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Neighborhood self management :a study of the role of local communities in the revitalization of metropolitan… Ragetli, Rene Francois 1993

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Neighborhood Self ManagementA study of the role of local communities in therevitalization of metropolitan areasbyRENE FRANCOIS RAGETLIB.A. The University of British Columbia, 1989A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSchool of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE TJNIVER TY OF BRITISH COLUMBIADecember 1993© Rene Francois Ragetli, 1993In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)___________________________Department of / I ( I / p%_,_?The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate Ie 1993DE-6 (2/88)nABSTRACTTraditionally observers of the urban scene have held that byunilaterally shifting the balance between central and local control over urbanmanagement, conditions within cities could be improved. More recently atheoretical synthesis has been advanced which advocates thedecentralization of some urban functions to the neighborhood level and thecentralization of others to a metropolitan wide authority. Adherents of thislatter position hold that healthy cities operate best on the principle of a“federation of neighborhoods”.Following a review of the construction of modern society, this thesisconsiders the theoretical benefits of dividing responsibility for fourcategories of urban functions between local and central authorities. The idealtheoretical division of various environmental, economic, social and politicalfunctions has subsequently been tested against an implemented form ofneighborhood self management in Jerusalem. The results of this comparisonconfirm that properly constituted neighborhood authorities can indeeddeliver human services more effectively and with considerable financialsavings. It has also become apparent that social cohesion is enhanced byrecognizing and legitimizing local communities. The Jerusalem experiencefurther reveals that a strong metropolitan wide authority is crucial insecuring the judicious use of natural resources and preventingenvironmental degradation, thereby ensuring long-term economic wellbeing.The considered balancing of urban functions between central and localcontrol would benefit metropolitan areas worldwide, particularly thoseconsidering a comprehensive revitalization.mTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract iiTable of Contents iii-ivList of Tables vList of Figures viAcknowledgements viiChapter 1 Introduction 1 --5Chapter 2 The Structure of Modern Society 6-- 152.1 Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 62.2 Zionism and Community 92.3 From Zionist to Israeli Planning 13Chapter 3 Theoretical Arguments in theCentralization-Decentralization Debate 16-403.1 Environmental Considerations 183.2 Economic Considerations 233.3 Social Considerations 273.4 Political Considerations 303.5 Synthesis 353.5.1 Environment 353.5.2 Economy 363.5.3 Society 383.5.4 Politics 39Chapter 4 Neighborhood Self Management inJerusalem: A Case Study 41-954.1 Setting the Stage 414.1.1 Jerusalem During the Nineteenth Century 414.1.2 Jerusalem during the British Mandate 464.1.3 Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967 504.1.4 Relationship of State and LocalGovernments 564.2 Neighborhood Self Management inJerusalem 594.2.1 The Aftermath of Reunification 594.2.2 Early Attempts at Decentralization 684.2.3 Goals and Structures of theNeighborhood Self-Management Project 704.2.4 Activities of the Minhalot 804.2.5 Financial and Human ResourceDevelopment 884.2.6 Evolving Status of the Minhalot 92ivChapter 5 Implications of the Jerusalem Experiencefor Revitalizing Metropolitan Areas 96-1075.1 Environmental Considerations 965.2 Economic Considerations 985.3 Social Considerations 1005.4 Political Considerations 1025.5 Structures and Method of Implementation 1045.6 Conclusion 104Postscript 108Bibliography i 09-117Personal Interviews 118Glossary 119-120VLIST of TABLESTable 1 Population Change in Jerusalem During theBritish Mandate 48Table 2 Selected Characteristics for West and EastJerusalem Before and Mter Unification in 1967 61Table 3 Features of Neighborhoods in Jerusalem withNeighborhood Councils of Minhelet Status 63Table 4 Nature of Neighborhoods and Characteristics ofCorresponding Minhelet 78Table 5 Minhelet Budgets and Major Activities in 1989 86Table 6 Budget and Employees of the NeighborhoodSelf-Management Project 198 1-1990 89LIST of FIGURESFigure 1 Population Growth of Jerusalem 1900-1990 51Figure 2 Map of Jerusalem showing 1985 municipalboundaries and location of various neighborhoods 65Figure 3 Aguda Organizational Structure 73Figure 4 Minhelet Organizational Structure 77viviiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would like to acknowledge and thank those who helped in thedevelopment of this thesis. In particular, my supervisor, Mr. PeterBoothroyd who offered encouragement and welcome guidance along the way.Further, my other reviewers, Dr. Michael Leaf who provided valuablecomments and Dr. Michael Seelig, who introduced me to the NeighborhoodSelf-Management Project during the UBC Field School in Jerusalem in 1989.I am indebted to those individuals in Jerusalem who gave freely oftheir time and provided a first-hand insight into the governance of the cityand its neighborhoods.I am grateful for the wisdom and steadfast support of my father, Dr.H.W.J. Ragetli without whom this thesis could not have been completed. Iwish to recognize my friends, Dong Ho Shin, for his sage advice as I beganmy research, and Paul Diamond, for his assistance in preparing the Tablesand Figures. Finally, thanks to my wife Leah for her translations of materialwritten in Hebrew. her loving support of this project and her patience.1CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTIONThere has long been broad consensus among observers of the urbanscene that our cities are not what they could (or should) be. Urban areasboth in developing and developed countries are the scenes of growingeconomic disparities (Pickvance & Preteceille 1986), inequalities inaccess to decision making, racial and ethnic tensions and environmentaldegradation to the point that human health is affected. The evidence isthere for all to see and on that there is little disagreement. There ishowever a wide range of opinion on what is responsible for this urbanmalaise.Broadly speaking there have been two major schools of thought onurban pathology. The first has traditionally seen uncontrolled growth asthe cause of the problem. Naturally this group (largely corresponding tothe “Golden Age” of planning) has prescribed stronger central control ofthe urban environment as the means of “curing” the cause of the problem.A second school of thought emerged in the sixties. This group, composedof both classic liberals such as Jane Jacobs and anarchists such asBookchin, agreed that centrally directed “Urban Renewal” was the root ofthe problem. Not surprisingly, they supported decentralization as ameans of reducing the power of city governments.More recently there has begun to emerge a theoretical synthesis ofthis centralization-decentralization debate. This “amalgam” (Bellush andNetzer 1990) advocates a recognition of the need for certain urbanfunctions to be decentralized and for others to remain centralized. Inessence this approach sees the recognition and legitimation ofcommunity (read local or neighborhood) government complementing a2strong regional (metropolitan) government. This functionaldifferentiation is a refinement of the city as a “federation ofneighborhoods” proposed by Jane Jacobs in Death and Life of GreatAmerican Cities.The notion of a city as a federation of neighborhoods is findingexpression in the managerial organization of modern Jerusalem. Itsgovernance has swung dramatically between centralized anddecentralized control over the past century. Prior to the First World War,Ottoman Jerusalem, then a provincial city, essentially consisted of selfgoverning religio-ethnic communities living in distinct quarters. In theMandate period (1917-1948) British colonial bureaucrats attempted to“rationalize” the planning of the city. The ambitious master plan thatPatrick Geddes developed in 1919 (Broadman 1978: 313) soonfoundered on the rocks of inter-communal strife.At the end of the British Mandate the city was divided into IsraeliWest Jerusalem and Transjordanian East Jerusalem. Municipal planners,many of whom had been trainedin the British planning tradition, continued the master planapproach in West Jerusalem (Gertel and Law-Yone 1991). The goals ofthis planning reflected the strong national consensus of assertion ofsovereignty in the city as the capital of Israel, settling of new immigrantsand creation of a modern infrastructure. These were accepted withoutquestion by a weak and ineffectual municipal government. In contrast,East Jerusalem reverted to the pre-Mandate form of weak centralcontrol within the city limits and modest interest or investment from a“distant” capital (Amman). Indeed much of the actual built up area of EastJerusalem which was developed in this period lay outside the municipal3boundaries.These divergent paths were roughly united following the Israelivictory in 1967. The Israeli vision of the city and methods of planningand implementation were quickly extended over a metropolitan area,comprising both West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem as well as most ofthe suburban areas adjacent to the latter. The Jerusalem Master Plan of1968 marked the high point of the trend toward centralization. Sincethen the municipality has begun to move cautiously in the direction ofdecentralization. (Hasson 1989)The stated intent behind this shift in policy was to: (1) improve thedelivery of urban services; and (2) strengthen local democracy. A thirddriving force was the desire to legitimize the central authorities in theeyes of the Arab population (28 % of the total population). The vehicle forthis decentralization was the Neighborhood Self-Management Project(NSMP) which was initiated as a pilot project in 1980 and graduallyextended to involve more and more neighborhoods.This new level of urban management, represented by theformalized empowerment of neighborhood councils (minhalot)’, hashelped solve some problems facing Jerusalem but has also given rise tonew dilemmas. The clash of nationalisms in the city and opposingpolitico-religious views often means that the simplest activities (such asparticipating in the planning process) take on tremendous meaning2.The existence of autonomous neighborhood councils buffers the local1 A brief definition of non-English words and terms used in this thesismay be found in the Glossary on page 119.2 Since 1948 Jerusalem has been the declared capital of the State ofIsrael and since 1988 of the theoretical State of Palestine. In additionthere are large pockets of ultra-orthodox Jews who either questionthe legitimacy of the Israeli State (non-Zionists) or even violentlyoppose it (anti- Zionists).4activists from charges of being mere agents of central authority. On theother hand the real if limited power which the councils possess hasprovided a new arena for horizontal conflicts between neighborhoods.The thesis examines the Neighborhood Self-ManagementProgram in Jerusalem between 1980 and 1990. The goal of the thesis isto assess the utility in terms of the existing theoretical basis and actualpractice of implementing this self management scheme in Jerusalem andon this basis to make some extrapolations about the general desirabifity offunctional reorganization into metropolitan and neighborhood levelmanagement units.In order to accomplish the above stated goal, the thesis raises threemajor questions regarding urban Jerusalem. They are:1. What is the existing balance between central andlocal control?- How did this come about?- Who are the key actors?- What is the impact of this situationon urban residents?2. What are the arguments for changing the balance?- Who proposes them?3. What would be (or is) the consequence of the new formof city management?- How is the change implemented?- What problems have emerged?This thesis is composed of five chapters. Following thisintroduction, the second chapter begins with a brief discussion of therole of community in modern society and then examines the debate inZionist thought regarding the nature of modern Jewish nationalism.Following this an analytical framework articulating the theoretical and5practical rationales for increasing centralization or decentralization ofurban functions is presented in chapter three. The areas of considerationare social, political, economic and environmental. This review of urbanmanagement3 theory includes examples of the goals, methods andoutcomes of the different strategies.The fourth chapter begins with a brief urban history of Jerusalem,identifying themes and actors in the management of the city. It thendescribes the goals, planning and implementation of the NSMP andshows how this is an example of decentralization while maintaining astrong center. I believe that this program is a suitable example of evolvingfunctional differentiation because it is well defined administratively, it hasbeen operating for a decade and despite enormous political upheavals inthe region it has been well accepted by the participants.The fourth chapter assesses the adequacy of Jerusalem’sdecentralization scheme in meeting those needs articulated in Chapter 3.While there is ample academic material which deals with thecentralization /decentralization debate; literature directly related to theMinhellet program is limited. Therefore, Chapter 4 relies heavily on theauthor’s personal observations over several years and interviewsconducted with municipal and neighborhood officials in January 1991.Background material and statistical information is taken fromgovernment publications, newspapers and journal articles. Chapter 5concludes with a presentation of the theoretical implications arising fromthe NSMP and will offer policy recommendations for future planning inJerusalem and other urban areas.3 Management is used here to mean both the governance and themanagement of urban functions.6CHAPTER 2The Structure of Modern Society2.1 Gemeinschaft and GessellschaftModern society is a product of the nineteenth century IndustrialRevolution (1850-1950). The near religion of technologically basedprogress which dominated this period had its critics throughout. Perhapsthe most graphic accounts of the impact of industrialization andurbanization are the early narratives of Friedrich Engels and CharlesDickens. The miserable living conditions of the urban working classbecame the object of reforms from the beginning of the industrialrevolution. In large measure the ensuing investment in urbaninfrastructure and services alleviated the obvious primary needs of citydwellers.However, the full impact on society brought about bymodernization did not emerge until the end of the nineteenth century.In the wake of the Industrial Revolution the conception of how modernsociety evolved has been essentially linear. Although, Karl Marx in DasKar,ital advances the view that human society is organized to benefit theeconomic interests of certain classes over others and thatindustrialization only intensified this class struggle, he dismissed thedistinctions between groups based on race or faith as artificial divisionsused by the dominant class to divert and weaken the working class. Thechallenge, to this simplistic view of society, posed by the persistence ofcommunal ties has only recently been addressed by Neo-Marxist scholarssuch as David Harvey and Manuel Castells.The nineteenth century social theorist Ferdinand Toennies was oneof the earliest to describe the impact of modernization on society as a7whole (Toennies 1957). He used the terms Gemeinschaft andGessellschaft to represent the two poles of this development path. Theformer (usually translated as community) stands at the traditional, premodern pole while Gessellschaft (modern society) stands at the other.Toennies (see also Durkheim 1964, Weber 1964 and Marx & Engels1969) observed that communal ties based on blood (family) or localeare broken down through a combination of population density(urbanization), social mobility, secularism and above all the market nexus.Personal ties and loyalties are replaced with temporary, contractualrelationships designed to further ulterior self interests.Emile Durkheim writing at the same time as Toennies describedthe impact of modernization in terms of individual well-being. His bleakassessment was that rather than freeing people from the strictures ofagrarian society the twin forces of urbanization and industrializationisolated people from one another and left them vulnerable to what hedescribed as “anomie”5. In this regard Durkheim and Toennies havebecome favorites among those critical of modem society and who harbora nostalgia for the warmth and security of the pre-modern world. Theseutopians of today are inheritors of a romantic but essentially escapisttradition. The salvation of an increasingly urbanized society can never liein the tiny intentional enclaves they propose. One of the largestexperiments in creating such “organic” communities has been the Israelikibbutz. This movement which presently has some 150 000 members in4 The four authors in question writing in either German or French wereoriginally published near the turn of the century. Their impact on theEnglish speaking world was considerably diluted by the lag-time intranslating their works.5 This “anomie” clearly points to the hierarchy of human needs asproposed by Abraham Maslow. Since his views are widely recognizedthey will not be elaborated here.8250 settlements was one of the first products of Zionism. Proponents ofthis promising communal form began to be disillusioned as early as thelate 1950s (Schwartz 1957, cited in Breed 1971: 181). Thisdisillusionment stemmed from the realization that after all memberspreferred a higher material standard of living over ideological purity.Today’s industrialized kibbutzim with re-emerging nuclear families bearlittle resemblance to the pioneer collectives of less than half a centuryago. The view of society and the Gemeinschaft-Gessellschaft debateembodied in Zionist ideology will be discussed in the following section.The characterization of modern society (meaning aggregations ofindividuals relating through the market) as replacing traditional tiesremained unchallenged until the Post War era. Talcott Parsons, thedominant social theorist of this period, advanced a complex theory ofdifferentiation of society in order to explain the existence of “collegialformations” (Bayliss 1989). These functional communities are based onnormative relationships between members of a profession or group ofprofessions. The race riots and counter-culture movements of the 1960sforced some democratic theorists such as Robert Dahl to entirelyreassess their view of society as having no sub-societal units other thanindividuals (cf. Dahl 1961 and Dahl 1982).Although modernity is clearly irreversible, the need for communitycannot be dismissed. The latter being a prerequisite for the satisfaction ofhigher order human needs described by Abraham Maslow. The need forboth Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft is clear. The debate over theproportion between community and modernity requires further analysis.This will be done in the context of an examination of the tension betweenthe two in modern Jewish society.92.2 Zionism and CommunityThroughout its history the Jewish people has wrestled with twoopposing characterist:ics. Simply put these are the inclination towardsparticularism, often involving withdrawal and isolation from the outsideworld, and the desire to play an active role in shaping a universal society.The latter course of open communication with other groups has at timesleaned towards adopting new forms and customs to Judaism and atothers to adapting Judaism to fit into other cultures6.The dichotomybetween insularity and openness is present at the very beginning ofJewish history. For example, the Torah speaks of the Jews as “A peopledestined to dwell apart” (Numbers 23,9) and “A nation of priests”(Exodus 19,6). Yet, the same Bible is emphatic that there is to be nodistinction between the rights of Jews and non-Jews8.Ideally a creative tension exists between these two tendencies. Thisallows for gradual change without losing the core identity. Unfortunately,the outside world has repeatedly sought to reconcile the apparentcontradiction on its terms. The Zionist movement arose as a modernattempt to establish the balance between Jewish particularism anduniversalism on indigenous terms.The Zionist revolution, with its triumphant consummation in asovereign Jewish state, has given rise to an extensive literature. By andlarge these works seek to explain the rise of Zionism through the6 Such innovation has not been without some risk to its proponents.Consider for example the attempted murder of Joseph by his brothersfor suggesting that the tribal confederation be replaced by a monarchysimilar to neighboring cultures (Genesis 37: 1-23).7 A modem (secular) Israeli social psychologist describes this derisivelyas a “divine pilot project” (Beit-Hallahmi 1991).8 Jewish Law does differentiate between the two groups in terms ofobligations, Jews being expected to observe 613 (mostly ritualistic)commandments.10interplay of external factors. Many authors see Zionism as a synthesis ofthe universalistic yearnings of post Enlightenment Jewish intellectualsand the intolerant nationalisms of nineteenth century Europe.The argument usually reviews the events following the FrenchRevolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man, spread by Frencharmies, had served to knock down the ghetto walls in Western andCentral Europe. With the defeat of Napoleon and the reimposition ofrestrictions on Jews many sought relief either through conversion toChristianity or by abandoning the national elements of Jewishness andcreating a “Spiritual Judaism”. A Socialist variant of this integrationiststrategy emerged in revolutionary circles in Czarist Russia. They sawIndustrial Capitalism as the real problem and advocated Jewishautonomy within a Socialist Europe as the solution (Almog 1987). ThisYiddish speaking movement dominated the Jewish working class inEastern Europe until the 1930s. The development of racially based anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century doomed the efforts of bothmovements. In essence Jews were no longer targets for living a Jewishlife but simply for living (Hess 1862).In fact the only real alternatives (in the light of the Holocaust)were emigration or annihilation. This was the conclusion of TheodorHerzl, the founder of the World Zionist Organization. He was anassimilated Viennese Jew who initially sought mass conversion as asolution to the “Jewish Problem” of Europe. His liberal world view wasshattered by the Paris mob shouting ‘Death to the Jews” during theDreyfus trial of 1895. This event led him to the realization that only thecreation of a state of their own would relieve the danger that EuropeanJewry faced. However, by emphasizing the reaction to external forces11(the Enlightenment and rise of Nationalism), the traditionalinterpretation neglects the role that internal intellectual forces playedin creating the Zionist movement. These forces clashed over the type ofZionism which was needed to overcome the existential crisis facingJewry and subsequently the type of state which should emerge.Ultimately, the decisive factor behind the Restoration is that theJewish people formed a nation. They possessed a culture (in terms oflanguage9 and especially religion), the aspiration for politicalindependence, a deep historical consciousness of peoplehood and aburning desire to repossess their historical homeland (Hertzberg 1959).As noted above, early Political Zionism saw the fact that the territorialaspect of the nation existed only as an abstract desire to return to EretzIsrael (The Land of Israel) as the primary imbalance in Jewish nationalexistence.The other major trend within the Zionist movement was CulturalZionism. Although accepting the need for self-governance most CulturalZionists defined community in terms of culture and belief. Hence theysaw the revival of Hebrew language and literature as the harbinger ofnational rebirth. This in turn would strengthen Jewish culture enabling itto act as a progressive element in human society (Ha-Am 1897, Buber1934). Most Cultural Zionists held a critical or even hostile (such as theinfluential poet Berdichevsky) view of traditional Judaism. A remarkableexception to this rule was the first Chief Rabbi of Israel, Abraham IsaacKook. One of the first to employ the religious term teshuvahin conjunction with the physical return to Zion, Kook9 Hebrew, although the language of prayer had almost ceased to bespoken by the nineteenth century.10 Teshuvah is often translated as repentance. However, the fullest12expressed it thus:“The nation longs to set root again in its homeland and toreturn to normalcy, as in ancient days. But to the extent ofher readiness for the inspiration of greatness, she must,through her own initiative, discover a source of spiritualinspiration that shall act on all aspects of her life... The surgeof literary creativity, when it is robed in the spirit of thepeople that has returned to life will engage the best spirits ofthe world.” (The Road to Renewal, 1904)11Out of this swirling cauldron of cultural messianism, secularnationalism and Socialism emerged Labour Zionism. This movement,which was to dominate political culture in Israel until 1977, believed thatsocioeconomic “normalization” was essential to the Jewish future. That is,in their own national society Jews would play all economic roles incontrast to the restricted occupational structure in the diaspora. LabourZionism viewed the formation of a Jewish working class in Palestine as aprerequisite of this goal of normalization. The nation’s economy would bebased on collective farming. Consequently, Zionism became “the onlymajor migration movement with a conscious ideology of downward socialmobility” (Avineri 1976: 116).In reaction to the realities of a largely feudal, agricultural area likePalestine, lacking a significant bourgeoisie or a proletariat (not tomention Jews), a Marxist version of class struggle was unrealistic. Insteadthe working class would lead the Zionist Movement, pursuing a strategyof building economic institutions and co-operative settlements. This“Constructivist Phase” (Cohen 1987) saw the emergence of institutionssuch as the Kupat Holim (health services), Ha-Mashbir (co-operativemeaning of the term involves repentance in order to return to anearlier state of holiness.11 Republished in English translation by B. Bokser in 1978.13department stores) a labour exchange, mobile library, the Hagannah(self defence force) and the first Kibbutzim. In 1920, most of theseorganizations were placed under the central control of the Histadrut (TheGeneral Confederation of Jewish Labour in Palestine). By dominatingcontrol of this “state-in-genesis” (Cohen 1987: 109), Labour Zionism hadthe tools by which to set the political, economic and spiritual boundariesof the future Jewish state. The fashioning of a self-sufficient workingnation was to be the revolution in modem Jewish life.In power, Labour Zionism tended towards a highly centralizedtechnocratic form of decision making. This statist orientation had begunto emerge among Labour politicians (particularly the first Prime MinisterDavid Ben-Gurion) and institutions even prior to 1948. An early critic ofthis tendency toward over-centralization was the philosopher MartinBuber. In Paths in Utopia (1949) he singles out the kibbutz as a concreteexample of what he means by authentic community. By accepting thenarrow vision of the early political Zionists in the name of practicalexpediency, Labour Zionism sowed the seeds of its own ideologicaldemise.2.3 From Zionist to Israeli PlanningAlthough some authors place the end of Labour Zionism’s creativephase as early as the 1930s (Cohen 1987), this may be unduly critical.Consider for example the creative approach to absorbing the waves ofnewcomers embodied in the Sharon Plan of 1950. This national MasterPlan led to the creation of an urban network that included the existingmetropolitan areas and the construction of new regional cities,development towns and villages (Moshavim). In effect, it replaced the1419th Century Zionist dream that the renaissance of the Jewish people ina state of their own must be accomplished by recreating a Jewishpeasantry with a late 20th Century model of a modern, urban,technologically advanced society along Western European and evenJapanese models (Akzin & Dror 1966). Arieh Sharon, the author of theplan, believed that the success in organizing agricultural settlementscould be matched in urban planning.However, the Sharon Plan was not fully successful. It could notmaster the forces of urbanization it itself recognized and valued. Thepower of the marketplace, the attraction of living in a metropolis and theaccumulated free choices of citizens have proved to be at least asimportant as governmental programs in shaping the country (Troen1988). Successive Israeli governments remained committed to a policy ofdispersing population away from the Haifa-Tel Aviv corridor. In effect thiswas a variant of the anti-urban bias of early Labour Zionism. Littleattention was paid to conditions in the three metropolitan areas of TelAviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. The Labour party paid dearly for thisoversight, losing disaffected urban wage earners to the Right wingpopulist party of Menachem Begin in 1977. The first domestic action heundertook as Prime Minister was a decade long urban renewal scheme,Project Renewal.This billion dollar program eventually targeted 100 neighborhoodsthroughout the country with a combined population of some one millionresidents. The goals of this revitalization effort were firstly to “reducesocial disparities between the haves and have-nots in Israeli society” andsecondly to “improve the image of the project neighborhood” (Carmon &Hill: 471). Project Renewal focussed on social goals rather than the15traditional economic view of increasing the “productive” use of urbanland. Its success was in large part due to the recognition andempowerment of neighborhood organizations to participate in planning(Alterman 1988) and implementing the program to meet the specificneeds of the current residents of each community. The change in focusfrom meeting the elementary needs of new immigrants to improvingexisting communities marks the transition from Zionist to Israeliplanning. This is not to say that Israel has ceased to be concerned aboutimmigration’2.Rather that having met the fundamental needs of mostIsraelis the opportunity now exists to revitalize community. Toparaphrase Buber, the current challenge is to demonstrate that the pathsto utopia can lead through the city as well as the countryside.In many ways the experience gained from Project Renewal helpedset the stage for the Neighborhood Self-Management Program which isthe focus of the case study in Chapter 4. The theoretical arguments infavour of this type of decentralized urban management are examined inthe following chapter.12 in two years (1990-199 1) Israel absorbed 400,000 immigrantsfrom the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, thereby increasing itspopulation by some 10 %.16CHAPTER 3THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS IN THECENTRALIZATION-DECENTRALIZATION DEBATEThe imperative for a restructuring of urban management followsfrom an increasing awareness that there are limits to healthy growth. Forone, the environmental crisis of the past two decades is a clear indicationthat both globally and locally there are natural limits to current forms ofhuman development. In addition, the debt crisis in the developing worldand its equivalent in developed countries’3 indicate a major economiclimit to development. Yet, the enormous international tides of economicrefugees and the vicious outbursts from the urban underclass in manycountries signal that the status quo cannot simply be frozen in place.With the way forward blocked by natural limitations and the status quountenable the answer can only lie in a comprehensive, rationalrestructuring of urban management. The latter term including thegovernance of urban functions (as defined in footnote 3, page 5).Thus, although there is little doubt of the need for restructuringthere is much disagreement on the manner to achieve it. There are twomajor, diametrically opposed schools of thought, namely those whoadvocate greater centralization of urban management and those whopropose a decentralization of authority and responsibility for urbanfunctions. The first school advances theories which concentrate on theeconomic efficiency and accountability of local government (Self 1982,Norton 1985, Picard & Zariski 1987, Barlow 1991). These theories areoften part of a wider argument advancing strategies for improving13 The result of ballooning budget deficits In industrialized countriesduring the 1980s is aptly described by Eisenstadt and Ahimeir intheir 1985 work, The Welfare State and its Aftermath.17competitiveness, (for example Hutton & Davis 1989, Ley & Hutton 1991,Seelig & Artibise 1991)14. The second school represents authors whofocus mainly on the social issues of access to urban resources anddecision making (Roussopolos 1982, Flynn et al 1985, Pickvance &Preteceille 1985, Weiher 1991).Many of the authors in both groups take a decidedly polemical tone,but there is no consistent correlation between Right and centralizationand Left and decentralization in the literature’5.The mass of oftencontradictory literature is perhaps the best indication of the enormouscomplexity of the issues facing Homo Urbanus.In the current chapter urban management is considered on thebasis of four categories: environmental, economic, social and political.These will be analyzed according to the two schools of thoughtmentioned above. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the twotheoretical schàols on the basis of the nascent holistic approachmentioned in Chapter One. This third way analyses each activity andthen considers at which level, this particular function should bemanaged, viz, at the neighborhood level or city-wide. In this way thetraditional centralization-decentralization debate is effectively bypassed.One last task which must be addressed before examining urbanfunctions and which level of government is best suited to manage them isto clarify what is meant by the term decentralization. Rondinelli (1981a)14 These authors include environmental and social conditions in theirarguments for increasing centralization. However, they seem to viewlocal communities as an obstacle to rational development rather thanpart of the solution. Therefore, I have included them in the firstbroad group of thinkers.15 This absence of ideological consistency in regards to urbanmanagement is apparent in the political world as well. Consider forexample the centralist policies of the Thatcher regime and thedecentralist tendencies of the Reagan administration.18defines decentralization as “the transfer or delegation of legal andpolitical authority to plan, make decisions, and manage publicfunctions, from central government and its agencies to fieldorganizations of those agencies, subordinate units of government,semiautonomous public corporations area-wide or regionaldevelopment authorities, functional authorities, autonomous localgovernments, or non-governmental organizations.” Decentralization maytake different forms, depending on what type of authority is transferred,the degree of discretionary powers which accompany it and to what typeof agency. Alterman (1988) distinguishes four types of decentralization:deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization.Deconcentration involves the transfer of function from central ministriesto field officers or agencies within those ministries, along with somesmall degree of discretion. Delegation is the transfer of functions toagencies outside the existing bureaucratic structure together with asignificant degree of discretion and independent decision makingpowers. Devolution is the transfer of functions to agencies such that theywould have autonomous legal powers. Privatization involves movingfunctions from the public to the voluntary, semipublic, or private sector(Alterman 1988: 456-457).3.1 Environmental ConsiderationsThe deteriorating state of the environment has been of concern tomany since the 1960s (Ehrlich 1968, McHarg 1969, Schumacher 1973).However, since the mid 1980s there has been increasing alarm over thequickening rate of change. Perhaps the seminal work in this area was“Our Common Future” published by the World Commission on the19Environment and Development in 1987. This report highlighted thecause and effect relationship between the economic activity necessary tosustain modem urban society and the possibly irreparable damage beingwrought on the bio-sphere. The Green Paper on the urban environmentpublished by the Commission of the European Communities in 1990elaborates on this theme, suggesting specific policies which must beundertaken in Europe’s conurbations to address the root cause of globalenvironmental problems.The Green Paper reviews the consequences of the narrow vision ofdevelopment which dominated urban thinking in the Post-War era.Improvement was measured only in narrowly defined (short term)economic terms. One result was inefficient use of local resources: fertilesoil, air and clean water’6.The resulting impact on the environment hasbeen both direct, through alterations in the use of these basic resourcesand indirect, through the intensity of use. Where agricultural land hasbeen lost through urbanization the produce previously derived from itmust be imported. Similarly water bodies (both fresh and salt) have beenaltered by use for transportation of waste and materials therebynecessitating the importation of clean drinking water and marine foodresources. In addition to the loss of farm productivity, the ill-considereduse of land has led to dispersed populations. These populations have inturn often been settled on sensitive wetlands and floodplains (Yaro 1991).16 One of the most extreme example of unsustainable urban developmentlies in Southern California. Huge engineering works are necessary tobring water from Northern California to the Los Angeles area. The lowdensity sprawl and uneven distribution of employment has resulted ina transportation system which not only kills large numbers of thecity’s inhabitants through motor vehicle accidents and violentlycompetitive drivers but also has produced air quality whichconsistently falls below WHO standards (OECD 1990: 24).20Another characteristic of cities in developed nations is the spatialseparation of work and residence. When this factor is combined with lowresidential densities the result has been high use of private automobiles.The emissions from these vehicles constitutes the largest component ofurban atmospheric pollutants (OECD 1991). While the atmosphericimpact of vehicle emissions was identified as long as twenty years ago17,more recent studies have highlighted other effects of the automobileupon the urban environment. These include degradation due to trafficnoise, roadside runoff, disposal of tires and lubricants, the loss of timethrough congestion and the loss of life and health through accidents. Allof these are now being recognized as connected elements in a lesseningof the quality of urban life (Wood 1990).Yet another consequence of the dispersed settlement patterncommon in modern cities is the consumption of materials forconstruction and maintenance of the built environment. The importationof materials (in particular lumber) for construction is coming underincreasing scrutiny in some developed nations (Deelstra 1990). Themaintenance aspect which includes space heating and cooling as well aslighting became an issue earlier as part of the “energy crisis” of the late1970s. However, the solution was seen in technological terms, not inchanging patterns of settlement. In contrast, many authors since the mid1980s have identified the lack of regional land-use planning andtransportation management as the root cause of many of the problemsfacing the urban environment and by extension the global environment(Rees and Roseland 1991). Additionally, air and water quality are17 A study conducted in the early 1970s found that local air quality ineight OECD countries was being degraded by increased levels of lowlevel Ozone, particulate matter and Nitrous Oxides. (Berry et al 1974).21increasingly being addressed at the level of the urban region. The logicbeing that neither air nor water are respecters of artificial boundaries.Many authors (Deelstra 1990, DeGrove 1991, Stren 1992) haveidentified fragmented authority as a major barrier to effectivemanagement of the environment in large cities. Although, mostmetropolitan areas have had some experience with single issue boardsresponsible for things such as sewerage, water provision, mass transitand more recently air quality, few have had unequivocal success. Theapparent lack of success in tackling the root causes of urbanenvironmental degradation appears to arise from the inability of theseboards to enforce standards and/or to direct development throughregional zoning and transportation management (OECD 1990: 78-79).The gap between responsibility and authority is clearest in areas such asSouthern California were single issue boards are attempting to operate ina political environment of many small local authorities (DeGrove 1991).The 1990 European Communities Green Paper identifies aninterconnected approach:“Metropolitan authorities must undertake policies whichconcern the physical structure of the city (including urbanplanning, transport, the historical heritage and theprotection and enhancement of natural areas): and policiesconcerned with reducing the impact of urban activities on theenvironment (including urban industry, waste management,energy management and water management)” (Roberts andHunter 1991: 59-60).While many authors focus on the need for a centralized approach tothe urban environment there are those who argue for at least an elementof decentralization. Their argument stated simply is that sinceenvironmental problems are created by individual actions they must, at22some point, be addressed at the level of the individual. The slogan of“Think globally act locally” comes to mind. The first step in this processis education to raise the general level of environmental awareness. Thesecond step is to address the problems either by altering (lessening) ourconsumption habits or by finding alternative methods and materials. Inboth cases the actual change must occur where people live their everydaylives. This in turn requires at the very least deconcentration ofresponsibility down to the local level. In his opening address to theEuropean Workshop on “Cities and the Global Environment” held in TheHague in December 1990 René Vlaanderen, that city’s Alderman for theEnvironment, elaborated on the need to involve people and localcommunities in addressing these critical issues in a decentralized fashion(European Foundation, publication, 1992). The basic argument in favourof this approach seemed to be the willingness of people to get involvedwith small scale projects (such as composting) and to alter theirconsumption habits. In addition the acceptance (in terms of not beingvandalized) of urban reforestation and stream enhancement wasdependant on the perception that these were local initiatives and notimpositions of the state.This theme of legitimation of environmental projects in cities wasalso examined by Peggy Wireman. As part of her study on neighborhoods,networks and families she examined the Federal Urban GardeningProgram in the United States. Although her primary interest was to showthe gardening program’s utility “for strengthening the social fabric ofneighbourhoods” (Wireman 1984: 84-85) her study also showed theability of city dwellers to affect their environment’.18 In 1981 there were 175,000 gardeners involved in the program23No longer is the management of the urban environment onlyconsidered in terms of local amenity. Increasingly it is being seen as thevery basis of urban life and as a fundamental part of that most basicfeature, the economy of the city.3.2 Economic ConsiderationsAs previously mentioned many of the arguments in favour ofincreasing centralized control over urban functions lie in the economicfield. In an increasingly market driven global economic environmentevery avenue for improving the efficiency of existing urban services mustbe explored, if an urban region is to maintain or enhance its position.This rationalization extends beyond the obvious improvements to physicalinfrastructure to include the entire spectrum of publicly providedservices and the bureaucratic regulation of public and private economicactivity.By now the emergence of a post-industrial service-based economyis well accepted. Service-providing firms have locational preferenceswhich are worthy of consideration in the centralization-decentralizationdebate. The most easily observable characteristic of service firms is theirtendency of clustering in a single location within an urban region (Leyand Hutton 1991). These firms are attracted by proximity to each otherand to ancillary services such as the hospitality sector as well as linkagesto transportation and communication facilities. Once a Central BusinessDistrict is established it is not easily displaced.The two factors which may influence this situation are differencesin municipal tax rates and the level of services provided with these taxes.raising more than $14 million worth of food. Wireman 1984: 75.24Particularly significant is the quality and stability of the local workforce(strongly related to social factors favouring centralization, see below), thequality of the local environment and of course the level and cost of basicservices (water, power, transport, waste disposal, fire-and -policeprotection).In an age of austerity in which transfers from senior governmentsare declining and the taxpayer is already heavily burdened, urbanauthorities are faced with a choice between cutting services or findingways of doing more with less. One method of achieving the latter is tomaximize the use of physical and staff resources by reducing unnecessaryduplication (realizing economies of scale). In terms of physical facilities(water and sewerage networks, highways and bridges) these have in manycases long ago been centralized in metropolitan-wide authorities.However, by placing all of these bodies under a single authority it isclaimed that further savings may be realized (Barlow 1991). One examplegiven by a proponent of metro schemes concerns traffic management.Area- wide traffic congestion can be addressed not only throughinfrastructure improvements and alterations to the modes oftransportation (modal split), but must in the end include an element of“positive 19 in determining land use. This sort of long term,strategic thinking can only come from a body considering the entireurban field (Norton 1985: 258). Once again Los Angeles is offered asevidence for the impossibility of continuing a trend manner of planning.The estimated cost of maintaining the road network in that sprawling19 Defined as planning where the planning authority or body sets outactual goals and purposes for the pattern of development and for thestructure of the city or urban region. This theme emerges from PeterSelfs work, The Role and Limitations of Metro Government inPositive Urban Planning, 1987.25agglomeration will require $110 billion over the next two decades20.Clearly what is called for (and is emerging) is a fundamental change inurban managerial institutions to reflect and respond to the pressingeconomic realities.Having a single authority responsible for providing basic serviceshas another related benefit. It simplifies the regulatory environment forall concerned. This not only reduces the number of bureaucrats neededto implement regulations but should shorten permit application times aswell. The reduction in paper pushing occupations need not result in adrop in public sector employment. Anton (1975) argues that instead, itwil allow for an institutional reorganization. Jurisdictions which formerlycould not afford the luxury of specialized staff would have this ability in arationalized metropolitan bureaucracy.Yet another benefit which should result from unification into asingle metropolitan authority would be the elimination of often cut-throatcompetition between municipalities in their efforts to attract investment.Similarly, the need for weaker” jurisdictions to accept unpopulardevelopments because of economic necessity would be greatly lessened.In addition, the taxation benefits from investment in one part of themetropolis would be spread more evenly throughout the area.In his examination of the role of metro government in positiveplanning, Peter Self links the economic efficiency arguments to socialequity. Clearly from an economic perspective a certain degree of socialstability is necessary for investor confidence. In so far as urban socialpeace is a product of equal access to opportunities and services,20 American Planning Association Zoning News cited in J.M. DeGrove(ed.) Balanced Growth: A Planning Guide for Local Government p. 44.26centralization can be said to benefit the economic climate. The theme ofequity will be discussed further in section 3.3.Although the urban economy seems to benefit generally fromcentralization, there are a number of economic arguments which providea rationale for increasing decentralization even in this area. One of themost persuasive of these is a 1987 study on the management andfinancing of urban services commissioned by the Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors of thisreport advance the view that “urban service provision can be made moreefficient and effective through the implementation of appropriatedecentralisation (sic) policies”. A decentralized provision of services, it isargued, “encourages and facilitates variations in the supply of and demandfor urban services due to differences in the physical structure of areas,characteristics of residents, economic resources and patterns of growthand change in the community” (OECD 1987: 19). Among the examplesgiven, the cities of Amsterdam and Oslo stand out as having benefittedeconomically from decentralization of urban management. The authorsalso claim that decentralization may encourage greater use of localresources to finance, at least in part, urban services. Mobilizing localresources could involve the re-use of vacant or derelict land for parks,playgrounds or other activities both to improve the quality of the localenvironment and to attract business activity. For example, in their studyof Community Development Corporations in Pittsburgh Lurcott andDowning (1987) state that more than 60 million dollars in privateinvestment had been attracted to inner city neighborhoods over a six yearperiod. Decentralization of urban service provision2’could also result in21 There is little consistency in the literature. Wereas the OECD study27an expansion of human resources brought out into the public (voluntary)sector, as residents gain a feeling of local ownership.223.3 Social ConsiderationsUnlike the views expressed by Peter Self in Section 3.2, manyeconomists consider equitable access to public services and economicefficiency in conflictual terms. Any increase in one must lead to adecrease in the other. From this point of departure authors such asArthur Okun try to arrive at the “ideal” balance point between these polaropposites. Implicit in many of these works is the notion that equity isenhanced by decentralization and efficiency increased through greatercentralization.Some social scientists take a different path. Basing themselvesprimarily though not exclusively on the American experience thesewriters examine the anti-centralist trend in urban America. Oneconclusion is that the promotion of local democracy through theincorporation of neighborhood sized (5-15,000 people) municipalitieswithin metropolitan areas is in fact a cover for greedy (and short sighted)self defense (Weiher 1991), a mechanism wereby suburbs protect theirricher tax base from the demands of poorer inner cities. A study based onthe 1970 American census found that metropolitan structure, particularlythe correspondence of economic inequalities with jurisdictionalascribes these benefits to the decentralization of “urban serviceprovision”, an earlier work by Rohe and Gates (Planning withNeighbourhoods) gives decentralization of “planning” as the reason forthe improvement.22 This theme is well developed by Nachman and Cohen (1989) whoapproach the issue of volunteer recruitment from a social workperspective and by Lurcott and Downing (1987) using a communityeconomic development argument.28boundaries, was one of the primary factors responsible for variations inrates of urban criminal violence. The authors of this study conclude thatrates of inter-personal violence between strangers further increased inareas where racial or ethnic divisions also existed between jurisdictions(Blau & Blau 1982). Douglas Yates, an early critic of decentralization inthe U.S., decries the trend toward neighborhood institutions as “abetrayal of integration and the merit system in urban government”. Hefurther argued that decentralization would produce racism and arbitraryrule (Yates 1973: 3).Clearly the existence of wildly differing levels of public serviceswithin a metropolitan area will quickly lead to social unrest. The erectionand maintenance of municipal boundaries may be a defense mechanismbut it is not particularly effective as the “invasion” of suburbs in the L.A.riots of 1992 attest. A desire to be “a more integrated and tolerantsociety cannot be successful while metropolitan areas remain spatiallyfractured and politically fragmented (Weiher 1991: 195).However, the social health of urban residents is not based solely onequitable access to public services. In large measure it is a result of thedegree to which people feel that they have something in common. At thispoint the terms social health and healthy communities often becomeintertwined. An example of this etymological intersection appears inBoothroyd and Eberle’s discussion of healthy communities. They definethese as:“...a community in which all organisations frominformal groups to governments are workingeffectively together to improve the quality of all people’slives.” (Doothroyd and Eberle 1990: 7)29Their quite reasonable assertion Is that without healthy communitiesthere cannot be healthy societies and vice versa. Their examination ofhealthy communities is process oriented and does not describe in anygreat detail the scale of organizational or functional divisions. Accordingto these authors healthy true communities are small (i.e. <1000 people)scale (Boothroyd and Eberle 1990: 6).Social psychologists such as Gaister and Hesser also acknowledgethe crucial role that local neighborhoods play in urban social health.These particular authors assert that:• .there are certain physical and social features ofneighbourhoods which people generally need or towhichthey aspire and that people cannot adapt to theabsence of these features” (Galster and Hesser 1981:748).Some of the social features include the socialization23 of children andthe provision of personal support networks among neighbors (Wireman1984). The development of these primary relationships can occur at thescale of neighborhoods it does not naturally occur at larger scales (Roheand Gates 1985).Beyond these immediate functions, neighborhoods provide a localframe of reference and a supportive environment from which individualsand groups may interact with society at large. Both aspects serve toincrease the integration of participants into larger society. Many socialtheorists feel that neighborhood organizations provide this necessary linkbetween the individual and the state24.This role is especially critical to23 Websters Dictionary defines socialization as “to adapt, as oneself orothers, to the common needs of a social group”.24 See for example the discussion based on Durkheim in Chapter 3 ofRohe and Gates Planning with Neighborhoods.30members of minorities who would otherwise remain marginalized(Wireman 1984: 34).In addition to promoting individuals’ sense of belonging and socialsupport networks it may also be inferred that strengthening ofneighborhoods through decentralization will enhance as well the socialcontrol functions that these communities perform (Warren 1962).Normative constraints of adult behavior to maintain local customs may berather benign. However, in some authoritarian states (e.g. China)neighborhood associations are in part used as agents of state control(Edgington 1986).Sensitivity to the importance of neighborhoods led sociologists andlater some planners to seek ways of strengthening local communities.Initially this included rudimentary decentralization throughdeconcentration of municipal bureaucracies. The so-called neighborhoodcity halls which emerged were in fact no more than field offices of thecentral bureacracy and had little impact on neighborhood development(Smith 1985: 174). Another expression of this trend was neighborhoodplanning (Fainstein 1987). Since the rationale for local area planning waslargely political in nature it will be discussed further in Section Political ConsiderationsThe word political originally referred to the structure and activitiesof city government25.As urban development spread beyond city limits,the original, close link between political and urban life was eroded. Thus,a situation emerged wherein cities with jurisdictions over portions of25 Websters Dictionary gives the Greek word polis, meaning city, as theultimate root. A closely related word is polity, from the Greek wordpolitela, pertaining to the form of government.31metropolitan areas could no longer manage urban affairs effectively.Following a lengthy examination of the decline in cities’ ability to planeffectively, Peter Self concludes that local government reform isnecessary (Self 1982: 61). In Planning the Urban Region he advocates theadoption of a “metro scheme” wereby an overall public authority is set upfor the entire urban area. He advanced this course because the simpleexpansion of major city boundaries was seen as politically impractical anddemocratically undesirable. The political impracticality stemmed fromthe resistance of municipal residents, bureaucrats and politicians toamalgamation and their resultant loss of influence and employment.More recent observers of the urban scene (notably Barlow 1991)acknowledge the political opposition to metropolitan centralization in thepost-war era. However, they note that it is precisely in those jurisdictionswhich tackled this contentious issue that relatively successful examples ofmetropolitan reorganization may be encountered. Barlow offers Torontoand London as positive examples of metro schemes involving a reductionof municipalities. He gives San Fransisco as an example of the resultingfailure of metropolitanization if this difficult step is avoided.Another argument in favour of increasing centralization in urbanareas concerns the relationship between local and central governments.In a conversation recorded in 1987, Self argued that metropolitangovernment is a stronger advocate of local concerns than are individualmunicipalities. In some cases such strength can become a source of fear.Indeed, this is given as the real reason for the abolition of the GreaterLondon Council by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in1986 (Flynn et at 1985, Young and Grayson 1988)26.26 Even in some areas were the metropolitan authority could not be32However, if local government remains fragmented, then theresponsibility for dealing with broader urban problems passes inescapablyto central or state governments. This result seems to represent a failureof democratic accountability as traditionally understood. “The democraticargument for a metro authority remains logical and strong, provided itcorresponds to a genuine arena of common problems and interests” (Self1982: 66).Alan Norton gives a similar argument in his rationale for thecentralization of political functions. He does stipulate that for such a bodyto speak with democratic authority it must be a representativegovernment, democratically elected. He sees the alternatives tocentralization as either the loss of local control to central government orthe proliferation of unelected single function boards (Norton 1985: 261).This concern with maintaining local control over urban areas is the sameargument given by those who advocate greater decentralization of urbanmanagement.Within modern political thought there are two streams that standout as strongly favouring municipal decentralization. The first seesdecentralization as a mechanism of increasing public participation incivic affairs. Proponents of this view are heirs to the long-standing radicaldemocratic belief that representative government is inferior toparticipatory democracy27.Adherents of this theory hold that “the termlocal democracy can hardly be applied to municipal authorities where adescribed as a government senior governments have viewed them ascompetitors. Take for example the emasculation of the GreaterVancouver Regional District under the Social Credit government inthe early 1980s.27 In representative democracy citizen participation is occasional,through the ballot box or through the ability to petition politicians; inparticipatory government decisions are made directly by the citizenry.33hundred councillors represent a million people” (Sharpe 1979: 83).Instead, they argue for neighborhood self-government in urbanequivalents of the New England town halls (Barber 1984: 261). Thisgovernment by the people results in increased trust in local decision-making according to these theorists. Failure to include citizens in activeparticipation in planning decisions that affect the quality of neighborhoodlife will “lead to further deterioration and concentration of the poor, asthose with the means to move to other locations do so” (Rohe and Gates:192).Susskind and Elliott summarize the impact of increasing citizeninvolvement in government decision making. They claim that it leads to:(quote) 1) democratization of choices involving resource allocation, 2)decentralization of service systems management, 3) deprofessionalizationof bureaucratic judgements that affect the lives of residents, and 4)demystification of design and investment decisions (Susskind and Elliott1983: 3). In his 1985 work, Brian Smith refers to a number of explicitlypolitical outcomes of decentralization. Among these are the fostering of apolitically educated citizenry, practical training for future nationalleaders, political equality and closer scrutiny (accountability) overgovernment (Smith 1985: 20-27).The second major theoretical school in favour of decentralizationrepresents the neo-conservatives28.Simply put they believe that lessgovernment is better government. Thus, they favour the privatization ofmany local government functions. Barring this most extreme form ofdecentralization, they advocate delegation of functions to smaller28 This school, the so-called ‘Virginia School” Is discussed by WarrenMagnusson in his 1979 essay “The New Neighbourhood Democracy:Anglo-American Experience in Historical Perspective.34jurisdictions as a means of fragmenting and thereby reducing the powerof governments.Other motivations for decentralization which emerge in theliterature can best be described as originating in practical municipalmanagement. Municipal bureaucrats and politicians saw decentralizationas a means of blunting the urban unrest of the 1960s29 (Bealey 1988:107). Thus, community organizations were seen as “flak catchers” todeflect popular demands and enmesh local citizens in participatoryactivities (Fainstein 1987: 385).A more generous appraisal of why some municipalities supportdecentralization is offerred by R.S. Oropesa in a study of neighborhoodimprovement associations in Seattle and Bellevue. The author argues inhis case studies that government officials had a genuine desire to educatethe public and improve the lines of communication (Oropesa 1989: 740-41). Involving members of the public in city affairs can be a trust buildingmechanism as well as providing an appreciation of constraints on localresources (Morlan 1982: 439). In cities with several hundred thousandinhabitants the lines of communication are simply to long for effectiveaction (Smith 1985: 202).Local citizen groups have emerged as powerful actors on the urbanstage with or without formal decentralization (Nanetti 1985: 115). Ifthese groups remain outside the formal decision-making circles thenmunicipal activities will be characterized by still more confrontation andobstruction than at present. Municipal decentralization may be a way ofdrawing defensive (“NIMBY”)3°minded local groups into formal, working29 This was city governments’ rationale for the “neighborhood city halls”mentioned in Section 3.3.30 The “Not In My Backyard” phenomena which is essentially a rejection35partnerships with urban authorities. As Linda Stamato states in her studyof community organizations and siting controversies:“Much of the negative community posture evident insiting controversies stems from fear, outrage andresistance to change. But it also reflects the absence ofa means for the community to exercise powerresponsibly, creatively, and constructively. With trainingand support, community organizations can fill thatvoid.” (Stamato 1991: 144)The nature of this relationship between local, neighborhoodorganizations and central, urban authorities forms part of the discussionin the concluding section of this chapter.3.5 SynthesisThe preceding sections have presented the theoretical (and tosome extent practical) considerations for centralization ordecentralization within each of the four functional areas of urbanmanagement. In the current section these arguments are summarizedand a preliminary conclusion regarding the structural division of urbanmanagement is offerred. This division acknowledges the criticalimportance of safeguarding the environment and tries to balance theneed for economic efficiency, the desire for social equity and the wish tostrengthen community.3.5.1 EnvfronmentIn terms of the urban environment three main considerationsemerge. The first is that existing patterns of urban settlement are behindmuch of the environmental degradation. The only way to deal with thisof outsider initiated change appears to occur universally.36problem of urban sprawl effectively is through regional land-useplanning. The closely related responsibility of traffic management mustalso be considered (at least in part) at a regional level31. In a similar vein,the mobile elements of air and water must, by their nature, be managedon a regional basis.The second major conclusion is that regional authorities must havethe ability to enforce environmental standards and to direct developmentthrough regional zoning and traffic management.The final point which emerges from the literature is the need toengage citizens in environmental action at the street level. This meansgetting people involved in small scale projects and providing localencouragement to change consumption habits. If nothing else individualsand neighborhoods must become custodians of centrally initiatedprograms such as urban reforestation and stream and shoreenhancement. Ironically the solution to the problem of waste (both solidand liquid) may lie within the cumulative choices of households and notin the large scale techno-fixes traditionally tried.Thus, in the realm of the environment there is a pressing need forcentralization of responsibilities in area wide authorities. Yet, at the sametime there must be some decentralization in the form of small scaleprojects to help build an informed constituency for environmentalchange.3.5.2 EconomyThere are a number of economic arguments favouring centralizationof urban management functions. These have become urgent in an era31 This represents the familiar triangle of work, residence and thetransportation link between them.37where the provision of basic infrastructure and services is fallingincreasingly on local authorities alone. Many of the arguments forcentralizing urban functions in a metropolitan body derive from the cost-savings and improvements in efficiency realized through creatingeconomies of scale. At its simplest level this entails construction andmaintenance of physical facilities for the provision of basic services acrossthe entire urban area.Other considerations focus on the reduction in bureaucraticregulation of economic activity through elimination of unnecessaryduplication. This serves a dual purpose of simplifying the regulatoryenvironment (thereby removing an impediment to investment) andfreeing up staff budgets to focus on specialized tasks.Centralization also allows metropolitan areas to focus their attentionon competition with other urban areas. This is accomplished byeliminating the opportunity for firms to play municipalities against eachother. Finally, centralization serves the cause of social equity. This, inturn, reduces the basis for civil strife, thereby increasing investorconfidence.In terms of decentralization there are two main economicarguments. The first involves the improvements in efficiency of socialservice provision. A decentralized approach allows for the differentnuances characterizing communities and residents to be recognized byservice providers. By making use of local knowledge, existing services arebrought to bear more accurately where there is a need. This knowledge oflocal conditions is gained either by placing professionals in thecommunity or delegating authority to existing organisations. In both caseslatent physical resources can be mobilized.38The second argument points out that decentralization drawspeople’s savings and energies into the public sphere. This isaccomplished through an increased sense of ownership of theircommunity.Thus, in the economic sphere there are clear benefits to a divisionof functions between a central metropolitan authority and various localauthorities. While the former would be responsible for providing basicservices and unified regulatory procedures the latter would be chargedwith the responsibility for providing human services.3.5.3 SocietyAmong the four categories of arguments for moving the balancebetween central and local authorities no group is more difficult toreconcile than that of the social considerations. This is because the socialarguments for centralization and decentralization are based on mutuallyhostile views of what forms the basis of society.The argument for centralization is predicated on the contentionthat society is best served by the free association of individuals. In thislight the removal of jurisdictional barriers will foster a more integratedsociety in which individuals will be judged solely on merit. Centralizationremoves one of the bases (geographical) for discrimination within ametropolitan area.The social arguments for decentralization are similarly predicatedon a particular view of society. Namely, that society is composed of twolevels, individuals and collectivities; and that, the intermediary structuresare critical to the well-being of both individuals and society as a whole.Decentralization to local organizations serves to strengthen areal based39communities and thereby contributes to a healthy society.An additional argument for decentralization concerns the role thatlocal organizations play in directing behaviour. By delegatingresponsibility for limiting some common forms of deviant behaviour,more use may be made of normative rather than coercive controls.There are benefits to maintaining metropolitan wide standardsconcerning the rights of individuals. Thus, any area wide authority wouldhave a watchdog” function. However, urban social health would benefitprofoundly from the recognition and enhancement of neighborhoodorganizations. This would be realized through widespreaddecentralization of human service provision and transfer of appropriatedecision making powers.3.5.4 PoliticsThe political arguments for increasing centralization ordecentralization are less controversial than the social considerationssince the former are all rooted in the same democratic principles.Centralists see representative democracy as a practical necessity whendealing with large numbers of citizens; while decentralists seek toinstitute a “purer” form of democracy with more active and frequentpublic involvement.Arguments favouring political centralization in urban areas springfrom a desire to improve the ability to arrive at and implement decisions.In large, politically fragmented, urban areas it is extremely difficult toreach a consensus on a course of action and on methods of implementingpolicies for addressing common issues in a timely fashion. Also, politicalcentralization is favoured because in its dealings with senior governments40a unified metropolitan voice is considered louder than a chorus ofconstituent municipalities.There are numerous benefits given for increasing politicaldecentralization. First among these is the promotion of participatorydemocracy which is said to result from the creation of smaller politicalunits. Bringing government closer to the people also serves to improvethe flow of information to citizens regarding the design of public policiesand investment decisions. In many cities the current distrust ofprofessional government has reached a point where even routineactivities are resisted. Decentralization is seen as one way to overcomethe suspicion of the citizenry.Political centralization is required to better deal with metropolitan-wide events and issues. Such an authority is also well placed to push theinterests of an urban area with senior governments. Politicaldecentralization strengthens the fundamental bond between governmentand the governed. This critical, consentual relationship forms the basisfor any true democracy.In summary, the review of the theoretical literature does notprovide an overall clear preference for greater centralization ordecentralization. A certain dichotomy appears with environmental andeconomic functions benefitting from centralization and social andpolitical functions benefitting from decentralization.In the following chapter we will examine some of the practicalconsequences of restructuring urban management. To this end we willconsider the rationale for and assess the impacts of alterations in thefunctional balance between a central authority and local communities.41CHAPTER 4Neighborhood Self Management in Jerusalem:A Case Study4.1 Setting the StageThe Neighborhood Self-Management Project (NSMP) in Jerusalememerged as a municipal pilot program in 1980. Although described bysome as an ‘experiment” (Hasson 1989) it was no whimsical undertaking.It represented and still represents a serious attempt at reconciling thecentralizing demands of urban life in a developed country with thepresence of large, extremely diverse and long established communities inthis ancient city. To fully understand this dialectic it is necessary tobriefly review the more recent history of Jerusalem prior to 1967 and todescribe in some detail the relationship between central and localgovernment in Israel.4.1.1 Jerusalem in the Nineteenth CenturyAt the beginning of the nineteenth century Jerusalem was at one ofthe lowest ebbs in its long history (Romann & Weingrod 1991: 13).Enclosed within its sixteenth century walls, its inhabitants numberedfewer than ten thousand. The city was divided into four unequal Quarters:Moslem, Christian, Armenian and Jewish. Approximately half of the totalpopulation were Moslems living in the largest quarter adjacent to theTemple Mount. The different Christian communities numbered some2,700 in total. The Jews, numbering fewer than 2,500 were almostexclusively Sepharadim, descendants of fifteenth century exiles from theIberian peninsula (Halper 1991: 7). The Jewish Quarter was tiny, just 32acres32. Consequently, overcrowding became a severe problem as the32 The Old City was (remains) 215 acres in total. Of this the Moslem42Jewish population began its rapid increase in the mid-nineteenthcentury.The city was administered from Acre the regional capital of anOttoman pashalik (district) which included most of present day Israel.However, each community (millet) was left to manage its own internalaffairs (Tsimhoni 1986). Besides the security provided by the city’s walland small Turkish garrison there were no local services offered. Theextensive water works which had supplied the city two millennia earlierhad long since crumbled. As a result each home or group of homes wasresponsible for collecting its own water in pools and cisterns fed by thewinter rains. Unfortunately, this standing water provided the breedingplaces for the malarial mosquitoes which plagued the city until well intothe 20th Century. As there was no provision for liquid or solid waste,cholera and other water-borne diseases were also endemic.Jerusalem circa 1800 was almost entirely a consumer city. Lackinga productive hinterland and not being on any natural trade-routes theeconomy was based on the city’s heritage. Religious tourism, especiallythe Easter pilgrimage was critical to the city’s Christian and Moslemcommunities. Since study was the focus of Jewish life in Jerusalem whileproductive labor was actively discouraged by the rabbinic authorities33,the Jewish population relied on a tenuous welfare system (halukah). Itsaw funds raised in communities overseas and distributed based on thecountry of origin of the recipients. Moslems, under no such restrictions,Quarter is 75, the Christian Quarter 44 and the Armenian Quarter 30acres in area. The non-residential Temple Mount is 33 acres in area.33 The communities of religious Jews who had always inhabitedJerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safad were collectively known as theOld Yishuv (Settlement) in contrast with the Zionist communitieswhich were referred to as the New Yishuv.43were active as merchants and as skilled labor. So remote andunimportant was Jerusalem that during the French invasion of Egypt andthe Levant in 1799, Napoleon made no effort to approach the city.Instead Jerusalem’s entry into the modem age came gradually.There were three primary factors responsible for Jerusalem’sgrowth in the first half of the nineteenth century: The decrepit state ofthe Turkish Empire, competition among European Imperial powers andpopulation growth through natural increase and immigration (Ben-Arieh1976: 74)34• Most important of these was the weakness of the OttomanEmpire without which the other two factors could not have come intoplay.Following European intervention in its favor, first against Egyptianrebels in 1840 and again during the Crimean War (1854-1856), theTurkish regime passed legislation making it possible for citizens of othercountries to buy land outside of the Old City of Jerusalem. By the 1870sthe European powers had established a plethora of institutions to servetheir own visiting nationals and also their respective local clientcommunities35.Ironically, the most imposing of these was thecompound built by the Russians in 1860. It was capable ofaccommodating a thousand pilgrims at a time.However, for the residents of Jerusalem the mission schoolsestablished in the 1840s and 1850s and hospitals such as The EnglishHospital (1844), the Leper’s Hospital and Schneller Orphanage (1860)34 For an extensive exploration of the dynamic between these factors seeRuth Kark’s Jerusalem’s Neighborhoods 1991.35 Different European powers took advantage of the Millet system byextending their “protection” over recognized local groups. In additionEnglish and German Protestants sought to gain converts from theJewish and Orthodox Christian communities.44established by British and German Protestants had a more lasting impact.The Catholic Powers also contributed facilities such as the AustrianHospice (1853) and Hospital of St. Louis (1887).Jewish building initiatives in this period focussed on residentialconstruction. Thus, Mishkenot She’ananim, the first Jewishneighborhood outside the city walls was begun in 1857 and Batei Mahase(houses for the indigent) was built in 1865. Both of these projects werefunded by overseas donations. Indeed between 1850 and 1917 more thana third of the new Jewish neighborhoods were established throughphilanthropic initiative. A further 27 % were constructed by buildingsocieties, while the remainder were commercial and private projects(Kark 1991).Jewish neighborhoods from this era housed small groups of familieswhose lives centered on a study hail, synagogue and ritual bath. Theseneighborhoods had two built forms. The quarters erected up to the 1890swere built in the form of a walled neighborhood with gates that could belocked. Thereafter, collective apartment blocks of two and three storiespredominated (Amiran 1973: 31). In both cases neighborhood affairswere administered by a single committee or several committees, selectedthrough direct and secret balloting to terms of office lasting from one tothree years. The committees’ spheres of activity included neighborhoodplanning; construction; allocation of housing; and the level of rents. Thecommittees also enforced neighborhood by-laws, kept up the watercisterns and public lavatories, removed garbage, ensured that private andpublic areas were lit at night36 and the gates guarded (Kark 1991: 88).36 In 1905 the Jerusalem Municipality took on the responsibility forstreet lighting (Kark 1991).45Although there was some Jewish institutional construction during thisperiod (i.e. the Hurva Synagogue 1863); it was limited to the Old City.Lacking comparable access to foreign capital there was littlephysical expansion of the Moslem Quarter. However, by the 1870s a fewwealthy Moslem families had begun building private homes outside of theOld City (Kark 1991: 38). These clan-based clusters of houses formed thenuclei of many of today’s Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.As modern standards of hygiene were gradually introduced, deathrates began to fall. This had a most marked effect on the Jewishpopulation. Before the nineteenth century the continual stream ofimmigrants had been cancelled out by the extremely high death ratesprevalent in Jerusalem. Between 1800 and 1870 the general populationmore than doubled, reaching 22,000. In the same period the Jewishpopulation grew five-fold from 2,250 to 11,000. For the first time incenturies Jews formed a majority of Jerusalem’s residents (for laterpopulation growth see Figure 1).The schools which were established in this period had a profoundimpact on local life. Rising to the challenge presented by the Protestantmissionary schools, Western European Jewish philanthropists establisheda number of schools which emphasized technical training, Europeanlanguages, Math and Science. These schools were the vehicle whichrevolutionized the Old Yishuv (see footnote 32) from within.Through this period Ottoman officials were becoming increasinglyalarmed at the penetration of European influence and the growingautonomy of their client communities in Jerusalem. Hoping to stem thistrend they re-defined the city as a separate jurisdiction and appointed ahighly nationalistic governor to the city in 1857. In 1867 the Turkish46government took a further step by granting municipal status to Jerusalemin order to mobilize the local Moslem Arab community against the foreign“invasion”. This status made Jerusalem unique outside of the Imperialcapital, Istanbul. The mayor was a local Moslem appointed by thegovernor. In addition to the mayor, the council consisted of six Moslems,two Christians and two Jews, all of whom were Turkish subjects.On the eve of World War One, Jerusalem was bustling with apopulation of 75,000. Its economy, still based on the twin pillars ofpilgrimage and financial contributions from abroad, benefitted from thecapital accompanying Jewish immigrants. With the outbreak of war in1914, all three sources of income dried up. The Jews and part of theChristian community were more dependent on their foreign connectionsthan the Moslems and consequently suffered more from these changes.In three years the overall population dropped by a third. The Jewishcommunity declined through expulsions, starvation and epidemic diseasefrom 48,000 to 26,000 (Lieber 1987: 168). This trauma finally forced theremnants of the Old Yishuv into the modem era.4.1.2 Jerusalem During the British MandateIn 1917 British Forces entered Jerusalem, ending four centuries ofOttoman rule. The British military administration immediately took stepsto alleviate the grave situation. While the food supply was ensured withgrain from Egypt, the water cisterns were emptied, cleaned andequipped with covers and pumps. Subsequently, a water pipeline was laidfrom springs near Hebron in 1919. The results of these measures camequickly. For example, the incidence of fatal cases of malaria dropped from113 in 1918 to 5 in 1922 (Amiran 1973: 29).47In 1920 the military government was replaced by a British civiladministration and in 1922 the British Mandate for Palestine(encompassing present day Israel, the ‘West Bank” and Gaza District) wasformally adopted by the League of Nations. In that year, the first moderncensus taken in the Mandate area showed a total population of 764,000.Jerusalem, then with 62,700 residents, was its largest city. A period ofprosperity followed with the renewal of immigration from Europe andinflux of British and Jewish capital. The Mandatory Government beganmodernizing the city’s infrastructure. One example being the airfield,established at Kalandia to the North of the city near the Jewishagricultural settlements of Atarot and Neve Ya’akov. Access to a reliablesupply of electricity was ensured in 1928. Jerusalem’s role as thecountry’s capital was further reinforced when the various Zionistorganizations established their headquarters there38.The decade alsosaw the opening of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (planned byPatrick Geddes), the Hadassah Hospital, John D. Rockefeller Museum andthe American Y.M.C.A. In 1931, construction of the luxurious King DavidHotel was completed.The Census of 1931 showed that the municipal population hadswelled to 90,500. A further 2,600 dwelled in suburbs outside the citylimits. Amongst the three communities in Jerusalem there was littledifference in terms of median age and birth and death rates39. However37 The disparity in modem services between Jerusalem and other largecities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv was only closed after the SecondWorld War. In 1939, for example, Jerusalem had 9 % of the country’spopulation but consumed only 2 % of the electricity (Lieber 1987:171). Water consumption was still half the national average as late as1968 (Amiran 1973: 35).38 The most striking of these was the Jewish Agency compound built in1929 in Rehavia.39 In 1931 the respective birth and death rates per thousand were 3648the disparity in literacy rates was considerable. 77 % of Jews and 72 % ofChristians were literate; while only 33 % of Moslems could read andwrite (Schmelz 1987: 36). The Census also revealed that there were 658“industrial” establishments in the city, which however employed only3,316 persons (Lieber 1987: 170). Thus, economically Jerusalemremained a service oriented, consumer city.Table 1Population Change in JerusalemaDuring the British MandateYear Jews Moslems Christians Totalb1922 34,100 13,400 14,700 62,7001931 53,800 19,900 19,300 93,1001946 99,300 33,700 31,300 164,400a) Including Suburbsb) Including Druze, Bahal and OthersSource: U. SchmeLz, Modern Jerusalem’s Demographic Evolution Table 2,p. 28.With regard to spatial development, two main tendenciescharacterize the Mandatory period. The first was the increase of built uparea, in line with the growth in population. This was achieved by fifing-invacant patches between neighborhoods built during the close of theOttoman period; and by extending the urban fringe to the South andWest. As a consequence of the latter, several Jewish garden suburbs (e.g.and 14 for Jews; 42 and 20 for Moslems and 30 and 13 for Christians.The profile for Christians is somewhat misleading as it included largenumbers of ecclesiastical workers and British personnel.49Belt HaKerem) sprang up outside the then municipal boundaries. Withinthese new neighborhoods a new form of housing appeared in the 1930s.Architects belonging to the Histadrut (see Chapter 2) Planning Instituteerected workers’ cooperative housing in the new neighborhood ofRehavia. The Jerusalem architects who built these residences saw thetraditional residential form in Jerusalem as a negative example. Although,their design maintained the common enclosed yards they redesigned theentranceways to give each family greater privacy (Graicer 1989: 297).The second tendency in spatial development was continuedresidential separation between religious groups. The disturbances of1929 and 1936-1939 further intensified this tendency (Schmelz 1987:37).During the British Mandate there was a modest expansion in localauthority and responsibility for services. Appointed municipal councilswere replaced with elected bodies. These councils were charged withadministering local services such as sanitation, lighting and roadmaintenance. Building and town-planning were regulated by a statutorycommittee composed of municipal councillors and British officials; i.e.the District Engineer, Medical Officer and District Commissioner(Bentwich 1932: 242). Property owning Palestinian citizens were eligibleto vote and run for office in local elections. Mayors (who alone received asalary) were appointed by the Governor from amongst the electedcouncillors. In mixed cities such as Jerusalem, voters cast ballots forcommunal representatives (Jewish, Moslem, Christian). The compositionof the Jerusalem City Council was fixed at six Jews, four Moslems(including the mayor) and two Christians (Benvenisti 1976). The councilthus constructed proved unable to function as Christian and Moslem50councillors voted in a bloc balancing the Jewish plurality. Consequently,by 1945 Jerusalem was being run entirely by British officials (Prittle1987: 172).As the Mandate deteriorated into violence and repression by theauthorities, municipal affairs ground to a halt. Beginning in November1947 the British began abandoning Jerusalem and by the spring of 1948,the city was split into Jewish West Jerusalem and Arab East Jerusalem.With the Declaration of Independence in May 1948 West Jerusalembecame the capital of the State of Israel. The Bedouin, Arab Legion fromTransJordan invaded and occupied territory of the former Mandate,including Arab East Jerusalem. The city remained divided by a hostileborder for 19 years.4.1.3 Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967In 1948 Israel inherited the structures of a unitary state. Yet,organically it was a “compound of communities” (Elazar and Kaicheim1988: xxix) and a “nation of neighborhoods” (King et al 1987). Indeed theNew Yishuv was created out of a series of local communities which wereonly subsequently formed into a country-wide community and still laterinto a state. These modern settlements were founded by cultural andideological groups during the Ottoman and British regimes. Some such asthe Kibbutzim and Moshavim later formed federations of like mindedcommunities. Others, particularly neighborhoods which formed thenuclei of cities were settled by distinct groups based on area of originand/or level of adherence to orthodox Judaism. These neighborhoodsgradually coalesced into cities and towns. The historical development ofJerusalem differs from this urban “norm” in two regards. Firstly,51Jerusalem had been continuously inhabited for centuries. Thus, itinherited an existing built form. Secondly, the city is home to largeautonomous communities (both Jewish and non-Jewish) which pre-datethe efforts of modem Jewish nationalism (see Chapter 2 Section 2).Many, such as Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, felt that modem,centralized state structures and services would soon replace thesetraditional modes of living. The resolution of these two world views waspostponed first by war and then by an influx of refugees.At the end of hostilities in 1949 Jerusalem was a shambles. For,Figure 1Population Growth of Jerusalem 19OO199O*600500 •...f400I___1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000Year-‘-TotaI Jewish* Within Current (1990) Municipal BoundariesSource: Statisical Yearbook of Jerusalem, various years.52unlike earlier wars, this time the communities of the city fought againsteach other, tearing the metropolitan fabric asunder. Within the citylimits there was a population transfer with some 20,000 Arabsabandoning their homes in West Jerusalem and 4,000 Jews leaving theirhomes behind in the East.Recovery from the war’s upheaval was very different in the twosectors of Jerusalem. The differences in socio-economic status that hadlong existed between the two national communities were furtherexacerbated by the jurisdictional imbalance which emerged. The westernsector becoming the capital of a sovereign and rapidly developing nation;while the eastern sector became a provincial town on the periphery ofthe then nominally independent state of Jordan.By 1961 the population of West Jerusalem had reached 165,000 inan area of 38 2 Despite the enormous growth in population, WestJerusalem in this period remained “a mosaic of neighborhoods, eachpossessing a clearly defined character, way of life and communalcomposition” (Benvenisti 1976: 32). It was this patchwork structure thatallowed the co-existence of communities of widely differing social,economic and religious ways. The older Jewish quarters maintained theirpre-State character, while the abandoned Arab neighborhoods werepopulated by refugee immigrants from a particular country of origin (ie.Moroccans in Musrara and other North Africans in Baka’a). Even thepublic housing projects built from the mid- 1950s onwards were settledby homogeneous groups (Lieber 1987: 180).In addition to housing, the Israeli government invested heavily ininstitutional construction during the period of 1948-1967. A newparliament building (Knesset) and various government ministry buildings53were built in the 1960s. A large new university campus and expandednational hospital were also built replacing those now inaccessible in theenclave on Mount Scopus. Thus, West Jerusalem emerged as an urbancenter providing a wide range of services to the rest of the country.Under the Mandate local government in Jerusalem had remainedat a primitive level. The sudden withdrawal of strong, central controlmeant that the stabilization of municipal government in Jerusalem was “along and painful process” (Benvenisti 1976: 33). The 21 member electedcouncil was split into tiny factions unused to working with each other4°Consequently, the central government was forced to disband severalcouncils. It was not until 1955 that a workable coalition led by the Labourparty emerged in the city. This coalition (which mirrored that at thenational level) remained in power until 1965. In that year the energeticTeddy Kollek, leading a left wing splinter party, swept the Labour partyfrom office. His campaign which for the first time focussed on purelylocal issues marked a watershed in the development of Jerusalem.In contrast to the enormous development of West Jerusalem, ArabEast Jerusalem under Jordanian control lagged far behind. Despite localopposition, the territory occupied by the Arab Legion was unilaterallyannexed4’ by Jordan in 1950. However, rather than encouragingredevelopment in East Jerusalem, the Jordanian government pursued adiscriminatory policy against the city. With the exception of money fortourist facilities, public and private investment was directed toward thesmall desert capital, Amman. As a result many left East Jerusalem for40 These parties were local representatives of national parties who couldoperate at the national level because of the broad consensus onnational issues such as security and immigration.41 This area to the West of the River Jordan, became known as the ‘WestBank” of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.54work in Jordan or the Gulf States. Under these conditions the populationof East Jerusalem did not recover its pre-1948 level until the mid-1960s.Even this “measure” is misleading as the population which left the citywas replaced with migrants from rural parts of the West Bank.Under Jordanian rule East Jerusalem’s infrastructure remainedrudimentary. In 1961 one quarter of the households did not have accessto safe drinking water. Even more critical was the absence of a seweragesystem. These two factors contributed to an infant mortality rate tentimes higher in East Jerusalem than in West Jerusalem. Other areas suchas education42,medical services, and housing also lagged behind that ofWest Jerusalem (see Table 2).In addition to the low level of public services, East Jerusalem’seconomy was weak. Fully half of the families were reliant onremittances from family members in the Gulf States or on the UnitedNations Relief Works Agency (Benvenisti 1976). Even in terms of basiceducation the gap between East and West Jerusalem remained.Jordanian government decision makers continued to seeJerusalem as many of their Mandatory predecessors had43. Namely, as “acity holy to Moslems and Christians” (Anglo-American Committee 1945-1947: 785). Their efforts at urban planning were aimed at preserving theOld City and its religious sites for all Moslems and Christians44’5.42 In Mandatory Palestine primary education till Grade 5 had been free.The Jordanian authorities extended this by a year.43 This is evident from official publications such as the introduction tothe 1961 Jordanian Census.44 H. Kendall, the Director of Planning in Mandatory Jerusalemcontinued as the head of the Jerusalem planning panel underJordanian rule until 1967.45 Under Jordanian control Jewish religious sites including 56synagogues and some 60,000 graves on the Mount of Olives had beensystematically destroyed.55Restrictive controls were placed on land use within the small (6 km2)area of East Jerusalem. As a consequence residential development in thisperiod took place largely outside of the municipal boundaries. The resultwas unplanned, difficult to service ribbon development along a North-South axis leading to the nearby cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem.However, it was the unexpected loss of communal leadership46andthe crude actions of Jordanian officials which most infuriated the localPalestinian population. In 1951 the King of Jordan was assassinated onthe Temple Mount. The crackdown and martial law which followed lasteduntil 1957. The last ten years of Jordanian control over the Easternsector of the city were relatively quiet, as East Jerusalem accepted itsrole as a secondary center. This period came to an abrupt end with theSix Day War.Following two days of fighting in June 1967 the Jordanian army fledJerusalem. As a result a single municipal authority was established withthe Israeli municipality of Jerusalem extending its control over an area of108 km2, encompassing an urban core of 44 km2 and a suburban fringeto the North and South47.The broadly based Israeli coalition governmenttook immediate steps to “maintain Jerusalem as a united city and thecapital of Israel, with a sizable Jewish majority” (Sharkansky 1992: 18).These steps, some of which are still being implemented will form part ofthe discussion on neighborhood self management in Section 4.2.46 Meron Benvenisti the dovish former deputy mayor of Jerusalemchronicling the effects of the conflict in his work Jerusalem: TheTorn City gives percentages of each of the leading Arab families ofJerusalem who remained in the City after 1948.47 The area annexed included parts or all of 28 municipalities andvillages.564.1.4 RelationshIp of State and Local Governments in IsraelTo this day, local government in Israel includes three types ofbodies: municipalities, local councils and regional councils. Municipalauthority is still based on legislation enacted in the Mandatory period.Specifically, these are the Municipal Act of 1934 and the Local CouncilsAct of 1941. The transition from the British Mandate to independentIsraeli rule in 1948 saw the transfer of responsibility for localgovernment to the new Ministry of Interior. While this is the case in law,the reality is rather more complex. The complexity stems from thepolitical culture of Israeli governments48,which makes variousministries de facto preserves of political parties which are recurringmembers of coalition governments49.In fact, there are five governmentministries in Israel whose activities have significant implications for thefunctioning of local authorities: Interior; Education and Culture; Labor andSocial Welfare; Construction and Housing; and Finance. The Ministry ofInterior is formally responsible for legal, administrative and financialactivities of municipalities. The Ministries of Education and Culture andLabor and Social Welfare overseer the most important social services.The Ministry of Construction and Housing was until the 1980s thedominant force in the development of housing and newneighborhoods50.Urban housing initiatives are entitled to receivegovernment land allocations and financing. The ministry was responsible48 Kaicheim describes the state government as “a federation ofministries whose coordinating mechanisms are extremely loose.”(Kaicheim 1988: 41).49 For a comprehensive discussion of the formal and informal policymaking structures which affect local government in Israel see Gerteland Law-Yone 1991: 176-179.50 The percentage of public housing declined from a high of 70 % ofbuilding starts in 1958 to 35 % in 1985 (Alterman & Hill 1986: 128).57for project planning, design and implementation. Local input into thesepublic developments occurs after a finalized proposal (master plan andurban design scheme) has been prepared (MaIler 1991: 59).The Ministry of Finance is a major actor in financial policy making.Other ministries such as Health and Religious Affairs are authorized toapprove planning details which relate to sanitary requirements and theprotection of holy sites respectively.The services which these state ministries fund constituted 24 % ofJerusalem’s Ordinary Budget in 1989/90. A further 9 % came from thecentral government in the form of a general grant5’. There are divergentopinions as to the impact of this financial dependency. Al-Haj andRosenfeld (1990) use the Israel wide average of 55 % (in 1984) tobuttress their contention that local government is weak and thattherefore Israel is highly centralized. Arye Hecht (1988) reaches a quitedifferent conclusion on the basis that the funds flow through stateministries which themselves operate semi-autonomously.While there is ambivalence among academics as to the impact ofstate structures on local government, a trend toward decentralizationdoes seem to be emerging. Haim Kubersky, a long-time Director-Generalof the Interior Ministry clearly favours decentralization or as he calls it“the gradual increase of local self-reliance” (Elazar & Kalcheim 1988: xxv)He cites the move from 29 % of local budgets being locally generated in1979 to 50 % in 1986 as a positive indicator of this trend. Regardless ofthis overall shift towards financial autonomy, Jerusalem has long beenless financially dependent on central government than most Israeli cities.The restructuring of central-local government relations during the51 Table 18/5 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 7 1988.581980s in economic terms is clear. Between 1980 and 1990 stateparticipation in Jerusalem’s budget declined from 65 % to 33 %. Thisdevolution of financial responsibility has forced Jerusalem to restrict itsexpenditures. Indeed, in real terms spending per capita ($275 in1980/8 1 and $441 in 1989/90) has slipped behind the rate of inflation.The best measure of this fact is the 30 % drop in municipal employeesfrom 7,200 to 5,000 over the decade (Statistical Yearbooks 1982,1990).Municipalities in Israel are governed by mayors who, since 1978,are elected directly and by councils which are elected on the basis ofproportional representation. Normally, no party gains a majority incouncil and a coalition has to be formed. The 1989 Jerusalem municipalelections are a case in point. In that year fourteen parties contested thethirty one council positions. The “One Jerusalem” party won eleven ofthose seats with 36 % of the vote. It formed a coalition from amongst theother seven parties which gained seats. Teddy Kollek, the incumbentmayor of Jerusalem, who heads the “One Jerusalem” party, received 59 %of the votes cast for mayor, thereby, beating out the other fourcontenders for the post52.The ability to vote in municipal elections in Israel is based onresidency and age. All residents over the age of eighteen are eligible tovote, regardless of citizenship. Voter participation in Israeli localelections ranges from 40 % in the largest centers to 90 % in thesmallest municipalities (Goldberg 1988: 150). In the 1989 election 42 %of those eligible exercised their franchise in Jerusalem53 Since 1967,no Arab resident of Jerusalem has run for City Council, although up to 2052 Table 19/4 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 7 1988.53 Table 19/3 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 7 1988.59% of Arab residents have cast ballots in local elections since then (seeTable 3). Most of these votes have gone towards Teddy Kollek and hisparty (Kollek 1978: 212).4.2 Neighborhood Self-Management in JerusalemPrior to 1967 most Israeli officials adhered to a Labour- Zionistview of societal development. The goal of this ideology was theingathering of Jews from their worldwide dispersion and the creation ofa single national identity within a secular democratic and socialist state.There was no place given for local communities based on ethnic or socialdivisions. The ultra-orthodox Jewish communities were seen as isolatedanomalies which would eventually be swept aside by the tides of progress.In Jerusalem this view also predominated amongst decision makersbefore 1967 (Kollek 1978).4.2.1 The Aftermath of ReunificationIn a flurry of activity following the Six Day War, the City wasphysically reunited. The bunkers, barbed wire, and mines were removed.Roads between East and West were reopened and the eastern sector wasconnected to the Israeli water grid. Within half a year civilian trafficbetween the two halves of the city had become routine. The mayor ofJerusalem made it clear that the extension of authority over EastJerusalem and its surrounding villages meant that municipal serviceswould be provided equally. However, it soon became clear that it wouldtake years to bring the physical and social infrastructure in EastJerusalem up to the levels of the West. Indeed, the gap in basic indicatorsbetween East and West was still discernible in 1983 (See Table 2).There are difficulties in comparing the statistical information from60the Israeli and Jordanian censuses conducted in 1961. Nevertheless, asTable 2 indicates East and West Jerusalem were worlds apart in terms ofthe provision of basic services. In West Jerusalem water, sewerage andelectricity were provided by public utilities; while in East Jerusalemwater and electricity were expensive commodities and sewage wasdisposed of in individual septic tanks or allowed to flow untreated into anearby valley54.In addition to the daunting task of extending basic services to theexisting Arab neighborhoods, the municipality faced three other newchallenges. The first of these arose from the sudden demand for housingof three different groups after 1967. Poor immigrant communities,hurriedly settled in the 1950s, protested strenuously for an improvementin their living conditions55. The large ultra-orthodox community,growing by natural increase at a rate above 2.5 % per annum (Schmelz1987: 74) and tending to self-segregation (Hershkowitz 1987a), assertedpressure on neighborhoods (ie. Mekor Baruch) adjacent to their “core”.Wealthy immigrants from North America and Western Europe stimulatedthe hitherto small private housing market and began a process ofgentrification in older neighborhoods such as Baka’a.These pressures were meshed with the central government’s goalof ensuring that Jerusalem remain united under Israeli sovereignty. As afirst phase, four new neighborhoods were initiated in 1968 to physicallyconnect the former enclave on Mount Scopus with West Jerusalem. Some54 In 1970 Jerusalem experienced its last outbreak of cholera.It was attributed tO this “disposal” method.55 Differences in housing standards and tenure, social service provision,and education levels between neighborhoods settled largely by Jews ofAsian and African origin and those areas developed after 1967erupted in two neighborhood based protest movements in Jerusalemin the 1970s (Hasson 1983).61Table 2Selected Characteristicsa for West andEast Jerusalem Before and After Unification in 19671961 1983PopulationIndicators West East West EastResidents 167.000 78900b 306,300 122,300Infant MortalityRate (%) 2.2 22.9 1.3 2.3(1963)Physicians! 2.3 0.4 2.8% of Ages 15-65in Labor Force 53 41c 57 38Literacy Rate 89 53 93 75% of Ages 6-14In School 96 73 99 95(1981) (1981)% one or more yearsof university 19 1 24 8Persons/Household 3.6 5.7 3.5 5.7Persons/Room 2.2 1.1 2.3Homeownership (%) 39 21 65 56Households withRefrigerator (%) 52 7 99 86(1981) (1981)Households withRunning Water (%) 100 79Households withFlush Toilets (%) 84 43a) All figures refer to 1961 unless otherwise stated.b) Includes the suburban areas of East Jerusalem annexed to the unitedmunicipality in 1967. All other figures for urban population (60,400) only.c) Includes military personnel.Sources: Jordanian Census 1961, Statistical Yearbook of Jordan 1963, IsraeliCensus 1961,1983 Statistical Yearbook of Israel 1966.62five thousand units of public housing were constructed in this area overthe next decade. In 1970 a more ambitious program was unveiled. Onethat would see four large neighborhoods ultimately housing ninetythousand people encircling the inner city.These areas, Ramot and Neve Ya’acov in the North, Quo and TalpiotMizrach in the South and East respectively were planned asheterogeneous “Israeli” neighborhoods (for relative location see map,from pre-1967 Jerusalem by deep valleys (Maller 1991: 60). The localauthorities favoured the densification of existing neighborhoods whichwould not require extensive new networks of water and sewage lines androads all of which were local responsibilities. Nor would it impinge onthe green belt which the municipality planned on its periphery (Kollek1978: 232). Failing to convince the national ministries to change theirapproach, the municipality proposed that Ramot, planned for 30,000housing units, be granted the status of an independent satellite town56.A compromise was reached wereby the number of units was reduced to10,000 and Jerusalem assumed responsibility for local services (Kollek1978: 226).The migration from older neighborhoods in the centre city area toperipheral areas continues until the present. As Table 3 shows, olderneighborhoods such as Nahlaot/Rehavia and Belt HaKerem areexperiencing losses of population; while adjoining areas such as MercazHaIr and Mekor Baruch are just maintaining their population levels. The56 The development in the early 1980s of three satellite towns (Ma’aleAdumim, Givat Ze’ev and Efrata) by national initiative, outside themunicipal boundaries put further stress on the physical infrastructureof Jerusalem. Moreover these bedroom communities were drawingaway middle class taxpayers from the city at a rate of some onethousand per year (Statistica1 Yearbook of Jerusalem 1990.63Table 3Featuresa of Neighborhoods in Jerusalem withNeighborhood Councils of Minhelet tatusbNeighborhood C Population Area Population Density VoterTurnout dNumber Median Growth Acres Number Built Space1(000s) Age Rate %e /Acre /Person (m2)A-Tur 22.9 20 2.0 1,339 17 8 n/aBaka’a 8.1 30 1.3 273 42 22 77Belt HaKerem 6.2 32 -0.9 521 31 26 72Belt Hanina 16.2 20 4.7 1,275 13 12 29BeitSafafa 4.4 20 3.7 2,143 2 12 61Gilo 29.7 25 4.2 678 44 14 82HarNof 11.9 14 21.7 352 34 6 84Mekor Baruch 4.4 24 0.0 84 52 19 75Mercaz HaIr 3.3 41 0.0 90 37 29 73Nahlaot/Rehavia 9.4 40 -5.2 258 36 40 73Neve Ya’acov 7.8 23 8.6 444 40 12 82Pisgat Ze’ev 7.4 23 22.5 1,363 5 5 90Ramot 35.3 19 10.2 1,099 32 11 87Talpiot Mizrach 14.7 27 3.6 265 55 17 81City 524.5 23 3.1 26,828 20 17 77a)Figures based on 1988 & 1990 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook.b)Mlnhelet means Management Council and Is used In Jerusalem to Indicate formallyrecognised and empowered neighborhood associations.c)There are approximately 50 neighborhoods In Jerusalem.d)Voter turnout based on participation of registered voters In the national elections of 1988e) Based on population change 1988-1990.f) The figures for living space are given as a measure of affluence. Unfortunately a moredirect measure of affluence was not available at the neighborhood level. The low figuresin the upper middle class neighborhoods of Har Nof and Pisgat Ze’ev are apparently theresult of a lag In registrations of new construction.64average age in three of these four areas (40, 32, 41 and 24 respectively)is well above the city average of 23.In contrast the four peripheral neighborhoods (Ramot, NeveYa’acov, Talpiot Mizrach and Gilo) begun in the 1970s are stillexperiencing population growth in excess of the city average of 3.1 % perannum. Not surprisingly the average age in these areas is much closer tothat of the city as a whole. The two neighborhoods begun in the 1980s(Har Nof and Pisgat Zeev) had annual rates of population growth as highas 23 % and similarly younger average ages (see Table 3).Whether these neighborhoods were initiated by the public sectoror, as in the case of Har Nof, the private sector they all faced uponcompletion the problem of inadequate infrastructure. As a result, thepriority of the residents in these areas was the improvement of physicalinfrastructure (discussed at length in Section 4.2.4).The three Arab neighborhoods with minhalot also experiencedpopulation growth during the 1980s. In A-Tur the average annual rate of2 % is the result of natural increase; while in Beit Hanina and Belt Safafathe increase (4.7 % and 3.7 % respectively) is the result of naturalincrease and migration from towns and villages in Israel (Sa’ada 1991).Since these three areas have historically suffered from inadequateinfrastructure, the relatively high population growth has meant thatneighborhood residents also placed priority on improvement of physicalservices.The second challenge Jerusalem faced resulted from the generalincrease in the material standard of living. The rapid increase in vehiclesis a case in point. Between 1967 and 1980 the number of private vehiclesregistered in Jerusalem rose by 300 %. Over the same period the length65FIgure 2Jerusalem Municipal Boundaries (1985)and Selected NeighborhoodsAtarotNBeit HaninaNeve Ya’acovPisgat Ze’evRamotRamotEshkolMekorHar Nof BaruchNahlaotCityBeit Centre Old A-TurHakerem CiRehaviaBaka’aTalpiotMizrachBeitSafafaG ilo1000 2000Metres66of municipal roads doubled. In 13 years the municipality laid 300kilometers of new water lines, while water consumption in Jerusalemrose by 148 % (population increase was 47 % between 1967 and1980). New schools, medical clinics and fire stations were also built inthese years. Leisure facilities were developed including several hundredacres of parks.As the Nation’s capital, Jerusalem received extra funding for somepublic works (e.g. the urban land purchased around the Old City walls anddesignated as a national park)58.Despite this additional funding, the costof many of these capital projects exceeded Jerusalem’s financialresources. Not to be slowed down by such mundane considerations,Teddy Kollek increased his use of the Jerusalem Foundation for funds.This quasi-public body was founded by Kollek in 1966 to “cope with abudget that is too small”. The Foundation with a staff of 50 allocates fundsraised overseas which are equivalent to some 16 % of the municipality’sordinary budget (Sharkansky 1984).The Fund’s legacy to the city has been two sided. On the one handmillions of dollars have flowed into projects and programs which wouldnot have otherwise existed; where the Foundation has often been used asa device to bypass political opposition to spending in Arab parts of thecity59. On the other hand construction of new facilities and programs has57 All figures from the Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 1984.58 The Old City which is still home to some 28,000 people has no trulypublic open space. The Western Wall plaza and the small park in theJewish quarter, dating from the 1970s are used almost exclusively byJewish residents; while the Temple Mount is the site of Moslemcommunal prayers.59 Kollek used $200,000 from the Foundation to begin work onupgrading the sewers in the Moslem Quarter in 1972. He used thesefunds as leverage to obtain further funds from the nationalgovernment for this project (Kollek 1978: 228).67outstripped the city’s ability to staff and maintain them.The third major challenge facing Jerusalem following reunificationsprang from the addition of some 75,000 Palestinian Arabs to the city’spopulation. Israeli municipal officials believed that the benefits ofinclusion in a developed democracy would convince the city’s Arabresidents to accept reunification. However, most of these residentscontinued to view Israeli sovereignty as temporary60.While individualswere willing to accept public services, participation in municipal politicswas seen as implying recognition of Israeli sovereignty and thereforeavoided. In 1969 the former members of the Jordanian city councilrefused to run in city wide elections. The result was an absence of localrepresentatives for more than a quarter of the city’s residents. This lackof Arab representation at decision making levels was and remains aconcern for the municipality (Kaminker 1990). In the short term avehicle was found allowing for some form of institutionalizedcommunication between City Hall and Arab residents. To this end, thecity government initially recognized 44 Arab mukhtars (traditional clanelders) as de facto city councillors (Benvenisti 1976: 139). Somewhatreluctantly, the Municipality also dealt with the reactivated SupremeMoslem Council61.This body which had been disbanded by the Jordanianauthorities had traditionally been composed of representatives from theleading Moslem families in Jerusalem.These “temporary, pragmatic” solutions were the first small stepsin reversing the century long trend towards centralization in Jerusalem.60 Israeli citizenship was offered to residents of East Jerusalem.However, the vast majority refused and instead maintained theirJordanian citizenship.61 This ultra-nationalistic body had spearheaded Palestinian oppositionto Jewish statehood under the British Mandate.684.2.2 Early Attempts at Municipal DecentralizationThe decentralized modus vivendi between the municipality andArab residents of the city which gradually emerged was the result of unrelated, ad hoc decisions to overcome specific problems. One example ofde facto decentralization arose from the lack of political representationdiscussed above. Another arose when the Israeli Arabic language schoolcurriculum was introduced into schools in East Jerusalem and Arabparents refused to send their children to city schools. Eventually the cityrelented, allowing the Jordanian curriculum (minus anti-Semiticreferences) to be taught in municipal schools in Arab neighborhoods.While this de facto decentralization emerged piece-meal in EastJerusalem, a more structured argument for decentralization began toemerge from a different source.In 1975 two committees examining the organization of localwelfare services in Israel submitted their far-reaching reports to theMinistry of Labor and Social Welfare. The first group found thatgovernment welfare services failed to meet actual needs. Co-ordinationwas lacking with local authority services such as education and publichealth. The second group came up with the recommendation that:“local offices change their names from social welfare’ toCitizen advice and aid center’. Such centers wouldform part of the local authority and be open outsidenormal working hours. Every center would have a tripartite advisory committee consisting of administrators,field workers and client’s representatives. Thecommittee further proposed the formation ofneighborhood teams composed of professionals and layvolunteers. These neighborhood teams would beresponsible for regular communications with housecommittees (in co-operatively managed blocks of flats,the most common housing-form in Israel),neighborhood committees, ad-hoc action groups and69various volunteer and non-professional organizations...”(Klausner 1982: 10)Activists within the Jerusalem branch of the social worker’s tradeunion incorporated these recommendations in a “Proposal for InclusiveOrganization of Local-Neighborhood Welfare Services” published in 1977.In it they advocated the establishment of “area-managements” for welfareservices (Klausner 1982: 10). These area-managements would, inconsultation with local residents, shape existing services to the needs ofthe local community. The group proposed a trial experiment in a limitednumber of locations. Mayor Teddy Kollek who advocated a boroughsystem for Jerusalem (Kollek 1978: 250) saw in this proposal anopportunity for political decentralization. He had long held thatJerusalem was a “pluralistic city in which the multi-faceted co-existenceof Jews and Arabs, Orthodox and secular Jews, rich and poor is ensuredby functional autonomous units which administer themselvesdemocratically according to their socio-cultural values” (Kollek 1988:163).In the municipal elections of 1978 a social worker (LotteSalzberger) ran successfully on a platform for decentralizing welfareservices. In November 1979 the Jerusalem Municipality agreed to cosponsor an experiment in neighborhood administration of humanservices in four Jerusalem neighborhoods. The other partner in thisproject was the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), anon-governmental organization whose mission is to “initiate, develop andassist in the implementation of highly innovative projects in the areas ofhealth, education and social welfare” (JDC 1990).Human service professionals within the JDC and municipal and70governmental agencies wanted to:“bring about a social reform in the provision of welfareservices by establishing an umbrella neighborhoodadministration to coordinate and operate all theservices at the neighborhood level. Thus, developing anintegrative vision and general policy (planning) whichwould respond effectively and sensitively to local needs”(Hasson 1989: 120).The umbrella administrations within each neighborhood soon becameknown as “the minhelet” (plural minhalot). As these minhalot becameoperative the term Neighborhood Self-Management Project (NSMP) wascoined to describe the entire effort62. From its inception theNeighborhood Self-Management Proj ect reflected the two independentsets of interests of its sponsors (i.e. reform of human services andpolitical decentralization). These interests are reflected in the goals andstructures described in the following section.4.2.3 Goals and Structures of the NSMPWithin a few months of operation the need for a body to coordinatethe implementation of the NSMP became clear. As a result, the Jerusalemmunicipality and the JDC established the Jerusalem Association forNeighborhood Self-Management (Aguda) in 1980. As is the case withmost innovative projects in Israel, the objectives of this initiative werenever formally defined63.However, in its publications the Aguda (1986)delineated the following six goals:62 Although this became the standard term for this project, severalother names such as “The Jerusalem Project” or “The JerusalemAssociation” also appear in the literature.63 The goals of Project Renewal, the massive urban revitalization schemeof the 1980s, were similarly developed after the fact. This strategy,described as “ad hocism”, has become an orthodox planning doctrinein Israel (Gertel & Law-Yone 1991: 181).711. Development of a system of neighborhood self-management, withelected delegates providing the broadest possible representation ofthe residents.2. Creation of frameworks in which the residents can functioneffectively as partners of municipal and government agencies.Namely an organizational structure that would include localresidents in the decision making process, a current data bank onneighborhood needs and services, professional assistance and anadministrative unit in each neighborhood.3. Development of indigenous leadership for the neighborhood.4. Education of residents toward the need and the possibility toexercise civic responsibility and to work on their own behalf for thedelivery of neighborhood services, through knowledgeableinvolvement in the decision-making process, volunteer activitiesand financial participation.5. Coordination and merger of various neighborhood services, sothat the needs of the local residents can be provided with thegreatest efficiency and economy.6. Decentralization of the municipal system; placing emphasis onthe particular needs of each neighborhood and the characteristicsof its residents, and enlisting the positive partnership of the localpopulation.Except for the addition of conflict resolution at the local level,these goals of the NSMP have remained roughly the same to this date. Inorder to achieve the above stated goals the Aguda: 1) provides theminhalot with a budget, professional staff and technical aid; 2) serves as achannel for conveying information between neighborhoods andcoordinates the activities of the various minhalot; 3) provides selfmanagement tools and training to neighborhood lay and professionalleadership64;4) promotes general issues and public initiatives; 5).maintains and monitors professional standards of neighborhood staff: 6).64 In 1990 the Aguda ran 18 leadership development programswith 600 participants.72deals with conflicts arising between neighborhoods65,as necessary; 7).establishes new minhalot.The central Aguda office has a staff compliment of ten, including anExecutive Director, a Director of Resource Development, a Director ofOrganizational Development (also referred to as Director of LeadershipDevelopment) and a Director of Finance. It is overseen by a Board ofGovernors. Initially this was a fifteen member board composed of equalnumbers of representatives from the JDC and Jerusalem Municipalityunder the chairmanship of the deputy mayor. By 1990 plans wereunderway to include the elected heads of each minhelet to the Board ofGovernors (Adiv et al 1991). This policy making body is responsible forapproving the overall budget of the Aguda and of each individual minhelet.Beneath the Board of Governors is a body described as a “public council”(Aguda 1986). This group which gives guidance to the central office iscomposed of the chairman and director of each minhelet,representatives of the Aguda and heads of municipal and governmentdepartments providing services to the neighborhood. Meetings take placeonce a month and are the primary vehicle for discussing public policyrelevant to general neighborhood development. In addition to these twobodies there is a “Professional Advisory Committee” which meets twicemonthly to provide professional guidance to the local leadership andadministrative staff of the individual minhalot. The members of thiscommittee include members of the “public council” as well as academics.For further organizational detail and areas of activity see Figure 3.65 For instance, mediation in the (horizontal) conflict between NeveYa’akov and Pisgat Ze’ev over the siting of new secondary schoolfacilities (Kaminker 1990).73Figure 3Aguda Organizational StructureBoard of GovernorsPublicCouncil________________Professional (Executive)AdvisoryCommittee_______________________Executive DirectorI I I BudgetFinance Resource Organizational CommitteeDevelopment DevelopmentI I I PersonnelCommitteeFuture Minhal MinhalotMinhalot Meshulav and .AmutotAt the neighborhood (minhelet) level the organizational structure issomewhat more complicated. The decision making body of each miriheletis composed of residents and representatives of local service-deliveryorganizations (social workers, school principals, directors of communitycenters and health-care workers). The latter, non-elected group may notexceed the number of neighborhood representatives serving on theboard. This governing board, which is always headed by a local resident,numbers between 8 and 25.The board of each minhelet has sub-committees which considerspecific issues in the neighborhood. Most commonly there are subcommittees dealing with services to seniors and youth, an education subcommittee, a finance sub-committee and a physical development74(planning) group. In addition there are sub-committees for immigrantabsorption, religious affairs and security in some neighborhoods. Thesevolunteer sub-committees may have up to ten members, however theymust be headed by a resident of the neighborhood. The total number ofvolunteers active on sub-committees in the minhalot in 1988 was 630(Hasson 1989: 95). More than half of all the members of the subcommittees are women. This is in marked contrast with the 10 - 20 %representation of women on the boards of the minhalot (Kaminker 1990).The day to day operation of the minhelet is carried out by a professionalstaff headed by a director. For the organizational structure of a typicalminhelet see Figure 4.The functions of the Director include: 1) identifying neighborhoodneeds: accumulating current data in order to design programs to meetthose needs; and delivering the gathered information to the appropriatemunicipal or service agency; 2) presenting programs and activities forconsideration by the Minhelet and implementing the decisions reached;3) initiating and implementing programs for neighborhood servicesprovided by municipal departments and other governmental or publicagencies; ensuring the coordination of delivery-systems; 4) developingthe skills of residents toward co-operative self-management at theneighborhood level; 5) overseeing the other staff of the minhelet (Aguda1986).The position of physical planner entails: 1) gathering data about thephysical resources of the neighborhood and developing potential projectsin areas such as housing, road development, street furniture and publicparks; 2) identifying existing or projected municipal plans affecting theneighborhood and providing data and guidance to the minhelet for the75purpose of affecting these plans; 3) overseeing the maintenance of theneighborhood infrastructure and advising residents regarding theappropriate agency to approach on problems in the physicalinfrastructure (Aguda 1986).The half-time position of social planner originally focussed on; 1)collecting data regarding the neighborhood, its residents and services; 2)establishing an accessible data-bank and educating service-deliverers andresidents in the retrieval and use of the data. In most minhalot this roleis presently performed by the community organizer.The secretary, who is always a neighborhood resident, isconsidered “an integral part of the administrative-professional staff’(Aguda 1986: 14). The secretary helps to maintain ongoing contact withthe residents to: 1) identify and develop new activists; 2) foster closerelations with the deliverers of neighborhood services; 3) activateresidents’ participation in neighborhood projects; 4) identify potentialproblems or areas of contention (Aguda 1986).The actual staff compliment of each minhelet may vary from four tothirty eight, according to the resources available to each (funding will bediscussed in section 4.2.5). The Aguda provides funds for a base level ofstaffing (one full time and three half-time positions) regardless ofneighborhood size or affluence. As previously indicated these positionsconsist of a full-time Director; a community organizer/social planner; aphysical planner and a secretary. In line with the first stated goal of theNSMP all the neighborhood representatives on a minhelet board were tobe elected. However, from the very beginning of the project thisdemocratic principle came into conflict with the principle of localautonomy (Goal 6). For, in the three Arab neighborhoods where the76community structure is based on membership in clans (hamulot), no“general” elections have ever been held. Thus, representatives to theminhelet board here are designated by the clans and their number isbased on clan size. Additional “neighborhood” representatives acceptableto the traditional leaders also sit on the minhelet boards in the Arabneighborhoods of A-Tur, Beit Hanina and Beit Safafa. These individuals areselected based on a history of activism in the neighborhood (Sa’ada1990).The deep cleavage within the Jewish community between the ultra-orthodox (anti-Zionist) and secular (Zionist) groups has also resulted innon-elections in some neighborhoods. In Ramot for example, the secularmajority (65 %) maintained exclusive control of the neighborhood councilby stalling local elections. The ultra-orthodox community took theminhelet to court to try and force them to hold elections (In Jerusalem1990). Eventually the dispute was settled when the ultra-orthodox andthe Jerusalem municipality agreed to form a separate minhelet for theultra-orthodox in part of Ramot (Epstein 1990). The discriminatoryattitude of the secular residents66 should be seen in the light of theongoing struggle for Jewish Jerusalem between these two groups. Thus,one of the original four minhalot (see Table 4), viz. Mekor Baruch,wasdescribed in the secular media as “taken by the ultra-orthodox in1983” (In Jerusalem 1990).In Baka’a the minhelet established guidelines for neighborhoodelections which the Aguda views as “a model” (Aguda 1986: 8). Theseguidelines stipulate that elections are to be held every two years. Further,66 The term secular is used to distinguish those who are Zionist inorientation from those (ultra-orthodox) who are not. There are bothreligious and non-religious Zionists.77Figure 4Minhelet Organizational StructureI Sub-Committees II I IYouth f Education Seniorseach geographic district within the neighborhood is to have onerepresentative on the council. Special interest groups may berepresented on the board, however candidates may not represent or besponsored by a political party. This results in representatives beingelected by a defined electorate and being accountable to theirconstituents (Aguda 1986: 9).As of 1990, elections had been held in seven of the thirteenminhalot then operating. Of the six areas which as of 1990 had not heldminhelet elections, three are “traditional” Arab neighborhoods and twoare Jewish whose minhalot were then only recently established (seeBoard of GovernorsChairmanResident’s RepresentativesService RepresentativesProfessional StaffDirectorPhysical PlannerCommunity OrganizerSecretary78Table 4Nature of Neighborhoods andCharacteristics of Corresponding MinheletaNeighborhood Character Minheletorigin Ethnicity Typec Founded Board ElectionsYear Turnout %A-Tur l86Os Arab B 1980 none heldBaka’a 1890s Jewish B 1982 1989 20Belt HaKerem 1924 Jewish C 1988 none heldBelt Hanina 1870s Arabd Be 1984 none heldBeit Safafa 1870s Arabd A 1988 none heldGilo 1970 Jewish B 1980 1990 22HarNof 1981 Jewish A 1984 1989 67Mekor Barnch 1920s Jewish A 1980Mercaz HaIr 1875 Jewish C 1986 1990 33Nahlaot/Rehavia 189 1/1922 Jewish A 1982 1987NeveYa’acov 1970 Jewish A 1986 1988Pisgat Ze’ev 1982 Jewish C 1987 none heldRamot 1970 Jewish C 1983 none heldTalpiot Mizrach 1970 Jewish B 1980 1989a) Formally recognized and empowered neighborhood association.b) Some of these neighbourhoods were founded by “Building Societies” whose precise yearof Incorporation is taken as the neighborhood’s year of origin (see Kark R. 1991).C) There are three types of minhelet: A) legal extensions of the Aguda; B) separate anddistinct legal, non-profit corporate entities, and C) those in which the boards of theminhelet and neighborhood community centre are Integrated in a separate and distinctlegal, non-profit corporate entity. Since 1989 some of these have changed their status.d These neighborhoods have emerged from rural clan based villages which have beenswallowed up by urbanization.e) Formally this minhelet has an “A” status, In fact it solicits funds calling itself the BeltHanina Development Association.f) This minhelet was disbanded in 1983.79Table 4). The voter turnout for these neighborhood elections ranged froma low of 18 % to a high of 80 % in Har Nof in 1987 (see Table 3 for acomparison with national election turnout). This high figure is dismissedby some as simply the result of ‘spiritual leaders ordering their followersto vote” (Aguda 1990). However, the 67 % turnout in the subsequent1989 minhelet election would seem to indicate that the neighborhoodleaders standing for election in Har Nof saw the minhelet as a valuableresource worth fighting for (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). As Table 4 indicates,the average turnout appears to be stabilizing around 25-33 % of eligiblevoters. This figure should be seen in light of the city-wide voter turnoutfor recent municipal elections which is 45 % as opposed to 77 % fornational elections67.The often dizzying social and economic diversity within theneighborhoods is reflected in the make-up of the elected minheletboards. In Har Nof for example, the hotly contested elections of 1989resulted in a board with the following philosophically diversecomposition: Four ultra-orthodox members (including the chairman),three religious Zionists (including the single woman on the board) andtwo followers of the Bostoner Rebbe (modern orthodox) (KatzburgKadosh 1991). In addition, the board members here, as in most otherminhalot, have widely differing occupations68.This diversity ensureseffective representation. In Mercaz HaIr, the neighborhood with the nexthighest minhelet voter participation, the board is also very diverse. It iscomposed of three members who are ultra-orthodox, three who are67 If the same eligibility criteria applied (ie. residency), the figure fornational elections would fall to 55 %.68 The 1990 Har Nof Board consisted of: a private teacher; a civilservant; an accountant; a lawyer; a president of an advertising agency;two other businessmen and a homemaker.80secular and four who may be described as modern orthodox of MiddleEastern descent (Amedi 1990).4.2.4 Activities of the MinhalotAs the preceding discussion indicates, the activities of the minhalottouch on nearly every aspect of neighborhood life. However, the level of aparticular activity may vary from one locale to another (see Table 5). Suchvariations are the result of differences in local circumstances,organizational experience and access to resources. The different activitiesof the minhalot may be divided into four categories. The first groupcovers involvement in the planning and implementation of sewerage anddrainage projects; waste disposal; surveying, paving and lighting of publicconveyances; land-use and transit planning. The second group includesinvolvement in government health and welfare services; public safety; andlocal initiatives such as food-, clothing- and toy-banks. The third clustercovers all activities related to recreation, landscaping and parkdevelopment. The fourth category includes activities of an educationalnature regardless of age. The minhalot operate in these four areasthrough planning and local policy determination, implementation of localservices, special projects and community development. The followingsection will present specific examples of each of these categories fromdifferent Jerusalem neighborhoods.As mentioned above, the scope of activity of the minhalot is broad,with literally hundreds of examples of projects and programs undertakensince the inception of the NSMP in 198069, categorized in Table 5. Tofurther clarify the function of minhalot, I have chosen to elaborate on a69 A compendium of projects in 1985 already lists 102 entries in sevenminhalot.81few examples from different neighborhoods. These are intended toconvey two points. Firstly, to show, when considered together, the fullrange of minhelet activities. Secondly, to give an indication of the utilityof neighborhood self management in the management of urban functions.This examination will form a central part of the synthesis presented inthe closing chapter.Immediately after their formation, minhalot engage in severalprocesses of public consultation to enable them to determine communitypriorities. Normally the first step in this process is to undertake a surveyof needs in the neighborhood. Usually, this is accompanied by anexamination of current services and resources (both physical and human)available in the locality. Such surveys serve decision makers in threeways; 1) quantifying community priorities; 2) identifying spatial areas andfields of activity which are not receiving sufficient attention or are beingignored all together; 3) identifying areas of under-utilized or overlappingservices and resources.A review of minhelet activities in July 1985 revealed that a third ofall projects then underway fell into the category of planning and physicaldevelopment. This early emphasis on basic functions was most evident inA-Tur. The most impressive project in that East Jerusalem neighborhoodbegun in 1981 and completed in 1985 involved the planning andinstallation of a 3.5 kilometer sewage line connecting all residences inthe area with the central sewerage system. In addition to participation inplanning the route and method of installation, the residents provided$50,000 toward the overall cost of the project. A further $20,000 wasraised from ex-residents of the former village, now living in Saudi Arabiaand the United States (Chesin 1990). The Jerusalem Municipality82estimated that this participation resulted in $690,000 of direct savings aswell as considerable savings in staff time (Aguda 1985).Traffic management is another field in which there is considerableorganized involvement in planning. While local roads are a municipalresponsibility, the Ministry of Transport is in charge of the highwaysleading into the city. One proposal for adding a new highway through thesouthern approaches to Jerusalem was opposed by the minhalot of BeitSafafa, Talpiot Mizrach and Gilo. The initial proposal was for a 160 meterwide right of way, to accommodate 8 lanes of traffic. This swath wouldhave cut Beit Safafa in half. The three minhalot hired a private consultantand together they devised a plan which, while reducing the width of theroad to 90 meters, still satisfied the traffic engineers and the commutersfor whom the road was planned (Sa’ada 1990).A less dramatic although equally contentious issue of trafficmanagement involves the Sabbath closure of roads through religiousneighborhoods. In Mekor Baruch the minhelet developed a pattern ofroad closures which was acceptable to the secular and religious residentsof the neighborhood70.In the neighborhood of Nahlaot/Rehavia the impact of officepenetration into residential areas is a major concern for the residents. Tocounter this trend the minhelet formed an “Office Committee”. This subcommittee monitors apartments which are being vacated and liable to beoccupied by offices. The Office Committee then addresses the owners ofthe apartments personally and attempts to persuade them not to rent orsell the apartment as offices. This persuasion takes two forms. The first is70 This was one of the few successes that this minhelet achieved in its 21/2 year existence.83by “moralsuasion”, detailing the social significance for the neighborhoodand its residents. The second is through the threat of alerting municipalauthorities in cases where the zoning ordinance does not allow forcommercial use. In addition, the minhelet has successfully persuadedthe municipality to gradually begin removing existing offices from thearea (Hershkovitz 1987b).The minhalot are also actively involved in implementing localservices. This involvement may be as simple as advocating for improvedlevels of services. The actions of the Har Nof minhelet provide a goodexample of this sort of advocacy work. As a young, religious neighborhood,Har Nof has an extremely high birth rate, which contributes substantiallyto its high growth rate (see Table 3). In fact, according to the communityworker in the minhelet, there are some 500 babies born to mothers inthe neighborhood each year. Thus making the “mother and child” clinicin Har Nof the second busiest in the city. The two room apartment inwhich the clinic functions is far too small for this number of clients. Thisrapidly growing neighborhood also lacks a Kupat HoUrn (health clinic)and welfare office. The minhelet is pressuring the Ministries of Healthand Social Welfare to build facilities on the land which was set aside forthis purpose and to assign additional staff (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991).Another important area in which the minhalot are involved iseducation services. Two programs initiated by the Gilo minhelet providenotable examples of this kind of activity. The minhelet and thecommunity centre (Matnas) established a youth centre to begin dealingwith disadvantaged youth7’ in the neighborhood. For the most part these71 These are defined as youth who are delinquents or “in danger” ofslipping out of the mainstream.84are youngsters who have dropped out of school. The program seeks tocreate a supportive learning environment for 250 teenagers. The Gilominhelet provides $15,000 towards the $70,000 total budget of thisprogram. The second program is a partnership between the minhelet and6 neighborhood schools. This program aims to provide specializedinstruction to “weak” students. This takes the form of after-hourstutoring, said to use the most modern methods of instruction. Thisprogram has a budget of $45,000 of which the minhelet provides $7,000(Gilo Management Corporation 1988).The minhalot are also involved in recruiting volunteers toimplement services. One of the largest ongoing volunteer programs is therecruitment and coordination of residents for neighborhood securitypatrols under the aegis of the police. In Talpiot Mizrach the minheletorganized 400 volunteers for these civil guard patrols (Talpaz 1990).Operating in four hour shifts, the patrols consist of two armed residentsin radio contact with the neighborhood police station. The patrols aremostly intended to deter break-ins and car thefts. However, duringperiods of unrest (such as the “Intifada”) their role may be diversified.One recent example involved Arab youths from an adjoining Bedouinneighborhood (Jebel Mukabber) who were stoning cars driving to andfrom Talpiot Mizrach. In response some residents of Talpiot Mizrachvandalized vehicles in Jebel Mukabber. To defuse these tensions theminhelet of Talpiot and Bedouin clan leaders arranged for mixed patrolsto supervise the border area between the two neighborhoods (Basat1990).The highest degree of decentralization of local service provision isin the area of sanitation. In a number of the neighborhoods the minhalot85have actually taken over the responsibility for waste disposal. In BeitHanina residents were frustrated with the quality and scheduling ofgarbage pickup. In response, the minhelet hired four workers to collecthousehold garbage and to dispose of it in central locations (Ayyoub1990). The municipality agreed to grant the minhelet those funds whichit would otherwise have allocated for collection. In A-Tur, Gilo andTalpiot Mizrach there are similar arrangements where workers hired bythe respective minhelet have replaced municipal crews (Epstein 1990).In other neighborhoods, the minhelet is involved in choosing locationsfor municipal dumpsters and pick-up schedule, together with the citysanitation department (Aguda 1985).Services to new immigrants is another field in which minhalot areactively involved. In keeping with a Zionist ethos, the integration ofnewcomers is not left to chance. Rather, their rapid absorption intoIsraeli life is encouraged through practical measures at all levels ofgovernment. State ministries provide initial housing, healthcare, and jobre-training. However, social integration occurs at the neighborhood level.In the face of 500 arrivals from the former Soviet Union per year, theRamot minhelet established an integrated system of immigrant services.Beginning with their most immediate needs (clothing and furniture), theminhelet eases their transition by collecting donations of clothes and toyson their behalf from the residents of Ramot. The minhelet also lendshousehold furniture and appliances to new families for the first fewmonths after their arrival. Some of the other programs which theminhelet organizes are Hebrew immersion classes running five days aweek; “twinning” of new immigrant families with veteran families; and86Table 5Minhelet Budgets and Major Activities in 1989Neighborhood Budget In 1989 Relative Level0fptya000s Overhead Physlcalb Soclalc Recreatlond EducationUS$A-Tur ++++ + ++Baka’a + ++Belt HaKerem 20.2 87Belt Hanina 69.7 36 ++++ + ++Belt Safafa 34.4 95 -H-+ ++ +Gilo 168.9 66 +++-i- +Har Nof 88.0 26 ++ +Mekor Baruche + +4Mercaz HaIry 82.9 38 ++++ ++ +Nahlaot/Rehavla 87.5 36 +4+4 ++ +NeveYa’acov 42.4 64 + ++ +4+Pisgat Ze’ev 53.1 36 +Ramot 4+ +Talpiot Mlzrach + ++++ ++ +++a) The different areas of activity within each minhelet are ranked from one to four. Onecross (+) indicating little activity and four indicating frequent activity In this area.b) Covers Involvement in planning and implementation of sewerage and drainage projects;waste disposal; surveying, paving and lighting of public conveyances; land-use andtransit planning.c) Includes Involvement in government health and welfare services; public safety; localInitiatives such as food, clothing and toy banks.d) Includes landscaping, park development and programs for youth and seniors.e) This Minhelet was disbanded in 1983.f) This Minhelet Is run in conjunction with Project Renewal. The combined budgets In 1989were $608,550.g) Ramot does not receive funds through the Aguda. 90 % of Its budget is raised fromresidents.Source: Annual reports of the minhalot filed with the Jerusalem Association forNeighborhood Self-Management87social events for teenagers (Ramot Community Council 1990: 18). Asimilar social welfare function is performed by the Belt Hanina minhelet.In 1989 its “centre for needy families” provided basic needs (food,clothing and furnishings) to 200 families (Darwish 1990).Each of the minhalot have projects which are designated as“special”. In general these are short term activities intended to meet acommunity-wide need. In Har Nof for example, there was a consensusamong residents that the neighborhood most needed additional greenery.Therefore, in 1990 the entire special-project budget of $ 7,500 wasspent on tree-planting. Approximately four thousand saplings werepurchased and distributed to each apartment block to be planted by theresidents themselves (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). A similar project inTalpiot Mizrach saw 1,200 trees planted by youngsters around 7 schoolsand 30 daycares in 1984 (Aguda 1985).In Belt Safafa, the minhelet produced an annual calendar for theresidents of the neighborhood. The photography and layout were donatedby two local professionals and the minhelet covered the cost of printing.The calendar was published in a printing house in Belt Safafa (Sa’ada1990).Some special projects require only staff time. Thus, in 1990 theboard of the minhelet in Talpiot Mizrach instructed their communityworker to approach town and village councils throughout Israel with thesuggestion that residents temporarily “swap” apartments. The purposebeing to enable families from Talpiot Mizrach and the reciprocatingcommunity to vacation at a reasonable cost. By early 1991 one town innorthern Israel had responded positively to the idea (Basat 1991).Community newspapers are produced by ten of the thirteen88minhalot. They range in size from four to sixteen pages and in frequencyof publication from monthly to quarterly. The newspapers are intended todo two things. The first is to provide an open communication channelbetween the minhelet and neighborhood residents, alerting them tochanges affecting the community. The second objective is to putresidents in touch with each other. In all but one case the papers aresupported entirely by their respective minhelet. The Har Nof paper is runas a business by a neighborhood resident. Local advertising by shops andservices located in the neighborhood is accepted by most of thecommunity newspapers.4.2.5 Human and Financial Resource DevelopmentThe NSMP began with a modest annual budget of less than$100,000. These monies came from the Jerusalem municipality and theJDC on an equal basis. The involvement of the JDC was intended toprovide support through an initial five year trial period. However, it soonbecame clear that the initial pilot project would be extended in scopeand to other neighborhoods. The need for additional funds would be metthrough the system of joint financing mentioned above and through localinitiative. To this end the minhalot were encouraged to raise monies ontheir own from outside sources, such as government departments;foundations and private contributors; and from sources within theneighborhood (fees for service and fund raising). By 1990 theseminhelet sources were delivering in excess of $120,000 (Epstein1990). Table 6 shows the evolution of the NSMP, in terms of overallbudget and number of employees. The idea of partial financialresponsibility stems, according to the Aguda’s own literature, in part,89Table 6Neighborhood Self-Management0ii5aOrdinary Budget and Number of EmployeesNumber of Self- Total Budgetb Number ofYear Management Councils 000s of US $ Employeesc1981 4 93 unavailable1982 6 4371983 7 5061984 7 6641985 7 693 771986 9 857 901987 11 680d 1001988 12 873 1001989 12 1,143 1001990 13 1,347 100a) Including councils (minhalot) operating on behalf of the JerusalemAssociation for Neighborhood Self-Management (Aguda) andindependent councils (minhalot).b) Not including funds raised for special projects.c) Including 10 staff in the central Aguda office but not includingemployees whose salaries are paid by municipal departments (ie.sanitation workers).d) For nine months only.Source: Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-ManagementBudget Overview 1981-1985, Table 18/3 1988 Statistical Yearbook ofJerusalem, Table 18/5 1990 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem.90from practical needs but more importantly,“reflects the idea that responsible self-government alsoinvolves responsibility for the acquisition of fundsneeded to implement policies and projects which areproposed by the neighborhood itself’. (Aguda 1990: 3)After ten years of involvement the JDC finally withdrew its financialsupport to the ordinary budget, leaving the municipality to cover basicstaff (the four positions described in section 4.2.3) and overhead costs.However, the JDC continues to fund special projects within individualminhalot. In 1990 the Aguda received three quarters of its ordinarybudget of $ 1.3 million from the Jerusalem municipality. Residentsaccounted for 10 % of monies raised while a further 15 % came from theJewish Agency’s Fund for Innovative Projects72.As alluded to in the preceding discussion, the minhalot differ intheir ability to raise funds. Neighborhoods such as A-Thr and Har Nof withextensive overseas connections derive considerable contributions forspecial projects from these foreign benefactors. The large, well-off andwell-organized community in Ramot manages to raise nearly its entirebudget from fees and membership dues. This variation helps account forthe range in minhelet budgets visible in Table 5. The other factor beingthe stage of development of the minhelet.The earlier examples of minhelet activities also allude to theextensive use of non-monetary, community assets, in particular the use ofvolunteers and the mobilization of under-used facilities. The total numberof volunteers involved in the NSMP is difficult to estimate. As stated inSection 4.2.4, there were some 630 volunteers active on the various72 These funds were used to help establish and support minhalot inProject Renewal (see footnote 32) neighborhoods (e.g. Mercaz HaIr).91boards and sub-committees of the minhalot in 1988. The number ofvolunteer participants in service implementation and special projects isconsiderably higher.An indication of the level of resident participation may be derivedfrom a glance at a few minhelet based services and projects. In twoneighborhoods (Talpiot Mizrach, Pisgat Ze’ev) in which the local securityis coordinated through the minhelet, there are nearly 800 Civil Guardvolunteers. Talpiot’s immigrant absorption program involves 95 familiesof veteran Israelis who have adopted an equal number of newcomers(Basat 1990). In Gilo “Project Linkage” connects 70 volunteers withhomebound seniors. These volunteers spend time with these elderlyresidents two or three times a week (Quo 1988).The tree planting project in Har Nof required thousands ofvolunteers albeit for a short period of time (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). Thedearth of volunteers in Arab communities is a contentious issue. Thecommunity worker in Beit Hanina, herself an East Jerusalem Arab, statedin an interview that in her neighborhood there were no residents willingto work for nothing (Ayyoub 1990). The director of the Arab minhelet inBeit Safafa was of the opinion that the spirit of voluntarism needed to bestrengthened in his community (Sa’ada 1990). Thus, this minhelet’sefforts were directed towards youth involvement. There were twoprojects requiring volunteer time conducted in Beit Safafa recently. Thefirst was the neighborhood clean-up involving all school agedyoungsters74.The second, longer term project involves teenagers who73 An information pamphlet issued in 1990 claims that with the additionof new minhalot and the expansion of existing councils this numberhas grown to “nearly 1000” (JDC 1990).74 At the time there were approximately 1,000 children between 5 and15 living in Beit Safafa. 1990 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook.92pay regular visits to patients in Schara Tzedeck and Haddasah hospitals(Sa’ada 1990).A similar difficulty exists in quantifying the use of physical facilitiesin NSMP neighborhoods. However, the following examples provide anindication of this form of resource mobilization. In A-Tur the minheletlocated and renovated vacant rooms for a variety of public services,including a ‘mother and child” clinic, classrooms for special educationand kindergartens (Aguda 1985: 17). In Baka’a, the minhelet developed arecreational plan to provide play areas in the unused lots of theneighborhood. These included lands contributed by resident-owners. Theminhelet also renovated “old, unused or under-utilized public buildings tomeet various needs of the neighborhood”. With the agreement of theowners, unused sheds located on privately owned property were movedand transformed into kiosks and seating shelters for public use in Talpiot(Aguda 1985: 16). The Gilo minhelet sought out under-used space forstoring the sanitation equipment and materials for its volunteer corps ofpublic area cleaners (Aguda 1985: 15).As mentioned above some minhalot are also involved inredistributing household goods. Among these are “banks” for clothes,toys, furniture and school books in Beit Hanina, Ramot and Talpiot.4.2.6 Evolving Status of the MinhalotThe legal status of the minhalot showed considerable evolutionduring the first decade of the NSMP. Ten years after the initiation of theproject there are minhalot with three different legal statuses. This finalsection of Chapter 4 describes the evolving status of the minhalot andconcludes with a projection of some emerging issues for the minhalot93and the entire NSMP in Jerusalem.The four original neighborhood minhalot (A-Tur, Gilo, MekorBaruch and Talpiot Mizrach) were legal extensions of the Aguda (itself acreation of the Jerusalem municipality and the JDC). This status meantthat the Aguda hired their staff and monitored their finances. In order tobroaden the financial base of the NSMP (described in the previoussection) a change in the legal status of the minhalot was required. Theresult was that three of the original four minhalot (Mekor Baruch havingbeen disbanded in 1983) became separate and distinct legal non-profitcorporate entities in 1987. These “amutot” (for definition see Glossary)are free to hire and fire staff and manage their own finances. A significantelement of this autonomy is the ability to solicit funds from overseascontributors.In practice, most of the amutot’s budgets continue to come fromthe municipality and they function in an urban environment managed bythe municipality according to law. The result is that “the amutot aresubject to certain significant restrictions” (Aguda 1990: 4). Firstly, thebudget proposal and work plan of an amuta have to fall within the generalguidelines of the NSMP. Secondly, the directors of each amuta must behired and trained by the Aguda. Thirdly, the municipality is required bylaw to provide certain services. This defines a priori the functional limitsof the amutot.Since the late 1980s a third stage of development has emerged.This involves integrating the neighborhood minhelet and communitycentre (matnas). The emergent body is described by some as a “minhalmeshulav” (integrated management council) and by others as a “minhalkehilati” (community council). In either case, the result is a body which94delivers social and cultural services and a body whose main function ispolicy determination, needs assessment and priority setting (Aguda 1990:5). The view from City Hall is that these institutions thus become “a minicity council with a body that openly debates projects and issues andmakes decisions and a body that executes those decisions” (Nahmias1990).By 1990 five of the thirteen minhalot had the status of an amuta. Ofthe remainder, four (Beit HaKerem, Mercaz HaIr, Pisgat Ze’ev and Ramot)had the more “sophisticated”75 role of minhal meshulav and fourremained as extensions of the Aguda (see Table 4). The two minhalotwhich appear content with the latter relationship with the Aguda areeither very young (Beit Safafa) or are unwilling to assume greater legaland financial responsibility (Har Nof). The other two were in the midst ofchanging their status in 1990. Neve Ya’acov was in the process ofintegrating its minhelet and matnas into a minhal meshulav andNahlaot/Rehavia was in the process of splitting in two; the residents ofNahlaot having decided that they would be better served by joining withMercaz HaIr. According to a 1991 interview with Jerusalem Councillor,Sara Kaminker, the minhalot in Baka’a, Gilo and Talpiot Mizrach will soonbe joining the four neighborhoods which have already integrated theirminhelet and matnas into a minhal meshulav.After a decade of operation the Neighborhood Self- ManagementProject is an integral part of the management of Jerusalem. The thirteen75 This adjective was used by Eli Nahmias of the Jerusalem Municipalityin a 1990 interview to describe these institutions. A view consistentwith that of the mayor’s advisor on neighborhood affairs, Rafi Davara,who also feels that the minhal meshulav is the most desired form ofneighborhood self-management council (minhelet). (“Minhalot meetobstacles on path to local democracy” in In Jerusalem, May 4, 1990).95neighborhoods with minhalot are home to two out of three of the city’sresidents. Indeed, none of the public figures interviewed expressed anydoubt that the minhalot were now an accepted part of the city scene.According to David Epstein, the Aguda’s Director of ResourceDevelopment, all of the city’s neighborhoods will have a minhelet by theend of the century. These will have the status of a minhal meshulav.Neighborhood financial autonomy, such as that already achieved by theRamot minhelet, is also anticipated by other participants in the NSMP.To this end Ziad Darwish, director of the Belt Hanina minhelet, wouldlike to see that in future a portion of the municipal property tax flowdirectly to the minhalot (Darwish 1990).As for the residents of NSMP neighborhoods, they seem to stronglysupport the continuation and strengthening of the project. ShlomoHasson, Professor of Geography at Hebrew University in Jerusalem,surveyed resident opinion on this matter in 1988 and found that 62 %stated that neighborhood self management had improved conditions intheir neighborhoods: while 55 % expressed the view that abandoning theNSMP would be harmful to the community (Hasson 1989: 106). Thus, atthe local level it would appear that the Neighborhood Self-ManagementProject is widely appreciated and will continue to improve the everydaylives of the citizens of Jerusalem. Many, including the current Mayor ofJerusalem, see the NSMP as a return to the traditional norm ofcommunal self-governance in Jerusalem (Kollek 1988). As such it maywell be the only way two peoples can share a united Jerusalem.96CHAPTER 5Implications of the Jerusalem Experiencefor Revitalizing Metropolitan AreasIn view of the broad satisfaction of all the participants in theproject outlined in the concluding section of the previous chapter itwould seem appropriate to analyze whether the experience gained in theNSMP in Jerusalem may be of value for other metropolitan areas. To thisend we will briefly revisit the theoretical conclusions regarding urbangovernance arrived at in Chapter 3 and determine the degree to whichthe experience of the Neighborhood Self-Management Project supportsthese conclusions.5.1 Environmental ConsiderationsAlthough environmental considerations are not the strongestfeatures of the NSMP, the order of treatment in Chapter 3 will bemaintained in the current discussion. In Section 3.5.1 it was postulatedthat safeguarding the metropolitan environment required an area-wideauthority. This authority would have to be responsible for preserving orimproving air and water quality and ensuring the judicious use of land. Toachieve the latter, the metropolitan body would have to have a largedegree of authority over regional planning, zoning and trafficmanagement. It was also concluded that a certain degree ofdecentralization, particularly in the area of waste management, wasneeded in order to change individual consumption habits. Urbanreforestation and other local, physical improvements were thought torequire a partnership of metropolitan authorities and neighborhoodbodies.97As a service-oriented city, Jerusalem avoided the environmentaldegradation that has normally accompanied industrialization. However,the natural and historical cirëumstances described in Chapter 4combined to make Jerusalem an extremely unhealthy city nevertheless.As expected, the centralization of water distribution and the installationof a comprehensive sewerage system, outlined earlier, alleviated theseproblems (see Table 2).However, not all physical developments in Jerusalem since 1967depending on centralization have been equally successful. The lack ofmetropolitan authority over land use controls resulted in the municipalitybeing unable to stop the plans of the national government to encircleJerusalem with suburban communities (Hyman et al 1985). This urbansprawl76,with its network of hastily designed highways threatened theintegrity of existing neighborhoods, put tremendous pressure on locallyprovided services and ate into parts of the green belt surrounding thecity. Despite the lack of formal authority, the municipality was able tolessen the negative impacts of the national plan through the power ofreason, at least as far as Ramot is concerned (see Section 4.2.1).As for decentralization, the devolution of regular sanitation servicesin NSMP neighborhoods has led to greater efficiency in garbage pickup,especially as far as timing is concerned (see page 85). The latter is ofgreat importance because of local climatic conditions. Thisdecentralization has also increased local self-reliance, resulting insuccessful neighborhood cleanup campaigns (e.g. Beit Safafa and Gilo: seepage 91). With their success in local waste management, the minhalot are76 The difficult topography and the patchwork of existing Arabsettlements do not allow for typical (ie. contiguous) suburban sprawl.98well positioned to undertake recycling programs when this becomesnecessary in the Israeli context77.The considerable economic benefits ofdecentralizing waste management will be discussed in the followingsection.5.2 Economic ConsiderationsThe theoretical review in Chapter 3 posited that a restructuring ofurban management may result in tremendous cost savings andimprovements in the delivery of urban services for the metropolitanregion and its residents. For the full benefits of this restructuring toaccrue, two conditions would have to be met. Firstly, the metropolitanauthority must be made responsible for the construction andmaintenance of large facilities for basic service provision and foradministering a unified set of regulatory procedures. Secondly, local(neighborhood) authorities would have to be given the task of deliveringhuman services.As mentioned earlier, the heavy investment by central authorities inextending and upgrading water and sewerage services resulted in adramatic rise in health standards in East Jerusalem. In addition, thiscentralization in public utilities brought about a reduction in the cost ofthese basic services to consumers and a rise in the efficiency of thesystem78.Again as described earlier in Chapter 4, the lack of a strongmetropolitan zoning authority resulted in the national government77 Until recently household garbage in Israel contained little packagingmaterial (paper, cardboard, metal and plastic).78 Thus, average household consumption of water doubled; while thedifference between the amount of water sold to the city and then resold to consumers (wastage) dropped from 19.7 % in 1969 to 10.4 %in 1990, according to the 1990 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook.99pushing through its development plans in and around the city andsaddling the municipality with the additional economic costs of providinglocal services. In addition, the failure to incorporate all of the adjoiningsuburban areas from 1967 onwards has meant that private (mostly Arab)development there could derive the benefits of proximity to the citywithout the costs of planning restrictions and municipal taxes79.Thesetwo shortcomings have set the stage for a pernicious form ofsuburbanization both in the Jewish and Arab sectors.The NSMP provides many examples of the economic benefits ofdecentralizing some urban functions. These benefits fall into threecategories. The first category represents examples which show anincrease in the accuracy of service delivery and a reduction in the cost ofthese services. As mentioned at the end of Chapter 4, a majority ofresidents felt that the NSMP had resulted in an improvement of servicedelivery. As well, the mayor of Jerusalem stated in a recent paper that thepractical proposals of the minhalot for the allocation of municipalresources benefitted both residents and the municipality (Kollek 1988).The examples regarding the public use of vacant land and unused orunder-utilized buildings described in Section 4.2.5 point clearly to thesecond category of benefits. These derive from the ability of empoweredneighborhood associations to mobilize latent physical resources. Recently,some minhalot have expanded their activities to include collecting andredistributing household items (clothes, furniture and books) to weakermembers of the local community. A more economically significant79 The Jerusalem municipality has continually annexed small parcels ofland since independence. More recently it has included lands fromKibbutz Ramat Rachel which is now entirely encircled by Jerusalemand land under state authority on the western periphery of the city.The most recent annexation occurred in 1993.100example of this process is the mediation by the Baka’a minhelet betweentwo philosophically different but economically weak (private) or under-attended (public) schools. This intervention allowed the twoneighborhood schools to share one facility, thereby reducing theiroverhead costs and ensuring the preservation of both (Aguda 1986).The experience of neighborhood self management in Jerusalem hasconfirmed that a functional decentralization can bring private resourcesinto the public realm. This increased use of resources represents thethird category of economic benefits of decentralization. As noted inSection 4.2.5, residents contributed up to 10 % of the total budget of theNSMP in recent years. It is of particular note that the minhalot havesucceeded in attracting funds from abroad, mainly from the families ofcurrent or former residents. The minhalot have also proven especiallysuccessful in harnessing the volunteer talents and energies of residents(see Section 4.2.4).5.3 Social ConsiderationsSince the 18th Century there have emerged two opposing views ofsociety: the modernists who stress the role of the individual in societyand the traditionalists who generally consider the collective paramount.The modernists lean towards centralization; while the traditionalistsfavor decentralization (discussed at length in Chapter 2). In Section 3.5.3it was deduced that these two views could be reconciled in the socialsphere by giving a metropolitan wide authority a “watchdog’ function,while decentralizing human service provision to neighborhood levelbodies. Such a division of responsibility would ensure both the well beingof individuals and the overall urban social health. This contention has101been clearly confirmed in Jerusalem with the interaction of themunicipality and minhalot in the NSMP.Thus, as discussed in Section 4.2, the Jerusalem municipality hasexpended considerable energies and monies to ensure that residentshave equitable access to local services. The rationale behind these effortsis in large measure to ensure social stability. As one observer noted, ‘Cityofficials think in terms of coping at the points of friction between thecommunities” (Sharkansky 1992). This means keeping a city that ischronically tense from becoming chronically violent80. Even at theheight of the “Intifada” (1987-1992) there was not only relatively littlecommunal violence in the city but, as the formation of the Beit Safafaminhelet (see Table 4) and the activities of the Beit Hanina minhelet Inthat period (see Table 5 and page 87) indicate, there were evenconstructive steps being taken in Arab parts of Jerusalem. As pointed outin Section 4.2.3, horizontal conflicts between neighborhoods aremanaged by the Aguda.It is no exaggeration to say that residents of Jerusalem identifystrongly with their neighborhoods. Through the NSMP this strong senseof community is not only recognized but institutionalized. The variousactivities of the minhalot discussed in Section 4.2.4/5 and summarized inTable 5, show how these sentiments can be harnessed to benefitneighborhood residents, particularly the weaker members (seniors,immigrants and asocial youth) of the population. This sense of belonginghas been given further opportunities for expression through minheletcoordinated or sponsored projects such as neighborhood clean-ups,80 In 1990 there were only 13 murders committed in Jerusalem (1990Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook).102treeplanting in public areas and community newspapers. Through thedecentralization of social functions Jerusalem was able to cope with asudden increase of population, amounting to 5 % in one year (1990),without any noticeable social upheaval. This is particularly striking asthese newcomers consisted of very foreign elements, viz. Jews from theformer Soviet Union and Ethiopia and Palestinian Arabs returning aseconomic refugees from the Gulf States.5.4 Political ConsiderationsIn Chapter 3, the major political challenge facing metropolitanareas in democratic states was considered to be the need to provide astructure that allows for real local democracy and which is strong enoughto face senior levels of government; other, competing, urban authorities;and large corporations.The recent history of Jerusalem provides a good example of theeffects of shifting the political balance between central (municipal) andcommunity control. As outlined in Section 4.1, the absence of any realmunicipal control during the Turkish period left the separatecommunities extremely vulnerable to external change. Under the highlycentralized Mandatory regime, the other extreme was reached. Theconcentration of decision-making power within a small group of Britishbureaucrats left local political leaders unused to merging theircommunities interest’s with those of the city as a whole. The Jordanianoccupation manipulated the fractures within the Palestinian Arabcommunity to help maintain control over the eastern sector of Jerusalembetween 1948 and 1967. Following independence, Israeli West Jerusalemrequired eight years before a stable and productive municipal government103emerged in 1955. As Table 2 indicates, the emergence of a stable andlocally accountable municipal government began to affect life in WestJerusalem by the early 1960s.The election of Teddy Kollek as mayor in 1965, marked awatershed in the political development of Jerusalem. Since then, he hasmanaged through force of character and practical results to convinceresidents of the benefits of a united yet pluralistic city8’. Beginning in1980, the NSMP has to no small degree contributed to the realization ofthis vision. In dealing with national governments of both the Left andRight, Teddy Kollek has often succeeded in defending the interests ofthe city over narrowly perceived national interests. Nowhere was thismore controversial than in the recognition of the political rights of thecity’s diverse communities (see Section 4.2.2).Through their boards and sub-committees (see Figure 3), theminhalot have been an effective tool for increasing participatorydemocracy. By 1990 hundreds of Jerusalem residents had had theexperience of determining and implementing local policy. The relativelyhigh voter turnout in minhelet elections (see Table 4) is one measure ofthe seriousness with which the actions of the minhalot are taken.Another measure is the large numbers of candidates who put themselvesforward for local elected office82. As the examples in Section 4.2 show,local activists working through the minhalot have proven themselves ableto deal constructively with municipal bureaucracies in addressing localconcerns.81 In six consecutive elections Teddy Kollek has never failed to win lessthan 50 % of the votes cast for mayor.82 In the 1990 elections in Mercaz HaIr there were 36 candidates for 15positions on the board of the minhelet.1045.5 Structures and Method of ImplementationAs already stated, the Neighborhood Self-Management Project hasbeen well received by the public as well as municipal politicians andbureaucrats. In large part this acceptance has been the result of thegradual, evolutionary manner in which the NSMP was implemented. Asdiscussed in Section 4.2.2, the project began with two broad aims:improved delivery of human services and political decentralization.Specific objectives to achieve these aims were developed as the projectwas implemented.As a time limited (5 year) pilot project with a modest budget, theNSMP created no unrealistic expectations that it would change life inJerusalem overnight. This small scale also helped to allay the fears ofmunicipal officials (Epstein 1989). The diversity in the socialdevelopment of neighborhoods has been attended to by the differentforms of the minhalot (minhelet, amuta, minhal meshulav). When internaldiversity has proven too much to accommodate, the areal definition ofneighborhoods have been changed as in Ramot and Nahlaot/Rehavia(discussed in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.6 respectively). Finally, it should benoted that the involvement of the JDC and its largely foreign trainedprofessional staff83, provided a tremendous pool of expertise in thesuccessful implementation of innovative projects, such as the NSMP.5.6 ConclusionsWhile it may be argued that Jerusalem is unique among the world’scities, it nevertheless suffers from many of the same universal pressures83 Of the three senior JDC officials interviewed one was born andeducated in Israel but has lectured extensively abroad, another wasborn and educated in England and the third in the United States.105facing other metropolitan areas. As Figure 1 graphically illustrates,Jerusalem continues to experience rapid population growth. Theimmigration of entire communities from less-developed parts of theworld, combined with the custom of large families in the economicallyweak ultra-orthodox Jewish community and segments of the Arabcommunity, has resulted in pockets of material poverty. The wide rangeof personal incomes is reflected in the differences in neighborhoodhousing densities shown in Table 3. Serious as they are, these economicdifferences are dwarfed by the chasms between the city’s three majorcommunities. Keeping the tensions between these groups non-violent isessential both in social and economic terms. For, without social stabilitytwo important components of Jerusalem’s economy, tourism and foreignphilanthropic support for local institutions, will wither. At the same time,Jerusalem’s rich heritage places limits on the physical and economicdevelopment of the city. Jerusalem’s natural carrying capacity is alsolimited by its inland location, difficult topography and scarce watersupply.As Jerusalem’s population grew rapidly in this century, thoseresponsible for the city attempted to deal with these pressures byincreasing central control. This centralization brought about dramaticimprovements in the physical and economic well being of Jerusalem andits residents. However, it failed to alleviate the communal tensions withinthe city. Through the tenacity of local community leaders, the social andpolitical dangers of over-centralization were made clear to municipalofficials. With great foresight, a handful of key figures translated a seriesof ad hoc solutions into a structural change in the governance ofJerusalem. This development, resulting in the birth of the minhalot, has106been invaluable for the city. For, in the words of Jerusalem’s mayor:“An expanded system of minhalot could eventually play arole in a permanent arrangement by becoming theframework for self-administration by the differentautonomous communities within one municipality.Direct elections to the minhalot can assure that eachneighborhood’s religious, linguistic, ethnic, cultural,educational and economic character will be determinedas in the past by its inhabitants and their customs andtraditions” (Kollek 1988)Further, this devolution of responsibility will free the municipalityto focus more on the urgent environmental and economic concernsfacing metropolitan Jerusalem and less on particular needs within itsvarious neighborhoods. The modest financial cost of implementing theNSMP (see Table 6) compared to the resulting savings both direct (seepage 94) and indirect84 emphasizes the fact that such a restructuringdoes not have to rely on charitable sentiments. What it does require is anenlightened, democratic world view on the part of city politicians.The experience of the Neighborhood Self-Management Project inJerusalem has clearly shown the benefits of a formalized division offunctions between neighborhood bodies and a city wide authority. Thisrestructuring, involving a mixture of centralization and decentralization,has: 1) improved the delivery of local services, 2) strengthened localdemocracy, and 3) lowered the level of tension between communities.The benefits of such a scheme when applied elsewhere would beparticularly pertinent for urban areas which have deep rooted social,economic and political divisions or that lack a city wide sense of loyalty84 The prevention of social unrest is difficult to assess in dollar terms.However, the human and financial cost of the Watts riots in 1968 andthe more recent riots in Los Angeles in 1991 may be indicative.107and belonging. However, the Neighborhood Self-Management Project alsohas universal relevance, in that the continued existence of distinct urbancommunities and the emergence of new, life-style based communitieswithin metropolitan areas is a world-wide phenomenon. Rather thanbeing disruptive, the NSMP shows that these communities can beintegrated into the constructive governance of metropolitan areas andenhance the experience of modern urban living.From the Jerusalem experience it may be deduced that the seriousrestructuring of the municipal government in Jerusalem could be ahelpful model for curing urban pathology elsewhere. Such a revitalizationof metropolitan areas would, according to the Jerusalem model, requiretwo interdependent developments. The first would have to result in theformation of healthy, local communities. The second would require theformation of a strong metropolitan wide authority. The new metropolitanbody would have to draw its strength from the citizens through directelections.Since the 20th Century history of Jerusalem’s urban governance hasshown that neither extreme centralization nor extreme decentralizationlead to anything but urban decline, whereas a carefully considered,rational balance between the two is beneficial, there is obviously nosimple path to urban utopia. For cities to be what they could be, thisbalance, between a strong central authority and autonomous localcommunities, must be vigilantly maintained. As the Neighborhood SelfManagement Project in Jerusalem illustrates, this “third option” in urbangovernance is best rooted in a functional division of responsibilities.POSTSCRIPTSince the completion of this thesis, Teddy Kollek wasdefeated as mayor of Jerusalem in the municipal elections ofNovember 2, 1993. He has retained his directorship of theJerusalem Foundation.108109BIBLIOGRAPHYAdiv H., Shekhori N. and Epstein D. 1991. 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Birmingham, The Institute of LocalGovernment Studies.118PERSONAL INTERVIEWS1. A1-Saada, Isadin. Director of the Beit Safafa Minhelet, interviewed onDecember 31st 1990.2. Amedi, Un. Director of the Centre-City Minhelet and ExecutiveDirector of Project Renewal in the City-Centre, interviewed onDecember 27th 1990.3. Basat, Iris. Director of the Talpiot Mizrach Minhelet, interviewed onDecember 26th 1990.4. Ayyoub, Evelyn. Community Worker with the Belt Hanina Minhelet,interviewed on December 18th 1990.5. Chesin, Amir. Advisor to the Mayor on Arab Affairs, interviewed onDecember 21st 1990.6. Darwish, Ziad. Director of the Beit Hanina Minhelet interviewed onDecember 18th 1990.7. Epstein, David. Director of Resource and Leadership Development,Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Management,interviewed in April 1989 and on December 17th 1990.8. Kaminker, Sara. Municipal Council member, City of Jerusalem,founding member of the Board of the Jerusalem Association forNeighborhood Self- Management, interviewed on December 21st1990.9. Katzburg-Kadosh, Ruti. Community Worker with the Har NofMinhelet, interviewed on January 1st 1991.10. Nahmias, Eli. Assistant Deputy Director of Communications and PublicRelations of the City of Jerusalem, interviewed on December 20th1990.119GLOSSARY of TERMS and ABBREVIATIONSAguda Literal meaning: association. The term is used as a Hebrewabbreviation for the Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Management.Amuta Literal meaning: corporation. The term is used to describe thoseminhalot which are separate, incorporated nonprofit entities.Amutot Plural form of Amuta.Ashkenazim Term used to indicate Jews from Central and EasternEurope.Eretz Israel Literal meaning: the Land of Israel. Term used to describethe geographical area of biblical Israel.Halukah Literal meaning: division. The distribution system which sawmonies raised overseas to support scholars and their families inJerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safad.Hamula An Arabic word denoting a patrilineal clan.Histadrut Literal meaning: self-organization. The term is used as anabbreviation for the General Federation of Labor.Intifada An Arabic word meaning literally ‘to shake off’. This is theexpression commonly used to describe the popular uprising againstIsraeli control over the West Bank and Gaza District.Kibbutz Literal meaning: gathering. The term is most commonly used todescribe rural collective settlements. The plural form is kibbutzim.Matnas Acronym for Culture, Youth and Sport Centre. These areneighborhood community centres.Millet Turkish word meaning community. The term is often used todescribe the situation of communal autonomy in the Ottoman Empire.Minhal Meshulav Literal meaning: integrated management. The term isused to describe those minhalot which have merged with neighborhoodcommunity centres.Minhelet The shortened form of Minhelet Schunati, meaningneighborhood management council. In its shortened form it is used todescribe neighborhood councils in Jerusalem.Minhalot Plural form of minhelet.120Moshav These are rural settlements where land is owned byindividual families but marketing is done on a co-operative basis.Pashalik Turkish word meaning district. A level of administrative areasmaller than a Vilayet (province).Sepharadim Term used to indicate Jews from the Iberian peninnsula.Often incorrectly used to indicate all non-European Jews.Yishuv Literal meaning: settlement. The term is used to describe theJewish community in pre-State Israel.Zionism Word coined in the nineteenth century to indicate themovement of Jews back to Ancient Israel, particularly to Jerusalem(Zion).ABBREVIATIONSJDC (American Jewish) Joint Distribution CommitteeNSMP Neighborhood Self-Management Project


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