Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Bhā-viveka (A.D. c. 490-570)’s Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, Tattvajñānaiṣanā, verses 137-266 : an.. Watanabe, Chikafumi 1994

You don't seem to have a PDF reader installed, try download the pdf

Item Metadata

Download

Media
ubc_1994-0650.pdf [ 2.41MB ]
[if-you-see-this-DO-NOT-CLICK]
Metadata
JSON: 1.0087551.json
JSON-LD: 1.0087551+ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 1.0087551.xml
RDF/JSON: 1.0087551+rdf.json
Turtle: 1.0087551+rdf-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 1.0087551+rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 1.0087551 +original-record.json
Full Text
1.0087551.txt
Citation
1.0087551.ris

Full Text

Bhã-viveka (A.D. c.490-570)’s Madhyamaka-hdayakãrikã, Tattvajñãnaisanã, verses 137-266An English translation and ExplanationbyCHIKAFUMI WATANABEB.A. Ryukoku University, 1990M.A. Ryukoku University, 1992A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREEOFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of Asian StudiesWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIASeptember 1994© Chikafumi Watanabe, 1994In presenting this thesis in partialfulfilment of the requirements foran advanceddegree at the University of BritishColumbia, I agree that the Library shallmake itfreely available for reference and study. Ifurther agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarlypurposes may be granted by thehead of mydepartment or by his or her representatives.It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financialgain shall not be allowed withoutmy writtenpermission.(Signature)_______________________________Department of,4;$j’4” 9?2ZU(The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDateO&t’. it, i//vDE-6 (2188)IIAbstractThe aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the thirdchapter, Tattvajnt1naianã, (vv. 137-266)ofMadhyamaka-hdaya-kãrikt(MHK)ofBhãviveka (A.D. c. 490-570). Bhaviveka was one of the commentators ofMadhyamaka-kãrik of Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamika, and, at thesame time, was a significant philosopher. MHK is one of Bhãviveka’s mostimportant works. In the MHK, Bhaviveka gives a his own philosophy inchapters 1-3, and thereafter, presents and criticizes Buddhist and non-Buddhistsystems opposing Madhyamaka philosophy in chapters 4-9.The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translatedinto Japanese by Yasunori Ejima. Shotaro lida, also, publisheda critical Sanskritedition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text ofMadhyamaka-hrdaya-tarkajvala(TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding tothose verses, and produced an English translation.The main subject of verses 137-256 is “the non-production of all dharmas.”This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning withNagarjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods andto examine it from their own viewpoint.Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (unyata) of allentities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Madhyamikas,basic and very important among the Buddha’s teachings. It canbe said thatwithout understanding this idea, no understanding of the philosophy of theMadhyamika is possible. Therefore, I have decided to translate andexplain inthis thesis Bha-viveka’s views on “non-production of entities.”Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita and Candrakirti used prasañga-anumana inorder to clarify the philosophy of emptiness. That is tosay, by pointing out theabsurdity of the opponent’s opinion, they tried to demonstrate thephilosophy ofemptiness. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in orderto have consensus by other schools.Bhãviveka, on the other hand, was not satisfied withprasaHga-anumana,and tried to clarify the philosophy of emptiness by means ofindependentsyllogism (svatantra-anumãna), including the three modifications:(1) adding of theword paramãrthataz (from the standpoint of the highesttruth) to propositions insyllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in syllogismsshould be understoodas prasajya-pratiedha (the negation of a proposition or the simple negation ofa‘‘Uproposition) and (3) the condition that no counter-example (vipaka) is to begiven. In other words, he positively demonstrated the philosophy of emptinessby using independent syllogism.Table of ContentsAbstract iiTable of Contents ivList of Tables viAcknowledgement viiiChapter One.Introduction 1Basic Standpoint of Madhyamika ThoughtThe thought of ‘emptiness’ (anyata)“Dependent origination” (pratitya-samutpada)“Own-being” of “intrinsic nature” (sva-bhãva)Bhã-vivekaThe works of BhãvivekaBhãviveka’s logicAdding the restriction paramarthataz to the propositionThe negation in the proposition should be understood as prasajyapratiedhaFallacy of propositionNegation in the ultimate realityNo counter-example (vipaka) is availableChapter Two.Bhãviveka’s Madhyamaka-hdaya-karikã,Tattva-jñãnaiaiza,verses 137-256 An English translation andExplanation 26Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmasNon-production from itselfNon-production from othersThe criticism of the four pratyayas or conditionsThe criticism of the hetu-pratyaya or the primary or material causalfactorThe criticism of the dlambana-pratyaya or the objective causal factorThe criticism of the samanantara-pratyaya or the sequential causalfactorThe criticism of the adhipati-pratyaya or the dominant causal factorVThe problem of the pratyaka and pratitiThe criticism of the theory of the Sathkhya systemNon-production from itself and othersNon-production from ahetu or without causeNon-production from without (the criticism of Lokayatas)The criticism of acceptance of God, etc.drsti“view”duzkha “suffering”The examination of the BuddhaSeeing pratityasamutpada and seeing the BuddhaConclusi9nChapter Three.Conclusion 87Appendix 97Bibliography ‘102viList of TablesALB Adyar Library BulletinBS Bukkyogaku Seminã (Biddhist Seminar, Kyoto: OtaniUniversity)JATS International Association for Tibetan Studies, Vol.1 BuddhistPhilosophy and Literature, ed. by ShOren Ihara and ZuihOYamaguchi, Naritasan ShishOji, 1992IBK Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyü (Journal of Indianand BuddhistStudies, University of Tokyo)IIJ Indo-Iranian JounalJA Journal AsiatiqueJBORS Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research SocietyJIP Journal of Indian PhilosophyJOR Journal of Oriental ResearchKDBKN Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogaku KenkyuNenpo (Tokyo:Komazawa University)KDKKK Kinki Daigaku Kyoyobu Kenkyu KiyO (Osaka: KinkiUniversity)KDR KOyasan Daigaku RonsO (Wakayama: KoyasanUniversity)MB Mikkyo BunkaMCB Mélanges chinois et bouddhiquesNBKR Nagoya (Daigaku) Bungakubu Kenkyã Ronshã(Aichi: NagoyaUniversity)NIBK Nagoya (Daigaku) Indogaku BukkyOgakuKenkyukaiOKDK Osaka KyOiku Daigaku KiyO(Osaka: Osaka Kyoiku University)ON Otani NenpO (Kyoto: Otani University)OsG Osaki GakuhO (Tokyo: RisshO University)Ota. The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition - kept inthe Library of theOtani University, Kyoto - Catalogue andIndex), Suzuki ResearchFoundation, 1962.OtG Otani Gakuhö (Kyoto: Otani University)PTS Pali Text SocietyRDDKK Ryukoku Daigaku DaigakuinKenkyu Kiyo (Kyoto: RyukokuUniversity)RDDN RisshO Daigaku Daigakuin Nenpo(Tokyo: RisshO University)TD TaishO DaizOkyO (ChineseTripitaka)TDK Tsurumi Daigaku KiyO (Kanagawa:Tsurumi University)vi ITDT Tsukuba Daigaku Tetsugaku (S)hisOkei (R)onshü (Chiba:TsukubaUniversity)TDTK Tsurumi Daigaku Tankidaigakubu KiyOTJDTK Tsurumi Jyoshi Daigaku Tanki (Daigakubu)KiyoToh. A Complete Catalogue of the TibetanBuddhist Canons(Bkabgyur and Bstan-Iigyur),ed. by H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, T.Tada). Tohoku University Indogaku Kenkyükai, 1953.WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd undOstasiensAbbreviations and signs in the translation chapterMs Manuscript of MHK[1The syllables are not clear but ligible.( )The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are tobe supposed.Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible.+ Thespace for one syllable is damaged.= The syllable is divided, e.g. ‘tasy=asti’ in ms.oThe syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted.SC The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the firstcopy ordeciphering made bySankrtyayana.k. kãrika or kãrikã = verse(s) ofthe main textv. versevv. versesK The Kãrikã textKS The Kärikã text in Sanskrit ed.by Ejima.KT The Kãrikã text in Tibetaned. by Ejima.TJ Tarka-jvãlaViiiAcknowledgementI am in debted to Professor A. N. Aklujkar, my major professor, whointroduced me to Bhãviveka’sMadhyamaka-hrdaya-karika. As agraduatestudent of the University of British Columbia, I was much influenced byProfessor A. N. Aklujkar’s lectures on Indian Linguistics, philosophy andliterature. Here I wish to express my deepest obligations to Professor A. N.Aklujkar for critically reading my thesis and tirelessly making suggestions. Thesuggestions were invaluable.I also would like to thank Dr. Karin Preisendanz, now of HamburgUniversity, who was my supervisor when I was a first year in the master’sstudent at the University of British Columbia. I was given much usefulinformation and helpful advice in her classes and in private consultations.Thanks are also due to Professor Kenneth Bryant for allowing me to usehis computer font and for helpful advice in private consultations.I would like to acknowledge the generaous advice and help of thesiscommittee, Professor Daniel L. Overmyer, Professor Jerry Schmidt andProfessor Laurence Preston in shaping my thesis into more presentable form.I am deeply grateful to both Professor Yuichi Kajiyama and Mr. YushoWakahara for their invaluable suggestions.Nowadays, I realize the significance of the words kalyaiamitra. Mr.Tsunenori Ito who gave me much useful information and materials has been mykalyäi.zamitra.Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to mymother for herconstant encouragement. I believe that my late father has been protecting mewith blessings of the Triple Gem these years.C. WatanabeiChapter One.IntroductionThe Mahayana movement originated in India around the first centuryB.C. and developed gradually over the succeeding few centuries. MahayanaBuddhism is represented by the two great schools, namely, the Mãdhyamika andYogacara (Vijñanavãda). The founder of the Mädhyamika is Nagãrjuna (A.D.c.150-250), who developed and established the thought of anyatã (emptiness) thatis an important aspect of Buddhist thought. The Madhyamika maybe dividedinto three stages, early, middle and late.The early stage in the Madhyamika is marked by two great figures, thefounder Nagarjuna and Arya-deva (A.D. c.170-270). In the middle stage variouscommentaries on Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka-ktrika (hereafter,MK) were writtenby many scholars. In this stage, moreover, two sub-schools arose. One of themis the Prasangika (known for its reductio ad absurdummethod), and the other isthe Svãtantrika(known for its acceptance of independent syllogism). The latestage is characterized by the writings of two great figures, anta-rakita(A.D. c.725-784) and his disciple Jnana-garbha (eighth century).According to Tibetan tradition1,eight Indian scholars wrotecommentarieson Nagarjuna’s MK: Nagarjuna himself (Akutobhaya, existsonly in Tibetantranslation), Buddha-palita (A.D. c. 470-540; Buddhapilita-Mu1amadhyamaka-vjrtti,exists only in variant Tibetan translations), Candra-kirti (A.D.c. 600-650;Prasanna-padã, exists in Sanskrit manuscripts and variant Tibetan translations),Deva-arman (fifth to sixth centuries; Dkar-poichar-ba, exists in a Tibetanfragment), Guita-rI (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentaryis notknown), Guia-mati (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is notknown, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Sthira-mati(A.D. c. 510-570; Ta-ShengChung-Kuan Shih-lun, exists only in variant Chinese translations) and Bhãviveka1Avalokita-vrata, a commentator of Bhaviveka’s Prajna-pradipa-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti,enumerates eight commentators of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka-karikd in his Prajfiu-pradipa-malamadhyamaka-tika. (Prajnapradipa, 85a8.)2(A.D. c.49O57O)2(Prajna-pradipa-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti (hereafter, PP), exists invariant Tibetan and Chinese translations).The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the thirdchapter: vv. 137-256 of Madhyamaka-hrdaya-karika (hereafter,MHK) of Bha-viveka.Bhã-viveka was one of the commentators of MK and, at the same time, wasasignificant philosopher. In this thesis, Bhã-viveka’s idea of unyatd (emptiness) isfocused on through an English translation of the third chapter of his MHK. TheMHK is probably Bhã-viveka’s most important work. In this decade some of itschapters have been edited and published by various scholars(see Apendix). TheSanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japaneseby Yasunori Ejima.3 Shotaro lida also published a critical Sanskrit edition ofverses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text ofMadhyamaka-hdayatarkajvala (hereafter, TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding to those verses,and produced an English translation. Verses 137-256 which I have selectedfortranslation in this thesis have not been translated into English before.MyEnglish translation is based upon the Sanskrit text editedby Ejima.The main subject of verses 137-256 is ‘the non-production of all dharmas.”This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginningwithNagarjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methodsandto examine it from their own viewpoint.Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (unyata) of allentities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, accordingto the Madhyamikas,basic and very important among the Buddha’s teachings. It can be saidthatwithout understanding this idea no understanding of the philosophy of theMadhyamika is possible. Therefore, I will translate and explain in this thesisBháviveka’s views on “non-production.”2Kajiyama has investigated the relation of Bháviveka to Sthiramati and Dharmapala, andas aresult, calculated the date of Bhäviveka given here. For details see Kajiyama1968/1969: 193-203; Kajiyama 1989: 177-1873Ejima 1980: 259-3613Basic Standpoint of Mãdhyamika ThoughtAs mentioned above, Bhã-viveka was a Madhyamika philosopher.I willbase my discussion of the background of his thought on the Nagarjuna’s MK.‘emptiness’The intention of the Mahayana Buddhists can be said tobe the rediscoveryof the truth realized by Gautama Buddha. Therefore, theysought to point outthe contradictions of Hinayana Buddhism and return towhat they claimed wasthe Buddha’s teaching.As far as we know now, it was Nagarjunawho established andformulated the thought of “emptiness” upon thebasis of the Prajna-pThamitasütra, the Daa-bhãmika Sãtra, the Kaáyapa-parivarta4etc. The thought ofemptiness, however, can be said to be found evenin early Buddhist sütras suchas the Cãla-suññata-sutta, the Mahã-suññata-sutta (MajjhimaNiktya, no. 121, 122)etc.5 Nagarjuna claimed just to revive the trueteaching of the Buddha. Hisphilosophy of emptiness was alsoa criticism against Indian realism, as presentedby systems such as the Sathkhya, Vaieika and Nyaya,and other Buddhistschools such as the Sarvãstivada, Vaibhäsika, Sauträntika etc.The Sanskrit word “unya” literally means“empty,” “hollow,” absent.”6Indian mathematicians called zero “anya,” but“unya” in their usages did notmean solely the non-being of entities.Nagarjuna also did not mean that emptinessindicates the non-being ornon-existence of entities, but rather that everything is void ofsva-bhäva (“ownbeing,” “intrinsic nature”). All things in ourworld are neither substantiallyexistent nor non-existent absolutely: they are justlike images in a dream or anillusion. We assume that all things in our worldare substantially existent.According to Buddhist thought, however, theyare just ‘dependently co-arisen.’See Kajiyama 1982: 65“Seyyathapi ayath Migãramatu pasadosunflo hatthi-gavassa-valavena, sunño jãtaruparajatena, suflflarh itthi-purisa-sannipatena; atthi cev idath asuflflatathyad idath bhikkhusathghath paticca ekattath (P1’S, Majjhima-Nikdya, vol.3, Ci4a-sunnata-suttath. 1960). Thusthe idea of anyata is already found in the Nikayas.See Fujita 19836Monier-Williams 1899: 10854They are empty of inherent existence. In other words, all entities have nointrinsic nature (sva-bhava). The negation of a self-dependent substance is thusderived from the traditional Buddhist idea of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada), the idea that whatever exists arises and exists dependent on otherthings. Nagarjuna declares that it is dependent origination that we callemptiness.” (MK, 24’I8ab, Prasannapadap.503: yai pratitya-samutpMai anyatärhtiiz pracakmahe/). That is to say, something in existence has no intrinsic nature(sva-bhava), which means entities originate in dependence on others. In otherwords, something which is ‘dependent co-arisen’ is emptiness.“Dependent origination”Nagarjuna claims as follows in his MK:7“He who taught dependent origination (pratityasamutpMa), [whichis]without cessation, without origination,Without annihilation, without permanence, without coming, withoutgoing,Not something manifold, not one thing, the quiescence of conceptualproliferation, tranquil(diva),[Is] the perfect Buddha (sathbuddha). I pay homage to that best ofspeakers.” (Tr. by William 1993: 214)The above eightfold negation, according to Nagarjuna, is the truth thatthe Buddha realized. In other words, having recognized thatthe most importantidea in Buddhism is dependent origination, Nagarjunatransmitted it. His ideawas not formulated in a vacuum.Basically, the idea of “dependent origination,” for Nagarjuna, meansaloofness from existence and non-existence. That is, itdemands transcendence ofthe two extremes of eternalism and nihilism.‘anirodham anutpadam anucchedam aávatam/anekartham ananrtham anagamam anirgamam//yali pratitya-samutpadam prapañcopaamath ivam/deayamasa sathbuddhas tad vande vadatathvaram// (Poussin, Prasannapadi,p.11.)5The word “pratityasamutptda” is a compound of the Sanskrit words“pratitya” and “samutpdda.” The gerund “pratitya” derives from the root qi whichmeans “to go” or “to walk.”8 The prefix “prati” means “towards” or “near to.”9The root ‘Ipad with the prefix “sam-ut” means “to arise,” “to appear,” “to occur”etc.1° Consequently, the word “pratityasamutpada” means the arising of entitiesafter having reached toward an antecedent, a cause, a basis. In other words, itmeans that everything which exists depends completely on causal relations.”Nagarjuna declares that dependent origination, emptiness, and the middlepath (madhyamtl-pratipad), are all synonymous.’2It is, however, true that theBuddha’s statement of the middle path itself did not expressly include dependentorigination or emptiness. Yet, as far as we know, the Buddha proclaimed themiddle path in order to deny eternalism and nihilism. Accordingly, there is nocontradiction between the middle path and dependent origination or emptiness.Rather, as Nagarjuna declares, the idea of the middle path and that of dependentorigination are identical and both are a means to lead the ignorant person toabsolute truth, that is, Nirvana.“Own-being” or “intrinsic nature”(svabhãva)According to the Madhyamikas, “own-being” or “intrinsic nature”is notto be found in our world where everything that exists is based on other thingsand where everything is in a constant flux.8Monier-Williams 1899: 163Monier-Williams 1899: 661OMonier-Williams 1899: 1166This interpretation of the word pratityasamutpada is based on Candrakirti’s interpretation whois later than Bhäviveka. See appendix of Stcherbatsky 1927.12sã prajflaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyamà//24-l8cd/ / (Prasannapada,p.503.)6Nagarjuna states as follows in his MK.’3It is not proper to hold that own-being (sva-bhãva) is originated byconditions and causes. [If] own-being is originated by causes andconditions, [own-being] would be what is made.//15.1//And, how could own-being be what is made? For, own-being isnot what is made; it does not depend on others (nirpekazparatra).//15•2//If there is existence as essence(prakrti=sva-bhava), this would never benon-existence. For, it is never possible that the essence(prakrti= sva-bhdva)changes.//15•8//If there is no own-being, what would the changing (anyatha-bhava)be in.And if there is own-being, even then what wouldthe changing be in.//15.9// (my translation)From the above verses, own-being(svabhäva), in Nagarjuna’sunderstanding, can be seen as (1) an independent,(2) eternal and (3) unchangingsubstance.That everything is emptiness can be easily recognized. Emptiness,however, does not mean the negation of our world. Our realworld isconceptualized through the use of words. In this world, that is, ontheconventional level, conception through words is the only reality that has“own-being” or “intrinsic nature.” The conception through words is an independent,eternal and unchanging substance. For example, even if we burneddown achair, or even if we died, the word “chair” would still exist. The conceptionwhichthe word “chair” indicates is an independent, eternal and unchangingsubstance.A “word,” however, does not point out the essence ofa thing. What a wordindicates and the entity itself are essentially different fromeach other.13na sathbhavaI sva-bhavasyayuktah pratyaya-hetubhi/hetu-pratyaya-sarhbhutah sva-bhavah krtako bhavet//15-1/ /svabhavab lqtako näma bhaviyati punab katham/akrtrimal3 svabhavo hi nirapekab paratra cal / 15-2//yady astitvam prakrtya syan na bhaved asya nãstitã/prakrter anyatha-bhavo na hi jatupapadyate/ / 15-8/ /prakrtau kasya casatyäm anyathatvath bhaviyati/prakrtau kasya ca satyäm anyathatvath bhaviyati// 15-9/ /(Prasannapadd,pp. 259-272.). deJong reads vä satyam. I adopt vã satyam.7Consequently, we must not become attached to the “conceptions” producedthrough language or words. At the same time, language or words are, ofcourse, very important for us. It would be difficult to live in this world withoutlanguage. After all, Nagarjuna composed MK and elucidated unyata usinglanguage. In other words, everything exists in our ordinary world buteverything is “anyata” in the world which is beyond our ordinary world- thehighest reality.Bhã-vivekaAs mentioned in the preceding section, Bha-viveka was one of the eightknown commentators of Nagarjuna’s MK and one of the most prominentfigures in the Madhyamaka school. He is known as the author of the PP.MHK“Ta-Shên Chan-Chêng lun,”etc. His name, however, is a subject of debatedueto the various forms found in different texts.14 The names “Bhãva-viveka,”“Bhã-viveka,” “Bhagavad-viveka,” “Bhavya-viveka,” “Bhã-vivikta,”“Bhavya,”“Bhavyaka,” “Bhavya-kara” and “Bhãvin” are assumedbased upon Sanskrit,Chinese and Tibetan materials. In Chinese materials the names“Fen-piehming,” “Ch’ing-p’ieh,” “Ming-pien,” “Yuch’ing-fen,” “P’o-p’i-fei-chia” appear.InTibetan materials “Legs ldan libyed,” “Legs ldan,” “Skia ldan, Snañ bral,”“Bhavya” etc. are used. The names Bhã-viveka and Bhãva-viveka, however, appearin Chandrakirti’s Prasanna-padã’5(hereafter, Pras.), andthe name “Bhãvin”appears in Madhyamaka-dstra-stuti.’6The name Bhagavad-viveka is alsoused inthe manuscript of MHK’7.Nowadays the names Bhava-viveka, Bha-vivekaorBhavya are commonly used by scholars. Ejima, however,after examining themanuscripts of Pras., and the Tibetan and Chinese sources,suggests that thename of the author of MHK, PP and “Ta-ShênChan-Cheng lun” should be Bhãviveka.’8 His collected evidence maybe summarized as follows:14For details of this matter, see Poussin 1933: 60-61. Teramoto andHiramatsu 1935: 5-7.Yamaguchi 1941: 49-51. Gokhale 1958: 166.15Prasannapada,p.36.16de Jong 1962: 47-56. de Jong 1979: 541-550.17Gokhale 1958: 16618Ejima 1990: 846-838.8(1) The names “Bhãva-viveka” and‘1Bhã-viveka” appear four times in themanuscripts of Pras.. The name”Bhavya” never appears in these manuscripts.(2) The transliteration‘Ira/i_(JYuâ-JYji-b’jwai -ka=P’o-p’i-feichia)” and the Chinese translation “Ching-p’ieh” appear in the Chinese materials.The former”)“ refers to Bhã-viveka, not Bhava-viveka orBhavya-viveka. It is, moreover obvious that the name of the author of MHK,TJ, PP etc. was translated as”4“and was identified with Bhã-viveka byHsuan-tsang (A.D. 600-664). Furthr, there is no indication in Chinese materialsof the names “Bhãva-viveka,” “Bhavya-viveka”or “Bhavya” which areassumedbased upon the Tibetan and Sanskrit materials for the author of MHK, etc.(3) The name of the author of MHK is “sNañ bral” or “sKal idan” in theTibetan translation ofMadhyamakalathkãra-tikã (P. No. 5286: D. No. 3886).’ Theoriginal Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sNan bral” should be “Bhã-viveka” or“Bhã-vivikta.” On the other hand, the original Sanskrit word for theTibetan“sKal ldan” can be assumed to be “Bhavya.”2°The name of the author of PP is given as “Legs idan byed” or “Legs idan1byed” in the Tibetan translation of PP andPrajnt-pradipa-tika, the sub-commentary of PP by Jf’iãna-garbha (Kiuhi rgyalmtshan). However, “Legs idanbyed” is probably the Tibetan translator’s error. It should be corrected to “Legsidan byed.” The original sanskrit word of the latter wouldbe “Bhavyaviveka”corraborating the part “viveka.”(4) Atia (Dipathkara-rijñäna. AD. 982-1054) calls the author of MHKandPP “Bhavya”or “Bhavya sNafl bral (Bhavya-Bhãviveka)”in his Bodhi-pathapradipa-pafljika (P. No. 5344: D. No.3948.), the autocommentary of Bodhi-pathapradipa.21 Besides his own treatise, AtIa translated Madhyamaka-ratna-pradipa(hereafter, M RP), M H K, Madhyamaka-hrdaya-vrtti-tarka-jvalä(hereafter, TJ),Nikaya-bheda-vibhanga-vyakhyana (hereafter,NBVV) and Madhyamakartha-sathgraha(hereafter, MAS) into Tibetan from Sanskrit with the Tibetan translatorTshulkhrims rgyal ba. He calls the author of MRP, MHK, TJ and NBVV“Bhavya,”and Tshul thrims rgyal ba calls him “Legs idan Iibyed (Bhavya-viveka)” inMAS.19P. Sa.126b-4, 136b-6: D. Sa. 119b-6, 128a-2.20Maya-vyutpatti 1916, no. 3495.21Cf. P. Ki. 323b7, 329a8, 324a8, 324b2: D. Khi. 280a6, 285a1, 280b4, 280b6.9Assuming the correctness of Ejima’s investigation, I adopt the name “Bhãviveka” in this thesis.The Works of Bhã-vivekaAccording to Tibetan tradition, the following works are ascribed to Bhaviveka22Pradipa-uddyotana-nãma-tikãPañca-krama-pañjikãPrajnã-pradipa-mala-madhyamaka.-vttiMadhyamaka-ratna-pradipaMadhyamakartha-sathgrahaNikãya-bheda-vibhaiiga-vyakhyãn aMadhyamaka-hdaya-kãrikãMadhyamaka-hrdaya-vrtti-tarka-jvãlãBesides the above treatises, Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun is ascribed to Bhãviveka in the ChineseTripitaka.P. L. Vaidya (1923:51-52) ascribes Madhyamaka-pratitya-samutpãda toBha-viveka. In the Tibetan Tripitaka, however, this treatise is attributedtoKra.Accordingly, nowadays this treatise is not ascribed to Bhã-viveka(seeYamaguchi, 1941:57-58).Pradipa-uddyotana-nãma-ikã and Pañca-krama-pañjikã are alsonotattributed to Bhã-viveka in the TibetanTripitaka.Therefore, scholars do not atpresent consider them to be Bhä-viveka’s works.Madhyamaka-ratna-pradipa (=MRP)Tibetan title: Dbu ma nfl po cheii sgron ma es bya ba.22Taranãtha 1970: 401.10The Sde dge edition; No. 3854The Peking edition; No. 5254This treatise consists of nine chapters, in which Madhyamaka thought,especially the theory of the two truths, is well summarized. This treatise isattributed to Bhã-viveka in Tibet, but there must have been considerable doubtas to whether it should really be ascribed to him. As a result of his investigation,S. Yamaguchi concluded that the author of MRP is not Bha-viveka, and that thetext was written around 700 A.D.23 He points out that, firstly, there are someplaces where the author salutes three acaryas, namely Nagarjuna(A.D. C. 150-250), Aryadeva (A.D. c. 170-270) and Candra-kirti (A.D. c. 600-650). Candra-kirtiwas a founder of the Prasangika school (Tib. Thal gyur pa) and was in aposition of opposition to Bhã-viveka. It is thus hardly probable that Bhä-vivekasaluted Candrakirti. Secondly, a statement by Dharma-kirti is quoted in MRP.Dharma-kIrti lived around 600-660 A.D. Therefore, it is impossible that Bhãviveka knew Dharma-kirti’s works. For these reasons, nowadays MRP is nolonger ascribed to Bha-viveka.24Madhyamakarthasathgraha (=MAS)Tibetan title: Dbu mahi don bsdus pa.The Sde dge edition; No.3857The Peking edition; No.5258.This treatise consists of thirteen kãrikãs. As the title shows, it is asummary of Madhyamaka thought. The main subject of thistreatise is thetheory of two truths. According to the Tibetan translation, its author is Bhãviveka. As a result of his investigation, however, Ejima pointed out: (1) thestatement regarding the theory of the two truths in MASdoes not fit thestatement regarding the same theory in MHK, PP and TJ.(2) In order to solvethe differences between MAS and MHK, PP and TJ, a mediation ofthe theory of23Yamaguchi 1941: 54-57.24Kajiyama 1983: 13. Ruegg 1981: 66. Lindner asserts in his articler(1982: 167-194) that MRPshould be attributed to Bhävaviveka.11the Yogacara-Madhyamaka, such as the theory of Jnana-garbha, a later century,is neccesary. (3) It is difficult to understand the theory of MAS without firstassuming knowledge of the theory of Dipathkara-ri-jnana. (4) Avalokita-vrata,commentator of PP. does not mention MAS as Bha-viveka’s work.(5)Kamalaila, also, does not mention MAS as Bhã-viveka’s work. In hisMadhyamakalathkara-pañjikä, Kamalaila’s statement with regards to the theory ofthe two truths depends on MHK, not MAS. On the basis of these considerations,Ejima does not attribute MAS to Bhã-viveka.25Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lunSanskrit title:*Karatalaratha?Chinese title: Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun tr. by Hsuan-tsangTD. No. 1578.The Sanskrit manuscript of this treatise is not extant anda Tibetantranslation of it does not exist.The treatise has the same organization as the third chapter of MHKaccording to its abstract: it divides all entities into two categories, the conditioned(sathskita) and the unconditioned (asathskrta) and discusses the emptiness of thesecategories. Moreover, the logic and the theory of the two truths in it fit with thelogic and theory of the two truths in Bha-viveka’s other works. Further, thedetailed argument found in it against Yogacara theory depends on MHK.26Therefore, nowadays it is attributed to Bhã-viveka.From the fact that content of Ta-Shên Chang-Chenlun is relativelysimple, but still fits with that of MHK, Ejima assumes thatthis treatise waswritten after MHK in order to explain in a more concise form thecontent of thelatter (see Ejima, 1980: 15-16).25Ejima 1980: 18-32. Ejima suggests that MAS was written beforeAtia (Dipathkara-rijnana)or Tshul khrims rgyul ba, Tibetan translator of MAS. That is, MASwas completed some timebetween the latter half of eighth century and the beginning of theeleventh century.26Cf. TD.30.272a, 275a.12Prajñãpradipa-mãla-madhyamaka-vtti (=PP)Tibetan title: Dbu mazi rtsa bazi zgrel pa es rab sgron maThe Sde dge edition; No. 3853The Peking edition; No. 5253Chinese title: Pan-jo-teng-lun. tr. by Po-lo-p’o-chia-lo-mi-tiu-li(*Prabhakara.mjtra)Taishö No. 1566.This treatise is a commentary on Nagãrjuna’s MK. Bhã-viveka criticizesBuddha-palita in this commentary with the observation that Buddha-palita’sargument inMãlamadhyamaka-vrttiis a mere prasañga, lacking both a trueprobans (i.e., minor premise) and an example (i.e., major premise). Bhã-vivekaused Svatantra-anumana (independent inference), by which he tried to explainNagarjuna’s MK. Tibetan and Chinese translations of this treatise are extant, butonly Sanskrit fragments can be found in Candra-kirti’s Pras. There isa sub-commentary on PP. which exists only in Tibetan translation, titledSes rab sgronma rgya cher grel pa (restored Skt. title would bePrajnd-pradipa-tiktt) by Avalokitavrata (seventh century).27 Some of the chapters of the Tibetan text of PPhavebeen edited by Max Walleser(1914) and Christian Lindtner(1984).Nikaya-bheda-vibhaiga-vyakhyãnaTib. title: Sde pa tha dad par byed pa dan rnam par badpa.The Sde dge edition; No. 4139The Peking edition; No. 5640This treatise is only a portion of TJ and MHK, chapter 4 v.8 (Dsal6l-3--169a5). Because the authorship of TJ has not been resolved, the authorship ofthis treatise is also open to debate.27Toh. No. 3859, Ota. No. 5259.13Madhyamaka-hdaya-vtti-tarka-jvã1ã (=TJ)Tibetan title: Dbu mat-ti sñiñ poii igrel pa rtog ge zbar ba.The Sde-dge edition; No. 3856The Peking edition; No. 5256.It has long been accepted that TJ is Bha-viveka’s autocommentary(svavTtti)on MHK. There is, however, sufficient reason to doubt whether or not thesurviving Tibetan translation has preserved the original form of thisautocommentary. This is because, after one kãrikã, it is written “thus says theacarya” in what should be a reference to Bhã-viveka, the author of the kãrikãs.Moreover, in explaining the meaning of some kãrikãs, the expression “this is theintention of the ãcrya” is used.28 That is to say, if TJ was composed by Bhãviveka himself, would he be calling himself tcarya in his own treatise? Acãryausually means ‘senior teacher’ or ‘great teacher.’ There is, however, anotherexample of an author calling himself “ãcãrya.”29 It is, moreover, possible that thesurviving Tibetan translation includes additions to the text that were madeduring the translation from Sanskrit. There is also another piecewhich conflictswith Bha-viveka’s authorship of the TJ. In the commentary of the 291st verseofthe third chapter, there is a quotation from “ran gi bstanbcos (sva-ttlstra).”30There is, however, no indication of what the “ran gi bstanbcos (sva-stra)” is. Itmight indicate the author of MHK and TJ. This quotation isnot, however, foundin any of Bha-viveka’s works such as MHK, PP. TJ or “Ta-Shen Chang-Chênlun.” It is found as a quotation accompanied by the comment “ãcärya-ptda saysas follows” in MRP which is not ascribed to Bhã-viveka31.It is safe to assumethat both TJ and MRP are referring to the same person, and thatthis person is28TJ Dsa 50a-5; 75a-1; 86a-2; 107a-2;112b-6; 224b-4; 246b-5; 274b-6; 321a-5,etc.29Vasubandhu calls himself “ãcãrya” in his Abhidharmakoa-bhaya,p.2 • 17.“kimarthath punarabhidharmopadeabkena cayath prathamata upadio yata acaryo‘bhidharmakoath vaktum adriyata iti/ aha/” Yaomitra says;“acaryab astrakarab” cf.[Sphuartha],p.10.23.30TJ Dsa 140b6-141a7. “.... sku gsum rnam par bshag pa ñid kyãn slobdpon gyis ran gibstan bcos kyi skabs subdi skad bad do/...” (English tras: With regard to Buddha’s threebodies (dharma-body, rejoyment-body and accommodative body) also,äcarya says thefollowing in sva-ästra).31MR Tsa 360a5-b7. “... sku gsum rnam par bshagpa yañ/ slob dpon ñid shal ñas (acaryapada)/ji skad du...”14not the author of TJ and MRP. It remains, then, a mystery as to how this“crya” figure is connected with Bhá-viveka, the author of MHK. Presumably,“ãcärya” is an addition by AtIa (A.D. 952-1054), a Tibetan translator of TJ, as Bhãviveka was considered the author of MRP in the period of Atia. In any case, it isnot prudent to assume that the author of the surviving TJ is definitely the sameas Bha-viveka, the author of MHK, PP and Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun.It is possible that TJ was translated into Tibetan at least once before Atia(Dipathkara-ri-jnana), Tshul khrims rgyal ba etc., because “Dbumabisniñ 0rtog gebbarrtsa ba dani hgrel par bead pa gnus(Madhyamaka-hdaya-Tarkjvälaftkä)//” is recorded as a treatise in the process of translation in the Dkar chag Ldandkar ma (the catalogue of the Man dkar ma), completed in 788 A. D.32Madhyamaka-hrdaya-.kãrikã (=MHK)Tibetan title: Dbu mazi sniñ poii tshig le’iur byas paThe sde dge edition; No. 3855, Dsa 3b5-17a4.The Peking edition; No. 5255, Dsa 4a5-19-7.The Narthang edition33;No. 3246, Dsa 5a2-17a4.It can be said that this treatise is Bhã-viveka’s major work because it is hisindependent work and in it the Madhyamaka philosophy is well organized. Theonly known manuscript of MHK was discovered and hand copied by RahulaSathkrtyayanaat the Sha-lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. Having hand-copied theSanskrit manuscript there, he registered his copy as ‘VIIShaluMonastary, XXXVII, 1. 311. TarkjvtTh(Madhyamakairdaya)’ in his handlist. Later on, he gave thecopy to V. V. Gokhale.On the other hand, while traveling in India, Nepal and Tibet, G. Tuccisucceeded in taking photographs of the manuscript of MHK at the Sha lumonastary.When visiting Japan in 1971, V. V. Gokhale allowed several scholars tocopy his copy of the MHK, and entrusted further research to them.32Lalou 1953: 337.33The catalogue numbers of the Narthang edition given here are in accordance with those of AComparative List of TibetanTripitaka of Narthang Edition (Bstan-Ijgyur Division) with the Sde-dgeEdition, compiled by T. Mibu, Tokyo, 1967.15In 1972, when V. V. Gokhale visited Rome, he found the photographs ofthe manuscript of MFTK in G. Tucci’s collection, and was given the chance to editthem. Since then, a number of chapters of MHK have been edited andpublishedbased on the photograph from Tucci’s collection and Gokhale’s notes.In 1991, a photocopy of the manuscript of MHK was published inChina.34MHK consists of roughly 927anutubha-verses and is divided into elevenchapters. The third chapter, Tattva-jñãnaiaiã, is the most importantchapteramong the eleven because the Madhyamika thought is primarily presentedinthis chapter whereas the other chapters express the Mãdhyamikathoughtthrough the criticism of other systems and schools. According toGokhale(1985:78), Bhã-viveka originally composed the first three chapters under the titleTattvãmrtãvatãra, forming the core of MHK, and other chapters wereaddedlater. As the following note of the contents of the third chaptershow, thischapter has a close relationship with MK and PP. It is in order to clarifythis closerelationship, as well as to provide context for the verses I will translate,that anabstract of the third chapter is given here:Contents of the third chapterIntroduction1-1 The meaning and aim of the knowledge ofthe highest truthvv. 1-131-2 samtdhi ‘concentration’vv. 14-23abIntroduction to Examinationsvv. 23cd-242-1 sathskrta-dharmas ‘conditioned dharmas’(A) skandhas ‘aggregates’(A)-1 rupa-skandha v. 25(A)-2 mahã-bhütas ‘great elements’vv. 26-39(A)-3 rapa, etc.vv. 40-44(A)-4 indriya ‘sense organs’vv. 45-65(B) vedand-skandhavv. 66-68ab3Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasionof his 80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng,Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qing and Qian Wenzhong, 1991,p.511-523.16(C) sathjñãand sathskara skandhas vv. 68cd-69(D) vijfltna-skandha v. 702-1-1 dhatus ‘realms’ v. 7lab2-1-2 ãyatana ‘sense-fields’ v. 7lcd2-1-3 laksana ‘characteristics’ v. 72-762-1-4 gati ‘going’ vv. 77-85ab2-1-5 moka ‘emancipation’ andbandhana ‘bondage’ vv. 85cd-89(A) pudgala ‘person’ vv. 90-92(B) ãtman vv. 93-99ab2-1-6 raga ‘attachment’ and rakta the ‘affected’ vv. 99cd-1082-1-7 nirvana vv. 109-1162-1-8 viparydsa ‘perversion’ vv. 117-1182-1-9 dvesa ‘hate’ and moha ‘delusion’ v. 1192-1-10 sva-bhãva ‘intrinsic nature’ vv. 120-1282-1-11 Conclusion vv. 129ab2-2 asathskrta ‘unconditioned’ vv. 129cd-136Introduction to the Non-production ofall dharmas vv. 137-1383-1 Non-production from itself vv. 139-1463-2 Non-production from others vv. 147-1583-2-1 The criticism of the four pratyayas or conditions v. 159(A) hetu-pratyaya vv. 160-162(B) ãlambana-pratyaya vv. 163-166(C) samanantara-pratyaya vv. 167-169(D) adhipati-pratyaya vv. 170-1753-2-2 The problem of opposition by pratyaka andpratiti vv. 176-1813-2-3 The criticism of the theory of theSãthkhya school vv. 182-1913-3 Non-production from itself and others vv. 192-1933-4 Non-production from ahetu or‘without cause’ vv. 194-2133-5 The criticism of Lokayatas vv. 194-2143-6 The criticism of ivara vv. 215-223173-7 di ‘view’ vv. 224-2293-8 duikha ‘suffering’ vv. 230-2333-9 buddha vv. 234-2393-10 Seeing pratityasamutpãda andseeing Buddha vv. 240-2463-11 Conclusionvv. 247-2564. nisvabhãvatã and unyatavv. 257-2665. The Buddhas and the bodhisattvasvv. 267-360It follows from what has been said above that Bhã-viveka’sworks are PP,MHK, probably TJ (including Nikãyabhedavibhañgavyãkhyãna)and “Ta-ShenChang-Chen lun.”According to the relationship of quotationsin the above treatises, Ejimadecides the chronological order of theseworks as: first, MHK (possibly includingTJ), second, the “Ta-Shên Chang-Chenlun” and finally, PP.Bhã-viveka’s logicBha-viveka was influenced by Dignãga(c. 400-480 A.D.).35 Accordingly, itwas his view that the Madhyamikas had to employsyllogisms to prove the truthof their philosophy. Hence, Bhã-vivekaused syllogism (svatantra-anumãna) inMHK, PP and “Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun.” Inemploying syllogisms, Bhä-vivekaincluded three modifications:(1) adding of the word “paramãrthatai” (“from thestandpoint of the highest truth”) to propositionsin his syllogisms,(2)specification that the negation in his syllogismsshould be understood as prasajyapratiedha (“the negation of a proposition,”as opposed to paryudäsa, “thenegation of a term orword”), and (3) the condition that no counter-example(vipaka) is to be given.35Erich Frauwailner 1961: 125-48 established the dates ofimportant Buddhist philosophers. Asa result of his investigation, he suggested that the life-time ofDignaga was to be 480-540 A.D.The fact that Bhäviveka was influenced by Dignaga wasinvestigated by Ejima 1980: 61-82.18Bha-viveka tried to clarify the philosophy of unyati (emptiness) bymeans of syllogisms, including the three modifications. Here I will translateverse 26 in the third chapter, one of the typical syllogisms of Bhã-viveka in hisMHK, and its commentary TJ in order to clarify the point made just now and thematters which surround his syllogisms (i.e. fallacy of proposition and negation inthe ultimate reality). Then, I will explain the meaning of the verse. In order toclarify the context of the topic, I will divide the following translation into somesections, and will put an explanation after each section of translation, if neccesary.My translation is based upon the Tibetan text ed. and English tr. by lida, 1980: 81-90.“Here,(proposition) from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramarthatai) theearth, etc. do not have the gross elements as their own-beings,(reasoni) because they are things which are made, or(reason2) because they are things which have cause, etc.,(instance) just like knowledge (jñdna).”//326//36Adding the restriction “paramãrthataz” to the proposition.[Translation of TJ]In [the word] paramtrtha, artha is what is to be obtained (pratipattavya) andwhat is to be understood (adhigantavya) because artha is the object tobe known(jnttavya). Paramãrtha which means “the most excellent.” The compound paramaartha [can be interpreted in three ways].(1) It means “the most excellent object” because it is the object and themostexcellent (karmadharya compound)36tatra bhuta-sva-bhavãrh hi norvyadiparamarthatah/lqtakatvad yatha jñãnath hetumattvãdito pi vä/ /3-26/I (Ejima 1980;274.)In MI-{K the above verse is the first syllogism. In addition, Bhävaviveka explainshissyllogismd in his PP and Ta-Shên Chang-Chen lun. For further details of his syllogism in TJ, seelida 1980: 81-90. On his syllogism in PP. see Kajiyama1963/1964 On his syllogism in Ta-ShênChang-Chen lun, see Poussin 1932-1933: 68-138.19(2) Or, it is the object of the most excellent. That is, because it is theobject of themost excellent knowledge that is beyond discrimination (nirvikalpa-jñdna),itmeans the object of the most excellent(tatpurua compound)(3) Or, it is “comformable to paramartha” (paramrthanuküla). That is, since there isthat paramartha in wisdom (prajñ) which is conformable to obtainingofparamirtha, it means “one which is in conformity with paramärthai”(bahuvrihicompound)Paramarthataj [in syllogisms] is taken as the third type of compound (thebahuvrihi compound), i.e., paramttrthataz, in the ultimate reality.[An explanation]As is well known, the highest truth (paramartha) is contrasted withsathvrti(the conventional truth) in many schools ofphilosophy but particularly inMadhyamika. Bhã-viveka included this word “the highesttruth” in hissyllogisms. He interpretes the word paramarthataz inthree ways, i.e.,karmadhärya, tatpurua and bahuvrihi compound.37 Amongthese threeinterpretations, Bhã-viveka adopts the third restrictionparamärthataz in hispropostion. That is to say, the restriction “paramarthatah”in Bha-viveka’sproposition does not mean ‘the highest truth’ itself, but thatwhich is inconformity with the highest truth itself.In other words, the third interpretationmeans prajna, which is in comformity with the highest truth.38Assuming the first interpretation (karmadMrya compound) andthe second(tatpurua compound), the third interpretation is realized.The first and second“paramartha” are beyond conceptions. Truth itself cannotbe understood bymeans of concepts and language. On the otherhand, the third paramartha hasconcepts and language. However, it is prajna andis approaching truth itself.That is to say, even though it is verbal usage,as long as the word paramarthadirects to the highest truth itself, Bhãviveka’s syllogism, includingthe restrictionparamarthatai is truth.37In PP Bhãviveka interprets the word paramdrtha in thesame way. See, Uryãzu 1971: 34.Avalokitavrata in his PPT gives us gramatical explanations of these threeinterpretations of theword paramartha, that is,(1) karmadhdraya compound, (2) tatpurua compound and (3) bahuvrihicompound respectively.38This idea can be found in the commentary on v. 8 of PPXXIV. See, Uryazu 1971: 33-34.20The negation in the proposition should be understood as prasajyapratiedha.[Translation of TJ]Here, the negation ‘na (not)’ means prasajya-pratiedha (“the negation of aproposition”), and does not mean paryudiisa-pratiedha (“the negation of a term”).One might ask: What is the difference between prasajya-pratiedha and paryudasapratiedha? Paryudasa-pratiedha affirms the other entity(vastu) which is similar tothis entity due to the negation of the nature of this entity. For instance, by thenegation “he is not a Brahman,” one might affirm that[he] looks like a Brahmanbut he is a non-Brahman, he differs from[a brahman], that is [he] belongs to alower class (üdra) because of lacking mortification (tapas) and learning(truta)etc. The prasajya-pratiedha negates only the nature of the entity, it does notaffirm another entity which is similar but not identical. For instance,[theexpression] “Brahmans must not drink liquor” denies only[the very action]itself, and does not mean “do drink something other than liquor” or“do notdrink something other than liquor.” Therefore, here, “from the standpoint ofthe highest truth (paramarthata’z) the earth etc. which are imagined by people inthe world do not have [corresponding] gross elements as their own-being” isonly the negation of [“having gross elements as their own-being”]. It does notaffirm “having another as own-being” or “having non-existenceas own-being.”[An explanation]The negative particle in Bha-viveka’s proposition is related to the verb,not to a nominal as a prasajya-pratiedha. For instance, “whatever exists is notproduced from itself” does not mean “whatever exists is not produced fromanother.” It just means that “whatever exists is never producedfrom itself.”3939We come across the detailes of Bhaviveka regarding prasajya-pratiedha in PP and itscommentaryPPT.In PP Bhaviveka says: “here one should specify that entities do notF- - - -originate from themselves. If one specifies otherwise, one would ascertain, “Entities do notoriginate from themselves[- - - -1;rather they originate from another.” Likewise one wouldascertain, “Entities do not originate just(eva) from themselves; rather they originate fromthemselves and another.” Therefore, that also is not accepted, because it isdistinct from [our]doctrine. (Tr. William 1993: 221.) According to William, addition in brackets[]is based uponPPT.For detailed imformation regarding paryudasa and prasajya-pratiedha, see Kajiyama: 1963: 423-438, 1973: 161-175.21Fallacy of proposition[Translation of TJ]Here, the opponents object as follows:(i) There are the following statements in the saying of your teacher(llstTvacana =the Buddha).“Oh Brahman! everything consists of the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements.”And,“The characteristic of form (rupa) is change and destruction, etc”.You also accepted those [ideas, i.e., “the everything has the fiveaggregates,twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements as its own-being”and “thecharacteristic of form is change and destruction,etc”], but if you negate thosevery things, your thesis (pratijñä) is damagedby the very ideas you accept(abhyupagata).(ii) Likewise, it is well know (prasiddha) that the function of particularobjects (pratiniyata-viaya) is known through directperception (pratyaka) of thesense organs (indriya). And, there is no other superiorproper cognitiveinstrument (pramaia) than seeing(drta).Nevertheless, having seen the shape(sathsthãna) and colour (varna) of the four elements (i.e., fire, water, wind andearth) by means of your own eyes, you still search for the own-being oftheearth element, e.g., smooth touch. It is, however,understood by everybody inthe world that the earth element has the nature of firmness, etc.Therefore, thenegation of it means negation of direct perception(pratyaka).(iii) Also, the form (rupa), etc. and nature ofearth, i.e., solidity(khakkhatatva), wetness(dravatva), heat (usijatva) and mobility (samudiraizatva), etc.are well known even to the abara and mdtariga tribes.Thus, the negation of theown-being of entities which are well known to everybodyin the world meansthe negation of what is well known (prasiddha).To these objections we reply as follows:Because of the restriction paramãrthata’z inour proposition (pratijnã), ourproposition would not be a contradiction of thetheory we accept, or of directperception or of what is generally known. This isdue to the following reasons:(i) The Bhagavat proclaimed the theory oftwo truths (satya-dvaya), i.e.,sathvrti-satya and paramãrtha-satya. Among these two truths, as for thesalizvTti22satya, he established own-beings and characteristics of entities (dharma).Likewise, as for the paramartha-satya, he proclaimed non-own-being [of entities].That is, [the following was stated by the Bhagavat].“Kauika! all entities are empty in their own-being. [The statement] “allentities are empty in their own-being” means the non-existence of entities.And the non-existence is “prajnapdramita.”According to this statement, entities do not exist. Because of this, how can theypossess own-beings? Accordingly, contradiction with what we accepted does notoccur.(ii) The contradiction with pratyaka does not occur. The reason is: theobjects [of cognition] are untrue and the ability of seeing, etc. does not existbecause the sense-organs are [actually] senseless. Therefore, to consider that theobject is what is directly perceived is improper, just as in the case of one who hasan eye-disease who sees a hair, mosquito or horsefly in his eyes, or in the case ofone who perceives an echo as coming from a particular place, which is improper.Accordingly, what can be pratyaka for whom, and how can there be thecontradiction with that (pratyaka)?(iii) Also, the contradiction by what is well accepted does not occur,because the ordinary person is blind due to an eye-disease: “ignorance.” When itcomes to analyzing something from the standpoint of the highest truth, then justas in the example of a blind person who cannot examine a jewel, the ordinaryperson does not understand that analyzing from the standpoint of the highesttruth. Accordingly, contradiction with the well known does not occur.[An explanation]The opponents object to Bha-viveka’s proposition from three points ofview: (i) conflict with what weaccepted(ii) objection by direct perception and(iii) objection by the well-known. That is,(i) The Buddha proclaimed the own-being of entities. Therefore, forBuddhists, a negation of the Buddha’s statement would bea fallacy ofcontradiction.(ii) It is widely accepted that pratyaka of sense organs holds for specificobjects. Therefore, the negation of what is actually experienced would be afallacy.(iii) That the own-beings of the gross element of earthare solidity,wetness, heat and mobility etc. is generally known by all ordinary people.23Therefore, negation of what is generally known by all ordinary people would bea fallacy.To these objections Bhã-viveka replies:Because we have the restriction paramarthatai in our proposition (pratijnã), ourproposition would not be a fallacy on account of abyupagata, pratyaka andprasiddhabädha. That is:(i) The Buddha taught two truths, namelysathvrti-satyaand paramarthasatya. The own-beings and characteristics of entities are established insathWtisatya, that is, the own-beings and characteristics of entities are acceptable asconventional truth. The Buddha, however, taught the non-own-beingness ofentities from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramartha).(ii) From the standpoint of the highest truth the objects of sense organsare untrue. For example, from the standpoint of the highest truth the ability ofseeing does not exist. Nevertheless, in the eye of one who has an eye disease,unreal hair, etc. is seen as real. It is, however, not correct from the standpoint ofthe ultimate truth.(iii) The ordinary person is afflicted by ignorance. Accordingly, he cannotexamine anything as it is.Negation in the ultimate reality[Translation of TJ]One might say: the highest truth (paramartha) transcends every intelligence(buddhi). However, the negation of the own-being of entities (bhtva-svabMvapratiedha) is in the object sphere of words. Therefore, the negation does notestablish the absence of own-being of entities.We (Madhyamikas) reply: to say this is not proper. The paramartha istwofold. One is paramartha, which works without conception(anabhisathsk&apravrtti),which is beyond the world(lokottara), which is pure (anãsrava) and whichis beyond diversification (niprapaflca). The other is paramrtha which workswithvolition (sãbhisathsktra-pravrtti), which is conformable to the equipping ofvirtueand knowledge (pui.iya-jnana-sathbhara), which has diversification (saprapanca) thatis called “pure worldly intelligence” (uddha-laukika-jñana). Herewe adopt thelafter paramartha as qualification of the proposition (pratijna). Therefore, there isno fallacy [in our proposition].24Similar example[Translation of TJ]The statement which is connected with similar examples (sapakdnvayanirdeáa) is “no produced thing has elements (bhüta) as its nature (svabMva), justlike knowledge (jndna).”One might say: in what manner is knowledge (jñãna) a produced thing?We reply: it is accomplished by logic (tarka) which aims at heaven (svarga)and nirvana (apavarga). Here, the negation “knowledge does not haveelementsas its own-being, because it is a thing which is made” is connected with the senseof prasajya-pratiedha.No counter-example (vipaka) is available in the syllogism.[Translation of TJ]Here, among three aspects of reason(hetu), due to the non-indication ofthe third condition, i.e., absence of acounter-exampleswhat we intend to say isconventionally explained by using only two aspects of reason. The propertyofthe subject (paka-dharma) exists only in the similar example (sapaka),not in thecounter-example (vipaka) because the latter, which has own-beingdiffers fromthe former, which never exists. Therefore, wedo not state instances(dtinta)which lack counter-examples (vipaka) and reasons.In order to indicate a convertible term (paryiiya),[the word] hetumat isused. [The abstract] noun of hetu mat is hetumattva. The term “etc.” in thesyllogism includes other reasons, i.e., knowability and expressibility etc.In thiscase, the phrase “because they are things which have cause” is used as the reason(hetu). Whatever has cause, knowableness or expressibility etc. does not haveelements as its own-being, just like knowledge. Likewise, the earthdoes nothave gross elements as its own-being from the standpoint of the highesttruth.In this way, each term [of syllogism] is related to the others.[An explanation]According to Dignaga’s logic, a correct syllogism isconditioned by threeaspects. These are: (1) paka-dharmatva, namely reason(hetu) should be thepredicate of the subject of the proposition, (2)sapaka-sattva, namely reason(hetu)must belong to an example similar to the subject of the proposition.and (3)25vipakäsattva, namely, reason (hetu) must not belong to a counter-example of thesubject of the proposition. Bhã-viveka, however, does not adopt the third aspectamong the above three aspects. That is, Bha-viveka does not adopta counter-example in his syllogism. The reason is: Bha-viveka upholds the emptiness of allentities in the ultimate reality. Hence, with regard to the statement “from thestandpoint of the highest truth, earth, etc. do not have gross elements as theirown-beings, because they are things which are made,” a counter-example, i.e.,“something which has gross elements as its own-being”does not exist. That is,the proposition (pratijnt) “from the standpoint of the highest truth, the earth etc.have no gross elements as their own-being(svabhdva)” is a case ofprasajyapratiedha and means only the negation of “have gross element as theirown-being.” In this case, the counter-example which canbe assumed is one ofwhich “have gross as their own-being” couldbe said. However, as long as“have gross as their own-being” is simply negated, there is no possibility ofacounter-example. The employing of prasajyapratiedha as the negation of theproposition (pratijn) leads to non-necessity of the counter-example.Accordingly, the above-mentioned syllogism amounts to:(p) If considered by prajna (wisdom) which is in conformity with thehighest truth, the earth etc.40 do not have the gross elements astheir own-beings,(hi) because they are things which are made, or,(h2) because they are things which have cause,knowableness (jneyatva),expressiblity (vacyatva) etc.(d) just as knowledge does not have gross elements as its own-being.Thus, I have clarified the idea of Bhã-viveka regarding three modificationsand showed how we should understand Bhã-viveka’s syllogism.In the following chapter, I shall translated MHK 3.137-256.40The term “etc.” includes water, fire and wind. See, lida 1980:82.26Chapter Two.Bhã-viveka’s Madhyamaka-hdaya-karika, Third Chapter,Tattva-jñãnaianã, verses 137-256An English Translation and ExplanationAs mentioned in the introduction, a critical edition of the Sanskrit text andof the Tibetan text of the third chapter of MHK were published and translatedinto Japanese by Yasunori Ejima in 1980. Shotaro lida published a criticalSanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of TJcorresponding to those verses, accompanied by an English translation of boththe verses and the TJ.Here, I present an English translation and explanation of of MHK, 3 • 137-256. My translation is based upon the text edited by Y. Ejima, and myexplanation is basically based upon TJ. TJ, however, does not give us detailedcommentary for some verse parts. Hence, I have tried to explain verses whichTJ does not explain sufficiently based upon my own understanding. Althoughthe Tibetan translation indicates the separate components of the syllogism, likethesis, reason and example, I have combined them in a single sentence. I do notexplain each verse I translate. I sum up the main points of the discussion whereverses form a unit and have the same context.Explanation of abbreviations and signs employed in this chapter:Ms Photocopy in Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasionof his80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qian Wenzhong,1991,p.511-522The MHK manuscript itself is reported to have been written on22.5 X 2inch palm-leaves, and is said to consist of 24 folios with 5 or 6 lines on eachof the obverse and reverse sides. It has the Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithiliscript of the eleventh century. The dedication “deya-dharmo ‘yamuttarapathika-ramaizera-bandya-dharmdkarasenasya” further indicates that themanuscript was written in Northern India.4’[ ]The syllables (akaras) are not clear but legible.41For details of this manuscript, see R. Säñkrtyayana 1937.27( )The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed.Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible.+ The space for one syllable is damaged.= The syllable is divided, e.g. ‘tasy=ãsti’ in ms.oThe syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted.SC The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering madeby Sankrtyayana.k. kürika or käriküs = verse of the main textv. versevv. versesK The Kãrikã textKS The Kãrikã text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima.KT The Kãrikä text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima.TJ Tarka-jvãla: Sde dge edition, No. 3856, Dsa53b2-144b7.Peking edition, No. 5256, Dsa 57a-15Th2.Narthang edition, No. 3247, Dsa 53a7-152a5An outline of vv. 137-256 would be as follows:3. Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmasvv. 137-1383-1 Non-production from itselfvv. 139-1463-2 Non-production from othersvv. 147-1583-2-1 The criticism of the four pratyayas “conditions”v. 159(A) hetu-pratyayavv. 160-162(B) ãlambana-pratyayavv. 163-166(C) samanantara-pratyaya vv. 167-169(D) adhipati-pratyaya vv. 170-1753-2-2 The problem of the opposition of pratipakaandpratitivv. 176-1813-2-3 The criticism of the theory of theSathkhya system vv. 182-1913-3 Non-production from itself and othersvv. 192-1933-4 Non-production from ahetu “withoutcause” vv. 194-1953-5 The criticism of Lokayatasvv. 196-2143-6 The criticism of ivaravv. 215-2233-7drsti ‘view” vv. 224-229283-8 du’zkha “suffering” vv. 230-2333-9 The Buddha vv. 234-2393-10 Seeing pratitya-samutpada and seeing the Buddha vv. 240-2463-11 Conclusion vv. 247-25629TRANSLATION2. Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas3TT IT 1Iø1 l i1ct,: IIIc5’1 311 -ck,1 cicIcI II9II42TqT-qr8JrIiQ-: 1I-IH ?[Tfl9IIOr, indeed, the expansion of a net of false constructions which has suchabeginning with such things as [dravya, pradhäna, jiva andãtman], and whichhas for its basis produced entities, confounds an ignorant personthrough its force.//137//By the lamp of knowledge (vidyapradipa), a knowledgeable personexamines (arising of entities) as they are on [thebasis] from [the view of]rejection of production. Then out of its (=production’s) quenching is (i.e.comes) the cessation of the diversified world of experience.//138//Explanatory comment:The realists, i.e., the Sarvãstivãdin, Sautrantika, Vaibhãéika, Abhidharmikaetc. among the Buddhist schools and the Sathkhya,Vaieika, Naiyayika etc.among the Brahmanical schools, state that produced thingsactually exist in theworld. The Madhyamaka school, however, asserts that producedthings do notexist in ultimate reality.The phrase evam-adika kalpan&jala-prasara in the above verse meansdravya,pradhäna, jiva, ãtman etc. that other systems imagine as real existences and whichare referred to in vv. 135-136.An ignorant person misunderstands in that he thinks that producedthingsactually exist in the world and that entities are produced either fromthemselves,42ms.43n1 ms. KT: skye bkagms. KT: de shi bas5dravya-pradhana-jivadi jneyath yat tirthya-kalpitath/yatha-yogath nieddhavyathyukty-agama-viaradaib/ /3 • 35/ /iti sva-para-siddhanta-ka1pitatma-nirtmatath/vidvan vibhavya bhavãnamtattva-jflamrtath pibet/ /3 • 136/ /30from others, from both themselves and others or withouta cause. Adiscriminating person, however, realizes non-arising ofentities as the truth,attains proper wisdom, and liberates himself from thediversified world ofexperience.2-1 Non-production from itselfIntroduction to verses 139-140Bhä-viveka discusses here the doctrine of ‘pre-existenceof the effect in thecause in a potential state’ (Satkaryavada) in the Sathkhya school.The Sathkhyasclaim that the effect pre-exists in thecause and is therefore self-generated.However, their statement is not acceptableto Buddhists.According to TJ, the Sãthkhyas propose that aneffect pre-exists in the cause.This amounts to saying that it produces itselffrom itself or that an existent isproduced from itself. Bhã-viveka criticizes this opinion.cflcid c4cj 1c’LIIR1( I1I1oI,cclIc, Z{.Tlf: cçj’‘.‘1-1 { II9IIHere, firstly, production from itself is not proper even fromthestandpoint of conventional truth, because it[already] has itself,just as a curd has no birth from itself.//139//c-1I: cjIc4.ciI TIcccUcI, dUtP1T[IriiRiII9°IIThe existents do not arise out of themselves,because they are [already] inexistence, just like the purua(puths) in your view.Nor [on the otherhand], do the unproduced have a self (=own-being),because they are not born, just like the sky-flower(kha-pupa).//140//Explanatory comment:An existent thing is not producedfrom itself because it is already existent,just as purua of Sathkhya theoryis not produced from itself. Nordo the31unproduced things have themselves, because they have not been produced, justas the sky-flower.Whatever exists in our world does not arise from itself both because suchorigination would be purposeless and because it entails an absurdity. Therewould be no purpose in the repeated origination of things which are in existencealready. The absurdity is this: if something exists it would not arise again and yetthere would never be a time when it was not arising. For example, it is clear thatcurds are produced from milk. It, however, is not admissible even in oureveryday world that curds are produced from curds themselves.Further, entities are not produced from entities themselves becauseentities are things which already exist, just like “purua” (one of the twosubstantial principles) which Sarhkhya admits as a real, unchanging, unevolvingentity.On the other hand, what is not arisen cannot be said to exist, just like thesky-flower which is only an imaginary flower.According to TJ, the reasons (hetu) “because it [already) has itself’ in verse139 and “because they are [already] existent” in the verse 140 are conventional.From the standpoint of the highest truth entities do not have own-being.--cU-If (c4II ZfT 3T{4-lclNII I I 3WlIdtisft“--M1T Jj:II99IIIf you say that ‘there is absence of sky-flower’ means ‘thereis sky, etc.’ stillthat sky, etc. is not the sky-flower. Hence, we do not havea deficiency(nyanatd) even in [this] alternative (paka).//141//Explanatory comment:This verse is an elaboration with regard to the example(drtãnta)whichBhã-viveka advanced in v. 140. According to TJ, the Sathkhyaschool points outthat there are various interpretations regarding the sky-flower: i.e., “the flowerin the sky,” “the flower which comes from the sky” or “the flower of the sky.”etc. From this standpoint, they counter that there is no proper example tosupport Bhä-viveka’s statement. Bhã-viveka, however, clarifies thatbyadvancing the example of “the sky-flower” which does not really exist, he refers32only to non-existence of entities . Therefore, he says that “we do not have adeficiency even in our alternative.”*i4-icI’I’ui ‘c’flc4.II. c11-Ifrn1 c1Iccili-tStE?.cIicl-Icc1 cIc1--1cIIcI46ct,ILJ47*-1Ic 3it’i’ii Ii ctic1,I’u1 .iIc 31c,l’<VI1TII9IIThe own self of an effect is [its] cause. The production of that (effect) isconsidered to be from that (cause). Therefore, of existents[which are theeffects], birth from themselves (=their ownbeing, thecauses), isdesired - if this were [your, i.e., the Sarhkhya’s] view,//142//[then,] because [thecause] is not different from it (the effect), like the self[of that effect], it would be no cause (i.e., cease to be acause).And since [purua pradhna etc.] are unproduced, what, itself beingcauseless, could be the cause of what else?//143//31IcHI1 tZ[JIçi5O-c-4--v:fl9UAnd, when the self of an existent [already]exists, it is useless to postulatea cause. “A” is produced from the same “A”, so the generator (janaka)and what is generated (janya) become identical (ekya).//144//46gccucms. KT: de las gshan mm471vi ms. KT: rgyuni48Ms; sic, KT: bras bu (=karyasya)49IvIIcI,1I,KT: rgyur brtag pa ni501c’1-1I ms. KT: de skyes na33Su1IIq1cMMIcI f[r f t To11151 Il9IllIf [what we have said above is] undamaging[to your position] becausemilk exists as curd, [then what we have saidis] not undamaging (i.e., iscertainly damaging) because of [the factthat] a father does not exist aschild.//145//Explanatory comment:In the above verses, Bhá-viveka points out identityof a cause and aneffect. If the cause is the effect, a pot would be produced fromthe pot itself. Oralternatively, the pot (i.e. the effect) would pre-exist in clay(i.e. the cause). Inother words, if a pot really pre-exists, there is no sense in claiming its arisingasecond time.TJ gives the following explanation of v. 145: It is notseen by anyone,anywhere and in any way that “abandoning the state ofa father, the fatherchanges to the own-being of a child.” A father cannot abandonbeing a fatherand therefore cannot be a child. Even though a child and its fatherhave a bloodrelationship, the father and child are not identical. Therefore,you cannot get ridof the fallacy that the generator and the generated wouldbe identical in yourview.-i-rBecause of impossibility of counter-examples (vipaka),it too would not beright to hold that the reason[in our syllogism] is contradicted. //146ab//1jIcI1 cjçII91EJIThus, there is this much that existents are notproduced fromthemselves.//146cd//511 f 4..* ms. KT: /gnos pa med pa ma yin no!34Explanatory comment:The opponent may think of finding a fault like contradiction(viruddhatt) inBhã-viveka’s remark in order to reject his criticism. BecauseBhã-viveka’ssyllogisms, however, do not leave room for counter-examples his criticalstatement cannot contain a contradiction.2-2 Non-production from othersIntroduction to verses 147-158The argument on non-production from others takes placeas acontroversy between Bhã-viveka, on the on hand, and the SautrantikaandVaibhaika-Nyãya among the Buddhist schools and the Vaieikaschool, on theother hand. While the Sathkhya and Vedänta seekto explain reality exclusivelyin terms of a conceptual pattern of identity andpermanence, the Buddhist realistsstate it exclusively in terms of difference andimpermanence. They assert thatthe cause and effect are different entities. Thus, theBuddhist realists and theVaiesika school advocate the doctrine of origination from others,i.e., thatentities are produced from entities which are otherto them.-nRi: cti1Icj qr-ti 1[{1119 I IMoreover, since it is not possible that own-being can exist, whatis desiredto be different from what? It is not thought that the horn ofa horse(vaji-rriga) is different from the horn of acow (go-rHga) and the horn of amountain (adri-.rnga)./ /147//Explanatory comment:If entities are produced from other things,there is a question “what isdifferent from what? In the ultimate reality, thereis no ownbeing of entities,that is, entities do not exist in the ultimatereality. Therefore, distinction ofentities is not proper for Bhá-viveka. In the aboveverse he says: since a horn of52O.“(bertter)35a horse does not exist, any attempt to relate it to the horns of others does notmake sense.t{.ij1’c’tLjII T’Ic:I-t1Q-1ct,I:ci IIIci U9IIIFrom the standpoint of the highest truth, the other causal factors (parepratyaya), such as the eye, etc., do not produce visual cognition, etc.,because they are different [from each other], just like the viralza grass, etc.(virazadivat)/ /148/ /ra-ii1-ct.,i’uiT53 q--fr‘irj icI(1qT[31 cII IT ZIQTT II9IIIt is not admissible that cognition of form (rãpa) has the intended eye etc.as its cause, because it is different [from them], or because it does not existbeforehand, just like a jar and woven cloth etc. [are not the cause ofcognition of form].//149//Explanatory comment:If, as the Buddhist realists and Vaieika maintain, the cause and the resultare different entities, and the cause produces the result, there is a deficiency. Theeye produces only eye-cognition (cakur-vijñãna), but it does not produce a grasscap, cloth or jar. A grass-cap, cloth and jar are produced from vIraia grass, yarnand clay respectively, but eye-cognition is not produced from them. An entity“X” which is different from an entity “Y” does not produce“Y” as its result.Accordingly, Bha-viveka maintains that production from otherscan not beadmitted.53sET: °cl,IU1,KT: rgyu can54‘jcc4Ig = ms363icii‘.j’çcr dcccj:55 Ii.4.flc31fT J1Q-ci1-I Wtct’dl-I fT dj.1ll10llAnd, the otherness of something unproduced is a conventional truth;[yet that otherness] is not [there] from the point of view of the highesttruth. Thus it is grasped that origination from another entity is notproper.//150//1cr c11 fT Ilrd 3id -.icIc1 3-T:[If you now hypothesize the arising of something that] is produced [but]is inexpressible, then [that] production is useless. Nor can therebe arisingof what is not arisen yet, [because] it is impossible, just like the sky-flower(kha-pupavat).//151/ /1I.11-IM41c’-icitc--qiu1IdI I31cI-W--I 31I-cflcI dcjc563[-j:IIl-3 .II[Now, if someone were to say that] what is in the process of being bornarises, there would be a similar objection (tulyaparyanuyogita).There is no birth of something inexpressible also, because it isinexpressible [as to whether it is already produced or it is not producedyetl,just as [there is no birth of] things other than it (theunexpressible).//152/ /Explanatory comment:The above verses make four points:(1) what has already arisen does notarise again. (2) what is not arisen yet does not arise.(3) what is in the process ofcoming to exist does not arise either. (4) something inexpressibledoes not arise.The points (1) and(2) are already explained in the preceding sections. Hence, Ishall explain points(3) and (4) here.ms56avãc[ya]+..danyavad= ms. KT:/brjod du med phyir gshan bshinno!37(3) What is in the process of coming to exist has both a portion of whathas already arisen and a portion of what is not arisen yet. As mentioned before,what has already arisen does not arise and what is not arisen yet does not arise.Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, having both that which hasalready arisen and that which is not arisen yet, does not arise.(4) Something inexpressible also does not arise. Something inexpressiblerefers to what is in the process of coming to exist, because it is inexpressiblewhether it is what has already arisen or what is not arisen yet. What is in theprocess of coming to exist has two portions, that is, a portion which has alreadyarisen and a portion which is not arisen yet. As mentioned above, what hasalready arisen and what is not arisen yet do not arise. Therefore, what is in theprocess of coming to exist, i.e., something inexpressible, does not arise.According to TJ, a barren women’s child is also included in other thingsinexpressible. Presumably, TJ means that the skin colour of the barren woman’schild is inexpressible whether it is white or black.r’F-dIc’-I cIIciT57 T€t’Ic-1: Ic$çc4’,cccfM1IN {T q-ll1-W.1Il-I t{q:H9iHFrom the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are empty asentities consisting of conceptual construction(vikalpita), because they arecreated, because they are destroyed (vinãa), like illusory water(=amirage).//153//Explanatory comment:The opponents maintain that entities are produced,because they areacknowledged as mentally constructed entities. Therefore, there are entitieswhich are constructed by cognitions. To this statement Bha-viveka objects. Hesays: in our ordinary world it is admitted that the eye is an entityand cognizesthe form or colour of entities as blue or white or black etc. Theeye, however, isnot a real entity in the absolute reality, because the eye is what is created or what5711: ms. Nottranslated explicitly in KT.38is destroyed, just as illusory water (suggested by TJ). Therefore, the eye is notreal entity.z{-?q-fjmT ÷ii.it IIc1-lQ-1I It9abIIBecause [a non-conceptually constructed entity] is denied in the same wayas the object to be proved, i.e., due to the negation of the mentallyconstructed entity, (sadhyatulyaniedha), there is no doubt[about thereason (hetu)] by the other [non-mentallyconstructed] entity.//154ab//r-tsf{58f4{çj59q{:U9I cdiiIcNII[iII-iccIi6O4TTtIcIIc4IcII61ii9abiiAlthough the entity maya (‘ultimate illusion’) is not mentally constructed(akalpita), it from the standpoint of the highest truth is thought to beunreal (vitatha), because of its being a cause of self-affirmation, just as it isfalse as an imagined entity.//154cd-155ab//Explanatory comment:The opponents state that for illusion there is something which we do notcognize. Bhã-viveka objects to this statement here. He maintains thatthe entitymaya is made by a magician, not mentally constructed. It is not, however, a realentity. It is seen variously by people. That is, one person sees the colour of it asblue, etc. Another person sees the colour of it as red, etc. Or,a form of it is seenvariously by many people. The colour or form of illusion is different from one’svalidation. Therefore, such illusion is not in reality an entity. (suggested by TJ)ms59cKc4cil ms60ms. KT:/la lahidod chags rgyu yin phyir/61 0311iiiims. KT:de ñid (tad eva, tattva)394clcII1 ?1Th*IQ I’-McII62II9cdIIBecause it is proved by a portion of what is experienced in the world,there is no deficiency of analogy(d.rtantanyanatt).//155cd//Explanatory comment:The opponents object again that if there is no non-imagined entity inillusion the mäyii which Bhã-viveka adopted as an example would not be properinstance. There is, however, something material for making an illusion behindthe illusion. That material can be the instance. Therefore, there is no deficiencyin this instance.-4[- Vi163T 3T{ T cIccidI64IT -1r4d--Or, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are devoid ofown-being, because they are created, or because they are destroyed, justlike the Buddha made by evil(mtra).//156//ZfTT {--Tt -IIciIQ-1i --TT’tsf çj65IcIc Z{QUIccl413T:ff1{ T U93’3IIThe own-being of entities is not own-being from [the standpoint ofthe highest] truth, because it is created, just like the hotness or hardness ofwater.//157//Explanatory comment:Here Bhã-viveka discusses the own-being of entities. What is assumed asthe essence of entities in our world is not the essence of entities from the62[i]ms63..iIc -iii ms. KT: dños ñid stoñ64ms65ms40perspective of the highest truth. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, theessence of entities, i.e., the own-being of entities (svabhäva), of an independent,eternal and unchanging substance, is not admitted by the Madhyamika school.Here Bhã-viveka does not define the own-being of entities, but it comes to meanthe non-existence of entities. What is made or what disappears does not haveown-being because such a thing changes in substance and hence is non-eternal.For example, to follow TJ, when water is boiled, it becomes hot water; whenfrozen, water has solidity, i.e., becomes ice etc. Likewise, when water is cooled, itbecomes cold water; at room temperature, it has softness, i.e., it is water itself.Therefore, water does not have an own-being; it is not an independent, eternaland unchanging substance. Thus, the essence of entities accepted in oureveryday world is denied from the standpoint of the highest truth..ciIc4.ic66f-iiciii1 c’-fltIZ1c’-Ic’1l1St* {cIc-I1I fl9-3IIIt is not logically proper that entities arise by themselves(i.e. by theirown-being). And it is not seen that [entities] arise through the state ofanother (i.e. as something else). Just as the arising of a cow in the form ofa donkey is not seen.//158//Explanatory comment:TJ: The cow which has dewlap, tail, hoof and horn etc.as its essentialfeatures does not arise as the donkey which has single hoofs and longears etc. asits essential features. Moreover, a cow is not produced from the cow itself.There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of a cow which is inexistence already. Therefore, origination from an entity itself is not acceptable.Origination as other entities is not acceptable either.66Iri=ms67tr114T*1ms. KT: gshan gyi dños por412-2-A. The criticism of the four pratyayas or conditionsIntroduction to verses 159-175The Buddhist Realist, Vaibhãika and Abhidharmika advocates thedoctrine of origination from others. In these verses, BhA-viveka refutesthe fourcausal factors which appear to have been drawn from Hinayanaphilosophy.According to Bhã-viveka, the Buddha taught that the existent doesnot appearout of the four conditions for people whose wisdom is covered by nihilisticornon-nihilistic views (suggested by TJ). For this reason, he recognized andproclaimed the four conditions only for the purpose of establishing the truth ofverbal usage.68 The Vaibhãsika, however, adopted thistheory as the real truthwhich the Buddha realised, and they maintained that entities are producedfromothers, i.e., four causal factors. The four conditions are: (1) primaryor materialcausal factor (hetu-pratyaya), (2) objective causal factor (alambana-pratyaya),(3)sequential causal factor (samanantara-pratyaya), and (4) dominant causalfactor(adhipati-pratyaya).69fqj 7O[jcjdl1Iq[%sfr71d72f73zj:II9IIThe production from others such as causal-conditions (hetu-pratyaya)isconventional. Accordingly, there is no contradiction with the theorywehave accepted. For they (the four pratyayas) do not truly exist fromthestandpoint of the highest truth.//159//Explanatory comment:The four causal factors are in general admittedby all the schools ofBuddhist Realists. Bha-viveka admits the four causal factorsonly from the68Prajñapradipa,p.27.69Cf. Abhidharmakotabhya, 2 • 61c-63.70pa[re]..+[nma] ms. KT: gshan las! /skye ba71o--ms. Ejima puts Tftrm{. However, this is metrically unacceptable.KT:gnod pa med!72ms73t ms. KT: de dag42standpoint of conventional truth. Bhã-viveka refutes each of the causal factors inthe following verses.2-2-1-(A). The criticism of the hetu-pratyaya or the primary causal factorIntroduction to verses 160-162Hetu refers to ‘primary cause’ or might refer to simply ‘primary’ or ‘root.’As the mind is a complex of a number of mental factors inseparably associatedwith one another, a hetu is only one of the factors constituting the mind just asaroot of a tree is only one causal factor of the constituents ofa tree. The hetupratyaya refers to the appropriate object of the mental process. When somethingis said to be the primary cause of another, that thing is said tobe the hetupratyaya.74r 1?r iI’1cItLjcçj--: cj:75I-cc7631c’iI 41qz{zJ: --j: :77II9E.oIIIt is not proper either that what exists or what does not exist hasa causalcondition, because of being in existence and not being in existence[respectively], just like things which are different from them[,i.e., whichare not effects].Alternatively, how can the causal condition of something which does notarise [really] be a causal condition?//160//See, S. Chaudhri 1976: 113.75°icvici: ms76cms. KT: de las gshan bshin77=3ik={T irzp zq: r1: ms, which requires to beread “...q lisq?m: f:, KT: rkyenma skyes/ /rkyen rnams su ni ji itarhgyur/43[: c4-cj,: 1cciIc1, -?.iccII- i1LIcIt:78 31cc4k1 79 1c-’-1c1II9E9IIThe cause is not what produces the result, because it is void of that(theresult), just like things which are different from them.Nor is what is about to arise produced from that (thecause), because itdoes not exist beforehand, just like things which are different fromthem.//161//‘1I’1Ici 1ii’1I°-(5fl 8O3T( IdIcI c1cd:82 9jThis (thecause) does not produce what is not produced, what is in theprocess of being produced or what is already produced, because of thelogical faults already stated83 and because [entities] do not arise.Therefore, there is truly no hetu [pratyaya].//162//Explanatory comment:Here, Bhã-viveka poses the question whether the four conditions are forthe result which exists or for the result which does not exist? There cannot beconditions for the result which does exist, because it already exists. For example,there is no clay seen causing a completed pot. Then, with regard to the resultwhich does not exist, Bhã-viveka asserts that there are no causal conditions,because the result does not exist. For example, there is no seed or water as causefor the sky-flower. Accordingly, the primary or material condition(hetupratyaya) does not exist.78KT:/skye barbdod pahan des bskyed min/ (napi tajjanmatotpitsub)79°1cvn1=ms80iiii.vi =i mri ms81aja.. ms. KT: ma skyes phyir82ms83See, vv. 151-152.442-2-1-(B). The criticism of the ãlambana-pratyaya or objective causalfactor.Introduction to verses 163-166Alambana refers to an ‘object of cognition.’ The lambana-pratyaya is theobjective sub-cause of the relation between the object and the subject ofperception. All the conditioned(sathskta)and the unconditioned(asathskta)function as the ãlambana-pratyaya of the mind and mental states(citta-caitta).84For example, a weak man can neither get up nor stand without the help of astick. The mind and the mental states can neither arise nor continue without anobject of cognition. As stick is a support of the weak man, an object is thesupport of the mental function.5r1t Ird qTZ{f:IWhat is already arisen does not attach itself to a supporting cause for,[then] the arising of what is already arisen would be in vain.What is not arisen yet also [does not attach itself to the supportingcause],because it is not produced yet, just like what has non-arising as itsnature.//163//Explanatory comment:The supporting object is the object of the mind and mental functions. Thatis, when what is going to be the object of the mind and mental functionsbecomes the cause, the result, “mind and mental functions” arise. Therefore,Bhã-viveka says that what is already arisen does not attach itself to the object,because for what is already arisen such a cause would be again vain. In otherwords, cognizing the object, mind or consciousness does not cognize the sameobject again. For example, cognizing a desk, the mind orconsciousness does notneed to cognize a desk again as a desk.84See, S. Chaudhuri 1976:1 14.85= arambaiã° ms. KT: dmigs45Moreover, what is not arisen yet does not attach itself to an object becauseit is not produced yet. For example, the eye of the barren woman’s child doesnot attach to an object. (TJ available).:z:tiii--f86r-i iII9EiII[If one says that] what is in the process of coming to exist would attachitself to [the supporting cause], that [attaching] does not exist withoutsupport (ãlambana). The inclusion of the action of being born in that whichlacks some parts is not desired.//164//Explanatory comment:What is in the process of coming to exist does not attach itself to an object,because it has the nature of both what is already arisen and what is not yet toarise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming into existencedoes not havethe function of cognition of objects.3TT IT r-Mfcl -iii89-i1 Içjcç9Occ1.iIciicifT c1II9EIIAlternatively, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that there issupport for the mind and mental functions(citta-caitta) is not acceptable,because it is something in the process of coming into existence, or becauseit is something to be perceived (grahya), justlike a form (rãpa).//165//86= äramvaxath ms. KT: dmigs pa87°yä° added under the line in ms.88°athgasya, ms89= aramvanam= ms. KT: dmigs pa90clcvIcItms46Explanatory comment:From the standpoint of the highest truth there is no object in the mindand mental functions because this mind and these mental functions themselvesare what is to be perceived, just as form, color etc. are what are to be perceived.In other words, they are identical from the viewpoint that both are in the processof coming into existence, that is, they are not completed yet as themselves.Therefore mind and mental functions do not have an objective sub-cause(alambanapratyaya).f*r,1c1-j 31Ic51- 1i-flcUci94f*5 1ic’5195 -T1II9EEIIMoreover, [if one were to say that] what has a support(sttlambana) would[attach to the object], it would not be proper because of the absence ofdifference of time (kãlThheda). Thus, since the object does not exist, whatcould be the object of what?//166//Explanatory comment:The opponents maintain that what has a support, i.e., mind and mentalfunctions, attach to the object. Bha-viveka, however, objects to this statement. Ido not fully understand what Bhã-viveka says in this verse. His objectionprobably means: just as the right and left horns of a cow come out at the sametime, ‘the mind, and mental function’ and the object arise at the same time.Therefore, discrimination of what is grasped, i.e., the object, and what grasps,i.e., the mind and mental function, is not proper. In other words, what arises atthe same time cannot be either what grasps or what is grasped. Accordingly,there is no object, so anything cannot be the object of anything. (suggested byTJ)91jiui[]ms. KT: dmigs bcas pa92tms. KT: dus gcig phyir na93i 3P1’ ms. KT: de mi run94=3j,4.c4uIT° ms95ms472-2-1-(C). The criticism of the samanantara-pratyaya or the sequentialcausal factorIntroduction to verses 167-169Bhã-viveka criticizes the idea of the sequential condition(samanantarapratyaya). The sequential condition appears to pertain primarily to theproduction of mental events. It may be taken to refer to the extinction of theimmediately preceding moment of consciousness which engenders thesucceeding mental state. In other words, the sequential condition may refer tothe immediately preceding extinction of a cause, like a seed, which allows for theemergence of the effect, like the sprout.1I’1Id1 t[sfi --i.icic1 31’.1IIcB Irrsf{IZTTU93IIWhat is not arisen yet is not blocked, because it has not arisen, just like thesky-flower. What has already disappeared is not blocked, because ithas already disappeared, just as in the case of a dead person.//167//Explanatory comment:The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what is not arisen yet.What is not arisen yet has no disappearance, because it has had no arisen state,just as the sky-flower does not disappear.Moreover, the sequential condition cannot be the condition of what hasalready disappeared. What has already disappeared has no disappearance,because it has already disappeared, just as a dead person does not die.9641IQ-IIL.,: 1ctci-ffi 1:II9EIIWhat has not disappeared yet is not[blocked], because it has notdisappeared yet, just like a lamp (pradipa) that is existing.That what is in the process of disappearing disappears is not desired,because of the refutation already stated.//168//96ms48Explanatory comment:The sequential condition cannot be the condition of whathas notdisappeared yet. What has not disappeared yet has no disappearance, becauseithas not disappeared yet, just like a lamp which is still existing. Thatis, what hasnot disappeared yet refers to what is existing. Something existing does notneeda condition of arising.de1-c4,tc51 ?fTTii -*i sf T *L IIc4-ci197 f .111Iu1cciIQ-inti- -Ricici II9EU98Even then (tathãpi), [what is in the process of disappearing and what isinthe process of coming to exist] would be simultaneous(tulyakala) ortemporally separate (bhinnakäla). [In anycase,] it is not, like the finalmind of an Arhat (arhaccarama-cittavat), justified because of its beingin theprocess of disappearing.//169/ /Explanatory comment:In the case of what is in the process of disappearing the condition is deniedin the same way. The opponents, according to TJ,maintain that what is in theprocess of disappearing supports the arising of that whichis in the process ofcoming to exist. Accordingly, what is in the processof disappearing is thesequential condition. To this assertion Bha-vivekaobjects that the sequentialcondition, i.e., what is in the process of disappearing, isnot a sequential conditionof what is in the process of coming into existence, because whatis in the processof disappearing and what is in the process of cominginto existence would besimultaneous. Or, even if they are not simultaneous,a sequential conditiondefined as what is in the process of disappearing is nota condition. In otherwords, that which is in the process of disappearingcannot be the condition of the97ms98Ms puts here another half verse: 1ci< 3Twzm: 1l-l.1.-d:/ Ejimasuggests that it isleft out in the Tibetan K and does not appear in V even in prose form.It might be omitted herefor the same reasons; it seems to be misplaced and hardlyinterpretable when we pay attentionto the context (k. 163-166: ãlambana-pratyaya, k. 167-169: samanantara-pratyaya),and the writer ofMs writes the word “alambaia” in “ãramvaia” in the precedingk. 163-166 while he writes itonly here rightly, what leads us to suppose that this half versewas inseted at a certain occasion.It might be, however, copyist’s peculiarity, and may not come fromBhãviveka himself.49next arising, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind.The final mind of an Arhat means that when an Arhat is destroyed, after the nextexistence (punarbhava) and transmigration (sathtãna) he reaches Nirvãita.Therefore, his mind does not produce the next mind (=nextlife).2-2-1-(D). The criticism of the adhipati-pratyaya or the dominant causalfactor.Introduction to verses 170-175Bhã-viveka refutes the dominant causal factor (adhipati-pratyaya). Thedominant causal factor assists the other in respect of the origination of entities,just as the three legs of a tripod assist one another, without disturbing the arisingof entities. Accordingly, everything can be a dominant causal factor (indirectcause). For example, water, earth, sun and warmth can be the dominant causalfactors for the growing of seeds.citcicit99 1Ic 11-1Icuc-TJ-rm 1 Thx1I-4-Ic1OO3T?[ jftitrf [f:U99°IIThe being of entities is not logically proper, because the arising of[entities] does not exist from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, just likethe existence of the barren woman’s child.Therefore, the dominant causalfactor is not accepted.//170//*I1T3TITi -i ri I9c-a’ Z1TUl11II99II[If one were to accept:] the dominant causal factor would be either withthe effect or without the effect.[The condition that] lacks [the effect] is not [the dominant causal factor],because it lacks that (the effect), just like the eye[sense] for cognition ofwords.//171//991rc4c1100°lclcms50Explanatory comment:Bhã-viveka says: the condition without the effect is not the dominantcausal factor, because it is without the effect, just as the eye-organ is not thedominant causal factor of the cognition of words. According to Abhidharmika,Vaibhãika, etc. everything can be a dominant causal factor. The eye organ,however, cannot be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. Instead,auditory consciousness can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition ofwords. On the other hand, the eye organ can be a dominant causal factor of thecognition of the eye. Thus, the eye organ and cognition of words do not haveinterdependence. Moreover, the eye organ without eye-cognition cannot be thedominant causal factor of eye-cognition, because when there is no result there isno causal factor. Therefore, the condition without result cannot be the dominantcausal factor. (suggested by TJ)lcc.UII1fjj1O2 Z{(:1O3Ic4,I104T4lc4I4N3{l II99IIThat which is not empty [of effect, i.e., which is coupled with aneffect]is not [the dominant causal factor] even on the conventional level.For such a situation is opposed(bädhikã) to actual experience (pratiti).Moreover, there would be no effect in the such a effect. And whatdoesnot exist for you would become the effect.//172//Explanatory comment:Something which is coupled with an effect cannot be the dominant causalfactor, because it already has an effect. Something which already has an resultcannot be a causal factor. Moreover, if something which already has an effect101(m,pi) ms102Mssic103KT:/sbyañ la sogs na gnas pa yi/ /rgyu tsam yod pa Lii tshela/ (KD, NP, VDNP, sic) In Vit is preceded by the following sentence :/mig stoñ pa shes bya ba la kun rdsob tu yañ gragspabi gnod par bgyur te/ /gan gi phyir she na/ /sbyan la....(VD, Dsa 98b5-6; N, 102b3; P.106a5), which, though not being a versified rendering of it, is connected with the pada ab in KSif we can rectify “mi stoñ pa” (aãnya).104=(k)[a]rye ms. KT:bbrasbu51associated with it, this could not be considered as the effect. It would pre-exsit,or something else that is not an effect would be the effect.i4-ir-t f -Iri1H31--1c1*I’ui[a:I3mTrq--Tt%i1 in’siiIf one were to say that the [latent] capability of the result (karyaákti) is theresult, how can there be a cause other than that (latent capability of theresult)? A relation of the recipient and the thing to be received(adharãdheyabMva) is not desired in the case of anything else [other thancause and effect].//173/ /zfrft -f1O5 zjjIici41O6 Rl3ff1O7t[11t 95flIf this [latent capability of the result] is just a synonym for the result, justas in the usage “there is a space in the space,” what could be admissable asthat (cause) with which that (result) is seen as associated.//174//Explanatory comment:The opponent maintains that the latent capability of effect is the effect andthat latent capability exists in the cause. To this statement Bha-viveka asks: Ifthat is so, how can there be a cause other than the latent capability of the effect.That is, if the latent capability exists in the cause, the cause would be unnecessary.Bha-viveka continues, moreover, by asking: if this latent capability of theeffect is just a synonym for the effect as in the usage “there is a space in thespace.” That is, if the latent capability of the effect is a synonym for the effect,the cause and the effect would be indentical. There is, however, no relationshipof place and what is to be placed. In other words, the usage “there is a space inlO5fri0ms106imt ms. KT: gal te de ñid107f ms52the space” does not make sense. Therefore, the idea that “the latent capability isa synonym for the effect” is not admitted.f[lO8:I1rdi:3:jj-ij: I11L1’d1o9H9’3IIBecause there is no arising of what is existing, what is takenas thedominant[ causal factor] for what? On the other hand, because what isnot existing does not have a cause, what is taken as the dominant[causal factor] of what?//175//Explanatory comment:The opponents state that the latent capability of an effect is what pre-existsin the cause. To this statement Bhã-viveka responds: if thecause is the latentcapability of the effect, what is the effect which thecause has? He, moreover,states that because there is no repeated arising in what already exists, how can itbe understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z?Likewise, because there is no condition in what is not existing, how can it beunderstood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z?Thus, Bha-viveka refutes the idea of the dominant causal factor even fromthe standpoint of conventional truth as well as from the standpoint ofthe highesttruth.2-2-2 The problem of the pratyaka and pratiti.1Ic1IE11Oj-;Q:ITftiT 1rfi ra‘j11 4eI ftrT I1081.1ci° ms. KT: skye ba (sambhava)1093T[fT]qft[1109ms. KT:/mñon sum dan ni grags pa yi/ /gnod pas539zj112rnt t?t 4Qr: U999flA possible objection (cet): An earthen pitcher, etc. are seen as produced.Reasoning (hetu) has no role to play in the case of what is perceived. [Ifyou use hetu,] the invalidation of what is actually seen (rta) and actualexperience (pratiti) becomes something that invalidates it.//176//By a knowledge which is similar to that of the ignorant person(balastlmdnya), the arising of the pitcher, etc. is perceived. We do not denysuch [an opinion]. Therefore, there is no deficiency (doa) pointedout.//177/1Ic1--1Ihl3cj[:--f ]ft{ccjçj:ll4f [-[JJ[115T1tPT dIrdd: II9’3HIn the ultimate analysis, a cognition which has form as its object (ãlambana)[and] is self-conscious does not exist. Hence, for us the “invalidation” bythat (direct perception) would not be an invalidation because that (directperception) does not arise [in the ultimate reality].//178//116T?1TZ{Tqii4a:31Id { r-Th II9’3IIFrom the standpoint of the highest truth, it is not logical that a cognitionof direct perception which is in accordance with the object should exist,because it is not distinguished (i.e. it does not really differ) from theknowledge of an ignorant person, just like the cognition of the circle for afire-brand.//179/ /112KT:/gan phyir de ni mihgogpas/ (=pratiiddhath yato nedath?)113°3TtLTmsms115çtn ms. KT: de yi gnod pa116pra....dhi ms. KT:mñon sum blo ni54ir -itrc.d 1c1ccII-3occ-q qq?timoII[The direct perception which has] that (form, etc.) as the object-sphereis not a really existing substance, because it is what is created, just like thecognition of ãtman. And, direct perception would not be a refutation forus because form, etc. are not really existingsubstances.//180//ç[j:ITIsfti1t’-i’17 t:Actual experience does not invalidate the thought coming from thewisdom of wise men. The word of people who are blind is not consideredeligible with respect to truth because of their covering ofignorance.//181/ /Explanatory comment:The opponents claim that Bhã-viveka’s reason(hetu) in his syllogism is notvalid because his reason would be opposedby direct perception (pratyaka) andactual experience (pratiti). In the syllogism, for example,“from the standpoint ofthe highest truth, a pot has no real existence,because it is what is produced (ormade), just like a cloth,” the thesis and example are reasonable. The reason,however, is not sound. For it is, by direct perception, seen and understoodthat apot is a thing which is produced or made from clay, water,a lathe, potter etc.Thus, for Bha-viveka’s opponents the reason in thesyllogism is invalidated bydirect perception and actual experience.On the other hand, for Bhã-viveka, direct perception and actualexperiencecannot refute his view. The arising of a pot, etc. isperceived by the means ofknowledge accessible to an ignorant (=ordinary) person. Direct perceptioncanbe admitted in terms of conventional truth yet not from the standpointof thehighest truth. The knowledge derived fromdirect perception, from thestandpoint of the highest truth,does not correspond to its object. For example,55seeing the revolving fire brand, an ordinary person cognizes it as a circle, whichit is not.Likewise, actual experience cannot refute Bha-viveka’s syllogism either.The word of people blinded by ignorance cannot be admitted as truth. That is,since people are affected by ignorance, their so called actual experiences are notacceptable as superior means of knowing from the standpoint of the highesttruth.2-2-3. The criticism of the theory of the Sãthkhya systemIntroduction to verses 182-191.According to TJ, in these verses Bhã-viveka discusses the doctrine of “preexistence of the effect in the cause in a potential state” (satkaryavada). He,however, has already criticized this doctorine in verses 139-146(the section of“non-production from itself”). Instead, it seems Bhä-viveka is actually referingto the pradhäna (primary matter) and pzrua (pure consciousness) which theSathkhya system advances as the cause of all phenomenon. According toSathkhya philosophy, these two are independent existences and ungeneratedexistences. Bha-viveka criticizes this idea.T??t sfjij-11T41E?. [(:ffi Th-4-I 1 I ‘4118Iia T {T *i-i,QqjIj1? 119tFTII9IIIt is not acceptable that there is arising of what already exists. What is thepoint of the arising of what already exists?If one answers: there is grossness (sthaulya)[as new element when aneffect comes about, we reply that then] the effect does not exist[in thecause] because of the impossibility of grossness (sthaulya) in the previous[cause] state. //182//118KT:/yod pa ci phyir skye barbgyur/(Eng. tr. Why does what already exists arise?)119sth[au](lya)sya° ms56f*q, tpf j:f{ {-‘ tj ci I311cIcçl2°qe c4,U1ccjIc vII[ -‘1c4-cccI U9(.IIMoreover, what [we consider] the grossness of the eye is not createdbyits causal conditions (=causes), because it (grossness) does not existbeforehand, just like a pot, or just like the purua, because it (grossness) iswhat is to be known (jñeya).//183//Explanatory comment:The opponents state that there is grossness of an effect in a cause. To thisstatement Bhã-viveka objects: Because there is no effect in the cause, there is nogrossness in the previous cause state. For example, there are no thicktrunk orrank twigs etc. in a seed of a fig tree. (TJ available) Bhã-viveka continueshisobjection. The grossness of something is not created by its causes. For example,a pot is not made by grossness of the pot. The grossness of the pot does notexist beforehand. The pot is made by clay, water etc.1‘1cjc’LII 3T141%i:’2’ I1kI ttSf{ ot’cjRc 3i- H9HIn the conventional [truth] we (also) generally accept the experiencer,etc.(bhoktrãdi). Hence, the deficiency (doa) of the analogy(drtanta) does notoccur any where here (i.e. in the precedingstatement)./1184//Explanatory comment:The Sathkhya system claims that you cannot use the ‘experiencer’as ananalogy when you do not accept the existence of an experiencer.Bhã-viveka,however, admits the existence of an experienceras a general convention.Therefore, there is no deficiency of the analogy inBhã-viveka’s statement.120oç1ms121j:ms573T1rR 31c’Ii fj[oy ZjQ[t{T Er: Tf1o.1[f-d:tItz:II9II.icc’Lu[:1122IrcA,L1(1-rd rdi1tit stjT Il9(IIIf [the Sarhkhya] were to say: “there is no deficiency [in our claim]because of manifestation (abhivyakti) (i.e. what we are speaking about isreally manifestation of the effect, not new physical creation),”[we ask:]for instance what is manifested by what? [If the Sathkhya replies that]“for example, by means of [the light of] a lamp, a pot [is manifested],” [wesay] no. For this is manifestation of what exists already.//185//Even on the conventional level, [it is obvious that] by means of a lamp, apot is joined with the light, or the perception of that (i.e. pot) is created, orthe arisal of something opposite [to light, i.e. darkness] is created.//186//Explanatory comment:The Sathkhyas maintain that the existent does not arise, but simplybecomes manifest. To this statement Bha-viveka asks what is manifested bywhat? If a pot is manifested by means of the light of a lamp, it is not proper,because a pot is what is already arisen. Therefore it is not admissable that whatis already arisen manifests itself. Only the features of a pot are seen by means ofthe light of a lamp. A pot itself has been existent before the light is turned on.Therefore, the unmanifest, i.e., pot, etc., does not become manifest.--31°’-1°IcicIki {-‘-I1cid Irrir uuThe unmanifested (abhivyakta) is not manifested, because it is nonmanifested (i.e. is a non-manifested) principle, just like the sky-flower.Or, from the standpoint of [the Sathkhya] himself, [we] could point out[the following disproving anology]: just like the experiencer and theprimary material cause (pradMna)./ /187//122sathvrty=a..i...dipena ms. KT:/kun rdsob tu yañ mar mes ni589 T [-1?1t-i’c1CiI1IciT ci 9 T IcJIi 3ZR oct’dccj123fii II9II[Further objection against the Sarhkhya:1 If that [experiencerl also ismanifested, the experiencer would be neither omnipresent (sarvagata),causeless (ahetu), or sentient (cetana), and its unmanifestness (avyaktatva)would be lost.//188//ctjji.u(jZfTt q.19:Ioc4J9cJu1124 f%T(II9II125[If you were to admit the above, then] your pradMna would becomesomething transformed and a result. By nature it (pradhãna) would bean individual [effect]. [But], how can it have unchangeableness (avilqti)when [it, pradhanal is a result?//189//Explanatory comment:Bhã-viveka maintains that what does not exist does not become manifest.The sky-flower, for example, is not manifested, because it does not exist. ThenBhã-viveka refers to pradhana and purua considered as always (i.e. already)existing. Considering that both a pot and pradhana or purua are what alreadyexist, he objects that the unmanifested does not become manifest, because it isnot manifested (i.e. is an unchanging existent). If what already exists, i.e., purua,becomes manifest, it would not be purua which has characteristic ofomnipresence, etc. and its unmanifestness would be lost. Bhã-viveka, moreover,maintains that if pradhana becomes manifest, its omnipresence, etc. would be lostthat is, pradhana would be the manifestor of itself. Therefore, the unmanifestnessof both purua and pradhana would be lost.123=avyaktathtvan=ca ms. KT: nii gsal ba yan (avyaktatvath Ca)124vyakti+++..pena ms. SG: vyakti+++rupel)a. The restoration above is Ejima’s provisional.KT does not translated ‘svarüpena.’ I translated this verse based upon my understanding.125The Tibetan editions are based on a Sanskrit text slightly different from our ms. KT says: Ifpradhana is manifested, your pradhana which is an effect and which is changed would bemanifestation. This [idea] is not accepted.)59o’L1o.,1Ct,I‘-1’-1 1 ‘1 1o-iolI1{fl 126IcIIc1’-It1T II9°llIt is thought that “Xl,” “X2,” “X3” etc. are the manifestors of “x’,” but theyare not admitted [by us] as manifestors of “Y,” because of the reasons‘being of the cause’ (kãraizatva), etc., just as thread, etc. [are not manifestorsof] yogurt.//190//c1-ccI 3ff[ ck’d--1rd t{ I(dccflI--II-I( IZ{{:1281199911If [the Sathkhya] were to say that “because the thread, etc. have a latentcapability (akti) for [producing of] that (yogurt), your example isdeficient,” [we reply that] that is not [so]. For they (the thread,etc.) arenot the manifestors of that (yogurt) as thread, etc. .//191//Explanatory comment:The Sathkhyas think that Xl, X2, X3 etc. are the manifestor of somethingY. Bhã-viveka, however, does not accept this idea. Ido not fully understandwhat Bhã-viveka says here. Bhä-viveka probably means: forexample, yogurt isnot made by thread, etc. Yogurt is made by milk. Therefore,thread, etc. cannotbe the cause of yogurt. In other words, thread, etc. are not manifestors ofyogurt. Even if the thread, etc. have a latent capability of producing yogurt,theycannot be the cause of yogurt, because the thread, etc. cannot bethe cause ofyogurt as the thread, etc. themselves. (suggestedby TJ)126ygoj,ims. KT:/de dag de gsal byed mibdod/, cf. K. l9lcd.127i.’-ioi,i ms128In ms follows a verse:;qj1k://Ejima suggests that it is the same with what appears once more as k. 193. Thismay be amisplacement in comparison with the Tibetan versions of K and V.602-3. Non-production from itself and others.Introduction to verses 192-193.There are those who, like Jams, maintain thatcause and effect are bothidentical and different. That is, they claim that entities are produced bothfromthemselves and others. For example, in the case of the productionof a gold ring,cause and result are both identical and different. Inasmuchas the gold ring isproduced from gold, it is produced from itself, i.e., cause and effect are identical.Nevertheless, inasmuch as causes like an artisan and heat arealso required forthe production of the effect, however, the gold ring is produced fromothers.That is, the cause and effect are different. Therefore, the causalrelation is one ofboth identity and difference.[jq 129{ 1 It1T -T1sft1 [tcjd: q: nnProduction from neither itself nor from somethingelse is acceptable. Noris the [production of] an entity which exists and whichdoes not existacceptable, because a statement speaking of both[possibilities as the onerefered to just now] which has already been examinedin the proper way,[and rejected] is inexistent [cannot be entertained].//192//Explanatory comment:Bhã-viveka claims that the idea of “productionfrom both itself andsomething else” should be negated by the aforesaid twosyllogisms, i.e., thesyllogism about non-production from itself and thesyllogism about nonproduction from others, because here “selfand others” is nothing but acombination of “self” and “others.”129svaparasyan=na=[nm]=etath ms. KT:/bdag dan gshan las skye ba dan/I mibdod/130c=asadasadatmanab ms. KT: bdag flid yod dan med61[cti4i131[.<-ic1ci lcI[[-T: fl9II’2Even on the standpoint of conventional level it is not desired that theeffect is manifested by its conditions, because an effect follows the changesof that (cause) , just as [manifestation of] a pot through soil, etc.(md).//193//Explanatory comment:Clay, for example, is a cause of a pot. In other words, a pot is an effect ofsoil. The pot, however, is not manifested by soil, because when the potproduced, soil itself has been destroyed. Accordingly, the effect, i.e., the pot, isnot manifested by its cause, i.e., soil.2-4. Non-production from ahetu “without cause”Introduction to verses 194-195Some thinkers, like nihilists, proclaim that entities are produced withoutcause. In the following verses Bhä-viveka criticizes their view.jc’-iiR.i f i -IM1331i1i1134-Lidiic1ffitk”Tc4cfII91IIEven from the standpoint of conventional [truth], it is not desired that theeye is produced from nothing, because it comes to be associated withuniversality (sumanya) and particularity (viea), just as in the case of pot.(kua).//194//131Ms here reads “kamasya” instead of “krasya” in verse misplaced after k. 191. See. thefootnote 140.132This verse is the same with the superfluous one that is misplaced just after k. 191.133=31r1i?a1=ms. KT: gb bur134*iI1I-l ms62c4,I4ccUcI135fk[itici RvII1-k1: If-qz{- qiqf 136Th1ic f1 rii II9IIMoreover, because it is a result, because it is produced in a [specific]sequence, because it can be destroyed [later], because it can change,because there is regularity of cause and causal conditions, and becauseit comes into existence -- this is what one should notice.//195//Explanatory comment:The assertion of a production without cause means that it is no longerheld that the result is produced from a cause which is itself or that the effect isproduced from a cause other than itself. In other words, the effect is producedby chance. Those who assert that entities are produced without causes admitonly perception, and ignore the causality. For example, a pot possesses bothuniversal features (sämnya-lakaza) and specific features(sva-lakai.za). That is tosay, a pot has hardness, etc. Hardness, etc. are generally known as the featuresof the pot. The pot also has colour, design, shape etc., which are specific features.As long as a pot has universal features and specific features, it has causality, thatis, it is produced from causes. Besides the two features, Bhã-viveka mentionsother features of entities in verse 195. (my own understanding)Here, the qualification, i.e., from the standpoint of the highest truth, is notadded to Bha-viveka’s syllogism refuting the opponent’s assertion. Probably,the intention of this section is that causality should be examined. Therefore, itmight be pointless to discuss the production without cause from the standpointof the highest truth.2-5. The criticism of LokãyatasIntroduction to verses 196-214Those who, like the Lokãyatas and ãjivikas, do not concede the existenceof a next life, and deny the result of an action, consequently negate the necessary135q,14ms. KT:/ hbras bu yin phyir rim skyebi phyir/136ms. SG: hetupratya(ya)naiyamyaj=, KT:/rgyu rkyen ñespabi phyir dannil63causal ground for the existent, and assert the production of entities withoutcause. In the following, Bhã-viveka attacks them.çç-1-qfçLj-u-1371icicjTh38 1:-IIIIccic?ITh1QT *uj139 cN$ccflclfi 41c14-III9EIIf,UjLJ-UIfio1Iq ZJTIQflts-1I m-qi II93IIOne might say: it is not thought that a clay ball(ivaka)’4°which hasdisappeared due to another’s arising is produced [again], because it isalready destroyed, or because it is a result, just like a pot (ku1a).//196//Just as a pot which has disappeared as a pot is not produced,a clay ball isnot produced, if this is what you mean (abhi.ta), then[by this statementof yours] nothing but something desired [byus] is proved.//197//Explanatory comment:Here, Bha-viveka points out the opponent’s contrariety of syllogism. Bhãviveka says that the statement of the opponent proves whathe (Bhã-viveka)wishes to prove. That is to say, the statement of the opponent ‘it is notthoughtthat a clay ball which has disappeared due to another’s arising (=arisingof a pot)is produced again’ cannot be the objection forBha-viveka’s idea.r- rdIiiu ieizif-i-.uRciiII9cII137ms138KT:bjim gon (the Sanskrit equivalent of which would be mrt-pii4a).139140According to M. Monier-Williams 1899, this word means(1) an idol or image of iva (2) apillar or post to which cows are tied(to be milked or for rubbing against). According to St.Petersburg Wörterbuch, the word means(1) em Idol civa’s (2) em Pfal, an den eine Kuhgebunden wird oder an den sie sich kratzt. Thus, according to the dictionaries consultedtheword does not have the meaning “soil.” However, the Tibetan translator uses the word“bjingoñ.” From the context, his gloss should be taken as meaning “soil.”64Now, if [your reason “because it is already destroyed” in v. 196 means:‘because its] cause has already been blocked,’ there would be contrarietyof reason (i.e. you would be giving a reason opposite to what you wish toprove). Or, if your reason means: ‘[because] what has not been destroyedyet [disappears] as a continuous existence,’ your reason would beinconclusive (i.e. you will not be able to point out a definite, specificcause).//198//Explanatory comment:The opponents explain the meaning of reason(hetu) in verse 196.However, even they try to explain or to interpretate the reason ‘because it isalready destroyed’ in various ways, they cannot prove their opinion. It is thefact that what is already destroyed is never produced again, therefore, thereason which the opponents advenced does not make sense.3Tfta 1PT 3-i 1ci--:141IThe cognition (buddhi) which has just been blocked exists in the cognitionthat begins within the womb (garbha), because it becomes different withthe distinction of what is to be known (i.e. of the object), or,because it is a cognition (dhitva), just like the cognition later than that(i.e. just like a subsequence cognition).//199//-T1\ 142?p zf-143 Z{[OOflBecause of the difference of object, the identity of ‘X’s cognition of anexpression and cognition of a form is like the identity of two persons withdifferent continua (i.e. such an identity does not exist).//200//1413TftI kr: ms. SG prag=a+ntaraniruddhadhib.KT:/mñal gnas sñon rol blo la ni//mdun rol kho nar bgags blo yod/1421(1’: gshan phyir, “jñeya-” is not translated in KT.143ms65•cci’-i45 DfT dct,cci,146f IuI’.4T 11Z0911Therefore, there is an impossibility of an analogy [in verse 199]. Oneness(ekatva) of cognition does not arise. Nor does oneness of them [onaccount of the reason]”because it is cognition” arise, because [the reason]would be vitiated (vyabhicãra) by another [person’s] cognition.//201//Explanatory comment:I do not fully understand what these verses say. Probably this versemeans: The Lokãyatas do not admit the transmigration. The Buddhists,however, admit the transmigration on the conventional level. After a persondies, the next cognition of the person begins within the womb. It is not the samecognition with the cognition which the person had before his or her death. Thisprocess continues as long as a person is in the conventional world. Therefore, inverse 199 Bhã-viveka advances the analogy ‘just like the cognition later than that,that is, just like a subsequent cognition. Moreover, oneness of previouscognition and later cognition does not arise, because, as mentioned above, thecognition of previous life and the cognition of later life are different from eachother, just as the cognitions of two persons are different from each other.ri-r[ot41147‘1Ic 31 IIcIcItR Ird-I-- -d--cIr frI T [IThe non-believers [in the Buddhist’s message](nãstika) may say as follows:144iiç dii c4N TfZ ft: ms. KT:/de phyir pha rol phyir yan ni//dpemed par ni mibgyur tel which differs from the reading in ms.145ms146trr ms. KT:bkhrul par bgyur phyir ro/147ms. KT: mtshams sbyor med/66The mind of an ignorant person at the time of death does notattainre-birth (apratisathdhika), because it is a mind at the time of death(cyuticitta), just like the final mind of an Arhat (arhaccaramacittavat).//202//[In response, we say your] reason would be inconclusive (anaikntiJca)because of the mind at the time of death in the past (atitaccyuticeta). Andsince recollection of a previous existence remains, that[mind at the time ofdeath] exists also on account of the reasoning [already] given(uktaniti).//203//Explanatory comment:The opponents do not admit the next life. From this viewpoint,they statethat when a person dies, his or her mind does notattain re-birth, just as the finalmind of an Arhat does not attain re-birth. To thisstatement Bhã-viveka objects.On the conventional level, it is admitted thata person has recollection of aprevious life. Therefore, the mind at the time of deathin which recollection ofprevious existence remains.‘*- -°Ic-1 IQ--ci1: IiI[ccic1148 3fl4QR ?F51-l1°Z{QflULOIIThe mind at the time of death becomesa generator (janaka) of anothermind, because it has ignorance (sividyd), justas the mind of adishonourable person (anrya) generates that(another mind).//204//Explanatory comment:As mentioned above, the opponents state thata mind at the time of deathdoes not produce the next mind, just asa mind of an Arhat does not produce thenext mind. To this statement Bhá-viveka objects:an ordinary person hasignorance, therefore, a mind at the timeof death produces the next mind. Thatis, as long as one who has ignorance, his or hermind is produced every time ofdeath, i.e., there is transmigration.148s(a)..[dyaltvad= ms. KT:/ma rig pa dan bcaspabi phyir/67q-4-riei:i1i-c-i:l49I150 ‘q’j[ q- ts3TIti 11flO(3fl[Thenon-believersmight stateas follows:]it is not desiredthat body,sense organsand cognition(arirendriya-buc1dhi)are producedby theirown action,becausethey areperishable,just like apot. Therefore,thenext worlddoes notexist. / /205//1c3qj152%:i53[However,what dowe Màdhyamikashave to dowith the viewthat]since“A” is generatedneither bythe same“A” nor byanother,the body (deha)is not producedeither byone’s ownaction orby thatof another.Eitherway wehave nothingto lose.//206//ii1i-iI(/iñ la sogspa dusskye ba//semscan las kyidbañ giste/)’541R°’3U[If onewere to say:body, etc are]not producedby theaction [ofhumanbeings],there is nosupportinginstance (nidarana)of your statement.[Ifone wereto say: thetree (Tib.:in, Skt.: vrksa),etc arenot producedby theaction ofhumanbeingsl, thetree , etc.are producedby the powerof theaction ofhumanbeings (akarmajanita).//207//(/semsdmyal gnasdan mtshondan dpagbdamin skyebshin/)’55//208ab//149n=estä=sa°ms150ms. KT: shigphyir151?1ms. KT: dema byas/1523-iIR4 ms.One aksarashould beadded for thesake ofthe metre.153The pada cdis differentin KT: /hjigrten ran gilas bskyed min//gshan bdined la dshiggnod/154The pada cdis left out inms155The pada abis left out inms68Just as the sword and the felicitous pearls arise in hell and heavenrespectively.! /208ab//Explanatory comment:According to the Lokayatas, human beings consist of elements of earth,water, fire and wind. While alive they are independent existences. After theirdeath, they return to their conglomerations of each element respectively, i.e., theelement of earth returns to the conglomeration of the element of the earth andso on. The Lokayatas, etc. claim that the production of a body has no cause andis a matter of chance. By contrast, Buddhism does not admit the production ofentities without cause. Bhã-viveka denies their statement “the body, etc. are notproduced from action” because they do not give a valid example. In this case,their example should be “just as a tree is not grown by the force of action ofhuman beings, but just consists of the elements of earth and water etc.” Thegrowing of trees however, needs the force of action of human beings. Withoutit, a tree does not arise, grow or bear fruit. In some cases, it might be that just asthe sword, which is a symbol of suffering, arises in hell whereas the felicitouspearls, which are a symbol of pleasure, arise in heaven. (my own understanding)How can a cognition which has completely different characteristics fromthose (=gross elements) (tadanyantavilakaiã) arise from grosselements?/ /208//31-cMI-IIc(156-jIdcicII-cIdI[1cjTf1 iii1I1I4icicI:157IIoiI[If one were to say:] consciousness (caitanya) seen [on the part of]unconscious gross elements is like the power to intoxicate (madaákti) or156cai+.., ms. SC: cai(ta)nyath. KT: es pa yod pa flid.157ir: ms69like the fire which arises out of the sun-stone (süryakanta), because it hasarising.//209//-Icrk 31-c-’Lflc158,IQ-(-j-u-Q-jcjIf15931-III-.cit160-iRi[You] still have deficiency of analogy [in your statement] because there isno consciousness in the ability of liquor. And there would be acontrariety of reason [in your statement] because non-equivalent kinds ofcause are used.//210//9f1I11ct’I11-IcIII1161162 jf-163diii 1R9911That internal gross elements (adhyatmikanibhãtdni) are not cognizors (i.e.cognition) is understood, because they have firmness, etc.(kathinadi),orbecause they are gross elements, just like other similar entities.//211//Explanatory comment:I do not understand what these verses mean. Probably these versesmean: As mentioned above, the Lokayatas state that human beings consist ofelements of earth, water, fire and wind. Bhä-viveka, however, objects to thisview. The elements of earth, water etc. have firmness, and they are grosselement. It is known that the firmness is an intrinsic nature of earth, not anintrinsic nature of cognizors, i.e., beings. Accordingly, earth, etc, which havefirmness, etc. cannot be human beings.15831cI4I ms. KT: es yod ma yin pas.159th ms. KT: khyod kyi.160Ms sic. All of the Tibetan versions:! rgyu rnams rigs mthun yinpabiphyir/ (=e Ii’cirU161boddhriiiti ms162KT: sa la sogs pai.1631iT f ms. KT:bbyuñba yin phyir.70ri-t-rI-id,flct)ccUdcc 164II9JITherefore, the wise man should understand that sense-consciousness(vijñtna) which begins within a womb, etc. is preceded by anotherprevious sense-consciousness, because it is one which cognizes, just likethe [sense-consciousnesses] which comes after it.//212//j: t-cIRjIci1II’I-çi[165I3111’1Qf 166L-cc1 ‘qj tuiF-:iI9tIA calf seeks food after birth because of earlier practice (i.e.habit) formedin its previous [life], because it moves for the purpose of [searching for]food, just like a full-grown sense organ (parftzatendriya).//213//1lct,I1dck,dI167IR 31 tILic5I1fT:168cIII-N’ cciI1 1I’-- 31I4Ic1I IR9?II[Our] reason [“because it moves for the purpose of seaching food”] wouldnot be uncertain(anaikãntika) due to the stone [which is moved] by amagnet. And [our reason would not be] incomplete because the eating ofthat (calf) is actually perceived(tadahdribhyavahti).//214//Explanatory comment:When a person is born, his or her cognition is produced, but it is notacompletely new production. The next cognition of the person is madeimmediately after his or her death. For example, a calf seeks food withoutlearning how to obtain food. That is, a calf knows how to obtain thefoodbecause of earlier practice formed in the previous life.164gra[ha]..÷....ddhavat ms SC: grahaka(tva)t=tadurddha(?rdhva)vat.KT:/bdsin pa yin phyirdebog bshin/165Ms sic. KT:/byun ma thag tu zasbtshol byed/ (=jätastha aharam eate).166TTQrms167ms168Ms sic. KT:/ khab ion gis ni rdo bskyod pas/.712-6. The criticism of acceptance of God, etc.cI cl’-otc*: IqTr-:9IIThe world is not made by God, because it is the cause of pleasure for[only] some people, just as the worldly lord who gives pleasure does nothave God as his creator.//215//31cc4Ic1693II {T fit o,l.uI1.1170lctII cf’IUIIR9EJIThe universe is not made by God, because the universe does not have acause, or because the universe does not arise, just as it is not desired that asky-flower be the cause of the universe./ /216//31’L1I1 ..zjdIcj’171 ci,iv1‘-i- icjc’Ic172 Z{Qffj’1tj II.9’3IIGod is not the ultimate cause of the universe, because he has a mind, justas a cowherd (gopa) is not the ultimate cause of the universe.//217//IIdNI t1sI*i c:-ct,cc4,: ct)[- 3{:IR9(.flAny individual is not the lord [of everything] because an entity isproduced by the totality (sãmagri) [of causes]. And, nothing has a single169°°added in the margin in ms170n=eo viva....+na[m] ms. KT:/dban phyug kun gyi rgyur mihdod/171Ms. sic.KT:/bgro ba ma lus bdi dag gi/ (aeasyasya jagat)172ms173%.iIci[’.1c: ms. KT:/ dñosrnams I3grub pabi phyir/17472creator. Therefore, [the reason “because it has a mind”] is notinconclusive.//28/ /ctce ccUcI’1lcI Itft’75 Ic1 -14i: II9IIIf [one were to say:] “that the eye, etc. have God as their creator isaccepted, because they are many, just like servants,”[we reply:] becausean unborn and single God has not been proved, established, Ivara wouldbe the opposite of that (i.e. of what you normally take God to be - oneand uncreated).//219//Rcicciic i1ci3rr-ruI17o ctdI177Now if [you were to say:] “that [the eye, etc.] have a creator isdesired by us, because they have been produced, just like a pot, etc,”[then in thiscase,] the ‘creator’ (kartd) does not have definite particularity(anirdistaviesa), therefore, you would be proving something alreadyproved [byus] (siddhasidhana).//22O//:Then, [if one were to refer to a‘creator’] with particular [features] such as‘eternal,’ ‘single’ and ‘minute’ etc., there wouldbe no logical connection(anvaya) in your statement. Further,[if you give an example “just like apotter for a pot,”] there would be an occurrence of a deficiency(doa) i.e.,that (Ivara) is ‘the uneternal,’ ‘the material’ and ‘the arisen’ in yourstatement.//221/ /175= ms. KT bdañ phyug gcig(eko io)176Ms. sic. KT: khyad par ma bstanpahi/ (= RilIT ft?)177I1 ms178° ms73179Ic4’I t?{ (ccii18O1iii1(T1t ULIIIf you were to say that as conventional truth, God is the action whichcauses manifoldness of the world called being and the receptacle(sattvabhdjana), then the proved is being proved (i.e. you will prove whatwe have already proved.//222//,-q[-qfl1(-LNIIIUIcI:Ict,I’UI-fl ft niiThus, with this (reasoning) one should reject [saying] that the world ismade by ‘time,’ ‘purua,’ ‘pradhana,’ ‘atoms’ (paramaiiu) or‘Viu’ .//223//Explanatory comment:Bhã-viveka maintains that nothing is produced not only by L4vara, butalsoby kla (time), purua, pradMna (ultimates in the Sathkhyas) and pramazu or by apersonal God like Vizu.. Some thinkers say that the whole world is producedby a creator such as Ivara (God). To this statement Bhã-viveka objects.On the conventional level, for the Mãdhyamikas entities which includesanuniversal world is produced from causes. They are not produced by singlecause, like God. Moreover, even the opponents refer to the God (creator) withqualifications such as eternal, single, subtle etc; they cannot prove production ofentities from the God (creator), because the God should be eternal, single, subtleetc. That is, qualifications to the God indicate that the God is uneternal, many etc.Therefore, the opponents cannot establish their opinion.179°ms180kar(m)=e÷[]=[c1(e)[t]=sa(th)vrtya ms. KT las//dbañ phyug yin na kun rdsob tuban.742-7. Drsti “view”Introduction to verses 224-229The theme here is the negation of the classification of eternalism(gtvatavãda) and destructionism (ucchedavãda).i-f1t181q182ff:IIc 311 c’.ilc 3{ i’IIUIf one were to say that “since from the arising of the Buddhas comes thedestruction of blinded vision. Therefore, likewise, the arising of senseorgans is desired.” [We say:] this is false answer (uttara).//224//3T1-1T 311c’il t’L1( i13T-lcWI183JfZIlTIRLIIWhen there is non-production [of entities] because of the non-existence ofthe process of time (adhvan), which view on whose part is desiredby us!(i.e. we do not propound any view for any one as real.) Therefore, thearising of the Buddhas [is considered tobe] an agent (kart) for making[people] understand what never came to be (i.e. the Buddhas come intoexistence in our view only to let people grasp that nothing come intoexistence).//225//Explanatory comment:The opponents state that because there is arising of theBuddha, there isthe destruction of wrong views. It means that because there isa cause, there isthe effect. Therefore, there should be arising of sense organsas the cause ofgrasping of objects. Bhã-viveka, however, objects to this statement. Arisingofthe Buddha is said for those who have wrong views, i.e., production of entities,etc. That is to say, in the ultimate reality there is no arising of theBuddha. On181ms. KT: sel ba.ms183°sya° added under the line in ms75the conventional level, the Buddha comes into existence in our view to let peoplegrasp that nothing has come into existence.3iii ta rT o-1V-I: I1{ ci4I 31IIck11-Il8431’I,% j’Icç3Sur6 LIr’L11lIJLEiIIf the non-god is not different from a god, how can there not bepermanence? If the non-god is different from a god, how can absence ofbeing cut off (=being destroyed) make sense?!/226/ /31cI1c Sfi4cç 3T[‘cxQ.jI185Sf{r-i d-1I’c 31rdc:Even if one were to say that there is ineffability[one cannot decidewhether identical or different], just like that of a pot, how could there bethe abandonment of extirpation, i.e., permanence? Even if one were tosay that [the identity] exists or does not exist, there is no passing over ofthe other in Nirvana.//227//Explanatory comment:The classification of permanence and extirpation denotes the same resultof emphasizing only one of these two in cognition, perception and inference.Therefore, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path because he was aware ofthese two extreme views. Here, Bhã-viveka shows the idea of the middle path inorder to deny the two classifications of eternalism and nihilism. Verse 227indicates the idea of the middle path. Bha-viveka maintains in this verse thatthere is no classification of eternalism and destructionism from the standpoint ofthe highest truth.184ms. KT:/des na ji Itar rtag mibgyur/ We could read this asiIclc” or rt r Tri” as in k. 228b, but here Ejima takes into considerationthe possibility of contrast between“anucchedah” and “aãvatarh”.185o—ms7631jcLII186?b-IviiIcii iIzIIIf it be the case that what has been blocked arises, how can there notbe eternal? If it be the case that what has been blocked does not arise,how can there not be propounding of nihilism?//228//cic-IIclcI:I?Icflc 3TcUc?tSince continuity (sathtna) does not really exist, how can there beextirpation and permanence? Since that (sathtcna) does not exist, thenon-arising [of sathtãna] from the standpoint of non-extirpation andnon-permanence (anucchedaavata) is proper.//229/ /Explanatory comment:Bhã-viveka says that nihilism and eternalism should be deniedbecausecontinuity does not exist. What does not exist, in other words, does not haveeither destruction or eternity because it does not have a beginning or end.2-8. Duikha “suffering”3f’1c1-1IcI’-I:q188ciIQ114-i-ii3T?T zif IIoIIjIcicI ?IThLllcT1 cRIIQcLW1 1189IiMc’-iIc:9?iz{?j:IR9IIIf one were to say: “the Buddhas taught dharma in order to secure nonarising of suffering. Accordingly, the effect (non-arising of suffering) of186or “3i.iiii Fii”.31.cL.uc1I ms.KT:/bgags pa skye ba med gyur na/187ms. KT:/rtag chad de dag ga la yod/188([]q ms189ms. KT:/gal te de ni skyehdod na/77that (the teaching of the Buddha) exists, arising of [suffering] is approved[by us].”//230//[In response, we say:] as mentioned before, that (suffering) does not arise,[even if] the arising of that (suffering) is admitted, non-arising of that(suffering) is not an effect. But comprehension (parijfii) of that (non-arising of suffering) is an effect of that (namely, the teaching of theBuddhas).//231//cflc<UUcI-[LI r’-1 It -iI II.flThat [result] ought not be self-made, since a thing does not make itself.And, because X does not have contact with Y’s action, it is not desired thata thing is made by an other.//232//—‘IdIT{191icd192Ifl.IIBecause of the impossibility of spiritual essence(sattva), etc, it is notdesired that suffering be born from its own continuity(sva-sathtäna). And,because it is not a real entity and it does not have distinction(abheda),there is no suffering in continuity.//233//Explanatory comment:One critic objects that the Buddha taught the teachings(dharma) in order toaim at the non-arising of suffering. This means the existence of the arising ofsuffering. However, even if the arising of suffering is admitted, sufferingdoesnot have arising as itself(svabMva). The non-arising of suffering, moreover, isnot an effect of the teaching of the Buddha. Correct understanding of the non190ms. °t has a virãma.191°ms1921cI°ms193ms. SC:dubkhariitan=n=api santateh, KT:/sdug bsñal de la rgyud kyanmed/78arising of suffering based upon the teaching of the Buddha is the effect. It is akind of effect but is at the same time transcendent.2-9. The examination of the BuddhaIntroduction to verses 234-239Opponents analyze variously the figure of the Buddha. They consier thatwhat the figure of the Buddha is or what the Buddha is. Hence, Bha-vivekaexamines the Buddha.c’..II[a-I:4TI-oMII f]Z{:I194siclcz1f(-jc4cj:1951cLiic-W[1i °Ic11 cici ?1[: I196{T 1{clI.df:197If [by you] are argued for, as real, the composite things (sathskra) the eye,etc. as undergoing production, because they are expressed by the term“sattva,” just like the Buddhas.//234//Then we say in response: for us (Madhyamikas), the Buddhas do not havearising as their nature (dharma). Accordingly, they (the composite things)do not have arising, just as they (Buddhas)[donot arise], or they do notexist [in the ultimate reality], just like the itman, or there is a possibility[oftheir arisal in conventional reality], just like illusions.//235//Explanatory comment:Humans are called sattva, and are beings who are made. This meanssomething which is made has arisen. Likewise, because the Buddha hasthename “Buddha,” he would be a being who is made, that is, has arisen. To thisview, Bhã-viveka objects by pointing out that the Buddha does not have arising194-ems196cI1cgI ms.KT: de skye yod mmte/197mayovadv=as[t]usambhavab, SG: mayo baddhãstu sambhavab, KT: sgyu ma bshinbbyun yod/79as his nature and is not identical with rupa, skandha, etc.. For theMãdhyamikasthe real Buddha is our phenomenal world.198The Buddha does not have anyown-being. This world does not have ownbeingeither. The “Buddha” is just aname, and is not an independent entity. TheBuddha is illustrated as a dream,illusion or figure in the mirror.199 In other words, the Buddhais just the name“Buddha” in the conventional world and does not have the name“Buddha” inthe absolute truth which is beyond false discrimination.Further, because theBuddha is not an independent entity, theBuddha does not arise. From this itfollows that the Buddha does not exist, and similarly entitiesin the conventionalworld do not exist from the standpoint ofthe absolute truth. Therefore,Bhaviveka says “just like the Buddha” that is,despite the fact that the Buddha hasthe name “Buddha,” he does not exist, i.e.,the Buddha is not real existence. Inother words, even the Buddha is dependentorigination (pratityasamutpada), justas entities are dependently coarisen. Therefore, the Buddhashould be examinedaccording to the theory of dependent origination.fc1cciIc scIc200I1it-i -‘i1Iccld IIIIBuddha is not rapa[from the standpoint of the highest truth], because it iswhat is to be cognized (bodhya), or onaccount of being something to beunderstood, or because he arises, like a clodof earth. And Buddha is notconsciousness, because he illuminutes others andhimself, just like illusioncreated through magic.//236//198tathä-gato yat-svabhavas tat-svabhävam idam jagat/tatha-gatonibsvabhavo nihsvabhavam idam jagat/ /22-16//(Prasannapada,pp.448-449).199Cf. Prasannapad1.p.289,P.436,p.449.p.540. etc.200KT:/gzugs ni yañ dag ñid duna//sans rgyas ma yin rtog byahiphyir//bkhor los sgyurbshin , and it might be restored as follows:rupath na buddho bodhyatvat tattvatacakravartivat/80-jd 1:2O1I1cciIc cuRi ‘icic1 IR’.3IIThe Buddha is not considered skandha, having form on account of beingaconglomeration of skandha (skandha-sathgraha), or because they have thenature of arising and passing away, or because they are objects ofcognition, just like for.//237//?I’1-ll 9TT-i-q2O2I1ItST-TT1T. 311c4-IclcI 1 QTT L IIIIWhen they (the skandhas) are destroyed, there would be deficiency that[the Buddha] would disappear, it is not proper that the skandhasbeBuddha. Because characteristics other than these of[skandhas] do notexist, [the Buddha] is not different [from skandhas]. And how could he belike the ãtman for us?//238//:c1cj 11Ic:ic-2O331cI-r.ccId1—cIIT[flfl9fl‘S \ -SBecause it can be refuted as before, he is not acceptable as someoneinexpressible and not a real entity. Or, how can his Buddhahoodbeacknowledged on account of being inexpressible like a pot.//239//Explanatory comment:Bhã-viveka negates the identity of the Buddha and skandhas. I do not,however, fully understand what Bha-viveka says. In Buddhism, it is said thatbeings consist of five skandhas in order to demonstrate impermanence ofexistent. From this point of view, the opponents state that existent which iscalled the Buddha exists. If something exists, the existent consists of skandhas,i.e., rupa-skandha (matter of form), vedant-skandha (perception), sathjñä-skandha201[ma].. ms. SC: matäh.202KT: sku (tanu)203yad=ghatav=apy= ms. °ya° and °gha° added under the line; KT: bum pa bshin du.81(conception), sathskära-skandha (volition) and vijñãna-skandha (consciousness). Forthe Buddhists, however, the Buddha is transcendant, nota being. Hence, theBuddha consists of five skandhas. For the Mãdhyamikas the Buddha is alsodependent origination (pratitya-samutpada). He is nota real existent. Hetrancends existent and non-existent. Therefore, it cannot be said that sometingand the Buddha is identical or something and the Buddha is not identical.2-10. Seeing pratityasamutpãda and seeing the BuddhaI c1-cIc1- I311çLflc:‘-jdUI oilBecause, as mentioned before, it can be refuted, it (arising of sense organs)is not desired that because the Buddha is seen by seeing dependentorigination (pratityasamutpcda). //240//I{l ‘ii+M204 i1cit1 I1c-iI-I ‘ii 31cid: Iii1 -r1:2o5II9iiWhat exists ,what does not exist and what either exists or does notexistdo not [arisel. There is no entity transcending permanence as wellasdestruction which is [produced] from the permanent or withoutcause orfrom this or from that. Both permanence andextirpation areabandoned.//241//204i-iii ms205n=ãpy=asmä=anasmac=cha° ms82ic1*fr1Tcl:206I1Tri cI I1’cr:207The arising is not what exists, what does not exist or what either existsordoes not exist. Therefore, what kind of [arisal] is it? How is a vision[oftruth] known from the vision[of truth] of that teacher?//242//cjI209 t-fI\iIt ‘-11 ?Rt{ [r’L1IRNTherefore, for one who maintains that entities have own-being(svabhävavãdin), the statement [“the Buddha is seenby seeing dependentorigination] damages what they desired. However, for one who[maintains that] the arising [of entities] is similar to the arising of illusion,[that statement “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination”] isproper.//243//d-N-”-IcNI’-UcI co-cctIa-lcj210f211-1’IRIISeeing the Buddha is something which belongs to lower truth(sathvtti).[It is said to come] from removing the dust of afore-mentioned deficiency[and] from lighting the torch of true dharma (saddharmolkäana). But this isa conventional [expression] as an assistance towards activity(kriyopakararüpa).//244//206na san=n=ãsan (c. viräma)sadasann=utpadadoab sa kidrab ms. KT:/skye ba yod mmmed ma yin//yod med ma yin de ganna/207ic1L1ms. KT: es par bya208ms209IIcçms. KT: de phyir (=tasmad).210ctI I1Ictms. KT:/smraspabiñes palii dri bsal bas//damchos sgron ma rab bstan phyir/211thrIi-c3T)831TiNicciIcIccII T[ (1-I11212311 ‘-1I1ic1”14213IRIIr4ff*i1qfkri-itOi[12143r1T? IIIEIIBecause what is similar to illusion never takes place is not truth, from thestandpoint of [the highest] truth, that (seeing) is not really seeing. It isbeyond inference (apratarkya), is indiscernible (avijñeya), cannot bedemonstrated (anirãpya), does not have an illustrative example(anidarsana), is without any mark, is devoid of any image(nirbhäsa), isbeyond mental constructions (nirvikipa), is beyond words(nirakara) andis to be awakened by the mind of the viewer (pasyato buddhiboddhavya)and is an act of seeing from the standpoint of non-vision.//245,246//Explanatory comment:In Buddhism, as is well known, it is commonly said that “seeingdependent origination” refers to “seeing the Buddha,” and “seeing the Buddha”refers to “seeing dependent origination.” That is, “seeing dependentorigination” and “seeing the Buddha,” are not different, but identical. Withregard to this statement, however, opponents misunderstand that when theBuddha is seen by seeing dependent origination, the sense organs, i.e., theeyeorgan, etc., arise. That is, as long as the function of cognition, “seeing dependentorigination” or “seeing the Buddha,” is taking place, the sense organ, i.e., theeyeorgan, arises. For the Madhyamikas, however, the idea that “the Buddha is seenby seeing dependent origination” refers to the fact that those who understandproperly the theory of dependent origination cognize the real Buddha, that is,the Buddha himself is dependent origination, or again, the Buddha andthe truthof “dependent origination” which the Buddha realised are identical.212ms. KT:/de ni de nid mthoñ mm tel21331r.1’1I1kii ms. KT:/brtag bya ma yin dpe medpa!214e—ms842-11. Conclusion?( ti iij:i’c?t r I31ck,11Ic215[(‘:{1 cII1o-i216 qJThus, in the highest truth, nothing is produced from itself, from others,from either itself or others, from both or without cause or produced assomething existing, not existing or as [existing] in other ways(anyatha).//247//I217ii-i10.1\31 ciRi -fl:Qq(218No entity is produced or manifested in any way from a cause suchas Keava (=Vishizu), Isa, Purusa, Pradhdna or atom etc.//248//?1( IR-5q-5 T-T5WtlT: IIIThere(=in the highest truth), [conceptual construction (kalpant) which]depends on own-being(svabhãva), function (küritra), what is to becharacterized (lakya) and characteristics (lakaiia) [does not arise]. And,[conceptual construction which] depends on identity(ekatva), otherness(anyatva) and function of either affliction (sathk!ea) or purification(vyavadna) [does not arise either].//249//215KT: rgyu med.216icciI’1.1 ms. KT: yod med ma yin.217°iuiT: ms. KT: rgyu las.2181:ms85Z{1c4,II-4Ici1k-4r219iiri i ‘IrIci ?IQnfl4-M-cI,.io-:22OAll mental constructions are in it as hitting with a whip or the act ofbeautiful painting or growing of seeds would be in the sky.//250//‘L1c1r IHc-cfrI IIRII?{T Ir4)RIdjd.ffff1[{JTIIL3IIWhen the eye-disease passes away, one whose eye becomes completelyclean and pure does not see the hair (keáa), mosquito (maaka), two moons(dvicandra) and the eye in a peacock’s plumage (ikhicandraka).//251//Likewise, when the eye-disease of darkness which envelopes what is tobe known and defilements passes away, a wise man whose eye hasbecome pure by means of proper knowledge does notseeanything.//252//1T‘:rcIIct222;j[tii;t 1tf223 4-q[pT[:224iJust as, one who is fallen into sleep might see a child, woman, palace,house etc. But the same person when awakened from sleepwould notsee [anything] there.//253//219KT:/tshon gyi ri mobi las dan nil220c,e-jIms221....9° ms. SG:°dvicandra°, KT: zia gñis dan.222I1cicç ms. KT: gñid dbañgis mthoñ gyur pa2233TrfmT ms. KT: kun rdsob es pa dag.224 Oqffij:ms86Similarly, one whose eye of intelligence is opened wakes up from theexpiration of the sleep of ignorance does not see those whichare obtainedfrom the conventional standpoint(sathvrtyddhigata). / /254/ /33ii1i.ji4 qqf2254IciitZJ’f33 ff{226‘.ii1i II.5lIqqfiqT 1iir-1-[T-ulN227IQFflJust as, one sees inexistent demons(bhüta) in the darkness at night. Asone whose eyes are open when the sun rises, he does not see[thosedemons].! /255//Likewise, one whose inclinations (väsani) of all ignorance(samastjnãna)are destroyed by the sun (ravi) of the proper knowledgedoes not see theobject-sphere of the mind and the function of mind(ctticaitasagocara)//256//Bhaviveka here concludes his theory of the “non-own-beingness”ofentities.225[41ifT ms. SG: tanmasi payati, KT: mun khrod na.226tfi ms. KT:/ ñi ma ar shin migbyehi tshe/227Ii.i(c. viráma) ci° ms87Chapter Three.ConclusionAs A. K. Warder says:228Nagarjuna’s main contention is that it was not the intention of the Buddhato set out a list of ‘ultimate’ principles or elements which in somemetaphysical sense ‘exist,’ still less to define their ‘own-nature,’ byimplication immutable.Nagarjuna formulated and established the philosophy of “emptiness”(áunyatã) upon the basis of the Prajñaparamita scriptures, etc. and the followers,Buddha-palita, Bhã-viveka, Candra-kirti, Deva-arman etc. inherited hisphilosophy of “emptiness,” and developed their own methodologies to defendit. Nagarjuna himself used logic. He generally used prasar(gaas often asdilemmas and tetralemmas. A follower Budhda-palita inherited prasarigaanumna but analyzed it into four prasariga arguments. For example, toNagarjuna’s statement“Not from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from nocause, do any entities ever originate anywhere,”229 (tr. by Ames 1993:233)Buddha-palita divided this into the following four arguments. He pointed out:(1) entities are not produced from themselves, because the origination of entitiesfrom themselves would serve no purpose and would lead to absurdity.Therewould no purpose in the repeated origination of what is in existence already; (2)if entities are produced from others, all things are produced from all otherthings; (3) if entities are produced from both themselves and others, the faultattached to the two preceding alternatives would combine in this thirdargument; (4) if entities are produced from causeless, all entities would beproduced from all things.Bha-viveka, however, raised an objection against Buddha-pãlita’sstatement. He maintained that Buddha-pälita’s statement was deficient, because228Warder 1970: 377, ii, 11-13.229na svato näpi parato na dvabhyath napyahetutah/utpanna jatu vidyantebhavab kvacana kecana//1 .1/I (Prasannapada,p.12.)88neither a reason (hetu) nor an example (drsttnta) had been stated. Besides, heclaimed that Buddha-pãlita’s statement implied the acceptance of the alternativeproposition, i.e., that entities are produced from others. Bhã-viveka, therefore,attempted to interpret Nagarjuna’s philosophy and his own philosophy bymeans of the independent syllogism (sva-tantra-anumäna) which included threeunusual modifications; adding the word paramãrthatai(from the standpoint ofthe highest truth) to the proposition in a syllogism: specification that thenegation in his syllogisms should be taken as “prasajya-pratiedha” (the negationof a proposition); and the condition that no counterexample is to be given.Candra-kirti, however, criticized the alternative mode of argumentadvocated by Bhã-viveka and defended Buddha-palita’s statement againt theobjections put forward by Bha-viveka. Candra-kirti argued that Buddha-palita’sstatement had no faults even though an independent reason and example hadnot been stated by him in his statement. Candra-kirti’s statement was that theway of prasailga was enough to refute the opponent’s opinions. Therefore, theindependent syllogism was not necessary.Later on, this controversy was considered as the origin of division of twosub-schools, i.e., Prasangika and Svátantrika, in the Madhyamikas in Tibet.Sthira-mati, a prasangika, and Nayaikas also criticized syllogism of Bhãviveka. If the modification paramtrthatai governs not only the proposition(prajfii) but also the whole syllogism, reason(hetu) would not be permissible,because all things would be non-existent from the standpoint of the highesttruth. If, on the contrary, the modification governs only the proposition and notboth reason and instance(drstãnta), then the subject in reason would have to beregarded as existent when considered from the standpoint of conventional level,while the same subject in the proposition wouldbe non-existent whenconsidered from the standpoint of the highest truth.230Using the svatantra syllogism, Bhã-viveka maintained a philosophy of“emptiness.” He, in other words, recognized the truth of logic which is foundedon perfect wisdom (prajnd) of the absolute, and that perfect wisdom manifestsitself by means of the conventional truth, i.e., logic.230See Kajiyama 1969: 152-163.89This attitude of Bha-viveka can be seen in the following passage from hisMHK:231After intelligence (mati=prajnã) is concentrated, one should examineby means of prajflä as follows: “There is own-being of dharmas, whichis grasped from the point of view of verbal usage.//3.21//But [while] analyzing with intelligence (dhi=prajfia), is this [grasped]from the standpoint of the highest truth?” If it would be so, this is indeedtruth (tattva). If not, he [stilli searches for [truth].//3•22//Then, for Bha-viveka what is the truth? As he says below, the non own-being ofentities, i.e., emptiness, is truth;2323T5TTR T iIc1:233234cIQ1I41 icciPç235ii.’u[The wise man] does not see that state in which entities have own-being,because own-being has not come into effect, or because there is no birththrough the very nature [of entities], just as he would not see an illusoryelephant.//257//ciRii-icii236cIIc12373TQT{ ‘T I1{{ 238j-p ff1ciIclc11TII3II231samähitamatih pacat prajflayaivath parikayet/yo ‘yam svabhavo dharmãi.äthgrhyeta vyavaharatab//3.21//vicaryamäIas tu dhiya kim ayathparamarthatab/yadi syat tattvam evayam ato ‘nya cet samrgyate/ /3.22!!(Ejima, 1980:272)232i ms.KT: dños fiid ma grub phyir/233msms. KT:/sgyumabiglan chen ji bshin no!. cf. k. 258c.235iif ms236°•qrms237°wims238°n=na° added under the line in ms90[Likewise, the wise man] does not see that state in which entities havesubstantial nature, because they (entities) have production,[i.e., undergoproduction] from the standpoint of conventional[truth], or because they(entities) have causes, just as he would not see an illusoryelephant.//258//i1i fI TzlQrRII’cI‘!\ 1:1-rnIiivj’t:II3llOr it is held that the cognition “entities do not exist”does not accordwith things as they really are, because it (cognition) occurs by means ofconceptual construction (kalpanadvara), just like a cognition whichperceives a tree as a human being.//259//35?tT -IIcIcl-IT fk?Pt1{:indnOr, an existent which is grasped by a false cognition isconsidered unreal,because it (existent) is perceived by knowledge (jñtna=prajflã) havingconceptual construction, just like the cognition in which“a filament of airis seen as water.”//260//-°-1T L4 I ?f I1F1ct-L1I 1:FI1:1cII II9IIThus (evam eva tu), through the refutation of a realas well as unrealcognition as well as object of cognition, for the wisemen, cognition(mati=prajna) which is beyond conceptual constructionarises as aconsequence of non-arising (ajatiyogena). /261/ /239ms. SG: na sa÷bhäva, KT: dños rnams med.240°qms91I’-icc1(1 TSI—ti -1iuif cjc -L1 ccjiPic4,cr’Uj241L4’jdcj f-jJ(:II.UIt is not accepted [by us Madhyamikasl that a constructionless state ofmind does not exists when one’s mind grasps ‘all dharmas are empty’ or’all dharmas are not empty.’1/262/!Z:--U --idi I(i.[:i?[itrI cI2423If{ j1cii4-i lI.EUEmptiness [on its part] lacks self in the form of emptiness, etc.Accordingly, the wise man does not see emptiness as emptiness.//263//tT-TTi1sf1-flcfiç1-flI31iø1ccic243{[Qff(-ic244-4: iiQEWiIEven the existent appearanceless grasped in a constructless cognition isnot reality as it is, because it (existent) is what is tobe grasped, just like thecognition that the moon in water is seen as the moon.//264//241+.[i]..[lpa] matir =a=estã ms. SC: (nirvi)kalpa matir=n=estä,KT:/mi rtog blo gros mi bdodmini242ms2433I1-ogcc4ms244c4ms92I3icr--Uciccii r-’imCognition (dhi=prajfltt) which is beyond conceptual construction, andwhich has as its object that object which is beyond conceptualconstruction is [considered] unreal, because it (cognition) has non-selfness,etc. (anttmddi) as its nature, just like a cognition having conceptualconstruction.//265//245 Lfl[ z[:i3Z(246drt247f:Because an object of cognition (jfleya) is not provedin any way [,i.e., sinceno objects of cognitions exist], those who know the truthunderstand thatwhere even constructiess cognition (dhi=prajnt)does not arise isunequalled truth.//266//As long as we recognize that cognizable entitiesdo not exist, that entitiesneither exist nor do not exist, that entitiesdo not have own-being and thateverything is emptiness, all such cognitions are false discrimination.The truth istruth where even cognition which isbeyond false discrimination, conceptualconstruction or any imaginations does not arise. Thatis to say, only by theentreme exclusion of any false discrimination,conceptual construction orimagination truth can be obtained.245*T{r]. . +.. I*ri ms. SG: jñeyasya sarvathäsiddhe, KT:/es bya rnam kun ma grubphyir/246ms247i° ms93Nagarjuna states as follows:248There is emancipation (moka) from the extinction of action and affliction(karmaklea). Action and affliction [are produced] from conceptualconstruction (vikalpa). They (conceptual construction)[are produced] fromdiversification (prapañca). But, diversification is destroyed in emptiness(anyata). (18-5)When the object sphere of the mind (cittagocara) becomes extinct, [theobject sphere of] the word (abhidMtavya) [would also] become extinct.Indeed, dharmahood (dharmati) is neither what is arisen nor what isdestroyed. (18-7)This is the characteristic (lakaiia) of truth which is known through others,which is quiescent (ãnta), which is not diversified by diversification(prapañca), which is beyond conceptual construction (nirvikalpa), whichdoes not have many meanings (anandrtha).//18-9//From the above statement of Nagarjuna, it is obvious that the importantpoint is the notion of “conceptual construction” (vikalpa). Conceptualconstruction is the cause of the arising of actions and afflictions, and conceptualconstruction is produced from diversification (prapaflca). Diversification isdestroyed by an understanding of unyatã. Bha-viveka’s statement regarding“conceptual construction,” on the other hand, is slightly different from that ofNagarjuna. Bha-viveka adds a remark on it as “knowledge of conceptualconstruction” or “cognition which is beyond conceptual construction.”Moreover, with regard to definition of anyatd, we come across the differencebetween the statements of Nagarjuna and that of Bhã-viveka. Theformer statesthat “it is dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) thatwe call emptiness.”(MK, 24•l8ab,p.503.: yah pratitya-samutpadai anyatã ttliñ pracakmahe/). Bhãviveka, on the other hand, states that “voidness(anyata) alludes to the248ka mak1eakayanmokah karmak1eä vikalpatah/te prapañcätprapañcas tu unyatayath nirudhyate/ /18-5/Inirvittam abhidhatavyam nirvrtte cittagocare/anutpannãniruddha hi nirväiamiva dharmata// 18-7/ /aparapratyayath äntarh prapaficair aprapaficitam/nirvikalpam anänartham etat tattvasya 1akaiam//18-9//(Prasannapada,pp. 349-372)94knowledge which perceives voidness without any grasping.”249It is the factthat Bha-viveka was a Madhyamika and a follower of the Madhyamika,Nagarjuna. In spite of this fact, Bhã-viveka’s definition of anyata is differentfrom Nagarjuna’s definition. Here too Bha-viveka refers to knowledge orwisdom (prajña). Then, how does Candra-kirti, a follower of Nagarjuna and aprasañgika, define anyatt? He quotes Nagarjuna’s statement above regardingthe definition of it in his Pras.250 That is to say, Candra-kirti exactly followsNagarjuna’s definition, and comments that “thus, the meaning of the wordpratitya-samutptida is the meaning of the word unyata.”25’Thus, we come acrossthe difference between Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, on the one hand and Bhãviveka, on the other hand. Here, it should be noticed, however, that there is noessential differences between them. Both Bhã-viveka and Candra-kirti are thefollowers of Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas. They both cognized that entitieshave no own-being (sva-bhdva), and there is only emptiness (unyata). Their finalaim was obtaining of absolute truth (tattva) and reaching Nirvãia. For theMadhyamikas, “unyatd” itself is absolute truth. In other words, byunderstanding “anyata,” obtaining of absolute truth is possible. To theobtaining of absolute truth, i.e., Nirvana, Bhã-viveka just recognized theimportance of knowledge or wisdom (prajna).From these points of view, I would like to assume Bha-viveka’s intention.Bhã-viveka followed Nagãrjuna’s philosophy as a Madhyamika and at the sametime, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “unyatã,” which is declared in“Prajñaparamita-sütra,” etc.252. That is to say, while Bhã-viveka followedNagarjuna’s philosophy, at the same time, he tried to restore the originalphilosophy of “unyata.” There are over two hundreds years separatingNagarjuna’s period and Bhã-viveka’s period. Therefore, Bhaviveka saw the needto demonstrate the true intentions of Nagarjuna and the philosophy of“anyata.”249Uryuzu 1985: 33.250Prasannapada,p.491.251evath pratitya-samutpada-abdasya yo‘rthab sa eva unyata-abdasyartha. (Prasannapada,p.491)252Kajiyama 1979: 114-143, 1989: 89-206 examined the relationship between philosophy ofprajna and philosophy of emptiness.95Logic itself belongs to verbal usage, and is not absolute reality. It is,however, impossible to state the philosophy of “unyatt” without verbalusage.Therefore, Bh-viveka added a restriction “paramarthatai” to hissyllogismarguing “anyata,” in order to caution the reader about this contradiction.Hiskind of syllogism was rejected by Candra-kirti. For Candra-kIrti thelogicalmethod could play a role only from the conventional standpoint and itshouldnot be brought into speak of any phases of the highest truth. ForBhã-viveka,however, the restriction “paramdrthata.i” is the function which leads to“absolutetruth” from the “conventional world,” and only on reaching theabsolute truth,i.e., Nirvãiza, the use of logic should be abandoned.Nagarjuna, Buddha-pãlita and Candra-kirti used prasaiiga-anumãna.Thatis to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent’s opinion,they tried todemonstrate the philosophy of unyatd. In other words, they didnot take firmstand on their claims in order to have consensusby other shools. Svãtantrikasbeginning with Bhã-viveka, on the other hand, were not satisfied with it,andpositively demonstrated the philosophy of ünyataby using svatantra-anumnaFor them, probably, prasanga-anumdna was not enoughto demonstrate thephilosophy of unyatã and was not enough to refute the opinions ofrealists. Itmay be, moreover, possible that Bha-vivekawas influenced by dominant shoolof thought, i.e., importance of logic. From these points, it can beunderstood thatBha-viveka’s use of logic employeda more positive approach to Nirvãiza.96I shall try to clarify Bhã-viveka’s theory through a diagram which showshis idea of the process from the conventional world(sarhv.rti) to the highest truth(paramartha), i.e., Nirvana.The highest truth(Nirvãia)perfect wisdom(having no diversification, “niprapañca”)TIThe BuddhaTIThe middle way (madhyama-pratipad)I-I-Dependent origination (pratityasamutpada)TIEmptiness (anyata)TINon own-beingness (ni’isvabhavati)TIt -= logic (havingthe restriction “paramärthatai”etc.)wisdom(having diversification, “prapañca”)The conventional world97AppendixAn outline of research on Bhã-vivekaThe works of Bhã-viveka have been studied by many scholars over a longperiod because his philosophy is one of the most important strands in theMãdhyamika school. Therefore, numerous works have already been completedon the subject. Below only a representative bibliography of the works of Bhãviveka is provided.1. Prajñã-pradipa-mã1a-madhyamaka-vtti.This treatise is a commentary on Nãgarjuna’s MK. Accordingly, the basiccontents of it and those of MK are identical.Chapter one.Frauwaliner, 1958: 226-232.Nozawa, 1977: 1-7.Kajiyama, 1963: 37-62,1964: 100-130.NOnin, 1993: 45-66.Willam, 1993: 219-259.Chapter two.Tachikawa, 1982: 1-26, 1983: 31-58, 1984: 111-128, 1981: 1-22, 1985: 44-55,1985: 21-41.Chapter Three.NOnin, 1987: 16-38.Chapter Eleven.Mochizuki, 1990: 25-49.Chapter Twelve.Mochizuki, 1989: 1-27.Chapter Thirteen.Mochizuki, 1989: 69-86.Chapter Fifteen.Kajiyama, 1079: 181-202.Chapter Sixteen.Furusaka, 1981:1-14.Chapter Seventeen.Kajiyama, 1979: 305-357.Chapter Eighteen.98Kajiyama, 1978: 287-328.Ichigo, 1967: 1-20.Ichigo, 1967: 250-260.Chapter Nineteen.Nishikawa, 1984: 7-13.Chapter Twenty-four.Uryuzu, 1971: 15-56.Furusaka, 1976: 117-131.Chapter Twenty-Five.Malcolm, 1985: 25-75.Yasui, 1961: 305-372.2.Madhyamakahrdayakarikaand TarkajvãlãAccording to the colophons of the Tibetan translation of MHK, theTibetan translation of TJ was finalized by Atia(981-1054 A.D) at Lhasa anddictated to Lotsawa Jayaila.253 The Sanskrit original has notso far been found.Chapter One.Skt. title: Bodhi-cittaparityitga.Tib. title: Byar chub kyi sems mi gtaii bazi le’iu ste dan po.Eng. title: Non-abandonment of the thought of enlightenment.Skt. text: Gokhale, and Bahulkar, 1985: 76-108. (Including an Englishtranslation).Chapter Two.Skt. title: Muni-vratasamaáraya.Tib. title: Thub pazi brtul shugs la yari dag par bsten pa.Eng. title: Taking the vow of an asceticSkt. text: Gokhale, 1972:40-45. (Including an English translation)Chapter Three.Skt. title: Tattva-jnanaiaiza.Tib. title: De kho na ñid kyi es pa ztshol ba.Eng. title: The quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality.253See, Chattopadhyaya 1967: 475, 487.99Skt. texts (edition): Gokhale, 1962: 271-275.(vv.275284.)254(Including an English translation)lida, 1980: 52-242. (vv. 1-136.) (Including an English translation).Ejima, 1980: 259-474. (Including a Japanese translation of MHK anda portion of TJ equivalent to v. 26 of MHK).Japanese translation: Nozawa, 1954: 53-46, 1955: 56-44, 1955: 38-26,1956: 43-31, 1959: 105-118, 1964. 87-74, 1964: 70-58: 79-64, 1971: 96-86, 1973: 108-89. (vv.1-141 and TJ).Chapter Four.Skt. title: .ravaka-tattvanicayavatara.Tib. title: IJan thos kyi de kho na ñid iijug pa.Eng. title: Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the ivara.Japanese translation from Tib.: Nozawa, 1941: 45-71, 1944: 45-71.Chapter Five.Skt. title: Yogtcara-tattvavinicaya.Tib. title: Rnal ‘zbyor spyod pa’zi de kho na ñid gtan La dbab pa La ljug pa.Eng. title: The ascertainment of the truth of the Yogicra.Japanese translation from Tib.: Yamaguchi, 1961: 1-41.English translation from Skt.: lid a, 1966: 79-96. (An annotated translationand study of verses 1, 7, 8 & 9), Hirabayashi, and lida, 1978: 341-360.Chapter Six.Skt. title: Srhkhya-tattvãvattra.Tib. title: Grangs can gyi de kho na ñid La zjug pa.Eng. title: Ascertainment of the truth of the Sathkhya.Skt. text: Nakada, 1973: 145-155, 1983: 1-3.Japanese translation from Skt. and Tib. : Nakada, 1973: 156-185. 1983: 4-7.Honda, 1980: 126-166.Chapter Seven.Skt. title: Vaieika-tattvaniscaya.Tib. title: Bye brag pa’zi de kho na ñid La ‘zjug pa.Eng. title; Ascertainment of the truth of the Vaieika.Japanese translation from Tib.: Miyasaka, 1958: 51-87.254According to Gokhale, the number of these verses is provisional. The verses whichGokhale proposed are equivalent to vv. 280-289 of Ejima’s Skt. edition.100Chapter Eight.Skt. title: Vedntatattvavinicaya.Tib. title: Rig byed kyi mthar smra ba,zi de kho na ñid La zjug pa.Eng. title: Ascertainment of the truth of the Vednta.Skt. editon: Gokhale, 1958: 165-180. (vv. 1-16).Nakamura, 1975: 300-329. (vv. 18-96).Qvarnstrom, 1989.Chapter Nine.Skt. title: Mimathsa-tattvanirizaytlvatãra.Tib. title: Dpyod pali de kho na ñid gtan La dbab pa La jug pa.Eng. title: Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the Mim4rhsaka.Skt. edition: Kawasaki, 1973: 71-86. (vv. 1-17 and a Japanesetranslation), 1976: 1-16. (vv. 1-17 and an English translation), 1985:174-184. (vv. 132-138 and TJ and a Japanesetranslation), 1992: 407-467. (Includes Tibetan edition and a Japanesetranslation), 1992: 131-143. (Includes an English translation)Chapter Ten.Skt. title: Sarvajñãtãsiddhinirdea.Tib. title: Thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du grub par bstan pa.Eng. title: Exposition of the proof of the omnisciencelof the Buddha).Skt. text: Kawasaki, 1992: 468-472. (Includes Tibetan edition and a Japanesetranslation), 1992: 131-143. (Includes Tibetan edition and an Englishtranslation)Chapter Eleven.Skt. title: Stutilaksananirdea.Tib. title: Bstod pa dan mtshan bstan pa.Eng. title: Exposition on the eulogy and the marks.3. MadhyamakarthasathgrahaRestored Skt. text: N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Madhyamakartha-sathgrahaofBhãvaviveka, 1931: 41-49.Tib. ed. and Japanese tr.: Ejima, 1980: 18-23.Japanese tr.: Nagasawa, 1969: 191-198.English tr.: Lindtner, 1981: 200-201.4. Nikãyabhedavibhañgavyakhyãna101English tr.: Rockill, 1884: 181.Japanese tr.: Watanabe, 1939.French tr.: André Bareau, 1956: 167-200.5. Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lunSkt. ed.: N. Aiyaswami Sastri, 1949.Translations: Poussin, 1932-33: 1-146, Frauwaliner, 1958: 232-240, Hatani,1931: 99-138.102BibliographyORIGINAL SANSKRIT, PALl ETC. TEXTSAbhidharmakoa-bhaya, Pradhan Prahlad ed..,Abhidharmakoa-bhasyaofVasubandhu, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. VIII, Patna, 1967.Ibushãrinron, ed. by Enga Teramoto and Tomotsugu Hiramatsu,ZU—Kan-WaSanyaku TaikO Ibushürinron (A Study of the Samaya-bhedoparacanacakraádstra— Comparative Study of Tibetan, Chinese and Japanesetranslations),Kyoto, 1935.Christian Lindtner, Bhavya’s Controversy with Yogacara in the Appendix toPrajnäpradipa, Chapter 25, Bibiotheca Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. 29/1,Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary ofthe Birth of Alexander Csoms de Körös, 1984,pp.77-97. (Last half ofchapter twenty-five).Etudes sur Aryadeva et son CatuMataka, P. L. Vaidya ed. Paris, 1923,pp.51-52.La Madhyamakadstrastuti de Candrakirti, J.W.de Jong ed. Oriens Extremus9, 1962,J.W.de Jong, Buddhist Studies, 1979, Berkeley, California.Madhyamaka4stram, The Madhyamakastramof Magarjuna, Raghunath Pandeyaed., Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.Prasannapathl, Louis de la Vallée Poussin ed., Malamadhyamakakarikãde Ngarjunaaved Ia Prasannapada commentaire de Candrakirti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4,StPetersbourg, repr. Osnabrück 1970, Tokyo, 1977.Prajnapradipa, Max Walleser ed., A commentary on the MadhyamakasutrabyBhdvaviveJca, Bibliotheca Indica, work 226, nes seriesNo. 1396, Calcutta,1914.ShOtarO Iida [19801, Reason and Emptiness, A Study in Logic andMysticism, TheHokuseidO Press, Tokyo,pp.52-242.Sphutiirtha,Unrai Wogihara ed., Sphutarthil Abhidharmakoa-vyakhyti,SankiböBuddhist Book Store, Tokyo, 1989.The Madhyamakaastram of Mtlgdrjuna, Raghunath Pandeya ed. Delhi, MotilalBanarsidass, 1988.Yasunori Ejima [1980], Chãkan-shisd no Tenkai - BMvaviveka noKenkya -(Development of Mãdhyamika Philosophy inIndia), Shunjüsha, Tokyo, pp. 259-360.103SECONDARY SOURCESArticles and BooksAlaka, Chattopadhyaya [19671, Atia and Tibet, Calcutta.Bareau, André [1956], Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques, JA 224,pp.167-200.Eckel, Malcolm David [1985], Bhtlvaviveka’s Critique of Yogacara Philosophy inChapter XXV of the Prajnapradipa, Miscelanea Buddhica, Indiske Studier V,Chr. Lindtner ed., Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag,pp.25-75.Edgerton, Franklin [1985], Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, Rinsen BookCo.Ejima, Yasunori [1985], Chãron Sho-chãshakusho ni okeru Engino Gogi-kaishaku (Theinterpretation of “pratityasamutpada” in the commentaries onMadhyamakaastra), Dr. Akira Hirakawa’s anniversary for his seventiethbirthday, Bukkyo Shisd no Shomondai (The Problems of the Buddhist thought).Shunjüsha, Tokyo.[1990], Bhãvaviveka/ Bhavya/ Bhdviveka, IBK 38-2,pp.98-106.Frauwailner, Erich [1958], Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin.[19611, Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic, WZKSO 5,pp.125-148.Fujita KOtatsu [1982], Kã- suñña, suññata, suññatt, (Empty- suñña,suflñata,suññatã) Bukkyö Kyori no Kenkyu (A Study of Buddhist doctrine),pp.81-93.Furusaka Köichi [1976], Daijyd Bukkyd ni okeru Nitaisetsuno ichi-kösatsu - “HannyaTUron” ‘kan-Shdtaibon wo Chüshin to shite - (An Examinationof the Theory ofthe Two Truths in Mahayina Buddhism), OKDK 25,Pp.117-131.[1980/1981], “Chãron” ni okeru Rinnekan no Hitei(1) (The Negation ofsaiñs1ra in Madhyamakakarika(1)), OKDK 29-2/3, pp.l7’1-l84, (2) OKDK30-1/2,pp. 1-14.Gokhale, V.V.[1958], The Vedanta Philosophy described by Bhavyain his Madhyamakatdaya-kariktt, IIJ, 2-3, 1958,p.166.-— [1962], Masters of Buddhism adore the Brahman through Non-adoration(Bhavya’smadhyamakahrdaya, 3), IIJ 5-4, pp. 271-275.[1972], The Second chapter of Bhavya Madhyamaka-hrdaya-karika.,IIJ 14-1/2,pp.40-45.Gokhale, V.V.: Bahulkar, S.S. [1985], MadhyamakahrdayakarikaTarkajvãla Chapter1., Miscellanea Buddhica Indiske Studier 5, ed. by Chr.Lindtner,Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag,pp.76-108.104Guenther, H.V. [1932], Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice, PelicanBooks A,Penguin Books Inc.,1972.Hatani, Ryötai [1931], Daijyo Shdchin ron, Kokuyaku Issaikya, Chugan-bu3,pp. 99-138.Hirabayashi, Jay: Jida, ShOtarO [1978], Another look at the Madhyamika vs.Yogacara Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence, EdwardConze Festschrift (Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series vol. 1,pp.341-360.Honda, Megumu [1980], Sathkhya Tetsugaku Kenkyu Jo., Tokyo, Shunjüsha.Ichigo, Masamichi [1967-1], Chaganha to Katsuron• Shorigakuha tono Tairon(Madhyamika’s criticism of[the atmanl of the Vaieika and the Naiyayika),Tohogaku 34,pp. 1-20.[1967-21, Chuganha to Süronha tono Tairon (Madhyamika’s criticism of thesoul-theory of Sdthkhya as found in PrajñtipradipaXVIII), IBK15-2,pp.250-260.lida, ShOtarO [1966], Agama (Scripture) and Yukti(reason) in Bhdvaviveka, KanakuraKinenronbunshu (kanakura Festschrify), Tokyo,pp.79-96.Inaba, kenshO [1966], Shoin no Kyoron o chashintoshita Chãkan-Hdtdron no KOsatsu(Nitaishd 1), BS 4.Kajiyama, Yüichi [1960], Bhtlvaviveka and the Prasangikaschool, The Nava-NalandaMahavihara Research Publication, vo. 1, Edited.by Satkari Mookerjee,Directed by Navanalandamahavihara, Nalanda, Navanalandamahavihara,Patna,pp.19-331.[1968/69], Bhãvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapála, WienerZeitshrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens und Archiv für JndischePhilosophie, Bd.XII-XIII, Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichite Indiens,Festschirift für Erich Frauwaliner,pp.193-203.: Ueyama, Shunpei [1969], BukkyO no ShisO 3 Ku no Ronri - Chugan(Thought of Buddhism 3 Logic of Emptimess - the Madhyamika-),Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo.[1978], “Chie no Tomoshibi”(Chãron ShOven-shaku) Dai Jahachisha ‘Jiga toTaishO no Kenkyu’ (Bhãvaviveka’s Prajntlpdadipa - The EighteenthChapter - AStudy of Atman and Alambana), Sekai no Meicho DaijO Butten,ChüOKOronsha,pp.287-328.[1979-1], Bhdvaviveka no GO ShisO - “Hannya TOron” Dai Junanasha noWayaku (Bhdvaviveka’s Thought of Karma, Japanese Translationof theSeventeenth Chapter of Prajnãpradipa), Go Shisö Kenkyu,pp.305-357.105[1979-2], Mahtiytima Buddhism and the Philosophy of Prajnci, Studies in Pãliand Buddhism, ed. by A. K. Narain, B. R. Publishing, Delhi.[1979-3], “Chie no Tomoshibi” Dai Jugoshd (Shiyaku) (Japanese Translation ofthe Fifteenth Chapter of Prajnapradipa), Prof. Shinjyo ItO and Junsho Tanaka’sMemorial Volume, TOhO Shuppan,pp.181-202.[1983], Chükan Shisã no Rekishi to Bunken (History and treatises ofMadhyamaka thought)., Tokyo, Shunjusha.[19891, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (selected papers) edit. on theOccasion of his Retirement from Kyoto University by KatsumiMimaki et al. under the Auspices of the Felicitation Committee of theSociety for Buddhist Studies, Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, RinsenBook Co., Ltd, Kyoto.Kawasaki, ShinjyO [1973], Bhavya no Tsutaeru Mimãthsã Shisã., Nakamura KinenRonshü,pp.71-86.[19761, The Mimdthsã Chapter of Bhavya’s Madhyamaka-hdaya- kãriktl - Textand Translation - (1) Pãrva-paka.,TDT.[1985], Nikushoku to Bhdviveka., TOhO 1, pp. 174-184.[1992-1], Issai-chi shisd no Kenkya, Tokyo, Shunjusha,[1992-2], Discrepancies in the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of Bhavya’sMadhyamaka-hrdaya-Tarkajvala (the IX th and Xth Chapters), IATS vol. 1, pp.131-143.Lalou, M [1953], Les textes bouddhiques au temp du Roi Khri-sron-lde-bcan, JA,CCXLI,pp.313-353.Larson: Bhattacharya [19871, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. IV,Sthkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Phisophy, Motilal Banarsidass.Lhundup, Sopa Geshe: Hopkins,J.[1976], Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism,New York.Lindtner, Christian [1981], Atia’s Introduction to the Two Truths and its Sources, JIP9.[19841, Bhavya’s Controversy with Yogaaira in the Appendix to Prajndpradipa,Chapter 25, Bibiotheca Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. 29/1, Tibetan andBuddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth ofAlexander Csoms de Körös.Mayãvyutpatti, ed. by RyOzaburO Sasaki, Tokyo, repr. 1962.Mimaki, Katsumi [1977], Le Grub mtha-i rnam bshag rin chen phreriba de dkon mchogzjigs med dbañ p0 (1728-1 791), Texte tibétain édité, avec une introduction,106ZINBUN: Memoirs of the Reserch Institute for Humanistic Studies. KyotoUniversity.Miyasaka, YüshO [1958], “Ronri no Honoo” ni okeru Vaieika Tetsugaku, (Vaiáeikaphilosophy in Tarkajvãld) KD 1,pp. 62-107.Mochizuki, Kaie [1989], “Hanña Tãron” Dai Janishc5 Shiyaku, (Japanese Translation ofthe Twelveth Chapter of Prajflapradipa), Zanshin 62.[1989-2], “Hannya Tdron” Dai Jasansho Shiyaku, (Japanese Translation of theThirteenth Chapter of Prajnapradipa), RDDN 7.[1990-1], “Hanña Töron” Dai Juichi Shã Shiyaku, (Japanese Translation of theEleventh Chapter of Prajfldpradipa), Zanshin 61.Monier-Williams [18991, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford University Press.Murakami, Shinkan [1991], Indo Tetsugaku Gairon (Introductionto IndianPhilosophy), Heirakuji shoten, Kyoto.Nagasawa, JitsudO [1969], Daijö Bukkya Yugagyd Shisö no Hatten Keitai, Tokyo,Nagasawa JitsudO Sensei IkO Shuppankai, 1969.Nakada, Naomichi [1973-1], The Sanskrit text of the madhyamakahrdaya-kriM(Dbumaii snin-po’ii tshig-leiur-byas-pa) and the Tibetan Text of the Madhyamakahrdaya-vrtti-tarkajvra (Dbu-mazi snin-poli igrel-pa rtog-ge zbar-ba) atazparicchedaz/ Sãthkhyatattvãvatãrai// (Part 1. Pürvapaka)., TJDTK, 6,pp.145-155.[1973-2], Chükanshinron no Ju Dai Roku-shd oyobi Ronrino Honoo -Indo noNigenron no Tetsugaku LSathkhya-setsul o Shdkai seru Bubun noWayaku to Chã-., TJDTK 6,pp.156-1 85.[1983], The Sanskrit Text of the Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kärikã(Dbu-mazi sñiñpoii tshig-leiur-byas-pa) and the Tibetan Text of the Madhyamakahrdaya-vrtti-tarkajvtld (Dbu-maii sfliñ-po’zi -igrel pa rtog-ge bar-ba)athaiparicchedai/ Sarhkhyatattvavatarai// (Part 2. Uttarapaka,(a)vv. 5-7., TDK2O,pp. 1-3.[1983], Chükan Shinron no ju Dai Roku-shd Dai Go-Dai Nana kãrika oyobiRonri no Honoo Wayaku sono 2 (Shddaijöron-shaku shoshutsu no HiseshiNayashuma no toku Ga to Hikakushite)., TDK 20,pp.4-7.Nakamura, Hajime [1975], The Vedãn tic Chapter of Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdaya,ALB 39,pp.300-329.Nishikawa, Takashi [1984], Prajnapradipa Dai Jakyasha niokeru Sho-chãshakushono Inyo ni tsuite - Buddhapãlita Hihan wo Chüshinto Shite - (On the quotations107of the commentaries in the Nineteenth Chapter of Prajnttpradipa), KDBKN 17,pp.7-13.Nonin, Masa’aki [1987], Shdben-cho “Hannya Tdron” Dai Sanshã no Wayaku tochuu (Bhdvaviveka’s Prajflapradipa - Annotated Japanese Translation of theThird Chatper-),RDDKK 8.[1992], Chie no Tomoshibi Dai ichi shd no Wayaku (1) - En no Kösatsu - (Japanesetranslation of the first chapter of Prajnapradipa (1) - the examination ofpratyaya-), Bukkyo to Fukushi no Kenkyu, Ryukoku DaigakuNozawa, Jyosho [1941], Daijd Hibussetsuron(Criticism of the authenticity ofMahayana Buddhism in India). OtG 22-2,pp.45-71.[1944], Shdben no Shãmon Hihan (Bhãviveka’s criticism of the rävaka),MK 88,pp.45-71.[1977], Hanña Tdron-shaku “Shohd Fujishd” Ron (Prajnapradipatik - TheTheory of Non-birth of Dharma-), ODBK.Qvarnstrom, Olle [1989], Hindu Philosophy In Buddhist Perspective - TheVed4ntatattvavinicaya Chapter of Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdaya-karika -,Sweden, Lund Studies In African and Asian Religions vol 4, Lund - PlusUltra -.Rockhill ,W. Woodvill [1884], The life of the Buddha, London.Ruegg, David Seyfort [19811, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophyin India, Wiesbaden, Otto Harassowitz.Sañkrtyayana,Rãhula [1937], Second Search for Sanskrit Palm-ieaf MSS. in Tibet.JBORS 23, Part 1PP.1-163.Sastri, N. Aiyaswami [1931], Madhyamakãrtha-sathgraha of Bhavaviveka, JOR 5-1,Madras.[1949], Karatalaratna of Bhävaviveka, translated into Sanskrit, VisvabharatiAnnals II, Appendix.Schayer, Stanislaw [19351, Notes and Queries on Buddhism,Rocznik Orjentalistyezy11.pp.206-213.Stcherbatsky, Stanislaw [1977], The Conception of BuddhistNirvana, Leningrad,1927, repr. Varanasi.Tachikawa, Musashi [1982-1985], Shdben-cho “Chie no Tomoshibi,” DaiNi ShãWayaku • Kaisetsi (I) (Bhdvaviveka’s Prajfltlpradipa, Annotated Japanesetranslation of the Second Chapter (I)), NBKR 84, 1982,pp.1-26, (II), NBKR 87,1983,pp.31-58, (III), Sarhbhäsa (NIBK) 5, 1984,pp.111-128, (TV-i), NBKR10890, 1981,pp.1-22, (IV-2), Sathbhãsa (NIBK) 6, 1985,pp.44-55, (V), NBKR93, 1985,pp.21-41.Tãranãtha [1970], Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, tr. , DebiprasadChattopadhyaya, ed., Täranãtha’s History of Buddhism In India, Delhi,Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, second ed., 1990.Uryãzu, Ryushin [1985], Nãgaujuna Kenkyü (A Study of Nagarjuna),Shunjüsha,TokyoWatanabe, Zuigen [19391, Zdbun “Shajyd Jahachibu Buha Kaisetsu” Yakuchã(Japanese translation of Tibetan “The explanation of the eighteen subschools inHinayana Buddhism), OsG 94.Warder, A.K. [1970], Indian Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers PVT.Ltd.Delhi, Second Revised Edition, 1980, Reprinted, 1991.Yamaguchi, Susumu [1941], Bukkyd ni okeru Mu to U tono Tairon (Dialogueconcerning existence and non-existence in Buddhism), Tokyo, SankiböBusshorin.[1943], Chagan-ha ni okeru Chagangakuhsetsu no kayasho (A summary of thetheory of the Mddhyamika in the Madhyamakaschool.), ON 2,pp69-152.Yasui, KOsai [1961], Chagan-shisd no Kenkyu(A Study of Madhyamika philosophy),HOzOkan,pp.305-372.[1970], Chakan shisd no Kenkyã (A Study of MMhyamika philosophy),HOzOkan Kyoto, Japan.List of TibetanTripitakaA Comparative List of TibetanTripitaka of Narthang Edition (Bstan-Ijgyur Division)with the Sde-dge Edition, compiled by T. Mibu, Tokyo, 1967.

Cite

Citation Scheme:

    

Usage Statistics

Country Views Downloads
United States 24 8
Norway 9 0
India 7 0
China 6 0
Sweden 6 2
Japan 4 0
France 4 0
Republic of Korea 4 1
Malaysia 4 4
Croatia 3 3
Costa Rica 2 2
Germany 2 19
Unknown 2 0
City Views Downloads
Unknown 24 25
Mountain View 11 6
Ashburn 8 0
Beijing 6 0
New Delhi 5 0
Oslo 5 0
Mo i Rana 4 0
Suwon-si 4 1
Kuala Lumpur 3 3
Zagreb 3 3
Tokyo 3 0
San Francisco 2 2
Flushing 1 0

{[{ mDataHeader[type] }]} {[{ month[type] }]} {[{ tData[type] }]}
Download Stats

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0087551/manifest

Comment

Related Items