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Participatory evaluation of urban poor NGOs in Thailand Pratt, James Holden 1993

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PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION OF URBAN POOR NGOs IN THAILANDByJAMES HOLDEN PRATTB.A., Simon Fraser University, 1988A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESThe School of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISHDecember 1993James Holden Pratt, 1993COLUMBIAIn presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signatu____________________Department ofThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate Yv z-% /‘7VJDE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTThe global trends of rapid urbanization and increasing disparitybetween rich and poor have been particularly extreme in the case ofThailand. The benefits of Thailand’s spectacular economic growthhave been unequally distributed. For many of the over one millionslum dwellers of Bangkok this boom period has resulted in masseviction. Recent evidence suggests that slum communities inregional cities are also facing a trend of increased eviction.This case study analyzes the work of the Human SettlementFoundation, a Thai nongovernmental organization (NGO) whichsupports the formation and development of community—basedorganizations as a means for enabling and empowering Thailand’surban poor to solve their shelter problems. The study focuses onthe role of program evaluation in strengthening NGO capacities. Itanalyzes the purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths,and weaknesses of external and internal evaluation processes asthey are applied to NGOs.The thesis links field evidence with recent literature aboutparticipatory program evaluation to identify opportunities andconstraints which might arise with the introduction of morecollaborative evaluation processes. Basic data sources includesemi—structured interviews; participant observation; primarydocuments such as project proposals, progress reports, memoranda,iiand brochures; and secondary documents such as studies, reports,and newspaper articles.The study finds that both external and internal evaluation havelimited potential for strengthening NGO capacities. It develops ahypothesis about how more broadly participatory collaborativeevaluation would affect the following five NGO capacity variables:relations with funding agencies, management abilities,accountability to clients, relations with other NGOs, and relationswith government.111TABLE OF CONTENTSAbstractTable of Contents ivList of Tables viiList of Figures viiiAcknowledgments ix1. INTRODUCTION 11.1 Purpose 11.2 scope and Definitions 11.3 Conceptual Framework 51.4 Rationale and Background 61.4.1 Perspectives on Participation 71.4.2 Urban Poverty in Developing Countries 91.4.3 strategies for Housing the Urban Poor 91.4.4 Urban Poverty in Thailand 111.4.5 Low Income Housing Trends in Bangkok 121.4.6 Slums in Regional Cities 141.5 organization of Thesis 162. PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION IN PROGRAM PLANNING THEORY 182.1 Participatory Evaluation as an Alternative Model 192.2 Opportunities 222.2.1 Learning and Empowerment of Participants 222.2.2 Communication Among Stakeholders 242.2.3 Value of Results 26iv2.3 Constraints 292.3.1 Resource Requirements 302.3.2 Inherent Subjectivity 312.3.3 Reluctance of Funding Agencies 322.3.4 Lack of Awareness and Skills 332.4 Summary 343. URBAN POOR NGOs: THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION 363.1 HSF in the Context of the Thai NGO Movement 363.2 HSF in Terms of NGO Typologies 413.3 HSF in Terms of NGO Capacity Variables 453.3.1 Relations with Funding Agencies 453.3.2 Management Abilities 493.3.3 Accountability to Clients 513.3.4 Relations with Other NGO5 523.3.5 Relations with Government 533.4 Human Settlement Foundation - Bangkok 553.5 Songkhla Slums Community Development Project 593.6 Summary 694. EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, AND COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION 714.1 External Evaluation 714.2 Internal Evaluation 764.3 Collaborative Evaluation 844.3.1 Purposes of Collaborative Evaluation 854.3.2 Methods: Planning Collaborative Evaluations 864.3.3 Participation in Collaborative Evaluation 89v4.3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses 924.3.5 Implications of Collaborative Evaluation 944.4 Summary 975. CONCLUSION 98APPENDIX A: RECOMMENDATIONS 103APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY 107BIBLiOGRAPHY 113viLIST OF TABLESTable 1 Slum Housing Stock in Metropolitan Bangkok, 131984 and 1988Table 2 Korten’s Model of NGO Development Strategies 44Table 3 Data on Songkhla Slum Project Communities 60Table 4 Indicators of Slum Community Development 70Table 5 Comparison of External, Internal, and 98Collaborative EvaluationTable A-l Embedded Units of Analysis 107viiLIST OF FIGURESFigure 1 Scope of Resource and Information Flows 3Figure 2 Regional Cities Project Organization Chart 15Figure 3 Contributions of Participatory Evaluation 29to Use of ResultsviiiACKNOWLEDGMENTSI thank my wife, Sarah, for her patience and loyalty, and formaintaining her sense of humour through this project.I thank Prod Laquian for his encouragement and prompt feedback,from the research design stage through to editing. I thank MichaelLeaf for providing thoughtful, rigorous critiques of my analysis.Peter Boothroyd, Brahm Wiesman, Terry McGee, and Kris Olds deservespecial thanks for their strategic guidance during the initialphases of this project. I also thank Pat McIntosh for her expertcopy editing.I thank the Canadian Bureau for International Education for thehonour of being awarded a two-year scholarship under the CIDAAwards for Canadians program. I also thank the University ofBritish Columbia Centre for Human Settlements for providing agraduate student travel fellowship.Finally, I am deeply indebted to the Thai people who assisted me ashosts, advisors, and interviewees. I hope that their time was notwasted.ixCHAPTER 1.INTRODUCTION1.1 PURPOSEThis thesis analyzes evaluation of Thai nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs). It includes a case study of the HumanSettlement Foundation, an indigenous NGO which supports theformation and development of community—based organizations as ameans for enabling and empowering Thailand’s urban poor. This casestudy analyzes the purposes, methods, levels of participation,strengths, and weaknesses of external and internal evaluationprocesses as they are applied to NGOs. The thesis links fieldevidence with recent literature about participatory programevaluation to identify opportunities and constraints which mightarise with the introduction of more collaborative evaluationprocesses.1.2 SCOPE AND DEFINITIONSThe general scope of this thesis includes four main categories ofactors in the urban poor community development process:1. slum dwellers2. people’s organizations13. domestic NGOs4. international funding agencies.The thesis presents the inter—relationships among these actors asa sequence of resource inputs and development outputs. Asillustrated in Figure 1, there are processes of informationfeedback which can potentially change funding or other communitydevelopment resource inputs. These processes, combined withanalyses of gathered information, are known as ‘evaluation’.There are three types of evaluation defined here. Externalevaluations are processes through which the performance of aprogram is assessed, typically by or on behalf of funding agencies(see feedback arrows on right side of Figure 1). Internalevaluations are conducted primarily by program staff (see feed backarrows on left side of Figure 1). Collaborative evaluations arejointly conducted, typically involving participation of programstaff, funding agency representatives, and client communities.Non—governmental organizations (NGO5) are non—profit publicinterest groups which are independent of any government or publicsector organization. Community—based organizations (CBOs) are thesame as NGOs except that they operate not only the people but)y the people. Normally they are focused on a specificgeographical area. They operate primarily on a voluntary basis, incontrast to typical NGOs.’Section 3.1 includes a more detailed discussion of differenttypes of NGOs.2FIGURE 1: SCOPE OF RESOURCE AND INFORMATION FLOWSDOMESTIC NGOsReader training, support servicesiSLUM COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONSLinobilization for collective actionjSLUM COMMUNITIES[coil ective actionFUNDING AGENCIES3Participatory strategies are approaches to development whichmaximize individual and community involvement in decision making atall stages of projects and programs. Such approaches typicallyinvolve the strengthening of people’s organizations so that theycan plan and decide how to solve local problems. This process,commonly referred to as ‘empowerment’, consists of disadvantagedpeople developing their abilities to mobilize economic andpolitical resources both from within their communities and fromoutside sources.A slum is a type of human settlement characterized by high densityand physically and/or legally substandard dwellings. In Thailandthis term includes squatter communities, where people occupy publicor private land without consent of the landowners.Sustainable community development includes all activities directedtoward enhancement of the long term economic, ecological, andsocial viability of a particular community.2 In the context ofhousing the urban poor, economic sustainability includesestablishing security of tenure and maintaining affordability ofshelter. Ecological sustainability includes minimization ofharmful impact an surrounding environment. In this thesis,2 This term can also refer to cultural dimensions ofcommunities. However, analysis of culture as a factor indevelopment is beyond the scope of this thesis. For an example ofethnography of Bangkok slums, see Rabibhadna (1975).4sustainability of community development also refers to the processof creating and strengthening community—based organizations so thatslum dwellers can become able to plan, implement, and evaluatetheir own development activities.The spatial scope of this study includes NGO teams in Bangkok andin Songkhla, a secondary city located in southern Thailand. Withinthese primary units of analysis the study analyzes three specificcommunities as sub-units: Khlong Phai Singto (in Bangkok), Kubo,and Kao Seng (both in Songkhla). As described in the methodologysection (Appendix B), this case study format is called an“embedded” single case design (Yin 1989).1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKThis thesis is an exploratory study. Rather than attempting toprove any causal relationships among variables, it attempts todevelop a hypothesis which could be applied in further research.The hypothesis derives from analysis of evaluation phenomena in aparticular organizational and geographical context (small, domesticNGOs doing urban poor community development work in Thailand). Thestudy identifies the following set of general NGO capacityvariables: relations with funding agencies, management skills,accountability to client communities, relations with other domesticNGOs, and relations with government (see Section 3.1 forexplanation of these variables). By analyzing field data in light5of literature about participatory program evaluation, the studydevelops a hypothesis about how collaborative evaluation as anindependent variable would have implications for the five NGOcapacity variables.The bottom—up paradigm of international development planning servesas both a philosophical orientation and a theoretical tool in thisthesis. Bottom—up development entails rejection of themodernization model in favour of strategies which seekredistribution of wealth and power in conjunction with grassrootsaction to build sustainable communities. The paradigm challengesthe concept of international development as unidirectional deliveryof foreign aid. Instead it calls for supporting networks ofautonomous people’s organizations which can facilitate mutuallearning processes and empowerment of disadvantaged groups (seeHellinger et al. 1988; Korten 1990; Sachs 1992).1.4 RATIONALE AND BACKGROUNDThis thesis is significant because it addresses a critical aspectof an important real world problem—— how to more effectivelysupport urban poor community development in Thailand—— and becauseit helps to alleviate the lack of academic knowledge about insiderperspectives regarding evaluation of domestic NGOs. This sectionintroduces the latter rationale, arguing that literature onparticipatory development tends to frame questions in terms of6outsiders’ policy concerns while neglecting the perspectives oflocal NGO workers and beneficiary communities. The sectionproceeds to review the following five background topics:1. urbanization and poverty trends in developing countries;2. the evolution of urban poor housing policy;3. urbanization and poverty in Thailand;4. low—income housing trends in Bangkok; and,5. the situation of slums in Thailand’s regional cities.1.4.1 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATIONThe connotations of “participation” differ when viewed from theperspective of international policy texts and from that of urbanpoor communities. Hosaka (1993:133) offers the following critiqueof outsider views:Seen by “experts from outside” or from “above” popularparticipation is often described as a means to efficientdevelopment management: if one organizes “target”(!)population one can “mobilize”(L) more human “resources”(!) forsmooth implementation of a project, leading to self-motivated(and hence cheaper) maintenance of the project afterward. Buthow can people conceive themselves as a “target”? Popularparticipation, viewed from “within” by people themselves, interms of heightened awareness, self—determination, andexpanded mastery over their own community, is itself anobjective of a development process.Much of the literature on ‘participation in development’ poses theproblem as a question of how to entice the poor to contribute7resources to projects or programs which are not their own.3 Forsome, participation is simply a means to reduce costs and avoidlocal resistance to development schemes imposed from above. Fromthe slums of Thailand the problem could appear inversely as aquestion of how communities can persuade governments and fundingagencies to participate.The trend toward participatory development has coincided with anincreased interest in the role of NGOs. Many human settlementspolicy experts argue that community—level NGOs, also known as‘community—based organizations’ (CBOs), should have a greater rolein urban development because of their capacity to achieve much withvery little money (Angel l983a; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1986;Yap 1989a; UNCHS 1990). According to the Global Report on HumanSettlements (UNCHS 1986) and the Brundtland Commission report (WCED1987), international development agencies should increasecollaboration with domestic and international NGOs because they canprovide cost—effective channels for assistance to the urban poor.Although such arguments indicate an apparently progressive trend ininternational development policy, they actually reveal afundamentally ‘top—down’ bias. NGO5 are viewed from theperspective of donor agencies and policy experts as ‘channels’ or‘vehicles’ for delivering development. The views from small, localNGO5 —— from the field workers, administrators, and coordinatorsFor an excellent critique of “participation” see Rahnema(1992)8who struggle from day to day and from year to year to make theiractivities more effective —— are virtually absent from the policydebate about how and why to increase the role of NGOs. This thesisattempts to help rectify this imbalance of perspectives in theliterature by presenting views of local NGO staff and slum dwellersregarding program evaluation.1.4.2 URBANIZATION AND POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIESDeveloping countries are undergoing rapid urbanization and awidening of socio-economic disparities. During the 1990s the urbanpopulation of developing countries will increase from 1.5 billionto an estimated 2.2 billion people (UNDP 1991:10). By the year2000 there will be 21 ‘megacities’ (with populations exceeding 10million), 17 of which will be in developing countries (World Bank1991:3).Economic development policies and programs, including theubiquitous ‘structural adjustment’ schemes, are contributing to theexacerbation of socio—economic disparities in developing countries.The World Bank refers to this macroeconomic policy—induced downwardmobility as “a transitional problem” (World Bank 1991:45).According to Human Development Report 1990, the total global numberof urban households living in absolute poverty will increase by anestimated 76% during the 1990s (UNDP 1990).91.4.3 STRATEGIES FOR HOUSING THE URBAN POORThe growth of urban poverty in developing countries calls foracceleration of the policy shift from provision of housing towardan “enabling” approach (see Turner 1983). This shift began withthe recognition that public housing cannot meet the shelter needsof the urban poor because it is too expensive to construct enoughunits and those units that do get built typically house middle-class households (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989). The idea thatinformal sector housing processes are not the problem but a sourceof solutions, promulgated by Laquian (1969), Turner (1972, 1976),Penman (1976), and others, resulted in the development of ‘sitesand services’ and ‘community upgrading’ approaches.Provision of serviced building sites was viewed as a more viableapproach because it would minimize public expenditure and mobilizepopular participation in construction. Ultimately, however, thesites and services approach was criticized for having some of thesame problems as public housing (Peattie 1982; Laquian 1976, 1983).In addition to problems of scale and affordability, the peripherallocation of most sites and services schemes proved to beinappropriate for the majority of the urban poor who rely oncentrally located informal sector employment.Slum and squatter community upgrading emerged during the l970s and1980s as a cost—effective approach which allows the urban poor to10remain in locations near to informal sector employment. Upgradingprojects have proved relatively successful, especially where theissue of land tenure was avoided as in the case of Indonesia’sKampung Improvement Programme. One impediment to communityupgrading, at least in Thailand, has been that land ownerstypically avoid granting more secure tenure to slum dwellersbecause it would restrict their ability to exercise their landdevelopment rights. In some cases slum residents have resistedupgrading because they feared it would lead to eviction (Angel1983b).As it becomes increasingly apparent that governments are unwillingto provide sufficient serviced sites or enough upgrading ofexisting housing, the preferred policy approach is to “enable”people to solve their own shelter problems. Despite a wideconsensus about the need for development of a so—called “enabling”approach, there are sharply divergent views about what kind ofshelter policies should be adopted. The neoclassical argument, asrepresented in papers by Mayo, Malpezzi and Gross (1986) and theWorld Bank (1991), stresses that policy should be based on‘effective demand’ and that subsidies to the urban poor should beavoided through ‘cost recovery’ mechanisms. As Hardoy andSatterthwaite (1989) argue, however, the poor’s needs for adequateshelter and basic urban services can only be met throughredistribution of resources. This redistribution needs to occurboth internationally and domestically.111.4.4 URBANIZATION AND POVERTY IN THAILANDThailand’s urbanization and current economic boom are associatedwith increasing socio-economic disparity. The population of theBangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), which now exceeds 9 million, isgrowing at an annual rate of about 3.3%. The population of the BMRas a proportion of the national total grew from 13.2% in 1970 to15.5% in 1988, and it is projected to reach 17.7% by 2001(Isarankura 1990:59).The benefits of Thailand’s rapid industrialization and economicgrowth have been unequally distributed. Between 1976 and 1986 therichest 20% of Thais increased their share of total national incomefrom 49.3% to 55.6% (Komin 1991:118). During the same period theincome share of the poorest quintile dropped from 6.1% to 4.6%, andthe richest 10% increased their share from 33.4% to 39.2%. Thisdramatic increase in inequality of income has evidently resultedmostly from the disproportionate share of economic developmentoccurring in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region relative to the restof Thailand, so most poor BMR residents have probably experiencedrising real incomes (Yap 1989b:29).1.4.5 LOW-INCOME HOUSING TRENDS IN BANGKOKIncreases in the real incomes of Bangkok’s poor have notnecessarily translated into improved shelter conditions because of12skyrocketing land prices. Dowall (1989) cites the boom inproduction of developer—built low—cost housing as evidence thatBangkok’s housing market is performing efficiently. The cheapestof these suburban formal—sector units are affordable to householdsbelow the 40th income percentile, but not to those below the 20th(PADCO 1990:121). The number of slum housing units in metropolitanBangkok increased from 139,000 in 1974 to 171,000 in 1988, but thepercentage of slum housing as a proportion of total stock in theregion declined (PADCO 1990:38).TABLE 1: SLUM HOUSING STOCK IN METROPOLITAN BANGKOK, 1984 AND 1988Distance from Slum units Slum units Change Percentagecity centre 1984 1988 1984—88 increase0—5 (km) 69,906 63,907 —5,999— 8.586—10 46,031 40,654 —5,377 — 8.5611—20 36,581 47,718 11,137 30.4421—30 6,370 15,398 9,028 141.72OVER 30 1,257 2,961 1,704 135.56TOTAL 160,145 170,638 10,493 6.55Source: PADCO-LIF Bangkok Land Market Assessment, 1990.The alarming trend in recent years has been the displacement ofslum dwellers to peripheral locations. As shown in Table 1, slumhousing stock in the core area declined significantly between 1984and 1988, and it more than doubled in the urban periphery duringthe same period. Analysts suggest this trend has persisted inrecent years (Yap 1992; Pornchokchai 1992). Given the ongoing13boom in urban development and associated escalation of land prices,evictions of centrally located slum communities will probablycontinue.The suburbanization of Bangkok’s slum communities may not be asserious a problem for dwellers who find work in the new factoriesaround the city, but the many slum households that continue to relyon primarily informal sector employment in the city centre faceincreasingly severe constraints on their access to suitable shelter(Yap 1989b). Such massive slum displacement, combined with rapidlyescalating land prices throughout the BMR, increases the urgency ofefforts to develop effective strategies for housing Bangkok’s poor.1.4.6 SLUMS IN REGIONAL CITIESThe published literature on Thai slums virtually ignores secondarycities such as Chiang Mai, Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen, Hat Yai,and Songkhla. A recent urban poor “basic minimum needs” study bythe Thailand Development Research Institute surveyed 300 secondarycity households (of a 1,000 household sample size) in order “toallow for variation and regional comparison” (TDRI 1992:21).Unfortunately the report failed to disaggregate its results byregion.4 There is evidence that slum development projects have‘ The study revealed that Thailand’s urban poor rank tenuresecurity as their most important basic minimum need (TDRI 1992).This finding confirms the legitimacy of NGOs work to support slumdwellers struggles against eviction. As the case of Songkhla’sslums indicates, the threat of eviction is a problem in secondary14been functioning in at least some of Thailand’s secondary citiessince 1980 when UNICEF and the Department of Local Administration(DOLA) initiated the Regional Cities Congested Area ImprovementProject (Phoonswasde 1987). In 1985 this project was integratedwith the Regional Cities Development Project which receivedadditional funding from the United Nations Development Program andthe World Bank. This slum upgrading project ostensibly sought to“encourage full citizen participation in community development andself—reliance”, yet, as Phoonswasde reveals in Figure 2, DOLA andthe regional municipalities created a top—down organizationalstructure so that the project could be “implemented quickly andefficiently” (Phoonswasde 1987).FIGURE 2: REGIONAL CITIES PROJECT ORGMTIZATION CHARTBOARD OF DIRECTORSPROJECT MANAGERCONTACT TEAMCOMMUNITY COMMITTEEPEOPLEcities as well as in the BMR. A regionally disaggregatedcomparison of how slum dwellers rank tenure security as a basicminimum need would be extremely interesting.15Bottom—up slum community development programs, like those initiatedby urban poor NGOs in Bangkok in the early 1970s, were virtuallynon-existent in Thailand’s secondary cities until 1987 when theHuman Settlement Foundation created the Songkhla branch.1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THESISThe three core chapters of this thesis consist of a literaturereview, a case study, and a synthesis of the two. Chapter 2critically reviews analyses of participatory evaluation in programplanning literature. The chapter presents participatory evaluationas an alternative to conventional models, and proceeds to discussopportunities and constraints associated with application of it incommunity development programs.Chapter 3 is a case study of the Human Settlement Foundation (HSF).The chapter begins with an analysis of HSF in the context of theThai NGO movement. It locates HSF in terms of three NGO typologies(by scale of activity, by type of activity, and by developmentapproach) and describes the organization in terms of five key NGOcapacity variables:1. relations with funding agencies;2. management abilities;3. accountability to the urban poor;4. relations with other NGOs;5. relations with government.Finally, the chapter provides a brief overview of the Bangkok andSongkhla units of HSF and the three slum communities included in16the study. This overview includes analysis of developmentindicators from the perspectives of NGO staff, community leaders,and slum dwellers.Chapter 4 links theoretical literature on participatory evaluationwith case study data on external and internal evaluation processes.The chapter analyzes each of these types of processes in terms ofpurposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, andweaknesses. This analysis provides a basis for identification ofopportunities and constraints of collaborative evaluation.Two appendices follow the conclusion (Chapter 5). Appendix Aoffers policy recommendations for funding agencies and interestedacademics. Appendix B explains methodological details.17CHAPTER 2PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION IN PROGRAM PLANNING THEORYThis chapter analyzes opportunities and constraints associated withparticipatory evaluation of community development programs.Program planning literature in both international development andadult education has responded to the emergence of participatorycommunity development approaches with discussion of alternativeevaluation models.Evaluation is an essential element of program planning. However,as Feuerstein (1988) argues, many proponents of participatoryapproaches to community development fail to extend participatoryprinciples to evaluation. Whereas participation of programbeneficiaries in planning and implementation has gained widespreadacceptance as an important characteristic of effective communitydevelopment programs, participatory evaluation remains a neglectedarea in program planning theory.In addition to this theory gap, there is a related practicalrationale for analyzing opportunities and constraints associated18with participatory evaluation. The prevalence of external, expert—driven evaluation constrains opportunitiesfor using evaluationprocesses and products to strengthen community developmentprograms. As shown in chapter 4, NGOs engaging in small—scalecommunity development may have evaluation goals which arefundamentally different from those of their funding agencies.External evaluations can satisfy funding agency requirements suchas determining whether and at what level to continue funding,whereas NGO goals such as program improvementand capacity buildingmight be better served by alternativemethods. From theperspective of those who understand communitydevelopment primarilyas a process of fostering “conscientization” and local self—determination, there is a clear need for further exploration andanalysis of more participatory evaluation methods.52.1 PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION AS M ALTERNATIVE MODELThis section analyzes how participatory evaluation emerged as aresponse to the inadequacy of conventional models, particularly inthe context of community development programs.Pietro discussesfive categories of evaluation models or “persuasions”, arguing thatthey emerged as responses to each other: “each is corrective to aprevious approach, yet they are not mutually exclusive” (PietroThe term “conscientization”, which has becomecommonly usedin adult education and community developmentdiscourses, was coinedby Paolo Freire to denote “the processby which human beingsparticipate critically in a transforming act”(Freire 1985:106).191983:66). The first four of pietro’s categories (goal—based,decision making, goal-free, and expert judgement) fall within therealm of external, expert—driven models, whereas the fifth(naturalistic) includes interactive, relativelyparticipatorymodels.Similarly, Worthen and Sanders discuss “naturalistic andparticipant—oriented evaluation” as the last category in theirtypology of program evaluation models. Describing how it differsfrom conventional models, they offer sixcharacteristics of thenaturalistic approach: more qualitative than quantitative; moreethnographic than economistic; more adaptable; based on actualprogram activity rather than original program intent; sensitive todiversity in the values and perspectives of various programparticipants; generative of products written in a form accessibleto participants; and reflective of the judgements of participantsas well as those of the evaluator (Worthen and Sanders 1987).Proponents of alternative evaluation models for internationaldevelopment programs argue that standard, external evaluations areof limited utility (Swantz 1992). Standard methodsare viewed asespecially inappropriate where primary program goals include socialtransformation, conscientization, and strengthening of localpeople’s organizations (Pietro 1983; Berlage and Stokke 1992).The Pietro text is the product of extensive discussions among20American NGOs about various approaches to evaluation. It assertsthat although elements of external models can be incorporatedwithin collaborative evaluation processes these models arefundamentally inadequate because they are inconsistent with theshared vision of evaluation as a community—based dialogue.Participants in an inter—NGO workshop “stressed that evaluationmust be viewed as a dialogue. Information comes out of and is fedinto a community process directed toward action” (Pietro 1983:12).This perspective stands in dramatic contrast to the standardevaluation practice in which involvement of program beneficiariesis usually minimal other than in facilitating or carrying out datacollection activities (Rugh 1986; Lawrence 1989).The exclusionary quality of external evaluation models derivespartly from the technical complexity of research techniques and therelated emphasis on research objectivity. Advocates of fundamentalchange in international development such as Hellinger, Hellinger,and O’Regan (1988:43) argue that this complexity has “precluded ahigh degree of involvement by project participants” in both theselection of evaluative criteria and in the implementation ofevaluation. They argue that development assistance organizationsshould carry out evaluation activities on the basis of “thelearning experience of project participants.” (Hellinger,Hellinger, and O’Regan 1988:44). This view implies that subjectiveanalysis can provide a vital complement to more objectivelyverifiable data.212.2 OPPORTUNITIESThis section focuses on three categories of potential benefitsassociated with participatory evaluation: learning and empowermentof participants; enhanced communication among stakeholders; andgreater value of results.2.2.1 LEARNING AND EMPOWERMENT OP PARTICIPANTSProponents of participatory evaluation claim that it can contributeto achievement of community development program goals such aslearning and empowerment of participants (Anyanwu 1988; Feuerstein1988; Greene 1988; Hatch 1991; tJphoff 1991; Swantz 1992).Swantz analyzes cases of participatory evaluation of women indevelopment, noting that the process becomes an educationalexperience “for all parties involved, not least for the evaluators”(Swantz 1992:114). She emphasizes the importance of ensuring thatthe beneficiary community “gains from the process itself and is notleft to wait for the reports to come out” (Swantz 1992:114).Whereas external evaluation treats intended program beneficiariesas mere sources of data, participatory approaches create learningexperiences by engaging beneficiaries as researchers and analysts.Collaborating in the design, implementation, and analysis ofevaluation research helps to develop intellectual and leadershipcapabilities as well as practical skills (Feuerstein 1988:16).22Analyzing rural development programs in Nepal, Esman and Uphoff(1984:250) conclude that monthly self—evaluation meetings servedtwo purposes in addition to generating evaluative data andanalysis: they provided an opportunity for informal training ofleaders and a means for participation of community members inprogram planning. This example confirms that participatoryevaluation can integrate leadership training and local empowerment.Evaluation can become an integral part of the program in such a waythat it contributes directly to achievement of such goals as wellas contributing indirectly as a means of guiding future action.Some proponents of ‘naturalistic’ evaluation stress the importanceof empowerment as an outcome but fail to acknowledge thefundamentally political nature of participation. Guba and Lincoln,for example, advocate collaborative control of program evaluationin which power is shared among various stakeholders. They claimthis approach is “empowering to all parties involved in theinquiry” (Guba and Lincoln 1989:139, emphasis in original). Theydiscuss power as something infinite rather than a fixed—sumcharacterized by shifting relations among unequal parties. Thisview is evident in their advice about selection of stakeholders forinclusion in evaluation: “inclusion and exclusion. . .must bedetermined by negotiation, in which each audience that wishes to doso can present its case from a position of equal power. Theevaluator’s task is to arrange that situation.” (Guba and Lincoln1989:203, emphasis added)..23For those who understand empowerment as increasing the power of thedisadvantaged in relation to the advantaged, this ‘evaluator’stask’ is unrealistic. Community development strategies generallyseek to proactively create access to decision making processes forless powerful groups, whereas philosophically idealisttheoreticians such as Guba and Lincoln deny the need toredistribute power by elevating the role of intended programbeneficiaries. Indeed, Guba and Lincoln’s comments about‘stakeholder selection’ reveal emphatic opposition todifferentiating access on the basis of power: “there can be noquestion of resolving the sorting problem by reference to relativepower.” (1989:203)6. Thus what claims to be a model forempowerment actually limits the status of relatively powerlessintended beneficiaries to that of just another one of the many“stakeholder” groups.2.2.2 COMMUNICATION AMONG STAKEHOLDERSAnother commonly cited opportunity associated with participatoryevaluation is that it provides a forum for communication amongvarious ‘stakeholders’, groups which are involved in or affected bythe program (Pietro 1983; Greene 1988). speaking from an NGOperspective, Pietro (1983:63) stresses that this communicationTo be fair, Guba and Lincoln’s main point here is that peopleshould not be excluded for lack of power. In making this point,however, they reveal that their model falls short of recognizingany need for proactive inclusion.24serves as a means of organizational growth and mutual learning:“Each evaluation audience may derive its own lessons.” Pietrorecognizes the community as the group which “has the most atstake”, and notes that it may come up with lessons that are “highlysignificant” to the NGO (Pietro 1983:63).These comments offer two important contributions to the debateabout participatory evaluation and stakeholder communication.First, particularly valuable communication can occur when thecommunity gains opportunities to play the role of teacher and otherstakeholders such as program staff play the role of learner. Thispoint is amplified by Salmen (1987), who advocates “participant-observer evaluation”. Second, the community, or population ofintended program beneficiaries, is not merely one of the variousstakeholders. It is the key stakeholder, the group whose voice isof primary importance in the communication among stakeholders thatoccurs in participatory evaluation.This recognition of the fundamental distinction between intendedbeneficiaries and other stakeholders challenges an implicitassumption held by some proponents of the stakeholder approach.This assumption is evident in Guba and Lincoln (1989), as notedabove, and in rational models which specify categories ofstakeholders. For example, Freeman (1980) lists “targetparticipants” as just one of nine categories of parties which aretypically involved with or interested in the evaluation of social25projects in developing countries.Whereas Freeman (1980:199) stresses the need for the evaluator tofacilitate communication primarily among the more powerfulstakeholders (sponsoring agency, program managers, and staff),Pietro (1983) suggests that communication among stakeholders shouldbegin at the local level and be extended upward: “participation inevaluation should be extended to include donors.. .Involving donorsin the process may alleviate misunderstandings and make them moreaware of the advantages of participation.” Again, this NGOperspective reveals a conception of community development programsas primarily ‘bottom—up’ rather than ‘top—down’ processes.72.2.3 VALUE OF RESULTSA third category of opportunities associated with participatoryevaluation is the potential for more valuable results. Theproducts can be of greater value than those of external evaluationin several ways: capacity to assess intangible outcomes (Salmen1987; Worthen and Sanders 1987); richer data about the beneficiarycommunity and the program context (Pagaduan 1983; Salmen 1987;Berlage and Stokke 1992); and increased likelihood of use.This emphasis on ‘bottom—up’ communication is consistent withthe paradigm shift toward understanding development as mutuallearning and partnership (see Brodhead 1987; Hellinger, Hellinger,and O’Regan 1988; Carroll 1992; Edwards and Hulme 1992; Sachs1992)26Assessment of intangible outcomes is a chronic problem inevaluation. The general goal of many NGOs’ community developmentprograms is building the capacity of local grassrootsorganizations. As Carroll (1992:114) comments, however, evaluatorslack the means to adequately assess “progress in organizationalcapacity”. He offers some general performance indicators forevaluating “group capacity building” (Carroll 1992:253). Inpractice, selecting and applying these in the case of a specificprogram would require a high level of awareness of the localcontext and a highly adaptable evaluation approach.8 As notedabove, context-sensitivity and flexibility are commonly citedadvantages of participatory approaches.Richness of contextual data can be particularly useful inidentifying and assessing the significance of factors external tothe program which may have contributed to or interfered withprogram success. One of the principal sources of disillusionmentwith external evaluation approaches, especially quasi—experimentalmethods, is their inability to reveal the complexity of connectionsbetween independent, intervening, and conditioning variables (USAIDstaff interview 16 March 1993). The relative context-sensitivityof data gathered by participatory methods means that it tends to beof greater relevance as an input in program planning.8 The problem of how to evaluate ‘strengthening’ ofcommunities will be discussed further in sections 3.1 and 4.2.27Dawson and D’Amico (1985) analyze the results of involvingeducational program staff in evaluations, arguing that the primarybenefit is increased utilization of evaluation information. Asthey note, staff involvement tends to increase the relevance ofevaluation questions, so the data gathered relate directly to highpriority information needs (Dawson and D’Amico 1985:181). Greene(1988) draws similar conclusions about “stakeholder participation”resulting in “enhanced utilization”.FIGURE 3: CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION TO UTILIZATIONUses of the Contributions of the EvaluationParticipatory Evaluation Process Evaluation Process Process to UtilizationI I I IAs shown in Figure 3, Greene links elements of participatoryevaluation to factors which enhance utilization of results.Elements Designed Dimensions ExperiencedSOURCE: Greene (1988:108).28Interviews with program staff who participated in evaluation revealthat their involvement resulted in “a greater acceptance andownership of results” and a greater sense of responsibility for“following through on evaluation findings” (Greene 1988:112).Most importantly, the participation of intended programbeneficiaries in evaluation can help to ensure that the resultswill be constructed in a form which they can make use of.Pagaduan and Ferrer (1983:158) conclude from their case study of a“Community—Based Evaluation System” that one of the key features ofthis approach is “a feedback system in a form not alien to thepeople but one that enhances their learning....” Evaluationresults which are comprehensible to beneficiaries can help empowerthem to participate more actively in subsequent program cycles.2.3 CONSTRAINTSThis section analyzes two types of constraints associated withparticipatory evaluation: weaknesses of the approach andimpediments to its application. Two of the main weaknesses areresource intensivity (costliness in terms of time and money) andinherent subjectivity (vulnerability to bias of evaluators and keyparticipants). Two of the main categories of impediments towidespread implementation of participatory evaluation are thereluctance of funding agencies and the lack of people whoare trained facilitators of this approach.292.3.1 RESOURCE COSTSCritics and even some proponents of participatory evaluation notethat it tends to be relatively costly in terms of time and moneyrequired (Worthen and Sanders 1987; Feuerstein 1988; Swantz1992). All phases of participatory evaluation take a longer timethan is normally allowed for external evaluation missions (Swantz1992:115). The inherent complexity of such a pluralisticnegotiative process may be acceptable in theory, critics charge,but in practice evaluators demand standard, manageable methodswhich can be applied efficiently (Worthen and Sanders 1987).Answers to the problem of justifying spending more resources onevaluation can be derived from two of the key points noted above.First, participatory evaluation products tend to be of high valueboth to community development program management and to intendedprogram beneficiaries. Second, the participatory evaluationprocess can also produce direct contributions to program success.Recognizing that participatory evaluation is both formative (asource of program inputs) and summative (an assessment of programoutputs) may strengthen arguments in favour of this approach.Another solution is to modify the approach, as in the case ofSalmen’s (1987) “participant observer evaluation” approach, whichproved to be relatively cost effective in the context of large—scale programs. This modified approach uses local social30scientists who can be trained and employed to work as participantobservers. Locally recruited evaluators are much less expensivethan foreign experts, so they can spend the time necessary to leada more participatory process. In the context of small—scale NGOs,however, the resource requirements of participatory evaluationcould be prohibitive (see Section 4.3).2.3.2 INHERENT SUBJECTIVITYAnother commonly cited weakness of participatory evaluation is thatit is inherently subjective and that application of it usuallyrequires compromising scientific rigour (Worthen and Sanders 1987).This problem is perhaps the largest impediment to more widespreadadoption of the method. One response is that participatoryevaluation does not preclude application of conventional socialscience research techniques (Pietro 1983; Swantz 1992). Types ofdata which are particularly prone to subjective bias can be testedthrough triangulation, which consists of measuring the samephenomenon using different methods and alternate data sources.9Proponents of participatory evaluation such as Swantz suggest thatthe various stakeholders’ subjective biases should be made explicitin evaluation reports (Swantz 1992). Such open recognition ofsubjectivity may actually strengthen the credibility of theparticipatory model relative to the credibility of externalThe subjectivity problem could also be ameliorated bycombining participatory evaluation with “rapid appraisal”techniques (see Chambers 1981).31evaluation approaches which implicitly claim objectivity yet maycontain hidden biases. As discussed below (see Section 4.3) theproblem of inherent subjectivity should be a central considerationin adapting the participatory evaluation model for application ina specific type of context.2.3.3 RELUCTANCE OF FUNDING AGENCIESIn addition to concerns about subjectivity and cost, fundingagencies may be reluctant to adopt participatory evaluation forpolitical, ideological, and practical reasons. An example of apractical reason is scheduling: the timing of participatoryevaluation depends primarily on the community’s schedule ratherthan on that of the funding agency (Pietro 1983:51). Feuerstein(1988:24) argues that external evaluation persists largely becauseof the pervasiveness of western world views, a narrow range ofconceptual frameworks which undermines the validity of otherperspectives: “perhaps the most fundamental constraint to the morerapid adoption of participatory evaluation remains rooted at a deepconceptual level.” This point combines with the political realitythat those who hold power generally tend be reluctant to endorse oreven permit grassroots empowerment practices which could threatentheir privileged position. Guba and Lincoln’s (1989:267) hope that“those with disproportionate power” might be convinced torelinquish it may appeal as a utopian ideal, but the recent trendsof growing disparity of power and wealth indicate that this hope is32unrealistic.In the case of NGO-funded programs the disparities among fundingagency staff, managers, local staff, and beneficiaries arerelatively small, which may help to explain why the bulk ofparticipatory evaluation experiments have occurred within thissector.2.3.4 LACK OF AWARENESS AND SKILLSEven in the NGO sector, however, there is little evidence thatbroadly participatory evaluation has become part of standardpractice. One factor which helps to explain this failure is thelack of people who are trained in or even aware of this approach.Indeed, much of the literature on NGO evaluation either ignores theparticipatory approach (Sen 1987; Carroll 1992) or documents aprocess of training people to engage in it where no such traininghad occurred previously (Pagaduan and Ferrer 1983; Rugh 1986;Anyanwu 1988; Feuerstein 1988; Swantz 1992). Other texts notethe inappropriateness of external methods in the context ofcommunity development programs and make vague reference toalternative, relatively informal evaluation methods which evidentlywere not yet sufficiently clarified or documented (Clark andMcCaffery 1979:5; Caffarella 1988).The critical human resource in participatory evaluation is the33external evaluation facilitator who provides training forparticipants and generally supports the process (Pietro 1983:51;Salmen 1987:106; Worthen and Sanders 1987; Feuerstein 1988:23;Swantz 1992:114) In the case of the Overseas Education Fund“participatory evaluation system” the role of the facilitator is to“involve an evaluation team” in a three phase process of design,data gathering, and analysis, mediating different points of viewand adding insights from her or his own experience (Pietro1983:55). As shown in this and other examples, participatoryevaluation is neither external nor internal to the program.Therefore, implementation of it requires building the capacities ofboth evaluation facilitators and participants.2.4 SUMMARYThe above analysis of opportunities and constraints associated withparticipatory evaluation suggests that collaborative evaluationapproaches may be suitable and viable in the context of communitydevelopment programs. The idea of involving beneficiaries inevaluation is philosophically consistent with goals such asconscientization and local self—determination. Participatoryevaluation can serve a broad range of purposes, whereas externalmethods primarily serve funding agency needs. The process ofparticipatory evaluation can be a source of learning andempowerment, and can serve as a forum for communication amongvarious stakeholders. The products tend to be very useful both for34program management and for enabling intended program beneficiariesto participate actively.Considering these advantages, allocating more resources than wouldbe used for external evaluation may be justifiable in the contextof community development programs. The problem of inherentsubjectivity can be ameliorated by incorporating selected standardevaluation methods within the participatory model and by makingbiases explicit. Overcoming impediments to more widespreadapplication, such as funding agency reluctance and. the lack ofskilled participatory evaluation facilitators, will require furtherdevelopment, explication, and advocacy of the approach (see Section4.3)35CHAPTER 3URBAN POOR NGOs: THE CASE OF THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATIONThis chapter locates the Human Settlement Foundation in the contextof the Thai NGO movement, analyzes the organization in terms of NGOtypologies, and describes it in terms of the following NGO capacityvariables: relations with funding agencies, management abilities,accountability to client communities, relations with other NGOs,and relations with governments. The chapter provides an overviewof HSF-Bangkok and HSF-Songkhla, including brief descriptions ofdevelopment work in the three communities included in this study(Khlong Phai Singto, Kubo, and Kao Seng).3.1 HSF IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THAI NGO MOVEMENTThe Thai NGO movement began in the late l960s and grew rapidlyduring the 1973-1976 political liberalization, but it was not untilthe 1980s that it started to flourish. Several coordinating bodieswere established to promote NGO cooperation and to provide supportservices such as training, publicity, and contact with foreignfunding agencies: the Thai Inter—Religious Commission for36Development (1979); the Thai Development Support Committee (1982);and the NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development (1985). A1990 Thai NGO directory indicates that as of that year there wereat least 475 “public interest nongovernmental organizations” in thecountry (CUSRI 1990)Gohlert (1991:99-107) provides a useful overview of the history ofThai NGOs and their changing roles. As Gohiert states, the ThaiNGO movement emerged as a response to the failure of governmentdevelopment programs. Student activists, university professors,and religious leaders have played catalytic roles, and theirinfluence continues to shape the character and direction of the NGOcommunity. The movement’s reliance on altruism as a motivatingfactor for recruiting new workers is an increasingly significantconstraint on the potential for scaling up activities (ThailandVolunteer Services interview, 23 February 1993). Young NGO workersfeel strong pressure to pursue relatively lucrative employment inthe booming private sector (HSF and Duang Prateep Foundation staffinterviews, February 1993). The difficulty of recruiting andretaining young NGO activists is one factor which necessitates ashift toward more indirect, wide—impact community developmentmethods.Many Thai NGO5 are developing and exercising their capacities to10 This figure includes Thai offices of international NGO5 butexcludes CBOs.37engage in a growing range of activities. In terms of Korten’s(1990) model, these emerging NGO strategies correspond withcharacteristics of “third generation” NGO5. The primary functionsof first and second generation NGOs are delivery of social welfareservices and implementation of small—scale self—reliant localdevelopment projects. To increase the scale and the sustainabilityof their work, third generation NGOs engage in catalytic activitiessuch as research, policy advocacy, and public education. ThaiNGOs’ movement in this direction has been impeded by the followingfactors: reluctance to shift scarce resources away fromimplementation of first and second generation strategies, stafflimitations, hostile relations with governmental organizations, andthe bias of international funding agencies in favour of projectimplementation (see Pongsapich 1992).Thai NGOs are struggling to adapt their strategies in a rapidlychanging political and economic environment. They are attemptingto take advantage of increasingly pluralistic political climatesand of their growing credibility as legitimate players in theprocesses of Thailand’s development (Grassroots DevelopmentInstitute interview, January 1993).Some international funding agencies are exerting pressure on ThaiNGO5 to raise funds domestically. This expectation seemsreasonable, given Thailand’s spectacular economic growth. Domesticfunding from private donors could enhance Thai NGOs’ autonomy and38stability, and it would also counteract government claims that theyare ‘taking money from foreigners to destabilize Thailand’. Oneproblem, though, is that undertaking an effective fundraisingcampaign costs money and requires certain administrative andpublicity abilities that few NGOs have.Thai NGOs such as HSF which are practicing enabling strategies facean uncertain future because of potential funding problems.International donor agencies are shifting their resources to poorercountries. European NGO5 such as Terre des Hommes (Germany) haveexplicit expectations that recipient NGOs try to develop domesticfundraising capacity (Terre des Honuues “Project Criteria”guidelines, 1988). In Thailand, however, NGO organizers aresceptical about the potential for raising substantial privatesupport for empowerment of poor communities (HSF interview, 2 March1993; Alternative Development Centre interview, 15 March, 1993).Slum communities throughout urban Thailand are facing a trend ofmass evictions. They need support in their struggles for landrights and infrastructure improvement, but the few NGO5 which focustheir work on slum community development are now worrying abouttheir own survival (Grassroots Development Institute interview,January 1993). Senior staff of NGO5 such as Grassroots DevelopmentInstitute, the Alternative Development Centre, and the HumanSettlement Foundation emphasize that raising public awareness inThailand is required as a prerequisite to being able to operate39successful fundraising campaigns for NGO work which goes beyondrelief and charity. Such public awareness campaigns would build abasis for the Thai elite and middle classes to recognize the needfor redistribution of wealth not only through charitable donationsbut through means such as low—interest credit programs andsubsidized arrangements for gaining security of land tenure.Among Thai NGOs working with urban poor communities, HSF is the onemost explicitly committed to strengthening people’s organizationsas the primary development task.11 The HSF philosophy and methodsrecognize the basic contradiction between the role of an NGO as acatalyst for local empowerment and the role of an NGO as a sourceof aid. Even serving as a consultant contains a dangerouspotential for the creation of dependency. The essential role,then, is to encourage and facilitate the formation andstrengthening of slum dwellers’ organizations so that they canplan, implement, and evaluate their own problem solving processes.The goal is for these organizations to become capable of playingthis role with little or no external assistance. Initially the NGOmay need to take the initiative to build and restructure CBOs, andto directly manage community development activities. The successof these efforts shows as the CBOs become capable of increasinglycomplex functions. For HSF, the critical skill of the NGOThe only other urban poor NGO in Thailand which focuses onstrengthening communities as its primary task is a small, secretiveorganization called “People’s Organization for Power” (POP). POPis not listed in the Directory of Public Interest Non-governmentOrganizations in Thailand (CUSRI 1990).40fieldworker is the ability to sense the optimal, minimum necessarylevel of input at each point in the process. As one seniororganizer put it, the key is to know how to “give the right help atthe right time.” (senior HSF staff interview, 9 February 1993).The philosophy and development approach of HSF can best beunderstood by analyzing the organization’s history. HSF emergedfrom a preceding organization called the Community Relations Group(CRG). The original founder of CRG, a student activist fromsouthern Thailand, set up this independent organization in 1982after graduating from Songkhla Teacher’s College and working withthe Duang Prateep Foundation. The original focus of CRG, the“core idea” which differentiated it from Duang Prateep and whichremains as “the main objective” of HSF, was the development ofpeople’s organizations (former HSF staff interview, 13 February93). Early organizers were influenced by radical Buddhist thought(see Gohlert 1991; Sivaraksa 1992). In 1987 CRG registered as alegal foundation called Munniti Pattana Tiyou Arsai (translation:Human Settlement Foundation).3.2 HUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION IN TERMS OF NGO TYPOLOGIESThe term “NGO” covers a wide variety of organizations. Acronymsfor different types of NGOs abound. As Gohlert (1991:107) argues,there is a lack of consensus about appropriate categories todistinguish the various NGO5. They can be categorized by41ideological orientation or affiliation, source of funding, size ofannual budget, target population, and many other criteria. Korten(1990:2) offers the following basic typology:* Voluntary Organizations (VOs) that pursue a social missiondriven by a commitment to shared values.* Public Service Contractors (PSCs) that function as market-oriented nonprofit businesses serving public purposes.* People’s Organizations (POs) that represent their members’interests, have member—accountable leadership, and aresubstantially self-reliant.* Governmental Nongovernmental Organizations (GONGO5) that arecreations of government and serve as instruments ofgovernment policy.HSF falls within the “VO” category. Carroll (1992) makes a primarydistinction between “membership service organizations” (MSO5),which he defines in a manner similar to what this thesis defines asCBO5, and “grassroots support organizations” (GSO5), which serve asintermediaries between beneficiaries and “the often remote levelsof government, donor and financial institutions” (Carroll 1992:11).HSF falls within the GSO category. Carroll provides asophisticated tripartite set of typologies for identification ofGSOs and MSOs within the spectrum of NGO5:1. PURPOSES (charity, relief, development, political action,advocacy of special interests);2. MAIN ACTIVITY (education, research, lobbying, networking);3. LEVEL (local, regional, national, international).This section identifies the Human Settlement Foundation in terms ofthree NGO typologies adapted from Carroll (1992): geographic scaleof activities, types of activities, and development strategies.42TYPOLOGY 1: BY GEOGRAPHIC SCALE OF ACTIVITYThe global NGO movement consists of international, national, andlocal organizations.12 Some NGOs begin as local organizations andsubsequently expand to become national ones. The Duang PrateepFoundation, founded in Kiong Toey slum, Bangkok in 1978, nowsupports social welfare work in Khon Kaen as well. The HumanSettlement Foundation, established in Bangkok in 1982, created asubsidiary organization in Songkhla (the Songkhla Slums DevelopmentProject) in 1987. During the 1990-92 period, HSF began to doextension work in Nakhorn Ratchasima and Chiang Mai.TYPOLOGY 2: BY TYPES OF ACTIVITIESThe basic categories of Thai NGO5 are rural and urban. The vastmajority are rural, engaging in a wide range of sector specificactivities. Almost all urban NGOs in Thailand work on varioustypes of slum community development activities: physicalimprovement (especially infrastructure), social services, economicimprovement (eg. savings groups), and local empowerment. HSFengages in all of these activities, but its main focus is onbuilding the strength of CBO5 so that slum dwellers can become moreeffective in addressing their problems independently.12 Within each category we can distinguish betweenorganizations which exist primarily to implement developmentefforts and those which serve as network organizationsfor collaboration and exchange among member NGOs.43TYPOLOGY 3: BY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGYAll of Thailand’s urban poor NGOs have adopted the language of‘popular participation’ and ‘community involvement’, but the extentof their actual practice of bottom—up development strategiesvaries. Korten’s model of “four generations” of NGO developmentstrategies serves as a useful reference for distinguishing theapproach of HSF and other organizations in the Thai NGO movement(Korten 1990).TABLE 3: KORTEN’S MODEL OF NGO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIESGENERATIONFIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTHRelief and Wefw? o7imuniy Development Sustainable Systems People’s Movements-. DevelopmentProblem Definition Shortage Local Inertia Institutional and Policy Inadequate MobilizingConstraints VisionTime Frame- Immediate Project Life Ten to Twenty Years Indefinite FutureScope Individual or Family Neighborhood or Village Region or Nation National or GlobalChief Actors NGO NGO plus Community AU Relevant Public and Loosely Defmed NetsrksPrivate Institutions of People & OrganizationsNGO Role Doer Mobilizer Catalyst Activist/EducatorManagement Orientation Logistics Management Project Management Strategic Management Coalescing and EnergizingSelf-Managing NetwerksDevelopment Education Starving Children Community Self-Help Constraining Policies and Spaceship EarthInstitutions-SOURCE: Korten (1990:117).44The development strategies of the majority of NGOs working with theurban poor in Thailand correspond primarily with Korten’s “firstgeneration”. NGOs such as the Duang Prateep Foundation, theJapanese International Volunteer Centre, and the Foundation forSlum Child Care emphasize charity programs and relief services,primarily directed toward children. As shown in the followingsection, this “first generation” orientation has significantimplications for domestic fundraising potential.The HSF strategy corresponds primarily with the “second generation”or “community development” approach. As shown in the followingsections, however, the organization is shifting toward third andfourth generation strategies. One factor impeding this shift isthe inadequacy of current external and internal evaluationprocesses (see chapter 4).3.3 HSF IN TERMS OF NGO CAPACITY VARIABLESThis section further describes HSF in terms of the following NGOcapacity variables: relations with funding agencies, managementabilities, accountability to clients, relations with other domesticNGOs, and relations with governments.3.3.1 RELATIONS WITH FUNDING AGENCIESInsufficient funding constrains NGOs’ action possibilities.45Conversely, excessive funding typically undermines ‘grassroots’authenticity, leading to bureaucratization and dependence ondonors. Some NGO5 working with Bangkok slum communities haveannual budgets of less than $20,000, whereas the Duang PrateepFoundation annual budget has grown to over $2 million (Kaothien andRachatatanun 1991). Studies of large, U.S.-funded NGO projects showthat decision making was dominated by NGO staff and local elites(Clark 1990:50). NGOs can best facilitate popular participation indecision making when their projects or campaigns are small—scale.This constraint poses a problem for major funding agencies whichare used to dealing in large sums of money. One solution is to useinternational NGOs or federations of domestic NGOs asintermediaries which can allocate resources locally.Funding of Thai urban NGOs comes primarily from international NGOswhich in turn obtain funding from bilateral development agenciesand private donors. A notable exception is the Duang PrateepFoundation, which raises about 80% of its funds domestically (CUSRI1990:66).’ In the case of HSF, funding comes primarily from threeEuropean NGOs: Terre des Hommes, Christian Aid, and NOVIB. Only18% of funds come from domestic donations (HSF Progress Report1992).13 The Duang Prateep Foundation is famous in Thailandprimarily because of the legendary status of Prateep UngsongthamHata, who was acclaimed by the news media as a “slum angel” whenshe won the 1979 Magsaysay Award for her work as a kindergartenteacher in Khlong Toey slum. She used the award to set up theFoundation, which continues to focus on provision of kindergartenservices to slum children.46These international NGOs typically allocate funds in the form oftwo or three year projects. Such durations are insufficientbecause the pace of bottom—up development processes is determinedprimarily by the local dynamics of the characteristics, capacities,and situations of each community. The experience of HSF revealsthat the results of their work often take five or more years tobecome evident (interview, 2 March 1993).The annual budget for HSF-Bangkok has risen gradually, from2,700,000 Thai baht (approximately $135,000 Canadian) in 1989 to3,046,470 Thai baht (approximately $153,000 Canadian) in 1992(CUSRI 1990; HSF budget 1992). Once funding has been approved,periodic documentary progress reports and financial reports serveas the primary vehicles for communicating information about recentwork. The lack of hard, quantitative data in biannual HSF progressreports is not considered a problem because funding agencies“understand that you can not see immediate outcomes, but you cansee the progress” of strengthening the communities (HSF interview,2 March 1993).In the case of HSF, international NGOs choose to provide fundingprimarily on the basis of compatibility of their developmentphilosophies and objectives (Terre des Hommes staff interview;Terre des Hommes brochure). HSF staff say they have good relationswith their current funding agencies because they “share the samephilosophy” (interview, 2 March 1993).47Christian Aid is a British NGO which raises funds primarily fromprivate donors and churches to fund development programs in 70countries. The compatibility of its philosophy and objectives withthose of HSF is revealed in the following organizational statementof purpose:With no overseas staff it links directly with the poor throughlocal church and other organizations whose programs aim tostrengthen the poor toward self—sufficiency. It also seeks toaddress the root causes of poverty and spends up to 10 per centof its income on development education and related campaigningat home (Christian Aid brochure, emphasis added).Terre des Hoimiies — Germany (translation: “Ground of Humanity”) isa national branch of an international NGO. It too raises fundsprimarily from private donors (German Embassy brochure). Withinits general mission to serve children, the NGO’s central criterionin selecting projects to support is “whether the project work willpromote the emancipation of a group suffering from discrimination”(Terre des Honunes “Project Criteria” guidelines, June 1988). LikeChristian Aid, Terre des Hommes shares with HSF a focus onaddressing the root causes of poverty.The top—down flow of resources from international NGO5 does notnecessarily mean top—down program design. These funding agenciesallow HSF a high degree of autonomy in the planning andimplementation of community development programs. However, 11SFdoes feel constrained to the extent that the international NGOs doimpose even general program requirements (interview, 2 February1993). For example, Terre des Hommes requires that its fundsshould be primarily directed toward children, youth, and women.48Christian Aid is more flexible about specifics of intendedbeneficiary groups, but requires that its funds be spent onsalaries for field staff. Such constraints serve as an impetus forHSF to strive toward increasing the proportion of funds raisedindependently.’43.3.2 MANAGEMENT ABILITIESThough leadership is critical to the success of NGOs, usuallylittle attention is paid to leadership or management training.(Clark 1990, p.57) Having a strong, charismatic leader may bevital, but organizational health and effectiveness usually dependson participatory decision making and sharing of authority. HSFgovernance occurs primarily through collective discussions (eg.weekly staff meetings). By branching out spatially to formregional teams it has thus far avoided following the pattern of NGOorganizational growth which typically leads to bureaucratizationand “death” • 1514 International NGOs which have standard program designspecifications or standards encounter problems in working with theurban poor in Thailand. The main reason for the 1993 closure ofthe Foster Parents Plan (FPPI) Bangkok project was because itbecame virtually impossible to maintain contact with recipientfamilies while maintaining FPPI’s international standards ofadministrative efficiency. This difficulty arose primarily fromthe rising frequency of slum evictions and from staff time beingwasted in Bangkok traffic. The international office of FPPI denieda proposal to shift FPPI Bangkok’s work toward a focus on improvingland tenure (FPPI interview, March 1993).A Thai NGO organizer refers to an “organizational lifecycle” graph in a Canadian handbook entitled “Managing the NonProfit Organization” (Manitoba Institute of Management, no date).49However, the growth of HSF has led to some degree of hierarchy.The organization’s governance system has developed from a simplegroup consensus process to an increasingly complex managementstructure. The original Community Relations Group team,consisting of one to three staff, shared all decisions. As theteam grew to larger numbers this consensus system came intoquestion: senior members felt that in some situations the “biggroup has the power to make decisions but lacks sufficientinformation.” (former HSF organizer interview, 13 March 1993).Small domestic NGOs typically have weak management abilities.Unfortunately, remedying this weakness could undermine an NGO’scost—effectiveness and proximity to the poor, the verycharacteristics for which NGOs are so highly acclaimed. In thecase of HSF—Bangkok the eleven member staff includes threeadministrators: one secretary, one manager, and one officesecretary. HSF-Songkhla has a similarly small administrativestaff: of five persons, one is an accountant and one is a halftime coordinator (and half-time field worker). According to onefunding agency staff person, HSF performs basic administrativefunctions very well relative to smaller, less established Thai NGOs(Terre des Hommes interview, March 1993).3.3.3 ACCOUNTABILITY TO CLIENTSWhile NGOs must be financially accountable to funding agencies,50accountability to their clients -- in this case the urban poor --is of even greater importance in terms of their credibility andeffectiveness. Clark argues that to succeed, NGOs “must respond tothe problems and aspirations identified by the poor and must havea management and decision making structure in which they haveconfidence” (Clark 1990:49).Responsiveness to the urban poor is inherent in HSF’s communitydevelopment method. This method relies primarily on what Forester(1989) refers to as “the art of listening” (field observations,August 1992, March 1993). The method, as analyzed by a senior HSForganizer, involves a three part planning process (interview, 9February 1993). First, an NGO worker encourages slum dwellers tobrainstorm about the problems they face. The worker then informspeople about their rights regarding these problems. Third, theyplan how to organize in response to these problems. Theimplementation of planned activities is open-ended: “a rigidschedule or plan is not good for the development process”.Evaluative discussions are “not about success, but a chance tosynthesize the experience of working” (interview, 9 February 1993).This model derives from four central concepts (interview, 9February 1993):1. independent thinking;2. working in groups, not as individuals;3. going to the root of the problem;4. evaluation and learning.This community development method is based on being responsive andaccountable to the intended beneficiaries. The extent of popular51participation in planning, implementation, and evaluation ofactivities serves as a simple indicator of NGO responsiveness(former HSF organizer interview, August 1992). With a shift toward“third generation” NGO strategies, however, there may be a need formore systematic channels of accountability. Client participationin evaluation of the NGO would be one such channel.3.3.4 RELATIONS WITH OTHER NGOsNetworking among NGOs, on local, national, and internationallevels, can provide opportunities for sharing information, buildingsolidarity, and boosting morale. At least one study indicates thatfederated NGOs perform better than isolated ones, particularly ifthe linkage allows for autonomy of member organizations (Clark1990:86). A Bangkok slum NGO leader cites the lack ofcommunication and cooperation among Bangkok NGOs as a key factor intheir failure to prevent repeated violent evictions (Maier 1990:2).HSF tends to work independently of other urban poor NGOs, partlybecause it is generally considered more radical in emphasizing thefight against evictions rather than doing “first generation”charitable activities.’6 A sense of isolation is reflected in thecomment of one HSF organizer who lamented that since the closure of16 The Duang Prateep Foundation, which is by far Thailand’slargest urban poor NGO, devotes over half of its total budget to ascholarship program which funds slum children’s educationalexpenses (HSF organizer interview, 5 March 1993).52Foster Parents Plan—Bangkok “we are alone” (interview, 16 March1993). HSF is, however, a member of Thailand’s main NGO networkorganization (NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development). Asargued below (see section 4.3), developing collaborative evaluationcould necessitate a higher level of inter—NGO cooperation.3.3.5 RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTFor many NGOs, relationships with various levels and agencies ofgovernment are among the most important factors affecting theirability to function effectively. In the case of HSF, interpersonalconnections with key individuals in Thailand’s National HousingAuthority have been vital to the organization’s emergence andgrowth (former HSF organizer interview, February 1993). Morerecently, HSF has been involved with a successful effort topersuade the national government to fund the formation of a largeGONGO called the Urban Community Development Office.17 However,relations between HSF and local governments such as the BangkokMetropolitan Authority and the Songkhla municipality have been lesscooperative and sometimes hostile.Empowering the poor is fundamentally political. Governments tendto view the work of NGOs as a threat to their authority, and the17 The budget for the Urban Community Development Office isextremely high at 1.25 billion Thai baht (approximately $63 millionCanadian) during 1992-1997 (HSF Progress Report, January-June1992).53very existence of organizations which proudly define themselves asnon—governmental implicitly challenges and potentially underminesthe credibility of governments. The work of HSF sometimes involvessupporting slum communities in their struggles against localgovernments which are trying to evict them from municipal land (seesections 3.4 and 3.5 below).Governments typically view NGOs as competitors for internationaldevelopment funding. This phenomenon was observed in an interviewwith a Songkhla municipal officer who claimed that of foreignfunding to NGOs only “30% goes to the people and 70% goes foradministration” (interview, 25 February 1993). He advised that themunicipality has “a financial evaluation system but NGO5 don’t” andrequested that the researcher “send funding agencies directly tothis office” (25 February 1993).NGOs such as HSF which aim to strengthen grassroots peoples’organizations may be perceived as particularly threatening,especially to authoritarian or undemocratic regimes. In Thailand,government—condoned violence against NGO activists protesting thecontroversial Pak Moon dam project (reported in The Nation, March1993) indicated that even a relatively democratic regime may viewNGOs with hostility.543.4 HUMMI SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION - BMGKOKHSF—Bangkok offers a variety of services, ranging from theiroriginal slum community development programs (as analyzed above) toresearch, publicity, and support to autonomous CBO networks.During the 1990-1992 period, HSF-Bangkok worked directly with sixslums which were facing mass eviction (one of these is describedbelow), and four resettled communities.’8 It indirectly supportedfourteen slums facing eviction by providing services to the UnitedSlums Development Association. These services included legaltraining courses and assistance with lobbying government agenciessuch as the National Housing Authority and the Department ofCharitable.’9 HSF is currently developing a “housing hotline”through which communities facing a sudden eviction threat can alertother slum dwellers and thus rapidly mobilize defensive resistancecampaigns (HSF staff interview, 5 March 1993).Recent research and publicity work by HSF-Bangkok includes thefollowing: studies of informal sector workers such as mobilevendors; publication of documents entitled “Fight for Home” and“Homes and Lives” for distribution at the 1991 People’s Forum (held18 Two of these six slums facing eviction are located in NakhonRatchasima (a secondary city outside the BMR) and have been servedon an extension basis.19 One indicator of the growing independence of the UnitedSlums Development Association (USDA) is that the HSF staff lawyerwho had been serving this CBO network now works directly for it(USDA interview, 5 March 1993).55in conjunction with the World Bank/International Monetary Fundmeeting); and publicity about slums and the problems of the urbanpoor during the 1992 Thai election campaign (HSF report, “Summaryof Works in the Second Phase”). Currently the organization isundertaking a comparative study of social conditions and urban poorhousing problems in the secondary cities of Chiangmai, NakhonRatchasima, and Songkhla. Pursuing its pattern of diversificationand geographic expansion of services, HSF plans to support urbanpoor community development in Indochina.KELONG PRAI SINGTO COMMUNITYThe HSF—Bangkok project in Khlong Phai Singto slum exemplifiesthe integration of “second generation” community developmentstrategies and “third generation” NGO roles. This 135-householdcommunity, having begun settling along this former khlong or canalthirty to forty years ago, has been facing the threat of evictionby the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) since 1977 (leaderinterviews, 14 March 1993). This threat became particularlyextreme prior to the October, 1991 World Bank/InternationalMonetary Fund meeting at the new Queen Sirikit Convention Centre,which is located opposite the slum (across a major arterial road).One of the community’s defensive tactics was to erect a zinc fenceon which slum youths painted depictions of community life. RhiongPhai Singto, now known as “the painted wall community”, remainsintact. About sixty to eighty households intend to agree to56resettlement, however, if the terms of a promised World Bank fundedsites—and—services project prove to be affordable (leader and HSForganizer interviews, 14 March 1993).HSF-Bangkok has supported the community in resisting eviction byworking with leaders to develop strong CBOs, to organize self-helpbasic infrastructure upgrading, and to facilitate “thirdgeneration” development processes. CBOs include a general“Community Committee”, a “Savings Group for Housing”, and a“Housewives Savings Group”. Through these CBOs the communityparticipates in the United Slums Development Association“housewives group” and pro—democracy political campaigns. Thecommunity secured funding from the Dutch Embassy to install arudimentary running water system which serves each household. InMarch, 1993 the community was collecting donations from its membersto fund upgrading of the main footpath. HSF has also assisted inarranging meetings and seminars to try to work out a proposed landlease with the BMA (HSF “Progress Report” 1992).One reason why the residents have been adamant in resistingeviction is that most of them are employed in street vending in theimmediate vicinity. According to an HSF-funded and facilitatedparticipatory action research study, about 80% of Khlong PhaiSingto households sell fresh sliced fruit or somtham (spicy papayasalad) out of three—wheel carts. The location of the community ——within walking distance of both the Khlong Toey produce market and57the Sukhumvit Road business district -- is ideal for this type ofvending. The vendors typically go to purchase their produce atabout 3:00 AN, return to the community to spend two to three hourspreparing their fruit or salad, then wheel their carts one or morekilometres to various vending locations. HSF published thisinformation as a brochure, including photographs and a colourcover. The dwellers can now use it when they meet with governmentagencies or talk to reporters.HSF-Bangkok staff evaluate their work with slums such as KhlongPhai Singto in terms of the community’s changing capabilities tocollectively plan and take action in improving their livingconditions and, most importantly, in defending their housingrights. They view reduction in the intensivity of conflict betweenfactions as one indicator of the NGO contribution to communitycooperation (HSF Progress Report 1992; interviews, 16 March 1993).Evaluating CBO networking activities is difficult because of theirdynamic nature. For example, the project plan may specify fouractivities “but some cannot be implemented [so] we have to know whynot, and meanwhile start other activities.” (interviews, 16 March1993). The degree of success of policy advocacy is recognized byorganizers as even more complex because it “depends on manyfactors” (interviews, 16 March 1993). HSF—Bangkok’s main purposein working with the community is to support the dwellers inresisting eviction, so the ultimate indicator is whether the58community has remained.Khloncr Phai Singto dwellers and leaders evaluate their communitydevelopment efforts in terms of progress toward realization oftheir ambition to achieve land tenure security and to continueimproving their housing (interviews, March 1993). They identifyimprovements in physical and social service infrastructure (eg.walkways, water supply, daycare centre) as indicators of success.They evaluate the strength of their Community Committee in terms ofhow effectively it represents the community to outsiders (such asgovernment agencies), and its capacity to mobilize dwellers forpolitical campaigns (for example about 100 residents participatedin a 1992 demonstration against the military government).3.5 SONGKHLA SLUMS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTSongkhla is a fishing and port city of about 85,000 people locatedon the east coast of southern Thailand. Combined with the 145,000population of Hat Yai, a neighbouring commercial centre and bordercity, this is Thailand’s largest urban population outside ofBangkok (Xeokungwal 1992:40).During the 1980s, government infrastructure projects, includingconstruction of the Ko Yor Bridge and a deep sea port, contributedto increasing eviction pressures on Songkhla’s slum communities.In 1987 dwellers in Kao Seng fishing village learned via a59television news report of a Songkhla municipal government plan toevict their community for tourist development (Ekachai 1990:116).This threat sparked HSF organizers to initiate the Songkhla SlumsCommunity Development Project (SSDP).A 1988 survey by the SSDP and the Songkhla Teacher Training Collegeidentified twenty one slum communities, with a combined populationof 7,863 people or about 9% of Songkhla’s total population (SSDP1988:6). These numbers are small compared to those of Bangkokslums, but are significant nonetheless. As shown in Table 3,recent government figures show the four largest Songkhla slums ashaving a larger population than the total found by SSDP (1988) •20TABLE 3: DATA ON SONGKIILA SLUM PROJECT COMMUNITIESCOMMUNITY POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS LAND OWNERKao Seng 2174 417 Ministry of FinanceThasa Am 3170 572 Buddhist templeBon Wua 1330 240 State Railway AuthorityKubo 3252 768 State Railway AuthorityTOTAL 9926 1997SOURCE: Office of Urban Development, Ministry of Interior, 1992.20 This discrepancy may result from several factors. First,there is evidence of rapid growth of slums, especially along thedefunct State Railway line. Second, the NGO and government surveysmay have varied in their definition of community boundaries.60The Songkhla HSF team has implemented similar community developmentmethods and activities as in the case of HSF—Bangkok, but hasremained primarily within the realm of “second generation”strategies. The team has worked toward the primary goal ofstrengthening slum communities through initiating and building thegrassroots accountability of CBOs, stimulating basic infrastructureupgrading efforts, encouraging inter—slum cooperation, andpromoting political action campaigns. Pre-existing communitycommittees were more accountable to the municipality than to thedwellers, so SSDP field organizers facilitated more democraticcommittees through a system of election of representatives to servevarious zones within the slums. Field organizers initiated thecreation of savings groups run by women. As in the case of HSF—Bangkok, these groups serve multiple functions: to increaseeconomic security (eg. by providing credit to members), to developorganizing and accounting skills, and to develop a demonstrablecapacity to buy or lease land. Similarly, organizers viewinfrastructure upgrading as more than just physical development.Combining money and time to do footpath improvements, canalcleaning, latrine construction, etc. serves to create a greatersense of cooperation, to enhance community pride, to developleadership skills, and to counteract local government complaintsabout slums as environmental menaces (SSDP “Progress Report” 1992).Inter—slum network activities serve as a means of mutual learningand political solidarity. For example, a meeting of leaders from61various slums served as an opportunity for sharing informationabout common concerns as well as a planning session in preparationfor an SSDP-organized outdoor all-candidates meeting and rallyduring the 1992 federal election campaign (observation, 29 August1992). As of March, 1993, however, there was not yet anyindependent federation of Songkhla slums.21 Aside from the initialsurvey of Songkhla slums (SSDP 1988), SSDP has done little researchor publicity work.SSDP initiated a primary school scholarship program which alsoserves a range of purposes (eg. combining charitable fundraisingwith public awareness about the plight of slum dwellers and thepresence of an urban poor NGO in Songkhla). This program may beterminated, however, perhaps in part because it is more of acharitable or “first generation” type of activity (see section 4.2below).KUBO COMMUNITYSSDP initiated the Kubo project in 1990. As in other communities,initial development activities included simple mutual-aid basicinfrastructure upgrading (eg. purchase of landfill to improve aflood-prone section of road along the railway track). SSDP21 SSDP organizers expressed frustration about allegedsabotage by municipal officials which destroyed years of work tobuild trust among slum communities. Leaders of Kao Seng and Kubocommunities clashed at a January, 1993 government sponsored meetingof community leaders.62attempted to undertake a survey to determine the tenure status ofeach household in the community. This information would have beenuseful in negotiating for land purchase or lease from the StateRailway Authority, but the survey was never completed because oftensions within the community (SSDP organizer interview, 1 March1993). The Railway Authority subsequently promised to consider aland use plan if the community were to submit one, but it warnedthat it would not grant new land leases beyond three years induration. According to SSDP, the Municipality and the RailwayAuthority share the goal of evicting the dwellers to resettlementareas outside of the city so that developers can use the land forcommercial purposes •22SSDP organizers consider their project in Kubo community to berelatively unsuccessful. They attribute the slow progress instrengthening Kubo to conflict between old and new leadershipfactions; conflict among land renters, owners, and squatters; thespread of the community along about three kilometres of formerrailway line; and lack of continuity of SSDP field staff(interview March 1, 1993; SSDP evaluation meeting, 25 January1993). Most of the Community Committee members live on land whichthey own, whereas SSDP is primarily concerned with supporting landrenters and squatters in lobbying for a long—term lease with theState Railway Authority. Conflict between Community Committee22 SSDP was working with a nearby slum (Lang Wat SalaHuayang), which was also located on Railway Authority land and wasfacing mass eviction.63members loyal to the municipality and those loyal to the NGO hasbeen particulary heated regarding the issue of an alleged lack ofopenness of accounting for revolving funds supplied by UNICEF.SSDP shifted its work to focus on the “Savings Group forHabitation” which it had initiated and provided training for.23 Asof February, 1993 the Kubo community centre, which had been used bythe savings group and others, was being used for storage only.As in the case of Rhiong Phai Singto, SSDP organizers evaluatetheir work in Kubo primarily in terms of the strengthening of CBOleadership. The lack of cooperation among various factions of thecommunity is the key indicator of failure.The leaders and dwellers of Kubo evaluate the success of communitydevelopment in terms of popular participation and actual changes inliving conditions. Leaders use the question “does anything ofbenefit go to the dwellers?” as the key criterion in consideringthe merits of activities (leaders interviews, 17 February 1993).When asked for examples of success they list well—attendedcommunity events such as a New Year religious ceremony, Queen’sbirthday activities, and neighbourhood clean-up parties. Fromtheir perspective the extent of popular participation is the bestindicator of success.Training consisted primarily of organizing field visits forSongkhla slum women to learn from the experiences of establishedsavings groups in Bangkok and elsewhere (leader interviews, 18 and23 February 1993).64Kubo dwellers who are not CBO leaders typically evaluate communitydevelopment in terms of immediate improvements in their economicsecurity and physical quality of life. Squatters focus more on theproblem of tenure security, but they lack a sense of ability to doanything about it. Those asked what the solution might begenerally respond “I don’t know” (dweller interviews, 23 February1993). One elderly market vendor, who had previously been evictedfrom another slum, comments with sad resignation: “I don’t knowwhere to go if evicted from here”.KAO SENG COMMUNITYThe Kao Seng fishing village has existed at its present location --at the southern end of an approximately five kilometre stretch ofsandy beach —— since it was evicted from the northern tip of theSongkhla isthmus in 1957.24 Kao Seng’s location is vital to itseconomic viability. In addition to small-scale fishing andmanufacturing of sun—dried salt fish, the economy of Kao Seng isbased on a busy roadside produce market. When the governmenterected a sign in 1987 indicating plans for development of the siteand relocation of the community, dwellers responded by throwingrocks to destroy the sign. Six years later the community remainsand the National Housing Authority likely will not proceed with24 Kao Seng dwellers tell the story of how their originaleviction was ordered by the late prime minister Field MarshallSarit Thanarat when he stepped on some human excrement on thebeach.65subsequent stages of site and infrastructure development at theresettlement location (National Housing Authority interview, 5March 1993).The work of SSDP in Kao Seng has included a somewhat broader rangeof activities than those described above. The scope of NGO supporthas gone beyond basic infrastructure improvement, CBO creation andstrengthening, and assisting with organizing and lobbying for landtenure. In 1990, for example, a British architecture studentinitiated a participatory community design process which resultedin a plan for land readjustment and physical development inaccordance with the needs expressed by Kao Senci residents. Thisplan has served not only as a political tool but also as a guidefor self—determined development.25In 1991 SSDP provided the majority of funding for materials toconstruct a kindergarten/community centre. This expenditure was adeparture from the NGOs usual avoidance of providing major funding,and it was the main cause of an almost 80% SSDP annual budget overrun (HSF “Financial Summary” 1991). The decision to fund thecentre proved to be valuable, however, as a substantialmanifestation of the NGO’s support for the community and as a wayof creating neutral meeting space (leader interviews, 21 February1993).25 The residents are already implementing this plan. Forexample, houses have been readjusted to widen a footpath so thatgarbage trucks can now serve the interior of the community.66The SSDP team considers Kao Seng a success story. The strength ofthe community is evident not only in the fact that it has not beenevicted but also in the improved physical quality of life in thecommunity. Most importantly, the team identifies success as thecapacity of the people to carry out ongoing development andadvocacy activities with less and less help from the NGO.26SSDP organizers evaluate their work in Kao Seng in terms of thecommunity leaders’ capacities for self—evaluation and strategicplanning. When asked why the community development work there hasbeen so successful, an organizer responds thatThe leaders review themselves and their activities regularly.They often think about new initiatives, especially how tomobilize people for community development activities and how tocirculate information among the people. They can analyze who isenemy, who is ally, what to do in what situation. The leadersknow each others’ skills, so they can put the right person inthe right job (SSDP interview, 15 February 1993).Indicators of success are evident in the relatively high level ofparticipation in problem solving: “everybody tries to think itout”, whereas the degree of participation is less elsewhere (SSDPinterview, 15 February 1993). The process of development towardincreasingly participatory decision making can be measured not onlyin the increasing number of people becoming active but also in the26 The Kao Seng Community Committee is an elected body oftwenty people. Business discussed at one meeting (19 February1993) included how to enforce the five Thai baht/month ($0.25Canadian) taxation of market vendors. The Market Committee, a subgroup of the Community Committee, collects this tax to partiallyfund the salaries of two kindergarten teachers. Another item ofdiscussion was how to keep the roadway through the community clearof salt-fish drying so that the recently negotiated municipalgarbage pick up could proceed efficiently.67increasing ratio of “thinkers” to “doers” in community meetings.The most vital NGO role in supporting this process is to intervenein such a way that people who are afraid to participate will beginto do so.Kao Seng leaders and dwellers attribute their success in part tothe eviction threat. Members of the Community Committee citelevels of popular participation as the most important indicator(interviews, 21 and 22 February 1993). They use the example of howthey “tested people’s strength” by visiting each house in thecommunity to announce a protest, and succeeded in mobilizing over2,000 dwellers to attend. Leaders emphasize how their closerelations with the dwellers enable them to discuss projectstogether as neighbours and to mobilize mass participation inactivities.27 Dwellers evaluate community development in terms ofimprovements in infrastructure, economic security, and tenuresecurity (interviews, 1 March 1993). For many, their dream for thefuture is simply “to stay here”.3.6 SUMMARYHSF faces the challenge of how to make itself increasinglyeffective despite funding constraints and a high degree of27 This proximity is primarily informal, but it is reinforcedby a ward system through which five zones elect four leaders each.68isolation from other actors such as municipal governments and otherurban poor NGOs. While funding from foreign sources is beingeroded due to Thailand’s economic growth, domestic fundraising forcommunity development is difficult because of public preferencesfor supporting charitable and relief work. HSF’s emphasis onstrengthening CBOs and supporting slums in their struggles for landtenure is fundamentally political. Unlike other urban poor NGOs inThailand, HSF seeks to increase community capacities to mobilizeeconomic and political resources both from within and from externalsources. The purpose of this work is not so much to alleviate thesymptoms of urban poverty, but rather to challenge the structuralimbalances of power which are its root causes.HSF’s working method is shifting from second generation to thirdand fourth generation NGO strategies. Increasing the emphasis onresearch, publicity, and provision of support services toautonomous CBO networks is one means of scaling up developmentimpact. The Bangkok team has been able to make this shift morerapidly than the Songkhla team, partly because of the higher levelof slum CBO organizational capacity.Analysis of the work in three slums reveals a pattern of NGO staff,community leaders, and dwellers citing different types ofindicators of slum community development. As shown in Table 3,dwellers focus on the products, leaders focus primarily on massparticipation in activities, and HSF staff focus primarily on69processes. These different foci reflect the different developmentoutputs of each level of actors. Although the outputs of eachlevel can contribute to the success of the next level, interveningvariables such as relations with local government can impede orenhance this contribution. Therefore, NGO performance should notbe evaluated only by the final outputs. This point confirms thatthe capacity of various NGO evaluation approaches to measureintangible improvements in process is one factor which should beconsidered in assessing these approaches (Chapter 4).TABLE 3: INDICATORS OF SLUM COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTDWELLERS Tenure securityEconomic securityInfrastructureLEADERS Mass participation in CD activitiesUnity of communityHSF STAFF Participation in decision makingSelf reliant activity managementSelf reliant planning and evaluationCollaboration with other communitiesPolitical and social change activismFUNDING AGENCY STAFF Achievement of stated objectives70CHAPTER 4EXTERNAL, INTERNAL, AND COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONThis chapter links general analysis of participatory evaluationwith case study evidence to analyze the purposes, methods,strengths, and weaknesses of external, internal, and collaborativeevaluation.4.1 EXTERNAL EVALUATIONExternal evaluation of HSF serves two main purposes. First, it isa means of accountability to funding agencies. In addition to biannual progress reports and financial narratives, the internationalNGOs which fund HSF conduct periodic evaluations to assess theextent to which their funds are being spent in accordance withproject proposals. They also attempt to monitor the communitydevelopment activities and assess the impact these activitiesappear to be having on quality of life, equity, and other generalprogram goals. Essentially, this central purpose is to assess therecipient NGO’s performance.71The second purpose is to facilitate learning on the part of thefunding agency. In the case of a Christian Aid evaluation of theSSDP project, for example, data gathered from field visits were tobe used in a report on urban community development projects inThailand, Chile, and Bolivia (Christian Aid memorandum, 14 January1993). Terre des Hommes (Germany) specifies that evaluationresults “must be reappraised within Terre des Hommes so thatlessons can be learned from the experience” (“Project Criteria”guidelines, 1988). For a funding agency to learn about howdevelopment activities are actually implemented can be important inimproving policy guidelines on how to work with recipient NGOs(Antrobus 1987; Carroll 1992). In addition, this learning processcontributes to development education purposes in donor countries.For example, Christian Aid brochures, which fold out to becomeposters, consist primarily of illustrated project case—studies(Christian Aid brochure, 1992).The method of conducting external HSF evaluations consistsprimarily of brief site visits by funding agency staff. In thecase of Christian Aid, the evaluator comes from Britain, whereasTerre des Hommes (Germany) relies mainly on Thai staff employed ina Bangkok branch office. A February, 1993 Christian Aid evaluationof SSDP was conducted during a three day period. It includedbriefings by the SSDP staff, interviews with them and leaders ofproject communities, and observation of meetings and livingconditions in the communities. The evaluator attempted to follow72a set of general guidelines. These guidelines provided a detailedlist of suggested questions about the following dimensions of theproject: description, objectives, short— and long—term benefits,expenditures, and sustainability of impact. Many of the questions,especially regarding long—term benefits, focused on relativelyintangible but vitally important aspects of community developmentsuch as “what is the degree of popular participation” and “havepoor communities been strengthened?” (Christian Aid memorandum, 14January 1993).By contrast, Terre des Hommes staff accept these intangibles asunmeasurable. Their evaluation criteria are the quantitativeobjectives set forth in project proposals. For example, a proposalmight state that a savings group will be formed with a targetmembership of 100 for the first year. If the evaluator finds theattained membership is lower, she or he attempts to investigatewhether the problem is with the people or with the NGO staff. Theprocess of strengthening the community “is up to the NGOs [and] isnot evaluated by Terre des Hommes” (interview, 10 March, 1993).Regardless of whether the method attempts to measure intangibles,external evaluations of HSF have virtually excluded the possibilityof participation (as defined in section 1.2) by project staff,clients, or other stakeholders. Their role in the evaluation hasbeen mainly to supply information. In this respect the case of HSFconfirms the criticism of external evaluation found in73participatory program planning literature (see section 2.1).The main strength of external evaluation in this context is that itsatisfies funding agency reporting requirements in a timely andreasonably cost—effective manner. It generates data which can beused as an objective basis for making decisions about whether andat what level to renew funding. It may also contribute to theeducation of funding agency staff and of concerned citizens indonor countries.There are at least three significant weaknesses of externalevaluation methods used in the context of HSF. First, they eitherignore or make weak attempts to assess the main task of this typeof NGO: strengthening communities. Measuring results in terms ofnumbers only tends to focus attention on physical development suchas infrastructure. As the case of Kubo illustrates, work oninfrastructure improvement does not necessarily lead to sustainablecommunity development. The Christian Aid evaluation model set outto directly assess the process of strengthening communities, butthe brevity of the evaluation, combined with the evaluator’sinability to speak Thai, rendered this difficult task virtuallyimpossible. Both the Christian Aid and the Terre des Hommesevaluations of HSF fail to answer the most critical questions abouthow well the NGO is performing in strengthening the clientcommunity (eg. improvements in the extent of local selfdetermination, the capacity for participatory planning and74networking, and the degree of CBOs’ accountability to theirmembers).A second weakness is that external evaluation uses the time of therecipient NGO and the client communities without delivering anydirect benefits to them. As an extractive rather than particpatoryform of research, external evaluation is primarily a unidirectionalrather than mutual learning process. HSF staff and the slumdwellers they work with learn little of value to their work. Theevaluation results are retained by the funding agencies, so they donot serve as a form of feedback for ongoing program planning. Inthis respect the experience of HSF reconfirms the generallimitations of external evaluation in the context of communitydevelopment programs (see, for example, Rugh 1986; Lawrence 1989).Third, external evaluations of HSF set a non—participatory exampleof how to manage programs. For some Asian urban poor NGOs,evaluation is considered an obligatory task which deserves minimaleffort because it is just another requirement imposed by fundingagencies.28 As Sen (1987:161) observes, many NGOs share a“perception of evaluation as a non—legitimate activity.” Onesenior NGO activist counters this negative perception: “evaluation28 At an international planning meeting for the Asian Coalitionfor Housing Rights (ACHR) Training and Advisory Project arepresentative from the Overseas Development Agency CODA) stressedthe need for a solid monitoring and evaluation plan. Yet duringthe three day meeting this aspect of planning was virtually ignored(observation, February 1993).75is not something ‘required by [the funding agency)’, but should beconceived as our own management tool” (letter included in Patel1993). As analyzed below, one HSF internal evaluation replicatedthe non—participatory character of the external evaluations towhich it is regularly subjected. Similarly, annual self-evaluations of slum community leaders are less participatory thanthey should be, as suggested in the comment from a field workerthat such meetings “need deeper discussion among dwellers”(interview, 25 February 1993). The external evaluation approachmay be a learning experience for the recipient NGO, but the lessonis a negative one.4.2 INTERNAL EVALUATIONThis section analyzes the purposes, methods, degrees ofparticipation, strengths, and weaknesses of SSDP internalevaluation. The analysis includes references to two case—studyevaluation processes. One is a biannual comprehensive SSDPinternal evaluation meeting which occured at a Sakom districtseaside resort (24 and 25 January 1993). The other is a review ofthe SSDP scholarship program which consisted primarily of meetingsheld in the beneficiary slum communities.Internal evaluations by Thai urban poor NGOs serve a variety ofpurposes in addition to satisfying funding agency expectationsabout project management. The main purposes are to summarize past76activities and strategies and to plan future ones. As one seniorHSF organizer comments, evaluation is “not about success, but achance to synthesize the experience of working” (interview, 8February 1993). In the case of the SSDP comprehensive review, thepurpose included summative evaluation of the projects in eachclient community and a general evaluation of the overall teamstrategy. In the case of the scholarship program review, thepurpose was to diagnose problems encountered by recipients in thedisbursement process and to gather data about program impact (eg.what the money was actually being used for). In both cases theprimary reason for summarizing and assessing the experience andprocess of community development is to plan subsequent phases.The internal evaluation methods of SSDP are simple. For thebiannual review the SSDP Coordinator wrote an evaluation plan whichfocused on four categories of information: slum leaders, dwellers,development activities, and field workers’ relations with thecommunities. During the three weeks prior to the evaluationmeeting the four field workers were to visit each of the six clientcommunities, working in pairs of two. The meeting agenda dealtwith each community, first reviewing the situation and thenplanning the strategy and activities for the upcoming period. Atthe end of the last day of this meeting a discussion about inter-community networking strategies led to a brief planning sessionregarding the team’s long range strategy and division of labour.This session included extensive comments from a senior advisor (a77founder of HSF who now works for an environmental NGO) about howSSDP might scale up its impact by shifting from ‘second generation’community development methods to ‘third generation’ NGO roles (eq.providing consultation and support to CBOs and regional intersectoral CBO networks). Significantly, this important long rangeplanning was not part of the evaluation plan or the meeting agenda(see analysis of “weaknesses” below).Seven people participated in the SSDP biannual review: the fivestaff members and two senior staff of other Songkhla-based NGOs.These two are considered ‘insiders’ because they work with the teamCoordinator as a three—person Steering Committee. The evaluationstrategy failed to include representatives of client communities orany other interested parties. As in the case of the scholarshipprogram evaluation, the role of client groups and individuals wasfor the most part limited to that of suppliers of information.These two processes were internally participatory, but the extentof strategic involvement of clients or other outsiders was notsufficient to categorize the evaluations as collaborative.The main strengths of the SSDP evaluation processes are that theycreate an opportunity for reflection and planning, that theyfacilitate staff learning, and that they generate rich, usefulinformation. The work of urban poor community development NGO5such as 11SF is an intense process. Although the weekly staffmeetings of SSDP allow for informal discussion of activities and78events in each of the client slums, staff see value in allocatingmore substantial amounts of time for methodical review and planning(interviews, 24 and 25 February 1993). When asked about thebenefits of the Sakom meeting, one field worker responded that itwas good because it encouraged her to “reflect and listen toreflections” and to “see the process in other communities”.Another revealed a sense of value in collective strategic planning,commenting that “to improve the process, the team should discusstogether”.SSDP evaluations serve as a learning process for the staff. In theHSF organizational culture, formal staff training is minimal andthe emphasis is on “learning by doing” (interviews, 22 January and24 February 1993). Staff comments suggest that the evaluationprocess facilitates sharing of wisdom among generations of staff.One young field worker said the Sakom meeting was useful because“senior people help” with the discussion of problems and withbrainstorming (24 February, 1993). In this respect, internalevaluation shares a common strength with more broadly participatoryevaluation (see section 2.2.1), but the learning process does notextend to the NGO’s client groups.Another strength of participatory evaluation which is evident inthis case of internal evaluation is the richness and utility ofevaluation results. The Sakom meeting generated a wealth ofdetailed analysis of topics such as the characteristics of various79categories of leaders in each community, levels of popularparticipation, the history of intra-community and inter-communityconflicts, levels of popular recognition of SSDP and its role, andother topics. Because the majority of evaluators were fieldworkers, the process was more effective than external evaluationwould have been in assessing intangible dimensions of communitydevelopment. The richness of this information was directly usefulfor program planning. Review discussions were followed immediatelyby planning discussion (observation, 24 and 25 January, 1993). Theevaluation results were created by and for the NGO team. Theprocess served as a self—management tool which enabled the team tomake a direct linkage between summative evaluation and subsequentprogram planning.SSDP self evaluations exhibit four principal weaknesses: a lack ofcritique of the team’s own performance and of its communitydevelopment strategy; inherent subjectivity; inadequatedocumentation; and, a lack of connection to the concerns of otheractors (eg. funding agencies and local government).Sen (1987) argues NGO self—evaluation processes can be vital toorganizational strengthening. In this case, however, theopportunity for such strenthening was limited. As noted above, thestrategic review portion of the Sakom meeting came as an additionto an already full day of discussions. The evaluation plan andmeeting agenda was framed within a “second generation” set of80normative assumptions about the role of the NGO in communitydevelopment.While staff consistently expressed satisfaction with the Sakommeeting as an evaluation of activities in each community, someexpressed the opinion that there was an inadequate amount ofreflection on the strength of the team itself. Interviews(February 1993) revealed that at least some SSDP staff are keen topursue more “third generation” strategies such as policy advocacyand public awareness work, yet they feel a lack of skills in theseareas. The Sakom meeting failed to address questions of staffperformance, capabilities, or training needs. Nor did it reviewthe project management and administration. At least oneparticipant indicated a need for such a review, but recognized thatit is a “sensitive issue” because criticism of the existing systemcould be felt as personal attacks on the project Coordinator(interview, 25 February 1993). In the context of such a small NGO,team participatory self—evaluation is an inadequate process fordealing with such sensitive matters.29The inherent subjectivity of internal evaluations is anotherweakness that characterizes the Sakom and scholarship programreview processes. For example, community leaders with closerelations to the Songkhla municipal government are labeled “bad”,29 This difficulty is particularly true in the context of Thaiculture which places great emphasis on avoiding loss of face andshowing respect for seniors.81whereas ones with close relations with the NGO are labeled “good”.These affiliations may indeed tend to correspond with objectiveleadership quality criteria (eg. accountability to dwellers,integrity, etc.), but quite possibly NGO staff assessments ofleaders are unfairly influenced. In some cases leaders mightchoose to affiliate more closely with the local government thanwith the NGO because they view this as their best means of securingoutside resources for the community. In the case of thescholarship program review, parents of recipients have an obviousdisincentive to criticize the program. Not surprisingly, theparents attending review meetings offered few if any negativecomments about it. If the question appears to be whether to cancela charitable program, the beneficiaries are unlikely to say ‘yes’.A third weakness of SSDP self evaluation processes is inadequacy ofdocumentation. Most of the rich, detailed information discussed atSakom went unrecorded. Field workers did prepare brief writtenreports for each of the communities, and the project accountantwrote summary notes of the meeting, but other than these documentsthere is virtually no record of the Sakom evaluation results. Thelack of a record is a problem because it misses an opportunity todocument historically significant work. More importantly, suchdocumentation would reduce the negative impact of discontinuitiesof field staff due to high staff turnover. In the case of Kubo,for example, the field worker who took over in 1992 after a severalmonth lapse in the SSDP presence in the community received no file82of past evaluations of the work there. In addition, thoroughdocumentation of the wisdom shared by senior organizers could proveuseful in training new staff.A fourth weakness evident in the SSDP internal evaluation processesis a lack of connection to the concerns of other actors. As shownin the case of Kubo, the conflict between the Songkhla municipalityand SSDP constrains the NGO’s capacity to function effectivelythere. Internal evaluations, because they are by definition closedprocesses, are ineffective means of increasing communication amongstakeholders. This strength of collaborative evaluation (Pietro1983; Greene 1988) is not shared by internal evaluation. On thecontrary, the Sakom process may have actually reinforced the ‘usand them’ mentality reflected in comments such as “we don’t needthe government” to function (SSDP staff interview, 13 January1993) The discontinuity between the content of the Sakomdiscussions and the concerns of funding agencies was alsoproblematic. For example, the internal evaluation focused on thefield workers’ relationships with members of the communities,whereas the external evaluation conducted the following month byChristian Aid focused on the impact of SSDP activities. When theChristian Aid evaluator asked what proportion of a certain30 This attitude may be reasonable in view of the fundamentaldifferences in the government and NGO community developmentmethods. Evidence suggests that the conflict does impede SSDP’scapacity, however. For example, the Kubo scholarship reviewmeeting was cut short when a man with ties to the municipalityentered and became aggressive (observation, 18 Februrary 1993).83community benefited from the SSDP intervention, the field workerresponded that “100 % recognize the leaders and about 60 %recognize me” (observation, 10 February 1993)Identifying the lack of connection to the concerns of other actorsas a weakness of internal evaluation (at least in this particularcase) is not intended as an attack on SSDP or its evaluationprocesses. Indeed, it could be stated with equal or greatervalidity that this gap is a weakness of external evaluation.Similarly, other stakeholders such as local governments can beaccused of not considering the concerns or perspectives of theNGOs. The point here is not who is to blame for thediscontinuities and lack of coordination among various evaluationprocesses. Rather, it is to argue that there may be opportunitieswhich could be exploited through collaborative evaluationprocesses.4.3 TOWARD COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONThis final section begins to answer the question: “how could morebroadly participatory evaluation processes strengthen thecapacities of an NGO such as HSF to support sustainable urban poor31 This communication gap may result from problems with thetranslation process. Nonetheless it is a microcosm of thediscontinuity between internal and external evaluation.84community development?”.32 The section considers the suitability,viability, and implications of collaborative evaluation in thecontext of HSF-Bangkok and SSDP. The section hypothesizes aboutthe purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, andweaknesses of collaborative evaluation as it might develop in thiscontext. The section concludes with an analysis of implicationsfor each of the NGO capacity variables identified in Section 3.3.The above two sections show the limitations of external andinternal evaluations of HSF. The former approach is non—participatory and contributes little to the achievement of programgoals. The latter can be classified as a form of “participatoryself—evaluation” (see Rugh 1986; Uphoff 1991). It fails, however,to include participation of intended beneficiaries. Otherweaknesses of this approach partially confirm Sen’s (1987:166)conclusion that NGO self—evaluation “tends to be impressionisticand unsystematic”. The Sakom meeting was systematic in analyzingthe constraints and opportunities in working with variouscategories of leaders in each community. The evaluation performedweakly, however, in assessing the NGO itself. Both the internaland external evaluations have been constrained by being mutuallyexclusive.32 Internal evaluation is participatory, but to a lesser extentthan collaborative evaluation.854.3.1 PURPOSES OF COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONHypothetically, collaborative evaluation could serve both fundingagency and HSF purposes. It could be a means for summarizing andplanning program activities while simultaneously producing anassessment of HSF performance. In addition, it could serve thepresumably shared goal of strengthening the NGO’s strategicplanning capabilities. Participation of intended beneficiariesmeans that evaluation becomes a direct as well as an indirect meansof strengthening communities. The quality of such participation,and the extent to which it promotes and facilitates the developmentof democratizing self-evaluation at the CBO level, may beconsidered indicators of NGO performance.4.3.2 METHODS: PLANNING COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONSOne way to achieve collaboration among the funding agencies, NGOstaff, community leaders, and slum dwellers would be to use an“evaluation facilitator” (see Swantz 1992). In the context ofrelatively large—scale programs this role can be played by aninternational expert or team (Salmen 1987; Hatch 1991; Lovell1992). In the case of small to medium-sized programs such as SSDPand HSF-Bangkok, however, it might be more viable to develop localexpertise so that future collaborative evaluations would notnecessitate large travel expenditures.86Training is the primary input required to develop collaborativeevaluation capabilities (Feuerstein 1987; Swantz 1992). The firstlevel consists of training evaluation facilitators who can thenorganize training workshops for NGO staff and other participants.In the case of SSDP, training could be provided to local academicsand staff of regional NGO and CBO network organizations. In thecase of HSF-Bangkok, existing NGO support networks andorganizations may already have the capacity to train evaluationfacilitators.33 In both cases training would most appropriatelyoccur through exchange programs.Learning by doing, and by seeing what others do, is the preferredmode of training among typical Asian NGOs. Senior NGO staff inSongkhla suggest that training/exchange programs with MalaysianNGOs may be more economically viable than with Bangkok ones(interview, 29 August 1992). In both Songkhla and Bangkok,training for collaborative evaluation would involve local actionsupported by international exchange and learning among NGO5.For example, the Chulalongkorn University “NGO AcademicService Committee”, an interdisciplinary network of academicsformed in 1991, organizes training programs for NGO staff (“StaffDevelopment for Nongovernmental Organization” [no date], ContinuingEducation Centre, Chulalongkorn University).The Asian Coalition for Housing Rights “Training andAdvisory Project for Community Based Human Settlement in UrbanAreas”, sponsored by the South East Asia Development Division ofthe Overseas Development Administration (SEADD), will use themajority of a 649,000 pound (Sterling) budget to facilitatelearning through exchange among member NGO5 and CBOs during the1993—1996 period (SEADD 1992).87Planning how to implement a collaborative evaluation process andselecting appropriate research techniques are tasks which mustthemselves be planned. Levels of participation should increase asthe process moves from pre—planning to planning to actualimplementation of the evaluation. Evaluation planning ideallyinvolves representatives from each category of actors. In the caseof a relatively minor evaluation, such as the biannual review of asmall program, broad participation may occur only in theimplementation phase. The details of different evaluation planswill vary, but certain elements should be included.1. The means of selecting participants should be specified, withparticular consideration given to the problem of ensuringparticipation of less powerful sub—categories of actors (eq. thepoorest of slum dwellers and women).2. The role of the evaluation facilitator in relation to thevarious participants should be clearly defined.3. The variety of indicators used by each category of participantsshould be considered (see Table 4).4. There should be a strategy for documenting the process andresults of the evaluation (see Rugh 1986).5. There should be a means for achieving continuity through88subsequent evaluations. Sustainable community development in thecontext of Thai slums takes many years of NGO involvement.35 Plansshould recognize that ultimately the effectiveness of theevaluation itself needs to be evaluated.4.3.3 PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE EVAlUATIONThe range of participants in collaborative evaluation begins withthe NGO and the intended beneficiary communities as the centralactors (see Vargas 1991:269). Funding agencies may participate,but in a less central role. In the case of HSF, the logistics offunding agency participation may be problematic for those agencieswhich lack offices in Thailand. They could, however, have input inplanning collaborative evaluation without actually being directlyinvolved in the implementation.Opportunities for participation by governmental organizations wouldbe limited, particularly where relations with NGO5 are hostile. Inthe case of HSF—Bangkok, a collaborative evaluation mightappropriately include the Urban Community Development Office (aGONGO funded through the NHA). Other potential governmentparticipants would be the Crown Property Bureau, the NHA CommunityDevelopment Department, and perhaps the Bangkok MetropolitanAuthority. In the case of SSDP, relations with the SongkhlaUrban poor NGO field workers say the process normally takesfive to ten years (HSF interview, 12 August 1992; Duang PrateepFoundation interview, 12 March 1993).89municipality are currently so hostile that collaboration wouldprobably not be viable. However, a semi—neutral evaluationfacilitator may be able to serve as an intermediary and thus assistin breaking through current communication barriers.Participation of outside NGOs and CBOs would be appropriate. In1991 HSF—Bangkok invited assessments of its performance from otherurban poor NGOs and CBOs (HSF “Progress Report”, 1991). Many ofthe comments were extremely negative, perhaps in part because offundamental differences in development approaches. Unfortunately,such feedback could exacerbate the tensions and lack ofcoordination among urban poor NGO5. As noted in Section 3.2, HSFis somewhat constrained by a sense of alienation. Thereforeinviting participation of NGO5 which work in other sectors butwhich have a similar development approach would be appropriate.Such intersectoral collaboration already occurs to some extent, andincreasing it would create further opportunities for buildingsolidarity within the Thai NGO movement. Another potential benefitis mutual learning about substantive development issues (eg. urbanNGOs being influenced by environmental NGOs). In the view of atleast one NGO network organizer, evaluation of community organizingwork in the urban and the rural sectors “is the same because thedevelopment method is the same” (interview, February 25, 1993).Participation of community leaders and dwellers is a central90feature of collaborative evaluation, yet this necessity posesseveral practical difficulties. First, NGO staff are likely to bereluctant. One reason is that the strengthening of slum CBO5 isoften impeded by corrupt slum leadership. The NGO role is partlyto intervene in ways which lead to the development of moredemocratic leaders. Interventions in slums to promote grassrootsdemocracy upsets existing intra—comrnunity power structures.In practice, even benign intervention is a form of manipulation.Rahnema critiques the role of the NGO “barefoot developer” as anagent of “manipulation” in the name of participation (1992:124).In the Thai NGO movement, the issue of how and whether to involvecommunity representatives in NGO governance is a much discussedtopic (interview, 1 September, 1992). Exclusion of slum leadersand dwellers from evaluation may be partly intentional. One SSDPworker comments that the Sakom meeting was good because it was achance to “talk freely about problems” in a discrete context (24February 1993).A second practical difficulty is that slum dwellers and leaders maylack the time and inclination to participate. One SSDP fieldworker comments that “community development is just one part ofslum life” (25 February, 1993). For poorer dwellers, levels ofparticipation in implementing activities are constrained by thedaily exigencies of survival. Expecting them to participate in NGOevaluation may be unrealistic and unfair. Participation of women91is particularly problematic because of their “triple role” asproducers, reproducers, and community managers (Moser and Peake1987:13).Collaborative evaluation would tend to exclude disadvantagedsegments of slum communities unless such evaluation implementsaffirmative action measures. Leaders are typically relativelywealthy, in part because others cannot afford to donate so muchtime to their communities (observation and leader interviews, 16-21February 1993) •36 To extend participation in evaluation beyondthe level of the advantaged segments of slum communities wouldrequire proactive efforts such as reimbursement of childcare andtravel expenses, and perhaps even some form of honorarium. Suchexpenditures would be justifiable in the interest of strengtheningthe accountability of the NGO to its intended beneficiaries.4.3.4 STRENGTHS M4D WEAKNESSES OF COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONCollaborative evaluation of NGO5 such as HSF could result inlearning and empowerment to the extent that the range ofparticipants includes disadvantaged members of client communities.Having an established feedback system would help ensure that the36 pornchokchai (1992:168) offers convincing evidence tosupport his conclusion that “many of the slum population are notvery poor”. Among Kao Seng leaders interviewed for this study, onehad a large new house which looked like it should be in an uppermiddle class suburb, another had a large rooming house, and anotherhad a gleaming Harley Davidson motorcycle parked in front of hispool hall.92work of HSF is consistent with the principle of slum dwellers’self—determination. This system could be a channel through whichbottom—up communication would enhance accountability to thegrassroots.Another strength of collaborative evaluation is that it couldproduce a more rigorous and methodical assessment of the NGOitself. Compared to internal and external approaches, it could beuseful in making a transition toward “third generation” and “fourthgeneration” strategies.Stronger analysis and documentation of HSF’s work would alsostrengthen its capacity to share its experience with outsider NGOsand CBOs which come for exchange/training/solidarity visits. Forexample, in 1992 SSDP organized slum visits for participants in aninternational grassroots planning project called the “People’s Planfor the 21st Century” (see Panyakul 1992). Building linkages amongNGOs and CBOs from the local level to the global level is becomingthe primary means through which people with alternative visions ofdevelopment are able to strengthen their effectiveness.Collaborative NGO evaluation both relies upon and facilitates suchlinkages.As noted above, the inherent subjectivity of participatoryevaluation approaches is a commonly cited weakness (see sections2.3.2 and 4.2). However, Pagaduan and Ferrer (1983: 157) conclude93from the experience of applying a “Community Based EvaluationSystem” in the Philippines that participatory techniques yieldeddata which were “more accurate” than if they had been obtainedthrough a random survey of respondents:Since most of the data were collected in groups, exaggeratedresponses were checked and avoided. According to theparticipants themselves, “the process allowed for everyone toexpress his/her views, check and clarify each other’srecollection of events and processes, and to be thorough andsystematic”.Similarly, drawing together a diversity of subjective perspectivesregarding the performance of an NGO such as HSF could generate areasonably objective overall assessment. Overcoming thesubjectivity problem reaffirms the importance of the evaluationfacilitator role. Part of this role is to introduce some basicsocial science principles and techniques which can be incorporatedwithin the collaborative evaluation.The costs of collaborative evaluation, both in terms of programbudgets and participants’ time, could constrain opportunities forapplication of the approach. This constraint would be particularlysignificant in the context of small programs such as SSDP. In asituation where just five staff members are attempting to providecommunity development services to thousands of slum dwellers,taking even two days out (as for the Sakom meetings) can bedifficult. NGOs such as HSF are action-oriented, and spending timeto evaluate must be considered in terms of the missed opportunityto work in the field. However, to the extent that participantsrecognize the potential benefits of more collaborative evaluation94they would be willing to pay the costs.4.3.5 IMPLICATIONS OF COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONWhat, then, are the hypothetical implications of collaborativeevaluation for HSF in terms of the five NGO capacity variablesidentified in this thesis?RELATIONS WITH FUNDING AGENCIESRelations with funding agencies would shift further from the top-down foreign aid model and toward a more egalitarian relationshipof mutual learning. Creating colloborative evaluation processesinvolves integrating HSF’s accountability to funding agencies andto the urban poor. This integration means that bottom—up flows ofinformation and influence would more directly determine top—downresource flows. It would require 11SF and funding agencies toconsider one another’s purposes of evaluation and indicators ofsuccess. For example, it would mean learning how to combineassessments of NGO impact with analysis of NGO relationships withCBOs and communities.MANAGEMENT ABILITIESShifting toward collaborative evaluation would both require andfacilitate stengthening of 11SF management abilities. Such a shiftmeans becoming more systematic in assessing staff performance andin considering how to implement third and fourth generation95development strategies.ACCOUNTABILITY TO INTENDED BENEFICIARIESBuilding regular channels of accountability to the urban poor wouldhelp minimize the risk of losing touch with the principle ofpopular self determination. To the extent that slum leaders’ anddwellers’ feedback influenced subsequent NGO action, collaborativeevaluation might enhance HSF credibility and hence its capacity tostimulate community action. Involving slum dwellers and leaders inevaluation would serve the additional purpose of providingopportunities for them to learn about democratic programmanagement.RELATIONS WITH OTHER NGOSAs suggested above, collaborative evaluation of HSF would bothrequire and facilitate strengthening of linkages with other NGOsand CBO5. Building stronger relationships among NGOs which work indifferent sectors but share similar development approaches wouldenhance opportunities for combining learning and solidarityactivities.RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTWhere HSF relations with government are too hostile to permitparticipation in collaborative evaluation, application of theapproach would have little direct impact on this variable.Indirectly, however, other evaluation participants might help to96assess whether the hostility is a serious problem. If it is, theremay be opportunities to plan possible solutions.4.3.6 SUMMARYTable 5 summarizes the purposes, methods, levels of participation,strengths, and weaknesses of the three evaluation approaches.TABLE 5: SUMMARY OP EXTERNAL, INTERNAL AND COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONEXTERNAL INTERNAL COLLABORATIVEPURPOSES fimding agency reporting, summarize developmentactivities, (combines NGO, community, anddevelopment education plan future activities funding agency purposes)METHODS NGO and community visits community visit rotation, evaluation facilitator coordinatesgroup discussionPARTICIPATION funding agency staff NOt) staff, senior advisors NGO staff,community leaders, dwellers,other NGOs and CBOs,funding agenciesSTRENGTHS efficient reporting, planning opportunity, all participants learn,donor learning staff learning, community empowennent,rich and useful results rich and useful results,NOt) and CBO networkingWEARNES SE S weak measure of community dcv., lack of NOt) critique, costly,no benefit to recipients, inherently subjective, subjectivesets negative example inadequate documentation97CHAPTER 5CONCLUS IONThe global trends of rapid urbanization and increasing disparitybetween rich and poor have been particularly extreme in the case ofThailand. The benefits of Thailands spectacular economic growthhave been unequally distributed. For many of the over one millionslum dwellers of Bangkok this boom period has resulted in masseviction. Recent evidence suggests that slum communities inregional cities such as Songkhla, Chiang Mai, and NakhornRatchasima are also facing a trend of increased eviction.During the last three decades strategies for housing the urban poorin Third World countries have shifted from provision of housing toa community enabling approach. Relatively inexpensiveinterventions such as subsidization of serviced building sites andupgrading of existing slum and squatter communities have largelyfailed to stimulate the creation of adequate quantities ofpermanent, affordable shelter. The apparently wide consensus infavour of policies which enable the urban poor to solve their ownshelter problems contains a fundamental ideological split between98those who emphasize self—reliance and those who emphasize self—determination combined with redistribution of resources.This thesis has analyzed the work of the Human SettlementFoundation, a small, indigenous NGO that works with Thailand’surban poor communities. Using an embedded single—case researchdesign, the thesis analyzed the work of HSF in three slumcommunities. This work involves supporting a wide range ofcommunity development activities, including infrastructureupgrading, formation and strengthening of CBO5, negotiating forland tenure, and policy advocacy. The main purpose of HSF work isto increase the capacities of urban poor communities to mobilizeeconomic and political resources, from both internal and externalsources. Improvements in these capacities mean increased levels ofself-determination.Like other Thai NGOs which share a similar community developmentapproach, HSF is gradually shifting away from direct interventionin communities and toward what Korten (1990) calls “thirdgeneration” and “fourth generation” strategies. These strategiesinclude doing research, publicity, and policy advocacy. To theextent that “second generation” efforts have succeeded inorganizing strong, democratically structured CBOs and CBO networks,the role of NGOs can shift toward provision of support services tothese independent organizations.99Program evaluation is perhaps the single most crucial means ofimproving NGO effectiveness. Recent literature on participatoryevaluation criticizes conventional external evaluation as aninappropriate approach in the context of community developmentprograms. Evidence from numerous sources shows that participatoryevaluation can serve several purposes, including learning andempowerment of program staff and intended beneficiaries, andenhanced communication among various categories of actors.The approach can produce high quality results. Compared toexternal evaluation, the results of participatory evaluationcontain rich information about program context and are capable ofmeasuring intangible dimensions of community development. Mostimportantly, these results are immediately useful in planning andimproving community development programs.At least four factors impede widespread adoption of participatoryevaluation. 1) It is relatively costly. 2) It is inherentlysubjective, relying primarily on insiders’ views rather than onmeasurements made by outsiders. 3) Funding agencies may bereluctant to use it for practical, political, and ideologicalreasons. 4) There is a lack of awareness and skills about it,even in the NGO sector.In the case of HSF two evaluation approaches are currently in use:external and internal. External evaluation of HSF serves as a100means of accountability to the European NGOs which fund it. Thisapproach also facilitates learning on the part of these fundingagencies. The evaluation method, which consists primarily of briefsite visits by staff, satisfies the above purposes in a reasonablycost—effective manner. The evaluation excludes participation ofrecipient NGO staff and client communities except as suppliers ofinformation. It has three principal weaknesses: 1) it isineffective at measuring NGO performance in the central task ofstrengthening communities; 2) it contributes little to programplanning or achievement of program objectives; and, 3) it sets anexample of non—participatory program management.Internal evaluations by HSF serve primarily to summarize pastactivities and plan future ones. Biannual reviews consist ofrotating staff among client communities and then meeting to discussthe development issues in each. Such reviews, at least in the caseof SSDP, involve participation of all program staff and a fewsenior advisors. Internal evaluation by HSF teams has threeprincipal strengths: 1) it creates an opportunity for reflectionand planning within the action-oriented NGO working method; 2) itfacilitates staff learning; and, 3) it generates rich, usefulinformation. It exhibits four principal weaknesses: 1) it lackssufficient critique of the team’s own performance and of itsstrategy; 2) it is inherently subjective; 3) it is not welldocumented; and, 4) it lacks connection to the concerns of otheractors.101Hypothetically, broadly participatory collaborative evaluationcould be an improvement over the external and internal approaches.Using a relatively neutral evaluation facilitator, it could involveparticipation of HSF staff, slum leaders and dwellers, fundingagencies, other indigenous NGO5 and CBOs, and, perhaps, governmentbodies. Facilitating inclusion of disadvantaged segments of slumcommunities would necessitate some form of affirmative actionstrategy.Developing the approach in the context of the Thai NGO movementwould require training in the form of exchange programs and supportfrom academic institutions. In Songkhla, training could occurthrough building linkages with Malaysian NGOs. HSF-Bangkok hasaccess to a wider range of resources for organizationaldevelopment. In both cases stronger cooperation with local NGOsworking in different sectors would be beneficial.The weaknesses of collaborative evaluation would be similar tothose noted in the literature on participatory evaluation. Again,each of these weaknesses can be addressed or alleviated.In addition to the strengths noted in the literature, collaborativeevaluation could produce more rigorous and methodical assessmentsof HSF. Most importantly, it could strengthen HSF’s capacities tosupport sustainable urban poor community development.102APPENDIX ARECOMMENDATIONSThis appendix offers general recommendations to two categories ofactors: funding agencies and academics interested in internationaldevelopment program planning.1. FUNDING AGENCIESAs indicated above in section 1.4, much of the policy literature onNGO5 frames questions from the funding agency perspective. Onecentral problem is how to select authentic NGO5 which are capableof implementing cost effective development projects. Establishedinternational NGOs such as Oxfam have well documented performancerecords, but the strengths and weaknesses of the many new NGOs indeveloping countries are relatively difficult to assess. Hellingersuggests that major international funding agencies can rely oninternational NGOs for advice about NGOs in developing countries(1987:139). Indeed, this case study suggests that internationalNGOs can serve as intermediary funding agencies.International funding agencies seeking to increase the extent ofcollaboration with domestic NGO5 in their human settlementsdevelopment programmes need to develop their own abilities toengage in effective communication about how they might provide103appropriate support to local NGOs and CBOs. Recent internationaldevelopment policy literature contains analyses of many of thecommon opportunities and constraints associated with NGOcollaboration (see Hellinger 1987; Clark 1990; Sanyal 1991;Carroll 1992). Building appropriate linkages is far more complexthan merely selecting authentic, effective NGO recipients.Jorge Anzorena, who has spent decades encouraging collaborationamong human settlements NGOs around the world, offers the followingadvice about how funding agencies can best address the needs of theurban poor (Anzorena 1993:131):Try to learn their way of communication, through personalstories. Through them you will find a way to learn and then toshare your knowledge with the people.It is very important that the people participate in everystage of the programme: in the planning, in the management, inthe evaluation. The way of proceeding will be different, butyou will find something new happening.New things are indeed happening. Increasingly, the onus is on alllevels of actors in development processes to learn about and fromeach other. Collaborative evaluation is one practical means forfacilitating such mutual learning.The emergence of the bottom—up paradigm of internationaldevelopment as a viable alternative to past models implies thatfunding agencies must give up some power in order to make theirresources more effective. It means that funding agencies, too,need to develop abilities to participate more effectively insupporting processes which lead to sustainable community development.1042. INTERESTED ACADEMICSThis thesis has attempted to make a small contribution to theliterature on participatory evaluation of community developmentprograms. The author hopes that some readers will be inspired tofurther pursue this area of research and action. The following isa list of questions which deserve further investigation.1. How can collaborative evaluation processes build effectivechannels of accountability among intermediary NGOs, intendedprogram beneficiaries, and funding agencies?2. In what ways does an NGO’s interventionist role as a promoterof more democratic organizational structures at the community level(ie. accountable CBOs) conflict with the principle of bottom updevelopment, and how does this conflict affect opportunities forcommunity participation in program evaluation?3. What practical strategies can be used to enable the leastadvantaged segments of poor communities to participate inevaluations?4. What specific methods can minimize problems of bias or evenconflict of interest arising from the inherent subjectivity ofparticipatory evaluation?1055. How can academics contribute to the strengthening of communitydevelopment processes by serving as evaluation facilitators or byassisting in the development of participatory research trainingprograms (see Peattie 1983; Women’s Research Centre 1987;Feueurstein 1988; Swantz 1992; Hall 1979, 1993)?106APPENDIX BMETHODOLOGYThis case study uses an embedded single—case research design tostudy three units of analysis: the NGO as a whole, regional sub—offices, and specific slum communities. The Human SettlementFoundation is the largest unit of analysis, and each of the othersare embedded within it.TABLE Al: EMBEDDED UNITS OF ANALYSISHUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATIONBANGKOK SONGKRLA CHIANG MAI NAKHON RAT.Khlong Phai Singto Kao Seng Rong Kaje Ratchanikun 1Bon Gai Kubo Khlong Nung Kau LoyRimthang Rotfai Bon WuaChalerm Anusorn BorhwaSena Pattana SamrongOn Nuuch Ruam Pattana40 RaiThe rationale for using a single-case design is that this is anexample of what Yin (1989:47—48) calls a “unique” and “revelatory107case”. Human Settlement Foundation is one of the few slum NGOs inThailand which are committed to playing a truly enabling role,focusing on strengthening community organizations rather than onproviding charitable services. It is the only one to haveinitiated projects outside of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region.Within this case study approach the author used the following fieldresearch methods: interviewing, participant observation, anddocumentary research.i) interviewees: NGO staff and advisors, local government andNational Housing Authority officials, funding agency staff,community leaders, and slum dwellers.ii) participant observation: throughout field work.iii) documentary research: primary documents (biannualprogress reports, project proposals, evaluation reports, memoranda,brochures, etc.) and secondary documents (studies, publishedreports, and newspaper articles).Interviewees included members of the following organizations orgroups. In cases where the author interviewed more than one personthe number of people interviewed is given in brackets.1. FUNDING AGENCIESTerre des Hommes — Coordination Office Southeast AsiaChristian Aid108UNICEF — East Asia and Pacific Region OfficeUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations ESCAP/UNCHS Joint Unit on Human SettlementsUnited States Agency for International Development - RegionalHousing and Urban Development Office (2)2. NGO SUPPORT NETWORKSAsian Coalition for Housing RightsSouth NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural DevelopmentThai Volunteer ServiceChulalongkorn University NGO Academic Service CommitteeAlternative Development Studies Program - Chulalongkorn UniversitySocial Research InstituteThai Development Support CommitteeUnited Slums Development Association3. THAI URBAN POOR NGOsHuman Settlement Foundation - Bangkok (5)Human Settlement Foundation - Songkhla (5)Human Settlement Foundation - Chiang Mai (2)Human Settlement Foundation - former staff (3)Duang Prateep Foundation (4)Building Together Association (2)Grassroots Development Institute4. SLUM COMMUNITY LEADERSKhlong Phai Singto (3)109Kubo (7)Kao Seng (8)5. SLUM DWELLERSKhlong Phai Singto (2 households)Kubo (4 households)Kao Seng (4 households)6. GOVERNMENT BODIESCommunity Development Department, National Housing Authority (3)Office of Urban Development, Ministry of Interior, Kingdom ofThailandSongkhla MunicipalityField observation included the following events and sites:1. NGO MEETINGSUrban Community Development Office -- planning meeting with NGO5and CBOs (Xavier Hall, Bangkok; August 1992)Chiang Mai NGO inter-sectoral network planning meeting (Chiang MaiYMCA, August 1992)Human Settlement Foundation internal evaluation meeting (LeelaResort, Sakom District; January 1993)Human Settlement Foundation weekly staff meeting (Songkhla office,February 1993)Asian Coalition for Housing Rights -- Training and Advisory Projectplanning meeting (Bangkok; February 1993)1102. COMMUNITY MEETINGSSongkhla slum network -- federal election rally planning meeting(Bonwua community, Songkhla; August 1992)Songkhla slum network —— campaign meeting (Bonwua community,Songkhla; February, 1993)Kubo community —— scholarship program evaluation meeting (Kubocommunity leader’s residence. Songkhla; February 1993’)Kao Seng community —— scholarship program evaluation meeting (KaoSeng Children’s Centre; February 1993)Kao Seng Community Committee -- general meeting (Kao SengChildren’s Centre; February 1993)3. COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS AT WORKRong Kaje, Khlong Nung (Chiang Mai; August 1992)Kubo (Songkhla; February 1993)Khlong Phai Singto (Bangkok; March 1993)4. 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