EVALUATING COMPETING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COOPERATION: THE CASE STUDY OF ASEAN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

by

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War is bringing about crucial changes in international relations. The Cold War security system has collapsed and the old bipolar international system is crumbling. These changes are now central to political debates in international relations. Scholars have asked whether these new developments would lead to new modes of cooperation or whether they would create new opportunities for conflicts.

As far as developed states (*core states*) are concerned, most scholars agree that they now form a community and have ruled out the use of war in their relations. Hence the growing interest in non-realist, more specifically liberal theories of international relations. Yet for the Third World and the Second World disaggregated (the *periphery*), the neorealist theory still seems to prevail among scholars: it is indeed usually inferred that the collapse of the Cold War security system and the consequent changes in the distribution of power will increase instability and exacerbate conflicts in the periphery. This thesis presents and evaluates this perspective on the stability of the post-Cold War periphery, as well as its theoretical underpinnings.

At its simplest, the neorealists' world is characterized by conflict and the constant possibility of war. Neorealists do acknowledge the likelihood of cooperation in such a conflictual world. Yet they usually hold that, particularly in the security arena, cooperation is unusual, fleeting and temporary. They further argue that cooperation is rare, because states act autonomously and

self-help is the rule. Since neorealists hold that states cooperate only to deal with a common threat, they see cooperation, when manifest, as temporary or inconsequential and ultimately explained by conflict. The neorealist perspective on international cooperation thus raises an important theoretical question regarding states' motivations for cooperating: is a common enemy required for the creation and maintenance of cooperation among states ?

This thesis examines the hypothesis that cooperation among some peripheral states may be better explained by liberal theory than by neorealism - namely that states will be motivated for cooperating not exclusively because of a common enemy, but because they have reduced their commitment to war as an instrument of policy.

The case-study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- the current debate on ASEAN security cooperation and its future relevance in the post-Cold War era -- provides evidence to test our hypothesis. Neorealists have pointed out that such sub-regional security cooperation, being the sole product of intraregional stress, will last only as long as there is a common enemy. Thus they hold that today, with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, the continued viability of the organization cannot be taken for granted. Unless ASEAN states find a new common enemy, intra-ASEAN security cooperation will be jeopardized. This thesis underlines the limitations of this discourse on the Association. It argues that, while ASEAN has been created and maintained thanks to the common communist enemy, motivations for cooperation have changed. Habits of cooperation and mutual interests in avoiding war, as well as the belief that war is not a viable instrument of policy, have

developed: ASEAN in the post-Cold War era will thus seek to strengthen peaceful change rather than gradually collapsing.

Such motivations for cooperating are not explained by the neorealist theory, and may be more accountable to liberal theory. This thesis thus contends that the ASEAN case study may provide grounds to water down the pessimistic prospect that neorealists put forward for peripheral states' stability in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War is bringing about crucial changes in international relations. The Cold War security system has collapsed and the old bipolar international system is crumbling. These changes are now central to political debates in international relations. Scholars have asked whether these new developments would lead to new modes of cooperation or whether they would create new opportunities for conflicts.

As far as developed states (*'core states'*) are concerned, most scholars agree that they now form a community and have ruled out the use of war in their relations (Jervis, 1992; Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992; Buzan, 1991b). Hence the growing interest in non-realist, more specifically liberal theories of international relations. Yet for the Third World and the Second World disaggregated (the *periphery*), the neorealist theory still seems to prevail among scholars (1): it is indeed usually inferred that the collapse of the Cold War security system and the consequent changes in the distribution of power will increase instability and exacerbate conflicts in the periphery. This thesis presents and evaluates this perspective on the stability of the post-Cold War periphery, as well as its theoretical underpinnings.

At its simplest, the neorealists' world is characterized by

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(1) Throughout this thesis, we will be using the term 'neorealists' to refer to the realists writing in the 'structural' tradition of international relations scholarship. The most influential argument for a structural perspective is K. Waltz, 1979. It should be noted however that while traditional realists and neorealists diverge on certain points (see below: section 2.2), they do agree on crucial issues like the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states, and the problem of cooperation (Grieco, 1988: 1, fn. 1).

conflict and the constant possibility of war (Stein, 1990: 16-20). Neorealists do acknowledge the likelihood of cooperation in such a conflictual world. Yet they usually hold that, particularly in the security arena, "cooperation is unusual, fleeting and temporary". Stein further argues that for neorealists, "cooperation is rare, because states act autonomously and self-help is the rule... Since (neorealists) hold that states cooperate only to deal with a common threat, they see cooperation, when manifest, as temporary or inconsequential and ultimately explained by conflict" (*id.*: 6-7). The neorealist perspective on international cooperation thus raises an important theoretical question regarding states' motivations for cooperating: is a common enemy required for the creation and maintenance of cooperation among states ?

This thesis attempts to answer this theoretical question by examining the current debate on ASEAN security cooperation and its future relevance in the post-Cold War era.

The following chapter analyzes the competing perpectives on the periphery's stability in the post-Cold War era. It focuses on and presents in detail the prevailing perspective, namely the neorealist one, which basically holds that conflicts will multiply; neorealists also posit that states will seldom cooperate, and ultimately to deal with a common enemy. It then puts forward an alternative perspective on the issue. This thesis indeed argues that although neorealism may account for the general international security environment in the periphery in the post-Cold War era, the behavior of states in certain regions of the periphery may be better explained by a non-realist,

liberal theory. Liberal theory may be described in a rather archetypal manner as cooperation-oriented (Stein, 1990: 16-20); in fact liberals differ in a major way from neorealists in that they believe forms of cooperation in the international system to be significant and to be based on states' mutual interests rather than on a common threat. This thesis thus examines the hypothesis that cooperation among some peripheral states may be better explained by liberal theory than by neorealism - namely that states will be motivated for cooperating because they have reduced their commitment to war as an instrument of policy.

The following two chapters then focus on the case study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to test our hypothesis (2). This case-study is indeed significant because the neorealist discourse is usually applied to account for the Association's creation, maintenance and future relevance.

Chapter 3 thus outlines the neorealist perspective on the Association - namely that ASEAN, without a common threat, will not survive in the post-Cold War era. Neorealists have argued that ASEAN was created in the midst of the Cold War in Southeast Asia (1967), and that it found its real *raison d'etre* in the common resistance to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. The common opposition to this communist menace in Southeast Asia provided the main ground on which the member states muted their bilateral disputes and cooperated. Neorealists have pointed out that such sub-regional security cooperation, being the sole product of intraregional stress,

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(2) ASEAN comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei.

will last only as long as there is a common enemy (Ayoob, 1986: 18-19; and "Comments" by S.D. Muni, *ibid.:* 31-32). Thus they hold that today, with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, the continued viability of the organization cannot be taken for granted. Unless ASEAN states find a new common enemy, intra-ASEAN security cooperation will be jeopardized (Acharya, 1991: 176).

Chapter 4 underlines the limitations of this discourse on the Association. It argues that, while ASEAN has been created and maintained thanks to the common communist enemy, motivations for cooperation have changed. Habits of cooperation and mutual interests in avoiding war, as well as the belief that war is not a viable instrument of policy, have developed: ASEAN in the post-Cold War era will thus seek to strengthen peaceful change in the Association, in Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific region, rather than gradually collapsing. Such motivations for cooperating are not explained by the neorealist theory, and may be more accountable to liberal theory. This thesis thus contends that the ASEAN case study provides grounds to water down the pessimistic prospect that neorealists put forward for peripheral states' stability in the post-Cold War era.

The final chapter, along with summarizing the main points of this thesis, evaluates the findings regarding our hypothesis, and broadly explores the future prospects for a liberal argument on security cooperation in the periphery in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 2 - THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE PERIPHERY'S STABILITY: EVALUATING COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

Studying the implications of the end of the Cold War on states' security involves a certain degree of prediction in world politics which, as Robert Jervis clearly pointed out, is a rather difficult exercise (Jervis, 1992). The subtitle of Jervis' article raises the main question that scholars tackle concerning the future of world politics: "will it resemble the past ?"

> Cyclical thinking suggests that, freed from the constraints of the Cold War, world politics will return to earlier patterns. Many of the basic generalizations of international politics remain unaltered: it is still anarchic in the sense that there is no international sovereign that can make and enforce laws and agreements. The security dilemma remains as well, with the problem it creates for states who would like to cooperate but whose security requirements do not mesh. Many specific causes of conflict also remain... To put it more generally, both aggression and spirals of insecurity and tension can still disturb the peace. But are the conditions that call these forces into being as prevalent as they were in the past ? Are the forces that restrain violence now as strong or stronger than they were ? (Jervis, 1992: 46).

No single response to these questions has been put forward: different answers for different regions may be posited. Indeed, in this, most scholars have usually distinguished between developed (or 'core') countries and developing (or 'peripheral') countries (3). Some neorealists have contended that the end of the Cold War will result in a renewed instability in Western Europe (Mearsheimer, 1990). Yet others have more convincingly pointed to the emergence of a 'pluralistic security community' among core states - that is a group of states that have developed "dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Deutsch, 1957: 5-6; see Jervis, 1992: 55). Three

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(3) On the use of this vocabulary, see below.

major interactive factors have been determinant of this change: the nuclear revolution and the consequent increased cost of war (Jervis, 1992); the changes in domestic regimes and values -- modern democratic states focussing on maximizing wealth rather than power (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 468); and the high level of economic interdependence among modern democratic states (Jervis, 1992: 52-53). As a result of those three factors, relations among developed states have changed: international norms have been strengthened and the use of war to solve conflicts has been ruled out (Jervis, 1992; Buzan, 1991b; Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992).

Opinions also diverge on the implications of the end of the Cold War for peripheral countries, but most scholars consider the prospects for their security gloomier than those for the core states. For developing states, "...there is no reason to think that the basic contours of international politics (in the Third World) will be unfamiliar" (Jervis, 1992: 61). In other words, there is a likelihood of increased instability in the periphery in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter will present and evaluate the competing perspectives (as well as their theoretical underpinnings) on the end of the Cold War's implications for the periphery's stability. The first section will discuss those competing views; the second will focus on the perspective that prevails among scholars, namely the neorealist one. Finally, the last section will discuss the limitations of this pessimistic argument. We will argue that, although the end of the Cold War may increase instability and conflicts in the periphery, the neorealist paradigm does not help us explain the full-range security of security behavior of peripheral states. Some developing countries,

fearing that the end of the Cold War might bring more instability, may indeed try to counteract this trend and may redouble their efforts to work together and minimize frictions. States' motivations for engaging in such cooperative processes, however, may not be explained by neorealist theory: this thesis indeed contends that neorealism may be relatively useful for depicting the post-Cold War situation in the periphery, but that motivations for cooperation among certain states may be best explained by liberal theory. (The following two chapters will then provide evidence to back up our argument, focussing on the ASEAN case-study).

2.1 - IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF BIPOLARITY FOR THE PERIPHERY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The first issue that the end of the Cold War raises is one of vocabulary. The label *Third World*, often criticized during the Cold War period as being a "residual category" and "surely a confession of intellectual failure" (Jervis, 1992: 58), further lost its relevance with the disappearance of the Second World (Buzan, 1991b: 432) (4).

Scholars have therefore tried to coin a new expression suitable to the current situation. Geographical labels such as "South" by contrast to the "North" have not been regarded as satisfactory, as they are misleading geographical images (Australia being in the South and Eastern Europe in the North) (*ibid.*). The expression *periphery* (by opposition to a core), borrowed from the dependency theory, has been considered as the most relevant label: "center here

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(4) For a different perspective on the relevance of the term "Third World" as an analytic category, see Steven R. David, 1991: 238-42.

implies a globally dominant core of capitalist economies; "periphery" a set of industrially, financially and politically weaker (5) states operating within a set of relationships largely constructed by the center". Buzan goes to argue that "the center-periphery approach captures much of what remains constant from the past and is a useful framework within which to consider the impact of changes in the core on the security of the periphery" (Buzan, 1991b: 434). Goldgeier and McFaul also argue that the core and periphery concepts are "analytically useful because they denote and demarcate two different kinds of space. First in economic terms, core refers to the industrialized states of Western Europe, North America and Japan, whereas periphery refers to the agriculturally based, industrializing states of the developing world (6). Second, in reference to power, periphery denotes those states which are "weak" relative to the core of great powers dominating the international system" (1992: 469, fn.7).

This change in vocabulary is far from being merely symbolic: although the countries forming the core have remained the same, the term 'periphery' in the post-Cold War era encompasses both the ex-Third World and the Second World disaggregated. Moreover, this change in vocabulary captures one of the major implications of the end of the Cold War for the developing countries' security environment -- namely the decoupling of the core's security concerns from those of

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(5) On the concept of 'weak' states, see Buzan, 1991a. Buzan distinguishes the weak/strong state dichotomy (which is based on the degree of socio-political cohesiveness) from the weak/strong power dichotomy (which is based on the range and size of resources and capabilities).

(6) The definition of the periphery that Goldgeier and McFaul put forward is rather schematic: some states such as the Newly Industrialised Countries, although located in the periphery, do not really fit those qualifications.

the periphery.

We will analyze the different opinions on three main consequences of the collapse of the bipolar system of security: the prospects for core states' involvement in the periphery; the prospects for regional conflicts; and finally the implications of the general diffusion of power. Scholars' views as to the consequences of the decoupling for the periphery's security environment may diverge; however, there is a prevalent assumption among them that, in the post-Cold War era, the periphery's security environment will be less stable than during the Cold War.

2.1.1: Prospects for core states' involvement in the periphery

During the Cold War, as a result of the superpowers' involvement in the Third World, an intimate relationship was assumed between global security imperatives and regionally indigenous ones: witness the analyses of the security of Third World states and regions, which were primarily undertaken from American or Soviet viewpoints (7). B. Buzan's concept of "overlay" depicted the extreme situation "when the direct presence of outside powers in a region (was) strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states" (1992: 365) (8). Today, all scholars acknowledge that the international security order of the post-Cold War era will bear little resemblance to the post-WWII order, but "the implications of

(7) Michael Nacht, "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security", *Daedalus* 110 (Winter 1981), 1-22; and S. Neil MacFarlane, "The Soviet Conception of Regional Security", *World Politics* 37 (April 1985), 295-316.

(8) Overlay involves, "at a minimum, substantial long-term stationing of military forces by outside powers in the region. It may also involve effective political takeover, as in the case of the Soviet empire in Eastern urope after the Second World War" (Buzan, 1992: 365).

such a revised order for the Third World and its security dilemmas remain puzzling. The events leading to and following the Persian Gulf War of 1991 have in many ways exercised a more direct impact upon Third World countries and their security interests" than the end of the Cold War itself (Job, 1992: 66). The characteristics and the outcome of this first post-Cold War regional conflict have indeed provided grounds for three different scenarios concerning the approach of major powers to regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era. The first scenario states that a condominium/multilateral regime will take a managerial role regarding regional conflicts; the second one posits that the United States will provide a global policeman role and thus intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts; the third argues that above all, indifference will characterize the core-periphery relationship in the post-Cold War era.

The first scenario posits that as the Cold War disappears, some form of condominium or multilateral regime (e.g. a reinvigorated United Nations) will emerge to attempt to manage security problems in the periphery (Mac Farlane, 1992: 475). This scenario points to the evidence of the 1991 Gulf War. However, the major powers may not have the interest and more significantly the resources required to deal with all regional conflicts. Russia, as the inheritor of the Soviet Union, is unlikely to play a role of any importance in the periphery given its own deeply-entrenched political, social and economic problems. Moreover, although the strengthening of the UN Security Council role may be viewed as a positive development, the consensus fostered during the Gulf War might not be easy to reproduce: the approval of all five members for an intervention in Kuwait was the

result of a fortuitous convergence of interests rather than a real consensus.

The scenario of a unipolar world (Krauthammer, 1990), in which the United States would assume the management of regional conflicts like a global policeman points to the interventions in Panama in 1990 and in the 1991 Gulf War. This scenario can easily be debunked as the United States does not have the actual political, financial and military means of such a unilateralism. The issues of the political and financial means are closely linked: the US needs international financial support for intervening, given its deficits and given that the Democratic-lead Congress would otherwise not consent to the use of forces abroad. As for the military means, the question is whether the force reductions envisaged by the Administration will preserve the US' ability to act alone. According to J. Tritten, it might keep its capability of a unilateral tactical intervention, but a strategic and operational one (like Desert Shield) might require the participation of host nations and allies (Tritten, 1991: 35). As Jervis states, "it is ... far from clear whether other states would tolerate having so little influence as they did in (the Persian Gulf) case. The alternative is a smaller American contribution and truly multilateral decision-making. But how often has the United States been willing to take an active part in an international venture without playing the leading role ?" (1992: 68).

The third scenario posits that core states' involvement in the Persian Gulf was highly dependent on peculiar circumstances, so that further involvement in the periphery will be highly reduced and highly selective: Goldgeier and McFaul state that core states "will

neither intervene to preserve the security of a peripheral state nor constrain a peripheral state from undertaking belligerent actions unless core economic interests are at stake" (1992: 486). Jervis, focusing on the United States, doubts that economic interests (such as access to raw material) will drive the US to intervene abroad (1992: 63-4). He underlines the fact that "how involved America should be in world politics and what values it should seek to foster - and at what cost and risk - are questions that remain open, unanswered, and largely unaddressed" (1992: 73). Whatever the nuances may be, most scholars believe that, "to the extent that bipolar conflict and the concentration of power in the centre are both presently weakening, the current outlook should be for less intervention by the great powers in regional security affairs" (Buzan, 1992: 389). The third scenario indeed posits that the end of the Cold war will spawn a decoupling of great powers' security imperatives from those of the periphery, and thus lead to a superpower withdrawal from their commitment abroad. Consequently, the post-Cold War era will witness an accelerated trend towards the "decentralization of the international security system" (Kolodziej and Harkavy, 1980: 59).

2.1.2 - Prospects for regional conflicts

The end of the Cold War and the decoupling of core states' security imperatives from the peripheral security ones will have major implications for regional conflicts (given the subordination of the local security dynamics to those of the overlaying powers during the Cold War period). This decoupling raises primarily the following

question: is the end of the Cold War likely to increase or decrease international conflicts in the Third World ? There are two separate views which, to put it simply, may be labelled optimistic and pessimistic.

The optimistic perspective stems from the assumption that the Cold War exacerbated regional conflicts. Thus, the end of the bipolar structure will tend to dampen current conflicts. Superpowers are viewed as having involved Third World states in wars not of their own making, overloading client regimes with unecessary oversophisticated weapons, and imposing artificial ideological definition to regional politics. The war in Angola, for instance, epitomized these processes. Thus, the retreat of the superpowers bodes well for the security of peripheral states in the post-Cold War era.

The assumption that superpower involvement dampened and inhibited Third World conflicts provides grounds for the pessimistic viewpoint. Some scholars indeed posit that the end of the Cold War will result in the reemergence of local conflicts in the periphery, what one may label the "reversion" thesis (9). Scholars such as Ayoob (1991), Buzan (1991a and 1992) or Jervis (1992) view the superpowers as having imposed structures and limits upon Third World conflicts and security competition which were in some sense "beneficial". They also point to the fact that the regional conflicts had their origins in indigenous forces, not in the Soviet-American rivalry: witness the Iran-Iraq war. Thus in turn, withdrawal by the US and USSR from their commitments and initiatives abroad will be accompanied by a

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(9) One may note that such a reversion thesis is also put forward by Mearsheimer in the case of Western Europe (Mearsheimer, 1990).

rekindling of traditional and communal disputes in the periphery. These conflicts, "proceeding without any restraining superpower hand, fuelled by supplies of weapons obtained readily and without qualms by buyers or sellers, will be even more bloody and less resolvable than before" (Job, 1992: 67-68).

The optimistic and the pessimistic views are in fact not mutually exclusive: the Cold War both dampened and exacerbated conflicts. But "it generally dampened conflict and we can therefore expect more rather than less conflicts in the future" (Jervis, 1992: 59).

2.1.3: Implications of the general diffusion of power

The core-periphery divorce is also "supported by the diffusion of power to the regional states, which should extend the process begun by decolonization of increasing the importance of regional security dynamics" (Buzan, 1992: 389). The subsequent lowering of great power concern and engagement will let regional security complexes reemerge. Thus, as Buzan states, "it seems a safe bet to predict that indigenous patterns of regional security will be increasingly important features of the international system in the twenty-first century" (Buzan, 1992: 442). It thus underlines the theoretical point that, as far as security issues are concerned, there is not a single international system: it makes more sense to begin with the assumption that there are unique regional security systems that may or may not be linked in various ways to the great power security system (Holsti, 1992: 91).

Buzan further argues that the decrease in core states' intervention in the periphery will by definition give more leverage

to local powers to reshape the political environment of their regions (Buzan, 1991b: 435). Ayoob goes on and highlights the deleterious implications of such a diffusion of power:

> A disentanglement on the part of both superpowers from arenas of tension and conflict in the periphery may remove some of the restraints on the conflictual behavior of important peripheral states. The aggressive potential of those states has been constrained by the apprehension that it could draw negative reactions from the superpowers. But the superpowers pulling back might lead to greater assertiveness on the part of regionally preeminent powers interested in translating their preeminence into hegemony, or at least into a managerial role within their respective regions. Resistance by other countries to such regional hegemonic behavior might in turn lead to situations of violent interstate conflict relatively unhindered by concerns regarding superpower intervention (Ayoob, 1991: 282).

Witness Saddam Hussein's aggression of Kuwait in August 1990: the continuation of the Cold War would have made the aggression less likely, but the global changes offered him a window of opportunity. States that are dominant regional powers or that aspire to such status will thus play a greater role in the security concerns of states in their areas: scholars usually point to states such as India, Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, China, Iran, Iraq among others (International Journal, 1991).

The theoretical underpinnings of this pessimistic thesis are rooted in the neorealist belief that the distribution of power in the system affects its stability. According to neorealists, the distribution of capabilities is indeed the major determinant of international outcomes: "given state interests ... patterns of outcomes in world politics will be determined by the overall distribution of power among states" (Keohane, 1986: 183). Following K. Waltz, mainstream neorealists argue that bipolar systems are more

stable than multipolar ones (1979: chap. 5-6) (10). Thus, the current general dispersion of power, the multipolar structure of the system and the reemergence of regional complexes will bring more instability to the periphery in the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 1991c: 52).

In conclusion, the answer to the question : "is the end of the Cold War likely to increase or to decrease international conflicts in the periphery ?" ultimately stems from the neorealist model. In the periphery -- contrary to the core -- the demise of the bipolar structure will permit more aggression and mutual insecurity that constitute the standard pattern of international conflict. The same cause - the disappearance of the bipolar structure - will thus have different effects; in the periphery, many of the basic generalizations of traditional neorealist international politics remain unaltered. This suggests that peripheral states will have to seek means of enhancing their security in such a situation of new found vulnerability.

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(10) The linkage neorealists posit between this polarity of the international system and the incidence of war are in fact open to debate. The logic of Waltz's position (a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one) is among neorealists themselves open to dispute: they disagree about what configuration of capabilities would constitute a stable distribution of power. Where Waltz argues that a bipolar balance is more stable, Gilpin for example, argues that hegemonic power provides more stability (1981). The theories and empirical evidence are largely contradictory, so that no authoritative generalizations have emerged.

2.2. PERIPHERAL STATES' SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEOREALIST HYPOTHESES

Neorealism posits that states have static interests, with the primary interest being survival and security in an anarchical environment (11). States may pursue different strategies in order to guarantee their perpetuity. Some neorealists agree with the realists on the hypothesis that states will seek to maximize their power. Yet the most influential argument for a structural perspective remains Waltz's, which holds that states seek to balance power against threatening and more powerful states rather than maximizing it (see also Grieco, 1988).

2.2.1: Maximizing power

The quest for survival and security shapes states' goals in international relations: following the realist argument, some neorealists believe that accumulating wealth and power are the two overriding goals of states as the means to guarantee states' perpetuity.

"In many parts of the developing world, power and wealth are still linked in ways recognizable to the realists... Not only can conquering new lands lead to more secure borders, but the addition of population and resources can increase the wealth that supports military power" (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 479-80). Thus, following

(11) Anarchy means that "states do not accept any significant legal or moral constraints in their interactions with each other" (Zacher and Matthew, 1992: 7). Grieco notes that "R. Gilpin observes that individuals and groups may seek truth, beauty, and justice, but he emphasizes that "all these more noble goals will be lost unless one makes provision for one's security in the power struggle among groups" (1988: 498). See also Waltz, 1979: 88-92.

the realist paradigm, power is traditionally identified with increased population, accretion of territory and - as by the mercantilist doctrine -, with wealth.

Goldgeier and McFaul point to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which "demonstrated that Saddam Hussein discerned a direct relationship between military power and economic gain. Adding the resources of new oil fields would have added to his wealth and thus his power both in the region and globally" (*ibid.*). Other conflicts over economic resources could thus possibly lead to such military actions in the periphery; access to needed but scarce economic resources may broaden the national security perimeter. Disputes over territory may consequently be far from obsolete in the periphery, as they are among core states. As goals of peripheral states in the post-Cold War era will involve territorial conquests, the territorial *status quo* might be queried. Some scholars point to the fact that post-colonial boundaries might be questioned in the post-Cold War era, particularly in Africa and in the Middle-East. Buzan states:

> Although there is no clear link between the Cold War and the attempt to fix boundaries, the ending of the Cold War is opening up boundary question in a rather major way...It is not yet clear if it is the norm of fixed boundaries that is under assault or only the practice in specific locations. But it is clear that this norm is vulnerable to the counter-norm of national self-determination, and that some of the restraints on boundary change have been weakened by the ending of the Cold War (Buzan, 1991b: 440-1).

He adds that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, besides being an attempt at conquering scarce economic resources, was also "an explicit assault on the post-colonial boundaries" (*ibid.*) (12). The post-Cold

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(12) In fact, the likelihood of territorial disputes is open to debate: R. Jackson has argued that peripheral states' commitment to territorial boundaries as well as juridical sovereignty points to the unlikelihood of territorial disputes (1987 and

War era might increase the concerns of states that worry for their whole or partial territorial integrity. Their primary fears of absorption (or of loss of significant portions of their territory) usually revolve around threats from neighbouring countries. As discussed above, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent lowering of great power engagement will give more leverage to local powers to reshape the political environment of their regions to the detriment of their neighbours (Buzan, 1991b: 435).

Given that accumulation of power and wealth to ensure survival remains the overriding goal of states in the periphery, some scholars argue that the realist paradigm will be helpful in explaining the behavior of states outside of the economic and political core.

2.2.2: Balancing power

Other scholars explicitly (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 469; Buzan, 1991b) or implicitly (Jervis, 1992) argue that the neorealist paradigm is helpful in explaining the behavior of states within regional systems outside of the economic and political core in the post-Cold War era. In the core, "the logic of state behavior predicted by realist balance-of-power theory no longer applies" (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 480). Nuclear weapons, economic interdependence as well as shared democratic political norms are,

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1991). Holsti (1991: 310) as well as Zacher (1992: 7) state that boundaries have achieved a legitimacy that they never had in the past: witness constraints such as the OAU norm against the revision of territorially inherited boundaries, as well as Third World consensus against the Iraqui invasion of Kuwait. Acquisition of territory has also declined in its strategic and economic value: "while Holsti finds that territorial wars still occur regularly (albeit at reduced rate), he does indicate that both international normative constraint and a decrease in the importance of territory for international power is reducing the probability of wars over territory", Zacher (1992: 7, fn. 44).

among others, factors that converge in creating an environment prone to cooperation and to peaceful change rather than to power politics. In the periphery, however, states' behavior as suggested by the neorealist paradigm is, argue Goldgeier and McFaul, highly relevant. They note that:

> In the periphery, absolute deterrents that might induce caution do not exist. A variety of political systems ranging from democracies to monarchies coexist side by side, and interdependence between peripheral states is subordinate to dependence on core states. Pressures for expansion are still present, stemming from goals of wealth, population, and protection as well as from internal instabilities (1992: 469-70) (13).

Goldgeier and McFaul go on to argue that given the decoupling of core states' security concerns from the periphery ones, peripheral states "will have to seek means of enhancing security within their own states or regions. Classic structural realist balance-of-power theory delineates the options available" (1992: 487). Neorealists posit that when states see the primary threats to their security coming from threatening and more powerful states or coalitions of states, they pursue two general strategies. They may seek to counterbalance the power of hostile or potentially hostile states and coalitions either by building their own power (self-help strategy) and/or by forming alliances (Waltz, 1979).

States may seek to deter a potential aggressor by relying on themselves. Stein writes: "to realists... states in the anarchic world of international politics rely only on themselves. ... They

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(13) The statement on the inexistence of nuclear weapons is odd, given that there *are* nuclear powers in the periphery, and that the number of haves might well increase in the future. What Goldgeier and McFaul may point to is that the deterrence effect of those weapons is not effective among peripheral states. On the nuclear issue in the periphery, see Buzan, 1991b: 442-44.

must not allow themselves to become dependent on others" (1991: 5). They may seek to deter a hypothetical aggressor through the increase of their military capabilities by either purchasing weapons and/or developing domestic arms production capabilities. In certain areas of the globe such as the Asia-Pacific region, the end of the Cold War is indeed resulting in a growing militarization (Cheeseman, 1991). Not only are some peripheral countries developing their military capabilities, but they are particularly acquiring more 'offensive' and hence more potentially destabilising weapons (Mack, 1992: 1). The 'security dilemma' metaphor will consequently be highly relevant to depict peripheral states' security concerns in the post-Cold War era. Jervis writes:

> (In the post-Cold War era), aggression will be less difficult and, partly for this reason, *status quo* states in the Third World will worry more about self-protection. Even absent aggressive motives, conflict will often result through the security dilemma: states' effort to make themselves more secure will threaten others (Jervis, 1992: 60).

The resulting spiral of tension might pave the way, because of possible misperceptions, to inadvertent wars: as Gilpin states, the most devastating effect of the security dilemma is indeed the "unresolved problem of war" (Gilpin, 1981: 7).

States can also choose, following the neorealist paradigm, to form alliances. A pure balance-of-power theory of alliances predicts that alliances form against the strongest state or coalition: states seek to balance against power (or threats according to Walt, 1988). States concerned with their own survival will act in concert to prevent the emergence of a power that threatens them. Walt argues that states may also bandwagon with threats rather than balance

against them. However, the most obvious strategy for states facing an adversary with hegemonial pretensions is, according to Walt and Holsti, balancing. "The alternative, bandwagoning (supporting the hegemon), has proven through experience to be a more dangerous and less successful strategy" (1992: 93). Witness the post-Cold War example of "Saddam Hussein's quest for regional hegemony (which) forced the other Middle Eastern states to act, with Jordon choosing to bandwagon and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria choosing to balance against the rising threat" (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 487).

Joining an alliance is a form of cooperation. Stein thus locates them "between the poles of convergent interests and self-interested autonomy" (1990: 168). But "alliances represent temporary marriages of convenience" (*ibid.*: 152). They lack permanence because they continually change as the relative power of states changes; they represent commitments that are temporary and that are based on a convenient convergence of interests. They are thus rather inconsequential in restraining allies (14).

If the neorealist paradigm is, as some scholars argue, highly relevant in explaining peripheral states behavior in the post-Cold War era, there is no prospect for change in the international relations of the periphery: states' continued commitments to their own security and survival as a guide to their behavior will impede changes towards a more secure international system - what Adler, Crawford and Donelly label 'progress' in international relations

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(14) Stein develops the argument that certain alliances do matter because they lead the states bound by them sometimes to pursue certain courses of action because of their allies and in contradiction with their own interest (1990: 154).

(1991). Self-help, needless to say, does not promote international security; "alliances may be able to preserve balances of power and thus generate ephemeral stability", but do not promote real substantive progress in international security (Adler, 1991: 159). Thus, while the perspectives scholars outline for core states in the post-Cold War era are rather optimistic, propects for the periphery remain highly pessimistic.

2.3: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Adler, Crawford and Donelly (1991) believe that a minimalist progress in international relations -- and more specifically in security -- is possible. Changes in states' policies have and will promote security: Adler argues that substantive progress in international security may be achieved through the creation of international cooperation through changes in values and expectations of war. He stresses that the creation and maintenance of international institutions whose norms, rules and procedures constrain the resort to war to settle conflicts (international *regimes*) provide a good indicator of progress. However, he underlines the fact that Third World states still have to be 'debelled', to resolve their "bitter struggles of nation building and integration, boundary disputes and lack of confidence in and expectation of a better economic future... (to develop) a higher expected utility from peace and from war" (Adler, 1991: 161).

This restriction may be relevant for the majority of peripheral states, but we hold that in certain regions of the periphery,

prospects for progress in security should be more likely. This thesis indeed argues that cooperation among states of a region may be a means by which substantive progress can come about, and that such cooperation is motivated by changes in values and in expectations of war among those states (15).

This section analyzes the prospects for regional cooperative arrangements. It argues that while neorealists do acknowledge the rationality of such arrangements, they hold that states do cooperate only to deal with a common threat. Cooperation is temporary and inconsequential: it thus does not provide a means by which international security could substantively be promoted. This thesis puts forward an alternative perspective which holds that cooperation among some peripheral states is motivated by a mutual interest in avoiding war, which should contribute to the creation of 'islands of peace' in the post-Cold War periphery.

2.3.1: Relevance of regional cooperative arrangements

In the post-Cold War era, the creation or the maintenance and strengthening of existing regional security arrangements may provide an avenue towards more stability in the periphery. Scholars that have been studying the security of peripheral states have usually downplayed the effectiveness and the relevance of regional security cooperation in alleviating the security problems of peripheral states. They argue (as Adler implicitly does) that because interstate

(15) Adler, Crawford and Donelly distinguish between instrumental and substantive progress."Substantive progress refers to the goals or ends by which progress is measured" (eg. security); "instrumental progress, on the other hand, involves the 'means' by which substantive progress comes about" (eg. international cooperation) (1991: 8).

conflicts usually stem from domestic problems, the only solution is to be found at the domestic level: nation-building and state-making are the only responses to the security problem of Third World states (Ayoob, 1986: 19; Buzan, 1991a: chap. 5) (16). "But this is sure to be a long drawn process; until then the Third World must resign itself to live in regionally - as in many other ways - insecure conditions" (Ayoob, 1986: 21). However, we believe that evidence (as provided below in our case study) shows that regional cooperation on security matters has been a means of improving national security of peripheral states by providing a more stable security environment. Moreover, given that the reduced involvement of great powers will restore autonomy to the separate regions in the periphery, the end of the Cold War will foster the aspiration to fashion regional solutions to regional problems such as the creation of 'zones of peace'. Muthiah Alagappa states:

> The new momentum underscoring the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the support of the major powers for this process may also give a boost to regional effort in other parts of the globe. ...Their place in the emerging structure for the maintenance of international peace and security would be a function of their effectiveness in the prevention and resolution of regional conflicts, and in the enhancement of national security of the states in the region (Alagappa, 1991: 1).

Acharya also mentions the fact that the role of regional cooperative arrangements is worth investigating "as the world searches for effective arrangements... to provide security and stability in the post-Cold War environment"(1992a: 19).

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(16) Buzan states: "building stronger states is virtually the only way in which the vicious circle of unstable states and an unstable security environment can be broken" (Buzan, 1988b: 40).

Neorealists do not frequently discuss the creation and the effectiveness of regional security arrangements. One could nevertheless make the case that in certain situations, they would consider this strategy as rational. A neorealist such as Barry Buzan has indeed acknowledged the existence and the relative effectiveness of regional security cooperation (Buzan, 1986; 1991a; 1992). But he emphasizes that conflict management among states in regional organizations such as the Arab League, the OAS and the OAU was due to the common front they were building against an outside state: Israel for the Arab League, Cuba for the OAS, South Africa for the OAU. The same argument has been put forward for sub-regional organizations such as ASEAN, the GCC, the SADCC and the OECS (17). Thus regional/subregional cooperation is to be explained by conflicts. Indeed, neorealists usually hold that, particularly in the security arena, "cooperation is rare, because states act autonomously and self-help is the rule... Since realists hold that states cooperate *only to deal with a common threat*, they see cooperation, when manifest, as temporary or inconsequential and *ultimately explained by conflict*" (Stein, 1990: 6 -- emphasis added).

This thesis contends that the neorealist perspective on regional cooperation may be undermined. In some cases, regional cooperation may be explained by mutual interest in avoiding war, by a shared perception that war is not a viable instrument of policy - namely by a nonrealist, liberal theory.

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(17) Indochina for ASEAN, Iran for the GCC, South Africa for the SADCC and Cuba for the OECS: see Tow, 1990b: 129.

2.3.2: Liberal motivations for cooperation

Liberals hold that cooperation is based on mutual interests rather than conflict, and that consequently, cooperation is more significant than neorealists argue (18): cooperation may promote substantive progress in international relations. This thesis argues that motivations for regional cooperation may be better explained by liberal rather than neorealist theory. Indeed, some developing countries, absorbed with economic development, are not willing to contemplate the cost of resorting to war in order to solve emerging/reemerging conflicts. Some peripheral countries place more emphasis on economic growth rather than on pure military power: they are consequently willing to create an international environment prone to peaceful change rather than to armed conflicts. On this basis, they have developed a mutual interest in cooperating in the security field. Thus, following neofunctionalist assumptions, states' interests in cooperation in the economic arena has led to a spill-over into other areas of cooperation involving high politics of security. The emmeshing of states, the promotion of dialogue and communication has fostered states' interests in ruling out the use of war as a useful instrument of foreign policy.

The central purpose of this thesis is to set forth the hypothesis that regional cooperation among some peripheral states in the post-Cold War era may be better explained by liberalism rather than by neorealism, and to test this hypothesis by examining the motivations

(18) "For neo-realists, mutual interests do not have a major impact... because there are serious obstacles to cooperation in an anarchic system... Mainstream liberals... diverge from neorealists in their belief that mutual interests have important impacts on international outcomes - particularly cooperation" (Zacher and Matthew, 1992: 9).

for cooperating among states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The hypothesis put forward holds that if liberal theory helps better in understanding peripheral states' behavior, we should then be able to find evidence that states have reduced their commitment to war as an instrument of policy. The development of these perceptions concerning the use of war among some peripheral states will have an important impact on the stability of their international environment. While in the post-Cold War era, international relations in the periphery will be far from free of conflict, cooperation on security issues among some peripheral states will alleviate the deleterious impact of the end of the Cold War. Thus the neorealist paradigm will prove to be too pessimistic and will not help us explain the full-range of security behavior in the periphery in the post-Cold War era. The case of ASEAN is relevant because the neorealist discourse is usually put forward to account for its creation, its rationale and its post-Cold War future (19). Neorealists argue that ASEAN was created in the midst of the Cold War in Southeast Asia (1967), and that it found its real *raison d'etre* in the common resistance to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. The common opposition to this communist menace in Southeast Asia provided the main ground on which the member states muted their bilateral disputes, cooperated and contributed to the

(19) This argument has been posited in the Western European case after the end of the Cold War: the Soviet/communist enemy that, argue the neorealists, fostered cooperation among some states was gradually disappearing. They indeed argue that cooperation among Western European states was due to the common opposition to the Eastern bloc and that the disintegration of bipolarity will dissolve the existence of common interests and will result in the reemergence of all the instability associated with the interwar period (Mearsheimer, 1990). The Cold War certainly heavily contributed to the development of a sense of community among Western states; but the end of the Cold War will not bring a return to the older patterns.

creation of a quasi-'pluralistic security community'. Neorealists have pointed out that this sub-regional security cooperation, being the sole product of intraregional stress, will last only as long as there is a common enemy (Ayoob, 1986: 18-19; and "Comments" by S.D. Muni, *ibid.*: 31-32). Thus today, with the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, the continued viability of the organization cannot be taken for granted. Unless ASEAN states find a new common enemy, intra-ASEAN security cooperation will be jeopardized (Acharya, 1991: 176). The neorealist perspective on security cooperation among ASEAN states in the post-Cold War era raises an important theoretical question: is a common enemy required for the creation and maintenance of cooperation ? In this thesis, we will attempt to answer this theoretical question by examining the current debate on ASEAN security cooperation and its future relevance in the post-Cold War era. In the next chapter, we will present in detail the neorealist perspective on the Association - namely that ASEAN as a quasi-'security community', will not stand without a common external threat. We will then underline the limitations of this thesis and argue that, while ASEAN as a quasi-'security community' has been created and maintained thanks to the common communist enemy, motivations for security cooperation have changed. Habits of cooperation as well as mutual interests in avoiding war have developed, so that ASEAN today is giving priority to cooperation and to the strengthening of peaceful change in the Association. This thesis thus contends that the ASEAN case study provides ground to water down the pessimistic prospect that neorealists put forward for peripheral states' stability in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 3 : THE NEOREALIST DISCOURSE ON ASEAN

This chapter deals with the neorealist discourse on ASEAN - ie. the neorealist interpretation of ASEAN's *raison d'etre*, achievements and, above all, of ASEAN's future. The neorealist discourse on the Association emphasizes the fact that its creation, its rationale and its success were primarily due to the existence of a common communist threat. It is the common opposition to the communist menace that enabled ASEAN to cooperate and to become a quasi-'security community'. The neorealist discourse on the Association emphasizes the fact that until the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, ASEAN was rather lethargic; the perception of a communist external threat enabled its member states to mute bilateral tensions and to cooperate in the military-security arena. Today, with the Association's common enemy fading, neorealists argue that ASEAN's future as a 'security community' is rather uncertain: the loss of its common external threat will undermine ASEAN's internal cohesion.

In analyzing this argument, we will devote the first section to ASEAN's security environment, with an emphasis on the new challenges ASEAN members face in the post-Cold War/post-Cambodia era - namely potential regional hegemons. According to the neorealist hypotheses, states face two options to balance a real or perceived hegemon: forming a military alliance or resorting to a self-help strategy. The second section will assess the relevance and the likelihood of an ASEAN military alliance. The third section will present the neorealist argument that ASEAN countries are actually resorting to a self-help strategy. Neorealists argue that unless a new impetus for ASEAN cohesion is found when the Cambodian war is resolved, these

capabilities could be construed as mutually threatening. By creating intra-ASEAN security dilemmas, this self-help strategy should jeopardize intra-ASEAN security cooperation and the creation of an ASEAN 'security community'.

3.1: ASEAN in the post-Cold War era: changes in the regional balance of power

Neorealists view the post-Cold War changes in the security environment of ASEAN in terms of distribution of capabilities and balance of power. They indeed posit that the distribution of capabilities, which determines the stability of the system, is the only major aspect of international relations that varies. They contend that the disappearance of the bipolar structure and the withdrawal of the superpowers from their commitments abroad will result in a diffusion of power. This diffusion of power, as in the case of Southeast Asia, will lead potential regional hegemons to play a more active and destabilizing role. Some ASEAN political and military leaders indeed perceive their security environment in such neorealist terms.

3.1.1: Diffusion of power in Asia-Pacific

The neorealist discourse on the post-Cold War Southeast Asian security environment stresses that the general diffusion of power will bring more instability. This pessimism does not hinge directly on Waltz's argument that a bipolar balance is more stable than a multipolar one: since the 1960s, the polarity in Asia-Pacific was more triangular than bipolar. It rather stems from the variant of

neorealism which contends that a hegemonic power - the United States - provides stability (Gilpin, 1981). This variant derives from the Hegemonic Stability Theory. Although fashioned in an international political economy context, this theory is relevant for security issues. At its simplest, it holds that a stable international security system requires a hegemonic state that establishes and underwrites the principle of stability/order. Thus, the demise of the hegemon will result in increased instability.

Indeed, the most important fact for the future of the Southeast Asian security environment is the perception that the US, a hegemonic power in relative decline, is gradually lowering its commitments to the region. On the positive side, the end of the Cold War has removed much of what had been the 'overlay' of US-China-USSR competition onto Southeast Asia: it has thus alleviated smaller states' concerns over the domination of their foreign and defense policies by great powers. On the other hand, the Cold War's demise also means that the security surplus that superpowers' involvement generated for their regional clients is being progressively reduced.

The US has certainly reaffirmed its continued military commitment to its allies - albeit at lower force levels -, but US officials appear unable to clearly articulate what the future US role in the region will encompass - other than using vague expressions such as 'regional balancing wheel'. The Cold War rationale for a US forward presence and for US alliances in the region has lost its relevance. The need for permanent American bases in the region has declined: the US is withdrawing from the Philippine bases after the Philippine Senate's September 1991 decision not to extend the bases agreement.

Finally, the US is increasingly pressuring its regional allies for greater 'burden sharing' (Tow, 1991). These developments only serve to confirm the perception that the US as an external security guarantor is unreliable. It is true that the US continues to have considerable economic interests in the region; yet, in spite of the massive deployment in the Middle East in response to the Iraqi invasion, it is unlikely to physically intervene in any substantive way in conflicts in Southeast Asia, especially if it involves other major regional powers (Alagappa, 1991b: 14).

The perception of a US withdrawal from the region has generated comments concerning a consequent 'power vacuum' which could tempt aspiring regional hegemons into expansionist maritime policies. Singapore has contended that any significant cut in US military forces in the region would lead to "potentially destabilizing changes in the regional balance of power, one which may lead to other significant powers playing a more active role in the region" (20). Indeed, as a result of this more diffuse polarity, the "dominant player" role that the US used to play in Asia is increasingly being externally challenged by aspiring regional hegemons (Tow, 1991).

3.1.2: The potential regional hegemons: China, Japan and India

Scholars are pointing to the potential emergence of three regional hegemons with expansionist maritime activities: India, China and Japan. India is indeed usually mentioned as being an aspiring regional leader, but China and Japan are the ones who create most concerns.

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(20) Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), 24 February 1990.

In this transitional period of changing geopolitical complexion in Asia, perceptions and images are crucial - all the more since, in most instances, it remains difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. Hence the general tendency to interpret one's neighbours' arms acquisitions as threatening. This tendency is particularly significant among ASEAN countries which, located at the crossroads of China's, Japan's and India's claimed spheres of influence, dread being the target of their contradictory ambitions (Bilveer, 1989). The head of Indonesia's National Defence Institute has warned that Southeast Asia could become the scene of "unavoidable maritime conflicts in view of the emergence of ... India and Japan ... as world maritime powers" (21). The three potential regional hegemons are perceived to be enhancing their power-projection capability to fill the 'power vacuum' in the Southeast Asian region (22). Their navies are indeed classified as building a "medium regional force projection" - i.e. an "ability to project force into the adjoining ocean basin" (Grove, 1990: 238).

India

ASEAN's concerns about India are recent. They stem from the inevitable disengagement of foreign maritime powers from the Indian Ocean, which is likely to promote India as a regional policeman. In a speech in 1989, Singapore's ex-Defence Minister, Lee Hsien Loong admitted to be deeply concerned when a retired Deputy Chief of the Indian Army A. K. Sinha declared: "India has to be the dominant

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(21) Straits Times, 24 August 1989.
(22) R. Tilman's book remains the most in-depth study of ASEAN perceptions of external threats (1987).

military power between the Suez Canal and Singapore" (23). Recent developments show indeed New Delhi's regional ambition.

First, India's arms acquisition and build-up of naval and air forces on the Nicobar and Andaman islands are fuelling the worries of ASEAN countries. Indeed, these two bases put India within striking distance of the Straits of Malacca (one of Singapore's vital lifelines), and would allow India to dominate its northern approach. Second, Thailand and India have competing claims over the delineation of economic zones off Thailand's West coast, where mineral deposits have been discovered. As an Indian scholar argues, India believes that "future international conflicts in the developing world will be over the mastery of natural resources, particularly in ocean beds. Having a "pioneer status" for deep sea mining, it believes it should have a voice in determining the allocation of these resources" (Majeed, 1990: 1094). Third, the dialogue engaged with Vietnam over the use of Cam Ranh Bay captured Bangkok's attention (24). Finally, Kuala Lumpur fears that India might use the presence of an Indian minority in Malaysia's population as a pretext for intervening in Malaysia's domestic affairs: in 1986, New Delhi sent a Godavari frigate off Aden to protect the local Indians during the *coup d'Etat* (Ayoob, 1990).

China

ASEAN members' fear of China is not new, and stemmed from the historical support of overseas revolutionary movements. But Beijing

(23) Age (Australia), 5/03/88. The propensity of New-Delhi to take on the role of regional policeman has already been demonstrated in Sri Lanka in 1987-89 and in the Maldives in November 1988.
(24) Asian Defence Journal, October 1990, p. 111; see also G. Till (1990).

has long ago disawoved its policy, facilitating the end of insurgency in Malaysia in 1990. Today, China is perceived by its Southeast Asian neighbours as a potential external threat. The removal of American and Soviet bases in Southeast Asia gives China a 'freer' hand and it will be at liberty to address its relations with countries in Southeast Asia unencumbered by other considerations.

China's power is indeed dramatically increasing with the on-going retreat of the US and of the USSR fleets from the region. Moreover, China is forming initiatives that are worrisome to ASEAN countries. Beijing is multiplying its efforts to develop a blue-water navy and to improve its amphibious assault and air-borne forces. China is notably purchasing an air-to-air refuelling capability geared to extending the range and combat time of its aircrafts. The possible purchase of an aircraft carrier from Russia has also been reported: G. Segal argue that "the introduction of aircrafts carriers into East Asia would be a major change in the (regional) strategic balance" (25). This military build-up is perceived as being part of China's strategy to dominate the South China Sea (26). An airbase is indeed already nearing completion on Woody Island (Paracels), which will enable China to extend its power projection deep into the South China Sea, reinforcing any operation in the area by its warships and marines (27).

The recent discoveries and projection of potential oil, gas and

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(25) New York Times, 7 June 1992.
(26) One may note that, out of the three fleets China has (South, Center, North), the South China fleet is the most modern and the most important as far as amphibious might is concerned.
(27) "Wary of China, Southeast Asia Upgrades Maritime Defences", International Herald Tribune, 19 December 1990.

mineral deposits in the unhabited islets of the South China Sea (the Spratlys) have indeed fuelled a dispute over their acquisition. China has claimed "indisputable sovereignty" over them. Its naval forces seized several of the disputed islands from Vietnam in a brief clash in 1988, and have since expanded its military occupation to seven atolls. Chinese troops have been placed in positions of potential conflict with soldiers from Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines who occupy other islands (28). Recently, the Chinese government has signed an oil exploration contract with an American company, Crestone Energy Corporation; it has pledged that it will use its navy to back the company (29).

Some analysts argue that ASEAN countries may be overestimating China's power, given its fiscal constraints and given the priority it has assigned to economic development (30). Moreover, in the short term, China's priority is to achieve better relations with ASEAN countries as well as with Vietnam. This friendly diplomatic stance Beijing has recently adopted towards ASEAN countries has enabled it to normalize its relations with Singapore and Indonesia and to engage in mutually beneficial economic relations. But it remains that its very recent aggressive move to take control of disputed territory in the South China Sea is perceived as extremely worrying for ASEAN

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(28) Vietnam has garrisons on 24 islands and atolls, the Philippines, eight and Malaysia three. So far ownership has largely been enforced ipso facto, which provides an incentive for the claimant states to incrementally deploy their occupational forces. Moreover, the PRC's voting behaviour on the Persian Gulf crisis is being interpreted by some ASEAN members as China's reserving its right to use force to settle territorial disputes.

(29) New York Times, 18 June 1992.

(30) The suspension of China's plans to build its first aircraft carrier is cited as an example of fiscal constraint that limits its effort to modernise the armed forces: R. Karniol, 1990: 33.

states who also claim some of those islands.

Japan

Japan's steady military build-up over the last decade gives it number-three status after the Soviet Union and the US in terms of national military expenditures. Japanese defence spending is increasing by an average of 5 percent per year, which reflects a commitment to steadily modernise Japan's Self-Defence Force (31). Besides, Japan is progressively asserting its regional role: witness the talks of making exceptions to the limit of 1000 miles on naval operations (which would overlap with ASEAN's strategic perimeter). This increased regional role stems from purely defensive purposes: it comes primarily from Japan's security concern over safety of navigation of its lines of supply and unhampered access to the markets and raw material in the region.

But most ASEAN countries remain highly sensitive to the Japanese increased regional assertion and have difficulties in distinguishing defensive from offensive actions. Apprehensions over a "militant Japan" have been voiced by ASEAN members after Prime Minister Chatichai Choonavan's proposal, in May 1990, of Thai-Japanese joint military exercises in Southeast Asian waters (Sudo, 1991: 37). Singapore has also boldly expressed its worry after the passage of the peacekeeping bill allowing Japan to play a limited role in international peacekeeping operations (32). But ASEAN's perception of a real Japanese offensive threat hinges primarily on the burden-sharing talks with the US, on the future of the security treaty with

(31) On Japanese recent military acquisitions, Mack, 1992: 3-5.
(32) Nayan Chanda, "Why They Worry", FEER, 25 June 1992: 18.

the US. The crucial question for ASEAN countries remains: will Japan be a supplement to a reduced US presence or an alternative to an American presence (33) ? A US withdrawal from Japan would cause the Japanese to rearm on a massive scale: Japan would indeed seek to normalize its defence posture to compensate for the loss of American projection forces. Among others, A. Mack contends that Japan does not have an interest in rearming, given the potential security and economic disruption it could entail (Mack, 1992: 10-11; see also Alagappa, 1991b: 15-16). "But arguments against the resurgent Japan thesis, while compelling, miss the point. Regional defence planners do worry about the 'worst case' of US withdrawal and possible consequent reemergence of Japanese militarism" (Mack, 1992: 11).

In conclusion, ASEAN states perceive the end of the Cold War and the growing regional multipolarity as increasing regional instability. This change in regional balance-of-power is raising deep concerns among ASEAN members. Despite professing non-alignment, regional autonomy and self-reliance as long-term objectives, ASEAN countries thus continue to value their external security linkages. Thailand and Singapore have been committed to a balance-of-power approach. They have been firm advocates of a continued US presence in the Philippines. Singapore signed an agreement with the United States for the use of Singaporean military facilities (Buzynski, 1990) (34); Thailand hailed Singapore's offer of facilities to the US as "something that could preserve regional security in terms of greater

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(33) Interestingly, A. Mack points to the differences in the perception by their neighbours of a potential Japanese and German rearmament (Mack, 1992: 10-11).
(34) "Whistling up a Storm", FEER, 31 August 1989: 9.

balance of power" (35). Brunei's recent offer of military facilities to the US further underscores the continuing emphasis on outside security guarantees (Acharya, 1991: 172). Other ASEAN members, while maintaining a public position of non-commitment, have privately endorsed those proposals (36).

Regional powers perceived as having hegemonistic ambitions are thus taking up where the communist threat left off. This fear was, according to neorealists, ASEAN's cooperation rationale in the 1980s. Neorealists thus argue that ASEAN post-Cambodia should consider the new external threats as the rationale for ASEAN's security cooperation: it should, in a classic neorealist balance-of-power pattern, form a military alliance in order to balance China's, Japan's and India's increasing power.

3.2: Calls for a military alliance

Talks and official proposals for an ASEAN military alliance have increased since the end of the 1980s. However, a closer analysis of ASEAN states' military capabilities as well as their security needs shows that their implementation seems rather unlikely.

3.2.1: Proposals and reactions

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(35) Straits Times, 6 August 1989. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in November 1990.

(36) Malaysia, officially committed to the ZOPFAN concept (Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality) which strongly advocates regional autonomy, has also signed an agreement with the US for the use of Malaysian facilities, FEER, 14 May 1992: 14. Indonesia has also ackowledged base use. It is interesting to note that each ASEAN member is individually developing links of assurance with the US, but they continue rejecting the SEATO-type alliance (see Acharya, 1992a).

Given the changing geopolitical environment, calls for a military alliance have multiplied: in May 1989, the former foreign minister of Malaysia, Abu Hassan Omar, called on the countries of ASEAN to form a "Defence Community" which would take them to "new heights of political and military cooperation" (37). Although he did not provide much detail on what the concept of 'defence community' meant, it has been interpreted as a call for the formation of a military pact (38). Singapore has expressed the hope that "firm and strong bilateral ties will provide the foundation for multilateral cooperation" (39). In March 1991, the Philippines also suggested that ASEAN should form a regional security alliance (Acharya, 1992a: 13). The renewed idea of an ASEAN military alliance is designed to enable ASEAN states to present a common military front against an outside aggressor, to create a balance of power to counter potential regional hegemons. As discussed earlier, balance-of-power worries have been expressed by ASEAN officials; as the former foreign minister of Indonesia, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, states, an ASEAN military alliance could be a necessary response to "fill the security vacuum after the US leaves the region" (40).

The issue is not new. Different proposals were made in the 1970s, but did not find support from decision makers in the ASEAN states. In the post-Cold War era, however, ASEAN policy-makers could have rethought their options for military-security cooperation. Between

(37) Straits Times, 5 May 1989.
(38) A. Acharya distinguishes two approaches to an ASEAN 'defence community': a minimalist one, which involves regional self-sufficiency in arms manufacturing and weapon standardization; and the maximalist one, which encompasses a military pact (Acharya, 1991: 169-172).
(39) Straits Times, 23 March 1989.
(40) Cited by Acharya, 1991: 171. Straits Times, 22 August 1989.

1989 and 1992, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have each convened conferences to explore regional security alternatives for the 1990s. None of them has advocated an ASEAN military pact. Singapore's General Winston Choo has denied "any intention (among the ASEAN states) to move towards a defence pact", while Indonesia's General Try Sutrisno has contended that "without a military pact... (the ASEAN states) can cooperate more flexibly" (41). More recently, former Malaysian foreign minister Ghazali Shafie said, after an ASEAN meeting, that "what emerged was that ASEAN itself must not be turned into a military alliance" (42). Above all, strong opposition to such an alliance by Indonesia - the *de facto* leader of ASEAN - makes it highly unlikely to be implemented. In March 1991, Indonesia's foreign minister Ali Alatas rejected the suggestion made by the Philippines. He argued that ASEAN "should remain true to its essence and that is economic, social, cultural and even now political cooperation, but not a defence pact" (43).

ASEAN's proposed alternative to the calls for a military pact lies in the strengthening of bilateral military ties.

> ASEAN members debated the issue (of a military alliance) on the eve of the first ASEAN summit held in Bali in 1976 but rejected the alliance option. Instead, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord endorsed existing bilateral military ties by calling for the continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between member states in security matters (Acharya, 1991: 163).

The rapid evolution of these bilateral military-security ties has led to the emergence of what the chief of Indonesia's armed forces

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(41) Sunday Times (Singapore), 26 November 1989; "Is ASEAN Turning into a Military Pact?", Asian Defence Journal, no. 5 (1989): 113.
(42) Asahi Evening News, 8 June 1991.
(43) Straits Times, 29 March 1991.

has described as an 'ASEAN defence spider web' (44). These military ties address external threats to regional security, as well as measures to enhance the long-term self-reliance of ASEAN members (45). Although army exercises initially formed a small part of those bilateral links, recent trends point to an increase. The chief purpose of these exercises are to develop joint operational procedures and doctrine, which in turn would facilitate a common response in times of crisis. It is indeed claimed that those bilateral exercises could be geared to provide a common response to an external threat. Expectations of reciprocal help to be activated at the time of a threat is indeed one aspect of intra-ASEAN military-security cooperation, "but this is largely a declaratory commitment and not a formal obligation as in the case of alliance" (Acharya, 1992a: 17). Thus, the rejection of a military alliance means that security collaboration will remain bilateral and confined to adjacent states who perceive common security challenges. "Thus some ASEAN analysts' hopes for an overarching regional defense arrangement seem ill conceived. The localization of security implies multiple, smaller, parallel arrangements" (Simon, 1992: 4). The end of the Cold War will lead to the subregionalization of security arrangements in Southeast Asia.

3.2.2: The unlikelihood of an ASEAN military alliance: explanations

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(44) Tai Ming Cheung, "Shoulder to Shoulder: ASEAN Members Stregthen Defence Ties", FEER 22 March 1990, p. 25. On the nature and form of this cooperation, see Acharya, 1991: 164-168 and 1992a: 13-14; Simon, 1992: 17-18.

(45) These measures include joint exercises, training, cooperation in arms manufacturing and exchange of senior level personnel for familiarization with each other's military establishment.

The resistance to greater military integration has often been explained by the ASEAN members' lack of political will to create a military alliance (Acharya, 1992a: 12). However, reasons for such a resistance are more numerous and more complex.

Since its creation, ASEAN states have officially refused to form a military pact on the grounds that such an option could "intensify ideology-based polarization and conflicts within Southeast Asia, encourage the big powers to initiate preemtive counteraction and prevent ASEAN from pursuing with undiluted vigour and freedom of action its vision of full regional stability and economic self-sufficiency" (46). Regional concerns might indeed have explained ASEAN's resistance; however, Acharya points more convincingly to the fundamental reason of ASEAN's rejection:

> Given that sources of interstate conflict in Southeast Asia were closely linked to the domestic political stability of the regional actors, any rationale for a military pact... had to be conceived by ASEAN leaders in its utility in serving internal legitimacy and stability. Alliances are a strategy aimed at responding to the threat of a military attack by an external aggressor. In the case of ASEAN, however, security perceptions of the enemy was primarily internal. Both the Communist insurgencies, which confronted all member states and ethnic separatist movement (especially in Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia) destabilized the ruling regimes (1991: 161).

ASEAN states' political leaders had a primarily inward-looking conception of security, based on the perception that national security lies not in military alliances but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, as well as political stability (47). Their legitimacy depended on the

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(46) Fidel Ramos (the then defence secretary of the Philippines), Sunday Times (Singapore), 26 November 1989 - quoted by Acharya, 1992a: 169.

(47) The concept of 'comprehensive security' was ASEAN countries' basis of their national security doctrines. The New Order regime of President Suharto of Indonesia interpreted this concept and advanced the doctrine of 'national

promotion of economic development and ensuring a stable regional environment that could foster economic cooperation. Thus, the neorealist logic could not account for ASEAN's rationale (48).

In the post-Cold War era, domestic insurrections have virtually disappeared, with the exception of the Philippines; similarly, ethnic separatists have also been defeated, again with the exception of the Moro rebellion in the Southern Philippines. The growing recognition of conventional threats (Acharya, 1988), as well as the changes in regional balance of power could have led ASEAN leaders to rethink their security options. Yet today, the neorealist logic that points to the relevance of a military alliance still does not stand. ASEAN states continue to reject a military alliance because of its lack of credibility, and because of their differing threat perceptions.

The concept of an ASEAN military alliance deterrent against aggression remains far from credible. A military alliance among weak powers would have little military utility. As the chief of staff of Malaysian Defence Forces put it: "in terms of deterrence value, it is very doubtful if an ASEAN alliance would really deter any would be agressor... To achieve deterrence ASEAN will have to form an alliance with one of the superpowers" (49). Indeed, no ASEAN country sees an indigenous ASEAN security arrangement as a substitute for its

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resilience'. 'Regional resilience' would result as a sum total of national resilience in individual ASEAN states: it was adopted as the ASEAN motto by other members of the grouping. On ASEAN's interpretations of the concept of 'comprehensive security', see Alagappa, 1988. On the inward-looking security perception of ASEAN states, Tilman, 1987; Ayoob and Samudavanija, 1987.

(48) This specific point will be discussed more deeply in the next chapter.

(49) Address by General Hashim Mohammed Ali, 29 November 1989, published in ISIS Focus, no. 58 (January 1990), p. 41. Cited by Acharya, (1991: 172). However, it must be noted that ASEAN has always rejected a SEATO-type military alliance with an external power: on this point, see Acharya, 1992a: 7-8 and 15-16.

security linkages with external powers. Acharya argues that "despite doubts over the credibility of the Western security commitments in the region, all ASEAN countries except Indonesia remain tied to such commitments" (1991: 172). Thailand has consolidated its security relationship with China in response to the perceived US withdrawal from the region; Malaysia and Singapore, besides the recent arrangements signed with the US, have tried to reinvigorate the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) (50). Indeed, the most effective military exercises by ASEAN militaries are not the one conducted exclusively among its members but rather in collaboration with outsiders. Thus, ASEAN members perceive the continued maintenance of a regional balance of power conducive to their security interests as being contingent on a strong external input. Security cannot be developed through a sole sub-regional military alliance.

The creation of a military alliance would also require the emergence of a common major external threat to cement the ASEAN countries. However, such a requirement is not fulfilled, as ASEAN states' threat perceptions do not converge. A balance-of-power would only operate if ASEAN states perceived a common threat, one regional hegemon with expansionist ambitions. Yet ASEAN countries' threat perceptions have always diverged. During the Cold War, they disagreed on the question of Vietnam or China as being the major threat. Malaysia and Indonesia, viewing China as the long-term threat to the region, sought accomodation with Hanoi which was seen by them as a counterweight to Chinese expansionism in the region. Singapore and,

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(50) The FDPA includes Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain.

until recently, Thailand took a more hardline stance against Vietnam and developed a strategic partnership with China in its bid to contain Vietnamese advance into Cambodia (Leifer, 1989). This divergence in threat perception is today clearly indicated by their disagreements over the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. Similarly, ASEAN countries currently have differing threat perceptions as far as potential regional hegemons are concerned: India is feared by Thailand and Malaysia, China primarily by Malaysia and Indonesia, and Japan by all of them except for Thailand (51).

These facts show that the military alliance option offered by the neorealist paradigm is not likely in the ASEAN case. ASEAN states will thus, argue the neorealists, resort to a self-help strategy - namely increase their military capabilities in order to deter/counter potential regional hegemons.

3.3: Self-help strategy: ASEAN's military build-up

Given the fact that a military alliance will not make up for the reduction of external security guarantees, ASEAN member states have resorted to the other option the neorealist paradigm offers to balance a potential hegemon: the self-help strategy. Hence the recent and sudden military build-up among ASEAN states, after a decade of reduction in defense spending. We will first analyze the scope and characteristics of this build-up. We will then present the neorealist

(51) Differences in a Japanese threat perception among ASEAN countries hinges on their own historical experience with the Japanese occupation during WWII. For instance, Thailand, who never came under Japanese occupation, was satisfied with Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations (FEER, 25 June 1992: 18). Witness also the different reactions to the Thai proposal in 1990 of Japanese-Thai joint military exercises in South China Sea (Sudo, 1991: 337).

argument that this self-help strategy should create security dilemmas among ASEAN states and that the consequent mutual distrust should undermine the conventional idea of ASEAN being a 'security community'.

3.3.1: Scope and characteristics

In the words of Singapore's Defence Minister Yeo Ning Hong, "no country in Southeast Asia is overjoyed with the reduction in US presence. None of them has declared a peace dividend. No one has reduced its defence expenditure" (52). In fact, all of them are increasing their defence spending. After a peak around 1982, defence expenditures decreased in most ASEAN countries. This was a result of both strategic and economic changes: a more sanguine outlook on Vietnamese capabilities and intentions; the reinvigorated American presence in Southeast Asia under the Reagan administration; and the oil and commodity price falls in 1983-85 that hit several of the ASEAN states.

But the 1991 estimations display a general and sudden rise in defence budgets. Thailand, which has been ruled since February 1991 by a military junta, announced a 13.5 percent increase in defence spending: this increase lead Sukhumband Paribatra, a Southeast Asian specialist, to affirm that Thailand was in the midst of "the largest arms procurement program in the kingdom's history" (53). In 1990s, Thailand spent US$ 1.7 billion on weapons' acquisition, more than any other ASEAN member (Simon, 1992: 8). The Malaysian government in June

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(52) The Guardian Weekly, March 15, 1992, p. 17.
(53) The Guardian Weekly, March 15, 1992, p. 17.

1991 said it would allocate M$6 billion - or 11 percent of government revenue - for the armed forces in its 1991-95 development plan, compared to M$1.5 billion in the previous plan (54). Singapore, which already possesses an important and sophisticated army, plans a 5 to 6 percent increase in defence spending annually for at least the next five years. Similar upward jumps are also planned by the remainder member countries.

Several factors will further encourage this trend in the years to come. The economic recovery of the region will enable ASEAN states to absorb the cost of such a build-up (55). 'Supplier pressures' will also favour an increase in defence expenditures: arms reduction in Europe will bring declining prices of advanced weapons and a plentiful supply of surplus European arms. This will enable ASEAN countries to enhance their arsenal cost-effectively (56).

In terms of characteristics of this build-up, ASEAN countries are shifting from an arms procurement strategy aimed at domestic counterinsurgency to a strategy aimed at countering external threats, as indicated by the purchase of conventional and modern military hardware with offensive capability (Acharya, 1988; Weatherbee, 1989). Recently, they have sought to extend the reach of their armed forces beyond their borders, stressing the upgrading of their naval

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(54) Most of the funds are intended to go towards purchasing weapons from Britain under a multi-billion dollar Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1988: FEER, 7 November 1991, p. 53.

(55) During the last years of the 1980s, the economic growth of Thailand, Malaysia and to a certain extend Indonesia has been on average over 8.5 percent per annum (12 percent in the case of Thailand).

(56) As indicated by Bangkok's procurement of 650 surplus M60 and M48 tanks from the US at 5 percent of market rates (Um, 1991: 266).

capability: all of them have recently put more emphasis on maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.

Thailand was until recently mainly concerned by land-based attacks by Vietnam through the Kampuchean border, given that the Vietnamese navy was rather weak. Indicative of Thailand's mainland strategy for the 1990s of turning Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace is the armed forces emphasis on maritime threats to the country's eastern and southern seaboards. Much of Bangkok's expenditures on aircraft and ships is being justified as necessary to protect Thailand's EEZ which covers both the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has notably submitted a $1-billion plan for defending the eastern seaboard, hitherto neglected (Young, 1990: 68) (57).

Malaysia also intends to upgrade the capabilities of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). Since Malaysia's independence (1957), the Army has dominated the MAF because of the primarily domestic land-based threats. In the late 1970s-80s, Kuala Lumpur has put more emphasis on its navy and air force; its current intent is to enlarge its capability so as to develop a blue-water defence force (Stubbs, 1991). Thus Malaysia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Britain in September 1988 designed to improve its air and maritime capabilities. Moreover, in 1989, it was announced that the RMAF would transform a former British

(57) The navy will receive coast-to-sea missiles and medium patrol boats as part of the east coast defence program (Um, 1991: 265). Bangkok is also seeking to increase combat capabilities by establishing a naval airwing, which would provide concerted operation with the surface fleet. Enhanced air security over the Gulf of Thailand would require the acquisition of advanced radar equipment: Thailand has expressed interest in the Grumman E2C Hawkeye early warning system already in service in Singapore (Simon, 1992: 8).

air force base along the East border into the largest and most sophisticated Malaysian air base (58). A new naval base is also being constructed on the East Coast (Kota Kinabalu), expected to be the main staging base for operations into the South China Sea (59).

In March 1990, the head of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) disclosed that Singapore would be acquiring aircrafts specifically equipped for maritime patrol and surveillance functions. They will enable Singapore to improve its early warning system and detect potential threats further afield (Da Cunha, 1991).

Even Indonesia, despite severe budget constraints, plans on purchasing 30 maritime patrol aircraft and is talking about more acquisitions. And the Philippines, who have always had a relatively low defence budget focused primarily on domestic counterinsurgency warfare, have drawn up a ten-year modernization program, which displays a significant change in threat perceptions. This plan involves an initial four-fold increase in the navy's procurement and maintenance budget to some $80 million annually over the next two years. The air force is also due to upgrade its maritime patrol capabilities (Karniol, 1991: 35).

The characteristics of the on-going military build-up clearly show that ASEAN states are pursuing a self-help strategy in trying to balance potential regional hegemons with perceived expansionist maritime policies. One can doubt, however, that this strategy will enable ASEAN countries to deter any of the three potential hegemons;

(58) Straits Times, 5 June 1989, p. 18.
(59) In June 1991, the RMN opted to purchase British missile-corvettes which will be deployed in the South China Sea, and will supply and defend Malaysia's positions on three island in the Spratlys (Simon, 1992: 10-11).

at most, they would make them pay a slightly higher cost if they attacked. It remains that, as discussed above, ASEAN's concerns with potential threats arising from its maritime and wider geopolitical environment provide the official justification for this military build-up. Regional powers perceived as having hegemonistic ambitions are taking up where the Soviet threat left off, in helping to fuel a defence build-up among ASEAN countries. Yet, evidence also shows that ASEAN states' military build-ups are carried out with a view to the lingering, albeit muted, bilateral disputes.

3.3.2: An intra-ASEAN arms race ?

To a certain underestimated extent, the military build-up phenomenon among ASEAN member states has also an internal dimension. Neorealists point to the fact that the self-help strategy is creating security dilemmas among ASEAN member states: namely that states, by seeking to advance their individual national securities through policies of arming, decrease the security of other states. Hence the creation of an international environment prone to an arms race. In the ASEAN case, certain purchases of weapons may indeed be said to be motivated more as a deterrent against other ASEAN members than against extra-ASEAN threats. This phenomenon is not new, and can be traced back to the late 1970s-early 1980s. But the ongoing military build-up, given the end of the Cold War and the current geostrategic flux of the region, might further stimulate intra-ASEAN security dilemmas.

ASEAN defence planners seem indeed to pay continuously close attention to the composition of their neighbours' arsenals; and any

upgrading of one is likely to be followed by an upgrading of the others. Ron Huisken has labelled this dynamic of inter-state relations within the Association an "interactive weapon acquisition" (Huisken, 1977) - that is a slow motion arms race. He provides evidence of such a competition in the 1970s (60).

The best and most recent example of this interactive arms acquisition is the purchase in 1983 of F-16 fighter aircraft by Singapore, followed in kind by Indonesia and Thailand. The 'threat factor' deriving from the situation in Indochina is credible for Thailand's acquisition of the F-16. But Indonesia, geographically removed from the Cambodian conflict, could not have furthered the same rationale (61).

Incidentally, such competition within a security-oriented regional organization is not uncommon: even within NATO, the UK and France have, for reasons of international prestige, attempted to maintain a certain parity in some aspects of their force structures (Huxley, 1990: 75). One could also argue that those weapons ASEAN armed forces have in common are more a matter of planning than of competition. It could indeed be the result of a conscious planning

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(60) The purchase of missile-armed fast patrol boats by most of South-East Asian navies (Huisken, 1977: 52), the acquisition of Scorpion light tanks by Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, and of V-150 Commando personnel carriers by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Combat aircrafts purchases also illustrate this interactive acquisition phenomenon: F-5s were bought by all except Brunei, and A-4s by Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

(61) The most significant reaction to Singapore's purchase remains that of Malaysia. Singapore's air force ordering a squadron of F-16s was going to enhance both its strike and air defence capabilities; all the more since it was reportedly also interested in the even more advanced F/A-18. The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) escalated its pressure on the Mahathir government to purchase new equipment, stressing that it had been "left behind" by the air forces of the other ASEAN countries (Straits Times, 25 April 1987). Consequently, reports in July 1988 that Malaysia was to purchase F-16 were not surprising.

aimed at increasing the level of standardization within the Association in the face of a common threat. Yet, as discussed above, ASEAN states never really perceived a common threat. Moreover, there is no evidence of any cooperation in arms purchasing among the ASEAN governments (despite the clear cost saving that it would entail). Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have actually voiced support for joint arms procurement and manufacturing (62). But a general scepticism prevails on the possibility of an ASEAN arms industry as well as of joint procurement given the differences in the level of defence spending and in strategic priorities, and given intra-ASEAN competitive relations.

Thus, a certain degree of military competition has persisted based not only on prestige considerations but on the existence of security dilemmas. A scholar stated that "at present serious political friction exists between and among ASEAN countries, and it should not be precluded that the present military build-up in each member-country is carried out with a view to that fact" (Popov, 1991: 254). Another went further contending that "anticipating the creation of small, though potent ASEAN member air forces and navies in the 1990's, the Association leaders fear that unless a new impetus for ASEAN cohesion is found when the Cambodian war is resolved, these capabilities could be construed as mutually threatening" (Simon, 1992: 7).

The underlying bilateral suspicions that have been muted during the Cold War might be, according to neorealists, sharpened in the

(62) In July 1990, Thailand's supreme commander announced that ASEAN countries agreed in principle to establish an arms assembly plant with each member state producing specific weapons parts: Straits Times, 20 July 1990.

post-Cold War era. Neorealists believe that intra-ASEAN conflicts have been inhibited in the late 1970s-1980s primarily because of the imperative to form a common front against the Marxist-leninist countries of Southeast Asia. Neorealists indeed hold that a cooperation among ASEAN states was unlikely without the existence of a strong common threat. The ending of the Cold War should thus result in the reemergence of these old disputes. Neorealists undermine the conventional wisdom concerning ASEAN as being a Deutschian 'security community': the Association has not reached the stage of 'integration' as Deutsch unconventionally defines it - i.e. 'absence of expectation of war'. ASEAN never really came to resolve internal bilateral tensions, and in the post-Cambodia era, the future of ASEAN as a 'security community' is highly jeopardized.

We challenge this pessimistic perspective and argue that, although cooperation among ASEAN states has been fostered thanks to the perception of a mutual threat (marxism-leninism), member states today have a different motivation for cooperating and for working towards the creation of a 'security community' in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 4 - AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON ASEAN

Contrary to the neorealist theory of international relations, this thesis attempts to prove that substantive progress in international security may occur, and that the ASEAN case study provides some evidence to back up this argument. Indeed, neorealist theory does not account for the fact that ASEAN states, considering that resorting to force is not a fruitful way of settling disputes and sharing a mutual interest in avoiding war, are willing to cooperate to promote progress in security.

Although neorealists focus on the self-help and the alliance strategies, they do acknowledge the rationality of regional security cooperation. In order to prevent greater powers from threatening their survival, small states may cooperate amongst themselves to prevent any external intervention. In such cases, cooperation is only motivated by the existence of a threat to states' survival. Indeed, neorealists believe security cooperation among ASEAN states to be solely motivated by the existence of a common enemy. Although the perception on a common enemy has facilitated the creation and maintenance of ASEAN, motivations for security cooperation has involved more than the mere perception of a common threat: they have lain in states' reduced commitment to war as an instrument of policy.

In positing such an argument, it is clear that the analysis of our case-study falls within a basically liberal mold. Notably, we believe that ASEAN states' renunciation of war stems from the fact that they are placing less weight on military might and more on economic growth and development (Grieco, 1988: 489). Indeed, in the

1960s-1970s, ASEAN countries' leaders, challenged by communist insurgencies, perceived their legitimacy as dependent on their ability to promote rapid economic development and economic cooperation in an atmosphere of political tranquility (Acharya, 1991: 161-2 - see also Acharya, 1992b). Given that sources of interstate conflict in Southeast Asia were closely linked to the domestic political instability of the regional actors, the promotion of a sub-regional environment prone to peaceful change (and thus to development) was required. Thus ASEAN's main goal: forming a 'security community', a reliable expectation of peaceful change.

In arguing that ASEAN states' motivations for cooperating are better explained by liberal theory than by the neorealist one, this chapter first examines ASEAN's goal of creating a 'security community' and the instruments set up for it. It then contends that although the post-Cold War Association is facing some challenges, one should be sanguine about the prospects for a strengthening of cooperation. Finally, we will highlight the fact that the liberal assumptions on which ASEAN states cooperate is providing a model for the recent initiatives on Asia-Pacific security forum.

4.1: TOWARDS A 'SECURITY COMMUNITY'

Since its creation in 1967, ASEAN has been somewhat preoccupied by the issue of whether to create a military alliance or a security community - a choice between neorealist and liberal logic. The issue has been recurrent: ASEAN members tackled it in 1967, in 1976 during their first summit and recently in the wake of the end of the Cold

War. ASEAN leaders have always resisted the idea of a military alliance; they have, in turn, professed the aim of creating a 'security community' -- the attainment of "institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population" (Deutsch, 1957: 2). In Acharya words, "at best, an ASEAN military arrangement was deemed unnecessary or unimportant; at worst, it was seen as counterproductive. The goal of creating a 'security community' not only assumed priority over a military pact, but the latter was considered subversive of the former" (Acharya, 1991: 161). We will first present ASEAN's goal of creating a 'security community', and then look at the instruments ASEAN set up to attain its professed goal.

4.1.1: ASEAN's goal: forming a 'security community'

As discussed above, given ASEAN states' inward perception of security, they aimed at promoting rapid economic development rather than enhancing their military power. Economic cooperation in an atmosphere of political stability was deemed to be the primary task of ASEAN's regionalism. ASEAN thus came into being in 1967 largely as the result of a desire of its five original members (63) to create a mechanism which would contribute to peace and stability in intra-regional relations. Intraregional conflict management had indeed assumed importance given the failure of the previous attempts at regional unity, as in the case of the Maphilindo (Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia). A military alliance was thus of little

(63) Brunei joined the group in 1984.

help, while the promotion of long-term habit of cooperation to move the group towards a regional 'security community' formed the core of ASEAN's political role. As Acharya put it:

> The need for such a mechanism was urgent given that ASEAN states were involved in a number of disputes which had led to armed conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia (Indonesia's leader Sukarno's *konfrontasi* policy), war-like tensions between Singapore on the one hand and Indonesia on the other (over Singapore's separation from Malaysia and the distrust of Chinese-dominated Singapore by its Malay neighbours) and a similar situation between Malaysia and the Philippines (over the latter's claim to Malaysia's Sabah province) (1992:10-1).

In terms of conflict management, the idea of creating a 'pluralistic security community' constitutes a markedly different goal than the idea of forming an alliance. The former focuses on cooperation to resolve disputes and conflicts within the regional grouping. It differs from an alliance in the sense that the primary function of a security community is mutual accommodation among its members, while an alliance focuses primarily on mutual defense against non-members. Mutual accomodation is required, but it is subordinate to the larger objective of defense. Conflict management is thus a side-effect of an alliance's real purpose, whereas it is the professed goal of creating a 'security community'. Jervis also points to this major difference when he notes that alliances and balance-of-power thinking restrain aggressive or potentially aggressive powers externally (1982: 185), whereas when states form a 'security community', restraints are norms internalized by the actors.

The concept of a 'pluralistic security community' refers to the ability of controlling the forceful settlement of conflicts among members. According to Deutsch, political integration (defined as

"dependable expectation of peaceful change" (Deutsch, 1957: 5)) results in the attainment of lasting peace (64). This concept rejects the pessimistic assumptions of neorealism; it displays the underlying liberal conviction that continuing peace and peaceful change are attainable in international relations. Peace is postulated as the ultimate value (65); Deutsch believes that if political communities value peace, the attainment of a pluralistic security community is possible. "The outstanding issue leading to the emergence of a security community is the increasing unattractiveness of war among the political units concerned. War became unattractive because of the danger of international complications that might engulf the contestants" (1957: 113). According to Deutsch, two conditions are necessary for a security community to take hold: a compatibility of political values derived from common political institutions and communication that reflects a "we-feeling" among the members of a community (1957: 36; 129). Both conditions derive their significance not only from economic interdependencies and from the spillover of functional-technical problems to the political realm (66), but also from the sharing of political values, first and foremost democracy, which inhibits nations from using force against each other.

As discussed earlier, most scholars acknowledge that Western

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(64) Deutsch distinguishes the 'amalgamated' from the 'pluralistic security community': both are instances of integration, but the former implies a central government instead of sovereign political communities which merely form a "zone of peace" (1957).

(65) "In a civilization that wishes to survive, the central problem in the study of international organization is this: How can men learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution", (Deutsch, 1957: 3).

(66) Puchala emphasizes that the "ties in trade, migration, mutual services, or military collaboration prompted by necessity or by profit generate flows of transactions between communities and enmesh people in transcommunity communications networks" (1981: 156).

European nations are now experiencing something close to the 'pluralistic security community'. Adler writes: "A pluralistic security community creates a model that supposedly other regions may replicate... If only because of... the need for Third World countries to adopt democratic and other Western values, the concept of a global security community is from the point of view of our generation a utopian dream" (1991: 139).

Indeed, ASEAN does not qualify for the conditions Deutsch underlines as necessary for a 'security community' to take hold. ASEAN countries may share the concept of free enterprise, which is the philosophical basis of the Association; but they do not have compatible political values, as the Association encompasses many types of regimes, from democracies to monarchies (67). If the leaders of member countries do feel they form a community, there is less evidence that the people perceive this 'we-feeling' Deutsch stresses. Thus, ASEAN can not be labelled a 'security community' in the 'maximalist' conception Deutsch puts forward. Yet, if a security community is primarily a community of states who have reduced their commitment to war as an instrument of policy; if a security community' is a "cluster of countries whose relations have been characterized by peaceful conflict resolution and whose leaders and peoples conceived of no contingencies in their mutual relations that could bring resorts to violence" (Puchala, 1981: 151), then ASEAN may be labelled so.

Thus ASEAN cannot be said to be a 'security community' *stricto*

(67) Malaysia and Singapore are governed by a parliamentary system in the Westminster model, the Philippines by a US-style presidential regime, Thailand a monarchy sometimes under military control and Brunei is a sultanate.

sensu: it is a quasi-'security community' of its own kind that has developed on the grounds of common values such as a shared approach towards development and the efficacy of market economies. Because ASEAN states do care about promoting dependable expectations of peaceful change, ASEAN may be said to be a 'security regime', with a tendency towards community (Wiseman, 1992: 46).

4.1.2: The instrument: ASEAN's security regime

The creation of a security regime has been the instrument used to attempt forming a 'security community'. As Emanuel Adler argues, security regimes may be an instrument to promote progress in international security (Adler, 1991b: 153; 1991a: 12-13).

ASEAN has specified a set of norms to govern the conduct of inter-member relations, and has established procedures and institutions for conflict management and control. The norms have been enumerated in two major documents: the 1967 Bangkok Declaration announcing the creation of ASEAN and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed at the first summit of ASEAN member states in Bali in 1976. One of the components of the ZOPFAN proposal (1971) also includes the strengthening of relations amongst the ASEAN countries so that disputes can be settled through pacific means - what Alagappa calls "peace through rule of law". This component of ZOPFAN urges states to renounce the use of force and to renounce resorting to non-constitutional means in the pursuit of their interests (Alagappa, 1991b: 19-26). The 1976 Treaty is especially relevant in assessing ASEAN's contribution to conflict management. The norms enunciated are: (1) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and

territorial integrity of all nations; (2) The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion; (3) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (4) Settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means; and (5) Renunciation of the threat of use of force (68).

Regarding the pacific settlement of disputes, a chapter of the 1976 document makes provision for the establishment of a High Council comprising a representative of ministerial rank from each of the contracting parties. The provision for such a multilateral process "constituted a considerable diplomatic success at the time given the reluctance of the Philippines to permit its territorial claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah to be made subject to dispute settlement other than under the aegis of the International Court of Justice" (Leifer, 1992: 169; see also Alagappa, 1991b: 19-26). However, the High Council has never been established; "indeed, no attempt has ever been made to invoke the dispute settlement machinery of the Association" (*ibid.*). ASEAN states' approach to security has not progressed much by way of institutional form. Indeed, insofar as procedures and institutions of conflict resolution are concerned, ASEAN states have instead relied on informal measures, on using the procedures of discussion and accomodation at high political levels to settle their conflicts. This role was most seriously tested in the case of the Malaysian-Philippines dispute over Sabah. Admittedly, such a pragmatic approach and such consultations have been useful tools for building confidence and trust among the ASEAN states; in

(68) Thongswasdi, PhD Dissertation quoted by Acharya, 1992a: 11.

this respect, the psychological and political aspects of ASEAN, the so-called "ASEAN spirit", have been more useful to intra-ASEAN dispute settlement than formal, institutional mechanisms.

The question that remains is how much progress towards a 'security community' has ASEAN achieved ? As Nye pointed out, the concept of security community is extremely difficult to measure. Says Nye:

> It is difficult to be certain whether states plan for war with each other... It is also difficult to develop a scale of security-community rather than merely describing its presence or absence. Public opinion data indicating popular or elite attitudes of friendliness or trust are not sufficient, since hostile international actions can occur despite such opinion, or opinion can change rapidly, and military planners must act accordingly. Despite this difficulty, the concept of security community is important" (Nye, 1971: 47-8).

One can nevertheless measure the Association's progress towards a security community by looking at how member states have chosen to solve their disputes. By and large the ASEAN countries have conformed to the norms of the 1976 Treaty. Although bilateral relations (Singapore-Malaysia, Malaysia-Philippines) have not been free of tension, the use of force has not been contemplated as an option. The ASEAN countries have also quite strictly respected political independence and territorial integrity, and refrained from interfering in the domestic affairs of other member states. Thus Wiseman recently argued that ASEAN's "development has produced a new set of attitudes and informal conflict avoidance mechanisms which currently make war between member states unlikely" (Wiseman, 1992: 48). Michael Leifer went further to posit that "the end of the Cambodian conflict as a matter of regional contention has not lead to

the Association losing its *raison d'etre*. The habit of bureaucratic and ministerial consultation and cooperation is very deeply entrenched with membership in ASEAN having acquired a virtual quasi-familial quality" (Leifer, 1992: 168).

However, Muthiah Alagappa provides a more balanced and - according to us - more correct assessment of ASEAN's progress. Although conflicts have been muted, "the ASEAN record of pacific settlement of disputes is less impressive, even disappointing. The bilateral disputes among the ASEAN countries remain unresolved and new disputes issuing primarily from overlapping claims of exclusive economic zones have been added to the list" (Alagappa, 1991a: 24-5). The Association has thus contributed to the defusion of tension, to conflict avoidance, but not to conflict resolution. "While conflict avoidance is important, it is no substitute for conflict resolution" (*ibid.*). Consequently, ASEAN can only be characterized as a quasi-'security community'.

4.2: CHALLENGES TO ASEAN'S GOAL

As the neorealist discourse rightfully points out, ASEAN should face two challenges in a post-Cambodia era: "ASEAN's future as a ... security community faces two major challenges: firstly, overcoming several lingering intra-ASEAN disputes that are potentially disruptive of regional peace, and secondly, reaching a consensus on how to approach the task of eventual reconciliation with Vietnam and thereby move the subregional (ASEAN) 'security community' to a regional (Southeast Asian) entity" (Acharya, 1991: 173). As discussed

above, neorealists hold that ASEAN should not be able to overcome those challenges and that ASEAN's viability in the post-Cold War era is doubtful. They have contended that intra-ASEAN cooperation will be jeopardized by increasing mutual distrust among member states, and that ASEAN is merely the product of intraregional stress, rather than of mutual interests. In this section, we discuss these two major challenges and argue that the neorealist perspective underestimates the extent to which ASEAN states have developed a mutual interest in avoiding war.

4.2.1: Intra-ASEAN's lingering suspicions

As stated above, the goal of the Association is to create a "security community", a forum to resolve the numerous and deleterious regional disputes which had thwarted the previous attempts at forming a regional organization, and to prevent any conflict to develop that could invite external interventions. "While ASEAN has come a long way in reducing tensions between its members, it has not yet reached the stage of a 'security community'. A number of actual or potential conflict situations remain" (Acharya, 1992a: 12). Neorealists infer from these facts that in the post-Cold War era, intra-ASEAN lingering disputes will reemerge so as to jeopardize ASEAN members' cooperation; internal tensions, accompanied by increased militarization, will create an atmosphere prone to armed conflicts.

The numerous maritime boundary disputes among various ASEAN countries, the unresolved dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over the former's claim to Sabah, as well as the continuing ethnic-based suspicion between Malaysia and Singapore may indeed

illustrate the vulnerability of intra-ASEAN ties, as well as the possibilities and limits of intra-ASEAN conflict management. But in assessing the potential for conflict issuing from these disputed claims, it is necessary to explore the following question: will states go to war over these conflicting claims ?

Old territorial disputes

Among numerous old territorial disputes, the most significant remain the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over the claim to Sabah and the concerns of Brunei and Singapore over their territorial integrity (Alagappa, 1991a: 17-23). For the past twenty-six years, relations have been strained because of the Philippine claim over Sabah: the final resolution of the issue has been elusive, despite attempts by the Aquino government to secure the necessary legal basis for dropping the claim. But the two countries never actually resorted to the use of war in order to solve the dispute. Security and survival concerns of Singapore and Brunei are focused primarily - but not exclusively - on Malaysia. Singapore has often, notably after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, expressed its worries about Malaysia being a threat to its existence (Acharya, 1991: 174). While bilateral relations have experienced quite rough patches, they have not been allowed to deteriorate and have not resulted in the consideration of options relating to the use of force. Greater political, security and economic cooperation among those states may help to control and in the long run more permanently transform the conflictual dynamics. Increased cooperation would foster confidence-building, helping to overcome suspicions and build links with neighbours.

Spratlys

The recent discoveries and projection of potential oil, gas and mineral deposits in the unhabited islets of the South China Sea (the Spratlys) have indeed fuelled a dispute for their acquisition. If a 200-mile EEZ was to be attached to these islands, they would also offer a key control over vast surrounding areas of fisheries. Six countries are involved in this dispute, of which three are ASEAN member states, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei (the others are China, Taiwan and Vietnam). The three ASEAN countries lay claims to parts of the Spratlys (while the PRC, Taiwan and Vietnam claim them in their entirety). The Philippines' claim is based on history and effective occupation, while those of Malaysia and Brunei are based on certain provisions of the Law of the Sea. Only China and Vietnam have thus far engaged in premeditated military clashes with each other in 1988. The potential for conflict appears to be confined to the Sino-Vietnamese dyad. The three ASEAN claimants have expressed their desire and intent to settle the conflicting claims through negotiations. A forum for dialogue on the South China Sea has been proposed by Indonesia and endorsed by China (69). Indonesia has organized a series of workshops and seminars for officials and academics to discuss disputes in the South China Sea. The Indonesian objective as a 'broker', according to foreign minister Ali Alatas, is to convert the area into a region of cooperation rather than confrontation.

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(69) Michael Richardson, "Asians Trying to settle Spratly Dispute" and "Asians seek a Forum to Settle Disputes", International Herald tribune, 19 and 21 June 1991. See also FEER, 4 and 11 July 1991. On this issue, see also Weatherbee, 1987.

Exclusive Economic Zones

The renewed preeminence of maritime interests has spawned a progressive territorialization of the sea and compelled a reassessment of existing international maritime regimes. ASEAN has unilaterally proclaimed a 200-mile EEZ, which has suddendly expanded the territorial jurisdiction of its member states. In addition, the new regime which is emerging from the UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 recognizes the authority of the coastal and archipelagic states over the management of maritime resources within their territorial waters. The unilateral extension of EEZs has made for disputes relating to jurisdiction and rights to living and non-living resources in areas of overlap. Most prominent has been the issue of fishing rights (Leng, 1989).

While conflicting claims over EEZs are likely to make for tension in bilateral relations (Malaysia-Philippines (70), Malaysia-Thailand), it is highly improbable that these countries would go to war with each other over ocean resource related issues. The thrust of policy in all countries has been to resolve such disputes through negotiations. In 1988, Malaysia and Thailand concluded an agreement providing for joint deep-sea tuna fishing in Malaysian waters. Malaysia and Thailand reactivated the idea of joint exploitation of living and non-living resources in the area where their EEZs overlap. Malaysia and Philippines have also begun talks over their overlapping claims in the area between Sabah and the Southern Philippines.

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(70) In April 1988, the arrest by the Malaysian navy of 49 Filipino fishermen who alledgedly intruded into Malaysian waters caused considerable tensions in bilateral relations: Straits Times, 24 April 1988.

Intra-ASEAN conflicts cannot be said, as the foreign minister of Singapore claimed in 1982, to have "either become irrelevant or been muted considerably" (71). Yet, ASEAN has become a quasi-security community in the sense that its members do not foresee the prospect of resorting to armed confrontation among themselves to resolve existing bilateral disputes. ASEAN countries have not contemplated the use of force as an option. They have also quite strictly respected political independence and territorial integrity, and refrained from interfering in the domestic affairs of other member states (Alagappa, 1991b: 24). Notably, during the ASEAN summit meeting in Singapore in January 1992, a confidential report suggested closer consultations among member states to avoid military misunderstandings and a flare-up of territorial disputes in the region (72). ASEAN has not attained conflict resolution but has certainly succeeded in defusing tensions, in avoiding armed conflicts, in creating a political community and with it, respect among its member states for international norms has also grown. Moreover, ASEAN states have recently agreed to step up economic cooperation among them through the formation of an Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) which should further decrease the utility of war as an instrument of policy (73). The neorealist discourse's pessimism on ASEAN should thus be watered down. While ASEAN does not have a successful record in the pacific settlement of disputes, it has succeeded in ruling out the use of force in inter-state relations among members states.

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(71) Straits Times, 15 September 1988.
(72) Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 18, (10-11), April-May 1992: 32.
(73) "The Morning AFTA", FEER, 24 October 1991: 64-65.

4.2.2: Bringing Indochina into ASEAN

Neorealists have argued that ASEAN post-Cambodia will lose its relevance: being the mere product of intra-regional stress rather than of common interests, its viability will soon be put to the test. Although the end of this regional conflict will certainly challenge the Association, one can be more sanguine about ASEAN's prospects. ASEAN's ultimate goal with respect to intra-regional conflicts has always been the creation of a security regime (and eventually of a security community) encompassing all states in Southeast Asia. The demise of global tensions between the great powers and the consequent expectations of a settlement of the Cambodian conflict have put the Indochina issue on the top of ASEAN's current agenda. The issue raised pertains to how to include the Indochinese countries into the Association, how to move from a subregional quasi-'security community' to a regional (Southeast Asian) entity.

The global changes have renewed hope and interest in the inclusion of Indochina into ASEAN. In 1967, the founding declaration of ASEAN extended to the whole of Southeast Asia; one of the components of the ZOPFAN concept adopted in 1971 was also to develop relations with those countries ultimately through their membership in ASEAN; and in 1976, provision was made for the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to be open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia. "Such an act was intended to demonstrate a willingness to abide by the (ASEAN) code of conduct. The underlying object was to seek a *modus vivendi* with Vietnam based on the cardinal rule of the international society of states as a practical alternative to any

premature attempt to expand the membership of ASEAN" (Leifer, 1992: 168). However, this political opening was not furthered. Development and implementation of these ideas was brought to a halt by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Since then, a comprehensive solution of this conflict has been stated by ASEAN members as a prerequisite for Indochina's inclusion in the Association. Thus, in formal terms, the settlement of the Cambodian conflict should open the way for the Indochina countries to accede to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. As the Indonesian General Sustrino put it, by accepting the Indochina countries, ASEAN seeks to "rid the region of antagonism and be a force of cooperation" (74).

Although agreeing on the necessity of enlarging the cooperative framework so as to include the Indochinese countries, ASEAN countries diverge on the form through which regional cooperation should be pursued. "Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have publicly stated that Hanoi's communist ideology would not be a barrier to its eventual reconciliation with ASEAN. Thailand's pragmatic approach, aiming at "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place", also seems quite indifferent to the type of regime. Singapore, however, has expressed concern that Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN "could change the character of the organization and jeopardize further ASEAN cooperation" (quoted by Acharya, 1991: 175). Lee Kuan Yew claimed that ASEAN had to await the change in their politico-social system before being able to mesh with those of the present ASEAN members

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(74) Straits Times, 14 January 1989.

(75). Thus, two basic (but not mutually exclusive) options regarding how to bring Indochina into ASEAN have been put forward. One is the early enlargement of ASEAN to include the Indochina countries so that all nine countries will be under one regional framework. The second option is based on a functional approach to regional cooperation. ASEAN states have in fact opted for a combination of both.

The first option appeared quite attractive because the founding 1967 Declaration of Bangkok appeals to the unity of the Southeast Asian region. Expansion of membership should thus make ASEAN's regional credentials even stronger and accord it greater weight and consideration from the international community. However, given that ASEAN has not been able to achieve its goal of peace and stability, the inclusion of Indochina countries would make the harmonising of political interests even more difficult. Moreover, the inclusion of the Indochinese economies would add complexity to the pattern of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation and impose additional economic burden on the Association. Thus, the nature and cohesion of ASEAN might be affected without significantly enhancing the prospects for peace and stability in the region. Enlargement would not only inhibit further progress, but could even be retrogressive.

Thus, as far as formal enlargement of ASEAN is concerned, ASEAN states have only enabled the Indochinese countries to sign the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - that is to extend ASEAN's security regime norms to the regional entity. As a matter of fact, Vietnam and

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(75) Cited in Michael Richardson, "Asia-Pacific Nations Search for Security Strategy", International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1990. In must be noted that Vietnam has clearly stated that moves towards a freer economy do not signal the abandonment of its socialist ideology: M. Vatikiotis, "Join the Club", FEER, 20 June 1991.

Laos had requested to become a signatory to the 1976 Treaty. That request was warmly welcomed by ASEAN's head of government meeting in Singapore in January 1992 as a way of providing "a common framework for wider regional cooperation embracing the whole of Southeast Asia" (76). During the Cold War, the ideological confrontation as well as the security surplus generated by the great powers' involvement reduced the likelihood of a regional Southeast Asian security regime. But with the end of the Cold War, both sides perceive such a regional security regime as a substitute to enhance their security in a situation of new found vulnerability. W. Tow writes:

> ASEAN in the post-Cambodia era will have to institutionalize regional security agendas independent from the traditional imperatives of threat assessment. ...ASEAN's future task will be to convert the ZOPFAN ideal into more tangible means for resolving outstanding intra-regional territorial disputes, ... and forming long-term habits of security consultation and cooperation that, in turn, will lead to the emergence of a viable and enduring security regime throughout Southeast Asia" (Tow, 1990b: 129).

It is indeed in the interests of both the Indochinese countries and ASEAN to promote peace in the Southeast Asian region by enlarging the cooperative framework that helped build the goodwill and trust that has been crucial to the success of ASEAN. Moreover, in order to attract the necessary financial and political support to rebuild their economies, the Indochinese states have to demonstrate continued good behaviour and reduce their commitment to war as an instrument of policy.

The second option will enable the Indochina countries to undertake functional economic cooperation. They will be gradually

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(76) Singapore Declaration of 1992, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore, 28 January 1992; cited by Leifer, 1992: 168.

drawn into the ASEAN economic activities on a sectoral basis. This approach is based on the creation of regional organizations on a function-specific basis. Eventually all these functional organizations might be pulled together under one regional framework (77). In the same token, the Thai initiative to encourage economic cooperation among continental Southeast Asian economies should be viewed positively. This would help to mesh the Indochina countries with ASEAN, to minimise suspicion, build confidence and make the eventual enlargement of ASEAN more feasible and acceptable. The underlying theoretical assumption of this approach stems from the liberal belief that regional economic cooperation can contribute, in Nye's phrase, to 'peace in parts'. Wisemann stresses the "functionalist and neo-functionalist assumptions - that international cooperation in economic/technical issues would lead over time to a spill-over into other areas of cooperation involving high politics of security such as war", which underline much of the contemporary debate on Southeast Asia (1992: 45). This debate implicitly endorses functional linkages in the Deutsch tradition of a 'security community'.

Thus, ASEAN will and is already facing those two major challenges that neorealists have pointed to; the evidence shows that cooperation among ASEAN members should not be jeopardized by the end of the Cold War as neorealists contend. On the contrary, ASEAN intends to pursue its goal of forming a 'security community' in the post-Cold War era. A habit of cooperation has developed among member states and has gradually contributed to deep changes in states' values and

(77) Muthiah Alagappa, "Bringing Indochina into ASEAN", FEER, 29 June 1989.

attitudes. Those countries, as well as the Indochinese countries today, are primarily interested in pursuing economic development and economic growth, which creates incentives for better relations with the market economies in the region able to foster trade, aid, loans, foreign investment, technology transfer and human resource expertise so vital to their economic development. They consequently do not contemplate the option of waging war in order to solve remaining territorial disputes.

ASEAN's renunciation of war as an instrument of policy is thus gradually evolving to encompass the entirety of Southeast Asia; evidence also shows that it may well be expanded to the whole of Asia-Pacific.

4.3 : EMULATING THE ASEAN MODEL IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The relative success of ASEAN security cooperation is clearly displayed by the fact that ASEAN's approach to security as well as the institutional mechanisms it developed are being emulated in Asia-Pacific. Indeed, as Cold War tensions are subsiding in Asia, former adversaries in the region are intensifying efforts to develop new channels for solving political and security problems. There has recently been an inflation of proposals for a pan-Asian security forum: the Shevardnadze proposal, the Australian and the Canadian initiatives. What is of interest for our central concern is that the 'ASEAN spirit' and its liberal assumptions is considered by other countries of the Pacific Rim as a model to further security in the wider region. ASEAN, which has now survived longer than any other

regional organization in the Pacific-Asian area, is thus fostering new ideas for promoting security cooperation in Asia-Pacific. Our purpose here is not to discuss the feasability of such initiatives (see Segal, 1990; Wiseman, 1992 among others) but to show that the philosophy underlying those proposals stems from the ASEAN experience and from liberal assumptions.

4.3.1: Emulating ASEAN's spirit

The 'ASEAN spirit' may be characterized by two main features: a direct relationship between security and economic prosperity; a cooperative model of international security based on the renunciation of war. These two features, which display a certain liberal way of thinking, have inspired the different initiatives for an Asia-Pacific security architecture that have recently been launched.

The first feature inspiring the initiatives on Asia-Pacific security is the direct relationship between security and economics. ASEAN has always emphasized the fact that it was an economic organization aimed at fostering economic cooperation. It was thought that regional involvement of ASEAN states in a multilateral non-security regime would help foster the habit of cooperation which, in itself, would have a positive security spin-off. It is such an assumption that is today underlying the initiatives for an Asia-Pacific security architecture. The proposals for an Asia-Pacific security architecture stem from the increasing economic integration among East Asian and Asia-Pacific countries and from the fear of

repercussions of war (78). The proliferation of economic contacts across political lines has strengthened the prospects for peace by raising the economic incentive to maintain harmonious contact. Because of the potential economic disruption war may cause, states are willing to cooperate to further international security in the region. There is indeed a greater consensus within the region on the key priority - "economic development through domestic modernisation and widening economic intercourse" (Scalapino, 1991: 20) - than any time in the past. Thus, in a classic neofunctionalist way, what Scalapino has labelled 'Asianisation' (79) is in turn leading states to reduce their commitment to war as an instrument of policy. The decreasing attraction of war has fostered the initiatives for the creation of a security forum.

The second feature of the 'ASEAN spirit' indeed stems from the previous one. The cooperative model of international security that the Association has developed is based on the gradual renunciation of war. The evidence has shown that the competitive model of power politics was only partially relevant in explaining ASEAN's creation, rationale and achievements. ASEAN has not sought to achieve peace through strength and deterrence as neorealists posit: the deterrence discourse, which pledges to increase security through military build-ups, has never really been prevalent among ASEAN political leaders and military establishments. The priority of ASEAN member states was

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(78) Scalapino labels the trend towards economic integration in Northeast Asia a 'soft regionalism': economic and cultural ties have proliferated across political boundaries, but lack any institutional structure (1991: 19).

(79) Namely "the creation of a thickening network of ties between and among societies that in the colonial era existed half foreign to each other", Scalapino, 1991: 20.

rather to focus on the principle of cooperative and mutual security, based on the assumption that war has lost its utility as an instrument of policy. This thinking about security is in turn highly relevant for Asia-Pacific as a whole. A. Mack contends that:

> The historical evidence suggests that there are few grounds for feeling confident that the security philosophy of 'peace through strength' and deterrence which the current military build-up in the Asia-Pacific reflects will in fact enhance regional security. Recognition that this is the case, that wars may arise by inadvertence as well as aggression, is reason enough for regional defence planners to think seriously about some of the possible long-term risks which the Asia-Pacific build-up may generate and... how these risks might be minimised (1992: 14).

Moreover, both for Asia-Pacific as well as ASEAN countries, there is no immediately perceived potential aggressor, but just a pervasive feeling of instability - so that the old fashioned deterrence thinking is not appropriate. The deterrence discourse indeed applies in the case where there is a defined threat, a defined potential aggressor to deter. Moreover, as Mack notes, the deterrence discourse may invite aggression and may exacerbate the conditions which lead to inadvertent wars because it creates security dilemmas. The 'ASEAN spirit', on the contrary, seeks security with other states rather than against them (1991: 84): it emphasizes the role of dialogue, cooperation and confidence building measures. The initiatives for an Asia-Pacific forum are thus aiming to build cooperative security regimes: setting up norms, rules and procedures that restrain states in their political and military relations. "And at a higher level of norm development and cooperation, regional states might operate a security community characterized, in Deutsch's terms, by expectations of peaceful change and a very high level of cooperation" (Wiseman, 1992: 46).

ASEAN's experience and 'ASEAN's spirit' may thus be said to have provided ideas of a liberal kind to those who initiated proposals for promoting security in Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN model has also been emulated as far as mechanisms are concerned.

4.3.2: Emulating ASEAN's mechanisms

Scholars have usually stressed that ASEAN's resort to more informal processes rather than formal institutional mechanisms to promote peace and stability is also a relevant option for Asia-Pacific. Dialogues and consultations have indeed been more useful for intra-ASEAN dispute settlement than formal, institutional mechanisms such as the High Council (Alagappa, 1991b; Leifer, 1992: 169). Geoffrey Wiseman asserts that informal conflict-avoidance mechanisms and pragmatism are more suited to Asia-Pacific (1992: 57). ASEAN's Post-Ministerial Conference has thus been contemplated as a suitable dialogue forum for Asia-Pacific.

Canada as well as Japan have suggested that an Asia-Pacific security forum should be built on existing regional forums such as the annual ASEAN post-ministerial meeting (PMM). Canada has encouraged ASEAN to broaden the scope of its consultations from economic to security matters, as well as to extend the participation to Asia-Pacific nations. Japan has also proposed that ASEAN formalise the PMM as a structure for security discussions.

ASEAN first appeared reluctant to the idea of an Asia-Pacific forum, which would steal the limelight from ASEAN's own brand of regionalism. "They are afraid of losing their identity. Bringing in

outside powers would dilute their identity" says A. Acharya (80). Yet Asia-Pacific's security has been creeping onto ASEAN's agenda: as a senior Singaporean diplomat declared, "we are nudging ourselves, or being nudged, into this way of thinking" (81). ASEAN thinking on broader Asia-Pacific matters began to take concrete form during a series of academic conferences, with 'informal' governmental participation, in the summer of 1991 in Jakarta, Manila and Kuala Lumpur. One group of influential ASEAN academics has proposed an ASEAN PMM-initiated "Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia-Pacific" including the ASEAN countries, the dialogue partners, and additional invitations on a regular basis to China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. One of its objectives would be to "contribute to the constructive management of the emerging international processes in the region, with a view to the establishment of a multilateral framework of cooperative peace". As announced in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Asean Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, there is a growing consensus that the organization should use the vehicle of an expanded Post-Ministerial Meeting, eventually including a wider membership, as a forum for discussion of Asia-Pacific political and security issues (82). And for the first time in July 1991, China and the Soviet Union attended the annual meeting of foreign ministers of ASEAN member states.

ASEAN countries have thus come to acknowledge the merits of the PMM as the basis for an institutionalized security dialogue. It would

(80) Asian Bulletin, April 1992:6.
(81) FEER, 20 June 1991.
(82) FEER, 20 June 1991 and 1 August 1991.

notably enable ASEAN states to deal with the perceived expansionist maritime policies of both China and Japan by enmeshing them into a multilateral framework, to address the emerging security dilemmas through dialogue and reassurance. Recently, in May 1992, Malaysia has offered to host an Asia-Pacific security dialogue next year. As a senior member of the Malaysian armed forces suggested: "Emulating the ASEAN model, a similar mechanism on a region-wide basis to provide a platform for dialogue among the armed forces on regional security should be established". Thus, as a senior Indonesian delegate said: "We will evolve an ASEAN-centric structure in the ASEAN way - through discussions and consensus" (83) - that is through ASEAN's approach to security based on "peaceful and cooperative" relationships among states.

Thus the philosophy underlying the proposals for futhering Asia-Pacific's security stems from the ASEAN experience and from the liberal assumptions that the ASEAN experience displays.

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(83) Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), 27 July 1991.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the argument that the neorealist theory of international politics will be helpful in explaining the security environment of the periphery in the post-Cold War era. Scholars that have answered the question of whether the end of the Cold War will lead to new modes of cooperation or create new opportunities for conflicts have usually predicted pessimistic prospects for the periphery. They indeed have argued that the new global situation should multiply and exacerbate conflicts. Such a pessimism is furthered by the neorealist belief that cooperation among states should seldom occur, should only emerge when motivated by a common threat and should be inconsequential in restraining states' behavior and in promoting substantive security.

This thesis has sought to contend that although a common enemy may help cooperation to emerge and to be maintained, cooperation may not exclusively hinge on such motivations. Chapter 2 has posited that some states in the periphery have developed mutual interests in avoiding war that motivate them to cooperate. In such cases, cooperation based on common interests will be more significant and may promote substantive security in the periphery. In presenting such an argument, it is clear that the analysis we made falls within a basically liberal mold. Hence the hypothesis set in Chapter 2, which states that cooperation may be better explained by liberal theory rather than by neorealism.

In analyzing the case study of ASEAN in the post-Cold War era, we have looked for evidence that ASEAN member states have reduced their commitment to war as an instrument of policy: our findings do lend support to our hypothesis.

Evidence does 'prove' that ASEAN states are adopting neorealist strategies to ensure their survival: they are indeed resorting to self-help as well as forming alliances with external great powers. Yet it also shows that states are ultimately seeking to promote cooperation and pursue their strategy of conflict management precisely on the grounds that war has lost its utility. Therefore, while ASEAN cooperation has been facilitated by a common enemy, evidence shows that liberal pressures also provided states' motivations for collaborating. We found that ASEAN states have been willing to create a 'security community' on the liberal assumption that they place more importance on economics rather than on military power. Progress towards ASEAN members' security in the post-Cold War era thus has depended on one element: the continued reluctance of states to initiate war because of its disruptive potential. As far as ASEAN's future is concerned, despite challenges to ASEAN's viability resulting from the end of the Cold War, member states are willing to strengthen cooperation among them; security cooperation, based on the liberal assumptions discussed above, is also gradually being extended to the whole of Southeast Asia as well as to the wider Asia-Pacific area.

Cooperation among ASEAN states has, and will continue to promote substantive progress in the security of the region. Liberal theory is therefore more useful in explaining some developments in ASEAN

than is neorealist theory, but does not yet account for the full-range of their security behavior. Liberal theory does not challenge the relevance of neorealism in depicting the periphery in the post-Cold War era, but qualifies it (84).

For liberal theory to really challenge the applicability of neorealism, indictaions should be found that a norm has developed among ASEAN states, which stigmatizes war as being illegitimate; evidence should be found of a moral inhibition regarding war among the societies of ASEAN member states, and of the fact that these states are willing to place their faith in other countries because they share the same values. Needless to say, such evidence is still extremely difficult to identify among ASEAN states. Thus, although neorealist theories of international relations cannot fully account for the developments that are occurring among some states in the periphery, they still are partially relevant in depicting the periphery in the post-Cold War era. Our findings nevertheless show that some developments also support a liberal argument. If these developments are furthered and result in a moral inhibition concerning war, future research on the relevance of the liberal argument will still be warranted.

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(84) A very interesting issue is the question of the distinctiveness of ASEAN in the periphery, but investigating the reasons for this distinctiveness would require further research that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

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