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Evaluating competing theoretical perspectives on cooperation: the case study of Asean in the post-cold… Ayvazian, Elizabeth 1992

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EVALUATING COMPETING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COOPERATION:THE CASE STUDY OF ASEAN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERAbyELIZABETH AYVAZIAND.E.A., Paris I - La Sorbonne, 1991A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAMarch 1992© Elisabeth AYVAZIAN, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature) Department ofThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate An,,r,r 20- 1$5..1._.1DE-6 (2/88)l*iABSTRACTThe end of the Cold War is bringing about crucial changes ininternational relations. The Cold War security system has collapsedand the old bipolar international system is crumbling. These changesare now central to political debates in international relations.Scholars have asked whether these new developments would lead to newmodes of cooperation or whether they would create new opportunitiesfor conflicts.As far as developed states (core states) are concerned, mostscholars agree that they now form a community and have ruled out theuse of war in their relations. Hence the growing interest in non-realist, more specifically liberal theories of internationalrelations. Yet for the Third World and the Second Worlddisaggregated (the periphery), the neorealist theory still seems toprevail among scholars: it is indeed usually inferred that thecollapse of the Cold War security system and the consequent changesin the distribution of power will increase instability andexacerbate conflicts in the periphery. This thesis presents andevaluates this perspective on the stability of the post-Cold Warperiphery, as well as its theoretical underpinnings.At its simplest, the neorealists' world is characterized byconflict and the constant possibility of war. Neorealists doacknowledge the likelihood of cooperation in such a conflictualworld. Yet they usually hold that, particularly in the securityarena, cooperation is unusual, fleeting and temporary. They furtherargue that cooperation is rare, because states act autonomously andI I Iself-help is the rule. Since neorealists hold that states cooperateonly to deal with a common threat, they see cooperation, whenmanifest, as temporary or inconsequential and ultimately explainedby conflict. The neorealist perspective on international cooperationthus raises an important theoretical question regarding states'motivations for cooperating: is a common enemy required for thecreation and maintenance of cooperation among states ?This thesis examines the hypothesis that cooperation among someperipheral states may be better explained by liberal theory than byneorealism - namely that states will be motivated for cooperatingnot exclusively because of a common enemy, but because they havereduced their commitment to war as an instrument of policy.The case-study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations --the current debate on ASEAN security cooperation and its futurerelevance in the post-Cold War era -- provides evidence to test ourhypothesis. Neorealists have pointed out that such sub-regionalsecurity cooperation, being the sole product of intraregionalstress, will last only as long as there is a common enemy. Thus theyhold that today, with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, thecontinued viability of the organization cannot be taken for granted.Unless ASEAN states find a new common enemy, intra-ASEAN securitycooperation will be jeopardized. This thesis underlines thelimitations of this discourse on the Association. It argues that,while ASEAN has been created and maintained thanks to the commoncommunist enemy, motivations for cooperation have changed. Habits ofcooperation and mutual interests in avoiding war, as well as thebelief that war is not a viable instrument of policy, have(Vdeveloped: ASEAN in the post-Cold War era will thus seek tostrengthen peaceful change rather than gradually collapsing.Such motivations for cooperating are not explained by theneorealist theory, and may be more accountable to liberal theory.This thesis thus contends that the ASEAN case study may providegrounds to water down the pessimistic prospect that neorealists putforward for peripheral states' stability in the post-Cold War era.VCHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTIONCHAPTER 2 - THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND PERIPHERY'S STABILITY:EVALUATING COMPETING PERSPECTIVES^ 52.1: Implications of the end of bipolarity for the periphery's security environment ^ 72.1.1: Prospects for core states' involvement2.1.2: Prospects for regional conflicts2.1.3: Implications of the diffusion of power2.2: Peripheral states' security strategies in the post-Cold Warera: realist and neorealist hypotheses ^ 172.2.1: Maximizing power2.2.2: Balancing power2.3: An alternative perspective ^ 232.3.1: Relevance of regional security arrangements2.3.2: Liberal motivations for cooperationCHAPTER 3: THE NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE ON ASEAN^ 303.1: ASEAN in the post-Cold War era: changes in the regional balance of power ^ 313.1.1: Diffusion of power3.1.2: The potential regional hegemons: China, Japan, India3.2: Calls for an ASEAN military alliance ^ 403.2.1: Proposals and reactions3.2.2: Unlikelihood of a military alliance: explanations3.3: Self-help strategy: ASEAN members' military build-up ^473.3.1: Scope and characteristics3.3.2: An intra-ASEAN arms race ?CHAPTER 4: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON ASEAN^ 564.1: Towards a security community ^ 574.1.1: ASEAN's goal: forming a 'security community'4.1.2: The instrument: an ASEAN security regime4.2: Challenges to ASEAN as a 'security community' ^ 654.2.1: Intra-ASEAN's lingering suspicions4.2.2: Bringing Indochina into ASEAN4.3: Emulating the ASEAN model in Asia-Pacific^ 764.3.1: Emulating the 'ASEAN spirit'4.3.2: Emulating ASEAN's mechanismsCHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION^ 831CHARTER 1: INTRODUCTIONThe end of the Cold War is bringing about crucial changes ininternational relations. The Cold War security system has collapsedand the old bipolar international system is crumbling. These changesare now central to political debates in international relations.Scholars have asked whether these new developments would lead to newmodes of cooperation or whether they would create new opportunitiesfor conflicts.As far as developed states ('core states') are concerned, mostscholars agree that they now form a community and have ruled out theuse of war in their relations (Jervis, 1992; Goldgeier and McFaul,1992; Buzan, 1991b). Hence the growing interest in non-realist, morespecifically liberal theories of international relations. Yet for theThird World and the Second World disaggregated (the periphery), theneorealist theory still seems to prevail among scholars (1): it isindeed usually inferred that the collapse of the Cold War securitysystem and the consequent changes in the distribution of power willincrease instability and exacerbate conflicts in the periphery. Thisthesis presents and evaluates this perspective on the stability ofthe post-Cold War periphery, as well as its theoreticalunderpinnings.At its simplest, the neorealists' world is characterized by(1) Throughout this thesis, we will be using the term 'neorealists' to refer tothe realists writing in the 'structural' tradition of international relationsscholarship. The most influential argument for a structural perspective is K.Waltz, 1979. It should be noted however that while traditional realists andneorealists diverge on certain points (see below: section 2.2), they do agree oncrucial issues like the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states,and the problem of cooperation (Grieco, 1988: 1, fn. 1).2conflict and the constant possibility of war (Stein, 1990: 16-20).Neorealists do acknowledge the likelihood of cooperation in such aconflictual world. Yet they usually hold that, particularly in thesecurity arena, "cooperation is unusual, fleeting and temporary".Stein further argues that for neorealists, "cooperation is rare,because states act autonomously and self-help is the rule... Since(neorealists) hold that states cooperate only to deal with a commonthreat, they see cooperation, when manifest, as temporary orinconsequential and ultimately explained by conflict" (id.: 6-7). Theneorealist perspective on international cooperation thus raises animportant theoretical question regarding states' motivations forcooperating: is a common enemy required for the creation andmaintenance of cooperation among states ?This thesis attempts to answer this theoretical question byexamining the current debate on ASEAN security cooperation and itsfuture relevance in the post-Cold War era.The following chapter analyzes the competing perpectives on theperiphery's stability in the post-Cold War era. It focuses on andpresents in detail the prevailing perspective, namely the neorealistone, which basically holds that conflicts will multiply; neorealistsalso posit that states will seldom cooperate, and ultimately to dealwith a common enemy. It then puts forward an alternative perspectiveon the issue. This thesis indeed argues that although neorealism mayaccount for the general international security environment in theperiphery in the post-Cold War era, the behavior of states in certainregions of the periphery may be better explained by a non-realist,3liberal theory. Liberal theory may be described in a ratherarchetypal manner as cooperation-oriented (Stein, 1990: 16-20); infact liberals differ in a major way from neorealists in that theybelieve forms of cooperation in the international system to besignificant and to be based on states' mutual interests rather thanon a common threat. This thesis thus examines the hypothesis thatcooperation among some peripheral states may be better explained byliberal theory than by neorealism - namely that states will bemotivated for cooperating because they have reduced their commitmentto war as an instrument of policy.The following two chapters then focus on the case study of theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to test our hypothesis(2). This case-study is indeed significant because the neorealistdiscourse is usually applied to account for the Association'screation, maintenance and future relevance.Chapter 3 thus outlines the neorealist perspective on theAssociation - namely that ASEAN, without a common threat, will notsurvive in the post-Cold War era. Neorealists have argued that ASEANwas created in the midst of the Cold War in Southeast Asia (1967),and that it found its real raison d'etre in the common resistance tothe Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. The commonopposition to this communist menace in Southeast Asia provided themain ground on which the member states muted their bilateral disputesand cooperated. Neorealists have pointed out that such sub-regionalsecurity cooperation, being the sole product of intraregional stress,(2) ASEAN comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines andBrunei.4will last only as long as there is a common enemy (Ayoob, 1986: 18-19; and "Comments" by S.D. Muni, ibid.: 31-32). Thus they hold thattoday, with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, the continuedviability of the organization cannot be taken for granted. UnlessASEAN states find a new common enemy, intra-ASEAN securitycooperation will be jeopardized (Acharya, 1991: 176).Chapter 4 underlines the limitations of this discourse on theAssociation. It argues that, while ASEAN has been created andmaintained thanks to the common communist enemy, motivations forcooperation have changed. Habits of cooperation and mutual interestsin avoiding war, as well as the belief that war is not a viableinstrument of policy, have developed: ASEAN in the post-Cold War erawill thus seek to strengthen peaceful change in the Association, inSoutheast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific region, ratherthan gradually collapsing. Such motivations for cooperating are notexplained by the neorealist theory, and may be more accountable toliberal theory. This thesis thus contends that the ASEAN case studyprovides grounds to water down the pessimistic prospect thatneorealists put forward for peripheral states' stability in the post-Cold War era.The final chapter, along with summarizing the main points of thisthesis, evaluates the findings regarding our hypothesis, and broadlyexplores the future prospects for a liberal argument on securitycooperation in the periphery in the post-Cold War era.5CHAPTER 2 - THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE PERIPHERY'S STABILITY:EVALUATING COMPETING PERSPECTIVESStudying the implications of the end of the Cold War on states'security involves a certain degree of prediction in world politicswhich, as Robert Jervis clearly pointed out, is a rather difficultexercise (Jervis, 1992). The subtitle of Jervis' article raises themain question that scholars tackle concerning the future of worldpolitics: "will it resemble the past ?"Cyclical thinking suggests that, freed from the constraints ofthe Cold War, world politics will return to earlier patterns.Many of the basic generalizations of international politicsremain unaltered: it is still anarchic in the sense that thereis no international sovereign that can make and enforce lawsand agreements. The security dilemma remains as well, with theproblem it creates for states who would like to cooperate butwhose security requirements do not mesh. Many specific causesof conflict also remain... To put it more generally, bothaggression and spirals of insecurity and tension can stilldisturb the peace. But are the conditions that call theseforces into being as prevalent as they were in the past ? Arethe forces that restrain violence now as strong or strongerthan they were ? (Jervis, 1992: 46).No single response to these questions has been put forward:different answers for different regions may be posited. Indeed, inthis, most scholars have usually distinguished between developed (or'core') countries and developing (or 'peripheral') countries (3).Some neorealists have contended that the end of the Cold War willresult in a renewed instability in Western Europe (Mearsheimer,1990). Yet others have more convincingly pointed to the emergence ofa 'pluralistic security community' among core states - that is agroup of states that have developed "dependable expectations ofpeaceful change" (Deutsch, 1957: 5-6; see Jervis, 1992: 55). Three(3) On the use of this vocabulary, see below.6major interactive factors have been determinant of this change: thenuclear revolution and the consequent increased cost of war (Jervis,1992); the changes in domestic regimes and values moderndemocratic states focussing on maximizing wealth rather than power(Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 468); and the high level of economicinterdependence among modern democratic states (Jervis, 1992: 52-53).As a result of those three factors, relations among developed stateshave changed: international norms have been strengthened and the useof war to solve conflicts has been ruled out (Jervis, 1992; Buzan,1991b; Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992).Opinions also diverge on the implications of the end of the ColdWar for peripheral countries, but most scholars consider theprospects for their security gloomier than those for the core states.For developing states, "...there is no reason to think that the basiccontours of international politics (in the Third World) will beunfamiliar" (Jervis, 1992: 61). In other words, there is a likelihoodof increased instability in the periphery in the post-Cold War era.This chapter will present and evaluate the competing perspectives(as well as their theoretical underpinnings) on the end of the ColdWar's implications for the periphery's stability. The first sectionwill discuss those competing views; the second will focus on theperspective that prevails among scholars, namely the neorealist one.Finally, the last section will discuss the limitations of thispessimistic argument. We will argue that, although the end of theCold War may increase instability and conflicts in the periphery, theneorealist paradigm does not help us explain the full-range securityof security behavior of peripheral states. Some developing countries,7fearing that the end of the Cold War might bring more instability,may indeed try to counteract this trend and may redouble theirefforts to work together and minimize frictions. States' motivationsfor engaging in such cooperative processes, however, may not beexplained by neorealist theory: this thesis indeed contends thatneorealism may be relatively useful for depicting the post-Cold Warsituation in the periphery, but that motivations for cooperationamong certain states may be best explained by liberal theory. (Thefollowing two chapters will then provide evidence to back up ourargument, focussing on the ASEAN case-study).2.1 - IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF BIPOLARITY FOR THE PERIPHERY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENTThe first issue that the end of the Cold War raises is one ofvocabulary. The label Third World, often criticized during the ColdWar period as being a "residual category" and "surely a confession ofintellectual failure" (Jervis, 1992: 58), further lost its relevancewith the disappearance of the Second World (Buzan, 1991b: 432) (4).Scholars have therefore tried to coin a new expression suitableto the current situation. Geographical labels such as "South" bycontrast to the "North" have not been regarded as satisfactory, asthey are misleading geographical images (Australia being in theSouth and Eastern Europe in the North) (ibid.). The expressionperiphery (by opposition to a core), borrowed from the dependencytheory, has been considered as the most relevant label: "center here(4) For a different perspective on the relevance of the term "Third World" as ananalytic category, see Steven R. David, 1991: 238-42.8implies a globally dominant core of capitalist economies; "periphery"a set of industrially, financially and politically weaker (5) statesoperating within a set of relationships largely constructed by thecenter". Buzan goes to argue that "the center-periphery approachcaptures much of what remains constant from the past and is a usefulframework within which to consider the impact of changes in the coreon the security of the periphery" (Buzan, 1991b: 434). Goldgeier andMcFaul also argue that the core and periphery concepts are"analytically useful because they denote and demarcate two differentkinds of space. First in economic terms, core refers to theindustrialized states of Western Europe, North America and Japan,whereas periphery refers to the agriculturally based, industrializingstates of the developing world (6). Second, in reference to power,periphery denotes those states which are "weak" relative to the coreof great powers dominating the international system" (1992: 469,fn.7).This change in vocabulary is far from being merely symbolic:although the countries forming the core have remained the same, theterm 'periphery' in the post-Cold War era encompasses both the ex-Third World and the Second World disaggregated. Moreover, this changein vocabulary captures one of the major implications of the end ofthe Cold War for the developing countries' security environmentnamely the decoupling of the core's security concerns from those of(5) On the concept of 'weak' states, see Buzan, 1991a. Buzan distinguishes theweak/strong state dichotomy (which is based on the degree of socio-politicalcohesiveness) from the weak/strong power dichotomy (which is based on the rangeand size of resources and capabilities).(6) The definition of the periphery that Goldgeier and McFaul put forward israther schematic: some states such as the Newly Industrialised Countries, althoughlocated in the periphery, do not really fit those qualifications.9the periphery.We will analyze the different opinions on three main consequencesof the collapse of the bipolar system of security: the prospects forcore states' involvement in the periphery; the prospects for regionalconflicts; and finally the implications of the general diffusion ofpower. Scholars' views as to the consequences of the decoupling forthe periphery's security environment may diverge; however, there is aprevalent assumption among them that, in the post-Cold War era, theperiphery's security environment will be less stable than during theCold War.2.1.1: Prospects for core states' involvement in the periphery During the Cold War, as a result of the superpowers' involvementin the Third World, an intimate relationship was assumed betweenglobal security imperatives and regionally indigenous ones: witnessthe analyses of the security of Third World states and regions, whichwere primarily undertaken from American or Soviet viewpoints (7). B.Buzan's concept of "overlay" depicted the extreme situation "when thedirect presence of outside powers in a region (was) strong enough tosuppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the localstates" (1992: 365) (8). Today, all scholars acknowledge that theinternational security order of the post-Cold War era will bearlittle resemblance to the post-WWII order, but "the implications of(7) Michael Nacht, "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security", Daedalus110 (Winter 1981), 1-22; and S. Neil MacFarlane, "The Soviet Conception ofRegional Security", World Politics 37 (April 1985), 295-316.(8) Overlay involves, "at a minimum, substantial long-term stationing of militaryforces by outside powers in the region. It may also involve effective politicaltakeover, as in the case of the Soviet empire in Eastern urope after the SecondWorld War" (Suzan, 1992: 365).10such a revised order for the Third World and its security dilemmasremain puzzling. The events leading to and following the Persian GulfWar of 1991 have in many ways exercised a more direct impact uponThird World countries and their security interests" than the end ofthe Cold War itself (Job, 1992: 66). The characteristics and theoutcome of this first post-Cold War regional conflict have indeedprovided grounds for three different scenarios concerning theapproach of major powers to regional conflicts in the post-Cold Warera. The first scenario states that a condominium/multilateral regimewill take a managerial role regarding regional conflicts; the secondone posits that the United States will provide a global policemanrole and thus intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts; the thirdargues that above all, indifference will characterize the core-periphery relationship in the post-Cold War era.The first scenario posits that as the Cold War disappears, someform of condominium or multilateral regime (e.g. a reinvigoratedUnited Nations) will emerge to attempt to manage security problems inthe periphery (Mac Farlane, 1992: 475). This scenario points to theevidence of the 1991 Gulf War. However, the major powers may not havethe interest and more significantly the resources required to dealwith all regional conflicts. Russia, as the inheritor of the SovietUnion, is unlikely to play a role of any importance in the peripherygiven its own deeply-entrenched political, social and economicproblems. Moreover, although the strengthening of the UN SecurityCouncil role may be viewed as a positive development, the consensusfostered during the Gulf War might not be easy to reproduce: theapproval of all five members for an intervention in Kuwait was the11result of a fortuitous convergence of interests rather than a realconsensus.The scenario of a unipolar world (Krauthammer, 1990), in whichthe United States would assume the management of regional conflictslike a global policeman points to the interventions in Panama in 1990and in the 1991 Gulf War. This scenario can easily be debunked as theUnited States does not have the actual political, financial andmilitary means of such a unilateralism. The issues of the politicaland financial means are closely linked: the US needs internationalfinancial support for intervening, given its deficits and given thatthe Democratic-lead Congress would otherwise not consent to the useof forces abroad. As for the military means, the question is whetherthe force reductions envisaged by the Administration will preservethe US' ability to act alone. According to J. Tritten, it might keepits capability of a unilateral tactical intervention, but a strategicand operational one (like Desert Shield) might require theparticipation of host nations and allies (Tritten, 1991: 35). AsJervis states, "it is ... far from clear whether other states wouldtolerate having so little influence as they did in (the Persian Gulf)case. The alternative is a smaller American contribution and trulymultilateral decision-making. But how often has the United Statesbeen willing to take an active part in an international venturewithout playing the leading role ?" (1992: 68).The third scenario posits that core states' involvement in thePersian Gulf was highly dependent on peculiar circumstances, so thatfurther involvement in the periphery will be highly reduced andhighly selective: Goldgeier and McFaul state that core states "will12neither intervene to preserve the security of a peripheral state norconstrain a peripheral state from undertaking belligerent actionsunless core economic interests are at stake" (1992: 486). Jervis,focusing on the United States, doubts that economic interests (suchas access to raw material) will drive the US to intervene abroad(1992: 63-4). He underlines the fact that "how involved Americashould be in world politics and what values it should seek to foster- and at what cost and risk - are questions that remain open,unanswered, and largely unaddressed" (1992: 73). Whatever the nuancesmay be, most scholars believe that, "to the extent that bipolarconflict and the concentration of power in the centre are bothpresently weakening, the current outlook should be for lessintervention by the great powers in regional security affairs"(Buzan, 1992: 389). The third scenario indeed posits that the end ofthe Cold war will spawn a decoupling of great powers' securityimperatives from those of the periphery, and thus lead to asuperpower withdrawal from their commitment abroad. Consequently, thepost-Cold War era will witness an accelerated trend towards the"decentralization of the international security system" (Kolodziejand Harkavy, 1980: 59).2.1.2 - Prospects for regional conflicts The end of the Cold War and the decoupling of core states'security imperatives from the peripheral security ones will havemajor implications for regional conflicts (given the subordination ofthe local security dynamics to those of the overlaying powers duringthe Cold War period). This decoupling raises primarily the following13question: is the end of the Cold War likely to increase or decreaseinternational conflicts in the Third World ? There are two separateviews which, to put it simply, may be labelled optimistic andpessimistic.The optimistic perspective stems from the assumption that theCold War exacerbated regional conflicts. Thus, the end of the bipolarstructure will tend to dampen current conflicts. Superpowers areviewed as having involved Third World states in wars not of their ownmaking, overloading client regimes with unecessary oversophisticatedweapons, and imposing artificial ideological definition to regionalpolitics. The war in Angola, for instance, epitomized theseprocesses. Thus, the retreat of the superpowers bodes well for thesecurity of peripheral states in the post-Cold War era.The assumption that superpower involvement dampened and inhibitedThird World conflicts provides grounds for the pessimistic viewpoint.Some scholars indeed posit that the end of the Cold War will resultin the reemergence of local conflicts in the periphery, what one maylabel the "reversion" thesis (9). Scholars such as Ayoob (1991),Buzan (1991a and 1992) or Jervis (1992) view the superpowers ashaving imposed structures and limits upon Third World conflicts andsecurity competition which were in some sense "beneficial". They alsopoint to the fact that the regional conflicts had their origins inindigenous forces, not in the Soviet-American rivalry: witness theIran-Iraq war. Thus in turn, withdrawal by the US and USSR from theircommitments and initiatives abroad will be accompanied by a(9) One may note that such a reversion thesis is also put forward by Mearsheimerin the case of Western Europe (Mearsheimer, 1990).14rekindling of traditional and communal disputes in the periphery.These conflicts, "proceeding without any restraining superpower hand,fuelled by supplies of weapons obtained readily and without qualms bybuyers or sellers, will be even more bloody and less resolvable thanbefore" (Job, 1992: 67-68).The optimistic and the pessimistic views are in fact not mutuallyexclusive: the Cold War both dampened and exacerbated conflicts. But"it generally dampened conflict and we can therefore expect morerather than less conflicts in the future" (Jervis, 1992: 59).2.1.3: Implications of the general diffusion of power The core-periphery divorce is also "supported by the diffusion ofpower to the regional states, which should extend the process begunby decolonization of increasing the importance of regional securitydynamics" (Buzan, 1992: 389). The subsequent lowering of great powerconcern and engagement will let regional security complexes reemerge.Thus, as Buzan states, "it seems a safe bet to predict thatindigenous patterns of regional security will be increasinglyimportant features of the international system in the twenty-firstcentury" (Buzan, 1992: 442). It thus underlines the theoretical pointthat, as far as security issues are concerned, there is not a singleinternational system: it makes more sense to begin with theassumption that there are unique regional security systems that mayor may not be linked in various ways to the great power securitysystem (Holsti, 1992: 91).Buzan further argues that the decrease in core states'intervention in the periphery will by definition give more leverage15to local powers to reshape the political environment of their regions(Buzan, 1991b: 435). Ayoob goes on and highlights the deleteriousimplications of such a diffusion of power:A disentanglement on the part of both superpowers from arenas oftension and conflict in the periphery may remove some of therestraints on the conflictual behavior of important peripheralstates. The aggressive potential of those states has beenconstrained by the apprehension that it could draw negativereactions from the superpowers. But the superpowers pulling backmight lead to greater assertiveness on the part of regionallypreeminent powers interested in translating their preeminenceinto hegemony, or at least into a managerial role within theirrespective regions. Resistance by other countries to suchregional hegemonic behavior might in turn lead to situations ofviolent interstate conflict relatively unhindered by concernsregarding superpower intervention (Ayoob, 1991: 282).Witness Saddam Hussein's aggression of Kuwait in August 1990: thecontinuation of the Cold War would have made the aggression lesslikely, but the global changes offered him a window of opportunity.States that are dominant regional powers or that aspire to suchstatus will thus play a greater role in the security concerns ofstates in their areas: scholars usually point to states such asIndia, Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, China, Iran, Iraq among others(International Journal, 1991).The theoretical underpinnings of this pessimistic thesis arerooted in the neorealist belief that the distribution of power in thesystem affects its stability. According to neorealists, thedistribution of capabilities is indeed the major determinant ofinternational outcomes: "given state interests ... patterns ofoutcomes in world politics will be determined by the overalldistribution of power among states" (Keohane, 1986: 183). FollowingK. Waltz, mainstream neorealists argue that bipolar systems are more16stable than multipolar ones (1979: chap. 5-6) (10). Thus, the currentgeneral dispersion of power, the multipolar structure of the systemand the reemergence of regional complexes will bring more instabilityto the periphery in the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 1991c: 52).In conclusion, the answer to the question : "is the end of theCold War likely to increase or to decrease international conflicts inthe periphery ?" ultimately stems from the neorealist model. In theperiphery -- contrary to the core -r the demise of the bipolarstructure will permit more aggression and mutual insecurity thatconstitute the standard pattern of international conflict. The samecause - the disappearance of the bipolar structure - will thus havedifferent effects; in the periphery, many of the basicgeneralizations of traditional neorealist international politicsremain unaltered. This suggests that peripheral states will have toseek means of enhancing their security in such a situation of newfound vulnerability.(10) The linkage neorealists posit between this polarity of the internationalsystem and the incidence of war are in fact open to debate. The logic of Waltz'sposition (a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one) is amongneorealists themselves open to dispute: they disagree about what configuration ofcapabilities would constitute a stable distribution of power. Where Waltz arguesthat a bipolar balance is more stable, Gilpin for example, argues that hegemonicpower provides more stability (1981). The theories and empirical evidence arelargely contradictory, so that no authoritative generalizations have emerged.172.2. PERIPHERAL STATES' SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEOREALIST HYPOTHESES Neorealism posits that states have static interests, with theprimary interest being survival and security in an anarchicalenvironment (11). States may pursue different strategies in order toguarantee their perpetuity. Some neorealists agree with the realistson the hypothesis that states will seek to maximize their power. Yetthe most influential argument for a structural perspective remainsWaltz's, which holds that states seek to balance power againstthreatening and more powerful states rather than maximizing it (seealso Grieco, 1988).2.2.1: Maximizing power The quest for survival and security shapes states' goals ininternational relations: following the realist argument, someneorealists believe that accumulating wealth and power are the twooverriding goals of states as the means to guarantee states'perpetuity."In many parts of the developing world, power and wealth arestill linked in ways recognizable to the realists... Not only canconquering new lands lead to more secure borders, but the addition ofpopulation and resources can increase the wealth that supportsmilitary power" (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 479-80). Thus, following(11) Anarchy means that "states do not accept any significant legal or moralconstraints in their interactions with each other" (Zacher and Matthew, 1992: 7).Grieco notes that "R. Gilpin observes that individuals and groups may seek truth,beauty, and justice, but he emphasizes that "all these more noble goals will belost unless one makes provision for one's security in the power struggle amonggroups" (1988: 498). See also Waltz, 1979: 88-92.18the realist paradigm, power is traditionally identified withincreased population, accretion of territory and - as by themercantilist doctrine -, with wealth.Goldgeier and McFaul point to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which"demonstrated that Saddam Hussein discerned a direct relationshipbetween military power and economic gain. Adding the resources of newoil fields would have added to his wealth and thus his power both inthe region and globally" (ibid.). Other conflicts over economicresources could thus possibly lead to such military actions in theperiphery; access to needed but scarce economic resources may broadenthe national security perimeter. Disputes over territory mayconsequently be far from obsolete in the periphery, as they are amongcore states. As goals of peripheral states in the post-Cold War erawill involve territorial conquests, the territorial status quo mightbe queried. Some scholars point to the fact that post-colonialboundaries might be questioned in the post-Cold War era, particularlyin Africa and in the Middle-East. Buzan states:Although there is no clear link between the Cold War and theattempt to fix boundaries, the ending of the Cold War is openingup boundary question in a rather major way...It is not yet clearif it is the norm of fixed boundaries that is under assault oronly the practice in specific locations. But it is clear thatthis norm is vulnerable to the counter-norm of national self-determination, and that some of the restraints on boundary changehave been weakened by the ending of the Cold War (Buzan, 1991b:440-1).He adds that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, besides being an attemptat conquering scarce economic resources, was also "an explicitassault on the post-colonial boundaries" (ibid.) (12). The post-Cold(12) In fact, the likelihood of territorial disputes is open to debate: R. Jacksonhas argued that peripheral states' commitment to territorial boundaries as well asjuridical sovereignty points to the unlikelihood of territorial disputes (1987 and19War era might increase the concerns of states that worry for theirwhole or partial territorial integrity. Their primary fears ofabsorption (or of loss of significant portions of their territory)usually revolve around threats from neighbouring countries. Asdiscussed above, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent loweringof great power engagement will give more leverage to local powers toreshape the political environment of their regions to the detrimentof their neighbours (Buzan, 1991b: 435).Given that accumulation of power and wealth to ensure survivalremains the overriding goal of states in the periphery, some scholarsargue that the realist paradigm will be helpful in explaining thebehavior of states outside of the economic and political core.2.2.2: Balancing power Other scholars explicitly (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 469;Buzan, 1991b) or implicitly (Jervis, 1992) argue that the neorealistparadigm is helpful in explaining the behavior of states withinregional systems outside of the economic and political core in thepost-Cold War era. In the core, "the logic of state behaviorpredicted by realist balance-of-power theory no longer applies"(Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 480). Nuclear weapons, economicinterdependence as well as shared democratic political norms are,1991). Holsti (1991: 310) as well as Zacher (1992: 7) state that boundaries haveachieved a legitimacy that they never had in the past: witness constraints such asthe OAU norm against the revision of territorially inherited boundaries, as wellas Third World consensus against the Iraqui invasion of Kuwait. Acquisition ofterritory has also declined in its strategic and economic value: "while Holstifinds that territorial wars still occur regularly (albeit at reduced rate), hedoes indicate that both international normative constraint and a decrease in theimportance of territory for international power is reducing the probability ofwars over territory", Zacher (1992: 7, fn. 44).20among others, factors that converge in creating an environment proneto cooperation and to peaceful change rather than to power politics.In the periphery, however, states' behavior as suggested by theneorealist paradigm is, argue Goldgeier and McFaul, highly relevant.They note that:In the periphery, absolute deterrents that might inducecaution do not exist. A variety of political systems rangingfrom democracies to monarchies coexist side by side, andinterdependence between peripheral states is subordinate todependence on core states. Pressures for expansion are stillpresent, stemming from goals of wealth, population, andprotection as well as from internal instabilities (1992: 469-70)(13).Goldgeier and McFaul go on to argue that given the decoupling ofcore states' security concerns from the periphery ones, peripheralstates "will have to seek means of enhancing security within theirown states or regions. Classic structural realist balance-of-powertheory delineates the options available" (1992: 487). Neorealistsposit that when states see the primary threats to their securitycoming from threatening and more powerful states or coalitions ofstates, they pursue two general strategies. They may seek tocounterbalance the power of hostile or potentially hostile states andcoalitions either by building their own power (self-help strategy)and/or by forming alliances (Waltz, 1979).States may seek to deter a potential aggressor by relying onthemselves. Stein writes: "to realists... states in the anarchicworld of international politics rely only on themselves. ... They(13) The statement on the inexistence of nuclear weapons is odd, given that thereare nuclear powers in the periphery, and that the number of haves might wellincrease in the future. What Goldgeier and McFaul may point to is that thedeterrence effect of those weapons is not effective among peripheral states. Onthe nuclear issue in the periphery, see Buzan, 1991b: 442-44.21must not allow themselves to become dependent on others" (1991: 5).They may seek to deter a hypothetical aggressor through the increaseof their military capabilities by either purchasing weapons and/ordeveloping domestic arms production capabilities. In certain areas ofthe globe such as the Asia-Pacific region, the end of the Cold War isindeed resulting in a growing militarization (Cheeseman, 1991). Notonly are some peripheral countries developing their militarycapabilities, but they are particularly acquiring more 'offensive'and hence more potentially destabilising weapons (Mack, 1992: 1). The'security dilemma' metaphor will consequently be highly relevant todepict peripheral states' security concerns in the post-Cold War era.Jervis writes:(In the post-Cold War era), aggression will be less difficultand, partly for this reason, status quo states in the Third Worldwill worry more about self-protection. Even absent aggressivemotives, conflict will often result through the security dilemma:states' effort to make themselves more secure will threatenothers (Jervis, 1992: 60).The resulting spiral of tension might pave the way, because ofpossible misperceptions, to inadvertent wars: as Gilpin states, themost devastating effect of the security dilemma is indeed the"unresolved problem of war" (Gilpin, 1981: 7).States can also choose, following the neorealist paradigm, toform alliances. A pure balance-of-power theory of alliances predictsthat alliances form against the strongest state or coalition: statesseek to balance against power (or threats according to Walt, 1988).States concerned with their own survival will act in concert toprevent the emergence of a power that threatens them. Walt arguesthat states may also bandwagon with threats rather than balance22against them. However, the most obvious strategy for states facing anadversary with hegemonial pretensions is, according to Walt andHolsti, balancing. "The alternative, bandwagoning (supporting thehegemon), has proven through experience to be a more dangerous andless successful strategy" (1992: 93). Witness the post-Cold Warexample of "Saddam Hussein's quest for regional hegemony (which)forced the other Middle Eastern states to act, with Jordon choosingto bandwagon and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria choosing to balanceagainst the rising threat" (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 487).Joining an alliance is a form of cooperation. Stein thus locatesthem "between the poles of convergent interests and self-interestedautonomy" (1990: 168). But "alliances represent temporary marriagesof convenience" (ibid.: 152). They lack permanence because theycontinually change as the relative power of states changes; theyrepresent commitments that are temporary and that are based on aconvenient convergence of interests. They are thus ratherinconsequential in restraining allies (14).If the neorealist paradigm is, as some scholars argue, highlyrelevant in explaining peripheral states behavior in the post-ColdWar era, there is no prospect for change in the internationalrelations of the periphery: states' continued commitments to theirown security and survival as a guide to their behavior will impedechanges towards a more secure international system - what Adler,Crawford and Donelly label 'progress' in international relations(14) Stein develops the argument that certain alliances do matter because theylead the states bound by them sometimes to pursue certain courses of actionbecause of their allies and in contradiction with their own interest (1990: 154).23(1991). Self-help, needless to say, does not promote internationalsecurity; "alliances may be able to preserve balances of power andthus generate ephemeral stability", but do not promote realsubstantive progress in international security (Adler, 1991: 159).Thus, while the perspectives scholars outline for core states in thepost-Cold War era are rather optimistic, propects for the peripheryremain highly pessimistic.2.3: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVEAdler, Crawford and Donelly (1991) believe that a minimalistprogress in international relations -- and more specifically insecurity -- is possible. Changes in states' policies have and willpromote security: Adler argues that substantive progress ininternational security may be achieved through the creation ofinternational cooperation through changes in values and expectationsof war. He stresses that the creation and maintenance ofinternational institutions whose norms, rules and proceduresconstrain the resort to war to settle conflicts (internationalregimes) provide a good indicator of progress. However, he underlinesthe fact that Third World states still have to be 'debelled', toresolve their "bitter struggles of nation building and integration,boundary disputes and lack of confidence in and expectation of abetter economic future... (to develop) a higher expected utility frompeace and from war" (Adler, 1991: 161).This restriction may be relevant for the majority of peripheralstates, but we hold that in certain regions of the periphery,24prospects for progress in security should be more likely. This thesisindeed argues that cooperation among states of a region may be ameans by which substantive progress can come about, and that suchcooperation is motivated by changes in values and in expectations ofwar among those states (15).This section analyzes the prospects for regional cooperativearrangements. It argues that while neorealists do acknowledge therationality of such arrangements, they hold that states do cooperateonly to deal with a common threat. Cooperation is temporary andinconsequential: it thus does not provide a means by whichinternational security could substantively be promoted. This thesisputs forward an alternative perspective which holds that cooperationamong some peripheral states is motivated by a mutual interest inavoiding war, which should contribute to the creation of 'islands ofpeace' in the post-Cold War periphery.2.3.1: Relevance of regional cooperative arrangements In the post-Cold War era, the creation or the maintenance andstrengthening of existing regional security arrangements may providean avenue towards more stability in the periphery. Scholars thathave been studying the security of peripheral states have usuallydownplayed the effectiveness and the relevance of regional securitycooperation in alleviating the security problems of peripheralstates. They argue (as Adler implicitly does) that because interstate(15) Adler, Crawford and Donelly distinguish between instrumental and substantiveprogress."Substantive progress refers to the goals or ends by which progress ismeasured" (eg. security); "instrumental progress, on the other hand, involves the'means' by which substantive progress comes about" (eg. international cooperation)(1991: 8).25conflicts usually stem from domestic problems, the only solution isto be found at the domestic level: nation-building and state-makingare the only responses to the security problem of Third World states(Ayoob, 1986: 19; Buzan, 1991a: chap. 5) (16). "But this is sure tobe a long drawn process; until then the Third World must resignitself to live in regionally - as in many other ways - insecureconditions" (Ayoob, 1986: 21). However, we believe that evidence (asprovided below in our case study) shows that regional cooperation onsecurity matters has been a means of improving national security ofperipheral states by providing a more stable security environment.Moreover, given that the reduced involvement of great powers willrestore autonomy to the separate regions in the periphery, the end ofthe Cold War will foster the aspiration to fashion regional solutionsto regional problems such as the creation of 'zones of peace'.Muthiah Alagappa states:The new momentum underscoring the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the support of the major powersfor this process may also give a boost to regional effort inother parts of the globe. ...Their place in the emergingstructure for the maintenance of international peace and securitywould be a function of their effectiveness in the prevention andresolution of regional conflicts, and in the enhancement ofnational security of the states in the region (Alagappa, 1991:1).Acharya also mentions the fact that the role of regionalcooperative arrangements is worth investigating "as the worldsearches for effective arrangements... to provide security andstability in the post-Cold War environment"(1992a: 19).(16) Buzan states: "building stronger states is virtually the only way in whichthe vicious circle of unstable states and an unstable security environment can bebroken" (Suzan, 1988b: 40).26Neorealists do not frequently discuss the creation and theeffectiveness of regional security arrangements. One couldnevertheless make the case that in certain situations, they wouldconsider this strategy as rational. A neorealist such as Barry Buzanhas indeed acknowledged the existence and the relative effectivenessof regional security cooperation (Buzan, 1986; 1991a; 1992). But heemphasizes that conflict management among states in regionalorganizations such as the Arab League, the OAS and the OAU was due tothe common front they were building against an outside state: Israelfor the Arab League, Cuba for the OAS, South Africa for the OAU. Thesame argument has been put forward for sub-regional organizationssuch as ASEAN, the GCC, the SADCC and the OECS (17). Thusregional/subregional cooperation is to be explained by conflicts.Indeed, neorealists usually hold that, particularly in the securityarena, "cooperation is rare, because states act autonomously andself-help is the rule... Since realists hold that states cooperateonly to deal with a common threat, they see cooperation, whenmanifest, as temporary or inconsequential and ultimately explained byconflict" (Stein, 1990: 6 -- emphasis added).This thesis contends that the neorealist perspective on regionalcooperation may be undermined. In some cases, regional cooperationmay be explained by mutual interest in avoiding war, by a sharedperception that war is not a viable instrument of policy - namely bya nonrealist, liberal theory.(17) Indochina for ASEAN, Iran for the GCC, South Africa for the SADCC and Cubafor the OECS: see Tow, 1990b: Liberal motivations for cooperationLiberals hold that cooperation is based on mutual interestsrather than conflict, and that consequently, cooperation is moresignificant than neorealists argue (18): cooperation may promotesubstantive progress in international relations. This thesis arguesthat motivations for regional cooperation may be better explained byliberal rather than neorealist theory. Indeed, some developingcountries, absorbed with economic development, are not willing tocontemplate the cost of resorting to war in order to solveemerging/reemerging conflicts. Some peripheral countries place moreemphasis on economic growth rather than on pure military power: theyare consequently willing to create an international environment proneto peaceful change rather than to armed conflicts. On this basis,they have developed a mutual interest in cooperating in the securityfield. Thus, following neofunctionalist assumptions, states'interests in cooperation in the economic arena has led to a spill-over into other areas of cooperation involving high politics ofsecurity. The emmeshing of states, the promotion of dialogue andcommunication has fostered states' interests in ruling out the use ofwar as a useful instrument of foreign policy.The central purpose of this thesis is to set forth the hypothesisthat regional cooperation among some peripheral states in the post-Cold War era may be better explained by liberalism rather than byneorealism, and to test this hypothesis by examining the motivations(18) "For neo-realists, mutual interests do not have a major impact... becausethere are serious obstacles to cooperation in an anarchic system... Mainstreamliberals... diverge from neorealists in their belief that mutual interests haveimportant impacts on international outcomes - particularly cooperation" (Zacherand Matthew, 1992: 9).28for cooperating among states of the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN). The hypothesis put forward holds that if liberaltheory helps better in understanding peripheral states' behavior, weshould then be able to find evidence that states have reduced theircommitment to war as an instrument of policy. The development ofthese perceptions concerning the use of war among some peripheralstates will have an important impact on the stability of theirinternational environment. While in the post-Cold War era,international relations in the periphery will be far from free ofconflict, cooperation on security issues among some peripheral stateswill alleviate the deleterious impact of the end of the Cold War.Thus the neorealist paradigm will prove to be too pessimistic andwill not help us explain the full-range of security behavior in theperiphery in the post-Cold War era. The case of ASEAN is relevantbecause the neorealist discourse is usually put forward to accountfor its creation, its rationale and its post-Cold War future (19).Neorealists argue that ASEAN was created in the midst of the Cold Warin Southeast Asia (1967), and that it found its real raison d'etre inthe common resistance to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia inDecember 1978. The common opposition to this communist menace inSoutheast Asia provided the main ground on which the member statesmuted their bilateral disputes, cooperated and contributed to the(19) This argument has been posited in the Western European case after the end ofthe Cold War: the Soviet/communist enemy that, argue the neorealists, fosteredcooperation among some states was gradually disappearing. They indeed argue thatcooperation among Western European states was due to the common opposition to theEastern bloc and that the disintegration of bipolarity will dissolve the existenceof common interests and will result in the reemergence of all the instabilityassociated with the interwar period (Mearsheimer, 1990). The Cold War certainlyheavily contributed to the development of a sense of community among Westernstates; but the end of the Cold War will not bring a return to the older patterns.29creation of a quasi-'pluralistic security community'. Neorealistshave pointed out that this sub-regional security cooperation, beingthe sole product of intraregional stress, will last only as long asthere is a common enemy (Ayoob, 1986: 18-19; and "Comments" by S.D.Muni, ibid.: 31-32). Thus today, with the withdrawal of Vietnam fromCambodia, the continued viability of the organization cannot be takenfor granted. Unless ASEAN states find a new common enemy, intra-ASEANsecurity cooperation will be jeopardized (Acharya, 1991: 176). Theneorealist perspective on security cooperation among ASEAN states inthe post-Cold War era raises an important theoretical question: is acommon enemy required for the creation and maintenance of cooperation? In this thesis, we will attempt to answer this theoretical questionby examining the current debate on ASEAN security cooperation and itsfuture relevance in the post-Cold War era. In the next chapter, wewill present in detail the neorealist perspective on the Association- namely that ASEAN as a quasi-'security community', will not standwithout a common external threat. We will then underline thelimitations of this thesis and argue that, while ASEAN as a quasi-'security community' has been created and maintained thanks to thecommon communist enemy, motivations for security cooperation havechanged. Habits of cooperation as well as mutual interests inavoiding war have developed, so that ASEAN today is giving priorityto cooperation and to the strengthening of peaceful change in theAssociation. This thesis thus contends that the ASEAN case studyprovides ground to water down the pessimistic prospect thatneorealists put forward for peripheral states' stability in the post-Cold War era.30CHAPTER 3 : THE NEOREALIST DISCOURSE ON ASEANThis chapter deals with the neorealist discourse on ASEAN - ie.the neorealist interpretation of ASEAN's raison d'etre, achievementsand, above all, of ASEAN's future. The neorealist discourse on theAssociation emphasizes the fact that its creation, its rationale andits success were primarily due to the existence of a common communistthreat. It is the common opposition to the communist menace thatenabled ASEAN to cooperate and to become a quasi-'securitycommunity'. The neorealist discourse on the Association emphasizesthe fact that until the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December1978, ASEAN was rather lethargic; the perception of a communistexternal threat enabled its member states to mute bilateral tensionsand to cooperate in the military-security arena. Today, with theAssociation's common enemy fading, neorealists argue that ASEAN'sfuture as a 'security community' is rather uncertain: the loss of itscommon external threat will undermine ASEAN's internal cohesion.In analyzing this argument, we will devote the first section toASEAN's security environment, with an emphasis on the new challengesASEAN members face in the post-Cold War/post-Cambodia era - namelypotential regional hegemons. According to the neorealist hypotheses,states face two options to balance a real or perceived hegemon:forming a military alliance or resorting to a self-help strategy. Thesecond section will assess the relevance and the likelihood of anASEAN military alliance. The third section will present theneorealist argument that ASEAN countries are actually resorting to aself-help strategy. Neorealists argue that unless a new impetus forASEAN cohesion is found when the Cambodian war is resolved, these31capabilities could be construed as mutually threatening. By creatingintra-ASEAN security dilemmas, this self-help strategy shouldjeopardize intra-ASEAN security cooperation and the creation of anASEAN 'security community'.3.1: ASEAN in the post-Cold War era: changes in the regional balanceof powerNeorealists view the post-Cold War changes in the securityenvironment of ASEAN in terms of distribution of capabilities andbalance of power. They indeed posit that the distribution ofcapabilities, which determines the stability of the system, is theonly major aspect of international relations that varies. Theycontend that the disappearance of the bipolar structure and thewithdrawal of the superpowers from their commitments abroad willresult in a diffusion of power. This diffusion of power, as in thecase of Southeast Asia, will lead potential regional hegemons toplay a more active and destabilizing role. Some ASEAN political andmilitary leaders indeed perceive their security environment in suchneorealist terms.3.1.1: Diffusion of power in Asia-Pacific The neorealist discourse on the post-Cold War Southeast Asiansecurity environment stresses that the general diffusion of powerwill bring more instability. This pessimism does not hinge directlyon Waltz's argument that a bipolar balance is more stable than amultipolar one: since the 1960s, the polarity in Asia-Pacific wasmore triangular than bipolar. It rather stems from the variant of32neorealism which contends that a hegemonic power - the United States- provides stability (Gilpin, 1981). This variant derives from theHegemonic Stability Theory. Although fashioned in an internationalpolitical economy context, this theory is relevant for securityissues. At its simplest, it holds that a stable internationalsecurity system requires a hegemonic state that establishes andunderwrites the principle of stability/order. Thus, the demise of thehegemon will result in increased instability.Indeed, the most important fact for the future of the SoutheastAsian security environment is the perception that the US, a hegemonicpower in relative decline, is gradually lowering its commitments tothe region. On the positive side, the end of the Cold War has removedmuch of what had been the 'overlay' of US-China-USSR competition ontoSoutheast Asia: it has thus alleviated smaller states' concerns overthe domination of their foreign and defense policies by great powers.On the other hand, the Cold War's demise also means that the securitysurplus that superpowers' involvement generated for their regionalclients is being progressively reduced.The US has certainly reaffirmed its continued military commitmentto its allies - albeit at lower force levels -, but US officialsappear unable to clearly articulate what the future US role in theregion will encompass - other than using vague expressions such as'regional balancing wheel'. The Cold War rationale for a US forwardpresence and for US alliances in the region has lost its relevance.The need for permanent American bases in the region has declined: theUS is withdrawing from the Philippine bases after the PhilippineSenate's September 1991 decision not to extend the bases agreement.33Finally, the US is increasingly pressuring its regional allies forgreater 'burden sharing' (Tow, 1991). These developments only serveto confirm the perception that the US as an external securityguarantor is unreliable. It is true that the US continues to haveconsiderable economic interests in the region; yet, in spite of themassive deployment in the Middle East in response to the Iraqiinvasion, it is unlikely to physically intervene in any substantiveway in conflicts in Southeast Asia, especially if it involves othermajor regional powers (Alagappa, 1991b: 14).The perception of a US withdrawal from the region has generatedcomments concerning a consequent 'power vacuum' which could temptaspiring regional hegemons into expansionist maritime policies.Singapore has contended that any significant cut in US militaryforces in the region would lead to "potentially destabilizing changesin the regional balance of power, one which may lead to othersignificant powers playing a more active role in the region" (20).Indeed, as a result of this more diffuse polarity, the "dominantplayer" role that the US used to play in Asia is increasingly beingexternally challenged by aspiring regional hegemons (Tow, 1991).3.1.2: The potential regional hegemons: China, Japan and India Scholars are pointing to the potential emergence of threeregional hegemons with expansionist maritime activities: India, Chinaand Japan. India is indeed usually mentioned as being an aspiringregional leader, but China and Japan are the ones who create mostconcerns.(20) Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), 24 February 1990.34In this transitional period of changing geopolitical complexionin Asia, perceptions and images are crucial - all the more since, inmost instances, it remains difficult to distinguish between friendand foe. Hence the general tendency to interpret one's neighbours'arms acquisitions as threatening. This tendency is particularlysignificant among ASEAN countries which, located at the crossroads ofChina's, Japan's and India's claimed spheres of influence, dreadbeing the target of their contradictory ambitions (Bilveer, 1989).The head of Indonesia's National Defence Institute has warned thatSoutheast Asia could become the scene of "unavoidable maritimeconflicts in view of the emergence of ... India and Japan ... asworld maritime powers" (21). The three potential regional hegemonsare perceived to be enhancing their power-projection capability tofill the 'power vacuum' in the Southeast Asian region (22). Theirnavies are indeed classified as building a "medium regional forceprojection" - i.e. an "ability to project force into the adjoiningocean basin" (Grove, 1990: 238).IndiaASEAN's concerns about India are recent. They stem from theinevitable disengagement of foreign maritime powers from the IndianOcean, which is likely to promote India as a regional policeman. In aspeech in 1989, Singapore's ex-Defence Minister, Lee Hsien Loongadmitted to be deeply concerned when a retired Deputy Chief of theIndian Army A. K. Sinha declared: "India has to be the dominant(21) Straits Times, 24 August 1989.(22) R. Tilman's book remains the most in-depth study of ASEAN perceptions ofexternal threats (1987).35military power between the Suez Canal and Singapore" (23). Recentdevelopments show indeed New Delhi's regional ambition.First, India's arms acquisition and build-up of naval and airforces on the Nicobar and Andaman islands are fuelling the worries ofASEAN countries. Indeed, these two bases put India within strikingdistance of the Straits of Malacca (one of Singapore's vitallifelines), and would allow India to dominate its northern approach.Second, Thailand and India have competing claims over the delineationof economic zones off Thailand's West coast, where mineral depositshave been discovered. As an Indian scholar argues, India believesthat "future international conflicts in the developing world will beover the mastery of natural resources, particularly in ocean beds.Having a "pioneer status" for deep sea mining, it believes it shouldhave a voice in determining the allocation of these resources"(Majeed, 1990: 1094). Third, the dialogue engaged with Vietnam overthe use of Cam Ranh Bay captured Bangkok's attention (24). Finally,Kuala Lumpur fears that India might use the presence of an Indianminority in Malaysia's population as a pretext for intervening inMalaysia's domestic affairs: in 1986, New Delhi sent a Godavarifrigate off Aden to protect the local Indians during the coup d'Etat(Ayoob, 1990).ChinaASEAN members' fear of China is not new, and stemmed from thehistorical support of overseas revolutionary movements. But Beijing(23) Age (Australia), 5/03/88. The propensity of New-Delhi to take on the role ofregional policeman has already been demonstrated in Sri Lanka in 1987-89 and inthe Maldives in November 1988.(24) Asian Defence Journal, October 1990, p. 111; see also G. Till (1990).36has long ago disawoved its policy, facilitating the end of insurgencyin Malaysia in 1990. Today, China is perceived by its Southeast Asianneighbours as a potential external threat. The removal of Americanand Soviet bases in Southeast Asia gives China a 'freer' hand and itwill be at liberty to address its relations with countries inSoutheast Asia unencumbered by other considerations.China's power is indeed dramatically increasing with the on-goingretreat of the US and of the USSR fleets from the region. Moreover,China is forming initiatives that are worrisome to ASEAN countries.Beijing is multiplying its efforts to develop a blue-water navy andto improve its amphibious assault and air-borne forces. China isnotably purchasing an air-to-air refuelling capability geared toextending the range and combat time of its aircrafts. The possiblepurchase of an aircraft carrier from Russia has also been reported:G. Segal argue that "the introduction of aircrafts carriers into EastAsia would be a major change in the (regional) strategic balance"(25). This military build-up is perceived as being part of China'sstrategy to dominate the South China Sea (26). An airbase is indeedalready nearing completion on Woody Island (Paracels), which willenable China to extend its power projection deep into the South ChinaSea, reinforcing any operation in the area by its warships andmarines (27).The recent discoveries and projection of potential oil, gas and(25) New York Times, 7 June 1992.(26) One may note that, out of the three fleets China has (South, Center, North),the South China fleet is the most modern and the most important as far asamphibious might is concerned.(27) "Wary of China, Southeast Asia Upgrades Maritime Defences", International Herald Tribune, 19 December 1990.37mineral deposits in the unhabited islets of the South China Sea (theSpratlys) have indeed fuelled a dispute over their acquisition. Chinahas claimed "indisputable sovereignty" over them. Its naval forcesseized several of the disputed islands from Vietnam in a brief clashin 1988, and have since expanded its military occupation to sevenatolls. Chinese troops have been placed in positions of potentialconflict with soldiers from Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines whooccupy other islands (28). Recently, the Chinese government hassigned an oil exploration contract with an American company, CrestoneEnergy Corporation; it has pledged that it will use its navy to backthe company (29).Some analysts argue that ASEAN countries may be overestimatingChina's power, given its fiscal constraints and given the priority ithas assigned to economic development (30). Moreover, in the shortterm, China's priority is to achieve better relations with ASEANcountries as well as with Vietnam. This friendly diplomatic stanceBeijing has recently adopted towards ASEAN countries has enabled itto normalize its relations with Singapore and Indonesia and to engagein mutually beneficial economic relations. But it remains that itsvery recent aggressive move to take control of disputed territory inthe South China Sea is perceived as extremely worrying for ASEAN(28) Vietnam has garrisons on 24 islands and atolls, the Philippines, eight andMalaysia three. So far ownership has largely been enforced ipso facto, whichprovides an incentive for the claimant states to incrementally deploy theiroccupational forces. Moreover, the PRC's voting behaviour on the Persian Gulfcrisis is being interpreted by some ASEAN members as China's reserving its rightto use force to settle territorial disputes.(29)New York Times, 18 June 1992.(30) The suspension of China's plans to build its first aircraft carrier is citedas an example of fiscal constraint that limits its effort to modernise the armedforces: R. Karniol, 1990: 33.38states who also claim some of those islands.JapanJapan's steady military build-up over the last decade gives itnumber-three status after the Soviet Union and the US in terms ofnational military expenditures. Japanese defence spending isincreasing by an average of 5 percent per year, which reflects acommitment to steadily modernise Japan's Self-Defence Force (31).Besides, Japan is progressively asserting its regional role: witnessthe talks of making exceptions to the limit of 1000 miles on navaloperations (which would overlap with ASEAN's strategic perimeter).This increased regional role stems from purely defensive purposes: itcomes primarily from Japan's security concern over safety ofnavigation of its lines of supply and unhampered access to themarkets and raw material in the region.But most ASEAN countries remain highly sensitive to the Japaneseincreased regional assertion and have difficulties in distinguishingdefensive from offensive actions. Apprehensions over a "militantJapan" have been voiced by ASEAN members after Prime MinisterChatichai Choonavan's proposal, in May 1990, of Thai-Japanese jointmilitary exercises in Southeast Asian waters (Sudo, 1991: 37).Singapore has also boldly expressed its worry after the passage ofthe peacekeeping bill allowing Japan to play a limited role ininternational peacekeeping operations (32). But ASEAN's perceptionof a real Japanese offensive threat hinges primarily on the burden-sharing talks with the US, on the future of the security treaty with(31) On Japanese recent military acquisitions, Mack, 1992: 3-5.(32) Nayan Chanda, "Why They Worry", FEER, 25 June 1992: 18.39the US. The crucial question for ASEAN countries remains: will Japanbe a supplement to a reduced US presence or an alternative to anAmerican presence (33) ? A US withdrawal from Japan would cause theJapanese to rearm on a massive scale: Japan would indeed seek tonormalize its defence posture to compensate for the loss of Americanprojection forces. Among others, A. Mack contends that Japan doesnot have an interest in rearming, given the potential security andeconomic disruption it could entail (Mack, 1992: 10-11; see alsoAlagappa, 1991b: 15-16). "But arguments against the resurgent Japanthesis, while compelling, miss the point. Regional defence plannersdo worry about the 'worst case' of US withdrawal and possibleconsequent reemergence of Japanese militarism" (Mack, 1992: 11).In conclusion, ASEAN states perceive the end of the Cold War andthe growing regional multipolarity as increasing regionalinstability. This change in regional balance-of-power is raising deepconcerns among ASEAN members. Despite professing non-alignment,regional autonomy and self-reliance as long-term objectives, ASEANcountries thus continue to value their external security linkages.Thailand and Singapore have been committed to a balance-of-powerapproach. They have been firm advocates of a continued US presence inthe Philippines. Singapore signed an agreement with the United Statesfor the use of Singaporean military facilities (Buzynski, 1990) (34);Thailand hailed Singapore's offer of facilities to the US as"something that could preserve regional security in terms of greater(33) Interestingly, A. Mack points to the differences in the perception by theirneighbours of a potential Japanese and German rearmament (Mack, 1992: 10-11).(34) "Whistling up a Storm", FEER, 31 August 1989: 9.40balance of power" (35). Brunei's recent offer of military facilitiesto the US further underscores the continuing emphasis on outsidesecurity guarantees (Acharya, 1991: 172). Other ASEAN members, whilemaintaining a public position of non-commitment, have privatelyendorsed those proposals (36).Regional powers perceived as having hegemonistic ambitions arethus taking up where the communist threat left off. This fear was,according to neorealists, ASEAN's cooperation rationale in the 1980s.Neorealists thus argue that ASEAN post-Cambodia should consider thenew external threats as the rationale for ASEAN's securitycooperation: it should, in a classic neorealist balance-of-powerpattern, form a military alliance in order to balance China's,Japan's and India's increasing power.3.2: Calls for a military allianceTalks and official proposals for an ASEAN military alliance haveincreased since the end of the 1980s. However, a closer analysis ofASEAN states' military capabilities as well as their security needsshows that their implementation seems rather unlikely.3.2.1: Proposals and reactions (35) Straits Times, 6 August 1989. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed inNovember 1990.(36) Malaysia, officially committed to the ZOPFAN concept (Zone of Peace Freedomand Neutrality) which strongly advocates regional autonomy, has also signed anagreement with the US for the use of Malaysian facilities, FEER, 14 May 1992: 14.Indonesia has also ackowledged base use. It is interesting to note that each ASEANmember is individually developing links of assurance with the US, but theycontinue rejecting the SEATO-type alliance (see Acharya, 1992a).41Given the changing geopolitical environment, calls for a militaryalliance have multiplied: in May 1989, the former foreign minister ofMalaysia, Abu Hassan Omar, called on the countries of ASEAN to form a"Defence Community" which would take them to "new heights ofpolitical and military cooperation" (37). Although he did not providemuch detail on what the concept of 'defence community' meant, it hasbeen interpreted as a call for the formation of a military pact (38).Singapore has expressed the hope that "firm and strong bilateral tieswill provide the foundation for multilateral cooperation" (39). InMarch 1991, the Philippines also suggested that ASEAN should form aregional security alliance (Acharya, 1992a: 13). The renewed idea ofan ASEAN military alliance is designed to enable ASEAN states topresent a common military front against an outside aggressor, tocreate a balance of power to counter potential regional hegemons. Asdiscussed earlier, balance-of-power worries have been expressed byASEAN officials; as the former foreign minister of Indonesia, MochtarKusumaatmadja, states, an ASEAN military alliance could be anecessary response to "fill the security vacuum after the US leavesthe region" (40).The issue is not new. Different proposals were made in the 1970s,but did not find support from decision makers in the ASEAN states. Inthe post-Cold War era, however, ASEAN policy-makers could haverethought their options for military-security cooperation. Between(37) Straits Times, 5 May 1989.(38) A. Acharya distinguishes two approaches to an ASEAN 'defence community': aminimalist one, which involves regional self-sufficiency in arms manufacturing andweapon standardization; and the maximalist one, which encompasses a military pact(Acharya, 1991: 169-172).(39) Straits Times, 23 March 1989.(40) Cited by Acharya, 1991: 171. Straits Times, 22 August 1989.421989 and 1992, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have eachconvened conferences to explore regional security alternatives forthe 1990s. None of them has advocated an ASEAN military pact.Singapore's General Winston Choo has denied "any intention (among theASEAN states) to move towards a defence pact", while Indonesia'sGeneral Try Sutrisno has contended that "without a military pact...(the ASEAN states) can cooperate more flexibly" (41). More recently,former Malaysian foreign minister Ghazali Shafie said, after an ASEANmeeting, that "what emerged was that ASEAN itself must not be turnedinto a military alliance" (42). Above all, strong opposition to suchan alliance by Indonesia - the de facto leader of ASEAN - makes ithighly unlikely to be implemented. In March 1991, Indonesia's foreignminister All Alatas rejected the suggestion made by the Philippines.He argued that ASEAN "should remain true to its essence and that iseconomic, social, cultural and even now political cooperation, butnot a defence pact" (43).ASEAN's proposed alternative to the calls for a military pactlies in the strengthening of bilateral military ties.ASEAN members debated the issue (of a military alliance) on theeve of the first ASEAN summit held in Bali in 1976 but rejectedthe alliance option. Instead, the Declaration of ASEAN Concordendorsed existing bilateral military ties by calling for thecontinuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between memberstates in security matters (Acharya, 1991: 163).The rapid evolution of these bilateral military-security ties hasled to the emergence of what the chief of Indonesia's armed forces(41) Sunday Times (Singapore), 26 November 1989; "Is ASEAN Turning into a MilitaryPact?", Asian Defence Journal, no. 5 (1989): 113.(42) Asahi Evening News, 8 June 1991.(43) Straits Times, 29 March 1991.43has described as an 'ASEAN defence spider web' (44). These militaryties address external threats to regional security, as well asmeasures to enhance the long-term self-reliance of ASEAN members(45). Although army exercises initially formed a small part of thosebilateral links, recent trends point to an increase. The chiefpurpose of these exercises are to develop joint operationalprocedures and doctrine, which in turn would facilitate a commonresponse in times of crisis. It is indeed claimed that thosebilateral exercises could be geared to provide a common response toan external threat. Expectations of reciprocal help to be activatedat the time of a threat is indeed one aspect of intra-ASEAN military-security cooperation, "but this is largely a declaratory commitmentand not a formal obligation as in the case of alliance" (Acharya,1992a: 17). Thus, the rejection of a military alliance means thatsecurity collaboration will remain bilateral and confined to adjacentstates who perceive common security challenges. "Thus some ASEANanalysts' hopes for an overarching regional defense arrangement seemill conceived. The localization of security implies multiple,smaller, parallel arrangements" (Simon, 1992: 4). The end of the ColdWar will lead to the subregionalization of security arrangements inSoutheast Asia.3.2.2: The unlikelihood of an ASEAN military alliance: explanations (44) Tai Ming Cheung, "Shoulder to Shoulder: ASEAN Members Stregthen DefenceTies", FEER 22 March 1990, p. 25. On the nature and form of this cooperation, seeAcharya, 1991: 164-168 and 1992a: 13-14; Simon, 1992: 17-18.(45) These measures include joint exercises, training, cooperation in armsmanufacturing and exchange of senior level personnel for familiarization with eachother's military establishment.44The resistance to greater military integration has often beenexplained by the ASEAN members' lack of political will to create amilitary alliance (Acharya, 1992a: 12). However, reasons for such aresistance are more numerous and more complex.Since its creation, ASEAN states have officially refused to forma military pact on the grounds that such an option could "intensifyideology-based polarization and conflicts within Southeast Asia,encourage the big powers to initiate preemtive counteraction andprevent ASEAN from pursuing with undiluted vigour and freedom ofaction its vision of full regional stability and economic self-sufficiency" (46). Regional concerns might indeed have explainedASEAN's resistance; however, Acharya points more convincingly to thefundamental reason of ASEAN's rejection:Given that sources of interstate conflict in Southeast Asia wereclosely linked to the domestic political stability of theregional actors, any rationale for a military pact... had to beconceived by ASEAN leaders in its utility in serving internallegitimacy and stability. Alliances are a strategy aimed atresponding to the threat of a military attack by an externalaggressor. In the case of ASEAN, however, security perceptionsof the enemy was primarily internal. Both the Communistinsurgencies, which confronted all member states and ethnicseparatist movement (especially in Thailand, Philippines andIndonesia) destabilized the ruling regimes (1991: 161).ASEAN states' political leaders had a primarily inward-lookingconception of security, based on the perception that nationalsecurity lies not in military alliances but in self-reliance derivingfrom domestic factors such as economic and social development, aswell as political stability (47). Their legitimacy depended on the(46) Fidel Ramos (the then defence secretary of the Philippines), Sunday Times (Singapore), 26 November 1989 - quoted by Acharya, 1992a: 169.(47) The concept of 'comprehensive security' was ASEAN countries' basis of theirnational security doctrines. The New Order regime of President Suharto ofIndonesia interpreted this concept and advanced the doctrine of 'national45promotion of economic development and ensuring a stable regionalenvironment that could foster economic cooperation. Thus, theneorealist logic could not account for ASEAN's rationale (48).In the post-Cold War era, domestic insurrections have virtuallydisappeared, with the exception of the Philippines; similarly, ethnicseparatists have also been defeated, again with the exception of theMoro rebellion in the Southern Philippines. The growing recognitionof conventional threats (Acharya, 1988), as well as the changes inregional balance of power could have led ASEAN leaders to rethinktheir security options. Yet today, the neorealist logic that pointsto the relevance of a military alliance still does not stand. ASEANstates continue to reject a military alliance because of its lack ofcredibility, and because of their differing threat perceptions.The concept of an ASEAN military alliance deterrent againstaggression remains far from credible. A military alliance among weakpowers would have little military utility. As the chief of staff ofMalaysian Defence Forces put it: "in terms of deterrence value, it isvery doubtful if an ASEAN alliance would really deter any would beagressor... To achieve deterrence ASEAN will have to form an alliancewith one of the superpowers" (49). Indeed, no ASEAN country sees anindigenous ASEAN security arrangement as a substitute for itsresilience'. 'Regional resilience' would result as a sum total of nationalresilience in individual ASEAN states: it was adopted as the ASEAN motto by othermembers of the grouping. On ASEAN's interpretations of the concept of'comprehensive security', see Alagappa, 1988. On the inward-looking securityperception of ASEAN states, Tilman, 1987; Ayoob and Samudavanija, 1987.(48) This specific point will be discussed more deeply in the next chapter.(49) Address by General Hashim Mohammed Ali, 29 November 1989, published in ISISFocus, no. 58 (January 1990), p. 41. Cited by Acharya, (1991: 172). However, itmust be noted that ASEAN has always rejected a SEATO-type military alliance withan external power: on this point, see Acharya, 1992a: 7-8 and 15-16.46security linkages with external powers. Acharya argues that "despitedoubts over the credibility of the Western security commitments inthe region, all ASEAN countries except Indonesia remain tied to suchcommitments" (1991: 172). Thailand has consolidated its securityrelationship with China in response to the perceived US withdrawalfrom the region; Malaysia and Singapore, besides the recentarrangements signed with the US, have tried to reinvigorate the FivePower Defense Arrangements (FPDA) (50). Indeed, the most effectivemilitary exercises by ASEAN militaries are not the one conductedexclusively among its members but rather in collaboration withoutsiders. Thus, ASEAN members perceive the continued maintenance ofa regional balance of power conducive to their security interests asbeing contingent on a strong external input. Security cannot bedeveloped through a sole sub-regional military alliance.The creation of a military alliance would also require theemergence of a common major external threat to cement the ASEANcountries. However, such a requirement is not fulfilled, as ASEANstates' threat perceptions do not converge. A balance-of-power wouldonly operate if ASEAN states perceived a common threat, one regionalhegemon with expansionist ambitions. Yet ASEAN countries' threatperceptions have always diverged. During the Cold War, they disagreedon the question of Vietnam or China as being the major threat.Malaysia and Indonesia, viewing China as the long-term threat to theregion, sought accomodation with Hanoi which was seen by them as acounterweight to Chinese expansionism in the region. Singapore and,(50) The FDPA includes Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and GreatBritain.47until recently, Thailand took a more hardline stance against Vietnamand developed a strategic partnership with China in its bid tocontain Vietnamese advance into Cambodia (Leifer, 1989). Thisdivergence in threat perception is today clearly indicated by theirdisagreements over the resolution of the Cambodian conflict.Similarly, ASEAN countries currently have differing threatperceptions as far as potential regional hegemons are concerned:India is feared by Thailand and Malaysia, China primarily by Malaysiaand Indonesia, and Japan by all of them except for Thailand (51).These facts show that the military alliance option offered by theneorealist paradigm is not likely in the ASEAN case. ASEAN stateswill thus, argue the neorealists, resort to a self-help strategy -namely increase their military capabilities in order to deter/counterpotential regional hegemons.3.3: Self-help strategy: ASEAN's military build-upGiven the fact that a military alliance will not make up for thereduction of external security guarantees, ASEAN member states haveresorted to the other option the neorealist paradigm offers tobalance a potential hegemon: the self-help strategy. Hence the recentand sudden military build-up among ASEAN states, after a decade ofreduction in defense spending. We will first analyze the scope andcharacteristics of this build-up. We will then present the neorealist(51) Differences in a Japanese threat perception among ASEAN countries hinges ontheir own historical experience with the Japanese occupation during WWII. Forinstance, Thailand, who never came under Japanese occupation, was satisfied withJapan's participation in peacekeeping operations (FEER, 25 June 1992: 18). Witnessalso the different reactions to the Thai proposal in 1990 of Japanese-Thai jointmilitary exercises in South China Sea (Sudo, 1991: 337).48argument that this self-help strategy should create security dilemmasamong ASEAN states and that the consequent mutual distrust shouldundermine the conventional idea of ASEAN being a 'securitycommunity'.3.3.1: Scope and characteristics In the words of Singapore's Defence Minister Yeo Ning Hong, "nocountry in Southeast Asia is overjoyed with the reduction in USpresence. None of them has declared a peace dividend. No one hasreduced its defence expenditure" (52). In fact, all of them areincreasing their defence spending. After a peak around 1982, defenceexpenditures decreased in most ASEAN countries. This was a result ofboth strategic and economic changes: a more sanguine outlook onVietnamese capabilities and intentions; the reinvigorated Americanpresence in Southeast Asia under the Reagan administration; and theoil and commodity price falls in 1983-85 that hit several of theASEAN states.But the 1991 estimations display a general and sudden rise indefence budgets. Thailand, which has been ruled since February 1991by a military junta, announced a 13.5 percent increase in defencespending: this increase lead Sukhumband Paribatra, a Southeast Asianspecialist, to affirm that Thailand was in the midst of "the largestarms procurement program in the kingdom's history" (53). In 1990s,Thailand spent US$ 1.7 billion on weapons' acquisition, more than anyother ASEAN member (Simon, 1992: 8). The Malaysian government in June(52) The Guardian Weekly, March 15, 1992, p. 17.(53) The Guardian Weekly, March 15, 1992, p. 17.491991 said it would allocate M$6 billion - or 11 percent of governmentrevenue - for the armed forces in its 1991-95 development plan,compared to M$1.5 billion in the previous plan (54). Singapore, whichalready possesses an important and sophisticated army, plans a 5 to 6percent increase in defence spending annually for at least the nextfive years. Similar upward jumps are also planned by the remaindermember countries.Several factors will further encourage this trend in the years tocome. The economic recovery of the region will enable ASEAN states toabsorb the cost of such a build-up (55). 'Supplier pressures' willalso favour an increase in defence expenditures: arms reduction inEurope will bring declining prices of advanced weapons and aplentiful supply of surplus European arms. This will enable ASEANcountries to enhance their arsenal cost-effectively (56).In terms of characteristics of this build-up, ASEAN countries areshifting from an arms procurement strategy aimed at domesticcounterinsurgency to a strategy aimed at countering external threats,as indicated by the purchase of conventional and modern militaryhardware with offensive capability (Acharya, 1988; Weatherbee, 1989).Recently, they have sought to extend the reach of their armed forcesbeyond their borders, stressing the upgrading of their naval(54) Most of the funds are intended to go towards purchasing weapons from Britainunder a multi-billion dollar Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1988: FEER, 7November 1991, p. 53.(55) During the last years of the 1980s, the economic growth of Thailand, Malaysiaand to a certain extend Indonesia has been on average over 8.5 percent per annum(12 percent in the case of Thailand).(56) As indicated by Bangkok's procurement of 650 surplus M60 and M48 tanks fromthe US at 5 percent of market rates (Um, 1991: 266).50capability: all of them have recently put more emphasis on maritimepatrol and reconnaissance aircraft.Thailand was until recently mainly concerned by land-basedattacks by Vietnam through the Kampuchean border, given that theVietnamese navy was rather weak. Indicative of Thailand's mainlandstrategy for the 1990s of turning Indochina from a battlefield into amarketplace is the armed forces emphasis on maritime threats to thecountry's eastern and southern seaboards. Much of Bangkok'sexpenditures on aircraft and ships is being justified as necessary toprotect Thailand's EEZ which covers both the Andaman Sea and the Gulfof Thailand. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has notably submitted a $1-billion plan for defending the eastern seaboard, hitherto neglected(Young, 1990: 68) (57).Malaysia also intends to upgrade the capabilities of the RoyalMalaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). SinceMalaysia's independence (1957), the Army has dominated the MAFbecause of the primarily domestic land-based threats. In the late1970s-80s, Kuala Lumpur has put more emphasis on its navy and airforce; its current intent is to enlarge its capability so as todevelop a blue-water defence force (Stubbs, 1991). Thus Malaysiasigned a Memorandum of Understanding with Britain in September 1988designed to improve its air and maritime capabilities. Moreover, in1989, it was announced that the RMAF would transform a former British(57) The navy will receive coast-to-sea missiles and medium patrol boats as partof the east coast defence program (Um, 1991: 265). Bangkok is also seeking toincrease combat capabilities by establishing a naval airwing, which would provideconcerted operation with the surface fleet. Enhanced air security over the Gulf ofThailand would require the acquisition of advanced radar equipment: Thailand hasexpressed interest in the Grumman E2C Hawkeye early warning system already inservice in Singapore (Simon, 1992: 8).51air force base along the East border into the largest and mostsophisticated Malaysian air base (58). A new naval base is also beingconstructed on the East Coast (Kota Kinabalu), expected to be themain staging base for operations into the South China Sea (59).In March 1990, the head of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)disclosed that Singapore would be acquiring aircrafts specificallyequipped for maritime patrol and surveillance functions. They willenable Singapore to improve its early warning system and detectpotential threats further afield (Da Cunha, 1991).Even Indonesia, despite severe budget constraints, plans onpurchasing 30 maritime patrol aircraft and is talking about moreacquisitions. And the Philippines, who have always had a relativelylow defence budget focused primarily on domestic counterinsurgencywarfare, have drawn up a ten-year modernization program, whichdisplays a significant change in threat perceptions. This planinvolves an initial four-fold increase in the navy's procurement andmaintenance budget to some $80 million annually over the next twoyears. The air force is also due to upgrade its maritime patrolcapabilities (Karniol, 1991: 35).The characteristics of the on-going military build-up clearlyshow that ASEAN states are pursuing a self-help strategy in trying tobalance potential regional hegemons with perceived expansionistmaritime policies. One can doubt, however, that this strategy willenable ASEAN countries to deter any of the three potential hegemons;(58) Straits Times, 5 June 1989, p. 18.(59) In June 1991, the RMN opted to purchase British missile-corvettes which willbe deployed in the South China Sea, and will supply and defend Malaysia'spositions on three island in the Spratlys (Simon, 1992: 10-11).52at most, they would make them pay a slightly higher cost if theyattacked. It remains that, as discussed above, ASEAN's concerns withpotential threats arising from its maritime and wider geopoliticalenvironment provide the official justification for this militarybuild-up. Regional powers perceived as having hegemonistic ambitionsare taking up where the Soviet threat left off, in helping to fuel adefence build-up among ASEAN countries. Yet, evidence also shows thatASEAN states' military build-ups are carried out with a view to thelingering, albeit muted, bilateral disputes.3.3.2: An intra-ASEAN arms race ? To a certain underestimated extent, the military build-upphenomenon among ASEAN member states has also an internal dimension.Neorealists point to the fact that the self-help strategy is creatingsecurity dilemmas among ASEAN member states: namely that states, byseeking to advance their individual national securities throughpolicies of arming, decrease the security of other states. Hence thecreation of an international environment prone to an arms race. Inthe ASEAN case, certain purchases of weapons may indeed be said to bemotivated more as a deterrent against other ASEAN members thanagainst extra-ASEAN threats. This phenomenon is not new, and can betraced back to the late 1970s-early 1980s. But the ongoing militarybuild-up, given the end of the Cold War and the current geostrategicflux of the region, might further stimulate intra-ASEAN securitydilemmas.ASEAN defence planners seem indeed to pay continuously closeattention to the composition of their neighbours' arsenals; and any53upgrading of one is likely to be followed by an upgrading of theothers. Ron Huisken has labelled this dynamic of inter-staterelations within the Association an "interactive weapon acquisition"(Huisken, 1977) - that is a slow motion arms race. He providesevidence of such a competition in the 1970s (60).The best and most recent example of this interactive armsacquisition is the purchase in 1983 of F-16 fighter aircraft bySingapore, followed in kind by Indonesia and Thailand. The 'threatfactor' deriving from the situation in Indochina is credible forThailand's acquisition of the F-16. But Indonesia, geographicallyremoved from the Cambodian conflict, could not have furthered thesame rationale (61).Incidentally, such competition within a security-orientedregional organization is not uncommon: even within NATO, the UK andFrance have, for reasons of international prestige, attempted tomaintain a certain parity in some aspects of their force structures(Huxley, 1990: 75). One could also argue that those weapons ASEANarmed forces have in common are more a matter of planning than ofcompetition. It could indeed be the result of a conscious planning(60) The purchase of missile-armed fast patrol boats by most of South-East Asiannavies (Huisken, 1977: 52), the acquisition of Scorpion light tanks by Brunei, thePhilippines, Thailand and Malaysia, and of V-150 Commando personnel carriers byIndonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Combat aircrafts purchases alsoillustrate this interactive acquisition phenomenon: F-5s were bought by all exceptBrunei, and A-4s by Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia.(61) The most significant reaction to Singapore's purchase remains that ofMalaysia. Singapore's air force ordering a squadron of F-16s was going to enhanceboth its strike and air defence capabilities; all the more since it was reportedlyalso interested in the even more advanced F/A-18. The Royal Malaysian Air Force(RMAF) escalated its pressure on the Mahathir government to purchase newequipment, stressing that it had been "left behind" by the air forces of the otherASEAN countries (Straits Times, 25 April 1987). Consequently, reports in July 1988that Malaysia was to purchase F-16 were not surprising.54aimed at increasing the level of standardization within theAssociation in the face of a common threat. Yet, as discussed above,ASEAN states never really perceived a common threat. Moreover, thereis no evidence of any cooperation in arms purchasing among the ASEANgovernments (despite the clear cost saving that it would entail).Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have actually voiced supportfor joint arms procurement and manufacturing (62). But a generalscepticism prevails on the possibility of an ASEAN arms industry aswell as of joint procurement given the differences in the level ofdefence spending and in strategic priorities, and given intra-ASEANcompetitive relations.Thus, a certain degree of military competition has persistedbased not only on prestige considerations but on the existence ofsecurity dilemmas. A scholar stated that "at present seriouspolitical friction exists between and among ASEAN countries, and itshould not be precluded that the present military build-up in eachmember-country is carried out with a view to that fact" (Popov, 1991:254). Another went further contending that "anticipating the creationof small, though potent ASEAN member air forces and navies in the1990's, the Association leaders fear that unless a new impetus forASEAN cohesion is found when the Cambodian war is resolved, thesecapabilities could be construed as mutually threatening" (Simon,1992: 7).The underlying bilateral suspicions that have been muted duringthe Cold War might be, according to neorealists, sharpened in the(62) In July 1990, Thailand's supreme commander announced that ASEAN countriesagreed in principle to establish an arms assembly plant with each member stateproducing specific weapons parts: Straits Times, 20 July 1990.55post-Cold War era. Neorealists believe that intra-ASEAN conflictshave been inhibited in the late 1970s-1980s primarily because of theimperative to form a common front against the Marxist-leninistcountries of Southeast Asia. Neorealists indeed hold that acooperation among ASEAN states was unlikely without the existence ofa strong common threat. The ending of the Cold War should thus resultin the reemergence of these old disputes. Neorealists undermine theconventional wisdom concerning ASEAN as being a Deutschian 'securitycommunity': the Association has not reached the stage of'integration' as Deutsch unconventionally defines it - i.e. 'absenceof expectation of war'. ASEAN never really came to resolve internalbilateral tensions, and in the post-Cambodia era, the future ofASEAN as a 'security community' is highly jeopardized.We challenge this pessimistic perspective and argue that,although cooperation among ASEAN states has been fostered thanks tothe perception of a mutual threat (marxism-leninism), member statestoday have a different motivation for cooperating and for workingtowards the creation of a 'security community' in the post-Cold Warera.56CHAPTER 4 - AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON ASEANContrary to the neorealist theory of international relations,this thesis attempts to prove that substantive progress ininternational security may occur, and that the ASEAN case studyprovides some evidence to back up this argument. Indeed, neorealisttheory does not account for the fact that ASEAN states, consideringthat resorting to force is not a fruitful way of settling disputesand sharing a mutual interest in avoiding war, are willing tocooperate to promote progress in security.Although neorealists focus on the self-help and the alliancestrategies, they do acknowledge the rationality of regional securitycooperation. In order to prevent greater powers from threateningtheir survival, small states may cooperate amongst themselves toprevent any external intervention. In such cases, cooperation is onlymotivated by the existence of a threat to states' survival. Indeed,neorealists believe security cooperation among ASEAN states to besolely motivated by the existence of a common enemy. Although theperception on a common enemy has facilitated the creation andmaintenance of ASEAN, motivations for security cooperation hasinvolved more than the mere perception of a common threat: they havelain in states' reduced commitment to war as an instrument of policy.In positing such an argument, it is clear that the analysis ofour case-study falls within a basically liberal mold. Notably, webelieve that ASEAN states' renunciation of war stems from the factthat they are placing less weight on military might and more oneconomic growth and development (Grieco, 1988: 489). Indeed, in the571960s-1970s, ASEAN countries' leaders, challenged by communistinsurgencies, perceived their legitimacy as dependent on theirability to promote rapid economic development and economiccooperation in an atmosphere of political tranquility (Acharya, 1991:161-2 - see also Acharya, 1992b). Given that sources of interstateconflict in Southeast Asia were closely linked to the domesticpolitical instability of the regional actors, the promotion of a sub-regional environment prone to peaceful change (and thus todevelopment) was required. Thus ASEAN's main goal: forming a'security community', a reliable expectation of peaceful change.In arguing that ASEAN states' motivations for cooperating arebetter explained by liberal theory than by the neorealist one, thischapter first examines ASEAN's goal of creating a 'securitycommunity' and the instruments set up for it. It then contends thatalthough the post-Cold War Association is facing some challenges, oneshould be sanguine about the prospects for a strengthening ofcooperation. Finally, we will highlight the fact that the liberalassumptions on which ASEAN states cooperate is providing a model forthe recent initiatives on Asia-Pacific security forum.•4.1: TOWARDS A 'SECURITY COMMUNITY' Since its creation in 1967, ASEAN has been somewhat preoccupiedby the issue of whether to create a military alliance or a securitycommunity - a choice between neorealist and liberal logic. The issuehas been recurrent: ASEAN members tackled it in 1967, in 1976 duringtheir first summit and recently in the wake of the end of the Cold58War. ASEAN leaders have always resisted the idea of a militaryalliance; they have, in turn, professed the aim of creating a'security community' -- the attainment of "institutions and practicesstrong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time,dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population"(Deutsch, 1957: 2). In Acharya words, "at best, an ASEAN militaryarrangement was deemed unnecessary or unimportant; at worst, it wasseen as counterproductive. The goal of creating a 'securitycommunity' not only assumed priority over a military pact, but thelatter was considered subversive of the former" (Acharya, 1991: 161).We will first present ASEAN's goal of creating a ' securitycommunity', and then look at the instruments ASEAN set up to attainits professed goal.4.1.1: ASEAN's goal: forming a 'security community' As discussed above, given ASEAN states' inward perception ofsecurity, they aimed at promoting rapid economic development ratherthan enhancing their military power. Economic cooperation in anatmosphere of political stability was deemed to be the primary taskof ASEAN's regionalism. ASEAN thus came into being in 1967 largelyas the result of a desire of its five original members (63) to createa mechanism which would contribute to peace and stability in intra-regional relations. Intraregional conflict management had indeedassumed importance given the failure of the previous attempts atregional unity, as in the case of the Maphilindo (Malaysia,Philippines and Indonesia). A military alliance was thus of little(63) Brunei joined the group in 1984.59help, while the promotion of long-term habit of cooperation to movethe group towards a regional 'security community' formed the core ofASEAN's political role. As Acharya put it:The need for such a mechanism was urgent given that ASEAN stateswere involved in a number of disputes which had led to armedconflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia (Indonesia's leaderSukarno's konfrontasi policy), war-like tensions betweenSingapore on the one hand and Indonesia on the other (overSingapore's separation from Malaysia and the distrust ofChinese-dominated Singapore by its Malay neighbours) and asimilar situation between Malaysia and the Philippines (over thelatter's claim to Malaysia's Sabah province) (1992:10-1).In terms of conflict management, the idea of creating a'pluralistic security community' constitutes a markedly differentgoal than the idea of forming an alliance. The former focuses oncooperation to resolve disputes and conflicts within the regionalgrouping. It differs from an alliance in the sense that the primaryfunction of a security community is mutual accommodation among itsmembers, while an alliance focuses primarily on mutual defenseagainst non-members. Mutual accomodation is required, but it issubordinate to the larger objective of defense. Conflict managementis thus a side-effect of an alliance's real purpose, whereas it isthe professed goal of creating a 'security community'. Jervis alsopoints to this major difference when he notes that alliances andbalance-of-power thinking restrain aggressive or potentiallyaggressive powers externally (1982: 185), whereas when states form a'security community', restraints are norms internalized by theactors.The concept of a 'pluralistic security community' refers to theability of controlling the forceful settlement of conflicts amongmembers. According to Deutsch, political integration (defined as60"dependable expectation of peaceful change" (Deutsch, 1957: 5))results in the attainment of lasting peace (64). This concept rejectsthe pessimistic assumptions of neorealism; it displays the underlyingliberal conviction that continuing peace and peaceful change areattainable in international relations. Peace is postulated as theultimate value (65); Deutsch believes that if political communitiesvalue peace, the attainment of a pluralistic security community ispossible. "The outstanding issue leading to the emergence of asecurity community is the increasing unattractiveness of war amongthe political units concerned. War became unattractive because of thedanger of international complications that might engulf thecontestants" (1957: 113). According to Deutsch, two conditions arenecessary for a security community to take hold: a compatibility ofpolitical values derived from common political institutions andcommunication that reflects a "we-feeling" among the members of acommunity (1957: 36; 129). Both conditions derive their significancenot only from economic interdependencies and from the spillover offunctional-technical problems to the political realm (66), but alsofrom the sharing of political values, first and foremost democracy,which inhibits nations from using force against each other.As discussed earlier, most scholars acknowledge that Western(64) Deutsch distinguishes the 'amalgamated' from the 'pluralistic securitycommunity': both are instances of integration, but the former implies a centralgovernment instead of sovereign political communities which merely form a "zone ofpeace" (1957).(65) "In a civilization that wishes to survive, the central problem in the studyof international organization is this: How can men learn to act together toeliminate war as a social institution", (Deutsch, 1957: 3).(66) Puchala emphasizes that the "ties in trade, migration, mutual services, ormilitary collaboration prompted by necessity or by profit generate flows oftransactions between communities and enmesh people in transcommunitycommunications networks" (1981: 156).61European nations are now experiencing something close to the'pluralistic security community'. Adler writes: "A pluralisticsecurity community creates a model that supposedly other regions mayreplicate... If only because of... the need for Third World countriesto adopt democratic and other Western values, the concept of a globalsecurity community is from the point of view of our generation autopian dream" (1991: 139).Indeed, ASEAN does not qualify for the conditions Deutschunderlines as necessary for a 'security community' to take hold.ASEAN countries may share the concept of free enterprise, which isthe philosophical basis of the Association; but they do not havecompatible political values, as the Association encompasses manytypes of regimes, from democracies to monarchies (67). If the leadersof member countries do feel they form a community, there is lessevidence that the people perceive this 'we-feeling' Deutsch stresses.Thus, ASEAN can not be labelled a 'security community' in the1 maximalist' conception Deutsch puts forward. Yet, if a securitycommunity is primarily a community of states who have reduced theircommitment to war as an instrument of policy; if a securitycommunity' is a "cluster of countries whose relations have beencharacterized by peaceful conflict resolution and whose leaders andpeoples conceived of no contingencies in their mutual relations thatcould bring resorts to violence" (Puchala, 1981: 151), then ASEAN maybe labelled so.Thus ASEAN cannot be said to be a 'security community' stricto(67) Malaysia and Singapore are governed by a parliamentary system in theWestminster model, the Philippines by a US-style presidential regime, Thailand amonarchy sometimes under military control and Brunei is a sultanate.62sensu: it is a quasi-'security community' of its own kind that hasdeveloped on the grounds of common values such as a shared approachtowards development and the efficacy of market economies. BecauseASEAN states do care about promoting dependable expectations ofpeaceful change, ASEAN may be said to be a 'security regime', with atendency towards community (Wiseman, 1992: 46).4.1.2: The instrument: ASEAN's security regimeThe creation of a security regime has been the instrument used toattempt forming a 'security community'. As Emanuel Adler argues,security regimes may be an instrument to promote progress ininternational security (Adler, 1991b: 153; 1991a: 12-13).ASEAN has specified a set of norms to govern the conduct ofinter-member relations, and has established procedures andinstitutions for conflict management and control. The norms have beenenumerated in two major documents: the 1967 Bangkok Declarationannouncing the creation of ASEAN and the Treaty of Amity andCooperation signed at the first summit of ASEAN member states in Baliin 1976. One of the components of the ZOPFAN proposal (1971) alsoincludes the strengthening of relations amongst the ASEAN countriesso that disputes can be settled through pacific means - what Alagappacalls "peace through rule of law". This component of ZOPFAN urgesstates to renounce the use of force and to renounce resorting to non-constitutional means in the pursuit of their interests (Alagappa,1991b: 19-26). The 1976 Treaty is especially relevant in assessingASEAN's contribution to conflict management. The norms enunciatedare: (1) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and63territorial integrity of all nations; (2) The right of every state tolead its national existence free from external interference,subversion and coercion; (3) Non-interference in the internal affairsof one another; (4) Settlement of differences and disputes bypeaceful means; and (5) Renunciation of the threat of use of force(68).Regarding the pacific settlement of disputes, a chapter of the1976 document makes provision for the establishment of a High Councilcomprising a representative of ministerial rank from each of thecontracting parties. The provision for such a multilateral process"constituted a considerable diplomatic success at the time given thereluctance of the Philippines to permit its territorial claim to theMalaysian state of Sabah to be made subject to dispute settlementother than under the aegis of the International Court of Justice"(Leifer, 1992: 169; see also Alagappa, 1991b: 19-26). However, theHigh Council has never been established; "indeed, no attempt has everbeen made to invoke the dispute settlement machinery of theAssociation" (ibid.). ASEAN states' approach to security has notprogressed much by way of institutional form. Indeed, insofar asprocedures and institutions of conflict resolution are concerned,ASEAN states have instead relied on informal measures, on using theprocedures of discussion and accomodation at high political levels tosettle their conflicts. This role was most seriously tested in thecase of the Malaysian-Philippines dispute over Sabah. Admittedly,such a pragmatic approach and such consultations have been usefultools for building confidence and trust among the ASEAN states; in(68) Thongswasdi, PhD Dissertation quoted by Acharya, 1992a: 11.64this respect, the psychological and political aspects of ASEAN, theso-called "ASEAN spirit", have been more useful to intra-ASEANdispute settlement than formal, institutional mechanisms.The question that remains is how much progress towards a'security community' has ASEAN achieved ? As Nye pointed out, theconcept of security community is extremely difficult to measure. SaysNye:It is difficult to be certain whether states plan for war witheach other... It is also difficult to develop a scale ofsecurity-community rather than merely describing its presence orabsence. Public opinion data indicating popular or eliteattitudes of friendliness or trust are not sufficient, sincehostile international actions can occur despite such opinion, oropinion can change rapidly, and military planners must actaccordingly. Despite this difficulty, the concept of securitycommunity is important" (Nye, 1971: 47-8).One can nevertheless measure the Association's progress towards asecurity community by looking at how member states have chosen tosolve their disputes. By and large the ASEAN countries haveconformed to the norms of the 1976 Treaty. Although bilateralrelations (Singapore-Malaysia, Malaysia-Philippines) have not beenfree of tension, the use of force has not been contemplated as anoption. The ASEAN countries have also quite strictly respectedpolitical independence and territorial integrity, and refrained frominterfering in the domestic affairs of other member states. ThusWiseman recently argued that ASEAN's "development has produced a newset of attitudes and informal conflict avoidance mechanisms whichcurrently make war between member states unlikely" (Wiseman, 1992:48). Michael Leifer went further to posit that "the end of theCambodian conflict as a matter of regional contention has not lead to65the Association losing its raison d'etre. The habit of bureaucraticand ministerial consultation and cooperation is very deeplyentrenched with membership in ASEAN having acquired a virtual quasi-familial quality" (Leifer, 1992: 168).However, Muthiah Alagappa provides a more balanced and -according to us - more correct assessment of ASEAN's progress.Although conflicts have been muted, "the ASEAN record of pacificsettlement of disputes is less impressive, even disappointing. Thebilateral disputes among the ASEAN countries remain unresolved andnew disputes issuing primarily from overlapping claims of exclusiveeconomic zones have been added to the list" (Alagappa, 1991a: 24-5).The Association has thus contributed to the defusion of tension, toconflict avoidance, but not to conflict resolution. "While conflictavoidance is important, it is no substitute for conflict resolution"(ibid.). Consequently, ASEAN can only be characterized as a quasi-'security community'.4.2: CHALLENGES TO ASEAN'S GOALAs the neorealist discourse rightfully points out, ASEAN shouldface two challenges in a post-Cambodia era: "ASEAN's future as a community faces two major challenges: firstly, overcomingseveral lingering intra-ASEAN disputes that are potentiallydisruptive of regional peace, and secondly, reaching a consensus onhow to approach the task of eventual reconciliation with Vietnam andthereby move the subregional (ASEAN) 'security community' to aregional (Southeast Asian) entity" (Acharya, 1991: 173). As discussed66above, neorealists hold that ASEAN should not be able to overcomethose challenges and that ASEAN's viability in the post-Cold War erais doubtful. They have contended that intra-ASEAN cooperation will bejeopardized by increasing mutual distrust among member states, andthat ASEAN is merely the product of intraregional stress, rather thanof mutual interests. In this section, we discuss these two majorchallenges and argue that the neorealist perspective underestimatesthe extent to which ASEAN states have developed a mutual interest inavoiding war.4.2.1: Intra-ASEAN's lingering suspicions As stated above, the goal of the Association is to create a"security community", a forum to resolve the numerous and deleteriousregional disputes which had thwarted the previous attempts at forminga regional organization, and to prevent any conflict to develop thatcould invite external interventions. "While ASEAN has come a long wayin reducing tensions between its members, it has not yet reached thestage of a 'security community'. A number of actual or potentialconflict situations remain" (Acharya, 1992a: 12). Neorealists inferfrom these facts that in the post-Cold War era, intra-ASEAN lingeringdisputes will reemerge so as to jeopardize ASEAN members'cooperation; internal tensions, accompanied by increasedmilitarization, will create an atmosphere prone to armed conflicts.The numerous maritime boundary disputes among various ASEANcountries, the unresolved dispute between the Philippines andMalaysia over the former's claim to Sabah, as well as the continuingethnic-based suspicion between Malaysia and Singapore may indeed67illustrate the vulnerability of intra-ASEAN ties, as well as thepossibilities and limits of intra-ASEAN conflict management. But inassessing the potential for conflict issuing from these disputedclaims, it is necessary to explore the following question: willstates go to war over these conflicting claims ?Old territorial disputesAmong numerous old territorial disputes, the most significantremain the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over the claim to Sabah andthe concerns of Brunei and Singapore over their territorial integrity(Alagappa, 1991a: 17-23). For the past twenty-six years, relationshave been strained because of the Philippine claim over Sabah: thefinal resolution of the issue has been elusive, despite attempts bythe Aquino government to secure the necessary legal basis fordropping the claim. But the two countries never actually resorted tothe use of war in order to solve the dispute. Security and survivalconcerns of Singapore and Brunei are focused primarily - but notexclusively - on Malaysia. Singapore has often, notably after theIraqi invasion of Kuwait, expressed its worries about Malaysia beinga threat to its existence (Acharya, 1991: 174). While bilateralrelations have experienced quite rough patches, they have not beenallowed to deteriorate and have not resulted in the consideration ofoptions relating to the use of force. Greater political, security andeconomic cooperation among those states may help to control and inthe long run more permanently transform the conflictual dynamics.Increased cooperation would foster confidence-building, helping toovercome suspicions and build links with neighbours.68SpratlysThe recent discoveries and projection of potential oil, gas andmineral deposits in the unhabited islets of the South China Sea (theSpratlys) have indeed fuelled a dispute for their acquisition. If a200-mile EEZ was to be attached to these islands, they would alsooffer a key control over vast surrounding areas of fisheries. Sixcountries are involved in this dispute, of which three are ASEANmember states, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei (the others areChina, Taiwan and Vietnam). The three ASEAN countries lay claims toparts of the Spratlys (while the PRC, Taiwan and Vietnam claim themin their entirety). The Philippines' claim is based on history andeffective occupation, while those of Malaysia and Brunei are based oncertain provisions of the Law of the Sea. Only China and Vietnam havethus far engaged in premeditated military clashes with each other in1988. The potential for conflict appears to be confined to the Sino-Vietnamese dyad. The three ASEAN claimants have expressed theirdesire and intent to settle the conflicting claims throughnegotiations. A forum for dialogue on the South China Sea has beenproposed by Indonesia and endorsed by China (69). Indonesia hasorganized a series of workshops and seminars for officials andacademics to discuss disputes in the South China Sea. The Indonesianobjective as a 'broker', according to foreign minister All Alatas, isto convert the area into a region of cooperation rather thanconfrontation.(69) Michael Richardson, "Asians Trying to settle Spratly Dispute" and "Asiansseek a Forum to Settle Disputes", International Herald tribune, 19 and 21 June1991. See also FEER, 4 and 11 July 1991. On this issue, see also Weatherbee, 1987.69Exclusive Economic ZonesThe renewed preeminence of maritime interests has spawned aprogressive territorialization of the sea and compelled areassessment of existing international maritime regimes. ASEAN hasunilaterally proclaimed a 200-mile EEZ, which has suddendly expandedthe territorial jurisdiction of its member states. In addition, thenew regime which is emerging from the UN Law of the Sea Convention of1982 recognizes the authority of the coastal and archipelagic statesover the management of maritime resources within their territorialwaters. The unilateral extension of EEZs has made for disputesrelating to jurisdiction and rights to living and non-livingresources in areas of overlap. Most prominent has been the issue offishing rights (Leng, 1989).While conflicting claims over EEZs are likely to make for tensionin bilateral relations (Malaysia-Philippines (70), Malaysia-Thailand), it is highly improbable that these countries would go towar with each other over ocean resource related issues. The thrust ofpolicy in all countries has been to resolve such disputes throughnegotiations. In 1988, Malaysia and Thailand concluded an agreementproviding for joint deep-sea tuna fishing in Malaysian waters.Malaysia and Thailand reactivated the idea of joint exploitation ofliving and non-living resources in the area where their EEZs overlap.Malaysia and Philippines have also begun talks over their overlappingclaims in the area between Sabah and the Southern Philippines.(70) In April 1988, the arrest by the Malaysian navy of 49 Filipino fishermen whoalledgedly intruded into Malaysian waters caused considerable tensions inbilateral relations: Straits Times, 24 April 1988.70Intra-ASEAN conflicts cannot be said, as the foreign minister ofSingapore claimed in 1982, to have "either become irrelevant or beenmuted considerably" (71). Yet, ASEAN has become a quasi-securitycommunity in the sense that its members do not foresee the prospectof resorting to armed confrontation among themselves to resolveexisting bilateral disputes. ASEAN countries have not contemplatedthe use of force as an option. They have also quite strictlyrespected political independence and territorial integrity, andrefrained from interfering in the domestic affairs of other memberstates (Alagappa, 1991b: 24). Notably, during the ASEAN summitmeeting in Singapore in January 1992, a confidential report suggestedcloser consultations among member states to avoid militarymisunderstandings and a flare-up of territorial disputes in theregion (72). ASEAN has not attained conflict resolution but hascertainly succeeded in defusing tensions, in avoiding armedconflicts, in creating a political community and with it, respectamong its member states for international norms has also grown.Moreover, ASEAN states have recently agreed to step up economiccooperation among them through the formation of an Asean Free TradeArea (AFTA) which should further decrease the utility of war as aninstrument of policy (73). The neorealist discourse's pessimism onASEAN should thus be watered down. While ASEAN does not have asuccessful record in the pacific settlement of disputes, it hassucceeded in ruling out the use of force in inter-state relationsamong members states.(71) Straits Times, 15 September 1988.(72) Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 18, (10-11), April-May 1992: 32.(73) "The Morning AFTA", FEER, 24 October 1991: 64-65.714.2.2: Bringing Indochina into ASEAN Neorealists have argued that ASEAN post-Cambodia will lose itsrelevance: being the mere product of intra-regional stress ratherthan of common interests, its viability will soon be put to the test.Although the end of this regional conflict will certainly challengethe Association, one can be more sanguine about ASEAN's prospects.ASEAN's ultimate goal with respect to intra-regional conflicts hasalways been the creation of a security regime (and eventually of asecurity community) encompassing all states in Southeast Asia. Thedemise of global tensions between the great powers and the consequentexpectations of a settlement of the Cambodian conflict have put theIndochina issue on the top of ASEAN's current agenda. The issueraised pertains to how to include the Indochinese countries into theAssociation, how to move from a subregional quasi-'securitycommunity' to a regional (Southeast Asian) entity.The global changes have renewed hope and interest in theinclusion of Indochina into ASEAN. In 1967, the founding declarationof ASEAN extended to the whole of Southeast Asia; one of thecomponents of the ZOPFAN concept adopted in 1971 was also to developrelations with those countries ultimately through their membership inASEAN; and in 1976, provision was made for the Treaty of Amity andCooperation to be open for accession by other states in SoutheastAsia. "Such an act was intended to demonstrate a willingness to abideby the (ASEAN) code of conduct. The underlying object was to seek amodus vivendi with Vietnam based on the cardinal rule of theinternational society of states as a practical alternative to any72premature attempt to expand the membership of ASEAN" (Leifer, 1992:168). However, this political opening was not furthered. Developmentand implementation of these ideas was brought to a halt by theVietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Since then, acomprehensive solution of this conflict has been stated by ASEANmembers as a prerequisite for Indochina's inclusion in theAssociation. Thus, in formal terms, the settlement of the Cambodianconflict should open the way for the Indochina countries to accede tothe 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. As the Indonesian GeneralSustrino put it, by accepting the Indochina countries, ASEAN seeks to"rid the region of antagonism and be a force of cooperation" (74).Although agreeing on the necessity of enlarging the cooperativeframework so as to include the Indochinese countries, ASEAN countriesdiverge on the form through which regional cooperation should bepursued. "Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have publicly stated that Hanoi'scommunist ideology would not be a barrier to its eventualreconciliation with ASEAN. Thailand's pragmatic approach, aiming at"turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place", also seemsquite indifferent to the type of regime. Singapore, however, hasexpressed concern that Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN "could change thecharacter of the organization and jeopardize further ASEANcooperation" (quoted by Acharya, 1991: 175). Lee Kuan Yew claimedthat ASEAN had to await the change in their politico-social systembefore being able to mesh with those of the present ASEAN members(74) Straits Times, 14 January 1989.73(75). Thus, two basic (but not mutually exclusive) options regardinghow to bring Indochina into ASEAN have been put forward. One is theearly enlargement of ASEAN to include the Indochina countries so thatall nine countries will be under one regional framework. The secondoption is based on a functional approach to regional cooperation.ASEAN states have in fact opted for a combination of both.The first option appeared quite attractive because the founding1967 Declaration of Bangkok appeals to the unity of the SoutheastAsian region. Expansion of membership should thus make ASEAN'sregional credentials even stronger and accord it greater weight andconsideration from the international community. However, given thatASEAN has not been able to achieve its goal of peace and stability,the inclusion of Indochina countries would make the harmonising ofpolitical interests even more difficult. Moreover, the inclusion ofthe Indochinese economies would add complexity to the pattern ofintra-ASEAN economic cooperation and impose additional economicburden on the Association. Thus, the nature and cohesion of ASEANmight be affected without significantly enhancing the prospects forpeace and stability in the region. Enlargement would not only inhibitfurther progress, but could even be retrogressive.Thus, as far as formal enlargement of ASEAN is concerned, ASEANstates have only enabled the Indochinese countries to sign the 1976Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - that is to extend ASEAN's securityregime norms to the regional entity. As a matter of fact, Vietnam and(75) Cited in Michael Richardson, "Asia-Pacific Nations Search for SecurityStrategy", International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1990. In must be noted thatVietnam has clearly stated that moves towards a freer economy do not signal theabandonment of its socialist ideology: M. Vatikiotis, "Join the Club", FEER, 20June 1991.74Laos had requested to become a signatory to the 1976 Treaty. Thatrequest was warmly welcomed by ASEAN's head of government meeting inSingapore in January 1992 as a way of providing "a common frameworkfor wider regional cooperation embracing the whole of Southeast Asia"(76). During the Cold War, the ideological confrontation as well asthe security surplus generated by the great powers' involvementreduced the likelihood of a regional Southeast Asian security regime.But with the end of the Cold War, both sides perceive such a regionalsecurity regime as a substitute to enhance their security in asituation of new found vulnerability. W. Tow writes:ASEAN in the post-Cambodia era will have to institutionalizeregional security agendas independent from the traditionalimperatives of threat assessment. ...ASEAN's future task will beto convert the ZOPFAN ideal into more tangible means forresolving outstanding intra-regional territorial disputes, ...and forming long-term habits of security consultation andcooperation that, in turn, will lead to the emergence of aviable and enduring security regime throughout Southeast Asia"(Tow, 1990b: 129).It is indeed in the interests of both the Indochinese countriesand ASEAN to promote peace in the Southeast Asian region by enlargingthe cooperative framework that helped build the goodwill and trustthat has been crucial to the success of ASEAN. Moreover, in order toattract the necessary financial and political support to rebuildtheir economies, the Indochinese states have to demonstrate continuedgood behaviour and reduce their commitment to war as an instrument ofpolicy.The second option will enable the Indochina countries toundertake functional economic cooperation. They will be gradually(76) Singapore Declaration of 1992, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore,28 January 1992; cited by Leifer, 1992: 168.75drawn into the ASEAN economic activities on a sectoral basis. Thisapproach is based on the creation of regional organizations on afunction-specific basis. Eventually all these functionalorganizations might be pulled together under one regional framework(77). In the same token, the Thai initiative to encourage economiccooperation among continental Southeast Asian economies should beviewed positively. This would help to mesh the Indochina countrieswith ASEAN, to minimise suspicion, build confidence and make theeventual enlargement of ASEAN more feasible and acceptable. Theunderlying theoretical assumption of this approach stems from theliberal belief that regional economic cooperation can contribute, inNye's phrase, to 'peace in parts'. Wisemann stresses the"functionalist and neo-functionalist assumptions - that internationalcooperation in economic/technical issues would lead over time to aspill-over into other areas of cooperation involving high politics ofsecurity such as war", which underline much of the contemporarydebate on Southeast Asia (1992: 45). This debate implicitly endorsesfunctional linkages in the Deutsch tradition of a 'securitycommunity'.Thus, ASEAN will and is already facing those two major challengesthat neorealists have pointed to; the evidence shows that cooperationamong ASEAN members should not be jeopardized by the end of the ColdWar as neorealists contend. On the contrary, ASEAN intends to pursueits goal of forming a 'security community' in the post-Cold War era.A habit of cooperation has developed among member states and hasgradually contributed to deep changes in states' values and(77) Muthiah Alagappa, "Bringing Indochina into ASEAN", FEER, 29 June 1989.76attitudes. Those countries, as well as the Indochinese countriestoday, are primarily interested in pursuing economic development andeconomic growth, which creates incentives for better relations withthe market economies in the region able to foster trade, aid, loans,foreign investment, technology transfer and human resource expertiseso vital to their economic development. They consequently do notcontemplate the option of waging war in order to solve remainingterritorial disputes.ASEAN's renunciation of war as an instrument of policy is thusgradually evolving to encompass the entirety of Southeast Asia;evidence also shows that it may well be expanded to the whole ofAsia-Pacific.4.3 : EMULATING THE ASEAN MODEL IN ASIA -PACIFICThe relative success of ASEAN security cooperation is clearlydisplayed by the fact that ASEAN's approach to security as well asthe institutional mechanisms it developed are being emulated in Asia-Pacific. Indeed, as Cold War tensions are subsiding in Asia, formeradversaries in the region are intensifying efforts to develop newchannels for solving political and security problems. There hasrecently been an inflation of proposals for a pan-Asian securityforum: the Shevardnadze proposal, the Australian and the Canadianinitiatives. What is of interest for our central concern is that the'ASEAN spirit' and its liberal assumptions is considered by othercountries of the Pacific Rim as a model to further security in thewider region. ASEAN, which has now survived longer than any other77regional organization in the Pacific-Asian area, is thus fosteringnew ideas for promoting security cooperation in Asia-Pacific. Ourpurpose here is not to discuss the feasability of such initiatives(see Segal, 1990; Wiseman, 1992 among others) but to show that thephilosophy underlying those proposals stems from the ASEAN experienceand from liberal assumptions.4.3.1: Emulating ASEAN's spirit The 'ASEAN spirit' may be characterized by two main features: adirect relationship between security and economic prosperity; acooperative model of international security based on the renunciationof war. These two features, which display a certain liberal way ofthinking, have inspired the different initiatives for an Asia-Pacificsecurity architecture that have recently been launched.The first feature inspiring the initiatives on Asia-Pacificsecurity is the direct relationship between security and economics.ASEAN has always emphasized the fact that it was an economicorganization aimed at fostering economic cooperation. It was thoughtthat regional involvement of ASEAN states in a multilateral non-security regime would help foster the habit of cooperation which, initself, would have a positive security spin-off. It is such anassumption that is today underlying the initiatives for an Asia-Pacific security architecture. The proposals for an Asia-Pacificsecurity architecture stem from the increasing economic integrationamong East Asian and Asia-Pacific countries and from the fear of78repercussions of war (78). The proliferation of economic contactsacross political lines has strengthened the prospects for peace byraising the economic incentive to maintain harmonious contact.Because of the potential economic disruption war may cause, statesare willing to cooperate to further international security in theregion. There is indeed a greater consensus within the region on thekey priority - "economic development through domestic modernisationand widening economic intercourse" (Scalapino, 1991: 20) - than anytime in the past. Thus, in a classic neofunctionalist way, whatScalapino has labelled 'Asianisation' (79) is in turn leading statesto reduce their commitment to war as an instrument of policy. Thedecreasing attraction of war has fostered the initiatives for thecreation of a security forum.The second feature of the 'ASEAN spirit' indeed stems from theprevious one. The cooperative model of international security thatthe Association has developed is based on the gradual renunciation ofwar. The evidence has shown that the competitive model of powerpolitics was only partially relevant in explaining ASEAN's creation,rationale and achievements. ASEAN has not sought to achieve peacethrough strength and deterrence as neorealists posit: the deterrencediscourse, which pledges to increase security through military build-ups, has never really been prevalent among ASEAN political leadersand military establishments. The priority of ASEAN member states was(78) Scalapino labels the trend towards economic integration in Northeast Asia a'soft regionalism': economic and cultural ties have proliferated across politicalboundaries, but lack any institutional structure (1991: 19).(79) Namely "the creation of a thickening network of ties between and amongsocieties that in the colonial era existed half foreign to each other", Scalapino,1991: 20.79rather to focus on the principle of cooperative and mutual security,based on the assumption that war has lost its utility as aninstrument of policy. This thinking about security is in turn highlyrelevant for Asia-Pacific as a whole. A. Mack contends that:The historical evidence suggests that there are few grounds forfeeling confident that the security philosophy of 'peace throughstrength' and deterrence which the current military build-up inthe Asia-Pacific reflects will in fact enhance regionalsecurity. Recognition that this is the case, that wars may ariseby inadvertence as well as aggression, is reason enough forregional defence planners to think seriously about some of thepossible long-term risks which the Asia-Pacific build-up maygenerate and... how these risks might be minimised (1992: 14).Moreover, both for Asia-Pacific as well as ASEAN countries,there is no immediately perceived potential aggressor, but just apervasive feeling of instability - so that the old fashioneddeterrence thinking is not appropriate. The deterrence discourseindeed applies in the case where there is a defined threat, a definedpotential aggressor to deter. Moreover, as Mack notes, the deterrencediscourse may invite aggression and may exacerbate the conditionswhich lead to inadvertent wars because it creates security dilemmas.The 'ASEAN spirit', on the contrary, seeks security with other statesrather than against them (1991: 84): it emphasizes the role ofdialogue, cooperation and confidence building measures. Theinitiatives for an Asia-Pacific forum are thus aiming to buildcooperative security regimes: setting up norms, rules and proceduresthat restrain states in their political and military relations. "Andat a higher level of norm development and cooperation, regionalstates might operate a security community characterized, in Deutsch'sterms, by expectations of peaceful change and a very high level ofcooperation" (Wiseman, 1992: 46).80ASEAN's experience and 'ASEAN's spirit' may thus be said to haveprovided ideas of a liberal kind to those who initiated proposals forpromoting security in Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN model has also beenemulated as far as mechanisms are concerned.4.3.2: Emulating ASEAN's mechanisms Scholars have usually stressed that ASEAN's resort to moreinformal processes rather than formal institutional mechanisms topromote peace and stability is also a relevant option for Asia-Pacific. Dialogues and consultations have indeed been more useful forintra-ASEAN dispute settlement than formal, institutional mechanismssuch as the High Council (Alagappa, 1991b; Leifer, 1992: 169).Geoffrey Wiseman asserts that informal conflict-avoidance mechanismsand pragmatism are more suited to Asia-Pacific (1992: 57). ASEAN'sPost-Ministerial Conference has thus been contemplated as a suitabledialogue forum for Asia-Pacific.Canada as well as Japan have suggested that an Asia-Pacificsecurity forum should be built on existing regional forums such asthe annual ASEAN post-ministerial meeting (PMM). Canada hasencouraged ASEAN to broaden the scope of its consultations fromeconomic to security matters, as well as to extend the participationto Asia-Pacific nations. Japan has also proposed that ASEANformalise the PMM as a structure for security discussions.ASEAN first appeared reluctant to the idea of an Asia-Pacificforum, which would steal the limelight from ASEAN's own brand ofregionalism. "They are afraid of losing their identity. Bringing in81outside powers would dilute their identity" says A. Acharya (80). YetAsia-Pacific's security has been creeping onto ASEAN's agenda: as asenior Singaporean diplomat declared, "we are nudging ourselves, orbeing nudged, into this way of thinking" (81). ASEAN thinking onbroader Asia-Pacific matters began to take concrete form during aseries of academic conferences, with 'informal' governmentalparticipation, in the summer of 1991 in Jakarta, Manila and KualaLumpur. One group of influential ASEAN academics has proposed anASEAN PMM-initiated "Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia-Pacific" including the ASEAN countries, the dialogue partners, andadditional invitations on a regular basis to China, the Soviet Union,North Korea, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. One of its objectives wouldbe to "contribute to the constructive management of the emerginginternational processes in the region, with a view to theestablishment of a multilateral framework of cooperative peace". Asannounced in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of theAsean Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, there is agrowing consensus that the organization should use the vehicle of anexpanded Post-Ministerial Meeting, eventually including a widermembership, as a forum for discussion of Asia-Pacific political andsecurity issues (82). And for the first time in July 1991, China andthe Soviet Union attended the annual meeting of foreign ministers ofASEAN member states.ASEAN countries have thus come to acknowledge the merits of thePMM as the basis for an institutionalized security dialogue. It would(80) Asian Bulletin, April 1992:6.(81) FEER, 20 June 1991.(82) FEER, 20 June 1991 and 1 August 1991.82notably enable ASEAN states to deal with the perceived expansionistmaritime policies of both China and Japan by enmeshing them into amultilateral framework, to address the emerging security dilemmasthrough dialogue and reassurance. Recently, in May 1992, Malaysia hasoffered to host an Asia-Pacific security dialogue next year. As asenior member of the Malaysian armed forces suggested: "Emulating theASEAN model, a similar mechanism on a region-wide basis to provide aplatform for dialogue among the armed forces on regional securityshould be established". Thus, as a senior Indonesian delegate said:"We will evolve an ASEAN-centric structure in the ASEAN way - throughdiscussions and consensus" (83) - that is through ASEAN's approach tosecurity based on "peaceful and cooperative" relationships amongstates.Thus the philosophy underlying the proposals for futhering Asia-Pacific's security stems from the ASEAN experience and from theliberal assumptions that the ASEAN experience displays.(83) Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), 27 July 1991.83CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONThe purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the argumentthat the neorealist theory of international politics will be helpfulin explaining the security environment of the periphery in the post-Cold War era. Scholars that have answered the question of whether theend of the Cold War will lead to new modes of cooperation or createnew opportunities for conflicts have usually predicted pessimisticprospects for the periphery. They indeed have argued that the newglobal situation should multiply and exacerbate conflicts. Such apessimism is furthered by the neorealist belief that cooperationamong states should seldom occur, should only emerge when motivatedby a common threat and should be inconsequential in restrainingstates' behavior and in promoting substantive security.This thesis has sought to contend that although a common enemymay help cooperation to emerge and to be maintained, cooperation maynot exclusively hinge on such motivations. Chapter 2 has posited thatsome states in the periphery have developed mutual interests inavoiding war that motivate them to cooperate. In such cases,cooperation based on common interests will be more significant andmay promote substantive security in the periphery. In presenting suchan argument, it is clear that the analysis we made falls within abasically liberal mold. Hence the hypothesis set in Chapter 2, whichstates that cooperation may be better explained by liberal theoryrather than by neorealism.84In analyzing the case study of ASEAN in the post-Cold War era, wehave looked for evidence that ASEAN member states have reduced theircommitment to war as an instrument of policy: our findings do lendsupport to our hypothesis.Evidence does 'prove' that ASEAN states are adopting neorealiststrategies to ensure their survival: they are indeed resorting toself-help as well as forming alliances with external great powers.Yet it also shows that states are ultimately seeking to promotecooperation and pursue their strategy of conflict managementprecisely on the grounds that war has lost its utility. Therefore,while ASEAN cooperation has been facilitated by a common enemy,evidence shows that liberal pressures also provided states'motivations for collaborating. We found that ASEAN states have beenwilling to create a 'security community' on the liberal assumptionthat they place more importance on economics rather than on militarypower. Progress towards ASEAN members' security in the post-Cold Warera thus has depended on one element: the continued reluctance ofstates to initiate war because of its disruptive potential. As far asASEAN's future is concerned, despite challenges to ASEAN's viabilityresulting from the end of the Cold War, member states are willing tostrengthen cooperation among them; security cooperation, based on theliberal assumptions discussed above, is also gradually being extendedto the whole of Southeast Asia as well as to the wider Asia-Pacificarea.Cooperation among ASEAN states has, and will continue to promotesubstantive progress in the security of the region. Liberal theoryis therefore more useful in explaining some developments in ASEAN85than is neorealist theory, but does not yet account for the full-range of their security behavior. Liberal theory does not challengethe relevance of neorealism in depicting the periphery in the post-Cold War era, but qualifies it (84).For liberal theory to really challenge the applicability ofneorealism, indictaions should be found that a norm has developedamong ASEAN states, which stigmatizes war as being illegitimate;evidence should be found of a moral inhibition regarding war amongthe societies of ASEAN member states, and of the fact that thesestates are willing to place their faith in other countries becausethey share the same values. Needless to say, such evidence is stillextremely difficult to identify among ASEAN states. Thus, althoughneorealist theories of international relations cannot fully accountfor the developments that are occurring among some states in theperiphery, they still are partially relevant in depicting theperiphery in the post-Cold War era. Our findings nevertheless showthat some developments also support a liberal argument. 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