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Date **14 OCTOBER, 1993**
ABSTRACT

In 1981, the Reagan administration came to the White House emphasizing the moral and political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. The conflict between the two countries was likened to one between right and wrong, good and evil. Yet, by the end of his second term in office, Reagan was hailing a new era in Soviet-American relations. The possibility of a lasting peace between once implacable foes was pronounced.

The questions which form the framework for this thesis arise from this dramatic shift in the Reagan administration rhetoric regarding the Soviet Union. The thesis focuses on the political beliefs of Reagan. The purpose is to gain some insight into the role a political actor’s beliefs about politics - the operational code - in international relations. Specifically, this paper uses qualitative content analysis to examine Ronald Reagan’s operational code during both terms in office and look for evidence of modified or discarded beliefs which may reflect the changing international situation and the altered character of the Soviet Union.

General conclusions drawn from the study indicate that Reagan’s operational code did not undergo any major modifications in response to the new situation in the Soviet Union. However, liberal, optimistic elements of his operational code became more dominant in the second term. It appears that some political leaders resist change in their belief systems - even in the face of strong, contradictory evidence.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and began an irreversible program of change. Since that time, the very nature of the Soviet Union, as well as the structure of the international environment, have been transformed. The essentially bipolar, East versus West orientation of international affairs was irrevocably altered by the emergence of this new leader. His profound changes led to the exposure of internal Soviet weaknesses to the world; a new direction in Soviet international politics and domestic policies and, ultimately; to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The changes Gorbachev initiated were embodied in an overarching framework called "new thinking". This "new thinking" included: a radical reappraisal of the Soviet role in the international system; a reconsideration of appropriate foreign policy and action; and a new emphasis on global interdependence, underlined by the existence of nuclear weapons. For Gorbachev, this involved a shift in the concept of "peaceful coexistence"1, away from an instrument of class struggle to a "condition for the survival of the entire human race." (Gorbachev, in Lynch, 1989, p.35). Another important shift was from the primacy of national security to one of "mutual security". Gorbachev understood that measures to increase the security of one state often led to the increased insecurity of its opponent. This cycle of security-insecurity merely exacerbated the arms race and heightened mistrust between the two superpowers.

---

1 Lenin first coined the phrase "peaceful coexistence" to mean a breathing space, or temporary period of improved relations with the Western Imperialists, in which the Soviets could gather their forces for the final confrontation.
Gorbachev's "new thinking" laid the foundation for a transformation of Soviet international action and importantly, was also linked to new domestic policies of renewal and increasing openness. It was, in many ways, revolutionary.

Within the United States government however, the phenomenon of Gorbachev was initially met (not without reason) with scepticism, and many influential U.S. specialists continued to believe that the USSR was incapable of meaningful social, economic, or political change (Lewin, 1988, p.2). The prevailing American image of the Soviet Union was one of "totalitarianism" which denoted a one-party regime, a powerful leadership, state terrorism, and political and ideological indoctrination of the population. The label "totalitarian" emerged during the 1940's to describe Germany under Hitler and, later, Russia under Stalin. The label evolved into a powerful ideological tool as well as an explanatory concept for understanding the Soviet system (Lewin, 1988, p.3).

This conceptual image of the Soviet Union focused on the state and political system while excluding other aspects of the Soviet experience. It emphasized the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as the driving force behind Soviet policy which had the ultimate goals of world revolution and the transplanting of communist ideology through whatever means. The tenets of Marxism-Leninism were distorted by some American analysts who mistook ideological rhetoric as fixed reality, and who viewed Soviet ideology, as well as their political system, as static and unchanging. Within such a rigid ideological framework, the possibilities for significant change within the Soviet polity seemed negligible.

This was the dominant conceptual framework for thinking about the Soviet Union which pervaded the Reagan administration when Gorbachev came to power. In
American Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary, Erik Beukal commented that "During its first years the Reagan administration expressed the most distinct Soviet essentialist image presented by an American government since the early Kennedy administration..." (1989, p.105). The moral and political contrast between the United States and the Soviet Union was emphasized, with the conflict between the two countries likened to one between right and wrong, good and evil. In his first press conference in January 1981, President Ronald Reagan declared the only morality they (the Soviets) recognized was that which would further their goal of world revolution and they believed they had the moral right to lie, cheat, or commit any crime in order to achieve that end (WCPD, 1981, p.66-67).

Yet, by the end of his second term in office, Reagan was pronouncing the possibilities of an enduring peace with a new Soviet Union and a "new era in history" (Reagan, in Shimko 1992, p.353). Certainly, the changes in U.S.-Soviet relations during Reagan's two terms as President appeared to be nothing short of dramatic. But what of the changes in Reagan's own image of the Soviet Union and his beliefs about the international political environment? Did Reagan undergo any fundamental alteration of his political belief system as a result of the new situation in the Soviet Union? To what extent and in what ways did Reagan's initial beliefs guide, or even dominate, the interpretation of new evidence of a changing Soviet Union?

These questions then, form the focus of this thesis. The purpose in answering them is to attempt to gain some insight into the role of a political actor's beliefs about politics - termed the operational code - in international relations. More specifically, this paper will look at Ronald Reagan's operational code during both terms in office and look
for evidence of modified or discarded beliefs which may reflect the changing international situation and the altered character of the Soviet Union.

This thesis is organized as follows: in the first section of the paper there will be a short discussion on the variety of cognitive theories which have been applied to the study of foreign policy decision-making and international relations. This section will also contain a discussion of the operational code construct including its development as a theoretical tool for understanding political decision-making, some examples of studies which employed the operational code, and some general criticisms of the construct.

The second section will involve the analysis of Ronald Reagan's operational code during both of his terms in office, 1981-1984 and 1985-1989, using qualitative content analysis of sixteen presidential documents from both terms. The steps followed for the analysis are loosely based on Ole Holsti's 1977 "Coding Handbook" which will also be discussed in some detail. The analysis of Reagan's operational code will be primarily descriptive and will concentrate specifically on Reagan's beliefs about the nature of the international political environment and his beliefs about, and image of, the Soviet Union. Particular attention will be paid to any changes within his operational code over the course of his two terms in office.

The concluding sections will include: an analysis of the study's findings regarding change in Reagan's operational code; some general implications about the utility of the operational code construct for understanding how leaders cope with change in the international environment; and how new information is absorbed into a pre-existing belief systems.
CHAPTER ONE

THE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

I. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY - SOME COGNITIVE THEORIES:

Approaches to international relations have been dominated by the "realist" school of international relations (see for example, Morgantheau, Politics Among Nations, 1960) which has focused on the nation-state and state system as the relevant unit and level of analysis, respectively. Incorporated into the realist position is the assumption that in an international environment characterized by structural anarchy, policy-makers are guided by "national interest" in calculating political action (Holsti, 1989, P.13). National decision-makers are treated as "unitary rational actors" whose actions, even when the outcome is war, are the result of calculated political choice. "Whatever may be the underlying causes of international conflict... wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace" (Howard in Holsti, 1989, p.16).

Foreign policy decision-making analysis also has been dominated by realist approaches, including the "rational actor model" and "rational deterrence theory" which conceptualize the decision-maker as a rational actor (see for example, Huth & Russet, 1984; Tsebelis, 1990). Rational actors make choices based the maximization of expected utility. Governments, as unitary rational actors, select the action which will maximize strategic goals and objectives as determined by the national interest (Allison, 1969, p.694). Within the framework of the rational actor model, the cognitive mechanisms of
decision-making are "black-boxed" as the rational procedure of information gathering and processing which results in a response — foreign policy behaviour.

However, many other foreign policy research frameworks have pointed to the limitations of the "black-box" model of decision-making, citing a variety of constraints on rational decision-making. Rational choice theorists have little to say about the preferences which shape leaders’ calculations in decision-making nor how or why preferences may change. Herbert Simon has argued:

To understand political choices, we need to understand where the frame of reference for the actors’ thinking comes from - how it is evoked. An important component of the frame of reference is the set of alternatives that are given consideration in the choice process. We need to understand not only how people reason about alternatives, but where alternatives come from in the first place (in Lebow and Stein, 1989, p.214).

As well, there is strong evidence that decision-makers often deviate from the process of rational calculation. In fact, foreign policy decision-makers appear to systematically deviate from rational norms and distort information in their estimates of those factors specified by the theorists as critical to their calculations (Lebow and Stein, 1989, p.215).

Borrowing models and theories from psychology, many political scientists have attempted to develop constructs which go beyond the rational actor model which seek to more fully explain the decision-making process. Researchers have been investigating the dynamics of group decision-making (de Rivera, 1968; Janis, 1982), the organizational norms, routines and standard operating procedures which may distort or constrain decision-making (Allison, 1971), and the effects of bureaucratic politics on how issues are defined or options considered (Simon, 1947; Halpern, 1974) in order to better understand decision-making behaviour (Holsti, 1977, p.1, Mandel, 1986, pp.258-60).
Political researchers have utilized psychological approaches at several levels of analysis from individual actors to small-groups, bureaucracies, government systems and nation-states. Cognitive approaches in political psychology tend to focus on the level of the individual, primarily on determining the cognitive constraints on rationality. A principal purpose of the cognitive approach has been to "get inside" the black box of the S-R model and go beyond the conceptualization of the political decision-maker as a unitary rational actor. By doing so, cognitive researchers are looking for a more comprehensive understanding of foreign policy behaviour.

The potential value of the cognitive approach to political behaviour lies in the recognition that decision-makers (even in an authoritarian state) do not share a homogeneous set of beliefs, nor do they perceive political events in identical ways. A decision-maker's orientation to, and interpretation of, the political environment are mediated by his beliefs about the world around him (Holsti, 1976, p.18). It is generally recognized that actors' behaviour is, in large measure, determined by the manner in which they perceive, diagnose, and evaluate the environment around them. Further, it is accepted that actors require coping strategies and information filters to deal with the complexity and sheer amount of information and experiences which is the reality of their environment.

Built upon these assumptions about the cognitive constraints on rationality,2

2 According to Tetlock and McGuire (1986, p.149-50) the 'hard core' assumptions about cognitive research include the following:
- The international environment imposes heavy information processing demands upon policy-makers.
- The best solutions are not easily identified.
- Information is often incomplete and/or unreliable.
Tetlock and McGuire (1986, p.148) define a positive heuristic of cognitive research: the central objective should be to understand the cognitive strategies, including pre-existing knowledge structures and decision-making tactics, that policy-makers rely upon to construct and maintain their simplified images of the environment.

Political scientists engaged in cognitive research, while agreeing in general on Tetlock and McGuire's "hard core assumptions" about the subject, have tended to utilize a variety of theoretical and methodological strategies as potential explanatory tools (see Table 1). Generally, the theoretical strategies can be divided into two substantial areas of research which are by no means mutually exclusive: cognitive process and cognitive content.

Cognitive process research involves investigating the mental strategies and cognitive functions individuals employ to cope with their environment and decision-making; the focus is on HOW an individual thinks or processes information. Examples of this research include: perception, misperception including Jervis', *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976); integrative cognitive

- Consequences of any given option are often uncertain.
- Policy-makers must often make choices under intense stress and time pressure.
- Policy-makers (like all human beings) have a limited capacity for information and must employ simplifying strategies to cope with complexity, uncertainty, and difficult trade-offs with which they are confronted.
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(Holsti, 1977, p.31)
complexity (Wallace and Suedfeld, 1988; Suedfeld et al., 1977); rigidity/flexibility and black and white thinking (Glad, 1983); and crisis decision-making (Hermann, 1969; Herek, Janis and Huth, 1987).

Cognitive content analysts emphasize mental content through the investigation of knowledge structures and organization; they are concerned with determining WHAT individuals think and how their cognitive structures screen and encode new information. These cognitive structures have been studied under a variety of names such as belief systems, scripts, schema, cognitive maps, and operational codes.

Both process and content studies are important to understanding why political actors behave the way they do and make the choices or decisions they make. Moreover, some synthesis of the two categories may be essential to developing a fuller explanation of political behaviour. There is also a need to more explicitly link cognitive theories to other areas of psychological research such as personality and motivational theories (Walker and Falkowski 1984; Walker 1990). While linking research paradigms will eventually be essential, there is still much work to be done within the individual constructs.

The focus of this paper is the political belief system of Ronald Reagan; what he believed about the Soviet Union and the international environment. This paper will deal with cognitive content and not cognitive structures. Specifically, the focus will be on the operational code construct and the analysis of Reagan’s beliefs.
II. THE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

**BELIEF SYSTEMS:** The underlying premise of the operational code approach is that all people construct internal belief systems which help to order and simplify the world around them. An actor's belief system encompasses all the hypotheses and theories which that actor sees as valid at a given moment. Beliefs, along with attitudes, values and stereotypes, are all guides to information processing. They serve as baselines in interpretations, expectations and predictions of other's behaviour, and provide a means for confirming or disconfirming the validity of information (Vertzberger, 1980, p.113). Beliefs tend to be more general in content than attitudes or stereotypes and usually include principles and broad ideas regarding the social and physical environment. Individual beliefs organized into a system or set have three important characteristics: they are functionally interdependent; there is an internal consistency, though there may not appear to be an external logic; and the beliefs are relatively stable and resistant to change.

Converse (1964, p.207) defined the belief system as a "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." Functional interdependence means that any change in status of one "idea-element" (or belief) would, psychologically, require some compensating changes elsewhere in the belief system. The changes in other beliefs are required because beliefs are "tied" to one another and also to maintain a level of internal consistency amongst belief sets.

Converse also identified the dimension of "centrality" within the belief system. Centrality refers to the role which an idea-element or belief plays within the belief
system as a whole. Holsti has extended this dimension of centrality and has separated "core" or "master" beliefs from peripheral beliefs. He has suggested that "master" beliefs may be more rigidly held and would be highly resistant (although not impervious) to change. The operational code, according to Holsti can be defined as a belief system as defined by Converse. It encompasses a set of "master" beliefs which play a central role in a decision-maker's cognitive processing of information regarding politics and political action (Holsti, 1977, p.40). Operational code beliefs are a subset of an actor's broader belief system which comprises general theories and principles concerning the political world.

Operational code beliefs and broader belief systems are personal constructs but they are not an isolated phenomenon. Rather, they may be affected by social and cultural norms and also by other psychological constructs and life experiences. Some analysts (Walker, 1983; Walker and Falkowski, 1984) suggest that belief systems may also be built upon more basic motivations for power, achievement, and affiliation which are acquired in childhood. These needs or motivations are embedded in the broader belief system of an actor and may be triggered with a belief set, thus reinforcing the rigidity with which a belief is held (Walker, 1983, p.189). There is a need for more research linking psychological constructs such as personality and cognitive paradigms. Such linkages may provide researchers and analysts with greater insights into the behaviour of political decision-makers.

THE OPERATIONAL CODE: In 1969 Alexander L. George wrote a formative paper titled "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political
Leaders and Decision-Making". In this paper, George used the concept of the operational code as a tool in the study of political leaders and their beliefs. George drew, in large part, from an earlier study of the Bolsheviks done by Nathan Leites. Leites employed the term "operational code" to refer to the maxims of political strategy and tactics which characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics (George, 1969, p.193).

In his interpretation of Leites' work, George defined the operational code as the set of political beliefs held within the context of a decision-maker's broader belief system which simplifies and structures their world. The operational code, as George interpreted it, is not intended to be a set of rules applied mechanically, but a set of premises and beliefs about politics which may act as a filter or prism through which the decision maker perceives and diagnoses political events.

Operational code beliefs may also provide norms, standards and guidelines that influence a decision-maker's choice of strategy and tactics.

These beliefs provide [the decision maker] with a relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of what would otherwise be a confusing and overwhelming array of signals and cues picked up from the environment and his senses (George, in Vertzberger, 1979, p. 114).

Operational code beliefs do not serve as a prescriptive for action or decision making behaviour and, while George and others endow the operational code with "diagnostic and choice propensities" in decision-making analysis, there are no simplistic linkages between belief and behaviour. Instead, operational code beliefs function as one of many intervening variables which may shape and constrain decision-making behaviour. Beliefs may operate as a lens through which information is understood,
processed, and given meaning. Beliefs may also act as a filter or screen, as a means of coping with too much or too little information, of dealing with the various cognitive constraints on rationality.

Operational code beliefs then, are the subset of an individual’s belief system which deal specifically with the political environment, the nature of political life, and the means of achieving political goals. George organized this subset of beliefs into a series of ten questions, the answers to which may sum up the essence of an individual’s political beliefs. He ordered his questions into two clusters: philosophical and instrumental. The philosophical questions refer to the assumptions a political actor makes about the fundamental nature of the international system, the nature of his opponent and the role of the individual in history. The instrumental beliefs focus on the strategy, timing, and utility of achieving desired ends in the international environment. The questions George developed are as follows:

**Philosophical:**

1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in "moving" or "shaping" history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and historical development?
Instrumental:

1. What is the best approach for selecting goal or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

(George, 1969, pp.201-216)

The purpose of George's questions is to utilize a common set of political beliefs which are relevant to all political actors in order to help the analyst understand how or why a decision-maker will behave in a variety of situations. The questions are general enough to apply to people in any political system and provide a base on which to help explain one decision-maker's behaviour, compare the behaviour of two or more different decision-makers, and perhaps make some predictions about decision-making behaviour.

The usefulness of the code however, may vary according to the situation decision-makers are faced with. The operational code is not to be seen as the only factor in the decision-making process, nor as consistently relevant in all situations. In mundane or routine occurrences, situational, organizational, and role factors may predominate the decision-making process. Ole Holsti recognized this and generated a set of situations where operational code beliefs may play an especially significant role in a decision-maker's diagnosis and response.

1. Nonroutine situations requiring more than the application of standard operating procedures.
2. *Decisions made at the pinnacle of government hierarchy* by leaders relatively free of organizational and other constraints.

3. *Long-range policy planning* which involves a certain amount of ambiguity and uncertainty and where questions about "what is", "what will be", "what ends are desirable" and "how to achieve desired ends" will be at the core of the decision-making process.

4. *When the situation itself is highly ambiguous* and open to a variety of interpretations and there may be either an overload or scarcity of information.

5. *Circumstances of information overload* in which decision-makers are forced to use a variety of coping strategies to reduce the complexity of the situation to a manageable level.

6. *Unanticipated events* in which initial reactions are likely to reflect cognitive "sets".

(Holsti, 1976, p.30)

Clearly, this set of situations applies particularly strongly to the study of international relations which is marked by uncertainty and unexpected events. Political actors making decisions in the international arena are often faced with either an overload or a scarcity of information and unanticipated or ambiguous circumstances which forces them to rely more heavily on their internal belief system, their operational code, to simplify and order a complex, confusing situation into one which is both manageable and understandable.

The political decision-maker's operational code is, perhaps, determined through the answers to George's set of ten questions. For the purposes of this study, the answers to George's questions, (defining the actor's fundamental beliefs about the nature of the political world), act as an intervening variable between incoming information and decision-making behaviour. However, the operational code construct may prove to be useful for a variety of different study types. The construct may be useful as a dependent,
independent, or intervening variable in political socialization and decision-making studies, or as the basis for comparison in elite studies (Holsti, 1977, p.153).

In general, the operational code affects the actor's definition of the situation, his perceptions of options and, ultimately, his choice of behaviour. A political actor's definition of the situation may be mediated by his orientation to and interpretation of the political environment - his operational code. Thus, according to Holsti (1977, p.2), the actor's psychological environment, how he "sees" the situation, may only imperfectly match the "real" or operational political environment or situation.

Beliefs, therefore, affect and may distort the information processing which leads to decision-making behaviour. The importance and relevance attached to incoming information may fluctuate depending on how closely the information correlates with the actor's beliefs. Information which conflicts with established beliefs may be rejected or given a lesser priority. Policy choices or strategies may also be assessed, in part, by the instrumental belief set of the operational code. However, it is important to remember that operational code beliefs are only one variable in a complex causal framework for understanding decision-making and, while operational code beliefs may not unilaterally determine the choice of behaviour, they may influence the range of policy choices a decision-maker finds preferable (George, 1979, p.104).

A number of analysts have utilized George's formulation of the operational code in their own research. The majority have used the operational code to study individual decision-makers such as: John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1970); Senator Frank Church (Johnson, 1977); German Socialist leaders Schumacher and Brandt (Ashby, 1969); Dean Acheson (McLennan, 1971); Pierre Elliot Trudeau (Thordarson, 1972); and Henry
Kissinger (Walker, 1977). Other researchers have expanded on or adapted the operational code for diverse purposes. Below are three examples of how the operational code has been utilized in research studies.

Hoagland and Walker (1977) applied the operational code to international crises in order to assess the congruence between Soviet and American operational codes and their crisis behaviour. Their research also tested the ability of the operational code construct to be generalized from an individual to a national level of analysis.

Rosenau and Holsti (1983) used political belief systems in their study of the breakdown of consensus in American politics. They suggest that a 'shrinking' world and the number of military, economic, and social challenges the United States has had to cope with has fragmented the shared American political culture. This fragmentation is evidenced by the number of competing belief systems which have developed among American leadership groups. While not model operational code research per se, this study does show the versatility of the construct, and the different ways belief systems may be used in research.

Walker and Falkowski (1984) focused on the relationship between operational code, early childhood socialization experiences, and motivational needs for power, affiliation and achievement. They argue that political belief systems develop from childhood experiences and motivations. Their focus was to "construct and evaluate an integrated, cumulative model of the relationships between personality traits and foreign policy decisions." (Walker and Falkowski, 1984, p.238).
Some General Criticisms of the Operational Code: Gunnar Sojblom (1982) and Martha Cottam (1986) and others have presented a number of criticisms of the operational code approach. Critiques of the approach include relevant questions about the validity of the categories, the vagueness of terms, the units of analysis, the causal connection between beliefs and behaviour, when the operational code should be employed, and even about the name, "operational code", itself. The question of when the operational code should be employed has already been addressed by Holsti's work on prescribing a list of situations. Although all the above questions are important, only three of the major criticisms will be discussed here: 1) the individual as the unit of analysis; 2) the operational code categories and; 3) the connection between beliefs and behaviour.

Both Cottam and Sojblom have argued that the individual is not a useful level of analysis for understanding political decision-making. Both mention the fact that the operational code was originally developed to study the political beliefs of a group, namely the Bolsheviks. Sojblom states that role and institutional constraints limit the level to which an individual leader's personal traits or beliefs can affect policy, and by the time systemic, societal, governmental, and bureaucratic constraints on decision-making are taken into account, the attributes of the individual decision-maker have been minimized to the point of mere idiosyncratic differences of little research relevance.

Research focusing on the individual has been dismissed as merely descriptive and that "such a direction would normally mean we are some further steps away from an explanatory approach" (Sojblom, 1982, p.45).
However, according to Allison (1971), levels of analysis can be thought of as "beacons" which sensitize investigators to different bodies of data and potential explanations. The purpose of investigating political behaviour at any given level is not to disprove the analysis at other levels, but to contribute to a more thorough explanation of a given phenomenon or event. Understanding political actor's operational codes and how they affect the decision-making process may not provide a complete explanation but may enrich the analyst's understanding. Different research foci may lead to significantly different explanations for the same phenomenon.

The unit of analysis adopted for this paper is the individual. Understanding the belief systems of the key political actors in the Soviet-American "thaw" of the late 1980's may help explain how the Cold War came to an end. The level of the individual may be especially relevant as the unit of analysis in this instance because Soviet-American relations have always been emotionally charged and infused with rhetoric and ideology. The predominant American image of the Soviet Union and Reagan's own hard-line views discussed in the Introduction are evidence of the "personal" nature of Soviet-American relations. Even with strong signs that the Soviets were undergoing profound changes, many Americans remained sceptical, resistant to the idea that the Soviet Union was capable of real transformation. For many, such change went against long held beliefs about the nature of the Soviet Union.

Reagan himself appears to have held firm, even simplistic, beliefs about the Soviet Union and the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In terms of foreign policy, especially dealing with the Soviets, Reagan may fit the image of the "insensitive predominant leader" as defined by M. Hermann and C. Hermann (1989).
Such leaders tend to chose advisors who define the problem as they do; they are relatively insensitive to information which does not conform to what they believe; and they value some congruence between "who they are" and "what they do" (pp.365-66). Hermann and Hermann argue that understanding the insensitive predominant leader's personality (and, therefore, beliefs) will provide clues about his government's foreign policy. Understanding Reagan's beliefs then, should supply some insights into the policies toward the Soviet Union which his government followed.

This assertion is reinforced by Holsti's work on situations where the operational code may play an especially significant role in the decision-maker's diagnosis and response (see page 26). The second situation involves decisions made at the pinnacle of government by leaders relatively free of organizational and other constraints. Reagan, it appears, had a relative amount of freedom in his militant campaign against the Soviets. This relative freedom combined with his essentialist views toward the Soviet Union make Reagan as an individual, an important level of analysis.

Another major criticism of the operational code is the categories used in operational code analysis. Cottam argues that there is no explanation for the selection of the beliefs embedded in George's ten questions nor why these and not other beliefs are called "master" beliefs (1986, p.11). Sojblom also finds difficulties with George's questions, stating some concepts, such as that of conflict, are too vague to have much meaning.

Holsti (1982, pp.82-83), counters these arguments by stating that operational code categories have some important and positive features. First, the categories are limited to a manageable number; second, they are large enough in scope to be salient in any
decision-making situation; third, they can be further differentiated and elaborated (as Holsti does in the construction of his typology); and fourth, researchers have found many of the categories to have significant political relevance.

George's categories are not cast in stone and many analysts have adapted the original questions, formulated new ones, or used only sections of the code as fit their purpose. The categories do have shortfalls and limitations but, argues Holsti, it would be more productive to build upon their positive aspects than to simply discard them in favour of other untried categories. In that regard Holsti (1977), has developed a typology of operational codes which will be discussed in the next section. This typology has been elaborated upon by Walker (1983), and Walker and Falkowski (1984), who have incorporated motivational imagery into Holsti's model. Their work exemplifies the utility and flexibility of George's original categories.

For the purposes of this study only the first philosophical belief, which has been identified as a "core" or "master" belief, is being utilized in order to understand the character of Reagan's beliefs regarding the Soviet Union and the nature of the international environment. This belief has been divided into two important component parts: the nature of the international system and the character of one's political opponent. Each of these parts has also been further subdivided into a number of questions to provide a detailed picture of Reagan's beliefs about the Soviet Union and the international environment.

Regarding the question about the connection between beliefs and action, Sojblom asks whether an actor's belief system can be used to explain his behaviour, despite the fact that George has clearly stated that beliefs do not unilaterally determine action.
Sojblom also argues that the operational code approach is too vague to be used as an explanatory tool. Cottam does believe the operational code can be useful, but only to construct a detailed picture of a single individual to predict or explain that person's behaviour. Cottam does not believe that any useful generalizations can be developed from these isolated studies. These are fair criticisms of the approach. A number of researchers including George (1979), Walker and Murphy (1981-82), Walker and Falkowski (1984), and Holsti (1977), have tackled this question in a variety of ways (Cottam 1986, pp.12-13).

In 1979, George wrote a paper titled the "Casual Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behaviour: The "Operational Code" Belief System" in which he sought to strengthen the connection between political decision-maker's beliefs and foreign policy outcomes. He introduced two theoretical premises for the linkage between beliefs and behaviour.

The first premise is that beliefs influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information-processing tasks that precede and accompany choice of action. A decision-maker's beliefs about the opponent may help define an ambiguous situation or interpret discrepant information. The operational code therefore, may introduce "diagnostic propensities" into the information-gathering and processing tasks. Operational code beliefs may also offer the decision-maker "choice propensities" in selecting options. An "optimist" may avoid high-risk alternatives, while an "optimizer" may be more likely to seek options with the promise of the greatest pay-offs.

Operational code beliefs then, may introduce both "diagnostic and choice propensities" into the information gathering and processing tasks, but they are just
propensities, not determinants. George's second premise is that beliefs do not unilaterally determine behaviour. "Operational code beliefs are only one variable-cluster within a rich, complex causal framework for explaining decision-making...a policy-maker may be influenced by personal considerations, domestic politics, and/or organizational interests..." (1979, p.104). George states that operational code beliefs may be most useful in discerning the decision-maker's choice preference as opposed to the final action taken.

Walker and Murphy (1981-82) have applied the operational code construct to political forecasting. These researchers state that the operational code contains the premise that decision-makers use beliefs about their political environment to appraise the effectiveness of various political actions, and that their beliefs influence their selection or choice of action. If that premise is valid they argue, it should be possible to use a decision-maker's beliefs to predict or anticipate how he will define a situation and what actions he will consider.

In their paper "The Utility of the Operational Code in Political Forecasting" (1981-82), Walker and Falkowski argue that Holsti's list of relevant decision-making situations represents a class of situations in which "assumptions of environmental determinism are not likely to be valid" (p.28). Knowledge of the situation would be insufficient to forecast a decision in these circumstances and it becomes necessary to know the attributes of the decision-maker in order to make a forecast which significantly narrows the range of possible decisions. They list a series of conditions which restrict the utility
of the operational code in predicting political decisions, but argue that when these conditions are met, the operational code can be used as a useful tool in political forecasting.

III. HOLSTI’S TYPOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL CODES

In 1977, Holsti presented a manual for coding operational code beliefs in which he developed a typology of operational codes. In his manual he stated two important reasons for developing such a typology. First, an intrinsic principle of the operational code is that beliefs about politics form a belief system, wherein the elements are bound together by functional interdependence, there is a hierarchy of importance, and an internal consistency or logic. This is a basic but essential proposition to be tested by the typology - that there are some systematic linkages between operational code beliefs. As well, a sound typology would be useful in distinguishing central or master beliefs from peripheral beliefs.

Second, a typology would allow comparisons to be drawn between political decision-makers. Without a typology, Holsti argues, operational code studies are likely

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3 Walker and Falkowski’s conditions for the use of the operational code as a tool in political forecasting are as follows:

a) restricted to a certain class of decision-making situations where environmental determinism is an invalid assumption

b) utility declines as the number of individuals with different beliefs increase (unless one or more like-minded people control the others)

c) if there are differences between the instrumental beliefs of the decision-makers and the decision-implementers, then as the control of the decision-makers decreases, the linkage between beliefs and actions of the latter group increases

d) even under optimum conditions, a knowledge of the decision-maker’s beliefs may be sufficient only to identify a range of likely decisions, not to forecast the exact response (1981-82, p.29).
to remain isolated vignettes which do not connect in any meaningful way. A valid typology would provide the framework necessary to develop purposeful comparisons.

Whether the operational code serves as an independent, intervening or dependent variable in socialization and decision-making studies, or as the basis of comparison in elite studies, analysis is greatly facilitated if at least part of the comparison can be focused on types of belief systems rather than solely on the many individual beliefs that constitute the operational code (Holsti, 1977, P.153).

Without a typology, a separate category would be needed for each leader’s belief system, and such studies would merely serve to emphasize individual attributes of each leader.

At the core of Holsti’s typology is the first philosophical belief which several operational code researchers have suggested should be considered a prime candidate for a "master" belief – that is, a belief which is likely to constrain or dominate the other elements of a belief system (Holsti, 1977, P.156). Holsti rephrased George’s original question in two parts:

1) Is conflict perceived as a permanent part of the political universe or is this condition at least partially amenable to amelioration or eradication?

2) Where does one locate the sources of conflict and the conditions of peace? In human nature? In the characteristics of nations? In the nature of the system within which nations interact?

The answers to these questions give rise to six different "types" as illustrated below. The defining characteristics of each type are whether they see the international environment as inherently conflictual or harmonious and what they regard as the source of conflict.

Holsti contends that the distinction between locating the sources of conflict in actor dispositions (types A,B,D,E) and external conditions (types C and F) is an important one from both psychological and foreign policy perspectives. A decision-maker who regards other nations as reacting to aspects of the international system is likely to
What is the Fundamental Nature of the Political Universe?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are the Fundamental Sources of Conflict?</th>
<th>Harmonious (conflict is temporary)</th>
<th>Conflictual (conflict is permanent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Nature</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes of Nations</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International System</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Holsti, 1977, p.158)

prescribe different policies than those advocated by a decision-maker who believes that the source of conflict originates from the internal attributes of a specific nation (or class of nations).

A more specific example is the debate over Soviet intentions during the Cold War. Some American policy-makers regarded high Soviet expenditures on strategic forces as a search for parity and as a response to threats. Moscow was simply reacting to external conditions. This position was countered by those who saw the Soviet build-up as a campaign for military superiority driven by internal goals of the leadership as directed by ideology, not by outside forces. Internal attributes of the Soviet system were driving the arms build-up. Such divergent "definitions of the situation" would clearly result in dissimilar policy preferences.
Further, according to Holsti, there appears to be significant differences between types A and B. Type B decision-makers, who view some nations as peaceful and others as warlike, tend to view politics in zero-sum terms while type A decision-makers put more emphasize on human traits, presumably shared by all (Holsti, 1977, p.162).

Once Holsti established this basic typology, he tested its utility. His first step was to determine if a plausible set of hypotheses linking each of the six types to significantly different clusters of beliefs could be developed (see Appendix 1). These hypothetical belief clusters were then empirically tested by two methods. The first test used existing operational code studies of six American policy-makers - three Senators and three Secretaries of State. The second test saw detailed questionnaires about each operational code belief sent to the those who had undertaken operational code studies but were unfamiliar with both the typology and the purposes for which their responses would be used.

The results provided Holsti with moderately strong support for his hypotheses. All actors did not fit the typology to the same extent. Those leaders who most closely fit the typology tended also to be those with the highest correlations between predicted and observed beliefs. Some deviations were noted from belief to belief; support for some beliefs tended to stronger than others. Despite this, the evidence suggests that it is appropriate to consider the operational code construct as a way of characterizing belief systems. Certain types of beliefs do form clusters with greater regularity than would be expected by chance (Holsti, 1977, p.270). Moreover, the evidence supports the proposition that the first philosophical belief is the most central or a "master" belief. This evidence is of particular importance to this paper which utilizes Holsti’s coding
methodology in order to determine Reagan's "type", specifically focusing on the first philosophical belief. The express application of Holsti's work for this research project will be discussed in the next section.
THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF RONALD REAGAN

I. METHODOLOGY

For the purpose of this thesis, the operational code of Ronald Reagan was explored using qualitative content analysis. The documents were analyzed using coding sheets found in Holsti's (1977) coding manual. The study concentrates exclusively on Philosophical Belief Number One. This belief is divided into three parts: a) What is the "essential" nature of political life?; b) What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?; and c) What is the nature of the contemporary international system? Each of these parts is then further divided into a series of statements with a number of possible coding categories for each. The documents were coded for each of these categories. Answers to parts "a" and "c" (both focused on beliefs about the international environment) were then combined for the purpose of the study. Many of the categories in these two parts were redundant.

Sixteen documents (seven from the first term, 1981-1984 and nine from the second term, 1985-1989) were read and coded (Table 2). These documents include State of the Union addresses, news conferences, radio addresses to the nation, and speeches. The criteria for choosing the documents to be analyzed included topic - documents related to foreign policy, specifically Soviet-American relations; dates - for equitable representation of Reagan's years in office; and type of document - for a variety of text from polished speeches to off-the-cuff remarks made at press conferences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President’s News Conference</td>
<td>January 20, 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with the President</td>
<td>January 20, 1982.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association of Evangelicals Speech</td>
<td>March 08, 1982.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Address (U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Vice-President’s Trip to Europe)</td>
<td>January 08, 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address to the Nation (Soviet-American relations)</td>
<td>January 16, 1984.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of the Union Address</td>
<td>February 06, 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Interview (Foreign and Domestic Issues)</td>
<td>August 24, 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of the Union Address</td>
<td>February 04, 1986.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks and a Question and Answer Session with Members of the National Strategy Forum</td>
<td>May 04, 1988.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Ogonek of the Soviet Union</td>
<td>May 19, 1988.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s News Conference</td>
<td>December 08, 1988.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In section III of this chapter, Reagan’s beliefs regarding the nature of the international environment and the Soviet Union are discussed in detail and summarized. In this section, Reagan’s beliefs are summed up without separation into the first and second four year terms, however there is an attempt to show a range of quotes from both terms.
From the evidence of the previous analysis, a prediction is made about Reagan's "type" in section IV. In order to confirm this prediction, Holsti's eleven hypothetical questions regarding the first philosophical belief are "answered" by Reagan. Reagan's beliefs are scored with a code representing a rough estimate of the degree to which they agree with "type B" predicted responses to the hypotheses set out in Holsti's typology:

- ++ Very substantial agreement
- + Agreement on balance
- 0 Insufficient or inconclusive evidence
- - Disagreement on balance
- -- Very substantial disagreement

These categories represent both the frequency with which each theme appears in the documents, and the closeness with which Reagan's statements match the predicted responses for each hypothetical question. A rating of "++" indicates that Reagan's statements are both numerous and very closely matched to the predicted response. A rating of "+" indicates that the belief is also well matched, however fewer statements on that theme appear in the documents. A rating of "0" may indicate either an insufficient number of statements on which to make a judgement, or inconclusive evidence. That is, the statements made are not clear enough to determine Reagan's beliefs. A rating of "-" indicates that the evidence from Reagan's statements do not match Holsti's predicted responses for the "type B" actor.

The "goodness of fit" for each component of the first philosophical belief is then analyzed for both terms, 1981-1984 and 1985-1989. The information from section IV is summarized in Table 4. The final step is to look for change in beliefs over the two terms. Faced with incoming evidence of a very different and new situation in the Soviet
Union, did Reagan modify his beliefs about the international environment or the nature of the Soviet Union?

In summary then, the remainder of this section considers some of the limitations of the methodology. Section III contains the coding of Reagan's first philosophical belief, and section IV, his "fit" with Holsti's predicted responses for the hypotheses of the first philosophical belief of the operational code. The final section will look at any changes which occurred in Reagan's operational code over the two terms in office and the implications of finding Reagan to be a specific "type" of leader.

II. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY

This coding and "typing" process provides only a partial test of Holsti's typology and yields only a portion of Reagan's whole spectrum of beliefs. Reagan is "typed" in this paper on the basis of his "fit" with only the first philosophical belief. Despite the fact that this belief is considered to be a "master" belief which constrains other beliefs, a fully developed picture of Reagan's operational code requires coding of all his beliefs, both philosophical and instrumental (a task beyond the scope of this paper).

Another significant limitation of this research methodology is the lack of one or more independent coders. Having more than one coder would provide inter-coder reliability. Such reliability would strengthen the validity of the coding process.

The categories used in Holsti's coding forms are also a limitation. These categories may not be successful in catching all the nuances of Reagan's beliefs about the Soviet Union and about the relationship between the Soviets and the Americans. An example is Reagan's proclivity for separating the Soviet leadership and government from
"ordinary" Soviet citizens. He seems to believe that while all Americans agree with and stand behind their government's policies, Soviet leadership acts with no such public approval.

As well, the categories do not capture Reagan's fundamentalist religious views which seem to permeate many of his beliefs about the Soviet Union and the nature of the relationship between the two adversarial nations. This aspect of his belief system may however be partially captured by the second philosophical belief which is related to optimism-pessimism. Part of Reagan's optimistic outlook may be attributable to his belief about the "righteousness" of the American way and the "ungodly" nature of communism.

III. CODING REAGAN'S BELIEFS

This section embodies a detailed view of Reagan's beliefs about the nature of the international environment and the fundamental character of the Soviet Union. The analysis below evolved through the reading and coding of the sixteen documents found in Table 2 as well as other sources. Keith Shimko's (1992) research paper on the operational code of Ronald Reagan was especially useful. His work is cited in several places throughout the analysis to reinforce the findings of this research paper.

The questions which are answered below are taken from Holsti's coding sheets. Some of the statements from the sheets were combined and others, about which no evidence was found, were eliminated. The "answers" to these questions form the first philosophical belief of Reagan's operational code. In this section, the beliefs are not
divided into first and second term, although there is an attempt to provide representative statements from both terms.

**Philosophical Belief #1(a): What is the Essential Nature of Political Life?**

Reagan's statements about the international environment tend to indicate that he believes that although there is conflict in the world presently, there will eventually be peace and harmony. In several instances, he alludes to an underlying harmony of interests among all states and people. His statements (below) reveal a belief that harmony will be realized through the forces of democracy, capitalism, and freedom as championed by the United States and the Western world.

*Is political life essentially conflictual, harmonious, or mixed?*

Reagan tends to see political life as a mixture of conflict and harmony. Conflict is for the most part regional and localized, but is often triggered and sustained by the Soviets, either directly or indirectly. The contemporary international environment is dominated by the conflict between democracy and communism. Reagan often makes reference to the enduring nature of this contest between freedom and oppression: "We’re in a long twilight struggle with an implacable foe of freedom" (WCPD, 1985, p.865).

People all over the globe have common interests however, and these interests are the basis for a lasting international peace. In discussing the 1984 Olympics Reagan alludes to his beliefs about the fundamentally harmonious nature of the international environment:
And when each race or event is done and our teams come together in friendship, we will remember that we are meant to be one family of nations" (Israel, 1987, p.186, emphasis added).

Reagan’s belief in a harmony of interests among people leads him to differentiate between the Soviet people and the Soviet government. He argues that while the Soviet government does not embody the interests of the people which it ruled over, the people of America and the Soviet Union (and the rest of the world) do share common interests, values, and aspirations.

I think the people of all countries have something in common...I doubt that the people have ever started a war (WCPD, 1981, p.708).

I believe with all my heart that if a generation of young people throughout the world could get to know each other, they would never make war on each other (WCPD, 1986, p.839).

These common interests shared by all people are mentioned numerous times, especially when linked with discussion of nuclear weapons. The existence of nuclear weapons serves to strengthen common interests among peoples and forces them to look beyond their differences to find ways to coexist peaceably. "...we do have common interests and foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms" (WCPD, 1984, p.41).

What is the source of conflict?

For Reagan, the source of international conflict lies not in human nature nor in the international system but in the attributes of specific nations or groups of nations.
Totalitarianism and dictatorship, which run counter to basic human desires for freedom, are the root cause of much of the conflict in the world: "...we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit" (WCPD, 1982, p.765).

Communism is a main source of evil in the world because it attempts to oppress mankind, to deny individual freedom.

At the same time [as the threat of global war], there is a threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state... It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying freedom and human dignity to its citizens ...[new philosophies are based on] the rejection of the arbitrary power of the state, the refusal to subordinate the rights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivism stifles all the best human impulses (WCPD, 1982, p.764-65).

Reagan states a number of times that if the Soviets want peace, there will be peace. He leaves no doubt as to the source of much of the conflict in the world:

I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of declaring yourselves blithely above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil (WCPD, 1983, p.364, emphasis added).

Yet the threat from Soviet forces, conventional and strategic, from the Soviet drive for domination, from the increase in espionage and state terror remains great. This is reality (WCPD, 1986, p.127).

As much as the communist system embodies evil, America represents all that is just and noble in the world. For Reagan, America is a beacon of freedom and democracy leading the march towards global peace:

America’s highest aspiration has never wavered. We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere (WCPD, 1984, p.41).
The United States is the economic miracle, the model to which the world once again turns. We stand for an idea whose time is now... (WCPD, 1986, p.126).

**What is the nature and scope of conflict?**

Conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is, on the whole, a zero-sum game, a test of wills and ideas, between the Soviet Union and the United States. In his speech to the National Evangelical Association in 1982, Reagan made the nature of the contest clear by stating that "the real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith" (WCPD, 1983, p.365).

In some situations however, there is a commonality of interests which allows cooperation and non zero-sum situations. Arms reductions is seen as an area in which both sides win and a nuclear war would render both sides losers: "A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last" (WCPD, 1984, p.43). "A nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought...There would be no victors in that kind of a war" (WCPD, 1988, p.685). Reagan also believes passionately that his Strategic Defence Initiative would result in a situation where the whole world would win because nuclear weapons would be rendered obsolete. He maintained that the United States would share the technology with the rest of the world.

Statements in the documents also indicate that Reagan sees issues as highly linked. Arms reductions alone will not lead to an improved relationship between the Soviets and Americans:

And I happen to believe, also, that you can't sit down at a table and just negotiate that [arms reductions] unless you take into account, in
consideration at that table all the other things that are going on. In other words I believe in linkage (WCPD, 1981, p.66).

...more responsible Soviet conduct...is a key element of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. Progress is also required on the other items of our agenda...real respect for human rights and more open contacts between our societies and, of course, arms reduction (WCPD, 1987, p.58).

But we must keep in mind that arms agreements alone will not make the world safer. We must also deal with the core source of mistrust between our nations. This is why our dialogue must cover a broad agenda of human rights, regional and bilateral issues, as well as arms reductions (WCPD, 1988, p.686).

Reagan believed strongly that a better relationship with the Soviet Union required the Soviets to reform not just their foreign policy but their internal political, economic and social policies as well. In his remarks to the National Strategy Forum, he emphasized the importance of human rights and stated that better relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were dependent on the improvement of the Soviet human rights record.

*What are the conditions of peace?*

The need for American strength to limit Soviet action is a theme prevalent in the documents. It appears that Reagan, right up until his last year in office, believed that the Soviets would run wild in the world if a strong American presence was not maintained. In his final news conference Reagan was still vigorously defending the need for high defence spending. While continuing to extol the importance of arms reductions and talk about his vision of a nuclear-free world, Reagan still insisted that America needed to strive for parity which required continued military build-up.
The conditions of peace then, include American military and economic strength and improved Soviet conduct both internally and externally. Reagan emphasizes repeatedly the need for a militarily strong America:

> Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used... (WCPD, 1982, p.769)

> There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition (WCPD, 1984, p.41).

> ...because a strong, respected America is the surest way to preserve peace and prevent conflict (Israel, 1987, p.62).

Such strength is required because the Soviets must not think that American resolve or will is weak. "History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap" (WCPD, 1984, p.41).

Real and lasting peace requires the Soviet Union to constrain its behaviour in the world and change its internal policies. "We know that peace follows in freedom’s path and conflicts erupt when the will of the people is denied" (WCPD, 1986, p.129). In both terms, change in Soviet behaviour remained a key element in Reagan’s comments about achieving world peace.

> If there are to be better mutual relations, they must result from moderation in Soviet conduct, not just from our own good intentions (Israel, 1987, p.63).

During his final news conference in 1988, Reagan was asked if he believed that the beginning he had made with Gorbachev would result in a situation where the two countries were once again allies. He responded:

> I think that is all dependent on them-if it can be definitely established that they are no longer following the expansionist policy that was instituted in
the Communist revolution that their goal must be a one-world Communist state. Now, if that has definitely been given up, and certainly there are indications, we could anticipate bringing such a thing about. Then I do think that there is evidence that they do not like being the pariah, that they might want to join the family of nations and join them with the idea of bringing about or establishing peace (PPP, 1988-89, p.1612).

Philosophical Belief #1(b): What is the Fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

Several themes run through the documents which appear to dominate Reagan’s image of the Soviet Union. One theme is the unchanging nature of their system. The enduring nature of the Soviet system is mentioned time and time again:

We must recognize we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad (WCPD, 1984, p.43).

All of us need to be informed about the unchanging realities of the Soviet system (WCPD, 1985, p.865).

Even in November 1985, after the Geneva Summit, eight months subsequent to Gorbachev taking office in the Soviet Union, Reagan was definitive about the nature of the Soviet system:

...the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. We cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change; this implies enduring competition (WCPD, 1985, p.1426).

Another theme is the inherent untrustworthyness of the Soviets. "[The Soviets] have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any lie, to cheat, in order to attain that." (WCPD, 1981, p.57)
Reagan also states several times that Soviets can not be trusted to abide by negotiated treaties: "Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union will be fulfilled" (WCPD, 1983, p.1352). Shimko found similar results in his analysis of Reagan when he coded documents for the Soviet record of abiding by treaties. Out of sixty-one comments pertaining to the Soviet treaty record, Shimko found that fifty-one described the Soviets as cheaters and violators of agreements (Shimko, 1992, p.368). This belief of Soviet untrustworthiness did not appear to undergo any dramatic changes. In 1987, just before signing the INF agreement, Reagan stated, "it is said for them arms agreements are like diets: the second day is always the best, because that's when you break them" (in Shimko, 1992, p.368).

**What are the opponent’s goals?**

For Reagan, the goals of the Soviet Union are clearly expansionist and destructionist. This belief is explicitly revealed in his memoirs when he states that except for a brief period during World War Two, "the Russians had been our de facto enemies for almost sixty-five years, devoted to destroying democracy and imposing communism" (Reagan, 1990, p.44). This belief about the nature of Soviet objectives appears to be a dominant element in Reagan’s operational code:

I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution and including the present leadership that has not repeated...their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world socialist or communist state (WCPD, 1981, p.57).

There is no question but that the Soviet Union has made it plain that they are embarked on an expansionist program (WCPD, 1985, p.1003).
With 120,000 Soviet combat troops and military personnel and 15,000 military advisors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, can anyone still doubt their single-minded determination to expand their power? (WCPD, 1987, p.57)

The Soviet Union is expansionist. They have a belief that their purpose must be to bring about world revolution, a one-world communist state (WCPD, 1986, p.666).

*What is the source of the opponent's policy?*

Especially prevalent in his first term is Reagan’s belief that ideology, the "religion" of Marxism-Leninism, was the source of all Soviet policy and behaviour. He regarded the actions of Soviet leaders as being prescribed by the dictates of their overarching ideology. With such a simplistic and rigid view of ideology and relationship between Soviet policy and Marxism-Leninism, it is understandable that he believed the Soviet Union was incapable of change and that the nature of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was enduring.

...that religion of theirs, which is Marxism-Leninism, requires them to support and bring about a one-world communist state. And they’ve never denied that (WCPD, 1982, p.62).

[The 1979 Afghanistan invasion is] "further proof that they are following an expansionist policy that is based upon the Marxist doctrine, and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, that communism must [be] a one-world, that it must be a one-world communist state (WCPD, 1986, p.796)."
During his second term in office, Reagan's remarks about the role of ideology in Soviet behaviour lessen considerably. He seems to begin to consider other possible motivators of Soviet policy including fear of the outside world:

...you have to wonder if this [their belief in the one-world communist state] is not based on their fear and suspicion that the rest of the us in the world mean them harm (WCPD, 1985, p.1003).

He also begins to allude to Gorbachev as a "different" type of Soviet leader. With Gorbachev, Reagan appears to accept that Soviet policy may deviate from ideology and that an individual leader may have an impact on the direction the Soviet Union follows. When asked during his last years in office if his views about the "evil empire" had changed, Reagan said they had not but he added:

Now there is a new leader, and he does want to make some changes in the system. I have always wanted to take up the matter of human rights, and there has been some improvement in that. Regional conflicts -and we see them now-this leader wanting to get out of Afghanistan. So I think progress could be made (WCPD, 1988, p.336).

During his final news conference Reagan was asked if he felt that Gorbachev was trying to remake the Soviet Union into a less threatening country. Reagan's answer was "Yes, I do" (WCPD, 1988, p.1607). In the same conference Reagan was also asked to comment on his statement made during his very first press conference about the Soviets lying and cheating in order to reach their political goals. Reagan answered that he was only reiterating their own ideology, and that with Gorbachev, there has been a change:

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4 This is reinforced by Keith Shimko's (1992) findings in his analysis of Reagan's operational code. In coding for Soviet policy motivations, Shimko found ideology cited in eleven instances for the years 1981-1984 and in only two instances for the years 1985-1989. For the latter years he also found six instances where Soviet leader's personalities were cited as shaping Soviet policy.
"... I must say I have never met with one of those leaders that was comparable to this man [Gorbachev] or had the approach that he has" (WCPD, 1988, p.1608). In response to a question about change in his own thinking about the Soviet Union, Reagan was rather vague. He stated that the leadership has dramatically altered the situation and that perhaps Gorbachev has come to recognize the failings of their system.

What is the opponent's likely response to one's own policy of conciliation? To policies of firmness?

Along with being untrustworthy, Soviets were also likely to take advantage of any situation where they perceived a lack of will or resolve on the part of the United States to protect its interests and those of its allies. The Soviet Union, acting according to its ideology, seeks military superiority over the United States and will use its superiority to establish the "one-world" communist state. The Soviets will only moderate their conduct in the face of American strength and resolve.

...if history teaches anything it teaches that simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversary is folly (WCPD, 1983, p.364).

Reagan’s statements regarding policies of detente reinforced this belief about Soviet reactions to American conciliatory actions. In his memoirs, Reagan claimed that the Soviets had interpreted detente as the freedom to "pursue subversion, aggression, and expansionism anywhere in the world" (Reagan, 1990, p.44). The Soviet response to American hesitation and constraint in the world was to attempt to exploit it to the fullest.

[policies of detente were]...one-way restraint that was never returned...while past American leaders hesitated or naively hoped for the best, the Soviet Union was left free to pile up new nuclear arsenals (WCPD, 1983, p.1190).
Reagan's campaign to strengthen American military power was his response to this situation. He believed that America had to deal from a position of strength which required military and strategic parity with the Soviets. America had to show resolve and the will to back up its words with actions.

America's deterrence is more credible, and it is making the world a safer place - safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve (WCPD, 1984, p.41).

What is the opponent's view of conflict?

Reagan seems to believe that the Soviets condone conflict which advances their ideological objectives in the world. Soviet leaders reserved for themselves "the right to lie and cheat" in order to achieve their goals and the licence to "export its ideology by force" (WCPD, 1981, p.57; 1986, p.129). This belief supports his belief about the need for American military might to prevent Soviet aggression around the globe.

What is the opponent's decision-making process?

Soviet decision-making is not seen as democratic, or as taking into account the concerns of average Soviet citizens.

Within the Soviet Union, decision-making is tightly concentrated at the top. The authority of the Communist Party is not determined by a document-a constitution, if you will-but by a leadership who determine what is right for the people (PPP, 1988, p.553).
What evidence is required for the opponent to show good faith?

Reagan makes frequent references to the need for Soviets to "modify" their conduct around the world. In 1987, Reagan called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and stated that better Soviet-American relations required "more responsible Soviet conduct around the world" (WCPD, 1987, p.58). Soviets must also prove themselves worthy of trust. In regard to arms reductions negotiations in Geneva, Reagan stated that "Soviet compliance with the letter and the spirit of agreements is essential" (WCPD, 1986, p.129).

SUMMARY: The information presented above gives a substantially developed picture of Reagan's beliefs about the nature of the international environment and the Soviet Union. Reagan possessed a hard-line image of the Soviet Union underscored by his simplistic notions of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the unchanging nature of the Soviet goal of world domination. His views about the nature of the international environment however, were remarkably more optimistic, focused on shared interests amongst nations, and the ultimate triumph of democracy and freedom over communism and oppression.

These seemingly incongruent beliefs provide a remarkable tension when seeking to determine Reagan's fundamental operational code beliefs. Shimko describes reading Reagan's comments as like "listening to two people, Reagan the optimist and Reagan the pessimist" (1992, p.373). Although Reagan sees the Soviet Union as the complete antithesis to everything the United States stands for, he believes that there are mutual
interests between the two nations. On one hand he states that Marxist ideology has predetermined the Soviet objective of strategic superiority over the United States and eventual domination over the world, yet he also states that arms reductions are a shared interest between the two nations.

Shimko grapples with this same difficulty in his review of Reagan’s beliefs. He argues that, whether Reagan was aware of it or not, he was differentiating between narrow national interests and broader national interests which transcend prevailing operational goals. Shimko states that Reagan must have believed that it was in the greater interest of the Soviet Union to give up current goals of strategic superiority and a nuclear-winning capability in order to achieve "real" objectives of world peace and safety from the threat of nuclear conflict (1992, p.371). These "real" objectives then, lay at the heart of his discussions about common interests.

During his second term in office, Reagan’s prevailing optimism about the contemporary international environment appears to increase, despite his hesitancy to believe that the Soviet Union was undergoing dramatic change. For a man who believed so strongly in the righteousness of the American way, and who campaigned so hard to force the Soviets to moderate their behaviour, it seems that when evidence of such change was presented, he was reluctant to accept it. This appears to indicate that Reagan’s operational code beliefs were rigidly held.

Also inconsistent are his discussions about misperception and fear fuelling the Cold War. In several instances Reagan admits that the Soviet Union might perceive the United States as threatening and that fear might have contributed to the arms race. He also often makes statements about the need to persuade the Soviets of peaceful American
intentions. Yet he shows no inclination to believe that the United States has misperceived Soviet objectives, or that American misperception or misunderstanding has exacerbated the Cold War.

There is an underlying religious element which comes through in the documents. Reagan imbued much of his rhetoric with fundamentalist morality. The conflict between the United States the Soviet Union is characterized as one of right against wrong, good against evil. Communism is an immoral system which is against God. The United States, embodying democratic principles, has God on its side.

Reagan also shows a certain naivete about international relations. He appears able to reduce the complexities of international strife into a battle between good and evil. He also seems to believe that if peoples of different nations got to know each other better they would not make war.

The next step in this study is to "type" Reagan according to Holsti’s typology. The final stage is to discern any changes which occurred within his operational code over the two terms and evaluate the implications of such change.

IV. "TYPING" REAGAN ACCORDING TO HOLSTI’S TYPOLOGY

From the coding above, Reagan’s beliefs have been matched to Holsti’s typology for "goodness of fit". Reagan’s operational code appears to most closely match that of a "type B" actor. Reagan’s beliefs are compared to Holsti’s hypotheses about the first philosophical belief for "type B" actors (see Table 3). Each hypothesis, stated below, is followed with an evaluation of the congruence between the hypothesis and Reagan’s belief. Any differences between the years 1981-1984 and 1985-1989 are noted for each
### TABLE 3. TYPE B: HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the nature of the political universe?</th>
<th>Conflict is temporary; in a world of peaceful states there will be peace.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the basic sources of conflict?</td>
<td>Warlike states or classes of states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the conditions of peace?</td>
<td>Containment, reform or elimination of warlike states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of conflict?</td>
<td>Zero-sum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the scope of conflict?</td>
<td>Issues tend to be closely linked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is role of conflict in historical development?</td>
<td>Very functional in some circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario of major danger of war.</td>
<td>War from miscalculation; &quot;appeasement model&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the adversary?</td>
<td>High correlation between the adversary’s disposition and attributes, and its foreign policy. Actions result from careful planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the goals of the adversary?</td>
<td>Range from expansionist to destructionist; these arise from basic features of the adversary’s regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the adversary respond to conciliatory policies?</td>
<td>Likely to view such action as a sign of weakness or lack of commitment; will be encouraged to pursue expansion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the adversary respond to policies of firmness?</td>
<td>Likely to be deterred from pursuing expansion; danger of impulsive response is minimal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Holsti, 1977, p.164)
hypothesis. Under each evaluation is a summary code (as explained on p.36) for each term, and a brief statement indicating if there is any change in the belief between the two terms.

**What is the nature of the political universe?** For Reagan, while the contemporary international environment is one of conflict, there is potential for harmony and peace. People around the world are basically the same and share common interests. These common interests, which go beyond national objectives such as military or economic superiority, form the basis on which the Soviet Union and the United States can negotiate to reduce the threat of war.

This basic premise does not appear to change over the two terms which Reagan served. In the second four years however, there is an increasing emphasis on mutual or shared interests between the Soviets and the Americans.

Summary code: + + , + +

1st Term → 2nd Term: Emphasis on conflictual nature of international environment in first term is superseded by heightened emphasis on common interests in second term.

**What are the basic sources of conflict?**

The source of conflict is warlike states or groups of states, specifically the Soviet Union and other totalitarian, communist regimes. Communism and totalitarianist states generate conflict because they are aggressive externally and oppressive internally. In the contemporary international environment, communism is the focus of evil in the world. Communist states incite and ferment conflict around the world.
The reciprocal belief is that with democracy and capitalism comes peace. The United States stands as an archetype of democratic ideals, freedom and peace for all other nations to follow. This belief is maintained over the course of Reagan's eight years in office.

Summary code: + +, + +

1st Term → 2nd term: No change.

What are the conditions of peace?

Peace can be achieved by moderating the behaviour of offending states. Moderating transgressing states' behaviour requires both internal and external policy changes. Until such time as these states have reformed their policies however, their actions in the international environment must be contained. The United States and the western world can prevent conflict by remaining militarily and economically strong and by showing resolve against any attempted aggression.

1985-1989 saw increased comments regarding Gorbachev as a "new" kind of Soviet leader. Reagan perceives Gorbachev as helping to ease tensions because he is different from previous Soviet leaders. Gorbachev sees the failures of communism and may change the nature of that system. Reduced conflict stems from change within the Soviet polity. However, in the second term, statements are also made regarding the need to remove mistrust and suspicion in order to achieve lasting peace. This implies a need for improved communication between the Soviets and the Americans.

Summary code: + +, +
1st Term → 2nd Term: Less emphasis on American military strength as a deterrent in 2nd term. Stress on modification of Soviet system and action as a condition of peace remains constant through both terms. Indication of communication as necessary for peace in second term.

**What is the nature of the conflict?**

The evidence for this belief leads to the conclusion that Reagan sees the nature of conflict as mixed. Reagan's belief in common interests may lead him to think in non-zero sum terms however, he appears to hold hard-line views about the adversarial nature of the Soviet-American relationship. The main source of conflict, communism versus democracy, is an essentially zero-sum game in which there can only be one winner. However, there are issues where cooperation can lead to non-zero-sum results. Two examples of Reagan's non-zero sum thinking include a belief that in a nuclear war both sides would lose, and his plan for Strategic Defence Initiative which he said would make all nations of the world "winners" by protecting them from the effects of a nuclear war and effectively making nuclear weapons obsolete.

Statements regarding the enduring Soviet-American conflict are less evident in the second term when there is increasing emphasis on commonalities and shared interests. Again with Gorbachev, Reagan sees more potential for non-zero-sum interactions during his latter years in office. As Gorbachev began to admit some of the failings of the system he had inherited, Reagan saw opportunities for the two countries reduce tensions and perhaps end the arms race. In 1988, Reagan stated that he hoped the United States could assist Gorbachev and the Soviet Union improve their economic situation "And that, I think, is preferable to staging a kind of contest with him so that someone looks
like a winner or loser" (WCPD, 1988, p.557). Reagan does not match the "type B" actor who sees conflict as exclusively zero-sum. The significance of this deviation from the predicted response will be discussed in the summary of this section.

Summary code: -,-

1st Term → 2nd Term: Shift from mixed-sum to predominantly non-zero-sum.

**What is the scope of the conflict?** Reagan sees issues as highly linked. Merely reducing the number of strategic weapons in the world will not end conflict in the world. Instead, all issues must be addressed in order to find lasting peace. Issues of human rights within the Soviet Union and Soviet behaviour around the globe are intrinsically linked to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. This theme is heightened in the second term when negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union became more intense and far-reaching and Reagan believes that the United States is bargaining from a position of power.

Summary code: +,++

1st Term → 2nd Term: No substantial change, increasing emphasis in 2nd term.

**What is the role of conflict in historical development?** Evidence for this belief is limited but there are indications that Reagan saw conflict as unappealing but sometimes necessary to achieve important goals. Reagan praises "freedom fighters" everywhere who are struggling against dictatorship and oppression. Conflict, such as the war in El Salvador, are noble struggles for freedom which should be supported by nations of the
"free" world. No change is detected over the course of the eight years. Summary code: +,+ 1st Term → 2nd Term: No change.

Scenario of major danger of war? Again, evidence for this is less obvious. Reagan does mention the possibility of war beginning through miscalculation or misperception. He states that mutual "suspicion" and "mistrust" has fuelled a dangerous arms race. He also states that a strong American military presence and sense of purpose has made the world is a less dangerous place because there is less of a chance that the Soviets would underestimate American resolve. Such underestimation could lead the Soviets to attempt an action which could lead to war. There is little indication that this belief underwent any alteration. Summary code: +,0 1st Term → 2nd Term: Inconclusive evidence about change.

What is the nature of the adversary? Ideology plays a dominating role in Soviet policy, both internal and external. The Soviet Union is not merely pursuing traditional national interests through expansionist policies, they are, by the very nature of their system, a threat to all other states in the world. The ideology, politics, and institutions of communism are inherently immoral. Soviet actions are determined by their ideology and are carefully planned by a calculating leadership. Ideology becomes less of a factor during Reagan’s last four years however, there are still comments on the inherent evil
nature of the communist system. While this system is intact, the Americans and the Soviets will remain adversaries.

Summary code: + +,+

1st Term → 2nd Term: Decreasing references to ideology in 2nd term; in both terms communist system determines Soviet foreign policy.

What are the goals of the adversary? The goals of the Soviet Union are clearly expansionist and even destructionist. There is no doubt that the objective of Soviet communism as determined by Marxist-Leninist ideology is to create a "one-world" communist state. In his second term Reagan may have begun to reassess this belief. Although he still comments on the aggressive nature of Soviet goals up until the end of his presidency, he begins to allude to other possible, more defensive goals. Shimko documented similar findings in his analysis of Reagan's operational code. He found an equal number of statements for both terms which alluded to the expansionist or destructionist nature of Soviet goals. However, for term two he found more comments which suggested the Soviets may be pursuing other, unspecified types of objectives (Shimko, 1992, p.362).

Summary code: + +,+

1st Term → 2nd Term: No significant change.

How will the adversary respond to conciliatory policies? The Soviets view American policies of appeasement and placation as a sign of weakness and lack of resolve. Such policies have, in the past, encouraged the Soviets to actively pursue expansion and to
further their attempts to gain strategic superiority by building up weapons unchecked.

Summary code: ++,+ 

1st Term → 2nd Term: No significant change.

How will the adversary respond to policies of firmness?

The world is a less dangerous place when the United States is militarily strong and willing to back up their commitments, because there is less of a chance that the Soviets will underestimate American resolve. Soviet action is contained and deterred by American policies of firmness and commitment around the world. This belief does not undergo any change over the course of the eight years rather, it is reinforced by compliant Soviet behaviour in the late 1980's.

Summary code: ++,+ +

1st Term → 2nd term: No significant change; belief is reinforced by Soviet behaviour in 2nd term.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the political universe?</td>
<td>Conflict is temporary; in a world of peaceful states there will be peace.</td>
<td>Political life is a mixture of conflict and harmony; common interests among all states exist.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the basic sources of conflict?</td>
<td>Warlike states or classes of states.</td>
<td>USSR, communism, totalitarianism are the sources of conflict in world.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the conditions of peace?</td>
<td>Containment, reform, or elimination of warlike actors.</td>
<td>Peace requires a strong U.S. military presence; modify Soviet behaviour</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of conflict?</td>
<td>Zero-sum.</td>
<td>Conflict is a mixed-sum game; both sides can be winners or losers.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the scope of conflict?</td>
<td>Issues tend to be closely linked.</td>
<td>Issues are highly linked.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the role of conflict in historical development?</td>
<td>Very functional in some circumstances.</td>
<td>Conflict is sometimes necessary to achieve important goals.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers represent the frequency with which each theme appeared in all sixteen documents coded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario of major danger of war.</td>
<td>War from miscalculation; &quot;appeasement model&quot;.</td>
<td>Soviet under-estimation of American commitment could lead to war.</td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>+ 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the adversary?</td>
<td>High correlation between disposition/attributes and foreign policy; actions ensue from careful planning.</td>
<td>Ideology, politics and institutions of communism determine the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union.</td>
<td>11 4</td>
<td>++ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the goals of the adversary?</td>
<td>Expansionist to destructionist; arise from basic features of regime.</td>
<td>Destructionist/ expansionist; creation of a one-world communist state.</td>
<td>6 4</td>
<td>++ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the adversary respond to conciliatory policies?</td>
<td>View as sign of weakness, lack of commitment; encouraged to seek expansion.</td>
<td>Conciliatory policies are regarded as signs of weakness and lack of resolve.</td>
<td>4 1</td>
<td>++ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will the adversary respond to policies of firmness?</td>
<td>Likely to be deterred from pursuing expansionist policies.</td>
<td>Soviet action is contained and deterred by American policies of firmness.</td>
<td>4 3</td>
<td>++ ++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY: From the evidence above, Reagan fits the "type B" political actor very closely in all areas except in how he perceives conflict. In this one area, Reagan more closely matches the type C actor who conceives of conflict in mixed (zero-sum and non-zero-sum). As will be discussed below, this difference in his conception of conflict may well be an important one.

In many respects, Reagan's operational code beliefs about the nature of the international system and the character of the Soviet Union resemble those of the later (post-1940) John Foster Dulles to a remarkable degree. Dulles also fits the type B political actor model notably well. Dulles's beliefs are consistent with the two defining criteria of the type B actor that: a) the international environment is potentially harmonious; and b) the source of conflict is to be found in the nature or attributes of certain state actors (Holsti, 1977, p.194). There is also a religious undercurrent in Dulles. Conflict is often characterized in terms of morality, and the nature of foreign policy is determined by the "spiritual qualities" of those who formulate it.

Dulles and Reagan (especially 1981-1984), share a conceptual image of the Soviet Union as a rigid, aggressively expansionist state, slavishly following the dictates of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In his second major treatise on international politics, War or Peace, Dulles equated Stalin's Problems of Leninism with Hitler's Mein Kampf as a masterplan of goals, strategies, and tactics (Holsti, 1970, p.129-30). He also wrote that the main premise of communism is atheistic Godlessness and that the characteristics of Soviet leaders - insincerity, immorality, brutality and deceitfulness - were due to their atheism (Holsti, 1970, p.130).
The Soviet Union, which is for Dulles both a military and spiritual adversary, can only be deterred through firm military and moral commitment by the United States. Reagan and Dulles diverge however, on their beliefs about the nature of conflict. Where Reagan (in both terms), regards conflict in mixed-sum terms, Dulles perceives Soviet-American conflict in exclusively zero-sum terms. For Dulles, there is no room for compromise or negotiation because Cold War political issues are, at heart, moral issues.

His beliefs about the nature of the international system and the Soviet Union leads Dulles' instrumental beliefs to include several premises: a position of power is the key to success in dealing with communist leaders; all defined interests must be defended to preserve credibility; and when the adversary seeks negotiations it is a sign of weakness and one can and should push harder. It would be significant to determine if Reagan's belief about the nature of conflict (mixed as opposed to Dulles' zero-sum) leads to very different beliefs about the policies and tactics the United States should follow.

Using Reagan's first philosophical belief, it should possible to predict the remainder of his operational code, including his instrumental beliefs, with some degree of accuracy. From the limited evidence of this study, it appears that Reagan's beliefs can be predicted to closely match the majority of the hypotheses developed by Holsti. However, a full analysis of all Reagan's beliefs needs to be done in order to verify such as prediction.

V. DETECTING CHANGE IN REAGAN'S BELIEFS

The evidence indicates that Reagan's operational code beliefs about the nature of the international environment and the Soviet Union did not undergo significant change
between the years 1981-1984 and 1985-1989. However, there are indications of subtle shifts in some of Reagan's thinking. More precisely, there are tendencies which exist throughout his presidency which seem to become more predominant in the second term. These tendencies include a more optimistic appraisal of the international environment and a less rigid and simplistic view of the connection between ideology and Soviet policy.

These themes however, are not newly introduced elements within Reagan's operational code. Even in the documents from the first term there are indications of these beliefs. He makes comments about the existence of common interests of "ordinary" people across the globe throughout both terms. And, although during the first term he emphasizes the role of ideology as the sole source of Soviet policy, there are also a few comments about the possibilities of Soviet fear and mutual suspicions exacerbating the arms race. Even in his first term he was willing to entertain the notion that the Soviets were motivated by something other than ideology and the goal of the "one-world" communist state.

It appears, from the evidence of this study, that Reagan did not undergo any fundamental alterations of his operational code in response to the new situation in the Soviet Union. Despite evidence of dramatic changes occurring within the communist bloc, Reagan remained cautious, even sceptical.

In his study, Shimko argues that the most consistently hardline element in his image of the Soviet Union, their inherent untrustworthiness, does not undergo any significant change during his time in office. In fact, Shimko found no statements reflecting trust in the Soviet Union or its leaders for either term (1992, p.368). In this
study, statements regarding trust in the second term always had the same theme: "trust but verify". He was not taking any chances with the Soviets, especially in reference to treaties. It appears Reagan was never willing to trust the Soviets completely.

If his operational code did not undergo any significant changes, how did Reagan incorporate new information about a dramatically different situation? The answer appears to be that he simply emphasized the optimistic elements of his code which were pre-existing. In some sense, many of his beliefs were confirmed by the new Soviet policy under Gorbachev. The world was becoming safer and more peaceful because the Soviet Union had begun to moderate its policies.

For Reagan, there was reason to believe that the Soviets were forced to reform their behaviour not only because of internal economic collapse, but because of his administration. In his memoirs he stated that his government was going to send a powerful message to the Soviets, and let them know that there were "some new fellows in Washington who had a realistic view of what they were up to and weren't going to let them keep it up" (Reagan, 1990, p.45).

If Reagan believed that the actions of his government were, in large measure, responsible for the change in Soviet behaviour, there would be no pressure to change his beliefs in any significant manner. In many respects Reagan may have even felt vindicated. Democracy was winning over communism, good had triumphed over evil.

In this study and in Shimko’s study of Reagan, little evidence was found that Reagan’s beliefs underwent any significant change. Yet such a finding should not be generalized to include all "type B" political actors. It appears that John Foster Dulles (also a "type B" actor) did undergo significant changes in his operational code beliefs
from pre-1940 to post-1940. Most significant of these changes is his change in belief about the source of international conflict, one of the defining criteria of the typology.

Holsti (1970), found that pre-1940 Dulles regarded man's selfish and emotional nature as the source of all social dynamics including conflict (p.126). Yet, in his examination of Dulles' post-1940 beliefs, Holsti (1970, 1977) found that the actions and attributes of certain states were the source of conflict. Dulles appears to have changed his beliefs about the source of conflict in the international environment. This was a very significant transformation of his operational code. This shift in beliefs was accompanied by increased emphasis on applying Christian principles to political problems (Holsti, 1970, p.129). For Dulles, Marxism-Leninism, an atheistic philosophy, became the fundamental threat to international peace and security. The source of conflict was no longer in human nature but in the clash between conflicting faiths, Communism versus Christianity (Holsti, 1970, p.130).

More research must be done on change within operational codes. What causes an actor to modify his beliefs? What is the significance of such changes in terms of policy decision-making? Answering these questions could provide more depth to the operational code construct and help to explain actor's policy choices at different points in time.
The implications of this study (which are reinforced by Shimko’s study) include the premise that even when faced with a large amount of evidence, some political actors resist change in their belief systems. From this study it appears that the first philosophical belief, considered by many to be a "master" belief, is held with a considerable degree of rigidity. It is not evident however, if this is equally true for all "types" of actors as defined in the typology. More research on change in operational code for a variety of actor "types" is necessary to determine if rigidity with which beliefs are held can be predicted based on an actor’s "type". This may require further research on cognitive structures and the linkages between structure and content.

Several researchers have completed studies on Reagan which attempt to make some linkages. Shimko’s (1992) content analysis of all documents from Reagan’s eight years led him to define Reagan as an "uncommitted thinker" rather than an ideologue due to the presence of contradictory belief patterns.

Shimko argues that essentially, Reagan is an "uncommitted thinker". This does not mean he does not have firmly held beliefs, rather, he does not have one set of "consistent, mutually reinforcing beliefs relevant to U.S.-Soviet relations" (p.357). Reagan’s hard-line image of the Soviet Union is counteracted by his belief in the existence of underlying shared interests and potential for harmony in the world. Shimko
argues that while these views are not logically inconsistent, they do not reinforce each other in terms of their policy implications (p.375).

Uncommitted thinkers may tend to adopt different belief patterns for the same decision problem. They may also tend to oscillate between groups of advisors, siding with one group on one issue and with another on the next issue and so on (Shimko, 1992, p.358). Reagan, very often passive in the decision-making process, frequently left his advisors unclear as to which position he would support on various issues.

Betty Glad (1983), writing in the middle of Reagan’s first term, offers another analysis of Reagan. In her work, Glad defines Reagan’s cognitive style and relates it to his childhood experiences and resulting psychological make-up.

Her research has lead her to argue that Reagan is a "black and white" thinker who sees the world as a battle between the Americans and the Soviets, a battle between the forces of good and the forces of evil. Glad argues that this cognitive style is a result of his childhood experiences and ambivalent feelings towards his alcoholic father which he was never able to express. As a result, as a political actor, Reagan engages in displacement of anger and cognitive stereotyping, projecting negative feelings onto the culturally approved outgroup - the communists (p.68).

This cognitive style may have a significant impact on policy decision-making, states Glad, as "institutional and culture constraints are apt to be lacking when he [Reagan] projects outward on a culturally defined enemy (p.69). Reagan had made his

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5 Glad’s work ties in with similar work done in international relations on mirror-imaging and cultural stereo-typing. Political actors see their opponents as the mirror-image of themselves (right vs. wrong, good vs. bad) and employ rigid stereotypes in their assessments of opponent’s words and actions.
mandate clear when he came into office, and the political climate was favourable to his militant stance against the Soviets. This may have given him more options and freedom to act on his own than normally exists for a president.

A "black and white" thinker however, has little conceptual understanding about where to confront the enemy and where to make compromises. The rigidity with which he holds onto his conceptualizations of reality may also hinder any cognitive learning. Glad comments that "black and white" thinkers can tolerate behaviour which runs counter to their views by making tactical adaptations. However, these adaptations are most often made without any modifications in the categories through which they view the world (p.72). Perceptual changes may take place, but they require a large amount of negative evidence and they are slow to be realized. It is unclear from the evidence in this study whether Reagan merely made tactical adaptations to the new environment of the late 1980's, or whether he actually began the process of perceptual change.

It does seem clear that Reagan's fundamental beliefs about the nature of the international environment had not undergone significant alteration by 1989. Liberal, optimistic facets to his beliefs were in existence from his first days as president. These elements became more predominant as the situation in the Soviet Union was transformed. His beliefs remained intact with only minor shifts in emphasis. But what of his image of the Soviet Union? Beyond toning down his rhetoric, to do which, as he states in his memoirs, he had to make a "conscious decision" (1990, p.46), did Reagan's image of the Soviet Union undergo any substantial change?

The evidence is less than conclusive on this question. It seems likely that he continued to regard the Soviet Union with mistrust and some hostility. His positive
comments regarding Gorbachev may have been possible because he separated the leader from the rest of Soviet polity. Gorbachev was less of a villain because he was not "one of them". He acknowledged the problems of communism and he did not make references to the Soviet goal of world domination. This was enough to set him apart, to make him more acceptable to Reagan. His acceptance however, does not imply that Reagan changed any of his fundamental beliefs about the Soviet Union. In 1989, the Soviets were still a threat, albeit not as menacing as they were in 1981.

The question still remains. How did Reagan accommodate new, conflicting information about a changed Soviet Union into a pre-existing belief system? How did his beliefs guide his interpretation of the new evidence? This question is only partially answered by this research work. A fuller understanding may be achieved by determining whether Reagan more accurately fits Shimko’s description of an "uncommitted thinker" or Glad’s analysis of a "black and white thinker". Understanding his cognitive structures is essential for determining how Reagan deals with information which conflicts with his operational code beliefs.

On a more general note, how does this understanding of Reagan’s beliefs help researchers explain the decision-making process? Holsti’s typology may assist by permitting researchers to make some general predictions about different types of leaders. It appears from the typology that actors who view the world from different perspectives (philosophical questions), have different predispositions to policy prescriptions (instrumental questions). Understanding a political decision-maker’s type may help to explain past actions or predict future decision-making choices.
However, despite the lack of real change in Reagan's operational code, an actor's
type may not be a static phenomenon (as evidenced by the change in Dulles' beliefs).
Operational codes may shift in response to the changing nature of the international
environment, or to changes within the actor himself. "Typing" an actor might take on a
static quality which does not reflect actual fluctuations in belief-systems. Even for an
actor such as Reagan, who appears to hold his beliefs rigidly, noting shifts within his
beliefs may be important for understanding his stance on some issues. Even knowing
which elements of his code are being emphasized may be relevant in determining his
diagnostic and choice propensities.

In the final analysis, this study is still an isolated, primarily descriptive case study
of one political actor. However, many of the questions raised are important ones. There
is still much to be learned about political behaviour which can only be realized through
cognitive research. How individual actors perceive the world, their beliefs about their
political environment continues to play a significant role in how decisions are made.

For eight years Ronald Reagan played a principal part in the on-going drama of
international relations. His role was especially pivotal considering the changes in the
Soviet-American relationship which occurred during his presidency. Yet Reagan's
thinking about many issues appeared muddy, his discourse was often vague and
inconsistent, and frequently there was the disconcerting feeling that he was unclear
about the matter at hand.

Understanding Reagan's fundamental operational code beliefs about the nature of
the international environment and the Soviet Union is essential to clearing some of this
muddy water. Reagan, it appears, was not just a simplistic ideologue, a cold warrior
bent on destroying the Evil Empire. At the deepest level, Reagan held liberal, optimistic beliefs about the chances of global peace. His beliefs did not undergo any radical transformation as a result of the changes in the Soviet Union, Reagan still believed that communism was the focus of evil in the world. But Gorbachev admitted to faults in the system he had inherited, and he did not mention the goal of communist world domination. So, while Reagan could never come to trust Gorbachev, nor give up his dreams of a space defence system, he began to see hope for the future.

This hope was possible because of his underlying optimism and faith that international harmony could be achieved. These beliefs, which had always been part of his operational code, became more evident in the last few years of his presidency. While appearing inconsistent, there may be an internal logic to Reagan’s beliefs. If, in a world of peaceful states the world will be peaceful, the behaviour of aggressive states must be modified. Reagan sought to do just that. And on those terms, perhaps he was successful.
REFERENCES


_____. (1977). The "Operational Code" as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems. Final Report to the National Science Foundation, Grant SOC75-15368.


APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE OF HOLSTI'S (1977) CODING SHEETS
P-1 (a)

A. Nature of political life:
1. [ ] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ____________

B. Sources of conflict:
1. [ ] Human nature
2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology
2b. [ ] National attributes: Political
2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2d. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other: ____________

C. Conditions of peace:
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [ ] No reference
7. [ ] Other: ____________

D. Nature of conflict:
1. [ ] Zero-sum
2. [ ] Non-zero-sum
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ____________

E. Scope of conflict:
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ____________

F. Role of conflict in hist. devel.

G. Source of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events: ____________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [ ] No reference
A. Opponent's goals:
1. [ ] Destructionist
2. [ ] Expansionist
3. [ ] Defensive
4. [ ] Conciliatory
5. [ ] Peace
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other:_____________________

B. Source of opponent's policy:
1. [ ] Ideology
2. [ ] Historical
3. [ ] Internal needs
4. [ ] Leader
5. [ ] Power politics
6. [ ] External
7. [ ] No reference

C. Generality of adversary's position:
1. [ ] General/permanent
2. [ ] Specific/limited
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other:_____________________

D. Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions:
1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
3. [ ] Ignore
4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation
5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation
6. [ ] No reference

E. Likely response of adversary to one's own policies of firmness:
1. [ ] Back down
2. [ ] Ignore
3. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
4. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
5. [ ] Respond impulsively
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other:_____________________

F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:
1. [ ] Destructionist
2. [ ] Expansionist
3. [ ] Defensive
4. [ ] Conciliatory
5. [ ] Peace
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other:_____________________

G. Opponent's view of conflict:
1. [ ] Inevitable
2. [ ] Avoidable
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other:_____________________
1a.[ ] Desirable
2a.[ ] Undesirable
3a.[ ] No reference
4a.[ ] Other:_____________________

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H. Opponent's decision-making process:
1. [ ] Model I - unitary rational actor
2. [ ] Model II - organizational process
3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: _______________
1a. [ ] Calculating
2a. [ ] Impulsive
3a. [ ] No reference
4a. [ ] Other: _______________

I. Opponent's op code: Choice of Objectives:
1. [ ] Optimize
2. [ ] Satisfice
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other: _______________
1a. [ ] Realistic
2a. [ ] Unrealistic
3a. [ ] No reference
4a. [ ] Other: _______________

J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives
1. [ ] Prepare ground
2. [ ] Try and see
3. [ ] Incremental
4. [ ] Blitzkrieg
5. [ ] No reference
6. [ ] Other: _______________

K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:
1. [ ] Maximize gains
2. [ ] Minimize losses
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other: _______________

L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:

M. Terms used to describe opponent and actions:

N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific events: _______________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [ ] No reference
8. [ ] Other: _______________
A. Nature of contemporary international system:
1. [ ] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:______________

B. Sources of conflict:
1. [ ] Human nature
2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology
2b. [ ] National attributes: Political
2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2d. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other:______________

C. Conditions of peace:
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [ ] No reference
7. [ ] Other:______________

D. Structure of international system:
1. [ ] Polarized
2. [ ] Pluralistic
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other:______________

E. Stability of the system:
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:______________

G. Source of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events:______________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [ ] No reference
APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF CODED DOCUMENT
Document Identification Information

1. Identification number assigned: 7
2. Author: RONALD REAGAN / SPEECH WRITERS
3. Date: JUNE 8, 1982
4. Type of document: ADDRESS TO BRITISH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
5. Audience: BRITISH PARLIAMENT
6. Date document first made public: 
7. Additional information about the circumstances surrounding preparation of the document:
8. Source in which coded version of the document found:
   Title: WCPO
   Author, editor, compiler: GOVT PRINTING OFFICE
   Publisher: 
   Place of publication: WASHINGTON
   Date of publication: 
   Page(s): 764-770
This is my second visit to Great Britain as President of the United States. My first opportunity to stand on British soil occurred almost a year and a half ago when your Prime Minister graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at the British Embassy in Washington. Mrs. Thatcher said then that she hoped I was not distressed to find staring down at me from the grand staircase a portrait of His Royal Majesty King George III. She suggested it was best to let bygones be bygones, and in view of our two countries' remarkable friendship in succeeding years, she added that most Englishmen today would agree with Thomas Jefferson that "a little rebellion now and then is a very good thing." [Laughter]

Well, from here I will go to Bonn and then Berlin, where there stands a grim symbol of power untamed. The Berlin Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the city, is in its third decade. It is the fitting signature of the regime that built it.

And a few hundred kilometers behind the Berlin Wall, there is another symbol. In the center of Warsaw, there is a sign that notes the distances to two capitals. In one direction it points toward Moscow. In the other it points toward Brussels, headquarters of Western Europe's tangible unity. The marker says that the distances from Warsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are equal. The sign makes this point: Poland is not East or West. Poland is at the center of European civilization. It has contributed mightily to that civilization. It is doing so today by being magnificently unreconciled to oppression.

Poland's struggle to be Poland and to secure the basic rights we often take for granted demonstrates why we cannot take those rights for granted. Gladstone, defending the Reform Bill of 1866, declared, "You cannot fight against the future. Time is on our side." It was easier to believe in the march of democracy in Gladstone's day—in that high noon of Victorian optimism.

[We're approaching the end of a bloody century plagued by a terrible political invention—totalitarianism.] Optimism comes less easily today, not because democracy is less vigorous, but because democracy's enemies have refined their instruments of repression. Yet optimism is in order, because
day by day democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-all-fragile flower. From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

11 The strength of the Solidarity movement in Poland demonstrates the truth told in an underground joke in the Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union would remain a one-party nation even if an opposition party were permitted, because everyone would join the opposition party. [Laughter]

12 America's time as a player on the stage of world history has been brief. I think understanding this fact has always made you patient with your younger cousins—well, not always patient. I do recall that once, Sir Winston Churchill said in exasperation about one of our most distinguished diplomats: "He is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him."

[Laughter]

13 But witty as Sir Winston was, he also had that special attribute of great statesmen—the gift of vision, the willingness to see the future based on the experience of the past. It is this sense of history, this understanding of the past that I want to talk with you about today, for it is in remembering what we share of the past that our two nations can make common cause for the future.

14 We have not inherited an easy world. If developments like the Industrial Revolution, which began here in England, and the gifts of science and technology have made life much easier for us, they have also made it more dangerous. There are threats now to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never have imagined.

15 There is first the threat of global war. No President, no Congress, no Prime Minister, no Parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don't have to tell you that in today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. That's why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and unshakable, and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides.

16 At the same time there is a threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state. History teaches the dangers of government that overreaches—political control taking precedence over free economic growth, secret police, mindless bureaucracy, all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal freedom.

17 Now, I'm aware that among us here and throughout Europe there is legitimate disagreement over the extent to which the public sector should play a role in a nation's economy and life. But on one point all of us are united—our abhorrence of dictatorship in all its forms, but most particularly totalitarianism and the terrible inhumanities it has caused in our time—the great purge, Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag, and Cambodia.

18 Historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the West. They will note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear monopoly in the forties and early fifties for territorial or imperial gain. That nuclear monopoly has been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe—indeed, the world—would look very different today. And certainly they will note it was not the democracies that invaded Afghanistan or suppressed Polish Solidarity or used chemical and toxin warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

19 If history teaches anything it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly. We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma—predictions of doomsday, antinuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must, for its own protection, be an unwilling participant. At the same time we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom
Sir Winston Churchill refused to accept the inevitability of war or even that it was imminent. He said, "I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries."

Well, this is precisely our mission today: to preserve freedom as well as peace. It may not be easy to see; but I believe we live now at a turning point.

In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union[22] is the Soviet Union that runs again the tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens[23]. It also is in deep economic difficulty. The rate of growth in the national product has been steadily declining since the fifties and is less than half of what it was then.

The dimensions of this failure are astounding: A country which employs one-fifth of its population in agriculture is unable to feed its own people. Were it not for the private sector, the tiny private sector tolerated in Soviet agriculture, the country might be on the brink of famine. These private plots occupy a bare 3 percent of the arable land but account for nearly one-quarter of Soviet food output and nearly one-third of meat products and vegetables. Overcentralized, with little or no incentives, year after year the Soviet system pours its best resource into the making of instruments of destruction. The constant shrinkage of economic growth combined with the growth of military production is putting a heavy strain on the Soviet people. What we see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where productive forces are hampered by political ones[26].

The decay of the Soviet experiment should come as no surprise to us. Wherever the comparisons have been made between free and closed societies—West Germany and East Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Vietnam—it is the democratic countries which are prosperous and responsive to the needs of their people. And one of the simple but overwhelming facts of our time is this: Of all the millions of refugees we've seen in the modern world, their flight is always away from, not toward the Communist world. Today on the NATO line, our military forces face east to prevent a possible invasion. On the other side of the line, the Soviet forces also face east to prevent their people from leaving.

The hard evidence of totalitarian rule has caused in mankind an uprising of the intellect and will. Whether it is the growth of the new schools of economics in America or England or the appearance of the so-called new philosophers in France, there is one unifying thread running through the intellectual work of these groups—rejection of the arbitrary power of the state, the refusal to subordinate the rights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivism stifles all the best human impulses.

Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of those who sacrificed and struggled for freedom—the stand at Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw uprising in World War II. More recently we've seen evidence of this same human impulse in one of the developing nations in Central America. For months and months the world news media covered the fighting in El Salvador. Day after day we were treated to stories and film slanted toward the brave freedom-fighters battling oppressive government forces in behalf of the silent, suffering people of that tortured country.

And then one day those silent, suffering people were offered a chance to vote, to choose the kind of government they wanted. Suddenly the freedom-fighters in the hills were exposed for what they really are—Cuban-backed guerrillas who want power for themselves, and their backers, not democracy for the people. They threatened death to any who voted, and destroyed hundreds of buses and trucks to
keep the people from getting to the polling places. But on election day, the people of El Salvador, an unprecedented 1.4 million of them, braved ambush and gunfire, and trudged for miles to vote for freedom.

They stood for hours in the hot sun waiting for their turn to vote. Members of our Congress who went there as observers told me of a woman who was wounded by rifle fire on the way to the polls, who refused to leave the line to have her wound treated until after she had voted. A grandmother, who had been told by the guerrillas she would be killed when she returned from the polls, and she told the guerrillas, "You can kill me, you can kill my family, kill my neighbors, but you can't kill us all." The real freedom-fighters of El Salvador turned out to be the people of that country—the young, the old, the in-between.

Strange, but in my own country there's been little if any news coverage of that war since the election. Now, perhaps they'll say it—well, because there are newer struggles now.

On distant islands in the South Atlantic, young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren't fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause—for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and the people must participate in the decisions of government—[applause]—the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodletting of World War II.

In the Middle East now the guns sound once more, this time in Lebanon, a country that for too long has had to endure the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and foreign intervention and occupation. The fighting in Lebanon on the part of all parties must stop, and Israel should bring its forces home. But this is not enough. We must all work to stamp out the scourge of terrorism that in the Middle East makes war an ever-present threat.

But beyond the trouble spots lies a deeper, more positive pattern. Around the world today, the democratic revolution is gathering new strength. In India a critical test has been passed with the peaceful change of governing political parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving into remarkable and unmistakable ways to build and strengthen its democratic institutions. In the Caribbean and Central America, 16 of 24 countries have freely elected governments. And in the United Nations, 8 of the 10 developing nations which have joined that body in the past 5 years are democracies.

In the Communist world as well, man's instinctive desire for freedom and self-determination surfaces again and again. To be sure, there are grim reminders of how brutally the police state attempts to stuff out this quest for self-rule—1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 in Poland. But the struggle continues in Poland. And we know that there are even those who strive and suffer for freedom within the confines of the Soviet Union itself. How we conduct ourselves here in the Western democracies will determine whether this trend continues.

No, democracy is not a fragile flower. Still it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.

Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in right-wing dictatorships, but not in Communist regimes. Well, to accept this preposterous notion—as some well-meaning people have—is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. We reject this course.

As for the Soviet view, Chairman Brezhnev repeatedly has stressed that the competition of ideas and systems must continue and that this is entirely consistent with relaxation of tensions and peace.

Well, we ask only that these systems begin by living up to their own constitutions, abiding by their own laws, and complying with the international obligations they have undertaken. We ask only for a process, a direction, a basic code of decency, not for an instant transformation.

We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement there has been and
will continue to be repeated explosions against repression and dictatorships. The Soviet Union itself is not immune to this reality. Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its leaders. In such cases, the very repressive-ness of the state ultimately drives people to resist it, if necessary, by force. We in America now intend to take additional steps, as many of our allies have already done, toward realizing this same goal. The chairmen and other leaders of the National Republican and Democratic Party organizations are initiating a study with the bipartisan American political foundation to determine how the United States can best contribute as a nation to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force. They will have the cooperation of congressional leaders of both parties, along with representatives of business, labor, and other major institutions in our society. I look forward to receiving their recommendations and to working with these institutions and the Congress in the common task of strengthening democracy throughout the world.

It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation—in both the public and private sectors—to assisting democratic development. We plan to consult with leaders of other nations as well. Here is a proposal before the Council of Europe to invite parliamentarians from democratic countries to a meeting next year in Strasbourg. That prestigious gathering could consider ways to help democratic political movements.

This November in Washington there will take place an international meeting on free elections. And next spring there will be a conference of world authorities on constitutionalism and self-government hosted by the Chief Justice of the United States. Authorities from a number of developing and developed countries—judges, philosophers, and politicians with practical experience—have agreed to explore how to turn principle into practice and further the rule of law.

At the same time, we invite the Soviet Union to consider with us how the competition of ideas and values—which it is committed to support—can be conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal basis. For example, I am prepared to offer President Brezhnev an opportunity to speak to the American people on our television if he will allow me the same opportunity with the Soviet people. We also suggest that panels of our
These ideals that have done so much to ease the plight of man and the hardships of our imperfect world. This reluctance to use these vast resources at our command reminds me of the elderly lady whose home was bombed in the Blitz. As the rescuers moved about, they found a bottle of brandy she’d stored behind the staircase, which was all that was left standing. And since she was barely conscious, one of the workers pulled the cork to give her a taste of it. She came around immediately and said, “Here now—there now, put it back. That’s for emergencies.” [Laughter]

Well, the emergency is upon us. Let us be shy no longer. Let us go to our strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell the world that a new age is not only possible but probable.

During the dark days of the Second World War, when this island was incandescent with courage, Winston Churchill explained about Britain’s adversaries. “What kind of a people do they think we are?” Well, Britain’s adversaries found out what extraordinary people the British are. But all the democracies paid a terrible price for allowing the dictators to underestimate us. We dare not make that mistake again. So, let us ask ourselves, “What kind of people do we think we are?” And let us answer, “Free people, worthy of freedom and determined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well.”

Sir Winston led his people to great victory in war and then lost an election just as the fruits of victory were about to be enjoyed. But he left office honorably, and, as it turned out, temporarily, knowing that the liberty of his people was more important than the fate of any single leader. History recalls his greatness in ways no dictator will ever know. And he left us a message of hope for the future, as timely now as when he first uttered it, as opposition leader in the Commons nearly 27 years ago, when he said, “When we look back on all the perils through which we have passed and at the mighty foes that we have laid low and all the dark and deadly designs that we have frustrated, why should we fear for our future? We have,” he said, “come safely through the worst.”

Well, the task I’ve set forth will long outlive our own generation. But together, we
too have come through the worst. Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best—a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny.

Thank you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:14 p.m. in the Royal Gallery at the Palace of Westminster.

On the previous evening, the President was greeted by Queen Elizabeth II in an arrival ceremony at Windsor Castle, near Windsor, England. Later, the Queen hosted a private dinner for the President.

On the morning of June 8, the President and the Queen spent part of the morning horseback riding on the Windsor Castle grounds.

London, England

Toasts at a Luncheon Honoring the President. June 8, 1982

The Prime Minister. We are here today to welcome and to honor our great ally, the United States of America, Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, it's a privilege and a pleasure to have you both here with us. It's rare enough to have an American President as a guest at Number 10, but we researchers have been unable to find out when we last had the honor of the First Lady at Number 10 as well.

President and Mrs. Reagan, your presence gives me and, indeed, many of our guests a chance to repay as best we can the hospitality you bestowed on us when we were your first official guests from abroad at the beginning of your Presidential term of office. I realize, of course, that you've both become accustomed recently to taking your meals in rather grander places—[laughter]—the Palace of Versailles and Windsor Castle. As you can see, this is a very simple house, one which has witnessed the shaping of our shared history since it first became the abode of Prime Ministers in 1732.

Mr. President, some of us were present this morning to hear your magnificent speech to members of both Houses of Parliament in the historic setting of the Royal Gallery. It was, if I may say so, respectfully, a triumph. We are so grateful to you for putting freedom on the offensive, which is where it should be. You wrote a new chapter in our history—no longer on the defensive but on the offensive. It was, if I might say so, an exceedingly hard act to follow. [Laughter] But I will try to be brief.

Much has been said and written over the years, Mr. President, about the relations between our two countries. And there's no need for me to add to the generalities on the subject today, because we've had before our eyes in recent weeks the most concrete expression of what, in practice, our friendship means. I refer to your awareness of our readiness to resist aggression in the Falklands even at great sacrifice and to our awareness of your readiness to give support to us even at considerable costs to American interests.

It is this preparedness on both sides for sacrifices in the common interest and, indeed, in the wider interest that characterizes our partnership. And I should like to pay tribute to you, Mr. President, and to you, Mr. Secretary Haig, whom I also greet here heartily today, and through you to the American people for your predictably generous response.

Believe me, Mr. President, we don't take it for granted. We are grateful from the depth of our national being for your tremendous efforts in our support.

Mr. President, your mission to London and to other capitals of Europe is a remarkable one, and we are fully conscious both of its symbolism and of its substance.

From the day you took office, you were determined to breathe new life into the Alliance. One of your predecessors, also much loved in this, our country, President Eisenhower, put it so well when he said, "One truth must rule all we think and all we do. The unity of all who dwell in freedom is their only sure defense."

You recognized how central your allies were to American interests, and vice versa.
A. Nature of contemporary int. system:
1. [X] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:

B. Sources of conflict:
1a. [ ] Human nature
1b. [X] National attributes: Ideology
2a. [ ] National attributes: Political
2b. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2c. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other:

C. Conditions of peace:
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [X] No reference
7. [ ] Other:

D. Structure of international system:
1. [ ] Polarized
2. [ ] Pluralistic
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other:

E. Stability of the system:
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other:

G. Source of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events:
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
A. **Nature of contemporary int. system:**
1. [ ] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [X] Harmonious
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other:  

B. **Sources of conflict:**
1. [ ] Human nature
2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology
2b. [ ] National attributes: Political
2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2d. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [X] Other **Military Technology**

C. **Conditions of peace:**
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [X] Transform international system
6. [X] No reference
7. [ ] Other:  

D. **Structure of international system:**
1. [ ] Polarized
2. [ ] Pluralistic
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other:  

E. **Stability of the system:**
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other:  

G. **Source of knowledge/evidence:**
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events:  
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
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<td>3d. [ ] International System: Power politics</td>
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<td>4. [ ] Balance of power</td>
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<td>5. [ ] Transform international system</td>
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<td>6. [ ] No reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. [ ] Other: __________________</td>
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### A. Nature of contemporary int. system:
1. [ ] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other:

### B. Sources of conflict:

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<td>2c.</td>
<td>[ ] National attributes: Economic</td>
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### C. Conditions of peace:
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [X] No reference
7. [ ] Other:

### D. Structure of international system:
1. [ ] Polarized
2. [ ] Pluralistic
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other: ________________
5. [ ] Other:

### E. Stability of the system:
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ________________

### G. Source of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events: ________________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
P-1 (c)

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<th>D. Structure of international system:</th>
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<th>E. Stability of the system:</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1. [ ] All issues are linked</td>
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<td>2. [ ] Trends</td>
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<td>5. [ ] Other_______________________</td>
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<td>6. [ ] Faith</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. [ ] Education/communication</td>
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<td>2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)</td>
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P-1 (b)

Coded: EDGAR Doc. No.: 7 Page No.: 765 Para No.: 18 Coding Sheet No.: 6
Issue: TOTALITARIANISM Adversary: COMMUNIST STATES
Specific Circumstances: NUCLEAR MONOPOLY

A. Opponent's goals:
1. [ ] Destructionist
2. [ ] Expansionist
3. [ ] Defensive
4. [ ] Conciliatory
5. [ ] Peace
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other: ____________

B. Source of opponent's policy:
1. [ ] Ideology
2. [ ] Historical
3. [ ] Internal needs
4. [ ] Leader
5. [ ] Power politics
6. [ ] External
7. [ ] No reference

C. Generality of adversary's position:
1. [ ] General/permanent
2. [ ] Specific/limited
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other: ____________

D. Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions:
1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
3. [ ] Ignore
4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation
5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation
6. [ ] No reference

E. Likely response of adversary to one's own policies of firmness:
1. [ ] Back down
2. [ ] Ignore
3. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
4. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
5. [ ] Respond impulsively
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other: ____________

F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:
1. [ ] Destructionist
2. [ ] Expansionist
3. [ ] Defensive
4. [ ] Conciliatory
5. [ ] Peace
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other: ____________

G. Opponent's view of conflict:
1. [ ] Inevitable
2. [ ] Avoidable
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other: ____________

1a. [ ] Desirable
2a. [ ] Undesirable
3a. [ ] No reference
4a. [ ] Other: ____________
H. Opponent's decision-making process:
1. [ ] Model I - unitary rational actor
2. [ ] Model II - organizational process
3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: __________________________
   1a.[ ] Calculating
   2a.[ ] Impulsive
   3a.[X] No reference
   4a.[ ] Other: __________________________

I. Opponent's op code: Choice of Objectives:
1. [X] Optimize
2. [ ] Satisfice
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other: __________________________
   1a.[ ] Realistic
   2a.[ ] Unrealistic
   3a.[X] No reference
   4a.[ ] Other: __________________________
   1b.[ ] Flexible
   2b.[ ] Inflexible
   3b.[X] No reference
   4b.[ ] Other: __________________________

J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives
1. [ ] Prepare ground
2. [ ] Try and see
3. [ ] Incremental
4. [ ] Blitzkrieg
5. [X] No reference
6. [ ] Other: __________________________

K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:
1. [X] Maximize gains
2. [ ] Minimize losses
3. [ ] No reference
4. [ ] Other: __________________________

L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:

M. Terms used to describe opponent and actions: invaded, suppressed, used chemical and toxic warfare

N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [X] Specific events: Afghanistan, Poland
6. [ ] Faith
7. [ ] No reference
8. [ ] Other: __________________________
### Specific Circumstances:

#### A. Nature of political life:
1. [X] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: _______________

#### B. Sources of conflict:
1. [ ] Human nature
2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology
2b. [X] National attributes: Political
2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2d. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other: _______________

#### C. Conditions of peace:
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [X] No reference
7. [ ] Other: _______________

#### D. Nature of conflict:
1. [ ] Zero-sum
2. [ ] Non-zero-sum
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other: _______________

#### E. Scope of conflict:
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other: _______________

#### F. Role of conflict in hist. devel.
1. [ ] Necessary
2. [ ] Functional
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] Dysfunctional
5. [X] No reference
6. [ ] Other: _______________

#### G. Source of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events: _______________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
**P-1 (b)**

**Coder:** EDGAR  
**Doc. No.:** 7  
**Page No.:** 765  
**Para No.:** 19  
**Coding Sheet No.:** 8

**Issue:**

**Specific Circumstances:** FIGHTING AGAINST TOTALITARIAN FORCES

**A. Opponent's goals:**

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<td>5.</td>
<td>[ ] Peace</td>
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<td>6.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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**B. Source of opponent's policy:**

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<td>3.</td>
<td>[ ] Internal needs</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>[ ] Leader</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>[ ] Power politics</td>
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<td>6.</td>
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**C. Generality of adversary's position:**

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<td>3.</td>
<td>[ ] No reference</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>[ ] Other:</td>
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**D. Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions:**

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<td>2.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>[ ] Ignore</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>[ ] Take advantage - this situation</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>[ ] Take advantage - other situation</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[X] No reference</td>
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**E. Likely response of adversary to one's own policies of firmness:**

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[ ] Back down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[ ] Ignore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[ ] Reciprocate - this situation</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>[X] Reciprocate - other situations</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>[ ] Respond impulsively</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[X] No Reference</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>[ ] Other:</td>
<td></td>
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**F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:**

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[ ] Destructionist</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>[ ] Expansionist</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[ ] Defensive</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[ ] Conciliatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[ ] Peace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[X] No Reference</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>[ ] Other:</td>
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**G. Opponent's view of conflict:**

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[X] Inevitable</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>[ ] Avoidable</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>[ ] No reference</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>[ ] Other:</td>
<td></td>
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|   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1a. | [X] Desirable |   |   |
| 2a. | Undesirable |   |   |
| 3a. | [ ] No reference |   |   |
| 4a. | [ ] Other: |   |   |
H. Opponent's decision-making process:
1. [ ] Model I - unitary rational actor
2. [ ] Model II - organizational process
3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ________________
   la. [ ] Calculating
   2a. [ ] Impulsive
   3a. [X] No reference
   4a. [ ] Other: ________________

I. Opponent's op code: Choice of Objectives:
1. [ ] Optimize
2. [ ] Satisfice
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other: ________________
   1a. [ ] Realistic
   2a. [ ] Unrealistic
   3a. [X] No reference
   4a. [ ] Other: ________________
   1b. [ ] Flexible
   2b. [ ] Inflexible
   3b. [X] No reference
   4b. [ ] Other: ________________

J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives
1. [ ] Prepare ground
2. [ ] Try and see
3. [ ] Incremental
4. [ ] Blitzkrieg
5. [X] No reference
6. [ ] Other: ________________

K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:
1. [ ] Maximize gains
2. [ ] Minimize losses
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other: ________________

L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:

M. Terms used to describe opponent and actions: SUBVERSION, CONFLICT, BARBAROUS ASSAULT ON THE HUMAN SPIRIT

N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific events: ________________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
8. [ ] Other: ________________
A. **Opponent's goals:**
   1. [ ] Destructionist
   2. [ ] Expansionist
   3. [ ] Defensive
   4. [ ] Conciliatory
   5. [ ] Peace
   6. [X] No Reference
   7. [ ] Other: ______________________

B. **Source of opponent's policy:**
   1. [ ] Ideology
   2. [ ] Historical
   3. [ ] Internal needs
   4. [ ] Leader
   5. [X] Power politics
   6. [ ] External
   7. [ ] No reference

C. **Generality of adversary's position:**
   1. [ ] General/permanent
   2. [ ] Specific/limited
   3. [X] No reference
   4. [ ] Other: ______________________

D. **Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions:**
   1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
   2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
   3. [ ] Ignore
   4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation
   5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation
   6. [X] No reference

E. **Likely response of adversary to one's own policies of firmness:**
   1. [ ] Back down
   2. [ ] Ignore
   3. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
   4. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
   5. [ ] Respond impulsively
   6. [X] No Reference
   7. [ ] Other: ______________________

F. **Opponent's image of one's own nation:**
   1. [ ] Destructionist
   2. [ ] Expansionist
   3. [ ] Defensive
   4. [ ] Conciliatory
   5. [ ] Peace
   6. [X] No Reference
   7. [ ] Other: ______________________

G. **Opponent's view of conflict:**
   1. [ ] Inevitable
   2. [ ] Avoidable
   3. [X] No reference
   4. [ ] Other: ______________________
### H. Opponent's decision-making process:

1. [x] Model I - unitary rational actor
2. [ ] Model II - organizational process
3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ____________________________

1a. [x] Calculating
2a. [ ] Impulsive
3a. [ ] No reference
4a. [ ] Other: ____________________________

### J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives

1. [ ] Prepare ground
2. [ ] Try and see
3. [ ] Incremental
4. [ ] Blitzkrieg
5. [x] No reference
6. [ ] Other: ____________________________

### K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:

1. [ ] Maximize gains
2. [ ] Minimize losses
3. [x] No reference
4. [ ] Other: ____________________________

### L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:

______________________________________

### M. Terms used to describe opponent and actions: Making instruments of destruction runs against tide of history/denying freedom

1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific events: ____________________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [x] No reference
8. [ ] Other: ____________________________

### N. Sources of knowledge/evidence: FREEDOM

1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific events: ____________________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [x] No reference
8. [ ] Other: ____________________________
**A. Nature of political life:**

1. [X] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:________________

**B. Sources of conflict:**

1. [ ] Human nature
2a. [ ] National attributes: Ideology
2b. [X] National attributes: Political
2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2d. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other________________

**C. Conditions of peace:**

1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [ ] No reference
7. [X] Other: **STRUGGLE TO OVERCOME**

**D. Nature of conflict:**

1. [X] Zero-sum
2. [ ] Non-zero-sum
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:________________

**E. Scope of conflict:**

1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other________________

**F. Role of conflict in hist. devel.:**

1. [ ] Necessary
2. [X] Functional
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] Dysfunctional
5. [ ] No reference
6. [ ] Other________________

**G. Source of knowledge/evidence:**

1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [X] Specific Events: **EXODUS FROM EGYPT**
6. [ ] Faith
7. [ ] No reference
P-1 (a)

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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Issue: INTERNATIONAL SITUATION Adversary: THOSE WHO OPPOSE DEMOCRACY</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>Specific Circumstances: RISE OF DEMOCRACY</td>
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<td>3. [ ] Harmonious</td>
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<td>2b. [ ] National attributes: Political</td>
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<td>2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic</td>
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<td>2d. [ ] National attributes: Other</td>
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<td>F. Role of conflict in hist. devel.</td>
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<td>3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism</td>
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<td>3c. [ ] International System: Economic</td>
<td>2. [ ] Functional</td>
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<td>3d. [ ] International System: Power politics</td>
<td>3. [ ] Mixed</td>
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<td>3e. [ ] International System: Other</td>
<td>4. [ ] Dysfunctional</td>
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<th>G. Source of knowledge/evidence:</th>
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<td>2. [ ] Trends</td>
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<td>4. [ ] Balance of power</td>
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<td>5. [ ] Transform international system</td>
<td>5. [ ] Specific Events:</td>
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<td>6. [ ] No reference</td>
<td>6. [ ] Faith</td>
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<td>7. [X] Other: STRENGTH OF DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT AROUND THE WORLD</td>
<td>7. [X] No reference</td>
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A. Nature of political life:
1. [ ] Conflictual
2. [ ] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ______________________

B. Sources of conflict:
1. [ ] Human nature
2. [ ] National attributes: Ideology
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other: ______________________

C. Conditions of peace:
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [ ] No reference
7. [X] Other: Resistance of citizens of repressive state

D. Nature of conflict:
1. [ ] Zero-sum
2. [ ] Non-zero-sum
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ______________________

E. Scope of conflict:
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [X] No reference
5. [ ] Other: ______________________

F. Role of conflict in hist. devel.
1. [ ] Necessary
2. [X] Functional
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] Dysfunctional
5. [ ] No reference
6. [ ] Other: ______________________

G. Source of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events: ______________________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
A. Opponent's goals:
1. [ ] Destructionist
2. [X] Expansionist
3. [ ] Defensive
4. [ ] Conciliatory
5. [ ] Peace
6. [ ] No Reference
7. [ ] Other:

B. Source of opponent's policy:
1. [ ] Ideology
2. [ ] Historical
3. [ ] Internal needs
4. [ ] Leader
5. [ ] Power politics
6. [ ] External
7. [X] No reference

C. Generality of adversary's position:
1. [ ] General/permanent
2. [ ] Specific/limited
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other:

D. Likely response of adversary to one's own conciliatory actions:
1. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
2. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
3. [ ] Ignore
4. [ ] Take advantage - this situation
5. [ ] Take advantage - other situation
6. [X] No reference

E. Likely response of adversary to one's own policies of firmness:
1. [ ] Back down
2. [ ] Ignore
3. [ ] Reciprocate - this situation
4. [ ] Reciprocate - other situations
5. [ ] Respond impulsively
6. [X] No Reference
7. [ ] Other:

F. Opponent's image of one's own nation:
1. [ ] Destructionist
2. [ ] Expansionist
3. [ ] Defensive
4. [ ] Conciliatory
5. [ ] Peace
6. [X] No Reference
7. [ ] Other:

G. Opponent's view of conflict:
1. [ ] Inevitable
2. [ ] Avoidable
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other:

1a. [ ] Desirable
2a. [ ] Undesirable
3a. [X] No reference
4a. [ ] Other:
H. Opponent's decision-making process:
1. [X] Model I - unitary rational actor
2. [ ] Model II - organizational process
3. [ ] Model III - bureaucratic politics
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:

la. [X] Calculating  
2a. [ ] Impulsive 
3a. [ ] No reference
4a. [ ] Other:

I. Opponent's op. code: Choice of Objectives:
1. [ ] Optimize
2. [ ] Satisfice
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other:

la. [ ] Realistic
2a. [ ] Unrealistic
3a. [X] No reference
4a. [ ] Other:

1b. [ ] Flexible
2b. [ ] Inflexible
3b. [X] No reference
4b. [ ] Other:

1c. [ ] Predictable
2c. [ ] Unpredictable
3c. [X] No reference
4c. [ ] Other:

J. Opponent's op. code: Pursuing objectives
1. [ ] Prepare ground
2. [ ] Try and see
3. [X] Incremental
4. [ ] Blitzkrieg
5. [ ] No reference
6. [ ] Other:

K. Opponent's op. code: Coping with risk:
1. [ ] Maximize gains
2. [ ] Minimize losses
3. [X] No reference
4. [ ] Other:

L. Evidence required for opponent to show good faith:

M. Terms used to describe opponent and actions: Promoted use of violence and overthrow

N. Sources of knowledge/evidence:
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific events:
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference
8. [ ] Other:
A. Nature of political life:    
1. [ ] Conflictual
2. [X] Mixed
3. [ ] Harmonious
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:__________________

B. Sources of conflict:    
1. [ ] Human nature
2a. [X] National attributes: Ideology
2b. [ ] National attributes: Political
2c. [ ] National attributes: Economic
2d. [ ] National attributes: Other
3a. [ ] International System: Ideology
3b. [ ] International System: Nationalism
3c. [ ] International System: Economic
3d. [ ] International System: Power politics
3e. [ ] International System: Other
4. [ ] No Reference
5. [ ] Other__________________

C. Conditions of peace:    
1. [ ] Education/communication
2. [ ] Eliminate offending nation(s)
3. [ ] Eliminate inequalities
4. [ ] Balance of power
5. [ ] Transform international system
6. [ ] No reference
7. [X] Other: MILITARY STRENGTH

D. Nature of conflict:    
1. [X] Zero-sum
2. [ ] Non-zero-sum
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other:__________________

E. Scope of conflict:    
1. [ ] All issues are linked
2. [ ] High spillover
3. [ ] Issues separable
4. [ ] No reference
5. [ ] Other__________________

F. Role of conflict in hist. devel.    
1. [ ] Necessary
2. [ ] Functional
3. [ ] Mixed
4. [ ] Dysfunctional
5. [ ] No reference
6. [X] Other__________________

G. Source of knowledge/evidence:    
1. [ ] Theory/ideology
2. [ ] Trends
3. [ ] Experience
4. [ ] History
5. [ ] Specific Events:__________________
6. [ ] Faith
7. [X] No reference