Arts, Faculty of
Philosophy, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Raabe, Peter Bruno
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
It has been argued that Locke's theory of toleration is not only flawed in some respects, but that it lacks relevance for present day North American society since it addresses only the conditions and concerns of Locke's own civil society and historical period. But a detailed analysis of the arguments in the Letter, along with an examination of the criticisms of his letter levelled at him by his contemporary, Jonas Proast, especially, on the issue of the use of force to promote belief, shows that Locke's theory of toleration is in fact logically sound and quite rigorous. Furthermore, an examination of some of Locke's other writings reveals that Locke has based his theory of toleration on sound political and epistemological foundations. A scrutiny of later criticisms by Joseph Priestley, Susan Mendus, Jeremy Waldron, and John Rawls shows that they also fail to diminish either the force of Locke's arguments or the relevance of his theory of toleration to present day issues surrounding religious freedom. Although Locke's intolerance of atheists is shown to be misplaced, it is argued that his approach to universal religious toleration is not at odds with modern approaches from individual rights. It is also argued that he is not mistaken in his assumption that matters of state can, and must, be separated from matters of religion if the peace and security of a state are to be maintained. Locke's theory of toleration is therefore shown to be neither parochial nor historically bound.
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LOCKE'S THEORY OF TOLERATION AND ITS CRITICS by PETER BRUNO RAABE B.A. Hon. The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1994 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P h i l o s o p h y ) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1995 (c) P e t e r Bruno Raabe, 1995 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or. publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of f K( 1 The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) Abstract I t has been argued t h a t Locke ' s theory of t o l e r a t i o n is not only f l a w e d in some respects , but t h a t i t lacks re levance fo r present day N o r t h Amer ican soc ie ty since i t addresses only the cond i t i ons and concerns of Locke 's own c i v i l soc ie ty and h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d . But a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t h e a r g u m e n t s in t h e L e t t e r , a l o n g w i t h an examina t ion of the c r i t i c i s m s of his l e t t e r l e v e l l e d at h im by his con tempora ry , Jonas Proast , espec ia l l y , on the issue of the use of f o r c e to promote be l i e f , shows t h a t Locke ' s t heo ry of t o l e r a t i o n is in f a c t l o g i c a l l y sound and qu i te r igo rous . F u r t h e r m o r e , an examina t ion of some of Locke ' s o ther w r i t i n g s reveals t h a t Locke has based his t h e o r y o f t o l e r a t i o n on s o u n d p o l i t i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l founda t ions . A s c r u t i n y of l a t e r c r i t i c i s m s by Joseph P r i e s t l e y , Susan Mendus, Jeremy Waldron , and John Rawls shows tha t they also f a i l to d imin ish e i the r the f o r c e of Locke ' s arguments or the re levance of his theory of t o l e r a t i o n to present day issues sur round ing re l ig ious f reedom. A l though L o c k e ' s i n t o l e r a n c e of a the is ts is shown to be i i misplaced, it is argued that his approach to universal rel igious toleration is not at odds with modern approaches from individual rights. It is also argued that he is not mistaken in his assumption that matters of state can, and must, be separated from matters of religion if the peace and security of a state are to be maintained. Locke 's theory of to lerat ion is therefore shown to be neither parochial nor historically bound. i i i Table of Contents Abstract i i Table of Contents i v Acknowledgements v i Introdu c t i o n 1 Chapter One Locke's L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n and the S t r u c t u r e of I t s Argurent 6 A Sirnrrary and A n a l y s i s of Locke's L e t t e r 10 No n - r e l i g i o u s Arguments for T o l e r a t i o n The State 14 The Church 19 The Scope of the duty of T o l e r a t i o n The Church 21 P r i v a t e Persons 21 R e l i g i o u s Leaders 22 The M a g i s t r a t e 23 Vvhat the M a g i s t r a t e Need Not T o l e r a t e 30 On the Right to Freedom of R e l i g i o u s Assembly 33 Conclusion 34 Chapter Two The Debate Between Locke and Proast 36 Force May Be Used By A l l 41 Wham To Use Force On? 42 Force May Harm The Truth 44 iv Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter F i v e How Much Force is Enough? 46 God and the Use of Force 50 What i f C i t i z e n s Agreed to the Use of Force? 51 The Argurent F r a n True R e l i g i o n 55 Conclusion 61 C l a r i f y i n g Locke's Arguments Concerning T o l e r a t i o n by Means of an Examination of Sore of h i s Other W r i t i n g s 65 An Essay Concerning To l e r a t ion 68 The F i r s t and Second T r e a t i s e of Government 75 An Essays Concerning Human Understanding 78 Seme Thoughts on Education 85 The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y 88 Some Later C r i t i c i s m s of Locke's L e t t e r 93 Is the Scope of Locke's T o l e r a t i o n Too Narrow?94 Does Locke Neglect I n d i v i d u a l R i g h t s ? 95 If Coercing B e l i e f Works to Enhance State S e c u r i t y , Why May the State S t i l l Not Use i t ? 106 Locke's Intolerance Of Opinions 116 Of the In t o l e r a n t 119 Of "Those Devoted to Another P r i n c e " 121 Of A t h e i s t s 123 Conclusion 126 Selected b i b l i o g r a p h y 129 Acknowl edgerent s I wish to thank two members of the faculty of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia: Dr. Jim Dybikowski for the probing questions, and the many suggestions and criticisms he so patiently offered during the summer of my writing this thesis; and Dr. Paul Russell for his prompt second reading and final approval of my work. To my first and second year philosophy instructor at Capilano Co l lege , Mark Bat tersby, I say, thank you for your continued encouragement regardless of which carpus I was attending. I am most indebted to my wife Anne without whose financial, moral, and emotional support the effort required for the successful completion of this degree would not have been possible. And thanks to Tim Raabe for thinking it was "cool" of me to get this degree so late in l i f e . Introduction It is generally the case that in the more liberal modern day, industrialized nations civil governments allow each citizen the right to hold whatever religious beliefs he or she chooses, and to worship in whatever way he or she thinks is appropriate and consistent with that belief. But this has not always been the case. At one time, in pre-industrialized Europe, civil authorities took it as their responsibility to choose and promote, by means of force if necessary, the "true fa i th" and the "one path that leads to salvation." This instituting of a state religion and a uniformity of worship was seen by the civil authorities as a means of promoting a common world view, a unanimity of values and goals among citizens which would allow the peace, stability, and security of society to be maintained. But one problem was that it was impossible for the members of any population to reach a unanimous agreement as to which faith was to be called the true faith that should be promoted as the state re l ig ion. This disagreement caused no end of trouble for c iv i l authori t ies s ince , regardless of which rel igion a state chose to 1 promote , t h e r e were i n e v i t a b l y a number of t h e i r c i t i z e n r y who simply re fused to accep t , or openly rebe l l ed aga ins t , t h a t church w h i c h the s ta te chose to p r o c l a i m as the only t r ue c h u r c h . W h i l e c h u r c h l e a d e r s and c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s c o n t i n u e d t h e i r e f f o r t s to en fo rce the s t a t e - p r o c l a i m e d " o r t h o d o x y , " a grass roots movement was slowly gaining momentum all over 17th century Europe. The common people were beginn ing to demand t o l e r a t i o n f o r t h e i r var ious r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s f r o m c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s and the leaders of s t a t e -sanct ioned churches. The he terodox were t i r e d of being p reven ted f r o m h o l d i n g c e r t a i n p u b l i c o f f i c e s , o w n i n g t h e i r own businesses, and l i v i n g l i ves f ree f r o m fear of pe rsecu t ion and t o r t u r e because they re fused to accept the s ta te r e l i g i o n as t h e i r own. Such a re fusa l labe led a c i t i z e n a h e r e t i c and, in many cases, resu l ted in t h e i r being execu ted by the s t a t e . John Locke was one of the most ou ts tand ing u n o f f i c i a l spokesmen fo r re l ig ious t o l e r a t i o n dur ing th is t ime of g row ing d i scon ten t . No t only were his w r i t i n g s on the subject of re l ig ious t o l e r a t i o n w ide ly read in his day, they have set the terms of the debate even fo r those who have subsequent ly argued in oppos i t ion to his l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n . A l though Locke was comment ing on the re l ig ious problems of his day, his w r i t i n g s were a major c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r to the r e l a t i v e peace and ca lm t h a t pervaded the Church of England in the e igh teen th c e n t u r y . Desp i te the f a c t t h a t the beginn ing of his L e t t e r argues f r o m the pos i t i on of C h r i s t i a n i t y , and he uses the Church of England as a case in po in t , his approach is fo r the most par t ph i losoph ica l and un iversa l in t h a t he enquires what sor t and how much t o l e r a t i o n is 2 required not just of one church or government but of everyone. This un ive r sa l i ty , together wi th the power of his arguments, has given his w r i t i n g s re levance not only across the p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s boundaries of h i s day but seems to have a l s o extended h i s arguments across the boundary of time. Today there i s a d i scon ten t w i t h the s o - c a l l e d heterodox r e l i g i o n s , - the f r i nge groups, the c u l t s , and the new agers -s imi l a r to the one which existed in Locke's day. There seems to be a growing desire in same sectors of society to promote what is believed to be "the c o r r e c t " C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s and "the proper modes of worship." There is an ever increasing demand that government not only not t o l e r a t e heterodoxy, but that the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s be e n f o r c e d t h rough government l e g i s l a t i o n and a p p l i e d to secular l i f e . It i s once again being argued that state promoted r e l i g i o n w i l l enhance the peace, securi ty , and s t a b i l i t y of nations. C lea r ly th i s movement toward the re l ig ious r i g h t , and the c a l l for a r e i n t e g r a t i o n of mat te rs of r e l i g i o n and mat te rs of s t a t e , i s as great a threat to r e l i g i o u s freedom and i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y of b e l i e f today as the s ta te promoted r e l i g i o n s were in Locke's day. In l i g h t of the present a s sau l t on r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t y , the ques t ion cons idered in t h i s t h e s i s i s , can the w r i t i n g s of Locke, s p e c i f i c a l l y h i s L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n , of fer us any sor t of insights or guidance for dealing wi th these developments in our modern day society? The f i r s t chapter sets the stage by offering a surrnary of Locke's 3 L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t ion , and a n a l y z i n g how he s t r uc tu r e s h i s arguments. Th is chapter d i scusses the h i s t o r i c a l context in which Locke i s w r i t i n g , the C h r i s t i a n argument w i t h which he begins , and then his phi losophical reasoning. It points out how, contrary to the arguments made by some c r i t i c s , Locke's main philosophical arguments each have the force to stand independently as separate defenses for to le ra t ion . It also becomes evident that what may seem at f i r s t to be an argument for to le ra t ion wi th in Protestant England, or perhaps only the wider C h r i s t i a n community, i s in fact a c a l l for u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o u s to lera t ion . The second chapter examines the debate between Locke and Proast. Locke wrote a t o t a l of four l e t t e r s on the t o p i c of r e l i g i o u s to le ra t ion - the o r ig ina l and three responses to Proast. Proast wrote a t o t a l of three in response to Locke. Desp i t e the fact that Proas t made a fa ta l mistake in argument in his second le t t e r , Locke took a l l of P roas t ' s l e t t e r s s e r i o u s l y and responded w i t h excep t iona l depth, c l a r i t y , and thoroughness. Among Locke 's contemporar ies Proas t of fe red one of the most se r ious cha l lenges to Locke 's p o s i t i o n . In the process of responding to Proast Locke was compelled to elaborate on, and thereby to c l a r i f y and strengthen, his o r ig ina l arguments as stated in his f i r s t Let ter . Chapter three examines a number of other wr i t ings by Locke, and po in t s out the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r ences among h i s w r i t i n g s in order to fur ther c l a r i f y the arguments he makes i n h i s L e t t e r Concerning Tolerat ion. This invest igat ion offers an insight into the development of his thinking from his e a r l i e r , less tolerant , pos i t ion A t o h i s l a t e r m o r e l i b e r a l s t a n c e . T h i s c h a p t e r a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e r e a r e common t h r e a d s o f i d e a s t h a t he h e l d c o n s i s t e n t l y t h r o u g h o u t h i s l i f e w h i c h r u n t h r o u g h m o s t o f h i s w r i t i n g s and l e d h i m t o e x p r e s s h i s b e l i e f i n t h e e q u a l i t y o f " a l l m e n " a n d t o c a l l f o r u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n . C h a p t e r f o u r d e a l s w i t h a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s m a d e a g a i n s t L o c k e by l a t e r w r i t e r s s u c h as J o s e p h P r i e s t l e y o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , and Jeremy W a l d r o n and John R a w l s o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . W h i l e P r i e s t l e y and R a w l s a r g u e t h a t L o c k e ' s t o l e r a t i o n may be t o o n a r r o w , g i v e n t h e e x e m p t i o n s t o t o l e r a t i o n he c a l l s f o r , W a l d r o n a r g u e s , somewhat l i k e L o c k e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r y Jonas P r o a s t had , t h a t t h e use o f f o r c e may i n f a c t be u s e f u l i n p r o m o t i n g b e l i e f . But w h i l e each o f t h e s e a r g u m e n t s c a l l s i n t o q u e s t i o n some s p e c i f i c p o i n t i n L o c k e ' s L e t t e r , t h e . o v e r a l 1 f o r c e o f h i s a r g u m e n t f o r t o l e r a t i o n r e m a i n s u n d i m i n i s h e d , T h i s c h a p t e r a l s o c o n s i d e r s t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t has been asked many t i m e s s i n c e L o c k e w r o t e h i s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n : does t h e L e t t e r h a v e any r e l e v a n c e f o r us t o d a y ? W i t h r i g h t w i n g r e l i g i o u s f u n d a m e n t a 1 i s m on t h e r i s e i n s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s as t h e e n d o f t h i s c e n t u r y and t h i s m i 11 enn i u m a p p r o a c h e s , a n d w i t h r a d i c a l r e l i g i o u s c u l t g r o u p s t h r e a t e n i n g t h e peace and s e c u r i t y o f a number o f n a t i o n s , i t may be t h o u g h t t h a t L o c k e o f f e r s l i t t l e i n t h e way o f a s o l u t i o n t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g d i s a g r e e m e n t s and c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n r e l i g i o n a n d t h e c i v i l s t a t e . T h e s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f L o c k e ' s L e t t e r a r e e x a m i n e d i n l i g h t o f t h e n e e d s a n d c o n c e r n s o f o u r l a t e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y s o c i e t y . 5 Chapter 1 - Locke ' s Le t te r Concerning Toleration and the Structure of Its Argument John L o c k e ' s L e t t e r Conce rn ing T o i e r a t i o n , was composed immediately after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In 1598 the Edict of Nantes granted Protestants a degree of religious tolerat ion in Cathol ic France. This meant that the Cathol ic French government was wil l ing to put up with French Protestants worshipping God in a manner of their choosing rather than having to attend, and profess a belief in the teachings of, the Catholic church. But in 1685 King Louis X V I proudly proclaimed that his goal was ' L a France toute Catholique, ' and revoked the Edic t (Dunn 183). French Huguenots who refused to convert to Catholicism were once again beaten, robbed of their possessions, harassed by government troops, their children were taken from them, their marriages were not recognized, the men were sent to row on galleys or were driven into exi le , a l l in the name of promoting Catholicism as the only true religion to be practiced in the nation (Cranston 82). In' the early 1660's the young Locke had no quarrel with a state demanding religious uniformity from its c i t izens. In his Two Tracts 6 on Government (1660, 1662) he suppor ted re l ig ious c o n f o r m i t y and i n t o l e r a n c e because he be l ieved t h a t a re l i g ious ly homogeneous na t ion was more apt to be p e a c e f u l , s tab le , and secure than one in wh ich re l ig ious d i v e r s i t y and sec ta r ian ism were a l l owed to run rampant . In his Second T r a c t Locke w r i t e s t h a t God has e n t r u s t e d the ceremon ia l aspects of worship to the m a g i s t r a t e , and t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e has " t h e r i g h t to govern the c h u r c h , " and to " judge what is o rde r l y and d e c e n t , " " b e a u t i f u l and a t t r a c t i v e " in ceremonies and r i t u a l s ( in W o o t t o n 1 5 7 - 8 ) . The m a g i s t r a t e ' s c o n t r o l o v e r r e l i g i o n is an impor tan t par t of C h r i s t i a n l i b e r t y , says Locke since i t a l lows the m a g i s t r a t e to consider at the same t ime both the peace of soc ie ty and the w e l f a r e and d ign i t y of r e l i g i o n , and to p rov ide fo r them both w i t h a s ingle set of laws ( i b i d ) . In the 1680's the quest ion of whe ther Char les 11's b ro the r James, a Roman C a t h o l i c , should be a l l owed to accede to the Engl ish th rone was d r i v i n g p redominan t l y P r o t e s t a n t England to the br ink of c i v i l war . When James became K ing in 1685, Locke 's oppos i t ion led to a c c u -sat ions of sed i t i on against h im. He f l e d f o r his l i f e to Ho l land where he jo ined the f l o o d of F rench P ro tes tan t re fugees f l e e i n g f r o m the c r u e l t i e s of Lou is X V I . I t w a s . i n Ho l land t h a t Locke came to wi tness f i r s t hand the unres t , pa in , and ab jec t misery s u f f e r e d by e x p a t r i a t e c i t i z e n s of coun t r i es who had adopted a po l i cy of re l ig ious c o n f o r m i t y or i n to le rance to re l ig ious d i v e r s i t y . Locke met d e s t i -t u t e , and s o - c a l l e d " n o n - o r t h o d o x , " P r o t e s t a n t Armin ians , Lu the rans , and Socinians who had been persecuted not only in t h e i r C a t h o l i c 7 homelands, but in Protestant England for dissenting from the Protes-tant state rel igion: the Church of England. He also met homeless Catholics whose fellow believers were being hunted and oppressed in vir tual ly every Protestant state, and Jews who were persecuted almost everywhere. In fact it seemed that every nation in the c iv i l i zed world was persecuting some portion of its people for their "non-orthodox" religious beliefs in the name of c i v i l peace and security. But rather than the hoped-for peace and security, the consequences L o c k e saw r e su l t i ng from r e l i g i o u s i n t o l e r a n c e was c i v i l unrest , p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , pove r ty , s u f f e r i n g , and death . What he witnessed led Locke to write in his Le t te r , for rel igion, subjects are frequently i l l treated, and l ive miserably.. . [Such] oppression raises ferments, and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke (67). Whi le L o c k e ' s v iews on the powers of the mag i s t r a t e over religious matters had already gradually changed, and shifted toward greater religious toleration than currently existed in his day, (as we sha l l see in Chapte r 3) , his exper iences in H o l l a n d no doubt confirmed his views and influenced him to write what he did in his famous Letter Concerning Tolerat ion. The Structure of Locke 1 s Let ter Locke was a very methodical writer and his Let te r Concerning Toleration is a classic example of structure and c lar i ty in philoso-phical argument. His let ter may be divided into six clearly defined parts. F i rs t , Locke, responds direct ly to the enquiry that has been 8 put to h im by his D u t c h F r iend Ph i l ip van L imbroch concern ing " t h e m u t u a l t o l e r a t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n s in t h e i r d i f f e r e n t p r o f e s s i o n s o f r e l i g i o n " ( L e t t e r L3) . He o f f e r s an argument f o r t o l e r a t i o n based on t r u e C h r i s t i a n i t y , i .e. , why t o l e r a t i o n makes sense in l i g h t of the teach ings of the C h r i s t i a n Gospe ls ( L o c k e L e t t e £ 1 2 - 1 8 ) . Th i s sec t ion is d i r e c t e d against C h r i s t i a n re l ig ious leaders who defend re l ig ious i n t o l e r a n c e f r o m the Sc r ip tu res . But Locke then goes on to t ranscend th is re l ig ious argument . He o f f e r s a ser ies of t h ree ph i losoph ica l arguments to show why i t is r a t i o n a l f o r bo th the s ta te and the church to be t o l e r a n t of i n d i v i -dual c i t i zens in m a t t e r s of t h e i r p re fe rences in re l ig ious be l i e f s and t h e i r modes of worsh ip ( i b i d 1 8 - 2 2 ) . F i r s t , the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e , accord ing to L o c k e , has no business c o n c e r n i n g h i m s e l f , as m a g i s t r a t e , w i t h r e l i g i o u s m a t t e r s s i n c e ne i ther God nor the m a g i s t r a t e ' s subjects have g iven h im the a u t h o r i t y to do so. Locke argues secondly t h a t because of the na tu re of the human unders tand ing i t cannot be compel led to be l ieve any th ing by means of f o r c e , and, t h i r d l y , t h a t even i f f o r c e were useful in c o m -pe l l ing be l i e f , the m a g i s t r a t e can never be c e r t a i n t h a t the be l ie f he is e n f o r c i n g is in f a c t the t rue one. These th ree arguments are each of them so s t rong t h a t even i f one of them seems to be undermined - as f o r example when Proast argues t h a t the na tu re of b e l i e f is such tha t i t can be compel led by means of f o r c e - the o thers remain u n a f f e c t e d and can s t i l l be successfu l ly used to defend t o l e r a t i o n . T h i r d , he de l ineates the scope of the duty of t o l e r a t i o n fo r the c h u r c h , p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s , re l ig ious leaders, , and the m a g i s t r a t e or 9 c i v i c leader ( i b id 2 2 - 6 1 ) . In th is s e c t i o n he offers arguments establishing the legitimate sphere of influence of each party. He also l imits the magistrate's power to "indifferent things" and allows him no jurisdict ion over religious ceremonies or "outward worship." Fourth, he argues why some things need not be tolerated by the magistrate in his effort to maintain c i v i l peace and security (ibid 61-64). F i f th , he defends the right to freedom of religious assembly to counter claims that "non-orthodox" religious meetings are prone to be hotbeds of sedition (ibid 64-69). And f inal ly , he concludes with a simple statement of the general intent of his let ter (ibid 69-73). A Sirrnrary and Analysis of Locke's Let ter 1. The Argument for Tolerat ion from True C h r i s t i a n i t y Locke begins his Let te r Concerning Toleration with a c r i t i c i sm of the state's promotion of one particular Christ ian church with the use of force. He uses the example of the Church of England as a case in point. At the time of his wri t ing the Le t te r , this national church was claiming to be the only true Christ ian church. Locke saw the corruption, the quest for power, and the emphasis on correct ceremony within the church as the sources of wide spread dissension, and the cause of the persecution of those who refused to be part of i t . The first thing Locke argues is that "the chief character is t ica l mark of the true Church" is its toleration for other Christians (Letter 13). This immedia te ly c a l l s in to ques t ion the s tatus of the intolerant Church of England. It is not the pomp and ceremony, nor 10 the claim to orthodoxy, says Locke, but rather charity, meekness, and good will to others, including non-Christians, that mark the true Christian (ibid). There is no striving for power, and no use of force to rule over others in the true church , but rather the "regulating of men's lives according to the rules of virtue and piety" (ibid). In the true church war is fought against one's own lusts and vices, and Christianity is embraced fully before any attempt is made to convert others. Locke goes on to point out that in order to be a true Christian one's faith must work by love, not by force. To point out the hypo-crisy within the Church of England, Locke asks those who "persecute, torment, destroy, and kill" others in the name of religion and claim to be doing it out of friendship and kindness, why they don't extend their f i re and sword to fr iends and family in l ike manner (14)? Furthermore, he points out that while, on the one hand, some men are punished with imprisonment and have their property, and often their lives, taken from them because they refuse to worship in a particular church (in this case the Church of England), on the other hand "whoredom, fraud, malice, and suchlike enormities" are committed by members of that same church without anyone being punished for them (ibid). The latter, says Locke, is certainly more contrary to the glory of God, the purity of the church, and the salvation of souls than conscientious dissension (15). In Locke's opinion the heretic is not the one who sincerely follows Christ without attending the state church. The true heretic is the one who piously debates the intr ica-cies of church dogma and ceremonies while practicing un-Christian 11 moral vices and wickedness. L o c k e was born to Puritan parents and he was deeply influenced by his Puritan background (Horton John Locke 1). It must be remembered that in the 16th and 17 centuries the Puritans were cal l ing for the simplif icat ion of ceremonies and creeds within the Church of England, str ict religious discipline, moral rigor, and the shunning of social pleasures and indulgences. So Locke seems to be reflecting his own religious background when he asks why there is so much time and effort being put into the "introduction of ceremonies." But he goes beyond Puritain beliefs with the argument that it is i l log ica l for a church to spend i t s t ime and e f fo r t f o r c i n g c i t i z e n s to f o l l o w c e r t a i n ceremonies in l i gh t of the f ac t that such force only leads to dissension and schism, and in light of the fact that there are more pressing matters to attend to, such as the "moral vices and wicked-nesses" perpetrated by its members (15). L o c k e f inds i t s t range that i t is cons idered accep t ab l e to torture a man to death to save his soul, even before he has been converted, and to do so in the name of chari ty, love, and good w i l l . It also seems incredible to Locke that anyone who lives an immoral life and who desires to use force to compel others to join him in his church could believe that he is forming a truly Christ ian church (16). If one truly wants to save souls, says Locke , one should follow the example of the "Prince of Peace" who gathered people into his church not with swords and physical force but with the Gospel and with persuasion. In fact, Locke argues, if physical force were acceptable in conve r t i ng n o n - C h r i s t i a n s or in f ide l s , then Christ could easily 12 have done so by using his "armies of heavenly legions" (17). By this Locke implies that because Christ has not used physical force, the use of physical force is not an acceptable means of conversion. With this entire f i rst passage Locke c r i t i c i z e s Chr is t ian churches for their intolerance, their disregard for the wrong doings of their own members, and their use of persecution against those who refuse to be either this or that denomination. His criticism suggests that, because of their un-Christian behaviour and their un-Christian policies against dissenters, many churches are proving themselves not to be the truly Christian churches they claim to be. He finds it perfectly clear and obvious that religious toleration, which many churches are not practicing, is both in line with the Gospel of Jesus Christ and agreeable to human reason. His conclusion is that only those churches which have religious toleration among their practices and beliefs may be considered truly Christian. In this way he shows that there is no basis within. Christianity itself for the intolerance shown by Christians for each other. In what follows in his Letter Locke makes it clear that the question he has been set, and has answered with his Chr is t ian arguments, is in fact too narrow. Leaving behind the Christian argument, Locke broadens the scope of his inquiry into toleration by offering a philosophical analysis that has universal application, and may be applied to the Christian as well as the non-Christians state. He addresses the civil magistrate and considers the question of how toleration may further the cause of peace and security within any commonwealth. Peace and security will come about, he says, when religious persecution, which is supposedly 13 carried out in the name of c i v i l law and order, for the common good', is ended, and when individuals are stopped from being allowed to act immorally in public in the name of rel igion. But in order to justify an end to r e l i g ious pe r secu t ion and immoral s o - c a l l e d r e l i g ious behaviour Locke says it is necessary first to "distinguish exactly the business of c i v i l government from that of re l ig ion" and to settle the boundaries that l ie between them (18). 2. Non-rel igious arguments for to le ra t ion The State While the church is responsible for the salvation of souls, Locke sees a commonwealth or c i v i l state as organized to procure, preserve and, advance the c i v i l interests or rights of its c i t izens . These c i v i l in te res t s or r igh t s he says are l i f e , l i b e r t y , hea l th , and "indolency of body" or the pursuit of happiness, and the possession of material property (18). While some cr i t i cs have argued that this seems to be simply an "essentialist defini t ion" of "society" by Locke, lacking any sort of supporting argument (see Waldron 100), it must be remembered that Locke discusses and argues the nature and function of the state in his Firs t and Second Treatise of Government. In chapter eight of his Second Treaties ent i t led, "Of the Beginning of Po l i t i ca l Societies," Locke writes Men being, as has been said, by nature a l l free, equal and independent, no man can be put out of this estate and subjected to the po l i t i ca l power of another without his own consent. The only way whereby anyone divests himself 14 of his n a t u r a l l i b e r t y and puts on the bonds of c i v i l soc ie ty is by agree ing w i t h o ther men t o j o in and un i te i n t o a communi ty f o r t h e i r c o m f o r t a b l e , safe, and peace-able l i v i n g one amongst another in a secure en joyment of t he i r p r o p e r t i e s , and a g rea te r s e c u r i t y against any t h a t are not of i t . . . When any number of men have so consented to make one communi ty or government , they are the reby p resent ly i n c o r p o r a t e d , and make one body p o l i t i c . . . ( in Woot ton 309-10). Locke goes on at l eng th in th is chap te r and e lsewhere in the T rea t i se to discuss how th is consensual or c o n t r a c t u a l a r rangement funct ions. In a soc ie ty based on the c o n t r a c t u a l agreement of i t s members t h e n , the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e governs by the consent of his sub jec ts and is g iven the duty to p r o t e c t t h e i r peace and s e c u r i t y , t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and r i g h t s th rough an i m p a r t i a l execu t ion of equal laws. The mag is -t r a t e has the " f o r c e and s t r e n g t h " of a l l his subjects behind h im and he is g iven the power by them to punish anyone who wou ld i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n t e r e s t s or r i g h t s of another by t a k i n g away or l i m i t i n g his c i v i l r i g h t s ( i b i d ) . I t is in par t by means of th i s d e l i m i t a t i o n of the power of the s ta te to c i v i l m a t t e r s only t h a t Locke is able to c l a r i f y his reasons for t o l e r a t i o n - the o ther par t being the na tu re of human under -s tand ing . He begins by saying i t is c lear t h a t the c i v i l mag is -t r a t e ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n , power , r i g h t and dominion invo lves only c i v i l m a t t e r s and not " t h e sa lva t ion of souls" (19 ) . Locke a c t u a l l y gives 15 three reasons for this, but the two distinguishing features of the first one are often overlooked. Fi rs t he says God has not given one man the authority to compel another into any one religion for the good of his soul. This refers back to his previous arguments for to le ra-tion based on Christ ian scriptures. Here Locke is arguing that even i f his p o l i t i c a l theory is fa lse and p o l i t i c a l authority is derived from God, there is no basis for supposing that theory gives the magis-trate a wider jurisdict ion. In the second arm to this first argument, and consistent with his own po l i t i ca l theory, Locke says the ci t izens of the state have not consented to give the i r mag i s t r a t e the authority to choose their religion for them, and they do not consent to the abandoning of the caring for their own souls to the c i v i l authorities. Ci t izens have not given this authority to the magistrate because a person cannot simply "conform his faith to the dictates of another." True religion consists of an "inward and full persuasion of the mind," a deeply held belief that the believer is satisfied in his own mind is the true one, and which goes beyond the outward acts of r i tual and ceremony (ibid). Any outward pract ice without this inward belief is nothing more than hypocrisy, says Locke, and, in the Chris t ian definition of true belief, is sinful because offensive to God. This first argument then is a po l i t i ca l argument focusing on the scope of authority that God and the c i t i z e n s of a commonweal th have a l l o w e d the c i v i l magi s t ra te . Second, Locke says, the magistrate can't be concerned with the salvation of the soul since his power consists only of physical force. 16 The prob lem is t h a t s ince the re l ig ious pe rspec t i ve has i t t h a t only a be l ie f based on inward persuasion is accep tab le to God, and since such be l ie f c a n ' t be compel led w i t h phys ica l f o r c e , the m a g i s t r a t e ' s power c a n ' t c r e a t e the c o r r e c t k ind of be l i e f t h a t re l ig ions say is a c c e p t -able to God. There is no th ing s topp ing the m a g i s t r a t e f r o m using persuasion, jus t l i ke anyone else m i g h t , to change someone's m ind . But " i t is one th ing to persuade, another to command; one th ing to press w i t h arguments , another w i t h p e n a l t i e s , " says Locke (20). Penal t ies don ' t conv ince the mind , says L o c k e , and a l l re l ig ions hold t h a t w i t h o u t t h e s i n c e r e c o n v i c t i o n of b e l i e f s s a l v a t i o n is n o t possib le. This m igh t be ca l l ed Locke ' s ep is teme log ica l argumenmt. But here the quest ion ar ises, c a n ' t s incere c o n v i c t i o n be c r e a t e d th rough the employment of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and/or propaganda? Even i f the answer is " y e s , " as is argued by bo th Proast and Waldron in l a t e r chap te rs , Locke ' s argument f o r t o l e r a t i o n s i l l holds because of the f i r s t argument above, and the t h i r d argument below. Locke addresses the quest ion of the use of f o r c e in his t h i r d po in t when he says, even i f phys ica l f o r c e and pena l t ies were in f a c t able to improve or change men's be l ie fs in the r i g h t way , the re is s t i l l no guarantee of s a l v a t i o n . I f mag is t ra tes eve rywhere have the r i g h t to use f o r c e to compel c i t i z e n s to the r e l i g i o n they be l ieve to be t r u e , but wh ich they cannot know fo r c e r t a i n is t r u e , i t wou ld mean t h a t the sa l va t i on of c i t i z e n s wou ld depend on luck , t h a t is, i t wou ld depend on the i r being born in t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s ta te in wh ich the m a g i s t r a t e happens to have dec ided on the t r u e r e l i g i o n . I nve rse ly , many c i t i z e n s would lose t h e i r soul due to t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e hav ing 17 forced them to f o l l o w a f a l s e r e l i g i o n he only b e l i e v e d to be the t rue . Locke expands on t h i s po in t in h i s Es say Concerning Human Understanding where he says there can't be a more dangerous thing to re ly on, nor anything more l i k e l y to mislead one than the opinions of others in matters of r e l i g i o n . The opinions of others would give men reason to be "Heathens in Japan, Mahumetans i n Turkey, P a p i s t s in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden" (657). Locke suggests that i t i s a r i s k y bet indeed to p i n one's " e v e r l a s t i n g happiness or misery" on the f a l l i b l e opinions of others since proba-b i l i t y has i t that they might be wrong (708). The structure of Locke's argument then is as fol lows: 1 a. God has not given anyone the authority to compel others into any one r e l i g i o n for the good of their souls. 1 b. C i t i z e n s have not g iven the m a g i s t r a t e the power to p ick t h e i r r e l i g i o n for them These two points argue that the magistrate has not been g iven the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y to compel h i s c i t i zens to fo l low a par t icu la r set of be l i e f s . 2. The nature of the c o r r e c t k ind o f b e l i e f - that which w i l l lead to s a l v a t i o n - i s such that a person can't be made to change what they b e l i e v e to be t rue by means of. someone e l s e us ing force on them This is his epistemological argument. 3. Even i f outward force could produce the kind of be l i e f that leads to sa lvat ion, the magistrate may be forcing the wrong, r e l i g i o n on h i s sub jec t s , s ince there i s no assurance he has the r i g h t r e l i g i o n , and their souls would s t i l l not be saved. This may be ca l l ed his argument from probab i l i ty . 18 Locke ' s conc lus ion is t h a t the use of f o r c e is not only i l l e g i t i -mate but i m p r a c t i c a l . These cons ide ra t ions , says L o c k e , seem su f -f i c i e n t to lead to the conc lus ion t h a t a l l the power of c i v i l government re la tes only to men's c i v i l i n t e r e s t s , is con f i ned to the care of the th ings of th is w o r l d , and ha th no th ing to do w i t h the w o r l d to come ( L e t t e r 22 ) . The Church Locke def ines a church as a v o l u n t a r y soc ie ty of ind iv idua ls who have come toge the r to worsh ip God in a manner they be l ieve to be acceptab le to God and t h a t w i l l lead to the sa l va t i on of t h e i r souls. Locke sees no one as being born a member of any c h u r c h , and no ch i l d as i n h e r i t i n g the r e l i g i o n of i t s parents (22 ) . Just as a person f r e e l y jo ins a c h u r c h , so he is f r ee to leave i t i f he disagrees w i t h i ts doc t r ines or means of worsh ip . The r i g h t to make the i n t e r n a l laws t h a t govern the church 's day to day a c t i v i t i e s , says L o c k e , belongs only to the members of t h a t c h u r c h p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e j o i n i n g t o g e t h e r of c i t i z e n s in to a church is "abso lu te l y f ree and spontaneous" ( L e t t e r 23) . Locke deals w i t h the quest ion of an u n i n t e r r u p t e d l ine of e c c l e -s ias t i ca l succession as a sign of the t r u e church w i t h t h r e e a r g u -ments. F i r s t , he says i t is not necessary f o r a church to be able to demonst ra te an u n i n t e r r u p t e d l ine of ru l i ng a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y f r o m the apost les in order to be the t r u e church since s c r i p t u r e shows t h a t any smal l ga the r ing is approved of by God and conduc ive to the s a l v a -t i o n of souls. 19 Second, he po in ts out t h a t the d isagreement as to the proper succession of church leaders has led to choosing ru le rs by means of d e l i b e r a t i o n and v o t e , p u t t i n g any c l a i m t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r l ine of r u l e r s is a d i r e c t l i n e f r o m t h e a p o s t l e s i n t o s e r i o u s d o u b t . T h i r d , e v e n i f c h u r c h l e a d e r s a r e in a l i n e o f s u c c e s s i o n t h a t s t re tches back to the apost les , Locke says i t s t i l l does not g ive t h a t church the r i g h t to impose i t s e l f on anyone. Each c i t i z e n s has the r i g h t , accord ing to L o c k e , to p ick wha teve r re l ig ious leader he wants to f o l l o w ( L e t t e r 24 ) . The mark of the t r u e c h u r c h , says L o c k e , is a church t h a t f o l l o w s what is ca l led f o r in s c r i p t u r e and no more . The " i n v e n t i o n s , " " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , " and " e c c l e s i a s t i c a l l a w s , " t h a t some churches c l a i m are necessary to the pro fess ion of C h r i s t i a n i t y are in f a c t not requ i red by Chr is t (25 ) . And wh i le the Sc r ip tu res say t h a t the t r u e church is also the one whose members su f fe r pe rsecu t i on , t h e r e is no proof in the Sc r ip tu res , says L o c k e , t h a t the opposi te is t r u e , t h a t the t rue church is the one wh ich persecutes o thers w i t h f i r e and sword. The laws w i t h i n the church p e r t a i n only to m a t t e r s of worsh ip , says Locke , and have no j u r i s d i c t i o n over the persona l , m a t e r i a l p r o p e r t y of any c i t i z e n . The church also has no a u t h o r i t y to use f o r c e . Both the power over m a t e r i a l goods and the use of f o r c e are solely under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e . The church may only use " e x h o r t a t i o n s , admoni t ions , and a d v i c e " to conv ince i ts members to respect i t s laws (26 ) . The only punishment the church may use against an obs t ina te member is excommun ica t i on . 20 3. The scope of the duty of t o l e r a t i o n Locke nex t examines how fa r the duty of t o l e r a t i o n extends and what is requ i red f r o m everyone by i t . (a) The Church F i r s t , no church needs to t o l e r a t e any person who refuses to abide by i ts laws. This person may be excommunica ted but w i t h o u t the use o f any p h y s i c a l f o r c e or t h e c o n f i s c a t i o n o f t h e i r m a t e r i a l possessions as was common p r a c t i c e of the Church of England in Locke ' s day. (b) P r i v a t e Persons Second, p r i v a t e persons must be t o l e r a n t of those w i t h re l ig ious be l ie fs d i f f e r e n t than t h e i r own since those be l ie fs a f f e c t none but t h e b e l i e v e r . T h i s m u t u a l t o l e r a t i o n o f p r i v a t e persons f o r one another Locke also appl ies to churches. A church c a n ' t have i t s power over o ther churches increased th rough the membership of the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e . In th is sense a l l churches are equal in power regardless of wh ich one the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e belongs t o . To say t h a t the o r t h o -dox church should have power over a l l o thers is specious accord ing to L o c k e , s ince every church bel ieves i t s e l f to be or thodox and the source of t r u t h . Even i f one church cou ld prove i t s o r thodoxy over the o thers Locke says th is s t i l l wou ld not g ive the or thodox church the r i g h t to use f o r c e in des t roy ing i ts r i v a l s ince, as he has argued above (20), such f o r c e does not work to change the minds of those who have chosen to worsh ip d i f f e r e n t l y . The c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e does not have the a u t h o r i t y to t r a n s f e r his r i g h t to use phys ica l f o r c e to any 21 church since such f a v o r i t i s m c r e a t e s i n t o l e r a n c e w i t h i n the favoured church over those not favoured. Locke's point is that neither i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s , churches, nor states or commonwealths have the r i g h t to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the c i v i l r i g h ts and wordly goods of others "upon the pretense of r e l i g i o n " or for r e l i g i o u s reasons (31). One of the greatest t h r e a t s to the s e c u r i t y and peace of the s t a t e , according to Locke, is the b e l i e f that "dominion is founded by grace, and that r e l i g i o n is to be propa-gated by f o r c e of arms" ( i b i d ) . This f a c t was borne out by the s u f f e r i n g of i n d i v i d u a l s and the s u b s e q u e n t u n r e s t of p o p u l a t i o n s L o c k e saw a l l around him. (c) R e l i g i o u s Leaders Thi r d , L o cke says the power of those who hold o f f i c e in a church comes from the church and ought to be c o n f i n e d w i t h i n i t because the a f f a i r s of the church are as separate and d i s t i n c t from the a f f a i r s of s t a t e as heaven is from earth. And just as the church has no power to deprive a man of his worldly goods because of a r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e , so no member of a church has that power e i t h e r . It is not enough, says Locke, for e c c l e s i a s t i c a l men to abstain from " v i o l e n c e , rapine, and a l l manner of persecution," they are also obliged to teach t h e i r f o l l o w e r s to be c h a r i t a b l e , meek, peace-f u l , and t o l e r a n t (32-3). L o cke argues that since the B i b l e teaches that C h r i s t i a n s are to abstain from v i o l e n c e against those who have a c t u a l l y harmed them, how much more so should they abstain from violence toward those who have done them no harm but simply worship in a manner that is d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r own. A man's r e l i g i o n is as 22 p r i v a t e an a f f a i r as how he manages his estate or his own health, says Locke. Why is i t , asks Locke, that, while no one i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the man who spends a l l his money in a tavern, everyone is ready to i n t e r -fere w i t h the man who does not frequent the approved church? This i n t e r f e r e n c e , which may be as severe as a death penalty, seems to Locke to come more from a desire for "temporal dominion" than from a sincere attempt to save the victim's soul from h e l l (34). (d) The M a g i s t r a t e F o u r t h , is the c o n s i d e r a b l e duty of the m a g i s t r a t e to be t o l e r a n t . In l i n e w i t h his P r o t e s t a n t b e l i e f s , but a l s o f o r the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l reason given.above, concerning the nature of the right kind of b e l i e f , L o cke reminds his readers that the care of the soul belongs to each i n d i v i d u a l , and can not be l e f t to the magistrate's c i v i l laws or use of f o r c e . Just as the magistrate can not f o r c e a c i t i z e n to care f o r his health w i t h the f o r c e of law l i k e w i s e he can not f o r c e a c i t i z e n to care for his soul. Even i f a p r i n c e were to f o r c e his subjects to care f o r t h e i r h e a l t h , L o c k e asks which doctor would he f o r c e his subjects to consult when there are so many possible remedies and potions? But L o c k e admits that i t could be argued that while there are many ways to good health there is only one way to heaven. The trouble i s , says L o c k e , a m a g i s t r a t e may be f o r c i n g his subjects down the wrong path (35). Also c i t i z e n s who are in f a c t on the r i g h t p a t h ar e s t i l l b e i n g p e r s e c u t e d b e c a u s e of f r i v o l o u s reasons, such as the way they cut t h e i r hair or the way they were baptize d into the f a i t h , which may not c o i n c i d e w i t h the approved p r a c t i c e s promoted by the s t a t e r e l i g i o n . If we are prepared to hold 23 that these small d i f f e r e n c e s in p r a c t i c e s or "modes" in f a c t lead to d i f f e r e n t ends, says Locke, we are f a c e d w i t h the problem of having to prove beyond a doubt e x a c t l y which is the ri g h t path that leads to heaven. A c c o r d i n g to L o c k e t o l e r a t i o n should t h e r e f o r e not only be e x t e n d e d by the m a g i s t r a t e to i n c l u d e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s but a l s o r e l i g i o u s ceremonies, p r a c t i c e s and customs, so long as they are not d e t r i m e n t a l to t h e p e a c e and s e c u r i t y of the s t a t e . In a l a t e r s e c t i o n he e x t e n d s t o l e r a t i o n to i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t t o r e l i g i o u s assembly (64-69). The a u t h o r i t y of the magistrate does not help him discover the right path to heaven any better than any c i t i z e n ' s p r i v a t e search and study. The prince's superior power and the magistrate's a b i l i t y to rule does not make ei t h e r of them b e t t e r q u a l i f i e d than t h e i r subjects to determine which is the true r e l i g i o n . Even i f i t is granted that the magistrate is allowed to choose the r e l i g i o n that leads to heaven, Locke says there is nothing the magistrate can do to compensate his c i t i z e n s i f he should prove to have been mistaken. To tr u s t the magistrate in as important a matter as the s a l v a t i o n of one's soul is to risk a very great loss indeed (38). Some might argue, says Locke, that i n f a l l i b l e judgement belongs not to the magistrate, but to the church. The magistrate is merely the e n f o r c e r for the church. But, L o c k e asks, which church should the magistrate promote? The way may be. just as erroneous whether the magistrate f o r c e s his c i t i z e n s to f o l l o w his own d i c t a t e s or those of some church. Just because one church has succeeded in co n v i n c i n g the magistrate that i t p r a c t i c e s the righ t r e l i g i o n does not necessarily 24 mean it actually does, or that the magistrate speaks for the right religion when he speaks for the church he favours. The truth is, says Locke, that rather than churches influencing po l i t i c a l leaders it is far more often the case that po l i t i c a l leaders influence the church to change its teachings to suit t h e i r p o l i t i c a l agenda. If re l i g i o u s decrees, articles of faith, and forms of worship can be changed so easily to suit the whims of the powerful, Locke wonders how it is possible for anyone to obey them al l with a clear conscience. Church leaders dispute articles of faith as much as magistrates do, says Locke, and a magistrate's decision as to the right religion is no better with or without the help of "churchmen" (AO). Even if the magistrate is in fact promoting the right religion, says Locke, there is no point in a citizen following it except if he is persuaded of it in his own mind. While a person can become rich at a job he dislikes, he can not be saved by a religion which his con-science says is wrong, which he distrusts, and whose form of worship he abhors. As mentioned above, God requires the right kind of belief, that is complete faith and inward sincerity before he w i l l save a person's soul. It w i l l not save people if the magistrate forces them to come to church, says Locke. If they believe, they w i l l come; if they don't believe, forcing them to come wi l l not save their souls. The magistrate ought to tolerate any assembly of individuals who come together to worship God in a manner they sincerely believe is accept-able to God, and who draw others to their church by their good example in l i f e and worship. According to Locke, these churches have as much legal right to exist as any national church. 25 When it comes to rites and ceremonies, the magistrate has no power to enforce the use of any particular type within any church, first because churches are outside the jurisdict ion of the magistrate, and second because to be a justifiable part of worship, rites and ceremonies must be seen to be acceptable to God. Locke emphasizes that the magistrate is only justified in making laws concerning things that affect the good of the commonwealth or state. What goes on in church is the salvation of souls, and religious ceremonies do not affect the l i fe , l iber ty , or estate of any member of the state. Locke distinguishes between washing a chi ld in water for hygienic reasons and baptizing a child in water in the form of a religious r i tua l . He says the magistrate may compel by force of law the washing of the c h i l d for i ts hea l th but not i t s bapt i sm for the s a l v a t i o n of i ts soul. Again, r i tuals, to be acceptable to God, must contain what worshippers believe God has commanded for the salvation of their souls, not what the magistrate decrees. Just as the magistrate does, not have the power to impose rites and ceremonies by law, he likewise does not have the power to forbid any rites or ceremonies. Every church believes its rites and ceremo-nies to be decreed by God as an essential part of worship. For a magistrate to forbid the use of certain rites or ceremonies would, according to Locke, be tantamount to destroying the church i tself . Locke says it could then be argued that the magistrate must tolerate the sacr i f ic ing of infants if a church's ceremonies ca l l for such an act. But Locke says that what is not lawful in "the ordinary course of l i f e " is likewise not lawful in a religious meeting (47). If it 26 is lega l to k i l l a c a l f a t home, says L o c k e , i t is also lega l to k i l l a c a l f as a s a c r i f i c i a l o f f e r i n g at a re l ig ious ceremony since doing so does not adversely a f f e c t o thers in the commonwea l th . But i f , fo r example, a disease has reduced c a t t l e numbers to dangerously low leve ls , i t is a l l owab le f o r the m a g i s t r a t e to f o r b i d the s laugh te r ing of calves in re l ig ious r i t u a l f o r the good of the species and the reby the good, of the s t a t e . But th is is then a law based not on re l i g ious , but economic and p o l i t i c a l cons idera t ions . G e n e r a l l y , says L o c k e , what is a l l owed by law in the commonweal th should not be p r o h i b i t e d in c h u r c h , and wha teve r th ings secular laws f o r b i d because they are ha rmfu l to the c i t i z e n s of the s ta te should also not be p e r m i t t e d to be par t of re l ig ious ceremonies. But the m a g i s t r a t e must be very c a r e f u l not to misuse his a u t h o r i t y by oppres-sing any church "under pretense of doing publ ic good" (49). I f a church is pe rce ived to be i do la t rous , says L o c k e , t h e r e is no th ing the m a g i s t r a t e can do about i t because i f he is a l l owed the power to suppress what some would ca l l a sec ta r i an r e l i g i o n the re is no l o g i c a l reason why his power c o u l d n ' t also be tu rned aga ins t , and used to suppress, what may be ca l led a more or thodox r e l i g i o n . Locke points out t ha t c i v i l power is un iversa l and the p r inc ip les guid ing such power must be app l i cab le to a l l c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e s . T h e r e f o r e i f something is a l lowed to one m a g i s t r a t e i t w i l l be a l l owed to a l l . This means t h a t a l l churches are l i k e l y to s u f f e r at the hands of one m a g i s t r a t e or another depending on wh ich church each m a g i s t r a t e considers to be or thodox and wh ich one i do la t rous . Locke goes beyond mere ly advoca t ing mutua l t o l e r a t i o n among C h r i s t i a n sects , and empha-27 sizes the universality of religious toleration by pointing out that the c i v i l powers of the magistrate are "the same every where, and the religion of the prince is orthodox to himself." If the power to suppress religious beliefs is granted to a l l magistrates, it w i l l lead them to suppress a great variety of religions world wide, including the true one (49). It follows from this as well that the magistrate may not punish anyone for any sins against God. So long as the sin, or actions, of one person does not affect another person it may not be punished by the magistrate. The sin of lying is only punishable by c i v i l law when it has a harmful effect on ci t izens or the security of the common-wealth i tself . Again, i f the magistrate were allowed to punish sins against God, then the universalization of this power would allow "a Mahometan or pagan prince" to punish those who practice the Christ ian religion since, in their opinion, it would be a sin against God (51). Here again Locke is arguing for religious tolerat ion not only from the leaders of his home nation, nor for his own chosen religion or church, but on a universal scale. Regarding the ca l l for capi tal punishment against idolaters in the law of Moses, Locke says this law applied to ancient Israel not to modern nations. The commonwealth of the Jews was an absolute theo-cracy with no separation between church and state. God himself was considered to be the legislator, a condition which does not exist in any Chris t ian nation. Locke reminds his readers that Christ did not meddle in the a f f a i r s of ea r th ly governments , and the anc ien t Israelites, although they conquered many other, idolatrous, nations 28 did not f o r c e t h e i r i nhab i tan ts to embrace the Jewish r e l i g i o n . The a r t i c l e s of r e l i g i o n , as Locke ca l ls t hem, consist of t w o t yp es : p r a c t i c a l , wh ich " i n f l u e n c e the w i l l and manner " ; and specu-l a t i v e wh ich " t e r m i n a t e simply in the unders tand ing" ( 5 4 - 5 ) . Specu-l a t i v e opinions and a r t i c l e s of f a i t h wh ich requ i re be l i e f may not be imposed on any church by c i v i l law because, as was po in ted out e a r l i e r , a person c a n ' t s imply w i l l h imsel f to be l ieve on command, nor w i l l p ro fess ing to be l ieve , when he in f a c t does no t , lead a person to s a l v a t i o n . The m a g i s t r a t e may not f o r b i d the p reach ing or pro fess ing of any specu la t i ve opinions in any p a r t i c u l a r church because opinions d o n ' t a f f e c t t h e c i v i l r i g h t s o f c i t i z e n s o u t s i d e t h a t c h u r c h . Acco rd ing to L o c k e , the be l ie f t h a t , f o r example, bread is rea l l y the body of Chr i s t does not harm the be l i eve r ' s neighbour and so may not be fo rb idden by c i v i l l aw. The t r u t h w i l l s u f f e r , says L o c k e , i f f o r c e and v io lence are used by the m a g i s t r a t e in an a t t e m p t to f u r t h e r i t . By th is he means t h a t not only may the m a g i s t r a t e be wrong and p romot ing the wrong b e l i e f , but t h a t the use of f o r c e does not a l low men to use those G o d - g i v e n f a c u l t i e s " s u f f i c i e n t to d i r e c t them in the way they should t a k e " (Locke Essay 708) . The c o n f l i c t t h a t may ar ise be tween what is o rdered by the mag is -t r a t e and what one's consc ience d i c t a t e s may be reso lved, says L o c k e , i f we are c lear about the l i m i t s of both the c i v i l powers and the power one has over one's own a f f a i r s . He po in ts out t h a t ca r ing fo r one's soul is the most i m p o r t a n t duty a person has to h imsel f , and t h a t , since one person's re l ig ious opin ions and manner of worsh ip do not a f f e c t o thers , what he bel ieves and how he worships is no one's 29 business but his own. I t is the duty of every c i t i z e n f i r s t of a l l to be obedient to God, t h a t is to worsh ip in the way he be l ieves is accep tab le to God, says L o c k e , s ince his e t e r n a l soul and eve r las t i ng happiness are dependent on th is obedience, and only then to obey c i v i l laws ( 5 9 ) . Locke says, r a t h e r i d e a l i s t i c a l l y , t h a t i t r a re l y happens t h a t a m a g i s t r a t e leg is la tes what is good fo r the commonweal th but d is turbs the conscience of i t s c i t i z e n s . But i f i t should happen, c i t i z e n s have the r i g h t to disobey the law and accep t the pena l ty f o r i t . I f , on the o ther hand, the m a g i s t r a t e makes a law concern ing m a t t e r s over wh ich he has no a u t h o r i t y , m a t t e r s in wh ich ne was not g iven the power by his sub jec ts , such .as a law that , fo rces c i t i z e n s to take up a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n , c i t i z e n s are not ob l iga ted to f o l l o w th is law. Locke says his subjects may not have the power to res is t h im but they may f i n d c o m f o r t in the f a c t t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e ' s ac t ions w i l l in the end be judged by God. A. What the Magistrate Need Not Tolerate I t must be kept in mind t h a t Locke defends re l i g ious t o l e r a t i o n w i t h the argument t h a t t o l e r a t i o n of a d i v e r s i t y of re l ig ions is f a r more conduc ive to peace and secu r i t y w i t h i n a s ta te than f o r c e d c o n -f o r m i t y and i n t o l e r a n c e . The th ings wh ich he singles out as not having to be t o l e r a t e d by the m a g i s t r a t e are those th ings wh ich Locke sees as ha rmfu l to the peace and secu r i t y of the s t a t e . Locke says t h a t t he re are f i v e th ings a m a g i s t r a t e need no t , or s h o u l d n o t , t o l e r a t e . F i r s t , t h e m a g i s t r a t e s h o u l d no t t o l e r a t e opinions wh ich are c o n t r a r y or ha rmfu l to soc ie ty and i ts mora l ru les . 30 But he p o i n t s out t h a t examples of such h a r m f u l t e a c h i n g s a r e r a r e s i n c e no s e c t w o u l d p u r p o s e l y undermine s o c i e t y i n the name of r e l i g i o n knowing that the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of s o c i e t y would be detrimen-t a l to i t s own w e l l being w i t h i n that s o c i e t y . An important question a r i s e s at t h i s point: can the c i t i z e n s of a ccrrrnonwealth be adequate-ly protected, and can s o c i e t y as a whole be maintained, without pena-l i z i n g people for t h e i r unorthodox b e l i e f s ? Second, the ma g i s t r a t e should not t o l e r a t e i n d i v i d u a l s or sects w h i c h c l a i m some s o r t of s p e c i a l c i v i l power over o t h e r s f o r them-selves i n the name of r e l i g i o n . T o l e r a t i o n should not be extended to those who, f o r example, c a l l o t h e r s h e r e t i c s , t h e r e b y c l a i m i n g the power to c a l l t h e i r own r e l i g i o n the one and Only t r u e one. Locke says t h i s includes those churches who c l a i m that excormunicating the k i n g s t r i p s h i m of a l l c i v i l power, s i n c e t h i s a s s e r t s a c l a i m to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y which a church does not possess. T h i r d , the m a g i s t r a t e s h o u l d not t o l e r a t e those "who w i l l not own and teach" the duty of r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n (63). Remember that i n h i s f i r s t argument f o r t o l e r a t i o n above Locke says t h a t c i t i z e n s cannot s i m p l y w i 11 themse 1 ves to b e l i e v e one t h i n g or another. T h i s makes i t i m p e r a t i v e t h a t each c i t i z e n t o l e r a t e whatever i t i s t h a t o t h e r s b e l i e v e s i n c e no one i s more c a p a b l e than anyone e l s e of cha n g i n g what i t i s they s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e . An u n w i l l i n g n e s s to t o l e r a t e others, says Locke, suggests that the i n t o l e r a n t are prepared to s e i z e the government and c o n f i s c a t e the m a t e r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s of t h e i r f e l l o w c i t i z e n s i n the name of r e l i g i o u s conformity, leading, no doubt, to c i v i l u n r e s t and a d e s t a b i 1 i z a t i o n of government. A 31 to lerant state needs to be made up of to lerant i n d i v i d u a l s , says Locke, i f i t is to survive as a tolerant state . But isn' t the argument that a to lerant state must be in to lerant a paradox? Or is Locke in fact arguing that to tolerate the destruction of toleration would be self-contradictory (Nicholson 169)? Fourth, the magistrate need not tolerate a church which demands that i ts fo l lowers consider themselves under the protect ion and service of a foreign prince. Locke used the example of the Mahometan to i l lustrate his point, but commentators are agreed that he meant to include Catholics (Wootton 96; Cranston 81, 85; Park 14, and others). In fact he was referring to religious leaders of a l l denominations who use the force of the i r power as r e l i g i o u s leaders to make de'crees regarding c i v i l matters. This would be like allowing a foreign jur is -d i c t i o n to be estab l ished in the magistrate 's home state and would, again, be a threat to the peace, security and stabi l i ty of the state. F i f th , those who deny the existence of God, namely atheists, are a lso not to be to lera ted . In order for promises and oaths to be binding there needs to be a belief in God behind them. Since atheists have no belief in God, Locke thinks they feel no obligation to honour their oaths and promises "which are the bonds of human society" (64). According to Locke, then, without a belief in God, atheists are a threat to the stabi l i ty of society. This is , of course, a problema-t ic conception of what motivates individuals to keep their promises. Furthermore, and in a separate argument, Locke says, s ince a the is ts have no r e l i g i o n they can l o g i c a l l y have no c l a i m to r e l i -gious to le ra t ion ( ib id) . Re l ig ious t o l e r a t i o n is meant to a l low 32 c i t i z e n s t o w o r s h i p a n y G o d i n any manner t hey w i s h so long as t h i s does not t h r e a t e n the peace and s e c u r i t y o f t he commonwea l th , b u t , s i n c e a t h e i s t s do not w i s h t o w o r s h i p any God, Locke sees them as h a v i n g no r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , and t h e r e f o r e t h e concep t of r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n does not apply to them. In h i s f i r s t a rgument a g a i n s t t o l e r a t i n g a t h e i s t s , Locke i s o b v i o u s l y , and m i s t a k e n l y , c o n v i n c e d t h a t they a r e a t h r e a t t o the cohesiveness of soc ie ty . This argument would be j u s t i f i e d i f i t were a g r e e d , w h i c h i t i s n o t , t h a t a t h e i s t s f a i l t o keep t h e i r p r o m i s e s . As fo r h i s second argument aga ins t a t h e i s t s , l o g i c seems to i n d i c a t e , c o n t r a r y to Locke's a s s e r t i o n , t ha t i f one grants t ha t every c i t i z e n has a r i g h t to be l i eve as he chooses, every c i t i z e n a lso has the r i g h t to d i s b e l i e v e as he chooses. 5. On the R igh t to Freedom of R e l i g i o u s Assembly Locke says t h a t some p e o p l e may t h i n k t h a t the e x i s t e n c e o f sec re t , i l l e g a l r e l i g i o u s meet ings or " c o n v e n t i c l e s " and "nu rse r ies of f a c t i o n s " are the s t rongest argument aga ins t r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n (64). But he p o i n t s out t ha t these secret groups would not be secret i f t he s t a t e were more t o l e r a n t o f t hose w i t h n o n - o r t h o d o x b e l i e f s . I t i s the i n t o l e r a n c e o f the s t a t e w h i c h d r i v e s these g roups i n t o h i d i n g as a means of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . Locke goes on to say tha t r e l i g i o u s assembl ies are not a t h rea t to the peace and s e c u r i t y of the s t a t e s i n c e they a r e n ' t conce rned w i t h c i v i 1 m a t t e r s . They conce rn t h e m s e l v e s o n l y w i t h t h e s a l v a t i o n o f t h e s o u l . And even i f t h e r e were s o m e t h i n g t o f e a r f r o m t h e s e r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s , i f r e l i g i o u s a s s e m b l i e s were a t h r e a t t o t h e commonwea l th , Locke asks why t h e 3 3 magi s t r a t e does not fear h i s own, and does not cons ider i t a th rea t . The reason some r e l i g i o u s groups are persecuted, says Locke, i s because the m a g i s t r a t e i s b iased agains t them. It i s not r e l i g i o n that leads men in to s e d i t i o u s consp i racy agains t t h e i r s t a t e , but ra ther t h e i r s u f f e r i n g oppress ion at the hands of t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e . The s ta te w i l l be safe and peacefu l , says Locke, i f , beyond merely t o l e r a t i n g r e l i g i o u s groups, the m a g i s t r a t e a l l o w s a l l r e l i g i o u s groups to enjoy "an equal c o n d i t i o n w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w sub jec t s , " "the same favor of the p r i n c e , " and to a l l have the same benef i t of the law" (68). 6. Conclusion In conclusion, says Locke, "The sum of a l l we drive at i s , that every man enjoy the same r i g h t s that are granted to others" (69). Because Locke presupposes a S a l v a t i o n i s t nature in r e l i g i o n , he has not only been arguing that a c o n d i t i o n of equal r i g h t s , which leads n e c e s s a r i l y to r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n , i s e s s e n t i a l for m a i n t a i n i n g peace and securi ty w i t h i n the state, but that i t leads to a salvat ion of souls which would not be possible under inequali ty and intolerance. Accord ing to Locke, equal r i g h t s and t o l e r a t i o n means that a l l forms of worship are to be equa l l y acceptable w i t h i n a s o c i e t y . Everything that is permitted in secular society by c i v i l law should be permitted in church as w e l l . Re l ig ion should not be used as a j u s t i -f i c a t i on to take away a man's worldly possessions or to interfere wi th the way he wants to l i v e h i s l i f e . Churches should be a l l owed to organize themselves in any manner they choose and to preach whatever they wish so long as i t does not harm the publ ic peace. They are not 34 t o be s a n c t u a r i e s o f " f a c t i o u s and f l a g i t i o u s f e l l o w s " ( 7 0 ) . C r i m i -n a l s o u g h t t o be e q u a l l y p u n i s h e d f o r t h e i r a c t s a g a i n s t s o c i e t y r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n s . N o n - C h r i s t i a n s a r e t o be a 11 owed t h e same c i v i l r i g h t s as C h r i s t i a n s i n a C h r i s t i a n s o c i e t y . And i f n o n - C h r i s t i a n s a r e t o be t o l e r a t e d , says L o c k e , how much m o r e so o u g h t C h r i s t i a n s t o t o l e r a t e t h e d i v e r s i t y o f o p i n i o n s w i t h i n C h r i s t i a n i t y . L o c k e s e e s t h e u n r e s t i n . h i s s o c i e t y as t h e r e s u l t o f an "unhappy a g r e e m e n t " b e t w e e n t h e c h u r c h and t h e s t a t e w h i c h l e a d s t h e s t a t e t o p e r s e c u t e v a r i o u s g r o u p s o f p e o p l e deemed o f t h e w r o n g f a i t h , and d r i v e s t h e s e p e o p l e t o f o r c e a b l y d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s , as i s o n l y n a t u r a l ( 7 1 ) . I f t h e s t a t e a n d t h e c h u r c h a c t e d o n l y w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s p h e r e s o f p o w e r , says L o c k e , i t w o u l d n o t o n l y end t h e d i s c o r d w i t h i n a l l s o c i e t i e s b u t t h e v a r i o u s and b l o o d y r e l i g i o u s w a r s b e t w e e n them. L o c k e w r o t e t h i s l e t t e r w h i l e w i t n e s s i n g t h e c i v i l u n r e s t a n d m i s e r y caused by r e l i g i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n and i n t o l e r a n c e . No doub t h i s m e e t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s who had l e f t a l l t h e i r w o r l d l y p o s s e s s i o n s b e h i n d t o e s c a p e a h o m e l a n d i n w h i c h t h e y w e r e h a t e d on a c c o u n t o f t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s m u s t h a v e h a d an u n s e t t l i n g a f f e c t on L o c k e . The q u e s t i o n a r e a d e r o f L o c k e ' s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n m i g h t n o w a s k i s , d i d t h e e m o t i o n a l i m p a c t o f l i f e as a r e f u g e e i n H o l l a n d a f f e c t t h e l o g i c o f L o c k e ' s a r g u m e n t s ? One c o n t e m p o r a r y r e a d e r o f t h e L e t t e r f e l t t h e r e w e r e m a j o r p r o b l e m s w i t h L o c k e ' s l o g i c and w r o t e t o h i m t o t e l l h i m so i n no u n c e r t a i n t e r m s . 35 Chapter 2 - The Debate between Locke and Proast After its publication in 1689, Locke 's Le t te r was c r i t i c i zed most notably by the H i g h Church c le rgyman and chap l a in of A l l Souls College, Jonas Proast. In his essay enti t led "John Locke, Jonas Proast and religious toleration 1688-1692" Mark Goldie claims that Proast was a defender of religious persecution and resisted the toleration of dissenters by what he perceived to be the true church whenever, and by whomever, it was called for. He notes how Proast "resisted [King] James' demand that the D e c l a r a t i o n of Indulgence - the p r e roga t i ve ed i c t of toleration - be read from the pulpit" (Goldie 147). Goldie sees Proast's resistance as having less to do with "the consti tutional impropriety of the King 's suspension of the penal laws, than with a revulsion against religious toleration as such" (ibid). But, on careful examination it seems that, rather than being a sweeping or dogmatic defense of existing religious persecution, or a documentation of his "revulsion against tolerat ion as such," Proast's in i t i a l c r i t i c i sm of Locke 's position, enti t led A Let te r Concerning 36 T o l e r a t i o n B r i e f l y Considered and Answered (March 27, 1690), and taking up only t w e n t y - e i g h t l a r g e - t y p e pages, was a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g and c h a l l e n g i n g a r g u m e n t w i t h a n a r r o w f o c u s : t h e e f f i c a c y of the use of f o r c e on a person's b e l i e f . L o cke found th i s response so i n t e r e s t i n g that i t e l i c i t e d from him a l e t t e r of almost equal length to his f i r s t f i l l e d w i t h c l a r i f y i n g d e t a i l s . This was his A Second L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n (May 27, 1690). A year l a t e r , in the enthusiasm of his response to Locke's Second L e t t e r , Proast enlarged his scope and challenged a number of other points made by Locke. But this r e s u l t e d in his making the f a t a l mistake of changing Locke's argument from "the use of f o r c e to compel b e l i e f " to "the use of f o r c e to compel the true b e l i e f . " This t a i n t e d a l l of his subsequent arguments against t o l e r a t i o n . D e s p i t e the f a c t that Proast had, in e f f e c t , changed the argument - e i t h e r by a c c i d e n t or by design - Locke responded to Proast the f o l l o w i n g year w i t h his enormously long A T h i r d L e t t e r For T o l e r a t i o n (June 20, 1692). In i t he takes great pains to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and meticulously analyze and c r i t i c i z e each paragraph, each sentence, and of t e n i n d i v i d u a l words used by Proast to show him how his e a r l i e r a r g u m e n t s s t i l l h o l d and P r o a s t ' s a r e a l l i l l c o n c e i v e d . T h i s i n c r e d i b l y d e t a i l e d and a n a l y t i c a l t h i r d l e t t e r from Locke seems to have had a profound s i l e n c i n g impact on Proast. Proast didn't respond u n t i l June of 1704, twelve years l a t e r , w i t h his Second L e t t e r (in f a c t his t h i r d response to L o c k e ) , apparently in order to defend his re p u t a t i o n as not having conceded the lengthy public debate to Locke. Although Proast's A Second L e t t e r seems nothing more than a 37 brush-off, and an attempt to wash his hands of the whole a f f a i r , Locke none-the-less began to w r i t e a reply, e n t i t l e d A F o u r t h L e t t e r For T o l e r a t i o n . Much of what is in this l e t t e r is an almost word for word r e p e t i t i o n of what L o c k e argued in his previous l e t t e r s and which Proast e i t h e r chose to ignore or f a i l e d to respond to adequately. But L o c k e was unable to f i n i s h the l e t t e r before his death on October 28, 1704 and so the debate was ended. The reader is l e f t w i t h the questions, f i r s t of a l l , who has won the debate; second, do the argu-ments in Locke's o r i g i n a l L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n w ithstand the c r i t i c i s m of Proast's analysis; and t h i r d , how does L o c k e c l a r i f y his po s i t i o n in the course of his debate w i t h Proast? An answer may be found by f o l l o w i n g the various li n e s of argument through the seven l e t t e r s . In his f i r s t reply to Locke, Proast summarizes what he claims to be the " s i n g l e " argument of Locke's L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n as f o l l o w s : 1. there is only one way to s a l v a t i o n and only one true r e l i g i o n (by " r e l i g i o n " Proast means a s p e c i f i c denomination or church, as w i l l be seen l a t e r in his arguments); 2. no man can be saved by this r e l i g i o n i f he does not believe i t to be the true r e l i g i o n ; 3. b e l i e f in th i s r e l i g i o n must be c r e a t e d through reason and argu-ment, not by outward f o r c e and compulsion; 4. t h e r e f o r e a l l such f o r c e is useless f o r promoting the true r e l i -gion and the saving of souls; 5. and t h e r e f o r e nobody, regardless of t h e i r s t a t i o n in s o c i e t y , can 38 have the right to use force to bring men to the true religion (Argument 3-4). Proast presents the first proposition as though it were Locke 's , although it is not. In fact Locke maintains that the way to salvation lies in the core teachings of a l l Christ ian churches, but that their various outward forms of worship or ceremonies often conceal this core. The second proposition is also one which Proast mistakenly attributes to Locke. Again, Locke would not have said that salvation comes from belonging to one p a r t i c u l a r c h u r c h , but by l i v i n g in harmony with the teachings of Christ which can be found as the basic teachings in a l l Christ ian churches. Proast says he agrees with the third of what he claims to be Locke 's propositions, that only reason and arguments can induce the mind to assent to any truth. But, as for the fourth proposition, he wonders whether it might not prove effec-tive to use force, not instead of reason and argument, but only "to bring men to consider those reasons and arguments which are proper and sufficient to convince them," but which they never would have consi-dered without being forced to (Argument 5). Using force " indirect ly and at a distance" would bring men to consider the true rel igion which they otherwise might never have done due to their carelessness, negligence, or prejudices against it ( ibid). The use of force to bring men to consider the truth, says Proast, refutes Locke 's fourth proposition that a l l use of force is utterly useless for promoting true religion and the salvation of souls. In response Locke reminds Proas t that the other two arguments of his L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g Toleration (that the magistrate has no authority to use force in 39 matters of religion, and that . the magistrate may be enforcing the wrong religion) are ample reason for toleration even if it were allowed that force could be used successfully to convince men's.minds. It is evident, both from what Proast himself has written and Locke's reply to him, that Proast has failed to appreciate the complexity of Locke's position. Locke also claims that Proast has attributed to him a claim he has not made. Referring to himself, Locke says, [Nowhere] does the author say that it is impossible that force should any way, at any time, upon any person, by any accident, be useful towards the promoting of true religion, and the salvation of souls (Works vol. 6 68). Locke says he didn't deny that God may at times "graciously" make use of "force towards the salvation of men's souls." What he did deny is that "force has any proper efficacy to enlighten the understand-ing, or produce belief" (ibid). It is for this reason, he says, that the magistrate may not lawfully use force in an attempt "to compel men in matters of religion" (ibid). The use of force " ind i rect ly and at a d istance" as Proast proposes, may make some men take up the true religion, says Locke, but these can be seen as nothing more than accidental consequences which may or may not result from the use of force. But in his Third Letter Proast again insists that, although he..agrees force is not able to procure the conviction of the understanding, it may be useful by way of procuring such a conviction by compelling a man "to consider and weigh those reasons and arguments which do convince his understanding" 4 0 since f o r c e has "a proper e f f i c a c y . . . to procure the enlightenment of the understanding and the production of b e l i e f ( T h i r d L e t t e r 16,17). In this subtle argument Proast is not c l a i m i n g , c o n t r a r y to Locke, that f o r c e can be used d i r e c t l y to change a person's b e l i e f , but only that f o r c e can be used to make a person give thought to his b e l i e f s and in this way he might change his b e l i e f s of his own accord. This e f f e c t of f o r c e on b e l i e f would not be as a c c i d e n t a l as L o cke claims, says Proast, but " i s both intended by him that uses i t , and w i t h a l l , I doubt not, so o f t e n a t t a i n e d , as abundantly to manifest the u s e f u l -ness of i t " ( i b i d ) . 1. Force May Be Used By A l l But, says Locke, i f one accepts that the use of f o r c e by one magistrate is j u s t i f i a b l e , then i t l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w s that i t is j u s t i -f i a b l e f o r a l l magistrates to use i t . The problem then is that one would have to agree that the heathen magistrate may use f o r c e to compel C h r i s t i a n s , papists may use i t against protestants, and those who consider themselves orthodox protestant C h r i s t i a n s may use i t against those they p e r c e i v e as non-orthodox protestant C h r i s t i a n s . L o c ke makes t h i s . p o i n t a number of times by repeating that i f one magistrate, who believes his r e l i g i o n to be the true one, has the r i g h t , according to the law of nature, to use f o r c e , a l l magistrates have the r i g h t to do so, since the law of nature gives equal power to a l l magistrates (Works v o l . 6 143, 146, 150, 402). L o cke thereby points out that even i f i t were true that f o r c e could change b e l i e f s , there is s t i l l another argument for t o l e r a t i o n which holds: i f one argues that one p a r t i c u l a r m agistrate has the n a t u r a l r i g h t to use 41 f o r c e in matters of r e l i g i o n , every magistrate who maintains r e l i g i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s has the same n a t u r a l rig h t . 2. Wnom To Use Force On? Lo c k e sees Proast's c o n t e n t i o n that f o r c e should be used to make dissenters at least consider joining the st a t e r e l i g i o n as also run-ning into problems of a d i f f e r e n t nature. F or one thing, he says, i t is impossible to dis t i n g u i s h between dissenters, non-believers who don't att e n d church, sly non-believers who attend church to avoid punishment, and those who honestly don't know what they are to believe. By this he means that i t is not possible f o r the magistrate to pick out those who deserve to be f o r c e d w i t h punishment to consider the e r r o r of t h e i r b e l i e f s from those who don't. Some men have s i n -c e r e l y considered the s t a t e r e l i g i o n and b e l i e v e i t t o be wrong, refuse to attend the state church, and are t h e r e f o r e l e g i t i m a t e d i s -senters e n t i t l e d not to be punished; others simply don't believe in God or r e l i g i o u s worship, refuse to attend the st a t e church, and may or may not have considered t h e i r d i s b e l i e f c a r e f u l l y - i t would be d i f f i c u l t to distinguish which since no one can know what is in the heart or mind of another; s t i l l others attend church as though they are b e l i e v e r s but are merely going through the motions, a c t i n g as though they are beli e v e r s while in f a c t d i s b e l i e v i n g , simply in order to avoid the punishment they in f a c t deserve; and 'finally there are those who are s i n c e r e l y r e l i g i o u s but confused about t h e i r b e l i e f s , which confusion does not j u s t i f y punishment. Again, determining which of these d e s c r i p t i o n s applies to which c i t i z e n of the commonwealth is an impossible task, says Locke, because no one besides God is capable 42 of knowing the motives or true i n t e n t i o n s of another. In o r d e r to be on the s a f e s i d e and get a t , and s u c c e e d i n punishing a l l those dissenters who have not considered t h e i r b e l i e f s and are t h e r e f o r e deserving of punishment, says Locke, i t seems Proast would be l o g i c a l l y f o r c e d into punishing a l l non-believers since he would not be able to i d e n t i f y and i s o l a t e deserving dissenters for punishment. Not only would Proast then be punishing the innocent, but some of the g u i l t y , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e a t t e n d i n g his own f a v o u r e d church, would not be found out and t h e r e f o r e not r e c e i v e the punish-ment they deserve. This makes his c a l l f or a law to punish non-b e l i e v e r s not only i m p r a c t i c a b l e but i n h e r e n t l y i l l e g i t i m a t e since i t would be inequitable (Works v o l . 6 74, Wootton 104). L o c k e also points out that Proast's c a l l f or punishment is not d i r e c t e d generally against those who don't believe in God but s p e c i f i -c a l l y against those who don't accept the magistrate's or the state r e l i g i o n . L o cke thereby not only points out that Proast is c a l l i n g for the punishment of a very s p e c i f i c group - only dissenters and those outside the n a t i o n a l church - he also i n f e r s that Proast is assuming something about the state r e l i g i o n which may in f a c t not be t r u e at a l l - t h a t the s t a t e r e l i g i o n has the t r u t h and t h a t the dissenters and non-believers are wrong and need to be f o r c e d to consider the e r r o r of t h e i r way. But Proast's suggestion that dissen-ters and non-believers should be f o r c e d to consider the state r e l i g i o n w o u l d be s e r v i n g j u s t i c e o n l y i f c a r r i e d out s p e c i f i c a l l y against those who the magistrate is c e r t a i n have not thought long and hard about what the s t a t e r e l i g i o n has to o f f e r . The task of how to 43 determine who has considered adequately and who has not i s , of course, i m p r a c t i c a b l e ( i b i d 75). In l i g h t of the d i f f i c u l t y of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g e x a c t l y who is a dissenter and who is a non-believer, and who has, and who has not considered t h e i r b e l i e f s , L o c k e points out in his t h i r d l e t t e r that i f f o r c e were in f a c t a useful means of bringing men to the true r e l i g i o n , "God alone knows where i t is necessary, and on whom i t w i l l be useful, which no man being capable of knowing" (Works v o l . 6 162). 3. Force May Harm The Truth In pointing out a f u r t h e r problem w i t h the use of f o r c e , L o c k e asks Proast to name p r e c i s e l y "what that t r u t h i s , which you can p o s i t i v e l y say any man, 'without being f o r c e d by punishment, would through carelessness never acquaint himself w i t h ' " (Works v o l . 6 73-4). L o c k e already argued in his o r i g i n a l L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n that there is a strong p r o b a b i l i t y that the b e l i e f s of most magis-t r a t e s are f a l s e . Proast's c a l l f or the magistrate's use of punish-ment against those outside the n a t i o n a l church assumes, and very possibly wrongly, that the n a t i o n a l ' c h u r c h , on whose behalf the magis-t r a t e is a c t i n g , is unquestionably the true one. Because of t h i s , he says, using f o r c e may in f a c t "bring men to r e c e i v e and embrace falsehood, which w i l l destroy them... F o r c e is much more proper, and l i k e l y , to make men r e c e i v e and embrace err o r than the t r u t h , " since those magistrates using this f o r c e are apt to be on the wrong way which they only believe to be the true way ( i b i d 76). This also means, says Locke, just as he argued in his f i r s t l e t t e r , that i t 44 would be a mistake for c i t i z e n s to invest in the magistrate the power to choose t h e i r r e l i g i o n for them, and that they would be no f u r t h e r ahead than i f they were to choose t h e i r own r e l i g i o n , since a magis-t r a t e is just as l i a b l e to be wrong in his c h o i c e as any ordinary c i t i z e n ( i b i d 177-9). That using f o r c e may do more harm than good is borne out, says Locke, by the f a c t that i t cannot be measured whether or not, and how w e l l , men have been compelled to consider t h e i r b e l i e f s , e s p e c i a l l y i f they refuse to change t h e i r r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n a f t e r being f o r c e d to consider. F o r c e may, in the end, turn men away from the true church and c r e a t e enemies by v i r t u e of the f a c t that the magistrate has u n f a i r l y punished them in the name of the true church even though they have already considered and decided against i t of t h e i r own f r e e w i l l (Works v o l . 6 78). L o c k e points out in his t h i r d l e t t e r that in those places where magistrates have been using f o r c e to promote a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n , this f o r c e has caused more s e c t a r i a n i s m and more prejudice against C h r i s t i a n i t y than would ever have been caused by t o l e r a t i o n ( i b i d 240). While f o r c e may have turned men against the true church, L o c k e says, there is no evidence that the opposite is t r u e : that t o l e r a t i o n has ever led men to take up f a l s e r e l i g i o n ( i b i d 478). In f a c t , says Locke, i f the use of f o r c e by the I n q u i s i t i o n were taken away from countries l i k e I t a l y , Spain, P o r t u g a l , and F r a n c e and t o l e r a t i o n were p r a c t i c e d , e v e n i n p o p i s h , M a h o m e t a n and pagan countries, "the true r e l i g i o n would be a gainer by i t " since those who belong to the true r e l i g i o n where i t is not the state r e l i g i o n would not be persecuted for being dissenters or unorthodox, and would 45 be allowed to tr y to persuade others to join them (Locke Works v o l . 6 64). Another important point, according to Locke, is that although f o r c e may make men consider t h e i r b e l i e f s , i t does not help them to make a c o r r e c t decision between t r u t h and falsehood, so i t is no help at a l l in leading men to the true church (Works v o l . 6 78). F i n a l l y , L o cke i n s i s t s that i f i t is necessary to f o r c e dissen-ters to consider the r e l i g i o n of conformists, then i t is l o g i c a l to conclude that i t is also necessary to use f o r c e to compel conformists to consider the b e l i e f s of dissenters (Works v o l . 6 85). Locke's point here is that there is no a v a i l a b l e o b j e c t i v e point of view f r o m which to determine which group of be l i e v e r s has the t r u t h , and t h e r e -fore which group is allowed to compel the other w i t h f o r c e to consider t h e i r b e l i e f s . 4. How Much Force Is Enough? Proast is convinced that the use of f o r c e would c r e a t e a bette r world. The f a c t that there are so many d i f f e r e n t and fa l s e r e l i g i o n s is evidence to Proast that men have not bothered to seek the t r u t h in the r i g h t way (Proast Argument 8-9). If we accept that men choose r e l i g i o n based on " s t i f f p r e j u d i c e s " and without good reason, then, says Proast, i t is obvious that both gentle admonition, "most earnest e n t r e a t i e s , " and persuasion won't work to change t h e i r minds ( i b i d 10). The use of " p e n a l t i e s " or f o r c e in "just measure," or the right proportion is the only way to bring men to consider the t r u t h ( i b i d 11-12). Of course the use of extreme measures, such as im-prisonment, s t a r v a t i o n , t a k i n g away t h e i r w o r l d l y possessions, and 46 manning and torturing men to death in an effort to bring them to the true re l ig ion and save their souls, says Proast , is a "manifest absurdity" since it can create the exact opposite effect (ibid 13). Force should only be used by way of disposing men to submit to instruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reasons which are offered, for the enlightening their minds and discovering truth to them ( ib id) . According to Locke, this points to yet another problem with the use of force: the difficulty of determining what sorts of punishments are severe enough and long enough, and at the same time not too severe, to compel men to consider the truth of their religion (Works vol. 6 106-9). Proast explains that what he means by the use of moderate force " ind i rect ly and at a d is tance," is that it is the same sort of benevolent force used by schoolmasters, tutors, or masters "upon their scholars, or apprentices, to bring them to learning, or to the skill of their arts and trades" and that it may work just as well for the magistrate when used on citizens in this manner for the purpose of bringing them to consider the true religion (Argument 18, 26). This claim about the usefulness of moderate force also seems to imply a right for some - that is those in authority - to use it (ibid 53). But Locke responds in his Third Letter by saying that Proast's analogy between the schoolmaster or parent forcing a child and the magistrate forcing his subjects does not hold, since adults are not children. Adults are not under the age of reason, incapable of making their own 47 informed decisions, needing people in a u t h o r i t y t e l l i n g them what to believe (Works v o l . 6 206-11). And as f o r the e f f i c a c y of using punishment to teach, L o cke gives the example of mathematics, in which, as in r e l i g i o n , the t r u t h of propositions is not s e l f - e v i d e n t . L o c k e says that even i f a l l students are sincere in t h e i r desire to come to know mathematical propositions by coming to an understanding of the proofs, some students w i l l come to understand proofs and know proposi-tions which others never w i l l , regardless of the methods used by the i n s t r u c t o r , i n c l u d i n g the use of ph y s i c a l punishments (Works vo l . 6 425). L o c k e is implying that just as punishment w i l l not help some students to ever come to understand some proofs or propositions in mathematics, punishment is s i m i l a r l y u n l i k e l y to ever help some men come to understand the proofs of r e l i g i o u s truths or to discover the true r e l i g i o n . So if punishment is to be applied u n t i l such an under-standing comes, says Locke, when w i l l the punishment of these students and some men ever end? Proast's c a l l f o r moderate f o r c e or penalties which can be i n -creased f or those who refuse to change leaves the door open, says Locke, for an ever in c r e a s i n g use of f o r c e . The question remains: how much f o r c e to use; what is too l i t t l e or too much (Works v o l . 6 263-5, 270, 457)? For an example of how punishment can es c a l a t e to ex-tremes Locke c i t e s the case of the law which f i r s t a llowed the le v y i n g of a l s fin e against a man f o r not attending church. The punishment was c o n t i n u a l l y increased u n t i l i t e v e n t u a l l y led to the law al l o w i n g the banishment of a man from his home and country on threat of the death penalty, and a l l this during the reign of a single queen -48 E l i z a b e t h ( i b i d 287). What w i l l prevent th i s e s c a l a t i o n of punish-ment? .-Proast's rule for punishment is "so general, loose, and i n c o n -s i s t e n t , " says Locke, that i t is no help at a l l in avoiding the death penalty at the extreme (i b i d 279). L o c k e also points out that Proast has in f a c t c o n t r a d i c t e d him-se l f , and is not as benevolent in his use of "moderate punishment" as he t r i e s to appear. He says that while Proast has c a l l e d the use of the death penalty to save a man's soul "an a b s u r d i t y " early on in his f i r s t l e t t e r , he l a t e r seems to allow f o r " g r e a t e r punishments when lesser are not s u f f i c i e n t to bring men to be convinced." Proast seems ev i d e n t l y to condone the "absurd" use of the death penalty as a means of saving souls when he says, " a l l c o a c t i v e power resolves at last into the sword since a l l that refuse to submit to lesser penal-t i e s must at la s t f a l l under the stroke of i t " (Works v o l . 6 73; Proast L e t t e r 23). In f a c t , in the end Proast makes no pretense against the use of c a p i t a l punishment when he again a f f i r m s the use of "the sword" against those who rebel against the magistrate and refuse to submit to lesser penalties meant to bring them to consider t h e i r b e l i e f s in his T h i r d L e t t e r (21). L o c k e asks Proast to look beyond a mere c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the degrees of punishment and to consider the j u s t i c e of what he proposes. While i t may seem to him j u s t i f i a b l e to use moderate punishment to f o r c e a man to consider his b e l i e f s , L o c k e asks, is i t s t i l l j u s t i f i -able to use f o r c e against a man who w i l l not profess the n a t i o n a l f a i t h even though he has given i t c a r e f u l thought and has concluded that he does not believe i t to be true, or against the man who does 0 49 not enter a church or worship a c e r t a i n way because he thinks these are erroneous? Proast may be arguing f or the use of "moderate" punishment merely to moti v a t e everyone to consider t h e i r b e l i e f s , but, says Locke, "where there is no f a u l t , " where c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n has already been made, "there can be no moderate punishment," because even the l i g h t e s t kind of punishment of an innocent man is u n j u s t i f i -able (Works v o l . 6 71). 5. God And The Use Of Force Proast argues that i f the use of f o r c e were not e f f e c t i v e to bring men to consider the true r e l i g i o n , then God would not • have furnished i t as a means of saving souls and promoting his own honour. The f a c t that the use of f o r c e has been necessary throughout the histor y of the true church, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s were no longer able to use the performing of mi r a c l e s to convert unbelievers, says Proast, shows that there is a ri g h t to use f o r c e , and that this r i g h t seems to rest w i t h the magistrate and a l l those in a u t h o r i t y , such as "parents, masters of f a m i l i e s , t utors e t c . " (Argument 16). To th i s L o cke says in his t h i r d l e t t e r that many more people in the early days of C h r i s t i a n i t y , and since then, have come to accept the gospel of C h r i s t due to the preaching and persuasions of C h r i s t i a n missionaries rather than because of the performing, and witnessing, of miracles. This shows that m i r a c l e s were not necessary for conversion, and' f o r c e is not t h e r e f o r e a l e g i t i m a t e replacement for mi r a c l e s to convince men of the true r e l i g i o n (Works v o l . 6 443-44). No one has the r i g h t , says Locke, to make use of any other means for the s a l v a -t i o n of men's souls besides preaching and persuasion regardless of how 50 useful that means may seem. The only means anyone has a r i g h t to are those p r e s c r i b e d by "the author and f i n i s h e r of our f a i t h , " that is through persuasion w i t h arguments ( i b i d 81, 112-13). While there is no doubt that preaching is e f f e c t i v e in promoting b e l i e f , says Proast, t h i s does not rule out the use of moderate f o r c e as a useful a d d i t i o n to preaching (Argument 37). Furthermore, i f God did not want "moderate p e n a l t i e s " used to induce men to hear and consider "he would have t o l d us so" says Proast, and L o c k e should have shown where he did so in s c r i p t u r e ( i b i d 38). In reply, L o c k e quotes a number of t e x t s from the B i b l e (which say that f a i t h comes by hearing, that f a i t h is a g i f t of God, etc.) that dispute Proast's c l a i m that God seems to have allowed the use of f o r c e t o . c r e a t e f a i t h (Works v o l . 6 82-5). He also points out that, c l e a r l y , the Gospel was f i r s t spread by means of discussion and per-suasion, and that i t t h r i v e d without the use of f o r c e ( i b i d ) . Using Proast's own argument against him, L o c k e says that i t could be said that i f f o r c e is necessary in promoting the church, then God did not furnis h his people the means for promoting his own honour in the world during the f i r s t three hundred years a f t e r Christ's death, since f o r c e was not used to spread C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f ( i b i d 113). 6. What If C i t i z e n s Agreed To The Use Of Force? In his Third L e t t e r Proast returns to arguing s c r i p t u r e . He says he is not s a t i s f i e d that L o cke has used the s c r i p t u r e s to his advan-tage. He argues that the magistrate has the r i g h t to use f o r c e because a number of s c r i p t u r a l t e x t s seem to i n d i c a t e that God, through the Law of Nature, gives him this commission. His using f o r c e 51 is simply "the discharging an old duty" ( i b i d 35, 52). Proast fe e l s he also has this r i g h t when his subjects have vested this power in him of t h e i r own free w i l l for t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , that i s , because they see i t as b e n e f i c i a l to the s a l v a t i o n of t h e i r own souls ( i b i d 65). Proast says, a c c o r d i n g to Locke, the magistrate's j u r i s d i c t i o n is to be measured by the end for which the commonwealth is c o n s t i t u t e d . But Proast asks, why must the commonwealth be c o n s t i t u t e d , as Locke claims, only f or the procuring, preserving, and advancing of c i v i l i n t e r e s t s ? This statement, says Proast, merely begs the question: Why can a commonwealth not be c o n s t i t u t e d f o r the procuring and advance-ment of men's s p i r i t u a l and e t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s ? This would c e r t a i n l y l e g i t i m i z e the magistrate's use of f o r c e in the s a l v a t i o n of souls (Argument 18). What Proast f a i l s to recognize however is that the arguments in Locke's o r i g i n a l L e t t e r already r e f u t e the implied argu-ment in Proast's question: a commonwealth can't be c o n s t i t u t e d f or the procuring and advancement of men's s p i r i t u a l and e t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s b e c a u s e , f i r s t , r a t i o n a l c i t i z e n s w o u l d not a g r e e t o a l l o w t h e i r m a g istrate to use f o r c e on them to compel them to bel i e v e what he wanted them to believe; second, the use of outward f o r c e by i t s e l f is i n s u f f i c i e n t in the formation of the righ t kind of b e l i e f - the kind that leads to s a l v a t i o n ; and t h i r d , the magistrate may be compelling false b e l i e f ( L e t t e r 19-22; Works V o l 6 116-17) Proast also points out that Locke's a s s e r t i o n that the care of souls is not committed to the c i v i l m a g istrate is a "proving the thing by i t s e l f " or a c i r c u l a r argument (Argument 19). Since only the c i v i l m agistrate may lay pena l t i e s on c i t i z e n s who refuse to 52 embrace the d o c t r i n e of a commonwealth's s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r s , P r o a s t sees t h i s as proof t h a t the c a r e of s o u l s t h r o u g h the use of f o r c e must indeed be committed to him ( i b i d 20-21). I t may be noted how-ever t h a t , i f anything i s a c i r c u l a r argument, i t i s t h i s argument of P r o a s t ' s . F u r t h e r m o r e , says P r o a s t , t h i s a u t h o r i t y of the m a g i s -t r a t e ' s i s not, as Locke has p o r t r a y e d i t , " t o compel any one to h i s r e l i g i o n , " but rather o n l y an a u t h o r i t y to p r o c u r e a l l h i s s u b j e c t s the means of d i s c o v e r i n g the way of s a l v a t i o n , and t o p r o c u r e w i t h a l l , as much as i n h i m l i e s , t h a t none remain ignorant of i t , or refuse to embrace i t , e i t h e r for want of using those means, or by reason of any such p r e j u d i c e s as may render them i n e f f e c t u a l ( i b i d 21). P r o a s t goes so f a r as t o say t h a t c i t i z e n s a c t u a l l y a l l o w the m a g i s t r a t e the power to use the sword, i n o t h e r words the death p e n a l t y , a g a i n s t those who r e f u s e to submit to the l e s s e r p e n a l t i e s meant to make them consider (Argument 23). Locke responds by arguing that just because an end may be a t t a i n -a b l e by c i v i l s o c i e t y (eg. the s a l v a t i o n of s o u l s ) i t does not then n e c e s s a r i l y make t h i s one of the ends of c i v i l s o c i e t y . In f a c t the use of f o r c e w i t h i n s o c i e t y as a means t o make men f i n d the t r u e r e l i g i o n , and as an attempt to improve s o c i e t y , may a c t u a l l y do more harm than good to c i v i l s o c i e t y because "men's c i v i l i n t e r e s t s a r e dis t u r b e d , i n j u r e d , and impaired by i t " (Works v o l . 6 117-8). Locke a l s o says that nobody can i n reason suppose t h a t any one e n t e r e d i n t o 53 c i v i l s o c i e t y f or the procuring, securing, or advancing the s a l v a t i o n of h i s s o u l , when he, for that end, needed not the force of c i v i l s o c i e t y (Works v o l . 6 119). It i s c l e a r to Locke t h a t j u s t as the c h u r c h has as i t s end the s a l v a t i o n of souls, not c i v i l a f f a i r s , so every c i v i l s o c i e t y and i t s m a g i s t r a t e has as i t s end the smooth running of the secular a f f a i r s of that s o c i e t y and not the s a l v a t i o n of souls. This i s what each i n s t i -t u t i o n has been ccrrmissioned to do by i t s c i t i z e n s (Works v o l . 6 120-22). This a l s o r e f u t e s Proast's c l a i m that he has argued i n a c i r c l e , says Locke, since to say that the m a g i s t r a t e does not have the power to care f or souls because i t i s not corrrnitted to him by h i s subjects i s "a f a i r proof" and not c i r c u l a r i t y ( i b i d 122-3). Locke a l s o s u ggests t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n P r o a s t ' s a g r e e i n g w i t h him, on the one hand, t h a t a man cannot and s h o u l d not leave the matter of h i s own s a l v a t i o n i n the hands of another, w h i l e a s s e r t i n g , on the o t h e r hand, t h a t c i t i z e n s of a commonwealth c o u l d ccrrrnit to t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e the power to force them to examine t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s (Works v o l . 6 127-8). Furthermore, Locke wonders i n h i s second l e t t e r what i t w i l l do to the m a g i s t r a t e ' s own r e l i g i o n i f he i s t o use f o r c e to p r o c u r e "aU_ h i s s u b j e c t s the means of d i s c o v e r i n g the way of s a l v a t i o n " (Wojrks v o l . 6 88, 90-1, 103, 125-6). Locke a g a i n s u g g e s t s t h a t the ma g i s t r a t e w i l l f i n d h i m s e l f i n the absurd, but l o g i c a l , p o s i t i o n of h a v i n g to use f o r c e a g a i n s t a l l h i s s u b j e c t s , even those whom he c o n s i d e r s t o have the t r u e r e l i g i o n , i n o r d e r to be e q u i t a b l e i n h i s use of f o r c e . 54 L o c k e says that in the f i n a l analysis the use of f o r c e is e i t h e r u n l a w f u l , because thi s power was never committed to the magistrate by his subjects, or i m p r a c t i c a b l e , because i t is impossible to determine on whom fo r c e should be used, how much f o r c e should be used, what sort of f o r c e should be used, and so on (Works v o l . 6 126). 7. The Argument From True Religion Proast argues that the m a g i s t r a t e does not use his power, and is not commissioned, to bring men to hi_s own r e l i g i o n but to the true r e l i g i o n . By f o r c i n g his subjects to make use of the l i g h t of t h e i r own reason and to f o l l o w the d i c t a t e s of t h e i r own consciences, c i t i z e n s c o u l d a c t u a l l y f i n d t h e m s e l v e s bei n g led away from the r e l i g i o n of t h e i r m agistrate when they discovered i t to be f a l s e . This i n v e s t i g a t i v e process w i l l lead c i t i z e n s ever onward toward the true r e l i g i o n (Argument 26-7). This supports his c o n t e n t i o n that the use of f o r c e by the magistrates of a l l commonwealths w i l l lead to a l l c i t i z e n s seeking, and e v e n t u a l l y f i n d i n g , the one true r e l i g i o n . This argument from true r e l i g i o n proves to be the f a t a l f l a w in Proast's second response to Locke. In this l e t t e r Proast makes a number of i n t e r e s t i n g points, but the f a t a l f l a w in his reasoning overshadows and c r i p p l e s a l l his arguments. The mistake Proast makes is that he bases his j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the magistrate's use of f o r c e to make men consider t h e i r b e l i e f s on the assumption that the magis-t r a t e is in f a c t promoting the true r e l i g i o n . While he spoke in his f i r s t l e t t e r of the magistrate's use of f o r c e as necessary and useful in promoting the true r e l i g i o n as though the true r e l i g i o n was as l i k e l y to be d i f f e r e n t from that of the magistrate as i t was to be the 55 same (The Argument 26-7), in this l e t t e r Proast argues that f o r c e is not necessary when the na t i o n a l r e l i g i o n , or the r e l i g i o n of the magistrate, is in f a c t a fa l s e one. He points out that i t l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w s that "no man ought to be punished for being of any fa l s e r e l i g i o n , though i t be the n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n , " and that a l l who have s u f f i c i e n t means of i n s t r u c t i o n provided f or them may jus t l y be punished for not being of the na t i o n a l r e l i g i o n where the true is the n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n because i t i s a f a u l t i n a l l s u c h not t o be of t h a t n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n ( T h i r d L e t t e r 20). Proast makes this point again and again throughout his t h i r d l e t t e r by saying in various ways, "I am for punishing only such as re j e c t the true r e l i g i o n , " ( T h i r d L e t t e r 24, 26-30, 40, 42, 45, 47-51, 55, and elsewhere). He grants that Locke's argument for t o l e r a -t i o n would hold i f a l l r e l i g i o n s were "equally true and so i n d i f -f e r e n t , or a l l be equally c e r t a i n (or u n c e r t a i n ) " since in this case there seems no point to make anyone change his r e l i g i o n ( i b i d 47). But he goes on to say that i f there is only one true r e l i g i o n , "and that may be known to.be the only true r e l i g i o n by those who are of i t " i t is then reasonable and necessary to f o r c e those of the wrong r e l i g i o n "to forsake t h e i r f a l s e r e l i g i o n and to embrace the t r u e " ( i b i d 48). But th i s argument i s , according to Locke, "based on so general and e q u i v o c a l marks," and dependent on suppositions which nobody w i l l grant Proast - that some one magistrate can be c e r t a i n that his sta t e r e l i g i o n is the true. one. It would be impossible, says Locke, to know 56 for c e r t a i n one person who could be said to be g u i l t y of belonging to what .is unquestionably known to be a f a l s e r e l i g i o n and t h e r e f o r e deserving of punishment from the magistrate, since no one but God knows which is in f a c t the only true r e l i g i o n (Works v o l . 6 255; Wootton 102). This raises the question concerning what some w r i t e r s c l a i m to be Locke's s c e p t i c i s m (eg. Proast Second L e t t e r 35; Wootton 101, Tuck 33, 35; H orton John L o c k e 9). The t h i r d argument in his o r i g i n a l l e t t e r seems to suggest a r e l i g i o u s s c e p t i c i s m . But while the s c e p t i c holds that one ought to suspend b e l i e f in any r e l i g i o n u n t i l i r r e f u t -able proof is found as to which one is the true one, L o cke is very c l e a r in his b e l i e f , granting Proast that there is but one true r e l i g i o n in the world, which is that whose d o c t r i n e and worship are necessary to s a l v a t i o n . I grant too that the true r e l i g i o n , necessary to s a l v a t i o n , is taught and professed in the Church of England (Works v o l . 6 320). N o t i c e that he has not said, as claimed by Proast, that the true r e l i g i o n j_s the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d , o n l y t h a t i t _is taugh_t by the Church of England. He goes on to say i t w i l l not f o l l o w from hence that the r e l i g i o n of the Church of England, as established by law, is the only true r e l i g i o n ; i f there be anything established in the Church of England by law, and made part of i t s r e l i g i o n , which is not necessary to s a l v a t i o n (Works v o l . 6 422-3). 57 What Locke has done is di s t i n g u i s h between the " d o c t r i n e and worship necessary to s a l v a t i o n " and those p e r i p h e r a l r i t u a l s and ceremonies as established by church law which are not necessary for s a l v a t i o n . For Locke, t h e r e f o r e , true r e l i g i o n , as necessary for s a l v a t i o n , may be present in a number and v a r i e t y of churches. Locke is f a r f r o m b e i n g a s c e p t i c s i n c e he b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n has w i t h i n i t what is needed for s a l v a t i o n despite the f a c t that there are " c o n t r i v a n c e s of men" added on which are not necessary for s a l v a t i o n (Works v o l . 6 328). His argument against Proast then is not one from s c e p t i c i s m about C h r i s t i a n i t y but one from u n c e r t a i n t y as to which of the.many C h r i s t i a n churches in the world are among the p l u r a l i t y of paths to s a l v a t i o n because of the confusion of r i t u a l s and ceremonies which obscure t h e i r core teachings. F i r s t he refuses to accept Proast's co n t e n t i o n of the single path to s a l v a t i o n - v i z . the Church of England. And second, he denies that f o r c e is j u s t i f i e d in the spreading of b e l i e f . L o c k e sees f o r c e as being used u n l a w f u l l y in England since i t is used to make men accept those p e r i p h e r a l r i t u a l s and ceremonies which are -merely claimed necessary to communion in the Church of England but are in f a c t not necessary to s a l v a t i o n (Works v o l . 6 327). L o c k e says t h a t i n o r d e r to j u s t i f y the use of f o r c e to c o m p e l men t o conform to the n a t i o n a l church, even i f i t were the true one, i t must be shown that no s a l v a t i o n is possible outside this church ( i b i d 247). What d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h i s church from others is not the t r u t h of i t s core b e l i e f s , but merely i t s i n s i s t e n c e on p a r t i c u l a r r i t u a l s and ceremonies. In Locke's opinion, which he also expresses l a t e r in his 58 book The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y , any number of churches may have the t r u t h , and the disputes among the various churches is not about thi s core of t r u t h but about the p e r i p h e r a l elements or t r i v i a l -i t i e s unessential to s a l v a t i o n . Therefore, i f f o r c e is used to compel men into this or that church, says Locke, f o r c e w i l l not necessarily be used to compel men to accept the t r u t h but only to accept those t r i v i a l i t i e s a ssociated w i t h some p a r t i c u l a r church's r i t u a l s or c e r e -monies. In his T h i r d L e t t e r L o c k e says that to argue, as Proast does, that the magistrate may not use f o r c e merely to compel men to his r e l i g i o n , but only to compel them to the true r e l i g i o n , which is the magistrate's r e l i g i o n and which he has judged to be true, is to argue in a c i r c l e (Works v o l . 6 185). Furthermore, L o c k e says, " i f men must be punished as long as they r e j e c t the true r e l i g i o n , those who punish them must be judges what is true r e l i g i o n " ( i b i d 295). This makes i t a l o g i c a l i m p e r a t i v e t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e be f o r c e d to consider his own b e l i e f s before he uses any f o r c e to bring others to consider the r e l i g i o n he holds as the true one ( i b i d 364-6). If i t is the absence of " m o l e s t a t i o n " or persecution that c o n s t i t u t e s the greatest danger to the souls of men, says Locke, then i t seems the magistrate himself is in the gravest danger of a l l since there has, so f a r , been no talk of punishing or f o r c i n g the magistrate ( i b i d 136). Locke, almost tongue in cheek, accuses Proast of ignoring this very important problem. The questions this leaves i s , who is to f o r c e the magistrate, and who is to determine whether he has considered his b e l i e f s adequately enough to have a r r i v e d at the true r e l i g i o n ? 59 Regarding the f a t a l f l a w in Proast's second response to L ocke -Proast's T h i r d L e t t e r (his assumption that the magistrate knows he has the true r e l i g i o n ) L o cke repeats in numerous places (Works v o l . 6 142, 150, 167, 169, 176, 185, 295, 321 and elsewhere) what he points out most s u c c i n c t l y near the middle of his T h i r d L e t t e r when he says, You say, "the question there debated i s , whether the magistrate has any ri g h t or a u t h o r i t y to use f o r c e for promoting the true r e l i g i o n ; which p l a i n l y supposes the unlawfulness and i n j u s t i c e of using f o r c e to promote a false r e l i g i o n , as granted on both sides." N e i t h e r is that the question in debate; nor, i f i t were, does i t suppose what you pretend (Works v o l . 6 364). The problem i s , says Locke, even, i f a m a g i s t r a t e were commis-sioned to use f o r c e , he can only act a c c o r d i n g to his b e l i e f , and s t i l l does not know for c e r t a i n that his r e l i g i o n is in f a c t the true one (Works v o l . 6 144-45, 176). What Proast has f a i l e d to e x p l a i n i s , in order to j u s t i f y the use of f o r c e , "which of the magistrates of your time... c e r t a i n l y knew which was the m i n i s t r y which our L o r d had appointed" (Works v o l . 6 150). "What, I beseech you," asks L o c k e , " i s that true r e l i g i o n ? " ( i b i d 167). A f u r t h e r t r o u b l i n g point regarding the use of f o r c e , says Locke, is that a l l o w i n g the magistrate the power to use f o r c e or punishment "to make men consider" seems to be i d e n t i c a l w i t h a l l o w i n g punishment to be used to f o r c e men to take up a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n , namely the magistrate's, since he would l o g i c a l l y use f o r c e only against those 60 not of his own r e l i g i o n (Works v o l . 6 128-9). Proast grants in his second l e t t e r that a magistrate is obliged to use fo r c e to bring men to his own r e l i g i o n because his r e l i g i o n "must needs be the True R e l i g i o n " ( i b i d 5). This is because the magistrate has not simply been persuaded to promote his own r e l i g i o n because of his f a i t h or b e l i e f in i t , says Proast, but rat h e r because of "something very near to demonstration" which makes his persuasion "knowledge" or " f u l l assurance." The.more the magistrate examines his r e l i g i o n , the more c l e a r and so l i d the ground of his knowledge of the t r u t h of his r e l i g i o n ( i b i d 6-8). No f a l s e r e l i g i o n would ever stand such close s c r u t i n y , says Proast, as to lead a magistrate to believe i t to be the true ( i b i d 9). And furthermore, he says, no matter how f i r m l y a magistrate believes his f a l s e r e l i g i o n to be true, he is forbidden, by • "the F i r s t Table of the D i v i n e Law," from using any means for the promoting of his r e l i g i o n no matter how good his inten t i o n s ( i b i d 16-17). With this as his f i n a l argument Proast, i n c r e d i b l y , thinks he has said enough to counter a l l the arguments against r e l i g i o u s p e r s ecution made up to this point by Locke. Conclusion Locke's short, because unfinished, reply to Proast's f i n a l brush-o f f , that i s , Proast's Second L e t t e r , is e n t i t l e d A F o u r t h L e t t e r For T o l e r a t i o n (1706), and was not published u n t i l a f t e r Locke's death. In i t L ocke finds himself obliged to repeat many of the arguments he had made su c c e s s f u l l y against Proast in his second and t h i r d l e t t e r s , e s p e c i a l l y the f a c t that i t is impossible f or any magistrate to be c e r t a i n beyond a doubt that his r e l i g i o n is the true one. He t e l l s 61 P r o a s t t h a t e v e r y m a g i s t r a t e is c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e r e l i g i o n he believes to be true is in f a c t the true one. "Men in a l l r e l i g i o n s , " he says, whether they are Bramin, Mahometan, papist, Lutheran, quaker, anabaptist or p r e s b y t e r i a n , "have equally strong persuasions" about the t r u t h of t h e i r r e l i g i o n , and no one can judge for them whether they are ri g h t or not (Works vo l . 6 559-61). He reminds Proast that he has neglected once again to i n s i s t that magistrates themselves be brought to consider t h e i r b e l i e f s through the use of f o r c e against them ( i b i d • 564-5). The f a l l a c y in Proast's reasoning, says Locke, is that you allow yourself to suppose the m a g i s t r a t e , who is of y our r e l i g i o n , to be w e l l - g r o u n d e d , a t t e n t i v e , and unbiased, and f u l l y and f i r m l y assured that his r e l i g i o n is true; but that other magistrates of other r e l i g i o n s d i f f e r e n t from yours are not so (568-9). L o c k e also repeats that since a l l magistrates believe they are of the ri g h t r e l i g i o n , and the law of nature allows a l l to use f o r c e , using f o r c e in the matter of r e l i g i o n allows more harm than good to come to the true r e l i g i o n ( i b i d 566). A l l of Locke's arguments in thi s l e t t e r are v i r t u a l r e p e t i t i o n s of former arguments he has made which Proast has not bothered to, or has been unable to, r e f u t e . In the f i n a l analysis, Proast's t h i r d l e t t e r can be described in the same terms with which L o c k e describes one of i t s empty paragraphs, that is as "a most exact and studied piece of a r t i f i c i a l f e n c i n g , wherein, under the cover of good words, and the appearance of nice t h i n k i n g , nothing is s a i d " ( i b i d 557). 62 While Proast makes a v a r i e t y of arguments against t o l e r a t i o n , there is no doubt that L o c k e counters them a l l e f f e c t i v e l y . What seems to Proast to be his single most pow e r f u l argument against Locke's c a l l f o r t o l e r a t i o n of a l l r e l i g i o n s , that of the magistrate's using f o r c e to promote the true r e l i g i o n , turns out to be nothing but a straw, man argument of his own making. Even so, L o c k e sportingly o f f e r s a number of devastating arguments against i t , most of which he has not previously made in his o r i g i n a l L e t t e r . In his o r i g i n a l l e t t e r Locke argued that, because of the nature of the b e l i e f that leads to s a l v a t i o n , a magistrate's using outward f o r c e in an attempt to compel a person to believe would not be succes-s f u l . In the course of his argument w i t h Proast, L o c k e is obliged to make a number of a d d i t i o n a l supporting arguments. F i r s t , he says that the magistrate is not a u t h o r i z e d to use f o r c e to compel b e l i e f since i t is not humanly possible to determine who needs to be compelled to consider and who has in f a c t already considered. Second is the problem of how much f o r c e to use - what is severe and long enough to compel a person to consider adequately? T h i r d , he points out that i t is impossible to determine whether the use of f o r c e by a magistrate a c t u a l l y does any good, whether i t a c t u a l l y brings a person closer to the true r e l i g i o n or whether i t harms the cause of t r u t h by d r i v i n g the v i c t i m away from his own b e l i e f which may have been the t r u t h . F o u r t h , L ocke says the use of f o r c e alone doesn't help a person to decide between falsehood and the t r u t h . F i f t h is the p o s s i b i l i t y that the magistrate's use of f o r c e may lead a person to take up an unexpec-ted r e l i g i o n or b e l i e f , one which the m a g i s t r a t e considers to be 6 3 obviously f a l s e . And f i n a l l y there is the f a c t that i f everyone is to be f o r c e d to consider t h e i r b e l i e f s then the magistrate himself must also s u f f e r such f o r c e to be i n f l i c t e d on him. But Locke's two arguments which are the most damaging to intoler-ance are never considered by Proast: f i r s t , the magistrate does not know that the r e l i g i o n he is f o r c i n g on his subjects is in f a c t one that w i l l lead to s a l v a t i o n ; and, second, even i f the magistrate is f o r c i n g the true r e l i g i o n on his people, they cannot f o r c e themselves, through an act of w i l l , to believe that which they are being compelled to believe. By' f a i l i n g to account for a l l of the premises of Locke's complex argument, Proast proves himself to be an unconvincing opponent unequal to the systematic a n a l y t i c a l mind of John Locke. R a t h e r than harming Locke's p o s i t i o n , Proast's a t t a c k on Locke leaves the argu-ments made by Locke in his o r i g i n a l L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n even more s o l i d l y defended. While Proast's challenge to Locke's L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n led- L o c k e to a greater c l a r i f i c a t i o n of his arguments, even more insight is a v a i l a b l e by means of an examination of some of Locke's other w r i t i n g s in the area of p o l i t i c a l theory, epistemology, educa-t i o n , and r e l i g i o n . 6 4 Chapter 3 - Clar i fy ing Locke 's Arguments Concerning Toleration By Means of an Examination of Some of his Other Writings Locke's E a r l y W r i t i n g s and Intolerance In his First and Second Tracts on Government (1660, 1662) Locke pointed out that the v a r i e t y of C h r i s t i a n sects was a "perpetual foundation of war and c o n t e n t i o n " because i t n e c e s s i t a t e d the use of for c e against heresy and dissension. Although i n t o l e r a n c e no doubt added to the unrest c r e a t e d by se c t a r i a n i s m in s o c i e t y , L o cke thought early on that a p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n , rather than improve things, was sure to make matters worse. Therefore, he argued, i t is prudent for the magistrate to end this unrest and d e s t r u c t i o n in soc i e t y brought on by the v a r i o u s C h r i s t i a n f a c t i o n s by i m p o s i n g u n i f o r m i t y i n r e l i g i o n (Tuck 33-4). He maintained that there was a need " f o r an absolute state a u t h o r i t y to impose r e l i g i o u s orthodoxy and p o l i t i c a l unity," and he allowed that i t was acceptable to impose uniformity in those matters that were necessary f or s a l v a t i o n (Wootton 28, 33). For the young Locke i n t o l e r a n c e was a matter of p r a c t i c a l i t y ; he saw unif o r m i t y as the only way to peace and s t a b i l i t y in so c i e t y . A l l of Locke's arguments in the two t r a c t s are mainly d i r e c t e d 63 towards j u s t i f y i n g the c i v i l magistrate's a u t h o r i t y over the realm of i n d i f f e r e n t things, "that is those p r a c t i c e s which are con v e n t i o n a l l y part of re l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e , but which are not expressly p r e s c r i b e d by divine law revealed through s c r i p t u r e " ( K e l l y 127). While L o c k e b e l i e v e d a l l C h r i s t i a n s h e l d t h e same c o r e b e l i e f s , i t was t h e s e i n d i f f e r e n t things on which the various C h r i s t i a n sects d i f f e r e d that caused a l l the unrest among them. Locke argued that i f the magistrate was given the power over i n d i f f e r e n t things, then he could l i m i t what v a r i o u s s e c t s c o u l d c l a i m to be e s s e n t i a l , and t h e r e f o r e w o r t h f i g h t i n g over. L o c k e knew that i f the magistrate was required to accommodate l i b e r t y of conscience over i n d i f f e r e n t things in re l i g i o u s worship, then his aut h o r i t y was e f f e c t i v e l y undermined because e a c h i n d i v i d u a l and s e c t c o u l d s t i l l c l a i m to be the ultimate determinant of whether an a c t i o n was o b j e c t i v e l y i n d i f f e r e n t or whether i t formed part of the necessary requirements of re l i g i o u s worship or p r a c t i c e " ( K e l l y 131). That L o c k e was concerned about the extent to which r e l i g i o u s leaders thought themselves to have the power to c o n t r o l c i t i z e n s is i l l u s t r a t e d i n h i s f i r s t t r a c t w h ere he g i v e s t h e e x a m p l e of the Presbytery of Scotland who took on them at pleasure to f o r b i d the c i v i l and innocent meeting of friends in any place but the church or market, under pretense to prevent e v i l and scandal. So f a r w i l l r e l i g i o u s and s p i r i t u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n be extended even to 66 the most i n d i f f e r e n t of common actions... ( F i r s t T r a c t of Government in Wootton 142). If s o c i e t y was to remain pe a c e f u l , then the power to c o n t r o l these "most i n d i f f e r e n t of common a c t i o n s " should belong only to the magistrate, according to Locke. In his two t r a c t s L o c k e makes i t his business to c l e a r l y e stablish the power and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the magis-t r a t e over " i n d i f f e r e n t things" so that c i t i z e n s might not be able to c l a i m that actions which are not prescribed by s c r i p t u r e , but are po t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e and d i s r u p t i v e to the peace and s e c u r i t y of the commonwealth, are in f a c t e s s e n t i a l to the p r a c t i c e of t h e i r r e l i g i o n . From his e a r l i e s t w r i t i n g to his landmark L e t t e r , L o c k e continues to t r y to separate out those things unessential to s a l v a t i o n that are the greatest cause of dissension and c o n f l i c t between C h r i s t i a n sects. While i t might be said that in his early w r i t i n g s young Locke is "a l o y a l member of the Church of England, a s c h o l a s t i c philosopher, an a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and an a b s o l u t i s t , " he n e v e r t h e l e s s e n c o u r a g e s dialogue between d i f f e r i n g opinions, something he champions throughout his more mature works. A l t h o u g h he does not end o r s e s c e p t i c i s m , he s t a t e s s c e p t i c a l arguments in t h e i r strongest form. He endorses neither divine ri g h t monarchy nor c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m , but gives both t h e i r say (Wootton 36). And at the same time that he promotes a r e l i g i o u s u n i f o rmity under the d i s c r e t i o n of the c i v i l m agistrate he also imagines an id e a l w o r ld in which r e l i g i o n does not have the right to the use of fo r c e , and where w a r f a r e and bloodshed may no longer be j u s t i f i e d in 67 the name of re l i g i o u s b e l i e f s (From the F i r s t T r a c t on Government in Wootton 144-5). An Essay Concerning T o l e r a t i o n Locke's a t t i t u d e toward r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n seems to have been gre a t l y i n f l u e n c e d in the d i r e c t i o n of t o l e r a t i o n by his coming to know L o r d Ashley, the E a r l of Shaftesbury in 1666. Shaftesbury was a strong proponent, of t o l e r a t i o n . In his essay "The Development of Locke's B e l i e f in T o l e r a t i o n " j.w. Gough suggests that it's possible Locke's a t t i t u d e to t o l e r a t i o n was "already d e f i n e d " by 1659 as evidenced by a l e t t e r he wrote thanking someone he only r e f e r r e d to as "S.H." for sending him a book on t o l e r a t i o n which he read " w i t h great pleasure and ad m i r a t i o n " (Gough 59). Of course, th i s does not c o n s t i t u t e proof that his a t t i t u d e had in f a c t changed at such an early date. Be that as i t may, while L ocke had maintained in his e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s that uniformity, and t h e r e f o r e i n t o l e r a n c e , was most l i k e l y to ens u r e p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y i n s o c i e t y , by 1667 he had changed his mind and was arguing in his Essay Concerning T o l e r a t i o n that i t was in f a c t t o l e r a t i o n that was necessary in order to estab-l i s h and maintain a pea c e f u l s o c i e t y (An Essay Concerning T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 192-3, 197-8, 207). P.J. K e l l y sees the maintenance of c i v i l peace and s t a b i l i t y as the most important p o l i t i c a l goal under-ly i n g a l l of Locke's p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s b e c a u s e c i v i l p e a c e a n d s t a b i l i t y a r e n e c e s s a r y conditions f or the development and f l o u r i s h i n g of man's two e s s e n t i a l f u nctions, r a t i o n a l i t y and agency. The successful f l o u r i s h i n g of these two de f i n i n g features of 68 human n a t u r e i s a c o n d i t i o n not o n l y of the s u c c e s s f u l and i n d u s t r i o u s l i f e , but i t i s a l s o a c o n d i t i o n of r e a l i z i n g man's greatest goal, namely personal s a l v a t i o n ( K e l l y 132-3). Many of the points and arguments Locke makes two years l a t e r i n h i s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n are a l r e a d y i n e v i d e n c e i n h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n . F or example, r e g a r d i n g the c l e a r d i f -f e r e n t i a t i o n of the j u r i s d i c t i o n and powers of the church and s t a t e , Locke says i n the Essay the t r u s t , power, and a u t h o r i t y of the m a g i s t r a t e i s vested i n him for no other purpose but to be made use of f o r the good, p r e s e r v a t i o n , and peace of men i n t h a t s o c i e t y over which he i s set... For the m a g i s t r a t e i s but an i r r p i r e between man and man; he can r i g h t me against my n e i g h b o u r but c a n n o t d e f e n d me a g a i n s t my God (i n Wootton 186, 188). L a t e r he w r i t e s i n his' L e t t e r t h a t the purpose of the power and s t r e n g t h w i t h w h i c h . t h e m a g i s t r a t e i s armed i s " i n o r d e r t o the punishment of those that v i o l a t e any other man's r i g h t s . " But Locke makes i t c l e a r that the whole j u r i s d i c t i o n of the m a g i s t r a t e reaches only to these c i v i l concernments, and a l l c i v i l power, r i g h t , and do m i n i o n i s bounded and c o n f i n e d to the o n l y c a r e of p r o m o t i n g t h e s e t h i n g s ; and i t n e i t h e r can nor ought i n any manner t o be extended t o the s a l v a t i o n of souls... ( L e t t e r 19). 69 Another example is when he says in his L e t t e r that the reason why a magistrate can have no say in the matter of s a l v a t i o n of men's souls is because men have not given him the power to make them do that which they can't make themselves do, i.e., to believe according to what he orders them to believe ( L e t t e r 19, 55). In his Essay Locke had already made this same argument by saying, "No man can give another man power (and i t would be to no purpose i f God should) over that over which he has no power himself" (Wootton 187, 189). L o c k e also says in his Essay that s p e c u l a t i v e opinions "cannot by any means eit h e r disturb the sta t e or inconvenience my neighbour, and so come not w i t h i n the magistrate's c ognizance" (in Wootton 187). He makes this same point l a t e r in his L e t t e r by saying the magistrate should not fo r b i d the "preaching or pro f e s s i n g " of any sp e c u l a t i v e opinion in any church because "they have no manner of r e l a t i o n to the c i v i l r i g h ts of the subjects" ( L e t t e r 55). Other examples can be found in his arguments regarding the magis-t r a t e having no j u r i s d i c t i o n over s o - c a l l e d " i n d i f f e r e n t things" to reli g i o u s worship, which i n d i f f e r e n t things, such as outward r i t e s and ceremonies, although having no e f f e c t on c i v i l s o c i e t y , are a very important instrument of communication between a man and the God he worships (cf. T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 190; L e t t e r 43-44); his argument that whatever doesn't disturb the peace or th r e a t e n the s e c u r i t y of the state ought to be allowed and ought not to be outlawed by the magistrate (cf. T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 191; L e t t e r 43, 47-9); his argument that i t is not ac c e p t a b l e to use fo r c e to in f l u e n c e a man's reli g i o u s opinions since f o r c e doesn't change a man's mind, i t only 70 makes him a hyp o c r i t e (cf. T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 192; L e t t e r 19-20); and his argument that C a t h o l i c s or papists ought no to be t o l e r -ated since they c l a i m a l l e g i a n c e to a f o r e i g n power (cf. T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 197, 202-3; L e t t e r 63). L i k e his l a t e r L e t t e r , his Essay Concerning T o l e r a t i o n is both C h r i s t i a n in i t s approach as w e l l as secular, "both a u t h o r i t a r i a n and l i b e r t a r i a n , both in favour of passive obedience and sympathetic to resistance," (Wootton 41 ) . The importance of his Essay Concerning T o l e r a t i o n is that w i t h i t Locke turns the corner from the conserva-t i v e argument that n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y can only be maintained through f o r c e d uniformity in r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and worship which he had been promoting in his two T r a c t s on Government, to the argument that in f a c t "people that are so shattered into d i f f e r e n t f a c t i o n s are best secured by t o l e r a t i o n " ( T o l e r a t i o n in Wootton 207). There is l i t t l e doubt that his Essay Concerning T o l e r a t i o n a n t i c i p a t e s the main arguments and conclusions of the L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n of 1689, and was consistent w i t h the fundamental thesis which L o c k e adhered to c o n s i s t e n t l y a l l through his l i f e (Gough 71). The Fundamental C o n s t i t u t i o n s of C a r o l i n a When L o r d Ashley and eight of his associates became the Lords P r o p r i e t o r s of the " p r o v i n c e " of C a r o l i n a in N o r t h America, L o c k e was a s k e d to be t h e i r s e c r e t a r y and to d r a f t a c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r the colony. In 1669 Locke helped to d r a f t The Fundamental C o n s t i t u t i o n s of C a r o l i n a . Although this document is included in c o l l e c t i o n s of L o c k e ' s p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s . i t seems to be g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d t h a t , although L o c k e d r a f t e d i t , the scheme of the C o n s t i t u t i o n was not his. 71 In his L i f e , of John Locke (1876) Fox Bourne wrote that A r t i c l e 96 (discussed below) was not drawn up by L o c k e at a l l but was i n s e r t e d by "the c h i e f of some of the p r o p r i e t o r s , against his judgement, as Mr. L o c k e himself informed one of his f r i e n d s " ( c i t e d in Gough 67). A r t i c l e 95 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n seems to r e i n f o r c e the aversion L o c k e expresses in his L e t t e r against a t h e i s t s ( L e t t e r 64). He says that i f a person refuses to acknowledge the existence of God, and the f a c t that God ought to be " p u b l i c l y and solemnly" worshipped, such a person s h a l l not be permitted to be a freeman in C a r o l i n a or "to have any estate or h a b i t u a t i o n w i t h i n i t " ( C o n s t i t u t i o n in Wootton 228). Since L o cke f e l t that s o c i e t y was based on the keeping of oaths and promises, and since he believed that an a t h e i s t would not be compelled to keep his oaths and promises since he had no b e l i e f in God as the e n f o r c e r , i t seems reasonable, in l i g h t of these views, that L o cke i n c l u d e d t h i s c l a u s e i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a n e w l y e s t a b l i s h e d "commonwealth." A somewhat surprising aspect about the C o n s t i t u t i o n is that, while L o cke concludes his L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n by saying that "The sum of a l l we d r i v e at i s , that every man enjoy the same rights that are granted to others" (69), he allows every freeman of C a r o l i n a to have "absolute power and a u t h o r i t y over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or r e l i g i o n soever" ( A r t i c l e 110, C o n s t i t u t i o n in Wootton 230). By p e r m i t t i n g slaves to be "of what Church or ( r e l i g i o u s ) profession any of them s h a l l think best, and there of be as f u l l y members as any freeman" (ibid) i t could be said that L o c k e can say that at least in this sense every man enjoys the same rights as every 72 other. But this r i g h t does not exempt the slave from "that c i v i l dominion his master hath over him," which c i v i l dominion is the c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t to o w n e r s h i p of p r o p e r t y , i.e., his s l a v e ( i b i d ) . Since the r e c o g n i t i o n of slavery may have been a given while L o c k e ex e r c i s e d his c o n t r o l , i t is l i k e l y that L o c k e already has in mind, and is t r y i n g to establish in C a r o l i n a , a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between c i v i l matters (ownership of p r o p e r t y ) and m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o u s freedom (the rig h t to worship as one pleases) which he l a t e r argues for in his L e t t e r . This c a l l f o r freedom of r e l i g i o n , while he allows for the ownership of slaves, seems to be c l e a r evidence of his b e l i e f that the two j u r i s d i c t i o n s of church and st a t e , are quite independent and should not i n t e r f e r e w i t h each other. A r t i c l e 96 is another unexpected item in the C o n s t i t u t i o n . While his L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n c l e a r l y defends (and perhaps even encourages) d i v e r s i t y in r e l i g i o n , a r t i c l e 96 states that i t s h a l l belong to the parliament of C a r o l i n a to take c a r e f o r the b u i l d i n g of c h u r c h e s , and t h e p u b l i c maintenance of divines, to be employed in the ex e r c i s e of r e l i g i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C h u r c h of E n g l a n d ( C o n s t i t u t i o n in Wootton 228). The Church of England, then, was also to be the n a t i o n a l church of the new colony of C a r o l i n a . As mentioned above, this a r t i c l e might not at f i r s t seem l i k e a p o s i t i o n L o cke would take since i t seems to be promoting one p a r t i c u l a r church. L o c k e w i l l l a t e r use the argument from u n c e r t a i n t y as to which is the true church in his L e t t e r to argue for t o l e r a t i o n . This would lead one to expect that, l e f t to w r i t e the 73 c o n s t i t u t i o n on h i s own, Locke might have decided against e s t a b l i s h i n g a n a t i o n a l c h u r c h i n a new c o l o n y , and opt i n s t e a d f o r a l l o w i n g a d i v e r s i t y of churches to e s t a b l i s h t h e m s e l v e s as they may. But i t must be remembered that a d i v e r s i t y of churches and b e l i e f s i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e even though the s t a t e endorses one ch u r c h as the s t a t e c h urch. What Locke argues a g a i n s t i n h i s L e t t e r i s the r i g h t of any church to c l a i m the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to e x i s t , and thereby to c l a i m as l e g i t i m a t e the r i g h t to the use of f o r c e to e l i m i n a t e a l l o t h e r churches, and to ccmpel those outside the s t a t e church to accept i t as t h e i r own. He does not argue against the l e g i t i m a c y of the existence of a s t a t e c h u r c h per se. Sixteen years a f t e r the w r i t i n g of the C o n s t i t u t i o n Locke would w r i t e i n h i s L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n that "no opinions contrary to human s o c i e t y , or to those moral r u l e s which are necessary to the pr e s e r v a t i o n of c i v i l s o c i e t y , are to be t o l e r a t e d by the ma g i s t r a t e " (61). He e x p r e s s e s t h i s same sent iment i n the Const i t u t i o n when he says, "no person whatsoever s h a l l speak anything i n t h e i r r e l i g i o u s asserrbly, i r r e v e r e n t l y or s e d i t i o u s l y of the government or governors, or s t a t e m a t t e r s " ( A r t i c l e 103, i n Wootton 229). In t h i s way Locke a s s u r e s t h a t r e l i g i o n may not be used as a cam o u f l a g e f o r the d i s c u s s i o n of ideas and the making of p l a n s t h a t a r e h a r m f u l to the peace and s e c u r i t y of the ccnrnonwealth or the colony. The L o r d s P r o p r i e t o r s of the c o l o n y and Locke p r o v i d e f o r r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n i n the new colony by means of A r t i c l e s 102, 106, and 109 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h guarantee c i t i z e n s the r i g h t to r e l i g i o u s assembly free from m o l e s t a t i o n by other Churches or i n d i v i -7 4 duals, Churches the r i g h t to be free from "reproachful, r e v i l i n g , or a b u s i v e language" by n o n b e l i e v e r s , and i n d i v i d u a l s the r i g h t to be free from being d i s t u r b e d , molested, or persecuted by others because of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s (Const i tut ion i n wootton 229, 230). Locke l a t e r includes these provisos i n h i s L e t t e r . The F i r s t and Second T r e a t i s e of Government Locke p u b l i s h e d both h i s F_irs_t and h i s Second T r e a t i s e of 92Y.£LDmi?Di: i n 1 6 8 9 . s h o r t l y a f t e r h i s Le_t_ter_ C o n c e r n i n g Toj_er_a_t_ion (Gough 57). While some an a l y s t s hold that Locke's L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n p r e d a t e s h i s Two T r e a t i s e of Government (Gough 57), and that t h e r e f o r e Locke's L e t t e r "provides a foundation for the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l freedoms defended i n the Second T r e a t i s e of Government" (LaSelva 2), David Wootton dates the w r i t i n g of both T r e a t i s e as c i r c a 1681. He dates the w r i t i n g of the L e t t e r as 1685. This supports the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Locke's ideas c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e , f u n c t i o n and scope of c i v i l government were w e l l d e v e l o p e d b e f o r e he w r o t e h i s L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t ion. In h i s L e t t e r Concerning. T o l e r a t ion Locke goes beyond j u s t i f y i n g the magistrate's r i g h t to r u l e , and beyond e s t a b l i s h i n g the purpose of a ccrrrnonwealth and the scope of the magistrate's power. The c e n t r a l argument of Locke's L e t t e r i s "that, whatever the scope of the magis-trate's l e g i t i m a t e power may reasonably be thought to be, the regula-t i o n of r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p a s such must l i e u nequivoca 11 y beyond i t " for the three important reasons discussed in the f i r s t chapter above (Dunn 175). So, wh i 1 e the Let_te£ makes use of h i s p o l i t i ca 1 t h e o r y and i t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s Two T r e a t i s e , i t s argument does not rest 75 on an acceptance of h i s contractar.ian conception of society. In t h i s way h i s L e t t e r can stand q u i t e independent of h i s p o l i t i c a l theory. In h i s T r e a t i s e Locke e s t a b l i s h e s that a corrmonwealth c o n s i s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s who a r e " u n i t e d i n t o one body, w i t h a u t h o r i t y to d e c i d e c o n t r o v e r s i e s between them, and p u n i s h o f f e n d e r s , " to r e d r e s s the i n j u r i e s that may happen to any one of i t s c i t i z e n , and, perhaps most importantly - "the great and c h i e f end" - to preserve t h e i r property through a common e s t a b l i s h e d law and j u d i c a t u r e (Second T r e a t i s e i n Wootton 304, 305, 325). He acknowledges t h i s pos i t ion'ear 1 y i n h i s L e t t e r by s t a t i n g that the ccrrrnonwealth seems to be "a s o c i e t y of men c o n s t i t u t e d f o r the p r o c u r i n g , p r e s e r v i n g , and a d v a n c i n g t h e i r own c i v i l i n t e r e s t s , " which he says are " l i f e , l i b e r t y , and indolency of the body" as w e l l as "the p o s s e s s i o n of outward t h i n g s , such as money, lands, houses, f u r n i t u r e , and the l i k e " ( L e t t e r 18). In h i s Second T r e a t i s e Locke a l s o says, t h a t the p e o ple have "a supreme power to remove or a l t e r the l e g i s l a t i v e " when they f i n d t h e i r r u l e r s making laws that are "contrary to the t r u s t " the people have p l a c e d i n t h e i r l e a d e r s ( i n w o o t t o n 337). The community "pe r p e t u a l l y r e t a i n s the supreme power of saving themselves from the a t t e m p t s and d e s i g n s of anybody, even t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s " ( i b i d ) . Locke makes a s i m i l a r point regarding the power re t a i n e d by c i t i z e n s in h i s L e t t e r when he says that i f a m a g i s t r a t e makes a law concerning things which are not w i t h i n h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n , as, for example, i f he should attempt to compel people to worship in a p a r t i c u l a r way or to a t t e n d a p a r t i c u l a r c h u r c h , "men a r e not i n t h e s e cases o b l i g e d by that law, against t h e i r consciences" because matters r e l a t i n g to the s a l v a t i o n of the soul are the concerns of i n d i v i d u a l s themselves, and 76 not the. magistrate's ( L e t t e r 59-60). This supreme power which j u s t i f i e s c i t i z e n s of the corrrnonwealth to save t h e m s e l v e s f r o m the d e s i g n s of t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s i s founded not o n l y on the e x t e n t of power c i t i z e n s have agreed to a l l o w t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e , i t i s a l s o based on t h a t w h i c h , i n Locke's o p i n i o n , c i t i z e n s cannot do, namely to d e l i v e r themselves up to "the absolute w i l l and a r b i t r a r y dominion of another" (Second T r e a t i s e i n wootton 337-8). This l i m i t a t i o n on what men can do i s the f i r s t of the three arguments Locke makes i n h i s L e t t e r a g a i n s t the magi s t r a t e ' s b e i n g involved i n the s a l v a t i o n of souls. The m a g i s t r a t e does not have the duty to care for men's souls because, says Locke, "the care of souls i s not v e s t e d i n the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e . . . by the consent of the people." The choice of f a i t h or worship cannot be handed over to the m a g i s t r a t e s i n c e i t depends on i n w a r d p e r s u a s i o n and not s i m p l y an agreement to c o n f o r m to the m a g i s t r a t e ' s d i c t a t e s (Le_tter_ 19). In both the Let_ter and the T r e a t i s e Locke reminds h i s r e a d e r s t h a t the power of the m a g i s t r a t e or the l e g i s l a t i v e i s only a f i d u c i a r y power, meaning that i t i s a t r u s t e e r e l a t i o n s h i p which a l l o w s the m a g i s t r a t e the power to use force to promote what c i t i z e n s see as t h e i r own good, and not the power to do what the m a g i s t r a t e sees as best f o r the c i t i z e n s but a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l , or worse s t i l l , what i s best f o r himself ( L e t t e r 18-19; Second T r e a t i s e i n Wootton 337). Perhaps the most important element of Locke's Second T r e a t i s e i s t h a t he s t r e s s e s i n i t t h a t a l l men a r e n a t u r a l l y i n a s t a t e of e q u a l i t y , , "wherein a l l the power and j u r i s d i c t i o n i s r e c i p r o c a l , no one h a v i n g more than a n o t h e r " because a l l men a r e " f u r n i s h e d w i t h 77 l i k e f a c u l t i e s , sharing a l l i n one community of nature" ( i n Wootton 263-4). T h i s e q u a l i t y of a l l i s r e a f f i r m e d by Locke i n the L e t t e r when he says at i t s beginning that i t i s the duty of the m a g i s t r a t e to care f o r h i s subjects "by i m p a r t i a l execution of equal laws," and at the end of h i s L e t t e r w i t h the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the sum of a l l he i s d r i v i n g at " i s that every man enjoy the same r i g h t s that are granted to others" ( L e t t e r 18, 69). This e q u a l i t y which Locke w r i t e s about in h i s L e t t e r can therefore be seen to o r i g i n a t e from the same nat u r a l s t a t e of human e q u a l i t y Locke argues for i n h i s Second T r e a t i s e . Four years a f t e r Locke composed h i s two T r e a t i se (1681) the l a t i n v e r s i o n of h i s L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n was p u b l i s h e d (1685). Four y e a r s a f t e r h i s L e t t e r h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human Understanding, which he had been working on since 1671, was published in i t s f i n a l d r a f t (1689). In i t he was able to c l a r i f y , and discuss at much greater length, the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l arguments he had used in hi s L e t t e r in support of r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n . An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke c l e a r l y s t a t e s t h a t the purpose of h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human Understanding i s to enquire i n t o the o r i g i n , c e r t a i n t y , and extent of human knowledge; t o g e t h e r w i t h the grounds and degrees of b e l i e f , opinion and assent... It i s ther e f o r e worth w h i l e to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measure, i n things, whereof we have no c e r t a i n knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and 78 moderate our persuasions (Essay 43-44) It i s i n p a r t t h i s q u e s t i o n of the c e r t a i n t y of knowledge i n matters Of r e l i g i o n , the nature of b e l i e f i t s e l f , and the p r o b a b i l i t y of knowing f o r sure w h i c h i s the r i g h t b e l i e f t h a t he w i s h e s to enquire i n t o w i t h h i s Essay. These e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are present i n (though not c e n t r a l to) a l l three of Locke's main arguments for t o l e r a t i o n i n h i s L e t t e r (19-21). In h i s L e t t e r Locke had w r i t t e n that b e l i e f cannot be compelled by means of "corporal s u f f e r i n g s or any other outward p e n a l t i e s " but o n l y t h r o u g h " l i g h t and e v i d e n c e " ( L e t t e r 20, 21). He r e a f f i r m s t h i s p o s i t i o n in h i s Essay when he says f a i t h i s nothing but a f i r m assent of the mind, which i f i t be r e g u l a t e d , as i s our duty, cannot be a f f o r d e d any thin g but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to i t (Essay 687). Not only i s Locke here saying that f a i t h or b e l i e f r e s t s on coming to a f i r m c o n v i c t i o n through reason, he i s , more i m p o r t a n t l y , s a y i n g t h a t i t i s every person's duty to use the l i g h t of reason to examine t h e i r b e l i e f s because i t i s through such examination that the examiner w i l l come ever c l o s e r to the o n l y f o r m of be l i e f a c c e p t a b l e to God, and to the t r u t h . In h i s essay e n t i t l e d "The C l a i m to Freedom of C o n s c i e n c e : Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Thought, Freedom of Worship," John Dunn says that f or John Locke the n o n - d i s c r e t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r of human b e l i e f at any p a r t i c u l a r t i m e was not i n i t s e l f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n -indeed i t was not even an excuse - f o r the c o n t e n t of th a t b e l i e f . The c e n t r a l purpose of Locke's g r e a t e s t work, the Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , was to i n s i s t on the urgency and i n t r i c a c y . o f the duty of each human being to regulate h i s assent to the content of h i s own b e l i e f s , to make hi m s e l f f u l l y r e sponsible f or that content and to shape i t m e t i c u l o u s l y and strenuously to f i t the obdurate contours of ext e r n a l r e a l i t y (Dunn 179-80). The s a l v a t i o n of the s o u l i s a c c o m p l i s h e d , a c c o r d i n g to Locke, through a f a i t h b u i l t on reasoned u n d e r s t a n d i n g of those t h i n g s one has f a i t h i n . I t i s the use of reason t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s us f r o m beasts, and elevates us "as r a t i o n a l creatures above brutes" (Essay 696). One cannot be ignorant or doubtful of one's r e l i g i o n and expect s a l v a t i o n . "I cannot be saved by a r e l i g i o n t h a t I d i s t r u s t , " says Locke i n h i s L e t t e r , and there i s no s a l v a t i o n without c o n v i c t i o n and "an inward and f u l l persuasion of the mind" (40-41, 19). Not only i s i t necessary that one understands what one clai m s to b e l i e v e , i t a l s o makes l o g i c a l sense, a c c o r d i n g t o Locke, not to simply go by what others say. In h i s Essay he says that there cannot be a "more dangerous t h i n g to r e l y on, nor more l i k e l y to m i s l e a d one" than the opinions of others since there i s 'nxich more falsehood and errour amongst men than t r u t h and knowledge," because no one has "the u n c o n t e s t a b l e e v i d e n c e of t r u t h of a l l t h a t he h o l d s " (Essay 657, 660). Assent, then, or the accepting of something as true should o n l y ever be based on the degree of p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the re a s o n s , arguments, or proofs o f f e r e d are i n f a c t true and ther e f o r e b e l i e v a b l e (Essay 657-8). Locke's f i r s t and t h i r d arguments (that n e i t h e r God 80 nor the people t h e m s e l v e s have g i v e n the m a g i s t r a t e the power to choose a b e l i e f f o r them s i nee no one can "conform h i s f a i t h to the d i c t a t e s of another;" and that there i s no guarantee that the f a i t h of the m a g i s t r a t e i s the one that w i l l lead to s a l v a t i o n ) are therefore seen by some analy s t s as "exp l o r a t i o n s of problems i n decision-making theory, problems concerning making d e c i s i o n s on the basis of judge-ments of p r o b a b i l i t i e s , " d e c i s i o n s made i n such a way as to lead to the r i g h t k i n d of b e l i e f (Wootton 103). The L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t ion i s there f o r e not j u s t a t e x t t h a t echoes the c o n t r a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y and the r e s i s t a n c e arguments of the Second T r e a t i s e ; i t i s a l s o d i r e c t e d to problems c e n t r a l to the d i s c u s s i o n of p r o b a b i l i t y and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n the Essay (Wootton 103). Locke takes up t h i s t o p i c by d e v o t i n g a l l or p a r t s of c h a p t e r s XV, XVI, XVII, and XX of Book IV of the Essay to an extended d i s c u s s i o n of how sound d e c i s i o n s are made and what f a c t o r s a f f e c t the p r o b a b i l i t y of a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n being made concerning what i s true. In h i s L e t t e r Locke asks what hope there might be that more men would be led in t o the r i g h t r e l i g i o n and c e r t a i n s a l v a t i o n " i f they had no o t h e r r u l e to f o i l o w but the r e l i g i o n of the c o u r t " i n l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t the l e a d e r s or p r i n c e s of the w o r l d , as w e l l as the various r e l i g i o u s leaders they endorse and promote, are as d i v i d e d " i n the v a r i e t y and c o n t r a d i c t i o n of o p i n i o n s i n r e l i g i o n " as i n t h e i r s e c u l a r i n t e r e s t s (21). He makes t h i s p o i n t a g a i n i n h i s E s _ s a y , asking r h e t o r i c a l l y , 81 A r e the c u r r e n t o p i n i o n s and l i c e n s e d g u i d e s of ev e r y country s u f f i c i e n t evidence and s e c u r i t y to every man to venture h i s greatest concernments on, nay h i s e v e r l a s t i n g h a p p i n e s s or m i s e r y ? Or can those be the c e r t a i n and i n f a l l i b l e o r a c l e s and standards of t r u t h which teach one thin g i n Christendom and another i n Turkey (Essay 708)? The question Locke asks here i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the one he asked in h i s Lett e r . : what are the chances, what i s the p r o b a b i l i t y , t h a t the r e l i g i o n being forced on h i s subjects by one m a g i s t r a t e i n one country w i l l l e a d to s a l v a t i o n , when t h e r e a r e so many d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s among mag i s t r a t e s as to the r i g h t way to s a l v a t i o n ? The s o l u t i o n to t h i s p r o b l e m i s c l e a r l y o f f e r e d by Locke on the same page when he says, "God has furnish e d men w i t h f a c u l t i e s s u f f i c i e n t to d i r e c t them i n the way they s h o u l d t a k e " (Essay 708). Ev e r y c i t i z e n i s , according to Locke, to use t h e i r own reasoning power to f i n d the way to s a l vat i o n . In the L e t t e r L ocke l i m i t s the scope of what the m a g i s t r a t e should a l l o w i n terms of outward forms and r i t e s of worship, and the d o c t r i n e s and p r a c t i c a l and s p e c u l a t i v e a r t i c l e s of f a i t h (42-61). There are r i t e s and ceremonies w h i c h the magi s t r a t e has a r i g h t t o p r o h i b i t , namely those which harm the peace or s e c u r i t y of the'corrmon-w e a l t h , or tho s e , l i k e the s a c r i f i c i n g of the c a l v e s i n t i m e s of c a t t l e stock shortage, that are necessary f o r the good of the common-wealth, and then there are those which the m a g i s t r a t e may not i n t e r -f e r e w i t h that are necessary f o r worship since they are seen as d i r e c t ccrrmands from God. 82 In c h a p t e r X I X of h i s Essay Locke a d d r e s s e s the o t h e r s i d e of t h i s issue, so to speak. Having already argued i n h i s L e t t e r that the m a g i s t r a t e ' s power and j u r i s d i c t i o n does not extend over r e l i g i o u s matters, Locke addresses r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r s , e s p e c i a l l y those prone to what he c a l 1 s "enthusiasm." E n t h u s i a s m , a c c o r d i n g to Locke, i s founded ne i t h e r on reason nor d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n , but comes from "the co n c e i t s of a warmed or over-weening b r a i n , " and leads men to think t h a t whatever they f e e l s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e d to do they may c a l l a " d i r e c t i o n f r o m heaven" t h a t must be obeyed as a "commission f r o m above, and they cannot e r r i n e x e c u t i n g i t " (Essay 699). In modern E n g l i s h i t m i g h t be c a l l e d r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c i s m . The p r o b l e m w i t h enthusiasm for Locke i s , of course, that i f any sort of a c t i o n at a l l may be c a l l e d "a commission from above," i t would a l l o w c i t i z e n s to commit a l l s o r t s of a c t i o n s harmful to the commonwealth i n the name of God or r e l i g i on. By d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s s o r t of f a n a t i c a l r e l i g i o u s c l a i m made by some i n the name of freedom of r e l i g i o n , Locke has a n t i c i p a t e d and e l i m i n a t e d the argument that there e x i s t s a need for the m a g i s t r a t e to p r o h i b i t some b e l i e f s i n the name of the good of the state. R e c a l l that Locke has p r e v i o u s l y argued i t i s impossible for the m a g i s t r a t e to make such d e c i s i o n s because of the nature of b e l i e f , and the u n c e r t a i n t y of w h i c h c h u r c h i s the t r u e one ( L e t t e r 19-21). In the Essay Locke asks each c i t i z e n to examine the w o r k i n g s of h i s own mind, and to use the l i g h t of reason to determine what i s i n f a c t a command f r o m God and what i s no more than p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l "enthusiasm." In t h i s way c i t i z e n s w i l l be p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r own r i g h t to r e l i g i o u s freedom through s e l f - p o l i c i n g , rather than a l l o w i n g the 83 argument t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r the c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e to make dec i s i o n s regarding the a u t h e n t i c i t y of c e r t a i n r e l i g i o u s c laims. In h i s L e t t e r Locke a l s o w r i t e s about " C h r i s t i a n brethren" who are " a l l agreed i n the s u b s t a n t i a l and t r u l y fundamental p a r t of r e l i g i o n " but among whom "implacable e n m i t i e s " develop because they disagree w i t h each other on f r i v o l o u s things which may be omitted from t h e i r r e l i g i o n w i t h o u t r i s k i n g the s a l v a t i o n of s o u l s ( L e t t e r 36). This issue concerning the unreasonableness of disagreements on account of m a t t e r s of l i t t l e a c t u a l consequence to s a l v a t i o n i s taken up by Locke a g a i n i n h i s Essay. There he w r i t e s t h a t because men "have been p r i n c i p l e d w i t h an opinion that they must not consult, reason in t h e t h i n g s of r e l i g i o n , " r e l i g i o n has become f i l l e d w i t h " a b s u r d i t i e s , " " f a n c i e s , " " n a t u r a l s u p e r s t i t i o n s , " " e x t r a v a g a n t o p i n i o n s and c e r emon i e s.. .con t r ad i c t ory to common sense," and "extravagant p r a c t i c e s " due to which a c o n s i d e r a t e man cannot but s t a n d amazed at t h e i r f o l 1 i e s , and judge them so f a r f r o m b e i n g a c c e p t a b l e to the g r e a t and w i s e God, t h a t he cannot a v o i d t h i n k i n g them r i d i c u l o u s , and o f f e n s i v e t o a sober, good man (Essay 696). It seems evident then that Locke i s convinced that r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s that are p e r i p h e r a l to the core and fundamental t r u t h of the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n - w h i c h t o p i c he w r i t e s about at length i n h i s 9.L 9 l2 l i i l i ^Hi ly d i s c u s s e d b e l o w - and w h i c h " a b s u r d i t i e s " have not been examined by means of the l i g h t of reason, not o n l y cause u n r e s t w i t h i n a s o c i e t y because of the d i s a g r e e m e n t s 84 among chu rches as t o w h i c h a r e e s s e n t i a l and w h i c h a re mere t r i v i a , they are a l s o , f o r the most p a r t , unacceptable to God s ince they have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l f a i t h a l l chu rches b e l i e v e God requ i res of b e l i e v e r s . W i t h h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human Unders tand ing Locke leaves the reader i n no doubt t h a t , in l i g h t of the na ture of human b e l i e f , which cannot be fo rced e i t h e r by the agent or the m a g i s t r a t e to change f r o m one v i e w t o a n o t h e r , and i n l i g h t of t he d i v e r s i t y o f b e l i e f s , and t h e r e f o r e the u n c e r t a i n t y of r e l i g i o u s t r u t h s , i t would "become a l l men t o m a i n t a i n peace, and the o t h e r common o f f i c e s o f h u m a n i t y and f r i e n d s h i p i n the d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n " and t o " c o m m i s e r a t e our m u t u a l i g n o r a n c e , and endeavour t o remove i t i n a l l g e n t l e and f a i r ways of. i n f o r m a t i o n , " i n o ther words, to be t o l e r a n t of one another (Essay 659, 660) . Seme Thoughts on Educat ion An issue which Locke addresses repeated ly in h i s essay e n t i t l e d Some Thoughts on Educat ion (1693) is tha t of punishment as a pa r t of r a i s i n g and educat ing a c h i l d . He says e a r l y on, I am very apt to t h i n k , t ha t great s e v e r i t y of punishment does but very l i t t l e good; nay, great harm in educat ion : and I b e l i e v e i t w i l l be f o u n d , t h a t , c a e t e r i s p a r i b u s , those c h i l d r e n who have been most chas t i sed , seldom make the bes t men (Works V o l . 9 35) . He p o i n t s out l a t e r t h a t m a t u r a t i o n t a k e s c a r e o f much o f t h e " a c t i o n s o f c h i l d i s h n e s s " and " u n f a s h i o n a b l e c a r r i a g e " and t h a t 85 t h e r e i s l e s s need of the use of "the d i s c i p l i n e of the r o d " or b e a t i n g s of c h i l d r e n "as i s g e n e r a l l y made use o f " ( i b i d 60). He goes on to say that i f we add l e a r n i n g to read, w r i t e , dance, f o r e i g n languages, &c. as under the same p r i v i l e g e , there w i l l be but v e r y r a r e l y any o c c a s i o n f o r blows or f o r c e i n an ingenious education ( i b i d ) . The r i g h t way to t e a c h , he says, i s " t o g i v e t h e m a l i k i n g and i n c l i n a t i o n to what you propose to teach them to be learned" ( i b i d ) . The greatest discouragement to l e a r n i n g , Locke observes, i s when those whom one w i s h e s t o t e a c h , or who e x p r e s s an i n t e r e s t to l e a r n , a r e then c o m p e l l e d to i t ( i b i d 63). These passages support Locke's p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g the use of f o r c e i n h i s L e t t e r c o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n i n w h i c h he p o i n t s out t h a t a m a g i s t r a t e has no r i g h t to use force t d compel h i s subjects to b e l i e v e , or - as Proast would have i t - to at l e a s t c o n s i d e r , any p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n . "Teaching, i n s t r u c t i n g , and r e d r e s s i n g the erroneous by rea s o n " a r e the o n l y means a v a i l a b l e to t h e ' m a g i s t r a t e . i n the e d u c a t i n g Of men and the s a v i n g of s o u l s , says Locke, because "such i s the n a t u r e of the understanding that i t cannot be compelled to the b e l i e f of any thi n g by outward f o r c e " (Le_tter_ 20). T h i s can be seen as both a u t i l i -t a r i a n and an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l argument f o r the use of reason over f o r c e , both i n the e d u c a t i o n of c h i l d r e n and i n b r i n g i n g men to the t r u e r e l i g i o n , s i n c e , i n Locke's o p i n i o n , f o r c e cannot persuade but reason can. " I f t r u t h makes not her way in t o the understanding by her own l i g h t , " Locke e x p l a i n s , "she w i l l be.but the weaker f o r any 86 borrowed force v i o l e n c e can add to her" ( L e t t e r 56). The use of the rod, which seemed to be h i g h l y favoured by t u t o r s i n Locke's day, " n a t u r a l l y breeds an aversion to that which i t i s the t u t o r ' s b u s i n e s s to c r e a t e a l i k i n g t o " (Wojrks V o l 9 37). T h i s i s s i m i l a r to an argument Locke made i n h i s response to Proast's c a l l f or the use of f o r c e i n c o m p e l l i n g men to l e a r n about and c o n s i d e r adopting the s t a t e r e l i g i o n as t h e i r own. He t o l d Proast that perse-c u t i o n , punishrment, or compe 1 l i n g men to c o n s i d e r may i n f a c t b r i n g more harm than good to the true r e l i g i o n since i t w i l l lead men away from that church which condones the use of f o r c e rather than b r i n g men to i t . S i m i l a r l y i n h i s essay on e d u c a t i o n Locke says t h a t the g r e a t e s t d iscouragement to a c h i l d ' s l e a r n i n g i s when "they a r e c a l l e d t o i t ; i t i s made t h e i r b u s i n e s s , they a r e t e a s e d and c h i d about i t , and do i t w i t h t r e m b l i n g and a p p r e h e n s i o n , " a l l of w h i c h intrenches on t h e i r freedom (Works Vol 9 63). While i n h i s L e t t e r he a l l o w s the m a g i s t r a t e , to i n s t r u c t , r e d r e s s the erroneous by reason, and do "what becomes any good man to do" rather than compel w i t h the use of f o r c e , s i m i l a r l y i n h i s essay on education Locke suggests that instead of beatings to compel a c h i l d to learn "there needs patience and s k i l l , gentleness and a t t e n t i o n , and a prudent conduct" to a t t a i n a c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t i n l e a r n i n g ( L e t t e r 20; Works Vol 9 64). Locke does a l l o w that only one s i t u a t i o n c a l l s for the beating of c h i l d r e n : obstinacy or r e b e l l i o n . But t h i s punishment has nothing to do w i t h c o n v i n c i n g or e d u c a t i n g a c h i l d . R a t h e r i t i s analogous to Locke's argument that the m a g i s t r a t e i s allowed to punish the c i t i z e n who disobeys c i v i l law. Even so, Locke cautions that he does not mean 87 t h a t punishment ought to i n f l i c t a l o t of p a i n , but r a t h e r t h a t the threat of punishments, and the f e a r of the "shame" of the punishment i s enough to keep a c h i l d i n l i n e (Works Vol 9 65). S i m i l a r l y i n h i s L e t t e r Locke says that the m a g i s t r a t e has the r i g h t to punish subjects who d i s o b e y the laws of the l a n d , and t h a t i t i s the f e a r of p u n i s h -ment alone that w i l l keep c i t i z e n s i n l i n e ( L e t t e r 18). In both h i s Let_ter and h i s essay on e d u c a t i o n then,' Locke sees force as having very l i m i t e d and s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n : the en f o r c i n g of the laws of the ho u s e h o l d or the laws of the land . A c c o r d i n g to Locke, f o r c e works n e i t h e r i n the e d u c a t i o n of c h i l d r e n nor i n the p e r s u a s i o n of a d u l t s to c o n s i d e r or adopt a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y In h i s essay e n t i t l e d The R e a s o n a b l e n e s s of_ Ch£j_stj_anj__ty as Del i v e r e d _in the S c r i p t u r e s , p u b l i s h e d i n 1695, Locke renews the in q u i r y i n t o the p r i n c i p l e s of revealed r e l i g i o n which he had under-taken e a r l i e r i n h i s Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g . In t h i s work Locke advocates a h i s t o r i c a l e m p i r i c i s m , p l a i n n e s s of sense, and the r e j e c t i o n of systems of d i v i n i t y w i t h t h e i r ' l e a r n e d , a r t i f i c i a l , and f o r c e d sense' of e x p r e s s i o n , i n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s c r i p t u r e s , w h i c h were f o r him... d e s i g n e d by God 'fox the i n s t r u c t i o n of the i11 i t e r a t e b u l k of mankind i n the way t o s a l v a t i o n ' ( N i d d i t c h , i n the F o reword to Locke's Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human Under-88 standing x x i ) . Locke a l s o f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s what he p e r c e i v e s to be the most i m p o r t a n t and fundamental element of b e i n g a C h r i s t i a n : the s i m p l e b e l i e f t h a t C h r i s t Jesus i s the s a v i o u r of s i n f u l humankind (Wo_rks Vol 7 17). He c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h i s b e l i e f , which he has c a l l e d the "one t r u t h " and "one way to heaven" i n h i s L e t t e r , w i t h those outward r i t u a l s and ceremonies he c a l l s " i n d i f f e r e n t " i n h i s L e t t e r and " a b s u r d i t i e s " i n h i s Essay ( L e t t e r 21, 42-49; Essay 696). Not e v e r y sentence w r i t t e n i n the G o s p e l , he says, needs to be seen as a fundamental a r t i c l e that must be understood and b e l i e v e d necessary to s a l v a t i o n . If i t were i n f a c t n e c e s s a r y to know and u n d e r s t a n d a l l the t r u t h s of the B i b l e b e f o r e s a l v a t i o n c o u l d be a c h i e v e d , says Locke, what wou 1 d become of those e a r l y Chr i s t i a n s who f e l l a s l e e p " b e f o r e these t h i n g s i n the e p i s t l e s were r e v e a l e d to them" (Wor_k_s Vol 7 155)? Locke reminds h i s reader that most of the e p i s t l e s were not w r i t t e n u n t i l same twenty to t h i r t y years a f t e r C h r i s t ' s ascension to heaven. How would i t have been p o s s i b l e for those e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s to have come to gain s a l v a t i o n i f i t were necessary f o r s a l v a t i o n to have known everything in those e p i s t l e s ? A Great many of the t r u t h s revealed i n the B i b l e , says Locke, "everyone does, and must confess, a man may be i g n o r a n t o f ; nay, d i s b e l i e v e w i t h o u t danger t o h i s s a l v a t i o n " (Works Vol.7 155, 156). He makes t h i s point again i n h i s Second V i n d i c a t i o n s t a t i n g that an e x p l i c i t b e l i e f i n many of the "other t r u t h s , " which may have no more than a "remote connection' w i t h the fundamental a r t i c l e of the law of f a i t h ( t h e b e l i e f t h a t Jesus i s the M e s s i a h ) , i s not neces-s a r i l y required to make a man a C h r i s t i a n , or to save h i s soul (Works 89 Vol 7 227-8, 353-4). Th is means that the use of force to compel c i t i zens to accept any of the various diverse practices only peripher-a l to the c o r e C h r i s t i a n be l i e f i s un j u s t i f i a b l e f r o m a C h r i s t i a n p e r s p e c t i v e , a poin t he has p r e v i o u s l y made i n h i s Let_ter_ (16). Locke here affirms his e a r l i e r pos i t ion , as explained in his le t te r to Proast, that i t is not necessary for a man's sa lvat ion that he accept the Church of England, wi th a l l i t s outward r i t u a l s and ceremonies, as the one and only way to s a l v a t i o n s ince what i s necessary for s a l v a t i o n can be found in the core b e l i e f s of a great many churches and r e l ig ions . This exp l ana t i on by Locke of the k i n d of f a i t h he b e l i e v e s consti tutes a true C h r i s t i a n , and what i t is that he thinks is neces-sary for salvat ion also refutes the contention of some analysts that Locke was a sceptic about r e l i g i o n . Far from bel ieving that one could not know where the t r u t h l i e s in r e l i g i o n , or which i s the true r e l i g i o n , The Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y manifests Locke's be l ie f that the true r e l i g i o n may be found wi th in C h r i s t i a n i t y , but that i t is often obscured wi th a profusion of va r ious ec 1 es i ast i ca 1 r i t u a l s and ceremonies quite unnecessary for salvat ion. In his defense of his Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y , en t i t l ed A Vindica t ion of the Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y from M i \ Edwards's Ref lec t ions , Locke again makes reference to the c l a i m . t o orthodoxy of t h i s or that form of worsh ip . He says that there is "nothing more r i d i c u l o u s " than for any one person or group to ho ld that they are i n f a l l i b l y orthodox and thereby assume the power to condemn others who d i f fe r wi th them in their opinion (Works Vol 7 376). "The considera-90 t i o n of human f r a i l t y ought to check t h i s v a n i t y , " says Locke. T h i s r e a f f i r m s h i s p o s i t i o n , as st a t e d i n h i s L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n , t h a t "every c h u r c h i s orthodox to i t s e l f ; to o t h e r s erroneous or h e r e t i c a l . Whatsoever any c h u r c h b e l i e v e s i t b e l i e v e s to be t r u e " ( L e t t e r 29). Locke holds that men are not able judges of the t r u t h of t h e i r own b e l i e f s , and that the only one capable of judging which has the t r u t h , which i s the orthodox church, i s "the Supreme Judge" and not any one e a r t h l y m a g i s t r a t e ( i b i d ) . The V i n d i c a t i o n thereby a l s o supports the argument he made e a r l i e r i n h i s L e t t e r that there should be no t o l e r a t i o n of those who a t t r i b u t e unto the f a i t h f u l , r e l i g i o u s , and o r t h o d o x , t h a t i s , i n p l a i n terms, unto t h e m s e l v e s , any p e c u l i a r p r i v i l e g e or power above other m o r t a l s i n c i v i l concern-ments; or who, upon p r e t e n s e o f , r e l i g i o n , do c h a l l e n g e any manner of a u t h o r i t y over such as are not a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them i n t h e i r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l communion (Let t e r 63). Locke knew that t h i s c l a i m to orthodoxy and s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e by one c h u r c h was not o n l y l o g i c a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e , but t h a t i t was causing great unrest i n the England and France of h i s day. Locke a l s o r e a f f i r m s i n the V i n d i c a t ion the stand he took against atheism i n h i s o r i g i n a l L e t t e r . There he sees i t as undermining a l l of s o c i e t y and r e l i g i o n ( L e t t e r 64). Here he c a l l s a the i s m madness as w e l l as a c r i m e "which... ought to shut a man out of a l l sober and c i v i l s o c i e t y " (Works Vol 7 161). Locke concludes h i s o r i g i n a l L e t t e r by saying that i t s purpose i s to argue t h a t "every man e n j o y the same r i g h t s as a r e g r a n t e d to 91 others," that, since the free p r a c t i c e of t h e i r r e l i g i o n i s allowed to some people i t should be allowed to a l l ( L e t t e r 69). He r e i n f o r c e s t h i s p o s i t i o n i n h i s Second V i n d i c a t i o n when he says How f u l l y soever I am persuaded of the t r u t h of what I hold, I am i n ccrrmon j u s t i c e to a l l o w the same s i n c e r i t y to h i m t h a t d i f f e r s f r o m me; and so we a r e upon equal terms (377). Here Locke i s not o n l y c a l l i n g f o r the t o l e r a t i o n of one group of b e l i e v e r s by another, more powerful, group, he i s e v i d e n t l y speaking in terms of e q u a l i t y under the law and equal r i g h t s w i t h i n the common-w e a l t h f o r c i t i z e n s of a l l of the v a r i o u s d i f f e r i n g r e l i g i o u s p e r s u a s i o n s - a theme t h a t i s c l e a r l y present throughout h i s L e t t e r (18, 69). 92 Chapter 4 - Sonne Later C r i t i c i s m s of Locke 's Let ter Locke 's Let te r Concerning Toleration may have seemed l ike a radical argument to those, l ike Proast, born and raised amid the religious intolerance of the 17th century. To them Locke 's ca l l for a sweeping and universal tolerat ion - not only of Christians for the beliefs and practices of other Christians, but of Christians for the beliefs and practices of non-Christians and vice versa - must have seemed l i k e a c a l l to open the f loodgates of s in fu l ideas and behaviour that would lead to the demise of entire nations. But as times changed and religious intolerance proved i tself ever more to be the cause of, rather than the cure for, many of society's i l l s , Locke 's let ter eventually came to be read by some as actually not arguing strongly enough on behalf of tolerat ion, and as excluding too many things (and too many people) which should in fact be tolerated. Today, while there is s t i l l disagreement in some quarters as to whether Locke 's toleration went too far or not far enough, a broader c r i t i c i sm has been developing: is Locke 's let ter relevant to the 93 events and s i t u a t i o n s we experience in this modern era? This chapter w i l l examine some of the h i s t o r i c as w e l l as some of the contemporary c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against Locke's L e t t e r to see w h e t h e r L o c k e ' s p e r s p e c t i v e on r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n c a n s t i l l be meaningful for us today. (1) Is The Scope of Locke's T o l e r a t i o n Too Narrow? In his essay " L o c k e : T o l e r a t i o n and t h e r a t i o n a l i t y of Persecution," (published in 1993) Jeremy Waldron argues that Locke's conception of t o l e r a t i o n is too narrow, that i t concerns only r e l i g -ious t o l e r a t i o n , rather than a l l types of t o l e r a t i o n , and then only for a very s p e c i f i c reason. He says that Locke's opposition to i n -t o l e r a n c e based on the awareness of the d i f f i c u l t y of determining whether the r e l i g i o n the magistrate believes to be the true one is in f a c t o b j e c t i v e l y the true one " i s not opposition to i n t o l e r a n c e as such, but only opposition to p a r t i c u l a r cases of i t . It is not an argument for t o l e r a t i o n in g e n e r a l " (Waldron 108). In her essay "Locke: T o l e r a t i o n , M o r a l i t y and R a t i o n a l i t y , " Susan Mendus agrees with Waldron that L o c k e f a i l s to address general t o l e r a t i o n of a l l sorts, pointing out that, unlike John Stuart M i l l who argues for l i b e r t y in general, "Locke's argument is a quite s p e c i f i c argument for [ r e l i g i o u s ] t o l e r a t i o n , or against persecution (he takes the two to be i d e n t i c a l ) " (Mendus 157-8). But even though we grant that L o cke himself was too narrow by s p e c i f i c a l l y addressing only r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n , this doesn't pre-clude applying the p r i n c i p l e s he holds to j u s t i f y r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n to other matters besides r e l i g i o n . R e c a l l that in his L e t t e r Locke's 94 r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s general p o l i t i c a l theory, as expressed i n h i s Two T r e a t i s e on Government, i n which he holds that c i t i z e n s of a s t a t e r e t a i n a l l the n a t u r a l r i g h t s they brought w i t h them from the s t a t e of nature i n t o the common wealth except those they w i 11 i n g l y consent to hand over to the s t a t e (Locke L e t t e r 58). And since he assumes that c i t i z e n s act i n a r a t i o n a l manner, he would a l s o assume t h a t no c i t i z e n s w o u l d k n o w i n g l y consent to the s t a t e b e i n g i n t o l e r a n t , e i t h e r i n matters of r e l i g i o n or i n secular a f f a i r s , since anyone and everyone i s l i a b l e to s u f f e r under the d i c t a t e s of an i n t o l e r a n t state. Since the peace and s e c u r i t y of the ccrrrnonwealth i s one of t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n s Locke a d d r e s s e s i n both h i s L e t t e r and previous p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s , i t seems reasonable to assume that Locke would advocate g e n e r a l t o l e r a t i o n as a means t o t h a t end. Locke's p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f y i n g h i s argument for r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n can there-f o r e be used to j u s t i f y t o l e r a t i o n i n g e n e r a l even i f the t o p i c of general t o l e r a t i o n i s not d i r e c t l y addressed by Locke i n h i s l e t t e r . (2) Does Locke Neglect I n d i v i d u a l R i g h t s ? Waldron a l s o c r i t i c i z e s Locke by saying that Locke does not seem to e x h i b i t any deep c o n c e r n f o r the v i c t i m s of p e r s e c u t i o n s i n c e he addresses and advises only the o p p r e s s o r s and p e r s e c u t o r s . Waldron sees the i n t e r e s t s of the v i c t i m s of persecution "addressed and pro-t e c t e d o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y as a r e s u l t of what i s , i n the l a s t r e s o r t , p r u d e n t i a l advice o f f e r e d to those who are disposed to oppress them" (Waldron 120). Susan Mend us.notes t h a t t h i s i s indeed the i m p r e s s i o n one g e t s f r o m L o c k e s i n c e h i s emphasis on r a t i o n a l i t y i s " g r e a t e r than and 95 d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t w h i c h i s f a v o u r e d i n modern m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y " (Mendus 161). Mendus agrees w i t h W a l d r o n t h a t Locke seems to be focusing on the persecutor, that he has f a i l e d to address the r i g h t s of the persecuted ( i b i d 159), and that there i s "no general r i g h t to freedom of worship" acknowledged i n the l e t t e r ( i b i d 160; 157, 159). But Mendus o f f e r s two arguments i n defense of Locke against Waldron's c r i t i c i s m . To b e g i n w i t h , Mendus says, u n l i k e M i l l who argues f o r l i b e r t y , i t i s Locke's i n t e n t i o n to argue o n l y a g a i n s t those who p e r p e t r a t e r e l i g i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n , i m p l y i n g t h a t i t i s t h e r e f o r e reasonable for Locke to address the persecutors rather than attending to the r i g h t s of t h e i r v i c t i m s . Locke's approach must be seen, she says, as a d d r e s s i n g a p r a c t i c e t h a t was g e n e r a l l y h e l d to be wrong, namely r e l i g i o u s persecution, at a time when freedom of worship was not yet an assured personal r i g h t (Mendus 158, 160-61). But, w h i l e i n d e f e n d i n g Locke, Mendus ag.rees t h a t Locke i s ad-d r e s s i n g the p e r s e c u t o r r a t h e r than the v i c t i m , a c l o s e r r e a d i n g of the L e L t e r seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t he i s i n f a c t concerned w i t h the r i g h t s and freedoms of c i t i z e n s . Locke spends a number of pages arguing for every c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t to be free to worship i n any manner he p l e a s e s so l o n g as i t does not d i s t u r b the peace and s e c u r i t y of the commonwealth. He argues f o r r e s t r a i n t on s t a t e and i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the r i g h t s of o t h e r s f r o m a v i e w of the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . He speaks i n no u n c e r t a i n terms of the freedom to' care for one's own soul ( L e t t e r 35), the freedom to pick one's own path to s a l v a t i o n ( i b i d 37 -38), the freedom of conscience i n r e l i g i o u s m a t t e r s ( i b i d A l ) , and the freedom of c h o i c e of r i t u a l , 96 r i t e s , ceremonies and p r a c t i c e s ( i b i d 47). Locke's sirrmary s t a t e -ment, "having thus at l e n g t h f r e e d men f r o m a l l d o m i n i o n over one another in" matters of r e l i g i o n . . . " makes i t evident that Locke f e e l s he has indeed argued not o n l y f o r t o l e r a t i o n and an end to p e r s e c u -t i o n , but f o r the i n d i v i d u a l ' s n a t u r a l r i g h t to freedom of w o r s h i p ( i b i d 41). In her second defense of Locke, Mendus says Locke's approach does not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l of the wrong done to the v i c t i m She r e f e r s to an argument made by Onora O'Neill that w h i l e r i g h t s can be e x h a u s t i v e l y a n a l y z e d i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s , the converse i s not the case, and therefore ' the p e r s p e c t i v e of o b l i g a t i o n may e n a b l e us.to e x p l a i n why c e r t a i n a c t i o n s a r e wrong even though they do not c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of r i g h t s (Mendus 160). Mendus goes on to e x p l a i n that the reason modern t h e o r i s t s , l i k e Waldron, f e e l so uneasy about Locke's f a i l u r e to deal w i t h r i g h t s i s because modern e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g i s simply d i f f e r e n t from that which was c a r r i e d out i n Locke's day. According t o Mendus, Locke's focus on the " i r r a t i o n a l i t y of the would-be persecutors i s w h o l l y at odds w i t h much modern thought on the s u b j e c t of t o l e r a t i o n " f o r two reasons: (1) e t h i c a l r a t i o n a l i s m i s no longer i n vogue, that i s , contemporary t h e o r i s t s no longer focus, l i k e Locke seems to have, on the i r r a t i o n -a l i t y of the p e r s e c u t o r ; (2) i n d i v i d u a l autonomy i s a c e n t r a l concept i n modern 1 i b e r a l i s m w i t h i t s f o c u s on the r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . A c c o r d i n g to Mendus, t h i s means t h a t w h i l e modern p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s ask, "What are the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s to 97 p r a c t i c e t h e i r own f a i t h ? " Locke's corrrni tment to reason has h i m asking, "What are the reasons which should dissuade.us from preven-t i n g them p r a c t i c i n g t h e i r own f a i t h ? " (Mendus 150). R e g a r d i n g (1) above, i t i s , f i r s t of a l l , not at a l l c l e a r t h a t Locke's approach i s t h a t much at v a r i a n c e w i t h modern e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g , or t h a t h i s approach i s p u r e l y f r o m the d i r e c t i o n of the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of persecution. Admittedly, Locke is. c l e a r l y concerned w i t h the consequences of i n t o l e r a n c e , f r o m a s u b j e c t ' s l o s i n g h i s chance at s a l v a t i o n as a r e s u l t of h i s being forced to change h i s form of worship and thereby being h y p o c r i t i c a l i n h i s worship of God (Locke L e t t e r 19), to " b u s t l e s and w a r s " t h a t a r e a r e a c t i o n by c i t i z e n s a g a i n s t t h e i r i n t o l e r a n t l e a d e r s ( i b i d 71). But h i s L e t t e r i s none the l e s s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s p r e v i o u s p o l i t i c a l c o n c e r n w i t h the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , and the i l l e g a l i n f r i n g e m e n t of those r i g h t s for s o - c a l l e d r e l i g i o u s reasons, as noted above. S e c o n d l y , Locke's t h r e e main arguments f o r t o l e r a t i o n a r e not based s o l e l y on the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of the persecutor. L i k e other, more modern, p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s Locke argues from l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s which the consent of the c i t i z e n s of a commonwealth have vested i n t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e ( L e t t e r 19). Locke's emphasis on r a t i o n a l i t y cannot be s a i d to be "greater than and d i f f e r e n t from that which i s f a v o u r e d i n modern m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . " Nor i s h i s emphasis on the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of would-be p e r s e c u t o r s " w h o l l y at odds w i t h much modern thought on the subject of t o l e r a t i o n " (Mendus 161, 150) since the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of persecution i s only one part of h i s argument. In (2) above Mendus argues that i n d i v i d u a l autonomy i s a modern 98 l i b e r a l concept w h i c h was not a focus of a t t e n t i o n i n Locke's day. But i t must be remembered that i n h i s l e t t e r Locke speaks of the fa c t that the m a g i s t r a t e i s "armed w i t h the force and strength of a l l h i s subjects" and that the care of souls i s not committed to a m a g i s t r a t e because such power cannot be vested i n the m a g i s t r a t e by the consent of the people f o r reasons to do w i t h the r a t i o n a l i t y of p e r s o n a l c h o i c e and so on ( L e t t e r 18, 19). I t seems then t h a t Locke was indeed addressing the issue of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, or s e l f - d e t e r m i n a -t i o n . The i s s u e of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy i s c e n t r a l t o Locke's-Two T r e a t i ses erf Government., w r i t t e n f o u r y e a r s p r i o r to h i s L e t t e r but p u b l i s h e d the year a f t e r h i s Let_ter_ was p u b l i s h e d . In i t he argues that i n the s t a t e of Nature, the law of Nature a l l o w s each i n d i v i d u a l to p e r s o n a l l y punish wrongs perpetrated against them. People form a commonwealth by lea v i n g the s t a t e of Nature and f r e e l y consenting to t r a n s f e r some of t h i s i n d i v i d u a l power to p u n i s h o f f e n d e r s to the commonwealth or p o l i t i c a l s t ate. People a l s o have the power to deter-mine how much power leaders are to have, to decide how long they are to have t h i s power b e f o r e i t r e v e r t s back to the p e o p l e , and so on (Second T r e a t i s e C h a p t e r 10 sec. 132, 141; Ch a p t e r 11 sec. 135, and e l s e w h e r e ) . A g a i n , as m e n t i o n e d above, Locke i s concerned w i t h how i n t o l e r a n c e w i l l a f f e c t not o n l y the i n d i v i d u a l ' s s a l v a t i o n but h i s c i v i l r i g h t s , and t h i s makes i t evident that there i s indeed i n Locke a c l e a r notion and defense of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. Wootton, on the o t h e r hand, defends Locke by p o i n t i n g out t h a t , contrary to Waldron's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Locke's f i r s t argument does not focus on the r u l e r s or persecutors but rather on the subjects. It i s 99 an argument aimed at those who might became the persecuted because i t i s about "what i s r a t i o n a l f o r s u b j e c t s , " and "what s o r t of s t a t e i s i n the m o r a l i n t e r e s t s of i t s c i t i z e n s " (Wootton 99, 100). Wootton says Locke p o i n t s out how i t i s i r r a t i o n a l f o r s u b j e c t s to hand over t o t h e i r r u l e r s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e c i d i n g what they s h o u l d b e l i e v e because i t i s p l a c i n g themselves under an o b l i g a t i o n ( t o obey the r u l e r ) w h i c h they w o u l d not be c a p a b l e of f u l f i l l i n g (adopting the b e l i e f s p r e s c r i b e d by the r u l e r ) . According to Wootton, then, Locke seems to be arguing that r a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t d i c t a t e s that c i t i z e n s ought to regard t h e i r r i g h t to think for themselves as i n a l i e n a b l e ( i b i d 99). Wootton goes on to p o i n t out t h a t Locke's t h i r d argument (what the m a g i s t r a t e may choose as the " t r u e " r e l i g i o n may i n f a c t be f a l s e ) , when combined w i t h the f i r s t argument (the subject can't for c e h i m s e l f to change h i s b e l i e f at w i l l ) leads the s u b j e c t to c o n c l u d e , " I ought not to agree to the government making r e l i g i o u s d e c i s i o n s on my behalf; that t h i s i s no proper part of i t s f u n c t i o n s " ( i b i d 101). In f a c t , e i t h e r premise could, on i t s own, lead to t h i s same conclusion. This c o n c l u s i o n i s c l e a r l y aimed at the s u b j e c t (the p o t e n t i a l l y p e r s e c u t e d ) and not at the m a g i s -t r a t e (the persecutor) thereby d i s p r o v i n g Waldron's c l a i m that a l l of Locke's arguments are aimed at the l a t t e r . I t m i g h t a l s o be argued a g a i n s t Locke t h a t the w o r d i n g of h i s f i r s t argument i s so ambiguous t h a t i t does not c o n s t i t u t e a very s o l i d defense of the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s since i t speaks of a power or a b i l i t y c i t i z e n s lack - not being able to use t h e i r common consent to give t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e the power to use force. But t h i s i s not a lack 100 of p o l i t i c a l power but r a t h e r an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n - the i n a b i l i t y to c o n f o r m what one b e l i e v e s t o the d i c t a t e s of another. Locke i s not arguing that c i t i z e n s lack the r i g h t to vest t h i s power in t h e i r m a g i s t r a t e but simply that they have good reason not to vest i t i n t h i s way. That Locke seems c l e a r l y t o t h i n k he has defended i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s throughout h i s l e t t e r i s evident when he says near i t s end, "The sum of a l l we d r i v e at i s , t h a t e v e r y man enjoy the same r i g h t s t h a t a r e g r a n t e d to o t h e r s " ( L e t t e r 69). But the question as to whether or not Locke does i n f a c t address the issue of r i g h t s may be s e t t l e d more c o n c l u s i v e l y i f we d e t e r m i n e how he has cane to t h i s conclusion. Three approaches may be taken. In the f i r s t one c o u l d s i m p l y review the d i r e c t references to the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s , and therefore p o t e n t i a l v i c t i m s , made.by Locke throughout h i s l e t t e r . Locke sees the commonwealth as b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d f o r the e x p r e s s purpose of "procuring, preserving, and advancing" the c i v i l i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i -d u a l s , namely l i f e , l i b e r t y , h e a l t h and i n d o l e n c y of the body, the o w n e r s h i p of p r o p e r t y , and the a c c e s s to b e n e f i t s f r o m one's own l a b o u r (Locke L e t t e r 18, 72). I f one person v i o l a t e s the r i g h t s of another, Locke a l l o w s that the s t a t e may punish the g u i l t y party. He sees p e o p l e as h a v i n g the r i g h t to j o i n and l e a v e a c h u r c h of t h e i r own f r e e w i l l ( i b i d 22), to choose a l e a d e r of t h e i r c h u r c h , and to make laws w i t h which to govern the a f f a i r s of t h e i r church ( i b i d 23-4). Excommunication may not a f f e c t any of a person's c i v i l r i g h t s or f r a n c h i s e s t h a t b elong to h i m as a man or a " d e n i s o n " ( i b i d 27). P r i v a t e persons have no r i g h t of s u p e r i o r i t y or j u r i s d i c t i o n over one 101 another. In other words, a l l c i t i z e n s , regardless of r e l i g i o u s per-s u a s i o n have equal r i g h t s w i t h i n the s t a t e i n a l l m a t t e r s i n c l u d i n g b u s i n e s s and e d u c a t i o n ( i b i d 28, 31, 51, 67-8). Everyone has the r i g h t to w o r s h i p any way they p l e a s e s i n c e the c a r e of the s o u l belongs only to the person himself ( i b i d 33-59). A l l have the r i g h t to n e g l e c t t h e i r own h e a l t h or w e a l t h and t o s i n i f they so choose, and. to l i e and perj u r e themselves provided no harm comes to others or the commonweal t h (51). F i n a l l y , everyone has the r i g h t to a b s t a i n from state-sanctioned a c t i o n s he judges to be u n l a w f u l , and the r i g h t to p e a c e f u l assembly ( i b i d 59-60, 65-66). W i t h t h i s many d i r e c t references to r i g h t s , i t i s not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g then that Locke says near h i s c o n c l u s i o n , "The sum of a l l we d r i v e at i s t h a t e v e r y man enjoy the same r i g h t s that are granted to others" ( i b i d 69). A second, and perhaps b e t t e r , approach i s f r o m the d i r e c t i o n of the a s s u m p t i o n of n a t u r a l r i g h t s p o s s e s s e d by a l l c i t i z e n s . I f we a l l o w that i n t h i s l e t t e r Locke holds the .same assumptions about the o r i g i n s of the commonwealth or s t a t e t h a t he expounds i n the Two T r e a t i se of Government, i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t a l l h i s arguments focus on the r e t e n t i o n of those na t u r a l r i g h t s which he argued every i n d i v i d u a l possesses i n the s t a t e of nature, some of which seme sta t e s have i l l e g i t i m a t e l y arrogated to themselves. According to Locke, the ccrrrnonwealth i s formed when i n d i v i d u a l s who have been " f r e e , e q u a l , and independent" i n a s t a t e of n a t u r e f o r m an a 11iance or s o c i e t y by consent and g i v e over some of t h e i r power and na t u r a l r i g h t s to the state. One of the i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s c i t i z e n s g i v e up to the s t a t e i s the r i g h t to p u n i s h those who wrong 102 against others by t a k i n g property to which they are not e n t i t l e d . The s t a t e i s t h e r e f o r e the h o l d e r of a monopoly on f o r c e ( L e t t e r 58, Second T r e a t i se ch. 8 sec. 95, ch. 11 sec. 135). But w h i l e the i n d i v i d u a l s i n a commonwealth have g i v e n up the r i g h t to use f o r c e against one another, they have not given up innumerable other r i g h t s , such as the r i g h t to choose which r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f to accept as t h e i r own. This i s one of the r i g h t s , argues Locke, which i n d i v i d u a l s have not g i v e n up to the s t a t e f o r the t h r e e reasons a l r e a d y examined i n c h a p t e r one above. And, s i n c e f o r c e can't c r e a t e b e l i e f , the s t a t e has no r i g h t to a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e b e l i e f . R a t h e r i t i s the r i g h t of the i n d i v i d u a l , through the " i n w a r d p e r s u a s i o n of the mind" to choose h i s own p a t h t o s a l v a t i o n . T h i s i s Locke's second m a i n argument ( i b i d 20). These t h r e e arguments then can a l l be seen as being based on and supporting the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l to freedom of worship - r i g h t s which Locke f e e l s the i n d i v i d u a l possessed in the s t a t e of nature, r i g h t s which the i n d i v i d u a l would never know-in g l y have given up, but which, i n Locke's day as wel 1 as other times in h i s t o r y , the s t a t e has i l l e g i t i m a t e l y arrogated to i t s e l f without the consent of the people. Locke concludes h i s three main arguments by p o i n t i n g out that " a l l the power of c i v i l government r e l a t e s only to men's c i v i l i n t e r e s t s , i s c o n f i n e d to the c a r e of the t h i n g s of t h i s w o r l d , and hath nothing to do w i t h the w o r l d to come" r e i t e r a -t i n g that the c i t i z e n s of the commonwealth have not consented to give t h e i r s t a t e any greater powers than these ( L e t t e r 22). A t h i r d response comes when one examines how the n o t i o n of r i g h t s may be addressed. Locke's addressing the persecutor, i n so f a r as he 103 does so, is compatible w i t h the p r o t e c t i o n of the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s because i t focuses on why the a c t i o n s of the persecutor are wrong because they i n f r i n g e upon the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s . L o c k e is providing the magistrate w i t h arguments against persecution, or conversely, he is providing the magistrate w i t h reasons to t o l e r a t e , thereby defend-ing the n a t u r a l rights of c i t i z e n s , r i ghts which they have not r e l i n -quished to the state. A l l of these responses to Waldron make i t evident that, c o n t r a r y to Waldron's c r i t i c i s m , L o c ke does not only address and advise the oppressors and persecutors, nor does he merely address and p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the v i c t i m s of persecution " i n c i d e n t a l l y as a result of what i s , in the l a s t r e s o r t , p r u d e n t i a l advice o f f e r e d to those who disposed to oppress them" (Waldron 120). While Locke is not i n d i f -f erent to p r u d e n t i a l reasons, his arguments go w e l l beyond them. (3) Does Locke Assume What Can't be Done? L o c k e assumes t h a t m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and s e c u l a r matters can easily and c l e a r l y be separated. He says, for example, "The care t h e r e f o r e of every man's soul belongs unto himself and is to be l e f t to himself" ( L o c k e L e t t e r 35). By this he means that, since a c i t i z e n of a c o m m o n w e a l t h is a r a t i o n a l , r e s p o n s i b l e and f r e e person, that c i t i z e n ' s s p i r i t u a l w e l l being, t h e i r personal decisions as to what to believe and how to worship in-order to f i n d favour w i t h God and gain s a l v a t i o n , is the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .only of that person. He extends th i s r i g h t to a l l r a t i o n a l adults, even those not c i t i z e n s of the commonwealth but merely residing w i t h i n i t s borders. L o c k e argues that neither the magistrate nor any other person has the ri g h t nor the 104 duty to concern her or himself w i t h the care of another person's soul. It seems reasonable to assume that L o c k e would argue that the care of a child's soul belongs to the parents since a c h i l d is under the age of reason. But what of cases where i t is impossible to make a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between what is care for the body and what is care for the soul? One modern day example of a fusion of body and soul care is the case of blood transfusions. The state i n s i s t s that a c h i l d r e c e i v e a b l o o d t r a n s f u s i o n f o r the sake of i t s p h y s i c a l w e l f a r e , but the p a r e n t s i n s i s t , due to t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , t h a t r e f u s i n g the transfusion is c a r i n g f o r the child's soul. Which persp e c t i v e should be given precedence? Does Locke's assumption, that a c l e a r d i s t i n c -t i o n e x i s t s between where the care of the soul ends and where the care of the body begins, hold in this case? In an attempt to answer thi s question it"'may be noted that the case of the state's r u l i n g in favour of f o r c i n g a blood t r a n s f u s i o n on a c h i l d to save i t s l i f e , against the wishes and r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of the child's parents, seems analogous to Locke's reasoning on the question of whether the state ought to allow i n f a n t s to be s a c r i f i c e d a c c o r d i n g to the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of the parents. His response to this question i s , "These things are not l a w f u l in the ordinary course of l i f e , nor in any p r i v a t e house, and t h e r e f o r e neither, are they so in the worship of God, or in any r e l i g i o u s - meeting" ( L e t t e r 47). L o c k e might say that the parents' d i s a l l o w i n g a blood transfusion to save the l i f e of the c h i l d would be the same as s a c r i f i c i n g the c h i l d for r e l i g i o u s reasons, and t h e r e f o r e the state could not acquiesce to the wishes of the parents. Such a stance by c i v i l " a u t h o r i t i e s may 105 make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the p a r e n t s to f o l l o w the t e a c h i n g s of t h e i r church, and i t might i n t e r f e r e w i t h the s a l v a t i o n of the c h i l d ' s s o u l , but these are not the concern of the s t a t e , whose mandate, as given to i t by i t s c i t i z e n s , i s only to care for the p h y s i c a l w e l l being of the c h i l d . It seems th e r e f o r e that, i n t h i s case at l e a s t , where matters of the p h y s i c a l w e l l being of a c h i l d and i t s s p i r i t u a l s a l v a t i o n seem to c o n f l i c t , t h i s c o n f l i c t i s the r e s u l t of the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s e n c r o a c h i n g on c i v i l m a t t e r s - i.e., the p h y s i c a l w e l l b e i n g of a c i t i z e n - over which, Locke says, r e l i g i o n has no l e g i t i m a t e j u r i s d i c -t i o n . I f r e l i g i o n s s t a y w i t h i n t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n i t i s i n f a c t p o s s i b l e , as Locke h o l d s , to c l e a r l y s e p a r a t e m a t t e r s of s t a t e f r o m matters of r e l i g i o n . (4) If Coercing B e l i e f Works to Enhance St a t e S e c u r i t y , Why May the State S t i l l Not Use i t ? W aldron agrees w i t h Locke, t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s "an unabridgeable causal gap between c o e r c i v e means and r e l i g i o u s ends" (Waldron 115), meaning that p h y s i c a l coercion w i l l not change b e l i e f and t h e r e f o r e the use of c o e r c i o n i s i r r a t i o n a l . W a l d r o n p o i n t s out t h a t i n h i s Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke- s t a t e s that knowledge i s not. v o l u n t a r y f o r two reasons (1) we don't choose how to p e r c e i v e what we p e r c e i v e , we s i m p l y do; and (2) the p r o c e s s of under-standing and b e l i e v i n g the ideas that came from what we perceive works a u t o m a t i c a l l y . But Waldron p o i n t s out t h a t a p e r s o n can d e c i d e "which o b j e c t s to look a t , w h i c h books to read and more g e n e r a l l y w h i c h arguments to l i s t en t o , w h i c h people to t a k e n o t i c e o f and so on." So a law can compel a person to turn t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to reading 106 or l i s t e n i n g to c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l w h i c h may e v e n t u a l l y i n f l u e n c e b e l i e f , or conversely keep them from hearing or reading m a t e r i a l which may be d e t r i m e n t a l to government s a n c t i o n e d r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f ( i b i d 116). Note t h a t p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n c u r r i c u l u m s i n the mod.ern w e s t e r n w o r l d are almost e x c l u s i v e l y d i c t a t e d by c i v i l governments which, i n North America, promote such ideas as e v o l u t i o n which run contrary to the t e a c h i n g s of some r e l i g i o n s . In t h i s way i t doesn't attempt to force an a l t e r a t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of i n d i v i d u a l s ' d i r e c t l y but may succeed i n doing so i n d i r e c t l y through education. Therefore, t h i s does not seem to be an i r r a t i o n a l a p p l i c a t i o n of coercion since i t c o u l d t u r n s t u d e n t s away f r o m t h i n k i n g about e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s or from r e l i g i o u s t h i n k i n g i n general. W a l d r o n c o u l d go f a r t h e r s t i l l and argue t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e c o u l d a l s o s u b t l y use the power of h i s a u t h o r i t y and o f f i c e on h i s subjects when he i s engaging them i n argument and attempting to per-suade them to accept h i s b e l i e f s , as Locke a l l o w s i n h i s L e t t e r (20). Such i n g e n i o u s , though not i n f r e q u e n t , use of s t a t u s to add to the f o r c e of persuasion does not contravene the l i m i t s Locke has placed on the s t a t e ' s use of "outward f o r c e . " W a l d r o n says Locke p r o v i d e s no argument against force being a p p l i e d to the e p i s t e m i c apparatus which surrounds, supports and generates b e l i e f , namely s e l e c t i o n , a t t e n t i o n , c o n c e n t r a t i o n and so on, over w h i c h w i l l does seem to have c o n t r o l (Waldron 117). T h i s w o u l d be f o r c e a p p l i e d , as P r o a s t put i t , " i n d i r e c t l y and at a d i s t a n c e " " t o b r i n g men to c o n s i d e r those reasons and arguments w h i c h are proper and s u f f i c i e n t to c o n v i n c e them," but which they would not have considered without being forced 107 to (Argument 5). The question for Wladron, as it was for Proast, is: have ci t izens agreed to the use of this subtle coercion? If the answer, is "no" then this type of forced persuasion may not be leg i t -imately used by the state even under the guise of "education." Waldron says one argument against his position might be that belief is not genuine if it is generated through coercion, but some-thing more like what results from intensive propaganda, or worse, brain washing. And since it is genuine belief that the magistrate is after, it is i r rat ional to force belief even in this indirect manner. In defense of Locke, Susan Mendus attempts just such a c r i t i c i sm of Waldron by pointing out that Bernard Williams discusses four con-ditions which are necessary for belief. One of them he has called "the acceptance Condition" which says that for " fu l l blown" belief what is needed is both the possibility of "deliberate reticence (the agent not saying what he believes) and the possibility of insincerity (the agent saying something other than what he believes) (Mendus 152). Williams sees legitimate belief as being dependent on the human w i l l and the abil i ty to assert what one does or does not believe. It could be arghued that there is not necessarily any difference, in this abil i ty to assert a belief, between the person whose belief has been forced on him by the state and the person who has come to his beliefs independently. It could perhaps be argued that a subject might meet Williams' "acceptance condit ion" even after being coerced into a belief through propaganda or brainwashing, and that this fabricated belief might be every bit as " fu l l blown" as a belief that is known to have resulted from non-coercive causal factors. 108 In discussing the four conditions necessary for b e l i e f Williams says that " I f a man recognizes that what he has been b e l i e v i n g is f a l s e , he thereby abandons the b e l i e f he had" (Williams 137). He states furthermore that r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s hold b e l i e f s on r a t i o n a l grounds, and he acknowledges that there are causal f a c t o r s which can produce f a l s e b e l i e f s ( i b i d 143, 149). This is in l i n e w i t h the view of b e l i e f and f a i t h L o c ke himself held. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke says that f a i t h , or r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , is n o t h i n g but a f i r m a s s e n t o f . mind: w h i c h i f i t be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be a f f o r d e d to any thing, but upon good reason; and so can not be opposite to i t . He that believes, without having any reason for b e l i e v i n g , may be i n l o v e w i t h his own f a n c i e s ; but neither seeks t r u t h as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use. those discerning f a c u l t i e s he has given him, to keep him out of mistakes and error ( L o c k e Essay 687). This reasoning process which leads to the holding of a p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f or f a i t h , and does not seem to be as independent of the w i l l as L o c ke suggests in his L e t t e r (19), is r a t i o n a l and explainable purely in c o g n i t i v e and p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e r m s . H e n c e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , i n order to be genuine or " f u l l blown" from the n o n - t h e o l o g i c a l per-s p e c t i v e , does not seem to need anything more than a p a r t i c u l a r psy-c h o l o g i c a l state. This could lead one to accept Waldron's conclusion that i t would be r a t i o n a l for the magistrate to use c o e r c i o n , although i n d i r e c t and only on the decision-making apparatus, to t r y to change 109 b e l i e f s . But just because i t may be r a t i o n a l for the magistrate to do so given th i s one argument this s t i l l does not support the stronger conclusion that the use of f o r c e is t h e r f o r e l e g i t i m a t e . R e c a l l that L o c k e o f f e r s three arguments for t o l e r a t i o n , of which the argument from the nature of b e l i e f is only one. Locke's response to Waldron would in a l l l i k e l y h o o d be that Waldron has f a l l e n into the same trap which caught Proast: he assumes Locke's argument for t o l e r a t i o n is completely dependent on this one premise when in f a c t i t is supported by three. Mendus attempts.to save L o c k e by pointing out that, unlike the b e l i e f t h a t is the p r o d u c t of b r a i n w a s h i n g , l e g i t i m a t e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s a r e not m e r e l y f u n c t i o n a l l y e f f i c i e n t . They are genuine c o n v i c t i o n s coming from deep inside; they are ultimate and so compel-li n g that the b e l i e v e r has no choice in the matter because his b e l i e f is for him an undeniable r e a l i t y . They are b e l i e f s that have been generated in the right way and are held in the right kind of way (Mendus 154). W i l l i a m James goes even, f u r t h e r and argues that genuine r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s are in f a c t i n t u i t i v e and come from a deeper l e v e l of your nature than the loquacious l e v e l w h i c h r a t i o n a l i s m i n h a b i t s . . . If a p e r s o n f e e l s the presence of a l i v i n g God... your c r i t i c a l arguments, be t h e y e v e r so s u p e r i o r , w i l l v a i n l y set t h e m s e l v e s to change his f a i t h (James 72-3). But i f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s - that i s , the " r i g h t k i n d " of b e l i e f s that leads to s a l v a t i o n - depend on i n t u i t i o n and f e e l i n g s i t seems 110 fa i r to ask, How is i t poss ible to account for the innumerable individuals who have changed their beliefs, not only from one religion to another but from theism to atheism? Even to argue that religious belief comes about by miraculous intervention is not enough since, for one thing, miracles can't account for loss of belief the way rational contemplation can. If one wants to argue, that there is more than rat ionali ty behind belief, then one is in danger of having to allow for arguments which assume a random change of fai th , or the existence of supernatural influences, or for a "miraculous change of heart" over which the agent has no control . Furthermore, is it not possible that those very feelings or intuitions on which religious beliefs are said to be based are the product of contemplation and rational persua-sion? Locke acknowledges the efficacy of rat ional persuasion on belief when he says in his Let ter that the magistrate may "make use of arguments, and thereby draw the heterodox into the way of truth," to "persuade," and to "press with arguments," to "admonish, exhort, convince another of error, and by reasoning to draw him into truth" (20). Mendus' defense of the nature of legitimate belief can't w i th -stand Waldron's own two responses against his argument. He says that (1) he finds it hard to imagine what sort of epistemology or philoso-phy of mind could possibly connect the nature of the way belief was acqu i red w i t h the e f f i c a c y of those be l i e f s and ( 2 ) that the "•correct belief" approach appears to place such great demands on the notion of genuine belief as to lead us to doubt the genuineness of 111 everything we normally count as a b e l i e f in ordinary l i f e (Waldron 118). Mendus responds that " i t is one thing to say that a l l b e l i e f must be causally e x p l i c a b l e in some way, quite another to say that any way is as good as any other and that a l l s i n c e r e l y expressed b e l i e f s are equally genuine" (Mendus 154). But Waldron's point above is that perhaps b e l i e f s can be caused in a number of d i f f e r e n t ways, i n c l u d i n g strong, persuasion assisted by the use of f o r c e , and s t i l l be held as " f u l l blown" or genuine b e l i e f s by the agent of which they are, as L o c ke puts i t , f u l l y s a t i s f i e d in t h e i r own mind that i t is the t r u t h ( L e t t e r 19). Not only w i l l outside observers not n o t i c e the d i f -f e r e n c e between an agent's f a b r i c a t e d b e l i e f and " r e a l " b e l i e f , neither w i l l the agent himself. A b e t t e r argument is that God would know, but that would be digressing into the realm of theology. A d i f f e r e n t approach taken by Mendus, that is perhaps a stronger argument than the above, is when she says that while i t may be a r e l a t i v e l y easy matter to brainwash c h i l d r e n whose b e l i e f s are not f u l l y developed, i t is extremely d i f f i c u l t to change the b e l i e f s of adults. This is in f a c t the issue L o c k e was addressing, and h i s t o r y has shown that attempts to e r a d i c a t e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f completely in adults (such as in communist Russia) proved unsuccessful because of the h o l i s t i c e f f e c t of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f on the agent's l i f e , and the n o n - i n t e l l e c t u a l nature of this b e l i e f (Mendus 155). But Waldron's reply might be that L o cke has overlooked the f a c t that the state need not concern i t s e l f w i t h adults. It may achieve i t s end by focusing e x c l u s i v e l y on the education of c h i l d r e n . For example, while Russian 112 communist education did not e r a d i c a t e d a l l r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , i t none-t h e l e s s achieved such f a r - r e a c h i n g e f f e c t , not only over a single population but over se v e r a l generations, that those in power during Russia's communist era might be r i g h t f u l l y able to c l a i m that t h e i r a n t i - r e l i g i o n propaganda e f f o r t s were in f a c t s u ccessful. Wootton, on the other hand, sees Waldron as having completely missed Locke's point. He sees Locke's main argument a r i s i n g out of, what he c a l l s , his f i r s t and t h i r d arguments ( f i r s t , that neither God nor c i t i z e n s themselves have given the magistrate the power to compel them since i t is not possible to conform b e l i e f a c c o r d i n g to the d i c t a t e s of another, and, second, that the magistrate may be wrong in his choice of which r e l i g i o n to compel c i t i z e n s to f o l l o w ) . Wootton sees these arguments as being explorations of problems in d e c i s i o n -making theory rather than the i n e f f e c t u a l nature of c o e r c i o n over b e l i e f (Wootton 103). He explains that while experts can help a p e r s o n p r e d i c t f u t u r e e v e n t u a l i t i e s i n , f o r e x a m p l e , f i n a n c i a l matters, and t h e r e f o r e i t is r a t i o n a l for a person to consult such an expert in making decisions about t h e i r finances,- matters of r e l i g i o n require sincere b e l i e f that goes beyond simply f o l l o w i n g the advice of others. L i k e Mendus, Wootton argues that r e l i g i o u s judgements need to be reached in the r i g h t way, that is from personal b e l i e f and c o n v i c -t i o n . Wootton says L o c k e argues that i t is t h e r e f o r e i r r a t i o n a l for the c i t i z e n to allow the state to act as the expert and take the a d v i c e of the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s i n m a t t e r s of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . Locke's main argument i s , according to Wootton, that "there are c e r t a i n decisions that i t is i r r a t i o n a l , and perhaps impossible, to 113 allow others to make on our behalf," and not simply, as Waldron suggests, that i t is i r r a t i o n a l for the s t a t e to coerce b e l i e f ( i b i d 104). The question for both Wootton and Mendus i s , i f we don't allow God to f i g u r e in the argument in terms of being the judge of who has a r r i v e d at b e l i e f in "the r i g h t way," then why can't a depth of c o n v i c t i o n be a r r i v e d at by means of state " e d u c a t i o n " and f o r c e of modern methods of persuasion that is every bit as profound, sincere, genuine, and f u l l - b l o w n as the i d e n t i c a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l state that can be reached by each person independently? Wootton's and Mendus' argu-ments both seem to require a means of o b j e c t i v e l y judging the o r i g i n of b e l i e f that necessitates the acceptance of premises defending the e x i s t e n c e of God in the p o s i t i o n of i d e a l o b s e r v e r . But i n the absence of such premises Waldron's conclusion s t i l l holds - i t may be possible and judicious for a state to i n f l u e n c e r e l i g i o u s judgements by generating those deep p s y c h o l o g i c a l states c a l l e d b e l i e f s in i t s c i t i z e n s through the various means at i t s disposal. Both Wooton and Mendus would have been more successful in t h e i r defense of L o c k e by pointing out that, in making his argument concerning the r a t i o n a l i t y inherent in the state's use of f o r c e to generate b e l i e f , Waldron has f a i l e d to account for Locke's two other arguments. L o c k e also, states in his L e t t e r that i t is i r r a t i o n a l to f o r c e a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e on a person since he may go through the motions but not believe and thereby be g u i l t y of the sin of hypocrisy and lose his soul anyway (Locke L e t t e r 19). But Waldron argues that such " p r a c t i c e may stand in some sort of generative and supportive 114 r e l a t i o n to b e l i e f - that is to say i t may be part of the apparatus which surrounds, nurtures and sustains the sort of i n t e l l e c t u a l con-v i c t i o n of which true r e l i g i o n , i n L o c k e ' s o p i n i o n , is c o m p o s e d " (Waldron 118). In other words, a law r e q u i r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e may not change b e l i e f immediately, but i t may be r a t i o n a l for the state to f o r c e such a p r a c t i c e as an i n d i r e c t means of "avoiding a decline in genuine r e l i g i o u s f a i t h " ( i b i d ) . This leads Waldron to conclude that "we can no longer say that the magistrate's power is r a t i o n a l l y inappropriate in the s e r v i c e of true r e l i g i o n " ( i b i d 119). In response to Waldron, Wootton points out that Locke's t h i r d argument addresses th i s attempted approach when he says that the magistrate is probably wrong in his choice of r e l i g i o n and t h e r e f o r e r a t i o n a l c i t i z e n s would not hand over decision-making a u t h o r i t y to the magistrate (Wootton 104). While Waldron's argument may at f i r s t seem compelling, Locke's arguments in his L e t t e r do in f a c t adequately counter i t . L o c ke would probably have responded the same way to Waldron's modern c r i t i c i s m as he did to those of his contemporary, Jonas Proast: f i r s t , in f o r c i n g be l i e f on his c i t i z e n s , the magistrate may be c o e r c i n g his c i t i z e n s to attend the mass of the wrong church - one that does not lead to s a l v a t i o n . Furthermore, and much more im p o r t a n t l y , in the type of p o l i t i c a l arrangement Locke envisions in a t o l e r a n t commonwealth, free and equal c i t i z e n s would never consent to f o r c e being used on them by the magistrate for r e l i g i o u s purposes, even i f i t were only the subtle f o r c e of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n through education, censorship, or a d v e r t i s i n g , in other words, " i n d i r e c t l y and at a distance." It does not matter, 115 as both Mendus and Wootton argue, that brainwashing or i n d o c t r i n a t i o n leads to "the wrong k i n d " of b e l i e f , one that w i l l not lead to s a l v a t i o n . From a p o l i t i c a l point of view, the important point is that free and r a t i o n a l c i t i z e n s would never consent to a l l o w i n g the magistrate to use these subtle forms of mind manipulation on them and t h e i r c h i l d r e n . Again, the magistrate who attempts to use such means to f o r c e b e l i e f o n his subjects would be doing so i l l e g i t i m a t e l y . (5) Locke's Intolerance... (a) Of Opinions In his book An Essay on the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s of Government and on the Nature of P o l i t i c a l , C i v i l , and R e l i g i o u s L i b e r t y (1768), Joseph P r i e s t l e y , w r i t e s that the greater the l i b e r t y in matters of r e l i g i o n , the more society stands to gain. He says that the t o l e r a t i o n in England of his day " i s f a r from being complete" (117). Drawing on the examples of France, England, Pennsylvania, H o l l a n d , and Poland, P r i e s t l e y says history has shown that "the consequences of unbounded l i b e r t y , in matters of r e l i g i o n , promise to be so very favourable to the best i n t e r e s t s of mankind" (108). R e c a l l that f a r from c a l l i n g f o r "unbounded l i b e r t y , " L o c ke c a l l s for the state to not t o l e r a t e , among other things, "opinions c o n t r a r y to human s o c i e t y , or those moral rules which are necessary to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of c i v i l s o c i e t y " ( L e t t e r 61). P r i e s t l e y w r i t e s that a l l r e l i g i o n s , no matter how subversive t h e i r ideas may seem to outsiders, have "some salvo for good morals; so that, in f a c t , they enforce the more e s s e n t i a l parts, at l e a s t , of 116 that conduct, which the good order of soc i e t y r e q u i r e s " ( P r i e s t l e y 110). A c c o r d i n g to P r i e s t l e y , i f an o u t r a g e o u s r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f should lead to an i l l e g a l act i t is simply a matter of that act being r e s t r a i n e d by a c i v i l m agistrate operating w i t h i n c i v i l laws, he says. Therefore there is no need to have what Locke seems to be c a l l i n g f o r , n a m ely, c i v i l a u t h o r i t y j u d g i n g , and r u l i n g a g a i n s t , some re l i g i o u s b e l i e f in the i n t e r e s t of avoiding a possible a c t i o n that may be d e t r i m e n t a l to s o c i e t y . Without saying so d i r e c t l y , P r i e s t l e y i s a r g u i n g a g a i n s t L o c k e , and f o r the a b s o l u t e t o l e r a t i o n of a l l re l i g i o u s opinion, by extending the p r i n c i p l e made by L o c k e himself -that the magistrate has no j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h i n the church - and by denying the necessity of the proviso L ocke has added on - that a l l opinions are allowed so long as "the commonwealth r e c e i v e no preju-dice, and that there be no injury done to any man, e i t h e r l i f e or e s t a t e " ( L e t t e r 48). P r i e s t l e y saw the benefits to the commonwealth re s u l t i n g from a l l o w i n g the f r e e expression of a l l opinions as f a r o u t w e i g h i n g any p o s s i b i l i t y of d i r e c t harm f r o m t h e s e o p i n i o n s . Speaking of the commonwealth as a c o n s t a t l y growing and developing e n t i t y , he wrote, "The more l i b e r t y is given to everything which is in a s t a t e of growth the more p e r f e c t i t w i l l become" ( P r i e s t l e y 137). Twenti e t h century philosopher John Rawls says that while L ocke has based his l i m i t a t i o n s to t o l e r a t i o n on what he supposes is " c l e a r and evident consequences for the s e c u r i t y of public order" L ocke is d r a w i n g h a s t y c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d a n g e r to s o c i e t y f r o m o p i n i o n s , and the h a r m f u l e f f e c t s t h e i n t o l e r a n t , C a t h o l i c s , and ath e i s t s would have on a s o c i e t y , without the be n e f i t of s u f f i c i e n t 117 e m p i r i c a l evidence. More experience, says Rawls, would presumably have convinced him that he was mistaken ( J u s t i c e 121). Rawls says r e l i g i o u s opinion, or " l i b e r t y of c o n s c i e n c e " may only be l i m i t e d when there is "a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n that not doing so w i l l damage the public order which the government should m a i n t a i n " (A Theory 213). This "reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n " should be based on more than merely the magistrate's worries that an opinion might harm the commonwealth. Rawls says it must be based on evidence and ways of reasoning a c c e p t a b l e to a l l . It must be supported by ordinary observation and modes of thought ( i n c l u d i n g the methods of r a t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c inquiry where these are not c o n t r o v e r s i a l ) which are generally recognized as correct... The consequences for the s e c u r i t y of p u b l i c o r d e r s h o u l d not be m e r e l y possible or in c e r t a i n cases even probable, but reason-ably c e r t a i n or imminent... This requirement expresses the high place which must be accorded to l i b e r t y of conscience and freedom of thought (A Theory 213). The question Rawls' c r i t e r i o n raises i s , is i t in f a c t r e a l i s t i c to expect that the consequences of an opinion can ever be shown to be "reasonably c e r t a i n or imminent"? With such stringent c r i t e r i o n Rawls c e r t a i n l y allows f o r f a r fewer, i f any, cases of i n t o l e r a n c e of opinion than i t appears Locke c a l l s f or in his L e t t e r . Rawls, l i k e P r i e s t l e y , sees t he p o s s i b i l i t y of harm c o m i n g f r o m o p i n i o n s as v i r t u a l l y non-existent. Only actions harmful to the commonwealth, may be r e a c t e d against by the magistrate; never opinions themselves. 118 (b) Of The I n t o l e r a n t In his L e t t e r L o c k e says the state need not t o l e r a t e those who, in the name of t h e i r r e l i g i o n , arrogate s p e c i a l powers to themselves which t h r e a t e n the c i v i l r i g hts of others in a community (Locke 62-3). This includes, he says, that the state should not t o l e r a t e those who refuse to be t o l e r a n t of the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of others and who refuse to teach r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n to t h e i r f o l l o w e r s . These i n -t o l e r a n t ones, says Locke, are a t h r e a t to the s t a t e since they merely use the t o l e r a t i o n a f f o r d e d them by the magistrate to build up t h e i r own strength so that they may one day take absolute p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l , and take the estates and fortunes of others for themselves. On the basis of his c o n t r a c t u a l theory of s o c i e t y , L o c k e sees the purpose of a commonwealth to be the procuring, preserving, and advancing of the i n t e r e s t s of the c i t i z e n s of that state. Since L o c k e sees l i b e r t y and e q u a l i t y as two of the''interests the c i t i z e n s of that state wish to procure, preserve, and/or advance for themselves, i t seems to him l o g i c a l to say that they cannot allow i n t o l e r a n c e to be t o l e r a t e d w i t h i n the t o l e r a n t state they have cr e a t e d . But Rawls sees the t o l e r a t i o n of the i n t o l e r a n t as a requirement of a t o l e r a n t state. S t i l l , Rawls, l i k e L ocke, argues that there must be some l i m i t s to t o l e r a t i o n . Rawls t h e o r i z e s that a just state would result i f i t were based on the p r i n c i p l e s that free and r a t i o n a l persons concerned to f u r t h e r t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s would accept in an i n i t i a l p o s i tion of e q u a l i t y as d e f i n i n g the fundamental terms of t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n (A Theory 11). 119 In this i n i t i a l or " o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , " as Rawls c a l l s i t e l s e -where, no person would know for c e r t a i n whether they would or would not be part of the dominant r e l i g i o n i f i t were allowed that the state could promote a f a v o r i t e church and persecute the rest. Therefore, r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s in the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n would " i n s i s t upon an equal ri g h t to decide what his r e l i g i o u s o b l i g a t i o n s a r e " ( i b i d 217). In other words each person would choose r e l i g i o u s freedom and t o l e r a -t i o n f o r a l l i n o r d e r to s e c u r e i t f o r t h e m s e l v e s . But r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s in the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n would also undoubtedly c l a i m the right to s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , or as Rawls puts i t , " j u s t i c e does not require that men must stand idl y by while others destroy the basis of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e " ( i b i d 218). It would seem t h e r e f o r e that j u s t i c e would allow c i t i z e n s not to t o l e r a t e the threat to a p e a c e f u l e x i s t -ence posed by the i n t o l e r a n t . But Rawls says there is no reason for a general denial of freedom to the i n t o l e r a n t . C i t i z e n s s h o u l d a l l o w e q u a l l i b e r t i e s t o a l l , i n c l u d i n g the i n t o l e r a n t , so long as the c o n s t i t u t i o n which guarantees these l i b e r t i e s is secure and in no danger from the i n t o l e r a n t . In f a c t , says Rawls, given enough time w i t h i n a t o l e r a n t s t a t e , an i n t o l e r a n t sect w i l l "tend to lose i t s i n t o l e r a n c e and a ccept l i b e r t y of c o n science" ( i b i d 219). But what i f the i n t o l e r a n t sect should pose an immediate threat to the "just c o n s t i t u t i o n " of "a w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t y ? " Rawls says, the state may l i m i t the freedoms of the i n t o l e r a n t "only in the s p e c i a l c a s e s when i t is n e c e s s a r y f o r p r e s e r v i n g e q u a l l i b e r t y i t s e l f , " or "when the t o l e r a n t s i n c e r e l y and w i t h reason believe 120 that t h e i r own s e c u r i t y and that of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of l i b e r t y are in d a n g e r " ( i b i d 2 20). A n d when t h e l i b e r t y of t h e i n t o l e r a n t i s l i m i t e d " i t is done f o r the sake of e q u a l l i b e r t y under a j u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n the p r i n c i p l e s of which the i n t o l e r a n t themselves would acknowledge in the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n " ( i b i d ) . So while Rawls agrees with L o c k e that, in order to p r o t e c t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a t o l e r a n t state from the ac t i o n s of the i n t o l e r a n t , i t is at times necessary to l i m i t the freedom of the i n t o l e r a n t to act, he disagrees w i t h Locke's po s i t i o n that opinions themselves must at times not be t o l e r a t e d . (c) Of "Those Devoted to Another Prince" In his L e t t e r L ocke also says that the state need not t o l e r a t e those who " d e l i v e r themselves up to the p r o t e c t i o n and s e r v i c e of another p r i n c e " (Locke 63). By th i s he means that the state can't a f f o r d to t o l e r a t e e i t h e r the C a t h o l i c church whose members c l a i m a l l e g i a n c e to the Pope, or other r e l i g i o n s whose members hold that obeying t h e i r church's leaders takes precedence over obeying the leaders of t h e i r state. L ocke sees such r e l i g i o u s devotion as a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t in the c o n t r a c t u a l agreement of l o y a l t y between c i t i z e n s and' t h e i r state that w i l l be d e t r i m e n t a l to the w e l l - b e i n g of the state. In reply, P r i e s t l e y says that i t may be said that C a t h o l i c i s m is an e v i l because the C a t h o l i c church at one time persecuted Protes t a n t dissenters. But a "mature c o n s i d e r a t i o n " shows that i t is not necessary to render more e v i l f or a past e v i l ( P r i e s t l e y 119). In the f i r s t place, he says, i t is u n l i k e l y that "so absurd a system of f a i t h " w i l l ever appeal to any but the "lowest and most i l l i t e r a t e 121 of our common people" and w i l l t h e r e f o r e never have any e f f e c t on the state (ibid-120). P e r s e c u t i o n or i n t o l e r a n c e toward C a t h o l i c s could in f a c t be used by C a t h o l i c s to argue that P r o t e s t a n t i s m is so weak i t finds i t necessary to a t t a c k i t s r i v a l . But t o l e r a t i n g them, says P r i e s t l e y , makes them an "open enemy" which is less dangerous than a s e c r e t one ( i b i d 122). F u r t h e r m o r e , P r i e s t l e y p o i n t s out t h a t Poland, a "popish country," is presently showing more t o l e r a t i o n than England, and another C a t h o l i c nation, France, may soon improve on its l e v e l of t o l e r a t i o n . This may res u l t in a mass emigration of persecuted B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s to more t o l e r a n t places. It is the r e f o r e n e c e s s a r y , says P r i e s t l e y , f o r s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t E n g l a n d be tol e r a n t toward a l l i t s people, even the "popish ones" ( i b i d 125). So while L o c k e has argued for the n o n - t o l e r a t i o n of C a t h o l i c s and a l l those who hold a l l e g i a n c e to a " f o r e i g n p r i n c e " because he sees a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t in the c o n t r a c t u a l agreement between the i n d i -v idual and the st a t e , P r i e s t l e y c a l l s f o r t o l e r a t i o n f or pru d e n t i a l reasons: i t allows for the open observation of enemies of the stat e , and i t prevents large numbers from emigrating out of the i n t o l e r a n t s t a t e . One reading of the L e t t e r makes it seem that L o cke allows for the breaking of c i v i l , laws in the name of someone c l a i m i n g to be speaking on behalf of C h r i s t or God, by s t a t i n g that "obedience is due in the f i r s t place to God, and aft e r w a r d s to the laws" ( L e t t e r 59). This seems to allow f o r a l l manner of actions that contravene c i v i l laws to be perp e t r a t e d in the name of obedience to those who c l a i m to be speaking with a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y from God, as various c u l t 122 l e a d e r s h a v e d o n e r e c e n t l y . B u t L o c k e ' s c a l l f o r i n t o l e r a n c e o f t h o s e w h o c l a i m a l l e g i a n c e t o " a n o t h e r p r i n c e " does a g o o d j o b o f a d d r e s -s i n g t h i s m o d e r n d a y p r o b l e m o f c u l t l e a d e r s w h o i n s i s t t h a t t h e i r f o l l o w e r s o b e y l a w s w h i c h r u n c o n t r a r y t o t h e c i v i l l a w s o f t h e i r s t a t e . Undoub ted ly L o c k e w o u l d acknowledge t h a t i f c u l t s w e r e a l l o w e d t o c o n t r a v e n e t h e s e c u l a r l a w s o f t h e i r s t a t e on s o - c a l l e d r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y t h e p e a c e a n d s t a b i l i t y o f t h e s e c u l a r s t a t e w o u l d be s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n e d . T h e r e f o r e , L o c k e ' s g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o G o d ' s l a w s o v e r s e c u l a r l a w s does r e f l e c t h is b e l i e f t h a t s e c u l a r l a w s m a y be b r o k e n i n t h e n a m e o f r e l i g i o n . H e s a w G o d ' s l a w s , as r e v e a l e d t o h i s w o r s h i p p e r s i n c h u r c h , as n o t a t a l l c o n c e r n e d w i t h s e c u l a r a f f a i r s o r a f f a i r s o f s t a t e , b u t o n l y w i t h t h e s a l v a t i o n o f s o u l s . I n l i g h t o f t h i s v i e w o f t h e n a t u r e o f r e l i g i o n , i t is c l e a r t h a t L o c k e does n o t g i v e c u l t l e a d e r s t h e a u t h o r i t y , f r e e d o m , or r i g h t t o c o n t r a -v e n e s e c u l a r l a w s i n t h e n a m e o f t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , o r on a c l a i m t o a u t h o r i t y f r o m G o d . ( d ) O f A t h e i s t s L o c k e a l s o a r g u e s i n h i s L e t t e r t h a t t h e s t a t e n e e d n o t t o l e r a t e t h o s e w h o " d e n y t h e b e i n g o f G o d , " i n o t h e r w o r d s , a t h e i s t s ( 6 4 ) . H u m a n s o c i e t y is b a s e d on bonds t h a t a r e c r e a t e d t h r o u g h p r o m i s e s , c o v e n a n t s and o a t h s s w o r n t o be u p h e l d i n t h e n a m e o f G o d . S i n c e an a t h e i s t does n o t b e l i e v e i n G o d , says L o c k e , h is o a t h s and p r o m i s e s w i l l h a v e no h o l d on h i m . " T h e t a k i n g a w a y o f G o d , t h o u g h b u t e v e n in t h o u g h t , " says L o c k e , " d i s s o l v e s a l l " ( i b i d ) . A t h e i s t s , a c c o r d i n g t o L o c k e , a r e t h e r e f o r e a t h r e a t t o t h e m u t u a l t r u s t w h i c h b i n d s h u m a n s o c i e t y t o g e t h e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e a t h e i s t s a r e , by d e f i n i t i o n , 123 i r r e l i g i o u s they can l o g i c a l l y have no c l a i m to re l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n . On the other hand, P r i e s t l e y sees the opinions of at h e i s t s and he r e t i c s as having "nothing formidable or alarming in them," and among the most easily r e f u t e d . It is t h e r e f o r e completely unneces-sary, in his opinion, to persecute those who hold such points of view. In f a c t there is a danger that persecution may a c t u a l l y lead some C h r i s t i a n s to take up the cause of the persecuted ( P r i e s t l e y 173-4). Furthermore, he says, i t seems an impossible task to attempt to deter-mine which b e l i e f s are in f a c t h e r e t i c a l or a t h e i s t i c . The magistrate may f i n d himself having to punish not only those who " d i r e c t l y m a i n t a i n the p r i n c i p l e s of atheism but he must punish those who do i t i n d i r e c t l y " ( i b i d 181). The p r o b l e m is t h a t t o o many h a r m l e s s b e l i e f s may then be. punished because they are seen as leading to a t h e i s m . B u t , a l t h o u g h P r i e s t l e y c o n s i d e r s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of atheism and argues that they are not as dire as Locke supposes, he does not address Locke's concern d i r e c t l y . In order to respond to Locke one needs to argue, as P i e r r e Bayle did shortly before L o c k e wrote his L e t t e r , that "the notion that a t h e i s m is the s o u r c e of a l l v i c e s is d i s p r o v e d by e x p e r i e n c e " (Labrousse 80). There seems to be no provable causal r e l a t i o n between re l i g i o u s experience and moral dependability (Dunn 188). L ocke might reply that an atheist's keeping, his promises is c o n t r a r y to his d i s -b e l i e f in God, and that this d i s b e l i e f w i l l some day lead the ath e i s t to act in a way that is harmful to s o c i e t y . But two re p l i e s to L o c k e are possible: one is that many who c a l l themselves C h r i s t i a n s also do not keep t h e i r promises, covenants, and oaths, demonstrating that his 124 b e l i e f in God does not n e c e s s a r i l y make a c i t i z e n t r u s t w o r t h y ; and two, that i t is neither the case that "the t a k i n g away of God, though even but in thought, dissolves a l l , " nor is i t the case that oaths and promises are meaningless to an a t h e i s t ( L o c k e L e t t e r 64, Wootton 109). I t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o suppose t h a t t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s is a c h a r a c t e r t r a i t which is not necessarily connected with a b e l i e f in God. John Rawls w r i t e s that equal l i b e r t y of conscience, when it comes to r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , is " c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a sense of c o m m u n i t y " w i t h i n a just s o c i e t y ( J u s t i c e 116). If a s o c i e t y does not a l l o w athe i s t s to f r e e l y d i s b e l i e v e in God - which is in e f f e c t t h e i r b e l i e f - then, under Rawls' theory, i t has r e l e g a t e d them to an unequal and i n f e r i o r status w i t h i n that s o c i e t y , not only weakening the sense of community w i t h i n that s o c i e t y but proving i t s e l f to be unjust. The question for L o cke then i s : Since atheism, l i k e any b e l i e f , is not an a t t i t u d e one can simply choose to surrender, and since atheism has e m p i r i c a l l y proved i t s e l f throughout his t o r y to be harm-less to secular s o c i e t y , why should i t not be t o l e r a t e d for e i t h e r one or both of these reasons? It seems that in his enthusiasm for main-t a i n i n g the peace and s t a b i l i t y of s o c i e t y L o c k e may have gone a bit too far in his i n t o l e r a n c e of atheism. 125 Chapter 5 - Conclusion In the final analysis it is . clear that Locke 's Let te r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n not only addresses the conce rns , and surv ives the cr i t ic isms, of his. 17th century con temporar ies and the h i s t o r i c a l events of his day, his arguments for religious tolerat ion continue to display a v i ta l i ty that enables the modern reader to apply Locke 's reasoning and arguments to current events. The problem of f r inge r e l i g ious groups or cu l t s who c l a i m authority directly from God, and sometimes perpetrate crimes against t h e i r f e l l o w c i t i z e n s in the name of r e l i g i o n , was as ser ious a concern in Locke 's day as it is in the twentieth century. Locke 's reasoning allowed the fringe groups of his day the right and freedom to hold and express any opinions that were not contrary to the welfare of society, but did not allow them to act on those opinions that would break c i v i l law, and thereby harm their fellow ci t izens, in the name of their re l igion. This • same reasoning may be applied today, and works equally as well in today's modern society as it did in Locke 's day. 126 Locke's reasoning concerning the nature of belief - that it can't be forced on an individual from the outside, nor can he or she simply decide to believe - s t i l l holds today. Locke argued, especia l ly against Proast, that belief may not be compelled by civil authorities, and that citizens have not allowed civil authorities to force belief on them. Locke argued that, in order that the right kind of beliefs may develop, that is, the kind that lead to salvation, everyone must be allowed the freedom to develop their own beliefs. The question about forced bel ief was raised again in this century by Jeremy Waldron, but Locke's reasoning still holds. In fact we have modern-day evidence that compelling people to believe does not work: in communist Russia forcing belief failed, first because people could not simply discard their deeply held religious beliefs and accept those presented by the state, and second, the citizens of Russia had not given their civil leaders the power to force beliefs on them and eventually rebelled against their illegitimate use of force. Locke's argument holds: compelling people to believe that which they are not convinced of in themselves was just as wrong in communist Russia as it was in the France and England of Locke's day. Locke also warned that compelling citizens through force of civil laws to bel ieve a part icular re l ig ion is i r ra t ional since it is probable that the belief chosen by the civil authorities as the right one is in fact not the way to salvation at al l . No one can be so certain about their particular church that they can guarantee salva-tion to those who follow its teachings. The same argument may be directed at fanatical, right wing fundamentalists of all persuasions 127 who insist on forcing their beliefs, by means of secular legislation, on entire populations. Those who promote their religion as "the only true religion that will lead to salvation" are just as likely to be mistaken today as those who claimed the same in L o c k e ' s day. Religious toleration, as Locke advocated it, and as many are arguing for it today by means of the premises offered by Locke, is the only legitimate, and the most logical way, for rational citizens to find salvation for themselves. So while his letter has sometimes been crit icized as being too parochial or historically bound it seems evident that it has stood the test of time and will continue to exert an influence on discussions of universal religious toleration, and toleration in general, not only this year, 1995 - the year the United Nations has declared "The Year of Toleration" - but for generations yet to come. 128 S e l e c t e d B i b l i o g r a p h y Crans ton , Maur i ce . "John Locke and the Case for T o l e r a t i o n . " Mendus and Horton John Locke 78-97. Dunn, John. "The c l a i m to f reedom of consc ience: f r e e d o m of speech, freedom of thought, f reedom of w o r s h i p ? " G r e l l 171-193. Go ld ie , Mark . "John L o c k e , Jonas Proast and re l ig ious t o l e r a t i o n 1688-1692 . " Walsh et a l , 1 4 3 - 1 7 1 . Gough, J.W. "The Deve lopment of L o c k e ' s B e l i e f in T o l e r a t i o n . " Mendus and Horton John Locke 57-77. G r e l l , Ole Peter , Jonathan I. I s r a e l , and N icho las Tyacke ed. Frr jm Persecut ion to T o l e r a t i o n . O x f o r d : C la rendon , 1991. G r o f f i e r , E t h e l and M iche l Paradis , ed. The N o t i o n of To le rance and Human Rights. Don Mil ls: Carlton UP, 1991. H o r t o n , John and Susan Mendus, ed. Aspects of T o l e r a t i o n . London : Methuen, 1985. John L o c k e : A L e t t e r Concern ing T o l e r a t i o n in focus. London : Rou t ledge , 1991. 129 _ "Locke and T o l e r a t i o n . " Mendus and Horton John Locke 1-11. James, Wi l l i a m . The V a r i e t i e s of R e l i g i o u s Experience. 1903. New York: Mentor, 1958 ed. K e l l y , P.J. 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" H o r t o n and Mendus, John Locke 147 - 162. j u s t i f y i n g T o l e r a t i o n . Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988. Nagel, Thomas. Mortal Questions. New York: Cambridge UP, 1979. E q u a l i t y and P a r t i a l i t y . New York: O x f o r d UP, 1991. Nicholson, Peter P. " T o l e r a t i o n as a moral i d e a l . " Horton, Aspects 158-173. Park, Desiree. "John Locke: T o l e r a t i o n and the C i v i c V i r t u e s . " The 130 N o t i o n of Tolera n c e and Human Rights. E t h e l G r o f f i e r and M i c h e l Paradis ed. Don M i l l s : C a r l t o n UP, 1991. P r i e s t l e y , Joseph. An Essay on the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s of Government; and on the Nature of P o l i t i c a l , C i v i l , and R e l i g i o u s L i b e r t y . London: Dodsley, C a d e l l and Johnson, 1768. Proast, Jonas. "The Argument of the L e t t e r Concerning T o l e r a t i o n B r i e f l y Considered and A n s w e r e d ; A T h i r d L e t t e r C o n c e r n i n g T o l e r a t i o n ; A Second L e t t e r to the Author of the Three L e t t e r s for T o l e r a t i o n " . 1690. The Philosophy of John Locke. New York: Garland, 1984. Rawls, John. " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L i b e r t y and. the Concept of J u s t i c e . " J u s t i c e . C a r l J. F r i e d r i c h and John W. Chapman ed. New York: A t h e r t o n , 1963: 98-125. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t 1762. G.D.H. Cole trans. London: Dent, 1986 ed. Tu c k , R i c h a r d . " S c e p t i c i s m and t o l e r a t i o n i n the s e v e n t e e n t h century." Mendus J u s t i f y i n g 21-35. W a l d r o n , Jeremy. " L o c k e , t o l e r a t i o n and t h e r a t i o n a l i t y of ' persecution." L i b e r a l R i g h t s - C o l l e c t e d Papers 1981-1991 New York: Cambridge UP, 1993: 88-114. Walsh, John, C o l i n Haydon, and Stephen Taylor. The Church of England C.1689-C.1833 From T o l e r a t i o n to T r a c t a r i a n i s m . C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge UP, 1993. Williams, Bernard. Problems of the Self. London: Cambridge UP, 1973. Wootton, David. P o l i t i c a l Writings of John Locke. New York: Penguin, 1993) 131
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Philosophy
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Locke’s theory of toleration and its critics
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