Bhā-viveka (A.D. c. 490-570)'s Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, Tattvajñānaisanā, verses 137-266
An English translation and Explanation

by
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Date Oct. 15, 1994
Abstract

The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the third chapter, Tattoajñānāsañā (vv. 137-266) of Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (MHK) of Bhāviveka (A.D. c. 490-570). Bhāviveka was one of the commentators of Madhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika, and, at the same time, was a significant philosopher. MHK is one of Bhāviveka’s most important works. In the MHK, Bhāviveka gives his own philosophy in chapters 1-3, and thereafter, presents and criticizes Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems opposing Madhyamaka philosophy in chapters 4-9.

The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima. Shotaro Iida, also, published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-tarkajvala (TJ), a commentary on MHK, corresponding to those verses, and produced an English translation.

The main subject of verses 137-256 is “the non-production of all dharmas.” This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nāgārjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoint.

Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Mādhyamikas, basic and very important among the Buddha's teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea, no understanding of the philosophy of the Mādhyamika is possible. Therefore, I have decided to translate and explain in this thesis Bhāviveka’s views on “non-production of entities.”

Nāgārjuna, Buddhāpālīta and Candrakīrti used prapañga-anumāna in order to clarify the philosophy of emptiness. That is to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent’s opinion, they tried to demonstrate the philosophy of emptiness. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in order to have consensus by other schools.

Bhāviveka, on the other hand, was not satisfied with prapañga-anumāna, and tried to clarify the philosophy of emptiness by means of independent syllogism (svatantra-anumāna), including the three modifications: (1) adding of the word paramārthatañ (from the standpoint of the highest truth) to propositions in syllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in syllogisms should be understood as prasajya-pratiṣedha (the negation of a proposition or the simple negation of a
proposition) and (3) the condition that no counter-example (vipakṣa) is to be given. In other words, he positively demonstrated the philosophy of emptiness by using independent syllogism.
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duhkhha "suffering"
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TDK T Tsurumi Daigaku Tankidaigakubu Kiyō
TJDTK T Tsurumi Jyoshi Daigaku Tanki (Daigakubu) Kiyō
WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens

Abbreviations and signs in the translation chapter

Ms Manuscript of MHK
[ ] The syllables are not clear but ligible.
( ) The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed.
.. Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible.
+ The space for one syllable is damaged.
= The syllable is divided, e.g. ‘tasy=āsti’ in ms.
° The syllables, previous or subseuent, are omitted.
SG The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering made by Sānkṛtyāyana.
k. kārika or kārikā = verse(s) of the main text
v. verse
vv. verses
K The Kārikā text
KS The Kārikā text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima.
KT The Kārikā text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima.
TJ Tarka-jvālā
Acknowledgement

I am in debt to Professor A. N. Aklujkar, my major professor, who introduced me to Bhāviveka’s Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā. As a graduate student of the University of British Columbia, I was much influenced by Professor A. N. Aklujkar's lectures on Indian Linguistics, philosophy and literature. Here I wish to express my deepest obligations to Professor A. N. Aklujkar for critically reading my thesis and tirelessly making suggestions. The suggestions were invaluable.

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Nowadays, I realize the significance of the words kalyāṇamitra. Mr. Tsunenori Ito who gave me much useful information and materials has been my kalyāṇamitra.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my mother for her constant encouragement. I believe that my late father has been protecting me with blessings of the Triple Gem these years.

C. Watanabe
Chapter One.

Introduction

The Mahāyāna movement originated in India around the first century B.C. and developed gradually over the succeeding few centuries. Mahāyāna Buddhism is represented by the two great schools, namely, the Madhyamika and Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda). The founder of the Madhyamika is Nāgarjuna (A.D. c. 150-250), who developed and established the thought of śūnyatā (emptiness) that is an important aspect of Buddhist thought. The Madhyamika may be divided into three stages, early, middle and late.

The early stage in the Madhyamika is marked by two great figures, the founder Nāgarjuna and Ārya-deva (A.D. c. 170-270). In the middle stage various commentaries on Nāgarjuna’s Madhyamaka-kārikā (hereafter, MK) were written by many scholars. In this stage, moreover, two sub-schools arose. One of them is the Prāsaṅgika (known for its reductio ad absurdum method), and the other is the Svātantrika (known for its acceptance of independent syllogism). The late stage is characterized by the writings of two great figures, Śānta-rakṣita (A.D. c. 725-784) and his disciple Jñāna-garbha (eighth century).

According to Tibetan tradition1, eight Indian scholars wrote commentaries on Nāgarjuna’s MK: Nāgarjuna himself (Akutobhayā, exists only in Tibetan translation), Buddha-pālita (A.D. c. 470-540; Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamaka-ṛtti, exists only in variant Tibetan translations), Candra-kīrti (A.D. c. 600-650; Prasanna-padā, exists in Sanskrit manuscripts and variant Tibetan translations), Deva-śarman (fifth to sixth centuries; Dkar-po Ḫchar-ba, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Guṇa-śrī (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known), Guṇa-mati (fifth to sixth centuries; title of his commentary is not known, exists in a Tibetan fragment), Sthira-mati (A.D. c. 510-570; Ta-Sheng Chung-Kuan Shīh-lun, exists only in variant Chinese translations) and Bhāviveka

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1 Avalokita-vrata, a commentator of Bhāviveka’s Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-ṛtti, enumerates eight commentators of Nāgarjuna’s Madhyamaka-kārikā in his Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-ṭikā. (Prajñāpradīpa, 85a8.)
The aim of this thesis is an English translation and elucidation of the third chapter: vv. 137-256 of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (hereafter, *MHK*) of Bhā-viveka. Bhā-viveka was one of the commentators of MK and, at the same time, was a significant philosopher. In this thesis, Bhā-viveka’s idea of śūnyatā (emptiness) is focused on through an English translation of the third chapter of his *MHK*. The *MHK* is probably Bhā-viveka’s most important work. In this decade some of its chapters have been edited and published by various scholars (see Apendix). The Sanskrit text of the third chapter was critically edited and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima. Shotaro Iida also published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-tarkajvalā* (hereafter, *TJ*), a commentary on *MHK*, corresponding to those verses, and produced an English translation. Verses 137-256 which I have selected for translation in this thesis have not been translated into English before. My English translation is based upon the Sanskrit text edited by Ejima.

The main subject of verses 137-256 is “the non-production of all dharmas.” This is also the main subject of Madhyamaka philosophers beginning with Nāgārjuna. Many of them tried to explain it by means of their own methods and to examine it from their own viewpoint.

Non-production of all dharmas implies the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all entities in our world. The idea of emptiness is, according to the Mādhyamikas, basic and very important among the Buddha’s teachings. It can be said that without understanding this idea no understanding of the philosophy of the Mādhyamika is possible. Therefore, I will translate and explain in this thesis Bhā-viveka’s views on “non-production.”

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2 Kajiyama has investigated the relation of Bhāviveka to Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, and as a result, calculated the date of Bhāviveka given here. For details see Kajiyama 1968/1969: 193-203; Kajiyama 1989: 177-187

3 Ejima 1980: 259-361
Basic Standpoint of Mādhyamika Thought

As mentioned above, Bhā-viveka was a Mādhyamika philosopher. I will base my discussion of the background of his thought on the Nāgārjuna’s MK.

‘emptiness’

The intention of the Mahāyāna Buddhists can be said to be the rediscovery of the truth realized by Gautama Buddha. Therefore, they sought to point out the contradictions of Hīnayāna Buddhism and return to what they claimed was the Buddha’s teaching.

As far as we know now, it was Nāgārjuna who established and formulated the thought of “emptiness” upon the basis of the Prajñā-pāramitā sūtra, the Daśa-bhūmika Sūtra, the Kāśyapa-parivarta etc. The thought of emptiness, however, can be said to be found even in early Buddhist sūtras such as the Cūḷa-suññata-sutta, the Mahā-suññata-sutta (Majjhima Nikāya, no. 121, 122) etc. Nāgārjuna claimed just to revive the true teaching of the Buddha. His philosophy of emptiness was also a criticism against Indian realism, as presented by systems such as the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, and other Buddhist schools such as the Sarvāstivāda, Vaibhāṣika, Saūtrāntika etc.

The Sanskrit word “śūnya” literally means “empty,” “hollow,” absent. Indian mathematicians called zero “śūnya,” but “śūnya” in their usages did not mean solely the non-being of entities.

Nāgārjuna also did not mean that emptiness indicates the non-being or non-existence of entities, but rather that everything is void of sva-bhāva (“own-being,” “intrinsic nature”). All things in our world are neither substantially existent nor non-existent absolutely; they are just like images in a dream or an illusion. We assume that all things in our world are substantially existent. According to Buddhist thought, however, they are just ‘dependently co-arisen.’

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4 See Kajiyama 1982: 6
5 "Seyyathāpi ayaṁ Migāramātū pāsādo suñño hatthi-gavāssa-vaḷavena, suñño jātarūpa-rajatena, suñño itthi-purisa-sannipātena; aththi c'ev' idariḥ asuññataṁ yad idariḥ bhikkhu-saṅghahāṁ paṭicca ekattaṁ...." (PTS, Majjhima-Nikāya, vol. 3, Cūḷa-suññata-suttaṁ. 1960). Thus the idea of śūnyatā is already found in the Nikāyas. See Fujita 1983
6 Monier-Williams 1899: 1085
They are empty of inherent existence. In other words, all entities have no intrinsic nature (sva-bhāva). The negation of a self-dependent substance is thus derived from the traditional Buddhist idea of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda), the idea that whatever exists arises and exists dependent on other things. Nāgārjuna declares that it is dependent origination that we call emptiness.” (MK, 24.18ab, Prasannapada p. 503: yaḥ pratītya-samutpādah śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe/). That is to say, something in existence has no intrinsic nature (sva-bhāva), which means entities originate in dependence on others. In other words, something which is ‘dependent co-arisen’ is emptiness.

“Dependent origination”

Nāgārjuna claims as follows in his MK:7

“ He who taught dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), [which is] without cessation, without origination,
Without annihilation, without permanence, without coming, without going,
Not something manifold, not one thing, the quiescence of conceptual proliferation, tranquil (śīva),
[Is] the perfect Buddha (saṁbuddha). I pay homage to that best of speakers.” (Tr. by William 1993: 214)

The above eightfold negation, according to Nāgārjuna, is the truth that the Buddha realized. In other words, having recognized that the most important idea in Buddhism is dependent origination, Nāgārjuna transmitted it. His idea was not formulated in a vacuum.

Basically, the idea of “dependent origination,” for Nāgārjuna, means aloofness from existence and non-existence. That is, it demands transcendence of the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism.

7 anirodhām anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam/
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamaṁ anirgamaṁ//
yah pratītya-samutpādāṁ prapañcāpāṣamaṁ śīvam/
deśayāmāsa saṁbuddhas tāṁ vande vaddatāṁ varam//= (Poussin, Prasannapada, p. 11.)
The word "pratītyasamutpāda" is a compound of the Sanskrit words "pratītīya" and "samutpāda." The gerund "pratītīya" derives from the root ṣi which means "to go" or "to walk."\(^8\) The prefix "prati" means "towards" or "near to."\(^9\) The root ṝpad with the prefix "sam-ut" means "to arise," "to appear," "to occur" etc.\(^10\) Consequently, the word "pratītyasamutpāda" means the arising of entities after having reached toward an antecedent, a cause, a basis. In other words, it means that everything which exists depends completely on causal relations.\(^11\)

Nāgārjuna declares that dependent origination, emptiness, and the middle path (madhyamā-pratipad), are all synonymous.\(^12\) It is, however, true that the Buddha’s statement of the middle path itself did not expressly include dependent origination or emptiness. Yet, as far as we know, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path in order to deny eternalism and nihilism. Accordingly, there is no contradiction between the middle path and dependent origination or emptiness. Rather, as Nāgārjuna declares, the idea of the middle path and that of dependent origination are identical and both are a means to lead the ignorant person to absolute truth, that is, Nirvāṇa.

"Own-being" or "intrinsic nature" (svabhāva)

According to the Mādhyamikas, "own-being" or "intrinsic nature" is not to be found in our world where everything that exists is based on other things and where everything is in a constant flux.

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\(^8\) Monier-Williams 1899: 163
\(^9\) Monier-Williams 1899: 661
\(^10\) Monier-Williams 1899: 1166
\(^11\) This interpretation of the word pratītyasamutpāda is based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation who is later than Bhāviveka. See appendix of Stcherbatsky 1927.
\(^12\) sā prajñāptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //24-18cd// (Prasannapadā, p. 503.)
Nāgārjuna states as follows in his MK.\textsuperscript{13}

It is not proper to hold that own-being (sva-bhāva) is originated by conditions and causes. If own-being is originated by causes and conditions, [own-being] would be what is made.//15•1//

And, how could own-being be what is made? For, own-being is not what is made; it does not depend on others (nirpeksṣaḥ paratra).//15•2//

If there is existence as essence (prakṛti=sva-bhāva), this would never be non-existence. For, it is never possible that the essence (prakṛti= sva-bhāva) changes.//15•8//

If there is no own-being, what would the changing (anyathā-bhāva) be in. And if there is own-being, even then what would the changing be in.//15•9// (my translation)

From the above verses, own-being (svabhāva), in Nāgārjuna's understanding, can be seen as (1) an independent, (2) eternal and (3) unchanging substance.

That everything is emptiness can be easily recognized. Emptiness, however, does not mean the negation of our world. Our real world is conceptualized through the use of words. In this world, that is, on the conventional level, conception through words is the only reality that has "own-being" or "intrinsic nature." The conception through words is an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. For example, even if we burned down a chair, or even if we died, the word "chair" would still exist. The conception which the word "chair" indicates is an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. A "word," however, does not point out the essence of a thing. What a word indicates and the entity itself are essentially different from each other.

\textsuperscript{13} na saṁbhavaḥ sva-bhāvasya yuktāḥ prayāya-hetubhiḥ/
hetu-pratyaya-saṁbhūtaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet//15-1//
svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham/
akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirpeksṣaḥ paratra ca//15-2//
yady astitvaṁ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā/
prakṛter anyathā-bhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate//15-8//
prakṛtāu kasya cāsaṭyāṁ anyathātvam bhaviṣyati/
Consequently, we must not become attached to the "conceptions" produced through language or words. At the same time, language or words are, of course, very important for us. It would be difficult to live in this world without language. After all, Nāgārjuna composed MK and elucidated śūnyatā using language. In other words, everything exists in our ordinary world but everything is "śūnyatā" in the world which is beyond our ordinary world - the highest reality.

**Bhā-viveka**

As mentioned in the preceding section, Bhā-viveka was one of the eight known commentators of Nāgārjuna's MK and one of the most prominent figures in the Madhyamaka school. He is known as the author of the **PP, MHK "Ta-Shên Chan-Chêng Ian,"** etc. His name, however, is a subject of debate due to the various forms found in different texts.14 The names "Bhāva-viveka," "Bhā-viveka," "Bhagavad-viveka," "Bhavya-viveka," "Bhā-vivikta," "Bhāvyā," "Bhāvyaka," "Bhāvyā-kāra" and "Bhāvin" are assumed based upon Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan materials. In Chinese materials the names "Fen-pieh-ming," "Ch'ing-p'ieh," "Ming-pien," "Yuch'ing-fen," "P'o-p'i-fei-chia" appear. In Tibetan materials "Legs ldan ḡbyed," "Legs ldan," "Skla ldan, Snaṅ bral," "Bhāvyā" etc. are used. The names Bhā-viveka and Bhāva-viveka, however, appear in Chandrakirti's Prasanna-padā15 (hereafter, Pras.), and the name "Bhāvin" appears in Madhyamaka-śāstra-stuti.16 The name Bhagavad-viveka is also used in the manuscript of MHK17. Nowadays the names Bhāva-viveka, Bhā-viveka or Bhavya are commonly used by scholars. Ejima, however, after examining the manuscripts of Pras., and the Tibetan and Chinese sources, suggests that the name of the author of MHK, PP and "Ta-Shên Chan-Chêng Ian" should be Bhā-viveka.18 His collected evidence may be summarized as follows:

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15 *Prasannapadā*, p. 36.
17 Gokhale 1958: 166
(1) The names “Bhãva-viveka” and “Bhã-viveka” appear four times in the manuscripts of Pras.. The name “Bhavya” never appears in these manuscripts.

(2) The transliteration “ BRAHVâ VîJâ/kâ (b’uâ-b’jî-b’jîwâi -ka=P’o-p’i-feichia)” and the Chinese translation “Ching-p’ieh” appear in the Chinese materials. The former “ BRAHVâ VîJâ/kâ ” refers to Bhã-viveka, not Bhava-viveka or Bhavya-viveka. It is, moreover obvious that the name of the author of MHK, TJ, PP etc. was translated as “ 清淨 ” and was identified with Bhã-viveka by Hsüan-tsang (A.D. 600-664). Further, there is no indication in Chinese materials of the names “Bhãva-viveka,” “Bhavya-viveka” or “Bhavya” which are assumed based upon the Tibetan and Sanskrit materials for the author of MHK, etc.

(3) The name of the author of MHK is “sNañbral” or “sKal ldan” in the Tibetan translation of Madhyamakâlakāra-tikā (P. No. 5286: D. No. 3886). The original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sNanbral” should be “Bhã-viveka” or “Bhã-vivikta.” On the other hand, the original Sanskrit word for the Tibetan “sKal ldan” can be assumed to be “Bhavya.”

The name of the author of PP is given as “Legs ldan byed” or “Legs ldan ḥbyed” in the Tibetan translation of PP and Prajñâ-pradîpa-tikā, the sub-commentary of PP by Jñāna-garbha (Kluṭi ṛgyal mtshan). However, “Legs ldan byed” is probably the Tibetan translator’s error. It should be corrected to “Legs ldan ḥbyed.” The original sanskrit word of the latter would be “Bhavyaviveka” corroborating the part “viveka.”

(4) Atiśa (Dīparnikara-śrījñâna. A.D. 982-1054) calls the author of MHK and PP “Bhavya” or “Bhavya sNañbral (Bhavya-Bhāviveka)” in his Bodhi-patha-pradîpa-pradîpa (P. No. 5344: D. No. 3948.), the autocommentary of Bodhi-patha-pradîpa. Besides his own treatise, Atiśa translated Madhyamaka-ratna-pradîpa (hereafter, MRP), MHK, Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarka-jvālā (hereafter, TJ), Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna (hereafter, NBVV) and Madhyamakārtha-saṅgraha (hereafter, MAS) into Tibetan from Sanskrit with the Tibetan translator Tshul khrims ṛgyal ba. He calls the author of MRP, MHK, TJ and NBVV “Bhavya,” and Tshul ṛgyal ba calls him “Legs ldan ḥbyed (Bhavya-viveka)” in MAS.

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19 P. Sa.126b-4, 136b-6: D. Sa. 119b-6, 128a-2.
20 Mayā-vyutpatti 1916, no. 3495.
21 Cf. P. Kī. 323b7, 329a8, 324a8, 324b2: D. Khi. 280a6, 285a1, 280b4, 280b6.
Assuming the correctness of Ejima's investigation, I adopt the name “Bhā-viveka” in this thesis.

The Works of Bhā-viveka

According to Tibetan tradition, the following works are ascribed to Bhā-viveka.

- Pradīpa-uddyotana-nāma-ṭīkā
- Pañca-krama-paṇjikā
- Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti
- Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa
- Madhyamakārtha-saṅgraha
- Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna
- Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā
- Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarka-jvālā

Besides the above treatises, Ta-Shēn Chang-Chēn lun is ascribed to Bhā-viveka in the Chinese Tripitaka.

P. L. Vaidya (1923:51-52) ascribes Madhyamaka-pratītya-samutpāda to Bhā-viveka. In the Tibetan Tripitaka, however, this treatise is attributed to Kṛṣṇa. Accordingly, nowadays this treatise is not ascribed to Bhā-viveka (see Yamaguchi, 1941:57-58).

Pradīpa-uddyotana-nāma-ṭīkā and Pañca-krama-paṇjikā are also not attributed to Bhā-viveka in the Tibetan Tripitaka. Therefore, scholars do not at present consider them to be Bhā-viveka's works.

Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa (=MRP)

Tibetan title: Dbu ma rin po cheṅi sgron ma šes bya ba.

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This treatise consists of nine chapters, in which Madhyamaka thought, especially the theory of the two truths, is well summarized. This treatise is attributed to Bhā-viveka in Tibet, but there must have been considerable doubt as to whether it should really be ascribed to him. As a result of his investigation, S. Yamaguchi concluded that the author of MRP is not Bhā-viveka, and that the text was written around 700 A.D.²³ He points out that, firstly, there are some places where the author salutes three ācāryas, namely Nāgārjuna (A.D. c. 150-250), Āryadeva (A.D. c. 170-270) and Candra-kīrti (A.D. c. 600-650). Candra-kīrti was a founder of the Prāsaṅgika school (Tib. Thal ḫgyur pa) and was in a position of opposition to Bhā-viveka. It is thus hardly probable that Bhā-viveka saluted Candrakīrti. Secondly, a statement by Dharma-kīrti is quoted in MRP. Dharma-kīrti lived around 600-660 A.D. Therefore, it is impossible that Bhā-viveka knew Dharma-kīrti’s works. For these reasons, nowadays MRP is no longer ascribed to Bhā-viveka.²⁴

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²³ Yamaguchi 1941: 54-57.
the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka, such as the theory of Jñāna-garbha, a later century, is necessary. (3) It is difficult to understand the theory of MAS without first assuming knowledge of the theory of Dīpankara-śrī-jñāna. (4) Avalokita-vrata, commentator of PP, does not mention MAS as Bhā-viveka’s work. (5) Kamalaśīla, also, does not mention MAS as Bhā-viveka’s work. In his Madhyamakālaṃkāra-panṭijā, Kamalaśīla’s statement with regards to the theory of the two truths depends on MHK, not MAS. On the basis of these considerations, Ejima does not attribute MAS to Bhā-viveka.25

Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun

Sanskrit title: *Kara-tala-ratna?
Chinese title: Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun tr. by Hsüan-tsang
TD. No. 1578.

The Sanskrit manuscript of this treatise is not extant and a Tibetan translation of it does not exist.

The treatise has the same organization as the third chapter of MHK according to its abstract: it divides all entities into two categories, the conditioned (sāṁskṛta) and the unconditioned (asaṁskṛta) and discusses the emptiness of these categories. Moreover, the logic and the theory of the two truths in it fit with the logic and theory of the two truths in Bhā-viveka’s other works. Further, the detailed argument found in it against Yogācāra theory depends on MHK.26 Therefore, nowadays it is attributed to Bhā-viveka.

From the fact that content of Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun is relatively simple, but still fits with that of MHK, Ejima assumes that this treatise was written after MHK in order to explain in a more concise form the content of the latter (see Ejima, 1980: 15-16).

25 Ejima 1980: 18-32. Ejima suggests that MAS was written before Atiśa (Dīpankara-śrījñāna) or Tshul khrims rgul ba, Tibetan translator of MAS. That is, MAS was completed some time between the latter half of eighth century and the beginning of the eleventh century.
26 Cf. TD.30.272a. 275a.
Prajñāpradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti (=PP)

Tibetan title: Dbu maḥi rtsa bahi ḡrel pa šes rab sgron ma
   The Sde dge edition; No. 3853
   The Peking edition; No. 5253
Chinese title: Pan-jo-teng-lun. tr. by Po-lo-p’o-chia-lo-mi-tiu-li

This treatise is a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s MK. Bhā-viveka criticizes Buddha-pālita in this commentary with the observation that Buddha-pālita’s argument in Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti is a mere prasaṅga, lacking both a true probans (i.e., minor premise) and an example (i.e., major premise). Bhā-viveka used Svaśātantra-anumāṇa (independent inference), by which he tried to explain Nāgārjuna’s MK. Tibetan and Chinese translations of this treatise are extant, but only Sanskrit fragments can be found in Candra-kīrti’s Pras. There is a sub-commentary on PP, which exists only in Tibetan translation, titled Ses rab sgron ma rgya cher ḡrel pa (restored Skt. title would be Prajñā-pradīpa-tīkā) by Avalokita-vrata (seventh century). Some of the chapters of the Tibetan text of PP have been edited by Max Walleser (1914) and Christian Lindtner (1984).

Nikāya-bheda-vibhanga-vyākhyāna

Tib. title: Sde pa tha dad par byed pa daṅ rnam par bṣad pa.
   The Sde dge edition; No. 4139
   The Peking edition; No. 5640

This treatise is only a portion of TJ and MHK, chapter 4 v.8 (Dsa161-3--169a5). Because the authorship of TJ has not been resolved, the authorship of this treatise is also open to debate.

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27 Toh. No. 3859, Ota. No. 5259.
It has long been accepted that TJ is Bhā-viveka’s autocommentary (sva-vṛtti) on MHK. There is, however, sufficient reason to doubt whether or not the surviving Tibetan translation has preserved the original form of this autocommentary. This is because, after one kārikā, it is written “thus says the ācārya” in what should be a reference to Bhā-viveka, the author of the kārikās. Moreover, in explaining the meaning of some kārikās, the expression “this is the intention of the ācārya” is used. That is to say, if TJ was composed by Bhā-viveka himself, would he be calling himself ācārya in his own treatise? Ācārya usually means ‘senior teacher’ or ‘great teacher.’ There is, however, another example of an author calling himself “ācārya.” It is, moreover, possible that the surviving Tibetan translation includes additions to the text that were made during the translation from Sanskrit. There is also another piece which conflicts with Bhā-viveka’s authorship of the TJ. In the commentary of the 291st verse of the third chapter, there is a quotation from “rañ gi bstan bcos (sva-sāstra).” There is, however, no indication of what the “rañ gi bstan bcos (sva-sāstra)” is. It might indicate the author of MHK and TJ. This quotation is not, however, found in any of Bhā-viveka’s works such as MHK, PP, TJ or “Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun.” It is found as a quotation accompanied by the comment “ācārya-pāda says as follows” in MRP which is not ascribed to Bhā-viveka. It is safe to assume that both TJ and MRP are referring to the same person, and that this person is

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28 TJ Dsa 50a-5; 75a-1; 86a-2; 107a-2; 112b-6; 224b-4; 246b-5; 274b-6; 321a-5, etc.
29 Vasubandhu calls himself “ācārya” in his Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, p. 2•17.
   “kimarthath punar abhidharmopadesaḥ kena cāyaṁ prathamata upadiṣṭo yata ācāryo
   bhidharmakośaṁ vaktum ādriyata iti/ āaha/” Yaśomitra says ;“ācāryaḥ śāstrakāraḥ” cf.
   [Sphuṭārthā], p. 10•23.
30 TJ Dsa 140b6-141a7. “... sku gsum rnam par bshag pa fiid kyāñ slob dpon gyis rañ gi
   bstan bcos kyi skabs su ḡdi skad bṣad do/...” (English tras: With regard to Buddha’s three
   bodies (dharma-body, rejoyment-body and accommodative body) also, ācārya says the
   following in sva-sāstra).
31 MR Tsa 360a5-b7. “... sku gsum rnam par bshag pa yan/ slob dpon ŋlid shal śnas (ācārya-
   pāda) / ji skad du...”
not the author of TJ and MRP. It remains, then, a mystery as to how this “ācārya” figure is connected with Bhā-viveka, the author of MHK. Presumably, “ācārya” is an addition by Atīśa (A.D. 952-1054), a Tibetan translator of TJ, as Bhā-viveka was considered the author of MRP in the period of Atīśa. In any case, it is not prudent to assume that the author of the surviving TJ is definitely the same as Bhā-viveka, the author of MHK, PP and Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun.

It is possible that TJ was translated into Tibetan at least once before Atīśa (Dīpankara-śrī-jñāna), Tshul khrims rgyal ba etc., because “Dbu maḥi sṇīṅ poṃ tshig leḥur byas pa”/ ḥgrel par bṣad pa gūs (Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-Tarkṛvālā-tīkā) is recorded as a treatise in the process of translation in the Dkar chag Ldan dkar ma (the catalogue of the Ldan dkar ma), completed in 788 A. D.\(^{32}\)

**Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (=MHK)**

Tibetan title: *Dbu maḥi sṇīṅ pοḥi tshig leḥur byas pa*

The sde dge edition; No. 3855, Dsa 3b5-17a4.
The Peking edition; No. 5255, Dsa 4a5-19-7.
The Narthang edition\(^{33}\); No. 3246, Dsa 5a2-17a4.

It can be said that this treatise is Bhā-viveka’s major work because it is his independent work and in it the Madhyamaka philosophy is well organized. The only known manuscript of MHK was discovered and hand copied by Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana at the Ṣha-lu monastery in Tibet in 1936. Having hand-copied the Sanskrit manuscript there, he registered his copy as ' VII Ṣhalu Monastery, XXX VII, 1. 311. Tarkṛvālā (Madhyamakahṛdaya)' in his handlist. Later on, he gave the copy to V. V. Gokhale.

On the other hand, while traveling in India, Nepal and Tibet, G. Tucci succeeded in taking photographs of the manuscript of MHK at the Ṣha lu monastery.

When visiting Japan in 1971, V. V. Gokhale allowed several scholars to copy his copy of the MHK, and entrusted further research to them.

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\(^{32}\) Lalou 1953: 337.

\(^{33}\) The catalogue numbers of the Narthang edition given here are in accordance with those of *A Comparative List of Tibetan Tripitaka of Narthang Edition (Bstan-Ḥgyur Division) with the Sde-dge Edition*, compiled by T. Mibu, Tokyo, 1967.
In 1972, when V. V. Gokhale visited Rome, he found the photographs of the manuscript of MHK in G. Tucci's collection, and was given the chance to edit them. Since then, a number of chapters of MHK have been edited and published based on the photograph from Tucci's collection and Gokhale's notes.

In 1991, a photocopy of the manuscript of MHK was published in China.34

MHK consists of roughly 927 anuṣṭubha-verses and is divided into eleven chapters. The third chapter, Tattva-jñānaisaṇṇa, is the most important chapter among the eleven because the Mādhyamika thought is primarily presented in this chapter whereas the other chapters express the Mādhyamika thought through the criticism of other systems and schools. According to Gokhale (1985:78), Bhā-viveka originally composed the first three chapters under the title Tattvaṁrtavatāra, forming the core of MHK, and other chapters were added later. As the following note of the contents of the third chapter show, this chapter has a close relationship with MK and PP. It is in order to clarify this close relationship, as well as to provide context for the verses I will translate, that an abstract of the third chapter is given here:

Contents of the third chapter

Introduction

1-1 The meaning and aim of the knowledge of the highest truth vvs. 1-13

1-2 samādhi 'concentration' vvs. 14-23ab

Introduction to Examinations vvs. 23cd-24

2-1 samāskṛta-dharmas 'conditioned dharmas'

(A) skandhas 'aggregates'

(A)-1 rūpa-skandha v. 25

(A)-2 maha-bhūtas 'great elements' vvs. 26-39

(A)-3 rūpa, etc. vvs. 40-44

(A)-4 indriya 'sense organs' vvs. 45-65

(B) vedanā-skandha vvs. 66-68ab

34 Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qing and Qian Wenzhong. 1991, p. 511-523.
(C)  *sānjñā* and *saṃskāra* skandhas  
(D)  *vijñāna*-skandha  

2-1-1  *dhātus* 'realms'  
2-1-2  *āyatana* 'sense-fields'  
2-1-3  *lakṣaṇa* 'characteristics'  
2-1-4  *gati* 'going'  
2-1-5  *mokṣa* 'emancipation' and  
*bandhana* 'bondage'  
(A)  *pudgala* 'person'  
(B)  *ātman*  
2-1-6  *rāga* 'attachment' and *rakta* the 'affected'  
2-1-7  *nirvāṇa*  
2-1-8  *vipaṭyāsa* 'perversion'  
2-1-9  *dveṣa* 'hate' and *moha* 'delusion'  
2-1-10  *sva-bhāva* 'intrinsic nature'  
2-1-11  Conclusion  
2-2  *asaṃskṛta* 'unconditioned'  

**Introduction to the Non-production of all dharma**s  

3-1  Non-production from itself  
3-2  Non-production from others  
3-2-1  The criticism of the four *pratyayas* or conditions  
(A)  *hetu-pratyaya*  
(B)  *ālambana-pratyaya*  
(C)  *samanantara-pratyaya*  
(D)  *adhipati-pratyaya*  
3-2-2  The problem of opposition by *pratyakṣa* and *pratīti*  
3-2-3  The criticism of the theory of the Sāṃkhyas school  
3-3  Non-production from itself and others  
3-4  Non-production from *ahetu* or 'without cause'  
3-5  The criticism of Lokāyatas  
3-6  The criticism of *īśvara*
It follows from what has been said above that Bhā-viveka’s works are PP, MHK, probably TJ (including Nikāyabheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna) and “Ta-Shēn Chang-Chên lun.”

According to the relationship of quotations in the above treatises, Ejima decides the chronological order of these works as: first, MHK (possibly including TJ), second, the “Ta-Shēn Chang-Chên lun” and finally, PP.

Bhā-viveka’s logic

Bhā-viveka was influenced by Dignāga (c. 400-480 A.D.). Accordingly, it was his view that the Mādhyamikas had to employ syllogisms to prove the truth of their philosophy. Hence, Bhā-viveka used syllogism (svatantra-anumāna) in MHK, PP and “Ta-Shēn Chang-Chên lun.” In employing syllogisms, Bhā-viveka included three modifications: (1) adding of the word “paramārthataḥ” (“from the standpoint of the highest truth”) to propositions in his syllogisms, (2) specification that the negation in his syllogisms should be understood as prasajya-pratīṣedha (“the negation of a proposition,” as opposed to paryudāsa, “the negation of a term or word”), and (3) the condition that no counter-example (vipakṣa) is to be given.
Bhā-viveka tried to clarify the philosophy of śūnyatā (emptiness) by means of syllogisms, including the three modifications. Here I will translate verse 26 in the third chapter, one of the typical syllogisms of Bhā-viveka in his MHK, and its commentary TJ in order to clarify the point made just now and the matters which surround his syllogisms (i.e. fallacy of proposition and negation in the ultimate reality). Then, I will explain the meaning of the verse. In order to clarify the context of the topic, I will divide the following translation into some sections, and will put an explanation after each section of translation, if necessary. My translation is based upon the Tibetan text ed. and English tr. by Iida, 1980: 81-90.

"Here,
(proposition) from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramārthataḥ) the earth, etc. do not have the gross elements as their own-beings,
(reason1) because they are things which are made, or
(reason2) because they are things which have cause, etc.,
(instance) just like knowledge (jñāṇa)." //3-26//

Adding the restriction "paramārthataḥ" to the proposition.

[Translation of TJ]

In [the word] paramārtha, artha is what is to be obtained (pratipattavaya) and what is to be understood (adhigantavaya) because artha is the object to be known (jñātavaya). Paramārtha which means "the most excellent." The compound paramārtha [can be interpreted in three ways].
(1) It means "the most excellent object" because it is the object and the most excellent (karmadhārya compound)

36 tatra bhūta-sva-bhāvāḥ hi norvyaḍi paramārthataḥ/
kratakavād yathā jñānam hetumatvādito 'pi vā/ /3-26/ (Ejima 1980; 274.)
In MHK the above verse is the first syllogism. In addition, Bhāvaviveka explains his syllogism in his PP and Ta-Shèn Chang-Chên lun. For further details of his syllogism in TJ, see Iida 1980: 81-90. On his syllogism in PP, see Kajiyama 1963/1964 On his syllogism in Ta-Shèn Chang-Chên lun, see Poussin 1932-1933: 68-138.
(2) Or, it is the object of the most excellent. That is, because it is the object of the most excellent knowledge that is beyond discrimination (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*), it means the object of the most excellent (*tatpurusa* compound)

(3) Or, it is "comformable to *paramārtha*" (*paramārthānukūla*). That is, since there is that *paramārtha* in wisdom (*prajñā*) which is comformable to obtaining of *paramārtha*, it means "one which is in conformity with *paramārthaḥ*" (*bahuvihi* compound)

*Paramārthataḥ* [in syllogisms] is taken as the third type of compound (the *bahuvihi* compound), i.e., *paramārthataḥ*, in the ultimate reality.

[An explanation]

As is well known, the highest truth (*paramārtha*) is contrasted with *sahvrti* (the conventional truth) in many schools of philosophy but particularly in Mādhyamika. Bhā-viveka included this word "the highest truth" in his syllogisms. He interpretes the word *paramārthataḥ* in three ways, i.e., *karmadhārya*, *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvihi* compound.37 Among these three interpretations, Bhā-viveka adopts the third restriction *paramārthataḥ* in his proposition. That is to say, the restriction "*paramārthataḥ*" in Bhā-viveka's proposition does not mean 'the highest truth' itself, but that which is in conformity with the highest truth itself. In other words, the third interpretation means *prajñā*, which is in conformity with the highest truth.38

Assuming the first interpretation (*karmadhārya* compound) and the second (*tatpuruṣa* compound), the third interpretation is realized. The first and second "*paramārtha*" are beyond conceptions. Truth itself cannot be understood by means of concepts and language. On the other hand, the third *paramārtha* has concepts and language. However, it is *prajñā* and is approaching truth itself. That is to say, even though it is verbal usage, as long as the word *paramārtha* directs to the highest truth itself, Bhāviveka's syllogism, including the restriction *paramārthataḥ* is truth.

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37 In PP Bhāviveka interprets the word *paramārtha* in the same way. See, Uryūzu 1971: 34. Avalokitavrata in his PPT gives us gramatical explanations of these three interpretations of the word *paramārtha*, that is, (1) *karmadhāraya* compound, (2) *tatpuruṣa* compound and (3) *bahuvihi* compound respectively.

38 This idea can be found in the commentary on v. 8 of PP XXIV. See, Uryūzu 1971: 33-34.
The negation in the proposition should be understood as *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.

[Translation of TJ]

Here, the negation 'na (not)' means *prasajya-pratiṣedha* ("the negation of a proposition"), and does not mean *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* ("the negation of a term"). One might ask: What is the difference between *prasajya-pratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*? *Paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* affirms the other entity (*vastu*) which is similar to this entity due to the negation of the nature of this entity. For instance, by the negation "he is not a Brahman," one might affirm that [he] looks like a Brahman but he is a non-Brahman, he differs from [a brahman], that is [he] belongs to a lower class (*śūdra*) because of lacking mortification (*tapas*) and learning (*śrūta*) etc. The *prasajya-pratiṣedha* negates only the nature of the entity, it does not affirm another entity which is similar but not identical. For instance, [the expression] "Brahmans must not drink liquor" denies only [the very action] itself, and does not mean "do drink something other than liquor" or "do not drink something other than liquor." Therefore, here, "from the standpoint of the highest truth (*paramārtha*) the earth etc. which are imagined by people in the world do not have [corresponding] gross elements as their own-being" is only the negation of ["having gross elements as their own-being"]. It does not affirm "having another as own-being" or "having non-existence as own-being."

[An explanation]

The negative particle in Bhāviveka’s proposition is related to the verb, not to a nominal as a *prasajya-pratiṣedha*. For instance, "whatever exists is not produced from itself" does not mean "whatever exists is not produced from another." It just means that "whatever exists is never produced from itself."39

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39 We come across the details of Bhāviveka regarding *prasajya-pratiṣedha* in PP and its commentary PPT. In PP Bhāviveka says: "here one should specify that entities do not [-- - - ] originate from themselves. If one specifies otherwise, one would ascertain, "Entities do not originate from themselves [-- - - ]; rather they originate from another." Likewise one would ascertain, "Entities do not originate just (eva) from themselves; rather they originate from themselves and another." Therefore, that also is not accepted, because it is distinct from [our] doctrine. (Tr. William 1993: 221.) According to William, addition in brackets [ ] is based upon PPT.

Fallacy of proposition

[Translation of TJ]
Here, the opponents object as follows:

(i) There are the following statements in the saying of your teacher (śāstra-vacana = the Buddha).

"Oh Brahman! everything consists of the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements."

And,

"The characteristic of form (rupa) is change and destruction, etc".

You also accepted those ideas, i.e., "the everything has the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields and eighteen elements as its own-being" and "the characteristic of form is change and destruction, etc"], but if you negate those very things, your thesis (pratijñā) is damaged by the very ideas you accept (abhyaśgata).

(ii) Likewise, it is well know (prasiddha) that the function of particular objects (pratiniyata-visaya) is known through direct perception (pratyakṣa) of the sense organs (indriya). And, there is no other superior proper cognitive instrument (pramāṇa) than seeing (drṣṭa). Nevertheless, having seen the shape (samsthāna) and colour (varṇa) of the four elements (i.e., fire, water, wind and earth) by means of your own eyes, you still search for the own-being of the earth element, e.g., smooth touch. It is, however, understood by everybody in the world that the earth element has the nature of firmness, etc. Therefore, the negation of it means negation of direct perception (pratyakṣa).

(iii) Also, the form (rupa), etc. and nature of earth, i.e., solidity (khakkhatatva), wetness (dravatva), heat (uṣṇatva) and mobility (samudrīṇatva), etc. are well known even to the śabara and mātanga tribes. Thus, the negation of the own-being of entities which are well known to everybody in the world means the negation of what is well known (prasiddha).

To these objections we reply as follows:
Because of the restriction paramārthataḥ in our proposition (pratijñā), our proposition would not be a contradiction of the theory we accept, or of direct perception or of what is generally known. This is due to the following reasons:

(i) The Bhagavat proclaimed the theory of two truths (satya-dvaya), i.e., samvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya. Among these two truths, as for the samvṛti-
satya, he established own-beings and characteristics of entities (dharma). Likewise, as for the paramārtha-satya, he proclaimed non-own-being [of entities]. That is, [the following was stated by the Bhagavat].

"Kauśīka! all entities are empty in their own-being. [The statement] "all entities are empty in their own-being" means the non-existence of entities. And the non-existence is "prajñāpāramitā."

According to this statement, entities do not exist. Because of this, how can they possess own-beings? Accordingly, contradiction with what we accepted does not occur.

(ii) The contradiction with pratyakṣa does not occur. The reason is: the objects [of cognition] are untrue and the ability of seeing, etc. does not exist because the sense-organs are [actually] senseless. Therefore, to consider that the object is what is directly perceived is improper, just as in the case of one who has an eye-disease who sees a hair, mosquito or horsefly in his eyes, or in the case of one who perceives an echo as coming from a particular place, which is improper. Accordingly, what can be pratyakṣa for whom, and how can there be the contradiction with that (pratyakṣa)?

(iii) Also, the contradiction by what is well accepted does not occur, because the ordinary person is blind due to an eye-disease: "ignorance." When it comes to analyzing something from the standpoint of the highest truth, then just as in the example of a blind person who cannot examine a jewel, the ordinary person does not understand that analyzing from the standpoint of the highest truth. Accordingly, contradiction with the well known does not occur.

[An explanation]

The opponents object to Bhā-viveka's proposition from three points of view: (i) conflict with what we accepted, (ii) objection by direct perception and (iii) objection by the well-known. That is,

(i) The Buddha proclaimed the own-being of entities. Therefore, for Buddhists, a negation of the Buddha's statement would be a fallacy of contradiction.

(ii) It is widely accepted that pratyakṣa of sense organs holds for specific objects. Therefore, the negation of what is actually experienced would be a fallacy.

(iii) That the own-beings of the gross element of earth are solidity, wetness, heat and mobility etc. is generally known by all ordinary people.
Therefore, negation of what is generally known by all ordinary people would be a fallacy.

To these objections Bhā-viveka replies:
Because we have the restriction paramārthaḥ in our proposition (pratijñā), our proposition would not be a fallacy on account of abyupagata, pratyakṣa and prasiddhabādha. That is:

(i) The Buddha taught two truths, namely saṁvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya. The own-beings and characteristics of entities are established in saṁvṛti-satya, that is, the own-beings and characteristics of entities are acceptable as conventional truth. The Buddha, however, taught the non-own-beingness of entities from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramārtha).

(ii) From the standpoint of the highest truth the objects of sense organs are untrue. For example, from the standpoint of the highest truth the ability of seeing does not exist. Nevertheless, in the eye of one who has an eye disease, unreal hair, etc. is seen as real. It is, however, not correct from the standpoint of the ultimate truth.

(iii) The ordinary person is afflicted by ignorance. Accordingly, he cannot examine anything as it is.

Negation in the ultimate reality

[Translation of TJ]
One might say: the highest truth (paramārtha) transcends every intelligence (buddhi). However, the negation of the own-being of entities (bhāvo-svabhāva-pratīṣedha) is in the object sphere of words. Therefore, the negation does not establish the absence of own-being of entities.

We (Mādhyamikas) reply: to say this is not proper. The paramārtha is twofold. One is paramārtha, which works without conception (anabhisamāskāra-pravṛtti), which is beyond the world (lokottara), which is pure (anāsrava) and which is beyond diversification (nisprapaṇca). The other is paramārtha which works with volition (śābhisaṃskāra-pravṛtti), which is conformable to the equipping of virtue and knowledge (punya-jñāna-saṁbhāra), which has diversification (saprapaṇca) that is called “pure worldly intelligence” (śuddha-laukika-jñāna). Here we adopt the latter paramārtha as qualification of the proposition (pratijñā). Therefore, there is no fallacy [in our proposition].
Similar example

[Translation of TJ]

The statement which is connected with similar examples (sapakṣānvayavānirdeśā) is "no produced thing has elements (bhūta) as its nature (svabhāva), just like knowledge (jñāna)."

One might say: in what manner is knowledge (jñāna) a produced thing?

We reply: it is accomplished by logic (tarka) which aims at heaven (svarga) and nirvana (apavarga). Here, the negation "knowledge does not have elements as its own-being, because it is a thing which is made" is connected with the sense of prasajya-pratiṣedha.

No counter-example (vipaka) is available in the syllogism.

[Translation of TJ]

Here, among three aspects of reason (hetu), due to the non-indication of the third condition, i.e., absence of a counter-example, what we intend to say is conventionally explained by using only two aspects of reason. The property of the subject (pakṣa-dharma) exists only in the similar example (sapakṣa), not in the counter-example (vipakṣa) because the latter, which has own-being differs from the former, which never exists. Therefore, we do not state instances (drṣṭānta) which lack counter-examples (vipakṣa) and reasons.

In order to indicate a convertible term (paryāya), [the word] hetumat is used. [The abstract] noun of hetumat is hetumattva. The term "etc." in the syllogism includes other reasons, i.e., knowability and expressibility etc. In this case, the phrase "because they are things which have cause" is used as the reason (hetu). Whatever has cause, knowableness or expressibility etc. does not have elements as its own-being, just like knowledge. Likewise, the earth does not have gross elements as its own-being from the standpoint of the highest truth.

In this way, each term [of syllogism] is related to the others.

[An explanation]

According to Dignāga's logic, a correct syllogism is conditioned by three aspects. These are: (1) pakṣa-dharmatva, namely reason (hetu) should be the predicate of the subject of the proposition, (2) sapakṣa-sattva, namely reason (hetu) must belong to an example similar to the subject of the proposition. and (3)
vipakṣāsatvā, namely, reason (hetu) must not belong to a counter-example of the subject of the proposition. Bhā-viveka, however, does not adopt the third aspect among the above three aspects. That is, Bhā-viveka does not adopt a counter-example in his syllogism. The reason is: Bhā-viveka upholds the emptiness of all entities in the ultimate reality. Hence, with regard to the statement "from the standpoint of the highest truth, earth, etc. do not have gross elements as their own-beings, because they are things which are made," a counter-example, i.e., "something which has gross elements as its own-being" does not exist. That is, the proposition (pratijñā) "from the standpoint of the highest truth, the earth etc. have no gross elements as their own-being (svabhāva)" is a case of prasajyapratisedha and means only the negation of "have gross element as their own-being." In this case, the counter-example which can be assumed is one of which "have gross as their own-being" could be said. However, as long as "have gross as their own-being" is simply negated, there is no possibility of a counter-example. The employing of prasajyapratisedha as the negation of the proposition (pratijñā) leads to non-necessity of the counter-example.

Accordingly, the above-mentioned syllogism amounts to:

(p) If considered by prajñā (wisdom) which is in conformity with the highest truth, the earth etc. do not have the gross elements as their own-beings,

(h1) because they are things which are made, or,

(h2) because they are things which have cause, knowableness (jñeyatva), expressiblity (vācyatva) etc.

(d) just as knowledge does not have gross elements as its own-being.

Thus, I have clarified the idea of Bhā-viveka regarding three modifications and showed how we should understand Bhā-viveka’s syllogism.

In the following chapter, I shall translated MHK 3•137-256.

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40 The term “etc.” includes water, fire and wind. See, lida 1980: 82.
Chapter Two.

Bhā-viveka's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, Third Chapter, Tattva-jñānaiṣanā, verses 137-256
An English Translation and Explanation

As mentioned in the introduction, a critical edition of the Sanskrit text and of the Tibetan text of the third chapter of MHK were published and translated into Japanese by Yasunori Ejima in 1980. Shotaro Iida published a critical Sanskrit edition of verses 1-136 of the same chapter and of the Tibetan text of TJ corresponding to those verses, accompanied by an English translation of both the verses and the TJ.

Here, I present an English translation and explanation of MHK, 3•137-256. My translation is based upon the text edited by Y. Ejima, and my explanation is basically based upon TJ. TJ, however, does not give us detailed commentary for some verse parts. Hence, I have tried to explain verses which TJ does not explain sufficiently based upon my own understanding. Although the Tibetan translation indicates the separate components of the syllogism, like thesis, reason and example, I have combined them in a single sentence. I do not explain each verse I translate. I sum up the main points of the discussion where verses form a unit and have the same context.

Explanation of abbreviations and signs employed in this chapter:

Ms Photocopy in Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday, ed. by Li Zheng, Jiang Zhongxin, Duan Qian Wenzhong, 1991, p. 511-522

The MHK manuscript itself is reported to have been written on 22.5 X 2 inch palm-leaves, and is said to consist of 24 folios with 5 or 6 lines on each of the obverse and reverse sides. It has the Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili script of the eleventh century. The dedication "deya-dharmo 'yam uttarāpathika-śrāmaṇera-bandya-dharmakarasenasya" further indicates that the manuscript was written in Northern India.41

[ ] The syllables (akṣaras) are not clear but legible.

41 For details of this manuscript, see R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937.
The syllables are unclear and illegible, but are to be supposed.

Two dots. There is a space for one letter which is illegible.

The space for one syllable is damaged.

The syllable is divided, e.g. 'tasya=asti' in ms.

The syllables, previous or subsequent, are omitted.

The handcopy by Gokhale, based on the first copy or deciphering made by Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

k. kārika or kārikās = verse of the main text

v. verse

vv. verses

K The Kārikā text

KS The Kārikā text in Sanskrit ed. by Ejima.

KT The Kārikā text in Tibetan ed. by Ejima.


Peking edition, No. 5256, Dsa 57a-157b2.

Narthang edition, No. 3247, Dsa 53a7-152a5

An outline of vv. 137-256 would be as follows:

3. Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas

3-1 Non-production from itself

3-2 Non-production from others

3-2-1 The criticism of the four pratyayas “conditions”

(A) hetu-pratyaya

(B) ālambana-pratyaya

(C) samanantara-pratyaya

(D) adhipati-pratyaya

3-2-2 The problem of the opposition of pratipakṣa and pratiṣṭi

3-2-3 The criticism of the theory of the Sāṅkhya system

3-3 Non-production from itself and others

3-4 Non-production from ahetu “without cause”

3-5 The criticism of Lokāyatas

3-6 The criticism of īśvara

3-7 drṣṭi "view"
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2. Introduction to the topic: Non-production of all dharmas

Or, indeed, the expansion of a net of false constructions which has such a beginning with such things as [dravya, pradhāna, jīva and ātman], and which has for its basis produced entities, confounds an ignorant person through its force. //137//

By the lamp of knowledge (vidyāpradīpa), a knowledgeable person examines (arising of entities) as they are on [the basis] from [the view of] rejection of production. Then out of its (=production’s) quenching is (i.e. comes) the cessation of the diversified world of experience. //138//

Explanatory comment:

The realists, i.e., the Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Ābhidharmika etc. among the Buddhist schools and the Sāmkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika etc. among the Brahmanical schools, state that produced things actually exist in the world. The Madhyamaka school, however, asserts that produced things do not exist in ultimate reality.

The phrase evam-ādika kalpanā-jāla-prasara in the above verse means dravya, pradhāna, jīva, ātman etc. that other systems imagine as real existences and which are referred to in vv. 135-136.45

An ignorant person misunderstands in that he thinks that produced things actually exist in the world and that entities are produced either from themselves,

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42 विद्वान् ms.
43 जाते ms. KT: skye bkag
44 तत्कालान्ते ms. KT: de shi bas
45 dravya-pradhāna-jīvādi jñeyaṁ yat tirthya-kalpitāṁ/
yathā-yogāṁ nīṣeddhavyāṁ yuktā-āgama-viśāradāṁ//3•135//
itī sva-para-siddhānta-kalpitātma-nirātmataṁ/
vidvān vibhāvya bhāvānāṁ tattva-jaamṛtāṁ pibet//3•136//
from others, from both themselves and others or without a cause. A discriminating person, however, realizes non-arising of entities as the truth, attains proper wisdom, and liberates himself from the diversified world of experience.

2-1 Non-production from itself

Introduction to verses 139-140

Bhā-viveka discusses here the doctrine of ‘pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state’ (Satkāryavāda) in the Sāṁkhya school. The Sāṁkhya claim that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is therefore self-generated. However, their statement is not acceptable to Buddhists. According to TJ, the Sāṁkhya propose that an effect pre-exists in the cause. This amounts to saying that it produces itself from itself or that an existent is produced from itself. Bhā-viveka criticizes this opinion.

तत्र तावत् स्वते जन्म संवृत्यापि न युज्यते ।
सात्मकत्वाद्, यथा दधनः स्वते जन्म न विद्यते ॥१३९॥

Here, firstly, production from itself is not proper even from the standpoint of conventional truth, because it [already] has itself, just as a curd has no birth from itself. ॥१३९॥

नोपन्ना: स्वात्मतः भावा भावत्वात्, तद्यथा पुमानः ।
नापि चात्मास्त्य: अजातानाम् अजातवात्स्ख-पुष्पवत् ॥१४०॥

The existents do not arise out of themselves, because they are [already] in existence, just like the puruṣa (puṇya) in your view. Nor [on the other hand], do the unproduced have a self (=own-being), because they are not born, just like the sky-flower (kha-puṣpa). ॥१४०॥

Explanatory comment:

An existent thing is not produced from itself because it is already existent, just as puruṣa of Sāṁkhya theory is not produced from itself. Nor do the
unproduced things have themselves, because they have not been produced, just as the sky-flower.

Whatever exists in our world does not arise from itself both because such origination would be purposeless and because it entails an absurdity. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of things which are in existence already. The absurdity is this: if something exists it would not arise again and yet there would never be a time when it was not arising. For example, it is clear that curds are produced from milk. It, however, is not admissible even in our everyday world that curds are produced from curds themselves.

Further, entities are not produced from entities themselves because entities are things which already exist, just like "purusa" (one of the two substantial principles) which Sāmkhya admits as a real, unchanging, unevolving entity.

On the other hand, what is not arisen cannot be said to exist, just like the sky-flower which is only an imaginary flower.

According to TJ, the reasons (hetu) "because it [already] has itself" in verse 139 and "because they are [already] existent" in the verse 140 are conventional. From the standpoint of the highest truth entities do not have own-being.

Explanatory comment:

This verse is an elaboration with regard to the example (drṣṭānta) which Bhā-viveka advanced in v. 140. According to TJ, the Sāmkhya school points out that there are various interpretations regarding the sky-flower: i.e., "the flower in the sky," "the flower which comes from the sky" or "the flower of the sky." etc. From this standpoint, they counter that there is no proper example to support Bhā-viveka's statement. Bhā-viveka, however, clarifies that by advancing the example of "the sky-flower" which does not really exist, he refers
only to non-existence of entities. Therefore, he says that “we do not have a deficiency even in our alternative.”

कार्यस्य कारण स्वात्मा, तस्य जन्म ततो मतम्।
स्वतो जन्म ततोऽभीष्टं भावानाम् इति चेन् मतम् ॥१४२॥
स्वात्मयस्तः तद्वनन्यत्वात् ॥४६ कारणं स्याद् अकारणम्।
अजातत्वाच् च किं कार्यस्य कारण स्याद् अकारणम् ॥१४३॥

The own self of an effect is [its] cause. The production of that (effect) is considered to be from that (cause). Therefore, of existents [which are the effects], birth from themselves (=their ownbeing, the causes), is desired - if this were [your, i.e., the Sāṃkhya’s] view, //142//
[then,] because [the cause] is not different from it (the effect), like the self [of that effect], it would be no cause (i.e., cease to be a cause).
And since [puruṣa pradāna etc.] are unproduced, what, itself being causeless, could be the cause of what else? //143//

सत्यं आत्मनि च भावस्य ॥४८ वृथा कारण-कल्पना॥
तस्माद् एव तद् उत्पन्नं ॥५० चैव कार्यं जनक-जन्मयोऽऽ। ॥१४४॥

And, when the self of an existent [already] exists, it is useless to postulate a cause. “A” is produced from the same “A”, so the generator (janaka) and what is generated (janya) become identical (ekya). //144//
If [what we have said above is] undamaging [to your position] because milk exists as curd, [then what we have said is] not undamaging (i.e., is certainly damaging) because of [the fact that] a father does not exist as child.//145/

Explanatory comment:

In the above verses, Bhā-viveka points out identity of a cause and an effect. If the cause is the effect, a pot would be produced from the pot itself. Or alternatively, the pot (i.e. the effect) would pre-exist in clay (i.e. the cause). In other words, if a pot really pre-exists, there is no sense in claiming its arising a second time.

TJ gives the following explanation of v. 145: It is not seen by anyone, anywhere and in any way that “abandoning the state of a father, the father changes to the own-being of a child.” A father cannot abandon being a father and therefore cannot be a child. Even though a child and its father have a blood relationship, the father and child are not identical. Therefore, you cannot get rid of the fallacy that the generator and the generated would be identical in your view.

Because of impossibility of counter-examples (vipakṣa), it too would not be right to hold that the reason [in our syllogism] is contradicted. //146ab//

Thus, there is this much that existents are not produced from themselves./146cd//

51 न हि नं,धकः ms. KT: /gnos pa med pa ma yin no/
Explanatory comment:

The opponent may think of finding a fault like contradiction \( (\text{viruddhat}a) \) in Bhā-viveka's remark in order to reject his criticism. Because Bhā-viveka's syllogisms, however, do not leave room for counter-examples his critical statement cannot contain a contradiction.

2-2 Non-production from others

Introduction to verses 147-158

The argument on non-production from others takes place as a controversy between Bhā-viveka, on the one hand, and the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika-Nyāya among the Buddhist schools and the Vaiṣeṣika school, on the other hand. While the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta seek to explain reality exclusively in terms of a conceptual pattern of identity and permanence, the Buddhist realists state it exclusively in terms of difference and impermanence. They assert that the cause and effect are different entities. Thus, the Buddhist realists and the Vaiṣeṣika school advocate the doctrine of origination from others, i.e., that entities are produced from entities which are other to them.

Moreover, since it is not possible that own-being can exist, what is desired to be different from what? It is not thought that the horn of a horse \( (\text{vāji}-\text{ṛṅga}) \) is different from the horn of a cow \( (\text{go}-\text{ṛṅga}) \) and the horn of a mountain \( (\text{adri}-\text{ṛṅga}) \). //147//

Explanatory comment:

If entities are produced from other things, there is a question "what is different from what? In the ultimate reality, there is no own-being of entities, that is, entities do not exist in the ultimate reality. Therefore, distinction of entities is not proper for Bhā-viveka. In the above verse he says: since a horn of

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52 ॐ <br> ॐ (berter)
a horse does not exist, any attempt to relate it to the horns of others does not make sense.

From the standpoint of the highest truth, the other causal factors (pare pratyayā), such as the eye, etc., do not produce visual cognition, etc., because they are different from each other, just like the vīraṇa grass, etc. (vīraṇādivant) //148//

It is not admissible that cognition of form (rūpa) has the intended eye etc. as its cause, because it is different from them, or because it does not exist beforehand, just like a jar and woven cloth etc. [are not the cause of cognition of form]. //149//

Explanatory comment:
If, as the Buddhist realists and Vaiśeṣika maintain, the cause and the result are different entities, and the cause produces the result, there is a deficiency. The eye produces only eye-cognition (caksur-vijñāna), but it does not produce a grass-cap, cloth or jar. A grass-cap, cloth and jar are produced from vīraṇa grass, yarn and clay respectively, but eye-cognition is not produced from them. An entity “X” which is different from an entity “Y” does not produce “Y” as its result. Accordingly, Bhā-viveka maintains that production from others can not be admitted.

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53 कारण, मस्त, कथा: कारण, KT: rgyu can
54 रत्त्वादि = ms
And, the otherness of something unproduced is a conventional truth; [yet that otherness] is not [there] from the point of view of the highest truth. Thus it is grasped that origination from another entity is not proper.//150//

[If you now hypothesize the arising of something that] is produced [but] is inexpressible, then [that] production is useless. Nor can there be arising of what is not arisen yet, [because] it is impossible, just like the sky-flower (kha-puspavat).//151//

[Now, if someone were to say that] what is in the process of being born arises, there would be a similar objection (tulyaparyanuyogita). There is no birth of something inexpressible also, because it is inexpressible [as to whether it is already produced or it is not produced yet], just as [there is no birth of] things other than it (the unexpressible).//152//

Explanatory comment:

The above verses make four points: (1) what has already arisen does not arise again. (2) what is not arisen yet does not arise. (3) what is in the process of coming to exist does not arise either. (4) something inexpressible does not arise. The points (1) and (2) are already explained in the preceding sections. Hence, I shall explain points (3) and (4) here.
(3) What is in the process of coming to exist has both a portion of what has already arisen and a portion of what is not arisen yet. As mentioned before, what has already arisen does not arise and what is not arisen yet does not arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, having both that which has already arisen and that which is not arisen yet, does not arise.

(4) Something inexpressible also does not arise. Something inexpressible refers to what is in the process of coming to exist, because it is inexpressible whether it is what has already arisen or what is not arisen yet. What is in the process of coming to exist has two portions, that is, a portion which has already arisen and a portion which is not arisen yet. As mentioned above, what has already arisen and what is not arisen yet do not arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming to exist, i.e., something inexpressible, does not arise.

According to TJ, a barren women’s child is also included in other things inexpressible. Presumably, TJ means that the skin colour of the barren woman’s child is inexpressible whether it is white or black.

विकल्पितात्मना शून्यास् तत्वतत्त्व, 57 चक्षुराधि।
कृतकत्वाद् विनाशाद् वा यथा मायामय पचः ||१५३||

From the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are empty as entities consisting of conceptual construction (vikalpita), because they are created, because they are destroyed (vināśa), like illusory water (=a mirage).//153//

Explanatory comment:
The opponents maintain that entities are produced, because they are acknowledged as mentally constructed entities. Therefore, there are entities which are constructed by cognitions. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects. He says: in our ordinary world it is admitted that the eye is an entity and cognizes the form or colour of entities as blue or white or black etc. The eye, however, is not a real entity in the absolute reality, because the eye is what is created or what

57 तत्त्वः ms. Not translated explicitly in KT.
is destroyed, just as illusory water (suggested by TJ). Therefore, the eye is not real entity.

साध्य-तुल्य-निषेधाय च संशयो नेतरत्मना॥१५४ab॥

Because [a non-conceptually constructed entity] is denied in the same way as the object to be proved, i.e., due to the negation of the mentally constructed entity, (sādhyatulyanisedha), there is no doubt [about the reason (hetu)] by the other [non-mentally constructed] entity.//154ab//

अकल्पितो शिप्त मायात्मा वितथस्त तत्तचतो मतः॥१५४cd॥
स्वतत्माभित्वेहस्तल्वाद् 60 एथासौ कल्पितात्मना॥१५४ab॥

Although the entity māyā ('ultimate illusion') is not mentally constructed (akalpita), it from the standpoint of the highest truth is thought to be unreal (vitatha), because of its being a cause of self-affirmation, just as it is false as an imagined entity.//154cd-155ab//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that for illusion there is something which we do not cognize. Bhā-viveka objects to this statement here. He maintains that the entity māyā is made by a magician, not mentally constructed. It is not, however, a real entity. It is seen variously by people. That is, one person sees the colour of it as blue, etc. Another person sees the colour of it as red, etc. Or, a form of it is seen variously by many people. The colour or form of illusion is different from one's validation. Therefore, such illusion is not in reality an entity. (suggested by TJ)

58 अकल्पितोशिप्त ms
59 तत्तचतो ms
60 स्वतत्माभित्वेहस्तल्वाद् ॰ ms. KT:/la lahidod chags rgyu yin phyir/
61 एथासौ ms. KT:de nīd (tad eva, tattva)
Because it is proved by a portion of what is experienced in the world, there is no deficiency of analogy (dṛṣṭāntanyānatā).

Explanatory comment:
The opponents object again that if there is no non-imagined entity in illusion the māyā which Bhā-viveka adopted as an example would not be proper instance. There is, however, something material for making an illusion behind the illusion. That material can be the instance. Therefore, there is no deficiency in this instance.

Or, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the eye, etc. are devoid of own-being, because they are created, or because they are destroyed, just like the Buddha made by evil (māra).

The own-being of entities is not own-being from [the standpoint of the highest] truth, because it is created, just like the hotness or hardness of water.

Explanatory comment:
Here Bhā-viveka discusses the own-being of entities. What is assumed as the essence of entities in our world is not the essence of entities from the

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62 न [च] ms
63 भावशृष्ट्या ms. KT: dēños ḍhiid stoṇ
64 तत्वः ms
65 तत्वतः ms
perspective of the highest truth. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the essence of entities, i.e., the own-being of entities (svabhāva), of an independent, eternal and unchanging substance, is not admitted by the Mādhyamika school. Here Bhā-viveka does not define the own-being of entities, but it comes to mean the non-existence of entities. What is made or what disappears does not have own-being because such a thing changes in substance and hence is non-eternal.

For example, to follow TJ, when water is boiled, it becomes hot water; when frozen, water has solidity, i.e., becomes ice etc. Likewise, when water is cooled, it becomes cold water; at room temperature, it has softness, i.e., it is water itself. Therefore, water does not have an own-being; it is not an independent, eternal and unchanging substance. Thus, the essence of entities accepted in our everyday world is denied from the standpoint of the highest truth.

र्वात्मनैव66 हि भावानां उत्पादो नोषष्ठायते।
पर-भावेन67 चौत्पादो न हृष्टो गो: खरात्मना।$158$

It is not logically proper that entities arise by themselves (i.e. by their own-being). And it is not seen that [entities] arise through the state of another (i.e. as something else). Just as the arising of a cow in the form of a donkey is not seen.//158//

Explanatory comment:

TJ: The cow which has dewlap, tail, hoof and horn etc. as its essential features does not arise as the donkey which has single hoofs and long ears etc. as its essential features. Moreover, a cow is not produced from the cow itself. There would be no purpose in the repeated origination of a cow which is in existence already. Therefore, origination from an entity itself is not acceptable. Origination as other entities is not acceptable either.

66 स्वात्मन- ऐवं ms
67 पर-भावेन ms. KT: gshan gyi dnos por
2-2-A. The criticism of the four *pratyayas* or conditions

Introduction to verses 159-175

The Buddhist Realist, Vaibhāṣika and Ābhidharmika advocates the doctrine of origination from others. In these verses, Bhā-viveka refutes the four causal factors which appear to have been drawn from Hinayāna philosophy. According to Bhā-viveka, the Buddha taught that the existent does not appear out of the four conditions for people whose wisdom is covered by nihilistic or non-nihilistic views (suggested by TJ). For this reason, he recognized and proclaimed the four conditions only for the purpose of establishing the truth of verbal usage.\(^68\) The Vaibhāṣika, however, adopted this theory as the real truth which the Buddha realised, and they maintained that entities are produced from others, i.e., four causal factors. The four conditions are: (1) primary or material causal factor (*hetu-pratyaya*), (2) objective causal factor (*ālambana-pratyaya*), (3) sequential causal factor (*samanantara-pratyaya*), and (4) dominant causal factor (*adhipati-pratyaya*).\(^69\)

The production from others such as causal-conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) is conventional. Accordingly, there is no contradiction with the theory we have accepted. For they (the four *pratyayas*) do not truly exist from the standpoint of the highest truth.\(/159//\)

Explanatory comment:

The four causal factors are in general admitted by all the schools of Buddhist Realists. Bhā-viveka admits the four causal factors only from the

\(^68\) *Prajñapradīpa*, p. 27.
\(^69\) Cf. *Abhidharmakosabhāsya*, 2•61c-63.
\(^70\) pa[rel-]+{nma} ms. KT: gshan las / skye ba
\(^71\) *mārpa*- = ms. Ejima puts नालोभयुपेतत्वाभिधितस्. However, this is metrically unacceptable. KT: gnod pa med /
\(^72\) तत्तवो ms
\(^73\) तो ms. KT: de dag
standpoint of conventional truth. Bhā-viveka refutes each of the causal factors in the following verses.

2-2-1-(A). The criticism of the hetu-pratyaya or the primary causal factor

Introduction to verses 160-162

Hetu refers to 'primary cause' or might refer to simply 'primary' or 'root.' As the mind is a complex of a number of mental factors inseparably associated with one another, a hetu is only one of the factors constituting the mind just as a root of a tree is only one causal factor of the constituents of a tree. The hetu-pratyaya refers to the appropriate object of the mental process. When something is said to be the primary cause of another, that thing is said to be the hetu-pratyaya.  

र न सतो नासतो युक्त: प्रत्ययः सदसर्वत: ।
तदन्यवद् कते वा प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययः कुत: ॥१६०॥

It is not proper either that what exists or what does not exist has a causal condition, because of being in existence and not being in existence [respectively], just like things which are different from them [i.e., which are not effects].

Alternatively, how can the causal condition of something which does not arise [really] be a causal condition? //160//

\[74\] See, S. Chaudhri 1976: 113.
\[75\] सत: ms
\[76\] तदन्यवद् ms. KT: de las gshan bshin
\[77\] कते वा प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययः कुतः ms, which requires to be read "...प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययः कुतः, KT: rkyen ma skyes/ /rkyen rnam su ni ji ltar hgyur/
The cause is not what produces the result, because it is void of that (the result), just like things which are different from them. Nor is what is about to arise produced from that (the cause), because it does not exist beforehand, just like things which are different from them. //161//

This (the cause) does not produce what is not produced, what is in the process of being produced or what is already produced, because of the logical faults already stated and because [entities] do not arise. Therefore, there is truly no hetu [pratyaya]. //162//

Explanatory comment:

Here, Bhã-viveka poses the question whether the four conditions are for the result which exists or for the result which does not exist? There cannot be conditions for the result which does exist, because it already exists. For example, there is no clay seen causing a completed pot. Then, with regard to the result which does not exist, Bhã-viveka asserts that there are no causal conditions, because the result does not exist. For example, there is no seed or water as cause for the sky-flower. Accordingly, the primary or material condition (hetu-pratyaya) does not exist.

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78 KT: /skyē bar ḫdod pāḥaḥ des bskyeṛ min/ (nāpi tajjanmatotpitsuh)
79 सत्ताः =ms
80 जायमानम् -वा जातम् वा ms
81 ajā .. ms. KT: ma skyes phyir
82 धेतू न तत्तवः ms
83 See, vv. 151-152.
2-2-1-(B). The criticism of the ālambana-pratyaya or objective causal factor.

Introduction to verses 163-166

Ālambana refers to an ‘object of cognition.’ The ālambana-pratyaya is the objective sub-cause of the relation between the object and the subject of perception. All the conditioned (saṁskṛta) and the unconditioned (asaṁskṛta) function as the ālambana-pratyaya of the mind and mental states (citta-caitīta).  

For example, a weak man can neither get up nor stand without the help of a stick. The mind and the mental states can neither arise nor continue without an object of cognition. As stick is a support of the weak man, an object is the support of the mental function.

What is already arisen does not attach itself to a supporting cause for, [then] the arising of what is already arisen would be in vain. What is not arisen yet also [does not attach itself to the supporting cause], because it is not produced yet, just like what has non-arising as its nature.//163//

Explanatory comment:

The supporting object is the object of the mind and mental functions. That is, when what is going to be the object of the mind and mental functions becomes the cause, the result, “mind and mental functions” arise. Therefore, Bhā-viveka says that what is already arisen does not attach itself to the object, because for what is already arisen such a cause would be again vain. In other words, cognizing the object, mind or consciousness does not cognize the same object again. For example, cognizing a desk, the mind or consciousness does not need to cognize a desk again as a desk.

84 See, S. Chaudhuri 1976:114.
85 = ārambāna° ms. KT: dmigs
Moreover, what is not arisen yet does not attach itself to an object because it is not produced yet. For example, the eye of the barren woman’s child does not attach to an object. (TJ available)

[If one says that] what is in the process of coming to exist would attach itself to [the supporting cause], that [attaching] does not exist without support (ālambana). The inclusion of the action of being born in that which lacks some parts is not desired.\textsuperscript{164}/

Explanatory comment:
What is in the process of coming to exist does not attach itself to an object, because it has the nature of both what is already arisen and what is not yet to arise. Therefore, what is in the process of coming into existence does not have the function of cognizance of objects.

Alternatively, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that there is support for the mind and mental functions (citta-caitta) is not acceptable, because it is something in the process of coming into existence, or because it is something to be perceived (grāhya), just like a form (rūpa).\textsuperscript{165}/

\textsuperscript{86} = āramvaṇam ms. KT: dmigs pa
\textsuperscript{87} *yā° added under the line in ms.
\textsuperscript{88} *āṁgasya, ms
\textsuperscript{89} = āramvaṇam= ms. KT: dmigs pa
\textsuperscript{90} tattvātī ms
Explanatory comment:

From the standpoint of the highest truth there is no object in the mind and mental functions because this mind and these mental functions themselves are what is to be perceived, just as form, color etc. are what are to be perceived. In other words, they are identical from the viewpoint that both are in the process of coming into existence, that is, they are not completed yet as themselves. Therefore mind and mental functions do not have an objective sub-cause (ālambanapratyaya).

Moreover, [if one were to say that] what has a support (sālambana) would [attach to the object], it would not be proper because of the absence of difference of time (kālābhedā). Thus, since the object does not exist, what could be the object of what? //166//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents maintain that what has a support, i.e., mind and mental functions, attach to the object. Bhā-viveka, however, objects to this statement. I do not fully understand what Bhā-viveka says in this verse. His objection probably means: just as the right and left horns of a cow come out at the same time, ‘the mind and mental function’ and the object arise at the same time. Therefore, discrimination of what is grasped, i.e., the object, and what grasps, i.e., the mind and mental function, is not proper. In other words, what arises at the same time cannot be either what grasps or what is grasped. Accordingly, there is no object, so anything cannot be the object of anything. (suggested by TJ)

91 आरम्भणः ms. KT: dmigs bcas pa
92 कालाभेदः ms. KT: dus gcig phyir na
93 स चाप्पः अर्थः ms. KT: de mi ruṅ
94 अरम्भणः ms
95 अरम्भणः ms
Introduction to verses 167-169

Bhā-viveka criticizes the idea of the sequential condition (samanantara-pratyaya). The sequential condition appears to pertain primarily to the production of mental events. It may be taken to refer to the extinction of the immediately preceding moment of consciousness which engenders the succeeding mental state. In other words, the sequential condition may refer to the immediately preceding extinction of a cause, like a seed, which allows for the emergence of the effect, like the sprout.

What is not arisen yet is not blocked, because it has not arisen, just like the sky-flower. What has already disappeared is not blocked, because it has already disappeared, just as in the case of a dead person. //167//

Explanatory comment:

The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what is not arisen yet. What is not arisen yet has no disappearance, because it has had no arisen state, just as the sky-flower does not disappear.

Moreover, the sequential condition cannot be the condition of what has already disappeared. What has already disappeared has no disappearance, because it has already disappeared, just as a dead person does not die.

What has not disappeared yet is not [blocked], because it has not disappeared yet, just like a lamp (pradīpa) that is existing.
That what is in the process of disappearing disappears is not desired, because of the refutation already stated. //168//

96 निरुच्छलवाद् = ms
Explanatory comment:

The sequential condition cannot be the condition of what has not disappeared yet. What has not disappeared yet has no disappearance, because it has not disappeared yet, just like a lamp which is still existing. That is, what has not disappeared yet refers to what is existing. Something existing does not need a condition of arising.

Even then (tathāpi), [what is in the process of disappearing and what is in the process of coming to exist] would be simultaneous (tulyakāla) or temporally separate (bhinnakāla). [In any case,] it is not, like the final mind of an Arhat (arhaccarama-cittavat), justified because of its being in the process of disappearing. //169//

Explanatory comment:

In the case of what is in the process of disappearing the condition is denied in the same way. The opponents, according to TJ, maintain that what is in the process of disappearing supports the arising of that which is in the process of coming to exist. Accordingly, what is in the process of disappearing is the sequential condition. To this assertion Bhā-viveka objects that the sequential condition, i.e., what is in the process of disappearing, is not a sequential condition of what is in the process of coming into existence, because what is in the process of disappearing and what is in the process of coming into existence would be simultaneous. Or, even if they are not simultaneous, a sequential condition defined as what is in the process of disappearing is not a condition. In other words, that which is in the process of disappearing cannot be the condition of the

97 [युक्तो Ms
98 Ms puts here another half verse: सातम्बनत्वाद् अथ वा प्रत्ययः समानतरः/ Ejima suggests that it is left out in the Tibetan K and does not appear in V even in prose form. It might be omitted here for the same reasons; it seems to be misplaced and hardly interpretable when we pay attention to the context (k. 163-166: ālambana-pratyaya, k. 167-169: samanantara-pratyaya), and the writer of Ms writes the word “ālambana” in “āramvaṇa” in the preceding k. 163-166 while he writes it only here rightly, what leads us to suppose that this half verse was inserted at a certain occasion. It might be, however, copyist’s peculiarity, and may not come from Bhāviveka himself.
next arising, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind. The final mind of an Arhat means that when an Arhat is destroyed, after the next existence (punarbhava) and transmigration (saṁtāna) he reaches Nirvāṇa. Therefore, his mind does not produce the next mind (= next life).

2-2-1-(D). The criticism of the adhipati-pratyaya or the dominant causal factor.

Introduction to verses 170-175

Bhā-viveka refutes the dominant causal factor (adhipati-pratyaya). The dominant causal factor assists the other in respect of the origination of entities, just as the three legs of a tripod assist one another, without disturbing the arising of entities. Accordingly, everything can be a dominant causal factor (indirect cause). For example, water, earth, sun and warmth can be the dominant causal factors for the growing of seeds.

The being of entities is not logically proper, because the arising of [entities] does not exist from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, just like the existence of the barren woman’s child. Therefore, the dominant causal factor is not accepted.//170//

[If one were to accept:] the dominant causal factor would be either with the effect or without the effect. [The condition that] lacks [the effect] is not [the dominant causal factor], because it lacks that (the effect), just like the eye [sense] for cognition of words.//171//

99 तत्त्वतो ms
100 "सत्त्वकः" = ms
Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka says: the condition without the effect is not the dominant causal factor, because it is without the effect, just as the eye-organ is not the dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. According to Ābhidharmika, Vaibhāṣika, etc. everything can be a dominant causal factor. The eye organ, however, cannot be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. Instead, auditory consciousness can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of words. On the other hand, the eye organ can be a dominant causal factor of the cognition of the eye. Thus, the eye organ and cognition of words do not have interdependence. Moreover, the eye organ without eye-cognition cannot be the dominant causal factor of eye-cognition, because when there is no result there is no causal factor. Therefore, the condition without result cannot be the dominant causal factor. (suggested by TJ)

संवृपापि न चालविन्यः 101 प्रतीतिर बाधिकः 102 यतः 103।
कार्यः 104 च न भवेत् कार्यम् असत् कार्यं च ते भवेत्। ॥१७२॥

That which is not empty [of effect, i.e., which is coupled with an effect] is not [the dominant causal factor] even on the conventional level. For such a situation is opposed (bādhikā) to actual experience (pratīti). Moreover, there would be no effect in the such a effect. And what does not exist for you would become the effect.//172//

Explanatory comment:

Something which is coupled with an effect cannot be the dominant causal factor, because it already has an effect. Something which already has an result cannot be a causal factor. Moreover, if something which already has an effect

101 चालविन्य: (m, pl) ms
102 Ms sic
103 KT: /sbyaṅ la sogsa ga nas pa yi/ /rgyu tsam yod pa fi zi la/ (KD, NP, VDNP, sic) In V it is preceded by the following sentence: /mig ston pa shes bya ba la kun rdo so tu yaṅ grags paḥi gnod par ḥgyur te/ /gaṅ gi phyir she na/ /sbyaṅ la... (VD, Dsa 98b5-6; N, 102b3; P, 106a5), which, though not being a versified rendering of it, is connected with the pāda ab in KS if we can rectify "mi ston pa" (aśūnya).
104 =(k)[ā]rye ms. KT: ḥbras bu
associated with it, this could not be considered as the effect. It would pre-exist, or something else that is not an effect would be the effect.

If one were to say that the [latent] capability of the result (kārayaśkī) is the result, how can there be a cause other than that (latent capability of the result)? A relation of the recipient and the thing to be received (ādharādheyabhāvo) is not desired in the case of anything else [other than cause and effect].//173//

If this [latent capability of the result] is just a synonym for the result, just as in the usage "there is a space in the space," what could be admissible as that (cause) with which that (result) is seen as associated.//174//

Explanatory comment:

The opponent maintains that the latent capability of effect is the effect and that latent capability exists in the cause. To this statement Bhā-viveka asks: If that is so, how can there be a cause other than the latent capability of the effect. That is, if the latent capability exists in the cause, the cause would be unnecessary.

Bhā-viveka continues, moreover, by asking: if this latent capability of the effect is just a synonym for the effect as in the usage "there is a space in the space." That is, if the latent capability of the effect is a synonym for the effect, the cause and the effect would be indentical. There is, however, no relationship of place and what is to be placed. In other words, the usage "there is a space in

105 व्योमिन् "न्योः ms
106 यथासौ ms. KT: gal te niid
107 कि ms
the space" does not make sense. Therefore, the idea that "the latent capability is a synonym for the effect" is not admitted.

Because there is no arising of what is existing, what is taken as the dominant causal factor for what? On the other hand, because what is not existing does not have a cause, what is taken as the dominant causal factor of what?//175//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that the latent capability of an effect is what pre-exists in the cause. To this statement Bhā-viveka responds: if the cause is the latent capability of the effect, what is the effect which the cause has? He, moreover, states that because there is no repeated arising in what already exists, how can it be understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z? Likewise, because there is no condition in what is not existing, how can it be understood whether the dominant causal factor becomes effect Y or effect Z?

Thus, Bhā-viveka refutes the idea of the dominant causal factor even from the standpoint of conventional truth as well as from the standpoint of the highest truth.

2-2-2 The problem of the pratyakṣa and pratīti.

2-2-2 The problem of the pratyakṣa and pratīti.

\[108\text{ सम्बन्धः ms. KT: skye ba (sambhava)}\]
\[109\text{ आधिपतिर् ms}\]
\[110\text{ हष्ट् ms}\]
\[111\text{ हष्ट् प्रतीतिर् बाध्यं ms. KT: mñon sum dañ ni grags pa yi/ /gnod pas}\]
A possible objection (cet): An earthen pitcher, etc. are seen as produced. Reasoning (hetu) has no role to play in the case of what is perceived. [If you use hetu,] the invalidation of what is actually seen (drśta) and actual experience (pratīti) becomes something that invalidates it. //176//

By a knowledge which is similar to that of the ignorant person (bālasāmānya), the arising of the pitcher, etc. is perceived. We do not deny such [an opinion]. Therefore, there is no deficiency (doṣa) pointed out. //177//

In the ultimate analysis, a cognition which has form as its object (ālambana) [and] is self-conscious does not exist. Hence, for us the “invalidation” by that (direct perception) would not be an invalidation because that (direct perception) does not arise [in the ultimate reality]. //178//

From the standpoint of the highest truth, it is not logical that a cognition of direct perception which is in accordance with the object should exist, because it is not distinguished (i.e. it does not really differ) from the knowledge of an ignorant person, just like the cognition of the circle for a fire-brand. //179//

112 KT: gaṇ phyir de ni mi ḷṣog pas/ (=pratīṣṭhānaiḥ yata nedaiḥ?)
113  "ālambana ms
114 tascet: ms
115 tadbhāva ms. KT: de yi gnod pa
116 pra....dhī ms. KT: mṭion sum blo ni
The direct perception which has] that (form, etc.) as the object-sphere is not a really existing substance, because it is what is created, just like the cognition of ātman. And, direct perception would not be a refutation for us because form, etc. are not really existing substances. //180//

Actual experience does not invalidate the thought coming from the wisdom of wise men. The word of people who are blind is not considered eligible with respect to truth because of their covering of ignorance. //181//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents claim that Bhā-viveka’s reason (hetu) in his syllogism is not valid because his reason would be opposed by direct perception (pratyakṣa) and actual experience (pratiti). In the syllogism, for example, “from the standpoint of the highest truth, a pot has no real existence, because it is what is produced (or made), just like a cloth,” the thesis and example are reasonable. The reason, however, is not sound. For it is, by direct perception, seen and understood that a pot is a thing which is produced or made from clay, water, a lathe, potter etc. Thus, for Bhā-viveka’s opponents the reason in the syllogism is invalidated by direct perception and actual experience.

On the other hand, for Bhā-viveka, direct perception and actual experience cannot refute his view. The arising of a pot, etc. is perceived by the means of knowledge accessible to an ignorant (=ordinary) person. Direct perception can be admitted in terms of conventional truth yet not from the standpoint of the highest truth. The knowledge derived from direct perception, from the standpoint of the highest truth, does not correspond to its object. For example,
seeing the revolving fire brand, an ordinary person cognizes it as a circle, which it is not.

Likewise, actual experience cannot refute Bhā-viveka’s syllogism either. The word of people blinded by ignorance cannot be admitted as truth. That is, since people are affected by ignorance, their so called actual experiences are not acceptable as superior means of knowing from the standpoint of the highest truth.

2-2-3. The criticism of the theory of the Sāṁkhya system

Introduction to verses 182-191.

According to TJ, in these verses Bhā-viveka discusses the doctrine of “pre-existence of the effect in the cause in a potential state” (satkāryavāda). He, however, has already criticized this doctrine in verses 139-146 (the section of “non-production from itself”). Instead, it seems Bhā-viveka is actually referring to the pradhāna (primary matter) and puruṣa (pure consciousness) which the Sāṁkhya system advances as the cause of all phenomenon. According to Sāṁkhya philosophy, these two are independent existences and ungenerated existences. Bhā-viveka criticizes this idea.

सतो श्रीप जन्म नामीच्छ. सत: कि जन्मना भवेत्। 118
स्थौल्यं चेन्न च सत्कार्यं, स्थौल्यस्यासेभवात्। 119 पुरा। ॥१८२॥

It is not acceptable that there is arising of what already exists. What is the point of the arising of what already exists?
If one answers: there is grossness (sthāulya) [as new element when an effect comes about, we reply that then] the effect does not exist [in the cause] because of the impossibility of grossness (sthāulya) in the previous [cause] state. //182//

118 KT:/yod pa ci phyir skye bar ḡgyur/ (Eng. tr. Why does what already exists arise?)
119 sth(au)l(ya)sya° ms
Moreover, what [we consider] the grossness of the eye is not created by its causal conditions (=causes), because it (grossness) does not exist beforehand, just like a pot, or just like the \textit{puru\textashelper{s}a}, because it (grossness) is what is to be known (\textit{jñeya}).//183//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that there is grossness of an effect in a cause. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects: Because there is no effect in the cause, there is no grossness in the previous cause state. For example, there are no thick trunk or rank twigs etc. in a seed of a fig tree. (TJ available) Bhā-viveka continues his objection. The grossness of something is not created by its causes. For example, a pot is not made by grossness of the pot. The grossness of the pot does not exist beforehand. The pot is made by clay, water etc.

\textit{सामान्यं प्र च संबूत्या भोक्त्राद्य अभिमंत हि न:} 121
\textit{नातो हृष्टान्त-दोषोः पि कवचिद् अन्तःपपद्यते} //184//

In the conventional [truth] we (also) generally accept the experiencer, etc. \textit{(bhoktrādi)}. Hence, the deficiency (\textit{doṣa}) of the analogy (\textit{dṛṣṭānta}) does not occur anywhere here (i.e. in the preceding statement).//184//

Explanatory comment:

The Śāṁkhya system claims that you cannot use the ‘experiencer’ as an analogy when you do not accept the existence of an experiencer. Bhā-viveka, however, admits the existence of an experiencer as a general convention. Therefore, there is no deficiency of the analogy in Bhā-viveka’s statement.

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{120} सत्वाद् ms
\item \texttt{121} हि त् ms
\end{itemize}
If [the Sāṁkhya] were to say: "there is no deficiency [in our claim] because of manifestation (abhivyakti) (i.e. what we are speaking about is really manifestation of the effect, not new physical creation)," [we ask:] for instance what is manifested by what? [If the Sāṁkhya replies that] "for example, by means of [the light of] a lamp, a pot [is manifested]," [we say] no. For this is manifestation of what exists already. //185//

Even on the conventional level, [it is obvious that] by means of a lamp, a pot is joined with the light, or the perception of that (i.e. pot) is created, or the arisal of something opposite [to light, i.e. darkness] is created. //186//

Explanatory comment:

The Sāṁkhyas maintain that the existent does not arise, but simply becomes manifest. To this statement Bhā-viveka asks what is manifested by what? If a pot is manifested by means of the light of a lamp, it is not proper, because a pot is what is already arisen. Therefore it is not admissable that what is already arisen manifests itself. Only the features of a pot are seen by means of the light of a lamp. A pot itself has been existent before the light is turned on. Therefore, the unmanifest, i.e., pot, etc., does not become manifest.

The unmanifested (abhivyakta) is not manifested, because it is non-manifested (i.e. is a non-manifested) principle, just like the sky-flower. Or, from the standpoint of [the Sāṁkhya] himself, [we] could point out [the following disproving anology]: just like the experiencer and the primary material cause (pradhāna). //187//
Further objection against the Sāṁkhya: If that [experimenter] also is manifested, the experimenter would be neither omnipresent (sārvagata), causeless (ahetud), or sentient (cetana), and its unmanifestness (avyaktatva) would be lost.//188//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka maintains that what does not exist does not become manifest. The sky-flower, for example, is not manifested, because it does not exist. Then Bhā-viveka refers to pradhāna and puruṣa considered as already existing. Considering that both a pot and pradhāna or puruṣa are what already exist, he objects that the unmanifested does not become manifest, because it is not manifested (i.e. is an unchanging existential). If what already exists, i.e., puruṣa, becomes manifest, it would not be puruṣa which has characteristic of omnipresence, etc. and its unmanifestness would be lost. Bhā-viveka, moreover, maintains that if pradhāna becomes manifest, its omnipresence, etc. would be lost that is, pradhāna would be the manifestor of itself. Therefore, the unmanifestness of both puruṣa and pradhāna would be lost.

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123 =avyaktatvañ=ca ms. KT: m gsal ba yan (avyaktatvar ca)
124 vyakti+++peça ms. SG: vyakti+++rūpeça. The restoration above is Ejima’s provisional.
KT does not translated ‘svarūpeça.’ I translated this verse based upon my understanding.
125 The Tibetan editions are based on a Sanskrit text slightly different from our ms. KT says: If pradhāna is manifested, your pradhāna which is an effect and which is changed would be manifestation. This [idea] is not accepted.)
It is thought that “X1,” “X2,” “X3” etc. are the manifestors of “Y,” but they are not admitted [by us] as manifestors of “Y,” because of the reasons ‘being of the cause’ (kāraṇatva), etc., just as thread, etc. [are not manifestors of] yogurt. //190//

If [the Sāṁkhya] were to say that “because the thread, etc. have a latent capability (śakti) for [producing of] that (yogurt), your example is deficient,” [we reply that] that is not [so]. For they (the thread, etc.) are not the manifestors of that (yogurt) as thread, etc. //191//

Explanatory comment:

The Sāṁkhya think that X1, X2, X3 etc. are the manifestor of something Y. Bhā-viveka, however, does not accept this idea. I do not fully understand what Bhā-viveka says here. Bhā-viveka probably means: for example, yogurt is not made by thread, etc. Yogurt is made by milk. Therefore, thread, etc. cannot be the cause of yogurt. In other words, thread, etc. are not manifestors of yogurt. Even if the thread, etc. have a latent capability of producing yogurt, they cannot be the cause of yogurt, because the thread, etc. cannot be the cause of yogurt as the thread, etc. themselves. (suggested by TJ)

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126 तद्वचन्यन्याजक रत्ता ms. KT://de dag de gsal byed mi Ḥdod/, cf. K. 191cd.
127 तद्वचन्यन्याजक ms
128 In ms follows a verse:

Ejima suggests that it is the same with what appears once more as k. 193. This may be a misplacement in comparison with the Tibetan versions of K and V.
2-3. Non-production from itself and others.

Introduction to verses 192-193.

There are those who, like Jains, maintain that cause and effect are both identical and different. That is, they claim that entities are produced both from themselves and others. For example, in the case of the production of a gold ring, cause and result are both identical and different. Inasmuch as the gold ring is produced from gold, it is produced from itself, i.e., cause and effect are identical. Nevertheless, inasmuch as causes like an artisan and heat are also required for the production of the effect, however, the gold ring is produced from others. That is, the cause and effect are different. Therefore, the causal relation is one of both identity and difference.

Production from neither itself nor from something else is acceptable. Nor is the [production of] an entity which exists and which does not exist acceptable, because a statement speaking of both [possibilities as the one referred to just now] which has already been examined in the proper way, [and rejected] is inexistent [cannot be entertained].//192//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka claims that the idea of “production from both itself and something else” should be negated by the aforesaid two syllogisms, i.e., the syllogism about non-production from itself and the syllogism about non-production from others, because here “self and others” is nothing but a combination of “self” and “others.”

129 svaparasyān=na=[nm]=eṣṭaṁ ms. KT:/bdag dañ gshan las skye ba dañ//......mi ḷdod/
130c=āsadasadātmanāḥ ms. KT: bdag ŋid yod dañ med
Even on the standpoint of conventional level it is not desired that the effect is manifested by its conditions, because an effect follows the changes of that (cause), just as [manifestation of] a pot through soil, etc. (mrd).//193//

Explanatory comment:
Clay, for example, is a cause of a pot. In other words, a pot is an effect of soil. The pot, however, is not manifested by soil, because when the pot produced, soil itself has been destroyed. Accordingly, the effect, i.e., the pot, is not manifested by its cause, i.e., soil.

2-4. Non-production from ahetu “without cause”

Introduction to verses 194-195
Some thinkers, like nihilists, proclaim that entities are produced without cause. In the following verses Bhā-viveka criticizes their view.

Even from the standpoint of conventional [truth], it is not desired that the eye is produced from nothing, because it comes to be associated with universality (sāmānyā) and particularity (viśeṣa), just as in the case of pot. (kuṇḍa).//194//

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131 Ms here reads “kāmasya” instead of “kārasya” in verse misplaced after k. 191. See the footnote 140.
132 This verse is the same with the superfluous one that is misplaced just after k. 191.
133 =आकर्षणः = ms. KT: glo bur
134 सामान्ये ms
Moreover, because it is a result, because it is produced in a [specific] sequence, because it can be destroyed [later], because it can change, because there is regularity of cause and causal conditions, and because it comes into existence -- this is what one should notice.//195//

Explanatory comment:

The assertion of a production without cause means that it is no longer held that the result is produced from a cause which is itself or that the effect is produced from a cause other than itself. In other words, the effect is produced by chance. Those who assert that entities are produced without causes admit only perception, and ignore the causality. For example, a pot possesses both universal features (sāmānyā-lakṣaṇa) and specific features (sva-lakṣaṇa). That is to say, a pot has hardness, etc. Hardness, etc. are generally known as the features of the pot. The pot also has colour, design, shape etc., which are specific features. As long as a pot has universal features and specific features, it has causality, that is, it is produced from causes. Besides the two features, Bhā-viveka mentions other features of entities in verse 195. (my own understanding)

Here, the qualification, i.e., from the standpoint of the highest truth, is not added to Bhā-viveka's syllogism refuting the opponent's assertion. Probably, the intention of this section is that causality should be examined. Therefore, it might be pointless to discuss the production without cause from the standpoint of the highest truth.

2-5. The criticism of Lokāyas

Introduction to verses 196-214

Those who, like the Lokāyas and ājīvikas, do not concede the existence of a next life, and deny the result of an action, consequently negate the necessary
causal ground for the existent, and assert the production of entities without cause. In the following, Bhā-viveka attacks them.

One might say: it is not thought that a clay ball (śivaka) which has disappeared due to another’s arising is produced [again], because it is already destroyed, or because it is a result, just like a pot (kuṇḍa).//196//

Just as a pot which has disappeared as a pot is not produced, a clay ball is not produced, if this is what you mean (abhīṣṭa), then [by this statement of yours] nothing but something desired [by us] is proved.//197//

Explanatory comment:

Here, Bhā-viveka points out the opponent’s contrariety of syllogism. Bhā-viveka says that the statement of the opponent proves what he (Bhā-viveka) wishes to prove. That is to say, the statement of the opponent ‘it is not thought that a clay ball which has disappeared due to another’s arising (=arising of a pot) is produced again’ cannot be the objection for Bhā-viveka’s idea.

According to M. Monier-Williams 1899, this word means (1) an idol or image of Śiva (2) a pillar or post to which cows are tied (to be milked or for rubbing against). According to St. Petersburg Wörterbuch, the word means (1) ein Idol Čiva’s (2) ein Pfal, an den eine Kuh gebunden wird oder an den sie sich kratzt. Thus, according to the dictionaries consulted the word does not have the meaning “soil.” However, the Tibetan translator uses the word “ḥjin goṇ.” From the context, his gloss should be taken as meaning “soil.”
Now, if [your reason "because it is already destroyed" in v. 196 means: ‘because its] cause has already been blocked,’ there would be contrariety of reason (i.e. you would be giving a reason opposite to what you wish to prove). Or, if your reason means: [because] what has not been destroyed yet [disappears] as a continuous existence,' your reason would be inconclusive (i.e. you will not be able to point out a definite, specific cause). //198//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents explain the meaning of reason (hetu) in verse 196. However, even they try to explain or to interpret the reason ‘because it is already destroyed’ in various ways, they cannot prove their opinion. It is the fact that what is already destroyed is never produced again, therefore, the reason which the opponents advanced does not make sense.

अरित गर्भाविशेषः प्रागु अनन्तर-निरुच्छ-धीः।
झेप-भेदेन तद्भेदाद्धीतीवाद्व जायि तदुपर्यत् II.199II

The cognition (buddhi) which has just been blocked exists in the cognition that begins within the womb (garbha), because it becomes different with the distinction of what is to be known (i.e. of the object), or, because it is a cognition (dhitva), just like the cognition later than that (i.e. just like a subsequence cognition). //199//

चैतन्य शब्द-बुद्धिर्य रूप-बुद्धिश् च जायते।
झेप-भेदात् 142 तयोर एवं भिन्न-संतानप्रोर 143 चथा II.200II

Because of the difference of object, the identity of ‘X’s cognition of an expression and cognition of a form is like the identity of two persons with different continuua (i.e. such an identity does not exist). //200//

141 अरित गर्भाविशेषः =तु परात्=अ+.... निरुच्छ-धीः: ms. SG......prāg =a+n.tarani.ruddhadhīḥ.
KT:/mṇāl gnas sānon rol blo la ni//mdun rol kho nar ḥgags blo yod/
142 KT: gshan phyir, "jñeya." is not translated in KT.
143 संतानप्रोर = ms
Therefore, there is an impossibility of an analogy [in verse 199]. Oneness (ekatva) of cognition does not arise. Nor does oneness of them [on account of the reason] “because it is cognition” arise, because [the reason] would be vitiated (vyabhicāra) by another [person’s] cognition. //201//

Explanatory comment:
I do not fully understand what these verses say. Probably this verse means: The Lokāyatas do not admit the transmigration. The Buddhists, however, admit the transmigration on the conventional level. After a person dies, the next cognition of the person begins within the womb. It is not the same cognition with the cognition which the person had before his or her death. This process continues as long as a person is in the conventional world. Therefore, in verse 199 Bhā-viveka advances the analogy ‘just like the cognition later than that, that is, just like a subsequent cognition. Moreover, oneness of previous cognition and later cognition does not arise, because, as mentioned above, the cognition of previous life and the cognition of later life are different from each other, just as the cognitions of two persons are different from each other.

The non-believers [in the Buddhist’s message] (nāstika) may say as follows:

144 Ṛṣṭṭanāṁśaṁbhvasu tasyān. nāmekvar jāyate dhīye: ms. KT://de phyir pha rol phyir yān ni//dpe med par ni mi ḡgyur te/ which differs from the reading in ms.
145 dhīlānasya nāmyati ms
146 vyabhicāryā ms. KT: ḡkhrul par ḡgyur phyir ro/
147 pratiśamṭik mś. KT: mtshams sbyor med/
The mind of an ignorant person at the time of death does not attain re-birth \( (aparita-sandhika) \), because it is a mind at the time of death \( (cyuticitta) \), just like the final mind of an Arhat \( (arhacaramacittavat) \). 

[In response, we say your] reason would be inconclusive \( (anaikāntika) \) because of the mind at the time of death in the past \( (atitaccyuticeta) \). And since recollection of a previous existence remains, that [mind at the time of death] exists also on account of the reasoning [already] given \( (uktanīti) \).

Explanatory comment:

The opponents do not admit the next life. From this viewpoint, they state that when a person dies, his or her mind does not attain re-birth, just as the final mind of an Arhat does not attain re-birth. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects. On the conventional level, it is admitted that a person has recollection of a previous life. Therefore, the mind at the time of death in which recollection of previous existence remains.

\[ \text{च्युति-चित्तं जनकं भजत्वं एवान्य-चेतसं} \]
\[ \text{साविद्यत्वाद्} 148 \text{ अनायर्यस्य चित्तं तत्-जनकं यथा} \]

The mind at the time of death becomes a generator \( (janaka) \) of another mind, because it has ignorance \( (sāvidyā) \), just as the mind of a dishonourable person \( (anārya) \) generates that (another mind).

Explanatory comment:

As mentioned above, the opponents state that a mind at the time of death does not produce the next mind, just as a mind of an Arhat does not produce the next mind. To this statement Bhā-viveka objects: an ordinary person has ignorance, therefore, a mind at the time of death produces the next mind. That is, as long as one who has ignorance, his or her mind is produced every time of death, i.e., there is transmigration.

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148 sā. [dyā]tvād= ms. KT: /ma rig pa dañ bcas pahi phyir/
[The non-believers might state as follows:] it is not desired that body, sense organs and cognition (śarīrendriya-buddhi) are produced by their own action, because they are perishable, just like a pot. Therefore, the next world does not exist. //205//

[However, what do we Mādhyamikas have to do with the view that] since “A” is generated neither by the same “A” nor by another, the body (deha) is not produced either by one’s own action or by that of another. Either way we have nothing to lose. //206//

[If one were to say: body, etc are] not produced by the action [of human beings], there is no supporting instance (nidarṣana) of your statement. [If one were to say: the tree (Tib.: śiṅ, Skt.: vrksa), etc are not produced by the action of human beings], the tree, etc. are produced by the power of the action of human beings (akarmajanita). //207//

//sems dmyal gnas dan mtshon dan dpag bdam shiṅ skye bshin// //208ab//
Just as the sword and the felicitous pearls arise in hell and heaven respectively. //208ab//

Explanatory comment:

According to the Lokāyatas, human beings consist of elements of earth, water, fire and wind. While alive they are independent existences. After their death, they return to their conglomerations of each element respectively, i.e., the element of earth returns to the conglomeration of the element of the earth and so on. The Lokāyatas, etc. claim that the production of a body has no cause and is a matter of chance. By contrast, Buddhism does not admit the production of entities without cause. Bhā-viveka denies their statement “the body, etc. are not produced from action” because they do not give a valid example. In this case, their example should be “just as a tree is not grown by the force of action of human beings, but just consists of the elements of earth and water etc.” The growing of trees however, needs the force of action of human beings. Without it, a tree does not arise, grow or bear fruit. In some cases, it might be that just as the sword, which is a symbol of suffering, arises in hell whereas the felicitous pearls, which are a symbol of pleasure, arise in heaven. (my own understanding)

भूतेभ्यं च कथं बुद्धिः तदत्यन्त-विलक्षणं।

How can a cognition which has completely different characteristics from those (=gross elements) (tadanyantavilakṣaṇā) arise from gross elements? //208//

अचेतनानां भूतानां चैतन्यं वस्त्रशक्तिवादः।
सूर्य-कान्तानिवद् वापि जायते जातिमत्तत:॥२०९॥

[If one were to say:] consciousness (caitanya) seen [on the part of] unconscious gross elements is like the power to intoxicate (madaśkta) or

\[156\] cai+... ms SG: cai(ta)nyām. KT: śes pa yod pa ŋid.
\[157\] जातिमत्तत: ms
like the fire which arises out of the sun-stone (sūryakānta), because it has arising.//209//

[You] still have deficiency of analogy [in your statement] because there is no consciousness in the ability of liquor. And there would be a contrariety of reason [in your statement] because non-equivalent kinds of cause are used.//210//

That internal gross elements (ādhyātmikāni bhūtāni) are not cognizors (i.e. cognition) is understood, because they have firmness, etc. (kaṭhinādi), or because they are gross elements, just like other similar entities.//211//

Explanatory comment:
I do not understand what these verses mean. Probably these verses mean: As mentioned above, the Lokāyatas state that human beings consist of elements of earth, water, fire and wind. Bhā-viveka, however, objects to this view. The elements of earth, water etc. have firmness, and they are gross element. It is known that the firmness is an intrinsic nature of earth, not an intrinsic nature of cognizors, i.e., beings. Accordingly, earth, etc, which have firmness, etc. cannot be human beings.

158 अचेतन्यां Ms. KT: śes yod ma yin pas.
159 हेतुत्म प्राचीन ms. KT: khyod kyi.
160 Ms sic. All of the Tibetan versions: rgyu rnams rigs mthun yin paḥi phyir/=-tun-yi-ma-he-rig-mtshun-yi-pa-.  
161 boddhirinti ms  
162 KT: sa la sogs paḥi.  
163 भूतवाच्चि Ms. KT: ḥbyun ba yin phyir.
Therefore, the wise man should understand that sense-consciousness (viṣṇāṇa) which begins within a womb, etc. is preceded by another previous sense-consciousness, because it is one which cognizes, just like the [sense-consciousnesses] which comes after it. //212//

A calf seeks food after birth because of earlier practice (i.e. habit) formed in its previous [life], because it moves for the purpose of [searching for] food, just like a full-grown sense organ (parinātendriya). //213//

[Our] reason [“because it moves for the purpose of searching food"] would not be uncertain (anaikāntika) due to the stone [which is moved] by a magnet. And [our reason would not be] incomplete because the eating of that (calf) is actually perceived (tadāhārābhṛyavahṛti). //214//

Explanatory comment:

When a person is born, his or her cognition is produced, but it is not a completely new production. The next cognition of the person is made immediately after his or her death. For example, a calf seeks food without learning how to obtain food. That is, a calf knows how to obtain the food because of earlier practice formed in the previous life.

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164 gra[ha]..+....ddhavat ms SG: grāhaka(tvā)t=tadūrddh(a(?rdhva)vat. KT:ḥdsin pa yin phyir de ḥog bshin/
165 Ms sic. KT:/byun ma thag tu las ḥtshol byed/ (=jātastha āhāram eṣate).
166 हारार्थ ms
167 नानेकान्तिकता ms
168 Ms sic. KT:/ kha[l]on gis ni rdo bskyod pas/.
2-6. The criticism of acceptance of God, etc.

The world is not made by God, because it is the cause of pleasure for [only] some people, just as the worldly lord who gives pleasure does not have God as his creator.//215//

The universe is not made by God, because the universe does not have a cause, or because the universe does not arise, just as it is not desired that a sky-flower be the cause of the universe.//216//

God is not the ultimate cause of the universe, because he has a mind, just as a cowherd (gopa) is not the ultimate cause of the universe.//217//

Any individual is not the lord [of everything] because an entity is produced by the totality (sāmagrī) [of causes]. And, nothing has a single

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169 added in the margin in ms
170 n=eso viśva....+na[ri] ms. KT:/dban phyug kun gyi rgyur mi ḍod/  
171 Ms. sic. KT:/ḥgro ba ma lus ḍdi dag gi/ (aṣeṣasyāśya jagat)
172 चित् (ms
173 भाजिने: ms. KT:/dnos rnams...hgrub paḥi phyir/
174 नानेकामतिताव: //आप्ते //
creator. Therefore, [the reason “because it has a mind”] is not inconclusive.//218//

If [one were to say:] “that the eye, etc. have God as their creator is accepted, because they are many, just like servants,” [we reply:] because an unborn and single God has not been proved, established, Īśvara would be the opposite of that (i.e. of what you normally take God to be - one and uncreated).//219//

Now if [you were to say:] “that [the eye, etc.] have a creator is desired by us, because they have been produced, just like a pot, etc,” [then in this case,] the ‘creator’ (kartā) does not have definite particularity (anirdiśṭaviśeṣa), therefore, you would be proving something already proved [by us] (siddhasādhana).//220//

Then, [if one were to refer to a ‘creator’] with particular [features] such as ‘eternal,’ ‘single’ and ‘minute’ etc., there would be no logical connection (anvaya) in your statement. Further, [if you give an example “just like a potter for a pot,”] there would be an occurrence of a deficiency (doṣa) i.e., that (Īśvara) is ‘the uneternal,’ ‘the material’ and ‘the arisen’ in your statement.//221//

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175 *=ईसें ms. KT bdaṅ phyug gcig (eko īso)
176 Ms. sic. KT: khyad par ma bstan paḥi/ (=अनिर्दिष्टविशेषो हि?)
177 कर्त्ता ms
178 चतुः ms
If you were to say that as conventional truth, God is the action which causes manifoldness of the world called being and the receptacle (sattvabhañjana), then the proved is being proved (i.e. you will prove what we have already proved.\[222\]

Thus, with this (reasoning) one should reject [saying] that the world is made by ‘time,’ ‘puruṣa,’ ‘pradhāna,’ ‘atoms’ (paramāṇu) or ‘Viṣṇu’.\[223\]

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka maintains that nothing is produced not only by Īśvara, but also by kāla (time), puruṣa, pradhāna (ultimates in the Sāṁkhya) and pramāṇu or by a personal God like Viṣṇu. Some thinkers say that the whole world is produced by a creator such as Īśvara (God). To this statement Bhā-viveka objects. On the conventional level, for the Mādhyamikas entities which includes an universal world is produced from causes. They are not produced by single cause, like God. Moreover, even the opponents refer to the God (creator) with qualifications such as eternal, single, subtle etc; they cannot prove production of entities from the God (creator), because the God should be eternal, single, subtle etc. That is, qualifications to the God indicate that the God is uneternal, many etc. Therefore, the opponents cannot establish their opinion.

179 सत्वः ms
180 kar(m)=e+[Ś]=[c][e][t]=sa(m)vyāms. KT: ......las//dbaṅ phyug yin na kun rdsob tuḥaṅ.
2-7. Dṛṣṭi “view”

Introduction to verses 224-229

The theme here is the negation of the classification of eternalism (sāsvoatavāda) and destructionism (ucchedavāda).

If one were to say that “since from the arising of the Buddhas comes the destruction of blinded vision. Therefore, likewise, the arising of sense organs is desired.” [We say:] this is false answer (uttara).//224//

When there is non-production [of entities] because of the non-existence of the process of time (adhvan), which view on whose part is desired by us! (i.e. we do not propound any view for any one as real.) Therefore, the arising of the Buddhas [is considered to be] an agent (kartya) for making [people] understand what never came to be (i.e. the Buddhas come into existence in our view only to let people grasp that nothing come into existence).//225//

Explanatory comment:

The opponents state that because there is arising of the Buddha, there is the destruction of wrong views. It means that because there is a cause, there is the effect. Therefore, there should be arising of sense organs as the cause of grasping of objects. Bhā-viveka, however, objects to this statement. Arising of the Buddha is said for those who have wrong views, i.e., production of entities, etc. That is to say, in the ultimate reality there is no arising of the Buddha. On

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181 "विध्वंसस्" ms. KT: sel ba.
182 बुधोत्पादो = ms
183 स्या° added under the line in ms
the conventional level, the Buddha comes into existence in our view to let people grasp that nothing has come into existence.

If the non-god is not different from a god, how can there not be permanence? If the non-god is different from a god, how can absence of being cut off (=being destroyed) make sense?//226//

Even if one were to say that there is ineffability [one cannot decide whether identical or different], just like that of a pot, how could there be the abandonment of extirpation, i.e., permanence? Even if one were to say that [the identity] exists or does not exist, there is no passing over of the other in Nirvāṇa.//227//

Explanatory comment:

The classification of permanence and extirpation denotes the same result of emphasizing only one of these two in cognition, perception and inference. Therefore, the Buddha proclaimed the middle path because he was aware of these two extreme views. Here, Bhā-viveka shows the idea of the middle path in order to deny the two classifications of eternalism and nihilism. Verse 227 indicates the idea of the middle path. Bhā-viveka maintains in this verse that there is no classification of eternalism and destructionism from the standpoint of the highest truth.

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184 कथं-ए[ब]्याश्चर्यं ms. KT:/des na jī ltar rtag mi hgyur/ We could read this as “कथं एव न शाश्वतं” or “कथं एव न शाश्वतं” as in k. 228b, but here Ejima takes into consideration the possibility of contrast between “anucchedaḥ” and “aśāśvataṁ”.

185 सदस्त्रे ms
If it be the case that what has been blocked arises, how can there not be eternal? If it be the case that what has been blocked does not arise, how can there not be propounding of nihilism? //228//

Since continuity (samātā) does not really exist, how can there be extirpation and permanence? Since that (samātā) does not exist, the non-arising [of samātā] from the standpoint of non-extirpation and non-permanence (anučchedaśāśvata) is proper. //229//

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka says that nihilism and eternalism should be denied because continuity does not exist. What does not exist, in other words, does not have either destruction or eternity because it does not have a beginning or end.

2-8. Duḥkha “suffering”

If one were to say: “the Buddhas taught dharma in order to secure non-arising of suffering. Accordingly, the effect (non-arising of suffering) of

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186 or “अनुपादाय निरृद्धस्य”. अनुपादाय निरृद्धस्य ms. KT://ḥgags pa skye ba med gyur na/
187 कस्य जत्तु निन्त्रेषायायाय: ms. KT://rtag chad de dag ga la yod/
188 तत्कत् च ms
189 कस्यानुपादाय हन्यत ms. KT://gal te de ni skye ḍod na/
that (the teaching of the Buddha) exists, arising of [suffering] is approved [by us].” //230//

[In response, we say:] as mentioned before, that (suffering) does not arise, [even if] the arising of that (suffering) is admitted, non-arising of that (suffering) is not an effect. But comprehension (parijñā) of that (non-arising of suffering) is an effect of that (namely, the teaching of the Buddhas). //231//

तेनेव तस्याकरणात् स्व-कृत्त तन् न युज्यते |
अन्येनान्य-क्रियायोगान्।।\^0190 न चान्य-कृत्तम् इष्टते। || ३ २ ॥

That [result] ought not be self-made, since a thing does not make itself. And, because X does not have contact with Y’s action, it is not desired that a thing is made by an other. //232//

न स्व-संतानां दुःखम् इष्टोऽस्त्वाद्यसंभवात्।।\^0191 न तैस्रोऽस्त्वाद्यसंभवात्।।\^0192 ॥
अद्भूतवाद् अभेदायः च दुःखं तनं नापि संतते।।\^0193 ॥२ ३ ३॥

Because of the impossibility of spiritual essence (sattva), etc, it is not desired that suffering be born from its own continuity (sva-saṅtāna). And, because it is not a real entity and it does not have distinction (abheda), there is no suffering in continuity. //233//

Explanatory comment:

One critic objects that the Buddha taught the teachings (dharma) in order to aim at the non-arising of suffering. This means the existence of the arising of suffering. However, even if the arising of suffering is admitted, suffering does not have arising as itself (svabhāva). The non-arising of suffering, moreover, is not an effect of the teaching of the Buddha. Correct understanding of the non-

\^0190 अन्येनान्यक्रियायोगान् ms. "t has a virāma.
\^0191 दुःखं हृः ms
\^0192 सत्वायः ms
\^0193 दुःखं न...... नत्ते: ms. SG: duḥkhaṁ tan=āpi santateḥ, KT: sdug bsñal de la rgyud kyañ med/
arising of suffering based upon the teaching of the Buddha is the effect. It is a kind of effect but is at the same time transcendent.

2-9. The examination of the Buddha

Introduction to verses 234-239

Opponents analyze variously the figure of the Buddha. They consider that what the figure of the Buddha is or what the Buddha is. Hence, Bhā-viveka examines the Buddha.

If [by you] are argued for, as real, the composite things (*samskāra*) the eye, etc. as undergoing production, because they are expressed by the term "sattva," just like the Buddhas. //234//

Then we say in response: for us (Mādhyamikas), the Buddhas do not have arising as their nature (*dharma*). Accordingly, they (the composite things) do not have arising, just as they (Buddhas) [do not arise], or they do not exist [in the ultimate reality], just like the ātman, or there is a possibility [of their arising in conventional reality], just like illusions. //235//

Explanatory comment:

Humans are called sattva, and are beings who are made. This means something which is made has arisen. Likewise, because the Buddha has the name "Buddha," he would be a being who is made, that is, has arisen. To this view, Bhā-viveka objects by pointing out that the Buddha does not have arising

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194 सत्त्वं ms
195 तत्त्वं ms
196 तबसत्त्वं ms.KT: de skye yod min te/
197 मायोवद=व=ās[t]ju sambhavah, SG: māyo baddhāstu sambhavah, KT: sgyu ma bshin ḡbyun yod/
as his nature and is not identical with rūpa, skandha, etc.. For the Mādhyamikas the real Buddha is our phenomenal world. The Buddha does not have any own-being. This world does not have own-being either. The “Buddha” is just a name, and is not an independent entity. The Buddha is illustrated as a dream, illusion or figure in the mirror. In other words, the Buddha is just the name “Buddha” in the conventional world and does not have the name “Buddha” in the absolute truth which is beyond false discrimination. Further, because the Buddha is not an independent entity, the Buddha does not arise. From this it follows that the Buddha does not exist, and similarly entities in the conventional world do not exist from the standpoint of the absolute truth. Therefore, Bhāviveka says “just like the Buddha” that is, despite the fact that the Buddha has the name “Buddha,” he does not exist, i.e., the Buddha is not real existence. In other words, even the Buddha is dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), just as entities are dependently coarisen. Therefore, the Buddha should be examined according to the theory of dependent origination.

रूप न बुद्धो बोध्यत्वाद् उदयाद् जापि लोष्टवत्।
पराभासात्म-भासत्त्वाद् विज्ञान नेन्द्र-जालवत्।

Buddha is not rūpa [from the standpoint of the highest truth], because it is what is to be cognized (bodhya), or on account of being something to be understood, or because he arises, like a clod of earth. And Buddha is not consciousness, because he illuminates others and himself, just like illusion created through magic.//236//

198 tathā-gato yat-svabhāvas tat-svabhāvam idam jagat/
   tathā-gato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idam jagat/ //22-16// (Prasannapadā, pp. 448-449).
200 KT:/gzugs ni yan dag ñid du na/ saṅs rgyas ma yin rtog byaḥi phyir//ḥkhor los sgyur bshin....., and it might be restored as follows:
   rūpaṁ na buddho bodhyatvāt tattvātaś cakravartivat/
The Buddha is not considered skandha, having form on account of being a conglomeration of skandha (skandha-saṅgṛaha), or because they have the nature of arising and passing away, or because they are objects of cognition, just like for...//237///

When they (the skandhas) are destroyed, there would be deficiency that [the Buddha] would disappear, it is not proper that the skandhas be Buddha. Because characteristics other than these of [skandhas] do not exist, [the Buddha] is not different [from skandhas]. And how could he be like the ātman for us?...//238///

Because it can be refuted as before, he is not acceptable as someone inexpressible and not a real entity. Or, how can his Buddhahood be acknowledged on account of being inexpressible like a pot...//239///

Explanatory comment:

Bhā-viveka negates the identity of the Buddha and skandhas. I do not, however, fully understand what Bhā-viveka says. In Buddhism, it is said that beings consist of five skandhas in order to demonstrate impermanence of existent. From this point of view, the opponents state that existent which is called the Buddha exists. If something exists, the existent consists of skandhas, i.e., rūpa-skandha (matter of form), vedanā-skandha (perception), saṁjñā-skandha

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201 [ma]. ms. SG: matāḥ.
202 KT: sku (tanu)
203 yad=ghaṭāv=āpy= ms. ०ya° and ०gha° added under the line; KT: bum pa bshin du.
(conception), *saṃskāra-skandha* (volition) and *vijñāna-skandha* (consciousness). For the Buddhists, however, the Buddha is transcendant, not a being. Hence, the Buddha consists of five skandhas. For the Mādhyamikas the Buddha is also dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). He is not a real existent. He transcends existent and non-existent. Therefore, it cannot be said that someting and the Buddha is identical or something and the Buddha is not identical.

2-10. Seeing *pratītyasamutpāda* and seeing the Buddha

Because, as mentioned before, it can be refuted, it (arising of sense organs) is not desired that because the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). //240//

What exists, what does not exist and what either exists or does not exist do not [arise]. There is no entity transcending permanence as well as destruction which is [produced] from the permanent or without cause or from this or from that. Both permanence and extirpation are abandoned. //241//

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204 न तन्नाशः ms
205 n=āpy=asmā=anasmā=chā° ms
The arising is not what exists, what does not exist or what either exists or does not exist. Therefore, what kind of [arisal] is it? How is a vision [of truth] known from the vision [of truth] of that teacher? //242//

Therefore, for one who maintains that entities have own-being (svabhāvavādin), the statement [“the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination] damages what they desired. However, for one who [maintains that] the arising [of entities] is similar to the arising of illusion, [that statement “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination”] is proper. //243//

Seeing the Buddha is something which belongs to lower truth (saṁvṛtī). [It is said to come] from removing the dust of afore-mentioned deficiency [and] from lighting the torch of true dharma (saddharmokāśana). But this is a conventional [expression] as an assistance towards activity (kriyopakārūpa). //244//
Because what is similar to illusion never takes place is not truth, from the standpoint of [the highest] truth, that (seeing) is not really seeing. It is beyond inference (apratarkya), is indiscernible (avijñeya), cannot be demonstrated (anirūpya), does not have an illustrative example (anidarsana), is without any mark, is devoid of any image (nirabhāsa), is beyond mental constructions (nirviklpa), is beyond words (niraksara) and is to be awakened by the mind of the viewer (paśyato buddhiboddhavya) and is an act of seeing from the standpoint of non-vision. //245,246//

Explanatory comment:

In Buddhism, as is well known, it is commonly said that “seeing dependent origination” refers to “seeing the Buddha,” and “seeing the Buddha” refers to “seeing dependent origination.” That is, “seeing dependent origination” and “seeing the Buddha,” are not different, but identical. With regard to this statement, however, opponents misunderstand that when the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination, the sense organs, i.e., the eye organ, etc., arise. That is, as long as the function of cognition, “seeing dependent origination” or “seeing the Buddha,” is taking place, the sense organ, i.e., the eye organ, arises. For the Mādhyamikas, however, the idea that “the Buddha is seen by seeing dependent origination” refers to the fact that those who understand properly the theory of dependent origination cognize the real Buddha, that is, the Buddha himself is dependent origination, or again, the Buddha and the truth of “dependent origination” which the Buddha realised are identical.

212 tattvas 'tann 'nirdvāṇēṁ ms. KT: /de ni de nid mthon min te/
213 anusāsāvaśīvēṁ ms. KT: /brtag bya ma yin dpe med pa/
214 'svām 'tān ms
Thus, in the highest truth, nothing is produced from itself, from others, from either itself or others, from both or without cause or produced as something existing, not existing or as [existing] in other ways (anyathā). //247//

No entity is produced or manifested in any way from a cause such as Keśava (=Vishṇu), Īṣa, Puruṣa, Pradhāna or atom etc. //248//

There (= in the highest truth), [conceptual construction (kalpanā) which] depends on own-being (svabhāva), function (kārita), what is to be characterized (lakṣya) and characteristics (lakṣaṇa) [does not arise]. And, [conceptual construction which] depends on identity (ekatva), otherness (anyatva) and function of either affliction (saṅklesa) or purification (vyavatāna) [does not arise either]. //249//

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215 KT: rgyu med.
216 न सत्याचार्यः = ms. KT: yod med ma yin.
217 कारणः = ms. KT: rgyu las.
218 कथं च न: ms
All mental constructions are in it as hitting with a whip or the act of beautiful painting or growing of seeds would be in the sky.//250//

When the eye-disease passes away, one whose eye becomes completely clean and pure does not see the hair (kesa), mosquito (mašaka), two moons (dviścandra) and the eye in a peacock’s plumage (śikhicandraka).//251//

Likewise, when the eye-disease of darkness which envelopes what is to be known and defilements passes away, a wise man whose eye has become pure by means of proper knowledge does not see anything.//252//

Just as, one who is fallen into sleep might see a child, woman, palace, house etc. But the same person when awakened from sleep would not see [anything] there.//253//

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219 KT: tshon gyi ri moḥī las dañ ni/
220 sarvakalpaṇa ms
221 nā ms. SG:"dviścandra", KT: zla gāṇis dañ.
222 pāśaye, "sirabhaj ṣ. ms. KT: gṇid dbaṅ gis.....mthon γyur pa
223 sarvōc. "aadhagata ms. KT: kun rdsob šes pa dag.
224 *parāśkaraṇa ms
Similarly, one whose eye of intelligence is opened wakes up from the expiration of the sleep of ignorance does not see those which are obtained from the conventional standpoint (saṁvidyādhigata).

निन्दिभूतान्य अभूतानि यथा तमसि पशयति।
प्रोपीतिष्ठाश्रो यथां अर्क उदेति च न पशयति।
न पशयति तथा न विद्धान् चित्त-चेतस-गोचरम्।
सम्प्लन्य-ज्ञान-रवि-पुवस्त-समस्ताज्ञान-वासनः।

Just as, one sees inexistent demons (bhūta) in the darkness at night. As one whose eyes are open when the sun rises, he does not see [those demons].

Likewise, one whose inclinations (vāsanā) of all ignorance (saṃstājñāna) are destroyed by the sun (ravi) of the proper knowledge does not see the object-sphere of the mind and the function of mind (citticaitasagocara).

Bhāviveka here concludes his theory of the “non-own-beingness” of entities.

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226 न्यदि चेतस हृतः ms. KT: ni ma sar shini mig byehi tshe/
227 बिद्मान् (c. virāma) ci° ms
Chapter Three.
Conclusion

As A. K. Warder says:\textsuperscript{228}

Nāgārjuna’s main contention is that it was not the intention of the Buddha to set out a list of ‘ultimate’ principles or elements which in some metaphysical sense ‘exist,’ still less to define their ‘own-nature,’ by implication immutable.

Nāgārjuna formulated and established the philosophy of “emptiness” (śūnyatā) upon the basis of the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, etc. and the followers, Buddha-pālita, Bhā-viveka, Candra-kīrti, Deva-śarman etc. inherited his philosophy of “emptiness,” and developed their own methodologies to defend it. Nāgārjuna himself used logic. He generally used prasaṅga as often as dilemmas and tetralemmas. A follower Budhsda-pālita inherited prasaṅga-anumāna but analyzed it into four prasaṅga arguments. For example, to Nāgārjuna’s statement

“Not from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from no cause, do any entities ever originate anywhere;”\textsuperscript{229} (tr. by Ames 1993: 233)

Buddha-pālita divided this into the following four arguments. He pointed out: (1) entities are not produced from themselves, because the origination of entities from themselves would serve no purpose and would lead to absurdity. There would no purpose in the repeated origination of what is in existence already; (2) if entities are produced from others, all things are produced from all other things; (3) if entities are produced from both themselves and others, the fault attached to the two preceding alternatives would combine in this third argument; (4) if entities are produced from causeless, all entities would be produced from all things.

Bhā-viveka, however, raised an objection against Buddha-pālita’s statement. He maintained that Buddha-pālita’s statement was deficient, because

\textsuperscript{228} Warder 1970: 377, ll, 11-13.

\textsuperscript{229} na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpy ahetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//1+1// (Prasannapadā, p. 12.)
neither a reason (hetu) nor an example (drṣṭānta) had been stated. Besides, he claimed that Buddha-pālita’s statement implied the acceptance of the alternative proposition, i.e., that entities are produced from others. Bhā-viveka, therefore, attempted to interpret Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and his own philosophy by means of the independent syllogism (sva-tantra-anumāna) which included three unusual modifications; adding the word paramārthataḥ (from the standpoint of the highest truth) to the proposition in a syllogism: specification that the negation in his syllogisms should be taken as “prasajya-pratīṣṭedha” (the negation of a proposition); and the condition that no counterexample is to be given.

Candra-kīrti, however, criticized the alternative mode of argument advocated by Bhā-viveka and defended Buddha-pālita’s statement against the objections put forward by Bhā-viveka. Candra-kīrti argued that Buddha-pālita’s statement had no faults even though an independent reason and example had not been stated by him in his statement. Candra-kīrti’s statement was that the way of prasāṅga was enough to refute the opponent’s opinions. Therefore, the independent syllogism was not necessary.

Later on, this controversy was considered as the origin of division of two sub-schools, i.e., Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, in the Mādhyamikas in Tibet.

Sthira-mati, a prāsaṅgika, and Nayākas also criticized syllogism of Bhā-viveka. If the modification paramārthataḥ governs not only the proposition (prajñā) but also the whole syllogism, reason (hetu) would not be permissible, because all things would be non-existent from the standpoint of the highest truth. If, on the contrary, the modification governs only the proposition and not both reason and instance (drṣṭānta), then the subject in reason would have to be regarded as existent when considered from the standpoint of conventional level, while the same subject in the proposition would be non-existent when considered from the standpoint of the highest truth.230

Using the svatantra syllogism, Bhā-viveka maintained a philosophy of “emptiness.” He, in other words, recognized the truth of logic which is founded on perfect wisdom (prajñā) of the absolute, and that perfect wisdom manifests itself by means of the conventional truth, i.e., logic.

This attitude of Bhā-viveka can be seen in the following passage from his MHK:

After intelligence (mati=prajñā) is concentrated, one should examine by means of prajñā as follows: “There is own-being of dharmas, which is grasped from the point of view of verbal usage.//3•21// But [while] analyzing with intelligence (dhi=prajñā), is this [grasped] from the standpoint of the highest truth?” If it would be so, this is indeed truth (tattva). If not, he [still] searches for [truth].//3•22//

Then, for Bhā-viveka what is the truth? As he says below, the non own-being of entities, i.e., emptiness, is truth;

स्वभावापरिनिष्पत्तेर् अजातेर् वा स्वभावतः
मायेभवन्  न भावानाम् ईश्कृते सर्वभावताम्

[The wise man] does not see that state in which entities have own-being, because own-being has not come into effect, or because there is no birth through the very nature [of entities], just as he would not see an illusory elephant.//257//

उत्पत्तिमभावात् संबृत्या हेतुमच्छवाद्
मायेभवन् न  भावानाम् ईश्कृते सर्वभावताम्

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231 samāhita-matiḥ paścāt prajñāyaivaṁ parikṣayet/
yo 'yam svabhāvo dharmānāṁ gṛhyeta vyavahārataḥ//3•21//
vicāryaṁaṇas tu dhiyā kim ayam paramārthataḥ/
yadi syāt tattvam evāyam ato 'nyaś cet sa mrgyate//3•22// (Ejima, 1980:272)
232 स्वभावत् परिनिष्पत्तेर् = ms. KT: ḍnos ōid ma grub phyir/
233 स्वभावत् ms
234 मायेभवन् = ms. KT:/sgyu maḥi glaṅ chen ji bshin no/. cf. k. 258c.
235 सत्त्वात्त्वां ms
236 "भावा ms
237 "मत्त्वा ms
238 "n=na" added under the line in ms
[Likewise, the wise man] does not see that state in which entities have substantial nature, because they (entities) have production, [i.e., undergo production] from the standpoint of conventional [truth], or because they (entities) have causes, just as he would not see an illusory elephant. //258//

न सन्ति भावः 239 इति वा यथार्थाः न मतिः मतम।
कल्पना-द्वार-निर्वृत्ते: स्थाणोऽपूर्वः-बुद्धिवत् ॥२५९॥

Or it is held that the cognition "entities do not exist" does not accord with things as they really are, because it (cognition) occurs by means of conceptual construction (kalpanādoaśra), just like a cognition which perceives a tree as a human being. //259//

असस्तु-बुद्धिपुपलभ्यो वा भावात्मा वितथो मतम:।
कल्पना-झान-गम्यत्वान् २४० मरीच्युदक-बुद्धिवत् ॥२६०॥

Or, an existent which is grasped by a false cognition is considered unreal, because it (existent) is perceived by knowledge (jñāna=prajñā) having conceptual construction, just like the cognition in which "a filament of air is seen as water." //260//

सदस्तु-बुद्धिः-बोद्धम्भ-निषेधात् एवम् एव तू।
जाप्तेष्याति-योगेन निर्विकल्पा मति: सताम् ॥२६१॥

Thus (evam eva tu), through the refutation of a real as well as unreal cognition as well as object of cognition, for the wise men, cognition (mati=prajñā) which is beyond conceptual construction arises as a consequence of non-arising (ajātiyogena). //261//

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239 ....भाव ms. SG: na sa+bhāvā, KT: dātos mams med.
240 गम्यत्वा ms
It is not accepted [by us Mādhyamikas] that a constructionless state of mind does not exists when one's mind grasps 'all dharmas are empty' or 'all dharmas are not empty.' //262//

Emptiness [on its part] lacks self in the form of emptiness, etc. Accordingly, the wise man does not see emptiness as emptiness. //263//

Even the existent appearanceless grasped in a constructless cognition is not reality as it is, because it (existential) is what is to be grasped, just like the cognition that the moon in water is seen as the moon. //264//

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241 +[il]-[lpā] matir =a=eṣṭā ms. SG: (nirvi)kalpā matir=n=eṣṭā , KT:/mi rtog blo gros mi bdod min/
242 विद्वृधिः ms
243 आलम्ब्यत्वाद् ms
244 जलेन्द्रावः हव ms
Cognition (dhi=prajñā) which is beyond conceptual construction, and
which has as its object that object which is beyond conceptual
construction is [considered] unreal, because it (cognition) has non-selfness,
etc. (anātmādi) as its nature, just like a cognition having conceptual
construction.//265//

Because an object of cognition (jñeya) is not proved in any way [, i.e., since
no objects of cognitions exist], those who know the truth understand that
where even constructless cognition (dhi=prajñā) does not arise is
unequalled truth.//266//

As long as we recognize that cognizable entities do not exist, that entities
neither exist nor do not exist, that entities do not have own-being and that
everything is emptiness, all such cognitions are false discrimination. The truth is
truth where even cognition which is beyond false discrimination, conceptual
construction or any imaginations does not arise. That is to say, only by the
extreme exclusion of any false discrimination, conceptual construction or
imagination truth can be obtained.

245 जeya[स्व].. +.. सिद्धे ms: SG: jñeyasya sarvathāsiddhe, KT: šes bya rnam kun ma grub phyir/
246 तत्व ms
247 तत्व° ms
Nāgārjuna states as follows:\textsuperscript{248}

There is emancipation (mokṣa) from the extinction of action and affliction (karmakleśa). Action and affliction [are produced] from conceptual construction (vikalpa). They (conceptual construction) [are produced] from diversification (prapañca). But, diversification is destroyed in emptiness (śūnyatā). (18-5)

When the object sphere of the mind (cittagocara) becomes extinct, [the object sphere of] the word (abhidhātavya) [would also] become extinct. Indeed, dharmahood (dharmatā) is neither what is arisen nor what is destroyed. (18-7)

This is the characteristic (laksana) of truth which is known through others, which is quiescent (śānta), which is not diversified by diversification (prapañca), which is beyond conceptual construction (nirvikalpa), which does not have many meanings (anānārtha).//18-9//

From the above statement of Nāgārjuna, it is obvious that the important point is the notion of "conceptual construction" (vikalpa). Conceptual construction is the cause of the arising of actions and afflictions, and conceptual construction is produced from diversification (prapañca). Diversification is destroyed by an understanding of śūnyatā. Bhā-viveka's statement regarding "conceptual construction," on the other hand, is slightly different from that of Nāgārjuna. Bhā-viveka adds a remark on it as "knowledge of conceptual construction" or "cognition which is beyond conceptual construction." Moreover, with regard to definition of śūnyatā, we come across the difference between the statements of Nāgārjuna and that of Bhā-viveka. The former states that "it is dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) that we call emptiness." (MK, 24•18ab, p. 503.: yah pratītya-samutpādaḥ śūnyatā tāṁ pracaṅkṣamahe/). Bhā-viveka, on the other hand, states that "voidness (śūnyatā) alludes to the

\textsuperscript{248} karmakleśākṣayan mokṣaḥ karmakleśa vikalpataḥ/ te prapañca-prapañcas tu śūnyatayāṁ nirudhyate/ /18-5// nirvṛttam abhidhātavyaṁ nirvṛtte cittagocare/ anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇamiva dharmatā/ /18-7// aparapratyayaṁ śāntaṁ prapañcāraṁ aprapañcaṁ/ nirvikalpaṁ anānārtham etat tattvasya laksanam/ /18-9// (Prasannapada, pp. 349-372)
knowledge which perceives voidness without any grasping." 249 It is the fact that Bhā-viveka was a Mādhyamika and a follower of the Mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna. In spite of this fact, Bhā-viveka’s definition of śūnyatā is different from Nāgārjuna’s definition. Here too Bhā-viveka refers to knowledge or wisdom (prajñā). Then, how does Candra-kīrti, a follower of Nāgārjuna and a prasaṅgika, define śūnyatā? He quotes Nāgārjuna’s statement above regarding the definition of it in his Pras. 250 That is to say, Candra-kīrti exactly follows Nāgārjuna’s definition, and comments that “thus, the meaning of the word pratitya-samutpāda is the meaning of the word śūnyatā.” 251 Thus, we come across the difference between Nāgārjuna and Candra-kīrti, on the one hand and Bhā-viveka, on the other hand. Here, it should be noticed, however, that there is no essential differences between them. Both Bhā-viveka and Candra-kīrti are the followers of Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas. They both cognized that entities have no own-being (sva-bhāva), and there is only emptiness (śūnyatā). Their final aim was obtaining of absolute truth (tattva) and reaching Nirvāṇa. For the Mādhyamikas, “śūnyatā” itself is absolute truth. In other words, by understanding “śūnyatā,” obtaining of absolute truth is possible. To the obtaining of absolute truth, i.e., Nirvāṇa, Bhā-viveka just recognized the importance of knowledge or wisdom (prajñā).

From these points of view, I would like to assume Bhā-viveka’s intention. Bhā-viveka followed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy as a Mādhyamika and at the same time, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “śūnyatā,” which is declared in “Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra,” etc. 252 That is to say, while Bhā-viveka followed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, at the same time, he tried to restore the original philosophy of “śūnyatā.” There are over two hundreds years separating Nāgārjuna’s period and Bhā-viveka’s period. Therefore, Bhāviveka saw the need to demonstrate the true intentions of Nāgārjuna and the philosophy of “śūnyatā.”

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249 Uryuzu 1985: 33.
250 Prasannapādā, p. 491.
251 evaṁ pratitya-samutpāda-sābdasya yo ‘rthaḥ sa eva śūnyatā-sabdasyārthā. (Prasannapādā, p. 491)
Logic itself belongs to verbal usage, and is not absolute reality. It is, however, impossible to state the philosophy of “śūnyatā” without verbal usage. Therefore, Bhā-viveka added a restriction “paramārthataḥ” to his syllogism arguing “śūnyatā,” in order to caution the reader about this contradiction. His kind of syllogism was rejected by Candra-kīrti. For Candra-kīrti the logical method could play a role only from the conventional standpoint and it should not be brought into speak of any phases of the highest truth. For Bhā-viveka, however, the restriction “paramārthataḥ” is the function which leads to “absolute truth” from the “conventional world,” and only on reaching the absolute truth, i.e., Nirvāṇa, the use of logic should be abandoned.

Nāgārjuna, Buddha-pālita and Candra-kīrti used prasanīga-anumāna. That is to say, by pointing out the absurdity of the opponent’s opinion, they tried to demonstrate the philosophy of śūnyatā. In other words, they did not take firm stand on their claims in order to have consensus by other shools. Svaṭantrikas beginning with Bhā-viveka, on the other hand, were not satisfied with it, and positively demonstrated the philosophy of śūnyatā by using svaṭantra-anumāna. For them, probably, prasanīga-anumāna was not enough to demonstrate the philosophy of śūnyatā and was not enough to refute the opinions of realists. It may be, moreover, possible that Bhā-viveka was influenced by dominant shool of thought, i.e., importance of logic. From these points, it can be understood that Bhā-viveka’s use of logic employed a more positive approach to Nirvāṇa.
I shall try to clarify Bhā-viveka’s theory through a diagram which shows his idea of the process from the conventional world (saṁvṛti) to the highest truth (paramārtha), i.e., Nirvāṇa.

**The highest truth (Nirvāṇa)**
perfect wisdom
(having no diversification, “niśprapañca”)

↑↓

The Buddha
↑↓

The middle way (madhyamā-pratipad)
↑↓

Dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)
↑↓

Emptiness (śūnyatā)
↑↓

Non own-beingness (niḥsvabhāvatā)
↑
↑
↑ ← logic (having the restriction “paramārthataḥ” etc.)

wisdom
(having diversification, “prapañca”)

**The conventional world**
Appendix
An outline of research on Bhā-viveka

The works of Bhā-viveka have been studied by many scholars over a long period because his philosophy is one of the most important strands in the Mādhyamika school. Therefore, numerous works have already been completed on the subject. Below only a representative bibliography of the works of Bhā-viveka is provided.

1. Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti.
   This treatise is a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s MK. Accordingly, the basic contents of it and those of MK are identical.

Chapter one.
   Nōnin, 1993: 45-66.

Chapter two.

Chapter Three.

Chapter Eleven.

Chapter Twelve.

Chapter Thirteen.

Chapter Fifteen.

Chapter Sixteen.

Chapter Seventeen.
   Kajiyama, 1979: 305-357.

Chapter Eighteen.
Chapter Nineteen.

Chapter Twenty-four.
Uryūzu, 1971: 15-56.

Chapter Twenty-Five.

2. Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā

According to the colophons of the Tibetan translation of MHK, the Tibetan translation of TJ was finalized by Atiśa (981-1054 A.D) at Lhasa and dictated to Lotsawa Jayaśīla.253 The Sanskrit original has not so far been found.

Chapter One.
Skt. title: Bodhi-cittāparityāga.
Tib. title: Byar chub kyi gsum mi gta'i bāhī lehu ste dan po.
Eng. title: Non-abandonment of the thought of enlightenment.

Chapter Two.
Skt. title: Muni-vratasamāśraya.
Tib. title: Thub paḥi brtul shugs la yari dag par bsten pa.
Eng. title: Taking the vow of an ascetic

Chapter Three.
Skt. title: Tattva-jñānaisanā.
Tib. title: De kho na nhid kyi śes pa ḥtshol ba.
Eng. title: The quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality.

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253 See, Chattopadhyaya 1967: 475, 487.
(Including an English translation)

Chapter Four.
Skt. title: Śrāvaka-tattvaniścayāvatāra.
Tib. title: Ńan thos kyi de kho na ſni ldug pa.
Eng. title: Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the Īśvara.

Chapter Five.
Skt. title: Yogācāra-tattvaviniścaya.
Tib. title: Rnal’ byor spyod paḥi de kho na ſni gタン la dbab pa la ldug pa.
Eng. title: The ascertainment of the truth of the Yogācāra.

Chapter Six.
Skt. title: Sāṁkhya-tattvāvatāra.
Tib. title: Grang can gyi de kho na ſni la ldug pa.
Eng. title: Ascertainment of the truth of the Sāṁkhya.

Chapter Seven.
Skt. title: Vaieśika-tattvaniścaya.
Tib. title: Bye brag paḥi de kho na ſni la ldug pa.
Eng. title: Ascertainment of the truth of the Vaiśeṣika.

254 According to Gokhale, the number of these verses is provisional. The verses which Gokhale proposed are equivalent to vv. 280-289 of Ejima’s Skt. edition.
Chapter Eight.

Skt. title: *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya*.
Tib. title: *Rig byed kyi mtha' smra baḥi de kho na ṅid la ḡjug pa*.
Eng. title: *Ascertainment of the truth of the Vedānta*.
Qvarnström, 1989.

Chapter Nine.

Skt. title: *Mīmāṁsā-tattvanirṇayāvatāra*.
Tib. title: *Dpyod paḥi de kho na ṅid gtan la dbab pa la ḡjug pa*.
Eng. title: *Entering to the ascertainment of the truth of the Mīmāṁsaka*.

Chapter Ten.

Skt. title: *Sarvajñātāsiddhinirdeśa*.
Tib. title: *Thams cad mkhyen pa nīd du grub par bstan pa*.
Eng. title: *Exposition of the proof of the omniscience of the Buddha*.

Chapter Eleven.

Skt. title: *Stutilakṣananiirdeśa*.
Tib. title: *Bstod pa daṅ mtshan bstan pa*.
Eng. title: *Exposition on the eulogy and the marks*.

3. **Madhyamakārthasaṅgraha**

4. **Nikāyabhedavibhāṅga-vyākhyāna**
English tr.: Rockill, 1884: 181.
Japanese tr.: Watanabe, 1939.

5. *Ta-Shên Chang-Chên lun*
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