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Operational code beliefs of Ronald Reagan: the nature of the international environment and image of the… Edgar, Tracey 1993

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We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardOPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS OF RONALD REAGAN:THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAND IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNIONbyTRACEY EDGARB.A., The University of Guelph, 1989B.ed., The University of British Columbia, 1992A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAAugust 1993© Tracey Edgar, 1993an advancedshall make itfor extensivehead of mycopying ort my writtenIn presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements fordegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Libraryfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permissioncopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by thedepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood thatpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed withoupermission.(Signature)Department of  Pat_ IT 1CAL^CI MC..e.- The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate  \Lk OCTC.(7)Ers)- ) 9 6i 3DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTIn 1981, the Reagan administration came to the White House emphasizing the moraland political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. The conflictbetween the two countries was likened to one between right and wrong, good and evil.Yet, by the end of his second term in office, Reagan was hailing a new era in Soviet-American relations. The possibility of a lasting peace between once implacable foes waspronounced.The questions which form the framework for this thesis arise from this dramatic shiftin the Reagan administration rhetoric regarding the Soviet Union. The thesis focuses on thepolitical beliefs of Reagan. The purpose is to gain some insight into the role a politicalactor's beliefs about politics - the operational code - in international relations. Specifically,this paper uses qualitative content analysis to examine Ronald Reagan's operational codeduring both terms in office and look for evidence of modified or discarded beliefs whichmay reflect the changing international situation and the altered character of the SovietUnion.General conclusions drawn from the study indicate that Reagan's operational codedid not undergo any major modifications in response to the new situation in the SovietUnion. However, liberal, optimistic elements of his operational code became moredominant in the second term. It appears that some political leaders resist change in theirbelief systems - even in the face of strong, contradictory evidence.TABLE OF CONTENTSPageABSTRACT ^TABLE OF CONTENTS ^  iiiLIST OF TABLES  ivINTRODUCTION ^  1CHAPTER ONE: THE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH ^  5I. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY - SOME COGNITIVE THEORIES.^ 5II. THE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH  11III.^HOLSTI'S TYPOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL CODES ^ 25CHAPTER TWO: THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF RONALD REAGAN ^ 30I. METHODOLOGY ^  30II. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY ^  33III. CODING REAGAN'S BELIEFS ^  34IV. "TYPING" REAGAN ACCORDING TO HOLSTI'S TYPOLOGY ^ 49V.^DETECTING CHANGE IN REAGAN'S BELIEFS ^  61CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ^  65REFERENCES ^  71APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE OF HOLSTI'S (1977) CODING SHEETS ^ 75APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF CODED DOCUMENT ^  80iiiLIST OF TABLESPageTABLE 1.^SOME COGNITIVE APPROACHES ^  9TABLE 2.^DOCUMENTS CODED ^  31TABLE 3.^TYPE B: HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF ^ 50TABLE 4.^SUMMARY OF REAGAN'S BELIEFS: FREQUENCY OF STATEMENTSAND GOODNESS OF FIT FOR BOTH TERMS ^  58iv1INTRODUCTIONIn March 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev became General Secretary of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union and began an irreversible program of change.Since that time, the very nature of the Soviet Union, as well as the structure of theinternational environment, have been transformed. The essentially bipolar, East versusWest orientation of international affairs was irrevocably altered by the emergence of thisnew leader. His profound changes led to the exposure of internal Soviet weaknesses tothe world; a new direction in Soviet international politics and domestic policies and,ultimately; to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.The changes Gorbachev initiated were embodied in an overarching frameworkcalled "new thinking". This "new thinking" included: a radical reappraisal of the Sovietrole in the international system; a reconsideration of appropriate foreign policy andaction; and a new emphasis on global interdependence, underlined by the existence ofnuclear weapons. For Gorbachev, this involved a shift in the concept of "peacefulcoexistence", away from an instrument of class struggle to a "condition for the survivalof the entire human race." (Gorbachev, in Lynch, 1989, p.35). Another important shiftwas from the primacy of national security to one of "mutual security". Gorbachevunderstood that measures to increase the security of one state often led to the increasedinsecurity of its opponent. This cycle of security-insecurity merely exacerbated the armsrace and heightened mistrust between the two superpowers.Lenin first coined the phrase "peaceful coexistence" to mean a breathing space, ortemporary period of improved relations with the Western Imperialists, in which the Sovietscould gather their forces for the final confrontation.2Gorbachev's "new thinking" laid the foundation for a transformation of Sovietinternational action and importantly, was also linked to new domestic policies ofrenewal and increasing openness. It was, in many ways, revolutionary.Within the United States government however, the phenomenon of Gorbachevwas initially met (not without reason) with scepticism, and many influential U.S.specialists continued to believe that the USSR was incapable of meaningful social,economic, or political change (Lewin, 1988, p.2). The prevailing American image of theSoviet Union was one of "totalitarianism" which denoted a one-party regime, a powerfulleadership, state terrorism, and political and ideological indoctrination of the population.The label "totalitarian" emerged during the 1940's to describe Germany under Hitlerand, later, Russia under Stalin. The label evolved into a powerful ideological tool aswell as an explanatory concept for understanding the Soviet system (Lewin, 1988, p.3).This conceptual image of the Soviet Union focused on the state and politicalsystem while excluding other aspects of the Soviet experience. It emphasized theideology of Marxism-Leninism as the driving force behind Soviet policy which had theultimate goals of world revolution and the transplanting of communist ideology throughwhatever means. The tenets of Marxism-Leninism were distorted by some Americananalysts who mistook ideological rhetoric as fixed reality, and who viewed Sovietideology, as well as the their political system, as static and unchanging. Within such arigid ideological framework, the possibilities for significant change within the Sovietpolity seemed negligible.This was the dominant conceptual framework for thinking about the Soviet Unionwhich pervaded the Reagan administration when Gorbachev came to power. In3American Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary, Erik Beukalcommented that "During its first years the Reagan administration expressed the mostdistinct Soviet essentialist image presented by an American government since the earlyKennedy administration..." (1989, p.105). The moral and political contrast between theUnited States and the Soviet Union was emphasized, with the conflict between the twocountries likened to one between right and wrong, good and evil. In his first pressconference in January 1981, President Ronald Reagan declared the only morality they(the Soviets) recognized was that which would further their goal of world revolution andthey believed they had the moral right to lie, cheat, or commit any crime in order toachieve that end (WCPD, 1981, p.66-67).Yet, by the end of his second term in office, Reagan was pronouncing thepossibilities of an enduring peace with a new Soviet Union and a "new era in history"(Reagan, in Shimko 1992, p.353). Certainly, the changes in U.S.-Soviet relations duringReagan's two terms as President appeared to be nothing short of dramatic. But what ofthe changes in Reagan's own image of the Soviet Union and his beliefs about theinternational political environment? Did Reagan undergo any fundamental alteration ofhis political belief system as a result of the new situation in the Soviet Union? To whatextent and in what ways did Reagan's initial beliefs guide, or even dominate, theinterpretation of new evidence of a changing Soviet Union?These questions then, form the focus of this thesis. The purpose in answeringthem is to attempt to gain some insight into the role of a political actor's beliefs aboutpolitics - termed the operational code - in international relations. More specifically, thispaper will look at Ronald Reagan's operational code during both terms in office and look4for evidence of modified or discarded beliefs which may reflect the changinginternational situation and the altered character of the Soviet Union.This thesis is organized as follows: in the first section of the paper there will be ashort discussion on the variety of cognitive theories which have been applied to thestudy of foreign policy decision-making and international relations. This section will alsocontain a discussion of the operational code construct including its development as atheoretical tool for understanding political decision-making, some examples of studieswhich employed the operational code, and some general criticisms of the construct.The second section will involve the analysis of Ronald Reagan's operational codeduring both of his terms in office, 1981-1984 and 1985-1989, using qualitative contentanalysis of sixteen presidential documents from both terms. The steps followed for theanalysis are loosely based on Ole Holsti's 1977 "Coding Handbook" which will also bediscussed in some detail. The analysis of Reagan's operational code will be primarilydescriptive and will concentrate specifically on Reagan's beliefs about the nature of theinternational political environment and his beliefs about, and image of, the Soviet Union.Particular attention will be paid to any changes within his operational code over thecourse of his two terms in office.The concluding sections will include: an analysis of the study's findings regardingchange in Reagan's operational code; some general implications about the utility of theoperational code construct for understanding how leaders cope with change in theinternational environment; and how new information is absorbed into a pre-existingbelief systems.CHAPTER ONETHE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACHI.^POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY - SOME COGNITIVE THEORIES:Approaches to international relations have been dominated by the "realist" schoolof international relations (see for example, Morgantheau, Politics Among Nations, 1960)which has focused on the nation-state and state system as the relevant unit and level ofanalysis, respectively. Incorporated into the realist position is the assumption that in aninternational environment characterized by structural anarchy, policy-makers are guidedby "national interest" in calculating political action (Holsti, 1989, P.13). Nationaldecision-makers are treated as "unitary rational actors" whose actions, even when theoutcome is war, are the result of calculated political choice. "Whatever may be theunderlying causes of international conflict.., wars begin with conscious and reasoneddecisions based on the calculation, made by both parties, that they can achieve more bygoing to war than by remaining at peace" (Howard in Holsti, 1989, p.16).Foreign policy decision-making analysis also has been dominated by realistapproaches, including the "rational actor model" and "rational deterrence theory" whichconceptualize the decision-maker as a rational actor (see for example, Huth & Russet,1984; Tsbelis, 1990). Rational actors make choices based the maximization of expectedutility. Governments, as unitary rational actors, select the action which will maximizestrategic goals and objectives as determined by the national interest (Allison, 1969,p.694). Within the framework of the rational actor model, the cognitive mechanisms of56decision-making are "black-boxed" as the rational procedure of information gathering andprocessing which results in a response — foreign policy behaviour.However, many other foreign policy research frameworks have pointed to thelimitations of the "black-box" model of decision-making, citing a variety of constraints onrational decision-making. Rational choice theorists have little to say about thepreferences which shape leaders' calculations in decision-making nor how or whypreferences may change. Herbert Simon has argued:To understand political choices, we need to understand where the frame ofreference for the actors' thinking comes from - how it is evoked. Animportant component of the frame of reference is the set of alternatives thatare given consideration in the choice process. We need to understand notonly how people reason about alternatives, but where alternatives comefrom in the first place (in Lebow and Stein, 1989, p.214).As well, there is strong evidence that decision-makers often deviate from the process ofrational calculation. In fact, foreign policy decision-makers appear to systematicallydeviate from rational norms and distort information in their estimates of those factorsspecified by the theorists as critical to their calculations (Lebow and Stein, 1989, p.215).Borrowing models and theories from psychology, many political scientists haveattempted to develop constructs which go beyond the rational actor model which seek tomore fully explain the decision-making process. Researchers have been investigating thedynamics of group decision-making (de Rivera, 1968; Janis, 1982), the organizationalnorms, routines and standard operating procedures which may distort or constraindecision-making (Allison, 1971), and the effects of bureaucratic politics on how issuesare defined or options considered (Simon, 1947; Halpern, 1974) in order to betterunderstand decision-making behaviour (Holsti, 1977, p.1, Mandel, 1986, pp.258-60).7Political researchers have utilized psychological approaches at several levels ofanalysis from individual actors to small-groups, bureaucracies, government systems andnation-states. Cognitive approaches in political psychology tend to focus on the level ofthe individual, primarily on determining the cognitive constraints on rationality. Aprincipal purpose of the cognitive approach has been to "get inside" the black box of theS-R model and go beyond the conceptualization of the political decision-maker as aunitary rational actor. By doing so, cognitive researchers are looking for a morecomprehensive understanding of foreign policy behaviour.The potential value of the cognitive approach to political behaviour lies in therecognition that decision-makers (even in an authoritarian state) do not share ahomogeneous set of beliefs, nor do they perceive political events in identical ways. Adecision-maker's orientation to, and interpretation of, the political environment aremediated by his beliefs about the world around him (Holsti, 1976, p.18). It is generallyrecognized that actors' behaviour is, in large measure, determined by the manner inwhich they perceive, diagnose, and evaluate the environment around them. Further, it isaccepted that actors require coping strategies and information filters to deal with thecomplexity and sheer amount of information and experiences which is the reality of theirenvironment.Built upon these assumptions about the cognitive constraints on rationality 2 ,2 According to Tetlock and McGuire (1986, p.149-50) the 'hard core' assumptions aboutcognitive research include the following:- The international environment imposes heavy information processing demands uponpolicy-makers.- The best solutions are not easily identified.- Information is often incomplete and/or unreliable.8Tetlock and McGuire (1986, p.148) define a positive heuristic of cognitive research: thecentral objective should be to understand the cognitive strategies, including pre-existingknowledge structures and decision-making tactics, that policy-makers rely upon toconstruct and maintain their simplified images of the environment.Political scientists engaged in cognitive research, while agreeing in general onTetlock and McGuire's "hard core assumptions" about the subject, have tended to utilizea variety of theoretical and methodological strategies as potential explanatory tools (seeTable 1). Generally, the theoretical strategies can be divided into two substantial areasof research which are by no means mutually exclusive: cognitive process and cognitivecontent.Cognitive process research involves investigating the mental strategies andcognitive functions individuals employ to cope with their environment and decision-making; the focus is on HOW an individual thinks or processes information. Examplesof this research includes: perception, misperception including Jervis', Perception andMisperception in International Politics (1976); integrative cognitive- Consequences of any given option are often uncertain.- Policy-makers must often make choices under intense stress and time pressure.- Policy-makers (like all human beings) have a limited capacity for information and mustemploy simplifying strategies to cope with complexity, uncertainty, and difficult trade-offswith which they are confronted.9TABLE 1. SOME COGNITIVE APPROACHESDecision-maker Stage of Decision- Theoretical Illustrative Constructs:gs.: making: Literature:Believer(pre-decision)*conceptualbaggage thatdecision-makerbrings to decision-making tasksSources of beliefsystemContent of beliefsystemStructure of beliefsystemPolitical socializationPersonality & politicsPolitical philosophyIdeologyCognitivepsychology1st independent politicalsuccessMind setImageOperational codeWorld viewDecisional premisesCognitive balanceCognitive complexityCognitive rigidityCognitive mapsPerceiver Identification of aproblemPsychology ofperceptionDefinition of situationPerception/misperceptionCognitive setSelective perceptionFocus of attentionInformationProcessorObtaininformationProduction ofsolutionEvaluation ofsolutionCognitiveconsistency theoriesTheories of attitudeof changeInformation theoryCommunicationtheorySterotypingSearch capacitySelective exposurePsycho-logicTolerance of ambiguityCoping with discrepant infoInfo overloadInfo processing capacitySatisficing/maximizingTolerance of inconsistencyDecision maker/StrategistSelection ofstrategyGame theoryDecision theoryDeterrence theoryUtilityRisk-takingDecision rulesManipulation of imagesEnds-means linksBounded rationalityLearner Coping withnegative feedbackLearning (post-decision)Learning theoryCognitive dissonanceFeedbackLessons of history(Holsti, 1977, p.31)10complexity (Wallace and Suedfeld, 1988; Suedfeld et al., 1977); rigidity/flexibility andblack and white thinking (Glad, 1983); and crisis decision-making (Hermannn, 1969;Herek, Janis and Huth, 1987).Cognitive content analysts emphasize mental content through the investigation ofknowledge structures and organization; they are concerned with determining WHATindividuals think and how their cognitive structures screen and encode new information.These cognitive structures have been studied under a variety of names such as beliefsystems, scripts, schema, cognitive maps, and operational codes.Both process and content studies are important to understanding why politicalactors behave the way they do and make the choices or decisions they make. Moreover,some synthesis of the two categories may be essential to developing a fuller explanationof political behaviour. There is also a need to more explicitly link cognitive theories toother areas of psychological research such as personality and motivational theories(Walker and Falkowski 1984; Walker 1990). While linking research paradigms willeventually be essential, there is still much work to be done within the individualconstructs.The focus of this paper is the political belief system of Ronald Reagan; what hebelieved about the Soviet Union and the international environment. This paper will dealwith cognitive content and not cognitive structures. Specifically, the focus will be on theoperational code construct and the analysis of Reagan's beliefs.11II.^THE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACHBELIEF SYSTEMS: The underlying premise of the operational code approach isthat all people construct internal belief systems which help to order and simplify theworld around them. An actor's belief system encompasses all the hypotheses andtheories which that actor sees as valid at a given moment. Beliefs, along with attitudes,values and stereotypes, are all guides to information processing. They serve as baselinesin interpretations, expectations and predictions of other's behaviour, and provide ameans for confirming or disconfirming the validity of information (Vertzberger, 1980,p.113). Beliefs tend to be more general in content than attitudes or stereotypes andusually include principles and broad ideas regarding the social and physicalenvironment. Individual beliefs organized into a system or set have three importantcharacteristics: they are functionally interdependent; there is an internal consistency,though there may not appear to be an external logic; and the beliefs are relatively stableand resistant to change.Converse (1964, p.207) defined the belief system as a "configuration of ideas andattitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint orfunctional interdependence." Functional interdependence means that any change instatus of one "idea-element" (or belief) would, psychologically, require somecompensating changes elsewhere in the belief system. The changes in other beliefs arerequired because beliefs are "tied" to one another and also to maintain a level of internalconsistency amongst belief sets.Converse also identified the dimension of "centrality" within the belief system.Centrality refers to the role which an idea-element or belief plays within the belief12system as a whole. Holsti has extended this dimension of centrality and has separated"core" or "master" beliefs from peripheral beliefs. He has suggested that "master" beliefsmay be more rigidly held and would be highly resistant (although not impervious) tochange. The operational code, according to Holsti can be defined as a belief system asdefined by Converse. It encompasses a set of "master" beliefs which play a central rolein a decision-maker's cognitive processing of information regarding politics and politicalaction (Holsti, 1977, p.40). Operational code beliefs are a subset of an actor's broaderbelief system which comprises general theories and principles concerning the politicalworld.Operational code beliefs and broader belief systems are personal constructs butthey are not an isolated phenomenon. Rather, they may be affected by social andcultural norms and also by other psychological constructs and life experiences. Someanalysts (Walker, 1983; Walker and Falkowski, 1984) suggest that belief systems mayalso be built upon more basic motivations for power, achievement, and affiliation whichare acquired in childhood. These needs or motivations are embedded in the broaderbelief system of an actor and may be triggered with a belief set, thus reinforcing therigidity with which a belief is held (Walker, 1983, p.189). There is a need for moreresearch linking psychological constructs such as personality and cognitive paradigms.Such linkages may provide researchers and analysts with greater insights into thebehaviour of political decision-makers.THE OPERATIONAL CODE:  In 1969 Alexander L. George wrote a formativepaper titled "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political13Leaders and Decision-Making". In this paper, George used the concept of theoperational code as a tool in the study of political leaders and their beliefs. Georgedrew, in large part, from an earlier study of the Bolsheviks done by Nathan Leites. Leitesemployed the term "operational code" to refer to the maxims of political strategy andtactics which characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics (George, 1969,p.1 93).In his interpretation of Leites' work, George defined the operational code as theset of political beliefs held within the context of a decision-maker's broader belief systemwhich simplifies and structures their world. The operational code, as George interpretedit, is not intended to be a set of rules applied mechanically, but a set of premises andbeliefs about politics which may act as a filter or prism through which the decisionmaker perceives and diagnoses political events.Operational code beliefs may also provide norms, standards and guidelines thatinfluence a decision-maker's choice of strategy and tactics.These beliefs provide [the decision maker] with a relatively coherent wayof organizing and making sense of what would otherwise be a confusingand overwhelming array of signals and cues picked up from theenvironment and his senses (George, in Vertzberger, 1979, P. 114).Operational code beliefs do not serve as a prescriptive for action or decisionmaking behaviour and, while George and others endow the operational code with"diagnostic and choice propensities" in decision-making analysis, there are no simplisticlinkages between belief and behaviour. Instead, operational code beliefs function as oneof many intervening variables which may shape and constrain decision-makingbehaviour. Beliefs may operate as a lens through which information is understood,14processed, and given meaning. Beliefs may also act as a filter or screen, as a means ofcoping with too much or too little information, of dealing with the various cognitiveconstraints on rationality.Operational code beliefs then, are the subset of an individual's belief systemwhich deal specifically with the political environment, the nature of political life, and themeans of achieving political goals. George organized this subset of beliefs into a seriesof ten questions, the answers to which may sum up the essence of an individual'spolitical beliefs. He ordered his questions into two clusters: philosophical andinstrumental. The philosophical questions refer to the assumptions a political actormakes about the fundamental nature of the international system, the nature of hisopponent and the role of the individual in history. The instrumental beliefs focus on thestrategy, timing, and utility of achieving desired ends in the international environment.The questions George developed are as follows:Philosophical:1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially oneof harmony or conflict?What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental politicalvalues and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on thisscore; and in what respects the one and/or other?3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? Whatis one's role in "moving" or "shaping" history in the desired direction?5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and historical development?15Instrumental:1. What is the best approach for selecting goal or objectives for political action?2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?(George, 1969, pp.201-216)The purpose of George's questions is to utilize a common set of political beliefswhich are relevant to all political actors in order to help the analyst understand how orwhy a decision-maker will behave in a variety of situations. The questions are generalenough to apply to people in any political system and provide a base on which to helpexplain one decision-maker's behaviour, compare the behaviour of two or more differentdecision-makers, and perhaps make some predictions about decision-making behaviour.The usefulness of the code however, may vary according to the situation decision-makers are faced with. The operational code is not to be seen as the only factor in thedecision-making process, nor as consistently relevant in all situations. In mundane orroutine occurrences, situational, organizational, and role factors may predominate thedecision-making process. Ole Holsti recognized this and generated a set of situationswhere operational code beliefs may play an especially significant role in a decision-maker's diagnosis and response.1.^Nonroutine situations requiring more than the application of standard operatingprocedures.162. Decisions made at the pinnacle of government hierarchy by leaders relatively freeof organizational and other constraints.3. Long-range policy planning which involves a certain amount of ambiguity anduncertainty and where questions about "what is", "what will be", "what ends aredesirable" and "how to achieve desired ends" will be at the core of the decision-making process.4. When the situation itself is highly ambiguous and open to a variety ofinterpretations and there may be either an overload or scarcity of information.5. Circumstances of information overload in which decision-makers are forced to usea variety of coping strategies to reduce the complexity of the situation to amanageable level.6.^Unanticipated events in which initial reactions are likely to reflect cognitive"sets".(Holsti, 1976, p.30)Clearly, this set of situations applies particularly strongly to the study of internationalrelations which is marked by uncertainty and unexpected events. Political actors makingdecisions in the international arena are often faced with either an overload or a scarcityof information and unanticipated or ambiguous circumstances which forces them to relymore heavily on their internal belief system, their operational code, to simplify and ordera complex, confusing situation into one which is both manageable and understandable.The political decision-maker's operational code is, perhaps, determined throughthe answers to George's set of ten questions. For the purposes of this study, the answersto George's questions, (defining the actor's fundamental beliefs about the nature of thepolitical world), act as an intervening variable between incoming information anddecision-making behaviour. However, the operational code construct may prove to beuseful for a variety of different study types. The construct may be useful as a dependent,1 7independent, or intervening variable in political socialization and decision-makingstudies, or as the basis for comparison in elite studies (Holsti, 1977, p.153).In general, the operational code affects the actor's definition of the situation, hisperceptions of options and, ultimately, his choice of behaviour. A political actor'sdefinition of the situation may be mediated by his orientation to and interpretation of thepolitical environment - his operational code. Thus, according to Holsti (1977, p.2), theactor's psychological environment, how he "sees" the situation, may only imperfectlymatch the "real" or operational political environment or situation.Beliefs, therefore, affect and may distort the information processing which leads todecision-making behaviour. The importance and relevance attached to incominginformation may fluctuate depending on how closely the information correlates with theactor's beliefs. Information which conflicts with established beliefs may be rejected orgiven a lesser priority. Policy choices or strategies may also be assessed, in part, by theinstrumental belief set of the operational code. However, it is important to rememberthat operational code beliefs are only one variable in a complex casual framework forunderstanding decision-making and, while operational code beliefs may not unilaterallydetermine the choice of behaviour, they may influence the range of policy choices adecision-maker finds preferable (George, 1979, p.104).A number of analysts have utilized George's formulation of the operational codein their own research. The majority have used the operational code to study individualdecision-makers such as: John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1970); Senator Frank Church(Johnson, 1977); German Socialist leaders Schumacher and Brandt (Ashby, 1969); DeanAcheson (McLennan, 1971); Pierre Elliot Trudeau (Thordarson, 1972); and Henry18Kissinger (Walker, 1977). Other researchers have expanded on or adapted theoperational code for diverse purposes. Below are three examples of how the operationalcode has been utilized in research studies.Hoagland and Walker (1977) applied the operational code to international crisesin order to assess the congruence between Soviet and American operational codes andtheir crisis behaviour. Their research also tested the ability of the operational codeconstruct to be generalized from an individual to a national level of analysis.Rosenau and Holsti (1983) used political belief systems in their study of thebreakdown of consensus in American politics. They suggest that a 'shrinking' world andthe number of military, economic, and social challenges the United States has had tocope with has fragmented the shared American political culture. This fragmentation isevidences by the number of competing belief systems which have developed amongAmerican leadership groups. While not model operational code research per se, thisstudy does show the versatility of the construct, and the different ways belief systemsmay be used in research.Walker and Falkowski (1984) focused on the relationship between operationalcode, early childhood socialization experiences, and motivational needs for power,affiliation and achievement. They argue that political belief systems develop fromchildhood experiences and motivations. Their focus was to "construct and evaluate anintegrated, cumulative model of the relationships between personality traits and foreignpolicy decisions." (Walker and Falkowski, 1984, p.238).19SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE OPERATIONAL CODE:  Gunnar Sojblom(1982) and Martha Cottam (1986) and others have presented a number of criticisms ofthe operational code approach. Critiques of the approach include relevant questionsabout the validity of the categories, the vagueness of terms, the units of analysis, thecausal connection between beliefs and behaviour, when the operational code should beemployed, and even about the name, "operational code", itself. The question of whenthe operational code should be employed has already been addressed by Holsti's workon prescribing a list of situations. Although all the above questions are important, onlythree of the major criticisms will be discussed here: 1) the individual as the unit ofanalysis; 2) the operational code categories and; 3) the connection between beliefs andbehaviour.Both Cottam and Sojblom have argued that the individual is not a useful level ofanalysis for understanding political decision-making. Both mention the fact that theoperational code was originally developed to study the political beliefs of a group,namely the Bolsheviks. Sojblom states that role and institutional constraints limit thelevel to which an individual leader's personal traits or beliefs can affect policy, and bythe time systemic, societal, governmental, and bureaucratic constraints on decision-making are taken into account, the attributes of the individual decision-maker have beenminimized to the point of mere idiosyncratic differences of little research relevance.Research focusing on the individual has been dismissed as merely descriptive andthat "such a direction would normally mean we are some further steps away from anexplanatory approach" (Sojblom, 1982, p.45).20However, according to Allison (1971), levels of analysis can be thought of as"beacons" which sensitize investigators to different bodies of data and potentialexplanations. The purpose of investigating political behaviour at any given level is notto disprove the analysis at other levels, but to contribute to a more thorough explanationof a given phenomenon or event. Understanding political actor's operational codes andhow they affect the decision-making process may not provide a complete explanation butmay enrich the analyst's understanding. Different research foci may lead to significantlydifferent explanations for the same phenomenon.The unit of analysis adopted for this paper is the individual. Understanding thebelief systems of the key political actors in the Soviet-American "thaw" of the late 1980'smay help explain how the Cold War came to an end. The level of the individual maybe especially relevant as the unit of analysis in this instance because Soviet-Americanrelations have always been emotionally charged and infused with rhetoric and ideology.The predominant American image of the Soviet Union and Reagan's own hard-line viewsdiscussed in the Introduction are evidence of the "personal" nature of Soviet-Americanrelations. Even with strong signs that the Soviets were undergoing profound changes,many Americans remained sceptical, resistant to the idea that the Soviet Union wascapable of real transformation. For many, such change went against long held beliefsabout the nature of the Soviet Union.Reagan himself appears to have held firm, even simplistic, beliefs about the SovietUnion and the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In terms offoreign policy, especially dealing with the Soviets, Reagan may fit the image of the"insensitive predominant leader" as defined by M. Hermann and C. Hermann (1989).21Such leaders tend to chose advisors who define the problem as they do; they arerelatively insensitive to information which does not conform to what they believe; andthey value some congruence between "who they are" and "what they do" (pp.365-66).Hermann and Hermann argue that understanding the insensitive predominant leader'spersonality (and, therefore, beliefs) will provide clues about his government's foreignpolicy. Understanding Reagan's beliefs then, should supply some insights into thepolicies toward the Soviet Union which his government followed.This assertion is reinforced by Holsti's work on situations where the operationalcode may play an especially significant role in the decision-maker's diagnosis andresponse (see page 26). The second situation involves decisions made at the pinnacle ofgovernment by leaders relatively free of organizational and other constraints. Reagan, itappears, had a relative amount of freedom in his militant campaign against the Soviets.This relative freedom combined with his essentialist views toward the Soviet Union makeReagan as an individual, an important level of analysis.Another major criticism of the operational code is the categories used inoperational code analysis. Cottam argues that there is no explanation for the selection ofthe beliefs embedded in George's ten questions nor why these and not other beliefs arecalled "master" beliefs (1986, p.11). Sojblom also finds difficulties with George'squestions, stating some concepts, such as that of conflict, are too vague to have muchmeaning.Holsti (1982, pp.82-83), counters these arguments by stating that operational codecategories have some important and positive features. First, the categories are limited toa manageable number; second, they are large enough in scope to be salient in any22decision-making situation; third, they can be further differentiated and elaborated (asHolsti does in the construction of his typology); and fourth, researchers have found manyof the categories to have significant political relevance.George's categories are not cast in stone and many analysts have adapted theoriginal questions, formulated new ones, or used only sections of the code as fit theirpurpose. The categories do have shortfalls and limitations but, argues Holsti, it would bemore productive to build upon their positive aspects than to simply discard them infavour of other untried categories. In that regard Holsti (1977), has developed a typologyof operational codes which will be discussed in the next section. This typology has beenelaborated upon by Walker (1983), and Walker and Falkowski (1984), who haveincorporated motivational imagery into Holsti's model. Their work exemplifies the utilityand flexibility of George's original categories.For the purposes of this study only the first philosophical belief, which has beenidentified as a "core" or "master" belief, is being utilized in order to understand thecharacter of Reagan's beliefs regarding the Soviet Union and the nature of theinternational environment. This belief has been divided into two important componentparts: the nature of the international system and the character of one's politicalopponent. Each of these parts has also been further subdivided into a number ofquestions to provide a detailed picture of Reagan's beliefs about the Soviet Union andthe international environment.Regarding the question about the connection between beliefs and action, Sojblomasks whether an actor's belief system can be used to explain his behaviour, despite thefact that George has clearly stated that beliefs do not unilaterally determine action.23Sojblom also argues that the operational code approach is too vague to be used as anexplanatory tool. Cottam does believe the operational code can be useful, but only toconstruct a detailed picture of a single individual to predict or explain that person'sbehaviour. Cottam does not believe that any useful generalizations can be developedfrom these isolated studies. These are fair criticisms of the approach. A number ofresearchers including George (1979), Walker and Murphy (1981-82), Walker andFalkowski (1984), and Holsti (1977), have tackled this question in a variety of ways(Cottam 1986, pp.12-13).In 1979, George wrote a paper titled the "Casual Nexus Between CognitiveBeliefs and Decision-Making Behaviour: The "Operational Code" Belief System" in whichhe sought to strengthen the connection between political decision-maker's beliefs andforeign policy outcomes. He introduced two theoretical premises for the linkagebetween beliefs and behaviour.The first premise is that beliefs influence decision-making indirectly by influencingthe information-processing tasks that precede and accompany choice of action. Adecision-maker's beliefs about the opponent may help define an ambiguous situation orinterpret discrepant information. The operational code therefore, may introduce"diagnostic propensities" into the information-gathering and processing tasks.Operational code beliefs may also offer the decision-maker "choice propensities" inselecting options. An "optimist" may avoid high-risk alternatives, while an "optimizer"may be more likely to seek options with the promise of the greatest pay-offs.Operational code beliefs then, may introduce both "diagnostic and choicepropensities" into the information gathering and processing tasks, but they are just24propensities, not determinants. George's second premise is that beliefs do notunilaterally determine behaviour. "Operational code beliefs are only one variable-clusterwithin a rich, complex causal framework for explaining decision-making...a policy-makermay be influenced by personal considerations, domestic politics, and/or organizationalinterests..." (1979, p.104). George states that operational code beliefs may be mostuseful in discerning the decision-maker's choice preference as opposed to the final actiontaken.Walker and Murphy (1981-82) have applied the operational code construct topolitical forecasting. These researchers state that the operational code contains thepremise that decision-makers use beliefs about their political environment to appraise theeffectiveness of various political actions, and that their beliefs influence their selection orchoice of action. If that premise is valid they argue, it should be possible to use adecision-maker's beliefs to predict or anticipate how he will define a situation and whatactions he will consider.In their paper "The Utility of the Operational Code in Political Forecasting" (1981-82), Walker and Falkowski argue that Holsti's list of relevant decision-making situationsrepresents a class of situations in which "assumptions of environmental determinism arenot likely to be valid" (p.28). Knowledge of the situation would be insufficient toforecast a decision in these circumstances and it becomes necessary to know theattributes of the decision-maker in order to make a forecast which significantly narrowsthe range of possible decisions. They list a series of conditions which restrict the utility25of the operational code in predicting political decisions', but argue that when theseconditions are met, the operational code can be used as a useful tool in politicalforecasting.III. HOLSTI'S TYPOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL CODESIn 1977, Holsti presented a manual for coding operational code beliefs in whichhe developed a typology of operational codes. In his manual he stated two importantreasons for developing such a typology. First, an intrinsic principle of the operationalcode is that beliefs about politics form a belief system, wherein the elements are boundtogether by functional interdependence, there is a hierarchy of importance, and aninternal consistency or logic. This is a basic but essential proposition to be tested by thetypology - that there are some systematic linkages between operational code beliefs. Aswell, a sound typology would be useful in distinguishing central or master beliefs fromperipheral beliefs.Second, a typology would allow comparisons to be drawn between politicaldecision-makers. Without a typology, Holsti argues, operational code studies are likely3 Walker and Falkowski's conditions for the use of the operational code as a tool inpolitical forecasting are as follows:a) restricted to a certain class of decision-making situations where environmentaldeterminism is an invalid assumptionb) utility declines as the number of individuals with different beliefs increase (unlessone or more like-minded people control the others)C)^if there are differences between the instrumental beliefs of the decision-makers andthe decision-implementers, then as the control of the decision-makers decreases, thelinkage between beliefs and actions of the latter group increasesd)^even under optimum conditions, a knowledge of the decision-maker's beliefs maybe sufficient only to identify a range of likely decisions, not to forecast the exactresponse (1981-82, p.29).26to remain isolated vignettes which do not connect in any meaningful way. A validtypology would provide the framework necessary to develop purposeful comparisons.Whether the operational code serves as an independent, intervening ordependent variable in socialization and decision-making studies, or as thebasis of comparison in elite studies, analysis is greatly facilitated if at leastpart of the comparison can be focused on types of belief systems ratherthan solely on the many individual beliefs that constitute the operationalcode (Holsti, 1977, P.153).Without a typology, a separate category would be needed for each leader's belief system,and such studies would merely serve to emphasize individual attributes of each leader.At the core of Holsti's typology is the first philosophical belief which severaloperational code researchers have suggested should be considered a prime candidate fora "master" belief — that is, a belief which is likely to constrain or dominate the otherelements of a belief system (Holsti, 1977, P.156). Holsti rephrased George's originalquestion in two parts:1) Is conflict perceived as a permanent part of the political universe or is thiscondition at least partially amenable to amelioration or eradication?2) Where does one locate the sources of conflict and the conditions of peace? Inhuman nature? In the characteristics of nations? In the nature of the system withinwhich nations interact?The answers to these questions give rise to six different "types" as illustrated below. Thedefining characteristics of each type are whether they see the international environmentas inherently conflictual or harmonious and what they regard as the source of conflict.Holsti contends that the distinction between locating the sources of conflict inactor dispositions (types A,B,D,E) and external conditions (types C and F) is an importantone from both psychological and foreign policy perspectives. A decision-maker whoregards other nations as reacting to aspects of the international system is likely toWhat is the Fundamental Nature of thePolitical Universe?What are the^Harmonious^ConflictualFundamental (conflict is (conflict isSources of temporary) permanent)Conflict?27Human NatureAttributes ofNationsInternationalSystemA^ DB^ EC^ F(Holsti, 1977, p.158)prescribe different policies than those advocated by a decision-maker who believes thatthe source of conflict originates from the internal attributes of a specific nation (or classof nations).A more specific example is the debate over Soviet intentions during the ColdWar. Some American policy-makers regarded high Soviet expenditures on strategicforces as a search for parity and as a response to threats. Moscow was simply reacting toexternal conditions. This position was countered by those who saw the Soviet build-upas a campaign for military superiority driven by internal goals of the leadership asdirected by ideology, not by outside forces. Internal attributes of the Soviet system weredriving the arms build-up. Such divergent "definitions of the situation" would clearlyresult in dissimilar policy preferences.28Further, according to Holsti, there appears to be significant differences betweentypes A and B. Type B decision-makers, who view some nations as peaceful and othersas warlike, tend to view politics in zero-sum terms while type A decision-makers putmore emphasize on human traits, presumably shared by all (Holsti, 1977, p.162).Once Holsti established this basic typology, he tested its utility. His first step wasto determine if a plausible set of hypotheses linking each of the six types to significantlydifferent clusters of beliefs could be developed (see Appendix 1). These hypotheticalbelief clusters were then empirically tested by two methods. The first test used existingoperational code studies of six American policy-makers - three Senators and threeSecretaries of State. The second test saw detailed questionnaires about each operationalcode belief sent to the those who had undertaken operational code studies but wereunfamiliar with both the typology and the purposes for which their responses would beused.The results provided Holsti with moderately strong support for his hypotheses. Allactors did not fit the typology to the same extent. Those leaders who most closely fit thetypology tended also to be those with the highest correlations between predicted andobserved beliefs. Some deviations were noted from belief to belief; support for somebeliefs tended to stronger than others. Despite this, the evidence suggests that it isappropriate to consider the operational code construct as a way of characterizing beliefsystems. Certain types of beliefs do form clusters with greater regularity than would beexpected by chance (Holsti, 1977, p.270). Moreover, the evidence supports theproposition that the first philosophical belief is the most central or a "master" belief.This evidence is of particular importance to this paper which utilizes Holsti's codingmethodology in order to determine Reagan's "type", specifically focusing on the firstphilosophical belief. The express application of Holsti's work for this research projectwill be discussed in the next section.2930CHAPTER TWOTHE OPERATIONAL CODE OF RONALD REAGANI.^METHODOLOGYFor the purpose of this thesis, the operational code of Ronald Reagan wasexplored using qualitative content analysis. The documents were analyzed using codingsheets found in Holsti's (1977) coding manual. The study concentrates exclusively onPhilosophical Belief Number One. This belief is divided into three parts: a) What is the"essential" nature of political life?; b) What is the fundamental character of one's politicalopponents?; and c) What is the nature of the contemporary international system? Each ofthese parts is then further divided into a series of statements with a number of possiblecoding categories for each. The documents were coded for each of these categories.Answers to parts "a" and "c" (both focused on beliefs about the internationalenvironment) were then combined for the purpose of the study. Many of the categoriesin these two parts were redundant.Sixteen documents (seven from the first term, 1981-1984 and nine from thesecond term, 1985-1989) were read and coded (Table 2). These documents includeState of the Union addresses, news conferences, radio addresses to the nation, andspeeches. The criteria for choosing the documents to be analyzed included topic -documents related to foreign policy, specifically Soviet-American relations; dates - forequitable representation of Reagan's years in office; and type of document - for a varietyof text from polished speeches to off-the-cuff remarks made at press conferences.31TABLE 2. DOCUMENTS CODEDName of Document DatePresident's News Conference January 20, 1981.Interview with the President January 20, 1982.National Association of Evangelicals Speech March 08, 1982.Radio Address (U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Vice-President's Trip to Europe)January 08, 1983.Address to the Nation (Soviet-American relations) January 16, 1984.Radio Address (Soviet-American Relations) February 11, 1984.Radio Address (U.S.-Soviet Relations) September 29, 1984.State of the Union Address February 06, 1985.Radio Address (Counterintelligence Activities) June 29, 1985.Telephone Interview (Foreign and Domestic Issues) August 24, 1985.United States-Soviet Summit in Geneva November 21, 1985.State of the Union Address February 04, 1986.State of the Union Address January 27, 1987.Remarks and a Question and Answer Session with Membersof the National Strategy ForumMay 04, 1988.Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Ogonek ofthe Soviet UnionMay 19, 1988.President's News Conference December 08, 1988.In section III of this chapter, Reagan's beliefs regarding the nature of theinternational environment and the Soviet Union are discussed in detail and summarized.In this section, Reagan's beliefs are summed up without separation into the first andsecond four year terms, however there is an attempt to show a range of quotes from bothterms.32From the evidence of the previous analysis, a prediction is made about Reagan's"type" in section IV. In order to confirm this prediction, Holsti's eleven hypotheticalquestions regarding the first philosophical belief are "answered" by Reagan. Reagan'sbeliefs are scored with a code representing a rough estimate of the degree to which theyagree with "type B" predicted responses to the hypotheses set out in Holsti's typology:+ + Very substantial agreement+ Agreement on balance0 Insufficient or inconclusive evidence- Disagreement on balance— Very substantial disagreementThese categories represent both the frequency with which each theme appears inthe documents, and the closeness with which Reagan's statements match the predictedresponses for each hypothetical question. A rating of "+ +" indicates that Reagan'sstatements are both numerous and very closely matched to the predicted response. Arating of "+" indicates that the belief is also well matched, however fewer statements onthat theme appear in the documents. A rating of "0" may indicate either an insufficientnumber of statements on which to make a judgement, or inconclusive evidence. That is,the statements made are not clear enough to determine Reagan's beliefs. A rating of "-"indicates that the evidence from Reagan's statements do not match Holsti's predictedresponses for the "type B" actor.The "goodness of fit" for each component of the first philosophical belief is thenanalyzed for both terms, 1981-1984 and 1985-1989. The information from section IV issummarized in Table 4. The final step is to look for change in beliefs over the twoterms. Faced with incoming evidence of a very different and new situation in the Soviet33Union, did Reagan modify his beliefs about the international environment or the natureof the Soviet Union?In summary then, the remainder of this section considers some of the limitationsof the methodology. Section III contains the coding of Reagan's first philosophical belief,and section IV, his "fit" with Holsti's predicted responses for the hypotheses of the firstphilosophical belief of the operational code. The final section will look at any changeswhich occurred in Reagan's operational code over the two terms in office and theimplications of finding Reagan to be a specific "type" of leader.II.^LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGYThis coding and "ping" process provides only a partial test of Holsti's typologyand yields only a portion of Reagan's whole spectrum of beliefs. Reagan is "typed" inthis paper on the basis of his "fit" with only the first philosophical belief. Despite thefact that this belief is considered to be a "master" belief which constrains other beliefs, afully developed picture of Reagan's operational code requires coding of all his beliefs,both philosophical and instrumental (a task beyond the scope of this paper).Another significant limitation of this research methodology is the lack of one ormore independent coders. Having more than one coder would provide inter-coderreliability. Such reliability would strengthen the validity of the coding process.The categories used in Holsti's coding forms are also a limitation. Thesecategories may not be successful in catching all the nuances of Reagan's beliefs aboutthe Soviet Union and about the relationship between the Soviets and the Americans. Anexample is Reagan's proclivity for separating the Soviet leadership and government from34"ordinary" Soviet citizens. He seems to believe that while all Americans agree with andstand behind their government's policies, Soviet leadership acts with no such publicapproval.As well, the categories do not capture Reagan's fundamentalist religious viewswhich seem to permeate many of his beliefs about the Soviet Union and the nature ofthe relationship between the two adversarial nations. This aspect of his belief systemmay however be partially captured by the second philosophical belief which is related tooptimism-pessimism. Part of Reagan's optimistic outlook may be attributable to hisbelief about the "righteousness" of the American way and the "ungodly" nature ofcommunism.III.^CODING REAGAN'S BELIEFSThis section embodies a detailed view of Reagan's beliefs about the nature of theinternational environment and the fundamental character of the Soviet Union. Theanalysis below evolved through the reading and coding of the sixteen documents foundin Table 2 as well as other sources. Keith Shimko's (1992) research paper on theoperational code of Ronald Reagan was especially useful. His work is cited in severalplaces throughout the analysis to reinforce the findings of this research paper.The questions which are answered below are taken from Holsti's coding sheets.Some of the statements from the sheets were combined and others, about which noevidence was found, were eliminated. The "answers" to these questions form the firstphilosophical belief of Reagan's operational code. In this section, the beliefs are not35divided into first and second term, although there is an attempt to provide representativestatements from both terms.Philosophical Belief #1(a): What is the Essential Nature of Political Life?Reagan's statements about the international environment tend to indicate that hebelieves that although there is conflict in the world presently, there will eventually bepeace and harmony. In several instances, he alludes to an underlying harmony ofinterests among all states and people. His statements (below) reveal a belief thatharmony will be realized through the forces of democracy, capitalism, and freedom aschampioned by the United States and the Western world.Is political life essentially con flictual, harmonious, ormixed?Reagan tends to see political life as a mixture of conflict and harmony. Conflict isfor the most part regional and localized, but is often triggered and sustained by theSoviets, either directly or indirectly. The contemporary international environment isdominated by the conflict between democracy and communism. Reagan often makesreference to the enduring nature of this contest between freedom and oppression: "We'rein a long twilight struggle with an implacable foe of freedom" (WCPD, 1985, p.865).People all over the globe have common interests however, and these interests arethe basis for a lasting international peace. In discussing the 1984 Olympics Reaganalludes to his beliefs about the fundamentally harmonious nature of the internationalenvironment:36And when each race or event is done and our teams come together infriendship, we will remember that we are meant to be one family ofnations" (Israel, 1987, p.186, emphasis added).Reagan's belief in a harmony of interests among people leads him to differentiatebetween the Soviet people and the Soviet government. He argues that while the Sovietgovernment does not embody the interests of the people which it ruled over, the peopleof America and the Soviet Union (and the rest of the world) do share common interests,values, and aspirations.I think the people of all countries have something in common...I doubt thatthe people have ever started a war (WCPD, 1981, p.708).I believe with all my heart that if a generation of young people throughoutthe world could get to know each other, they would never make war oneach other (WCPD, 1986, p.839).These common interests shared by all people are mentioned numerous times,especially when linked with discussion of nuclear weapons. The existence of nuclearweapons serves to strengthen common interests among peoples and forces them to lookbeyond their differences to find ways to coexisist peaceably. "...we do have commoninterests and foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms"(WCPD, 1984, p.41).What is the source of conflict?For Reagan, the source of international conflict lies not in human nature nor inthe international system but in the attributes of specific nations or groups of nations.37Totalitarianism and dictatorship, which run counter to basic human desires for freedom,are the root cause of much of the conflict in the world: "...we see totalitarian forces inthe world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarousassault on the human spirit" (WCPD, 1982, p.765).Communism is a main source of evil in the world because it attempts to oppressmankind, to deny individual freedom.At the same time [as the threat of global war], there is a threat posed tohuman freedom by the enormous power of the modern state... It is theSoviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying freedom andhuman dignity to its citizens ...[new philosophies are based on] therejection of the arbitrary power of the state, the refusal to subordinate therights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivismstifles all the best human impulses (WCPD, 1982, p.764-65).Reagan states a number of times that if the Soviets want peace, there will be peace. Heleaves no doubt as to the source of much of the conflict in the world:I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of declaringyourselves blithely above it all and label both sides equally at fault, toignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, tosimply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby removeyourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil(WCPD, 1983, p.364, emphasis added).Yet the threat from Soviet forces, conventional and strategic, from theSoviet drive for domination, from the increase in espionage and state terrorremains great. This is reality (WCPD, 1986, p.127).As much as the communist system embodies evil, America represents all that isjust and noble in the world. For Reagan, America is a beacon of freedom anddemocracy leading the march towards global peace:America's highest aspiration has never wavered. We have and willcontinue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men andwomen everywhere (WCPD, 1984, p.41).38The United States is the economic miracle, the model to which the worldonce again turns. We stand for an idea whose time is now... (WCPD,1986, p.126).What is the nature and scope of conflict?Conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is, on the whole, a zero-sum game, a test of wills and ideas, between the Soviet Union and the United States. Inhis speech to the National Evangelical Association in 1982, Reagan made the nature ofthe contest clear by stating that "the real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, itis a test of moral will and faith" (WCPD, 1983, p.365).In some situations however, there is a commonality of interests which allowscooperation and non zero-sum situations. Arms reductions is seen as an area in whichboth sides win and a nuclear war would render both sides losers: "A nuclear conflictcould well be mankind's last" (WCPD, 1984, p.43). "A nuclear war cannot be won andshould never be fought...There would be no victors in that kind of a war" (WCPD, 1988,p.685). Reagan also believes passionately that his Strategic Defence Initiative wouldresult in a situation where the whole world would win because nuclear weapons wouldbe rendered obsolete. He maintained that the United States would share the technologywith the rest of the world.Statements in the documents also indicate that Reagan sees issues as highlylinked. Arms reductions alone will not lead to an improved relationship between theSoviets and Americans:And I happen to believe, also, that you can't sit down at a table and justnegotiate that [arms reductions] unless you take into account, in39consideration at that table all the other things that are going on. In otherwords I believe in linkage (WCPD, 1981, p.66)....more responsible Soviet conduct...is a key element of the U.S.-Sovietagenda. Progress is also required on the other items of our agenda...realrespect for human rights and more open contacts between our societiesand, of course, arms reduction (WCPD, 1987, p.58).But we must keep in mind that arms agreements alone will not make theworld safer. We must also deal with the core source of mistrust betweenour nations. This is why our dialogue must cover a broad agenda of humanrights, regional and bilateral issues, as well as arms reductions (WCPD,1988, p.686).Reagan believed strongly that a better relationship with the Soviet Union requiredthe Soviets to reform not just their foreign policy but their internal political, economicand social policies as well. In his remarks to the National Strategy Forum, heemphasized the importance of human rights and stated that better relations between theU.S. and the Soviet Union were dependent on the improvement of the Soviet humanrights record.What are the conditions of peace?The need for American strength to limit Soviet action is a theme prevalent in thedocuments. It appears that Reagan, right up until his last year in office, believed that theSoviets would run wild in the world if a strong American presence was not maintained.In his final news conference Reagan was still vigorously defending the need for highdefence spending. While continuing to extol the importance of arms reductions and talkabout his vision of a nuclear-free world, Reagan still insisted that America needed tostrive for parity which required continued military build-up.40The conditions of peace then, include American military and economic strengthand improved Soviet conduct both internally and externally. Reagan emphasizesrepeatedly the need for a militarily strong America:Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear wemaintain this strength in the hope it will never be used...(WCPD, 1982,p.769)There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would callcredible deterrence and peaceful competition (WCPD, 1984, p.41)....because a strong, respected America is the surest way to preserve peaceand prevent conflict (Israel, 1987, p.62).Such strength is required because the Soviets must not think that American resolve orwill is weak. "History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price ofaggression is cheap" (WCPD, 1984, p.41).Real and lasting peace requires the Soviet Union to constrain its behaviour in theworld and change its internal policies. "We know that peace follows in freedom's pathand conflicts erupt when the will of the people is denied" (WCPD, 1986, p.129). Inboth terms, change in Soviet behaviour remained a key element in Reagan's commentsabout achieving world peace.If there are to be better mutual relations, they must result from moderationin Soviet conduct, not just from our own good intentions (Israel, 1987,p.63).During his final news conference in 1988, Reagan was asked if he believed thatthe beginning he had made with Gorbachev would result in a situation where the twocountries were once again allies. He responded:I think that is all dependent on them-if it can be definitely established thatthey are no longer following the expansionist policy that was instituted in41the Communist revolution that their goal must be a one-world Communiststate. Now, if that has definitely been given up, and certainly there areindications, we could anticipate bringing such a thing about. Then I dothink that there is evidence that they do not like being the pariah, that theymight want to join the family of nations and join them with the idea ofbringing about or establishing peace (PPP, 1988-89, p.1612).Philosophical Belief #1(b): What is the Fundamental character of one's political opponents?Several themes run through the documents which appear to dominate Reagan'simage of the Soviet Union. One theme is the unchanging nature of their system. Theenduring nature of the Soviet system is mentioned time and time again:We must recognize we are in a long-term competition with a governmentthat does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peacefulchange abroad (WCPD, 1984, p.43).All of us need to be informed about the unchanging realities of the Sovietsystem (WCPD, 1985, p.865).Even in November 1985, after the Geneva Summit, eight months subsequent toGorbachev taking office in the Soviet Union, Reagan was definitive about the nature ofthe Soviet system:...the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R.We cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change; thisimplies enduring competition (WCPD, 1985, p.1426).Another theme is the inherent untrustworthyness of the Soviets. "[The Soviets]have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what willfurther their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any lie, tocheat, in order to attain that." (WCPD, 1981, p.57)42Reagan also states several times that Soviets can not be trusted to abide bynegotiated treaties: "Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume agreementsnegotiated with the Soviet Union will be fulfilled" (WCPD, 1983, p.1352). Shimkofound similar results in his analysis of Reagan when he coded documents for the Sovietrecord of abiding by treaties. Out of sixty-one comments pertaining to the Soviet treatyrecord, Shimko found that fifty-one described the Soviets as cheaters and violators ofagreements (Shimko, 1992, p.368). This belief of Soviet untrustworthyness did notappear to undergo any dramatic changes. In 1987, just before signing the INFagreement, Reagan stated, "it is said for them arms agreements are like diets: the secondday is always the best, because that's when you break them" (in Shimko, 1992, p.368).What are the opponent's goals?For Reagan, the goals of the Soviet Union are clearly expansionist anddestructionist. This belief is explicitly revealed in his memoirs when he states thatexcept for a brief period during World War Two, "the Russians had been our de factoenemies for almost sixty-five years, devoted to destroying democracy and imposingcommunism" (Reagan, 1990, p.44). This belief about the nature of Soviet objectivesappears to be a dominant element in Reagan's operational code:I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution and includingthe present leadership that has not repeated...their determination that theirgoal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world socialistor communist state (WCPD, 1981, p.57).There is no question but that the Soviet Union has made it plain that theyare embarked on an expansionist program (WCPD, 1985, p.1003).43With 120,000 Soviet combat troops and military personnel and 15,000military advisors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, can anyone still doubttheir single-minded determination to expand their power? (WCPD, 1987,p.57)The Soviet Union is expansionist. They have a belief that their purposemust be to bring about world revolution, a one-world communist state(WCPD, 1986, p.666).What is the source of the opponent's policy?Especially prevalent in his first term is Reagan's belief that ideology, the "religion"of Marxism-Leninism, was the source of all Soviet policy and behaviour. He regardedthe actions of Soviet leaders as being prescribed by the dictates of their overarchingideology. With such a simplistic and rigid view of ideology and relationship betweenSoviet policy and Marxism-Leninism, it is understandable that he believed the SovietUnion was incapable of change and that the nature of the competition between theUnited States and the Soviet Union was enduring....that religion of theirs, which is Marxism- Leninism, requires them tosupport and bring about a one-world communist state. And they've neverdenied that (WCPD, 1982, p.62).[The 1979 Afghanistan invasion is] "further proof that they are following anexpansionist policy that is based upon the Marxist doctrine, and theMarxist-Leninist doctrine, that communism must [be] a one-world, that itmust be a one-world communist state (WCPD, 1986, p.796).44During his second term in office, Reagan's remarks about the role of ideology inSoviet behaviour lessen considerably4. He seems to begin to consider other possiblemotivators of Soviet policy including fear of the outside world:...you have to wonder if this [their belief in the one-world communiststate] is not based on their fear and suspicion that the rest of the us in theworld mean them harm (WCPD, 1985, p.1003).He also begins to allude to Gorbachev as a "different" type of Soviet leader. WithGorbachev, Reagan appears to accept that Soviet policy may deviate from ideology andthat an individual leader may have an impact on the direction the Soviet Union follows.When asked during his last years in office if his views about the "evil empire" hadchanged, Reagan said they had not but he added:Now there is a new leader, and he does want to make some changes inthe system. I have always wanted to take up the matter of human rights,and there has been some improvement in that. Regional conflicts -and wesee them now-this leader wanting to get out of Afghanistan. So I thinkprogress could be made (WCPD, 1988, p.336).During his final news conference Reagan was asked if he felt that Gorbachev wastrying to remake the Soviet Union into a less threatening country. Reagan's answer was"Yes, I do" (WCPD, 1988, p.1607). In the same conference Reagan was also asked tocomment on his statement made during his very first press conference about the Sovietslying and cheating in order to reach their political goals. Reagan answered that he wasonly reiterating their own ideology, and that with Gorbachev, there has been a change:4 This is reinforced by Keith Shimko's (1992) findings in his analysis of Reagan'soperational code. In coding for Soviet policy motivations, Shimko found ideology cited ineleven instances for the years 1981-1984 and in only two instances for the years 1985-1989.For the latter years he also found six instances where Soviet leader's personalities were citedas shaping Soviet policy.45"... I must say I have never met with one of those leaders that was comparable to thisman [Gorbachev] or had the approach that he has" (WCPD, 1988, p.1608). In responseto a question about change in his own thinking about the Soviet Union, Reagan wasrather vague. He stated that the leadership has dramatically altered the situation and thatperhaps Gorbachev has come to recognize the failings of their system.What is the opponent's likely response to one's own policy^of conciliation? Topolicies of firmness?Along with being untrustworthy, Soviets were also likely to take advantage of anysituation where they perceived a lack of will or resolve on the part of the United Statesto protect its interests and those of its allies. The Soviet Union, acting according to itsideology, seeks military superiority over the United States and will use its superiority toestablish the "one-world" communist state. The Soviets will only moderate their conductin the face of American strength and resolve....if history teaches anything it teaches that simple-minded appeasement orwishful thinking about our adversary is folly (WCPD, 1983, p.364).Reagan's statements regarding policies of detente reinforced this belief aboutSoviet reactions to American conciliatory actions. In his memoirs, Reagan claimed thatthe Soviets had interpreted detente as the freedom to "pursue subversion, aggression, andexpansionism anywhere in the world" (Reagan, 1990, p.44). The Soviet response toAmerican hesitation and constraint in the world was to attempt to exploit it to the fullest.[policies of detente were]...one-way restraint that was neverreturned...while past American leaders hesitated or naively hoped for thebest, the Soviet Union was left free to pile up new nuclear arsenals(WCPD, 1983, p.1190).46Reagan's campaign to strengthen American military power was his response tothis situation. He believed that America had to deal from a position of strength whichrequired military and strategic parity with the Soviets. America had to show resolve andthe will to back up its words with actions.America's deterrence is more credible, and it is making the world a saferplace - safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadershipwill underestimate our strength of question our resolve (WCPD, 1984,p.41).What is the opponent's view of conflict?Reagan seems to believe that the Soviets condone conflict which advances theirideological objectives in the world. Soviet leaders reserved for themselves "the right tolie and cheat" in order to achieve their goals and the licence to "export its ideology byforce" (WCPD, 1981, p.57; 1986, p.129). This belief supports his belief about the needfor American military might to prevent Soviet aggression around the globe.What is the opponent's decision-making process?Soviet decision-making is not seen as democratic, or as taking into account theconcerns of average Soviet citizens.Within the Soviet Union, decision-making is tightly concentrated at thetop. The authority of the Communist Party is not determined by adocument-a constitution, if you will-but by a leadership who determinewhat is right for the people (PPP, 1988, p.553).47What evidence is required for the opponent to show goodfaith?Reagan makes frequent references to the need for Soviets to "modify" theirconduct around the world. In 1987, Reagan called for the withdrawal of Soviet troopsfrom Afghanistan and stated that better Soviet-American relations required "moreresponsible Soviet conduct around the world" (WCPD, 1987, p.58). Soviets must alsoprove themselves worthy of trust. In regard to arms reductions negotiations in Geneva,Reagan stated that "Soviet compliance with the letter and the spirit of agreements isessential" (WCPD, 1986, p.129).SUMMARY: The information presented above gives a substantially developedpicture of Reagan's beliefs about the nature of the international environment and theSoviet Union. Reagan possessed a hard-line image of the Soviet Union underscored byhis simplistic notions of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the unchanging nature of theSoviet goal of world domination. His views about the nature of the internationalenvironment however, were remarkably more optimistic, focused on shared interestsamongst nations, and the ultimate triumph of democracy and freedom over communismand oppression.These seemingly incongruent beliefs provide a remarkable tension when seekingto determine Reagan's fundamental operational code beliefs. Shimko describes readingReagan's comments as like "listening to two people, Reagan the optimist and Reagan thepessimist" (1992, p.373). Although Reagan sees the Soviet Union as the completeantithesis to everything the United States stands for, he believes that there are mutual48interests between the two nations. On one hand he states that Marxist ideology haspredetermined the Soviet objective of strategic superiority over the United States andeventual domination over the world, yet he also states that arms reductions are a sharedinterest between the two nations.Shimko grapples with this same difficulty in his review of Reagan's beliefs. Heargues that, whether Reagan was aware of it or not, he was differentiating betweennarrow national interests and broader national interests which transcend prevailingoperational goals. Shimko states that Reagan must have believed that it was in thegreater interest of the Soviet Union to give up current goals of strategic superiority and anuclear-winning capability in order to achieve "real" objectives of world peace andsafety from the threat of nuclear conflict (1992, p.371). These "real" objectives then, layat the heart of his discussions about common interests.During his second term in office, Reagan's prevailing optimism about thecontemporary international environment appears to increase, despite his hesitancy tobelieve that the Soviet Union was undergoing dramatic change. For a man who believedso strongly in the righteousness of the American way, and who campaigned so hard toforce the Soviets to moderate their behaviour, it seems that when evidence of suchchange was presented, he was reluctant to accept it. This appears to indicate thatReagan's operational code beliefs were rigidly held.Also inconsistent are his discussions about misperception and fear fuelling theCold War. In several instances Reagan admits that the Soviet Union might perceive theUnited States as threatening and that fear might have contributed to the arms race. Healso often makes statements about the need to persuade the Soviets of peaceful American49intentions. Yet he shows no inclination to believe that the United States hasmisperceived Soviet objectives, or that American misperception or misunderstanding hasexacerbated the Cold War.There is an underlying religious element which comes through in the documents.Reagan imbued much of his rhetoric with fundamentalist morality. The conflict betweenthe United States the Soviet Union is characterized as one of right against wrong, goodagainst evil. Communism is an immoral system which is against God. The UnitedStates, embodying democratic principles, has God on its side.Reagan also shows a certain naivete about international relations. He appearsable to reduce the complexities of international strife into a battle between good andevil. He also seems to believe that if peoples of different nations got to know each otherbetter they would not make war.The next step in this study is to "type" Reagan according to Holsti's typology.The final stage is to discern any changes which occurred within his operational codeover the two terms and evaluate the implications of such change.IV. "TYPING" REAGAN ACCORDING TO HOLSTI'S TYPOLOGYFrom the coding above, Reagan's beliefs have been matched to Holsti's typologyfor "goodness of fit". Reagan's operational code appears to most closely match that of a"type B" actor. Reagan's beliefs are compared to Holsti's hypotheses about the firstphilosophical belief for "type B" actors (see Table 3). Each hypothesis, stated below, isfollowed with an evaluation of the congruence between the hypothesis and Reagan'sbelief. Any differences between the years 1981-1984 and 1985-1989 are noted for each50TABLE 3. TYPE B: HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE FIRSTPHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFWhat is the nature of the politicaluniverse?Conflict is temporary; in a world of peacefulstates there will be peace.What are the basic sources ofconflict?Warlike states or classes of states.What are the conditions of peace? Containment, reform or elimination of warlikestates.What is the nature of conflict? Zero-sum.What is the scope of conflict? Issues tend to be closely linked.What is role of conflict inhistorical development?Very functional in some circumstances.Scenario of major danger of war. War from miscalculation; "appeasement model".What is the nature of theadversary?High correlation between the adversary'sdisposition and attributes, and its foreign policy.Actions result from careful planning.What are the goals of theadversary?Range from expansionist to destructionist; thesearise from basic features of the adversary'sregime.How will the adversary respond toconciliatory policies?Likely to view such action as a sign of weaknessor lack of commitment; will be encouraged topursue expansion.How will the adversary respond topolicies of firmness?Likely to be deterred from pursuing expansion;danger of impulsive response is minimal.(Holsti, 1977, p.164)51hypothesis. Under each evaluation is a summary code (as explained on p.36) for eachterm, and a brief statement indicating if there is any change in the belief between thetwo terms.What is the nature of the political universe? For Reagan, while the contemporaryinternational environment is one of conflict, there is potential for harmony and peace.People around the world are basically the same and share common interests. Thesecommon interests, which go beyond national objectives such as military or economicsuperiority, form the basis on which the Soviet Union and the United States cannegotiate to reduce the threat of war.This basic premise does not appear to change over the two terms which Reaganserved. In the second four years however, there is an increasing emphasis on mutual orshared interests between the Soviets and the Americans.Summary code: + +,+ +1st Term^2nd Term: Emphasis on conflictual nature of internationalenvironment in first term is superseded by heightened emphasis oncommon interests in second term.What are the basic sources of conflict?The source of conflict is warlike states or groups of states, specifically the SovietUnion and other totalitarian, communist regimes. Communism and totalitarianist statesgenerate conflict because they are aggressive externally and oppressive internally. In thecontemporary international environment, communism is the focus of evil in the world.Communist states incite and ferment conflict around the world.52The reciprocal belief is that with democracy and capitalism comes peace. TheUnited States stands as an archetype of democratic ideals, freedom and peace for allother nations to follow. This belief is maintained over the course of Reagan's eight yearsin office.Summary code: + +,+ +1st Term ---> 2nd term: No change.What are the conditions of peace?Peace can be achieved by moderating the behaviour of offending states.Moderating transgressing states' behaviour requires both internal and external policychanges. Until such time as these states have reformed their policies however, theiractions in the international environment must be contained. The United States and thewestern world can prevent conflict by remaining militarily and economically strong andby showing resolve against any attempted aggression.1 985-1 989 saw increased comments regarding Gorbachev as a "new" kind ofSoviet leader. Reagan perceives Gorbachev as helping to ease tensions because he isdifferent from previous Soviet leaders. Gorbachev sees the failures of communism andmay change the nature of that system. Reduced conflict stems from change within theSoviet polity. However, in the second term, statements are also made regarding theneed to remove mistrust and suspicion in order to achieve lasting peace. This implies aneed for improved communication between the Soviets and the Americans.Summary code: + +,+531st Term —> 2nd Term: Less emphasis on American military strength as adeterrent in 2nd term. Stress on modification of Soviet system and action asa condition of peace remains constant through both terms. Indication ofcommunication as necessary for peace in second term.What is the nature of the conflict?The evidence for this belief leads to the conclusion that Reagan sees the nature ofconflict as mixed. Reagan's belief in common interests may lead him to think in non-zero sum terms however, he appears to hold hard-line views about the adversarial natureof the Soviet-American relationship. The main source of conflict, communism versusdemocracy, is an essentially zero-sum game in which there can only be one winner.However, there are issues where cooperation can lead to non-zero-sum results. Twoexamples of Reagan's non-zero sum thinking include a belief that in a nuclear war bothsides would lose, and his plan for Strategic Defence Initiative which he said would makeall nations of the world "winners" by protecting them from the effects of a nuclear warand effectively making nuclear weapons obsolete.Statements regarding the enduring Soviet-American conflict are less evident in thesecond term when there is increasing emphasis on commonalities and shared interests.Again with Gorbachev, Reagan sees more potential for non-zero-sum interactions duringhis latter years in office. As Gorbachev began to admit some of the failings of the systemhe had inherited, Reagan saw opportunities for the two countries reduce tensions andperhaps end the arms race. In 1988, Reagan stated that he hoped the United Statescould assist Gorbachev and the Soviet Union improve their economic situation "Andthat, I think, is preferable to staging a kind of contest with him so that someone looks54like a winner or loser" (WCPD, 1988, p.557). Reagan does not match the "type B"actor who sees conflict as exclusively zero-sum. The significance of this deviation fromthe predicted response will be discussed in the summary of this section.Summary code: -,-1st Term —> 2nd Term: Shift from mixed-sum to predominantly non-zero-sum.What is the scope of the conflict? Reagan sees issues as highly linked. Merelyreducing the number of strategic weapons in the world will not end conflict in theworld. Instead, all issues must be addressed in order to find lasting peace. Issues ofhuman rights within the Soviet Union and Soviet behaviour around the globe areintrinsically linked to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and theUnited States. This theme is heightened in the second term when negotiations betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union became more intense and far-reaching andReagan believes that the United States is bargaining from a position of power.Summary code: +,+ +1st Term --› 2nd Term: No substantial change, increasing emphasis in 2nd term.What is the role of conflict in historical development? Evidence for this belief is limitedbut there are indications that Reagan saw conflict as unappealing but sometimesnecessary to achieve important goals. Reagan praises "freedom fighters" everywherewho are struggling against dictatorship and oppression. Conflict, such as the war in ElSalvador, are noble struggles for freedom which should be supported by nations of the55"free" world. No change is detected over the course of the eight years. Summary code:+,+1st Term —> 2nd Term: No change.Scenario of major danger of war? Again, evidence for this is less obvious. Reagan doesmention the possibility of war beginning through miscalculation or misperception. Hestates that mutual "suspicion" and "mistrust" has fuelled a dangerous arms race. He alsostates that a strong American military presence and sense of purpose has made the worldis a less dangerous place because there is less of a chance that the Soviets wouldunderestimate American resolve. Such underestimation could lead the Soviets to attemptan action which could lead to war. There is little indication that this belief underwentany alteration.Summary code: +,01st Term -> 2nd Term: Inconclusive evidence about change.What is the nature of the adversary? Ideology plays a dominating role in Soviet policy,both internal and external. The Soviet Union is not merely pursuing traditional nationalinterests through expansionist policies, they are, by the very nature of their system, athreat to all other states in the world. The ideology, politics, and institutions ofcommunism are inherently immoral. Soviet actions are determined by their ideologyand are carefully planned by a calculating leadership. Ideology becomes less of a factorduring Reagan's last four years however, there are still comments on the inherent evil56nature of the communist system. While this system is intact, the Americans and theSoviets will remain adversaries.Summary code: + +,+1st Term 2nd Term: Decreasing references to ideology in 2nd term; inboth terms communist system determines Soviet foreign policy.What are the goals of the adversary? The goals of the Soviet Union are clearlyexpansionist and even destructionist. There is no doubt that the objective of Sovietcommunism as determined by Marxist-Leninist ideology is to create a "one-world"communist state. In his second term Reagan may have begun to reassess this belief.Although he still comments on the aggressive nature of Soviet goals up until the end ofhis presidency, he begins to allude to other possible, more defensive goals. Shimkodocumented similar findings in his analysis of Reagan's operational code. He found anequal number of statements for both terms which alluded to the expansionist ordestructionist nature of Soviet goals. However, for term two he found more commentswhich suggested the Soviets may be pursuing other, unspecified types of objectives(Shimko, 1992, p.362).Summary code: + +,+1st Term 2nd Term: No significant change.How will the adversary respond to conciliatory policies? The Soviets view Americanpolicies of appeasement and placation as a sign of weakness and lack of resolve. Suchpolicies have, in the past, encouraged the Soviets to actively pursue expansion and to57further their attempts to gain strategic superiority by building up weapons unchecked.Summary code: + +,+1st Term —> 2nd Term: No significant change.How will the adversary respond to policies of firmness?The world is a less dangerous place when the United States is militarily strongand willing to back up their commitments, because there is less of a chance that theSoviets will underestimate American resolve. Soviet action is contained and deterred byAmerican policies of firmness and commitment around the world. This belief does notundergo any change over the course of the eight years rather, it is reinforced bycompliant Soviet behaviour in the late 1980's.Summary code: + +,+ +1st Term -> 2nd term: No significant change; belief is reinforced by Sovietbehaviour in 2nd term.TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF REAGAN'S BELIEFS:FREQUENCY OF STATEMENTS AND GOODNESS OF FIT FOR BOTH TERMS'Frequency^Goodness ofFitHypotheticalQuestionsType B PredictedResponsesReagan's Beliefs 19811984198519891981198419851989What is the nature ofthe political universe?Conflict is temporary; in aworld of peaceful statesthere will be peace.Political life is a mixture ofconflict and harmony;common interests among allstates exist.10 3 + + + +What are the basicsources of conflict?Warlike states or classesof states,USSR, communism,totalitarianism are thesources of conflict in world.10 4 + + + +What are theconditions of peace?Containment, reform, orelimination of warlikeactors.Peace requires a strong U.S.military presence; modifySoviet behaviour9 7 + + +What is the nature ofconflict?Zero-sum. Conflict is a mixed-sumgame; both sides can bewinners or losers.4 4 - -What is the scope ofconflict?Issues tend to be closelylinked.Issues are highly linked. 3 6 + + +What is the role ofconflict in historicaldevelopment?Very functional in somecircumstances,Conflict is sometimesnecessary to achieveimportant goals.2 2 + +a Numbers represent the frequency with which each theme appeared in all sixteen documents coded.Frequency^Goodness ofFitHypotheticalQuestionsType B PredictedResponsesReagan's Beliefs 19811984198519891981198419851989Scenario of majordanger of war.War from miscalculation;"appeasement model".Soviet under-estimation ofAmerican commitment couldlead to war.1 0 + 0What is the nature ofthe adversary?High correlation betweendisposition/attributes andforeign policy; actionsensue from carefulplanning.Ideology, politics andinstitutions of communismdetermine the expansionistforeign policy of the SovietUnion.11 4 + + +What are the goals ofthe adversary?Expansionist todestructionist; arise frombasic features of regime.Destructionist/ expansionist;creation of a one-worldcommunist state.6 4 + + +How will theadversary respond toconciliatory policies?View as sign of weakness,lack of commitment;encouraged to seekexpansion.Conciliatory policies areregarded as signs ofweakness and lack ofresolve.4 1 + + +How will theadversary respond topolicies of firmness?Likely to be deterred frompursuing expansionistpolicies.Soviet action is containedand deterred by Americanpolicies of firmness.4 3 + + + +60SUMMARY: From the evidence above, Reagan fits the "type B" political actorvery closely in all areas except in how he perceives conflict. In this one area, Reaganmore closely matches the type C actor who conceives of conflict in mixed (zero-sum andnon-zero-sum). As will be discussed below, this difference in his conception of conflictmay well be an important one.In many respects, Reagan's operational code beliefs about the nature of theinternational system and the character of the Soviet Union resemble those of the later(post-1940) John Foster Dulles to a remarkable degree. Dulles also fits the type Bpolitical actor model notably well. Dulles's beliefs are consistent with the two definingcriteria of the type B actor that: a) the international environment is potentiallyharmonious; and b) the source of conflict is to be found in the nature or attributes ofcertain state actors (Holsti, 1977, p.194). There is also a religious undercurrent inDulles. Conflict is often characterized in terms of morality, and the nature of foreignpolicy is determined by the "spiritual qualities" of those who formulate it.Dulles and Reagan (especially 1981-1984), share a conceptual image of theSoviet Union as a rigid, aggressively expansionist state, slavishly following the dictates ofMarxist-Leninist ideology. In his second major treatise on international politics, War orPeace, Dulles equated Stalin's Problems of Leninism with Hitler's Mein Kampf as amasterplan of goals, strategies, and tactics (Holsti, 1970, p.129-30). He also wrote thatthe main premise of communism is atheistic Godlessness and that the characteristics ofSoviet leaders - insincerity, immorality, brutality and deceitfulness - were due to theiratheism (Holsti, 1970, p.130).61The Soviet Union, which is for Dulles both a military and spiritual adversary, canonly be deterred through firm military and moral commitment by the United States.Reagan and Dulles diverge however, on their beliefs about the nature of conflict. WhereReagan (in both terms), regards conflict in mixed-sum terms, Dulles perceives Soviet-American conflict in exclusively zero-sum terms. For Dulles, there is no room forcompromise or negotiation because Cold War political issues are, at heart, moral issues.His beliefs about the nature of the international system and the Soviet Unionleads Dulles' instrumental beliefs to include several premises: a position of power is thekey to success in dealing with communist leaders; all defined interests must be defendedto preserve credibility; and when the adversary seeks negotiations it is a sign of weaknessand one can and should push harder. It would be significant to determine if Reagan'sbelief about the nature of conflict (mixed as opposed to Dulles' zero-sum) leads to verydifferent beliefs about the policies and tactics the United States should follow.Using Reagan's first philosophical belief, it should possible to predict theremainder of his operational code, including his instrumental beliefs, with some degreeof accuracy. From the limited evidence of this study, it appears that Reagan's beliefs canbe predicted to closely match the majority of the hypotheses developed by Holsti.However, a full analysis of all Reagan's beliefs needs to be done in order to verify suchas prediction.V.^DETECTING CHANGE IN REAGAN'S BELIEFSThe evidence indicates that Reagan's operational code beliefs about the nature ofthe international environment and the Soviet Union did not undergo significant change62between the years 1981-1984 and 1985-1989. However, there are indications of subtleshifts in some of Reagan's thinking. More precisely, there are tendencies which existthrough out his presidency which seem to become more predominant in the secondterm. These tendencies include a more optimistic appraisal of the internationalenvironment and a less rigid and simplistic view of the connection between ideologyand Soviet policy.These themes however, are not newly introduced elements within Reagan'soperational code. Even in the documents from the first term there are indications ofthese beliefs. He makes comments about the existence of common interests of"ordinary" people across the globe throughout both terms. And, although during the firstterm he emphasizes the role of ideology as the sole source of Soviet policy, there arealso a few comments about the possibilities of Soviet fear and mutual suspicionsexacerbating the arms race. Even in his first term he was willing to entertain the notionthat the Soviets were motivated by something other than ideology and the goal of the"one-world" communist state.It appears, from the evidence of this study, that Reagan did not undergo anyfundamental alterations of his operational code in response to the new situation in theSoviet Union. Despite evidence of dramatic changes occurring within the communistbloc, Reagan remained cautious, even sceptical.In his study, Shimko argues that the most consistently hardline element in hisimage of the Soviet Union, their inherent untrustworthiness, does not undergo anysignificant change during his time in office. In fact, Shimko found no statementsreflecting trust in the Soviet Union or its leaders for either term (1992, p.368). In this63study, statements regarding trust in the second term always had the same theme: "trustbut verify". He was not taking any chances with the Soviets, especially in reference totreaties. It appears Reagan was never willing to trust the Soviets completely.If his operational code did not undergo any significant changes, how did Reaganincorporate new information about a dramatically different situation? The answerappears to be that he simply emphasized the optimistic elements of his code which werepre-existing. In some sense, many of his beliefs were confirmed by the new Sovietpolicy under Gorbachev. The world was becoming safer and more peaceful because theSoviet Union had begun to moderate its policies.For Reagan, there was reason to believe that the Soviets were forced to reformtheir behaviour not only because of internal economic collapse, but because of hisadministration. In his memoirs he stated that his government was going to send apowerful message to the Soviets, and let them know that there were "some new fellowsin Washington who had a realistic view of what they were up to and weren't going to letthem keep it up" (Reagan, 1990, p.45).If Reagan believed that the actions of his government were, in large measure,responsible for the change in Soviet behaviour, there would be no pressure to change hisbeliefs in any significant manner. In many respects Reagan may have even feltvindicated. Democracy was winning over communism, good had triumphed over evil.In this study and in Shimko's study of Reagan, little evidence was found thatReagan's beliefs underwent any significant change. Yet such a finding should not begeneralized to include all "type B" political actors. It appears that John Foster Dulles(also a "type B" actor) did undergo significant changes in his operational code beliefs64from pre-1940 to post-1940. Most significant of these changes is his change in beliefabout the source of international conflict, one of the defining criteria of the typology.Holsti (1970), found that pre-1940 Dulles regarded man's selfish and emotionalnature as the source of all social dynamics including conflict (p.126). Yet, in hisexamination of Dulles' post-1940 beliefs, Holsti (1970, 1977) found that the actions andattributes of certain states were the source of conflict. Dulles appears to have changedhis beliefs about the source of conflict in the international environment. This was a verysignificant transformation of his operational code.^This shift in beliefs wasaccompanied by increased emphasis on applying Christian principles to politicalproblems (Holsti, 1970, p.129). For Dulles, Marxism-Leninism, an atheistic philosophy,became the fundamental threat to international peace and security. The source ofconflict was no longer in human nature but in the clash between conflicting faiths,Communism versus Christianity (Holsti, 1970, p.130).More research must be done on change within operational codes. What causesan actor to modify his beliefs? What is the significance of such changes in terms ofpolicy decision-making? Answering these questions could provide more depth to theoperational code construct and help to explain actor's policy choices at different pointsin time.65CHAPTER 3CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONSThe implications of this study (which are reinforced by Shimko's study) includethe premise that even when faced with a large amount of evidence, some political actorsresist change in their belief systems. From this study it appears that the firstphilosophical belief, considered by many to be a "master" belief, is held with aconsiderable degree of rigidity. It is not evident however, if this is equally true for all"types" of actors as defined in the typology. More research on change in operationalcode for a variety of actor "types" is necessary to determine if rigidity with which beliefsare held can be predicted based on an actor's "type". This may require further researchon cognitive structures and the linkages between structure and content.Several researchers have completed studies on Reagan which attempt to makesome linkages. Shimko's (1992) content analysis of all documents from Reagan's eightyears led him to define Reagan as an "uncommitted thinker" rather than an ideologuedue to the presence of contradictory belief patterns.Shimko argues that essentially, Reagan is an "uncommitted thinker". This doesnot mean he does not have firmly held beliefs, rather, he does not have one set of"consistent, mutually reinforcing beliefs relevant to U.S.-Soviet relations" (p.357).Reagan's hard-line image of the Soviet Union is counteracted by his belief in theexistence of underlying shared interests and potential for harmony in the world. Shimko66argues that while these views are not logically inconsistent, they do not reinforce eachother in terms of their policy implications (p.375).Uncommitted thinkers may tend to adopt different belief patterns for the samedecision problem. They may also tend to oscillate between groups of advisors, sidingwith one group on one issue and with another on the next issue and so on (Shimko,1992, p.358). Reagan, very often passive in the decision-making process, frequently lefthis advisors unclear as to which position he would support on various issues.Betty Glad (1983), writing in the middle of Reagan's first term, offers anotheranalysis of Reagan. In her work, Glad defines Reagan's cognitive style and relates it tohis childhood experiences and resulting psychological make-up.Her research has lead her to argue that Reagan is a "black and white" thinker whosees the world as a battle between the Americans and the Soviets, a battle between theforces of good and the forces of evil. Glad argues that this cognitive style is a result ofhis childhood experiences and ambivalent feelings towards his alcoholic father which hewas never able to express. As a result, as a political actor, Reagan engages indisplacement of anger and cognitive sterotyping, projecting negative feelings onto theculturally approved outgroup - the communists (p.68). 5This cognitive style may have a significant impact on policy decision-making,states Glad, as "institutional and culture constraints are apt to be lacking when he[Reagan] projects outward on a culturally defined enemy (p.69). Reagan had made his'Glad's work ties in with similar work done in international relations on mirror-imagingand cultural stereo-typing. Political actors see their opponents as the mirror-image ofthemselves (right vs. wrong, good vs. bad) and employ rigid stereotypes in their assessmentsof opponent's words and actions.67mandate clear when he came into office, and the political climate was favourable to hismilitant stance against the Soviets. This may have given him more options and freedomto act on his own than normally exists for a president.A "black and white" thinker however, has little conceptual understanding aboutwhere to confront the enemy and where to make compromises. The rigidity with whichhe holds onto his conceptualizations of reality may also hinder any cognitive learning.Glad comments that "black and white" thinkers can tolerate behaviour which runscounter to their views by making tactical adaptations. However, these adaptations aremost often made without any modifications in the categories through which they viewthe world (p.72). Perceptual changes may take place, but they require a large amount ofnegative evidence and they are slow to be realized. It is unclear from the evidence inthis study whether Reagan merely made tactical adaptations to the new environment ofthe late 1980's, or whether he actually began the process of perceptual change.It does seem clear that Reagan's fundamental beliefs about the nature of theinternational environment had not undergone significant alteration by 1989. Liberal,optimistic facets to his beliefs were in existence from his first days as president. Theseelements became more predominant as the situation in the Soviet Union wastransformed. His beliefs remained intact with only minor shifts in emphasis. But whatof his image of the Soviet Union? Beyond toning down his rhetoric, to do which, as hestates in his memoirs, he had to make a "conscious decision" (1990, p.46), did Reagan'simage of the Soviet Union undergo any substantial change?The evidence is less than conclusive on this question. It seems likely that hecontinued to regard the Soviet Union with mistrust and some hostility. His positive68comments regarding Gorbachev may have been possible because he separated the leaderfrom the rest of Soviet polity. Gorbachev was less of a villain because he was not "oneof them". He acknowledged the problems of communism and he did not makereferences to the Soviet goal of world domination. This was enough to set him apart, tomake him more acceptable to Reagan. His acceptance however, does not imply thatReagan changed any of his fundamental beliefs about the Soviet Union. In 1989, theSoviets were still a threat, albeit not as menacing as they were in 1981.The question still remains. How did Reagan accommodate new, conflictinginformation about a changed Soviet Union into a pre-existing belief system? How didhis beliefs guide his interpretation of the new evidence? This question is only partiallyanswered by this research work. A fuller understanding may be achieved by determiningwhether Reagan more accurately fits Shimko's description of an "uncommitted thinker"or Glad's analysis of a "black and white thinker". Understanding his cognitive structuresis essential for determining how Reagan deals with information which conflicts with hisoperational code beliefs.On a more general note, how does this understanding of Reagan's beliefs helpresearchers explain the decision-making process? Holsti's typology may assist bypermitting researchers to make some general predictions about different types of leaders.It appears from the typology that actors who view the world from different perspectives(philosophical questions), have different predispositions to policy prescriptions(instrumental questions). Understanding a political decision-maker's type may help toexplain past actions or predict future decision-making choices.69However, despite the lack of real change in Reagan's operational code, an actor'stype may not be a static phenomenon (as evidenced by the change in Dulles' beliefs).Operational codes may shift in response to the changing nature of the internationalenvironment, or to changes within the actor himself. "Typing" an actor might take on astatic quality which does not reflect actual fluctuations in belief-systems. Even for anactor such as Reagan, who appears to hold his beliefs rigidly, noting shifts within hisbeliefs may be important for understanding his stance on some issues. Even knowingwhich elements of his code are being emphasized may be relevant in determining hisdiagnostic and choice propensities.In the final analysis, this study is still an isolated, primarily descriptive case studyof one political actor. However, many of the questions raised are important ones. Thereis still much to be learned about political behaviour which can only be realized throughcognitive research. How individual actors perceive the world, their beliefs about theirpolitical environment continues to play a significant role in how decisions are made.For eight years Ronald Reagan played a principal part in the on-going drama ofinternational relations. His role was especially pivotal considering the changes in theSoviet-American relationship which occurred during his presidency. Yet Reagan'sthinking about many issues appeared muddy, his discourse was often vague andinconsistent, and frequently there was the disconcerting feeling that he was unclearabout the matter at hand.Understanding Reagan's fundamental operational code beliefs about the nature ofthe international environment and the Soviet Union is essential to clearing some of thismuddy water. Reagan, it appears, was not just a simplistic ideologue, a cold warrior70bent on destroying the Evil Empire. At the deepest level, Reagan held liberal, optimisticbeliefs about the chances of global peace. His beliefs did not undergo any radicaltransformation as a result of the changes in the Soviet Union, Reagan still believed thatcommunism was the focus of evil in the world. But Gorbachev admitted to faults in thesystem he had inherited, and he did not mention the goal of communist worlddomination. So, while Reagan could never come to trust Gorbachev, nor give up hisdreams of a space defence system, he began to see hope for the future.This hope was possible because of his underlying optimism and faith thatinternational harmony could be achieved. These beliefs, which had always been part ofhis operational code, became more evident in the last few years of his presidency.While appearing inconsistent, there may be an internal logic to Reagan's beliefs. If, in aworld of peaceful states the world will be peaceful, the behaviour of aggressive statesmust be modified. Reagan sought to do just that. And on those terms, perhaps he wassuccessful.71REFERENCESAllison, G. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, American Political Science Review, 63, 689-718.Beukel, E. (1989). American Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary.London: Pinter Publishers.Converse, P. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public. In D. Apter (Ed.),Ideology and Discontent. New York: The Free Press.Cottam, M. (1986). Foreign Policy Decision Making.  Boulder: Westview Press.de Riveria, J. (1968). The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy.  Columbus, Ohio:Merrill.Finlay, D., Holsti, 0., & Fagen, R. (1967). Enemies in Politics, Chicago: Rand McNallyand Company.George, A.L. (1969). The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study ofPolitical Leaders and Decision-Making.  International Studies Quarterly, 13, (2),190 221., (1979). The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-MakingBehaviour: The 'Operational Code' Belief System. In L. Falkowski (Ed.),Psychological Models in International Politics,  (pp. 95-123). Boulder: WestviewPress.Glad, B. (1989). Reagan's Midlife Crisis and the Turn to the Right. Political Psychology,10, (4), 593-623.. (1983). Black and White Thinking: Ronald Reagan's Approach to Foreign Policy.Political Psychology, 4, (1), 33-75.Halperin, M. (1974). Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington: BrookingsInstitution.Herek, J. & Huth P. (1987). Decision Making During International Crisis: Is Quality ofProcess Related to Outcome. Journal of Conflict Resolution,  31, (2), 203-226.Hermann, C. & Hermann, M. (1989). Who Makes Foreign Policy and How. International Studies Quarterly, 33, (4), 361-388.72Hoagland, S. & Walker, S. (1977). Operational Code and Crisis Outcomes. In M.Hermann (Ed.), A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders,  (pp. 125-167)New York: The Free Press.Holsti, 0. (1989). Crisis Decision-Making. In P.Tetlock et al. Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War, I, New York:Oxford Press. 8-84.. (1982). The Operational Code Approach: Problems and Some Solutions In C.Jonsson (Ed.), Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics,  (pp.37-74) London:Frances Pinter.(1977). The "Operational Code" as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems.Final Report to the National Science Foundation, Grant #S0075-15368..(1976). Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making American Behavioral Scientist, 20, (1), 11-27.(1970). The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: JohnFoster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs Canadian lournal of Political Science, III, (1), 123-157.Huth, P. & Russet, B. (1984). What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900-1980World Politics, 36. 496-526.Israel, F. C. (1987). Ronald Reagan's Weekly Radio Addresses  (Vol. 1), Delaware:Scholarly Resources.Janis, I. (1982). Groupthink, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.Johnson, L. (1977). Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behaviour:Senator Frank Church at Midcareer in Margaret Hermann, A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, (pp.80-119), New York: The Free Press.Mandel, R. (1986). Psychological Approaches to International Relations. In M. Hermann,Handbook of Political Psychology,  (pp.251-278), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.Lebow, R.N. & Stein, J.G. (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter.World Politics, 41, (2), 208-224.Lewin, M. (1988). The Gorbachev Phenomenon,  Berkeley: University of California Press.Reagan, R. (1990, Nov. 5). An American Life. (reprinted excerpts) Time, pp.42-55.73Rosenau, J. & Holsti, 0. (1983). U.S. Leadership in a Shrinking World: The Breakdownof Consensuses and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems World Politics,35, (3), 368-392.Shimko, K. (1992). Reagan on the Soviet Union and the Nature of International ConflictPolitical Psychology, a (3), 353-375.Simon, H. (1947). Administrative Behaviour, New York: Macmillan.Sjoblom, G. (1982). Some Problems of the Operational Code Approach. In C. Jonsson(Ed.), Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics.  (pp. 37-74), London: FrancesPinter.Smith, S. (1988). Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations. In R. Little & S.Smith (Eds.), Belief Systems and International Relations. (pp.11-36), Oxford: BritishInternational Studies Association.Spear, J. & Williams, P. (1988). Belief Systems and Foreign Policy: the Cases of Carterand Reagan. In R. Little & Steve Smith (Eds.), Belief Systems and International Relations. (pp. 190-208), Oxford: British International Studies Association.Suedfeld, P. & Tetlock P. (1977). Integrative Complexity of Communications inInternational Crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution,  3, 169-184.Tetlock, P. & McGuire, C. Jr. (1986). Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy. In S.Long (Ed.), Political Behaviour Annual, 1, (pp.147-170), Boulder: Westview Press.Tsbelis, G. (1990). Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley;University of California Press.Vertzberger, Y. (1990). The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision making.  Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress.Walker, S. & Murphy, T. (1981). The Utility of Operational Code in Political Forecasting.Political Psychology, 3, (1/2), 24-54.Walker, S. & Lawrence F. (1984). The Operational Codes of U.S. Presidents andSecretaries of State: Motivational Foundations and Behavioral ConsequencesPolitical Psychology, 5, (2) 237-265.Walker, S. (1990). The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis. Political Psychology, 11(2), 403-416.74• (1983). The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis ofthe Operational Code Construct International Studies Quarterly, 27, 179-201.Wallace, M.D. & Suedfeld, P. (1988). Leadership Performance in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link. International Studies Quarterly, 32, 439-451.Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Government Printing Office, 1981-1988.Washington, D.C.APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE OF HOLSTI'S (1977) CODING SHEETS75Page No.: ^Adversary:Para No.: Coding Sheet No.:Coder:^Doc. No.:Issue:Specific Circumstances:P-1 (a) A. Nature of political life:^D. Nature of conflict:1.2.3.4.5.B.1.2a.2b.2c.2d.3a.3b.[^1^Conflictual^ 1.^[[^]^Mixed^ 2.^[[^] Harmonious 3.^[[^] No reference 4.^[[^]^Other: 5.^[] Zero-sum] Mixed] Other:of] Non-zero-sum] No referenceSources of conflict:^ E. Scope conflict:[^] Human nature 1.^[^][^] National attributes: Ideology^2.^[^][^] National attributes: Political^3.^[ ][ ] National attributes: Economic^4.^[ ][^] National attributes: Other^5.^[ ][ ] International System: Ideology[ ] International System: Nationalism^F.AllHighIssuesOtherRoleNo referenceissues are linkedspilloverseparableof conflict in hist. devel.3c. [ ] International System: Economic3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 1. [ ] Necessary3e. [ ] International System: Other 2. [ ] Functional4. [ ] No Reference 3. [ ] Mixed5. [^] Other 4. [ ] Dysfunctional5. [ ] No referenceC. Conditions of peace: 6. [ ] Other1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s) G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities 1. [ ] Theory/ideology4. [ ] Balance of power 2. [ ] Trends5. [ ] Transform international system 3. [ ] Experience6. [ ] No reference 4. [ ] History7. [^]^Other: 5. [ ] Specific Events:6. [ ] Faith7. [ 3 No referenceP-1 (b) A.Coder:Issue:SpecificDoc.^No.:^Page No.: Para No.:^Coding Sheet No.:Adversary:Circumstances:Opponent's goals: E. Likely response of adversary to one's1. [ ] Destructionist own policies of firmness:2. [ ] Expansionist 1. [ ) Back down3. [ ] Defensive 2. [^] Ignore4. [ ] Conciliatory 3. [^] Reciprocate - this situation5. [ ] Peace 4. [^] Reciprocate - other situations6. [ ] No Reference 5. [^] Respond impulsively7. [ ] Other: 6. [^] No Referênce7. [^] Other:B. Source of opponent's policy:1. [ ] Ideology2. [ ] Historical3. [ ] Internal needs4. [ ] Leader5. [ ] Power politics6. [ ] External7. [ ] No referenceC. Generality of adversary's position:1. [ ] General/permanent2. [ ] Specific/limited3. [ ] No reference4. [ ] Other:D. Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions: 1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation3. [ ] Ignore4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation6. [ ] No referenceF. Opponent's image of one's own nation:1. [ ] Destructionist2. [ ] Expansionist3. [ ] Defensive4. [ ] Conciliatory5. [ ] Peace6. [ ] No Reference7. [ ] Other:G. Opponent's view of conflict:1. [^)^Inevitable2. [ ] Avoidable3. [ ] No reference4. [ ] Other:1a.[ ] Desirable2a.[ ] Undesirable3a.[ ] No reference4a.[ ] Other:P-1 (b), page 2 Coder:^Doc. No.:^Page No.: Para No.:^Coding Sheet No.:Issue: Adversary:Specific Circumstances:H. Opponent's decision-making process: J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives1.^[ ] Model I - unitary rational actor 1. [ ] Prepare ground2.^[ ] Model II - organizational process 2. [ ] Try and see3.^[ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics 3. [ ] Incremental4.^[^] No reference 4. [^] Blitzkrieg5.^[^]^Other: 5. [ ] No referencela.[^] Calculating 6. [^] Other:2a.[^] Impulsive3a.[^] No reference K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:4a.[^]^Other: 1. [ ] Maximize gains2. [^] Minimize lossesI. Opponent's op code: Choice of 3. [ ] No referenceObjectives: 4. [^]^Other:1. [ ] Optimize2. [ ] Satisfice L. Evidence required for opponent to show3. [ ] No reference good faith:4. [ ] Other:la.[ ] Realistic M. Terms used to describe opponent and2a.[ ] Unrealistic actions:3a.[ ] No reference4a.[ ] Other: N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:lb.[ ] Flexible 1. [ ] Theory/ideology2b.[ ] Inflexible 2. [^] Trends3b.[ ] No reference 3. [^] Experience4b.[ ] Other: 4. [^] Historylc.[ ] Predictable 5. [ ] Specific events:2c.[ ] Unpredictable 6. [^] Faith3c.[ ] No reference 7. [ ] No reference4c.[ ] Other: 8. [^]^Other:P-1 (c) Coder:Issue: Doc. No.: Page No.:^ Para No.:^ Coding Sheet No.:Adversary:Specific Circumstances:A. Nature of contemporary int. system: D. Structure of international system:1. [^] Conflictual 1. [^] Polarized2. [ ] Mixed 2. [^] Pluralistic3. [ ] Harmonious 3. [^] No reference4. [ ] No reference 4. [^] Other:5. [ ] Other:B. Sources of conflict:^ E. Stability of the system:1. [ ] Human nature 1.^[ ] All issues are linked2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology^2.^[ ] High spillover2b. [ ] National attributes: Political^3.^[ ] Issues separable2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic^4.^[ ] No reference2d. [ ] National attributes: Other^5.^[ ] Other3a. [ ] International System: Ideology3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3c. [ ] International System: Economic 1. [ ] Theory/ideology3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 2. [^] Trends3e. [ ] International System: Other 3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] No Reference 4. [^] History5. [ ] Other 5. [^] Specific Events:6. [^] FaithC. Conditions of peace: 7. [ ] No reference1. [ ] Education/communication2. [^] Eliminate offending nation(s)3. [^] Eliminate inequalities4. [^] Balance of power5. [^] Transform international system6. [^] No reference7. [^] Other:APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF CODED DOCUMENT80Document Identification Information 1. Identification number assigned:2. Author: ^P^/ Pc--C.14 ,OKiT ER53. Date: !•E R , \9aa 4. Type of document:^ OrlEkinf-_-- OF PAP-LO1E:J.3T5. Audience: 0')R_ kT t-t PAW—AM OLTT6. Date document first made public:7. Additional information about the circumstances surrounding preparationof the document:8. Source in which coded version of the document found:Title: uc.P0Author, editor, compiler:  CA 0^RW-TUOC-.1  Publisher: ^Place of publication: ^'\..A..)\A1N.)C_CCOkl Date of publication: Page(s):^1-7081London, EnglandAddres.c to illembers. of Parliament.June 8, I982My Lord Chancellor, Air. Speaker:The journey of which this visit forms apart is a long one. Already it has taken meto two great cities of the \Vest, Rome andParis, and to the economic summit at Ver-sailles. And there, once again, our sister de-mocracies haVe prOVed that even iii It till1Cof severe economic strain, free peoples canwork together freely and voluntarily to at problems as serious as inflation, unem-ployment, trade, and economic develop-ment in a spirit of cooperation and solidar-ity.2 Other milestones lie ahead. Later thisweek, in Germany, we and our NATO allieswill discuss measures for our joint defenseand America's latest initiatives for a morepeaceful, secure world through arms reduc-tions.3 Each stop of this trip is important, butamong them all, this moment occupies aspecial place in my heart and in the heartsof my countrymen—a moment of kinshipincl homecoming in these hallowed halls.Speaking for all Americans, I want to sayhow very much at home we feel in yourhouse. Every American would, because thisis, as \to have been Si) eloquently told, oneof democracy's shrines. Here the rights offree people and the processes of representa-tion ha \ e been debated and refined.It has been said that an institution is thelengthening shadow of a man. This institu-tion is the lengthening shadow id. all themen and \vowel) who have at here ;ind allthose who have voted to ',lid representa-tives hew.June 7 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1982us in ti This is my second visit to Great Britain asPresident of the United States. My first op-portunity to stand on British soil occurredalmost a year and a hall' ago when yourPrime Nlinister graciously hosted a diplo-matic dinner at the British Embassy inWashington. Mrs. Thatcher said then thatshe hoped I was not distressed to find star-ing down at me from the grand staircase aportrait of Ilis Royal Majesty King GeorgeIII. She suggested it was best to let bygonesbe bygones, and in view of our two coun-tries' remarkable friendship in succeedingyears, she added that most Englishmentoday would agree with Thomas Jeffersonthat "a little rebellion now and then is avory good thing.- [Laughter]Well, from here I will go to Bonn andthen Berlin, where there stands a grimsymbol of power untamed. The Berlin Wall,that dreadful gray gash across the city, is inits H :rd decade. It is the fitting signature ofthe regime that built it.And a few hundred kilometers behindthe Berlin Wall, there is another symbol. Inthe center of Warsaw, there is a sign thatnotes the distances to two capitals. In onedirection it points toward Moscow. In theother it points toward Brussels, headquar-ters of Western Europe's tangible unity.The marker says that the distances fromWarsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brusselsare equal. The sign makes this point: Polandis not East or \Vest. Poland is at the centerof' European civilization. It has contributedmightily to that cis ilization. It is doing sotoday by being magnificently unreconciledto oppression.Poland's struggle to be Poland and tosecure the basic rights we often take forgranted demonstrates why we clam not takethose rights for granted. Gladstone, defend-ing the RelOrin Bill of 1866, declared, "Youcannot fight against the future. Time is onour side." It was easier to believe in themarch of deinocracy ill Gladstone's day—inthat high noon of Victorian optimism.;0^'e're approaching the end of a bloody p_1(c)century plagued by a terrible political in-vent ion—totalitarianisig Opt illliS111 colliesless easily today, not because democracy isless vigorous, but because democracy's en-emies have rdilled their instruments of re-pression. Yet optimism is in order, because82amine means of strengthening relathese fields. The first cultural attion talks vill be held in Wastober.'['he two sides conwelcoming recentmutual consult •special andand the(led their talks byCeisions to strengthenons as an expression of theose relationship which Itnted States enjoy.!Molina-gton in Oc-Adminiviration of Ronald Beag,an, 1982 / June 883future based on the experience of the past.It is this sense of history, this understandingof the past that I want to talk with youabout today, for it is in remembering whatwe share of the past that our two nationscan make common cause for the future.14.. We have not inherited an easy world. Ifdevelopments like the Industrial Revolu-tion, which began here in England. and thegifts of science and technology have madelife much easier for us. they have also madeit more dangerous. There are threats nowto our freedom, im eed to our \ VIA" eXitit-day lw day democracy is proving itself to be are not just critical to American or Westerna not-at-all-fragile flower. From Stettin on policy; they are critical to mankind. Ourthe Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the commitment to early success in these nego-regimes planted by totalitarianism have had^tiations is firm and unshakable, and our pur-more than .30 years to establish their legiti-^pose is clear: reducing the risk of war bymacv. But none—not one regime—has yet reducing the means of waging war on bothbeen able to risk free elections. Regimes sides]planted lw bayonets do not take root.^II The strength of the Solidarity move ment^At the same time there is a threat posedto mman freedom by the enormous powerin Poland deillmlstrates Ole In" l"ld ii iii^of the modern slate. History teaches theunderground joke in the Soviet t!nion. II is dangers of government that 'overreaches—that the Soviet Union would remain a one-^political control taking precedence overparty nation rvc., ir an opposition party^free economic growth, secret police, mind-were permitted, because everyone would^less bureaucracy, all combining to stifle in-join the opposition party. 11,arwlacri^• dividual excellence and personal freedoma America's time as a player on the stage of .-it Now.^aware that among us here ancworld history has been brii !^think under- throughout Europe there is legitimate dis-standing this fact has always made on pa- agreement over the extent to which thetient with your younger cousins—Well. not plibile sector should play a role in a nation'salways patient. I do recall that^one occa- economy and life. But on one point all of usslot), Sir Winston Churchill said^exaspera- are united—our a thorrence of dictatorship^(c)lion about one of our most distinguishedin all its forms, but most particularly totali-diplomats: -Ile is the only ciise I know oftiirtimisin and the terrible inhumanities itbull who carries his china shop with him.-has caused in our time—the great purge,[Laughter)3 But witty as Sir Winston was, he also had Auschwitz and Dacha". the Gulag, andCambodiathat special attribute of great statesmen—the gilt of vision. the willingness to see the IP Historians looking biick at our iine willnote the consistent restraint and peacefulintentions of the West. They will note thatit was the democracies who refused to usethe threat of their nuclear monopoly in theforties and early fifties for territorial or im-perial gain. glad that nuclear monopolybeen in the hands of the Communist world,the map of Europe—indeed, the world—woul(l look very different today. And cer-tainly they will note it was not the democ- - I(b)racies that invaded Afghanistan or Su-pressed Polish Solidarity or used chemicalimd toxin warfare in Afghanistan and South-p-1(6)-RC) ence, that other generations could never east AsiDeven have imagine(]^ 19 P. history teaches anything it teaches self-IS There is first the threat f,1 global war. No^diTusion ifl the face of unpleasant facts isPresident, no Congress. no Prime Minister,^folly. We see armind us today the marks ofno Parliament can spend a day ellt irely free our^terrible^dilemma—predictions^ofof" this threat.[1nd I don't have to tell you^doomsday, itntinticlear demonstrations, anthat in todav's world the existence of nucle-^.%as;.:1Ce in which the West must, for its^,ar weapons could mean, if not the extinc- 'rotection, be an unwilling participaqLion of mankind. then surely the end of^tile same time we see totalitarian forcescivilization as we know it. That's why nego-^in lln. world who seek subversion and con-nations on^intermediate-ramze nuclear^Ilict around the globe to further their bar-^;)1(b)forces now underway in Europe and the barous assault on the human spiri3 What, ._sTmiT talks—Strategic. Arms Beduction^then, is mil- course? Must civilization perishTalks—which will begin later this month.^in a hail ()I' Bery atoms? Must freedomP-13‘)Jane S / Admin istra tio n 11/1tomild Reagan , 19S:2wither ill a quiet, deadening accommoda- 74 The decay of the Soviet experimentLion with totalitarian evil^ slmuld come as no surprise to us. Wherever^:C Sir W'inston Churchill relused to accept^the comparisons have been made betweenthe inevitability of war or even that it was^free ,ind closed societies—W'est Germanyimminent. Ile said, -I (I() not believe that^;Ind Fast Germany, Austria and Czechoslo-Soviet Russia desires war. \Vila( they desire^vakia, Malaysia and Vietnam—it is theis the fruits of war and the indefinite expan-^democratic countries what are prosperoussion of their power and doctrines. But what^:Hid responsive to the needs of their people.we have to consider here todav while time And one of the simple hut overwhelmingremains is the permanent prevention of^facts of our tnne is this: Of all the millionswar and the establishment ol conditions ol^of relugees we've Set 'II ill the modernfreedom 111111 110111(Wl'at'y c I.:11101V ;15^W01•1(1, then- night 5 alWayS aWlly from , 110(1/1,.• ill all^ tOW:i1.11 the Communist world. Today on the.21^W 11 tills IS precisely our mission today:^NATO line, our military forces face east toto preserve freedom :IN \SCII :15 peace. It^prevent LI^111Valii011. On the other^1101 he easy to see: but I believe we^side of the line, the Soviet forces also facelive now al a turning point.^ east to prevent their people from leaving.In^ironic sense Karl Marx was right. 25 Thc hard evidence of totalitarian rule hasWe are witnessing today a great revolution-^causeo ill mankind an uprising of the intel-ary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the^Let and will. \‘'llether it is the growth ofeconomic order are conflicting directly with^the new schools of economics ill America orthose of the political order. But the crisis is^in 'land or the appearance of the so-calledhappening not in the tree, non-Alarxist^new philosophers in France, there is oneWest, but in the lionte ol Alarxist-Leninisin,^unifying thread running through the intel-the Soviet linion.a.t is the Soviet rnion that^lectual work of these groups—rejection ofrolls at.?,•aiir,; the tide of history lis denying^the arbitrary power of the state, the refusalhuman^.,00 and hull", (ii,.!mtv to its^to subordinate the rights of the individualcitizeiv3 It :its° is in deep economic dillicill-^to the superstate, the realization that collec-ty. The rate of growth ill till. 11:11 11111:1! prod_^liVitilll Sillk's^OW bt'Sloct IllIS beCII^ Lt>iiice the exodus from Egypt, historiansfifties and is less than hall of 5511:11 it was^hive written of those who sacrificed andthen.^ struggled for 1101:(10111-010 Stand^'Flier-8423 The dinwnsions of this failure ;ire as-toimcling: A country 55 IICII employs one-fifth of its population in ,igriculture isunabl(• to feed its 05511 people. \\ re  it notfor the private sector, the tiny pri\•atesector toh..rated in Soviet agriculture, thecountry might be on the brink If famine.These private plots OCUllpS a 11:11Cof the arable laml but liC101111l lor nearlyon(..-quarter of Soviet farm ()Irwin ;111(1noarly one-third of incat produ(t, lilt! sego-tables. ()vota.ot1trali/(.(1, \%ith kilo of no iii-mou5 Lie, the revolt of Spartacus, the storm-ing .1. the Bastille. the \‘'arsaw uprising ill\Vorld 1'ar ii3 Alore recently %Ye've seenevidence of this same human impulse illom• of the developing lizitions ill (:entral.1inerica. For months and months the %vorld110WS Illt'llia COVert'll the lighting in Ii Sal-alter day we were treated tostories and film slanted toward the bravefreedom-lighters battling oppressive gov-ernment forces in behalf of the silent,tering people of that tortured country.celiti\vs, year alter year the So\ael systempours its best res()urce into the making ofinstruments of destruction Tile constant'S shrhil:age of l`Clmoinic grok■III combined\vith the grinvtli of^productionputting a 11(•avy strain on the Sovi■•t pt.ople.What 55e see here is l political structurethat no longer corresponds to its economicbase, a socioty \%•hota. product' \ o^an'2.1 .\11(1^ (1:1\ 1.110S0 silent, sufferingpeople \yore offered a chance to vote, tochoose the kind of governimilt they■vanted. Suddenly the freedom-fighters inthe hills wen.. exposed for what :hey reallyare—t:nban-backed guerrillas \Alio \vainpokver for themselves, and their hackers,11111 (lootocrac■ lor^oplo. Thoy throat-ono(' (loath to ati■ II^sotod, and (lo-,,tro\ (.(1 litnidrods of hoses and trucks to2'? Strange, kit in my own country there'sbeen little if any news coverage or that warsince the election. Now, perhaps they'll sayit's—well, because there are newer strug-gles now.mine whether this trend continues.30 On distant islands in the South AtlanticNo, democracy is not a fragile flower. Stillyoung men ;ire fighting for Britain. And. :91it needs cultivating. If the rest of this cern-yes, voices have been raised protesting theirtory is to witness the gradual growth ofsacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so farIreedom and democratic ideals, we mustaway. But those young men aren't fightingfor mere real estate. The^fight for a^take actions to assist the campaign for de-yout to be the people of that country—theuyong, the okl. the in-between.can kill me, you can kill my family, kill myneighbors. but you can't kill us all.- Thereal freedom-fighters of El Salvador turneduntil after slit' 11'1(1 v°1"1. A gr""(1")the•, V, In the Communist world as well, man'swho had been told by the guerrillas She^instinctive desire for ircedom and scif_de_would be killed WI14.11 she returned from^termination surfaces again and again. To bethe polls, and she told the guerrillas, -Yon sure. there are grim reminders ()I how bru-tally the police state attempts to snuff outthis quest for self-rule-1953 in East Ger-many, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslo-vakia, 1981 in Poland. But the struggle con-tinues in Poland. And we know that thereare even those who strive and suffCr forfreedom within the confines of the SovietUnion itself. I low we conduct ourselveshere in the Western democracies will deter-Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1982 / June 885keep the people from getting to the pollingplaces. But on election day, the people of ElSalvador, an unprecedented 1.4 million ofthem. braved ambush and gunfire. ;111dtrudged for miles to vote for freedom.They stood for hours in the hot sun wait-ing for their turn to vote. Nlembers of ourCongress who went there as observers Ink!me of a women %vim was 'wounded by riflefire on the way to the polls, who refused toleave the line to have her \mum! treatedtest lias been passed with the peacefulchange of governing political parties. InAfrica. Nigeria is moving into remarkableand unmistakable ways to build andstrengthen its democratic institutions. Inthe Caribbean and Central America, 16 of24 countries have freely elected govern-ments. And in the United Nations, 8 of the10 developing nations which have joinedthat body in the past 5 years are democra-cies.cause—for the belief that armed aggression mocracy.must not be allowed to succeed, and the -IS Sonic argue that we should encouragedemocratic change in right-wing dictator-government—lapphnisel—the decisions of ships, but not in Communist regimes. Vell,government tinder the rule of law. If there to accept this preposterous notion—as somewell-meaning people have—is to invite thehad been firmer support for that principleargument that once countries achieve a nu-some 45 years ago. perhaps our generationwouldn't have suffered the bloodletting or clear capability. they should be allowed anWorld war^ undisturbed reign of terror over their own:1 I^In the Nliddle East now the gnus sound^citizens. We reject this course.once more. this time in Lebanon, a country 36 As for the Soviet view, Chairman Brezh-that for too long has had to endure the vie.. repeatedly has stressed that the compe-tragedy of civil war, terrorism. and foreign^tition of ideas and systems must continueintervention arid occnr p rtinii . The lighting^and that this is entirely consistent with re-in Lebanon on the part of all parties !mist^laxation of tensions and peace.stop, and Israel should bring its forces 31 Well. we ask only that these systemshum,. Hint this is not enough. w,. most all^begin by living up to their own constifii-work to stamp out the scourg,e of term' ism^lions, abiding by their own laws, and coin-that in one middle East makes war an ever_^plying with the international obligationspresent threat^ they h^uave nderta n Wke.^e ask only for aTio b„yond tIre troubh,spots lies a^process. ;1 direction, a basic code of decen-deeper, more positive pattern. Around the^cy. not for an instant transformation.Rqa) world today, the democratic revolution is 3F-3 We cannot ignore the fact that even with-gathering new strengg In India a critical out our encouragement there has been andpeople must participate in the decisions ofJune 8 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1982%OR • continue to be repeated explosions vigorous new democracy, the Federal Re-against repression and dictatorships. The public of Germany's political foundationsSoviet Union itself is not immune to this have become a major force in this effort.reality.Gny. system is inherently unstable 43 We in America now intend to take addi-NG) that has no peaceful means to legitimize its tional steps, as many of our allies have al-'^leaders. In such cases, the very repressive-^ready done, toward realizing this same goal.ness of the state ultimately drives people to The chairmen and other leaders of the na-resist it, if necessary, by forceD^tional Republican and Democratic Party or-.S(-1^While we must be cautious about forcing ganizations are initiating a study with thethe pace of change, we must not hesitate to bipartisan American political foundation todeclare our ultimate objectives and to take determine how the United States can bestconcrete actions to move toward them. We contribute as a nation to the global cam-must be staunch in our conviction that free- paign for democracy' now gathering force.dom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky They will have the cooperation of congres-few, but the inalienable and universal right sional leaders of both parties, along withof all human beings. So states the United representatives of business, labor, and otherNations Universal Declaration of HumanRights, which, among other things, guaran-major institutions in our society. I look for-ward to receiving their recommendationstees free elections.^ and to working with these institutions and41.0^The objective I propose is quite simple to the Congress in the common task ofstate: to foster the infrastructure of democ- strengthening democracy throughout theracy, the system of a free press, unions, po-litical parties, universities, which allows a ."rici*tipeople to choose their own way to develop^It is time that we committed ourselves astheir own culture, to reconcile their own a nation—in both the pubic and private sec-differences through peaceful eans. tors—to assisting democratic development.mThis is not cultural imperialism, it is pro-^We plan to f•i '11.11t with leaders of otherviding the means for genuine self-determi- nations as well. here is a proposal beforenation and protection for diversity. Democ- the Council of arope to invite parliamen-racy already flourishes in countries l‘'ith^tarians from democratic countries to avery different cultures and historical experi- meeting next year in Strasbourg. That(glees. It would be cultural condescension, prestigious gathering could consider ways toor worse, to say that any people prefer die- help democratic political movements.tatorship to democracy. \Vho would volun- -15 This November in Washington there willtardy choose not to have the right to vote, take place an international meeting on freedecide to purchase government propaganda elections. And next spring there will be ahandouts instead of independent newspa- conference of world authorities on constitu-pers, prefer government to worker-con- tionalism and self-goverment hosted by thetrolled unions, opt for land to be owned by Chief Justice of the United States. Authori-the state instead of those who till it, want^ties from a number of developing and de-government repression of religious liberty,^'eloped countries—judges, philosophers,a single political party instead of a free^and politicians yyith practical experience—choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of have agreed to explore how to turn princi-democratic tok•rance and diversity'?^pie into practice and further the rule ofince 1917 the Soviet Union has given^law.covert political training and assistance to qu At the same time, we invite the SovietP-I (I)) Marxist-Leninists in many countries. Of Union to consider with us how the competi-course, it also has promoted the use of viii- lion .of ideas and values—which it is com-lence and subversion by these same lOrca mitted to support—can be conducted on aOver the past several decades, \Vest Euro- peaceful and reciprocal basis. For example,pean and other Social Democrats, Christian 1 am prepared to offer President lirezhnevDemocrats, and leaders have offered open an opportunity to speak to the Americanassistance to fraternal, political. and social^people on our television if he will allow meinstitutions to bring about peaceful and^the saine opportunity with the Sovietdemocratic progress. Appropriately, for a people. We also suggest that panels of our86Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1982 / June 8nwwsmen periodically appear on each these ideals that have done so much to easeother's television to discuss major events, the plight of man and the hardships of ourLP Now, I don't wish to sound overly opti- imperfect world. This reluctance to 0Semistic. yet the Soviet Union is not immune those vast resources at our command re-from the reality of what is going on in the minds me of the elderly lady whose homeworld. It has happened in the past—a small was bombed in the Blitz. As the rescuersruling elite either mistakenly attempts to moved about, they found a bottle of brandyease domestic unrest through greater re- she'd stored behind the staircase, which waspression and foreign adventure, or it all that was left standing. And since she was^ a wiser C01.11.tie. It begins to allow its^barely conscious, one of the workers pulledpeople a voice in their own destiny. Even if the cork to give her a taste of it. She Cathis latter process is not realized soon.0^.iround immediately and said, "I len.. HOW—believe the renewed strength of the demo- there now, put it back. That's for emergen-cratic movement. complemented by a cjes ll,aughierlfol global campaign for freedom. will strength- r.), \‘ ell. the emergency is upon us. Let usen the prospects for arms control and a^,oe sn) no longer. Lel Is go to our strength.world at peacg^ Let us offer hope. l,et us tell the world thatI have discussed On other occasions, in- new age is not only possible but probable.chiding my icldress on Nlay 9th. the He- ,.,• .5, During the dark days of the Secondments of Western policies toward the Soviet WorldNvorin \Val% when this island was incandes-Union to safeguard our interests and pro-cent with courage, Winston Churchill ex-tect the peace. What I am describing now isclaimed about Britain's adversaries, "Whata plan and a hope for the long term—thekind of a people do they think we are?"'march of freedom and democracy whichWell. Britain's adversaries fonnd out whatwill leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-extraordinary people the British are. But allheap of history as it has left other tyranniesthe democracies paid a terrible price forwhich stifle the freedom and muzzle theself-expression of the people. And that's^allowing the dictators to underestimate us.why we must continue our efforts to We dare not make that mistake again. So,let us^ourselves, "What kind of people'strengthen NATO (Well as we move for-(I() we think we are? And let us answer,ward with mu' Zero-Option initiative in thenegotiations on intermediate-range forces "Free people. worthy of freedom and deter-mined not only to remain so but to helpand our proposal for a one-third reductionin strategic ballistic missile warheads.^others gain their freedom as weft-.^eur military strength is a prerequisite to 5 3 Sir Winston led his people to great victo-peace, but let it be ch:ar We maintain this^ry in war and then lost an election just asstrength in the hope it will never be used,^the fruits of victory were about to be en-for the ultimate determinant in the st niggle joyed. But he left office honorably, and, as13-i(0) that's now going On in the world will not be^it turned out. temporarily, knowing that the's bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and^liberty of his people WaS more importantideas, a trial of spiritual resolve. the values^than the fate of any single leader. historyW e 1101d , the beliefs we cherish, the ideals^recalls his greatness in WayS no dictator willto which we are dedicate^ ever know. And he left us a message ofso The British people know that, given hope for the future, as timely now as whenstrong leadership, bine and a little bit of^he first uttered it, as opposition leader inhope, the forces of good ultimately rally^the Commons nearly 27 years ago, w.lien heand triumph over evil. Ilea, among you is said, -When we look back on all the perilsthe cradle of self-government. the Mother through which we have passed and at theof Parliaments. Here is the enduring great-^mighty foes that We 1 1 a Ve laid low and all'less of the British contribution to mankind,^the (lark and deadly designs that We havethe great civilized ideas: individual liberty,^frustrated, why should We fear for ourfuture? We have." he said, "come safelyrepresentative government, and the rule idlaw under God.^ through the worst.-r.;1^I've olten wondered about the shyness 459- Well, the task I've set forth will long 001-50111e of in in the West about standing for^live our own generation. But together, we87June 8 / Administration of 1?onald Remmn, 198288too have come through the worst. I.et usnow begin a major effort to secure thebest—a crusade for freedom tliat willengage the faith and hirtitude of the nextgeneration. For the sake of peace and jus-tice, let us move toward a world in whichall people are at last free to determine theirown destiny.Thank you.Note: The President spoke at 12:1-1 p.m. inthe Royal Gallery at the Palace of West-minsterOn the previous evening, ihe PresidentUM greeted/ by ()nee,' Elizabeth II in anarrival ceremony at Windwr Castle, nearWindsor, England. Later, the Orwell hosteda private dinner for the President.On the morning 01. Pine S, the Presidentand the Queen spent part of the morninghorseback riding on the Windsor Castlegrown's.London, England•Masts at a Luncheon Honoring thePresident. June 8, 1982l'he Prime Minister. We are her todayto welcome and to honor our grez ally, theUnited States of America. NIr. President,Mrs. Reagan, it's a privilege al a pleasureto have you both here wit us. It's rareenough to have an :kinetic: President as aguest at Number 10, but 11 researchers havebeen unable to find on when we last hadthe honor of the First ,ady at Number 10 aswell.President and i's. Reagan, your pres-ence gives me id, indeed, many of ourguests a chance 0 repay as best we can thehospitality yo bestowed on us xyhtin wewere your rst official guests from abroadat the be fining of yonr Presidential termof office I realize, of course, that you'veboth b ()me accustomed recently to takingyour meals in rather grander places—[lin diterj—the Palace of Versailles andidsor Castle. As you can see, this is aery simple house, one which has witnessedthe shaping of our shared history since itfirst became the abode of Prime Ministerin 1732.NI r. President, some of us were pres; tthis morning to hear your magnitii.ntspeech to members of both Houses of ar-!lament in the historic setting of the oyalGallery. It was, if I may say so, respe fully,a triumph. We are so grateful to u forputting freedom on the offensive, x Inch iswhere it should be. You wrote a n v chap-ter in our history—no longer on t e defen-sive but on the offensive. It was, f I mightsay so, an exceedingly hard ac to follow.[Laughter] But I will try to be I) id'.Much has been said and wri en over the'ea is, NIr. President, about th relations be-tween our two countries. id there's noneed for me to add to the generalities onthe subject today, because e've had beforeour eyes in recent weeks t e most c,)nereteexpression of what, in pr. ctice, Out friend-ship means. I refer to yot awareness of ourreadiness to resist aggr ssion in the Falk-lands even at great s crifice and to ourawareness of .■'our rea mess to give supportto us even at consul table costs to Ameri-can interests.It is this prepare ness on both sides forsacrifices in the common interest and,indeed, in the wid r interest that character-izes our partner And I should like topay tribute to in, NI'. President, and to.i'on, Mr. Secret. ry Haig, whom I also greethere heartily t day, and through you to theAmerican pe for your predictably gen-erous responBelieve m , Mr. President, we don't takeit for gran ed. We are grateful from thedepth Of ur national being for your tre-mendous florts in our support.\Ir. P esident, your mission to Londonand to m her capitals of Europe is a remark-able of and we are fully conscious both ofits SVII tolism and of its substance.Fr( n the day you took office, you weredete nnned to breathe new life into theAlli• nee. One of your predecessors, alsoMI Ii loved in this, our country, Presidentenhower, put it so well when he said,The truth must rule all we think and allti do. The unity of all who dwell in free-dom is their only sure defense.-You recognized how central your allieswere to American interests, and vice versa.P-1 (c) Coder: ^EOGRP. ^Doc. No.:^ Page No.:-4/04  Para No.:  iO ^Coding Sheet No.: IIssue: ^Co --C•E‘v\kpo‘z. - ^ 9-D.NolEnfr Adversary: ^ 0 J lt7N)Specific Circumstances:^-1-12q.wq-n-kA. Nature of contemporary int. system: D. Structure of international system:1.2.3.4.5.Do[[[[Conflictual 1.^[]^Mixed^ 2.^[] Harmonious 3.^[x]] No reference^ 4.^[] Other:]]]PolarizedPluralisticNo referenceOther:B. Sources of conflict: E. Stability of the system:1. [ ] Human nature^ 1.^[^] All issues are linked2a. [x] National attributes: Ideology^2.^[ ] High spillover2b. [ ] National attributes: Political^3.^[ ] Issues separable2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic^4.^[(] No reference2d. [ ] National attributes: Other^5.^[ ] Other3a. [ ] International System: Ideology3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3c. [ ] International System: Economic 1. [ ] Theory/ideology3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 2. [^] Trends3e. [ ] International System: Other 3. [^] Experience4. [ ] No Reference 4. [^] History5. [ ] Other 5. [^] Specific Events:6. [^]^FaithC. Conditions of peace: 7. [x] No reference1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities4. [ ] Balance of power5. [ ] Transform international system6. [X] No reference7. [ ] Other:P-1 (c) Coder: ^Gowkg ^Doc. No.:  -4 ^Page No.:-7(05  Para No.: vf^Coding Sheet No.: 2Issue: ^OEMDCAZAO■K) -n\c uTug.e' ^Adversary:  To-TAt-v-vAizAAA 5-CcsveSSpecific Circumstances: T)AfEccrv,^a.>c\fs-ciewCe.A. Nature of contemporary int. system: D. Structure of international system:1.2.3.4.5.[[[[x][] Conflictual^ 1.^[]^Mixed^ 2.^[] Harmonious 3.^[y]No reference 4.^[] Other:]]]PolarizedPluralisticNo referenceOther:B. Sources of conflict:^ E. Stability of the system:1. [ ] Human nature 1.^[ ] All issues are linked2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology^2.^[ ] High spillover2b. [ ] National attributes: Political^3.^[ ] Issues separable2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic^4.^[A] No reference2d. [ ] National attributes: Other^5.^[^] Other3a. [ ] International System: Ideology3b. [ International System: Nationalism G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3c. [ ] International System: Economic 1. [ ] Theory/ideology3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 2. [^] Trends3e. [ ] International System: Other 3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] No Reference 4. [^] History5. (X) Other^MLArag.-/ - Ec.AANx,Lcy"..,Y 5. [^] Specific Events:6. [^]^FaithC. Conditions of peace: 7. [X] No reference1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities4. [ ] Balance of power5. [ ) Transform international system6. [X] No reference7. [ ) Other:P-1 (c) Coder: GOCIIV.^Doc.^No.:^-7^Page No.:-4(05 Para No.:^IS^Coding Sheet No.:Issue:A.1.2.3.4.Specific 1-‘-‘9.;.4gs To VoTogzAdversary:Circumstances:^f.10(.,LC- P\AQuJima.Nature of contemporary int. system:^D. 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[ ] Eliminate inequalities4. [ ] Balance of power5. ( ] Transform international system6. [ ] No reference7. [ ] Other:3B. Sources of conflict: 1. [ ) Human nature2a. [ ] National attributes:2b. [V] National attributes:2c. [ ] National attributes:2d. [ ] National attributes:3a. [ ] International System:E.1.Ideology 2.Political 3.Economic 4.Other 5.IdeologyP-1 (c) Coder:^Doc. No.:  -f ^Page No.:  71-0S  Para No.:  C, ^Coding Sheet No.:  4Issue: ^Fo-rog.e^kNYV. cmOif.00tnehrl Adversary: ^Specific Circumstances:  -voge- A-rs To VEM0CRAc'lA. Nature of contemporary int. system: D. Structure of international system: 1. [^] Conflictual 1.2. [^] Mixed 2.3. [^] Harmonious 3.4. [X] No reference 4.5. [^] Other:[ ] Polarized[ ] Pluralistic[X] No reference[ ] Other:Stability of the system: [ ] All issues are linked[ ] High spillover[ ] Issues separablery) No referenceL ] Other^3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism^G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3c. [ ) International System: Economic^1. [ ] Theory/ideology3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 2. [ ] Trends3e. [ ] International System: Other 3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] No Reference^ 4. ( ] History5. [ ] Other ^5. [ ] Specific Events:C. Conditions of peace: 1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities4. [ ] Balance of power5. [ ] Transform international system6. [x] No reference7. [ 3 Other:6. [ ] Faith7. [y] No reference P-1 (c) Coder:  G0C-Nt1z. ^Doc. No.:  71. ^Page No.:-46S  Para No.:  Fi ^Coding Sheet No.:  SIssue:  TOTALI-TIZIAN1/46a ^Adversary: ^--vo--Tpax7p,gv;,,\.syyl Specific Circumstances: ^OF OW_IfWICOR.SVPA. Nature of contemporary int. system: D. Structure of international system: 1. [ ] Conflictual 1. [ ] Polarized2. [ ] Mixed^ 2. [ ) Pluralistic3. [ ] Harmonious 3. Do No reference4. 04] No reference^ 4. [ ] Other:^5. [ ] Other:B. Sources of conflict:^E. Stability of the system: 1. [ ] Human nature 1. [ ) All issues are linked2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology^2. [ ] High spillover2b.Do National attributes: Political 3. [ ] Issues separable2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic 4. DO No reference2d. [ ] National attributes: Other^5. [ ] Other^3a. [ ] International System: Ideology3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism^G. Source of knowledge/evidence: 3c. [ ] International System: Economic^1. [ ] Theory/ideology3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 2. [ ] Trends3e. [ ] International System: Other 3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] No Reference^ 4. [ ] History5. [ ] Other ^5. [ ] Specific Events:^C. Conditions of peace: 1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities4. [ ] Balance of power5. [ ] Transform international system6.Do No reference7. [ ] Other:6. [ ] Faith7. DC] No reference P-1 (b) Coder: ^LOC:7AF- ^Doc. No.:  -4  Page No.:  ,5 Para No.:  i8  Coding Sheet No.:  6Issue: ^1-0-TAL-trAR-tAN160N ^Adversary:  cryivwymots-rSpecific Circumstances: ^mocueAP-ONDNO9oLy A. Opponent's goals:1. [^] Destructionist2. [y] Expansionist3. [ ] Defensive4. [ ] Conciliatory5. ( ] Peace6. [ ] No Reference7. [ ] Other:B. Source of opponent's policy:1. [^) Ideology2. [ ] Historical3. [ ] Internal needs4. [ ] Leader5. [ ] Power politics6. [ ] External7. [X] No referenceC. Generality of adversary's position: 1. [ ] General/permanent2. [ ] Specific/limited3. [X] No reference4. [ ] Other:D. Likely response of adversary toone's own conciliatory actions: 1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation3. [ ] Ignore4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation6. [X] No referenceE. Likely response of adversary to one'sown policies of firmness:1. [ ] Back down2. [ ] Ignore3. ( ] Reciprocate - this situation4. ( ] Reciprocate - other situations5. [ ] Respond impulsively6. no No Reference7. [^] Other:F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:1. [ ] Destructionist2. [ ] Expansionist3. [ ] Defensive4. [ ] Conciliatory5. [ ] Peace6. [X1 No Reference7. [^] Other:G. Opponent's view of conflict:1. [X) Inevitable2. [^] Avoidable3. [^] No reference4. [^] Other:la.IX] Desirable2a.[ ] Undesirable3a.[ ] No reference4a.[ ] Other:^P-1 (b), page 2 Coder:^Doc. No.:^Page No.: Para No.:^Coding Sheet N^(p32)Issue: Adversary:Specific Circumstances:H. Opponent's decision-making process: J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives1.^[ ] Model I - unitary rational actor 1. [ ] Prepare ground2.^[ ] Model II - organizational process 2. [ ] Try and see3.^[ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics 3. [ ] Incremental4.^[^] No reference 4. [^] Blitzkrieg5.^[^]^Other: 5. oq No referencela.(^] Calculating 6. (^) Other:2a.[^]^Impulsive3a.[Y] No reference K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:4a.[^]^Other: 1. [X] Maximize gains2. [^] Minimize lossesI. Opponent's op code: Choice of 3. [ ] No referenceObjectives: 4. [^] Other:1. [y] Optimize2. [^] Satisf ice L. Evidence required for opponent to show3. [^] No reference gpo,I faith:4. [^] Other:la.[^] Realistic M. Terms used to describe opponent and2a.[^] Unrealistic actions: INIUNDE0,5-PC.E-E.0,otset,cr,^o)icAL3a.(yj No reference t,..)A■CV ARE4a.[^] Other: N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:lb.[^] Flexible 1. [^] Theory/ideology2b.[^] Inflexible 2. [^] Trends3b.[1] No reference 3. [^] Experience4b.(^] Other: 4. [^] Historylc.[^] Predictable 5. [N] Specific events^WWI6V0`)/ 90LAA3P2c.[^] Unpredictable 6. [^] Faith^ AS ‘A3c.[X] No reference 7. [^3 No reference4c.[^] Other: 8. [^] Other:P-1 (a) Coder: ^cxpg ^Doc. No.:  7 ^Page No.:-46S Para No.:  19 ^Coding Sheet No.: 7Issue: ^‘Ay;ftcf.11^-rovv.AvAgAto PiClkON) Adversary: ^55,)e--1- or,)\oi\)Specific Circumstances:A. Nature of political life: 1. [X] Conflictual2. [ ] Mixed3. [ ] Harmonious4. [ ] No reference5. [ ] Other:^D. Nature of conflict: 1. [ ] Zero-sum2. [ ] Non-zero-sum3. [ ] Mixed4. (>1 No reference5. [ ] Other:B. Sources of conflict:^ E. Scope of conflict: 1. [ ] Human nature 1. [ ] All issues are linked2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology^2. [ ] High spillover2b. [x] National attributes: Political 3. [ ] Issues separable2c. [ ) National attributes: Economic^4. [X] No reference2d. [ ] National attributes: Other^5. [ ] Other^3a. [ ] International System: Ideology3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism^F. Role of conflict in hist. devel. 3c. [ ] International System: Economic3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 1. [ ] Necessary3e. [ ] International System: Other^2. [ ] Functional4. [ ] No Reference^ 3. [ ] Mixed• [ ] Other 4. [ ] Dysfunctional5. [X] No referenceC. Conditions of peace: 6. [ ] Other^1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)^G. Source of knowledge/evidence: 3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities^1. [ ] Theory/ideology4. [ ] Balance of power^ 2. [ ] Trends5. [ ] Transform international system^3. [ ] Experience6. DO No reference 4. [ ] History7. [ ] Other:^ 5. [ ] Specific Events:^6. [ ] Faith7. [X] No referenceG. Opponent's view of conflict:1. [X] Inevitable2. [ ] Avoidable3. [ ] No reference4. [ ] Other:la.[K] Desirable2a.[ ] Undesirable3a.[ ] No reference4a.[ ] Other:^A.Coder:Issue:SpecificP-I (b)No.: 19^Coding Sheet No.:^8E0c-,-As^Doc.^No.:^Page No.: -4(„S ParaAdversary:^TOTAU-CAPAHN) FoRce-,Circumstances: NC-PA/J61" To-TALVTAlz \otsiv^cp-R-c_esOpponent's goals: E. Likely response of adversary to one's1. [ ] Destructionist own policies of firmness:2. [Y] Expansionist 1. [ ] Back down3. [ ] Defensive 2. [^] Ignore4. ( ] Conciliatory 3. (^] Reciprocate - this situation5. [ ] Peace 4. [^] Reciprocate - other situations6. [ ] No Reference 5. [^] Respond impulsively7. [ ] Other: 6. [X] No Reference7. [^] Other:B.1.Source of opponent's policy:F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:[^] Ideology2. [ ] Historical 1. [ ] Destructionist3. [ ] Internal needs 2. [ ] Expansionist4. [ ] Leader 3. [ ] Defensive5. [ ] Power politics 4. [ ] Conciliatory6. [ ) External 5. [ ] Peace7. [X] No reference 6. [X] No Reference7. [^) Other:C. Generality of adversary's position: 1. [X] General/permanent2. [ ] Specific/limited3. [ ] No reference4. ( ] Other:D. Likely response of adversary toone's own conciliatory actions: 1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation3. [ ] Ignore4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation6. [X] No referenceCoder:Issue:Specific Circumstances:Page No.: ^Adversary:Para No.:^ Coding Sheet No.: z)Doc. No.:P-1 (b), page 2 H. Opponent's decision-making process: J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives1.^[ ] Model I - unitary rational actor 1. [ ] Prepare ground2.^[ ] Model II - organizational process 2. [ ] Try and see3.^[ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics 3. [^] Incremental4.^[^] No reference 4. [^] Blitzkrieg5.^[^]^Other: 5. [)(] No referencela.[^] Calculating 6. [^] Other:2a.[^]^Impulsive3a.CX1 No reference K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:4a.[^]^Other: 1. [^] Maximize gains2. [^] Minimize lossesI. Opponent's op code: Choice of 3. (),] No referenceObjectives: 4. [^]^Other:1. [ ] Optimize2. [ ] Satisfice3. [y] No reference4. [ ] Other:la.[ ] Realistic2a.[ ] Unrealistic3a.[X] No reference4a.[ ] Other:^lb.[ ] Flexible2b.[ ] Inflexible3b.[X] No reference4b.[ ] Other:^lc.[ ] Predictable2c.[ ] Unpredictable3c.[>(] No reference4c.[ ] Other:L. Evidence required for opponent to showgood faith: M. Terms used to describe opponent andactions: ut?:,\IeRs‘bra,c0.*FL■a,6pozorlsoo.f, Assiwtzr W.) -r■- e 1-luMRNN. Sources of knowledge/evidence: 1. [ ] Theory/ideology2. [ ] Trends3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] History5. [ ] Specific events:^6. [ ] Faith7. [x] No reference8. [ ] Other:^coP-1 (b) Coder:  ED(cAR ^Doc. No. : 3 ^Page No.:  -766 Para No. :22-23 coding Sheet No.:  9Issue: ^1?e6e-gNo3c, 'RceocxY\ - FurueE. Adversary: ^'co‘E.-r uK) la n3Speci f ic Circumstances : ^c_.Q,\S‘S ANJO oio■on) A. Opponent's goals: E.1. [^] Destructionist2. [ ] Expansionist 1.3. [ ] Defensive 2.4. [ ] Conciliatory 3.5. [ ] Peace 4.6. [X1 No Reference 5.7. [^] Other: 6.7.B. Source of opponent's policy:1. [ ] Ideology F.2. [ ] Historical 1.3. [ ] Internal needs 2.4. [ ] Leader 3.5. [y] Power politics 4.6. [ ] External 5.7. [ ] No reference 6.7.C. Generality of adversary's position:1. [^] General/permanent G.2. [^] Specific/limited 1.3. ne] No reference 2.4. [^] Other: 3.4.Likely response of adversary to one'sown policies of firmness: [ ] Back down[ ] Ignore[ ] Reciprocate - this situation[ ] Reciprocate - other situations[ ] Respond impulsively[y] No Reference[ ] Other:Opponent's image of one's own nation:[ ] Destructionist[ ] Expansionist[ ] Defensive[ ] Conciliatory[ ] Peace[)(] No Reference[ ] Other:Opponent's view of conflict:[ ] Inevitable[ ] AvoidableDO No reference[ ] Other:D. Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions: 1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation3. [ I Ignore4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation6. [X] No referencela.[ ] Desirable2a.[ ] Undesirable3a.[4 No reference4a.[ ] Other:^Coder:Issue:Specific Circumstances:Doc. No.:P-1 (b), page 2 Para No.:^ Coding Sheet No.::/(e.)z)Page No.: ^Adversary:H. Opponent's decision-making process: 1. [X] Model I - unitary rational actor2. [ ] Model II - organizational process3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics4. [ ] No reference5. [ ] Other:^la. [x] Calculating2a.[ ] Impulsive3a.[ ] No reference4a.[ ] Other:I. Opponent's op code: Choice ofObjectives: 1. [ ] Optimize2. [ ] Satisfice3. [y] No reference4. [ ] Other:la.[ ] Realistic2a.[ ] Unrealistic3a. [X) No reference4a.[ ] Other:^lb.[ ] Flexible2b.[ ] Inflexible3b.[y] No reference4b.[ ] Other:^lc.[ ] Predictable2c.[ ] Unpredictable3c.[X] No reference4c.[ ] Other:J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives1. [ ] Prepare ground2. [ ] Try and see3. [ ] Incremental4. [ ] Blitzkrieg5.Do No reference6. [ ] Other:^K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk: 1. [ ] Maximize gains2. [ ] Minimize losses3. [N,e] No reference4. [ ] Other:^L. Evidence required for opponent to showgood faith: M. Terms used to describe opponent andactions: ArtN,‘AN1c, \M-,StRuNtEkliS^Ot-,5-revc-I o Rkirvs^T410€ Ov 1-)■S TORY / oenlyvvG,N. Sources of knowledge/evidence: FiCEE DWI1. [^Theory/ideology2. [ ] Trends3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] History5. [ ] Specific events:^6. [ ] Faith7. [X] No reference8. [ 3 Other:P-1 (a) Coder: ^E.-,OGAg. ^Doc. No.:  -7 ^Page No.:  7.66  Para No.:  2.(0  Coding Sheet No.:  10Issue:  Adversary:  TrITALIT A NglA16Y11 01C--vccoR6tme Specific Circumstances: ^719-€-E-Otm F-tC.t-1/4-Te-es -Tvkleco(-0-k t-416-r09-1 A. Nature of political life: D. Nature of conflict: 1.2.3.4.5.B.1.2a.2b.2c.2d.3a.3b.[X]^Conflictual 1.^[-X][^]^Mixed^ 2.^[[^] Harmonious 3.^[[^] No reference^ 4.^[[^]^Other: 5.^[Zero-sum] Mixed] Other:of] Non-zero-sum] No referenceSources of conflict: E. Scope conflict:[^] Human nature^ 1.^[^][^] National attributes:^Ideology^2.^[^]Ly) National attributes: Political^3.^[^][^] National attributes:^Economic^4.^[)(][^] National attributes: Other^5.^[^][ ] International System: Ideology[^] International System: Nationalism^F.AllHighIssuesOtherRoleNo referenceissues are linkedspilloverseparableof conflict in hist. devel.3c. [^] International System: Economic3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 1. [^] Necessary3e. [ ] International System: Other 2. [V] Functional4. [^] No Reference 3. [^] Mixed5. [^] Other 4. [ ] Dysfunctional5. [ ] No referenceC. Conditions of peace: 6. [ ] Other1. ( ] Education/communication2. [^] Eliminate offending nation(s) G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3. [^] Eliminate inequalities 1. [^Theory/ideology4. [ ] Balance of power 2. [ ] Trends5. [ ] Transform international system 3. [ ] Experience6. [ ] No reference 4. [ ] History7. [ X]^Other:^-To cmeguav.* 5. [ X] Specific Events:^NA0 00S 5 cool6. [ ] Faith^LAAR,- fist.0 ure.ts, QC-)7. [ ] No referencecP-1 (a) Coder:  6V17,1(Ag. ^Doc. No.:  -T ^Page No.:^ Para No.:  12,  Coding Sheet No.:  1%Issue:  03-Teczopc11olop,k_ .scroRN \on) ^Adversary:  -I-v(26e uotAociP6E.T_)e.fv\nc.A.ACISpecific Circumstances:  g\se^DeOlocaCNA. Nature of political life: D. Nature of conflict: 1.2.3.4.5.B.1.2a.2b.2c.2d.3a.3b.[^] Conflictual^ 1.^[[x] Mixed^ 2.^[[^] Harmonious 3.^[[^] No reference 4.^[■,0[^]^Other: 5.^[] Zero-sum] Mixed] Other:of] Non-zero-sumNo referenceSources of conflict:^ E. Scope conflict:1 i Human nature 1.^[^] All[ ] National attributes:^Ideology^2.^[ ] High[^National attributes: Political^3.^[ ] Issues[^] National attributes: Economic^4.^[y] No[ I National attributes: Other^5.^[ ] Other[ ] International System: Ideology[ ] International System: Nationalism^F. Rolereferenceissues are linkedspilloverseparableof conflict in hist. devel.3c. [ ] International System: Economic3d. [I International System: Power politics 1. [ Necessary3e. [I International System: Other 2. [ ] Functional4. No Reference 3. ] Mixed5. [I Other 4. [ ] Dysfunctional5. [ XI No referenceC. Conditions of peace: 6. [^] Other1. [ ] Education/communication2. [^] Eliminate offending nation(s) G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3. [^] Eliminate inequalities 1. [ ] Theory/ideology4. [^] Balance of power 2. [ ] Trends5. [ ] Transform international system 3. [ ] Experience6. [^No reference 4. [ ] History7. D4] Other: &TcEW4-1-1-1 OF DEMOCRA- 5. [ ] Specific Events:YvIDOsnaEATE AR-o-don -Tv■-E tAX.X=4-.0 6. [ ] Faith7. [X] No referenceP-1 (a) Coder:  GOC.:AR ^Doc. No.:^ Page No.:  7NA3 Para No.:  7-38  Coding Sheet No.:  (2Issue: ^u,3-reemm-koppy_ tQu.,-QD,QiyNeo- ^Adversary: ^a..1■.-C - 00\0).1 pro vANL_Crictyg..0../.) v•S Specific Circumstances:  Fk‘iyaki0G,, OccPc- oostkkP A. Nature of political life: 1. [ ] Conflictual2. [ ] Mixed3. [ ] Harmonious4. [X] No reference5. [ ] Other:^B.1.2a.2b.2c.2d.3a.3b.3c.3d.3e.4.5.C. Conditions of peace: 1. [ ] Education/communication2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities4. [ ] Balance of power5. [ ] Transform international system6. [ ] No reference7. [X] Other:  g.E5\-TANK-EC)5C-VCVE.ek)S OF "CZ& P.5.5tVE. -CAID. Nature of conflict: 1. [ ] Zero-sum2. [ ] Non-zero-sum3. [ ] Mixed4. [..)(1 No reference5. [ ] Other:^E. Scope of conflict: 1. [ ] All issues are linked2. [ ] High spillover3. [ ] Issues separable4. [xj No reference5. [ ] Other^F. Role of conflict in hist. devel. 1.2.3.4.5.6.G. Source of knowledge/evidence: 1. [ ] Theory/ideology2. [ ] Trends3. [ ) Experience4. [ ] History5. [ ] Specific Events:6. [ ] Faith7• [X] No referenceSources of conflict: Human natureNational attributes: IdeologyNational attributes: PoliticalNational attributes: EconomicNational attributes: OtherInternationalInternationalInternationalInternationalInternationalNo ReferenceOtherSystem: IdeologySystem: NationalismSystem: EconomicSystem: Power politicsSystem: OtherNecessaryFunctionalMixedDysfunctionalNo referenceOtherP-1 (b) Coder: ^es*.,..pe. ^Doc. No.:-7. ^Page No.:-74.8  Para No.:  142  Coding Sheet No.:  1-:3Issue: ^fcx c*.71)EPXYWMC STA:re3 Adversary: -.:7. emF-T-Ly‘or.) Specific Circumstances: ^(5.)\E-c Nc-c-kcyoqo mipetkAD A. Opponent's goals:1. [^] Destructionist2. [0 Expansionist3. [^] Defensive4. [^] Conciliatory5. [^] Peace6. [^] No Reference7. [^] Other:B. Source of opponent's policy:1. [^]^Ideology2. [ ] Historical3. [ ] Internal needs4. [ ] Leader5. [ ] Power politics6. [ ] External7. pq No referenceC. Generality of adversary's position:1. [^] General/permanent2. [^] Specific/limited3. [x] No reference4. [^] Other:D. Likely response of adversary toone's own conciliatory actions: 1. ] Reciprocate - other situations2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation3. [ ] Ignore4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation6. [X] No referenceE. Likely response of adversary to one'sown policies of firmness:1. [^] Back down2. [ ] Ignore3. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation4. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations5. [ ] Respond impulsively6. [ie] No Referdnce7. [^] Other:^F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:1. [^] Destructionist2. [ ) Expansionist3. [ ] Defensive4. [ ] Conciliatory5. [ ] Peace6. (>1 No Reference7. [^] Other:G. Opponent's view of conflict: 1. [ ] Inevitable2. [ ] Avoidable3. [X] No reference4. [ ] Other:^la.[ ] Desirable2a.[ ] Undesirable3a.[X] No reference4a.[ ] Other:^H. Opponent's decision-making process: 1. 00 Model I - unitary rational actor2. ( ] Model II - organizational process3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics4. [ ] No reference5. [ ] Other:^la.[)in Calculating2a.[ ] Impulsive3a.[ ] No reference4a.[ ] Other:I. Opponent's op code: Choice ofObjectives: 1. [ ] Optimize2. [ ] Satisfice3.[y) No reference4. [ ] Other:la.[ ] Realistic2a.[ ] Unrealistic3a.M No reference4a.[ ] Other:^lb.[ ] Flexible2b.( ) Inflexible3b.rX] No reference4b.[ ] Other:^lc.[ ] Predictable2c.[ ] Unpredictable3c. [X] No reference4c.[ ] Other:Coder:Issue:Specific Circumstances:Doc. No.:P-1 (b), page 2 ^ Page No.:^ Para No.:^ Coding Sheet No.:  VS (1>9.Z.) Adversary:J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives1. ( ] Prepare ground2. [ ] Try and see3. [)] Incremental4. (fl Blitzkrieg5. [ ] No reference6. ( ] Other:K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk: 1. [ ] Maximize gains2. [ ] Minimize losses3. [X] No reference4. [ ] Other:L. Evidence required for opponent  to  showgood faith: M. Terms used to describe opponent andactions: PfavyreD use-,^toi_E^Ptmo%)a-A.heP-6 0.x.)N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:1. [ ] Theory/ideology2. [ ] Trends3. [ ] Experience4. [ ] History5. [ ] Specific events:6. [ ] Faith7. N] No reference8. [^] Other:P-1 (a) Coder: ^EOCAIZ ^Doc. No.:  -4. ^Page No.: ^fl Para No.:  1-}9  Coding Sheet No.:  (4. Issue: ^GNLOGN.-- 'Peke ^Adversary: f-ADJkcii7c 01,ApN1Specific Circumstances:A. Nature of political life: D. Nature of conflict: 1.2.3.4.5.B.1.2a.2b.2c.2d.3a.3b.[^]^Conflictual^ 1.^[)'(][y] Mixed^ 2.^[[^] Harmonious 3.^[[^] No reference 4.^[[^]^Other: 5.^[Zero-sum] Mixed] Other:of] Non-zero-sum] No referenceSources of conflict:^ E. Scope conflict:[^] Human nature 1.^[\00[g] National attributes: Ideology^2.^[^][^] National attributes:^Political^3.^(^][^] National attributes: Economic^4.^[^][^] National attributes: Other^5.^[^][^] International System: Ideology[^] International System: Nationalism^F.AllHighIssuesOtherRoleNo referenceissues are linkedspilloverseparableof conflict in hist. devel.3c. [ ] International System: Economic3d. [ ] International System: Power politics 1. [^] Necessary3e. [^] International System: Other 2. [^] Functional4. [^] No Reference 3. [^] Mixed5. [^] Other 4. [^] Dysfunctional5. [g] No referenceC. Conditions of peace: 6. [^] Other1. [ ] Education/communication2. [^] Eliminate offending nation(s) G. Source of knowledge/evidence:3. [^]^Eliminate inequalities 1. [^] Theory/ideology4. [^] Balance of power 2. [^] Trends5. [ ] Transform international system 3. [^] Experience6. [^] No reference 4. [^] History7. [ x]^Other:^yAki.x-KJN72.^ge 5. [^] Specific Events:6. [^] Faith7.^[A No reference

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