Neighborhood Self Management
A study of the role of local communities in the revitalization of metropolitan areas

by

RENE FRANCOIS RAGETLI

B.A. The University of British Columbia, 1989

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
School of Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
December 1993

© Rene Francois Ragetli, 1993
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

(Signature)

Department of School of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date December 27th, 1993
ABSTRACT

Traditionally observers of the urban scene have held that by unilaterally shifting the balance between central and local control over urban management, conditions within cities could be improved. More recently a theoretical synthesis has been advanced which advocates the decentralization of some urban functions to the neighborhood level and the centralization of others to a metropolitan wide authority. Adherents of this latter position hold that healthy cities operate best on the principle of a "federation of neighborhoods".

Following a review of the construction of modern society, this thesis considers the theoretical benefits of dividing responsibility for four categories of urban functions between local and central authorities. The ideal theoretical division of various environmental, economic, social and political functions has subsequently been tested against an implemented form of neighborhood self management in Jerusalem. The results of this comparison confirm that properly constituted neighborhood authorities can indeed deliver human services more effectively and with considerable financial savings. It has also become apparent that social cohesion is enhanced by recognizing and legitimizing local communities. The Jerusalem experience further reveals that a strong metropolitan wide authority is crucial in securing the judicious use of natural resources and preventing environmental degradation, thereby ensuring long-term economic well-being.

The considered balancing of urban functions between central and local control would benefit metropolitan areas worldwide, particularly those considering a comprehensive revitalization.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract  

Table of Contents  

List of Tables  

List of Figures  

Acknowledgements  

Chapter 1 Introduction  

Chapter 2 The Structure of Modern Society  
2.1 Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft  
2.2 Zionism and Community  
2.3 From Zionist to Israeli Planning  

Chapter 3 Theoretical Arguments in the Centralization-Decentralization Debate  
3.1 Environmental Considerations  
3.2 Economic Considerations  
3.3 Social Considerations  
3.4 Political Considerations  
3.5 Synthesis  
3.5.1 Environment  
3.5.2 Economy  
3.5.3 Society  
3.5.4 Politics  

Chapter 4 Neighborhood Self Management in Jerusalem: A Case Study  
4.1 Setting the Stage  
4.1.1 Jerusalem During the Nineteenth Century  
4.1.2 Jerusalem during the British Mandate  
4.1.3 Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967  
4.1.4 Relationship of State and Local Governments  
4.2 Neighborhood Self Management in Jerusalem  
4.2.1 The Aftermath of Reunification  
4.2.2 Early Attempts at Decentralization  
4.2.3 Goals and Structures of the Neighborhood Self-Management Project  
4.2.4 Activities of the Minhalot  
4.2.5 Financial and Human Resource Development  
4.2.6 Evolving Status of the Minhalot
Chapter 5  Implications of the Jerusalem Experience for Revitalizing Metropolitan Areas  96-107
  5.1 Environmental Considerations  96
  5.2 Economic Considerations  98
  5.3 Social Considerations  100
  5.4 Political Considerations  102
  5.5 Structures and Method of Implementation  104
  5.6 Conclusion  104

Postscript  108

Bibliography  109-117

Personal Interviews  118

Glossary  119-120
**LIST of TABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Population Change in Jerusalem During the British Mandate</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Selected Characteristics for West and East Jerusalem Before and After Unification in 1967</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Features of Neighborhoods in Jerusalem with Neighborhood Councils of Minhelet Status</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Nature of Neighborhoods and Characteristics of Corresponding Minhelet</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Minhelet Budgets and Major Activities in 1989</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Budget and Employees of the Neighborhood Self-Management Project 1981-1990</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST of FIGURES

| Figure 1 | Population Growth of Jerusalem 1900-1990 | 51 |
| Figure 2 | Map of Jerusalem showing 1985 municipal boundaries and location of various neighborhoods | 65 |
| Figure 3 | Aguda Organizational Structure | 73 |
| Figure 4 | Minhelet Organizational Structure | 77 |
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge and thank those who helped in the development of this thesis. In particular, my supervisor, Mr. Peter Boothroyd who offered encouragement and welcome guidance along the way. Further, my other reviewers, Dr. Michael Leaf who provided valuable comments and Dr. Michael Seelig, who introduced me to the Neighborhood Self-Management Project during the UBC Field School in Jerusalem in 1989.

I am indebted to those individuals in Jerusalem who gave freely of their time and provided a first-hand insight into the governance of the city and its neighborhoods.

I am grateful for the wisdom and steadfast support of my father, Dr. H.W.J. Ragetli without whom this thesis could not have been completed. I wish to recognize my friends, Dong Ho Shin, for his sage advice as I began my research, and Paul Diamond, for his assistance in preparing the Tables and Figures. Finally, thanks to my wife Leah for her translations of material written in Hebrew. her loving support of this project and her patience.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There has long been broad consensus among observers of the urban scene that our cities are not what they could (or should) be. Urban areas both in developing and developed countries are the scenes of growing economic disparities (Pickvance & Preteceille 1986), inequalities in access to decision making, racial and ethnic tensions and environmental degradation to the point that human health is affected. The evidence is there for all to see and on that there is little disagreement. There is however a wide range of opinion on what is responsible for this urban malaise.

Broadly speaking there have been two major schools of thought on urban pathology. The first has traditionally seen uncontrolled growth as the cause of the problem. Naturally this group (largely corresponding to the "Golden Age" of planning) has prescribed stronger central control of the urban environment as the means of "curing" the cause of the problem. A second school of thought emerged in the sixties. This group, composed of both classic liberals such as Jane Jacobs and anarchists such as Bookchin, agreed that centrally directed "Urban Renewal" was the root of the problem. Not surprisingly, they supported decentralization as a means of reducing the power of city governments.

More recently there has begun to emerge a theoretical synthesis of this centralization-decentralization debate. This "amalgam" (Bellush and Netzer 1990) advocates a recognition of the need for certain urban functions to be decentralized and for others to remain centralized. In essence this approach sees the recognition and legitimation of community (read local or neighborhood) government complementing a
strong regional (metropolitan) government. This functional differentiation is a refinement of the city as a "federation of neighborhoods" proposed by Jane Jacobs in Death and Life of Great American Cities.

The notion of a city as a federation of neighborhoods is finding expression in the managerial organization of modern Jerusalem. Its governance has swung dramatically between centralized and decentralized control over the past century. Prior to the First World War, Ottoman Jerusalem, then a provincial city, essentially consisted of self-governing religio-ethnic communities living in distinct quarters. In the Mandate period (1917-1948) British colonial bureaucrats attempted to "rationalize" the planning of the city. The ambitious master plan that Patrick Geddes developed in 1919 (Broadman 1978: 313) soon foundered on the rocks of inter-communal strife.

At the end of the British Mandate the city was divided into Israeli West Jerusalem and Transjordanian East Jerusalem. Municipal planners, many of whom had been trained

in the British planning tradition, continued the master plan approach in West Jerusalem (Gertel and Law-Yone 1991). The goals of this planning reflected the strong national consensus of assertion of sovereignty in the city as the capital of Israel, settling of new immigrants and creation of a modern infrastructure. These were accepted without question by a weak and ineffectual municipal government. In contrast, East Jerusalem reverted to the pre-Mandate form of weak central control within the city limits and modest interest or investment from a "distant" capital (Amman). Indeed much of the actual built up area of East Jerusalem which was developed in this period lay outside the municipal
boundaries.

These divergent paths were roughly united following the Israeli victory in 1967. The Israeli vision of the city and methods of planning and implementation were quickly extended over a metropolitan area, comprising both West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem as well as most of the suburban areas adjacent to the latter. The Jerusalem Master Plan of 1968 marked the high point of the trend toward centralization. Since then the municipality has begun to move cautiously in the direction of decentralization. (Hasson 1989)

The stated intent behind this shift in policy was to: (1) improve the delivery of urban services; and (2) strengthen local democracy. A third driving force was the desire to legitimate the central authorities in the eyes of the Arab population (28 % of the total population). The vehicle for this decentralization was the Neighborhood Self-Management Project (NSMP) which was initiated as a pilot project in 1980 and gradually extended to involve more and more neighborhoods.

This new level of urban management, represented by the formalized empowerment of neighborhood councils (minhalot)\(^1\), has helped solve some problems facing Jerusalem but has also given rise to new dilemmas. The clash of nationalisms in the city and opposing politico-religious views often means that the simplest activities (such as participating in the planning process) take on tremendous meaning\(^2\). The existence of autonomous neighborhood councils buffers the local

---

1 A brief definition of non-English words and terms used in this thesis may be found in the Glossary on page 119.
2 Since 1948 Jerusalem has been the declared capital of the State of Israel and since 1988 of the theoretical State of Palestine. In addition there are large pockets of ultra-orthodox Jews who either question the legitimacy of the Israeli State (non-Zionists) or even violently oppose it (anti- Zionists).
activists from charges of being mere agents of central authority. On the other hand the real if limited power which the councils possess has provided a new arena for horizontal conflicts between neighborhoods.

The thesis examines the Neighborhood Self-Management Program in Jerusalem between 1980 and 1990. The goal of the thesis is to assess the utility in terms of the existing theoretical basis and actual practice of implementing this self management scheme in Jerusalem and on this basis to make some extrapolations about the general desirability of functional reorganization into metropolitan and neighborhood level management units.

In order to accomplish the above stated goal, the thesis raises three major questions regarding urban Jerusalem. They are:

1. What is the existing balance between central and local control?
   - How did this come about?
   - Who are the key actors?
   - What is the impact of this situation on urban residents?

2. What are the arguments for changing the balance?
   - Who proposes them?

3. What would be (or is) the consequence of the new form of city management?
   - How is the change implemented?
   - What problems have emerged?

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter begins with a brief discussion of the role of community in modern society and then examines the debate in Zionist thought regarding the nature of modern Jewish nationalism. Following this an analytical framework articulating the theoretical and
practical rationales for increasing centralization or decentralization of urban functions is presented in chapter three. The areas of consideration are social, political, economic and environmental. This review of urban management\(^3\) theory includes examples of the goals, methods and outcomes of the different strategies.

The fourth chapter begins with a brief urban history of Jerusalem, identifying themes and actors in the management of the city. It then describes the goals, planning and implementation of the NSMP and shows how this is an example of decentralization while maintaining a strong center. I believe that this program is a suitable example of evolving functional differentiation because it is well defined administratively, it has been operating for a decade and despite enormous political upheavals in the region it has been well accepted by the participants.

The fourth chapter assesses the adequacy of Jerusalem's decentralization scheme in meeting those needs articulated in Chapter 3. While there is ample academic material which deals with the centralization/decentralization debate; literature directly related to the Minhellet program is limited. Therefore, Chapter 4 relies heavily on the author's personal observations over several years and interviews conducted with municipal and neighborhood officials in January 1991. Background material and statistical information is taken from government publications, newspapers and journal articles. Chapter 5 concludes with a presentation of the theoretical implications arising from the NSMP and will offer policy recommendations for future planning in Jerusalem and other urban areas.

\(^3\) Management is used here to mean both the governance and the management of urban functions.
CHAPTER 2

The Structure of Modern Society

2.1 Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft

Modern society is a product of the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution (1850-1950). The near religion of technologically based progress which dominated this period had its critics throughout. Perhaps the most graphic accounts of the impact of industrialization and urbanization are the early narratives of Friedrich Engels and Charles Dickens. The miserable living conditions of the urban working class became the object of reforms from the beginning of the industrial revolution. In large measure the ensuing investment in urban infrastructure and services alleviated the obvious primary needs of city dwellers.

However, the full impact on society brought about by modernization did not emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. In the wake of the Industrial Revolution the conception of how modern society evolved has been essentially linear. Although, Karl Marx in Das Kapital advances the view that human society is organized to benefit the economic interests of certain classes over others and that industrialization only intensified this class struggle, he dismissed the distinctions between groups based on race or faith as artificial divisions used by the dominant class to divert and weaken the working class. The challenge, to this simplistic view of society, posed by the persistence of communal ties has only recently been addressed by Neo-Marxist scholars such as David Harvey and Manuel Castells.

The nineteenth century social theorist Ferdinand Toennies was one of the earliest to describe the impact of modernization on society as a
whole (Toennies 1957). He used the terms Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft to represent the two poles of this development path. The former (usually translated as community) stands at the traditional, pre-modern pole while Gessellschaft (modern society) stands at the other. Toennies (see also Durkheim 1964, Weber 1964 and Marx & Engels 1969) observed that communal ties based on blood (family) or locale are broken down through a combination of population density (urbanization), social mobility, secularism and above all the market nexus. Personal ties and loyalties are replaced with temporary, contractual relationships designed to further ulterior self interests.

Emile Durkheim writing at the same time as Toennies described the impact of modernization in terms of individual well-being. His bleak assessment was that rather than freeing people from the strictures of agrarian society the twin forces of urbanization and industrialization isolated people from one another and left them vulnerable to what he described as "anomie". In this regard Durkheim and Toennies have become favorites among those critical of modern society and who harbor a nostalgia for the warmth and security of the pre-modern world. These utopians of today are inheritors of a romantic but essentially escapist tradition. The salvation of an increasingly urbanized society can never lie in the tiny intentional enclaves they propose. One of the largest experiments in creating such "organic" communities has been the Israeli kibbutz. This movement which presently has some 150 000 members in

4 The four authors in question writing in either German or French were originally published near the turn of the century. Their impact on the English speaking world was considerably diluted by the lag-time in translating their works.

5 This "anomie" clearly points to the hierarchy of human needs as proposed by Abraham Maslow. Since his views are widely recognized they will not be elaborated here.
250 settlements was one of the first products of Zionism. Proponents of this promising communal form began to be disillusioned as early as the late 1950s (Schwartz 1957, cited in Breed 1971: 181). This disillusionment stemmed from the realization that after all members preferred a higher material standard of living over ideological purity. Today's industrialized kibbutzim with re-emerging nuclear families bear little resemblance to the pioneer collectives of less than half a century ago. The view of society and the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft debate embodied in Zionist ideology will be discussed in the following section.

The characterization of modern society (meaning aggregations of individuals relating through the market) as replacing traditional ties remained unchallenged until the Post War era. Talcott Parsons, the dominant social theorist of this period, advanced a complex theory of differentiation of society in order to explain the existence of "collegial formations" (Bayliss 1989). These functional communities are based on normative relationships between members of a profession or group of professions. The race riots and counter-culture movements of the 1960s forced some democratic theorists such as Robert Dahl to entirely reassess their view of society as having no sub-societal units other than individuals (cf. Dahl 1961 and Dahl 1982).

Although modernity is clearly irreversible, the need for community cannot be dismissed. The latter being a prerequisite for the satisfaction of higher order human needs described by Abraham Maslow. The need for both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is clear. The debate over the proportion between community and modernity requires further analysis. This will be done in the context of an examination of the tension between the two in modern Jewish society.
2.2 Zionism and Community

Throughout its history the Jewish people has wrestled with two opposing characteristics. Simply put these are the inclination towards particularism, often involving withdrawal and isolation from the outside world, and the desire to play an active role in shaping a universal society. The latter course of open communication with other groups has at times leaned towards adopting new forms and customs to Judaism and at others to adapting Judaism to fit into other cultures. The dichotomy between insularity and openness is present at the very beginning of Jewish history. For example, the Torah speaks of the Jews as "A people destined to dwell apart" (Numbers 23,9) and "A nation of priests" (Exodus 19,6). Yet, the same Bible is emphatic that there is to be no distinction between the rights of Jews and non-Jews.

Ideally a creative tension exists between these two tendencies. This allows for gradual change without losing the core identity. Unfortunately, the outside world has repeatedly sought to reconcile the apparent contradiction on its terms. The Zionist movement arose as a modern attempt to establish the balance between Jewish particularism and universalism on indigenous terms.

The Zionist revolution, with its triumphant consummation in a sovereign Jewish state, has given rise to an extensive literature. By and large these works seek to explain the rise of Zionism through the

---

6 Such innovation has not been without some risk to its proponents. Consider for example the attempted murder of Joseph by his brothers for suggesting that the tribal confederation be replaced by a monarchy similar to neighboring cultures (Genesis 37: 1-23).

7 A modern (secular) Israeli social psychologist describes this derisively as a "divine pilot project" (Beit-Hallahmi 1991).

8 Jewish Law does differentiate between the two groups in terms of obligations, Jews being expected to observe 613 (mostly ritualistic) commandments.
interplay of external factors. Many authors see Zionism as a synthesis of the universalistic yearnings of post Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals and the intolerant nationalisms of nineteenth century Europe.

The argument usually reviews the events following the French Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man, spread by French armies, had served to knock down the ghetto walls in Western and Central Europe. With the defeat of Napoleon and the reimposition of restrictions on Jews many sought relief either through conversion to Christianity or by abandoning the national elements of Jewishness and creating a "Spiritual Judaism". A Socialist variant of this integrationist strategy emerged in revolutionary circles in Czarist Russia. They saw Industrial Capitalism as the real problem and advocated Jewish autonomy within a Socialist Europe as the solution (Almog 1987). This Yiddish speaking movement dominated the Jewish working class in Eastern Europe until the 1930s. The development of racially based anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century doomed the efforts of both movements. In essence Jews were no longer targets for living a Jewish life but simply for living (Hess 1862).

In fact the only real alternatives (in the light of the Holocaust) were emigration or annihilation. This was the conclusion of Theodor Herzl, the founder of the World Zionist Organization. He was an assimilated Viennese Jew who initially sought mass conversion as a solution to the "Jewish Problem" of Europe. His liberal world view was shattered by the Paris mob shouting "Death to the Jews" during the Dreyfus trial of 1895. This event led him to the realization that only the creation of a state of their own would relieve the danger that European Jewry faced. However, by emphasizing the reaction to external forces
(the Enlightenment and rise of Nationalism), the traditional interpretation neglects the role that internal intellectual forces played in creating the Zionist movement. These forces clashed over the type of Zionism which was needed to overcome the existential crisis facing Jewry and subsequently the type of state which should emerge.

Ultimately, the decisive factor behind the Restoration is that the Jewish people formed a nation. They possessed a culture (in terms of language and especially religion), the aspiration for political independence, a deep historical consciousness of peoplehood and a burning desire to repossess their historical homeland (Hertzberg 1959). As noted above, early Political Zionism saw the fact that the territorial aspect of the nation existed only as an abstract desire to return to Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel) as the primary imbalance in Jewish national existence.

The other major trend within the Zionist movement was Cultural Zionism. Although accepting the need for self-governance most Cultural Zionists defined community in terms of culture and belief. Hence they saw the revival of Hebrew language and literature as the harbinger of national rebirth. This in turn would strengthen Jewish culture enabling it to act as a progressive element in human society (Ha-Am 1897, Buber 1934). Most Cultural Zionists held a critical or even hostile (such as the influential poet Berdichevsky) view of traditional Judaism. A remarkable exception to this rule was the first Chief Rabbi of Israel, Abraham Isaac Kook. One of the first to employ the religious term *teshuvah* (renewal) in conjunction with the physical return to Zion, Kook

---

9 Hebrew, although the language of prayer had almost ceased to be spoken by the nineteenth century.
10 Teshuvah is often translated as repentance. However, the fullest
expressed it thus:

"The nation longs to set root again in its homeland and to return to normalcy, as in ancient days. But to the extent of her readiness for the inspiration of greatness, she must, through her own initiative, discover a source of spiritual inspiration that shall act on all aspects of her life... The surge of literary creativity, when it is robed in the spirit of the people that has returned to life will engage the best spirits of the world." (The Road to Renewal, 1904)

Out of this swirling cauldron of cultural messianism, secular nationalism and Socialism emerged Labour Zionism. This movement, which was to dominate political culture in Israel until 1977, believed that socioeconomic "normalization" was essential to the Jewish future. That is, in their own national society Jews would play all economic roles in contrast to the restricted occupational structure in the diaspora. Labour Zionism viewed the formation of a Jewish working class in Palestine as a prerequisite of this goal of normalization. The nation's economy would be based on collective farming. Consequently, Zionism became "the only major migration movement with a conscious ideology of downward social mobility" (Avineri 1976: 116).

In reaction to the realities of a largely feudal, agricultural area like Palestine, lacking a significant bourgeoisie or a proletariat (not to mention Jews), a Marxist version of class struggle was unrealistic. Instead the working class would lead the Zionist Movement, pursuing a strategy of building economic institutions and co-operative settlements. This "Constructivist Phase" (Cohen 1987) saw the emergence of institutions such as the Kupat Holim (health services), Ha-Mashbir (co-operative

---

meaning of the term involves repentance in order to return to an earlier state of holiness.

11 Republished in English translation by B. Bokser in 1978.
department stores) a labour exchange, mobile library, the Hagannah (self defence force) and the first Kibbutzim. In 1920, most of these organizations were placed under the central control of the Histadrut (The General Confederation of Jewish Labour in Palestine). By dominating control of this "state-in-genesis" (Cohen 1987: 109), Labour Zionism had the tools by which to set the political, economic and spiritual boundaries of the future Jewish state. The fashioning of a self-sufficient working nation was to be the revolution in modern Jewish life.

In power, Labour Zionism tended towards a highly centralized technocratic form of decision making. This statist orientation had begun to emerge among Labour politicians (particularly the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion) and institutions even prior to 1948. An early critic of this tendency toward over-centralization was the philosopher Martin Buber. In Paths in Utopia (1949) he singles out the kibbutz as a concrete example of what he means by authentic community. By accepting the narrow vision of the early political Zionists in the name of practical expediency, Labour Zionism sowed the seeds of its own ideological demise.

2.3 From Zionist to Israeli Planning

Although some authors place the end of Labour Zionism's creative phase as early as the 1930s (Cohen 1987), this may be unduly critical. Consider for example the creative approach to absorbing the waves of newcomers embodied in the Sharon Plan of 1950. This national Master Plan led to the creation of an urban network that included the existing metropolitan areas and the construction of new regional cities, development towns and villages (Moshavim). In effect, it replaced the
19th Century Zionist dream that the renaissance of the Jewish people in a state of their own must be accomplished by recreating a Jewish peasantry with a late 20th Century model of a modern, urban, technologically advanced society along Western European and even Japanese models (Akzin & Dror 1966). Arieh Sharon, the author of the plan, believed that the success in organizing agricultural settlements could be matched in urban planning.

However, the Sharon Plan was not fully successful. It could not master the forces of urbanization it itself recognized and valued. The power of the marketplace, the attraction of living in a metropolis and the accumulated free choices of citizens have proved to be at least as important as governmental programs in shaping the country (Troen 1988). Successive Israeli governments remained committed to a policy of dispersing population away from the Haifa-Tel Aviv corridor. In effect this was a variant of the anti-urban bias of early Labour Zionism. Little attention was paid to conditions in the three metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. The Labour party paid dearly for this oversight, losing disaffected urban wage earners to the Right wing populist party of Menachem Begin in 1977. The first domestic action he undertook as Prime Minister was a decade long urban renewal scheme, Project Renewal.

This billion dollar program eventually targeted 100 neighborhoods throughout the country with a combined population of some one million residents. The goals of this revitalization effort were firstly to "reduce social disparities between the haves and have-nots in Israeli society" and secondly to "improve the image of the project neighborhood" (Carmon & Hill: 471). Project Renewal focussed on social goals rather than the
traditional economic view of increasing the "productive" use of urban land. Its success was in large part due to the recognition and empowerment of neighborhood organizations to participate in planning (Alterman 1988) and implementing the program to meet the specific needs of the current residents of each community. The change in focus from meeting the elementary needs of new immigrants to improving existing communities marks the transition from Zionist to Israeli planning. This is not to say that Israel has ceased to be concerned about immigration\textsuperscript{12}. Rather that having met the fundamental needs of most Israelis the opportunity now exists to revitalize community. To paraphrase Buber, the current challenge is to demonstrate that the paths to utopia can lead through the city as well as the countryside.

In many ways the experience gained from Project Renewal helped set the stage for the Neighborhood Self-Management Program which is the focus of the case study in Chapter 4. The theoretical arguments in favour of this type of decentralized urban management are examined in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{12} In two years (1990-1991) Israel absorbed 400,000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, thereby increasing its population by some 10\%.
CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS IN THE CENTRALIZATION-DECENTRALIZATION DEBATE

The imperative for a restructuring of urban management follows from an increasing awareness that there are limits to healthy growth. For one, the environmental crisis of the past two decades is a clear indication that both globally and locally there are natural limits to current forms of human development. In addition, the debt crisis in the developing world and its equivalent in developed countries\(^\text{13}\) indicate a major economic limit to development. Yet, the enormous international tides of economic refugees and the vicious outbursts from the urban underclass in many countries signal that the status quo cannot simply be frozen in place. With the way forward blocked by natural limitations and the status quo untenable the answer can only lie in a comprehensive, rational restructuring of urban management. The latter term including the governance of urban functions (as defined in footnote 3, page 5).

Thus, although there is little doubt of the need for restructuring there is much disagreement on the manner to achieve it. There are two major, diametrically opposed schools of thought, namely those who advocate greater centralization of urban management and those who propose a decentralization of authority and responsibility for urban functions. The first school advances theories which concentrate on the economic efficiency and accountability of local government (Self 1982, Norton 1985, Picard & Zariski 1987, Barlow 1991). These theories are often part of a wider argument advancing strategies for improving

\(^{13}\) The result of ballooning budget deficits in industrialized countries during the 1980s is aptly described by Eisenstadt and Ahimeir in their 1985 work, *The Welfare State and its Aftermath*. 

Many of the authors in both groups take a decidedly polemical tone, but there is no consistent correlation between Right and centralization and Left and decentralization in the literature. The mass of often contradictory literature is perhaps the best indication of the enormous complexity of the issues facing Homo Urbanus.

In the current chapter urban management is considered on the basis of four categories: environmental, economic, social and political. These will be analyzed according to the two schools of thought mentioned above. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the two theoretical schools on the basis of the nascent holistic approach mentioned in Chapter One. This third way analyses each activity and then considers at which level, this particular function should be managed, viz. at the neighborhood level or city-wide. In this way the traditional centralization-decentralization debate is effectively bypassed.

One last task which must be addressed before examining urban functions and which level of government is best suited to manage them is to clarify what is meant by the term decentralization. Rondinelli (1981a)

14 These authors include environmental and social conditions in their arguments for increasing centralization. However, they seem to view local communities as an obstacle to rational development rather than part of the solution. Therefore, I have included them in the first broad group of thinkers.

15 This absence of ideological consistency in regards to urban management is apparent in the political world as well. Consider for example the centralist policies of the Thatcher regime and the decentralist tendencies of the Reagan administration.
defines decentralization as "the transfer or delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions, and manage public functions, from central government and its agencies to field organizations of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semiautonomous public corporations area-wide or regional development authorities, functional authorities, autonomous local governments, or non-governmental organizations." Decentralization may take different forms, depending on what type of authority is transferred, the degree of discretionary powers which accompany it and to what type of agency. Alterman (1988) distinguishes four types of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization. Deconcentration involves the transfer of function from central ministries to field officers or agencies within those ministries, along with some small degree of discretion. Delegation is the transfer of functions to agencies outside the existing bureaucratic structure together with a significant degree of discretion and independent decision making powers. Devolution is the transfer of functions to agencies such that they would have autonomous legal powers. Privatization involves moving functions from the public to the voluntary, semipublic, or private sector (Alterman 1988: 456-457).

3.1 Environmental Considerations

The deteriorating state of the environment has been of concern to many since the 1960s (Ehrlich 1968, McHarg 1969, Schumacher 1973). However, since the mid 1980s there has been increasing alarm over the quickening rate of change. Perhaps the seminal work in this area was "Our Common Future" published by the World Commission on the
Environment and Development in 1987. This report highlighted the cause and effect relationship between the economic activity necessary to sustain modern urban society and the possibly irreparable damage being wrought on the bio-sphere. The Green Paper on the urban environment published by the Commission of the European Communities in 1990 elaborates on this theme, suggesting specific policies which must be undertaken in Europe's conurbations to address the root cause of global environmental problems.

The Green Paper reviews the consequences of the narrow vision of development which dominated urban thinking in the Post-War era. Improvement was measured only in narrowly defined (short term) economic terms. One result was inefficient use of local resources: fertile soil, air and clean water\textsuperscript{16}. The resulting impact on the environment has been both direct, through alterations in the use of these basic resources and indirect, through the intensity of use. Where agricultural land has been lost through urbanization the produce previously derived from it must be imported. Similarly water bodies (both fresh and salt) have been altered by use for transportation of waste and materials thereby necessitating the importation of clean drinking water and marine food resources. In addition to the loss of farm productivity, the ill-considered use of land has led to dispersed populations. These populations have in turn often been settled on sensitive wetlands and floodplains (Yaro 1991).

\textsuperscript{16} One of the most extreme example of unsustainable urban development lies in Southern California. Huge engineering works are necessary to bring water from Northern California to the Los Angeles area. The low density sprawl and uneven distribution of employment has resulted in a transportation system which not only kills large numbers of the city's inhabitants through motor vehicle accidents and violently competitive drivers but also has produced air quality which consistently falls below WHO standards (OECD 1990: 24).
Another characteristic of cities in developed nations is the spatial separation of work and residence. When this factor is combined with low residential densities the result has been high use of private automobiles. The emissions from these vehicles constitutes the largest component of urban atmospheric pollutants (OECD 1991). While the atmospheric impact of vehicle emissions was identified as long as twenty years ago\textsuperscript{17}, more recent studies have highlighted other effects of the automobile upon the urban environment. These include degradation due to traffic noise, roadside runoff, disposal of tires and lubricants, the loss of time through congestion and the loss of life and health through accidents. All of these are now being recognized as connected elements in a lessening of the quality of urban life (Wood 1990).

Yet another consequence of the dispersed settlement pattern common in modern cities is the consumption of materials for construction and maintenance of the built environment. The importation of materials (in particular lumber) for construction is coming under increasing scrutiny in some developed nations (Deelstra 1990). The maintenance aspect which includes space heating and cooling as well as lighting became an issue earlier as part of the "energy crisis" of the late 1970s. However, the solution was seen in technological terms, not in changing patterns of settlement. In contrast, many authors since the mid 1980s have identified the lack of regional land-use planning and transportation management as the root cause of many of the problems facing the urban environment and by extension the global environment (Rees and Roseland 1991). Additionally, air and water quality are

\textsuperscript{17} A study conducted in the early 1970s found that local air quality in eight OECD countries was being degraded by increased levels of low level Ozone, particulate matter and Nitrous Oxides. (Berry et al 1974).
increasingly being addressed at the level of the urban region. The logic being that neither air nor water are respecters of artificial boundaries.

Many authors (Deelstra 1990, DeGrove 1991, Stren 1992) have identified fragmented authority as a major barrier to effective management of the environment in large cities. Although, most metropolitan areas have had some experience with single issue boards responsible for things such as sewerage, water provision, mass transit and more recently air quality, few have had unequivocal success. The apparent lack of success in tackling the root causes of urban environmental degradation appears to arise from the inability of these boards to enforce standards and/or to direct development through regional zoning and transportation management (OECD 1990: 78-79). The gap between responsibility and authority is clearest in areas such as Southern California were single issue boards are attempting to operate in a political environment of many small local authorities (DeGrove 1991). The 1990 European Communities Green Paper identifies an interconnected approach:

"Metropolitan authorities must undertake policies which concern the physical structure of the city (including urban planning, transport, the historical heritage and the protection and enhancement of natural areas): and policies concerned with reducing the impact of urban activities on the environment (including urban industry, waste management, energy management and water management)" (Roberts and Hunter 1991: 59-60).

While many authors focus on the need for a centralized approach to the urban environment there are those who argue for at least an element of decentralization. Their argument stated simply is that since environmental problems are created by individual actions they must, at
some point, be addressed at the level of the individual. The slogan of "Think globally act locally" comes to mind. The first step in this process is education to raise the general level of environmental awareness. The second step is to address the problems either by altering (lessening) our consumption habits or by finding alternative methods and materials. In both cases the actual change must occur where people live their everyday lives. This in turn requires at the very least deconcentration of responsibility down to the local level. In his opening address to the European Workshop on "Cities and the Global Environment" held in The Hague in December 1990 René Vlaanderen, that city's Alderman for the Environment, elaborated on the need to involve people and local communities in addressing these critical issues in a decentralized fashion (European Foundation, publication, 1992). The basic argument in favour of this approach seemed to be the willingness of people to get involved with small scale projects (such as composting) and to alter their consumption habits. In addition the acceptance (in terms of not being vandalized) of urban reforestation and stream enhancement was dependant on the perception that these were local initiatives and not impositions of the state.

This theme of legitimation of environmental projects in cities was also examined by Peggy Wireman. As part of her study on neighborhoods, networks and families she examined the Federal Urban Gardening Program in the United States. Although her primary interest was to show the gardening program's utility "for strengthening the social fabric of neighbourhoods" (Wireman 1984: 84-85) her study also showed the ability of city dwellers to affect their environment¹⁸.

¹⁸ In 1981 there were 175,000 gardeners involved in the program
No longer is the management of the urban environment only considered in terms of local amenity. Increasingly it is being seen as the very basis of urban life and as a fundamental part of that most basic feature, the economy of the city.

3.2 Economic Considerations

As previously mentioned many of the arguments in favour of increasing centralized control over urban functions lie in the economic field. In an increasingly market driven global economic environment every avenue for improving the efficiency of existing urban services must be explored, if an urban region is to maintain or enhance its position. This rationalization extends beyond the obvious improvements to physical infrastructure to include the entire spectrum of publicly provided services and the bureaucratic regulation of public and private economic activity.

By now the emergence of a post-industrial service-based economy is well accepted. Service-providing firms have locational preferences which are worthy of consideration in the centralization-decentralization debate. The most easily observable characteristic of service firms is their tendency of clustering in a single location within an urban region (Ley and Hutton 1991). These firms are attracted by proximity to each other and to ancillary services such as the hospitality sector as well as linkages to transportation and communication facilities. Once a Central Business District is established it is not easily displaced.

The two factors which may influence this situation are differences in municipal tax rates and the level of services provided with these taxes.
Particularly significant is the quality and stability of the local workforce (strongly related to social factors favouring centralization, see below), the quality of the local environment and of course the level and cost of basic services (water, power, transport, waste disposal, fire-and-police protection).

In an age of austerity in which transfers from senior governments are declining and the taxpayer is already heavily burdened, urban authorities are faced with a choice between cutting services or finding ways of doing more with less. One method of achieving the latter is to maximize the use of physical and staff resources by reducing unnecessary duplication (realizing economies of scale). In terms of physical facilities (water and sewerage networks, highways and bridges) these have in many cases long ago been centralized in metropolitan-wide authorities. However, by placing all of these bodies under a single authority it is claimed that further savings may be realized (Barlow 1991). One example given by a proponent of metro schemes concerns traffic management. Area-wide traffic congestion can be addressed not only through infrastructure improvements and alterations to the modes of transportation (modal split), but must in the end include an element of "positive planning"19 in determining land use. This sort of long term, strategic thinking can only come from a body considering the entire urban field (Norton 1985: 258). Once again Los Angeles is offered as evidence for the impossibility of continuing a trend manner of planning. The estimated cost of maintaining the road network in that sprawling

19 Defined as planning where the planning authority or body sets out actual goals and purposes for the pattern of development and for the structure of the city or urban region. This theme emerges from Peter Self's work, The Role and Limitations of Metro Government in Positive Urban Planning, 1987.
agglomeration will require $110 billion over the next two decades\textsuperscript{20}. Clearly what is called for (and is emerging) is a fundamental change in urban managerial institutions to reflect and respond to the pressing economic realities.

Having a single authority responsible for providing basic services has another related benefit. It simplifies the regulatory environment for all concerned. This not only reduces the number of bureaucrats needed to implement regulations but should shorten permit application times as well. The reduction in paper pushing occupations need not result in a drop in public sector employment. Anton (1975) argues that instead, it will allow for an institutional reorganization. Jurisdictions which formerly could not afford the luxury of specialized staff would have this ability in a rationalized metropolitan bureaucracy.

Yet another benefit which should result from unification into a single metropolitan authority would be the elimination of often cut-throat competition between municipalities in their efforts to attract investment. Similarly, the need for "weaker" jurisdictions to accept unpopular developments because of economic necessity would be greatly lessened. In addition, the taxation benefits from investment in one part of the metropolis would be spread more evenly throughout the area.

In his examination of the role of metro government in positive planning, Peter Self links the economic efficiency arguments to social equity. Clearly from an economic perspective a certain degree of social stability is necessary for investor confidence. In so far as urban social peace is a product of equal access to opportunities and services,

centralization can be said to benefit the economic climate. The theme of equity will be discussed further in section 3.3.

Although the urban economy seems to benefit generally from centralization, there are a number of economic arguments which provide a rationale for increasing decentralization even in this area. One of the most persuasive of these is a 1987 study on the management and financing of urban services commissioned by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors of this report advance the view that "urban service provision can be made more efficient and effective through the implementation of appropriate decentralisation (sic) policies". A decentralized provision of services, it is argued, "encourages and facilitates variations in the supply of and demand for urban services due to differences in the physical structure of areas, characteristics of residents, economic resources and patterns of growth and change in the community" (OECD 1987: 19). Among the examples given, the cities of Amsterdam and Oslo stand out as having benefitted economically from decentralization of urban management. The authors also claim that decentralization may encourage greater use of local resources to finance, at least in part, urban services. Mobilizing local resources could involve the re-use of vacant or derelict land for parks, playgrounds or other activities both to improve the quality of the local environment and to attract business activity. For example, in their study of Community Development Corporations in Pittsburgh Lurcott and Downing (1987) state that more than 60 million dollars in private investment had been attracted to inner city neighborhoods over a six year period. Decentralization of urban service provision\textsuperscript{21} could also result in

\textsuperscript{21} There is little consistency in the literature. Whereas the OECD study
an expansion of human resources brought out into the public (voluntary) sector, as residents gain a feeling of local ownership.\textsuperscript{22}

### 3.3 Social Considerations

Unlike the views expressed by Peter Self in Section 3.2, many economists consider equitable access to public services and economic efficiency in conflictual terms. Any increase in one must lead to a decrease in the other. From this point of departure authors such as Arthur Okun try to arrive at the "ideal" balance point between these polar opposites. Implicit in many of these works is the notion that equity is enhanced by decentralization and efficiency increased through greater centralization.

Some social scientists take a different path. Basing themselves primarily though not exclusively on the American experience these writers examine the anti-centralist trend in urban America. One conclusion is that the promotion of local democracy through the incorporation of neighborhood sized (5-15,000 people) municipalities within metropolitan areas is in fact a cover for greedy (and short sighted) self defense (Weiher 1991), a mechanism whereby suburbs protect their richer tax base from the demands of poorer inner cities. A study based on the 1970 American census found that metropolitan structure, particularly the correspondence of economic inequalities with jurisdictional

\textsuperscript{22} This theme is well developed by Nachman and Cohen (1989) who approach the issue of volunteer recruitment from a social work perspective and by Lurcott and Downing (1987) using a community economic development argument.
boundaries, was one of the primary factors responsible for variations in rates of urban criminal violence. The authors of this study conclude that rates of inter-personal violence between strangers further increased in areas where racial or ethnic divisions also existed between jurisdictions (Blau & Blau 1982). Douglas Yates, an early critic of decentralization in the U.S., decries the trend toward neighborhood institutions as "a betrayal of integration and the merit system in urban government". He further argued that decentralization would produce racism and arbitrary rule (Yates 1973: 3).

Clearly the existence of wildly differing levels of public services within a metropolitan area will quickly lead to social unrest. The erection and maintenance of municipal boundaries may be a defense mechanism but it is not particularly effective as the "invasion" of suburbs in the L.A. riots of 1992 attest. A desire to be "a more integrated and tolerant society cannot be successful while metropolitan areas remain spatially fractured and politically fragmented (Weiher 1991: 195).

However, the social health of urban residents is not based solely on equitable access to public services. In large measure it is a result of the degree to which people feel that they have something in common. At this point the terms social health and healthy communities often become intertwined. An example of this etymological intersection appears in Boothroyd and Eberle's discussion of healthy communities. They define these as:

"...a community in which all organisations from informal groups to governments are working effectively together to improve the quality of all people's lives." (Boothroyd and Eberle 1990: 7)
Their quite reasonable assertion is that without healthy communities there cannot be healthy societies and vice versa. Their examination of healthy communities is process oriented and does not describe in any great detail the scale of organizational or functional divisions. According to these authors healthy true communities are small (i.e. <1000 people) scale (Boothroyd and Eberle 1990: 6).

Social psychologists such as Galster and Hesser also acknowledge the crucial role that local neighborhoods play in urban social health. These particular authors assert that:

"...there are certain physical and social features of neighbourhoods which people generally need or to which they aspire and that people cannot adapt to the absence of these features" (Galster and Hesser 1981: 748).

Some of the social features include the socialization\(^{23}\) of children and the provision of personal support networks among neighbors (Wireman 1984). The development of these primary relationships can occur at the scale of neighborhoods it does not naturally occur at larger scales (Rohe and Gates 1985).

Beyond these immediate functions, neighborhoods provide a local frame of reference and a supportive environment from which individuals and groups may interact with society at large. Both aspects serve to increase the integration of participants into larger society. Many social theorists feel that neighborhood organizations provide this necessary link between the individual and the state\(^{24}\). This role is especially critical to

\(^{23}\) Webster's Dictionary defines socialization as "to adapt, as oneself or others, to the common needs of a social group".

\(^{24}\) See for example the discussion based on Durkheim in Chapter 3 of Rohe and Gates Planning with Neighborhoods.
members of minorities who would otherwise remain marginalized (Wireman 1984: 34).

In addition to promoting individuals' sense of belonging and social support networks it may also be inferred that strengthening of neighborhoods through decentralization will enhance as well the social control functions that these communities perform (Warren 1962). Normative constraints of adult behavior to maintain local customs may be rather benign. However, in some authoritarian states (e.g. China) neighborhood associations are in part used as agents of state control (Edgington 1986).

Sensitivity to the importance of neighborhoods led sociologists and later some planners to seek ways of strengthening local communities. Initially this included rudimentary decentralization through deconcentration of municipal bureaucracies. The so-called neighborhood city halls which emerged were in fact no more than field offices of the central bureaucracy and had little impact on neighborhood development (Smith 1985: 174). Another expression of this trend was neighborhood planning (Fainstein 1987). Since the rationale for local area planning was largely political in nature it will be discussed further in Section 3.4.

3.4 Political Considerations

The word political originally referred to the structure and activities of city government. As urban development spread beyond city limits, the original, close link between political and urban life was eroded. Thus, a situation emerged wherein cities with jurisdictions over portions of

25 Websters Dictionary gives the Greek word \textit{polis}, meaning city, as the ultimate root. A closely related word is \textit{polity}, from the Greek word \textit{politeta}, pertaining to the form of \textit{government}. 
metropolitan areas could no longer manage urban affairs effectively. Following a lengthy examination of the decline in cities' ability to plan effectively, Peter Self concludes that local government reform is necessary (Self 1982: 61). In Planning the Urban Region he advocates the adoption of a "metro scheme" whereby an overall public authority is set up for the entire urban area. He advanced this course because the simple expansion of major city boundaries was seen as politically impractical and democratically undesirable. The political impracticality stemmed from the resistance of municipal residents, bureaucrats and politicians to amalgamation and their resultant loss of influence and employment.

More recent observers of the urban scene (notably Barlow 1991) acknowledge the political opposition to metropolitan centralization in the post-war era. However, they note that it is precisely in those jurisdictions which tackled this contentious issue that relatively successful examples of metropolitan reorganization may be encountered. Barlow offers Toronto and London as positive examples of metro schemes involving a reduction of municipalities. He gives San Francisco as an example of the resulting failure of metropolitanization if this difficult step is avoided.

Another argument in favour of increasing centralization in urban areas concerns the relationship between local and central governments. In a conversation recorded in 1987, Self argued that metropolitan government is a stronger advocate of local concerns than are individual municipalities. In some cases such strength can become a source of fear. Indeed, this is given as the real reason for the abolition of the Greater London Council by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in 1986 (Flynn et al 1985, Young and Grayson 1988)26.

---

26 Even in some areas where the metropolitan authority could not be
However, if local government remains fragmented, then the responsibility for dealing with broader urban problems passes inescapably to central or state governments. This result seems to represent a failure of democratic accountability as traditionally understood. "The democratic argument for a metro authority remains logical and strong, provided it corresponds to a genuine arena of common problems and interests" (Self 1982: 66).

Alan Norton gives a similar argument in his rationale for the centralization of political functions. He does stipulate that for such a body to speak with democratic authority it must be a representative government, democratically elected. He sees the alternatives to centralization as either the loss of local control to central government or the proliferation of unelected single function boards (Norton 1985: 261). This concern with maintaining local control over urban areas is the same argument given by those who advocate greater decentralization of urban management.

Within modern political thought there are two streams that stand out as strongly favouring municipal decentralization. The first sees decentralization as a mechanism of increasing public participation in civic affairs. Proponents of this view are heirs to the long-standing radical democratic belief that representative government is inferior to participatory democracy. Adherents of this theory hold that "the term local democracy can hardly be applied to municipal authorities where a
described as a government senior governments have viewed them as competitors. Take for example the emasculation of the Greater Vancouver Regional District under the Social Credit government in the early 1980s.

27 In representative democracy citizen participation is occasional, through the ballot box or through the ability to petition politicians; in participatory government decisions are made directly by the citizenry.
hundred councillors represent a million people" (Sharpe 1979: 83). Instead, they argue for neighborhood self-government in urban equivalents of the New England town halls (Barber 1984: 261). This government by the people results in increased trust in local decision-making according to these theorists. Failure to include citizens in active participation in planning decisions that affect the quality of neighborhood life will "lead to further deterioration and concentration of the poor, as those with the means to move to other locations do so" (Rohe and Gates: 192).

Susskind and Elliott summarize the impact of increasing citizen involvement in government decision making. They claim that it leads to: (quote) 1) democratization of choices involving resource allocation, 2) decentralization of service systems management, 3) deprofessionalization of bureaucratic judgements that affect the lives of residents, and 4) demystification of design and investment decisions (Susskind and Elliott 1983: 3). In his 1985 work, Brian Smith refers to a number of explicitly political outcomes of decentralization. Among these are the fostering of a politically educated citizenry, practical training for future national leaders, political equality and closer scrutiny (accountability) over government (Smith 1985: 20-27).

The second major theoretical school in favour of decentralization represents the neo-conservatives28. Simply put they believe that less government is better government. Thus, they favour the privatization of many local government functions. Barring this most extreme form of decentralization, they advocate delegation of functions to smaller

28 This school, the so-called "Virginia School" is discussed by Warren Magnusson in his 1979 essay "The New Neighbourhood Democracy: Anglo-American Experience in Historical Perspective."
jurisdictions as a means of fragmenting and thereby reducing the power of governments.

Other motivations for decentralization which emerge in the literature can best be described as originating in practical municipal management. Municipal bureaucrats and politicians saw decentralization as a means of blunting the urban unrest of the 1960s\(^\text{29}\) (Bealey 1988: 107). Thus, community organizations were seen as "flak catchers" to deflect popular demands and enmesh local citizens in participatory activities (Fainstein 1987: 385).

A more generous appraisal of why some municipalities support decentralization is offered by R.S. Oropesa in a study of neighborhood improvement associations in Seattle and Bellevue. The author argues in his case studies that government officials had a genuine desire to educate the public and improve the lines of communication (Oropesa 1989: 740-41). Involving members of the public in city affairs can be a trust building mechanism as well as providing an appreciation of constraints on local resources (Morlan 1982: 439). In cities with several hundred thousand inhabitants the lines of communication are simply too long for effective action (Smith 1985: 202).

Local citizen groups have emerged as powerful actors on the urban stage with or without formal decentralization (Nanetti 1985: 115). If these groups remain outside the formal decision-making circles then municipal activities will be characterized by still more confrontation and obstruction than at present. Municipal decentralization may be a way of drawing defensive ("NIMBY")\(^\text{30}\) minded local groups into formal, working

\(^{29}\) This was city governments' rationale for the "neighborhood city halls" mentioned in Section 3.3.

\(^{30}\) The "Not In My Backyard" phenomena which is essentially a rejection
partnerships with urban authorities. As Linda Stamato states in her study of community organizations and siting controversies:

"Much of the negative community posture evident in siting controversies stems from fear, outrage and resistance to change. But it also reflects the absence of a means for the community to exercise power responsibly, creatively, and constructively. With training and support, community organizations can fill that void." (Stamato 1991: 144)

The nature of this relationship between local, neighborhood organizations and central, urban authorities forms part of the discussion in the concluding section of this chapter.

3.5 Synthesis

The preceding sections have presented the theoretical (and to some extent practical) considerations for centralization or decentralization within each of the four functional areas of urban management. In the current section these arguments are summarized and a preliminary conclusion regarding the structural division of urban management is offered. This division acknowledges the critical importance of safeguarding the environment and tries to balance the need for economic efficiency, the desire for social equity and the wish to strengthen community.

3.5.1 Environment

In terms of the urban environment three main considerations emerge. The first is that existing patterns of urban settlement are behind much of the environmental degradation. The only way to deal with this
problem of urban sprawl effectively is through regional land-use planning. The closely related responsibility of traffic management must also be considered (at least in part) at a regional level. In a similar vein, the mobile elements of air and water must, by their nature, be managed on a regional basis.

The second major conclusion is that regional authorities must have the ability to enforce environmental standards and to direct development through regional zoning and traffic management.

The final point which emerges from the literature is the need to engage citizens in environmental action at the street level. This means getting people involved in small scale projects and providing local encouragement to change consumption habits. If nothing else individuals and neighborhoods must become custodians of centrally initiated programs such as urban reforestation and stream and shore enhancement. Ironically the solution to the problem of waste (both solid and liquid) may lie within the cumulative choices of households and not in the large scale techno-fixes traditionally tried.

Thus, in the realm of the environment there is a pressing need for centralization of responsibilities in area wide authorities. Yet, at the same time there must be some decentralization in the form of small scale projects to help build an informed constituency for environmental change.

3.5.2 Economy

There are a number of economic arguments favouring centralization of urban management functions. These have become urgent in an era

31 This represents the familiar triangle of work, residence and the transportation link between them.
where the provision of basic infrastructure and services is falling increasingly on local authorities alone. Many of the arguments for centralizing urban functions in a metropolitan body derive from the cost-savings and improvements in efficiency realized through creating economies of scale. At its simplest level this entails construction and maintenance of physical facilities for the provision of basic services across the entire urban area.

Other considerations focus on the reduction in bureaucratic regulation of economic activity through elimination of unnecessary duplication. This serves a dual purpose of simplifying the regulatory environment (thereby removing an impediment to investment) and freeing up staff budgets to focus on specialized tasks.

Centralization also allows metropolitan areas to focus their attention on competition with other urban areas. This is accomplished by eliminating the opportunity for firms to play municipalities against each other. Finally, centralization serves the cause of social equity. This, in turn, reduces the basis for civil strife, thereby increasing investor confidence.

In terms of decentralization there are two main economic arguments. The first involves the improvements in efficiency of social service provision. A decentralized approach allows for the different nuances characterizing communities and residents to be recognized by service providers. By making use of local knowledge, existing services are brought to bear more accurately where there is a need. This knowledge of local conditions is gained either by placing professionals in the community or delegating authority to existing organisations. In both cases latent physical resources can be mobilized.
The second argument points out that decentralization draws people's savings and energies into the public sphere. This is accomplished through an increased sense of ownership of their community.

Thus, in the economic sphere there are clear benefits to a division of functions between a central metropolitan authority and various local authorities. While the former would be responsible for providing basic services and unified regulatory procedures the latter would be charged with the responsibility for providing human services.

### 3.5.3 Society

Among the four categories of arguments for moving the balance between central and local authorities no group is more difficult to reconcile than that of the social considerations. This is because the social arguments for centralization and decentralization are based on mutually hostile views of what forms the basis of society.

The argument for centralization is predicated on the contention that society is best served by the free association of individuals. In this light the removal of jurisdictional barriers will foster a more integrated society in which individuals will be judged solely on merit. Centralization removes one of the bases (geographical) for discrimination within a metropolitan area.

The social arguments for decentralization are similarly predicated on a particular view of society. Namely, that society is composed of two levels, individuals and collectivities; and that, the intermediary structures are critical to the well-being of both individuals and society as a whole. Decentralization to local organizations serves to strengthen areal based
communities and thereby contributes to a healthy society.

An additional argument for decentralization concerns the role that local organizations play in directing behaviour. By delegating responsibility for limiting some common forms of deviant behaviour, more use may be made of normative rather than coercive controls.

There are benefits to maintaining metropolitan wide standards concerning the rights of individuals. Thus, any area wide authority would have a watchdog" function. However, urban social health would benefit profoundly from the recognition and enhancement of neighborhood organizations. This would be realized through widespread decentralization of human service provision and transfer of appropriate decision making powers.

### 3.5.4 Politics

The political arguments for increasing centralization or decentralization are less controversial than the social considerations since the former are all rooted in the same democratic principles. Centralists see representative democracy as a practical necessity when dealing with large numbers of citizens; while decentralists seek to institute a "purer" form of democracy with more active and frequent public involvement.

Arguments favouring political centralization in urban areas spring from a desire to improve the ability to arrive at and implement decisions. In large, politically fragmented, urban areas it is extremely difficult to reach a consensus on a course of action and on methods of implementing policies for addressing common issues in a timely fashion. Also, political centralization is favoured because in its dealings with senior governments
a unified metropolitan voice is considered louder than a chorus of constituent municipalities.

There are numerous benefits given for increasing political decentralization. First among these is the promotion of participatory democracy which is said to result from the creation of smaller political units. Bringing government closer to the people also serves to improve the flow of information to citizens regarding the design of public policies and investment decisions. In many cities the current distrust of professional government has reached a point where even routine activities are resisted. Decentralization is seen as one way to overcome the suspicion of the citizenry.

Political centralization is required to better deal with metropolitan-wide events and issues. Such an authority is also well placed to push the interests of an urban area with senior governments. Political decentralization strengthens the fundamental bond between government and the governed. This critical, consentual relationship forms the basis for any true democracy.

In summary, the review of the theoretical literature does not provide an overall clear preference for greater centralization or decentralization. A certain dichotomy appears with environmental and economic functions benefitting from centralization and social and political functions benefitting from decentralization.

In the following chapter we will examine some of the practical consequences of restructuring urban management. To this end we will consider the rationale for and assess the impacts of alterations in the functional balance between a central authority and local communities.
CHAPTER 4

Neighborhood Self Management in Jerusalem: A Case Study

4.1 Setting the Stage

The Neighborhood Self-Management Project (NSMP) in Jerusalem emerged as a municipal pilot program in 1980. Although described by some as an "experiment" (Hasson 1989) it was no whimsical undertaking. It represented and still represents a serious attempt at reconciling the centralizing demands of urban life in a developed country with the presence of large, extremely diverse and long established communities in this ancient city. To fully understand this dialectic it is necessary to briefly review the more recent history of Jerusalem prior to 1967 and to describe in some detail the relationship between central and local government in Israel.

4.1.1 Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Jerusalem was at one of the lowest ebbs in its long history (Romann & Weingrod 1991: 13). Enclosed within its sixteenth century walls, its inhabitants numbered fewer than ten thousand. The city was divided into four unequal Quarters: Moslem, Christian, Armenian and Jewish. Approximately half of the total population were Moslems living in the largest quarter adjacent to the Temple Mount. The different Christian communities numbered some 2,700 in total. The Jews, numbering fewer than 2,500 were almost exclusively Sepharadim, descendants of fifteenth century exiles from the Iberian peninsula (Halper 1991: 7). The Jewish Quarter was tiny, just 32 acres. Consequently, overcrowding became a severe problem as the

32 The Old City was (remains) 215 acres in total. Of this the Moslem
Jewish population began its rapid increase in the mid-nineteenth century.

The city was administered from Acre the regional capital of an Ottoman *pashalik* (district) which included most of present day Israel. However, each community (*millet*) was left to manage its own internal affairs (Tsimhoni 1986). Besides the security provided by the city's wall and small Turkish garrison there were no local services offered. The extensive water works which had supplied the city two millennia earlier had long since crumbled. As a result each home or group of homes was responsible for collecting its own water in pools and cisterns fed by the winter rains. Unfortunately, this standing water provided the breeding places for the malarial mosquitoes which plagued the city until well into the 20th Century. As there was no provision for liquid or solid waste, cholera and other water-borne diseases were also endemic.

Jerusalem circa 1800 was almost entirely a consumer city. Lacking a productive hinterland and not being on any natural trade-routes the economy was based on the city's heritage. Religious tourism, especially the Easter pilgrimage was critical to the city's Christian and Moslem communities. Since study was the focus of Jewish life in Jerusalem while productive labor was actively discouraged by the rabbinic authorities, the Jewish population relied on a tenuous welfare system (*halukah*). It saw funds raised in communities overseas and distributed based on the country of origin of the recipients. Moslems, under no such restrictions,

---

Quarter is 75, the Christian Quarter 44 and the Armenian Quarter 30 acres in area. The non-residential Temple Mount is 33 acres in area.

33 The communities of religious Jews who had always inhabited Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safad were collectively known as the Old Yishuv (Settlement) in contrast with the Zionist communities which were referred to as the New Yishuv.
were active as merchants and as skilled labor. So remote and unimportant was Jerusalem that during the French invasion of Egypt and the Levant in 1799, Napoleon made no effort to approach the city. Instead Jerusalem's entry into the modern age came gradually.

There were three primary factors responsible for Jerusalem's growth in the first half of the nineteenth century: The decrepit state of the Turkish Empire, competition among European imperial powers and population growth through natural increase and immigration (Ben-Arieh 1976: 74)34. Most important of these was the weakness of the Ottoman Empire without which the other two factors could not have come into play.

Following European intervention in its favor, first against Egyptian rebels in 1840 and again during the Crimean War (1854-1856), the Turkish regime passed legislation making it possible for citizens of other countries to buy land outside of the Old City of Jerusalem. By the 1870s the European powers had established a plethora of institutions to serve their own visiting nationals and also their respective local client communities35. Ironically, the most imposing of these was the compound built by the Russians in 1860. It was capable of accommodating a thousand pilgrims at a time.

However, for the residents of Jerusalem the mission schools established in the 1840s and 1850s and hospitals such as The English Hospital (1844), the Leper's Hospital and Schneller Orphanage (1860)

34 For an extensive exploration of the dynamic between these factors see Ruth Kark's Jerusalem's Neighborhoods 1991.
35 Different European powers took advantage of the Millet system by extending their "protection" over recognized local groups. In addition English and German Protestants sought to gain converts from the Jewish and Orthodox Christian communities.
established by British and German Protestants had a more lasting impact. The Catholic Powers also contributed facilities such as the Austrian Hospice (1853) and Hospital of St. Louis (1887).

Jewish building initiatives in this period focussed on residential construction. Thus, Mishkenot She'ananim, the first Jewish neighborhood outside the city walls was begun in 1857 and Batei Mahase (houses for the indigent) was built in 1865. Both of these projects were funded by overseas donations. Indeed between 1850 and 1917 more than a third of the new Jewish neighborhoods were established through philanthropic initiative. A further 27% were constructed by building societies, while the remainder were commercial and private projects (Kark 1991).

Jewish neighborhoods from this era housed small groups of families whose lives centered on a study hall, synagogue and ritual bath. These neighborhoods had two built forms. The quarters erected up to the 1890s were built in the form of a walled neighborhood with gates that could be locked. Thereafter, collective apartment blocks of two and three stories predominated (Amiran 1973: 31). In both cases neighborhood affairs were administered by a single committee or several committees, selected through direct and secret balloting to terms of office lasting from one to three years. The committees' spheres of activity included neighborhood planning; construction; allocation of housing; and the level of rents. The committees also enforced neighborhood by-laws, kept up the water cisterns and public lavatories, removed garbage, ensured that private and public areas were lit at night36 and the gates guarded (Kark 1991: 88).

36 In 1905 the Jerusalem Municipality took on the responsibility for street lighting (Kark 1991).
Although there was some Jewish institutional construction during this period (i.e. the Hurva Synagogue 1863); it was limited to the Old City.

Lacking comparable access to foreign capital there was little physical expansion of the Moslem Quarter. However, by the 1870s a few wealthy Moslem families had begun building private homes outside of the Old City (Kark 1991: 38). These clan-based clusters of houses formed the nuclei of many of today's Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

As modern standards of hygiene were gradually introduced, death rates began to fall. This had a most marked effect on the Jewish population. Before the nineteenth century the continual stream of immigrants had been cancelled out by the extremely high death rates prevalent in Jerusalem. Between 1800 and 1870 the general population more than doubled, reaching 22,000. In the same period the Jewish population grew five-fold from 2,250 to 11,000. For the first time in centuries Jews formed a majority of Jerusalem's residents (for later population growth see Figure 1).

The schools which were established in this period had a profound impact on local life. Rising to the challenge presented by the Protestant missionary schools, Western European Jewish philanthropists established a number of schools which emphasized technical training, European languages, Math and Science. These schools were the vehicle which revolutionized the Old Yishuv (see footnote 32) from within.

Through this period Ottoman officials were becoming increasingly alarmed at the penetration of European influence and the growing autonomy of their client communities in Jerusalem. Hoping to stem this trend they re-defined the city as a separate jurisdiction and appointed a highly nationalistic governor to the city in 1857. In 1867 the Turkish
government took a further step by granting municipal status to Jerusalem in order to mobilize the local Moslem Arab community against the foreign "invasion". This status made Jerusalem unique outside of the Imperial capital, Istanbul. The mayor was a local Moslem appointed by the governor. In addition to the mayor, the council consisted of six Moslems, two Christians and two Jews, all of whom were Turkish subjects.

On the eve of World War One, Jerusalem was bustling with a population of 75,000. Its economy, still based on the twin pillars of pilgrimage and financial contributions from abroad, benefitted from the capital accompanying Jewish immigrants. With the outbreak of war in 1914, all three sources of income dried up. The Jews and part of the Christian community were more dependent on their foreign connections than the Moslems and consequently suffered more from these changes. In three years the overall population dropped by a third. The Jewish community declined through expulsions, starvation and epidemic disease from 48,000 to 26,000 (Lieber 1987: 168). This trauma finally forced the remnants of the Old Yishuv into the modern era.

4.1.2 Jerusalem During the British Mandate

In 1917 British Forces entered Jerusalem, ending four centuries of Ottoman rule. The British military administration immediately took steps to alleviate the grave situation. While the food supply was ensured with grain from Egypt, the water cisterns were emptied, cleaned and equipped with covers and pumps. Subsequently, a water pipeline was laid from springs near Hebron in 1919. The results of these measures came quickly. For example, the incidence of fatal cases of malaria dropped from 113 in 1918 to 5 in 1922 (Amiran 1973: 29).
In 1920 the military government was replaced by a British civil administration and in 1922 the British Mandate for Palestine (encompassing present day Israel, the "West Bank" and Gaza District) was formally adopted by the League of Nations. In that year, the first modern census taken in the Mandate area showed a total population of 764,000. Jerusalem, then with 62,700 residents, was its largest city. A period of prosperity followed with the renewal of immigration from Europe and influx of British and Jewish capital. The Mandatory Government began modernizing the city's infrastructure. One example being the airfield, established at Kalandia to the North of the city near the Jewish agricultural settlements of Atarot and Neve Ya'akov. Access to a reliable supply of electricity was ensured in 1928\(^3\). Jerusalem's role as the country's capital was further reinforced when the various Zionist organizations established their headquarters there\(^3\). The decade also saw the opening of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (planned by Patrick Geddes), the Hadassah Hospital, John D. Rockefeller Museum and the American Y.M.C.A. In 1931, construction of the luxurious King David Hotel was completed.

The Census of 1931 showed that the municipal population had swelled to 90,500. A further 2,600 dwelled in suburbs outside the city limits. Amongst the three communities in Jerusalem there was little difference in terms of median age and birth and death rates\(^3\). However

\(^{37}\) The disparity in modern services between Jerusalem and other large cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv was only closed after the Second World War. In 1939, for example, Jerusalem had 9 % of the country's population but consumed only 2 % of the electricity (Lieber 1987: 171). Water consumption was still half the national average as late as 1968 (Amiran 1973: 35).

\(^{38}\) The most striking of these was the Jewish Agency compound built in 1929 in Rehavia.

\(^{39}\) In 1931 the respective birth and death rates per thousand were 36
the disparity in literacy rates was considerable. 77% of Jews and 72% of Christians were literate; while only 33% of Moslems could read and write (Schmelz 1987: 36). The Census also revealed that there were 658 "industrial" establishments in the city, which however employed only 3,316 persons (Lieber 1987: 170). Thus, economically Jerusalem remained a service oriented, consumer city.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>62,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>19,900</td>
<td>19,300</td>
<td>93,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>99,300</td>
<td>33,700</td>
<td>31,300</td>
<td>164,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Including Suburbs  
b) Including Druze, Bahai and Others

Source: U. Schmelz, Modern Jerusalem's Demographic Evolution Table 2, p. 28.

With regard to spatial development, two main tendencies characterize the Mandatory period. The first was the increase of built up area, in line with the growth in population. This was achieved by filling-in vacant patches between neighborhoods built during the close of the Ottoman period; and by extending the urban fringe to the South and West. As a consequence of the latter, several Jewish garden suburbs (e.g. and 14 for Jews; 42 and 20 for Moslems and 30 and 13 for Christians. The profile for Christians is somewhat misleading as it included large numbers of ecclesiastical workers and British personnel.
Beit HaKerem) sprang up outside the then municipal boundaries. Within these new neighborhoods a new form of housing appeared in the 1930s. Architects belonging to the Histadrut (see Chapter 2) Planning Institute erected workers' cooperative housing in the new neighborhood of Rehavia. The Jerusalem architects who built these residences saw the traditional residential form in Jerusalem as a negative example. Although, their design maintained the common enclosed yards they redesigned the entranceways to give each family greater privacy (Graicer 1989: 297).

The second tendency in spatial development was continued residential separation between religious groups. The disturbances of 1929 and 1936-1939 further intensified this tendency (Schmelz 1987: 37).

During the British Mandate there was a modest expansion in local authority and responsibility for services. Appointed municipal councils were replaced with elected bodies. These councils were charged with administering local services such as sanitation, lighting and road maintenance. Building and town-planning were regulated by a statutory committee composed of municipal councillors and British officials; i.e. the District Engineer, Medical Officer and District Commissioner (Bentwich 1932: 242). Property owning Palestinian citizens were eligible to vote and run for office in local elections. Mayors (who alone received a salary) were appointed by the Governor from amongst the elected councillors. In mixed cities such as Jerusalem, voters cast ballots for communal representatives (Jewish, Moslem, Christian). The composition of the Jerusalem City Council was fixed at six Jews, four Moslems (including the mayor) and two Christians (Benvenisti 1976). The council thus constructed proved unable to function as Christian and Moslem
councillors voted in a bloc balancing the Jewish plurality. Consequently, by 1945 Jerusalem was being run entirely by British officials (Prittie 1987: 172).

As the Mandate deteriorated into violence and repression by the authorities, municipal affairs ground to a halt. Beginning in November 1947 the British began abandoning Jerusalem and by the spring of 1948, the city was split into Jewish West Jerusalem and Arab East Jerusalem. With the Declaration of Independence in May 1948 West Jerusalem became the capital of the State of Israel. The Bedouin, Arab Legion from TransJordan invaded and occupied territory of the former Mandate, including Arab East Jerusalem. The city remained divided by a hostile border for 19 years.

4.1.3 Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967

In 1948 Israel inherited the structures of a unitary state. Yet, organically it was a "compound of communities" (Elazar and Kalkheim 1988:xxix) and a "nation of neighborhoods" (King et al 1987). Indeed the New Yishuv was created out of a series of local communities which were only subsequently formed into a country-wide community and still later into a state. These modern settlements were founded by cultural and ideological groups during the Ottoman and British regimes. Some such as the Kibbutzim and Moshavim later formed federations of like minded communities. Others, particularly neighborhoods which formed the nuclei of cities were settled by distinct groups based on area of origin and/or level of adherence to orthodox Judaism. These neighborhoods gradually coalesced into cities and towns. The historical development of Jerusalem differs from this urban "norm" in two regards. Firstly,
Jerusalem had been continuously inhabited for centuries. Thus, it inherited an existing built form. Secondly, the city is home to large autonomous communities (both Jewish and non-Jewish) which pre-date the efforts of modern Jewish nationalism (see Chapter 2 Section 2). Many, such as Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, felt that modern, centralized state structures and services would soon replace these traditional modes of living. The resolution of these two world views was postponed first by war and then by an influx of refugees.

At the end of hostilities in 1949 Jerusalem was a shambles. For,

---

**Figure 1**

*Population Growth of Jerusalem 1900-1990*  

![Population Growth of Jerusalem 1900-1990](chart.png)

---

* Within Current (1990) Municipal Boundaries

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, various years.
unlike earlier wars, this time the communities of the city fought against each other, tearing the metropolitan fabric asunder. Within the city limits there was a population transfer with some 20,000 Arabs abandoning their homes in West Jerusalem and 4,000 Jews leaving their homes behind in the East.

Recovery from the war's upheaval was very different in the two sectors of Jerusalem. The differences in socio-economic status that had long existed between the two national communities were further exacerbated by the jurisdictional imbalance which emerged. The western sector becoming the capital of a sovereign and rapidly developing nation; while the eastern sector became a provincial town on the periphery of the then nominally independent state of Jordan.

By 1961 the population of West Jerusalem had reached 165,000 in an area of 38 km². Despite the enormous growth in population, West Jerusalem in this period remained "a mosaic of neighborhoods, each possessing a clearly defined character, way of life and communal composition" (Benvenisti 1976: 32). It was this patchwork structure that allowed the co-existence of communities of widely differing social, economic and religious ways. The older Jewish quarters maintained their pre-State character, while the abandoned Arab neighborhoods were populated by refugee immigrants from a particular country of origin (ie. Moroccans in Musrara and other North Africans in Baka'a). Even the public housing projects built from the mid-1950s onwards were settled by homogeneous groups (Lieber 1987: 180).

In addition to housing, the Israeli government invested heavily in institutional construction during the period of 1948-1967. A new parliament building (Knesset) and various government ministry buildings
were built in the 1960s. A large new university campus and expanded national hospital were also built replacing those now inaccessible in the enclave on Mount Scopus. Thus, West Jerusalem emerged as an urban center providing a wide range of services to the rest of the country.

Under the Mandate local government in Jerusalem had remained at a primitive level. The sudden withdrawal of strong, central control meant that the stabilization of municipal government in Jerusalem was "a long and painful process" (Benvenisti 1976: 33). The 21 member elected council was split into tiny factions unused to working with each other. Consequently, the central government was forced to disband several councils. It was not until 1955 that a workable coalition led by the Labour party emerged in the city. This coalition (which mirrored that at the national level) remained in power until 1965. In that year the energetic Teddy Kollek, leading a left wing splinter party, swept the Labour party from office. His campaign which for the first time focussed on purely local issues marked a watershed in the development of Jerusalem.

In contrast to the enormous development of West Jerusalem, Arab East Jerusalem under Jordanian control lagged far behind. Despite local opposition, the territory occupied by the Arab Legion was unilaterally annexed by Jordan in 1950. However, rather than encouraging redevelopment in East Jerusalem, the Jordanian government pursued a discriminatory policy against the city. With the exception of money for tourist facilities, public and private investment was directed toward the small desert capital, Amman. As a result many left East Jerusalem for...
work in Jordan or the Gulf States. Under these conditions the population of East Jerusalem did not recover its pre-1948 level until the mid-1960s. Even this "measure" is misleading as the population which left the city was replaced with migrants from rural parts of the West Bank.

Under Jordanian rule East Jerusalem's infrastructure remained rudimentary. In 1961 one quarter of the households did not have access to safe drinking water. Even more critical was the absence of a sewerage system. These two factors contributed to an infant mortality rate ten times higher in East Jerusalem than in West Jerusalem. Other areas such as education, medical services, and housing also lagged behind that of West Jerusalem (see Table 2).

In addition to the low level of public services, East Jerusalem's economy was weak. Fully half of the families were reliant on remittances from family members in the Gulf States or on the United Nations Relief Works Agency (Benvenisti 1976). Even in terms of basic education the gap between East and West Jerusalem remained.

Jordanian government decision makers continued to see Jerusalem as many of their Mandatory predecessors had. Namely, as "a city holy to Moslems and Christians" (Anglo-American Committee 1945-1947: 785). Their efforts at urban planning were aimed at preserving the Old City and its religious sites for all Moslems and Christians.

---

42 In Mandatory Palestine primary education till Grade 5 had been free. The Jordanian authorities extended this by a year.

43 This is evident from official publications such as the introduction to the 1961 Jordanian Census.

44 H. Kendall, the Director of Planning in Mandatory Jerusalem continued as the head of the Jerusalem planning panel under Jordanian rule until 1967.

45 Under Jordanian control Jewish religious sites including 56 synagogues and some 60,000 graves on the Mount of Olives had been systematically destroyed.
Restrictive controls were placed on land use within the small (6 km²) area of East Jerusalem. As a consequence residential development in this period took place largely outside of the municipal boundaries. The result was unplanned, difficult to service ribbon development along a North-South axis leading to the nearby cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem.

However, it was the unexpected loss of communal leadership⁴⁶ and the crude actions of Jordanian officials which most infuriated the local Palestinian population. In 1951 the King of Jordan was assassinated on the Temple Mount. The crackdown and martial law which followed lasted until 1957. The last ten years of Jordanian control over the Eastern sector of the city were relatively quiet, as East Jerusalem accepted its role as a secondary center. This period came to an abrupt end with the Six Day War.

Following two days of fighting in June 1967 the Jordanian army fled Jerusalem. As a result a single municipal authority was established with the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem extending its control over an area of 108 km², encompassing an urban core of 44 km² and a suburban fringe to the North and South⁴⁷. The broadly based Israeli coalition government took immediate steps to "maintain Jerusalem as a united city and the capital of Israel, with a sizable Jewish majority" (Sharkansky 1992: 18). These steps, some of which are still being implemented will form part of the discussion on neighborhood self management in Section 4.2.

---

⁴⁶ Meron Benvenisti the dovish former deputy mayor of Jerusalem chronicling the effects of the conflict in his work Jerusalem: The Torn City gives percentages of each of the leading Arab families of Jerusalem who remained in the City after 1948.

⁴⁷ The area annexed included parts or all of 28 municipalities and villages.
4.1.4 Relationship of State and Local Governments in Israel

To this day, local government in Israel includes three types of bodies: municipalities, local councils and regional councils. Municipal authority is still based on legislation enacted in the Mandatory period. Specifically, these are the Municipal Act of 1934 and the Local Councils Act of 1941. The transition from the British Mandate to independent Israeli rule in 1948 saw the transfer of responsibility for local government to the new Ministry of Interior. While this is the case in law, the reality is rather more complex. The complexity stems from the political culture of Israeli governments\(^{48}\), which makes various ministries de facto preserves of political parties which are recurring members of coalition governments\(^{49}\). In fact, there are five government ministries in Israel whose activities have significant implications for the functioning of local authorities: Interior; Education and Culture; Labor and Social Welfare; Construction and Housing; and Finance. The Ministry of Interior is formally responsible for legal, administrative and financial activities of municipalities. The Ministries of Education and Culture and Labor and Social Welfare oversee the most important social services.

The Ministry of Construction and Housing was until the 1980s the dominant force in the development of housing and new neighborhoods\(^{50}\). Urban housing initiatives are entitled to receive government land allocations and financing. The ministry was responsible

\(^{48}\) Kaicheim describes the state government as "a federation of ministries whose coordinating mechanisms are extremely loose." (Kaicheim 1988: 41).

\(^{49}\) For a comprehensive discussion of the formal and informal policy making structures which affect local government in Israel see Gertel and Law-Yone 1991: 176-179.

\(^{50}\) The percentage of public housing declined from a high of 70% of building starts in 1958 to 35% in 1985 (Alterman & Hill 1986: 128).
for project planning, design and implementation. Local input into these public developments occurs after a finalized proposal (master plan and urban design scheme) has been prepared (Maller 1991: 59).

The Ministry of Finance is a major actor in financial policy making. Other ministries such as Health and Religious Affairs are authorized to approve planning details which relate to sanitary requirements and the protection of holy sites respectively.

The services which these state ministries fund constituted 24 % of Jerusalem’s Ordinary Budget in 1989/90. A further 9 % came from the central government in the form of a general grant\(^5\). There are divergent opinions as to the impact of this financial dependency. Al-Haj and Rosenfeld (1990) use the Israel wide average of 55 % (in 1984) to buttress their contention that local government is weak and that therefore Israel is highly centralized. Arye Hecht (1988) reaches a quite different conclusion on the basis that the funds flow through state ministries which themselves operate semi-autonomously.

While there is ambivalence among academics as to the impact of state structures on local government, a trend toward decentralization does seem to be emerging. Haim Kubersky, a long-time Director-General of the Interior Ministry clearly favours decentralization or as he calls it "the gradual increase of local self-reliance" (Elazar & Kalchelm 1988: xxv) He cites the move from 29 % of local budgets being locally generated in 1979 to 50 % in 1986 as a positive indicator of this trend. Regardless of this overall shift towards financial autonomy, Jerusalem has long been less financially dependent on central government than most Israeli cities.

The restructuring of central-local government relations during the

---

\(^5\) Table 18/5 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 7 1988.
1980s in economic terms is clear. Between 1980 and 1990 state participation in Jerusalem’s budget declined from 65% to 33%. This devolution of financial responsibility has forced Jerusalem to restrict its expenditures. Indeed, in real terms spending per capita ($275 in 1980/81 and $441 in 1989/90) has slipped behind the rate of inflation. The best measure of this fact is the 30% drop in municipal employees from 7,200 to 5,000 over the decade (Statistical Yearbooks 1982, 1990).

Municipalities in Israel are governed by mayors who, since 1978, are elected directly and by councils which are elected on the basis of proportional representation. Normally, no party gains a majority in council and a coalition has to be formed. The 1989 Jerusalem municipal elections are a case in point. In that year fourteen parties contested the thirty one council positions. The "One Jerusalem" party won eleven of those seats with 36% of the vote. It formed a coalition from amongst the other seven parties which gained seats. Teddy Kollek, the incumbent mayor of Jerusalem, who heads the "One Jerusalem" party, received 59% of the votes cast for mayor, thereby, beating out the other four contenders for the post.52

The ability to vote in municipal elections in Israel is based on residency and age. All residents over the age of eighteen are eligible to vote, regardless of citizenship. Voter participation in Israeli local elections ranges from 40% in the largest centers to 90% in the smallest municipalities (Goldberg 1988: 150). In the 1989 election 42% of those eligible exercised their franchise in Jerusalem.53 Since 1967, no Arab resident of Jerusalem has run for City Council, although up to 20

52 Table 19/4 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 7 1988.
53 Table 19/3 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 7 1988.
% of Arab residents have cast ballots in local elections since then (see Table 3). Most of these votes have gone towards Teddy Kollek and his party (Kollek 1978: 212).

4.2 Neighborhood Self-Management in Jerusalem

Prior to 1967 most Israeli officials adhered to a Labour- Zionist view of societal development. The goal of this ideology was the ingathering of Jews from their worldwide dispersion and the creation of a single national identity within a secular democratic and socialist state. There was no place given for local communities based on ethnic or social divisions. The ultra-orthodox Jewish communities were seen as isolated anomalies which would eventually be swept aside by the tides of progress. In Jerusalem this view also predominated amongst decision makers before 1967 (Kollek 1978).

4.2.1 The Aftermath of Reunification

In a flurry of activity following the Six Day War, the City was physically reunited. The bunkers, barbed wire, and mines were removed. Roads between East and West were reopened and the eastern sector was connected to the Israeli water grid. Within half a year civilian traffic between the two halves of the city had become routine. The mayor of Jerusalem made it clear that the extension of authority over East Jerusalem and its surrounding villages meant that municipal services would be provided equally. However, it soon became clear that it would take years to bring the physical and social infrastructure in East Jerusalem up to the levels of the West. Indeed, the gap in basic indicators between East and West was still discernible in 1983 (See Table 2).

There are difficulties in comparing the statistical information from
the Israeli and Jordanian censuses conducted in 1961. Nevertheless, as Table 2 indicates East and West Jerusalem were worlds apart in terms of the provision of basic services. In West Jerusalem water, sewerage and electricity were provided by public utilities; while in East Jerusalem water and electricity were expensive commodities and sewage was disposed of in individual septic tanks or allowed to flow untreated into a nearby valley\textsuperscript{54}.

In addition to the daunting task of extending basic services to the existing Arab neighborhoods, the municipality faced three other new challenges. The first of these arose from the sudden demand for housing of three different groups after 1967. Poor immigrant communities, hurriedly settled in the 1950s, protested strenuously for an improvement in their living conditions\textsuperscript{55}. The large ultra-orthodox community, growing by natural increase at a rate above 2.5% per annum (Schmelz 1987: 74) and tending to self-segregation (Hershkowitz 1987a), asserted pressure on neighborhoods (i.e. Mekor Baruch) adjacent to their "core". Wealthy immigrants from North America and Western Europe stimulated the hitherto small private housing market and began a process of gentrification in older neighborhoods such as Baka'a.

These pressures were meshed with the central government's goal of ensuring that Jerusalem remain united under Israeli sovereignty. As a first phase, four new neighborhoods were initiated in 1968 to physically connect the former enclave on Mount Scopus with West Jerusalem. Some

\textsuperscript{54} In 1970 Jerusalem experienced its last outbreak of cholera. It was attributed to this "disposal" method.

\textsuperscript{55} Differences in housing standards and tenure, social service provision, and education levels between neighborhoods settled largely by Jews of Asian and African origin and those areas developed after 1967 erupted in two neighborhood based protest movements in Jerusalem in the 1970s (Hasson 1983).
Table 2

Selected Characteristics\(^a\) for West and East Jerusalem Before and After Unification in 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Indicators</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>167,000</td>
<td>78,900(^b)</td>
<td>306,300</td>
<td>122,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1963)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians/10(^3)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Ages 15-65 in Labor Force</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41(^c)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Ages 6-14 in School</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>99 (1981)</td>
<td>95 (1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% one or more years of university</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons/Household</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons/Room</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with Running Water (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with Flush Toilets (%)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) All figures refer to 1961 unless otherwise stated.
b) Includes the suburban areas of East Jerusalem annexed to the united municipality in 1967. All other figures for urban population (60,400) only.
c) Includes military personnel.

five thousand units of public housing were constructed in this area over the next decade. In 1970 a more ambitious program was unveiled. One that would see four large neighborhoods ultimately housing ninety thousand people encircling the inner city.

These areas, Ramot and Neve Ya'acov in the North, Gilo and Talpiot Mizrach in the South and East respectively were planned as heterogeneous "Israeli" neighborhoods (for relative location see map, from pre-1967 Jerusalem by deep valleys (Maller 1991: 60). The local authorities favoured the densification of existing neighborhoods which would not require extensive new networks of water and sewage lines and roads all of which were local responsibilities. Nor would it impinge on the green belt which the municipality planned on its periphery (Kollek 1978: 232). Failing to convince the national ministries to change their approach, the municipality proposed that Ramot, planned for 30,000 housing units, be granted the status of an independent satellite town. A compromise was reached whereby the number of units was reduced to 10,000 and Jerusalem assumed responsibility for local services (Kollek 1978: 226).

The migration from older neighborhoods in the centre city area to peripheral areas continues until the present. As Table 3 shows, older neighborhoods such as Nahlaot/Rehavia and Beit HaKerem are experiencing losses of population; while adjoining areas such as Mercaz HaIr and Mekor Baruch are just maintaining their population levels. The

56 The development in the early 1980s of three satellite towns (Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev and Efrata) by national initiative, outside the municipal boundaries put further stress on the physical infrastructure of Jerusalem. Moreover these bedroom communities were drawing away middle class taxpayers from the city at a rate of some one thousand per year (Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 1990).
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number (000s)</td>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>Growth Rate %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Tur</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baka'a</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit HaKerem</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Hanina</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Safafa</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Nof</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekor Baruch</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercaz HaIr</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahlaot/Rehavia</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Ya'acov</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Ze'ev</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramot</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talpiot Mizrach</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>524.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Minhelet means Management Council and is used in Jerusalem to indicate formally recognised and empowered neighborhood associations.
c) There are approximately 50 neighborhoods in Jerusalem.
d) Voter turnout based on participation of registered voters in the national elections of 1988.
e) Based on population change 1988-1990.
f) The figures for living space are given as a measure of affluence. Unfortunately a more direct measure of affluence was not available at the neighborhood level. The low figures in the upper middle class neighborhoods of Har Nof and Pisgat Ze'ev are apparently the result of a lag in registrations of new construction.
average age in three of these four areas (40, 32, 41 and 24 respectively) is well above the city average of 23.

In contrast the four peripheral neighborhoods (Ramot, Neve Ya'acov, Talpiot Mizrach and Gilo) begun in the 1970s are still experiencing population growth in excess of the city average of 3.1 % per annum. Not surprisingly the average age in these areas is much closer to that of the city as a whole. The two neighborhoods begun in the 1980s (Har Nof and Pisgat Ze'ev) had annual rates of population growth as high as 23 % and similarly younger average ages (see Table 3).

Whether these neighborhoods were initiated by the public sector or, as in the case of Har Nof, the private sector they all faced upon completion the problem of inadequate infrastructure. As a result, the priority of the residents in these areas was the improvement of physical infrastructure (discussed at length in Section 4.2.4).

The three Arab neighborhoods with minhalot also experienced population growth during the 1980s. In A-Tur the average annual rate of 2 % is the result of natural increase; while in Beit Hanina and Beit Safafa the increase (4.7 % and 3.7 % respectively) is the result of natural increase and migration from towns and villages in Israel (Sa'ada 1991). Since these three areas have historically suffered from inadequate infrastructure, the relatively high population growth has meant that neighborhood residents also placed priority on improvement of physical services.

The second challenge Jerusalem faced resulted from the general increase in the material standard of living. The rapid increase in vehicles is a case in point. Between 1967 and 1980 the number of private vehicles registered in Jerusalem rose by 300 %. Over the same period the length
of municipal roads doubled. In 13 years the municipality laid 300 kilometers of new water lines, while water consumption in Jerusalem rose by 148% (population increase was 47% between 1967 and 1980)\(^{57}\). New schools, medical clinics and fire stations were also built in these years. Leisure facilities were developed including several hundred acres of parks.

As the Nation’s capital, Jerusalem received extra funding for some public works (e.g. the urban land purchased around the Old City walls and designated as a national park)\(^{58}\). Despite this additional funding, the cost of many of these capital projects exceeded Jerusalem’s financial resources. Not to be slowed down by such mundane considerations, Teddy Kollek increased his use of the Jerusalem Foundation for funds. This quasi-public body was founded by Kollek in 1966 to "cope with a budget that is too small". The Foundation with a staff of 50 allocates funds raised overseas which are equivalent to some 16% of the municipality’s ordinary budget (Sharkansky 1984).

The Fund’s legacy to the city has been two sided. On the one hand millions of dollars have flowed into projects and programs which would not have otherwise existed; where the Foundation has often been used as a device to bypass political opposition to spending in Arab parts of the city\(^{59}\). On the other hand construction of new facilities and programs has

---

57 All figures from the Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 1984.
58 The Old City which is still home to some 28,000 people has no truly public open space. The Western Wall plaza and the small park in the Jewish quarter, dating from the 1970s are used almost exclusively by Jewish residents; while the Temple Mount is the site of Moslem communal prayers.
59 Kollek used $200,000 from the Foundation to begin work on upgrading the sewers in the Moslem Quarter in 1972. He used these funds as leverage to obtain further funds from the national government for this project (Kollek 1978: 228).
outstripped the city's ability to staff and maintain them.

The third major challenge facing Jerusalem following reunification sprang from the addition of some 75,000 Palestinian Arabs to the city's population. Israeli municipal officials believed that the benefits of inclusion in a developed democracy would convince the city's Arab residents to accept reunification. However, most of these residents continued to view Israeli sovereignty as temporary. While individuals were willing to accept public services, participation in municipal politics was seen as implying recognition of Israeli sovereignty and therefore avoided. In 1969 the former members of the Jordanian city council refused to run in city wide elections. The result was an absence of local representatives for more than a quarter of the city's residents. This lack of Arab representation at decision making levels was and remains a concern for the municipality (Kaminker 1990). In the short term a vehicle was found allowing for some form of institutionalized communication between City Hall and Arab residents. To this end, the city government initially recognized 44 Arab mukhtars (traditional clan elders) as de facto city councillors (Benvenisti 1976: 139). Somewhat reluctantly, the Municipality also dealt with the reactivated Supreme Moslem Council. This body which had been disbanded by the Jordanian authorities had traditionally been composed of representatives from the leading Moslem families in Jerusalem.

These "temporary, pragmatic" solutions were the first small steps in reversing the century long trend towards centralization in Jerusalem.

---

60 Israeli citizenship was offered to residents of East Jerusalem. However, the vast majority refused and instead maintained their Jordanian citizenship.

61 This ultra-nationalistic body had spearheaded Palestinian opposition to Jewish statehood under the British Mandate.
4.2.2 Early Attempts at Municipal Decentralization

The decentralized *modus vivendi* between the municipality and Arab residents of the city which gradually emerged was the result of unrelated, ad hoc decisions to overcome specific problems. One example of de facto decentralization arose from the lack of political representation discussed above. Another arose when the Israeli Arabic language school curriculum was introduced into schools in East Jerusalem and Arab parents refused to send their children to city schools. Eventually the city relented, allowing the Jordanian curriculum (minus anti-Semitic references) to be taught in municipal schools in Arab neighborhoods. While this de facto decentralization emerged piece-meal in East Jerusalem, a more structured argument for decentralization began to emerge from a different source.

In 1975 two committees examining the organization of local welfare services in Israel submitted their far-reaching reports to the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. The first group found that government welfare services failed to meet actual needs. Co-ordination was lacking with local authority services such as education and public health. The second group came up with the recommendation that:

"local offices change their names from 'social welfare' to 'Citizen advice and aid center'. Such centers would form part of the local authority and be open outside normal working hours. Every center would have a tripartite advisory committee consisting of administrators, field workers and client's representatives. The committee further proposed the formation of neighborhood teams composed of professionals and lay volunteers. These neighborhood teams would be responsible for regular communications with house committees (in co-operatively managed blocks of flats, the most common housing-form in Israel), neighborhood committees, ad-hoc action groups and
various volunteer and non-professional organizations..."  
(Klausner 1982: 10)

Activists within the Jerusalem branch of the social worker's trade union incorporated these recommendations in a "Proposal for Inclusive Organization of Local-Neighborhood Welfare Services" published in 1977. In it they advocated the establishment of "area-managements" for welfare services (Klausner 1982: 10). These area-managements would, in consultation with local residents, shape existing services to the needs of the local community. The group proposed a trial experiment in a limited number of locations. Mayor Teddy Kollek who advocated a borough system for Jerusalem (Kolkek 1978: 250) saw in this proposal an opportunity for political decentralization. He had long held that Jerusalem was a "pluralistic city in which the multi-faceted co-existence of Jews and Arabs, Orthodox and secular Jews, rich and poor is ensured by functional autonomous units which administer themselves democratically according to their socio-cultural values" (Kollek 1988: 163).

In the municipal elections of 1978 a social worker (Lotte Salzberger) ran successfully on a platform for decentralizing welfare services. In November 1979 the Jerusalem Municipality agreed to co-sponsor an experiment in neighborhood administration of human services in four Jerusalem neighborhoods. The other partner in this project was the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), a non-governmental organization whose mission is to "initiate, develop and assist in the implementation of highly innovative projects in the areas of health, education and social welfare" (JDC 1990).

Human service professionals within the JDC and municipal and
governmental agencies wanted to:

"bring about a social reform in the provision of welfare services by establishing an umbrella neighborhood administration to coordinate and operate all the services at the neighborhood level. Thus, developing an integrative vision and general policy (planning) which would respond effectively and sensitively to local needs" (Hasson 1989: 120).

The umbrella administrations within each neighborhood soon became known as "the minhelet" (plural minhalot). As these minhalot became operative the term Neighborhood Self-Management Project (NSMP) was coined to describe the entire effort. From its inception the Neighborhood Self-Management Project reflected the two independent sets of interests of its sponsors (i.e. reform of human services and political decentralization). These interests are reflected in the goals and structures described in the following section.

4.2.3 Goals and Structures of the NSMP

Within a few months of operation the need for a body to coordinate the implementation of the NSMP became clear. As a result, the Jerusalem municipality and the JDC established the Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Management (Aguda) in 1980. As is the case with most innovative projects in Israel, the objectives of this initiative were never formally defined. However, in its publications the Aguda (1986) delineated the following six goals:

---

62 Although this became the standard term for this project, several other names such as "The Jerusalem Project" or "The Jerusalem Association" also appear in the literature.

63 The goals of Project Renewal, the massive urban revitalization scheme of the 1980s, were similarly developed after the fact. This strategy, described as "ad hocism", has become an orthodox planning doctrine in Israel (Gertel & Law-Yone 1991: 181).
1. Development of a system of neighborhood self-management, with elected delegates providing the broadest possible representation of the residents.

2. Creation of frameworks in which the residents can function effectively as partners of municipal and government agencies. Namely an organizational structure that would include local residents in the decision making process, a current data bank on neighborhood needs and services, professional assistance and an administrative unit in each neighborhood.

3. Development of indigenous leadership for the neighborhood.

4. Education of residents toward the need and the possibility to exercise civic responsibility and to work on their own behalf for the delivery of neighborhood services, through knowledgeable involvement in the decision-making process, volunteer activities and financial participation.

5. Coordination and merger of various neighborhood services, so that the needs of the local residents can be provided with the greatest efficiency and economy.

6. Decentralization of the municipal system; placing emphasis on the particular needs of each neighborhood and the characteristics of its residents, and enlisting the positive partnership of the local population.

Except for the addition of conflict resolution at the local level, these goals of the NSMP have remained roughly the same to this date. In order to achieve the above stated goals the Aguda: 1) provides the minhalot with a budget, professional staff and technical aid; 2) serves as a channel for conveying information between neighborhoods and coordinates the activities of the various minhalot; 3) provides self-management tools and training to neighborhood lay and professional leadership\textsuperscript{64}; 4) promotes general issues and public initiatives; 5) maintains and monitors professional standards of neighborhood staff; 6).

\textsuperscript{64} In 1990 the Aguda ran 18 leadership development programs with 600 participants.
deals with conflicts arising between neighborhoods, as necessary; 7) establishes new minhalot.

The central Aguda office has a staff compliment of ten, including an Executive Director, a Director of Resource Development, a Director of Organizational Development (also referred to as Director of Leadership Development) and a Director of Finance. It is overseen by a Board of Governors. Initially this was a fifteen member board composed of equal numbers of representatives from the JDC and Jerusalem Municipality under the chairmanship of the deputy mayor. By 1990 plans were underway to include the elected heads of each minhelet to the Board of Governors (Adi et al 1991). This policy making body is responsible for approving the overall budget of the Aguda and of each individual minhelet. Beneath the Board of Governors is a body described as a "public council" (Aguda 1986). This group which gives guidance to the central office is composed of the chairman and director of each minhelet, representatives of the Aguda and heads of municipal and government departments providing services to the neighborhood. Meetings take place once a month and are the primary vehicle for discussing public policy relevant to general neighborhood development. In addition to these two bodies there is a "Professional Advisory Committee" which meets twice monthly to provide professional guidance to the local leadership and administrative staff of the individual minhalot. The members of this committee include members of the "public council" as well as academics. For further organizational detail and areas of activity see Figure 3.

---

65 For instance, mediation in the (horizontal) conflict between Neve Ya'akov and Pisgat Ze'ev over the siting of new secondary school facilities (Kaminker 1990).
At the neighborhood (minhelet) level the organizational structure is somewhat more complicated. The decision making body of each minhelet is composed of residents and representatives of local service-delivery organizations (social workers, school principals, directors of community centers and health-care workers). The latter, non-elected group may not exceed the number of neighborhood representatives serving on the board. This governing board, which is always headed by a local resident, numbers between 8 and 25.

The board of each minhelet has sub-committees which consider specific issues in the neighborhood. Most commonly there are sub-committees dealing with services to seniors and youth, an education sub-committee, a finance sub-committee and a physical development
(planning) group. In addition there are sub-committees for immigrant absorption, religious affairs and security in some neighborhoods. These volunteer sub-committees may have up to ten members, however they must be headed by a resident of the neighborhood. The total number of volunteers active on sub-committees in the minhalot in 1988 was 630 (Hasson 1989: 95). More than half of all the members of the sub-committees are women. This is in marked contrast with the 10 - 20 % representation of women on the boards of the minhalot (Kaminker 1990). The day to day operation of the minhelet is carried out by a professional staff headed by a director. For the organizational structure of a typical minhelet see Figure 4.

The functions of the Director include: 1) identifying neighborhood needs; accumulating current data in order to design programs to meet those needs; and delivering the gathered information to the appropriate municipal or service agency; 2) presenting programs and activities for consideration by the Minhelet and implementing the decisions reached; 3) initiating and implementing programs for neighborhood services provided by municipal departments and other governmental or public agencies; ensuring the coordination of delivery-systems; 4) developing the skills of residents toward co-operative self-management at the neighborhood level; 5) overseeing the other staff of the minhelet (Aguda 1986).

The position of physical planner entails: 1) gathering data about the physical resources of the neighborhood and developing potential projects in areas such as housing, road development, street furniture and public parks; 2) identifying existing or projected municipal plans affecting the neighborhood and providing data and guidance to the minhelet for the
purpose of affecting these plans; 3) overseeing the maintenance of the neighborhood infrastructure and advising residents regarding the appropriate agency to approach on problems in the physical infrastructure (Aguda 1986).

The half-time position of social planner originally focussed on; 1) collecting data regarding the neighborhood, its residents and services; 2) establishing an accessible data-bank and educating service-deliverers and residents in the retrieval and use of the data. In most minhalot this role is presently performed by the community organizer.

The secretary, who is always a neighborhood resident, is considered "an integral part of the administrative-professional staff" (Aguda 1986: 14). The secretary helps to maintain ongoing contact with the residents to: 1) identify and develop new activists; 2) foster close relations with the deliverers of neighborhood services; 3) activate residents' participation in neighborhood projects; 4) identify potential problems or areas of contention (Aguda 1986).

The actual staff compliment of each minhelet may vary from four to thirty eight, according to the resources available to each (funding will be discussed in section 4.2.5). The Aguda provides funds for a base level of staffing (one full time and three half-time positions) regardless of neighborhood size or affluence. As previously indicated these positions consist of a full-time Director; a community organizer/social planner; a physical planner and a secretary. In line with the first stated goal of the NSMP all the neighborhood representatives on a minhelet board were to be elected. However, from the very beginning of the project this democratic principle came into conflict with the principle of local autonomy (Goal 6). For, in the three Arab neighborhoods where the
community structure is based on membership in clans (hamulot), no "general" elections have ever been held. Thus, representatives to the minhelet board here are designated by the clans and their number is based on clan size. Additional "neighborhood" representatives acceptable to the traditional leaders also sit on the minhelet boards in the Arab neighborhoods of A-Tur, Beit Hanina and Beit Safafa. These individuals are selected based on a history of activism in the neighborhood (Sa'ada 1990).

The deep cleavage within the Jewish community between the ultra-orthodox (anti-Zionist) and secular (Zionist) groups has also resulted in non-elections in some neighborhoods. In Ramot for example, the secular majority (65%) maintained exclusive control of the neighborhood council by stalling local elections. The ultra-orthodox community took the minhelet to court to try and force them to hold elections (In Jerusalem 1990). Eventually the dispute was settled when the ultra-orthodox and the Jerusalem municipality agreed to form a separate minhelet for the ultra-orthodox in part of Ramot (Epstein 1990). The discriminatory attitude of the secular residents⁶⁶ should be seen in the light of the ongoing struggle for Jewish Jerusalem between these two groups. Thus, one of the original four minhalot (see Table 4), viz. Mekor Baruch, was described in the secular media as "taken by the ultra-orthodox in 1983" (In Jerusalem 1990).

In Baka'a the minhelet established guidelines for neighborhood elections which the Aguda views as "a model" (Aguda 1986: 8). These guidelines stipulate that elections are to be held every two years. Further,

---

⁶⁶ The term secular is used to distinguish those who are Zionist in orientation from those (ultra-orthodox) who are not. There are both religious and non-religious Zionists.
each geographic district within the neighborhood is to have one representative on the council. Special interest groups may be represented on the board, however candidates may not represent or be sponsored by a political party. This results in representatives being elected by a defined electorate and being accountable to their constituents (Aguda 1986: 9).

As of 1990, elections had been held in seven of the thirteen minhalot then operating. Of the six areas which as of 1990 had not held minhelet elections, three are "traditional" Arab neighborhoods and two are Jewish whose minhalot were then only recently established (see
Table 4

**Nature of Neighborhoods and Characteristics of Corresponding Minhelet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Character Origin</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Board Elections Year</th>
<th>Turnout %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-Tur</td>
<td>1860s</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>none held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baka'a</td>
<td>1890s</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit HaKerem</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>none held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Hanina</td>
<td>1870s</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>none held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Safafa</td>
<td>1870s</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>none held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekor Baruch</td>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercaz HaIr</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahlaot/Rehavia</td>
<td>1891/1922</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Ze'ev</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>none held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramot</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>none held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Formally recognized and empowered neighborhood association.
b) Some of these neighbourhoods were founded by "Building Societies" whose precise year of incorporation is taken as the neighborhood's year of origin (see Kark R. 1991).
c) There are three types of minhelet: A) legal extensions of the Aguda; B) separate and distinct legal, non-profit corporate entities, and C) those in which the boards of the minhelet and neighborhood community centre are integrated in a separate and distinct legal, non-profit corporate entity. Since 1989 some of these have changed their status.
d) These neighborhoods have emerged from rural clan based villages which have been swallowed up by urbanization.
e) Formally this minhelet has an "A" status, in fact it solicits funds calling itself the Beit Hanina Development Association.
f) This minhelet was disbanded in 1983.
Table 4). The voter turnout for these neighborhood elections ranged from a low of 18% to a high of 80% in Har Nof in 1987 (see Table 3 for a comparison with national election turnout). This high figure is dismissed by some as simply the result of "spiritual leaders ordering their followers to vote" (Aguda 1990). However, the 67% turnout in the subsequent 1989 minhelet election would seem to indicate that the neighborhood leaders standing for election in Har Nof saw the minhelet as a valuable resource worth fighting for (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). As Table 4 indicates, the average turnout appears to be stabilizing around 25-33% of eligible voters. This figure should be seen in light of the city-wide voter turnout for recent municipal elections which is 45% as opposed to 77% for national elections.

The often dizzying social and economic diversity within the neighborhoods is reflected in the make-up of the elected minhelet boards. In Har Nof for example, the hotly contested elections of 1989 resulted in a board with the following philosophically diverse composition: Four ultra-orthodox members (including the chairman), three religious Zionists (including the single woman on the board) and two followers of the Bostoner Rebbe (modern orthodox) (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). In addition, the board members here, as in most other minhalot, have widely differing occupations. This diversity ensures effective representation. In Mercaz HaIr, the neighborhood with the next highest minhelet voter participation, the board is also very diverse. It is composed of three members who are ultra-orthodox, three who are

---

67 If the same eligibility criteria applied (i.e. residency), the figure for national elections would fall to 55%.
68 The 1990 Har Nof Board consisted of: a private teacher; a civil servant; an accountant; a lawyer; a president of an advertising agency; two other businessmen and a homemaker.
secular and four who may be described as modern orthodox of Middle Eastern descent (Amedi 1990).

4.2.4 Activities of the Minhalot

As the preceding discussion indicates, the activities of the minhalot touch on nearly every aspect of neighborhood life. However, the level of a particular activity may vary from one locale to another (see Table 5). Such variations are the result of differences in local circumstances, organizational experience and access to resources. The different activities of the minhalot may be divided into four categories. The first group covers involvement in the planning and implementation of sewerage and drainage projects; waste disposal; surveying, paving and lighting of public conveyances; land-use and transit planning. The second group includes involvement in government health and welfare services; public safety; and local initiatives such as food-, clothing- and toy-banks. The third cluster covers all activities related to recreation, landscaping and park development. The fourth category includes activities of an educational nature regardless of age. The minhalot operate in these four areas through planning and local policy determination, implementation of local services, special projects and community development. The following section will present specific examples of each of these categories from different Jerusalem neighborhoods.

As mentioned above, the scope of activity of the minhalot is broad, with literally hundreds of examples of projects and programs undertaken since the inception of the NSMP in 198069, categorized in Table 5. To further clarify the function of minhalot, I have chosen to elaborate on a

---

69 A compendium of projects in 1985 already lists 102 entries in seven minhalot.
few examples from different neighborhoods. These are intended to convey two points. Firstly, to show, when considered together, the full range of minhelet activities. Secondly, to give an indication of the utility of neighborhood self-management in the management of urban functions. This examination will form a central part of the synthesis presented in the closing chapter.

Immediately after their formation, minhalot engage in several processes of public consultation to enable them to determine community priorities. Normally the first step in this process is to undertake a survey of needs in the neighborhood. Usually, this is accompanied by an examination of current services and resources (both physical and human) available in the locality. Such surveys serve decision makers in three ways: 1) quantifying community priorities; 2) identifying spatial areas and fields of activity which are not receiving sufficient attention or are being ignored altogether; 3) identifying areas of under-utilized or overlapping services and resources.

A review of minhelet activities in July 1985 revealed that a third of all projects then underway fell into the category of planning and physical development. This early emphasis on basic functions was most evident in A-Tur. The most impressive project in that East Jerusalem neighborhood begun in 1981 and completed in 1985 involved the planning and installation of a 3.5 kilometer sewage line connecting all residences in the area with the central sewerage system. In addition to participation in planning the route and method of installation, the residents provided $50,000 toward the overall cost of the project. A further $20,000 was raised from ex-residents of the former village, now living in Saudi Arabia and the United States (Chesin 1990). The Jerusalem Municipality
estimated that this participation resulted in $690,000 of direct savings as well as considerable savings in staff time (Aguda 1985).

Traffic management is another field in which there is considerable organized involvement in planning. While local roads are a municipal responsibility, the Ministry of Transport is in charge of the highways leading into the city. One proposal for adding a new highway through the southern approaches to Jerusalem was opposed by the minhalot of Beit Safafa, Talpiot Mizrach and Gilo. The initial proposal was for a 160 meter wide right of way, to accommodate 8 lanes of traffic. This swath would have cut Beit Safafa in half. The three minhalot hired a private consultant and together they devised a plan which, while reducing the width of the road to 90 meters, still satisfied the traffic engineers and the commuters for whom the road was planned (Sa'ada 1990).

A less dramatic although equally contentious issue of traffic management involves the Sabbath closure of roads through religious neighborhoods. In Mekor Baruch the minhelet developed a pattern of road closures which was acceptable to the secular and religious residents of the neighborhood 70.

In the neighborhood of Nahlaot/Rehavia the impact of office penetration into residential areas is a major concern for the residents. To counter this trend the minhelet formed an "Office Committee". This sub-committee monitors apartments which are being vacated and liable to be occupied by offices. The Office Committee then addresses the owners of the apartments personally and attempts to persuade them not to rent or sell the apartment as offices. This persuasion takes two forms. The first is

70 This was one of the few successes that this minhelet achieved in its 2 1/2 year existence.
by "moralsuasion", detailing the social significance for the neighborhood and its residents. The second is through the threat of alerting municipal authorities in cases where the zoning ordinance does not allow for commercial use. In addition, the minhelet has successfully persuaded the municipality to gradually begin removing existing offices from the area (Hershkovitz 1987b).

The minhalot are also actively involved in implementing local services. This involvement may be as simple as advocating for improved levels of services. The actions of the Har Nof minhelet provide a good example of this sort of advocacy work. As a young, religious neighborhood, Har Nof has an extremely high birth rate, which contributes substantially to its high growth rate (see Table 3). In fact, according to the community worker in the minhelet, there are some 500 babies born to mothers in the neighborhood each year. Thus making the "mother and child" clinic in Har Nof the second busiest in the city. The two room apartment in which the clinic functions is far too small for this number of clients. This rapidly growing neighborhood also lacks a Kupat Holim (health clinic) and welfare office. The minhelet is pressuring the Ministries of Health and Social Welfare to build facilities on the land which was set aside for this purpose and to assign additional staff (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991).

Another important area in which the minhalot are involved is education services. Two programs initiated by the Gilo minhelet provide notable examples of this kind of activity. The minhelet and the community centre (Matnas) established a youth centre to begin dealing with disadvantaged youth71 in the neighborhood. For the most part these

---

71 These are defined as youth who are delinquents or "in danger" of slipping out of the mainstream.
are youngsters who have dropped out of school. The program seeks to create a supportive learning environment for 250 teenagers. The Gilo minhelet provides $15,000 towards the $70,000 total budget of this program. The second program is a partnership between the minhelet and 6 neighborhood schools. This program aims to provide specialized instruction to "weak" students. This takes the form of after-hours tutoring, said to use the most modern methods of instruction. This program has a budget of $45,000 of which the minhelet provides $7,000 (Gilo Management Corporation 1988).

The minhalot are also involved in recruiting volunteers to implement services. One of the largest ongoing volunteer programs is the recruitment and coordination of residents for neighborhood security patrols under the aegis of the police. In Talpiot Mizrach the minhelet organized 400 volunteers for these civil guard patrols (Talpaz 1990). Operating in four hour shifts, the patrols consist of two armed residents in radio contact with the neighborhood police station. The patrols are mostly intended to deter break-ins and car thefts. However, during periods of unrest (such as the "Intifada") their role may be diversified. One recent example involved Arab youths from an adjoining Bedouin neighborhood (Jebel Mukabber) who were stoning cars driving to and from Talpiot Mizrach. In response some residents of Talpiot Mizrach vandalized vehicles in Jebel Mukabber. To defuse these tensions the minhelet of Talpiot and Bedouin clan leaders arranged for mixed patrols to supervise the border area between the two neighborhoods (Basat 1990).

The highest degree of decentralization of local service provision is in the area of sanitation. In a number of the neighborhoods the minhalot
have actually taken over the responsibility for waste disposal. In Beit Hanina residents were frustrated with the quality and scheduling of garbage pickup. In response, the minhelet hired four workers to collect household garbage and to dispose of it in central locations (Ayyoub 1990). The municipality agreed to grant the minhelet those funds which it would otherwise have allocated for collection. In A-Tur, Gilo and Talpiot Mizrach there are similar arrangements where workers hired by the respective minhelet have replaced municipal crews (Epstein 1990). In other neighborhoods, the minhelet is involved in choosing locations for municipal dumpsters and pick-up schedule, together with the city sanitation department (Aguda 1985).

Services to new immigrants is another field in which minhalot are actively involved. In keeping with a Zionist ethos, the integration of newcomers is not left to chance. Rather, their rapid absorption into Israeli life is encouraged through practical measures at all levels of government. State ministries provide initial housing, healthcare, and job re-training. However, social integration occurs at the neighborhood level. In the face of 500 arrivals from the former Soviet Union per year, the Ramot minhelet established an integrated system of immigrant services. Beginning with their most immediate needs (clothing and furniture), the minhelet eases their transition by collecting donations of clothes and toys on their behalf from the residents of Ramot. The minhelet also lends household furniture and appliances to new families for the first few months after their arrival. Some of the other programs which the minhelet organizes are Hebrew immersion classes running five days a week; "twinning" of new immigrant families with veteran families; and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Budget in 1989</th>
<th>Relative Level of Activity&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>000s US $</td>
<td>Overhead %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Tur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baka'a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit HaKerem</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Hanina</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Safafa</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>168.9</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Nof</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekor Baruch&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercaz HaIry&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahlaot/Rehavia</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Ya'acov</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psigat Ze'ev</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramot&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talpiot Mizrach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> The different areas of activity within each minhelet are ranked from one to four. One cross (+) indicating little activity and four indicating frequent activity in this area.

<sup>b</sup> Covers involvement in planning and implementation of sewerage and drainage projects; waste disposal; surveying, paving and lighting of public conveyances; land-use and transit planning.

<sup>c</sup> Includes involvement in government health and welfare services; public safety; local initiatives such as food, clothing and toy banks.

<sup>d</sup> Includes landscaping, park development and programs for youth and seniors.

<sup>e</sup> This Minhelet was disbanded in 1983.

<sup>f</sup> This Minhelet is run in conjunction with Project Renewal. The combined budgets in 1989 were $608,550.

<sup>g</sup> Ramot does not receive funds through the Aguda. 90% of its budget is raised from residents.

Source: Annual reports of the minhalot filed with the Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Management.
social events for teenagers (Ramot Community Council 1990: 18). A similar social welfare function is performed by the Beit Hanina minhelet. In 1989 its "centre for needy families" provided basic needs (food, clothing and furnishings) to 200 families (Darwish 1990).

Each of the minhalot have projects which are designated as "special". In general these are short term activities intended to meet a community-wide need. In Har Nof for example, there was a consensus among residents that the neighborhood most needed additional greenery. Therefore, in 1990 the entire special-project budget of $7,500 was spent on tree-planting. Approximately four thousand saplings were purchased and distributed to each apartment block to be planted by the residents themselves (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). A similar project in Talpiot Mizrach saw 1,200 trees planted by youngsters around 7 schools and 30 daycares in 1984 (Aguda 1985).

In Beit Safafa, the minhelet produced an annual calendar for the residents of the neighborhood. The photography and layout were donated by two local professionals and the minhelet covered the cost of printing. The calendar was published in a printing house in Beit Safafa (Sa'ada 1990).

Some special projects require only staff time. Thus, in 1990 the board of the minhelet in Talpiot Mizrach instructed their community worker to approach town and village councils throughout Israel with the suggestion that residents temporarily "swap" apartments. The purpose being to enable families from Talpiot Mizrach and the reciprocating community to vacation at a reasonable cost. By early 1991 one town in northern Israel had responded positively to the idea (Basat 1991).

Community newspapers are produced by ten of the thirteen
minhalot. They range in size from four to sixteen pages and in frequency of publication from monthly to quarterly. The newspapers are intended to do two things. The first is to provide an open communication channel between the minhelet and neighborhood residents, alerting them to changes affecting the community. The second objective is to put residents in touch with each other. In all but one case the papers are supported entirely by their respective minhelet. The Har Nof paper is run as a business by a neighborhood resident. Local advertising by shops and services located in the neighborhood is accepted by most of the community newspapers.

4.2.5 Human and Financial Resource Development

The NSMP began with a modest annual budget of less than $100,000. These monies came from the Jerusalem municipality and the JDC on an equal basis. The involvement of the JDC was intended to provide support through an initial five year trial period. However, it soon became clear that the initial pilot project would be extended in scope and to other neighborhoods. The need for additional funds would be met through the system of joint financing mentioned above and through local initiative. To this end the minhalot were encouraged to raise monies on their own from outside sources, such as government departments; foundations and private contributors; and from sources within the neighborhood (fees for service and fund raising). By 1990 these minhelet sources were delivering in excess of $120,000 (Epstein 1990). Table 6 shows the evolution of the NSMP, in terms of overall budget and number of employees. The idea of partial financial responsibility stems, according to the Aguda's own literature, in part,
### Table 6

**Neighborhood Self-Management Councils**

**Ordinary Budget and Number of Employees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Self-Management Councils</th>
<th>Total Budget (^b) 000s of US $</th>
<th>Number of Employees (^c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>680(^d)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Including councils (minhalot) operating on behalf of the Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Management (Aguda) and independent councils (minhalot).

b) Not including funds raised for special projects.

c) Including 10 staff in the central Aguda office but not including employees whose salaries are paid by municipal departments (ie. sanitation workers).

d) For nine months only.

from practical needs but more importantly,

"reflects the idea that responsible self-government also involves responsibility for the acquisition of funds needed to implement policies and projects which are proposed by the neighborhood itself". (Aguda 1990: 3)

After ten years of involvement the JDC finally withdrew its financial support to the ordinary budget, leaving the municipality to cover basic staff (the four positions described in section 4.2.3) and overhead costs. However, the JDC continues to fund special projects within individual minhalot. In 1990 the Aguda received three quarters of its ordinary budget of $1.3 million from the Jerusalem municipality. Residents accounted for 10% of monies raised while a further 15% came from the Jewish Agency's Fund for Innovative Projects.72

As alluded to in the preceding discussion, the minhalot differ in their ability to raise funds. Neighborhoods such as A-Tur and Har Nof with extensive overseas connections derive considerable contributions for special projects from these foreign benefactors. The large, well-off and well-organized community in Ramot manages to raise nearly its entire budget from fees and membership dues. This variation helps account for the range in minhelet budgets visible in Table 5. The other factor being the stage of development of the minhelet.

The earlier examples of minhelet activities also allude to the extensive use of non-monetary, community assets, in particular the use of volunteers and the mobilization of under-used facilities. The total number of volunteers involved in the NSMP is difficult to estimate. As stated in Section 4.2.4, there were some 630 volunteers active on the various

72 These funds were used to help establish and support minhalot in Project Renewal (see footnote 32) neighborhoods (e.g. Mercaz HaIr).
boards and sub-committees of the minhalot in 1988\textsuperscript{73}. The number of volunteer participants in service implementation and special projects is considerably higher.

An indication of the level of resident participation may be derived from a glance at a few minhelet based services and projects. In two neighborhoods (Talpiot Mizrach, Pisgat Ze'ev) in which the local security is coordinated through the minhelet, there are nearly 800 Civil Guard volunteers. Talpiot's immigrant absorption program involves 95 families of veteran Israelis who have adopted an equal number of newcomers (Basat 1990). In Gilo "Project Linkage" connects 70 volunteers with homebound seniors. These volunteers spend time with these elderly residents two or three times a week (Gilo 1988).

The tree planting project in Har Nof required thousands of volunteers albeit for a short period of time (Katzburg-Kadosh 1991). The dearth of volunteers in Arab communities is a contentious issue. The community worker in Beit Hanina, herself an East Jerusalem Arab, stated in an interview that in her neighborhood there were no residents willing to work for nothing (Ayyoub 1990). The director of the Arab minhelet in Beit Safafa was of the opinion that the spirit of voluntarism needed to be strengthened in his community (Sa'ada 1990). Thus, this minhelet's efforts were directed towards youth involvement. There were two projects requiring volunteer time conducted in Beit Safafa recently. The first was the neighborhood clean-up involving all school aged youngsters\textsuperscript{74}. The second, longer term project involves teenagers who

\textsuperscript{73} An information pamphlet issued in 1990 claims that with the addition of new minhalot and the expansion of existing councils this number has grown to "nearly 1000" (JDC 1990).

\textsuperscript{74} At the time there were approximately 1,000 children between 5 and 15 living in Beit Safafa. 1990 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook.
pay regular visits to patients in Schara Tzedeck and Haddasah hospitals (Sa'ada 1990).

A similar difficulty exists in quantifying the use of physical facilities in NSMP neighborhoods. However, the following examples provide an indication of this form of resource mobilization. In A-Tur the minhelet located and renovated vacant rooms for a variety of public services, including a "mother and child" clinic, classrooms for special education and kindergartens (Aguda 1985: 17). In Baka'a, the minhelet developed a recreational plan to provide play areas in the unused lots of the neighborhood. These included lands contributed by resident-owners. The minhelet also renovated "old, unused or under-utilized public buildings to meet various needs of the neighborhood". With the agreement of the owners, unused sheds located on privately owned property were moved and transformed into kiosks and seating shelters for public use in Talpiot (Aguda 1985: 16). The Gilo minhelet sought out under-used space for storing the sanitation equipment and materials for its volunteer corps of public area cleaners (Aguda 1985: 15).

As mentioned above some minhalot are also involved in redistributing household goods. Among these are "banks" for clothes, toys, furniture and school books in Beit Hanina, Ramot and Talpiot.

4.2.6 Evolving Status of the Minhalot

The legal status of the minhalot showed considerable evolution during the first decade of the NSMP. Ten years after the initiation of the project there are minhalot with three different legal statuses. This final section of Chapter 4 describes the evolving status of the minhalot and concludes with a projection of some emerging issues for the minhalot.
and the entire NSMP in Jerusalem.

The four original neighborhood minhalot (A-Tur, Gilo, Mekor Baruch and Talpiot Mizrach) were legal extensions of the Aguda (itself a creation of the Jerusalem municipality and the JDC). This status meant that the Aguda hired their staff and monitored their finances. In order to broaden the financial base of the NSMP (described in the previous section) a change in the legal status of the minhalot was required. The result was that three of the original four minhalot (Mekor Baruch having been disbanded in 1983) became separate and distinct legal non-profit corporate entities in 1987. These "amutot" (for definition see Glossary) are free to hire and fire staff and manage their own finances. A significant element of this autonomy is the ability to solicit funds from overseas contributors.

In practice, most of the amutot's budgets continue to come from the municipality and they function in an urban environment managed by the municipality according to law. The result is that "the amutot are subject to certain significant restrictions" (Aguda 1990: 4). Firstly, the budget proposal and work plan of an amuta have to fall within the general guidelines of the NSMP. Secondly, the directors of each amuta must be hired and trained by the Aguda. Thirdly, the municipality is required by law to provide certain services. This defines a priori the functional limits of the amutot.

Since the late 1980s a third stage of development has emerged. This involves integrating the neighborhood minhelet and community centre (matnas). The emergent body is described by some as a "minhal meshulav" (integrated management council) and by others as a "minhal kehilati" (community council). In either case, the result is a body which
delivers social and cultural services and a body whose main function is policy determination, needs assessment and priority setting (Aguda 1990: 5). The view from City Hall is that these institutions thus become "a mini city council with a body that openly debates projects and issues and makes decisions and a body that executes those decisions" (Nahmias 1990).

By 1990 five of the thirteen minhalot had the status of an amuta. Of the remainder, four (Beit HaKerem, Mercaz HaIr, Psgat Ze'ev and Ramot) had the more "sophisticated" role of minhal meshulav and four remained as extensions of the Aguda (see Table 4). The two minhalot which appear content with the latter relationship with the Aguda are either very young (Beit Safafa) or are unwilling to assume greater legal and financial responsibility (Har No). The other two were in the midst of changing their status in 1990. Neve Ya'acov was in the process of integrating its minhelet and matnas into a minhal meshulav and Nahlaot/Rehavia was in the process of splitting in two; the residents of Nahlaot having decided that they would be better served by joining with Mercaz HaIr. According to a 1991 interview with Jerusalem Councillor, Sara Kaminker, the minhalot in Baka'a, Gilo and Talpiot Mizrach will soon be joining the four neighborhoods which have already integrated their minhelet and matnas into a minhal meshulav.

After a decade of operation the Neighborhood Self-Management Project is an integral part of the management of Jerusalem. The thirteen

---

75 This adjective was used by Eli Nahmias of the Jerusalem Municipality in a 1990 interview to describe these institutions. A view consistent with that of the mayor's advisor on neighborhood affairs, Rafi Davara, who also feels that the minhal meshulav is the most desired form of neighborhood self-management council (minhelet), ("Minhalot meet obstacles on path to local democracy" in In Jerusalem, May 4, 1990).
neighborhoods with minhalot are home to two out of three of the city's residents. Indeed, none of the public figures interviewed expressed any doubt that the minhalot were now an accepted part of the city scene. According to David Epstein, the Aguda's Director of Resource Development, all of the city's neighborhoods will have a minhelet by the end of the century. These will have the status of a minhal meshulav. Neighborhood financial autonomy, such as that already achieved by the Ramot minhelet, is also anticipated by other participants in the NSMP. To this end Ziad Darwish, director of the Beit Hanina minhelet, would like to see that in future a portion of the municipal property tax flow directly to the minhalot (Darwish 1990).

As for the residents of NSMP neighborhoods, they seem to strongly support the continuation and strengthening of the project. Shlomo Hasson, Professor of Geography at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, surveyed resident opinion on this matter in 1988 and found that 62% stated that neighborhood self management had improved conditions in their neighborhoods; while 55% expressed the view that abandoning the NSMP would be harmful to the community (Hasson 1989: 106). Thus, at the local level it would appear that the Neighborhood Self-Management Project is widely appreciated and will continue to improve the everyday lives of the citizens of Jerusalem. Many, including the current Mayor of Jerusalem, see the NSMP as a return to the traditional norm of communal self-governance in Jerusalem (Kollek 1988). As such it may well be the only way two peoples can share a united Jerusalem.
CHAPTER 5

Implications of the Jerusalem Experience for Revitalizing Metropolitan Areas

In view of the broad satisfaction of all the participants in the project outlined in the concluding section of the previous chapter it would seem appropriate to analyze whether the experience gained in the NSMP in Jerusalem may be of value for other metropolitan areas. To this end we will briefly revisit the theoretical conclusions regarding urban governance arrived at in Chapter 3 and determine the degree to which the experience of the Neighborhood Self-Management Project supports these conclusions.

5.1 Environmental Considerations

Although environmental considerations are not the strongest features of the NSMP, the order of treatment in Chapter 3 will be maintained in the current discussion. In Section 3.5.1 it was postulated that safeguarding the metropolitan environment required an area-wide authority. This authority would have to be responsible for preserving or improving air and water quality and ensuring the judicious use of land. To achieve the latter, the metropolitan body would have to have a large degree of authority over regional planning, zoning and traffic management. It was also concluded that a certain degree of decentralization, particularly in the area of waste management, was needed in order to change individual consumption habits. Urban reforestation and other local, physical improvements were thought to require a partnership of metropolitan authorities and neighborhood bodies.
As a service-oriented city, Jerusalem avoided the environmental degradation that has normally accompanied industrialization. However, the natural and historical circumstances described in Chapter 4 combined to make Jerusalem an extremely unhealthy city nevertheless. As expected, the centralization of water distribution and the installation of a comprehensive sewerage system, outlined earlier, alleviated these problems (see Table 2).

However, not all physical developments in Jerusalem since 1967 depending on centralization have been equally successful. The lack of metropolitan authority over land use controls resulted in the municipality being unable to stop the plans of the national government to encircle Jerusalem with suburban communities (Hyman et al 1985). This urban sprawl\textsuperscript{76}, with its network of hastily designed highways, threatened the integrity of existing neighborhoods, put tremendous pressure on locally provided services and ate into parts of the green belt surrounding the city. Despite the lack of formal authority, the municipality was able to lessen the negative impacts of the national plan through the power of reason, at least as far as Ramot is concerned (see Section 4.2.1).

As for decentralization, the devolution of regular sanitation services in NSMP neighborhoods has led to greater efficiency in garbage pickup, especially as far as timing is concerned (see page 85). The latter is of great importance because of local climatic conditions. This decentralization has also increased local self-reliance, resulting in successful neighborhood cleanup campaigns (e.g. Beit Safafa and Gilo; see page 91). With their success in local waste management, the minhalot are

\textsuperscript{76} The difficult topography and the patchwork of existing Arab settlements do not allow for typical (ie. contiguous) suburban sprawl.
well positioned to undertake recycling programs when this becomes necessary in the Israeli context. The considerable economic benefits of decentralizing waste management will be discussed in the following section.

5.2 Economic Considerations

The theoretical review in Chapter 3 posited that a restructuring of urban management may result in tremendous cost savings and improvements in the delivery of urban services for the metropolitan region and its residents. For the full benefits of this restructuring to accrue, two conditions would have to be met. Firstly, the metropolitan authority must be made responsible for the construction and maintenance of large facilities for basic service provision and for administering a unified set of regulatory procedures. Secondly, local (neighborhood) authorities would have to be given the task of delivering human services.

As mentioned earlier, the heavy investment by central authorities in extending and upgrading water and sewerage services resulted in a dramatic rise in health standards in East Jerusalem. In addition, this centralization in public utilities brought about a reduction in the cost of these basic services to consumers and a rise in the efficiency of the system.

Again as described earlier in Chapter 4, the lack of a strong metropolitan zoning authority resulted in the national government

---

77 Until recently household garbage in Israel contained little packaging material (paper, cardboard, metal and plastic).
78 Thus, average household consumption of water doubled; while the difference between the amount of water sold to the city and then resold to consumers (wastage) dropped from 19.7% in 1969 to 10.4% in 1990, according to the 1990 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook.
pushing through its development plans in and around the city and saddling the municipality with the additional economic costs of providing local services. In addition, the failure to incorporate all of the adjoining suburban areas from 1967 onwards has meant that private (mostly Arab) development there could derive the benefits of proximity to the city without the costs of planning restrictions and municipal taxes. These two shortcomings have set the stage for a pernicious form of suburbanization both in the Jewish and Arab sectors.

The NSMP provides many examples of the economic benefits of decentralizing some urban functions. These benefits fall into three categories. The first category represents examples which show an increase in the accuracy of service delivery and a reduction in the cost of these services. As mentioned at the end of Chapter 4, a majority of residents felt that the NSMP had resulted in an improvement of service delivery. As well, the mayor of Jerusalem stated in a recent paper that the practical proposals of the minhalot for the allocation of municipal resources benefitted both residents and the municipality (Kollek 1988).

The examples regarding the public use of vacant land and unused or under-utilized buildings described in Section 4.2.5 point clearly to the second category of benefits. These derive from the ability of empowered neighborhood associations to mobilize latent physical resources. Recently, some minhalot have expanded their activities to include collecting and redistributing household items (clothes, furniture and books) to weaker members of the local community. A more economically significant

79 The Jerusalem municipality has continually annexed small parcels of land since independence. More recently it has included lands from Kibbutz Ramat Rachel which is now entirely encircled by Jerusalem and land under state authority on the western periphery of the city. The most recent annexation occurred in 1993.
example of this process is the mediation by the Baka'a minhelet between two philosophically different but economically weak (private) or underattended (public) schools. This intervention allowed the two neighborhood schools to share one facility, thereby reducing their overhead costs and ensuring the preservation of both (Aguda 1986).

The experience of neighborhood self management in Jerusalem has confirmed that a functional decentralization can bring private resources into the public realm. This increased use of resources represents the third category of economic benefits of decentralization. As noted in Section 4.2.5, residents contributed up to 10% of the total budget of the NSMP in recent years. It is of particular note that the minhalot have succeeded in attracting funds from abroad, mainly from the families of current or former residents. The minhalot have also proven especially successful in harnessing the volunteer talents and energies of residents (see Section 4.2.4).

5.3 Social Considerations

Since the 18th Century there have emerged two opposing views of society: the modernists who stress the role of the individual in society and the traditionalists who generally consider the collective paramount. The modernists lean towards centralization; while the traditionalists favor decentralization (discussed at length in Chapter 2). In Section 3.5.3 it was deduced that these two views could be reconciled in the social sphere by giving a metropolitan wide authority a "watchdog" function, while decentralizing human service provision to neighborhood level bodies. Such a division of responsibility would ensure both the well being of individuals and the overall urban social health. This contention has
been clearly confirmed in Jerusalem with the interaction of the municipality and minhalot in the NSMP.

Thus, as discussed in Section 4.2, the Jerusalem municipality has expended considerable energies and monies to ensure that residents have equitable access to local services. The rationale behind these efforts is in large measure to ensure social stability. As one observer noted, "City officials think in terms of coping at the points of friction between the communities" (Sharkansky 1992). This means keeping a city that is chronically tense from becoming chronically violent. Even at the height of the "Intifada" (1987-1992) there was not only relatively little communal violence in the city but, as the formation of the Beit Safafa minhelet (see Table 4) and the activities of the Beit Hanina minhelet in that period (see Table 5 and page 87) indicate, there were even constructive steps being taken in Arab parts of Jerusalem. As pointed out in Section 4.2.3, horizontal conflicts between neighborhoods are managed by the Aguda.

It is no exaggeration to say that residents of Jerusalem identify strongly with their neighborhoods. Through the NSMP this strong sense of community is not only recognized but institutionalized. The various activities of the minhalot discussed in Section 4.2.4/5 and summarized in Table 5, show how these sentiments can be harnessed to benefit neighborhood residents, particularly the weaker members (seniors, immigrants and asocial youth) of the population. This sense of belonging has been given further opportunities for expression through minhelet coordinated or sponsored projects such as neighborhood clean-ups.

80 In 1990 there were only 13 murders committed in Jerusalem (1990 Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook).
treeplanting in public areas and community newspapers. Through the decentralization of social functions Jerusalem was able to cope with a sudden increase of population, amounting to 5% in one year (1990), without any noticeable social upheaval. This is particularly striking as these newcomers consisted of very foreign elements, viz. Jews from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia and Palestinian Arabs returning as economic refugees from the Gulf States.

5.4 Political Considerations

In Chapter 3, the major political challenge facing metropolitan areas in democratic states was considered to be the need to provide a structure that allows for real local democracy and which is strong enough to face senior levels of government; other, competing, urban authorities; and large corporations.

The recent history of Jerusalem provides a good example of the effects of shifting the political balance between central (municipal) and community control. As outlined in Section 4.1, the absence of any real municipal control during the Turkish period left the separate communities extremely vulnerable to external change. Under the highly centralized Mandatory regime, the other extreme was reached. The concentration of decision-making power within a small group of British bureaucrats left local political leaders unused to merging their communities' interests with those of the city as a whole. The Jordanian occupation manipulated the fractures within the Palestinian Arab community to help maintain control over the eastern sector of Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967. Following independence, Israeli West Jerusalem required eight years before a stable and productive municipal government
emerged in 1955. As Table 2 indicates, the emergence of a stable and locally accountable municipal government began to affect life in West Jerusalem by the early 1960s.

The election of Teddy Kollek as mayor in 1965, marked a watershed in the political development of Jerusalem. Since then, he has managed through force of character and practical results to convince residents of the benefits of a united yet pluralistic city. Beginning in 1980, the NSMP has to no small degree contributed to the realization of this vision. In dealing with national governments of both the Left and Right, Teddy Kollek has often succeeded in defending the interests of the city over narrowly perceived national interests. Nowhere was this more controversial than in the recognition of the political rights of the city’s diverse communities (see Section 4.2.2).

Through their boards and sub-committees (see Figure 3), the minhalot have been an effective tool for increasing participatory democracy. By 1990 hundreds of Jerusalem residents had had the experience of determining and implementing local policy. The relatively high voter turnout in minhelet elections (see Table 4) is one measure of the seriousness with which the actions of the minhalot are taken. Another measure is the large numbers of candidates who put themselves forward for local elected office. As the examples in Section 4.2 show, local activists working through the minhalot have proven themselves able to deal constructively with municipal bureaucracies in addressing local concerns.

---

81 In six consecutive elections Teddy Kollek has never failed to win less than 50% of the votes cast for mayor.
82 In the 1990 elections in Mercaz Ha’Ir there were 36 candidates for 15 positions on the board of the minhelet.
5.5 Structures and Method of Implementation

As already stated, the Neighborhood Self-Management Project has been well received by the public as well as municipal politicians and bureaucrats. In large part this acceptance has been the result of the gradual, evolutionary manner in which the NSMP was implemented. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the project began with two broad aims: improved delivery of human services and political decentralization. Specific objectives to achieve these aims were developed as the project was implemented.

As a time limited (5 year) pilot project with a modest budget, the NSMP created no unrealistic expectations that it would change life in Jerusalem overnight. This small scale also helped to allay the fears of municipal officials (Epstein 1989). The diversity in the social development of neighborhoods has been attended to by the different forms of the minhalot (minhelet, amuta, minhal meshulav). When internal diversity has proven too much to accommodate, the areal definition of neighborhoods have been changed as in Ramot and Nahlaot/Rehavia (discussed in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.6 respectively). Finally, it should be noted that the involvement of the JDC and its largely foreign trained professional staff83, provided a tremendous pool of expertise in the successful implementation of innovative projects, such as the NSMP.

5.6 Conclusions

While it may be argued that Jerusalem is unique among the world's cities, it nevertheless suffers from many of the same universal pressures

83 Of the three senior JDC officials interviewed one was born and educated in Israel but has lectured extensively abroad, another was born and educated in England and the third in the United States.
facing other metropolitan areas. As Figure 1 graphically illustrates, Jerusalem continues to experience rapid population growth. The immigration of entire communities from less-developed parts of the world, combined with the custom of large families in the economically weak ultra-orthodox Jewish community and segments of the Arab community, has resulted in pockets of material poverty. The wide range of personal incomes is reflected in the differences in neighborhood housing densities shown in Table 3. Serious as they are, these economic differences are dwarfed by the chasms between the city's three major communities. Keeping the tensions between these groups non-violent is essential both in social and economic terms. For, without social stability two important components of Jerusalem's economy, tourism and foreign philanthropic support for local institutions, will wither. At the same time, Jerusalem's rich heritage places limits on the physical and economic development of the city. Jerusalem's natural carrying capacity is also limited by its inland location, difficult topography and scarce water supply.

As Jerusalem's population grew rapidly in this century, those responsible for the city attempted to deal with these pressures by increasing central control. This centralization brought about dramatic improvements in the physical and economic well being of Jerusalem and its residents. However, it failed to alleviate the communal tensions within the city. Through the tenacity of local community leaders, the social and political dangers of over-centralization were made clear to municipal officials. With great foresight, a handful of key figures translated a series of ad hoc solutions into a structural change in the governance of Jerusalem. This development, resulting in the birth of the minhalot, has
been invaluable for the city. For, in the words of Jerusalem's mayor:

"An expanded system of minhalot could eventually play a role in a permanent arrangement by becoming the framework for self-administration by the different autonomous communities within one municipality. Direct elections to the minhalot can assure that each neighborhood's religious, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, educational and economic character will be determined as in the past by its inhabitants and their customs and traditions" (Kollek 1988)

Further, this devolution of responsibility will free the municipality to focus more on the urgent environmental and economic concerns facing metropolitan Jerusalem and less on particular needs within its various neighborhoods. The modest financial cost of implementing the NSMP (see Table 6) compared to the resulting savings both direct (see page 94) and indirect\(^{84}\) emphasizes the fact that such a restructuring does not have to rely on charitable sentiments. What it does require is an enlightened, democratic world view on the part of city politicians.

The experience of the Neighborhood Self-Management Project in Jerusalem has clearly shown the benefits of a formalized division of functions between neighborhood bodies and a city wide authority. This restructuring, involving a mixture of centralization and decentralization, has: 1) improved the delivery of local services, 2) strengthened local democracy, and 3) lowered the level of tension between communities.

The benefits of such a scheme when applied elsewhere would be particularly pertinent for urban areas which have deep rooted social, economic and political divisions or that lack a city wide sense of loyalty.

---

\(^{84}\) The prevention of social unrest is difficult to assess in dollar terms. However, the human and financial cost of the Watts riots in 1968 and the more recent riots in Los Angeles in 1991 may be indicative.
and belonging. However, the Neighborhood Self-Management Project also has universal relevance, in that the continued existence of distinct urban communities and the emergence of new, life-style based communities within metropolitan areas is a world-wide phenomenon. Rather than being disruptive, the NSMP shows that these communities can be integrated into the constructive governance of metropolitan areas and enhance the experience of modern urban living.

From the Jerusalem experience it may be deduced that the serious restructuring of the municipal government in Jerusalem could be a helpful model for curing urban pathology elsewhere. Such a revitalization of metropolitan areas would, according to the Jerusalem model, require two interdependent developments. The first would have to result in the formation of healthy, local communities. The second would require the formation of a strong metropolitan wide authority. The new metropolitan body would have to draw its strength from the citizens through direct elections.

Since the 20th Century history of Jerusalem's urban governance has shown that neither extreme centralization nor extreme decentralization lead to anything but urban decline, whereas a carefully considered, rational balance between the two is beneficial, there is obviously no simple path to urban utopia. For cities to be what they could be, this balance, between a strong central authority and autonomous local communities, must be vigilantly maintained. As the Neighborhood Self-Management Project in Jerusalem illustrates, this "third option" in urban governance is best rooted in a functional division of responsibilities.
POSTSCRIPT

Since the completion of this thesis, Teddy Kollek was defeated as mayor of Jerusalem in the municipal elections of November 2, 1993. He has retained his directorship of the Jerusalem Foundation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


In Jerusalem. "Minhalot meet obstacles on path to local democracy" May 4, 1990 Jerusalem weekly (English).


PERSONAL INTERVIEWS


2. Amedi, Uri. Director of the Centre-City Minhelet and Executive Director of Project Renewal in the City-Centre, interviewed on December 27th 1990.


4. Ayyoub, Evelyn. Community Worker with the Beit Hanina Minhelet, interviewed on December 18th 1990.


GLOSSARY of TERMS and ABBREVIATIONS

**Aguda**  Literal meaning: association. The term is used as a Hebrew abbreviation for the Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Management.

**Amuta**  Literal meaning: corporation. The term is used to describe those minhalot which are separate, incorporated nonprofit entities.

**Amutot**  Plural form of Amuta.

**Ashkenazim**  Term used to indicate Jews from Central and Eastern Europe.

**Eretz Israel**  Literal meaning: the Land of Israel. Term used to describe the geographical area of biblical Israel.

**Halukah**  Literal meaning: division. The distribution system which saw monies raised overseas to support scholars and their families in Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safad.

**Hamula**  An Arabic word denoting a patrilineal clan.

**Histadrut**  Literal meaning: self-organization. The term is used as an abbreviation for the General Federation of Labor.

**Intifada**  An Arabic word meaning literally "to shake off". This is the expression commonly used to describe the popular uprising against Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza District.

**Kibbutz**  Literal meaning: gathering. The term is most commonly used to describe rural collective settlements. The plural form is kibbutzim.

**Matnas**  Acronym for Culture, Youth and Sport Centre. These are neighborhood community centres.

**Millet**  Turkish word meaning community. The term is often used to describe the situation of communal autonomy in the Ottoman Empire.

**Minhal Meshulav**  Literal meaning: integrated management. The term is used to describe those minhalot which have merged with neighborhood community centres.

**Minhelet**  The shortened form of Minhelet Schunati, meaning neighborhood management council. In its shortened form it is used to describe neighborhood councils in Jerusalem.

**Minhalot**  Plural form of minhelet.
**Moshav** These are rural settlements where land is owned by individual families but marketing is done on a co-operative basis.

**Pashalik** Turkish word meaning district. A level of administrative area smaller than a Vilayet (province).

**Sepharadim** Term used to indicate Jews from the Iberian peninsula. Often incorrectly used to indicate all non-European Jews.

**Yishuv** Literal meaning: settlement. The term is used to describe the Jewish community in pre-State Israel.

**Zionism** Word coined in the nineteenth century to indicate the movement of Jews back to Ancient Israel, particularly to Jerusalem (Zion).

**ABBREVIATIONS**

**JDC** (American Jewish) Joint Distribution Committee

**NSMP** Neighborhood Self-Management Project