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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Locke’s theory of toleration and its critics Raabe, Peter Bruno 1994

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LOCKE'S THEORY OF TOLERATION AND ITS C R I T I C S by PETER BRUNO RAABE B.A. Hon. The U n i v e r s i t y  of B r i t i s h  Columbia,  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department  We a c c e p t to  this  of P h i l o s o p h y )  t h e s i s as  the required  conforming  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA S e p t e m b e r 1995 (c)  P e t e r B r u n o R a a b e , 1995  1994  In  presenting this  degree at the  thesis  in  University of  partial  fulfilment  of  this thesis for  department  or  by  his  or  agree that  scholarly purposes may be her  representatives.  It  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not permission.  Department of  f  K( 1  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  requirements  British Columbia, I agree that the  freely available for reference and study. I further copying of  the  is  for  an advanced  Library shall make it  permission for extensive  granted  by the  understood  that  head of copying  my or.  be allowed without my written  Abstract  I t has been a r g u e d t h a t L o c k e ' s t h e o r y of t o l e r a t i o n is not f l a w e d in some r e s p e c t s , North  American  but t h a t  society  concerns  of  detailed  analysis  since  it  i t lacks relevance for present  day  addresses  and  Locke's own c i v i l society  examination  of  contemporary,  the  of  the  Jonas P r o a s t ,  force to promote belief,  of  theory  of  foundations.  A scrutiny  conditions  his  period.  But  a  along w i t h  an  letter  at  him  by  his  of  the  use  of  levelled  e s p e c i a l l y , on t h e  issue  shows t h a t L o c k e ' s t h e o r y of t o l e r a t i o n is in  other  toleration  the  in the L e t t e r ,  f a c t l o g i c a l l y sound and q u i t e r i g o r o u s . of some of L o c k e ' s  only  and h i s t o r i c a l  arguments  criticisms  only  writings  Furthermore,  reveals  on  sound  of  later  that  political criticisms  an e x a m i n a t i o n  Locke and by  has based  his  epistemological Joseph  Priestley,  Susan Mendus, Jeremy W a l d r o n , and John R a w l s shows t h a t t h e y also f a i l t o d i m i n i s h e i t h e r t h e f o r c e of L o c k e ' s a r g u m e n t s or t h e r e l e v a n c e his  theory  freedom.  of  toleration  Although  to  Locke's  present  day  intolerance i i  issues s u r r o u n d i n g of  atheists  is  of  religious  shown  to  be  misplaced,  it  is argued that  toleration  is  rights.  is also argued that  It  that matters religion if Locke's  not  at  his a p p r o a c h to  odds with  of state  can,  modern  of  religious  approaches from  individual  he is not mistaken  and must,  the peace and security of  theory  universal  toleration  is  parochial nor historically bound.  i ii  in his assumption  be separated from matters a state  therefore  are  of  to be maintained.  shown  to  be  neither  Table of Contents  Abstract  i i  T a b l e of C o n t e n t s  iv  Acknowledgements  vi  Introduction C h a p t e r One  1 Locke's L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n and t h e S t r u c t u r e o f I t s A r g u r e n t  6  A Sirnrrary and A n a l y s i s o f Locke's L e t t e r  10  N o n - r e l i g i o u s Arguments f o r T o l e r a t i o n The S t a t e  14  The Church  19  The Scope o f t h e duty of T o l e r a t i o n The Church  21  P r i v a t e Persons  21  R e l i g i o u s Leaders  22  The M a g i s t r a t e  23  Vvhat the M a g i s t r a t e Need Not T o l e r a t e  30  On the R i g h t t o Freedom of R e l i g i o u s Assembly 33  Chapter Two  Conclusion  34  The Debate Between Locke and P r o a s t  36  F o r c e May Be Used By A l l  41  Wham To Use F o r c e On?  42  F o r c e May H a r m The Truth  44  iv  How Much F o r c e is Enough? God and t h e Use of F o r c e  Chapter  Three  46 50  What i f C i t i z e n s Agreed t o the Use of F o r c e ?  51  The A r g u r e n t F r a n True R e l i g i o n  55  Conclusion  61  C l a r i f y i n g Locke's Arguments C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n by Means o f an E x a m i n a t i o n of Sore  C h a p t e r Four  of h i s O t h e r W r i t i n g s  65  An Essay C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n  68  The F i r s t and Second T r e a t i s e of Government  75  An E s s a y s C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g  78  Seme Thoughts on E d u c a t i o n  85  The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y  88  Some L a t e r C r i t i c i s m s o f Locke's L e t t e r  93  Is t h e Scope of Locke's T o l e r a t i o n Too Narrow?94 Does Locke N e g l e c t I n d i v i d u a l R i g h t s ?  95  If C o e r c i n g B e l i e f Works t o Enhance S t a t e S e c u r i t y , Why May t h e S t a t e S t i l l Not Use i t ? 106 Locke's  Intolerance  Of O p i n i o n s  116  Of t h e I n t o l e r a n t  119  Of  "Those Devoted  Of A t h e i s t s Chapter F i v e Selected  Conclusion  bibliography  t o Another P r i n c e "  121 123 126 129  Acknowl edgerent s  I wish to thank two members of the faculty of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia: Dr. Jim Dybikowski for the probing questions, and the many suggestions and criticisms he so patiently offered during the summer of my writing this thesis; and Dr. Paul Russell for his prompt second reading and final approval of my work. To my first and second year philosophy instructor at Capilano C o l l e g e , Mark B a t t e r s b y , I say, thank you for your c o n t i n u e d encouragement regardless of which carpus I was attending. I am most indebted to my wife Anne without whose financial, moral, and emotional support the effort required for the successful completion of this degree would not have been possible. And thanks to Tim Raabe for thinking it was "cool" of me to get this degree so l a t e in l i f e .  Introduction  It  is generally  industrialized  the  case that  in the  more  liberal  modern  nations civil governments allow each citizen the  to hold whatever  religious beliefs he or she chooses,  day, right  and to worship  in whatever  way he or she thinks is appropriate and consistent with  that belief.  But this has not always been the case.  At one time,  in pre-industrialized Europe, civil authorities  took  it as their responsibility to choose and promote, by means of force if necessary, salvation."  the  "true  faith"  and the  "one  path  that  leads  to  This instituting of a state religion and a uniformity  of  worship was seen by the c i v i l authorities as a means of promoting a common world view,  a unanimity  of values and goals among citizens  which would allow the peace, stability,  and security of society to be  maintained. But one problem was that it was impossible for the members of any population to reach a unanimous agreement as to which faith was to  be called the  religion. authorities  true  faith that  This disagreement since,  should be  promoted  as the  state  caused no end of  trouble  for  r e g a r d l e s s of which r e l i g i o n  a state  chose to  1  civil  p r o m o t e , t h e r e w e r e i n e v i t a b l y a number of t h e i r c i t i z e n r y who simply refused to accept,  or openly r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t ,  that  church which  the  s t a t e chose t o p r o c l a i m as t h e only t r u e c h u r c h . While efforts  church  leaders  to enforce  the  and  civil  authorities  state-proclaimed  continued  "orthodoxy,"  their  a grass  roots  movement was slowly gaining momentum all over 17th century Europe. common p e o p l e w e r e b e g i n n i n g to demand t o l e r a t i o n f o r t h e i r religious  beliefs  from  sanctioned churches. holding  certain  civil  offices,  from fear  refused  to  accept  labeled  a citizen  and t h e  leaders  various  of  state-  The h e t e r o d o x w e r e t i r e d of being p r e v e n t e d f r o m  public  living lives free  authorities  The  the  of  state  a heretic  owning  their  persecution  and t o r t u r e  religion  as t h e i r  and,  many  in  o w n businesses,  own.  because Such a  cases,  resulted  and they  refusal in  their  being e x e c u t e d by t h e s t a t e . John L o c k e was one of t h e most o u t s t a n d i n g u n o f f i c i a l f o r r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n d u r i n g t h i s t i m e of only  were  his w r i t i n g s  on t h e  subject  growing  spokesmen  discontent.  of r e l i g i o u s  toleration  widely  r e a d in his day, t h e y have set t h e t e r m s of t h e d e b a t e even f o r who  have  subsequently  argued  in  opposition  to  his  liberal  Not  those  position.  A l t h o u g h L o c k e was c o m m e n t i n g on t h e r e l i g i o u s problems of his day, his w r i t i n g s and  calm  century.  were  that  a major  pervaded  Despite  contributing the  the f a c t  Church that  f r o m t h e p o s i t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y , as a case  in point,  his a p p r o a c h  of  factor  to the r e l a t i v e  England  in  the  eighteenth  t h e b e g i n n i n g of his L e t t e r and he uses t h e C h u r c h of is f o r  t h e most  part  peace  argues England  philosophical  and u n i v e r s a l in t h a t he e n q u i r e s w h a t s o r t and how m u c h t o l e r a t i o n is  2  required not just of one church or government but of everyone. universality, writings  together w i t h the power of his arguments,  r e l e v a n c e not  only across  the p o l i t i c a l  This  has given his and  religious  boundaries of h i s day but seems to have a l s o extended h i s arguments across the boundary of time. Today  there  religions,  is  a discontent  - the f r i n g e groups,  with  the  the c u l t s ,  so-called  heterodox  and the new agers  s i m i l a r to the one which existed i n Locke's day.  -  There seems to be a  growing desire i n same sectors of society to promote what i s believed to be "the c o r r e c t " worship." not  C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s and  "the proper modes of  There i s an ever increasing demand that government not only  tolerate  particular  heterodoxy,  but  religious beliefs  that  the fundamental  be e n f o r c e d  l e g i s l a t i o n and a p p l i e d to s e c u l a r  life.  It  p r i n c i p l e s of  through  government  i s once a g a i n b e i n g  argued that state promoted r e l i g i o n w i l l enhance the peace, and s t a b i l i t y of nations.  security,  C l e a r l y t h i s movement toward the r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t , and the c a l l for a r e i n t e g r a t i o n of m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o n and m a t t e r s of s t a t e ,  i s as great a t h r e a t to r e l i g i o u s freedom and  i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y of b e l i e f today as the s t a t e promoted r e l i g i o n s were i n Locke's day. In  light  of  the  present  assault  question considered in t h i s thesis  on r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t y ,  the  i s , can the w r i t i n g s of L o c k e ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y h i s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n , o f f e r us any s o r t of insights or guidance for dealing w i t h these developments in our modern day society? The f i r s t chapter sets the stage by o f f e r i n g a surrnary of Locke's  3  L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n , and a n a l y z i n g how he s t r u c t u r e s arguments.  his  T h i s chapter d i s c u s s e s the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t i n w h i c h  Locke i s w r i t i n g , the C h r i s t i a n argument w i t h w h i c h he b e g i n s , and then his p h i l o s o p h i c a l reasoning. arguments made by some c r i t i c s ,  It points out how, contrary to the Locke's main p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments  each have the f o r c e to stand i n d e p e n d e n t l y as s e p a r a t e defenses toleration.  for  It a l s o becomes evident that what may seem at f i r s t to be  an argument for t o l e r a t i o n w i t h i n Protestant England, or perhaps only the w i d e r C h r i s t i a n community,  is  in fact  a call  for  universal  religious toleration. The second chapter examines the debate between Locke and Proast. Locke w r o t e a t o t a l  of  four  letters  on the  t o p i c of  t o l e r a t i o n - the o r i g i n a l and three responses to Proast. a t o t a l of t h r e e i n response to Locke.  religious  Proast wrote  D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t P r o a s t  made a f a t a l mistake in argument in his second l e t t e r , Locke took a l l of P r o a s t ' s l e t t e r s s e r i o u s l y and responded w i t h e x c e p t i o n a l depth, clarity,  and thoroughness.  Among L o c k e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s  Proast  o f f e r e d one of the most s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e s to L o c k e ' s p o s i t i o n .  In  the process of responding to Proast Locke was compelled to elaborate on, and thereby to c l a r i f y and strengthen, stated  his o r i g i n a l arguments  as  in his f i r s t L e t t e r .  Chapter three examines a number of other w r i t i n g s by Locke, and p o i n t s out the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s among h i s w r i t i n g s i n order  to  further  clarify  Concerning T o l e r a t i o n .  the  arguments  he makes  in his  Letter  This i n v e s t i g a t i o n offers an insight into the  development of his thinking from his e a r l i e r ,  A  less t o l e r a n t , p o s i t i o n  to his  later  more  liberal  t h e r e a r e common t h r e a d s  stance. of  This  ideas  chapter  l i f e which run through most of his w r i t i n g s  his  belief  religious  against  four  Locke  deals w i t h  by  later  eighteenth century, century. too  that  While  each of  the  f o r c e may  in  as  Joseph  argue  Locke's fact  these arguments  universal  arguments  Priestley  that  to  of  the  twentieth may  he  calls  for,  Jonas P r o a s t  had,  in promoting b e l i e f .  But  contemporary  into  the  made  toleration  toleration  be u s e f u l  calls  Locke's  question  some s p e c i f i c  the .overal 1 f o r c e of h i s argument  also considers  since Locke w r o t e  his  have any r e l e v a n c e  century  that  for  point  toleration  Concerning  us t o d a y ?  in several  has been a s k e d many  Toleration:  With  right  countries  threatening  i t may be t h o u g h t  t h e peace and s e c u r i t y  t h a t Locke o f f e r s  the c o n t i n u i n g disagreements state.  examined  in  The light  strengths of  little  and c o n f l i c t s and  of  wing  religion  Locke's  t h e needs and c o n c e r n s  of  our  5  nations,  i n t h e way o f a s o l u t i o n  of  late  this  religious  a number o f  between  the  religious  radical  weaknesses  society.  does  as t h e end o f  a n d t h i s m i 11 e n n i u m a p p r o a c h e s , a n d w i t h  groups  century  the question  Letter  for  f u n d a m e n t a 1 i s m on t h e r i s e  civil  for  express  undiminished,  Letter  cult  important  exemptions like  This chapter times  of  such  and R a w l s  somewhat  in Locke's L e t t e r , remains  and t o c a l l  that  throughout  and l e d h i m t o  and J e r e m y W a l d r o n and J o h n R a w l s o f  given  argues,  t h e use o f  while  men"  a number  writers  Priestley  narrow,  Waldron  "all  out  toleration.  Chapter  be  of  points  t h a t he h e l d c o n s i s t e n t l y  his  in the e q u a l i t y  also  and  Letter  to the are  twentieth  Chapter 1 - L o c k e ' s L e t t e r Concerning Toleration and the Structure of Its Argument  John L o c k e ' s L e t t e r  Concerning Toieration,  was  immediately after the Revocation of the E d i c t of Nantes.  composed In 1598 the  E d i c t of Nantes granted Protestants a degree of religious toleration in C a t h o l i c France.  This meant that the C a t h o l i c French  government  was willing to put up with French Protestants worshipping God in a manner of their choosing rather than having to attend, and profess a belief  in the  teachings  of,  the C a t h o l i c church.  Louis X V I proudly proclaimed that his goal was Catholique,' and revoked the E d i c t (Dunn 183).  But in 1685 K i n g ' L a France  toute  French Huguenots who  refused to convert to C a t h o l i c i s m were once again beaten, robbed of their possessions,  harassed by government  troops, their children were  taken from them, their marriages were not recognized, the men were sent to row on galleys or were driven into e x i l e , a l l in the name of promoting C a t h o l i c i s m as the only true religion to be practiced in the nation  (Cranston 82).  In' the early 1660's the young L o c k e had no quarrel with a state demanding religious uniformity from its c i t i z e n s .  6  In his Two Tracts  on G o v e r n m e n t  (1660,  1662)  he  supported  religious  conformity  and  i n t o l e r a n c e because he b e l i e v e d t h a t a r e l i g i o u s l y homogeneous  nation  was m o r e  which  apt  t o be p e a c e f u l ,  religious diversity  stable,  and secure t h a n one in  and s e c t a r i a n i s m w e r e a l l o w e d t o r u n r a m p a n t .  his Second T r a c t L o c k e w r i t e s t h a t God has e n t r u s t e d t h e aspects  of  worship  to  the  magistrate,  "the right to govern the c h u r c h , " decent,"  "beautiful  and t o  and a t t r a c t i v e "  Wootton  157-8).  important  p a r t of C h r i s t i a n l i b e r t y , it  and t h a t  The  allows  In  ceremonial  the m a g i s t r a t e  has  " j u d g e w h a t is o r d e r l y  and  in c e r e m o n i e s and r i t u a l s  magistrate's  control  over  says L o c k e  since  the magistrate  to  consider  at  religion  the  (in is  an  same  time  b o t h t h e peace of s o c i e t y and t h e w e l f a r e and d i g n i t y  of  r e l i g i o n , and t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e m b o t h w i t h a s i n g l e  set  of  laws  (ibid).  In t h e 1680's t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r C h a r l e s 11's b r o t h e r James, a Roman C a t h o l i c , was war.  driving  should be a l l o w e d t o accede t o t h e E n g l i s h  predominantly  Protestant  England  the  brink  of  sedition  against  him.  He  fled  for  w h e r e he j o i n e d t h e f l o o d of F r e n c h P r o t e s t a n t cruelties  witness  first  of L o u i s X V I . hand t h e  unrest,  It  was.in pain,  his  life  to  civil  conformity  or  intolerance  t u t e , and s o - c a l l e d Socinians  who  to  Holland that  and a b j e c t  religious  "non-orthodox," had  been  Holland  refugees fleeing Locke  misery  diversity.  Locke  from  came  to  suffered  by  e x p a t r i a t e c i t i z e n s of c o u n t r i e s who had a d o p t e d a p o l i c y o f  and  of  When James became K i n g i n 1685, L o c k e ' s o p p o s i t i o n led t o a c c u -  sations  the  to  throne  religious  met  desti-  Protestant Arminians, Lutherans,  persecuted  7  not  only  in  their  Catholic  homelands,  but in Protestant  tant state r e l i g i o n :  England for dissenting from the Protes-  the Church of England.  He also met  homeless  Catholics whose fellow believers were being hunted and oppressed in virtually every Protestant state, and Jews who were persecuted almost everywhere.  In fact  it seemed  world was persecuting orthodox" But  that every  nation in the  some portion of its people  civilized  for their  "non-  religious beliefs in the name of c i v i l peace and security.  rather than the hoped-for  peace and security, the  consequences  L o c k e saw r e s u l t i n g from r e l i g i o u s i n t o l e r a n c e  was c i v i l  political  death.  instability,  poverty,  suffering,  and  unrest, What  he  witnessed led Locke to write in his L e t t e r , for  religion,  subjects  are  frequently  i l l treated,  and  live miserably... [Such] oppression raises ferments,  and  makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and t y r a n n i c a l yoke  (67).  W h i l e L o c k e ' s v i e w s on the  powers  of the m a g i s t r a t e  religious matters had already gradually changed,  and shifted  over toward  greater religious toleration than currently existed in his day, (as we shall  see  confirmed  in C h a p t e r  3),  his e x p e r i e n c e s  in H o l l a n d  no  doubt  his views and influenced him to w r i t e what he did in his  famous Letter Concerning T o l e r a t i o n . The Structure of Locke s L e t t e r 1  Locke was a very methodical w r i t e r and his L e t t e r Concerning Toleration is a classic example of structure phical argument. parts.  and c l a r i t y in philoso-  His letter may be divided into six clearly defined  F i r s t , Locke, responds d i r e c t l y to the enquiry that has  8  been  put t o h i m by his D u t c h F r i e n d P h i l i p van L i m b r o c h c o n c e r n i n g mutual  toleration  religion"  (Letter  of C h r i s t i a n s L3).  on t r u e C h r i s t i a n i t y , teachings section religious  directed  i.e.,  professions toleration  why t o l e r a t i o n makes sense in l i g h t Gospels  against  intolerance  different  He o f f e r s an a r g u m e n t f o r  of t h e C h r i s t i a n  is  in t h e i r  (Locke  Christian  f r o m the  Lette£  religious  "the  based of  the  12-18).  leaders  who  This defend  Scriptures.  B u t L o c k e t h e n goes on t o t r a n s c e n d t h i s r e l i g i o u s a r g u m e n t . offers rational  a series for  of  three  both the  of  philosophical  arguments  s t a t e and t h e c h u r c h t o  dual c i t i z e n s in m a t t e r s of t h e i r  preferences  to  show  be t o l e r a n t  in r e l i g i o u s  He  why of  it  is  indivi-  beliefs  and  t h e i r modes of w o r s h i p ( i b i d 1 8 - 2 2 ) . First, concerning  the c i v i l magistrate, himself,  according to Locke,  as m a g i s t r a t e ,  with  religious  has no business matters  since  n e i t h e r God nor t h e m a g i s t r a t e ' s s u b j e c t s have g i v e n h i m t h e a u t h o r i t y t o do so. human  L o c k e argues secondly t h a t  understanding  it  cannot  means of f o r c e , a n d , t h i r d l y , pelling belief,  because  be c o m p e l l e d  that  even i f  of t h e n a t u r e of  to  believe  anything  by  f o r c e were useful in c o m -  t h e m a g i s t r a t e can never be c e r t a i n t h a t t h e b e l i e f  is e n f o r c i n g is i n f a c t t h e t r u e one.  the  he  These t h r e e a r g u m e n t s are each  of t h e m so s t r o n g t h a t even i f one of t h e m seems t o be u n d e r m i n e d - as f o r example w h e n Proast argues t h a t t h e n a t u r e of b e l i e f is such t h a t i t can be c o m p e l l e d by means of f o r c e - t h e o t h e r s r e m a i n and can s t i l l be s u c c e s s f u l l y Third, church,  used t o d e f e n d  unaffected  toleration.  he d e l i n e a t e s t h e scope of t h e d u t y of t o l e r a t i o n f o r  private  citizens,  religious  leaders,,  9  and  the  magistrate  the or  c i v i c leader establishing  (ibid 22-61). the  legitimate  In t h i s s e c t i o n he o f f e r s  sphere of influence  also limits the magistrate's power to  of each  arguments party.  He  "indifferent things" and allows  him no jurisdiction over religious ceremonies or  "outward worship."  Fourth, he argues why some things need not be tolerated by the magistrate 61-64).  in his effort Fifth,  to maintain c i v i l peace and security  (ibid  he defends the right to freedom of religious assembly  to counter claims that  "non-orthodox"  to be hotbeds of sedition  religious meetings are  (ibid 64-69).  And f i n a l l y ,  he  prone  concludes  with a simple statement of the general intent of his l e t t e r  (ibid 69-  73). A Sirrnrary and A n a l y s i s of Locke's L e t t e r 1.  The Argument for T o l e r a t i o n from True C h r i s t i a n i t y L o c k e begins his L e t t e r Concerning Toleration with a c r i t i c i s m of  the state's promotion of one particular C h r i s t i a n church with the of force. point.  use  He uses the example of the Church of England as a case in  At the time of his w r i t i n g the L e t t e r ,  was claiming to be the  this national  only true C h r i s t i a n church.  church  Locke saw  the  corruption, the quest for power, and the emphasis on correct ceremony within the church as the sources of wide spread dissension, and the cause of the persecution of those who refused to be part of i t . first thing Locke argues is that the 13).  true  Church"  This  is its  immediately  "the chief c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l mark of  toleration  Christians  (Letter  the  of  the  It is not the pomp and ceremony,  nor  calls  intolerant Church of England.  The  into  10  for  other  question  status  the claim to orthodoxy, says Locke, but rather charity, meekness, and good will  to  Christian  (ibid).  force  rule  to  others,  including non-Christians,  There  over  is no striving  others  in  the  for  true  that  mark  power,  church,  the  true  and no use of but  rather  the  "regulating of men's lives according to the rules of virtue and piety" (ibid).  In the true church war is fought against one's own lusts and  vices,  and Christianity is embraced fully before any attempt is made  to convert others. Locke goes on to point out that in order to be a true Christian one's faith must work by love, not by force.  To point out the hypo-  crisy within the Church of England, Locke asks those who torment,  destroy, and kill"  "persecute,  others in the name of religion and claim  to be doing it out of friendship and kindness, why they don't their  f i r e and sword to f r i e n d s and f a m i l y  in like  extend  manner  (14)?  Furthermore, he points out that while, on the one hand, some men are punished with imprisonment and have their  property,  and often  their  lives, taken from them because they refuse to worship in a particular church  (in  this case the  Church of  England),  "whoredom, fraud, malice, and suchlike enormities"  on the  other  hand  are committed by  members of that same church without anyone being punished for (ibid).  The latter,  glory of God, the  says L o c k e , is certainly more contrary  purity  of the  than conscientious dissension (15).  church, and the  cies of  the  salvation of souls  In Locke's opinion the heretic is  not the one who sincerely follows Christ without attending the church.  to  them  state  The true heretic is the one who piously debates the i n t r i c a church dogma and ceremonies while  11  practicing  un-Christian  moral vices and wickedness. L o c k e was born to Puritan parents and he was deeply influenced by his Puritan background that in the  (Horton John Locke 1).  16th and 17 centuries  It must be remembered  the Puritans were c a l l i n g for  the  simplification of ceremonies and creeds within the Church of England, strict  religious discipline, moral rigor,  pleasures and indulgences.  and the  shunning  of social  So Locke seems to be reflecting his own  religious background when he asks why there is so much time and effort being put into the Puritain  "introduction of ceremonies."  beliefs with the  to spend  argument that it is i l l o g i c a l for a church  i t s time and e f f o r t  ceremonies  in l i g h t  of  the  forcing citizens fact  that  such  dissension and schism, and in light of the fact pressing matters to attend to, such as the nesses"  But he goes beyond  to  follow  force  certain  only l e a d s  that there are  to  more  "moral vices and w i c k e d -  perpetrated by its members (15).  Locke  finds  it strange that  i t is c o n s i d e r e d  torture a man to death to save his soul, converted,  acceptable  even before  he has  to been  and to do so in the name of c h a r i t y , love, and good w i l l .  It also seems incredible to Locke that anyone who lives an immoral life and who desires to use force to compel others to join him in his church (16).  could believe  that  he  is forming  a truly  Christian  church  If one truly wants to save souls, says L o c k e , one should follow  the example of the  "Prince of Peace"  who gathered people into his  church not with swords and physical force but with the Gospel and with persuasion.  In fact, Locke argues, if physical force were  in c o n v e r t i n g  non-Christians  acceptable  or i n f i d e l s , then Christ could easily  12  have done so by using his  "armies of heavenly  this Locke implies that because Christ has not  legions"  (17).  By  used physical force,  the use of physical force is not an acceptable means of conversion. With  this  entire  churches for their  first  passage  intolerance,  their  Locke  criticizes  Christian  disregard for the wrong doings  of their own members, and their use of persecution against those who refuse to be either this or that denomination. that,  because of their  His criticism suggests  un-Christian behaviour and their  un-Christian  policies against dissenters, many churches are proving themselves not to  be the  perfectly  truly clear  Christian and  churches they  obvious  that  claim to be.  religious  He finds  toleration,  which  it  many  churches are not practicing, is both in line with the Gospel of Jesus Christ and agreeable  to human reason.  His conclusion is that only  those churches which have religious toleration  among their  and beliefs may be considered truly Christian.  In this way he shows  that there is no basis within. Christianity  itself  for  the  practices  intolerance  shown by Christians for each other. In  what  follows  in  question he has been  his Letter  set,  Locke makes  and has answered  it  clear  with  his  that  the  Christian  arguments, is in fact too narrow. Leaving behind the Christian argument, Locke broadens the scope of  his  inquiry  into  toleration  by  offering  a  philosophical  analysis  that has universal application, and may be applied to the Christian as well as the non-Christians state.  He addresses the civil  magistrate  and considers the question of how toleration may further the cause of peace and security within any commonwealth.  Peace and security will  come about, he says, when religious persecution, which is supposedly  13  carried out in the name of c i v i l law and order, for the common good', is ended, and  when individuals are stopped from being allowed to act  immorally in public in the name of r e l i g i o n .  But in order to justify  an end to r e l i g i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n and i m m o r a l s o - c a l l e d r e l i g i o u s behaviour Locke says it is necessary  first to  "distinguish exactly  the business of c i v i l government from that of r e l i g i o n " the boundaries that lie between them 2.  and to settle  (18).  N o n - r e l i g i o u s arguments for t o l e r a t i o n The  State  While the church is responsible for the salvation of souls, Locke sees a commonwealth or c i v i l state as organized to procure, and,  advance  civil  interests  the  civil  interests  or rights  or r i g h t s he says are  preserve  of its c i t i z e n s .  life,  liberty,  These  health,  and  "indolency of body" or the pursuit of happiness, and the possession of material property seems to  (18).  be simply  While some c r i t i c s have argued  an "essentialist  definition"  L o c k e , lacking any sort of supporting argument  of  that  this  "society"  by  (see Waldron 100), it  must be remembered that L o c k e discusses and argues the nature and function of the state in his F i r s t and Second Treatise of Government. In chapter eight of his Second Treaties e n t i t l e d , of P o l i t i c a l S o c i e t i e s , " Men  " O f the Beginning  Locke writes  being, as has been said, by nature a l l free,  equal  and independent, no man can be put out of this estate and subjected  to the p o l i t i c a l power of another without his  own consent.  The only way whereby anyone divests himself  14  of  his  natural  liberty  and  puts  on  the  bonds  of  civil  s o c i e t y is by a g r e e i n g w i t h o t h e r men t o j o i n and  unite  i n t o a c o m m u n i t y f o r t h e i r c o m f o r t a b l e , s a f e , and p e a c e able l i v i n g one amongst a n o t h e r in a secure e n j o y m e n t their properties,  and a g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t any  of  that  are not of i t . . . When any number of men have so c o n s e n t e d to make one c o m m u n i t y  or g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e y are  thereby  p r e s e n t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d , and make one body p o l i t i c . . .  (in  W o o t t o n 309-10). Locke Treatise  to  goes  on a t  discuss how  length this  in this  chapter  consensual  or  and e l s e w h e r e  contractual  in  the  arrangement  funct ions. In a s o c i e t y based on t h e c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t  of i t s members  t h e n , t h e c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e g o v e r n s by t h e c o n s e n t of his s u b j e c t s is g i v e n t h e d u t y t o p r o t e c t  t h e i r peace and s e c u r i t y ,  their  and r i g h t s t h r o u g h an i m p a r t i a l e x e c u t i o n of equal l a w s . t r a t e has t h e " f o r c e and s t r e n g t h "  and  interests  The m a g i s -  of a l l his s u b j e c t s b e h i n d h i m and  he is g i v e n t h e p o w e r by t h e m t o punish anyone who w o u l d  interfere  w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s or r i g h t s of a n o t h e r by t a k i n g away or l i m i t i n g his civil  rights It  (ibid).  is in p a r t  by means of t h i s d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e p o w e r of  s t a t e t o c i v i l m a t t e r s only for  toleration  standing. trate's  He  - the  begins  jurisdiction,  m a t t e r s and n o t  other by  power,  that  Locke  part saying right  is able  being it  is  and  " t h e s a l v a t i o n of s o u l s "  15  the  to c l a r i f y  nature  clear  that  dominion (19).  of the  the  his  reasons  human  under-  civil  magis-  involves  only  civil  Locke actually  gives  three reasons for this,  but  the  first one are often overlooked.  two distinguishing features  of  the  F i r s t he says God has not given one  man the authority to compel another into any one religion for the good of his soul.  This refers  back to his previous arguments  tion based on C h r i s t i a n scriptures. if  his p o l i t i c a l  theory  for t o l e r a -  Here Locke is arguing that even  is f a l s e  and p o l i t i c a l authority is derived  from God, there is no basis for supposing that theory gives the magistrate a wider j u r i s d i c t i o n . In the second arm to this first argument, and consistent with his own  p o l i t i c a l theory,  consented  Locke says the c i t i z e n s of the state have not  to g i v e t h e i r  religion for them, caring for their  the  authority to choose  own souls to the  civil  authorities.  to the magistrate  "inward and full  C i t i z e n s have  because a person  "conform his faith to the dictates of another."  consists of an  their  and they do not consent to the abandoning of the  not given this authority simply  magistrate  cannot  True religion  persuasion of the mind,"  a deeply  held belief that the believer is satisfied in his own mind is the true one, and which goes beyond the outward acts of r i t u a l and ceremony (ibid).  Any outward p r a c t i c e without this inward belief  is nothing  more than hypocrisy, says L o c k e , and, in the C h r i s t i a n definition of true belief,  is sinful because offensive to God.  then is a p o l i t i c a l argument God  and the  This first  argument  focusing on the scope of authority  c i t i z e n s of a c o m m o n w e a l t h have a l l o w e d the  that civil  magi s t r a t e . Second, Locke says, the magistrate  can't be concerned with the  salvation of the soul since his power consists only of physical force.  16  The p r o b l e m is t h a t since t h e r e l i g i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e has i t t h a t only a b e l i e f based on i n w a r d p e r s u a s i o n is a c c e p t a b l e t o G o d , and since such b e l i e f c a n ' t be c o m p e l l e d w i t h p h y s i c a l f o r c e , can't  create  able  to  God.  persuasion, But  "it  press  the  correct  There  just  like  k i n d of  belief that  is n o t h i n g anyone  stopping  arguments,  else m i g h t ,  another  with  r e l i g i o n s say is  the to  is one t h i n g t o p e r s u a d e , a n o t h e r  with  the m a g i s t r a t e ' s  magistrate change  without  possible. But  the  This  here  the  sincere  penalties,"  conviction  might  be c a l l e d  question  arises,  of  Locke's can't  accept-  from  using  someone's  mind.  t o command; one t h i n g  P e n a l t i e s d o n ' t c o n v i n c e t h e m i n d , says L o c k e , that  says  Locke  beliefs  salvation  epistemelogical  sincere  later  answer  is  "yes,"  chapters,  as is a r g u e d  by  Locke's argument for  hold  is  not  argumenmt.  conviction  both Proast  to  (20).  and a l l r e l i g i o n s  be  created  t h r o u g h t h e e m p l o y m e n t of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n a n d / o r p r o p a g a n d a ? the  power  Even if  and W a l d r o n  in  t o l e r a t i o n s i l l holds because  of  t h e f i r s t a r g u m e n t a b o v e , and t h e t h i r d a r g u m e n t b e l o w . Locke  addresses  the  question  of  the  use of  force  in  his  third  p o i n t w h e n he says, even i f p h y s i c a l f o r c e and p e n a l t i e s w e r e i n f a c t able  to i m p r o v e  still  no g u a r a n t e e  right  or change m e n ' s of s a l v a t i o n .  beliefs  in t h e  right  way,  there  I f m a g i s t r a t e s e v e r y w h e r e have  t o use f o r c e t o c o m p e l c i t i z e n s t o t h e r e l i g i o n t h e y  believe  is the to  be t r u e , but w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t know f o r c e r t a i n is t r u e , i t w o u l d mean t h a t the s a l v a t i o n of c i t i z e n s w o u l d depend on l u c k , t h a t is, i t depend  on  magistrate many  their  being  born  in  that  particular  happens t o have d e c i d e d on t h e t r u e  citizens  would  lose  their  soul  due t o  17  state  in  religion.  their  would  which  the  Inversely,  magistrate  having  f o r c e d them to f o l l o w a f a l s e r e l i g i o n he o n l y b e l i e v e d to be the true.  Locke expands on t h i s p o i n t i n h i s Es say C o n c e r n i n g Human  Understanding where he says there can't be a more dangerous thing to r e l y on, nor anything more l i k e l y to mislead one than the opinions of others i n matters of r e l i g i o n . reason to be  The opinions of others would give men  "Heathens i n Japan, Mahumetans i n Turkey, P a p i s t s i n  Spain, Protestants  in England, and Lutherans i n Sweden"  suggests that i t i s a r i s k y bet indeed to p i n one's happiness or misery"  (657).  Locke  "everlasting  on the f a l l i b l e opinions of others since proba-  b i l i t y has i t that they might be wrong  (708).  The structure of Locke's argument then is as f o l l o w s : 1 a. God has not given anyone the a u t h o r i t y to compel others into any one r e l i g i o n for the good of t h e i r souls. 1 b. C i t i z e n s have not g i v e n the r e l i g i o n for them  m a g i s t r a t e the power to p i c k t h e i r  These two points argue that the magistrate  has not been g i v e n the  political  authority  to compel  his  c i t i z e n s to f o l l o w a p a r t i c u l a r set of b e l i e f s . 2.  The nature of the c o r r e c t k i n d o f b e l i e f  - that w h i c h w i l l lead  to s a l v a t i o n - i s such t h a t a person can't be made to change what they b e l i e v e to be t r u e by means of. someone e l s e u s i n g force on them 3.  This i s h i s epistemological argument.  Even i f outward force could produce the kind of b e l i e f that leads to s a l v a t i o n , the magistrate may be forcing the wrong, r e l i g i o n on his subjects, religion,  since there  i s no assurance he has  and t h e i r souls would s t i l l  c a l l e d his argument from p r o b a b i l i t y .  18  not be saved.  the  right  This may be  L o c k e ' s c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t mate  but  impractical.  t h e use of f o r c e  These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  f i c i e n t to lead to the conclusion all the power  only  says L o c k e ,  illegiti-  seem  suf-  that  of c i v i l  civil interests,  is not  government  r e l a t e s only t o  men's  is c o n f i n e d t o t h e c a r e of t h e t h i n g s  of  t h i s w o r l d , and h a t h n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e w o r l d to come (Letter  22).  The Church L o c k e d e f i n e s a c h u r c h as a v o l u n t a r y s o c i e t y of i n d i v i d u a l s who have come t o g e t h e r  to w o r s h i p  God in a manner  they  believe  to  a c c e p t a b l e t o God and t h a t w i l l l e a d t o t h e s a l v a t i o n of t h e i r  be  souls.  L o c k e sees no one as being born a member of any c h u r c h , and no c h i l d as  inheriting  freely  the  religion  joins a church,  of  its  parents  (22).  so he is f r e e t o l e a v e  i t s d o c t r i n e s or means of  it  Just if  as a  person  he disagrees  with  worship.  The r i g h t t o make t h e i n t e r n a l laws t h a t g o v e r n t h e c h u r c h ' s day t o day a c t i v i t i e s ,  says L o c k e ,  church  because  precisely  belongs only  the  joining  to  t h e members  together  c h u r c h is " a b s o l u t e l y f r e e and s p o n t a n e o u s "  of  of  citizens  ments.  succession First,  demonstrate  as a sign  he says i t  of  the  true  into a  ( L e t t e r 23).  L o c k e deals w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of an u n i n t e r r u p t e d l i n e of siastical  that  church  with  three  eccleargu-  is not necessary f o r a c h u r c h t o be able to  an u n i n t e r r u p t e d  line  of  ruling  authority  directly  from  the a p o s t l e s in o r d e r t o be t h e t r u e c h u r c h since s c r i p t u r e shows t h a t any small g a t h e r i n g is a p p r o v e d of by God and c o n d u c i v e t o t h e s a l v a tion  of  souls.  19  Second, succession of deliberation  he p o i n t s  is  a  Third,  even  that  the  disagreement  as  to  the  proper  c h u r c h l e a d e r s has l e d t o c h o o s i n g r u l e r s by means of and  rulers  out  vote,  direct if  putting  line  church  any  claim  that  from  the  apostles  leaders  are  in  a particular into  a line  of  line  serious  of  doubt.  succession  that  s t r e t c h e s back t o t h e a p o s t l e s , L o c k e says i t s t i l l does not g i v e t h a t church  the r i g h t  t o impose i t s e l f  on a n y o n e .  Each c i t i z e n s  has  the  r i g h t , a c c o r d i n g t o L o c k e , t o p i c k w h a t e v e r r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r he w a n t s to f o l l o w  (Letter  24).  The m a r k of t h e t r u e c h u r c h , says L o c k e , is a c h u r c h t h a t f o l l o w s what  is  called  for  in  "interpretations,"  scripture  and  and  no  "ecclesiastical  more.  The  laws,"  that  c l a i m are necessary t o t h e p r o f e s s i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y r e q u i r e d by C h r i s t  (25).  the  in t h e S c r i p t u r e s ,  true  church  is  says L o c k e ,  the  some  churches  are i n f a c t  And w h i l e t h e S c r i p t u r e s say t h a t t h e  c h u r c h is also t h e one whose members s u f f e r proof  "inventions,"  one  which  that  persecution,  the opposite  persecutes  others  not true  t h e r e is no  is t r u e , with  fire  that and  sword. The laws w i t h i n says  Locke,  property force.  of  and any  the  have  c h u r c h p e r t a i n only  no  citizen.  jurisdiction  over  The  also  church  t o m a t t e r s of the  personal,  has no a u t h o r i t y  worship, material to  use  B o t h t h e p o w e r over m a t e r i a l goods and t h e use of f o r c e  are  solely under t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e .  The c h u r c h may  only  to  use  "exhortations,  admonitions,  members t o r e s p e c t i t s laws  (26).  and a d v i c e "  convince  its  The only punishment t h e c h u r c h may  use a g a i n s t an o b s t i n a t e member is e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  20  3.  The scope of t h e d u t y of  toleration  L o c k e n e x t examines how f a r t h e d u t y of t o l e r a t i o n e x t e n d s and w h a t is r e q u i r e d f r o m e v e r y o n e by i t . (a) The Church First,  no  church  abide by i t s l a w s . use  of  any  needs  to  tolerate  any  person  who r e f u s e s  This person may be e x c o m m u n i c a t e d b u t w i t h o u t  physical  force  or  the  confiscation  of  their  to the  material  possessions as was common p r a c t i c e of t h e C h u r c h of E n g l a n d in L o c k e ' s day. (b)  P r i v a t e Persons Second,  beliefs the  p r i v a t e persons must be t o l e r a n t  different  than their  believer.  This  of those w i t h  own since those b e l i e f s  mutual  toleration  of  affect  private  religious none  but  persons f o r  one  a n o t h e r L o c k e also a p p l i e s t o c h u r c h e s .  A c h u r c h c a n ' t have i t s power  over  the  other  churches  magistrate.  increased  through  membership  of  In t h i s sense a l l c h u r c h e s are equal in p o w e r  of w h i c h one t h e c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e belongs t o .  the  civil  regardless  To say t h a t t h e o r t h o -  dox c h u r c h should have p o w e r over a l l o t h e r s is specious a c c o r d i n g Locke,  since  every  church  believes  itself  to  be  source of t r u t h .  Even i f one c h u r c h c o u l d p r o v e  the  says t h i s s t i l l  others Locke  w o u l d not  have  (20), chosen  and  its orthodoxy  give the orthodox  t h e r i g h t t o use f o r c e in d e s t r o y i n g i t s r i v a l s i n c e , above  orthodox  to the  over  church  as he has a r g u e d  such f o r c e does not w o r k t o change t h e minds of those who to  worship  have t h e a u t h o r i t y  differently.  The  does  not  t o t r a n s f e r his r i g h t t o use p h y s i c a l f o r c e t o  any  21  civil  magistrate  church since such f a v o r i t i s m c r e a t e s c h u r c h o v e r those not Locke's point s t a t e s or  for  that  neither individual citizens,  w o r d l y goods of o t h e r s  and  (31).  p e a c e of  the  r i g h t to  by  force  suffering L o c k e saw  of  arms"  One  of i n d i v i d u a l s and a l l around  interfere with  of  the  greatest  state, according  (ibid). the  churches,  nor  the  civil  "upon the p r e t e n s e of r e l i g i o n "  " d o m i n i o n is f o u n d e d by g r a c e , and  gated  (c)  is t h a t  r e l i g i o u s reasons  security  favoured  favoured.  c o m m o n w e a l t h s have the  r i g h t s and  i n t o l e r a n c e w i t h i n the  threats  to L o c k e ,  to  is the  f a c t was  subsequent  b o r n e out  unrest  of  the  belief  t h a t r e l i g i o n is t o be  This  or  propaby  the  populations  him.  Religious Leaders T h i r d , L o c k e says the p o w e r of t h o s e who  comes f r o m the c h u r c h and  ought to be c o n f i n e d  a f f a i r s of the c h u r c h a r e as s e p a r a t e and s t a t e as h e a v e n is f r o m e a r t h . deprive  a man  h o l d o f f i c e in a c h u r c h  And  w i t h i n i t because  the  d i s t i n c t f r o m the a f f a i r s of  j u s t as the c h u r c h has no p o w e r to  of his w o r l d l y goods b e c a u s e of a r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e ,  so no m e m b e r of a c h u r c h has t h a t p o w e r e i t h e r . It is not from  enough, says L o c k e , f o r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l men  "violence,  rapine,  also o b l i g e d to t e a c h f u l , and  tolerant  harmed  persecution,"  them,  abstain  they  are  c h a r i t a b l e , meek, p e a c e -  L o c k e a r g u e s t h a t s i n c e the B i b l e t e a c h e s  to a b s t a i n f r o m v i o l e n c e  violence toward those who a manner that  a l l m a n n e r of  t h e i r f o l l o w e r s to be  (32-3).  t h a t C h r i s t i a n s are actually  and  to  how  m u c h m o r e so  have done them no  is d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e i r  22  own.  against  should  t h o s e who  they  abstain  have from  harm but simply worship in A  man's r e l i g i o n  is as  p r i v a t e an a f f a i r as how  he m a n a g e s his e s t a t e or his own  Locke.  Why  man  spends a l l his money i n a t a v e r n , e v e r y o n e is r e a d y to i n t e r -  who  is i t , asks L o c k e , t h a t , w h i l e no one  h e a l t h , says  f e r e w i t h the man interference,  who  does not f r e q u e n t  w h i c h may  be  a death  penalty,  "temporal dominion"  s i n c e r e a t t e m p t to save the v i c t i m ' s s o u l f r o m h e l l  (d)  The  the  the a p p r o v e d c h u r c h ?  as s e v e r e as  L o c k e to come more from a desire for  interferes with  This  seems  to  than f r o m a  (34).  Magistrate  Fourth, tolerant.  is the In  line  considerable  with  duty  of  his P r o t e s t a n t  the  magistrate  beliefs,  but  to  also  be  for  the  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e a s o n g i v e n . a b o v e , c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e of the r i g h t k i n d of b e l i e f ,  L o c k e r e m i n d s his r e a d e r s t h a t  belongs to e a c h civil  l a w s or use  c i t i z e n to c a r e not  individual,  and  of f o r c e .  can  Just as  not  be  the  left  care  to the  the m a g i s t r a t e  f o r his h e a l t h w i t h the f o r c e of l a w  force a citizen  to c a r e  f o r c e his subjects to care  f o r his s o u l .  of the  soul  magistrate's  can  not  force  l i k e w i s e he  Even if a prince  can  were  f o r t h e i r h e a l t h , L o c k e asks w h i c h  a  to  doctor  w o u l d he f o r c e his s u b j e c t s to c o n s u l t when t h e r e are so many p o s s i b l e r e m e d i e s and while  there  heaven.  The  potions?  But  L o c k e a d m i t s t h a t i t c o u l d be a r g u e d t h a t  are many w a y s to good h e a l t h  right path  r e a s o n s , such as baptized  is o n l y  t r o u b l e i s , says L o c k e , a m a g i s t r a t e  s u b j e c t s d o w n the w r o n g p a t h the  there  i n t o the  are the  still way  faith,  (35).  being  w h i c h may  not  p r a c t i c e s p r o m o t e d by the s t a t e r e l i g i o n .  23  coincide If we  with  to  are i n f a c t  because  t h e i r h a i r or the  way  be f o r c i n g h i s  A l s o c i t i z e n s who  persecuted  they cut  may  one  of  way the  on  frivolous they  were  approved  are p r e p a r e d t o h o l d  that these small d i f f e r e n c e s i n p r a c t i c e s or  "modes"  i n fact lead to  d i f f e r e n t ends, says L o c k e , we a r e f a c e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m of h a v i n g t o prove beyond heaven.  a doubt e x a c t l y w h i c h i s t h e r i g h t p a t h  According  extended  t o L o c k e t o l e r a t i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e n o t o n l y be  by t h e m a g i s t r a t e  religious ceremonies, detrimental  he e x t e n d s  assembly  (64-69).  The  to include religious  beliefs but also  p r a c t i c e s a n d c u s t o m s , so l o n g as t h e y  to the peace  section  that leads t o  and s e c u r i t y  toleration  of t h e state.  to include the right  a r e not  In a l a t e r to religious  a u t h o r i t y o f t h e m a g i s t r a t e does n o t h e l p h i m d i s c o v e r t h e  r i g h t p a t h t o h e a v e n any b e t t e r t h a n any c i t i z e n ' s p r i v a t e s e a r c h and study.  The p r i n c e ' s s u p e r i o r p o w e r and t h e m a g i s t r a t e ' s a b i l i t y t o  r u l e does n o t m a k e e i t h e r of t h e m b e t t e r q u a l i f i e d t h a n t h e i r s u b j e c t s to  determine  which is the true religion.  Even i f i t is granted  that  the m a g i s t r a t e i s a l l o w e d t o c h o o s e t h e r e l i g i o n t h a t l e a d s t o h e a v e n , L o c k e says t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t h e m a g i s t r a t e c a n do t o c o m p e n s a t e h i s citizens  i f he s h o u l d  prove  m a g i s t r a t e i n as i m p o r t a n t  t o have  a matter  to r i s k a v e r y g r e a t loss i n d e e d Some m i g h t argue,  been  as t h e s a l v a t i o n of one's s o u l i s  that infallible  not t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e , b u t t o t h e c h u r c h .  magistrate promote?  To t r u s t t h e  (38).  says L o c k e ,  the e n f o r c e r f o r t h e c h u r c h .  mistaken.  judgement  The m a g i s t r a t e  belongs  is merely  B u t , L o c k e asks, w h i c h c h u r c h s h o u l d t h e  T h e way may be. just as e r r o n e o u s  whether the  m a g i s t r a t e f o r c e s h i s c i t i z e n s t o f o l l o w h i s own d i c t a t e s or t h o s e of some c h u r c h . magistrate  J u s t b e c a u s e one c h u r c h has s u c c e e d e d i n c o n v i n c i n g t h e  that  i t p r a c t i c e s the right  24  religion  does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  mean i t actually does,  or that the magistrate speaks for the right  religion when he speaks for the church he favours. The truth is, says Locke,  that rather than churches influencing p o l i t i c a l leaders i t is  far more often the case that p o l i t i c a l leaders influence the church to change i t s teachings to suit t h e i r p o l i t i c a l  agenda.  If r e l i g i o u s  decrees, a r t i c l e s of f a i t h , and forms of worship can be changed so easily to suit the whims of the powerful, Locke wonders how i t is possible for anyone to obey them a l l with a clear conscience. leaders dispute a r t i c l e s of faith Locke,  Church  as much as magistrates do, says  and a magistrate's decision as to the right religion is no  better with or without the help of "churchmen" (AO). Even i f the magistrate is in fact promoting the right religion, says Locke, there is no point in a c i t i z e n following i t except i f he is persuaded of i t in his own mind.  While a person can become rich at  a job he dislikes, he can not be saved by a religion which his conscience says is wrong, which he distrusts, and whose form of worship he abhors.  As mentioned above, God requires the right kind of belief,  that is complete person's soul.  f a i t h and inward sincerity  before he w i l l save a  It w i l l not save people i f the magistrate forces them  to come to church, says Locke.  If they believe, they w i l l come; i f  they don't believe, forcing them to come w i l l not save their souls. The magistrate ought to tolerate any assembly of individuals who come together to worship God i n a manner they sincerely believe is acceptable to God, and who draw others to their church by their good example in l i f e and worship.  According to Locke, these churches have as much  legal right to exist as any national church.  25  When it comes to rites and ceremonies,  the magistrate has no  power to enforce the use of any particular type within any church, first because churches are outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate, and second because  to be a justifiable part  of worship, rites and  ceremonies must be seen to be acceptable to God.  Locke emphasizes  that the magistrate is only justified in making laws concerning things that affect the good of the commonwealth or state. church  is the  salvation of souls,  and religious  What goes on in  ceremonies do not  affect the l i f e , l i b e r t y , or estate of any member of the state.  Locke  distinguishes between washing a child in water for hygienic  reasons  and baptizing a child in water in the form of a religious r i t u a l .  He  says the magistrate may compel by force of law the washing of the c h i l d for i t s h e a l t h but not i t s b a p t i s m for the s a l v a t i o n of i t s soul.  Again,  r i t u a l s , to be acceptable to God, must contain what  worshippers believe God has commanded for the  salvation of  their  souls, not what the magistrate decrees. Just as the magistrate does, not have the power to impose rites and ceremonies by law, he likewise does not have the power to forbid any rites or ceremonies.  Every church believes its rites and ceremo-  nies to be decreed by God as an essential part of worship. magistrate to forbid  the  according to L o c k e ,  be tantamount  For a  use of c e r t a i n rites or ceremonies would, to destroying the church i t s e l f .  Locke says it could then be argued that the magistrate must tolerate the s a c r i f i c i n g act.  of infants if a church's ceremonies c a l l for such an  But Locke says that what is not lawful in  of l i f e "  "the ordinary course  is likewise not lawful in a religious meeting  26  (47).  If it  is l e g a l t o k i l l a calf  a calf  a t home,  as a s a c r i f i c i a l  says L o c k e ,  offering  at  it  a religious  is also l e g a l ceremony  since  so does not a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t o t h e r s in t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h . example,  a disease  levels,  is a l l o w a b l e  it  has  of c a l v e s i n r e l i g i o u s t h e good, of t h e s t a t e .  reduced  for  cattle  numbers  the magistrate  to  to  to  kill doing  But i f ,  for  dangerously  forbid  the  low  slaughtering  r i t u a l f o r t h e good of t h e species and  thereby  But t h i s is t h e n a l a w based n o t on r e l i g i o u s ,  but e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l  considerations.  G e n e r a l l y , says L o c k e , w h a t is a l l o w e d by l a w in t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h should not be p r o h i b i t e d in c h u r c h , and w h a t e v e r f o r b i d because t h e y also  not  are h a r m f u l  be p e r m i t t e d  to  to the citizens  be p a r t  of  religious  things secular of  the  state  ceremonies.  laws should  But  the  m a g i s t r a t e must be v e r y c a r e f u l n o t t o misuse his a u t h o r i t y by o p p r e s sing any c h u r c h If  " u n d e r p r e t e n s e of doing p u b l i c g o o d "  a c h u r c h is p e r c e i v e d t o be i d o l a t r o u s ,  nothing the magistrate  can do about  it  (49).  says L o c k e ,  because  there  i f he is a l l o w e d  p o w e r t o suppress w h a t some w o u l d c a l l a s e c t a r i a n r e l i g i o n t h e r e no l o g i c a l reason why his p o w e r c o u l d n ' t  also be t u r n e d a g a i n s t ,  used t o suppress, w h a t may be c a l l e d a m o r e o r t h o d o x r e l i g i o n . points  out  that  civil  power  is  universal  and  the  principles  such p o w e r must be a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e s . something  is  allowed  to  one  magistrate  it  will  This means t h a t a l l c h u r c h e s are l i k e l y t o s u f f e r magistrate  or  another  depending  on  which  be  is and  guiding if  to  all.  at t h e hands of  one  church  c o n s i d e r s t o be o r t h o d o x and w h i c h one i d o l a t r o u s .  the  Locke  Therefore  allowed  is  each  magistrate  L o c k e goes beyond  m e r e l y a d v o c a t i n g m u t u a l t o l e r a t i o n among C h r i s t i a n s e c t s , and e m p h a -  27  sizes the  universality of religious toleration  by  pointing out  that  the c i v i l powers of the magistrate are "the same every where, and the religion  of the  prince  suppress  religious beliefs is granted  them to suppress the true one  is orthodox  to  himself."  If  the  to a l l magistrates,  power  to  it w i l l lead  a great variety of religions world wide, including  (49).  It follows from this as well that the magistrate may not punish anyone for any sins against God.  So long as the sin, or actions, of  one person does not affect another person it may not be punished by the magistrate.  The sin of lying is only punishable by c i v i l law when  it has a harmful effect wealth itself.  on c i t i z e n s or the security of the common-  Again, i f the magistrate  were allowed to punish sins  against God, then the universalization of this power would allow  "a  Mahometan or pagan prince" to punish those who p r a c t i c e the C h r i s t i a n religion since, in their opinion, it would be a sin against God  (51).  Here again Locke is arguing for religious t o l e r a t i o n not only from the leaders of his home nation, nor for his own chosen religion or church, but on a universal scale. Regarding  the  call  for c a p i t a l punishment  against  idolaters in  the law of Moses, Locke says this law applied to ancient Israel not to modern nations.  The commonwealth of the Jews was an absolute theo-  cracy with no separation between church and state.  God himself was  considered to be the legislator, a condition which does not exist in any C h r i s t i a n nation. meddle  in the  Israelites,  affairs  Locke reminds his readers that Christ did not of e a r t h l y  governments,  although they conquered many other,  28  and the  ancient  idolatrous,  nations  did not f o r c e t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s t o embrace t h e J e w i s h The types:  articles  of  religion,  practical, which  lative which  as L o c k e  calls  them,  religion. consist  " i n f l u e n c e t h e w i l l and m a n n e r " ;  " t e r m i n a t e simply in t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g "  of  two  and s p e c u -  (54-5).  Specu-  l a t i v e o p i n i o n s and a r t i c l e s of f a i t h w h i c h r e q u i r e b e l i e f may n o t imposed  on  any  church  by  civil  law  because,  as  was  be  pointed  out  e a r l i e r , a person c a n ' t simply w i l l h i m s e l f t o b e l i e v e on c o m m a n d ,  nor  w i l l p r o f e s s i n g t o b e l i e v e , when he in f a c t does n o t , lead a person t o salvation.  The m a g i s t r a t e may not f o r b i d t h e p r e a c h i n g or  of any s p e c u l a t i v e  o p i n i o n s in any p a r t i c u l a r  don't  civil  affect  the  According to Locke,  rights  of  c h u r c h because  citizens  outside  that  opinions church.  f o r e x a m p l e , b r e a d is r e a l l y  the  body of C h r i s t does n o t h a r m t h e b e l i e v e r ' s n e i g h b o u r and so may  not  be  forbidden  by  the belief t h a t ,  professing  civil  law.  The  truth  will  suffer,  says  Locke,  if  f o r c e and v i o l e n c e are used by t h e m a g i s t r a t e in an a t t e m p t t o f u r t h e r it.  By t h i s he means t h a t not only may t h e m a g i s t r a t e be w r o n g and  promoting the wrong belief, men to use those G o d - g i v e n t h e way t h e y should t a k e "  but t h a t t h e use of f o r c e does not faculties  "sufficient  to direct  allow  them  in  ( L o c k e Essay 7 0 8 ) .  The c o n f l i c t t h a t may a r i s e b e t w e e n w h a t is o r d e r e d by t h e m a g i s t r a t e and w h a t one's c o n s c i e n c e d i c t a t e s may be r e s o l v e d , says L o c k e , if  we  and  the  p o w e r one has o v e r one's own a f f a i r s .  He p o i n t s o u t t h a t c a r i n g  for  one's soul  a person has t o h i m s e l f ,  and  that, not  are  clear  about  is t h e most  the  limits  important  of  both  duty  the  civil  since one p e r s o n ' s r e l i g i o u s o p i n i o n s and manner affect  others,  powers  of w o r s h i p  do  w h a t he b e l i e v e s and how he w o r s h i p s is no one's  29  business but his o w n . be  obedient  to  I t is t h e d u t y of e v e r y  God,  that  is t o  worship  in  citizen first  the  way  of a l l  to  he b e l i e v e s  is  a c c e p t a b l e t o G o d , says L o c k e , since his e t e r n a l soul and  everlasting  happiness are dependent on t h i s o b e d i e n c e , and only t h e n t o obey c i v i l laws  (59). L o c k e says,  rather  idealistically,  that  it  rarely  happens t h a t  a  m a g i s t r a t e l e g i s l a t e s w h a t is good f o r t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h b u t  disturbs  the  citizens  conscience  of  its  citizens.  But  if  it  have t h e r i g h t t o disobey t h e l a w and a c c e p t  should  happen,  the penalty for  it.  If,  on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m a g i s t r a t e makes a l a w c o n c e r n i n g m a t t e r s over w h i c h he has no a u t h o r i t y , m a t t e r s in w h i c h ne was n o t g i v e n t h e p o w e r by  his  subjects,  particular  such .as a l a w  religion,  citizens  that, forces  are  not  citizens  obligated  to  to  take  follow  up  this  a  law.  L o c k e says his s u b j e c t s may not have t h e p o w e r t o r e s i s t h i m but t h e y may f i n d c o m f o r t in t h e f a c t t h a t t h e m a g i s t r a t e ' s a c t i o n s w i l l in t h e end be judged by G o d .  A.  with  What the Magistrate Need Not  Tolerate  I t must be k e p t in m i n d t h a t  Locke  the  argument  that  toleration  of  defends r e l i g i o u s  a diversity  toleration  of r e l i g i o n s  is  far  m o r e c o n d u c i v e t o peace and s e c u r i t y w i t h i n a s t a t e t h a n f o r c e d c o n formity  and  intolerance.  The  things  which  he  singles  out  as  h a v i n g t o be t o l e r a t e d by t h e m a g i s t r a t e are those t h i n g s w h i c h  not  Locke  sees as h a r m f u l t o t h e peace and s e c u r i t y of t h e s t a t e . L o c k e says t h a t should  not,  t h e r e are f i v e t h i n g s a m a g i s t r a t e need n o t ,  tolerate.  First,  the magistrate  should  not  or  tolerate  opinions w h i c h are c o n t r a r y or h a r m f u l t o s o c i e t y and i t s m o r a l r u l e s .  30  But  he p o i n t s o u t t h a t e x a m p l e s o f s u c h h a r m f u l t e a c h i n g s  since  no s e c t w o u l d  purposely  undermine  society  are rare  i n t h e name o f  r e l i g i o n knowing t h a t t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of s o c i e t y w o u l d be d e t r i m e n tal  t o i t s own w e l l being w i t h i n t h a t s o c i e t y .  arises at this point: ly protected,  An i m p o r t a n t  can t h e c i t i z e n s of a ccrrrnonwealth  question  be adequate-  and can s o c i e t y as a whole be m a i n t a i n e d , w i t h o u t pena-  l i z i n g p e o p l e f o r t h e i r unorthodox b e l i e f s ? Second,  the m a g i s t r a t e  should  not t o l e r a t e i n d i v i d u a l s or s e c t s  w h i c h c l a i m some s o r t o f s p e c i a l c i v i l selves  i n t h e name o f r e l i g i o n .  power o v e r o t h e r s f o r t h e m -  T o l e r a t i o n should  not be extended t o  t h o s e who, f o r e x a m p l e , c a l l o t h e r s h e r e t i c s , t h e r e b y c l a i m i n g t h e power t o c a l l says t h i s  t h e i r own r e l i g i o n t h e one and O n l y t r u e one.  includes  those churches who c l a i m t h a t e x c o r m u n i c a t i n g t h e  king s t r i p s h i m of a l l c i v i l political  power, s i n c e t h i s a s s e r t s  a c l a i m to  a u t h o r i t y w h i c h a c h u r c h does not possess.  T h i r d , the m a g i s t r a t e own  Locke  and teach"  should not t o l e r a t e those  t h e duty of r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n  "who w i l l n o t  (63). Remember t h a t  in h i s f i r s t argument f o r t o l e r a t i o n above L o c k e says t h a t  citizens  c a n n o t s i m p l y w i 11 t h e m s e 1 ves t o b e l i e v e one t h i n g o r a n o t h e r . T h i s makes i t i m p e r a t i v e others  believe  c h a n g i n g what  t h a t each c i t i z e n t o l e r a t e whatever i t i s that  since  no one i s m o r e c a p a b l e t h a n a n y o n e e l s e o f  i t i s they s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e .  t o l e r a t e others,  An u n w i l l i n g n e s s  says Locke, suggests t h a t t h e i n t o l e r a n t a r e p r e p a r e d  t o s e i z e t h e g o v e r n m e n t and c o n f i s c a t e t h e m a t e r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s their fellow citizens doubt,  to  civil  to  i n t h e name of r e l i g i o u s c o n f o r m i t y ,  unrest  l e a d i n g , no  and a d e s t a b i 1 i z a t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t .  31  of  A  tolerant Locke,  s t a t e needs to be made up of if  it  is  to  tolerant  s u r v i v e as a t o l e r a n t  i n d i v i d u a l s , says  state.  But  isn't  argument that a t o l e r a n t s t a t e must be i n t o l e r a n t a paradox? Locke in fact arguing that to tolerate would be self-contradictory Fourth, that  its  the destruction of  the  Or is  toleration  (Nicholson 169)?  the magistrate need not tolerate a church which demands  f o l l o w e r s c o n s i d e r themselves under  service of a foreign prince.  the p r o t e c t i o n and  Locke used the example of the Mahometan  to i l l u s t r a t e his point, but commentators are agreed that he meant to include Catholics  (Wootton 96; Cranston 81, 85; Park 14, and others).  In fact he was referring to religious leaders of a l l denominations who use the f o r c e of t h e i r  power as r e l i g i o u s leaders to make de'crees  regarding c i v i l matters.  This would be like allowing a foreign j u r i s -  d i c t i o n to be e s t a b l i s h e d in the m a g i s t r a t e ' s home s t a t e and would, again,  be a threat to the peace, security and s t a b i l i t y of the state.  Fifth,  those who deny the existence of God, namely a t h e i s t s ,  a l s o not to be t o l e r a t e d .  In order for promises and oaths to be  binding there needs to be a belief have no belief  are  in God behind them.  Since atheists  in God, Locke thinks they feel no obligation to honour  their  oaths and promises  (64).  According to Locke,  "which are the bonds of human s o c i e t y " then, without a belief  a threat to the s t a b i l i t y of society.  in God, atheists are  This i s , of course, a problema-  t i c conception of what motivates individuals to keep their promises. Furthermore,  and in a separate argument,  Locke says,  since  a t h e i s t s have no r e l i g i o n they can l o g i c a l l y have no c l a i m to r e l i gious t o l e r a t i o n  (ibid).  Religious toleration  32  is meant  to  allow  citizens toworshipanyGod  i n any manner t h e y w i s h so l o n g as  this  does n o t t h r e a t e n t h e peace and s e c u r i t y o f t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h ,  but,  s i n c e a t h e i s t s do n o t w i s h t o w o r s h i p any God, L o c k e sees t h e m as h a v i n g no r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , and t h e r e f o r e t h e c o n c e p t o f  religious  t o l e r a t i o n does not a p p l y t o them. In h i s obviously,  first  argument  and m i s t a k e n l y ,  cohesiveness of agreed, which i t  society.  against  tolerating  T h i s argument w o u l d be j u s t i f i e d  is not, that a t h e i s t s f a i l  t o Locke's a s s e r t i o n ,  has a r i g h t  Locke  convinced t h a t they are a t h r e a t  that  if  if  t o keep t h e i r  As f o r h i s second argument a g a i n s t a t h e i s t s , contrary  atheists,  that  the  it  were  promises.  l o g i c seems t o  one g r a n t s  to  is  indicate,  every  citizen  t o b e l i e v e as he chooses, every c i t i z e n a l s o has the  right  t o d i s b e l i e v e as he chooses.  5.  On the R i g h t t o Freedom of R e l i g i o u s Assembly L o c k e says t h a t  secret, of  illegal  factions"  (64).  some p e o p l e may t h i n k  r e l i g i o u s m e e t i n g s or  that  "conventicles"  a r e the s t r o n g e s t argument a g a i n s t  But he p o i n t s out t h a t  the e x i s t e n c e and  "nurseries  religious  toleration  these s e c r e t groups w o u l d not be s e c r e t  i f the s t a t e were more t o l e r a n t of those w i t h n o n - o r t h o d o x It  is the  i n t o l e r a n c e of  h i d i n g as a means of  the s t a t e which d r i v e s  self-preservation.  r e l i g i o u s assemblies a r e not a t h r e a t  into  Locke goes on t o say  that  t o the peace and s e c u r i t y of the  themselves only w i t h the s a l v a t i o n of the s o u l . f r o m these r e l i g i o u s  assemblies were a t h r e a t  beliefs.  these groups  s t a t e since they aren't concerned w i t h c i v i 1 m a t t e r s .  were something to fear  of  They c o n c e r n  And even i f  groups,  if  there  religious  t o t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h , L o c k e a s k s why  33  the  m a g i s t r a t e does not fear h i s own, and does not c o n s i d e r i t a t h r e a t . The reason  some r e l i g i o u s groups are p e r s e c u t e d ,  because the m a g i s t r a t e  i s b i a s e d a g a i n s t them.  says L o c k e ,  It i s not  that leads men i n t o s e d i t i o u s c o n s p i r a c y a g a i n s t  The s t a t e w i l l  the m a g i s t r a t e  6.  magistrate.  allows a l l religious  "an equal c o n d i t i o n w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w  "the same favor of the p r i n c e , " the law"  but  be safe and p e a c e f u l , says L o c k e , i f , beyond m e r e l y  t o l e r a t i n g r e l i g i o u s groups, groups to enjoy  religion  their state,  r a t h e r t h e i r s u f f e r i n g o p p r e s s i o n at the hands of t h e i r  is  subjects,"  and to a l l have the same b e n e f i t of  (68).  Conclusion In conclusion, says Locke,  "The sum of a l l we d r i v e at i s , that  every man enjoy the same r i g h t s t h a t are granted to o t h e r s "  (69).  Because Locke presupposes a S a l v a t i o n i s t n a t u r e i n r e l i g i o n , he has not o n l y been a r g u i n g that a c o n d i t i o n of equal r i g h t s , w h i c h leads n e c e s s a r i l y to r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n , i s e s s e n t i a l  for m a i n t a i n i n g  peace and s e c u r i t y w i t h i n the state, but that i t leads to a s a l v a t i o n of souls which would not be possible under i n e q u a l i t y and intolerance. A c c o r d i n g to L o c k e , equal r i g h t s and t o l e r a t i o n means that a l l forms of w o r s h i p are  to be e q u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e w i t h i n a s o c i e t y .  Everything that i s permitted in secular society by c i v i l permitted in church as w e l l .  law should be  R e l i g i o n should not be used as a j u s t i -  f i c a t i o n to take away a man's w o r l d l y possessions or to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the way he wants to l i v e h i s l i f e . organize themselves  Churches s h o u l d be a l l o w e d to  in any manner they choose and to preach whatever  they wish so long as i t does not harm the p u b l i c peace.  34  They are not  t o be s a n c t u a r i e s nals  ought  regardless  to of  of  be  "factious  equally  their  And so  if  non-Christians  ought  Christians  Christianity. an  "unhappy  punished  religious  a 11 o w e d t h e same c i v i l  and f l a g i t i o u s for  fellows"  their  affiliations.  to  to  be t o l e r a t e d ,  tolerate  the  agreement"  between  are  says L o c k e , of  only  and d r i v e s natural  their  these  (71).  respective  people  If  spheres  the d i s c o r d w i t h i n  all  forceably  the  state  of  power,  societies  defend  opinions  more  within  state which  but  the  various  it  wrong  themselves,  would  not  and b l o o d y  of  leads  the  and t h e c h u r c h a c t e d o n l y says L o c k e ,  be  society.  i n . h i s s o c i e t y as t h e r e s u l t  t h e c h u r c h and t h e  to  to  how m u c h  t h e s t a t e t o p e r s e c u t e v a r i o u s g r o u p s of p e o p l e deemed o f faith,  society  in a C h r i s t i a n  diversity  L o c k e sees t h e u n r e s t  Crimi-  against  Non-Christians  r i g h t s as C h r i s t i a n s  are  acts  (70).  as  is  within only  end  religious  wars between them. Locke w r o t e misery meeting  c a u s e d by  this  religious  individuals  while witnessing  persecution  w h o had  to escape a homeland religious  letter  left  in which  b e l i e f s must  all  and  their  the c i v i l  intolerance. worldly  they were hated  unrest  and  No d o u b t  his  possessions  on a c c o u n t  have had an u n s e t t l i n g a f f e c t  behind  of  their  on L o c k e .  q u e s t i o n a reader of Locke's L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t ion m i g h t ask  is,  did  affect  the  Letter  felt  him to t e l l  the  logic  emotional  impact  of  of Locke's arguments?  there were major  life  as a r e f u g e e  One c o n t e m p o r a r y  problems w i t h Locke's  h i m so i n no u n c e r t a i n  terms.  35  logic  in  reader  The now  Holland of  and w r o t e  the to  Chapter 2 - The Debate between Locke and Proast  After its publication in 1689, L o c k e ' s L e t t e r was c r i t i c i z e d most n o t a b l y by the H i g h C h u r c h c l e r g y m a n and c h a p l a i n of A l l Souls College, Jonas Proast. In his essay entitled toleration 1688-1692"  "John L o c k e ,  Jonas Proast  and religious  Mark Goldie claims that Proast was a defender  of religious persecution  and resisted  the toleration of dissenters by  what he perceived to be the true church whenever, and by whomever, it was called for. that  the  toleration Proast's  He notes how Proast  D e c l a r a t i o n of - be  read  resistance  as  "resisted  Indulgence  from the  - the  pulpit"  having less  to  [King]  prerogative  (Goldie 147). do  James'  with  "the  demand  edict  Goldie  of sees  constitutional  impropriety of the K i n g ' s suspension of the penal laws, than with a revulsion against  religious toleration  as such"  (ibid).  But, on careful examination it seems that, rather than being a sweeping or dogmatic defense of existing religious persecution, documentation of his  or a  "revulsion against t o l e r a t i o n as such," Proast's  i n i t i a l c r i t i c i s m of L o c k e ' s position,  entitled  36  A L e t t e r Concerning  Toleration taking  Briefly  up only  interesting  Considered  twenty-eight  and A n s w e r e d  and c h a l l e n g i n g argument w i t h  of t h e use of f o r c e on a person's  response  so i n t e r e s t i n g  length  that i t elicited  to his f i r s t  filled  his A S e c o n d L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g  with  Proast enlarged  p o i n t s made  by  to  focus:  of  details.  " t h e use of f o r c e  was  ( M a y 27, 1690).  of h i s response  But this  this  almost  This  to Locke's Second  h i s s c o p e and c h a l l e n g e d a number  Locke.  the  L o c k e found  him a l e t t e r  clarifying  resulted  m i s t a k e of c h a n g i n g L o c k e ' s a r g u m e n t f r o m belief"  a narrow  belief.  from  Toleration  A year later, in the enthusiasm Letter,  27, 1690), and  l a r g e - t y p e pages, was a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  efficacy  equal  (March  in his making  of o t h e r the f a t a l  " t h e use of f o r c e t o c o m p e l  to compel  the true  belief."  This  t a i n t e d a l l of h i s s u b s e q u e n t a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t t o l e r a t i o n . D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t P r o a s t had, i n e f f e c t , c h a n g e d t h e a r g u m e n t - either  by a c c i d e n t or by d e s i g n  - Locke  responded  to Proast the  f o l l o w i n g year with his enormously long A T h i r d L e t t e r F o r T o l e r a t i o n (June  20, 1692).  In i t he t a k e s  g r e a t p a i n s t o s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and  m e t i c u l o u s l y a n a l y z e and c r i t i c i z e e a c h p a r a g r a p h , often  i n d i v i d u a l w o r d s used  arguments incredibly  still  hold  detailed  h a v e had a p r o f o u n d  by P r o a s t  and Proast's  and a n a l y t i c a l  f a c t h i s t h i r d response  letter  on P r o a s t .  years later,  to Locke),  h i m how  his earlier  are a l li l l conceived.  third  silencing impact  u n t i l June of 1704, t w e l v e  t o show  e a c h s e n t e n c e , and  from  Locke  This  seems t o  P r o a s t didn't  respond  w i t h his Second L e t t e r (in  apparently in order to defend his  r e p u t a t i o n as not h a v i n g c o n c e d e d t h e l e n g t h y p u b l i c d e b a t e t o L o c k e . Although  Proast's A  Second  L e t t e r seems n o t h i n g  37  more  than  a  b r u s h - o f f , and an a t t e m p t t o w a s h h i s hands of the w h o l e a f f a i r , L o c k e n o n e - t h e - l e s s began t o w r i t e Toleration. repetition Proast  of w h a t  either  1704  entitled A  Fourth Letter  For  M u c h of w h a t is i n t h i s l e t t e r i s an a l m o s t w o r d f o r w o r d Locke  chose  B u t L o c k e was 28,  a reply,  argued  i n his p r e v i o u s l e t t e r s  t o i g n o r e or f a i l e d  to r e s p o n d  and  to adequately.  u n a b l e to f i n i s h the l e t t e r b e f o r e his d e a t h on  and so t h e d e b a t e was  q u e s t i o n s , f i r s t of a l l , who  ended.  has won  The  which  October  reader is l e f t w i t h  the  the d e b a t e ; s e c o n d , do t h e a r g u -  ments in Locke's original L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n w i t h s t a n d the c r i t i c i s m of P r o a s t ' s a n a l y s i s ; and  t h i r d , how  does L o c k e  p o s i t i o n i n the c o u r s e of his d e b a t e w i t h P r o a s t ? found  by  following  the various lines  An  c l a r i f y his  a n s w e r may  of a r g u m e n t t h r o u g h t h e  be  seven  letters. In his f i r s t r e p l y to L o c k e , P r o a s t s u m m a r i z e s w h a t he c l a i m s to be the  "single"  a r g u m e n t of L o c k e ' s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n as  follows: 1. t h e r e is o n l y one "religion"  way  t o s a l v a t i o n and o n l y one t r u e r e l i g i o n  Proast means a s p e c i f i c  denomination  (by  or c h u r c h ,  as  w i l l be seen l a t e r i n h i s a r g u m e n t s ) ; 2. no man be 3.  c a n be s a v e d by t h i s r e l i g i o n i f he does not b e l i e v e i t to  the true  belief  religion;  i n t h i s r e l i g i o n must be  c r e a t e d t h r o u g h r e a s o n and  argu-  ment, not by o u t w a r d f o r c e and c o m p u l s i o n ; 4.  therefore  a l l such  force  is useless f o r  promoting  the true  reli-  g i o n and t h e s a v i n g of souls; 5.  and t h e r e f o r e nobody, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r s t a t i o n i n s o c i e t y ,  38  can  have the right to use force  to bring men to the  true  religion  (Argument 3-4). Proast presents the first proposition as though it were L o c k e ' s , although it is not.  In fact Locke maintains that the way to salvation  lies in the core teachings of a l l Christian churches, various outward forms of worship or ceremonies core.  but that their  often  conceal this  The second proposition is also one which Proast mistakenly  attributes to L o c k e .  Again, Locke would not have said that salvation  comes from b e l o n g i n g to one p a r t i c u l a r c h u r c h , but by l i v i n g in harmony with the teachings of Christ which can be found as the basic teachings in a l l Christian churches.  Proast says he agrees with  the  third of what he claims to be L o c k e ' s propositions, that only reason and arguments can induce the mind to assent to any t r u t h .  But, as for  the fourth proposition, he wonders whether it might not prove e f f e c tive to use force, not instead of reason and argument,  but only  "to  bring men to consider those reasons and arguments which are proper and sufficient to convince them,"  but which they never would have c o n s i -  dered without being forced to  (Argument 5).  and at  a distance"  Using force  would bring men to consider the true religion  which they otherwise might never have done due to their negligence,  or prejudices against  it  (ibid).  refutes  proposition  useless  a l l use  of force  is utterly  carelessness,  The use of force  bring men to consider the truth, says Proast, that  "indirectly  to  L o c k e ' s fourth for  promoting  true religion and the salvation of souls.  In response Locke reminds  Proast  of his L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g  that  Toleration  the  other  two arguments  (that the magistrate  has  39  no authority  to  use  force in  matters of religion, wrong  religion)  and t h a t . t h e  are  ample  magistrate  reason  for  may  toleration  be enforcing even  if  it  the were  allowed that force could be used successfully to convince men's.minds. It  is evident,  both from what Proast himself has written and Locke's  reply to him, that Proast has failed to appreciate Locke's  the complexity  of  position.  Locke also claims that Proast has attributed to him a claim he has not made.  Referring to himself, Locke says, [Nowhere] does the author say that it is impossible that force should any way, at any time, any accident,  be useful towards  upon any person, by  the  religion, and the salvation of souls  promoting  true  (Works vol. 6  68).  "graciously"  make  Locke says he didn't deny that God may at times use of "force towards the salvation of men's souls." is that  of  What he did deny  "force has any proper efficacy to enlighten the understand-  ing, or produce belief" the magistrate  (ibid).  may not lawfully  men in matters of religion" The use of  force  It  is for this reason, he says,  use force in an attempt  that  "to compel  (ibid).  "indirectly  and at  a d i s t a n c e " as Proast  proposes, may make some men take up the true religion, says Locke, but these can be seen as nothing more than accidental consequences which may or may not result from the use of force. Proast  again  insists that,  although  he..agrees  But in his Third force  is not  Letter able  to  procure the conviction of the understanding, it may be useful by way of procuring such a conviction by compelling a man  "to consider and  weigh those reasons and arguments which do convince his understanding"  40  s i n c e f o r c e has  "a p r o p e r e f f i c a c y . . . to p r o c u r e the e n l i g h t e n m e n t of  the u n d e r s t a n d i n g and  the  production  of b e l i e f  In t h i s s u b t l e  argument Proast  that force can  be  used d i r e c t l y to c h a n g e a person's b e l i e f , but  t h a t f o r c e can  be  used t o m a k e a p e r s o n g i v e t h o u g h t t o his b e l i e f s  and  i n t h i s way  is not  ( T h i r d L e t t e r 16,17).  claiming,  contrary  he m i g h t c h a n g e his b e l i e f s of his own  to  Locke,  accord.  e f f e c t of f o r c e on b e l i e f w o u l d not be as a c c i d e n t a l as L o c k e says P r o a s t ,  but  " i s both intended  by  him  t h a t uses i t , and  1.  it"  withall,  fiable  Be Used By A l l  says L o c k e ,  magistrate  i f one  is j u s t i f i a b l e ,  accepts that  then  for a l l magistrates  to  w o u l d have to a g r e e t h a t  use  the  consider  against  themselves  those  they  it.  who  right, according  p o i n t s out there argues  follows  that  p r o b l e m t h e n is t h a t may  use  orthodox  protestant  C h r i s t i a n s may  non-orthodox  believes  t i m e s by  his r e l i g i o n  law  to  of n a t u r e ,  (Works v o l . 6  protestant  143,  be  t o use  true  and  to  those use  it  Christians.  repeating the  one  force  protestants,  as  one  i t is j u s t i -  i t against  h a v e the r i g h t t o do so, s i n c e the l a w all magistrates  of f o r c e by  use  perceive  to the  The  use  heathen magistrate  L o c k e m a k e s t h i s . p o i n t a number of magistrate,  the  it logically  c o m p e l C h r i s t i a n s , p a p i s t s may who  useful-  (ibid).  F o r c e May But,  This claims,  I doubt not, so o f t e n a t t a i n e d , as a b u n d a n t l y to m a n i f e s t the ness of  only  that one,  force, a l l  if has  one the  magistrates  of n a t u r e g i v e s e q u a l p o w e r to 146,  150,  402).  Locke  thereby  that even i f i t were true that f o r c e could change beliefs,  is s t i l l that  another one  argument  particular  for toleration  magistrate  41  has  the  which natural  holds: right  if  one  to  use  f o r c e i n m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o n , e v e r y m a g i s t r a t e who m a i n t a i n s  religious  c o n v i c t i o n s has t h e same n a t u r a l r i g h t . 2.  Wnom To Use F o r c e On? L o c k e sees P r o a s t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t f o r c e s h o u l d be used t o m a k e  dissenters at least  consider  joining  the state religion  n i n g i n t o p r o b l e m s of a d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e . is  impossible  don't a t t e n d punishment, believe.  to distinguish church,  between  and those  who  honestly  run-  F o r one t h i n g , he says, i t  dissenters,  sly non-believers  as a l s o  who  don't  non-believers  attend know  church  what  who  to avoid  they  are to  By t h i s he means t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r t h e m a g i s t r a t e  to p i c k o u t t h o s e who d e s e r v e t o be f o r c e d w i t h p u n i s h m e n t t o c o n s i d e r the e r r o r o f t h e i r b e l i e f s f r o m t h o s e who don't. cerely  considered  the s t a t e r e l i g i o n  refuse to attend the state church, senters entitled God  or may  and a r e t h e r e f o r e l e g i t i m a t e d i s others  simply  their  still  b e l i e v e r s but a r e m e r e l y  disbelief  carefully  others attend church going  through  believe in  - i t would  to a v o i d t h e p u n i s h m e n t t h e y who  are sincerely  in fact  religious  deserve;  but confused  w h i c h c o n f u s i o n does not j u s t i f y punishment.  as t h o u g h  the motions,  though they are b e l i e v e r s while i n f a c t d i s b e l i e v i n g ,  those  don't  be  t o d i s t i n g u i s h w h i c h s i n c e no one c a n k n o w w h a t i s i n t h e  h e a r t or m i n d of a n o t h e r ; are  wrong,  r e f u s e t o a t t e n d t h e s t a t e c h u r c h , and may  not have considered  difficult  a n d b e l i e v e i t t o be  not t o be punished;  or r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p ,  Some men have s i n -  they  a c t i n g as  simply  i n order  and 'finally t h e r e a r e about  their  beliefs,  Again, determining which  of t h e s e d e s c r i p t i o n s a p p l i e s t o w h i c h c i t i z e n of t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h is an i m p o s s i b l e t a s k , says L o c k e ,  b e c a u s e no one b e s i d e s G o d is c a p a b l e  42  of k n o w i n g the m o t i v e s or t r u e i n t e n t i o n s of In  order  punishing  t o be  a l l those  on  the  another.  s a f e s i d e and  d i s s e n t e r s who  get  have not  a t , and  considered  succeed in their  beliefs  and a r e t h e r e f o r e d e s e r v i n g of p u n i s h m e n t , says L o c k e , i t seems P r o a s t would  be  logically  would  not  be  punishment.  forced  able  to  into  punishing  identify  and  guilty,  especially  those  c h u r c h , w o u l d not be f o u n d out and they  deserve.  b e l i e v e r s not  only  This  for  the  Locke  who  favoured  law  punish-  t o punish  inherently illegitimate  that Proast's c a l l  non-  since it  p o i n t s out  that Proast  the  state  is c a l l i n g  also  infers  that Proast  is  a s s u m i n g s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the s t a t e r e l i g i o n w h i c h may  i n f a c t not  be  true  national church  at a l l - t h a t the  dissenters  and  specific  or  dissenters  the  very  magistrate's  specifi-  - only  outside  a  only  the  but  i s not  group  those  of  not  for punishment  don't b e l i e v e i n G o d  don't a c c e p t  thereby  punishment  for a  but  ( W o r k s v o l . 6 74, W o o t t o n 104).  a l s o p o i n t s out  a g a i n s t those  religion.  he  dissenters for  a t t e n d i n g h i s own  m a k e s his c a l l  d i r e c t e d g e n e r a l l y a g a i n s t those who cally  deserving  t h e r e f o r e not r e c e i v e the  i m p r a c t i c a b l e but  w o u l d be i n e q u i t a b l e Locke  isolate  since  N o t only w o u l d P r o a s t t h e n be p u n i s h i n g the i n n o c e n t ,  some of the  ment  a l l non-believers  state religion  non-believers  are  c o n s i d e r the e r r o r of t h e i r way. t e r s and would  be  - he  wrong  has  the  and  truth  need  to  and be  that forced  and  the to  But Proast's suggestion that dissen-  n o n - b e l i e v e r s s h o u l d be f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r the s t a t e r e l i g i o n serving justice  those  who  about  what  the m a g i s t r a t e the  only  if carried  is c e r t a i n have not  state religion  has  to  43  offer.  out  specifically  against  t h o u g h t l o n g and The  task  of  how  hard to  d e t e r m i n e who  has c o n s i d e r e d  impracticable In  (ibid  light  of  d i s s e n t e r and considered if  force  beliefs,  were in f a c t a  religion, be  difficulty  "God  of  distinguishing exactly  is a n o n - b e l i e v e r ,  their  has not i s , of c o u r s e ,  75).  the  who  a d e q u a t e l y and who  Locke  and  points  who out  u s e f u l means of  has,  and  man  being  c a p a b l e of k n o w i n g "  is a  has  letter  men  a l o n e knows w h e r e i t is n e c e s s a r y , and  u s e f u l , w h i c h no  who  i n his t h i r d  bringing  who  to  not that  the  true  on w h o m i t w i l l (Works vol.  6  162). 3.  F o r c e May  Harm The  In p o i n t i n g out asks P r o a s t positively  Truth  a f u r t h e r p r o b l e m w i t h the  to name p r e c i s e l y say  any  man,  through carelessness  "what that  ' w i t h o u t being  never acquaint  use  of f o r c e ,  truth is, which  forced  by  himself with'"  Locke  you  punishment,  can would  (Works vol. 6  73-  4).  L o c k e a l r e a d y a r g u e d in his o r i g i n a l L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n  that  there  trates ment  are  is a  strong  false.  against  probability that  Proast's  call  outside  the  those  the  f o r the  b e l i e f s of m o s t  magistrate's  national  church  p o s s i b l y w r o n g l y , t h a t the n a t i o n a l ' c h u r c h ,  using  falsehood, likely,  f o r c e may  which w i l l destroy  to make men  those magistrates which means,  they  in f a c t  only  believe  says L o c k e ,  " b r i n g men  j u s t as  and  be he  the  are  apt  true  argued  44  very  B e c a u s e of t h i s ,  to r e c e i v e  and  to  way i n his  be  he  embrace  embrace e r r o r than the t r u t h , "  this force to  assumes,  punish-  them... F o r c e is m u c h m o r e p r o p e r ,  r e c e i v e and using  of  on whose b e h a l f the m a g i s -  t r a t e is a c t i n g , is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y the t r u e one. says,  use  magis-  and since  on  the  wrong  way  (ibid  76).  This  also  first  letter,  that it  w o u l d be a m i s t a k e f o r c i t i z e n s to i n v e s t i n the m a g i s t r a t e to c h o o s e t h e i r r e l i g i o n f o r them, and  t h a t t h e y w o u l d be no  a h e a d t h a n i f t h e y w e r e to c h o o s e t h e i r own trate  i s just  citizen  as  (ibid  l i a b l e to  be  wrong  the p o w e r further  religion, since a magis-  i n his c h o i c e  as  any  ordinary  177-9).  T h a t using f o r c e may  do m o r e h a r m t h a n good is b o r n e out,  says  L o c k e , by the f a c t t h a t i t c a n n o t be m e a s u r e d w h e t h e r or not, and  how  w e l l , men they  have been c o m p e l l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e i r b e l i e f s , e s p e c i a l l y i f  refuse  to c h a n g e t h e i r  to c o n s i d e r . F o r c e may, and  create  enemies  religious  affiliation  in the end, t u r n men  by  virtue  of  the  after  being  forced  a w a y f r o m the t r u e c h u r c h  fact  that  the  magistrate  has  u n f a i r l y p u n i s h e d t h e m i n the name of the t r u e c h u r c h e v e n t h o u g h t h e y have a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d ( W o r k s v o l . 6 78).  and  decided  a g a i n s t i t of t h e i r own  free  will  L o c k e p o i n t s out i n his t h i r d l e t t e r t h a t i n t h o s e  p l a c e s w h e r e m a g i s t r a t e s h a v e been using f o r c e t o p r o m o t e a p a r t i c u l a r religion,  t h i s f o r c e has  against C h r i s t i a n i t y ( i b i d 240). Locke  there  has  more  t h a n w o u l d e v e r h a v e b e e n c a u s e d by  W h i l e f o r c e may  says,  toleration  c a u s e d m o r e s e c t a r i a n i s m and  is no  h a v e t u r n e d men  evidence  e v e r l e d men  that  the  prejudice toleration  a g a i n s t the t r u e opposite  is t r u e :  to t a k e up f a l s e r e l i g i o n  In f a c t , says L o c k e , i f the use of f o r c e by  the  church,  (ibid  that  478).  Inquisition  were  t a k e n a w a y f r o m c o u n t r i e s l i k e I t a l y , S p a i n , P o r t u g a l , and  France  toleration  and  were p r a c t i c e d , e v e n  countries,  "the  who  t o the  belong  in popish,  t r u e r e l i g i o n w o u l d be true  w o u l d not be p e r s e c u t e d  religion  where  Mahometan  a g a i n e r by i t is not  pagan  i t " since  the  state  those  religion  f o r b e i n g d i s s e n t e r s or u n o r t h o d o x , and  45  and  would  be a l l o w e d  t o t r y to persuade others to join them  ( L o c k e Works v o l . 6  64). Another  important  point,  f o r c e may make men c o n s i d e r  according  to Locke,  is that  t h e i r b e l i e f s , i t does not help  m a k e a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n b e t w e e n t r u t h and f a l s e h o o d , at a l l i n l e a d i n g men t o t h e t r u e c h u r c h Finally, ters  Locke  to consider  insists  that  the religion  (Works v o l . 6 78).  i f i t is necessary  of c o n f o r m i s t s ,  t h e b e l i e f s of d i s s e n t e r s  point here is that there  them to  so i t is no help  then  to force  (Works  vol.  dissen-  i t is logical to  c o n c l u d e t h a t i t i s also n e c e s s a r y t o use f o r c e t o c o m p e l to c o n s i d e r  although  conformists  6 85).  Locke's  i s no a v a i l a b l e o b j e c t i v e p o i n t of v i e w  from  w h i c h t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h group of b e l i e v e r s has t h e t r u t h , and t h e r e f o r e w h i c h group i s a l l o w e d their  4.  to compel the other with force to consider  beliefs.  How Much F o r c e Is Enough? Proast  world.  i s c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e use o f f o r c e w o u l d c r e a t e a b e t t e r  The f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e so many d i f f e r e n t and f a l s e r e l i g i o n s  is e v i d e n c e t o P r o a s t the r i g h t way  t h a t men h a v e not b o t h e r e d t o seek t h e t r u t h i n  ( P r o a s t A r g u m e n t 8-9).  r e l i g i o n b a s e d on  I f we a c c e p t t h a t men c h o o s e  "stiff prejudices"  and w i t h o u t good r e a s o n , t h e n ,  says P r o a s t , i t i s o b v i o u s t h a t b o t h g e n t l e a d m o n i t i o n , entreaties," 10).  and persuasion  T h e use of  right proportion (ibid  11-12).  prisonment,  or f o r c e  in  " j u s t measure,"  w a y t o b r i n g men  to consider  O f c o u r s e t h e use o f e x t r e m e m e a s u r e s , starvation,  earnest  won't w o r k t o c h a n g e t h e i r m i n d s  "penalties"  i s t h e only  "most  taking  away  their  46  worldly  (ibid or the  the truth  such  as i m -  possessions,  and  manning and torturing men to death in an effort to bring them to the true r e l i g i o n absurdity"  and save t h e i r  since it can create  souls,  says P r o a s t ,  the exact  is a  opposite effect  "manifest (ibid  13).  Force should only be used by way of  disposing men to fair  submit  hearing to the  to  instruction,  reasons which are  and to  offered,  give a for  the  enlightening their minds and discovering truth to them (ibid). According to Locke, this points to yet another problem with the use of force: are  severe  the difficulty of determining what sorts of punishments  enough and long enough,  and at  the  same time not  severe, to compel men to consider the truth of their religion  too  (Works  vol. 6 106-9). Proast explains that what he means by the use of moderate force "indirectly benevolent their  and at force  a distance,"  is that  used by schoolmasters,  scholars, or apprentices,  skill of their arts and trades"  it  is the  tutors,  same  sort  or masters  to bring them to learning,  of  "upon  or to  the  and that it may work just as well for  the magistrate when used on citizens in this manner for the purpose of bringing them to consider the true religion claim about the  usefulness of moderate  right  - that  for  some  is those  (Argument 18, 26).  force also seems to  in authority  - to  use it  This  imply a  (ibid  53).  But Locke responds in his Third Letter by saying that Proast's analogy between the schoolmaster or parent forcing a child and the forcing  his subjects  does not  hold,  since  adults  are  not  magistrate children.  Adults are not under the age of reason, incapable of making their own  47  informed decisions, needing people i n authority telling believe  (Works v o l . 6  206-11).  them what to  A n d as f o r t h e e f f i c a c y of using  p u n i s h m e n t t o t e a c h , L o c k e g i v e s t h e e x a m p l e of m a t h e m a t i c s , i n w h i c h , as i n r e l i g i o n ,  t h e t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i s not s e l f - e v i d e n t .  Locke  says t h a t e v e n i f a l l s t u d e n t s a r e s i n c e r e i n t h e i r d e s i r e t o come t o k n o w m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s by c o m i n g t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e p r o o f s , some s t u d e n t s w i l l come t o u n d e r s t a n d p r o o f s a n d k n o w p r o p o s i tions which others instructor, 425).  never w i l l , regardless  o f t h e m e t h o d s used by t h e  i n c l u d i n g t h e use of p h y s i c a l p u n i s h m e n t s  Locke is implying  t h a t just as p u n i s h m e n t w i l l not help  s t u d e n t s t o e v e r come t o u n d e r s t a n d  some p r o o f s  mathematics, punishment is s i m i l a r l y come t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o o f s true religion.  (Works vol. 6 some  or p r o p o s i t i o n s i n  u n l i k e l y t o e v e r help  some men  o f r e l i g i o u s t r u t h s or t o d i s c o v e r t h e  So i f p u n i s h m e n t i s t o be a p p l i e d u n t i l s u c h an u n d e r -  s t a n d i n g comes, says L o c k e , when w i l l t h e p u n i s h m e n t of t h e s e s t u d e n t s and some men ever end? Proast's creased  call  f o r moderate force  f o r t h o s e who r e f u s e  or p e n a l t i e s w h i c h c a n be i n -  to change leaves  L o c k e , f o r an e v e r i n c r e a s i n g use of f o r c e .  open,  says  T h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s : how  m u c h f o r c e t o use; w h a t is t o o l i t t l e or t o o m u c h 5, 270, 4 5 7 ) ?  t h e door  (Works vol. 6  263-  F o r an e x a m p l e o f how p u n i s h m e n t c a n e s c a l a t e t o e x -  t r e m e s L o c k e c i t e s t h e c a s e of t h e l a w w h i c h f i r s t a l l o w e d  the levying  of a l s f i n e a g a i n s t a man f o r not a t t e n d i n g  church.  was c o n t i n u a l l y i n c r e a s e d  l e d to the law allowing  the  until it eventually  b a n i s h m e n t of a man f r o m h i s home and c o u n t r y  death  penalty,  and a l l t h i s  during  the reign  48  The p u n i s h m e n t  on t h r e a t of t h e  of a s i n g l e  queen  -  Elizabeth ment?  (ibid  287).  What w i l l  .-Proast's r u l e f o r p u n i s h m e n t is says L o c k e , t h a t i t is no  sistent,"  p e n a l t y at the e x t r e m e  (ibid  L o c k e a l s o p o i n t s out s e l f , and he  the d e a t h p e n a l t y first  "so g e n e r a l , l o o s e , and  death  279).  t h a t P r o a s t has  letter,  He  in f a c t c o n t r a d i c t e d him-  says t h a t w h i l e P r o a s t has  to save a man's s o u l he  later  "an  seems to a l l o w  seems e v i d e n t l y to c o n d o n e t h e  "absurd"  a m e a n s of s a v i n g souls w h e n he says, into  the  t i e s must Proast  incon-  help at a l l i n a v o i d i n g the  at  as  c a l l e d the use  absurdity"  for  w h e n l e s s e r are not s u f f i c i e n t t o b r i n g men  last  punish-  is not as b e n e v o l e n t i n his use of " m o d e r a t e p u n i s h m e n t "  t r i e s to a p p e a r .  his  t h i s e s c a l a t i o n of  prevent  e a r l y on  "greater  punishments  t o be c o n v i n c e d . "  Proast  use of the d e a t h p e n a l t y  last  f a l l under  the  In f a c t ,  stroke  i n the  of  end  it"  (Works  Proast  vol.  m a k e s no  a g a i n s t those who  6  73;  pretense  r e b e l a g a i n s t t h e m a g i s t r a t e and  s u b m i t to l e s s e r p e n a l t i e s m e a n t t o b r i n g t h e m  b e l i e f s i n his T h i r d L e t t e r Locke  asks P r o a s t  f o r c e a man  to consider  able  force  to  use  f a i t h e v e n t h o u g h he t h a t he  does not  has  beyond  their  a m e r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of  j u s t i f i a b l e to use his b e l i e f s ,  against  refuse  to c o n s i d e r  t o c o n s i d e r the j u s t i c e of w h a t he  s e e m to him  of  (21).  t o look  d e g r e e s of p u n i s h m e n t and W h i l e i t may  as  " a l l c o a c t i v e p o w e r r e s o l v e s at  a g a i n s t the use of c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t when he a g a i n a f f i r m s the use  to  in  s w o r d s i n c e a l l t h a t r e f u s e to s u b m i t to l e s s e r p e n a l -  L e t t e r 23).  "the sword"  of  a man  Locke  who  not  is i t s t i l l  profess  g i v e n i t c a r e f u l t h o u g h t and  b e l i e v e i t t o be  the has  t r u e , or a g a i n s t the man  0  49  proposes.  moderate punishment asks,  will  the  to  justifinational concluded  who  does  not e n t e r a c h u r c h are e r r o n e o u s ?  or worship P r o a s t may  a c e r t a i n way b e c a u s e he t h i n k s these be a r g u i n g  f o r t h e use of  "moderate"  punishment merely to m o t i v a t e everyone t o consider their b e l i e f s , but, says L o c k e , " w h e r e t h e r e  i s no f a u l t , "  where c a r e f u l consideration  has already been made, "there can be no moderate punishment,"  because  e v e n t h e l i g h t e s t k i n d of p u n i s h m e n t o f an i n n o c e n t man i s u n j u s t i f i able  5.  (Works v o l . 6 71).  God And The Use Of F o r c e Proast  b r i n g men  argues  that  to consider  i f t h e use o f f o r c e w e r e the true  religion,  then  not e f f e c t i v e t o  God would  not • have  f u r n i s h e d i t as a means of s a v i n g souls and p r o m o t i n g his own honour. The  fact  t h a t t h e use of f o r c e  history of the true church,  has been  necessary  throughout the  e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s w e r e no  l o n g e r a b l e t o use t h e p e r f o r m i n g  of m i r a c l e s t o c o n v e r t  unbelievers,  says P r o a s t , shows t h a t t h e r e i s a r i g h t t o use f o r c e , a n d t h a t t h i s right  seems t o r e s t w i t h  s u c h as To  the magistrate  and a l l t h o s e  "parents, masters of f a m i l i e s , t u t o r s e t c . "  ( A r g u m e n t 16).  t h i s L o c k e says i n h i s t h i r d l e t t e r t h a t many m o r e p e o p l e i n  the e a r l y days o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , and s i n c e t h e n , the g o s p e l o f C h r i s t due t o t h e p r e a c h i n g  h a v e come t o a c c e p t  and p e r s u a s i o n s o f C h r i s t i a n  m i s s i o n a r i e s r a t h e r t h a n b e c a u s e of t h e p e r f o r m i n g , miracles.  in authority,  a n d w i t n e s s i n g , of  T h i s shows t h a t m i r a c l e s w e r e n o t n e c e s s a r y  for conversion,  and' f o r c e i s n o t t h e r e f o r e a l e g i t i m a t e r e p l a c e m e n t f o r m i r a c l e s t o c o n v i n c e men of t h e t r u e r e l i g i o n  (Works vol. 6  443-44).  N o one has  the r i g h t , says L o c k e , t o m a k e use of any o t h e r means f o r t h e s a l v a t i o n o f men's souls b e s i d e s p r e a c h i n g and p e r s u a s i o n r e g a r d l e s s of how  50  u s e f u l t h a t means may  seem.  those p r e s c r i b e d  "the  by  through persuasion While there  The  o n l y means a n y o n e has a r i g h t t o are  a u t h o r and  with arguments is no  f i n i s h e r of our  ( i b i d 81,  doubt t h a t p r e a c h i n g  is e f f e c t i v e i n p r o m o t i n g  r u l e out  as a u s e f u l a d d i t i o n to p r e a c h i n g  ( A r g u m e n t 37).  not  want  consider  "moderate p e n a l t i e s "  "he  the  use  of m o d e r a t e  says P r o a s t ,  have s h o w n w h e r e he d i d so i n s c r i p t u r e  (ibid  and  to hear Locke  that faith  comes by  t h a t d i s p u t e Proast's  hearing,  that faith  c l a i m that God  force to.create faith  38).  is a g i f t  c l e a r l y , the G o s p e l was  of  seems to h a v e a l l o w e d  (Works v o l . 6 82-5).  and  should  In r e p l y , L o c k e q u o t e s a number of t e x t s f r o m the B i b l e say  force  F u r t h e r m o r e , i f God  used t o i n d u c e men  w o u l d h a v e t o l d us so"  t h a t is  112-13).  b e l i e f , says P r o a s t , t h i s does not  did  faith,"  God,  etc.)  the use  of  a l s o p o i n t s out  that,  f i r s t s p r e a d by means of d i s c u s s i o n and  per-  suasion,  and  t h a t i t t h r i v e d w i t h o u t the  Proast's  own  argument against  him,  He  (which  use  of f o r c e  (ibid).  Using  L o c k e says t h a t i t c o u l d  be  t h a t i f f o r c e is n e c e s s a r y i n p r o m o t i n g the c h u r c h , t h e n G o d f u r n i s h his p e o p l e the means f o r p r o m o t i n g his own  said  did  not  honour in the  world  d u r i n g the f i r s t t h r e e h u n d r e d y e a r s a f t e r C h r i s t ' s d e a t h , s i n c e  force  was  not  used t o s p r e a d C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f  6.  What I f C i t i z e n s Agreed To The Use Of In his T h i r d L e t t e r P r o a s t  he  is not  tage. because  argues  that  a  number  of  t h r o u g h the L a w  the  113).  Force?  returns to arguing  s a t i s f i e d t h a t L o c k e has  He  (ibid  used the  magistrate  scriptural  texts  has seem  scripture.  says  s c r i p t u r e s t o his a d v a n the  r i g h t to  use  to  indicate  that  of N a t u r e , g i v e s him t h i s c o m m i s s i o n .  51  He  force God,  H i s using f o r c e  is s i m p l y  " t h e d i s c h a r g i n g an o l d d u t y "  ( i b i d 35, 5 2 ) . P r o a s t  feels  he a l s o has t h i s r i g h t w h e n h i s s u b j e c t s h a v e v e s t e d t h i s p o w e r i n h i m of t h e i r own f r e e w i l l f o r t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , see  i t as b e n e f i c i a l  that i s , because they  t o t h e s a l v a t i o n o f t h e i r own souls ( i b i d 6 5 ) .  P r o a s t says, a c c o r d i n g  to Locke, the magistrate's j u r i s d i c t i o n is  to be m e a s u r e d by t h e end f o r w h i c h t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d . B u t P r o a s t asks, why must t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h be c o n s t i t u t e d , as L o c k e claims,  only  interests?  f o r the procuring,  preserving,  and advancing  of c i v i l  T h i s s t a t e m e n t , says P r o a s t , m e r e l y begs t h e q u e s t i o n :  Why  c a n a c o m m o n w e a l t h not be c o n s t i t u t e d f o r t h e p r o c u r i n g and a d v a n c e m e n t of men's s p i r i t u a l and e t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s ? legitimize  the magistrate's  (Argument 18).  use of f o r c e  What P r o a s t  This would  certainly  i n t h e s a l v a t i o n of souls  fails to recognize  however is that the  arguments in Locke's original L e t t e r already r e f u t e the implied argument i n Proast's question:  a c o m m o n w e a l t h can't be c o n s t i t u t e d f o r  the p r o c u r i n g a n d a d v a n c e m e n t of men's s p i r i t u a l and e t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s because, first, magistrate  rational  citizens  would  not agree  to allow  their  t o use f o r c e on t h e m t o c o m p e l t h e m t o b e l i e v e w h a t he  w a n t e d t h e m t o b e l i e v e ; s e c o n d , t h e use o f o u t w a r d f o r c e by i t s e l f is insufficient  in the formation  that leads to salvation; false belief Proast souls  and t h i r d , t h e m a g i s t r a t e may  - the kind  be c o m p e l l i n g  a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h a t L o c k e ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e c a r e of  i s not c o m m i t t e d  civil  k i n d of belief  ( L e t t e r 19-22; W o r k s V o l 6 116-17)  t h i n g by i t s e l f " the  of t h e r i g h t  to the c i v i l  magistrate  or a c i r c u l a r a r g u m e n t  magistrate  may  "proving the  (Argument 19). Since  l a y p e n a l t i e s on  52  is a  citizens  who  only  refuse to  embrace t h e d o c t r i n e of a commonwealth's s p i r i t u a l sees t h i s as p r o o f must  t h a t t h e c a r e of s o u l s t h r o u g h t h e use o f f o r c e  indeed be c o m m i t t e d t o h i m  ever t h a t , i f a n y t h i n g Proast's.  ( i b i d 20-21).  I t may be noted how-  i s a c i r c u l a r argument, i t i s t h i s argument of  F u r t h e r m o r e , says P r o a s t ,  t r a t e ' s i s n o t , as L o c k e h a s p o r t r a y e d religion,"  leaders, Proast  t h i s a u t h o r i t y of the magisit,  " t o c o m p e l any one t o h i s  but r a t h e r o n l y an a u t h o r i t y t o p r o c u r e a l l h i s s u b j e c t s t h e means of  discovering  withall,  t h e way o f s a l v a t i o n , and t o  a s much a s i n h i m l i e s ,  that  procure  none  remain  i g n o r a n t o f i t , or r e f u s e t o embrace i t , e i t h e r f o r want of u s i n g those means, or by reason of any such p r e j u d i c e s as may render  them i n e f f e c t u a l  ( i b i d 21).  P r o a s t goes so f a r a s t o s a y t h a t c i t i z e n s a c t u a l l y a l l o w t h e magistrate  t h e power t o u s e t h e s w o r d ,  i n other  words the death  p e n a l t y , a g a i n s t t h o s e who r e f u s e t o s u b m i t t o t h e l e s s e r p e n a l t i e s meant t o make them c o n s i d e r  (Argument 23).  Locke responds by a r g u i n g t h a t j u s t because an end may be a t t a i n a b l e by c i v i l  s o c i e t y (eg. t h e s a l v a t i o n o f s o u l s )  n e c e s s a r i l y make t h i s one o f t h e ends o f c i v i l use  i t does n o t t h e n  society.  In f a c t the  o f f o r c e w i t h i n s o c i e t y a s a means t o make men f i n d  r e l i g i o n , and as an a t t e m p t t o improve s o c i e t y , h a r m t h a n good t o c i v i l disturbed,  s o c i e t y because  i n j u r e d , and i m p a i r e d  the true  may a c t u a l l y do more  "men's c i v i l  interests are  by i t " (Works v o l . 6 117-8).  Locke a l s o says t h a t nobody c a n i n r e a s o n s u p p o s e t h a t any one e n t e r e d  53  into  civil  society  f o r the p r o c u r i n g ,  securing,  or a d v a n c i n g  the s a l v a t i o n of h i s s o u l , when he, f o r t h a t end, needed not  t h e f o r c e of c i v i l  society  (Works v o l . 6 119).  I t i s c l e a r t o L o c k e t h a t j u s t as t h e c h u r c h has as i t s end t h e s a l v a t i o n o f s o u l s , not c i v i l magistrate  a f f a i r s , so every c i v i l  has as i t s end the smooth running  of the s e c u l a r a f f a i r s of  t h a t s o c i e t y and not t h e s a l v a t i o n o f s o u l s . t u t i o n has been c c r r m i s s i o n e d 22).  This  is  (Works v o l . 6 120-  does not have t h e power  f o r s o u l s because i t i s not corrrnitted t o h i m by h i s s u b j e c t s  "a f a i r  proof"  and not c i r c u l a r i t y  Locke a l s o suggests that there agreeing leave  insti-  c l a i m t h a t he has argued i n a c i r c l e ,  says Locke, s i n c e t o say t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e to c a r e  i s what each  t o do by i t s c i t i z e n s  T h i s a l s o r e f u t e s Proast's  s o c i e t y and i t s  (ibid  122-3).  i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n Proast's  w i t h h i m , on t h e one h a n d , t h a t a man c a n n o t and s h o u l d n o t  t h e m a t t e r of h i s own s a l v a t i o n i n the hands of a n o t h e r ,  while  a s s e r t i n g , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h a t c i t i z e n s o f a c o m m o n w e a l t h c o u l d ccrrrnit t o t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e  t h e power t o f o r c e them t o examine t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s (Works v o l . 6 127-8). F u r t h e r m o r e , Locke wonders i n h i s second l e t t e r what i t w i l l to the m a g i s t r a t e ' s "aU_  h i s subjects  own r e l i g i o n  i f he i s t o u s e f o r c e t o p r o c u r e  t h e means o f d i s c o v e r i n g  (Wojrks v o l . 6 88, 9 0 - 1 , 103, 125-6). magistrate  will  find himself  h a v i n g t o use f o r c e a g a i n s t considers  do  t h e way o f s a l v a t i o n "  Locke again  suggests that the  i n the absurd, but l o g i c a l , a l l h i s subjects,  t o have t h e t r u e r e l i g i o n , i n o r d e r  use o f f o r c e .  54  p o s i t i o n of  e v e n t h o s e whom he  t o be e q u i t a b l e i n h i s  L o c k e says t h a t  i n the  f i n a l a n a l y s i s the  u n l a w f u l , b e c a u s e t h i s p o w e r was  b e c a u s e i t is i m p o s s i b l e  on w h o m f o r c e should be used, how  7.  The  determine  m u c h f o r c e should be used, w h a t s o r t  so on  (Works v o l . 6  a r g u e s t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e  commissioned,  religion. own  to  by  126).  Argument F r o m True Religion  Proast not  be used, and  of f o r c e is e i t h e r  n e v e r c o m m i t t e d t o the m a g i s t r a t e  his s u b j e c t s , or i m p r a c t i c a b l e ,  of f o r c e should  use  By  reason  citizens  t o b r i n g men  t o hi_s own  f o r c i n g his s u b j e c t s and  could  to  follow  the  actually find  r e l i g i o n of t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e  does not  use  r e l i g i o n but  to m a k e use  dictates  of  themselves  his p o w e r , and  of the  their  the  true  l i g h t of  their  own  being  consciences,  led away from  This  i n v e s t i g a t i v e process w i l l lead c i t i z e n s ever onward t o w a r d the  true  (Argument 26-7).  of  by  force  the  c i t i z e n s seeking, This Proast's number  that  of  eventually  a l l commonwealths f i n d i n g , the  one  second of  he  response  to  Locke.  interesting points,  but  the  this  letter  fatal  flaw  c r i p p l e s a l l his a r g u m e n t s .  bases his j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t o m a k e men  In  consider  f o r the  The  f i r s t l e t t e r of the m a g i s t r a t e ' s  use  the  true  religion  as  Proast  makes  i n his  a  reasoning  mistake Proast makes use  of  W h i l e he  n e c e s s a r y and  though  true  the  l i k e l y t o be d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t of the m a g i s t r a t e  force magis-  spoke in his  of f o r c e as  55  to a l l  the f a t a l f l a w i n  t h e i r b e l i e f s on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the true religion.  promoting  lead  use  religion.  magistrate's  t r a t e is i n f a c t p r o m o t i n g the  in  t h a t the  will  true  a r g u m e n t f r o m t r u e r e l i g i o n p r o v e s to be  o v e r s h a d o w s and is  T h i s s u p p o r t s his c o n t e n t i o n  magistrates and  i t to be  the  false.  religion  when they discovered  to  is  religion  as i t was  useful was  as  t o be  the  same not  (The Argument 26-7), necessary  magistrate, follows  when  the national  is in fact  that  in this l e t t e r Proast argues that f o r c e is  a false  "no man  religion,  one.  He  or t h e r e l i g i o n  points  ought t o be p u n i s h e d  r e l i g i o n , t h o u g h i t be t h e n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n ,  out that  f o r being "  of the  i t logically of any  false  and t h a t  a l l who h a v e s u f f i c i e n t means o f i n s t r u c t i o n  provided f o r  t h e m may j u s t l y be p u n i s h e d f o r n o t b e i n g of t h e n a t i o n a l religion where the true is the national religion it  is a fault  religion Proast  makes  l e t t e r by s a y i n g reject  this  point  in various  the true religion,"  would  hold  But  national  again  ways,  " I am  throughout  f o r punishing  his third  only  such as  He grants that Locke's argument f o r t o l e r a -  i f a l l religions  seems no p o i n t  and a g a i n  ( T h i r d L e t t e r 24, 26-30, 40, 42, 45, 4 7 -  f e r e n t , or a l l be e q u a l l y there  n o t t o be o f t h a t  (Third L e t t e r 20).  51, 55, and e l s e w h e r e ) . tion  i n a l l such  because  certain  were  "equally  (or u n c e r t a i n ) "  true  and so i n d i f -  since in this  t o make a n y o n e c h a n g e h i s r e l i g i o n  he goes on t o say t h a t i f t h e r e  i s only  case  (ibid 47).  one t r u e r e l i g i o n ,  "and  t h a t may be k n o w n to.be t h e only t r u e r e l i g i o n by those who a r e of i t " it  is then  religion  reasonable  "to forsake  and necessary  their  false  to force  religion  those  of t h e w r o n g  and t o e m b r a c e  the true"  ( i b i d 48). But  this argument is, according  and e q u i v o c a l marks," grant Proast  to Locke,  " b a s e d on so g e n e r a l  and d e p e n d e n t on s u p p o s i t i o n s w h i c h nobody w i l l  - t h a t some one m a g i s t r a t e  r e l i g i o n i s t h e true. one.  c a n be c e r t a i n  that his state  I t w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e , says L o c k e , t o k n o w  56  f o r c e r t a i n one  p e r s o n who  w h a t .is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y deserving  known  to  be  a  false  i s i n f a c t the  only  true  35;  clear  no  therefore but  God  (Works v o l . 6  255;  one  H o r t o n J o h n L o c k e 9).  t h a t one proof  The  third  ought t o suspend b e l i e f  i n his b e l i e f ,  granting  that there that  salvation.  i n any  is the  one  doctrine  I grant  and  it  He  will  Church  and  true  L o c k e is v e r y  are  world,  necessary  true religion,  professed  which  i n the  to  necessary Church  of  320).  of E n g l a n d ,  only  by P r o a s t , t h a t the that  i t _is taugh_t by  true the  goes on to say  not of  until irrefut-  in the  worship  N o t i c e t h a t he has not s a i d , as c l a i m e d  C h u r c h of E n g l a n d .  t r u e one,  too t h a t the  (Works v o l . 6  r e l i g i o n j_s t h e C h u r c h  original  w h i l e the s c e p t i c  religion  true religion  to s a l v a t i o n , i s t a u g h t England  But  Tuck  Proast  i s but  whose  W o o t t o n 101,  a r g u m e n t i n his  scepticism.  is f o u n d as to w h i c h one  is  w h a t some w r i t e r s c l a i m t o be  (eg. P r o a s t S e c o n d L e t t e r 35;  l e t t e r seems to suggest a r e l i g i o u s  able  and  to  102).  Locke's scepticism  holds  since  religion  T h i s r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g  33,  religion  of p u n i s h m e n t f r o m the m a g i s t r a t e ,  knows which Wootton  c o u l d be s a i d t o be g u i l t y of b e l o n g i n g  f o l l o w f r o m hence that England,  religion;  as  i f there  the  e s t a b l i s h e d by be  anything  C h u r c h of E n g l a n d by l a w , and  57  law,  of  is t h e  established  in  the only the  made p a r t of i t s r e l i g i o n ,  w h i c h i s not n e c e s s a r y to s a l v a t i o n 3).  religion  (Works v o l . 6  422-  What L o c k e worship  has done is d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e  necessary  to  salvation"  and  those  "doctrine  peripheral  rituals  and and  c e r e m o n i e s as e s t a b l i s h e d by c h u r c h l a w w h i c h a r e not n e c e s s a r y f o r salvation.  For  s a l v a t i o n , may is f a r f r o m  Locke,  therefore,  true  religion,  as  necessary for  be p r e s e n t i n a number and v a r i e t y of c h u r c h e s . being a sceptic  r e l i g i o n has w i t h i n  s i n c e he  i t w h a t is n e e d e d  believes that for salvation  the  Locke  Christian  despite  the  fact  t h a t t h e r e a r e " c o n t r i v a n c e s of men"  a d d e d on w h i c h a r e not n e c e s s a r y  for salvation  H i s argument against Proast then  (Works v o l . 6  328).  is not one f r o m s c e p t i c i s m about C h r i s t i a n i t y but one f r o m u n c e r t a i n t y as t o w h i c h of the.many C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h e s i n the w o r l d a r e among t h e plurality  of p a t h s t o s a l v a t i o n  because  of t h e  c o n f u s i o n of  and c e r e m o n i e s w h i c h o b s c u r e t h e i r c o r e t e a c h i n g s . to a c c e p t P r o a s t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h e C h u r c h of E n g l a n d .  And  F i r s t he  of the s i n g l e p a t h t o s a l v a t i o n  rituals refuses - viz.  s e c o n d , he d e n i e s t h a t f o r c e i s j u s t i f i e d  in the s p r e a d i n g of b e l i e f . Locke  sees f o r c e as b e i n g used u n l a w f u l l y i n E n g l a n d s i n c e i t is  used t o make men  a c c e p t t h o s e p e r i p h e r a l r i t u a l s and c e r e m o n i e s  which  are -merely claimed necessary to communion in the Church of England but a r e i n f a c t not n e c e s s a r y t o s a l v a t i o n  (Works v o l . 6  says that  of f o r c e  in order to justify  t h e use  327).  Locke  t o c o m p e l men  to  c o n f o r m t o the n a t i o n a l c h u r c h , e v e n i f i t w e r e the t r u e one, i t must be  shown  247).  that  no  salvation  is possible  outside  this  church  (ibid  What d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h i s c h u r c h f r o m o t h e r s i s not t h e t r u t h of  its core beliefs, ceremonies.  but m e r e l y  its insistence  In L o c k e ' s o p i n i o n , w h i c h he  58  on  particular  rituals  and  a l s o e x p r e s s e s l a t e r i n his  book The  R e a s o n a b l e n e s s of C h r i s t i a n i t y , any  number of c h u r c h e s  have the  truth,  v a r i o u s c h u r c h e s is not  and  the  d i s p u t e s among the  a b o u t t h i s c o r e of t r u t h but a b o u t the p e r i p h e r a l e l e m e n t s or i t i e s u n e s s e n t i a l to s a l v a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , men be  i n t o t h i s or t h a t c h u r c h , used t o c o m p e l men  trivialities  to a c c e p t  associated with  trivial-  i f f o r c e is used t o  says L o c k e , f o r c e w i l l the t r u t h but  may  compel  not n e c e s s a r i l y  only to accept  those  some p a r t i c u l a r church's r i t u a l s or  cere-  monies. In his T h i r d L e t t e r L o c k e t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e religion,  but  only  may  not  r e l i g i o n and  in a c i r c l e  (Works v o l . 6  force merely  t h e m must be  makes  it a logical  consider  his own  consider  the  185).  imperative  r e l i g i o n he  holds  g r e a t e s t d a n g e r t o the  w h i c h is the  r e j e c t the t r u e r e l i g i o n , those  he  the  ( i b i d 295).  magistrate  uses any  who  forced  to  f o r c e to b r i n g o t h e r s  to  as the t r u e one  (ibid  be  This  364-6).  If i t  or p e r s e c u t i o n t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s the  souls of men,  says L o c k e , t h e n i t seems  the  h i m s e l f i s in the g r a v e s t d a n g e r of a l l s i n c e t h e r e has,  been no  t a l k of p u n i s h i n g  or f o r c i n g the m a g i s t r a t e  L o c k e , almost tongue in cheek, accuses Proast important  to his  F u r t h e r m o r e , L o c k e says, " i f men  that  "molestation"  does,  t r u e , i s to a r g u e  judges w h a t i s t r u e r e l i g i o n "  beliefs before  is the a b s e n c e of  magistrate  to c o m p e l men  w h i c h he has j u d g e d t o be  p u n i s h e d as l o n g as t h e y  punish  far,  use  as P r o a s t  to c o m p e l t h e m to the t r u e r e l i g i o n ,  magistrate's  must be  says t h a t t o a r g u e ,  problem.  magistrate,  and  beliefs adequately  The  who  of i g n o r i n g t h i s  q u e s t i o n s t h i s l e a v e s i s , who  is to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r  (ibid  he  has  136). very  is t o f o r c e  the  considered  his  enough t o h a v e a r r i v e d at the t r u e r e l i g i o n ?  59  so  R e g a r d i n g the f a t a l f l a w i n Proast's s e c o n d response to L o c k e Proast's  Third Letter  has the t r u e r e l i g i o n ) 6  142,  150,  167,  ( h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e L o c k e r e p e a t s i n numerous p l a c e s  169,  176,  185,  295,  321  and  knows  he  (Works vol.  elsewhere)  what  he  p o i n t s out m o s t s u c c i n c t l y near the m i d d l e of his T h i r d L e t t e r w h e n he says, You  say,  "the  magistrate  has  promoting  the  unlawfulness false that  question any  right  and  injustice as  The sioned  to  use  force,  does not  one  (Works vol. 6  is, in order  nor,  he  can  only  act  according  force  for  supposes  the  sides."  Neither  i f i t were,  (Works vol. 6  144-45, 176).  to j u s t i f y  the  use  appointed"  is  does i t  were commis-  t o his b e l i e f ,  and  the  true  What P r o a s t has f a i l e d to e x p l a i n  of f o r c e ,  ( W o r k s v o l . 6 150).  " i s that true religion?"  a  364).  k n o w f o r c e r t a i n t h a t his r e l i g i o n is i n f a c t  of y o u r time... c e r t a i n l y k n e w w h i c h was  Locke,  both  the  f o r c e to p r o m o t e  p r o b l e m i s , says L o c k e , e v e n , i f a m a g i s t r a t e  still  had  using  on  in debate;  suppose w h a t you p r e t e n d  is, whether  which plainly  of  granted  question  debated  or a u t h o r i t y t o use  true religion;  religion, the  there  " w h i c h of the  the m i n i s t r y w h i c h our  "What, I b e s e e c h  (ibid  magistrates Lord  you,"  asks  167).  A f u r t h e r t r o u b l i n g p o i n t r e g a r d i n g the use of f o r c e , says L o c k e , is t h a t a l l o w i n g the m a g i s t r a t e " t o m a k e men to be  consider"  used t o f o r c e men  magistrate's,  s i n c e he  the p o w e r to use  f o r c e or p u n i s h m e n t  seems to be i d e n t i c a l w i t h a l l o w i n g p u n i s h m e n t to t a k e up a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n , namely would  logically  60  use  force  only  against  the  those  not of his own r e l i g i o n Proast to  grants  use f o r c e  "must  i n his second  t o b r i n g men  letter  that a magistrate  t o his own r e l i g i o n  needs be t h e T r u e R e l i g i o n "  magistrate  (ibid  because  5).  This  is obliged his religion  is because the  has n o t s i m p l y been p e r s u a d e d t o p r o m o t e h i s o w n r e l i g i o n  because of his f a i t h of  ( W o r k s v o l . 6 128-9).  or b e l i e f i n i t , says P r o a s t ,  " s o m e t h i n g v e r y near t o d e m o n s t r a t i o n "  "knowledge"  or  " f u l l assurance."  but r a t h e r b e c a u s e  w h i c h m a k e s his p e r s u a s i o n  The.more t h e m a g i s t r a t e  examines  his r e l i g i o n , t h e m o r e c l e a r and s o l i d t h e g r o u n d of h i s k n o w l e d g e of the  truth  stand  such  believe  of h i s r e l i g i o n  ( i b i d 6-8).  No false religion would  c l o s e s c r u t i n y , says P r o a s t ,  i t t o be t h e t r u e  (ibid  m a t t e r how f i r m l y a m a g i s t r a t e  9).  as t o l e a d  a magistrate  And furthermore,  he says,  to no  b e l i e v e s his f a l s e r e l i g i o n t o be t r u e ,  he i s f o r b i d d e n , by • " t h e F i r s t T a b l e o f t h e D i v i n e Law," any  ever  f r o m using  means f o r t h e p r o m o t i n g of h i s r e l i g i o n no m a t t e r how good h i s  intentions  (ibid  16-17).  With  this  incredibly,  t h i n k s he has s a i d enough  as h i s f i n a l to counter  argument  Proast,  a l l the arguments  a g a i n s t r e l i g i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n made up t o t h i s p o i n t by L o c k e .  Conclusion Locke's short, because unfinished, reply t o Proast's f i n a l o f f , t h a t i s , Proast's S e c o n d L e t t e r , i s e n t i t l e d A F o u r t h Toleration  (1706),  brush-  Letter For  and was n o t p u b l i s h e d u n t i l a f t e r L o c k e ' s  death.  In i t L o c k e f i n d s h i m s e l f o b l i g e d t o r e p e a t many of t h e a r g u m e n t s he had  made s u c c e s s f u l l y a g a i n s t P r o a s t  especially certain  the fact  beyond  that  i n h i s s e c o n d and t h i r d  i t is impossible  a doubt t h a t h i s r e l i g i o n  61  letters,  f o r any m a g i s t r a t e i s t h e t r u e one.  He  t o be tells  Proast  that  every  b e l i e v e s to be  magistrate  is c o n v i n c e d  t r u e i s i n f a c t the t r u e one.  that  the  religion  "Men  in a l l religions,"  he says, w h e t h e r t h e y are B r a m i n , M a h o m e t a n , p a p i s t , L u t h e r a n , anabaptist the  or p r e s b y t e r i a n ,  t r u t h of t h e i r  t h e y are r i g h t or not he  has  brought them is  neglected to  and  no  one  can  once a g a i n  reminds Proast  to i n s i s t t h a t m a g i s t r a t e s  beliefs  through  the  The  fallacy  in Proast's  whether  use  that  themselves  of  force  reasoning,  against  says  a l l o w y o u r s e l f t o suppose the m a g i s t r a t e ,  your  religion,  unbiased, is  and  true;  but  to  be  fully that  well-grounded,  and  firmly  other  Locke,  L o c k e also repeats right  religion,  and  law  of  nature  is of and  t h a t his r e l i g i o n of  other  religions  (568-9).  that since a l l magistrates the  who  attentive,  assured  magistrates  d i f f e r e n t f r o m y o u r s a r e not so  b e l i e v e they are  allows  a l l to  use  come t o the this letter  true religion  are  which Proast  virtual  has  not  (ibid  566).  r e p e t i t i o n s of  and  studied  is s a i d "  has  made  (ibid  be  described  i n the  In  same  of i t s e m p t y p a r a g r a p h s , t h a t is  piece  under the c o v e r of good words, and nothing  a r g u m e n t s he  b o t h e r e d t o , or has been u n a b l e t o , r e f u t e .  the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , Proast's t h i r d l e t t e r c a n  "a m o s t e x a c t  to  A l l of L o c k e ' s a r g u m e n t s in former  t e r m s w i t h w h i c h L o c k e d e s c r i b e s one  of  force,  using f o r c e i n the m a t t e r of r e l i g i o n a l l o w s m o r e h a r m t h a n good  as  be  that you  the  He  their  (ibid • 564-5).  about  judge f o r t h e m  (Works v o l . 6 559-61).  consider  quaker,  "have equally strong persuasions"  religion,  he  of a r t i f i c i a l  fencing,  wherein,  the a p p e a r a n c e of n i c e t h i n k i n g ,  557).  62  While Proast there  i s no  seems  to  makes  a  v a r i e t y of  doubt t h a t L o c k e  Proast  to  be  his  arguments  counters  against  them a l l e f f e c t i v e l y .  s i n g l e most  powerful  L o c k e ' s c a l l f o r t o l e r a t i o n of a l l r e l i g i o n s ,  a r g u m e n t of his own  making.  What  argument  t h a t of the  E v e n so,  against  magistrate's  using f o r c e to p r o m o t e the t r u e r e l i g i o n , t u r n s out to be a straw, man  toleration,  nothing  Locke sportingly  o f f e r s a number of d e v a s t a t i n g a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t i t , most of w h i c h has  not  the  belief  that leads  to s a l v a t i o n , a magistrate's  using  nature outward  f o r c e in an a t t e m p t to c o m p e l a p e r s o n to b e l i e v e w o u l d not be sful.  In the c o u r s e  the m a g i s t r a t e  is not  a u t h o r i z e d t o use  and  who  p r o b l e m of how  has  in f a c t  already  m u c h f o r c e t o use  L o c k e says the  use  b e t w e e n f a l s e h o o d and  use  or  l o n g enough to  of f o r c e by  a  magistrate  belief,  one  c a u s e of t r u t h  b e l i e f w h i c h may of f o r c e a l o n e the t r u t h .  the m a g i s t r a t e ' s use of f o r c e may religion  the  good, w h e t h e r i t a c t u a l l y b r i n g s a p e r s o n c l o s e r to  the v i c t i m a w a y f r o m his own  decide  is  to  T h i r d , he p o i n t s out t h a t i t  t r u e r e l i g i o n or w h e t h e r i t harms the  Fourth,  compelled Second  - w h a t is s e v e r e and  is i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the  ted  needs t o be  considered.  c o m p e l a p e r s o n to c o n s i d e r a d e q u a t e l y ?  a c t u a l l y does any  F i r s t , he says t h a t  f o r c e to compel belief since  i t i s not h u m a n l y p o s s i b l e to d e t e r m i n e who consider  succes-  of his a r g u m e n t w i t h P r o a s t , L o c k e is o b l i g e d t o  m a k e a number of a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t i n g a r g u m e n t s .  the  he  p r e v i o u s l y made in his o r i g i n a l L e t t e r .  In his o r i g i n a l l e t t e r L o c k e a r g u e d t h a t , b e c a u s e of the of  but  by  h a v e been the  doesn't h e l p  the  63  truth.  a person  to  F i f t h is the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t  l e a d a p e r s o n to t a k e up an  which  driving  magistrate  unexpec-  considers  to  be  obviously false. be  And  f i n a l l y t h e r e is the f a c t t h a t i f e v e r y o n e  is to  f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e i r b e l i e f s t h e n t h e m a g i s t r a t e h i m s e l f must  a l s o s u f f e r such f o r c e to be i n f l i c t e d on But Locke's two  arguments which are the most damaging to i n t o l e r -  a n c e a r e n e v e r c o n s i d e r e d by P r o a s t : know t h a t that  will  the r e l i g i o n lead  him.  he  to salvation;  is f o r c i n g and,  f i r s t , t h e m a g i s t r a t e does not on  second,  his subjects is in f a c t even  one  i f t h e m a g i s t r a t e is  f o r c i n g the t r u e r e l i g i o n on his p e o p l e , t h e y c a n n o t f o r c e t h e m s e l v e s , t h r o u g h an a c t of w i l l , to b e l i e v e t h a t w h i c h t h e y a r e b e i n g c o m p e l l e d to believe.  By' f a i l i n g to a c c o u n t f o r a l l of t h e p r e m i s e s of L o c k e ' s  c o m p l e x a r g u m e n t , P r o a s t p r o v e s h i m s e l f to be an u n c o n v i n c i n g o p p o n e n t u n e q u a l to the s y s t e m a t i c a n a l y t i c a l m i n d of John L o c k e . harming  Locke's  position, Proast's a t t a c k  on L o c k e  R a t h e r than  l e a v e s the a r g u -  m e n t s made by L o c k e i n h i s o r i g i n a l L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n more solidly  defended.  W h i l e P r o a s t ' s c h a l l e n g e to L o c k e ' s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g led- L o c k e insight  to a  greater clarification  is available  by  and  of  his arguments,  Toleration even  means of an e x a m i n a t i o n of some of  o t h e r w r i t i n g s i n t h e a r e a of p o l i t i c a l tion,  even  religion.  64  theory, epistemology,  more  Locke's educa-  Chapter 3 - C l a r i f y i n g L o c k e ' s Arguments Concerning Toleration By Means of an Examination of Some of his Other Writings  Locke's E a r l y W r i t i n g s and I n t o l e r a n c e In his F i r s t and Second Tracts pointed  out that  foundation force  the variety  of C h r i s t i a n s e c t s  of w a r a n d c o n t e n t i o n "  against  heresy  on Government  (1660, 1662) L o c k e was a  "perpetual  because i t necessitated  t h e use of  and dissension.  A l t h o u g h i n t o l e r a n c e no doubt  a d d e d t o t h e u n r e s t c r e a t e d by s e c t a r i a n i s m i n s o c i e t y , L o c k e t h o u g h t e a r l y on t h a t a p o l i c y o f t o l e r a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n i m p r o v e t h i n g s , was sure t o m a k e m a t t e r s w o r s e . the m a g i s t r a t e on  t o end t h i s unrest  by t h e v a r i o u s  ( T u c k 33-4).  absolute  state authority and he a l l o w e d  he a r g u e d , i t i s p r u d e n t f o r  and d e s t r u c t i o n i n society brought  Christian factions  religion  unity,"  Therefore,  by i m p o s i n g  uniformity in  H e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e r e was a need t o impose r e l i g i o u s t h a t i t was a c c e p t a b l e  those matters that were necessary  orthodoxy  " f o r an  and p o l i t i c a l  t o impose u n i f o r m i t y i n  for salvation  ( W o o t t o n 28,  33).  F o r t h e young L o c k e i n t o l e r a n c e was a m a t t e r of p r a c t i c a l i t y ; he saw u n i f o r m i t y as t h e only w a y t o p e a c e a n d s t a b i l i t y i n s o c i e t y . All  of L o c k e ' s a r g u m e n t s i n t h e t w o t r a c t s a r e m a i n l y  63  directed  towards justifying the c i v i l magistrate's indifferent  things, "that is those p r a c t i c e s w h i c h are c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  p a r t of r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e , divine  law revealed  believed  b u t w h i c h a r e n o t e x p r e s s l y p r e s c r i b e d by  through  scripture"  a l l Christians held  indifferent  a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e r e a l m of  (Kelly  t h e same c o r e  127).  While  Locke  b e l i e f s , i t was  these  t h i n g s on w h i c h t h e v a r i o u s C h r i s t i a n  c a u s e d a l l t h e unrest among them.  sects differed  that  L o c k e argued that i f the magistrate  was g i v e n t h e p o w e r o v e r i n d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , t h e n he c o u l d l i m i t w h a t various  sects  fighting  over.  could  claim  Locke  knew  t o be e s s e n t i a l , that  and t h e r e f o r e  i f the magistrate  a c c o m m o d a t e l i b e r t y of c o n s c i e n c e  worth  was r e q u i r e d t o  over i n d i f f e r e n t things i n religious  worship, then  his authority  each  individual  was  effectively  t o be t h e  u l t i m a t e d e t e r m i n a n t of w h e t h e r an a c t i o n was  objectively  or w h e t h e r  requirements  could  i t formed  of religious  still  because  claim  indifferent  and sect  undermined  part  worship  of t h e n e c e s s a r y  or p r a c t i c e "  (Kelly  131). That L o c k e leaders  was c o n c e r n e d  about the extent  to which  religious  thought themselves to have the power to c o n t r o l c i t i z e n s is  illustrated  in his first  Presbytery o f S c o t l a n d  tract  where  he g i v e s  t h e example of the  who  t o o k on t h e m a t p l e a s u r e t o f o r b i d t h e c i v i l and i n n o c e n t m e e t i n g o f f r i e n d s i n any p l a c e b u t t h e c h u r c h or m a r k e t , under p r e t e n s e t o p r e v e n t e v i l and s c a n d a l . religious  and s p i r i t u a l  So f a r w i l l  j u r i s d i c t i o n be e x t e n d e d  66  even to  the most i n d i f f e r e n t  of common a c t i o n s . . .  (First  Tract  of Government i n Wootton 142). If  s o c i e t y was t o r e m a i n  these  peaceful,  then  "most i n d i f f e r e n t o f common a c t i o n s "  magistrate, business  to Locke.  s h o u l d b e l o n g only t o t h e  In his t w o t r a c t s L o c k e m a k e s i t h i s  t o c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h t h e p o w e r and j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e m a g i s -  trate over claim  according  the power to c o n t r o l  " i n d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s " so t h a t c i t i z e n s m i g h t not be a b l e t o  that  potentially  actions  which  are not prescribed  by s c r i p t u r e , but a r e  d i v i s i v e and d i s r u p t i v e to the peace and s e c u r i t y of t h e  c o m m o n w e a l t h , a r e i n f a c t e s s e n t i a l t o t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e i r F r o m his e a r l i e s t w r i t i n g t o his l a n d m a r k L e t t e r , L o c k e to t r y t o s e p a r a t e  religion. continues  o u t those t h i n g s u n e s s e n t i a l t o s a l v a t i o n t h a t a r e  the g r e a t e s t c a u s e of d i s s e n s i o n a n d c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n C h r i s t i a n s e c t s . W h i l e i t m i g h t be s a i d t h a t i n h i s e a r l y w r i t i n g s young L o c k e i s "a l o y a l member of the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d , a s c h o l a s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r , an authoritarian,  a n d an a b s o l u t i s t , "  he n e v e r t h e l e s s  encourages  d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s , s o m e t h i n g he c h a m p i o n s t h r o u g h o u t his more mature works. Although  he does  not endorse  scepticism,  s c e p t i c a l arguments i n their strongest form. neither divine right monarchy g i v e s b o t h t h e i r say And under  a t t h e same t i m e  that  He endorses  n o r c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m , but  (Wootton 36). he p r o m o t e s a r e l i g i o u s  the d i s c r e t i o n of the c i v i l  ideal world  he s t a t e s  magistrate  he a l s o  uniformity  i m a g i n e s an  i n w h i c h r e l i g i o n does n o t h a v e t h e r i g h t t o t h e use of  f o r c e , a n d w h e r e w a r f a r e a n d b l o o d s h e d may no l o n g e r be j u s t i f i e d i n  67  t h e name of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s Wootton  ( F r o m t h e F i r s t T r a c t on G o v e r n m e n t i n  144-5).  An Essay C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n Locke's greatly  attitude toward  r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n seems t o have been  influenced in the direction  of t o l e r a t i o n  by h i s c o m i n g t o  k n o w L o r d A s h l e y , t h e E a r l of S h a f t e s b u r y i n 1666. S h a f t e s b u r y was a s t r o n g proponent, o f t o l e r a t i o n . Locke's  Belief in Toleration"  Locke's  attitude  In h i s essay  "The D e v e l o p m e n t of  j.w. G o u g h s u g g e s t s t h a t i t ' s p o s s i b l e  to toleration  was  "already defined"  by 1659 as  e v i d e n c e d by a l e t t e r he w r o t e t h a n k i n g someone he only r e f e r r e d t o as "S.H."  f o r sending  h i m a book on t o l e r a t i o n  g r e a t p l e a s u r e and a d m i r a t i o n " constitute early  date.  proof  ( G o u g h 59).  that his attitude  Be t h a t as i t may,  which  he r e a d  "with  O f c o u r s e , t h i s does not  had i n f a c t  changed  a t such  w h i l e L o c k e had m a i n t a i n e d  an  in his  e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s t h a t u n i f o r m i t y , and t h e r e f o r e i n t o l e r a n c e , w a s most likely  to ensure  peace  and s t a b i l i t y  in society,  c h a n g e d h i s m i n d and was a r g u i n g i n h i s t h a t i t was i n f a c t  by 1 6 6 7 he h a d  Essay C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n  t o l e r a t i o n t h a t was n e c e s s a r y  i n order to estab-  l i s h and m a i n t a i n a p e a c e f u l s o c i e t y (An Essay C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n in  Wootton  192-3, 197-8, 2 0 7 ) . P.J. K e l l y  sees  c i v i l p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t lying  a l l of L o c k e ' s because  political civil  t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of political  goal under-  writings peace  and  stability  are  necessary  c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and f l o u r i s h i n g two  essential  functions, rationality  s u c c e s s f u l f l o u r i s h i n g of t h e s e  68  of man's  and agency.  two defining  The  f e a t u r e s of  human n a t u r e i s a c o n d i t i o n and  industrious  life,  but i t i s a l s o  r e a l i z i n g man's g r e a t e s t (Kelly  not only of the s u c c e s s f u l  goal,  a c o n d i t i o n of  namely p e r s o n a l  salvation  132-3).  Many of the p o i n t s and arguments Locke makes two y e a r s l a t e r i n his  L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n  Essay Concerning T o l e r a t ion.  are already  i n evidence i n h i s  For example, regarding  the c l e a r d i f -  f e r e n t i a t i o n of the j u r i s d i c t i o n and powers of the c h u r c h and s t a t e , Locke says i n the Essay the  trust,  vested for  p o w e r , and a u t h o r i t y o f t h e m a g i s t r a t e  is  i n h i m f o r no other purpose but t o be made use of  t h e good, p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  and p e a c e o f men  s o c i e t y over w h i c h he i s set... F o r t h e m a g i s t r a t e  i n that i s but  an i r r p i r e between man and man; he can r i g h t me a g a i n s t my neighbour (in Later  he w r i t e s  but  Wootton 186,  cannot  me  against  my  God  188).  i n his' L e t t e r  that  strength with which.the magistrate punishment of those t h a t  defend  t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e power and i s armed i s  " i n order  v i o l a t e any o t h e r man's r i g h t s . "  to the  But Locke  makes i t c l e a r t h a t the w h o l e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the m a g i s t r a t e these c i v i l concernments, and a l l c i v i l dominion  i s bounded and c o n f i n e d  reaches o n l y t o  power, r i g h t , and  to the only care of  p r o m o t i n g t h e s e t h i n g s ; and i t n e i t h e r c a n n o r o u g h t i n any m a n n e r t o be e x t e n d e d t o t h e s a l v a t i o n o f s o u l s . . . (Letter  19).  69  A n o t h e r e x a m p l e is w h e n he says i n his L e t t e r t h a t t h e r e a s o n why a magistrate  c a n h a v e no say i n t h e m a t t e r of s a l v a t i o n of men's souls  is because men have not given him the power to make them do that which t h e y can't m a k e t h e m s e l v e s do, i.e., t o b e l i e v e a c c o r d i n g  t o w h a t he  orders  L o c k e had  them to believe  ( L e t t e r 19, 5 5 ) .  In h i s E s s a y  a l r e a d y made t h i s same a r g u m e n t by s a y i n g , "No man c a n g i v e a n o t h e r man p o w e r ( a n d i t w o u l d be t o no p u r p o s e i f G o d s h o u l d ) o v e r t h a t o v e r w h i c h he has no p o w e r h i m s e l f " in  h i s Essay that speculative  disturb  the state  point  later  cognizance"  i n his L e t t e r  forbid the  "preaching  any  because  church  opinions  o r i n c o n v e n i e n c e my  w i t h i n the m a g i s t r a t e ' s same  ( W o o t t o n 187, 189).  r i g h t s of t h e s u b j e c t s "  " c a n n o t by any means e i t h e r neighbour,  and so come n o t  ( i n W o o t t o n 187).  by s a y i n g  or p r o f e s s i n g " "they  L o c k e a l s o says  He makes this  the magistrate  should not  of any s p e c u l a t i v e  h a v e no m a n n e r o f r e l a t i o n  opinion in  to the c i v i l  ( L e t t e r 55).  O t h e r e x a m p l e s c a n be f o u n d in his a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g the m a g i s t r a t e h a v i n g no j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r s o - c a l l e d  "indifferent things"  to  r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p , w h i c h i n d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , such as o u t w a r d r i t e s a n d ceremonies,  although  having  no e f f e c t on c i v i l  society, are a  very  i m p o r t a n t i n s t r u m e n t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n a man and t h e G o d he worships  ( c f . T o l e r a t i o n i n W o o t t o n 190; L e t t e r 4 3 - 4 4 ) ;  t h a t w h a t e v e r doesn't d i s t u r b t h e p e a c e o r t h r e a t e n the s t a t e ought t o be a l l o w e d magistrate  (cf. Toleration  since  in Wootton  force  t h e s e c u r i t y of  and ought n o t t o be o u t l a w e d  argument that i t is not acceptable religious opinions  his a r g u m e n t  191; L e t t e r  by t h e  43, 4 7 - 9 ) ;  his  t o use f o r c e t o i n f l u e n c e a man's  doesn't c h a n g e a man's m i n d ,  70  i t only  makes him a h y p o c r i t e 20);  ( c f . T o l e r a t i o n i n W o o t t o n 192;  Letter  19-  and h i s a r g u m e n t t h a t C a t h o l i c s or p a p i s t s ought no t o be t o l e r -  ated since they c l a i m allegiance to a foreign power in W o o t t o n 197, 202-3; Like  L e t t e r 63).  his l a t e r L e t t e r ,  his Essay  Concerning  C h r i s t i a n i n i t s a p p r o a c h as w e l l as s e c u l a r , libertarian, resistance,"  both  i n f a v o u r of p a s s i v e  (Wootton  Toleration is that with  (cf. Toleration  41).  Toleration  " b o t h a u t h o r i t a r i a n and  obedience  and s y m p a t h e t i c t o  The i m p o r t a n c e of h i s Essay  i t Locke  is both  Concerning  turns the corner f r o m the c o n s e r v a -  t i v e a r g u m e n t t h a t n a t i o n a l p e a c e and s e c u r i t y c a n only be m a i n t a i n e d through forced uniformity  i n r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and w o r s h i p w h i c h he had  been p r o m o t i n g i n h i s t w o T r a c t s on G o v e r n m e n t , t o t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t in  fact  "people  that  a r e so s h a t t e r e d  into different factions are  best s e c u r e d by t o l e r a t i o n "  ( T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 207).  little  Concerning  doubt  that  his  Essay  m a i n a r g u m e n t s and c o n c l u s i o n s 1689,  and was  consistent  Toleration  with  the fundamental  asked  t o be t h e i r  colony. of  "province"  became  this  the Lords  of C a r o l i n a i n N o r t h A m e r i c a , L o c k e was  secretary  Although  political  Locke  C o n s t i t u t i o n s of C a r o l i n a  and to d r a f t  a constitution f o r the  In 1669 L o c k e h e l p e d t o d r a f t The F u n d a m e n t a l  Carolina.  Locke's  thesis which  (Gough 71).  When L o r d A s h l e y and e i g h t of h i s a s s o c i a t e s P r o p r i e t o r s of t h e  anticipates the  of t h e L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n of  adhered to consistently a l l through his l i f e  The F u n d a m e n t a l  There is  document  writings.it  is included  Constitutions  i n c o l l e c t i o n s of  s e e m s t o be g e n e r a l l y  agreed  that,  a l t h o u g h L o c k e d r a f t e d i t , t h e s c h e m e of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n was n o t h i s .  71  In his L i f e , of John L o c k e (discussed below)  was  (1876)  Fox  not d r a w n up  by  "the  Mr.  L o c k e h i m s e l f i n f o r m e d one  Bourne wrote that A r t i c l e  by L o c k e at a l l but was  c h i e f of some of the p r o p r i e t o r s , a g a i n s t  Article  95  of  the  of his f r i e n d s "  inserted  his j u d g e m e n t ,  r e i n f o r c e the  L o c k e e x p r e s s e s i n his L e t t e r a g a i n s t a t h e i s t s  ( L e t t e r 64).  aversion He  t h a t i f a p e r s o n r e f u s e s to a c k n o w l e d g e the e x i s t e n c e of God, o u g h t to be  " p u b l i c l y and s o l e m n l y "  p e r s o n s h a l l not be p e r m i t t e d any  estate  S i n c e L o c k e f e l t t h a t s o c i e t y was p r o m i s e s , and  included  and  " t o have  ( C o n s t i t u t i o n in W o o t t o n  based on  the  the  228).  k e e p i n g of o a t h s  and  s i n c e he b e l i e v e d t h a t an a t h e i s t w o u l d not be c o m p e l l e d  to k e e p h i s o a t h s and enforcer,  says  w o r s h i p p e d , such a  to be a f r e e m a n i n C a r o l i n a or  or h a b i t u a t i o n w i t h i n i t "  as  ( c i t e d in G o u g h 67).  C o n s t i t u t i o n seems to  f a c t that God  96  p r o m i s e s s i n c e he  i t seems r e a s o n a b l e , this  clause  in the  had  in light  of  no  b e l i e f i n God  these  c o n s t i t u t i o n of  a  as  the  views,  that  Locke  newly  established  "commonwealth." A  somewhat  surprising aspect  about  the  Constitution  w h i l e L o c k e c o n c l u d e s his L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n "The  sum  of a l l we  d r i v e at i s , t h a t e v e r y man  t h a t are g r a n t e d to o t h e r s " to have opinion 230).  "absolute or By  profession  soever"  permitting any  m e m b e r s as any  of  slaves  them  freeman"  by s a y i n g  that  enjoy the same r i g h t s  ( 6 9 ) , he a l l o w s e v e r y f r e e m a n of C a r o l i n a  p o w e r and  religion  is t h a t ,  shall  a u t h o r i t y o v e r his N e g r o s l a v e s , of w h a t (Article to  be  "of  think  (ibid)  110,  best,  Constitution  in  w h a t C h u r c h or and  there  of  Wootton  (religious) be  as  fully  i t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t L o c k e can  t h a t at l e a s t i n t h i s sense e v e r y man  e n j o y s the same r i g h t s as  72  say  every  other.  But  dominion  this right  his m a s t e r  citizen's right  does not e x e m p t  hath  over  to ownership  him,"  and  his c o n t r o l ,  is t r y i n g  civil matters freedom  i t is l i k e l y  to establish  which  civil  "that  dominion  that  property)  Locke a clear and  ( t h e r i g h t t o w o r s h i p as one p l e a s e s ) This c a l l f o r freedom  already  civil  is the (ibid).  h a v e been a g i v e n w h i l e  in Carolina,  ( o w n e r s h i p of  from  of p r o p e r t y , i . e . , his s l a v e  S i n c e the r e c o g n i t i o n of s l a v e r y may exercised  the s l a v e  Locke  has  i n mind,  distinction  between  m a t t e r s of  religious  w h i c h he l a t e r argues  for  i n his L e t t e r .  of r e l i g i o n , w h i l e he  for  the o w n e r s h i p of s l a v e s , seems t o be c l e a r e v i d e n c e of his b e l i e f  t h a t the two j u r i s d i c t i o n s of c h u r c h and s t a t e , a r e q u i t e  allows  independent  and s h o u l d not i n t e r f e r e w i t h e a c h o t h e r . A r t i c l e 96 is a n o t h e r u n e x p e c t e d i t e m i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . his  Letter Concerning Toleration clearly  encourages)  diversity it  shall  care  in religion, belong  f o r the  maintenance religion,  defends  a r t i c l e 96  to the building  (and p e r h a p s  states  churches,  of d i v i n e s , t o be e m p l o y e d according  (Constitution  to  the  even  that  p a r l i a m e n t of C a r o l i n a of  While  and  to take  the  public  i n the e x e r c i s e of  Church  of  England  i n W o o t t o n 228).  The C h u r c h of E n g l a n d , t h e n , was a l s o t o be t h e n a t i o n a l c h u r c h of t h e new first  c o l o n y of C a r o l i n a . seem  like  p r o m o t i n g one  As m e n t i o n e d above, t h i s a r t i c l e m i g h t not at  a position  Locke  particular church.  would  take  since  i t seems  to  be  Locke  w i l l l a t e r use t h e a r g u m e n t  f r o m u n c e r t a i n t y as to w h i c h is t h e t r u e c h u r c h i n his L e t t e r t o argue for  toleration.  T h i s w o u l d l e a d one t o e x p e c t t h a t , l e f t t o w r i t e t h e  73  c o n s t i t u t i o n on h i s own, Locke m i g h t have d e c i d e d a g a i n s t e s t a b l i s h i n g a n a t i o n a l c h u r c h i n a new c o l o n y , a n d o p t i n s t e a d  forallowing  d i v e r s i t y o f c h u r c h e s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e m s e l v e s a s t h e y may.  a  But i t  must be remembered t h a t a d i v e r s i t y of churches and b e l i e f s i s s t i l l possible church.  even though  the state  e n d o r s e s one c h u r c h as t h e s t a t e  What L o c k e a r g u e s a g a i n s t  i n h i s L e t t e r i s t h e r i g h t o f any  c h u r c h t o c l a i m t h e e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o e x i s t , and thereby t o c l a i m as l e g i t i m a t e t h e r i g h t t o the use of f o r c e  to eliminate  a l l other  c h u r c h e s , and t o ccmpel those o u t s i d e  the s t a t e c h u r c h t o accept i t as  t h e i r own.  the l e g i t i m a c y of the e x i s t e n c e  He does not argue a g a i n s t  of a s t a t e c h u r c h p e r se. Sixteen write  y e a r s a f t e r t h e w r i t i n g o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n Locke w o u l d  i n h i s L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n  that  "no o p i n i o n s  contrary  to human s o c i e t y , or t o those m o r a l r u l e s w h i c h a r e n e c e s s a r y t o the preservation (61).  of c i v i l  s o c i e t y , a r e t o be t o l e r a t e d by t h e m a g i s t r a t e "  He e x p r e s s e s t h i s same s e n t i m e n t i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n when he  says,  "no p e r s o n whatsoever s h a l l  asserrbly,  in their religious  i r r e v e r e n t l y or s e d i t i o u s l y of the government or g o v e r n o r s ,  or s t a t e m a t t e r s " assures  speak a n y t h i n g  that  ( A r t i c l e 103, i n W o o t t o n 229).  religion  may  n o t be u s e d  I n t h i s way L o c k e  as a c a m o u f l a g e  f o r the  d i s c u s s i o n o f i d e a s and t h e m a k i n g o f p l a n s t h a t a r e h a r m f u l t o t h e peace and s e c u r i t y of t h e ccnrnonwealth or the c o l o n y . The  Lords P r o p r i e t o r s  of t h e c o l o n y  and L o c k e  provide f o r  r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n i n t h e new c o l o n y by means of A r t i c l e s 102, 106, and  109 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h g u a r a n t e e c i t i z e n s t h e r i g h t t o  r e l i g i o u s assembly f r e e f r o m m o l e s t a t i o n  74  by o t h e r Churches or i n d i v i -  d u a l s , Churches t h e r i g h t t o be f r e e f r o m abusive language" f r e e f r o m being  by n o n b e l i e v e r s ,  r e v i l i n g , or  a n d i n d i v i d u a l s t h e r i g h t t o be  d i s t u r b e d , m o l e s t e d , o r p e r s e c u t e d by o t h e r s  of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s later  "reproachful,  because  (Const i t u t i o n i n w o o t t o n 229, 230). Locke  i n c l u d e s these p r o v i s o s  i n hisLetter.  The F i r s t and Second T r e a t i s e of Government Locke 92Y.£LD i?Di: m  published  both  1689.shortly  i n  h i s F_irs_t  and h i s Second  T r e a t i s e of  a f t e r h i s Le_t_ter_ C o n c e r n i n g Toj_er_a_t_ion  (Gough 57). W h i l e some a n a l y s t s  hold  t h a t Locke's L e t t e r  Concerning  T o l e r a t i o n p r e d a t e s h i s Two T r e a t i s e o f G o v e r n m e n t  (Gough 57), a n d  that  f o r the s o c i a l  and  therefore political  Locke's L e t t e r  "provides  a foundation  freedoms defended i n t h e Second T r e a t i s e of Government"  ( L a S e l v a 2), D a v i d Wootton dates the w r i t i n g of both T r e a t i s e as c i r c a 1681.  He dates t h e w r i t i n g o f t h e L e t t e r as 1685. T h i s  conclusion  t h a t Locke's ideas  scope of c i v i l  concerning  the nature,  government were w e l l developed before  s u p p o r t s the f u n c t i o n and he w r o t e h i s  L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t ion. In h i s L e t t e r Concerning. T o l e r a t ion Locke goes beyond the m a g i s t r a t e ' s a ccrrrnonwealth  justifying  r i g h t t o r u l e , and beyond e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e purpose of and t h e scope of the m a g i s t r a t e ' s  power.  The c e n t r a l  argument of Locke's L e t t e r i s " t h a t , whatever t h e scope o f t h e m a g i s t r a t e ' s l e g i t i m a t e power may r e a s o n a b l y be thought t o be, t h e r e g u l a t i o n of r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p a s for  the three  (Dunn 175). and  important  s u c h m u s t l i e u n e q u i v o c a 11 y b e y o n d i t "  reasons d i s c u s s e d  i n t h e f i r s t c h a p t e r above  So, wh i 1 e t h e Let_te£ m a k e s u s e o f h i s p o l i t i ca 1 t h e o r y  i t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s Two T r e a t i s e , i t s argument does not r e s t  75  on an a c c e p t a n c e of h i s c o n t r a c t a r . i a n c o n c e p t i o n way  h i s L e t t e r can  of s o c i e t y .  stand q u i t e independent of h i s p o l i t i c a l  In  this  theory.  In h i s T r e a t i s e Locke e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t a corrmonwealth c o n s i s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s who controversies  a r e " u n i t e d i n t o one body, w i t h a u t h o r i t y t o d e c i d e b e t w e e n them, and  i n j u r i e s t h a t may importantly  - "the  happen to any great  and  punish offenders,"  one  of i t s c i t i z e n , and,  c h i e f end"  through a common e s t a b l i s h e d law and W o o t t o n 304,  305,  325).  to redress  perhaps most  - to p r e s e r v e t h e i r  judicature  the  property  (Second T r e a t i s e i n  He a c k n o w l e d g e s t h i s pos i t i o n ' e a r 1 y i n h i s  L e t t e r by s t a t i n g t h a t the ccrrrnonwealth  "a s o c i e t y of  men  c o n s t i t u t e d f o r t h e p r o c u r i n g , p r e s e r v i n g , and a d v a n c i n g t h e i r  own  civil  i n t e r e s t s , " w h i c h he says are  t h e body"  as w e l l as  "the  seems to be  "life,  possession  money, lands, houses, f u r n i t u r e , and  l i b e r t y , and  indolency  of o u t w a r d t h i n g s ,  the  like"  such  t h e i r r u l e r s making laws t h a t are have p l a c e d "perpetually a t t e m p t s and  in their  leaders  legislative"  "contrary  r e t a i n s the supreme power of  regarding  337).  saving  d e s i g n s of a n y b o d y , e v e n t h e i r  Locke makes a s i m i l a r p o i n t  when t h e y  to the t r u s t "  ( i n wootton  as  ( L e t t e r 18).  In h i s S e c o n d T r e a t i s e L o c k e a l s o s a y s , t h a t t h e p e o p l e have s u p r e m e power t o remove or a l t e r t h e  of  The  "a find  the people community  themselves from  the  legislators"  (ibid).  the power r e t a i n e d by  citizens  in h i s L e t t e r when he says t h a t i f a m a g i s t r a t e makes a law c o n c e r n i n g t h i n g s w h i c h a r e not w i t h i n h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n , should  f o r example,  attempt to compel people to w o r s h i p i n a p a r t i c u l a r way  attend a p a r t i c u l a r church, that  as,  law,  against  "men  t h e i r consciences"  a r e not  i f he or  to  in these cases o b l i g e d  by  because m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g to  s a l v a t i o n of the s o u l are the concerns of  76  i n d i v i d u a l s themselves,  the and  not  the. m a g i s t r a t e ' s  (Letter  59-60).  T h i s supreme power w h i c h j u s t i f i e s c i t i z e n s of the corrrnonwealth to s a v e t h e m s e l v e s  f r o m the d e s i g n s of t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s i s founded  not o n l y on t h e e x t e n t o f power c i t i z e n s h a v e a g r e e d t o a l l o w t h e i r magistrate,  i t i s a l s o b a s e d on  c i t i z e n s cannot do, will  and  337-8).  that which,  namely to d e l i v e r themselves  a r b i t r a r y d o m i n i o n of another" T h i s l i m i t a t i o n on what men  i n Locke's o p i n i o n , up t o  "the a b s o l u t e  (Second T r e a t i s e i n w o o t t o n  can do i s the f i r s t of the t h r e e  arguments L o c k e makes i n h i s L e t t e r a g a i n s t the magi s t r a t e ' s involved duty is  i n the s a l v a t i o n of s o u l s .  The m a g i s t r a t e does not have the  to c a r e f o r men's s o u l s because, says Locke, not  people."  vested The  i n the  civil  being  magistrate...  c h o i c e of f a i t h or w o r s h i p  by  "the c a r e of s o u l s the  consent  of  cannot be handed over  the  to  the  m a g i s t r a t e s i n c e i t d e p e n d s on i n w a r d p e r s u a s i o n and not s i m p l y an agreement to c o n f o r m to the m a g i s t r a t e ' s d i c t a t e s  (Le_tter_ 19).  In  b o t h t h e L e t _ t e r and t h e T r e a t i s e L o c k e r e m i n d s h i s r e a d e r s t h a t t h e power of the m a g i s t r a t e or the l e g i s l a t i v e  i s o n l y a f i d u c i a r y power,  meaning t h a t i t i s a t r u s t e e r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h a l l o w s the m a g i s t r a t e the power to use f o r c e to promote what c i t i z e n s see as t h e i r own and  not  t h e power t o do w h a t t h e m a g i s t r a t e s e e s as b e s t  c i t i z e n s but a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l , himself  he  f o r the  what i s best  for  ( L e t t e r 18-19; Second T r e a t i s e i n Wootton 337).  Perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t that  or w o r s e s t i l l ,  good,  element of Locke's Second T r e a t i s e i s  s t r e s s e s i n i t t h a t a l l men  equality,,  "wherein  a l l the power and  are n a t u r a l l y jurisdiction  one h a v i n g m o r e t h a n a n o t h e r " b e c a u s e a l l men  77  are  i n a s t a t e of  is reciprocal,  no  "furnished with  l i k e f a c u l t i e s , s h a r i n g a l l i n one community o f n a t u r e " 263-4).  ( i n Wootton  T h i s e q u a l i t y o f a l l i s r e a f f i r m e d by L o c k e i n t h e L e t t e r  when he says at i t s b e g i n n i n g care f o r h i s subjects  t h a t i t i s the duty of t h e m a g i s t r a t e t o  "by i m p a r t i a l e x e c u t i o n  of equal  laws,"  and a t  t h e end o f h i s L e t t e r w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e sum o f a l l he i s d r i v i n g at  " i s t h a t every man enjoy the same r i g h t s t h a t a r e g r a n t e d  to o t h e r s "  (Letter  18, 69). T h i s e q u a l i t y w h i c h Locke w r i t e s  about  i n h i s L e t t e r can t h e r e f o r e be seen t o o r i g i n a t e f r o m the same n a t u r a l s t a t e of human e q u a l i t y Locke argues f o r i n h i s Second T r e a t i s e . F o u r y e a r s a f t e r L o c k e c o m p o s e d h i s t w o T r e a t i se latin  (1681)  v e r s i o n o f h i s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n was  (1685).  Four  years  i t s final draft  at much g r e a t e r his  published  a f t e r h i s L e t t e r h i s E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human  U n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h he had been w o r k i n g on s i n c e 1671, was in  the  (1689).  length,  In i t he was a b l e t o c l a r i f y ,  published and d i s c u s s  the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l arguments he had used i n  L e t t e r i n support o f r e l i g i o u s  toleration.  An Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g Locke c l e a r l y  s t a t e s that the purpose of h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g  Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s t o enquire  i n t o the o r i g i n  knowledge;  together  , c e r t a i n t y , and e x t e n t of human  with  b e l i e f , o p i n i o n and assent... to search and  t h e g r o u n d s and d e g r e e s o f I t i s therefore worth  out the bounds between o p i n i o n  while  and knowledge,  examine by what measure, i n t h i n g s , whereof we have  no c e r t a i n knowledge, we ought t o r e g u l a t e our assent and  78  moderate our p e r s u a s i o n s It  (Essay 43-44)  i s i n part t h i s q u e s t i o n of the c e r t a i n t y of knowledge i n  m a t t e r s Of r e l i g i o n , t h e n a t u r e of b e l i e f  itself,  and the p r o b a b i l i t y  of  belief  t h a t he w i s h e s t o  knowing  f o r sure which  i s the r i g h t  e n q u i r e i n t o w i t h h i s Essay. These e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e present for  i n (though not c e n t r a l t o ) a l l t h r e e of Locke's m a i n arguments  toleration In  in his Letter  (19-21).  h i s L e t t e r Locke had w r i t t e n  by means o f  t h a t b e l i e f cannot be c o m p e l l e d  " c o r p o r a l s u f f e r i n g s or any o t h e r outward p e n a l t i e s "  only through  " l i g h t and e v i d e n c e "  ( L e t t e r 20, 2 1 ) . He  but  reaffirms  t h i s p o s i t i o n i n h i s Essay when he says faith  i s n o t h i n g but a f i r m a s s e n t of the m i n d , w h i c h i f  i t be r e g u l a t e d , as i s o u r d u t y , c a n n o t be a f f o r d e d any t h i n g but upon good reason, and so cannot be o p p o s i t e t o it Not  (Essay 687).  o n l y i s Locke here s a y i n g t h a t f a i t h or b e l i e f r e s t s on coming t o  a f i r m c o n v i c t i o n t h r o u g h r e a s o n , he i s , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y ,  saying  t h a t i t i s e v e r y person's duty t o use the l i g h t of reason t o examine t h e i r b e l i e f s because will  i t i s through such e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t the examiner  come e v e r c l o s e r t o t h e o n l y f o r m o f be l i e f a c c e p t a b l e t o God,  and t o t h e t r u t h . Conscience: Worship,"  I n h i s e s s a y e n t i t l e d "The C l a i m t o F r e e d o m o f  Freedom of Speech,  Freedom of Thought, Freedom of  John Dunn says t h a t f o r John the  Locke  n o n - d i s c r e t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r o f human b e l i e f a t any  particular  t i m e was n o t i n i t s e l f  a justification  -  i n d e e d i t was n o t e v e n an e x c u s e - f o r t h e c o n t e n t o f that b e l i e f .  The c e n t r a l  purpose  of Locke's  greatest  w o r k , t h e E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  was t o  i n s i s t on t h e u r g e n c y and i n t r i c a c y . o f t h e d u t y o f e a c h human b e i n g own b e l i e f s , content fit  t o r e g u l a t e h i s assent t o make h i m s e l f  t o the content  fully  of h i s  responsible f o r that  and t o shape i t m e t i c u l o u s l y and s t r e n u o u s l y t o  the obdurate c o n t o u r s  of e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y  (Dunn 179-  80). The  s a l v a t i o n of the soul i s accomplished,  according to Locke,  t h r o u g h a f a i t h b u i l t on r e a s o n e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f t h o s e t h i n g s one  has  faith  beasts, 696).  in.  I t i s t h e u s e o f r e a s o n t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s us f r o m  and e l e v a t e s us  "as r a t i o n a l  c r e a t u r e s above b r u t e s "  One cannot be i g n o r a n t or d o u b t f u l of one's r e l i g i o n and expect  salvation.  " I c a n n o t be s a v e d by a r e l i g i o n t h a t I d i s t r u s t , " s a y s  Locke i n h i s L e t t e r , and t h e r e i s no s a l v a t i o n w i t h o u t "an  inward Not  believe,  and f u l l  only  persuasion  i s i t necessary  of t h e m i n d "  say.  c o n v i c t i o n and  (40-41, 19).  t h a t one understands what one c l a i m s t o  i t a l s o makes l o g i c a l  s i m p l y go by what o t h e r s  sense, a c c o r d i n g  t o Locke, not t o  In h i s E s s a y he says t h a t t h e r e cannot  be a  "more d a n g e r o u s t h i n g t o r e l y on, n o r m o r e l i k e l y  one"  than the o p i n i o n s of o t h e r s s i n c e t h e r e i s 'nxich more  and e r r o u r amongst men than t r u t h and knowledge," "the u n c o n t e s t a b l e 657,  (Essay  660). A s s e n t ,  only ever  to mislead falsehood  because no one has  e v i d e n c e o f t r u t h o f a l l t h a t he h o l d s "  (Essay  then, or t h e a c c e p t i n g of something as t r u e  should  be b a s e d on t h e d e g r e e o f p r o b a b i l i t y  that the reasons,  arguments, or p r o o f s o f f e r e d a r e i n f a c t t r u e and t h e r e f o r e b e l i e v a b l e (Essay  657-8).  Locke's f i r s t  and t h i r d arguments  80  ( t h a t n e i t h e r God  nor  t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s have g i v e n  the magistrate  t h e power t o  c h o o s e a b e l i e f f o r t h e m s i nee no one c a n " c o n f o r m h i s f a i t h t o t h e d i c t a t e s of another;" and t h a t t h e r e  i s no guarantee t h a t t h e f a i t h of  the m a g i s t r a t e  lead t o s a l v a t i o n )  i s the one t h a t w i l l  seen by some a n a l y s t s as theory,  the  " e x p l o r a t i o n s o f problems i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  problems c o n c e r n i n g m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s  ments of p r o b a b i l i t i e s , " right kind  are therefore  on t h e b a s i s of judge-  d e c i s i o n s made i n such a way as t o l e a d t o  of b e l i e f  (Wootton  103).  The L e t t e r  Concerning  T o l e r a t ion i s t h e r e f o r e not  j u s t a t e x t t h a t echoes t h e c o n t r a c t u a l  theory  and t h e r e s i s t a n c e  Treatise;  arguments  political  of t h e Second  i t i s a l s o d i r e c t e d t o problems c e n t r a l t o the  d i s c u s s i o n of p r o b a b i l i t y and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g Essay  i n the  (Wootton 103).  L o c k e t a k e s up t h i s t o p i c by d e v o t i n g  a l l o r p a r t s o f c h a p t e r s XV,  XVI, X V I I , and XX of Book IV of t h e Essay t o an extended d i s c u s s i o n of how sound d e c i s i o n s a r e made and what f a c t o r s a f f e c t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n b e i n g made c o n c e r n i n g what i s t r u e . In h i s L e t t e r Locke asks what hope t h e r e m i g h t be t h a t more men w o u l d be l e d i n t o t h e r i g h t r e l i g i o n and c e r t a i n s a l v a t i o n  " i f they  had no o t h e r  in light  r u l e t o f o i l o w but the r e l i g i o n of the c o u r t "  of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e l e a d e r s o r p r i n c e s o f t h e w o r l d ,  as w e l l a s t h e  v a r i o u s r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s they endorse and promote, a r e as d i v i d e d " i n t h e v a r i e t y and c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f o p i n i o n s secular asking  interests  (21).  inreligion"  He m a k e s t h i s p o i n t a g a i n  rhetorically,  81  as i n t h e i r inhisEs_say,  Are  t h e c u r r e n t o p i n i o n s and l i c e n s e d g u i d e s of e v e r y  country s u f f i c i e n t evidence  and s e c u r i t y t o every man t o  venture h i s g r e a t e s t concernments on, nay h i s e v e r l a s t i n g happiness  or m i s e r y ?  Or c a n t h o s e be t h e c e r t a i n and  i n f a l l i b l e o r a c l e s and standards o f t r u t h w h i c h t e a c h one thing  i n Christendom  and another  i n Turkey  (Essay 708)?  The q u e s t i o n Locke asks here i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the one he asked Letter.:  what a r e t h e chances, what  i s the p r o b a b i l i t y ,  in his  that the  r e l i g i o n b e i n g f o r c e d on h i s s u b j e c t s by one m a g i s t r a t e i n one c o u n t r y will  l e a d t o s a l v a t i o n , when t h e r e a r e so many d i f f e r i n g  among m a g i s t r a t e s as t o the r i g h t way t o s a l v a t i o n ?  opinions  The s o l u t i o n t o  t h i s p r o b l e m i s c l e a r l y o f f e r e d by L o c k e on t h e same page when he says, in  "God has f u r n i s h e d men w i t h f a c u l t i e s s u f f i c i e n t t o d i r e c t them  t h e way  they  a c c o r d i n g t o Locke,  should  take"  (Essay  708).  Every  citizen i s ,  t o use t h e i r own r e a s o n i n g power t o f i n d the way  to s a l vat i o n . In t h e L e t t e r  Locke l i m i t s  t h e scope of what t h e m a g i s t r a t e  s h o u l d a l l o w i n terms of outward forms and r i t e s of w o r s h i p ,  and the  d o c t r i n e s a n d p r a c t i c a l and s p e c u l a t i v e a r t i c l e s o f f a i t h  (42-61).  T h e r e a r e r i t e s and c e r e m o n i e s w h i c h t h e m a g i s t r a t e has a r i g h t t o p r o h i b i t , namely those w h i c h harm the peace or s e c u r i t y of the'corrmonwealth,  or those,  like  c a t t l e stock shortage, wealth,  the s a c r i f i c i n g of the c a l v e s  that are necessary  i n t i m e s of  f o r the good of t h e common-  and then t h e r e a r e those w h i c h t h e m a g i s t r a t e may not i n t e r -  f e r e w i t h that are necessary  for worship  ccrrmands f r o m God.  82  s i n c e they a r e seen as d i r e c t  In c h a p t e r X I X of h i s E s s a y L o c k e a d d r e s s e s t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h i s i s s u e , so t o speak.  H a v i n g a l r e a d y argued i n h i s L e t t e r t h a t the  m a g i s t r a t e ' s power and j u r i s d i c t i o n does n o t e x t e n d o v e r r e l i g i o u s matters,  Locke a d d r e s s e s r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r s , e s p e c i a l l y those prone  t o w h a t he c a l 1 s  "enthusiasm."  Enthusiasm, a c c o r d i n g to Locke, i s  founded n e i t h e r on reason nor d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n , but comes f r o m c o n c e i t s of a warmed or over-weening b r a i n , "  and  that  t o do t h e y may  whatever  they f e e l  " d i r e c t i o n f r o m heaven"  strongly  inclined  l e a d s men  t h a t m u s t be o b e y e d as a  a b o v e , and t h e y c a n n o t e r r i n e x e c u t i n g i t "  e n t h u s i a s m f o r Locke may  be c a l l e d  to think call  "commission  ( E s s a y 699).  E n g l i s h i t m i g h t be c a l l e d r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c i s m .  "the  The  a  from  In modern  problemwith  i s , of c o u r s e , t h a t i f any s o r t of a c t i o n at a l l  "a c o m m i s s i o n f r o m above,"  i t would a l l o w c i t i z e n s to  commit a l l s o r t s of a c t i o n s h a r m f u l t o the commonwealth i n the name of God o r r e l i g i on.  By d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s s o r t o f f a n a t i c a l r e l i g i o u s  c l a i m made by some i n t h e name o f f r e e d o m o f r e l i g i o n , L o c k e a n t i c i p a t e d and e l i m i n a t e d  the argument t h a t  has  t h e r e e x i s t s a need f o r  the m a g i s t r a t e t o p r o h i b i t some b e l i e f s i n the name of the good of the state.  Recall  t h a t Locke has p r e v i o u s l y argued  i t i s impossible  for  the m a g i s t r a t e t o make such d e c i s i o n s because of the n a t u r e of b e l i e f , and t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of w h i c h c h u r c h i s t h e t r u e one  ( L e t t e r 19-21).  In t h e E s s a y L o c k e a s k s e a c h c i t i z e n t o e x a m i n e t h e w o r k i n g s of h i s own mind,  and to use the l i g h t of reason t o d e t e r m i n e what i s i n f a c t  a command f r o m God "enthusiasm."  and w h a t  In t h i s way  to r e l i g i o u s freedom  i s no m o r e t h a n p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l  citizens w i l l  be p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r own  through s e l f - p o l i c i n g ,  83  rather  right  than a l l o w i n g  the  argument  that  i t i s necessary  decisions regarding  f o r the  civil  " a l l a g r e e d i n t h e s u b s t a n t i a l and  religion"  but among whom  "implacable  " C h r i s t i a n brethren"  who  t r u l y fundamental part  of  e n m i t i e s " d e v e l o p because  d i s a g r e e w i t h each o t h e r on f r i v o l o u s t h i n g s w h i c h may their r e l i g i o n without This issue concerning  t o make  the a u t h e n t i c i t y of c e r t a i n r e l i g i o u s c l a i m s .  In h i s L e t t e r Locke a l s o w r i t e s about are  magistrate  they  be o m i t t e d  r i s k i n g the s a l v a t i o n of s o u l s  from  ( L e t t e r 36).  the u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of d i s a g r e e m e n t s on account  of m a t t e r s o f l i t t l e a c t u a l c o n s e q u e n c e t o s a l v a t i o n i s t a k e n up Locke again  i n h i s Essay.  T h e r e he w r i t e s t h a t b e c a u s e men  been p r i n c i p l e d w i t h an o p i n i o n t h a t they must not the  things  of  religion,"  "absurdities," opinions  and  "extravagant  "fancies,"  due  considerate  f o l 1 i e s , and the great  and  (Essay seems e v i d e n t  "have  c o n s u l t , reason i n  become  "natural superstitions,"  filled  with  "extravagant  t o common s e n s e , "  and  to which man  cannot  but  stand  amazed  at  their  j u d g e t h e m so f a r f r o m b e i n g a c c e p t a b l e w i s e God,  them r i d i c u l o u s ,  It  has  c e r emon i e s.. .con t r ad i c t o r y  practices" a  religion  by  and  to  t h a t he c a n n o t a v o i d t h i n k i n g  o f f e n s i v e to a sober,  good  man  696).  then t h a t Locke i s c o n v i n c e d  that r e l i g i o u s  and p r a c t i c e s t h a t a r e p e r i p h e r a l t o the c o r e and  beliefs  fundamental t r u t h of  the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n - w h i c h t o p i c he w r i t e s about at l e n g t h i n h i s  9.L 9 l 2 l i i l i ^ H i l y "absurdities"  discussed  below  - and  which  have not been examined by means of the l i g h t of  reason,  not o n l y c a u s e u n r e s t w i t h i n a s o c i e t y b e c a u s e of t h e d i s a g r e e m e n t s  84  among c h u r c h e s as t o w h i c h a r e e s s e n t i a l and w h i c h a r e m e r e they are a l s o ,  for  the most p a r t ,  unacceptable t o God s i n c e they have  n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l requires  of  trivia,  faith all  c h u r c h e s b e l i e v e God  believers.  W i t h h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g Locke leaves the reader  i n no doubt t h a t ,  cannot be f o r c e d e i t h e r  i n l i g h t of the n a t u r e of human b e l i e f ,  by the agent or the m a g i s t r a t e to change f r o m  one v i e w t o a n o t h e r , and i n l i g h t therefore  which  the u n c e r t a i n t y  of  of the d i v e r s i t y of b e l i e f s ,  religious  truths,  it  would  "become  and all  men t o m a i n t a i n p e a c e , and t h e o t h e r common o f f i c e s o f h u m a n i t y and friendship  in the d i v e r s i t y  of o p i n i o n "  and t o  m u t u a l i g n o r a n c e , and e n d e a v o u r t o remove i t ways of. i n f o r m a t i o n , "  in other words,  "commiserate  our  i n a l l g e n t l e and f a i r  t o be t o l e r a n t  of one another  (Essay 6 5 9 , 6 6 0 ) . Seme Thoughts on E d u c a t i o n An issue w h i c h Locke addresses Some Thoughts on Educat ion  i n h i s essay  little  t h a t g r e a t s e v e r i t y of  punishment  good; nay, g r e a t harm i n e d u c a t i o n :  and I b e l i e v e i t w i l l be f o u n d , t h a t , c a e t e r i s those c h i l d r e n who have been most c h a s t i s e d ,  He p o i n t s o u t  later  " a c t i o n s of c h i l d i s h n e s s "  of  He says e a r l y on,  I am very apt t o t h i n k ,  t h e b e s t men  entitled  (1693) i s t h a t of punishment as a p a r t  r a i s i n g and e d u c a t i n g a c h i l d .  does but very  repeatedly  paribus,  seldom make  (Works V o l . 9 3 5 ) . t h a t m a t u r a t i o n t a k e s c a r e o f much o f and  "unfashionable carriage"  85  the  and t h a t  there  i s l e s s need o f t h e u s e o f  b e a t i n g s of c h i l d r e n  "the d i s c i p l i n e of the r o d " or  "as i s g e n e r a l l y made u s e o f " ( i b i d 60).  He  goes on t o say t h a t if  we  add l e a r n i n g t o r e a d ,  write,  dance,  foreign  languages, &c. as under the same p r i v i l e g e , t h e r e w i l l but v e r y  r a r e l y any o c c a s i o n f o r b l o w s o r f o r c e i n an  ingenious education The  be  (ibid).  r i g h t way t o t e a c h , he s a y s , i s " t o g i v e t h e m a l i k i n g and  i n c l i n a t i o n t o what you propose t o t e a c h them t o be l e a r n e d " The g r e a t e s t discouragement t o l e a r n i n g , Locke observes,  (ibid).  i s when those  whom one w i s h e s t o t e a c h , o r who e x p r e s s an i n t e r e s t t o l e a r n , a r e then  compelled  position  to i t  regarding  (ibid  63).  t h e use of  These passages support  force  in his Letter  Locke's  concerning  T o l e r a t i o n i n w h i c h he p o i n t s o u t t h a t a m a g i s t r a t e has no r i g h t t o use f o r c e t d compel h i s s u b j e c t s t o b e l i e v e , or - as P r o a s t w o u l d have it  - to at least  consider,  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t r u c t i n g , and r e d r e s s i n g t h e e r r o n e o u s means a v a i l a b l e  by r e a s o n "  "Teaching, are the only  t o t h e ' m a g i s t r a t e . i n t h e e d u c a t i n g Of men a n d t h e  s a v i n g of s o u l s , says Locke, understanding  religion.  because  t h a t i t cannot be c o m p e l l e d  by o u t w a r d f o r c e "  (Le_tter_ 20).  "such  i s the nature  of the  t o the b e l i e f of any t h i n g  T h i s c a n be s e e n as b o t h a  utili-  t a r i a n and an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t f o r t h e u s e o f r e a s o n  over  f o r c e , b o t h i n t h e e d u c a t i o n o f c h i l d r e n and i n b r i n g i n g men t o t h e t r u e r e l i g i o n , s i n c e , i n Locke's o p i n i o n , f o r c e cannot persuade but reason can. " I f t r u t h makes not her way i n t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g own  light,"  L o c k e e x p l a i n s , "she w i l l  86  be.but  by her  t h e w e a k e r f o r any  borrowed f o r c e v i o l e n c e can add The  to her"  ( L e t t e r 56).  use of the rod, w h i c h seemed to be h i g h l y f a v o u r e d by t u t o r s  i n Locke's day,  " n a t u r a l l y breeds an a v e r s i o n to t h a t w h i c h i t i s the  tutor's business  to c r e a t e a l i k i n g to"  (Wojrks V o l 9 37).  This is  s i m i l a r to an argument Locke made i n h i s response to P r o a s t ' s c a l l the  use  of  adopting  force  in compelling  men  to  the s t a t e r e l i g i o n as t h e i r own.  c u t i o n , punishrment, or compe 1 l i n g men  l e a r n a b o u t and He  t o l d Proast  t o c o n s i d e r may  more harm than good to the t r u e r e l i g i o n s i n c e i t w i l l  for  consider  that  perse-  in fact bring l e a d men  away  f r o m t h a t c h u r c h w h i c h condones the use of f o r c e r a t h e r than b r i n g  men  to  that  the  "they  are  it.  Similarly  greatest  i n h i s essay  discouragement  on  education  to a c h i l d ' s  c a l l e d t o i t ; i t i s made t h e i r  Locke  says  l e a r n i n g i s when  business,  they are teased  a b o u t i t , and do i t w i t h t r e m b l i n g and a p p r e h e n s i o n , " i n t r e n c h e s on t h e i r freedom  (Works V o l 9 63).  and  a l l of w h i c h  W h i l e i n h i s L e t t e r he  a l l o w s t h e m a g i s t r a t e , t o i n s t r u c t , r e d r e s s t h e e r r o n e o u s by and do  "what becomes any good man  use of f o r c e , s i m i l a r l y i n s t e a d of b e a t i n g s and s k i l l , a child's  t o do"  i n h i s essay  on e d u c a t i o n Locke suggests  t o compel a c h i l d to l e a r n  in learning  c h i l d r e n : o b s t i n a c y or r e b e l l i o n .  But  Locke's argument t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e law.  that  " t h e r e needs p a t i e n c e to a t t a i n  s i t u a t i o n c a l l s f o r the b e a t i n g of t h i s punishment has  do w i t h c o n v i n c i n g o r e d u c a t i n g a c h i l d .  disobeys c i v i l  the  ( L e t t e r 20; Works V o l 9 64).  Locke does a l l o w t h a t o n l y one  who  reason,  r a t h e r than compel w i t h  g e n t l e n e s s and a t t e n t i o n , and a prudent conduct" interest  chid  Rather  i s allowed  nothing  to  i t i s analogous to  to punish  the  citizen  Even so, Locke c a u t i o n s t h a t he does not mean  87  t h a t punishment ought t o i n f l i c t a l o t of p a i n , but r a t h e r t h a t t h e t h r e a t o f punishments, and t h e f e a r of t h e "shame" i s enough t o keep a c h i l d i n l i n e  (Works V o l 9 65).  L e t t e r Locke says t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e  of t h e punishment Similarly in his  has t h e r i g h t t o p u n i s h  subjects  who d i s o b e y t h e l a w s o f t h e l a n d , and t h a t i t i s t h e f e a r o f p u n i s h ment a l o n e t h a t w i l l  keep c i t i z e n s  in line  ( L e t t e r 18).  In b o t h h i s L e t _ t e r a n d h i s e s s a y on e d u c a t i o n f o r c e as h a v i n g very  then,' L o c k e s e e s  l i m i t e d and s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n :  of t h e l a w s o f t h e h o u s e h o l d o r t h e l a w s o f t h e l a n d . Locke, force works n e i t h e r persuasion  of a d u l t s  i n the education  to consider  the e n f o r c i n g According  to  of c h i l d r e n nor i n t h e  or adopt a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s  belief. The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y In h i s e s s a y e n t i t l e d  The R e a s o n a b l e n e s s of_ Ch£j_stj_anj__ty as  D e l i v e r e d _in t h e S c r i p t u r e s , p u b l i s h e d inquiry  i n t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s of r e v e a l e d  i n 1695, L o c k e r e n e w s t h e r e l i g i o n w h i c h he had under-  t a k e n e a r l i e r i n h i s E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g .  In t h i s  work Locke advocates a historical  empiricism,  plainness  o f sense, and t h e  r e j e c t i o n of systems of d i v i n i t y w i t h t h e i r artificial,  and f o r c e d  sense'  of expression,  'learned, i n the  u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s c r i p t u r e s , w h i c h w e r e f o r him... d e s i g n e d by God  ' f o x t h e i n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e i11 i t e r a t e  b u l k o f m a n k i n d i n t h e way t o s a l v a t i o n '  (Nidditch, i n  t h e F o r e w o r d t o L o c k e ' s E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r -  88  standing x x i ) . L o c k e a l s o f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s w h a t he p e r c e i v e s t o be t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t and f u n d a m e n t a l e l e m e n t o f b e i n g a C h r i s t i a n : t h e s i m p l e b e l i e f t h a t C h r i s t Jesus i s the s a v i o u r of s i n f u l humankind V o l 7 17). the  "one  outward and  He c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h i s b e l i e f , w h i c h he has truth"  and  "one way  to heaven"  r i t u a l s and ceremonies  "absurdities"  he c a l l s  i n h i s Essay  (Wo_rks called  i n h i s L e t t e r , w i t h those "indifferent"  ( L e t t e r 21, 42-49;  in his Letter  Essay 696). Not  e v e r y s e n t e n c e w r i t t e n i n t h e G o s p e l , he s a y s , n e e d s t o be s e e n as a fundamental  a r t i c l e t h a t must be understood and b e l i e v e d n e c e s s a r y t o  salvation.  I f i t w e r e i n f a c t n e c e s s a r y t o know and u n d e r s t a n d  the t r u t h s  of t h e B i b l e  b e f o r e s a l v a t i o n c o u l d be a c h i e v e d ,  L o c k e , w h a t wou 1 d become of t h o s e e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s who  fell  " b e f o r e t h e s e t h i n g s i n t h e e p i s t l e s w e r e r e v e a l e d t o them" V o l 7 155)?  Locke  not w r i t t e n u n t i l to heaven.  How  reminds  would  i n the B i b l e ,  may  be  salvation"  asleep (Wor_k_s  same twenty to t h i r t y y e a r s a f t e r C h r i s t ' s a s c e n s i o n i t have been p o s s i b l e f o r those e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s i f i t were n e c e s s a r y f o r s a l v a t i o n to  have known e v e r y t h i n g i n those e p i s t l e s ?  a man  says  h i s reader t h a t most of the e p i s t l e s were  to have come to g a i n s a l v a t i o n  revealed  all  says Locke,  i g n o r a n t o f ; nay,  (Works Vol.7 155,  A G r e a t many of the  "everyone  truths  does, and must c o n f e s s ,  d i s b e l i e v e w i t h o u t danger t o h i s  156).  He makes t h i s p o i n t a g a i n i n h i s Second V i n d i c a t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t an e x p l i c i t b e l i e f more than a l a w of f a i t h  i n many of the  "remote c o n n e c t i o n '  "other t r u t h s , "  w h i c h may  w i t h the fundamental  ( t h e bel i e f t h a t Jesus i s the M e s s i a h ) ,  s a r i l y r e q u i r e d to make a man  a r t i c l e of the i s not  a C h r i s t i a n , or to save h i s s o u l  89  have no  neces(Works  Vol 7 227-8, 353-4).  T h i s means t h a t the use of f o r c e to compel  c i t i z e n s to accept any of the various diverse p r a c t i c e s only periphera l to the c o r e C h r i s t i a n be l i e f perspective,  i s un j u s t i f i a b l e f r o m a C h r i s t i a n  a p o i n t he has p r e v i o u s l y made i n h i s Let_ter_  (16).  Locke here affirms his e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n , as explained in his l e t t e r Proast,  that i t is not necessary for a man's s a l v a t i o n that he accept  the Church of England, w i t h a l l i t s outward r i t u a l s and ceremonies, the  to  one and o n l y way to  s a l v a t i o n s i n c e what  i s necessary  as for  s a l v a t i o n can be found i n the core b e l i e f s of a great many churches and r e l i g i o n s . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n by Locke of the k i n d of f a i t h he b e l i e v e s constitutes a true C h r i s t i a n , and what i t is that he thinks is necessary for s a l v a t i o n also refutes the contention of some analysts that Locke was a sceptic about r e l i g i o n . not know where the t r u t h  Far from b e l i e v i n g that one could  l i e s in r e l i g i o n ,  or w h i c h i s the  true  r e l i g i o n , The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y manifests Locke's b e l i e f that the true r e l i g i o n may be found w i t h i n C h r i s t i a n i t y , but that  it  is often obscured w i t h a p r o f u s i o n of v a r i o u s ec 1 es i ast i c a 1 r i t u a l s and ceremonies quite unnecessary for s a l v a t i o n . In his defense of his Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y , e n t i t l e d A V i n d i c a t i o n of the Reasonableness  of C h r i s t i a n i t y from M i \ Edwards's  R e f l e c t i o n s , Locke again makes reference to the c l a i m . t o orthodoxy of t h i s or that form of w o r s h i p . ridiculous"  He says t h a t t h e r e i s  " n o t h i n g more  than for any one person or group to h o l d that they are  i n f a l l i b l y orthodox and thereby assume the power to condemn others who d i f f e r w i t h them in t h e i r opinion  (Works Vol 7 376). 90  "The considera-  t i o n of human f r a i l t y o u g h t t o c h e c k t h i s v a n i t y , " s a y s L o c k e .  This  r e a f f i r m s h i s p o s i t i o n , as s t a t e d i n h i s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n , that  "every church i s orthodox  heretical.  Locke h o l d s t h a t men  beliefs,  the t r u t h , w h i c h not any  to others erroneous  W h a t s o e v e r any c h u r c h b e l i e v e s i t b e l i e v e s t o be  ( L e t t e r 29). t h e i r own  to i t s e l f ;  one  true"  a r e not a b l e judges of the t r u t h of  and t h a t the o n l y one c a p a b l e of j u d g i n g w h i c h  i s the orthodox c h u r c h , i s  earthly magistrate  (ibid).  s u p p o r t s the argument he made e a r l i e r be no t o l e r a t i o n of those  or  "the Supreme Judge"  has and  The V i n d i c a t i o n thereby a l s o  in his Letter  that there should  who  a t t r i b u t e unto the f a i t h f u l ,  r e l i g i o u s , and  orthodox,  t h a t i s , i n p l a i n t e r m s , u n t o t h e m s e l v e s , any  peculiar  p r i v i l e g e or power above o t h e r m o r t a l s i n c i v i l  concern-  m e n t s ; o r who,  upon p r e t e n s e o f , r e l i g i o n , do c h a l l e n g e  any m a n n e r o f a u t h o r i t y o v e r s u c h as a r e not a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them i n t h e i r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l communion  ( L e t t e r 63).  Locke knew t h a t t h i s c l a i m to orthodoxy and s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e by one  c h u r c h was  not o n l y l o g i c a l l y  indefensible,  but  that  c a u s i n g g r e a t u n r e s t i n the England and F r a n c e of h i s day.  i t was  Locke  also  r e a f f i r m s i n the V i n d i c a t i o n the s t a n d he took a g a i n s t a t h e i s m i n h i s original Letter. religion crime society"  There  ( L e t t e r 64).  "which...  ought  he sees  i t as u n d e r m i n i n g  a l l of s o c i e t y  and  H e r e he c a l l s a t h e i s m m a d n e s s as w e l l as a to shut  a man  out  of a l l sober  and  civil  (Works V o l 7 161).  Locke c o n c l u d e s h i s o r i g i n a l L e t t e r by s a y i n g t h a t i t s purpose i s to  argue that  " e v e r y man  e n j o y t h e same r i g h t s as a r e g r a n t e d t o  91  others,"  that,  s i n c e the f r e e p r a c t i c e o f t h e i r r e l i g i o n i s a l l o w e d  to some people i t s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o a l l  ( L e t t e r 69).  He  r e i n f o r c e s t h i s p o s i t i o n i n h i s Second V i n d i c a t i o n when he says How f u l l y hold,  s o e v e r I am p e r s u a d e d o f t h e t r u t h o f w h a t I  I am i n ccrrmon j u s t i c e t o a l l o w t h e same s i n c e r i t y  t o h i m t h a t d i f f e r s f r o m me; and so we a r e upon e q u a l terms  (377).  Here Locke i s not only  calling  f o r t h e t o l e r a t i o n o f one g r o u p o f  b e l i e v e r s by a n o t h e r , more p o w e r f u l , group, he i s e v i d e n t l y  speaking  i n terms of e q u a l i t y under t h e l a w and equal r i g h t s w i t h i n the commonwealth  f o r c i t i z e n s of a l l of the v a r i o u s  p e r s u a s i o n s - a theme t h a t  differing religious  i s c l e a r l y p r e s e n t throughout h i s L e t t e r  (18, 6 9 ) .  92  Chapter 4 - Sonne Later C r i t i c i s m s of L o c k e ' s L e t t e r  L o c k e ' s L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n may have seemed radical  argument  to  those,  like Proast,  like  born and raised amid  a the  religious intolerance of the 17th century.  To them L o c k e ' s c a l l for a  sweeping  only of Christians for  the  beliefs and practices of other Christians, but of Christians for  the  and universal t o l e r a t i o n  - not  beliefs and practices of non-Christians and vice versa - must seemed  like  a call  to  open  the  floodgates  of s i n f u l  ideas  have and  behaviour that would lead to the demise of entire nations. But as times changed and religious intolerance proved itself ever more to be the cause of, rather than the cure for, many of society's ills,  L o c k e ' s l e t t e r eventually came to be read by some as actually  not arguing strongly enough on behalf of t o l e r a t i o n , and as excluding too many things  (and too many people)  which should in fact  be  tolerated. Today, while there is s t i l l disagreement  in some quarters as to  whether L o c k e ' s toleration went too far or not far enough, a broader criticism  has  been  developing:  is L o c k e ' s l e t t e r  93  relevant  to  the  e v e n t s and s i t u a t i o n s we This chapter the  in this modern era?  w i l l e x a m i n e some of the h i s t o r i c as w e l l as some of  contemporary  whether  experience  criticisms  Locke's  levelled  perspective  on  against  Locke's  Letter  religious toleration  can  to  see  still  be  m e a n i n g f u l f o r us t o d a y . (1)  Is The In  Scope of Locke's T o l e r a t i o n Too  his  essay  Persecution," conception ious  Toleration  ( p u b l i s h e d i n 1993)  of t o l e r a t i o n i s too  toleration,  for a very tolerance  "Locke:  rather  than  s p e c i f i c reason. based  on  the  such,  o b j e c t i v e l y the  narrow,  but  only  opposition  to  her  essay  "Locke:  of  toleration,  of  the  difficulty  b e l i e v e s t o be  " i s not  and  then  cases  (Waldron  Toleration,  of  of  who  of  argues  a l l sorts, for  liberty  s p e c i f i c argument for (he t a k e s the two But  [religious]  to be i d e n t i c a l ) "  addressing  applying  the  out  in general,  e v e n t h o u g h we  specifically clude  pointing  to o t h e r m a t t e r s b e s i d e s  unlike  "Locke's  intolerance  as  it.  It i s not  an  and  Rationality,"  John  religion.  general  Stuart  argument  t o l e r a t i o n , or a g a i n s t  is a  Mill quite  persecution  (Mendus 157-8).  religious  p r i n c i p l e s he  is in  to  g r a n t t h a t L o c k e h i m s e l f was only  to i n -  108).  Morality  that,  only  determining  Susan Mendus a g r e e s w i t h W a l d r o n t h a t L o c k e f a i l s to a d d r e s s toleration  of  relig-  the t r u e one  opposition  particular  argument for t o l e r a t i o n in general" In  rationality  says t h a t L o c k e ' s o p p o s i t i o n  awareness  one  the  t h a t i t c o n c e r n s only  a l l types He  true  and  Jeremy Waldron argues that Locke's  w h e t h e r the r e l i g i o n the m a g i s t r a t e fact  Narrow?  holds  toleration, to j u s t i f y  this  too n a r r o w doesn't  religious  by  pre-  toleration  R e c a l l t h a t i n his L e t t e r L o c k e ' s  94  religious  toleration  i s consistent w i t h h i s general p o l i t i c a l  theory,  as e x p r e s s e d i n h i s Two T r e a t i s e on Government, i n w h i c h he h o l d s t h a t c i t i z e n s of a s t a t e r e t a i n a l l  the n a t u r a l r i g h t s they brought w i t h  them f r o m the s t a t e of n a t u r e i n t o the common w e a l t h except those they w i 11 i n g l y c o n s e n t t o hand o v e r t o t h e s t a t e  ( L o c k e L e t t e r 58).  And  s i n c e he assumes t h a t c i t i z e n s a c t i n a r a t i o n a l manner, he w o u l d  also  a s s u m e t h a t no c i t i z e n s w o u l d k n o w i n g l y c o n s e n t t o t h e s t a t e b e i n g i n t o l e r a n t , e i t h e r i n m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o n or i n s e c u l a r a f f a i r s , a n y o n e and  everyone  intolerant state.  is liable  to s u f f e r  under the d i c t a t e s of  an  S i n c e the peace and s e c u r i t y of the ccrrrnonwealth i s  one of t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n s L o c k e a d d r e s s e s previous p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s , would  since  i n both h i s L e t t e r  i t seems r e a s o n a b l e to assume t h a t  a d v o c a t e g e n e r a l t o l e r a t i o n as a means t o t h a t end.  and  Locke  Locke's  p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f y i n g h i s argument f o r r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n can t h e r e f o r e be u s e d t o j u s t i f y  t o l e r a t i o n i n g e n e r a l even i f the t o p i c of  g e n e r a l t o l e r a t i o n i s not d i r e c t l y addressed by Locke  (2)  in his letter.  Does Locke N e g l e c t I n d i v i d u a l R i g h t s ? W a l d r o n a l s o c r i t i c i z e s Locke by s a y i n g t h a t Locke does not seem  t o e x h i b i t any deep c o n c e r n f o r t h e v i c t i m s o f p e r s e c u t i o n s i n c e he a d d r e s s e s and a d v i s e s o n l y t h e o p p r e s s o r s and p e r s e c u t o r s .  Waldron  sees the i n t e r e s t s of the v i c t i m s of p e r s e c u t i o n "addressed and t e c t e d o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y as a r e s u l t o f w h a t i s , i n t h e l a s t prudential (Waldron  a d v i c e o f f e r e d t o those who  pro-  resort,  a r e d i s p o s e d t o oppress  them"  120).  S u s a n Mend u s . n o t e s t h a t t h i s i s i n d e e d t h e i m p r e s s i o n one g e t s fromLocke  since  h i s e m p h a s i s on r a t i o n a l i t y i s  95  " g r e a t e r t h a n and  d i f f e r e n t from that which i s favoured (Mendus 161).  the p e r s e c u t e d  and  failed  that there  acknowledged i n the  But Mendus o f f e r s two  liberty,  t h a t he has  ( i b i d 159),  freedom of w o r s h i p "  criticism.  philosophy"  Mendus a g r e e s w i t h W a l d r o n t h a t L o c k e seems t o  f o c u s i n g on the p e r s e c u t o r , of  i n modern m o r a l  t o address the  is  letter  "no  general  ( i b i d 160;  reasonable  right  i n t e n t i o n to argue only persecution,  implying  f o r Locke t o address the p e r s e c u t o r s  t o t h e r i g h t s of t h e i r v i c t i m s .  against  that  those  i t is  personal  But, w h i l e i n defending d r e s s i n g the p e r s e c u t o r  right  r a t h e r than a t t e n d i n g  (Mendus 158,  he p l e a s e s  was  160-61).  L o c k e , Mendus ag.rees t h a t L o c k e i s a d -  r a t h e r t h a n t h e v i c t i m , a c l o s e r r e a d i n g of  freedoms of c i t i z e n s .  a r g u i n g f o r every  she  g e n e r a l l y h e l d t o be w r o n g ,  L e L t e r seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t he i s i n f a c t c o n c e r n e d w i t h  r i g h t s and  who  therefore  namely r e l i g i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n , at a t i m e when freedom of w o r s h i p  the  159).  argues for  L o c k e ' s a p p r o a c h m u s t be s e e n ,  s a y s , as a d d r e s s i n g a p r a c t i c e t h a t was  not yet an assured  to  arguments i n defense of Locke a g a i n s t Waldron's  i t i s Locke's religious  rights  157,  To b e g i n w i t h , Mendus s a y s , u n l i k e M i l l who  perpetrate  be  the  L o c k e s p e n d s a number o f p a g e s  c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t to be f r e e t o w o r s h i p i n any manner  so l o n g as i t does not d i s t u r b t h e p e a c e and  s e c u r i t y of  the commonwealth.  He a r g u e s f o r r e s t r a i n t on s t a t e and  interference with  the r i g h t s of o t h e r s f r o m a v i e w of the n a t u r a l  r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . freedom to' c a r e f o r one's own one's own  path to s a l v a t i o n  He  individual  s p e a k s i n no u n c e r t a i n t e r m s o f soul  ( L e t t e r 35),  ( i b i d 37 -38),  the freedom t o p i c k  the freedom of  conscience  i n r e l i g i o u s m a t t e r s ( i b i d A l ) , and t h e f r e e d o m of c h o i c e o f  96  the  ritual,  rites,  ceremonies and  practices  ment, "having thus at another  i n " m a t t e r s of  he has  (ibid  f o r the  47).  l e n g t h f r e e d men  Locke's sirrmary  o n l y f o r t o l e r a t i o n and  individual's natural  that  an end  Locke  worship  second defense of Locke, Mendus says Locke's approach does  necessarily  She  r e f e r s to an argument made by Onora O ' N e i l l  constitute  a denial  w h i l e r i g h t s can obligations,  the  of  the  wrong done to the  why  be e x h a u s t i v e l y a n a l y z e d i n t e r m s c o n v e r s e i s not  certain actions  constitute Mendus goes on  the case, and  that  rights  enable us.to  the  (Mendus  c a r r i e d out  i n Locke's day.  explain  reason modern t h e o r i s t s ,  is simply d i f f e r e n t  not  160).  W a l d r o n , f e e l so uneasy about Locke's f a i l u r e to d e a l w i t h thinking  of  therefore  a r e w r o n g e v e n t h o u g h t h e y do  a v i o l a t i o n of  to e x p l a i n  because modern e t h i c a l  victim  that  ' t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of o b l i g a t i o n may  like  rights  f r o m that  is  which  A c c o r d i n g t o Mendus, Locke's focus  on  " i r r a t i o n a l i t y of the would-be p e r s e c u t o r s i s w h o l l y at odds w i t h  much m o d e r n t h o u g h t on t h e s u b j e c t o f t o l e r a t i o n " (1)  feels  to p e r s e c u -  r i g h t t o f r e e d o m of  not  the  one  41). In her  was  state-  f r o m a l l dominion over  r e l i g i o n . . . " makes i t e v i d e n t  i n d e e d a r g u e d not  t i o n , but  (ibid  ethical rationalism  t h e o r i s t s no ality  of  concept  the  i s no  longer  i n vogue, t h a t  persecutor;  (2)  individual  political  According  theorists  ask,  autonomy  i t s f o c u s on  to Mendus,  the  t h i s means t h a t  "What a r e  97  the  rights  of  reasons:  i s , contemporary  longer f o c u s , l i k e Locke seems to have, on  i n modern 1 i b e r a l i s m w i t h  individual.  f o r two  the  irration-  is a rights  central of  the  w h i l e modern individuals  to  practice  t h e i r own  asking,  faith?"  "What a r e the  t i n g them p r a c t i c i n g  L o c k e ' s corrrni t m e n t t o r e a s o n has  him  reasons w h i c h s h o u l d d i s s u a d e . u s f r o m preven-  t h e i r own  faith?"  (Mendus  150).  R e g a r d i n g (1) a b o v e , i t i s , f i r s t o f a l l , not a t a l l c l e a r Locke's  approach  thinking,  at  variance  with  modern  ethical  or t h a t h i s a p p r o a c h i s p u r e l y f r o m t h e d i r e c t i o n o f  irrationality with  i s t h a t much  that  of p e r s e c u t i o n .  t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of  Admittedly,  intolerance,  Locke is. c l e a r l y  the  concerned  from a subject's losing  his  chance at s a l v a t i o n as a r e s u l t of h i s b e i n g f o r c e d to change h i s f o r m of w o r s h i p and Letter  19),  thereby  being h y p o c r i t i c a l  t o " b u s t l e s and w a r s "  against their intolerant the  that are a r e a c t i o n  l e a d e r s ( i b i d 71).  less consistent w i t h his previous  r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , and t h e i l l e g a l for so-called  i n h i s w o r s h i p of God  r e l i g i o u s reasons,  by  (Locke  citizens  But h i s L e t t e r  i s none  p o l i t i c a l concern w i t h infringement  of t h o s e  the  rights  as noted above.  S e c o n d l y , Locke's t h r e e m a i n arguments f o r t o l e r a t i o n are based s o l e l y on the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of the p e r s e c u t o r . modern, p o l i t i c a l  theorists  not  L i k e o t h e r , more  Locke argues from legitimate  political  r i g h t s w h i c h the consent of the c i t i z e n s of a commonwealth have v e s t e d in t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e  (Letter  cannot be s a i d  " g r e a t e r than and  favoured  to be  19).  L o c k e ' s e m p h a s i s on r a t i o n a l i t y  i n modern m o r a l philosophy."  irrationality  of w o u l d - b e p e r s e c u t o r s  different Nor  the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of p e r s e c u t i o n  i s h i s e m p h a s i s on  "wholly  modern thought on the s u b j e c t of t o l e r a t i o n "  from that which i s the  a t odds w i t h much  (Mendus 161,  150)  since  i s o n l y one p a r t of h i s argument.  In (2) above Mendus argues t h a t i n d i v i d u a l autonomy i s a modern  98  l i b e r a l c o n c e p t w h i c h was n o t a f o c u s o f a t t e n t i o n i n L o c k e ' s day. But  i t must be remembered t h a t i n h i s l e t t e r Locke speaks of the f a c t  t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e subjects"  i s "armed w i t h the f o r c e and s t r e n g t h of a l l h i s  and t h a t the c a r e of s o u l s i s not c o m m i t t e d t o a m a g i s t r a t e  because such power cannot be v e s t e d of  i n the m a g i s t r a t e  t h e p e o p l e f o r r e a s o n s t o do w i t h  choice  and so on  indeed a d d r e s s i n g tion.  ( L e t t e r 18, 19).  by the consent  the r a t i o n a l i t y of personal  I t seems t h e n t h a t L o c k e  was  the i s s u e of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, or s e l f - d e t e r m i n a -  The i s s u e o f i n d i v i d u a l  autonomy  i s c e n t r a l t o Locke's-Two  T r e a t i s e s erf Government., w r i t t e n f o u r y e a r s p r i o r t o h i s L e t t e r b u t p u b l i s h e d t h e y e a r a f t e r h i s Let_ter_ was p u b l i s h e d . that to  In i t he a r g u e s  i n the s t a t e of N a t u r e , the l a w of N a t u r e a l l o w s each  p e r s o n a l l y p u n i s h wrongs p e r p e t r a t e d  commonwealth  against  them.  People form a  by l e a v i n g the s t a t e of N a t u r e and f r e e l y c o n s e n t i n g  t r a n s f e r some o f t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l power t o p u n i s h  commonwealth or p o l i t i c a l  state.  offenders  h a v e t h i s power b e f o r e  to  to the  P e o p l e a l s o have the power t o d e t e r -  m i n e how much power l e a d e r s a r e t o have, t o d e c i d e how to  individual  long they a r e  i t r e v e r t s back t o t h e p e o p l e ,  and so on  ( S e c o n d T r e a t i s e C h a p t e r 10 s e c . 132, 141; C h a p t e r 11 s e c . 135, and elsewhere).  A g a i n , as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , L o c k e i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h  intolerance w i l l civil  rights,  how  a f f e c t not o n l y the i n d i v i d u a l ' s s a l v a t i o n but h i s  and t h i s makes i t e v i d e n t  a c l e a r n o t i o n and defense of i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t t h e r e i s indeed  i n Locke  autonomy.  W o o t t o n , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , d e f e n d s L o c k e by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o Waldron's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , focus on the r u l e r s or p e r s e c u t o r s  Locke's f i r s t  argument does not  but r a t h e r on the s u b j e c t s .  99  It i s  an argument aimed at those who is about is  m i g h t became the p e r s e c u t e d because i t  "what i s r a t i o n a l f o r s u b j e c t s , "  i n the  moral  interests  of  and  "what s o r t of s t a t e  its citizens"  W o o t t o n s a y s L o c k e p o i n t s out how  (Wootton  99,  100).  i t is i r r a t i o n a l for subjects  to  hand o v e r t o t h e i r r u l e r s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e c i d i n g w h a t t h e y should  b e l i e v e b e c a u s e i t i s p l a c i n g t h e m s e l v e s under an  ( t o obey t h e r u l e r ) w h i c h t h e y w o u l d n o t (adopting  the b e l i e f s p r e s c r i b e d by  then, Locke seems to be  arguing  t h a t c i t i z e n s ought t o r e g a r d inalienable third  ( i b i d 99).  argument  (what  the r u l e r ) .  that  their  be c a p a b l e of  rational right  According  magistrate  fulfilling to Wootton,  self-interest  may  out  c h o o s e as  the  i n f a c t be f a l s e ) , when combined w i t h the f i r s t  (the s u b j e c t  can't f o r c e h i m s e l f  the s u b j e c t  to conclude,  of  decisions  i t s functions"  own,  l e a d to t h i s  at the s u b j e c t trate  on my  ( i b i d 101).  In f a c t ,  (the p o t e n t i a l l y  to agree to the  behalf;  same c o n c l u s i o n .  (the p e r s e c u t o r )  "true" argument  t o change h i s b e l i e f at w i l l )  " I ought not  that t h i s either  persecuted)  leads  government  i s no proper  premise could,  This conclusion  as  t h a t Locke's  r e l i g i o n may  making r e l i g i o u s  dictates  to think for themselves  W o o t t o n goes on t o p o i n t the  obligation  part  on i t s  i s c l e a r l y aimed  and n o t a t t h e m a g i s -  thereby d i s p r o v i n g Waldron's c l a i m t h a t a l l  of Locke's arguments are aimed at the l a t t e r . I t m i g h t a l s o be a r g u e d a g a i n s t L o c k e t h a t t h e w o r d i n g of h i s f i r s t a r g u m e n t i s so a m b i g u o u s t h a t  i t does n o t  s o l i d d e f e n s e of the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s s i n c e a b i l i t y c i t i z e n s l a c k - not being a b l e to use give their magistrate  the power to use  100  force.  constitute a  very  i t speaks of a power or t h e i r common consent But  to  t h i s i s not a l a c k  of p o l i t i c a l inability  power but r a t h e r an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  t o c o n f o r m w h a t one  Locke i s not a r g u i n g in  their magistrate  i t i n t h i s way. individual its  end,  same  simply  l a c k the  right  to vest  this  t h a t they have good reason not  T h a t L o c k e seems c l e a r l y t o t h i n k he has  r i g h t s throughout h i s "The  sum  r i g h t s that  of a l l we are  letter  i s evident  granted  to  others"  defended  when he  d r i v e a t i s , t h a t e v e r y man  says near enjoy  ( L e t t e r 69).  be s e t t l e d m o r e c o n c l u s i v e l y i f we  cane to t h i s  But  be t a k e n .  the d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e s  t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h as b e i n g  In t h e f i r s t  one  to the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s ,  preserving,  and a d v a n c i n g "  o w n e r s h i p of p r o p e r t y ,  the c i v i l  could and  has  and  the  ( L o c k e L e t t e r 18, 72).  Locke sees  indivi-  of t h e body,  the  a c c e s s t o b e n e f i t s f r o m one's  own  I f one p e r s o n v i o l a t e s t h e r i g h t s of  t h a t the s t a t e may  s e e s p e o p l e as h a v i n g  t h e r i g h t t o j o i n and  free w i l l  simply  therefore  i n t e r e s t s of  indolency  another, Locke a l l o w s  own  he  c o n s t i t u t e d f o r t h e e x p r e s s p u r p o s e of  d u a l s , n a m e l y l i f e , l i b e r t y , h e a l t h and  labour  the  i s s u e of  d e t e r m i n e how  p o t e n t i a l v i c t i m s , made.by L o c k e t h r o u g h o u t h i s l e t t e r .  "procuring,  the  conclusion.  T h r e e a p p r o a c h e s may review  power  to v e s t  q u e s t i o n as to whether or not Locke does i n f a c t address the r i g h t s may  the  b e l i e v e s t o t h e d i c t a t e s of a n o t h e r .  that c i t i z e n s but  limitation -  punish  the g u i l t y p a r t y .  l e a v e a c h u r c h of  He  their  ( i b i d 2 2 ) , t o c h o o s e a l e a d e r of t h e i r c h u r c h , and  to  make laws w i t h w h i c h to govern the a f f a i r s of t h e i r c h u r c h  (ibid  4).  r i g h t s or  E x c o m m u n i c a t i o n may  not  a f f e c t any  f r a n c h i s e s that belong to him  as a man  of a person's c i v i l or a  P r i v a t e persons have no r i g h t of s u p e r i o r i t y or  101  "denison"  (ibid  j u r i s d i c t i o n over  23-  27). one  another.  In o t h e r words,  a l l citizens,  regardless of r e l i g i o u s  per-  s u a s i o n have e q u a l r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e s t a t e i n a l l m a t t e r s i n c l u d i n g b u s i n e s s and e d u c a t i o n right  ( i b i d 28, 3 1 , 5 1 , 6 7 - 8 ) .  t o w o r s h i p any way t h e y p l e a s e s i n c e  belongs o n l y t o the person h i m s e l f  E v e r y o n e has t h e  the care of the soul  ( i b i d 33-59).  A l l have t h e r i g h t  t o n e g l e c t t h e i r own h e a l t h o r w e a l t h a n d t o s i n i f t h e y so c h o o s e , and. t o l i e and p e r j u r e t h e m s e l v e s p r o v i d e d no harm comes t o o t h e r s or t h e commonweal t h  ( 5 1 ) . F i n a l l y , e v e r y o n e has t h e r i g h t t o a b s t a i n  f r o m s t a t e - s a n c t i o n e d a c t i o n s he judges t o be u n l a w f u l , to p e a c e f u l assembly references to r i g h t s ,  ( i b i d 59-60, 6 5 - 6 6 ) .  and the r i g h t  W i t h t h i s many  direct  i t i s not a t a l l s u r p r i s i n g then t h a t Locke says  n e a r h i s c o n c l u s i o n , "The sum o f a l l we d r i v e a t i s t h a t e v e r y man enjoy the same r i g h t s t h a t a r e g r a n t e d t o o t h e r s "  ( i b i d 69).  A s e c o n d , and p e r h a p s b e t t e r , a p p r o a c h i s f r o m t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s p o s s e s s e d by a l l a l l o w that  in this  citizens.  I f we  l e t t e r Locke h o l d s the .same a s s u m p t i o n s about the  o r i g i n s o f t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h o r s t a t e t h a t he e x p o u n d s i n t h e Two T r e a t i se o f G o v e r n m e n t , i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t a l l f o c u s on the r e t e n t i o n o f those n a t u r a l  h i s arguments  r i g h t s w h i c h he argued every  i n d i v i d u a l p o s s e s s e s i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e , some of w h i c h seme s t a t e s have i l l e g i t i m a t e l y a r r o g a t e d t o themselves. A c c o r d i n g t o Locke, the ccrrrnonwealth i s formed when who h a v e been  " f r e e , e q u a l , and i n d e p e n d e n t "  individuals  i n a s t a t e of nature  f o r m an a 1 1 i a n c e o r s o c i e t y by c o n s e n t a n d g i v e o v e r some o f t h e i r power and n a t u r a l  rights  t o the s t a t e .  One o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l  rights  c i t i z e n s g i v e up t o t h e s t a t e i s t h e r i g h t t o p u n i s h t h o s e who w r o n g  102  a g a i n s t o t h e r s by t a k i n g p r o p e r t y to w h i c h they are not e n t i t l e d .  The  state  (Letter  58,  while  the  i s t h e r e f o r e t h e h o l d e r o f a m o n o p o l y on f o r c e  S e c o n d T r e a t i se ch. individuals a g a i n s t one  8 sec.  95,  ch.  11  sec.  135).  But  i n a c o m m o n w e a l t h h a v e g i v e n up t h e r i g h t t o use f o r c e another,  they have not g i v e n up  innumerable  other  rights,  such as the r i g h t to choose w h i c h r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f to accept as own.  their  T h i s i s one of the r i g h t s , argues Locke, w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s have  not g i v e n up t o t h e s t a t e f o r t h e t h r e e r e a s o n s a l r e a d y e x a m i n e d i n c h a p t e r one a b o v e .  And,  has no r i g h t t o a t t e m p t the  individual,  c h o o s e h i s own argument  s i n c e f o r c e can't c r e a t e b e l i e f , t h e s t a t e to create b e l i e f .  through  the  path  salvation.  ( i b i d 20).  to  "inward  Rather  i t i s t h e r i g h t of  p e r s u a s i o n of This  the mind"  i s Locke's  second  s u p p o r t i n g the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of the  freedom of w o r s h i p  - r i g h t s w h i c h Locke f e e l s the i n d i v i d u a l  individual  but w h i c h ,  history,  the s t a t e has  the consent  of the people.  by p o i n t i n g out  that " a l l  to men's c i v i l  interests,  possessed  i n Locke's day as wel 1 as o t h e r  illegitimately  arrogated to i t s e l f  Locke c o n c l u d e s  without  the power of c i v i l  government r e l a t e s o n l y  i s c o n f i n e d to the c a r e of the t h i n g s of reitera-  t i n g t h a t the c i t i z e n s of the commonwealth have not consented t h e i r s t a t e any  g r e a t e r powers than these  the n o t i o n of  Locke's a d d r e s s i n g the p e r s e c u t o r ,  103  to g i v e  ( L e t t e r 22).  A t h i r d response comes when one examines how be addressed.  times  h i s t h r e e m a i n arguments  t h i s w o r l d , and hath n o t h i n g to do w i t h the w o r l d t o come"  may  to  the s t a t e of n a t u r e , r i g h t s w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l w o u l d never know-  i n g l y have g i v e n up, in  main  T h e s e t h r e e a r g u m e n t s t h e n c a n a l l be s e e n as  b e i n g based on and  in  to  rights  i n so f a r as  he  does so,  is compatible  because i t focuses  on  with why  the the  p r o t e c t i o n of the actions  of  the  persecutor  b e c a u s e t h e y i n f r i n g e upon the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s . the magistrate  are  wrong  L o c k e is p r o v i d i n g  w i t h reasons to t o l e r a t e , thereby  ing the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s ,  rights which  he  defend-  t h e y have not  relin-  to the s t a t e .  A l l of t h e s e r e s p o n s e s t o W a l d r o n m a k e i t e v i d e n t to Waldron's c r i t i c i s m , o p p r e s s o r s and  Locke  does not  only  that, contrary  a d d r e s s and  advise  the  p e r s e c u t o r s , nor does he m e r e l y a d d r e s s and p r o t e c t the  i n t e r e s t s of the  v i c t i m s of p e r s e c u t i o n  what  last resort, prudential advice  i s , i n the  disposed  citizens  w i t h a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t p e r s e c u t i o n , or c o n v e r s e l y ,  is p r o v i d i n g the m a g i s t r a t e  quished  r i g h t s of  to oppress t h e m "  "incidentally  ( W a l d r o n 120).  as a r e s u l t of  o f f e r e d to those  W h i l e L o c k e i s not  who  indif-  f e r e n t to p r u d e n t i a l r e a s o n s , his a r g u m e n t s go w e l l b e y o n d them. (3)  Does L o c k e Assume What Can't be Done? Locke  assumes that  matters can "The  e a s i l y and  c l e a r l y be  of  religious  separated.  He  belief  and  says,  secular  for example,  c a r e t h e r e f o r e of e v e r y man's s o u l belongs unto h i m s e l f and  be l e f t to h i m s e l f " a citizen person,  ( L o c k e L e t t e r 35).  of a c o m m o n w e a l t h  and  By  how  is to  t h i s he means t h a t , s i n c e  is a r a t i o n a l ,  that citizen's s p i r i t u a l w e l l being,  as to w h a t t o b e l i e v e and God  matters  responsible  their  personal  and  free  decisions  to w o r s h i p i n - o r d e r to f i n d f a v o u r  with  g a i n s a l v a t i o n , i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .only of t h a t p e r s o n .  e x t e n d s t h i s r i g h t to a l l r a t i o n a l a d u l t s , e v e n t h o s e not the c o m m o n w e a l t h but m e r e l y r e s i d i n g w i t h i n i t s b o r d e r s . t h a t n e i t h e r the m a g i s t r a t e  nor any  citizens  of  L o c k e argues  o t h e r p e r s o n has the r i g h t nor  104  He  the  duty t o c o n c e r n her or h i m s e l f w i t h the c a r e of a n o t h e r person's s o u l . It seems r e a s o n a b l e to assume t h a t L o c k e w o u l d a r g u e t h a t the c a r e of a c h i l d ' s soul b e l o n g s t o the of r e a s o n .  But  parents since  a child  w h a t of c a s e s w h e r e i t is i m p o s s i b l e  d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is c a r e f o r the body and soul?  One  m o d e r n day  transfusion  parents  insist,  for  due  The  the  w h a t is c a r e f o r the  to  of  its physical  their religious beliefs,  t r a n s f u s i o n is c a r i n g f o r the be g i v e n p r e c e d e n c e ?  state insists that  sake  child's soul.  soul c a r e is the  a child  receive  welfare,  but  the  refusing  the  that  Which perspective  body  In an  begins,  should  hold  in this  w h e r e the c a r e  case?  a t t e m p t to a n s w e r t h i s q u e s t i o n  it"'may be  noted that  the  c a s e of the state's r u l i n g i n f a v o u r of f o r c i n g a b l o o d t r a n s f u s i o n a  child  the  to  save i t s l i f e ,  child's parents,  question  against  seems  of w h e t h e r the  according  the  w i s h e s and  analogous  to  Locke's  reasoning  r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of  this question  is,  " T h e s e t h i n g s are not l a w f u l i n the o r d i n a r y  in  the  i n any  worship  of  L o c k e m i g h t say save the  or  t h a t the  i n any  parents'  for  r e l i g i o u s reasons, and  the  w i s h e s of  parents.  the  therefore  His  response  n e i t h e r , are  they  a  same as s a c r i f i c i n g the  the  state could  s t a n c e by  105  to  child  acquiesce  civil" authorities  so 47).  (Letter  the  not  to  course  disallowing a blood transfusion  therefore Such  parents.  religious - meeting"  l i f e of the c h i l d w o u l d be  the  the  p r i v a t e house, and God,  on  s t a t e ought t o a l l o w i n f a n t s t o be s a c r i f i c e d  the  nor  on  r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of  to  of l i f e ,  a  Does Locke's assumption, that a clear d i s t i n c -  t i o n e x i s t s b e t w e e n w h e r e the c a r e of t h e s o u l ends and of the  age  to make a c l e a r  e x a m p l e of a f u s i o n of body and  c a s e of b l o o d t r a n s f u s i o n s . blood  is under the  to may  make i t d i f f i c u l t church,  and  f o r the p a r e n t s  t o f o l l o w t h e t e a c h i n g s of  their  i t m i g h t i n t e r f e r e w i t h the s a l v a t i o n of the c h i l d ' s s o u l ,  but these a r e not the c o n c e r n of the s t a t e , whose mandate, as g i v e n i t by  i t s c i t i z e n s , i s o n l y to c a r e f o r the p h y s i c a l w e l l being of  child.  the  I t seems t h e r e f o r e t h a t , i n t h i s case at l e a s t , where m a t t e r s  of the p h y s i c a l w e l l b e i n g of a c h i l d and to  to  conflict,  encroaching  this conflict on c i v i l  i s the  its spiritual  s a l v a t i o n seem  r e s u l t of the r e l i g i o u s  beliefs  m a t t e r s - i.e., the p h y s i c a l w e l l b e i n g  of a  c i t i z e n - over w h i c h , Locke says, r e l i g i o n has no l e g i t i m a t e j u r i s d i c tion.  If r e l i g i o n s  stay w i t h i n t h e i r  jurisdiction  i t is in  fact  p o s s i b l e , as L o c k e h o l d s , t o c l e a r l y s e p a r a t e m a t t e r s o f s t a t e f r o m m a t t e r s of  (4)  religion.  I f C o e r c i n g B e l i e f Works t o Enhance S t a t e S e c u r i t y , Why  May  the S t a t e S t i l l Not Use i t ? W a l d r o n agrees w i t h Locke, t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s c a u s a l gap  between c o e r c i v e means and  "an  r e l i g i o u s ends"  unabridgeable (Waldron  meaning t h a t p h y s i c a l c o e r c i o n w i l l  not  t h e use o f c o e r c i o n  W a l d r o n p o i n t s out  is irrational.  Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g not. v o l u n t a r y f o r two w h a t we  p e r c e i v e , we  reasons simply  (1) do;  change b e l i e f  and  115),  therefore  that i n h i s  Locke- s t a t e s t h a t knowledge i s we  don't c h o o s e how  and  (2)  the process  to p e r c e i v e of  under-  s t a n d i n g and b e l i e v i n g the ideas t h a t came f r o m what we p e r c e i v e works automatically.  But  Waldron points  out  t h a t a p e r s o n can  decide  " w h i c h o b j e c t s t o l o o k a t , w h i c h b o o k s t o r e a d and m o r e g e n e r a l l y w h i c h a r g u m e n t s t o l i s t en t o , w h i c h p e o p l e t o t a k e n o t i c e o f and on."  So a law can compel a p e r s o n to t u r n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o  106  so  reading  or  listening  to c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l  b e l i e f , or c o n v e r s e l y may  be d e t r i m e n t a l  w h i c h may  eventually  influence  keep them f r o m h e a r i n g or r e a d i n g m a t e r i a l w h i c h  to government s a n c t i o n e d  religious belief  116).  Note that p u b l i c education  world  are a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y d i c t a t e d by c i v i l  (ibid  c u r r i c u l u m s i n t h e mod.ern w e s t e r n governments w h i c h ,  in  N o r t h A m e r i c a , promote such ideas as e v o l u t i o n w h i c h run c o n t r a r y  to  the t e a c h i n g s f o r c e an but may  of some r e l i g i o n s .  a l t e r a t i o n of  the  it could  i t doesn't a t t e m p t t o  r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of i n d i v i d u a l s ' d i r e c t l y  succeed i n d o i n g so  t h i s does not  In t h i s way  seem to be an  i n d i r e c t l y through e d u c a t i o n . irrational  Therefore,  a p p l i c a t i o n of c o e r c i o n  since  t u r n s t u d e n t s away f r o m t h i n k i n g a b o u t e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r  r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s or f r o m r e l i g i o u s t h i n k i n g i n g e n e r a l . W a l d r o n c o u l d go f a r t h e r s t i l l c o u l d a l s o s u b t l y use s u b j e c t s when he  and  argue that  magistrate  t h e power of h i s a u t h o r i t y and o f f i c e on h i s  i s engaging them i n argument and  suade them to accept h i s b e l i e f s , as Locke a l l o w s Such i n g e n i o u s ,  the  though not  i n f r e q u e n t , use  attempting  to per-  in his Letter  of s t a t u s t o add  (20). to  the  f o r c e of p e r s u a s i o n  does not c o n t r a v e n e the l i m i t s Locke has p l a c e d  on  t h e s t a t e ' s use of  "outward force."  no  argument a g a i n s t  force being  s u r r o u n d s , s u p p o r t s and concentration (Waldron  and  117).  over w h i c h w i l l  apparatus w h i c h  would  be  a distance"  force  does s e e m t o have c o n t r o l  applied,  "indirectly  and  r e a s o n s and  a r g u m e n t s w h i c h a r e p r o p e r and  them,"  at  a p p l i e d to the e p i s t e m i c  g e n e r a t e s b e l i e f , namely s e l e c t i o n , a t t e n t i o n ,  so on, This  Waldron says Locke p r o v i d e s  but w h i c h they w o u l d not  " t o b r i n g men  Proast  put i t ,  to c o n s i d e r  sufficient  have c o n s i d e r e d  107  as  those  to c o n v i n c e  without being  forced  to  (Argument 5).  have  The question for Wladron, as it was for Proast, is:  c i t i z e n s agreed  answer, is  "no"  to the  use  of this subtle  Waldron says one argument  against  belief is not genuine if it is generated thing more like what results from  after,  If  the  then this type of forced persuasion may not be l e g i t -  imately used by the state even under the guise of  brain washing.  coercion?  "education."  his position might be that through c o e r c i o n , but some-  intensive propaganda,  or worse,  And since it is genuine belief that the magistrate is  it is i r r a t i o n a l to force belief  even in this indirect manner.  In defense of L o c k e , Susan Mendus attempts just such a c r i t i c i s m of Waldron by pointing out that Bernard Williams discusses four c o n ditions which are necessary for belief. "the acceptance Condition"  One of them he has called  which says that for  what is needed is both the possibility of agent not saying what he believes) (the agent 152).  " f u l l blown"  belief  "deliberate reticence  (the  and the possibility of insincerity  saying something other than what he believes)  (Mendus  Williams sees legitimate belief as being dependent on the human  w i l l and the ability to assert what one does or does not believe.  It  could be arghued that there is not necessarily any difference, in this ability to assert a belief, between the person whose belief has been forced on him by the state and the person who has come to his beliefs independently. Williams'  It could perhaps be argued that a subject might meet  "acceptance  condition"  even after  being coerced into a  belief through propaganda or brainwashing, and that this fabricated belief might be every bit as  " f u l l blown"  as a belief that is known  to have resulted from non-coercive causal factors.  108  In d i s c u s s i n g the says t h a t  four  " I f a man  false,  he  thereby  states  furthermore  grounds, and  conditions  recognizes  abandons the that  necessary  t h a t w h a t he b e l i e f he  rational  for belief  has  had"  creatures  Williams  been b e l i e v i n g is  ( W i l l i a m s 137).  hold  beliefs  on  He  rational  he a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e r e a r e c a u s a l f a c t o r s w h i c h  produce false beliefs  ( i b i d 143,  149).  T h i s is i n l i n e w i t h the  of b e l i e f and f a i t h L o c k e h i m s e l f h e l d .  can view  In his E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g H u m a n  U n d e r s t a n d i n g L o c k e says t h a t f a i t h , or r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , i s nothing  but  regulated,  a  as  f i r m assent i s our  duty,  t h i n g , but upon good reason; to i t .  He  be  in love  n e i t h e r seeks t r u t h as he due to his M a k e r , who f a c u l t i e s he  This reasoning  has  t o be  and  with  having h i s own  ought, nor  him,  not  be  any  any  opposite  reason for  fancies;  pays the  ( L o c k e Essay  to k e e p him  but  obedience  out  of m i s t a k e s  687).  psychological  ( 1 9 ) , is r a t i o n a l and terms.  Hence  " f u l l blown"  f r o m the  s p e c t i v e , does not s e e m to need a n y t h i n g T h i s c o u l d l e a d one  only on  explainable  religious  purely  belief,  non-theological  as  in per-  m o r e t h a n a p a r t i c u l a r psy-  t o a c c e p t Waldron's c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t i t w o u l d be r a t i o n a l f o r the m a g i s t r a t e i n d i r e c t and  so c a n  to  does not seem to be as i n d e p e n d e n t of the w i l l  g e n u i n e or  chological state.  afforded  be  w o u l d have him use. t h o s e d i s c e r n i n g  given  L o c k e s u g g e s t s i n his L e t t e r  order  cannot  be  if it  p r o c e s s w h i c h l e a d s to the h o l d i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f or f a i t h , and  in c o g n i t i v e and  which  that believes, without  b e l i e v i n g , may  and e r r o r  of. mind:  the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  109  to use c o e r c i o n ,  although  a p p a r a t u s , to t r y t o c h a n g e  beliefs.  But just because  so g i v e n t h i s one conclusion Locke  i t may  argument this s t i l l  does not s u p p o r t the  t h a t the use of f o r c e i s t h e r f o r e l e g i t i m a t e .  o f f e r s three arguments  f o r t o l e r a t i o n , of w h i c h  f r o m t h e n a t u r e of b e l i e f i s o n l y would  be r a t i o n a l f o r t h e m a g i s t r a t e t o do  one.  Recall  that  the argument  Locke's response to  i n a l l l i k e l y h o o d be t h a t W a l d r o n  stronger  Waldron  has f a l l e n i n t o t h e same t r a p  which caught Proast:  he assumes L o c k e ' s a r g u m e n t f o r t o l e r a t i o n is  completely dependent  on t h i s one p r e m i s e w h e n i n f a c t i t is s u p p o r t e d  by  three. Mendus a t t e m p t s . t o save L o c k e  belief  that  beliefs  by p o i n t i n g out t h a t , u n l i k e t h e  i s t h e p r o d u c t of b r a i n w a s h i n g , l e g i t i m a t e r e l i g i o u s  are  not  merely  functionally efficient.  They are  genuine  c o n v i c t i o n s c o m i n g f r o m deep i n s i d e ; t h e y a r e u l t i m a t e and so c o m p e l l i n g t h a t the b e l i e v e r has no c h o i c e i n t h e m a t t e r b e c a u s e h i s b e l i e f is  f o r him  generated  an  undeniable reality.  in the  r i g h t way  and  They  are b e l i e f s that  are held  have  in the right kind  been  of  way  (Mendus 154). W i l l i a m James goes even, f u r t h e r and a r g u e s t h a t g e n u i n e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s a r e i n f a c t i n t u i t i v e and come f r o m a deeper which  rationalism inhabits...  presence they  l e v e l of your n a t u r e t h a n t h e l o q u a c i o u s l e v e l  of a l i v i n g God... y o u r c r i t i c a l  e v e r so s u p e r i o r ,  change his f a i t h But that  If a person  will  feels  the  arguments,  be  vainly set themselves  to  (James 7 2 - 3 ) .  i f religious beliefs - that  leads to s a l v a t i o n - depend  on  i s , the " r i g h t k i n d " intuition  110  and  of b e l i e f s  f e e l i n g s i t seems  f a i r to ask,  How is i t p o s s i b l e to a c c o u n t  for the  innumerable  individuals who have changed their beliefs, not only from one religion to another but from theism to atheism?  Even to argue that religious  belief comes about by miraculous intervention is not enough since, for one thing, miracles can't account for loss of belief the way rational contemplation can.  If one wants to argue, that there is more than  r a t i o n a l i t y behind belief,  then one is in danger of having to allow  for arguments which assume a random change of f a i t h , or the existence of supernatural  influences,  or for a  "miraculous change  over which the agent has no c o n t r o l .  of heart"  Furthermore, is it not possible  that those very feelings or intuitions on which religious beliefs  are  said to be based are the product of contemplation and rational persuasion?  Locke  acknowledges the  efficacy of rational persuasion on  belief when he says in his L e t t e r that the magistrate may  "make use  of arguments, and thereby draw the heterodox into the way of truth," to  "persuade,"  and to  "press  with  arguments,"  to  "admonish,  exhort, convince another of error, and by reasoning to draw him into truth"  (20).  Mendus' defense  of the nature of legitimate belief can't  stand Waldron's own two responses against his argument. (1)  with-  He says that  he finds it hard to imagine what sort of epistemology or philoso-  phy of mind could possibly connect the nature of the way belief was acquired  with  "•correct belief"  the  efficacy  of those  b e l i e f s and  ( 2 ) that  the  approach  appears to place such great demands  on the notion of  genuine belief as to lead us to doubt the genuineness of  111  everything (Waldron  we  normally  c o u n t as a b e l i e f in o r d i n a r y  118).  Mendus r e s p o n d s t h a t  " i t is one  thing  must be c a u s a l l y e x p l i c a b l e i n some way, way  is as  good as any  are e q u a l l y g e n u i n e "  strong, p e r s u a s i o n "full  blown"  other  and  say  a s s i s t e d by  the  use  of f o r c e ,  the  held  as  a g e n t of w h i c h t h e y a r e ,  as  (Letter  19).  outside  ference  between  Not  only an  will  agent's  and  belief  not  easy  developed,  adults.  the  notice "real"  This  shown  matter  to  brainwash  i t is e x t r e m e l y  is i n f a c t t h e  that  attempts to  difficult  e f f e c t of  to  issue L o c k e was eradicate  i t may  change  the  n o n - i n t e l l e c t u a l n a t u r e of t h i s b e l i e f  the  addressing,  and  a not  history  completely  in  b e c a u s e of  agent's l i f e ,  (Mendus 155).  be  b e l i e f s of  proved unsuccessful on  stronger  b e l i e f s are  religious belief  religious belief  would  theology.  while  c h i l d r e n whose  (such as i n c o m m u n i s t R u s s i a )  holistic  says t h a t  dif-  belief,  A b e t t e r a r g u m e n t is t h a t G o d  a b o v e , is w h e n she  truth  the  d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t a k e n by Mendus, t h a t is p e r h a p s a  relatively  adults  be  i t is the  and  know, but t h a t w o u l d be d i g r e s s i n g i n t o the r e a l m of  has  still  mind that  observers  fabricated  agent himself.  a r g u m e n t t h a n the  any  be c a u s e d i n a number of d i f f e r e n t ways, i n c l u d i n g  in t h e i r own  fully  a l l belief  q u i t e a n o t h e r to say t h a t  L o c k e puts i t , f u l l y s a t i s f i e d  A  that  But Waldron's p o i n t a b o v e is t h a t  or g e n u i n e b e l i e f s by  n e i t h e r w i l l the  to  that a l l sincerely expressed beliefs  (Mendus 154).  p e r h a p s b e l i e f s can  life  But  and  the  Waldron's  r e p l y m i g h t be t h a t L o c k e has o v e r l o o k e d  the f a c t t h a t the s t a t e need  not  a c h i e v e i t s end  concern  itself with  adults.  e x c l u s i v e l y on the e d u c a t i o n  It may  of c h i l d r e n .  112  by  For example, while  focusing Russian  communist education theless  achieved  population Russia's  but  d i d not  such  eradicated  far-reaching  a l l religious belief,  effect,  over several generations,  communist  era  might  be  not  that  on  the  other  missed Locke's point. w h a t he  He  those  r i g h t f u l l y able  a n t i - r e l i g i o n propaganda e f f o r t s were in f a c t Wootton,  i t is not  his c h o i c e  third arguments  theory  belief  (Wootton  103).  person  predict  future  m a t t e r s , and  to  conform  rather  being  than He  therefore  explorations  the  of  ineffectual  explains  that  eventualities  the  of, God  may  to  the  be w r o n g in Wootton  problems in d e c i s i o n -  while for  of  coercion  experts  can  example,  in making decisions about their finances,-  over  help  a  financial an  m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o n  f o l l o w i n g the a d v i c e  of  L i k e Mendus, W o o t t o n a r g u e s t h a t r e l i g i o u s j u d g e m e n t s need to  c i t i z e n to of  allow  the  Locke's main certain  completely  according  nature  in,  t h a t is f r o m p e r s o n a l  W o o t t o n says L o c k e a r g u e s t h a t  advice  their  i t is r a t i o n a l f o r a p e r s o n t o c o n s u l t s u c h  r e a c h e d i n the r i g h t way,  tion.  claim that  the p o w e r to c o m p e l  belief  r e q u i r e s i n c e r e b e l i e f t h a t goes b e y o n d s i m p l y  be  during  of w h i c h r e l i g i o n to c o m p e l c i t i z e n s to f o l l o w ) .  making  others.  in p o w e r  (first, that neither  s e c o n d , t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e  sees t h e s e a r g u m e n t s as  expert  single  hand, sees W a l d r o n as h a v i n g  possible  d i c t a t e s of a n o t h e r , and,  a  sees L o c k e ' s m a i n a r g u m e n t a r i s i n g out  c a l l s , his f i r s t and  since  to  over  successful.  nor c i t i z e n s t h e m s e l v e s have g i v e n the m a g i s t r a t e them  only  i t none-  the  civil  argument  decisions  that  state  to  authorities  irrational for  as  and  the  in matters to  i t is i r r a t i o n a l ,  113  convic-  i t is t h e r e f o r e  act  is, according  b e l i e f and  expert of  Wootton, and  take  religious that  perhaps  the  belief.  "there  impossible,  are to  allow  others  to m a k e on  suggests, t h a t  our  behalf,"  i t is i r r a t i o n a l  and  f o r the  not  s t a t e to  simply, coerce  as  Waldron  belief  (ibid  104). The God  question  f o r b o t h W o o t t o n and  M e n d u s i s , i f we  t o f i g u r e i n the a r g u m e n t i n t e r m s of b e i n g  arrived  at  belief  in  "the  r i g h t way,"  m o d e r n m e t h o d s of p e r s u a s i o n g e n u i n e , and  the judge of who  t h e n why  c o n v i c t i o n be a r r i v e d at by means of s t a t e  don't a l l o w  can't a  "education"  depth  and  sincere,  identical psychological state that  be r e a c h e d by e a c h p e r s o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y ?  of  f o r c e of  t h a t is e v e r y b i t as p r o f o u n d ,  f u l l - b l o w n as the  has  can  Wootton's and Mendus' a r g u -  m e n t s b o t h seem to r e q u i r e a means of o b j e c t i v e l y j u d g i n g  the  origin  of b e l i e f t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e s the a c c e p t a n c e of p r e m i s e s d e f e n d i n g  the  existence  in  the  a b s e n c e of such p r e m i s e s Waldron's c o n c l u s i o n s t i l l holds - i t may  be  possible by  of  and  God  in the  p o s i t i o n of  j u d i c i o u s f o r a s t a t e to  generating  those  deep  ideal observer.  influence  psychological  states  But  r e l i g i o u s judgements c a l l e d b e l i e f s in i t s  c i t i z e n s t h r o u g h the v a r i o u s means at i t s d i s p o s a l .  Both Wooton  Mendus w o u l d h a v e been m o r e s u c c e s s f u l in t h e i r d e f e n s e of L o c k e p o i n t i n g out inherent  t h a t , i n m a k i n g his a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g  in the  s t a t e ' s use  of f o r c e t o g e n e r a t e b e l i e f ,  f a i l e d to a c c o u n t f o r L o c k e ' s two Locke  other  also, s t a t e s i n his L e t t e r t h a t i t is i r r a t i o n a l  not  b e l i e v e and  and l o s e his soul a n y w a y such  " p r a c t i c e may  stand  t h e r e b y be  rationality Waldron  go  to f o r c e through  g u i l t y of the s i n of  ( L o c k e L e t t e r 19).  has  a the  hypocrisy  But W a l d r o n a r g u e s t h a t  i n some s o r t of g e n e r a t i v e  114  by  arguments.  p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e on a p e r s o n s i n c e he may m o t i o n s but  the  and  and  supportive  r e l a t i o n to b e l i e f which  surrounds,  - t h a t i s to say nurtures  v i c t i o n of w h i c h t r u e ( W a l d r o n 118). p r a c t i c e may  and  i t may  be  s u s t a i n s the  religion,  of  the  apparatus  s o r t of i n t e l l e c t u a l  in Locke's  In o t h e r w o r d s , a l a w  part  opinion,  is composed"  requiring a particular religious  not c h a n g e b e l i e f i m m e d i a t e l y , but i t may  be r a t i o n a l f o r  the s t a t e t o f o r c e s u c h a p r a c t i c e as an i n d i r e c t means of (ibid).  conclude that  t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e ' s  rationally  can  inappropriate  In r e s p o n s e to  no  longer  i n the  say  Waldron,  is p r o b a b l y  leads  Wootton  p o i n t s out  approach  w r o n g i n his c h o i c e  119).  that Locke's  third  when  he  a u t h o r i t y to  it.  his c i t i z e n s , the m a g i s t r a t e  the  salvation.  the  mass of  the  wrong  F u r t h e r m o r e , and  Locke's  L o c k e would  to Waldron's m o d e r n c r i t i c i s m as  d i d to those of his c o n t e m p o r a r y , J o n a s P r o a s t :  attend  the  therefore  at f i r s t s e e m c o m p e l l i n g ,  have r e s p o n d e d the same way  b e l i e f on  says t h a t  of r e l i g i o n and  a r g u m e n t s i n his L e t t e r do i n f a c t a d e q u a t e l y c o u n t e r  he  p o w e r is  ( W o o t t o n 104).  W h i l e Waldron's a r g u m e n t may  probably  to  (ibid  r a t i o n a l c i t i z e n s w o u l d not hand o v e r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g magistrate  Waldron  s e r v i c e of t r u e r e l i g i o n "  argument addresses this attempted magistrate  This  "avoiding  a decline in genuine religious f a i t h " "we  con-  may  church  first,  in forcing  be c o e r c i n g his c i t i z e n s t o  - one  that  does not  much more importantly,  i n the  lead  to  type  of  p o l i t i c a l arrangement L o c k e envisions in a tolerant commonwealth, free and  e q u a l c i t i z e n s w o u l d n e v e r c o n s e n t to f o r c e b e i n g used on t h e m by  the m a g i s t r a t e  f o r r e l i g i o u s p u r p o s e s , e v e n i f i t w e r e only the  f o r c e of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n , in o t h e r w o r d s , " i n d i r e c t l y  and  censorship,  at a d i s t a n c e . "  115  subtle  or a d v e r t i s i n g ,  It does not  matter,  as b o t h Mendus and W o o t t o n argue, t h a t b r a i n w a s h i n g or i n d o c t r i n a t i o n leads  to  "the  salvation. that  From  f r e e and  magistrate  wrong a  kind"  of  political  belief,  point  of  view,  Locke's Of  A g a i n , the m a g i s t r a t e  C i v i l , and  w r i t e s t h a t the  the  society  more  stands  E n g l a n d of his day  who  point  is  greater to  the  gain.  d o i n g so  i n m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o n ,  "unbounded l i b e r t y , " other  things,  (1768),  l i b e r t y i n m a t t e r s of  He  says  that  the  and  on  Joseph  religion,  t o l e r a t i o n in  (117).  Drawing  Holland,  and  on  Poland,  " t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of u n b o u n d e d  p r o m i s e t o be (108).  so  very  favourable  R e c a l l that far from  to  calling  L o c k e c a l l s f o r the s t a t e t o not t o l e r a t e ,  "opinions  contrary  t o human s o c i e t y , or  m o r a l r u l e s w h i c h are n e c e s s a r y to the p r e s e r v a t i o n  those  of c i v i l s o c i e t y "  61).  Priestley t h e i r ideas may so  on t h e m  illegitimately.  " i s f a r f r o m being c o m p l e t e "  best i n t e r e s t s of m a n k i n d "  (Letter  the  a t t e m p t s to use s u c h means  e x a m p l e s of F r a n c e , E n g l a n d , P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  among  important  Religious Liberty  P r i e s t l e y says h i s t o r y has shown t h a t  for  to  E s s a y on the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s of G o v e r n m e n t and  Priestley,  the  lead  Opinions  the N a t u r e of P o l i t i c a l ,  liberty,  not  Intolerance...  In his book An  the  the  will  t o use t h e s e s u b t l e f o r m s of m i n d m a n i p u l a t i o n  t o f o r c e b e l i e f o n his s u b j e c t s w o u l d be  (a)  that  r a t i o n a l c i t i z e n s w o u l d n e v e r c o n s e n t to a l l o w i n g  their children.  (5)  one  writes  that  a l l religions,  seem to o u t s i d e r s , have  that, in f a c t , they enforce  no  matter  how  subversive  "some s a l v o f o r good m o r a l s ;  the m o r e e s s e n t i a l p a r t s , at l e a s t , of  116  that conduct, 110).  which the good order  According  to Priestley,  of s o c i e t y r e q u i r e s "  i f an o u t r a g e o u s  religious  s h o u l d l e a d t o an i l l e g a l a c t i t i s s i m p l y a m a t t e r r e s t r a i n e d by a c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e Therefore for,  may  civil  belief  in the interest  be d e t r i m e n t a l to s o c i e t y .  is a r g u i n g  against Locke,  the magistrate  denying  resulting  he says.  ruling a  calling  against,  some  possible action  that  W i t h o u t s a y i n g so d i r e c t l y , P r i e s t l e y toleration  of a l l  t h e p r i n c i p l e made by L o c k e h i m s e l f w i t h i n the church  - and by  t h e n e c e s s i t y of t h e p r o v i s o L o c k e has a d d e d on - t h a t a l l  and t h a t t h e r e  estate"  of a v o i d i n g  has no j u r i s d i c t i o n  o p i n i o n s a r e a l l o w e d so l o n g as dice,  and  and f o r the a b s o l u t e  r e l i g i o u s o p i n i o n , by e x t e n d i n g that  operating w i t h i n c i v i l laws,  authority judging,  belief  of t h a t a c t b e i n g  t h e r e i s no need t o h a v e w h a t L o c k e seems t o be  namely,  religious  (Priestley  " t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h r e c e i v e no p r e j u -  be no i n j u r y  done t o any man,  either  l i f e or  ( L e t t e r 4 8 ) . P r i e s t l e y saw t h e b e n e f i t s t o t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h from  outweighing  allowing  the free  any p o s s i b i l i t y  expression  of d i r e c t  of a l l o p i n i o n s  harm  from  as f a r  these  opinions.  S p e a k i n g of t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h as a c o n s t a t l y g r o w i n g and  developing  e n t i t y , he w r o t e , "The m o r e l i b e r t y i s g i v e n t o e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h i s i n a s t a t e of g r o w t h t h e m o r e p e r f e c t i t w i l l b e c o m e " Twentieth  ( P r i e s t l e y 137).  c e n t u r y p h i l o s o p h e r John R a w l s says t h a t w h i l e  Locke  has  based h i s l i m i t a t i o n s t o t o l e r a t i o n on w h a t he supposes i s  "clear  and  e v i d e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e s e c u r i t y of p u b l i c o r d e r "  drawing  hasty  conclusions  opinions, and the h a r m f u l atheists would  regarding  the danger  L o c k e is  to society from  e f f e c t s the i n t o l e r a n t , C a t h o l i c s , and  h a v e on a s o c i e t y , w i t h o u t  117  t h e b e n e f i t of s u f f i c i e n t  empirical evidence.  More  e x p e r i e n c e , says R a w l s ,  have c o n v i n c e d h i m t h a t he was m i s t a k e n R a w l s says r e l i g i o u s o p i n i o n , only  be l i m i t e d  d o i n g so w i l l maintain" based  when  there is  on m o r e  ( J u s t i c e 121).  or  "liberty  order which  This  than merely  presumably  of c o n s c i e n c e "  the government should  "reasonable expectation"  s h o u l d be  t h e m a g i s t r a t e ' s w o r r i e s t h a t an  might harm the commonwealth.  may  "a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t not  damage t h e p u b l i c  (A T h e o r y 2 1 3 ) .  would  opinion  R a w l s says i t must be based on  e v i d e n c e and w a y s  of r e a s o n i n g a c c e p t a b l e t o a l l .  It  must be s u p p o r t e d by o r d i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n and modes of thought inquiry  (including where  generally the  the methods  these  a r e not c o n t r o v e r s i a l )  r e c o g n i z e d as c o r r e c t . . .  security  of p u b l i c  order  the  certain high  or imminent...  place which  conscience and freedom The  question Rawls'  criterion  to e x p e c t t h a t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s "reasonably  certain  must  which  n o t be  be  are  merely  p r o b a b l e , but r e a s o n -  This requirement accorded  of thought raises  scientific  The c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r  should  p o s s i b l e or i n c e r t a i n c a s e s e v e n ably  of r a t i o n a l  expresses  to l i b e r t y  of  (A Theory 213).  i s , is i t i n f a c t  realistic  of an o p i n i o n c a n e v e r be shown t o be  or i m m i n e n t " ?  With  such  stringent  criterion  R a w l s c e r t a i n l y a l l o w s f o r f a r f e w e r , i f any, c a s e s of i n t o l e r a n c e of opinion than i t appears Priestley,  sees  Locke  c a l l s f o r i n his L e t t e r .  the possibility  virtually non-existent.  of harm  coming  from  Rawls,  like  o p i n i o n s as  O n l y a c t i o n s h a r m f u l t o t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h , may  be r e a c t e d a g a i n s t by t h e m a g i s t r a t e ; n e v e r o p i n i o n s t h e m s e l v e s .  118  (b)  Of The  Intolerant  In his L e t t e r L o c k e says the in  the  name of t h e i r r e l i g i o n ,  which threaten  s t a t e need not  t o l e r a t e those  a r r o g a t e s p e c i a l p o w e r s to  who,  themselves  the c i v i l r i g h t s of o t h e r s in a c o m m u n i t y ( L o c k e 6 2 - 3 ) .  This includes,  he  says, t h a t the  refuse  to  be  tolerant  refuse  to  teach  of  the  s t a t e s h o u l d not  t o l e r a t e those  r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of  r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n to  others  their followers.  who  and  who  These  in-  t o l e r a n t ones, says L o c k e , are a t h r e a t to the s t a t e s i n c e t h e y m e r e l y use  the  toleration afforded  own  strength  so t h a t t h e y may  and  t a k e the  estates  and  basis of his c o n t r a c t u a l  t h e m by one  the m a g i s t r a t e to b u i l d up  day  fortunes  take absolute p o l i t i c a l control,  of o t h e r s f o r t h e m s e l v e s .  preserving,  i n t e r e s t s of the  c i t i z e n s of t h a t s t a t e .  equality  of  procure, logical  two  preserve, to  say  that  the''interests  the  they  cannot  allow  S i n c e L o c k e sees l i b e r t y  and  that  intolerance  state  wish  i t seems to to  be  to him  tolerated  i n t o l e r a n t as a  requirement  S t i l l , R a w l s , l i k e L o c k e , a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e must  be some l i m i t s to t o l e r a t i o n . r e s u l t i f i t w e r e based the  the  created.  R a w l s sees the t o l e r a t i o n of the  of a t o l e r a n t s t a t e .  the  a d v a n c i n g of  c i t i z e n s of  and  and/or a d v a n c e f o r t h e m s e l v e s ,  w i t h i n the t o l e r a n t s t a t e t h e y h a v e But  On  t h e o r y of s o c i e t y , L o c k e sees the p u r p o s e of  a c o m m o n w e a l t h to be the p r o c u r i n g ,  as  their  R a w l s t h e o r i z e s that a just state would  on  principles that  free  to f u r t h e r t h e i r own  and  r a t i o n a l persons  concerned  i n t e r e s t s w o u l d a c c e p t i n an  initial  p o s i t i o n of e q u a l i t y as d e f i n i n g the f u n d a m e n t a l t e r m s of their association  (A T h e o r y  119  11).  In  this initial  w h e r e , no not  or  "original position,"  Rawls  calls  it else-  p e r s o n w o u l d k n o w f o r c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e y w o u l d or w o u l d  be p a r t of the  dominant r e l i g i o n if i t were allowed that  c o u l d p r o m o t e a f a v o r i t e c h u r c h and rational  as  individuals  i n the  p e r s e c u t e the  original position  the  rest.  would  Therefore,  "insist  e q u a l r i g h t to d e c i d e w h a t his r e l i g i o u s o b l i g a t i o n s  are"  upon  (ibid  In o t h e r w o r d s e a c h p e r s o n w o u l d c h o o s e r e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m and tion  for  a l l in order  individuals right  to  require  i n the  to  self-preservation, t h a t men  the  says  Citizens  rational  " j u s t i c e does  w h i l e o t h e r s d e s t r o y the  basis  It w o u l d s e e m t h e r e f o r e t h a t the  Rawls,  of c o n s c i e n c e " But the  says, the  given  "just  cases  enough  threat  to a p e a c e f u l  the not of  justice exist-  allow  when "when  equal  liberties  to a l l ,  constitution which guarantees  danger f r o m  time  within  the  a  intolerant.  tolerant  its intolerance  and  state,  accept  In an  liberty  219). i n t o l e r a n t s e c t s h o u l d pose an  constitution"  s t a t e may  i n no  " t e n d to l o s e  (ibid  w h a t i f the  or  should  i n t o l e r a n t , so l o n g as the  intolerant sect w i l l  itself,"  tolera-  intolerant.  intolerant.  special  But  217).  undoubtedly claim  R a w l s puts i t ,  to t o l e r a t e  t h e s e l i b e r t i e s is s e c u r e and  to  themselves.  an  R a w l s says t h e r e is no r e a s o n f o r a g e n e r a l d e n i a l of f r e e d o m  including  fact,  as  ( i b i d 218).  e n c e posed by the  the  or  must s t a n d i d l y by  w o u l d a l l o w c i t i z e n s not  But  it for  o r i g i n a l position would also  their existence"  to  secure  state  l i m i t the  of  "a  well-ordered  society?"  f r e e d o m s of the i n t o l e r a n t  i t is n e c e s s a r y the  immediate  tolerant  for  sincerely  120  preserving and  with  threat Rawls  " o n l y in the equal  liberty  reason  believe  t h a t t h e i r own danger"  s e c u r i t y and  (ibid  limited  220).  t h a t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of l i b e r t y are i n  And  when the liberty  " i t is done f o r the  constitution  sake  of e q u a l  the p r i n c i p l e s of w h i c h  of t h e i n t o l e r a n t i s liberty  under  a  the i n t o l e r a n t themselves  would  a c k n o w l e d g e i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n "  (ibid).  with  t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a t o l e r a n t  Locke  that,  i n o r d e r to p r o t e c t  So w h i l e  just  Rawls  agrees  s t a t e f r o m the a c t i o n s of t h e i n t o l e r a n t , i t i s at t i m e s n e c e s s a r y l i m i t the f r e e d o m  of the i n t o l e r a n t to a c t , he d i s a g r e e s  position that opinions (c)  Of  In his L e t t e r L o c k e  afford  to Another P r i n c e " a l s o says t h a t t h e s t a t e need  "deliver themselves  another prince"  Locke's  t h e m s e l v e s must at t i m e s not be t o l e r a t e d .  "Those Devoted  t h o s e who  with  ( L o c k e 63).  up By  not t o l e r a t e  to the p r o t e c t i o n and  s e r v i c e of  t h i s he means t h a t t h e s t a t e can't  to t o l e r a t e e i t h e r the C a t h o l i c c h u r c h  whose m e m b e r s  claim  a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e Pope, or o t h e r r e l i g i o n s w h o s e m e m b e r s h o l d obeying  their  leaders  of  church's  their  state.  leaders  takes  Locke  sees  precedence such  over  religious devotion  c i t i z e n s and' t h e i r s t a t e t h a t w i l l be d e t r i m e n t a l  that  obeying  c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t of l o y a l t y  the  to  the as  a  between  to t h e w e l l - b e i n g  of  state. In r e p l y , P r i e s t l e y says t h a t i t may  an e v i l b e c a u s e the C a t h o l i c c h u r c h at one dissenters.  But  a  "mature  n e c e s s a r y to r e n d e r m o r e e v i l the f i r s t faith"  place,  he  be s a i d t h a t C a t h o l i c i s m is time persecuted  consideration" f o r a past e v i l  says, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t  w i l l e v e r a p p e a l t o any  shows  but t h e  121  that  (Priestley  Protestant i t i s not 119).  "so a b s u r d a s y s t e m  " l o w e s t and  most  In of  illiterate  of o u r common p e o p l e " state  (ibid-120).  a n d w i l l t h e r e f o r e n e v e r have any e f f e c t on t h e  Persecution  or i n t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d C a t h o l i c s  in f a c t be used by C a t h o l i c s t o a r g u e t h a t P r o t e s t a n t i s m finds  i t necessary  to attack  P r i e s t l e y , makes t h e m an secret  one  Poland,  a  (ibid  is so w e a k i t  B u t t o l e r a t i n g them,  "open e n e m y "  122).  "popish  its rival.  says  w h i c h is l e s s d a n g e r o u s t h a n a  Furthermore, P r i e s t l e y points  country,"  could  is presently  showing  out that  more t o l e r a t i o n  t h a n E n g l a n d , and a n o t h e r C a t h o l i c n a t i o n , F r a n c e , may soon i m p r o v e on its  level  of t o l e r a t i o n .  persecuted British  This  may  r e s u l t i n a mass  c i t i z e n s t o more t o l e r a n t p l a c e s .  n e c e s s a r y , says P r i e s t l e y ,  emigration  It is therefore  f o rself-preservation that  tolerant toward a l l i t s people, even the  "popish  of  ones"  England  be  (ibid 125).  So w h i l e L o c k e has a r g u e d f o r t h e n o n - t o l e r a t i o n o f C a t h o l i c s a n d a l l those who h o l d a l l e g i a n c e t o a  "foreign prince"  b e c a u s e he sees  a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e i n d i vidual  and the state,  reasons: and  Priestley calls  f o r toleration f o r prudential  i t a l l o w s f o r t h e open o b s e r v a t i o n  of e n e m i e s o f t h e s t a t e ,  i t p r e v e n t s l a r g e numbers f r o m e m i g r a t i n g  out of the i n t o l e r a n t  state. One the  reading  breaking  of the L e t t e r  of c i v i l , l a w s  s p e a k i n g on b e h a l f due 59).  i n t h e name  of someone c l a i m i n g  o f C h r i s t o r G o d , by s t a t i n g t h a t  in the first place This  makes i t seem that L o c k e allows for  t o God, and a f t e r w a r d s  seems t o a l l o w  c i v i l l a w s t o be p e r p e t r a t e d  "obedience is  to the laws"  f o r a l l m a n n e r of a c t i o n s t h a t i n t h e name of  t o be  (Letter contravene  o b e d i e n c e t o those who  c l a i m t o be s p e a k i n g w i t h a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y f r o m G o d , as v a r i o u s  122  cult  leaders have done r e c e n t l y . who claim allegiance to sing  this  modern  followers state. to  obey  Undoubtedly  authority  the  seriously  which  Locke  the  over  secular  of  cult  of  stability  does  worshippers  affairs light  or  of  vene  affairs  this  does not  in  reflect  give  but  the  nature  leaders  laws  as  state,  of  cult  secular  church,  of  view  of  in  the  the  insist  civil if  state  on  giving  at  all  only  with  religion,  authority, of  is  freedom,  their their allowed  religious would to  secular  be  God's  laws  may  as r e v e a l e d with  salvation it  were  state  concerned  the  addres-  of  priority  that  those  that  so-called  He saw God's laws,  of  of  laws  cults  secular  belief  not  name  that  the  his  who  the  Locke's  be b r o k e n i n t h e n a m e o f r e l i g i o n . his  to  their  Therefore,  laws  leaders  acknowledge  laws  intolerance  does a good job of  contrary  would  and  threatened.  prince"  run  secular  peace  Locke's call for  "another  problem  laws  contravene  laws  day  But  of  secular  souls.  clear  that  or r i g h t  to  their  religious  beliefs,  that  the state  need not  to  In  Locke contra-  or  on  a  claim to authority f r o m God.  (d)  Of  Atheists  Locke those  also  who  Human  atheist  "deny  society  covenants  argues  is  in  his L e t t e r  the being of based  on  God,"  bonds  in other  that  are  words,  created  atheists  through  not  believe  w i l l h a v e no h o l d on h i m .  God,  says  Locke,  his  oaths  Since  and  " T h e t a k i n g away of God, t h o u g h but even  says  to Locke,  are t h e r e f o r e a t h r e a t to the m u t u a l t r u s t w h i c h binds  together.  "dissolves  Furthermore,  all"  since  123  (ibid).  atheists  Atheists,  are,  by  an  promises  thought,"  society  Locke,  in  (64).  promises,  a n d o a t h s s w o r n t o be u p h e l d i n t h e n a m e o f G o d .  does  tolerate  in  according human  definition,  i r r e l i g i o u s t h e y c a n l o g i c a l l y h a v e no c l a i m On  t h e o t h e r hand, P r i e s t l e y  h e r e t i c s as h a v i n g  sees  to religious  toleration.  t h e o p i n i o n s o f a t h e i s t s and  " n o t h i n g f o r m i d a b l e or a l a r m i n g i n them,"  among t h e most e a s i l y  refuted.  It is t h e r e f o r e completely  and  unneces-  s a r y , i n h i s o p i n i o n , t o p e r s e c u t e t h o s e who h o l d such p o i n t s o f v i e w . In  fact  t h e r e i s a d a n g e r t h a t p e r s e c u t i o n may  C h r i s t i a n s t o t a k e up t h e c a u s e Furthermore, mine which may  find  of t h e p e r s e c u t e d  actually  lead  (Priestley  some  173-4).  he says, i t seems an i m p o s s i b l e t a s k t o a t t e m p t t o d e t e r -  b e l i e f s a r e i n f a c t h e r e t i c a l or a t h e i s t i c . himself  having  t o punish  not only  The m a g i s t r a t e  those  who  "directly  m a i n t a i n t h e p r i n c i p l e s of a t h e i s m but he must punish t h o s e who do i t indirectly" b e l i e f s may atheism.  (ibid then  181).  The problem  be. punished  because  But, although Priestley  a t h e i s m and argues  t h a t they  i s t h a t t o o many they  a r e seen  harmless  as l e a d i n g t o  c o n s i d e r s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of  a r e n o t as d i r e as L o c k e supposes,  does not a d d r e s s L o c k e ' s c o n c e r n  he  directly.  In o r d e r t o r e s p o n d t o L o c k e one needs t o argue, as P i e r r e B a y l e did  shortly  atheism  before  Locke  is the source  ( L a b r o u s s e 80).  wrote  his L e t t e r ,  of a l l vices  "the notion that  i s d i s p r o v e d by  experience"  T h e r e seems t o be no p r o v a b l e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n  r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e and m o r a l d e p e n d a b i l i t y reply  that  t h a t an a t h e i s t ' s keeping, h i s p r o m i s e s  ( D u n n 188).  L o c k e might  is contrary to his dis-  b e l i e f i n G o d , and t h a t t h i s d i s b e l i e f w i l l some day l e a d t h e a t h e i s t to  a c t i n a way t h a t i s h a r m f u l t o s o c i e t y .  But two replies to Locke  a r e p o s s i b l e : one i s t h a t many who c a l l t h e m s e l v e s  C h r i s t i a n s a l s o do  not k e e p t h e i r p r o m i s e s , c o v e n a n t s , and o a t h s , d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t h i s  124  belief two,  i n God  does not  necessarily make a c i t i z e n  t h a t i t is n e i t h e r the c a s e t h a t  e v e n but i n t h o u g h t , d i s s o l v e s a l l , " p r o m i s e s are 109).  m e a n i n g l e s s to an  "the t a k i n g a w a y of God, nor  trait  which  is not  and  though  is i t the c a s e t h a t o a t h s  atheist  ( L o c k e L e t t e r 64,  It seems r e a s o n a b l e to suppose that  character  trustworthy;  and  Wootton  trustworthiness  necessarily connected  with  a  is a  belief in  God. J o h n R a w l s w r i t e s t h a t e q u a l l i b e r t y of c o n s c i e n c e , to r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , within  a  is  just s o c i e t y  "consistent  with  ( J u s t i c e 116).  a sense of  allow  a t h e i s t s t o f r e e l y d i s b e l i e v e i n God  - w h i c h is i n e f f e c t t h e i r  belief  - t h e n , under R a w l s ' t h e o r y ,  r e l e g a t e d t h e m t o an u n e q u a l  i n f e r i o r s t a t u s w i t h i n t h a t s o c i e t y , not c o m m u n i t y w i t h i n t h a t s o c i e t y but The is  not  question an  a t h e i s m has  can  too  i t s e l f t o be  Since  unjust.  a t h e i s m , l i k e any surrender,  belief,  harm-  p e a c e and  to  of  e m p i r i c a l l y p r o v e d i t s e l f t h r o u g h o u t h i s t o r y to be should  choose  sense  since  or b o t h of t h e s e r e a s o n s ?  simply  w e a k e n i n g the  and  and  l e s s t o s e c u l a r s o c i e t y , why  t a i n i n g the  proving  for L o c k e then i s :  a t t i t u d e one  only  society  community"  does not  i t has  If a  w h e n i t comes  i t not be t o l e r a t e d f o r e i t h e r  one  It seems t h a t i n h i s e n t h u s i a s m f o r m a i n -  s t a b i l i t y of s o c i e t y L o c k e may  f a r i n his i n t o l e r a n c e of  atheism.  125  have gone a b i t  Chapter 5 - Conclusion  In the final analysis it is. clear that L o c k e ' s L e t t e r Concerning Toleration criticisms,  not  only  addresses  of his. 17th c e n t u r y  the  concerns,  and  contemporaries  survives  and the  the  historical  events of his day, his arguments for religious t o l e r a t i o n continue to display a v i t a l i t y that enables  the modern reader to apply L o c k e ' s  reasoning and arguments to current events. The p r o b l e m of f r i n g e  r e l i g i o u s groups  or c u l t s  authority d i r e c t l y from God, and sometimes perpetrate their fellow  c i t i z e n s in the  name  of r e l i g i o n ,  who  claim  crimes against  was as s e r i o u s  concern in L o c k e ' s day as it is in the twentieth century.  a  Locke's  reasoning allowed the fringe groups of his day the right and freedom to hold and express any opinions that were not contrary to the welfare of society, but did not allow them to act on those opinions that would break c i v i l law, and thereby harm their fellow c i t i z e n s , in the of  their  religion.  This • same reasoning may be applied today,  name and  works equally as well in today's modern society as it did in L o c k e ' s day.  126  Locke's reasoning concerning the nature of belief - that it can't be forced on an individual from the outside, nor can he or she simply d e c i d e to b e l i e v e  -  s t i l l holds t o d a y .  Locke argued, especially  against Proast, that belief may not be compelled by civil authorities, and that citizens have not allowed civil authorities on them.  to force  belief  Locke argued that, in order that the right kind of beliefs  may develop, that is, the kind that lead to salvation, everyone must be allowed the freedom to develop their about  forced belief  own beliefs.  The question  was r a i s e d again in this c e n t u r y  Waldron, but Locke's reasoning still holds.  by Jeremy  In fact we have modern-  day evidence that compelling people to believe does not work:  in  communist Russia forcing belief failed, first because people could not simply  discard their  deeply  presented by the  state,  given  leaders  their  eventually  civil  held religious beliefs  and second, the  power  rebelled against their  argument holds:  and accept  those  the citizens of Russia had not to  force  illegitimate  beliefs  on them  use of force.  and  Locke's  compelling people to believe that which they are not  convinced of in themselves was just as wrong in communist Russia as it was in the France and England of Locke's day. Locke also warned that compelling citizens through force of civil laws  to  believe  a  particular  probable that the belief one is in fact  religion  irrational  since  chosen by the civil authorities as the  not the way to salvation at  certain about their  all.  it  is  right  No one can be so  particular church that they can guarantee salva-  tion to those who follow its teachings. directed at  is  fanatical,  right  The same argument may be  wing fundamentalists of all persuasions  127  who insist on forcing their on entire populations. true religion mistaken  by means of secular  Those who promote their religion as  that will lead to salvation"  today  as those  Religious toleration, for  beliefs,  who  claimed  are the  as Locke advocated it,  just  and the most logical way,  salvation for  for  "the only  as likely  to  same in L o c k e ' s and as many are  it today by means of the premises offered by Locke,  legitimate,  legislation,  rational  be  day.  arguing  is the only  citizens  to  find  themselves.  So while his letter  has sometimes been c r i t i c i z e d as being too  parochial or historically bound it seems evident  that it has stood the  test of time and will continue to exert an influence on discussions of universal  religious  this year,  1995 - the year the United Nations has declared  of Toleration" -  toleration,  and  toleration  in  but for generations yet to come.  128  general,  not  only  "The Year  Selected Bibliography  Cranston, Maurice.  "John L o c k e and t h e Case f o r T o l e r a t i o n . "  and Horton John Locke Dunn, John.  78-97.  " T h e c l a i m t o f r e e d o m of c o n s c i e n c e :  freedom of thought, freedom of w o r s h i p ? " Goldie,  Mark.  "John  1688-1692." Gough,  J.W.  Locke,  Jonas Proast  "The  Ole P e t e r ,  Development  J o n a t h a n I.  P e r s e c u t i o n to T o l e r a t i o n . Groffier,  of  Grell and  Locke's  171-193.  religious  toleration  Human Rights.  Don Mills:  Belief  in  Toleration."  57-77.  Israel,  and N i c h o l a s T y a c k e ed.  Oxford:  E t h e l and M i c h e l P a r a d i s , e d .  Frrjm  Clarendon, 1991. The N o t i o n of T o l e r a n c e and  Carlton UP, 1991.  H o r t o n , John and Susan Mendus, e d . Methuen,  f r e e d o m of s p e e c h ,  Walsh et a l , 1 4 3 - 1 7 1 .  Mendus and Horton John Locke Grell,  Mendus  A s p e c t s of T o l e r a t i o n .  London:  1985. John L o c k e :  T o l e r a t i o n in f o c u s .  A Letter  London: Routledge, 1991.  129  Concerning  _ and Horton John L o c k e James, W i l l i a m .  The  P.J.  "John  Toleration."  and  Toleration."  1903.  New  ed.  Locke:  Authority,  Conscience  Mendus and Horton John L o c k e  Labrousse, Elisabeth.  Mendus  1-11.  V a r i e t i e s of R e l i g i o u s E x p e r i e n c e .  York: Mentor, 1958 Kelly,  "Locke  Bayle.  New  York:  and  Religious  125-145.  Oxford,  1983.  L a S e l v a , S a m u e l V. " T r a d i t i o n s of T o l e r a n c e : R e l a t i v i s m , C o e r c i o n and Truth  in  the  Political  Colloquium lecture, Locke,  John.  A  Philosophy  of  W.J.  Stankiewicz."  1994. 1689.  New  An Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human Understanding.  1690.  Prometheus,  Letter  1990  Concerning  Toleration.  York:  ed.  H. N i d d i t c h . ed. O x f o r d :  Peter  C l a r e n d o n , 1991 ed.  The W o r k s of John L o c k e .  Vol. VI.  Germany: Scientia  V e r l a g A a l e n , 1963 ed. McLure,  Kirstie  Toleration." Mendus, Susan.  M.  "Difference,  P o l i t i c a l Theory  D i v e r s i t y , and 18.3  (1990):  the  Limits  of  361-391.  " L o c k e : T o l e r a t i o n , M o r a l i t y and R a t i o n a l i t y . "  Horton  and Mendus, John L o c k e 147 - 162. justifying Toleration. Nagel, Thomas.  M o r t a l Questions. New  C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e UP, York: Cambridge UP,  E q u a l i t y and P a r t i a l i t y . N i c h o l s o n , P e t e r P.  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