã-viveka. 25  Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun Sanskrit title: *Karatalaratha? Chinese title: Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun tr. by Hsuan-tsang TD. No. 1578. The Sanskrit manuscript of this treatise is not extant and a Tibetan translation of it does not exist. The treatise has the same organization as the third chapter of MHK according to its abstract: it divides all entities into two categories, the conditioned (sathskita) and the unconditioned (asathskrta) and discusses the emptiness of these categories. Moreover, the logic and the theory of the two truths in it fit with the logic and theory of the two truths in Bha-viveka’s other works. Further, the detailed argument found in it against Yogacara theory depends on MHK. 26 Therefore, nowadays it is attributed to Bhã-viveka. From the fact that content of Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun is relatively simple, but still fits with that of MHK, Ejima assumes that this treatise was written after MHK in order to explain in a more concise form the content of the latter (see Ejima, 1980: 15-16).  25 Ejima 1980: 18-32. Ejima suggests that MAS was written before Atia (Dipathkara-rijnana)  or Tshul khrims rgyul ba, Tibetan translator of MAS. That is, MAS was completed some time between the latter half of eighth century and the beginning of the eleventh century. 26 Cf. TD.30.272a, 275a.  12  Prajñãpradipa-mãla-madhyamaka-vtti (=PP) Tibetan title: Dbu mazi rtsa bazi zgrel pa es rab sgron ma The Sde dge edition; No. 3853 The Peking edition; No. 5253 Chinese title: Pan-jo-teng-lun. tr. by Po-lo-p’o-chia-lo-mi-tiu-li (*Prabhakara.mjtra) Taishö No. 1566. This treatise is a commentary on Nagãrjuna’s MK. Bhã-viveka criticizes Buddha-palita in this commentary with the observation that Buddha-palita’s argument in Mãlamadhyamaka-vrtti is a mere prasañga, lacking both a true probans (i.e., minor premise) and an example (i.e., major premise). Bhã-viveka used Svatantra-anumana (independent inference), by which he tried to explain Nagarjuna’s MK. Tibetan and Chinese translations of this treatise are extant, but only Sanskrit fragments can be found in Candra-kirti’s Pras. There is a subcommentary on PP. which exists only in Tibetan translation, titled Ses rab sgron ma rgya cher grel pa (restored Skt. title would be Prajnd-pradipa-tiktt) by Avalokita 27 Some of the chapters of the Tibetan text of PP have vrata (seventh century). been edited by Max Walleser (1914) and Christian Lindtner(1984).  Nikaya-bheda-vibhaiga-vyakhyãna Tib. title: Sde pa tha dad par byed pa dan rnam par bad pa. The Sde dge edition; No. 4139 The Peking edition; No. 5640 This treatise is only a portion of TJ and MHK, chapter 4 v.8 (Dsal6l-3-169a5). Because the authorship of TJ has not been resolved, the authorship of this treatise is also open to debate.  27 Toh. No. 3859, Ota. No. 5259.  13 Madhyamaka-hdaya-vtti-tarka-jvã1ã (=TJ)  Tibetan title: Dbu mat-ti sñiñ poii igrel pa rtog ge zbar ba. The Sde-dge edition; No. 3856 The Peking edition; No. 5256. It has long been accepted that TJ is Bha-viveka’s autocommentary (sva vTtti) on MHK. There is, however, sufficient reason to doubt whether or not the surviving Tibetan translation has preserved the original form of this autocommentary. This is because, after one kãrikã, it is written “thus says the acarya” in what should be a reference to Bhã-viveka, the author of the kãrikãs. Moreover, in explaining the meaning of some kãrikãs, the expression “this is the intention of the ãcrya” is used. 28 That is to say, if TJ was composed by Bhã viveka himself, would he be calling himself tcarya in his own treatise? Acãrya usually means ‘senior teacher’ or ‘great teacher.’ There is, however, another example of an author calling himself “ãcãrya.” 29 It is, moreover, possible that the surviving Tibetan translation includes additions to the text that were made during the translation from Sanskrit. There is also another piece which conflicts with Bha-viveka’s authorship of the TJ. In the commentary of the 291st verse of the third chapter, there is a quotation from “ran gi bstan bcos (sva-ttlstra).” 30 There is, however, no indication of what the “ran gi bstan bcos (sva-stra)” is. It might indicate the author of MHK and TJ. This quotation is not, however, found in any of Bha-viveka’s works such as MHK, PP. TJ or “Ta-Shen Chang-Chên lun.” It is found as a quotation accompanied by the comment “ãcärya-ptda says as follows” in MRP which is not ascribed to Bhã-viveka . It is safe to assume 31 that both TJ and MRP are referring to the same person, and that this person is 28 TJ Dsa 50a-5; 75a-1; 86a-2; 107a-2;112b-6; 224b-4; 246b-5; 274b-6; 321a-5, etc. 29 Vasubandhu calls himself “ãcãrya” in his Abhidharmakoa-bhaya, 2 • 17. p. “kimarthath punar abhidharmopadeab kena cayath prathamata upadio yata acaryo ‘bhidharmakoath vaktum adriyata iti/ aha/” Yaomitra says ;“acaryab astrakarab” cf. [Sphuartha], p. 10.23. 30 TJ Dsa 140b6-141a7. sku gsum rnam par bshag pa ñid kyãn slob dpon gyis ran gi bstan bcos kyi skabs su bdi skad bad do/...” (English tras: With regard to Buddha’s three bodies (dharma-body, rejoyment-body and accommodative body) also, äcarya says the following in sva-ästra). 31 MR Tsa 360a5-b7. sku gsum rnam par bshag pa yañ/ slob dpon ñid shal ñas (acarya “....  “...  pada) / ji skad du...”  14 not the author of TJ and MRP. It remains, then, a mystery as to how this “crya” figure is connected with Bhá-viveka, the author of MHK. Presumably, “ãcärya” is an addition by AtIa (A.D. 952-1054), a Tibetan translator of TJ, as Bhã viveka was considered the author of MRP in the period of Atia. In any case, it is not prudent to assume that the author of the surviving TJ is definitely the same as Bha-viveka, the author of MHK, PP and Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun. It is possible that TJ was translated into Tibetan at least once before Atia (Dipathkara-ri-jnana), Tshul khrims rgyal ba etc., because “Dbu mabi sniñ 0 rtog ge bbar rtsa ba dani hgrel par bead pa gnus (Madhyamaka-hdaya-Tarkjväla ftkä)//” is recorded as a treatise in the process of translation in the Dkar chag Ldan dkar ma (the catalogue of the Man dkar ma), completed in 788 A. D. 32  Madhyamaka-hrdaya-.kãrikã (=MHK) Tibetan title: Dbu mazi sniñ poii tshig le’iur byas pa The sde dge edition; No. 3855, Dsa 3b5-17a4. The Peking edition; No. 5255, Dsa 4a5-19-7. ; No. 3246, Dsa 5a2-17a4. 33 The Narthang edition It can be said that this treatise is Bhã-viveka’s major work because it is his independent work and in it the Madhyamaka philosophy is well organized. The only known manuscript of MHK was discovered and hand copied by Rahula Sathkrtyayana at the Sha-lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. Having hand-copied the Sanskrit manuscript there, he registered his copy as ‘VII Shalu Monastary, XXX VII, 1. 311. TarkjvtTh (Madhyamakairdaya)’ in his handlist. Later on, he gave the copy to V. V. Gokhale. On the other hand, while traveling in India, Nepal and Tibet, G. Tucci succeeded in taking photographs of the manuscript of MHK at the Sha lu monastary. When visiting Japan in 1971, V. V. Gokhale allowed several scholars to copy his copy of the MHK, and entrusted further research to them. 32 Lalou 1953: 337. 33 The catalogue numbers of the Narthang edition given here are in accordance with those of A Comparative List of Tibetan Tripitaka of Narthang Edition (Bstan-Ijgyur Division) with the Sde-dge Edition, compiled by T. Mibu, Tokyo, 1967.  15 In 1972, when V. V. Gokhale visited Rome, he found the photographs of the manuscript of MFTK in G. Tucci’s collection, and was given the chance to edit them. Since then, a number of chapters of MHK have been edited and published based on the photograph from Tucci’s collection and Gokhale’s notes. In 1991, a photocopy of the manuscript of MHK was published in 34 China. MHK consists of roughly 927 anutubha-verses and is divided into eleven chapters. The third chapter, Tattva-jñãnaiaiã, is the most important chapter among the eleven because the Madhyamika thought is primarily presented in this chapter whereas the other chapters express the Mãdhyamika thought through the criticism of other systems and schools. According to Gokhale (1985:78), Bhã-viveka originally composed the first three chapters under the title Tattvãmrtãvatãra, forming the core of MHK, and other chapters were added later. As the following note of the contents of the third chapter show, this chapter has a close relationship with MK and PP. It is in order to clarify this close relationship, as well as to provide context for the verses I will translate, that an abstract of the third chapter is given here:  Contents of the third chapter Introduction 1-1 1-2  2-1  The meaning and aim of the knowledge of the highest truth samtdhi ‘concentration’ Introduction to Examinations sathskrta-dharmas ‘conditioned dharmas’ skandhas ‘aggregates’ (A) (A)-1 rupa-skandha (A)-2 mahã-bhütas ‘great elements’ (A)-3 ra pa, etc. (A)-4 indriya ‘sense organs’ (B) vedand-skandha  vv. 1-13 vv. 14-23ab vv. 23cd-24  v. 25 vv. 26-39 vv. 40-44 vv. 45-65 vv. 66-68ab  3 Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qing and Qian Wenzhong, 1991, p. 511-523.  16  sathjñã and sathskara skandhas (C) (D) vijfltna-skandha 2-1-1 dhatus ‘realms’ 2-1-2 ãyatana ‘sense-fields’ 2-1-3 laksana ‘characteristics’ 2-1-4 gati ‘going’ 2-1-5 moka ‘emancipation’ and bandhana ‘bondage’ (A) pudgala ‘person’ (B) ãtman 2-1-6 raga ‘attachment’ and rakta the ‘affected’ 2-1-7 nirvana 2-1-8 viparydsa ‘perversion’ 2-1-9 dvesa ‘hate’ and moha ‘delusion’ 2-1-10 sva-bhãva ‘intrinsic nature’  vv. 68cd-69 v. 70 v. 7lab v. 7lcd v. 72-76 vv. 77-85ab vv. 85cd-89 vv. 90-92 vv. 93-99ab vv. 99cd-108 vv. 109-116 vv. 117-118 v. 119  2-1-11  Conclusion  vv. 120-128 vv. 129ab  2-2  asathskrta ‘unconditioned’  vv. 129cd-136  Introduction to the Non-production of all dharmas  vv. 137-138  3-1  Non-production from itself  vv. 139-146  3-2  Non-production from others  vv. 147-158  3-2-1  The criticism of the four pratyayas or conditions (A)  (B) (C) (D) 3-2-2  hetu-pratyaya ãlambana-pratyaya samanantara-pratyaya adhipati-pratyaya  vv. 160-162 vv. 163-166 vv. 167-169 vv. 170-175  The problem of opposition by pratyaka and  pratiti 3-2-3  v. 159  vv. 176-181  The criticism of the theory of the Sãthkhya school  vv. 182-191  3-3  Non-production from itself and others  vv. 192-193  3-4  Non-production from ahetu or  3-5 3-6  ‘without cause’  vv. 194-213  The criticism of Lokayatas The criticism of ivara  vv. 194-214 vv. 215-223  17  3-7 3-8 3-9 3-10 3-11  di ‘view’ duikha ‘suffering’ buddha Seeing pratityasamutpãda and seeing Buddha Conclusion  vv. 224-229  vv. 230-233 vv. 234-239 vv. 240-246 vv. 247-256  4. nisvabhãvatã and unyata  vv. 257-266  5. The Buddhas and the bodhisattvas  vv. 267-360  It follows from what has been said above that Bhã-viveka’s works are PP, MHK, probably TJ (including Nikãyabhedavibhañgavyãkhyãna) and “Ta-Shen Chang-Chen lun.” According to the relationship of quotations in the above treatises, Ejima decides the chronological order of these works as: first, MHK (possibly including TJ), second, the “Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun” and finally, PP.  Bhã-viveka’s logic Bha-viveka was influenced by Dignãga (c. 400-480 A.D.). 35 Accordingly, it was his view that the Madhyamikas had to employ syllogisms to prove the truth of their philosophy. Hence, Bhã-viveka used syllogism (svatantra-anumãna) in MHK, PP and “Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun.” In employing syllogisms, Bhä-viveka included three modifications: (1) adding of the word “paramãrthatai” (“from the standpoint of the highest truth”) to propositions in his syllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in his syllogisms should be understood as prasajya pratiedha (“the negation of a proposition,” as opposed to paryudäsa, “the negation of a term or word”), and (3) the condition that no counter-example (vipaka) is to be given. 35 Erich Frauwailner 1961: 125-48 established the dates of important Buddhist philosophers. As a result of his investigation, he suggested that the life-time of Dignaga was to be 480-540 A.D. The fact that Bhäviveka was influenced by Dignaga was investigated by Ejima 1980: 61-82.  18 Bha-viveka tried to clarify the philosophy of unyati (emptiness) by means of syllogisms, including the three modifications. Here I will translate verse 26 in the third chapter, one of the typical syllogisms of Bhã-viveka in his MHK, and its commentary TJ in order to clarify the point made just now and the matters which surround his syllogisms (i.e. fallacy of proposition and negation in the ultimate reality). Then, I will explain the meaning of the verse. In order to clarify the context of the topic, I will divide the following translation into some sections, and will put an explanation after each section of translation, if neccesary. My translation is based upon the Tibetan text ed. and English tr. by lida, 1980: 8190. “Here, (proposition) from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramarthatai) the earth, etc. do not have the gross elements as their own-beings, (reasoni) because they are things which are made, or (reason2) because they are things which have cause, etc., (instance) just like knowledge (jñdna).” //326//36  Adding the restriction “paramãrthataz” to the proposition. [Translation of TJ] In [the word] paramtrtha, artha is what is to be obtained (pratipattavya) and what is to be understood (adhigantavya) because artha is the object to be known (jnttavya). Paramãrtha which means “the most excellent.” The compound parama artha [can be interpreted in three ways]. (1) It means “the most excellent object” because it is the object and the most excellent (karmadharya compound)  36 tatra bhuta-sva-bhavãrh hi norvyadi paramarthatah/ lqtakatvad yatha jñãnath hetumattvãdito pi vä/ /3-26/I (Ejima 1980; 274.) In MI-{K the above verse is the first syllogism. In addition, Bhävaviveka explains his syllogismd in his PP and Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun. For further details of his syllogism in TJ, see lida 1980: 81-90. On his syllogism in PP. see Kajiyama 1963/1964 On his syllogism in Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun, see Poussin 1932-1933: 68-138.  19 (2) Or, it is the object of the most excellent. That is, because it is the object of the most excellent knowledge that is beyond discrimination (nirvikalpa-jñdna), it means the object of the most excellent (tat purua compound) (3) Or, it is “comformable to paramartha” (paramrthanuküla). That is, since there is that paramartha in wisdom (prajñ) which is conformable to obtaining of paramirtha, it means “one which is in conformity with paramärthai” (bahuvrihi compound) Paramarthataj [in syllogisms] is taken as the third type of compound (the bahuvrihi compound), i.e., paramttrthataz, in the ultimate reality. [An explanation] As is well known, the highest truth (paramartha) is contrasted with sathvrti (the conventional truth) in many schools of philosophy but particularly in Madhyamika. Bhã-viveka included this word “the highest truth” in his syllogisms. He interpretes the word paramarthataz in three ways, i.e., karmadhärya, tat purua and bahuvrihi compound. 37 Among these three interpretations, Bhã-viveka adopts the third restriction paramärthataz in his propostion. That is to say, the restriction “paramarthatah” in Bha-viveka’s proposition does not mean ‘the highest truth’ itself, but that which is in conformity with the highest truth itself. In other words, the third interpretation means prajna, which is in comformity with the highest truth. 38 Assuming the first interpretation (karmadMrya compound) and the second (tatpurua compound), the third interpretation is realized. The first and second “paramartha” are beyond conceptions. Truth itself cannot be understood by means of concepts and language. On the other hand, the third paramartha has concepts and language. However, it is prajna and is approaching truth itself. That is to say, even though it is verbal usage, as long as the word paramartha directs to the highest truth itself, Bhãviveka’s syllogism, including the restriction paramarthatai is truth.  37 In PP Bhãviveka interprets the word paramdrtha in the same way. See, Uryãzu 1971: 34. Avalokitavrata in his PPT gives us gramatical explanations of these three interpretations of the word paramartha, that is, (1) karmadhdraya compound, (2) tatpurua compound and (3) bahuvrihi compound respectively. 38 This idea can be found in the commentary on v. 8 of PP XXIV. See, Uryazu 1971: 33-34.  20 The negation in the proposition should be understood as prasajya pratiedha. [Translation of TJ] Here, the negation ‘na (not)’ means prasajya-pratiedha (“the negation of a proposition”), and does not mean paryudiisa-pratiedha (“the negation of a term”). One might ask: What is the difference between prasajya-pratiedha and paryudasa pratiedha? Paryudasa-pratiedha affirms the other entity (vastu) which is similar to this entity due to the negation of the nature of this entity. For instance, by the negation “he is not a Brahman,” one might affirm that [he] looks like a Brahman but he is a non-Brahman, he differs from [a brahman], that is [he] belongs to a lower class (üdra) because of lacking mortification (tapas) and learning (truta) etc. The prasajya-pratiedha negates only the nature of the entity, it does not affirm another entity which is similar but not identical. For instance, [the expression] “Brahmans must not drink liquor” denies only [the very action] itself, and does not mean “do drink something other than liquor” or “do not drink something other than liquor.” Therefore, here, “from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramarthata’z) the earth etc. which are imagined by people in the world do not have [corresponding] gross elements as their own-being” is only the negation of [“having gross elements as their own-being”]. It does not affirm “having another as own-being” or “having non-existence as own-being.” [An explanation] The negative particle in Bha-viveka’s proposition is related to the verb, not to a nominal as a prasajya-pratiedha. For instance, “whatever exists is not produced from itself” does not mean “whatever exists is not produced from another.” It just means that “whatever exists is never produced from itself.” 39  39 We come across the detailes of Bhaviveka regarding prasajya-pratiedha in PP and its commentary PPT. In PP Bhaviveka says: “here one should specify that entities do not Foriginate from themselves. If one specifies otherwise, one would ascertain, “Entities do not originate from themselves [- - - -1; rather they originate from another.” Likewise one would ascertain, “Entities do not originate just (eva) from themselves; rather they originate from themselves and another.” Therefore, that also is not accepted, because it is distinct from [our] doctrine. (Tr. William 1993: 221.) According to William, addition in brackets[] is based upon PPT. For detailed imformation regarding paryudasa and prasajya-pratiedha, see Kajiyama: 1963: 423438, 1973: 161-175. -  -  -  21 Fallacy of proposition [Translation of TJ] Here, the opponents object as follows: (i) There are the following statements in the saying of your teacher (llstT vacana =the Buddha). “Oh Brahman! everything consists of the five aggregates, twelve sensefields and eighteen elements.” And, “The characteristic of form (rupa) is change and destruction, etc”. You also accepted those [ideas, i.e., “the everything has the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements as its own-being” and “the characteristic of form is change and destruction, etc”], but if you negate those very things, your thesis (pratijñä) is damaged by the very ideas you accept (abhyupagata). (ii) Likewise, it is well know (prasiddha) that the function of particular objects (pratiniyata-viaya) is known through direct perception (pratyaka) of the sense organs (indriya). And, there is no other superior proper cognitive instrument (pramaia) than seeing (drta). Nevertheless, having seen the shape (sathsthãna) and colour (varna) of the four elements (i.e., fire, water, wind and earth) by means of your own eyes, you still search for the own-being of the earth element, e.g., smooth touch. It is, however, understood by everybody in the world that the earth element has the nature of firmness, etc. Therefore, the negation of it means negation of direct perception (pratyaka). (iii) Also, the form (rupa), etc. and nature of earth, i.e., solidity (khakkhatatva), wetness (dravatva), heat (usijatva) and mobility (samudiraizatva), etc. are well known even to the abara and mdtariga tribes. Thus, the negation of the own-being of entities which are well known to everybody in the world means the negation of what is well known (prasiddha). To these objections we reply as follows: Because of the restriction paramãrthata’z in our proposition (pratijnã), our proposition would not be a contradiction of the theory we accept, or of direct perception or of what is generally known. This is due to the following reasons: (i) The Bhagavat proclaimed the theory of two truths (satya-dvaya), i.e., sathvrti-satya and paramãrtha-satya. Among these two truths, as for the salizvTti  22  satya, he established own-beings and characteristics of entities (dharma). Likewise, as for the paramartha-satya, he proclaimed non-own-being [of entities]. That is, [the following was stated by the Bhagavat]. “Kauika! all entities are empty in their own-being. [The statement] “all entities are empty in their own-being” means the non-existence of entities. And the non-existence is “prajnapdramita.” According to this statement, entities do not exist. Because of this, how can they possess own-beings? Accordingly, contradiction with what we accepted does not occur. (ii) The contradiction with pratyaka does not occur. The reason is: the objects [of cognition] are untrue and the ability of seeing, etc. does not exist because the sense-organs are [actually] senseless. Therefore, to consider that the object is what is directly perceived is improper, just as in the case of one who has an eye-disease who sees a hair, mosquito or horsefly in his eyes, or in the case of one who perceives an echo as coming from a particular place, which is improper. Accordingly, what can be pratyaka for whom, and how can there be the contradiction with that (pratyaka)? (iii) Also, the contradiction by what is well accepted does not occur, because the ordinary person is blind due to an eye-disease: “ignorance.” When it comes to analyzing something from the standpoint of the highest truth, then just as in the example of a blind person who cannot examine a jewel, the ordinary person does not understand that analyzing from the standpoint of the highest truth. Accordingly, contradiction with the well known does not occur. [An explanation] The opponents object to Bha-viveka’s proposition from three points of view: (i) conflict with what we accepted (ii) objection by direct perception and (iii) objection by the well-known. That is, (i) The Buddha proclaimed the own-being of entities. Therefore, for Buddhists, a negation of the Buddha’s statement would be a fallacy of contradiction. (ii) It is widely accepted that pratyaka of sense organs holds for specific objects. Therefore, the negation of what is actually experienced would be a fallacy. (iii) That the own-beings of the gross element of earth are solidity, wetness, heat and mobility etc. is generally known by all ordinary people.  23 Therefore, negation of what is generally known by all ordinary people would be a fallacy. To these objections Bhã-viveka replies: Because we have the restriction paramarthatai in our proposition (pratijnã), our proposition would not be a fallacy on account of abyupagata, pratyaka and prasiddhabädha. That is: (i) The Buddha taught two truths, namely sathvrti-satya and paramartha satya. The own-beings and characteristics of entities are established in sathWti satya, that is, the own-beings and characteristics of entities are acceptable as conventional truth. The Buddha, however, taught the non-own-beingness of entities from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramartha). (ii) From the standpoint of the highest truth the objects of sense organs are untrue. For example, from the standpoint of the highest truth the ability of seeing does not exist. Nevertheless, in the eye of one who has an eye disease, unreal hair, etc. is seen as real. It is, however, not correct from the standpoint of the ultimate truth. (iii) The ordinary person is afflicted by ignorance. Accordingly, he cannot examine anything as it is.  Negation in the ultimate reality [Translation of TJ] One might say: the highest truth (paramartha) transcends every intelligence (buddhi). However, the negation of the own-being of entities (bhtva-svabMva pratiedha) is in the object sphere of words. Therefore, the negation does not establish the absence of own-being of entities. We (Madhyamikas) reply: to say this is not proper. The paramartha is twofold. One is paramartha, which works without conception (anabhisathsk&a pravrtti), which is beyond the world (lokottara), which is pure (anãsrava) and which is beyond diversification (niprapaflca). The other is paramrtha which works with volition (sãbhisathsktra-pravrtti), which is conformable to the equipping of virtue and knowledge (pui.iya-jnana-sathbhara), which has diversification (saprapanca) that is called “pure worldly intelligence” (uddha-laukika-jñana). Here we adopt the lafter paramartha as qualification of the proposition (pratijna). Therefore, there is no fallacy [in our proposition].  24 Similar example [Translation of TJ] The statement which is connected with similar examples (sapakdnvaya nirdeáa) is “no produced thing has elements (bhüta) as its nature (svabMva), just like knowledge (jndna).” One might say: in what manner is knowledge (jñãna) a produced thing? We reply: it is accomplished by logic (tarka) which aims at heaven (svarga) and nirvana (apavarga). Here, the negation “knowledge does not have elements as its own-being, because it is a thing which is made” is connected with the sense of prasajya-pratiedha. No counter-example (vipaka) is available in the syllogism. [Translation of TJ] Here, among three aspects of reason (hetu), due to the non-indication of the third condition, i.e., absence of a counter-examples what we intend to say is conventionally explained by using only two aspects of reason. The property of the subject (paka-dharma) exists only in the similar example (sapaka), not in the counter-example (vipaka) because the latter, which has own-being differs from the former, which never exists. Therefore, we do not state instances (dtinta) which lack counter-examples (vipaka) and reasons. In order to indicate a convertible term (paryiiya), [the word] hetu mat is used. [The abstract] noun of hetu mat is hetumattva. The term “etc.” in the syllogism includes other reasons, i.e., knowability and expressibility etc. In this case, the phrase “because they are things which have cause” is used as the reason (hetu). Whatever has cause, knowableness or expressibility etc. does not have elements as its own-being, just like knowledge. Likewise, the earth does not have gross elements as its own-being from the standpoint of the highest truth. In this way, each term [of syllogism] is related to the others. [An explanation] According to Dignaga’s logic, a correct syllogism is conditioned by three aspects. These are: (1) paka-dharmatva, namely reason (hetu) should be the predicate of the subject of the proposition, (2) sapaka-sattva, namely reason (hetu) must belong to an example similar to the subject of the proposition. and (3)  25 vipakäsattva, namely, reason (hetu) must not belong to a counter-example of the subject of the proposition. Bhã-viveka, however, does not adopt the third aspect among the above three aspects. That is, Bha-viveka does not adopt a counterexample in his syllogism. The reason is: Bha-viveka upholds the emptiness of all entities in the ultimate reality. Hence, with regard to the statement “from the standpoint of the highest truth, earth, etc. do not have gross elements as their own-beings, because they are things which are made,” a counter-example, i.e., “something which has gross elements as its own-being” does not exist. That is, the proposition (pratijnt) “from the standpoint of the highest truth, the earth etc. have no gross elements as their own-being (svabhdva)” is a case of prasajyapratiedha and means only the negation of “have gross element as their own-being.” In this case, the counter-example which can be assumed is one of which “have gross as their own-being” could be said. However, as long as “have gross as their own-being” is simply negated, there is no possibility of a counter-example. The employing of prasajyapratiedha as the negation of the proposition (pratijn) leads to non-necessity of the counter-example. Accordingly, the above-mentioned syllogism amounts to: (p) If considered by prajna (wisdom) which is in conformity with the highest truth, the earth etc. 40 do not have the gross elements as their own-beings, (hi) because they are things which are made, or, (h2) because they are things which have cause, knowableness (jneyatva), expressiblity (vacyatva) etc. (d) just as knowledge does not have gross elements as its own-being. Thus, I have clarified the idea of Bhã-viveka regarding three modifications and showed how we should understand Bhã-viveka’s syllogism. In the following chapter, I shall translated MHK 3.137-256.  40 The term “etc.” includes water, fire and wind. See, lida 1980: 82.  26 Chapter Two. Bhã-viveka’s Madhyamaka-hdaya-karika, Third Chapter, Tattva-jñãnaianã, verses 137-256 An English Translation and Explanation As mentioned in the introduction, a critical edition of the Sanskrit text and of the Tibetan text of the third chapter of MHK were published and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima in 1980. Shotaro lida published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of TJ corresponding to those verses, accompanied by an English translation of both the verses and the TJ. Here, I present an English translation and explanation of of MHK, 3 • 137256. My translation is based upon the text edited by Y. Ejima, and my explanation is basically based upon TJ. TJ, however, does not give us detailed commentary for some verse parts. Hence, I have tried to explain verses which TJ does not explain sufficiently based upon my own understanding. Although the Tibetan translation indicates the separate components of the syllogism, like thesis, reason and example, I have combined them in a single sentence. I do not explain each verse I translate. I sum up the main points of the discussion where verses form a unit and have the same context. Explanation of abbreviations and signs employed in this chapter: Ms  [ ]  Photocopy in Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qian Wenzhong, 1991, p. 511-522 The MHK manuscript itself is reported to have been written on 22.5 X 2 inch palm-leaves, and is said to consist of 24 folios with 5 or 6 lines on each of the obverse and reverse sides. It has the Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili script of the eleventh century. The dedication “deya-dharmo ‘yam uttarapathika-ramaizera-bandya-dharmdkarasenasya” further indicates that the manuscript was written in Northern India. ’ 4 The syllables (akaras) are not clear but legible.  41 For details of this manuscript, see R. Säñkrtyayana 1937.  27 ( ) + =  o  SC k. v. vv. K KS KT TJ  The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed. Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible. The space for one syllable is damaged. The syllable is divided, e.g. ‘tasy=ãsti’ in ms. The syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted. The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering made by Sankrtyayana. kürika or käriküs = verse of the main text verse verses The Kãrikã text The Kãrikã text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima. The Kãrikä text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima. Tarka-jvãla: Sde dge edition, No. 3856, Dsa 53b2-144b7. Peking edition, No. 5256, Dsa 57a-15Th2. Narthang edition, No. 3247, Dsa 53a7-152a5  An outline of vv. 137-256 would be as follows: 3. Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas 3-1 Non-production from itself 3-2 Non-production from others 3-2-1 The criticism of the four pratyayas “conditions” (A) hetu-pratyaya  (B) (C) (D) 3-2-2 3-2-3 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7  ãlambana-pratyaya samanantara-pratyaya adhipati-pratyaya The problem of the opposition of pratipaka and pratiti The criticism of the theory of the Sathkhya system Non-production from itself and others Non-production from ahetu “without cause” The criticism of Lokayatas The criticism of ivara drsti ‘view”  vv. 137-138 vv. 139-146 vv. 147-158 v. 159 vv. 160-162 vv. 163-166 vv. 167-169 vv. 170-175 176-181 182-191 192-193 194-195 196-214 vv. 215-223 vv. 224-229 vv. vv. vv. vv. vv.  28  3-8 3-9 3-10 3-11  du’zkha “suffering” The Buddha Seeing pratitya-samutpada and seeing the Buddha Conclusion  vv. 230-233 vv. 234-239 vv. 240-246 vv. 247-256  29 TRANSLATION 2.  Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas 1Iø1 l i1ct,: I  3TT IT  IIc5’1 42  311  TqTiQ-:  -ck,1 cicIcI  qr8Jr  II9II  I  1I-IH ?[T fl9II  Or, indeed, the expansion of a net of false constructions which has such a beginning with such things as [dravya, pradhäna, jiva and ãtman], and which  has for its basis produced entities, confounds an ignorant person through its force.//137// By the lamp of knowledge (vidyapradipa), a knowledgeable person examines (arising of entities) as they are on [the basis] from [the view of] rejection of production. Then out of its (=production’s) quenching is (i.e. comes) the cessation of the diversified world of experience.//138// Explanatory comment: The realists, i.e., the Sarvãstivãdin, Sautrantika, Vaibhãéika, Abhidharmika etc. among the Buddhist schools and the Sathkhya, Vaieika, Naiyayika etc. among the Brahmanical schools, state that produced things actually exist in the world. The Madhyamaka school, however, asserts that produced things do not exist in ultimate reality. The phrase evam-adika kalpan&jala-prasara in the above verse means dravya, pradhäna, jiva, ãtman etc. that other systems imagine as real existences and which are referred to in vv. 135-136. An ignorant person misunderstands in that he thinks that produced things actually exist in the world and that entities are produced either from themselves, 42  ms. 43 n1 ms. KT: skye bkag ms. KT: de shi bas 5 dravya-pradhana-jivadi jneyath yat tirthya-kalpitath/ yatha-yogath nieddhavyath yukty-agama-viaradaib/ /3 • 35 / / iti sva-para-siddhanta-ka1pitatma-nirtmatath/ vidvan vibhavya bhavãnam tattva-jflamrtath pibet/ /3 • 136/ /  30 from others, from both themselves and others or without a cause. A discriminating person, however, realizes non-arising of entities as the truth, attains proper wisdom, and liberates himself from the diversified world of experience.  2-1  Non-production from itself  Introduction to verses 139-140 Bhä-viveka discusses here the doctrine of ‘pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state’ (Satkaryavada) in the Sathkhya school. The Sathkhyas claim that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is therefore self-generated. However, their statement is not acceptable to Buddhists. According to TJ, the Sãthkhyas propose that an effect pre-exists in the cause. This amounts to saying that it produces itself from itself or that an existent is produced from itself. Bhã-viveka criticizes this opinion. cflcid c4cj  1c’LIIR1 (  1I1oI,cclIc, Z{.Tlf: cçj’ ‘.‘1-1  I {  II9II  Here, firstly, production from itself is not proper even from the standpoint of conventional truth, because it [already] has itself, just as a curd has no birth from itself.//139// c-1I: cjIc4.ciI  riiRi  TIcccUcI, dUtP1T[ I  II9°II  The existents do not arise out of themselves, because they are [already] in existence, just like the purua (puths) in your view. Nor [on the other hand], do the unproduced have a self (=own-being), because they are not born, just like the sky-flower (kha-pupa).//140// Explanatory comment: An existent thing is not produced from itself because it is already existent, just as purua of Sathkhya theory is not produced from itself. Nor do the  31 unproduced things have themselves, because they have not been produced, just as the sky-flower. Whatever exists in our world does not arise from itself both because such origination would be purposeless and because it entails an absurdity. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of things which are in existence already. The absurdity is this: if something exists it would not arise again and yet there would never be a time when it was not arising. For example, it is clear that curds are produced from milk. It, however, is not admissible even in our everyday world that curds are produced from curds themselves. Further, entities are not produced from entities themselves because entities are things which already exist, just like “purua” (one of the two substantial principles) which Sarhkhya admits as a real, unchanging, unevolving entity. On the other hand, what is not arisen cannot be said to exist, just like the sky-flower which is only an imaginary flower. According to TJ, the reasons (hetu) “because it [already) has itself’ in verse 139 and “because they are [already] existent” in the verse 140 are conventional. From the standpoint of the highest truth entities do not have own-being.  --cU-If  I I  (c4II ZfT 3T{  -lclNI 4  I 3WlId tisft “--M1T J  j:  II99II  If you say that ‘there is absence of sky-flower’ means ‘there is sky, etc.’ still that sky, etc. is not the sky-flower. Hence, we do not have a deficiency (nyanatd) even in [this] alternative (paka).//141// Explanatory comment: This verse is an elaboration with regard to the example (drtãnta) which Bhã-viveka advanced in v. 140. According to TJ, the Sathkhya school points out that there are various interpretations regarding the sky-flower: i.e., “the flower in the sky,” “the flower which comes from the sky” or “the flower of the sky.” etc. From this standpoint, they counter that there is no proper example to support Bhä-viveka’s statement. Bhã-viveka, however, clarifies that by advancing the example of “the sky-flower” which does not really exist, he refers  32 only to non-existence of entities Therefore, he says that “we do not have a deficiency even in our alternative.” .  *i4-i  c11-I  cI’I’ui ‘c’flc4.II.  ccil icIicl-Icc1  frn1 c1I  tStE?  .  cIc1--1cIIcI 46 i  cti  7 4 ct,ILJ  c1,I’u1  *-1Ic 3it’i’ii I  .iIc  31c,l’<VI1TII9II  The own self of an effect is [its] cause. The production of that (effect) is considered to be from that (cause). Therefore, of existents [which are the effects], birth from themselves (=their ownbeing, the causes), is desired if this were [your, i.e., the Sarhkhya’s] view,//142// [then,] because [the cause] is not different from it (the effect), like the self [of that effect], it would be no cause (i.e., cease to be a cause). And since [purua pradhna etc.] are unproduced, what, itself being causeless, could be the cause of what else?//143// -  Z[J  31IcHI1 t  çi5O -c-4  I  --v:  fl9U  And, when the self of an existent [already] exists, it is useless to postulate a cause. “A” is produced from the same “A”, so the generator (janaka) and what is generated (janya) become identical (ekya).//144//  46  ms. KT: de las gshan mm 47 1vi ms. KT: rgyu ni gccuc  48 Ms; sic, KT: bras bu (=karyasya) 49 IvIIcI,1I, KT: rgyur brtag pa ni 50 1c’1-1I ms. KT: de skyes na  33  I  Su1I  q1cMMIcI  f[r  f  t  51 To111  Il9Ill  If [what we have said above is] undamaging [to your position] because milk exists as curd, [then what we have said is] not undamaging (i.e., is certainly damaging) because of [the fact that] a father does not exist as child.//145// Explanatory comment: In the above verses, Bhá-viveka points out identity of a cause and an effect. If the cause is the effect, a pot would be produced from the pot itself. Or alternatively, the pot (i.e. the effect) would pre-exist in clay (i.e. the cause). In other words, if a pot really pre-exists, there is no sense in claiming its arising a second time. TJ gives the following explanation of v. 145: It is not seen by anyone, anywhere and in any way that “abandoning the state of a father, the father changes to the own-being of a child.” A father cannot abandon being a father and therefore cannot be a child. Even though a child and its father have a blood relationship, the father and child are not identical. Therefore, you cannot get rid of the fallacy that the generator and the generated would be identical in your view.  -i-  r  Because of impossibility of counter-examples (vipaka), it too would not be right to hold that the reason [in our syllogism] is contradicted. //146ab// 1jIcI1  cjç  II91EJI  Thus, there is this much that existents are not produced from themselves. / / 146cd / /  51 1 f 4..* ms. KT: /gnos pa med pa ma yin no!  34 Explanatory comment: The opponent may think of finding a fault like contradiction (viruddhatt) in Bhã-viveka’s remark in order to reject his criticism. Because Bhã-viveka’s syllogisms, however, do not leave room for counter-examples his critical statement cannot contain a contradiction.  2-2  Non-production from others  Introduction to verses 147-158 The argument on non-production from others takes place as a controversy between Bhã-viveka, on the on hand, and the Sautrantika and Vaibhaika-Nyãya among the Buddhist schools and the Vaieika school, on the other hand. While the Sathkhya and Vedänta seek to explain reality exclusively in terms of a conceptual pattern of identity and permanence, the Buddhist realists state it exclusively in terms of difference and impermanence. They assert that the cause and effect are different entities. Thus, the Buddhist realists and the Vaiesika school advocate the doctrine of origination from others, i.e., that entities are produced from entities which are other to them.  -nRi :  q  cti1Icj  r  -  ti  1[{1  119  II  Moreover, since it is not possible that own-being can exist, what is desired to be different from what? It is not thought that the horn of a horse (vaji-rriga) is different from the horn of a cow (go-rHga) and the horn of a mountain (adri-.rnga). / / 147/ / Explanatory comment: If entities are produced from other things, there is a question “what is different from what? In the ultimate reality, there is no ownbeing of entities, that is, entities do not exist in the ultimate reality. Therefore, distinction of entities is not proper for Bhá-viveka. In the above verse he says: since a horn of  52  O  .  “(bertter)  35 a horse does not exist, any attempt to relate it to the horns of others does not make sense.  t{  .ij1’  T’Ic: I ci IIIci U9III  c’tLjII  -t1Q-1ct,I:  From the standpoint of the highest truth, the other causal factors (pare pratyaya), such as the eye, etc., do not produce visual cognition, etc., because they are different [from each other], just like the viralza grass, etc. (virazadivat)/ /148/ /  r  a-ii1-ct.,i’uiT53 q--fr  cI(1  qT[ 31  cII IT ZIQTT  ‘irj  i II9II  It is not admissible that cognition of form (rãpa) has the intended eye etc. as its cause, because it is different [from them], or because it does not exist beforehand, just like a jar and woven cloth etc. [are not the cause of cognition of form].//149// Explanatory comment: If, as the Buddhist realists and Vaieika maintain, the cause and the result are different entities, and the cause produces the result, there is a deficiency. The eye produces only eye-cognition (cakur-vijñãna), but it does not produce a grass cap, cloth or jar. A grass-cap, cloth and jar are produced from vIraia grass, yarn and clay respectively, but eye-cognition is not produced from them. An entity “X” which is different from an entity “Y” does not produce “Y” as its result. Accordingly, Bha-viveka maintains that production from others can not be admitted.  53 54  sET: °cl,IU1, KT: rgyu can ‘jcc4Ig  =  ms  36 55 I r dcccj:  3icii ‘.j’çc  i.4.flc  31fT J1Q-ci1-I Wtct’dl-I fT  dj.1 ll10ll  And, the otherness of something unproduced is a conventional truth; [yet that otherness] is not [there] from the point of view of the highest truth. Thus it is grasped that origination from another entity is not proper.//150//  1cr lrd 3id  c11  fT I  -.icIc1 3-T:  [If you now hypothesize the arising of something that] is produced [but] is inexpressible, then [that] production is useless. Nor can there be arising of what is not arisen yet, [because] it is impossible, just like the sky-flower (kha-pupavat). / /151 / / 1I.11-IM4 1c’-icit c--q  iu1IdI I  31cI-W--I 31I-cflcI dcjc 56 3[-j: IIl-3 .II  [Now, if someone were to say that] what is in the process of being born arises, there would be a similar objection (tulyaparyanuyogita). There is no birth of something inexpressible also, because it is inexpressible [as to whether it is already produced or it is not produced yetl,just as [there is no birth of] things other than it (the unexpressible). / / 152 / / Explanatory comment: The above verses make four points: (1) what has already arisen does not arise again. (2) what is not arisen yet does not arise. (3) what is in the process of coming to exist does not arise either. (4) something inexpressible does not arise. The points (1) and (2) are already explained in the preceding sections. Hence, I shall explain points (3) and (4) here.  ms  56 avãc[ya]+..danyavad= ms. KT:/brjod du med phyir gshan bshin no!  37 (3) What is in the process of coming to exist has both a portion of what has already arisen and a portion of what is not arisen yet. As mentioned before, what has already arisen does not arise and what is not arisen yet does not arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, having both that which has already arisen and that which is not arisen yet, does not arise. (4) Something inexpressible also does not arise. Something inexpressible refers to what is in the process of coming to exist, because it is inexpressible whether it is what has already arisen or what is not arisen yet. What is in the process of coming to exist has two portions, that is, a portion which has already arisen and a portion which is not arisen yet. As mentioned above, what has already arisen and what is not arisen yet do not arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, i.e., something inexpressible, does not arise. According to TJ, a barren women’s child is also included in other things inexpressible. Presumably, TJ means that the skin colour of the barren woman’s child is inexpressible whether it is white or black.  r’F-dIc’-I c$çc4’,ccc  fM1IN  57 T€t’Ic-1: I cIIciT  {T q-ll 1-W.1Il-I t{q: H9iH  From the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are empty as entities consisting of conceptual construction (vikalpita), because they are created, because they are destroyed (vinãa), like illusory water (=a mirage).//153// Explanatory comment: The opponents maintain that entities are produced, because they are acknowledged as mentally constructed entities. Therefore, there are entities which are constructed by cognitions. To this statement Bha-viveka objects. He says: in our ordinary world it is admitted that the eye is an entity and cognizes the form or colour of entities as blue or white or black etc. The eye, however, is not a real entity in the absolute reality, because the eye is what is created or what  57 11: ms. Not translated explicitly in KT.  38 is destroyed, just as illusory water (suggested by TJ). Therefore, the eye is not real entity.  z{-?q-fjm T ÷ii.it  IIc1-lQ-1I  It9abII  Because [a non-conceptually constructed entity] is denied in the same way as the object to be proved, i.e., due to the negation of the mentally constructed entity, (sadhyatulyaniedha), there is no doubt [about the reason (hetu)] by the other [non-mentally constructed] entity.//154ab//  r-t  f4{  U9I cdii IcNII[iII-iccIi6O 4TTt IcIIc4IcII61 ii9abii sf{58  çj59q{:  Although the entity maya (‘ultimate illusion’) is not mentally constructed (akalpita), it from the standpoint of the highest truth is thought to be unreal (vita tha), because of its being a cause of self-affirmation, just as it is false as an imagined entity.//154cd-155ab// Explanatory comment: The opponents state that for illusion there is something which we do not cognize. Bhã-viveka objects to this statement here. He maintains that the entity maya is made by a magician, not mentally constructed. It is not, however, a real entity. It is seen variously by people. That is, one person sees the colour of it as blue, etc. Another person sees the colour of it as red, etc. Or, a form of it is seen variously by many people. The colour or form of illusion is different from one’s validation. Therefore, such illusion is not in reality an entity. (suggested by TJ)  ms  59  cKc4cil  ms  60 61  0311 iiii  ms. KT:/la lahidod chags rgyu yin phyir/ ms. KT:de ñid (tad eva, tattva)  39 4clcII1 ?1Th*IQ  62  I’-McII  II9cdII  Because it is proved by a portion of what is experienced in the world, there is no deficiency of analogy (d.rtantanyanatt).//155cd// Explanatory comment: The opponents object again that if there is no non-imagined entity in illusion the mäyii which Bhã-viveka adopted as an example would not be proper instance. There is, however, something material for making an illusion behind the illusion. That material can be the instance. Therefore, there is no deficiency in this instance.  -4[- Vi 163 T 3T{ T cIccidI 64 T  I  -1r4d--  Or, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are devoid of own-being, because they are created, or because they are destroyed, just like the Buddha made by evil (mtra).//156// ZfT T {--Tt -IIciIQ-1i --TT’t s f  cIc Z{QUIccl41 3T:  çj  ff1{  65  I  T U93’3II  The own-being of entities is not own-being from [the standpoint of the highest] truth, because it is created, just like the hotness or hardness of water.//157// Explanatory comment: Here Bhã-viveka discusses the own-being of entities. What is assumed as the essence of entities in our world is not the essence of entities from the  62 [i]ms 63 ..iIc -iii ms. KT: dños ñid stoñ  64 65  ms ms  40 perspective of the highest truth. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the essence of entities, i.e., the own-being of entities (svabhäva), of an independent, eternal and unchanging substance, is not admitted by the Madhyamika school. Here Bhã-viveka does not define the own-being of entities, but it comes to mean the non-existence of entities. What is made or what disappears does not have own-being because such a thing changes in substance and hence is non-eternal. For example, to follow TJ, when water is boiled, it becomes hot water; when frozen, water has solidity, i.e., becomes ice etc. Likewise, when water is cooled, it becomes cold water; at room temperature, it has softness, i.e., it is water itself. Therefore, water does not have an own-being; it is not an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. Thus, the essence of entities accepted in our everyday world is denied from the standpoint of the highest truth.  .ciIc4.ic66  f -iiciii1  c’-flt  Z1c’-Ic’1 l 1St  I  *  {cIc-I1I fl9-3II  It is not logically proper that entities arise by themselves (i.e. by their own-being). And it is not seen that [entities] arise through the state of another (i.e. as something else). Just as the arising of a cow in the form of a donkey is not seen.//158// Explanatory comment: TJ: The cow which has dewlap, tail, hoof and horn etc. as its essential features does not arise as the donkey which has single hoofs and long ears etc. as its essential features. Moreover, a cow is not produced from the cow itself. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of a cow which is in existence already. Therefore, origination from an entity itself is not acceptable. Origination as other entities is not acceptable either.  66  Iri=ms  67  tr114T*1  ms. KT: gshan gyi dños por  41 2-2-A.  The criticism of the four pratyayas or conditions  Introduction to verses 159-175 The Buddhist Realist, Vaibhãika and Abhidharmika advocates the doctrine of origination from others. In these verses, BhA-viveka refutes the four causal factors which appear to have been drawn from Hinayana philosophy. According to Bhã-viveka, the Buddha taught that the existent does not appear out of the four conditions for people whose wisdom is covered by nihilistic or non-nihilistic views (suggested by TJ). For this reason, he recognized and proclaimed the four conditions only for the purpose of establishing the truth of verbal usage. 68 The Vaibhãsika, however, adopted this theory as the real truth which the Buddha realised, and they maintained that entities are produced from others, i.e., four causal factors. The four conditions are: (1) primary or material causal factor (hetu-pratyaya), (2) objective causal factor (alambana-pratyaya), (3) sequential causal factor (samanantara-pratyaya), and (4) dominant causal factor 69 (adhipati-pratyaya). fqj q[%sfr71 d72  7O[jcjdl1  f  I  73 zj:  II9II  The production from others such as causal-conditions (hetu-pratyaya) is conventional. Accordingly, there is no contradiction with the theory we have accepted. For they (the four pratyayas) do not truly exist from the standpoint of the highest truth.//159// Explanatory comment: The four causal factors are in general admitted by all the schools of Buddhist Realists. Bha-viveka admits the four causal factors only from the  68 Prajñapradipa, p. 27. 69 Cf. Abhidharmakotabhya, 2 • 61c-63. 70 pa[re]..+[nma] ms. KT: gshan las! /skye ba 71 o-- ms. Ejima puts Tftrm{. However, this is metrically unacceptable. KT: gnod pa med! 72 ms  73 t ms. KT: de dag  42 standpoint of conventional truth. Bhã-viveka refutes each of the causal factors in the following verses.  The criticism of the hetu-pratyaya or the primary causal factor  2-2-1-(A).  Introduction to verses 160-162 Hetu refers to ‘primary cause’ or might refer to simply ‘primary’ or ‘root.’ As the mind is a complex of a number of mental factors inseparably associated with one another, a hetu is only one of the factors constituting the mind just as a root of a tree is only one causal factor of the constituents of a tree. The hetu pratyaya refers to the appropriate object of the mental process. When something is said to be the primary cause of another, that thing is said to be the hetu 74 pratyaya. r 1?r  iI’1cIt  Ljcçj  --:  75 cj:  -cc76 31c’iI 41 qz{zJ:  --j:  I :77 II9E.oII  It is not proper either that what exists or what does not exist has a causal condition, because of being in existence and not being in existence [respectively], just like things which are different from them [,i.e., which are not effects]. Alternatively, how can the causal condition of something which does not arise [really] be a causal condition?//160//  75 76  See, S. Chaudhri 1976: 113. °icvici: ms  ms. KT: de las gshan bshin =3ik={T irzp zq: r1: ms, which requires to be read ma skyes/ /rkyen rnams su ni ji itar hgyur/ 77  c  “...q  lisq?m:  f:,  KT: rkyen  43  [:  c4-cj,:  1cciIc1,  i1LIcIt:78  -  -?.iccI  I  31cc4k1 79 1c-’-1c1II9E9II  The cause is not what produces the result, because it is void of that (the result), just like things which are different from them. Nor is what is about to arise produced from that (the cause), because it does not exist beforehand, just like things which are different from them.//161// ‘1I’1Ici 1ii’1I°-(  5fl  8O  3T(  I  82 dIcI c1cd:  9j  This (the cause) does not produce what is not produced, what is in the process of being produced or what is already produced, because of the logical faults already stated 83 and because [entities] do not arise. Therefore, there is truly no hetu [pratyaya].//162// Explanatory comment: Here, Bhã-viveka poses the question whether the four conditions are for the result which exists or for the result which does not exist? There cannot be conditions for the result which does exist, because it already exists. For example, there is no clay seen causing a completed pot. Then, with regard to the result which does not exist, Bhã-viveka asserts that there are no causal conditions, because the result does not exist. For example, there is no seed or water as cause for the sky-flower. Accordingly, the primary or material condition (hetu pratyaya) does not exist.  78 KT:/skye bar bdod pahan des bskyed min/ (napi tajjanmatotpitsub) 79 °1cvn1=ms  80  iiii.vi =i  mri  ms  81 aja.. ms. KT: ma skyes phyir  82  ms 83 See, vv. 151-152.  44 2-2-1-(B).  The criticism of the ãlambana-pratyaya or objective causal factor.  Introduction to verses 163-166  Alambana refers to an ‘object of cognition.’ The lambana-pratyaya is the objective sub-cause of the relation between the object and the subject of perception. All the conditioned (sathskta) and the unconditioned (asathskta) function as the ãlambana-pratyaya of the mind and mental states (citta-caitta). 84 For example, a weak man can neither get up nor stand without the help of a stick. The mind and the mental states can neither arise nor continue without an object of cognition. As stick is a support of the weak man, an object is the support of the mental function. 5r1t  Ird  qT Z{f: I  What is already arisen does not attach itself to a supporting cause for, [then] the arising of what is already arisen would be in vain. What is not arisen yet also [does not attach itself to the supporting cause], because it is not produced yet, just like what has non-arising as its nature.//163// Explanatory comment: The supporting object is the object of the mind and mental functions. That is, when what is going to be the object of the mind and mental functions becomes the cause, the result, “mind and mental functions” arise. Therefore, Bhã-viveka says that what is already arisen does not attach itself to the object, because for what is already arisen such a cause would be again vain. In other words, cognizing the object, mind or consciousness does not cognize the same object again. For example, cognizing a desk, the mind or consciousness does not need to cognize a desk again as a desk.  84 See, S. Chaudhuri 1976:1 14.  85  =  arambaiã° ms. KT: dmigs  45 Moreover, what is not arisen yet does not attach itself to an object because it is not produced yet. For example, the eye of the barren woman’s child does not attach to an object. (TJ available)  .  :z:t iii--f86  r-i i II9EiII  [If one says that] what is in the process of coming to exist would attach itself to [the supporting cause], that [attaching] does not exist without support (ãlambana). The inclusion of the action of being born in that which lacks some parts is not desired.//164// Explanatory comment: What is in the process of coming to exist does not attach itself to an object, because it has the nature of both what is already arisen and what is not yet to arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming into existence does not have the function of cognition of objects.  3TT IT  r-Mf cl  çjcç9O  -iii89 -i1 I  cc1.iIciic ifT  c1II9EII  Alternatively, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that there is support for the mind and mental functions (citta-caitta) is not acceptable, because it is something in the process of coming into existence, or because it is something to be perceived (grahya), justlike a form (rãpa).//165//  86 87  äramvaxath ms. KT: dmigs pa °yä° added under the line in ms.  =  88 °athgasya, ms 89  =  aramvanam= ms. KT: dmigs pa  90 clcvIcIt ms  46 Explanatory comment: From the standpoint of the highest truth there is no object in the mind and mental functions because this mind and these mental functions themselves are what is to be perceived, just as form, color etc. are what are to be perceived. In other words, they are identical from the viewpoint that both are in the process of coming into existence, that is, they are not completed yet as themselves. Therefore mind and mental functions do not have an objective sub-cause (alambanapratyaya).  f*r, 1c1-j  31Ic51-  94 1i-flcUci  f*5  95 -T1II9EEII 1ic’51  Moreover, [if one were to say that] what has a support (sttlambana) would [attach to the object], it would not be proper because of the absence of difference of time (kãlThheda). Thus, since the object does not exist, what could be the object of what?//166// Explanatory comment: The opponents maintain that what has a support, i.e., mind and mental functions, attach to the object. Bha-viveka, however, objects to this statement. I do not fully understand what Bhã-viveka says in this verse. His objection probably means: just as the right and left horns of a cow come out at the same time, ‘the mind, and mental function’ and the object arise at the same time. Therefore, discrimination of what is grasped, i.e., the object, and what grasps, i.e., the mind and mental function, is not proper. In other words, what arises at the same time cannot be either what grasps or what is grasped. Accordingly, there is no object, so anything cannot be the object of anything. (suggested by TJ)  91  ms. KT: dmigs bcas pa tms. KT: dus gcig phyir na 92 93 i 3P1’ ms. KT: de mi run  94 95  jiui[]  =3j,4.c4uIT°  ms  ms  47 2-2-1-(C).  The criticism of the samanantara-pratyaya or the sequential causal factor  Introduction to verses 167-169 Bhã-viveka criticizes the idea of the sequential condition (samanantara pratyaya). The sequential condition appears to pertain primarily to the production of mental events. It may be taken to refer to the extinction of the immediately preceding moment of consciousness which engenders the succeeding mental state. In other words, the sequential condition may refer to the immediately preceding extinction of a cause, like a seed, which allows for the emergence of the effect, like the sprout.  1I’1Id1  t[sfi  r rsf{  --i.icic1  31’.1IIcB I  IZTT U93II  What is not arisen yet is not blocked, because it has not arisen, just like the sky-flower. What has already disappeared is not blocked, because it has already disappeared, just as in the case of a dead person.//167// Explanatory comment: The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what is not arisen yet. What is not arisen yet has no disappearance, because it has had no arisen state, just as the sky-flower does not disappear. Moreover, the sequential condition cannot be the condition of what has already disappeared. What has already disappeared has no disappearance, because it has already disappeared, just as a dead person does not die. 96  41I  Q-IIL.,:  1ctci-ffi  1: II9EII  What has not disappeared yet is not [blocked], because it has not disappeared yet, just like a lamp (pradipa) that is existing. That what is in the process of disappearing disappears is not desired, because of the refutation already stated.//168// 96  ms  48 Explanatory comment: The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what has not disappeared yet. What has not disappeared yet has no disappearance, because it has not disappeared yet, just like a lamp which is still existing. That is, what has not disappeared yet refers to what is existing. Something existing does not need a condition of arising.  de1-c4,tc51 ?fTT ii Ic4-ci197  f  .111Iu1cciIQ-i  -*i sf T *L I  nti-  -Ricici  98 II9EU  Even then (tathãpi), [what is in the process of disappearing and what is in the process of coming to exist] would be simultaneous (tulyakala) or temporally separate (bhinnakäla). [In any case,] it is not, like the final mind of an Arhat (arhaccarama-cittavat), justified because of its being in the process of disappearing. / / 169 / / Explanatory comment: In the case of what is in the process of disappearing the condition is denied in the same way. The opponents, according to TJ, maintain that what is in the process of disappearing supports the arising of that which is in the process of coming to exist. Accordingly, what is in the process of disappearing is the sequential condition. To this assertion Bha-viveka objects that the sequential condition, i.e., what is in the process of disappearing, is not a sequential condition of what is in the process of coming into existence, because what is in the process of disappearing and what is in the process of coming into existence would be simultaneous. Or, even if they are not simultaneous, a sequential condition defined as what is in the process of disappearing is not a condition. In other words, that which is in the process of disappearing cannot be the condition of the 97  ms  1ci<  98 Ms puts here another half verse: 3 T wzm: 1l-l.1.-d:/ Ejima suggests that it is left out in the Tibetan K and does not appear in V even in prose form. It might be omitted here for the same reasons; it seems to be misplaced and hardly interpretable when we pay attention to the context (k. 163-166: ãlambana-pratyaya, k. 167-169: samanantara-pratyaya), and the writer of Ms writes the word “alambaia” in “ãramvaia” in the preceding k. 163-166 while he writes it only here rightly, what leads us to suppose that this half verse was inseted at a certain occasion. It might be, however, copyist’s peculiarity, and may not come from Bhãviveka himself.  49 next arising, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind. The final mind of an Arhat means that when an Arhat is destroyed, after the next existence (punarbhava) and transmigration (sathtãna) he reaches Nirvãita. Therefore, his mind does not produce the next mind (=next life).  The criticism of the adhipati-pratyaya or the dominant causal factor.  2-2-1-(D).  Introduction to verses 170-175 Bhã-viveka refutes the dominant causal factor (adhipati-pratyaya). The dominant causal factor assists the other in respect of the origination of entities, just as the three legs of a tripod assist one another, without disturbing the arising of entities. Accordingly, everything can be a dominant causal factor (indirect cause). For example, water, earth, sun and warmth can be the dominant causal factors for the growing of seeds. citcicit99 1Ic  11-1Icuc -TJ-rm 1 Thx1I  -4-Ic1OO3T?[ jftitrf [f: U99°II  The being of entities is not logically proper, because the arising of [entities] does not exist from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, just like the existence of the barren woman’s child.Therefore, the dominant causal factor is not accepted.//170/ / *I1T3T i  -i ri  IT I9c-a’ Z1TUl11II99II  [If one were to accept:] the dominant causal factor would be either with the effect or without the effect. [The condition that] lacks [the effect] is not [the dominant causal factor], because it lacks that (the effect), just like the eye[sense] for cognition of words.//171// 99 1rc4c1 100 °lclc  ms  50 Explanatory comment: Bhã-viveka says: the condition without the effect is not the dominant causal factor, because it is without the effect, just as the eye-organ is not the dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. According to Abhidharmika, Vaibhãika, etc. everything can be a dominant causal factor. The eye organ, however, cannot be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. Instead, auditory consciousness can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. On the other hand, the eye organ can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of the eye. Thus, the eye organ and cognition of words do not have interdependence. Moreover, the eye organ without eye-cognition cannot be the dominant causal factor of eye-cognition, because when there is no result there is no causal factor. Therefore, the condition without result cannot be the dominant causal factor. (suggested by TJ)  lcc.UII 1 c4,I104  T4l c4I4N 3{l  fjj1O2 Z{(:1O3  I  II99II  That which is not empty [of effect, i.e., which is coupled with an effect] is not [the dominant causal factor] even on the conventional level. For such a situation is opposed (bädhikã) to actual experience (pratiti). Moreover, there would be no effect in the such a effect. And what does not exist for you would become the effect.//172// Explanatory comment: Something which is coupled with an effect cannot be the dominant causal factor, because it already has an effect. Something which already has an result cannot be a causal factor. Moreover, if something which already has an effect 101  (m, pi) ms  102 Mssic 103 KT:/sbyañ la sogs na gnas pa yi/ /rgyu tsam yod pa Lii tshe la/ (KD, NP, VDNP, sic) In V it is preceded by the following sentence :/mig stoñ pa shes bya ba la kun rdsob tu yañ grags pabi gnod par bgyur te/ /gan gi phyir she na/ /sbyan la....(VD, Dsa 98b5-6; N, 102b3; P. 106a5), which, though not being a versified rendering of it, is connected with the pada ab in KS if we can rectify “mi stoñ pa” (aãnya). 104 =(k)[a]rye ms. KT: bbras bu  51 associated with it, this could not be considered as the effect. It would pre-exsit, or something else that is not an effect would be the effect.  i4-ir-t  f  3mTrq--Tt  -Iri  %  1H  31--1c1 *I’ui[a: I  i1 in’sii  If one were to say that the [latent] capability of the result (karyaákti) is the result, how can there be a cause other than that (latent capability of the result)? A relation of the recipient and the thing to be received (adharãdheyabMva) is not desired in the case of anything else [other than cause and effect]. / / 173 / /  zfrft ici41O6 Rl3f f1O7  -f1O5  t[11t  zjj  I 95fl  If this [latent capability of the result] is just a synonym for the result, just as in the usage “there is a space in the space,” what could be admissable as that (cause) with which that (result) is seen as associated.//174// Explanatory comment: The opponent maintains that the latent capability of effect is the effect and that latent capability exists in the cause. To this statement Bha-viveka asks: If that is so, how can there be a cause other than the latent capability of the effect. That is, if the latent capability exists in the cause, the cause would be unnecessary. Bha-viveka continues, moreover, by asking: if this latent capability of the effect is just a synonym for the effect as in the usage “there is a space in the space.” That is, if the latent capability of the effect is a synonym for the effect, the cause and the effect would be indentical. There is, however, no relationship of place and what is to be placed. In other words, the usage “there is a space in  fri0 ms 5 lO 106 imt ms. KT: gal te de ñid 107 f ms  52 the space” does not make sense. Therefore, the idea that “the latent capability is a synonym for the effect” is not admitted. 8 : I1rd f [lO 3:  jj-ij :  I11L1’d1o9  i:  H9’3II  Because there is no arising of what is existing, what is taken as the dominant[ causal factor] for what? On the other hand, because what is not existing does not have a cause, what is taken as the dominant [causal factor] of what?//175// Explanatory comment: The opponents state that the latent capability of an effect is what pre-exists in the cause. To this statement Bhã-viveka responds: if the cause is the latent capability of the effect, what is the effect which the cause has? He, moreover, states that because there is no repeated arising in what already exists, how can it be understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z? Likewise, because there is no condition in what is not existing, how can it be understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z? Thus, Bha-viveka refutes the idea of the dominant causal factor even from the standpoint of conventional truth as well as from the standpoint of the highest truth.  2-2-2 The problem of the pratyaka and pratiti. E11O j-;  1Ic1I  TftiT ‘j11 4eI  108  1.1ci°  109  3T[fT]qft[  Q:  I  1rfi ra ftrT I  ms. KT: skye ba (sambhava)  1109 ms. KT:/mñon sum dan ni grags pa yi/ /gnod pas  53 zj112 9  rnt t?t  4Qr: U999fl  A possible objection (cet): An earthen pitcher, etc. are seen as produced. Reasoning (hetu) has no role to play in the case of what is perceived. [If you use hetu,] the invalidation of what is actually seen (rta) and actual experience (pratiti) becomes something that invalidates it.//176// By a knowledge which is similar to that of the ignorant person (balastlmdnya), the arising of the pitcher, etc. is perceived. We do not deny such [an opinion]. Therefore, there is no deficiency (doa) pointed out.//177/ 3 cj[: Ic1--1Ihl  1  f  --f  115 [-[JJ[  ]ft{  T1tPT  4 ccjçj:ll  dIrdd: II9’3H  In the ultimate analysis, a cognition which has form as its object (ãlambana) [and] is self-conscious does not exist. Hence, for us the “invalidation” by that (direct perception) would not be an invalidation because that (direct perception) does not arise [in the ultimate reality].//178// 116  T?1T Z{Tq ii4a: 31Id  { r-Th II9’3II  From the standpoint of the highest truth, it is not logical that a cognition of direct perception which is in accordance with the object should exist, because it is not distinguished (i.e. it does not really differ) from the knowledge of an ignorant person, just like the cognition of the circle for a fire-brand. / / 179 / /  112 KT:/gan phyir de ni mi hgog pas/ (=pratiiddhath yato nedath?) 113 °3TtLTms  ms 115 çtn ms. KT: de yi gnod pa 116 pra....dhi ms. KT:mñon sum blo ni  54 ir -itr 3occ-q  c.d 1c1ccI  qq ?ti  ImoII  [The direct perception which has] that (form, etc.) as the object-sphere is not a really existing substance, because it is what is created, just like the cognition of ãtman. And, direct perception would not be a refutation for us because form, etc. are not really existing substances.//180// ITI sfti1t’-i’17 t: ç[j:  Actual experience does not invalidate the thought coming from the wisdom of wise men. The word of people who are blind is not considered eligible with respect to truth because of their covering of ignorance. / /181 / / Explanatory comment: The opponents claim that Bhã-viveka’s reason (hetu) in his syllogism is not valid because his reason would be opposed by direct perception (pratyaka) and actual experience (pratiti). In the syllogism, for example, “from the standpoint of the highest truth, a pot has no real existence, because it is what is produced (or made), just like a cloth,” the thesis and example are reasonable. The reason, however, is not sound. For it is, by direct perception, seen and understood that a pot is a thing which is produced or made from clay, water, a lathe, potter etc. Thus, for Bha-viveka’s opponents the reason in the syllogism is invalidated by direct perception and actual experience. On the other hand, for Bhã-viveka, direct perception and actual experience cannot refute his view. The arising of a pot, etc. is perceived by the means of knowledge accessible to an ignorant (=ordinary) person. Direct perception can be admitted in terms of conventional truth yet not from the standpoint of the highest truth. The knowledge derived from direct perception, from the standpoint of the highest truth, does not correspond to its object. For example,  55 seeing the revolving fire brand, an ordinary person cognizes it as a circle, which it is not. Likewise, actual experience cannot refute Bha-viveka’s syllogism either. The word of people blinded by ignorance cannot be admitted as truth. That is, since people are affected by ignorance, their so called actual experiences are not acceptable as superior means of knowing from the standpoint of the highest truth.  2-2-3.  The criticism of the theory of the Sãthkhya system  Introduction to verses 182-191. According to TJ, in these verses Bhã-viveka discusses the doctrine of “pre existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state” (satkaryavada). He, however, has already criticized this doctorine in verses 139-146 (the section of “non-production from itself”). Instead, it seems Bhä-viveka is actually refering to the pradhäna (primary matter) and pzrua (pure consciousness) which the Sathkhya system advances as the cause of all phenomenon. According to Sathkhya philosophy, these two are independent existences and ungenerated existences. Bha-viveka criticizes this idea. T??t sfj  ij  -1 1T41E?. [(:  ffi  Th-4-I 1 I  ‘4 118 I  ia T {T *i-i, QqjIj1? 119 tFT II9II  It is not acceptable that there is arising of what already exists. What is the point of the arising of what already exists? If one answers: there is grossness (sthaulya) [as new element when an effect comes about, we reply that then] the effect does not exist [in the cause] because of the impossibility of grossness (sthaulya) in the previous [cause] state. //182//  118 KT:/yod pa ci phyir skye bar bgyur/ (Eng. tr. Why does what already exists arise?) 119 sth[au](lya)sya° ms  56  f* q,  tpf j: f{ {- ‘ I tj ci 11cIcçl qe c4,U 3 ° 2 1ccjIc vII[ -‘1c4-cccI U9(.II Moreover, what [we consider] the grossness of the eye is not created by its causal conditions (=causes), because it (grossness) does not exist beforehand, just like a pot, or just like the purua, because it (grossness) is what is to be known (jñeya).//183// Explanatory comment: The opponents state that there is grossness of an effect in a cause. To this statement Bhã-viveka objects: Because there is no effect in the cause, there is no grossness in the previous cause state. For example, there are no thick trunk or rank twigs etc. in a seed of a fig tree. (TJ available) Bhã-viveka continues his objection. The grossness of something is not created by its causes. For example, a pot is not made by grossness of the pot. The grossness of the pot does not exist beforehand. The pot is made by clay, water etc.  1 ‘1cjc’LII  1kI  ttSf{  3T141 % i:’ ’ 2  I  ot’cjRc 3i- H9H  In the conventional [truth] we (also) generally accept the experiencer, etc. (bhoktrãdi). Hence, the deficiency (doa) of the analogy (drtanta) does not occur any where here (i.e. in the preceding statement)./1184// Explanatory comment: The Sathkhya system claims that you cannot use the ‘experiencer’ as an analogy when you do not accept the existence of an experiencer. Bhã-viveka, however, admits the existence of an experiencer as a general convention. Therefore, there is no deficiency of the analogy in Bhã-viveka’s statement.  120  1 oç  ms  121 j : ms  57 3T1rR 31c’Ii f j [ oy ZjQ[ t{T Er: Tf1o.1[f-d: tIt z: II9II .icc’Lu[:1  rcA,L1 (1-rd  122  rd  I  i1tit stj T Il9(II  If [the Sarhkhya] were to say: “there is no deficiency [in our claim] because of manifestation (abhivyakti) (i.e. what we are speaking about is really manifestation of the effect, not new physical creation),” [we ask:] for instance what is manifested by what? [If the Sathkhya replies that] “for example, by means of [the light of] a lamp, a pot [is manifested],” [we say] no. For this is manifestation of what exists already.//185// Even on the conventional level, [it is obvious that] by means of a lamp, a pot is joined with the light, or the perception of that (i.e. pot) is created, or the arisal of something opposite [to light, i.e. darkness] is created.//186// Explanatory comment: The Sathkhyas maintain that the existent does not arise, but simply becomes manifest. To this statement Bha-viveka asks what is manifested by what? If a pot is manifested by means of the light of a lamp, it is not proper, because a pot is what is already arisen. Therefore it is not admissable that what is already arisen manifests itself. Only the features of a pot are seen by means of the light of a lamp. A pot itself has been existent before the light is turned on. Therefore, the unmanifest, i.e., pot, etc., does not become manifest.  --  1°’-1°IcicIki {-‘-I1cid I 3  rrir  uu  The unmanifested (abhivyakta) is not manifested, because it is non manifested (i.e. is a non-manifested) principle, just like the sky-flower. Or, from the standpoint of [the Sathkhya] himself, [we] could point out [the following disproving anology]: just like the experiencer and the primary material cause (pradMna). / / 187/ / 122 sathvrty=a..i...dipena ms. KT:/kun rdsob tu yañ mar mes ni  58 9T  [-1?1t  -i’c1CiI 1IciT ci 9 T I  cJIi 3ZR oct’dccj 123  fii II9II  [Further objection against the Sarhkhya:1 If that [experiencerl also is manifested, the experiencer would be neither omnipresent (sarvagata), causeless (ahetu), or sentient (cetana), and its unmanifestness (avyaktatva) would be lost.//188// ctjj i.u(j ZfT t q.19 oc4  124 1 J9 cJu  :  I f%T(  II9II125  [If you were to admit the above, then] your pradMna would become something transformed and a result. By nature it (pradhãna) would be an individual [effect]. [But], how can it have unchangeableness (avilqti) when [it, pradhanal is a result?//189// Explanatory comment: Bhã-viveka maintains that what does not exist does not become manifest. The sky-flower, for example, is not manifested, because it does not exist. Then Bhã-viveka refers to pradhana and purua considered as always (i.e. already) existing. Considering that both a pot and pradhana or purua are what already exist, he objects that the unmanifested does not become manifest, because it is not manifested (i.e. is an unchanging existent). If what already exists, i.e., purua, becomes manifest, it would not be purua which has characteristic of omnipresence, etc. and its unmanifestness would be lost. Bhã-viveka, moreover, maintains that if pradhana becomes manifest, its omnipresence, etc. would be lost that is, pradhana would be the manifestor of itself. Therefore, the unmanifestness of both purua and pradhana would be lost.  123 =avyaktathtvan=ca ms. KT: nii gsal ba yan (avyaktatvath Ca) vyakti+++..pena ms. SG: vyakti+++rupel)a. The restoration above is Ejima’s provisional. 124 KT does not translated ‘svarüpena.’ I translated this verse based upon my understanding. 125 The Tibetan editions are based on a Sanskrit text slightly different from our ms. KT says: If pradhana is manifested, your pradhana which is an effect and which is changed would be manifestation. This [idea] is not accepted.)  59 o’L1o.,1Ct,I ‘-1’-1  1  o-iolI 1{fl 126 I  ‘1 1  cIIc1’-It 1T II9°ll  It is thought that “Xl,” “X2,” “X3” etc. are the manifestors of “x’,” but they are not admitted [by us] as manifestors of “Y,” because of the reasons ‘being of the cause’ (kãraizatva), etc., just as thread, etc. [are not manifestors of] yogurt.//190// c1-ccI  3ff[  ck’  d--1rd t{  ( dccflI--II-I ( I  I  Z{{:128  1199911  If [the Sathkhya] were to say that “because the thread, etc. have a latent capability (akti) for [producing of] that (yogurt), your example is deficient,” [we reply that] that is not [so]. For they (the thread, etc.) are not the manifestors of that (yogurt) as thread, etc. .//191// Explanatory comment: The Sathkhyas think that Xl, X2, X3 etc. are the manifestor of something Y. Bhã-viveka, however, does not accept this idea. I do not fully understand what Bhã-viveka says here. Bhä-viveka probably means: for example, yogurt is not made by thread, etc. Yogurt is made by milk. Therefore, thread, etc. cannot be the cause of yogurt. In other words, thread, etc. are not manifestors of yogurt. Even if the thread, etc. have a latent capability of producing yogurt, they cannot be the cause of yogurt, because the thread, etc. cannot be the cause of yogurt as the thread, etc. themselves. (suggested by TJ)  126  ygoj,i  127  i.’-ioi,i  ms. KT:/de dag de gsal byed mi bdod/, cf. K. l9lcd.  ms  128 In ms follows a verse: ;  qj1k:// Ejima suggests that it is the same with what appears once more as k. 193. This may be a misplacement in comparison with the Tibetan versions of K and V.  60 2-3.  Non-production from itself and others.  Introduction to verses 192-193. There are those who, like Jams, maintain that cause and effect are both identical and different. That is, they claim that entities are produced both from  themselves and others. For example, in the case of the production of a gold ring, cause and result are both identical and different. Inasmuch as the gold ring is produced from gold, it is produced from itself, i.e., cause and effect are identical. Nevertheless, inasmuch as causes like an artisan and heat are also required for the production of the effect, however, the gold ring is produced from others. That is, the cause and effect are different. Therefore, the causal relation is one of both identity and difference. [  t1T  jq  129  { 1  -T1sft1 [tcjd:  I  q:  nn  Production from neither itself nor from something else is acceptable. Nor  is the [production of] an entity which exists and which does not exist acceptable, because a statement speaking of both [possibilities as the one refered to just now] which has already been examined in the proper way, [and rejected] is inexistent [cannot be entertained].//192// Explanatory comment: Bhã-viveka claims that the idea of “production from both itself and something else” should be negated by the aforesaid two syllogisms, i.e., the syllogism about non-production from itself and the syllogism about non production from others, because here “self and others” is nothing but a combination of “self” and “others.”  129 svaparasyan=na=[nm]=etath ms. KT:/bdag dan gshan las skye ba dan/I c=asadasadatmanab ms. KT: bdag flid yod dan med 130  mi bdod/  61 [ cti4i 131  [.<-  ic1ci  lcI[[-T:  2 fl9II’  Even on the standpoint of conventional level it is not desired that the effect is manifested by its conditions, because an effect follows the changes of that (cause) , just as [manifestation of] a pot through soil, etc. (md).//193// Explanatory comment: Clay, for example, is a cause of a pot. In other words, a pot is an effect of soil. The pot, however, is not manifested by soil, because when the pot produced, soil itself has been destroyed. Accordingly, the effect, i.e., the pot, is not manifested by its cause, i.e., soil.  2-4.  Non-production from ahetu “without cause”  Introduction to verses 194-195 Some thinkers, like nihilists, proclaim that entities are produced without cause. In the following verses Bhä-viveka criticizes their view. jc’-iiR.i  f  i  133 -IM  1i1i1134-Lidiic1  ffitk”T c4cf II91II  Even from the standpoint of conventional [truth], it is not desired that the eye is produced from nothing, because it comes to be associated with universality (sumanya) and particularity (viea), just as in the case of pot. (kua).//194//  131 Ms here reads “kamasya” instead of “krasya” in verse misplaced after k. 191. See. the footnote 140. 132 This verse is the same with the superfluous one that is misplaced just after k. 191. 133 =31r1i?a1= ms. KT: gb bur 134 *iI1I-l  ms  62 135  ccUcI 4 c4,I  f-qz{- qiqf 136  fk[itici RvII1-k1: I Th1ic f1 rii II9II  Moreover, because it is a result, because it is produced in a [specific] sequence, because it can be destroyed [later], because it can change, because there is regularity of cause and causal conditions, and because it comes into existence this is what one should notice.//195// --  Explanatory comment: The assertion of a production without cause means that it is no longer held that the result is produced from a cause which is itself or that the effect is produced from a cause other than itself. In other words, the effect is produced by chance. Those who assert that entities are produced without causes admit only perception, and ignore the causality. For example, a pot possesses both universal features (sämnya-lakaza) and specific features (sva-lakai.za). That is to say, a pot has hardness, etc. Hardness, etc. are generally known as the features of the pot. The pot also has colour, design, shape etc., which are specific features. As long as a pot has universal features and specific features, it has causality, that is, it is produced from causes. Besides the two features, Bhã-viveka mentions other features of entities in verse 195. (my own understanding) Here, the qualification, i.e., from the standpoint of the highest truth, is not added to Bha-viveka’s syllogism refuting the opponent’s assertion. Probably, the intention of this section is that causality should be examined. Therefore, it might be pointless to discuss the production without cause from the standpoint of the highest truth.  2-5.  The criticism of Lokãyatas  Introduction to verses 196-214  Those who, like the Lokãyatas and ãjivikas, do not concede the existence of a next life, and deny the result of an action, consequently negate the necessary 135 q,14 136 nil  ms. KT:/ hbras bu yin phyir rim skyebi phyir/ ms. SG: hetupratya(ya)naiyamyaj=, KT:/rgyu rkyen ñes pabi phyir dan  63 causal ground for the existent, and assert the production of entities without cause. In the following, Bhã-viveka attacks them.  çç1 q  f  çLj-u-137  1icicjTh38 1:  -IIIIccic?ITh1QT *uj139 cN$ccflcl fi f ,Uj Qfl  LJ-UI  41c14-III9EII  fi o1Iq ZJT I  ts-1I  m-qi II93II  One might say: it is not thought that a clay ball (ivaka)’ ° which has 4 disappeared due to another’s arising is produced [again], because it is already destroyed, or because it is a result, just like a pot (ku1a).//196// Just as a pot which has disappeared as a pot is not produced, a clay ball is not produced, if this is what you mean (abhi.ta), then [by this statement of yours] nothing but something desired [by us] is proved.//197// Explanatory comment: Here, Bha-viveka points out the opponent’s contrariety of syllogism. Bhã viveka says that the statement of the opponent proves what he (Bhã-viveka) wishes to prove. That is to say, the statement of the opponent ‘it is not thought that a clay ball which has disappeared due to another’s arising (=arising of a pot) is produced again’ cannot be the objection for Bha-viveka’s idea.  riiu  iei  rdI  zif-i-.uRcii II9cII  137  ms 138 KT: bjim gon (the Sanskrit equivalent of which would be mrt-pii4a). 139 140 According to M. Monier-Williams 1899, this word means (1) an idol or image of iva (2) a pillar or post to which cows are tied (to be milked or for rubbing against). According to St. Petersburg Wörterbuch, the word means (1) em Idol civa’s (2) em Pfal, an den eine Kuh gebunden wird oder an den sie sich kratzt. Thus, according to the dictionaries consulted the word does not have the meaning “soil.” However, the Tibetan translator uses the word “bjin goñ.” From the context, his gloss should be taken as meaning “soil.”  64 Now, if [your reason “because it is already destroyed” in v. 196 means: ‘because its] cause has already been blocked,’ there would be contrariety of reason (i.e. you would be giving a reason opposite to what you wish to prove). Or, if your reason means: ‘[because] what has not been destroyed yet [disappears] as a continuous existence,’ your reason would be inconclusive (i.e. you will not be able to point out a definite, specific cause).//198// Explanatory comment: The opponents explain the meaning of reason (hetu) in verse 196. However, even they try to explain or to interpretate the reason ‘because it is already destroyed’ in various ways, they cannot prove their opinion. It is the fact that what is already destroyed is never produced again, therefore, the reason which the opponents advenced does not make sense.  3Tfta  PT 3-i 1 ci 1  -  -: 141 I  The cognition (buddhi) which has just been blocked exists in the cognition that begins within the womb (garbha), because it becomes different with the distinction of what is to be known (i.e. of the object), or, because it is a cognition (dhitva), just like the cognition later than that (i.e. just like a subsequence cognition).//199//  -T1\ 142?p zf  -  143 Z{ [  OOfl  Because of the difference of object, the identity of ‘X’s cognition of an expression and cognition of a form is like the identity of two persons with different continua (i.e. such an identity does not exist).//200// 141  kr: ms. SG prag =a+ntaraniruddhadhib. 3TftI KT:/mñal gnas sñon rol blo la ni//mdun rol kho nar bgags blo yod/ 142 1(1’: gshan phyir, “jñeya-” is not translated in KT. 143 ms  65 • cci’-i45  DfT  146  dct,cci,  f  IuI’.4T 11Z0911  Therefore, there is an impossibility of an analogy [in verse 199]. Oneness (ekatva) of cognition does not arise. Nor does oneness of them [on account of the reason]”because it is cognition” arise, because [the reason] would be vitiated (vyabhicãra) by another [person’s] cognition. / /201 / / Explanatory comment: I do not fully understand what these verses say. Probably this verse means: The Lokãyatas do not admit the transmigration. The Buddhists, however, admit the transmigration on the conventional level. After a person dies, the next cognition of the person begins within the womb. It is not the same cognition with the cognition which the person had before his or her death. This process continues as long as a person is in the conventional world. Therefore, in verse 199 Bhã-viveka advances the analogy ‘just like the cognition later than that, that is, just like a subsequent cognition. Moreover, oneness of previous cognition and later cognition does not arise, because, as mentioned above, the cognition of previous life and the cognition of later life are different from each other, just as the cognitions of two persons are different from each other.  ri-r ‘1Ic  31  [ot41 147  IIcIcIt R  rd-I--  I -d--cIr frI T [I  The non-believers [in the Buddhist’s message] (nãstika) may say as follows:  144  iiç dii c4N TfZ ft: ms. KT:/de phyir pha rol phyir yan ni//dpe med par ni mi bgyur tel which differs from the reading in ms.  145 ms 146 trr ms. KT: bkhrul par bgyur phyir ro/ 147  ms. KT: mtshams sbyor med/  66 The mind of an ignorant person at the time of death does not attain re-birth (apratisathdhika), because it is a mind at the time of death (cyuti citta), just like the final mind of an Arhat (arhaccaramacittavat).//202// [In response, we say your] reason would be inconclusive (anaikntiJca) because of the mind at the time of death in the past (atitaccyuticeta). And since recollection of a previous existence remains, that [mind at the time of death] exists also on account of the reasoning [already] given (uktaniti). / /203 / / Explanatory comment: The opponents do not admit the next life. From this viewpoint, they state that when a person dies, his or her mind does not attain re-birth, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not attain re-birth. To this statement Bhã-viveka objects. On the conventional level, it is admitted that a person has recollection of a previous life. Therefore, the mind at the time of death in which recollection of previous existence remains.  IQ--ci1: I -°Ic-1 148 3fl4Q R ?F51-l1° Z{Qfl ULOII ‘*-  iI[ccic1  The mind at the time of death becomes a generator (janaka) of another mind, because it has ignorance (sividyd), just as the mind of a dishonourable person (anrya) generates that (another mind).//204// Explanatory comment: As mentioned above, the opponents state that a mind at the time of death does not produce the next mind, just as a mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind. To this statement Bhá-viveka objects: an ordinary person has ignorance, therefore, a mind at the time of death produces the next mind. That is, as long as one who has ignorance, his or her mind is produced every time of death, i.e., there is transmigration.  148 s(a)..[dyaltvad= ms. KT:/ma rig pa dan bcas pabi phyir/  67  q-4-ri ei: i1i-c-i:l49I 150 ‘q’j[  q-  ts3TIt i 11  flO(3fl  desired that body, [The non-believers might state as follows:] it is not produced by their sense organs and cognition (arirendriya-buc1dhi) are Therefore, the own action, because they are perishable, just like a pot. next world does not exist. / /205 / / 3qj152  1c  %:i53  with the view that] since [However, what do we Màdhyamikas have to do her, the body (deha) “A” is generated neither by the same “A” nor by anot of another. Either is not produced either by one’s own action or by that way we have nothing to lose.//206//  i  i1i-i  I  5 ’3U /)’ R° 4 te gis 1 (/iñ la sogs pa dus skye ba//sems can las kyi dbañ the action [of human [If one were to say: body, etc are] not produced by of your statement. [If beings], there is no supporting instance (nidarana) not produced by the one were to say: the tree (Tib.: in, Skt.: vrksa), etc are by the power of the action of human beingsl, the tree , etc. are produced action of human beings (akarmajanita).//207// (/sems dmyal gnas dan mtshon dan dpag bdam in skye // )’ ab n/ 5 08 bshi 5 //2 149 n=estä=sa° ms 150 ms. KT: shig phyir 151 ?1 ms. KT: de ma byas/ 152 3-iIR4 ms. One aksara should be added for the sake of the metre. la d shig 153 The pada cd is different in KT: /hjig rten ran gi las bskyed min/ /gshan bdi ned gnod/ 154 The pada cd is left out in ms 155 The pada ab is left out in ms  68 Just as the sword and the felicitous pearls arise in hell and heaven respectively.! /208ab/ / Explanatory comment: According to the Lokayatas, human beings consist of elements of earth, water, fire and wind. While alive they are independent existences. After their death, they return to their conglomerations of each element respectively, i.e., the element of earth returns to the conglomeration of the element of the earth and so on. The Lokayatas, etc. claim that the production of a body has no cause and is a matter of chance. By contrast, Buddhism does not admit the production of entities without cause. Bhã-viveka denies their statement “the body, etc. are not produced from action” because they do not give a valid example. In this case, their example should be “just as a tree is not grown by the force of action of human beings, but just consists of the elements of earth and water etc.” The growing of trees however, needs the force of action of human beings. Without it, a tree does not arise, grow or bear fruit. In some cases, it might be that just as the sword, which is a symbol of suffering, arises in hell whereas the felicitous pearls, which are a symbol of pleasure, arise in heaven. (my own understanding)  How can a cognition which has completely different characteristics from those (=gross elements) (tadanyantavilakaiã) arise from gross elements?/ /208/ / 31-cMI-II  -cIdI[1cj  c  (156-jIdcicI I Tf1 iii 1I1I4icicI:157 IIoiI  [If one were to say:] consciousness (caitanya) seen [on the part of] unconscious gross elements is like the power to intoxicate (madaákti) or  156 cai+.., ms. SC: cai(ta)nyath. KT: es pa yod pa flid.  157 ir: ms  69 like the fire which arises out of the sun-stone (süryakanta), because it has arising. / /209 / /  -Icrk  31-c-’Lflc 158  ,IQ-(-j-u-Q-jcjI  f 159  31-III-.cit160 -iRi  [You] still have deficiency of analogy [in your statement] because there is no consciousness in the ability of liquor. And there would be a contrariety of reason [in your statement] because non-equivalent kinds of cause are used.//210// 161  9f1I11ct’I11 -IcIII1 162  jf-163  diii 1R9911  That internal gross elements (adhyatmikani bhãtdni) are not cognizors (i.e. cognition) is understood, because they have firmness, etc. (kathinadi), or because they are gross elements, just like other similar entities.//211// Explanatory comment: I do not understand what these verses mean. Probably these verses mean: As mentioned above, the Lokayatas state that human beings consist of elements of earth, water, fire and wind. Bhä-viveka, however, objects to this view. The elements of earth, water etc. have firmness, and they are gross element. It is known that the firmness is an intrinsic nature of earth, not an intrinsic nature of cognizors, i.e., beings. Accordingly, earth, etc, which have firmness, etc. cannot be human beings.  158  31cI4I  ms. KT: es yod ma  yin pas.  159 th ms. KT: khyod kyi. 160 Ms sic. All of the Tibetan versions:! rgyu rnams rigs mthun yin pabi phyir/ (=e Ii’cirU 161 boddhriiiti ms 162 KT: sa la sogs pai. 163 1iT f ms. KT: bbyuñ ba yin phyir.  70  r i-t-rI-i d,flct)ccUd  cc 164  II9JI  Therefore, the wise man should understand that sense-consciousness (vijñtna) which begins within a womb, etc. is preceded by another previous sense-consciousness, because it is one which cognizes, just like the [sense-consciousnesses] which comes after it.//212// II’I-ç i[165  j: t-cIRjIci1  111 3 Q 1 ’ f 166  L-cc1  I  ‘qj tuiF-: iI9tI  A calf seeks food after birth because of earlier practice (i.e. habit) formed in its previous [life], because it moves for the purpose of [searching for] food, just like a full-grown sense organ (parftzatendriya).//213//  1lct,I1dck,dI 167 cIII-N’  IR  31  tI  Lic5I1fT: 168  cciI1 1I’-- 31I Ic1I IR9?II 4  [Our] reason [“because it moves for the purpose of seaching food”] would not be uncertain (anaikãntika) due to the stone [which is moved] by a magnet. And [our reason would not be] incomplete because the eating of that (calf) is actually perceived (tadahdribhyavahti).//214// Explanatory comment: When a person is born, his or her cognition is produced, but it is not a completely new production. The next cognition of the person is made immediately after his or her death. For example, a calf seeks food without learning how to obtain food. That is, a calf knows how to obtain the food because of earlier practice formed in the previous life. 164 gra[ha]..÷....ddhavat ms SC: grahaka(tva)t=tadurddha(?rdhva)vat. KT:/bdsin  de bog bshin/ 165 Ms sic. KT:/byun ma thag tu zas btshol byed/ (=jätastha aharam eate). TTQrms 166  167  ms 168 Ms sic. KT:/ khab ion gis ni rdo bskyod pas/.  pa yin phyir  71 The criticism of acceptance of God, etc.  2-6.  cI  cl’-otc*:  I  qTr-: 9II  The world is not made by God, because it is the cause of pleasure for [only] some people, just as the worldly lord who gives pleasure does not have God as his creator.//215// 31cc4Ic169 3II  {T  lctII  fit  170  o,l.uI1.1  cf’IUI  IR9EJI  The universe is not made by God, because the universe does not have a cause, or because the universe does not arise, just as it is not desired that a sky-flower be the cause of the universe./ /216/ / 31’L1I1 ..zjdIcj’171  ci,iv1 ‘-i-  cjc’Ic 172 Z{Qff j’1tj  i  II.9’3II  God is not the ultimate cause of the universe, because he has a mind, just as a cowherd (gopa) is not the ultimate cause of the universe.//217// IIdNI  t1sI*i  -ct,cc4,: ct)[-  c: 3{: IR9(.fl  Any individual is not the lord [of everything] because an entity is produced by the totality (sãmagri) [of causes]. And, nothing has a single  169  added in the margin in ms 170 n=eo viva....+na[m] ms. KT:/dban phyug kun gyi rgyur mi hdod/ 171 Ms. sic. KT:/bgro ba ma lus bdi dag gi/ (aeasyasya jagat) 172 ms 173 174  °°  %.iIci[’.1c:  ms. KT:/ dños rnams  I3grub pabi phyir/  72 creator. Therefore, [the reason “because it has a mind”] is not inconclusive. / /2 8/ /  c tce ccUc tft’75  I’1lcI Ic1  I  -14i:  II9II  If [one were to say:] “that the eye, etc. have God as their creator is accepted, because they are many, just like servants,” [we reply:] because an unborn and single God has not been proved, established, Ivara would be the opposite of that (i.e. of what you normally take God to be one and uncreated).//219// -  Rcicciic 3rr-ruI17o  i1ci  ctdI177  Now if [you were to say:] “that [the eye, etc.] have a creator is desired by us, because they have been produced, just like a pot, etc,” [then in this case,] the ‘creator’ (kartd) does not have definite particularity (anirdistaviesa), therefore, you would be proving something already proved [by us] (siddhasidhana).//22O/ /  : Then, [if one were to refer to a ‘creator’] with particular [features] such as ‘eternal,’ ‘single’ and ‘minute’ etc., there would be no logical connection (anvaya) in your statement. Further, [if you give an example “just like a potter for a pot,”] there would be an occurrence of a deficiency (doa) i.e., that (Ivara) is ‘the uneternal,’ ‘the material’ and ‘the arisen’ in your statement. / /221 / /  175  ms. KT bdañ phyug gcig (eko io) 176 Ms. sic. KT: khyad par ma bstan pahi/ (= 177 I1 ms 178 ° ms =  RilIT ft?)  73 179  c4’I t?{ (ccii18O  1iii  1(  I  T1t ULII  If you were to say that as conventional truth, God is the action which causes manifoldness of the world called being and the receptacle (sattvabhdjana), then the proved is being proved (i.e. you will prove what we have already proved.//222// ,-q[-q ct,I’UI -fl  fl1(-LNIIIUIcI:  ft  I  nii  Thus, with this (reasoning) one should reject [saying] that the world is made by ‘time,’ ‘purua,’ ‘pradhana,’ ‘atoms’ (paramaiiu) or ‘Viu’ .//223// Explanatory comment: Bhã-viveka maintains that nothing is produced not only by L4vara, but also by kla (time), purua, pradMna (ultimates in the Sathkhyas) and pramazu or by a personal God like Vizu.. Some thinkers say that the whole world is produced by a creator such as Ivara (God). To this statement Bhã-viveka objects. On the conventional level, for the Mãdhyamikas entities which includes an universal world is produced from causes. They are not produced by single cause, like God. Moreover, even the opponents refer to the God (creator) with qualifications such as eternal, single, subtle etc; they cannot prove production of entities from the God (creator), because the God should be eternal, single, subtle etc. That is, qualifications to the God indicate that the God is uneternal, many etc. Therefore, the opponents cannot establish their opinion.  179° ms 180 kar(m)=e÷[]=[c1(e)[t]=sa(th)vrtya ms. KT  las//dbañ phyug yin na kun rdsob tuban.  74 2-7.  Drsti “view”  Introduction to verses 224-229 The theme here is the negation of the classification of eternalism (gtvatavãda) and destructionism (ucchedavãda).  i-f1t181 q182  Ic 311  c’.ilc  ff: I  3{ i’ IIU  If one were to say that “since from the arising of the Buddhas comes the destruction of blinded vision. Therefore, likewise, the arising of sense organs is desired.” [We say:] this is false answer (uttara).//224// 3T1-1T  311c’il t’L1 ( 183 JfZ 3T-lcWI  i1 IlT IRLII  When there is non-production [of entities] because of the non-existence of the process of time (adhvan), which view on whose part is desired by us! (i.e. we do not propound any view for any one as real.) Therefore, the arising of the Buddhas [is considered to be] an agent (kart) for making [people] understand what never came to be (i.e. the Buddhas come into existence in our view only to let people grasp that nothing come into existence). / /225/ / Explanatory comment: The opponents state that because there is arising of the Buddha, there is the destruction of wrong views. It means that because there is a cause, there is the effect. Therefore, there should be arising of sense organs as the cause of grasping of objects. Bhã-viveka, however, objects to this statement. Arising of the Buddha is said for those who have wrong views, i.e., production of entities, etc. That is to say, in the ultimate reality there is no arising of the Buddha. On 181  ms. KT: sel ba. ms 183 °sya° added under the line in ms  75 the conventional level, the Buddha comes into existence in our view to let people grasp that nothing has come into existence.  3iii ta rT  o-1V-I: I1{ ci4I  84 31IIck11-Il  j’Icç 3Sur6 LIr’L11  31’I,%  lIJLEiI  If the non-god is not different from a god, how can there not be permanence? If the non-god is different from a god, how can absence of being cut off (=being destroyed) make sense?! /226/ / 31cI1c Sfi  185Sf{  4cç  3T[  ‘  cxQ.j  r-i d-1I’c 31rdc:  I  Even if one were to say that there is ineffability [one cannot decide whether identical or different], just like that of a pot, how could there be the abandonment of extirpation, i.e., permanence? Even if one were to say that [the identity] exists or does not exist, there is no passing over of the other in Nirvana.//227// Explanatory comment: The classification of permanence and extirpation denotes the same result of emphasizing only one of these two in cognition, perception and inference. Therefore, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path because he was aware of these two extreme views. Here, Bhã-viveka shows the idea of the middle path in order to deny the two classifications of eternalism and nihilism. Verse 227 indicates the idea of the middle path. Bha-viveka maintains in this verse that there is no classification of eternalism and destructionism from the standpoint of the highest truth.  184  ms. KT:/des na ji Itar rtag mi bgyur/ We could read this as  i Iclc” or rt r Tri” as in k. 228b, but here Ejima takes into consideration the possibility of contrast between “anucchedah” and “aãvatarh”. 185 o— ms  76  31jcLI  I  ?b-IviiIcii  186  iIzII  If it be the case that what has been blocked arises, how can there not be eternal? If it be the case that what has been blocked does not arise, how can there not be propounding of nihilism?//228// cic  -IIclcI:I  ?Icflc 3TcUc?t  Since continuity (sathtna) does not really exist, how can there be extirpation and permanence? Since that (sathtcna) does not exist, the non-arising [of sathtãna] from the standpoint of non-extirpation and non-permanence (anucchedaavata) is proper. / /229 / / Explanatory comment: Bhã-viveka says that nihilism and eternalism should be denied because continuity does not exist. What does not exist, in other words, does not have either destruction or eternity because it does not have a beginning or end.  Duikha “suffering”  2-8.  3f’1c1-1IcI’-I :q188 ciIQ11 4-i-i i  zif IIoII  3T?T jIcicI ?IThLllcT1  cRIIQcLW1 1189 I  iMc’-iIc: 9 ?iz{  ?j:  IR9II  If one were to say: “the Buddhas taught dharma in order to secure non arising of suffering. Accordingly, the effect (non-arising of suffering) of 186 or  187 188 189  “3i.iiii  Fii”.  ms. KT:/bgags pa skye ba med ms. KT:/rtag chad de dag ga la yod/ 1.cL.uc1I 3  ([]q ms  ms. KT:/gal te de ni skye hdod na/  gyur na/  77 that (the teaching of the Buddha) exists, arising of [suffering] is approved [by us].”//230// [In response, we say:] as mentioned before, that (suffering) does not arise, [even if] the arising of that (suffering) is admitted, non-arising of that (suffering) is not an effect. But comprehension (parijfii) of that (nonarising of suffering) is an effect of that (namely, the teaching of the Buddhas).//231//  cflc<UUcI  -[LI r’-1 I t  -iI II.fl  That [result] ought not be self-made, since a thing does not make itself. And, because X does not have contact with Y’s action, it is not desired that a thing is made by an other.//232// —‘IdIT{ 191  2 9 icd1  I fl.II  Because of the impossibility of spiritual essence (sattva), etc, it is not desired that suffering be born from its own continuity (sva-sathtäna). And, because it is not a real entity and it does not have distinction (abheda), there is no suffering in continuity.//233// Explanatory comment: One critic objects that the Buddha taught the teachings (dharma) in order to aim at the non-arising of suffering. This means the existence of the arising of suffering. However, even if the arising of suffering is admitted, suffering does not have arising as itself (svabMva). The non-arising of suffering, moreover, is not an effect of the teaching of the Buddha. Correct understanding of the non 190 191  192  ms. °  °t  has a virãma.  ms  1cI°ms  193 med/  ms. SC: dubkharii tan=n=api santateh, KT:/sdug bsñal de la rgyud kyan  78 arising of suffering based upon the teaching of the Buddha is the effect. It is a kind of effect but is at the same time transcendent.  2-9.  The examination of the Buddha  Introduction to verses 234-239 Opponents analyze variously the figure of the Buddha. They consier that what the figure of the Buddha is or what the Buddha is. Hence, Bha-viveka examines the Buddha.  194  1cLiic-W[1 i  f]Z{: I  oMII  c’..II[a-I: 4TI-  siclc  °Ic11 196  {T  f 1 z  (-jc4cj: 195  cici ?1[: I 1{clI.d f:197  If [by you] are argued for, as real, the composite things (sathskra) the eye, etc. as undergoing production, because they are expressed by the term “sattva,” just like the Buddhas.//234// Then we say in response: for us (Madhyamikas), the Buddhas do not have arising as their nature (dharma). Accordingly, they (the composite things)  do not have arising, just as they (Buddhas) [do not arise], or they do not exist [in the ultimate reality], just like the itman, or there is a possibility [of their arisal in conventional reality], just like illusions.//235// Explanatory comment: Humans are called sattva, and are beings who are made. This means something which is made has arisen. Likewise, because the Buddha has the name “Buddha,” he would be a being who is made, that is, has arisen. To this view, Bhã-viveka objects by pointing out that the Buddha does not have arising 194  -e  ms  196 cI1cgI ms.KT: de skye yod mm te/ 197 mayovadv=as[t]u sambhavab, SG: mayo baddhãstu sambhavab, KT: sgyu ma bshin bbyun yod/  79 as his nature and is not identical with rupa, skandha, etc.. For the Mãdhyamikas the real Buddha is our phenomenal world. 198 The Buddha does not have any own-being. This world does not have ownbeing either. The “Buddha” is just a name, and is not an independent entity. The Buddha is illustrated as a dream, illusion or figure in the mirror. 199 In other words, the Buddha is just the name “Buddha” in the conventional world and does not have the name “Buddha” in the absolute truth which is beyond false discrimination. Further, because the Buddha is not an independent entity, the Buddha does not arise. From this it follows that the Buddha does not exist, and similarly entities in the conventional world do not exist from the standpoint of the absolute truth. Therefore, Bhaviveka says “just like the Buddha” that is, despite the fact that the Buddha has the name “Buddha,” he does not exist, i.e., the Buddha is not real existence. In other words, even the Buddha is dependent origination (pratityasamutpada), just as entities are dependently coarisen. Therefore, the Buddha should be examined according to the theory of dependent origination.  f c 1cciIc  scIc  1it-i  200 I  -‘i1Iccld IIII  Buddha is not rapa [from the standpoint of the highest truth], because it is what is to be cognized (bodhya), or on account of being something to be understood, or because he arises, like a clod of earth. And Buddha is not consciousness, because he illuminutes others and himself, just like illusion created through magic.//236//  198 tathä-gato yat-svabhavas tat-svabhävam idam jagat/ tatha-gato nibsvabhavo nihsvabhavam idam jagat/ /22-16/ / (Prasannapada, pp. 448-449). 199 Cf. Prasannapad1. p. 289, P. 436, p. 449. p. 540. etc. 200 KT:/gzugs ni yañ dag ñid du na//sans rgyas ma yin rtog byahi phyir//bkhor los sgyur bshin and it might be restored as follows: rupath na buddho bodhyatvat tattvata cakravartivat/ ,  80  -jd  1cciIc  1:2O1  cuRi ‘icic1  I  IR’.3II  The Buddha is not considered skandha, having form on account of being a conglomeration of skandha (skandha-sathgraha), or because they have the nature of arising and passing away, or because they are objects of cognition, just like for. / /237/ / ?I’1-ll 9TT-i-q  2O2  I  1ItST-TT1T. 311c4-IclcI 1 QT T L IIII  When they (the skandhas) are destroyed, there would be deficiency that [the Buddha] would disappear, it is not proper that the skandhas be Buddha. Because characteristics other than these of [skandhas] do not exist, [the Buddha] is not different [from skandhas]. And how could he be like the ãtman for us?//238// : c1cj 11Ic: i c- 2 31cI-r.ccId 3 O ‘S  \  1—cII T[fl fl9fl -S  Because it can be refuted as before, he is not acceptable as someone inexpressible and not a real entity. Or, how can his Buddhahood be acknowledged on account of being inexpressible like a pot.//239// Explanatory comment: Bhã-viveka negates the identity of the Buddha and skandhas. I do not, however, fully understand what Bha-viveka says. In Buddhism, it is said that beings consist of five skandhas in order to demonstrate impermanence of existent. From this point of view, the opponents state that existent which is called the Buddha exists. If something exists, the existent consists of skandhas, i.e., rupa-skandha (matter of form), vedant-skandha (perception), sathjñä-skandha 201 [ma].. ms. SC: matäh. 202 KT: sku (tanu) 203 yad=ghatav=apy= ms. °ya° and °gha° added under the line; KT: bum pa bshin du.  81 (conception), sathskära-skandha (volition) and vijñãna-skandha (consciousness). For the Buddhists, however, the Buddha is transcendant, not a being. Hence, the Buddha consists of five skandhas. For the Mãdhyamikas the Buddha is also dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada). He is not a real existent. He trancends existent and non-existent. Therefore, it cannot be said that someting and the Buddha is identical or something and the Buddha is not identical.  2-10.  Seeing pratityasamutpãda and seeing the Buddha I  c1-cIc1311  çLflc:  I UI oil  ‘-jd  Because, as mentioned before, it can be refuted, it (arising of sense organs) is not desired that because the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination (pratityasamutpcda) / /240 / / .  I{l ‘ii+M 204 i1cit1 I1c-iI-I ‘ii ii1  31cid: I  -r1:2o5 II9ii  What exists ,what does not exist and what either exists or does not exist do not [arisel. There is no entity transcending permanence as well as destruction which is [produced] from the permanent or without cause or from this or from that. Both permanence and extirpation are abandoned. / /241 / /  204  i-iii  ms  205 n=ãpy=asmä=anasmac=cha° ms  82 T cl:206 I  ic1*fr1  1Tri  cI  I1’cr: 207  The arising is not what exists, what does not exist or what either exists or does not exist. Therefore, what kind of [arisal] is it? How is a vision [of truth] known from the vision [of truth] of that teacher?//242// cjI 209 t-f \iIt ‘-11 ?Rt{ [  r’L1  I  IRN  Therefore, for one who maintains that entities have own-being (svabhävavãdin), the statement [“the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination] damages what they desired. However, for one who [maintains that] the arising [of entities] is similar to the arising of illusion, [that statement “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination”] is proper. / /243/ / co-cctIa-lcj 210  d-N-”-IcNI’-UcI f211  -1’IRII  Seeing the Buddha is something which belongs to lower truth (sathvtti). [It is said to come] from removing the dust of afore-mentioned deficiency [and] from lighting the torch of true dharma (saddharmolkäana). But this is a conventional [expression] as an assistance towards activity (kriyopakararüpa). / /244/ /  206 na san=n=ãsan (c. viräma) sadasann=utpadadoab sa kidrab ms. KT:/skye ba yod mm med ma yin//yod med ma yin de gan na/ 207 ic1L1 ms. KT: es par bya 208 ms 209 IIcç ms. KT: de phyir (=tasmad). 210  ctI  I1Ict  ms. KT:/smras pabi ñes palii dri bsal bas//dam  chos sgron ma rab bstan phyir/ 211  thr Ii-c3T)  83 1TiNicciIcI  ccII T[ ( 311 ‘-1I1ic1”14  1-I11 212 213  IRII  r 4f f* i 1 -it  q fkri 214 3r1T? Oi[1  IIIEII  Because what is similar to illusion never takes place is not truth, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that (seeing) is not really seeing. It is beyond inference (apratarkya), is indiscernible (avijñeya), cannot be demonstrated (anirãpya), does not have an illustrative example (anidarsana), is without any mark, is devoid of any image (nirbhäsa), is beyond mental constructions (nirvikipa), is beyond words (nirakara) and is to be awakened by the mind of the viewer (pasyato buddhiboddhavya) and is an act of seeing from the standpoint of non-vision.//245,246// Explanatory comment: In Buddhism, as is well known, it is commonly said that “seeing dependent origination” refers to “seeing the Buddha,” and “seeing the Buddha” refers to “seeing dependent origination.” That is, “seeing dependent origination” and “seeing the Buddha,” are not different, but identical. With regard to this statement, however, opponents misunderstand that when the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination, the sense organs, i.e., the eye organ, etc., arise. That is, as long as the function of cognition, “seeing dependent origination” or “seeing the Buddha,” is taking place, the sense organ, i.e., the eye organ, arises. For the Madhyamikas, however, the idea that “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination” refers to the fact that those who understand properly the theory of dependent origination cognize the real Buddha, that is, the Buddha himself is dependent origination, or again, the Buddha and the truth of “dependent origination” which the Buddha realised are identical.  212  ms. KT:/de ni de nid mthoñ mm tel  213 31r.1’1I1kii ms. KT:/brtag bya ma yin dpe med pa! 214 e— ms  84  2-11.  Conclusion ?( ti ii j : i’c?t r I ‘:{ 31ck,11Ic 215 [( 1 cII1o-i 216  qJ  Thus, in the highest truth, nothing is produced from itself, from others, from either itself or others, from both or without cause or produced as something existing, not existing or as [existing] in other ways (anyatha).//247// 217  I ii-i1  0.1\31  ciRi -fl:  Qq(218  No entity is produced or manifested in any way from a cause such as Keava (=Vishizu), Isa, Purusa, Pradhdna or atom etc.//248// IR-5q-5  ?1(  T-T5WtlT: I II  There (= in the highest truth), [conceptual construction (kalpant) which] depends on own-being (svabhãva), function (küritra), what is to be characterized (lakya) and characteristics (lakaiia) [does not arise]. And, [conceptual construction which] depends on identity (ekatva), otherness (anyatva) and function of either affliction (sathk!ea) or purification (vyavadna) [does not arise either].//249//  215 KT: rgyu med. 216 217  218  icciI’1.1  ms. KT: yod med ma yin.  ms. KT: rgyu las. 1: ms  °iuiT:  85 , 4 c 1 Z{  iiri  II-4Ici 1k-4r219  i ‘IrIci ?IQnfl4-M -cI,.io-:22O  All mental constructions are in it as hitting with a whip or the act of beautiful painting or growing of seeds would be in the sky.//250//  ‘L1c1  r  IHc-cfrI I  IRII ?{T I r4)RId  jd.ffff1[{JT  IIL3II  When the eye-disease passes away, one whose eye becomes completely clean and pure does not see the hair (keáa), mosquito (maaka), two moons (dvicandra) and the eye in a peacock’s plumage (ikhicandraka).//251// Likewise, when the eye-disease of darkness which envelopes what is to be known and defilements passes away, a wise man whose eye has become pure by means of proper knowledge does not see anything. / /252 / / 1T  ‘:  r  222 ;j[ tii;t 1 tf cIIct 223  4-q[pT[:224  i  Just as, one who is fallen into sleep might see a child, woman, palace, house etc. But the same person when awakened from sleep would not see [anything] there.//253//  219 KT:/tshon gyi ri mobi las dan nil 220 c,e-jI ms 221 ....9° ms. SG:°dvicandra°, KT: zia gñis dan. 222 I1cicç ms. KT: gñid dbañ gis mthoñ gyur pa 223 3TrfmT ms. KT: kun rdsob es pa dag. 224 Oqffij:  ms  86 Similarly, one whose eye of intelligence is opened wakes up from the expiration of the sleep of ignorance does not see those which are obtained from the conventional standpoint (sathvrtyddhigata). / /254/ / .ji4 qqf225  33ii1i  4 I ciit qqf iqT  ZJ’f  33  1ii  ff  {226  ‘.ii1i II.5lI  r-1-[T-ulN227 I  QFfl Just as, one sees inexistent demons (bhüta) in the darkness at night. As one whose eyes are open when the sun rises, he does not see [those demons].! /255/ / Likewise, one whose inclinations (väsani) of all ignorance (samastjnãna) are destroyed by the sun (ravi) of the proper knowledge does not see the object-sphere of the mind and the function of mind (ctticaitasagocara) / /256 / / Bhaviveka here concludes his theory of the “non-own-beingness” of entities.  225  [41ifT ms. SG: tanmasi payati, KT: mun khrod na. tfi ms. KT:/ ñi ma ar shin mig byehi tshe/ 227 Ii.i(c. viráma) ci° ms 226  87 Chapter Three. Conclusion As A. K. Warder says: 228 Nagarjuna’s main contention is that it was not the intention of the Buddha to set out a list of ‘ultimate’ principles or elements which in some metaphysical sense ‘exist,’ still less to define their ‘own-nature,’ by implication immutable. Nagarjuna formulated and established the philosophy of “emptiness” (áunyatã) upon the basis of the Prajñaparamita scriptures, etc. and the followers, Buddha-palita, Bhã-viveka, Candra-kirti, Deva-arman etc. inherited his philosophy of “emptiness,” and developed their own methodologies to defend it. Nagarjuna himself used logic. He generally used prasar(ga as often as dilemmas and tetralemmas. A follower Budhda-palita inherited prasariga anumna but analyzed it into four prasariga arguments. For example, to Nagarjuna’s statement “Not from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from no cause, do any entities ever originate anywhere,” 229 (tr. by Ames 1993: 233) Buddha-palita divided this into the following four arguments. He pointed out: (1) entities are not produced from themselves, because the origination of entities from themselves would serve no purpose and would lead to absurdity. There would no purpose in the repeated origination of what is in existence already; (2) if entities are produced from others, all things are produced from all other things; (3) if entities are produced from both themselves and others, the fault attached to the two preceding alternatives would combine in this third argument; (4) if entities are produced from causeless, all entities would be produced from all things. Bha-viveka, however, raised an objection against Buddha-pãlita’s statement. He maintained that Buddha-pälita’s statement was deficient, because  228 Warder 1970: 377, ii, 11-13. 229 na svato näpi parato na dvabhyath napy ahetutah/ utpanna jatu vidyante bhavab kvacana kecana//1 .1/I (Prasannapada, p. 12.)  88 neither a reason (hetu) nor an example (drsttnta) had been stated. Besides, he claimed that Buddha-pãlita’s statement implied the acceptance of the alternative proposition, i.e., that entities are produced from others. Bhã-viveka, therefore, attempted to interpret Nagarjuna’s philosophy and his own philosophy by means of the independent syllogism (sva-tantra-anumäna) which included three unusual modifications; adding the word paramãrthatai (from the standpoint of the highest truth) to the proposition in a syllogism: specification that the negation in his syllogisms should be taken as “prasajya-pratiedha” (the negation of a proposition); and the condition that no counterexample is to be given. Candra-kirti, however, criticized the alternative mode of argument advocated by Bhã-viveka and defended Buddha-palita’s statement againt the objections put forward by Bha-viveka. Candra-kirti argued that Buddha-palita’s statement had no faults even though an independent reason and example had not been stated by him in his statement. Candra-kirti’s statement was that the way of prasailga was enough to refute the opponent’s opinions. Therefore, the independent syllogism was not necessary. Later on, this controversy was considered as the origin of division of two sub-schools, i.e., Prasangika and Svátantrika, in the Madhyamikas in Tibet. Sthira-mati, a prasangika, and Nayaikas also criticized syllogism of Bhã viveka. If the modification paramtrthatai governs not only the proposition (prajfii) but also the whole syllogism, reason (hetu) would not be permissible, because all things would be non-existent from the standpoint of the highest truth. If, on the contrary, the modification governs only the proposition and not both reason and instance (drstãnta), then the subject in reason would have to be regarded as existent when considered from the standpoint of conventional level, while the same subject in the proposition would be non-existent when considered from the standpoint of the highest truth. 230 Using the svatantra syllogism, Bhã-viveka maintained a philosophy of “emptiness.” He, in other words, recognized the truth of logic which is founded on perfect wisdom (prajnd) of the absolute, and that perfect wisdom manifests itself by means of the conventional truth, i.e., logic.  230 See Kajiyama 1969: 152-163.  89 This attitude of Bha-viveka can be seen in the following passage from his 231 MHK: After intelligence (mati=prajnã) is concentrated, one should examine by means of prajflä as follows: “There is own-being of dharmas, which is grasped from the point of view of verbal usage.//3.21// But [while] analyzing with intelligence (dhi=prajfia), is this [grasped] from the standpoint of the highest truth?” If it would be so, this is indeed truth (tattva). If not, he [stilli searches for [truth].//3•22// Then, for Bha-viveka what is the truth? As he says below, the non own-being of entities, i.e., emptiness, is truth; 232 3T5TTR T iIc1: 233 234 cIQ1I41  35 ii.’u 2 icciPç  [The wise man] does not see that state in which entities have own-being, because own-being has not come into effect, or because there is no birth through the very nature [of entities], just as he would not see an illusory elephant. / /257/ /  ciRii-icii  236  1{{ 238  j-p  cIIc1 237 3TQT{ ‘T I ff1 ciIclc11T II3II  231 pacat prajflayaivath parikayet/ samähitamatih yo ‘yam svabhavo dharmãi.äth grhyeta vyavaharatab//3.21// vicaryamäIas tu dhiya kim ayath paramarthatab/ yadi syat tattvam evayam ato ‘nya cet sa mrgyate/ /3.22!! (Ejima, 1980:272) 232 i ms. KT: dños fiid ma grub phyir/ 233 ms  235  ms. KT:/sgyu mabi glan chen ji bshin no!. cf. k. 258c. iif ms  236 °•qrms 237 °wims 238 °n=na° added under the line in ms  90 [Likewise, the wise man] does not see that state in which entities have substantial nature, because they (entities) have production, [i.e., undergo production] from the standpoint of conventional [truth], or because they (entities) have causes, just as he would not see an illusory elephant. / /258 / / i 1i  fI  T zlQrRI iivj’t:  I’cI ‘!\ 1:1-rn I II3ll  Or it is held that the cognition “entities do not exist” does not accord with things as they really are, because it (cognition) occurs by means of conceptual construction (kalpanadvara), just like a cognition which perceives a tree as a human being.//259// 35?t T -IIcIcl-IT  fk?Pt 1{:  i ndn  Or, an existent which is grasped by a false cognition is considered unreal, because it (existent) is perceived by knowledge (jñtna=prajflã) having conceptual construction, just like the cognition in which “a filament of air is seen as water.”//260// -°-1T  L4 I ?f I 1F1ct-L1I 1:FI1: 1cII II9II  Thus (evam eva tu), through the refutation of a real as well as unreal cognition as well as object of cognition, for the wise men, cognition (mati=prajna) which is beyond conceptual construction arises as a consequence of non-arising (ajatiyogena). /261 / /  239 240  °q  ms. SG: na sa÷bhäva, KT: dños rnams med. ms  91 I’-i cc 1(1 TSI—ti -1i u if cj c -L1 ccj  i  j241  Pic4,cr’U  L4’jdcj  f-jJ(: II.U  It is not accepted [by us Madhyamikasl that a constructionless state of mind does not exists when one’s mind grasps ‘all dharmas are empty’ or’ all dharmas are not empty.’ 1/262/! Z:  (  i.[:i  ?[it  rI  --U  --idi I  cI 242 3If{ j1cii4-i  lI.EU  Emptiness [on its part] lacks self in the form of emptiness, etc. Accordingly, the wise man does not see emptiness as emptiness.//263// tT-TTi1sf1 -flcfiç1-fl I 243 {[Qff ( -ic244 31iø1ccic  -4:  iiQEWiI  Even the existent appearanceless grasped in a constructless cognition is not reality as it is, because it (existent) is what is to be grasped, just like the cognition that the moon in water is seen as the moon.//264//  241 +.[i]..[lpa] matir =a=estã ms. SC: (nirvi)kalpa matir=n=estä, KT:/mi rtog blo gros mi bdod mini  242  ms  243 3I1-ogcc4  244  c4  ms ms  92  I  3icr--Uciccii  r-’im  Cognition (dhi=prajfltt) which is beyond conceptual construction, and which has as its object that object which is beyond conceptual construction is [considered] unreal, because it (cognition) has non-selfness, etc. (anttmddi) as its nature, just like a cognition having conceptual construction. / /265/ / 245  Lfl[  z [: i  3Z(246 drt247f:  Because an object of cognition (jfleya) is not proved in any way [,i.e., since no objects of cognitions exist], those who know the truth understand that where even constructiess cognition (dhi=prajnt) does not arise is unequalled truth. / /266 / / As long as we recognize that cognizable entities do not exist, that entities neither exist nor do not exist, that entities do not have own-being and that everything is emptiness, all such cognitions are false discrimination. The truth is truth where even cognition which is beyond false discrimination, conceptual construction or any imaginations does not arise. That is to say, only by the entreme exclusion of any false discrimination, conceptual construction or imagination truth can be obtained.  245 *T{r].  .  246 ms 247 i° ms  +..  I*ri ms. SG: jñeyasya sarvathäsiddhe, KT:/es bya rnam kun  ma grub phyir/  93 248 Nagarjuna states as follows: There is emancipation (moka) from the extinction of action and affliction (karmaklea). Action and affliction [are produced] from conceptual construction (vikalpa). They (conceptual construction) [are produced] from diversification (prapañca). But, diversification is destroyed in emptiness (anyata). (18-5) When the object sphere of the mind (cittagocara) becomes extinct, [the object sphere of] the word (abhidMtavya) [would also] become extinct. Indeed, dharmahood (dharmati) is neither what is arisen nor what is destroyed. (18-7) This is the characteristic (lakaiia) of truth which is known through others, which is quiescent (ãnta), which is not diversified by diversification (prapañca), which is beyond conceptual construction (nirvikalpa), which does not have many meanings (anandrtha).//18-9/ / From the above statement of Nagarjuna, it is obvious that the important point is the notion of “conceptual construction” (vikalpa). Conceptual construction is the cause of the arising of actions and afflictions, and conceptual construction is produced from diversification (prapa flca). Diversification is destroyed by an understanding of unyatã. Bha-viveka’s statement regarding “conceptual construction,” on the other hand, is slightly different from that of Nagarjuna. Bha-viveka adds a remark on it as “knowledge of conceptual construction” or “cognition which is beyond conceptual construction.” Moreover, with regard to definition of anyatd, we come across the difference between the statements of Nagarjuna and that of Bhã-viveka. The former states that “it is dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) that we call emptiness.” (MK, 24•l8ab, p. 503.: yah pratitya-samutpadai anyatã ttliñ pracakmahe/). Bhã viveka, on the other hand, states that “voidness (anyata) alludes to the  248 ka mak1eakayan mokah karmak1eä vikalpatah/ te prapañcätprapañcas tu unyatayath nirudhyate/ /18-5/I nirvittam abhidhatavyam nirvrtte cittagocare/ anutpannãniruddha hi nirväiamiva dharmata/ / 18-7/ / aparapratyayath äntarh prapaficair aprapaficitam/ nirvikalpam anänartham etat tattvasya 1akaiam/ / 18-9/ / (Prasannapada, pp. 349-372)  94 knowledge which perceives voidness without any grasping.” 249 It is the fact that Bha-viveka was a Madhyamika and a follower of the Madhyamika, Nagarjuna. In spite of this fact, Bhã-viveka’s definition of anyata is different from Nagarjuna’s definition. Here too Bha-viveka refers to knowledge or wisdom (prajña). Then, how does Candra-kirti, a follower of Nagarjuna and a prasañgika, define anyatt? He quotes Nagarjuna’s statement above regarding 250 That is to say, Candra-kirti exactly follows the definition of it in his Pras. Nagarjuna’s definition, and comments that “thus, the meaning of the word pratitya-samutptida is the meaning of the word unyata.” ’ Thus, we come across 25 the difference between Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, on the one hand and Bhã viveka, on the other hand. Here, it should be noticed, however, that there is no essential differences between them. Both Bhã-viveka and Candra-kirti are the followers of Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas. They both cognized that entities have no own-being (sva-bhdva), and there is only emptiness (unyata). Their final aim was obtaining of absolute truth (tattva) and reaching Nirvãia. For the Madhyamikas, “unyatd” itself is absolute truth. In other words, by understanding “anyata,” obtaining of absolute truth is possible. To the obtaining of absolute truth, i.e., Nirvana, Bhã-viveka just recognized the importance of knowledge or wisdom (prajna). From these points of view, I would like to assume Bha-viveka’s intention. Bhã-viveka followed Nagãrjuna’s philosophy as a Madhyamika and at the same time, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “unyatã,” which is declared in . That is to say, while Bhã-viveka followed 252 “Prajñaparamita-sütra,” etc. Nagarjuna’s philosophy, at the same time, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “unyata.” There are over two hundreds years separating Nagarjuna’s period and Bhã-viveka’s period. Therefore, Bhaviveka saw the need to demonstrate the true intentions of Nagarjuna and the philosophy of “anyata.”  249 Uryuzu 1985: 33. 250 Prasannapada, p. 491. 251 evath pratitya-samutpada-abdasya yo ‘rthab sa eva unyata-abdasyartha. (Prasannapada, p. 491) 252 Kajiyama 1979: 114-143, 1989: 89-206 examined the relationship between philosophy of prajna and philosophy of emptiness.  95 Logic itself belongs to verbal usage, and is not absolute reality. It is, however, impossible to state the philosophy of “unyatt” without verbal usage. Therefore, Bh-viveka added a restriction “paramarthatai” to his syllogism arguing “anyata,” in order to caution the reader about this contradiction. His kind of syllogism was rejected by Candra-kirti. For Candra-kIrti the logical method could play a role only from the conventional standpoint and it should not be brought into speak of any phases of the highest truth. For Bhã-viveka, however, the restriction “paramdrthata.i” is the function which leads to “absolute truth” from the “conventional world,” and only on reaching the absolute truth, i.e., Nirvãiza, the use of logic should be abandoned. Nagarjuna, Buddha-pãlita and Candra-kirti used prasaiiga-anumãna. That is to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent’s opinion, they tried to demonstrate the philosophy of unyatd. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in order to have consensus by other shools. Svãtantrikas beginning with Bhã-viveka, on the other hand, were not satisfied with it, and positively demonstrated the philosophy of ünyata by using svatantra-anumna For them, probably, prasanga-anumdna was not enough to demonstrate the philosophy of unyatã and was not enough to refute the opinions of realists. It may be, moreover, possible that Bha-viveka was influenced by dominant shool of thought, i.e., importance of logic. From these points, it can be understood that Bha-viveka’s use of logic employed a more positive approach to Nirvãiza.  96 I shall try to clarify Bhã-viveka’s theory through a diagram which shows his idea of the process from the conventional world (sarhv.rti) to the highest truth (paramartha), i.e., Nirvana.  The highest truth (Nirvãia) perfect wisdom (having no diversification, “niprapañca”) TI  The Buddha TI  The middle way (madhyama-pratipad) I-I-  Dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) TI  Emptiness (anyata) TI  Non own-beingness (ni’isvabhavati) T I  t  logic (having the restriction “paramärthatai”etc.) wisdom (having diversification, “prapañca”) -=  The conventional world  97 Appendix An outline of research on Bhã-viveka The works of Bhã-viveka have been studied by many scholars over a long period because his philosophy is one of the most important strands in the Mãdhyamika school. Therefore, numerous works have already been completed on the subject. Below only a representative bibliography of the works of Bhã viveka is provided.  Prajñã-pradipa-mã1a-madhyamaka-vtti. This treatise is a commentary on Nãgarjuna’s MK. Accordingly, the basic contents of it and those of MK are identical. Chapter one. Frauwaliner, 1958: 226-232. Nozawa, 1977: 1-7. Kajiyama, 1963: 37-62,1964: 100-130. NOnin, 1993: 45-66. Willam, 1993: 219-259. Chapter two. Tachikawa, 1982: 1-26, 1983: 31-58, 1984: 111-128, 1981: 1-22, 1985: 44-55, 1985: 21-41. Chapter Three. NOnin, 1987: 16-38. Chapter Eleven. Mochizuki, 1990: 25-49. Chapter Twelve. Mochizuki, 1989: 1-27. Chapter Thirteen. Mochizuki, 1989: 69-86. Chapter Fifteen. Kajiyama, 1079: 181-202. Chapter Sixteen. Furusaka, 1981:1-14. Chapter Seventeen. Kajiyama, 1979: 305-357. Chapter Eighteen. 1.  98 Kajiyama, 1978: 287-328. Ichigo, 1967: 1-20. Ichigo, 1967: 250-260. Chapter Nineteen. Nishikawa, 1984: 7-13. Chapter Twenty-four. Uryuzu, 1971: 15-56. Furusaka, 1976: 117-131. Chapter Twenty-Five. Malcolm, 1985: 25-75. Yasui, 1961: 305-372. 2.  Madhyamakahrdayakarika and Tarkajvãlã  According to the colophons of the Tibetan translation of MHK, the Tibetan translation of TJ was finalized by Atia (981-1054 A.D) at Lhasa and dictated to Lotsawa Jayaila. 253 The Sanskrit original has not so far been found. Chapter One. Skt. title: Bodhi-cittaparityitga. Tib. title: Byar chub kyi sems mi gtaii bazi le’iu ste dan po. Eng. title: Non-abandonment of the thought of enlightenment. Skt. text: Gokhale, and Bahulkar, 1985: 76-108. (Including an English translation). Chapter Two. Skt. title: Muni-vratasamaáraya. Tib. title: Thub pazi brtul shugs la yari dag par bsten pa. Eng. title: Taking the vow of an ascetic Skt. text: Gokhale, 1972:40-45. (Including an English translation) Chapter Three. Skt. title: Tattva-jnanaiaiza. Tib. title: De kho na ñid kyi es pa ztshol ba. Eng. title: The quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality.  253 See, Chattopadhyaya 1967: 475, 487.  99 Skt. texts (edition): Gokhale, 1962: 271-275. (vv. 275284.)254 (Including an English translation) lida, 1980: 52-242. (vv. 1-136.) (Including an English translation). Ejima, 1980: 259-474. (Including a Japanese translation of MHK and a portion of TJ equivalent to v. 26 of MHK). Japanese translation: Nozawa, 1954: 53-46, 1955: 56-44, 1955: 38-26, 1956: 43-31, 1959: 105-118, 1964. 87-74, 1964: 70-58: 79-64, 1971: 9686, 1973: 108-89. (vv.1-141 and TJ). Chapter Four. Skt. title: .ravaka-tattvanicayavatara. Tib. title: IJan thos kyi de kho na ñid iijug pa. Eng. title: Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the ivara. Japanese translation from Tib.: Nozawa, 1941: 45-71, 1944: 45-71. Chapter Five. Skt. title: Yogtcara-tattvavinicaya. Tib. title: Rnal ‘zbyor spyod pa’zi de kho na ñid gtan La dbab pa La ljug pa. Eng. title: The ascertainment of the truth of the Yogicra. Japanese translation from Tib.: Yamaguchi, 1961: 1-41. English translation from Skt.: lid a, 1966: 79-96. (An annotated translation and study of verses 1, 7, 8 & 9), Hirabayashi, and lida, 1978: 341360. Chapter Six. Skt. title: Srhkhya-tattvãvattra. Tib. title: Grangs can gyi de kho na ñid La zjug pa. Eng. title: Ascertainment of the truth of the Sathkhya. Skt. text: Nakada, 1973: 145-155, 1983: 1-3. Japanese translation from Skt. and Tib. : Nakada, 1973: 156-185. 1983: 4-7. Honda, 1980: 126-166. Chapter Seven. Skt. title: Vaieika-tattvaniscaya. Tib. title: Bye brag pa’zi de kho na ñid La ‘zjug pa. Eng. title; Ascertainment of the truth of the Vaieika. Japanese translation from Tib.: Miyasaka, 1958: 51-87. 254 According to Gokhale, the number of these verses is provisional. The verses which Gokhale proposed are equivalent to vv. 280-289 of Ejima’s Skt. edition.  100 Chapter Eight. Skt. title: Vedntatattvavinicaya. Tib. title: Rig byed kyi mthar smra ba,zi de kho na ñid La zjug pa. Eng. title: Ascertainment of the truth of the Vednta. Skt. editon: Gokhale, 1958: 165-180. (vv. 1-16). Nakamura, 1975: 300-329. (vv. 18-96). Qvarnstrom, 1989. Chapter Nine. Skt. title: Mimathsa-tattvanirizaytlvatãra. Tib. title: Dpyod pali de kho na ñid gtan La dbab pa La jug pa. Eng. title: Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the Mim4rhsaka. Skt. edition: Kawasaki, 1973: 71-86. (vv. 1-17 and a Japanese translation), 1976: 1-16. (vv. 1-17 and an English translation), 1985: 174-184. (vv. 132-138 and TJ and a Japanese translation), 1992: 407467. (Includes Tibetan edition and a Japanese translation), 1992: 131143. (Includes an English translation) Chapter Ten. Skt. title: Sarvajñãtãsiddhin irdea. Tib. title: Thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du grub par bstan pa. Eng. title: Exposition of the proof of the omniscience lof the Buddha). Skt. text: Kawasaki, 1992: 468-472. (Includes Tibetan edition and a Japanese translation), 1992: 131-143. (Includes Tibetan edition and an English translation) Chapter Eleven. Skt. title: Stutilaksananirdea. Tib. title: Bstod pa dan mtshan bstan pa. Eng. title: Exposition on the eulogy and the marks. 3.  Madhyamakarthasathgraha Restored Skt. text: N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Madhyamakartha-sathgraha of Bhãvaviveka, 1931: 41-49. Tib. ed. and Japanese tr.: Ejima, 1980: 18-23. Japanese tr.: Nagasawa, 1969: 191-198. English tr.: Lindtner, 1981: 200-201.  4.  Nikãyabhedavibhañgavyakhyãna  101 English tr.: Rockill, 1884: 181. Japanese tr.: Watanabe, 1939. French tr.: André Bareau, 1956: 167-200.  5.  Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun Skt. ed.: N. Aiyaswami Sastri, 1949. Translations: Poussin, 1932-33: 1-146, Frauwaliner, 1958: 232-240, Hatani, 1931: 99-138.  102  Bibliography ORIGINAL SANSKRIT, PALl ETC. TEXTS  Abhidharmakoa-bhaya, Pradhan Prahlad ed..,Abhidharmakoa-bhasya of Vasubandhu, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. VIII, Patna, 1967. Ibushãrinron, ed. by Enga Teramoto and Tomotsugu Hiramatsu, ZU—Kan-Wa Sanyaku TaikO Ibushürinron (A Study of the Samaya-bhedoparacanacakra ádstra— Comparative Study of Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese translations), Kyoto, 1935. 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