PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION OF URBAN POOR NGOs IN THAILAND

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B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1988

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The School of Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming

to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

December 1993

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ABSTRACT

The global trends of rapid urbanization and increasing disparity between rich and poor have been particularly extreme in the case of Thailand. The benefits of Thailand's spectacular economic growth have been unequally distributed. For many of the over one million slum dwellers of Bangkok this boom period has resulted in mass eviction. Recent evidence suggests that slum communities in regional cities are also facing a trend of increased eviction.

This case study analyzes the work of the Human Settlement Foundation, a Thai nongovernmental organization (NGO) which supports the formation and development of community-based organizations as a means for enabling and empowering Thailand's urban poor to solve their shelter problems. The study focuses on the role of program evaluation in strengthening NGO capacities. It analyzes the purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, and weaknesses of external and internal evaluation processes as they are applied to NGOs.

The thesis links field evidence with recent literature about participatory program evaluation to identify opportunities and constraints which might arise with the introduction of more collaborative evaluation processes. Basic data sources include semi-structured interviews; participant observation; primary documents such as project proposals, progress reports, memoranda,
and brochures; and secondary documents such as studies, reports, and newspaper articles.

The study finds that both external and internal evaluation have limited potential for strengthening NGO capacities. It develops a hypothesis about how more broadly participatory collaborative evaluation would affect the following five NGO capacity variables: relations with funding agencies, management abilities, accountability to clients, relations with other NGOs, and relations with government.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank my wife, Sarah, for her patience and loyalty, and for maintaining her sense of humour through this project.

I thank Prod Laquian for his encouragement and prompt feedback, from the research design stage through to editing. I thank Michael Leaf for providing thoughtful, rigorous critiques of my analysis.

Peter Boothroyd, Brahm Wiesman, Terry McGee, and Kris Olds deserve special thanks for their strategic guidance during the initial phases of this project. I also thank Pat McIntosh for her expert copy editing.

I thank the Canadian Bureau for International Education for the honour of being awarded a two-year scholarship under the CIDA Awards for Canadians program. I also thank the University of British Columbia Centre for Human Settlements for providing a graduate student travel fellowship.

Finally, I am deeply indebted to the Thai people who assisted me as hosts, advisors, and interviewees. I hope that their time was not wasted.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

This thesis analyzes evaluation of Thai nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It includes a case study of the Human Settlement Foundation, an indigenous NGO which supports the formation and development of community-based organizations as a means for enabling and empowering Thailand's urban poor. This case study analyzes the purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, and weaknesses of external and internal evaluation processes as they are applied to NGOs. The thesis links field evidence with recent literature about participatory program evaluation to identify opportunities and constraints which might arise with the introduction of more collaborative evaluation processes.

1.2 SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

The general scope of this thesis includes four main categories of actors in the urban poor community development process:

1. slum dwellers
2. people's organizations
The thesis presents the inter-relationships among these actors as a sequence of resource inputs and development outputs. As illustrated in Figure 1, there are processes of information feedback which can potentially change funding or other community development resource inputs. These processes, combined with analyses of gathered information, are known as 'evaluation'.

There are three types of evaluation defined here. External evaluations are processes through which the performance of a program is assessed, typically by or on behalf of funding agencies (see feedback arrows on right side of Figure 1). Internal evaluations are conducted primarily by program staff (see feedback arrows on left side of Figure 1). Collaborative evaluations are jointly conducted, typically involving participation of program staff, funding agency representatives, and client communities.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are non-profit public interest groups which are independent of any government or public sector organization. Community-based organizations (CBOs) are the same as NGOs except that they operate not only for the people but by the people. Normally they are focused on a specific geographical area. They operate primarily on a voluntary basis, in contrast to typical NGOs.¹

¹ Section 3.1 includes a more detailed discussion of different types of NGOs.
FIGURE 1: SCOPE OF RESOURCE AND INFORMATION FLOWS

FUNDING AGENCIES

- money

DOMESTIC NGOs

- leader training, support services

SLUM COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

- mobilization for collective action

SLUM COMMUNITIES

- collective action
Participatory strategies are approaches to development which maximize individual and community involvement in decision making at all stages of projects and programs. Such approaches typically involve the strengthening of people's organizations so that they can plan and decide how to solve local problems. This process, commonly referred to as 'empowerment', consists of disadvantaged people developing their abilities to mobilize economic and political resources both from within their communities and from outside sources.

A slum is a type of human settlement characterized by high density and physically and/or legally substandard dwellings. In Thailand this term includes squatter communities, where people occupy public or private land without consent of the landowners.

Sustainable community development includes all activities directed toward enhancement of the long term economic, ecological, and social viability of a particular community.² In the context of housing the urban poor, economic sustainability includes establishing security of tenure and maintaining affordability of shelter. Ecological sustainability includes minimization of harmful impact on surrounding environment. In this thesis,

² This term can also refer to cultural dimensions of communities. However, analysis of culture as a factor in development is beyond the scope of this thesis. For an example of ethnography of Bangkok slums, see Rabibhadna (1975).
sustainability of community development also refers to the process of creating and strengthening community-based organizations so that slum dwellers can become able to plan, implement, and evaluate their own development activities.

The spatial scope of this study includes NGO teams in Bangkok and in Songkhla, a secondary city located in southern Thailand. Within these primary units of analysis the study analyzes three specific communities as sub-units: Khlong Phai Singto (in Bangkok), Kubo, and Kao Seng (both in Songkhla). As described in the methodology section (Appendix B), this case study format is called an "embedded" single case design (Yin 1989).

1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis is an exploratory study. Rather than attempting to prove any causal relationships among variables, it attempts to develop a hypothesis which could be applied in further research. The hypothesis derives from analysis of evaluation phenomena in a particular organizational and geographical context (small, domestic NGOs doing urban poor community development work in Thailand). The study identifies the following set of general NGO capacity variables: relations with funding agencies, management skills, accountability to client communities, relations with other domestic NGOs, and relations with government (see Section 3.1 for explanation of these variables). By analyzing field data in light
of literature about participatory program evaluation, the study develops a hypothesis about how collaborative evaluation as an independent variable would have implications for the five NGO capacity variables.

The bottom-up paradigm of international development planning serves as both a philosophical orientation and a theoretical tool in this thesis. Bottom-up development entails rejection of the modernization model in favour of strategies which seek redistribution of wealth and power in conjunction with grassroots action to build sustainable communities. The paradigm challenges the concept of international development as unidirectional delivery of foreign aid. Instead it calls for supporting networks of autonomous people's organizations which can facilitate mutual learning processes and empowerment of disadvantaged groups (see Hellinger et al. 1988; Korten 1990; Sachs 1992).

1.4 RATIONALE AND BACKGROUND

This thesis is significant because it addresses a critical aspect of an important real world problem — how to more effectively support urban poor community development in Thailand — and because it helps to alleviate the lack of academic knowledge about insider perspectives regarding evaluation of domestic NGOs. This section introduces the latter rationale, arguing that literature on participatory development tends to frame questions in terms of
outsiders' policy concerns while neglecting the perspectives of local NGO workers and beneficiary communities. The section proceeds to review the following five background topics:

1. urbanization and poverty trends in developing countries;
2. the evolution of urban poor housing policy;
3. urbanization and poverty in Thailand;
4. low-income housing trends in Bangkok; and,
5. the situation of slums in Thailand's regional cities.

1.4.1 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION

The connotations of "participation" differ when viewed from the perspective of international policy texts and from that of urban poor communities. Hosaka (1993:133) offers the following critique of outsider views:

Seen by "experts from outside" or from "above" popular participation is often described as a means to efficient development management: if one organizes "target"(!) population one can "mobilize"(!) more human "resources"(!) for smooth implementation of a project, leading to self-motivated (and hence cheaper) maintenance of the project afterward. But how can people conceive themselves as a "target"? Popular participation, viewed from "within" by people themselves, in terms of heightened awareness, self-determination, and expanded mastery over their own community, is itself an objective of a development process.

Much of the literature on 'participation in development' poses the problem as a question of how to entice the poor to contribute
resources to projects or programs which are not their own.\(^3\) For some, participation is simply a means to reduce costs and avoid local resistance to development schemes imposed from above. From the slums of Thailand the problem could appear inversely as a question of how communities can persuade governments and funding agencies to participate.

The trend toward participatory development has coincided with an increased interest in the role of NGOs. Many human settlements policy experts argue that community-level NGOs, also known as 'community-based organizations' (CBOs), should have a greater role in urban development because of their capacity to achieve much with very little money (Angel 1983a; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1986; Yap 1989a; UNCHS 1990). According to the Global Report on Human Settlements (UNCHS 1986) and the Brundtland Commission report (WCED 1987), international development agencies should increase collaboration with domestic and international NGOs because they can provide cost-effective channels for assistance to the urban poor. Although such arguments indicate an apparently progressive trend in international development policy, they actually reveal a fundamentally 'top-down' bias. NGOs are viewed from the perspective of donor agencies and policy experts as 'channels' or 'vehicles' for delivering development. The views from small, local NGOs -- from the field workers, administrators, and coordinators

\(^3\) For an excellent critique of "participation" see Rahnema (1992).
who struggle from day to day and from year to year to make their activities more effective — are virtually absent from the policy debate about how and why to increase the role of NGOs. This thesis attempts to help rectify this imbalance of perspectives in the literature by presenting views of local NGO staff and slum dwellers regarding program evaluation.

1.4.2 URBANIZATION AND POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Developing countries are undergoing rapid urbanization and a widening of socio-economic disparities. During the 1990s the urban population of developing countries will increase from 1.5 billion to an estimated 2.2 billion people (UNDP 1991:10). By the year 2000 there will be 21 'megacities' (with populations exceeding 10 million), 17 of which will be in developing countries (World Bank 1991:3).

Economic development policies and programs, including the ubiquitous 'structural adjustment' schemes, are contributing to the exacerbation of socio-economic disparities in developing countries. The World Bank refers to this macroeconomic policy-induced downward mobility as "a transitional problem" (World Bank 1991:45). According to Human Development Report 1990, the total global number of urban households living in absolute poverty will increase by an estimated 76% during the 1990s (UNDP 1990).
1.4.3 STRATEGIES FOR HOUSING THE URBAN POOR

The growth of urban poverty in developing countries calls for acceleration of the policy shift from provision of housing toward an "enabling" approach (see Turner 1983). This shift began with the recognition that public housing cannot meet the shelter needs of the urban poor because it is too expensive to construct enough units and those units that do get built typically house middle-class households (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989). The idea that informal sector housing processes are not the problem but a source of solutions, promulgated by Laquian (1969), Turner (1972, 1976), Perlman (1976), and others, resulted in the development of 'sites and services' and 'community upgrading' approaches.

Provision of serviced building sites was viewed as a more viable approach because it would minimize public expenditure and mobilize popular participation in construction. Ultimately, however, the sites and services approach was criticized for having some of the same problems as public housing (Peattie 1982; Laquian 1976, 1983). In addition to problems of scale and affordability, the peripheral location of most sites and services schemes proved to be inappropriate for the majority of the urban poor who rely on centrally located informal sector employment.

Slum and squatter community upgrading emerged during the 1970s and 1980s as a cost-effective approach which allows the urban poor to
remain in locations near to informal sector employment. Upgrading projects have proved relatively successful, especially where the issue of land tenure was avoided as in the case of Indonesia's Kampung Improvement Programme. One impediment to community upgrading, at least in Thailand, has been that land owners typically avoid granting more secure tenure to slum dwellers because it would restrict their ability to exercise their land development rights. In some cases slum residents have resisted upgrading because they feared it would lead to eviction (Angel 1983b).

As it becomes increasingly apparent that governments are unwilling to provide sufficient serviced sites or enough upgrading of existing housing, the preferred policy approach is to "enable" people to solve their own shelter problems. Despite a wide consensus about the need for development of a so-called "enabling" approach, there are sharply divergent views about what kind of shelter policies should be adopted. The neoclassical argument, as represented in papers by Mayo, Malpezzi and Gross (1986) and the World Bank (1991), stresses that policy should be based on 'effective demand' and that subsidies to the urban poor should be avoided through 'cost recovery' mechanisms. As Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) argue, however, the poor's needs for adequate shelter and basic urban services can only be met through redistribution of resources. This redistribution needs to occur both internationally and domestically.
1.4.4 URBANIZATION AND POVERTY IN THAILAND

Thailand's urbanization and current economic boom are associated with increasing socio-economic disparity. The population of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), which now exceeds 9 million, is growing at an annual rate of about 3.3%. The population of the BMR as a proportion of the national total grew from 13.2% in 1970 to 15.5% in 1988, and it is projected to reach 17.7% by 2001 (Isarankura 1990:59).

The benefits of Thailand's rapid industrialization and economic growth have been unequally distributed. Between 1976 and 1986 the richest 20% of Thais increased their share of total national income from 49.3% to 55.6% (Komin 1991:118). During the same period the income share of the poorest quintile dropped from 6.1% to 4.6%, and the richest 10% increased their share from 33.4% to 39.2%. This dramatic increase in inequality of income has evidently resulted mostly from the disproportionate share of economic development occurring in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region relative to the rest of Thailand, so most poor BMR residents have probably experienced rising real incomes (Yap 1989b:29).

1.4.5 LOW-INCOME HOUSING TRENDS IN BANGKOK

Increases in the real incomes of Bangkok's poor have not necessarily translated into improved shelter conditions because of
skyrocketing land prices. Dowall (1989) cites the boom in production of developer-built low-cost housing as evidence that Bangkok's housing market is performing efficiently. The cheapest of these suburban formal-sector units are affordable to households below the 40th income percentile, but not to those below the 20th (PADCO 1990:121). The number of slum housing units in metropolitan Bangkok increased from 139,000 in 1974 to 171,000 in 1988, but the percentage of slum housing as a proportion of total stock in the region declined (PADCO 1990:38).

**TABLE 1: SLUM HOUSING STOCK IN METROPOLITAN BANGKOK, 1984 AND 1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance from city centre</th>
<th>Slum units 1984</th>
<th>Slum units 1988</th>
<th>Change 1984-88</th>
<th>Percentage increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5 (km)</td>
<td>69,906</td>
<td>63,907</td>
<td>-5,999</td>
<td>- 8.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>46,031</td>
<td>40,654</td>
<td>-5,377</td>
<td>- 8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>36,581</td>
<td>47,718</td>
<td>11,137</td>
<td>30.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>6,370</td>
<td>15,398</td>
<td>9,028</td>
<td>141.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 30</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>135.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>160,145</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,638</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,493</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.55</strong></td>
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</table>


The alarming trend in recent years has been the displacement of slum dwellers to peripheral locations. As shown in Table 1, slum housing stock in the core area declined significantly between 1984 and 1988, and it more than doubled in the urban periphery during the same period. Analysts suggest this trend has persisted in recent years (Yap 1992; Pornchokcharee 1992). Given the ongoing
boom in urban development and associated escalation of land prices, evictions of centrally located slum communities will probably continue.

The suburbanization of Bangkok's slum communities may not be as serious a problem for dwellers who find work in the new factories around the city, but the many slum households that continue to rely on primarily informal sector employment in the city centre face increasingly severe constraints on their access to suitable shelter (Yap 1989b). Such massive slum displacement, combined with rapidly escalating land prices throughout the BMR, increases the urgency of efforts to develop effective strategies for housing Bangkok's poor.

1.4.6 SLUMS IN REGIONAL CITIES

The published literature on Thai slums virtually ignores secondary cities such as Chiang Mai, Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen, Hat Yai, and Songkhla. A recent urban poor "basic minimum needs" study by the Thailand Development Research Institute surveyed 300 secondary city households (of a 1,000 household sample size) in order "to allow for variation and regional comparison" (TDRI 1992:21). Unfortunately the report failed to disaggregate its results by region. There is evidence that slum development projects have

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4 The study revealed that Thailand's urban poor rank tenure security as their most important basic minimum need (TDRI 1992). This finding confirms the legitimacy of NGOs work to support slum dwellers struggles against eviction. As the case of Songkhla's slums indicates, the threat of eviction is a problem in secondary
been functioning in at least some of Thailand's secondary cities since 1980 when UNICEF and the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) initiated the Regional Cities Congested Area Improvement Project (Phoonwasde 1987). In 1985 this project was integrated with the Regional Cities Development Project which received additional funding from the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank. This slum upgrading project ostensibly sought to "encourage full citizen participation in community development and self-reliance", yet, as Phoonwasde reveals in Figure 2, DOLA and the regional municipalities created a top-down organizational structure so that the project could be "implemented quickly and efficiently" (Phoonwasde 1987).

FIGURE 2: REGIONAL CITIES PROJECT ORGANIZATION CHART

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

PROJECT MANAGER

CONTACT TEAM

COMMUNITY COMMITTEE

PEOPLE

cities as well as in the BMR. A regionally disaggregated comparison of how slum dwellers rank tenure security as a basic minimum need would be extremely interesting.
Bottom-up slum community development programs, like those initiated by urban poor NGOs in Bangkok in the early 1970s, were virtually non-existent in Thailand's secondary cities until 1987 when the Human Settlement Foundation created the Songkhla branch.

1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The three core chapters of this thesis consist of a literature review, a case study, and a synthesis of the two. Chapter 2 critically reviews analyses of participatory evaluation in program planning literature. The chapter presents participatory evaluation as an alternative to conventional models, and proceeds to discuss opportunities and constraints associated with application of it in community development programs.

Chapter 3 is a case study of the Human Settlement Foundation (HSF). The chapter begins with an analysis of HSF in the context of the Thai NGO movement. It locates HSF in terms of three NGO typologies (by scale of activity, by type of activity, and by development approach) and describes the organization in terms of five key NGO capacity variables:

1. relations with funding agencies;
2. management abilities;
3. accountability to the urban poor;
4. relations with other NGOs;
5. relations with government.

Finally, the chapter provides a brief overview of the Bangkok and Songkhla units of HSF and the three slum communities included in
the study. This overview includes analysis of development indicators from the perspectives of NGO staff, community leaders, and slum dwellers.

Chapter 4 links theoretical literature on participatory evaluation with case study data on external and internal evaluation processes. The chapter analyzes each of these types of processes in terms of purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, and weaknesses. This analysis provides a basis for identification of opportunities and constraints of collaborative evaluation.

Two appendices follow the conclusion (Chapter 5). Appendix A offers policy recommendations for funding agencies and interested academics. Appendix B explains methodological details.
CHAPTER 2

PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION IN PROGRAM PLANNING THEORY

This chapter analyzes opportunities and constraints associated with participatory evaluation of community development programs. Program planning literature in both international development and adult education has responded to the emergence of participatory community development approaches with discussion of alternative evaluation models.

Evaluation is an essential element of program planning. However, as Feuerstein (1988) argues, many proponents of participatory approaches to community development fail to extend participatory principles to evaluation. Whereas participation of program beneficiaries in planning and implementation has gained widespread acceptance as an important characteristic of effective community development programs, participatory evaluation remains a neglected area in program planning theory.

In addition to this theory gap, there is a related practical rationale for analyzing opportunities and constraints associated
with participatory evaluation. The prevalence of external, expert-driven evaluation constrains opportunities for using evaluation processes and products to strengthen community development programs. As shown in chapter 4, NGOs engaging in small-scale community development may have evaluation goals which are fundamentally different from those of their funding agencies. External evaluations can satisfy funding agency requirements such as determining whether and at what level to continue funding, whereas NGO goals such as program improvement and capacity building might be better served by alternative methods. From the perspective of those who understand community development primarily as a process of fostering "conscientization" and local self-determination, there is a clear need for further exploration and analysis of more participatory evaluation methods.5

2.1 PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

This section analyzes how participatory evaluation emerged as a response to the inadequacy of conventional models, particularly in the context of community development programs. Pietro discusses five categories of evaluation models or "persuasions", arguing that they emerged as responses to each other: "each is corrective to a previous approach, yet they are not mutually exclusive" (Pietro

5 The term "conscientization", which has become commonly used in adult education and community development discourses, was coined by Paolo Freire to denote "the process by which human beings participate critically in a transforming act" (Freire 1985:106).
1983:66). The first four of Pietro's categories (goal-based, decision making, goal-free, and expert judgement) fall within the realm of external, expert-driven models, whereas the fifth (naturalistic) includes interactive, relatively participatory models.

Similarly, Worthen and Sanders discuss "naturalistic and participant-oriented evaluation" as the last category in their typology of program evaluation models. Describing how it differs from conventional models, they offer six characteristics of the naturalistic approach: more qualitative than quantitative; more ethnographic than economistic; more adaptable; based on actual program activity rather than original program intent; sensitive to diversity in the values and perspectives of various program participants; generative of products written in a form accessible to participants; and reflective of the judgements of participants as well as those of the evaluator (Worthen and Sanders 1987).

Proponents of alternative evaluation models for international development programs argue that standard, external evaluations are of limited utility (Swantz 1992). Standard methods are viewed as especially inappropriate where primary program goals include social transformation, conscientization, and strengthening of local people's organizations (Pietro 1983; Berlage and Stokke 1992).

The Pietro text is the product of extensive discussions among
American NGOs about various approaches to evaluation. It asserts that although elements of external models can be incorporated within collaborative evaluation processes these models are fundamentally inadequate because they are inconsistent with the shared vision of evaluation as a community-based dialogue. Participants in an inter-NGO workshop "stressed that evaluation must be viewed as a dialogue. Information comes out of and is fed into a community process directed toward action" (Pietro 1983:12). This perspective stands in dramatic contrast to the standard evaluation practice in which involvement of program beneficiaries is usually minimal other than in facilitating or carrying out data collection activities (Rugh 1986; Lawrence 1989).

The exclusionary quality of external evaluation models derives partly from the technical complexity of research techniques and the related emphasis on research objectivity. Advocates of fundamental change in international development such as Hellinger, Hellinger, and O'Regan (1988:43) argue that this complexity has "precluded a high degree of involvement by project participants" in both the selection of evaluative criteria and in the implementation of evaluation. They argue that development assistance organizations should carry out evaluation activities on the basis of "the learning experience of project participants." (Hellinger, Hellinger, and O'Regan 1988:44). This view implies that subjective analysis can provide a vital complement to more objectively verifiable data.
2.2 OPPORTUNITIES

This section focuses on three categories of potential benefits associated with participatory evaluation: learning and empowerment of participants; enhanced communication among stakeholders; and greater value of results.

2.2.1 LEARNING AND EMPOWERMENT OF PARTICIPANTS

Proponents of participatory evaluation claim that it can contribute to achievement of community development program goals such as learning and empowerment of participants (Anyawu 1988; Feuerstein 1988; Greene 1988; Hatch 1991; Uphoff 1991; Swantz 1992). Swantz analyzes cases of participatory evaluation of women in development, noting that the process becomes an educational experience "for all parties involved, not least for the evaluators" (Swantz 1992:114). She emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the beneficiary community "gains from the process itself and is not left to wait for the reports to come out" (Swantz 1992:114). Whereas external evaluation treats intended program beneficiaries as mere sources of data, participatory approaches create learning experiences by engaging beneficiaries as researchers and analysts.

Collaborating in the design, implementation, and analysis of evaluation research helps to develop intellectual and leadership capabilities as well as practical skills (Feuerstein 1988:16).
Analyzing rural development programs in Nepal, Esman and Uphoff (1984:250) conclude that monthly self-evaluation meetings served two purposes in addition to generating evaluative data and analysis: they provided an opportunity for informal training of leaders and a means for participation of community members in program planning. This example confirms that participatory evaluation can integrate leadership training and local empowerment. Evaluation can become an integral part of the program in such a way that it contributes directly to achievement of such goals as well as contributing indirectly as a means of guiding future action.

Some proponents of 'naturalistic' evaluation stress the importance of empowerment as an outcome but fail to acknowledge the fundamentally political nature of participation. Guba and Lincoln, for example, advocate collaborative control of program evaluation in which power is shared among various stakeholders. They claim this approach is "empowering to all parties involved in the inquiry" (Guba and Lincoln 1989:139, emphasis in original). They discuss power as something infinite rather than a fixed-sum characterized by shifting relations among unequal parties. This view is evident in their advice about selection of stakeholders for inclusion in evaluation: "inclusion and exclusion...must be determined by negotiation, in which each audience that wishes to do so can present its case from a position of equal power. The evaluator's task is to arrange that situation." (Guba and Lincoln 1989:203, emphasis added).
For those who understand empowerment as increasing the power of the disadvantaged in relation to the advantaged, this 'evaluator's task' is unrealistic. Community development strategies generally seek to proactively create access to decision making processes for less powerful groups, whereas philosophically idealist theoreticians such as Guba and Lincoln deny the need to redistribute power by elevating the role of intended program beneficiaries. Indeed, Guba and Lincoln's comments about 'stakeholder selection' reveal emphatic opposition to differentiating access on the basis of power: "there can be no question of resolving the sorting problem by reference to relative power." (1989:203). Thus what claims to be a model for empowerment actually limits the status of relatively powerless intended beneficiaries to that of just another one of the many "stakeholder" groups.

2.2.2 COMMUNICATION AMONG STAKEHOLDERS

Another commonly cited opportunity associated with participatory evaluation is that it provides a forum for communication among various 'stakeholders', groups which are involved in or affected by the program (Pietro 1983; Greene 1988). Speaking from an NGO perspective, Pietro (1983:63) stresses that this communication

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6 To be fair, Guba and Lincoln's main point here is that people should not be excluded for lack of power. In making this point, however, they reveal that their model falls short of recognizing any need for proactive inclusion.
serves as a means of organizational growth and mutual learning: "Each evaluation audience may derive its own lessons." Pietro recognizes the community as the group which "has the most at stake", and notes that it may come up with lessons that are "highly significant" to the NGO (Pietro 1983:63).

These comments offer two important contributions to the debate about participatory evaluation and stakeholder communication. First, particularly valuable communication can occur when the community gains opportunities to play the role of teacher and other stakeholders such as program staff play the role of learner. This point is amplified by Salmen (1987), who advocates "participant-observer evaluation". Second, the community, or population of intended program beneficiaries, is not merely one of the various stakeholders. It is the key stakeholder, the group whose voice is of primary importance in the communication among stakeholders that occurs in participatory evaluation.

This recognition of the fundamental distinction between intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders challenges an implicit assumption held by some proponents of the stakeholder approach. This assumption is evident in Guba and Lincoln (1989), as noted above, and in rational models which specify categories of stakeholders. For example, Freeman (1980) lists "target participants" as just one of nine categories of parties which are typically involved with or interested in the evaluation of social
projects in developing countries.

Whereas Freeman (1980:199) stresses the need for the evaluator to facilitate communication primarily among the more powerful stakeholders (sponsoring agency, program managers, and staff), Pietro (1983) suggests that communication among stakeholders should begin at the local level and be extended upward: "participation in evaluation should be extended to include donors...Involving donors in the process may alleviate misunderstandings and make them more aware of the advantages of participation." Again, this NGO perspective reveals a conception of community development programs as primarily 'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down' processes.7

2.2.3 VALUE OF RESULTS

A third category of opportunities associated with participatory evaluation is the potential for more valuable results. The products can be of greater value than those of external evaluation in several ways: capacity to assess intangible outcomes (Salmen 1987; Worthen and Sanders 1987); richer data about the beneficiary community and the program context (Pagaduan 1983; Salmen 1987; Berlage and Stokke 1992); and increased likelihood of use.

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7 This emphasis on 'bottom-up' communication is consistent with the paradigm shift toward understanding development as mutual learning and partnership (see Brodhead 1987; Hellinger, Hellinger, and O'Regan 1988; Carroll 1992; Edwards and Hulme 1992; Sachs 1992).
Assessment of intangible outcomes is a chronic problem in evaluation. The general goal of many NGOs' community development programs is building the capacity of local grassroots organizations. As Carroll (1992:114) comments, however, evaluators lack the means to adequately assess "progress in organizational capacity". He offers some general performance indicators for evaluating "group capacity building" (Carroll 1992:253). In practice, selecting and applying these in the case of a specific program would require a high level of awareness of the local context and a highly adaptable evaluation approach. As noted above, context-sensitivity and flexibility are commonly cited advantages of participatory approaches.

Richness of contextual data can be particularly useful in identifying and assessing the significance of factors external to the program which may have contributed to or interfered with program success. One of the principal sources of disillusionment with external evaluation approaches, especially quasi-experimental methods, is their inability to reveal the complexity of connections between independent, intervening, and conditioning variables (USAID staff interview 16 March 1993). The relative context-sensitivity of data gathered by participatory methods means that it tends to be of greater relevance as an input in program planning.

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8 The problem of how to evaluate 'strengthening' of communities will be discussed further in sections 3.1 and 4.2.
Dawson and D'Amico (1985) analyze the results of involving educational program staff in evaluations, arguing that the primary benefit is increased utilization of evaluation information. As they note, staff involvement tends to increase the relevance of evaluation questions, so the data gathered relate directly to high priority information needs (Dawson and D'Amico 1985:181). Greene (1988) draws similar conclusions about "stakeholder participation" resulting in "enhanced utilization".

**FIGURE 3: CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION TO UTILIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elements Designed</td>
<td>Dimensions Experienced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iterative, ongoing communication and dialogue (especially via personal contacts)</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Learning more about the program and agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders' substantive decision making role and responsibilities</td>
<td>Affective</td>
<td>Learning more about evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of stakeholder participants</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Heightened perceptions of the results as valid, credible, persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater understanding of the results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater acceptance/ownership of the results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater sense of responsibility and obligation to follow through on the results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in Figure 3, Greene links elements of participatory evaluation to factors which enhance utilization of results.
Interviews with program staff who participated in evaluation reveal that their involvement resulted in "a greater acceptance and ownership of results" and a greater sense of responsibility for "following through on evaluation findings" (Greene 1988:112).

Most importantly, the participation of intended program beneficiaries in evaluation can help to ensure that the results will be constructed in a form which they can make use of. Pagaduan and Ferrer (1983:158) conclude from their case study of a "Community-Based Evaluation System" that one of the key features of this approach is "a feedback system in a form not alien to the people but one that enhances their learning...." Evaluation results which are comprehensible to beneficiaries can help empower them to participate more actively in subsequent program cycles.

2.3 CONSTRAINTS

This section analyzes two types of constraints associated with participatory evaluation: weaknesses of the approach and impediments to its application. Two of the main weaknesses are resource intensivity (costliness in terms of time and money) and inherent subjectivity (vulnerability to bias of evaluators and key participants). Two of the main categories of impediments to widespread implementation of participatory evaluation are the reluctance of funding agencies and the lack of people who are trained facilitators of this approach.
2.3.1 RESOURCE COSTS

Critics and even some proponents of participatory evaluation note that it tends to be relatively costly in terms of time and money required (Worthen and Sanders 1987; Feuerstein 1988; Swantz 1992). All phases of participatory evaluation take a longer time than is normally allowed for external evaluation missions (Swantz 1992:115). The inherent complexity of such a pluralistic negotiative process may be acceptable in theory, critics charge, but in practice evaluators demand standard, manageable methods which can be applied efficiently (Worthen and Sanders 1987).

Answers to the problem of justifying spending more resources on evaluation can be derived from two of the key points noted above. First, participatory evaluation products tend to be of high value both to community development program management and to intended program beneficiaries. Second, the participatory evaluation process can also produce direct contributions to program success. Recognizing that participatory evaluation is both formative (a source of program inputs) and summative (an assessment of program outputs) may strengthen arguments in favour of this approach.

Another solution is to modify the approach, as in the case of Salmen's (1987) "participant observer evaluation" approach, which proved to be relatively cost effective in the context of large-scale programs. This modified approach uses local social
scientists who can be trained and employed to work as participant observers. Locally recruited evaluators are much less expensive than foreign experts, so they can spend the time necessary to lead a more participatory process. In the context of small-scale NGOs, however, the resource requirements of participatory evaluation could be prohibitive (see Section 4.3).

2.3.2 INHERENT SUBJECTIVITY

Another commonly cited weakness of participatory evaluation is that it is inherently subjective and that application of it usually requires compromising scientific rigour (Worthen and Sanders 1987). This problem is perhaps the largest impediment to more widespread adoption of the method. One response is that participatory evaluation does not preclude application of conventional social science research techniques (Pietro 1983; Swantz 1992). Types of data which are particularly prone to subjective bias can be tested through triangulation, which consists of measuring the same phenomenon using different methods and alternate data sources.9 Proponents of participatory evaluation such as Swantz suggest that the various stakeholders' subjective biases should be made explicit in evaluation reports (Swantz 1992). Such open recognition of subjectivity may actually strengthen the credibility of the participatory model relative to the credibility of external

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9 The subjectivity problem could also be ameliorated by combining participatory evaluation with "rapid appraisal" techniques (see Chambers 1981).
evaluation approaches which implicitly claim objectivity yet may contain hidden biases. As discussed below (see Section 4.3) the problem of inherent subjectivity should be a central consideration in adapting the participatory evaluation model for application in a specific type of context.

2.3.3 RELUCTANCE OF FUNDING AGENCIES

In addition to concerns about subjectivity and cost, funding agencies may be reluctant to adopt participatory evaluation for political, ideological, and practical reasons. An example of a practical reason is scheduling: the timing of participatory evaluation depends primarily on the community's schedule rather than on that of the funding agency (Pietro 1983:51). Feuerstein (1988:24) argues that external evaluation persists largely because of the pervasiveness of western worldviews, a narrow range of conceptual frameworks which undermines the validity of other perspectives: "perhaps the most fundamental constraint to the more rapid adoption of participatory evaluation remains rooted at a deep conceptual level." This point combines with the political reality that those who hold power generally tend be reluctant to endorse or even permit grassroots empowerment practices which could threaten their privileged position. Guba and Lincoln's (1989:267) hope that "those with disproportionate power" might be convinced to relinquish it may appeal as a utopian ideal, but the recent trends of growing disparity of power and wealth indicate that this hope is
unrealistic.

In the case of NGO-funded programs the disparities among funding agency staff, managers, local staff, and beneficiaries are relatively small, which may help to explain why the bulk of participatory evaluation experiments have occurred within this sector.

2.3.4 LACK OF AWARENESS AND SKILLS

Even in the NGO sector, however, there is little evidence that broadly participatory evaluation has become part of standard practice. One factor which helps to explain this failure is the lack of people who are trained in or even aware of this approach. Indeed, much of the literature on NGO evaluation either ignores the participatory approach (Sen 1987; Carroll 1992) or documents a process of training people to engage in it where no such training had occurred previously (Pagaduan and Ferrer 1983; Rugh 1986; Anyanwu 1988; Feuerstein 1988; Swantz 1992). Other texts note the inappropriateness of external methods in the context of community development programs and make vague reference to alternative, relatively informal evaluation methods which evidently were not yet sufficiently clarified or documented (Clark and McCaffery 1979:5; Caffarella 1988).

The critical human resource in participatory evaluation is the
external evaluation facilitator who provides training for participants and generally supports the process (Pietro 1983:51; Salmen 1987:106; Worthen and Sanders 1987; Feuerstein 1988:23; Swantz 1992:114) In the case of the Overseas Education Fund "participatory evaluation system" the role of the facilitator is to "involve an evaluation team" in a three phase process of design, data gathering, and analysis, mediating different points of view and adding insights from her or his own experience (Pietro 1983:55). As shown in this and other examples, participatory evaluation is neither external nor internal to the program. Therefore, implementation of it requires building the capacities of both evaluation facilitators and participants.

2.4 SUMMARY

The above analysis of opportunities and constraints associated with participatory evaluation suggests that collaborative evaluation approaches may be suitable and viable in the context of community development programs. The idea of involving beneficiaries in evaluation is philosophically consistent with goals such as conscientization and local self-determination. Participatory evaluation can serve a broad range of purposes, whereas external methods primarily serve funding agency needs. The process of participatory evaluation can be a source of learning and empowerment, and can serve as a forum for communication among various stakeholders. The products tend to be very useful both for
program management and for enabling intended program beneficiaries to participate actively.

Considering these advantages, allocating more resources than would be used for external evaluation may be justifiable in the context of community development programs. The problem of inherent subjectivity can be ameliorated by incorporating selected standard evaluation methods within the participatory model and by making biases explicit. Overcoming impediments to more widespread application, such as funding agency reluctance and the lack of skilled participatory evaluation facilitators, will require further development, explication, and advocacy of the approach (see Section 4.3).
CHAPTER 3

URBAN POOR NGOs: THE CASE OF THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION

This chapter locates the Human Settlement Foundation in the context of the Thai NGO movement, analyzes the organization in terms of NGO typologies, and describes it in terms of the following NGO capacity variables: relations with funding agencies, management abilities, accountability to client communities, relations with other NGOs, and relations with governments. The chapter provides an overview of HSF-Bangkok and HSF-Songkhla, including brief descriptions of development work in the three communities included in this study (Khlong Phai Singto, Kubo, and Kao Seng).

3.1 HSF IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THAI NGO MOVEMENT

The Thai NGO movement began in the late 1960s and grew rapidly during the 1973-1976 political liberalization, but it was not until the 1980s that it started to flourish. Several coordinating bodies were established to promote NGO cooperation and to provide support services such as training, publicity, and contact with foreign funding agencies: the Thai Inter-Religious Commission for
Development (1979); the Thai Development Support Committee (1982); and the NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development (1985). A 1990 Thai NGO directory indicates that as of that year there were at least 475 "public interest nongovernmental organizations" in the country (CUSRI 1990).^{10}

Gohlert (1991:99-107) provides a useful overview of the history of Thai NGOs and their changing roles. As Gohlert states, the Thai NGO movement emerged as a response to the failure of government development programs. Student activists, university professors, and religious leaders have played catalytic roles, and their influence continues to shape the character and direction of the NGO community. The movement's reliance on altruism as a motivating factor for recruiting new workers is an increasingly significant constraint on the potential for scaling up activities (Thailand Volunteer Services interview, 23 February 1993). Young NGO workers feel strong pressure to pursue relatively lucrative employment in the booming private sector (HSF and Duang Prateep Foundation staff interviews, February 1993). The difficulty of recruiting and retaining young NGO activists is one factor which necessitates a shift toward more indirect, wide-impact community development methods.

Many Thai NGOs are developing and exercising their capacities to

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^{10} This figure includes Thai offices of international NGOs but excludes CBOs.
engage in a growing range of activities. In terms of Korten's (1990) model, these emerging NGO strategies correspond with characteristics of "third generation" NGOs. The primary functions of first and second generation NGOs are delivery of social welfare services and implementation of small-scale self-reliant local development projects. To increase the scale and the sustainability of their work, third generation NGOs engage in catalytic activities such as research, policy advocacy, and public education. Thai NGOs' movement in this direction has been impeded by the following factors: reluctance to shift scarce resources away from implementation of first and second generation strategies, staff limitations, hostile relations with governmental organizations, and the bias of international funding agencies in favour of project implementation (see Pongsapich 1992).

Thai NGOs are struggling to adapt their strategies in a rapidly changing political and economic environment. They are attempting to take advantage of increasingly pluralistic political climates and of their growing credibility as legitimate players in the processes of Thailand's development (Grassroots Development Institute interview, January 1993).

Some international funding agencies are exerting pressure on Thai NGOs to raise funds domestically. This expectation seems reasonable, given Thailand's spectacular economic growth. Domestic funding from private donors could enhance Thai NGOs' autonomy and
stability, and it would also counteract government claims that they are 'taking money from foreigners to destabilize Thailand'. One problem, though, is that undertaking an effective fundraising campaign costs money and requires certain administrative and publicity abilities that few NGOs have.

Thai NGOs such as HSF which are practicing enabling strategies face an uncertain future because of potential funding problems. International donor agencies are shifting their resources to poorer countries. European NGOs such as Terre des Hommes (Germany) have explicit expectations that recipient NGOs try to develop domestic fundraising capacity (Terre des Hommes "Project Criteria" guidelines, 1988). In Thailand, however, NGO organizers are sceptical about the potential for raising substantial private support for empowerment of poor communities (HSF interview, 2 March 1993; Alternative Development Centre interview, 15 March, 1993).

Slum communities throughout urban Thailand are facing a trend of mass evictions. They need support in their struggles for land rights and infrastructure improvement, but the few NGOs which focus their work on slum community development are now worrying about their own survival (Grassroots Development Institute interview, January 1993). Senior staff of NGOs such as Grassroots Development Institute, the Alternative Development Centre, and the Human Settlement Foundation emphasize that raising public awareness in Thailand is required as a prerequisite to being able to operate
successful fundraising campaigns for NGO work which goes beyond relief and charity. Such public awareness campaigns would build a basis for the Thai elite and middle classes to recognize the need for redistribution of wealth not only through charitable donations but through means such as low-interest credit programs and subsidized arrangements for gaining security of land tenure.

Among Thai NGOs working with urban poor communities, HSF is the one most explicitly committed to strengthening people's organizations as the primary development task.\textsuperscript{11} The HSF philosophy and methods recognize the basic contradiction between the role of an NGO as a catalyst for local empowerment and the role of an NGO as a source of aid. Even serving as a consultant contains a dangerous potential for the creation of dependency. The essential role, then, is to encourage and facilitate the formation and strengthening of slum dwellers' organizations so that they can plan, implement, and evaluate their own problem solving processes. The goal is for these organizations to become capable of playing this role with little or no external assistance. Initially the NGO may need to take the initiative to build and restructure CBOs, and to directly manage community development activities. The success of these efforts shows as the CBOs become capable of increasingly complex functions. For HSF, the critical skill of the NGO

\textsuperscript{11} The only other urban poor NGO in Thailand which focuses on strengthening communities as its primary task is a small, secretive organization called "People's Organization for Power" (POP). POP is not listed in the Directory of Public Interest Non-government Organizations in Thailand (CUSRI 1990).
fieldworker is the ability to sense the optimal, minimum necessary level of input at each point in the process. As one senior organizer put it, the key is to know how to "give the right help at the right time." (senior HSF staff interview, 9 February 1993).

The philosophy and development approach of HSF can best be understood by analyzing the organization's history. HSF emerged from a preceding organization called the Community Relations Group (CRG). The original founder of CRG, a student activist from southern Thailand, set up this independent organization in 1982 after graduating from Songkhla Teacher's College and working with the Duang Prateep Foundation. The original focus of CRG, the "core idea" which differentiated it from Duang Prateep and which remains as "the main objective" of HSF, was the development of people's organizations (former HSF staff interview, 13 February 93). Early organizers were influenced by radical Buddhist thought (see Gohlert 1991; Sivaraksa 1992). In 1987 CRG registered as a legal foundation called Munniti Pattana Tiyou Arsai (translation: Human Settlement Foundation).

3.2 HUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION IN TERMS OF NGO TYPOLOGIES

The term "NGO" covers a wide variety of organizations. Acronyms for different types of NGOs abound. As Gohlert (1991:107) argues, there is a lack of consensus about appropriate categories to distinguish the various NGOs. They can be categorized by
ideological orientation or affiliation, source of funding, size of annual budget, target population, and many other criteria. Korten (1990:2) offers the following basic typology:

* **Voluntary Organizations (VOs)** that pursue a social mission driven by a commitment to shared values.

* **Public Service Contractors (PSCs)** that function as market-oriented nonprofit businesses serving public purposes.

* **People's Organizations (POs)** that represent their members' interests, have member-accountable leadership, and are substantially self-reliant.

* **Governmental Nongovernmental Organizations (GONGO5)** that are creations of government and serve as instruments of government policy.

HSF falls within the "VO" category. Carroll (1992) makes a primary distinction between "membership service organizations" (MSOs), which he defines in a manner similar to what this thesis defines as CBOs, and "grassroots support organizations" (GSOs), which serve as intermediaries between beneficiaries and "the often remote levels of government, donor and financial institutions" (Carroll 1992:11). HSF falls within the GSO category. Carroll provides a sophisticated tripartite set of typologies for identification of GSOs and MSOs within the spectrum of NGOs:

1. **PURPOSES** (charity, relief, development, political action, advocacy of special interests);

2. **MAIN ACTIVITY** (education, research, lobbying, networking);

3. **LEVEL** (local, regional, national, international).

This section identifies the Human Settlement Foundation in terms of three NGO typologies adapted from Carroll (1992): geographic scale of activities, types of activities, and development strategies.
The global NGO movement consists of international, national, and local organizations. Some NGOs begin as local organizations and subsequently expand to become national ones. The Duang Prateep Foundation, founded in Klong Toey slum, Bangkok in 1978, now supports social welfare work in Khon Kaen as well. The Human Settlement Foundation, established in Bangkok in 1982, created a subsidiary organization in Songkhla (the Songkhla Slums Development Project) in 1987. During the 1990-92 period, HSF began to do extension work in Nakhorn Ratchasima and Chiang Mai.

The basic categories of Thai NGOs are rural and urban. The vast majority are rural, engaging in a wide range of sector specific activities. Almost all urban NGOs in Thailand work on various types of slum community development activities: physical improvement (especially infrastructure), social services, economic improvement (eg. savings groups), and local empowerment. HSF engages in all of these activities, but its main focus is on building the strength of CBOs so that slum dwellers can become more effective in addressing their problems independently.

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12 Within each category we can distinguish between organizations which exist primarily to implement development efforts and those which serve as network organizations for collaboration and exchange among member NGOs.
All of Thailand's urban poor NGOs have adopted the language of 'popular participation' and 'community involvement', but the extent of their actual practice of bottom-up development strategies varies. Korten's model of "four generations" of NGO development strategies serves as a useful reference for distinguishing the approach of HSF and other organizations in the Thai NGO movement (Korten 1990).

**TABLE 3: KORTE N'S MODEL OF NGO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERATION</th>
<th>FIRST Relief and Welfare</th>
<th>SECOND Community Development</th>
<th>THIRD Sustainable Systems Development</th>
<th>FOURTH People's Movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem Definition</td>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>Local Inertia</td>
<td>Institutional and Policy Constraints</td>
<td>Inadequate Mobilizing Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Project Life</td>
<td>Ten to Twenty Years</td>
<td>Indefinite Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Individual or Family</td>
<td>Neighborhood or Village</td>
<td>Region or Nation</td>
<td>National or Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Actors</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>NGO plus Community</td>
<td>All Relevant Public and Private Institutions</td>
<td>Loosely Defined Networks of People &amp; Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Role</td>
<td>Doer</td>
<td>Mobilizer</td>
<td>Catalyst</td>
<td>Activist/Educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Orientation</td>
<td>Logistics Management</td>
<td>Project Management</td>
<td>Strategic Management</td>
<td>Coalescing and Energizing Self-Managing Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Education</td>
<td>Starving Children</td>
<td>Community Self-Help</td>
<td>Constraining Policies and Institutions</td>
<td>Spaceship Earth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Korten (1990:117).
The development strategies of the majority of NGOs working with the urban poor in Thailand correspond primarily with Korten's "first generation". NGOs such as the Duang Prateep Foundation, the Japanese International Volunteer Centre, and the Foundation for Slum Child Care emphasize charity programs and relief services, primarily directed toward children. As shown in the following section, this "first generation" orientation has significant implications for domestic fundraising potential.

The HSF strategy corresponds primarily with the "second generation" or "community development" approach. As shown in the following sections, however, the organization is shifting toward third and fourth generation strategies. One factor impeding this shift is the inadequacy of current external and internal evaluation processes (see chapter 4).

3.3 HSF IN TERMS OF NGO CAPACITY VARIABLES

This section further describes HSF in terms of the following NGO capacity variables: relations with funding agencies, management abilities, accountability to clients, relations with other domestic NGOs, and relations with governments.

3.3.1 RELATIONS WITH FUNDING AGENCIES

Insufficient funding constrains NGOs' action possibilities.
Conversely, excessive funding typically undermines 'grassroots' authenticity, leading to bureaucratization and dependence on donors. Some NGOs working with Bangkok slum communities have annual budgets of less than $20,000, whereas the Duang Prateep Foundation annual budget has grown to over $2 million (Kaothien and Rachatatanun 1991). Studies of large, U.S.-funded NGO projects show that decision making was dominated by NGO staff and local elites (Clark 1990:50). NGOs can best facilitate popular participation in decision making when their projects or campaigns are small-scale. This constraint poses a problem for major funding agencies which are used to dealing in large sums of money. One solution is to use international NGOs or federations of domestic NGOs as intermediaries which can allocate resources locally.

Funding of Thai urban NGOs comes primarily from international NGOs which in turn obtain funding from bilateral development agencies and private donors. A notable exception is the Duang Prateep Foundation, which raises about 80% of its funds domestically (CUSRI 1990:66). In the case of HSF, funding comes primarily from three European NGOs: Terre des Hommes, Christian Aid, and NOVIB. Only 18% of funds come from domestic donations (HSF Progress Report 1992).

13 The Duang Prateep Foundation is famous in Thailand primarily because of the legendary status of Prateep Ungsongtham Hata, who was acclaimed by the news media as a "slum angel" when she won the 1979 Magsaysay Award for her work as a kindergarten teacher in Khlong Toey slum. She used the award to set up the Foundation, which continues to focus on provision of kindergarten services to slum children.
These international NGOs typically allocate funds in the form of two or three year projects. Such durations are insufficient because the pace of bottom-up development processes is determined primarily by the local dynamics of the characteristics, capacities, and situations of each community. The experience of HSF reveals that the results of their work often take five or more years to become evident (interview, 2 March 1993).

The annual budget for HSF-Bangkok has risen gradually, from 2,700,000 Thai baht (approximately $135,000 Canadian) in 1989 to 3,046,470 Thai baht (approximately $153,000 Canadian) in 1992 (CUSRI 1990; HSF budget 1992). Once funding has been approved, periodic documentary progress reports and financial reports serve as the primary vehicles for communicating information about recent work. The lack of hard, quantitative data in biannual HSF progress reports is not considered a problem because funding agencies "understand that you cannot see immediate outcomes, but you can see the progress" of strengthening the communities (HSF interview, 2 March 1993).

In the case of HSF, international NGOs choose to provide funding primarily on the basis of compatibility of their development philosophies and objectives (Terre des Hommes staff interview; Terre des Hommes brochure). HSF staff say they have good relations with their current funding agencies because they "share the same philosophy" (interview, 2 March 1993).
Christian Aid is a British NGO which raises funds primarily from private donors and churches to fund development programs in 70 countries. The compatibility of its philosophy and objectives with those of HSF is revealed in the following organizational statement of purpose:

With no overseas staff it links directly with the poor through local church and other organizations whose programs aim to strengthen the poor toward self-sufficiency. It also seeks to address the root causes of poverty and spends up to 10 per cent of its income on development education and related campaigning at home (Christian Aid brochure, emphasis added).

Terre des Hommes - Germany (translation: "Ground of Humanity") is a national branch of an international NGO. It too raises funds primarily from private donors (German Embassy brochure). Within its general mission to serve children, the NGO's central criterion in selecting projects to support is "whether the project work will promote the emancipation of a group suffering from discrimination" (Terre des Hommes "Project Criteria" guidelines, June 1988). Like Christian Aid, Terre des Hommes shares with HSF a focus on addressing the root causes of poverty.

The top-down flow of resources from international NGOs does not necessarily mean top-down program design. These funding agencies allow HSF a high degree of autonomy in the planning and implementation of community development programs. However, HSF does feel constrained to the extent that the international NGOs do impose even general program requirements (interview, 2 February 1993). For example, Terre des Hommes requires that its funds should be primarily directed toward children, youth, and women.
Christian Aid is more flexible about specifics of intended beneficiary groups, but requires that its funds be spent on salaries for field staff. Such constraints serve as an impetus for HSF to strive toward increasing the proportion of funds raised independently.¹⁴

### 3.3.2 MANAGEMENT ABILITIES

Though leadership is critical to the success of NGOs, usually little attention is paid to leadership or management training. (Clark 1990, p. 57) Having a strong, charismatic leader may be vital, but organizational health and effectiveness usually depend on participatory decision making and sharing of authority. HSF governance occurs primarily through collective discussions (eg. weekly staff meetings). By branching out spatially to form regional teams it has thus far avoided following the pattern of NGO organizational growth which typically leads to bureaucratization and "death".¹⁵

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¹⁴ International NGOs which have standard program design specifications or standards encounter problems in working with the urban poor in Thailand. The main reason for the 1993 closure of the Foster Parents Plan (FPPI) Bangkok project was because it became virtually impossible to maintain contact with recipient families while maintaining FPPI’s international standards of administrative efficiency. This difficulty arose primarily from the rising frequency of slum evictions and from staff time being wasted in Bangkok traffic. The international office of FPPI denied a proposal to shift FPPI Bangkok’s work toward a focus on improving land tenure (FPPI interview, March 1993).

¹⁵ A Thai NGO organizer refers to an "organizational life cycle" graph in a Canadian handbook entitled "Managing the Non-Profit Organization" (Manitoba Institute of Management, no date).
However, the growth of HSF has led to some degree of hierarchy. The organization's governance system has developed from a simple group consensus process to an increasingly complex management structure. The original Community Relations Group team, consisting of one to three staff, shared all decisions. As the team grew to larger numbers this consensus system came into question: senior members felt that in some situations the "big group has the power to make decisions but lacks sufficient information." (former HSF organizer interview, 13 March 1993).

Small domestic NGOs typically have weak management abilities. Unfortunately, remedying this weakness could undermine an NGO's cost-effectiveness and proximity to the poor, the very characteristics for which NGOs are so highly acclaimed. In the case of HSF-Bangkok the eleven member staff includes three administrators: one secretary, one manager, and one office secretary. HSF-Songkhla has a similarly small administrative staff: of five persons, one is an accountant and one is a half-time coordinator (and half-time field worker). According to one funding agency staff person, HSF performs basic administrative functions very well relative to smaller, less established Thai NGOs (Terre des Hommes interview, March 1993).

3.3.3 ACCOUNTABILITY TO CLIENTS

While NGOs must be financially accountable to funding agencies,
accountability to their clients -- in this case the urban poor -- is of even greater importance in terms of their credibility and effectiveness. Clark argues that to succeed, NGOs "must respond to the problems and aspirations identified by the poor and must have a management and decision making structure in which they have confidence" (Clark 1990:49).

Responsiveness to the urban poor is inherent in HSF's community development method. This method relies primarily on what Forester (1989) refers to as "the art of listening" (field observations, August 1992, March 1993). The method, as analyzed by a senior HSF organizer, involves a three part planning process (interview, 9 February 1993). First, an NGO worker encourages slum dwellers to brainstorm about the problems they face. The worker then informs people about their rights regarding these problems. Third, they plan how to organize in response to these problems. The implementation of planned activities is open-ended: "a rigid schedule or plan is not good for the development process". Evaluative discussions are "not about success, but a chance to synthesize the experience of working" (interview, 9 February 1993). This model derives from four central concepts (interview, 9 February 1993):

1. independent thinking;
2. working in groups, not as individuals;
3. going to the root of the problem;
4. evaluation and learning.

This community development method is based on being responsive and accountable to the intended beneficiaries. The extent of popular
participation in planning, implementation, and evaluation of activities serves as a simple indicator of NGO responsiveness (former HSF organizer interview, August 1992). With a shift toward "third generation" NGO strategies, however, there may be a need for more systematic channels of accountability. Client participation in evaluation of the NGO would be one such channel.

3.3.4 RELATIONS WITH OTHER NGOS

Networking among NGOs, on local, national, and international levels, can provide opportunities for sharing information, building solidarity, and boosting morale. At least one study indicates that federated NGOs perform better than isolated ones, particularly if the linkage allows for autonomy of member organizations (Clark 1990:86). A Bangkok slum NGO leader cites the lack of communication and cooperation among Bangkok NGOs as a key factor in their failure to prevent repeated violent evictions (Maier 1990:2).

HSF tends to work independently of other urban poor NGOs, partly because it is generally considered more radical in emphasizing the fight against evictions rather than doing "first generation" charitable activities. A sense of isolation is reflected in the comment of one HSF organizer who lamented that since the closure of

\[16\] The Duang Prateep Foundation, which is by far Thailand's largest urban poor NGO, devotes over half of its total budget to a scholarship program which funds slum children's educational expenses (HSF organizer interview, 5 March 1993).
Foster Parents Plan—Bangkok "we are alone" (interview, 16 March 1993). HSF is, however, a member of Thailand's main NGO network organization (NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development). As argued below (see section 4.3), developing collaborative evaluation could necessitate a higher level of inter-NGO cooperation.

3.3.5 RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT

For many NGOs, relationships with various levels and agencies of government are among the most important factors affecting their ability to function effectively. In the case of HSF, interpersonal connections with key individuals in Thailand's National Housing Authority have been vital to the organization's emergence and growth (former HSF organizer interview, February 1993). More recently, HSF has been involved with a successful effort to persuade the national government to fund the formation of a large GONGO called the Urban Community Development Office. However, relations between HSF and local governments such as the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority and the Songkhla municipality have been less cooperative and sometimes hostile.

Empowering the poor is fundamentally political. Governments tend to view the work of NGOs as a threat to their authority, and the

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very existence of organizations which proudly define themselves as non-governmental implicitly challenges and potentially undermines the credibility of governments. The work of HSF sometimes involves supporting slum communities in their struggles against local governments which are trying to evict them from municipal land (see sections 3.4 and 3.5 below).

Governments typically view NGOs as competitors for international development funding. This phenomenon was observed in an interview with a Songkhla municipal officer who claimed that of foreign funding to NGOs only "30% goes to the people and 70% goes for administration" (interview, 25 February 1993). He advised that the municipality has "a financial evaluation system but NGOs don't" and requested that the researcher "send funding agencies directly to this office" (25 February 1993).

NGOs such as HSF which aim to strengthen grassroots peoples' organizations may be perceived as particularly threatening, especially to authoritarian or undemocratic regimes. In Thailand, government-condoned violence against NGO activists protesting the controversial Pak Moon dam project (reported in The Nation, March 1993) indicated that even a relatively democratic regime may view NGOs with hostility.
HSF-Bangkok offers a variety of services, ranging from their original slum community development programs (as analyzed above) to research, publicity, and support to autonomous CBO networks. During the 1990-1992 period, HSF-Bangkok worked directly with six slums which were facing mass eviction (one of these is described below), and four resettled communities. It indirectly supported fourteen slums facing eviction by providing services to the United Slums Development Association. These services included legal training courses and assistance with lobbying government agencies such as the National Housing Authority and the Department of Charitable. HSF is currently developing a "housing hotline" through which communities facing a sudden eviction threat can alert other slum dwellers and thus rapidly mobilize defensive resistance campaigns (HSF staff interview, 5 March 1993).

Recent research and publicity work by HSF-Bangkok includes the following: studies of informal sector workers such as mobile vendors; publication of documents entitled "Fight for Home" and "Homes and Lives" for distribution at the 1991 People's Forum (held

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18 Two of these six slums facing eviction are located in Nakhon Ratchasima (a secondary city outside the BMR) and have been served on an extension basis.

19 One indicator of the growing independence of the United Slums Development Association (USDA) is that the HSF staff lawyer who had been serving this CBO network now works directly for it (USDA interview, 5 March 1993).
in conjunction with the World Bank/International Monetary Fund meeting); and publicity about slums and the problems of the urban poor during the 1992 Thai election campaign (HSF report, "Summary of Works in the Second Phase"). Currently the organization is undertaking a comparative study of social conditions and urban poor housing problems in the secondary cities of Chiangmai, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Songkhla. Pursuing its pattern of diversification and geographic expansion of services, HSF plans to support urban poor community development in Indochina.

KHLONG PHAI SINGTO COMMUNITY

The HSF-Bangkok project in Khlong Phai Singto slum exemplifies the integration of "second generation" community development strategies and "third generation" NGO roles. This 135-household community, having begun settling along this former khlong or canal thirty to forty years ago, has been facing the threat of eviction by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) since 1977 (leader interviews, 14 March 1993). This threat became particularly extreme prior to the October, 1991 World Bank/International Monetary Fund meeting at the new Queen Sirikit Convention Centre, which is located opposite the slum (across a major arterial road). One of the community's defensive tactics was to erect a zinc fence on which slum youths painted depictions of community life. Khlong Phai Singto, now known as "the painted wall community", remains intact. About sixty to eighty households intend to agree to
resettlement, however, if the terms of a promised World Bank funded sites-and-services project prove to be affordable (leader and HSF organizer interviews, 14 March 1993).

HSF-Bangkok has supported the community in resisting eviction by working with leaders to develop strong CBOs, to organize self-help basic infrastructure upgrading, and to facilitate "third generation" development processes. CBOs include a general "Community Committee", a "Savings Group for Housing", and a "Housewives Savings Group". Through these CBOs the community participates in the United Slums Development Association "housewives group" and pro-democracy political campaigns. The community secured funding from the Dutch Embassy to install a rudimentary running water system which serves each household. In March, 1993 the community was collecting donations from its members to fund upgrading of the main footpath. HSF has also assisted in arranging meetings and seminars to try to work out a proposed land lease with the BMA (HSF "Progress Report" 1992).

One reason why the residents have been adamant in resisting eviction is that most of them are employed in street vending in the immediate vicinity. According to an HSF-funded and facilitated participatory action research study, about 80% of Khlong Phai Singto households sell fresh sliced fruit or somtham (spicy papaya salad) out of three-wheel carts. The location of the community —— within walking distance of both the Khlong Toey produce market and
the Sukhumvit Road business district -- is ideal for this type of vending. The vendors typically go to purchase their produce at about 3:00 AM, return to the community to spend two to three hours preparing their fruit or salad, then wheel their carts one or more kilometres to various vending locations. HSF published this information as a brochure, including photographs and a colour cover. The dwellers can now use it when they meet with government agencies or talk to reporters.

HSF-Bangkok staff evaluate their work with slums such as Khlong Phai Singto in terms of the community's changing capabilities to collectively plan and take action in improving their living conditions and, most importantly, in defending their housing rights. They view reduction in the intensivity of conflict between factions as one indicator of the NGO contribution to community cooperation (HSF Progress Report 1992; interviews, 16 March 1993).

Evaluating CBO networking activities is difficult because of their dynamic nature. For example, the project plan may specify four activities "but some cannot be implemented [so] we have to know why not, and meanwhile start other activities." (interviews, 16 March 1993). The degree of success of policy advocacy is recognized by organizers as even more complex because it "depends on many factors" (interviews, 16 March 1993). HSF-Bangkok's main purpose in working with the community is to support the dwellers in resisting eviction, so the ultimate indicator is whether the
community has remained.

Khlong Phai Singto dwellers and leaders evaluate their community development efforts in terms of progress toward realization of their ambition to achieve land tenure security and to continue improving their housing (interviews, March 1993). They identify improvements in physical and social service infrastructure (eg. walkways, water supply, daycare centre) as indicators of success. They evaluate the strength of their Community Committee in terms of how effectively it represents the community to outsiders (such as government agencies), and its capacity to mobilize dwellers for political campaigns (for example about 100 residents participated in a 1992 demonstration against the military government).

3.5 SONGKHLA SLUMS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Songkhla is a fishing and port city of about 85,000 people located on the east coast of southern Thailand. Combined with the 145,000 population of Hat Yai, a neighbouring commercial centre and border city, this is Thailand's largest urban population outside of Bangkok (Keokungwal 1992:40).

During the 1980s, government infrastructure projects, including construction of the Ko Yor Bridge and a deep sea port, contributed to increasing eviction pressures on Songkhla's slum communities. In 1987 dwellers in Kao Seng fishing village learned via a
television news report of a Songkhla municipal government plan to 
evict their community for tourist development (Ekachai 1990:116). 
This threat sparked HSF organizers to initiate the Songkhla Slums 
Community Development Project (SSDP).

A 1988 survey by the SSDP and the Songkhla Teacher Training College 
identified twenty one slum communities, with a combined population 
of 7,863 people or about 9% of Songkhla's total population (SSDP 
1988:6). These numbers are small compared to those of Bangkok 
slums, but are significant nonetheless. As shown in Table 3, 
recent government figures show the four largest Songkhla slums as 
having a larger population than the total found by SSDP (1988). 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITY</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS</th>
<th>LAND OWNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kao Seng</td>
<td>2174</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thasa Arn</td>
<td>3170</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>Buddhist temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bon Wua</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>State Railway Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubo</td>
<td>3252</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>State Railway Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9926</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


20 This discrepancy may result from several factors. First, 
there is evidence of rapid growth of slums, especially along the 
defunct State Railway line. Second, the NGO and government surveys 
may have varied in their definition of community boundaries.
The Songkhla HSF team has implemented similar community development methods and activities as in the case of HSF-Bangkok, but has remained primarily within the realm of "second generation" strategies. The team has worked toward the primary goal of strengthening slum communities through initiating and building the grassroots accountability of CBOs, stimulating basic infrastructure upgrading efforts, encouraging inter-slum cooperation, and promoting political action campaigns. Pre-existing community committees were more accountable to the municipality than to the dwellers, so SSDP field organizers facilitated more democratic committees through a system of election of representatives to serve various zones within the slums. Field organizers initiated the creation of savings groups run by women. As in the case of HSF-Bangkok, these groups serve multiple functions: to increase economic security (eg. by providing credit to members), to develop organizing and accounting skills, and to develop a demonstrable capacity to buy or lease land. Similarly, organizers view infrastructure upgrading as more than just physical development. Combining money and time to do footpath improvements, canal cleaning, latrine construction, etc. serves to create a greater sense of cooperation, to enhance community pride, to develop leadership skills, and to counteract local government complaints about slums as environmental menaces (SSDP "Progress Report" 1992).

Inter-slum network activities serve as a means of mutual learning and political solidarity. For example, a meeting of leaders from
various slums served as an opportunity for sharing information about common concerns as well as a planning session in preparation for an SSDP-organized outdoor all-candidates meeting and rally during the 1992 federal election campaign (observation, 29 August 1992). As of March, 1993, however, there was not yet any independent federation of Songkhla slums. SSDP has done little research or publicity work.

SSDP initiated a primary school scholarship program which also serves a range of purposes (eg. combining charitable fundraising with public awareness about the plight of slum dwellers and the presence of an urban poor NGO in Songkhla). This program may be terminated, however, perhaps in part because it is more of a charitable or "first generation" type of activity (see section 4.2 below).

**KUBO COMMUNITY**

SSDP initiated the Kubo project in 1990. As in other communities, initial development activities included simple mutual-aid basic infrastructure upgrading (eg. purchase of landfill to improve a flood-prone section of road along the railway track).

SSDP organizers expressed frustration about alleged sabotage by municipal officials which destroyed years of work to build trust among slum communities. Leaders of Kao Seng and Kubo communities clashed at a January, 1993 government sponsored meeting of community leaders.
attempted to undertake a survey to determine the tenure status of each household in the community. This information would have been useful in negotiating for land purchase or lease from the State Railway Authority, but the survey was never completed because of tensions within the community (SSDP organizer interview, 1 March 1993). The Railway Authority subsequently promised to consider a land use plan if the community were to submit one, but it warned that it would not grant new land leases beyond three years in duration. According to SSDP, the Municipality and the Railway Authority share the goal of evicting the dwellers to resettlement areas outside of the city so that developers can use the land for commercial purposes.22

SSDP organizers consider their project in Kubo community to be relatively unsuccessful. They attribute the slow progress in strengthening Kubo to conflict between old and new leadership factions; conflict among land renters, owners, and squatters; the spread of the community along about three kilometres of former railway line; and lack of continuity of SSDP field staff (interview March 1, 1993; SSDP evaluation meeting, 25 January 1993). Most of the Community Committee members live on land which they own, whereas SSDP is primarily concerned with supporting land renters and squatters in lobbying for a long-term lease with the State Railway Authority. Conflict between Community Committee

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22 SSDP was working with a nearby slum (Lang Wat Sala Huayang), which was also located on Railway Authority land and was facing mass eviction.
members loyal to the municipality and those loyal to the NGO has been particularly heated regarding the issue of an alleged lack of openness of accounting for revolving funds supplied by UNICEF. SSDP shifted its work to focus on the "Savings Group for Habitation" which it had initiated and provided training for. As of February, 1993 the Kubo community centre, which had been used by the savings group and others, was being used for storage only. As in the case of Khlong Phai Singto, SSDP organizers evaluate their work in Kubo primarily in terms of the strengthening of CBO leadership. The lack of cooperation among various factions of the community is the key indicator of failure.

The leaders and dwellers of Kubo evaluate the success of community development in terms of popular participation and actual changes in living conditions. Leaders use the question "does anything of benefit go to the dwellers?" as the key criterion in considering the merits of activities (leaders interviews, 17 February 1993). When asked for examples of success they list well-attended community events such as a New Year religious ceremony, Queen's birthday activities, and neighbourhood clean-up parties. From their perspective the extent of popular participation is the best indicator of success.

Training consisted primarily of organizing field visits for Songkhla slum women to learn from the experiences of established savings groups in Bangkok and elsewhere (leader interviews, 18 and 23 February 1993).
Kubo dwellers who are not CBO leaders typically evaluate community development in terms of immediate improvements in their economic security and physical quality of life. Squatters focus more on the problem of tenure security, but they lack a sense of ability to do anything about it. Those asked what the solution might be generally respond "I don't know" (dweller interviews, 23 February 1993). One elderly market vendor, who had previously been evicted from another slum, comments with sad resignation: "I don't know where to go if evicted from here".

KAO SENG COMMUNITY

The Kao Seng fishing village has existed at its present location at the southern end of an approximately five kilometre stretch of sandy beach since it was evicted from the northern tip of the Songkhla isthmus in 1957. Kao Seng's location is vital to its economic viability. In addition to small-scale fishing and manufacturing of sun-dried salt fish, the economy of Kao Seng is based on a busy roadside produce market. When the government erected a sign in 1987 indicating plans for development of the site and relocation of the community, dwellers responded by throwing rocks to destroy the sign. Six years later the community remains and the National Housing Authority likely will not proceed with

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24 Kao Seng dwellers tell the story of how their original eviction was ordered by the late prime minister Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat when he stepped on some human excrement on the beach.
subsequent stages of site and infrastructure development at the resettlement location (National Housing Authority interview, 5 March 1993).

The work of SSDP in Kao Seng has included a somewhat broader range of activities than those described above. The scope of NGO support has gone beyond basic infrastructure improvement, CBO creation and strengthening, and assisting with organizing and lobbying for land tenure. In 1990, for example, a British architecture student initiated a participatory community design process which resulted in a plan for land readjustment and physical development in accordance with the needs expressed by Kao Seng residents. This plan has served not only as a political tool but also as a guide for self-determined development.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1991 SSDP provided the majority of funding for materials to construct a kindergarten/community centre. This expenditure was a departure from the NGOs usual avoidance of providing major funding, and it was the main cause of an almost 80% SSDP annual budget overrun (HSF "Financial Summary" 1991). The decision to fund the centre proved to be valuable, however, as a substantial manifestation of the NGO's support for the community and as a way of creating neutral meeting space (leader interviews, 21 February 1993).

\textsuperscript{25} The residents are already implementing this plan. For example, houses have been readjusted to widen a footpath so that garbage trucks can now serve the interior of the community.
The SSDP team considers Kao Seng a success story. The strength of the community is evident not only in the fact that it has not been evicted but also in the improved physical quality of life in the community. Most importantly, the team identifies success as the capacity of the people to carry out ongoing development and advocacy activities with less and less help from the NGO.26

SSDP organizers evaluate their work in Kao Seng in terms of the community leaders' capacities for self—evaluation and strategic planning. When asked why the community development work there has been so successful, an organizer responds that

The leaders review themselves and their activities regularly. They often think about new initiatives, especially how to mobilize people for community development activities and how to circulate information among the people. They can analyze who is enemy, who is ally, what to do in what situation. The leaders know each others' skills, so they can put the right person in the right job (SSDP interview, 15 February 1993).

Indicators of success are evident in the relatively high level of participation in problem solving: "everybody tries to think it out", whereas the degree of participation is less elsewhere (SSDP interview, 15 February 1993). The process of development toward increasingly participatory decision making can be measured not only in the increasing number of people becoming active but also in the

26 The Kao Seng Community Committee is an elected body of twenty people. Business discussed at one meeting (19 February 1993) included how to enforce the five Thai baht/month ($0.25 Canadian) taxation of market vendors. The Market Committee, a subgroup of the Community Committee, collects this tax to partially fund the salaries of two kindergarten teachers. Another item of discussion was how to keep the roadway through the community clear of salt-fish drying so that the recently negotiated municipal garbage pick up could proceed efficiently.
increasing ratio of "thinkers" to "doers" in community meetings. The most vital NGO role in supporting this process is to intervene in such a way that people who are afraid to participate will begin to do so.

Kao Seng leaders and dwellers attribute their success in part to the eviction threat. Members of the Community Committee cite levels of popular participation as the most important indicator (interviews, 21 and 22 February 1993). They use the example of how they "tested people's strength" by visiting each house in the community to announce a protest, and succeeded in mobilizing over 2,000 dwellers to attend. Leaders emphasize how their close relations with the dwellers enable them to discuss projects together as neighbours and to mobilize mass participation in activities. Dwellers evaluate community development in terms of improvements in infrastructure, economic security, and tenure security (interviews, 1 March 1993). For many, their dream for the future is simply "to stay here".

3.6 SUMMARY

HSF faces the challenge of how to make itself increasingly effective despite funding constraints and a high degree of

27 This proximity is primarily informal, but it is reinforced by a ward system through which five zones elect four leaders each.
isolation from other actors such as municipal governments and other urban poor NGOs. While funding from foreign sources is being eroded due to Thailand's economic growth, domestic fundraising for community development is difficult because of public preferences for supporting charitable and relief work. HSF's emphasis on strengthening CBOs and supporting slums in their struggles for land tenure is fundamentally political. Unlike other urban poor NGOs in Thailand, HSF seeks to increase community capacities to mobilize economic and political resources both from within and from external sources. The purpose of this work is not so much to alleviate the symptoms of urban poverty, but rather to challenge the structural imbalances of power which are its root causes.

HSF's working method is shifting from second generation to third and fourth generation NGO strategies. Increasing the emphasis on research, publicity, and provision of support services to autonomous CBO networks is one means of scaling up development impact. The Bangkok team has been able to make this shift more rapidly than the Songkhla team, partly because of the higher level of slum CBO organizational capacity.

Analysis of the work in three slums reveals a pattern of NGO staff, community leaders, and dwellers citing different types of indicators of slum community development. As shown in Table 3, dwellers focus on the products, leaders focus primarily on mass participation in activities, and HSF staff focus primarily on
processes. These different foci reflect the different development outputs of each level of actors. Although the outputs of each level can contribute to the success of the next level, intervening variables such as relations with local government can impede or enhance this contribution. Therefore, NGO performance should not be evaluated only by the final outputs. This point confirms that the capacity of various NGO evaluation approaches to measure intangible improvements in process is one factor which should be considered in assessing these approaches (Chapter 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3: INDICATORS OF SLUM COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DWELLERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenure security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LEADERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass participation in CD activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unity of community</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HSF STAFF</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self reliant activity management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self reliant planning and evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collaboration with other communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political and social change activism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FUNDING AGENCY STAFF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of stated objectives</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This chapter links general analysis of participatory evaluation with case study evidence to analyze the purposes, methods, strengths, and weaknesses of external, internal, and collaborative evaluation.

4.1 EXTERNAL EVALUATION

External evaluation of HSF serves two main purposes. First, it is a means of accountability to funding agencies. In addition to bi-annual progress reports and financial narratives, the international NGOs which fund HSF conduct periodic evaluations to assess the extent to which their funds are being spent in accordance with project proposals. They also attempt to monitor the community development activities and assess the impact these activities appear to be having on quality of life, equity, and other general program goals. Essentially, this central purpose is to assess the recipient NGO's performance.
The second purpose is to facilitate learning on the part of the funding agency. In the case of a Christian Aid evaluation of the SSDP project, for example, data gathered from field visits were to be used in a report on urban community development projects in Thailand, Chile, and Bolivia (Christian Aid memorandum, 14 January 1993). Terre des Hommes (Germany) specifies that evaluation results "must be reappraised within Terre des Hommes so that lessons can be learned from the experience" ("Project Criteria" guidelines, 1988). For a funding agency to learn about how development activities are actually implemented can be important in improving policy guidelines on how to work with recipient NGOs (Antrobus 1987; Carroll 1992). In addition, this learning process contributes to development education purposes in donor countries. For example, Christian Aid brochures, which fold out to become posters, consist primarily of illustrated project case-studies (Christian Aid brochure, 1992).

The method of conducting external HSF evaluations consists primarily of brief site visits by funding agency staff. In the case of Christian Aid, the evaluator comes from Britain, whereas Terre des Hommes (Germany) relies mainly on Thai staff employed in a Bangkok branch office. A February, 1993 Christian Aid evaluation of SSDP was conducted during a three day period. It included briefings by the SSDP staff, interviews with them and leaders of project communities, and observation of meetings and living conditions in the communities. The evaluator attempted to follow
a set of general guidelines. These guidelines provided a detailed list of suggested questions about the following dimensions of the project: description, objectives, short- and long-term benefits, expenditures, and sustainability of impact. Many of the questions, especially regarding long-term benefits, focused on relatively intangible but vitally important aspects of community development such as "what is the degree of popular participation" and "have poor communities been strengthened?" (Christian Aid memorandum, 14 January 1993).

By contrast, Terre des Hommes staff accept these intangibles as unmeasurable. Their evaluation criteria are the quantitative objectives set forth in project proposals. For example, a proposal might state that a savings group will be formed with a target membership of 100 for the first year. If the evaluator finds the attained membership is lower, she or he attempts to investigate whether the problem is with the people or with the NGO staff. The process of strengthening the community "is up to the NGOs [and] is not evaluated by Terre des Hommes" (interview, 10 March, 1993).

Regardless of whether the method attempts to measure intangibles, external evaluations of HSF have virtually excluded the possibility of participation (as defined in section 1.2) by project staff, clients, or other stakeholders. Their role in the evaluation has been mainly to supply information. In this respect the case of HSF confirms the criticism of external evaluation found in
The main strength of external evaluation in this context is that it satisfies funding agency reporting requirements in a timely and reasonably cost-effective manner. It generates data which can be used as an objective basis for making decisions about whether and at what level to renew funding. It may also contribute to the education of funding agency staff and of concerned citizens in donor countries.

There are at least three significant weaknesses of external evaluation methods used in the context of HSF. First, they either ignore or make weak attempts to assess the main task of this type of NGO: strengthening communities. Measuring results in terms of numbers only tends to focus attention on physical development such as infrastructure. As the case of Kubo illustrates, work on infrastructure improvement does not necessarily lead to sustainable community development. The Christian Aid evaluation model set out to directly assess the process of strengthening communities, but the brevity of the evaluation, combined with the evaluator's inability to speak Thai, rendered this difficult task virtually impossible. Both the Christian Aid and the Terre des Hommes evaluations of HSF fail to answer the most critical questions about how well the NGO is performing in strengthening the client community (eg. improvements in the extent of local self determination, the capacity for participatory planning and
networking, and the degree of CBOs' accountability to their members).

A second weakness is that external evaluation uses the time of the recipient NGO and the client communities without delivering any direct benefits to them. As an extractive rather than participatory form of research, external evaluation is primarily a unidirectional rather than mutual learning process. HSF staff and the slum dwellers they work with learn little of value to their work. The evaluation results are retained by the funding agencies, so they do not serve as a form of feedback for ongoing program planning. In this respect the experience of HSF reconfirms the general limitations of external evaluation in the context of community development programs (see, for example, Rugh 1986; Lawrence 1989).

Third, external evaluations of HSF set a non-participatory example of how to manage programs. For some Asian urban poor NGOs, evaluation is considered an obligatory task which deserves minimal effort because it is just another requirement imposed by funding agencies. As Sen (1987:161) observes, many NGOs share a "perception of evaluation as a non-legitimate activity." One senior NGO activist counters this negative perception: "evaluation

28 At an international planning meeting for the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) Training and Advisory Project a representative from the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) stressed the need for a solid monitoring and evaluation plan. Yet during the three day meeting this aspect of planning was virtually ignored (observation, February 1993).
is not something 'required by [the funding agency]', but should be conceived as our own management tool" (letter included in Patel 1993). As analyzed below, one HSF internal evaluation replicated the non-participatory character of the external evaluations to which it is regularly subjected. Similarly, annual self—evaluations of slum community leaders are less participatory than they should be, as suggested in the comment from a field worker that such meetings "need deeper discussion among dwellers" (interview, 25 February 1993). The external evaluation approach may be a learning experience for the recipient NGO, but the lesson is a negative one.

4.2 INTERNAL EVALUATION

This section analyzes the purposes, methods, degrees of participation, strengths, and weaknesses of SSDP internal evaluation. The analysis includes references to two case-study evaluation processes. One is a biannual comprehensive SSDP internal evaluation meeting which occured at a Sakom district seaside resort (24 and 25 January 1993). The other is a review of the SSDP scholarship program which consisted primarily of meetings held in the beneficiary slum communities.

Internal evaluations by Thai urban poor NGOs serve a variety of purposes in addition to satisfying funding agency expectations about project management. The main purposes are to summarize past
activities and strategies and to plan future ones. As one senior HSF organizer comments, evaluation is "not about success, but a chance to synthesize the experience of working" (interview, 8 February 1993). In the case of the SSDP comprehensive review, the purpose included summative evaluation of the projects in each client community and a general evaluation of the overall team strategy. In the case of the scholarship program review, the purpose was to diagnose problems encountered by recipients in the disbursement process and to gather data about program impact (eg. what the money was actually being used for). In both cases the primary reason for summarizing and assessing the experience and process of community development is to plan subsequent phases.

The internal evaluation methods of SSDP are simple. For the biannual review the SSDP Coordinator wrote an evaluation plan which focused on four categories of information: slum leaders, dwellers, development activities, and field workers' relations with the communities. During the three weeks prior to the evaluation meeting the four field workers were to visit each of the six client communities, working in pairs of two. The meeting agenda dealt with each community, first reviewing the situation and then planning the strategy and activities for the upcoming period. At the end of the last day of this meeting a discussion about inter-community networking strategies led to a brief planning session regarding the team's long range strategy and division of labour. This session included extensive comments from a senior advisor (a
founder of HSF who now works for an environmental NGO) about how SSDP might scale up its impact by shifting from 'second generation' community development methods to 'third generation' NGO roles (eg. providing consultation and support to CBOs and regional inter-sectoral CBO networks). Significantly, this important long range planning was not part of the evaluation plan or the meeting agenda (see analysis of "weaknesses" below).

Seven people participated in the SSDP biannual review: the five staff members and two senior staff of other Songkhla-based NGOs. These two are considered 'insiders' because they work with the team Coordinator as a three-person Steering Committee. The evaluation strategy failed to include representatives of client communities or any other interested parties. As in the case of the scholarship program evaluation, the role of client groups and individuals was for the most part limited to that of suppliers of information. These two processes were internally participatory, but the extent of strategic involvement of clients or other outsiders was not sufficient to categorize the evaluations as collaborative.

The main strengths of the SSDP evaluation processes are that they create an opportunity for reflection and planning, that they facilitate staff learning, and that they generate rich, useful information. The work of urban poor community development NGOs such as HSF is an intense process. Although the weekly staff meetings of SSDP allow for informal discussion of activities and
events in each of the client slums, staff see value in allocating more substantial amounts of time for methodical review and planning (interviews, 24 and 25 February 1993). When asked about the benefits of the Sakom meeting, one field worker responded that it was good because it encouraged her to "reflect and listen to reflections" and to "see the process in other communities". Another revealed a sense of value in collective strategic planning, commenting that "to improve the process, the team should discuss together".

SSDP evaluations serve as a learning process for the staff. In the HSF organizational culture, formal staff training is minimal and the emphasis is on "learning by doing" (interviews, 22 January and 24 February 1993). Staff comments suggest that the evaluation process facilitates sharing of wisdom among generations of staff. One young field worker said the Sakom meeting was useful because "senior people help" with the discussion of problems and with brainstorming (24 February, 1993). In this respect, internal evaluation shares a common strength with more broadly participatory evaluation (see section 2.2.1), but the learning process does not extend to the NGO's client groups.

Another strength of participatory evaluation which is evident in this case of internal evaluation is the richness and utility of evaluation results. The Sakom meeting generated a wealth of detailed analysis of topics such as the characteristics of various
categories of leaders in each community, levels of popular participation, the history of intra-community and inter-community conflicts, levels of popular recognition of SSDP and its role, and other topics. Because the majority of evaluators were field workers, the process was more effective than external evaluation would have been in assessing intangible dimensions of community development. The richness of this information was directly useful for program planning. Review discussions were followed immediately by planning discussion (observation, 24 and 25 January, 1993). The evaluation results were created by and for the NGO team. The process served as a self-management tool which enabled the team to make a direct linkage between summative evaluation and subsequent program planning.

SSDP self evaluations exhibit four principal weaknesses: a lack of critique of the team's own performance and of its community development strategy; inherent subjectivity; inadequate documentation; and, a lack of connection to the concerns of other actors (eg. funding agencies and local government).

Sen (1987) argues NGO self-evaluation processes can be vital to organizational strengthening. In this case, however, the opportunity for such strengthening was limited. As noted above, the strategic review portion of the Sakom meeting came as an addition to an already full day of discussions. The evaluation plan and meeting agenda was framed within a "second generation" set of
normative assumptions about the role of the NGO in community development.

While staff consistently expressed satisfaction with the Sakom meeting as an evaluation of activities in each community, some expressed the opinion that there was an inadequate amount of reflection on the strength of the team itself. Interviews (February 1993) revealed that at least some SSDP staff are keen to pursue more "third generation" strategies such as policy advocacy and public awareness work, yet they feel a lack of skills in these areas. The Sakom meeting failed to address questions of staff performance, capabilities, or training needs. Nor did it review the project management and administration. At least one participant indicated a need for such a review, but recognized that it is a "sensitive issue" because criticism of the existing system could be felt as personal attacks on the project Coordinator (interview, 25 February 1993). In the context of such a small NGO, team participatory self-evaluation is an inadequate process for dealing with such sensitive matters.29

The inherent subjectivity of internal evaluations is another weakness that characterizes the Sakom and scholarship program review processes. For example, community leaders with close relations to the Songkhla municipal government are labeled "bad".

29 This difficulty is particularly true in the context of Thai culture which places great emphasis on avoiding loss of face and showing respect for seniors.
whereas ones with close relations with the NGO are labeled "good". These affiliations may indeed tend to correspond with objective leadership quality criteria (eg. accountability to dwellers, integrity, etc.), but quite possibly NGO staff assessments of leaders are unfairly influenced. In some cases leaders might choose to affiliate more closely with the local government than with the NGO because they view this as their best means of securing outside resources for the community. In the case of the scholarship program review, parents of recipients have an obvious disincentive to criticize the program. Not surprisingly, the parents attending review meetings offered few if any negative comments about it. If the question appears to be whether to cancel a charitable program, the beneficiaries are unlikely to say 'yes'.

A third weakness of SSDP self evaluation processes is inadequacy of documentation. Most of the rich, detailed information discussed at Sakom went unrecorded. Field workers did prepare brief written reports for each of the communities, and the project accountant wrote summary notes of the meeting, but other than these documents there is virtually no record of the Sakom evaluation results. The lack of a record is a problem because it misses an opportunity to document historically significant work. More importantly, such documentation would reduce the negative impact of discontinuities of field staff due to high staff turnover. In the case of Kubo, for example, the field worker who took over in 1992 after a several month lapse in the SSDP presence in the community received no file
of past evaluations of the work there. In addition, thorough documentation of the wisdom shared by senior organizers could prove useful in training new staff.

A fourth weakness evident in the SSDP internal evaluation processes is a lack of connection to the concerns of other actors. As shown in the case of Kubo, the conflict between the Songkhla municipality and SSDP constrains the NGO's capacity to function effectively there. Internal evaluations, because they are by definition closed processes, are ineffective means of increasing communication among stakeholders. This strength of collaborative evaluation (Pietro 1983; Greene 1988) is not shared by internal evaluation. On the contrary, the Sakom process may have actually reinforced the 'us and them' mentality reflected in comments such as "we don't need the government" to function (SSDP staff interview, 13 January 1993).³⁰ The discontinuity between the content of the Sakom discussions and the concerns of funding agencies was also problematic. For example, the internal evaluation focused on the field workers' relationships with members of the communities, whereas the external evaluation conducted the following month by Christian Aid focused on the impact of SSDP activities. When the Christian Aid evaluator asked what proportion of a certain

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³⁰ This attitude may be reasonable in view of the fundamental differences in the government and NGO community development methods. Evidence suggests that the conflict does impede SSDP's capacity, however. For example, the Kubo scholarship review meeting was cut short when a man with ties to the municipality entered and became aggressive (observation, 18 February 1993).
community benefited from the SSDP intervention, the field worker responded that "100% recognize the leaders and about 60% recognize me" (observation, 10 February 1993).\textsuperscript{31}

Identifying the lack of connection to the concerns of other actors as a weakness of internal evaluation (at least in this particular case) is not intended as an attack on SSDP or its evaluation processes. Indeed, it could be stated with equal or greater validity that this gap is a weakness of external evaluation. Similarly, other stakeholders such as local governments can be accused of not considering the concerns or perspectives of the NGOs. The point here is not who is to blame for the discontinuities and lack of coordination among various evaluation processes. Rather, it is to argue that there may be opportunities which could be exploited through collaborative evaluation processes.

4.3 TOWARD COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION

This final section begins to answer the question: "how could more broadly participatory evaluation processes strengthen the capacities of an NGO such as HSF to support sustainable urban poor

\textsuperscript{31} This communication gap may result from problems with the translation process. Nonetheless it is a microcosm of the discontinuity between internal and external evaluation.
community development?". The section considers the suitability, viability, and implications of collaborative evaluation in the context of HSF-Bangkok and SSDP. The section hypothesizes about the purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, and weaknesses of collaborative evaluation as it might develop in this context. The section concludes with an analysis of implications for each of the NGO capacity variables identified in Section 3.3.

The above two sections show the limitations of external and internal evaluations of HSF. The former approach is non-participatory and contributes little to the achievement of program goals. The latter can be classified as a form of "participatory self-evaluation" (see Rugh 1986; Uphoff 1991). It fails, however, to include participation of intended beneficiaries. Other weaknesses of this approach partially confirm Sen's (1987:166) conclusion that NGO self-evaluation "tends to be impressionistic and unsystematic". The Sakom meeting was systematic in analyzing the constraints and opportunities in working with various categories of leaders in each community. The evaluation performed weakly, however, in assessing the NGO itself. Both the internal and external evaluations have been constrained by being mutually exclusive.

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32 Internal evaluation is participatory, but to a lesser extent than collaborative evaluation.
4.3.1 PURPOSES OF COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION

Hypothetically, collaborative evaluation could serve both funding agency and HSF purposes. It could be a means for summarizing and planning program activities while simultaneously producing an assessment of HSF performance. In addition, it could serve the presumably shared goal of strengthening the NGO's strategic planning capabilities. Participation of intended beneficiaries means that evaluation becomes a direct as well as an indirect means of strengthening communities. The quality of such participation, and the extent to which it promotes and facilitates the development of democratizing self-evaluation at the CBO level, may be considered indicators of NGO performance.

4.3.2 METHODS: PLANNING COLLABORATIVE EVALUATIONS

One way to achieve collaboration among the funding agencies, NGO staff, community leaders, and slum dwellers would be to use an "evaluation facilitator" (see Swantz 1992). In the context of relatively large-scale programs this role can be played by an international expert or team (Salmen 1987; Hatch 1991; Lovell 1992). In the case of small to medium-sized programs such as SSDP and HSF-Bangkok, however, it might be more viable to develop local expertise so that future collaborative evaluations would not necessitate large travel expenditures.
Training is the primary input required to develop collaborative evaluation capabilities (Feuerstein 1987; Swantz 1992). The first level consists of training evaluation facilitators who can then organize training workshops for NGO staff and other participants. In the case of SSDP, training could be provided to local academics and staff of regional NGO and CBO network organizations. In the case of HSF-Bangkok, existing NGO support networks and organizations may already have the capacity to train evaluation facilitators. In both cases training would most appropriately occur through exchange programs.

Learning by doing, and by seeing what others do, is the preferred mode of training among typical Asian NGOs. Senior NGO staff in Songkhla suggest that training/exchange programs with Malaysian NGOs may be more economically viable than with Bangkok ones (interview, 29 August 1992). In both Songkhla and Bangkok, training for collaborative evaluation would involve local action supported by international exchange and learning among NGOs.

33 For example, the Chulalongkorn University "NGO Academic Service Committee", an interdisciplinary network of academics formed in 1991, organizes training programs for NGO staff ("Staff Development for Nongovernmental Organization" [no date], Continuing Education Centre, Chulalongkorn University).

34 The Asian Coalition for Housing Rights "Training and Advisory Project for Community Based Human Settlement in Urban Areas", sponsored by the South East Asia Development Division of the Overseas Development Administration (SEADD), will use the majority of a 649,000 pound (Sterling) budget to facilitate learning through exchange among member NGOs and CBOs during the 1993-1996 period (SEADD 1992).
Planning how to implement a collaborative evaluation process and selecting appropriate research techniques are tasks which must themselves be planned. Levels of participation should increase as the process moves from pre-planning to planning to actual implementation of the evaluation. Evaluation planning ideally involves representatives from each category of actors. In the case of a relatively minor evaluation, such as the biannual review of a small program, broad participation may occur only in the implementation phase. The details of different evaluation plans will vary, but certain elements should be included.

1. The means of selecting participants should be specified, with particular consideration given to the problem of ensuring participation of less powerful sub-categories of actors (e.g. the poorest of slum dwellers and women).

2. The role of the evaluation facilitator in relation to the various participants should be clearly defined.

3. The variety of indicators used by each category of participants should be considered (see Table 4).

4. There should be a strategy for documenting the process and results of the evaluation (see Rugh 1986).

5. There should be a means for achieving continuity through
subsequent evaluations. Sustainable community development in the context of Thai slums takes many years of NGO involvement.\footnote{Urban poor NGO field workers say the process normally takes five to ten years (HSF interview, 12 August 1992; Duang Prateep Foundation interview, 12 March 1993).} Plans should recognize that ultimately the effectiveness of the evaluation itself needs to be evaluated.

4.3.3 PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION

The range of participants in collaborative evaluation begins with the NGO and the intended beneficiary communities as the central actors (see Vargas 1991:269). Funding agencies may participate, but in a less central role. In the case of HSF, the logistics of funding agency participation may be problematic for those agencies which lack offices in Thailand. They could, however, have input in planning collaborative evaluation without actually being directly involved in the implementation.

Opportunities for participation by governmental organizations would be limited, particularly where relations with NGOs are hostile. In the case of HSF-Bangkok, a collaborative evaluation might appropriately include the Urban Community Development Office (a GONGO funded through the NHA). Other potential government participants would be the Crown Property Bureau, the NHA Community Development Department, and perhaps the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority. In the case of SSDP, relations with the Songkhla
municipality are currently so hostile that collaboration would probably not be viable. However, a semi-neutral evaluation facilitator may be able to serve as an intermediary and thus assist in breaking through current communication barriers.

Participation of outside NGOs and CBOs would be appropriate. In 1991 HSF-Bangkok invited assessments of its performance from other urban poor NGOs and CBOs (HSF "Progress Report", 1991). Many of the comments were extremely negative, perhaps in part because of fundamental differences in development approaches. Unfortunately, such feedback could exacerbate the tensions and lack of coordination among urban poor NGOs. As noted in Section 3.2, HSF is somewhat constrained by a sense of alienation. Therefore inviting participation of NGOs which work in other sectors but which have a similar development approach would be appropriate.

Such intersectoral collaboration already occurs to some extent, and increasing it would create further opportunities for building solidarity within the Thai NGO movement. Another potential benefit is mutual learning about substantive development issues (e.g. urban NGOs being influenced by environmental NGOs). In the view of at least one NGO network organizer, evaluation of community organizing work in the urban and the rural sectors "is the same because the development method is the same" (interview, February 25, 1993).

Participation of community leaders and dwellers is a central
feature of collaborative evaluation, yet this necessity poses several practical difficulties. First, NGO staff are likely to be reluctant. One reason is that the strengthening of slum CBOs is often impeded by corrupt slum leadership. The NGO role is partly to intervene in ways which lead to the development of more democratic leaders. Interventions in slums to promote grassroots democracy upsets existing intra-community power structures.

In practice, even benign intervention is a form of manipulation. Rahnema critiques the role of the NGO "barefoot developer" as an agent of "manipulation" in the name of participation (1992:124). In the Thai NGO movement, the issue of how and whether to involve community representatives in NGO governance is a much discussed topic (interview, 1 September, 1992). Exclusion of slum leaders and dwellers from evaluation may be partly intentional. One SSDP worker comments that the Sakom meeting was good because it was a chance to "talk freely about problems" in a discrete context (24 February 1993).

A second practical difficulty is that slum dwellers and leaders may lack the time and inclination to participate. One SSDP field worker comments that "community development is just one part of slum life" (25 February, 1993). For poorer dwellers, levels of participation in implementing activities are constrained by the daily exigencies of survival. Expecting them to participate in NGO evaluation may be unrealistic and unfair. Participation of women
is particularly problematic because of their "triple role" as producers, reproducers, and community managers (Moser and Peake 1987:13).

Collaborative evaluation would tend to exclude disadvantaged segments of slum communities unless such evaluation implements affirmative action measures. Leaders are typically relatively wealthy, in part because others cannot afford to donate so much time to their communities (observation and leader interviews, 16-21 February 1993). To extend participation in evaluation beyond the level of the advantaged segments of slum communities would require proactive efforts such as reimbursement of childcare and travel expenses, and perhaps even some form of honorarium. Such expenditures would be justifiable in the interest of strengthening the accountability of the NGO to its intended beneficiaries.

4.3.4 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION

Collaborative evaluation of NGOs such as HSF could result in learning and empowerment to the extent that the range of participants includes disadvantaged members of client communities. Having an established feedback system would help ensure that the

36 Pornchokchai (1992:168) offers convincing evidence to support his conclusion that "many of the slum population are not very poor". Among Kao Seng leaders interviewed for this study, one had a large new house which looked like it should be in an upper middle class suburb, another had a large rooming house, and another had a gleaming Harley Davidson motorcycle parked in front of his pool hall.
work of HSF is consistent with the principle of slum dwellers' self-determination. This system could be a channel through which bottom-up communication would enhance accountability to the grassroots.

Another strength of collaborative evaluation is that it could produce a more rigorous and methodical assessment of the NGO itself. Compared to internal and external approaches, it could be useful in making a transition toward "third generation" and "fourth generation" strategies.

Stronger analysis and documentation of HSF's work would also strengthen its capacity to share its experience with outsider NGOs and CBOs which come for exchange/training/solidarity visits. For example, in 1992 SSDP organized slum visits for participants in an international grassroots planning project called the "People's Plan for the 21st Century" (see Panyakul 1992). Building linkages among NGOs and CBOs from the local level to the global level is becoming the primary means through which people with alternative visions of development are able to strengthen their effectiveness. Collaborative NGO evaluation both relies upon and facilitates such linkages.

As noted above, the inherent subjectivity of participatory evaluation approaches is a commonly cited weakness (see sections 2.3.2 and 4.2). However, Pagaduan and Ferrer (1983:157) conclude
from the experience of applying a "Community Based Evaluation System" in the Philippines that participatory techniques yielded data which were "more accurate" than if they had been obtained through a random survey of respondents:

Since most of the data were collected in groups, exaggerated responses were checked and avoided. According to the participants themselves, "the process allowed for everyone to express his/her views, check and clarify each other's recollection of events and processes, and to be thorough and systematic".

Similarly, drawing together a diversity of subjective perspectives regarding the performance of an NGO such as HSF could generate a reasonably objective overall assessment. Overcoming the subjectivity problem reaffirms the importance of the evaluation facilitator role. Part of this role is to introduce some basic social science principles and techniques which can be incorporated within the collaborative evaluation.

The costs of collaborative evaluation, both in terms of program budgets and participants' time, could constrain opportunities for application of the approach. This constraint would be particularly significant in the context of small programs such as SSDP. In a situation where just five staff members are attempting to provide community development services to thousands of slum dwellers, taking even two days out (as for the Sakom meetings) can be difficult. NGOs such as HSF are action-oriented, and spending time to evaluate must be considered in terms of the missed opportunity to work in the field. However, to the extent that participants recognize the potential benefits of more collaborative evaluation
they would be willing to pay the costs.

4.3.5 IMPLICATIONS OF COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION

What, then, are the hypothetical implications of collaborative evaluation for HSF in terms of the five NGO capacity variables identified in this thesis?

RELATIONS WITH FUNDING AGENCIES

Relations with funding agencies would shift further from the top-down foreign aid model and toward a more egalitarian relationship of mutual learning. Creating collaborative evaluation processes involves integrating HSF's accountability to funding agencies and to the urban poor. This integration means that bottom-up flows of information and influence would more directly determine top-down resource flows. It would require HSF and funding agencies to consider one another's purposes of evaluation and indicators of success. For example, it would mean learning how to combine assessments of NGO impact with analysis of NGO relationships with CBOs and communities.

MANAGEMENT ABILITIES

Shifting toward collaborative evaluation would both require and facilitate strengthening of HSF management abilities. Such a shift means becoming more systematic in assessing staff performance and in considering how to implement third and fourth generation
development strategies.

ACCOUNTABILITY TO INTENDED BENEFICIARIES
Building regular channels of accountability to the urban poor would help minimize the risk of losing touch with the principle of popular self determination. To the extent that slum leaders' and dwellers' feedback influenced subsequent NGO action, collaborative evaluation might enhance HSF credibility and hence its capacity to stimulate community action. Involving slum dwellers and leaders in evaluation would serve the additional purpose of providing opportunities for them to learn about democratic program management.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER NGOS
As suggested above, collaborative evaluation of HSF would both require and facilitate strengthening of linkages with other NGOs and CBOs. Building stronger relationships among NGOs which work in different sectors but share similar development approaches would enhance opportunities for combining learning and solidarity activities.

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT
Where HSF relations with government are too hostile to permit participation in collaborative evaluation, application of the approach would have little direct impact on this variable. Indirectly, however, other evaluation participants might help to
assess whether the hostility is a serious problem. If it is, there may be opportunities to plan possible solutions.

4.3.6 SUMMARY

Table 5 summarizes the purposes, methods, levels of participation, strengths, and weaknesses of the three evaluation approaches.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL, INTERNAL AND COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EXTERNAL</th>
<th>INTERNAL</th>
<th>COLLABORATIVE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PURPOSES</strong></td>
<td>funding agency reporting,</td>
<td>summarize development activities,</td>
<td>(combines NGO, community, and funding agency purposes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>development education</td>
<td>plan future activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>METHODS</strong></td>
<td>NGO and community visits</td>
<td>community visit rotation,</td>
<td>evaluation facilitator coordinates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>group discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTICIPATION</strong></td>
<td>funding agency staff</td>
<td>NGO staff, senior advisors</td>
<td>NGO staff, community leaders, dwellers, other NGOs and CBOs, funding agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTHS</strong></td>
<td>efficient reporting,</td>
<td>planning opportunity,</td>
<td>all participants learn, community empowerment, rich and useful results, NGO and CBO networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>donor learning</td>
<td>staff learning,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rich and useful results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEAKNESSES</strong></td>
<td>weak measure of community dev., no benefit to recipients, sets negative example</td>
<td>lack of NGO critique, inherently subjective, inadequate documentation</td>
<td>costly, subjective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The global trends of rapid urbanization and increasing disparity between rich and poor have been particularly extreme in the case of Thailand. The benefits of Thailand's spectacular economic growth have been unequally distributed. For many of the over one million slum dwellers of Bangkok this boom period has resulted in mass eviction. Recent evidence suggests that slum communities in regional cities such as Songkhla, Chiang Mai, and Nakhorn Ratchasima are also facing a trend of increased eviction.

During the last three decades strategies for housing the urban poor in Third World countries have shifted from provision of housing to a community enabling approach. Relatively inexpensive interventions such as subsidization of serviced building sites and upgrading of existing slum and squatter communities have largely failed to stimulate the creation of adequate quantities of permanent, affordable shelter. The apparently wide consensus in favour of policies which enable the urban poor to solve their own shelter problems contains a fundamental ideological split between
those who emphasize self-reliance and those who emphasize self-
determination combined with redistribution of resources.

This thesis has analyzed the work of the Human Settlement
Foundation, a small, indigenous NGO that works with Thailand's
urban poor communities. Using an embedded single-case research
design, the thesis analyzed the work of HSF in three slum
communities. This work involves supporting a wide range of
community development activities, including infrastructure
upgrading, formation and strengthening of CBOs, negotiating for
land tenure, and policy advocacy. The main purpose of HSF work is
to increase the capacities of urban poor communities to mobilize
economic and political resources, from both internal and external
sources. Improvements in these capacities mean increased levels of
self-determination.

Like other Thai NGOs which share a similar community development
approach, HSF is gradually shifting away from direct intervention
in communities and toward what Korten (1990) calls "third
generation" and "fourth generation" strategies. These strategies
include doing research, publicity, and policy advocacy. To the
extent that "second generation" efforts have succeeded in
organizing strong, democratically structured CBOs and CBO networks,
the role of NGOs can shift toward provision of support services to
these independent organizations.
Program evaluation is perhaps the single most crucial means of improving NGO effectiveness. Recent literature on participatory evaluation criticizes conventional external evaluation as an inappropriate approach in the context of community development programs. Evidence from numerous sources shows that participatory evaluation can serve several purposes, including learning and empowerment of program staff and intended beneficiaries, and enhanced communication among various categories of actors.

The approach can produce high quality results. Compared to external evaluation, the results of participatory evaluation contain rich information about program context and are capable of measuring intangible dimensions of community development. Most importantly, these results are immediately useful in planning and improving community development programs.

At least four factors impede widespread adoption of participatory evaluation. 1) It is relatively costly. 2) It is inherently subjective, relying primarily on insiders' views rather than on measurements made by outsiders. 3) Funding agencies may be reluctant to use it for practical, political, and ideological reasons. 4) There is a lack of awareness and skills about it, even in the NGO sector.

In the case of HSF two evaluation approaches are currently in use: external and internal. External evaluation of HSF serves as a
means of accountability to the European NGOs which fund it. This approach also facilitates learning on the part of these funding agencies. The evaluation method, which consists primarily of brief site visits by staff, satisfies the above purposes in a reasonably cost-effective manner. The evaluation excludes participation of recipient NGO staff and client communities except as suppliers of information. It has three principal weaknesses: 1) it is ineffective at measuring NGO performance in the central task of strengthening communities; 2) it contributes little to program planning or achievement of program objectives; and, 3) it sets an example of non-participatory program management.

Internal evaluations by HSF serve primarily to summarize past activities and plan future ones. Biannual reviews consist of rotating staff among client communities and then meeting to discuss the development issues in each. Such reviews, at least in the case of SSDP, involve participation of all program staff and a few senior advisors. Internal evaluation by HSF teams has three principal strengths: 1) it creates an opportunity for reflection and planning within the action-oriented NGO working method; 2) it facilitates staff learning; and, 3) it generates rich, useful information. It exhibits four principal weaknesses: 1) it lacks sufficient critique of the team's own performance and of its strategy; 2) it is inherently subjective; 3) it is not well documented; and, 4) it lacks connection to the concerns of other actors.
Hypothetically, broadly participatory collaborative evaluation could be an improvement over the external and internal approaches. Using a relatively neutral evaluation facilitator, it could involve participation of HSF staff, slum leaders and dwellers, funding agencies, other indigenous NGOs and CBOs, and, perhaps, government bodies. Facilitating inclusion of disadvantaged segments of slum communities would necessitate some form of affirmative action strategy.

Developing the approach in the context of the Thai NGO movement would require training in the form of exchange programs and support from academic institutions. In Songkhla, training could occur through building linkages with Malaysian NGOs. HSF-Bangkok has access to a wider range of resources for organizational development. In both cases stronger cooperation with local NGOs working in different sectors would be beneficial.

The weaknesses of collaborative evaluation would be similar to those noted in the literature on participatory evaluation. Again, each of these weaknesses can be addressed or alleviated.

In addition to the strengths noted in the literature, collaborative evaluation could produce more rigorous and methodical assessments of HSF. Most importantly, it could strengthen HSF's capacities to support sustainable urban poor community development.
APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDATIONS

This appendix offers general recommendations to two categories of actors: funding agencies and academics interested in international development program planning.

1. FUNDING AGENCIES

As indicated above in section 1.4, much of the policy literature on NGOs frames questions from the funding agency perspective. One central problem is how to select authentic NGOs which are capable of implementing cost effective development projects. Established international NGOs such as Oxfam have well documented performance records, but the strengths and weaknesses of the many new NGOs in developing countries are relatively difficult to assess. Hellinger suggests that major international funding agencies can rely on international NGOs for advice about NGOs in developing countries (1987:139). Indeed, this case study suggests that international NGOs can serve as intermediary funding agencies.

International funding agencies seeking to increase the extent of collaboration with domestic NGOs in their human settlements development programmes need to develop their own abilities to engage in effective communication about how they might provide
appropriate support to local NGOs and CBOs. Recent international development policy literature contains analyses of many of the common opportunities and constraints associated with NGO collaboration (see Hellinger 1987; Clark 1990; Sanyal 1991; Carroll 1992). Building appropriate linkages is far more complex than merely selecting authentic, effective NGO recipients.

Jorge Anzorena, who has spent decades encouraging collaboration among human settlements NGOs around the world, offers the following advice about how funding agencies can best address the needs of the urban poor (Anzorena 1993:131):

Try to learn their way of communication, through personal stories. Through them you will find a way to learn and then to share your knowledge with the people.

It is very important that the people participate in every stage of the programme: in the planning, in the management, in the evaluation. The way of proceeding will be different, but you will find something new happening.

New things are indeed happening. Increasingly, the onus is on all levels of actors in development processes to learn about and from each other. Collaborative evaluation is one practical means for facilitating such mutual learning.

The emergence of the bottom-up paradigm of international development as a viable alternative to past models implies that funding agencies must give up some power in order to make their resources more effective. It means that funding agencies, too, need to develop abilities to participate more effectively in supporting processes which lead to sustainable community development.
2. INTERESTED ACADEMICS

This thesis has attempted to make a small contribution to the literature on participatory evaluation of community development programs. The author hopes that some readers will be inspired to further pursue this area of research and action. The following is a list of questions which deserve further investigation.

1. How can collaborative evaluation processes build effective channels of accountability among intermediary NGOs, intended program beneficiaries, and funding agencies?

2. In what ways does an NGO's interventionist role as a promoter of more democratic organizational structures at the community level (ie. accountable CBOs) conflict with the principle of bottom up development, and how does this conflict affect opportunities for community participation in program evaluation?

3. What practical strategies can be used to enable the least advantaged segments of poor communities to participate in evaluations?

4. What specific methods can minimize problems of bias or even conflict of interest arising from the inherent subjectivity of participatory evaluation?
5. How can academics contribute to the strengthening of community development processes by serving as evaluation facilitators or by assisting in the development of participatory research training programs (see Peattie 1983; Women's Research Centre 1987; Feueurstein 1988; Swantz 1992; Hall 1979, 1993)?
APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY

This case study uses an embedded single-case research design to study three units of analysis: the NGO as a whole, regional sub-offices, and specific slum communities. The Human Settlement Foundation is the largest unit of analysis, and each of the others are embedded within it.

TABLE A1: EMBEDDED UNITS OF ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HUMAN SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BANGKOK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khlong Phai Singto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bon Gai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimthang Rotfai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalerm Anusorn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sena Pattana</td>
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<tr>
<td>On Nuuch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Rai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rationale for using a single-case design is that this is an example of what Yin (1989:47-48) calls a "unique" and "revelatory
case". Human Settlement Foundation is one of the few slum NGOs in Thailand which are committed to playing a truly enabling role, focusing on strengthening community organizations rather than on providing charitable services. It is the only one to have initiated projects outside of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region.

Within this case study approach the author used the following field research methods: interviewing, participant observation, and documentary research.

i) interviewees: NGO staff and advisors, local government and National Housing Authority officials, funding agency staff, community leaders, and slum dwellers.

ii) participant observation: throughout field work.

iii) documentary research: primary documents (biannual progress reports, project proposals, evaluation reports, memoranda, brochures, etc.) and secondary documents (studies, published reports, and newspaper articles).

Interviewees included members of the following organizations or groups. In cases where the author interviewed more than one person the number of people interviewed is given in brackets.

1. FUNDING AGENCIES

Terre des Hommes - Coordination Office Southeast Asia
Christian Aid
2. NGO SUPPORT NETWORKS

Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
South NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development
Thai Volunteer Service
Chulalongkorn University NGO Academic Service Committee
Alternative Development Studies Program - Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute
Thai Development Support Committee
United Slums Development Association

3. THAI URBAN POOR NGOs

Human Settlement Foundation - Bangkok (5)
Human Settlement Foundation - Songkhla (5)
Human Settlement Foundation - Chiang Mai (2)
Human Settlement Foundation - former staff (3)
Duang Prateep Foundation (4)
Building Together Association (2)
Grassroots Development Institute

4. SLUM COMMUNITY LEADERS

Khlong Phai Singto (3)
Kubo (7)
Kao Seng (8)

5. SLUM DWELLERS

Khlong Phai Singto (2 households)
Kubo (4 households)
Kao Seng (4 households)

6. GOVERNMENT BODIES

Community Development Department, National Housing Authority (3)
Office of Urban Development, Ministry of Interior, Kingdom of Thailand
Songkhla Municipality

Field observation included the following events and sites:

1. NGO MEETINGS

Urban Community Development Office -- planning meeting with NGOs and CBOs (Xavier Hall, Bangkok; August 1992)

Chiang Mai NGO inter-sectoral network planning meeting (Chiang Mai YMCA, August 1992)

Human Settlement Foundation internal evaluation meeting (Leela Resort, Sakom District; January 1993)

Human Settlement Foundation weekly staff meeting (Songkhla office, February 1993)

Asian Coalition for Housing Rights -- Training and Advisory Project planning meeting (Bangkok; February 1993)
2. COMMUNITY MEETINGS

Songkhla slum network -- federal election rally planning meeting (Bonwua community, Songkhla; August 1992)

Songkhla slum network -- campaign meeting (Bonwua community, Songkhla; February, 1993)

Kubo community -- scholarship program evaluation meeting (Kubo community leader's residence, Songkhla; February 1993)

Kao Seng community -- scholarship program evaluation meeting (Kao Seng Children's Centre; February 1993)

Kao Seng Community Committee -- general meeting (Kao Seng Children's Centre; February 1993)

3. COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS AT WORK

Rong Kaje, Khlong Nung (Chiang Mai; August 1992)

Kubo (Songkhla; February 1993)

Khlong Phai Singto (Bangkok; March 1993)

4. SLUM LIFE

Khlong Toey (Bangkok, August 1992)

Rong Kaje, Khlong Nung (Chiang Mai, August 1992)

Kubo (Songkhla, February 1992)

Kao Seng (Songkhla, February - March 1993)

Bonwua (Songkhla; February 1993)

Khlong Phai Singto (Bangkok, March 1993)

The author conducted a rigorous review of literature on urban poor
community development in Thailand, participatory program evaluation, and Third World housing policy.

Wherever possible data gathered were cross-referenced through different research methods in order to provide corroboration and thus increase "construct validity". (Yin 1989, pp.40-42, 95-98)
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